A TOUGH TRANSITION:
THE POST-COUP ELECTION AND ITS PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

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“But the majesty of the moment should not make us forget that first elections in a transition are not meant to consolidate democracy. They are not the proverbial “cherry on top.” They are a tentative step in a path that meanders from chaos to stability, from fear to guarantees and safeguards, from annihilation of the “Other” to acceptance of his/her right to exist and have a voice.” -- Carina Perelli, former UN Chief of Elections
ABSTRACT

While the military coup still accounts as one of the biggest direct threats to democracy, its effects today are not as irreversible and destructive as they once were. In this thesis, I examine what comes after the forceful seizure of a democratically-elected government. I am particularly interested in exploring what the prospects are for a country experiencing a coup to reverse its autocratic effects and pave the way toward a transition that will lead to more democratic outcomes. Because one tangible and integral features of democracies are competitive elections, I pay attention to the first national parliamentary election that happens after a military intervention. In doing so I ask the question: what strategies and factors of elections matter the most in affecting the long-term democratic outcomes following a military coup? I argue that the electoral timeline plays a major role in shaping democratic prospects. Specifically, I hypothesize that when electoral politics are temporized and introduced gradually--rather than rushing to implement them immediately or stalling indefinitely--the country will more likely follow a more democratic transition. To test this hypothesis, I analyze three case studies: the coups of Pakistan 1977, Turkey 1980, and Algeria 1992. I study the first post-coup national elections that happen in each of these cases, outlining how a number of electoral strategies are fulfilled in each of them, and what these elections mean for the country’s democratic prospects by looking at the indicators of voter turnout, electoral violence, changes in liberalization, and subsequent elections. After going through each case study to map out the political and historical circumstances surrounding each post-coup election and then comparing the three to one another, my findings confirm that time indeed is a significant variable in shaping democratic prospects, along with the degree of contestation and inclusion of the opposition. The empirical findings in this qualitative study may carry important implications for scholars, policymakers and political organizers studying or experiencing military-coup transitions.
INTRODUCTION

Last summer of 2013, millions of Egyptians took to the streets. By then, the scene was familiar. The world had gotten used to this image since the 2011 uprising when Egyptians reclaimed public space and made revolutionary slogans their own political genre, chanting “bread, freedom, dignity, social justice!” Unlike many of the day-to-day protests the public had become accustomed to since the 2011 uprising where smaller groups rallied together over more specific and local demands (for example, police reform, compensation for martyrs of the uprising, sacking corrupt officials, etc.), the protests that began on June 30, 2013 were widespread and brought together people of very different ideologies, motivations and expectations. But they all shared discontent for former President Muhammad Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government. Some called for early elections, others called for a vote of no confidence through a national referendum, and many were unambiguous with their resounding and all-too-familiar chants of Erhal! Leave!

Whatever their demands, it was the military that moved the situation along. Just a day after the Tamarod (“rebel”) group began its mass protests, army chief General Abdelfattah El-Sisi issued a 48-hour ultimatum to the incumbent government, warning that if the country’s various factions could not find a solution to the polarization, political deadlock and public’s dissatisfaction, the armed forces would be forced to seek a military solution and intervene to solve the crisis instead. The next day President Morsi addressed the nation, defending his administration vehemently and blaming the country’s political and economic problems on remnants of the previous regime. He made a few minor concessions, but it wasn’t what the opposition wanted to hear. They demanded nothing short of early elections or his resignation.

On the eve of the ultimatum deadline, Morsi vowed to form a new consensus-driven
government, but during the same time opposition leaders were meeting with the military to design the next plan of action. On July 3rd, 2013, in a two-minute televised address, General El-Sisi swiftly announced the dissolution of the country’s infant constitution, the annulment of what was left of parliament (the upper house had already been absolved by the judiciary at the end of 2012), and the naming of the head of the supreme constitutional court as the country’s new interim president until fresh elections were held (through a vague roadmap set by the military).

To be certain, many Egyptians supported the military intervention. It is what some scholars refer to as a “guardian coup” where people welcome the military stepping in in order for it to arbitrate and save the country from collapsing or falling into a civil war, as some characterized the alternative. At the same time, many who participated in the June 30 protests viewed the military’s action as a response to the demands of the public, rather than as the public bowing down or passively supporting the military’s desires and interests. A huge debate emerged both across Egypt and internationally about how to describe the events of June 30th to July 3rd. Some saw it as a classic example of a bloodless coup d’etat, while others vehemently opposed the label and described it as a second uprising or a “restoration” of the democratic January 25, 2011 uprising. The very term “coup” became extremely politicized as it shed its technical definition and became used as a binary litmus test of support for the army and opposition to President Morsi, or vice versa.

Much has been studied, debated and written extensively on why military interventions occur, what the varying levels of intervention look like, how militaries shape the democratic trajectory of revolutions, and, more generally, the nature of military coups and their outcomes. While these questions are important, because of the specific juncture Egypt finds itself in now, I am curious and concerned with the path it is heading down and what the current situation means
for the country’s democratic prospects that so many fought for demanded in the 2011 uprising. Especially as presidential and national parliamentary elections loom, I pay close attention to the outcomes of the transitional roadmap outlined by the military-backed government, and how it can be reevaluated and refined to support a more stable, secure and democratic transition.

Egypt has entered a dangerous and gloomy stage of severe repression. The country has experience unprecedented levels of violence, with the clearing of Rabaa Square in August marked as the worst mass killing in Egypt’s modern history (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Political arrests, political trials and a severe crackdown and monitoring of the press ensures the government has a monopoly on influencing political perceptions and revising history as it sees fit. Even ownership of public spaces—something that truly sprung out in full force since the 2011 uprising—is now under the tightening grip of security forces, whose crackdowns not only target public assemblies but also intimidate ordinary people off the streets through state-imposed curfews and road checkpoints. Whereas until recently the crackdown focused specifically on the Brotherhood and Morsi sympathizers, it is widening now to include any dissenting voices against the government and military at large. Although the military still enjoys wide approval from the public, we know from its brief yet highly mismanaged rule in 2011 that it does not hold complete impunity. Its popularity decreased as the economy plunged, military detentions for civilians increased, and the junta leaders stalled with no transparency on the democratic transition. If recent history is any guide, the military will continue to widen its witch-hunt, arbitrary detentions and violent targeting against more people of different political spheres. A recent law signed by the interim president criminalizes all protests and sit-ins. While this law may be intended to quash pro-Morsi protests, it carries implications for political parties, NGOs and activists organizing for various causes. A draft law aims to ban a burgeoning revolutionary tool, wall
graffiti, with four years in prison and a 100,000 LE fine for violators. Influential and leading activists Ahmed Maher and Alaa Abdelfattah, both key figures in the January 2011 uprising who are not Islamists or Morsi supporters, have been arrested for “attempting to influence the course of justice.” These steps are meant to quell dissident voices and institutionally criminalize public and political dissent.

Meanwhile, President Adly Mansour has just passed a decree in early 2014 regulating the upcoming election, paving the way for General Sisi to run and win (El-Din, 2014). There has not yet been mention of parliamentary elections, which will be significantly important in determining the inclusion, relevance and positionality of various political players. Although electoral processes cannot be looked to as a panacea for curing decades of corruption and despotism, they can play a role in indicating the political trajectory of a country, and its prospects for democracy based on that path. Free and fair elections are crucial for democratization as they allow citizens to assert their self-determination by choosing their leadership (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). Scholars have noted that even if elections are not completely free and fair, for nine out of ten countries they are now much more competitive than they were before 1990 (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). Because of their necessity in building democratic societies, it is worth examining whether and how military coups can lead to liberalizing outcomes (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). Some may think that it is counterproductive or even ironic to study the post-coup election in terms of what it means for democratization when the coup-makers who plotted it were obviously comfortable using unconstitutional, extrajudicial means to gain power--so why would they suddenly care to hold elections and risk losing that power? Isn’t the entire process irrelevant and farcical?

But where elections are competitive in some form, where a political opposition is present
and more than one candidate can run for office and multiple parties are challenging the incumbent’s rule, elections are worth paying attention to—even if they are not operated in an ideal fashion. In competitive elections, as Nikolay and Marinov point out, coup leaders do not always run, and when they or their affiliates do, they do not always win (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). Their own corporate interests and control over large segments of the national economy may incentivize them to go back to the barracks. The NELDA datasets have found that in 78% of post-coup cases in the Cold War and 76% in the post-Cold War, coup leaders lost their power after elections (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). Using Polity sets to track these trends, the datasets also found that post-1991 coups resulted in more liberalization than pre-1991 post-coup elections. Additionally, 82% of post-coup elections, as recorded by international observers, were categorized as relatively free and fair (Marinov & Hyde, 2012). Furthermore, in the post-Cold War era, there has been a stronger shift to support restoring democratic processes after a coup, whether through fresh elections or reinstatement (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). A lot of times coup leaders hand over power because of their economic stakes. While coups in the pre-Cold War era usually installed long-term regimes and durable dictators, coups after 1990 usually are followed by competitive elections (Marinov & Geomans, 2013).

Often, coup makers employ democratic strategies in the aftermath of intervention to justify their coup and gain acceptance or support for their actions. The legitimation strategies they have at their disposal are many including issuing ultimatums, requesting public mandates of support, installing civilian leaders, and organizing constitutional reforms, economic reforms, transitional justice and elections.

In this thesis, I pay particular attention to elections because of the many empirical and historical examples where the electoral process has been used post-coup to establish democracy,
or at least, restore a more stable and democratic transition. Whether there is genuine intention for
democratic aspirations is something I cannot measure (though we can often have much reason to
be skeptical of the intentions of coup leaders). What elections are used for in the post-
intervention period, however, beside legitimizing the coup or the coup leaders, is transitioning
the country and moving it to a different stage from the one that it is in (which often is a situation
of chaos, repression, polarization, instability and/or insecurity).

For this thesis, I explore how post-coup military governments utilize electoral politics
and what implications these actions have in shaping the country’s prospects for democracy. I will
focus on the electoral process in the immediate aftermath of a coup as a determinant for stability,
reconciliation and democratization in the long-term. To do this, I will first outline the different
electoral strategies coup leaders have at their disposal when it comes to elections. The strategies I
look at include the election timeframe 1 (announcing elections), election timeframe 2 (holding
elections), the degree of opposition inclusion and contestation, and the degree of military
interference. I will then look at the importance and relevance of each in shaping the election
process and outcome. I measure “prospects for democracy” by looking at a number of different
outcome variables that say something about the state of the country’s democratic robustness, or
at least how democratic its transition is. These outcome variables include legitimacy of elections
1 (voter turnout), legitimacy of elections 2 (electoral violence), change in political liberalization,
acceptance of electoral results, and subsequent elections.

While there is an urgency to understand Egypt’s trajectory, in order to understand it we
must historicize and contextualize the post-coup election. To do this, I will begin with a
preliminary hypothesis about the importance of electoral strategies in post-coup elections. I will
then conduct a number of case studies as empirical examples and as a way to examine the
plausibility of my hypothesis.

While many factors go into the making of the post-coup election order, I hypothesize that the most important factor in the historical chronology of a coup is the issue of election timing. I hypothesize that the primary electoral strategy that will affect the success of post-coup elections in restoring or opening up the potential for a democratic transition is the electoral timeframe (i.e. when elections are held). Specifically, I postulate that temporizing the electoral timeline and introducing electoral politics gradually in the post-coup aftermath increases the potential for a more democratic transition with increased stability and a more representative government. I hypothesize that delaying elections by three to five years in the post-coup time period increases the prospects for democratization because doing so allows factional tensions to de-escalate, political parties to regroup and organize and for ambitious constitutional, structural, and legal reforms to took root.

In hypothesizing this, I realize that there are many other factors at play in determining post-coup outcomes. However, I argue that the timing of elections is most crucial in determining democratic prospects in the post-coup transition because rushing to implement elections leads to more agitation, resistance and violence from supporters of the previous incumbent who refuse to acknowledge or see other than the incumbent as the legitimate leader. While some may believe that quickly holding elections will deliver governance back to democracy more quickly, doing so would disproportionately benefit the military’s backed candidates, while especially marginalizing candidates of the previous incumbent party or parties. Even if carried out smoothly and quickly, military interventions are serious interruptions of political processes and the social order in ways that cannot be undone rapidly or easily. Their impact is more often than not lasting and takes much time to recover. Quickly introducing elections also leads to unrest from other
opposition elements (not necessarily previous incumbents or previously active political forces) who feel as though they would have no time to mobilize, establish networks with constituencies and build their organizational power if elections were held quickly. On the contrary, elections that are delayed indefinitely or too extensively result in less accountability from the ruling junta and breed apathy in voters over time. Delaying elections for a lengthy period of time without evident pressure from the public leads to the praetorian regime to become long term military regimes, with a restoration of the democratic process greatly less likely. In other words, I argue that timing is the most important electoral strategy, and even if all of the other favorable electoral strategies were employed but the elections were held right away, then we would not witness strong or promising prospects for democracy following a country’s post-coup transition.
THEORY AND METHODS

METHODOLOGY

Explanatory Variables (e.g. electoral strategies)

In this thesis, my independent variables are the various electoral strategies and approaches coup makers have in shaping and influencing election outcomes. I have classified these explanatory variables into four categories: Time Frame (elections announced), Time Frame (elections held), Degree of Contestation and Opposition Inclusion, and Degree of Military Interference. In this section, I describe how I operationalize each one, what indicators and sources I am consistently using to calculate each variable, and my justifications for doing so.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame (elections announced)</td>
<td>No. of months before announcing election date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame (elections held)</td>
<td>No. of months before holding parliamentary elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of contestation &amp; opposition inclusion</td>
<td>0-4 scale (with zero being the least inclusive, and 4 the most inclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Only the ruling party can run</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = A finite amount can run but all prior parties cannot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = All parties can run except for the prior main opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3= All candidates can run but not through formal parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = All parties are included can run</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of military interference</td>
<td>0 = no interference; the military hands elections to a completely independent election committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = the military may be interfering behind the scenes through talks with leaders or ambiguous speech; the military is interfering in general terms (e.g. by urging public to vote but not backing a specific party or candidate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = there is a strong military presence in election spaces; they are primarily the ones observing elections; they bar international or independent voting monitors; they clearly influence voting patterns; there is poll rigging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = the military is funding specific parties; backing candidates and parties and urging the public to vote for them through speeches,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Time Frame 1
This factor examines how quickly coup leaders announce or call for elections. That is, when do they mention elections, but more specifically, when do they set a timeframe or specific date for when it will be held? This variable is measured by recording the number of months before the coup leaders announce the election timetable (e.g. not just saying there will be elections but actually announcing what month and year they will be held). This variable will be determined through second hand sources that trace the first mention of elections including newspaper articles from the time period (e.g. The New York Times, Milliyet, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Christian Science Monitor, etc.).

