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CERVANTES' *DON QUIJOTE* AND THE IDEA OF FRIENDSHIP

by

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of the requirements for the degree of
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To Beth

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INTRODUCTION

As a Hispanist, I have chosen to specialize in the literature of the *Siglo de Oro*-- the Golden Age of Spain. This period of Spanish letters extends over two centuries, the sixteenth and seventeenth, and corresponds to two literary periods- the Renaissance and the Baroque. One of the greatest works produced during this period, not only recognized as a masterpiece of Spanish literature, but as one of the great universal works, is Cervantes' (1547-1616) masterpiece *Don Quijote* (Part One, 1605 and Part Two, 1615). Because of my interest in the work, I decided to write my master's thesis on some of the rhetorical aspects of the protagonist's discourses. The *Quijote* continued to fascinate me, however, and I also wanted to dedicate my doctoral dissertation to some other facet of the text. During a seminar on Cervantes with Professor López-Grigera, she mentioned that the theme of friendship had not been sufficiently studied in the *Quijote*, and I suggested that this be the focus of my dissertation. She enthusiastically agreed.

Surprisingly little has been written on the subject of friendship, especially concerning the manner in which Renaissance philosophers and intellectuals treated the theme.

Most historians of philosophy mention that the topic of friendship was important to the philosophers of the period, but few writers bother to go beyond a footnote in their description of this social relation in their studies. Only a few good monographs have been published in this area, and none of them have the Spanish Renaissance as their focus.

There is also a scarcity of studies in the wide corpus of Cervantine criticism concerning the attitudes of friendship in works of this great author. Found within the plethora of commentaries on the *Quijote*, for example, only three relatively short pieces are dedicated to the study of friendship. Juan Bautista Avalle-Arce studies the subject, offering a panoramic view of the history of the theme of the two friends in Peninsular literature. He traces the tradition from the introduction of the topic with Pedro Alfonso's *Disciplina clericalis* (twelfth century) up to the Romantic movement of the nineteenth century. In this admirable study, he notes the novelistic similarities and differences in each stage of development up to the time of Cervantes. Avalle-Arce observes that in *El curioso impertinente* Cervantes takes the theme to its limit by proposing the question, "What would happen if one of the faithful friends was not faithful?" The answer is obviously total catastrophe.

Debra Andrist also examines the theme of friendship in the novel, distinguishing friendship between two males and between two females. The analyses of these types of

friendships are based upon the norm of "mediated desire" established by Cesáreo Bandera. The friendships in the novel which Andrist analyzes are: Grisóstomo/Ambrosio, Cardenio/Fernando, Anselmo/Lotario, Anselmo/Eugenio, Luscinda/maids, Dorotea/doncella, Camila/Leonela. Based on this analysis of "mediated desire," Andrist draws the conclusion that "men reciprocally heighten each other's desires and women do not" (158).

The final study that deals with the theme of friendship is "La convivencia entre Don Quijote y Sancho Panza" written by Pedro Laín Entralgo. As the title indicates, this study concentrates on the main characters in the novel and is an analysis of their relationship. Various aspects of this relationship are noted and examined: camaraderie, conversation, mutual assistance, and proximity. The combination of these various traits leads Laín Entralgo to conclude that "hay amistad, una genuina amistad entre Don Quijote y Sancho" (33), although "Aristóteles lo habría negado" (32) because of the difference in social status between master and servant.

Each of these studies, as good and interesting as it is, fails to account for the philosophical environment in which Cervantes was writing and by which he must have been influenced. Avalle-Arce traces the tradition of the two friends from its origins in the Iberian Peninsula, but he does not take into account the changing panorama of

philosophical ideas that accompanied the novelistic changes found in each of the versions, especially that of Cervantes.

Likewise, Pedro Laín Entralgo fails to use this philosophical background to define the friendship found between Don Quijote and his squire. His analysis is highly subjective and personal; it is based on what he, a twentieth-century critic, considers friendship to be. He does draw on Aristotle's thought about the impossibility of friendship between master and slave, to show Cervantes' supposed innovation by introducing a friendship between unequals, knight and squire. Nevertheless, by disregarding any other possible source of thought such as Seneca, Laín fails to see that this was indeed not a specifically Cervantine concept, simply another found among the classical theorists.

In just the same way, although analyzing different characters of the novel, Deborah Andrist projects a modern concept of friendship onto those relations found in the first part of *El Quijote*. She says, "...friendship necessarily involves some sort of desire..." (149), but she does not recognize all of the types of desire possible (i.e. utility, pleasure, virtue). Instead, she decides to concentrate on the amorous or carnal passions each character has for another, and how that specific appetite influences the relationships they share. In addition, her analysis of the relationship involving females seems to be based completely on a modern concept of woman, an assumption that is impossible to justify. To see woman with the notion

prevalent at the time would surely show Cervantes' innovative or traditional stance.

The first step in the process of investigating this topic was to determine which authors and which texts dealing with the theory or theories of friendship, especially which ethical treatises, were in circulation during the period between 1547 and 1616, Cervantes' lifetime. This presented a double problem: I am neither a philosopher familiar with the methodology of the history of philosophy, nor am I a classicist. With the help of my doctoral committee, a broad reading list was composed to help ameliorate my scanty philosophical preparation. I also took two Latin courses in the Department of Classical Studies so that I would be able to have at least limited access to Latin Renaissance texts. As far as the Greek authors are concerned, though, unfortunately I still am unable to read them in the original language.

During the Renaissance in Spain, as in the rest of Europe, three texts concentrating on the topic of friendship were widely diffused and formed part of the *studia humanitatis*, the educational system prevalent during the period in question. They were Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, Cicero's *De Amicitia*, and Seneca's *Epistulae Morales*. This observation was supported by consulting Nano Mirabello's *Polyanthea*, a collection of sayings sometimes used by students for their composition exercises. The wide circulation of these types of student aids makes them useful

in judging the intellectual atmosphere of the period. Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca, along with Plato, and to a much lesser extent Plutarch, are most often quoted.

I have employed the Rackham translation of Aristotle in this study, and used the bilingual editions of Falconer and Gummere for the Latin authors, though all quotations are given in English. Had this dissertation been exclusively a study of the Spanish Renaissance theories of friendship, it would have been indispensable to consult the various Latin translations of the Greek authors with commentaries, as well as the Latin texts published in the Renaissance. For my purposes, the translations I use are acceptable since according to what we know today about Cervantes' education, it does not appear that he ever studied at any university, and consequently, his knowledge of Latin was probably not too advanced. This does not undermine the importance of the Classical texts, however, since as Rubio and Bolgar have both pointed out, a great many Spanish translations of these works were also available.

Furthermore, due to the importance of Biblical and Patristic sources in the Renaissance, I have also included a brief study of the basic concept of the theory of friendship as presented in these texts, in particular Augustine and the desert fathers, since their works enjoyed great popularity during the period. I have excluded the models of friendship found in both the literature of Antiquity and in the Bible because of time constraints.

Since the topic is so vast, during the drafting stage of Chapter One, I found it useful to organize the various authors' ideas under several different categories. I chose to combine some of these subdivisions, and the resulting epigraphs were maintained for two reasons. Firstly, they provide a systematic representation of the theories of friendship found in the authors. Secondly, since I did not begin writing until I had done my research in both the theories and in the Cervantine text, these headings also correspond to the many aspects of friendship found within the *Quijote* itself.

I have included in Chapter Two a relatively small number of theoretical works from the Spanish Renaissance concerned with the theme of friendship. The works have been selected with two criteria in mind: either the author or the publication of the text was contemporary to Cervantes, and the texts and manuscripts contained interesting aspects relating to the theme of friendship. Catalogues of printed books and manuscripts, such as Antonio's *Bibliotheca Nova*, Gallardo's *Ensayo...*, and Cejador's *Historia de la lengua y literatura castellana*, as well as the Biblioteca Nacional's *Catálogo colectivo*, were especially useful for this stage of my research. Some treatises, such as the B. Castiglione's *Cortegiano* and L. Hebreo's *Diálogos de Amor*, though in circulation during this time, and the latter mentioned by Cervantes in the Prologue to the *Quijote* of 1605, were excluded from this study since they deal with friendship in a

secondary and often superficial way. Fonseca's *Tratado del amor de Dios* (1594), also mentioned by Cervantes in the Prologue, is included because he presents a clear, extensive theory of friendship between men. The other authors included in this study are Juan de Borja, Francisco de Castilla, Juan de Mal Lara, Francisco Miranda de Villafañe, Juan de Mora, Andrés Rey de Artieda, Diego de Rojas, Gaspar Salcedo de Aguirre. Another objective kept in mind when selecting texts was to find one or several that would give me the opportunity to develop and exercise my capacity for textual scholarship. Francisco de Castilla's *Tradato de amiçiqia*, in addition to its interest from the point of view of friendship, provided me with a practical way to confront the problems of textual editing.

In Chapters Three and Four friendships found in the *Quijote* are studied in light of the theoretical framework established in the first two chapters. The third chapter considers friendships between men, and the fourth between men and women, and solely between women. Due to the great number of all classes of friendships, I have necessarily had to limit the number of relationships studied, selecting from both the first (1605) and second (1615) parts the ones that are most fully developed, or that contain an interesting or unexpected Cervantine view of friendship. The most important relationship of this type is, of course, that shared by knight and squire, Don Quijote and Sancho. Due to the crucial nature of this friendship, it is rigorously evaluated

according to several subcategories: the types of men these two are, the cause of their friendship, the nature of their relationship, and aspects of their association which resemble the highest type of friendship described by the theorists. After this central friendship, the others studied are the interrelation between Don Quijote, the curate, the barber, and Sansón Carrasco, the failed friendship of Anselmo and Lotario in the intercalated novel of *El curioso impertinente*, and finally the association between Roque Guinart and his bandits.

Though the theorists do not treat the theme of friendship between man and woman except as it is related to marriage, Cervantes does present a good number of these relationships. As with the selection of friendships between men, I chose to limit the number of examples analyzed to the most developed or the most interesting from a theoretical standpoint. Consequently, the marital relationship of Sancho and Teresa was admitted under both of these criteria, as was the association of Grisóstomo and Marcela. Several lesser friendships include those between Dorotea and her servant, and between fathers and daughters. Cervantes does not describe fully any friendship between women, but there are several presented. I have chosen to analyze the relationship between the housekeeper and the niece, Maritornes and the innkeeper's daughter, Dorotea and Doña Clara, Camila and Leonela of the intercalated *El curioso* novel, and between the duchess and her companions.

These analyses of friendships produce interesting results. None of them can be classified as true friendship when judged against the norms of Classical and Renaissance theories of friendship. The associations between men are all based on utility or pleasure, or a certain measure of both. The relationship between women is seen to be founded exclusively upon pleasure. The friendship that comes closest to the theoretical ideal is not what one would expect it to be-- the friendship of Anselmo and Lotario-- but is the association formed between a man and a woman, Sancho and Teresa, the married couple. Equally as strong is the bond uniting father and daughter. But also within this category of man/woman relations is a tragic one, between Marcela and Grisóstomo, the man who dies for love of her.

In spite of these less than ideal portrayals of friendship, though, one cannot say that all of these relationships are base or meaningless: Don Quijote and Sancho form some sort of affection; the curate, the barber, and Carrasco manage to help their neighbor; and Sancho and Teresa, even though they do not have the theoretically ideal matrimony, lead a good life. What, then, is Cervantes' view on friendship as presented in the *Quijote*? With an author as complex as Cervantes, it is always difficult to draw definitive conclusions. What will be observed, however, is his apparent skepticism at the possibility of the highest friendship described by the theorists. Anselmo and Lotario fail miserably. Moreover, Cervantes at least raises the

possibility of friendships between two women, and between a woman and a man, a subject not broached by the theorists, as will be seen.

CHAPTER ONE

PRE-RENAISSANCE IDEAS OF FRIENDSHIP

1.0. Introduction

The Renaissance is most often associated with the rediscovery of many Classical texts, and the intellectual passion of Renaissance men for recovery of the ideas of Antiquity is well known. There is little dispute that the corpus of Latin, and later Greek, authors formed heavily influenced those who lived, worked, and studied in the Europe of the fourteenth century and later. But these Classical authors were not by any means the sole source of Renaissance thought, nor were they exclusively studied at the expense of Biblical and Patristic works. However, there is a great deal of similarity between these three sources of wisdom which inspired so many Renaissance thinkers, and it is often difficult to trace exactly from which source an author may have gleaned an idea or concept.

A tremendous amount of works by a wide variety of Classical authors was known during the Renaissance. However, since some authors and works were more widely known than others, this study will concentrate on several of the most important: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca. These authors, due to the amount of their works published, their place in the educational system,¹ their prominent place in the *polyantheas*,² and the large number of translations of their

works available in the vernacular, make them the most important to be examined in order to attempt to reconstruct the currents of thought to which a Renaissance author such as Cervantes may have been exposed.

1. The Non-Christian Tradition

Nearly all of the theories of friendship in the Renaissance found their sources in Antiquity, especially among the works of four particular authors: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca. Each of these Classical authors treats the theme of friendship in a different way. Plato's dialogue, *Lysis*, deals with the nature of friendship, but never arrives at a definite conclusion.³ Aristotle's treatise, the most complete and exhausting of the four, is composed of Books Eight and Nine of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Because he approaches the topic using this formal structure, his analysis of the theme is perhaps the most detailed, though not as clear on all points as one would hope him to be. Cicero takes advantage of the dialogue to present his views on the topic. He does this, by his own admission, to make the theme come alive and avoid the annoying repetition of "he said" and "I said" (1.3)⁴. Tullius' attempts to portray friendship are as realistic as possible, dealing with matters as they are in everyday life (4.18). The presentation is accurate, Cicero claims, because a true friend will see himself in the description. He addresses his friend Atticus, "as you read it [the dialogue], you will recognize in it a

portrait of yourself" (2.1). Seneca's treatment of the matter is the most informal and natural of the four classical authors. Most of his thoughts concerning the theme of friendship are found in the corpus of *Epistulae Morales*, letters to his friend Lucilius. Only several of the 124 letters are dedicated specifically to the exposition of the principle of friendship,⁵ but Seneca disperses thoughts on this topic among the letters that have various other principle themes as well.

1.1.1. The Natural Desire of Friendship

Plato is an enthusiastic proponent of friendship. In the dialogue, Socrates ranks friendship above all other worldly things: "I should greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even to Darius himself: I am such a lover of friends as that" (15). Even though Socrates knows his opinion to be valued by those listening to his discourse, he also uses the evidence of the poets to demonstrate the desirability of friendship:

...for they [the poets] are to us in a manner the father and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and draws them to one another... (18)

The bonds of friendship are believed to be transcendental, even divine, and therefore good.

Aristotle also believes friendship⁶ to be one of man's greatest external goods (9.2.2)⁷ and is so indispensable for life that no man "would choose to live without friends"

(8.1.1). This desirability is universal, for even when traveling in foreign lands one is able to see that "a natural affinity and friendship exist between man and man" (8.1.4). The Stagirite, as in the *Politics*,⁸ states that man is a social being and by his nature wishes to live with others; given this desire, he repeats in the *Ethics* that it is much more agreeable to live with friends and good men instead of strangers (9.9.3). To be happy, a man must have friends since to have an unfulfilled desire is to be incomplete, and therefore unhappy (9.9.10).⁹ Friendship is so important for man that it has become a bond of the state (8.1.4) and this friendly feeling forms a part of justice and lawmaking (8.1.4). Moreover friendship is a virtue (8.1.1), and as such "is not only indispensable as a means, it is also noble in itself" (8.1.5).

Cicero views the nature of friendship in much the same way as Aristotle.¹⁰ Friendship is one of man's natural inclinations, and man desires the support of mutual aid. Like Aristotle, Cicero believes that "fellow countrymen are preferred to foreigners and relatives to strangers" (5.19), but "a very dear friend" (23.88) is even more valuable for support. The necessity of friendship is so important that "life without friendship is no life at all" (23.86. See also 6.22 and 27.101). The only things that exceed the desirability of a true friend are wisdom and virtue (6.20 and 27.104). Friendship makes all life's experiences much more pleasing and is the best gift received from the gods (13.47);

to remove friendship from the human experience would be "to take the sun out of the universe" (13.47).

Seneca also believes in the natural inclination toward friendship. It has an inherent attractiveness for man because man hates solitude and desires society (9.17).¹¹ He says that human relationships are "like a stone arch which would collapse if the stones did not mutually support each other" (95.53). But Seneca must explain why friendship is necessary for the Stoic, who is supposedly self-sufficient. The wise man desires friends, Seneca says (9.3), but the Stoic is self-sufficient in the sense that "he can do without friends, not that he desires to do without them" (9.5); even the self-sufficient man will seek friendship for its own sake (9.12).

1.1.2. Elements of Friendship

The chief element of friendship for Plato, and one that will be remembered and often quoted by Renaissance authors, is equality. Without this, friendship is nearly impossible. He questions two youths who purport to be friends, asking them how they compare on the basis of several attributes, concluding:

And friends have all things in common, so that one of you can be no richer than the other, if you say truly that you are friends. (8)

Moral equality is not the only criterion to judge overall compatibility, but parity in wealth, physical beauty, nobility, and wisdom are also vital constituents. Any two

men who desire to be friends must be equal in nearly every respect.

Plato does not believe that this equality is the only element necessary for men to be friends. Towards the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates states that true friends must also be useful to one another:

And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far as we are useless to them? Certainly not. Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anyone else love anyone else, in so far as they are useless to them? No. And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor anyone else will be your friends. (13)

This utility is not always material, as for instance in the relationship of parent and son. If the principle of utility in some form is not present, however, there is no motive to form the friendship. In spite of this rather unambiguous stance, Socrates seems to contradict himself later. He says that true friendship is not formed for the sake of any other gain than itself:

And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear... Then we have done away with the notion that friendship has any further object. (28)

It must be concluded, therefore, that the utility which may result from friendship is only an apparent element of friendship, and not a true motive.

Though friendship is man's natural inclination, it is obvious, Aristotle says, that not all men are friends. There must be certain elements present to arouse feelings of

friendship, and for the Stagirite one of these factors leading to friendship is goodwill. A person feels goodwill toward another when he "wishes another good for his [the other's] own sake" (8.2.3); this feeling "is generally aroused by some kind of excellence or moral goodness" (9.5.4). However, one can feel goodwill for another without being friends, that is, when one wishes another good without seeking his company (8.5.3). To be a constituent part of friendship, the feeling of goodwill must be known to the object (8.2.4) and must also be reciprocated (8.2.3 and 9.5.3). This goodwill is not spontaneous and often takes time to mature and reach the point of intimacy, when it may be considered friendship in the truest sense (9.5.3). Goodwill generally leads to affection, a more intense feeling than goodwill (9.5.2), and one that takes even longer to develop. Affection is fundamental to friendship, too, for "in its essence, friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection" (8.8.3). Also similar to the concept of goodwill is "liking," which is a deliberate choice springing from man's fixed disposition toward friendship (8.5.5). Good temper and sociability seem to be qualities that stimulate such feelings of liking in man (8.6.1). However, only when the feeling of liking is reciprocal does it contribute to the establishing of bonds of friendship.

In short, in order to be friends men must feel mutual goodwill toward one another, be aware of this goodwill, and the cause of their goodwill must be either the useful, the

pleasant, or the good (8.2.4), since only that which is useful, pleasant, or good is lovable (8.2.1).

According to Aristotle, concord is another necessary element in fomenting friendship. Concord is not just an agreement of opinion, since such an agreement can exist even between strangers (9.6.1); rather, it is the agreement in regard to practical, important ends of action that may be accomplished by both (or more) parties (9.6.2). Concord is generally used to express the friendship between citizens because for Aristotle this relationship has at heart all the concerns of life (9.6.2). The Philosopher observes that concord can only exist between good men, since "they are of one mind with both themselves and with one another" (9.6.3). The base are incapable of concord since they are always scheming at attaining their own ends at the expense of others' good (9.6.4).

Cicero also finds the feeling of goodwill crucial in order to begin and maintain friendships. Without goodwill, friendship is no different than any other relationship (5.19). This goodwill is a product of love [caritas] (8.26), an emotion which can be likened to Aristotle's concept of "liking." Love is strengthened by acts of service which are not actively sought by either friend. With time, familiarity grows and friendship may spring up (9.29). Virtue is also a key element to the establishment and maintenance of this close bond between men. Virtue is "the parent and preserver of friendship, and without it, friendship cannot exist at

all" (6.21 and see also 27.100). Cicero admits that he has no precise philosophical definition for "virtuous," but rather he employs it in the way that it is commonly understood among men when they use the term in ordinary discourse (6.21). Virtue causes the feelings of love "to leap into flame" (27.100). At the same time virtue causes attraction between men, since "there is nothing more lovable than virtue" (6.21). This attraction between good men seems to be irresistible, since "the good have for the good, as if from necessity, a kindly feeling which nature has made the fountain of friendship" (14.50). Although Cicero does not specifically mention concord, virtue does seem to have this notion included since it is "complete harmony" (27.100).

Seneca hardly touches on the causes of friendship, although, like Cicero, he does count virtue as indispensable as a factor in forming friendships: "Sometimes virtue is widespread.. developing friendships..." (74.28). Again, just as Aristotle and Cicero, Seneca believes that something akin to concord is a key element in developing friendships, and a lack of friendship is not possible when "souls are drawn together by identical inclinations" (6.3).

1.1.3. Types of Friendship

Of these four classical authors, all but Plato make some sort of distinction between different classes of friendship, and only Aristotle thoroughly develops and explains each one. The Stagirite observes that since only the lovable can be loved, and the lovable is either good, pleasant, or useful, feelings of concord and goodwill must spring from one of these three qualities. The three lovable qualities are used as the basis for the classification of the various types of friendship. Due to the difference in these feelings, the corresponding friendship is also different (8.3.1).

The first and most basic type of friendship described by Aristotle is the one based on utility. The participants do not love each other for themselves, but for the benefits which can be accrued from the other. Very similar to this type is the friendship based on pleasure. Again, the participants do not love each other in and of themselves, but rather because of the pleasure they derive from the other. These two types of friendship are based on the accidental qualities (8.3.2) of a person and not on his intrinsic qualities. Therefore such relationships may be classified as egotistical because "men love their friend for their own good or their own pleasure" (8.3.2).

Aristotle's perfect type of friendship is based on virtue and is shared by good men who are alike in their virtuous character (8.3.6). These men love each other for

themselves and not for any accidental qualities. They wish their friend's good not for any benefits that might be received, but for the sake of the friend's well-being (8.3.6). However, simply because this friendship is based on virtue does not mean that the friends are not useful or pleasant; good men are useful and pleasant both absolutely and relatively to each other (8.3.6) because "the absolutely good is pleasant absolutely as well" (8.3.7). It is for this reason that of the two inferior types of friendship, the one which most closely resembles the higher type is the friendship based on pleasure (8.6.4). Aristotle also observes that only this relationship between good men deserves to be called "friendship," and the inferior relationships receive this name only by analogy (8.4.4). However, as common usage terms the men involved in these relationships friends, Aristotle feels obliged to call the associations "friendship" (8.4.4).

Cicero prefers to describe more fully the perfect form of friendship, that between good men whose relationship is characterized by "the complete harmony of opinions and inclinations in everything without exception" (17.16). He compares this "pure and faultless" (6.22) friendship with the "ordinary and commonplace friendship- delightful and profitable" (6.22). Here one sees the influence of the Aristotelian hierarchy¹² of friendships based on lovable qualities: the lower form of friendship is based exclusively on the profitable ("the useful") and the delightful ("the

pleasant"). However, these inferior classes of friendship are not the relationships that Cicero prefers to detail. He only mentions them in order to either compare or contrast them with the true form of friendship. For example, he states that some men will try to establish friendship for some specific advantage (8.26); this type of man sees nothing good unless it involves profit and they "regard their friends as they do their cattle" (21.79), as a means to an end, such as wealth. True friends do not form friendships with material advantage as a goal even though the friendship of virtuous men undoubtedly produces such advantage (9.30 and also 14.50, 21.80 and 27.100).

Much in the same way as Cicero, Seneca establishes a binary opposition with regard to types of friendship, though he does not view them as necessarily mutually exclusive. Friendship "produces between us a partnership in all our interests" (48.2); that is, it is possible that the true friendship between good men produces advantage. Moreover, it is natural to return favors to a friend, even though this is not an exclusive characteristic of true friendship (81.21). Furthermore, the friendship of good men should never be broken by self-interest (6.2). The man who seeks friendship for purely egotistical motives "strips it of all nobility" (9.12) and establishes Seneca's idea of *amicitia temporaria* (9.9), a combination of the Aristotelian inferior classes of friendship.

1.1.4. Types of Men and Friendships

Aside from the commenting on the differences between the types of friendship, each Classical author also describes what different types of men may be friends.

Plato analyzes which types of men can be friends more thoroughly than any of the other preceptors, but arrives at no conclusions. He begins his chain of reasoning by examining whether the like are capable of friendships or not. A bad man cannot be friends with another bad man because they are

never at unity with one another or with themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not like to be in union or harmony with any other thing. (18)

But neither can two truly good men be friends, because that would imply an imperfection in their character since they would be seeking something which they do not themselves possess:

'What place is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have no need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient for themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?' 'They cannot.' 'And friends they cannot be unless they value one another?' 'Very true....' (20)

But neither can the unlike be friends: it is perfectly clear that the just man is not friends with the unjust, nor the good with the bad. Therefore, Socrates concludes with an apparent paradox: neither the like nor the unlike are capable of being friends (21).

One other possibility is raised: can a good man be friends with a man who is neither good nor bad? At first, it appears to be so because the morally neutral man will be drawn to the good man in order to avoid evil. But if evil did not exist then there would be no inclination toward friendship; in other words, friendship is not desired in itself, but because of something that may result from it. Socrates concludes that this cannot be considered true friendship since it has ulterior motives (27). Socrates sums up his argument about the types of men that can become friends:

I can only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments:-If neither the beloved, not the lover, not the like, not the unlike, nor the good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke... If none of these are friends, I know not what remains to be said. (31-32)

It is here that the dialogue *Lysis* ends, and no other characteristics of friendship are discussed.

Seneca is not entangled in the intricacies of Plato's arguments, believing that any two good men can be friends and allowing a great deal of latitude regarding the characteristics that these two good men must hold in common. He does not comment at what age friendships are most agreeable, nor if the young can be friends with the old, although given that both men are virtuous, there should be no bar to such a relationship. Neither does Seneca recognize class differences; he treats all men as equal, proposing to "value them according to their character, and not according

to their duties" (47.15). He even goes as far as to assert that a slave can be an "unpretentious friend" (47.1).

Cicero takes a rather more limited view regarding the quality of men that may become friends. Like Seneca, he is basing his observations on the friendships of good men, who will be eager to form friendships because "there is nothing more eager... than nature for what is like itself" (14.50). Friendships between wicked men and virtuous ones are impossible, because the differences between them are too great to be overcome (22.84). But presupposing virtue, men of unequal station in life are capable of forming friendships, provided that the superior and inferior stand on some plane of equality (19.69). A man of superior virtue at times must lower himself to the level of his inferior in order that the inferior grow in virtue (20.71-72). To illustrate this point, Laelius, who is Cicero's advocate in the dialogue, brings to mind the example of Scipio. Although of superior rank, Scipio sought to "be the cause of enhancing the dignity of all his friends," a behavior worthy of emulation by all men (19.70). However, the possibility of friendship irrespective of differences in rank is not absolute. Great power in hands of one of the potential friends can impede the development of friendship (15.54) because no one can love whom he fears, and conversely, no one can love the man by whom he is feared (15.53). This is why men in office or any sort of public dealings have a difficult time forming true friendships (17.64). Cicero does not

believe that a difference of age between two men is an impediment forming friendships. Laelius relates that in his youth he had older friends and in his old age has young ones (27.101). But Cicero does also qualify these observation by saying he believes the most desirable friends are the ones who are the same age (27.101).

Aristotle believes that different types of men can share in the inferior types of friendship; such associations can exist between bad men, a bad man and a good one, and between a man who may be neither good nor bad and another of any type (8.4.2). Regardless, it must be remembered that in general the friendship of morally inferior people produce inferior friendships (9.12.3), and at one point, Aristotle even qualifies the friendship of solely utility is for "sordid souls" (8.6.4) because inferior people will make friends for no other reason than these inferior ends, while good men will not. The good make friends for each other's sake (8.4.6).

Aristotle observes that certain types of men tend to make specific sorts of friendships. Friendships of utility seem to be especially prevalent among opposites; they seem to be attracted. A poor man, for example, will tend to make friends with a rich man, and each will receive some sort of benefit (8.8.6). This observation is further qualified, however. The apparent attraction may be only accidental, and the real reason that opposites are attracted is the tendency toward the mean- since this is Aristotle's concept of the Good, or Virtue (8.8.7).¹³ Utility seems to be the most

prevalent type of friendship between old men since they tend not to seek pleasure but profit (8.3.4) and since an old man's capacity to please is small (8.5.2 and see also 8.6.1). Although the old often feel goodwill for one another, this feeling never blossoms into friendship because they do not seek each other's company since they give no pleasure (8.6.1). Aristotle recognizes that this type of friendship is not the exclusive domain of the old, and that the young and the ambitious in the prime of their life also tend to make friends for utility (8.3.4). Friendships of pleasure are made by the young because they let their lives be ruled by their emotions, especially pleasurable ones (8.3.5). Inasmuch as emotion can spring up quickly and then disappear, the young make friends quickly (8.6.1). But the source of pleasure can also change quickly, so a young man's friendships will change as his tastes change as he matures (8.3.5). Indeed, the young can be so fickle that he can make a friend and leave him in the same day (8.3.5)! Friendships based on pleasure are also typical of the prosperous. Although these men have little need for material gain, they do still need the pleasant company of others with whom they may spend their time (8.6.4). The highest and truest form of friendship, unlike the other two types, may be established only between good men who are alike in virtue (8.4.2); these good men enjoy in their friendships the chance to exercise and even grow in their virtue (9.12.3).

One observes in Aristotle's work the source of Cicero's preoccupation with friendships between men of differing stations in life. Aristotle considers it a difficult deed that men of distinct rank be friends unless the superior in rank also be superior in virtue (8.6.6). Since the lesser party will be bettered by his superior, he owes this superior a greater amount of affection so as to keep the relationship proportionally equal.¹⁴ In some cases, it is impossible to share the highest form of friendship with those in high rank, such as princes, who tend to compartmentalize their friends. Good men are both useful and pleasant as well as virtuous, but princes rarely seek friends who are pleasant because of their goodness or useful for noble purposes, much less good men who are both of these. (8.6.5). One notes a remarkable difference in the thinking of Aristotle and of Seneca when dealing with the extremes with respect to stations in life; Seneca knows no bounds, but Aristotle categorically rejects the possibility of friendship with slaves because "master and slave have nothing in common: a slave is like a living tool, just as a tool is an inanimate slave" (8.11.7).

1.1.5. The Time Needed to Develop Friendships and the Number of Friends Possible

All three authors agree that choosing a friend is no easy task, and can only give vague advice to their respective audiences regarding the principles that should be followed. Fundamental among the three is that friendship cannot be and should not be established rapidly. Aristotle notes that the desire to form friendships is strong but must be curbed (8.3.9). In order to allow a relationship to develop into friendship a great deal of time is needed because each aspiring friend must show himself worthy of friendship in the highest degree (8.3.8), and each must know the other intimately (8.6.3).

Cicero believes that such an important decision should only be taken when a man has reached maturity of mind (20.74). Similar to Aristotle, Tullius states that the initial desire for quick friendships must be checked, and the possible friend ought to be appraised with regard to his character and his virtue (17.62. See also 21.78). The aspirant must be put to some sort of trial or test as well (17.62. See also 22.85).

Seneca also stresses the need of time to consider whether to make friends or not (3.2), and believes that it is not a decision that should be taken lightly such as at a reception or dinner (19.11). However, one must eventually decide because it is just as bad to trust no one as to trust

everybody (3.4). Once it has been decided, the friend must be accepted with heart and soul (3.2).

Seneca does not raise the issue of how many friends a man should have, but Aristotle and Cicero agree that the number is limited to a few at most. In friendships of the lower sort, Aristotle reasons, it is not advisable to have a great number of friends. In the case of utility, one would have the disagreeable task of repaying numerous debts (9.10.2) and friendships based on pleasure should be restricted because in excess they can be harmful just as too many sweets are harmful in a man's diet (9.10.2). Friendships between good men are limited by practical considerations according to the Stagirite: good men are few (8.3.1); friends must spend much time together, an impossibility with a large number of friends (9.10.4); and it is impossible to share intimately in the joys and sorrows of many people (9.10.5). Cicero states more directly that compared with all bonds that may unite mankind, "this thing called friendship has been so narrowed that the bonds of affection always unite two persons only, or, at most, a few" (5.20).

1.1.6. Comportment of Friends

The ways in which friends should act are also discussed by all three of the Classical theorists, but it is Aristotle's treatise that the most detailed instructions are found. In general, a good man who forms a friendship with

another good man will find that his love is reciprocated in the same degree as he has loved (8.13.1). His actions will be guided by his friend's well-being and not his own (9.8.1. See also 8.4.3 and 8.5.5); this altruism can even reach the extreme of one friend laying down his life for another (9.8.9). These friends will actively seek each other and desire to spend time together, and this sociability is pleasurable to both of them because of their common interests and tastes (8.5.3). Friendship provides several other opportunities, as well, such as the chance to see virtue being exercised, the opportunity to exercise virtue, the possibility to grow in virtue (9.9.5-.7). Conversely, bad men who try to form friendships enjoy each other's wickedness and grow more evil, but their friendships rarely last since they have no faithfulness for their friends (8.8.5). Good men should only seek advantage from their true friends when the cost to the friend is low in proportion to great beneficence (9.11.5). In addition, friendship between such good men provides a barrier against sudden changes of fortune because a friend will help to lessen the burden of adversity (8.4.3). However, one should take care to not be eager for his friend to share in his pain (9.11.4), but on the contrary, there should be no hesitation to provide any necessary help to a friend in need (9.11.6).

For Cicero, the virtue that constitutes the heart of friendship is the key that governs the actions between friends, inasmuch as neither friendship nor anything else of

real worth can be gained without virtue (22.84). With his tendency "to rejoice at good deeds and to be pained at the reverse" (13.47), a good man would not be able to associate for long with a bad man. Tullius, like Aristotle, believes that friendship between the good helps to perfect virtue (22.83). In light of this concept, Cicero describes and rejects several prevalent opinions which dictate how one should treat friends: a man should feel toward himself as he would toward a friend (16.56), but a man will often do more for a friend than for himself (16.57); a man's feelings toward a friend should correspond to his friend's feeling toward him (16.56), but to keep close track of advantages if "petty accounting" (16.58); and a man should place upon himself what should be placed on him by his friends (16.56), but a depressed man, for instance, often underestimates himself with regard to his true worth (16.59). This last observation is modified and developed into a general rule for comportment: a friend should be given as much aid as possible, but only those honors which the friend is able to bear should be rendered (20.73). Great consideration should be given to what to ask of a friend and what will be permitted if requested (20.76), but a friend will never ask another to do dishonorable things, nor carry out the dishonorable wishes of his friend (12.40. See also 13.44). For to sin, even on behalf of a friend, is to abandon virtue, which in turn undermines the basis on which true friendships are built (12.40). Anyone trying to justify an evil deed by

claiming that it was done for the sake of a friend should be given no leniency (11.37. See also 12.40). In spite of all these warnings, though, Cicero modifies his opinions of what a friend may request:

...even if by some chance the wishes of a friend are not altogether honorable and require to be forwarded in matters which involve his life or reputation, we should turn aside from the straight path, provided, however, utter disgrace does not follow; for there are limits to the indulgences which can be allowed to friendship. (17.61)

There should be no hesitation in carrying out any honorable wishes a friend may make (13.44), but the damaging consequences must be weighed against any possible good ones before rendering a decision as to whether or not to comply with dishonorable request.

Cicero recommends that friends be affable and courteous in mutual discourse (18.66) and that they speak to each other with utmost frankness and honesty (6.22) since hypocrisy and feigning are anathema to true friendship (8.26. See also 18.65 and 25.92). Advice should be given when requested, and the counsel of a friend should be considered as the best available when making decisions (12.44). In case one friend errs, the other must correct him, though not in a spiteful manner but "in the spirit of goodwill" (24.89). When a man receives such a censure from his friend, he should not take offense but amend his ways (25.91). This advice is not to be confused with flattery, which is the "handmaid of vice" (24.89) and always grievously injures friendship (25.91). The flatterer is usually obvious, and the good man has no

difficulty in spotting him. Flattery can be of the more subtle variety and consequently not easily seen, though, and good men must be on their guard against this more insidious type (26.99).¹⁵

Another rule proposed by Cicero is that a friend should not spread gossip about a friend nor believe it about him when told by others (18.65). Furthermore, he concedes that

varied and complex are the experiences of friendship, and they afford many causes for suspicion and offense, which it is wise sometimes to ignore, sometimes to make light of, and sometimes to endure. (24.88)

Even though it seems a great deal must sometimes be borne for the sake of friendship, a friend will never abandon relationship for this reason, just as a good man would never abandon virtue in spite the apparent annoyances that must be withstood (13.48).

Seneca shares many of the same views as Cicero regarding how friends should behave toward one another, but he is even more emphatic when he says that one should "greedily enjoy" friends since one is never sure how long they will be present (63.8). Seneca also believes that a good man not only gives another the opportunity to exercise his virtue (109.1), but also affords him the opportunity to grow in virtue, since "men learn while they teach" (7.8) and one who teaches virtue can also learn more. A man can be an edification to his friends simply by the example of his life, just as Socrates was when he drank the hemlock (70.9). In much the same way as Cicero, Seneca believes that benefits should be bestowed

on friends, but they must be given judiciously (19.12). Again, following the Ciceronian argument, Seneca believes that there should be absolute frankness and openness in speaking with a friend (3.3. See also 75.4). However, in case correction is needed, advice should only be given to a man who is willing to accept it, and not before (29.1. See also 25.1); the man who is helping must also take care lest he too be pulled into vice by his friend (29.4). When the moment has come for such advice, Seneca is in agreement with Cicero that it must not resemble flattery. Enemies most often employ outlandish compliments and praise in order to achieve ignoble results (45.7), and even the appearance of such an action is to be avoided.

Seneca distinguishes himself from his counterparts in one aspect of friendly behavior- the question of proximity. While he admits, like Aristotle and Cicero, that living with one another makes it much easier to exercise friendship (6.5), he contends that separation, even for an extended period, does not destroy the friendship that has existed. The friendship is maintained in two ways. First, by simply dwelling on the friend (62.2) that friend is retained in spirit and can never be considered absent (55.11). More importantly, a friendship can be conserved through the written word. Not only do letters allow friends to converse and give advice from great distances, but they also allow that the written precepts may be maintained for succeeding generations (22.1). The reader of the *Epistolae* is struck by

the veracity of these two observations about the written word while actually reading the letters Seneca wrote to Lucilius, letters which have now become very pragmatic advice. Seneca also puts into practice his theories when he tells his friend Lucilius that even though they are not together physically, Seneca believes that Lucilius is always present (64.1).

1.1.7. Duration of Friendships

Aristotle and Cicero believe that friendships between good men theoretically should be permanent since virtue is a permanent quality (Aristotle, 8.3.5 and Cicero, 9.32). But both of these authors realize that in some cases one of the friends becomes bad, or appears to become bad. In such a case, if the attempt to correct the friend has been made unsuccessfully, the friendship must be broken off (Aristotle, 9.3.3 and Cicero, 21.76). However, since there is great danger in breaking off these relationships suddenly, Cicero advises that it should be done gradually to avoid any feelings of revenge or ill-will (21.76; 20.78 and 21.78). In some cases, concedes Aristotle, a certain amount of contact must be maintained for the sake of the "the good old days" (9.3.5).

The point at which the lesser forms of friendship are terminated is much clearer. When one makes friends for utility or for pleasure, the friendship will cease when the source of the friendship no longer exists (Aristotle, 8.3.3; Cicero, 21.76; Seneca, 9.9). Since accidental qualities of

people are constantly changing, it is no surprise that these types of friendships should always be changing as well.

1.1.8. Friendship and Death

Another problem that preoccupies the Latin writers is the death of a friend. Aristotle does not describe how the death of a friend affects those who are left behind, perhaps because the relationship simply ends due to a lack of the intercourse necessary to maintain a viable friendship between good men. Both Cicero and Seneca have had to endure the loss of friends, and both describe the experience in very personal terms. Seneca posits that while grief is a natural reaction in such a case, one must not allow the emotions to rule; the grief must be reasonable: "We may weep, but we must not wail" (63.1). Sadness is offset by Seneca's typical Stoic equanimity: "To me, the thought of my dead friends is sweet and appealing. For I have had them as if I should one day lose them; I have lost them if I have them still" (63.7). If one has fully enjoyed the friendship as much as possible, then the memory of that friend is enough to preserve him, and indeed to maintain the relationship even beyond death. The thoughts concerning a dead friend and an absent friend seem very similar: neither death nor geographical separation is an obstacle to friendship. Cicero expresses these thoughts in much the same way through the principal interlocutor of his dialogue, Laelius, who believes that his life has been made much richer and more virtuous through his close association

with his friend Scipio (4.15). In spite of Scipio's sudden death, his love, virtue, and friendship are not dead (27.102). By the simple act of Laelius' remembering the shared experiences, they are nourished and made more vivid, so that his friend's death is made much more bearable (27.104).

1.1.9. Love and Friendship

Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca have different ideas concerning the idea of love and its relationship to friends and friendship. For Aristotle, love is "friendship in the superlative degree" (9.10.5), and therefore is felt toward only one person (8.6.2. See also 8.6.3). Cicero's concept varies slightly from Aristotle's; Tullius says that love is nothing other than "great esteem and affection... not sought for material need or the sake of material gain" (27.100). It would also seem that Cicero believes love to be an integral part of friendship, although not necessarily a superior form or higher degree of the amicable relationship. Seneca, in contrast to his precursors, subordinates the concept of love under friendship. Even though love and friendship share some common characteristics (9.11) and one must love a man before he can be a friend (35.1), true friendship represents a purer form of relationship than does love, because "friendship... is always helpful, but love sometimes even does harm" (35.1). The subordination of love to friendship distinguishes Seneca from Cicero, with whom he shares so many concepts, and

differentiates him to an even greater degree from Aristotle, who places love above friendship.

Aristotle and Seneca also share to varying degrees a common belief in the importance of self-love. Aristotle remarks that self-love has all the characteristics of friendship of the highest sort:

For the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with every part of his nature. Also he wishes his own good, real as well as apparent, and seeks it by action... and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself, and this appears to be a man's real self). Also he desires his own life and security, and especially that of his rational self... the good man desires his own company... and he is keenly conscious of his own joys and sorrows. (9.4.1-.5)

It therefore follows that man should be his own best friend, and consequently, he ought to love himself the most (9.8.2). What is more, by being his own best friend a man will benefit himself by acting even more nobly trying to perfect his virtue and aid his friends (9.8.7). Finally, Aristotle is careful to distinguish between the type of noble self-love which he has described, and self-love of "the ordinary sort," (9.8.11) which is always seeking solely utility and pleasure; this love of self the Philosopher qualifies as wrong (9.8.11). Seneca's treatment of the matter is much more concise. He states a general rule not only for Lucilius, but for others as well: "Hasten to find me, but hasten to find yourself first" (35.4). Implicit in this mandate is that the precepts which apply to friendship also apply to self-goodwill, knowledge, honesty, and even love.

1.1.10. New Friends vs. Old Friends

Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca attempt to resolve the question of which is preferable, new friends or old? Aristotle does not clearly state a preference, although he would implicitly seem to favor old friends who have proven themselves for a long period of time (8.3.8). Cicero also prefers old friendships to new, but he develops the idea more fully than Aristotle. Cicero begins by comparing old friendships to old wines, both of which are preferable to new ones (19.67), and then continues the comparison by using the same adage as Aristotle, observing that "men must eat many a peck of salt together before the claims of friendship are fulfilled" (19.67. See also Aristotle, 8.3.8). The force of habit is also strong in man, and a man is more accustomed to his older friends than to his new ones (19.68). Of course none of this means that new friendships have no place in a man's life, especially those new friendships which "offer hope of bearing fruit" (19.68). The fruit proper to true friendship, not simply material or political advantage. Seneca seems to break with the attitude of his predecessors in saying that "there is great pleasure, not only in maintaining old and established friendships, but also in beginning and acquiring new ones" (9.5). The letters to Lucilius represent both in tone and style a correspondence with an old friend, so that perhaps in practice it is the affinity for older friends which is more natural.¹⁶ There

seems to be, therefore, a general preference among these authors to prefer old, established friendships over recently acquired ones.

