In the Service of which Master?
Civil-Military Relations and Regime Collapse in the Arab Spring

By

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A THESIS

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Abstract

After the Tunisian military abandoned President Ben Ali, ending his thirty-year reign, Middle East security analyst Steven Cook quipped, “Aren’t Middle Eastern militaries supposed to crack down and kick butt? Aren’t they supposed to be the ‘backbone’ of regimes? The guarantors of last resort? The ultimate instrument of political control?” All existing scholarship on Middle Eastern civil-military relations pointed to a simple but resounding answer: yes. But as the Arab Spring unfolded, two paradoxical images emerged: one, in Syria, where the military lived up the Cook’s billing, as it continues to kill tens of thousands Syrians in a civil war; the other, in Egypt, where the military embraced the protesters and refused to use violence, effectively rejecting Cook’s characterization. This paper will examine how each regime’s civil-military relationship dictated the results of Arab Spring protests, paying particular attention to levels of violence and defection as predictors of regime collapse. It will find that civil-military relations were a strong predictor of regime collapse at relatively high levels of violence and that coup-proofing methods, while effective in staving off coups, actually catalyzed the defection of the military and, consequently, the collapse of regimes.
Acknowledgements

I received valuable comments and advice from Professor Christian Davenport, who knows far more than any human being should about protest suppression, political violence and the political science literature generally. I benefited greatly from his connections throughout the civil conflict sphere as I was tracking down different data.

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Finally, my mother deserves all the credit for this project. She is a constant source of inspiration and her sacrifices drive me to be the best student I can be, including writing a 93 page thesis…voluntarily. So thanks for that? Also thank you to my brother, Sean, and my two sisters, Kelly and Leigh Anne. You three set the bar high in every way and I’m a better person for your influence.

Admonishments

I want to take this opportunity to publicly admonish the International Olympic Committee for scheduling the Olympics for February 2014, the month before this thesis was due. Not ideal.

The NCAA deserves a public reprimand for kicking off the NCAA March Madness tournament the week before this thesis was due. Also not ideal.
On becoming soldiers we have not ceased to be citizens.

*Anonymous spokesman for Cromwell’s soldiers, 1647*
Chapter 1: Introduction

Middle East analyst Be’eri famously alleged, “Without the active participation or at least the expressive approval of commanders of the military, no Arab government can hold on to the reigns of power.”¹ After World War II, he was right: coups constantly created turmoil throughout the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, making it so any leader who wanted to maintain power in an Arab state had to placate the military or risk being deposed. Between March 1949 and December 1980, there were an astonishing 55 coup attempts carried out by Arab militaries, about half of which were successful.² This furious rate of turnover, combined with the perpetual Arab-Israeli conflict, still dictates the narrative of constant instability in the Middle East that pervades Western thought. As the 1970s gave way to the modern era in the MENA region, though, coup d'états became a rarity in the Arab world and stability took over as the norm: regimes such as Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Oman, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen have or had held power for more than 20 years before 2011.³

When the Arab Spring began in Tunisia in 2011, most believed that the protests would be dealt with in the same way as dissent had been dealt with throughout the Arab world in recent history: with a heavy enough hand to keep the autocratic ruler in power.⁴ Foreign Policy analyst Steven Cook succinctly captured the universal expectation as the protests broke out: “Aren’t Middle Eastern militaries supposed to crack down and kick butt? Aren’t they supposed to be the ‘backbone’ of regimes? The guarantors of last

² Be’eri, “The Waning of the Military Coup in Arab Politics,” 70.
⁴ Insert some examples here
resort? The ultimate instrument of political control?"\(^5\) Thirty plus years of history and political science literature gave a resounding answer: yes.

However, with unprecedented international attention focused on the region, the world watched as Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia in the night, as Hosni Mubarak defiantly attempted to remain in power before being brushed aside by the military, and as Libya descended into civil war amidst calls for the eccentric Muammar Qaddafi to step down before he was eventually captured and killed by rebel forces—an humiliating end viewed by the world on CNN. Although it received much less coverage, the Ali Abdullah Saleh also regime in Yemen collapsed after nearly 30 years of rule. Protests occurred in 19 countries, representing many regime types, economic conditions, and levels of political freedom. The stability of the previous 30 years was thrown out the window in a matter of weeks, ushering Arab militaries into the spotlight as they were forced to choose between protesters and the regime.

Risa Brooks’ conclusion that “the military’s central position stems from its status as the primary repository of force, and hence the final guarantor of power” serves as the intellectual backbone of this project.\(^6\) It was the military that stabilized the region after the tumultuous 1950s, 1960s and 1970s and the relationship has been widely noted as essential the lasting stability of autocratic regimes while much of the world saw democratic transitions. Eva Bellin, for example, noted in 2004 that the state’s coercive apparatus maintained “the will and capacity” to suppress democratic movements, an essential element to the disproportionate resistance of authoritarianism in the MENA

\(^5\) Cook, Steven. "The Calculations on Tunisia's Military."Foreign Policy, 1/20/2011.

\(^6\) Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, 18.
region compared to other developing regions.\textsuperscript{7} If the military was so essential to the decades of stability in the MENA region, it is imperative to understand what role it had in destabilizing the region and why it took that role where it did. As the primary exporter of state power and the institution capable of committing the most physical harm against citizens, it is imperative that we understand trends in military action. Doing so will allow us to have a better understanding of possible institutional structures that will lend themselves to high levels of violence in future antigovernment protest movements across the globe. With such an understanding, human security in autocratic states could be improved. Less optimistically, such an understanding would provide insight into weaknesses and strengths that could be applied to autocratic regime stability. In other words, an autocratic ruler who reads this paper will be very interested to understand the structural failures and successes of civil-military relations in MENA regimes during the Arab Spring.

How, then, would the various militaries react to mass protests? How would their reactions be similar? How would they be different? How much of an effect would Arab militaries really have on the outcome of the protests? Would they really serve as the linchpin to stability as Be’eri, Brooks, and Bellin all believed? What role would state violence play in the outcome of the movements and what role would the military play in that violence? How would the structure of the military influence its response to the protests? In what circumstances would the military stand by its regime? And when would it defect? What would the consequences be of both? This paper will address these

questions, using the Table #1 as a basis for its analysis. The main variables examined are Results of Protests, Civil-Military Relations, Level of Violence, and Military Response, as the paper will attempt to unpack the role of the military in regime stability.\textsuperscript{8}

**Table #1: Militaries in the Arab Spring**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Result of Protests</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Civil-Military Relations</th>
<th>Level of Violence</th>
<th>Military Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Autocratic officer-politician</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>Autocratic officer-politician</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Defect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Theocracy</td>
<td>Dual</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Tribally dependent monarchy</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Tribally dependent monarchy</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>Dual</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Autocratic officer-politician</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Tribally dependent monarchy</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>Dual</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>Autocratic officer-politician</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>Autocratic officer-politician</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>Autocratic officer-politician</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Defect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>Personalist</td>
<td>Autocratic officer-politician</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Fracture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This paper finds that civil-military relationships are a strong indicator of the outcome of the mass protest movements, as it was accurate predictors of the military’s willingness or reluctance stand by the regime at high levels of violence. Autocratic Officer Politician and Dual militaries are especially susceptible to collapse due to structural tendencies that lead to defection and fracturing. Coup-proofing methods, while

\textsuperscript{8} The methodology for constructing this table will be discussed in detail in the Methods chapter of this paper.
effective in staving off coups, actually catalyzed the defection of the military and, consequently, the collapse of regimes.

This analysis is divided into five sections: first, a review of literature relevant to autocratic regime stability and civil-military relations; second, an overview of the theory and methods used by the author in attempting to unfold the role of civil-military relations and violence in the Arab Spring; third, a look at the macro trends in regime and military behavior in the Arab Spring; fourth, case studies looking in-depth at day-by-day actions of regimes and militaries in Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain followed by a comparison of the three; and finally, a conclusion linking the macro trends and the case studies, with comments on applicability to global protest repression and future research possibilities.
Chapter 2: Research Agenda

Literature Review

To begin why some regimes collapsed following protests while others maintained control, it is necessary to understand theories of autocratic regime stability. What accounts for the stability of autocratic regimes? While the military may play an important role, it is certainly not the only variable that has contributed to nearly 30 years of consistent, stable autocratic rule in the MENA region. One of the unifying characteristics of the Middle Eastern regimes that experienced Arab Spring protests is authoritarianism, so the focus will be on the theories that explain autocratic regime stability, as opposed to regime stability more generally. The logic, of course, is that autocracies retain power differently than other, more democratic forms of government do.

Regime Stability

Economic

The most common theory that scholars offer is economic in nature. The general line of thought is relatively simple: if a regime has money, it is able to appease its citizens via cooptation, quelling any desire for regime change. Investment in education, infrastructure, jobs, or other improvement that make the citizenry happy can be used. Regimes without money, however, are not able to co-opt the population and must instead rely on the citizenry’s goodwill, which is less likely to work.

Especially with respect to the Arab autocratic regimes, many scholars attribute regime stability to cooptation. Sven Behrendt’s work on sovereign wealth funds—“investment funds that are owned or controlled by national governments”—exemplifies
this line of thought. Behrendt argues that there is relationship between sovereign wealth funds in nondemocratic countries and the democratic quality of their institutions. The relationship he finds supports the notion that when a leader has a significant amount of expendable money, he is able to co-opt potential adversaries within the population. Authoritarian regimes are less likely to have transparent sovereign wealth funds, giving the autocrat more flexibility in delivering resources to the areas that will be most effective for their purposes. In other words, an authoritarian regime that has more control over its sovereign wealth fund is able to gain support via bribery. Likewise, O’Reilly explores the relationship Omani and Bahraini monarchs share with their oil wealth. He argues “the so-called oil monarchs have successfully placated opponents by providing their subjects with jobs that pay well and with excellent social services.” To O’Reilly, then, Oman and Bahrain have been able to co-opt their constituencies with the oil money that they have. Other scholars have found similar results. Bueno de Mesquita found that leaders with access to resources such as foreign aid or natural resource rentier states are best equipped to survive domestic threats. He states that there are two basic methods authoritarian leaders can use to ameliorate the threat of revolution with: they can increase economic public goods or suppress the oppositions’ ability to organize by restricting freedom of speech, assembly and free press. He finds, though, that cooptation is much more effective because “leaders find it hard to embark on the suppression response to

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9 Behrendt, Sven, "Sovereign Wealth Funds in Nondemocratic Countries Financing Entrenchment or Change?" *Journal of International Affairs* 65 (2011):65
mass political movements because the economic contraction it causes makes it harder for leaders to continue buying their coalitions loyalty.”11

Bueno de Mesquita’s argument illustrates a transition from a basic economic argument to a thread in the literature that relies on natural resources to explain regime stability. The idea that regimes are able to co-opt their constituencies is pretty intuitive, so this thread builds upon that notion by introducing the idea of the resource blessing/curse. O’Reilly begins to explore the connection oil and regime stability share, but scholars such as Bueno de Mesquita and Geddes take this a step further and claim that regimes become dependent on specific resources. Geddes finds that “increases in oil wealth relative to individual averages increase autocratic survival, not by deterring democratization, but by reducing the vulnerability of dictatorships to ouster by groups that establish subsequent dictatorships,” which implies “spikes in oil prices reinforce the durability of regimes like Iran’s” not because they help guard against democratization, but rather because they help ensure that other prospective autocratic rulers do not collect enough power to overthrow the regime.12 Thus, Geddes’ findings suggest that oil, and implicitly other natural resources can help quell resistance from within the elite, but that democratization is an entirely different process.

Institutions

Geddes findings regarding democratization provide a useful bridge to another explanation of regime stability that helps fill some of these gaps: institutionalization.

Institutions can refer to any formalized government structure that helps the regime maintain control. The logic with institutionalization follows two paths: first, democratic institutions give the regime a veil of legitimacy and second, that the institutions, democratic or not, elongate regime life because of the regime’s control over the institutions that make society function.

