NARRATING EARLY ISLĀMIC HISTORY

by

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Many fail to grasp what they have seen and cannot judge what they have learned, although they tell themselves they know.

Heraclitus
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### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Comparative Studies in Society and History</td>
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<td>EA</td>
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<td>EI¹</td>
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<td>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</td>
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<td>al-Jāmi‘ah Journal of Islamic Studies</td>
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<td>JMEMS</td>
<td>Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies</td>
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<td>JPR</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
NARRATING HISTORY

Introduction
Research Questions
Despite the overwhelming global presence of Islām – in its multiple religious, political, social, cultural, and intellectual forms – the history of early Islām continues to elude historians. Written over a century after the death of Muḥammad, extant Arabic sources reveal little about the history of early Islām. In the last century, source-critical, tradition-critical, and skeptical historians have grappled with the sources without reaching a consensus. Recent studies demonstrating the unreliability of sources once held to be foundational have only further compounded the problem. As a result, early Islāmic historiography has reached an impasse. *Narrating Early Islāmic History* tackles the central methodological questions looming behind the problem. This research project thoroughly answers three questions: (i) How is the problem of early Islāmic history framed? (ii) What is the entry point into the past? (iii) How can early Islāmic history be reconstructed? Consequently, this dissertation mainly addresses methodological issues in order to rethink past approaches and develop new ones. To this end, the dissertation incorporates authoritative primary and secondary sources from Arabic, Persian, German, and Italian that have long been neglected by specialists in the field.
Research Summary
The significance of this doctoral research rests in the fact that it has discovered fresh approaches to the entrenched problem of historical reconstruction. (i) In terms of framing the problem of early Islāmic history, this dissertation has formulated the concept of ‘proto-Islāmic’ history. This concept bypasses the negative false dichotomies perpetuated by current chronological divisions. (ii) This dissertation has identified in the annals of Islāmic history a unique entry point into the proto-Islāmic period, namely, the *ridda* or so-called *Apostasia Arabum*. (iii) Based upon these findings, this dissertation has developed the ‘narrative method’ for reconstructing the damaged, fragmentary history of proto-Islām. In particular, it restores the socio-economic, political, and geographic context of late antique Arabia. The results produced by this boundary-breaking method prove to be astounding. *Narrating Early Islāmic History* is organized into two sections: Historiography and Historical Reconstruction. Chapter 1 advances solutions to longstanding historiographical problems surrounding early Islāmic history. Chapters 2 through 4 reconstruct proto-Islāmic history with special reference to the Musaylima movement in central Arabia and the Muhammad movement in western Arabia.

Historiography
Historical Criticism
Julius Wellhausen’s “Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams” inaugurated the source-critical phase in Islāmic historiography.¹ This groundbreaking work sought to accomplish for Islāmic studies what Wellhausen’s influential documentary hypothesis had done for biblical studies just two decades earlier. Made possible by the recent availability of al-Ṭabarī’s (d. 923 C.E.) chronography,² Wellhausen sought to identify
stratified layers hidden beneath the homogenous narrative of later historians such as Ibn al-Athîr (d. 1233 C.E.).

Sifting through the heterogeneous – and supposedly unprocessed – reports preserved in al-Ṭabarî’s compilation, Wellhausen identified two dominant schools of early Arabic historiography, namely, the ‘Irāqī and Madīnan. Wellhausen maintained that the individual compilations produced by each of these schools constituted self-contained units, each with its own overarching bias imposed upon the material by its compiler. Juxtaposing these two sets of reports culled from al-Ṭabarî, Wellhausen was intent on determining their relative value for the purpose of historical reconstruction. Detecting a tribal bias at work in the reports of the Kūfan Sayf b. ‘Umar al-Tamîmî (d. ca. 800 C.E.), Wellhausen subjected the ‘Irāqī school to a devastating critique. He concluded that the Madīnan reports merited more credence.

Source-criticism attracted many practitioners. Noteworthy among these were M.J. de Goeje, N. Mednikov, and L. Caetani. For instance, in his monumental Annali dell’Islam, Caetani’s reconstruction largely followed Wellhausen’s lead by adopting a preference for the Madīnan sources. On the basis of the self-contained unit thesis, the source-critics devised a threefold method: (i) the assessment of each collection of traditions in toto, (ii) the juxtaposition and evaluation of the collections, and (iii) the determination of the relative value of one compilation over the other for the purposes of arriving at a synthetic history.

For over half a century, the source-critics went unchallenged. The first serious critique was offered in 1971 by A. Noth who scrutinized Wellhausen’s assumptions. Noth determined that al-Ṭabarî’s early sources did not individually represent unified conceptions of history. Since the early historians were primarily compilers, their works
preserved multiple reports from divergent, even antithetical perspectives. Furthermore, since multiple biases and tendencies pervade the different collections, there is consequently no overarching outlook within each collection. As a result, a single collection cannot be considered to be a homogenous self-contained unit. In other words, by attempting to locate stratified narrative layers, Wellhausen’s theory of schools unintentionally masked the underlying heterogeneity inherent in the earliest source material.

After Noth’s critique, scholars’ attention shifted to the reliability of the early compilers as credible authorities. Sayf b. ‘Umar was front and center in this debate. Whereas Wellhausen and the source-critics had once considered Sayf “unreliable” and his sources fictitious, subsequent scholars exculpated Sayf from these “charges” on “topographical” and “chronological grounds.” Meanwhile, Islāmic scholarship took another turn away from Wellhausen after scholars recognized the role played by ‘oral transmission’ in the earliest sources. This tradition-critical school (N. Abbott, A.A. Duri, F. Rosenthal, and F. Sezgin) became primarily concerned with history as a literary process. The orality thesis ‘undermined’ the assumption of an exclusive written transmission underpinning Wellhausen’s documentary hypothesis. As a result, skeptical scholars soon judged the transference and ‘application’ of biblical methods to Islāmic history to be untenable.

Nevertheless, the utility of methods derived from biblical scholarship did not escape the attention of two historians. Taking their cue from critiques of the documentary hypothesis in biblical studies, A. Noth and L. Conrad introduced form-criticism into Islāmic studies. Premised on oral transmission, form-criticism sought to
evaluate a representative cross-section of all the sources. In effect, Noth and Conrad’s method proposed to excise and recompile a homogeneous body of source material on the basis of commonalities of (i) conceptions of history (Themen), (ii) forms (Formen), and (iii) biases (Tendenzen). They argued that the order which emerges from the analysis of the form and content of these complexes of reports provides the means for assessing early Islāmic history.

**Ridda Criticism**

Significantly, the study of the *ridda* – the so-called apostasy of the Arabs – commenced with Wellhausen’s “Prolegomena.” *Ridda* reports formed the basis of Wellhausen’s critique of Sayf. Although Caetani followed suit, his studies contributed tremendously to standardizing the chronology of the *ridda*. The results of Caetani’s assiduous treatment of the *ridda* sources prepared the way for future research. Unfortunately, however, Caetani’s voluminous research was largely inaccessible, because it was published in Italian. Nonetheless, his findings made their way into C.H. Becker’s general historical work published in 1913. Then, after a four-decade hiatus, two *ridda* works came to light: (i) the collected fragments of Wathīma b. Mūsā’s (d. 851 C.E.) early *ridda* treatise and (ii) the assembled fragments of al-Balansī’s (d. 1237 C.E.) *Ta’rīkh al-Ridda*.

In 1973, E. Shoufani published his definitive monograph on the *ridda*. Shoufani’s work is exemplary not only in the sheer number of primary and secondary sources perused, but above all for the care and discernment with which these sources are sifted, evaluated, and integrated into a synthetic history of the *ridda* wars. Shoufani’s approach to the sources is based upon the Tamīmī-bias thesis. For example, Shoufani observes that al-Ṭabarī’s chronography suffers from his heavy reliance on Sayf b.
Shoufani even goes so far as to discount Sayf as a ‘story-teller.’ Nevertheless, given the fragmentary nature of the other extant sources, Shoufani judiciously weighs Sayf’s reports against those of other compilers. In fact, in certain instances, Shoufani deems Sayf reliable, warding off any charges of fabrication.

In the decades following Shoufani, the Jerusalem school published a number of specific studies, represented principally by E. Landau-Tasseron, M.J. Kister, and M. Lecker. In addition to these works, M.I. ul-Haq conducted a study focusing on ridda poetry. During this period, two printed editions of Ibn Ḥubaysh’s (d. 1188 C.E.) Kitāb al-Ghazawāt – available to Caetani only in manuscript form – were published. Soon afterward came the publication of three separate editions of al-Wāqīḍī’s (d. 823 C.E.) Kitāb al-Ridda, all based on the same unique manuscript. Thereafter, a damaged manuscript of Sayf b. ʿUmar’s treatise was discovered. However, even though this work is now published, its ridda portion remains lost. The study of the Banū Ḥanīfa and Musaylima (d. 633 C.E.) also attracted the attention of researchers. M.J. Kister’s copious work collected a substantial body of source material on Musaylima. A. al-Askar’s research determined the social, political, geographic, and economic conditions in al-Yamāma. Finally, A. Makin’s application of critical theory (e.g., in his ‘re-reading’ of Musaylima’s letter in light of J. Derrida and R. Barthes) reflects the ‘literary turn’ in Islāmic historiography.

Problems
Source Limits
Historians have at their disposal an abundance of narrative sources for early Islām. There are however three shortcomings inherent in this extant literature. To begin with, the texts
are of late composition. In other words, there is a gap between the event and the recording of the event. For example, more than a century separates the death of the prophet Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 632 C.E.) and the earliest hagiography (sīra) composed about his life. A further example is the literary account written about the so-called ‘apostasy wars’ (ḥurūb al-ridda) waged in Arabia roughly from 632 to 634 C.E. The earliest surviving manuscript on this subject is by the historian al-Wāqidī, whose death in 823 C.E. marks a two-century gap between the events of the ‘apostasy’ (ridda) and their commitment to writing. The second intrinsic problem of literary sources is the high loss of texts over time. For instance, of the nine or so known original ridda works, six are lost, two are fragmentary, and only one survives intact.\textsuperscript{41} The greatest shortcoming of narrative sources by far, however, is the literary genre itself. Four problems stand out, which can be classed under the rubrics of memory and fallacy.

Memory

Memory is the past remembered, it is not the past itself.\textsuperscript{42} Space and time intervene as barriers between the historian and past events. Not forgotten, the events of the ridda lived on in the collective memory of the ‘Irāqīs. Consider the ridda historian Sayf b. ‘Umar who, well over a century after the events unfolded, gathered ridda narratives that were circulating not in Arabia, but in ‘Irāq.\textsuperscript{43} His clan, the Usayyid b. ‘Amr of Tamīm, settled with the Banū Ḥanīfā in the ‘Irāqī garrison town of al-Kūfah after they had yielded in the ridda wars.\textsuperscript{44} Kept alive generation after generation through countless telling and retelling, the ridda narratives grounded the Kūfans’ unique and independent identity, thereby temporarily safeguarding it from being overshadowed by a universalizing Umayyad and later ‘Abbāsid umbrella. Kūfan memory preserved indispensable facts
about the *ridda* that had been forgotten elsewhere, but nonetheless, it continually shaped and reshaped these facts to fit a particular mold of communal mnemohistory (historical memory). In fact, Sayf’s history is a final testament bearing witness to this dying Kūfīan tradition that shortly thereafter was subsumed by the emergent caliphal counter-order.

Counter-memory is a corollary to collective memory. Competing interests and perspectives, along with the changing composition of communities and the ceaseless imagining and reimagining of communal identities, give rise to counter-memory. In fact, the annals of Islāmic history abound with counter-memory in the form of contradictory reports. For instance, the *ridda* reports make no fewer than seven different counterclaims about who killed the ‘rebel’ leader Musaylima (d. 633 C.E.). Whereas the Banū ‘Āmir b. Lu’ayy clan of Quraysh claim that it was one of their own, the Banū Umayya clan of Quraysh counterclaim that it was no one less than Mu‘āwiya, the founder of their dynasty, who slew him. A series of counterclaims coalesces into a counter-memory that defines a community’s boundaries. The sustained communal transmission of this counter-memory, in turn, transforms it into a counterhistory.

There is no such thing as a stand-alone history. Each history, relative to other histories, is a counterhistory. The triumph of one counterhistory over all the others results in official history. Firmly set within a master narrative, official history retrojects its worldview onto the timeline. So in this case, this newly minted minority elite (Umayyads, ‘Abbāsids) projected back into history the origins of their legitimacy to rule over the majority. Therefore, official history assumes an ahistorical, timeless quality. Take for instance the earliest surviving version of Muḥammad’s religious biography by Ibn Hishām (d. ca. 835 C.E.) that was based upon a redaction of Ibn Ishāq’s (d. ca. 761
C.E.) earlier work. Ibn Isḥāq had crystallized the collective memory of al-Madīna (Yathrib) – the city of the prophet – into a powerful counterhistory wrapped in the mantle of prophetic authority. As a de facto official history, Ibn Hishām’s later version trumped all other communal memories of the past, eclipsing even the historical memory of al-Kūfah. This official history situates Muḥammad within the framework of salvation history. The pre-Islāmic period becomes the theatrical backdrop to Muḥammad’s prophetic mission. Inaugurating the Islāmic phase in history, Muḥammad’s prophethood takes center stage in the master narrative. Ultimately assuming extra-historical qualities such as infallibility (‘iṣma), the person of Muḥammad consequently escapes historicization. That is, Muḥammad becomes larger than life, a ‘figure of memory,’ and not of history. Thus, as constructions of communal identity and alterity, these late narrative sources – set within emergent theological discourses of sacred history – reveal more about the milieux of their composition than they do about the history of early Islām.

Fallacy
Since narratives are finite constructions, historians select what to include and exclude in their final narrative report. The late composition of Islāmic literary sources makes them especially susceptible to fallacies of narration. Two fallacies predominate, namely, presentism and tunnel history. Regarding the first of these, later historians who perceive the historical timeline only through the lens of the present fall prey to the anachronistic fallacy of presentism. Akin to the problem of official history, presentism projects present-day concepts and categories back onto history. A noteworthy example is the reading of the so-called ‘Constitution of al-Madīna,’ otherwise known as the umma ('community') document. The text exhibits distinct semantic usages of the terms
‘Muslims’ and ‘Mu’mins’ (‘believers’). However, Ibn Isḥāq and modern historians conflate these two terms. As a result, they commit the fallacy of presentism by retrojecting an eighth-century conception of the term ‘Muslim’ upon this seventh-century document. This fallacy is represented in the following tables (SEE TABLES 1.1 AND 1.2). The first depicts an ideal series of times (ranging from the sixth to the tenth century) as well as historical events (E–M) that a tenth-century historian could potentially choose from to narrate the past. Committing the fallacy of presentism, the historian selects events exclusively from their tenth-century perspective. Accordingly, the historian’s narrative account is uneven and tends to systematically neglect other events that seem ir-

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<td>10th Century</td>
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**Table 1.1: Ideal Series**

relevant from a present-day vantage point. The result is an obstructed view of the past, namely a historical blind spot.

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<td>10th Century</td>
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**Table 1.2: Fallacy of Presentism**

Taking a narrow, singular view of the past, late Islāmic historians are also prone to the fallacy of tunnel history (SEE TABLE 1.3). The genealogy of Muḥammad that comes at the beginning of Ibn Isḥāq’s hagiography is a prime example. A product of
contested memory, this genealogy traces Muḥammad’s ancestry from his birth in the second half of the sixth century all the way back to the primordial Adam. Perpetrating the fallacy of tunnel history, the historian links the birth events of select mnemohistorical figures to the conception of a single individual. Therefore, the narrative account generated resembles a tunnel in time. Accordingly, a lack of empirical evidence, combined with the late provenance of textual sources, their high attrition rate, and their memory and fallacy shortcomings, together mark the source limits for narrating the history of early Islām.

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Table 1.3: Fallacy of Tunnel History

**Narrative Processes**

Historians report their research findings in the form of narratives that have a beginning, a middle, and an end. Consequently, historians narrate events in a sequence that naturally progresses from one event to the next. However, they are not privy to all the facts, and even less do they share in knowledge of the causal relations governing events. Given their fragmentary knowledge, historians have frequent recourse to a pair of literary devices, topoi and schemata. These devices nonetheless expose historical writing to a process of accretion, ultimately resulting in core displacement.
Devices

Topoi (sing.: topos) are transferable reoccurring literary stereotypes that derive from specific events. Once severed from these events, they become independent of their original context. Characteristic types of topoi include scene setting, naming, numbering, detailing, and arrangement. Narrators deploy these portable motifs in one literary environment after another.\(^5\) As a result, topoi tend to reoccur in a variety of more or less plausible situations. In addition to enriching narratives, these literary fillers also serve a legitimizing function by advancing the interests of one group over another. For example, the aforementioned controversy over the identity of Musaylima’s slayer reveals several tendencies and biases. The Umayyad counterclaim is especially instructive. ‘Abd al-Malik, the Umayyad caliph, once queried as to who it was that struck the final blow against Musaylima.\(^5\) According to an unnamed eyewitness from Musaylima’s tribe, Mu‘awiya was not responsible for Musaylima’s death. ‘Abd al-Malik retorted, passing judgment in favor of his ancestor. The memory of Musaylima, including claims to his legitimacy and authority, was a controversial subject at ‘Abd al-Malik’s Damascene court, particularly at a time when ‘Abd al-Malik’s own tenuous hold on the caliphate was contested.\(^5\) By using the topos of ‘naming the slayer,’ the caliph buttressed his own family claim, while simultaneously defaming and barring the rise of any possible counterclaimants to his throne. Therefore, history is generally perpetuated when it retains some relevance to the present.

Schemata (sing.: schema) are connectors that associate and link narrative units into a more or less coherent and meaningful sequence of events. Put differently, they move the narrative along. Schematic types include transitional rhetorical formulae (e.g., ‘then,’ ‘and’), pseudo-causes (e.g., anecdotes, letters), pseudo-etymologies (e.g.,
proper names, toponyms), systematization (i.e., parallel modeling), and undifferentiated reports (i.e., a string of topoi fitted into an ideal narrative mold). The original corpus of historical facts about early Islâm comprised a scattering of disparate atomic reports varying in length from a single sentence to a page. Historians employed schemata to combine and recombine these reports that were devoid of their original causal links. In other words, none of these historians were aware of the real causes behind the events they were narrating. For this reason, the principal function of schemata, as connectors, is to fill this explanatory vacuum.\textsuperscript{55} The conquest of al-Yamâma, for example, marks a turning point in the \textit{ridda}. The historian al-Balâdhurî (d. ca. 892 C.E.), juxtaposing two atomic reports when narrating the surrender of al-Yamâma, ends the first report about Mujjâ’a’s subterfuge with “O Mujjâ’a you deceived me!”\textsuperscript{56} The second report begins, “And (\textit{wa}-) the people of al-Yamâma converted to Islâm, so the alms tax was exacted from them.”\textsuperscript{57} As clearly evidenced, these two atomic reports are only loosely linked by the coordinating conjunction \textit{wa}- (‘and’ or ‘but’). The reader is therefore left to assume that one event immediately followed the other. Any sense of temporal perspective is consequently lost; the result is a fallacy that correlates narrative continuity with causality.\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{Developments}

The centuries-old process of explaining early Islâmic events by means of topoi and schemata culminated in the voluminous Arabic historical tradition. However, early Islâmic historiography is not special in this regard. For instance, the Battle of Manzikert fought between the Byzantines and Seljuq Turks in 1071 C.E. underwent a similar process of accretion.\textsuperscript{59} From the twelfth to the fifteenth century, the battle narrative became
transformed, taking on added features which included topoi (i.e., stock elements) and schematic pseudo-causes (e.g., anecdotes, documents). *Ridda* narratives also show evidence of accretion through time. For example, the execution narrative related about Musaylima’s disciple, Ibn Nawwāḥa, experienced a similar growth from the eighth to the eleventh century C.E.⁶⁰ Identical eighth-century reports narrate Muḥammad’s encounter with two unnamed messengers dispatched by Musaylima. A century later, another report relating the survival of Musaylima’s movement recounts the persecution of his followers and the execution of their leader, Ibn Nawwāḥa. Furthermore, this early ninth-century report also combines the information provided in the eighth-century report by naming Ibn Nawwāḥa as one of the two originally unnamed messengers. At the end of the ninth century, the original version circulates together with a further, enlarged combined version, detailing Ibn Nawwāḥa’s decapitation in the market square. In the tenth and early eleventh century, a total of six reports circulate, some of which preserve the original, while others name Ibn Uthāl as the second messenger.⁶¹

Accretion is not dependent on an original historical kernel; it can also arise from mnemohistorical polemic. Otherwise stated, a narrative motif can spawn another motif. A striking example from *ridda* literature is the meeting of Musaylima and his female ‘rebel’ counterpart, Sajāḥ.⁶² At the height of the so-called ‘apostasy wars,’ al-‘Ijlī (d. 641 C.E.) composed an invective poem graphically portraying Musaylima and Sajāḥ’s purported debauchery.⁶³ Adaptations of these popular verses continued to circulate well into the ninth century. However, Sayf, the principal *ridda* source for al-Ṭabarī, does not narrate this lurid tale. In a fifteenth-century Tunisian handbook for attracting the fairer sex, there appears another explicit version of how Musaylima used perfume to seduce
Sajāh. Although separated by eight centuries, one fiction generated another, continuously adding to the incessantly growing corpus.

Accretion is not so much a deviation as a way of following the natural course of historical narration. Its aggregate effect, however, is core displacement. For instance, once an original atomic report generates a secondary report, it can independently generate further accretions, thereby making the original dispensable. Multiplied many times over, the original atomic report increasingly becomes relegated to the periphery. The center, as a result, slowly becomes populated with later generations of reports. The graph below depicts this diachronic process of core displacement (SEE GRAPH 1.1). As illustrated, once an original cluster of seventh-century atomic reports produces secondary narratives within the emergent discursive field of practicing historians, the original cluster slowly begins to move off-center. However, the original cluster still casts a shadow of its former self onto the central narrative. By the ninth century, however, both the ‘shrinking’ narrative core and its growing shadow have taken a back seat to newly-minted tertiary narratives.64 Most dramatically, by the tenth century, the shrunken original core falls outside the purview of Islāmic discursive history; its overgrown shadow is now its only presence. This shadow represents an empty thematic vessel filled not with original atomic content, but rather with diluted topoi and schemata. Therefore, as a consequence of core displacement, historians reconstructing ‘what actually happened’ in early Islām must look beyond the center, that is, they must look to the margins of the Islāmic historical tradition.
The contextualization and historicization of Muḥammad and his movement are central issues for historians seeking to reconstruct the past. Modern historical research focuses on central events and reports about early İslām. For example, studies of Muḥammad’s religious biography dwell on a series of eight motifs: (i) the Calling to İslām, (ii) the Exodus (hijra) from Makka to al-Madīna, (iii) the Battle of Badr, (iv) the Battle of Uḥud, (v) the Battle of the Trench, (vi) the Armistice of al-Ḥudaybiya, (vii) the Accusation against ‘Ā’isha, and (viii) the Conquest of Makka.  The earliest extant reports (e.g., the corpus of ‘Urwa b. al-Zubayr (d. 712 C.E.)) on Muḥammad’s career are constrained by these same limitations. As critical nodes, these topoi form a matrix of commensurable mnemohistorical facts; the outcome is a structurally homogenous narrative cycle, or in other words, a hagiography.

This production of a smooth narrative is not limited to Muḥammad’s career. Take for instance the early Islāmic conquests (futūḥ). These central events and reports are
similarly stylized. The ideal conquest campaign is for this reason reducible to a six-node narrative cycle: (i) the Appointment of the Campaign Leader, (ii) the Naming of a Companion of the Prophet as the Supreme Leader, (iii) the Issuance of the Caliph’s Orders, (iv) the Victory Achieved through the Execution of the Caliph’s Orders, (v) the Dispatch of the Caliph’s Share of Spoils, and (vi) the Messenger’s Interaction with the Caliph in al-Madīna.66 In light of these considerations, historians approaching early Islām need a method for detection. The question is, how can historians breach the almost impenetrable spatiotemporal and conceptual barrier formed by this formidable body of late source material?

**Method**

Publishing in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Italian art historian Giovanni Morelli devised a method for discerning authentic paintings from forgeries.67 In establishing the authenticity of a portrait painting, he determined that the key is not to focus on central features of the face (e.g., eyes). Invariably, forgers will pay special attention to these features. Moreover, the portrayal of these central features tends to be greatly influenced by the painter’s school. Therefore, in order to establish whether a portrait is a forgery, the critic must assess marginal features that do not usually draw any suspicion (e.g., hands, ears). Look for instance at the vast range of ear portrayals by various Italian artists (SEE ILLUSTRATION 1.1).68 By focusing on these types of marginal clues, Morelli’s method uncovered new heterogeneous evidence. Combined with normative homogenous evidence, the Morellian method ultimately led to startling conclusions about the attribution of paintings held in galleries across Europe. Through the investigation of marginalities, he established a principle for sifting through both
pictorial and textual sources. Accordingly, historians must read against the grain. They must look at marginal – and not central – events and reports in the early Islamic historical corpus. The study of textual marginalities emerges as the cornerstone of early Islamic history.

Illustration 1.1: Ear Portrayals

Textual Marginalities
Although there is a predilection for the homogenization of narratives, this process is never complete. Consequently, uneven elements (i.e., marginal reports and marginal events) persist within the generally leveled master narrative. Marginal reports contain tangential information found within larger narratives on central events, and do not fit naturally within the grand narrative informing these events. For example, shortly after Muḥammad commenced his public preaching, the Makkans lambasted him by saying, “We have heard that a man in al-Yamāma called al-Raḥmān teaches you. We will never believe in him.” This ‘man from al-Yamāma’ is traditionally equated with Musaylima, the central Arabian ‘rebel’ leader. Although Ibn Isḥāq attempts to smooth out this jagged report by embedding it within a Qur’ānic discourse (Q. 13:30), this report nonetheless juts out. Another marginal report is found in Ibn Hishām’s notes on Muḥammad’s
religious biography. He relates that Thumāma b. Uthāl al-Ḥanafī once openly defied the authority of the Makkan leader, Abū Sufyān. In spite of his transgression, one Makkan remarked, “Let him alone, for you have need of al-Yamāma for your food.” Thumāma accordingly departed from the city unharmed. Combining these two marginal reports, a larger question begins to emerge: What does Makka have to do with al-Yamāma?

Marginal events – the second type of textual marginality – are those that are not central to the mnemohistorical origins and development of the Islāmic community. For instance, whereas the sīra and futūh genres flourished through countless retellings, the ridda corpus – apart from a handful of works – was altogether forgotten and deleted from the collective memory of the Islāmic community. Moreover, the early compilers of ridda works (e.g., Sayf, al-Wāqīdī) were in fact blacklisted by their contemporaries as well as by succeeding generations of scholars. Yet modern topographical research has corroborated Sayf’s ridda reports (e.g., his account of Khālid b. al-Walīd’s military expedition against the ‘apostates’ at al-Buzākha). In addition, although polemics and poetry often allude to figures such as ‘Musaylima the Arch-Liar,’ these are no more than literary topoi stripped of their actual historical referents. Consider the opening lines of al-Ma‘arrī’s (973-1058 C.E.) poetic invective launched against contemporary sectarians in which he equates dual topoi, Satan and Musaylima:

Will you not fear God, O party of (one like) Musaylima,
For you have gone astray in obedience to your lusts.
Do not follow in the steps of Satan;
How many of you are followers of footsteps?73

Furthermore, preoccupied with stabilizing the chronology of the maghāzī (i.e., Muḥammad’s campaigns and raids), classical chroniclers tended to neglect the ridda. In consequence, the ridda corpus is less prone to schematization than the sīra/maghāzī
and futūḥ. Compared to the smooth narrative cycles of Muḥammad’s hagiography and the early conquests, the ridda narratives go against the grain. For example, Sayf’s ridda

treatise is replete with idiosyncrasies in that the surviving narratives originate from tribal

informants who are largely unaccounted for in later biographical (tabaqāt) literature.75

Nor are these choppy ridda narratives stylized either in form or language. Some reports
even evidence a confusion of language when they revert to the ‘narrative present.’76 This
evidence points to the fact that what had once been historically central to early Islām
became displaced to the historiographical periphery. It is here that historians must look
to discover early Islāmic history. The ridda are the ‘ears’ of the Arabic historical corpus.

Ridda

Historians order information for the purpose of narrating history. They arrange available
information into a number of thematic categories. Although these themes are governed
by interests and concerns relevant to the historian’s own day, they also reflect the
autochthonous rubrics that once animated earlier historians.77 In other words, these
themes reflect what historians consider to be important and worthy of preservation.

Themes

Themes constitute the “…questions which preoccupied the early Islāmic transmitters of
history.”78 Primary themes reflect an early layer of historians’ thematic categories.
Accretion over time results in the derivation of secondary themes; subsequently, tertiary
themes ensue. The material core of the early Islāmic tradition is contained exclusively in
primary themes. Although primary themes are not exempt from change over time, historians must mine these first-order themes in order to extract historical facts about
early Islām. Among these, three contiguous primary themes dominate early Islāmic
historiography: sīra – ridda – futūḥ. Bridging the gap between the two crystallized themes of sīra and futūḥ, it is clear that ridda forms the nexus of this triad. Since ridda represents a genuine theme from which historians can reconstruct the oldest layers, the identification of three original ridda subsets is particularly significant. These generic themes are: tribal groups – tribal leader’s deeds – great tribal battles. Reflecting dominant themes prevalent in the ‘Battle-Days of the Arabs’ (ayyām al-‘arab) genre, these themes are of pre-Islāmic provenance. Interestingly enough, the confluence of these themes generates the Islāmic sub-theme of maghāzī and the complex of sub-thematic rubrics: conquest of provinces – storming of cities – great conquest battles. Ultimately, it is from these pre-Islāmic themes that the primary Islāmic themes of sīra, ridda, and futūḥ emerge. In turn, this triad of primary themes generates the secondary and tertiary themes of early Islāmic historiography (SEE CHART 1.1).

Since secondary and tertiary themes are reconfigured and take on narrative accretions, these themes rarely preserve historical information. Secondary themes consist of dependent and independent types. Dependent secondary themes (i.e., court and central government; law and administration) stem from the convergence of the dual primary themes, ridda and futūḥ. On the other hand, independent secondary themes are introduced by medieval historians into the Islāmic historical craft. These include annalistic style, causal links, and hijrī dating (i.e., chronology based on Muḥammad’s exodus from Makka to al-Madīna in 622 C.E.). Lastly, tertiary themes stem from secondary themes. For example, annalistic style gives rise to the arrangement of narratives according to caliphal reigns. The tertiary theme of caliphal entitlement is also noteworthy, as it ultimately derives from ridda and futūḥ.
'Apostasy'
As the earliest stratum of the Islāmic historical tradition, *ridda* is the entry point into the past. Waged in Arabia from roughly 632-634 C.E., the so-called ‘apostasy wars’ are chronologically positioned between two crucial sets of events in the annals of early Islāmic history, namely, the life of Muḥammad and the early Islāmic conquests. During the interim, several historiographical tendencies can be identified with partisan religio-political factions. Early counter-communities’ interests in securing legitimacy meant a strong investment in the historical enterprise. In particular, the issues of the succession (*khilāfa*) to Muḥammad, the Islāmic conquests, and the first civil war (*fitna*) gradually assumed a doctrinal character that molded historical fact to fit within particular modes of mnemohistorical understanding.

The official history of the *ridda* reads as follows: By the time the Messenger of God (*rasūl allāh*) passed away in western Arabia (al-Ḥijāz), the whole of the Arabian Peninsula had been converted to Islām. Just before that event, furthermore, in ‘the Year of Delegations,’ Arab chiefs made a beeline for al-Madīna to capitulate and enter into Islām. However, upon Muḥammad’s death, a number of these chiefs apostatized. Among their number was the ‘arch-apostate’ Musaylima, the ‘false prophet’ of the Banū Ḥanīfa in central Arabia (Najd). Immediately following the ‘apostasy,’ Muḥammad’s *de facto* successor, Abū Bakr, quelled the ‘rebellions’ and brought the ‘apostates’ into the fold once more. In quick succession, the unified Islāmic-Arab forces then dealt a debilitating blow to the Byzantine Empire, while simultaneously tolling the death knell for the Sāsānian Empire. The Islāmic conquests were accordingly deeds of God accomplished through the Arabs.
Based on the surviving material, modern historians have reassessed crucial narrative elements dictating this official *ridda* account. For instance, they have called into question the degree of Muḥammad’s hegemony and the extent to which the Arabs actually converted to Islām. The trumped-up delegation narratives functioned to buttress Muḥammad’s claims to sovereignty over those of the king of al-Yamāma, Hawdha b. ‘Alī (d. ca. 630 C.E.). In fact, the tribal deputations that did arrive in al-Madīna were little more than disenfranchised minority groups trying to gain the upper hand against their rivals back home. What is more, historians have systematically discerned four zones of Muḥammad’s influence in Arabia. According to this model, Muḥammad’s degree of control decreased from center to periphery. The tribes in immediate proximity to Makka and al-Madīna were both politically and religiously Islāmicized. However, those in the fourth zone (e.g., the Banū Ḥanīfa in al-Yamāma) were independent of him. Therefore, it is clear that ‘apostasy’ (*ridda*) is a religiously charged label applied by Madīnan historians to the independent Banū Ḥanīfa who never collectively embraced Islām. As a matter of fact, a series of concentric zones of influence also radiated from al-Yamāma (SEE MAP 2.1). So in effect, towards the end of Muḥammad’s life, there were two competing spheres of influence, ‘two Arabias’: central Arabia and western Arabia.

The primary theme of *ridda* originated from the insurmountable difficulty faced by Islāmic historians, lacking, as they did, any recourse to the original causal links. Committing the fallacy of presentism, these later historians worked under the assumption that Muḥammad was indeed the hegemon of Arabia. It follows that their narrative needed to account for the large number of inexplicable campaigns that were waged in
Arabia following his death. Consequently, the theme of *ridda* emerged because of its unifying explanatory power. That is, it was necessary for there to have been ‘apostasy wars’ in order to quell the ‘rebellion’ against Islām and the challenge it posed to the heirs to Muḥammad’s universal authority. Seeing that Abū Bakr adopted the same belligerent measures against all the ‘rebels,’ these historians focused on narrating a single grand ‘apostasy’ war fought after Muḥammad’s death. Because the heterogeneous causes and motivations behind these counter-movements had become lost to view, the *ridda* became homogenized as a result.

Once introduced, *ridda* developed accretions within the secondary theme of law and administration. Plagued by the problem of civil wars, medieval jurists had the question of defining an ‘apostate’ at the forefront of their minds. They categorized apostates into two classes: (i) those who deny the Muslim creed (*shahāda*), namely witnessing the unity of God and Muḥammad’s apostleship, and (ii) those who refuse the payment of tithes. This twofold classification reflects the religious motivation of the jurists. As a result of this religious tendency, tribes that had never converted to Islām at all became subsumed under one of these categories. In fact, the motivation behind this ahistorical classification was to establish the legality of the so-called ‘apostasy wars’ waged by Abū Bakr. In turn, this retroactive justification for Abū Bakr’s acts of war established an authoritative legal precedent for waging a just war against insurgents. To meet their own legal needs, jurists such as al-Shāfiʿī (767-820 C.E.) thus reshaped Islām’s early history.
Chart 1.1: Themes of Early Islamic Historiography
These mnemohistorical and mnemolegal sources make evident the fact that the theme of *ridda* in no way bypassed the process of tendential doctrinization. However, as a result of core displacement, the schematization of *ridda* reports was considerably mitigated. Moreover, the amount of *ridda* material suppressed is less astonishing than the sheer amount preserved.\(^9\) Although these marginal reports are by no means neutral, nonetheless, *ridda* as a marginal event poses fewer difficulties for historical reconstruction. It is here, accordingly, that historians must look in order to begin to discover early Islām. Once again, the *ridda* are the ‘ears’ of the Islāmic historical corpus. But then, what the *ridda* actually constitutes is another question altogether.

**Proto-Islām**

**Periodization**

Historians divide chronology into time periods amenable to analysis. Two types of periodization, namely, intuitive and analytic, demarcate the chronological boundaries of a historical phenomenon under consideration.\(^9\) However, both of these types suffer from the same difficulty of ascertaining a dividing criterion. In other words, what determines when one period ends and another begins? A number of conceptual problems arise from separating one period from another. As a result, historians must rethink how they divide history.

