Sound’s Arguments: Philosophical Encounters with Music Theory

By

Bryan J. Parkhurst

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Music Theory and Philosophy)
2014

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Kendall Walton, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Ramon Satyendra, Co-Chair
Professor Kevin Korsyn
Professor Victor Caston
# Table of Contents

List of Examples
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1: Aspects of Musical Analysis
Chapter 2: Schenker and Kantian Teleology; Or, Schenker’s Orcanicism Defended
Epilogue 1: More Thoughts on Dubiel’s Objections
Epilogue 2: The Place of Genius in Schenker’s Theory
Epilogue 3: Schenker’s Theory of Music as Ethics: A Criticism and a Suggestion
Bibliography
List of Examples

Example 1 Double Cross 24
Example 2 Beethoven, Op. 27 no. 2, 3rd mvmt., beginning of recapitulation 26
Example 3 Beethoven, Op. 27 no. 2, 2nd mvmt., end of Allegretto section 26
Example 4 Beethoven, Op. 27 no. 2, 2nd mvmt., beginning of Allegretto section 28
Example 5 Beethoven, Op. 27 no. 2, 2nd mvmt., phrase expansion at the end of the Allegretto section 30
Example 6 Schubert, Morgengruf, mm. 12-15 46
Example 7 Schubert, Morgengruf, m. 14 49
Example 8 Schenker, Counterpoint Vol. 1, Example 44, p. 57 81
Example 9 Schenker, Counterpoint Vol. 1, Example 47, p. 58 81
Example 10 Schenker, Counterpoint Vol. 1, Example 35, p. 50 85
Example 12 Schenker, Free Composition, Figure 5 157
Example 13 Tone sequence c^1-b-a-b 160
Example 14 Schenker’s graph of the C-major Prelude from Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier Book 1 161
List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations of frequently-cited texts, in this chapter and throughout the paper:


*TW / WT = Heinrich Schenker, Der Tonwille (Vienna: Albert J. Gutmann, 1921 [Vol. 1], 1922 [Vol. 2], 1922 [Vol. 3], 1923 [Vol. 4], 1923 [Vol. 5], 1924 [Vol. 6], 1924 [Vol. 7], 1924 [Vol. 8-9], 1924 [vol. 10]). / Der Tonwille, ed. William Drabkin trans. Ian Bent et. al.. (Oxford University Press, 2004 [Vol. 1], 2005 [Vol. 2]).*


*CPR = Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft), trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965). References to the first Critique, following established custom, give the page numbers of the first (A) and second (B) editions of 1781 and 1787 respectively. All German citations of Kant come from the “Academy edition” of Kant’s works, Kants gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-1940).*

*CJ = Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft), trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). Citations from the third Critique give the page number of*
Pluhar’s translation, Kant’s own section number, and the volume and page number of the Academy edition (volume 5 is the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*), in that order. Thus: *CJ*, 248-9/§64/5:370.

For ease of reading, I place all German block quotes in SMALL CAPS. I also often use SMALL CAPS when referring to concepts. Thus: “the complementary concepts of FREE COMPOSITION and STRICT COMPOSITION.”

Regardless of the order in which I introduce the German and English versions of a passage, citations of the passage will list the German edition first and the English edition second (this includes citations of works and translations that are not listed above). Thus: *KPT.* 1, p. 35 / *CPT.* 1, p. 37. In cases where I referred to an English translation other than the ones listed above, I give the abbreviated citation of the German followed by a full citation of the alternative English source.
CHAPTER 1. Aspects of Musical Analysis

Overview: This chapter thinks about how to think about what one is doing when one is doing music analysis. I explain the scope and aims of the activity by detailing the relations among three concepts: Dewey’s concept of INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE, his concept of ARTISTIC PRODUCTIVITY (as contrasted with PASSIVE AESTHETIC APPRECIATION), and Wittgenstein’s notion of ASPECTUAL PERCEPTION (a.k.a. SEEING-AS). We can adumbrate what’s contained in those concepts and how they are related:

1) Dewey uses the label INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE to cover a diverse collection of human practical activities. However, we can identify the greatest common factor they share: every INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE consists in the successful deployment of skills in order to attain an end one holds to be worth attaining. For the one who undergoes it, an integral experience possesses what I shall call TELEOLOGICAL VALUE.

2) Within the aesthetic domain, TELEOLOGICAL VALUE looms large, Dewey notices, in the artist’s skillful production of beautiful objects. But, Dewey suggests, it can also manifest itself in one’s receptive appreciation of art objects made by others.

