Paugh’s study builds on and complicates the picture presented by Kulick in other ways. Most significantly, Kulick predicted that in conditions where children who lack productive command of the vernacular are caretakers to other younger children, language shift is likely to accelerate. The data that Paugh presents reveal that in the case of Penville, where children also play a major role as caretakers to younger charges, the fact that Patwa is valorized as an important symbolic resource to assert autonomy and has come to be associated with local, gendered adult roles and professions which are not yet socially devalued, children do acquire restricted linguistic and communicative competence in Patwa in child-centric interactions involving socio-dramatic play. This complicates the portrait of language shift taking place on the ground in Penville and also possibly the rest of Dominica, as it is not a foregone conclusion that Patwa will completely obsolesce in the years to come. Perhaps future work exploring how different time scales of emblematic usage (“Corporations Are People: Emblematic Scales of Brand Personification Among Asian American Youth,” Angela Reyes, Language in Society 2013: 163–185) impact how codes become vehicles for discursive figures of personhood and provide even greater insight into how children’s peer group interactions effect linguistic change beyond microgenetic moments to longer ontogenetic and community wide forms of change. What is clear is Penville children value emblematic usage of Patwa and these emblematic usages do not correspond to the usages deployed within the language revitalization movement. Dominican language activists’ project to produce the next generation of Patwa speakers will fail precisely because they are failing to tap into the actual ways through which children deploy particular codes and varieties of language as they envision and revision particular socially valued discursive figures of personhood that they can and will become.


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Dynamic Embodiment for Social Theory is a statement on the importance of understanding embodied movement and an argument for the best way to study it. In a representative passage, Brenda Farnell reproduces a plate from Evans-Pritchard’s Nuer Religion (Oxford University Press, 1956: 112). The plate shows two men kneeling, holding metal spears, a dancing stick, and a piece of ambatch. It is captioned “Movement in wedding dance.” But if “Movement in wedding dance” is an image of movement, where is the movement? Where are the details of rhythm? Where are the paths of motion? Where are the variations in effort and vigor? For Farnell, the plate’s caption manifests a tendency, rampant in Western scholarship on the body, to reduce complex movement to two-dimensional stills (p. 34). There are two bodies in Evans-Pritchard’s plate but, Farnell argues, there is little movement, action, or agency. Throughout the book, she contends that the movement and meaning of the embodied person—the dynamism lacking in Evans-Pritchard’s plate—should be at the center of anthropological theory and ethnographic practice.

In broad strokes, the book is a theoretical argument for how best to study dynamic embodiment, bolstered by case studies from Farnell’s previous research. Farnell claims that to truly understand dynamic embodiment, scholars must adopt a combination of the “generative causal powers theory” of Rom Harré and the semasiological theories of the anthropologist, choreographer, and dancer Drid Williams. Harré’s writings provide Farnell with an ontological “grounding” for her theory of dynamic embodiment, and Farnell highlights Harré’s emphasis on the agency of materials. She argues, following Charles Varela (e.g., Science for Humanism, Routledge, 2009), that Harré’s theory provides a way beyond the material/non-material dichotomy and, thus, allows for a conception of the world in which “mere material” substances, like the human body, can act agentively.

While Harré’s theory is stressed through much of the book, Farnell looks to Drid Williams as her chief intellectual inspiration. Farnell dedicates the book to Williams and often cites her body of theoretical writings (called semasiology) and the core group of scholars who have built on it. As readers familiar with Williams’s work will notice, Farnell’s main conceptual
pushes—especially her emphasis on treating the “discourse” of the body with the same care as spoken discourse—resonate with Williams’s early writings (e.g., “‘Semasiology’: A Semantic Anthropologist’s View of Human Movements and Actions,” Semantic Anthropology, Parkin, D., ed., Academic Press: 161–182).

After an introductory chapter, Farnell positions her project historically as part of a “second somatic turn,” focused on how the moving body produces meaning. “The first somatic turn,” she argues, consisted of two camps: those inspired by the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, on the one hand, and theorists like Bourdieu and Foucault, on the other. According to Farnell, the second somatic turn—spawned by Drid Williams’s writings—moves beyond both of these approaches insofar as it carefully studies the “signifying enactments of the human body” (p. 17). In other words, the second somatic turn takes as its primary object the meaningful dimensions of bodily movement, the “discourse” of the body.

The book’s additional chapters cover significant ground. On the whole, they argue that dynamic embodiment has long been neglected and that those attempting to theoretically capture it have fallen short by maintaining—to one extent or another—the unproductive distinction between the mechanistic, unthinking body and the agentive mind. More specifically, the chapters, in order, (3) summarize causal powers theory and its usefulness for semasiology; (4) argue for the importance of using the movement script, Labanotation; (5) critique the “residual Cartesianism” and abstraction of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus; (6) claim that Lakoff and Johnson’s theories of metaphor are problematic insofar as they treat the physical world as a source of “pre-conceptual image schemas” but deny that the body can itself function metaphorically; (7) argue against any stark distinction between the verbal and the non-verbal; and, finally, (8) stress the importance of kinesthesia. Readers of Farnell’s previous work might be familiar with some of these arguments, as many of the chapters are adapted from previous publications with only minor alterations. As a result, there is some repetition across (and sometimes within) the chapters. Yet the book reads smoothly, like a cohesive inquiry and not a patchwork of articles.