*Intuitive Periodization*

Historical actors use intuitive periodization to make sense of their own communal history. Conscious of their founder’s role in history, these native historians primarily concern themselves with self-identification. They split history into pre- and post-communal stages. The dividing line is the moment at which their community is founded.
For example, intuitive periodization segments Islāmic history into two periods: Ignorance (jāhiliyya) and Islām. Originally more of a moral judgment than a chronological determination, this intuitive periodization contrasts polytheism and monotheism, that is, unbelief juxtaposed with belief. Consequently, problems of framing and structure stem from this type of periodization.⁹³

Couched in moral terms, the Ignorance–Islām divide determines how history is to be narrated. Historical agents of change take a backseat to moral causal factors. To elaborate, history moves forward not because of natural and human action, but rather because of an internal moral logic. Above all, history marches towards salvation. Structuring history around deliverance, intuitive periodization is prone to the fallacy of teleology. Just as an acorn becomes an oak tree, native historians see in the beginning of time the seed of salvation. In fact, native Islāmic historians (e.g., Ibn Isḥāq) see primeval monotheism in the mnemohistorical Abraham who was a ‘pure monotheist’ (ḥanīf).⁹⁴ Open to all the vagaries of time, this pristine monotheism became corrupt when idolatry and apostasy reared their ugly heads. Muḥammad then restored monotheism, and by setting the course of history right, he became its focal point. His ‘community’ (umma) is therefore the community of salvation. Because the acorn prefigures the tree, native periodization distorts the historical development of early Islām. Take for instance the portrayal of religion in the so-called ‘age of ignorance.’ Later native historians cast west and central Arabian religion as debased idolatry, a moral low point characterized by sex and violence. However, the Qur’ān portrays religion in western and central Arabia as a nondenominational monotheism.⁹⁵ This contemporary document reveals a missing link in the origins and development of Islām.
Analytic Periodization

When historical actors intuitively divide periods, historians must take this division into account with a grain of salt. To divide history, modern historians use analytic periodization. This can be either data derived (i.e., inductive) or theory based (i.e., deductive). Inductive periodization is determined by sifting through relevant historical facts. At times, its results can be counterintuitive. For example, historical actors may not be aware of significant long-term changes affecting their times. Consider the slow but steady growth of Arab migration and settlement on the imperial borders before the Islamic conquests. Although this major demographic shift played a significant role in the conquests, it is more often than not passed over in silence. In addition, living in the present, a historical actor’s gaze fixes on that particular moment, losing sight of all others. In the case of early Islam, the lightning-fast foreign conquests captured the attention of contemporaries, whereas domestic unrest went largely unnoticed. On the other hand, deductive periodization is based on a dominant theoretical criterion. For instance, political historians divide Islamic history according to dynasties, most notably, the Umayyad and ‘Abbāsid. However, ordering history on the basis of one factor of change neglects other factors such as religion and economics.

False Periodization

When historians fail to divide chronology along lines conforming to the historical phenomenon investigated, ‘false periodization’ results. Historians of early Islam face this serious and insidious problem. Relabeled pre-Islam and Islam, modern historians embraced the Ignorance–Islam division as their deductive model. They expanded the geographic limits of pre-Islamic Arabia to include South Arabia. In addition, by taking
into account the Nabateans, they extended pre-Islāmic chronology to cover ancient Arabia. However, by adopting this dichotomous intuitive model, they inadvertently inherited its biases and fallacies. Specifically, the temporal split between pre-Islām and Islām creates a false dichotomy. This generates an either-or fallacy. Everything—historical or thematic—must come either before or after Muḥammad. There is nothing in between. Any continuity between these allegedly incommensurable periods is reduced and homogenized. For example, in the portrayal of Arabian religion, this either-or periodization obfuscates the all-important development of a nondenominational monotheism in Arabia. Therefore, the pre-Islām–Islām periodization is fallacious. In fact, this official periodization masks a third intermediate category: proto-Islām. As a temporal category straddling the pre-Islāmic and Islāmic periods, proto-Islām offers a fresh perspective on the development of early Islām. The result is a new tripartite periodization: pre-Islām – proto-Islām – classical Islām.

**Proto-Islāmic History**

Proto-Islām accounts for seemingly inexplicable events in western and central Arabia. Consider the historical and mnemohistorical presence of Musaylima in the Islāmic historical tradition. Muḥammad’s hagiography clearly indicates that Musaylima the man and ‘Musaylima the Arch-Liar’ are present both before and after Muḥammad. Pertaining to the period prior to Muḥammad’s birth, another source attributes the eponymous title ‘Raḥmān’ to Musaylima. From this it appears that knowledge of Musaylima’s preaching circulated among the Makkans. On one occasion, Muḥammad recited the opening phrase: ‘In the Name of the Merciful and Compassionate God’ (*bismillāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm*). The Makkans mocked him because they interpreted this
to mean, ‘In the Name of the Merciful God, al-Raḥmān.’ At another time, the perplexed Makkans sent a delegation to al-Madīna to inquire about Muḥammad’s preaching. They related that “He [Muḥammad] has claimed that he is the Messenger of al-Raḥmān. Indeed, the only al-Raḥmān we know is the one of al-Yamāma.” Another report preserved in Muḥammad’s religious biography relates that after losing his tribe’s protection, he appealed directly to the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads for assistance. They rejected his appeal outright. After his exodus (hijra) to al-Madīna, he reviled Musaylima by calling him ‘the liar.’ Other sources preserve fragments of a lively correspondence between the two leaders and also narrate their meeting in al-Madīna. Lastly, reports attest that only after Muḥammad’s death did Musaylima meet his end in the so-called ‘apostasy wars.’ As a matter of fact, Musaylima’s legacy lived on well into the early modern era. These reports unequivocally situate Musaylima and his movement before and after Muḥammad.

However, all historians of early Islām share a common assumption. Following native Islāmic historians, modern historians equate the historical ridda wars with the ridda theme. As a result, ridda research is limited exclusively to the period after the death of Muḥammad, that is from 632 to 634 C.E. Their research never goes beyond what the Islāmic historical tradition designates as ‘apostasy’ (ridda). Yet the phenomenon of ridda chronologically extends well beyond the scope of both the ridda theme and the historical ridda wars. In fact, the ridda phenomenon commences well before Muḥammad and continues well after him. This continuity that spanned the pre-Islāmic and Islāmic periods was previously concealed under the dominant periodization. Similar to the phenomenon of an Arabian nondenominational monotheism, the ridda phenomenon falls
neatly within the proto-Islāmic period. From this it is clear that historians must escape the baited trap of native Islāmic historical and thematic categories of ‘apostasy.’ They must look to proto-Islāmic history in order to reconstruct early Islām.

**Subject**

Periodization and its subject matter are interlinked. Originally, the placement of the fourth and final *ridda* subtheme of Musaylima was problematic. It could only be regarded as *either* pre-Islāmic or Islāmic. Accordingly, historians overshadowed the Musaylima subtheme under the Islāmic thematic umbrella. However, moving beyond ‘apostasy,’ historians must now place Musaylima under the proto-Islāmic category. Therefore, the historical and thematic figure of Musaylima emerges as the subject of proto-Islāmic history (SEE CHART 1.1). Yet official historians (e.g., Ibn Ishāq, Ibn Ḥubaysh) have through the ages typecast Musaylima in the villainous role of heretic. Furthermore, when these historians recast him in a pseudo-prophetic role, they do so only for comedic effect. On the other hand, Sayf, the Kūfan counterhistorian, casts him in a positive light as a hero, saint, and martyr. Sifting through this heresiographical and hagiographical debris, the problem of writing a history of Musaylima comes to the fore.

*Heresiography*

History is written by the victors, and so too are works on heresy. Demonizing the enemy, heresiographies are not historical texts. Rather, they are functional and performative in nature. They function to define the ‘sameness’ that binds together orthodox communal identity against the ‘otherness’ of heterodoxy. As performative texts, they forge this identity by reenacting their founder’s mnemohistorical drama against an artificial foil. Contrasted with the protagonist, the Musaylima foil serves to
emphasize Muḥammad’s prophetic credentials. Beauty and truth go hand in hand. Whereas Musaylima is described as pale and thin, Muḥammad shines as the epitome of beauty.108 Roots and truth also stand side by side. While Muḥammad’s universal family tree is the centerpiece of genealogical works, Musaylima’s languishes in the corner.109 Cast as the imposter-prophet, Musaylima provides comic relief. Mimicking Muḥammad, his miracles go hilariously haywire. When Musaylima strokes the head of a newborn, the child goes bald.110 If Muḥammad blesses a freshly dug well, sweet water sprouts forth.111 But when Musaylima blesses a well, it dries up.112 Even Musaylima’s revelations are made into Qur’ānic parodies. The most famous of these verses reads: “O immaculate frog, neither do you refuse drink, nor do you muddy the water.”113 Once decontextualized, these lines were no doubt cited to extol Muḥammad’s virtues at Musaylima’s expense.

Typecast as the impostor, Musaylima is libeled by official heresiographers. In fact, the name Musaylima is in itself a diminutive of Maslama, a variant form of his given name, Aslam.114 As a ridda diminutive, it corresponds to a group of such belittling names which include Ṭulayḥa (Ṭalḥa), Ukaydir (Akdar), and most notably, Abū Hurayra (a one-time governor recalled from al-Yamāma).115 Musaylima’s title is also revealing. Unceremoniously dubbed ‘the Arch-Liar’ (al-kadhdhāb), this epithet ostensibly contrasts with Muḥammad’s designation, al-Amīn (‘the Trustworthy’).116 Although hagiographers relate an anecdote to support the pseudo-etymology of Muḥammad’s title, it is nevertheless evident that al-Amīn was his given name (ism), not his title.117 The actual contrapositive to al-Kadhdhāb (‘the Mendacious’) is al-Ṣiddīq (‘the Veracious’). This is the title of none other than Abū Bakr, de facto successor to Muḥammad and victor of the
so-called ‘apostasy wars.’ Hagiographers also deploy a literary scheme to mask this trail by using pseudo-etymologies to narrate various contradictory occasions on which Abū Bakr was supposedly given this title.\textsuperscript{118} Despite these efforts, the essential historical tension between ‘the Mendacious’ and ‘the Veracious,’ that is, between Musaylima and Abū Bakr remains.

Although heresiography resorts to these kinds of caricature, ridicule, and name-calling, these polemics nevertheless reveal a real power struggle between early counter-communities and their competing histories.\textsuperscript{119} Official heresiography attempts to subsume them all under the single rubric of ‘apostasy.’ As the transmitter of many ridda reports, Abū Hurayra relates this prophetic tradition: “The hour will not come until thirty antichrists come forth, each of them claiming to be a prophet.”\textsuperscript{120} Given the eschatological character implicit in salvation history, Islāmic historians hurriedly attempted to account for these thirty false prophets. They lumped together into this numerical topos divergent religious and secular ‘rebel’ leaders who were now recast as false prophets. Non-religious movements such as Umm Ziml’s also fell prey to this rubric of ‘apostasy.’ In effect, Islāmic historians of heresy created a false milieu: the ridda.

\textit{Hagiography}

As opposed to the abundance of writing on heresy, hagiographical fragments on Musaylima are limited. Hagiography is characterized by the same functional and performative qualities as heresiography. In contrast, hagiography seeks to sacralize rather than demonize its subject. As a subtle form of political apologetic, it tends to rely heavily on subtext. In other words, explicit themes remain unexpressed on the surface
level. By focusing on specific events or doctrines promulgated by the founding hero-saint, hagiography reveals the community’s deep-seated identity. For example, the manner of a hero-saint’s death is especially significant.\textsuperscript{121} In the case of Kūfan counter-history, Sayf twice narrates Musaylima’s last words: “Fight for your noble descent!”\textsuperscript{122} Elsewhere, it is reported that Musaylima and his followers fought and fell like lions in ‘the Oasis of Death’ (ḥadīqat al-mawt).\textsuperscript{123} Here, Musaylima is immortalized as a martyr.\textsuperscript{124} Consequently, he embodies the heroism (muruwwa) which is the highest virtue of tribal ethos. Especially noteworthy is Sayf’s account of Musaylima’s death. As Khālid inspects the corpses, Sayf’s narrative identifies the body of Musaylima’s right-hand man, but fails to identify the corpse of the ‘deathless’ hero-saint.\textsuperscript{125} Therefore, al-Ṭabarī – who preserves his own reworking of Sayf – needs to resort to another authority to make a positive identification of Musaylima’s small and pale remains.\textsuperscript{126} A further indicator of Musaylima’s elevated status is his age. He is reported to have died at the ripe age of a hundred and fifty.\textsuperscript{127} As a hagiographical embellishment, this emphasizes the hero’s near immortality.

Hagiographical fragments on Musaylima also highlight his teachings.\textsuperscript{128} In fact, his proto-Islām has an uncanny resemblance to that of Muḥammad’s. In stark contrast to the pre-Islāmic age of ignorance, these hagiographical materials clearly indicate that Musaylima’s proto-Islām regulated sex (i.e., unless for procreation) and violence (e.g., female infanticide). Characterized as a monotheist and ascetic, Musaylima enjoins prayers, fasting, and abstention from sins of the flesh. He calls for recognition of the one God, al-Raḥmān. In addition, his doctrines recognize a Day of Reckoning and a Kingdom of Heaven. Other verses are also preserved. Notable are the talismanic lines in
defense and praise of Sayf’s ancestral tribe. Musaylima once said that “Banū Tamīm is a tribe of purity, an independent tribe with nothing reprehensible about them and [who pay] no tribute [to anyone]; let us be allies of protection with them in goodness as long as we live, let us protect them from every person, then when we die their fate will be to the Merciful One (al-Raḥmān).”

**Historiography**

As mentioned above, official Islāmic historians attempted to place Musaylima after Muḥammad, intentionally placing the cause after the effect. In order to accommodate this official interpretation of history, these historians fashioned a false milieu of ‘apostasy.’ Musaylima, among others, became an imposter, i.e., an imitator mimicking Muḥammad. Nevertheless, once this false milieu is cast aside, the question of contextualizing Musaylima and Muḥammad remains. Some historians, on the other hand, have argued that since both preachers employed the same religious institutions (e.g., the caller to prayer: muʿadhddhin), these institutions must have emerged from a shared prototype. They maintain that ‘analogous effects must originate from analogous causes.’ The cumulative effect of such shared prototypes is a shared milieu. They also contend that Musaylima and Muḥammad were independent products of their environment. One preacher was not dependent upon the other, nor were their respective movements. However, a milieu can only delimit the coordinate plane in which a discourse is generated; it cannot generate the discourse itself. Put differently, there is a serious problem of agency in the development of early Islām. Only historical actors could have set proto-Islām into motion. It could not have given rise to itself. The unmistakable resemblance of the teachings and institutions of the two preachers points to
either a primacy of one over the other or a codependency. Given Muḥammad’s late arrival on the scene, Musaylima’s primacy necessarily follows. Therefore, Musaylima – from this point forward Aslam – is the subject of proto-Islāmic history. Narrating the life and times of Aslam proves to be another problem altogether.

Narrative Reconstruction

Function of a Narrative

History is the past described, it is not the past itself. Otherwise stated, history is historiography. Historical writing is the representation of past events in a nonfictional narrative format. Since history is told through the perspective of time, its narrative development is linear; it begins at the beginning and ends at the end. The narrative form of history performs several functions. First, it serves a heuristic purpose by aiding historians in processing and comprehending the past. Next, it gives order to the description of past events. Lastly, it serves a restorative function. Historians use the structure inherent in narrative to repair and restore damaged histories. The cumulative effect of narrative is history. When historical facts are plugged into a narrative template, otherwise unseen and unaccounted for historical facts are forced to the fore. These new facts are then ordered and synthesized with the old to forge a new narrative. The result is the recovery of the past. For this reason, the fractured historical record of proto-Islām ideally lends itself to narrative reconstruction. Framing and filling are two stages of this reconstruction.

Framing

Disparate and often putatively contradictory facts about the past are ordered by narrative parameters. A three-tier principle governs the narration of proto-Islāmic history: (i)
frameworks, (ii) levels, and (iii) factors. Proto-Islām’s linear framework progresses in three developmental phases: early, middle, and late proto-Islām. This framework reflects the major turning points in history. For example, early proto-Islām begins by tracing the emergence of the Banū Ḥanīfa as the protector of central Arabia. After sketching the rise of Aslam, early proto-Islām ends with the Banū Ḥanīfa’s hegemony over Arabian commerce. Middle proto-Islām, on the other hand, begins with the mobilization of Muḥammad’s reform movement in western Arabia and ends with his triumph there. Late proto-Islām then follows the confrontation of these two leaders and these two Arabias. Lastly, the new order established by Abū Bakr constitutes the post-development of classical Islām.

Two levels of interaction are at work in proto-Islāmic Arabia (i.e., local and regional). The narrative of proto-Islām follows developments at both levels, and the ways in which one of these affects the other. The main local levels include al-Yamāma in central Arabia (Najd) and Makka in western Arabia (al-Ḥijāz). These two local levels interact to form a trans-Arabian sphere of action. There are also three operative ethno-historical factors in proto-Islām, i.e., contexts, agents, and shifts. Contexts are the societal, environmental, ideological, and human surroundings in which historical agents act. Existing at the local and regional levels, contexts are the setting and backdrop of their times. Embedded within these contexts are the agents who play their role in history. The two principal proto-Islāmic agents are Aslam and Muḥammad (from this point forward Amīn) whose actions bring about changes that ultimately reconfigure contextual conditions at play. These historical agents’ actions cause ripples in society at the local and regional levels, in turn, shifting the course of human history. For instance, the
creation of a regional economic hegemony by the Yamāmī leader Hawdha had far-reaching consequences. Most notably, it gave rise to a local opposition movement resisting this centripetal force. Subsequently, this local effect itself became a cause which gave rise to the Makkan preacher Amīn. Eventually, Amīn and his opposition movement put an end to Hawdha’s regional order, supplanting it with their own.

Filling
Once the frame sets the narrative parameters, this area is then populated with available descriptive facts and sequences of events. The result is a punctured narrative shot full of holes. These interpretive “gaps” range in size from small to large. Filling is therefore the next stage of narrative reconstruction. Interpretive fillers comprise: (i) logical fillers, (ii) replacements, and (iii) bridges. **Logical fillers** are inferences used to repair micro fissures. For example, when the temporal sequence of events is uncertain, historians extrapolate relative chronologies based upon available data. For instance, the number of events transpiring between the battles at al-Buzākha and ‘the Oasis of Death’ indicate an interval that spanned at least two months. Given that Khālid arrived at al-Buzākha (in central Najd) at the end of October 632 C.E., it follows that the Banū Ḥanīfā were defeated at al-Yamāma (in eastern Najd) around January 633 C.E.¹³⁴ Once computed, this relative chronology is used as a logical filler to provide time perspective in the narrative.

**Replacements** fill in midsize gaps left when literary devices have been excised from the narrative. For example, pseudo-causes originally served as historical place holders. Once removed, they are replaced with descriptive content. Take for instance Aslam’s inverted miracles. After the inversion is corrected, the miracles remain. Although Aslam is made the direct causal agent of the swelling of sweet water in the
wells, the fertility of the land, and the good health of the children, these nevertheless point to the prosperity of al-Yamāma. This is corroborated by its agricultural productivity. The area produced an abundance of dates, barely, and wheat. In fact, al-Yamāma exported its surplus grain as far as Makka (known as ‘the valley without cultivation’) whose barren land made its inhabitants dependent upon grain arriving from al-Yamāma for survival. In short, Aslam’s miracles indicate that al-Yamāma was teeming with life. Furthermore, the prosperity of the place was tied to his social and legal reforms.

Bridges are the third and final fillers that hold together two historical phenomena when no causal link is directly given in the sources. Consider, for example, a central historical problem concerning Amīn’s military career. Soon after his exodus from Makka to al-Madīna, Amīn launched a series of military campaigns throughout the Arabian Peninsula. The objective of his first failed campaign was to secure Dūmat al-Jandal, a remote north Arabian trading outpost. A prolonged phenomenon, totaling no fewer than eighty campaigns with no apparent pattern, followed in the wake of this battle. The sources are silent on the military strategy informing Amīn’s opening gambit here, as well as his successive campaigns. It follows that this phenomenon is ‘poorly understood’ by historians. However, there exists another phenomenon that can shed light on this matter. Amīn’s rival, Hawdha, monopolized an extensive trans-Arabian trade network which bypassed both Makka and al-Madīna in western Arabia. Originating in Dūmat al-Jandal, this network spiraled throughout the peninsula, ultimately funneling its goods into Hawdha’s capital, al-Yamāma (SEE MAP 2.2). Amīn’s campaigns sought to reroute the flow of goods from central to western Arabia. As a result, a one-to-one
correspondence emerges between Amīn’s military objectives and Hawdha’s trade network. Therefore, this filler bridges a large gap in the narrative.

Since gaps in a severely damaged historical narrative can rarely, if ever, be reconstructed without resorting to new interpretive materials, it is no surprise that these new materials closely resemble the old. For example, in reconstructing the foundations of a brick building, a mason skillfully chisels the older damaged bricks and replaces them with new, stronger ones of the same shape and size. Strikingly similar in technique, fillers resemble literary devices. Nonetheless, as explanatory strategies, interpretive fillers are indispensable tools in the historian’s kit. Since interpretation and description are joined at the hip, historians need a critical method for filling and fleshing out narrative reconstruction.

Comparative Method
To systematically fill the gaps in the historical record, historians use the comparative method. This method compares discrete facts that constitute concrete phenomena in order to extrapolate shared patterns. Comparison is only feasible if two sets of phenomena already share a number of characteristics (SEE TABLE 1.4). Take for example the following three sets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SET 1</th>
<th>SET 2</th>
<th>SET 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.4: Comparative Method
Each set consists of five elements. A comparison of Sets 1 and 2 yields three shared elements (C, D, E). As a generic set, the comparative type (see Table 1.5) plugs in these three common elements and adds two further variables (X, Y) in order to account for those features not shared by the above two sets (A, B and F, G). This generic comparative type is comprehensive as it anticipates further comparable phenomena, including Set 3 (see Table 1.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENERIC SET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.5: Comparative Type

Classes
There are two classes of comparative types: historical and interdisciplinary. The distinction revolves around whether the data used to extrapolate a comparative type is strictly based upon historical facts, or upon a cross-section of different fields such as sociology and anthropology. Irrespective of this distinction, the three-stage construction of both types is the same. Whereas the first analytic stage determines sets of atomic facts, the second stage compares them. In the third stage, their shared features are then synthesized into a comparative type. Although the construction of comparative types is similar, their compatibility differs. Since the historical class is narrow in construction, its application is generally limited to the field of history. Conversely, the interdisciplinary class is broad in construction and therefore cross-compatible. Accordingly, historians have at their disposal both classes of comparative types.
Applications

The comparative method is a powerful tool for restoring historical narratives. This method is key for reconstructing ethno-historical factors such as agents, contexts, and shifts. For example, a comprehensive account of proto-Islām entails reconstructing the power roles that historical agents assumed in Arabia. However, the surviving facts are few and far between. Historians nonetheless use the comparative method to identify three ideal types of legitimate authority: (i) traditional authority, (ii) charismatic authority, and (iii) rational-legal authority.

Based upon custom, traditional authority is exemplified by the tribal chief. Charismatic authority, on the other hand, takes either a political or demagogic form. Political charisma is grounded in the person and heroic deeds of the conqueror. Demagogic charisma, in contrast, is epitomized by public orators such as the poet and preacher. Lastly, rational-legal authority is vouchsafed through the codification and enforcement of law. All these types of legitimacy are not mutually exclusive, since historically they exist as “variants,” ‘transitional’ forms, and syntheses.

In addition, multiple types of authority can be present simultaneously, one reinforcing the other; and, at times, these form a diachronic continuum of legitimation. By comparing these patterned types to extant historical facts, historians can systematically reconstruct the structure of power in Arabia. In fact, surviving information indicates not only shifts in legitimation styles, but also the emergence of another discourse that combines the charismatic and traditional types, namely, religious legitimacy.

The application of the comparative method also extends to reconstructing historical contexts. For instance, there exist two dominant forms of social and environmental adaptation in Arabia (i.e., nomadism and sedentary society). Some
historians have long considered these juxtaposed sectors to reflect a social bifurcation, therefore assuming a consequent friction between them. As a result, they have used the nomadic-sedentary divide to account for a wide variety of historical phenomena extending from the rise of al-Madīna to the Arab conquest of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{142} Comparative studies in human geography, however, demonstrate that this division does not constitute a static boundary between the two sectors of society. In fact, both of these social forms are among a range of interdependent organizational types that make up the continuum of Arab society. The insights garnered and gained from the comparative method make possible the reconstruction of the relationship between nomadism and sedentary life in late antique Arabia.

Lastly, comparative research contributes considerably to the reconstruction of historical shifts in Arabia. Take for example the dual processes of detribalization and retribalization. Reflecting the fluidity of social modes of adaptation, these twin processual types account for how decentralized tribes become transformed into centralized states, and vice versa. These processes therefore allow for the reconstruction of the sociological factors behind the transformation of the Banū Ḥānīfa into a major sedentary power centered in al-Yamāma during the early proto-Islāmic period. In sum, the judicious application of the comparative method as a critical filling technique results in the rich narrative reconstruction of proto-Islāmic history.
1 Julius Wellhausen, “Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams,” in *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten*, vol. 6 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1899): 1-160.
7 Noth and Conrad, 17.
9 Noth and Conrad, 17.
10 Ibid.
14 Noth and Conrad, 2.
15 See Donner, *Narratives*, 17.
17 Noth and Conrad, 17-18.
18 Ibid., 17.
19 Ibid.
21 For “The Sources for the Events of the Muslim Conquest of Arabia in the Years 11 and 12 A.H.,” see Caetani, *Annali*, vol. 2, part 1, 549-552. For “General Consideration on the Relative Value of the Traditions on the Arab Conquests,” see ibid., 561-569.
26 See above.
27 Shoufani, 117.
In the same vein, Caetani remarks that Sayf being “...possessed by the fervent imagination of a storyteller and devoid of the cold and critical genius of the historian, spurned with systematic indifference strict chronological bonds” (Caetani, Annali, vol. 2, part 1, 553-554).

For example, see ibid., 147.


Al Makin, Representing the Enemy: Musaylima in Muslim Literature (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 55-56.


For “Sayf’s Sources in General,” see Hinds, “Sayf ibn ‘Umar’s Sources,” 147. For Sayf’s reliance on ‘Syrian sources,’ see ibid., 156, fn. 41. For general information on Sayf, see Ibn al-Nadīm, vol. 2, 1095; and F.M. Donner, s.v. Sayf b. ‘Umar, EI.

On the settlement of the Banū Ḥanīfa (of Bakr b. Wā’il) and Tamīm in al-Kūfa, see Makin, Representing, 45, fn. 19, and 53; and Michael G. Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquest (Princeton: Princeton
Ibn Nawwāḥa, a partisan of Musaylima, is also said to have been executed in al-Kūfa (al-Balādhūrī, Kitāb Futūh al-Buldān, ed. M.J. de Goeje, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 87.


46 For competing claims as to the identity of Musaylima’s slayer, see al-Balādhūrī, Futūh, 88 f.; al-Askar, al-Yamama, 116; Makin, Representing, 239 f. and 245; and al-Wāqīḍī, The Life of Muḥammad: al-Wāqīḍī’s Kitāb al-Maghāzī, trans. Rizwi Faizer et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 131, 139-140, and 425.

47 For Ibn Iṣḥāq’s revised death date (from 767 to 761 C.E.), see Chase F. Robinson, Islamic Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xiv.


49 Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 adapted from ibid., 135 f. and 142 ff.


51 For topoi and schemata, see Noth and Conrad, passim.

52 For example, for the transfer of the obstruction topos, cf. al-Wāqīḍī, Life, 131, and Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 54. Also, for the severance and transfer of Musaylima’s title “Lord of al-Yamāmah” to ‘Ṭulayḥa as “Lord of Khaybar,” see Ella Landau-Tasseron, s.v. ‘Ṭulayḥa, EI².

53 al-Balādhūrī, Futūh, 89.

54 For Sayf’s reliance on ‘Syrian sources,’ see Hinds, “Sayf,” 156, fn. 41.

55 For causal links and transitional formulae (or ‘causal subordinators’), see Noth and Conrad, 57 f. and 110; and Michael J. Toolan, The Stylistics of Fiction: A Literary-linguistic Approach (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 241.

56 al-Balādhūrī, Futūh, 90.

57 Ibid.

58 For the problem of time perspective, see Noth and Conrad, 58; John Wansbrough, “Res Ipsa Loquitur: History and Mimesis,” in The Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2006), 169; and Toolan, 236-254, esp. 240.

59 For a treatment of the process of accretion in relation to the Battle of Manzikert, see Carole Hillenbrand, Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol: The Battle of Manzikert (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

60 For the reports on Ibn Nawwāḥa’s execution and “the tendency towards growth,” see Makin, Representing, 37-54.


64 With reference to the Battle of al-Yamāmah, Makin remarks that “[i]t is noteworthy that the reports which glorify Muslim forces, i.e., those highlighting the brave acts of Muslim warriors that enabled them to attain victory did indeed grow over the course of time. However, the reports that portray Musaylima and his forces remain meager. In most instances, they shrink; the later the reports, the more silent they are on Musaylima. These Muslim scholars, who had no interest whatsoever in enlarging the story of their enemy, refrained from commenting on Musaylima” (Makin, Representing, 248).


68 Illustration 1.1 based upon woodcut from Giovanni Morelli, Italian Painters (London: John Murray, 1900), 78.

69 Ibn Iṣḥāq, Life, 140.
345-418.

Periodization and Causality in Talmudic Literature,” Annali

movements” (Ibid., 105). The name of the war decided that given to the warriors and their

with accounting for the war against them…The war was one and the same against all the movements, and


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e la conquista d’Arabia («al-Riddah»),” in

Expansion of the Early Islamic State

Muhammad at Medina

82 For “Muhammad’s Control in Arabia,” see Shoufani, 12.


81 Wellhausen refers to the futūḥ as “die Gesta Dei per Arabes” (Wellhausen, “Prolegomena,” 4, fn. 2).

85 For “Muhammad’s Control in Arabia,” see Shoulmani, 12.

84 “The so-called deputations of the Ḥanīfī to Muḥammad are to be taken with a grain of salt...” (Caetani, Annali, vol. 2, part 1, 643 f.).

83 Eickelman conjectures that “…the Banū Ḥanīfīa delegation story is one of a number of delegation accounts, as Watt notes, which were invented to increase the prestige of Muḥammad at the expense of Abū Bakr (Dale F. Eickelman, “Musaylima: An Approach to the Social Anthropology of Seventh Century Arabia,” JESHO 10:1 (Jul., 1967): 34 f.). “The supposed ‘deputations’ of all the tribes and their conversion are largely pious inventions to magnify the achievement of Muḥammad (and perhaps to minimize that of Abū Bakr)” (W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 80, emphasis added). For the delegations, see M. Lecker, s.v. Wufūd, EF.


86 “The designation of these events as ‘apostasy’ is (consciously or unconsciously) a tendentious one, for as Caetani has convincingly demonstrated, the Muslims’ opponents in these struggles included not only apostates, but also – and perhaps in the majority of cases – tribes and tribal groups which in the lifetime of Muḥammad had remained largely or completely independent of the political entity led by him” (Noth and Conrad, 28).


88 Based on C.H. Becker’s line of reasoning (Shoufani, 73).

89 “The historians seem to have disregarded the causes of these movements and were concerned mainly with accounting for the war against them...The war was one and the same against all the movements, and the name Riddah gained prevalence for it. The name of the war decided that given to the warriors and their movements” (Ibid., 105).

80 For mnemohistorical definitions of what constitutes an ‘apostate,’ see ibid., 101-105.

81 Lindner makes a similar observation regarding early Ottoman history (Rudi Lindner, Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 31).


83 For jāhilyya, see William E. Sheppard, s.v. Age of Ignorance, EQ.
For example, see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 9 and 258.

For the representation of religion in the jāhiḥiyya, see Gerald R. Hawting, s.v. Pre-Islamic Arabia and the Qur‘ān, EQ; and idem, The Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam: From Polemic to History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

For examples relating to American political history, see Polsky, 526.


For ‘foreground myopia,’ see Polsky, 528.

For ‘periodization errors,’ see Fischer, 144 ff.

Hawting, s.v. Pre-Islamic.

For examples, see al-Askar, al-Yamama, 79-93.

See above.

For the problem of the basmala at the signing of the Armistice of al-Ḥudaybiyya, see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 504. “[T]he Meccans who objected to this [viz. the basmala] as a heading for the protocol of the treaty of al-Hudaybiyya seem to have regarded ar-Rahmān ar-Rahīm as proper names” (Richard Bell and W. Montgomery Watt, Introduction to the Qur‘ān (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 111).

For al-Askar, al-Yamama, 81.

For this early Madinan sermon, see ibid., 87, and cf. Makin, Representing, 160.

For example, an early modern Persian doxography preserves eyewitness testimony regarding a sectarian Musaylima movement still active in 1643 C.E. (See The Dabistan or School of Manners, vol. 3, trans. David Shea and Anthony Troyer (Paris: Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1843), 2).

For the problems faced by historians addressing heresy, see Averil Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” JMEMS 33:3 (Fall 2003): 473 f.


For example, see Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamharat an-nasab: Das genealogische Werk des Hišām Ibn Muhammad al-Kalbī, vol. 1, ed. Werner Caskel (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 4 and 156.

For examples of Musaylima’s inverted miracles, see Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 55 f.

For an example of Muḥammad’s miracle in which a “…well bubbled up with water,” see al-Wāqidī, Life, 507.

For a critique of Musaylima as an imitator of Muḥammad’s miracles, see Caetani, Annali, vol. 2, part 1, 637 f., Note 3a-b.

Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 53 f.

“These variations were not uncommon with familiar proper names…” (D.S. Margoliouth, “On the Origin and Import of the Names Muslim and Hanīf,” JRAS (1903): 467 f.; for examples, see ibid.) “The word Musaylima is a diminutive of Maslama (given to Musaylima in Kāmil, ii, 32; Balādūrī, 422), a name used in Yemāmah and elsewhere, and signifying ‘Safety,’ being a derivative from a root which is the source of a number of proper names. As we have already seen, names from the same root were regarded to some extent as interchangeable at this period; and I think there would be little difficulty about regarding Muslim as meaning a follower of a man named Maslamah or Aslam…” (Ibid., 484).

For Abū Hurayra as governor of al-Yamāmah, see al-Askar, al-Yamama, 131 f. For diminutive names, see Alois Musil, Arabia Deserta: A Topographical Itinerary (New York: American Geographical Society, 1927), 540. For the false etymology of the name Abū Hurayra, see S.A. Bonebakker and Michael Fishbein, A Reader of Classical Arabic Literature (Venice, Italy: Università Ca’ Foscari, 1995), 75; and cf.: J. Robson, s.v. Abū Hurayra, ElF; and G.H.A. Juynboll, s.v. Abū Hurayra, ElF.

For the epithet al-Amīn, see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 81 and 86.

For examples of these anecdotes (e.g., “The Rebuilding of the Ka’ba When the Apostle Acted as Umpire”), see ibid., 81, 84-87, and cf. 86. However, Ibn Ishāq relates that the Banū Quraysh (qawm) originally knew Muḥammad only by his given name (ism), al-Amīn (illā al-amīn) (Ibn Ishāq, Das Leben Muḥammed’s nach Muḥammed Ibn Isḥāk, vol. 1, part 1, ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld (Göttingen: Dieterichsche Universitäts–Buchhandlung, 1858), 117). For the problem of Muḥammad’s name, see Claude Gilliot, “Nochmals: Hieß der Prophet Muḥammad?” in Die Entstehung einer Weltreligion II: Von der koranischen Bewegung zum Frühislam, vol. 2, eds. Markus Groß et al. (Tübingen: Verlag Hans Schiler,
119 For the heresiologist’s ‘rhetorical techniques’, see Cameron, 477 and 484.
122 Translation adapted from al-Ṭabarī, *Conquest*, 125.
123 For the martyrdom of Musaylima, cf. *Annali*, vol. 2, part 1, 635.
124 For examples of these multiple occasions, see al-Balquiri, *Markets of the Arabs*, 41.
125 The corpse was identified as al-Rajjāl (al-Ṭabarī, *Conquest*, 126). “How they [viz. hagiographers] handle death can be as telling as what they say about birth” (Manring, 8 f.).
127 For the tradition on Musaylima’s ‘longevity,’ see Kister, “Struggle,” 6.
128 For these fragments, see Caetani, *Annali*, vol. 2, part 1, 636-640.
131 “[A] great deal (even, perhaps, too much) has been written about the nature of ‘historical understanding,’ identified by such tags as ‘metahistory,’ ‘dialectic,’ and ‘hermeneutics.’ But no amount of conceptual theorizing has been able to dispel the apparently deep-seated conviction that ‘history’ is essentially historiography. Whatever acts of collection and collocation might precede the composition, its expression is narrative. I am also inclined to believe that its perception too is narrative: that is to say, follows a ‘story-line,’ has something like a ‘plot,’ is linear (exhibits causal nexus) and cumulative (everything counts). It is according to these parameters that one can understand the seductive power of sentence structure. Attempts to escape this force are made from time to time, e.g. in ‘structuralism’ by dismissing the concept of ‘referred’; in ‘deconstruction’ by denying ‘syntactic’ continuity in experience. Neither has found, or is likely to find, universal assent. The reason for that lies probably in some vague but enduring conviction that the record has got to be readable. And this will be as much a matter of epistemology as of literature” (Wansbrough, “Res Ipsa Loquitur,” 170).