Time Frame 2
This factor measures how quickly coup leaders actually hold elections. It is measured by the number of months before parliamentary elections are held after the coup. This variable is also measured by looking through the historical archives of newspapers and locating when the first mention is made of elections occurring (e.g. The New York Times, Milliyet, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Christian Science Monitor, etc.).

Degree of Political Contestation and Opposition Inclusion
This variable represents how much contestation the ruling party permits in the first post-coup parliamentary elections. It measures how all political parties including the opposition are dealt with vis-à-vis the state. Informed by notions of Robert Dahl on polyarchy and political participation, I focus on opposition parties and look at the ways in which they are formally or informally included or excluded, and how this translates into overall inclusion and contestation in elections (Luong & Lust-Okar, 2002). It is measured not simply by examining how many parties are running (although that does carry weight), but primarily by measuring the range of candidates in the election that represent various interests of voters and how full the array of options they have is. It also considers the number of new political parties or non-previous incumbent parties contesting the election, as well as independents. This factor also represents the reason behind the number of parties contesting elections. Are there parties running at all? Is the number of parties particularly low? If so, is this due to voluntary reasons by parties (boycott, post-coup apathy/distrust in system, etc.) or through force (laws that prohibit certain parties from running e.g. previous parties, small parties, leftist parties, etc.) or both? This factor also demonstrates how thoroughly the opposition is included into the electoral process. Do opposition forces participate in elections? Is the main prior opposition or prior incumbent included? If yes,
under what conditions? If no, is it due to voluntarily reasons (e.g. boycotts) or by force (political exclusion laws) or both? For example, the military incumbents might decide to formally exclude all parties from participating, but allow them to informally organize and participate in elections as independents. They might decide to include a limited amount of parties, but have them only discuss issues set within the parameters allowed by the ruling junta (Luong & Lust-Okar, 2002). Alternatively, they may allow all parties to run, except the main prior incumbent/current opposition it deems as a threat and sought to quell before through forceful regime change.

This variable is measured by a continuum of 0-4, with 0 being the least inclusive and competitive and 4 being the most. 0 means only the ruling party can run, 1 means a finite amount can run but most prior opposition parties cannot, 2 means all parties except for the prior main opposition can run, 3 means parties cannot run formally but all candidates can run, and 4 means all parties are included and can run.

0-4 scale (0 being the least inclusive, and 4 the most inclusive)

0 = Only the ruling party can run  
1 = A finite amount can run but all prior parties cannot  
2 = All parties can run except for the prior main opposition  
3 = All candidates can run but not through formal parties  
4 = All parties are included can run

In determining how the opposition is included, I aim to to analyze what ways the military leaders are trying to fragment, shape and manipulate the opposition (Luong & Lust-Okar, 2002). This factor is determined by studying electoral datasets that outline what parties ran in and contested parliamentary elections (e.g. election handbooks including *Elections in Asia, Elections in Africa*, reports by international election observers, etc.)

**Degree of Military Interference**

This variable measures how much the coup-leaders and the military at large interfere in the post-coup election. While initially I had coded this variable as a simple “yes” or “no” for interference, the degrees of interference vary too much and too subtly for this categorization to be effective. Instead, I have classified military interference through a ranking system on a scale of 0-5, with 0 delineating no interference and 5 as the staging of a coup.

The ranking system is as follows:

0 = no interference; the military hands elections to a completely independent election committee  
1 = the military may be interfering behind the scenes through talks with leaders or ambiguous speech; the military is interfering in general terms (e.g. by urging public to vote but not backing a specific party or candidate)  
2 = there is a strong military presence in election spaces; they are primarily the ones observing
elections; they bar international or independent voting monitors; they clearly influence voting patterns; there is poll rigging
3 = the military is funding specific parties; backing candidates and parties and urging the public to vote for them through speeches, advertising campaigns, etc.; the military is only allowing parties it deems fit to run
4 = coup leaders and members of the military (or retired generals) are contesting elections directly
5 = military leaders stage a coup to prevent or annul results

This variable is determined by examining primary sources (speeches of military leaders regarding different political parties and the upcoming elections, television and media propaganda, etc.) and secondary sources (newspaper headlines and articles, scholarly journal articles and books that cite the different ways the coup leaders scrutinized or manipulated elections and parties).

Outcome Variables (e.g. measures of democratic prospects)

In this section, I outline the outcome variables produced by electoral strategies. The indicators of these variables offer substantial ways of measuring democratization prospects for the post-coup period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Variable</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Voter turnout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Organized/reported electoral violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Political Liberalization</td>
<td>Change in civil rights after elections: Did they regain pre-coup levels? By how much (or how little)? Looks at change 1 year after the elections then 5 years after the election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Electoral Results</td>
<td>Are elected representatives able to take office and are recognized by the incumbent government?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent elections</td>
<td>Do the next scheduled elections occur as scheduled?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legitimacy of Elections 1: Voter Turnout**

This outcome measures the legitimacy of elections in the eyes of the public. This factor can help us understand post-coup prospects for democracy because if there is consensus that the elections are legitimate, citizens (the opposition included) are more likely to participate and trust in the electoral process. To be certain, the ballot box is only one factor of many when looking at the democratic potential of a country, but political science scholars have long understood it to be an
important one nonetheless as it can reflect the prospects for democratic consolidation, constituent satisfaction, political attitudes, partisan distribution of the vote, and other outcomes (Alexander, 2002). I measure legitimacy of elections by studying the voter turnout of the election. Voter turnout, the percentage of eligible voters who cast their votes (including those whose ballot is invalid or blank), can be a good marker of democratic participation and democratic legitimacy. This factor is determined through electoral datasets that outline what parties ran in and contested parliamentary elections (e.g. election handbooks including Elections in Asia, Elections in Africa).

**Legitimacy of Elections 2: Electoral Violence**

This outcome used to measure the democratic prospects of a country regarding its post-coup elections represents levels of electoral violence. Election disputes are often used to delegitimize the electoral process by demonstrating the lack of objectivity and fairness in elections. Violence can be an option used to tamper with or influence the outcome of elections, either by the incumbents, the opposition or by both. It may be used to disrupt the elections altogether and make sure it is deemed invalid, or it can be used to block certain sectors of society from casting their votes. I will measure this outcome by examining second hand materials including newspapers that discuss the elections at hand and look to whether they make mention of reported violence or other disruptive irregularities occurring during the election. I determine systematic violence during elections and leading up to it based on reported accounts of injuries, deaths and destructive incidents via news sources and election reports by international and independent observer organizations.

**Change in Political Liberalization**

Because political and civil liberalization complements democratization processes (Alexander, 2002), I include this variable as an indicator of post-coup prospects for democracy. This outcome measures change in political liberalization before and after the post-coup election as a way to determine if the election was followed by greater or less liberalization. This outcome will be measured through changes in political liberalization over time: changes before the coup, after the coup, and after the first post-coup election. The primary indicator I use to determine this change over time is through measuring changes in civil and political rights before and after elections. Did civil rights increase or decrease one year following the post-coup election? Did civil rights increase or decrease five years after that election? I look to see if political liberalization after elections regains pre-coup levels, exceeds it or plummets entirely.

I quantify political liberalization and changes in civil and political rights by analyzing trends and changes in Freedom House’s Freedom Ratings (where 1 is the most free and 7 is the least free) that combine the scores of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Political rights are measured based on a country’s “electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and function of government,” while civil liberties are based on “freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights” (Freedom
Khalil (2013). To do this, I calculate differences in scores from right before the pre-coup, to right after the coup, to right after the first post-coup parliamentary election, to the second parliamentary post-coup election (usually 3-5 years for elections to recur).

I also track and include secondary sources (newspapers) that capture the political consciousness and liberalization attitudes of the time period (e.g. reports and news on arrests, executions, purging faculties, disbanding student organizations, installing military general in academic bureaucratic/academic positions, etc.).

**Acceptance of Electoral Results**

This outcome variable represents whether the elected leader or representatives with the most votes are able to take office. Do coup leaders recognize their victory? Do opposition factions or boycotters recognize their victory? If not, is their rejection relevant and what are the implications of it?

While I do take note of the responses of different political sectors of society, I calculate “acceptance” primarily by looking at acceptance from members of the incumbent government because their approval is fundamental in whether the elected representatives are sworn in.

I use primary sources (speeches, press releases, public statements) and second hand sources (newspapers, magazines) to determine this variable.

**Subsequent Elections**

This outcome variable determines whether the incoming incumbent government is able to finish its term and whether the next national parliamentary elections occur as scheduled. After the first post-coup elections, did elections occur again after the completion of the incumbent’s term? I measure this by ascribing a label of “yes” or “no” to whether the election happened. I measure this factor through electoral datasets that list all elections of a given country and I determine the soonest election following the post-coup election (e.g. election handbooks including *Elections in Asia*, *Elections in Africa*).

While I am concerned with whether or not the newly elected government is able to finish its term and the next elections happen on time, I realize there is more complexity and depth in determining the actual democratic consolidation that grows out of the election. Democratic consolidation implies that all actors engaging in politics have pro-democratic tendencies and a democratic government is unlikely to be reversed regardless of changing events and players (Alexander, 2002). Therefore, my typology that measures whether the post-coup elections led to a more democratic, somewhat democratic, or less democratic government takes this into consideration for this outcome variable.
**CASE SELECTION**

In the second half of the twentieth century, a majority of countries in the world experienced at least one coup attempt (Sing, 2013). Between 1950 and 2000, 471 independent countries underwent coups (Singh, 2013). To draw the most similar case design in studying and comparing military coups, I focus on Pakistan, Turkey and Algeria as the three primary case studies that guide this thesis. Military coup leaders are likely to use similar strategies in similar populations and contexts, so I chose countries with comparable circumstances in order to control as much as possible for confounding variables. All three of these case studies contain coups that occurred during the third wave of democratization, when many developing countries were transitioning to constitutional democracies--these countries stand out then, as countries that were experiencing drastic disruptions to democracy instead. The three countries share similar socioeconomic and demographic contexts at the time of their coups, with similar levels of poverty and education at the time of the coups. They are all predominantly Muslim countries and were emerging democracies at the time leading up to their respective coups. In each of these three cases all of these coups overthrew or interrupted democratic or popularly elected incumbents. Furthermore, all of these countries at the time of their coups had strong militaries, as exemplified by high military spending and a sense of popular allegiance and prestige afforded to the armed forces because of their role in the origins of the state.

In this thesis, I pay close attention to the first parliamentary election held in the post-coup period. Therefore, my case studies are: Turkey’s 1983 Grand National Assembly election, Pakistan’s 1985 National Assembly election, Algeria’s 1997 Peoples National Assembly election.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars of military interventions have written extensively about the implications of the military coup, noting that three out of four democracy failures in the world have come from coups (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010). Because coup politics have been a key marker of this time period, they deserve examination as they often prompt pivotal moments in history felt both locally and internationally.

Much has been written on the military coup, its motivations and causes, the internal dynamics of coup-plotters, and the different components of coup risk. Scholars of civil-military relations have studied and characterized the types of countries that most frequently undergo coups. Understanding the explanations of coup-risk and coup causes as well as structural components that lead up to intervention help us understand whether what happened in Egypt on June 3rd, 2013, for example, is not novel or extraordinary as both people in and outside of Egypt sought to characterize it after the military intervention last summer. Professor Naunihal Singh’s new publication, Seizure of Power, highlights the conditions that facilitate coups based on his own statistical analysis of hundreds of coup attempts. His findings suggest that coups more often occur “in countries that are less economically developed, with governments that are neither highly democratic nor highly dictatorial, and which have recently experienced at least one other coup attempt. In other words, coup attempts happen in countries like Egypt” (Singh, 2013). Indeed, scholars have documented that popular protests coupled or followed by coups are not anomalies but have happened frequently over history [see Iran 1979, Philippines 1986, Romania 1989, Ecuador 2000] (Singh, 2013).

The coup, as described by political scientist Eric Nordlinger, is “a situation in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened
use of force” (Nordlinger, 1977). Nordlinger has examined the ways military governments deal with a number of issues after seizing power, including those that adopt changes to justify themselves as an effective and progressive force (Nordlinger, 1977).

Another important factor in the discussion on military coups is the concept of legitimacy, or about the incumbent’s right to rule. Scholars have sought to explain that when there is a common readiness to use institutionalized procedures to address grievances and disputes, and when there are laws and policies in place to prevent abuses from executive powers, then the opposition is not likely to externally appeal to the military to intervene in politics. By the same token, the army is unlikely to turn against the government unless it thinks that some significant segment of society would feel the same as it and support its actions. Political scientists Marinov and Geomans have also discussed political legitimacy and explain that a lack of it is often the result of economic decline and weak political institutions. A lack of legitimacy, they argue, leads to political instability (through parliamentary deadlock or street protests) (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). In describing which countries experiencing coups are most likely to hold elections, they conclude that countries with more democratic political institutions make it more likely for coup leaders to arrange elections and hand over power because of public perceptions that the military belongs in the barracks and should not meddle directly in politics for too long.

Other scholars have sought to show how economic influences affect whether the military rulers decide to hold onto power or move sooner to elections (Powell, 2012). For example, coup leaders will often rush to make deals about foreign funding as soon as they seize office. Consider the recent case of Egypt, where coup leaders and the military-backed government hastened to secure support of the Saudi and Gulf governments once they realized that support from Qatar, the United States and other benefactors may be shaky because of their assault on democratic
electoral processes (or perhaps because of who they overthrew).