1.1.11. Friendship and Family

Aristotle also deals with several topics under the heading of friendship that the two Latin philosophers do not consider relevant. The first is the relationship of family members to each other, a relationship which is analogous to the different types of friendship.¹⁷ The most basic of familial relationships is that between parent and child (8.12.2). Parents love their children because they are part of themselves, while children love their parents as "the source of their being" (8.12.2). However, this mutual love is not equal in degree since generally the progenitor loves the progeny more than the reverse (8.12.2). Furthermore, the affection the mother feels for the child is stronger than that of the father, since she is more certain that the child is hers (8.12.3). Irrespective of the parent, however, this love toward the child develops nearly instantaneously, while the love the child feels for the parent may take some time, until "they have acquired understanding, or at least perception" (8.12.2). This feeling of a child is the "affection for what is good, and superior to oneself" (8.12.5). In addition, since parents and children have so much in common, their relationship provides greater possibilities for utility and pleasure (8.12.6). All other

familial relations are determined by this bond between parent and child (8.12.2) which vary correspondingly to the degree of consanguinity of the relatives in question (8.12.7).

Brothers love each other because they are from the same source (8.12.3) and their relationship can be compared to a comradeship, since "they have all things in common" (8.9.2). Fraternal love is nurtured by a common upbringing and similarity in age (8.12.4). Indeed, brothers perhaps have the greatest capacity for friendship, provided that they are virtuous (8.12.6), because they are "...in a manner the same being," although embodied in two separate persons (8.12.4), and since with them "the test of time has been the longest and most reliable" (8.12.6).

Also included in the description of familial relations is conjugal affection. A man marries since he is by nature a pairing creature even more than a political animal (8.12.7); this instinct has much to do with the division of labor, since "man and woman have different functions; thus they supply each other's wants..." (8.12.7). In addition to this aspect of utility, pleasure also seems to play a part in the relationship of man and woman (8.12.7).¹⁸ As is generally the case between friends of this type, the rules which should govern the conduct between man and woman are a question of justice (8.12.8). But there are exceptions to the observation that utility and pleasure are the sole source of attraction between man and woman. Aristotle says, "[the relationship of husband and wife] may also be based on

virtue, if the partners be of high moral character; for either sex has its special virtue, and this may be the ground of attraction" (8.12.7). This is the only mention of the possibility of a relation based on virtue between man and woman in the text.¹⁹

1.1.12. Justice in Friendships

The second topic which Aristotle explains that Cicero and Seneca do not is the concept of justice and its relevance to friendship.²⁰ The key to understanding Aristotle's justice is proportionality (8.7.2). In dealing with friends of any type who are of unequal status, each friend will receive "a larger share of the friendship" (8.14.2), but each friend cannot make claim to the same thing (8.7.2). Therefore, the larger share will not be of the same thing: in friendships of unequals, the superior will receive a larger part of the honor because of his association with an inferior, and the inferior will receive a larger part of the profits, whatever they may be (8.14.2. See also 8.14.3). When one or the other party claims to get more from the relationship, it must necessarily rupture, since there is an inequality (8.14.1), and equality is an essential element of any friendship (8.7.2). This concept of proportionality extends even to one's parents:

The friendship between parents and children will be enduring and equitable, when the children render to the parents the services due to the authors of one's being, and the parents to the children those due to one's offspring. (8.7.2)

However, at times it is impossible to render proportional services in order to produce equality, such as is the case with the gods or one's parents (8.14.4). It would seem that irrespective of this inequality, the relationship continues.

Disputes will often arise between friends because "the type of friendship in view at the conclusion of a friendship is not the same as when the relationship was formed" (8.13.5), with the result that neither friend obtains what he desired. This dichotomy of ends will naturally lead to an irreconcilable difference between the friends (9.1.4). Aristotle illustrates this concept by describing a pair of lovers, one of whom was seeking pleasure from the relationship, and the other profit. When one or the other no longer possess the desired attributes, the relationship will end (9.1.3).

Though important to all types of friendship, complaints against justice are most common in friendships of utility (8.13.2) because each party associates with the other for his own profit and always strives for more "thinking he is getting his due" (8.13.4), when in fact he has overstepped the boundaries of justice. In order to avoid disputes, a sort of contractual agreement in which the terms are clearly set forth should be reached at the beginning of the relationship so that this arrangement either can be accepted or rejected (8.13.9. See also 9.1.8). However, when such an agreement has not been arranged, disputes are likely to occur (8.13.10) and must somehow be resolved. As a general rule,

in friendships of utility the measure of service is determined by the original recipient (8.13.11. See also 9.1.9). Complaints about the value of services rendered are not at all common in friendships of pleasure since "...it seems ridiculous to find fault with somebody for not being agreeable to you..." (8.13.3). And as to be expected, in friendships of the highest degree, these complaints are impossible since the friends

vie with each other in giving and not getting benefit, no complaints nor quarrels can arise, since nobody is angry with one who loves him and benefits him. (8.13.2)

Further, although complaints do not arise in true friendships, one can measure the benefits received by the intention of the giver because "intention is the predominant factor in virtue and in character" (8.13.11).

2. The Biblical Tradition²¹

2.1. The Old Testament

The Old Testament is full of advice and observations on the ways in which men act, and friendship is recognized as an important aspect of human behavior; consequently, it is described in depth. A very thorough theoretical description is found in the sapiential books, especially Proverbs and Wisdom, and in the Pentateuch, especially Deuteronomy.

1.2.1.1. The Natural Desire of Friendship

The authors of the sapiential books, like their pagan counterparts, believed that friendship is good and to be

desired by man. Sirach says, "Happy the man who has found a friend," (Sir 25:12[9])²², for he believes that a man who has found a true friend has found a treasure (Sir 6:14).²³ This author even calls a faithful friend the "elixir of life" (Sir 6:16).²⁴ However, in spite of the basic goodness and desirability of friends, there are some cautious notes sounded. Not surprisingly, enemies are to be kept at a distance, but one does not expect to be counseled to "keep a wary eye" on friends (Sir 6:13).²⁵ Moreover, regardless of the strong degree of consanguinity or of friendship, it is recommended to "give no one power over yourself- son or wife, brother or friend" (Sir 33:20).²⁶ Thus, friendship itself may be desirable and good, but no man, no matter how trustworthy, is to be given complete confidence by another.

1.2.1.2. Elements of Friendship

This attitude of suspicion is also found in the advice given on the ways in which to form friendships. Nobody should make friends without first testing the candidate's mettle, and one should never be in a hurry to confide in another (Sir 6:7),²⁷ due to the basic mistrust one man has for another. However, this wary attitude does not preclude a certain degree of sociability. A man should "accept a greeting from everyone" even though he will accept advice from very few (Sir 6:6). This sociability is facilitated by "pleasant words" and an "affable manner" (Sir 6:5).²⁸

1.2.1.3. Types of Friendship

Even though the good man will associate with another, this does not mean that all friendships are perfect. Imperfect friendships are not necessarily to be desired, but they are described and attributed to several different causes- words, money, and pleasure.

It is possible to cover true motives with words, and while the Lord always knows the true reasons behind man's words and deeds, other men can be deceived. On account of their vanity, all men without exception adore to be flattered, and by this means "...you will make a king your friend with your fine phrases" (Prov 22:11).²⁹ This method is not without danger to the person being flattered, though: "a man who flatters his neighbor is spreading a net for his feet" (Prov 29:5).³⁰ The imagery of treachery and entanglement used indicates that this type of friendship is not open and honest, but on the contrary, could have mortal consequences, and therefore should not be sought.

Money is the second way in which temporary friendships are formed. In the Old Testament, the majority of these cases are presented by contrasting the rich man with the poor one. The rich gain their friends by lavishing their wealth on those who surround them (Prov 19:6),³¹ but these periods of financial success cannot be counted on to demonstrate who is a friend and who is not: "Prosperity does not reveal your friends" (Sir 15:8).³² The rich man is always seen to have friends only until he loses his wealth; after he has become

poor, these supposed friends immediately abandon him: "Wealth makes many friends, but a man without means loses the friends he has" (Prov 19:4).³³ Poverty can become such a burden that a man can even become a trial to his own brothers, and even more so to his friends.³⁴

Some men will have friends only in good times, though these friends are not actively seeking wealth, they do want a pleasurable, trouble-free life. This theme is reiterated in the book of Sirach. Fair-weather friends are constant in good conditions or when it is to their advantage to be friendly, but they quickly abandon their companions at the first signs of trouble: "Some friends are loyal when it suits them but desert you in time of trouble" (Sir 6:8).³⁵ This generality even applies to one's enemies as well, who will be friendly in good times, but they will be quick to act when given the opportunity.³⁶

However much one may learn by these negative examples, there are also several positive definitions of true friendship in the Old Testament. Just as some friends will desert a man in times of trouble, there are those, even though they may have begun a friendship because of self-interest, who will be faithful friends: "Another [friend] shares your toil for the sake of a meal, and yet may protect you against an enemy" (Sir 37:5).³⁷ And the bonds of friendship may be even tighter than those of fraternity: "Some companions are good for only idle talk, but a friend may stick closer than a brother" (Prov 18:24).³⁸

1.2.1.4. Types of Men and Friendships

All men are capable of friendship, and only the foolish complain that they cannot make friends in spite of their good intentions: "The fool says, 'I have no friends, I get no thanks for my kindnesses'..." (Sir 20:17).³⁹ Clearly, man is highly influenced by his peers, and the one who associates with less than desirable companions can find himself in personal danger.⁴⁰ Of those with whom one must associate, it is better to choose a wise man instead of a foolish one, because the fool will mislead the unsuspecting (Prov 13:20).⁴¹ The sensible man will know how to judge men,⁴² and, what is more, the good man will not choose to associate with an evil one. In fact, the good man "recoils" at the sight of evil, while wicked men will freely "take the path that leads them astray" (Prov 12:26).⁴³

1.2.1.5. Comportment of Friends

The ways in which a true friend should behave toward his companions are dealt with in depth. A variation on the Golden Rule is found in Sirach: "The man who fears the Lord keeps his friendships in repair, for he treats his neighbor as himself." (6:17).⁴⁴ A friend should be treated as "another self." But this rule was not established to treat the friend well simply because he is a friend. The interested party has more at stake than friendship, but also salvation. An offense against a friend would also be an

offense against the Lord, and so the relationship takes on a sacred character. A friend should never be neglected nor abandoned (Sir 22:31),⁴⁵ especially when prosperity has been fortunate to one of them. Any financial inequality should not influence the relationship in any way.⁴⁶ In short, before death one should help his friend as much as possible.⁴⁷

Negative examples of behavior are given along with the positive ones. A friend should not be neglected,⁴⁸ and the admonition "Plot no evil against your friend..." (Prov 3:29)⁴⁹ is issued. Deceit has no place in friendship, and to be found guilty of it toward a friend is to be considered shameful (Sir 41:23).⁵⁰ A man who tries to deceive his friend and then says it was all a practical joke is "shooting at random his deadly darts and arrows" (Prov 26:19).⁵¹ An abuse of friendship will cause the relationship to break (Sir 22:25).⁵²

Money provides one of the most dangerous opportunities for the abuse of a friendship, and a great deal of advice is dispensed so that the reader knows how to avoid such a problem. That a friend is more precious than gain is expressly stated: "Do not part with a friend for gain, or a true brother for all the gold of Ophir" (Sir 7:20).⁵³ Though money may be a danger to these relationships, it can be used to further strengthen them. To not use money in such a case would be to lose it: "Be ready to lose money for a brother or a friend; do not let it rust away under a stone" (Sir 29:13).⁵⁴ A man who owes a friend money should pay it back

promptly if he is able (Prov 3:28),⁵⁵ though Deuteronomy counsels that the debtor not collect any debt from his fellow countryman:

This is how remission [of debts] shall be made: everyone who holds a pledge shall remit the pledge of anyone indebted to him. He shall not press a fellow countryman for repayment, for the Lord's year of remission has been declared. You may press foreigners; but if it is a fellow countryman that holds anything of yours, you must remit all claim upon it. (Deut 15: 2-3)⁵⁶

Moreover, the same book also advises that a countryman should not abuse of the generosity of his neighbor (Deut 23:25).⁵⁷

Along with money, language provides another means of abusing friendship; this, however, is perceived as an even more serious abuse and more likely to break off friendships. Language has a great capacity to do either good or evil: "By his words a godless man tries to ruin others, but they are saved when the righteous plead for them" (Prov 11:9).⁵⁸ The wicked man will be jealous of the good and their friendships, and will use every means available to wreck them. The most effective way is by spreading malicious gossip, so that the friends are divided (Sir 28:11).⁵⁹ The person who believes the gossip about his friends in the end will be a man with no friends.⁶⁰ The best way to resolve these problems is to confront the friend with the rumor. In the unlikely case that the friend is guilty of the offense, he will admit to his fault, and his friend may remonstrate him, and the matter is settled (Sir 19:13).⁶¹ Revealing the secrets of a friend is seen to be the death blow for all friendships. The mere deed of reporting what one has seen is capable of bringing

recriminations from a friend (Prov 25:8).⁶² Furthermore, when defending himself, a man should always be careful to shield his friend's secrets and not use them in his own defense (Prov 25:9).⁶³ The man who does betray his friend's secrets irrevocably destroys that friendship, one of the few acts that has such consequences.⁶⁴ Such an action also puts other men on their guard when considering whether or not to form a friendship with the traitor.⁶⁵ If he has betrayed one friend, he has proven himself capable of betraying another. Besides breaking off the friendship, revealing a man's secrets can have even more serious consequences. Not only does it cause "mortal grief" (Sir 37:2),⁶⁶ but it can also lead to great shame, because the friend who betrayed the other's secrets is seen as duplicitous.⁶⁷ If the new enemy publicizes the quarrel, it can lead to even further public disgrace for the traitor (Sir 8:9).⁶⁸

1.2.1.6. New Friends vs. Old Friends

True friendships should be guarded and enjoyed. And while new friends are good to have, there is nothing as valuable as an old friend, because "a new friend is like a new wine; you do not enjoy drinking it until it has matured" (Sir 9:10).⁶⁹

1.2.1.7. Duration of Friendship

There is no temporal limit to these true friendships, and death does not put the relationship to an end, because

the dead man "has left an heir to take vengeance on his enemies and to repay the kindness of his friends" (Sir 30:6).⁷⁰

1.2.1.8. Friendship and Family

Though the majority of amicable relationships described in the Old Testament involve men, this does not necessarily preclude women from taking part in them. In fact, the relationship between husband and wife is viewed as even more important than that between friends: "A friend or companion is always welcome, but better still to be man and wife" (Sir 40: 23).⁷¹ The Song of Songs also treats the woman, the lover, as a special friend, and he calls her throughout "amica mea,"⁷² perhaps an indication that the role of lover and friend are not mutually exclusive.

1.2.2. Friendship in the New Testament

Jesus' teachings in the New Testament cannot be considered a complete rupture with those found in the Old Testament. Perhaps one of the most well-known of Jesus' parables is of the lost sheep. When the shepherd finds his lost lamb, he calls to his friends and neighbors to celebrate his good fortune, consistent with the Old Testament observations that friends are to be sought in good times.⁷³

However, Jesus does modify the mosaic tradition, and there are some differences between Jesus' concept of friendship and those in the mosaic tradition. In general,

the Old Testament takes a negative view of friendships formed exclusively for monetary gain, but Jesus does not consider the use of money to make friends wrong. In fact, money, something which will pass away, can be an instrument by which something lasting, such as a friendship, can be formed. These friendships bought with temporal wealth can serve later to help gain entrance into heaven:

'So I say to you, use your worldly wealth to win friends for yourselves, so that when money is a thing of the past you may be received into your eternal reward' (Luke 16:9)⁷⁴

This would indicate two important points: friendships can be eternal, or at least they are not limited by temporal bounds; and secondly, friends will mutually aid one another, although not necessarily in the same way.

Jesus also changes the way one views hospitality. Instead of allowing a friend or neighbor to have use of one's goods, Jesus insists that hospitality be shown to those who do not necessarily deserve it. Even the pagans, He says, are generous with relatives and friends. His new law is to love even those who normally would not be given any consideration at all. That is the way happiness is found:

Then he said to his host, 'When you are having a party for lunch or supper, do not invite your friends, your brothers, or other relations, or your rich neighbors; they will only ask you back again and you will be repaid. But when you give a party, ask the poor, the crippled, the lame, and the blind; and so find happiness. For they have no means of repaying you; but you will be repaid on the day when good men rise from the dead.' (Luke 14:12-14)⁷⁵

The underlying assumption is that all men are capable of some sort of friendship, not simply the truly good man. However, in Jesus' view, the good man will not treat those who are less fortunate than he any differently than one would normally treat a friend.

When Jesus follows his own counsel, He is criticized for it. When He sits to dine with less desirable elements of society, for example, those of the ruling class criticized Him: "The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say, 'Look at him! A glutton and a drinker, a friend of tax-gathers and sinners.'" (Matt 11:19).⁷⁶ That Jesus ignores these conventional social boundaries is a clear indication that followers of Christ do not necessarily make friends based on distinctions of class or societal status.⁷⁷

Political friendships are also presented in the New Testament. Pilate, the Roman magistrate, is a party involved in both examples of these political friendships found in the Gospels. First, the Pharisees, attempting to have Jesus crucified, prey on Pilate's sense of duty to his superiors. They say to him, "If you let this man go, you are no friend of Caesar's" (Jn 19:12)⁷⁸ The Jewish officials manipulate Pilate's sense of duty to his superior, his friend, in order to coerce the magistrate into action. Pilate also unknowingly helps his enemy, Herod, by ordering Christ to be crucified. Christ represented a threat to Herod's power, and with his death, this threat was removed. As a result of this political action, Herod and Pilate become friends: "That same

day Herod and Pilate became friends; till then there had been a standing feud between them" (Luke 23:12).⁷⁹

Jesus does not take an idealistic view of friendship, and he knows that all friendships are not necessarily permanent. He warns his disciples to be on guard, for "Even your parents and brothers, your relations and friends, will betray you" (Luke 21:16),⁸⁰ a clear echo of the mosaic tradition. Christ himself falls victim to a failed friendship the night before his appearance before Pilate. His apostle Judas betrays him for mere money, breaking the bond of friendship that they have shared. Jesus, though, calls him "friend" even at the moment of betrayal.⁸¹

1.3. The Patristic Tradition

1.3.1. Desert Fathers

The desert fathers were also seen as a source of inspiration to the writers and thinkers of the Renaissance, and many editions of various tales and legends of these holy men were published in this time period. Some skepticism is seen regarding the desirability of friends for one who is trying to lead an ascetic and completely contemplative life. In one particular example it is seen how one of the novices is discouraged from attempting to form friendships: "Once Paesios, the brother of Abba Poemen, made friends with someone outside his cell. Now Abba Poemen did not want that" (138).⁸²

However, this prohibition is tempered, and even contradicted in another anecdote. Another brother asks the Abba how he is to behave when going to market, and the wise man responds, "Make friends with anyone who tries to bully you and sell your produce in peace" (159). Obviously, this is not a spiritual friendship. It is one of convenience established in order to carry on efficiently and profitably a commercial activity.

But the hermits do admit friends to their company. The most important rule is that friendships cannot be forced; they must be given time to grow. And although the seeds of spiritual friendships are found in worldly affairs, given the proper climate, they bloom into a relationship that is other-worldly:

There are men who tire themselves to death involving themselves in friendships of this world. But keep yourself away from all that and do not get involved in such relationships and they will be transformed of their own accord. (155)

This transformed friendship is one in which the participants can mutually aid each other in their quest for spiritual perfection:

Greatly edified, he [the Egyptian] withdrew, and became his [an Abba of Rome] friend, and often went to him for help. For he was a man full of discernment and the good odour of the Holy Spirit. (176)

It is important to note that contrary to the Classical ideals of friendship as expressed by Aristotle and Cicero, in which a great degree of emphasis is placed on cohabitation, seclusion marks the friendship of the ascete. In addition, this is not friendship for the sake of friendship; this friendship is used to bring one or both parties closer to God. And finally, it would appear that the friend himself does not give advice, but is rather a conduit through which the Holy Spirit is received and the Father's will learned.

In spite of these recognized benefits of friendship, there is a certain amount of resistance. When several young men, who enjoy a reputation as seekers of holiness, come to talk with Abba Poemon, he does not want to admit them to his hermitage. Only after their continued, patient persistence does he invite them in to share a meal with them. During the meal, he realizes that all he has heard about these men has not been adequate to describe their goodness and for this reason, "from that day he became their friend" (138).

In the same way as the authors of Antiquity stress the need to reprimand a friend who errs, so too do the Desert Fathers:

If you are friendly with someone who happens to fall into the temptation of fornication, offer him your hand, if you can, and deliver him from it. But if he falls into heresy and you cannot persuade him to turn from it, separate yourself quickly from him, in case, if you delay, you too may be dragged down into the pit. (63-64)

A friend must help another in the throes of mortal sin. This type of sin, such as fornication, is so transparently and obviously wrong that the helper, if he is strong, is not endangered by merely attempting to raise up his friend. However, more dangerous to the helper is heresy, which can be disguised in many ways. If presented in an astute way, the helper can be easily tripped up and pulled down to the level of the friend he is trying to help. In this case, the Fathers' advice is similar to that given by Seneca: if the friend cannot be quickly saved, he must be abandoned.⁸³

1.3.2. St. Augustine (354-430)

St. Augustine, one of the most influential Fathers of the Church, was also a widely read writer during the Renaissance. His ideas on friendship are found in both his *Confessions* and *City of God*; in the latter work, the ideas are more simply stated, but in the former, small details are found throughout the biography, and the concept of friendship is more thoroughly explained.

In his *City of God*, Augustine, like Aristotle, believes man to be a social being, and even the life of the saints is social in nature (139). But the views expressed are rather negative. This social life is full of worries and even those who should love us, not only friends but family as well, are capable of betrayal. To support his opinion, he cites both Cicero and the Gospel of Matthew, pagan and Christian sources, that man must always be on guard, even against those whom he thinks are his friends (141). Conversely, however, our enemies may often times serve to correct us (*Confessions*, 168).

This pessimistic strain is continued in a later chapter of the *City of God*. Friends, especially those who are absent, are cause for worry because we constantly fear what evil may befall them (153). And if one would avoid sadness at the death of a friend,

he... must forbid, if he can, all friendly conversation, must interdict or intercept all friendly affection, must break with harsh brutality the bonds of all human relationships, or else lay down the law that they must be so indulged that no pleasure may be derived from them. (153)

Ever mindful of the life to come, Augustine recommends that our sadness at the death of a friend be tempered by the joy we know to be theirs in heaven (155). It appears that Augustine is fully aware of the pitfalls possible in friendship, but that in spite of such shortcomings, friendship is still to be desired and enjoyed.

The *Confessions*, as an early work, reflect a philosophy much closer to the Ancient theorists than does the *City of*

God. Recounting one of his earliest friendships, St. Augustine says,

There were other things which occupied my mind in the company of my friends: to make conversation, to share a joke, to perform mutual acts of kindness, to read together well-written books, to share in trifling and in serious matters, to disagree, though without animosity- just as a person debates with himself- and in the very rarity of disagreement to find the salt of normal harmony, to teach each other something or to learn from one another, to long with impatience for those absent, to welcome them with gladness on their arrival. These and other signs come from the heart of those who love and are loved and are expressed through the mouth, through the tongue, through the eyes, and a thousand gestures of delight, acting as fuel to set our minds on fire and out of many to forge unity. (60-61)

Friends share identical interests, pass time together, and treat each other as another self; there is no "no restraint... imposed by the exchange of mind with mind" (24). All these characteristics are typical of the highest type of friendship described by Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca. The passing of time together is important and is repeated on the occasion of Augustine's impending marriage. His friend urges him not to marry because it will disrupt their friendship. Augustine counters this argument by giving examples of friends who have been married but nevertheless maintained their friendly relations (106). One surmises from this that while passing time together with friends is helpful for friendships, it is not absolutely necessary.

It immediately is noticed that the number of friends in Augustine's idea of friendship is not as restrictive as in the Ancients, and indeed Augustine describes friendship as "a

nest of love... between many souls" (29). He continues to elaborate: "In sincere friendship nothing would be the private property of this or that individual, but out of the resources of all one treasure would be formed" (108).

Although a specific number is never mentioned, these passages certainly seem to be referring to more than two individuals, and quite possibly more than three. In fact, when recounting how at one time his friend Verecundus was in need of help, Augustine says that an appeal was made to the whole group of friends (142), and not just to an individual, or several particulars.

Love is the basis for Augustine's friendship. This love is a reciprocal feeling between friends and mutually recognized, and is generally an emotional and not physical love:⁸⁴

This is what we love in friends. We love to the point that the human conscience feels guilty if we do not love the person who is loving us, and if that love is not returned- without demanding any physical response other than the marks of affectionate good will. (61)

For Augustine before his conversion, friends are loved in and of themselves, with no higher purpose supposed (110).

Nevertheless, after his conversion, Augustine recognizes that the love of friends that is formed "on the basis of human judgment" (65) and is not rooted in Christ can easily lead to sin (29).

In spite of the fact that Augustine bases his theory of friendship in the Classical models with some slight

modifications, there exists an even more important fundamental difference, as observed in this passage:

During those years when first I began to teach in the town where I was born, I had come to have a friend who because of our shared interests was very close. He was my age, and we shared the flowering of youth. As a boy he had grown up with me, and we had gone to school together and played with one another. He was then not yet my friend, and when he did become so, it was less than true friendship which is not possible unless you bond together those who cleave to one another by the love which 'is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us' (Rom. 5:5). Nevertheless, it was a very sweet experience, welded by the fervour of our identical interests. (56)

The closeness of age, the shared interests and experiences are all hallmarks of the beginnings of friendship in the Classical treatises. But there is one obvious and utterly important difference in Augustine's theory. Regardless of the similarities, no men can be friends except in Christ, and although the artificial friendship can be pleasant, it does not last until it finds its source in Christ's love. But even friendships that are not shared in Christ can lead to Him; Augustine attributes to divine providence his meeting with Firminus (117), and through him Augustine learns of the vanity and uselessness of astrology (119).

An important point for Augustine is that Christianity should not hinder lesser friendships, and such associations can even be a source of conversion for the unbeliever. He cites Victorinus, one who wants to be a Christian, but is afraid of offending his pagan friends (136). However, his friendship with Simplicianus as well as study of the Scriptures finally give Victorinus the courage to make a

public profession of faith (136). Augustine also cites another instance of friendship leading to conversion as his close association with Nebridius leads him out of heresy and to the Faith (158). The ontological difference between the pagan Verecundus and the Christian Augustine and his friends is a source of anguish, since Verecundus cannot be counted among the Lord's flock (158). Notwithstanding, the occasion of Augustine's conversion does not completely sever the bond of friendship between the two men (159).

1.4. Conclusions

Friendship is one of the fundamental bonds of human society and is in some way desired by all men. All the Classical, Biblical, and Patristic sources recognize this to varying degrees.

The theoretical framework of friendship is most fully developed by the authors of Antiquity. The theme's importance is evidenced by the number of treatises devoted to the subject: Plato and Cicero each devoted an entire work to the theme, while Aristotle dwells on the topic in two of the books of his *Ethics*, and Seneca's preoccupation with the theme is apparent in his many letters written, in fact, to one of his good friends. All of these theorists laud the goodness and desirability of friendship and claim that it is a universal truth that no man would want to live without friends. The theories propounded by the Classical authors deal exclusively with friendship between men, and friendship

with woman is discussed only tangentially by Aristotle within the context of family relations.

However, friendship is not a uniform phenomenon; that is, there is no one single type of friendship, and the authors studied here work from this premise. There can be said to be two broad types of friendship: the superior kind based on virtue, and inferior type, which is not dependent on virtue. The precise definition of this virtue that is the foundation of friendly relations varies from author to author; Aristotle gives a rather complex and thorough treatment of the subject in his *Ethics*, while Cicero and Seneca understand the term as it is used in everyday conversation. The Latin authors choose to follow the bipartite division of friendship, specifically commenting on the superior form, while describing the inferior type only to demonstrate all the more the desirability of true friendship. On the other hand, Aristotle chooses to be much more thorough and further divides the inferior type of friendship into two subdivisions: one based on pleasure, and one on utility.

In general, all the Classical theorists agree that the behavior of true friends is ruled by virtue. Friends act virtuously and give their companions the opportunity to act in a like manner. Any action or request that is contrary to virtue is anathema to friendship, but within the Ciceronian concept, for example, there is a certain amount of latitude on this point: Tullius would allow a man to request his friend to perform a not quite virtuous deed, provided that the

consequences of such an act were not catastrophic. The end of a man's virtue signals the end of any true friendship he may have had with him. This does not necessarily mean that the former friends must have no contact with one another. Since virtue is the base of friendship, and given that virtue is not wide-spread, it follows that friendships of the highest form necessarily are few, generally between only two good men. Another mark of friendship in Antiquity is that friends are aware of the feelings they have for each other, and actively choose to engage in their mutual association. Friendship is an active property of the will, not a passive one.

Though the Classical authors regularly agree on the most important concepts of friendship, there are several points upon which they differentiate their theories, especially concerning the relationship of love and the duties of a friend and the link between death and friendship. All the theorists feel that interaction and cohabitation are conducive to and good for friendship. Hence, it is Aristotle's opinion that at death friendships cease because of the lack of any intercourse. In contrast, Seneca does not believe cohabitation and constant interaction to be an absolutely essential part of the highest type of association, only that they are desirable. He believes, therefore, that friendships can endure even beyond death. Cicero, though vague on this question, seems to be aligned with Seneca; he says that he, too, considers his deceased companions friends.

An even greater difference between theories is found regarding the relationship of love and friendship. For Aristotle, love is the highest form of friendship, and can be considered friendship perfected. Seneca, on the other hand, speaks of love as a component part of friendship, and therefore inferior to it. Likewise, Aristotle distinguishes himself from both Cicero and Seneca by placing familial relationships within the realm of friendship.

Many similarities between Classical and Biblical thought on the subject of friendship are found. The Scriptures state that friendship is desired by all men; they also distinguish between a superior and inferior type of friendship, the inferior based on gain and the superior on virtue. Friends regulate their behavior in accord with such virtue, but to not do so not only constitutes a rupture of friendship, as in the theories of Antiquity, but also an offense against God. In general, the Biblical theory of friendship warns that one ought never to trust another completely since all men have their faults. Special attention is given by the Biblical authors to the uses and abuses of speech between friends, especially the detrimental consequences of revealing a friend's secrets. Like Seneca, the Biblical tradition posits that friendships need not end with death; these relationships can be continued through a man's heirs. In addition, familial relations are also seen as analogous to friendship in the Biblical tradition.

The Patristic tradition is a clear continuation of its predecessors. However, the desert fathers, while maintaining the suspicion of friendship found in the Old Testament, recognize it to be a means by which the Holy Spirit may choose to act. For them, then, friendship is not an end in itself, but a means by which one may be drawn closer to God. Moreover, Augustine, who explains a great deal about friendship in the same terms as the Classical theorists, refines his theory to say that men can only be true friends in Christ. The lack of ontological equality between Christian and non-Christian does not exclude the two men from being friends, though they cannot experience the highest form of friendship and love that is found only in Christ.

Notes to Chapter One

¹Perhaps one of the most important, and certainly best documented, pedagogical influences in the Iberian Peninsula during the second half of the sixteenth century was the Society of Jesus. One historian goes as far as to say that Spanish pedagogy was thoroughly medieval until the arrival of the Jesuits and so requires no special attention until they begin their educational endeavors (Bolgar 361). The day-to-day business of education in a Jesuit college was thoroughly regulated by the *Ratio studiorum*, officially promulgated in 1599. A complete *ratio* from a school in the Jesuit Province of Spain proved difficult to locate. Consequently, the *ratio* (1565) of the Roman College was consulted to gauge the relative strength of the use of the various authors being studied. Cicero is without a doubt the author most read during the study of the humane letters. Even in their first year, after reading selections from Cicero's letters, students "compositiones quae brevissimae et minime multae esse debent, ex lectione audita Ciceronis..." (*Ratio-1563*, 206). Most of the reading is taken from the *Epistolae* until the third year, when the philosophical works, among them *De amicitia*, are read, commented on, and imitated. In the fourth year of study *De officiis*, *De tusculanis quaestionibus*, and *De finibus bonorum*, and some of orations are read. While some Greek authors are read in the study of the humanities in order to learn grammar and prosody, the philosophical works of Aristotle are not used until the superior courses in philosophy. During the study of Moral Philosophy, the *Ethics* is the only book to be used and commented on, according to the tenth chapter of the *Ratio* of 1599.

The typical secular humanist education probably was not much different from that found in the Jesuit colleges. In fact the Jesuit educational system "largely took over the contemporary humanistic curriculum" of the period (Fitzpatrick 15). Humanists based education on the *studia humanitatis*, and probably read many of the same authors that were being read in the Jesuit schools of the period.

²*Polyantheas* were compilations of citations taken from the texts of the ancients, as well as the Bible, Patristic writings, as well as early Renaissance authors; they were in wide circulation throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As one author points out, the situation in Spain with respect to these *polyantheas* was no different from that in any other European country of the epoch: "estas *polyantheas* circularon, se consultaban, se compraban, y se ocultaba (habitualmente) la cita de su conocimiento" (Infantes 245). Any author of the era (especially one like Cervantes who was so fond of reading that he would even read "los papeles rotos de las calles"

[Cervantes *Don Quijote* 93]) would be aware of these collections.

Two editions of the same *polyanthea* were consulted for this brief study, and yielded what might be considered startling results. The first copy examined is a second edition of the work (Nano Mirabello *Polyanthea*, Venice, 1507); its organization is straightforward and direct. The subjects treated are arranged alphabetically, and within each subject the authors are also arranged alphabetically. There is also a tendency to group the quotations taken from the same work together, though not necessarily within any particular order. The theme of friendship is treated rather extensively in this *polyanthea*, occupying six folios in double columns. Preceding the various *sententiae* is a diagram based heavily on Aristotle and St. Thomas in which "amicitia" is broken down into categories. The catalogue of maxims follows; of the three authors being studied, Cicero was quoted the most often (51 times) from various works, but most especially *De amicitia* and *De officiis*. Aristotle was second (35 times) with passages from the *Ethics*, *Politics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Topics*. Third, but still significant, was Seneca (24 times), most often from the *Epistulae Morales*, but also several times from his various moral essays.

The next edition examined of the work was published in Venice in 1616. The category "amicitia" maintains the same diagram examining the various categories of friendship, but the system of arrangement is completely different from that of the previous edition consulted. The subjects are alphabetically arranged by author, but within each subject there are various categories which are repeated under each subject heading. The first of these subdivisions is definition and etymology, then Biblical *sententiae*, *sententiae* of the Patristic writers, poetical *sententiae*, philosophical *sententiae*, etc. Within each category, passages from the particular author tend to be grouped together (there are several exceptions), but the author's works are quoted in no particular order. For example, under the category of philosophical *sententiae*, Aristotle's *Ethics* is quoted from the second book, from the seventh, and then from the second book again. In some of the categories (adages, emblems, and *hieroglyphica*), the author or origin of the particular quotation is not identified. Of the authorities cited under the rubric "amicitia," Cicero falls to third place, being used only nine times, which seems incredible given his importance in education as a model for imitation. Aristotle jumps ahead in number of times quoted, to nearly 60, and Seneca is the second most quoted of the authors studied, at nearly 40 times. Despite the decrease in the amount of citations of Cicero, these three authors are

the core ancient authorities in this category in both editions of the *Polyanthea*.

³Although *Lysis* is the only dialogue which specifically deals with the theme of friendship, *Symposium* also touches upon the subject but was only rarely used by later Renaissance authors.

⁴All quotes from *De Amicitia* are cited by chapter and sentence number.

⁵These letters are: 3, 9, 29, 35, 63, and 109.

⁶On the difficulty of translating Aristotle's use of *philia*, Tracy says, "As the commentators point out, there is no single word that can be applied to the wide spectrum of relationships covered by the Greek *philia*. The English 'love' is too strong for the relationship between business partners or fellow workers; while 'friendship' is too weak for the relationship between husband and wife, or mother and child" (65). In spite of the inadequacy of "friendship" as a translation for the concept, it is nonetheless most commonly used.

⁷All quotes from *Nicomachean Ethics* are cited by book, chapter and sentence number.

⁸In the *Politics*, Aristotle states, "That man is a much more political animal than any kind of bee or any herd animal is clear" (1.2.10) and "...there is in everyone by nature an impulse toward this sort of partnership [to live with others]" (1.2.15).

⁹Cooper observes that the shared life is a necessary element of flourishing; "Aristotle argues, first that to know the goodness of one's life, which he reasonably assumes to be a necessary condition of flourishing, one needs to have intimate friends whose lives are similarly good since one is better able to reach a sound and secure estimate of the quality of life when it is not one's own. Secondly, he argues that the fundamental moral and intellectual activities that go to make up a flourishing life cannot be continuously engaged in with pleasure and interest, as they must be if the life is to be a flourishing one, unless they are engaged in as parts of shared activities, rather than pursued merely in private; and given the nature of the activities that are in question, this sharing is possible only with intimate friends who are themselves morally good persons" (310).

¹⁰Brunt explains, "The range of *amicitia* is vast. From the constant intimacy and goodwill of virtuous or at least of like minded men to the courtesy that etiquette normally enjoined on gentlemen, it covers every degree of genuinely or overtly amicable relation. Within this spectrum purely political connexions have their place, but one whose all-importance must not be assumed" (20). In the *De amicitia*, it appears that Cicero is explaining the first type of friendship, that between the virtuous or the like, and not political alliances, as will become clear.

¹¹All quotes from Seneca are cited by letter and sentence.

¹²As Brunt points out, "Cicero's source or sources cannot be identified with certainty" (2), but one must also keep in mind that "Roman thinking was already permeated by Greek ideas [at the time of Cicero]. Like many others of his class, Cicero had been versed in Greek philosophy long before he began to write on it more or less systematically, and he could take such knowledge for granted in others" (Brunt 3).

¹³Aristotle describes virtue as being the mean between two extremes. Fr. Coppleston says, "virtue, in Aristotle's eyes, is a mean between two extremes, the extremes being vices, one being a vice through excess, the other being a vice through defect" (2: 336). See *Nicomachean Ethics* Book II.

¹⁴The idea of proportionality in Aristotle's concept of friendship is important. In this case, since the parties are unequal, the amount of affection rendered by the lesser party maintains a necessary equilibrium within the relationship.

¹⁵After these observations on flatterers, Cicero comments, "I have rambled on to a discussion of friendship of a frivolous kind" (26.100) and not the true variety, thereby further implying that there are several types of friendship.

¹⁶Prof. Gummere notes in his introduction to the *Epistolae* that the beginning of the friendship between Seneca and Lucilius is difficult to date, but that some of the Stoic's other earlier works were also dedicated to Lucilius, indicating a friendship of some duration (ix).

¹⁷Tracy believes, "The equality and similarity of *aretê* [moral excellence] demanded for perfect *philia* do in fact seem to lead Aristotle to deny the possibility of its

existence even between persons so closely related as husband and wife, or father and son" (71). However, one must keep in mind that Aristotle classifies family bonds as analogous to friendships, not actually being friendships themselves, though in some cases this relationships will approach *philia*.

¹⁸This relationship would seem to contradict the general rule that man does not make friends with another for the sake of both utility and pleasure at the same time combined (See 8.4.5).

¹⁹Tracy points out "[Aristotle] sees the nature, function, and proper *areté* of man and woman as being so different that they exclude the equality and similarity demanded for perfect *philia*" (71). But if each partner were perfect or near perfect in their distinguishing virtues, it would seem that their relationship could approach the level of *philia*, since the association would be based on virtue, not on accidental qualities of utility or pleasure.

²⁰It must be remembered that Cicero does mention a form of justice (he refers to "petty accounting" [16.58]), but given that he is trying to deal solely with the true friendship among good men, this class of justice seems impertinent.

²¹All English translations are taken from the Oxford edition. Due to the occasional variance between the English and the Vulgate, the Latin text will be given in endnotes.

²²"*beatus qui invenit amicum verum*" (Sir 25:12).

²³"*amicus fidelis protectio fortis qui autem invenit illum invenit thesaurum*" (Sir 6:14).

²⁴"*amicus fidelis medicamentum vitae...*" (Sir 6:16)

²⁵"*ab inimicis tuis separare et ab amicis tuis adtende*" (Sir 6:13).

²⁶"*filio et mulieri fratri et amico non des potestatem super te in vita tua*" (Sir 33:20).

²⁷"*si possides amicum in temptatione posside eum et non facile credas illi*" (Sir 6:7).

²⁸"*verbum dulce multiplicat amicos et mitigat inimicos et lingua eucharis in bono homine abundat*" (Sir 6:5).

²⁹"...propter gratiam labiorum suorum habebit amicum regem" (Prov 22:11).

³⁰"homo qui blandis fictisque sermonibus loquitur amico suo rete expandit gressibus eius" (Prov 29:5).

³¹"Many curry favor with the great; a lavish giver has the world for his friend [multi colunt personam potentis et amici sunt dona tribuenti]" (Prov 19:6).

³²"non agnosceatur in bonis amicus et non abscondetur in malis inimicus" (Sir 12:8).

³³"divitiae addunt amicos plurimos a paupere autem et hii quos habuit separantur" (Prov 19:4).

Also "If a rich man staggers, he is held up by his friends; a poor man falls, and his friends disown him as well [dives commotus confirmatur ab amicis humilis autem cum ceciderit expellitur et a notis]" (Sir 13:25).

And "A poor man is odious even to his friends; the rich have friends in plenty [etiam proximo suo pauper odiosus erit amici vero divitum multi]" (Prov 14:20).

³⁴"A poor man's brothers all dislike him, how much more is he shunned by his friends [fratres hominis pauperis oderunt eum insuper et amici procul recesserunt ab eo...]" (Prov 19:7a).

³⁵"est enim amicus secundum tempus suum et non permanebit in die tribulationis" (Sir 6:8).

Also "A friend may be all smiles when you are happy, but turn against you when trouble comes [sodalis amico coniuocundatur in oblectatione et in tempore tribulationis adversarius erit]" (Sir 37:4).

And "Another sits at your table, but is nowhere to be found in times of trouble; when you are prosperous, he will be your second self and make free will of your servants, but if you come down in the world, he will turn against you and you will not see him again [est autem amicus socius mensae et non permanet in die necessitatis/ amicus si permanserit fixus erit tibi quasi coequalis et in domesticis tuis fiducialiter aget/ si humiliaverit se contra te et a facie tua abscondet se unanimum habebis amicitiam bonam]" (Sir 6:10-12).

And "Every friends says, 'I too am your friend,' but some are friends in name only [omnis amicus dicet et ego amicitiam copulavi sed est amicus solo nomine amicus nonne tristitia inest usque ad mortem.]" (Sir 37:1).

³⁶"When all goes well a man's enemies are friendly, but in hard times even his friend will desert him. [in bonis viri inimici illius in tristitia et in malitia illius amicus agnitus est]" (Sir 12:9).

³⁷"sodalis amico condolet causa ventris et contra hostem accipiet scutum" (Sir 37:5).

³⁸"vir amicalis ad societatem magis amicus erit quam frater" (Prov 18:24).

³⁹"fatuo non erit amicus et non erit gratia bonis illius qui enim edunt panem illius falsi linguae sunt quotiens et quanti inridebunt eum" (Sir 20:17-18).

⁴⁰"Never make friends with an angry man nor keep company with a bad-tempered one; be careful not to learn his ways, or you will find yourself caught in a trap [noli esse amicus homini iracundo neque ambules cum viro furioso ne forte discas semitas eius et sumas scandulum animae tuae]" (Prov 22:24-25).