Slate and Fenner are a useful example of this line of thought. They argue that the state power—which is different from the state itself—can be used to keep authoritarian regimes in power in four different ways: coercing rivals, extracting revenues, registering citizens and cultivating dependence. The army, for example, an institution that, theoretically, at least, only the regime has access to, is a powerful institution for coercing and repressing rivals. Taxes, another institution controlled by the regime, can fund public services that co-opt citizens. Registering citizens can be used to keep citizens in or out of the political process and arena, depending on what is more useful to the regime. Finally, like with taxes, autocratic regimes can use state institutions such as government jobs to cultivate dependence. The state becomes an institution within itself, which allows the authoritarian regime to create a stranglehold on the institutions within it, strengthening the regime’s grip on power. When opposition arises, the regime is able to use the state’s resources to quell, co-opt or destroy the opposition.¹³

Other scholars have argued that institutions serve authoritarian regimes in a legitimizing role. Ezrow and Frantz are especially useful in this respect. Political parties and legislatures are common throughout the authoritarian world, they claim, because the

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authoritarian regimes rely on them to keep control of the state. “Even when they are weak and exert little de facto political power,” the authors explain, “parties and legislatures serve a purpose: they prolong the survival of the ruling establishment. Dictatorships with parties endure longer than those without them, an effect that is even more pronounced when regimes also have legislatures.”\textsuperscript{14} Their existence serves two purposes according to Ezrow and Frantz: first, they give a cloak of democracy, which offers the regime legitimacy. Second, preexisting legislatures allow the regime to smoothen leadership transitions at the time when these regimes are most susceptible to collapse. Bunce and Wolchik also look at democratic institutions, agreeing that the institutions can be manipulated to ensure electoral victory in what they term “competitive autocratic elections.”\textsuperscript{15}

The theory of institutionalization has significant pushback among scholars, however. Wright, for example, compares the Chinese autocracy-by-party with different Arab dictatorships and finds the institutionalization of the dictator gives opposition a figurehead to attacks. Whereas a dictator is an obvious and well-accepted target when things go wrong or people have discontents, the Chinese Communist party is so gigantic and convoluted that resistance ultimately fails because they have no one individual to blame. Stirring up passion against someone like Gadhafi, though, is much easier than turning public anger against a relatively faceless Chinese Communist Party, which is opaque and has frequent leadership changes. The institution of the dictator, therefore, can


ultimately serve as a destabilizing force. Likewise, Wright argues that democratic institutions such as political parties within autocratic states can serve as a destabilizing force because of their ability to organize an opposition.\textsuperscript{16}

**Foreign Factors**

In a similar line of thought to the economic factors, scholars have focused extensively on how foreign aid affects regime stability. Yom and Gause, for example, point out that all of the regimes that have survived the Arab Spring have strong foreign patrons. They explain that foreign support is important because “it lowers the cost of repression by diminishing any international backlash it might arouse” and “foreign patrons can arm local regimes with additional economic and coercive resources.”\textsuperscript{17}

Foreign aid, therefore, can both directly and indirectly ensure regime stability. The United States refusal to criticize Bahrain is illustrative of the indirect effect foreign aid can have on autocracies—namely, they can give international credence to the regime and ensure that international actors will not aid the regime’s collapse. Moreover, the arrival of Gulf Cooperation Council troops (namely, Saudi Arabian troops) in Bahrain helped bolster the regime and gave the regime resources it used to crush the protests. Yom and al-Momani’s case study of Jordan is also useful in illustrating this line of thought: the United States has provided aid to Jordan that had enabled Jordan to push back on democratic reforms that were occurring throughout 1989 and then again in the Arab


Spring, ensuring the stability of the monarch. However, the Mubarak regime received high levels of foreign support both before and at the start of the protests but fell in response to Arab Spring protests.

The autocratic regime stability literature explains—at least in part—how the autocratic leaders of Middle Eastern nations were able to so effectively maintain power throughout the final quarter of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st, but does not address the role that the military plays in states that rely heavily on the security apparatus to thwart domestic dissent. Of course, the focus of this paper is on the military’s role in regime stability or collapse, so the literature on civil-military relations will now be examined.

**Civil-Military Relations**

The scholarship surrounding the relationship of the state and the military is expansive. Perhaps the most famous and foundational text is Samuel Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State*. At the core of Huntington’s thesis is the assertion that the world militaries have experienced a phenomenon of professionalization, which has resulted in a necessary normalization of the relationship military elites share with the civilian control. As the military has become more of an permanent institution—as opposed to a set of citizens in reserve that can be called into action—the relationship that governments and militaries share has taken on increasing significance: the military needs the government’s money to function and the government needs the military’s support to avoid overthrow. On the basis of this thesis, multiple studies have looked at the relationships specific

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regimes share with their respective militaries, highlighting the vastly different ways in which militaries interact with their governments. As the field grew, scholars moved from individual case studies to more general theories of, and trends in, civil-military relations.

This project is concerned first and foremost with reactions to and effects of popular protests within Middle East regimes, so it is imperative that there is a clear understanding of the specific dynamics of Middle Eastern civil-military relations. In the broadest sense, scholars agree that there have been two distinct phases of civil-military relations in the Middle East. Phase one lasted from the 1950s to the early 1970s, when the military was the prime challenger to non-democratic governments. Phase two was from the 1970s onward, when military was the principal protector of the authoritarian regimes. While the scholarship on the first phase is abundant, modern scholarship on the second phase of Middle East political-military relations is sparse as the waning of coups has decayed interest.  

Born out of the legacy of the first phase of civil-military relations, the great majority of the literature focuses on coup-proofing mechanisms employed by regimes. Some common characteristics of coup-proofing include: the use of family and ethnic ties in coup-critical positions, the creation of a parallel forces to counter threats, development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdictions so that they

effectively spy on each other, and the cultivation a culture of expertise in the military.\textsuperscript{21} Much scholarship has focused on the effect of coup proofing on military capability, usually noting that the military tends to sacrifice some competence in the process.\textsuperscript{23}

Kamrava’s study of civil-military relations in the Middle East examines the professionalization of Middle Eastern militaries, which he argues has greatly enhanced the political capital of the militaries, even in those countries that did not experience military coups, such as the monarchies.\textsuperscript{24} The Royal Danish Defence College also concluded an exhaustive study of the civil-military relationships in the Middle East in 2008. It finds that direct seizure of political power by the military is becoming rare in the Middle East, as militaries opt instead to exert influence in other ways, especially economic ones.\textsuperscript{25} The Middle Eastern military, therefore, has seen its position in the political arena evolve in recent decades from a constant coup threat to a powerful, although more conventional, political player.

Foreign Policy’s MENA security analyst Steven Cook examined the state of the civil-military relationship in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey. Whereas many scholars saw the Middle Eastern and North African militaries as agents of progress—economically and politically—Cook draws distinctions. When the economy was thriving, he says, this was true. “The empirical evidence suggests that military officers in developing countries were, indeed, successful in generating significant economic performance and carried out

\begin{thebibliography}{99}


\bibitem{DeAtkine1999} For the best examples, see De Atkine (1999) and Powell (2012).


\end{thebibliography}
successful programs of natural infrastructure development.” When those economies stagnated, however, “the officers became conservative elements clinging tenaciously to regimes in which they were (and remain) the primary beneficiaries.” The civil-military relationship became one of conservatism, with military leaders serving primarily as protectors of the regime and not the people.

Very little has been done to create an understanding of the different trends in civil-military relationships across regimes, but Kamrava offers the most useful typology. Autocratic officer-politicians are former military officers turned civilian leaders. Tribally dependent monarchies are monarchies that rely on tribal heritage to staff the upper echelons of the military. Dual militaries are militaries that have a regular military that is representative of the population but also maintains a separate wing devoted either ideologically or tribally to the regime. Independent militaries do not share any significant ideological or tribal relationship with the regime. Mercenaries are hired, foreign forces.

Perhaps the most complete treatment of civil military relations in the Arab world comes from Risa Brooks’ paper “Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes.” She points out that “coups have become less frequent in the Arab world. Nonetheless, although public role differs over time and between regimes, the military remains a pivotal constituency in most Arab states.” She goes on to argue that, especially in Middle East and North African state dynamics, “maintaining its loyalty is essential to retaining office, and regimes have used a range of methods to ensure its

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27 Ibid.
28 Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East."
backing, or at least its acquiescence” such as, “increasing non-military support by cultivating social, economic, and religious groups, courting the high command and officer corps with corporate and private benefits; appointing members of specific groups—often privileged minorities—to key posts in the armed forces; and preventing officers from building a support baser within the military by purging potential opponents, monitoring military activity, rotating commands and establishing independent security services reporting directly to the presidency or the palace.”30 Coup proofing, therefore, has been the foundation of the civil-military relationship in the post-1970 phase of MENA civil-military relations. As a result, “on a political level…the armed forces’ loyalties lie with the regime rather than with the general population, a democratic system or the nation as an abstraction.”31

**Protest Repression**

There is an extensive literature on protest repression, with a general agreement on the characteristics of the entrance of violence into the repression equation. As Carey explains, there are multiple types of domestic dissent: “peaceful anti-government demonstrations, strikes, violent riots, guerrilla warfare and large-scale rebellion” are all methods of dissent that can lead the government to a repressive reaction.32 The reactions of the governments, naturally, vary across time and space, and there is considerable scholarship on how and why governments react the way that they do.

Regan and Henderson, for example, in a study of under-developed nations from 1979-1992, find that “(1) the level of threat is positively and significantly associated with political repression; (2) the level of threat has a greater impact than regime type on the likelihood of political repression; and (3) controlling for the level of threat, less developed states with intermediate levels of democracies—semi democracies—have the highest levels of political repression.”

Davenport, essentially concurring, finds that “regimes not only observe different aspects of political conflict with regard to the degree of threat perceived, but they also recognize the need to apply political repression at different rates to counter these threats.” Moreover, he finds that nondemocratic regimes repress at especially disproportionate levels when compared to transitional or democratic regimes.35 There thus seems to be some agreement within the literature: regimes respond with higher levels of repression when they feel especially threatened and developing, nondemocratic regimes are the biggest offenders. Neither finding is particularly surprising.

Gartner and Regan, however, break the consensus with their study of Latin American countries. When demands increase in Latin America, they say, government repression decreases and when demands decrease, government repression increases.36 Carey, who offered the different forms of protest, went on to find that among the five different forms of threat (demonstrations, strikes, riots, guerrilla attacks and revolutions),

35 Ibid.
only guerrilla attacks increase the probability of repression and that nonviolent movements (demonstrations or strikes) or relatively spontaneous (riots) are not responded to with high levels of repression.\textsuperscript{37} Bell et al. find that political violence increases in regimes that abuse the physical integrity of their citizens, that violence is especially likely to occur in weak states, and that violence increases with access to freedom of assembly and widespread access to internet technology.\textsuperscript{38} Francisco studied the repression-backlash dynamic in autocratic regimes, concluding that massacres and other acts of harsh repression rarely work, as protests tend to gain speed in the wake of state violence against protesters.\textsuperscript{39}

Next, this paper will develop a theory rooted in these three literatures to analyze the role of militaries in dictating the outcome of the Arab Spring protests.

\textsuperscript{37} Carey, "The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression," 182.
Theory

The Arab Spring illuminated gaps in the overlapping literatures described in the literature review: first, the current civil-military literature focuses on coup d’états and ignores the effect the relationship has on response to mass domestic protest movements. Second, theories don’t adequately explain the connection between violence and civil-military relationships. Third, there is no current analysis of the cause and effect of military defection in domestic antigovernment protests. Finally, theories have only explored the effect of coup-proofing on a regime’s ability in international wars, not to repress domestic challenges. The prevailing notion on Arab civil military relations is that “on a political level…the armed forces’ loyalties lie with the regime rather than with the general population, a democratic system or the nation as an abstraction,” but in certain instances the military behaved in ways that totally defied the conventional wisdom. 40

Thus, we are left with many questions without adequate scholarship to address them as we attempt to digest the Arab Spring: most importantly, how does the Arab Spring challenge the previous understanding of civil-military relations in the MENA region? Has the military-political dynamic evolved differently in certain regime types? Were certain regime types or civil military relationships more likely to use violence? What caused a military to stand by the regime and how did they differ from militaries that defected? Did the military actually even have any control over the events, or were they simply reacting to them? This paper will attempt to fill the holes in the literature by examining the

dynamics of violence, civil-military relations, defection and regime collapse in the Arab Spring.

The main theory that this paper posits is that the civil-military relationships were the most important variable in determining the outcome of the protests that swept through the Arab world in 2011. If the military was the stabilizing force in Arab politics the last three decades, then it is reasonable to believe that they played an instrumental role in the destabilization of the regimes. Using Kamrava’s civil-military relations typology, an Autocratic Officer Politician civil-military relationship has certain dynamics that yielded different responses than a tribally dependent monarchy did, and those differences dictated whether the regime was able to survive the challenge or not. The various civil-military relationships resulted in different levels of violence and rate of defection, each of contributed significantly to the regime’s collapse or survival. On a more specific level, this paper will look at the way in which regimes used violence to suppress the protests, the role of the military in perpetrating the violence, and the effect of that violence on both the regime and the military. In order to examine this theory, the paper will test the follow four hypotheses:

**Hypotheses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis #1</th>
<th>Regimes that maintained a stronger civil-military relationship were most likely to survive the challenges presented by the Arab Spring.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis #2</td>
<td>States that were willing to use violence at high levels against protesters were the regimes that collapsed, whereas those that did not use violence survived the challenge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis #3</td>
<td>High levels of violence resulted in military defection or fracturing, which in turn led to state collapse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis #4</td>
<td>Coup proofing mechanisms played an instrumental role in dictating military response to the protests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first hypothesis is one way to restate the thesis that this paper is arguing: that the stronger the civil-military relationship, the more likely a regime is to survive a serious domestic protest movement. As Desch points out, analysts disagree on what makes for a strong civil-military relationship and what makes a weak one.\(^{41}\) Moreover, most people think of civil-military relationships in terms of coups, but one “can have poor civil-military relations without the threat of a coup.”\(^{42}\) The strength of a civil military relationship can be measured based on a number of variables. As civil-military relations theorist Rebecca Shiff explains, “Nations framed in terms of civil-military relations (good or bad) are those that have been encouraged by Western nations to separate civil and military spheres.”\(^{43}\) This paper, however, will view “strength” of civil-military in terms of loyalty to the regime. How willing, in order words, is the military to defend the regime? Is it most loyal to the regime, the population, or some other entity? The strongest civil-military relations will be the most loyal to the regime.