All these economic, social, and political factors clearly may reinforce one another and are highly interconnected. Social perceptions, the identity and characteristic of the coup-makers, economic incentives, and international relations all must be taken into consideration when determining how military leaders react after a coup—particularly, whether or not and how soon they decide to hold elections.

Because this thesis focuses on post-coup electoral politics, my research is concerned with what comes after the coup—particularly, what has been written about “undoing” the harmful effects of coups and paving a democratic post-coup transition. Scholars of praetorianism—a militarist system where the armed forces intervene for regime change—have sought to outline the different pathways coup makers carve and take after a forceful seizure of power. They discuss why some seek to hold elections and transfer power, while others seek to rule and formulate policy on their own (Geddes, 1999).

Whereas, before 1999, especially before the Cold War, coups used to produce long-term leaders, they now are usually followed by competitive elections. Scholars have noted that before 1991, most coups did not have elections soon and were leaders for life; whereas, coups after 1992 usually held elections within five years (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). Coups are harmful to democratization, but in general, their effects today are not as permanently damaging and harmful to democracy as they once were. This is why coups and particularly their aftermaths are worthy of our attention.

Scholars Nikolay and Marinov have noted that post-Cold War international pressures were largely responsible for shaping the consequences of countries after coups. Their extensive research and case studies aimed to explore what factors affected a post-coup government’s
likelihood of holding elections afterwards versus which ones were likely to install durable dictators (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). These academics argue that because the international community’s position is key in shaping outcomes, perhaps even more so than domestic opinion and the influences of the junta leaders themselves, then perhaps democratic failures that result from a coup are more reversible if coup makers are penalized for their actions. They therefore look at it from a preventative standpoint, where anticipating elections after the intervention may cause coup plotters to think twice about organizing a coup in the first place. They found that those countries who were dependent on US aid were more likely to hold competitive elections after a coup.

Nikolay and Marinov note that after the Cold War, western international players pledged to support democracy-building abroad by punishing coup attempts. In 1991, the EU made a commitment to cut aid for those who overthrow elected governments, while the US in 1997 passed legislation in Congress to suspend aid for countries that undergo a coup (Powell & Thyne, 2011). These scholars explain that such decisions are motivated by a western understanding that a liberal international order is necessary for its long-term strategic interests (Powell & Thyne, 2011). While international players may not be able to directly affect how and whether a coup is carried out (though that certainly is possible and has been done), they can quickly affect the turn a recipient government and country will take after the coup based on patron-client stipulations.

Marinov and Geomans have also sought to explain the pathway in the post-coup aftermath by understanding what kind of change the coup makers sought when they came into power. What kind of status quo or policy change did the coup leaders seek? Having decided on one (or against one), they have to think then about what elections would do if they were to hold them during a specific point in time. Would it reproduce the same result and reinstate the ousted
government, or would it lead to a change that aligns with their partisan views? For example, in Algeria 1992, the military annulled elections right after the first round to avoid similar results. If the military were to hold competitive elections soon after the coup, they would probably face the same results where the FIS would win again. Whereas, in Egypt, after the military ousted the Morsi government in 2013, if the military holds parliamentary elections soon (which it looks to be the case), it would work in their favor since the typical voter’s preference more closely aligns with the military’s (rather than the prior incumbent). Here, the main variable at play in deciding whether or not to hold elections, and how soon, is the incumbent’s popularity. If the incumbent/ousted government enjoys popular support, then holding elections, or holding them sooner, would not work in the military’s favor—so it is likely something they would avoid.

Marinov and Geomans suggest that it may only be “worthwhile” to have a coup and intend to have elections if the incumbent is not popular; that way the coup leaders have something to gain in terms of policy change and can take power then give it up through elections to actualize their goal (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). While I agree with this notion, a more nuanced approach to this issue needs to ask whether there is a specific policy orientation the coup-leaders seek or if it simply seeks any alternative to the previous incumbent. On the other hand, scholars have noted that if the coup-plotters’ vision for policy is more distant to the median voter than that of the incumbent government’s, then they probably would not be likely to hold elections—or if they did, they would not be democratic or at all competitive (Marinov).

While these findings and research on deciding whether or not elections will happen are important in elevating the discourse on the post-coup aftermath, they do not address the foundational issue of what kind of conditions in elections lead to more democratic processes. Though the current literature sheds light on what holding elections during a certain point in time
would do in terms of realizing the goals of the coup makers, it does not closely consider what it would do overall in terms of cultivating more favorable democratic prospects. My goal, then, is to deepen this perspective by deconstructing the different electoral strategies available in shaping elections, and tracing which of these strategies are most salient in producing long-term democratic outcomes.
CASE STUDY 1: TURKEY 1983

We begin with Turkey because out of the three case studies, it had the longest history of civilian and democratic governance prior to its coup. Turkey was not part of the third wave of democracy, but rather of the second wave when it transitioned to democratic politics in the 1940s (Ozbudun, 2000). Since its founding in 1923 by Kamal Ataturk, Turkey has experienced many interventions by the military: a coup in 1960, a “coup by memorandum” in 1971, a coup in 1980, a “post-modern” coup in 1997 and, what some have dubbed, an “e-memorandum” in 2007 (an ultimatum that threatened the possibility of a coup but didn’t result in a regime change). For this thesis, I focus on the 1980 coup in Turkey as a primary case study because of its seminal historical significance.

The country experienced its first coup in 1960 as tensions between the government and opposition escalated dramatically. The military’s officers were losing patience with the increasingly poor economic state under the rule of the Democratic Party, as well what they perceived to be the army’s growingly diminishing prestige as their incomes were slashed and the period of mandatory military service was shortened by the government. The Democratic Party (a center right) government, headed by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, was seen as weakening and not abiding by the strictly secularist policies of Kemalism. Instead, it was viewed as strengthening religious freedoms and giving religion more of a public and visible position throughout the country (through its reopening of mosques that were shut down by the previous Republican People’s Party, opening up of schools for religious authorities, allowing the call to prayer to be recited in Arabic, etc.). At the same time, the government was accused of clamping down on certain media outlets and implementing laws that would restrict press freedoms (Birand, 1987). The government soon imposed martial law to address the growing disorder and tensions
that turned from a handful of urban-areas to a nationwide crisis. A few months later, seeing that the emergency law was not having its desired effect, the military staged a coup, overthrowing the Democratic Party government, executing Menderes and introducing new amendments to the constitution that gave the armed forces more autonomy than ever before. After the coup, the new military rulers of the country institutionalized the army’s presence in Turkey’s political life by creating the National Security Council, chaired by the president and minister of defense. These institutions yielded much influenced as they functioned as a parallel executive.

The next time the military intervened in politics was on March 12, 1971 through what is described as a “coup by memorandum.” Under growing economic instability as well as declines in law and order, the military issued a three-point memorandum over the airwaves by Chief of General Staff Mamduh Tagmac and the commanders of the air, land and sea forces. The memorandum called for the government to take immediate steps to resolve the deepening economic crisis, high inflation and loss of security. It demanded a new government be put in place that would carry out Kemalist principles and implement reforms to institutionalize the secular values of Ataturk. If the government did not take these steps, the memorandum warned, the military would intervene to carry out these steps and rule directly “under the laws that place the military in the role of protector of the nation (Birand, 1987).”

The coup that occurred in 1980 was a consequence of unfinished business of the 1971 memorandum. This coup was a result of the military viewing rightist and leftist groups, but especially the latter, as a severe threat to the state’s ideology and stability. Scholars have often noted the 1980 coup as Turkey’s most seminal coup as it was the last of Turkey’s classic coup d'etats, though it certainly was not the last of the military’s intervention or meddling in civilian life and politics. The 1971 intervention was seen as a “half-coup” concerned with the “re-
equilibration of democracy” (Özbudun, 2000, p. 25). The generals did not suspend the constitution, dissolve the national assembly, or ban political parties in this case. Rather, the military formed a highly technocratic government to deal with the issues it felt the current government could not address, asserting its control more subtly through backdoor deals in politics.

Meanwhile, scholars have distinguished between the 1960 and 1980 coups in their motivations and impact. The 1960 coup was carried out by middle-rank officers with serious differences among them, while the 1980 coup was led by the top level chain of the command of the armed forces, driven and operating by strict discipline and apparent consensus, who later became known as the National Security Council, composed of the commanders of the army, the navy, the air force, and the gendarmerie (Özbudun, 2000, p. 25). Furthermore, while the NSC of the 1980 coup outlawed all existing political parties and only allowed three new parties to contest elections, the National Unity Committee (NUC) military body collaborated with a previous opposition party, the Republican Peoples’ Party, and rallied for its victory. Finally, while the NUC was viewed as carrying out a moderating coup because of its main goal of resolving the pressing constitutional crisis, the National Security Council (NSC) on the other hand had ambitious goals for implementing swift social, political and structural changes. It passed more than 600 laws on political parties, trade unions, professional organizations, NGOs, educational institutions, media outlets, local government bodies, the judiciary and more. Thus, the 1980 coup was much more radical and authoritarian in its reach.
### INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR TURKEY 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>TURKEY 1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>Announcement of election date</td>
<td>15 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1 year, 3 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>When first post-coup parliamentary elections are held</td>
<td>38 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3 years, 2 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of contestation &amp; opposition</td>
<td>0 = Only the ruling party can run</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration</td>
<td>1 = A finite amount can run but all prior parties cannot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = All parties can run except for the prior main opposition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = All candidates can run but not through formal parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = All parties are included and can run</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = least inclusive, 4 = most</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inclusive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of military interference</td>
<td>0 = no interference</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = least interfering, 5 = most</td>
<td>1 = the military may be interfering behind the scenes through talks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interfering)</td>
<td>with leaders or ambiguous speech; military interfering in general</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>terms; military presence in election spaces; the ones observing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>elections; bar international monitors; is clearly influencing voting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>patterns; the military is poll rigging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = the military is funding specific parties; backing candidates and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>parties and urging public to vote for them through speeches, advertising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>campaigns, etc.; the military is only allowing parties it deems fit to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>run</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = coup leaders and many members of the military (or retired generals)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>are contesting elections directly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 = military leaders stage a coup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR TURKEY 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Voter turnout</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Is there reported organized violence?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Political Liberalization</td>
<td>Does political liberalization regain pre-coup levels (immediately after by 1 year, and then 5 years)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2, 3, F) → (5,5, PF) → (3,5, PF) → (2,4, PF) = Net Change = (0, +1)</td>
<td>Decreased by (0,1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Electoral Results</td>
<td>Are elected leaders able to take office and complete their term (e.g., does the incumbent recognize them?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent elections</td>
<td>Do next scheduled elections occur as scheduled?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INDEPENDENT/EXPLANATORY VARIABLES (X)

**Time Frame 1: Calling for Elections**

On September 12, 1980, Turkish military leaders executed a coup d'état known as Operation Fair Play. Upon seizing power, in a televised address to the public, General Kenan Evren mentioned no timetable for when elections would be held. Rather, he discussed that the new constitution would be the first step in regaining stability and this constitution would alter the election procedures and party laws that, “paved the way to today’s conditions,” he said (Kifner, 1980). In subsequent speeches, Evren made references to elections but still did not offer a specific timetable for the military to return to the barracks. Three months later, on December 19, 1980, he spoke of the timetable vaguely, “It is in our heads. I will disclose it in 1981. We carried
out the military intervention on time, and we will implement our plan to return to democracy also on time” (Kifner, 1980). Within months, rumors leaked to the press about when the parliamentary elections would be held, some stating that a parliament would be formed as early as March 1981 according to the interim government (Kifner, 1980). International newspapers repeatedly came out with headlines like “Turk Rejects ‘Foreign Pressures’ To Hasten Return to Democracy” (New York Times, 1980) and “Turkish Junta Plans Changes Far Wider Than Initial Aims” (Howe, 1981). Such headlines reflect an aura of impatience with the junta outside of Turkey over whether Evren and his allies were truly committed to relinquishing power. On October 16, 1980, the junta named a 160-member “advisory assembly” tasked with drafting the country’s next constitution that would stipulate laws for the upcoming national parliamentary elections. A month later, impatience with the junta was vocalized by the constituent assembly, who called for more freedoms in their work with one member directly challenging the generals by demanding that the assembly have the right to institute “an agenda” and timetable for free elections (New York Times, 1981). It was finally a month later, on December 31st 1981, when Evren revealed the timetable and announced that elections would be held in the fall of 1983 at the soonest and spring of 1984 at the latest (Howe, 1981). It took the coup leaders 15 months before they specifically declared when elections would be held.

**Time Frame 2: Holding Elections**

The first general post-coup elections were held in Turkey on November 7, 1983--27 months after the 1980 coup. They were held on time according to the date set and announced by General Evren two years earlier as the sooner date in the estimated timeframe (Howe, 1983, November 7).

**Degree of Contestation**

Following the 1980 coup, all political parties were disbanded and Prime Minister
Suleyman Demirel and former prime minister Bulent Ecevit, the leaders of two prominent parties, the far right National Action Party and the social democrat Republican People’s Party (in coalition with the Islamist National Salvation Party) were put on trial, while thousands of local party leaders and 240 politicians were banned from political activity for 10 years (Howe, 1983, August 28). The generals later repealed their comprehensive ban on political parties in 1983 but kept harsh restrictions on who could contest the upcoming elections. As a result, only three new parties were allowed to run in the 1983 elections--ANAP (the Motherland Party, HP2 (Populist Party) and MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party) all parties that were not key players in the pre-coup political landscape and had not run in the last national election in 1977. The popular parties that had won in this election--namely, the CHP (the Republican People’s Party) CHP and (the Justice Party (AP), were now banned from the 1983 elections). These parties lacked appeal for the most part, and the military wanted this. In fact, any party that sought to emerge as a charismatic, unique alternative, was quelled by the NSC by vetoing any founding members of the party right before the deadline the party founding members lists was due so that there was a shortage of the 30 needed names and the party could not run (Ahmed, 2000). Some opposition parties tried to regroup under different and new party names, but laws that specifically excluded candidates of the previous government were put in place to bar them too (Feldmann, 1983).