⁴¹"qui cum sapientibus graditur sapiens erit amicus stultorum efficietur similis" (Prov 13:20).

And "A man of violence draws others on and leads them into lawless ways [vir iniquus lactat amicum suum et ducit eum per viam non bonam]" (Prov 16:29).

⁴²"A man without senses despises others, but a man of understanding holds his price [qui despicit amicum suum indigens corde est vir autem prudens tacebit]" (Prov 11:12).

⁴³"qui neglegit damnum propter amicum iustus est iter autem impiorum decipiet eos" (Prov 12:26).

⁴⁴"qui timet Deum aequae habebit amicitiam bonam quoniam secundum illum erit amicus illius" (Sir 6:17).

⁴⁵"I will not be afraid to protect my friend nor will I turn my back on him [amicum salutare non confundaris et a facie illius non me abscondam...]" (Sir 22:31).

46"Never forget a friend or neglect him when prosperity comes your way [non obliviscaris amici tui in animo tuo et non inmemor sis illius in operibus tuis]" (Sir 37:6).

47"Before you die, do good to your friend; reach out as far as you can to help him [ante mortem benefac amico tuo et secundum vires tuas exporrigens da pauperi]" (Sir 14:13).

48"Do not neglect your own friend or you father's (or how should you enter your brother's house in the day of your ruin?) a neighbor at hand is better than a brother far away [amicum tuum et amicum patris tui ne demiseris et domum fratris tui ne ingrediaris in die afflictionis tuae, melior est vicinus iuxta quam frater procul]" (Prov 27:10)

49"ne moliaris amico tuo malum cum ille in te habeat fiduciam" (Prov 3:29).

50"[Be ashamed to be found guilty]... of dishonesty by a partner or a friend... [<erubescite>... a socio et amico de iniustitia]" (Sir 41:23).

51"...est qui mittit lanceas et sagittas et mortem..." (Prov 26:18)

52"Throw a stone at the birds and you scare them away; abuse a friend and you break your friendship [mittens lapidem in volatilia deiciet illa sic et qui conviciatur amico dissolvit amicitiam]" (Sir 22:25).

53"noli praevaricari in amicum pecunia differenti neque fratrem carissimum auro spreveris" (Sir 7:20).

54"Perde pecuniam pro fratre et amico et non abscondas illam sub lapide in perditionem" (Sir 29:13).

55"Do not say to your friend, 'Come back again; you shall have it tomorrow'- when you have it already [ne dicas amico tuo vade et revertere et cras dabo tibi cum statim possis dare]" (Prov 3:28).

56"septimo anno facies remissionem quae hoc ordine celebrabitur cui debetur aliquid ab amico vel proximo ac fratre suo repetere non poterit quia annus remissionis est Domini/ a peregrino et advena exiges civem et propinquum repetendi non habes potestatem" (Deut 15: 1-3)

⁵⁷"When you go into another man's standing corn, you may pluck ears to rub in your hands, but you may not put a sickle to his standing corn [si intraveris in segetem amici tui franges spicas et manu conteres falce autem non metes]" (Deut 23:25)

⁵⁸"similator ore decipit amicum suum iusti autem liberabuntur scientia" (Prov 11:9).

⁵⁹"A sinner sows trouble between friends and spreads scandal where before there was peace [homo enim iracundus incendit litem et vir peccator turbabit amicos et in medium pacem habentium inmittit inimicitiam]" (Sir 28:11).

⁶⁰"Whoever pays heed to it [gossip] will never again find rest or live in peace of mind [qui respicit illam non habebit requiem nec habebit cum requie]" (Sir 28:20 [16]). An alternate reading from the Vulgate is "qui respicit illam non habebit requiem nec habebit amicum in quo requiescat."

⁶¹"Confront your friend with the gossip about him; he may not have done it; or if he did, he will know not to do it again [corripe amicum ne forte non intellexerit et dicat non feci]" (Sir 19:13).

Also "Confront your friend; it will often turn out to be slander; do not believe everything you hear [corripe amicum saepe enim fit commissio et non omni verbo credas...]" (Sir 19:15-16).

⁶²"Be in no hurry to tell everyone what you have seen, or it will end in bitter reproaches from your friend [quae viderunt oculi ne proferas in iurgio cito ne postea emendare non possis cum deshonestaveris amicum tuum]" (Prov 25:8).

Also "Tell no tales about friend or foe; unless silence makes you an accomplice, never betray a man's secret [amico et inimico noli enarrare sensum tuum et si est tibi delictum noli denudare]" (Sir 19:8).

⁶³"Argue your own case with your neighbor, but do not reveal another man's secrets [causam tuam tracta cum amico tuo et secretum extraneo non reveles]" (Prov 25:9).

⁶⁴"If you have quarrelled with your friend, never fear, there can still be a reconciliation. But abuse, scorn a secret betrayed, a stab in the back- these will make any friend keep his distance [si aperuerit os triste non timeas

est enim concordatio (ad amicum) excepto convicio et inproperio et superbia et mysterii revelatione et plaga dolosa in his omnibus effugiet amicos]" (Sir 22:27 [22]).

A friend can even take up arms against his friend, and because it can still be remedied, it is not considered as serious as betraying a friend's secret: "If you have drawn your sword on a friend, do not give up hope, there is still a way back [ad amicum et is produxeris gladium non desperes, est enim regressus ad amicum]" (Sir 22:26).

⁶⁵"The betrayer of secrets loses his credit and can never find an intimate friend [qui denudat arcana amici perdet fidem et non inveniet amicum ad amicum suum]" (Sir 27:17 [16]).

Also "As a bird that is allowed to escape your hand, your neighbor, once lost, will not be caught again [sic qui perdit amicitiam proximi sui/ et sicut qui dimittit avem de manu sua/ sic reliquisti proximum tuum et non eum capies]" (Sir 27: 20-21).

And "Love your friend and keep faith with him, but if you betray his secrets, keep out of his way; as a man kills his enemy, so have you killed your neighbor's friendship [dilige proximum et coniugere fide cum illo/ quod si desnudaveris absconsa illius/ non persequeris pos eum/ sicut enim homo qui perdit amicum suum..]" (Sir 27:18-20 [17-18]).

⁶⁶"What mortal grief it is when a dear friend turns into an enemy [sodalis autem et amicus ad inimicitiam convertentur]" (Sir 37:2).

⁶⁷"Do not change from a friend to an enemy, for a bad name brings shame and disgrace, and this is a mark of duplicity [Noli fiere pro amico inimicus proximo inproperium enim et contumeliam malus heredetabit/ et omnis peccator invidus et bilinguis]" (Sir 6:1).

⁶⁸"Some friends turn into enemies and shame you by making the quarrel public [et est amicus qui egreditur ad inimicitiam/ et est amicus qui odium et rixam et convicia denudabit]" (Sir 6:9).

⁶⁹"ne dereliquas amicum antiquum novus enim non erit similis illi vinum novum amicus novus veterescat et cum suavitate bibes illud" (Sir 9:14).

70"reliquit enim defensorem domus et amicis reddentem gratiam" (Sir 30:6).

71"amicus et sodalis in tempore convenientes et super utrosque mulier cum viro" (Sir 40:23)

72 "I would compare you, my dearest, to Pharoah's chariot horses... [equitatu meo in curribus Pharaonis addsimilavi te amica mea...]" (Song 1:8).

73"He lifts it [the sheep] onto his shoulders, and home he goes to call his friends and neighbors together. 'Rejoice with me!' he cries. 'I have found my lost sheep' [et cum invenerit eam inponit in umeros suos guadens/ et veniens domum convocat amicos et vecinos dicens illis/ congratulamini mihi quia inveni ovem meam quae perierat]" (Luke 15:5-6).

74"et ego vobis dico facite vobis amicos mamona iniquitatis ut cum defeceritis recipiant vos in aeterna tabernacula" (Luke 16:9).

75"Dicebat autem et ei qui se invitaverit cum facis prandium aut cenam noli vocare amicos tuos neque fratres tuos neque cognatos neque vicinos divites ne forte et ipsi te reinvitent et fiat tibi retributio/ sed cum facis convivium voca pauperes debiles claudos caecos/ et beatus eris quia non habent retribuere tibi retribuetur enim tibi in resurrectione iustorum" (Luke 14:12-14).

76"venit Filius hominis manducans et bibens et dicunt ecce homo vorax et potator vini publicanorum et peccatorum amicus" (Matt 11:19).

77"That Jesus shares meals with these undesirables of society is also notable. The shared meal becomes "an expression of friendship not only within the Christian group, but also with those who had exploited their fellow-creatures but could learn a better way" (Clark, 38-39).

78"exinde quaerebat Pilatus dimittere eum Iudaei autem clamabant dicentes si hunc dimittis no es amicus Caesaris omnis qui se regem facit contradicit Caesari" (Jn 19:12).

79"et facti sunt amici Herodes et Pilatus in ipsa die/ nam antea inimici erant ad invicem" (Luke 23:12).

⁸⁰"trademini autem a parentibus et fratribus et cognatis et amicis et morte adficiet ex vobis" (Luke 21:16).

⁸¹"Jesus replied, 'Friend, do what you are here to do.' [dixitque Iesus amice ad quod venisti]" (Mt 26:50).

⁸²All quotations from the Desert Fathers are taken from *The Sayings of the Desert Fathers*.

⁸³See Seneca *Epistulae* 29.4.

⁸⁴Augustine believes that pure friendship is stained by physical love: "To me it was sweet to love and to be loved, the more so if I could also enjoy the body of the beloved. I therefore polluted the spring water of friendship with the filth of concupiscence" (35) This case refers to the relationship between Augustine and Verecundus, and would seem to indicate the possibility of friendships between man and woman, since it is this "water of friendship" which becomes contaminated.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORIES OF FRIENDSHIP IN THE SPANISH RENAISSANCE

2.0 Introduction: The Study of Moral Philosophy and its Place in the Renaissance

The philosophy of the Renaissance humanist was far different from its immediate predecessor, medieval philosophy, and the scholastics, who continued this line of thought into the Renaissance. The Renaissance humanists attempted to do away with the highly technical, abstract debate which was at the center of every scholastic disputation, and replace it with a practical discourse that would be pragmatic in man's everyday life.¹ Given the Renaissance's love of eloquence, then, it is no surprise that the "formalization of logical techniques and scholastic language" (Vasoli 59) which so marked the period preceding the Renaissance should be rejected and replaced by discourse more amenable to the Renaissance study of rhetoric. Man, and all aspects of his being, once again became the point of reference for philosophical speculation, and rhetoric, with its intrinsic power to persuade and to move, became inextricably bound to this branch of inquiry.

Representative of this rediscovered man-centered philosophy was the Spanish philosopher Fernán Pérez de Oliva (1494?-1531). His *Diálogo de la dignidad del hombre*, posthumously published in 1546, was typical in style and

argumentation of the attempts of many Renaissance philosophers to justify their anthropologic view of the universe (Kraye 308). It is a work written as a dialogue between two friends, Antonio and Aurelio. While strolling one day outside the city, these two agree to debate whether man has a certain dignity or not. They decide to ask their friend Dinarco, whom both respect as a wise man, to judge their discourses.

Aurelio plays the part of the devil's advocate, eloquently stating all the reasons why mankind is not worthy of respect or serious consideration. As proofs, he states that man is the only one of God's creatures who comes into the world totally defenseless, and even crying (82). Not only that, but the little defense man has, his wit and intelligence, are never fully developed, as proven by the fact that he is always forgetting what he has learned (85); these faculties deteriorate with age, constituting another sign of weakness (86). Moreover, man is not just physically and mentally weak, he is also lacks spiritual fortitude, and this is easily seen everyday when men are overcome by vice (87). Not even the threat of everlasting damnation is strong enough to deter him from his wicked ways (88). As final proof of the unworthiness of man, Aurelio observes that nothing man has done has ever stood the test of time, that "todo va en olvido, el tiempo lo borra" (92).

Antonio does not accept the proofs his companion has offered, and argues the contrary opinion: that man does have

a dignity superior to his fellow beings. He introduces his strongest proof at the beginning of his discourse: man is made in the image of God "mas veo también como en espejo claro el mismo ser de Dios, y los altos secretos de su Trinidad" (93). But even more than that, man is a composite being:

Tiene ánima a Dios semejante, y cuerpo semejante al mundo: bive como planta, siente como bruto, y entiende como ángel. (95)

So with the exception of God, man is better than any one of the beings which shares his constituent parts. Antonio goes on to add that man is capable of producing things with his natural, God-given gifts that no other being possesses (making song with his voice, for example). His intellect is capable of understanding the world around him, too (104). Finally, Antonio argues that there is nothing more pleasing to behold than a virtuous man (107).² The dialogue ends with the last of Antonio's arguments and without any judgment pronounced by Dinarco, though it seems clear that in this contest, Antonio ought to be declared the victor.

Even though philosophy in general was not held in great esteem by the humanists, moral philosophy was the exception because it did not only concern itself with the abstract, but in addition served as a practical guide used to live in this world (Kristeller *The Humanist Movement* 20). This philosophical branch was the only one to take a place among the *studia humanitatis*, the course of study followed by all humanists.³ As such, it had more influence, perhaps, than any

other branch of philosophy, such as logic, on any student who was a product of this educational technique. In general, the moral philosophy of the Renaissance was greatly influenced by Aristotle.⁴ His division of the subject into three parts (ethics, economics, and politics)⁵ was maintained,⁶ and in general his works were used as university textbooks on the subject. It must be noted, however, that many other authors of Antiquity were read with zeal, and although perhaps not understood as works of pure moral philosophy, readers of the period could, and often did, draw moral lessons from them.

2.1. Introduction of the Authors and Texts

2.1.1. Juan de Borja

Juan de Borja was the son of St. Francisco de Borja and Leonor de Mastro y Melo. He served as ambassador to both Portugal and Germany, and later became María of Austria's chamberlain. He published *Via spiritus, agora nuevamente abreviado* (Toledo, 1553), *Cien empresas morales* (Prague, 1581; Brussels, 1680; Madrid, 1981) and *Tratado de las cosas de la Samaritana* (n.d.).

2.1.2. Francisco de Castilla (?-?)

Very little is known about Francisco de Castilla. He was the brother of Alfonso de Castilla, bishop of Calahorra. The only biographical fact is found in Fracua, who notes that this author was governor of Baza, Guadix, and Almería in 1518. After his life in politics, he devoted himself to

poetry (Antonio 413). Among his works are *Theórica de virtudes en coplas de arte humilde con comento* (Murcia, 1518; Zaragoza 1552; Alcalá, 1564), *De los tratados de philosophia moral en coplas...* (Sevilla, 1546), *Ordenanza reales de Castilla* (Burgos, 1518; Salamanca, 1560; Alcalá, 1565).

There is only one extant manuscript of Castilla's *Tratado de la amistad* (BN MS 3257 ff 483r-485v). It is written in verse and is a clear continuation of the classical concept of friendship. It maintains the Aristotelian tripartite division of the different species of friends and draws inspiration from Cicero and Seneca as well. He overtly recognizes his debt to antiquity in the *Protestación* when he apologizes to his readers for any mis-translations of the Latin terms. He also states that instead of using the same word repeatedly, he will employ "lengua bulgar" to give some variety to the style. However, this stylistic change will have no noticeable effect on the themes found in the treatise, because although "discrepan sus nonbres y no sus efetos/ pues tienen sus fines y propios objetos" (50-51).⁷

2.1.3. Cristobal de Fonseca (1550-1621)

Cristobal de Fonseca was probably born in the province of Toledo in 1550. He entered the Augustinian monastery of Santa Olalla, Toledo, and professed final vows there in February, 1566. He studied theology in Salamanca and in 1591 was elected prior of the monastery in Toledo. In 1607 he was

elected provincial, and shortly after, prior of the monastery in Madrid. He died in Madrid on November 9, 1621.

While not a prolific author, he did write several works. *Del Amor de Dios primera, y segunda parte*, perhaps the most well-known, apparently enjoyed a good deal of success. The first edition was published in Barcelona in 1594, another in 1599 and in 1606; there is a Madrid edition of 1620. It was also translated, first into Italian in Brescia in 1602, and another Italian edition was published in Venice, 1608. A French translation in verse was published in Paris, translated not from Spanish but from the first Italian version in 1605. It was also translated into Latin in 1623 in Brussels; an English translation was also made (London, 1652). Fonseca published several other works as well: *La vida de Christo* in four volumes (Volume One, Toledo, 1596 and Madrid, 1601; Volume Two, Madrid, 1603; Volume Three, Madrid, 1605; Volume Four Madrid and Barcelona, 1611; an Italian translation exists, Venice, 1608, as does a Latin translation Brescia, 1617), *Sermones de Quaresma* (Madrid, 1614; Latin translation Cologne, 1618), and *Sermones para las Dominicas* (Paris, no date).

Fonseca must have been fairly well known in the literary circles of his day, since several authors mention him in their texts, including Lope de Vega in *Jerusalén conquistada*; Cervantes mentions the *Tratado del amor de Dios* in the Prologue of the *Quijote*, and as does Vicente Espinal in *Marcos de Obregón*. Menéndez y Pelayo believes that these

references in literature of the period are the only reason that Fonseca's name has survived, and he clearly leaves no room for doubt as to his opinion regarding the quality of this Augustinian's work: "...es, sin duda (para hablar claro), uno de los menos originales y de los más pesados místicos españoles" (*Obras completas* 2:102). He criticizes Fonseca so harshly because he believes that his book is nothing more than a compilation of common places, proverbs, and little snippets of texts culled from other authors (especially those of Antiquity and the Fathers of the Church) for the use of preachers, and that the work does not have "ni una centella de espíritu propio del autor" (*Obras completas* 2:103). However, it is precisely because of this reason that Fonseca's work is an excellent one to study in order to gain a deeper understanding of the way in which certain themes, such as friendship, were viewed during this period.

Before beginning his own discourse on friendship, Fonseca very briefly summarizes the major currents on the subject. According to this Spanish theorist, Plato calls the friend the mirror of the friend in which he sees himself reflected (86), Aristotle believes the friend is another "I" (78), and that Augustine posits that friends have one soul between them (78).

2.1.4. Juan de Mal Lara (1527-1571)

Juan de Mal Lara, born in Seville, studied Latin Literature and Rhetoric in Salamanca and then in Barcelona

under the tutelage of Francisco Escobar. Of his published works, the most well-known is *La Filosofía vulgar: primera parte, que contiene mil refranes glosados*, published in Seville in 1568.⁸ As the title indicates, it is a collection of popular refrains with an explanation of each one. All of the humanists of the sixteenth century realized the great value of proverbs and sententiae of the classics since they were a recompilation of wisdom based on experience; Erasmus' *Adagio* is the most well known collection of this type. Mal Lara's work is based on the same principle as any other collection of proverbs; that is, true wisdom may be found in the experience of the common folk. As Mal Lara himself states, proverbs are "un libro natural estampado e memorias y en ingenios humanos" (iii). Mal Lara also composed several other works, both in Latin and in Spanish, and published in Seville 1570 under the title *Recebimiento que hizo la Ciudad de Sevilla al Rey D. Felipe II con una breve descripción de la ciudad y su tierra*.

Modern critics generally view Mal Lara favorably. Menéndez y Pelayo calls him one of the "insignes humanistas" of the Spanish Renaissance, and in spite of this importance in the history of Spanish letters, few modern editions of his works have been published: *Obras del maestro Juan de Malara* (Sevilla, 1876), and *Proverbios morales* (Barcelona, 1959).

2.1.5. Francisco Miranda de Villafañe (?-?)

Very little biographical information is available about Miranda Villafañe. Nicolás Antonio states that he was a soldier under Carlos V's command before becoming a priest in Salamanca (II:238). Miranda's only known work is *Diálogos de la fantástica Filosofía e los tres en un compuesto* (Salamanca, 1582).

2.1.6. Juan de Mora (?-?)

Extremely little is known about Juan de Mora. The only biographical information about him is found in Nicolás Antonio, who states that Mora was from Toledo and was a priest (I: 747). Menéndez Pelayo also includes this author in a group that formed "una escuela de humanidades y arqueología clásica, una serie de preceptores auténticamente ilustres" (*Obras completas* 10:66). Along with his *Dos discursos morales* (Madrid: Pedro Madrigal, 1589), Nicolás Antonio also notes an unpublished manuscript *Explicación de las esigies de los Emperadores de Suetonio impresas por Felipe Galleo*.

2.1.7. Andrés Rey de Artieda (1549-1613)

The place of Rey de Artieda's birth is not certain, but it was most likely either in Zaragoza or in Valencia. He studied first in Valencia, then at the universities of Lérida and Tolosa; from the latter, he received a doctorate in 1574 and practiced law for a short time. Soon, however, Rey de

Artieda changed professions and became a soldier, fighting in such battles as Lepanto (1571), during which he was seriously injured. His bravery in action was well noted, and he was promoted to *capitán de infantería* shortly thereafter.

Though he must have been fairly well known in his time,⁹ only various bits of his poetry remain, and the only book which he published was *Discursos, epístolas y epigramas de Artemidoro* (Zaragoza, 1605). A modern edition also was published in Barcelona, 1955.

2.1.8. Diego de Rojas (?-?)

The only notice of Diego de Rojas is found in Nicolás Antonio, who simply says, "Scripsit: *Problemas en Filosofía moral*. Bernae 1618" (I:311). No other biographical information is available on this author.

2.1.9. Gaspar Salcedo de Aguirre (?-?)

It is only known that Salcedo de Aguirre was a professor of theology in Jaén. He published in Latin *Allusioinem Novi Testamenti ad Vetus primum tomum* (Jaén, 1608) and in Spanish *Pliego de cartas* (Baeza, 1594) and *Relación de alguna cosas insignes que tiene el Reyno y Obispado de Jaén* (Baeza, 1614).

2.2. Description of Renaissance Theories of Friendship

2.2.1. The Natural Desire of Friendship

Castilla, like the Ancients, believes that friendship is both natural and desirable, and indeed is a "don soberano"

(3) given by God to man. In a later part of the treatise he will say that a being who flees from companionship and conversation is either a god or a beast (139). During good times friendships are desirable, and they are not to be abandoned during bad times because friends can provide another with "razones palabras" which help him through the difficult period.

Juan de Mal Lara also finds that friendship is a natural inclination desired by all men. He believes that the Stoics were correct in observing that "los hombres nacieron para aprovechar a otros hombres" (36v). This is not solely man's natural inclination, but it also forms part of the divine plan. God wants man to live together, to work together, and to be mutually helpful to one another. In order to illustrate how common this perception is, Mal Lara uses the refrain, "Compañía de dos, compañía de Dios" (8v).¹⁰ Moreover, the natural desire inherent in men to form friendships is not indiscriminate. Just as Aristotle, Mal Lara believes that given the choice, man's propensity is to form friendships with those close to him and not with complete strangers. The refrain "Quien de los suyos aleja, Dios deja" (42r) is used to further emphasize this belief.

In his treatise, Fonseca indirectly reaffirms the Classical belief in the basic desirability of friendship, and he does this by commenting on the Scriptures. He cites the passages in which Jesus commands his followers to love their enemies,¹¹ but explains their meaning more clearly. He

insists that just because Christ wants man to love his enemies does not mean that he should not love his friends. Fonseca says that Christ "no hizo mención del amigo, antes le dexó por negocio tan llano tan justo, tan devido" (360). Fonseca argues that Jesus, along with the preceptors of Antiquity, does not question the desirability of friendship.

Neither does Juan de Mora prove to be an exception to the authors who place friendship as one of man's most sought after goals. He enthusiastically proclaims that "...se suele dezir que el amistad es una cosa de las mas deleytosas..." (34v). Not only is it agreeable and pleasant for man, but it is also one of the primeval forces in the world: "La amistad es la más fuerte de todas las cosas del mundo" (137r). Friendship is the bond of the Republic, and without this relationship all political ones would fail.

Borja, like the other authors, finds friendship to be natural and desirable in all cases, and even more necessary than fire and water (47v). Paraphrasing Ecclesiastes he says, "el que le tuviere tal [un buen amigo] con razón se puede tener por muy dichoso" (57v). He expands on the greatness of friendship:

Quán grandes sean los bienes, que proceden de la unión y amistad, se hechara bien dever, si se consideraren los daños que se siguen de la desconformidad y división, así en las cosas naturales como en las políticas y morales. (35v)

One surmises that friendship is not only desirable, but it is also morally good since it serves to bring order into politics and man's personal life, enabling him to complete

both small and great things. To illustrate this point, Borja uses the same image as Seneca, the stone arch.¹² However, the Renaissance Spaniard inverts the imagery. For Seneca, the keystone, friendship, is the center of the arch, and without which the structure falls. Borja observes that the keystone is able to be suspended in spite of gravity because of the other stones; likewise, a man with friends to support him is able to do great things: "es tan grande el provecho de la amistad, que se haze con ella lo que parece ymposible" (35v).

Miranda Villafañe mirrors Borja's enthusiasm regarding the goodness of friendship: "...no hay en el mundo cosa más dulce ni mas útil, que la verdadera amistad" (70v-71r).

Diego de Rojas is less enthusiastic in his praise of the goodness and desirability of friendship. The desire of man to come together was not for the sake of friendship, but rather a necessity to protect against the vicissitudes of nature: "juntáronse muchos los unos cerca de otros, y hizieron cibdades" (57). Man has refined this instinct, and he chooses to associate only with like beings so as to "poder mejor gozar deste desseo natural... y assi formaron las ciudades" (58).

2.2.2. Elements of Friendship

Castilla's definition of friendship is very closely related to the Classical description:

Virtud amiçiçia q[ue] naçe d[e] amor
benivolença de dos comutada
por ellos savida y en obras provada
movida por causa de bien y favor (55-59)

This definition is almost identical to the one given by Aristotle. Following closely the reasoning of the Stagirite, Castilla also says that this "bien y favor" is caused by three things: the useful ("la útil"), the pleasant ("la delectable"), and the good ("onesta"). This last type is the only true one since it is based on intrinsic, and not accidental qualities.

Mal Lara also finds himself in agreement with the ancient theorists as well as most of his contemporaries in observing that one of the most important elements of friendship is equality between the participants. Commenting on the Latin adage "Similem Deus ducit ad similem," Mal Lara observes that "...se puede aplicar este refrán... a todas las amistades..." (57v-58r). There are numerous passages in which he repeats this axiom, usually supporting his argument with citations taken from the Classics, especially Aristotle and Cicero. Mal Lara excuses himself for having to repeat the concept so often: "...aunque muchas vezes se repita, muchas vezes es menester dezillo..." (127r). Even though it seems obvious, he reasons, people often forget this concept and often get into trouble by trying to be friends (or worse, marry) someone who is not an equal. Mal Lara never explicitly defines what he means by "equal," although in the overall context of these passages it seems that he is referring to material wealth and social standing as the benchmark for equality, and not the moral equality to which Fonseca refers.

Mal Lara also believes cohabitation to be a necessary element of friendship. Following Aristotelian reasoning, Mal Lara says that man is a social animal inclined to live with others. These people with whom a man lives influence him greatly, much more than just simple blood ties and heredity do: "Con quien pasces, no con quien nascas" (165r). Of course, those with whom a person lives often are also relatives, so these blood relations are not necessarily excluded from this observation. Constant contact with another teaches virtue or vice, and influences one to exercise either virtuous or vicious behavior. So this philosopher concludes that friendship with the good will lead to virtue.

Mora believes that friendship must be based on love. That is, friendship is superior to love, but the relationship cannot exist without some sort of feeling of love, or else it is not to be considered true friendship: "El amistad, comunmente nace de amor, o es su firme principal fundamento, y donde no ay amor, no ay verdadera amistad" (137r). Given that love is the basis of the friendship, three other qualities must also be present for the relationship to truly be considered a friendship: experience, suffering, and equality in all things (137r). The first two qualities can only be gained through spending time together, and Mora does not deal extensively with them. However, equality, which is important to all writers of the Renaissance, receives more

attention from Mora. He explains precisely of what equality consists:

Primeramente muchos han querido dezir que el principio de la amistad (como he dicho) entre todas las otras cosas que en ella concurren, o la mas principal causa sea la semejança de las aficiones y genios, teniendo unas mesmas costumbres, y la misma manera y forma de vivir. (35r)

It is obvious that Mora means equality in the strictest sense of the word and is not simply referring to an abstract "moral equality" as some of the other authors of this period do.

Borja unequivocally states that regardless of who forms friendships, it must be founded on virtue: "La primera [ley de amistad], y principal dellas es, que se fundada en virtud, para que sea verdadera" (47v). A friendship that does not have virtue as its base is like two spheres, whose only contact is a single point instead of absolute concord which is the product of the union of two virtuous souls. Friendships not based on virtue soon disintegrate "por faltarles la atadura, que la avia de aprestar, y sustentar, que es la virtud" (47v).

2.2.3. Types of Friendship

Castilla clearly describes the friendship he considers to be the highest and truest type. Like the philosophers of Antiquity, this Spanish author believes that it can only be formed by honest men who are "del vicio enemigo" (74). He also list six basic attributes of true friendship. First, it is permanent and so it does not matter whether friends are present or absent, the friendship will endure (84). This

idea seems to come more from Seneca than Aristotle, who thought that friendship was nearly impossible to maintain during separations. Another attribute of this true friendship is that it has itself as an end, and not some gain or pleasure, other than, perhaps, contemplating virtue (76). The next four properties are listed quickly without any commentary; friendship is "perfeta muy buena muy grande muy rata" (89). These adjectives seem to constitute a *laus amicitiae* rather than a pragmatic description of what true friendship should be.

Friendships that are formed in adulthood and are based on virtue, continues Castilla, will last as long as there exists a "medida y conforme igualdad" (101). This is moral equality, and without it the friendship ceases to exist. It must be remembered, though, that virtuous men are prohibited from forming the other types of friendship. Like the authors of Antiquity, Castilla points out that men who enjoy true friendship will attempt to help one another and will also be pleasant to each other (113-117). Neither are good men limited to enjoying relationships with only other good men. A good man may have friendships of utility and of pleasure as well as friendships that are lasting and true. The two inferior types of friendships are viewed as morally neutral, and consequently "...sirben comunes en las condiciones/ de buenos y malos la[s] sus propiedades" (125-126).

Castilla differentiates his views on friendship from those of his Classical sources by distinguishing friendship

based on the social category of the participants involved. A friendship between equals is called "mediana;" One between a superior and an inferior is called "exçelsa," and between an inferior and superior is "subjeta."

According to this Spanish theorist, the "mediana" friendship is the only one which should be called "friendship" per se (163-164), and a superior speaking to an inferior or vice versa should not call the other "friend" even though they enjoy "recíproco amor" (171). Castilla says that:

Conviene que amemos igual compañia
que trata en aquellos q[ue] ni por natura
ni por señorío ni progenitura
seran obligados a soberania (154-157)

Therefore anyone outside of a person's social standing is excluded necessarily from enjoying the best type friendship: kings or "grandes" from their vassals, noblemen from peasants, men from women. Relationships between parent and child, which Aristotle does liken to certain types of friendship, are also not to be considered as true friendships. In Castilla's theory, however, friendships of the highest sort with relatives and brothers, since they are not progenitors of one another, are possible and indeed likely. Additionally, friendships can be formed between neighbors and fellow citizens, even though some may be "agora regidos agora rigientes" (160). Temporary political power, as opposed to the inherent power of the aristocracy, does not form an impediment to the formation of friendships.

The "exçelsa" and "subjeta" types seem to be descriptions of the political relations between the ruler and the ruled.¹³ Under the rubric of "De exçelsa amistad," Castilla compares the good king to the "canes muy bravos y los brutos leones" (176), who love and protect those who do them good. The theorist describes the duties of a good king to his loyal subjects, too: he is not a tyrant, he puts the public cause before his riches, and he governs with justice (181-189). The responsibilities of those who are governed are defined under the heading "De la subjeta amiçiçia." Since kingship is natural and found in nature, it is the vassal's obligation to love his king, who is God's vicar on earth (194), and this love is the ruler's "justo salario" (195). Moreover, these duties are not only due to a king, but all those "señores que rigen poder ordinario" (198).

Fonseca earnestly begins to describe friendship in a chapter entitled "De la verdadera amistad." The title is misleading if the reader expects an immediate synopsis of what friendship is and what are its constituent parts. Instead, Fonseca opts to begin by describing what he calls "amigos falsos" (361). He divides these types of friendships into four categories: alliances of bad men, pretenders of true friendship, friendship of old men, and friendship of young men.

The first type of false friendship is that made between bad men in order to take advantage of the good:

El primer linage de amigos falsos, sea de los malos, que hazen entre si confederación y aliança,

para hazer mal al bueno, que es condición de run gente, hazerse muchos gavilla para empressas tyranas y para intentos injustos... (361)

It is not surprising to find classified among this group common thieves and thugs, but also numerous figures from the Bible: Pilate and Herod, those who stoned Stephen, Joseph's brothers, and others. This type of behavior among evil men is to be expected since they are not capable of enjoying the good, and friendship is inherently good: "la amistad es uno de los mayores bienes de esta vida, y esse no le pueden conseguir los malos" (363). All men have the natural inclination to form friendships, but the base can only pervert true friendship for their advantage.

Even worse than this confederation of bad men is the second type of friendship, which is a feigned "true" friendship:

...es de los que fingen amistad con obras y con palabras, y siendo lobos y tigres, se muestran ovejas mansas para hazer mas a sus salvo sus venganças y crueldades. (363)

In Fonseca's opinion, this type of false friend is even worse than an alliance of bad men. One can generally recognize the partnership between evil men and attempt to take measures to defend oneself. However, the false friend who comes under the guise of a true friend is often times unrecognizable. It follows that it is extremely difficult to defend against this type. One possible defense is offered, however: to live "con miedo, con recato, y con cautela" (367).

Fonseca knows that to separate completely oneself from society is impossible and that this solution is not very

practical nor desirable.¹⁴ The other course of action to guard against the "wolf in sheep's clothing" is to introduce a good measure of paranoia in one's life:

No se puede ya fiar en amigo, ni en prendas dadas y recibidas: porque hay mil amigos falso y alevosos, ni ay que fiar en el favor de los príncipes, ni en la privança de los Reyes que son antojadizos y mudables, y oy aborrecen los que ayer amaron.
(368)

The safest course of action is to trust no one because of the inconstancy of nearly all men. This rule even applies to the married couple: to the prospective bride Fonseca advises caution because once the man enters the house, there is no means to get him out. To the groom-to-be he warns that once married, his bride will attempt to persuade him to divulge his secrets, and then she will betray him to his enemy (368). The Scriptures are full of examples of this type of false friend, too: Delilah betrayed her husband Samson; Cain, who under the guise of the closest form of friendship, brotherhood, lead Able to be murdered; and Fonseca also cites Judas as a man who made use of this despicable form of friendship for his own gain.

Fonseca's third type of false friendship is that based on the Aristotelian concept of friendship of interest. He defines it in much the same way as the Philosopher does: "...tiene por blanco el interés, y proprio provecho..." (370). Fonseca says that Aristotle calls this association the friendship of old men (370),¹⁵ although it is not exclusive to them. Those who seek princes and powerful men also desire to form this type of relationship; the princes are not loved for

themselves, but because of their treasure and power (371). Among the Biblical antecedents for this kind of friendship used by Fonseca to support his argument is the Prodigal Son, whose friends loved him only until his riches were spent. Absolute poverty of one friend becomes the "crisol de la amistad verdadera" (373). False friends of this sort will desert their companion in bad times, while a true friend will remain loyal and attempt to help his less fortunate friend.

The fourth and last type of false friendship recognized by Fonseca is also an Aristotelian category: friendship based on pleasure. The Spaniard follows Aristotle and also calls this species "de moços" (374). Once again he follows the Stagirite's basic concept and defines this friendship as:

[la amistad] que tiene por blanco el passatiempo y deleyte.. [y el deleyte] tiene sus assiento en la juventud y moçedad, por ser la razón en que están más robustos los bríos de la naturaleza, y los appetitos de la sensualidad. (374)

Fonseca moves this sort of alliance away from the purer form of friendship and describes it in even more sensual terms,¹⁶ moving friendship based on pleasure further away from the realm of the abstract and into the physical world. This primarily sensual pleasure is aroused by six principle characteristics in the friend: "hermosura, disposición, gentileza, libertad, donayre, y gracia" (374); Fonseca observes that these characteristics "son los pilares en que estrivan las amistades moças y juveniles" (374). Although the idea of this type relationship is not revolutionary, it

is notable that this theorist considers it a form of friendship, and not simply a form of physical attraction.

After describing and giving examples of the inferior friendships, which are classified as "viciosas y condenadas" (378), Fonseca outlines the higher forms of friendship. According to him, there are two. The first termed natural friendship, arises out of a similarity between two people. This type is found even in nature, he explains, and is why "todo animal ama a su semejante" (378). In man, the similarity is often between the humors and not just his social condition; that is, a melancholy man will tend to form friendship with another man who is also melancholy.

Fonseca's second form of friendship is the purest, and what the Classical authors considered the truest form of friendship. The Spaniard clearly follows the great thinkers of Antiquity when describing it:

...nace de la voluntad y de la razon, y tiene por blanco el bien del amigo esta no solamente es virtud, pero es cosa tan rara en el mundo, que se tiene por milagro. (378)

This concept of the higher form of friendship does not distinguish this theory from those found in the Classical period, and in fact Fonseca even cites Cicero, Aristotle, and Plato to support his position. Like these authors, Fonseca places virtue at the center and as the most important component of true friendship.

Mal Lara also divides friendship into categories as the ancients do. He is far less technical and specific than Aristotle is,¹⁷ choosing to describe what true friendship is

not. True friendship is not the friendship of utility, and it is this friendship against which Mal Lara warns his readers to be on their guard. He illustrates this type of friendship with the refrain "A quien dios quiere bien, la hormiga le va a buscar" (9v). He goes on to explain that when a man is rich he will have many friends who want to partake in the windfall.¹⁸ Another refrain counsels to slaughter a pig in order to have a prosperous month (128v) because friends looking out for some sort of gain are bound to come and share in the bounty. However, Mal Lara uses a later refrain to clarify this friendship of utility: "Entre tanto, que cria, amamos al ama, passado el provecho, luego olvidado" (196v). When good fortune is spent these friends of utility desert their comrade because they "travan amistades por amor de provecho no aman por si ni por su causa... sino por el provecho..." (196v). He explicitly gives Aristotle credit for this thought, and by doing so seems to imply that he acknowledges that true friendship exists even though he does not explicitly describe it. Mal Lara does, however, presuppose this higher form of friendship in several of his other refrains, as for instance when he says that blood relations and true friends do not keep count of services or favors rendered: "las cuentas son para entre gente, que no son parientes, o no son amigos... [tenerlas] es poca confianza del amigo..." (235v). The assumption that there is a true friendship is further supported by Mal Lara's advice as to the way in which to discover these false

friends: "Todas las cosas descubre el tiempo... y vendrá el tiempo donde los fingidos amigos, se parezcan y los verdaderos se confirmen..." (36r). True friendships are those which last with time, and false ones do not.

Juan de Mora, like his predecessors and contemporaries, also distinguishes between different types of friendship. He believes that there are inferior as well as superior friendships. The bifurcation among the inferior types of friendship is not based on the sources or causes of the relationship, as is the case in the works of the authors of Antiquity. For Mora, the division stems from the number of people involved in the relationship. One species is shared by more than two, and presumably many, men, and the other inferior type nearly mirrors the superior form of friendship between two good men.

Mora's first advice is to avoid becoming part of a group of men who form any sort of "hermandad conjuradas" (20v). These are considered worse than any plague, and are the source of "infinito daño" (21r). The harm is the result of three causes, the first of which is the oath itself. True friends do not need to make such an explicit pact in order to act like friends. In fact, to be obliged to do such a thing is completely contrary to true friendships. Additionally, such oaths often are used to make a member of the association complete acts which are immoral. The immoral acts are an action which is contrary to the laws of true friendship and also inhibit others who are not part of the confraternity

from forming friendship with a member, for fear of betrayal for the sake of the society. The final reason that these friendships should not be entered into is that when they sour and rupture, the participants become especially bitter enemies.

As dangerous as the friendships of sworn societies may be, Mora finds that false friendships between individuals are even more dangerous and insidious. The false friend, unlike the true friend, can lead a man astray:

El amigo verdadero si ponemos de nuestra parte cuydado veremos que nos aconseja segun la mejor parte de nuestros animos, y a esta ayuda, y procura, como fiel Medico, que conforta la parte sana, y aumenta las fuerças y corrije y sana los humores que andan alterados. El lisonjero siempre se acuesta a la parte bestial y dañosa, aquella regala, a aquella haze caricias, aquella lisonjea, aquella conforta, metiendo en aquella una cierta blandura pestilencial: procura apartarla de la razon. ... mas lisonjeando con un cierto deleyte de amor fingido despierta y enciende la ciega ira y abominable sensualidad... (49v-50r)

True friendship feed the soul and makes it stronger, but pretended friendship appeals to the more basic feelings of men and try to lead them from the use of reason, supplanting it with sensuality and emotions. The distinction in the focus of the two types of friendship necessarily has serious consequences:

Pues destos tales que digo se os pueden seguir impedimentos semejantes, que siendo ellos usados con sus lisonjas a confirmar a los otros en los vicios, y apartarlos del camino de la virtud, os podrian disponer vuestro natural al contrario de como es menester, y hazeros bolver atras de vuestro camino, encubriendo (como diximos) con lisonja y amistad fingida la malicia de su animo. (16r)

Consequently, false friendships are not morally neutral, but on the contrary, they are seen as evil because they attempt to divert man from the road of virtue and put him on the path of vice.

Given the negative moral position of these feigned friendships, Mora feels it necessary to give recommendations to his reader on the ways by which false friends can be found out and discarded. This is no easy task; it is as difficult for the author to describe the method as it is for a man to test his friends with it since false friends are generally very astute in the way in which they behave:

...pues con muestra de amigo pone tanto estudio en engañarnos, nuestro cargo sera descubrielle, quitandole los atavios y colores fingidos, poniendo a vista de todos las señales en que se diferencia del amigo. (34v)

Even though this is a difficult task, it is not impossible, and a good deal of the third chapter is devoted to the proposition.

The best and easiest way to eliminate false friendships is to lead a good, reputable life. This includes being careful not to be vain and not to seek the praise of others; humility is as good a guardian as any against false friendships:

Y sobre todo huyd del demasiado amor vuestro, y de estar muy contento de vos, y de estimar demasiadamente vuestras virtudes: porque haziéndolo de otra manera... vos mismo con vuestra presunción y amor de honra dariades lugar ancho a la lisonja, holgandose ser acariciado y notado de todos: y con esto muchas vezes tendriades sin concerle a vuestro enemigo en casa, en figura de amigo.... (33v)

It is on this sense of vanity that the false friend, the "lisonjero," preys and by means of chicanery that he works himself into the fabric of another's life. Only after he has the confidence of his friend does he strike, taking advantage of his friend for his own gain:

Porque solo a la miseria no se dizen lisonja, todas las demás cosas están sujetas a ellas: y aun a vezes el que vos teneys por amigo procura lisonjearos astutamente, metiéndoseos en las entrañas, haziéndoos creer que es verdadero amigo vuestro sin serlo: sólo para espiar vuestros secretos, y aprovecharse alguna cosa que se ofrezca que aya de ser en provecho suyo, o daño vuestro.
(32v-33r)

The false friend will always seek to applaud the actions of his companion in an attempt to lull him into complacency, but a true friend will always try to steer his friend away from vice and toward virtue, even if this means that strong words must be used.

Mora believes it is by means of correcting that a true friend distinguishes himself from a false one. The flatterer will always try to imitate his friend and praise all his actions. He also tends to agree with whatever opinions his friend might have, and this is one way Mora recommends to expose him. First one opinion should be shared, then the completely opposite one; a flatter will agree with both, and "desta manera le he visto yo loar y dezir mal de una cosa" (37r). He thereby proves his duplicity and unreliability. In addition, the flatter will claim to be inferior to his friend, in an attempt to fill his friend with self-pride (37v). A false friend who is extremely astute realizes that

correction is also a part of friendship, and will start off by criticizing his friend for several trivial matters in an effort to disguise his true motives; shortly after, he will turn to flattery. On the other hand, a true friend will not praise all his friend's actions; instead he will laud only sparingly and correct with greater frequency and when necessary. Moreover, a true friend does not inevitably attempt to imitate all his friend's actions like a flatterer, even though a friend's habits will most likely already be similar to his companion's.