Farnell’s position on transcription is particularly interesting for linguistic anthropology. As in her earlier work, Farnell uses and argues for a modified form of Labanotation. For the uninitiated, Labanotation is a movement script created by the preeminent dancer and choreographer Rudolf Laban. I had not been exposed to Labanotation before reading Farnell’s work and, although I have yet to learn to read or write the script with any proficiency, I found thinking through it to be an imaginative exercise. What might we gain from recording and representing bodily movement so abstractly and relatively precisely?

Farnell claims that writing movement would be a boon for the analysis of dynamic embodiment. She goes so far as to suggest that a script for writing movement might, in fact, be a more important innovation for the anthropology of embodiment than the development of video-recording technology (p. 37). Although the reader might not be swayed by Farnell’s arguments, one of the values of Dynamic Embodiment is that it sparks a productive conversation about the advantages and disadvantages of writing movement. This comes at a time when linguistic anthropology has continued to develop more careful analysis of so-called “nonverbal” behavior and demonstrated increased interest in multimodality. Reading Dynamic Embodiment forces one to ask often ignored questions about the representation of the body. How should we deal with the semiotics of movement in our articles and conference presentations, in our labs and video-data sessions?

For Farnell, Labanotation provides advantages over other methods of presenting and analyzing data, including drawings, pictures, and video-recordings. Her most compelling argument in Labanotation’s favor is that the script destabilizes our habitual modes of seeing or “registering” movement. It does this, Farnell argues, because it forces analysts to notice intricacies of movement they might otherwise ignore. In addition, she claims that it provides the resources for analysts “to think and analyze in terms of movement itself,” rather than through the medium of word-glosses, or nondynamic images of bodily positions (p. 38). Of course, when one uses Labanotation, one is not analyzing “movement itself” any more than when one uses spoken or written language to describe movement, but the thrust of Farnell’s argument has some power. Labanotation does allow one to process and pick apart movement in a way that would be extremely cumbersome in written language, and its efficiency and elegance in that respect could make it an excellent tool for particular kinds of analyses—say, tracking variations in kinds of handshakes, or different forms of full-blown, full-body “response cries” (Goffman, Erving, “Response Cries,” Language, 1978:787–815).

However, Farnell’s insistence on using Labanotation for every project, for both presentation and analysis, might strike some readers as doctrinaire. Transcripts should be oriented toward
the research questions of the transcriber (“Transcription as Theory,” Ochs, Elinor, Developmental Pragmatics, Ochs, Elinor and Bambi Schieffelin, eds., Academic Press, 1979:43–72), and, at the very least, it is worth distinguishing transcriptions made for analysis and transcriptions made for presentation. Often, transcriptions that help a researcher identify and specify a phenomenon are different from those that might best present the phenomenon to others. Perhaps Labanotation belongs primarily in transcriptions made for analysis, as its use in presentation is undermined by the not-unimportant fact that most anthropologists and linguists cannot read it. For the majority of readers, the Labanotation “movement scripts” that Farnell uses are less helpful than a diagram or video-still would have been.

Finally, although Farnell briefly mentions some of the research contributing to the recent boom in multi-modality—for example, Goodwin’s “Gesture as a Resource for the Organization of Mutual Orientation” (Semiotica, 1986:29–49)—some readers might wonder why this literature, which forms a strong and vibrant “second somatic turn” in and of itself, is almost absent from Dynamic Embodiment. The few sources that are cited are—with one or two exceptions—decades old and only considered in passing. I would have loved a sustained discussion of whether contributions to this field, like Murphy’s description of the “collaborative imagining” of architects (“Collaborative Imagining: the Interactive Use of Gestures, Talk, and Graphic Representation in Architectural Practice,” Semiotica, 2005:113–145) or Enfield’s analysis of Lao kinship diagrams (“Producing and Editing Diagrams Using Co-Speech Gesture: Spatializing Nonspatial Relations in Explanations of Kinship in Laos,” Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 2003:7–50), fit Farnell’s vision for an anthropology of dynamic embodiment. To my eyes, they sure seem to.

In the end, the contributors to this multimodal boom will probably be the audience most sympathetic with, and excited about, Farnell’s project: her attention to detail, her experiments with the line (imaginary or otherwise) between the semiotic and the somatic, and her insistence on taking the dynamism of everyday life seriously. I recommend Dynamic Embodiment to these multimodal explorers, along with others interested in the anthropology and philosophy of embodiment.