One such variable is by ethnic and tribal loyalty. It perhaps plays into the common stereotype about the Middle East and North Africa region that tribal identities dictate all politics. But, as Kamrava indicates, military identities are indeed often based on tribal loyalties.\(^{44}\) The logic for tribal loyalties being more willing to use violence in

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\(^{42}\) *Ibid.*


response to protests is simply that a tribally based militaries have the most to lose if a challenge to the regime is successful. Especially in minority ruled states such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the loss of power could mean high levels of death in the tribal/ethnic/religious group.

Another example of a measuring stick for the strength of the civil-military relationship would be the connection the military feels for the leader of the regime on a professional or ideological level. Many of the autocratic regimes in the Arab world came to power from a highly ideological revolutionary movement but moved away from their ideology and military roots as the years passed in an effort to consolidate civilian control.\textsuperscript{45} If the ideological drive of the original seizure of power still permeates the military, especially at the elite level, one would expect that the connection between the military and the leader remains strong. Sticher argues that the age of the regime increases, relationships with the elites in the military become solidified, creating an institutional level of devotion to the autocratic leader that then is passed throughout the ranks.\textsuperscript{46} Coupled with the leader’s position as a former military officer, the extent to which the militaries still feel the connection to the leader is an important indicator of the strength of the civil military relationship.

Economic and social position within a society can also be viewed as an important measure of the strength of the civil-military relationship. For example, Cook points out that many Arab militaries have a significant stake in the national economy, leading to the

\textsuperscript{45} Ezrow, Natasha and Erica Frantz, \textit{Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders}. 267.

conclusion that as economies falter, Arab militaries become more conservative and align more fully with the regime.47

The second hypothesis comes out of a relatively established norm in the literature: those regimes that use high levels of violence against their citizens tend to collapse shortly thereafter. One would expect that this trend continued in the Arab Spring, although it presents a problem of causation: do regimes that use high levels of violence do so as a last ditch effort to maintain power or does the violence cause the collapse to occur by hardening the demands and resolve of the protesters? Unpacking this dynamic is essential to understanding of the role of the military in protest repression. It also deals with the problem of causation presented by the use of violence regimes in response to protests—whereas the first clause only deals with those regimes that use violence, this hypothesis offers an explanation for the majority of cases: low to no violence and no collapse. If regimes that use violence harden the demands of the protesters, those that do not can be seen as letting the protesters air their complaints and then sputter out. It is possible that other methods, such as cooptation are the reason for the low violence-no collapse relationship, but those variables are outside the scope of this paper.

The third hypothesis builds off of Francisco’s findings that violent repression of protests actually has the opposite effect, although it views the relationship from the perspective of the military rather than the protesters.48 Francisco’s findings only apply to protest size and outcome, though. This hypothesis takes his general finding and applies

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the variable of concern in this paper—militaries—to it: if militaries are the linchpin upon which protest movements succeed or fail in the Middle East and the overwhelming trend is for state violence to lead to successful protest movements, then the military should react negatively to the violence. It is safe to assume that violence, especially when used against a domestic audience, would put stress on the military structure. How does this stress release itself? Previous research such as Francisco’s indicate that regimes collapse in the face of highly violent protest repression, but as the state institution capable of the executing the highest levels of violence, the military becomes the most important institution as violence escalates. If the regime has collapsed in previous such movements, it would be logical that the collapse occurred when the military either defected or fractured, leaving the regime without the resources to finish repressing the protests or the protection after having used violence in an attempt to quell the protests.

Finally, the fourth hypothesis comes out of the extensive coup-proofing literature that forms the bedrock of scholarship surrounding civil-military relations. Coup proofing, it has been widely noted, is not just an aspect of civil-military relations in Arab autocratic states, but the foundation of the relationship. Among the coup-proofing techniques that this paper will examine are “increasing non-military support by cultivating social, economic, and religious groups, courting the high command and officer corps with corporate and private benefits; appointing members of specific groups—often privileged minorities—to key posts in the armed forces; and preventing officers from building a support baser within the military by purging potential opponents, monitoring military
activity, rotating commands and establishing independent security services reporting directly to the presidency or the palace.”

In Kamrava’s analysis of the dynamics of autocratic officer politician states and dual militaries, he notes that volunteer militias are used as a coup-proofing tactic in many states (Kamrava 83). They focus mostly on internal security, are highly ideological, and a volunteer force, so their willingness to support the regime should be more likely than a regular, less ideological force. Mercenaries, another coup-proofing tactic, are disconnected from the population, which would lead one to conclude that they would not hesitate to use violence if ordered to by their hired bosses. Brooks, De Atkine (1999) and Powell (2012) all point to coup proofing as defining the capabilities of Arab militaries and civil-military relationships. The intention of some coup-proofing measures is to make it so that the military cannot act decisively, so one would expect that such a weakening of the armed forces would make it so that the military would struggle when put into action. Conversely, the parallel forces would have varying levels of connection to the regime, resulting in higher levels of violence from those with a strong connection and a fracturing from the rest of the military. Whereas the first three hypotheses looks at behavioral trends, this fourth hypothesis provides a structural explanation of why the typologies react in the way they do.

Methodology

To test these hypotheses, this paper will use macro-level typologies to gain a better understanding of the phenomena that occurred throughout the protests across the region. There is still considerable disagreement what happened in the Arab Spring, so this data will hopefully provide a clear lens through which to understand, at least on the macro level, what occurred. The paper will then grapple with the nuanced web of the civil-military relationship, use of state violence, defection and state collapse through case studies of Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The methods for both analyses will be explained in this section.

Table #1 will serve as the basis for the quantitative analysis section of this paper. Using typologies for Regime Type, Result of Protests, Civil-Military Relationship, Level of Violence, and Military Response, it will cross variables in an attempt to see how each interacts and unpack the puzzle of how and why regimes collapsed or survived and the role the military played in the collapse or the survival. The various typologies for Table #1 were gathered from various sources and required explanation.

“Results of protests” are as of January 2013. “Collapse” is defined as a removal of the head of state from power. “No collapse” refers to any regime whose head of state remains in power after the protests. Thus, although many regimes dissolved Parliaments and fired Cabinets, they are categorized as “No Collapse” because the head of state remained in power after the protests subsided. This is my own typology, and is relatively self-explanatory.

“Regime type” is according to Geddes typology for autocratic regimes offered in her book Paradigms and Sand Castles. Military regimes are “a group of officers decides
who will rule and exercises some influence on policy.”

Personalist “differ from both military and single-party in that access to the office and the fruits of the office depend much more on the discretion of an individual leaders. The leader may be an officer and may have created a party to support himself, but neither the military not the party exercises independent decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler.”

In Single Party regimes, “a party organization exercises some power over the leader at least part of the time, controls the selection of officials, organizes the distribution of benefits to supports and mobilizes citizens to vote and show support for party leaders in other ways.” This is in contrast to regimes “in which the leader himself maintains a near monopoly over policy and personnel decisions despite the existence of a support party,” which are personalist.

“Civil Military Relations” is categorized according to Kamrava’s typology. Autocratic officer-politicians are former military officers turned civilians. Tribally dependent monarchies are monarchies that rely on tribal heritage to staff the upper echelons of the military. Dual militaries are militaries that have a regular military that is representative of the population but also maintains a separate wing devoted either ideologically or tribally to the regime. Independent militaries do not share any significant ideological or tribal relationship with the regime. Mercenaries are hired, foreign forces. I only categorize countries under mercenaries if their civil-military relationship is greatly

50 Geddes, Barbara. Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics, 51
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
affected by the hiring of mercenaries. In Libya, for example, although Gaddafi hired mercenaries, they did not have enough of an effect to constitute a mercenary military. He offered a civil-military relationship for most countries in his article but I filled in the ones that he did not.

The “level of violence” typology uses the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s PRIO database. “Low” indicates a death toll of 1-24, “Intermediate” of 25-999, and “high” of 1000 or more. “None” is reserved for those countries that experienced Arab Spring protests, but did not have any protest related deaths. The death counts are only of those citizens killed by the use of state force.

The Military Response typology uses Silverman’s analysis of military action in the Arab Spring. Loyalty implies that the military did not take any actions or any noteworthy actions to aid the protesters. Defection is when the military decides as a cohesive unit to side with the protesters. Fracture is when at least one sizable portion of the military defects and fights against the loyal state forces on the protesters behalf.

These categorizations of the variables are simply the best available for each. Although imperfect, they help clarify the larger picture of the phenomenon that was the Arab Spring. This paper will cross reference these variables and attempt to clarify the role each played in the different outcomes. By “outcomes,” I mean both result of the

54 This entire paragraph can be found in Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East."
protest and levels of violence. Level of violence, therefore, will play a dual role in this paper as an explanatory variable and an outcome.

After establishing the overarching trends and macro-level results of the Arab Spring, this paper will then hone in on three case studies: Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. These cases were chosen because they illustrate cover various typologies in the macro-level analysis. Micro-level analysis will thus bring to light both the meaning of the data and help explain discrepancies within. Egypt and Tunisia are useful case studies because they are personalist regimes with autocratic officer politician political-military relationships that collapsed after intermediate levels of violence, which is the most common formula for collapse in the data set. It is imperative, therefore, to understand the common dynamics that accounted for the end result of relatively high violence and regime collapse. Bahrain will then be examined because it was the only monarchy to use high levels of violence, was the only regime to use Intermediate level of violence and did not defect, fracture, or collapse. Together, these case studies illuminate the largest questions that Chart 1 asks: what role did the civil-military relationship have in regime collapse or stability? What was did violence play? What conditions were necessary for a military to defect?

It is equally as important to explain why I chose to avoid certain cases as well. Syria, for example, based on the macro-data, seems like an interesting and important case study. Indeed, it would be and defies the norm within the data personalist regimes with autocratic officer-politician civil-military relationships with higher levels of violence should collapse. At the time of this writing, however, the conflict in Syria is very much
ongoing. The situation in Syria has devolved into civil war, and there is no way to tell how it will turn out. Simply put, at the time of this writing, I could write an analysis based on current circumstances in Syria that may be rendered totally irrelevant tomorrow. It is impossible, therefore, to definitively analyze the long-term impacts of civil-military relations in Syria. By our definition of “collapse” and “no collapse” we must treat Syria as a not collapsed regime, but it is too early to draw conclusions from the conflict. Libya, likewise, will not be examined because of the United States’ involvement in the conflict. It is now impossible to know if the Gadhafi regime would have been able to successfully repress the dissent without foreign intervention, and thus impossible to paint a clear picture of the civil-military, violence and collapse dynamic. While GCC troops entered Bahrain to help quell the protests, they did not have a significant effect on the outcome or drastically change the makeup of the military, as the Bahraini military was largely based on mercenaries before the protests began. The same cannot be said for the entrance of international force into Libya, as it very much affected the outcome of the conflict.

The Egyptian *coup-d'état* of 2013 that overthrew President Morsi is also not included in this paper. The main thrust of the analysis in this paper looks at the relationship between militaries and their long-term autocratic rulers. No such relationship existed between President Morsi and the Egyptian military, and therefore its inclusion would not add anything to the data or analysis other than to dilute the unique circumstances of the Arab Spring protests.

This paper will not examine the civil-military relationship of states that did not use violence. As was explained in the literature review, there is an expansive discussion
within Political Science about how Arab regimes have maintained power. Possibilities include cooptation, foreign aid, and tradition, among many others. This paper, however, is concerned with primarily with the military and violence. As such, countries that did not call on their militaries to play an active role in protest suppression and responded to the protests by means other than violence will not be analyzed other than via their inclusion in the data. There was no regime that used no or low violence and collapsed, so it is safe to assume for the purposes of this paper that these regimes dealt with the dissent in other ways that did not involve the civil-military dynamic. As such, they fall outside the purview of this paper.

The case studies will use news and international human rights reports to attempt to understand the actions of militaries and the development of violence in the various conflicts on a day-by-day basis. Internal military memos and other such historical material is not publicly available (at least yet), and given the time-constraints of an undergraduate thesis, it is impossible to wait for them to become available. With the amount written on the Arab Spring and the attention paid to each case, though, there is ample material from which to draw conclusions about the actions or inaction of militaries as well as the onset and escalation of violence. Such methods do present their own constraints, however. I do not speak Arabic or any of the more local dialects and therefore did not have access to more direct resources. Although the Arab Spring sparked a massive media interest, access was limited and coverage imperfect. This is especially the case in Tunisia, the first site of protests, which left Western media playing catch-up. Every attempt is made to piece together the fullest picture, but imperfection in the information is inevitable. Moreover, this qualitative analysis will be supplemented by
data from an ongoing project by Quinn Mecham and Tyler McArthur at Brigham Young University that is compiling data on daily protest repression and size for each Arab Spring country. As the project is not yet complete, certain variables are not yet available for some countries. Nonetheless, the data helps visualize the use violence across time.