2.2.4. Types of Men and Friendships

Castilla observes that in addition to the six qualities of friendship he has described (55-59), a true and lasting relationship of the highest sort cannot be formed until those involved are past their childhood. He places more emphasis on this concept than do the authors who serve as his philosophical base. He reasons that virtue, the basis of lasting friendship, is not developed and perfected until a man has matured; consequently, men must wait to form these friendships. As further evidence for his belief, Castilla observes that a boy's or young man's friends always are "vazio" and "mudable a natura" (94) because with a change in attitude, the efficient cause of the friendship is also eliminated.

When choosing a friend, Castilla recommends that a man should have several important criteria in mind. The

prospective friend should not be "subjeto aprivado" (226); that is, he should not be indebted to anyone. He must also be a reasonable man, one who can accept advice and criticism. Another quality that should be sought after is a man who is humble and who will put his interests behind those of his friend's. But not only will he not guard his own interests, but he will be generous with what he has, and not in the least avaricious.

Fonseca's treatise also includes advice on which sort of man should be chosen to be a friend. Obviously, a prospective friend must be virtuous since only virtuous men can form the highest type of friendship. But Fonseca presupposes this virtue, and says the first quality needed in a friend is that he have "aviso y discreción" (394).¹⁹ It must be remembered that communication is important to the relationship and if one of the friends were indiscreet and revealed the secrets that his friend told him, one of the important bonds uniting them would be dissolved. A fool cannot keep a secret and has to tell it as soon as he can, thereby betraying the friendship. The second quality necessary that should be present in a prospective friend is that he not be "sobervio" (395). The proud and haughty cannot be friends simply because they have the tendency always to dominate others. Domination of one party by another is not possible in true friendship because equality is an essential characteristic:

...la sobervia todo lo avasalla y todo lo señorea, a nadie honra, porque toda la honra quiere por si,

nadie suftre se le yguale, porque tiene puesta su felicidad en ser sola... (395)

If one keeps in mind the definition of true friendship and the laws of friendship which Fonseca has expounded, it follows that a person who cannot stand to be equaled and who must always be lording their superiority over another is incapable of true friendship. It is a worthless effort even to try to become friends with such a person. In addition to being contrary to friendship, pride is not a desirable quality in itself:

La sobervia es el mayor mal de los males, ella hizo al angel demonio, al hombre bestia, despoblo gran parte del cielo, y despues el Parayiso: hincho los sotanos del infierno y sus mazmorras... (396)

Pride is not a characteristic that ought to be sought by anyone, but, quite to the contrary, it is a deadly sin that has led to the downfall of many.

Fonseca also observes that there ought to be equality between the friends, a concept most clearly presented in Aristotle's work and which the other authors of this period consider an element of friendship as well. This Spaniard does not take this concept at face value, though, and he hones it until arriving at the conclusion that equality between virtuous men is "ygualdad moral... segun lo que deve cada uno" (381-382) and not "ygualdad rigurosa" (381).²⁰ Moral equality gives a much greater latitude to the type of men that can be friends, always supposing that they are moral men. Fonseca does not admit any barrier to friendship because of age, humors, or intelligence; he observes that

friendship is possible "...entre viejos y moços, robustos y flacos, sabios y no sabios..." (381). He also breaks the class barrier to friendships by citing Cicero's *De amicitia*.²¹ Even if the men are of differing fortune, the one of higher standing will lower himself in order to raise his friend up. Fonseca even uses the example of Christ to support this argument:

Y parece viene de esta ley, la amistad que Dios nos tuvo, pues se abaxo a tomar forma de siervo, por yguarse con su siervo... porque uviesse entre los dos mas verdadera amistad. (382)

If Christ himself is capable of such an action, no man should feel too proud to lower himself in order to befriend another.

Like Aristotle, Mal Lara does not believe that bad men are capable of forming friendships. He uses a Latin sententia to support his opinion, "*Malus cum malo colliquescit voluptate*" (62r). In spite of being capable of forming relationships with others, the bad man does not enjoy true friendship, since all his friends, like he himself, are searching for some sort of gain. In the same way as the Philosopher, Mal Lara observes that "...esta no es amistad que merezca el nombre honesto" (62r).

In addition to stating categorically that the bad cannot be friends, Mal Lara makes several other observations as to which types of men can be friends. The wise cannot be friends with the foolish because of the great differences between them. The antagonism between the two is so great that Mal Lara advises, "[¿]bien quieres vengarte de un discreto? átales un necio al pie..." (18r). A wise man is

better off arguing with an intelligent enemy and exercising his abilities than having a friendship with a fool. Like Castilla, Mal Lara believes that a young man does not make a good friend. Youth is not constant, one of the principle characteristics of friendship. Moreover, since youth has not fully developed its use of reason, and it is still ruled by its passions, it must be concluded that a youth cannot make a good friend. Mal Lara gives one final warning concerning the type of man to be sought after for friendship: ex-friends should not be readmitted to friendship because it is most likely that the one-time friend "...tornó a travar amistad... que va sobre falso" (21r) in order to seek some sort of revenge.

Mora holds the opinion that all men are capable of friendship, given that they conform to certain criteria, namely, that the friends be equal in all things. So not all men can be friends to every other, but each individual is capable of friendship with his counterpart. Some men, however, do not form true friendships as readily as others, most notably kings and powerful men. This is because they especially like to be praised and not criticized:

...desseando ser tenidos por tales creen mas
facilmente a los lisonjeros, que siempre los loan:
y huyen las amonestaciones delos amigos verdaderos,
que los han de apartar de los vicios, y con esto
dan mayor osadia a los lisonjeros y pierden los
amigos... (46v)

Unfortunately, this attitude may lead to serious consequences. As they have no one to tell them the truth they may soon rule unjustly and thereby provoke the anger of their vassals, which in turn leads to a further consequence,

insecurity: "...assi no pueden bivir seguros mucho tiempo" (46v).

Salcedo de Aguirre is the only author who recognizes the possibility of friendship between completely different types of men. He addresses one of his letters to "dos amigos de diferentes condiciones" (130r). He clarifies the differences which these two friends have:

...[habéis] conservado tan particular amistad tanto tiempo entre condiciones tan desyguales en esta parte, de ser el uno tan estremadamente amigo de los estudios ordinarios sin apetecer vacación o alivio alguno: el otro alegre de corazón y muy inclinado a entretenimientos de alegría. (130r)

However, such an unnatural attraction does not seem at all possible, and the author of this epistle explains it away by some unknown, hidden force which draws them together, in the same way that "la piedra yman y el hierro [tienen] para unirse entresi" (130r). The example he has given, while possible, is viewed as the exception to the rules of friendship.²²

Miranda Villafañe believes that good men must be friends among themselves, though he chooses to call them men who are lords of themselves: "Cierto que es gran cosa ser el hombre señor de sí, y a los señores por amigos..." (34r). This author does not elaborate further on this theme.

2.2.5. The Number of Friends Possible

Although he never explicitly prohibits or excludes the possibility of friendships between more than two men, Castilla implicitly favors this concept by exclusively

describing the ways in which pairs of friends should behave. Pairs of friends talk about even the most secret of things, and talking to a friend is like talking to oneself (207). A friend must also know when to advise and when to correct, when to try to persuade and when to obey, when to get angry and when to behave mildly; nowhere does Castilla mention friendly interaction between more than two men. The other theorists also imply that friendship is between only two men, with the exception of Juan de Mora.

In the course of his treatise, though Mora also seems to be referring to true friendship as one shared between only two men, at one point he is explicit in observing that true friendship is not a closed, static relationship, but rather serves as a springboard to others which are equally as virtuous:

...entre los amigos todas las cosas son comunes, y procuran a sus amigos dalles nuevos amigos, principales, virtuosos, y letrados, de quien pueda el amigo salir muy bien enseñado en virtud y letras. (46r)

This is obviously a departure from the Classical and Biblical concept of friendship, in which true friendship is deemed so rare that it is almost certainly limited to no more than two men.

2.2.6. Comportment of Friends

Fonseca establishes seven laws of true friendships, and though some have nothing to do with behavior between friends, several are concerned with their comportment. The second law

states that there is to be communication between two friends. Not only are they to share everyday concerns but also "no ha de aver cosa propia, partida, ni defendida, ni mio ni tuyo..." (382). The sixth law is a corollary to the second: "de la amistad se ha de desterrar es [sic] el silencio" (386). Silence is capable of freezing true friendship. To illustrate this concept, Fonseca observes that when a man prays, he enjoys a favorable relationship with his maker. However, the contrary is true when this communication ceases.

The third rule of friendship is that the friends have the same will and desire, "un querer y un no querer" (383). Fonseca decries any attempt at true friendship without this correspondence of wishes, and once again uses both Biblical and pagan authority to support his position. The fifth rule of friendship seems to be based on the third: "...que tenga por fin el bien de su amigo; porque la amistad es virtud y no ganancia" (385). Friends who share the same will necessarily wish the other well.

Fonseca recognizes his fourth law as Cicero's first: "que a nuestro amigo pidamos cosas honestas: porque inexcusable es la amistad que admite cosas feas" (386).²³ Since virtue rules friendship, a loss of virtue caused by a dishonest request would consequently mean an end to the friendship. Fonseca quotes St. Paul, who urges all Christians to reject evil and hold on to good, as evidence that this rule is applicable to the Christian as well as to the pagan. Though Cicero might bend this rule regarding

dishonorable requests from a friend, Fonseca does not allow for such a loose interpretation of it; the Spaniard insists that anyone who would attempt to ask dishonorable things from a friend is "gente mundanda perdida" and "gente ruyn" (385); such a man is obviously incapable of forming a true friendship based on virtue.

According to Salcedo de Aguirre, a theorist who believes friendship capable of many things, there are certain limits to the things one friend can do for another:

En tres cosas... se conoce ser un hombre cuerdo o loco (segun escribe un docto varón) en refrenarse la yra, en governar su casa, y en escribir una carta: las quales ni se pueden comprar la hazienda, ni aun prestar la amistad... (2v)

Even though a friend may be a great help to his companion, he cannot complete the three requisites for the sake of his sanity.

Mal Lara's advice concerning the behavior that friends should observe is almost exclusively proscriptive in nature, and it is almost wholly concerned with the dangers which abuses of speech present to friendship. The first thing which a friend will not do is reveal a secret entrusted to him by a friend (37r). Along with the Old Testament, Mal Lara finds that this act is one of the most fatal to a friendship. A secret between more than two people spreads rapidly until everyone knows it. Secrets that have been shared are especially vulnerable to be divulged when two friends have quarreled: "Rifien las comadres, descúbrense las poridades" (236r). In order to avoid this problem, one

should be very careful with whom one makes friendship because this dilemma generally arises only with those who "livianamente travaron amistad" (236r).

Mal Lara also warns that gossip is another potential problem for friendships. The safest and most certain rule of thumb to follow is summed up in the refrain "De tu mujer y de tu amigo experto, no creas, sino lo que supieres cierto" (72v). Gossip in itself is an evil and not good in any circumstances:

Las chismes son palabras que se usan entre demonios, y es gerigonça del infierno, y una fruta que el que la trae, avía de pagar la trayda, y con pena que se la bolviesse al muladar donde la hallo, y castigarlo porque no la traxesse más... (72v).

Spreading rumors also discredits the person who tells them, and even if he tells the truth later, he has lost all credibility (249v). Such ignoble gossip is not to divide man from the two most important things in his life: his wife and his friend. Furthermore, since confidence is requisite to form lasting friendships, either spreading or believing gossip undermines this foundation; consequently, the entire friendship is destroyed by this action (162v).

Another threat to friendship caused by one of the friends is excessive practical joking. There are some things which should never be treated in a cavalier manner: "Con la muger, y el dinero, no te burles compañero" (64v). These things are not to be trifled with because they represent the actual lifeblood of a man, as well as his honor. A man should also take care to not be so interested in impressing

those around him with his wit at the expense of a friend that he actually loses that friend (109r).

A friend should also behave in a wise manner: "Hombre de pocas palabras, y essas sabias" (284r). The man who talks too much is soon discovered to be a fool. A man should also know the limitations on his wise words, and not try to offer his advice to a friend regarding impertinent matters. This advice is paraphrased with the refrain: "Ir a la guerra, ni casar, no se ha de aconsejar" (95v). Again, as with the practical jokes, these two themes make up the most important matters to a man- his life and his honor- and should be left to him to decide with the help of the Almighty.

Mal Lara's only non-verbally oriented advice regarding the behavior of friends is the use of the refrain "Lo que la loba haze al lobo aplaze" (103r). Even though the main concern here is the relation between husband and wife, Mal Lara adds:

...debe parescer bien lo qu el uno haze al otro. Lo qual es regla muy firme de amistad, según lo traen Aristóteles, Tulio, Salustio, que de un sí por sí, y un no por no, el quiere del uno, sea el otro, y el no quiere del uno agrada al otro. (103r)

This conformity of wills is simply what is found in the Classical theorists and which forms part of true friendship. The concept of conformity is further emphasized by the refrain: "Entre hermano y hermano, dos testigos y un notario" (198v). At first glance, this appears to contradict what Mal Lara has implied about true friendship, but he goes on to explain that this is a hyperbolic example, and between truly

good friends and brothers who love one another as they should, "mas no seria menester mas de su buena palabra..." (198v).

Juan de Mora is also very specific as to the responsibilities of friendship and counsels his reader exactly how friends should behave. First, friends ought to behave in a like manner and encourage each other to even better conduct, never on account of competition or jealousy, but in order to improve and to increase morally "de bien en mejor" (20r). Because of the special relationship a man shares with a friend, the consequences of not treating a him in an appropriate manner can lead to hurt feelings and even to a broken friendship:

Y de aquí viene que las injurias que de los amigos recibimos, nos duelen mas gravemente por no se cosa pensada, siendo obligados a hazer lo contrario por lo que se deve a la amistad. (20r)

Mora even admits that something as trivial as addressing a person by a title other than that by which he wishes to be referred to can cause bruised feelings.²⁴

Mora observes that another way to avoid ill will between friends is to keep promises. In order to do this, one must consider thoroughly the consequences of any course of action before committing himself to one plan or another. However, just like the Ancient theorists, this Spaniard warns that a promise which would harm the honor of a friend, or be "[una] afrenta vuestra" (44v), referring to the party making the promise should not even be considered.

Like Cicero, Mora believes that some things should not be requested of a friend:

Mas quando la calidad de la obra, ni algun intento vuestro particular, sino un cierto empacho vergonçoso, os detiene y embaraça para hazer lo que juzgáys convenir a vuestra honra Christiana, digo, que será bien dezir de no a lo que se os pide.
(68r)

Mora, like Fonseca, remains uncompromising on this point. Avoiding these situations can sometimes be unpleasant, but the best way is to simply excuse oneself in a way that will not offend the person who has made the request.

Mora strongly asserts that one of the principal responsibilities of a friend is to counsel and warn his companion when the latter strays from the path of virtue. This obligation cannot be avoided even though it may sometimes make one of the friends bitter (44v). The only instance in which a friend should not correct another is when it would make the offender sin to an even greater degree in spite of, or because of, the advice of the counselor. The rule of thumb in this case is to do no harm (61v). When a friend has decided to reprehend his companion, it must be for one thing only, and there should be no mention of old faults (52v). Every little fault of the friend should not be picked apart; care must be taken to only criticize grave faults and mistakes:

Y débese también huyr de reprehender al amigo por cada cosa lijera, porque los que quieren notar pecados livianos, como los graves parecen demasiadamente amigos de reprehender, y por ventura les falta eficacia para las importantes... Y si el amigo no cae en culpa alguna grave, mas hay temor que de lijeras faltas vendrá a las graves (qual

suele acaecer) según el grado de nuestro amistad pareciere que se puede hazer diligencia que escuse las tales culpas veniales, y sin ofensa no parecería mal amonestalle livianamente dellas. (60r-60v)

Moral correction is a serious task and should not be made light of or softened by laughing and smiling (53v), although neither should it be "demasiado atrevido, afrentoso, y aspero" (54r). To avoid any undue bitterness, Mora observes, "no ay mejor manera de reprehensión que interponer algunos loores del que es reprehendido..." (60v). In some cases, such a method is ineffective, but it must be remembered that only the best of friends can be harshly spoken to:

Ya se que me preguntaréys cuándo es menester reprehender al amigo agramente (ya os lo he dicho) y os lo digo de nuevo, que yo no solamente me pondría a reprehender a otro con aspereza, pero ni aun de otra manera, si no fuesse mi hermano, o tuviessa tan provada, estrecha, y antigua amistad, que no se conociesse por menos que de muy amado hermano. Y si se ha de hazer, puede se dezir que se haga quando el amigo no huviesse dexando algun error, del qual estuviesse ya advertido apaciblemente algunas vezes, y especialmente si por la tal falta peligrasse su honra y vida, sabiéndolo vos claramente, porque en caso tan peligroso bien podriades soltar las riendas a la reprehensión, diziendole vuestro parecer. (56v-57r)

Two things, then, are necessary in order for harsh speech to be licit: a close degree of friendship and a repeated error of which the friend has been advised.

In addition to these considerations, when one friend determines it necessary to chastise another, he must do so in an appropriate place and time. The most important thing, contends Mora, is that no one be present to hear the words exchanged: "Háse de mirar también que no esté delante alguno

de los que podrían después burlarse del reprehendido" (57v). The ban on witnesses applies to everyone, even the friend's wife, because "...la reprehension parece desprecio..." (58v), or could appear to be so even though it is not. Only in the case of extreme urgency, "a punto de muy grave peligro de pecar" (58v), would it be acceptable to correct a friend in front of others.

Mora also gives advice to the friend who is the object of the reprehension. There are times a man may be subject to an unjust accusation, perhaps even by a friend. No effort should be made to defend oneself, though, and the diatribe should be suffered with patience, even if the offense is not a grave one: "Mas si acaeciére que el amigo nos reprehende en cosas livianas, es bien oylle con paciencia" (59r). Moreover, when being chastised, countercharges and accusations should not be leveled against the friend because it seems that the reprehended one is simply trying to avoid acknowledging culpability:

...porque parece que no queremos sufrir que nadie nos reprehenda, y que indignados y como ofendidos de los que nos reprehendieron tenemos más intento de vituperarlos, o vengarnos dellos, dándoles en cara con algunas faltas suyas que de amonestarlos amigablemente: y que les dezimos como por aftenta que van sus faltas y dexen las ajenas. Assí que mejor sera sufrillos mientras nos reprehenden, para que después teniendo mejor ocasión si tuvieren necesidad de corrección, la podemos dar. (60r)

It should be noted that criticizing a friend who has reprehended should not be avoided, but rather a more suitable occasion ought to be found.

Secrets, though an important part of friendship for Mora, do not assume a semi-sacred quality that they do in Classical, Biblical and other contemporary Renaissance theorists. A friend has the duty to keep any secret entrusted to him, but if he reveals it, prejudicial consequences to the friendship do not necessarily follow:

Assí como si algún amigo vuestro descubriese a otros el secreto que vos fiastes del, convendría en tal caso estar sobre aviso de no fiarle otra vez cosa que fuesse de importancia guardar secreta: de manera que sabida os pudiesse dañar. Y no dexéys por esso de comunicar con él, y traerlo alguna vez en vuestra necesidad para que os remedie y aproveche en otras muchas calidades y buenas condiciones que tendrá. (63r)

Keeping secrets is only a small part of friendship; a friend that has proven himself not capable of doing so should not be entrusted with them again, though the friendship should not be terminated simply for that reason.

According to Mora, another duty that the friend has is to inform his companion regarding what is being said about him, especially the criticism being leveled: "Porque el amigo nos repite la falta que oyo dezir" (70v). He does this so that the friend can make amends if the rumors are true. Even though the friend interacts with others, he will never spread rumors about his friend, always defend him, and "no nos descubre jamás [a] las personas enemigas" (70v).

Salcedo de Aguirre comments on the interaction between friends in one of his letters to two of his friends, one of whom does nothing but work and study. The purpose of this letter is to laud the desirability, and even necessity of

relaxation and recreation, especially when shared by two friends. This author, contrary to the advice of the others of the period, allows for practical jokes to be played among friends:

es muy necesario que las personas graves... tengan algun linage de recreación o deporte con juegos honestos, burlas sanctas, y passatiempos... (131v)

This does not give friends free reign; the jokes must be "santa," and furthermore, the author warns against crudely styled jokes. Practical jokes should not be "hechos torpes, ni dañosos, o perjudiciales: porque ya dexara de ser virtud" (134r).²⁵ All the other authors of this period, if they mention this type of behavior at all, are prone to reject it.

Borja finds that for one friend to test another is not only an acceptable behavior, but also a necessary one. This must be done very carefully, though, so that the friendship does not completely come apart even if it is not as true as it was thought to be. To illustrate this concept, he shows a cracked jar being knocked on carefully by a hand and the caption "Pulsa caute" (14r). To test the quality of a relationship is not an agreeable task, but one that must be performed before important matters are entrusted to a man. Even if such a relationship is not as firm as it was thought to be, the friendship need not be broken completely.

Borja treats the subject of testing a friend again in another of the *empresas*. He quotes the Latin proverb "Lapide aurum, auro homo" and gives the translation "con la piedra se prueba el oro, y con el oro el hombre" (54v). Gold serves as

a means to bring out the true mettle of those who enjoy friendship for "haçienda y intereses" (54v). A man who is truly a friend will not betray his companion for the sake of money, but will always be faithful to him.

In addition to his counsel about proving friendships, Borja advises that a careful attitude toward speech is also a necessary behavior for a friend to have. A man who talks about many things with many people is never completely trusted by anyone; on the other hand, the quiet man is assumed to be a wise one. He sums up this thought succinctly: "...pues sabemos de muy pocos, que se ayan arrepentido de aver callado, y muchos que llorarán para siempre lo mucho que an hablado" (20v). He treats this theme in a different way in a later *empresa*, saying that it is against natural law to gossip and talk about others' faults and shortcomings. Only the "maldiciente no sosiega hasta publicar, murmurar el mal ajeno que sabe" (76v), but "gente honrada" (76v) should guard against falling into such vile actions, which, being immoral, lead to a rupture in friendship. Further emphasizing the importance of custody of the tongue is the proverb "Gran virtud es la del callar" (99v). To illustrate this *empresa*, Borja has chosen a sketch of Tantalus, who he says was punished by the gods for his loose tongue.²⁶ Borja concludes that all men should learn the lesson of this fable.

Miranda Villafañe is vague about the duties of friendship, simply observing that one is supposed to spend

his life "obedeciéndolos y honrándolos" (34r). He does not give any more specific advice as to exactly what is entailed by these instructions.

2.2.7. Duration of Friendships

Although the other authors do not comment on the duration of friendship, Fonseca and Borja do. Fonseca's seventh and last law of friendship is more of an observation on the duration of friendly relations than a rule of behavior. He says that friendships are enduring and last forever. There is no end to friendship, and a friend is a friend forever, and one loves him "en muerte y en vida" (398).

Borja sustains that friendship endures even beyond death. In order to illustrate, he places a picture of a dead, dry tree that has a grape vine growing up and around its branches, the vines bearing large, succulent bunches of grapes with the proverb "Amicus post mortem" (58r) placed above. The duties of friendship are perpetual, and death does not interfere with them in any way:

Pues assí como el árbol haçe quando vivía, en
sustentar y ayudar, a dar fructo a la parra, assí
da a entender que el buen amigo, aun después de
muerto, a de haçer lo mismo. (57v)

Borja's position is much like that of Seneca who also believes that friendships continue beyond death and that the friends enjoy the same benefits as before.

2.2.8. Love and Friendship

In his sonnet "Vínculo de la amistad," Rey de Artieda distinctly contrasts the duties of love and friendship, drawing inspiration from Homer's characters of the *Odyssey*:

El arnes se desarma Achiles Griego
visto que el Rey se le llevo la amiga
y a no tener mas cuenta del se obliga
ni armarsele por fuerza, ni por ruego.

Mataronle a Patroclo, armose luego,
que aunque a su fe y palabra contradiga
una amistad es mas estrecha liga
que del amor lascivo el ñudo ciego.

Y ansi de la venganza del sediento
al Troyano homicida busca y llama
y matale con singular contento.

Mirad lo que Patroclo precia y ama
pues por vengarle rompe el juramento
que hizo por amores de su Dama. (98r)

Achilles breaks the oath he makes to his lover in order to take vengeance for the sake of his friend, Patrocles. He clearly states that this is the correct order of priorities ("...una amistad es mas estrecha liga..."). This is also an indication that love produced by friendship is a stronger than the love between man and woman.

2.2.9. Friendship and Family

Much like Aristotle, Mal Lara firmly places familial relationships, especially that of husband and wife, within the realm of true friendships. He observes that the rule of equality applies both to friendships and to marriages, and continues that he believes matrimony to be: "...una de las mayores amistades, que se pueden juntar, [y] requiere ygual"

(61v). This concept of equality is repeated in several places because as he observes with friendships "aunque muchas vezes se repita [el consejo], muchas vezes es menester dezillo" (127r). The concept of equality is expounded upon in even greater detail than the equality between men, and Mal Lara explains in detail in what equality between husband and wife consists:

Busca para ti muger ygual. Porque los que toman mugeres de mas alto estado que ellos, no se hazen sus maridos sino esclavos de la dote... No solamente avemos de mirar que la muger sea ygual en linage, y riquezas, sino en la edad, en la manera de bivar, que sean las costumbres semejantes, porque ay a vezes mugeres de baxa condicion, con mayor presunción, que las de alto linage, y aquellas son mas trabajosas de sufrir. (63v-64r)

The reader is left little room to doubt what Mal Lara means by equality in the instance of a married couple.

Furthermore, he often uses the technique of presenting matrimony and true friendship in tandem, thereby reinforcing the similarities between the two relationships. For example, he glosses the refrain "Cada ollaza, su cobertaza" (57v) with an explanation that applies equally to true friendship and to matrimony:

Dize el adagio latino. Similem Deus ducit ad similem. Trae dios semejante, a semejante. Según dize Aristóteles en el 8 de las *Ethicas* tratando de la amistad entre yguales... Puédese aplicar este refrán fuera de los que casan yguualmente. (58r)

The relationship between husband and wife is to be considered as friendship of the highest sort, even carried on beyond death provided that the wife "guarde el amor de su marido" (83r) even after he passes on.

Regardless of the high state of esteem in which Mal Lara hold the marital relationship, he does have several pieces of advice to give both husband and wife. To the men he observes how difficult it is to actually know what a woman is like: "El melón y la muger son malas de conocer" (280v). In fact one is never really certain of the quality of the melon until it is opened, or the woman until she is married. Since after the marriage it is of little use to find out the true quality of a woman, Mal Lara gives further counsel: "En el andar, y en el beber se consosce la muger" (281v). A woman who walks and drinks as little as possible is probably the best. This type of advice is not given exclusively to the husband, since Mal Lara is also suspicious of man's behavior. To the wife he counsels, "Sírvele como a marido y guárdate dél como de enemigo" (127v). A woman maintains her honor by serving her husband well, but she must also protect it by assuring that he is faithful to her.

The relationship between parent and sibling is also treated by Mal Lara as a type of friendship. Little attention is given to the mother-child bond except that "Tantos sean nascidos, quantos sean queridos" (240v); it often is at the expense of great pain that the children are loved (205v).²⁷ In contrast, the relationship between father and son is dealt with greater detail. Mal Lara observes that the father-son bond is even stronger and more sacred than the friendship between two men who are not related: "...la más estrecha amistad es la que es de una misma sangre, padres, y

hijos, y assí deve el hombre satisfazer a ella como primer grado..." (188r). For the son, there is no more reliable and desirable friend than his father: "Sobre padre no hay compadre" (239r). But Mal Lara also reminds the reader of the inherent dangers of this strong bond of friendship, namely, that the participants are blind to the faults of the other:

La amistad, que tienen los padres a los hijos les haze cegarse, y tomar de tal manera la affición, que nombran a lo bueno malo, y a lo malo bueno, y todo lo feo en sus hojos al parecer de otros, al suyo es grande hermosura... (198r)

The affection between the father and son is not based on love of virtue, but on the bonds of family. Therefore, in this case, it is at least possible for a good man to have friendship with a bad one. However, this is not very likely since "Regla es general, que los padres buenos crian de si hijos buenos" (182v), even though there are occasional exceptions. Mal Lara does not comment on what should be done in such circumstances.

The blood relation between brothers is also an impetus toward friendship. Fraternal friendship is always to be desired because it is good in itself, and not because of any material gain that may be accrued from the brother:

No está la verdadera amistad en la continuación de yr a casa del hermano solamente para conbites, sino favorecerse en todo lo que para sí haría, pues los latinos dizen que frater por el hermano, se llama fere alter, que es casi otro como tú. (144r)

In spite of any differences that are often found between brothers,²⁸ Mal Lara reasons, much like Aristotle, that the

brother becomes a second self to brother because of all the things that they share in common- cohabitation, sharing things together, and talking together.²⁹ Just as Mal Lara believes that the relationship between father and son is more valuable than a friendship between two non-blood related men, he also believes that the friendship between brothers is more desirable than an alliance with outsiders. To attempt to supplant the fraternal by a friendship with another would be akin to "cortar de braço o una pierna sana, y buena, y mandar hazer una de madera, para servirse della en lugar de la suya" (193r). Mal Lara concludes that "...es el hermano grande honra en las cosas prósperas, y gran socorro en las adversas" (193r). Mal Lara also cautions that there are possible pitfalls inherent in brotherly relations. Strong positive emotions can turn into anger, and given the strong feelings between brothers, there are certain dangers, namely that they will argue. The Spaniard quotes Erasmus' adage, "Fratrum inter se irae sunt acerbissimae" (209v), and further adds that the anger between brothers is often worse than between the worst of enemies. Outsiders should not attempt to interfere in these family feuds because it usually happens that the brothers reconcile and the blame and anger fall on the interloper (292r).

Mal Lara also presents other family bonds, though not in great detail. Half-brothers, he states, do not generally trust each other because they may have different manners, and also because they know that they are not completely related.

Mal Lara paints a terrible picture of in-laws, concentrating especially on sons-in-law. A son-in-law is generally guided by his own self-interest, and not by the precepts of true friendship:

El yerno es pariente de presto... le ponen en casa donde no tiene amistad firme... sino guiado más por su interés... se olvide del suegro. (148v)

Though this distrust is usually justified, occasionally there may be a son-in-law who becomes a true friend with his wife's parents, but Mal Lara emphasizes that this is an exception to the rule.

Not all of the theorists of the period are convinced of the compatibility of friendship and matrimony. Vicente Mexía, basing his argument on Scripture, contends that since woman was made from the rib of man, she is subordinate to him. He concludes that the wife is in a state of "...obediencia, y subjecion..." (37v). Friendship is not necessarily precluded simply because the wife must obey her husband (at least one other author says that one friend must obey the other), but rather because she is subordinate to him, and equality is always an essential element of friendship.

Rojas does not seem to accept the relation between man and woman as part of friendship since his treatment of the relations between husband and wife, and man and woman in general, remains on a purely physical level. He first asks why is it that men chase after women, but women do not chase after men? There are two parts to the answer: the first is

physiological. Man is warmer and woman cooler; heat makes things more active and cold less active. Therefore the warmer man is inclined to seek sexual activity. The other answer is psychological: "la muger siempre haze placer al hombre, mas el hombre no siempre a la muger" (168). Consequently, it is more natural that the man will ask for the pleasure that he is certain to receive from their company. The second question he poses regarding men and women is why do men pay women? Part of the answer is already known- men are certain to receive pleasure from the experience- but there is another reason: men, because they generally have more, will pay a woman for the sake of "compasión y amistad" (170). In Rojas' opinion, the man is in reality helping the woman since he is sharing his material wealth with her. By his constant attention to the differences between man and woman, Rojas implicitly rejects the possibility of true friendship between them.

2.2.10. Enemies and Virtue

Miranda Villafañe, along with several other authors of the period, lauds the usefulness of enemies along with friends as an inspiration to virtuous acts. In the dialogue, Bernaldo asks Anima what good to us are enemies. The latter responds:

...los enemigos hazen primeramene este bien, como las centinelas, y la guarda de una ciudad que esta cercada, que dan aviso al señor de ella, de todo lo que le puede offender, y assi estando los enemigos vigilantes, mirando tus costumbres te avisan con la

reprehension, o murmuracion, el mal de tus obras, y de todo lo que te debes de guardar. (70r)

But Bernaldo is not convinced because all the actions mentioned are also the duties of a friend. The Anima defends his opinion:

...pero el amor que tienen alguna vez los ciega, con que no veen los defectos como los enemigos, y si los veen como son aficionados los van escusando, trocando los nombres, llamando sagacidad, astucia, lo que el enemigo llama malicia... (70r)

So even though the duties of true friendship are well known, often times it is difficult to comply with them. The enemy, however, will have no such scruples, and in fact even keeps a more careful eye on his foe in order to criticize him. This, in turn, inspires the observed to better himself in virtue.

Fonseca also states that enemies are not necessarily bad for a man to have. It is true that friends are good, however, they are sometimes blinded by their love for their friends and so do not see the other's faults. An enemy, on the other hand, is never blinded by emotion and is, in fact, he is always on the lookout for some fault to criticize (352).

2.3. Conclusions

The theory of friendship in the Renaissance does not differ substantially regarding the fundamental principles established by the Classical, Biblical, and Patristic traditions. Most of the authors studied intersperse their comments on friendship on works devoted to other themes or

topics, though one author, Castilla, devotes a whole treatise to the theme.

Renaissance theorists find friendship a natural desire among mankind. When possible, men tend to make friends with their equals. There is no one definition of the equality essential to friendship which is agreed to by all of the theorists. Fonseca, for instance, claims rigorous equality in all things is needed for friendship, while Borja claims that nothing more than moral equality is needed as a base upon which a perspective friendship may be built. The authors of this period also follow the basic division of higher and lower friendship established by their philosophical models, though most of these Renaissance theorists opt for the Aristotelian tripartite division of friendship into classes rather than just the simple partition of superior and inferior types of friendship. In addition, Castilla establishes types of friendship based upon the classes of the individuals involved in the association. He is the only Renaissance theorist studied that makes such a clear class distinction. Though the Bible, especially the Old Testament, gives some advice on protection of oneself from false friends, most Renaissance theorists feel this theme is especially important and dedicate a substantial amount of time describing the dangers of such an association and the ways in which a man can protect himself from being caught up in such a bond. These associations with such friends, as well as one with a true friend who has turned

from the path of virtue, are considered dangerous because they can lead to vice and consequently have serious repercussions for the health of one's soul. Though the Ancients believed that bonds with an old friend who had lapsed from virtue could be kept for the sake of the past friendship, the Renaissance theorists reject such an association because of its possible mortal ramifications.

The Renaissance authors on the subject of friendship also devote themselves more thoroughly to describing the type of behavior expected between friends. Like their models, they expect good men to act in accord with virtue; such is the manner of true friendship. Moreover, like their Biblical antecedent, these authors also give a great deal of advice on the ways in which speech should be regulated, namely in regard to giving advice and keeping secrets. Counsel must be given with caution at the proper time and in the proper way, they contend, so as to not offend the friend involved. Whatismore, since a friend is at times reluctant to speak frankly regarding his companion's faults, an enemy, who has no such reservations, can be extremely useful. An enemy will criticize unmercifully and by this keep one on the path of virtue. Secrets present another potential problem to friendship. Confidences made by a friend are to never be revealed. For most theorists, a friend who tells another's secrets violates the bonds of friendship; the only exception to this precept among the authors studied is Juan de Mora,

who does not consider such a violation to destroy a friendship absolutely.

Only two authors comment on the interconnection of friendship and love. The first is Fonseca, who like Seneca, considers love to be a constituent part of friendship, though not superior to it. Rey de Artieda is even clearer on the subject. He believes that the bonds of friendship are stronger than those of love, and a vow to a friend takes precedence over one to a lover.

In short, though the authors of this period differ slightly from their Classical, Biblical and Patristic models on some minor points, the Renaissance theory of friendship remains essentially unchanged from that found in its sources.

Notes to Chapter Two

¹It must be remembered that the study of moral philosophy in general and ethics in particular is not a break with the Medieval tradition. In fact, Renaissance philosophers often used the same vocabulary for ethical themes that was found in the writings of St. Thomas (Kraye 304); it is rather a change in emphasis from a formal science, logic, to a subtle art, ethics (Aristotle *Ethics* 1.7.17), that marks the humanists approach to the subject (Kraye 305).

²An opinion held by Aristotle as well in *Ethics* 1.13.6.

³Kristeller believes that imposition of the *studia humanitatis* is the event that characterizes the Renaissance (*Renaissance Thought* 9).

⁴See Kristeller "Humanism and Moral Philosophy" 277-278.

⁵Each of these areas studies man's relationships with others: ethics is the study of man's relationship to other individuals, economics his relationship to the family, and politics his relationship to the state. While these are useful general guidelines, the distinction is not always so clear; for example, Aristotle deals with both familial and political relationships in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, and many Renaissance philosophers do not follow the stringent separation of these areas.

⁶As Professor Kraye points out in her article, this Aristotelian division of the subject was not new to the Renaissance, but was inherited through the Medieval scholastics: "Renaissance scholars continued to follow the tripartite division they inherited from their medieval predecessors... [and] Thomas himself was only rarely cited, but his arguments and terminology frequently in Renaissance discussions of the subject" (403-404).

⁷All citations of Castilla's manuscript are from my transcription.

⁸In Maravall's opinion, Mal Lara's *Filosofía vulgar* "constituye una fuente del pensamiento de Cervantes" (*Humanismo de las armas...* 95), hence making it particularly useful to this study.

⁹Rey de Artieda was praised by both Lope and Cervantes for his abilities as a poet (See Cejador 3:185).

¹⁰This refrain is also reminiscent of the Gospel passage, "Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I with in their midst" (Mt 18:20).

¹¹Matt 5 and John 15.

¹²Seneca 95.13.

¹³See Aristotle *Ethics* 8.10.1-6.

¹⁴Seneca also warns it is as bad to trust no one as it is to trust everyone (See *Epistulae* 3.4).

¹⁵See Aristotle *Ethics* 8.3.4.

¹⁶Aristotle likened this inferior type of friendship to the superior kind (see Chapter 1 and *Nicomachean Ethics*.)

¹⁷Aristotle seems to be Mal Lara's primary source. He uses both Cicero and the Stagirite, but when citing Cicero he generally just gives the name of the work from which the quotation came. When using Aristotle as a source, however, he not only gives the work, but also the book and chapter as well.

¹⁸This is especially reminiscent of the advice found in the Old Testament

¹⁹"Discreción" is an especially important concept in the works of Cervantes. See Margaret Bates "*Discreción*" in *the Works of Cervantes: A Semantic Study*.

²⁰Rigorous equality is understood as equality in all things.

²¹See Cicero *De amicitia* 19.69.

²²It must also be noted that within the context of this letter, Salcedo de Aguirre is attempting to explain the abstract concept of virtue. He, like Aristotle, believes it to be the mean of two extremes. He uses this example, then, to demonstrate that each man would be better if he were more like the other.

²³See Cicero *De amicitia* 12.40.

²⁴Mora relates: "Un amigo mio cuando tenia amistad con cierto estrajero mi amigo, y aviase con el en el escribirle de tal manera, que le honvrava como persona de mas

calidad que el: y quando le escrivia acabava la carta con un, de V.m. servidor: puesto en el postrer canto del papel. Acaecio despues que aquel pareciendole por ventura que era ya mas que antes, y conociendo mejor la calidad de aquel amigo suyo, escriviendole otra vez, mudo la cortesia en Aficionado hermano. Enojose mi amigo en tanto grado que jamas le respondió a carta ninguna qu no tuviesse el mismo titulo de cortesia que antes. En fin aquella su amistad que deviera de estar atada con flaca atadura desde el principio, cesso solamente porque le parecio que el otro no le tenia ya la misma figura que solia, y començava a despreciarle."

Evidently, the friend to whom the letter was written should not have taken offense over such a unimportant detail, but it does illustrate how sensitive some men can be.

He also says that when walking with one friend, a man should not leave him to join another (27v), and special care should be taken to remember names, since this can lead to anger because "parece que se han olvidado de nuestra amistad, por no selles necesaria" (27v).

²⁵Salcedo de Aguirre, like many of the moral philosopher of the period, believes like Aristotle that virtue is the mean between two extremes: "Aunque todas las virtudes morales, consisten en el medio: deven tener las circunstancias necesarias, pero esta de la Eutrapelia, muy particularmente se deven observar sin apartarse del medio, huyendo los extremos, mayormente el exceso y demasia..." (132v).

²⁶I have not been able to locate in mythology where Tantalus is punished for talking too much or indiscreetly. He was punished either for allowing mortals to taste nectar, or killing his son, cooking him, and serving him to the gods, who realized this and subsequently punished him (See *The Penguin Dictionary of Mythology*, 414).

²⁷See Aristotle *Ethics* 8.12.5-6.

²⁸Two refrains express the differences in brothers: "Ciento hijos de un vientre, cada uno de su mente" (164r) and the more realistic "Siete hijos de un vientre, cada uno de su mente" (239r). In spite of any dissimilarity, however, these brothers may still be friends because of all they hold in common.

²⁹See Aristotle *Ethics* 8.11.5, 8.12.3, and 8.12.6.

CHAPTER THREE

MASCULINE FRIENDSHIPS IN *DON QUIJOTE* ¹

3.1 Don Quijote and Sancho

3.1.1. Types of Men

The most efficient and practical way to deal with character delineation in the *Quijote* is to base any analysis on the well-known Ciceronian circumstances of person.² Since Don Quijote and Sancho are so well described throughout the work, this method is especially effective as a basis for analyzing them. One must keep these characteristics in mind while trying to ascertain exactly what type of friendship the two men share because nearly all the Renaissance theorists placed restrictions on the types of men that can form true friendships; indeed, to be true friends, the participants must be equal in one way or another.³

One gets an overall view of Don Quijote by examining the circumstances of person used to describe him, especially those found in the opening paragraphs of the novel, but character description and development continues throughout the work as well. Following the circumstances laid down by Cicero, the reader learns that the narrator is not sure exactly what the protagonist's true name is, it may be

Quijada, Quesana or Quejana (36); however, the narrator also adds that, "esto importa poco a nuestro cuento" (36). Don Quijote's nature is perhaps given a great deal of attention: he is a male, Manchegan, and "Frisaba la edad de nuestro hidalgo con los cincuenta años; era de complexión recia, seco de carnes, enjuto de rostro, gran madrugador" (36). He has spent a large part of his income and rentable land on acquiring books of chivalry; additionally, the reader later learns that this Manchegan has two friends, "el cura y el barbero del lugar, que eran grandes amigos de Don Quijote" (64). Moreover, in the initial description of Don Quijote, the reader learns of the character's fortune: he is a *hidalgo*, part of the minor Spanish nobility. One of Don Quijote's habits is also described, he is a "gran amigo de la caza" (36). The feeling described by the narrator will form the crux of the narration, Don Quijote has gone crazy, absolutely insane, and this is repeated several times so that the reader does not forget it. The cause of this temporary change of mind is the nobleman's interest- his insatiable consumption of the romances of chivalry. The feeling in addition to his predominant interest have led Don Quijote to his purpose:

le pareció conveniente y necesario, así para el aumento de su honra como para el servicio de su república, hacerse caballero andante, y irse por todo el mundo con sus armas y caballo a buscar las aventuras y a ejercitarse en todo aquello que el había leído.... (38)

The remaining circumstances of person, achievements, accidents, and speech, will make up the rest of the story.