3) TELEOLOGICAL VALUE can arise for music’s listeners, I suggest on Dewey’s behalf, when they ASPECTUALLY PERCEIVE music, i.e. exercise their capacity for HEARING-AS. Further, we can think of certain music-analytical activities as aimed at bringing about such perceptions and developing such capacities. Music analysis, so understood, endows acts of musical listening with TELEOLOGICAL VALUE.
In the first section of this chapter, I give a prospectus of Dewey’s discussion of integral experience. Much of his discussion centers on the way in which such experiences have both an active and a passive side. Kant, whose works Dewey studied intensely, also famously probes the connection between activity and passivity within experience (Erfahrung). I use Kant as foil in order to throw into relief several key features of Dewey’s account. In the second section, I find musical analogues to Wittgenstein’s examples of visual aspectual perception, using Beethoven’s “Moonlight” sonata as a case study. I then offer a conceptual analysis of the overarching phenomenon of perceiving-as. In the third section, I situate one of David Lewin’s essays within the framework of the hearing-as model. In the fourth section, I bring the first, second, and third sections together by unfolding the idea that we should prize music analysis for its potential to turn our experiences of music into integral experiences thereof.

Introduction: What’s the point of music analysis? A good deal of ink has been spilled attempting to demonstrate that music analysis can, does, or should explain things, after the manner of the canonical natural and social sciences. Since its

1 Dewey’s 1884 Johns Hopkins dissertation was entitled “The Psychology of Kant.” It was never published and is now lost. “Kant and Philosphic Method,” an article Dewey published that same year in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, is likely drawn from his dissertation.
inception, this platform has always had more notoriety than credibility. There is little cause, therefore, to challenge it in quite the revolutionary spirit with which one challenges the received wisdom and its entrenched orthodoxies. In many corners of the discipline of music theory, the “wisdom” of scientism was not received, and its “orthodoxies” never looked very orthos. Still, scientism in music theory has enjoyed enough of an ascendancy, and remains a big enough part of the field’s ideological patrimony, for its specter to continue to haunt those of us music theorists who feel drawn toward a sharply opposed perspective.3 That alone provides me with a reason to begin this essay by wondering: is it a good idea, even prima facie, to try to gather together the various facets of the music analyst’s vocation beneath an experimental-scientific rubric?

The idea isn’t utterly misconceived. On the one hand, it behooves us to figure out what important commonalities and continuities there are between what scientists do and what music analysts do. Figuring that out could be a matter of seeing how far we can get by trying to assimilate the latter to the former, taking as our starting point those cases where we have no qualms saying that one and the same theoretical exercise is both scientific (i.e., would be recognized as science by those we recognize as scientists) and music-analytical (i.e., would be recognized as

---


3 Part of what warrants continued hand wringing over scientism is the short supply of alternative views. Protestations against scientism abound in the music-theoretical literature; contender theories do not.
music analysis by those we recognize as music analysts). But, on the other hand, we should have little patience for those who monomaniacally fix their gaze on the “scientific image” of music analysis and are accordingly blind to how messy and complicated its true image is. They appear to be moved by a desire to provide music analysis with a kind of legitimation that it arguably doesn’t need and, in a wide swath of cases, demonstrably doesn’t deserve.

It is easy to see the attraction of the scientific image. It holds out the tantalizing prospect of delivering a unified account of what is going on in the field of music analysis. It also promises to deliver a share of the prestige of experimental science, simply the most important and successful intellectual endeavor the world has ever known. However, it is also easy to see that the wings melt off of one’s account of music analysis pretty quickly as it soars toward this lofty image. For the most part, it is obvious that the criteria of adequacy for most of what goes under the heading “music analysis” (e.g., the kind of stuff that gets published in *Music Analysis*) has little to do with the following: 1) determining which types of musical events are most statistically relevant to the occurrence of other types of musical events, as a means to 2) apportioning credence to counterfactual claims about how a piece of music would have gone later on had different things been true of it earlier on; 3) articulating rules for algorithmically elaborating syntactically well-formed musical

---

4 The example I suspect would win the widest consensus if Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s *A Generative Theory of Tonal Music* (MIT Press, 1995), which is proudly claimed by (many members of) the music theory and linguistics communities alike. The authors equate a musical theory with a “formal description of the musical intuitions of a listener who is experienced in a musical idiom” (p. 1). It will become clear over the course of this essay that I reject this reductive characterization root and branch, for the simple reason that I believe musical theories can be intended to (and can in fact) change and improve our musical intuitions.
phrases; 4) generating inductive generalizations that allow us to make principled conjectures about pieces we haven’t inspected based on what we’ve learned from pieces we have inspected; or 5) modeling, describing, or predicting the physical and psychological responses listeners exhibit when presented with musical stimuli.5

