Undermining Resistance:
Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order

by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Barry and Patti Sullivan, who taught me to question and inspired me to pursue what has not yet been done.
Acknowledgements

Like most dissertations, this project began looking significantly different from the final product. My first research trip to Guatemala was inspired not by an interest in police documents or the repression of underground mobilization attempts, but as an investigation into the spatial distribution of some of the most overt forms of political repression—government massacres. When I arrived in Guatemala in the Summer of 2009 to gather data on massacres committed during the country’s civil war, I was aware that an archive of police documents was wrapping up its digitization process, but I also knew that at that point the archive was closed off to researchers. Speaking with one member of Guatemala’s robust human rights community after another, I learned that the archive had recently been granted a legal statute to open its doors to researchers. In a surreal moment that is burned in my memory, I met the archive’s director, Gustavo Meono—a former insurgent commander in the Guatemalan Army of the Poor—on a rooftop above the offices of the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation, where their staff worked diligently below us to uncover clues on the country’s vast history of human rights abuses from the bodies of exhumed victims. When I discovered I was to be granted full access to the newly opened Archive of the Guatemalan National Police, it was clear that this was an opportunity to use these documents to tell a new story about the form and consequences of human rights that had remained hidden for far too long. To the archive’s
staff, who worked diligently protecting, cleaning, and digitizing these records, I could not be more grateful.

In total, I spent about a year and a half working in the archive and read more than a quarter million formerly classified police files. The choice to systematically cover the breadth of the archive meant that I was forced to translate the real suffering of thousands of victims into interchangeable quantities. As a consequence, while the dissertation takes on matters of mortal significance, it rather callously glosses over the suffering experienced by the individual victims. It is important to acknowledge that these are real people, whose stories deserve to be told. Research collected for this dissertation has been used as evidence to prosecute at least two cases related to human rights violations in Guatemala. In the first trial, data I collected was deployed by the prosecution to make the case that Hector Bol de la Cruz (the country’s former chief of police) had been responsible for crimes against humanity. In a second case, I worked to produce evidence used to prosecute the country’s former dictator, Efrain Rios Montt. This historic trial was the first time a national court had tried a former leader on charges of genocide. But despite these court cases, Guatemala’s post-conflict justice processes have stalled. To those who continue to pursue truth and reconciliation in Guatemala, I am both indebted and grateful.

As I read through the police documents, I saw that the government displayed a distinct interest in non-violent organizational behaviors, such as teach-ins, information distribution, and fundraising efforts, which were generally private and relatively unthreatening to the regime. These behaviors, which I would later refer to as “mobilization activities,” seemed to preoccupy political authorities, yet were largely
absent from existing theoretical work on government repression. Reading about the government’s concern with dissident mobilization led me to consider not only why a government might be interested in repressing these forms of behavior, but also why these actions had been missing from how we commonly think about government repression. This led to the first study of this dissertation, which generates a forward looking theory of repressive behavior and argues that contemporary reactionary understandings of repression result in part from biases in the news materials commonly used to study the topic. The implications then lead me to consider how the repression of mobilization impacts civil society and what this more “preemptive” theory of repression implies for when we should expect governments to improve their respect for human rights, which formed the subjects of the second and third studies in the dissertation.

As this project evolved over successive stages, I was aided by the continuous support of my advisor, Christian Davenport. I could not be more grateful for the mentorship, sage advice, and never-ending creativity he has generously given over the many years (and many institutions) we have known one another. The project was also significantly improved through close readings by the other members of my committee—Allan Stam, Mark Beissinger, and Kiyo Tsutsui. Key pieces of the dissertation were read by Will Moore, Rory McVeigh, Courtenay Conrad, Emilie Ritter, Amanda Murdie, Charles Brocket, Elizabeth Wood, Scott Straus, Rosio Titiunik, Naunihal Singh, Michael Coppedge, Javier Osorio, and Suparna Chaudhry. For their time and constructive criticism, I am grateful. Charles Brocket and Chris Farriss kindly shared data they have gathered and Patrick Ball provided helpful guidance on working with data in Guatemala.
I am deeply indebted to Alfredo Garcia and Mario Muralles, who worked alongside me in the Guatemalan police archive. Their research assistance and feedback helped guide the project through many challenges, and their camaraderie makes me nostalgic for the months we spent working in the police barracks. In the United States, I am grateful to Lauren Demeter and Melissa Guinan, who demonstrated their excellence as research assistants time and time again.

Successive research trips to Guatemala were supported by the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, the Social Science Research Council, and the National Science Foundation. Without the support of these organizations, the fieldwork at the core of the dissertation project would not have been possible. The Program on Order, Conflict, and Violence at Yale University’s MacMillan Center supported my final year of writing. The time and feedback provided by OCV and its faculty were invaluable in developing the project.

Finally, I am deeply indebted to my fiancé, Megan Maraynes, whom I met in Guatemala at the beginning of this project. She has supported me tirelessly over years of travel, research, and writing. And through all of it she has displayed a sense of grace and generosity that I could only hope to aspire to. I feel unduly lucky for the time we have already spent together as well as for the years ahead.
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Abstract

This project examines attempts by government authorities to undermine overt, collective challenges, such as riots, protests, and acts of terror, by targeting activities that precede and/or support such behavior. After providing a theory of how repression and resistance develop, the study examines unique data drawn from the confidential records of the Guatemalan National Police to assess the use of repressive action during the years between 1975 and 1985. Empirical tests confirm that 1) government forces anticipate challenger development by identifying the mobilization activities nascent challengers rely on to initiate and sustain overt, collective challenges; 2) the use of repression to undermine such efforts is specifically designed to contain the spread of radical (i.e., highly transformative) mobilization; 3) political repression directed at mobilization diminishes subsequent challenges against the government; and 4) decisions to liberalize repressive practices occur only after radical mobilization attempts have successfully been purged from society. Implications are drawn for how we understand and study political order and conflict.
Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation examines three intricately related questions: (1) why do governments violate the human rights of their citizens, (2) what impact do human rights violations have on civil society, and (3) when do human rights violations end. Such questions form the foundations for understanding important macro-level phenomena such as civil war, regime change, and state failure. They also impact the lived experience of individuals at the micro-level, including citizens’ exposure to violence, the rights and liberties apportioned to them, and the capacity for citizens to express political opinions without fear of sanctions.

In the dissertation, I develop a novel theory to account for the causes, effects, and decline of human rights violations that focuses on governments efforts to subvert the development of overt, collective challenges to political order (such as riots, protests or acts of terror). While it is often suggested that one of the key reasons that collective challenges are not observed in a particular situation is because expectations of repressive action (i.e., fear) prevent dissidents from organizing, existing theory provides few details on how governments might anticipate the development of collective challenges or how they attempt to undermine this behavior. What my research argues is that governments are able to subvert the development of the most costly challenges by identifying the organizational activities that precede and/or support collective action (what I refer to as mobilization) and applying repression when mobilization supports radical transformations of political power. Based on this understanding, the theory yields
predictions specifying when, where, and against whom repressive action can be expected, what its effects are, and when it will abate.

I test these expectations using unique data collected from the previously confidential records of the Guatemalan National Police. Because the police records were constructed for bureaucratic performance rather than for public dissemination and were released without oversight by the agency responsible for producing the documents, the Guatemalan police records contains one of the most comprehensive and unbiased collections of information on political repression identified to date. During my field research, I utilized these records to construct an events database of government and dissident behavior occurring in Guatemala between 1975-1985.

Through quantitative analysis of this database, I find that when organizers support radical transformation in political power, governments do not wait for challenges to materialize. In such settings, political repression is directed at the initial mobilization attempts of would be dissidents. I find further that repression targeting mobilization deters subsequent challenges, whereas repression directed at ongoing challenges increases challenger activity. This resolves a puzzle within the existing literature about whether human rights violations increase or decrease collective challenges; revealing that they do both, depending upon what aspect of a challenge someone is considering. Finally, the analysis shows that violations of human rights persist long after challenges have abated, lasting until the state has successfully removed attempts to mobilize in support of transformation of the political order.

Taken as a whole, this work demonstrates that existing conceptualizations of order must be amended to recognize how political repression is used to expunge attempts to
organize around the idea of transforming the political order. The success or failure of these repressive policies holds strong implications for political expression during times of relative peace as well as the likelihood for observing the onset or escalation of political conflict.

**Dissertation Structure**

The dissertation is comprised of three intricately related, though structurally independent, studies. Each specifies predictions derived from a common theory of political repression and evaluates them empirically using original data collected from the Guatemalan security apparatus.

The first paper identifies patterns of repression that have largely been ignored within existing research on human rights violations—repression directed against non-disruptive mobilization activities. The study articulates an argument for why governments direct repression at mobilization activities specifically when mobilization supports radical transformations in politically power. Explanations are also provided to account for why previous work has failed to capture this dynamic. Data biases within the media sources most commonly utilized to study patterns of repression and dissent have lead to the omission of mobilization activities from existing work as well as any potential repression directed at those behaviors. Empirical analysis of the confidential police data reveals how radical mobilization activities are as robustly related to the use of repression as overt, collective challenges. However, when the analysis is replicated on data derived using more conventional newspaper based data, political repression appears only to be motivated by government responses to ongoing challenges. The study concludes that
government repression is much more proactive than is commonly assumed within existing research.

The second study builds on the foundations of the first. If it is true that governments do not always wait for overt, collective challenges to materialize before committing repression, and in some settings choose to apply repression against non-challenging mobilization activities, what implications does this have for how we understand the impacts of repressive behavior on challenger development? Using an instrumental variables approach to identify seemingly exogenous variation in repression directed at mobilization and overt, collective challenges, the study reveals how repression can have divergent effects on subsequent challenger behavior depending on the forms of behavior it targets. When governments identify mobilization activities and target this behavior with repression, it diminishes the organizational foundations necessary to inspire and sustain participation. Consequently, future challenges decline. But when governments respond to ongoing challenges, for example by policing an ongoing protest, this leaves the organizational infrastructure in place to publicize abuses and promote future challenges.

Finally, the third study demonstrates the implications of the argument for government decisions to liberalize and improve their respect for human rights. The study shows how monopolizing control over territory does not appear to be sufficient to inspire liberalization. At the same time, domestic institutions and international pressures are ineffectual for curbing human rights abuses. Even in the face of such pressures and in sites where the state has succeeded in monopolizing control, liberalization takes place only after the state has removed attempts to mobilize in support of radical transformation of the political order. Where radical mobilization activities persists, governments face
concerns that liberalization could inspire emergent forms of contention that fundamentally threaten their hold on power. Repression only begins to abate once radical mobilization has ceased and the government has assurances that the types of threats likely to emerge following liberalization will not fundamentally challenge the political order.

**Extensions and Implications**

Cumulatively, the findings that emerge from this dissertation hold at least three implications that should transform the way we understand political repression and the violation of human rights.

First, the work demonstrates the significance of grievances and challenger demands for understanding repressive behavior. As Tilly (1978) articulates, governments intent on remaining in power should consider the potential threats emerging from society in terms of both the scope of the physical challenge and the scale of the demands they hope to achieve. But within the vast literature studying repression that has developed over the past several decades, scholars have overwhelmingly been concerned with challenger behavior, while assuming that challenger grievances are either constant or insignificant for explaining repression (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 2007; Moore 2000; Earl et al. 2003; Valentino et al. 2004; Carey 2010; see also Gartner and Regan 2002). The findings that emerge from this study reveal that even in sites where the behavior of potential challengers is relatively non-threatening, repression is deployed against individuals organizing in support of radical transformations in political order. Looking forward, it will no longer be sufficient to look for the causes of repression exclusively in government responses to ongoing behavioral challenges. Scholars will need to consider
how the demands emerging from challenger organization shape the use of political repression.

Second, the study demonstrates how order and conflict are contingent on the strategic interaction of governments and challengers. Much of the existing work that has been developed to understand the stability of order or the onset of conflict has focused how on structural factors, such as regime institutions, ethnic composition, or state capacity, should influence the outcomes of interest (e.g., Hegre 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Davenport 2007; Cederman et al. 2010). This dissertation reveals how the onset, escalation, and de-escalation of political conflict result not from structural determinants, but from strategic choices made by governments and challengers in response to one another’s actions. Structure is insufficient for accounting for these dynamics in part because the most prominent structural factors that emerge in the literature are likely to be endogenous to the outcomes of these repression-dissent interactions. Particular patterns of institutionalized order are observed when governments successfully identify and repress radical mobilization attempts, while conflict cycles can be expected when movements outpace or evade efforts to repress mobilization.

Finally, the study identifies the patterns of repression that, while remaining largely hidden, underlie the institutional foundations of politics practiced during times of apparent peace. Inverting Clausewitz’ classic dictum regarding war and politics, Foucault (2003 [1975]) argues that politics practiced during times of peace are the continuation of conflict, confrontation, war. What the present study demonstrates is how government strategies practiced during times of contention are designed to influence how politics are practiced in the post-conflict period. To begin, the study reveals the expansive use of
repression against private mobilization activities. Because such repression is largely hidden, it is not commonly considered by scholars conceptualizing political order. Perhaps more significantly, if (1) governments are only directing repression at particular types of mobilization (those that support radical transformations in political order), (2) the repression of mobilization effectively reduces the probability that the mobilized ideals are realized into public expression, and (3) repression persists until mobilization in support of radical ideals has been eliminated, then what is observed as a decline in repression and the onset of apparent peace is actually a signal that the government has succeeded in constraining the ideological distribution of civil society. The expectation is that the onset and stability of peace are contingent on the government’s elimination of social forces that would pursue claims that fundamentally challenge the established order.
Works Referenced


Chapter 2: Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order

Abstract: This paper examines attempts by authorities to undermine overt collective challenges, such as riots, protests, and acts of terror, by targeting activities that precede and/or support such behavior. After providing a theory of how repression and resistance develop, the study examines unique data drawn from the confidential records of the Guatemalan National Police to assess the use of repressive action during the years between 1975 and 1985. Empirical tests demonstrate that 1) government forces anticipate challenger development by identifying the mobilization activities nascent challengers rely on to initiate and sustain overt collective challenges; and 2) that the use of repression to undermine such efforts is specifically designed to contain the spread of radical (i.e., highly transformative) mobilization. Implications are drawn for how we understand and study political conflict and order.
How do governments enforce political order? Prevailing views correspond to a relatively simple sequence of events. Episodically, dissidents are able to overcome the internal barriers to mobilization and engage in overt collective challenges, such as protests, strikes, riots, or armed attacks (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Gates 2002; Lim 2008; Lind and Stepan-Norris 2011; McAdam 1986; McAdam et al. 2001; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1994). To protect political order, governments respond to overt collective challenges with repression (Carey 2010; Davenport 1995; 1996; 2007a; 2007b; 2010; Earl et al. 2003; Moore 2000; Pion-Berlin 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Valentino et al. 2004). Contestation then ensues as governments and challengers engage in open conflict (Cunningham et al. 2009; Davenport forthcoming; Kalyvas 2006; Lujala et al. 2009; Lyall 2009; Moore 1998; Pierskalla 2010; Ritter forthcoming).

Although useful in many ways, the view adopted above is limited. For example, while it is often suggested that one of the key reasons that challenges are not observed in a particular situation is because expectations of repression prevent dissidents from organizing (e.g., Conrad and Ritter 2012; Muller 1985; Muller et al. 1991; Pierskalla 2010), existing theory provides few details on how governments might anticipate the development of overt collective challenges or how they attempt to undermine this behavior (e.g., Danneman and Ritter forthcoming; Herreros and Criado 2009; Nordas and Davenport 2013).

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1 Repression refers to, “coercive actions political authorities take to inhibit the will or capacity of people within their jurisdiction to influence political outcomes” (Ritter forthcoming). Overt collective challenges refer “a sustained, organized [and public]…effort making collective claims of target authorities” (Tilly 2004, p 53).
Understanding how governments anticipate and/or undermine overt collective challenges is important because if authorities attempt to eliminate threats without exclusively relying upon repressive responses to overt activity, then models that fail to identify relevant state action have misspecified how contention begins and is sustained. Indeed, if government forces incapacitate individuals who are hoping to challenge the regime, this form of “preemptive” repression provides a novel mechanism for restraining political threats. Under this circumstance, explanations for civil conflict will have to be amended to account for the selection of surviving movements into subsequent conflagrations.

The current study provides insight into why repression is applied in anticipation of and in conjunction with overt collective challenges as well as when and against whom such repressive action can be expected. Rather than simply engage with overt behavior, governments seek to subvert the most costly challenges by applying repression against mobilization (i.e., the formation and support of an opposition organization from which overt collective challenges can be initiated and sustained). Governments do not attempt to address all challengers but focus their efforts on those mobilizing in support of highly transformative redistributions of political power. Upon observing “radical” mobilization, authorities repress to eliminate influential leaders, deplete organizational resources, and subvert overt challenges.

This study provides empirical evidence to support these claims by analyzing new data collected from the confidential records of Guatemalan National Police. These records contain unprecedented details on both the myriad of covert mobilization as well as overt collective activities engaged in by challengers and the spectrum of repressive
behavior employed by the government. Analysis of the police data reveals how government forces employ coercion to subvert challenges by directing repression against radical mobilization.

While exploring these issues, the investigation demonstrates how misconceptions regarding the dynamics of political repression manifest themselves empirically as well as theoretically. By comparing results generated from the Guatemalan National Police records against data collected from international and Guatemalan newspapers, the analysis reveals how biases in newspaper data predispose analysts to the conclusion that governments only employ repression in response to overt collective challenges. The full range of repressive activity and useful insights into its application will only be revealed when new and better data are brought to bear.

The article proceeds as follows: First, I review the academic literature on political order and conflict. Second, a model of repressive action is presented that distinguishes the repression of mobilization from repression directed against overt collective challenges. I then present the data, research design, and analysis. Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the implications of the study for understanding political order and conflict.

**Defending Political Order**

Over the past few decades, research on political repression and human rights violations, social movements, and civil war has sought to explain how governments enforce political order. Each approach has had a somewhat different but generally overlapping understanding of the topic.
For instance, one body of work has emerged on government coercion, such as political imprisonment, torture, disappearances and mass killing (e.g., Carey 2006; 2010; Conrad and Moore 2010; Davenport 1995; 2007a; 2007b; Gartner and Regan 1996; Gurr 1986; Moore 2000; Pierskalla 2010; Poe and Tate 1994; Regan and Henderson 2002; Shellman 2006; Stohl and Lopez 1984; 1986; Tilly 1978; Valentino et al. 2004). Often referred to as the “threat-response theory” (Earl et al. 2003), but alternatively as the “nobody-moves-nobody-gets-hurt thesis” (Davenport 2010) or the “law of coercive response” (Davenport 2007b), the dominant model expects governments to employ higher levels of repression in response to an increase in observed dissident threats.² The theory has as its underlying foundation a conceptualization of policymaking in which governments respond to overt, collective challenges to the regime by engaging in repressive behavior to control or eliminate challengers (e.g., Davenport 1995; 2007a; Earl et al. 2003; Gurr 1986; Pion-Berlin 1989; Poe 2002; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Poe et al. 2000). Recent studies are beginning to push in the direction of a more forward-looking model, but such work remains limited in part because the micro-foundational mechanisms that link prospective decision-making to the repression of specific events or individuals have yet to be well articulated (e.g., Danneman and Ritter forthcoming; Herrerros and Criado 2009; Moore 1995; Nordas and Davenport forthcoming; Pierskalla 2010; Walter 2006).

² Despite early work pushing scholars towards definitional clarity (e.g., Davenport 1995), the concept of threat remains imprecisely defined in the literature (e.g., Carey 2006, 3; Earl et al. 2003, 586; Poe et al. 1999, 293). Most often scholars conceptualize threats to the state as a function of the scope (e.g., Earl et al. 2003, 583; Valentino et al. 2004, 386) or form (e.g., Carey 2010, 171; Poe et al. 1999, 293; Valentino et al. 2004, 386) of overt collective challenges. Specific forms of overt collective challenges that have come to signify threats to the state include protests (Earl et al. 2003), riots (Carey 2010), terrorism (Carey 2010), civil war and insurgency (Poe et al. 1999; Valentino et al. 2004). As these challenges increase, the expectation is that states will subsequently escalate levels of repression.
At the same time, a rich literature on social movements has focused directly on the emergence of challenges to political order. Since Olson’s (1965) seminal study, it has generally been assumed that the internal barriers to collective action are so great that nonparticipation can be taken as a default position, rather than a facet of the existing interactions between governments and challengers. As a result, studies of social movements have tended to focus on factors influencing the capacity of organizations to overcome their internal collective action problems while overlooking the competition for resources that occurs between governments and challengers during mobilization (e.g., Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Conrad and Ritter 2012; Lind and Stepan-Norris 2011; Lim 2008; Klandermans 1984; McCarty and Zald 1976; Siegel 2009; Snow and Benford 1988). Where repression enters such research, causal explanations have centered on how unobservable expectations of repression hinder resolution to the collective action problem, rather than on any systematic and observable efforts authorities engage in to anticipate and subvert the development of political challenges (e.g., Muller 1985; Muller et al. 1991; Pierskalla 2010). And where scholars have examined the effects of repression on social movements empirically, research has not yet systematically addressed the effects of repressive behavior directed against activities other than overt collective challenges (e.g., Davenport et al. 2005; Daxecker and Hess 2012; Dugan and Chenoweth 2012; Lyall 2009; Moore 1998; Rasler 1996).

Among scholars studying the emergence of large-scale conflicts between governments and challengers (i.e., civil wars), opportunity-based arguments stress how the ability of insurgents to challenge the government results in part from the limited
coercive capacity of weak states (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003). But such work sees state repression as largely structurally determined and only briefly references the strategic interplay between nascent insurgents and the government, marginalizing the role of repressive efforts to restrain dissident mobilization (e.g., Cederman et al. 2011; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Hartzel et al. 2010; Ross 2004; Weidmann 2009).

In sum, understandings of conflict could be improved with increased attention to government efforts to subvert the development of potential challenges. If governments anticipate and/or undermine overt collective challenges without engaging this behavior directly, then existing theories will have to be revised in a number of important ways. First, prevailing models of political repression will have to be amended to recognize that government forecasts of future challenges are as important for inspiring repressive behavior as responses to ongoing threats and, perhaps, even more so. Second, theories of social movement mobilization will need to pay greater attention to understanding how movements attempt to outpace government attempts to undermine mobilization. Finally, rather than the dominant concern with structural variables theorized to influence challenger or state capacity, understandings of the emergence of large-scale conflict will need to pay greater attention to how the interaction of these two dynamic forces (repression and mobilization) will impact prospects for conflict escalation. When government forces successfully demobilize the opposition, the absence of overt collective

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3 More generally, the literature on political opportunity structures argues that social movements develop when favorable political environments provide access to new resources (e.g., Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1986; Tarrow 1994), with repression constituting part of the political opportunity structure. However, by treating repression as a structure, this literature has downplayed state strategies to work within structural constraints (McAdam et al. 2001, pp 43-45) and has experienced difficulty accounting for temporal variation in conflict (Young 2008).

4 This is at least partially because theories of civil war have been constructed around bodies of evidence that negate potential challengers who would have emerged if not for the actions of the state (Lewis 2012).
challenges occurs not because movements could not organize internally but because the government was able to outcompete challengers and reduce their capacity to engage in overt challenges. This will impact prospects for conflict escalation as well as the possibility for a change in political order.

**From Mobilization to Repression**

This section presents an argument for how and why governments employ repression to subvert the development of overt collective challenges. Like much of political science, the argument begins with the assumption that governments wish to stay in power. They extract some rents from being in office and allocate concessions and repression in order to manage threats and maximize their net resources. In choosing to apply concessions or repression, governments consider the costs of these policy instruments and their impacts on both ongoing and future challenges.\(^5\)

Moving beyond extant theory, this paper argues that governments not only consider the presence of observable challenges (e.g., Davenport 1995; Earl et al. 2003; Poe et al. 2000; Valentinio et al. 2004) or unobservable, latent probabilities of challenges (e.g., Danneman and Ritter forthcoming; Herrerros and Criado 2009; Nordas and Davenport 2013), but aim to improve the specificity of their expectations by monitoring their citizenry to identify and repress the observable indicators that herald the development of the most threatening overt collective challenges. Governments recognize

\(^5\) The present study aims to understand decisions to repress. While the relative costs of concessions are theorized to influence repressive decision-making, a more expansive understanding of decisions to make concessions is beyond the scope of this research. For relevant work see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), Moore (2000), Rasler (1996), Ritter (2013) and Shellman (2006).
that the outcome of repression targeting overt collective challenges is highly unpredictable (e.g., Davenport et al. 2005; Moore 1998). At the same time, the repression of those not directly engaged in challenges is costly as it involves resource allocations, the possible sacrifice of human life, and potential political backlash.

As a result, governments must balance the costs of repressive attempts to subvert challenger development against (1) the probability of a threat being realized into overt collective challenges, and (2) the probable costs of dealing with those challenges should they materialize. To improve their forecasts of the likelihood and costs of future overt collective challenges, governments must consider two factors. First, they focus on the behaviors of potential challengers, seeking to identify the most relevant actions signaling challenger development. Second, they attend to the demands challengers are likely to make should a challenge occur, seeking to identify the potential costs of conflict bargaining should overt collective challenges materialize.

Below, I present a model of challenger development in order to specify the behaviors and demands inspiring repressive efforts to subvert challengers. Based on this model, I develop hypotheses specifying where and when such repression can be expected.

*Mobilization, Repression and the Enforcement of Political Order*

Political order is often conceptualized as a dyadic relationship between the powerful and the (potentially) compliant (e.g., Arendt 1970; Huntington 1968; Lukes 2005). However, it is perhaps better conceived as a triadic relationship between the powerful, the (potentially) compliant, and the (existent or non-existent) organized opposition. This is the case because opportunities for challenging the regime vary to the
extent that there is, in fact, a viable alternative to compliance. In the absence of an organized opposition, many who would otherwise resist government authority find compliance to be in their self-interest. Resistance can take the form of foot dragging or other “weapons of the weak,” but without a viable alternative to the existing power structure to align with, individuals often find open resistance personally impractical (Scott 1985; 1990).

At times, small bands of individuals are able to overcome such restraints and engage in “mobilization,” which describes the process of forming and supporting an organized alternative to the government through small, generally private activities such as organizing meetings, articulating organizational objectives, distributing information, campaigning for funds, training members, and recruiting new participants (Gaventa 1982, pp 24-2; Tilly 1978, p 54). 6 Distinct from overt collective challenges to political authority, which are outwardly focused, mobilization is designed to draw individuals and resources into an organization in order to sustain a platform from which overt collective challenges can be planned, communicated, and directed (Chong 1991; McCarthy and Zald 1977).

Mobilization is difficult and requires extensive contributions from a small number of individuals (Olson 1965). Several studies have shown that while participation in collective action is generally dictated by the participation of others, there exists a core group of organizers for whom participation is driven by personal characteristics rather than social influence (e.g., McDoom 2011; Oliver 1984). These organizers must be

6 According to Tilly, (1978, p 192), mobilization contributes to situations of “multiple sovereignty,” in which, “previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves confronted with strictly incompatible demands from the government and from an alternative body.”
willing to overcome incentives to comply with the regime and act as the first movers in a potential challenging organization. Such actions are demanding both because they require personal contributions to a highly uncertain effort and because early action leaves organizers vulnerable to identification by the state. But the contributions of core members are critical because organizers cannot inspire others to participate in overt collective challenges without first reaching the minimal threshold of mobilized resources necessary to express collective demands and coordinate collective behavior (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978).