The reader is not introduced to Sancho immediately at the beginning of the novel, but only after Don Quijote's first unsuccessful sally. Moreover, Sancho is not as thoroughly described as is Don Quijote, though several of the fundamentals of the character delineation prescribed by Cicero are found. His name is Sancho Panza, by nature a man with "muy poca sal en la mollera" (79). As for manner of life, he is a *labrador*, poor, with a wife and children, but a free man. The circumstances that could be said to have more to do with character are not dealt with during the initial description of Sancho; the reader is not told of his habit, feelings or interests. But after all, he is a *villano* who must be interested in making ends meet and putting food on the table, thus leaving little or no time for the mental activity and pursuit of intellectual pleasure implied by these other circumstances of person.⁴ However, his purpose is mentioned when he does become Don Quijote's squire: "dejó su mujer y hijos y asentó por escudero de su vecino" (79). In spite of this apparently obvious purpose, the reader is left to doubt whether this decision is taken on his own. It seems that Don Quijote's promises have had more to do with his sudden resolution rather than any deliberately conceived plan on his part.

By organizing these character descriptions in the logical order found in the Ciceronian rhetorical tradition, it is apparent that the two principal people in this story have very little in common. Though they are from the same

town, they are from different social classes. One is, or has been, able to have modest financial success, while the other is poor. It is probable that they have had very little personal contact with one another. The only common bond is their mental defect: Don Quijote is crazy, and Sancho is characterized as not having "muy poca sal en la mollera" (79). In short, they are not similar except that they are both capable of believing anything when it suits their idea of the world. They are in no other way compatible, and it is very improbable that a true friendship as defined by the theorists of the subject can take root and blossom in such poor soil. The circumstances of person do not change in the second part of the novel; though ten years passed between the publication of the first and second parts, only a month has passed in the framework of the novel.⁵

3.1.2. Causes of Don Quijote's and Sancho's Friendship

The reason for which Don Quijote and Sancho become friends is rather obvious even though each has his particular motive for entering into the relationship. During Don Quijote's disastrous first adventure, the innkeeper tells the knight errant that many things are necessary to practice the art of knight errantry, and that he is lacking them; indeed, to be a true knight, he must have acquire them in some way:

Preguntóle [el ventero] si traía dineros; respondió don Quijote que no traía blanca, porque él nunca había leído en las historias de los caballeros andantes los hubiese traído. A esto dijo el ventero que se engañaba: que, puesto caso que en las historias no se escribía, por haberles parecido

a los autores dellas que no era menester escrebir una cosa tan clara y tan necesaria de traerse como eran dineros y camisas limpias... [y] tuvieron los pasados caballeros por cosa acertada que sus escuderos fuesen proveídos de dineros y de otras cosas necesarias; y cuando sucedía que los tales caballeros no tenían escuderos- que eran pocas y raras veces-, ellos mesmos lo llevaban todo en unas alforjas muy sutiles... (49-50).

This extensive conversation between Don Quijote and the innkeeper paraphrased by the narrator illustrates the importance that the squire has for a *caballero andante*. First and foremost, it is a relationship of utility; the squire is to carry his master's necessities so that the latter does not have to be bothered with them. Secondly, at least from the point of view of Don Quijote, the squire seems to be almost a type of status symbol.⁶ As the innkeeper says, it was not often that a knight errant was without a squire, and the greatest knights always had one. So just like any of the other objects Don Quijote has forgotten- shirts, money, potions- a squire becomes another acquisition of the office that must be obtained to help legitimize Don Quijote's life as a knight. In short, Don Quijote needs a squire not because of any inherent good this person might have, but rather because of the utility the servant will provide the knight errant. The beginning of the relationship is based on whatever accidental qualities Sancho has that are useful to Don Quijote.

In much the same way, Sancho Panza accompanies Don Quijote not for any intrinsic quality his master might have, but for the material advantage that may be gained by such a

decision. As has already been noted, Sancho is a poor man (79), but in spite of this, it appears he still must be convinced to follow Don Quijote on this adventure:

En resolución, tanto le dijo [don Quijote], tanto le persuadió y prometió, que el pobre villano determinó de salirse con él y servirle de escudero.
(79)

As the reader is made well aware, the incentive by which Sancho is truly motivated is the ownership of an island, or at least the governorship of it. The narrator concludes this episode with the observation, "Con estas promesas y otras tales, Sancho Panza... asentó por escudero de su vecino" (79).⁷

Don Quijote and Sancho renew their relationship in the second part of the *Quijote* for principally the same reasons as they do in the first part. That is, Don Quijote needs a squire because his concept of knight errantry mandates it. Likewise, Sancho hopes to enjoy some sort of material gain. This time, though, instead of simply accepting the offer his master has already made him, "la ínsula," Sancho attempts to persuade Don Quijote to give him a fixed salary. Sancho unequivocally expresses himself: "Voy a parar...en que vuestra merced me señale salario conocido de lo que me ha de dar cada mes..." (585). He wants to maximize his financial gain, but he is also aware that he must reach a compromise equally agreeable to both men. However, Don Quijote reacts decisively against this type of plan since he has never heard of a monthly salary being paid to a squire by a knight errant before. The Manchegan does not seek to improve the profession, only to restore it to its former grandeur. He

does not accept the contract that Sancho offers and tells him, "si... vos gustáredes de estar a merced conmigo, bene quidem; y si no, tan amigos como antes" (586). The knight will find someone else who can fulfill the duties of the squire of a knight just as well as Sancho has done. Don Quijote knows, just as Sancho knows, that their friendship is not based on intrinsic qualities. Each man is living in his own, separate world of dreams, and their relationship with each other is a function of those dreams.⁸ Sancho's association with his master is based on the profits he hopes to derive, while Don Quijote needs his squire as an important part of knight errantry. Since Don Quijote does not accept the terms Sancho offers and they cannot reach an agreement, their relationship is about to cease as is to be expected in a relationship based on utility. Sancho is nearly dumbstruck that Don Quijote says "yo con cualquier escudero estaré contento" (587). In order to avoid this, Sancho quickly explains to Don Quijote that he has only brought up the subject of the salary to placate his complaining wife, but he, a Panza, will not be bullied by a woman.⁹ He agrees to go with Don Quijote again, but quickly adds, "no hay más que hacer sino que vuestra merced ordene su testamento con su codicilo" (588). Of course, Sancho hopes to be included in the will, or in the codicil, thereby gaining what he has apparently given up- a sure income- if Don Quijote dies before he can fulfill his assurance of the long-promised island. By bargaining for a fair and clear agreement of

terms before the start of their adventures, the two men are doing exactly as Aristotle recommends in this type of relationship.¹⁰ This incident concludes when "Don Quijote y Sancho se abrazaron y quedaron amigos" (588). Of course, they remained friends based on the same terms as in the first part of the work- a mutually recognized principal of utility.

3.1.3. The Type of Friendship between Don Quijote and Sancho

Though the friendship between Don Quijote and Sancho begins for the sake of self-interest, it does not necessarily follow that the friendship cannot reach a higher plane, although it is not seen as very probable by neither Classical nor Renaissance theorists of the theme. Sancho in particular always has in mind his true motives and is not at all retiscent about reminding his master of the debt owed to him for the services he is rendering. Likewise, Don Quijote does not hesitate to remind a doubtful or vacillating Sancho of the rewards that await the faithful squire who conscientiously performs the duties to the best of his abilities.

The first conversation of this type occurs before the two adventurers have hardly left their village. Sancho is riding high and mighty on his mount with all the supplies for their journey, and "con mucho deseo de verse ya gobernador de la insula que su amo le había prometido" (79). It is obvious that at this first stage of the adventure Sancho is not too

interested in actually earning the reward that is to be his, but he would rather prefer the promised benefits without fulfilling the obligations he has made. As if somehow fearing that Don Quijote has forgotten their agreement, Sancho feels obligated to remind him, "Mire vuestra merced, que no se le olvide lo que de la ínsula ... que yo la sabré gobernar, por grande que sea" (80).¹¹ It is most likely that Sancho, when referring to being knowledgeable about the ways of governing, is actually thinking about the personal wealth and benefits he will be able to accrue for himself and his family. Don Quijote, both in order to impress Sancho and to put him at his ease, reminds him that all the knights of bygone ages would reward their squires by making them governors, or even better, counts. But as he, Don Quijote, is a knight *par excellence*, he can promise even more:

bien podría ser que antes de seis días ganase yo tal reino, que tuviese otros a él adherentes, que viniesen de molde para coronarte por rey de uno dellos. ... con facilidad te podría dar aún más de lo que te prometo. (80)

Sancho seems to be put at ease after these additional promises, even though he declines the offer of the kingdom, saying that his wife would be a better countess than queen.

The reader is also presented with another, though not so obvious, of Sancho's motives after Don Quijote's failed first adventure with the windmills. Sancho secondary motive for journeying with Don Quijote, though never explicitly highlighted, is seen here for the first time:

...se acomodó Sancho lo mejor que pudo sobre su jumento, y, sacando de las alforjas lo que en ellas

había puesto, iba caminando y comiendo detrás de su amo muy de su espacio, y de cuando en cuando empinaba la bota, con tanto gusto que le pudiera envidiar el más regalado bodegonero de Málaga. Y en tanto que él iba de aquella manera menudeando tragos, no se le acordaba de ninguna promesa que su amo le había hecho... (84)

For Sancho, this immediate gratification of his appetite is just as important a motive as the promise of future gains. Given the poverty in which Sancho lives, this reaction should not be surprising to the reader, and one should not underestimate this as one of the foundations of the friendship between Don Quijote and his squire.¹²

However, this preoccupation with his next meal is only a secondary consideration for Sancho's behavior. His true motivation lies in the promise that his master makes at the beginning of their adventure together, and their agreement is always in mind and influences his behavior. This hope for material gain even changes the way in which he perceives the world around him.¹³ The first incident of this type occurs just as Don Quijote sees the carriage and its entourage; the knight mistakes this scene to be a princess being taken to a far off land against her will. Sancho is well aware that two of the party are Benedictines, and the rest just travelers on the road. But knowing how his master will most certainly react, Sancho cynically observes, "Peor será esto que los molinos de viento" (85). Don Quijote immediately throws himself into battle, defeating two unsuspecting friars. One escapes unscathed, but the other has been knocked off his

donkey by Don Quijote. Sancho immediately reacts to the situation:

...apeándose ligeramente de su asno [Sancho], arremetió a él [el fraile] y le comenzó a quitar los hábitos. Llegaron en esto dos mozos de los frailes y preguntáronle por qué le desnudaba. Respondióle Sancho que aquello le tocaba a él legítimamente, como despojos de la batalla que su señor don Quijote había ganado. (86)

Sancho knows that the defeated enemy is a friar, but this does not cause him to vacillate in any way; he takes advantage of the situation, justifying himself with his master's conceptualization of the world in order to achieve material gain- in this case the friar's habit and anything he might be carrying on his person. Much to his disgust, Sancho is immediately chastised by the friars' serving boys, who nearly beat him senseless, certainly not the reward that Sancho was expecting.

In spite of the squire's enthusiasm for robbing the friar of his belongings and justifying himself by calling it the spoils of war, he does realize the gravity of what he and his master have done as soon as he recovers from his beating. Sancho is preoccupied at what the consequences might be, namely, that the Santa Hermandad will be searching for the two as common bandits or highway robbers. He voices his fears to Don Quijote, who is confident enough in his abilities that he promises to save Sancho, even from the Santa Hermandad. In spite of these assurances, Sancho does not want to continue on the adventure; in fact, he wants to retreat and take sanctuary in a church. Don Quijote attempts

to overcome Sancho's doubts by insisting that he will protect him from whatever danger may befall them, but this still does not completely shore up Sancho's wavering attitude. What does renew the squire's courage is Don Quijote's almost casual mention of the "bálsamo de Fierabrás" (98); Don Quijote does not use this method intentionally, but one must conclude that the knight sees this as an effective instrument for guaranteeing the loyalty of his squire because he continues encouraging Sancho: "...que mayores secretos pienso enseñarte y mayores mercedes hacerte" (99). This is a technique that Don Quijote will employ time and time again to assure that Sancho remain with him and not desert, even in times of trials.

Sancho responds positively to his master's mention of the balsam. He doesn't care about the healing powers it may have, but, ever vigilant regarding his self-interest, he thinks of the profits he can gain by marketing it:

...yo renuncio desde aquí el gobierno de la prometida ínsula, y no quiero otra cosa, en pago de mis muchos y buenos servicios, sino que vuestra merced me dé la receta de ese estremado licor; que para mí tengo que valdrá la onza adondequiera más de dos reales, y no he menester yo más para pasar esta vida honrada y descansadamente. (99)

Sancho is fully aware that his relationship with his master is one of *quid pro quo*, that in exchange for his services as squire, he will be given certain rewards. The squire is only concerned with his own good and wishes to maximize the benefits to be gained from his relationship with the knight. It is because he believes he can get more profits from the

balsam that he volunteers to give up governorship of the island. He is only concerned with the good of Don Quijote and the knight's mission insofar as it will reap some benefit for him as a servant.

The episode of the fulling mill is also useful to analyze the dynamics of the relationship between Don Quijote and Sancho.¹⁴ Knight and squire are traveling along in search of water when they both hear a most horrible, frightening sound. According to the narrator, both men react in nearly the same way : "...todo causaba horror y espanto" (179). Don Quijote, however, is able to overcome his fear and views this as an opportunity to have a new, never-heard of adventure by which the practice of knight errantry will be revived, and by which he will achieve fame:

Sancho amigo, has de saber que yo nací... en esta nuestra edad de hierro para resucitar en ella la de oro... Yo soy aquel para quien están guardados los peligros, las grandes hazañas, los valerosos hechos. Yo soy, digo otra vez, quien ha de resucitar los de la Tabla Redonda... (179)

The knight tries to encourage his squire to share in his enthusiasm with this rather one-sided dialogue, calling Sancho his "escudero fiel y legal" (179).¹⁵ To Don Quijote, Sancho's reaction to their situation is not important. The knight is thinking of his own gain- fame as the reviver of knight errantry. Sancho is nothing more than an accidental witness to these heroic deeds.

Sancho, as frightened as his master from the start of this episode, is not able to overcome this fear as Don Quijote is. The squire tries to dissuade his master from

following the plan of action that has been established. Not only is Sancho terrified of the unknown, he is also afraid that Don Quijote will meet his demise during this battle with the unknown, and he begins to cry "con la mayor ternura del mundo" (179). He not only fears losing his master and having to face the danger alone, but also losing his master and consequently forsaking all the benefits he has hoped to acquire through his bargain with Don Quijote:

Yo salí de mi tierra y dejé a mis hijos y mujer por venir a servir a vuestra merced, creyendo valer más y no menos; pero como la codicia rompe el saco, a mí me ha rasgado mis esperanzas, pues cuando más vivas las tenía de alcanzar aquella negra y malhadada ínsula que tantas veces vuestra merced me ha prometido, veo que en pago y trueco della, me quiere ahora dejar en un lugar tan apartado del trato humano. (180)¹⁶

Sancho's self-interest is working at cross purposes to that of Don Quijote. It is by Sancho's industry and deceit that his interests will predominate. Instead of continuing the confrontation with his master directly, Sancho opts for a more oblique solution to the problem. Since it is dark and Don Quijote cannot see what the squire is doing, Sancho ties the reins of his ass around the forelegs of Don Quijote's mount, Rocinante; the horse will not move in spite of his masters urging, and Don Quijote is forced to wait until daylight to embark on his adventure. It does not occur to him to cast blame for the delay on the machinations of Sancho, but rather he laments his bad fortune at having an enemy who is a powerful sorcerer.

It is also during this scene with the fulling mill that the reader observes that there still exist fundamental differences between these two characters, dichotomies that prevent the two men from forming true friendship.¹⁷ At the same time, it must be said that the characters themselves recognize these fundamental differences. After Sancho used chicanery to prevent Don Quijote from continuing onward, he suggests that they sleep since they can do nothing until daylight. Don Quijote is indignant at the suggestion and retorts, "Duerme tú, que naciste para dormir... que yo haré lo que viere que más viene con mi pretensión" (181). This clearly demonstrates that Don Quijote in no way feels himself to be similar or equal to his squire. The theme is again repeated later, closer to dawn, when Sancho feels the need to evacuate his bowels. Because of his terror, though, he does not dare move from his master's side. He does manage to take care of his necessities without separating from his master, but not without Don Quijote realizing what has happened. Don Quijote takes this, not surprisingly, as an insult and reprimands his squire: "desde aquí en adelante ten más cuenta con tu persona y con lo que debes a la mía" (186), clearly signaling again that he is aware of the differences that exist between them. These differences limit the degree of friendship which these two men can share.

Another incident in which the reader perceives the true relationship between the knight and his squire immediately follows the scene in which Don Quijote frees the prisoners on

their way to the galleys. Sancho, after this imprudent action by his master, fears once again that the authorities will be searching for them. In order to avoid punishment, he recommends that they retreat to the Sierra Morena. In their path, they find a bundle, and upon opening it, among an assortment of other things they find "un buen montoncillo de escudos de oro" (216). Don Quijote feels that he has no use for this money. He is more interested in the notebook included in the package. He asks Sancho to hand him this, and orders that Sancho "guardase el dinero y lo tomase para él" (216). Sancho is overjoyed and shows his gratitude by kissing Don Quijote's hands. Later in the adventure, Sancho consciously links the services he has rendered to this reward, and considers himself well-compensated:

...dio por bien empleados los vuelos de la manta, el vomitar del brebaje, las bendiciones de las estacas, las puñadas del harriero, la falta de las alforjas, el robo del gabán y toda la hambre, sed y cansancio que había pasado en servicio de su buen señor, pareciéndole que estaba más que rebién pagado con la merced recebida de la entrega del hallazgo. (219)

Sancho has not endured all this pain and suffering out of any type of lofty loyalty to Don Quijote, but rather because he has hoped to achieve some material gain from the adventure. In this case, he receives an unexpected reward, not the long promised island but hard currency, and so is especially grateful to his master.

Just as this episode clarifies the relationship of interest that these two men have, it again exemplifies the differences in the characters of the two. Don Quijote has no

qualms about rewarding Sancho with the windfall, but when from afar they spy a man wandering through the mountains, Don Quijote rightly assumes that it may be this unknown man's money he has given to Sancho. In good conscience the knight cannot let the question of ownership of the money be unresolved. He decides to find the mysterious stranger and settle the matter. Sancho, on the other hand, does not have such a strict moral code, especially when it pertains to protecting his self-interest, and does not want to seek out the man to return to him the new-found wealth. Don Quijote does not accept Sancho's reasoning, and the two indeed come upon the wanderer later in their adventure. He is, of course, Cardenio; luckily for Sancho, though, Cardenio has graver problems occupying his mind, and does not demand the return of the gold coins.

The notebook found with the gold coins brings Dulcinea once again to Don Quijote's mind, and he wishes to send her a letter. Sancho agrees to be the bearer for reasons that have nothing to do with his duties as a squire; he agrees to serve to further his own self-interest once again. Instead of thinking it his duty, he sees the opportunity to return to the town and collect the three hens that Don Quijote has promised him for the loss of his ass.¹⁸ The squire takes great pains to ensure that Don Quijote's niece will comply with the agreement her uncle has reached with him, and he even persuades his master to sign a document guaranteeing payment: "fírmela [la cédula] con mucha claridad, porque la

conozcan en viéndola" (247). Later, when Sancho is on his way to the village, he meets the curate and the barber who have come in search of Don Quijote. Sancho tells them of his errand, and they want to hear the letter that Don Quijote wrote to Dulcinea. When Sancho tries to find it, he realizes he has left the book in which it was written with his master. He laments this lack of care, not because he will not be able to comply with the wishes of his master, but rather because he does not have the document entitling him to his reward, the hens. The curate and the barber put Sancho's mind at ease by telling him they will advise his master to rewrite the document, at which news "...se consoló Sancho..." (255). However, the squire is not upset in the least at the loss of the letter because, he says, he knows it by heart. He then tries to recite it for the curate so that the priest can write it, and Sancho can continue on his mission. He does not remember the missive, as is to be expected, and the garbled version amuses the two men from village. In this episode, the reader undoubtedly perceives Sancho's hierarchy of values: first, his own self-interest, and then his duties as Don Quijote's squire.

Another small detail in this incident allows the reader to see that Don Quijote and Sancho are different types of men. After the necessary documents have been composed for Sancho's delivery, the squire asks for Don Quijote's blessing so that he may be on his way, though he has no wish to see any of the foolish acts Don Quijote is going to commit as

penance to his beloved. In spite of not having witnessed Don Quijote's penitential rites, Sancho assures his master not to worry because he will inform Dulcinea that he has seen his master performing the penance. This is unacceptable to Don Quijote; he wants Sancho to be able to tell the truth, or at least a half truth: "...habiéndolas [las penitencias] tú visto por los ojos, puedas jurar a tu salvo en las demás que quisieres" (248). Don Quijote cannot accept that his squire lie for him without at least having seen that the knight is verily disposed to comply with the penance to which he has pledged himself.

Another well-known aspect of Don Quijote's adventure is his encounter with the fictitious princess of Micomicon, who is in fact Dorotea. It is through the knight's encounter with this princess that the reader once again observes that Sancho places his self-interest above his duties as squire to Don Quijote. In the princess, Sancho sees the perfect opportunity for his master to win the reward that has been promised. Sancho urges Don Quijote to abandon the love of his lady, Dulcinea, whom the squire knows to be only a common peasant girl, and to marry the beautiful, rich princess:

Cásese, cátese luego... y tome ese reino que le viene a las manos vobis vobis, y en siendo rey, hágame marqués o adelantado... (306)

Don Quijote cannot stand the impertinence of his subordinate, and immediately reacts to what he has heard:

Don Quijote, que tales blasfemias oyó decir contra su señora Dulcinea, no lo pudo sufrir; y, alzando el lanzón, sin hablalle palabra a Sancho, y sin decirle esta boca es mía, le dio tales dos palos,

que dio con él en la tierra; y si no fuera porque Dorotea le dio voces que no le diera más, sin duda le quitara allí la vida. (306)

Don Quijote views the honor of his beloved as more important than the life of his squire because he does not consider the squire his friend. He expects Sancho to behave in a certain manner, like the squires of the knights errant he has read about in the novels of chivalry, and when Sancho does not act in such a way, he must be punished. Obviously, if Don Quijote considered Sancho his friend, his reaction would not have been so severe. It must be recalled that Rey de Artieda, for instance, placed friendship even above the love between man and woman.¹⁹ If Don Quijote believed he enjoyed a true, sincere friendship with Sancho, not only would he not have reacted so strongly at the insult to his lady, but he may have even considered taking the course of action that Sancho recommended simply for the good of his friend.

After assaulting his squire, Don Quijote goes on to defend his action by insulting Sancho, calling him "villano ruin... bellaco descomulgado... gañán, faquín, belitre... socarrón de lengua viperina... hideputa bellaco" (307), and lauding the beauty of Dulcinea. But Sancho does not give up hope of attaining greater rewards by Don Quijote's marriage to Micomicona, even in spite of the brutal treatment, both physical and verbal, that he receives from his master. From his position on the ground, where he lies beaten by his master, he persists in trying to convince Don Quijote to take advantage of the opportunity that has presented itself.

Sancho believes that they can reach a compromise: "...cásese vuestra merced por una con esta reina... y después puede volverse con mi señora Dulcinea" (307). He goes on to say that he does not question his master's word regarding Dulcinea's beauty, even though he has never seen her. Don Quijote almost catches him in this lie, until Sancho hastily improvises that he did not have much time to examine her beauty "punto por punto; pero así, a bulto" (307).

Later when Don Quijote and Sancho are talking, the squire again raises the possibility that his master marry the beautiful princess. It seems a shame to him to let such a wonderful opportunity pass without taking advantage of it, and he even suggests that the village curate can conveniently perform the ceremony. Even though it has seemed fairly obvious throughout the episode, Don Quijote finally realizes exactly why his squire wants him to marry the princess:

...si el consejo que me das de que me case es porque sea luego rey... y tenga cómodo para hacerte mercedes y darte lo prometido, hágote saber que sin casarme podré cumplir tu deseo muy fácilmente... (315)

Don Quijote is aware that Sancho is preoccupied about the agreement they have reached, and assures him that he will not be remiss in fulfilling his part of the contract, and Sancho will receive the promised benefits.

In spite of the guarantees that his master gives him, it appears that Sancho still harbors the hope that sometime in the near future his master will marry the princess Micomicona and become king. When Sancho sees the princess for what she really is, Dorotea, he is disappointed:

Todo esto escuchaba Sancho, no con poco dolor de su ánima, viendo que se le desaparecían e iban en humo las esperanzas de su ditado, y que la linda princesa Micomicona se le había vuelto en Dorotea, y el gigante en don Fernando... (381)

In having Dorotea take the princess' place, he loses hope that his master will be able to give him the governorship as easily as if he had married a member of some royal family with a certain inheritance.

Just as the two have renewed their relationship in the second part of the *Quijote* for the same reasons as in the first, so too do the dynamics of their friendship remain relatively stable in the sequel. Sancho seeks to maximize the benefits as much as possible, while Don Quijote expects to have with him a squire who will behave in an acceptable manner according to the laws of knight errantry.

The reader again observes that Sancho is prepared to protect his self-interest at all costs, even if in order to do so he must blatantly lie to his master. This is obvious when the pair arrives in El Toboso in search of Don Quijote's lady. Since Sancho has already lied to his master in the first part of the work about having seen Dulcinea in her home, he must maintain the fiction in this episode or be found out by his master. He comes up with a plan to postpone an admission that he has never seen the lady Dulcinea: he tells his master to wait outside the town and he will find Don Quijote's lady love. In a quandary and not knowing what to do, Sancho is lucky enough to find that three village girls are coming along the path toward his master. He

hurries back to Don Quijote and tells him that the Princess Dulcinea is coming along the road. He tells this boldface lie because "siendo, pues, loco [don Quijote], como lo es, y de locura que mas veces toma unas cosas por otras" (604), Sancho is sure his master will believe this consciously fabricated fantasy. Don Quijote sees the girls but does not imagine that any one of them is his beloved. Sancho insists, and finally Don Quijote takes his word. But as is expected, when the two men kneel before the villagers, the women spurn them and ride quickly away. That Sancho compounds his lie in order to prevent his master from finding out about the other is not surprising since he fears losing his reward. This is not a true friendship, but one of interest after all, and if Don Quijote were to realize that Sancho is lax in carrying out his commission, he might not feel obligated to pay for the squire's service. Sancho is above all else relieved that by covering his first lie with a second that his master has not realized what has happened: "contentísimo de haber salido de su enredo" (607). In addition, he laughs at his master, knowing him to be crazy: "Harto tenía de hacer el socarrón de Sancho en disimular la risa, oyendo las sandeces de su amo" (610). He is in fact proud of having left his master "delicadamente engañado" (610). Neither the lies nor the deprecating reaction are marks of true friendship.

In the second part of the work as well as the first, Sancho is always at pains to provide for himself a bed and a decent meal, even at the expense of modifying Don Quijote's

concept of knight errantry. Sancho's material comfort is first among his priorities, and this is no secret to Don Quijote. When the two have begun their wanderings and come upon Camacho's wedding, with its luxurious and abundant feast, Sancho exclaims, "El rey es mi gallo, a Camacho me atengo" (685). Don Quijote knows Sancho's motivation very well and is aware that the squire is always attempting to maximize whatever benefit he can for himself. The knight responds to Sancho's pronouncement with the wry observation, "...bien se parece, Sancho, que eres villano y de aquellos que dicen: '¡Viva quien vence!'" (685). It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that Don Quijote is also aware that his squire has accompanied him for purely material gain. When it is clear that Basilio has won the hand of Quiteria and that the wedding feast is to be lost, Sancho is clearly upset: "A solo Sancho se le escureció el alma, por verse imposibilitado de guardar la espléndida comida" (693).

This is not the only instance when Sancho seems disappointed at having lost the comfort and convenience of being well-fed and warm. In an episode preceding Camacho's wedding, Sancho and Don Quijote have spent a few days with don Diego de Miranda, *el caballero del verde gabán*.²⁰ When Don Quijote feels once again that his vocation is calling and he can no longer accept the hospitality don Diego offers him, Sancho has no great desire to return to the life of a squire:

[el día de su despedido fue] triste y aciago para Sancho Panza, que se hallaba muy bien con la abundancia de la casa de don Diego, y rehusaba de volver a la hambre que se usa en las florestas,

despoblados y la estrechez de sus mal proveídas alforjas. (669)

Sancho's reaction upon leaving the home of the duke and duchess is quite different, however. In spite of the way in which the duchess has taken good care of Sancho during his stay with them, the squire is not too disappointed at saying good-bye to his hosts. This is not because he, like Don Quijote, feels that he cannot exercise his true profession in the confines of a home, but rather because he has received a substantial sum of money for the continuation of his journey:

Estaba Sancho sobre su rucio, con sus alforjas, maleta y repuesto, contentísimo, porque el mayordomo del duque... le había dado un bolsico con docientos escudos de oro, para suplir los menesteres del campo. (949)

Leaving the comfort and abundance found in the duke's residence is compensated by the monetary gain.

Another aspect of Part II of the *Quijote* which demonstrates that Don Quijote and Sancho do not enjoy true friendship is the matter of the disenchantment of Dulcinea. This is a practical joke played on knight and squire by the duke and duchess, but Sancho's negative reaction to the penitence he must submit to is clearly a sign that he places his own health and well-being before that of his master. The prescribed self-flagellation cannot be considered dishonorable, so according to the prescripts of friendship, nothing bars Sancho from undertaking this punishment to help his "friend." Don Quijote's fierce reaction at Sancho's initial reserve is also noteworthy. He threatens to exact the punishment himself, but cannot do so only because he is

instructed that Sancho must inflict the lashes of his own accord. If Don Quijote were Sancho's true friend, he would certainly not intimidate him, nor threaten him with, "os arrancaré el alma" (799). Sancho decides to comply only at the urging of the duchess, who reminds him he owns at least as much to his master for the "buena correspondencia al pan que habéis comido" (802). This was not part of their original agreement, however, and Sancho still hesitates. He only agrees with the condition that he may perform the discipline whenever and however he wants. Don Quijote's reaction is one of pure joy- he hugs and kisses Sancho, thanking him profusely, although promises of even greater wealth would have certainly been a more effective manner to motivate the squire.

Regardless of the promises Sancho has made, however, he is slow in complying with the wishes of his master. This causes Don Quijote a great deal of anguish, and he persists in telling Sancho that it is his duty to comply with the promise, to which Sancho answers he will when he pleases, as agreed. Again, the lack of accord and true friendly feeling are seen during these interchanges. Don Quijote wants Sancho to carry out the penance immediately so that Dulcinea will be disenchanted, while Sancho hopes to postpone any pain or discomfort as long as possible. Don Quijote's patience with Sancho soon wears thin, and he resorts to action instead of words to oblige Sancho keep his word:

Y, procuraba y pugnaba por desenlazarle [a Sancho],
viendo lo cual Sancho Panza, se puso en pie, y

arremetiendo a su amo, se abrazó con él a brazo partido, y echándole una zancadilla, dio con el en el suelo boca arriba; púsole la rodilla derecha sobre el pecho, y con las manos le tenía las manos, de modo que ni le dejaba rodear ni alentar. Don Quijote le decía: -¿Cómo traidor? ¿Contra tu amo y señor natural desmandas? ¿Con quien te da su pan te atreves? (973)

Instead of persuading Sancho, Don Quijote resorts to violence so as to achieve his ends- the disenchantment of his beloved. When Sancho defends himself, Don Quijote chastises him, and in his rebuke the reader again observes that Don Quijote is aware that he is different than Sancho and that the squire is dependent on him for his daily bread. That is to say, Don Quijote knows that he and Sancho are not friends, but rather they have a relationship of mutual benefit.

On the way back to the village, Don Quijote once again insists that Sancho lash himself. This time, however, instead of trying to convince him by means of words or by the use of force, he uses a much more effective method: "azótate luego, y págate de contado y de tu propia mano, pues tienes dineros míos" (1047). Sancho's reaction is predictable when one keeps in mind that he is using his master to promote his own material gain: "abrió Sancho los ojos y las orejas de un palmo, y dio consentimiento en su corazón de azotarse de buena gana" (1047). It appears that now Sancho truly appears to want to whip himself, but not as a service to his companion, as is obvious, but to earn a monetary reward. Soon, though, an even better idea occurs to Sancho: he can win the money without having to suffer in the least. After having given himself six or eight lashes

el socarrón dejó de darselos en las espaldas, y daba en los árboles, con unos suspiros de cuando en cuando, que parecía con cada uno dellos se le arrancaba el alma. (1049)

Don Quijote worries that Sancho may be doing too much at one time, and advises him to stop. But as Sancho sees the advantage in continuing, he refuses, and his master does not insist until it seems that Sancho is nearly killing himself. He pleads, "No permita la suerte... que por el gusto mío pierdas tú la vida, que ha de servir para sustentar a tu mujer y a tus hijos" (1050). It appears either that Don Quijote does not want his squire's death on his conscience or that Sancho will die before having liberated Dulcinea from her enchantment. With this, Sancho effectively escapes inflicting any harm on himself since shortly after this episode they arrive in the village.

The reader gains particular insight once again into the motivation of Sancho both during and after his government of Barataria. This is his long awaited reward, the chance for Sancho finally to collect on all the promises that his master has made. The honor and prestige of such a position little matter to him. Upon his arrival in the territory, he sees an epitaph that reads "tomó posesión desta ínsula don Sancho Panza" (859); he wants to know who this "don Sancho" is. When his advisors tell him that he is the "don," Sancho replies "Sancho Panza me llaman a secas" (859) and goes on to complain about how the use of the title has spread excessively. Sancho's preoccupation is not for title or honor, but for material and financial gains, few of which he

will receive. Instead of being able to eat fully and well, his personal physician Pedro Recio allows him to eat nothing. Sancho repeatedly claims the doctor is trying to starve him to death. He writes in his letter to Don Quijote:

...las medecinas que usa son dieta y más dieta, hasta poner la persona en los huesos mondos... Finalmente, él me va matando de hambre, y yo me voy muriendo de despecho. (913)

Neither does Sancho obtain any pecuniary advantage by being governor as he has expected. Upon renouncing his position he says, "ni pierdo ni gano... sin blanca entré en este gobierno, y sin ella salgo" (926). In fact his long awaited reward compares poorly to the life he has led accompanying his master on his adventures. The comparatively good treatment he receives at the hand of Don Quijote henceforth will be considered his reward:

...doy un salto del gobierno, y me paso al servicio de mi señor don Quijote; que, en fin, en él, aunque como el pan con sobresalto, hártome, a lo menos; y para mí, como yo esté harto, eso me hace que sea de zanahorias que de perdices. (942)

Regardless of some of the bad treatment he receives, Sancho has realized that the benefits he obtains from Don Quijote are proportionally greater to his duties as squire than the rewards he received as governor are to his duties in government. For that reason, after leaving the government he returns to his master and not to his home.

The *quid pro quo* arrangement between Don Quijote and Sancho continues even up to the death of the Manchegan knight. When Don Quijote's sanity is recovered, he realizes that Sancho, in spite of everything, has been faithful:

si como estando yo loco fui parte de darle el gobierno de la ínsula, pudiera agora, estando cuerdo, darle el de un reino, se lo diera porque la sencillez de su condición y fidelidad de su trato lo merece. (1065)

Even though he is unable to grant Sancho great rewards, the protagonist wishes that he could, for Sancho deserves them for the faithful service rendered. Though this type of material utility is not anathema to true friendship whose foundations are rooted in virtue, Don Quijote and Sancho have no such virtue upon which their association is based, and so this can only be interpreted as a strict accounting of favors or services. Sancho deserves a greater reward for the services he has performed.

The squire's concerns at his master's deathbed are equally as interesting as the moribund knight's. Sancho becomes quite emotional, along with all the others who are present "Estas nuevas [que don Quijote se muere] dieron un terrible empujón a los ojos preñados del ama, sobrina, y de Sancho Panza" (1064). Sancho's emotions are compared, unfavorably, perhaps, with those of the women present at the time, and not with the men. He even begs that Don Quijote not die: "¡Ay!- respondió Sancho, llorando, -no se muera vuestra merced, señor mío, sino tome mi consejo, y viva muchos años..." (1065). It appears that Sancho is truly affected by the death of his master. This should not be surprising, really, given the amount of time they have spent together. Such an emotional bond, of camaraderie or of affability, does not necessarily indicate true friendship.

Additionally, Sancho's motives, be they as base as at the beginning of the story or not, are not clearly expressed. One thing which is patently clear, and which probably is an indication of Sancho's true feeling at the death of his companion, is the description offered by the narrator: "Andaba la casa alborotada; pero, con todo, comía la sobrina, brindaba el ama, y se regocijaba Sancho Panza" (1066). The death watch, although it has its moments charged with emotion and grief, is still a semi-festive occasion, and one which Sancho can take advantage of to once again fill his belly at his master's expense.

3.1.4. Apparent Aspects of True Friendship between Don Quijote and Sancho

Even though the relationship between the two protagonists of this work is essentially one of interest, there are several aspects which do reflect some of the elements of true friendship. They are the shared conversation between the two men, the mutual aid and protection the squire and knight give each other, and the similarity between the two when viewed by other characters in the story.

The conversations between the Don Quijote and Sancho are well known. They are greatly amusing, and it has been observed that one of their functions is to give the narrator more liberty to deal with the narrative structure than could otherwise be achieved with just a single protagonist.²¹

However, as has been noted, the presence of conversation is one of the most fundamental traits of true friendship since communication must necessarily occur between friends. Thus it can be said that as these two characters develop their relationship by means of communication, they have at least the possibility of achieving a higher level of friendship other than just between two men whose stake in the relationship is primarily one of self-interest.

Nevertheless, if a few of the representative conversations between knight and squire are analyzed, the reader sees that the dialogue serves mainly to highlight the differences between these two men, and in general, the topics of their colloquies are not the matters of importance that mark the conversations of men who enjoy true friendship.

The most comical exchanges that occur concern the different perceptions of reality the men have. The famous adventure of the windmills serves as an excellent example. Don Quijote sees giants who are waiting to do battle with him, but Sancho only sees some thirty or forty windmills that were found on the Manchegan plains. When Don Quijote tells Sancho that he is about to enter into battle, the squire protests, complaining that the giants do not exist. At this, the knight says, "Bien parece... que no estás cursado en esto de las aventuras" (82). After the knight's resounding defeat, Sancho reiterates his disbelief in giants, and Don Quijote responds, "Calla, amigo Sancho" (82) because he does not want to hear what his companion has to say.

Many of the conversations, especially at the beginning of the protagonists' shared adventure, are attempts by Don Quijote to familiarize Sancho with the ways of knights errant. At one point, Don Quijote becomes impatient with Sancho's ignorance and exclaims, "¡Qué mal lo entiendes" (101), referring to the rules that a knight must follow. He then precedes to enlighten the peasant on some of the rules that a knight such as himself must follow. Not only does Sancho fail to understand Don Quijote's language during the exchange, but he also fails to understand the type of life which the knight has chosen to live.

Sancho also fails to communicate effectively with his master. Not only does his advice often go unheeded, but Don Quijote often feels frustrated at Sancho's attempt at oral expression. Sancho's constant use of refrains, his unfinished story of the shepherd and sheep crossing the river, and his constant mispronunciation of words often drive Don Quijote to desperation. But the strongest reaction against Sancho's speech is when the squire talks about any aspect of knight errantry, especially Dulcinea. Don Quijote first warns his squire that free speech will not be tolerated: "la mucha conversación que tengo contigo ha engendrado este menosprecio" (186). When Sancho fails to pay attention to this counsel, Don Quijote's punishment for Sancho's loose tongue becomes more severe: "...alzó el lanzón y le asentó dos palos" (188), and follows the corporal punishment with a verbal reprehension even stronger than the

first: "...que te abstengas y reportes en el hablar demasiado conmigo" (189). Even though this prohibition is later lifted, one cannot say that communication between Don Quijote and Sancho is effective, free, or that it deals with important subjects.

The conversation between the two men also plays an important part in the construction of the second part of the *Quijote*. One of the most outstanding features is once again Don Quijote's complete desperation with the way in which Sancho expresses himself.²² At one point, the knight swears at his squire, "¿Adónde vas a parar, Sancho, que seas maldito?" (674),²³ giving vent to his frustration. Sancho, in an attempt to exert autonomy, counters against this criticism that Don Quijote has given him permission to speak as he wishes, provided that "no fuese contra el prójimo ni contra la autoridad de vuesa merced" (679). Since Sancho has not broken either stipulation, he should not be muzzled or punished for what he says. Regardless of whatever agreement they may have made, Don Quijote claims not to remember it, and in spite of Sancho's protests, orders that he be silent (679). Neither man is really trying to communicate to the other important matters, and Don Quijote is attempting to dominate in a heavy-handed manner whatever conversations they may have.

Sancho's propensity for conversation and especially interrupting the speeches his master is making at times lead to disastrous results in Part Two of the adventures of the

knight. A perfect example of such a catastrophe happens during the adventure of the braying mules in Chapter XXVIII. Don Quijote has fairly successfully dissuaded a large group of men about to fight because of silly name-calling, when Sancho interrupts his master and begins to bray. The party misunderstands this and thinks that Sancho is making fun of them. Immediately they begin to throw rocks at the two, and Don Quijote, "sin acordarse de Sancho ni del peligro en que le dejaba" (744), is forced to retreat, quickly followed by Sancho. Don Quijote is livid with his squire: "con asaz cólera le dijo- ¡Tan en hora mala supiste vos rebuznar, Sancho!" (745). Sancho is deeply offended by what he considers an unjust accusation and especially because Don Quijote escaped and abandoned him. In addition, he is in general frustrated by the lack of profits he has earned with his master up to this point in the second part, as well. He finally pronounces, "...harto mejor haría yo... en volverme a mi casa..." (746). Don Quijote does not seem terribly adverse to this plan of action and questions Sancho about how they can settle the debt. The squire believes he should get a daily rate equal to that of a farmhand. Don Quijote agrees and says that he owes the squire for twenty-five days' work. Sancho, ever vigilant regarding his interests, protests that he should be paid not for the time he has rendered service, but from when he was first promised his island, which was "más de veinte años, tres días más o menos" (748). At first Don Quijote laughs, but then becomes angry and insults Sancho

for his lack of integrity and fidelity. The squire is hurt by the words Don Quijote hurls at him, and asks for forgiveness. In the case of both men, neither really uses communication to convey feelings or matters of importance as prescribed by the theorists, but rather each speaks to the other in order to secure some sort of benefit: Sancho wants his salary, and Don Quijote shames his squire into remaining with him.

In addition to the conversation that may appear to be a mark of true friendship, the mutual help and aid that these two men lend one another may also be understood to be a trait of true friendship. However, when analyzed more closely, the reader observes that this is not really the case. Don Quijote assures his squire that he, the knight, needs no help in his battles, and that Sancho should be careful in lending a helping hand:

...advierete que, aunque me veas en los mayores peligros del mundo, no has de poner mano a tu espada para defenderme, si ya no vieres que los que me ofenden es canalla y gente baja, que en tal caso bien puedes ayudarme. (84)

Sancho seems much relieved by this admonition because he claims to be "pacífico y enemigo de meterme en ruidos ni pendencias" (85).

Throughout the story, however, the reader learns that these are not necessarily traits of Sancho's true character. He does indeed help his master on several occasions, defending him against common folk. The first time he does battle is with the Galician horsemen. When Don Quijote

attacks them for having beaten Rocinante, Sancho immediately follows suit: "...lo mesmo hizo Sancho Panza, incitado y movido del ejemplo de su amo" (136). Both end up being badly bruised and in need of care. Another incident occurs when Don Quijote meets Cardenio and interrupts his story. Cardenio reacts violently and attacks the knight:

...y dio [Cardenio] con él en los pechos tal golpe a don Quijote, que le hizo caer de espaldas. Sancho Panza, que de tal modo vio parar a su señor, arremetió al loco con el puño cerrado, y el Roto le recibió de tal suerte, que con una puñada dio con él a sus pies, y luego subió sobre él y le brumó las costillas muy a su sabor. (232)

Again, both men end up battered and bruised. Sancho's aid to Don Quijote seems to be always ineffective, and for his pains he usually is given a sound thrashing. In one incident, however, Sancho is more effective in coming to the aid of his master. On the return to the village with the curate and canon, the group meets a shepherd who, during a meal, insults Don Quijote. The knight springs to attack him, but the shepherd gets the better of him. Sancho has no choice but to intervene: "[el pastor] no dudara de ahogalle [a don Quijote], si Sancho Panza no llegara en aquel punto, y le asiera por las espaldas..." (511). He succeeds in freeing Don Quijote who immediately proceeds to pummel the shepherd. The fight is finally stopped by the curate and the canon of Toledo.