If lots of music analysis, lots of the time, adduces no such explanations, what are we to say music analysts are up to?6 In this essay, I try to tell a counter-

5 I do not intend the list to be exhaustive. Many more activities might deserve the title “explanatory science of music.” Robert Gjerdingen’s “An Experimental Music Theory?” in N. Cook and M. Everest, eds. Rethinking Music (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 161-170 contains interesting reflections on this topic, but rests on assumptions I do not endorse. Gjerdingen accuses music theory of suffering from the same defect he thinks mars Aristotle’s science: both fail to allow fundamental concepts to be subject to revision or elimination in the face of contravening evidence. (This does not seem to me to be a knowledgeable or fair treatment of Aristotle, but I leave that issue to one side.) “As a result,” Gjerdingen says, “music theoretical discourse has become largely music-exegetical in content. The self-stabilizing, corroborating effect of interdependent premises precludes fundamental revisions, major discoveries, or even accidental breakthroughs” (p. 162). This reasoning is questionable in two respects. First, Gjerdingen’s desire to disown “music exegesis” sits uncomfortably with his later acknowledgment that music theory has “important historical and art-critical components” (p. 169). Second, music theory only looks like bad science to Gjerdingen because he insists on looking at it as science in the first place, a move which he has not shown to be mandatory. That said, the empty scientific pretensions of some music-theoretical and music-analytical literature do invite these kinds of criticisms.

6 I would go so far as to say that the lion’s share of published music analysis contains nothing that a philosopher of science would recognize as an explanation, or even as an intended explanation. All the same, we probably shouldn’t think that every kind of explanation is scientific. There are as many kinds of explanation, arguably, as there are kinds of knowledge, and there is arguably more than one kind of knowledge. One major distinction to be drawn in epistemology is between knowledge-that—knowledge of matters of fact—and knowledge-how—the capacity to accomplish a task or perform an action. Later in this essay, I try to understand the activity of music analysis as something which is importantly connected with knowledge-how. Explanation could be reintroduced into my account if I went on to argue that music theory is explanatory in the same sense that, say, teaching someone to play the violin is explanatory, which is not the same sense in which a scientific theory is explanatory. Considerations of space force me to forgo making such an argument.
narrative about the possible aims of music analysis, a story from which the concept of explanation is conspicuously absent.

SECTION 1: DEWEY ON INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE AND ARTISTIC PRODUCTIVITY

1.1 Dewey and Kant: I open my story with one of Dewey’s orienting methodological commitments. It states that “the nature of experience can be understood only by noting that it includes an active and a passive element peculiarly combined.”7 Kant might have nodded in approval at this, but Dewey doesn’t have in mind—or, at least, he isn’t trying to defend or interpret—the Kantian thesis that coherent experience presupposes an active intellect (the faculty of understanding) that determines (conceptually subsumes) passively received intuitions.8 Dewey doesn’t treat the interplay between passivity and activity, doing and being-done-to, as a matter of transcendental psychology. For him, it is not a synthetic a priori truth about what is requisite for cognition as such, as it is for Kant. In Dewey’s system, the interplay in question is something world-made rather than, as on Kant’s transcendental account, something world-making.9 Dewey’s activity/passivity dyad 1

8 See CPR, A19-20 / B34-5 et passim.
9 The interface between activity and passivity is world-making, on one interpretation of Kant’s system, in that the “phenomenal world” or “world of appearances” is constituted by the active imposition, on the part of an epistemic agent (a judger/knower), of a priori concepts (such as causation and substance) and a priori forms of intuition (Space and Time) on the passively received manifold of sensation. The world, according to this reading of Kant, is not in itself a world in which substances causally interact with one another in space and time. The world is manifested that way for us (in our cognition) because organized that way by us (through our cognition).
is a purely naturalistic feature of our adaptive navigation of our surroundings, a give-and-take in which by which we shape our environment and are shaped by it in turn. This Janus-faced character of our practical exploits, Dewey believes, is open to empirical observation and is noticeable already in intelligent but non-rational animals."

"Every experience," he says in *Art as Experience*, "is the result of an interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives. A man does something; he lifts, let us say, a stone. In consequence he undergoes, suffers something: the weight, strain, texture of the surface of the thing." Beyond this, doings and undergoings, as they conjointly and interactively condition experience, stand in something more than a causal connection with one another.