From the core group of organizers and the resources they mobilize, overt collective action can spring up, be sustained, and potentially grow. Overt collective challenges have the potential to set in motion cascades of participation (Granovetter 1978; Shelling 1978). As a result, challenges have the capacity to escalate rapidly from seemingly insignificant degrees to levels that threaten the regime (Kuran 1989; Lohmann 1993). However, cascades of participation cannot proceed unless organizers are able to mobilize sufficient resources to spark and sustain such behavior (Marwell and Oliver 1993).

Governments recognize how significant mobilization is for inspiring and sustaining overt collective challenges and translate their beliefs about mobilization into expectations for future threats. Prior experiences dealing with challengers along with the evidence from neighboring states provide the background necessary to formulate expectations for the development of challenges to political order (e.g., Moore 1995; Ritter and Danneman forthcoming; Shellman 2006). Sophisticated surveillance apparatuses are established to monitor social behavior and detect movements toward
overt collective challenges (Lewis 2012). Governments look to identify behaviors such as meetings, seminars, fundraising, and recruitment drives, which do not directly threaten the government, but involve the coordination of individuals organizing in support of collective challenges.

Where mobilization is identified, it presents clear incentives for government forces to intervene with repression. Allowing such behavior to progress means accepting the possibility that overt collective challenges can be coordinated and sustained, which means risking open contestation with challengers. Upon observing mobilization, governments can direct repressive activities, such as wire-tapping, surveillance, arrests, or targeted attacks, against organizers as they attempt to coordinate overt collective challenges. Repressing mobilization drains the mobilizing organizations of critical individuals willing to put time and effort into mobilization and depletes the resources available to inspire and sustain overt collective challenges. Government forces can target the core group and remove influential individuals who are often difficult to replace. This, in turn, diminishes the willingness of others to contribute not only by intimidation but also by reducing popular perceptions that dissident organizations can successfully convert participation into public or private benefits. It is therefore hypothesized that:

Hypothesis 1: *Mobilization is related to increased political repression.*

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7 To be clear, this conceptualization is concerned with repression directed at particular groups attempting to mobilize, rather than blanket restrictions on civil liberties.
In deciding to repress mobilization, governments must not only consider the probability that overt collective challenges develop, but also weigh the potential costs of coercion against the potential costs of challenges should they materialize. Repression of this sort is costly and government forces cannot reasonably be assumed to have the capacity for repressing all forms of mobilization. Yet at the same time, not all forms of mobilization are equally threatening and worthy of government attention.

The anticipated demands of potential challengers are critical in this calculation. Governments must prioritize the threats posed by different mobilization efforts based on the expected costs of dealing with challenges should they develop. Of greatest concern for political authorities are those mobilizing in support of radical transformations in political power, such as the institutionalization of new rules for participation, the removal of existing authorities or the division of the state’s territorial integrity (Gamson 1975; Gartner and Regan 1996; Tilly 1978). If challenges are expected to emerge, but challengers are likely to make demands that fall short of radical redistributions of power, governments have the opportunity to negotiate with challengers and retain power at minimal costs. But if challengers are expected to make radical demands, negotiations become more problematic. In this case, conflict bargaining can be expected to center on issues considered indivisible by governments and challengers, leading to longer conflicts that are both more costly and more difficult to resolve (Thomas 2012; Walter 2009).

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8 Decisions to fight or negotiate with non-radical challengers are expected to be made based on the scope of the realized overt collective challenges (e.g., DeNardo 1985). In either case, the expectation is that conflict should be resolved quicker and at substantially less costs for the government than conflict with radical challengers.

9 The risks associated with these conflicts are also much greater for governments as a loss can threaten the survival of the regime.
Because mobilization supporting radical ideals has the potential to spark and sustain more protracted and costly overt collective challenges, government forces weigh the utility of repressing this form of mobilization differently from repressing non-radical mobilization. Should radical mobilization materialize into overt collective challenges, government forces will need to expend greater effort attempting to subdue challengers. In this case, governments find repression to be an attractive option. Governments attempt to suppress the development of the most costly overt collective challenges by targeting the radical mobilization efforts that inspire and sustain such activities.

If this conception is correct, then there exists an entire realm of political contestation not captured in existing research on political repression, social movements, and civil war. In this view, challengers work to mobilize critical resources necessary to initiate and sustain overt collective challenges, while governments aim to anticipate and/or undermine the development the most costly overt collective challenges by directing repression at radical mobilization. The argument leads to the following testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: Increases in political repression are expected to take place when mobilizers support radical redistributions of political power.

Hypothesis 2b: Increases in political repression are not expected to take place when mobilizers support less radical demands.

10 Similarly, the government has difficulty negotiating with radical mobilizers as the potential concessions these groups would demand to hold back overt collective challenges would vastly exceed the costs of other policy options, including repression.
Data

Identifying the repression of radical mobilization requires data that track the covert and overt activities of government forces as well as challengers. To acquire such information, I created an events database using records found in a unique archive of confidential police documents. The database is built from unprecedented information on different forms of challenger and government behavior contained in the *Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional* (AHPN), which was produced by the Guatemalan National Police between 1975 and 1985 (Morales Alvarado 2009).

During most of the 20th century, the Guatemalan National Police employed a central depository to store the records produced by the inner workings of their bureaucracy (e.g., memos passed up and down the chain of command, arrest records, log files summarizing daily activity, and investigative reports produced by local divisions, the central command, or other specialized units). This warehouse and the millions of documents it contains were abandoned following the signing of the peace accord and the disbanding of the national police in 1996. After this time, the documents lingered on the outskirts of Guatemala City for approximately ten years before being discovered by the Human Rights Ombudsman in 2006 (Doyle 2007; Smith 2009). Following a lengthy legal struggle, the decision was made to clean and index the documents into the newly formed *Archivo Histórico de la Policía Nacional*. The digitization and archiving process has recently been completed, and this study is one of the first to have been granted access to the Archive’s full 1975-1985 collection.

Records at the AHPN were archived following the administrative structure of the National Police, with each file indexed according to the office that received that
particular memo or report. The National Police had jurisdiction over the entire country and were divided into ten *cuerpos* (divisions) based on geographic location. Three additional divisions handled administrative tasks, major criminal investigations, and joint operations with the military, respectively. The Director General oversaw the entire force.

A purposefully selected subset of the Archive’s collection was coded as an events database of state and dissident actions. The subset is composed of the entire selection of records from two offices, the Director General of the Police and the Commissioner for Coordinating Joint Operations with the Military. The resulting dataset was constructed by reading all 300,000+ records sent to the two offices and preserved in the AHPN. All forms of political activity were coded as discrete events. This includes all forms of political behavior participated in by mobilizers and challengers as well as all forms of repressive state behavior directed at such groups. In total, the project coded more than seven thousand acts of state and dissident behavior.

Because the AHPN records were constructed for bureaucratic performance rather than for public dissemination and were released without oversight by the agency responsible for producing the documents, the *Archivo* contains one of the most comprehensive and unbiased collections of information on the inner workings of the state’s repressive apparatus identified to date. Still, data taken from police records are

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11 A pilot study that employed random sampling from the archive’s full collection identified that more than 95% of the relevant documents were contained within these two offices. Greater detail on the pilot study and the coding protocol can be found in the Supplemental Information.
12 Inter-coder reliability checks consistently demonstrated reliability rates above 85%.
13 The codebook can be found in the Supplemental Information accompanying this project.
14 U.S. readers might want to imagine a successful Freedom of Information Act request for which the FBI was required to turn over all of its documents, unredacted, for a 10-year period.
not without problems, and it is important to recognize that all sources of conflict data are likely to present incomplete and potentially biased representations of political events.\textsuperscript{15}

With data from the police, one needs to be conscious of parochial incentives that could lead to biased reporting for professional gains. For example, with reference to the reporting of repression, given the Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights, it is clear that the regime was consciously trying to improve its international human rights reputation by concealing evidence of massacres (Doyle 1999). While the records were only accessible to those within upper levels of the police, it is still possible that they contain some bias against the reporting of atrocities. Moderating the scope of repression could bias the study against identifying a relationship between mobilization and repression.

However, with regard to the reporting of challenger behavior, the direction of bias is less clear. Organizations might develop an interest in overestimating the threat of the movement in order to increase their budget (Stanley 1996). Alternatively, they might develop an interest in downplaying movement behavior to demonstrate professional success (Reiner 2010). What is evident is that because the Guatemalan government had significantly more resources than did news organizations and because it had extensive networks designed to identify political activities, the AHPN provides better detail on a far larger spectrum of political activity than other sources of information on the Guatemala conflict.

\textsuperscript{15} As an example, Maney and Oliver (1998) show how, in Madison, Wisconsin, the events covered by the newspapers but not identified by police records tended to be nondisruptive and to occur in private homes. This does not appear to be true for Guatemala, where the police records contain significantly more information on nondisruptive private gatherings than do the newspapers.
Indeed, because they contain a more extensive list of political events, government records have been used widely to help identify the form and extent of bias in newspaper coverage (e.g., Baranranco and Wisler 1999; Beissinger 2002; Maney 2000; McCarthy, et al. 1996; 1998; McCarthy, et al. 2008; Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Smith et al. 2001). With regard to the present topic of study, one of the factors contributing to the empirical validation of “threat-response” theories of political repression may be that employing traditional newspaper-based data to study the topic has biased existing understandings of when political repression is applied. While part of the difficulty in studying the repression of radical mobilization has been conceptual—scholars studying political order have focused theories on the most overt forms of behavior—there are corresponding empirical challenges, as these overt forms of behavior are also the activities most commonly identified in events databases on the topic. If we are more aware of larger acts of challenger activity, then when it comes time to articulate where and when states repress, larger and more intense incidents of overt collective challenges will be more easily conceptualized as catalysts (e.g., Brocket 1992; Danzger 1975; Davenport 2010; Drakos and Gofas 2006; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Wooley 2006). And when newspaper data are used to evaluate theoretical claims, the omission of smaller, nonviolent events from events databases can result in spurious correlations consistent with such theories (e.g., Barranco and Wisler 1999; Davenport and Ball 2002; Earl et al. 2004; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Oliver and Maney 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; Snyder and Kelly 1977). At the same time, description biases in newspaper coverage of contentious politics can lead to the assumption that governments respond to claims makers only in self-defense (Davenport 2010; Smith et al. 2001).
To empirically evaluate how the data sources employed in the analysis of political order and conflict influence understandings of state repression, this study replicates its analysis on a separate database of political activities reported in Guatemalan and international newspapers. The expectation is that the relationship between mobilization and repression will be apparent in the analysis of the AHPN data, but we are not likely to observe this relationship using data gathered from newspapers. The newspaper data for this replication were compiled from several sources. The first is a database of contentious events reported in the Guatemalan press, which was generated by Brocket (2005) for a study on repression and dissent in Central America.\textsuperscript{16} Brocket’s data collection effort involved hand coding the largest local and national daily newspapers in Guatemala using a system for measuring government and dissident behavior that is consistent with the protocol used at the AHPN. I then supplemented Brocket’s data with my own coding of political activity in Guatemala reported in the \textit{New York Times} as well as the Guatemalan newspapers, \textit{Prensa Libre}, \textit{El Diario}, and \textit{La Hora}, using the same coding system as applied at the AHPN. When combined, the newspaper dataset identifies more than two thousand incidents of political activity.\textsuperscript{17}

For the analysis, both the AHPN data and the newspaper-data event catalogs were transformed into a cross-sectional time-series of repression and dissent. For each of Guatemala’s 22 departments, the time-series identifies monthly counts of each specific

\textsuperscript{16} Brocket coded \textit{El Imparcial} as well as clippings from the \textit{Infopress Centro America} news aggregations service.

\textsuperscript{17} An extensive discussion of how media bias pertains to the case of Guatemala can be found in the Supplemental Information along with a more extensive comparison of the AHPN and newspaper data.
form of activity (as reported in the two datasets) occurring between January 1975 and December 1985.\footnote{Departments are the third smallest administrative units in Guatemala and are approximately the size of U.S. counties.}

**Operationalization**

For the purposes of this study, *mobilization* is operationalized as small, generally clandestine efforts to influence individuals affiliated or unaffiliated with a social movement to participate in collective action. Examples include the distribution of information, organized training programs, soliciting for funds, recruitment efforts, and organizational meetings.

Mobilization was further divided into two subtypes based on the claims made by challengers and identified in the AHPN records. *Radical mobilization* is operationalized as those activities carried out in support of expressed demands for overthrowing or displacing the political system.\footnote{More accurately, given the data, these are mobilization activities that the government associated with support for radical ideals.} Practically, this list includes all mobilization activities engaged in to support the overthrow of the government and/or division of the state’s territorial integrity. Examples include radical student and labor organizations, separatist groups, and Marxist insurgent organizations.\footnote{Though the coding schema allowed for this form of activity, no examples of separatist mobilization were identified in the AHPN data.} *Non-radical mobilization* is operationalized as those events carried out in support of demands that do not directly call for overthrowing the political system and/or a division of the state’s territorial integrity. Examples of non-radical mobilization include mobilization to support ideals and demands such as community development, land rights, and freedom from persecution.

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18 Departments are the third smallest administrative units in Guatemala and are approximately the size of U.S. counties.
19 More accurately, given the data, these are mobilization activities that the government associated with support for radical ideals.
20 Though the coding schema allowed for this form of activity, no examples of separatist mobilization were identified in the AHPN data.
**Overt collective challenges** are operationalized as public, outwardly focused demonstrations of organizational strength targeted at political authorities. Examples include strikes, demonstrations, marches, roadblocks, targeted killings, arson, kidnapping, and the taking of hostages.\(^{21}\)

Measures of repression are divided into two categories: covert and overt repressive actions. The purpose of the categorical division is somewhat different here than above, however. Acts of dissent were divided in order to test propositions regarding how different challenger activities influenced repressive action. By contrast, the two forms of repressive action are divided in order to counter a possible objection that repressive behavior related to mobilization differs in kind from repression related to overt collective challenges. More specifically, it could be argued that mobilization produces repressive activities that are more covert in nature, such as surveillance and other investigative practices, while overt collective challenges produce more overt repressive activities, such as raids or torture, which can be more easily observed.\(^{22}\)

To counter such an objection, political repression is divided into overt and covert activities and the analyses below estimate the effects of different forms of dissident behavior on each. **Overt repression** is operationalized as public (and commonly violent) displays of coercive force in which the targets are aware of the action and of the identity of the perpetrator. Examples include death threats, torture, disappearances, shootings, shootings, shootings,

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\(^{21}\) Overt collective challenges were not divided based on claims because the expectation in the literature is that all forms of overt challenges spark an increase in repression (see the above discussion on the “law of coercive response” [Davenport 2007b]). This includes studies analyzing concessions as well as repression (e.g., Rasler 1996; Shellman 2006). A replication effort divided overt collective challenges into radical and non-radical claims and found that both were positively and significantly related to repression. All other results proved substantively identical to those presented below.

\(^{22}\) On the distinction between overt and covert repression see Davenport 2005. For more on the functioning of covert repressive activities see Cunningham (2005), Davenport (2011), and Marx (1988).
raids, protest policing, and politically motivated arrests. *Covert repression* is operationalized as private (and often non-violent) coercive actions in which the target is intended to be unaware of the activity. Examples include surveillance, wiretapping, informing other officers, initiating an investigation, and drafting security plans.

**Repression and Dissent in Guatemala, 1975-1985**

The period under investigation for this study was an extremely turbulent period in Guatemalan history. Armed struggles occurred between a variety of Leftist social movement organizations (including unions, peasant cooperatives, land rights groups Catholic activists, students, urban revolutionaries and Marxist insurgents) and a fractured military government aligned with the landowning and capitalist classes (Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; Ball et al. 1999; Brocket 2005; Carmack 1992; Garrard-Burnett 2011; Manz 2004; Schirmer 1998; Stoll 1993).

Political conflict emerged at different points in time and with varying intensity depending on where in the country one was located, and this variation is captured by the AHPN data. In some departments, such as Guatemala City or Escuintla, the AHPN records identify conflict behavior during the first few months under review. On the other end of the spectrum lie El Petén and Zacapa, two departments that appear to have been spared from the worst forms of violence. Once initiated, mobilization, overt challenges, and repression each ebbed and flowed in each department as challengers attempted to press claims against authorities and the government engaged in coercion to suppress such efforts (Brocket 2005; Stoll 1993).
Because of the wide variation in repressive behavior occurring in Guatemala, studying this case can provide lessons for an encompassing variety of repressive states, ranging from those engaged with lower level abuses to those committing more egregious violations. The period witnessed some of the most heinous acts of political repression to take place in the latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Over the course of the 10 years under review the Guatemalan government was responsible for killing more than 100,000 of its citizens (Ball et al. 1999). Yet at the same time, there were periods of peace, both in the time leading up to and away from violence and in locations unaffected by the fighting (Gulden 2002; Stoll 1993). In this way the case of Guatemala functions as a unique laboratory for examining a wide variety of challenger behavior and related repression while holding relatively constant other important factors such as regime type or international pressures theorized to influence decisions to repress.\textsuperscript{23}

Prior to 1977, a date often used to mark the onset of the civil war (e.g., Brocket 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003), mobilization and sporadic protests were organized by student organizations and labor unions operating in the capital. Acts of terror waged by urban revolutionaries and insurgent assassinations of large landowners have also been documented during this period (Brocket 2005; Garrard-Burnett 2011; Stoll 1993), while in the highlands, nascent insurgent organizations were engaged in their initial mobilization attempts (Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999). On the side of the government, surveillance of social activity, arrests of suspected dissident leaders without charge, killings, disappearances and the application of torture all appear to have been common

\textsuperscript{23} I discuss constraints on the generalizability of the case in the conclusion with a proposal for future research.
As the violence moved into the rural highlands (beginning 1979-1980), the available indicators document a sharp increase in repression (Ball et al. 1999; CEH 1999). Human rights organizations identify how rampant abuse occurred during this period; tens of thousands were killed and many more displaced from their homes (Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; Ball et al. 1999; CEH 1999; Sanford 2004). The strong overlap between identified political conflict and racial segregation led to charges of acts of genocide levied at government forces (CEH 1999).

Government estimates of insurgent mobilization subsequently dropped rapidly, from a high of more than 3,000 troops in 1982 to fewer than 300 in 1984 (CIA estimates from Doyle 1999) and government forces appeared to reestablish control throughout the country (Kobrak 1997; Schirmer 1998). Measures of repression similarly decreased steadily in 1983 and 1984 (Ball et al. 1999). With the imposition of constitutional rule in 1985, it appears that most of the violence had ended (Schirmer 1998).

**Analysis**

In line with the arguments above, it is expected that repressive action is related to challenger mobilization and that the repression of mobilization is specifically targeted at those mobilizing in support of radical ideals. To evaluate these contentions, the analysis identifies factors related to the use of political repression using a series of econometric analyses.
The methods most commonly employed to identify the causes of political repression are cross-sectional time-series models examining correlations between lagged measures of dissent and subsequent levels of repressive activity (e.g., Davenport 1995; 2007b; Poe and Tate 1994). A similar method is employed here. The units of analysis are department-months and the functional form for the model is specified as negative binomial due to the nature of the dependent variables, which are count data that display over dispersion (Winklelman 2008). The models include a number of controls out of concern that they might influence both lagged mobilization and ensuing repression. These include a log of the department’s population, the percentage of indigenous persons living in the department, the occurrence of electoral campaigns, democratic institutions, and twice-lagged measures of political repression.  

As designed, the empirical investigation first examines the relationship between mobilization, overt collective challenges and political repression across the entire time period, before engaging in a similar analysis to identify how the repression of mobilization might be conditional on the ideals, radical or non-radical, around which groups are mobilizing. The aim here is to identify whether mobilization is having an independent effect on decisions to engage in political repression, while controlling for the ebb and flow of overt collective challenges. Because of the level of temporal and spatial aggregation, it is difficult to tell whether overt collective challenges committed in the same department-month as mobilization are co-occurring or are being carried out by another organization elsewhere in the department or later in the month. However, given

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24 Population and ethnic composition come from census data (ANONYMIZED), electoral campaign data come from a list of campaign registries found in the AHPN, and democracy is measured using Vreeland’s (2008) X-Polity scores.
the integral role mobilization plays in sustaining as well as inspiring overt collective challenges and the fact that repression is expected to be related to both behaviors, it is important to include a control for measures of overt collective challenges in order to identify any independent impact mobilization may have on repression.

Subsequent analyses extend these ideas by limiting the analysis to time periods in which there are no overt collective challenges taking place. In this context, the objective is to test how mobilization is related to subsequent decisions to repress particularly during periods when challengers are not engaged in any overt threats.
Table SI-I: Evidence of the Causes of Repressive Action: Negative-Binomial Regression Models using the AHPN Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample of Department-Months 1975-1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1 Covert Repressive Action IRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Mobilization</td>
<td>0.102* (0.056) 1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Radical Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Non-Radical Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Overt Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.416*** (0.051) 1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.144*** (0.035) 1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Overt Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.116 (0.120) 1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Campaigns</td>
<td>1.116***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous</td>
<td>0.735***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Policy</td>
<td>-0.305***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-11.311***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.385)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test).
IRR=Incident Risk Ratio. All Lagged Variables Measured at t-1, Twice Lagged Variables Measured at t-2.
In a final examination, the study replicates the analysis using data derived from newspapers. Here the aim is to investigate how the source material used to study the topic might influence our ability to observe the repression of mobilization.

The results of the first set of analyses are displayed in Table I. For each variable in the model, the table presents the coefficient, standard error, and level of statistical significance. To aid in interpretation, the table also presents the incident rate ratio (IRR) for significant coefficients.25

Models 1 and 2 present the results estimating the effects of all forms of mobilization on the repressive actions of the state, while controlling for a host of important covariates. In Model 1, the analysis examines the covert repressive actions, while in Model 2 the analysis focuses on acts of overt repression. Both models examine the full sample of department-months from 1975-1985.

Results disclose that government forces respond to overt collective challenges with repressive activity, but that repression is also directed at the covert mobilization activities that inspire and sustain overt behavior. The analysis thus supports conventional wisdom in that overt behavioral threats prompt repression, but it also reveals that the conventional understanding of the topic only captures part of the story, missing the less-overt-mobilization aspect of contention.

As a general trend, as mobilization increases, government forces increase repression. This suggests that governments do not simply respond to overt collective challenges, but that they anticipate and undermine challengers by identifying and

\[\text{IRR} = \frac{\text{rate of predicted counts of repressive actions when a variable is increased one standard deviation above zero}}{\text{rate of predicted counts when that variable is held at zero}.} \]

All other variables are held at their means.

25 The IRR is calculated as the rate of predicted counts of repressive actions when a variable is increased one standard deviation above zero over the rate of predicted counts when that variable is held at zero. All other variables are held at their means.
repressing the mobilization activities that inspire and sustain overt behavior. On average, increasing the number of mobilizing activities in a department during one month is predicted to increase the amount of covert repressive actions in the department during the next month by 10% and the predicted number of overt repressive actions by 11%.

**Radical and Non-Radical Mobilization**

The evidence presented in the first two models demonstrates that there exist strong correlations between mobilization and repression. Models 3 and 4 in Table I analyze the ways in which the ideals of those mobilizing influence decisions to repress. These models replicate Models 1 and 2, except that they divide mobilization activities into radical and non-radical subtypes as specified above.

As expected, radical mobilization is related to positive and statistically significant increases in both covert and overt repressive activity. Non-radical mobilization, by contrast, is not significantly related to an increase in subsequent repression and in one case correlates with a sharp decrease in repressive capacity. In other words, government forces do not always respond to mobilization with repression. Instead, *increases in repression are specifically related to mobilization around ideals that most directly threaten political order*. Government forces aim to anticipate and/or suppress overt collective challenges and increase repressive action upon observing mobilization in support of radical ideals. On average, an increase in radical mobilization is related to a 12% increase in both covert and overt political repression.
Table SI-II: Robustness Checks: Negative-Binomial Regression Models using the AHPN Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excluding Department-Months Jointly Experiencing Mobilization and Overt Collective Challenges</th>
<th>Repression and Mobilization Prior to the Onset of Overt Collective Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 5 IRR</td>
<td>Model 6 IRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Radical Mobilization</td>
<td>0.539*** (0.141) 1.71</td>
<td>0.683* (0.331) 1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Non-Radical Mobilization</td>
<td>0.291 (0.811)  -16.726</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Overt Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.553*** (0.097) 1.74</td>
<td>0.311*** (0.066) 1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.234*** (0.068) 1.26</td>
<td>0.058 (0.051) -17.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Overt Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.573 (0.461) 0.878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Campaigns</td>
<td>1.240*** (0.149) 3.46</td>
<td>0.401 (0.333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Population</td>
<td>2.866** (1.239) 17.57</td>
<td>-0.709 (2.929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous</td>
<td>0.715*** (0.211) 2.05</td>
<td>1.238*** (0.357) 3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Polity</td>
<td>-0.306*** (0.035) 0.74</td>
<td>-0.293*** (0.084) 0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.449*** (2.781) -4.683</td>
<td>-13.873 (6.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3401</td>
<td>3401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alternative Specifications

Combined, Models 1 through 4 provide strong evidence that the deployment of political repression is significantly related to mobilization, particularly that in support of radical ideals. Models 5 through 7 in Table II examine these relationships across different model specifications. The previous models examined the effects of mobilization on political repression during periods in which there was the potential for mobilization and overt collective challenges to co-occur (as when, for example, mobilization is sustaining overt challenges or when challenges occur in the department in a different place or time). The alternative specifications are designed to identify the relationship between mobilization and state repression in settings when no overt collective challenges are present. This allows the models to more directly test the theoretical argument that governments use mobilization to anticipate overt collective challenges and direct repression at mobilization in order undermine challenger behavior.

Models 5 and 6 identify the effects of mobilization on subsequent repression by excluding from the analysis all department-months that jointly experienced both mobilization and overt collective challenges. In this analysis, any potential relationship between lagged measures of radical or non-radical mobilization and ensuing repression are independent from overt collective challenges by construction, as the only periods of
mobilization that are examined occur in department-months in which no overt collective challenges were recorded.  

Model 7 examines whether repression is related to radical mobilization even before the first instances of overt collective challenges emerge. For each department, the model excludes from the analysis the month in which any overt collective challenges were first recorded as well as all subsequent months. While the above analyses examined the waxing and waning of conflict and the development of mobilization and overt collective challenges across the full time period, Model 7 focuses on department-months predating the first observations of overt challenges. As noted above, conflict emerged in Guatemala in different departments at different points of time. By exploiting this variation, it is possible to see how mobilization and repression function prior to the appearance of overt collective challenges.

It is important to note a few things regarding this analysis before proceeding. First, there were no instances of overt collective challenges or electoral campaigns recorded in the department months under review and so these variables were dropped from the analysis. More interestingly, once overt repression was lagged twice, observations of this form of behavior could not be found in the data either. Nor are there instances of non-radical mobilization observed during this period. There are acts of overt repression that are located between dissident mobilization events and the first observed instances of overt collective challenges, but they precede overt collective challenges only

26 The analysis was also replicated while including contemporaneous measures of collective challenges. Results proved substantively identical and can be found in the Supplemental Information along with several other robustness checks.