They use a threshold coding system. For Protest size, the coding is: 1 is less than 1,000; 2 is between 1,000 and 10,000; 3 is between 10,000 and 100,000; 4 is between 100,000 and 1,000,000; and 5 is greater than 1,000,000. For deaths, 1 is less than 10 deaths per day, 2 is between 10 and 50, 3 is between 50 and 100, 4 is between 100 and a 1,000, and 5 is greater than 1,000.57 This data will allow the author to illustrate trends in violence over time visually and, when cross-analyzed with the day-by-day military actions, will show the dynamics of violence, civil-military relations, defection and regime collapse.

Although the macro-data only categorizes by deaths (due to the fact that they are the most readily available and reliable statistics), the case studies will attempt to piece together violent government actions of all kinds, even non-lethal. These can include beatings, physical intimidation, and displays of force, among others.58

Together, the qualitative and quantitative analyses will provide insights into both the overarching trends of military action in the Arab Spring (who sided with the regime or the protesters? what role did violence play in dictating that role?) and why did the military act as they did (why did they defect or remain loyal? Why did they use or refuse to use violence?).

**Chapter 3: Militaries in the Arab Spring**

Many of the analyses of the Arab Spring have focused on regime type for the various outcomes, especially noting how resilient Arab monarchies were to the Arab Spring.\(^{59}\) Certainly, as Graph #1 illustrates, regime was an important indicator of regime collapse or stability. On the X-Axis, regime types are divided by protest outcome: on the left are regimes that collapsed and on the right are regimes that survived the challenge.

**Graph #1: Protest Outcome and Regime Type**

What is most readily apparent in Graph #1 is that Personalist regimes are the only regimes to have collapsed. In this sense, the scholarly discussion to this point is correct: regime type has mattered. That dictatorial Personalist regimes collapse coincide with Wright’s findings that dictatorial regimes tend to fare less well when faced with serious challenges as they have a specific, easily identifiable target (the dictator).\(^{60}\) That Democracies and Military regimes did not collapse also supports her notion that without a figurehead target, protest movements are less likely to succeed. Importantly, though, only 4 out of 6 Personalist regimes collapsed in the Arab Spring protests. This would lead

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to the conclusion that regime type is not the key variable in protest outcome throughout the Arab Spring, as there was significant variation within the only variable that had any collapses. Moreover, Wright’s assertion that a figurehead target leads to higher success rates in popular protests is countered by this chart as monarchies, which provide a very definitive figurehead, saw 6 regimes not collapse and none collapse.

Perhaps what Graph #1 illustrates best is that survival remained the standard despite the numerous challenges to regimes in the Arab Spring; it is regime collapse that remains the outlier. The vast majority (77.777%) of regimes did not collapse. Only Personalist regimes fell, but only 66.66% of Personalist regimes collapsed. Put differently, a full one-third of Personalist regimes survived the protests. While the media attention may have portrayed the Arab Spring as a changing of the guard in the Middle East, Graph #1 indicates that the stability that is so prevalently noted throughout the literature remains the standard in the MENA region. This begs the question: what was it that moved Personalist regimes from the norm of stability to the exception that is collapse?

The theory that this paper is testing is that the civil-military relationship was the linchpin upon which stability rested in the Arab Spring. As such, Graph #2 demonstrates the relationship between civil-military relations and protest outcome, indicating that the military plays a critical role in the varying outcomes across the Arab Spring. On the X-axis, civil-military relations are broken down according to Kamrava’s typology, while the Y-axis scales the number of regimes that experienced each outcome. The blue bars
indicate regime collapse while the red bars indicate that the regime survived the challenge.

**Graph #2: Civil-Military Relations and Protest Outcome**

Graph #2 is quite similar to Graph #1: collapses are concentrated in Autocratic Officer Politician Regimes just as they were in Personalist dictatorships. There is significant overlap between the two typologies, as Personalist regimes in the MENA region are largely a product of the string of coups from the mid-1900s and therefore are rooted in their relationship with the military. A Dual military (Libya) also fell, showing that variation was more existent in the Arab Spring than a simple regime-type analysis would indicate. Dual militaries are structured to correct for competing factions with varying levels of loyalty to the regime. Given a mass protest, such an organizational structure would predictably fracture, putting the regime in an especially precarious position. Mercenaries, Independent, and Tribally Dependent civil-military relation regimes were entirely resistant to the forces of the Arab Spring.

From this analysis, it is difficult to decipher how the role of civil-military relations differs from that of regime type. Both have highly concentrated proportions of regime collapse within one or two types and a majority of classifications
indistinguishable from each other. The role of the civil-military relationship, therefore, cannot yet be confirmed as the linchpin upon which protest outcome rests.

The third variable this paper will test is violence, with the understanding that the violence should be reflective of the civil-military relationship. If a regime shares an especially strong relationship with its military, it could be assumed that the military would be more likely to use violence against protesters in an attempt to protect the regime. Graph #3 illustrates the effect that violence shares with collapse.

**Graph #3: Violence and Protest Outcome**

![Graph showing the relationship between violence and protest outcome.](image)

This graph shows the strongest correlation of any of the three variables thus far reviewed (chi-square test: .00939). Every regime that used lower levels of violence remained stable, whereas those that used Intermediate or High levels of violence had a high probability of collapsing (66%). The only “high” use of violence that has not yet collapsed is Syria, which taken out of the data because of the ongoing conflict there would result in a 80% collapse rate for countries using Intermediate or High levels of violence. Unsurprisingly, every country that used relatively low levels of violence survived the challenge.
Although this violence and collapse relationship is a very tight one, it also presents a causation problem. Does higher violence lead to state collapse? Or do states use higher levels of violence when they see their security threatened, and therefore they use any last ditch options in a futile effort to elongate their rule? Although this data on violence does point to a strong correlation between violence being linked to state collapse, it is impossible to tell in which direction this relationship runs and the dynamic the escalation in violence shares with state collapse. The violence is clearly a driving force in the outcome and we must come to a better understanding of why certain regimes use violence in such un-proportional ways while others do not.

Again, this paper posits that, as the governmental body that has the greatest coercive capacity, the military is the key accompanying variable in protest suppression. When we cross the civil-military relationship with violence, we can begin to see how the different militaries used violence and tease out how the civil-military relationship plays into the strong correlation that violence and collapse share, as displayed in Graph #4.

**Graph #4: Civil military relations and violence**
What is immediately striking is that it is the Autocratic Officer Politician military-political relationship that yields that highest level of violence, not a military that is ethnically based. Logically, the assumption would be that a challenge to an ethnically based civil-military relationship would yield the most aggressive reaction from the military, as their ethnically based position in society would be most fragile. However, the opposite appears true: tribally dependent monarchies used exclusively low levels of violence. That Independent militaries used exclusively low levels of violence is predictable. Independent militaries by definition represent the population and function with a level of impartiality.

Autocratic Officer-Politicians were by far the most likely to use higher levels of violence and every AOP regime used at least Low violence. Although one would expect tribal loyalties to yield the highest violence, the leader who is being challenged in AOP came out of the military, so the military would presumably consider him an ally and use excessive force in an effort to protect him. AOPs did not, however, tend to escalate to past the High threshold, settling instead with Intermediate levels of violence. There is, however, some deviation in the Autocratic-Officer Politician civil-military relationship, as two of the six AOPs that saw protesters challenge the regime responded with low levels of violence.

It is again Autocratic Officer Politician civil-military relationships that are the most stimulating. Given the previously established connections that violence and regime collapse share and the willingness of AOPs to use violence, we see two simultaneous trends evolving: first, that AOPs are the most susceptible to state collapse and second,
that they can still be effective in suppressing the protesters. In order to examine this, we can triple cross variables. In order to do so, Graph #5 crosses civil-military relationships and state collapse for only those regimes that used High and Intermediate levels of violence. We could do another for those that used No and Low levels of violence, but the previous analysis already tells us that there will be no regime collapse. Chart #2 demonstrates the relationship that civil-military relations and collapse share in lower levels of violence effectively, albeit not visually.

**Graph #5: Civil Military Relations and State Collapse in Intermediate-High Violence**

![Graph showing civil military relations and state collapse](image)

**Table #2: Civil Military Relations and State Collapse with No-Low Violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autocratic Officer-Politician</th>
<th>Dual</th>
<th>Mercenaries</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Tribally Dependent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The AOP relationship is again the civil-military relationship that immediately catches the eye. When coupled with relatively high levels of violence, AOP regimes can be seen as extremely susceptible to collapse. The divide between AOP’s that used higher violence and those that used lower violence is stark: whereas 100% using low levels of violence remained stable, 75% of those that used higher levels of violence collapsed. The
outlying AOP that did not collapse is, again, Syria, which is in a prolonged civil war. If Syria were not included, therefore, it would be a clear-cut relationship: AOP regimes that use relatively high levels of violence are unable to survive challenges. All AOPs other than Syria and Libya used Intermediate levels of violence, so the relationship can also be analyzed differently, seeing it as Syria shows the correct formula for regime survival in AOP regimes where violence has escalated: a large scale use of truly overwhelming force while avoiding international intervention.

Due to the small sample size in the data set with mercenary militaries, it is impossible to draw any legitimate conclusions from this breakdown. Likewise, the data for Dual militaries is limited, but the resistance of low-violence Dual militaries when compared to high-violence Dual military indicates that they are not well suited to respond to highly violent domestic situations, as their structure intentionally encourages varying levels of loyalty to the regime.

Graph #4 and Chart #2 indicate that the variable most predictive of regime collapse is violence. This finding would concur with Francisco, who found that violence is not an effective method of repression. Indeed, across regime types, only those that used high levels of violence collapsed, whereas there were different civil-military relationships that saw collapse. Given these takeaways, one might conclude that the civil-military relationship was not actually the linchpin of regime stability, but when treated for high levels of violence, the importance of the civil military relationship becomes clear. The AOP relationship is the most susceptible to collapse in the face of the face of violence.
Dual militaries also appear to struggle while Mercenaries appear resilient to level of violence.

The next intellectual step, then, would be to ask what happens to the militaries in the face of higher levels of violence? If violence is used, presumably the military is attempting to protect the regime. Why, then, would the higher levels of violence lead to regime collapse? Another variable needs to be added into the equation. Table #1 attempts to unpack this puzzle through Defection for Intermediate and High levels of violence, bridging the divide between levels of violence, civil military relations and regime collapse.

**Table #3: Defection and Regime Collapse**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defect</th>
<th>Loyal</th>
<th>Fracture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>Egypt, Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya, Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Collapse</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first and most important finding from Table #1 is that all regimes that collapsed either saw their militaries Defect or Fracture. Whereas high levels of violence had a very strong relationship collapse, Defection is almost causational. The only regime that saw the military Defect or Fracture and did not collapse was Syria, which, like with levels of violence, must be understood in the context of the ongoing civil war.

The clear outlier in this table is Bahrain, whose military remained loyal to the regime throughout the protests. It is also an outlier in that it is the only predominantly mercenary army and monarchy in the subset of countries that experienced higher levels
of violence. That a mercenary army would remain loyal is logical, as they are the paid to come in and do the dirty work and would not be deterred by killing their countrymen or domestic political calculus.

Table #2 also begs the question of what is the difference, practically speaking, between Fracturing and Defecting on regime collapse. While Defection seemed to guarantee collapse (which makes sense logically as the government would not have a large enough coercive apparatus to counter a defection by the regular military), that Fracturing produces such one sided outcomes is more surprising. Moreover, with the ongoing nature of Syria’s conflict, the balance might continue to shift towards collapse if tides turn against the Assad regime.

If the consequence of defection is collapse and there is already an established, highly correlated relationship between regime collapse and violence, then the next question would be how defection and violence interact. Graph #6 examines the relationship these two variables share.

Graph #6: Defection and Violence
Graph #6 directs us to two important takeaways: first, that high levels of violence appear only when fracturing occurs and second, that at an Intermediate level of violence, militaries tend to become so strained that the organization’s structure either turns entirely away from the regime or crumbles from within. The difference between the Defection and Fracturing, therefore, can be seen in escalation, not outcome: simply, more deaths result from Fracturing than from Defection.

Intermediate levels of violence produced two defections (Tunisia and Egypt), one fracture (Yemen), and loyalty in Bahrain. Interestingly, if a military was going to defect, it did so before the violence escalated to High. There were no defecting militaries once the High threshold of violence had been crossed; only those that fractured experienced high levels of violence.

The concentration of high levels of violence entirely in Fracturing points to another causation problem. Does the military fracture, leading to high levels of violence, or does the violence lead the military to fracture, which perpetuates an ongoing cycle of escalating violence? If the Intermediate levels of violence indicate anything, it is that it is a combination of the two: militaries fracture as a result of Intermediate levels of violence and the fracturing escalates the violence. Such a conclusion makes sense given that the state coercive apparatus goes from being the only highly armed actor to having a foil that is either as armed and trained or only slightly less so. The Defection-Intermediate relationship points to the conclusion that fracturing is what leads to higher levels of violence, as defection occurs before the violence reaches the High threshold. Presumably fracturing and defection would occur at similar points in the conflict.
The decision to defect and the fracturing point back to the variable that this paper is most interested in, the civil-military relationship. In what way did the civil-military relationship relate to defections, fracturing, and loyalty? Graph #7 illustrates this relationship.