2011), 53-95; and cf. Margoliouth, 467 ff.). For a further discussion, see the Muslim-Mu’min distinction, passim, and esp. Chapter 3, under the subsection entitled “Constitution.”

For examples, see Décobert, 93-96.
CHAPTER TWO
EARLY PROTO-ISLĀM

Crisis
Transformations
The Persian-Sāsānian Empire had extended its sphere of influence into central Arabia (al-Yamāma) as early as the third century C.E. With the decline of its Lakhmid client state in the south-western ʿIrāqī city of al-Ḥīra, al-Yamāma came under the sway of the Kinda.¹ This tribe consolidated its power over central and northern Arabia, thereby forging a formidable confederacy. However, its rule in al-Yamāma was short-lived. Intertribal conflicts and wars of succession bled them dry. When the Kinda fled central Arabia around 530 C.E., a political vacuum emerged in its wake.² To suit the exigencies of the moment, its constituent nomads reverted to forming their own temporary alliances. As a result, decentralization – coupled with the breakdown of frontier defenses – created the crisis of town and village life during this period.

Decentralization
Besides settlements and oases, central Arabia consisted largely of pasture districts demarcating particular nomadic spheres of action and influence. These comprised water-sources, domesticated animals, settlements, and regional markets. Although located in a specific pasturage and projecting itself as a single entity, a nomadic group was nonetheless divided along lines of “kinship, geographical location, or interests.”³ In a region characterized by the scarcity of resources, raiding and tribute to a large degree
informed central Arabian socio-political and economic structures. Raiding was a reciprocal means by which resources were distributed and redistributed in the region. Reduced to tributary status by the nomads, the sedentary populace was unable to rise above the local level. Accordingly, this precluded the formation of alliances to secure their territorial, agricultural, and commercial interests against nomadic despoliations. Therefore, villages, towns, and settlements fell within the purview of the nomadic group within whose pasturage they happened to be situated. Since nomads either migrated according to the changing seasons, demographic and ecological necessity, or displacement by other tribes, pasturages frequently changed hands. As a result, this led to the high frequency of the formation and dissolution of nomadic alliances. For the sedentary populations, this meantshouldering the economic burden of multiple tributes which became all the more difficult to bear. Left unchecked, competing nomadic groups wreaked havoc on the settlements, destabilizing al-Yamāma. These unstable social, economic, and political conditions provided the catalyst for the rise of a number of local and regional enterprises emerging to fill the power vacuum. Among these was the Banū Ḥanīfa tribe.

*Tribe*
Nomads order societal relations according to (i) family, (ii) clan, (iii) tribe, and (iv) confederacy. The basic unit of a tribe is the family. This independent group labors together to provide daily necessities for its members. For the purpose of protection and herd management, a group of families forms a clan. As a political reaction to outside pressures and threats, clans coalesce into a tribe headed by an elected chief who serves as first councilor. In turn, a tribe is a constituent element within a macro political order,
namely, a confederacy.\textsuperscript{5} As larger expressions and extensions of aligned tribes, confederacies provide regional socio-economic and political stability. However, they are not conglomerations solely of tribes; rather, overseen by a chief, they form an alliance among the nomads and the sedentary populations. The actual or derivative relations among members of a clan, tribe, and confederacy are forged through the mechanism of kinship which necessitates common interests, not blood relations.\textsuperscript{6} On the clan as well as the tribal and confederate levels, genealogy facilitates the formation and dissolution of these groups. Nomads, however, do not exclusively participate in tribal forms of organization; both rural and urban sedentary populations are involved as well.

Retribalization
Coexisting as an alternative structure to centralizing enterprises (e.g., Kinda), tribal society serves the same essential functions of organizing and governing populations. Known as retribalization, centralized enterprises transform into decentralized tribes when they cease to secure the safety and welfare of its subjects.\textsuperscript{7} A centralizing enterprise dissolves when (i) the bureaucratic apparatus breaks down, (ii) commercial networks destabilize, and (iii) the enterprise can no longer supply food stuffs. Under these conditions, local populations look elsewhere.

In the second quarter of the sixth century, al-Yamâma had witnessed the breakdown of the Kinda’s institutions and authority. Dependent upon the security of the countryside, the urban food supply had been compromised. The number of predatory pastoral nomads pillaging sedentary agricultural populations increased dramatically during this period. Their numbers included internally displaced sedentary populations (i.e., “ex-farmers”) who adapted to nomadic pastoralism and raiding as a means of
survival.\textsuperscript{8} The centralized Kinda enterprise had in effect failed to protect and provision its subjects.

In the aftermath of the Kinda’s flight south to Ḥaḍramawt, the Banū Ḥanīfa started to overtake al-Yamāma’s numerous fortresses and villages. Many of the Kinda’s former subjects sided with the Ḥanafī chief, Qatāda b. Maslama (r. until ca. 600 C.E.).\textsuperscript{9} In exchange for protection, he received tribute from al-Yamāma’s sedentary population. Central Arabian cities, their agricultural hinterlands, and trade routes soon came under the protection of the Banū Ḥanīfa. Spearheaded by them, the new nomadic-sedentary alliance was successful because of the social positioning of Qatāda’s semi-sedentary clan. The fact that his clan was not purely nomadic allowed him to negotiate with the sedentary population.\textsuperscript{10} As chief and first councilor, he forged this alliance by balancing the vested interests of both his nomadic and sedentary followers. By making them clients of the kin group, the sedentary population was assimilated into the tribe. During his chieftainship, the Banū Ḥanīfa went from raiding to protecting its newly acquired Yamāmī towns.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{Detribalization}

When the townspeople submitted to Qatāda’s chieftaincy, he confirmed their land tenures.\textsuperscript{12} Over time, the direct and sustained contact of the nomads with sedentary populations set into motion the process of detribalization.\textsuperscript{13} This transformation from a decentralized tribe into a centralized state is accompanied by sedentarization, that is, the settlement of the nomads. As more Banū Ḥanīfa began to settle and till the soil, affiliation with place substituted kinship. In other words, the nomads increasingly identified with their town and territory.\textsuperscript{14} The set of demands placed upon Qatāda to govern an agricultural and urbanized society with its complex economy and relations,
moreover, required that he adopt ‘sedentary models’ of governance.\textsuperscript{15} Status was now accorded in the manner of a centralizing state, that is, through a tax register. Consequently, the Banū Ḥanīfa was fundamentally transformed in terms of social organization. No longer an exclusively nomadic tribe, it became a joint sedentary-nomadic confederacy.

As a result of the peace secured by the Banū Ḥanīfa, a symbiosis emerged between the nomadic and sedentary populations.\textsuperscript{16} Nomads bartered for dates, wheat, equipment, utensils, and weapons; in exchange, they traded clarified butter, domesticated animals, and other animal products. This commercial activity between these two sectors was not limited to the marketplace. In fact, merchants from the city would venture into the nomadic zone to transact business. Additionally, the nomads – through the institutions of companionship and honor – provided for the safe passage of goods and persons through their respective territories. This extended the reach of al-Yamāma far beyond the isolated Najd plateau (located in central Arabia). Furthermore, owing to the interaction between these two sectors, cultural traits (e.g., language, values, mores, traditions) were transmitted, and actual and fictional kinship relations developed.\textsuperscript{17} Peace and prosperity turned into profit, fueling unprecedented economic, demographic, and urban growth in the area.

\textbf{Imbalance}

The ancient oasis-town of Jaww in al-Yamāma flourished into a sizeable city. This and other similar oasis-cities (e.g., Ḥajr) developed when a cluster of villages unified. These oasis-cities gradually drew other surrounding villages into their urban production and consumption economy. They also attracted the inhabitants of nearby villages which
ultimately led to an ‘urban demographic implosion’ and depopulation of the agricultural hinterland.\textsuperscript{18} This implosion eventually turned into a rural demographic explosion that created a multiplicity of new villages. This enlarged rural countryside provisioned the city, while nomadic pastoralists subsisted on its fringes. Complex economic, social, and political relations resulted from this urbanization and ruralization. Ultimately, this stratification bred strife.

\textit{Stratification}

Commerce, mining, and agriculture formed the main economic basis for these urban centers and their hinterlands. These cities’ complex division of labor included nobles, peasants, merchants, artisans, and camel drivers. Consequently, this division of labor eventually overshadowed kinship. For this reason, social relations became increasingly based upon economic stratification.\textsuperscript{19} At first, these self-sufficient cities engaged in commerce through surplus production. Commerce became even more significant over time. For example, the area’s main market in al-Falaj boasted four hundred shops and a bustling slave trade.\textsuperscript{20} Once the marketplace connected the nomads to the city, their business became essential to the local and regional economy.

al-Yamāma prided itself on the high quality of its succulent meats, white wheat, curative water, and wide variety of dates.\textsuperscript{21} In addition to cultivating date palms, staples (e.g., barley), and small fruit bearing trees (e.g., pomegranates), it also produced cash crops (e.g., sugar). Total agricultural yield increased at an exponential rate in its forty-three valleys. For instance, it produced more dates than all of western Arabia combined.\textsuperscript{22} This intensive agriculture required large sums of investment and operating capital for the construction and maintenance of irrigation canals. In particular, its
growing agricultural sector depended heavily upon access to reclaimable land and intensive manual labor. Agriculturally-linked industries (e.g., milling, tool manufacture, distribution) were affected by the investment upturn. Therefore, sizeable increases in investment led to the rise of a whole agricultural sector that further drew the rural population into the urban economy.

There was no shortage of labor in al-Yamāma. In fact, peasants, transients, and slaves were abundant, cheap, and expendable. Slaves, for example, comprised one third of its total population, with upwards of four thousand slaves working a single plantation. Agricultural and industrial laborers, though they formed the majority, were only begrudgingly accepted in society. Only those of ‘pure’ tribal descent of the upper stratum held leadership positions. Yet, as a malleable device, tribal descent forged together an inclusive urban, rural, and nomadic elite. The urban notables included the old landed aristocracy whose landholdings Qatāda had guaranteed. To these were added new Ḥanafī landholding elite families similar to that of Qatāda. The rural gentry consisted of village heads and farm owners, while the nomadic nobility was composed of lesser nomadic chiefs, notably, Thumāma b. Uthāl (d. 632 C.E.). The rural and nomadic gentry held great power. Rural heads had the ability to refuse grain, while nomadic chiefs had the capacity to block trade. Therefore, all three gentrified classes formed an uneasy alliance. Although civic identification ostensibly unified these elites and their constituencies, power plays at court reverberated throughout al-Yamāma along kinship lines.
Disparity

In a land of plenty, the underlying problem was not production, but distribution.\(^{26}\) Agricultural surplus and industrial products (e.g., textiles, leather goods) were exported far and wide. Yamāmī grain not only supplied western Arabia (e.g., Makka and al-Madīnah), but also made its way into markets in southern ‘Irāq. Agricultural profits, gold and silver bullion, and commercial tax revenues poured into elite coffers all the while. Reinvesting in agricultural expansion and land reclamation, these absentee landlords and merchants sought to meet foreign market demands. These ventures, however, compromised domestic needs, placing an unbearable stress upon the land and its people. Unable to cope, indebted farmers became tenants, a virtually free labor source.\(^{27}\) The gap between the haves and have-nots widened. This disparity resulted in the corrosion of the patron-client system, moreover, disrupting nomad-sedentary relations.\(^{28}\)

Qatāda’s transformation of the Banū Ḫanīfa into a sedentary polity marginalized those nomads who had brought him to power. By means of taxation, he and his immediate successor regulated both their nomadic and sedentary subjects.\(^{29}\) The interests of the nomads were antithetical to the consolidation of Ḫanafī power. No longer needed for their military services, some nomads were reduced to cottagers, while the poorer ones were relocated with their flocks to pasturages on the other side of the escarpment dividing al-Yamāmah.\(^{30}\) Tossed to the side away from al-Yamāmah’s agricultural heartland, these disenfranchised nomads were alienated. Meanwhile, their desert brethren skirted southern al-Yamāmah on the borders of the Empty Quarter. Since both the urban labor class and rural populace maintained active kinship relations with the nomads, these three lower strata of society posed a formidable challenge to Qatāda’s authority. For example, as agriculture pushed its limits on the desert fringes, it encroached upon the land of the
As a result, heightened Ḥanafī-Tamīmī tensions slowly edged the nomads toward open revolt.

What is more, the majority of al-Yamāma’s sedentary populace continued to live in poverty and squalor. For this reason, some Ḥanafī laborers made their way back to western Arabia, the original homeland of the Banū Ḥanīfa. A moral uncertainty set in throughout al-Yamāma’s lower social strata. Justice gave way to greed, governance to tyranny. These forces ripped at the very seams of the traditional social fabric. Consequently, al-Yamāma was on the brink of splitting three ways. The plight of the poor and disillusioned, however, did not go unnoticed. Their crisis gave rise to a mediator: Aslam the reformer poet.

**Reform**

Mediator

The agricultural peasantry bore the brunt of the shift from a subsistence to an emergent commercial economy. The vested interests of the nobles (i.e., urban merchants, landowners, and gentrified chiefs) were diametrically opposed to those of the commoners (i.e., manual laborers, peasants, and nomads). Food rations grew thin. Diminishing rural resources put these peasants at odds with their nomadic neighbors. Increasingly resorting to predation, these nomads disrupted the transit routes, thereby compromising the security of Persian trade. No longer could the nobles turn a blind eye to the mounting crisis. In response to this existential threat, the nature and role of authority in al-Yamāma became radically transformed.
Protest

Order and stability constituted the core interests of the peasantry who needed this security to conduct their daily social and economic activities. Now vulnerable to external attack, they faced the difficult task of survival in a time when deadly nomadic raids razed their crops, ravished their women, and devastated their villages. They desperately groped in the dark for an immediate solution to their predicament. At one time, the peasantry at least had an option. Although caught between a rock and a hard place, they could either submit to the nomads or the city dwellers for protection. However, times had changed. The peasants were left to their own devices. They had to rely on themselves, fend for themselves, and defend their own land. In the midst of this chaos, an agrarian poet vented his grievances against the deteriorating state of his kinsmen. In al-Yamāma’s central market square, his voice cut through the din of the crowd. He implored them:

Defend your cultivated land,
Shelter the one seeking favor,
And oppose the oppressor.33

His verses polarized the populace, while galvanizing the peasants into action. Swearing by the honor of their women, he openly declared the virtues of his fellow plowmen:

By the women who scatter seed at planting,
By the women reaping at harvest,
By the women who winnow wheat,
By the women who grind flour,
By the women who break bread,
By the women who break bread into crumbs,
By the women who gobble mouthfuls of grease and fat,
You [men] have been favored over the nomads,
Nor shall the city folk take precedence over you.34

Capturing the hearts and minds of his people, Aslam, the people’s poet, channeled ‘the strength of local interests’ into a grassroots movement.35

The son of his village, Aslam b. Ḥābib (d. 633 C.E.) was much more closely attuned to the challenges facing the peasants.36 His hometown was located in the al-
ʻĀriḍ district of central al-Yamāma where his family owned some farmland in al-Haddār and Ubāḍ.\textsuperscript{37}  Situated near stable sources of water, al-ʻĀriḍ was well-known for its irrigated valleys and agricultural produce, particularly its wheat. Within this district lived the sedentary Banū Ḥanīfa.\textsuperscript{38}  al-ʻĀriḍ’s most important geographical feature was the Ṭuwayq escarpment, which acted as a natural defense against the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads on the other side. At the heart of al-ʻĀriḍ stood its commercial capital, Ḥajr where trade from Persia, ‘Irāq, al-Yaman, al-Baḥrayn, and al-Ḥijāz converged.\textsuperscript{39}  As a social and political act in the market square, Aslam’s rustic poetry critiqued both his society and its rulers.\textsuperscript{40}  His civil disobedience did not go unnoticed. Promulgated through public oration and private conversation, his message spread far and wide, travelling along the pan-Arabian trade network. As a result, he attracted a growing community of followers. Noteworthy were his highborn companions, the learned diplomat, al-Rajjāl b. ‘Unfuwa (d. 633 C.E.), and Muḥakkim b. al-Ṭufayl (d. 633 C.E.), the ‘old warhorse of al-Yamāma’ (muḥakkim al-yamāma).\textsuperscript{41}  Moreover, Aslam’s preaching came to the attention of none other than Hawdha b. ‘Alī, the future successor to al-Yamāma’s first man.

\textit{Coalition}

Hawdha hailed from the Suḥaym b. Murra clan of Banū Ḥanīfa.\textsuperscript{42}  His powerful mercantile family controlled the caravan trade, while simultaneously monopolizing political control in Jaww. Prior to his bid for power, he had failed to secure a Persian caravan train.\textsuperscript{43}  Beset by Tamīm nomads, the caravan’s precious cargo was lost. This transgression sparked an intertribal war between the Banū Ḥanīfa and Tamīm. Threatened by his rivals, Hawdha turned to the Persians who dealt the Tamīm a decisive blow. Eclipsed by Hawdha (r. ca. 600-630 C.E.), Qatāda’s coalition fell apart. The
capital of al-Yamāma then moved south from Ḥajr to Jaww. In return for helping him subject the Tamīm to his will, Hawdha secured trade routes vital to Persian interests. In exchange for performing and executing this duty, the Persian monarch deputized him as a vassal prince, bestowing the title ‘King of al-Yamāma’ upon him. He was in turn known as ‘bearer of the crown’ (dhū al-tāj). Thereafter, he set out to consolidate his power.

Hawdha’s retinue included al-Rajjāl, Muḥakkim, Mujjā’a b. Murāra (the land magnate), and Thumāma b. Uthāl (the chief of the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads). An astute politician, Hawdha understood the fragility of his authority in the face of the forces ripping at the seams of al-Yamāma’s social fabric. Having curbed nomadic power on the periphery, he now moved to limit their range of action on the home front. During Qatāda’s tenure, policies were instituted to forcibly settle the nomads in eastern al-Yamāma in order to neutralize their mobility. A settled population is governable and taxable. However, Qatāda’s plan was only partially successful. Restive nomads poured into western al-Yamāma, swelling Thumāma’s ranks. Ruling to the west of the Ṭuwayq escarpment, while Hawdha ruled the east, Thumāma was known as one of ‘the two heads of al-Yamāma.’ In order to maintain balance of power, Hawdha looked to the rural population to check the rising nomadic chief. His experience with the Tamīm also demonstrated the limits of unorganized steppe warfare in light of the advanced state of Persian arms (e.g., infantry, armored cavalry, and siegecraft). Accordingly, he began to deliberately shift away from the original core comprising the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads to a sedentarized military organization. Moreover, in rebuilding al-Yamāma’s economy, Hawdha recognized the central role of the agricultural sector. For this reason, he turned
to Aslam, the de facto agrarian leader with whom he shared a common enemy, the envious nomads. Joining forces with Aslam, their new coalition reformed society in order to strike an equitable balance centered on an inclusive city. Aslam’s verses effectively fashioned a new civic identity:

I swear by this city;
And do not leave from this city
Until you have property and progeny,
And [you] grow numerous and are bound to it [viz. the city];
So imagine and reckon
Until the end of time,
In spite of those who envy.49

In time, the broadening scope of Aslam’s concerns expanded his role from rural poet to sage-at-large.

Sage
Building on his role as rural poet, Aslam became a righter of wrongs. In al-Yamāma, for example, the urban elite monopolized water rights that were crucial to the irrigation canals. Naturally, the rural peasants required access to these aquifers.50 This brought matters to a head. In order to prevent a resource war, he sued for peace:

O immaculate frog,
Neither do you refuse drink,
Nor do you muddy the water.51

In another similar incident, he fairly redistributed energy resources, calling once again for moderation:

Indeed, we have given you coals;
Thus take for yourself and do not hesitate.
But be cautious [not] to be greedy and not to exceed [the bounds].52

Acting as an intermediary between the urban and rural populations and the rich and the poor, Aslam gradually took on the role of society-wide moralist and legislator.
Moralist

Aslam expressed his notion of civic justice with two central concepts, compassion (al-rahma) and the house (al-dār). With overtones of kinship, compassion represented his unifying code of conduct personified by the city’s merciful deity, al-Raḥmān. As divine protector, al-Raḥmān was the source of al-Yamāma’s prosperity. He was ‘the deity’ (allāh) of the farmer, the cottager, the miner, and the merchant alike:

Remember the grace of the deity (allāh) and thank him,
As he turned for you the sun into a shining lamp,
And sent heavy rain;
He brought forth for you the ram and the ewe,
And granted you silver and glass,
Gold and silk clothes.
And it is from his grace that he brought out from the earth pomegranates,
Grapes, sweet basil,
Wheat, and bitter plants.

The Arabic root word for compassion (√rḥm) also signifies kinship through matrilineal descent (raḥim). Aslam was cognizant of the complex kinship relations permeating al-Yamāma’s political clientele system. In this patrilineal society, male descent polarized feuding factions. Therefore, Aslam used the mechanism of kinship to broker political relations. He cut across these party lines by appealing to a common matrilineal ancestor. In fact, the city’s founding myth recalled the memory of this shared matriarch, al-Yamāma bt. Murra, who had been crucified on the town gate. Originally known as Jaww, Hawdha’s new capital was renamed al-Yamāma, a name which eventually broadened to encompass the whole area. In addition, raḥim also connotes the physical sense of womb. al-Raḥmān’s vibrant city, al-Yamāma is the womb from which its citizens issue forth. This is why the founding of al-Yamāma is akin to the birth of a child:

The deity (allāh) has been gracious to the mother-to-be;
He has brought forth from her a living being that can move;
From her very midst.
Aslam’s second concept refers to an encircled dwelling (al-dār). Overlapping with Hawdha’s ‘royal reserve,’ al-Rahmān’s city was an enclosed sacred communal space. Just as the household was the fundamental unit structuring his village community, he conceived of al-Yamāma as a conglomeration of unified households. Matrilineal kinship and propinquity ordered this inclusive community, bound by common property, intermarriage, and justice. ‘Compassion,’ ‘kinship,’ and the ‘womb’ are thus interlocked in his conception of an inclusive city based upon the household.

Lawgiver
Backed by Hawdha, Aslam issued a series of prescriptive laws collectively known as the Commandment (al-Furqān). This set of versified moral codes was directed at institutional, social, moral, and legal reform. The town crier (mu‘adhādhin) who proclaimed these laws in the public square became a permanent feature of Yamāmī life. Aslam’s general legal principles reinforced traditional ethics and values (e.g., enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, almsgiving, equity, common defense). In the area of criminal law, a specific statute outlawed female infanticide. Pertaining to family law, he recommended monogamy and prescribed sexual abstinence after the birth of the first child. In terms of commerce, he encouraged foreign merchants to settle in al-Yamāma, while at the same time making it a point to censure their questionable business practices:

Indeed, we have granted you wealth;
Thus pray to your lord (rabb) and emigrate.
And, indeed, your wrongdoing is immoral.

As a result of Aslam’s inclusive policy, al-Yamāma’s population increasingly included Persian mercantile families. To ease the burden on the urban and rural poor, a moratorium was placed on the export of grain. In the same vein, sumptuary laws
limited expenditure for luxury goods. Aslam forbade the consumption of fine wines and called for periodic abstention from food. Looking to Aslam as a role model, modesty and piety now became civic ideals for the effete nobles:

When I saw their faces they were comely,  
And their complexions were clear,  
And their hands were soft;  
I said to them, ‘You shall not come to women,  
Nor drink wine;  
But you are the company of the pious,  
Fasting a day  
And tasking a day.’64

A significant portion of the moral code centered on ritual prayer. As the frequency of interactions across kinship and class lines escalated, Aslam instituted ritual practices and urban ceremonies designed to normalize, unify, and legitimize the civic order. In effect, these rituals bolstered the city’s shared moral outlook. Their performance became part of al-Yamāma’s ‘drama of citizenship.’65 He entreated the citizens:

Pray to your lord (rabb) and do not hesitate  
During the nights and regularly.66

In time, he came to realize the special link between the numinous and the mundane:

The deity (allāh) listened to whomever he listened to,  
And made him yearn for good when he yearned,  
And his cause is still arranged in everything that delights him.  
Your lord (rabb) saw you and gave you life and preserved you from loneliness,  
And saved you and gave you life on the day of his religion (yawm dīnih);  
For us some prayers of the company of the pious,  
Neither miserable nor licentious,  
Staying up at night and fasting by day;  
Indeed your lord (rabb) is great,  
The lord (rabb) of the clouds and the rain.67

Aslam’s civic, legal, and moral precepts culminated in a unified religion. The divine and human were bound by reciprocal ties of prosperity and prayer. As a microcosm, the moral order of the city was ‘immutable.’68
Milieu

From Poet to Prophet

Aslam’s reforms were a staggering success. He managed to correct the class imbalance in al-Yamāma. Domestic peace ushered in wealth and prosperity. As the embodiment of piety, the city and its inhabitants were favored by al-Raḥmān. Rumors soon circulated about Aslam’s charismatic power (al-amr). In the eyes of the common people whom the reformer-poet had freed from the bonds of earthly suffering, he was seen as nothing short of a miracle worker. As the direct link between the city and its patron deity, the nature of his authority consequently transformed. An agrarian poet turned moralist and sage, Aslam – in the popular imagination – was now vested with charismatic and kerygmatic powers. Gossip turned gospel. Soon his image would be cut from the same cloth as that of the prophets.

Miracle Worker

Conceived as ‘the lord of the clouds and the rain,’ al-Raḥmān was initially a ‘god of economy’ for peasants dependent upon the harvest. Although now bound to the inclusive city, al-Raḥmān retained these attributes, and Aslam, his agent, became the rainmaker. Good harvests demonstrated the power and efficacy of the patron deity. Summoning down the harvest moon was among the miracles worked through Aslam. In addition, the populace flocked to him to win his blessing. Known for his congenial manner and believed to possess thaumaturgic powers, peasants and nobles alike implored him to work miracles on their behalf. Farmers reliant on irrigation sought him out to consecrate their newly dug wells, while the wealthy courted him to bless them with children. Even nomads came to him in order to ensure long and prosperous lives for their newborn. He was also called upon to pray on behalf of the sick and suffering. As a
result of these intensified interactions and his exposure to multiple conceptions of the divine, Aslam’s own understanding of al-Raḥmān grew more complex. Although al-Raḥmān was the city’s patron deity, he was not coterminous with al-Yamāma. al-Raḥmān was there from the city’s beginning, but it was not his beginning, nor would its end be his.

Prophet
Recast in an urban environment, the figure of al-Raḥmān accrued additional universal characteristics. With the further decline of al-Ḥīra, al-Yamāma received a steady stream of ‘Irāqī Christian scholars seeking patronage. The sum of their transmitted knowledge reinforced and refined the ideological shift concerning the nature of al-Raḥmān. Originating in Christian circles active in al-Yamāma since the fifth century C.E., al-Raḥmān was associated with a host of monotheistic concepts. Once reintroduced, these concepts universalized al-Raḥmān as the transcendental creator and immanent savior. ‘The lord of the clouds and the rain’ thus transformed into ‘the lord of the heavens’:

So praise be to the deity (allāh)! Verily life came to where you live;
Ascend to the king of heaven.74

The language of the gospels (e.g., ‘kingdom of heaven’ (mulk al-samā’)) was reasserted.75 In tune with audience expectations, Aslam’s role as reformer was re-scripted to that of religious virtuoso, an inner-worldly ascetic striving to match reality to his ideals.76 As a holy man, he donned prophetic garb:

I am a herald (rasūl) with whom the creator is pleased,
The powerful, the generous, and the provider to you.77

Warning the wicked away from the road to perdition, Aslam’s Commandment (al-Furqān) became a measure of salvation (furqān).78 Deviance from god’s commandments constituted sin that was to be reckoned on the day of judgment.79 Inspired by the
archangel Gabriel, *al-Furgān* attained the status of divine revelation. As ‘the herald of the deity’ (*rasūl allāh*), Aslam ultimately became the vehicle of salvation. His town crier, Ḥujayr b. ‘Umayr, publicly proclaimed the Ḥanafī creed (*shahāda*):

\[
\text{I witness that there is no deity but al-Raḥmān,}
\]
\[
\text{I witness that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān [viz. Aslam] is the herald of the deity.}
\]

Endowed with charismatic and kerygmatic gifts, Aslam possessed the credentials of a true biblical prophet who acted ‘In the name of the merciful deity, al-Raḥmān.’ Before long, he gathered around him a group of disciples who formed the nucleus of a fast growing communal network spreading throughout Arabia.

**The Muslim Movement**

Aslam’s inclusive city generated a new movement with its accompanying institutions. As word of his prophecy disseminated throughout the peninsula, devotees of al-Raḥmān congregated at al-Yamāma. As a result, the movement took on a life of its own. Additional layers of membership accumulated around Aslam’s original circle of close disciples, e.g., al-Rajjāl, Muḥakkim, and ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Nawwāḥa. Consequently, they became apostles by extension. These companions turned their attention to ensuring the continuity of the movement. In order to ‘secure the permanence’ of Aslam’s mission, they moved to routinize his prophetic authority (*al-nubuwwa*) by means of religion and the ritualization of power. They formalized his authority in a distinctively Yamāmī religious institution, i.e., the imāmate (*al-imāma*). His disciples’ interests coincided with the legitimation strategy of his ally, Hawdha, who was the functionary leader of al-Yamāma (*sāḥib al-yamāma*).
Aslam’s devotees called themselves the Raḥmāniyya, i.e., followers of al-Raḥmān, the Commiserator. Accordingly, Aslam’s honorific title became ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, the servant of al-Raḥmān. Throughout Arabia, his renewed monotheism coalesced with the efforts of Christian missionaries, monks, and preachers. For example, Quss b. Sā‘ida – the itinerant Nestorian associated with the Christian community at Najrān – forcefully preached monotheism and resurrection at ‘Ukāz. This famous market was located near Makka along an increasingly Yamāmī-dominated trade network. In addition, self-generated monotheistic groups (e.g., that of Umayya b. Abī al-Ṣalt at al-Ṭā‘if) later sprang up in cities across Arabia.

As the Imām of al-Yamāma, Aslam founded a non-denominational monotheistic religion. This defining feature set it a world apart from ‘competing’ confessions. Over the course of time, the nature al-Raḥmān shifted as well. Although beginning as a popular rural god of nature, the urban al-Raḥmān became a domestic deity, and above all, the elite’s god of salvation. As a matter of course, when this religion of salvation spread to the illiterate masses, al-Raḥmān was conflated with ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. Once equated with al-Raḥmān, Aslam was naturally looked upon as a personal savior. This reception induced a fundamental shift in the movement. Aslam’s followers increasingly identified themselves as Muslims, literally those who ‘Aslamed.’ Islām was their religion. Facing al-Raḥmān’s shrine (ka’ba) in Makka, the Muslims prayed three times a day and observed their holy month of Ramaḍān. Ritual ablution with water was permissible, while cleansing with sand was under all circumstances prohibited. Dietary laws restricted consuming the flesh of fowl, and substances inducing altered states of
consciousness were tabooed. Covering family, civil, criminal, and moral law, Islām was a comprehensive religion.

Legitimation

The question of legitimacy in al-Yamāma came to a critical juncture during Hawdha’s reign. Early in his career, he had already repelled the forces of the ‘king’ of al-Ḥīra, ‘Amr b. Hind (554-570 C.E.).98 After that, he had to contend with al-Ḥārith b. Wa‘la, a pretender to the throne. He resorted to propaganda by enlisting the services of Maymūn al-A’shā (ca. 570-625 C.E.). This youthful blind poet lambasted the counterclaimant in support of Hawdha’s own claims as sovereign.99 al-Yamāma’s internal politics was also characterized by the struggle for a share in power and control of its distribution. Its continued existence depended upon the acquiescence of power by the urban, rural, and nomadic subjects to their political ruler, Hawdha. In turn, Hawdha’s appropriation of power necessitated its legitimation through internal justification.100 Installed as an indirect ruler, he was dependent upon the resources of the landed and commercial elite. His ambition, however, was to establish direct rule. Drawing upon both the religious (al-imāma) and functionary authority crafted at his court, his alliance with Aslam guaranteed a unique dual form of legitimacy. With this in hand, Hawdha established and unified a patrimonial monarchy in al-Yamāma. Once he had put his house in order, he fixed his gaze on the whole peninsula.

Hegemony

Centralization

Peace at home and war abroad created conditions favorable for al-Yamāma’s expansion.101 At the turn of the sixth century, the Arabian political scene was in turmoil.
One by one, Arab tribes wrested themselves from Lakhmid control. With the murder of ‘Amr b. Hind, the Usayyid clan of Tamīm had already begun to throw off the yoke of al-Ḥira. However, the bloody reprisal cost them dearly. Soon thereafter followed the pillaging of the royal caravan en route to ‘Ukāz, which sparked the protracted Fījār War that destabilized western Arabia. The year 602 C.E. marked a turning point. The last Lakhmid king, al-Nu‘mān III b. al-Mundhir IV (r. 580-602 C.E.), was deposed and put to death by the Sāsānid emperor, Khusraw II (r. 591-628 C.E.). In the meantime, total war broke out between the Byzantine and Persian Empires. Redirecting their resources, the Sāsānians minimized their garrison forces defending the Arabian frontier. Consequently, the Bakr b. Wā’il tribal confederation defeated the Persians and their nomadic allies. This celebrated Battle of Dhū Qūr (605 C.E.) signaled the beginning of the end for foreign rule. This left a power vacuum in Arabia. Enter al-Yamāma.

Diplomacy
The ensuing intertribal wars bled the nomads white. Although a member of the Bakrī confederacy, the Banū Ḥanīfa had committed no men at Dhū Qūr. At the end of the day, al-Yamāma was unmatched in wealth, power, and resources. Fielding an army of ten thousand, Hawdha became the de facto ruler of central and northern Arabia.102 Tribal chiefs directly dispatched delegations to al-Yamāma. Some paid homage, others tribute. In return, Hawdha recognized their rights to communal pastures and watering grounds. To seal the deal, tribes contracted diplomatic marriages. Worthy of note is Aslam’s marriage into one of Makka’s leading clans, ‘Abd Shams. After Aslam had imposed the moratorium on grain exports, famine and disease hit Makka hard.103 In response, a Qurayshī deputation was dispatched to al-Yamāma to secure wheat vital to the survival of
Makka, the site of al-Rahmān’s shrine. After reaching a settlement that authorized limited shipments, the Qurayshī elite offered Aslam the hand of Ramla bt. al-Ḥārith.\textsuperscript{104} An enduring alliance was born. Under the protection of Thumāma b. Uthāl, Yamāmī grain once again flowed into Makka.\textsuperscript{105} Furthermore, commerce and peace led to conversion. Drawn to the prospect of instituting similar reforms in their tribes, villages, and cities back home, a number of Arab delegates embraced Islām and became Muslims.

Sphere of Influence

al-Yamāma’s sphere of influence extended over three zones: direct, indirect, and independent (SEE MAP 2.1). Hawdha directly controlled those tribes in the immediate area of al-Yamāma. These included four Bakrī tribes, five Tamīm clans, the Numayr, and the Ka'b and some Kilāb of ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a.\textsuperscript{106} He exacted taxes from them and the agricultural population.\textsuperscript{107} Village heads levied taxes in kind on irrigated and non-irrigated lands, while commercial taxes were primarily market dues (creativecommons) collected by agents. Nomadic chiefs, on the other hand, gathered taxes in the form of sheep and camels from their kinsmen. In the second zone, Hawdha held indirect sway over tribes in al-Yamāma’s vicinity, especially on the vast Najd plateau. To the north was the Usayyid clan of the ‘Amr (of Tamīm b. Murr). To the southwest were two branches of the ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a of Hawāzin: the Sa’d b. Bakr (who dwelt between al-Yamāma and al-Ḥijāz) and the ‘Uqayl.\textsuperscript{108} Not taxed in kind, these tribes paid with their services. In other words, they secured Yamāmī trade passing through their pasture districts. Lastly, among the independent tax-exempt tribes numbered the hostile Banū Sa‘d clan of Tamīm and its eastern enemies, the ‘Abd al-Qays. To the north dwelt the Banū Fazāra of Dhubyān b. Ghaṭafān and the remainder of the Bakr b. Wā’il.\textsuperscript{109} Finally, to the west were the Thaqīf
of Hawāzin. Although politically independent, these and other outlying territories were within al-Yamāma’s economic orbit. For example, neighboring on Najrān, the lucrative Yaman-Ctesiphon trade route ran right through al-Yamāma’s al-Falaj district. Hawdha’s political centralization of Arabia engendered its twin corollaries: cultural and economic hegemony.