27 A full listing of overt-collective-challenge-onset dates by department can be found in the Supporting Information.
by one or two months. Finally, during the period that precedes the onset of political conflict in each department, there were fewer than a dozen acts of overt repression observed and fewer than two-dozen acts of dissident mobilization. In essence, the period before overt collective challenges is essentially “pre-conflict.” As noted, mobilization and overt challenges ebbed and flowed in the different departments over time, but Model 7 examines the period before the onset of overt challenges. There was less mobilization, less repression, and significantly less variation to leverage. With only 22 departments and fewer than two-dozen cases of “conflict onset,” there proves to be too little variation to employ the maximum-likelihood econometric techniques estimated on the previous models on the different forms of repression individually. As a result, Model 7 estimates the relationship between lagged mobilization and all forms of repressive activity (overt and covert) together.

Interestingly, when department-months jointly experiencing both mobilization and overt collective challenges are excluded from the analysis in Models 5 and 6, the observed relationship between mobilization and ensuing repressive behavior becomes even more pronounced. This is true for both covert (Model 5) and overt (Model 6) repressive behavior. Within this analysis, acts of radical dissident mobilization are predicted to increase the amount of subsequent covert repression by 71% and nearly double the government’s deployment of overt repression.

28 Every instance of overt repression remaining in the sample was predated by at least one act of mobilization.
29 By comparison, there were nearly four-dozen acts of covert repressive behavior recorded during this period.
Analyzing the relationship between mobilizing events and coercive behavior in Model 7 provides additional evidence of the strong positive and statistically significant correlations between mobilization and the application of repression. In this case, following radical dissident mobilization, repression is predicted to increase more than eight fold.\(^\text{30}\)

Within the context of the present study, the evidence strongly supports the contention that governments do not wait for overt collective challenges to take place, but take repressive action targeting the mobilizing activities that initiate and sustain overt collective challenges. The repression of mobilization is targeted specifically at those organizations mobilizing in support for ideals that directly threaten the stability of the political regime. Government forces appear willing to allow certain forms of non-radical mobilization to take place uncoerced, but if an organization mobilizes in support for radical changes, government forces escalate political repression.

Replication with Newspaper Data

In addition to the theoretical biases recognized in the literature, there are issues related to the data employed in the empirical analysis of the topic that may have contributed to the validation of “threat-response” theories of political repression within previous work. To explore this idea, Table III replicates the analysis from Table I using data taken from local and international newspapers.

\(^{30}\) Nevertheless, care should be taken when interpreting the results of this model as the magnitude of this is influenced by the fact that repression was applied (on average) at a far lower rate during these initial periods.
Table SI-III: Replication: Negative-Binomial Regression Models using Newspaper Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 8 Covert Repressive Action</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Model 9 Overt Repressive Action</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Model 10 Covert Repressive Action</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Model 11 Overt Repressive Action</th>
<th>IRR</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lagged Mobilization</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.561</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.914)</td>
<td>(0.459)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Radical Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.081</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.876)</td>
<td>(0.663)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lagged Non-Radical Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td>-11.126</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
<td>(0.711)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lagged Overt Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.251**</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.258***</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.192**</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.243***</td>
<td>1.27</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.194</td>
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<td>0.336</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
<td>(0.405)</td>
<td>(0.944)</td>
<td>(0.409)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Overt Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.401*</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.394*</td>
<td>1.48</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.928)</td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.364)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Campaigns</th>
<th>0.867**</th>
<th>2.38</th>
<th>0.243</th>
<th>0.948***</th>
<th>2.58</th>
<th>0.256</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.290)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.029)</td>
<td>(2.366)</td>
<td>(5.024)</td>
<td>(2.392)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Indigenous</th>
<th>0.199</th>
<th>1.144**</th>
<th>3.14</th>
<th>0.234</th>
<th>1.140**</th>
<th>3.12</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.910)</td>
<td>(0.408)</td>
<td>(0.922)</td>
<td>(0.401)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X-Polity</th>
<th>-0.504****</th>
<th>0.60</th>
<th>-0.363***</th>
<th>0.69</th>
<th>-0.505***</th>
<th>0.60</th>
<th>-0.396***</th>
<th>0.69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-9.225***</td>
<td>-27.328</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N | 3568 | 3568 | 3568 | 3568 |       |      |

Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One Tailed Test). IRR=Incident Risk Ratio. All Lagged Variables Measured at t-1, Twice Lagged Variables Measured at t-2.
In the analyses, overt collective challenges are highly related to the subsequent application of both covert and overt repression actions, while dissident mobilizing activities are not significantly related to either dependent variable. An increase in overt collective challenges engaged in by the dissidents is expected to increase subsequent covert repressive actions by 28% and subsequent overt repressive actions by 29%. At the same time, the newspaper data do not show any significant relationships between dissident mobilization (of any type) and the repressive behavior of the state. Models 5 and 6 are replicated in the Supplementary Information and produced similarly insignificant results. However, tellingly, it proved impossible to replicate an analysis of mobilization and repression prior to the emergence of overt collective challenges because the newspapers did not record any instances of repression during this period. When months after the first instance of collective recorded in the newspaper data were dropped to replicate Model 7, there were no observed instances of either covert or overt repressive behavior left in the data.

The results of this replication analysis shine light on significant biases in analyses of repression and dissent conducted using newspaper data. When news sources are used in the analysis, the robust correlations between dissident mobilization and repression disappear. Analyzed in this fashion, the results would thus fail to identify efforts by government forces to repress dissidents before they can engage in overt collective challenges.
Conclusion

This study has argued that the range of repressive activity employed to protect political order is significantly broader than the conceptualization found in much of the literature on political conflict. While it is often suggested that dissidents’ fear of repression deters them from challenging the state, existing research commonly portrays the government as committing repression only in response to some ongoing challenge. Instead, the study argues that governments aim to anticipate challenger development by monitoring social behavior and claims making in order to identify signals heralding the development of the most costly future challenges. Governments direct repression against those mobilizing in support of radical redistributions of political power to suppress the likelihood that future overt collective challenges to directly threaten their authority. Analysis of unique data on the behavior of the Guatemalan security apparatus confirms these expectations and reveals how government forces anticipate and/or undermine overt collective challenges by repressing radical mobilization.

Future research will need to examine these relationships in more democratic or less violent contexts than those examined in this study. The key to doing this successfully will be to collect new and better data on the behavior of government forces and on those who would hope to challenge them. The relationship between mobilization and political repression was obscured when the analysis was replicated using newspaper data, which suggests that the news media incorrectly portray governments as more reactionary and less inclined to repress mobilization. Though it is rare to find data that are comparable in scope and quality to the documents employed in this study, recent efforts to collect conflict data from unconventional sources have the potential to open up new avenues for
studying repression and mobilization (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Davenport forthcoming; King et al. 2013).

If the relationship between repression and mobilization does hold, research will need to address the implications for theories of political order and conflict. Dominant models of repression will need to incorporate signals about future contestation into government decision calculi, while social movement theories will have to be amended to consider how organizers attempt to outpace government efforts to suppress mobilization. Finally, by advancing understandings of early contestation between governments and nascent challengers, it could be possible to develop more dynamic models of repression and mobilization that can push beyond the existing structural understandings of civil conflict to improve forecasts for when such encounters are likely to escalate to widespread violence.
Works Referenced


Ritter, Emily. forthcoming. “Policy Disputes, Political Survival and the Onset and Severity of Repression.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*


Young, Joseph. *Repression, Dissent and the Onset of Civil War: States, Dissidents and the Production of Armed Conflict*. PhD. Dissertation. Florida State University
Chapter 3: Political Repression and the Dismantling of Opposition Organizations

Abstract: Understandings of political order and conflict are founded on beliefs about the central importance of the state’s capacity for repression. Yet, the perception that coercive capacity is crucial for understanding the persistence of political order or the occurrence of conflict is challenged by the fact that within the scholarly literature there appears to be no clear relationship between repression and a reduction in collective challenges. This study contends that understanding whether repression escalates or deescalates conflict necessitates attention to how repression is linked to the organizational processes associated with the development of challenges to political authority. These arguments are tested using unique data gathered from a previously confidential archive of Guatemalan police documents. Instrumental variables estimates are presented using seemingly exogenous variation in repression resulting from the publication of NGO reports. The results confirm the expectations of the argument. Implications are drawn for the study of order and conflict.
Understandings of political order and conflict are founded on beliefs about the central importance of the state’s coercive capacity, the mobilization potential of challenging groups, and the interaction of these two forces. When repression succeeds in limiting dissent, governments strengthen their monopoly over the use of force and limit the capacity for organized challenges to political authority. When repression fails, it can lead to an escalation of challenger activity and the deterioration of order into civil war or revolution.

Yet, the perception that coercive capacity is crucial for understanding the persistence of political order must confront the fact that civil wars and revolutions seem to occur at times in spite of the strongest attempts of political authorities to suppress them (Goldstone 2001; Beissinger 2013). For decades, scholars have pursued investigations of how repression impacts the willingness of individuals to participate in overt, collective challenges to political authority, such as protests, strikes or acts of terror. But within the scholarly literature, there appears to be no clear relationship between the application of political repression and a reduction in collective challenges (see Davenport et al. 2005; Davenport 2007a). Within some research, repression appears to operate as a highly effective deterrent (e.g., Cunningham and Noakes 2008; Daxecker and Hess 2013). But other work presents evidence that repression is often unable to control or eliminate dissent, and at times contributes to a backlash (e.g., Moore 1998; Walsh and Piazza 2010; Dugan and Chenoweth 2012).  

\[31\]

\[31\] Repression refers to, “coercive actions political authorities take to inhibit the will or capacity of people within their jurisdiction to influence political outcomes” (Ritter 2014). Dissent refers to “a sustained, organized…effort making collective claims of target authorities” (Tilly 2004, p 53).
Building on a burgeoning subfield studying the organizational processes associated with rebellion (e.g., Weinstein 2007; Staniland 2012; Lewis 2012; Parkinson 2013), this study identifies distinct processes in the organization of dissent and contends that the impact of repression on dissent is conditional on the types of organizational behavior governments target with repression. Governments are able to suppress dissent when they can direct repression at the clandestine mobilization activities (such as recruiting new members, training participants, holding meetings, and campaigning for funds) necessary to inspire and sustain challenges against the government. When coercion is targeted at these forms of organizational behavior, repression undermines the capacity of the organization to coordinate collective action and incentivize participation, thereby diminishing collective challenges. Alternatively, when repression is directed at overt, collective challenges, such as for example when police respond to an ongoing demonstration or riot, repression leads to conflict escalation. In this case, repression leaves challenger organizations intact to publicize abuse and deliver the selective incentives necessary to promote further challenges.

To test these arguments, the research design employs highly disaggregated data collected from an archive of previously confidential police documents in Guatemala. The precise nature of the data enables to study to identify the targets of each repressive action, as well as where and when such repression occurs and the type of activity it targets (i.e., mobilization activities or overt, collective challenges). An innovative instrumental variables design identifies seemingly exogenous variation in repression occurring as a response to the publication of international and domestic human rights reports on government abuses (e.g., Conrad and DeMeritt 2011; Murdie and Davis 2012; see also
Results disclose that repression directed at dissident mobilization activities is strongly correlated with a decrease in challenges against the state. Further analysis of the data demonstrates how repression directed at overt, collective challenges is, on average, related to increased collective challenges.

In addition to providing resolution to the puzzle of repression’s impact on behavioral challenges, the results reveal a number of important selection mechanisms operating in existing analyses of order and conflict. When governments can disrupt the mobilization process, certain types of political expression are systematically censored from the public sphere. Alternatively, when dissidents can mobilize without being targeted by repression, they are able to recruit and inspire participation in overt, collective challenges even as governments attempt to repress those activities. The success or failure of mobilizers’ efforts to evade repression will shape the types of movements that emerge to challenge the government as well as the issues over which conflict occurs.

The rest of the article proceeds as follows: First, I review the literature on repression and dissent. Second, I present a theory on the form and function of repression targeting mobilization activities and how it differs from repression targeting overt, collective challenges. Third, I provide context to the analysis by detailing the development of repression and dissent in Guatemala from 1975-1985. Fourth, I present the data and identification strategy. The fifth section presents the analysis. In the conclusion, I discuss the implications for future research on political order and conflict.
Researching Repression

On the morning of January 30th, 1980, a group of armed indigenous peasants and student activists occupied the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City to protest human rights violations taking place in Northern Guatemala. Police forces surrounded the building and fired phosphorous gas into the Embassy to disperse the protest. The gas ignited and the resulting fire killed 36 people (AHPN 2010a).

On that same day, another unit of the Guatemalan police was busy conducting surveillance operations on a group of organizers and community leaders in the municipality of Chimaltenango, whom police suspected of publishing pamphlets to incite the local population to rise up against the regime (AHPN 2010b). Over the next two months, organizers in Chimaltenango were steadily kidnapped or disappeared by agents of the Guatemalan government (AHPN 2010c).

These two repressive events epitomize two distinct methods of government coercion. In the first, state agents responded to an overt, collective challenge, attempting to impose costs on the dissidents. In the second, state agents identified the mobilization activities that support overt, collective challenges and directed repression at organizers in an effort to limit their capacity for coordinating challenges. Similarly, their effects were broadly divergent. In the months following the embassy fire, Guatemala City witnessed a surge of insurgent bombings and attacks on the police (e.g., AHPN 2010d; 2010e; 2010f). In Chimaltenango, the next collective challenge did take place until nearly a year later (e.g., AHPN 2010g).

Historically, when looking at the repression of dissent, scholars have been principally concerned with events such as those at the Spanish Embassy, in which state
forces respond to ongoing challenges, such as riots, protests, acts of terrorism and insurgent attacks. In one of the literature’s most robust findings, states have been shown recurrently to increase their use of political repression in response to observed increases in overt challenges (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; 2007b). And there exist wide swaths of literature on topics concerned with repressive responses to specific forms of challenges, including studies on protest policing, counter-terrorism, and counterinsurgency.

Yet across the literature, the results that have emerged from studies estimating the effects of repression on dissent have been broadly inconsistent (e.g., Gurr and Moore 1997; Moore 1998; Linden and Klandermans 2006; Lyall 2009; Walsh and Piazza 2010; Dugan and Chenoweth 2012; Daxecker and Hess 2013). In recognition of the competing findings, different research trajectories have sought to resolve the paradox in various ways. For example, separate lines of research have studied how repression might generate opposing effects depending on when exactly it was applied or depending on whether the victims were chosen selectively or indiscriminately. Such work demonstrates that greater attention needs to be paid to how individual dissident actions build on one another and how repression’s impact may vary depending on when it is applied (e.g., Snyder 1976; Lichbach 1987; Koopmans 1997; Moore 1998; Beissinger 2002, ch 7; Brocket 2005; Sullivan et al. 2012). It is also apparent that understanding how repression shapes challenger behavior necessitates linking individual repressive events to their

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32 Part of the explanation for the inconsistencies identified in the literature on repression and dissent must lie in the fact that studies on the topic analyze rely on a multitude of different datasets to analyze a broadly diverse set of cases. Such work has traditionally paid little attention to issues of endogeneity beyond lagging the key independent variable. Consequently, it is likely that the spectrum of results identified is capturing endogenous repression-dissent dynamics in different locations and times rather than the exogenous influences of repression on dissent.

One path forward is to consider the process of organizing challenges to political authority as well as how the effects of repression might be conditional on the types of organizational behavior targeted with repression. For example, studies on repressive timing give little attention to why dissent might be escalating or decreasing except to say that given some initial movement in dissent and the application of political repression, we are likely to observe change in the direction of the slope of challenger behavior. At the same time, in the literature on the targeting of repression, all selectively targeted acts of repression are anticipated to have the same effects regardless of how dissidents were behaving at the time they were targeted by the state. Questions remain about whether selectively targeted repression might generate different effects conditional on how the targets were behaving at the time they were repressed. Below, I outline an approach that considers the difficult process of organizing dissent and presents a theory specifying the contingent impact of repression directed at different dissident activities.

**Mobilization, Repression, and Overt, Collective challenges**

As Przeworski (1988, 51-52) observed, “What matters for the stability of any regime is not [a] particular system of domination but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives.” Consistent with this contention, past research suggests that overt, collective challenges (e.g., protests, strikes, acts of terror, or insurgent attacks) cannot emerge except out of some preexisting organizational platform that serves to coordinate participants, direct strategy, and deliver selective incentives (e.g., McCarthy and Zald
In the absence of organized alternative to the regime, resistance can operate in the form of scattered attacks (Tilly 2003, 170-193), such as foot-dragging, sabotage and other weapons of the weak (Scott 1985; 1990), but individuals are often unwilling or unable to speak collectively against the status quo political order.

Thus, while mass participation in the end stages of a revolution can appear spontaneous (e.g., Kuran 1993; Lohman 1993), such collective action is reliant on a smaller group of organizers who sustain the movement during times of quiescence and support participation once a protest wave has begun (Taylor 1989). Organizational formation, development, and maintenance occur through a series of behaviors that can be referred to collectively as “mobilization activities.” Mobilization activities (which include actions such as holding clandestine meetings, creating new institutions and roles, campaigning for funds or equipment, generating shared symbols and identities, disseminating information, recruiting new members, and training participants) are generally clandestine, collective behaviors necessary to form a viable organizational alternative to the regime that can be used to inspire and support overt, collective challenges.

Mobilization activities are difficult and require extensive contributions from a relatively small set of individuals (Oliver 1984). Yet they fulfill a number of important functions necessary for supporting and sustaining participation in overt, collective challenges. Three are particularly significant. First, mobilization activities help to restructure social affiliations (Lichbach 1998, 149-156). By shaping social ties,
influencing communication, directing information and providing collective resources to members, such as common symbols, focal points, and values, mobilization activities influence the alignment of preexisting social networks and organizations away from the state and towards opposition (e.g., Morris 1984, ch. 3; Chong 1991, ch 6; Gould 1995; Wood 2003, ch. 3-4; Parkinson 2013). The effect increases shared expectations for participation in overt, collective challenges. Second, mobilization activities provide for the accumulation of resources that can be redistributed as selective incentives (Lichbach, 1998, 36-38). Supply networks are established to funnel resources, such as food, funding or weapons, into an organization infrastructure that can reallocate the resource flows to individuals on the periphery of the movement (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984, ch. 8; Oliver 1984; Chong 1991, 126-141; Staniland 2012; Parkinson 2013). The effect is to provide the structural foundation for growth by increasing the incentives for individual participation in overt, collective challenges. Finally, mobilization activities help institutionalize tit-for-tat reciprocity (Lichbach 1998, 129-146). Mobilization activities support an organizational base from which the sustained interactions necessary for the evolution of collective monitoring and enforcement can be developed (e.g., Hardin 1982, 165-187; Axelrod 1984, 124-142; Ostrom 1990, 94-100; Chong 1991, ch. 3). The effect is to facilitate the long-term trust necessary to produce cooperation even when any one individual’s participation is contingent on the participation of others.

In the presence of sustained mobilization, the possibilities for mass participation shift dramatically. Individuals who had previously acquiesced to political authority find themselves forced to choose between the demands of the existing government and an organized challenger promising a variety of selective and collective goods in exchange
for individual participation (Tilly 1978, 192). In this way, mobilization activities must begin before overt, collective challenges, but also must persist to sustain overt, collective challenges over time.

The Multi-directional Impacts of Political Repression

For governments seeking to maximize the security of their office, repression is a tool commonly utilized to disrupt the development of dissent (Davenport 2007a). Sophisticated surveillance apparatuses are established to monitor social behavior and detect movements toward overt, collective challenges, while armed security forces are trained to direct coercive force at perceived threats.

Through the development of these instruments of repression and their past experience interacting with dissidents, governments come to recognize the organizational processes necessary to inspire and sustain challenges to their rule (Sullivan 2013). Consequently, as part of repressive efforts to secure their tenures, governments look to identify behaviors, such as meetings, seminars, fundraising or recruitment drives, which do not directly threaten the government, but involve the coordination of individuals and signal organization in support of collective challenges. Employing repression against such activities, even when dissidents are not actively challenging the government, can prevent overt, collective challenges by depleting the organizations necessary to inspire and sustain such activity.33 When mobilization activities are ongoing, individuals share common expectations and trust that enables them to overcome internal barriers to

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33 These predicted effects are expected to hold on average, ceteris paribus. In the conclusion I address some structural factors that might mediate the relationship between repression, mobilizing activities, and overt, collective challenges.
participation and to act collectively. However, when mobilization activities are not possible because government coercion has disrupted the organization necessary to coordinate such behavior, would-be-challengers return to a situation in which they view participation in overt collective challenges to be personally impractical.

Repressing mobilization activities can be quite difficult for governments, as this behavior typically takes place clandestinely. Challenger organizations attempt to shield their behavior from the government, for example by developing safe houses and clandestine supply networks. The challenges associated with identifying mobilization activities and directing repression at such behavior mean that even while governments may prefer to repress mobilization prior to the onset of overt, collective challenges, governments can have trouble identifying the initial instances of mobilization activities. But as governments begin to suspect increased mobilization activities (for example when movements reveal their capacity for overt, collective challenges by engaging in public demonstrations or when government surveillance yields actionable intelligence), government forces are redistributed to restrict mobilization activities by directing surveillance and repression at suspected mobilization sites.

When governments are able to identify mobilization activities and direct repression at those efforts, repression targets the individuals at the heart of challenger organizations. These organizers are responsible for investing disproportionately in developing behavioral challenges. Without the rank and file present, the security forces repressing mobilization activities can focus coercion on removing these individuals and disrupting

34 It suffices to say that there is a minimum amount of state capacity necessary to identify and repress mobilization activities. State capacity is addressed in greater detail below and in the Supplementary Appendix.
their behavior. At the same time, repressing mobilization activities depletes challenger organizations of important resources such as weapons, printing presses, and safe houses.

There are important implications for the production of collective challenges. First, targeting mobilization activities with repression can lead members of the collectivity to reevaluate decisions to align themselves in opposition to the state. Repressing mobilization activities targets the core organizations responsible for sustaining common expectations for cooperate behavior, and can disrupt delicate assurances for cooperation. Second, repressing mobilization activities can deplete the resources available for organizations to fund their activities and incentivize participation. Finally, it can destabilize long term trust between individuals. Repressing mobilization activities limits the capacity for challenger organizations to fulfill their commitments to members, which can push tit-for-tat strategies away from an all cooperate equilibrium to an all defect equilibrium. Consequently, when governments engage in political repression targeting mobilizing activities, it diminishes the capacity for overt, collective challenges. This leads to the study’s first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *When mobilization activities are repressed, overt, collective challenges will decrease.*
By contrast, repression targeting overt, collective challenges, such as protests, strikes or ongoing attacks, does little to diminish the capacity for challenges to the state. While governments commonly employ repression against overt, collective challenges as they attempt to suppress dissent (e.g., Davenport 1995; Carey 2010), repressing collective challenges leaves in place the organizational infrastructure to facilitate dissent. When states target ongoing collective challenges with repression, they are able to selectively target challengers, but they often target those on the front lines, leaving organizers, and their mobilized resources safe behind the scenes.

In the light of repression, the organization can publicize abuses committed by government forces as a focal point or rallying cry to direct new collective action. Mobilizers can expose abuses committed during the repression of collective challenges, identifying state coercion as a threat to collective interests (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). Simultaneously, the organization is able to vouch for existing assurances of cooptation as well as dole out the requisite selective incentives to sustain participation. They can provide some protections to members, shielding them from some of the personal costs of repression (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). As a result, in the wake of repression targeting overt challenges, backlash waves can emerge that increase overt, collective challenges.

This discussion yields the second testable hypothesis:

35 There are no municipality-months in the data that jointly experience mobilization activities and collective challenges, and thus no sites in which both mobilization activities and overt, collective challenges are repressed.
36 In addition to increasing the amount of challenges that are observed after the repression of overt, collective challenges, repression may influence the form such challenges take (for example, by pushing movements underground and away from mass politics [della Porta 1995]). Future work will be necessary to investigate the relationship between tactical selection and the number of challenges directed at the government in the wake of political repression.
Hypothesis 2: When overt, collective challenges are repressed, overt, collective challenges will increase.

**Case Selection**

The arguments above are evaluated using data on government and challenger behavior from Guatemala between 1975 and 1985. Over this period, the government of Guatemala employed a wide variety of repressive tactics, from torture and targeted assassinations to massacres, against a broad set of challengers and would-be challengers that included unions, peasant cooperatives, land rights groups Catholic activists, students, urban revolutionaries, and Marxist insurgents (see Carmack 1992; Stoll 1993; Schirmer 1998; Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; Ball et al. 1999; Manz 2004; Brocket 2005; Garrard-Burnett 2011).

The form and severity of contentious politics varied widely across both time and space. Early on in the period, the conflict was largely isolated to the more urban municipalities such as Guatemala City or Escuintla. But as repression escalated, conflict spread in to the rural highland and to municipalities such as El Petén and Zacapa. By 1977, many observers of the county (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Brocket 2005) characterize the country as being in a state of civil war. Repression hit its peak between 1981 and 1983. Human rights organizations identify how rampant abuse occurred during this period; tens of thousands were killed and many more displaced from their homes (CEH 1999; Ball et al. 1999; Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; Sanford 2004). Political conflict continued to wax and wane in both territorial scope and intensity during the period in review, but eventually conflict between the state and the organized opposition
settled into a low level stalemate that persisted for more than a decade before the 1996 peace negotiations brought an end to a particularly violent phase of Guatemalan history (Ball et al. 1999; CEH 1999).

While many observers see the government’s pacification of the country as a victory of indiscriminate violence, particularly the massacres committed by an elite unit known as the Kaibiles (e.g., Stoll 1993; Perrera 1993; CEH 1999), it is important to note that while massacres are perhaps the most appalling form of government violence, repression in Guatemala encompassed an extremely broad variety of tactics deployed by several different units within the security apparatus. In the highlands, military massacres were commonly combined with two efforts to eradicate the base from which rural insurgents were mobilizing—forced displacement of indigenous peasants into “model villages” and the organization of remaining communities into paramilitary units directly overseen by the government. Alongside this military effort, the National Police engaged in a broad repressive campaign designed to root out individuals believed to be “subversives” throughout the country. 37 While the application of repression by the National Police has received less attention, the police were no less ferocious in their efforts to counter what the government perceived to be a growing communist threat perpetrated by a unified front of unions, student activists, indigenous organizers and insurgent organizations (e.g., Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999; CEH 1999; Weld 2010). 38

37 The police archives discussed below contain detailed information on repressive activity engaged in by the military as well as the police. 48% of the repressive events identified either exclusively involved the military or involved coordinated actions both the military and the police. The National Police committed the remaining activities.

38 In actuality, these groups were fractured and pursued what were often mutually exclusive goals. In future analyses of the material studied in this research, it will be possible to disaggregate dyadic interactions between government forces and specific social movements.
In order to track the activities of these groups, target coercive behavior, and evaluate its effects, the state developed a sophisticated system of surveillance, reporting, and archiving in which the National Police played a large role (Guberek 2012; Weld 2010; Schirmer 1998). Guatemala received millions of dollars of aid and direct training in intelligence collection from the CIA and the US Army, as well as the Israeli, Argentine, Colombian, Chilean, and Taiwanese intelligence forces (McClintock 1985; Jonas 1996; Schirmer 1998). Much of this money was devoted to developing a police force (with national jurisdiction) that was highly skilled at investigation, intimidation, arrest, disappearance, and torture (CEH 1999; Archdiocese 1999).