---

*I quote Dewey at length to allow him to explain himself: "The career and destiny of a living being are bound up with its interchanges with its environment, not externally but in the most intimate way. The growl of a dog crouching over his food, his howl in time of loss and loneliness, the wagging of his tail at the return of his human friend are expressions of the implication of a living in a natural medium which includes man along with the animal he has domesticated. Every need, say hunger for fresh air or food, is a lack that denotes at least a temporary absence of adequate adjustment with surroundings. But it is also a demand, a reaching out into the environment to make good the lack and to restore adjustment by building at least a temporary equilibrium. Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it—either through effort or by some happy chance. And, in a growing life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has successfully passed. If the gap between organism and environment is too wide, the creature dies. If its activity is not enhanced by the temporary alienation, it merely subsists. Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those of the conditions under which it lives" (John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York: Putnam, 1934) 13-14.). For Kant, again by contrast, animals lack a faculty of understanding and are thus merely and exclusively passive entities."


Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 44.
They also stand in a practical-rational connection: undergoings are both the motivating grounds (in their negative or privative manifestation as desires) and the sought-after consequences (in their positive or perfective manifestations as instances of fulfillment or satisfaction) of doings.

For Dewey, all of this goes to show, the study of experience is the study of humankind’s embodied, creaturely predicament, i.e. the study of the practical exigencies of how we must ceaselessly come to terms with our earthly station. By our very nature, we are striving, struggling, adaptive, and evolving organisms who, periodically and inevitably, find ourselves in states of need (a consequence of the passivity and finitude of our bodies). This imposes upon us the necessity of using innate powers, acquired know-how, and improvised ingenuity to re-achieve (fleeting) states of fulfillment or harmony.¹³ The back-and-forth between lack and satiety is a rhythm perpetuated by our bivalent character as simultaneously active and passive life forms. Thus, for Dewey, the warp and woof of experience is, in Brandom’s words, “work: the application of force through distance...something done rather than something that merely happens—a process, engaging in a practice, the exercise of abilities, rather than an episode.”¹⁴

The contrast between Kant and Dewey comes down to a difference in where each attempts to locate the fact of experience along an axis whose poles are

---

¹³ If Schopenhauer is correct to think that true fulfillment, the silencing of all our drives and urges, is precluded for us (or can be attained only momentarily) except in death, perhaps it is better to say that we use our ingenuity to bring ourselves into states in which we are differently, and hopefully less inopportune, dissatisfied than we were before.

theoretical reason (deliberation about knowledge and its objects) and practical reason (deliberation about action and its ends). In the Kantian system, the theoretical pole can be seen to have a certain kind of primacy. Kant lays the cornerstone of his critical philosophy by establishing which conceptual abilities and what background conceptual scheme are necessitated by the very fact of empirical experience, i.e. by our acknowledged ability to know things about objects located in space and time. Or, one could equally say, the fulcrum of the critical philosophy is Kant’s account of what epistemic conditions must be fulfilled for us to have cognition of any particular matter of fact whatsoever. Later, in the second Critique, Kant explains what one does when one undertakes practical commitments by appealing to a more basic conception of what one does when one engages in theoretical reasoning, namely, discursively applying concepts.

In quite a different spirit, Dewey sees fit to treat any inquiry into experience as an inquiry into an agent’s episodic history of practical involvement with her “environing conditions.” Whereas the Kantian locus of experience is in the first

---

15 *Erfahrung*, as Kant uses the term, implies not just the illumination of a Cartesian “light of consciousness,” but, more substantially, also the judgmental activity of taking spatio-temporal objects to answer to some empirical descriptions as opposed to others.

16 For Kant, undertaking practical commitments involves figuring out (making resolutions about) what to do or how to be, while engaging in theoretical reasoning involves figuring out (gaining knowledge of) out how the world is. In the former case, we apply concepts to actions; in the latter case we apply concepts to objects and events.

17 “Discursive” (*Diskursiv*) is a Kantian term of art. If a concept is discursive, in Kant’s sense, it can be applied to many different intuitions (representations passively received in experience) in virtue of some general feature those intuitions share. A discursive intellect is one which is capable of applying concepts to intuitions.

place a *judger*, the Deweyan locus of experience is in the first place *doer*. Not coincidentally, a signal feature of Dewey’s pragmatism is how he reverses the order of explanation Kant pursues. Dewey subordinates the theoretical to the practical by attempting to reduce empirical beliefs to tools for practical action. His pragmatic account of belief (the “tool theory,” as it has been called) seeks to explain them as intentional states whose whole significance is exhausted by their instrumentality in the service of the satisfaction of desires. More relevant to present concerns than Dewey’s problematic instrumentalism, however, is his *axiology* of experience. By this I mean Dewey’s idea that some exalted experiences (understood as expenditures of effort, willful “puttings-out” rather than judgmental “takings-in”) surpass other lesser ones by becoming unified and individuated in an exceptional way. Dewey’s axiology of experience, we can try saying, is not directed at uncovering what experience *per se* is or entails, as is Kant’s first *Critique*. Instead it aspires to uncover what a so-called *integral* experience (a label Dewey uses honorifically) consists in and derives its value and meaningfulness from.