While political exclusion laws were able to bar visible politicians from running, mostly those who had served in the National Assembly or government before the coup, other opposition parties (RPP and JP) called for an election boycott, but they did not gain much sympathy from the electorate (Ahmed, 2000) General Evren shamed the boycotters in a public speech, saying, “...even those who say ‘I am a nationalist’ are, like the communists, saying don’t vote” (Ahmed, 2000).
Besides completely and formally excluding the opposition, the generals only allowed contestation for new parties they deemed not threatening or related to previous parties. These new parties were allowed to form just a few months before the elections started on April 25, 1983 (seven months before the elections).

The generals kept the number of parties allowed to contest elections so small because they wanted one strong party to assert control over parliament rather than a return to the sort of coalition politics and party system fragmentation that dominated the pre-coup era, as Evren remarked, “Whatever we suffered, we suffered during the period of coalitions. Let (the parties) come together; we do not want another period of coalitions” (Ahmed, 2000). Scholars have noted that the military’s intentions behind this anti-coalition rhetoric was to produce strong one-party rule with incompetent and weakened opposition parties so the the September 12, 1980 regime could continue its regime with “all the trappings of parliamentary government” (Ahmed, 2000). The generals aimed to create a wider political class and eliminate all extremes and variation within it by excluding ideological minor parties (Türsan, 2004). The one-party government the generals envisioned would stunt the growth and power of all other groups. This is what the 1983 parliamentary law sought to codify by requiring political parties to possess 10% of the vote nationally if they wanted to compete. Thus, the general sought not only to disallow parties of the old guard, but also new parties that lacked the organizational strength needed to gain the support of large segments of the population in the short period of campaigning (Hazama). Even then, their allowance to participate was contingent on certain candidates being excluded from running with their party ticket, with the military rejecting some of the nominations on their candidate list (Nohlen, 2001).

Given the complete exclusion of all prior political parties as well as the heavy restrictions
for new parties to compete, the 1983 Turkish parliamentary election receives a 1 on the scale of 0-4 for degree of contestation and opposition integration.

**Degree of Military Interference**

The Turkish military played an important role in organizing and executing elections following the coup. Their interference in the electoral process—from setting the timetable to directly influencing voting patterns through public speeches and campaigns to setting severe restrictions on nominations—highlight how the military oversaw and managed this process. Any party that wished to run needed a stamp of approval from the NSC and could be rejected without reason. For this reason, it took four months before any party was approved by the NSC and three parties were qualified to run (while 14 were denied) (Ahmad, 1984). The parties that did make the cut had their lists of candidates closely scrutinized and challenged by the NSC.

Besides interfering in elections by selecting who could contest elections, the Turkish military actively championed one of the three parties it allowed to run. It threw its entire weight behind the MDP a few months before the elections because it saw it as the only party that could “guarantee continuity” to the September 12 regime’s ideology (Ahmed, 1984). The party was led by Turgut Sunalp, a retired general. By the time the party lists had been scrutinized and the final roster approved by the NSC, the parties only had three weeks to campaign, which marked the shortest campaigning period in the country’s political chronology” (Ahmad, 1984). During this time period, however, not much could be publicly discussed as the military dictated what issues could be discussed on air. The parties could not challenge or comment on the September 12 regime and were not allowed to critique it in anyway. At least on the surface, the parties appeared similar in this regard as they all publicly vowed to uphold the “September 12 philosophy” (Ahmad, 1984).

Evren used his oratorical skills and charisma to campaign for the representatives he
thought best reflected the post-September 12 order. In a speech in Malatya on November 11, 1982, shortly after the ban on all political activity had been lifted but still before the final party roster for contesting elections had been publicized, he warned people to choose the right party,

There will be a period of elections before us. You will choose your new representatives in this election. I advise you to be very careful when you elect these new representatives. The old ones are up to their underhanded tricks. We know this, and you ought to know it too. If there had been virtue in old things, flea markets would have been bathed in glory. Find new personalities. Find new representatives. I have told you on a number of occasions what kind of qualities they ought to possess. Find these people from among yourselves, elect them and send them. We, too, will withdraw into a corner when the time comes. No one is indispensable in this world. Everyone ought to know how to withdraw to one side after having done his duty. If he doesn’t know, then those who will drive him out by force [i.e. the armed forces] might come forward. I urge you to be wide awake on this matter. (Ahmad, 1984)

In this warning, Evren pressures the public to vote for a new party and forget about the parties of the pre-coup era. With growing skepticism about the military’s intentions in politics and its stated return to the barracks, he confirms that the military wants to withdraw; it is only looking over this process for the good of the public and until the government is in trustworthy hands. Alongside this paternalistic advice is also a bold and clear threat: if the people do not choose the right party, the military will once again intervene.

Just days before the election when it appeared that Ozal’s Motherland Party was ahead in public opinion polls and not the military’s favored MDP, the military actually banned domestic public opinion polls in order to curb their influence on the election’s turn out (Howe, 1983, November 3). It was also during this time that General Evren came out in public support of the MDP and Sunalp, which he had previously been vaguer about when he had tried to play neutral with the rest of the junta. He launched a smear campaign against Turgut Ozal, discussing on television and radio stations just days before the election how irresponsible he was and that only the MDP could ensure an extension of the NSC’s policies, remarking, “If you are happy with the activities of the NSC over these three years, I am convinced that you will bring to power an
administration which will continue the Council’s policies and will not again push the country into confusion (Ahmad, 1984).” In addition to his words, interim Prime Minister Ulusu also made a public statement on national broadcast where he reminded people of the pre-coup situation flared with violence and incompetence and asked people to remember this as they voted the next day.

Given the military’s unambiguous support for a certain party and its public campaign to urge electors to vote for the MDP, Turkey receives a 3 for the Degree of Military Interference in elections.

OUTCOME VARIABLES

Legitimacy of Elections 1: Voter Turnout

The first post-coup national elections in November 1983 boasted a high voter turnout of 92.3% (Nohlen, 2001). Different factors may have played a role in producing this high turnout. For one, many viewed this election as another referendum for the regime of September 12 (the first one being the actual constitutional referendum that put Evren in power in 1982). Other factors at play may include that voting was made compulsory in 1982, and a law mandated a fee on those who did not vote and did so with unjustified reason (although this law was known it was not really implemented) (Nohlen, 2001). Furthermore, those who did not register to vote for the 1982 referendum lost the right to vote for the next five years, so they could not vote in the national elections in 1983 (Nohlen).

Legitimacy of Elections 2: Electoral Violence

While local and international journalist outlets have documented and written about the widespread violence that shook the country before the coup, this violence seems to have been greatly reduced in the post-coup period perhaps due to the mass arrests and heavy security order and police expansion. Looking through historical archives of newspapers (using LexisNexis and
ProQuest) of the time period, both local and foreign, there are no mentions of reported instances of violence in the election or days leading up to it. The Boston Globe, noted that there was “...a radical decline in political violence” after the coup and hints at a restoration of public order even amid a widening security crackdown on dissident voices and political and civil rights (Gilbert, 1983).

**Change in Political Liberalization**

Based on year-to-year changes in Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World* reports on civil liberties and political rights, Turkey witnessed an increase in political liberalization following the election of 1983, though it did not regain pre-coup levels by the first post-coup election or even five years after it. In February 1979, before the September 12, 1980 coup, its scores were: 2 (political rights) and 3 (civil liberties) with a Freedom Rating designation as Free (2,3, F). Just a year later, in 1981, after the coup, its scores were: 5 (political rights) and 5 (civil liberties) with a Freedom Rating designation as Partly Free (5,5, PF). Things began to shift back in 1983-1984 soon after the first post-coup election in November 1983. Its score became: 3 (political rights) and 5 (civil liberties) with a Freedom Rating designation as Partly Free (3, 5, PF). This fluctuated little over the next five years until 1988 when its scores were: 2 (political rights) and 4 (civil rights) with a Freedom Rating of Partly Free (2, 4, PF). Although it did not reach its pre-coup status and Freedom Rating of “Free” it was able to lower its score over time close to pre-coup levels (Freedom House, 2014).

\[(2, 3, F) \rightarrow (5,5, PF) \rightarrow (3,5, PF) \rightarrow (2,4, PF) = \text{Net Change} = (0, +1)\]

*(Before the coup, right after the coup, right after the first post-coup election, five years after the first post-coup election)*

Thus, political liberalization did increase from the immediate post-coup time period to the first post-coup election time period but did not regain pre-coup elections by the first post-coup...
Aside from using Freedom House scores to determine the atmosphere for political and civil rights, comparing newspaper articles from the time before the coup, after the coup, and after the elections also help provide details on freedoms and repressions. Local and international newspapers documenting the period before elections highlight the extent the trials, executions, arrests, and crackdown of dissident journalists; the purging schools and universities of faculty deemed threatening to the September 12 regime and replacement with former generals; and the disbanding of student organizations and women’s wing of social and activist groups (Howe, 1983, April 3).

**Acceptance of Electoral Results**

Despite heavy campaigning against Ozal’s center-right ANAP and for the ultraconservative Sunalp of the MDP, voters refused to vote in high numbers for the military-backed NDP on election day. The MDP came in last out of the three running parties, with 23.3% of the vote compared with the liberal HP who received 30.5% of the vote and the center-right nationalist ANAP (Motherland Party) that came in at first with 45.1% (Nohlen, 2001). Because of the lackluster options in front of them, voters may have based their decision on whom they did not want to win rather on whom they vehemently supported. As one scholar notes, “...one may conclude that the voters regarded the election as a referendum on the regime of September 12; they were more concerned to express their disapproval of the government (thought not of the restoration of public order) than to judge the character of the alternatives offer to them” (Ahmed, 2000). It was in the president’s power to disqualify the winner and call for new elections before the date parliament is supposed to first convene in a month (Anil, 1983). Indeed, many worried that this would happen, urging the new elected officials to not antagonize the generals in any
way lest they be encouraged to intervene directly once more. Nevertheless, the military accepted the results and recognized ANAP’s victory. President Evren soon made a public statement calling on the public to accept the results of the election.

Subsequent Elections

Perhaps one silverlining the generals looked to is that there still awaited local elections for it to also try to manipulate. This may explain why Ozal called for local elections so soon--he worried about the growing appeal of other parties, not so much the MDP after its noticeable defeat, but of the previously banned parties that were now allowed to contest elections because of a lifted ban; namely, Demirel’s Truth Path Party and Inonu’s Social Democracy Party (SODEP). Indeed, when local elections were held less than a year later in March 1984 to elect mayors and local parliaments, Ozal’s ANAP won a majority. What is interesting to note is that the HP2 and MDP were practically wiped out in these municipal elections, just five months after they had won sizeable sectors of the electorate. They merged or dissolved their parties after these elections.

The elected officials were able to complete their term despite heavy scrutiny from the generals. Elections were held as scheduled in 1987 but this time with much less of the vote than it had previously collected. Fewer restrictions on the nomination process as well as the expiration of political exclusion laws (as voted by people in an earlier referendum to not renew it) opened up the elections for more parties to compete and a higher degree of contestation. ANAP came first once more followed by the Socialist Democratic Populist Party (a combination of SODEP and HP2) and then the True Path Party (of Demirel).
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS

The 1983 election paved the way for stable and more competitive elections in Turkey and helped tame the military while asserting civilian challenge, if not power, over it. The military has sought to intervene a number of times after the 1980 coup, but greater self-restraint as well as legitimacy of elected officials kept it from ever carrying out another full fledged coup (although smaller interventions did happen).

The 1983 elections should not be viewed as the restoration of democracy of multi-party politics. Strict interference by the military challenged the agency of people in choosing their next leaders. All previous parties were banned from running and the new parties could not include members of the old guard, or party names similar to previous ones. The NSC’s strong internal cohesion helped it maintain an image of authority and competency where there seemed to always be consensus among the five generals, and their power strongly remained intact in the post-coup era as other political bodies shifted, dissolved, recoiled and negotiated. The parties permitted to run by the NSC had all been established by loyal servants of the military administration who had actually worked together in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat (Birand, 1987). So even if there were options to choose from or it seemed like the people could choose between supporting a continuation of the September 12 regime (by voting NDP) or not (by voting ANAP or HP2), they all had some commitment to the NSC, even if they tried to portray otherwise (as Ozal tried to do by deliberately distancing himself as much as possible from the NSC). Further, martial law was reinstated and extended immediately after the election for another year, supposedly due to security and terrorist threats. The generals made it clear that even though there was a new civilian government in place, they were still the ultimate arbiters of politics and threatened intervention should the political parties not please them (Ahmed, 2000).
While it did not immediately produce the restoration or consolidation of democracy, some scholars have described the 1983 elections as the start of a “soft landing towards democracy” (Birand, 1987). While no single factor can be responsible on its own for the outcome of the elections as well as the implications the elections spelled out for the country’s democratic prospects, the timing and degree of inclusion of opposition parties stand out as particularly important variables in this case. Even though few parties were allowed to run, it is worth noting that the opposition was entirely excluded rather than selectively targeting or banning only one of the prior primary parties. For example, Ecevit, Demirel, Turkes and Erbakan were all taken into custody and were all banned from any political activity (Türsan, 2004). Erbakan was jailed while Turkes was sentenced with the death penalty along with 220 members of his party in the NAP. The leaders of all major parties were arrested, including the left of centre DISK and right wing MISK, while the leader of the Worker’s Party was stripped of her nationality (Türsan, 2004).