Because of the wide variation in repressive behavior occurring in Guatemala, studying this case can provide lessons for an encompassing variety of repressive states, ranging from those engaged with lower level abuses to those committing more egregious violations. In this way the case of Guatemala functions as a unique laboratory for examining repressive action. It is certainly an outlier in terms of the amount of repressive action employed, which to some may indicate that the case can only be generalized to other civil war settings. But that sidesteps the question of how civil wars emerge, effectively ignoring the fact that civil war is the result of strategic decisions made by governments and challengers. Periods of heightened violence ebbed and flowed over different areas of Guatemala during the decade in review. I return to the discussion of generalizability in the conclusion. But it is important to note that examining this case allows the analysis to study variation across the full spectrum of repressive practices, while holding many other important external factors constant. Examining variation within this single country can also address the micro-dynamics of challenger organization and
government targeting that cannot be identified through studies employing broad cross-
national datasets (e.g., Davenport 1995; 2007b; Nordas and Davenport 2013; Danneman
and Ritter forthcoming)

Data

Identifying the impacts of repression targeting mobilization activities or overt,
collective challenges requires a research strategy that is distinct from the strategy most
commonly employed in the existing literature. Across the existing research on repression,
scholars have followed a reasonably consistent methodological sequence. The first step
has been to collect information on the political actions committed by states and
challengers and recorded by different ledger sources (e.g., newspapers). These recordings
are then coded into events data and analyzed to test how repression committed at one
point in time impacts counts of challenger activity occurring afterwards (e.g., Francisco

There are two principal concerns with the existing approach. The first is that the
ledger sources most often employed within existing work tend to be biased towards the
reporting of specific events—those that are large, urban and violent (Davenport and Ball
2002; Earl et al. 2004). As a consequence, the empirical records analyzed within the
existing research often miss the small, private mobilization activities that inspire and
sustain overt, collective challenges (Sullivan 2013). The second concern has to do with
the information that is extracted when scholars code the available events records.
Imprecise information in the existing ledger sources means that the existing work often
has to rely on crude indicators for their theoretical concepts, for example by proxying
challenger development based on increases or decreases in observed overt, collective challenges (e.g., Brocket 2005; Sullivan et al. 2012) or using the technology of repression as a proxy for its target selection (e.g., Lyall 2009; Kocher et al. 2012).

Looking forward, research will require data that are more precise and disaggregated across both time and space. Such data will have to be based on alternative sources capable of identifying the smaller events that form the basis for organizing overt challenges. Lastly, when coding this alternative source material, greater details are needed to locate exactly whom or what the government is targeting.

Data for this study are taken from the Guatemalan National Police Archive (AHPN), an archive of police records found in Guatemala City. For nearly a hundred years, the Guatemalan National Police stored their records in a large series of warehouses located in police compound on the outskirts of the city. In 1996, the National Police were disbanded and reformed into the new National Civilian Police, which included members of the demobilized insurgent organizations. Documents lingered in the warehouse for nearly ten years until they were discovered by the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office in 2006 (Doyle 2006).

What the Ombudsman discovered was a trove of more than 80 million records containing information produced during the routine bureaucratic processes that accompany police surveillance, arrests, torture as well as other repressive acts carried out by the state. With aid from several European governments, the warehouse was transformed into the AHPN. Each document was organized, indexed, and archived, the approximately 10 million documents dating from 1975-1985 were digitized and entered
into an electronic archive. Those documents were released to the public in early 2009 and this project was one of the first to access the full digital collection.

Data generated from the AHPN are employed to track the diverse behavior of social movements and members of civil society, identify acts of political repression by government forces, and identify the effects of repression on overt, collective challenges. For example, records from the AHPN contain information on more than 3,000 events participated in by members of civil society or social movements. A similar sample collected from the major international and domestic press identified fewer than 1,000 events (Sullivan 2013). Most importantly, the AHPN data allow for direct observation of the targets of political repression. Where as other data sets have been forced to draw inferences about targeting based on the form of repression applied, such as the weapon utilized, or scope of victimization, the police files typically overtly identify both the type of activity the engaged in by state forces and the groups or individuals that activity was directed against.

To generate an events database of political activity from 10 million documents recorded in the AHPN, a multi-stage sampling procedure was carried out. In total, more than a quarter million files were read including every file sent to either the Director General’s office and the Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity. Coders

39 With regards to the reporting of repression, it is important be conscious of bias against the reporting of atrocities. The Supplemental Appendix contains a discussion detailing case specific information on underreporting as it pertains to the study’s analysis.

40 Details on the sampling procedure can be found in the Supplemental Appendix and in Sullivan 2013. The files were read by myself and two other human coders, and I adjudicated any coding disputes. Inter-coder reliability checks consistently demonstrated reliability rates well above 85%. The coding rubric along with additional details on the data collection process can be found on my website: http://www.sullivanchristophermichael.com.
read each file and coded all politically relevant events into the database using a coding rubric that included nearly one hundred event types.\textsuperscript{41}

What is unique about the database is the dyadic nature of state-challenger interactions that is built into its structure. For each event, variables record how members of civil society were behaving and how representatives of the Guatemalan state were behaving. For example, for a protest, the protesting organization is coded, as well as their behavior during the protest. If the government responded by policing the protest, then the relevant policing organization was identified and their behavior was coded. If the protest went on but was not policed, then the columns identifying state behavior were coded 0. Similarly, if the state engaged in an activity in which there was no identifiable related civil society behavior, for example the enforcement of perimeter lines around a public square, then the columns for civil society actors were coded 0.

**Operationalization and Research Design**

*Mobilization activities* are operationalized as identified challenger behavior that is designed to increase the level of formal organization of a challenger group or to raise the resource endowment of existing challenger organizations. Examples of challenger mobilization activities that are captured in the data include the distribution of information, organizational meetings, training sessions and recruitment efforts. *Overt, Collective Challenges* are operationalized as public efforts by organized challengers to

\textsuperscript{41} The database thus captures all political activity identified by the National Police and the Military Coordination office. This corpus can be used as a proxy for the set of political activity the government was aware of, but should not be thought of as a complete universe of political actions.
press claims against political authority. Examples include strikes, demonstrations, marches, roadblocks, targeted killings, arson, kidnapping and the taking of hostages.\textsuperscript{42}

*Political repression* is operationalized as politically motivated violence committed by representatives of the state against individuals under their political jurisdiction. Examples of political repression that are captured in the data include death threats, torture, disappearances, shootings, raids, protest policing and politically motivated arrests. Each instance of political repression is further coded as to the type of non-state action (i.e., mobilization activities or overt collective challenge) it is related to. Through this process, it is possible to identify for each incident of political repression whether that repression was directed at the mobilizing activities of would-be dissidents, at ongoing collective challenges, or at no apparent act of dissident behavior.\textsuperscript{43}

For the analyses below, the units of analysis are monthly measures of political activity in each of Guatemala’s municipalities from 1975-1985.\textsuperscript{44} The analysis investigates how repression targeting mobilization activities influenced later rates of collective challenges by dissidents as well as how repression targeting overt, collective challenges influenced dissident challenges. It is important to note the relevant comparison being made in this analysis. The aim not to draw inferences about how rates of challenges following the repression of mobilization activities compared to rates of challenges

\textsuperscript{42} This is admittedly a broad categorization. Future analyses might further divide overt, collective challenges based on the various tactics employed by challengers.

\textsuperscript{43} There were very few incidents of repression (fewer than 50) for which there was no connected or related act of non-state behavior. This fact provides some interesting insight into when, how and why repression is applied. On the other side, there were a large number (more than 800) incidents of mobilization activities and collective challenges for which the state’s only identifiable action was the filing of a report.

\textsuperscript{44} Municipalities are the second smallest administrative unit in Guatemala. During the period under review, there were 326 municipalities in the country. The smallest was San Jose Chacaya, with 464 inhabitants in 1981, and the largest was Guatemala City, which held 754,243 inhabitants.
following the repression of overt, collective challenges. Instead, the design is attempting to draw inferences about how the repression of mobilization activities impacts challenges, when compared to situations in which mobilization activities took place but repression did not occur. Similarly, for repression directed against overt, collective challenges, the study is attempting to draw inferences about how rates of dissident activity compare following the repression of overt, challenges relative to when repression was not applied.

**Identification Strategy**

This study employs an instrumental-variables (IV) design as its analytic strategy to identify how repression targeting mobilization activities or overt, collective challenges impacts dissent. The objective is to generate estimates for how different forms of repressive behavior affect overt, collective challenges by paying acute attention to how collective challenges would have unfolded if repression were not applied. Like most social phenomena, repression is (generally) applied non-randomly (Conrad and Ritter 2014). To the extent that the selection processes associated government decisions to apply repression are related to the expected behavior of dissidents, then correlations between repression and dissident behavior are likely to be biased (Sullivan et al. 2012).

IV regression employs two equations in order to first identify seemingly exogenous variation in the independent variable (i.e., repression targeting mobilization activities or collective challenges) and then examine how that exogenous variation relates to measures of the dependent variable (i.e., overt, collective challenges) (Angrist and Pischkey 2009).
NGO reports on governmental human rights abuses are employed as an instrument to identify as-if-randomization in the application of political repression. Specifically, the study utilizes the percentage of state human rights abuses identified by human rights NGOs (calculated as the number of abuses recorded in NGO reports over the total number of abuses identified in the data). Data on NGO human rights reporting come from the publications of five human rights organizations—Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and three Guatemalan human rights groups. They were compiled by The Center for Human Rights Research (CIIDH), a nongovernmental organization based in Guatemala City, during the truth and reconciliation processes that took place in Guatemala in the 1990s (Ball et al., 1999; Ball, 1999; Ball, 2001). The project, which was directed by the Human Rights Data Analysis Group for the purpose of identifying incidents of human rights abuses committed by state forces, insurgents, and other militant actors, began with a thorough review of published human rights documents. These reports were coded for who committed the act, as well as where and when it took place. The CIIDH data were used to generate monthly measures of the percentage of human rights abuses recorded by NGOs in a municipality each month over the preceding six months.\footnote{Because data on the publication date is not available for a large majority of the human rights reports, the date in which the reported violation took place is used to identify the human rights report, rather than the date in which the report was published. This seems to be relatively inconsequential as the available data suggests that the human rights reporting took place extremely quickly. Among the reports for which data on the publication date is available, 85\% of the reports were published in the same month in which the reported violation took place. 93\% were published within two months of the violation occurring. Less than 2\% were reported more than six months after the violation occurred.}

The core criteria for a valid IV design require that (1) the instrument impact variation in the independent variables of interests (the relevance criterion), (2) that the
instrument is independent of other causes of the dependent variable (exogeneity of the instrument), (3) and that the instrument only influences the dependent variable through its impact on the endogenous treatment (the exclusion restriction). These criteria are not directly testable on the data employed on the analysis. However, it is possible to validate the instrument’s plausibility by looking at qualitative case evidence, along with related outside research and relevant statistical tests (Dunning 2012).

Researchers have recently devoted considerable attention to investigating the relationship between NGO reporting and government behavior, with numerous studies showing how naming and shaming can have important impacts on human rights practices. To begin, there is evidence that naming and shaming can increase international pressures to reduce human rights abuses, either in the form of sanctions or in the likelihood of humanitarian intervention (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Esarey and DeMeritt 2013; Murdie and Peksen 2013a; 2013b). There is also a variety of research that probes the relationship between naming and shaming and repression directly. Though results are split between those who see naming and shaming impact as reducing repression (e.g., Franklin 2008; DeMeritt 2012; Krain 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012; Hendrix and Wong 2013) or leading to a shift in tactics (e.g., Ron 1997; Hafner-Burton 2008; Conrad and DeMeritt 2011), the evidence is consistent in concluding that following the publication of NGO reports detailing a government’s abuse of human rights, there are observable changes in repressive practice. This externally imposed variation is all that is necessitated by the relevance criterion. The Supplemental Appendix includes a discussion specifically about how human rights reporting influenced repressive practices in the case of Guatemala.
With regards to dissident behavior and NGO reporting, the exclusion criterion necessitates that NGO reporting only influence overt, collective challenges through its impact on government repression. While there is a great deal of evidence to suggest the government was sensitive to the information reported by human rights NGOs, it is less obvious that the publication of NGO reports detailing governmental human rights abuses impacted the strategic behavior dissidents engaged in. The presence of human rights organizations has been shown to help to boost mobilization (e.g., Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Bell et al. 2012; Bell et al. forthcoming). This is particularly true if they are active in domestic politics, but even from abroad human rights organizations can boost domestic protests. But such accounts stress the impact of human rights NGOs on domestic protest through their presence, not through their reporting and it is not obvious from existing work how variation in the reporting of human rights abuses might influence domestic dissent. For human rights reporting to influence dissidents, they would have to possess the information, strategic interest, and capacity to respond to its publication (Dunning 2012). It could be argued that human rights reporting signals to activists that NGO community is present and supports their endeavors. To the extent this is true, it would bias the estimates of repression’s effects in an upward direction, effectively increasing the probability of rejecting Hypothesis 1 (regarding the repression of mobilization activities) while decreasing the probability of rejecting Hypothesis 2 (regarding the repression of overt, collective challenges). The Supplemental Appendix contains greater detail on the relationship between human rights NGO reporting and dissent in Guatemala, specifically with regards to why information from human rights NGOs was unlikely to influence dissident behavior. But in order to guard against any remaining influence
transmitted by NGOs through their reporting, the models below include controls for both local and regional NGO presence.

**Table SII-I: P-Values for Balance Tests of Pre-treatment Covariates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Repression of Mobilization</th>
<th>Repression of Overt, Collective Challenges</th>
<th>Repression of Mobilization</th>
<th>Repression of Overt, Collective Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overt, Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Lag Overt Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>0.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Lag Mobilization</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Campaigns</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Differencing the Time Variant Independent and Dependent Variables</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I presents evidence supporting the as-if randomization in repression yielded by the documentation of human rights abuses in NGO reports. The table presents p-values for balance statistics of pretreatment measures of overt, collective challenges as well as a host of other important covariates (see Dunning 2012, 239-241). Two sets of equations were estimated. The left two columns represent the results of a series of IV regression models regressing instrumented measures of repression targeting mobilization activities and repression targeting overt, collective challenges on pre-treatment covariates. The right two columns replicate this analysis except that the equations employ first-differenced (e.g., $\Delta X_{i,t} = X_{i,t} - X_{i,t-1}$) changes in time variant independent and dependent variables, rather than direct values.

The first thing to note in looking at the table is that instrumented measures of repression targeting mobilization activities and repression targeting overt, collective challenges appear uncorrelated with pre-treatment measures of overt, collective challenges as well as pre-treatment measures of mobilization. While one cannot directly test the validity of the instrument’s exclusion, the table presents indirect evidence suggesting that prior to the application of treatment the exogenous influence of human rights reporting on repression was uncorrelated with dissident behavior. This is true both for the equations estimating direct measures (i.e., columns one and two) and for the first equations (i.e., columns three and four).

Table I also presents evidence of the degree of balance across pre-treatment measures of a host of important covariates. Seven distinct covariates are examined. Specifically, the analysis investigates the balance across two measures of challenger behaviors in neighboring territories—a spatial lag of mobilization activities and a spatial
lag of overt, collective challenges. The spatial lags measure ongoing counts of different forms of challenger behavior inversely weighted by how far they occurred from a given municipality (Ward and Gleditch, 2008). Two measures of democracy are also included. The first is an annual democracy score for the country, measured using Vreeland’s (2008) X-polity score. The second is a measure of any electoral campaign activity occurring in municipality and recorded in the AHPN. Finally, three time-invariant measures are included to identify the strategic value of a particular municipality—the municipal population, the percentage of the municipality that was indigenous, and the percentage of the municipality that was literate.

All of the evidence from the balance statistics supports the as-if randomization in repression inspired by human rights reporting. For both the equations employing direct measures and the first-differenced equations, there is no evidence that the exogenous influence of human rights reporting on repression targeting mobilization activities or repression targeting overt, collective challenges was correlated with pre-treatment measures in any of these important covariates. Once again, this is not a direct test of the exogeneity of the instrument, but it does provide evidence supportive of the contention that human rights reporting is not influencing the outcome through covariates other than repression (Dunning 2012, 239-241).

One remaining note concerns issues of state capacity. As a general rule, repression targeting mobilization activities is positively correlated with state capacity (as measured by municipal population and literacy rates), which suggests that such behavior
is more likely to be observed in high capacity regions. While the instrumented repression of mobilization activities appears uncorrelated with measures of capacity (as identified in Table I), several steps were taken to address the general relationship among these variables. First, the measures of state capacity are included as control variables in the analyses below. Second, in the Supplemental Appendix, the analysis is replicated on subsamples of ‘high capacity’ and ‘low capacity’ municipalities. The implications for generalizing the argument are discussed in the conclusion.

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46 Capacity appears related to quantity, not occurrence. Regressing repression of mobilization on measures of state capacity yields positive and statistically significant results. However, when looking at a zero-inflated negative-binomial regression, in both cases the state capacity variables are correlated with quantity, rather than occurrence. In models of the repression of overt collective challenges, results look somewhat similar.
Table SII-II: Instrumental Variables Second-Stage Estimation of Repression Targeting Mobilization and Overt Collective Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repression of Mobilization</td>
<td>-0.555*</td>
<td>-0.721**</td>
<td>-0.711**</td>
<td>-0.974*</td>
<td>-0.721**</td>
<td>-0.711**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.553)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.987)</td>
<td>(1.848)</td>
<td>(1.856)</td>
<td>(2.025)</td>
<td>(1.849)</td>
<td>(1.856)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual Fixed Effects</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Departmental Fixed Effects</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Differencing the Time Variant Independent and Dependent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>40,950</td>
<td>40,950</td>
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<td>40,950</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One-Tailed Test). Instruments: % of Human Rights Abuses Reported by Human Rights NGOs (six lags, t-1 – t-6) Controls: overt, collective challenges (single and double lags), mobilization (single and double lags), repression of overt, collective challenges (single and double lags), repression of mobilization (single and double lags), spatial lag of overt, collective challenges, spatial lag of mobilization, campaign events, % indigenous, % literate, population, local NGO presence, regional NGO presence, level of democracy.
Results

Table II presents the principal results estimating repression’s impact on overt, collective challenges, conditional on whether repression targeted mobilization activities or overt, collective challenges. The first stage of these models estimates the repression of mobilization activities and the repression of overt, collective challenges as a function of the percentage of human rights abuses committed in Guatemala’s 326 municipalities that were documented in NGO reports during each of the past six months. These results are presented in the Supplemental Appendix and demonstrate consistent significant relationship between lagged measures of human rights NGO reporting and repression targeting mobilization activities as well as repression targeting overt, collective action.

The second stage in the IV models estimates the local average treatment effect (LATE) of seemingly exogenous variation in repression on overt, collective challenges. With any instrumental variables model, attention needs to be paid to the types of units affected by the exogenous instrument and how they may or may not differ from the broader population of potentially treated units. In this case, the balance statistics in Table I suggest that there is a high degree of comparability between sites in which repression was applied as function of NGO reporting and sites in which it was not. The Supplemental Appendix includes a more extensive discussion of the local generalizability of the LATE estimates as well as the generalizability of these estimates to cases outside Guatemala.

Model I in Table II estimates the equation with no control variables. If the instrumented repression is truly exogenous, and not simply conditionally exogenous, then the model without control variables should yield consistent estimates of repression’s
LATE. The evidence above suggests that the model’s instrumented repression was independent of pretreatment measures of the control variables, but to check the validity of this assertion Model II includes the control variables from Table I above along with controls for lagged repression, (regional and local) NGO presence, and the country’s annual measure of democracy. Local NGO presence in a municipality is measured as a dummy measuring whether an NGO published a report about a given municipality in a given year. Regional NGO presence is measured using a spatial lag of the NGO presence measure. Model III includes all of these controls along with fixed effects for Guatemala’s 22 departments and for each year in order to control for any potential confounding factors occurring at more aggregate geographic or temporal units.

Models IV-VI assume the same structure as models I-III, except that they estimate first-differenced changes in the time variant independent and dependent variables. Thus instead of estimating how many overt, collective challenges occurred in a municipality-month as a function of how many repressive events occurred, they estimate how changes in rates of overt, collective challenges relate to changes in rates of repression targeting mobilization activities and repression targeting overt, collective challenges. Importantly, controls for lagged overt, collective challenges, mobilization and repression are all first-differenced as well to capture recent changes in collective challenges that might inspire both rates of repressive behavior and overt challenges (compare Berman et al. 2011). Across all six models, the standard errors are clustered by municipality (Dunning 2012, 175-178). Models are estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments, which displays greater efficiency for calculating heteroskedastic error terms produced by cross-sectional time-series research designs (Hansen 1982).
Hypothesis 1 predicts that repression directed against mobilization activities will be negatively related to overt, collective challenges. Looking at the results of Model I, repression targeting mobilization activities is estimated to reduce overt, collective challenges at a rate of one fewer challenge for every two mobilization events repressed. This effect is substantively significant. Across the full sample, overt, collective challenges occurred in just 3% of municipality-months. Of those months experiencing overt, collective challenges, 70% experienced only one challenge. If government forces were able to repress two mobilization events in those municipalities, the vast majority of overt, collective challenges would have been deterred.

These results are consistent across model specifications. For five of the six specifications, repression of mobilization activities is estimated to reduce overt, collective challenges at a rate of about one fewer overt, collective challenge for every two mobilization events repressed. Model IV estimates a slightly larger impact, with an estimated effect of about one fewer overt, collective challenge for every mobilization event repressed. First differencing the equations in models IV-VI yields extremely similar estimates to the first three models, which suggests the time-series data were reasonably stochastic.

The second hypothesis predicts that repression targeting overt, collective challenges will be positively related to overt, collective challenges. Looking at the estimated LATE for repression targeting overt, collective challenges, the results support this contention. Model I, which includes no controls and did not first-difference the time variant variables, estimates the effect to be very large substantively. In this case, repressing overt, collective challenges is estimated to lead to 17 more overt, collective
challenges than would have occurred had that repression not occurred. While the results are consistent across specifications, the substantive size of this affect appears to be something of an outlier when looking at the results of the other models. In Models II-VI, a single act of repression targeting overt, collective challenges is estimated to lead to around four additional overt, collective challenges than would have occurred had that repression not taken place.

Conclusion

Governments routinely turn to repression as a means for protecting their rule from overt, collective challenges, such as strikes, protests, and targeted attacks. At times, these efforts appear to succeed, diminishing challenges and helping preserving the existing political order. But government coercion appears equally likely to fail, leading to an escalation of conflict and potentially civil war or revolution. This study has argued that the impact of political repression on dissent is conditional on the types of challenger behavior targeted by the government. When governments are able to direct repression at the mobilization activities carried out behind the scenes by challenger organizations, repression depletes the capacity for the organization to coordinate overt, collective challenges, such as demonstrations or strikes. By contrast, when governments direct repression against ongoing overt, collective challenges, it leaves challenger organizations in place to escalate levels of dissent.

The study finds support for these arguments in a statistical analysis of micro-dynamic variation in political repression in Guatemalan municipalities from 1975-1985. Human rights NGO reports are used to identify plausibly exogenous variation in
repression (directed against mobilization activities or overt, collective challenges). When
the impacts of repression are estimated using this technique, the results indicate that
repression directed against mobilization activities decreases the number of challenges
committed by dissidents, while repression directed against overt, collective challenges
increases such activities.

At the micro-level, the results address limitations in prior efforts to resolve the
relationship between repression and political challenges. Earlier studies have noted that
repression’s effects might be conditional on when it was applied and suggested that
repression that selectively targets dissidents will have divergent effects from coercion
applied indiscriminately. The present study advances upon such analysis by identifying
precisely how repression operates at different stages of dissident organization, while also
providing evidence that even selectively targeted repression may have different effects
depending on the types of activities it targets.

There are also clues for understanding the broader phenomena of order and
conflict. When governments succeed in repressing mobilization activities, it depletes the
capacity for the public expression of collective claims making. To the extent that this
form of repression is responsible for stabilizing order, it is important to recognize that
within apparently peaceful states, there are selection effects operating to limit the public
articulation of particular ideologies or grievances. At the same time, to the extent that
dissidents can conceal their mobilization activities and outpace government efforts to
repress mobilization, their capacity to affect change and potentially overthrow the
government is improved. Here there are important selection effects to be studied
regarding the types of movements that are more or less able to avoid the repression of
mobilization. Understanding which types of movements succeed and which fail can help to explain the onset and escalation of political conflict.

Governments are best able to suppress challenges when they can identify mobilization activities and target them with repression. There are important structural variables, such as democracy, state capacity or civil war, that should impact the government’s capacity to identify and repress mobilization, and should thus be significant predictors of how likely a state is to descend into civil conflict. A study such as this one, which investigates micro-dynamic variation within a single case, has the capacity to narrow down on and identify challenger responses to individual acts of repression. But it has limited capacity to examine the impact of macro-level variables that could condition those responses. While it is important to note that many relevant structural factors, such as democracy, capacity, or civil war, are likely to be endogenously related to the outcomes of government-challenger struggles, greater attention to how these structures influence the subsequent strategic choices could provide clues to the broader generalizability of the findings.
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Chapter 4: Challenger Demands and the Liberalization of Repression

Abstract: This study seeks to account for the liberalization of political repression in authoritarian regimes, asking why an authoritarian government would begin to improve its respect for human rights. The theory offered challenges widely held conceptions about liberalization and the foundation of civil peace. As argued, governments do not limit their use of repression in response to domestic democratic pressures or international naming and shaming efforts. Instead, repression persists in settings where citizens remain ideologically mobilized in support of radical redistributions of political or economic power. Repression is curtailed only after the state has removed all organizational efforts to mobilize in support of such ideals. This argument is tested against rival hypotheses using empirical data on patterns of liberalization in Guatemala between 1975-1985. Analysis of unique data collected from the confidential records of Guatemalan National Police reveals that repression persists in the face of democratic institutions and international pressures as well as settings where the government has monopolized the control of force over territory. Liberalization occurs only after radical mobilization has ceased. Implications are drawn for how we understand democratization and political participation in liberalized regimes.
Coercion is inherent in nearly all contemporary understandings of government (e.g., Tilly 1985; Olsen 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Scott 2009). This is particularly true for autocratic regimes, which are believed to hold their societies in check through force (e.g., Linz 2000; Art 2012; Svolik 2012; Escribà-Folch 2013; Greitens 2013). Not only are citizens exposed to the threat of physical violence, but they also face limits on their ability to express ideals publically and collectively.

Yet, while autocratic regimes are substantially more repressive than their democratic counterparts, autocratic governments do occasionally liberalize and improve their respect for human rights.47 Coercive behaviors such as censorship, disappearances, and torture, which had previously been pervasive, become far more limited. Between 2005 and 2010, autocratic governments such as Zimbabwe and Uzbekistan moved from situations in which human rights violations were applied against “large numbers of the population” to policies of repression that were more constrained (Wood and Gibney 2010). Periods of autocratic liberalization improve respect for citizens’ physical integrity rights and expand opportunities for political participation. Liberalization has also been linked to more macro-level outcomes, in particular to improved prospects for democratization (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986; Geddes 1999). Many scholars continue to believe, first, that democratization cannot occur without liberalization, and, second, that liberalization sets in motion political dynamics that will produce democratization.