---

19 Dewey may not have been a thoroughgoing instrumentalist about truth. James is the pragmatist most associated with the slogan that what is true is what it is useful to believe. Peirce referred to this crass instrumentalism about truth as the “seeds of death” by which pragmatist philosophy, otherwise “so instinct with life,” had become infected. Dewey (in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, (New York: Henry Holt, 1938), 343*n.*) endorses Peirce’s preferred definition of truth, according to which truth is “[t]he opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real (Peirce, “How to Make our Ideas Clear,” *Popular Science Monthly* (1878)). But Dewey also sometimes lapses into speaking as though he accepts Jamesian instrumentalism about truth. Take, for instance, this passage from “The Intellectualist Criterion of Truth”: “What the experimentalist means is that the effective working of an idea and its truth are one and the same thing—this working being neither the cause nor the evidence of truth but its nature” (quoted in Brandom, *Perspectives on Pragmatism*, 15).
1.2 Integral Experience and Teleological Value: It is a fool’s errand to try to give a unified definition of “integral experience” that circumscribes all the vagaries of Dewey’s idiosyncratic and somewhat erratic usage. Rorty was ungenerous, but not wholly off the mark, when he called Dewey’s use of the word an “incantatory device for blurring every possible distinction.” Nevertheless, we can trace the broad contours of an idea that is of cardinal importance in Dewey’s disquisition on integral experience. In meeting our material and spiritual needs, Dewey thinks, we draw on an assemblage of acquired (practiced, learned) or inherited (inborn, evolved) skills. In the cases that fascinate Dewey, the successful exercise of those skills in prosecution of our ends has, and should be valued for having, the makeup of a structured, internally coordinated whole. Like the tragedies Aristotle describes in the Poetics, these experiences are “integral” in that they comprise a beginning, middle, and end that display a unity of action by being bound together through the seeming necessity and inevitability of their succession. Integral experiences thus represent the displacement of a dramatic schema away from fictional plots and onto the travails of a real-life agent. An integral experience, this encourages us to say, is marked for attention and appreciation by being a goal-oriented, dynamic, and ultimately triumphant confrontation between an actual protagonist’s talents and powers and the world of dangers and opportunities in which she finds herself.21

Whatever the finer points of Dewey’s understanding of integral experience may be, a relatively basic thought lies at its core, one that I want to isolate and use as

---

21 Dewey, Art as Experience, Chapter III et passim.
the keystone of my account: the thought that developing and demonstrating expertise is a source of nonpareil value.

This idea is not unique to Dewey. Various expressions of it dot the philosophical landscape. One of its notable proponents is Rawls, who builds into his account of rationality a “basic principle of motivation” he calls the “Aristotelian Principle.” This principle states: “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity.” Rawls claims to find this idea prefigured in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle allegedly “affirms two points that [the Aristotelian Principle] conveys: (1) that enjoyment and pleasure are not always by any means the result of returning to a healthy or normal state, or of making up deficiencies [as Plato is often interpreted as having thought]; rather many kinds of pleasure and enjoyment arise when we exercise our faculties; and (2) that the exercise of our natural powers is a leading human good.” There is a third point that the Aristotelian principle conveys, one which Rawls finds it more difficult to catch Aristotle overtly affirming, but which is “compatible with Aristotle’s conception of the natural order” and which “fits the judgments of value he makes.” It is that “(3) the idea that the more enjoyable activities and the more desirable and enduring pleasures spring from the exercise of greater abilities involving more complex discriminations.”

---


Aristotle’s arguments in *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.11-14 and X.1-5, the passages Rawls gives as the source of inspiration for the principle. But it is at least understandable that certain of Aristotle’s pronouncements about happiness would have struck Rawls’s ear as being in the same key as his own commitments. For example, at *NE* X.6 (not a passage Rawls cites) Aristotle links states of happiness with the effortful attainment of admirable things:

“But the happy life seems to be a life in accord with virtue, which is a life involving serious actions, and not consisting in amusement. Besides, we say that things to be taken seriously are better than funny things that provide amusement, and that in each case the activity of the better part and the better person is more serious and excellent; and the activity of what is better is superior, and thereby has more the character of happiness. Besides, anyone at all, even a slave, no less than the best person, might enjoy bodily pleasures; but no one would allow that a slave shares in happiness, if one does not also allow that the slave shares in the sort of life needed for happiness. Happiness, then, is found not in these pastimes, but in the activities in accord with virtue, as we also said previously.”