Map 2.1: Sphere of Influence

Monopoly
Fifty markets were scattered across Arabia. Of these, thirteen had risen to prominence. At one time tied into a Persian-dominated trade network, these markets ‘spiraled’ throughout the peninsula. Previously working through their Lakhmid intermediaries, imperial officials had exacted commercial taxes (*maks*), while the Tamīm confederacy
secured the circuit. However, the outbreak of war between Byzantium and Ctesiphon had destabilized the quadrant. As a result, trade experienced a marked decline. With the loss of its Lakhmid sponsors, the rapidly disintegrating Tamīm confederacy was no match for the rising power of the Banū Ḥanīfa. Hard pressed on every side, the Persians now contented themselves with exercising nominal suzerainty in all but eastern Arabia. By 611 C.E., Yamāmī clients and agents flying the flag of Hawdha monopolized and transformed the old market cycle. Spiraling throughout the peninsula, the trade vortex ultimately funneled its goods into Hawdha’s commercial capital, Ḥajr in al-Yamāma (SEE MAP 2.2).

**Vortex**
The ancient site of Dūmat al-Jandal fed the market cycle. Located in northern Arabia, Dūma was the shipping hub between the greater Near East and Arabia. Its well-fortified citadel was defended by the surrounding Banū Kalb. As the main depot for the storage of merchandise, its market hosted wholesale traders dealing in sizeable quantities of artisan goods, luxury items, and slaves. al-Mushaqqar in eastern Arabia was the next transit point along the network. Specializing in perfumes, this luxury market was policed by the ‘Abd al-Qays and a clan of Tamīm. However, its location made it vulnerable to periodic attacks, especially after the waning of Persian power. Incessant hostilities further spoiled relations between the ‘Abd al-Qays and the Banū Sa’d of Tamīm. From al-Mushaqqar, the trade sequence moved southeast to the third and fourth markets. On the gulf, these markets at Ṣuḥār and Dabā benefited from the Indian Ocean trade. The commercial cycle then swung downward around the great southern desert. Once at al-Shiḥr, merchants purchased textiles and fragrances. Further south was the port city of ‘Adan, and to its
north lay Ṣanʿā’. Both were held by Yamanī-born Persian families, known as the Abnā’. These markets boasted an excellent selection of merchandise (e.g., spices, dyes). Swinging back to Rābiya, the cycle then shot north to the annual market of ‘Ukāz. Held

between al-Ṭā’if and Nakhla in al-Ḥijāz, the ‘Ukāz market featured famed performances by poets and preachers who increasingly employed a Najdī-based poetic idiom. The ‘Orator of the Arabs,’ Quss b. Sāʿida of Iyād, spread his message here. In addition to an active slave trade, this market was known for its famous leather goods. More significantly, it was a site of negotiation where alliances were born. Moving westward, the circuit stopped at Majanna and Dhū al-Majāz. Thereafter, the cycle worked its way.
upward to Khaybar. Accelerating downward into Najd, the market vortex culminated in Hajr, the eye of the storm. As its hegemons, Hawdha and Aslam were masters of all they surveyed.\footnote{118} However, the centralization of Arabia was ‘uneven’ and incomplete. Therefore, the struggle for a share in power persisted in the essential tension between the center and its periphery. In sum, this tension resulted in the paradox of early proto-Islāmic history. Aslam’s reforms created prosperity in al-Yamāma while sowing the seeds of discontent in Makka.
For the Kinda, see Makin, *Representing*, 117; and I. Shahid, s.v. Kinda, *EI*.  
For a comparative case of “…the profound crisis that Najdī society had been experiencing in the 18th century,” see Abdulaziz al-Fahad, *The ‘Imama vs. the ‘Iqal: Hadari-Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Saudi State* (Italy: European University Institute, 2002), 4-24, esp. 6-10.  
For a tribe as “a political unit,” see Kostiner, 3 f.  
For the “idiom of kinship,” see Rudi Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1983), 9.  Lindner notes that “…in our reconstructions of the internal working of nomadic tribes of the past, we should give more emphasis to political factors and less to kinship models…” (Rudi Lindner, “What Was a Nomadic Tribe?” *CSSH* 24:4 (Oct., 1982): 696).  
For a case in which Bakr b. Wā’il villagers “took up the nomadic life,” see W. Caskel, s.v. Bakr b. Wā’il, *EI*.  For a comparative pre-modern Ottoman case, see Lindner, *Nomads*, 1-50, esp. 36.  
For the duration of Qatāda b. Maslama’s rule, see Montgomery W. Watt, s.v. Ḥanīfa b. Ludjaym, *EI*.  Regarding ancient Syro-Palestine, Lemche notes that “[s]ince ancient times two political systems have been prominent in Syria and Palestine: decentralized tribal societies and centralized states. Contrary to what is often held by modern investigators, the inhabitants of Syria and Palestine had to make up their minds whether they wanted to be reckoned as members of a tribe or citizens of a state” (Lemche, 1198).  
For Qatāda b. Maslama, see Watt, s.v. Ḥanīfa, and al-Askar, *al-Yamama*, 63.  For a comparative early modern case of the Āl Saʿūd, see al-Fahad, 11.  
For post-Kinda politics in al-Yamāmah, see al-Askar, *al-Yamama*, 62 f.  For a comparative pre-modern Ottoman case where “[i]t became Ottoman policy to protect, not to plunder, the towns of Bithynia as they fell one by one,” see Lindner, “What Was a Nomadic Tribe?” 689-711, esp. 708.  
For a comparative pre-modern Ottoman case “[w]hen farmers submitted to Osman’s chieftaincy, he left them in their former tenures and status,” see Lindner, *Nomads*, 24 and 29.  
For the duration of this ‘transformation,’ cf. Lemche, 1199.  
For a comparative case of the emergence of “a territory-based definition” in 18th Najd, see al-Fahad, 8.  
For a comparative pre-modern Ottoman case, see Lindner, *Nomads*, 35.  
For a comparative 19th century case at ‘Unayza, see Cole and Altorki, 75.  
For a comparative 19th century case at ‘Unayza, see Cole and Altorki, 78-82.  
For the people of al-Yamāmah used to say: ‘We surpass the people of the Earth in East and West by five features: by the beauty of our women, by the high quality of our wheat, by the sweetness of our dates, by the flavor of our meats (because of the quality of the Yamāmī pastures) and by the freshness of our water, which cleans the chest of phlegm’” (Translation adapted from Kister, “Struggle,” 7).  For al-Yamāmah’s economy, see al-Askar, *al-Yamama*, 46-52.  For a comparative ancient (6th century B.C.E.) case on ‘land
necessary,” in a comparative case in ancient Syro-Palestine, see Lemche, 1199.

For “…the establishment of international trade routes making military control over tribal land

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(London: Longman, 1979), 284 f.; and Róbert Simon,

Christianity among the Arabs in Pre-Islamic Times

University of New York Press, 1999), 289 ff. and 293; Bonner, “Commerce,” 67; Spencer J. Trimingham,

The Sābā‘īs

Early Islamic Period,” in

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Ḥijāz, see Watt, s.v. Hanīfa.

Translation adapted from al-Ṭabarī, Conquest, 109 f., and Makin, Representing, 211.

Ibid.


For Musaylima’s genealogy, see Kister, “Struggle,” 7. For the local boy or ibn al-balad (‘son of the town’), see Richard T. Antoun, Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 64.


For Hanīfa settlement in “the wādī-s of al-Yamāmah,” see al-Asqar, al-Yamama, 15.

For transit trade through al-ʿĀrid, see ibid., 21.

For the political function of early Arabic poetry, see Roger Allen, An Introduction to Arabic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 68.

For Musaylima’s companions, see Makin, Representing, 239. For Muḥammad’s genealogy, see Ibn al-Kalbī, vol. 1, 156.

For Haddār and his genealogy, see Ibn al-Kalbī, vol. 1, 156, and al-Asqar, al-Yamama, 64.


For Haddār’s title (‘King of al-Yamāmah’), see al-Asqar, al-Yamama, 64 f.


For the “Political Leaders of al-Yamāmah,” see al-Asqar, al-Yamama, 73.

For raʾisā al-yamāmah, see Kister, “Struggle,” 15, and Watt, M/Medina, 133.
nurture in the urban environment” (Weber, specific qualities of Christianity as an ethical religion of salvation and as personal piety found their real Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 541 and 544.

For the use of Persian forces to keep the nomads in check, see ibid. For a comparative pre-modern Ottoman case where a chief shifted to a sedentary military model, see Lindner, “What Was a Nomadic Tribe?” 708.

Translation adapted from Makin, Representing, 204. For “Relations between the Tribes of al-Yamāma,” see al-Asḵar, al-Yamāma, 45-49.

For agricultural land and irrigation in al-Yamāma, see al-Asḵar, al-Yamāma, 34.

For Persian settlement in al-Yamāma, see al-Asḵar, al-Yamāma, 46. For civic pride, see Makin, Representing, 204 and 216.

For the effects of famine and disease felt outside al-Yamāma, see for example, Ibn Ḫubayš, Life, 70 f.

Translation adapted from al-Dabar, Conquest, 93. For these verses, also see Makin, Representing, 214 f.

For a comparative ancient Mesopotamian case on the “drama of citizenship,” see Yoffee, 62.

Translation adapted from Makin, Representing, 217.

For al-amr (charismatic authority) and “The Rise of Religions,” see Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 2; Makin, Representing, 62-66; al-Baladhor, Futiḥ, 87; and Ibn Ḫubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 52 f. and 56. Weber notes that “…the specific qualities of Christianity as an ethical religion of salvation and as personal piety found their real nurture in the urban environment” (Weber, Sociology, 84 f.).

For this “naturalistic orientation,” see ibid., 2.

Dabistān, vol. 3, 3 f.

For examples of Musaylima’s inverted miracles, see Ibn Ḫubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 55 f. For Musaylima’s character, see Kister, “Struggle,” 21 f.
91 For Umayya b. Abū al-Yazīd, see Makin, Representing, vol. 2, part 1, 639.
92 Weber notes that “…a religious community arises in connection with a prophetic movement as a result of routinization (Veralltäglichung), i.e., as a result of the process whereby either the prophet himself or his disciples secure the permanence of his preaching and the congregation’s distribution of grace, hence insuring the economic existence of the enterprise and those who man it, and thereby monopolizing as well the privileges reserved for those charged with religious functions” (Weber, Sociology, 60 f.). For al-nubuwwa and al-imāma, see al-Waqiḍi, Ridda (1990), 108 f., and Makin, Representing, 66 and 202.
94 For the reconstructed basmala, see the introductory protocol in al-Baladhūrī, Futūḥ, 87.
95 For example, in the case of Musaylima, see Dabistān, vol. 3, 2.
96 For the reconstructed shahāda and the muʿadhdhin, see Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 56; Caetani, Annali, vol. 2, part 1, 639; Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 4, 69; and al-Ṭabarī, Conquest, 107 and fn. 703.
97 For these verses, see Makin, Representing, 217.
98 For ʿaywān dīnī, see Caetani, Annali, vol. 2, part 1, 636 f.
99 For Jibrīl, see Makin, Representing, 203.
100 For the reconstructed ʿadād, see Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ḥaḍaqa (1992), vol. 1, 57; and F.E. Peters, Muhammad and the Origins of Islam (Albany:


100 For legitimation, see Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 33 f. and 36 f.


104 For the name of Musaylima’s bride, see al-Askar, *al-Yamama*, 86; Makin, *Representing*, 94 f. and 114; Ibn Ishāq, *Life*, 527; and Kister, s.v. Musaylima. For a later delegation to al-Ŷāmnā, see al-Baladhūrī, *Fustāḥ*, 92.


109 For these tribes, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Fazāra, *EI* 1; J.W. Fück, s.v. Ghaṭafān, *EI*; and W. Caskel, s.v. ‘Abd al-Qays, *EI*.  


111 “[A]round fifty ‘ancient markets of the Arabs’...” are noted by the geographer al-Hamdaṇī (d. 945 C.E.) (See Bonner, “Commerce,” 74). See al-Hamdaṇī, 179-180.

112 For the “markets of the Arabs,” see Bonner, “Commerce,” 74 and 87 f. For “...the close relations of the leaders of Tamīm with the kings of al-Ḥīrā,” see M.J. Kister “Mecca and Tamīm (Aspects of Their Relations),” *JESHO* 8:2 (Nov., 1965): 113.

113 Musil notes that “[t]he discontinuance of its [viz. Dīmat al-Jandal’s] fairs at the beginning of the seventh century is very unlikely” (Musil, *Arabia Deserta*, 533).

114 For “...the waning of the influence of Tamīm...” see Kister, “al-Ḥīrā,” 144. For the *terminus ante quem* of 611 C.E., see Bonner, “Commerce,” 76. “He [viz. Hawdha] was respected by the tribes such an extent that it was enough to put the name ‘Hawdha’ on the flags of the caravans in order to ensure their safe passage” (Kister, “Struggle,” 15). Map 2.2 based upon Michael Bonner, “‘Time Has Come Full Circle’: Markets, Fairs and the Calendar in Arabia before Islam,” in *Scholars and Scholarship of the Islamic World: Studies in Islamic History, Law, and Thought in Honor of Professor Michael Allan Cook on his Seventieth Birthday*, eds. Asad Q. Ahmed, Michael Bonner and Behnam Sadeghi (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 50.

115 For the “markets of the Arabs before Islam,” see Bonner, “Commerce,” 64-71.

116 For the location of ‘Ūkōz, see “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 710, fn. 3. For the location of the ‘two Nakhlas,’ see Michael Lecker, *The Land of the B. Sulaym and Its Environs* [map], 1.6cm = 50km, in Lecker, *Banū Sulaym*, xiii; Ibn Ishāq, *Life*, 193, fn. 1; and W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Nakhlā, *EI*. Holes notes that “[a]
highly inflective poetic Arabic, or perhaps more accurately a poetic register, based principally on the speech of Najd, but no longer morphologically or syntactically identical to it, was in use throughout the whole of the area [viz. Arabia] for the composition and recitation of oral poetry and other forms of elevated diction” (Holes, 18).

117 For the slave trade in ‘Ukāz, see for example, M. Lecker, s.v. Zayd b. Ḥāritha, El; and W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Khadjīda, El.

118 For Hawdhaha as one of ‘the kings of the horizons’ (mulūk al-afāq), see al-Baladhurī, Futūḥ, 86. Watt notes that “Hawdhah was possibly the strongest man in central Arabia at this time” (Watt, M/Medina, 133). Chávez notes that “…the centralization of power is uneven in nature; the process of national homogenization is never complete and its limits are to an extent defined by the regional and local centres of power…” (Humberto G. Chávez, “The Centralization of Education in Mexico: Subordination and Autonomy,” in State and Society: The Emergence and Development of Social Hierarchy and Political Centralization, ed. John Gledhill (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 321).
CHAPTER THREE
MIDDLE PROTO-ISLĀM

Reform Preacher
Dissonance
Makka lay on the outskirts of western Arabia. From its humble beginnings as a village of palm huts, it emerged as a trade entrepôt. 1 Outside the orbit of the imperial powers and their proxies, the Banū Quraysh specialized in the lucrative trafficking of goods and predatory lending. Shrewd business practices, along with their organized network, made Makka a financial center. As it developed into a city, settlements formed around its original core which was centered on al-Rahmān’s shrine (ka’ba). The influx of wealth and its unequal distribution further bifurcated the city. The inner Quraysh (i.e., the ‘Abd Shams and Makhzūm clans) were the winners, while the outer Quraysh were the losers. 2 Although Makka’s remote location provided protection, its barren valley exposed it to periodic famine and disease. Dependent upon grain shipments, the Banū Quraysh were at the mercy of their suppliers. Therefore, Makka was not impervious to fluctuations abroad. With the fall of the Kinda, the intervening four decades of instability in al-Yamāma had rippled throughout al-Ḥijāz. With political instability, al-Yamāma’s agricultural output plummeted. Outlying areas in western Arabia suffered most. Year in and year out, famine and plague were daily realities. Syrian supplies provided temporary relief. However, with the escalating Persian-Byzantine war, these grain supplies were requisitioned northward. 3 This threatened the south with further waves of famine and suffering. In Makka, there was a return to religion.
Impurity

Disaster befell Makka. Whereas piety meant observance, the violation of taboos constituted a transgression against the cult god, in other words, a sin. Ancient ritual taboos were reintroduced among the well-to-do Quraysh whose leaders served as temple priests. To maintain their ritual purity, these elite Quraysh abstained from certain foods, limited their marriage circle, and reinstituted pilgrimage rites. These ostensibly pious acts served to distinguish social classes within Makka and moreover, created a zealous table-community (ḥums) that facilitated political alliances between neighboring and related tribes (ṭilāf). Linked to these taboos was the shark (quraysh), the Banū Quraysh’s eponymous tribal totem and traditional symbol of kinship and brotherhood. Housing the gods of their allies, the Makkān shrine was indicative of their expanding network. Their cult center, in turn, facilitated trade and relations beyond the intra-tribal level. Commerce and cult were interlocked. As the source of Makka’s wealth and local power, the shrine was ultimately the city’s origin.

But then disaster struck again. The return of famine and plague signaled a failure to appease the cult god. Rampant among these hardest hit Quraysh – the young, the weak, and the poor – desperately sought an end to their suffering. Sin and piety gave way to an ethical understanding of the divine, a monotheism. Soon some members of the Banū Quraysh refused to partake in the pagan cult. Among these was Zayd b. ‘Amr, a sage who proscribed female infanticide, renounced the idols, and publicly preached the worship of the one god:

To the heavenly king – there is no deity beyond him
And no lord can draw near him.
Beware, O men, of what follows death!
Notions of impurity gave way to a sense of societal imbalance. The god of commerce gave rise to a god of justice as guarantor of the fair ‘circulation’ of goods among the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor. Before long, a reform preacher came to warn of other-worldly judgment and retribution.

_Liminal Zone_

Born in a famine year that took his father’s life, Amīn b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 632 C.E.) was orphaned at an early age. Put in the care of Ḥalīma bt. Abī Dhu’ayb, Amīn spent his youth in the liminal zone within al-Yamāma’s indirect sphere of influence. Dependent upon the sedentary cult, Ḥalīma’s clan of Sa’d b. Bakr frequented Makka to the west. Drive by their need for provisions to sustain life, they also made their way east to al-Yamāma. The son of the steppe, Amīn was exposed early on to the egalitarian ethos of desert society centered on co-liability, codependency, and martial prowess. Following his days as a shepherd, he was taken in by his relatives who were engaged in commerce. In Makka, he experienced an acute culture shock. The rich towered above the poor, traditional bonds of kinship were cast aside, and profit carried the day. At the bottom of the barrel, his worldview was turned upside down.

While attending the trade fair at ‘Ukāz, Amīn was drawn to the sermon of an eccentric preacher perched atop a she-camel:

O people, he who lives dies
And he who dies passes away.
Whatever is coming is coming,
Dark night and the heaven of the zodiac,
And stars that shine,
Seas that accumulate,
And sons and daughters,
Fathers and mothers,
The one gone,
The one coming,
That in the heaven there is a passage
And that there is on earth a message.
Quss b. Sā‘ida’s words resonated with him, an orphaned outcast and firsthand witness to the fragility of life and the transience of this world. Turning away from the social chaos of his day, Amīn the religious virtuoso took upon himself the life of a world-rejecting ascetic. Resigning himself to a cave in Mount Ḥirā’ on the outskirts of Makka, he lived a life of solitude and contemplation. Constant exposure to poor passersby prevented him from escaping the mundane world and its ills. For this reason, he returned to the city to eke out a meager living, while occasionally retreating to the relative solace of Mount Hirā’.

*Warner*

Although the fortunes of the petty merchant changed when he married into wealth, his experiences in Makka and abroad ‘reawakened’ a keen sense of justice and balance. On one occasion, Amīn heard the oracle:

\[
\text{O you, enfolded in your mantle,} \\
\text{Arise and warn!} \\
\text{Glorify your lord,} \\
\text{Purify your inner self,} \\
\text{And cast off all fear.} \]

The religious virtuoso had become an inner-worldly ascetic, ‘an instrument of god.’ He took up the vocation of a local reform preacher warning that judgment was close at hand. He implored his fellow Makkans:

\[
\text{As for the orphan, oppress not,} \\
\text{As for the beggar, refuse not,} \\
\text{As for thy lord’s favor, proclaim.} \]

He publicly castigated the wealthy naysayers:

\[
\text{Woe to every slanderer, scoffer,} \\
\text{Who gathers wealth and counts it,} \\
\text{Thinking wealth will make him immortal.} \]

Lamenting their fate, he declaimed in a single incisive stroke:
Nay! He will surely be thrown into the grain grinder (al-hutama).\textsuperscript{20}

Far from being a harbinger of doom, he came bearing the message of salvation. To correct Makka’s imbalance, he called for the proper distribution of goods. In addition to a communal ‘political salvation,’ he also preached individual salvation through personal piety by means of fasting, vigils, and prayer (accompanied by ritual ablutions).\textsuperscript{21} He envisioned a coming world order in which the righteous “…shall recline on jeweled couches face to face, and there shall wait on them youths with bowls, pitchers, and a cup of purest wine (that will neither pain their heads nor take away their reason); with fruits of their own choice and flesh of fowl that they relish.”\textsuperscript{22}

Call for Social Justice

As Makka expanded into a full-fledged city, the class divide widened. The rich and powerful ‘Abd Shams and Makhzūm clans dominated the inner city and its shrine, while the remaining eight poor clans were scattered in makeshift huts strewn across the crowded, squalid outer city.\textsuperscript{23} Seven middling and lower classes emerged in Makka: caravan merchants, middlemen, debtors, clients, wage earners, mercenaries, and slaves. The wealthy mercantile class used patronage as a mechanism to tighten its grip on the rebounding population. In this system, a patron took under his wing a weak client. Dependent upon the patron for protection, the client-patron relation was a bond of subservience. In time, thirteen client groups were tied to the two most powerful Qurayshī clans.

Weight

Amin drew his followers and companions largely from the disenfranchised and the middling class.\textsuperscript{24} Among his early followers were a merchant, a youngster, and a slave.
The petty merchant Abū Bakr b. Abī Quḥāfa (known as ‘Atīq, ‘freedman’) was his confidant. The youngster whom Amīn took in during a famine was ‘Alī (d. 661 C.E.), the son of Abū Ṭālib, head of the Banū Hāshim clan. The slave purchased at ‘Ukāẓ by Ḥakīm b. Hizām was Zayd b. Ḥāritha al-Kalbī (d. 629 C.E.) who belonged to Amīn’s devoted wife and business partner, Khadīja bt. Khuwaylid (d. 619 C.E.). Among those who later sided with Amīn was the middleman ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 644 C.E.), the nephew of the outspoken sage Zayd b. ‘Amr. Amīn’s movement also attracted alienated Makkan elites. Notable was his son-in-law, ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān (d. 656 C.E.), a prosperous younger member of the powerful ‘Abd Shams clan that was vying with the Makhzūm for supremacy.

Ultimately, Makka’s societal structure became unstable under the weight of human-slavery, wage-slavery, and debt-slavery. In addition, the clientele system put an enormous burden upon the elite masters. When periodic famine struck, the dependent population looked to their patrons. This placed the Makkan leaders and priests in a precarious and potentially volatile situation. Makka was one failed food shipment away from civil strife.25 In order to shore up their position, the Banū Quraysh opened diplomatic channels with the region’s leading supplier of cereals, al-Yamāma. The ‘Abd Shams clan secured steady but limited grain shipments through a marriage alliance between Aslam and Ramla bt. al-Ḥārith. This ensured the inner Quraysh’s hold over the city center and its politics. This elite commodity, however, was accessible only to the dominant clans. The poor outer Quraysh remained exposed to famine.26 The elites, nonetheless, enjoyed virtual immunity, as they resided around the shrine’s sacred space (ḥaram) where violence was sacrilege.
Measure

Rich Makkans were given to conspicuous consumption. Public displays of generosity and largess purposefully redistributed wealth to the lower strata, thereby creating obligations and bonds of loyalty. However, these escalating contests of prestige took a destructive turn. In imitation of the proverbial Ḥātim al-Ṭāʿī, hundreds of camels would needlessly be slaughtered. Amīn condemned these unethical displays of wealth which tore apart the civic bonds uniting Makka:

I swear by this city,
You a citizen of this city,
And by the [ties binding] parent and child.
Surely we have created man to toil,
Does he think that none has power over him?
‘I have squandered vast riches!’ he boasts.
Does he think that no one sees him?
Have we not given him two eyes,
And a tongue, and two lips,
And shown him the two paths?
But he would not take the high road.

Echoing the sentiment that the city is a functional whole, he cautioned his Makkan audience about ingratitude:

Indeed, man transgresses all bounds,
Thinking himself self-sufficient.
Surely to your lord all things return.

He mused aloud:

Do they never reflect on the camels, and how they were created?
The heaven, how it was raised on high?
The mountains, how they were set down?
The earth, how it was made flat?

More and more, his sermons focused upon the gratitude owed to the creator god. The successful Makkan merchants, he felt, should show thanks “[f]or Quraysh’s political and commercial network (iḍāf), [and] their protection of the summer and winter caravans.” He admonished:
Therefore let them worship the lord of this house
Who fed them in the days of famine and shielded them from all peril.  

Moreover, he preached that when ordering the world, the just creator:

Raised the heaven on high and set the balance of all things,
That you might not transgress the balance.
Give just weight and full measure.

Amīn’s words met with strong resistance among the Makkan aristocracy. As a countermeasure, they attempted to lure him to their side by offering him a place in their ranks. These aristocrats temporarily succeeded in bending him to their will.  However, ‘Uthmān b. Maẓ‘ūn al-Jumaḥī (d. 624/5 C.E.) stepped in. He greatly strengthened Amīn’s hand against the Makkan elite.

Scattered across al-Ḥijāz were steadily growing communities of Aslam’s followers. Noteworthy among these were the actual Qurayshī Muslims active in Makka before Amīn’s public preaching. Their leader was Ibn Maẓ‘ūn. In line with Aslam’s laws, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn forbade intoxication, practiced monogamy, and observed abstinence after his wife bore him a son. Centered on the worship of al-Raḥmān, al-Yamāma’s religion attracted some affluent members of Makka’s aristocracy. Among Ibn Maẓ‘ūn’s followers were Abū ‘Ubayda b. al-Jarrāḥ, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Awf, Abū Salama b. ‘Abd al-Asad, and ‘Ubayda b. al-Ḥārith b. al-Muṭṭalib. Through the intermediacy of Abū Bakr, Ibn Maẓ‘ūn and Amīn soon made common cause and formed an uneasy coalition.

Amīn then publicly disclosed the name of the ‘heavenly king’: al-Raḥmān. His announcement caused a great stir among the Makkans both high and low. He touched a raw nerve with the mention of al-Raḥmān.
Although partially lifted, the continued Yamāmī ban on grain exports wreaked havoc on Makka. Prices rose to exorbitant levels. As the exclusive supplier of grain to the Qurayshī elite, Aslam was seen as the real culprit behind this heinous crime against the poor. He was known to the Makkans as ‘Raḥmān of al-Yamāma.’

By naming al-Raḥmān as the ‘heavenly king,’ Amīn had made an egregious error. The crowds dissipated. Whenever they encountered Amīn in public, they derided him, freely declaring their “…unbelief at the mention of al-Raḥmān.”

Perplexed, he observed: “When it is said to them, ‘Prostrate yourselves (in adoration) before al-Raḥmān,’ they say, ‘What is al-Raḥmān? Shall we prostrate ourselves before that which you command us?’” “Raḥmān,” they remarked, “is merely a shaman (kāhin) in al-Yamāma.”

Holding his ground, Amīn persisted, maintaining that al-Raḥmān “…is my lord and there is no deity but he; in him do I trust and to him do I turn.” The Makkans taunted Amīn and his companions, calling them treacherous ‘Aslamers,’ that is Muslims. Amīn’s companions countered by insisting that they were Mu’mins, literally, followers of Amīn.

Amīn’s movement was too politically sensitive to escape the notice of those in power. Uncertain over how to proceed, the Banū Quraysh immediately dispatched ‘Uqba b. Abī Mu’ayṭ and al-Naḍr b. al-Ḥārith to Yathrib (al-Madīna) in order to consult the Ḥanafī diaspora community residing there. Antagonistic towards Amīn, both couriers related: “We have come to you for a momentous matter, because a young, poor, vulgar, and orphaned youth has been repeating a splendid thing. He has claimed that he is the herald of al-Raḥmān. Indeed, the only al-Raḥmān we know is the one of al-Yamāma.” Amīn was playing with fire. His sermons had the potential to jeopardize the delicate relations between Makka and al-Yamāma. In other words, he posed an existential threat.
to the Makkan elite. With the crowds thinning out and pressure mounting, he took the most prudent course: “Pray to ‘the deity’ (allâh) or pray to al-Râhmân; whichever [name] you call upon, to him belong the most beautiful names.” 47 Amîn and his fledgling Mu’min movement were safe for the moment.

**Opposition**

**Makkan Neutrality**

The Makkan elite were caught in a bind. By bringing harm to Amîn and his Muslim followers, they risked a potential confrontation with al-Yamâma. On the other hand, by sitting on their hands, they risked the infiltration of an egalitarian ideology imimical to their vested interests. Walking a tightrope, they resolved to remain neutral. However, when rank and file members of the elite deserted to Amîn’s camp, the Makkan merchants resorted to stronger measures. Upon the death of al-Walîd b. al-Mughîra around 615 C.E., power changed hands. At the head of the indomitable Makhzûm clan now stood Abû al-Ḥakam (ca. 570-624 C.E.), the son of a Ḥanẓalî Tamîmî woman. Without recourse to physical violence, he resorted to ‘structural violence.’ 48

**Damage**

Abû al-Ḥakam imposed a trade blockade on Amîn and his kinsmen, the Banû Hâshim and Banû al-Muṭṭalib. 49 Almost immediately, Abû ʿUtba and his dependents defected from the Banû Hâshim. Amîn pleaded with Abû ʿUtba to reconsider, promising him infinitely greater rewards in the afterlife. Abû ʿUtba replied that “Amîn promises me things which I do not see. He alleges that they will happen after my death; what has he put in my hands after that?” Then he blew on his hands (yanfukhâ fi yadayhî) and said, ‘May you perish. I can see nothing in you [viz. his hands] of the things which Amîn
Shortly thereafter, the Makkan elite formalized their relationship with Abū ‘Utba who wed the sister of Abū Sufyān (d. ca. 650/1 C.E.). Her brother was head of the ‘Abd Shams clan that was in league with the Makhzūm. Amīn reviled both Abū ‘Utba – Abū Lahab (‘Father of Flame’) – and his Sufyānī bride in a scathing attack:

May the hands of Abū Lahab perish! May he himself perish!
Nothing shall his wealth and gains avail him.
He shall be burnt in a flaming fire,
And his wife, laden with firewood,
Shall have a rope of fiber round her neck!\(^{51}\)

This diatribe was to no avail; the ban continued uninterrupted. It effectively released debtors from repaying their loans to Amīn and his companions. Abū Bakr’s already modest capital dwindled further from forty to five thousand dirhams.\(^{52}\) The boycott restricted trade and marriage with Amīn’s kinsmen. However, the commercial ban was bypassed on a regular basis by close kin and allies who devised clever means of delivering foodstuffs and clothing. On one occasion, Abū al-Bakhtarī al-Asad even hampered an attempt by Abū al-Ḥakam – Abū Jahl (‘Father of Ignorance’) – to stop a flour delivery to Amīn’s wife.\(^{53}\)

Refuge
Although relatively unsuccessful, the boycott nonetheless further damaged Amīn’s credibility as leader of the joint Mu’min-Muslim movement.\(^{54}\) His activities had already placed the Qurayshī Muslims in the line of fire. In response, Ibn Maż‘ūn reasserted his own authority and shepherded his flock to safety.\(^{55}\) Around 615 C.E., eighty-three Qurayshī Muslim men fled with their women and children to their brethren and coreligionists in al-Yamāma.\(^{56}\) In al-‘Irḍ district of western al-Yamāma resided a long established Qurayshī community of miners.\(^{57}\) Situated near the Qarqarī district, these Quraysh were neighbors of Thumāma b. Uthāl, chief of the nomadic Banū Ḥanīfa.
Among the refugees were ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān and his wife Ruqayya, and Amīn’s cousin Ja‘far, the son of Abū Ṭālib. Amīn and the remaining Mu‘mins, however, stayed behind. The Makkāni merchant elite panicked when word of the flight reached them. They frantically dispatched ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ b. Wā‘il al-Sahmī and ‘Abd Allāh b. Abī Rabī‘a to retrieve the fugitives. In any case, this effort was in vain. Hawdha b. ‘Alī had already granted protection to the Qurayshī Muslims at the request of Ja‘far b. Abī Ṭālib. Summoned to Hawdha’s court, Ja‘far addressed ‘the king of the horizons’ (*malik al-afāq*):

> O king, we were an uncivilized people (*ahl al-jāhilīyya*), worshipping idols, eating carrion, committing abominations, breaking natural ties, treating guests badly, and our strong devoured our weak. Thus we were until God sent us a herald whose lineage, truth, trustworthiness, and clemency we know. He summoned us to acknowledge God’s unity and to worship him and to renounce the stones and images which we and our fathers formerly worshipped. He commanded us to speak the truth, be faithful to our engagements, mindful of the ties of kinship and kindly hospitality, and to refrain from crimes and bloodshed. He forbade us to commit abominations and to speak lies, and to devour the property of orphans, to vilify chaste women. He commanded us to worship God alone and not to associate anything with him, and he gave us orders about prayer, almsgiving, and fasting (enumerating the commands of Islām)...Therefore our people attacked us...So when they got the better of us, treated us unjustly and circumscribed our lives, and came between us and our religion, we came to your country, having chosen you above all others. Here we have been happy in your protection, and we hope that we shall not be treated unjustly while we are with you, O king.

When he heard this heartfelt appeal, Hawdha denied the Makkāni extradition request and granted the refugees asylum. Empty-handed, ‘Amr and his companion hastened to Makka. The Qurayshī Muslims remained in al-Yamāma for six years. Among those who repatriated early on was Ibn Maz‘ūn who sought to return to his affluent Qurayshī Muslim followers still residing in Makka. Sheltered by their wealth, these followers of his had had no need to flee Makka. When he arrived in Makka from Hawdha’s court, he witnessed firsthand the deteriorating situation of his coreligionists, the Mu‘mins.
Disgusted, he immediately cast off the protection of the dominant Makhzūm clan by stating defiantly that “…I am under the protection of one who is stronger and more powerful than you…” Soon thereafter, he and Amīn buried the hatchet; the two leaders resolved to coordinate their efforts and presented a united front.

Although Abū al-Ḥakam and Abū ‘Utba doggedly pushed on with the boycott, it came under heavy fire from the rest of the Banū Quraysh. In a sermon based on a dream vision, Amīn divined the outcome of his struggle against these two wealthy elites (the ‘Father of Folly’ and the ‘Father of Flame’): “I saw on my arms two bracelets of gold which I disliked so I blew on them (fa-nafakhtuhumā) and they flew away.” This soon came to pass. A group of leaders sympathetic to Amīn’s clan banded together to challenge the Makhzūm-‘Abd Shams monopoly of power in Makka. The ban was lifted, but even so, events took a turn for the worse. In 619 C.E., Abū Ṭālib, the leader of the Banū Hāshim and Amīn’s protector, passed away. He was succeeded by his brother who was none other than Abū ‘Utba, brother-in-law of Abū Sufyān and a sworn enemy of Amīn. Shortly after assuming power, Abū ‘Utba renounced Amīn. Left defenseless, Amīn scrambled.

Exodus
For nearly three years after the death of Abū Ṭālib, Amīn desperately searched for another patron and protector. Suffering from arrested development, Amīn’s movement came to a complete standstill and lost its appeal. No longer an imminent threat, he was left to rot. Having exhausted all options in Makka, he looked elsewhere to broaden his reach. He launched a revitalization campaign directed at nearby sedentary and nomadic populations.
Going from place to place, Amīn made his rounds. al-Ṭā’īf was his first stop. In the past, this self-sustaining town had proven fertile ground for fomenting dissent against their Makkan neighbors. However, following the Fijār War (ca. 580 C.E.), the Banū Quraysh under the leadership of Ḥarb b. Umayya (of ‘Abd Shams) had subjugated the Banū Thaqīf (the sedentary branch of the Hawāzin) to serve Makkan commercial interests. In fact, rich Makkan families summered in al-Ṭā’īf. Two competing factions dominated al-Ṭā’īf and its politics: the weak Aḥlāf and the stronger Banū Mālik. The Aḥlāf had allied with the Qurayshī Makhzūm clan to strengthen their hand against their rivals. Upon his arrival, Amīn pitched his bold plan to the Aḥlāf. He proposed to shake off the shackles that bound them to the Banū Quraysh. Meeting a cold reception and outright resistance, Amīn had grievously erred in tipping his hand. The Aḥlāf unceremoniously ran him out of town. Publicly humiliated, he returned to Makka a disgraced man. Bruised but not beaten, he kept his eye out for potential hosts.