47 Repression refers to, “coercive actions political authorities take to inhibit the will or capacity of people within their jurisdiction to influence political outcomes” (Ritter 2014). For the purposes of this article, the terms repression, coercion, and human rights abuse are used interchangeably. Liberalization refers to “the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 11). Liberalization does not refer to the temporary easing of particular restrictions or coercive tactics, but to drastic and lasting reductions in the overall levels of human rights abuse.
Despite the significance of liberalization, the process remains poorly understood (e.g., Conrad and Moore 2010; Moore 2010; Kathman and Wood 2011). There are at least two bodies of work that have emerged out of the broader literature on human rights to touch on the topic. The first investigates why governments commit repression to begin with. Here, following Weber, scholars have argued that governments repress in order to counter violent challenges to their rule (e.g., Moore 2000; Earl 2003; Davenport 2007a; Carey 2010; Pierskalla 2010; Ritter 2014). Once a government has succeeded in monopolizing control over a given piece of territory, one can extend the argument to predict that repression will abate. While this may argument may be consistent with many realist visions of the state, a second body of research investigates how domestic and international regimes can be put in place to constrain repressive leaders. The contention here is that given sufficient democratic institutions or NGO naming and shaming efforts, governments can be forced into liberalization (e.g., Davenport 2007b; Murdie and Davis 2012; Conrad and Ritter 2013; Conrad 2014).

While such arguments may intuitively follow from standard assumptions about state behavior, I argue that neither is sufficient for explaining liberalization because neither addresses the inherent uncertainty that surrounds government decisions to improve their respect for human rights. This paper advances an alternative explanation for liberalization that focuses on government forecasts for the types of challenges likely to emerge from civil society in the post-liberalization environment. Governments are not simply concerned with monopolizing force over a given set of territory, but are preoccupied with preventing the public articulation of ideologies that directly challenge the foundations of their rule. Despite the most concerted attempts to constrain repression though domestic
institutions or naming and shaming efforts, liberalization only becomes attractive for authoritarian regimes in sites where there are reasonable assurances that future public expressions will not articulate ideas that fundamentally challenge the regime.

To forecast the types of demands likely to emerge from civil society if the state were to lessen its use of coercion, authoritarian governments develop sophisticated surveillance apparatuses designed to monitor the clandestine organizational activities that support challenges and sustain movements during times of abeyance (e.g., Lewis 2013). In sites where governments identify mobilization in support of radical transformations of political or economic power, repression is used to remove the underlying organizational structures and deter others from organizing around such ideals in the future (Sullivan 2013; 2014). By targeting mobilization activities that support radical ideals, while leaving in place mobilization activities with demands that are less threatening, there is a deliberate effort to whittle away at the potential challenges that could emerge following liberalization. Improved respect for human rights is likely to occur only after radical mobilization activities have been eliminated.

These arguments are evaluated using micro-level evidence of the liberalization of Guatemala’s human rights record between 1975 and 1985. This is a case in which an autocratic government moved away from the most severe forms of political repression and began to improve its respect for human rights slowly, but steadily, across different areas of the country. It is also a case in which the government was challenged by a violent insurgency, while also facing significant domestic and international pressures to improve its respect for human rights. The investigation utilizes original data collected from previously confidential records produced by the Guatemalan security forces. A
series of event history models examine the relationship between patterns of liberalization and hypotheses derived from the above theory as well as its principal alternatives.

The findings caution against putting faith in the abilities of democratic institutions or human rights monitoring to inspire liberalization. Even in regimes classified as semi-democratic, liberalization is found to be extremely unlikely in settings where the state perceives its deterrence efforts as incomplete. And NGO naming and shaming displays almost no ability to induce liberalization where the government is concerned with the potential public expression of transformative ideals. Respect for human rights does improve, but only after the government has assurances that it has purged attempts to mobilize in support of radical ideals.

The rest of the study proceeds in the following manner. First, I review explanations for liberalization emerging from the existing literature on human rights. I then present an alternative argument that links liberalization to the elimination of radical mobilization activities. The third section discusses the details of liberalization in Guatemala and presents the data. The analysis then proceeds within an event history framework. In the conclusion, I discuss the broader implications of the findings for human rights and democratization.

The Liberalization of Human Rights Abuse

While liberalization has remained at the core of research on democratization for nearly three decades, there has been little systematic study focusing specifically on governmental decisions to stop committing certain forms of repression and drastically
improve their respect for human rights (e.g., Conrad and Moore 2010). Instead, theoretical and empirical studies of human rights overwhelmingly concentrate on the situations conducive to the use of political repression (see Davenport 2007a; Davenport and Inman 2012). Effectively inverting the research question at the core of this study, such work has concentrated on why governments would apply varying levels of coercion rather than why they might reduce or stop repression.

In accounting for this behavior, the dominant approach relies on government efforts to protect itself from observed challenges to its rule (e.g., Carey 2010; Davenport 1995; 1996; 2007b; 2010; Earl et al. 2003; Moore 2000; Pion-Berlin 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Valentino et al. 2004). Often referred to as “threat response theory,” the central argument behind such work is that governments are attempting to control ongoing challenges to their rule. The foundations behind the dominant theory lie in a Weberian (2009 [1919]) conception of state coercion in which the state is principally interested monopolizing the use of force over a given piece of territory. As challenges to the government arise, repression is deployed to defeat the challengers and control the populace.

Because governments employ repression in response to ongoing challenges, a reasonable extension of the argument can be made to understand why levels of repression would decline over time. If the mechanism motivating the use of repression is to control

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48 Using the above definition, one could focus on de facto or de jure policies of liberalization. The approach taken here concerns itself with de facto liberalization, or the observed reduction in the application of political repression over a given time and space. While de jure protections are often fought for by domestic and international rights groups, legal guarantees are far too often overridden when the government perceives its interests lie in continued repression (e.g., Davenport 1996; Hafner-Burton and Ron 2007; Keith et al. 2009).
challenges, then when challenges abate repression should decline. In this case, the prediction is that liberalization should occur in settings where governments are no longer facing overt, collective challenges, such as riots, strikes, protests, or acts of terror.

Hypothesis 1: The prospects for liberalization will increase as ongoing challenges to the government decline.

Alongside threat response theory, there has been a more recent trend towards understanding how various institutions might be put in place to constrain the repressive inclinations of authoritarian regimes. Much like the development of threat response theory, such work has proceeded by studying variation in levels of repression across regimes, rather than examining why any particular regime might liberalize and severely curtail its use of coercion (see Davenport 2007a). But the theoretical assumptions underlying much of the institutional work on repression are quite distinct. Where threat response theory is based on perceptions of a Weberian state that is utilitarian in its use of repression to extend control, much of the institutional work examining constraints on repression sees coercion as originating within the institutional structure of the state. From this perspective, violence is used to take control of the state and is thus inherent within autocratic systems of government (e.g., Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Gurr 1986).

In its strongest formulation, the coercive institutions that constitute authoritarian regimes will continue to apply repression until some other institution comes along to displace them (e.g., Greitens 2013). Once a regime is put in place, there is a great deal of path dependence to the application of political repression. However, during regime
change, governments are presented with critical junctures that enable institutional reform not possible during more routine political periods. As one regime is replaced with another, the incoming regime has an opportunity to effectively ‘reset’ the repressive apparatus and institute one that is (potentially) less repressive. 49

Hypothesis 2: The prospects for liberalization will increase during regime change.

There is another body of institutional theory that believes coercive institutions are capable of being contained, but only if the right set of rival domestic institutions can be put in place to restrain the repressive apparatus. Most prominently, in what has been dubbed the “domestic democratic peace,” regimes governed by more democratic institutions have been found to be significantly less repressive than regimes that do not hold such institutions (Davenport 1999; 2007b; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). The underlying theory suggests that democratic institutions decrease political repression by providing counterbalancing veto institutions and by imposing costs on repressive leaders through the possibility of being voted out of office.

In considering this hypothesis, at least two important points need to be made. First, the argument inverts the traditional understanding that liberalization precedes democratization. While scholars have argued for the “end of the transition paradigm” (Corothers 2002), it is still widely held that the openings provided by periods of

49 The incoming leader could also choose a more repressive institutional set up. See Greitens (2013) for an interesting look at the factors influencing this choice.
liberalization dramatically increase the expectations for democratic institutions, such as competitive elections (e.g., Geddes 1999; Tilly 2004). If respect for human rights must improve for democratic institutions to form, then the causal attribution of democracy’s capacity to reduce repression may be overstated (compare Przeworski et al. 2000). Second, there is the question of whether democratic institutions can improve respect for human rights in states that do not qualify as fully democratic. While there is some evidence that institutions matter for constraining repression in authoritarian governments (e.g., Davenport 2007c; Franz and Kendall-Taylor forthcoming), other evidence suggests that democratic institutions within autocracies or semi-democracies are either irrelevant (e.g., Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Hill and Jones 2013) or, in the case of electoral behavior, can lead to increased repression (Maves Braithwaite and Tanaka 2013; see also Davenport 1997). Recognizing these empirical puzzles, it remains important to investigate the theoretical claim that institutionalized democracy should promote liberalization.

Hypothesis 3: The prospects for liberalization will increase in the presence of democratic institutions.

A final argument that can be extracted from the existing literature on human rights violations to formulate expectations for liberalization is based in a set of research that examines the effectiveness of international pressures to restrain government repression.

50 This fact remains even if many states that impose these institutions get stalled in some form of electoral authoritarianism.
While scholars have looked at a wide variety of international factors that have the potential to influence decisions to commit repression, including economic sanctions (e.g., Wood 2008), intervention (e.g., Kathman and Wood 2011), and international law (e.g., Conrad and Ritter 2013), one of the more prominent arguments emerging in recent years focuses on the effectiveness of NGO ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns for reducing human rights abuses. While not directly addressing liberalization, a series of studies has shown that in the presence of naming and shaming efforts, levels of human rights abuse are significantly lower than they would be predicted to be otherwise (e.g., Franklin 2008; Demeritt 2012; Krain 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012; Hendrix and Wong 2013). The general contention holds that by publishing evidence of human rights abuses, NGOs are able to pressure states to improve their repressive practices by (1) framing discourse about the legitimacy of repressive behavior (e.g., Finemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999) and (2) motivating third-party states and international organizations to impose costs on repressive regimes, potentially in the form of economic sanctions or humanitarian interventions (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie and Peksen 2013; 2014).

Such research is suggestive of the potential for naming and shaming to inspire liberalization. Still, the exact impact of NGO reporting remains debated (see Hafner-Burton 2008; Conrad and Moore 2010). A key concern regards the capacity for human rights groups to monitor the changes in repressive practices they aim to inspire. In one articulation of the argument, NGO naming and shaming might motivate a state to increase its restrictions on freedom of expression, limiting future monitoring by the news media and human rights organizations scholars so frequently rely on to study repression.
Alternatively, NGO reporting can motivate a change in repressive tactics towards instruments that are less easily monitored, such as forced disappearances or non-scarring torture (e.g., Ron 1997). In either case, questions arise regarding whether liberalization can be brought about through naming and shaming activities. Wary of these potentialities, the present study investigates the contention that NGO reporting should increase liberalization alongside the alternative arguments presented from the existing literature.

Hypothesis 4: The prospects for liberalization will increase in the presence of

NGO naming and shaming efforts

Demands, Deterrence, and Decisions to Liberalize

Liberalization is a process fraught with uncertainty. By making effective certain rights and liberties that were previously repressed, governments that had been holding society in check through coercion effectively generate new openings in the political opportunity structure. If repression is a means of imposing costs on organized social forces, then liberalization effectively lowers the costs of collective action, making public expression more likely (e.g., Tilly 1978; Przeworski 1986; Tarrow 1998). As new political groups emerge in response to these openings, governments can expect to face new challenges from what O’Donnell and Schmitter (1985, 55) refer to a “resurrection of civil society.”

If managed effectively, these sorts of openings can hold considerable benefits for the regime. Coercion is costly, both as measured in terms of the expenditures on soldiers and weaponry, but also for its potential impact on human capital and economic productivity
(e.g., Yuksel and Yuksel 2013). Governments must constantly make constrained policy tradeoffs and continuing with repression can mean that fewer resources are available to pursue other goals. And, as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) note, “Authoritarian rulers may tolerate or even promote liberalization in belief that by opening up certain spaces for individual and group action, they can relieve various pressures and obtain needed information and support without altering the structure of authority.”

But every liberalization decision carries the risk that the newly emergent civil society actors will outpace the government’s capacity to manage their demands. When this occurs, governments face the possibility for widespread civil conflict or revolution (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Beissinger 2002). While it is true that, as Przeworski (1988, 61) notes, “Liberalization is a controlled opening of the political space, continually contingent upon the compatibility of the outcomes of politics with the interests or values of the authoritarian power apparatus,” every liberalization decision carries with it the potential that emergent civil society groups will utilize the available openings to challenge the legitimacy of the regime.

Liberalizing governments have been known to miscalculate. Almeida (2003) details how political organizations formed during El Salvador’s initial liberalization in the 1960s helped to sustain challengers during the ensuing civil war. Perhaps more famously, following the abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet Union conceded that it would no longer use force to ensure that the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe remained under the iron curtain. Waves of protests ensued, beginning first in Hungary and the German Democratic Republic and then quickly spreading through the region (see Beissinger 2002). Soon, one regime after another was brought down, as pro-
democratic social movements drove their authoritarian rulers to cede power and capitulate to democratization.

Yet such events are rare occurrences. In many more cases liberalization takes place without significant regime change (Corothers 2002). China, for example, began a process of liberalization under the Fifth Plenum Communiqué that many commentators believed would yield steps towards democratic reform (e.g., Thornton 2008; Gilley 2004). Repression was eased and some forms of domestic dissent began to be tolerated (e.g., Weiss 2013). But within this new political environment, the government has not been seriously challenged by public demands for regime change, nor has it enacted any significant democratic reform (Zhao 2003)

Understanding when liberalization occurs necessitates considering how governments calculate the strategic uncertainty that surrounds this process. Because, as is commonly assumed, governments aim to maximize their time in office, there are long-term considerations that must be satisfied for liberalization to occur. Specifically, in choosing to ease repression, governments must consider their capacities to manage the demands of the emergent civil society.

For liberalization to make sense from a cost benefit perspective, governments must have reasonable assurances that improved respect for human rights will not spark an escalation of mass conflict or revolution. Yet the existing literature on human rights provides little understanding for how governments might generate expectations for the potential impacts that liberalization might have on future patterns of contention. Existing efforts, including those derived from arguments regarding threat response, domestic institutions, or international pressures, all focus on contemporaneous decision-making.
Governments either choose to liberalize after monopolizing control over existing challengers or are compelled into liberalization through the imposition of established constraints. In neither conceptualization is attention given to long-term considerations.

To generate expectations of the potential implications of liberalization for future contention, governments must forecast their ability to manage the demands likely to emerge from the newly resurrected civil society. Liberalization can mean expanding the range of accepted forms of political expression as well as the ideas articulated in the public sphere. In lessening their coercive grip on society, there is a deliberate effort on behalf of the liberalizing governments to channel previously excluded individuals into political organizations the government can manage and negotiate with. Liberalization can also expand the range of bargaining solutions available for governments seeking to maintain a hold on power most efficiently. Moderate segments of political movements can be coopted into the political channels of the state and concessions can be found to redress collective demands for reform in a manner that efficiently maintains the stability of the established order (e.g., Levitsky and Way 2002; Ghandi and Przeworski 2006; Svolik 2012).

But there is a subset of demands that have the potential to arise from the newly emergent civil society that could generate conflict over the nature of the social, political, and economic order. Examples would include calls for social revolution, separatism, transferring control over the military to a new political organization, or integrating excluded minority groups into the political system. These demands, which might be labeled from the perspective of the government as “radical ideals” or “subversion,” fundamentally challenge the political hierarchy as well as the established socio-economic
institutions. Conflicts emerging over calls for radical transformations in the political order tend to present greater difficulty for government efforts to channel or coopt civil society. With radical ideals, the overlap in the bargaining space between the demands of potential challengers and the potential concessions of the government is small to non-existent. As a consequence, conflicts over radical ideals tend to be longer and more costly for the government. And unlike disputes over less fundamental issues, they hold the potential for governments to be replaced should they lose, leading to possible prosecution and punishment for the ruling elite.

Prior to liberalization, governments can be expected to attempt to expunge attempts to organize in support of radical transformation of power in order to remove the base from which conflicts over these issues could arise in the post-liberalization environment. Sophisticated surveillance apparatuses are developed to detect and weed out the generally clandestine mobilization activities of nascent challenger organizations (e.g., Lewis 2012; Sullivan 2013). All civil society groups are reliant on an organizational structure responsible for accumulating collective resources, planning collective strategies, sustaining activist relationships, and delivering selective incentives (e.g., Tilly 1978; Chong 1991; Parkinson 2013; Sullivan 2013; 2014). Often referred to in the literature as ‘mobilizing structures,’ the secretive activities of these organizations are necessary for maintaining the movement during times of dormancy as well as directing participation during a protest wave (e.g., Taylor 1989; Tarrow 1998).

Even in the face of pressures emerging from democratic restraints or international pressures, governments are unlikely to liberalize when facing sustained efforts by clandestine organization supportive of radical transformation in political order. There is
recognition that in the presence of such organizational activities there are significant prospects for liberalization to open up space that could trigger uncontrollable challenges. Organizations supporting radical ideals could spark mass movements surrounding their claims or potentially hijack more moderate challenges, radicalizing contention over time (e.g., Parsa 1988). By contrast, an absence of organizational activities supporting calls for radical transformations of power signals to governments that they are unlikely to face a dramatic emergence in calls for such transformations in the sprouting civil society. Where the demands around which nascent challenger organizations are mobilizing fall short of subversion, governments can make liberalization decisions with greater assurances that the emerging civil society will not fundamentally challenge their authority.

Governments look to the organizational activities surrounding mobilization as signals for the types of political challenges they can expect to face in the post-liberalization environment. In this consideration, the political ideals surrounding the detected mobilization activities are at least as significant as contentious behavior (e.g., Tilly 1978; Gartner and Regan 2002; Sullivan 2013).\footnote{An alternative argument could contend that ideology is a poor predictor of subsequent demands and what governments are trying to do is discourage mobilization activities writ large, rather than just radical mobilization activities. The tests below address this potentiality by looking at both radical and non-radical mobilization activities.} While the mobilizing organizations may be underground fundraising and promoting their ideas rather than publically challenging the regime, the ideas around which their activities coalesce provide clues to the government about the types of movements that could emerge if repression was abated.\footnote{Governments may be willing to tolerate isolated individual articulations of these ideas. The argument is that they are particularly concerned where and when organizations coalesce around radical ideals.} Governments may even liberalize in the face of non-radical violent challenges in the hopes that their

\section*{Footnotes}

\footnote{An alternative argument could contend that ideology is a poor predictor of subsequent demands and what governments are trying to do is discourage mobilization activities writ large, rather than just radical mobilization activities. The tests below address this potentiality by looking at both radical and non-radical mobilization activities.}

\footnote{Governments may be willing to tolerate isolated individual articulations of these ideas. The argument is that they are particularly concerned where and when organizations coalesce around radical ideals.}
liberalization efforts can channel such behavior toward more passive forms of contention (e.g., Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Dunning 2011). But where evidence exists that society’s mobilization structures would promote ideals that fundamentally contest political or economic authority, liberalization becomes a far riskier prospect.

Recognizing the political uncertainty that surround increasing respect for human rights, governments seek to use coercion to manage the types of challenges likely to emerge following liberalization. In short, repression is not simply a tool used to respond to ongoing challenges, such as riots, strikes, or protests, but a policy deployed against mobilization structures to remove the prospects that particular challenges emerge in the future—those that are supportive of radical ideals (see Sullivan 2013). By targeting organizational structures that support mobilization around subversive ideals, while leaving in place mobilization supporting less radical claims, governments attempt to shape to types of issues around which post-liberalization politics are practiced.

Liberalization is thus contingent on the types of mobilization activities detected at any given time. Authoritarian governments can consider liberalization in environments where they have reasonable assurances that their repressive efforts have successfully removed challenger organizing promoting radical challenges as well as deterred other actors from considering such goals in the future. But where radical mobilization is detected, governments face fears that challenges are likely to emerge in the future over issues fundamental to political authority. Concerns over the manner in which such contention can threaten the regime is likely to prevent governments from considering liberalization where radical mobilization persists.
Hypothesis 5: The prospects for liberalization will decrease in the presence of mobilization activities supporting radical transformations of political or economic power.

Case Selection

Decisions to liberalize are typically complex and multifaceted (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986). Discerning the connection between such decisions and the specific causal mechanisms articulated in the various hypotheses above necessitates a research design capable of directly measuring the concepts articulated in each theory and identifying how they connect to patterns of liberalization. Whereas a broad, cross-national study of a global sample of autocracies could face significant challenges identifying theoretical concepts and while ruling out observationally equivalent explanations for liberalization, a detailed investigation of liberalization within a single case can more closely test for connections between the predictions specified in the above hypotheses and the micro-dynamic patterns of behavior that surround decisions to limit political repression. By examining how liberalization unfolds over time and space within this case, rather than relying on obtuse cross-national indicators that are slow to change and difficult to measure, it is possible to tie expectations regarding the end of repression to specific behavioral patterns that would validate or invalidate each theory.

Regimes and Repression in Guatemala 1975-1985

In 1975, Guatemala was ruled by a military backed government that had been installed and propped up by a series of U.S. sponsored coups. Using the police, military,
and paramilitary units, General Kjell Laugerud García waged a repressive campaign against urban labor unions sympathetic to communism and a variety of rural insurgent bands, which were holdovers from an earlier coup that fractured the government along ideological lines. General Romeo Lucas García took power through a fraudulent election in 1978. During Lucas García’s regime, the use of extrajudicial killings, torture and disappearances escalated as the government began to ramp up repression to deal with what it perceived as the growing threat from “subversives” within the country. President Carter cut off U.S. military assistance in response to the escalation of repressive violence, but aid continued to pour in from outside countries. Beginning in 1980, the government’s repressive efforts expanded to include the massacre of entire villages (CEH 1999; Sullivan 2012). However, discontent within the military and a belief that repression was not doing enough to eliminate a growing subversive threat led to a coup that installed General Efrain Rios Montt (Garrard-Burnett 2011). Repression peaked between in 1981 and 1982, during which time the government engaged in a broadly targeted campaign applied against large segments of society, particularly the indigenous communities living in the rural highlands (Ball et al. 1999).
Figure SIII-I: Respect for Human Rights in Guatemala, 1949-2010

Figure SIII-II: Human Rights and Democratic Inclusion in Guatemala, 1975-1985
Figure I employs data from Farriss (2014) to track the evolution of respect for human rights in Guatemala from 1949-2010. As can be seen from the figure, there is a clear shift away from the use of political repression beginning around 1983 and continuing through the end of the period. Figure II uses these same data to specifically examine the 1975-1985 period. The graph identifies movement within Guatemala across a two-dimensional space identified using Farriss’ human rights measures and levels of democracy, as measured by the Coppedge et al. (2008) standardized measure of inclusion. Two points of reference are provided on the graph. The solid lines represent the sample average levels of respect for human rights and levels of democracy for autocratic governments not engaged in civil war; the dashed lines present these same averages for autocratic governments in civil wars. As can be seen from this figure, while levels of repression varied significantly over the period and clear movements to liberalize can be identified, the country was highly repressive throughout the period. Still, there is a marked change that can be identified in the trajectory of respect for human rights in Guatemala. After a long downward trend in repression, respect for human rights improved dramatically beginning in 1983 and continued to improve through the end of 1985. By focusing on the initial openings and liberalization during this period, the study hopes to generate insight into how and why an autocratic government might decide to ease up on the use of political repression.

The historical record has attributed the liberalization of repression in Guatemala to each of the different theoretical perspectives articulated above. One dominant narrative

53 This division relies on Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) definition of civil war. Consistent with recent research, autocracies in civil war have higher inclusion rates compared to autocracies not involved in civil war (e.g., Hegre 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2005).
that has emerged is that government repression was largely successful in containing the violent challenges emerging from the insurgent groups (e.g., Stoll 1993). Other research has attributed the decline in repression to the removal of Rios Montt in 1983 and the democratization efforts that began to take hold in 1984 and 1985 (e.g., Garrard-Burnett 2011). Still others have contended that human rights groups (in particular the campaign centered around indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchu) were able to direct sufficient international pressures as to rein in repression (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1999). And there is case evidence suggesting that the decline can be attributed to a sense among members of the security apparatus that they had succeeded in removing the “subversive” elements of society (Schirmer 1998).

Understood in this way, prior efforts to understand liberalization have over determined the decline in repression that occurred in Guatemala beginning in the early to mid 1980s. The country dramatically improved its human rights practices over the period, and these efforts culminated in a democratic constitution signed in 1986.54 And a broad variety of causal forces have been postulated as inducing this process.

But while liberalization is often conceived as a single decision articulated in the capital and applied all at once across the country, the national averages discussed with regards to the liberalization of repression are actually the product of an aggregation of a wide variety of events occurring in different parts of the country at various times. The timing of liberalization varied significantly across Guatemala’s 326 municipalities.55

54 Democratic institutions continued to evolve in the subsequent decades, though questions remain about their ability to impact the established military and financial orders (e.g., Schirmer 1998).
55 Municipalities are the country’s second smallest administrative unit. As measured in 1981, their populations ranged form 464 inhabitants (San Jose Chacaya) to 754,243 inhabitants (Guatemala City).
Certain municipalities saw repression end comparatively early on in the period. In some sites where repression was applied, improved respect for human rights can be seen as early as July 1980. However, several other municipalities continued to experience repression up through December 1985. This demonstrates that liberalization did not occur across the country uniformly, but was instead applied to the various areas of the country at different points in time. 25% of municipalities were still experiencing repression by the end of 1984 and 15% were still experiencing repression by mid-1985. 1% experienced repression through the end of 1985.

To more accurately capture the multitude of decisions surrounding liberalization and more precisely assess the competing theories for liberalization, this study pursues an investigation of subnational variation in liberalization within the country, while recognizing that governments are likely to increase their respect for human rights at different points and times depending on a range of local, national, and international factors. The analysis examines how the subnational patterns of liberalization correspond to the behaviors specified in the theoretical predictions.

Data and Measurement

The local level measures for liberalization as well as a host of relevant covariates are gathered from a unique set of data collected from within the Guatemalan security apparatus. For approximately a hundred years leading up to the peace negotiations that formally ended Guatemala’s civil war in 1996, the Guatemalan National Police stored their records in a large warehouse on the edge of a police barrack in Guatemala City.

56 Further information on the distribution of the liberalization can be found in the Supplemental Appendix.
When the National Police were disbanded as part of the peace accords’ reorganization of the security apparatus, the warehouse was abandoned along with the 80 million pages of internal records it contained. The records sat in various stages of disarray and decomposition for nearly ten years until they were discovered by the human rights community in 2006.57

To collect data for this project, a specially selected subset of the approximately 10 million documents dated between 1975 and 1985 were read and coded into an events database. Following a multi-stage sampling procedure, the project read more than a quarter million files, including every file sent to either the Director General’s Office and the Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity.58 A team of researchers read each file and coded all politically relevant events into the database using a coding rubric that included nearly one hundred event types.

The files were produced by an autocratic bureaucracy that never believed their records would be made public. And perhaps more significantly, they were released without oversight by the regime responsible for the repression. As a consequence of the relatively open access to the documents, the collection represents one of the most transparent sources of data on repressive behavior identified to date (Doyle 2007; Sullivan 2013). As a reference point for understanding the degree of access provided by these documents, a similar set of information collected from the media reveals 883 acts of political repression applied during this period (Sullivan 2013). Data coded from the

57 More information on the police archive can be found in Doyle (2006), Weld (2010), Guberek (2012), and Sullivan (2013; 2014).
58 Greater detail on the sampling and coding process can be found in Sullivan (2013; 2014). These same papers contain greater discussions of potential biases in police data.
National Police records identify more than 3,800 repressive events. The issue is not simply one of event counts, however. While the majority of studies of repression rely on media data of some form, such data have been shown to suffer from biases that systematically influence their identification of repression (ibid.). The concern here is that a number of these factors are related to the variables presumed to impact liberalization, which could lead studies employing media data towards biased results (see Wooley 2000). For example, the media are more likely to identify repression in areas where freedom of the press is secured, which by many measures is related to processes of democratization. Similarly, reporting by human rights groups can draw the attention of the international press, leading to greater reporting even while rights practices remained constant or declined.