Even though Sancho often tries to help his master, the favor is not always returned. The incident at the inn is a perfect example of the dynamic. Don Quijote decides since he

is a knight, he does not have to pay for his lodgings. He leaves before the innkeeper can stop him. Sancho Panza reasons that neither does he, as a squire to the knight, have to pay. But he is much slower in departing and the innkeeper catches him and begins to argue. It occurs to some of the men in the inn to have a little fun with Sancho: they catch him, and begin to throw him up in the air with a blanket, catch him, and begin the process again. Don Quijote sees what is happening, but does not help his squire, because, as he later explains, "...las leyes de caballería... no consienten que caballero ponga mano contra quien no lo sea" (159). Don Quijote does not feel obligated to assist Sancho because he feels himself to be on a higher plane than his squire, further highlighting the differences between the two and the impossibility of establishing a real friendship.

Mutual aid and assistance also play a part in the second part of Don Quijote's story. One of the first adventures after again setting out from the town is with the actors traveling in costume from town to town. When they attack Don Quijote, there is no doubt in Sancho's mind regarding what he must do: "saltó del rucio, y a toda priesa fue a valerle" (613). The difficulty for Sancho arises when his mount is also in trouble:

Miraba Sancho la carrera de su rucio y la caída de su amo, y no sabía a cuál de las dos necesidades acudiría primero; pero en efecto, como buen escudero y como buen criado, pudo más con el amor de su señor que el cariño de su jumento.
(614)

In this case, although Sancho does hesitate, he puts his master's interests above his own. In the long term, it must be said, this will probably be more profitable than the only possible loss of his mount. It must also be noted that the use of "amor" in this case does not seem to indicate any special affection that Sancho feels for his master, but rather that it is a technical term used to describe their relationship.

In the second part, Don Quijote is also helpful to Sancho. One especially notes this when Don Quijote is giving his squire advice on how to behave and to act when he takes possession of his island. This advice ranges from how he should dress and the way in which a governor should eat, to the way he should govern and what kinds of laws he should pass. Don Quijote does not set forth these precepts for Sancho's own good, however. After advising Sancho, the knight clearly states his motive for giving counsel: "Y dejemos esto aquí, Sancho; que si mal gobernares, tuya será la culpa, y mía la vergüenza" (847). Don Quijote is clearly more worried about his own reputation than he is about truly helping Sancho.

The final respect in which the relationship between Don Quijote and Sancho is similar to true friendship is the way in which other characters in the story view the pair. Everyone whom they meet eventually comes to the conclusion that the two are very much alike. This is even true of the two other men who could be said to know them best. When the

curate and the barber first meet with Sancho at the inn, they both are amazed that he is almost as crazy as his master:

los dos se admiraron de nuevo, considerando cuán vehemente había sido la locura de don Quijote, pues había llevado tras sí el juicio de aquel pobre hombre [Sancho]. (256)

Nearly everyone sees the similarity between the two men, and this continues into the second part as well. Sansón Carrasco immediately sees the likeness between the two: "...dijo entre sí que tales dos locos como amo y mozo no se habrían visto..." (588). When Don Quijote and his squire are staying with the duke and duchess, she qualifies Sancho as even "...más gracioso y... más loco que su amo" (773). However, regardless of this type of equality, it is doubtful that any of the theorists in Antiquity or in the Renaissance would consider an equality based on a defect sufficient grounds for true friendship.

3.2. The Curate, the Barber and Don Quijote

Another relationship between two men important to the construction of *Don Quijote* is the one shared by the curate and the barber of Don Quijote's home town. From the beginning of the work from when the two men are introduced to the reader, they seem inseparable, but their relationship is never truly developed or examined from an intrinsic perspective, but rather from an extrinsic one; that is, the way that they relate to the other characters in the story, namely Don Quijote himself, and to a lesser extent, to Sancho Panza.

Nearly every time the curate and the barber have some role in the plot of the story, they are together. The first time the reader meets them is no exception: "...y estaban en ella [la casa] el cura y el barbero del lugar, que eran grandes amigos de don Quijote..." (64). While Don Quijote's housekeeper complains to the priest, the niece complains to the barber. In this instance, there is no real difference between these two; they are merely sounding boards for the lamentations of the two women.

The pair, as noted in the quotation above, are both friends of Don Quijote; not only does the reader know this by means of the narration, but the curate says as much, calling Don Quijote, "mi buen amigo" (65). But what kind of friendship do the men share? At the beginning of the novel, it is one of pleasure. All three enjoy reading books, even romances of chivalry:

Tuvo muchas veces competencia con el cura de su lugar... sobre cuál había sido mejor caballero: Palarmín de Inglaterra o Amadís de Gaula; mas maese Nicolás, barbero del mismo pueblo, decía que ninguno llegaba al Caballero del Febo... (37)

Although their relationship is based on this pastime, it is obvious that not all of the friends enjoy this activity to the same degree. After all, the curate and barber do not spend so much time reading as to cast aside all their other responsibilities as their companion does.²⁴ Also at the beginning of the novel, the curate and the barber act in tandem to try and save their friend; the priest, even with the authority that he might have, decides not to act alone,

but instead to "llamar a su amigo el barbero maese Nicolás, con el cual se vino a la casa de don Quijote" (66). The curate decides to examine the library of his friend Don Quijote; by taking away the cause of the madness, he hopes that the madness itself will disappear; Maese Nicolás agrees with the plan. It must be noted that the motives of these two men are not completely pure. While they do want to save their mutual friend from his madness, the scrutiny of his private library is not solely an altruistic act. They do gain by it. Many of the books are burned, but only those judged not to reach their mutually established literary standard, a standard mostly determined by the curate and agreed to by the barber: "Todo lo confirmó el barbero" (70). Of the books that are not consigned to the bonfire, especially those of poetry, some will find their way into the friends' collections.²⁵

After they complete their search of the library, the curate decides it should be sealed up; the barber wholeheartedly agrees with his companion. When Don Quijote finally recovers nearly two weeks later from the adventure of his first sally, he returns to his habitual chats with his friends. While he said that the world needed more knights errant to save the world, the curate never gave him an honest answer:

El cura algunas veces le contradecía, y otras concedía, porque si no guardaba este artificio no había poder averiguarse con él. (78)

This is not the attitude nor the behavior that is prescribed by the theorists as appropriate to true friends. Even though the intentions of the curate seem honorable, the method, the "artificio," is not. One must keep in mind, though, that Don Quijote is not sane; perhaps because of this, the priest feels justified in lying to his friend.

The use of artifice and deceit occurs again when the curate and barber are attempting to come upon a plan that will succeed in returning Don Quijote to the village with them. After meeting with Sancho Panza, the curate and barber attempt to imagine a way by which Don Quijote can be taken back to his home. Their friend's wants do not enter into their considerations:

...habiendo pensado entre los dos el modo que tendrían para conseguir lo que deseaban, vino el cura en un pensamiento muy acomodado al gusto de don Quijote, y para lo que ellos querían. (258)

They feel that they know what is best for Don Quijote, and since the knight is insane, this may well be the case. However, if this were a case of true friendship, it is probable that the two would never have approached the matter in such a way.

It is during the episode in which the curate and barber are devising a plan to help the Manchegan knight that the reader focuses more clearly on the dynamics of the relationship between the barber and the priest. The curate, just as in the first instance when the two examine the library, is the stronger personality of the two. Although they nearly always act together, it is generally upon the

inspiration of the priest. As observed in the quotation above, it is the priest's idea to have someone dress as a princess so that she can then order Don Quijote back to his town. The barber offers no objections whatever to the priest's idea: "No le pareció mal al barbero la invención del cura, sino tan bien, que luego la pusieron por obra" (258). When it suddenly occurs to the curate that it would be an affront to his clerical dignity to dress as a woman, the barber is immediately persuaded to play the role instead: "el barbero vino en todo aquello que el cura quiso" (259). But the curate also takes charge of all the plans, and feels it necessary to inform his friend the barber who he should act and speak:

...trocando la invención, el cura le fue informando el modo que había de tener, y las palabras que había de decir a don Quijote para moverle y forzarle a que con él se viniese. (259)

Even these two characters normally act together and function as a single entity, there is a clear hierarchy established between them.

3.3. The Curate, the Barber, Sansón Carrasco and Don Quijote

The relationship between the curate and the barber does not significantly change during the second part of the *Quijote*. Just as in the first part, they are not delineated as separate personalities. They normally act in tandem even though the curate is the more prominent of the two: both are pleased that Don Quijote has been returned home (541), and

together they visit him and still marvel at their neighbor's insanity (541, 542).²⁶ Again in this second part, both characters receive a great deal of entertainment listening to Don Quijote's opinions regarding knight errantry; they ask him questions while "...gustando de oírle [a don Quijote] decir tan grandes disparates..." (550). In this second part, though, Don Quijote is not so ingenuous as to take his friendship with the pair at face value. In fact, he does not trust them to help him carry out his further adventures. While talking to Sansón Carrasco, he warns that "la tuviese secreta [su partida], especialmente al cura y a maese Nicolas... porque no estorbasen su honrada y valerosa determinación" (570).

This Sansón Carrasco, the bachelor from Salamanca, is introduced into the dynamics of the friendship between Don Quijote and the curate and barber in the second part of the novel. Given the propensity of the curate and barber for reading as a pastime, the base on which their friendship with Don Quijote rests, it is perfectly credible that Sansón would also become their friend. This friendship is also based on pleasure- their shared interest in books. He is one of Don Quijote's new friends- the housekeeper characterizes the bachelor as an "amigo fresco" (582)- and he clearly trusts him to keep the secret of his next sally. Keeping a friend's secret is, after all, the mark of a true friend. However, after being sworn to secrecy, "...el bachiller fue luego a buscar al cura, a comunicar con él..." (584) what Don Quijote plans to do.

Carrasco takes advantage of this feigned friendship he has formed with Don Quijote to encourage the Manchegan knight to continue to exercise his office as a knight errant. When Don Quijote is leaving, the bachelor begs him to send news so that he can share in his friend's good or bad luck, "como las leyes de su amistad pedían" (589). Sansón does not want this information for the sake of friendship, but rather so that he can pursue Don Quijote and by means of deceit make him return to the town. This plan is devised "todo por consejo del cura y del barbero, con quien él antes lo había comunicado" (588). Carrasco's friendship with the priest and the barber is certainly much stronger than his association with Don Quijote.

The motivation for the trio's plan first seems honorable. After all, they want to return Don Quijote "quieto y sosegado" (641) to his home in order that he may be cured. But just as the curate's and barber's motive in the first part of the novel was not as altruistic as it may have been, there is also room for doubt as to Sansón's motive in the second part. He enjoys making fun of Don Quijote, and when they first meet, he kneels and pays homage to the knight. This is perfectly within the bachelor's personality as seen by the introductory description of the character:

...muy gran socarrón... carirredonda, de nariz chata y de boca grande, señales todas de ser de condición maliciosa y amigo de donaires y de burlas. (558)

This propensity for practical joking, another trait foreign to the concept of true friendship, is likely a secondary motivation for Sansón's participation in the trio's project.

Whatever may motivate Carrasco to participate in the adventure to save Don Quijote, the factor that rules his actions soon changes. He sets off after Don Quijote dressed as a knight errant, the Knight of the Mirrors. Unfortunately for him, during his battle with Don Quijote, Carrasco's horse trips at a crucial moment and he is defeated by the insane Manchegan. The humiliation of the defeat gives him a new motive to seek out his neighbor:

...pensar que yo he de volver a la mía [casa] hasta haber molido a palos a don Quijote es pensar en lo escusado; y no me llevará a buscarle el deseo de que cobre su juicio, sino el de la venganza; que el dolor grande de mis costillas no me deja hacer más piadosos discursos. (642)

Carrasco, dressed as the Knight of the White Moon, later appears and defeats Don Quijote in Barcelona. Don Antonio, another of Don Quijote's new acquaintances, asks Carrasco who he is and what he is doing in the city. The bachelor explains himself and his plan to defeat Don Quijote and oblige him to return to his town. Finally he says, "...suplícoos no me descubráis... porque tengan efecto los buenos pensamientos míos y vuelva a cobrar su juicio [don Quijote]" (1014). Of course, his actions are not as altruistic as they may appear to the outsider, motivated as they are more by revenge than by pity for Don Quijote.

The Manchegan knight never becomes aware of his friends' duplicitous behavior. He continues to view them as his

friends, and they, for their part, manage to maintain appearances. When Don Quijote returns to the town for the last time to endure his year of imposed inactivity, the curate, barber, and bachelor greet him "con los brazos abiertos" (1058). In order to keep Don Quijote at peace, they continue to lie to him, promising to accompany him on his new, imagined pastoral excursions. And finally, on his deathbed Don Quijote demands, "Llámame a mis buenos amigos: al cura, al bachiller Sansón Carrasco y a maese Nicolás" (1063); they are to be witnesses to his will and testament.

3.4. "El curioso impertinente": Anselmo and Lotario

The most obvious and perhaps most telling relationship between men in the first part of the novel is that between Anselmo and Lotario, "los dos amigos."²⁷ The narrator uses this appellation various times, thereby conferring a special status on the relationship that the two share; in the first sentence alone the author uses the word "amigo" twice. The narrator also places emphasis on the similarities between the two friends, "...caballeros ricos y principales, mozos de una misma edad y de unas mismas costumbres" (397). Being rich and important is a characteristic frequently used in the tradition of the two friends.²⁸ Even though Anselmo and Lotario are very much alike, to be true friends according to Aristotle, they must also be aware of their similarities and mutual good feeling: "...los dos con recíproca amistad se correspondiessen" (397). The elements that would lead a

reader to believe that this is a "perfect friendship" according to the Classical norms that are put into place in the introductory sentence of the story, but immediately following in the next sentence, a discordant note is sounded. It is a seemingly unimportant detail, but one that must be observed; the two friends do not enjoy the same hobbies: "...Anselmo era algo más inclinado a los pasatiempos amorosos que el Lotario, al cual llevaban tras sí los de la caza" (397). Although the two reach a compromise, sometimes hunting and other times dallying, the reader notes that in spite of the opening sentence of the story, there is not the perfect accord in all things that is characteristic of the true form of friendship found in the preceptors of Antiquity. The relationship that each enjoys with the other must be analyzed individually because they are of different types according to the Aristotelian schematic. The friendship Anselmo has with Lotario is complex; it breaks the Aristotelian edict which mandates that the friendship must be of one type, and friendships of different types with the same person are rare,²⁹ even though a true friendship has elements of the two inferior types. Anselmo's friendship is based on pleasure; he truly enjoys Lotario's company. It is also a friendship of utility because Anselmo uses Lotario to further his own desires; at one point he explicitly states that he wants Lotario to be "el instrumento de mi gusto" (401). Anselmo never lets Lotario know that these are the true motives of his friendship, and disguises them under the

rubric and façade of "true friendship." Anselmo's preoccupation for the name of "los dos amigos" is also obvious. He calls it the "dulce nombre" (398) and describes it as "tan agradable" (398). He fears losing the name not because he fears losing the friendship which it is supposed to represent, but because he will lose the pleasure of being called by such a title.

Anselmo is a sensualist; he is, after all, inclined to "pasatiempos amorosos." The first concrete act narrated in the story is Anselmo's love for Camila ("Andaba Anselmo perdido de amores..." [397]). His best friend, Lotario, is the person in charge of making the arrangements which will lead to the gratification of Anselmo's desires. Although Lotario is not the object of Anselmo's pleasure, he is the means by which Anselmo achieves his ends. The narrator describes Lotario's success as "tan a gusto de su amigo" (398, italics mine). In addition, Lotario is the one who attempts to "festejalle y recocijalle [a Anselmo]" (398) after Camila has been brought to Anselmo's home. In this brief episode the reader is able to observe the dynamics of the triplex friendship: Anselmo has used Lotario to gain his ends (Camila), but Anselmo also enjoys Lotario's company ("festejar" and "recocijar"), all brought about because of the "true friendship."

The triplex friendship is again used by Anselmo to satisfy his curiosity. Anselmo's plan to test the faithfulness of Camila is brought forth in a moment of

leisure when the two friends are "paseando por un prado fuera de la ciudad" (399). Initially there is some doubt as to exactly why Anselmo has the urge to test his wife's loyalty; in fact, he says to Lotario "...me maravillo de mí mismo" (400). However, as the plan progresses, it can be noted that the dominant reason for Camila's trial by fire is Anselmo's pleasure. He simply derives satisfaction from observing how Camila behaves when confronted by such circumstances. When Lotario relates to Anselmo how Camila has rejected his supposed advances, the narrator reports the pleasure that Anselmo derives from this news: "todo esto le contentó mucho" (412). The choice of the verb "contentar" is interesting here. If Anselmo were truly concerned with the marital chastity of his wife, perhaps a more appropriate verb would have been "sossegar."³⁰ When Anselmo discovers that Lotario has been deceiving him and his pleasure is frustrated, he complains, "... [¿]por qué quieres quitarme con tu industria los medios que yo podría hallar para conseguir mi deseo?" (413). Word choice is again important in this passage. He is not searching for the "verdad"- is his wife loyal and faithful?- but is seeking to gratify his own "deseo," a word which connotes pleasure.³¹ Anselmo is using his friend to satiate his perverse desires and in no way enjoys a true friendship with him.

As much positive evidence as there is for the case of "friendship of utility and pleasure," there is also proof against the idea that Anselmo has a true friendship with

Lotario, regardless of the impression that the narrator give the reader with his traditional description of the two friends at the beginning of the novel. As has been noted, the first fault noticed is that both friends do not share the same tastes in pastimes, although they do reach a compromise on this point.³² The second major piece of evidence against the theory that these two are true friends according to the classical definition is Anselmo's lack of self-knowledge- "...me maravillo de mí mismo" (400). For Seneca especially this knowledge is fundamental for anyone who would want to form true friendships.³³ The final and most convincing piece of evidence against the proposition that these two are true friends is that Anselmo asks Lotario to carry out an unacceptable wish. As Lotario points out, if he were to comply he would lose his honor, his friend's honor, and Camila's honor as well. For Cicero, who accepted carrying out some morally questionable requests made by a friend,³⁴ a petition such as the one Anselmo makes of Lotario, would incontrovertibly destroy the honor of his friend and so would be beyond all the reasonable limits of friendship. Lotario uses precisely this argument in attempting to extricate himself and his friend from the web of destruction that Anselmo is unwittingly weaving around all those who surround him. The fact that Anselmo continues to insist upon this immoral course of action is also evidence of the lack of true friendly feeling that Anselmo has for Lotario.

Lotario's friendship with Anselmo is different. He behaves according to the classical ideals established regarding the perfect type of friendship, at least in the first part of the story. However, his friendship will change and become more base as the narration progresses. Lotario is constantly preoccupied with maintaining his friend's honor and allowing nothing to stain it. For that reason, after Anselmo's wedding, he frequents the newly established household on fewer and fewer occasions so as to not cause Anselmo any grief because

...aunque la buena y verdadera amistad no puede ni debe de ser sospechosa en nada, con todo esto, es tan delicada la honra del casado, que parece que se puede ofender aun de los mismos hermanos, cuanto más de los amigos. (398)

In addition, he realizes, even if Anselmo does not, that this could be the cause of malicious rumor that would ruin the newlyweds' reputation.

Ironically, it is Lotario's concern for Anselmo's reputation that first plants the seeds of doubt in Anselmo's mind regarding Camila's faithfulness. He observes that married men should have some friend who can advise them "...de los descuidos que en su proceder hiciese" (399). This is because husbands are not always quick to point these things out to their wives, either because they love them very much, or they fear angering them. Only Lotario is capable of performing this task of looking after "la honra de su amigo" (399). Once again, he insists on not passing too much time at Anselmo's house because "aunque su bondad y valor podía

poner freno a toda maldiciente lengua, todavía no quería poner en duda su crédito ni el de su amigo" (399).

Even after Anselmo's plan begins to take shape, Lotario remains faithful and attempts to keep his friend from falling into a grievous error. His initial reaction is that Anselmo's idea is a "burla" (402), and although this would be contrary to good taste,³⁵ it would still be better than a serious proposal to trespass the boundaries of morality and of honor. Since he knows that Anselmo is seriously considering this erroneous course of action, it is Lotario's duty as a true friend to attempt to prevent his companion from realizing such an ill-conceived idea. Of course, all the advice he gives falls on deaf ears and is a waste of time; according to the theorists on friendship,³⁶ advice should not be given to those not willing to listen.

Although Lotario knows that he has not changed, he does not recognize this new Anselmo: "...las cosas que me has dicho, ni son de aquel Anselmo mi amigo, ni las que me pides se han de pedir a aquel Lotario que tú conoces" (402). At this point Anselmo's quest for pleasure has exceeded all moral bounds, and it begins to interfere with the ideal of true friendship which Lotario has believed that they have shared since childhood. To put a stop to what he considers nonsense, Lotario first says that even the Gentiles knew that "...no se habían de valer de su amistad en cosas que fuesen contra Dios" (402). If this were true of non-believers, then it must be held especially by Christians. Lotario also

considers following the counsel of the preceptors of Antiquity by leaving the friend who will not let himself be corrected and improved in virtue: "...aun estoy por dejarte en tu desatino, en pena de tu mal deseo" (403). He compares Anselmo's intransigence to that of the Moors, who in spite of arguments, proofs, and even evidence cannot be swayed to accept the truth of "mi sacra religión" (403). The use of the first person *singular* possessive pronoun indicates that Lotario now realizes that there is a crucial difference between them, and that they no longer share certain fundamental beliefs.

Lotario then proceeds to develop more fully his argument against Anselmo's action. Not only is Anselmo's plan putting the married couple's honor at risk, but it is also endangering Lotario's as well, which is "contra toda amistad" (408) as Lotario understands it. But all these attempts are to no avail. This request is not contrary to Anselmo's concept of friendship, the friendship of utility, even though he preys on Lotario's feelings of true friendship to manipulate his friend into giving him the help he needs to satisfy his curiosity. Anselmo refuses to be swayed until this curiosity is completely satiated. At the end of his discourse, the narrator relates that "[c]alló en diciendo esto el *virtuoso y prudente* Lotario..." (409, italics mine). This is a clear indication that regardless of what kind of friend Anselmo may be, Lotario is capable of true friendship

because of his virtue,³⁷ even though he may not be conscious that Anselmo does not reciprocate this true friendship.

Lotario should have taken Seneca's advice to heart and left his friend when Anselmo refused to heed the good advice given to him. As Seneca observes, a man must be helped quickly or there is danger that his helper will be brought to ruin as well.³⁸ This is the case with Lotario, who notwithstanding his good intentions, falls into vice and dishonor because of his continued association with Anselmo. When Anselmo catches him in an honorable lie, Lotario feels that he has no choice but to make a serious attempt to seduce Camila because he takes it as a "punto de honor el haberse hallado en la mentira" (413). He has no intention of actually dishonoring himself because he will not fall in love with her. When he does find that he has become infatuated with Anselmo's wife, he continues to be a faithful friend by procuring to overcome the strong feelings he has for Camila. He does this for the sake of the true friendship he believes he shares with Anselmo. He longs to flee the city to escape the predicament in which he finds himself, but he has become a victim of pleasure: "...mas le hacía impedimento [del huir] y le detenía el gusto que hallaba en mirarla" (416). Lotario succumbs to these passions, not blaming himself, but placing all culpability on the shoulders of Anselmo, whose "locura y confianza" (416) have led to these results.

The change is obvious in the way that Lotario perceives his friendship with Anselmo from this point forward in the

narration. No longer is he the true friend he was, but rather he uses the friendship with Anselmo as an instrument by which he will satisfy his sensual appetite. He lies outright to Anselmo saying that Camila never wavered in her fidelity, and promises to write the poetry Anselmo asks him to. At this point the narrator intervenes again to say that "[q]uedaron de este acuerdo el impertinente y el *traidor amigo*" (420, italics mine). By using the word "friend" for Lotario and not to describe Anselmo, the narrator emphasizes the ways in which they had differed in their perception of the meaning of friendship. Anselmo is incapable of being a traitorous friend, because he has never been a true friend. He always followed the established behavior for his type of friendship; his association with Lotario was one of utility and pleasure. Though he did enjoy the time he spent with him, Lotario was also an instrument by means of which Anselmo furthered his ends- pleasure. Lotario is a traitor to his own belief of friendship; if he had been the true friend that he thought himself to be, he would never have agreed to Anselmo's ill-conceived scheme, and certainly never would have made a cuckold of his friend.

3.5. Roque Guinart and his *Bandoleros*

One of the types of friendships described and condemned expressly by Juan de Mora, which he called *amistades conjuradas*,³⁹ but seen by the other theorists as simply a friendship of utility, is brought to life by Cervantes in his

description of Don Quijote's encounter with the bandit Roque Guinart.⁴⁰

The common bond which brings this band of men together is obvious. They are highway robbers; by joining together, they are more productive. However, this is not a loose confederation as there is a well-defined hierarchical structure among this group of men. When Don Quijote and Sancho first encounter them, they take everything off Sancho's mount, but go no further than that. They order knight and squire that "se detuviesen hasta que llegase su capitán" (974). He is the one who will make the decisions for the society, and all the others are described as his "escuderos" (975). This clearly places him in a position of authority. When Roque arrives, he orders that they restore to Sancho all they are in the process of robbing: "mandóles que no lo hiciesen, y fue luego obedecido" (975). This further emphasizes his role as leader of the band. This power extends even beyond his followers who are near. When a group of pilgrims, soldiers and women which the band has robbed are about to depart, Roque gives them a letter of safe conduct in case "para que si toparen otras de algunas escuadras... no les hagan daño" (983).

Roque Guinart's also enjoys authority of the division of the spoils among the group, a power he exercises keeping in mind the principle of "la justicia distributiva" (981), a concept which Aristotle applies to precisely this type of friendship.⁴¹ Sancho observes that justice is so important

that "aun se usa entre los mismos ladrones" (981). The use of justice in this type of friendship is not at all unusual since each member expects a certain benefit, in this case money, in exchange for his contribution to the group's efforts. Roque amasses all the funds, and then divides them among all the members of the band, but with the advice that each man "mírese a cómo le cabe a cada uno, porque yo soy mal contador" (983). Even though each ought to receive his fair share, each individual must still care for his self-interest.

Cervantes also presents the terrible problems entailed with this sort of friendship. The first is the way in which Roque maintains discipline among his followers. When one of the band dares to complain that Roque is not exacting enough in collecting from those whom they rob, the leader's reaction is swift and violent: "No lo dijo tan paso el desventurado, que dejase de oírlo Roque, el cual echando mano a la espada, le abrió la cabeza casi en dos partes" (984). Fearing the same punishment, perhaps, no one else in the group risks protesting in any way: "Pasmáronse todos, y ninguno le osó decir palabra" (984). Not only by distributive justice, but also by swift corporal punishment is discipline maintained.

There are other expected drawbacks to this form of friendship. The royal authorities are searching for these men and punishment is unerring- they are hung from the trees wherever they are taken prisoner.⁴² In addition to living in fear from his enemies without, Roque also lives with the constant suspicion that one of his band will hand him over to

the authorities. Money, material gain, is the ruling factor in the lives of these men, and if they can maximize the benefits received by cooperating with the authorities who search for Roque, they will betray him. Roque does not even trust his men enough to sleep in their presence, but "pasaba las noches apartado de los suyos" (985). He also knows that purely economic considerations rule these men's actions: "no se osaba fiar de nunguno, temiendo que los mismos suyos, o le habían de matar, o entregar a la justicia" (985). The narrator directly comments on this type of life, much like the theorists do, "vida, por cierto, miserable y enfadosa" (985).

3.6. Conclusions

Friendships between two men are the most common type found in both parts of *Don Quijote*, and this should not be surprising given the nearly exclusive treatment that masculine friendships receive in both the theorists of Antiquity and the Renaissance.

The most striking and best described relationship between men is between the two protagonists, Don Quijote and Sancho Panza. Their friendship is exclusively based on the usefulness they provide one another. Don Quijote needs a squire, and Sancho fulfills this role. In return, Sancho expects monetary compensation in one form or another from his master. Given that these two characters have nothing in common except for their birthplace, and that they are in no

way equals, it is impossible that these two men share friendship of the highest sort described in both Renaissance and Classical treatises on the subject. Cervantes does not break these theoretical barriers with respect to true friendship through these two characters. Their comportment is not typical of that found between real friends since each is trying to further his own interests. Moreover, though they have extensive conversations, a typical characteristic of true friendships, they do not talk of substantive issues. Moreover, Sancho lies to Don Quijote and tells others that his master is crazy; the knight, in turn, often becomes exasperated with Sancho's attempts at communicating. And more contrary to true friendship, Don Quijote beats his squire on several occasions and is ready to sacrifice him in the interests of his lady love. Though they spend a great deal of time together and become familiar with one another, their association is not to be considered the true friendship described and lauded by all the theorists studied.

Neither can Don Quijote's relationship with the curate and the barber be considered a friendship of the highest type. In the beginning, it is apparently based on a common pastime, reading the books of chivalry. It must therefore be classified as an association of pleasure. When Don Quijote begins his insane adventures, it clearly establishes a fundamental difference between the protagonist and his companions, and thereby excludes the possibility of sharing a higher sort of friendship. In spite of these differences,

however, the two minor characters do help their associate, not because of friendly feelings, but because of a sense of obligation as Christians. Even this noble purpose is not absolutely pure, though. It is tainted with aspects of self-interest- the men sack Don Quijote's library, taking what they want- as well as pleasure- both men enjoy hearing the knight's *disparates*. Likewise, Sansón Carrasco's relationship with Don Quijote is at first based on pleasure. Upon meeting the knight, he mocks him, and also enjoys listening to him talk in such an antiquated fashion. Carrasco, too, attempts to help his neighbor, but when he is defeated easily by Don Quijote in battle, his motive changes: Sansón Carrasco no longer wishes Don Quijote well, but seeks to defeat him for revenge. Though he manages to bring the knight home, which consequently leads the knight to be cured, the feelings of vengeance which motivate Sansón are never displaced as his primary motive:

The other friendships between men studied here are also obviously less than true friendships. Anselmo, *el curioso impertinente*, destroys what most likely could have been a friendship of the highest sort. He does so by abandoning a fundamental precept of friendship: asking of a friend only honorable things. He also places the gratification of his desire above his friendship with Lotario. Consequently, he ruins not only his own life, but that of his friend and wife as well. The friendship of utility shared by the bandits and Roque Guinart is without a doubt portrayed in a negative

light. Though all concerned receive certain benefits, they live in fear and suspicious of one another. Cervantes apparently agrees with the theorists who consider this type of friendship a horrible, undesirable one.

These episodes of the *Quijote*, then, do not contain any relationship that could be considered friendship of the highest sort. Even the theorists admit, though, that friendships grounded in virtue between good men are not at all common and perhaps we should not be surprised by their absence. One sees that the inferior types of friendship are not necessarily as negative as the theorists might have described them, though they can be. Two extremes of friendship of utility, for example, are shown. The negative side is seen in Roque and his bandits. The narrator clearly holds the opinion that these men live a miserable existence. A much more positive friendship of utility is found between knight and squire. Each looks after his self-interest, but in spite of this they form a certain amount of affection for one another. After all, it must be remembered that Don Quijote misses his companion when the squire is governing his island, and Sancho cries at his master's deathbed. Also viewed in a positive way is the relationship between Don Quijote and the other men of his village. The curate, barber, and Sansón manage to cure Don Quijote in spite of the fact that their association with him is not based on virtue, but on utility and pleasure.

The friendships between men portrayed by Cervantes in the *Quijote* must be considered inferior kinds in light of the theories of the period in which the author lived and wrote. Cervantes elects not to present the theoretical, the abstract, the perfect; instead he chooses to paint the inferior friendships in a realistic light. That is, men are imperfect and often use one another, but in spite of this they manage to live together and at times even manage to do good.

Notes to Chapter Three

¹All quotations from the *Quijote*, both in this chapter and the next, are cited by page number from the Riquer edition.

²The twelve circumstances of person are found in nearly all of the handbooks of rhetoric of the time. One of the most popular of these handbooks was Cicero's *De Inventione*, which lists and defines the circumstances in the following manner: "Name is that which is given to each person, whereby he is addressed by his own proper and definite appellation. It is hard to give a simple definition of *nature*... In respect to human beings, their nature is considered first as to sex whether male or female, and as to race, place of birth, family, and age... Besides, we take into considerations such advantages and disadvantages as are given to mind and body by nature, as, for example: whether one is strong or weak, tall or short, handsome or ugly... in short, we shall take into consideration all qualities of mind and body that are bestowed by nature. ... Under *manner of life* should be considered with whom he was reared, in what tradition and under whose direction, what teachers he had... with whom he associates on terms of friendship, in what occupation, trade, or profession he is now engaged, how he manages his private fortune, and what is the character of his home life. Under *fortune* one inquires whether the person is a slave or free, rich or poor, a private citizen or an official with authority... By *habit* we mean a stable and absolute constitution of mind or body in some particular, as, for example, the acquisition of some capacity or of an art, or again some special knowledge, or some bodily dexterity not given by nature but won by careful training and practice. *Feeling* is a temporary change in mind or body due to some cause... *Interest* is unremitting mental activity ardently devoted to some subject and accompanied by intense pleasure... *Purpose* is a deliberate plan for doing or not doing something... *Achievements, accidents, and speech* will be considered under three tenses of the verb..." (xxiv.34-xxv.36).

For a brief synopsis of the use of rhetoric in the Renaissance, see Kennedy *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, 196-218, and López Grigera.

³It must be kept in mind that exactly what is meant by "equality" is defined differently by different theorists (see Chapter 2 of this study).

⁴The poverty of the rural peasant class during the period is well documented. See especially Salazar Rincón, 160-227 and Osterc 30.

⁵"Cuenta Cide Hamete Benengeli en la segunda parte desta historia, y tercera salida de don Quijote, que el cura y el barbero se estuvieron casi un mes sin verle, por no renovarle y traerle a la memoria las cosas pasadas" (541).

⁶Don Quijote tries to forget that he is nothing more than a poor country *hidalgo*: "[el] deseo de ascensión social es una contante en la conducta de don Quijote" (Salazar Rincón 122), and the squire is a mark of his social climbing.

⁷That Sancho would believe these seemingly incredible promises made by don Quijote is not that improbable: "Su fidelidad [la de Sancho] es consecuencia del afecto y la gratitud, pero hay también razones históricas que explican la firmeza con que Sancho, ilusionado unas veces y escéptico otras, se niega a abandonar esa disparatada guerra privada en que su amo le ha embarcado: Sancho, pobre jornalero de escasas letras y una gran carga de buena fe, convive con labriegos que han servido en el ejército o han emigrado a las Indias en busca de nuevos horizontes, y, aunque sólo conoce la pobreza del campo manchego, ha oído hablar a menudo de Flandes e Italia, del oro y la plata de América, y de las leyendas fantásticas de aquel mundo lejano. Su escasa instrucción y su credulidad sin límites no le permiten distinguir las ínsulas y los reinos de Tierra Firme, ni las riquezas y honores que don Quijote le ofrece, de aquellas aventuras que dice haber vivido Vicente Roca y las que Alonso Quijano piensa protagonizar, tienen para él los mismos visos de autenticidad, porque en su época, aunque la miseria siga siendo triste sino de las gentes sin fortuna, todos los sueños parecen ser realizables; y el desdichado labriego prefiere seguir a don Quijote, y aceptar con los ojos cerrados sus promesas de riqueza y prosperidad, antes que padecer el sudor y la penura hasta el final de sus días en los estrechos límites de una aldea castellana" (Salazar Rincón 197).

⁸The dreams of both protagonists originate with don Quijote, as Casaldüero notes, "Para Don Quijote, Dulcinea; para Sancho, la ínsula. Son exactamente lo mismo: dos creaciones de Don Quijote..." (*Sentido y forma...* 70).

⁹The supremacy of the husband over the wife is found both in Aristotle (*Ethics* 8.10.5), the Old and New Testaments (Gen 3:16 and Ephesians 5:22-24), and in several authors of the Renaissance. Vicente Mexía says in his *Saludable instrucción del estado de matrimonio* (1566), "Que el marido, por ser primero, ha de tener el principado y señoría en la gobernación de su muger. Y ella, como es cosa suya, le ha de

ser subjecta, y obediente para ser regida y gobernada por él. Lo qual se confirma por lo que dizo Dios a la primera muger, queriendo que lo mismo se guardase en todas las casadas" (35r).

¹⁰See Aristotle *Ethics* 8.13.6.

¹¹Clemecín comments that "Empieza ya desde aquí a pintarse el carácter de Sancho con una pincelada digna de Cervantes" (1091). However, Sancho's true character has already been described by means of being persuaded by don Quijote's promises of the governorship. This dialogue reaffirms the initial impression of his personality.

¹²Other examples of Sancho dining at his master's expense are found in Chapter X of the first part and in Chapter I and LXXIV of the second; in addition, Sancho is invited to many meals simply because he is with the Manchegan knight (for example: Chapters XI and XLVII of the first part and Chapters XII, XVIII, and XXXI of the second).

¹³I agree with Maravall when he says that don Quijote "lleva a cabo [una transformación de la realidad] para crear las condiciones de realidad necesarias al objeto de llevar a término su acción heroica" (*El Humanismo de las armas...* 168), but such a transformation is not limited solely to don Quijote, since Sancho also makes these transformations when they suit his egotistical aims; or in other words "Sancho es capaz de observar la realidad, siempre que no le toquen a su ínsula y su provecho" (Casalduero *Sentido y forma...* 148).

¹⁴Chapter XX of the first part.

¹⁵In his edition of *Don Quijote*, Riquer notes that "legal" in this case means "justo, ecuánime" (179, n.3). The *Diccionario de Autoridades* defines it as: "Se toma muchas veces por verdadero, puntual, fiel en el cumplimiento de su obligación" (II, 378).

¹⁶One must keep in mind: "No es extraño que Sancho, igual que los jornaleros y labradores pobres que iban a la Corte para servir a un señor, decida abandonar la aldea, desamparar a su familia, y seguir a un hidalgo le ha contratado como escudero... que le ofrece... una recompensa con la que poder sacar el pie del lodo" (Salazar Rincón 190).

¹⁷It is probable that the difference in social class alone would be enough to prevent these two men from forming true friendship, at least for some Renaissance philosophers (see Castilla, for example). Don Quijote never forgets his

position as noble, either: "Despreciar al villano, situarse por encima de él, o en el mejor de los casos, rehuir de su trato, son por ello reglas de conducta habituales entre caballeros e hidalgos" (Salazar Rincón 118).

¹⁸The loss of Sancho's ass is one of the famous inconsistencies in the first 1605 edition of this work. For more on this problem and how Cervantes resolved it, see the Riquer edition (214 n.3) and the Avalle-Arce edition (274 n. 6).

¹⁹See Rey de Artieda, "Vínculo de la amistad" (98r). In addition, José Antonio Maravall notes the importance of love in the protagonist's scheme of the universe: "...para el humanista el amor es, no menos, la colosal energía que hace del hombre otro del que era. También para toda la literatura caballeresca, el amor es una fuente de abnegación y sacrificio... Y por esta doble vía es claro que llegó Don Quijote ese impulso erótico para su perfeccionamiento interior que se nos muestra en todas las páginas de la obra" (88) and also "El amor viene a ser fuente de nuevas y rigurosas exigencias sobre uno mismo, origen de obligaciones que el enamorado se impone..." (*El Humanismo de las armas...* 112).

²⁰This episode occurs in Chapters XVI-XVIII of the second part.

²¹Manual Durán notes, "Era preciso resolver el problema de las transiciones (y es éste uno de los problemas centrales de la novela: ya lo hemos apuntado al hablar de las transiciones entre una y otra aventura: resultaban indispensables ciertas zonas de descanso, de introspección, de 'vacaciones' frente a las fatigosas exigencias de la vida activa)" (122). These "vacaciones" are in fact the numerous conversations that occur between knight and squire. Riquer also comments on the narrative function of the squire: "Lo importante es que a partir de este capítulo 7 ha aparecido en el *Quijote* la inmortal pareja y con ella el constante y sabroso diálogo. Gracias a este diálogo entraremos a fondo en el alma de don Quijote..." (*Aproximaciones al Quijote* 60).

²²If "La paciencia es la base de la reforma virtuosa del hombre" (Maravall *El Humanismo de las armas...* 135), then don Quijote lacks this solid ground *vis à vis* his association with Sancho Panza. In spite of the Manchegan knight's numerous attempts to correct Sancho's speech habits, he is never successful, and it is a constant source of frustration and impatience when dealing with the squire.

²³Sancho's liberal use of refrains and popular sayings is a constant source of frustration for don Quijote and of amusement for the reader. Other instances are found in Chapters XXXVIII, XXXIX, LXVII, LXVIII, LXXI; however, don Quijote's frustration is not at the use of refrains themselves, since "El gusto y la estimación de los refranes cunde en el humanismo de nuestro siglo XVI" (Maravall 254), but in Sancho's misapplication of them to the situation at hand, or his excessive use of them (Maravall *El Humanismo de las armas...* 253). See also Salazar Rincón, 175 and Rosenblat 36-40.

²⁴Within the framework of humanism, "Erudición, letras, doctrina, saber son medios para un fin moral: ser mejores" (Maravall *El Humanismo de las armas...* 82). Don Quijote takes this maxim and incorrectly applies it to his own readings, the fictional accounts of knights errant, believing them to be true and worthy of not only admiration but also of imitation. His companions make no such mistake, though according to Salazar Rincón, that such books would have a strong effect on men such as these is not necessarily impossible: "...a pesar de sus continuos disparates, nuestro anacrónico caballero no vive tan distanciado de su época como a primera vista podría parecer. Son muchos los contemporáneos de don Quijote que, con el juicio perfectamente sano, se sintieron incitados a la acción por la lectura de los libros de caballerías" (153). For more on the knight and his pastime, see Casaldüero *Sentido y forma...* 49-51, Eisenberg *A Study of Don Quijote* Chapter 1, and Eisenberg *Don Quijote and the Romances of Chivalry*.

²⁵Several of don Quijote's books are explicitly annexed into his friends collections: *Los diez libros de Fortuna de amor*, *El Pastor de Fílida*, *Tesoro de varias poesías*, *El Cancionero*, *La Araucana*, *La Austríada*, *El Monserrato*, *Las lágrimas de Angélica*, and of course, *La Galatea*. It is also probable that the edition of the *Amadís* that don Quijote has in his collection also is taken by one of his companions since it is spared the fate of the bonfire.

²⁶Don Quijote's insanity in the second part is again marked by his denial of both the concept of the modern state and of the use of firearms in the art of war (Maravall *El Humanismo de las armas...* 61). Don Quijote's anachronistic solution to the present political crisis in Spain is precisely what lead his friends the curate and the barber to believe that he has not been cured (See Chapter I of the second part).

²⁷This intercalated novel is recounted in an inn during don Quijote's return to his town with the curate and the barber. See Chapters XXXIII-XXXV of the first part.

²⁸See Avalle-Arce "Los dos amigos."

²⁹See Aristotle *Ethics* 8.4.5.

³⁰"Sossegar" ("apacigar, pacificar, aquietar alguna cosa" [*Dicc. de Aut.* VI, 163]) is used by Cervantes several other times in this episode, and does not have the same connotations of pleasure that "contentar" has ("Satisfacer, agradar, dar contento y gusto" [*Dicc. de Aut.* III, 163, italics mine]).

³¹In the *Diccionario de Autoridades* "apetencia del bien ausente o no poseído" (IV, 167). The first example used to illustrate the definition is taken from *La Celestina* "Tus acelerados deseos, no medidos por razón..." referring to the young lover's sexual desires.

³²See Aristotle *Ethics* 8.8 and Cicero *De Amicitia* (v.19-20).

³³See Seneca *Epistulae*, 35.4.

³⁴See Cicero *De amicitia*, 17.61.

³⁵See Gracián Dantisco, *El galateo español* XI,10 and Villalón *El scholástico* III.

³⁶See Cicero *De amicitia*, 15; Seneca *Epistulae* 19.1.