During the annual market at ‘Ukāẓ, Amīn delivered his public sermons and made for the tents of the Arabs. He approached the nomadic branch of the Hawāzin, the Banū ‘Āmir b. Ṣa’ṣa’a. One of their number candidly replied to his offer: “I suppose you want us to protect you from the Arabs with our breasts and then if god gives you victory someone else will reap the benefit! Thank you, No!” Other tribes such as the Banū Kinda of Ḥaḍramawt and the Banū Kalb politely declined. Amīn crossed the line when he stepped into the tent of Thumāma, chief of the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads. Condemned by Hawdha and Aslam to waste away on the outskirts of al-Yamāma, these nomads waited in the wings for the opportune moment to strike against them. Making a serious miscalculation, Amīn stood in their midst and preached their oppressor’s sedentary
ideology. They treated him badly for his audacity. He was fortunate to come back in one piece. From this experience, he gained a practical insight into imperial politics: al-Yamāma had a fifth column. The sum of these unsavory encounters soured his attitude towards the Banū Ḥanīfa, Banū Thaqīf, and Banū Quraysh, all three of whom he bitterly cursed.69

On one occasion, a delegation travelled from Yathrib to Makka in order to explore the prospect of an alliance. Back home in Yathrib, the clan of al-Aws was fighting a bloody feud against their Banū Qayla kinsmen, al-Khazraj.70 A food shortage had sparked this conflict. Although an oasis, the acreage of tillable land in Yathrib was limited. As a result, it depended on grain imports, largely from al-Yamāma.71 However, peace and stability there had resulted in a demographic boom. To sustain its growing population, al-Yamāma had increasingly begun to import, rather than export grain supplements from surrounding areas. This extraction of resources intensified during bad harvests in al-Yamāma.72 Lucrative profits guaranteed the flow of grain into al-Yamāma’s trade vortex, bypassing local markets. Moreover, the Yathribīs faced starvation with Aslam’s ongoing embargo on cereal sales. Left in the lurch, Yathrib’s nomadic clans turned against the sedentary population. In response, the farmers fled with their families to the village citadels that were primarily designed to defend against predatory raids. As a countermeasure, the sedentary population allied with one nomadic clan for protection against another. This social cleavage in Yathrib spawned two major political alignments, al-Aws and al-Khazraj, each resorting to land grabbing in a desperate act of survival. This conflict reached a stalemate after the Battle of Bu‘āth in 617 C.E.73 Bled white by incessant violence, neither side had the upper hand. al-Aws
sought to turn the tide by forming an alliance with Quraysh’s elite. When the
disenfranchised Amīn offered al-Aws his counsel, he was met with a sharp rebuff. From
this whole affair, Amīn became aware that all was not well in Yathrib. At a market in al-
‘Aqaba (located between Makka and Minā), he came upon a party of al-Khazraj. These
war-sick deserters enthusiastically embraced his offer: “We have left our people, for no
tribe is so divided by hatred and rancor as they. Perhaps god will unite them through
you. So let us go to them and invite them to this religion of yours; and if god unites them
in it, then no man will be mightier than you.”  

Subterfuge
Amīn mulled it over, considering all the available options. Yathrib meant a clean slate, a
fresh start. On the other hand, he contemplated joining those Qurayshī Muslim and
Mu’min refugees who continued to prosper in al-Yamāma: “I have dreamt that, indeed, I
am migrating from Makka to the land where there are date-palms; [this vision] comes and
goes and it is Yamāma….” But he thought better of it. In al-Yamāma, the Mu’min
movement risked losing its independence and cohesion. He was also reluctant to hand
over the reins of power to Ibn Maẓ‘ūn. Rather than al-Yamāma, Amīn divined the
ordained destination: “…it was the city of Yathrib, and in my dream I saw that I was
swinging a sword….“  

Thereafter, he commenced negotiations with the Yathribīs. He
held two major rounds of talks with them at al-‘Aqaba. After a party of al-Khazraj
became Mu’mins, they went back to Yathrib, promising to return the following year. In
the first round of talks in 621 C.E., a joint party of al-Khazraj and al-Aws swore their
allegiance to Amīn. They then headed back to Yathrib accompanied by Amīn’s agent
and scout, Muṣʿab b. ʿUmayr. Left out of the talks, Ibn Maẓʿūn saw this as a deliberate attempt to circumvent his authority. He had to beat Amīn at his own game. He straight away vacated his family home in Makka and hastened to Yathrib.78 Aslam’s religion had already taken root in Yathrib prior to the Battle of Buʿāth.79 His task greatly simplified, Ibn Maẓʿūn succeeded in converting a substantial portion of southern Yathrib. The Yathribī Muslims boasted about their chief, al-Barāʾ b. Maʿrūr:

To us belongs the man who was the first to pray
Facing al-Raḥmān’s shrine (kaʾba) between the sacred sites.80

In the fertile village of Qubāʾ located in Upper (southern) Yathrib, Ibn Maẓʿūn built himself an independent power base. These Yathribī Muslims provided his only leverage against Amīn.

At the next annual fair, Muṣʿab returned with seventy-five Yathribīs.81 This second round of negotiations established Amīn’s nominal primacy in Yathrib. In a call to arms, these Yathribīs pledged to defend him with their lives. The leaders of Banū Quraysh learned of his plan to take refuge in Yathrib. They therefore approached him and the Yathribīs. Stalling for time, Abū al-Ḥakam proposed to postpone their departure.82 According to his terms, they were free to go after a specified interval of time had elapsed. The Yathribīs refused to be diverted from their purpose. These battle-hardened men threatened to unleash war by striking down the fairgoers. At any rate, Amīn dissuaded them. He then acquiesced to Abū al-Ḥakam’s demands. A handful of Yathribī representatives remained behind to guarantee that the Banū Quraysh honored their half of the agreement.83 Amīn, however, suspected treachery. The Banū Quraysh redoubled their efforts against his followers. Some fled, while others committed apostasy.84 After foiling an attempt on his life, Amīn stealthily escaped to Yathrib.
Resistance

The Mu‘min Movement

Surrounded by hills to the north and south, lava flows to the east and west, Yathrib was situated on a plain (*jawf*) crisscrossed by rain-fed river beds (*wādī-s*) and wells. Sprawling across this fertile plain were numerous defended villages, each outfitted with its own citadel. Over a hundred citadels dotted the landscape. The name ‘Yathrib’ originally designated only the northwest quarter, but eventually, it was applied to the whole settlement. Largely concentrated in the south, oasis agriculture in Yathrib centered on date palms with limited cereal cultivation. Feuding clans – not tribes – dominated Yathrib. Although non-belligerency treaties allowed farming to continue, intermittent violence disrupted planting and irrigation. Before the Battle of Bu‘āth in 617 C.E., the clan of al-Khazraj had forged an alliance with the sedentary Banū Naḍīr and Banū Qaynuqā‘. Their foes were the al-Aws clan and the Banū Qurayza, a formidable sedentary force. During the battle, al-Aws then formed a temporary coalition with the Banū Naḍīr and Banū Qurayza. After Bu‘āth, the Banū Naḍīr realigned with al-Khazraj whose leader was ‘Abd Allāh b. Ubayy (d. 631 C.E.), chief of the ḤUBLA b. Ghanm b. ‘Awf b. al-Khazraj clan. He commanded the unassailable fortress of Muzāḥim, strategically located in the heart of Yathrib. Cold and calculating, he had prudently abstained from the destructive Battle of Bu‘āth that took the life of his Khazrajī rival, ‘Amr b. al-Nu‘mān. The last man standing, Ibn Ubayy, the chief of al-Khazraj, emerged as the de facto leader of Yathrib.
Confederacy

Around 622 C.E., Ibn Ubayy contracted a diplomatic marriage between his daughter and the son of Abū ʿĀmir al-Rāhib, head of the ‘Amr b. ‘Awf branch of al-Aws. A joint Khazrajī-Awsī confederacy was in the works. Ibn Ubayy’s rise to power, however, did not sit well with all of the oasis dwellers. These dissenters had bypassed his authority when they opened separate talks with Amīn at al-‘Aqaba. In September 622 C.E., Amīn dared to set foot on Ibn Ubayy’s turf uninvited. Following the second meeting at al-‘Aqaba, he gave the word to his followers to emigrate. Small waves of Qurayshī Muslims and Muʾmin emigrants (*al-muhājirūn*) steadily poured into Upper (southern) Yathrib. They lodged with local Banū Qayla hosts (*al-anṣār*) in Qubā’. Like ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān and ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, most emigrated, while a handful stayed back in Makka. In addition, Qurayshī Muslims and Muʾmins still residing in al-Yamāma made their way to Yathrib. Prior to their arrival, Ibn Maẓʿūn was actively proselytizing in Yathrib. By the time Amīn alighted in Qubā’ accompanied by Abū Bakr, he found that a considerable number of its inhabitants were Muslims who had ‘Aslamed.’ Accordingly, Amīn was infuriated with Ibn Maẓʿūn. He nonetheless bit his tongue and refrained from any ill-advised action at this point. His first order of business was Ibn Ubayy. Hoping to be received with open arms, he paid him a visit. But rather than a warm welcome, Ibn Ubayy sent him packing. The tone was set. As a result, Amīn settled in Lower (northern) Yathrib among another Khazrajī clan, the Mālik b. al-Najjār. In the meantime, Abū Bakr appropriately took up residence further south in al-Sunḥ, midway between Amīn and Ibn Maẓʿūn. While Amīn built his mosque in Lower Yathrib, Ibn Maẓʿūn completed his Qubā’ mosque in Upper (southern) Yathrib. In an effort to mitigate the damage caused by Ibn Maẓʿūn, Amīn delivered a vitriolic sermon. He denigrated Aslam
by calling him a little man (*musaylima*) and a liar.\(^9^6\) In a bold move geared towards legitimating his own position against that of Aslam, Amīn the preacher staked a counterclaim to exclusive prophetic authority (*al-nubuwwa*).\(^9^7\) It was to little avail. He had already made a futile effort to redirect the prayer (*qibla*) away from al-Raḥmān’s shrine (*ka‘ba*) to Syria in the north.\(^9^8\) Yathribī Muslims such as al-Barā’ (d. 622 C.E.) continued to pray towards Makka until their dying day.\(^9^9\) The Yathribī and Qurayshī Muslims held on dearly to both their new-found religion and its bearer, Ibn Maz‘ūn. Vying for power with Ibn Ubayy, Amīn had no choice but to once again join forces with Ibn Maz‘ūn in order to forge a combined Mu‘min-Muslim confederacy. Amīn directed his town crier (*mu‘adhdhin*), Bilāl b. Rabāḥ, to promulgate the joint Mu‘min-Muslim creed (*shahāda*) that equivocated on the identity of the herald of the deity:

\[
\begin{aligned}
&\text{I witness that there is no deity but the deity (} \text{allāh}, \\
&\text{I witness that the ‘praised one’ (} \text{muḥammad} \text{) is the herald of the deity.} \quad ^{100}
\end{aligned}
\]

This satisfied both the Mu‘mins and the Muslims in Yathrib.

**Constitution**

Amīn’s aim was to weaken the tribal structure underlying Ibn Ubayy’s emergent confederacy. His ultimate goal, however, was to replace Ibn Ubayy’s tribe with his own neo-tribe.\(^1^0^1\) Moreover, the emigrants to Yathrib came not as squatters, but as rebel raiders intent on exacting their revenge on the Banū Quraysh in Makka. These emigrants (*al-muhājirūn*) and their hosts (*al-anṣār*) were in effect neo-clans.\(^1^0^2\) Membership in the Anṣār neo-clan supplanted any previous tribal affiliation with the Banū Qayla. By merging his neo-tribe with Yathrib’s sedentary population, Amīn planned to create a full-fledged confederacy bound by ‘imagined’ kinship relations and a blood oath. The confederate treaty (*ṣaḥīfa*) read:
This is a document from the ‘praised one’ (muhammad) the prophet (al-nabi) between the Mu’mins and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib, and those who join them as clients, attach themselves to them and fight the holy war with them. They form one tribe (umma) to the exclusion of others. The emigrants from Quraysh keep to their tribal organization and leadership, cooperating with each other regarding blood money and ransoming their captives according to what is customary and equitable among the Mu’mins...A Mu’min will not kill a Mu’min in retaliation for a non-believer (kāfir) and will not aid a non-believer against a Mu’min...The Mu'mins are allies (mawālī) one to another, to the exclusion of other people...Whatever you differ about should be brought before the deity (allāh) and the ‘praised one’ (muhammad) [viz. Amīn]...The plain (jawf) of Yathrib is a violence-free zone (haram) for the people of this treaty (ṣaḥīfa)...No protection will be granted to Quraysh nor to whomever supports them...They [viz. the confederates] undertake to aid each other against whosoever attacks Yathrib.

This confederate oath was between two major parties: the Mu’mins and the Muslims. On the one hand, these included the Qurayshī and Yathribī Mu’mins, and on the other, the Qurayshī and Yathribī Muslims. Yathrib was split between confederates and non-confederates (i.e., non-believers: kāfir-s). Those who had become Mu’mins and Muslims were brothers bound to one another. At the same time, they were severed from their biological kin. The oath, therefore, annulled their preexisting kinship obligations, such as seeking revenge for their blood relatives. In fact, the oath clearly indicated that “[a] Mu’min will not kill a Mu’min in retaliation for a non-believer (kāfir) and will not aid a non-believer against a Mu’min.” Amīn’s treaty also contained another clause relating to Ibn Uabay’s own Khazrajī branch. It stipulated that “[t]he Banū ‘Awf keep to their tribal organization and leadership, continuing to cooperate with each other in accordance with their former mutual aid agreements regarding blood money, and every sub-group ransoms its captives according to what is customary and equitable among the Mu’mins.” Similar parallel clauses pertained to other Khazrajī and Awsī members of Ibn Uabay’s budding confederacy. On the face of it, the treaty preserved Ibn Uabay’s power that was founded upon mutual protection and retaliation. In reality, however,
Amīn’s confederacy eroded these foundations, thereby nipping Ibn Ubayy’s power in the bud. For good measure, Amīn strengthened the hand of ‘Ubāda b. al-Ṣāmit of the Khazrajī Sālim clan against their mutual rival, Ibn Ubayy. In place of Ibn Ubayy, Amīn installed himself as chief, arbiter, and tribal prophet (al-nabī al-ummī) of the confederacy. He designated the fertile lava plain (jawf) as a space free from violence (ḥaram). Most importantly, the treaty marked Amīn’s target: the Banū Quraysh in Makka.

From Prophet to Rebel Leader
Shortly after their migration (hijra), a terrible bout of fever and famine struck Yathrib. Following a period of convalescence, Amīn’s neo-tribe mobilized. Seven months after they touched down in Yathrib, Amīn ordered the first raid (sariyya) against Qurayshī caravans. In the months to follow, he dispatched further raiding parties, one after another. On certain occasions, he himself commanded the assault. The primary objective of the raids (al-maghāzī) was to temporarily divert secondary trade away from Makka. More importantly, the immediate goal was to provision themselves at their enemy’s expense. The Banū Quraysh managed to elude some of these predatory attacks by traveling off the beaten track. Consequently, several raids ended without engaging the enemy. In time, the conflict steadily escalated from low-stakes guerilla warfare to combat at close quarters. Nearly two years after the exodus, Amīn engaged the Banū Quraysh head-on.

Rebel War
In March of 624 C.E., Amīn’s scouts reported that a valuable Qurayshī caravan loaded with bullion was en route to Badr, a trading town southwest of Yathrib. Taking a back
road, he hastened there with some three hundred of his fellow neo-tribesmen. He also sent two camel riders on a reconnaissance mission. Reluctant to jeopardize his precious cargo, the caravan leader Abū Sufyān entered the town first as a precautionary measure. Informants directed him to a well where two unidentified camel riders had stopped; here he found fresh camel dung. An expert tracker, Abū Sufyān broke apart the dung to find Yathribī date stones inside. Alarmed, he rerouted his caravan in short order and scurried to Makka. Meanwhile, a courier sped ahead to alert the Makkans of what had transpired.

In Makka, Abū al-Ḥakam rallied the masses and marshaled a force of nine hundred and fifty bound for Badr. On the way there, Abū al-Ḥakam refused to turn back when he received news of the caravan’s safe arrival in Makka. Instead, he charged headlong into danger. Shut in by mountains and sand dunes on all sides, the plain of Badr was a death trap. All the while, Amīn lay in wait for the anticipated caravan. Soon, word reached him that a formidable Makkan force was less than a week away. He prepared to resist the coming onslaught. He set up camp in the northernmost district, strategically located near two escape routes: one to Syria, the other to Yathrib. Outnumbered three to one, he evened the odds by compromising every water source south of his position. After a long march, the Qurayshī host was greeted by sand-filled wells. The fatigued and thirsty Makkans were no match for Amīn. Their only other option was to fall back into the parched desert. Abū al-Ḥakam stood his ground. Suddenly, out of the blue, the heavens opened. Rather than a deliverance, the downpour proved damning. The Qurayshīs sank in deep mire, unable to regain their footing.

Loyal to Aslam (known as ‘Abd al-Raḥmān), Ibn Maẓ‘ūn led the Muslims and charged the enemy crying out, “O People of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān!” The Mu’mins
followed suit. Headed by Abū Bakr (known as ‘Abd Allāh), they advanced into the battlefield shouting, “O People of ‘Abd Allāh!” Above the din of battle roared the shared Mu’min-Muslim slogan, “O victorious, slay!” The bodies piled up. Among the seventy Qurayshī corpses lay Abū al-Ḥakam and Ḥanẓala, the son of Abū Sufyān. With the death Abū al-Ḥakam, the fortunes of the Makhzūm clan waned. At the head of the ascendant ‘Abd Shams clan, Abū Sufyān became Makka’s leading man. In the thick of the battle, the Qurayshīs killed about fourteen confederates and fatally wounded Ibn Maz‘ūn. Although the Battle of Badr failed to achieve its primary objective, Amīn generated an enormous sum ransoming the Qurayshī prisoners of war. Makkan elite families paid upwards of forty ounces of silver per captive. In one instance, Nawfal b. al-Hārith was ransomed in exchange for a large quantity of spears. In this way, Amīn secured funds and weapons for his rebellion.

Riding on the heels of Badr, Amīn tightened his hold on Yathrib. In the following months, Ibn Maz‘ūn slowly died from his wounds. At his funeral, Amīn made a public show of grief for his fallen comrade and coreligionist. Yet he censured Ibn Maz‘ūn’s wife, Khawla bt. Ḥākīm al-Sulamiyya, when she testified that her deceased husband was in paradise. Moreover, Amīn refused to marry this poor widow whom he distrusted. After assuming leadership over the Qurayshī and Yathribī Muslims, Amīn built another mosque in Qubā’ to rival that of Ibn Maz‘ūn. Despite his efforts, isolated pockets of Muslim resistance held out in Upper (southern) Yathrib against Amīn’s grab for power. Their leader-in-exile was the head of al-Aws clan, Abū ‘Āmir. This ascetic once charged Amīn with corrupting the religion. In quick response, Amīn turned against Abū ‘Āmir’s former partner, Ibn Ubayy. In an effort to reduce Ibn Ubayy’s influence in
Yathrib, Amīn attacked his sedentary power base, the Banū Qaynuqā‘. In addition to being political allies of al-Khazraj, the Banū Qaynuqā‘ were also Amīn’s commercial rivals. Shortly after settling in Yathrib, Amīn had established a duty-free market modeled on that of ‘Ukāz.\textsuperscript{126} Originally set up near the Buṭḥān Bridge, his market rivaled that of the Banū Qaynuqā‘. In protest, a member of this mercantile class, Ka‘b b. al-Ashraf, cut the strings of the newly erected market tent. Since its location in the Banū Qaynuqā‘ quarter caused friction, Amīn’s market was moved to the district of the Banū Sā‘īda. In April 624 C.E., Amīn laid siege to the Banū Qaynuqā‘ strongholds.\textsuperscript{127} Ibn Ubayy effectively intervened on their behalf. Some converted, while the rest were exiled north to Wādī al-Qurā.

\textit{War of Retaliation}

The defeat at Badr damaged Makka’s reputation. Soft-spoken merchants carrying little sticks, the Banū Quraysh relied heavily on their collective prestige to hold together their far-flung business ventures. The crack that appeared after Badr widened. To regain their lost honor and prestige, they needed to make an example of Amīn. At great expense, they made a show of force by mounting a military expedition numbering three thousand fighters.\textsuperscript{128} In November 624 C.E., the Qurayshīs marched to Yathrib under the command of Abū Sufyān, Khālid b. al-Walīd al-Mughīra al-Makhzūmī (d. 642 C.E.), and ‘Ikrima, the son of the slain Abū al-Ḥakam.\textsuperscript{129} Although outnumbered four to one, Amīn exercised the option of picking the battle site, thereby maximizing his tactical home-field advantage. Unable to shed blood in the sacred plain of Yathrib, Amīn set up his base of operations north of the oasis at Mount Uḥud. With only a couple of horses at their disposal, his men had little hope for survival in an open-field battle.\textsuperscript{130} Therefore, he
carefully chose this site in order to level the playing field by limiting his enemy’s two advantages, their numerical strength and maneuverability.

Naturally carved into the rock face of the northern Uḥud curve was a niche large enough for Amīn’s last stand. It was over 360 feet in length and approximately 130 feet in breadth. Accessible only through a corridor about 82 feet wide, the pass was narrow enough to hold. Since it was too constricted for the passage of a cavalry formation, it served to nullify the maneuverability of the Banū Quraysh’s two hundred strong cavalry. Furthermore, it compelled the Qurayshīs to enter Amīn’s lair in small groups vulnerable to attack. Ideal for an aerial assault with a volley of arrows, the elevated terrain flanking either side of the passageway functioned as the control valve. Fifty archers guarded either side of the northern corridor, and were instructed to allow only a handful of enemy at a time to pass through unencumbered. Thereafter, they were to stop up the corridor. On the ground, his forces were ordered to fight the enemy hand-to-hand in close quarters. Once the first wave was defeated, the archers were instructed to allow another troop of enemy inside. While one group of his men fought, the others rested in two adjacent chambers north of the niche. This tag-team effort greatly reduced the enemy’s numerical strength. In this manner, he not only directed the enemy’s flow, but also regulated its numbers. Since the archers formed the linchpin of his overall strategy, he issued them strict orders to hold their position at all costs. There was no room for error. His strategy succeeded in the initial leg of the conflict. The Qurayshī death toll rose to twenty-three. With victory in sight, most of the archers prematurely abandoned their stations in order to despoil the unguarded enemy camp. With the safety valve gone, the floodgates burst open. The enemy exploded onto the scene. Amīn and
his troops were pinned against the wall. Fear and panic quickly set in. His frightened men made a frenzied push through the Qurayshī lines into the open field. Here they were mercilessly cut down by Khālid’s cavalry. Cornered, wounded, and deserted, his fingers frantically scrabbled against the solid rock wall. Gripping a handhold, he climbed to higher ground and took refuge in a well-hidden cave. At the end of the day, his forces were literally decimated. Seventy of the seven hundred were trodden underfoot. Among the dead was Muṣ‘ab b. ‘Umayr, his first envoy to Yathrib. For the Makkans, the scent of victory was in the air. But at the last minute, Abū Sufyān’s jealous political rival, Ṣafwān b. Umayya, stopped him from achieving total victory over the oasis. The Qurayshī host withdrew. His blood revenge exacted and his tribe’s reputation restored, Abū Sufyān lamented the loss of Ḥanẓala, his son who had fallen at Badr:

Uḥud for Badr,
A day for a day;
Ḥanẓala Ḥanzala,
War is but a game of chance.

After suffering this humiliating, soul-crushing defeat, it took Amīn a moment to get his bearings. In a desperate attempt to save face, he turned vengefully against his enemies at home.

The earlier incident with Ibn al-Ashraf grew to be a bone of contention between Amīn and the Banū Naḍīr who were former allies of the exiled Banū Qaynuqā‘. One day, Muḥammad b. Maslama al-Ashhalī overheard Amīn saying, ‘Will no one rid me of this troublesome man,’ or words to that effect. With four others, including Ibn al-Ashraf’s foster-brother, al-Ashhalī carried out the deed. While the Banū Naḍīr mourned the loss of Ibn al-Ashraf, Amīn recounted the events after Badr. Abū Sufyān had negotiated with the Banū Naḍīr for the safe passage of two hundred cavalrmen who then
proceeded to set ablaze the date palms in northern Yathrib. Amīn used this as a pretext for war against Ibn Ubayy’s allies. In August 625 C.E., Amīn besieged the Banū Naḍīr for two weeks. After Ibn Ubayy failed to make good his promise for reinforcements, the Banū Naḍīr surrendered and were exiled to Khaybar. Amīn won the hearts of the emigrants (al-muhājirūn) when he distributed the seized property among them. Ibn Ubayy was a convenient scapegoat for the failure at Uḥud. Lumped together with his former ally, Abū ʿĀmir, Ibn Ubayy was branded the figurehead of the traitors and dissenters (al-munāfīqūn) for his obstructive activities on behalf of the Banū Qaynuqā‘ and the Banū Naḍīr, as well as for his alleged desertion at Uḥud. Although Amīn initially planned to incorporate the sedentary population of Yathrib into his confederation, his efforts were met with heavy resistance. Those not with him were against him. The tribal prophet therefore picked off his sedentary enemies one by one, all the while consolidating his own power. As rebel leader, he never lost sight of the fact that Yathrib was only a means to an end. The conquest of Makka was always first and foremost in his mind.

**Conflict**

**Conflagration**

In order to lay his hands on Makka, Amīn widened the local conflict in search of allies. He sent out raiding parties into deadly and contested territory. The Makkans could not afford to sit idly by while Amīn conducted systematic raids on their ‘inbound’ shipments. His actions met a reaction. The threatened Makkans summoned allies to their side, one tribe after another. As a result, Amīn embroiled western and northern Arabia in conflict. He himself, however, lacked the prerequisites for power. His position
in Yathrib was weak. As a staging ground, the oasis city was deficient in critical resources necessary to wage all out war on Makka. To remedy the situation, the tribal prophet unleashed his forces.

Authority
In 625 C.E., Amīn courted danger. The aging chief of the Banū ‘Āmir b. Șa’ṣa’a, Abū al-Barā’ approached him bearing gifts. Dwelling in the liminal zone, the Banū ‘Āmir were on the brink of assimilation. During his lifetime, Abū al-Barā’ witnessed firsthand al-Yamāma’s growing sphere of influence. Consequently, the Banū ‘Āmir faced the loss of their independence. Although vowed to the Qurayshī elite’s ritual cult (hums), it struck a deal with Yathrib against their mutual Yamāmī foe. Abū al-Barā’ proposed: “O Amīn, indeed I consider this authority (amr) of yours an excellent authority. My people are behind me, and if you send a group of your companions with me, I hope that they will answer your battle cry (da’wa) and follow your authority. If they follow you, how excellent your authority will be!” Enticed, but not convinced, Amīn responded: “I fear the people (ahl) of Najd will attack my companions.” Abū al-Barā’ assuaged his fears: “Do not fear for them. I will be protection for them, and not one of the people of Najd will obstruct them.” Even though he still harbored some doubts, Amīn gathered a reconnaissance raiding party comprising forty men; among them was Abū Bakr’s trusted client (mawlā) and fellow Taymī tribesman, ‘Āmir b. Fuhayra.

Amīn quickly dispatched the raiding party to Bi’r Ma‘ūna, on the oblong Najd plateau. This watering place straddled the pasture districts of two tribes: the Banū ‘Āmir and the Banū Sulaym. Bi’r Ma‘ūna was by no means a neutral zone. Left to choose between a weak chief on the one hand, and the might of al-Yamāma on the other,
the nomads of Najd fell upon Amīn’s men without hesitation. Sixteen men were confirmed dead, including Ibn Fuhayra and Mundhir b. ‘Amr. Deeply regretting the needless loss of life, Amīn knew better than to trust the Banū ‘Āmir who had once failed to protect the royal caravan from al-Ḥīra to ‘Ukāz. This notorious incident had sparked the sacrilegious Fijār War that Amīn had witnessed in his youth. He cursed the Banū ‘Āmir for the failed raid. Ḥassān b. Thābit (d. ca. 659 C.E.) composed an elegy for Ibn ‘Amr who was slain at Bi’r Ma‘ūna:

God decreed upon Ibn ‘Amr the truth that was most appropriate.
They said to him, ‘Choose between two authorities (amrayn).’
So he chose the view that was most loyal.

Ibn ‘Amr died a martyr upholding the authority of his comrade Amīn against that of Aslam. Nonetheless, Amīn continued to maintain amicable relations with ‘Āmir b. al-Ṭufayl of the Banū ‘Āmir, the culprit responsible for inciting the Banū Sulaym at Bi’r Ma‘ūna. Amīn and Ibn Ṭufayl remained on friendly terms since they shared a common enemy, the Ghaṭafān, and its sub-branch, the Fazāra in northern Najd. Amīn had entered into al-Yamāma’s third sphere of influence. On another expedition to Najd in 626 C.E., he led over four hundred men against two Ghaṭafān sub-groups, the Anmār and Tha‘labā. When his expedition (ghazwa) came face to face with the enemy at Dhāt al-Riqā‘, the nomads fled and took to the high ground. Surrounded and vulnerable to an assault, Amīn retreated without directly engaging them.

Source
After the fruitless expedition at Dhāt al-Riqā‘, Amīn mounted a major expedition to Dūmat al-Jandal. Four hundred thirty-five miles north of Yathrib, this far-off site housed the largest emporium in Arabia and was the ultimate source of the Yamāmī-
dominated trade vortex. The objective of the campaign (*ghazwa*) was to reroute Dūma’s lucrative trade route southwest into Yathrib.\(^{151}\) With a party of one thousand men, Amīn set out in the dead of summer. Without a supply train, they acquired provisions en route. However, the water proved impotable, the terrain torturous, and grazing virtually nonexistent. Furthermore, sand and lava tracts hampered the expedition’s progress. In short, Amīn never reached Dūma proper. Over a day’s journey south of Dūma, the raiding party came upon a handful of lightly armed herders from the Banū Kalb. At the sight of supper, Amīn’s hunger-stricken men rushed and seized the herd, while the shepherds fled. Amīn then sent out parties to search for water and grazing. They returned without success. Only Amīn’s henchman al-Ashhalī captured a single prisoner.\(^{152}\) Doomed to failure, the ambitious expedition backtracked to Yathrib.

The following year, enemy forces converged on Amīn’s position.\(^{153}\) From the south marched the Banū Quraysh, Banū Thaqīf, and Banū Sulaym. From the north descended the Ghaṭafān, Fazāra, and the Banū Ṣaḍīr exiles with their allies from Khaybar. Yathrib was to face a daunting enemy numbering ten thousand infantry and six hundred horsemen. Amīn prepared for the coming storm. He had trenches dug around critical quarters of Yathrib to defend against the cavalry. As a result, Abū Sufyān’s coalition was forced to switch its strategy from a swift strike to a slow siege. However it was a drought year. Besides, there was not a single straw of hay in northern Yathrib left for grazing.\(^{154}\) Ill-equipped and ill-provisioned, the coalition broke apart. After Amīn forced him to settle for a humiliating draw, Abū Sufyān suffered a fall from grace. For this reason, his political opponents at home gained the upper hand. Ṣafwān b. Umayya, ‘Ikrima b. Abī al-Ḥakam, and Suhayl b. ‘Amr increasingly dominated Makkan
politics. When the coalition broke camp, Amīn turned against the Banū Qurayṣa who were the allies of al-Aws headed by Abū ʿĀmir, the Muslim leader-in-exile. The allegation leveled against them was conspiring with the enemy. After a short siege of their farm strongholds, the Banū Qurayṣa accepted an unconditional surrender. Saʿd b. Muʿādh, an Awsī loyal to Amīn, delivered the condemning verdict.

By eliminating the sedentary allies of Ibn Ubayy and Abū ʿĀmir, Amīn solidified his political hold over Yathrib. Thereafter, he attempted another raid on Dūmat al-Jandal. Led by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Awf in the winter of 627/8 C.E., this seven hundred man campaign also failed to reach the settlement of Dūma. South of the trade depot, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān converted al-ʿAsbagh, a petty local chief of the Banū Kalb. Otherwise, the expedition was a wasteful drain on Yathrib’s diminishing resources. To this end, Amīn fixed his eyes on agricultural centers in the northern Ḥijāz. In 628 C.E., he waged a food war on ‘the valley of villages,’ Wādī al-Qurā’. Three nomadic groups defended this string of valleys in exchange for part of the farmers’ harvest: the ‘Udhra (a branch of the Quḍāʿa whose membership included the powerful Banū Kalb), and the Fazāra and Thaʿlab a b. Saʿd b. Dhubyān (both sub-groups of Ghaṭafān). Amīn had engaged the Fazāra on two prior occasions near Wādī al-Qurā’. This expedition, however, scored a decisive victory, and the sedentary populations capitulated. Amīn exacted one-third of the harvest, to be delivered annually. The rebel leader turned statesman now possessed the prerequisites for power. In all respects, Yathrib now stood on an equal footing with Makka.
Subjugation

Emboldened by his recent success, Amīn preached the invasion (*fatḥ*) of Makka. From his dream vision, he divined a speedy victory: “You will enter the sacred space secure and fearless.” In March 628 C.E., he ostensibly set out to perform the lesser pilgrimage (*ʿumra*). The Qurayshī cavalry intercepted him on the outskirts of Makka, near the village of al-Ḥudaybiya. When representatives met, Abū Sufyān was conspicuous by his absence, Ibn Ubayy by his presence. In a strong position to bargain, Amīn negotiated favorable terms with Suhayl b. ‘Amr, a prominent member of the Qurayshī elite. The resulting ten-year armistice called for: (i) the immediate withdrawal of Amīn’s forces, (ii) the right of return for Amīn in the following year, (iii) the cessation of hostilities, (iv) the repatriation of unauthorized Qurayshīs taking refuge in Yathrib, and (v) the permissibility for either party to form alliances with other third parties. Although Amīn benefited from this chance occurrence, he never had any intention of engaging the enemy, nor of taking Makka by storm with a token force of fourteen hundred. Rather, he operated on a false pretense. His real objective was an undisclosed meeting.

Attrition

A frontal assault on Makka was quickly ruled out as a viable option. Amīn needed another way to slip the noose around Makka’s neck. Poor water and dead soil doomed Makka to the fate of ‘a barren valley.’ Therefore, he sought to exploit the Achilles’ heel of Makka: food imports. He was aware that Quraysh’s elite consumed the ‘aristocratic starch,’ wheat. On the eastern Najd plateau, al-Yamāma produced enormous quantities of cereals. In addition to barley, it cultivated its famous white wheat. al-Yamāma was the Makkān elite’s exclusive supplier. Amīn recalled his
earlier run-in with the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads who formed al-Yamāma’s fifth column. Grain shipments passed directly through their district.164 Once he realized that al-Yamāma was the key to winning a war of attrition against Makka, he dispatched a message to the gatekeeper of al-Yamāma.165 Thumāma b. Uthāl was the nomadic chief of Banū Ḥanīfa and the envious rival of Hawdha and Aslam. In March 628 C.E., before Thumāma made his grain delivery, Amīn marched to the outskirts of Makka to rendezvous with him.166

Although a nominal member of Hawdha’s coalition, Thumāma the nomad was obviously the odd man out. Once courageous defenders of al-Yamāma’s frontiers, Thumāma’s poor nomads now shouldered heavy sheep and camel taxes, while the sedentary populace prospered in peace. Thumāma was growing restless and increasingly weary of Hawdha’s rule. What is more, Aslam was a thorn in the nomads’ side. His agrarian-based religion deliberately excluded these nomads who were dependent on the sedentary cult.167 In particular, the nomads objected to the ablution rites. Aslam mandated the use of water – not sand – for ritual cleansing, thus barring the nomads out in the desert steppe from partaking in the religious rites. Alienated from god, king, and country, Thumāma wanted to liberate the nomads from their heavy burden. More importantly, he anticipated that the succession struggle over the aging king’s throne was just over the horizon. Thumāma made common cause with Amīn, the tribal prophet. In return for blocking Makka’s grain supply, Amīn offered to assist Thumāma in his bid for power when the time came.168 In addition, Amīn extended his table-community by sanctifying the use of sand for ritual ablutions. He instructed, “O you who believe! When you rise to pray, wash your faces and your hands as far as the elbow, and wipe
your heads and your feet to the ankle. If you are unclean, cleanse yourselves...[if] you can find no water, take some clean sand and rub your faces and your hands with it. The deity does not wish to burden you; he seeks only to purify you and to perfect his favor to you, so that you may give thanks.”  