Because reports from the police archive were never intended to be made public and were not limited by the same constraints as media reporting, data taken from this archive are less likely to be influenced by the study’s primary independent variables. The National Police had jurisdiction over the entire country throughout the period under review. Their responsibilities included maintaining a vast surveillance operation, of which the police archive was a principal component (Weld 2010). In addition, the police force was responsible for arresting, torturing, and killing individuals identified as threats to the state (Lopez 2013; Sullivan forthcoming). They also carried out more typical police operations, such as clearing streets, corralling demonstrations, and monitoring highway traffic.

Throughout the period the police and the military were in close collaboration, and this coordination is captured in the police files. 48% of the repressive actions identified in the
dataset were either exclusively carried out by the military or involved coordinated military-police operations. What is likely missing from the dataset are the roaming military operations, which were carried out relatively clandestinely by elite military units. In such operations, the military would arrive in a municipality either via helicopter or on foot, and would round up the townspeople to forcibly reorganize some and massacre others (e.g., Falla 1994). Such massacres have received the bulk of the attention to contemporary studies of repression in Guatemala (e.g., Stoll 1993; Valentino 2004). But by most accounts, this form of repression was relatively short lived, occurring in communities for only brief periods of time (Kobrak 1997) and ending even as other forms of repression continued to occur (CEH 1999; Ball et al. 1999). Thus while the massacres have deservedly been subjected to rigorous academic study (e.g. Gulden 2002; Sullivan 2012), their relative absence from this dataset should not bias estimates of liberalization.  

**Liberalization**

The study’s principal dependent variable—*liberalization*—is operationalized as the final month in which a Guatemalan municipality experienced repression during the time between 1975 and 1985. While this time period is not exhaustive, it does represent a

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59 Using the definition of massacres articulated by the Commission for Historical Clarification, 16 such events are present in this dataset (compare Sullivan 2012).

60 The final month of observed repression is taken as a conservative estimate for the timing of liberalization occurred. The study was alternatively replicated using the definition of liberalization as ‘a period of over six months in which political repression was absent in a municipality.’ The results were not significantly affected.
critical opening in which to view decisions to reduce the use of political repression. Examining variation in liberalization within this important window can provide micro-level evidence to probe the principal mechanisms of liberalization identified above.

Repression is operationalized as discreet actions committed by representatives of the government to diminish the will or capacity of individuals under their political jurisdiction to influence political outcomes. To measure this variable, the study incorporates a broad range of tactics, including overt acts of government coercion, such as beatings, torture, politically motivated arrests, or disappearances, as well as more discreet forms of repression, including surveillance, police investigations, and the use of agents provocateur. In each case, liberalization is identified as the final month in which any form of repressive behavior was applied in a given municipality.

Mobilization Activities

To test the study’s primary hypothesis—that decisions to liberalize are diminishing in the presence of mobilization supporting radical ideals—this work’s first measurement task was to identify all mobilization activities present in the police data. Mobilization activities are operationalized challenger behavior that is designed to increase the level of formal organization of a challenger group or to raise the resource endowment of existing challenger organizations. Examples of challenger mobilization that are captured in the

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61 A relevant consideration was whether to treat the repressive period as beginning during the first month of the study or to examine ‘repressive spells’ beginning with the first act of repression and lasting until the final act. The study chose to focus on liberalization as potentially occurring at any point from the beginning of the period until the final act of repression because this approach was more consistent with the study’s conceptualization of ‘liberalization.’

62 Following from the focus on de facto liberalization, the study does not examine legal restrictions, such as bans on political opposition groups. It does, however, capture the types of politically motivated arrests that might be justified by legal restrictions.
data include the distribution of information, organizational meetings, training sessions and recruitment efforts.  

Mobilization activities were then divided based on the claims around which the individuals were organizing. Specifically, in dividing mobilization activities the analysis aims to examine how liberalization decisions might be related to a preoccupation with deterring certain forms of public expression—those that demand radical redistributions of political or economic power. Radical Mobilization Activities are operationalized as those activities carried out in support of expressed demands for overthrowing or displacing the political system and/or dividing the state’s territorial integrity. Examples include student and labor organizations calling for fundamental redistributions of wealth, organizers with separatist demands, and Marxist insurgent groups. Non-radical Mobilization Activities are operationalized as those events carried out in support of demands that do not directly call for overthrowing the political system and/or a division of the state’s territorial integrity. Examples of non-radical mobilization include mobilization to support ideals and demands such as community development, land rights, and freedom from persecution. Mobilization activities (as well as the subsets of radical and non-radical mobilization) are measured as a monthly count of the number of such events identified in the AHPN data for each municipality.

63 Greater detail on the coding procedures for mobilization and the other AHPN variables can be found in Sullivan (2013).

64 More accurately, given the data, these are mobilization activities that the government associated with support for radical ideals. There is evidence that the Guatemalan government conceived of radical ideals in dichotomous terms akin to this operationalization. For example, a famous government strategy document known as Plan Victoria 82 proclaimed, “The commands involved will conduct operations of security, development, countersubversive and ideological warfare in their respective areas of responsibility… with the objective to locate, capture or destroy subversive groups or elements [individuals]” (Schirmer 1998; see also Lopez 2013).

65 Though the coding schema allowed for this form of activity, no examples of separatist mobilization were identified in the AHPN data.
Attacks and Challenges

Having identified the principal independent variables associated with the primary theoretical argument, the study then moved to operationalize key variables to test key independent variables emerging form the literature. The first set of these are related to government efforts to control challenges and monopolize force over territory. Insurgent attacks is a variable examining armed attacks by organized groups challenging the government. They are measured as monthly count for each municipality based on the events recorded in the AHPN data. A second related variable, protests, measures challenges to the government that take the form of mass demonstrations. These are organized and public demonstrations making claims against the government. The protest variable is derived from the AHPN data and represents monthly event counts identified for each municipality.

Regime Change

Regime Change is a variable measuring large scale institutional reform. It is operationalized as the disposition of the existing government through military force or other extra institutional means. There were two such events occurring during the decade under review—the coup by General Rios Montt in February, 1982, and the subsequent coup by Defense Minister Mejira Victores in August 1983. The variable is measured

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66 Some may be concerned that radical mobilization might be highly collinear with insurgent attacks. Lagged radical mobilization is indeed correlated with insurgent attacks (which is consistent with the theory that mobilization is expected to be a necessary precursor to collective challenges), but no more so than non-radical mobilization. This evidence suggests that the tactical choices of dissidents are independent of their strategic goals.
dichotomously, with months in which regime change occurred scored 1 and all other months scored 0.

**Democracy**

Two measures of democracy are investigated in this study. The first, *Democratic Inclusion*, focuses on Dahl’s (1971, 4) understanding of inclusion, by which he referred to “the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government.”

Democracy is measured using the Coppedge et al. (2008) standardized inclusion metric that identifies annual changes in national indicators of inclusion, such as suffrage rights and the selection processes for legislatures and executives. Within the sample, the variable ranges from a minimum of -2.23 to a maximum inclusion value of 0.89.

A second variable, *Campaign Activity*, measures all public activities organized by representatives of political parties to test whether the actions surrounding political campaigns improve or reduce the prospects for liberalization (see Davenport 1997). Monthly, municipal level measures of campaign activity are derived based on events identified in the AHPN data (see Sullivan 2013). The variable is measured as an event count and seeks to identify local level variation in the behaviors of political parties.

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67 Earlier work on democracy and repression investigated the impacts of both contestation and inclusion (e.g., Davenport 2007b). A similar approach was not possible in this case because of the high degree of collinearity between measures of contestation and inclusion in Guatemala between 1975 and 1985 (P<0.0001). In this case the decision was made to focus on inclusion, but replications utilizing contestation proved substantively identical.

68 When compared to many alternative democracy metrics, the inclusion measure is both (a) less likely to capture civil liberties restrictions (see Coppedge et al. 1998) and (b) less sensitive to biases resulting from conflict and missing data (see Vreeland 2008).
NGO Naming and Shaming

NGO naming and shaming is measured using two variables. *Local NGO Reports* is a monthly measure of the percentage of total human rights abuses committed that were recorded in publications by international and domestic NGOs. The data are taken from Ball et al. (1999) and capture reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the three largest Guatemalan human rights groups (see Sullivan 2014). The data are recorded at the municipal level.

*Regional NGO Reports* is a spatial lag of the NGO Reports measure. The regional measure is generated by taking all the NGO documents reported in the various municipalities in Guatemala and weighting their influence by multiplying the local *NGO Reports* variable by an inverted distance matrix measuring how far a report occurred from any particular municipality (see Sullivan 2014). This is done to capture the possibility that NGO naming and shaming has both local and regional impacts (see Bell et al. 2012).

Empirical Analysis

To test the hypotheses specified above this analysis estimates a series of semiparametric models for the duration of political repression and the onset of liberalization. As noted above, the duration of repression applied in Guatemala varied considerably across space. The analysis identifies the duration of repressive spells down to municipality-month level, with the liberalization identified as the final month in which repression occurred.⁶⁹ 80 municipalities experienced did not experience repression and

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⁶⁹ Greater detail on the duration of repressive spells can be found in the Supplemental Appendix.
thus had no experience with liberalization. They are dropped from the analysis. Out of the 246 remaining spells, 3 were right censored.

Estimates are obtained using a series of Cox proportional hazards models. Cox models were chosen because the theoretical expectations do not specify the functional form of the underlying hazard function. This approach estimates how the covariates shift the baseline hazard of liberalization, while leaving the duration dependence unspecified.

In each case, the results are reported in terms of hazard ratios representing the estimated impact of the variable on the baseline hazard of liberalization. In this case, hazards refer to the instantaneous event rate of repression ending (i.e., liberalization). Hazard ratios above one represent an increase in expectation that liberalization will occur (at any given time t), while a hazard ratio below one represents a decreased expectation that liberalization will take place. For example, if the hazard rate for a given covariate is estimated to be 1.75, then for every one unit change in that variable we can expect a 75% increase in the expected rate of liberalization to occur at any given time period.

70 Municipalities spared from repression tended to have relatively low levels of mobilization, protests, and insurgent attacks. They also tended to have fewer campaign activity, higher populations, and a greater ratio of ladinos to indigenous. Further comparison between these municipalities and those included in the analysis can be found in the Supplemental Appendix.

71 The models and all of the included variables were tested for possible violations of the proportionality assumption. The models were also replicated using the Weibul approach and results proved substantively identical.

72 The Efron method is used for ties. Standard errors are clustered by municipality. All models were tested for violations of the proportional hazard assumption using scaled Schoenfeld residuals and no violations were identified (see Grambsch and Therneau 1994).
Table III-I: Cox Proportional Hazards Models of Liberalization

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
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Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (Two-Tailed Test).
The analysis begins by reviewing hypotheses H1-H4, which derive expectations for liberalization based on the existing research on human rights. These arguments were broad ranging, but were broadly based in two sets of understandings for state repression. The first contends that governments repress to control challenges to their rule, and should liberalize their human rights practices once challenges have abated. The second believes governments are inherently repressive and investigates different forms of restraint that can be put in place to limit coercion. Model 1 in Table I focuses on the association between variables based on these arguments and the hazard of liberalization.

From the initial evidence, there appears to be some significant relationship between violent challenges to the state and the hazard of liberalization, providing support for H1. In this case, insurgent attacks were predicted to depreciate the hazard of liberalization by 23%. Protests were not significantly related to the duration of repressive spells, however, which suggests that to the extent that the control theory of repression is correct, violent challenges to the state (rather than organized demonstrations) are principally responsible for delaying liberalization.

Examining the remaining hypotheses (H2-H4), there is less support for arguments originating in existing research on political repression. To begin, the variable measuring regime change does not approach conventional standards of statistical significance. The variables measuring democracy do not fare much better. Democratic campaigns have a reasonably small, negative predicted effect on liberalization, but this relationship is insignificant. The coefficient for the national democratic institutions variable is positive and dramatically large. But there is a tremendous amount of error surrounding this
estimate, so much so that the 95% confidence interval for the expected hazard also includes values considerably below zero. Finally, neither the local or regional NGO reporting measure is significantly related to liberalization. This challenges some recent findings regarding NGO naming and shaming efforts and patterns of repression (e.g., Franklin 2008; Demeritt 2012; Sullivan 2014; see also Murdie and Davis 2012).

Principal Hypothesis

The evidence presented thus far suggests that arguments derived from existing research on human rights fare reasonably poorly as explanations for empirical patterns of liberalization. Before comparing the existing explanations to the study’s primary hypotheses (H5), the analysis examines the relationship between mobilization and liberalization in isolation. Model 2 in Table I includes all mobilization activities occurring in a given municipality month. In this first step, no effort is made to distinguish between different forms of mobilization activities based on the claims around which would be challengers are mobilizing.

As can be seen from the results of Model 2, the hazard of liberalization occurring is not significantly related to the measure of mobilization activities. Graphical depictions of the predicted hazards rates for sites in which mobilization activities are and are not occurring can be seen in the left hand side of Figure III. When all forms of mobilization are grouped together, the likelihood of liberalization occurring at any given time is no

73 Prior results linking NGO reporting to a decline in abuse may have also been capturing a move to more discreet methods (e.g., Ron 1997). Because the data included in this paper come from within the security apparatus, they are more likely to capture repression that was strategically applied in a manner that was less likely to be identified by human rights groups or the press.
different in the presence of mobilization activities compared to when mobilization activities are not taking place. And while Model 2 does not include any additional covariates, if one were to examine a series of models including covariates derived from the literature, there is no consistent relationship between mobilization and the hazard of liberalization (the results of such models can be found in the Supplemental Appendix). Accordingly, if one were to only look at mobilization activities without considering the ideas around which the activities were organized, it would appear as though liberalization were unrelated to government concerns with deterring challenges to their rule.
Figure SIII-III: Mobilization and Liberalization
To further investigate the theory, Model 3 more directly tests H5, which speculates a relationship between mobilization activities and liberalization that is conditional on the ideals around which activists are organizing. The principal difference between Model 2 and the earlier results is that in Model 3 mobilization activities are divided into two subsets: (1) radical mobilization activities organized around ideals that would radically transform political or economic power and (2) non-radical mobilization activities, which are organized around non-transformative ideals.

As can be seen from the results, radical mobilization activities are related to significantly longer periods of repression. In any given time period, the expected hazard of a municipality liberalizing is approximately 45% higher if that municipality had no radical mobilization compared to that a similar municipality experiencing a single act of radical mobilization. These results are consistent with hypothesis H5. Non-radical mobilization activities are correlated with slightly shorter periods of repression, but this relationship is not statistically significant.

The results surrounding these relationships can be seen graphically in the right hand side of Figure III. Three sets of forecasts are generated. In the solid line, municipalities experienced no mobilization activities of any sort. In the dotted line, municipalities experienced a standard deviation increase in non-radical mobilization for any given month. As can be seen, areas with non-radical mobilization are expected to have a slightly higher expectation for liberalization in any given time period, though again this effect is not statistically significant. The dashed line at the bottom holds forecasts for the hazard of liberalization across municipalities experiencing a standard deviation increase in radical mobilization activities. As can be seen, the expectations for liberalization for
municipalities experiencing radical mobilization activities remain below 10% for the entire time period. It thus appears extremely unlikely that the government would choose to liberalize in areas where radical mobilization activities are ongoing.

**Alternative Explanations**

In considering the contention that governments liberalize following the demise of radical mobilization activities, an important question concerns how this argument fairs against alternative propositions drawn from the existing literature on repression. Models 4-7 in Table I evaluate each of these alternative explanations in turn. Model 8 examines all of the variables in a single formulation.

Across all of the formulations, radical mobilization activities remain negatively and statistically significantly related to the hazard of liberalization. The substantive size of the estimated impact of radical mobilization activities on liberalization remains remarkably constant. Across each of the estimations, a single act of radical mobilization is expected to decrease expectations for liberalization by between 43% and 47%. By contrast, non-radical mobilization activities remain insignificantly correlated with liberalization. Consistent with H5, all of this evidence suggests that governments are particularly concerned with deterring individuals from organizing around ideals that fundamentally threaten the political order.

There are some interesting results that emerge from the additional variables included in these model specifications. As above, and consistent with the threat response model, insurgent attacks are significantly related to longer periods of repression and a decreased hazard of liberalization. Though the negative predicted effect is robust across model
specifications, the substantive effect of this variable is smaller than that for mobilization. A single insurgent attack is predicted to reduce the hazard of liberalization in a period by between 25% and 30%.
Figure SIII-IV: Radical Mobilization, Democracy, and Liberalization
Both the domestic institutional changes surrounding Regime Change and measure of Democratic Inclusion are statistically significant predictors of liberalization. Regime change is expected to have a strong downward pull on expectations for liberalization, while democratic institutions are predicted to substantially shorten periods of repression and heighten expectations for liberalization. Figure IV presents a graphical depiction of the predicted impacts of challenger behavior on liberalization in two sets of institutional regimes. The figure on the left examines how a standard deviation increase in radical mobilization or insurgent attacks impact predictions for liberalization in a “Semi-Democratic Regime,” as measured by the historic maximum value for Democratic Inclusion during this time period. The figure on the right represents these same forecasts for an “Autocratic Regime,” as identified using the historical minimum value for Democratic Inclusion. As can be seen, semi-democratic regimes do have a substantially larger hazard of liberalization, when compared to autocratic regimes. However, expectations for liberalization are significantly reduced during radical mobilization. This is true even in comparison to how these regimes fare in the presence of insurgent attacks. In the presence of radical mobilization, the hazard of liberalization in semi-democratic regimes does not dip above 10% over the entire estimated duration of the sample. For autocratic regimes, radical mobilization decreases the expected hazards of liberalization practically to zero.

Finally, international pressures as measured by NGO naming and shaming efforts once again appear to have no significant impact on decisions to liberalize. Though neither estimate is statistically significant, local NGO naming and shaming has a coefficient that is associated with longer periods of repression, while regional naming and shaming is
predicted to be positively associated with liberalization. These results cast further challenge on the capacity for naming and shaming efforts to inspire significant reductions in government coercion.

*Robustness Checks*

The results thus far support the contention that liberalization decisions are made once the state has assurances that future forms of public expression will not fundamentally challenge the established order. Across all of the model specifications, radical mobilization activities were related to longer periods of repression and a decreased hazard for liberalization. This section investigates a series of alternative models to assess the robustness of the results. In particular, the design investigates a variety of alternative mechanisms or selection processes that could potentially confound the results.

Table II presents the results of the robustness checks. The core specification corresponds to Model 8 in Table I.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
<th>Model 13</th>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>Ethnic Conflict</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Regional Human</td>
<td>NGOs * Democracy</td>
<td>NGOs * Courts</td>
<td>Department Frailty</td>
<td>Municipal Frailty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Mobilization</td>
<td>0.573* (0.245)</td>
<td>0.541* (0.145)</td>
<td>0.524** (0.129)</td>
<td>0.524* (0.169)</td>
<td>0.519** (0.125)</td>
<td>0.519* (0.138)</td>
<td>0.624* (0.144)</td>
<td>0.583* (0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Radical</td>
<td>1.172 (0.362)</td>
<td>1.131 (0.399)</td>
<td>1.141 (0.358)</td>
<td>1.140 (0.379)</td>
<td>1.160 (0.352)</td>
<td>1.160 (0.390)</td>
<td>1.080 (0.321)</td>
<td>1.229 (0.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>0.714** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.710*** (0.076)</td>
<td>0.709** (0.084)</td>
<td>0.709** (0.083)</td>
<td>0.716** (0.085)</td>
<td>0.716** (0.079)</td>
<td>0.774** (0.064)</td>
<td>0.808* (0.087)</td>
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<td>Insurgent Attacks</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>0.488 (7.468)</td>
<td>0.368 (3.674)</td>
<td>0.334 (3.372)</td>
<td>0.334 (3.654)</td>
<td>0.338 (4.459)</td>
<td>0.338 (4.791)</td>
<td>0.286 (3.112)</td>
<td>0.283 (3.803)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change</td>
<td>0.411 (2.724)</td>
<td>0.094 (0.813)</td>
<td>1.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>2516.94 (22767.3)</td>
<td>0.119 (0.985)</td>
<td>0.051 (0.489)</td>
<td>1.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>1.000 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Inclusion</td>
<td>82.382 (491.05)</td>
<td>4096.81 (22721.5)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.072)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>4.957 (24.788)</td>
<td>0.433 (2.673)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Activity</td>
<td>0.868 (0.202)</td>
<td>0.783 (0.123)</td>
<td>0.759 (0.141)</td>
<td>0.759 (0.156)</td>
<td>0.766 (0.157)</td>
<td>0.765 (0.154)</td>
<td>0.758 (0.141)</td>
<td>0.813 (0.168)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local NGO Reports</td>
<td>1.278 (0.813)</td>
<td>1.198 (0.647)</td>
<td>1.165 (0.635)</td>
<td>1.165 (0.615)</td>
<td>0.502 (11.781)</td>
<td>0.687 (25.054)</td>
<td>1.163 (5.148)</td>
<td>1.009 (0.629)</td>
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<td>Regional NGO Reports</td>
<td>0.482 (0.602)</td>
<td>0.482 (0.627)</td>
<td>0.379 (0.391)</td>
<td>0.379 (0.376)</td>
<td>0.037 (0.239)</td>
<td>0.021 (0.098)</td>
<td>0.322 (0.364)</td>
<td>0.301 (0.348)</td>
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<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>0.282* (0.169)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.273 (0.358)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Guatemalan Military Aid</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.088 (0.722)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total US Military Aid</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.626</td>
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Table SIII-II: Robustness Checks
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>(0.356)</th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Human Rights Scores</td>
<td>0.001** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy*Local NGO Reports</td>
<td>0.652 (13.413)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy*Regional NGO Reports</td>
<td>0.022 (0.114)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts * Local NGO Reports</td>
<td>0.104 (15.562)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts * Regional NGO Reports</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theta</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.162 (0.084)</td>
<td>0.498 (0.133)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Municipalities</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>246</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Failures</td>
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<td>243</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>243</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time at Risk</td>
<td>1343</td>
<td>1343</td>
<td>1343</td>
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<td>1343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (Two-Tailed Test).
The first robustness check, which is presented in Model 9, investigates the potential for variation in state capacity to confound the results of the study. As noted in the theoretical section, governments develop sophisticated surveillance systems to monitor society and detect mobilization. If variance in monitoring capabilities were determined by state capacity, that capacity could also influence the ability of the government to deploy other forms of repression. To investigate this relationship, Model 9 includes as a measure of the capacity of the state as operationalized as the percentage of a municipality that was literate in 1973. This measure provides a seemingly exogenous measure for the capacity of the state in any given area.\textsuperscript{74} While this measure is significantly related to longer periods of repression, the inclusion of the state capacity measure does not appear to influence the core results of the model.

Another potential cofounder concerns the role of ethnicity. The deep divisions between the \textit{ladino} elite who ruled the Guatemalan government and the indigenous majority was endemic in patterns of violence (e.g., Grandin 2000; Jonas 2012). For potential challengers, ethnic concentrations can provide the networks necessary to support mobilizing structures, while for government forces they can provide a potential source of information leading to categorically targeted repression. To examine how ethnicity holds the potential to influence the above results, Model 10 includes the percentage of each municipality that was listed as indigenous in the 1973 census. Perhaps surprisingly, the variable appears uncorrelated with liberalization, suggesting that while the deployment repressive tactics may have been related to the country’s ethnic divisions

\textsuperscript{74} The variable ranges from 4\% literacy to nearly 90\%. Results were also robust to an alternative specification that used log population as a measure of state capacity.
(e.g., Sullivan 2012), the decision to liberalize repression was not. The study’s core results concerning radical mobilization activities and liberalization remain unaffected in this model.

The analysis next addresses other forms of international influence outside of NGO reporting. Model 11 examines the role of the international system, while Model 12 looks at regional patterns of repression. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) note the connection between Cold War politics and specific technologies of rebellion (i.e., irregular war) that promote longer conflicts. Two measures are used to investigate the influence of Cold War on liberalization: logged annual U.S. military aid to Guatemala and logged total annual U.S. military aid. Both measures are taken from the USAID Greenbook. Neither variable appears significantly related to liberalization. Looking at a more localized international influence, others have postulated that the human rights practices of neighboring states can influence human rights practice as countries try to emulate their neighbors while avoiding the spread of rebellion (e.g., Gleditch 2002; Danneman and Ritter forthcoming). A regional repression score was added to the analysis by averaging annual measures of the Farriss (2014) latent human rights scores for Guatemala’s contiguous neighbors. This variable is statistically significant, but in the opposite predicted direction, indicating that as neighboring countries became more repressive, municipalities in Guatemala were more likely to liberalize. Similar to the international system variables, the inclusion of the regional repression measure does not appear to influence the substantive effect or significance of the study’s core results.

Another potentiality is that to impact liberalization international and domestic pressures must overlap. In one formulation, international pressures are dependent on the
ability of local actors to utilize their reports to press claims on power through the institutional pathways of power (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; see also Hendrix and Wong 2013). Model 13 examines this possibility by interacting the local and regional NGO variables with measures of democratic inclusion. In another formulation on the overlap of international and domestic pressures, international efforts are only able to inspire changes in human rights practice in areas where the domestic courts possess sufficient independence to hold the government accountable (e.g., Powel and Staton 2009; Conrad 2014). Model 14 examines this possibility by including annual measures of the country’s judicial independence taken from Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2013) as well as interaction terms multiplying that metric and the NGO measures. In these formulations, the variables associated with international and domestic pressures remain insignificant, while radical mobilization activities retain their inverse relationship with liberalization.

Finally, the study examines the sensitivity of the model with respect to potential unobserved heterogeneity. The prior models relied on parametric specification and observed covariates to account for the variability in time to liberalization. The remaining variability can be accounted for by incorporating either cluster- or unit-specific frailty terms. Models 15 and 16 incorporate gamma frailty terms included as random effects (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). In Model 15, the frailty term is specified at the department, one level of spatial aggregation above the municipality. Here the potential unaccounted for variability in frailty is “shared” for all municipalities in a department. Model 16 includes municipal specific frailty terms. In both cases, the variance of these terms is statistically significant. However, the core results are not substantively impacted.
Radical mobilization activities remain negatively and statistically significantly related to the hazard of liberalization. Municipalities in which radical mobilization activities were not occurring were more likely to liberalize overall and to liberalize sooner. Municipalities experiencing radical mobilization activities experienced much longer periods of repression and were less likely to liberalize overall.

Interestingly, across the robustness checks, levels of democratic inclusion do not retain a robust relationship with liberalization. Democratic institutions had previously been shown to be significantly correlated with a decreased duration of repression. But the additional specifications cast some doubt on this relationship. The study’s core variable, radical mobilization activities, continues to be robustly related to liberalization, as does the variable measuring insurgent attacks. By contrast, democratic institutions are insignificant, and in some cases predicted in the wrong direction, in all but one of the robustness specifications. And across the robustness checks, there remains no evidence to suggest that NGO naming and shaming is effective for inducing liberalization.