³⁷See Aristotle *Ethics* 8.2.6 and Cicero *De amicitia* 6.

³⁸See Seneca *Epistulae*, 19.4.

³⁹See Juan de Mora 20v and Fonseca 361.

⁴⁰This episode occurs in Chapter LX and LXI of the second part. The problem of the *bandoleros* was nearly a chronic social plague by the publication of the *Quijote* of 1615, though the situation was to get much worse under the reign of Felipe IV (See Elliot *Imperial Spain*, 331, and Stradling 85-114). The formation of these bands was primarily motivated by economic problems: "En Cataluña, el labriego de escasos recursos suele unirse a las partidas de bandoleros" (Salazar Rincón 186).

⁴¹See Aristotle *Ethics* 5.2.12 and 5.3.1-17 and also Castro *El pensamiento de Cervantes* 204-209.

⁴²The reader sees the results of this swift punishment carried out by the authorities at the beginning of the episode: Sancho comes upon the bodies hanging from the trees just before they encounter the bandits. Don Quijote comments on Sancho's find "por aquí los suele ahorcar [a los bandoleros] la justicia cuando los coge, de veinte en veinte y de treinta en treinta..." (974). See also Elliot *The Revolt of the Catalans*.

CHAPTER FOUR

FRIENDSHIPS INVOLVING FEMALES IN *DON QUIJOTE*

4.1. Friendships between Men and Women

4.1.1. Sancho and his Wife

While several critics have attempted to analyze and explain the interchange between Sancho Panza and his wife in the *Quijote* of 1615,¹ very few have examined their relationship in the edition of 1605.² The first mention of their marriage is rather casual: Sancho observes that if and when he is made king of an island, his wife will become queen, and his children princes. However, without elaborating, Sancho also mentions that his wife has certain shortcomings, and he admits that she probably would not make a good queen. She would be better suited to be a countess instead even though she still might need help in that position: "...no vale dos maravedís para reina; condesa le caerá mejor, y aún Dios y ayuda" (81).

As has been demonstrated, Sancho's friendship with Don Quijote can be seen basically as one of utility. His friendship with his wife in this first part is much the same. Upon his return to the village after the days of his first adventures, Juana is not concerned about him, *per se*, but

about their property: "...así como vio a Sancho, lo primero que le preguntó fue que si venía bueno el asno" (516). She is much more worried about any possible property damage than her husband's health. In addition, she views Sancho's avocation in purely material terms relative to her and her children when she again asks,

...pero contadme agora, amigo: ¿Qué bien habéis sacado de vuestras escuderías? ¿Qué saboyana me traéis a mí? ¿Qué zapaticos a vuestros hijos? (516)

She is not glad her husband is home for any emotional reason, but for what benefits he might bring the family. She does admit that she has been sad and discontent during "todos los siglos de vuestra ausencia" (517), but again, it is not Sancho's presence which changes her mental state, but his promise to tell her new and interesting things, from which, she says, "...recibo yo mucho gusto" (516).

Sancho clearly feels himself superior to his wife. In response to her questions about what goods he brings back from his adventures, he tells her, "...traigo cosas de más momento y consideración" (516). He goes on to say that he is not concerned with the petty details of everyday life; he is above them because he will someday become governor of an island. When Juana does not understand what Sancho is trying to say, he tells her, "No es la miel para la boca del asno" (517), definitively placing his wife on a lower plane than the one on which he believes himself to be. Though Sancho's relationship with Don Quijote has been seen to be primarily a

friendship of utility, he does not describe it as such when speaking to his wife:

Sélo yo de experiencia, porque de algunas he salido manteado, y de otras molido; pero, con todo eso, es linda cosa esperar los sucesos atravesando montes, escudriñando selvas, pisando peñas, visitando castillos, alojando en ventas a toda discreción, sin pagar ofrecido sea al diablo el maravedí.
(517)

Sancho has not enjoyed these experiences while they were happening, and indeed, as has been seen, complained vehemently to his master whenever these events occurred. In reality he, just as his wife, hoped he would have some sort of material gain to show for all his efforts and sufferings. When he returns nearly as poor as when he left, he feels obligated to have something to show his wife, and so relates to her all these wonderful adventures.

When speaking with Sansón Carrasco in the second part, however, Sancho does not attempt to varnish the truth about his relationship with Don Quijote in the least. He readily admits that he has used the money earned in service of Don Quijote to support his family, and knowing that his adventures produced these material gains is "la causa de que mi mujer lleve en paciencia los caminos y carreras que he andado" (566).

The husband and squire recognizes that providing for his family is one of his primary responsibilities even though the means by which he accomplishes duty are not necessarily pleasant. While explaining to Teresa that he is about to set out again with Don Quijote, he observes, "...me entristece el

haberme de apartar de ti y de mis hijos" (571). Teresa is not nearly as emotionally affected by this news. She reminds Sancho of his financial responsibility to her and their children: "si por ventura os viéredes con algún gobierno, no os olvidéis de mí y de vuestros hijos" (572). At the very least, he ought to return again with money (573).

In spite of the similarities between the description of the couple's concept of the marital association in the first and second parts of the story, one must recognize that there is a fundamental difference in the sequel.³ Instead of discussing solely financial questions, Sancho and Teresa also speak of other important matters, namely, the welfare of their daughter, especially the way in which her father's new status of governor will affect her and her possibilities for marriage.⁴ In this discussion, Teresa takes a position closely aligned with the theorists of the epoch regarding marriage. She advocates that regardless of Sancho's success, their daughter should marry someone who is their social equal as peasants: "casadla con su igual, que es o más acertado" (572). Both she and her husband have followed this advice. Sancho, on the other hand, argues that they ought to attempt to improve Sanchica's social situation through marriage. Though they talk about this important family dilemma, Sancho and Teresa never reach an accord by means of their conversation. Instead, Teresa bows to the opinion of her husband because "con esta carga nacemos las mujeres, de estar obedientes a sus maridos, aunque sean unos porros" (576). By

insisting until Teresa capitulates and agrees to his plan, Sancho has contradicted one of the refrains he recites to his master Don Quijote, "el consejo de la mujer es poco, y el que no le toma es loco" (584). The squire's resistance to following his wife's advice, both here and later when speaking with his master, comes from an attempt to exert his authority as head of the family. He rotundly pronounces that "el hombre ha de ser hombre, y la mujer, mujer; y pues yo soy hombre dondequiera" (588), and he will not be bullied by his wife, who is on a lower plane in the hierarchical scheme of the family.⁵

The beginning of the second part is not the only time that the reader is privy to the relationship between Sancho and his wife. In one of his many discourses, Don Quijote expounds on the ideals of the married life.⁶ Sancho says he wishes he had heard Don Quijote's advice before marrying Teresa. This in turn leads to a conversation on the theme between master and squire. Don Quijote wants to know if Teresa is so bad that Sancho needs to complain about her. Sancho concedes that she "no es muy mala... pero no es muy buena; a lo menos no es tan buena como yo quisiera" (696). When Don Quijote chides him for speaking ill of his wife, Sancho affirms that he does not feel at all guilty because he knows that she complains as much about him as he about her. They are indeed equals and often act very much alike.⁷ In spite of her faults, Sancho later admits to the duchess, "no

la trocara yo por la gigante Andandona, que... fue una mujer muy cabal y muy de pro" (725).

The letters that the married couple exchange during Sancho's brief tenure as governor also provide insight into the relationship between them. Both missives are primarily concerned with matters of everyday life. Sancho briefly explains to Teresa where he has been and what he has done with his master, and that he has finally attained his governorship, the goal after which he has been striving. He advises Teresa not to worry about their financial straits because "tú has de ser rica, de buena ventura" (806).⁸ Likewise, Teresa's written response is also full of information relevant to both: she recounts everyone's reaction at receiving Sancho's letter, then the most current gossip about town, and Sanchica's preparations to find a suitor. Teresa ends the letter asking if she is to stay in town or travel to Sancho's court. Though neither the language nor the style of either letter is elevated, the material and the way in which it is treated is recognized to have value by all those who read the correspondence; the letters were "estimadas y admiradas" (922). These letters, then, represent the substantial issues for this married couple.

4.1.2. Fathers and Daughters

One of the many emotional scenes in the *Quijote* deals not with the separation or reunion of lovers, but with the

separation of a daughter from her father- Zoraida from Agi Morato. During this episode, the reader observes some of the characteristics of filial friendship, but the bonds are not eternal ones, as Zoraida can break them when she needs to do so. The father-daughter relationship is also examined, though not in such great detail, in the episode of Doña Clara and the Oidor.

Agi Morato and Zoraida's relationship is described in great detail by the narrator- in this case, the Captive is recounting the tale. The relationship between this father and daughter is good; he has given her everything she needs, and as his only heir, she will be a very rich woman in time. She, on the other hand, has been a good daughter and given her father no cause to grieve. Unbeknownst to Agi Morato, though, Zoraida has become a secret Christian and an especially devout follower of the Holy Mother due to the instruction she received as a young girl from a female captive who was a maid in her household. The wish to become a baptized, practicing Christian will rule all her actions and cause her to forsake even her closest blood relative- her father.

The treason begins when Zoraida attempts to communicate with the Captive, who is being held in one of the *baños* near her house. She tells him the story of how she became a believer, and continues:

Yo soy muy hermosa y muchacha, y tengo muchos
dineros que llevar conmigo: mira tú si puedes hacer
cómo nos vamos, y serás allá mi marido, si

quisieres, y si no quisieres, no se me dará nada;
que Lela Marién me dará con quien me case. (410)

Her principal objective, then, is not to marry, but rather the promise of marriage and wealth is to serve as a means by which she will escape from Muslim lands; the Captive is only an instrument by which she will achieve her goal. Through a series of notes written to the Captive, the plan of action becomes clearer, and Zoraida gives the Captive enough of her father's money to ransom himself and some of the others. Her betrayal has advanced to such a point that one day in the garden of Agi Morato, the Captive is speaking with Zoraida, when unexpectedly her father appears. In order that he not suspect anything, Zoraida pretends to have fainted into the unwilling arms of the Captive. It is a conscious decision to hide the truth from her father so that he cannot interfere with her arrangements.

Even though Zoraida has an unquenchable desire to become a Christian and will do nearly anything to obtain it, she still feels a deep love for her father and attempts to protect him from that emotional hurricane which is to pass over him. The night of her flight with the captives, one of the companions wants to enter the house to sack it, taking the father with them to be ransomed. Zoraida prohibits this: "a mi padre no se ha de tocar en ningún modo" (422); to further protect him, she enters the house to gather enough money to satisfy those who are fleeing with her. Unfortunately, her painstaking preparation is foiled when her father awakes and begins to give the alarm. He is

immediately gagged and taken with the group, much to the dismay of Zoraida, who has fainted because of this peripity. When she recovers, she is unable to look at her father out of a sense of shame.

Her father, on the other hand, does not even begin to suspect the treachery of which his daughter is a part. The narrator relates Agi Morato's reaction in the boat: "su padre quedó espantado, ignorando cuán de su voluntad se había puesto en nuestras manos" (422). At seeing his daughter in what he believes to be a perilous and dangerous situation, he begins to "suspirar ternísimamente" (423), and the fact that Zoraida seems perfectly comfortable among her supposed captors does not lead him to think that she has had some part in this plan.

Zoraida, it must be noted, has not lost her filial respect and love for her father, in spite of her actions. She wants to leave her father and the other captives they have taken on shore. Several members in the party protest, observing that if the prisoners were to be left behind, they would immediately raise the alarm, and the captives and Zoraida might be again returned to Arab lands. This is unacceptable to all, even the beautiful Moor: "Zoraida, a quien se le dio cuenta, con las causas que nos movía a no hacer lo que quería, también se satisfizo" (423). Her primary objective is to reach Christian lands and to be baptized; she will permit that nothing, even close family ties, prevent her from reaching her goal. This contrast

between family and religion is perfectly seen when the narrator says,

Iba Zoraida, en tanto que se navegaba, puesto la cabeza entre mis manos, por no ver a su padre, y sentía yo que iba llamando a Lela Marién que nos ayudase. (424)

She is ashamed that she has betrayed her father, but she still is confident that her newfound faith will save her.

Still, in spite of the many signs, Agi Morato does not realize what his daughter has done. He believes her to be a victim of the captives' action just as he is. Zoraida's father is willing to give up everything he has to save himself and his daughter, whom he calls "la mayor y la mejor parte de mi alma" (424). This produces an outpouring of emotion from Zoraida, and she goes to her father to hug him. It is at this point that Agi Morato realizes that Zoraida is finely dressed and he asks her why; then he sees the coffer full of his riches which Zoraida has brought along with her. The poor father is still completely confused but does not yet suspect that Zoraida is an accomplice in this unfortunate affair. It falls to one of the Captive's companions to tell Agi Morato what has happened. He explains that it is because of her faith as a Christian that Zoraida has tried to escape her homeland. When her father asks her if it is so, she finally admits her role; moreover, she justifies her actions by saying, "nunca mi deseo se estendió a dejarte ni a hacerte mal, sino a hacerme a mí bien" (425). When asked again why she has done it, Zoraida tells her father to pray to Lela Marién, the Virgin, that he might understand fully. At this,

her father jumps overboard in an attempt to drown himself, though he is immediately rescued.

Neither Zoraida nor the escaping party wish any harm to come to the old man or any of the other Moors that have been taken prisoner. In order to set the Arabs free, the group lands at a place called "Caba rumía," which in Spanish means "la mala mujer cristiana" (426). From the point of view of Agi Morato, this name is a bitter irony, since his own daughter, a converted Christian, is forced to treat him so poorly in order to win salvation for herself through baptism. However, from Zoraida's vantage point, she has tried her best to honor her father and not treat him badly; indeed, the whole experience has caused her a great amount of grief and pain. In spite of these strong emotions, though, she is obligated to complete her journey as mandated by her old maid on the authority of the Virgin Mary.⁹ It is because of this almost divine imperative that her father's threats, then pleas have no effect on her. In spite of the fact that she has attempted to be a good daughter, her duty to God is set above her duty to her family.

The episode of the arrival at the inn of the Oidor, narrated immediately after the episode of the Captive, provides another, although much briefer, view of the father-daughter relationship. Doña Clara has arrived with her father, the Oidor on his way to Seville in order to set sail for the New World. His daughter has enamoured a young, rich noble who had lived near them at Court. When Clara left with

her family, the rich young man also ran away from home dressed as a *mozo de mulas* to follow her. At the inn where all the characters have united, Clara talks with Dorotea about her problem- she is in love with the young man, but is afraid that neither her father nor the young noble's father will approve. Regardless of the love between the two young people, and the advantages Clara may receive by marriage to a noble, she flatly refuses to marry her pretender because "Pues casarme yo a hurto de mi padre, no lo haré por cuanto hay en el mundo" (444). This is the only direct comment she makes regarding her situation vis à vis her father, but it is a very telling one. She will not break the bond that joins them even for love of another. This is consistent with the attitude of Zoraida with respect to marriage and family; it was not to marry that she betrayed her father, but rather marriage was for her a means to an end. The respect that both young women have for their fathers differs significantly from the masculine attitude- Don Luis has left his father to seek true love in spite of the fact that he is the apple of his father's eye, and the latter is dying at his terrible loss.¹⁰

4.1.3. Marcela and Grisóstomo

One of the most illuminating episodes of the *Quijote* which deals with the relationships between men and women is that between the two shepherds, Marcela and Grisóstomo. The reader is told the story from several points of view: first

by the real shepherd who returns to the goatherds' camp where Don Quijote has decided to spend the night; then the following day by Ambrosio, the deceased Grisóstomo's friend, who relates more details; Grisóstomo himself speaks through his *Canción desesperada*; and finally, Marcela recounts her version of the events when she appears at Grisóstomo's funeral. This first intercalated novel of the *Quijote* is without a doubt pastoral, but as critics have pointed out it is not simply a reworking of the typical pastoral themes.¹¹ If this episode is examined in the light of theories of friendship of the period, we can see that Marcela is not just the mythical *zagala* worthy of admiration by all the other shepherds, but she feels herself capable of enjoying true friendship with her counterparts.

The similarity between the two protagonists is quite strong. Both are from the same town. Grisóstomo, after studying for years in Salamanca, returns to his family and by means of what he has learned makes them rich. For a reason unknown by his family, Grisóstomo and a close friend decide to become shepherds (the motivation was, of course, to pursue Marcela). Shortly after, his father dies leaving Grisóstomo a great deal of money. Marcela, too, is wealthy, since she, like Grisóstomo, has inherited a great fortune from her deceased father, a "labrador aún más rico que el padre de Grisóstomo" (112). She has lived with her uncle, the village curate, since the death of her father, and in spite of his advice to marry, she begs off, saying that she is too young

to be able to "llevar la carga del matrimonio" (113). One day, however, she suddenly decides to live the life of a shepherdess and abandons the life of the town. If matrimony, like true friendship between men, is equality in all things, then one would be hard pressed to find a couple who apparently has so much in common- both come from rich families (although from different classes), and both want to lead a fictional pastoral life, albeit for differing reasons- Marcela to assert her independent will, and Grisóstomo to please the one he loves.

However, these ideally suited people do not come together because each has a different concept of what they want their association to be. Grisóstomo has conceived the relationship in terms of the ideal of courtly love.¹² He is to be the loyal follower of this *mujer esquivia* who rejects all his unwanted advances. It is his duty to suffer, but in spite of this pain to continue to love her. These pains eventually become unbearable, even to Grisóstomo, the most devoted of Marcela's many admirers, and he dies.¹³ In a final gesture of amorous devotion, he has demanded in his will to be buried not in the cemetery, but in the place where he first saw, and presumably fell in love with, Marcela. There is no doubt that Grisóstomo feels Marcela is responsible for his death. This is made patently clear in the "Canción de Grisóstomo," a poem which clearly fits into the pastoral tradition.

This last poem written by Grisóstomo allows the reader to see precisely the manner in which the shepherd had conceived his relationship with Marcela. His pain and Marcela's deeds are inseparable, since the latter is the cause of the former. Grisóstomo is forced to express his feelings like a brute animal since the torment in which he finds himself nullifies the common forms of human communication: "pues la pena cruel que en mí se halla/ para contalla pide nuevos modos" (126). The way in which Marcela has treated him is then described in generally negative terms:

Mata un desdén, atierra la paciencia,
o verdadera o falsa, una sospecha;
matan los celos con rigor más fuerte;
desconcierta la vida larga ausencia;
contra un temor de olvido no aprovecha
firme esperanza de dichosa suerte. (126-127)

Moreover, Grisóstomo has managed to live and to continue to love Marcela in spite of the cruel treatment he has received from her ("mas yo, ¡milagro nunca visto!, vivo" [127]). Even his long-suffering fortitude has reached its limit; he cannot continue to live in this way, and so must die. Grisóstomo is not to blame for his own death, however:

Tú, que con tantas sinrazones muestras
la razón que me fuerza a que la haga
a la cansada vida que aborrezco... (128)

Neither should Marcela take any pleasure in being the cause of his demise: "que no quiero que en nada satisfagas" (128). Marcela is to blame, then, because not only does she not return Grisóstomo's love, but neither does she even give him the opportunity for him to demonstrate his love for her.

Marcela, on the other hand, does not place herself into either Grisóstomo's or any other man's vision of courtly love.¹⁴ She has decided that she does not want the type of love that Grisóstomo and nearly all the other men who pursue her try to offer her, and she certainly does not want to become anyone's wife. In spite of this, she is not a *mujer esquiva*.¹⁵ Regardless of some of the negative imagery that the shepherd who first describes her uses, this first shepherd-narrator admits that Marcela does hide from the men who seek her companionship, is not disdainful of them *per se*, and that she is sociable:

Que, puesto que no huye ni se esquiva de la compañía y conversación de los pastores, y los trata cortés y amigablemente, en llegando a descubrirle su intención cualquiera dellos, aunque sea tan justa y santa como la del matrimonio, los arroja de sí como con un trabuco. Y con esta manera de condición hace más daño en esta tierra que si por ella entrara la pestilencia; porque su afabilidad y hermosura atrae los corazones de los que la tratan a servirla y a amarla. (114)

There are three very important things to be learned from the description of Marcela delivered by the shepherd. First and foremost, even he admits that she does not disdain the company of men. He goes as far as to observe that she even treats them in a friendly manner. This is the key to Marcela's behavior: she desires friendship with man as an equal and nothing else. However, when she learns that they cannot accept these terms and that they have any sort of amorous intentions, she catapults them away- both figuratively and literally distancing herself from them. The result of what men would consider her abnormal behavior is a

trail of broken hearts. In spite of the narrator's- in this case the shepherd's- negative portrayal of Marcela, it is clear that he does not absolutely condemn her for the consequences that follow her actions since she apparently wants to have friendships with men, though no other sort of relationship with them.

In contrast to Grisóstomo's emotional appeal for sympathy in his "Canción desesperada," Marcela appears at the funeral to defend herself against the accusations levelled against her in a well-constructed, judicial discourse.¹⁶ It is here that the reader sees precisely what a differing concept Marcela has of her self-worth. She begins by saying that because of her "natural entendimiento" (130) she knows that beauty deserves to be loved; she also knows that she is beautiful and therefore worthy of being loved. But she asks, is she obligated to love a man who loves her but is ugly? Or even supposing a more ideal case, she claims that equal beauty does not mean equal affection between the parties. Her argument is both interesting and valid; moreover, a point that has not been noted is that she is capable of logical reasoning and is intellectually able to judge and choose what she wants. This sets her apart from the Renaissance notion of woman, who was thought to have "imperfect judgment and 'consilium invalidum et instabile' because of their temperament and imperfection" (Maclean 50).

Along with her God-given understanding, Marcela knows that she was born free and that she has free choice. Without

mincing words she affirms to her audience, "Nací libre, y para vivir libre escogí la soledad de los campos" (131). The fact that she yearns to live in solitude also distinguishes her from the typical conception of human nature; all the theorists, in both Antiquity and in the Renaissance, categorically state that man (that is, "humans") are social creatures and desire to live together. But Marcela does not live in complete solitude because she does enjoy "la conversación honesta de las zagalas destas aldeas" (132). This solitude is one apart from men. She emphasizes, "No prometo, engaño, llamo, ni admito [a nadie]... No engaño a ése, ni solicito aquél; no burlo con uno, ni me entretengo con el otro" (132). The shepherdess is not so foolish as to not realize that men seek her out for their own benefit: "me solicitan de su particular provecho" (132). This benefit, whether honorable (marriage) or not, is not what Marcela desires. She does not want to live with man because she knows that she will lose her freedom; her conception of marriage is the traditional one, one of subjugation.¹⁷ For Marcela, who recognizes herself to be a free, rational, moral being, such a state is unacceptable.¹⁸

The contrasts between the oral vehicles-- *canción/discurso*-- further emphasizes the differences between these two protagonists and their conceptions of their common relationship. The differences between the formal characteristics of the message is the least part of the dichotomy between these two characters. Grisóstomo's more

emotional appeal would have been perhaps better suited to the Renaissance conception of woman, while Marcela's well thought out, well reasoned discourse would have been more credible coming from the mouth of a man. It is put together exactly according to the rhetorical rules in use at the time.

Conceptually, she uses *ethos* (good moral character), and *pathos* (an emotional appeal). Additionally, her speech seeks to conciliate, move, and to teach her listeners- these three concepts are fundamental to oratory in the Renaissance.

Marcela's rhetorical discourse, when compared to Don Quijote's, for example, is much better constructed, and in short, much better than his (Mackey 65).

Marcela has a vision of herself that is not commonly understood by the men who surround her,¹⁹ and since they can never understand this, she knows that she is condemned to live a solitary life.

4.1.4. Dorotea and her Servant

The various relationships of love between Cardenio, Luscinda, Don Fernando and Dorotea have all been analyzed by various critics,²⁰ but there is one aspect of Dorotea's story which serves to illuminate supposedly non-amorous relationships between men and women. When Dorotea is about to flee from her parents in disgrace, she asks one of her father's workers for a set of clothes with which to disguise herself. When this servant discovers her intention to abandon her home and follow Don Fernando, he tries to

dissuade her. When Dorotea refuses, he threatens to tell her father. She begs with him not to tell anyone, but to go with her to the city where she believes Fernando to be. After again trying to dissuade her, the young man finally gives in and swears to accompany her "hasta el cabo del mundo" (285). Notably, in spite of Dorotea's beauty, the servant does not immediately volunteer to go with her but instead must be persuaded to accompany Dorotea; it is not on account of his own initiative that he travels with her, but because she has insisted that he do so.

When Dorotea finally arrives in the town of Lusinda, she learns what has happened at the wedding of Fernando and Lusinda. Additionally, she hears the town crier announcing her own situation, but not exactly as it has occurred; in this version, the servant has been accused of kidnapping the young lady. Dorotea's reaction is rather egotistic: "cosa que me llegó al alma, por ver cuán de caída andaba mi crédito" (287). She fails to take into account how this unjust accusation is to affect her companion. Her next course of action is to flee again to avoid being recognized. At this point, the relationship with her servant, which she herself classifies as "fiel y seguro" (287) begins to vary, and the servant, perhaps due to the unjust accusation levelled against him, "comenzaba a dar muestras de titubear" (287). The change is made evident to Dorotea when her companion begins to make amorous overtures. This type of behavior, according to Dorotea, was caused by two things: the

solitude of the mountain setting, and the roguery ("bellaquería" [287]) of the servant. It seems that the one has given room to the other, for up to this point there has been no question that the servant has performed admirably, and one is almost forced to question Dorotea's judgement, either in beginning the relationship with the servant, or in classifying it as true and faithful in the first place.

The advances are at first nothing more than words, and Dorotea reacts decisively against them, responding that such a daring attitude on his part is shameless and unacceptable. The servant persists, progressing from words to action; he tries forcibly to have his way with Dorotea. However, she is much more successful in defending herself against this rogue than she was against Don Fernando. Instead of accepting the servant on his terms, Dorotea pushes him over a precipice, and leaves him either dead or to die.

It seems that Dorotea has learned that men are not to be trusted. After her separation from her companion, she is found by a farmer in the area who takes her home as a servant. Dorotea is still dressed in the masculine clothing which her deceased companion had given her at the start of their journey, and she admits to her listeners that she did not want the farmer to know that she was indeed a woman. She uses her "industria y... solitud" (288) to prevent him from realizing the truth. Her plan consists of always keeping her head covered so that her master does not see her long hair, and staying away in the fields as much as possible. However,

all her efforts are wasted because somehow her employer learns the truth: "pues mi amo vino en conocimiento que yo no era varón, y nació en él el mesmo mal pensamiento que en mi criado" (288). Because of the new-found amorous intentions of her master, Dorotea is once again forced to terminate her relationship with a man, and she flees again deeper into the mountains.

Both of these relationships between Dorotea and a man do not bear fruit for essentially the same reason- they are based on utility. Dorotea pleads for the company of the *zagal* only when she learns that he is to betray her intentions to her father. By accepting him as a travelling companion, she not only effectively muzzles him, but has a male companion who can protect her as well. He, on the other hand, does not seem to expect any advantage to come about from this relationship, although his declaration of following Dorotea "hasta el cabo del mundo" (285) may be understood to have amorous undertones. When his position as an innocent accomplice in Dorotea's flight changes to the person responsible for the damsel's sequestration, he begins to see things in a different light. Not only does he expect compensation, but he demands it in currency which is unacceptable to Dorotea. Hence, the relationship comes to a violent end. When the parties in a friendship of utility cannot reach agreement on the benefits they want, such a rupture is to be expected. The relationship between the landowner and Dorotea is based on the same principle of

utility- he has contracted a young man to do a young man's work, and Dorotea, although not a young man, accepts the responsibilities involved. However, when the master learns what Dorotea really is, his expectations change. Since these new terms are not acceptable to her, Dorotea terminates the relationship.

4.2. Friendships between Women

4.2.1. The Housekeeper and the Niece

The first mention of Don Quijote's housekeeper and niece are almost in passing, for they are part of a list of his condition and fortune: "Tenía en su casa una ama que pasaba de los cuarenta, y una sobrina que no llegaba a los veinte..." (36). This age distinction between the two is the only one clearly stated by the narrator, and neither woman is developed as an individual, but both of these minor characters always act in tandem, much in the same way as the curate and barber do. In fact, just before Don Quijote's return from his first sally, the two women are seen speaking to the two men in much the same way, as the narrator takes pains to point out: "[que]estaba diciéndoles [al cura y barbero] su ama [la de don Quijote] a voces... [y] la sobrina decía lo mismo, y aún decía más" (64). Both are complaining that the books of chivalry that Don Quijote reads have driven him mad.

At the famous examination of Don Quijote's collection of books, once again the two women are seen acting in perfect

accord. They want the collection of books to be burned without exception:

-No- dijo la sobrina; -no hay para qué perdonar a ninguno...- Lo mismo dijo el ama; tal era la gana que las dos tenían de la muerte de aquellos inocentes... (67)

They are brought together by a common cause. Both of them behave in this manner for the good of Don Quijote. Their mutual assistance continues even after Don Quijote gets out of his sick bed. When he asks for his books, both the housekeeper and the niece are accomplices in the lie used to attempt to cure the old man. Both say that a supernatural power has come to the house to carry all the books and his library away.

These two women are not mentioned again until Don Quijote's return to the village at the end of the work. Of course, the housekeeper and the niece are together when they learn of Don Quijote's homecoming, and they react to the news in the same way:

...un muchacho acudió a dar las nuevas a su ama y a su sobrina de que su tío y su señor venía... Cosa de lástima fue oír los gritos que las dos buenas señoras alzaron, las bofetadas que se dieron, las maldiciones que de nuevo echaron a los malditos libros de caballerías; todo lo cual se renovó cuando vieron entrar a don Quijote por sus puertas. (516)

Together they take care of him and put him back to bed, and the last scene of the story is the image of the woman not knowing what to think about their situation:

Finalmente, ellas quedaron confusas y temerosas de que se habían de ver sin su amo y tío en el mismo punto que tuviese alguna mejoría, y sí fue como ellas se lo imaginaron. (518)

The description of the women's role in the second part does not substantially change. They are still not portrayed as individuals, but rather they nearly always act in unison. Their task is primarily to take care of their master, whether it be "dándole cosas confortativas y apropiadas para el corazón y el cerebro" (541), or fighting with Sancho Panza to keep him away from the Manchegan gentleman.²¹ Once again after Don Quijote's wanderings to Barcelona and back, both of the women are responsible for caring for him in his last hours.

This relationship does not seem to be described as one of individuals, but at the same time, neither is it illustrated in such a way that one is led to believe that this is a friendship of the true sort. While the participants do live together and have a common purpose, the reader does not know if the two communicate, or even if they enjoy each other's company, signs of true friendship according to nearly all the theorists on the topic.

4.2.2. Maritornes and the Innkeeper's Daughter

One of the most interesting relations between female characters is certainly that between the innkeeper's daughter and Maritornes, the young Asturian who is a maid at the inn.²² There seems to be a remarkable change in the character of the daughter and her relationship with Maritornes between the first scene in the inn and the second.

Don Quijote and Sancho are completely battered and bruised from their adventure with the Galician mares the first time they arrive at the inn where Maritornes and the daughter live. The mistress of the inn, who "naturalmente era caritativa y se dolía de las calamidades de sus prójimos" (143),²³ decides to take care of the two adventurers. She wants her daughter to help her, and she expects Maritornes' assistance as well. While describing what the wife of the innkeeper has decided to do, the narrator also describes the two young women who are to assist her. First, the daughter is said to be a "doncella, muchacha y de muy buen parecer" (143). Maritornes, on the other hand, is described much more fully:

...ancha de cara, llana de cogote, nariz roma, del un ojo tuerta y del otro no muy sana. Verdad es que la gallardía del cuerpo suplía las demás faltas: no tenía siete palmos de los pies a la cabeza, y las espaldas, que algún tanto le cargaban, la hacían mirar al suelo más de lo que ella quisiera. (143)

The reader immediately appreciates the differences of appearance; the daughter is rather attractive, but Maritornes is certainly ugly. The dissimilarity between these two is further delineated by the terms that the narrator chooses to use to describe them: "Esta gentil moza [Maritornes], pues ayudó a la doncella" (143). The daughter is a "doncella," but Maritornes is only a "moza."²⁴ The reason for this term applied to Maritornes instead of "doncella" is soon explained:

Había el harriero concertado con ella [Maritornes] que aquella noche se refocilarían juntos... y no

tenía por afrenta estar en aquel ejercicio de servir en la venta. (145-146)

Maritornes is not as chaste as the daughter, and in fact, views her office as prostitute as honorable as any other of her duties at the inn. Moreover, Maritornes avocation is not completely unknown to the owner of the inn. When pandemonium breaks loose during Don Quijote's first night at the inn, the innkeeper's reaction is immediate and certain: "fue a castigar a la moza, creyendo, sin duda, que ella sola era la ocasión de toda aquella armonía" (149). One is given cause to wonder why, knowing the type of woman that Maritornes is, the owner of the inn allows his daughter to associate with her. The constant companionship seems to lead to his daughter's fall from grace as seen during Don Quijote's second visit to the inn along with the curate, barber, and the rest of the characters he has encountered on the road.

During the knight's second stay with the innkeeper and his family, the daughter and Maritornes seem to be much more similar than they were during Don Quijote's first stay at the inn. Several indications lead the reader to believe that this relationship between women seems to be based on pleasure. The first evidence comes as the men discuss the relative merits of the stories of chivalry. The women- the mistress of the inn, her daughter, and Maritornes- find great pleasure when the novels are being read. The wife of the innkeeper gives an unexpected response, not judging the novels for themselves, but rather how they indirectly affect her, saying, "...nunca tengo buen rato en mi casa sino aquel

que vos estáis escuchando leer; que estáis tan embobado, que no acordáis de reñir por entonces" (321). This woman receives no intrinsic pleasure from the fiction, though she is able to enjoy a certain amount of tranquility since they keep her husband entertained.

The younger women have a different reaction. Although Maritornes agrees with her mistress, the young Asturian is almost as pleased as her master with the novels, though the source of their pleasure differs. He enjoys them for the deeds recounted, but she says:

...a buena fe que yo también gusto mucho de oír aquellas cosas que son muy lindas, y más cuando cuentan que se está la otra señora debajo de unos naranjos abrazada con su caballero, y que les está una dueña haciéndoles la guarda, muerta de envidia y con mucho sobresalto. Digo que todo esto es cosa de mieles. (321-322)

Her affinity for the amorous passages of the romances of chivalry are not completely unexpected, given the thorough description of her activities during Don Quijote's first visit to the inn.

The reaction of the innkeeper's daughter is similar to that of Maritornes:

...también lo escucho, y en verdad que, aunque no lo entiendo, que recibo gusto en oírlo; pero no gusto yo de los golpes de que mi padre gusta, sino de las lamentaciones que los caballeros hacen cuando están ausentes de sus señoras; que en verdad que algunas veces me hacen llorar, de compasión que les tengo. (322)

She, too, admits that she does not like the novels for the same reasons as her father, and perhaps as men in general do. Neither does she like them for the same reasons as her

mother; her the pleasure lies in much the same vein as Maritornes'- in the love stories-, though the daughter's imagination is not quite so base as the Asturian maid's. Dorotea, also present for this discussion of the literary merits of the novels of chivalry, prompts the young woman to explain how she would be compassionate toward a knight if she were one of the damsels of the novels. Although the daughter does not know how she would feel in such a situation, her response regarding how a woman should act in such a predicament is swift and certain:

-No sé lo que me hiciera... sólo sé que hay algunas señoras de aquéllas tan crueles, que las llaman sus caballeros tigres y leones y otras mil inmundicias. Y, ¡Jesús!, no sé qué gente es aquélla tan desalmada y tan sin conciencia, que por no mirar a un hombre honrado, le dejan que se muera, o que se vuelva loco. Yo no sé para qué es tanto melindre: si lo hacen de honradas, cásense con ellos, que ellos no desean otra cosa. (322)

Her mother's reaction to this vehemently pronounced statement is thought provoking as well:

-Calla, niña- dijo la ventera-, que parece que sabes mucho desas cosas, y no está bien a las doncellas saber ni hablar tanto. (322)

The mother disapproves for two reasons: it is unseemly that her daughter know so much about these affairs of the heart, and furthermore, she should not be speaking so freely, especially in the presence of the assembled company. It may be that the mother's rebuke is more than just concern regarding her daughter's behavior. If in fact the young woman has been keeping company with Maritornes, one would not be surprised to learn that she has begun to imitate certain

traits found in her friend's character. The behavior most readily observed by the reader is Maritornes' sexual adventures, and it seems that the innkeeper's daughter has also begun to take part in such things. This suspicion is strengthened further by the contrasting manners in which the characters and narrator address the daughter of the innkeeper. During this second stay at the inn, both the curate and Dorotea call the young woman "doncella" (321,322), as does the narrator during Don Quijote's first stay at the inn. However, the narrator has abandoned this title for the innkeeper's daughter, and instead begins to call her "moza" (322), thereby conferring upon her the same label as he has employed with Maritornes.

Further evidence that these two young women have become friends of a certain type- friends whose relationship is based on pleasure- is found in the narration of the events after the reading of the intercalated novel *El curioso impertinente*. Both of these characters are familiar with Don Quijote's singular type of insanity, and they decide to take advantage of him in order to amuse themselves:

...toda la venta se guardaba un grande silencio; solamente no dormían la hija de la ventera y Maritornes su criada, las cuales, como ya sabían el humor de que pecaba don Quijote... determinaron las dos de hacelle alguna burla, o, al menos, de pasar un poco tiempo oyéndole sus disparates. (444)

The description of the two being the only ones in the inn who are not asleep immediately brings to mind the description of Maritornes' nocturnal activities during the first adventures in the inn ("Toda la venta estaba en

silencio, y en toda ella no había otra luz que la que daba una lámpara..." [147]), but in this case there is no appointment to keep with a teamster. Instead the two have gotten out of bed to engage in another type of mischief. The similarity between these two women is given even greater emphasis by the appellation that the narrator uses in this instance; he calls them "semidoncellas" (444), and their simultaneous reaction to the joke they have played on Don Quijote is identical: "ella [Maritornes] y la otra [la hija de la ventera] se fueron, muertas de risa" (447).

4.2.3. Dorotea and Doña Clara

Dorotea and the Oidor's daughter, Clara, have been brought together by pure coincidence and have had no relationship before this point in the narration. At the inn the two find themselves brought into close proximity since they are to share the same room. During Doña Clara's first night there, Dorotea is awakened by one of the sweetest voices she has ever heard singing a love song. After listening a bit, she decides to awaken her roommate:

...le pareció a Dorotea que no sería bien que dejase Clara de oír una tan buena voz; y así, moviéndola a una y a otra parte, la despertó, diciéndole:
'Perdóname, niña, que te despierto, pues lo hago porque gustes de oír la mejor voz que quizás habrás oído en toda tu vida.' (441)

Two things are immediately apparent: Dorotea has enjoyed the voice, and she wants Clara to enjoy it as well. This is the first real interaction between these two characters that has been described, and it is founded upon pleasure.

It takes Clara a few moments to understand exactly what Dorotea is saying to her. As soon as Clara hears the voice, though, she recognizes it to be that of her lover, who is not a mule boy, but a "señor de lugares" (441); she begins to relate to Dorotea the particulars of their love affair. However, before she is able to continue, instead of encouraging her, Dorotea beckons her to stop, saying, "no quiero perder, por acudir a vuestro sobresalto, el gusto que recibo de oír al que canta" (441). In spite of the fact that Dorotea sees that her companion has been upset by this unexpected occurrence, she does not want to interrupt her enjoyment of the song, at least not for the time being.

When the serenade has finished, Clara is in tears, sobbing at Dorotea's side. Instead of any compassionate response, Clara's response piques Dorotea's curiosity: "todo lo cual encendía el deseo de Dorotea, que deseaba saber la causa de tan suave canto y de tan triste lloro" (442). Dorotea must know, and so she begins to question Clara about the particulars of the incident. Clara, for her part, feels the need to relate all that has happened to someone, since, as she says at the beginning of her narration, "como sola y sin madre, no sabía con quién comunicallo [el problema]" (443). She feels that Dorotea can be her confidant, and trusts her as much as she would trust her mother. This position of confidence is reinforced by the positions each takes:

Clara, temerosa de que Luscinda no la oyese,
abrazando estrechamente a Dorotea, puso su boca tan

junto del oído de Dorotea, que seguramente podía hablar sin ser de otro sentida. (443)

These two women do not begin their friendship for the same reason, nor do they expect the same benefits from it. The differences between these two characters is most evident when Clara's lover, Luis, is found by the servants his father as sent after him:

...estaban todos despiertos y se levantaban, especialmente doña Clara y Dorotea, que la una con sobresalto de tener tan cerca a su amante, y la otra con el deseo de verle, habían podido dormir bien mal aquella noche. (451)

Clearly, Dorotea has been motivated by her desire for pleasure, not by a more lofty, altruistic goal. On the other hand, Clara, not knowing whom to turn to, has cast Dorotea in a maternal role. Dorotea is not willing to accept this responsibility; from her point of view, their friendship is based on pleasure and continues to be so until they part. Fortunately for Clara, though, her father, after much thought, decides that such a match would certainly be worthy of his daughter and arranges for the reunion of the two lovers. Dorotea, whom Clara has trusted to help her, does nothing to aid her friend.

4.2.4. Camila and Leonela

Another important friendship between women is found in the intercalated novel of *El curioso impertinente*, between Camila and her maid Leonela. Although this relationship is not of primary importance to the novella itself, it does prove to be interesting since both of the principal

participants are women. As will be recalled, the Classical and Renaissance theorists, although not explicitly excluding women, did not mention them as participants in friendly relations.²⁵

The friendship that Camila and Leonela have is not as complex as the association between the male protagonists, Anselmo and Lotario. As with the men, Camila and Leonela have been friends since childhood, "por haberse criado desde niñas las dos juntas" (415), and the reader is told that Camila "mucho quería [a Leonela]" (415). Regardless of this feeling of goodwill, passion will overcome them both, and Camila and Leonela will end up simply using one another to further their lascivious behavior with their respective lovers.

The reader suspects Leonela from the very first, not only because of her name,²⁶ but also because of the way she behaves when Camila and Lotario are together. Camila has asked that Leonela be present when Lotario comes to dine in Anselmo's absence, but

...en otras cosas de *gusto* tenía puesto el pensamiento y había menester aquellas horas y aquel lugar para ocuparle en sus *contentos*, no cumplía todas las veces el mandamiento de su señora; antes los dejaba solos, como si aquello le hubieran mandado. (415, italics mine)

The reader later learns that these "gustos" and "contentos" are probably amorous interludes with her lover. The sensuous Leonela must take advantage of the opportunities she has while her mistress is preoccupied and her master is away.

So not only because Anselmo has left them alone, but also because Leonela does not fulfill her duties, Lotario and Camila have the opportunity to fall in love. It does not take a great deal of time for Camila to succumb to the charm exerted by Lotario; her surrender is so complete that the narrator repeats it twice: "[r]indióse Camila, Camila se rindió" (418). Camila later realizes that she surrenders rather quickly, and laments this to her maid, who, with an eye to future benefits that might be reaped from this situation, consoles her mistress, telling her that love affects different people in different ways. She also tries to assuage her mistress' conscience by using the maxim "el que luego da, dos veces da" (422).

Regardless of the relationship that either one feels they have enjoyed to this point, the friendship now becomes *quid pro quo*, a friendship of utility. Camila must do her best to facilitate the romantic trysts between Leonela and her lover, in exchange for which Leonela says nothing to her master, Anselmo, about the interludes between Camila and Lotario. Each of these two women is aware of the other's situation. Leonela enjoys the position of power she holds over her mistress, but the reversal of roles worries Camila:

Leonela respondió que así lo [no decir nada a Anselmo] haría; mas cumpliólo de manera, que hizo cierto temor de Camila de que por ella había de perder su crédito. Porque la deshonesto y atrevida Leonela... atrevióse a entrar y poner dentro de casa a su amante, confiada que, aunque su señora le viese, no había osar de descubrirle. (424)

Aristotle states that in a friendship between unequals, the superior party should receive a greater share of the honor while the lesser party ought to enjoy a greater portion of the more practical fruits of such an association.²⁷ Camila realizes that she gains no such honor from this relationship, though Leonela is certainly reaping substantial rewards. Both women stand to lose their reputations by attending to their illicit carnal desires, as well as facilitating the other's.