To seal the deal, Thumāma performed the ablutions and proclaimed the Mu’mīn creed. He confessed to Amīn saying, “…I swear, formerly there was no one on earth I hated more than you. Now I love you best of all men. And, I swear, there was no faith more hateful to me than yours. Now your faith has become the one I love best. Moreover, there used to be no land more hated by me than your land; now your land has become the one I love best....”

Following their meeting, Thumāma entered Makka as an avowed Mu’mīn. To the Makkans he said, “I follow the best religion, the religion of Amīn.” Thereafter, he threatened, “And by god not one kernel of wheat (hiṅṭa) from al-Yamāma will come to you until the herald [viz. Amīn] permits it.” Thumāma then performed the lesser pilgrimage, reciting the ritual formula (talbiya): ‘At your service, O the deity, at your service (labbaykā allāhumma labbaykā).’ By reciting this, he had committed a sacrilegious act. The Makkans who fell upon Thumāma were bent on decapitating him. However, some Qurayshī bystanders shouted: “Let him go, you need al-Yamāma for your food.” Thereupon, he was instantly released. The Banū Ḥanīfa nomads proudly hailed their chief’s defiant stand:

It was our man who said publicly in Makka  
In the sacred months labbaykā despite Abū Sufyān.

Thumāma honored his half of the agreement by blockading the flow of food from al-Yamāma to Makka.
Amīn intensified his war of attrition. He had ten years before the truce of al-Ḥudaybiya expired. He needed to purposely inflict a famine in order to bring Makka to its knees. Along the Sarāt range, al-Ṭā’if provisioned Makka with fruits (dates and raisins), vegetables, and wine, but no cereals. As for al-Yaman, its demand for cereals outstripped its supply; it therefore exported aromatics, not food. Whereas Taymā’ (located between Wādī al-Qurā and Dūmat al-Jandal) cultivated no wheat, Khaybar in the north grew and exported dates and barley. The truce secured Yathrib from an attack from the rear. Although Amīn turned his attention north, all the while he was maneuvering against the south. Careful not to violate the armistice, he waged war on Khaybar, the only other major regional arms dealer besides al-Yamāma. His secondary objectives were to secure the northern frontier and to stockpile food and weapons. His primary objective, however, was to seize and secure a critical node in al-Yamāma’s trade network; after all, Khaybar was the last stop right before Ḥajr in al-Yamāma. Furthermore, Khaybar’s northern location made it a prime staging ground against Dūmat al-Jandal and the Najd plateau. The siege of Khaybar dragged on for one and a half months; it fell when Amīn reached a peace agreement with the surrounding tribes of Ghaṭafān and Asad. In the aftermath, he captured rations and weapons, including a siege engine that was stored for sale. In addition, the population agreed to fork over half of their annual crop. The attack on Khaybar struck fear into the hearts of nearby townspeople and villagers. The town of Fadak sued for peace in exchange for half of its land and half of its annual date and cereal harvest. Both were to be paid directly to Amīn. Thereafter, Amīn raided Najd. In the winter of 628/9 C.E., Abū Bakr led a raid against the Hawāzin, the tribal confederation to which the Banū ‘Āmir belonged. Then in 629 C.E., Amīn dispatched another small
raiding party of twenty-four against the Hawāzin at al-Siyy (in the territory of the Banū ‘Āmir).\textsuperscript{182} This two-week expedition captured a large number of sheep and cattle, as well as a handful of women. Otherwise, all of these campaigns in Najd made no territorial gains.

Despite the fact that the armistice of al-Ḥudaybiya suspended open hostilities, both sides nonetheless engaged in proxy warfare. Along the northern coast, Abū Jandal and Abū Baṣīr led a group of three hundred marauders.\textsuperscript{183} Fighting on behalf of Amīn, they despoiled Qurayshī caravans from Syria, the major foreign supplier of Makka’s foodstuffs. Combined with Thumāma’s efforts, Abū Jandal mercilessly choked Makka to death.\textsuperscript{184} In response, Abū Sufyān journeyed to Yathrib to negotiate terms. He requested the recall of Abū Jandal and the others.\textsuperscript{185} Amīn consented. During the talks, Abū Sufyān asked Amīn a frank question: “Do you not claim that you were sent out of compassion for the worlds?” Amīn nodded. In a stern rebuttal, Abū Sufyān argued: “But you have killed the fathers with the sword, and the sons with hunger.”\textsuperscript{186} From this point forward, Amīn took measures to alleviate Makka’s suffering. In addition to lifting Thumāma’s blockade, he delivered to Makka a shipment of barley and dates captured at Khaybar.\textsuperscript{187} The spoils were divided among the Qurayshī elite, namely, Abū Sufyān, Ṣafwān b. Umayya, and Suhayl b. ‘Amr. While Ibn Umayya and Ibn ‘Amr rejected Amīn’s gesture of goodwill, Abū Sufyān accepted it wholeheartedly saying, “May the deity reward my brother, for he does good unto the kindred.”\textsuperscript{188} As a result, the elites became even more polarized.\textsuperscript{189} In 629 C.E., Amīn wed Ramla bt. Abī Sufyān b. Ḥarb b. al-Ḥārith (Umm Ḥabība) (d. ca. 664/5 C.E.) who was the thrice-married daughter of Abū Sufyān b. Ḥarb b. al-Ḥārith and sister of Mu‘āwiya b. Abī Sufyān.\textsuperscript{190} This marriage
bound together the destinies of Yathrib and Makka. In March 630 C.E., Abū Sufyān and Ḥakīm b. Ḥizām graciously invited Amīn to enter Makka with his force of ten thousand.¹⁹¹ The food blockade had broken the Makkans’ will. They literally lacked the strength to resist. Amīn declared a general amnesty.¹⁹² In his quest to correct the imbalance in Makkan society, things had gone horribly awry. It unleashed pestilence, war, famine, and death. Amīn conquered Makka while simultaneously causing its precipitous decline. His victory was a defeat, his triumph a failure. This is the paradox of middle proto-Islāmic history.


9. For “The Birth of the Apostle and His Suckling,” see for example, Ibn Ishāq, *Life*, 70 f. For famine, see for example, ibid.

10. For Ḥalima, see for example, Rubin, *Eye*, 60 f. and 245.

11. For Muhammad as a shepherd, see Ibn Ishāq, *Life*, 72. For “co-liable groups,” see Ella Landau-Tasseron, *s.v. Tribes and Clans*.


17. For “co-liable groups,” see Ella Landau-Tasseron, *s.v. Tribes and Clans*, *EQ*.


22. Q. 56:15-21, translation adapted from *Koran*.

23. For the “permanent settlement at Mecca,” see Wolf, 332. For the “real functional units of Meccan society,” see ibid., 335.

“The believers or to apostasy,” see Watt, For a Second Makkan Period (see Bell, 110) chapter (Q. 17:73-75) alluding to “…some opposition among Yamān b. Mazʿūn, Kitāb al-Tabaqāt al-Kabīr (Biographien Muhammeds), vol. 3, part 1, ed. Eduard Sachau (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1904), esp. 286.

For ‘Uṭmān b. Mazʿūn, see Watt, M/Prophet, 69; Watt, M/Mecca, 115; C.E. Bosworth, s.v. Khawla bt. Ḥākīm, EI2; Ibn Istāq, Life, 116 and 168; and A.J. Wensinck, s.v. ‘Uṭmān b. Mazʿūn, EI2.

For Ibn Mazʿūn’s followers, see Watt, M/Prophet, 69; Ibn Sa’d, s.v. ‘Uṭmān b. Mazʿūn, 286; and Watt, M/Mecca, 87, and cf. 90.

The accounts of Muḥammad’s difficulties with ‘Uṭmān [b. Mazʿūn] suggest that he had no easy time in canalizing the hopes and ideas of such preexisting monotheists” (Watt, M/Mecca, 97). “…[T]here was a sharp division of opinion within the embryonic Islamic community. After giving the first list of emigrants from Ibn Īṣāq, Ibn Ḥishām adds a note to the effect that the leader was ‘Uṭmān b. Mazʿūn…’Uṭmān originally came to Muḥammad with four friends, quite important men, and was doubtless the foremost of them. He is thus almost certainly to be regarded as the leader of a group within the Muslims which was in some sense a rival to the group led by Abū Bakr. The remark of ‘Umar’s, mentioned by Ibn Sa’d, that, until after the deaths of Muḥammad and Abū Bakr, he thought little of ‘Uṭmān because he died in his bed, is a relic of the rivalry between ‘Uṭmān b. Mazʿūn and the group of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar” (Ibid., 115). For a Second Makkān Period (see Bell, 110) chapter (Q. 17:73-75) alluding to “…some opposition among the believers or to apostasy,” see Watt, M/Mecca, 133. For ‘Uṭmān b. Mazʿūn as a latecomer along with his brothers, Qudāma and ‘Abd Allāh, cf. Ibn Īṣāq, Life, 116.


Q. 25:60, cited in ibid.

al-Askar, al-Yamama, 82.


“…[I]t would appear that the name the Muslims would most naturally have meant ‘the Traitors’” (Margoliouth, “On the Origin,” 473).

Translation adapted from al-Askar, al-Yamama, 82. For ‘Uqba b. Abī Mu’ayy, see Uri Rubin, s.v. Abū Jahl, EI2; and Ibn Īṣāq, Life, 164 f. For al-Naḍr b. al-Ḥarith, see Ch. Pellat, s.v. al-Naḍr b. al-Ḥarith, EI2; and Ibn Īṣāq, Life, 162 f.


For “The Boycott of the Clan of Hāshim,” see Watt, M/Prophet, 74-82, esp. 79 f.; and Ibn Īṣāq, Life, 159 ff.

M/Prophet, 2010), 64-65.

For "economic pressure," see Watt, M/Prophet, 75.

For this and similar episodes, see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 160 f. and 172. For Abū al-Bakhtārī al-Asad, see Watt, M/Mecca, 92, 121, 174, and 181.

For "...[T]he boycott must be adjudged a comparative failure" (Watt, M/Prophet, 77).

For ʿUthmān b. Maʿzūn’s leading role in the flight, see Watt, M/Mecca, 110 and 115; and "Ibn Hishām’s Notes," 721, Note 190.

For "The Migration to Abyssinia," see Watt, M/Prophet, 65-75; Ibn Ishāq, Life, 146 f.; and Donner, Muhammad, 42. For Muhammad’s dream vision about al-Yamāma as the destination of his hijra, see Makin, Representing, 115; and Muslim, Sahih Muslim (al-Riūḍ: Bayt al-Afkār al-Dawliyya, 1998), 934. “But the Meccans had no timber and no ships...” (Patricia Crone, Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 4 f.).

For "The Betrayal by Abū Lahab," see Watt, M/Prophet, 79-82; and Watt, M/Mecca, 120.

For "The Apostle Goes to Thaqīf to Seek Help" and "The Apostle Offers Himself to the Tribes," see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 192-197; and Watt, M/Mecca, 137-141.

For "The Sacreligious War," see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 82; "Ibn Hishām’s Notes," 709 f., Note 124; Bernjian, s.v. Abū Sufyān; and Ed., s.v. Ḥarb b. Umayyā b. ‘Abd Shams, EI².


For Muhammad’s low estimation of these tribes, see Makin, “Re-thinking,” 173; and Kister, “Struggle,” 13.


"The grain of al-Yamama was sold in Mecca, Medina and Basra” (al-Askar, al-Yamama, 49). “[T]here is evidence that wheat was exported from al-Yamāma to Mecca not only after the rise of Islam, but during Muhammad’s lifetime as well” (Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 254).

"Date palms were cultivated in all oases, but in the ‘Ird valley and in al-Khardj grain was grown. In good years corn [viz. ‘kernel of wheat (ḥinta)’ (see Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 262]) was sent to Mecca, but in bad years it was not even sufficient for local consumption” (W. Caskel, s.v. Bakr b. Wā’il, EI²).

For the Battle of Buʿāth, see Watt, M/Mecca, 142; and Ibn Ishāq, Life, 197.

Translation adapted from Ibn Ishāq, Life, 197-198. Also see Muslim, 934. For al-ʿAqaba, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. al-ʿAqaba, EI².

Translation adapted from Makin, Representing, 115; and Muslim, 934.

For “The Pledges of al-ʿAqaba,” see for example, Watt, M/Mecca, 145.
For ‘Uthmān b. Maz’ūn’s hasty departure, see ibid., 183 f.

“Tradition records claims made on behalf of two members of the Aws killed prior to the battle of Bu’āth that they died as Muslims” (Ibid., 144). For Iyās b. Mu‘ādh’s status as a Muslim “before the battle of Bu’āth,” see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 197.

Cited in “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 727, Note 237.

For “The Second Pledge at al-Aqabah,” see Watt, M/Mecca, 145; and Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 201-204.

For the negotiations, see Michael Lecker, “Did the Quraysh Conclude a Treaty with the Anṣār prior to the Hijra?,” in The Biography of Muhammad: The Issue of the Sources, ed. Harald Motzki (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 164 and passim.

For the threat to unleash war, see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 205; For the “…Anṣār who were also entitled to be called Muhājirūn,” see Lecker, “Did the Quraysh Conclude a Treaty,” 164 f.

For examples of those who took flight or “…succumbed to the temptation to apostatize,” see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 216 f.

For the name ‘Yathrib,’ see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. al-Madīna, EI². For “The Terrain around Medina,” see Hamidullah, Battlefields, 23.


For the shifting alliances, see ibid., 40 f. and 44. For “The Near-Crowning of ‘Abd Allāh b. Ubayy,” see ibid., 48; and W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. ‘Abd Allāh b. Ubayy, EI².

For the fortress of Muzāḥim, see Lecker, “King Ibn Ubayy,” 49. For ‘Amr b. al-Nu‘mān, see ibid., 46.

For the ‘Amr b. ‘Awf and Abū ‘Amir al-Rāḥib, see ibid., 40 and 56.

For the date of the hijra, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Hidjra, EI².

For the ‘waves’ of emigration, see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 218; Watt, M/Mecca, 150; and Watt, M/Prophet, 66.

…”[It may be noted that both Jews (Sūra xxviii, 53) and Christians (Ibn Isḥāq, pp. 209, 210) are represented as declaring that they had aslama’d before the Prophet” (Margoliouth, “On the Origin,” 476).

For Ibn Ubayy’s harsh response to Muhammad, see Lecker, “King Ibn Ubayy,” 51.

For Muhammad’s lodgings, see ibid., 48. For Abū Bakr’s lodgings, see Watt, s.v. Abū Bakr, EI²; and al-Balādūrī, s.v. Abū Bakr, 166 f.

For the Qubā’ mosque, see Claude Gilliot, s.v. Mosque of the Dissemination, EQ.

For this sermon, see al-Askar, al-Yamama, 87; and cf. Makin, Representing, 160.

For Musaylima’s “claim to the prophethood,” see for example, Ibl Kathīr, Life, vol. 4, 70.


For al-Barā’ b. Ma‘rūr, see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 202; Watt, M/Medina, 202; and K.V. Zetterstēen, s.v. al-Barā’, EI².

For the mu‘ādh din and the shahāda, see Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 56; Caetani, Annali, vol. 2, part 1, 639, and 641; Note 2; al-Balādūrī, Futūḥ, 90; and Q. 3:144, 33:40, 47:2, and 48:29. For the chronology of the Madīnan Period chapters, see Bell, 110 f. For muḥammad as a title, cf. Ibn Isḥāq, Das Leben, vol. 1, part 1, 117; and Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 86. For Bilāl b. Rabāḥ, see W. ’Arafat, s.v. Bilāl b. Rabāḥ, EI².

For Muhammad’s neo-tribe, cf. Watt, M/Mecca, 148 and 153.

For the Anṣār clan/tribe, see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 213 and 230; and W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. al-Anṣār, EI².

“Ummah appears to have the sense of tribe…Elsewhere umma is interpreted as qabīla…” (Michael Lecker, The “Constitution of Medina”: Muhammad’s First Legal Document (Princeton: Darwin Press, 2004), 90 f.).


For the parties involved, see Lecker, “Constitution of Medina”, 40.

For the “Brotherhood between Emigrants and Helpers,” see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 234.

For “blood vengeance,” see Lecker, “Glimpses,” 68.


Translation adapted from Lecker, “Constitution of Medina”, 32.

“On the face of it, the agreement upheld the tribal system of Medina. But in reality, families – and needless to say, tribal groups – were split between those who followed Muḥammad (i.e., the mu’minūn) and all the others” (Lecker, “Glimpses,” 68). For ‘Ubādā b. al-Ṣāmit, see Lecker, “King Ibn Ubayy,” 48.
For al-nabī al-ummī, see Lecker, “Constitution of Medina”, 90-91; and cf. R. Paret, s.v. Ummī, EI².

For “Fever Attacks the Apostle’s Companions,” see Ibn Iṣḥāq, Life, 279 f.


For Badr, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Badr, EI²; and Hamidullah, Battlefields, 13-21.

“The day of the Battle of Badr it had rained and historians record that as a consequence the Quraishite camp had become a swamp…” (Hamidullah, Battlefields, 15).

For this ‘watchword,’ see ibid., 19 f.; and Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 2, 276.

For this ‘watchword,’ see Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 2, 276; and Hamidullah, Battlefields, 19. For Ḥabū Bakr as ‘Abd Allāh, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Abū Ḥabīr, EI².

For this ‘watchword,’ see Hamidullah, Battlefields, 20.

For Hānẓala b. Abī Sufyān, see ibid., 28, fn. 1. For the rise of Abū Sufyān in Makka, see Watt, M/Mecca, 92.

For the ransoming of captives, see Hamidullah, Battlefields, 21.


For Khawla bt. Ḥakīm, see Wensinck, s.v. ‘Uthmān b. Maz‘ūn; Bosworth, s.v. Khawla bt. Ḥakīm; and Watt, M/Medina, 399.

For an example of Muḥammad’s distrust of Khawla bt. Ḥakīm, see al-Wāqiḍī, Life, 458.


For Abū ‘Amir, see Gilliot, s.v. Mosque of the Dissension; and Ibn Iṣḥāq, Life, 278.


For the Banū Qaynuqāʾ episode, see A.J. Wensinck, s.v. Qaynuqāʾ, EI². For this episode as a trebling, see Marco Schöller, “Ṣīra and Taḥfīr: Muhammad al-Kalbī on the Jews of Medina,” in The Biography of Muḥammad: The Issue of the Sources, 26-27; and Gregor Schoeler, The Biography of Muḥammad: Nature and Authenticity, trans. Uwe Vagelpohl, ed. James E. Montgomery (New York and London: Routledge, 2011), 11-12. However, Schoeler also notes that “[c]onverted descendants of the Jewish tribes expelled by the Prophet from Medina are said to have given Ibn Iṣḥāq information about his respective campaigns” (Schoeler, Biography, 26).

For the problem of numbers, see for example, Gottfried Hagen, “The Imagined and the Historical Muḥammad,” JAOS 129:1 (2009): 105.

For Uhūd, see Hamidullah, Battlefields, 22-28.

…”[O]n the day of Uhud [we only had] a single horse” (al-Wāqiḍī, Life, 374).

For “A Description of the Terrain of Mount Uhūd,” see Hamidullah, Battlefields, 24. For a passing reference to Mount Uhūd, see Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 4, 68. See Muhammad Hamidullah, Map of the Battlefield of Uhud [map], 2cm = 100 metres, in Hamidullah, Battlefields, 22.

For this envoy, see F. Buhl, s.v. Muṣ‘āb b. ‘Umayr, EI².

For this rivalry, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Abū Sufyān, EI².

Cited in Hamidullah, Battlefields, 28.


For the day of Ka‘b b. al-Ashrāf’s death, see Watt, s.v. Ka‘b b. al-Ashrāf. For Abū Sufyān’s dealings with the Banū Naḍīr, see Berndjan, s.v. Abū Sufyān; and cf. V. Vacca, s.v. Naḍīr, EI².

For the length of the siege, see Vacca, s.v. Naḍīr. For the date of the siege, see Watt, s.v. Ka‘b b. al-Ashrāf. For ‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥubayy’s intercession on behalf of the Banū Naḍīr, see Lecker, “King Ibn Ḥubayy,” 44 f.

For ‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥubayy’s alleged desertion, see Hamidullah, Battlefields, 24. For ‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥubayy as the “leader of the munāfīkūn,” see A. Brockett, s.v. al-Munāfīqūn, EI². For “Some Account of the Hypocrites,” see Ibn Iṣḥāq, Life, 277 ff.

For ‘inbound’ shipments, see Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 256 f.

Translation adapted from al-Wāqīḍī, Life, 169.

Translation adapted from ibid.

For ‘Āmir b. Fuhayra, see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 116.


For the instigation of ‘the second’ Fījār War, see Fück, s.v. Fīджār.

Translation adapted from al-Wāqīḍī, Life, 173; and al-Wāqīḍī, Maghāzī, vol. 1, 353.

For the Ghāṭafān as their common enemy, see W. Caskel, ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a, EI²; and J.W. Fück, s.v. Ghaṭafān, EI².

For “The Expedition of Bi‘r Ma‘ūna,” see Hamidullah, Battelfields, 29; and al-Wāqīḍī, Life, 194-197; and al-Wāqīḍī, Maghāzī, vol. 1, 395.

For “The First Moslem Expedition against Dūma (626 A.D.),” see Musil, Arabia Deserta, 535 ff.; al-Wāqīḍī, Life, 197 f.; and Vecchia L. Vaglieri, Dūmat al-Jandal, EI².

For the alleged reason behind Muḥammad’s attempt to reroute trade, see al-Wāqīḍī, Life, 197.

For the captive, see Musil, Arabia Deserta, 535. For al-Asḥālī, see al-Wāqīḍī, Life, 205 f.

For enemy troop movements at Khandaq, see Hamidullah, Battelfields, 30; and W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Khandaq, EI².

“They had arrived at a time when there was no wild or cultivated crop. The people had harvested a month before and brought in the harvest and straw…Their camels were almost destroyed by starvation. The night they arrived there was a drought in the city” (al-Wāqīḍī, Life, 218).

For Abū Sufyān’s fall from grace, see Watt, s.v. Abū Sufyān.

For the Banū Qurayza episode and Sa‘d b. Mu‘ādh, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Qurayza, EI²; and Lecker, “King Ibn Ubayy,” 45.

For “The Second Moslem Expedition against Dūma (627 – 628 A.D.),” see Musil, Arabia Deserta, 537 ff.

For Wādī al-Qurā’, see M. Lecker, s.v. Wādī ‘l-Qurā’, EI²; and Ibn Ḥawqal, 31. For the Quḍā‘a, see M.J. Kister, s.v. Qudā‘a, EI².

Q. 48:27, translation adapted from Koran. For the armistice and the participants, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. al-Hudaybiya, EI²; Watt, s.v. Abū Sufyān; Bernjian, s.v. Abū Sufyān; Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 499-507, esp. 504-507; and Watt, s.v. al-Madīnā.

For the terms of the armistice, see Watt, s.v. al-Hudaybiya. For historical accidence (Gk. tuchē) as a factor all too often omitted in the analysis of history, see for example, Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in The Vocation Lectures, 4.

“…Mecca, unlike some other caravan cities, did not have an oasis or agricultural area as its center. The grudging volcanic dust which passed for soil in Mecca would have discouraged even the most dedicated peasant cultivator; and given the severe shortage of reliable wells which marked the town, it is not difficult to see why Mecca had only the most limited agriculture…In short, Mecca was unable to produce the basic foodstuffs required to support its growing population on the eve of Islam. The city relied on the outside world…for the staples needed to sustain life” (Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 251-254). Koran (Q. 14:37).

For the ‘aristocratic starch,’ see Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 252.

For “Agricultural Crops,” see al-Askar, al-Yamama, 48 f.

For “The District of Qarqa‘,” see ibid., 22.

For Muḥammad’s envoy to Thumāma b. Uthāl, see Kister, “Struggle,” 15; Watt, M/Medina, 132 f.; Makin, Representing, 131 f.; and al-Ṭabarānī, Conquest, 106, fn. 697.

should be referred to among the delegations occurring in 9 A.H. This is because it is evident from the text of his story that it relates to prior to the conquest of Mecca...This is why the hāfiz al-Bayhaqī narrates the story of Thumāma b. Uthāl before the conquest of Mecca; this is most likely to have been the case. However, we have given it here in deference to al-Bukhārī..." (Ibid., 66, emphasis added). “…[al-Yamāma’s] granary was the main source of Quraishite import of grain. When Thumāma b. Uthāl, a chief of al-Yamāma, stopped at the instance [sic] of the Prophet, exports of grain, historians record that a famine in Mecca was the result” (Hamidullah, Battlefields, 37).

167 For a comparative case where “[t]he nomads received the benefit of urban facilities such as markets (musabala) and institutionalized religious rites,” see Kostiner, 3-4.
168 Q. 5:6, translation adapted from Koran.
169 For “[t]he story of Thumāma’s conversion,” see Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 262 f., fn. 36.
172 Translation adapted from Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 262. Also see “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 791 f., Note 915.
173 For the location of Taymā, see Simon, 83.
174 For the arms industry in al-Yamāma, see al-Askari, Al-Yamama, 51 and 53. For Khaybar’s weapons, see Veccia L. Vagliari, s.v. Khaybar, EI².
175 For the conclusion of peace with the Ghaṭafān and Asad, see Rubin, “Muḥammad’s Curse,” 257 f.
176 For Fadak, see Veccia L. Vagliari, s.v. Fadak, EI²; and al-Wāqidi, Life, 347 f., and cf. 355 ff.
177 For “The Expedition of Abū Bakr to Najd,” see al-Balādhurī, s.v. Abū Bakr, 160; and al-Wāqidi, Life, 355. For the date of this expedition, see al-Wāqidi, Maghāzī, vol. 2, 722.
178 For “The Expedition of Shūjā’ b. Wāḥib to al-Siyy,” see al-Wāqidi, Life, 371. For the date of this expedition, see al-Wāqidi, Maghāzī, vol. 2, 753. For al-Siyy, see Caskel, s.v. ‘Aмир b. Saʿṣa’a.
179 For the blockade imposed by Abū Jandal and Abū Baṣr, see Rubin, “Muḥammad’s Curse,” 252 ff. For Syria as a supplier, see Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 254 f.
180 “Among the food imports of Mecca, cereals from al-Yamāma were also important. According to one of the stories of the Sīra, when as a result of Muḥammad’s clever policy, the chief of one of the clans of Banū Ḥanīfah, Thumāma b. Uthāl, converted to Islam, after his return home cereal import was discontinued and the Quraysh were threatened with famine” (Simon, 94 f.).
181 For Abū Sufyān’s diplomatic efforts, see Rubin, “Muḥammad’s Curse,” 253.
183 For the blockade of Makkah, see Makin, Representing, 132; and Eickelman, 29.
184 For the intensification of political rivalries in Makka, see Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 264, fn. 42.
185 Cited in Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 263. Also see “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 791 f., Note 915.
186 For Muḥammad’s decision to end the blockade of Makkah, see Makin, Representing, 132; and Eickelman, 29.
187 Translation adapted from Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 262. Also see “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 791 f., Note 915.
188 Translation adapted from Hawting, Idea of Idolatry, 22. For the talbiya, see Peters, Muhammad, 107 and 118. Also see “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 791 f., Note 915.
189 Translation adapted from “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 791, Note 915.
191 For the date of this expedition, see al-Wāqidi, Life, 355.
192 For the general amnesty, see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 550 and 553.
CHAPTER FOUR  
LATE PROTO-ISLĀM

Consequences  
Decline of Makka  
For nearly a decade, Amīn raided and plundered Qurayshī caravans bound to and from Makka. These raids achieved his goal: the surrender of Makka. The city, however, suffered the long-term consequences. Rather than diverting commerce away from Makka temporarily, Amīn unintentionally caused a permanent decline in Makkan trade. Although he fulfilled his ambition of restoring the Makkān shrine (ka’ba) to his Banū Hāshim clan, his raids had the opposite effect. In Makka, commerce and cult went hand in hand. Once secondary trade routes had circumvented al-Ḥijāz, the shrine fell off the map. Merchants and pilgrims alike bypassed this remote and dangerous destination. There were no pilgrims left to object when Amīn destroyed the idols in the shrine. On the ground, the population was confronted with increasingly harsh realities. The bankrupt, famine-struck city struggled back onto its feet in the immediate aftermath of the conquest. On shaky legs, Makka was afflicted with chronic instability and poverty. In response, Amīn devised a contingency plan to arrest its fall.

Instability  
From 623 C.E. onwards, Amīn had obstructed the free movement of Makkan trade traffic. Raids on inbound shipments aimed to cut it off from its suppliers. For example,
in 624 C.E., there were two major raids, one at Badr and the other at Nakhla near al-Ṭā’if. At Nakhla, ‘Abd Allāh b. Jaḥsh had managed to seize a Qurayshī caravan. Amīn had never abandoned this policy, as the raid at al-‘Īṣ in 627 C.E. clearly demonstrates. Consequently, buyers and suppliers went elsewhere. In addition, he had conducted outbound raids. Amīn’s plundering of caravans leaving Makka had deprived the Qurayshī merchants of their investment capital. By 624 C.E., Amīn had effectively blockaded the Makka-Syria route. For this reason, the Qurayshī commercial elite explored an alternative route to ‘Irāq by way of the Najd plateau. On “the expedition to al-Qarada,” he commanded Zayd b. Ḥāritha and a troop of one hundred to block the passage of Ṣafwān b. Umayya’s caravan to ‘Irāq. Northeast of Makka, Zayd intercepted the Makkans on the foothills of Mount ‘Irq (Ḍhāt al-‘Irq) in Wādī al-‘Aqīq. They ransacked the caravan and captured a hoard of gold and silver coins, as well as a handful of prisoners. Investments with a potential one hundred percent profit returned to Makka empty-handed. With no capital, profits, and reinvestment, commerce and finance in Makka ground to a halt.

The high cost of war added to the city’s financial burdens. Makka’s defeat at the Battle of Badr had damaged its reputation as a credible middleman. Even though the Battle of Uḥud had ended with a Qurayshī victory, it was a situation of diminishing returns. The financial costs mounted when the Banū Quraysh hired over two thousand mercenaries. They had committed a small fortune to winning the war. At the end of the day, Abū Sufyān had returned with prestige, but no tangible war booty. Over the course of a decade, the sustained conflict had drained Makka’s resources, gradually bankrupting the city. De-urbanization soon set in. The exodus (hijra) from Makka had already left
many family homes (such as that of the Banū Jaḥsh) without tenants. Those who were able, left the city. Homes were either vacated or altogether abandoned with their doors flung wide-open. Meanwhile, famine and disease whittled away at the remaining population. Property values in Makka plummeted. The depopulated city was in ruins. All the while, the elite clung to their diminishing wealth and the poor to their withering lives.

Poverty
During his sermon, Amīn addressed those hardest hit by ‘extreme hunger’ (makhmaṣa) and permitted them to eat “forbidden” foods such as carrion and blood: “He who is forced by extreme hunger to eat of what is forbidden, not intending to commit sin, will find the deity forgiving and merciful.” He also repeated his old Makkān and earlier Yathribī sermons on poverty, while simultaneously implementing similar policies to feed the hungry. The main ‘recipients’ of charity were kin (dhū al-qurbā) and the poor (al-miskīn). He implored the rich to aid their less fortunate relatives and the urban needy. He preached that the deity gave the rich surplus wealth (al-fadl) so that it might trickle down to the impoverished. In this way, he urged his wealthy followers to practice reciprocity. The top-down redistribution of wealth was held to be morally commendable: “Such is the grace (al-fadl) of the deity: He bestows it on whom he will. His grace is infinite.” At the same time, Amīn condemned hoarding: “Never let those who hoard the wealth which the deity has bestowed on them out of his grace (min faḍlīh) think it good for them: indeed it is an evil thing for them. The riches they have hoarded shall become their fetters on the day of resurrection. It is the deity who will inherit the heavens and the earth. The deity is cognizant of all your actions.”
In addition to wealthy donors, Amīn designated three other sources of charity funding: (i) war booty, (ii) inheritance, and (iii) almsgiving. War booty largely denoted chattel or portable property seized through raids conducted by means of camelry or cavalry. He instructed, “Know that one fifth of your war booty (aghanimatum) shall belong to the deity, the herald (al-rasūl), the herald’s kindred, the orphans, the destitute, and the traveler in need: if you truly believe in the deity and what we revealed to our servant (‘alā ‘abdīnā) on the day of victory, the day when the two armies met. The deity has power over all things.”10 Inheritance was the second means of redistributing wealth. “If relatives, orphans, or needy men are present at the division of an inheritance, give to them, too, a share of it, and speak kind words to them.”11 Lastly, Amīn preached the purification of wealth through almsgiving: “And they were enjoined only to serve the deity and to worship none but him, to attend their prayers and to render the alms levy (al-zakāt). That, surely, is the correct religion (dīn).”12 As in early Yathrib, the destitute (fuqarā’) became ‘the center of the community’ in Makka.13

Amīn relinquished any preconceived ideas of making impoverished Makka his headquarters. After the conquest of Makka, Abū Sufyān moved to Yathrib, the seat of power.14 The elite of Banū Quraysh followed suit. With Makka out of the loop, Yathrib remained Amīn’s capital. He, however, stayed in Makka for about two weeks to preach and receive homage. He then appointed ‘Attāb b. Asīd governor, making him responsible for disaster relief.15 While in Makka, Amīn experienced an acute shock. He had faithfully executed his charge. Yet his mission remained incomplete. In order to correct the local imbalance, he had first to correct the regional imbalance. He had realized long ago that al-Yamāma was the root of iniquity and conflict in western Arabia.
stability in al-Yamāma came at a high price. The Makkān standoff that had ended with Amīn’s expulsion (hijra) stemmed from a food crisis. It was precipitated by Aslam’s embargo on cereal exports. The catalyst was the same for the futile and self-destructive Ḥāṭib Wars in Yathrib that ended with the Battle of Bu‘āth. This civil war that pitted clan against clan was essentially a war over food. al-Yamāma’s unchallenged trade monopoly had created a food shortage, and al-Ḥijāz continued to pay dearly. In his effort to restore Makka, Amīn prepared to strike at the heart of the problem. From the pangs of hunger issued forth the pangs of war.

**Restoration**

Makka had been virtually destroyed by Amīn’s own hand. In order to restore the city, he challenged al-Yamāma’s trade monopoly. To implement an independent economic policy, he needed direct control over the market of ʿUkāẓ. The prolonged conflict in al-Ḥijāz had already partially destabilized al-Yamāma’s preexisting trade network. To compensate, trade was diverted away from western Arabia. For this reason, he took measures to make al-Ḥijāz independent and self-sufficient. As a temporary commercial solution, he established a local trade circle. This, however, was only the first step. He instituted far-sighted policies deliberately meant to change the rules of the game. In this way, he engaged in a competitive struggle that challenged al-Yamāma’s monopoly.

**Destabilization**

The annual trade fair of ʿUkāẓ was held between ‘northern’ Nakhla and al-Ṭāʿīf. Immediately after conquering Makka, Amīn sent Khālid b. al-Walīd to destroy the old pilgrimage site at Nakhla. Thereafter, Amīn marched against al-Ṭāʿīf. He mobilized twelve thousand men: ten from the Makkān invasion – including the Banū Sulaym – who
were reinforced by another two thousand Makkans and nomads from the Dhubyān b. Ghaṭafān and Banū Asad. Meanwhile, under the command of Mālik b. ‘Awf, the Hawāzin laid an ambush for Amīn and his men at the oasis of Ḥunayn (about thirty miles northeast of al-Ṭā’īf). Early on in the engagement, the element of surprise worked to their advantage. Caught off-guard, Amīn’s men retreated. This would nearly have guaranteed the Hawāzin victory had not Khālid regained his composure and rallied Amīn’s forces. They routed the Hawāzin and its sub-branch, the Thaqīf. The unexpected reversal at the battle caught the Hawāzin off balance. The men fled to al-Ṭā’īf, leaving their families and flocks behind. Amīn seized the women, children, and camels as war booty.