**Conclusion**

This study has argued that government decisions to limit the use of political repression can be attributed to perceptions that repression has succeeded in eliminating civil society efforts to organize around ideologies that threaten the political-economic order. Repression, in other words, persists until those who would consider challenging the existing order no longer organize collectively in support of such ideals. Hypotheses derived from the literature on human rights and democratization do not account for most of the variation in decisions to limit repression. The study found that liberalizations were
largely unaffected by international naming and shaming pressures. Repression did persist longer in the face of armed attacks on the state and, in some specifications, was increasingly likely in the presence of democratic institutions. However, the strongest effect on the duration of repression had to do with the ideals around which potential actors were organizing, rather than the tactics employed by existing challengers.

Evidence presented from the internal records of the Guatemalan security apparatus reveals that repression persists where the government perceived ongoing attempts to organize around ideologies threatening the political order. This insight provides new clues to understanding decisions to repress as well as decision to limit abuses of human rights. If repression only persisted in settings where observable threats were ongoing, it could plausibly be argued that the government was employing repression to impose control against existing threats. But the persistence of repression in areas where the government is not directly being challenged, yet has reason to expect potential mobilization in support of ideals threatening the political order, suggests both a coordinated effort to destroy mobilization in support of such ideologies and an effort to deter the emergence of public support for these ideals in the post-liberalization period.

There are, of course, other forces that could provoke liberalization. Dissidents can, in rare instances, gain the upper hand in their struggles against authoritarian governments. But while challenger victory does sometimes lead to an immediate reduction in levels of repression (e.g., Czechoslovakia 1989), more typically it is the case that when regime change is pushed through via challenger victory, the revolutionary government continues or even escalates campaigns of repression in order to purge the country of “counter-revolutionaries” (e.g., Iran 1979, Rwanda 1994, Egypt 2011 [see also Tilly 1964]).
Liberalization, in such cases, occurs once the revolutionary movement has removed
ttempts to mobilize around ideals that would threaten their newly established order.

Although this singular study is unable to test these arguments on cases outside
Guatemala, evidence from other periods of repression and liberalization support these
contentions. Recent research on electronic censorship in China, for example, indicates the
government is far more willing to limit civil liberties when dissidents are involved in
coordinated, collective claims making, while allowing claims making when challenges
against the government are isolated and individualized (King et al. 2013a; 2013b). And
then there is case evidence from countries as diverse as Malaysia, Cambodia, Jordan, and
Paraguay that liberalization occurred only after the different governments felt relieved
from would-be challengers hoping to overturn the political system (Corothers 2002).
Finally, and perhaps most famously, in South Africa the Apartheid government only
agreed to liberalize and negotiate with the African National Congress (ANC) only after
the ANC abandoned calls for nationalizing industries and radically redistributing wealth
(Davenport and Sullivan 2013). Through auxiliary examination of additional cases as
well as through cross-national comparisons, it will be possible to further investigate the
generalizability of the findings presented in this study.

While the focus of this study has been on understanding the liberalization of
repression in authoritarian states, the argument presents complications for existing
understandings of the “domestic democratic peace” (e.g., Davenport and Armstrong
2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007b). While there is little doubt that
full democracies commit less repression than their authoritarian counterparts, existing
explanations (which tend to focus on electoral institutions and veto points) are not yet
paying sufficient attention to the selection processes operating with regards to the types of regimes that democratize. If liberalization precedes democratization and only takes place once the government has secured itself against radical mobilization, democratic states likely have fewer public claims-making efforts directed at radically redistributing political or economic power. To understand this process better, research on repression in democratic states (e.g., Davenport 2007b; Davenport et al. 2007; Moore 2010) would benefit from turning their attention to the variation in demands expressed by challengers under various institutional settings. To the extent that challengers within democratic regimes are less willing to express claims that publically challenge the political-economic order, democratic governments may have less reason to turn to repression.
Works Referenced


Art, David. 2012. "What do we know about authoritarianism after ten years?." *Comparative Politics* 44(3): 351-373.


Appendix AI: Supplementary Appendix For “Undermining Resistance: Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order”

Section I: Data Sources

Event Types by Source

Table AI-I reports the types of events recorded by type of activity and source. Both the AHPN and the newspapers appear highly interested in identifying acts of dissident collective action (i.e., collective violence and protests), which makes up more than 50% of the dissident events recorded by the AHPN and more than 90% of the dissident events recorded by the press. However, the AHPN still records more than 300 more acts of collective action than the newspapers. Comparing the identification of mobilization activities between the two sources reveals even starker differences. Nearly 50% of the AHPN records (more than 1,500 individual events) are identified mobilizing activities by the dissidents. Newspapers showed far less interest in recording these actions and documented just over 100 of them.
### Table AI-I: Events Recorded by Type and Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities Identified</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AHPN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>1,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>1,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>3,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt Repressive Action</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Events Identified</td>
<td>7,247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regards to the identified repressive activities in each source, covert repressive actions feature much more prominently in the AHPN data. In terms of sheer numbers, the two sources report similar quantities of overt repressive actions (772 in the AHPN, 660 in the newspapers), but covert repressive actions are recorded with much greater frequency in the AHPN data. More than 3,000 covert repressive actions are identified in the AHPN data, compared to fewer than 30 in the newspaper data.

**Temporal and Geographic Coverage by Source**

Figure AI-I displays monthly counts of political activity (the sum of incidents of overt and covert repression, mobilization and collective action) by month and data source.
Newspaper coverage appears to be temporally over-distributed in the first five years of the conflict. Following consistent coverage during the early years there is a sharp drop off in coverage beginning in the beginning of 1981. The AHPN records take almost the exact opposite distribution. For the first five years under review, coverage appears episodic. Then beginning at the same time as the rapid decline in newspaper coverage there is a rapid uptick in the number of events recorded by the AHPN. From 1981 through 1985 coverage by the AHPN remains high, while there is very little political activity reported in the press.

These two shifts (the decline in newspaper coverage and the increase in AHPN coverage that took place in early 1981) correspond with trends identified in repressive activity identified by the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH 1998), an alternative truth and reconciliation effort organized by the Catholic Church (Archdiocese of Guatemala 1999) and by a NGO study of human rights abuses in the
country (Ball et al. 1999). The rapid escalation of political repression documented by outside sources corresponds closely to both the increase repressive activity recorded by the AHPN and the decrease in similar activity recorded by the newspapers. The drop off in newspaper records is likely related to the intensification of attacks on the press (Brocket 2005; Guberek 2012). At least 42 Guatemalan journalists were murdered or disappeared between 1977 and 1981, while another 49 were killed between 1981 and 1982 (Garrard-Burnett 2011; Ball et al. 1999). Many more fled the country out of fear of persecution (Garrard-Burnett 2011). The censorship of the press was solidified through a state of siege instituted in 1982 that suspended civil liberties, curtailed freedom of the press and prohibited divulging news of political violence. Just as repressive action was beginning to take off, newspaper reports become almost nonexistent.\footnote{Limitations in Guatemalan press coverage resulted from more than just censorship however. In many cases the government was able to guarantee favorable coverage by bribing \textit{faferos}. As Garrard-Burnett (2011, 164) notes, \textit{faferos} were “poorly paid reporters and employees who accepted money in exchange for publishing articles favorable to the government and for suppressing negative news in their news outlet.” \textit{Fafero} translates roughly to “halfies—half to the reporter, half to the editor” (ibid.).}

An interesting question concerns whether the differences in reporting by time period across the two datasets influences the results found in this study. One might wonder, for example, whether the divergent findings resulting from the analysis of the news data and the AHPN data reflect different repression and dissent dynamics operating during different phases of the conflict. If one assumes that reporting in the two data sources is equally valid and that the two simply capture behavior at two different time points, then there is an interesting pattern to be revealed in the analysis. During the early years of the conflict, state repression is not significantly related to mobilization. The
preemptive repression of mobilization does not occur until after the state and dissidents have engaged in some initial sparring and the state has had time to build up its security apparatus. During the earlier years, which are most effectively captured by the media, the state is repressive, but only following collective action, not following mobilization. During the later years, as the state's repressive capacity increases, we see repression of mobilization as well as the repression of collective action.

Another way of interpreting the divergence of findings as a function of reporting over time is to question the assumption that the reporting of political repression is equally valid across sources. As noted in the text, existing research on reporting patterns in the media leads to questions regarding the capacity or interest of news organizations to report the types of preemptive repressive behavior this study is most interested in. Here, the divergent results found across the two news sources occur because the repression of mobilization is not recorded by the media during the earlier or later time periods.

One way of deciphering which of these interpretations is more plausible is to compare the temporal distributions to existing data on repressive behavior in Guatemala. Ball, Kobrak and Spirer (1999) engaged in what is likely the most extensive collection of quantitative data on state killings in Guatemala completed to date. Compiled across multiple data sources, including the media, human rights reports and survivor interviews, the Ball et al. study provides unique insight into when killings were perpetrated in the country.
As can be seen from Figure 1.1 in Ball et al., state killings remained relatively low and comparatively constant from 1975-1979. During this year, there is a sharp increase. Comparing the figure to Figure AI-I above we see that this pattern is to some extent captured in the media data, lending credibility to the argument that at least during the initial period of the conflict the media data did a reasonable job reflecting patterns of political behavior in the country.\textsuperscript{76} However, if the Ball et al. data can be taken as a reliable indicator for what repression actually looked like during this period, the uptick in repression reported in the newspapers through 1979 and into 1980 is not nearly as sharp as it should be. When we compare general trends for the AHPN data during this time, the patterns appear more consistent with the increase in repressive behavior beginning just before 1979 and continuing through 1980 and 1981. One way of interpreting such evidence is that the AHPN data and the newspaper data are not doing an equally good job at capturing repressive behavior at two different time periods, but that the AHPN data do a better job of reflecting patterns of political repression across the entire period of interest. This leads to questions regarding how repression was reported in the paper and whether we can actually infer from media data any knowledge regarding what patterns of repression looked like in actuality. Still, it is hard to draw firm conclusions without a more qualitative investigation of how repression might have varied across the decade under review. This is the topic of future research.

\textsuperscript{76} Of course such data are imprecise and refer only to reported counts, not to the description biases referenced in the main text.
Figure AI-II: Spatial Distribution of Political Activity by Source
Figure AI-II displays the distribution of incidents of political activity identified in the two datasets based by source and Guatemalan department. Examining the spatial distribution of the data across Guatemala’s departments, both the AHPN and the newspapers recorded the highest number of event in the capital department of Guatemala. Beyond that, there appears to be better spatial representation by the AHPN data, which records more events than the newspapers in 15 of the 22 departments. Most notably, the AHPN does a better job recording violence in departments such as Quiche, which experienced the worst reported acts of state repression and dissident violence during the war (CEH 1998). The AHPN also captures appreciably more events in Peten, which has been identified principal mobilizing site for the insurgency (Stohl 1993). One of the reasons why violence was so allegedly severe in Quiche and why the dissidents apparently mobilized in Peten is because these departments are areas with high elevation, dense jungle and sparse population settlements. Such evidence is consistent with arguments predicting undercounts of political activity from the newspapers in places far from urban settings with little state presence. All of this suggests that analysis of the AHPN data should provide a more representative assessment of political conflict in Guatemala.

Section II: Onset Table

Table AI-II details the month and year in which the first instance of collective challenges was reported in each of Guatemala’s 22 departments. This month and each subsequent month through December 1985 were dropped from Model 7 in the main text (Table II).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Month of First Recorded Collective Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alta Verapaz</td>
<td>May, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja Verapaz</td>
<td>March, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimaltenango</td>
<td>Feb-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiquimula</td>
<td>Sep-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Progreso</td>
<td>Apr-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Peten</td>
<td>No Reported CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Quiche</td>
<td>Oct-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escuintla</td>
<td>Apr-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>May-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huehuetenango</td>
<td>Feb-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izabal</td>
<td>Aug-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalapa</td>
<td>Jan-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jutiapa</td>
<td>May-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quetzaltenango</td>
<td>May-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retalhuleau</td>
<td>Oct-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacatepequez</td>
<td>Apr-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marcos</td>
<td>Nov-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Rosa</td>
<td>March, 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solola</td>
<td>May-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suchitepequez</td>
<td>Apr-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totonicapan</td>
<td>Nov-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacapa</td>
<td>No Reported CA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section III: Additional Robustness Checks

At least three critical challenges can be made against the results presented in the main text. The first argues that the models are capturing a relation between ongoing collective challenges and repression rather than a relationship between lagged mobilization and repression. The second critical challenge that can be made against the main text results charges that repression and dissent are so intricately connected that the models are simply identifying an endogenous process, rather than an the exogenous influence of dissident mobilization on repressive activity. The third charges that the models above are essentially retrospective in orientation and fail to directly test propositions of prospective decision making that were articulated in the theoretical arguments.

To test the validity of the results against such claims, three sets of robustness checks are examined. The first replicates the analysis while controlling for a contemporaneous measure of collective challenges. The second employs instrumental variables (IV) regression to identify exogenous variation in dissent and then estimate the effect of that exogenous variable on repression. The third employs vector error corrected (VEC) models to examine whether the state was forward-looking when deciding to engage in political repression.

Controlling for Contemporaneous Challenges

First, it could be argued that the results are being driven not by state authorities responding to previous revolutionary mobilization, but instead by state authorities
responding to ongoing collective challenges. Since mobilization is theorized to increase both levels of collective challenges and repression, and since repression is intricately linked to collective challenges, it may be that the observed correlation between past values of mobilization and contemporaneous measures of repression is spurious.

To guard against this possibility, the results were replicated while including a contemporaneous measure of collective challenges in the model. The results are displayed in table A-I-III.

Results prove that even if we control for ongoing collective action, that the amount of revolutionary mobilization engaged in in the department during the previous month still correlates with a strongly significant and positive increase in the predicated amount of repression committed during the subsequent month. Models A1 and A2 replicate models 3 and 4 in the main text, while models A3 and A4 replicate models 5 and 6. Across each of these models, the analysis predicts that engaging in revolutionary mobilization will spark an increase in the state’s repressive capacity.
**Table AI-III: Replication with Contemporaneous Challenges**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AHPN Dataset</th>
<th>AHPN Dataset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>Excluding Department-Months Jointly Experiencing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Department-Months,</td>
<td>Mobilization and Collective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-1985</td>
<td>Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model A1</td>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.182**</td>
<td>0.134*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Revolutionary Mobilization</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>-11.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.951)</td>
<td>(0.629)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>0.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.708)</td>
<td>(0.708)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporaneous Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.659***</td>
<td>0.310***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.069*</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged</td>
<td>0.141***</td>
<td>0.549***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.734*</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Coefficient 1</td>
<td>Coefficient 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt Repressive Action</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns</td>
<td>1.142***</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>3.017</td>
<td>28.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.053)</td>
<td>(2.471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Policy</td>
<td>-0.282***</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-10.661</td>
<td>-8.126*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.638)</td>
<td>(5.445)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3568</td>
<td>3568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One-Tailed Test)
Instrumental Variables

To examine the robustness of these findings, the results were first replicated using an instrumental-variables approach to control for endogeneity in the relationship between repression and dissent. Bias can result from the fact that the application of dissent is non-randomly assigned. Dissent may be related to prior levels of repression that can simultaneously subsequent levels of repression. As a result, the variable whose effect we are trying to determine (dissent) cannot be assumed to be unrelated to prior experiences with the dependent variable (repression). In such settings, non-random assignment of the treatment can lead to selection effects that may bias the results.

To generate unbiased estimates of how the state’s responses to dissent influence repression, we must be able to identify exogenous variation in dissent. One method for doing so is instrumental variables regression (IV). IV uses a first stage assignment equation to separate out the selection of the independent variable from the presence of the dependent variable. A second stage equation then estimates the effects of dissent on repression. For the models to successfully identify exogenous effects, independent variables in the assignment equation must be strongly correlated with dissent, but disassociated with subsequent repression (Angrist and Pischkey 2009).

The analyses below exploit the temporal disaggregation of the data used in this study to identify these first stage independent variables, which are often referred to as instruments. Follow a procedure common in labor economics (e.g., Porterba 1991) and

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77 This concern is what underlies the inclusion of the twice-lagged repression control variable in Tables I and II. The IV approach adds a more nuanced examination of potential selection effects to concerns with omitted variables bias present in the first sets of models.
recently expropriated to study counter-insurgent violence (e.g., Kocher et al. 2011), it is possible to exploit the time series component of the data to generate an effective instrument that is simultaneously related to the independent variable and conditionally independent of the dependent variable. This paper uses a lagged version of the dependent variable to identify exogenous variation in the independent variable so long as the model can extricate any direct influence from the lagged dependent variable to the value of the dependent variable at the time point the model is ultimately trying to estimate (i.e., time \( t \)). The first stage models instrument lagged dissent mobilization \( (D_{i,t-1}) \) as a function of levels of covert and overt repressive action measured three and four periods before \( (R_{i,t-3}, R_{i,t-4}) \). The second stage equation include measures of repression that exist between these prior periods and the dependent variable measured at time \( t \). Including these variables \( (R_{i,t-2}) \) along with the instrumented measure of dissent in the second stage equation effectively removes the endogenous selection processes that may bias our results. The strategy allows the model to identify exactly those levels of dissent inspired by previous levels of repressive and non-repressive policies, while extracting from those variables the endogenous relationship between prior acts of repression and current levels of repression (which are controlled for through the inclusion of \( R_{i,t-2} \) in the second stage equation). For selection effects to persist in biasing our results there would have to be artifact influencing the conflict processes during the earlier periods of repression used as instruments and repression measured as the dependent variable, but not influencing the middle levels of repression employed as control variables in the second stage equation. Models were estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen 1982).
### Table AI-IV: Instrumental Variables Equations Estimating Collective Challenges’ Influence on Repressive Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AHPN Dataset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model A5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covert Repressive Action</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Mobilization</td>
<td>1.66***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dissent</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.229***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Covert Repressive Challenges</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Overt Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns</td>
<td>1.161***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Polity</td>
<td>-0.016*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.687)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses.
p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test)
Instruments-Covert Repressive Action\textsubscript{t-3}, Covert Repressive Action\textsubscript{t-4}, Overt Repressive Action\textsubscript{t-3}, Overt Repressive Action\textsubscript{t-4}
Results from IV estimations provide further evidence supporting the contention that states engage in political repression targeting mobilization. The second stage models, which are presented in Table AI-IV, estimate whether exogenous variation in dissident mobilization is significantly related to subsequent counts of overt and covert repressive activities. From the analysis, mobilizing activities again appear to be strong and robust predictors of repressive action. This confirms that states do not simply act to repress their population in response to preexisting collective action, but also commit repressive action targeting early mobilization attempts.

*Vector Error Corrected Models*

A second robustness check employed is to estimate the integrated effects of dissent and repression. If states are anticipating dissident behavior in real time then modeling the effects of lagged dissent alone will not accurately capture this process (Moore 1995; Shellman 2006; Carey 2006). To check the robustness of the findings to a model in which states are forward looking in their application of repression, the second robustness check employs a form of dynamic time-series analysis known as vector-error corrected (VEC) models.

For the time-series models, the spatial components of the data are ignored but the temporal components remain disaggregated into monthly event counts. VEC models are similar to vector auto-regressive models (VAR) often used to study dynamic interactions between repression and dissent (e.g., Shellman 2006). But where VAR models are retrospective in orientation, such that repression and dissent variables respond to past values of one another, VEC models have a more prospective structure. In VEC models,
repression and dissent are expected to converge into a long term stationary equilibrium as dissidents and state forces learn to anticipate one another’s behavior and choose their actions accordingly (Reeves et al. 2011). In other words, the VEC models allow the two variables to respond stochastically to one another while predicting that they will converge into a stable relationship over time (Johansen 1995).

VEC models use maximum-likelihood techniques to estimate the cointegration of two or more variables with short-run dynamic properties and a long-run equilibrium (Johansen 1995). In expectation, the two variables are cointegrated such that they should jointly produce a stationary time series. These models are used when two time series X and Y follow different random walks in the short run, but are cointegrated series in the long run. A series Z is cointegrated if both series X and Y become stationary after differencing the series by the same order d, such that Yt – Yt-d makes both series stationary.

VEC regression produces parameters for three separate equations: a cointegration equation and two equations estimating repression and dissent. If states and dissidents employ prospective decision-making and anticipate one another’s behavior before deciding when and where to act, then they can be expected to share a long-run stationary relationship. Evidence of cointegration suggests that the two variables anticipate one another and converge in the future. In the case of repression and dissent such evidence suggests that states and dissidents are anticipating one another’s behavior and reacting to how they expect the other to behave.
Table AI-V: VEC Cointegration Equations for Repression and Mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AHPN Dataset</th>
<th>Model A7</th>
<th>Model A8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>Overt Repressive Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repressive Action</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissident Collective Action</td>
<td>-3.272*** (0.405)</td>
<td>-0.251*** (0.055)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One-Tailed Test)
All models run with constants—constants omitted from presentation.

Table AI-V displays the results from the cointegration equations of two VEC regressions. Negative and statistically significant parameters indicate that the two actors are anticipating one another’s behavior and adapting their own accordingly. Interestingly, both models displayed in Table AI-V show evidence of cointegration and suggest that the government is thinking prospectively and anticipating dissident actions when deciding when and where to commit repression. The evidence suggests that over time the state learned to anticipate mobilization and engaged in repressive action to counter such behavior.

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78 Each model estimated the mutual effects of repressive action and dissident mobilization or collective action using a first and second order lag, as suggested by the Dickie-Fuller (DF) method (Enders 2004). Stationarity was achieved with an auto-regressive model employing first and second order temporal lags of repression and no moving average components.

79 As Reeves et al. (2011, 17) point out, “The sign will be negative because the constant has a positive sign. If the series have a cointegrated relationship, they should have opposite signs.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excluding Department-Months Jointly Experiencing Mobilization and Collective Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model A9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>IRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Revolutionary Mobilization</td>
<td>-16.284 (2.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Non-Revolutionary Mobilization</td>
<td>-12.192 (0.642)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Collective Challenges</td>
<td>0.518* (0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Covert Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.574 (0.883)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice Lagged Overt Repressive Action</td>
<td>0.311 (0.318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns</td>
<td>0.704 (0.407)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>4.138 (4.621)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous</td>
<td>0.506 (1.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Polity</td>
<td>-0.541*** (0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-18.606 (10.688)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Huber-White Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One -Tailed Test)
Section V: Extensions of the Newspaper Replication

Models A9 and A10 in Table AI-VI replicate Models 5 and 6 in the main text using newspaper data. In this analysis, all months jointly experiencing mobilization and collective action are dropped from the analysis. The results of this replication analysis shine light on significant biases in analyses of repression and dissent conducted using newspaper data. When news sources are instead used in the analysis, the robust correlations between revolutionary mobilization and repression disappear. Analyzed in this fashion, the results would thus fail to identify efforts by state forces to repress would-be revolutionaries before they can commit collective challenges. This suggests that much of the evidence supporting existing models theory may derive from the samples used to evaluate the theory.

Part VI: Sampling and Coding Procedures

To generate an events database of political activity from 10 million documents recorded in the AHPN, a multi-stage sampling procedure was carried out. First, I conducted a pilot study of the police archive in March 2010. Given the vast trove of documents, it would be impossible to read the full collection (compare Guzman et al. 2009; Price et al. 2009). It was also recognized that of the 10 million, the vast majority contained matters pertaining to criminal, rather than political, investigations (Morales Alvarado 2009). The pilot study was carried out to identify a sampling process that would allow the full study to efficiently identify the most relevant information. To conduct the pilot study, we engaged in a stratified random sampling process to identify what
information was recorded in different portions of the archive. Information in the AHPN is archived based on the organizational structure of the police force. Each file is indexed based on the office that the file was created for or sent to and there exists separate archive locations for each of the different offices of the police ranging from the 10 cuerpos that formed operational units of the police force, through the different specialized offices and up to the Director General (chief of police). Records produced by the various divisions of the police and stored in the AHPN cover the full spectrum of police activities. On one end lie the most intensive acts of political repression, such as a directive to capture a list of suspected subversives with their last known whereabouts, to the most mundane, such as the hundreds of thousands of orders for officers to appear before the court at a given time and place.

Within this archive structure, the pilot study sampled documents at random from each of the different offices and cuerpos. Through this process, it was possible to decipher which office was receiving which type of information and how that information could be accessed. We discovered that more than 95% of the relevant documents (documents containing information on political behavior committed by members of civil society, social movements, political parties, security forces or members of the government) were located in two offices—the Director General’s office and the Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity.

80 The pilot study also engaged in other sampling procedures, including clustered random sampling and truly random sampling. Results proved substantively similar.

81 The reports vary significantly in length, from short missives from the field to lengthy investigations or security plans. Some of the longer documents contained multiple political activities, which enter into the database as separate events.
With this knowledge, the next stage in the process was to generate an events database recording information on political activity identified in the records of these two offices. I began the full study in October 2010. Over the next eight months, the full study of the document read each of the more than 120,000 documents indexed by the archive under these two offices. In total, more than a quarter million pages were read encapsulating every file sent to either the Director General’s office and the Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity. From each file, the full study coded all politically relevant events into the database using a coding rubric that included nearly one hundred event types. Each event entered into the dataset as individual rows, with the columns registering the different characteristics coded.

The final coding protocol is detailed below:

**Guatemala Coding Protocol**

08/10/10

Note: The coding protocol employed in this study built upon an early study of the archive by a team of researchers lead by Benetec’s Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG). Consequently, parts of the coding protocol refer to Benetec’s protocol, which can be found below the main protocol. Details of the Benetec study can be found here:

*EL DERECHO A SABER*

A. Coder

---

82 In our reading of the documents from the police archive, we found that nearly all of the files could be classified as either ‘political’ or ‘criminal/personal’ in nature. Events in the latter category, included criminal investigations and procedures as well as personal struggles such as household conflict, were dismissed. For a critical discussion of this distinction see Tilly (2003, 21).
B. Event Number

C. File Reference

D. Document Number

E. Document Type – See Benetec – Appendix 6,
   http://archivohistoricopn.org/media/informes/Gu%C3%ADa%20Usuario%2014_11_2012_Anexo_art%C3%ADculos.pdf

F. Reporting Group – Benetec See Appendix 12,
   http://archivohistoricopn.org/media/informes/Gu%C3%ADa%20Usuario%2014_11_2012_Anexo_art%C3%ADculos.pdf

   To
   From

G. Date of Report–
   Day
   Month
   Year

H. Location of Event –
   Street
   City/Town
   Municipality
   Municipality # - Select from XLS file
   Department
I. Date of Event

Day
Month
Year

J. Police Behavior – Select from the event list below

Note:

Overt Repression was measured using the following codes: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 54, 55, 57, 58, 78, 84, 85.

Covert Repression was measured using the following codes: 38, 41, 42, 44, 71, 74, 86.