**Graph #7: Civil-Military Relations and Defection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defect</th>
<th>Loyal</th>
<th>Fracture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Every Autocratic Officer Politician state either Defected or Fractured at higher levels of violence, helping solve the problem outlined in the analysis of Graph #5: why, if we accept the notion that the military is essential to the survival of the regime and there is a relatively high level of violence, would we see regimes collapse? Wouldn’t the relatively high levels of violence indicate the support of the military and consequently survival of the regime? What Graph #6 tells us is that the civil-military relationship in AOP relationships cannot withstand escalating levels of violence, as the military either will Defect wholesale or Fracture. The close kinship that AOP’s share with their leader, therefore, can be viewed as supportive until violence enters into the equation, at which point they begin to crumble.
The AOP divide between Defection and Fracture is curious, leaving one to question what leads to the different outcome in the same civil-military relationship dynamic. Although the data does not give us any sense of why the divergence occurs, we can deduce that the more nuanced structures of the militaries were likely to create different reactions within the military. If a regime coup-proofed by creating parallel divisions, for example, and gave preference to one, a fracture would be likely.\textsuperscript{61} If a regime coup-proofed through weakening the political influence and military capabilities of the military, on the other hand, a defection would be more likely to occur. This paper will attempt to understand the military calculus to defect in the Case Studies section, as there is no way to come to a proper understanding through the typologies in Table #1.

Unsurprisingly, Dual militaries exclusively fractured. Their very structure is designed to create different levels of loyalty to the regime, and when called on to use violent action to repress a domestic protest movement, it is predictable that some would defect to the protesters. Likewise, the loyalty of Mercenaries in the case of Bahrain is precisely the expected result. By removing the relationship between military and the population entirely, Mercenaries are less likely to defect than a more domestically recruited military would be. Moreover, their career choice as a mercenary points to the fact that they sign up to be a soldier, not to protect the nation, state, population, or any other abstraction that might drive a domestic military.

With all of the variables in Table #1 examined and their interaction shown, what can we take away about the importance of the civil-military relationship in the repression

of the Arab Spring protests and regime stability? The takeaways from the quantitative analysis can be divided into general categories: the role of violence, defection, and civil-military relations.

First, it is clear that violence has a very important effect on regime stability throughout the Arab Spring, as only the regimes that saw violence at higher levels collapsed. Whether this is a result of seriousness of the challenge or difference in tactics between regimes, violence was clearly a catalyst for regime change in the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, Hypothesis #2, which theorized that high levels of violence would lead to regime collapse, is partially confirmed, but there is enough variation within the data so that it is not fully confirmed. The military only became a relevant variable when levels of violence passed the Low threshold. Defections and collapses were non-existent at levels below Intermediate, indicating that the military only became an actor as violence escalated. Hypothesis #3, which asserted that militaries would fracture or defect under the stress of high levels of violence, appears to be true.

Second, the effect of civil-military relations on regime stability in the Arab Spring becomes important when violence escalates to Intermediate and High levels. When crossed only with regime collapse, it is clear that AOP and Dual regimes are the most likely to collapse, but there were plenty of regimes that remained stable under the AOP typology. When honing in on the regimes that used Intermediate or High levels of violence, however, the effect of civil-military relations becomes much clearer: AOPs are extremely susceptible to defection at high rates of violence and Dual militaries are likely to fracture. Mercenaries are likely to stand by their employers. Hypothesis #1, which
claimed that the strength of the civil-military relationship dictated the outcome of the protest movement, is partially confirmed.

Third, the highest levels of violence were exclusively perpetuated by Dual militaries that fractured. The two civil-wars (Libya and Syria) were both a result of this scenario, although their unique circumstances (international intervention in Libya, ongoing conflict in Syria) make it impossible to draw many definitive conclusions about the highest levels of violence. Yemen did not escalate to High violence, indicating that there is the possibility not to devolve into civil-war as a Dual military, but it stands in opposition of the two much deadlier cases.

Fourth, the violence-defection relationship helps correct for the variance in civil-military relations and collapse. As was pointed out when analyzing Graph #1, survival was the norm in the Arab Spring protests across virtually all regime types. Only those regimes that experienced higher levels of violence were susceptible to defection. While this may indicate that the civil-military relationship is unimportant in regime types such as Monarchies and Military governments, this analysis indicates that they would be put under increased stress at higher levels of violence should the regime be forced to repress another mass protest. Again, Hypothesis #3 is confirmed.

This chapter has found that civil-military relationship did dictate the outcome of the protests at high levels of violence. As violence reached higher levels, defection was prevalent amongst AOP and Dual military regimes, leading to collapses. Where defection or fracturing occurred, regimes tended to collapse, the only outlier being Syria. It also found that there was not a significant difference between defections and fracturing on the
outcome, other than an escalation in violence where fracturing occurred. It also found that the civil-military relationship had no effect on the outcome of protests in countries in which violence was kept to low levels.

The qualitative analysis could not test Hypothesis #4, which grapples with the effects of coup proofing on military action, as it was not captured in any of the variables. As such, it will have to be tested quantitatively in Chapter #4. Moreover, while we know that higher levels of violence stressed the civil-military relationship to the point of defection or violence, we do not know what about the civil-military collapsed. What made the AOPs so susceptible? This question must also be left for the case studies.

This paper will now turn to three case studies to examine the dynamics uncovered in this quantitative chapter. Each case study will look at the nuances of the specific civil-military relationship and then examine government violence on daily basis. Special attention will be paid to the role that the military plays in the violence and the buildup to defection or successful repression.
Chapter #4: Case Studies

Egypt: Reluctant Defectors

Throughout Egypt’s modern history, stability has been the norm. It is one of the few Arab states to have transferred power peacefully: Gamal Abdel Nasser handed the reigns to Anwar Sadat in 1970 and, although Sadat was assassinated, his vice president, Hosni Mubarak, took over in a relatively smooth transition in 1981 given the circumstances. Although coup plots and assassinations threatened all three leaders, they were put down with relative ease. Until the Arab Spring protests, Mubarak’s stranglehold on power was secure. This was, at least in part, because of the military’s position within Egyptian society under all three modern-era regimes.

All three of modern era Egyptian presidents were former military officers. More importantly though, including at outbreak of the Arab Spring protests, “the senior officers are the direct descendants of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers who built the Egyptian regime,” and thus connected via ideological lineage to the rulers. The military is also heavily invested in the Egyptian economy: analyst estimate that the military controls somewhere between 15% and 40% of the Egyptian economy, a hefty sum on the low end and an outstanding sum on the high end. Mubarak relied heavily on security forces and the military to sustain his authoritarian rule, with a state of emergency in place since the Sadat’s assassination. The military has been called on repeatedly to put down

63 Ibid.
64 Cook, Steven. Five Things You Need to Know about the Egyptian Armed Forces. From the Potomac to the Euphrates. Blog. Council on Foreign Relations.
movements, especially those of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak made sure to keep the military funded as a method of buying its loyalty: Egypt is one of the top recipients of US military aid, has access to advance weapon systems and training, and integrated it into an economic power.

It has therefore always been considered in the interest of the military to maintain the status quo. The military was heavily invested in the economy and was well treated by the regime, but the protests across Egypt in January and February of 2011 saw the military abandon the regime and side with the protesters. As the data showed, Egypt saw intermediate levels of violence, indicating that there was some organized repression of the protests. As such, the point at which Egyptian military defected becomes important. Did they defect in response to the violence or did they defect prior to the violence? Did they defect when the violence proved ineffective? The following section will go day-by-day looking at the use violence via news reports, focusing on who perpetuated the violence, when, and what role the military played in the greater struggle over Egypt’s future from the outset of the protests until Mubarak’s collapse.

**January 25th**

The first real day of protest came on January 25th, in which thousands of Egyptians took to the Tahrir Square in a “day of rage.” There was some violence, but the military was uninvolved. Instead, the police took the lead in attempting to stifle the

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67 *Ibid.*, 272
challenge by firing rubber bullets, using teargas and wielding batons.\textsuperscript{68} Ironically, it was a national holiday to commemorate the police forces.\textsuperscript{69} Other protests also occurred in Alexandria, Suez, Mansura, and Beni Suef, with police also taking the lead in containing those movements.\textsuperscript{70}

**January 26th & January 27th**

The next two days of protests saw much of the same in terms of protest repression: police were again the main source of violence and the main vehicle of the government’s response. Plainclothes police and riot teams were dispatched to break up the protests, arresting and beating many protesters.\textsuperscript{71,72} Large-scale protests occurred in both Suez and Cairo.

**January 28th**

January 28\textsuperscript{th} was the first real escalation in the situation. After protesters ignored a curfew imposed by Mubarak on the 27\textsuperscript{th}, the regime deployed the nation’s military for the first time since the protests began. Reuters reported more than 20 military vehicles, including tanks, moving into Tahrir Square around midnight and troops being deployed


\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{71} el Madany, Sherine and Yasmine Saleh. "Egypt on Edge as Demonstrations Turn Violent." \textit{Reuters}, 1/26/2011.

\textsuperscript{72} Fahim, Kareem and Liam Stack. "Protests in Egypt Defy Ban as Government Cracks Down."
into urban areas across the country to attempt to control the escalating protests. Forces were also deployed in other cities experiencing turmoil, such as Suez.

Violence continued throughout the day, but still between police and protesters, not the military. Instead, the military was greeted with relative calm and was welcomed to the protest areas. The military was present, but did “not interfere in the confrontations between police and protesters.”

The most serious violence of the day—and indeed, of the week so far—was in Suez. Protesters exchanged fire with policemen with guns they stole from a police station that was later burnt down. Similar confrontations continued with escalating severity in Assuit and Cairo. As police and protesters battled, the military interjected itself as a temporary buffer between the two parties.

January 29th

President Mubarak gave a speech a little after midnight dismissing his cabinet and reaffirming that he would not run for reelection but refusing to step down from the presidency, leading protests to continue unabated. The army stated that “anyone who breaks curfew will be in danger,” but they still refused to step in to break up clashes.

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76 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
between protesters and police forces. The crowd reached tens of thousands in Cairo, the largest so far in the protests. BBC described the atmosphere between the military and the demonstrators as “friendly,” while the Washington Post explained that the military “smiled and shook hands with protesters and invited them up onto their tanks.”

Meanwhile, the violence continued to escalate. At least 45 people died between the 28th and 29th according to the Health Ministry and Dr. Sayyed at the Sayyed Galal Hospital in Cairo reported more than 20 bullet wounds, often in the head. The New York Times characterized the night as “an all-out war against hundreds of thousands of protesters who flooded the street” by police officers. Later in the day, the police withdrew from the cities, leaving protesters with the military.

The military, despite being dispatched for a full 24 hours and surrounded by violent clashes, remained inactive.

**January 30th**

January 30th was a relatively quiet day in terms of actual protests, but the busiest in terms of political maneuvering, especially with the military. President Mubarak met with the high command of the military: Defense Minister Hohamed Hussein tantawi, Chief of Staff Sami a-Anan and other senior commanders attended the meeting that was, of course, noted widely by both Egyptian state media and independent media covering

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80 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
the developing situation. This cooperation was in stark contrast to the situation that had been unfolding on the streets over the past few days—whereas the military brass was sitting at the table with Mubarak, the military regulars were standing with the protesters.

The day remained relatively calm throughout, but the military did show its teeth at certain points. The military presence was increased in Cairo and F-16 fighter jets flew over the protests at low altitudes, although they still made no direct attempt to disperse the protest.

January 31st

January 31st saw the military make its most public and pointed statement to date on its role in the ongoing political tension in the country. A uniformed military spokesman, speaking on state television said that “the armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people,” essentially reaffirming the position that the actions of the military thus far had indicated.87 The security police were redeployed, though, ahead of the “million person marches” called for in Cairo and Alexandria for the next day.88

February 1st

The “million person march” lived up to its billing, as huge crowds poured into Cairo, Alexandria and other cities to continue their calls for the end of the Mubarak

88 Ibid.
regime. The protests remained peaceful throughout the day.\textsuperscript{89} When President Mubarak gave a speech explaining that he would step down from power in September, however, the festive atmosphere soured, leading to a tumultuous next day.

\textbf{February 2\textsuperscript{nd}}

On the heels of Mubarak’s defiant speech and with increased anger among the protesters, pro-Mubarak forces entered Tahrir Square and the most violence since the start of the protests in Egypt ensued. The crowds supporting the regime unloaded off buses in what appeared to be a well-coordinated attack at exactly 2:15pm.\textsuperscript{90} They used “clubs, rock, knives and firebombers in a concerted assault on thousands of antigovernment protesters in Tahrir.”\textsuperscript{91} Anti-Mubarak protesters struck back using similar tactics after the initial onslaught by Mubarak supporters.\textsuperscript{92}

This left the military in the middle of an escalating conflict. They remained stationed in Tahrir, but “neither stopped the violence nor attacked the protesters.”\textsuperscript{93} Reports of the military firing into the air were common and moving tanks in an attempt to shield the two forces from each other, but that was the extent of the reported attempts to break up the fighting.\textsuperscript{94} It was ineffective and casualties were seen on both sides.\textsuperscript{95} The military’s maintained a posture of inaction, refusing to either protect the protesters or repress them. The inaction to this point is telling in that while they were willing to say

\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Live Blog Feb 2- Egypt Protests.} Doha: Al-Jazeera.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Ibid.}
they would not fire on the protesters, they also would not take any proactive measures to protect them from police violence.