Among the women captured was Shaymā’, the daughter of Amīn’s wet nurse, Ḥalīma. Her tribe, Banū Sa’d b. Bakr, belonged to the Hawāzin. Some of these had fought with Amīn at Ḥunayn, others against him. After Amīn released his milk-sister, he pursued the fugitives who took refuge with their Thaqīfī kinsmen at al-Ṭā’īf. He was accompanied there by the ‘Āmir b. Sa’ṣa’a. This Hawāzin subgroup deserted to his side after the defeat at Ḥunayn. al-Ṭā’īf stood on a promontory surrounded by fertile villages. With the capture of Makka, it was left without a market for its fruit produce. With the defeat of the Hawāzin, it was also left without nomadic support. Its route to ‘Ukāz blocked, it capitulated. Subsequently, Amīn’s numbers surged. Dependent upon sedentary supplies, the surrounding nomads were compelled after the fall of Makka and al-Ṭā’īf to join the tribal prophet. In exchange, he affirmed their rights above all others to contested pasture districts and water wells. With the capture of the markets at ‘Ukāz,
and Khaybar to the north, al-Ḥijāz was once and for all cut off from the invisible hand of al-Yamāma.

Timed around the fall harvest, al-Yamāma’s annual market cycle commenced at Dūmat al-Jandal in November. From July through September, the markets set up shop in al-Ḥijāz. From August to September in the month of Dhū al-Ḥijja, the markets opened at Dhū al-Majāz, a day away from Makka. Although it was not a commercial destination, pilgrims once flocked to the sacred grove of Nakhla. During this month, Makka benefited from lucrative secondary trade and pilgrimage. In September, the markets cycled north to Nuṭāt Khaybar. Finally, in October, the trade sequence came to a close at Ḥajr in al-Yamāma. Like a water-wheel, once complete, the market cycle was bound to repeat. However, Amīn’s incessant raiding and the seizure of both Khaybar and ‘Ukāẓ destabilized the west Arabian trade routes, thereby forcing their closure. Rather than proceeding from Rābiya in the south to ‘Ukāẓ in the northwest, trade now flowed from Rābiya to Najrān, then directly to Ḥajr in al-Yamāma by way of al-Falaj (SEE MAP 4.1). As a result, ‘Ukāẓ, Majanna, Dhū al-Majāz, and Khaybar were simply cut out of the market cycle. In the month of Dhū al-Ḥijja, neither pilgrims nor residual trade now made their way from Dhū al-Majāz to Makka.

Restructuring
To counteract the negative effects on al-Ḥijāz’s economy, Amīn established his own shorter circle of market fairs (mawāsim) (SEE MAP 4.1). Although this local circle was pilgrimage-oriented, it was coupled with trade. He tried to jumpstart Makka’s economy through pilgrimage tourism. For this purpose, he had already desecrated Nakhla, Makka’s competitor and the foremost pilgrimage site in the area. He hoped to draw
pilgrims in to Makka by word of mouth: “Exhort all people to make the pilgrimage. They will come to you on foot and on the backs of swift camels from every distant quarter.” The new market circle started at ‘Ukāz, moved to Majanna, and ended in Minā and ‘Arafā. At times, Badr and Makka proper were also incorporated into this sequence. Amīn arranged an annual pilgrimage (ḥajj) in the sacred month of Dhū al-Ḥijja. He encouraged commerce at the pilgrimage sites by declaring that “[i]t is not accounted against you as a crime if you seek the bounty of your lord at the fairs of the pilgrimage (fi mawāsim al-ḥajj).” Furthermore, he set up ‘offices’ and institutions paralleling those at ‘Ukāz. To the pilgrimage sites, he assigned a peacekeeper, a market controller, and an arbiter. Unlike in old ‘Ukāz, he forbade prestige contests in his jurisdiction. Instead, he replaced this destructive practice with his own notions of the fair ‘circulation of wealth.’ These emphasized the ethical bond between the affluent and the destitute. For example, during the annual pilgrimage, the wealthy sacrificed animals to atone for their sins, while simultaneously feeding the hungry. He preached that “[t]he deity has made the shrine (ka’ba), the sacred house, the sacred month, and the sacrificial offerings with their garlands, eternal values for mankind.”

At the same time, Amīn outlawed ‘the practice of intercalation’ in which ‘time-reckoners’ annually switched the observance of ‘sacred and profane’ months. Consequently, the Yamāmī and Makkan calendars were no longer synchronized. The sacred months had forbidden violence, thereby allowing pan-Arab trade. This was no longer feasible with Amīn’s calendar reform. From this point onward, merchant caravans in al-Ḥijāz travelled safely only during the four sacred months, and only en route to the pilgrimage sites. The incompatibility of the Yamāmī and Ḥijāzī networks rendered
east-west trade a thing of the past. Amīn’s restructuring temporarily sheltered Makka; at the same time, it also isolated al-Ḥijāz. The long-term solution was the conquest and economic unification of western Arabia.

Map 4.1: Trade Circle

**Confrontation**

**Trade Wars**

Amīn’s independent trade circle closed off ‘Ukāz to al-Yamāma. However, control of this transit point for goods was meaningless without access to the source of goods. For this purpose, he campaigned north. His objective: the emporium of Dūmat al-Jandal. Following the fall of al-Ṭāʾif, he returned to Yathrib and made preparations for war on
the northern frontier. After a second setback at Dūmat al-Jandal in 627/8 C.E., he rethought his strategy.

Opening

Amīn had attempted to bypass the northern depot by reopening a direct route to Syria. Independent access meant channeling Syrian trade through Khaybar to Yathrib. For this task, in August of 629 C.E., he had dispatched Zayd b. Ḥāritha with a force of three thousand. Accompanying them was Khālid b. al-Walīd. After camping in Wādī al-Qurā, the expedition pressed on through dangerous territory. The Quḍā‘a, kinsmen of the Banū Kalb and the keepers of Dūmat al-Jandal, attacked Zayd and his men at Mu’ta. Zayd and two de facto commanders (amīr-s) were killed: ‘Abd Allāh b. Rawāḥa and Ja‘far b. Abī Ṭālib (who had just returned from al-Yamāma). Khālid ordered a general retreat. The death toll at Mu’ta was high. The Yathribīs treated those who returned alive as deserters. Abū Hurayra’s cousin confronted him point-blank, “Were you not a coward on the battle-day of Mu’ta!” At a loss for words, Abū Hurayra hung his head in shame. That winter, Amīn ordered ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ to lead a retaliatory raid at Dhāt al-Salāsil against three Quḍā‘a subgroups (the Balī, ‘Udhra, and Balqayn). He reached their territory with three hundred men. Greatly outnumbered, he requested reinforcements. When two hundred more arrived, he made a raid against the Quḍā‘a who immediately scattered and blended into their surroundings. The expedition returned with no spoils other than some sheep and camels. The fact remained that the defeat at Mu’ta was a major setback.

In 630 C.E., Amīn readied another campaign north, this time to Tabūk. The site was a prime staging ground against Dūmat al-Jandal. Beset with serious financial
difficulties, the preparations proceeded slowly. The nomads refused to contribute to the campaign fund. Moreover, the specter of failure hung over the expedition, and the proposed summer launch for the campaign met with strong resistance from all quarters. Even Ibn Ubayy, who commanded more men than Amīn himself, resolved to remain behind. In an attempt to overcome these obstacles, Amīn ‘threatened’ to unleash holy war and hell-fire upon the stragglers. In an effort to boost recruitment and to aid those unable to equip themselves, he designated them eligible for charity. He implored the rich to provide them with weapons, horses, and rations to fight in the campaign. After all, the capture of Dūmat al-Jandal would be a boon for business. Accordingly, the wealthy merchant ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān donated a sizeable sum. Thereafter, the ‘raid of hardship’ set out. Rather than risk an engagement, the ‘local chiefs’ around Tabūk capitulated. From there, Amīn dispatched his third expedition to Dūmat al-Jandal. Khālid reluctantly set out with four hundred and twenty horsemen. They traversed the hazardous territory around Dūma where the Banū Kalb dwelt. The expedition returned after a skirmish with al-Akdar, the head of the largest district of Dūmat al-Jandal. Unable to lay siege to the emporium, the Tabūk expedition fell far short of achieving its original objective, which again was Dūmat al-Jandal.

Closure
The political fallout of the unpopular and unsuccessful Tabūk campaign preoccupied Amīn. In order to quell internal dissent and encourage compliance, he made an example of his remaining enemies at home. It was during this time in October 630 C.E. that Abū ‘Āmir, the Muslim leader-in-exile, returned to Yathrib. He took refuge in the mosque of Ibn Maẓ‘ūn in Qubā’. His arrival lifted the spirits of Muslims among the ‘Amr b.
‘Awf clan who had withheld their monetary support for Amīn’s poorly financed expedition to Tabūk. So as to silence the opposition, Amīn declared: “And those who have taken a mosque in opposition and unbelief, and to divide the Mu’mins, and as a listening post for those who earlier fought against the deity and his herald, will swear ‘We desire nothing but good.’ But the deity testifies they are truly liars.” He forbade the Mu’mins to pray in Ibn Maz‘ūn’s mosque by saying: “You shall not set foot in it. It is more fitting that you should pray in a mosque founded on piety from the very first day.” He redirected the Mu’mins to his own mosque in Qubā’. Therein, he said: “…[Y]ou shall find men who would keep themselves pure. The deity loves those that purify themselves.” After he branded Abū ‘Āmir ‘the sinner,’ the Muslim ‘opposition’ mosque of Ibn Maz‘ūn was torched. When Amīn delivered his fiery sermon, he asked his captive audience “[w]ho is a better man, he who laid the foundation of his building on righteousness from the deity and his approval, or one who laid the foundation of his building on the brink of a crumbling precipice, so that his building will fall with him into the fire of hell? The deity does not guide the wrongdoing dissenters.” The last bastion of resistance went up in flames. Abū ‘Āmir fled once more into exile; those still loyal who remained in southern Yathrib dissimulated. As a sign for all to see, Amīn’s mosque stood alone and unchallenged in Qubā’. Soon thereafter in 631 C.E., his political rival Ibn Ubayy passed away. al-Khazraj’s leadership now fell to one loyal to Amīn: the Anṣārī leader Sa’d b. ‘Ubāda (d. 636 C.E.). Although Amīn managed to consolidate his hold over Yathrib and its politics, with no supply hub to feed his trade circle, the oasis city remained economically vulnerable. As a last resort, he opened the door to diplomacy.
Politics
The negotiations between Yathrib and al-Yamāma were born out of necessity. Khaybar was the turning point in Yamāmī-Yathribī relations. On the one hand, al-Yamāma’s demand outpaced its agricultural production; therefore, it increasingly required cereal and fruit imports. As the second-to-last stop in the trade cycle, Nuṭā Khaybar served to funnel barley and dates into al-Yamāma. However, Amīn’s siege of Khaybar disrupted al-Yamāma’s secondary food source. This created a temporary crisis at the center. For the first time, supplies were redirected away from al-Yamāma to Yathrib and Makka in al-Ḥijāz. For this reason, al-Yamāma turned to Najrān in northern al-Yaman. This site could not only salvage and secure al-Yamāma’s network, but it could also satisfy al-Yamāma’s food demand by means of its fertile northwestern oasis. To counter this development, Amīn opened a southern front against al-Yamāma. In exchange for their protection, he forged an alliance with a group from Najrān. A wartime provision of their agreement stipulated that they equip his forces with coats of mail, horses, and camels. In 630 C.E., he sent Quṭba b. ‘Āmir b. Ḥadīda on his behalf to conquer the settlement of Talāba in al-Yaman. After its subjugation, Šurad b. ‘Abd Allāh, a nomad of the Azd Shanū’a, attacked the neighboring Yamanī settlement of Jurash in the name of Amīn. Following a siege, the sedentary population sued for peace. Amīn then appointed ( wallā) Abū Sufyān to oversee Jurash. Despite the fact that Amīn’s forces had made significant inroads into al-Yaman, he had the weaker hand at the negotiating table. Yet he alone held the keys to the shrine ( ka‘ba) of al-Raḥmān, the symbol of Aslam’s authority. He was in a position to bargain.
Clean Succession

While Amīn conquered Makka, power in al-Yamāma changed hands. In around 630 C.E., Hawdha passed away, whereupon Aslam accomplished a peaceful transfer of power. As Hawdha’s heir apparent, he assumed the regal title ‘lord of al-Yamāma’ (ṣāḥib al-yamāma). In his person, he combined the functionary and religious (al-imāma) leadership of al-Yamāma. Although his succession went largely unchallenged, there naturally existed a silent opposition. Leading the pack was Thumāma, the nomadic chief of the Banū Ḥanīfa who dwelt in the Qarqarī district. Other notables included the land magnate Mujjā’a and those from the royal Ḥanafī clan of Hawdha, the Banū Suḥaym b. Murra of the Qurrān district. Located north of Ḥajr and Jaww at the foothills of the Ṭuwayq escarpment, the inhabitants of Qurrān specialized in commerce and agriculture. This district’s main nomadic malcontents included the Banū Yashkur and the nomadic branch of the Banū Suḥaym. In addition, concentrated at the Namira mine around the al-‘Irḍ district neighboring Thumāma’s nomads were a negligible number of discontented Banū Kilāb. None of these, however, posed a serious challenge to Aslam. His ardent supporters included his diplomat, al-Rajjāl, and his military general, Muḥākkim.

In geographical terms, divided by the Ṭuwayq escarpment, al-Yamāma totaled eight districts, three in the west (Qarqarī, al-‘Irḍ, al-Karma) and five in the east (al-Faqī, Qurrān, al-‘Ārid, al-Khaḍārim, al-Falaj). Aslam reigned supreme in the fertile east, while the desolate lands to the west fell within Thumāma’s purview. Thumāma controlled the Qarqarī and al-‘Irḍ districts; whereas, al-Karma in the far north was divided between him and Aslam. This district’s artisans and tradesmen favored the sedentary governance of Aslam; on the other hand, its semi-nomadic population who dwelt in the area’s sand dunes and flat plains leaned towards Thumāma. Also geographically caught between
Aslam and Thumāma, the eastern Qurrān district challenged Aslam’s authority. Its sedentary inhabitants pursued an untenable policy of nonalignment. In their midst lived Thumāma’s enemies, the Banū Qushayr, a subgroup of the ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘a. This semi-sedentary clan farmed the Qurrān (northern) and al-Falaj (southern) districts of eastern al-Yamāma. Although split in two, Thumāma could not stand up to Aslam in al-Yamāma; but then neither could Amīn in Arabia.

Dirty Diplomacy

In exchange for blockading Makka, Amīn appointed Thumāma as his agent and representative (‘āmil) in al-Yamāma. They both colluded against Aslam. Thumāma proposed to lure Aslam into Yathrib: “If he will answer positively to anyone, he will answer me and maybe he will come.” Amīn agreed. Thumāma set off straight away for the capital where he ingratiated himself with Aslam. Day after day, he implored him to visit Yathrib. Aslam almost acquiesced. However, al-Rajjāl suspected foul play and cautioned him against this rash course of action: “Do not do this; if you go to him [viz. Amīn], he will kill you.” In his stead, Aslam dispatched a body double fully veiled from head to toe in the garments of a holy man. Led by the royalist Salmā b. Ḥanẓala al-Suḥaymī, this delegation went to test the waters. Accompanied by Muḥakkim’s armed escort, Salmā, al-Rajjāl, Mujjā’a, Ṭalq b. ‘Alī, and the other delegates arrived in Yathrib. They stayed at the home of Ramla, Aslam’s former wife.

When she was around the age of seventeen, Abū Sufyān had married off Ramla to Aslam in order to guarantee the shipment of Yamāmī grain to Makka. In accordance with Aslam’s moral law, once she bore him a son (Shuraḥbīl), he released her from wedlock and returned her safely to Makka. Thereafter, Ramla remarried ‘Ubayd Allāh b.
Jahsh al-Asadī with whom she emigrated back to al-Yamāma. She bore him a daughter, Ḥabība. After their divorce, Ramla (known as Umm Ḥabība) married Khālid b. Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ. Once this marriage was dissolved, she repatriated to al-Ḥijāz. In order to lift Thumāma’s blockade on Makka, Abū Sufyān arranged her marriage (then at the age of thirty-five) to Amīn.

Under the impression that her former spouse Aslam was with the deputation, Amīn baited the trap. Ramla extended her hospitality by graciously offering bread, yoghurt, meat, and dates. To avoid detection by Ramla, Aslam’s double stayed behind with the baggage. This behavior, however, was strange for a head of state, and no doubt drew suspicion. When meeting the delegates the following day, Amīn approached the imposter. He immediately saw through the deception and treachery. Alarmed and unnerved, he warned the veiled assailant not to take a single step: “If you draw near, then surely the deity will do something to you, and if you turn your back, then surely the deity will annihilate you. I see you to be none other than him whom I saw concerning that which I saw,” Amīn blurted out. Aslam had pulled the wool over his eyes. With the trap sprung, Amīn lashed out against the duplicitous delegates. Holding a date palm branch in his hand, he adamantly declared, “Even if you asked me for this branch…I would not give it to you.” In a somewhat curt and abrupt manner, he then told them to negotiate with his spokesman, Thābit b. Qays b. Shammās (d. 633 C.E.).

Naturally, the talks failed to produce a trade agreement. Abiding by the policy that Amīn had so clearly laid out, Thābit refused to give an inch. The deadlocked parties established a modus vivendi. Amīn retained control over his possessions in the west, Aslam over those in the east. During this visit, al-Rajjāl met with prospective informants.
When Amīn walked by, al-Rajjāl was in the company of Abū Hurayra (a disgraced derelict with nothing to lose) and Furāt b. Ḥayyān al-‘Ijlī (a guide captured during the raid at Dhāt ‘Irq who had chosen conversion over death). Aghast at this sight, Amīn passed a damning judgment: “A molar tooth of one of you in hell will be as big as the mountain of Uḥud.” Still concerned about harboring potential enemy spies as well as to ensure Furāt’s loyalty, Amīn sweetened the offer by promising him lands in al-Yamāma. In the meantime, using land as an incentive for Mujjā‘a to betray Aslam, Amīn struck his own under-the-table deal. He granted Mujjā‘a a written title for uncultivated lands:

In the name of the merciful and compassionate deity.
This is a document that the ‘praised one’ (muḥammad), the herald of
the deity, wrote for Mujjā‘a b. Murāra b. Sulmī.
I bestow upon you al-Ghūra, Ghurāba, and al-Ḥubl.
Whoever demands proof from you, then refer them to me.66

Salmā also had a sudden change of heart. Aided and abetted by Amīn, he desired to throw off the yoke of Aslam and restore the royal house of Hawdha to the Yamāmī throne. In a ‘magnanimous’ gesture intended to win the other delegates to his side, Amīn presented each with five ounces of silver. He even afforded this special privilege to Aslam’s body double whose lot, he said, was no worse than theirs.68 When the delegation returned to al-Yamāma, al-Rajjāl reported to Aslam that war was imminent, “Two rams will butt horns, the one that we love more is our ram.”69

**Insurrection**

**Counter-Ideology**

With the news that Amīn was intent on war, Aslam consolidated his position in al-Yamāma. After Heraclius’ invasion of the Persian Empire and the death of the Sāsānid emperor, Khusraw II (d. 628 C.E.), outside influence on Arabia had rapidly declined.70
Aslam was no longer able to rely on the Persians for military support. What is more, he sensed something was amiss. Thumāma and the Banū Ḥanīfa clans were plotting against him. In order to counter this domestic threat, Aslam had to improvise quickly. He recruited auxiliary forces from neighboring nomadic groups. Meanwhile, as Thumāma stoked the fire in al-Yamāma, Amīn launched a propaganda campaign against Aslam. Now in a position of power, Amīn revived his counterclaim to exclusive prophetic authority: He, and he alone, was Muḥammad (the ‘praised one’).

**Consolidation**

Where Hawdha failed, Aslam succeeded. He brought over to his side a subgroup of the Tamīm b. Murr confederacy. To accommodate them, he established a garrison in al-Yamāma where he settled the nomadic Banū Usayyid clan of the ‘Amr (of Tamīm). This clan’s mobility provided a tactical advantage in the fight against Thumāma. However, his bold move to station nomads among the sedentary population had serious repercussions. The farmers looked upon these ‘hamlets of the allies’ (qurā al-aḥālīf) as nests of criminal activity. These culprits were protected from retribution in the violence-free zone (ḥaram). Whenever they raided orchards in the countryside, they took shelter in the garrison. The angry sedentary population therefore appealed directly to Aslam. He considered their case carefully. The nomads were no doubt a nuisance, but on the other hand, they were a necessary evil. The survival of al-Yamāma depended upon mounting an effective defense against Thumāma. In other words, the Banū Usayyid formed al-Yamāma’s first line of defense. On the verge of war, Aslam made the difficult decision of siding with the nomads. He pronounced a religious ‘verdict’ in favor of the Banū Usayyid:
By the darkest night,
By the blackest wolf,
By the mountain goat,
Usayyid has not defiled a sacred thing. 73

The plowmen challenged his decision by citing the fact that the nomads were directly liable for the wrongful damage of property. 74 He turned down their appeal. Left to their own devices, the Banū Usayyid continued to operate with impunity. This time, during their raid, they cut down some date palm groves. Once more, the farmers sued Aslam to hold the nomads accountable. He again refused:

By the obscure night,
By the restless wolf,
Usayyid never cut anything,
Neither succulent nor dry. 75

The frustrated farmers insisted that “[t]he Usayyid did cut the fresh fruit of the palms and broke down the dry fences.” 76 Well aware that the nomads were at fault, Aslam deliberately turned a blind eye to the plight of his fellow farmers. He told them, “Go! Return, for you have no claim.” 77 In their eyes, he had betrayed his sedentary roots. To assure full cooperation, he issued a public proclamation urging the people of al-Yamāma to patiently bear all losses suffered at the hands of the Banū Usayyid (of Tamīm). He reassured them that al-Raḥmān would mete out justice in the hereafter and declared that “Banū Tamīm is a pure and independent tribe, there should be no hatred towards them, nor should they pay collective compensatory damages (ītāwāfum). Let us be good neighbors as long as we live, let us protect them from every person. At our death their fate (amruhum) will be determined by al-Raḥmān.” 78

Meanwhile in al-Ḥijāz, Amin struck an alliance with the most powerful branch of the Tamīm confederacy, the Banū Sa’d b. Zayd Manāt. 79 In addition to belonging to the Tamīm, the Banū Sa’d also held membership in the Ribāb confederacy founded by Ḍabba
This confederacy included the Thawr ‘Abd Manāt b. Udd, ‘Adī, Taym, and ‘Ukl b. ‘Awf. Though a potent ally, nonetheless, the leadership of the Banū Sa’d was divided along clan lines. al-Zibriqān b. Badr commanded the majority of the tribe, while his rival, Qays b. ‘Āṣim, vied with him for power. Consequently, Qays’ loyalty to al-Zibriqān and Amīn wavered. Despite this, the Banū Sa’d sent ‘reinforcements’ to Thumāma. All the while, Mālik b. Nuwayra (d. ca. 632/3 C.E.), the chief of another major branch of the Tamīm (i.e., the Banū Tha‘labā b. Yarbū‘ b. Ḥanzala), treaded dangerously between the Banū Usayyid b. ‘Amr and the Banū Sa’d.80

**Propaganda**

In the losing war of words against Aslam, Amīn radically altered his strategy. Previously plagued by the menacing Makkans, he had refused to be associated with al-Raḥmān of al-Yamāma. With the conquest of Makka, the old stigma was lifted. Rather than rejecting his enemy’s religion, he now embraced it. As the earlier episode with Ibn Maẓ‘ūn made abundantly clear, the Muslim and Mu’mīn religions were commensurable; however, leadership authority (al-amr) was non-negotiable. Consequently, Amīn made Islām his own. He announced to his followers: “This day I have perfected your religion (dīn) for you and completed my favor to you. I have chosen Islām to be your religion (dīn).”81

No longer was Islām to be the exclusive ideological domain of Aslam. This deep incursion struck at the heart of the enemy. Amīn further held that Islām had become corrupt, as the illiterate masses who followed Aslam had committed the grave sin of association (shirk). Identifying ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (Aslam) with al-Raḥmān (the deity), these erring ‘Muslims’ had violated monotheism’s basic precept by associating a partner with the deity. Consequently, Amīn grouped these ‘associators’ (al-mushrikūn) with the
polytheists. He himself accordingly came as a ‘renewer of religion’ to purify Islām. In February 631 C.E., he issued an ultimatum to these ‘associators’:

A proclamation from the deity and his herald to the people (al-nās) on the day of the greater pilgrimage:

The deity and his herald are disassociated from the ‘associators.’ If you repent, it shall be well with you; but if you pay no heed, know that you shall not be immune from the deity’s judgment…When the sacred months are over, slay the ‘associators’ wherever you find them. Arrest them, besiege them, and lie in ambush everywhere for them…Evil is what they do. They treat the Mu’min ruthlessly. And it is they who are the transgressors…Fight them: The deity will chastise them at your hands and humble them. He will grant you victory over them and heal the hearts of the neo-tribe (qawm) of Mu’mins.83

By threatening violence against the ‘associators,’ he resolved to bring Aslam’s subjects into submission. At the same time, he coordinated a two-pronged propaganda campaign with Thumāma, who was then in al-Yamāma.

Thumāma roused the Banū Ḥanīfa to rebellion: “If you hear and obey me (amrī), then you will be rightly guided (turshadū). Two prophets (nabiyyānī) never share in a single authority (amr wāḥid).”84 The nomadic chief proceeded to assess the relative merits of the two claimants; he first cited Amīn’s verses:

In the name of the merciful and compassionate deity. The scripture (al-kitāb) is sent down from the deity, the omnipotent, the omniscient, who forgives sin and accepts repentance. His punishment is stern, and his bounty infinite. There is no deity but him. All shall return to him.85

Unequivocally, he declaimed that “this is the speech of the deity.”86 He then mockingly recited Aslam’s verses:

O immaculate frog,
Neither do you refuse drink,
Nor do you muddy the water.87

“Surely you will see,” he concluded, “this speech does not originate from a deity. Muḥammad [viz. Amīn] has merited authority (al-amr).”88 He then openly denounced Aslam and declared his allegiance to Amīn. This propaganda provoked discontent and
disagreement among the Banū Ḥanīfa. To counteract these negative effects, Aslam delivered a moving speech of his own:

O Banū Ḥanīfa! I want you to tell me, on what [grounds] are the Quraysh more entitled than you to the prophethood (al-nubuwya) and the imāmate (al-imāma)? By god, they are no more numerous than you and no braver. Indeed, your country (bilād) is more extensive than their country, and your wealth (amwāl) is greater than their wealth.89

He rallied them to his cause. The battle for the hearts and minds of the people of al-Yamāma was well underway.

Incursions
Thumāma’s ambition brought al-Yamāma to the brink of civil war. His public denunciation of Aslam proved to be a powerful propaganda weapon. The call for revolution spread far and wide. At Amīn’s behest, he instigated riots in al-Yamāma.90 Aslam had underestimated the strength of the enemy within. However, despite the prevailing social chaos, both the Banū Usayyid and Aslam’s sedentary forces stood by his side, ready to defend against attack. After forcibly quelling the civil unrest, Aslam’s general, Muḥakkim, beat down the petty village heads responsible. Although Aslam prevailed, the opposition movement continued to gain momentum. This only encouraged Thumāma to take further bold action.

Dissent
The resistance attracted farmers in the heart of al-Yamāma who felt slighted by the favoritism shown to the Banū Usayyid nomads. Even respected members of the community such as the ambitious friend of al-Rajjāl, Ibn ‘Umayr al-Yashkurī, sided with the dissidents and incited the population against Aslam.91 Ibn ‘Umayr secretly circulated
an inflammatory poem imploring the loyal subjects of al-Yamāma to bravely answer the call of Thumāma b. Uthāl:

O Suʿād (‘good fortune’) of the heart, daughter of Uthāl, my night has grown long by the intrigue of al-Rajjāl;

Verily it, O Suʿād (‘good fortune’), is one of the changes of fortune working against you, like the intrigue of the imposter (al-dajjāl);

The tribe (al-qawm) was seduced (ka-fitna) by the testimony (shahāda), but the deity, the possessor of power and perspicacity, is omnipotent;

That which they say is not equal to a sabot strap, since it is not shod with a latchet;

Verily my religion (dīn) is the religion of the prophet (al-nabī) and there are among the tribe (al-qawm) some men for the right guidance (al-hudā), like me;

Muhākkim b. Ṭufayl has destroyed the tribe (al-qawm), and has destroyed some men whom we do not consider to be men;

Today, ‘Aslam the apostate’ (musaylima) seized from them their authority (amr), and they will not return to it till the end of days;

I said to my soul that your contending in taking to unbelief (taʿāṭīka līl-kufr) is the reviling of the speech of the wretched;

Perhaps the souls who are unhappy with the authority (al-amr) will have a delight similar to being released from the hobble;

If my fate, by virtue of the natural disposition (fiṭrati ḥāli) for the deity, is true religion (ḥanīf), then I don’t mind!

These verses spread like wildfire among the sedentary population to the point that women and children sang it aloud while working in the fields. Incensed by these accusations, the authorities searched for the anonymous poet to silence him. In the meantime, this popular poem took root and produced its desired effect. It polarized the populace and turned public opinion against Aslam. Yamāmīs from all walks of life suddenly came out of the woodwork to resist his regime. Some defected, some spied, and others concealed their loyalty to Amīn. The stage was set for civil war.
Civil War
Thumāma b. Uthāl used the perfect pretext to raid Aslam’s territory and ignite a civil war in al-Yamāma. His father, Uthāl, had been slain by the Banū Qushayr. As a subgroup of the ‘Āmir b. Ṣa’ṣa’a, they alone withheld their allegiance to Amīn after the Battle of Ḥunayn. Thumāma then approached Amīn saying, “O herald of the deity, the Banū Qushayr killed Uthāl in the days of ignorance. So permit me to make a raid against them.” Amīn authorized the first strike. The Banū Ḥanīfa clans under Thumāma mobilized. Reinforced by the Banū Sa’d and the Banū Suḥaym nomads, they attacked villages loyal to Aslam. At the same time, Mujjā’a and the royal clan of Hawdha staged a palace coup on behalf of Hawdha’s son. They hoped to install this prince, Ṣabira, to the throne. While Aslam subdued the royalists, Muḥakkim took the field. He clashed with Thumāma’s coalition at Duran and Sihām. In both battles, victory fell to Aslam. The Banū Sa’d retreated. Falling back west of the Ṭuwayq escarpment, Thumāma made haste to dispatch couriers to Amīn with word of this major setback. Barely escaping, Mujjā’a fled to Yathrib. The tide had turned.

Amīn had committed an unprovoked act of aggression. His proxy war jeopardized the modus vivendi between them. Aslam sent a clear message to Amīn, reminding him of their standing agreement. Upon their arrival in Yathrib, his two messengers requested an audience. In Amīn’s presence, the first envoy read aloud the letter:

In the name of the merciful deity, al-Raḥmān.

From: ‘Abd al-Raḥmān [viz. Aslam], the herald of the deity
To: Amīn

To us belongs half the earth, and to the Quraysh belongs half of it. However, the Quraysh are unjust.
Amīn’s blood boiled when he heard the messenger profess his allegiance to Aslam’s prophetic authority. He said: “You lie! Seize this one and kill him!” When his men rushed to collar the messenger, the other messenger held on tightly to his companion’s waist. After an intense tug of war, Amīn cooled down and released both messengers.

They returned to al-Yamāma bearing Amīn’s reply:

In the name of the merciful and compassionate deity.

From: Muḥammad [viz. Amīn], the herald of the deity
To: ‘Aslam the apostate’ (musaylima), the mendacious (al-kadhdhāb)

The earth belongs to the deity. It is inherited by whomever he wills from among his servants. The end belongs to the god-fearing.

Peace be upon those who heed the right guidance.

Scribed by Ubayy b. Ka‘b.

It became crystal clear to Aslam that Amīn had no intent to cease and desist.

At about this time, Mujā‘a arrived in Yathrib. He had with him Khawla bt. Ja‘far, a highborn Yamāmī woman from the royal household, whom ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭalib later wed. Mujā‘a held Amīn responsible for the death of his brother, who had been killed in the crossfire by Amīn’s Banū Sa‘d and Asad allies. He wanted compensation in blood money (diya) amounting to one hundred camels. This, however, was by far the least of Amīn’s concerns. More bad news reached him from the battlefront. Thumāma’s forces had lost the battle for Ḥajr. When Amīn’s attempt to take al-Yamāma by direct assault failed, he prepared for a massive strike on several fronts. He redoubled his efforts to cut Aslam’s supply line at Najrān. In December 631 C.E., he deployed ‘Alī from Qubā with a force of three hundred against al-Yaman. He then sent reinforcements there under the command of Khālid b. al-Walīd. Simultaneously, he tried
to outflank al-Yamāma by going around it by way of greater al-Baḥrayn. When these efforts met with little success, he developed a fallback position. He was determined to open the northern route to Syria in order to resupply his own forces. To fund this war effort, he began to collect annual taxes from loyal nomads neighboring Yathrib and Makka; in effect, this centralized the nascent city-state (*al-madīna*) of Yathrib. All the while, he coordinated a full-scale war against al-Yamāma. But right before launching this war, he fell seriously ill.

**Endgame**

**Final Stage**

The major north Arabian tribes of ‘Adnān claimed descent from either of two ancestors, Rabī‘a or Muḍar. The Banū Ḥanīfa belonged to the Rabī‘a, the Banū Quraysh to the Muḍar. When Amīn disseminated his propaganda, it was infused with a virulent form of tribal chauvinism. The violent nature of his and Aslam’s rivalry intensified and took on a life of its own. As a result, their contested claims were overwhelmed by tribal identity. Irrespective of the veracity of their claims, nomads affiliated with the Muḍar paid homage to Amīn. Those of Rabī‘a threw their lot in with Aslam. As one tribesman of the Rabī‘a aptly phrased it, “A liar (*kadhdhāb*) of Rabī‘a is dearer to me than a liar (*kadhdhāb*) of Muḍar.”

Truth was in the tribe. Therefore, chauvinism, and not legitimacy, determined loyalty. Consequently, legitimacy developed “in an anti-authoritarian direction.” ‘Recognition’ was no longer based upon the ‘legitimacy’ of the claimant to authority (*al-amr*); rather, ‘legitimacy’ was now based upon the ‘recognition’ of the claimant to authority (*al-amr*).
Death

In June 632 C.E., Amīn passed away. As a matter of course, the death of the tribal prophet and chief signaled the dissolution and split of the Mu’min neo-tribe into its constituent elements. The Anṣār neo-clan under Sa’d b. ‘Ubāda – the head of the old al-Khazraj clan of Banū Qayla – decided to go their own way. The Qurayshī-Muhājirūn neo-clan opposed their secession. Appealing to tribal chauvinism, Abū Bakr argued that “...the Arabs [viz. Muṭar] will recognize this leadership authority (ḥādhā al-amr) only in this clan (al-hayy) of Quraysh, they being the best of the Arabs in descent (nasabān) and territory (dārān).” He then presented two Qurayshī ‘candidates’ for the chieftaincy, ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and Abū ‘Ubayda b. al-Jarrāḥ. The first was a Mu’min disciple of Amīn, and the second was an early ‘Muslim’ disciple of ‘Uthmān b. Maẓūn. Naturally, neither met with the universal approval of the Anṣār. They insisted on dividing Amīn’s leadership authority (al-amr) two-ways: “A leader (amīr) from us and a leader (amīr) from you.” As Sa’d b. ‘Ubāda’s rival, Bashīr b. Sa’d (d. 633 C.E.) openly supported his Qurayshī candidate, Abū Bakr. He said, “In truth Muḥammad [viz. Amīn] was from Quraysh [Muḍar], and his people are more entitled to [hold] (authority) and more suitable. I swear by the deity that he shall never see me contesting the leadership authority (amr) with them. So fear the deity and do not oppose them or dispute with them.” As the architect behind the first Mu’min-Muslim coalition in Makka, Abū Bakr had a foot in both camps. Bashīr accordingly paid him homage, recognizing his claim to authority. Since a group of Anṣār still refused to concede, ‘Umar roughed up their leader, Ibn ‘Ubāda. Even after this harsh treatment, Ibn ‘Ubāda remained recalcitrant to the end. Nonetheless, others followed Bashīr’s lead and recognized the authority (al-amr) of Abū Bakr.
The new chief was backed by a young generation of Makka’s Qurayshī elite. Among the Makhzūm clan were ‘Ikrima b. Abī al-Ḥakam, Khālid b. al-Walīd b. al-Mughīra, and al-Muhājur b. Abī Umayya. Abū Bakr’s supporters from the ‘Abd Shams clan included Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān, ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ, Khālid b. Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ, Khālid b. Asīd b. Abī al-‘Īṣ, and their client, al-‘Alā’ b. al-Ḥadrāmī. Abū Sufyān, meanwhile, opposed his impetuous son’s choice of joining the rival Makhzūm clan in support of Abū Bakr. Instead, Abū Sufyān proposed to cast his lot with another chief, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. ‘Alī, however, declined his support. For good measure, Abū Bakr neutralized this potential threat. He made Fadak public property, thereby rejecting the inheritance claim of Fāṭima, the daughter of Amīn and wife to ‘Alī. Abū Bakr had critical need of provisions from Fadak in order to launch an offensive campaign on multiple fronts. As a result, he killed two birds with one stone. When word reached Makka of his rise to power, Abū Bakr’s father – Abū Quḥāfa – inquired, “Are the Banū ‘Abd Shams and the Banū Mughīra [viz. Banū Makhzūm] pleased with this?” The answer was “Yes.”