K. Joint Operations with Operations

L. Number of Police Units

1 – 9 = Actual #

10 = 10 or more

M. Principal Unit of National Police – See Benetec Appendix 12,

http://archivohistoricopn.org/media/informes/Gu%C3%ADa%20Usuario%2014_11_2012_Anexo_art%C3%ADculos.pdf

Notes –

POPA are not part of the police structure

Add – TOCD= Todos los cuerpos en la capital

N. Number of Police Agents

188
O. Number of Subjects Identified – See the Benetec Appendix 20,
http://archivohistoricopn.org/media/informes/Gu%C3%ADa%20Usuario%2014_11_2012_Anexo_art%C3%ADculos.pdf

Notes -
Add POL = Political Parties
MIL = Military
PNGT = Police
PRIV = Private Security
JOUR = Journalists

P. Principal of Subject Identified – Select the main target from Benetec Appendix 20,
http://archivohistoricopn.org/media/informes/Gu%C3%ADa%20Usuario%2014_11_2012_Anexo_art%C3%ADculos.pdf

Notes -
Add POL = Political Parties
MIL = Military
PNGT = Police
PRIV = Private Security
JOUR = Journalists

Note Radical Mobilization was defined as mobilization with the following actors as the principal subjects: INSR, SIND, SUNI, as
well as when column Q (“subject suspected of ties to the insurgency” was coded YES).

Q. Subject Suspected of ties to the Insurgency

R. Number of Subject Actions Identified

S. Subject Behavior – Select the main behavior type from event list below

Note:

Mobilization was measured using the following codes: 21, 61, 71, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 87

Overt Collective Challenges were measured using the following codes: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, 19, 23, 25, 55, 57, 58, 78.

T. Number of Individuals Identified

U. Names of Individuals Identified

V. Information Source -

1 Other

2 Civilian informant

3 Police/Military informant

4 Wiretap/Other Covert Surveillance

5 Observation, Monitoring or Other Direct Surveillance

6 Neighborhood hearsay/public knowledge

7 Information Provided by Other members of the victim’s organization

8 Entrapment

W. Quality of Information
1) Baja – sólo nombre o descripción o dirección

2) Mediana –descripción, dirección

3) Alta – nombre, descripción, dirección

0) Ninguna

X. # of State Agents Injured

Y. # of State Agents Killed

Z. # of Civilians Injured

AA. # of Civilians Killed

AB. Additional notes

AC. Number of DIGE records referencing the event

AD. Number of COC records referencing the event

AE. Total Number of Records Referencing the event

AF. De-duplicated records

Event Types

0- Unknown

1- Other (coding to be used sparingly; email Chris if you think you have an example)

2- Accident

3- Verbal Harassment/Written Harassment/Death Threat
   (Perpetrator may be a civilian, a soldier, or a policeman)

4- Warning (more benign)

Individual and Group Violence
5- **Indiscriminate violence /Massacre:** Organized violence carried out intentionally and without regard for the individual identities of those killed. Generally involves the violation of multiple individuals simultaneously.

6- **Targeted Attacks/Killings—Political or Military Target:**

Organized violence directed at an individual because of actions they took related to their political or organizational affiliations. The violated individual was unable or unlikely to retaliate.

(Includes assassinations)

7- **Targeted Attacks/Killings—Sectarian Target:** Organized violence directed at an individual because of actions they took related to their sect. The violated individual was unable or unlikely to retaliate. (Includes assassinations)

8- **Brawl/Clash:** Two groups at protests; tumultuous back and forth (less than a battle); brawls happen in places like lunchrooms, bars, etc

9- **Battle:** Two organized bodies engaging in armed combat **Shootout:**

Violence between two disorganized bodies, or between one organized body and one disorganized body

10- **Riot/Mob violence/Looting**

Marches, Protest and Political Events
11- **Debate/verbal argument/Non-violent confrontation** (more of a back and forth between parties)

12- **Political March** (usually focused on civil rights issues)

13- **Sectarian March** (focused primarily on the Catholic/Protestant divide)

14- **Vigil**

15- **Speech** - Public or Private

16- **Strike/Picket** (specifically about labor issues)

17- **Public gathering/Meeting**

18- **Ceremony/Symbolic display by Government**

19- **Ceremony/Symbolic display by protestors/dissidents**

20- **Funeral Procession** (usually more of a preceding event)

21- **Information distribution**: tabling, press conference, graffiti

22- **Hunger strike**

23- **Protest/Civil Disobedience/Barricades** (organized; e.g., sit-ins, smaller gatherings)

24- **Protest Ban** (political ban)

25- **Counter-protest** (acts in a sequential manner: “This group is protesting—so will we!”)

26- **Complaint filing/Seeking legal advice**

27- **National Policy Change**

28- **Local Level Policy Change**: at the neighborhood, city level, etc.

29- **End of Ceasefire**
30- Ceasefire/Peace talks/negotiations/international negotiations
31- Release of hostages/prisoners
32- Elections

Policing

33- Selective Arrest/Attempted Arrest
34- Non-Selective Arrest/Non-Selective Attempted Arrest
35- Mass Arrest (indiscriminate in nature)
36- Informed/cooperated with Police/Military or Asked to inform/cooperate with Police/Military
37- operations con junta con el exercisio
38- Police (or Army) Road Block/Checkpoint/Patrol [a patrol is not defined as harassment]
39- Police Search
40- Police curfew (usually more of a preceding event)
41- Chase/Police Chase
42- State Surveillance
43- Police Abuse during detention/arrest
44- Protest Policing/Riot policing- No Live Rounds (the policing in question must be within the bounds of legal protest/riot police work, even if distasteful)
45- Protest Policing—Live Rounds
46- Other forms of state repression (coding to be used sparingly)

Paramilitary violence
47- **Intra-communal violence/social control**: Paramilitary groups imposing sanctions on their own communities for behavior deemed anti-social. The difference between internal policing and social control is that internal policing has to do with the politics internal to an organization, while social control has to do with sanctioning an individual for allegedly violating social norms.

48- **Turf war/Territorial dispute**

49- **Gang violence**

50- **Ethnic derogation/Ethnic violence**

51- **Intra-organizational violence/internal policing**

*Other Forms of Violence*

52- **Torture, mental or physical**

53- **Beating** (seen as 1 guy being attacked by multiple assailants; either civilian or police)

54- **Suicide/Attempted Suicide**

55- **Hijacking/Kidnapping**

56- **Rape/Sexual Assault/Sexual Harassment**

57- **Raid/Siege**: can be carried out by police, but does not have to be (raid and siege are distinguished by differing levels of violence)

58- **Robbery**

59- **Provocation by Victim**

60- **Provocation by Perpetrator**

61- **Arms Purchased by Insurgent, or Insurgent Friends/Kin**
62- Arms Purchase by State, or State Friends/Kin
63- Victim Taken to Hospital/Doctor
64- Public Sympathy for Victim
65- Ethnic Migration
66- Public Sympathy of Perpetrator
67- Forcibly Evicted

Miscellaneous

68- Non-Violent Trauma
69- Initiate an investigation
70- secure a perimeter
71- combat training
72- inform superiors
73- legal procedures/trial
74- solicited international actions
75- “non-violent mobilization” activities designed to encourage people to participate in political protest
76- Violent mobilization
77- Formation of an armed group
78- Terrorism
79- Membership in insurgent organizations/Contributing to the insurgency
80- Clandestine Meeting
81- Membership in a social movement organization/contributing to a social movement organization

82- Violent Trauma

83- Pre-emptive Security Measures

84- Subject Dissapeared/kidnapped

85- Subject murdered

86- Inform inferiors/rank and file

87- Planning Violent Actions

88- Defection to Army – No Amnesty

89- Defection to Army – Amnesty

90- Return of Refugees

91- Refugees flee across border

92- Possession of illegal literature
Works Referenced


Reeves, Andrew, Steven Shellman and Brandon Stewart. 2011. “Fair and Balanced or Fit to Print? The Effects of Media Sources on Statistical Inference.” Unpublished Manuscript.

Appendix AII: Supplementary Appendix for “Political Repression and the Dismantling of Opposition Organizations”

Section I: Human Rights Reporting and Repression in Guatemala

With regards to the particular case of Guatemala, it is well documented how publication of human rights abuses threatened to end the flow of aid from the United States (e.g., Schirmer 1998; Doyle 1999; Grandin 2004). Carter, for example, cut off US military aid following the publication of widespread human rights abuses by the Guatemalan Government. And while Regan famously increased US economic aid along with the provision of munitions and training to the Guatemalan Army, members of the state department began to actively pressure for a complete cessation of US aid as greater evidence of the ongoing human rights abuses became public (Grandin 2004; Doyle 1999). Pressure further increased when the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States began actively researching human rights abuses in Guatemala in 1982, using survivor interviews documented by human rights NGOs as a principal source of evidence (Carmack 1988).

The case evidence suggests that while international pressures were not sufficient for ending repression in Guatemala, the Guatemalan government was acutely aware of pressures from human rights groups and actively adjusted its strategy in order to minimize the documentation of repressive behavior. Information from within the Guatemalan security apparatus (e.g., Guberek 2012; Schirmer 1998) and the U.S. state
department (Doyle 1999) identify both the awareness of the Guatemalan government to NGO monitoring of human rights abuses and conscientious attempts to limit publications of abuse. Schirmer (1998, 247) documents a particularly telling example from an interview with a former army officer:

- This [squatting] must be dealt with intelligently so it doesn’t cause waves in the international press.
- Q: How do you mean “intelligently”
- Such as paying them off and not as they have been dealt with before—you know, cleansed.
- Q: Why the shift in tactic?
- Because we are more conscious of the international coverage now. For the loans. But we are not so certain that this [less repressive method] will in fact work.

In many cases, the shift in strategy that followed NGO reporting involved efforts to conceal repression, either through shifting its timing or location, or through adopting tactics that were less easily monitored (Guberek 2012). For example, Schirmer (1998, 247) notes how following the case discussed in the interview, twelve leaders of the squatting movement were abducted, and “their tortured bodies were later discovered in garbage bags in the city dump.” The Guatemalan government also turned its repression to target human rights monitors (Anderson 1989). Human rights organizations were severely repressed that in 1978 international human rights NGOs began to pull out of the country and establish their offices in Mexico or Costa Rica (Sikkink 2007, 138)

**Section II: Human Rights Reporting and Dissent in Guatemala**

With regards to the Guatemalan case, in many instances, dissent operated in extremely rural regions of the country, where news of the publication of an NGO report might take months to reach. When news of an NGO report did reach dissidents, it is not clear how they might have responded to its publication. Recall that the instrument is not
measuring the number of reports or even the number of abuses reported (though these variables are surely related), but the percentage of abuses committed that were recorded by human rights organizations. Whereas NGO human rights reports informs the state that there are human rights groups operating in a local with the capacity to monitor repressive behavior, the publication of a report does not provide similar strategic information for dissidents. It is perhaps plausible that the publication of information on human rights abuses might (a) incentivize dissidents to move into a local to engage in challenges where they might use the publication as a rallying call or (b) incentivize dissidents to move out of a local to avoid future repression. But these two potential outcomes are founded on the belief that without the publication of the report, dissidents and their potential supporters would remain ignorant of repression. Because dissidents are the targets of both repression targeting mobilization and repression targeting overt, collective challenges, they are likely to have first hand knowledge of human rights violations that supersedes the publication of any human rights reports. Then there is a question of capacity. Mobilization is a highly localized activity that is highly dependent on both prior activity and context (e.g., McAdam 1983; Gould 1995). As a result, mobilizers have limited capacity for picking up and strategically transplanting themselves to protest sites that might appear superior.

Section III: Sampling Protocol

First, a pilot study was carried out that engaged in stratified random sampling process to identify what information was recorded in the archive. Information in the AHPN is archived based on the organizational structure of the police force. Each file is
indexed based on the office that the file was created for or sent to and there exists separate archive locations for each of the different offices of the police ranging from the 10 cuerpos that formed operational units of the police force, through the different specialized offices and up to the Director General (chief of police). Within this archive structure, documents were sampled at random from each of the different offices and cuerpos. Through this process, it was possible to decipher which office was receiving which type of information and how that information could be accessed. We discovered that more than 95% of the relevant documents (documents containing information on political behavior committed by members of civil society, social movements, political parties, security forces or members of the government) were located in two offices—the Director General’s office and the Office for Coordinating Military and Police Activity. With this knowledge, the next stage in the process was to generate an events database recording information on political activity identified in the records of these two offices.

Section IV: A Note on Data Bias

Data from the AHPN are relatively unique. During the period in which they were composed, the authors had little belief that they would ever be made public. Moreover, they were discovered on accident and released without any form of Freedom of Information process through which sensitive information could be withheld or redacted. Like any data source, there remain potentials for bias. With data from the police, one needs to be conscious of parochial incentives that could lead to biased reporting for

83 The pilot study also engaged in other sampling procedures, including clustered random sampling and truly random sampling. Results proved substantively similar.

84 In our reading of the documents from the police archive, we found that nearly all of the files could be classified as either ‘political’ or ‘criminal/personal’ in nature. Events in the latter category, included criminal investigations and procedures as well as personal struggles such as household conflict, were dismissed. For a critical discussion of this distinction see Tilly (2003, 21).
professional gains. With regards to the reporting of repression, we should be conscious of bias against the reporting of atrocities. Given the Carter administrations’ emphasis on human rights, it is clear that the regime was consciously trying to improve its international human rights reputation by concealing evidence of massacres (Guberek 2012). But with regards to the reporting of social movement behavior, the direction of bias is less clear. Individuals might develop an interest in overestimating the threat of the movement in order to increase their budget or justify their budget. Or they might develop an interest downplaying movement behavior to demonstrate professional success. What is clear is that as a data source, the AHPN provides better detail on a far larger spectrum of political activity than other sources of information on the Guatemala conflict.

**Section V: Local Average Treatment Effects**

The models estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) of seemingly exogenous variation in repression on overt, collective challenges. With any instrumental variables model, attention needs to be paid to the types of units affected by the exogenous instrument and how they may or may not differ from the broader population of potentially treated units. In this case, the models estimate the effect of only those types of

85 In part because the police did not carry out these activities and in part because of potential reporting bias, there are few massacres captured in the police data. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting the results. That said, one of the reasons that indiscriminate forms of state repression, like massacres, are said to have succeeded in Guatemala (Kalyvas 2006; Valentino 2004) is because they were directed at villages identified as sites of insurgent mobilization (Stohl 1993; Kobrack 1996; Sullivan 2012). Upon learning of an insurgent presence in a village, the army would arrive with an ultimatum: either the village reformed itself into a civil defense unit under direct supervision of the military or the inhabitants would be killed.

86 With this in mind, careful attention is paid in the research design to identify seemingly exogenous variation in the independent variable.
repression that could have been stochastically influenced by human rights reporting. In
the language of IV analysis, this estimates the LATE for “compliers” (Dunnig 2012, 136-
143; 290-293; Imbens 2009). Units in which repression would have been applied
regardless of how much NGOs had documented past human rights abuses (e.g., large
military operations that were underway or covert and undetectable activities) as well as
repression that would never have been applied conditional on NGO reporting are not
affected by our instrument and thus do not factor in the analysis (e.g., pacified sites).

It is important also to consider the context of the case when discussing the
implications of the “local” on the estimated LATE. In this case two structural variables
appear to be potentially significant. The first is the regime structure. Throughout the ten
years under review, the country oscillated between a hybrid regime type and autocracy.
As democracy has been shown to significantly reduce human rights abuses (e.g.,
Davenport 2007a; 2007b; Davenport and Armstrong 2004), the estimated impact of the
types of repression being analyzed in this study might differ from those employed in
democracies. Similarly, past research indicates that civil war is a strong predictor of
escalated repressive behavior (e.g., Davenport 2007b; Valentino et al. 2004). Yet, while
the Guatemalan government was severely repressive and relatively unchecked by
democratic institutions, it does appear to have been responsive to the publication of
human rights abuses. It is an empirical question whether their responsiveness to NGO
publications is relatively consistent with more democratic or less conflict ridden states
(therefore yielding more generalizable LATE estimates), though there is evidence to suggest
that non-democratic regimes such as Guatemala’s are more responsive to NGO reporting
(e.g., Hendrix and Wong 2013), while civil war states may be less responsive (e.g.,
To the extent that these two issues overlap (i.e., the potential differences between complier repression and other repression, and the responsiveness of conflict ridden, autocratic states to alter repressive practices following NGO reporting), the LATE estimates become less generalizable. Clearly, additional research needs to be done on this topic, but one should consider these issues as the results of the study’s analysis are interpreted.

Section VI: First Stage Results

Table AII-I presents the first stage results for two instrumental variables equations employing lagged measures of the percentage of human rights abuses documented in NGO reports to instrument how repression (targeting mobilization or overt, collective challenges) impacts overt collective challenges.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Of Human Rights Abuses Documented in NGO Reports</th>
<th>Repression of Mobilization</th>
<th>Repression of Overt, Collective Challenges</th>
<th>Repression of Mobilization</th>
<th>Repression of Overt, Collective Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lag 1 Month</td>
<td>-0.298*</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>0.503**</td>
<td>-0.043***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 2 Months</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.054***</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 3 Months</td>
<td>0.520***</td>
<td>-0.139*</td>
<td>0.538***</td>
<td>-0.183**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 4 Months</td>
<td>0.315***</td>
<td>0.169***</td>
<td>-0.331***</td>
<td>0.310***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 5 Months</td>
<td>0.363***</td>
<td>0.323***</td>
<td>-0.144*</td>
<td>0.146***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag 6 Months</td>
<td>2.232***</td>
<td>0.080***</td>
<td>1.522**</td>
<td>-0.248**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.698)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.484)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Differencing the Time Variant Independent and Dependent Variables</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Stat</td>
<td>91.08</td>
<td>14.13</td>
<td>60.89</td>
<td>9.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (Two-Tailed Test).
For each of the six lags employed as instruments, the table presents their coefficients, standard errors, and levels of statistical significance. The table also presents adjusted $r^2$ statistics and F-stats for the joint significance of the six instruments. As in Table I, the left two columns present evidence from equations employing direct measures, while the right two present results from first differenced equations. Across the models, the majority of the lagged instruments appear significantly correlated with measures of political repression. The models capture a relatively small, but important slice of the variance in political repression, as recorded in the adjusted $r^2$ statistics. And the F-statistics for joint significance are highly significant across the four equations. These measures range from 9.75-91.08. While Sovey and Green (2012) recommend an F-statistic of at least ten to have confidence in the combined significance of multiple instruments, this metric is admittedly arbitrary as it is impacted by both the number of instruments and the number of observations (see Dunning 2012, 241). For this particular test, the first-differenced equation for repression targeting overt collective challenges falls just slightly below ten, while the other three equations have F-statistics well above this cut off.

Section VII: Replication in High/Low Capacity Municipalities

State Capacity in Guatemala was extremely unevenly distributed. In some sections, such as the capital region, the coastal shipping areas, and the lowlands, the state

87 As in Table I, the left two columns were estimated simultaneously as were the right two. These results correspond to equations I and IV in Table III.
was extremely present. But in other areas, such as the indigenous highlands, the Guatemalan government only first emerged during the decade under study.

Figure AII-I presents evidence to this effect. Looking at a key indicator of state presence—the literacy rate of municipalities in 1981—the figure presents a histogram displaying the bi-modal distribution of state capacity. One cluster of municipalities has a literacy rate centering around 25%, while a larger segment of the country can be represented by the cluster of municipalities with literacy around 60%.

Because repression requires a state presence (and because repression targeting mobilization may require an even greater degree of state capacity), it is important to investigate the generalizability of the argument into cases of both high and low state capacity. Table AII-II represents a replication of Models V and VI in Table II in the main text. In Models LV and LVI, this replication is conducted exclusively for municipalities with literacy less than the mean (50%). Models HV and HVI represent this same analysis exclusively for municipalities with literacy rates above the mean.

**Figure AII-I: Literacy in Guatemalan Municipalities**
Table AII-II: High/Low Capacity Replication of Instrumental Variables Second-Stage Estimation of Repression Targeting Mobilization and Overt Collective Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LV</th>
<th>LVI</th>
<th>HV</th>
<th>HVI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Capacity</td>
<td>High Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression of</td>
<td>-1.997</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.381***</td>
<td>-0.390***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>(6.567)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression of Overt</td>
<td>6.920+</td>
<td>3.404*</td>
<td>1.255</td>
<td>1.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Challenges</td>
<td>(4.995)</td>
<td>(1.763)</td>
<td>(1.207)</td>
<td>(1.252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Departmental Fixed</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Differencing</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Time Variant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>18,522</td>
<td>18,522</td>
<td>22,428</td>
<td>22,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (One-Tailed Test).
Instruments: % of Human Rights Abuses Reported by Human Rights NGOs (six lags, t-1 – t-6)
Controls: overt, collective challenges (single and double lags), mobilization (single and double lags), repression of overt, collective challenges (single and double lags), repression of mobilization (single and double lags), spatial lag of overt, collective challenges, spatial lag of mobilization, campaign events, % indigenous, % literate, population, local NGO presence, regional NGO presence, level of democracy
The results from the two subsample replications prove substantively interesting. Across all four replications, the point estimates are in the direction predicted by the theory, consistent with the results presented in the main text. But when the sample is restricted to only municipalities with below average, the significance of the negative impact of repression targeting mobilization disappears. In this replication, repressing overt, collective challenges is still associated with significant increases in challenges, but there is so much noise associated with the estimate of the impact of repression targeting mobilization that it is impossible to distinguish the impact of this variable from zero.

When looking at the subsample of high capacity municipalities, the results are exactly the opposite. In this sample, repressing mobilization is associated with significant reductions in future challenges, while repressing overt collective action does not appear to significantly increase collective challenges.

The results do not critically threaten the theoretical predictions identified in the main text analyses, but they do provide some important clues about context that are useful when thinking about extensions emerging from this work. It appears to be the case that repression directed at mobilization is most consistently associated with decreases in overt collective challenges when mobilization is repressed in sites where the state has the greatest capacity. In such settings repressing overt, collective challenges does not significantly increase collective challenges, but it does not significantly decrease them either. Conversely, when looking at low capacity municipalities, the repression of mobilization does not appear to have its same significant negative relationship with overt collective challenges. Here, repressing mobilization is not associated with any significant
change in challenger behavior. But when overt, collective challenges are repressed in low capacity areas, we see significant positive increases in future challenges.

As noted in the conclusion of the main text measures of state capacity are somewhat endogenous to the success or failure of repression. But the results emerging from this replication suggest that the impact of various repressive campaigns may be contingent on the underlying amount of state capacity operating in an area. Repression is most effective from the perspective of the government when it (a) is targeted at mobilization and (b) occurs in a high capacity area. Repression leads to its greatest increase in challenger behavior when it is (a) targeted at overt, collective challenges and (b) occurs in a low capacity area. Future research will need to investigate how governments make particular decisions about applying repressive force under different structural conditions and in response to different sets of challenger behaviors.
Works Referenced


Appendix AIII: Supplementary Appendix for “Challenger Demands and the Liberalization of Repression”

Section I: Variation in Liberalization at the Municipal Level

Table AIII-I displays descriptive statistics for municipal measures of liberalization as well as a host of variables relevant to theories of liberalization. The table displays three metrics for identifying liberalization. The first identifies the last month in which a municipality in Guatemala experienced any form repression. The second and third divide repression into two forms—overt and covert. Overt repression refers to acts in which the target of repression is made to be aware of the repression directed against them. It includes activities commonly associated with repression, such as torture, politically motivated arrests, and disappearances. The second liberalization metric identifies the last month in which a municipality experienced covert political repression. Covert repression represents acts in which the target is meant to be unaware of the action, and includes events such as surveillance, the use of civilian informants, agents provocateur, and the composition of investigative reports.\footnote{This distinction follows a division commonly made in the literature (see Davenport 2005). For greater information on the coding of the specific repressive events see Sullivan 2013.} An interesting facet that emerges is the relative multitude of covert repressive acts compared to overt forms of political repression. For every act of overt repression identified, more than four acts of covert repression can be identified. This likely results from the fact that much covert repression is difficult to identify and document.
repression was applied behind the scenes, and, as in the case of initiating investigations and writing reports, often does not involve the direct participation of movement actors. An approach focused exclusively on overt repression would fail to identify the majority of repressive behavior applied by the security forces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Earliest Observation</th>
<th>Median Observation</th>
<th>Latest Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>August, 1975</td>
<td>June, 1982</td>
<td>October, 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Reports</td>
<td>May, 1979</td>
<td>May, 1982</td>
<td>November, 1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure AIII-I gives a more complete accounting of the distribution of the duration of repressive spells in Guatemala’s municipalities. As can be seen from the figure, among those municipalities where repression was applied, there were relatively few in which liberalization occurred within the first 50 months of the study. This evidence is consistent with the macro-level descriptions of repressive behavior in Guatemala documented in the main text.

Then over the next two years, there is some more liberalization occurring, though this is still slight in comparison to what would follow. During the final four years under review there is an expansive opening of liberalization. What is significant to note is the variation in timing surrounding when different liberalizing municipalities experience their final act of repression. In some sites, liberalization occurs around what would be the beginning of 1982, many more drop off between 1983 and 1984, and some hold on through the end of 1985.
Section II: Selection in the Use of Political Repression

Table AIII-II displays descriptive statistics for two different sets of municipalities. The first column contains a set of variables that are important for understanding the application of repression and decisions to liberalize. Column two presents values for each of these variables for municipalities in which not a single act of government repression was observed in the police data. Because these variables did not experience repression, it was impossible to specify a liberalization date and they are consequently excluded from the analyses presented in the main text and below. Column three presents values across the different variables for the municipalities in which repression was committed.

Comparing across the table reveals some interesting patterns. Municipalities experiencing repression had consistently higher rates of mobilization, protests, and insurgent attacks. They were also more populous and had a larger number of campaign events. Interestingly, there appears to be little variation in the mean rate of literacy and percentage of indigenous persons residing in these two sets of municipalities.

### Table AIII-II: Comparing Municipalities With and Without Repression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Municipalities without Repression</th>
<th>Municipalities with Repression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Attacks</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Events</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>9,393</td>
<td>21,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Indigenous</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Literate</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section III: Replication Using All Types of Mobilization

Table AIII presents a series of examinations estimating the relationship between all forms of mobilization and liberalization. Unlike the principal results presented in the main text, in this case no effort is made to differentiate mobilization based on the ideals around which activists were organizing.

As a general rule, the results support the contention that when mobilization is not differentiated based on the ideals around which activists are organizing, there is no robust relationship between mobilization activities and decisions to liberalize. Consistent with the results presented in Model 2 of Table I in the main text, across three of the five additional specifications presented in table AIII, mobilization is insignificantly correlated with liberalization. Here, we see a negative point estimate, but that estimate is very small and the confidence bounds overlap with zero. Two of the models (Models A1 and A5) in Table AIII suggest that mobilization is negatively, and statistically significantly related to liberalization. This would suggest that governments are concerned over all forms of potential contention that may arise in the post liberalization period. However, when compared to the results surrounding radical mobilization, the results surrounding the undifferentiated mobilization variable are inconsistent. Taken together, this evidence suggests that some mobilization may be related to longer periods of repression and decreased expectations for liberalization. When the mobilization variable is differentiated into its radical and non-radical subcomponents, as it is in the principal reports presented in the main text, a much clearer picture emerges. Here, radical mobilization activities are related to longer periods of repression, while non-radical mobilization activities have no significant relationship with liberalization.
Table AIII-III: Cox Proportional Hazards Models of Liberalization with All Forms of Mobilization Undifferentiated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model A1</th>
<th>Model A2</th>
<th>Model A3</th>
<th>Model A4</th>
<th>Model A5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>0.593***</td>
<td>1.049</td>
<td>1.027</td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td>0.575***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.380)</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Attacks</td>
<td>0.742**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.706**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>(1.849)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.367)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.849)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.771)</td>
<td>(1.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.845**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.436)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGO Reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.610</td>
<td>1.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional NGO Reports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.401</td>
<td>0.381</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.929)</td>
<td>(0.386)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Municipal-Clustered Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 (Two-Tailed Test).
Works Referenced