**February 3\(^{rd}\) - 7\(^{th}\)**

Protests continued on the third and the fourth, although violence was not nearly as pronounced as it was on the 2\(^{nd}\). There was gunfire aimed at anti-government demonstrators that left at least five dead, although it was unclear who fired the shots.\(^{96}\) The 4\(^{th}\) was termed “Day of Departure,” and the protest was relatively peaceful.\(^{97}\)

February 5\(^{th}\) was also relatively calm on the protest front, but the military made its first real headlines as they prepared to clear the Tahrir Square for traffic.\(^{98}\) It was not a violent episode, but spoke to their new role as *de facto* police, including traffic police. There were still no incidents of military violence against the population.

As the army continued to prepare to reopen the country’s economy, reports indicated that they fired shots into the air again and moved armored vehicles in an attempt to clear protesters from Tahrir Square.\(^{99}^{100}\) The 7th also remained status quo, with protesters refusing to leave the square but no reported violence.

**February 8\(^{th}\)**

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\(^{97}\) *Ibid*.


\(^{100}\) Williams, Alison. "Egypt Opposition Says Talks to End Crisis Not enough." *Reuters*, 2/6/2011
February 8\textsuperscript{th} saw an escalation in protest activity, with a large sit in at Parliament and a rejuvenated crowd after a powerful interview with Google executive and prisoner Wael Ghonim aired.\textsuperscript{101} Cairo and Alexandria both saw their largest protests to date without any significant violence reported.\textsuperscript{102}

**February 9\textsuperscript{th}**

The 16\textsuperscript{th} and penultimate day of protests saw a spike in violence, again with police forces. In Al-Wadi al-Jadid, reports of violent clashes throughout the day with protesters were confirmed across news outlets, in which the police fired upon and killed demonstrators and set a gas station on fire.\textsuperscript{103} The army fired shots into the air in Tahrir again attempting to disperse protesters, but otherwise remained on the periphery as the crowds grew with the influx of labor unions.\textsuperscript{104}

**February 10\textsuperscript{th}**

With rumors of Hosni Mubarak’s impending resignation, the mood and actions throughout the day were generally jubilant.\textsuperscript{105} No violence was reported, and military was told the protesters “everything you want will be realized.”\textsuperscript{106} Uncertainty and rumors ruled the afternoon and early night.

When President Mubarak went on state television and said—in a speech that was anticipated to be his resignation speech—that he intended to remain in power, Tahrir

\textsuperscript{101} Mackey, Robert. *Updates on Day 17 of Egypt Protests*. The Lede. New York Times.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Live Blog Feb 9- Egypt Protests. Doha: Al-Jazeera.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
Square erupted with anger. They did not, however, erupt in violence, and the military remained as an observer and refrained from using force.107

February 11th and subsequent days

On the 18th day of protests, Mubarak was overthrown in what has since been recognized as a “bloodless coup,” only a few hours after his surprising and defiant speech the night before. Power was transferred to the military to guide the country towards democracy—what we now know as a failed experiment after another coup—but the overall celebrations remained peaceful and joyous.108

As the country moved past Mubarak’s resignation, the military was able to clear the protests areas and return the country to some semblance of normalcy without having to exert force, thus bringing an end to their role as protest policers in this wave of protests.

Analysis

According to Amnesty International, “at least 840 people were killed and 6,000 were injured mostly by police and other security forces during the 25 January Revolution that forced President Hosni Mubarak to leave office.”109 As an AOP regime with a strong interest in the status quo, the military’s loyalty to the Mubarak regime would seem a given: losing Mubarak would mean losing a close ally who channeled money, arms, and training throughout the ranks. When the Tunisian military defected and sent Ben Ali

107 Mackey, Robert. *Updates on Day 17 of Egypt Protests.*
fleeing, Steven Cook said, “Had Ben Ali followed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who has always taken great care to make sure that the Egyptian armed forces were well-resourced, General Ammar and his fellow officer may have thought twice about tossing their sugar daddy overboard.” The military did, however, “toss their sugar daddy overboard.” What explains the discrepancy in the seemingly strong civil-military relationship and the weak response to the protests?

The day-by-day analysis of the protests shows that the military was not the arbiter of violence throughout the 18 days of protests; the police were. An independent fact-finding study commissioned by former President Morsi confirmed that the police were responsible for “nearly all the killings and used snipers on rooftops overlooking Tahrir Square.” The seeming strength of the civil-military relationship makes this surprising, as one would expect the military to be willing to do what it takes to protect their benefactor. As Cook explains, though, “there is a split in the armed forces between the senior command on the one hand and junior officers and recruits on the other who would refuse to fire on protesters…the senior people never know whether those people below them will follow orders.”

Demographic shifts, it appears, played a role in the military calculus to not shoot on the protesters, as the relatively young base of troops who would need to execute the violence did not feel strongly enough about the Mubarak regime to act on orders. What demographic shifts do not explain is how the economic investment in

112 Cook, Steven. Five Things You Need to Know about the Egyptian Armed Forces. From the Potomac to the Euphrates. Council on Foreign Relations.
the regime, the foundation of the civil-military relationship and main method of coup-proofing, affected the military’s decision making.

Graph #8 displays trends in daily protest size and deaths from the start of the protests to the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power.

**Graph #8: Egypt Daily Protest Size and Deaths**

![Graph #8: Egypt Daily Protest Size and Deaths](image)

What is immediately clear about this graph is that there was a prolonged period of large protest size and high death rates before the regime collapsed. Even after the military declared that it would not harm the protesters, violence escalated in two separate instances. The qualitative analysis in Chapter #4 indicated that as violence spiked, militaries were more likely to defect and regimes collapse. The point of defection in the Egyptian case did come during a spike in violence on the 31st and 1st, but the reluctance of the military did not immediately cause the regime to collapse: another 11 days passed before Mubarak was forced from power. Moreover, the size of the protests tended to stay within the 4-5 range for the 11-day in between period of the military’s declaration and the
fall of Mubarak. The week and a half of violence after the military’s declaration would not harm the protesters thus begs the question of what effect the military defection really had. In order to tease this out, we must cross reference the day-to-day events with the trends displayed in Graph #8.

The military entered into the conflict on January 28th on the heels of a spike in violence on the 27th. Graph #8 shows that the entrance of the military stabilized the violence until the 31st, and their public statements were strongly in support of the regime throughout this period. On the 29th, for example, the army stated that “anyone who breaks curfew will be in danger.”113 The military, although not directly perpetrating violence against the protesters, aligned themselves as ambassadors of the regime when first deployed. The 30th reinforced this notion, as the military brass met with Mubarak in a cordial meeting and F-16 fighter jets flew over the protests in a show of force meant to intimidate the protesters into submission. Although the announcement that the military would not use force against protesters may seem like a defection, the actions of the military continued with the posture since their deployment on the 28th: despite not using force, the military continued to stand by Mubarak and attempted to end the protests with their “sugar daddy” safely in office. Violence spiked on the 2nd, but the military let the plainclothes Mubarak supports enter Tahrir Square and did nothing to actively protect the protesters. They continued to fire shots in the air as late as February 9th as an intimidation and dispersion technique. The Egyptian defection, clearly, was a reluctant one and much less responsive to violence than the data might indicate.

It is through this reluctance that we can best understand the role of the civil-military relationship’s importance in dictating the outcome of the protest movement. Mubarak’s chief method of coup proofing in Egypt was through economic benefits. With such a high level of investment in the national economy, the military could be predicted to stand by the regime that so enabled them. And for a majority of the protests, they did. The main role of the military was to protect infrastructure and economic assets, not to protect the revolution. Given the military’s investment in the economy, such a role aligns with their institutional interests. When the military’s economic interests became threatened after attempting to reopen the country for business on February 6th and 7th only to see protests shut down the economy again on the 8th did the military really begin to turn away from Mubarak as a cohesive institution. When Mubarak refused to step down from power on the 10th and the protesters responded with increased determination and anger on the 11th, the military saw a prolonged period of economic shut down if it did not act. It was at this point that the military defected from the regime wholesale, enacting a bloodless coup.

While perhaps the most popular image of the Arab Spring of the military embracing crying protesters in an apparent triumph of humanity, the reality is less clean. The police and security forces used relatively high levels of violence and the military remained somewhat loyal to the regime despite not committing a massacre until their economic interests were threatened. It in a ironic twist, therefore, it was choice of Mubarak’s coup-proofing mechanism that ultimately undid his rule, as it was the catalyst for the military’s defection and his subsequent deposition. The economic interests that caused the military to stand by their sugar daddy caused them to dispatch with him.
Tunisia: Eager Defectors

Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali came to power in Tunisia in 1987 via a bloodless coup after a career as an Army officer and head of intelligence.\textsuperscript{114} He gained a reputation for a willingness to repress dissent as Head of Intelligence and effectively rooted out the Islamic Tendency Movement in 1986.\textsuperscript{115} This reputation followed him to the presidency, which he held without much of a challenge until the December 2010 protests that would prove to be his undoing.

The Tunisian military was kept small, isolated and ineffective throughout Ali’s tenure. Whereas force sizes in the MENA region averaged 18.88\% of the male population between the ages of 18-32, Tunisia’s military employed a meager 4\%.\textsuperscript{116} Likewise, the defense budget was far below other North African countries at 1.2\% of GDP, compared to 3.8\% in Algeria, 2.2\% in Egypt, 3.3\% in Morocco and 2.8\% in Libya.\textsuperscript{117} As Parsons and Taylor point out, “the Tunisian National Guard, the cornerstone of the internal security forces, was allocated 50\% more funds in 2010 than the Tunisian army, navy, and air force combined.”\textsuperscript{118} Foreign Policy analyst Ellen Knickmeyer adds that the Tunisian army is of an anomaly in the region for more than its’ size: its level of professionalism and its separation from the autocratic regime are unlike any other MENA regime; “the military often resists foreign aid, scoffing at such patronizing treatment;” and “Ben Ali


\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes. 42.

\textsuperscript{117} Parsons, William and William Taylor. "Arbiters of Social Unrest: Military Responses to the Arab Spring." United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. 12.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
deliberately dispatched conscript-filled military ranks to the perimeter of the country to do public-works projects, disaster relief, and other good deeds—and to stay out of trouble.”\(^{119}\) The military’s equipment, largely imported from France and the United States, was outdated or obsolete.\(^{120}\) Whereas the civil-military relationship in Egypt was founded on the coup proofing mechanism of economic incentives to stand with the regime, the Tunisian civil-military relationship is founded the converse coup proofing mechanism: political and economic marginalization and keeping the military ill-equipped. There is no reason to believe that the Tunisian military had any investment in the status quo.

Despite this seemingly weak civil-military relationship, an intermediate level of violence was still used in Tunisia against protesters. What role did the military play in this? A day-by-day breakdown of the events will allow us to gain a better understanding of the military’s role in the Ben Ali’s collapse.\(^{121}\)

**December 17\(^{th}\)-24\(^{th}\)**

The protests famously began when Mohammed Bousazizi, a 26 year old Tunisia, doused himself in paint thinner and lit himself on fire in response to the police confiscating his fruit cart and beating him. The demonstrations began in earnest,

\(^{119}\) Knickmeyer, Ellen. "Just Whose Side are Arab Armies on, Anyway?" *Foreign Policy*, 1/30/2011.


\(^{121}\) Author’s note: The diversity of sources at the beginning of the Tunisian protest is lacking because Western media such as the New York Times and Reuters did not provide very strong day-to-day coverage of the Tunisian revolution until mid-January. As this was the first “domino” in the Arab Spring protests, it took time before Western media caught on to importance of the unfolding protests. Al-Jazeera was essentially the only credible English-language news source providing in-depth coverage from the start, so the author was forced to rely especially heavily on their reports in the first weeks of the protests.
spreading throughout Tunisia within days. Violence was not reported in this initial stage of protests.

**December 24th and 25th**

The first reports of state violence against the protests emerged on December 24th. A protester was shot and killed during protests in the Sidi Bouzid region.\(^{122}\) The police fired shots in the air in an attempt to disperse protesters throughout Tunisia.\(^{123}\) Two others were reported injured.\(^{124}\)

The violence continued on the 25th, with another man shot dead in Bouziane by police and several others injured.\(^{125}\) Again, the police were responsible for the death.

**December 27th through January 7nd**

Although no deaths were reported on the 27th, the police used batons and tensions continued to rise as protests continued unabated.\(^{126}\) Most importantly, the protests spread to the capital, Tunis. Similar clashes and reports of police brutality continued on the throughout the week, but there was little to no escalation in the violence.\(^{127}\)

Protests continued throughout the next two weeks, but the only significant violent event occurred on January 3rd. A student demonstration, mostly by students, in Thala saw the police respond by firing tear gas, including one canister that fell into a mosque. No

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\(^{123}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{124}\) *Ibid.*


\(^{127}\) *Ibid.*
deaths were reported. Strikes, especially by lawyers, continued throughout the week, although no violence was reported at those demonstrations. The military still had not entered the conversation and the police continued to be the government’s response to the protests.