The military leaders sought to purge the system of all previous parties. In its first coup communiqué, it blamed the country’s multiple parties and pinned responsibility for the intervention on all them, though it did emphasize that the “defender of the rule of the law” carried more of the blame for not being proactive in ending the internal strife (Türsan, 2004). By penalizing all political groups, the military regime had pressed a reset button that somewhat started over and opened a new chapter for competitive politics, albeit restricted and manipulated. Although the 1983 elections were not at all inclusive of the prior opposition and therefore not as contestable, this total exclusion rather than selective exclusion worked in favor of the country’s long-term democratic transition by defusing polarization and holding all parties accountable. Once the repeal of the political parties ban occurred in 1987 all parties were able to participate
once again and did not feel like they had to compensate for lost time since all parties had suffered the same consequence. The timing of the election, therefore, is also an important factor as gradually introducing elections, and even gradually including the opposition, gave time for the political parties that were highly scattered and arbitrary to standardize through ambitious reforms and policies the military regime introduced. For example, the 1983 Political Parties Laws imposed a standard organizational model for all parties to follow that outlined a particular system and timeline for all parties to follow (Özbudun, 2000). Doing this allowed the parties time discipline, re-evaluate and repair themselves internally, setting new policies for the election of their party congresses and executive committees and the national and local levels, as well as re-distributing the centralizing party power. The new models that emerged out of this post-coup time period produced party policies and vision that more greatly aligned with democratic principles. Thus delaying elections allowed parties to focus on reforming themselves (even if they were banned) rather than preoccupying themselves over campaigning and other political issues in the public sphere.
CASE STUDY 2: PAKISTAN 1985

We next move to study Pakistan, which was part of the third wave of democratization, and like Turkey, has been characterized as having effective periods of democratic rule interrupted by intermittent military interventions. In 1973, Pakistanis voted on a Constitution that was passed and put into law. Among its many changes and stipulations, it outlined that the ruling government of the National Assembly that was elected in 1970 and took office in 1972 should have their term reset and have their five year tenure begin on the date of the passing of the 1973 Constitution. This would make the next national elections occur on August 14, 1977 rather than 1975. The opposition to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People’s Party called for sooner elections, yet the incumbent refused. Under immense pressure, finally on January 1977, Bhutto dissolved both the national and provincial governments and called for early elections in March.

The opposition mobilized quickly and formed a coalition called the Pakistan National Alliance. It was a populist coalition composed of nine conservative and Islamic right-wing parties: Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Jamiatul Ulema-e-Islam Mufti (JUI), Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Pakistan Muslim League Pagara Group (PML-Pagara), National Democratic Party (NDP), Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Khaksar Tehrik (KT), and Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference (AKMC) (First Ten General Elections of Pakistan, 2013).

These parties had different stakes and could offer different leverage, but they all detested Bhutto’s government and were connected by a desire to replace his rule. They were disillusioned by the Bhutto government’s nationalization of industries and private educational institutions (First Ten General Elections of Pakistan, 2013), and called for a more Islamic approach to the political and economic systems. They disapproved of what they saw as Bhutto’s corrupt and
increasingly authoritarian positions, especially toward the Islamic right-wing media outlets (First 10 General Elections of Pakistan, 2013). However, the PPP was optimistic and determined to keep its power, emphasizing in its campaigns its widespread land reforms and assertive foreign policy toward India.

On the day of the national elections, on March 7, 1977, the PPP won the overwhelming majority of parliament with 151 votes, while the PNA received only 36 (Nohlen, 2001). The PNA immediately rejected the results and accused the incumbent of rigging as most had predicted this would be a very close race. They immediately organized mass protests, calling for a re-vote for the national elections and a boycott for the provincial elections scheduled for just three days later. The PPP initially used excessive force of the security apparatus along with martial law to try to quell street dissent. On June 15, under more intense pressure, Bhutto’s government agreed to negotiations with the PNA and soon after decided that it would organize new elections together with the PNA. They agreed that middle-ranking members of their groups would work out the details of the new election timeline and negotiate this agreement. Yet even while in negotiations with the ruling party, PNA supporters kept a street presence to apply pressure on the PPP and make sure it honored its end of the agreement. By then, some in the PNA were too disillusioned and felt like they could not trust the PPP after the last elections. For this reason, they advocated that the military needed step in to move forward this process (First 10 General Elections of Pakistan, 2013).

On July 5, 1977, General Zia ul Haq had lost his patience. He suspended the 1973 Constitution, imposed martial law, removed the government, and became the de facto head of government. He announced that elections would be held within 90 days. Many members of the PNA and opposition to Bhutto celebrated this news. Zia put Bhutto on trial, convicting him of
murder, and he was hanged on April 4, 1979 (Nohlen, 2001).

### INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR PAKISTAN 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>PAKISTAN 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>Announcement of elections date</td>
<td>73 months (6 years, 1 month)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>When first post-coup parliamentary elections are held</td>
<td>92 months (7 years, 7 months)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Degree of contestation & opposition integration**  
(0 = least inclusive, 4 = most inclusive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of military interference</th>
<th></th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (0 = least interfering, 5 = most interfering) | 0 = no interference  
1 = the military may be interfering behind the scenes through talks with leaders or ambiguous speech; military interfering in general terms  
2 = military presence in election spaces; the ones observing elections; bar international monitors; is clearly influencing voting patterns; the military is poll rigging  
3 = the military is funding specific parties; backing candidates and parties and urging public to vote for them through speeches, advertising campaigns, etc.; the military is only allowing parties it deems fit to run  
4 = coup leaders and many members of the military (or retired generals) are contesting elections directly  
5 = military leaders stage a coup | 4                       |
### DEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR PAKISTAN 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>PAKISTAN 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Voter turnout</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Is there reported organized violence?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Political Liberalization</td>
<td>Does political liberalization regain pre-coup levels (immediately after by 1 year, and then 5 years)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4,5) → (6, 4) → (4,5) → (4,4) = Net Change = (0, -1) Increased by (0, 1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Electoral Results</td>
<td>Are elected leaders able to take office and complete their term (e.g. does the incumbent recognize them?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent elections</td>
<td>Do next scheduled elections occur as scheduled?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Time Frame 1: Calling for Elections**

On July 7, 1977, Zia ul Haq staged a military coup where he suspended the constitution and announced that elections would be held within 90 days. This was not possible since he banned all legislative organs for four years. After the Supreme Court approved the execution of Bhutto, Zia ul Haq issued a new date for the general elections to take place during the fall of 1979. When the results of local bodies’ elections in September 1979 showed that candidates with previous political affiliations were getting elected even though the election only allowed for independents, the military was unsettled by this and decided to postpone the elections due to “unfavorable” circumstances (The First 10 Generals of Pakistan, 2013). On August 12, 1983, while addressing the Federal Council, Zia ul Haq announced that elections were to be held by March 23, 1985 and that the new National Assembly would take the place of the one dissolved during the 1977 coup. It took the military general 73 months, or roughly six years and one month before announcing the election timetable.
**Time Frame 2: Holding Elections**

Elections were held in Pakistan on February 25 and 28, 1985 for both the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. Though initially Zia ul Haq had said that they would happen within three months of the military coup, and then modified this multiple times to postpone its date, elections happened almost 92 months later, or roughly seven years and seven months (Nohlen, Asia).

**Degree of Contestation & Opposition Integration**

Whereas in Turkey the generals sought to break down coalitions and wanted weak or new parties to run, Zia ul Haq’s junta allowed no parties to run. All candidates running for the National Assembly could only run as independents. In this sense then, all political parties could technically be represented and included—just not formally. Left-leaning parties secretly formed a coalition in 1981 known as the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which was led by the PPP and included eleven other parties. They rejected the ban on political parties in elections and called for an election boycott, describing the upcoming elections as not, “free, fair and impartial” (Tempest, 1985) and that running as independents as opposed to parties hurt them. They engaged in an anti-election campaign that sought to keep voter turnout under 10%, which Zia had hoped would be at at least 40%. Their actions were closely scrutinized and silenced, with the government breaking up any meetings they had, arresting their leaders and putting them on military trials (Tempest, 1985).

In fact, by refusing to mobilize and put up unofficial candidates, they eased the way for the president to exclude them altogether. Real independents and members of parties who ran as independents were able to monopolize the vote and galvanize voters over personal and local issues palatable to the president and ruling junta (Silver, 1985). Zia ended up arresting many of
the leaders of the MRD for their subversive organizing against elections.

The banning of political parties from running in elections resulted in an overwhelming number of political candidates where 1300 contested the National Assembly’s 207 seats. Basically, people who had money and had some social capital at the local level saw this as a unique opportunity to run and win (First Ten General Elections of Pakistan, 2013).

The consequences of the military restricting the election’s themes and discourse had material consequences on political parties. Digressing national conversation away from socio-economic and political issues and banning broad-based political alignments encouraged the conversation to instead shift towards identity politics where people were more concerned with their ethnic, religious, linguistic, and social alignments. Doing this strayed away from the political process and hurt parties that were already weakened by not being able to organize around their respective political platforms and activities (First Ten General Elections of Pakistan, 2013).

Given that no parties were allowed to run but all candidates were allowed to run and that this indeed opened up opportunities for many people to contest the elections and for all parties to put up unofficial candidates, Pakistan is given a 3 on the continuum of 0-4 (where 0 is the least inclusive and 4 is the most inclusive) Banning parties from running hurt well-established parties, especially those that enjoyed broad recognition like the PPP and other parties in the MRD. However, this also opened the door for new players to compete and allowed all parties to put up unofficial candidates if they wanted to even if some parties and coalitions like the MRD chose not to participate.

**Degree of Military Interference**

As for military interference, Zia ul Haq shaped and meddled in the country’s first post-coup elections heavily. In October 1984, he suggested that he may continue to be president after
the new government was elected into power, and he agreed to handover power at all only if the new elected representatives promised the Islamicization policies he introduced. In this way, he made clear that his intentions was to “share” power rather than “transfer” it (First Ten General Elections of Pakistan, 2013).

From the time elections were announced, the campaigning period was tightly restricted and monitored by security forces. No public meetings, political rallies or demonstrations were allowed. Even election rhetoric was curtailed where candidates could not discuss issues related to national security, foreign policy or national domestic, political, and economic issues. Instead, candidates focused on local and personal issues to try to appeal to their voters, but that discourse obviously limited the scope of what issues voters could bring up (Silver, 1985).

Unlike General Evren who wanted to shape Turkey into a one or two-party political system, General Zia in Pakistan wanted to wipe out nationwide political parties and broad-based coalitions and instead encourage and incentivize parties to orient themselves around ethnic, sectarian and geographic identities. To influence the outcome of elections, he banned discussion on what coalition and established political parties were used to in building their platform. He turned election themes and discourse into ones that focused on identity politics rather than political and economic issues (as was the case with the 1977 election campaigning).

Besides interfering in elections through subtle and calculating approaches, the military interfered more directly by fielding its own candidates. Eleven members of Zia ul Haq’s cabinet ran in the National Assembly elections, including his defense minister Ali Ahmed Taipur. Surprisingly, these candidates did not do as well as expected; only six of them won (Tempest, 1985). Many reporters and analysts read this as a symbol of no-confidence in Zia’s rule (Tempest, 1985). Besides those in his cabinet running for office, 85 members of the Majlis-e-
Shoora, who served as an (unelected) advisory team to Zia ul Haq’s government, also contested elections.

**Legitimacy of Election: Voter Turnout**

The voter turnout for the National Assembly was placed at 53.7% according to official counts (Nohlen, 2001). There were 32,537,133 registered voters and 17,468,194 votes were cast. There were no compulsory voting laws in place. International news reporters documented voting as “generally fair and honest,” and contrasted it to the earlier presidential referendum that had much vote rigging and little voter supervision by neutral agents (Silver, 1985).

The opposition, who called for a ballot boycott, challenged this number, saying it was too high based on their calculations. One of the few leaders of the MRD who was still free, Asghar Khan, said the numbers were too high, especially in urban areas where he claimed voting was only 5% to 15% (Tempest, 1985).

A high voter turnout was extremely important to affirming Zia’s authority so he criminalized boycotting elections and waived requirements for voter IDs to make the process more accessible to all voters (Waseem, 1987).

Given the direct and indirect ways the military government influenced and interfered in elections, especially by contesting notable its own notable figures, the Pakistan 1985 national election is given a 4 (on a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 = least interference, 5 = most interference) for the degree of military interference.

**Legitimacy of Election: Electoral Violence**

There were reports of organized electoral violence in the 1985 National Assembly elections, fueled by a heavy security presence of soldiers and police near election stations and in political hotspots that often came into contact with street demonstrations. The instances of reported violence are scattered and not consistently documented by rights groups or the
government. But news sources from this period of time highlight that this was indeed a problem. One international newspaper reported six people killed, 40 injured and 30 arrested in the northern Haripur constituency where the son of Ayub Khan was contesting a seat against Zia ul Haq’s minister of power (Silver, 1985). Another article a different paper reported, “There were several episodes of violence connected with Monday’s voting. Two men were killed in an election conflict at Sahiwal, in southern Punjab” (Silver, 1985). Media outlets also noted violence and chaos aggravated by supporters of the political opposition that caused damage to public property and led to many arrests (Tempest, 1985). Another account read, “A few hundred demonstrators gathered in Lahore to protest at the elections, from which General Zia had banned all parties. The police dispersed them with baton charges, arresting a batch of second-tier opposition leaders. Youths on scooters set four buses on fire” (Silver, 1985). The Times of India ran headlines on February 26 of, “3 killed in Pakistan poll violence,” (Times of India, 1985, February 26) and another later one, “Pressure against Zia’s move: 10 die in Pak poll violence (“Times of India, 1985, March 1).

Change in Political Liberalization

Shortly before the coup, in January and February of 1977, Freedom House rated Pakistan’s Political Rights at 4 and Civil Liberties at 5 (on a scale of 1-7, with 7 being the worst). In 1978, a few months after the coup, Pakistan’s Political Rights score was 6 and its Civil Liberties score was 4, with a freedom score of Partly Free (6, 4, PF). After the coup, there was a decrease in political rights, but a slight improvement in civil rights. After the first post-coup election, in 1985-1986, the scores for Political Rights were marked at 4 and Civil Liberties at 5 with a Freedom Score of Partly Free (4, 5, PF). Five years later, in 1990, its score for Political Rights was 4, for Civil Liberties it was 4, and its Freedom Score was Partly Free (4,4, PF). Thus,
over this time period from the coup until the first post-coup election, civil rights stayed the same. After a worsening of Political Rights (by 2 points) and a slight improvement in Civil Liberties (by 1 point), Pakistan’s political liberalization regained pre-coup levels by the first post-coup elections in 1985.

\[(4,5) \rightarrow (6, 4) \rightarrow (4,5) \rightarrow (4,4) = \text{Net Change} = (0, -1)\]

*(Before the coup, right after the coup, right after the first post-coup election, five years after the first post-coup election)*

**Acceptance of Electoral Results**

On April 10, 1985, the winning candidates and members of the new cabinet, led by Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, were sworn into their new positions (Nohlen, 2001). The new assembly was characterized as conservative; from center to right-of-center to far right parties (Waseem, 1987). It was composed mostly of the feudal elite from Punjab, including some religious candidates and industrial-commercial magnates (Waseem, 1987). The Pir of Pagara did well, winning almost ¼ of the Assembly and half of the Senate seats and half of the women’s seats (Waseem, 1987). In Baluchistan, mostly tribal chiefs and their families secured seats, as well as mine owner groups (Waseem, 1987). Islamist and Islamic groups did not do well in these elections. The JI won 10 seats out of 217 and the Swad-e-Azam was defeated, marginalizing groups that had advocated for implementing the Nizam-e-Mustafa during the campaigning season (Waseem, 1987).