Rawls is arguably on more secure interpretive footing when he names Mill’s account of the higher pleasures, which appears in chapter two of *Utilitarianism*, as another historically significant incarnation of the Aristotelian Principle’s essential tenets. Human beings, Mill opines, “have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as

---

happiness which does not include their gratification."  

Mill takes our tendency to extol the gratification of the “elevated faculties” over the gratification of baser impulses to be indicative of genuine differences of rank within a hierarchy of pleasures. He concludes from this that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.”

This preeminently valuable class of pleasures, he goes on to claim, is to be identified with the class of pleasures brought about by putting to use the artistic/creative and scientific/investigatory abilities that grow up in civil society: “A cultivated mind—I do not mean that of a philosopher, but any mind to which the fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught, in any tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties—finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and present, and their prospects in the future.”

The nub of the Dewey-Rawls-Mill-(pseudo) Aristotle intuition, to reiterate, is that some experiences, some of the doings and undergoings that fill the horizon of our awareness, stand out from the crowd because they encompass the successful attainment, by means of developed capacities, of praiseworthy ends. To avoid

26 Mill, ibid.
27 Mill, 61.
28 Admittedly, Rawls, Aristotle, and Mill do not specifically bring up ends or their praiseworthiness in the passages I quoted. But we can readily connect what they say to a discussion of ends. For one who accepts the Aristotelian principle that all action is for the sake of an end one holds to be good, the purposeful deployments of skill discussed by all three philosophers will count as actions which are constitutively end-directed and done under the guise of the good. Rawls’s talk of the “realization of a capacity” seems especially apt for being explicated in terms of ends.
getting sidetracked from this paper’s main argument, I will offer no answers to some
germaine questions concerning the role of pleasure in integral experience. For
instance: Are integral experiences instrumentally valuable because productive of
pleasure or enjoyment, or is the pleasure and enjoyment they elicit, if they elicit it, a
fitting response to their intrinsic or inherent value? Is the goodness of an integral
experience something more than the sum of the goodness of the end attained by the
integral experience and the goodness of the pleasure taken in attaining it? Should
we think that pleasure is always a fitting response to the having of, or to the
completion of, an integral experience?29

In order to skirt such questions, I will adopt the term “teleological value” as a
neutral label for whatever (inherent, intrinsic, instrumental, hedonic, etc.) goodness
an experience comes to have in virtue the fact that it includes in its purview the

Capacities, as I am inclined to think about them, are defined by the ends they enable
their possessors to secure. The capacity to tie one’s shoes is different from the
capacity to brush one’s teeth in that the possession of the former, and not the latter,
allows one to reliably, and at one’s discretion, cause a state of affairs to obtain in
which one’s shoes are tied. I take it that the (full) realization of a capacity implies
the fulfillment of that capacity’s defining end. I also take it that attempting to realize
a capacity presupposes aiming for the capacity’s defining end.

29 The complication surrounding the role of pleasure in integral experience is
brought out by Dewey’s contention that “struggle and conflict may be themselves
enjoyed, although they are painful, when they are experienced as means of
developing an experience...There is, as will appear later, an element of undergoing,
of suffering in its large sense, in every experience. Otherwise there would be no
taking in of what preceded. For ‘taking in’ in any vital experience is something more
than placing something on the top of consciousness over what was previously
known. It involves reconstruction which may be painful. Whether the necessary
undergoing phase is by itself pleasurable or painful is a matter of particular
conditions. It is indifferent to the total esthetic quality, save that there are few
intense esthetic experiences that are wholly gleeful. They are certainly not to be
characterized as amusing, and as they bear down upon us they involve a suffering
that is none the less consistent with, indeed a part of, the complete perception that
is enjoyed” (Dewey, Art as Experience, 41).
successful realization of capacities or exercise of skills. This is not because I think
reference to pleasure has no place in a discussion of integral experience. To the
contrary, I believe it is by and large faithful to the spirit of Dewey’s views about
integral experience to give a Rawlsian or Millian paraphrase that makes essential
reference to pleasure, to wit: 1) integral experiences are distinguished from other
experiences by the extent to which they are productive of the goods enumerated in
Rawls’s Aristotelian Principle (viz., enjoyment and pleasure); or 2) integral
experiences are distinguished from other experiences by the extent to which they
engender Mill’s higher pleasures. However, it is the better part of philosophical
prudence to use the thinnest, least committal (and thus least contestable) concept of
integral experience I can get away with using—as it were, the lowest common
denominator shared by Dewey, Rawls, (pseudo-)Aristotle, and Mill. Thus, I will
henceforth say, minimally, that integral experiences are distinguished from other
(unremarkable, quotidian) experiences by the extent to which they possess
teleological value.