January 8th – 13th

January 8th marked the beginning of a serious escalation in both violence and protests. Demonstrations spread to multiple cities throughout the country, including Tala, Kasserine, and Rgeb. Six people were reported shot and killed by security forces in Tala, along with three in the Kasserine. These incidents were the first reported use of live ammunition pointed directly at the protesters.

The violence continued to escalate throughout the weekend, although reports were sketchy, making a true day-by-day analysis impossible. By the 10th, though fourteen civilians were killed throughout the weekend and military vehicles were reported as rolling into Thala on the 10th.

English language reporting was still scrambling to piece together what was occurring on the ground between the 11th and the 12th, but it is clear that the crackdown continued with disproportionate force through both days. Police were reported to have continued to fire live ammunition in the air to disperse the crowd in Tunis, while four

130 Ibid.
additional protesters were reported shot and killed in Kasserine, the site of the most violence from earlier in the week.\textsuperscript{133, 134}

Witnesses told the New York Times that the army had used rooftop snipers to fire on the crowd throughout the four-day crackdown that was quickly inflating the death toll.\textsuperscript{135} More credible analysis done by Al-Jazeera after the fact (in February 2011), however, found that while snipers were used on protesters, they were not military personnel.\textsuperscript{136} Originally, the police were used to attempt to quell the demonstrations, but when that failed the infamous BOP (Brigades de l’Ordre Public) were brought in, proceeding to use teargas, rubber bullets and hand-hand-hand combat against protesters.\textsuperscript{137} With the protesters still not budging, a special militia of national police force and presidential guard who had been discharged for serious infractions was brought in, and they were the ones who carried out the sniper attacks.\textsuperscript{138} The Al-Jazeera article goes on to explain “These agents were given comfortable front positions as civil servants in various government ministries. To guarantee their loyalty, they received a second salary and other perks.”\textsuperscript{139} Their unique status within the Tunisian coercive apparatus was reinforced by the fact that they were not carrying weapons from the Austrian arms manufacturer Stery Mannlicher as the rest of the armed forces do.\textsuperscript{140}

No incidents were reported on the 13\textsuperscript{th}.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{133} “Tunisia Protests: Fresh Clashes in Tunis.” Bbc, 1/12/2011.
\textsuperscript{135} Kirkpatrick, David. “Protests Spread to Tunisia’s Capital, and a Curfew is Decreed.” 1/12/2011.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
January 14th

Ben Ali gave a speech the night of the 13th promising not to stand for reelection in 2014, declaring emergency rule and directed police and security forces not to use violence on Tunisians, but protests continued unabated the next morning demanding his immediate resignation. Protesters and police quarreled in Tunis’ city center for the time, although tear gas was the only method of protest repression reported. The military was as active as it had been throughout the protests, taking control of the airspace and the airports. Still, no violence was needed to do so, and with Ali’s departure that night, the military went through the protests with no violence.

Analysis

Amnesty International concluded that some 230 protesters died in the upheaval throughout the country, along with over 700 injured. Tunisia’s military is the most celebrated in the Arab Spring. Army Chief of Staff Gen Rachid Ammar proclaimed the Tunisian military as “guarantors of the revolution” and, as the first country to experience Arab Spring protests, they were the first military to refuse to use force against the protesters. Nonetheless, intermediate levels of violence were still used, and as the aforementioned Al-Jazeera study points out, the relatively high levels of violence were because of a militia. How, then, should we understand Tunisia in the context of civil-military relations and violence in defense of the regime?

142 Ibid.
Graphs #9 and #10 provide a visual representation of the use of violence over time.

**Graph #9: Tunisia Daily Protest Size and Deaths (bar)**

The Tunisian military stepped in as the protests were escalating, consistent with the findings in Chapter 3. They rejected directives to “make the protests end, with live
rounds if needed." Instead, the escalation of violence depicted in Graphs #9 and #10 show that the police and militia greatly escalated the conflict and led to the military defection. Unlike in Egypt, the military made no attempt to quell the protests. Perhaps the best way to compare the two militaries’ repression efforts is to compare the timeline of the escalation of violence until the respective leaders’ deposition: in Egypt, a full 11 days of violence passed, whereas in Tunisia, violence began rising on the 9th, but Ben Ali fled on the 14th—only 5 days. This should come as no surprise given the status of the military in Tunisian society under Ben Ali: they were marginalized, kept small, and essentially irrelevant. They had no incentive to maintain the status quo by opening fire on civilians—indeed, as the aftermath of the revolution would indicate, the military benefited much more by defecting, as they gained national respect in the aftermath of the revolution that they did not previously have under the Ben Ali regime.

Conversely, the militia was intensely invested in the regime’s survival. Although they are domestic, the militia operated as a mercenary force: they were hired to be accountable only to the person who was paying them, not to the domestic constituency. Their unique position in Tunisian society made it so that they were invested in the status quo, if only for a paycheck. The members of the militia had histories that would not be protected under a different regime. Nonetheless, the militia was not sufficiently large enough to deal with the protests throughout the country or effectively suppress the growing protests in Tunis that eventually pushed Ben Ali from power; indeed, the protests grew even faster across space and time in the wake of the Kasserine shootings on

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145 Knickmeyer, Ellen. "Just Whose Side are Arab Armies on, Anyway?" Foreign Policy, 1/30/2011.
the 12th. Without the support of the regular military, there was a lack of overwhelming force to truly suppress the demands of the protesters.

What, then, does this tell us about the effect of civil-military relations on the Tunisian protest movement? First, it is clear that the military acted in its institutional interests as the violence escalated by defecting from the Ali regime. With Ali’s grip on power weakening as violent repression attempts backfired, the military seized the opportunity to push a leader that did them no favors aside and craft their own legacy in a post-Ali Tunisia. As a coup proofing mechanism, therefore, marginalization seems to be ineffective and counterproductive for an autocratic leader in the face of domestic protests. Second, while specialized forces such as the Presidential Guard or a militia for-hire will stay loyal to the regime, they are not sufficient to the suppression of a mass, nation-wide protest movement. Indeed, in Tunisia they actually had the opposite effect: rather than deter the protesters from continuing their efforts, protest size rose when violence was used. Finally, despite being marginalized and ill-equipped, the military was still the linchpin upon which the protest movement hinged. All other components of the coercive apparatus remained loyal to Ben Ali, but their coercive capacity was still not sufficient to disperse the protesters. It is impossible to know if the repression would have been successful if the military remained loyal to the regime, but it is clear that the conflict was trending against the Ben Ali regime even before the military made the decision to defect.
**Bahrain: Emphatic Loyalty**

Bahrain is a tiny majority Shiite island off the coast of Saudi Arabia that has been ruled by the Sunni Al-Hhalifa family since the late 18th century and the current Emir, Sheikh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa, has been in power since 1961 (but he did not take the title of Emir until 1971).\(^{146}\) Bahrain has a population of just fewer than 1.25 million people, with just under half of who are Bahraini nationals (the rest are mostly male Asian migrant workers).\(^{147}\) Of the Bahraini nationals, it is believed that close to 70% of the population is Shiite and 30% are Sunni.\(^{148}\) Although governed under minority rule, “Bahraini Shiites do not face religious oppression per se” but instead regularly see jobs go to and the government be dominated by Sunnis.\(^{149}\)

In what is the most thorough analysis of the Bahraini military (albeit slightly outdated, everything points to the fact that none of the big picture implications on civil-military relations have changed), Cordesman notes that “military service is not a popular career, and few native Shiites are allowed into the armed forces—at least half of Bahrain’s officers, NCOs and technicians are native. Bahrain is, however, heavily dependent on foreign contract personnel for support,” including a substantial number of Sunni Pakistanis, Jordanians, and Sudanese.\(^{150}\) Its civil-military relationship is therefore mercenary based, with the rest of the military following a tribally dependent monarchy.


\(^{149}\) *Ibid.*

structure: only those of the regime’s tribal identity are allowed in the military. The police and the internal security forces are both kept heavily Sunni as well.\textsuperscript{151}

It is important to also note that in 1995, Bahrain agreed to house the US Navy’s 5\textsuperscript{th} Fleet in Bahrain, with an Admiral and roughly 1,500 Navy personnel.\textsuperscript{152} Bahrain also maintains security agreements with Great Britain and is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, working especially closely with Sunni ruled Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{153} Thus, there is significant and powerful foreign investment in stability in Bahrain to compliment the military’s investment in regime stability.

Bahrain had a strong civil-military relationship before the protests began in February of 2011. It was the only Monarchy to experience Intermediate violence and the only regime to survive comfortably after crossing the Intermediate threshold (the violence is ongoing in Syria, so it is not yet considered a full survivor). How did the military contribute to the survival of the regime, especially having looked at how the militaries helped end the tenures’ of Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali? What role did violence play in Bahrain’s stability? Again, this section will go present the day-by-day use of violence as a protest repression method before analyzing the civil-military relationship. Bahrain’s protest movement was not as concentrated and does not have a definitive end point of regime collapse as the Egyptian and Tunisian case studies do, so the author thus uses his best discretion to present a timeline that accurately captures the effects of the military and violence in the protest outcome. The day-by-day analysis ends at the point

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid}, 108.
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid}, 116.
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibid}, 117.
that the regime is considered as safe in the face of the protests, although protests have continued since that time.

**February 14**

After seeing successful protests overthrow leaders in Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrainis staged sporadic protests in villages throughout the island and in the capital Manama in what was dubbed the “Day of Rage.” Police fired teargas and rubber bullets at the crowds, with one protester dying from a rubber bullet wound. Beatings were also reported.

**February 15**

In the second day of protests, only one death was reported, as police again killed a demonstrator, this time at the 10,000 person funeral march for the man who died the previous day. After the funeral, the King gave a speech in which he granted the protesters Pearl Square, but a police helicopter continuously circled the Square. It did not interfere with the protests, however. The rest of the day and night continued without incident.

February 16 saw the protests continue without incident.

**February 17**

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156 *Ibid*.
February 17th saw an escalation in violence, as hundreds of riot police officers used tear gas and concussion grenades against demonstrators who spent the night in Pearl Square. Four people were killed by live police fire, and the Square was cleared.

Making their first appearance since the outbreak of the protests, the military moved into Pearl Square and issued a stern warning to stay away from the Square, as it would do “whatever was needed to maintain security.”

**February 18th**

The next morning, protesters returned to the streets despite warnings from the military. The military responded by opening fire on the protesters, with more than 230 hurt. The firing began when the protesters made their way towards Pearl Square. Shots were reportedly fired from a helicopter, a nearby high rise building, and from the ground. There was no reliable death toll reported.

**February 19th**

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164 "Bahrain Troops 'Fire on Crowd'." *Bbc*, 2/18/2011.
In a whiplash-inducing pivot the day after the military carried out attacks on protesters, the government withdrew its forces and allowed the protesters back into Pearl Square.\(^{168}\) The protesters were allowed to continue their protests without incident until mid-March.

**March 13\(^{th}\)**

After weeks of relatively peaceful protests, with the military and police forces sidelined, police and protesters clashed on March 13\(^{th}\). Rubber bullets, water cannons and tear gas were fired when protesters left Pearl Square and headed to the Financial District.\(^{170}\) Police were the only government representatives involved.

**March 14\(^{th}\)**

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Troops entered Bahrain to bolster domestic forces in a renewed effort to suppress the protesters. Most came from Saudi Arabia.

**March 15\(^{th}\)**

The King declared a three-month state of emergency, giving the nation’s armed forces chief the authority to take any and all measures to “protect the safety of the country and its citizens.”\(^{171}\) Another two people were killed in clashes with military personnel.\(^{172}\)

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\(^{172}\) *Ibid.*
March 16th

The 16th saw government forces—both police and military—violently storm Pearl Square, forcibly removing protesters.173 Hundreds of troops, backed by helicopters and tanks, streamed through the central square, killing three protesters.174 The next days saw the tearing down of Pearl Square and an end to the immediate protests. With martial law declared and the recent display of force, the Bahraini Arab Spring was effectively suppressed, although there would be insignificant protests in the future. After the March 16th taking of Pearl Square, there has been no doubt that the Bahraini monarchy remains stable for the foreseeable future.

Analysis

The Bahraini army clearly made the decision to stand by the regime. They were willing to exert disproportionate and overwhelming force and, as such, were able to effectively repress the protest.

Graph #10 shows the size of protest across time in Bahrain. The Arab Spring project at BYU has not yet collected data on deaths in Bahrain, but using the day-to-day analysis from this case study and matching events with trends in protest size, it is possible to get a better understanding of how Bahrain’s military was influential the in the repression of the Arab Spring movement.

While the Mecham database does not include events before February 22\textsuperscript{nd}, the effect of the March 16\textsuperscript{th} actions of the military very clearly: after peaking immediately before the clearing of Pearl Square, protests moved back down to 2, spent another day at 3, and then took a steady path of decline. The show of force seemingly worked, as the size of protest receded after the violence, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, where the protests accelerated after episodes of escalation in violence.