While the opposition and boycotting parties refused to see the new government’s triumph as legitimate or fair, the incumbent regime recognized the elected candidates and allowed them to be sworn into office.

**Subsequent Elections**

Bhutto had scheduled elections for the fall of 1988. He died suddenly and mysteriously in
a plane crash on August 17, 1988 but plans for these elections went through anyway, led by the Chairman of the Senate and the now acting president, Ishaq Khan. Although these elections went on as scheduled, the entering government of Benazir Bhutto could not complete its term as they were dismissed by President Ishaq Khan in 1990.

**DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS**

Timing appears to be an important factor that stands out in Pakistan’s post-coup election. The election timing process was shaky both in announcement and practice. It took General Zia two or three false alarms before the actual date was announced for elections that then translated into material elections. The military government lost more of its credibility as it declared timetables for elections that kept changing and were not abided by. These national elections happened eight years after the coup. Although I hypothesized that there is merit in delaying elections and temporizing the timetable, I have argued that it should be delayed by 3-5 years and not indefinitely. In fact, scholars studying military coups have noted that military leaders need time in order to consolidate their power, as doing so allows them to build networks, institutionalize repressive mechanisms, and establish systems of patronage. In this sense, the coup leader grows more skillful over time and expands his power base (Bienen). Scholars have suggested that coup leaders are more vulnerable at the beginning of their incumbency and grow stronger and more secure over time. However, it is worth noting that in many contexts where the military already enjoys a strong and important role, including Pakistan, the leader does not always need time to establish himself and grow support as these leaders often already occupy an important role before the coup. In fact, in the role of Zia, extending his presidency did not work in his favor. Unlike when he enjoyed support from the PNA during 1977-1979, by the end of 1985 after the post-coup national elections, he did not have this same support and people grew
tired of his imposed martial law (Waseem, 1987). Toward the end of his tenure, Zia could not postpone elections any further because of growing cynicism among the general population, including non-MRD parties and non-bureaucratic institutions which previously had supported or been apathetic to his rule (Waseem, 1987). In fact, the military government put off elections for so long because it sought to wait out the MRD. It assumed, as Waseem Muhammad notes, a “passive policy” where it waited for the MRD to dissolve and give up on its own. He feared reprisal from the opposition and worried about his own lack of legitimacy as more pressure (domestically and internationally) grew on him in 1983 and 1984 to begin a democratic transition. In trying to outwait the MRD, Zia also tried to gain support by negotiating and opening talks with other political players, mostly ones that were irrelevant and insignificant (Waseem, 1987).

However, time is significant not only because it eroded support for military law, but also because it gave the opportunity for the main opposition movement, the MRD, to spread over the years. The coalition rallied against the one point that it thought the public could agree to: ending martial law. It was able to challenge this effectively using the time it had as a banned party to reach out and form alliances with group that were not naturally inclined to it but were growing weary of the military regime with time. The MRD succeeded in getting the regime to change martial law from “corrective” to “self-perpetuating” measures. Though a small and qualitative victory, it was nevertheless an important one that lent the party more visibility and legitimacy it needed, and eventually resulted in the lifting of martial law on December 1985 as well as the country’s state of emergency which had been in place for 20 years (Waseem, 1987). Some of the opposition parties were also successful in that they were able to better organize over time. The MRD was initially viewed skeptically as an activist force that did not know how to translate its
democratic calls into concrete platforms. Voters were disillusioned with its constant vague calls for restoring democracy rather than focusing on issues of class exploitation or problems with India (Waseem, 1987). They were also missing the support of student and labor demonstrations, as the PNA had before the 1977 election. But over time, the MRD was able to come to consensus on a number of issues even though the groups and individuals within it differed ideologically. They all came to agree that the 1973 Constitution needed to be restored and that general elections should happen on a party basis. Their canvassing and goal planning were important electoral exercises that helped them build organizational strength for their political parties. Additionally, their unwillingness to negotiate with the regime would buy them later legitimacy once broader sectors of the public became disillusioned with military rule (Waseem, 1987).

In comparison to Turkey’s 1983 post-coup election, where only three parties could run but none from the prior opposition, Pakistan’s 1985 election seemed to be more inclusive because theoretically everyone could run. It may seem counterintuitive to consider a party-less election as more inclusive (when compared to Turkey that we just looked at and Algeria that we will soon turn to), but in essence, all parties had the option to run unofficially even though they were all banned formally. Voters in this party had a wider range of candidates to choose from, and the options they had represented a more diverse array of interests than Turkey’s 1983 post-coup election.

However, holding an independent-only election contributed to the de-institutionalization of Pakistani politics. It hurt electoral politics because candidates had to rely on individual resources for support (Waseem, 1987). National elections often already are dominated by people of privileged backgrounds; banning parties made it even harder for candidates to rely on themselves for mobility, networks, and financial support. Therefore, even though these elections
were rather inclusive to all candidates in terms of participation, it was only those candidates with economic, factional and financial support who could make it very far.

Zia worried so much about his waning legitimacy that a higher voter turnout at the 1985 national elections became his biggest goal. In fact, it even drove him to invite the MRD that he had initially sought to exclude to participate in the elections, even though no parties were allowed to run. He knew that a higher turnout depended on them participating even though he simultaneously viewed them as a threat to post-election politics. But the MRD, which was accustomed to boycotts since its existence and disapproved of Zia’s exiling of its PPP leaders, did not trust that the government would welcome their initiatives when many of their leaders had rallied against Bhutto for so long (Waseem, 1987).

We see that time and contestation are related factors in Pakistan’s post-coup election. With time, the opposition movement grew more connected and the Zia government began to more closely monitor their activities. In fact, it started to base its own strategies on perceived threats of the MRD (Waseem, 1987). For example, when it heard that the MRD was calling for mass protests on August 14, 1983, it sought to prevent this by finally announcing a clearer election timetable just two days before this date.

Zia’s banning of parties had serious implications not only of the political parties who were disadvantaged because of this policy, but also for the composition of the new assembly. Banning parties caused multiple candidates for a majority of seats, which meant that the winning candidates would actually only carry a small fraction of the registered and polled votes (Waseem, 1987). So it became less clear how representative or legitimate the victory of the candidate was. One scholar of the 1977 coup described the assembly that emerged out of the 1985 elections as comprising, “The least ‘representative’ public representatives ever possible, at
least in terms of the direct public mandate each of them enjoyed” (Waseem, 1987). The authority and credibility of the incoming candidates, then, was questioned.

Additionally, the partyless election hurt the new incoming government administratively and logistically. Prime Minister Junejo’s partyless government was disorganized and chaotic, in comparison to the organized MRD that was not formally challenging them in parliament but that increasingly had the public’s eye follow them. In this sense, the apolitical elections of 1985 kept the regime from solving the serious political crisis the country was immersed in. The enforced diversion from national issues kept the discourse centered on local issues like sanitation, roads and water--issues that should have been left to the local and provincial body elections (Waseem, 1987). The focus of the elections were not ideological or national, but about consolidating power. General Zia sought to co-opt existing parties and local power holders rather than attempting to create his own constituency (Waseem, 1987).
Finally, we turn to Algeria, whose extended period of colonization delayed its experimentation with democracy until the 1980s. After a century of French colonial rule, Algeria gained its independence in 1962. The time period between 1962 to 1989 was marked by a single party system by the National Liberation Front (NLF) that had led the revolution against the French. This party became codified as the ruling regime in the 1963 and 1976 Constitutions (Nohlen, 1999). The real power always rested with the presidency, which became strongly linked to the army when Lieutenant Houari Boumedienne backed Ahmed Ben Bella’s installation as Algeria’s first president from 1962-1965. Boumedienne however, staged a coup to remove Bella and took over in 1965. The political landscape in Algeria during this time was characterized by autocracy and repression. In 1989, following the 1988 October Riots, the country experienced a political opening through a referendum where electors voted to stop the FLN’s monopoly in politics. The Party Act passed on July 5, 1989 and the Electoral Act passed on August 7, 1989 paved the way for the first competitive elections in Algeria scheduled for 1991/1992.

During this time, a new press flourished and the role of parliament was strengthened to balance the presidency. The military returned to its barracks and focused on issues of national defense. Many parties became legalized, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The party swept the first round of national elections on December 26, 1991, defeating the FLN that had dominated for so long. The FIS was poised to do well again in the second round when Algeria’s military generals disrupted the process and mounted a coup on January 11, 1992. They annulled the results, imposed martial law and ousted President Chadli Benjedid, who had held power since 1979 and was the one who had begun the government’s transition to multiparty democracy. The new ruling junta installed the new High Committee of State whose leader, Mohamed Boudiaf,
became the interim president for a short period of time. Minister of Defense General Liamine Zeroual became the head of state in 1994. In the meantime, in the place of parliament was a Transitional Council composed of representatives of various political parties, civil society and public authorities chosen by the generals. The situation grew more polarized, violent and repressive across the country.

In 1995, opposition groups including the FIS met in Italy for the “Rome Platform” which requested dialogue between the government and opposition (Khalaf, 1995). The government refused and instead held fraudulent elections in November 1995 where General Zeroual won in a landslide (though he did win support him because so many people craved a return to stability), which the opposition parties at the Rome Platform boycotted. A year later, a referendum on November 26, 1996 expanded the role of the president and created an upper chamber in the parliament appointed by the president that controlled parliamentary decisions (Nohlen, 1999).

The elections of 1997 marked the first time for Algerians to vote in national parliamentary elections since the coup. The military leaders were highly concerned with legitimizing this process, especially in the eyes of the international world, particularly from the United States and France. They actively sought the presence of international observers and election monitoring groups and created their own as well, known as the National Independent Elections Observation Commission (CNISEL), which was a civilian body responsible for overseeing the entire election process. While many hoped that the elections would usher in a new chapter and end the instability and widespread violence that had claimed the lives of one hundred thousand people, others were more wary because of the tainted slate of the military. While some analysts and journalists at the time described the upcoming elections as a way for the government to “bury its failed democratic experience” from a few years before (Khalaf, 1997),
some opposition parties believed that there was merit in working within this system and that there was more reason to believe in the credibility of elections this time (as compared with the presidential election two years before). One leader of the opposition party, the secularist and Berber-oriented Rally for Culture and Democracy, noted that the military would not try to manipulate this election or hold onto full pare, “It (the military government) always aims for permanent hegemony. But we are living in very unstable times and rigging this election will simply aggravate the divorce (Khalaf, 1997).
## INDEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR ALGERIA 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>ALGERIA 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>Announcement of election date</td>
<td>41 months (3 years, 5 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>When first post-coup parliamentary elections are held</td>
<td>58 months (4 years, 10 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of contestation &amp; opposition integration</td>
<td>0 = Only the ruling party can run 1 = A finite amount can run but all prior parties cannot 2 = All parties can run except for the prior main opposition 3 = All candidates can run but not through formal parties 4 = All parties are included and can run</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of military interference</td>
<td>0 = no interference 1 = the military may be interfering behind the scenes through talks with leaders or ambiguous speech; military interfering in general terms 2 = military presence in election spaces; the ones observing elections; bar international monitors; is clearly influencing voting patterns; the military is poll rigging 3 = the military is funding specific parties; backing candidates and parties and urging public to vote for them through speeches, advertising campaigns, etc.; the military is only allowing parties it deems fit to run 4 = coup leaders and many members of the military are contesting elections directly 5 = military leaders stage a coup</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## DEPENDENT VARIABLES TABLE FOR ALGERIA 1977
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>ALGERIA 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Voter turnout</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Is there reported organized violence?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Political Liberalization</td>
<td>Does political liberalization regain pre-coup levels (immediately after by 1 year, and then 5 years)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,4 → 7,6 → 6,5 → 6,5 = Net Change = (+2, +1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Electoral Results</td>
<td>Are elected leaders able to take office and complete their term (e.g. does the incumbent recognize them?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent elections</td>
<td>Do next scheduled elections occur as scheduled?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Time Frame 1**

President Zeroual, who became the interim president on January 1994, called for elections on May 1996, four years after the coup. He announced that elections would occur in early 1997 after the adoption of new electoral laws. Announcement of the first post-coup parliamentary elections were made 41 months after the coup (3 years and 5 months).

**Time Frame 2**

The first parliamentary post-coup elections took place on October 23, 1997--four years and 10 months after the coup (58 months later).

**Degree of Contestation & Opposition Integration**

Rather than entirely ban parties from running in elections, the military government sought to vet candidates and allow the ones it did not view as too threatening to participate. In fact, the military wanted to include more parties in the election in order to drive up the voter turnout percentage (similar to Zia’s motivations of inviting the MRD), and consequently, the
legitimacy of the electoral process despite the exclusion and severe repression against the FIS. In this sense, the state had an incentive to allow voters some variety in selecting candidates and to respect their votes (Roberts, 2004).

All told, 7,740 candidates from 39 parties along with 554 independents contested the 380 seats (IPU, 1997). The FIS, AIG and Islamic Salvation Army called for boycotts of the election but the FIS was banned from running anyway, and the AIG and Islamic Salvation army were not considered political parties. In addition, the right-of-center Movement for Democracy in Algeria also boycotted the 1997 election, being one of the few legal political parties to do so. Its leaders believed in opening up negotiations with FIS and believed they should participate in elections if the country were to move forward and undergo a democratic transition. They also disapproved of the unstable and insecure conditions which they believed were not conducive for democratic elections (IPU, 1997).