1.3: The Value of Art as a Productive Enterprise: Dewey sees it as self-
evident that art is valuable primarily insofar as it is productive of integral
experiences—experiences pregnant with teleological value. And art has this utility
most evidently, Dewey notices, in the making of it, for the maker of it. Making art is,
in the best cases, a complex problem-solving task that calls upon developed
capacities and terminates in a praiseworthy end (the beautiful artwork itself).
Captivated by the thought that the artist’s experience of art is well-nigh the
apotheosis of integral experience, Dewey hits upon the idea of taking manufacture
(activity), rather than inspection or contemplation (passivity), to be paradigmatic for his conception of aesthetic activity. In so doing, he associates aesthetic activity not first and foremost with detached observation and the refined, aristocratic exercise of peerless taste—the occupation of Hume’s “true judges”\(^{30}\) and Kant’s disinterested observers of sensible form.\(^{31}\) Instead, Deweyan aesthetic activity is linked to the corporeal and spiritual satisfactions of un-alienated labor, satisfactions to be gleaned from the disciplined but uncoerced channeling of one’s creative and expressive energies. This inverts once again the influential Kantian order of explanation, although this time the one that appears in Kant’s third *Critique*. There, Kant proceeds from an account of what kind of faculty aesthetic judgment is to an account of how it is possible for artists to fashion objects that are fitted to arouse that faculty.\(^{32}\) In §§ 46-50,\(^{33}\) Kant poses a question of this form: given that judgments of beauty have such-and-such features (the features his “Analytic of the Beautiful” has shown them to have), what must the production of objects of taste be like (what traits of genius must underlie it) if the producer is to succeed in bringing into existence something to which the predicate “beautiful” applies? Dewey reverses and modifies this line of questioning by asking, in essence: given that the production of objects of taste has such-and-such features (i.e. given that it perfectly...


\(^{31}\) See, *CJ* §§1–5 et passim.

\(^{32}\) See Kant’s treatment of genius in *CJ* §46 - §49.

\(^{33}\) The titles of the sections are “Fine Art Is the Art of Genius,” “Elucidation and Confirmation of the Above Explication of Genius,” “On the Relation of Genius to Taste,” “On the Powers of the Mind which Constitute Genius,” and “On the Combination of Taste with Genius in Products of Fine Art.”
instantiates the properties that make integral experiences integral), and given that those features are the grounds of an unparalleled kind of value, what must (perceptual, appreciative) judgments of those objects be like if those judgments are to likewise be a source of that same species of value?

This inversion encourages us to try to understand artistic consumption through the lens of artistic production, or to imagine a mode of consuming artworks that shares many of the good-making features Dewey discerns in the production of artworks. But how can a spectator’s or auditor’s appreciation of an artwork be relevantly like an artist’s planning and executing of one? Dewey makes no bones about how “it is not so easy in the case of the perceiver and appreciator to understand the intimate union of doing and undergoing as it is in the case of the maker.”34 And, sure enough, Dewey never manages to be perspicuously clear about what goes into the “intimate union of doing and undergoing” in the case of the perceiver/appreciator. He does, however, circle back repeatedly on this hazy but suggestive idea: the (non-productive) appreciator of an art object achieves an integral experience of the object, has an appreciative encounter with it that is shot through with teleological value, only when the way she purposefully constructs her encounter with the art object is akin to the way the artist originally fashioned the thing—with an aesthetic goal or aspiration guiding her, and by fluidly using appropriate competencies in bringing that goal to fruition.

34 Dewey, Art as Experience, 54.
"For to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience. And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent. They are not the same in any literal sense. But with the perceiver, as with the artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is in form, although not in details, the same as the process of organization the creator of the work consciously experienced...The artist selected, simplified, clarified, abridged and condensed according to his interest. The beholder must go through these operations according to his point of view and interest."35

Before we can begin to regiment this proposal, though, we must first home in on what it is for the productive artist to pursue an aesthetic goal. For if we want to grasp what it would be for artistic appreciation to aspire to the condition of artistic production, we need first to grasp what the individuating characteristics of this latter condition are. As Dewey describes things, the productive artist does not simply, as Kant famously says, “prescribe the rule to nature.” She does not merely give form to matter in accordance with a fixed, antecedently settled conception of what would constitute aesthetic excellence in some specific medium. Rather, her relationship to the raw materials that receive the imprint of her artistic labor is, to use a linguistic metaphor, conversational. She bends the materials to her will in a deliberate way, but remains responsive meanwhile to the “demands” the medium makes upon her in return:

“The potter shapes his clay to make a bowl useful for holding grain; but he makes it in a way so regulated by the series of perceptions that sum up the serial acts of making, that the bowl is marked by enduring grace and charm. The general situation remains the same in painting a picture or

molding a bust. Moreover, at each stage there is anticipation of what is to come. This anticipation is the connecting link between the next doing and its outcome for sense. What is done and what is undergone are thus reciprocally, cumulatively, and continuously instrumental to each other.”