The willingness of the military to act decisively on behalf of the government should not come as a surprise, as the mercenary nature of the army would indicate that the troops are not beholden to the protesters in any way. Importantly, the addition of Saudi and GCC troops did not really have much of an effect on the willingness of the military to act violently towards the protesters: the military had already shown throughout the February protests that they were more than willing to use excessive and deadly force to protect the regime. If it did anything, the additional troops simply gave the Bahraini
forces enhanced suppression capability, as the March 16th raids showed. Likewise, the tribally dependent component of the military proved to be effective. The ethnic composition of both the regular military and the mercenary army—Sunni against Shiite—ensured that the king retained a second layer of loyalty from the military, as the military risked losing social and economic benefits for their religious faction should the monarchy fall.

In Bahrain, therefore, coup-proofing strategies proved effective. By relying on forces from outside the country, the regime minimizes the threat of a coup because a non-Bahraini officer is less likely to aspire to the Bahraini throne. By only recruiting Sunni soldiers, the regime guarantees that the military would stand to lose should they be overthrown. In a popular protests scenario such as the Arab Spring, both coup-proofing mechanisms proved useful: the military had nothing to gain by deposing the king and much to lose if he was overthrown.
Chapter #5: Synthesis and Comparative Analysis

With the three case studies now complete, it is possible to reflect on what insights each case provides on the role of civil-military relations in regime stability, especially when compared to other cases. Moreover, the findings of the case studies can be viewed in light of the findings of the quantitative analysis done in Chapter 3.

Although the three case studies have more differences to analyze than similarities, one similarity unites all three: each military acted in its institutional interest, attempting to maximize their own benefit much more than attempting to serve as protectors of the population as the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries have both been given credit for. The civil-military relationships did dictate the actions of each military, as they were the basis on which political calculations were made by each military. In Tunisia, the civil-military relationship made it best to push Ali out of power; in Egypt, the civil-military relationship made it so the military attempted to keep Mubarak in power, but had to abandon him when he no longer served their institutional interests; in Bahrain, the civil-military dynamic guaranteed the unconditional loyalty of the military. And most importantly, in each, the military’s decision proved to be the deciding factor between regime collapse and survival. When the military decided to abandon the leader, the leader fell and when the military decided to stand by the leader, he remained in power. The divergence of the two seemingly similar cases in Tunisia and Egypt will provide the most insight into the role of the civil-military relationship.

When comparing Tunisia and Egypt, it is clear that the two civil-military relationships are very different, despite both falling into the autocratic-officer politician category. On the one hand, the Egyptian military enjoyed a special position in Egyptian
society, with economic benefits and a strong social situation for military leadership. On the other hand, in Tunisia, the military was pushed the periphery, both economically and politically. Where we can see the civil-military relationship coming into play was in the Egyptian army’s seemingly reluctant decision to stand by the protesters, as they did their best to disperse the crowds without firing on protesters, while the Tunisian army mobilized and immediately decided to protect the protesters. The Egyptian army was much more willing to stand by the regime than the Tunisian military was, reflective of the strength of the civil-military relationship. This points to two important takeaways: first, that there is significant behavioral variation within groupings in Kamrava’s typologies and second, that coup-proofing methods were essential in determining the specific actions of the militaries.

In Bahrain, the calculus was entirely different than in Egypt or in Tunisia: when police was not able to contain the movement, the military swept in with decisive force. The military’s actions on February 18th and March 16th demonstrated a willingness to unequivocally stand by the regime. Bahrain is categorized as a Mercenary army, so the domestic political calculus is not like Tunisia’s or Egypt’s. If the regime falls, a mercenary army has nothing to gain and everything to lose—they lose their employment, social status, and possibly more. Moreover, Bahrain operates on a tribally based military structure as a second level of civil-military relations, furthering insuring the loyalty of the military. As a minority-ruled society and a military that is reflective of the ruling, not the ruled, the military was not just fighting to keep the regime in power; they were also fighting to maintain their special position in society. If the Shiite majority were to take
power away from the Sunni monarchy, it is safe to assume that the benefits would quickly dry up for the Sunni population.

The three case studies allow us to grapple with Hypothesis #4, which posits that coup proofing played an instrumental role in the military’s response to the protests. In Tunisia and Bahrain, it is abundantly clear that this is true: the coup proofing strategy of marginalizing in Tunisia backfired as the military defected immediately. The coup proofing strategy of hiring mercenaries and keeping religious unity within the military worked in Bahrain, as the military stood firmly by the regime. In Egypt, the picture is less clear. The coup proofing strategy of having the military deeply invested in the economy seemed to work as the military stood by the regime for the first part of the protest. Although they did not shoot on the protesters, they repeatedly attempted to end the protests with shows of force. Here, it is clear that the coup proofing strategy worked. When the military pushed Mubarak out of power, however, it was for the same reason as when the military stood by the regime: the economy. The seemingly paradoxical calculus, while not as clear as Tunisian or Bahraini coup proofing methods, does indicate the effectiveness of using the military as a coup proofing technique: it is effective until the regime becomes detrimental to the military’s economic interests, at which point the military will act in its own institutional interests. Hypothesis #4, therefore, we can see as confirmed: coup-proofing strategies did influence the institutional calculus of the military as the organization decided how to respond to the Arab Spring movement.

The macro-data indicated that higher levels of violence would result in regime collapse and all three of the case studies used higher levels of violence. For two, Tunisia
and Egypt, that was indeed the case, whereas Bahrain did not collapse. This data highlighted a causation problem: did the regime collapse as a result of the violence or was there violence because of the impending regime collapse? The same problem was presented with the defection variable: did the military defect because of the violence or did the military’s defection/fracturing cause the violence? The case studies indicate that the use of violence did indeed entrench protesters, resulting in larger protests and harder demands. Where the collapse/no collapse paths diverge are the willingness to go beyond an Intermediate level of violence. In both Tunisia and Egypt, the military refused to allow the country to escalate into a civil-war level of violence. Bahrain’s unified and overwhelming response, while not pushing the country into High levels of violence, served as a stern enough warning of what would come if the protests continued. The ongoing conflict in Syria is, if the current status quo is maintained, another example: by going “all-in” on using violence against dissent, the Assad regime has avoided collapse. While the military fractured to an extent and a Civil War has resulted, the civil-military relationship has proven strong enough that the regime still wields the force to prevail. Libya also followed the Syria and Bahrain path, with the use of High levels of violence. Gadhafi, however, did not make it through the conflict, as the leaders in Syria and Bahrain managed to. Fracturing certainly occurred throughout the Libyan ranks a la Syria, but it is not unreasonable to think that Gadhafi may have been able to endure the conflict without foreign intervention by the United States. The outside interference on the side of the protesters-turned-rebels completely changed the equation, making Libya impossible to place within this developing trend. Nonetheless, it is possible to observe a general trend of the success of overwhelming violence in repressing the regime and the
failure of underwhelming violence. Of course, the optimal choice, no violence, was the most successful.

Finally, the case studies found that although their decisions were the most important variable in determining whether the regime would collapse or remain stable, militaries were not the primary perpetrators of state violence against citizens. Instead, police and specialized militias were responsible for most of the violence. Chapter 3’s analysis indicated that violence levels dictated military defection rates, but if they were not the entity committing the violence, why would their actions respond to it? Again, institutional interests seem to dictate the military calculus here: as the violence between police or small, specialized units escalated, the regime was put in an increasingly tenuous position. In order to fully repress the protests, a truly overwhelming display of force would be required to end the protests. Such a display of force would damage the military’s reputation and cost them in equipment, men, and power. By siding the protesters, the militaries were able to maximize their reputation and political capital while saving money, resources, and men.
Chapter #6: Conclusion

This paper found that civil-military relationship did dictate the outcome of the protests at high levels of violence. As violence escalated, defection or fracturing occurred across all cases in Autocratic Officer Politician and Dual civil-military relationships and where defection or fracturing occurred, regimes tended to collapse. Syria was the only case that ran counter to this trend, but the conflict there is ongoing at the time of this writing. This paper also found that there was not a significant difference between defections and fracturing on regime collapse other than where fracturing occurred, violence tended to push past the Intermediate level and into High. The civil-military relationship had no effect on the outcome of protests in countries in which violence was kept to low levels. Within classifications of civil-military relationships, the coup proofing strategies employed by the regime caused some variation in military response. Nonetheless, the coup proofing measures ironically led the military to defect or fracture, thus leading to the collapse of the regime.

Hypothesis #1, which stated that regimes that maintained a stronger civil-military relationship were the most likely to survive serious challenges the regime’s grip on power, was found to be partially true. The civil-military relationship only became a factor when the regime began using intermediate levels of violence, but when serious violence was introduced, the civil military relationship played a central role in dictating the outcome. The case studies indicated that mercenary and tribal loyalty was a strong civil-military relationship, but that the AOP and Dual militaries were relatively weak.

Hypothesis #2, which theorized that states willing to use violence at high levels against protesters were the regimes that collapsed, whereas those that did not use violence
survived the challenge, was also found to be mostly true. Only those regimes that used high levels of violence collapsed, so the second clause was proven entirely correct: regimes that did not use violence survived the Arab Spring protests. However, Intermediate levels of violence were the most susceptible to collapse, while High violence had a curious split that is difficult to decipher because of the ongoing conflict in Syria and the international intervention in Libya. What was clear was that an escalation of violence followed by a defection by the military guaranteed collapse.

Hypothesis #3, which posited that higher levels of violence resulted in military defection or fracturing, which in turn led to regime collapse, was proven as true. The only counter example to this hypothesis was Bahrain, the only mercenary based military and monarchy to experience Intermediate or High levels of violence. Syria is also an outlier, but the ongoing conflict makes it so that we cannot make a judgment on how the fracturing of its military will affect regime stability in the long term. Beyond these two exceptions, it is clear that in Autocratic Officer Politician and Dual military states that escalating violence against citizens leads to either defection or fracturing. When fracturing or defection occurs, states tend to collapse.

Hypothesis #4, which said that coup-proofing mechanisms played an instrumental role in dictating military response to the protests, was confirmed. In Tunisia, the coup proofing mechanism of marginalization made it so the Tunisian military had no investment in the regime, leading to its defection; in Egypt, the military’s investment in the economy made it reluctant to defect from Mubarak, but ultimately the economic interests of the military made it so that the military could no longer support their
benefactor; and in Bahrain, the emphasis on religious solidarity throughout the ranks ensured that the military remained loyal to the regime.

Although this study focused exclusively on Arab civil-military relations, the findings can give us insight into non-Arab protests situations. From a U.S. foreign policy perspective, the findings of this paper could help forecast events in Cuba should a mass antigovernment protest movement like those that occurred in the Arab Spring. Cuba’s autocratic structure is closely related to that of the Arab dictatorships examined in this paper: it is a Personalist dictatorship, Fidel and Raul Castro were and are autocratic officer politicians, respectively, and the regime came to power as through a rebellion that was supported by a strong populist ideology.\textsuperscript{175} Moreover, the Castro regime has used repression extensively to stamp out domestic dissent and has had difficulty developing its economy, resulting in an overeducated population and high unemployment.\textsuperscript{176} Many of the macro-level conditions in Cuba mirror those of pre-2011 Arab world.

This paper, then, would allow us to predict some of the outcomes of such a protest in Cuba, with obvious implications for U.S. foreign policy. First, if violence escalated to intermediate or high levels, the military would be predicted to fracture or defect and then the regime would be predicted to collapse; second, if the regime were not to respond with violence, the Castro regime would be able to hold on to power; third, initial violence would be perpetrated by internal security forces and the police, with escalation most likely coming from a highly ideological security division with intense ties to the regime.

\textsuperscript{175} Ezrow, Natasha and Erica Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders. 267.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
A Cuban protest movement would be expected to follow along the same general trajectory of the cases presented within this paper.

Future studies might consider examining the political relationship and makeup of these entities, attempting to gain a better understanding of their willingness to use force against protesters. Moreover, the elite security forces remain (intentionally) opaque and future research, if possible, might look into illuminating their structure, recruitment methods, and doctrine. As a general rule, Arab militaries do not publish the ethnic, religious, or social makeup of their troops. Analysts are forced to rely on sweeping statements such as ‘Bahrain’s military is predominantly Sunni.’ Access would be difficult, but such a study would greatly enhance the political science community’s ability to understand the military’s actions in mass protests such occurred in the Arab Spring. Finally, almost all scholarship in response to the Arab Spring has examined the cases that saw Intermediate and High levels of violence, while those that experienced Low-No violence have garnered essentially no attention. It is important that scholars examine what allowed the majority of countries not to escalate to higher levels of violence, so that the international relations community might better understand how to avoid the death and destruction caused by situations such as Syria, Libya and, on a lesser scale, Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen.
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Appendix

Civil-Military Relations and Violence

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<th>None</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>High</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autocratic Officer-Politician</td>
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<td>Dual</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
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<tr>
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Chi-Square test results: p=.357044

Civil Military Relations and Regime Type

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<td>Personalist</td>
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Chi-Square test results: p=.000292

Civil-Military Relations and State Collapse

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Chi-Square test results: p=.37647614

Violence and State Collapse

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<td>Collapse</td>
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<td></td>
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Chi-Square test results: p=.00939793
## Violence and Regime Type

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<td>Personalist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
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Chi-Square test results: $p = 0.383350502$

### Civil Military Relations and State Collapse with High-Intermediate Violence

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<th>Mercenaries</th>
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<th>Tribally Dependent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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### Civil Military Relations and State Collapse with No-Low Violence

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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