Legal provisions in the Political Party Law passed in March 1997 opened the way for formal exclusion of some parties. Article 5 of it states, “no political party may...found its establishment or its action on a religious, linguistic, racial, gender, corporate, or regionalist basis” (Algeria, 1997). But Islamic and Berber-centered parties did run, so the article was meant to ban parties with explicit sectarian associations in their name; that is, the FIS. Other parties who did have sectarian/ethnic oriented names changed them to follow the law (National Democratic Institute, 1997); for example, Hamas became known as the Movement of Society for Peace or MSP (National Democratic Institute, 1997). Rights groups criticized these laws for violating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that impeded full freedom of association for parties (Algeria, 1997).

Overall, the elections appeared to have some “pluralist trimmings” or “formal pluralism”
but it really was a repetition of the pre-1990 elections where regime-backed parties dominated elections, except this time there were two options aligning with the military regime--the FLN and the RND (Roberts, 2004). Other non-regime-backed parties were able to contest elections as well. There were alternatives offered to the FIS in an attempt by the government to pacify Islamists and supporters of the FIS, so the MSP and An-Nahda were included, agreeing to quiet down any radical tendencies. Two Berber-centered/supportive parties--the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) (Roberts, 2004) were also included in these elections.

The elections were considerably competitive not only because of the parties represented but because of what they were saying. They were not all loyalists or supporters to President Zeroual and some of them challenged military rule openly. One member of the executive council of the Islamist Movement for a Peaceful Society noted, “Democracy means dialogue and conviction. Violence will not end with the elections; it will end gradually and when the sources and reasons for it stop. One of the requirements if the return of the army to the barracks” (Khalaf, 1997). This sort of public ridicule and critique was not only characteristic of Islamist parties but of others including the Socialist Forces Front and the Workers’ Party who challenged the government’s inability to cultivate reconciliation and demanded accountability for its human rights abuses, including the assassinations of political figures. They went to so far as to threaten a “pacifist revolution” if elections were rigged (Khalaf, 1997). Such sentiments and public discourse show that dissent was common even in the repressive and violent circumstance of the post-coup period. The military regime could not silence discussion on pressing national issues as had been done in Pakistan’s post-coup period leading up the coup. One thing that was off-limits, however, was for public critics to describe the 1992 intervention as a coup d'état (Khalaf, 1997).
Given the government’s selective inclusion yet relative opening in the electoral process as well as the persistence of some political parties to participate despite their skepticism and frustration with the process and the military regime, Algeria is given a 2 because the exclusion is primarily against the prior main opposition party— the FIS— and the process is otherwise relatively open (yet regulated and manipulated) for all others.

**Degree of Military Interference**

Rights groups have noted discrepancies between civilian voting and military voting in the 1997 national election, which occurred on different days. Not only were these distinct votes, but they were marked hierarchically where military/security forces voting was referred to as “special” voting that happened before the civilian vote and occurred in the barracks (Algeria, 1997). The locations and specifics of military voting were not transparent, and as a result, opposition and international watchdog observers were not able to monitor them the way they did for the civilian voting. Police and military voting turnout was near 100%—voting for them was compulsory which was not consistent with non-compulsory voting for civilian voters (National Democratic Institute, 1997). As NDI election observers noted, “...changes should be made to the election law and to the administration of the election law to ensure that military (special) and civilian voting are subject to the same rules and guarantees of openness” (National Democratic Institute, 1997).

While all independent candidates and parties were allowed to have five representatives at the polling stations as observers for voting and counting the vote, international observers noted a heavy security presence with some armed guards inside polling stations, which often fostered an intimidating environment for voters. Furthermore, UN observers noted that the mobile voting booths, especially in rural parts of the countries, were too easily subject to fraud and were
dubious in securing neutrality (IPU, 1997).

Reports by Human Rights Watch national election observers noted that the military regime “facilitated the rapid rise of the RND, formed only in February to mobilize support for the President and his government” (Algeria, 1997). Opposition parties were aware of the regime’s favoritism toward the RND; the party used the national emblem in its publicity materials despite violating electoral rules (Khalaf, 1997) and had support from the government in organizing public rallies. Given that the military government visibly backed the RND through rhetoric and resources, and less so, the FLN, on the ranking system of 0-5 for military interference, the Algerian national election of 1997 is identified with a 3 for the degree of military interference.

Though there were international observers from various organizations and countries including the National Democratic Institute, Human Rights Watch, the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity, the hundreds of monitors who showed up could not possibly cover all or even most of the 35,000 polling stations across the country (Khalaf, 1997).

**Legitimacy of Election 1: Voter Turnout**

The voter turnout for the Algerian parliamentary election of 1997 was 65.6%. 10,999,139 out of the 167,767,309 eligible voters cast their ballots in the June election. This number was within relative range of what the military government had aspired to, though voting was much lower in Algiers at 44% (Cohn, 1997). Voting was not compulsory.

**Legitimacy of Election 2: Electoral Violence**

There are conflicting reports about election day violence as told by government, opposition and international records. The National Institute for Democracy (NDI), which had sent 13 members to 11 different wilayas, noted in its Parliamentary Election report that, “In the polling stations visited by the NDI team, the atmosphere on election day was devoid of violence
and fear” (National Democratic Institute, 1997) and, “The NDI team was generally impressed by the peaceful and orderly conduct of the election and the professionalism of the polling officials…” (National Democratic Institute, 1997).

Other national election monitoring groups, including a delegation of Human Rights Watch workers who visited from March 30 to April 13, 1997, noted that the “ongoing political violence and repression” was making it difficult for those Algerians who “wish to express their views or take part in political life.” The Human Rights Watch report noted the many political assassinations occurring that targeted activists across the political spectrum, especially five that occurred in the close run-up to the elections (Algeria, 1997).

Finally, a number of newspaper accounts from the time period paint a scenario of scattered attempts of violence, killings, and car bombs on election, sometimes resulting in great casualties (Star Tribune, 1997). Reports of casualties in the two days leading up to elections, whoever, were many (Star Tribune, 1997).

**Change in Political Liberalization**

Before the coup, in 1991, Freedom House assigned Algeria a score of 4 for Political Rights and 4 for Civil Liberties and its overall Freedom Score was Partly Free (4, 4, PF). In 1992, right after the coup, Algeria had a score of 7 for Political Rights, and 6 for Civil Liberties, with a Freedom Score of Not Free (7, 6, NF). Shortly after the first post-coup election in 1998 (one year after elections), Algeria had a rating of a 6 for Political Rights and 5 for Civil Liberties, with a Freedom Score of Not Free (6, 5, NF). Five years later in 2002, it held onto the same score of (6, 5, NF).

The country improved its scores a bit after the first post-coup election and five years after the post-coup election (in 2002) when compared to the immediate aftermath of the coup, but it has not yet gained pre-coup scores:
Acceptance of Electoral Results
The new government was created on June 26, 1997 where Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia formed his cabinet, mostly composed of the RND but also of some members of the Islamist MSP (with 69 seats) and government-supportive FLN (64), making this Algeria’s first multi-party legislature (Cohn, 1997). Though the opposition political parties doubted and contested the election results, they did not dismiss or boycott the new parliament. As the NDI election observers noted, As noted by NDI, “...the opposition political parties demonstrated long-term commitment to a democratic political process by remaining in the electoral process and agreeing to take their seats in the newly elected parliament even in the face of a less than fair election process and despite lodging several major complaints...The results of the election, although marked by some serious irregularities, have been accepted by the parties which have assumed their new positions in parliament” (National Democratic Institute, 1997).

Subsequent Elections
The incumbent government was able to complete its term and the next election for the People’s National Assembly was held as planned in 2002.

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
The case of the post-coup election in Algeria is directly contingent on its politics and the conditions leading up to and surrounding the election. Because of the civil war that ensued after the 1992 coup, this case is distinct from the others, and naming the primary factors that shape it is a difficult and audacious task. While I had hypothesized that it is the timing variable that is most impactful in spelling out the democratic prospects of a post-coup election, in the case of Algeria it is difficult to see how this is the case alone. Algeria introduced elections
approximately five years after its coup. This falls within the 3-5 timeframe I suggested is needed in order to gradually introduce electoral politics and allow time to defuse violence, political tensions and polarization as well as give time for parties to gain strength and re-organize to adapt to the post-coup order. In the case of Algeria, it is difficult to say that time defused violence, especially when some of the worst episodes of the war came shortly after the elections. But as I emphasize throughout this thesis, the first election cannot be seen as the end of a transition or the consolidation of democracy (Soudriette, 2007). It is one part of a painstaking process emerging from, especially in this case, a traumatic ordeal. It therefore is a cautious step in an attempt to move forward current political situations.

Time did not solve Algeria’s election issues but gradually introducing elections did allow some of the opposition an opportunity to meet with one another and form a coalition, even though they once competed against one another. For example, it wasn’t until 1995, as opposition members collectively grew agitated by the military government and itched for national dialogue and inclusive elections did the opposition form the Rome Platform that included the FIS, FLN, FFS (Socialist Forces Front) and other parties where it organized a proposal to the military regime for ending the political crisis. Although the regime rejected their requests and called for presidential elections instead, this was an important opportunity for the opposition to reach consensus through political mobilization; it was a political exercise for how coalition politics could operate despite the escalating violence and polarization.

In terms of military interference, although the process was designed and shaped by the military, election discourse was not as severely monitored and restricted as it was in Pakistan. Furthermore, although parties were screened and altered to meet the requirements of what the regime deemed acceptable and non-threatening, these changes were often superficial and done
for “official” reasons. Otherwise, it is clear from the words of various party leaders that not all those who were running trusted the system or were loyal to General Zeroual. Some of them ran precisely believing they could challenge the ruling party by engaging in subversive politics within the available system. Mouloud Hamrouch, former prime minister, former FLN party member and an independent candidate in the 1997 elections called on opposition parties to participate rather than boycott even if voting conditions were not ideal, “The Pouvoir may not have seen all the implications of its policy. It cannot always manipulate public opinion. It will have to cede something,” he continued to call on the opposition to participate in elections, saying that they had an option to, “Remain a naive primitive opposition, emphasizing only their own identity, or they can infiltrate the system from within, question the issues and highlight them before public opinion. The opposition will have a huge role to play, they could kill democracy or force it into existence (Khalaf, 1997).”

This sentiment was common and felt among many in the opposition. It highlighted that despite the problematic aspects of the electoral process, candidates were willing to take a chance and run anyway, and that they did not view the process as entirely illegitimate. Large segments of the opposition believed that even if not a full or significant victory, having some representation in parliament could, as one journalist described it, “help the country move from a shooting war to a war of words” (Cohn, 1997). In addition, the presence of international election monitors and observers from various parties reified that despite some irregularities and malpractice in voting, it was generally democratic and fair (Khalaf, 1997).

Finally, the degree of contestation and opposition inclusion was a factor that hugely shaped Algeria’s post-election prospects for democracy. In essence, the regime sought to have many parties compete so that the vote would be fragmented and no single opposition party or
broad-based coalition could win. It sought to play these parties against one another by multiplying them even when some parties’ platforms and orientations were similar. For example, the MSP tried to win the votes of the previous FIS vote since their ideologies were similar, yet the FIS dismissed them for collaborating with the government (Khalaf, 1997). Similarly, the RND courted the base of the FLN yet at the same time tried to distance itself from it and show that it was different from it since many Algerians blamed this former ruling party for the country’s social and economic issues (Khalaf, 1997). This “divide and conquer” strategy worked in favor of the military regime. This contrasts to the strategy used by the military regime in Turkey where they feared the fragmentation of politics because of the instability and deadlock it bred before the coup, and instead sought to have only a small handful of parties, none of whom were too hostile to the regime or were part of the prior political landscape, but also not all of whom were ardent supporters and loyalists to the regime. Essentially, excluding only one opposition party, and the one that had just been democratically-elected and overthrown in a coup before the electorate could even judge its performance, severely damaged the post-coup prospects for democracy. Rather than solve the country’s political issues that clearly included the FIS and its many supporters who had voted for it, the regime excluded it and tried to sweep the party under the rug and erase the coup from public memory. This would prove damaging and hard to heal in the long-term.
## CONCLUSION

### SUMMARY TABLE OF THREE CASE STUDIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>TURKEY 1983</th>
<th>PAKISTAN 1985</th>
<th>ALGERIA 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>When post-coup election date first announced</td>
<td>15 months</td>
<td>73 months</td>
<td>41 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1 year, 3 months)</td>
<td>(6 years, 1 month)</td>
<td>(3 years, 5 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Frame</td>
<td>When first post-coup parliamentary elections are held</td>
<td>38 months</td>
<td>92 months</td>
<td>58 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3 years, 2 months)</td>
<td>(7 years, 7 months)</td>
<td>(4 years, 10 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of contestation &amp; opposition integration (0 = least inclusive, 4 = most inclusive)</td>
<td>0 = Only the ruling party can run</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = A finite amount can run but all prior parties cannot run</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = All parties can run except for the prior main opposition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = All candidates can run but not through formal parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = All parties are included and can run</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of military interference</td>
<td>0 = no interference</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 = least interfering, 5 = most interfering)</td>
<td>interfering behind the scenes through talks with leaders or ambiguous speech; military interfering in general terms</td>
<td>2 = military presence in election spaces; the ones observing elections; bar international monitors; is clearly influencing voting patterns; the military is poll rigging</td>
<td>3 = the military is funding specific parties; backing candidates and parties and urging public to vote for them through speeches, advertising campaigns, etc.; the military is only allowing parties it deems fit to run</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
leaders stage a coup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
<th>ALGERIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Voter turnout</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy of Election</td>
<td>Is there reported organized violence?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Pending (conflicting reports)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Political Liberalization</td>
<td>Does political liberalization regain pre-coup levels? (immediately after by 1 year, and then 5 years)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2, 3, F) → (5,5, PF) → (3,5, PF) → (2,4, PF) = Net Change = (0, +1) Decreased by (0,1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4,5) → (6, 4) → (4,5) → (4,4) = Net Change = (0, -1) Increased by (0, 1)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Electoral Results</td>
<td>Are elected leaders able to take office and complete their term (e.g. does the incumbent recognize them?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent elections</td>
<td>Do next scheduled elections occur as scheduled?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transition More Democratic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transition Somewhat Democratic</td>
<td>Transition Less Democratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We operationalize a more democratic transition using the variables we have for democratic outcomes. Below is the continuum/typology we use to determine and approximate whether the elections led to a fuller democratic transition.