As is normal in this type of friendship, it ends when one of the parties is no longer of service to the other. In this case, the friendship abruptly ends when Anselmo discovers Leonela with her lover. She realizes now that it is more advantageous to use the information she has about Camila to free herself from the dilemma in which she is trapped. Camila, in turn, knows that she is no longer of service to her friend, and that Leonela will give her up to save herself. Because Camila is aware of the type of friendship that she and Leonela have, and because she knows the consequences inherent in such a friendship, she flees.

4.2.5. The Duchess and her Companions

One of the most notable female characters in the second part of the story is the duchess in whose home Don Quijote and Sancho lodge. The duchess' character and personality are such that she is always seeking to entertain herself. No sooner do she and her husband meet Don Quijote and Sancho,

when, "Mandó la duquesa a Sancho que fuese junto a ella, porque gustaba infinito de oír sus discreciones" (760). Her actions are ruled by the attempt to satiate her desire for the pleasurable and amusing, and the relationships she has with the other characters in the story, especially with other females, are based upon this desire.²⁸

Sancho and Don Quijote become the point around which the actions of the duchess and her ladies revolve. After the first meal that the two wanderers eat in the duke's home, the duchess invites Sancho to speak with her. But she does not horde this privilege to herself. She shares the enjoyment with her ladies in waiting: "...todas las doncellas y dueñas de la duquesa la rodearon atentas, con grandísimo silencio, a escuchar lo que diría" (783). The relationship between them is not viewed as between two individuals, but between an individual and a group. Additionally, the hierarchy is clearly established, as would be expected from one of her social category: "la duquesa fue la que habló primero" (783).

One of the matrons, however, does not fit into this paradigm. Doña Rodríguez has a daughter who was deceived by one of the duke's subjects. Neither the duke nor the duchess, because of questions of fiscal expediency, will remedy the matron's complaint, and so she resorts to pleading with Don Quijote that he take charge of the matter and gain satisfaction for her and her daughter. At the introduction of Doña Rodríguez into the story, it appears that she fulfills the function of providing entertainment for her

mistress. The *dueña* converses with Don Quijote as if he were sane, which is a great source of amusement for the duchess: "No pudo la duquesa tener la risa oyendo la simplicidad de su dueña" (785). Cervantes does not pass this opportunity to again demonstrate the dynamics of pleasure found in this female relationship.

Cervantes goes on to present another aspect of feminine association: petty rivalry and jealousy. These base emotions are first seen as part and parcel of the association between the duchess' ladies. They do most things together, including sleeping in the same room. When Rodríguez gets up one night to tell her story to Don Quijote, "[la] otra dueña que con ella dormía lo sintió, y que como todas las dueñas son amigas de saber, entender y oler, se fue tras ella" (898). Moreover, it is not simple curiosity which motivates this actions, since "todas las dueñas tienen de ser chismosas" (898). When she sees Doña Rodríguez enter Don Quijote's room, the *dueña*, Altisidora, cannot contain herself. She immediately "lo fue a poner en pico a su señora la duquesa" (898).²⁹ The two then go to Don Quijote's door to eavesdrop, and when Rodríguez describes both Altisidora and the duchess in unfavorable terms to Don Quijote, their reaction is the same: "la duquesa no lo pudo sufrir... ni menos Altisidora, y así llenas de cólera y deseosas de venganza, entraron de golpe en el aposento" (898). The punishment meted out by the two interlopers is swift and vicious:

Luego sintió la pobre dueña [Rodríguez] que la asían de la garganta con dos manos, tan

fuertemente, que no la dejaban gañir, y que otra persona... le alzaba las faldas, y con una, al parecer, chinela, le comenzó a dar tantos azotes, que era una compasión. (886)

Don Quijote does not escape punishment either, and they leave him pinched and bruised. The narrator comments that such a reaction on the part of the offended ladies should not be shocking because "las afrentas que van derechas contra la hermosura y presunción de las mujeres, despierta [sic] en ellas en gran manera la ira y enciende el deseo de vengarse" (898). The relationship between the duchess and her ladies then, is based on emotion, whether pleasant- the desire for amusement- or unpleasant- the desire for revenge.³⁰

4.3. Conclusions

In spite the lack of attention given to the theme of friendship between women and between men and women, Cervantes deals with the concept, although not as in great detail as he examines friendships between men.

The friendships between men and women can be divided into three groups: the relationship between husband and wife, between father and daughter, and between an unrelated man and woman. The latter type, represented by the aborted friendship between Grisóstomo and Marcela, is impossible attain. Grisóstomo cannot conceive of his relationship with Marcela as one of friendship. His concept of love, to him the proper way in which man and woman interact, prevent him from forming a friendship with her. Marcela, on the other hand, believes herself to be equal to man and therefore

capable of a pure friendship, untainted by feelings of physical love. So because of these incompatible ideas concerning the manner in which they believe they can associate with one another, true friendship between them is impossible.

The bond of friendship between father and daughter is much stronger than the tenuous thread that joins an unrelated man and woman. The fathers treat their daughters very well, attempting to meet their needs and wants. In return, the daughters have nothing but respect and love for their fathers. When the daughters are confronted with dilemmas, they react in different ways depending on the gravity of their problems. Clara will not act contrary to her father's will, but Zoraida does. Clara is in love and wants to marry, but she will not break the bond with her father to obtain her goal. The friendship with her father is worth more than her relationship with Don Luis. In contrast, Zoraida is faced with a much more serious situation. Her soul and the promise of eternal life are the reasons for which she ruptures the relationship that she shares with her father. And even though she does break away from Agi Morato, it is not by any means an easy task for her to complete; she is emotionally distraught at their parting. Nevertheless the superior ontological consideration overrules any human bonds of family and friendship.

The last class of friendship between man and woman is between husband and wife, best represented by Sancho Panza

and his wife Teresa. Their relationship strongly resembles the highest form of friendship described and lauded by the theorists of Antiquity and the Renaissance. Sancho and Teresa spend time together (though Sancho spends a great deal of the novel on his adventure with Don Quijote), they come from similar peasant backgrounds, and they talk of substantive issues- their children and their hopes and aspirations. Though Teresa is not convinced by all of her husband's justifying his desire for class ascension, she eventually resigns herself to his plan and agrees with him. This accord between Teresa and Sancho is to be expected from true friends, though there is an element that is not normally found in the highest type of friendship- Teresa feels obligated to cede to her husband's wishes because such is her proper role as a good wife. In addition, there is a strong element of utility to their relationship; Teresa never fails to ask her husband what material benefits he has brought from his adventures. Though the marital bond between Sancho and Teresa strongly resembles true friendship, it is not exactly the type described in the treatises.

In the *Quijote*, friendships between females are generally seen to be based in some way upon pleasure. The enjoyment they derive from one another overrules any other considerations. Dorotea, for instance, does not feel obligated to help Clara though the younger woman has no one else to turn to. The innkeeper's daughter loses her respectability because of her association with Maritornes.

The duchess does not comply with her social responsibilities because she would rather do nothing but enjoy herself, often at the expense of her companions. Although Leonela and Camila do not derive pleasure from one another, they use their friendship to further their illicit, erotic relationship with their lovers, which in turn eventually contributes to their downfall.

Notes to Chapter Four

¹See the *Quijote* of 1615, Chapter V.

²For the confusion regarding the name of Sancho's wife, see the Riquer version of the *Quijote* (80, n 13) as well as the Avallé Arce edition (127, n 19). For my purposes here, I will use the name as it appears "Juana" (517); when referring to her in the second part, I will use her name as it appears there, "Teresa."

For other perspectives on Sancho and Teresa's relationship see Aveleyra, Heid, and Martin.

³Casalduero also notes the emphasis given to the matrimonial relation in the second part: "La realidad de Teresa Panza estaba ya conquistada con dos frases en el primer *Quijote*; pero en 1615 se nos ofrece en todas sus dimensiones, se le da el volumen necesario para que haga juego con su marido" (*Sentido y forma...* 234). This is slightly inaccurate, however, since Sancho does not discuss his plans with his family before taking leave of them in the first part: "...sin despedirse Panza de sus hijos y mujer... se salieron" (79). Nevertheless, this does not undermine Casalduero's argument, but rather strengthens it.

⁴This difference is also signalled by the narrator, who observes, "Llegando a escribir el traductor desta historia este quinto capítulo, dice que le tiene por apócrifo, porque en él habla Sancho Panza con otro estilo del que se podía prometer de su corto ingenio, y dice cosas tan sutiles, que no tiene por posible que él las supiese" (570). Salazar Rincón does not keep in mind the episode's dubious position within the framework of the narrative when he states: "Sancho es partidario, a lo que parece, de la promoción individual de los plebeyos más afortunados... Teresa representa, por el contrario... la voz de la submisión, y la aceptación resignada de la pobreza y la dependencia" (226).

⁵See Chapter Two, note 8 of this study.

⁶Don *Quijote*'s observations on the married life occur during Camacho's wedding, Chapter XXII of the second part.

⁷This similarity between Sancho and his family is especially noted in their manner of speaking, as by the curate who says, "Yo no puedo creer sino que todos los deste linaje de los Panzas nacieron cada uno con un costal de refranes en el cuerpo; ninguno dellos he visto que no los derrame a todas horas y en todas las pláticas que tienen" (905). Even though it is Sanchica, the daughter, who is cause for comment here, the mother is also known for her liberal use of refrains.

⁸Though Teresa is not completely convinced by her husband's arguments for social ascension, she has no qualms whatsoever about such ambitions after receiving Sancho's letter. "Locas de alegría, y dispuestas a dar una lección a las estiradas hidalgas del pueblo, Teresa y Sanchica se imaginan libres ya de la esclavitud del campo, envidiadas de conocidos y extraños, y orgullosas como la más fatua señora de la Corte" (Salazar Rincón 226). Not only does she hope to escape the misery in which she lives, but by doing so it is also a means by which to honor her husband: "...que en verdad en verdad que tengo de honrar el gobierno de mi marido en cuanto yo pudiere, y aun que si me enojo, me tengo de ir a esa corte, y echar un coche, como todas; que la que tiene marido gobernador muy bien le puede traer y sustentar" (904-905).

⁹In her first letter to the Captive, Zoraida writes, "La cristiana murió, y yo sé que no fue al fuego, sino con Alá, porque después la vi dos veces, y me dijo que fuese a tierra de cristianos a ver a Lela Marién, que me quería mucho" (410).

¹⁰When Cardenio asks the men who have come to take Don Luis back to his father why they are behaving in such a way, one of them responds, "Muévenos... dar la vida a su padre, que por la ausencia deste caballero queda a peligro de perderla" (453).

¹¹Herman Ivantosch sees this episode as undeniably a continuation of the pastoral tradition of courtly love: "...a clearer statement of a rational humanist concerning this arch-medieval material comes to us in the episode of Grisóstomo and Marcela" ("Cervantes and Courtly Love" 64).

Forcione views this intercalated episode as a way in which Cervantes writes a new ending for his *Galatea*. He believes that Cervantes comes to believe that "Death... is the very substance of Arcadia and the nightmare of Arcadian love" ("Marcela and Grisóstomo..." 61) and that this belief precludes "any possibility of the erotic pastoral" ("Marcela and Grisóstomo..." 62).

¹²One of the most well known works regarding the art of courtly love is the treatise by Andreas Capellanus. He says that love is "a certain inborn suffering derived from the sight of and the excessive meditation upon the beauty of the opposite sex, which causes one to wish above all things the embraces of the other and by common desire to carry out all of love's precepts in the other's embrace" (28), and that

"Every attempt of a lover tends toward the enjoyment of the embraces of her whom he loves" (30).

Furthermore, a very succinct definition of courtly love is given by Prof. Duly: "The protagonist is a man, a 'youth' in both senses of the word, in the technical sense that is had at the time (a man without a lawful wife), and in the literal sense, that is, a man young in age, whose education is not yet complete. This man beseiges and tries to take a lady, that is to say, a woman who is married, and thus inaccessible, impregnable, a woman who is surrounded and protected by the strictest prohibitions imposed by a lineal society- a society based on male inheritances handed down through the male line, which therefore viewed a wife's adultery as the most dreadful subversion, and threatened her lover with terrible punishments. At the heart of this model lies danger, and this is where it should be. For on the one hand the whole spice of the affair came from the danger involved...; on the other hand, it was a test in the course of the continuing education, and the more perilous the test, the more educational it was" (57).

While there is not an exact literal correspondence of all the elements in this relationship between Grisóstomo and Marcela, Cervantes does seem to place them all there, modifying them to suit his purposes. For example, in this case the object of the lover's affections is not a married woman, but regardless, is inaccessible to him. Likewise, the element of danger also exists, but not from any source outside of the pair of lovers; the danger advances to such a point that Grisóstomo loses his life for his love.

¹³The manner in which Grisóstomo dies has been a point of confusion. Castro was the first to state, "Del contexto de la prosa del *Quijote* en que se habla de la muerte de Grisóstomo, nadie saca la impresión de que el pastor obstinado se suicidó; eso es, sin embargo, lo que hizo y anuncia que va a hacer en la canción del capítulo XIV, en donde dice que tomará una soga, se ahorcará, flotará su cuerpo al viento, no lo enterrarán en sagrado, irá al infierno porque muere 'sin lauro o palma de futuros bienes'" (*Hacia Cervantes* 239). Casaldüero also unambiguously affirms that "Hay que interpretar la muerte de Grisóstomo como la muerte de un desesperado, la muerte de un suicida" (*Sentido y forma* 86). Avalue-Arce, however, is much more cautious than Castro and Casaldüero; he produces evidence for both suicide and natural death, but in the end concludes that "cuando ha terminado la deposición de partes, su gesto [el de Cervantes] es el de un *tolle et lege* laico, en el que la responsabilidad judicial traspasa al lector" (*Deslindes cervantinos* 117). But after reviewing the evidence, although the ambiguity that

Avalle-Arce points out does exist, suicide still seems the best conclusion that a reader can draw.

¹⁴Though the situations in which they find themselves are fundamentally different, there are certain similarities between Marcela and the protagonist of the exemplary novel *La gitanilla*, Preciosa. For instance "Throughout the courtship of Juan and Preciosa, Cervantes stresses the fact that the maiden is not driven by the type of uncontrollable passion that motivates her suitor" (Forcione *Cervantes and the Humanist Vision* 120). Neither is Marcela infected with the passion that afflicts her suitor. Furthermore, "Preciosa is similarly resistant to the appeal of amatory rhetoric and disdainful of the attitudes and doctrines underlying it" (Forcione *Cervantes and the Humanist Vision* 127), as is Marcela, as evidenced in her discourse at Grisóstomo's funeral.

¹⁵Most critics classify Marcela as a *mujer esquivada*, or at very least, marginalized from society: "Marcela rejects Grisóstomo's proposal of marriage, thereby contributing to his suicide and in turn to her steadfast rejection of any male companionship, to live asocially..." (Socha 555), and also "She [Marcela] may be readily stereotyped as a *mujer esquivada*" (Steele 9).

¹⁶Mackey compares the uses of rhetoric in Marcela's discourse with that of Don Quijote's "Edad dorada" speech. After a rigorous analysis in which she points out the formal aspects one would expect to find in Marcela's judicial speech and Don Quijote's epideictic discourse, Mackey concludes that the shepherdess is a much better speaker than don Quijote, chiefly because her address to those present at Grisóstomo's funeral is appropriate, while Don Quijote's address to the shepherds is not.

Hart and Rendall do not deny that Marcela's speech follows the established rhetorical conventions, but they do not find themselves in agreement with Mackey's conclusions. After all, they argue, Marcela does not choose an appropriate time to make this speech, nor is it truly effective, since Don Quijote must prevent the shepherds from following her, a goal which her discourse hoped to achieve.

¹⁷"It is natural for commentators to refer to *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII.10, where it is implied that the wife's subjection to her husband... derives from nature" (Maclean 50).

¹⁸As Casaldueiro notes, "la mujer (y el hombre) necesitan la libertad para elegir entre el bien y el mal,

para ejercitar la voluntad" (85). This is precisely what Marcela wishes; furthermore, she knows that, given Grisóstomo's conception of marriage, she would not have that liberty.

¹⁹In this case, it appears that a woman's concept of woman is different than man's concept of her. As one social historian has stated, "One important reason why... scholars are able to write eclectically about women in spite of the difficulties involved is the remarkable concordance of views in Judeo-Christian and classical writings about her inferiority to the male" (Maclean 6). This inequality extends to moral philosophy, the study of ethics, and in particular, the study of friendship. Women are not mentioned at all in the Classical treatises, and in Renaissance texts cross-gender friendships are only mentioned within the context of marriage.

²⁰Some, for example, include Jehenson and Heid.

²¹The two ladies and Sancho have a heated debate (552-553) before don Quijote orders them to allow the squire to enter. This argument has another effect: "Grande gusto recibían el cura y el barbero de oír el coloquio de los tres" (553). Even though they are unaware of this secondary role, the women also do produce pleasure for several men of the story.

²²While Maritornes has been studied briefly, her relationship with the innkeeper's daughter has received no critical attention.

²³This feminine reaction is in complete accord with the theories of the behavior of women at the time. See Maclean 55-57.

²⁴*Diccionario de Autoridades* is clear on the meaning of *doncella*: "La muger que no ha conocido varón" (I, 336) but the definition of *moza* is much more ambiguous: "Lo mismo que jóven" (II, 621). Covarrubias adds that such people "suelen hazer algunas cosas fuera de razón" (808).

²⁵Critics of this episode of the *Quijote* have also tended to overlook this relationship as well. Debra D. Andrist is the only critic who specifically comments on the relationship between these two women. She recognizes that Camila and Leonela are each using the other to attain her desire (157). Nevertheless, Andrist does not relate this to the classical ideas of friendship, nor to the Aristotelian concept of justice between unequals.

²⁶Leonela is derived from "león" (see Reyre *Dictionnaire des noms...* 82); "león" in addition to meaning lion, the ferocious king of the jungle, also has another meaning: "En la voz de la Germanía significa rufián" (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, II, 386). "Rufián," in turn, means "el que trata y vive deshonestamente con mugeres, solicitándolas, o consintiéndolas el trato con otros hombres" (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, III, 651). Leonela's role certainly is one of "rufián," although she takes advantage of Camila's situation not for financial gain, but for her own amorous interests.

²⁷Aristotle *Ethics* 8.7.1-6.

²⁸The desire to amuse herself is not a quality exclusively attributed to the duchess. Her husband, and indeed most of their servants, are pleased with the arrival of don Quijote and Sancho precisely because it provides them with a new, amusing pastime.

²⁹Altisidora seems to be aware that her part of her function is to amuse and entertain her mistress, and instead of always waiting to be instructed by the duke or the duchess on the best way to participate in the practical joking, takes the initiative herself. She is the maiden who feigns, of her own accord, to be enamoured of don Quijote, which in turn produces admiration on the part of the duchess: "Quedó la duquesa admirada de la desenvoltura de Altisidora; que aunque la tenía por atrevida, graciosa y desenvuelta, no en grado que se atreviera a semejantes desenvolturas; y como no estaba advertida desta burla, creció más su admiración" (951).

³⁰Similar to the description of the duchess' relationships is the way in which the wife of Don Antonio, governor of Barcelona, is portrayed; she, too, enjoys many relationships based on pleasure. When don Quijote is first received by Don Antonio into his home, his wife "convidó a otras sus amigas a que viniesen a honrar a su huésped y a gustar de sus nunca vistas locuras" (992). The other guest to Antonio's home produces nearly the same reaction: "La mujer de don Antonio Moreno recibió grandísimo contento de ver a Ana Félix en su casa" (1009).

CONCLUSIONS

Friendship has long been recognized as one of man's most important social bonds; consequently, numerous authors throughout the ages have devoted themselves to studying and describing it. In this dissertation I have studied, in the first place, theories of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca (Chapter 1.1), the Bible (Chapter 1.2), the some Patristic sources (Chapter 1.3), and several authors of the Renaissance (Chapter 2). Secondly, a selection of the friendships in the *Quijote* have been interpreted in light of these theories (Chapters 3 and 4). The ways in which these theories may have affected the composition of the *Quijote* remains to be studied here.

All the theorists note that friendship is desired by all men. Two basic types of friendship existed in Classical and Biblical theory: the superior kind based on virtue, and the inferior type, which is not dependent on virtue, though Aristotle makes further subdivisions of the latter type based on other lovable qualities- the useful and the pleasurable (see 1.1.3 and 1.2.1.1.3). Overall, the Renaissance theorists also follow the same divisions of friendship into types, though most prefer Aristotle's tripartite separation instead of simple division (see 2.2.3). These lower sorts of

friendship are very important to the *Quijote* since they, and not the higher type based on virtue, are predominant, even to the exclusion of the superior class.

The most prominent of the friendships between men is that shared by the two protagonists, Don Quijote and Sancho. Their relationship can be classified as one of utility: Sancho seeks financial gain and Don Quijote needs a squire. Their behavior, whether dealing with each other or with those not included in their friendship, is always governed by that principle of utility. Furthermore, Don Quijote's relationship with his neighbors the curate and the barber also seem to be an association of pleasure, based on their mutual passion for reading. Proving to be a further impediment limiting the possibility of higher friendship is Don Quijote's mental defect.

The concept of virtue so important as the base of the highest type of friendship differed slightly between authors, though it is admitted that most men would recognize a virtuous man when confronted with one (see 1.1.4). Some Renaissance theorists agreed that virtue, or moral equality, was the only component necessary for men to be friends between men, but others demanded more than just this moral equality, but equality in class, rank, and wealth as well (see 2.2.4). Since Don Quijote and Sancho lack of any type of equality- moral or otherwise- the theorists would believe that they are incapable of sharing in a more substantial friendship. However, Cervantes also appears to reject the

concept of absolute rigorous equality held by some of the Renaissance theorists. The two men most alike, Anselmo and Lotario, in spite of their great similarities, fail to form a true, lasting friendship.

In general, the authors of Antiquity believe that the comportment of true friends is ruled by virtue. Friends act virtuously, and in turn, their companions have the opportunity to act in similar manner (see 1.1.6). In the Biblical tradition, to not act virtuously not only causes friendship to cease, but is also seen as a sin against God (see 1.2.1.1.5). Renaissance theorist held like views (see 2.2.6). To ask a friend to commit any act not in accord with virtue is considered to be necessarily contrary to friendship, though for the authors of Antiquity, there are exceptions even to this rule. Renaissance theorist were much more stringent on this point, believing that any type of dishonorable request should be rejected out of hand. Cervantes includes this concept in his narration of the tale of the *Curioso impertinente*. Anselmo's request that Lotario test Camila's loyalty is unreasonable, and even dangerous. This request sets in motion the terrible chain of events that will lead not only to the rupture of the friendship between Anselmo and Lotario, but also to the deaths of all the protagonists.

The Ancient theorists believe that a change in virtue for the worse in a man inevitably leads to the end of friendship with him, though not necessarily the termination

of all association between the two. The Spanish theorists reject such an association because of possible mortal ramifications; that is, the vicious friend can lead the virtuous one astray. Once again we see this abstract concept concretely illustrated in Anselmo's tale; instead of abandoning his friend when he could not be brought back to virtue, Lotario persists, and is also drawn into vice, consequently losing his life.

Furthermore, since virtue is not wide-spread, friendships of the highest form are limited to a few men, but are generally believed to occur only between two very good men. The veracity of this observation is perhaps proven by Cervantes; there are, after all, no friendships in the *Quijote* that can be strictly classified as the highest sort between two virtuous men.

The Renaissance authors on the subject of friendship also devote more time describing the type of behavior expected between friends. They presuppose that good men will act in accord with virtue and that they will exchange ideas about matters great and small. These philosophers also give a great deal of counsel concerning advice and keeping secrets. Moreover, they urge that correction must be given to a friend with caution at the proper time and in the proper way so as to not offend the friend involved. Nevertheless, since a friend is at times reluctant to speak frankly regarding his companion's faults, an enemy, who has no such reservations, can be useful to give honest counsel and keep

one on the path of virtue. In addition, a friend's secrets are never to be revealed since such an action violates the bonds of friendship; Juan de Mora is the only Renaissance theorist studied who does not believe that to betray a friend's secret utterly destroys friendship.

The association between Don Quijote and Sancho apparently does include some of these traits of true friendship, namely their extended conversations and the great deal of time they spend with one another. However, when they speak, they rarely deal with substantive issues, and the shared conversations also include lies, maledictions, oaths, and more often not, one of the two men ends up exasperated with the other. The great deal of time they pass on their adventures together produces a certain amount of affection, but this sentiment never becomes strong enough to interfere with either man's enthusiasm to satisfy his self-interest.

Though the Classics hold many beliefs about friendship in common, certain differences also exist. Aristotle believes that nearly constant interaction is necessary between friends, but Seneca believes that friendships can be maintained, even at great distances (see 1.1.6). The Renaissance theorist never expressly deny that friendships can be maintained in spite of geographical separation, but it seems that their constant preoccupation with verbal communication would suggest that friends ought to pass a good deal of time together.

Another such point of contention between the theorists is the relationship between death and friendship. Since Aristotle believes that active intercourse is necessary between friends, it is his opinion that at death friendships cease because of the lack of such an interchange. In contrast, since Seneca, like Cicero, does not believe cohabitation and constant interaction to be absolutely essential part of the highest type of association, he believes that friendships can endure even beyond death. Seneca develops this idea to a greater extent than Cicero (see 1.1.8). Both Fonseca and Borja, in agreement with Cicero and Seneca, believe that friendships can endure even beyond death (see 2.2.7).

And yet another differing aspect among the various theorists is the relationship between love and friendship. For Aristotle, love is the most perfect form of friendship. On the other hand, Seneca believes that love can at times do harm, but friendship cannot; therefore, love is inferior to friendship. Only two Renaissance authors comment on the interconnection of friendship and love. The first is Fonseca, who like Seneca, considers love to be a constituent part of friendship, though not superior to it. Rey de Artieda also clearly affirms that the bonds of friendship are stronger than those of love, and more is owed to a friend than to a lover. Once again we see this illustrated in the intercalated novel of *El curioso impertinente*. Lotario does not believe that his friendship with Anselmo should be

jeopardized because Anselmo wishes to prove his wife's love and fidelity. It is possible that this distortion of values also leads to the tragic consequences which follow.

In addition, Aristotle considers familial relationships analogous to friendship (see 1.1.12) as does the Bible (see 1.2.1.1.8); Cicero and Seneca do not mention them as such. Mal Lara, alone among the Renaissance theorists studied, also counts familial bonds among the relationships to be considered friendship (see 2.2.9).

These familial bonds become especially important in the *Quijote*; they are apparently the strongest and most enduring of the friendships presented, and are the type that most closely resemble the highest type of friendship described by the theorists. I have studied two types of family bonds, between father and daughter, and between husband and wife. The fathers in the *Quijote* treat their daughters well, and in general, the daughters honor their fathers. Zoraida, in spite of the deep love she feels for her father, must place the greater good-- care and salvation of her soul-- above even considerations for her father. Clara, on the other hand, has no such weighty dilemmas, and bows to what she believes is her father's will regarding her affair with Luis. It must be said that neither of these father-daughter friendships are between equals, though, since the father is undoubtedly the superior party in both instances. The other family relationship studied, that between husband and wife, is treated and examined in the *Quijote* through the marriage of

Sancho and Teresa. They are very similar, they spend a great deal of time together, and they speak of matters important to both of them. This leads to arguments and discussions, but their differences are always resolved. It must be noted that neither considers theirs to be a relationship of equals, though. Teresa readily admits as much, and Sancho never hesitates to tell Teresa that he is her better. Their relationship also has a strong aspect of utility that is also recognized by both of them as important. So even though Sancho and Teresa strongly resemble true friends, they are not exactly the type described in the treatises.

The Patristic tradition is a clear continuation of both the Classical and Biblical traditions, though it also recognizes that friendships are a way in which the Holy Spirit may work. For them, then, friendship is not an end in itself, but a means by which one may be drawn closer to God. Moreover, Augustine refines the Classical theory observing that men can only be true friends in Christ, and even though a Christian and a non-Christian may be friends, they cannot share the highest form of friendship that is found only in Christ's love.

This sense of Christian charity seems to be the motive on which the curate and the barber act in order to help Don Quijote. They abandon the village, search for their friend, and bring him home not because they feel obligated by the bonds of friendship described by many of the theorists, but because they want to help their neighbor. In fact, their

motive can be easily compared to that of Dorotea. Even though she has never met the knight and cannot in any way be considered his friend, she chooses to help Don Quijote's neighbors bring him back to the village. It is by this selfless action that she finally achieves her goal- finding and marrying Don Fernando. The good intentions of the curate, the barber, and Dorotea are in sharp contrast to those of Sansón Carrasco. His friendship with Don Quijote can hardly even be classified as one of pleasure; he is amused by the Manchegan knight, and he quickly loses any friendly feeling he may have had for his neighbor when the knight defeats him in battle. After this point, Sansón is motivated by revenge and not friendship or Christian charity as understood by the curate and the barber.

Cervantes also presents two types of friendships not described by either the Classical or Renaissance theorists: friendships between unrelated men and women, and between two women. This former type of association is best represented by Marcela and Grisóstomo. They never achieve a level of true friendship because even though Marcela wishes to and believes herself capable of doing so, Grisóstomo cannot accept her as a friend instead of as a lover.

Friendships between two females are usually founded in some way on pleasure. Dorotea, for instance, does not feel obligated to help Clara, but instead uses their relationship for her enjoyment. The innkeeper's daughter and Maritornes become more alike in the second part because of the time they

have spent together and the practical jokes they play on Don Quijote. The duchess does not comply with her social responsibilities choosing instead to enjoy her companions, often deriving her enjoyment at their expense. Although Leonela and Camila do not derive pleasure from one another, they use their friendship to further their illicit relationship with their lovers.

None of the relationships examined in the *Quijote* can be considered the highest, truest, purest form of friendship described by the theorists of Antiquity and the Renaissance. Some of the associations between characters, however, do approach the heights of true friendship, as for example between husband and wife and father and daughter; but there is still the vestige of one participant's superiority over the other in each of these relationships. Others, most notably the relationship between Don Quijote and Sancho, are seen to be of the basest sort when seen in the cold, hard light of the theorists. Though these two men never truly become friends, one cannot doubt that they do not form a certain amount of affection for each other, however superficial it may be. It is significant that the relationships that most resemble true friendships are not those between men, but between a man and a woman, a concept that receives very little attention in the treatises.

What, then, is Cervantes' concept of friendship? One can say with a fair amount of certainty what it is not-- the truest, highest type described and lauded by theorists of

Antiquity and the Renaissance. The friendship that most closely resembles the theoretical model is shared by Anselmo and Lotario, and these friends fail miserably. But what is left to fill the void? We have the imperfect friendships found in everyday life, based on utility or pleasure. Cervantes does not seem to view these lesser types of friendship as necessarily bad. After all, Don Quijote and Sancho form a degree of camaraderie and affection even though their friendship is founded principally on utility. Likewise, in spite of the imperfect friendship between Don Quijote and his neighbors, in spite of laughing at him and even taking advantage of him, the curate and barber manage to bring their friend back to his home and cure him. It is possible that Cervantes is proposing that the equality found in friendships is not always virtue. But even in these friendship is not founded on virtue, very good things can occur.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX #1

TRATADO DE AMIÇIÀ CONPUESTO POR EL MISMO SEÑOR DON
FRANCISCO DE CASTILLA Q[UE] ES COSA DE NOTAR DE COMO CADA UNO
EN SU ESTADO [H]A DE TENER AMISTAD CON QUIEN Y COMO Y QUAL
ESTA VERDADERA Y TODO EN METRO. BN MS 3257 FF 483R-485R

En todos aquellos magnificos dones
de que es ayudado el espiritu humano
le dio el amiçia por don soberano
natura en remedio de sus afliçiones
pues esta se tenga primero con dios
el qual [h]allaremos amigo de nos
si nuestra conçiencia se linpia de mal
y así lo que toca amistad humanal
cunplida la una se gozan las dos

Conbiene de paz y concordia perfecta
que [e]stemos armados en esta vatalla
do nuestro deseo continuo se [h]alla
discorde con etica guerra secreta
que [e]l alma enardiçia del vien berdadero
y el cuerpo en sequela del viçio guerrero
con varias contiendas aca en este mundo
no pueden tener amistad al segundo
sino la tubiesen consigo primero

Natura nos muestra la neçesidad
 que con los humanos de su conpañia
 y que [e]sta por nuestra flaqueza queçia
 s[e] esfuerçe y conserve d[e] amor y amistad
 y muestra que juntos los pocos unidos
 se [h]allan mas fuertes q[ue] muchos partidos
 y mas los amigos q[ue] no los discordes
 y pocos veçinos q[ue] biben concordes
 de muchos estraños seran ynbencidos

YINVOCACION

Divina y eterna perfeta bondad
 q[ue] amas por ultimo bien a ti misma
 virtud q[ue] sin ella las otras son çisma
 discorde enemiga de conformidad
 a ti protectora del orbe uniberso
 rrecorre mi barrio juiçio disperso
 por una çentella del sacro tesoro
 de la tu sapiençia y ornato y decoro
 que en bera amiçiçia dé luz a mi verso

PROTESTACION

Si bien no podemos asi trasladar
 tratados en lengua lattina digestos
 ternan su liçençia bocablos conpuestos
 d[e] aquella pasados en lengua bulgar

y por que amiçia sera repetida
 por todo el tratado siguiente esparçida
 tomando los nonbres q[ue] mas le convienen
 y en hobras y efetos con ella consuenen
 por otros vocablos sera conosçida

Diremos a beces por esta amiçia
 amor amistad y la benivolencia
 y amable concordia y bulgar vienq[ue]rençia
 naçidas de comutatiba justia
 discrepan sus nonbres y no sus efetos
 pues tienen sus fines y propios objetos
 [483v]

conformes en todo segun q[ue] apetecen
 amor comutado con quien obbedesçen
 aquel dos ençierran los otros preçeptos.

DIFINIÇION DE AMIÇIA EN

general y division de sus espeçies.
 Virtud amiçia q[ue] naçe d[e] amor
 es benibolencia de dos comutada
 por ellos savida y en obras probada
 movida por causa de bien y favor
 segun qu[e] en tres partes el bien magnifiesta
 ser sienpre partido conviene que [e]n esta
 virtud que se trata sus partes se den
 que son tres especies amigos del bien

la util y la delectable y onesta.

QUAL SERA LA VERDADERA

Pues ama la util su bien y provecho
 y sus apetitos la qu[e] es delectable
 terna sumo grado la honesta loable
 perfecta amiçia por justo derecho
 pues esta se tenga por mas suficiente
 que no las primeras q[ue] por açidente
 a fin de deleites y de utilidades
 amando reçiprocan sus boluntades
 que çesan çesando su causa efiçiente.

PROSIGUE DE ONESTA AMIÇIA

Onesta amiçia conversa en barones
 onestos q[ue] siendo del viçio enemigos
 por fin q[ue] contempla virtud son amigos
 y aquella es la causa de sus afixiones
 no puede ser esta amiçia perfecta
 si no es entre buenos y aquellos subjeta
 la que es entre malos sera conpañia
 q[ue] en quanto amistad es birtud no se fia
 d[e] aq[ue]llos q[ue] siguen el viçio y su seta.

LAS PROPIADADES DE HONESTA

amiçia

Son d[e] esta amiçia virtud muy preclara
 sus seis propriadades q[ue] sea permanente
 por fin de si misma en ausençia y presente
 perfeta muy buena muy grande muy rata
 y asi por contrario seran todas estas
 a la delectable y a util opuestas
 pues no permanen ni son mucho buenas
 ni grandes ni ratas perfectas ni llenas
 ni son amigables por si mas compuestas

EN QUE EDAD CONVIENE LA

honesta amiçia

Continua pues esta en edad y amadura
 profesa en virtudes perfeta y adulta
 y no en la pueriçia do sienpre resulta
 ser vazio el amigo y mudable a natura
 ynpide la honesta amistad en ausençia
 sus obras y ofiçios de benefiçiençia
 cesando la causa de conversaçion
 mas no que se mude su firme afiçion
 ni pierda por tiempo su benibolençia

EN QUE CONSISTE Y CON QUE

se conserba.

Honesta y perfeta virtud amigable
 consiste en medida y conforme ygualdad
 que por semejança d[e] alterna bondad
 conserva concordia perpetua y durable
 y por q[ue] en dos buenos amigos contrata
 sera asi constante y amiga tan grata
 segun q[ue] duraren sus mores yguales
 que y asi por tienpos el uno usa males
 la tal amiçiã se quiebra y desata

Asi que pues esta amistad virtuosa
 conserba con [hom]bres de biçios agenos
 [484r]

Si ya en esta hera son pocos los buenos
 pensemos [h]abella por dificultosa
 digamos d[e] aquellas que mas se platican
 las otras espeçies q[ue] se paçifican
 do [e]l verso siguiente pronunçia sentençia
 q[ue] la deletable y la utiliçençia
 terna justa mente si vien comunican.

Y pues se deven asi comutar
 los bienes eternos q[ue] son de fortuna
 y aquellos que suelen a vezes por una
 concordia de conversaçion deleitar

conbiene que usemos sus dos amistades
 la una q[ue] busque las utilidades
 la otra que siga sus deletaciones
 pues sirben comunes en las condiciones
 de buenos y malos la[s] sus propiedades

CONGRUIDAD DE LA UTIL AMY

çicia

Como corporea salud y hermosura
 que en si no son çiertas ni son balderas
 mas son semejança de las verdaderas
 del animo n[uest]ro segun su figura
 asi de la util su benibolençia
 nos viene de congruo por una aparençia
 q[ue] tiene d[e] aquella perfeta amistad
 en quanto apetece de conformidad
 amor comutado en ygual conferençia.

CONGRUIDAD DE LA AMIÇIÇIA

deletable

Razon es autentica philosophal
 qu[e] el bivo que huie la conversacion
 medida amigable y su delectacion
 sera solo dios o la bestia brutal
 y pues q[ue] nos haze razon razonables
 Razones palabras seran deletables
 y congruas al tienpo de n[uest]ras congoxas

doy a n[uest]ras fuerças de tib[i]as y floxas
 procuran remedio d[e] amigos afables

REGLA COMUN PARA TODAS

las espeçies de amiçiça.

Segun tres estados que todos tenemos
 o tres condiçiones asi nos conbienen
 sus tres amistades en que se contienen
 mediana y esçelsa y subjeta a supremos
 mediana se dize de yguales a yguales
 que sigue sus limites mas naturales
 exçelsas que ba de mayor a menor
 subjeta sera de menor a mayor
 amandolos subditos sus prinçipales

DE LA AMIÇIÇIA MEDIANA

Conviene que amemos ygual conpañia
 que trata en aquellos q[ue] ni por natura
 ni por señorío ni progenitura
 seran obligados a soberania
 conformes amigos parientes y hermanos
 veçinos estraños tambien çiudadanos
 agora regidos agora rigientes
 los unos con otros ansi convivientes
 que en sus amistades se traten muy llanos

QUE PROPIAMENTE CONVIENE

este nombre de amistad a los yguales.
 Entre [e]stos se dize amistad propiamente
 que son semejantes yquales en grados
 y entre supremos y sus sojuzgados
 amor soberano y amor obediente
 no deve llamar amigo al señor
 subsudito baxo sujeto ynferior
 tanpoco el supremo dira qu[e] es amigo
 [484v]

su sierbo que bibe a su pasto y abrigo
 por bien que se tengan reçiproco amor

DE EXÇELSA AMIÇIÇIA

Los reyes y grandes que tienen vasallos
 de cuió trabajo y sudor de su cara
 mantienen subida y estado a la clara
 les muestra natura que deven amallos
 los canes muy bravos los brutos leones
 con toda la furia de sus condiçiones
 alagan y aman [a] quien bien les haze
 por darnos exenplo natura le plaze
 domar la brabeza de sus coraçones

El rey que bien ama conviene q[ue] huya
 tiranica fuerça la cual solo tema
 pues tiene la soberania suprema

por causa del pueblo q[ue] no por la suya
 bien ama su reino de exçelsa amiçiça
 si bien la gobierna con recta justicia
 sus grandes virtudes sobrando a su estado
 los publicos bienes a su bien privado
 y el util comun a su propia diviçiã.

DE LA SUBJETA AMIÇIÇIA

Tambien los sujetos si bien se disçierna
 seguir las avejas un rey las aveza
 que deben por orden de naturaleza
 seguir en supremo q[ue] bien les gobierne
 al rey que en la tierra de dios es vicario
 se deve un amor por justo salario
 y a sus potesdades justiçiã regentes
 y a todos aquellos q[ue] son preminentes
 señores que rigen poder ordinario.

DE LA AMIÇIÇIA ENTRE DOS

Pues bemos el daño del comunicado
 secreto que ambos amigos se fia
 procure el prudente su fiel conpania
 buscando en examen de caso probado
 Que [e]l hombre a natura animal soçitable
 ningun maior gozo ni mas deletable
 podra en este siglo jamas alcançar
 que su fiel amigo do piense [h]allar

segundo con quien asimismo [h]able.

Ternan boluntad en no y en si una
 y alterna en consejos y humil correçion
 y alterna en secreto y participaçion
 de bienes y alegre o adversa fortuna
 en ruegos honestos alterna obediencia
 y en subitas yras alterna paçiencia
 y en reprehensiones alterna tenplança
 y alterno exerçicio de fiel confiança
 y en honrras devidas a su preeminencia

CONCILIARIA

Mas y a quien se teme de ynfiel amistad
 la deve con tiento dexar descoser
 y no toda junta de golpe ronper
 que cause rencores de su enemistad
 pues dexa ya el trato de su mal amigo
 no cobre ronpiendo con el enemigo
 q[ue] mas sin peligro el bemino se cura
 se puede ensolberse q[ue] no con çisura
 qu[e] encona y atrae ponçoña consigo.

QUE SEA LIBRE EL AMIGO

y consejable

Huyamos d[e] amigo subjeto a privado
 a quien la color de consejo sojuzga
 d[e] aquel que no sabe ser suio sojuzga
 que no sera d[e] otro pues no es libertado
 ni por el contrario amiçia se trave
 con hombre en quien sano consejo no cabe
 ny quiere de nadie tomar parecer
 pues ya confiando de su gran saber
 nos muestra a la clara lo poco que sabe

[485r]

QUE SEA HUMILDE EL AMIGO

Huyamos de amigo sobervio y prophano
 pues no es conpañero quien piensa mandar
 sojuzga el menor y despreçia su par
 y afuria al mayor con el mano a mano
 bu[s]quemos [h]umilde amistad verdadera
 qu[e] en todo se preçie de ygual conpañera
 sus pazes amigos asi obedeçiendo
 que no tenga propio querer posponiendo
 de dos boluntades la sua postrera.

QUE SEA FRANCO EL AMIGO Y

liberal.

Huyamos d[e] amigo que no es liberal
 es caso a natura biçioso abariento
 pues huie el efeto d[e] aquel fundamento
 qu[e] en ber amiçia no es prinçipal
 amor se contrata de propios ofiçios
 que son buenas obras y sus benefiçios
 pues vemos que todo amamos tomando
 y somos amados si fuereamos dando
 los tales ynpide el avaro escerçios.

CAPTA BENIVOLENÇIA AL

virtuoso.

Pues tu virtuoso q[ue] asi prebaleçes
 en todos los actos espirituales
 siguiendo sus bienes huyendo sus males
 contigo se tenga el amor q[ue] mereces
 a ti solo quiera quien busca amiçia
 por fin de tus obras sin otra cobdiçia
 pues amas a todos de tu condiçion
 con una amigable concorde afixion
 que nunca en ti rreyna rencor ni maliçia

FIN.

Amor si devemos al qu[e] es virtuoso
maior y primero se deve a virtud
pues esta es el medio de n[uest]ra salud
eterna y de nuestro perpetuo reposo
quien ama a virtudes a si mismo ama
d[e] amor ordenado qu[e] ençiende & ynflama
su justo apetito de propia bondad
conforme al ofiçio de su caridad
que todos los viçios excluie y derrama.

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