Accordingly, Abū Bakr relentlessly pursued Amīn’s expansionist policy, together with the Quraysh.

Default
At the time of his death, Amīn was finalizing his ambitious and costly war plans against al-Yamāma. When Abū Bakr became chief, loyal tribes requested exemption from taxes. Since he urgently needed these revenues to fund his massive expeditions, Abū Bakr firmly said no. “If they withheld only a hobbling-cord of what they gave the prophet, I would fight them for it.” Thereafter, he dispatched three thousand men under Usāma, the son of Zayd b. Ḥāritha, to go on a second expedition to Mu’ta. Usāma raided the
village of Ubnā but pulled back before risking a direct engagement with the Banū Kalb and their Quṭā‘a kinsmen.\textsuperscript{117} The northern route to Syria therefore remained closed. Meanwhile, Abū Bakr waited and directed affairs in al-Madīna (Yathrib) until Usāma’s return. When news of Amīn’s death first reached al-Yamāma, Thumāma sent Abū Bakr an urgent letter cautioning him that Aslam was growing stronger by the minute.\textsuperscript{118} The Rabī‘a from all quarters of Arabia were joining Aslam’s ranks. At this time, Mujjā‘a also approached Abū Bakr. In exchange for his continued loyalty and services against al-Yamāma, the new chief promised him land in al-Khiḍrima.\textsuperscript{119}

In August 632 C.E., Abū Bakr marched over 120 miles northeast of al-Madīna to al-Rabadha at al-Abraq. After taking possession of this site from the Banū Tha‘laba (of Sa‘d b. Dhubyān), he secured it as a staging ground and base of operations.\textsuperscript{120} From here he dispatched eleven commanders. Nine of these were directed against each and every one of al-Yamāma’s trading outposts, including Ḥajr.\textsuperscript{121} After appointing (i) Khālid b. al-Walīd as field commander, Abū Bakr ordered him to march on Dūmat al-Jandal. (ii) ‘Ikrima b. Abī al-Ḥakam and (iii) Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana, accompanied by Mujjā‘a, were sent to reinforce Thumāma in al-Yamāma. (iv) Ḥudahyfa b. Miḥṣan and (v) ‘Arfaja were assigned detachments to wage war in ‘Umān. Against al-Yaman and Ḥadrāmawt was sent (vi) al-Muhājir b. Abī Umayya. Passing through Makka, he was reinforced by (vii) Khālid b. Asīd. These two commanders fought the Bajīla, thereby forcing their way through the Sarāt mountains. They ultimately advanced against Ṣan‘ā’ and Najrān in the south. To greater al-Baḥrayn, (viii) al-‘Alā’ b. al-Ḥadrāmi was dispatched. Lastly, (ix) ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ, (x) Khālid b. Sa‘īd b. al-‘Āṣ, and (xi) Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān were sent to
resume the Syrian campaign. At a later date, Khālid b. Sa‘īd was reassigned to the area around Najrān.

En route to Dūmat al-Jandal, Khālid b. al-Walīd attacked the mountain strongholds of the Ṭayy’ near Taymā‘. Thereafter, he switched his attack pattern. Rather than marching on Dūma as ordered, he headed west. Towards the end of October 632 C.E., he arrived at al-Buzākha accompanied by the recently subdued Ṭayy’. From here he conducted extensive raids throughout the northern plateau. Once central Najd was firmly under his control, he raided the camp of the chief Mālik b. Nuwayra at Buṭāḥ. There he captured Mālik’s beautiful wife, Umm Tamīm bt. al-Minhāl. After executing this chief of Banū Yarbū‘ (of Tamīm), he wed the widow. Meanwhile, ‘Ikrima established a ‘garrison’ in Thumāma’s ‘territory’ where he was lured into a premature war with the enemy. With word from Mujjā’a of ‘Ikrima’s defeat at the hands of Aslam, Khālid announced, “By god, I will not stop until I have crushed Musaylima [viz. Aslam].” However, not everyone shared the same sentiment. Part of the Anṣār clan under Thābit b. Qays expressed their reservations about waging a patricidal war against Aslam. They insisted on returning to al-Madīna for further instructions. Khālid rejected their request outright and broke camp. Worried that noncooperation might cast doubt on their loyalty to Abū Bakr, they hurried to join Khālid’s march against al-Yamāma. In the meantime, ‘Ikrima withdrew with his tail between his legs. After regrouping and rebuilding his forces with aid from the Ka‘b b. Rabī‘a (Hawāzin), he joined al-Muhājir’s campaign in the south. Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana received his long-awaited orders to redeploy against the Banū Kalb who were protecting Dūmat al-Jandal. From central Arabia,
‘Iyād b. Ghanm was dispatched by Abū Bakr with standing orders to stage a frontal assault on the emporium.125

Deliverance
After ‘Ikrima and Shurāḥbīl b. Ḥasana left western al-Yamāma, tensions ran high in the camp of the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads. Thumāma reassured them that Abū Bakr had neither forsaken nor forgotten them.126 In anticipation of Khālid’s arrival, Thumāma broadcast one last damning poem against Aslam:

Musaylima [viz. Aslam], turn back! And do not be contentious, for you were not made a partner in the authority (al-amr);

You lie to the deity concerning your divine inspiration (wahy); your bizarre fantasy is the bizarre fantasy of an idiotic imbecile;

Your tribe will try to defend you, but if Khālid comes, then you will be discovered;

You have no ascent into the heavens (al-samāʾ), neither do you have any path on the earth (al-ard).127

In response, Aslam issued Khālid b. al-Walīd a moral warning in verse:

O Ibn al-Walīd, you are in my view [a mere] sinner, And an ungrateful infidel (kāfir) and a dissenter (munāfiq) to the lord (rabb).128

Shortly after this politically charged poetic exchange, Thumāma and the Banū Suḥaym mobilized. In an effort to outflank al-Yamāma, they planned to join al-‘Alā’ b. al-Ḥaḍramī in al-Baḥrayn.129 Before departing, Thumāma raised the spirits of his nomads and subtly warned those who were wavering. He then set off. al-Baḥrayn, however, proved resilient. Only a direct assault on al-Yamāma was possible. On his return journey, Thumāma passed through the territory of the Banū Qays b. Thaʿlabā (of Bakr b. Wāʾil) where members of the Rabīʿa had allied themselves with Aslam. As revenge for his part in the death of their tribesman and leader, al-Ḥuṭam b. Ḕubayʿa, they pounced
upon him at a spring. Thumāma was dead, but the war was not. Wartime propaganda continued to emanate from al-Madīna. Ḥassān b. Thābit sent a verse warning his former companion, Muḥakkim b. al-Ṭufayl, of the impending doom:

O Muḥakkim b. Ṭufayl! It has already been destined for you. Success is due to the deity. He willed [for] you ‘the serpent of death’ [viz. Khālid].

Hard on the heels of this message, Khālid arrived in al-Yamāma.

Clash
It was commerce, and not culture, that brought the conflict to a head. While Khālid marched into the eye of the storm, Abū Bakr’s forces fanned out throughout the peninsula, targeting the major trade centers. Back in al-Yamāma, Aslam, Muḥakkim, and other notables (ashrāf) identified the anonymous propaganda-poet in their midst. Ibn ‘Umayr fled for his life and took refuge with Khālid’s advancing forces. He divulged sensitive tactical information to the enemy. In particular, he updated Khālid on conditions in al-Yamāma and Aslam’s troop movements. Aslam, he said, was planning to camp in front of his farm estates (al-amwāl) in Ubāḍ. Strategically located in the rear, these villages functioned as supply hubs. Aslam, however, had not yet taken up position. Khālid quickly forced his way through the mountain pass, executed its guard detail, and camped opposite Aslam’s estates. On the plain of ‘Aqrabā’, the two armies fought a pitched battle.

War
Aslam fielded an army of seven thousand that included three thousand tribal auxiliaries recruited from the Banū Yashkur, Banū ‘Ījl, and Banū Qays b. Tha‘labā. Although largely composed of the Rabī‘a from the Bakr b. Wā’il, he also included the Banū
Usayyid b. Tamīm (Muḍar) cavalry in his ranks. Whereas Hawdha had once commanded ten thousand, the size and strength of Aslam’s forces were greatly diminished by internal dissent. Locked safely in their fortresses, the landed aristocracy lent no assistance. Notwithstanding, Aslam’s coalition held together. Muḥakkim and al-Rajjāl took the field. On the other side, Khālid committed his men to an unequal battle. With a force of four thousand drawn from the Banū Ḥanīfa nomads, Banū Quraysh, Asad, and Ṭayy’, he charged headlong into the fray.134 The Banū Sa‘d (of Tamīm) – the archenemies of Hawdha – swelled Khālid’s ranks. On the eve of battle, Shuraḥbīl b. Aslam warned his father’s men against failure: “O [sedentary] Banū Ḥanīfa, today is the day of vigilance; today, if you are defeated, [your] womenfolk will be carried off on horseback as captives, and will be taken as wives without being demanded in marriage. So fight for your noble [viz. Rabī‘a] descent and defend your women.”135 At the sight of Aslam’s men brandishing their swords, Khālid urged his men not to lose heart, “O troop of neo-Muslims! The deity has furnished you with comparable means to that of your enemy, so that you are not overwhelmed by them. Do you not see them unsheathe their swords one against one another? I believe they disputed and that strife is amongst them.”136 However, Khālid had jumped to the wrong conclusion. Mujjā‘a objected, saying: “By no means! Rather these are Indian swords (al-hundūwāniyya). They fear breaking them, so they brandish them to the sun, in order that their blades become flexible.”137 Thereafter, the two armies advanced to the plain of ‘Aqrabā’.

Muḥakkim and al-Rajjāl’s forces deflected Khālid’s initial attack. Despite suffering heavy casualties, Khālid stubbornly pressed on with the offensive. al-Rajjāl fell. After repelling several more attacks, Aslam declared:

In fact we are steadfast and steadfast!
Khālid’s men were forced to fall back to their camp where they leveled accusations of cowardice against one another. Meanwhile, Muḥakkim’s men staged a raid deep into the enemy camp. They wounded and killed the leader of the Anṣār, Thābit b. Qays. During the fighting, Mujjā’ā valiantly defended Khālid’s bride and shouted, “How excellent is the mistress of the tent!” The tables soon turned. Khālid rallied his men. Suddenly, the Banū Usayyid (of Tamīm) cavalry deserted to their Muḍar kinsmen in Khālid’s camp. This shift resulted in a complete reversal. The second engagement at ‘Aqrabā’ therefore went to Khālid. Muḥakkim gave the order for immediate retreat to the oasis of al-Raḥmān. En route, an arrow pierced through him. His terror-stricken men hoped to escape a similar fate:

If I escape from it, I would have escaped mightily,
Since otherwise I would be drinking from the cup of Muḥakkim.

Khālid’s forces charged the oasis. The slaughter was great. Aslam was surrounded. Wounded by Waḥshi’s spear, he received the final blow from an Anšārī. Blood and water flowed in the oasis of death. Fifteen hundred of Aslam’s men had fallen by his side. Twenty-five hundred were taken captive. In like manner, twelve hundred of Khālid’s men lay among the corpses. Khālid had won a pyrrhic victory.

Conquests
Having suffered heavy casualties, Khālid lacked the manpower necessary to overcome al-Yamāma and its countless fortresses of which only two had fallen. He raided the countryside and captured nineteen villages. Unable to seize the remaining fortresses, he initiated peace talks through the mediation of Mujjā’ā. Salama b. ‘Umayr al-Ḥanafī,
however, refused to capitulate. He urged his fellow Yamāmīs to hold out in their strongholds. After his body was found at the bottom of a well, the negotiations continued uninterrupted. Playing both ends against the middle, Mujjā’a shrewdly negotiated Khālid down from half to one quarter of the neo-Muslim captives, and half of the gold, silver, coats of mail, and herd. The treaty exempted the villages and fortresses captured beforehand. Khālid made peace on these terms and married Mujjā’a’s daughter.

Seeing that al-Yamāma was not completely subjugated, the Banū Ḫanīfa nomads remained as a garrison force. While still camped in al-Yamāma, Khālid sent ‘reinforcements’ to greater al-Baḥrayn. In the meantime, the assault on Dūmat al-Jandal in the north failed. Although al-Walīd b. ʿUqba had brought additional men, the enemy had ʿIyād pinned down. Upon his return to al-Madīna, Khālid received orders to march on Dūmat al-Jandal. Arriving on the scene, he lent his assistance to ʿIyād. Their combined forces crashed down on Dūmat al-Jandal from two directions, and overpowered the oasis. The defenders were executed, and their women and children enslaved. The conquest of Dūmat al-Jandal signaled the end of one era and the beginning of another. Abū Bakr was now master of the single most important north Arabian transit zone, well-situated for deploying armies and supplies. After an extended stay, Khālid made his way to al-Ḥīra where the merchants of Dūmat al-Jandal stored their goods. He entered unopposed. By early 634 C.E., the flames of war in eastern and southern Arabia were extinguished. In March 634 C.E., Khālid returned to Dūmat al-Jandal. From there he marched to al-Buṣrā, the gateway to Syria. The herald of the deity (rasūl allāh) was dead and the conquest of the Near East had begun. Covered by the blood of Aslam, Abū Bakr assumed the title, ‘the successor (caliph) of the herald of the deity’ (khalīfah
This resulted in the paradox of late proto-Islāmic history: Abū Bakr fought the ‘apostasy’ that ultimately became the ‘orthodoxy’ of classical Islām.

**Historiographical Conclusion**

**Skepticism**

The question of historical reconstruction has drawn a great deal of skepticism. In the “Historiographical Introduction” to *Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity*, P. Crone asserted with respect to the first sesquicentennial of Islāmic historiography:

> Unsurprisingly, it is full of contradictions, confusions, inconsistencies and anomalies, and if these could be ordered a certain meaning might emerge. But the debris is dejectingly resistant to internal criticism, and because it cannot be ordered, nothing much can be proved or disproved…and that there is so much pointless information; but all one can do is to note that there are oddities, and in time one gets inured to them. It is a tradition in which information means nothing and leads nowhere; it just happens to be there and lends itself to little…. ¹⁴⁸

Crone denied the possibility of internal criticism given the “disparate” nature of the “source material”; but, as demonstrated above through the application of the Morellian method, it is just such heterogeneous material that is ideal for internal criticism as opposed to a homogenous body of evidence. Moreover, Crone’s unchecked skepticism led to the wholesale rejection of the early Islāmic historical tradition since it exhibited no stratified “layers” of generation as yielded by the procedure of biblical criticism. ¹⁴⁹

Crone claimed that the transference of this model by Wellhausen, in his “Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams,” and in a modified form by Noth, is ‘fallacious.’ ¹⁵⁰

As a result, Crone ‘abandoned’ the Islāmic sources in favor of non-Islāmic sources. ¹⁵¹

However, for reconstructing the history (and internal development) of early Islām in Arabia before the conquests (*futūḥ*), these non-Islāmic sources are of limited utility. Accordingly, Islāmic historical materials prove to be indispensable. In fact, as
demonstrated above, it is precisely the marginal reports and events preserved in the Islamic narrative sources that allow for a reconstruction of the history of early Islam.

Narrative Method
Largely in response to the skeptical approach, form-criticism advanced a “critique” and reformulation of Wellhausen’s source-criticism. Noth and Conrad observed that the source-critical school (represented by Wellhausen, Caetani, de Goeje et al.) strove to write coherent historical accounts of early Islamic history. The flaw in the combined method of these historians, according to Noth and Conrad, was that they joined source criticism with “…a presentation of early history.” Therefore, the combined method resulted in a negative outcome: the negotiation of analysis and synthesis. That is, the combined method necessitates the resolution of criticism with narrative coherence. Consequently, the works of nineteenth-century source-critics “…still bear the traces of this process.” In light of this observation, Noth and Conrad decided not to employ the combined method, and for that reason alone, form-criticism precluded the possibility of writing a descriptive history of early Islam. Nevertheless, despite this problem inherent in the nature of their research project, Noth and Conrad introduced powerful analytic ‘tools’ with great potential applications, as demonstrated above.

Form-criticism’s inability to synthesize a narrative history was not only a serious limitation, but it also clearly established the fact that any criticism (or skepticism) not grounded in historical reconstruction leads to an imbalance resulting in an overemphasis on theoretical considerations. As a methodological corrective against this analytic tendency, R.G. Collingwood cogently argued that history is the product of two stages: analysis and synthesis. In the first stage, the historian sifts through the sources and
“[b]y criticism of the documents, the historian establishes the ‘framework’ of his narrative, the set of facts out of which a ‘story’ is to be fashioned in his narrative account of them.”159 Thereafter, within the “structural” limits imposed by this skeletal frame, the historian applies “constructive” fillers to flesh out the narrative. “[A]s in the structure of an organised body, the purpose of every member can only be deduced from the complete concept of the whole.”160 As demonstrated in this dissertation, the “twofold” narrative method makes possible the historical reconstruction of early Islām.161

Research Prospects
Form-criticism has demonstrated that eighth and ninth-century Islāmic historiographers schematized and systematized the early Islāmic conquest narratives. Accordingly, the primary theme of ḥudūd is reducible to a number of identifiable topoi.162 Islāmic historians plugged these topoi into an “ideal form” that ultimately represented the conquests as “Gesta Dei per Arabos,” that is, deeds of God accomplished through the Arabs.163 Thus, they narrated how the conquests “should be remembered,” but not how they occurred.164 Consequently, this casts doubt on the “historicity” of the conquest narratives. In fact, scholarly consensus considers the Battle of Buwayb to be nothing more than a series of topoi strung together to serve later interests.165 Comparative research can aid historians in reconstructing these conquests. Detribalization and re-tribalization, for instance, throw into sharp relief the transformative social processes at work in the Islāmic conquests and the subsequent rise of the early Islāmic state.
1 For the destruction of the idols, see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 552.
2 For ‘inbound’ shipments, see Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 256 f.; Watt, s.v. Nakha.
3 For “The Affair of the Expedition to al-Qurada,” see al-Waqi‘ī, Life, 98 f., esp. 99. For the Makka-Syria and Makka-Najd-Iraq blockades, also see Hamidullah, Battlefields, 37 and Errata. For the location of al-‘Irq, see A.J. Wensinck and J. Jomier, s.v. I, and Makka-Najd-Iraq, main ‘recipients’ of charity, see Michael Bonner, s.v. Poverty and the Poor.
4 For example, “…the direct gains of the northern traffic…was reputed to bring them [viz. the Banū Quraish] hundred percent profits” (Hamidullah, Battlefields, 37).
5 For the Aḥābīsh, see ibid., 24.
6 For the “house of the Banū Jaḥsh,” see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 214 f.
7 Q. 5:3, translation adapted from Koran. For makhmaza, see David Waines, s.v. Famine, EQ. For the main ‘recipients’ of charity, see Michael Bonner, s.v. Poverty and the Poor, EQ.
8 Q. 62:4, translation adapted from Koran. Also see Q. 24:22.
9 Q. 3:180, translation adapted from ibid.
10 Q. 8:41, translation adapted from ibid. For war booty, see F. Løkkegaard, s.v. ghanīma, EI².
11 Koran (Q. 4:8).
12 Q. 98:5, translation adapted from ibid. For “Tazakkā, &c.,” see Watt, M/Mecca, 165-169.
13 For the fuqara‘ as the ‘inner’ poor, see Bonner, s.v. Poverty and the Poor.
14 For conflicting reports on Abū Sufyān’s move to Yathrib, see Bernjia, s.v. Abū Sufyān.
15 On the period spent by the Messenger of God (SAAS) in Mecca” see Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 3, 428 f. and 431. For the new governor of Makka, see Watt, s.v. Makka; Ed., s.v. ‘Attāb, EI²; Ibn Ishāq, Life, 568 and 597; and cf. “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 774, Note 806.
16 The “war of Hāṭib,” see Watt, s.v. al-Madīnah.
17 For “Khālid’s Journey to Destroy al-Uzzā,” see Watt, s.v. Nakha; and Ibn Ishāq, Life, 565 f. For Hunayn, see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 568; Watt, s.v. Makka; M. Lecker, s.v. Sulaym, EI²; H. Lammens and ‘Abd al-Hafez Kamal, s.v. Hunayn, EI²; H. Kindermann, s.v. Asad, EI²; and W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Faza‘ra, EI².
18 For Shaymā‘ and the factions within the Banū Sa‘d b. Bakr, see W. Montgomery Watt, s.v. Sa‘d b. Bakr, EI².
19 For ‘Amīr b. ʿAqab b. Ṣa‘a’s political realignment, see W. Caskel, s.v. ‘Amīr b. ʿAqab b. Ṣa‘a’, EI².
20 For al-Ṭā‘if, see M. Lecker, s.v. al-Ṭā‘if, EI²; and Hamidullah, Battlefields, 46.
21 “One wonders whether the same factors do not in part lie behind the zeal with which the nomadic tribes of northern and central Arabia joined Muhammad’s new state, once he had conquered Mecca and al-Ṭā‘if—a zeal displayed in the famous ‘Year of Delegations.’ For these tribes were, like nomads everywhere, dependent on their settled neighbors for certain essentials of their diet; hence, once Muhammad had firm control over all agricultural areas in northwestern Arabia, the options of the tribes were distinctly limited. If they wished to eat, they had to come to terms with this new, ubiquitous political force” (Donner, “Mecca’s Food Supplies,” 265 f.). For the capitulation of the tribes, see for example, Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 3, 437. For the ‘Year of Delegations,’ see M. Lecker, s.v. Wufū‘, EI².
23 For the “Sequence and Timing of Markets (ca. 600-610 C.E.),” see Bonner, “Time,” 28.
25 For the mawāsim, see Bonner, “Time,” 35.
27 For the “mawāsim sequence,” see Bonner, “Time,” 36.
29 For the ‘offices’ and institutions, see Bonner, “Time,” 39 and 41.
30 Q. 5:97, translation adapted from Koran. For “feeding the poor,” see Bonner, s.v. Poverty and the Poor (Q. 22:28, 5:89, 5:95, 58:4).
32 Cf. Q. 9:36-37. “[T]he mawāsim cycle (in all its versions) is fundamentally incompatible with the ‘markets of the Arabs’ described in the ḥadīth al-aswāq” (Bonner, “Time,” 36).
complementary seemingly contradictory reports...these reports give a meaningful story – if they were viewed as

Tasseron, s.v. 132.

Madelung, 94. For the Banū Ḥārūn's transfer of Musaylima's title "Lord of al-Yamāma" against Dā'ud (Watt, 9:54-59).

"This kind of attire "[veiled, clad in clothes which concealed him" (Kister, "Struggle," 17) indicates the respect in which Musaylima was held: spiritual leaders of a tribe (kāhin-s), soothsayers and 'holy persons' were clothed in this fashion" (Ibid.). "[I]t may be assumed, then, that Musaylima was not one of the 'deputation'" (Watt, M/Medina, 134). For "two versions of the actual meeting between the deputation and Muhammad," see Makin, Representing, 94; and Ibn Ishāq, Life, 636 f.

33 For Muḥammad’s northern ambitions, see for example, Watt, M/Prophet, 203.


35 Translation adapted from al-Waqidi, Life, 376 f.


38 For ‘Abd Allāh b. Ubayy, see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 604; Lecker, “King Ibn Ubayy,” 56; and Watt, s.v. ‘Abd Allāh b. Ubayy.

39 For Muḥammad’s warnings, see for example, Watt, M/Medina, 190 (Q. 9:73). For equipping ‘the poor,’ see Bonner, s.v. Poverty and the Poor.


41 For Abū ‘Amir, cf. Watt, M/Medina, 190; and al-Waqidi, Life, 513 f. For the withholding of monetary support for Tabūk, cf. Q. 75-76.

42 Q. 9:107, translation adapted from Gilliot, s.v. Mosque of the Dissension.


44 Q. 9:108, translation adapted from ibid.

45 For Abū ‘Amir as ‘the sinner,’ see Gilliot, s.v. Mosque of the Dissension.

46 Q. 9:109, translation adapted from Korān. For “The Opposite Mosque,” see Ibn Ishāq, Life, 609.

47 For Sa’d b. ‘Ubādā, see W. Montgomery Watt, Sa’d b. ‘Ubayy, EI2; Watt, s.v. al-Anṣār; and Wilferd Madelung, The Succession to Muḥammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 35.

48 For the northwestern oasis, cf. I. Shadid, s.v. Nadjrān, EI2.

49 For the “treaty of peace,” see Watt, M/Medina, 127 f.

50 For “Talābā and Jurash,” see al-Waqidi, Life, 371; al-Baladurī, The Origins of the Islamic State, vol. 1, trans. Philip K. Hitti (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), 91, fn. 1; M. Lecker and C.E. Bosworth, s.v. Wufūd, EI2; and Watt, M/Medina, 120 f. For Shānū’a, see G. Strenziok, s.v. Azd, EI2. For Abū Sufyān’s appointment, see al-Baladurī, Futūḥ, 59; Watt, M/Medina, 123 and cf. 367; cf. Watt, s.v. Abū Sufyān; and Bernajian, s.v. Abū Sufyān.

51 For Hawdha’s death date, see Kister, “Struggle,” 15 f.; Watt, M/Medina, 133; and cf. Simon, 85. For Musaylima’s succession, see al-Askār, al-Yamama, 66 ff. and 73, esp. 67, and 94 f. For the severance and transfer of Musaylima’s title “Lord of al-Yamāma” to Ṭulaḥyā as “Lord of Khaybar,” see Landau-Tasseron, s.v. Ṭulaḥyā; and al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, vol. 4, 1796.

52 For the opposition, see Makin, Representing, 135-140; al-Askār, al-Yamama, 20, 37, 44, 50, 95, and cf. 94. For the Banū Suḥaym b. Murra, see Ibn al-Kalbī, vol. 1, 156; and al-Ṭabarī, Conquest, 139 and fn. 888.

53 For Musaylima’s supporters, see for example, Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 4, 69.

54 For “The District of Qarqarî” and “The District of al-Karma,” see al-Askār, al-Yamama, 22 f. and 44.

55 For the Banū Qushayr, see G. Levi Della Vida, s.v. Qushayr, EI2; al-Askār, al-Yamama, 16 and 38; and Ibn Hubaysh, Ghaṭawāt (1992), vol. 1, 54.

56 For Thumāmā “…as a representative (ʿāmīl) of the Prophet in al-Yamāma,” see Makin, Representing, 132.

57 Ibn Hubaysh, Ghaṭawāt (1992), vol. 1, 54 f.

58 Cited in Makin, Representing, 102. “There seems, however, to be another way of viewing these seemingly contradictory reports...these reports give a meaningful story – if they were viewed as complementary rather than contradictory” (Shoufani, 143 f., emphasis added).

59 “…This kind of attire [‘veiled, clad in clothes which concealed him’ (Kister, “Struggle,” 17)] indicates the respect in which Musaylima was held: spiritual leaders of a tribe (kāhin-s), soothsayers and ‘holy persons’ were clothed in this fashion” (Ibid.). “[I]t may be assumed, then, that Musaylima was not one of the ‘deputation’” (Watt, M/Medina, 134). For “two versions of the actual meeting between the deputation and Muḥammad,” see Makin, Representing, 94; and Ibn Ishāq, Life, 636 f.
For the members of the deputation, see Watt, M/Medina, 133 f.; Makin, Representing, 93 and 136; and cf. Kister, “Struggle,” 20.


Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 51. For the reinterpretation of the ‘two gold bracelets’ dream, see for example, Kister, “Struggle,” 16; and Muslim, 934.

Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 51. For the ‘date palm branch’ episode, see Kister, “Struggle,” 18; and Muslim, 934. For Thābit b. Qays, see al-Asḵar, al-Yamama, 98; and Makin, Representing, 235, 238 and 241.

Translation adapted from Kister, “Struggle,” 20. Also cited in Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 4, 68; and al-Ṭabarānī, Conquest, 117 f. For Abū Hurayra, see Robson, s.v. Abū Hurayra; and Juynboll, s.v. Abū Hurayra. For Furāt b. Hayyān’s capture, see al-Ṭabarānī, Foundation, 99. For Furāt b. Hayyān’s land grant, see al-Baladhurī, Futūḥ, 93.

al-Baladhurī, Futūḥ, 93. For Muẓẓā’ā b. Murāra’s land grant, also see ibid., 87; and Makin, Representing, 137.

For Salmā b. Ḥanzala, see Makin, Representing, 136.

For the gift, see Kister, “Struggle,” 17; and cf. Ibn Ishāq, Life, 631.

Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 52.

For the reign of Khusraw II, see Bosworth, s.v. Parwīz, Khusraw (II).

For the Banū Usayyid, see Kister, s.v. Musaylima; and Kister, “Struggle,” 21.

For the Qurā al-ahālīf and the haram, see Kister, “Struggle,” 21; al-Ṭabarānī, Conquest, 108; and cf. al-Asḵar, al-Yamama, 90 f.; and Eckelman, 42 ff.


Translation adapted from Kister, “Struggle,” 22; al-Ṭabarānī, Conquest, 109; and al-Ṭabarānī, Taʾrīkh, vol. 4, 1933. For itāwa, see Cl. Cahen, s.v. Itāwa, EI².


Q. 5:3, translation adapted from Koran. For the chronology of this sūra, cf. Bell, 111; and Devin J. Stewart, s.v. Farewell Pilgrimage, EQ.

“No radical distinction will be drawn between a ‘renewer of religion’ who preaches an older revelation, actual or supposititious, and a ‘founder of religion’ who claims to bring completely new deliverances. The two types merge into one another” (Weber, Sociology, 46).

Q. 9:3-14, translation adapted from Koran. For the “new policy of noncooperation,” see Donner, Muḥammad, 50; and Madelung, Succession, 47.


Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 53.

Cited in ibid., 53 f. Also cf. Makin, Representing, 250.

Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 54.

Translation adapted from Makin, Representing, 202; and al-Wāqidī, Ridda (1990), 108; variant cited in Makin, Representing, 203.
For “The War of al-Yamāma,” see al-Askar, al-Yamama, 110. “Muḥakkim b. Ṭufayl has destroyed the tribe (al-qawm), and has destroyed some men whom we do not consider to be men” (Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 52 f.).


91 Cited in Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 52 f.

92 “[T]he agricultural activities of the ‘village people’ of Banū Ḥanīfa of al-Yamāma were probably done by women and this peculiar division of labour also indicates the nomadic attitude” (Simon, 174 f., fn. 43).

93 For the search for Ibn ‘Umayr al-Yashkūr, see Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 53.

94 For “Other Opponents,” see Makin, Representing, 138-140.

95 Also see Makin, Life, 69.

96 Cited in al-Askar, al-Yamama, 110, fn. 75. For ʿAbdār Rabbā b. ʿUḥdha’s genealogy, see Ibn al-Kalbī, vol. 1, 156.

97 For Duran and Sihām, see al-Askar, al-Yamama, 110. For the retreat of the Banū Tamīm, cf. al-Ṭabarī, Conquest, 87; and as-Askar, al-Yamama, 111.

98 Opening protocol reconstructed from al-Baladhrī, Futūḥ, 87. For “Musaylima’s Letter and the Apostle’s Answer Thereto,” see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 649; al-Ṭabarī, Last Years, 106; and Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 4, 69. Also see Makin, Representing, 26-36 and 55-91.

99 For the episode with the two messengers, see Ibn Ḥubaysh, Ghazawāt (1992), vol. 1, 55; and Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 4, 69.

100 Q. 7:128.

101 Cited in al-Baladhrī, Futūḥ, 87. Also see al-Ṭabarī, Last Years, 107; and Ibn Kathīr, Life, vol. 4, 69.


103 For the diya, see Makin, Representing, 137 f. For Ḥārīr, see al-Ṭabarī, Conquest, 93.

104 For the ‘expeditions’ to al-Yaman, see al-Wāqiḍī, Life, 528 ff.; Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 678; “Ibn Hishām’s Notes,” 789, Note 3; cf. Watt, M/Medina, 124, fn. 2, and 367.

105 For the ‘alms-tax,’ see Madelung, Succession, 47.

106 For Rabī‘a and Muḍar, see Ibn al-Kalbī, vol. 1, 1; and H. Kindermann, s.v. Rabī‘a and Muḍar, EI2. “The religion of Muḥammad...and Musaylima turned bellicose through their tight association with Arabian folklore” (Wellhausen, “Prolegomena,” 19). For the rivalry between Rabī‘a and Muḍar, see for example, Kister, “Struggle,” 3; and cf. Makin, Representing, 126 f.

107 al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīḵh, vol. 4, 1937; Eickelman, 48; Wellhausen, “Prolegomena,” 16; and cf. al-Ṭabarī, Conquest, 112.


109 For Muḥammad’s death date, see F. Buhl and A.T. Welch, s.v. Muḥammad, EI2.

110 Translation adapted from Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 686; Ibn Isḥāq, Das Leben, vol. 1, part 2, 1016. “The expression hāḏhā al-amr, this matter, was often used in early texts in the meaning of the reign or the caliphate” (Madelung, Succession, 34, fn. 18).

111 Translation adapted from al-Ṭabarī, Conquest, 3, and cf. 1-8, esp. 6; and al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīḵh, vol. 4, 1839, and cf. 1841. For “The Meeting in the Hall of the Banū Sāʿida,” also see Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 683-687. For the “two candidates,” see Madelung, Succession, 31, 39, and 45.

112 Translation adapted from al-Ṭabarī, Conquest, 7 f. For Bashir b. Saʿd, see W. ‘Arafat, s.v. Bashir b. Saʿd, EI2; and Madelung, Succession, 33. For khulfa rasūl allāh, see Madelung, Succession, 46; and cf. al-Baladhrī, s.v. Abū Bakr, 163 f.

113 For “…the back-bone of Abū Bakr’s group of supporters,” see Shoufani, 61 f.; and Madelung, Succession, 45.

114 For Abū Sufyān’s proposal, see Madelung, Succession, 40 f. For Abū Sufyān’s impetuous son, see for example, Ibn Isḥāq, Life, 189. For the Fadak episode, see L. Veccia Vaglieri, s.v. Fadak, EI2; and al-Baladhrī, s.v. Abū Bakr, 174.


116 Cited in Madelung, Succession, 48.
142 For the number of ‘casualties’ on Khālid b. al-Walīd’s side, see Makin, *Representing*, 236, 239, and 242 f.; al-Ṭabarī, *Conquest*, 128; and al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 90-93. For the number of ‘captives,’ see al-Askar, *al-Yamama*, 120.


144 For the terms of the peace treaty, see al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, 90; and cf. al-Askar, *al-Yamama*, 119 f. For the ‘women clad as warriors’ topos, see Noth and Conrad, 170 ff.; and cf. al-Ṭabarī, *Conquest*, 133.

145 For Khālid b. al-Walīd’s marriage to Mujjā’a b. Murāra’s daughter, see Makin, *Representing*, 237, 243 f., 247, and cf. 240 and 243; Shoufani, 130; and al-Ṭabarī, *Conquest*, 133.


147 For the end of the so-called *ridda* wars, see Shoufani, 131; and Caetani, *Annali*, vol. 2, part 1, 558. For Khālid b. al-Walīd’s ‘departure’ date and itinerary to Syria, see Musil, *Arabia Deserta*, 548 and 567 f.


149 Ibid., 13 f.

150 Ibid.

151 Cf. ibid., 3; and Noth and Conrad, xi.

152 Noth and Conrad, 3.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid., 4.

158 See White, 59 ff.

159 Ibid., 59 f.


161 Cf. White, 59 ff.

162 For the six-node narrative cycle of the ideal conquest campaign, see Noth and Conrad, 217 f.


164 For a similar observation, see P. Heath, s.v. ‘Antar, Sīrat, EI’.

165 Noth and Conrad, 97, 137, and 194. “Indeed, Donner has shown how considerations of this kind led to the *ex nihilo* invention of a whole battle, that of Buwayb, by tradents from the tribe of Shaybān, who were obliged to fashion for themselves a great victory as a counter to accounts of their defeat by the Persians at the Battle of the Bridge” (Ibid., 137). “This cycle [viz. the Battle of Buwayb] was elaborated in the manner of the *ayyām al-‘arab* tales by piecing together numerous accounts of small skirmishes to create a synthesized ‘major battle’ (Fred M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 199).
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