**Transition More Democratic (need 4/5 to qualify)**
Features of a more democratic transition and long-term prospects for democracy include the following:

1. Voter turnout is 67% or higher. While this is high compared to some established and robust democracies, a country emerging from the polarizing and fragmented political chaos of a military intervention needs broad buy-in to legitimize the process and be reflective of the population’s will.
2. Election day includes no violence. Voting areas are secure and calm.
3. Political liberalization increases by at least 1 Freedom House point. Political liberalization returns to or surpasses pre-coup levels.
4. The newly elected government is able to take office and is recognized by the incumbent government.
5. The next scheduled elections not only occur on time, but the opposition can run in the next election as well. The incumbent has to concede the election if it loses.

**Transition Somewhat Democratic (Need ⅘ to qualify)**
1. Voter turnout is 50% or higher.
2. Election day includes scattered reports of violence or reports are not confirmed.
3. Political liberalization is stagnant and is about the same as pre-coup levels.
4. The newly elected government is able to take office and is recognized by the incumbent but may be questioned by the opposition/other political parties.
5. The next scheduled elections occur on time but the next leader is unable to finish the term.

**Less Democratic**
1. Voter turnout is 30% or higher.
2. Election day includes organized violence.
3. Political liberalization decreases by at least 1 Freedom House point.
4. The newly elected government is deeply questioned by the opposition. The elected government is not able to take office OR does so with heavy strings attached.
5. The next elections do not occur as scheduled. They may be interrupted by the military or the incumbent does not want to concede power.
may be questioned by the opposition or other political parties that participated in elections.
5. The next scheduled elections occurs on time but the next leader is unable to finish his/her term.

**Transition Less Democratic (Need \( \frac{3}{4} \) to qualify)**
1. Voter turnout is 30% or higher.
2. Election day includes organized violence or frequent reports of violence, threats and instability. The environment is not conducive for voting freely and safely.
3. Political liberalization decreases by at least one point and falls below pre-coup levels.
4. The newly government is deeply questioned by the opposition or other participating parties OR the elected government is not able to take office OR does so with heavy strings attached (must enter into coalition with the military regime, must drastically shift policies, etc.).
5. The next elections do not occur as scheduled. They may be interrupted by the military regime or the incumbent does not want to concede his/her power.

Given this typology, Turkey receives a “more democratic transition,” Pakistan receives a “somewhat democratic transition,” and Algeria receives a “less democratic transition.” When we look at differences in the explanatory variables, we notice that the greatest discrepancies are in timing followed by degree of contestation and opposition inclusion.

**DISCUSSION**

The post-coup election process means something entirely different today than it did 30 years ago. Although it is still the biggest threat to interrupting democratic systems, its effects are not as nefarious as they once were before and during the Cold War period. In this thesis, I sought to explore a number of cases where democratically-elected governments were overthrown by military leaders. I conducted three case studies of countries with similar politico-militarist backgrounds and characteristics as initial tests for my theory. I sought to examine how the electoral strategies used in a country’s first post-coup election influence the country’s transition towards stability, reconciliation and democracy.

I selected and justified a number of explanatory variables that play a crucial role in shaping long-term democratic prospects after forceful seizures of power. These variables include
timing, contestation/integration, and military interference. I hypothesized that time is the most critical variable in its effects on the prospects for long-term democratization following the country’s first post-coup election. Specifically, I hypothesized that gradually introducing electoral politics, by a timeframe of three to five years, is an important strategy in influencing democratic outcomes.

Elections on their own cannot be viewed as a cure-all for a country’s democratic troubles. It is precisely because of this reason that I thought presenting electoral politics steadily, particularly for national parliamentary elections, is a helpful strategy as doing so would allow time for widespread reflection on the flawed process that occurred before that facilitated and led up to the intervention. A gradualist approach would encourage an understanding that elections cannot solve all of the issues that led to the coup; rather that there needs to be a more comprehensive and nuanced perspective that allows other changes to take root rather than rushing to the ballot box. I hypothesized that temporizing the electoral process allows factional tensions leading up to the coup to de-escalate, political parties to regroup, refine and organize themselves, and for overhauling reforms to take root in order to move the country out of deadlock.

In looking at the explanatory variables for the three case studies, they all shared rather similar or close coding in their indicators for electoral strategies. In all three cases, announcements that elections would happen were made soon after the coup. However, announcements of actual election timetables were more varying (Turkey 15 months, Pakistan 73 months, Algeria 41 months). As for contestation and integration, at times I was conflicted about categorizing these two factors together, as they did not always seem to reinforce one another. Pakistan was assigned a 3, Algeria received a 2, and Turkey scored a 1 (the lowest for degree of
contestation and integration). Pakistan allowed no parties to run, but allowed all independent candidates to contest elections. Meanwhile, Turkey’s selective screening process permitted only three parties to run—none that were active or well known before the coup. In this sense, both of these processes were opening up some doorways for new players, but it is difficult to determine how they should be scored in relation to one another. Is it worse to not allow any parties to run and only independents (huge numbers of them), or to allow only a very limited number of parties to run? I thought about how these policies would affect the various political forces in different ways: who would be excluded by banning parties altogether, and who would benefit from it (e.g. candidates who rely on support from a political platform/collective base vs. wealthy individuals with some local recognition who can win votes independently)?

What is clear though, is that even though both Pakistan and Turkey excluded groups because of particular circumstances, they did not exclude only one group; or rather, they did not exclude only the main opposition and most recent previous incumbent, as did Algeria’s generals. It makes sense that the coup-makers would exclude the main opposition and previous ruling party if it had great popular support in relation to the typical voter, since having them run in elections would produce the same results the generals sought to annul through their intervention. However, what made this factor particularly injurious to Algeria is that it not only singled out the main opposition that enjoyed popularity and support from large segments of the population by outlawing it, but that it also placed an indefinite ban on the FIS. Election organizers did not set a timeline or expectation that this ban was temporary due to emergency circumstances or had more to do with specific leaders (as did Turkey by taking Ecevit, Demirel and Erbakan all into custody, and emphasizing that these political exclusion laws had some constitutional basis and were for a defined period of time) rather than collective punishment and indefinite exclusion
While time does indeed seem to be a critical factor in explaining the electoral process, it is evident that the degree of contestation and inclusion also strongly figure into democratic transition outcomes. My hypothesis of delaying elections alone proved to be missing other integral factors in place. We saw with the Algeria case study that it fit in the 3-5 year time free I hypothesized was needed before reintroducing electoral politics, yet its democratic transition both after the election and until today, is arguably the worst among these three countries. The period of military rule between the coup and until the first elections did indeed allow time for new parties to organize, not just ones loyal to the military regime but oppositional ones too. Excluding only one party, the main opposition party that held much grassroots support, exacerbates the unequal playing field and hyperpolarization of the country’s socio-political landscape, especially when that ban has no expiration date.

The opposite can be told of Turkey’s relationship with time and competitiveness. While its contestation score was also very low (albeit for different reasons) the ban on all political activity for three years following the coup was detrimental; however, it disenfranchised *all* parties so that the political consequences for being part of the extreme right or the extreme left were similar. In this way, coupled with time, the comprehensive restriction allowed violent and igniting factional tensions to de-escalate, as it was understood that the crisis had multiple blameworthy parties even if some held more power than others. Targeting all political parties alike signaled that this was a civil-military relationship issue, rather than one between civilians that would foment more civil unrest. Once the military’s involvement is visibly and highly politicized and openly flaunts its partisanship, parties that are directly disenfranchised by this disinclination (e.g. the FIS) as well as parties who boycott in solidarity, (e.g. the Movement for
Democracy in Algeria) lose hope in electoral politics altogether as it becomes less about mobilizing voters and more about who the army backs. In addition to time allowing tensions to de-escalate, the three year interim period in Turkey allowed previous parties to focus on rebuilding their organizational power while allowing new parties to enter the scene without feeling like they had to compete quickly for votes since this was presented to them as a new opportunity. Out of the 15 parties that did emerge after the ban lift on party politics in Turkey, only three were allowed to run—but even then they held some degree of competitiveness because not all of them were fiercely loyal to the generals in the same way. As it turned out, it was the centrist Motherland Party, and not the Nationalist Democracy Party championed by General Evren, that took the lead.

Therefore, based on these findings, there may be benefit to excluding parties equally, rather than selectively excluding one or some, particularly those with a large support base. It turns out that what we may consider as the least inclusive elections (as defined by how they are operationalized in this thesis) may produce the most democratic outcomes (though the opposite is not necessarily true).

Overall, it appears that time and competitiveness are significant variables in electoral politics that have significant implications for a country’s post-coup transition and its long-term democratic outcomes. Competitiveness and inclusion allows for buy-in across the political spectrum, which legitimizes the electoral process by driving up voter turnout. Meanwhile, time may help diminish polarization that is often pervasive leading up and during the post-coup period. Based on the findings in this thesis, gradually inserting electoral politics three to five years after an intervention increases the democratic outcome of the political transition of the post-coup aftermath. Doing so allows parties time to internally focus on refining their
organizational strength and building new networks and alliances needed for the post-coup period. Delaying elections by this timeframe may also help factional tensions defuse, help political parties build their organizational strength (that they often lack in “guardian coups” and is the reason why they protest the incumbent and demand his ouster), and allows for structural reforms that may be needed to overcome political deadlock and otherwise may not happen (undoubtedly, such reforms are not always beneficial to the democratic process) (Evans, 2014).

Furthermore, delaying elections for some time allows the “general’s spell” on supporters of the coup and military leaders (especially in guardian coups) to slowly evaporate (Marinov & Geomans, 2013). In all of the cases surveyed I noticed that the popularity of the coup leader plummeted over time the longer he stayed in time. Disenchantment with the military junta spread as more parts of the public began to realize that many of the issues that led to the coup were not being addressed: financial distress, instability and insecurity, and socio-political polarization. In this sense, over time, the military leaders begin to lose their legitimacy as a political force, and more want them to return to the barracks and call for elections. On the other hand, if elections happen during this “coup high” the junta has less incentive to carry out competitive and fair elections because it does not feel the pressure from the public to do so.

In the case of Egypt right now, where large parts of the population still highly favor the military and few view the military's intervention critically in terms of what it means for the country’s long-term demilitarization and democratization, holding elections anytime soon would produce results that only favor and legitimize the military's recent autocratic action. This would give the military leaders little reason to reform or carry out an authentic democratic transition. There is an incentive, however, for the military leaders to delay elections since it is not in its favor to visibly rule during one of the most economically and politically deteriorating episode in
Egypt’s modern history. Over time frustration with the junta leaders will grow and such faults will be ascribed to them, especially as all other political forces are further marginalized and the power of the main Brotherhood opposition is severely curtailed.

Much has been written on what variables influence whether coup-leaders will hold competitive elections or not after their takeover. I sought to build onto this area of study by looking at what variables influence whether those elections will lead to more fair transitions and long-term democratic outcomes. The strategies used in a country’s post-coup elections are many. It is difficult to generalize which factor is most important when many of these strategies are particular and unique to the specific case at hand. My findings suggest that among the systematic and most crucial factors that determine post-coup democratic outcomes are the timing and competitiveness of electoral politics. While the case studies I selected yielded these conclusions, much work remains needed on this topic in order to provide more rigorous and solid recommendations and conclusions for countries experiencing coups across different contexts.

Seldom are democratic transitions smooth. It is often troubling to even call them “democratic” because of how unorderly, authoritative and chaotic the circumstances are around them. The transition following a military coup often is met with disruptive national traumas and extraordinary anti-democratic ruptures. It is therefore a painstaking and incremental process, where each case is contingent on the historical context that led to it and the political conditions surrounding it. A single election, especially after a time as precarious and exceptional as the post-coup period, will not solve a government’s oppressive and autocratic tendencies. Rather, the issue is more complex and requires policymakers to re-evaluate the institutional frameworks in place and what outdated laws, arbitrary regulations, and lack of accountability mechanisms are in place. Indeed, the first post-coup election cannot consolidate democracy and it cannot guarantee
democratic prospects if there is a lack of democratic consistency thereafter; the tenure of the post-coup election government and the subsequent elections should be considered an extension of this democratic transition.

Some pundits, activists and scholars say that elections should not be prioritized in discussions on post-coup or post-conflict transitions because they are merely the “cherry on top” that should come after conditions of stability and inclusiveness are secured, rather than introducing something possibly divisive and distracting to the pressing work that needs to be done (Soudriette, 2007). While it is true that elections cannot be ranked as the most crucial element in the post-coup transition, they are nevertheless important in stabilizing a country’s social and political circumstances and in shaping the incoming state structure. Certain electoral strategies—the timing and degree of contestation—must be utilized effectively by policy makers and governing leaders to make the best of a difficult and inherently anti-democratic situation.

Almost one year after the military coup in Egypt, the interim government leaders and whoever desires a more stable, secure and democratic transition for the country must critically understand what potential the upcoming national election carries. Parliamentary election organizers must strategize the electoral timeline and degree of contestation if they strive for elections that lead to greater democratic prospects for a country that has repeatedly experienced difficulties with its transitional process during the past three years. They must ensure that elections are not rushed, and that the will of all sectors of the electorate are not suppressed by selectively excluding certain political forces while including and backing others.

Considering its current political climate and its drastic witch hunt societal landscape, if Egypt rushes to parliamentary elections this year, elections will only legitimize the coup leaders at the expense of further polarizing Egypt’s socio-political identities. Its elections should be
delayed and not held in the state of crisis it is currently in. Pro-democracy forces should insist that parties are not selectively banned. Namely, they should advocate that members of the Brotherhood be allowed to run even if they disagree with their politics and their short-lived mismanaged tenure. They should pressure the Parliamentary Elections Committee, and ruling government to introduce parliamentary elections that combine an individual candidates system along with an open party list system, with greater space allocated for the latter. This approach will allow constituents to vote based on party platforms and will give a stronger opportunity for newcomers. However, space for individual candidates should be provide some realistic informal inclusion for Islamist parties, specifically the Brotherhood, so that they are not underground and radicalized again. The space for candidates should be limited, however, so as not to revive remnants of the Mubarak regime who will view this as an opportunity to strengthen their political positions.