At every stage of the process of creation, the artist uses heightened powers of discrimination to detect how the particular sensible form the art object has so far acquired provides reasons for preferring one among many possible ways of modifying it further. The artist permits the object’s emerging characteristics to constrain and regulate her incremental molding of it, even as each new choice alters those characteristics and thus alters the way in which they provide further constraint and regulation.

“The real work of an artist is to build up an experience that is coherent in perception while moving with constant change in its development,” Dewey asserts. Hence, the art object’s ultimate form, to return to Dewey’s animating precept, “can be understood only by noting that it includes an active and a passive element peculiarly combined” in that “...art, in its form, unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience.”

____________________

36 Dewey, Art as Experience, 50. 37 Dewey, Art as Experience, 48. This is a particular instance of a general principle Dewey accepts. The principle is that experience, artistic or otherwise, is to be understood as a Darwinian phenomenon, an adaptive process in which an organism’s coping with ambient stimuli results in the selection of certain actions or ways of getting along (since successful responses get preserved and reproduced in the form of habits). This selection, in turn, has the effect of systematically modifying the pattern of incoming stimuli to be coped with, which results in the selection of new (or adjusted) response mechanisms. This biological perspective also informs Dewey’s philosophy of education, which details how evolutionary processes, as they
SECTION 2: MUSIC ANALYSIS AND THE HEARING OF ASPECTS

2.1 Introduction: The foregoing was a drawn-out preamble to this proposal: we can look upon music analysis as (or envision a kind of music analysis that is) a pursuit that puts into practice Dewey’s conception of a special manner of consuming artworks, one that has pronounced affinities with the material production of artworks. The allure of such an activity is the prospect of having integral experiences that are also musical experiences, i.e. the prospect of bestowing teleological value on our acts of musical appreciation. But what would music analysis have to be like in order to live up to this billing? To a first degree of approximation, we can say that it would essentially involve actively constructing an encounter with music by settling, pursuing, and attaining aesthetic-appreciative goals. Further, this undertaking should be one in which, as was the case for the productive artist, process and product mutually condition one another. Music analysis would need to display that form of reciprocity in which an aesthetic goal is gradually made fully determinate by the process of realizing it, while this process of unfold at the level of the species, are recapitulated in learning processes, as they unfold at both the individual and societal level. I mention this in order to take note of the wide ambit Dewey gives to his concept of experience. It encompasses processes and activities that fall within a wide range of time scales, running the gamut from quite local test-operate-test-exit loops, to the long-term pursuit of plans and projects, to the choice and adjustment of one’s lifestyle, to the creation and calibration of political institutions.

38 Needless to say, this is not the same as the prospect of obtaining the correct scientific explanation of whatever natural or social phenomena are implicated in the existence of a musical performance, piece, or practice.
realization is modulated in response to the ever-greater determinateness and fulfillment of the goal.

The first step in expanding upon this proposal is to give content to the concept of an AESTHETIC GOAL. In the second book of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* we find some of the raw materials for doing so. There, Wittgenstein dwells at length on our ability to notice what he calls “aspects” (*Aspekten*) of what we perceive. In Wittgenstein’s celebrated example, one comes to see a new aspect when one passes from seeing Jastrow’s famous Duck-Rabbit as a duck (picture) to seeing it as a rabbit (picture). Our awareness of the interpretive character of aspects, of the fact that they are ways of construing the deliverances of our senses, is keenest, Wittgenstein teaches us, in such “aspect-switches.” In these eerie sensations of difference-across-sameness, we are aware that none of the lines and shapes on the page have changed, while being simultaneously aware that the image appears differently, appears duck-ish where formerly it appeared rabbit-ish.

2.2 Wittgenstein’s Examples and their Musical Analogues: Music comes up from time to time in Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspects. Surprisingly, these passages have less to teach us about music analysis than do passages in which Wittgenstein sets about categorizing visual/pictorial specimens of aspect perception. I explore the musical relevance of those latter passages below.

“One kind of aspect,” Wittgenstein observes, “might be called an aspect of organization.”39 When such an aspect dawns on us, elements of the perceived thing hang together in a way they formerly did not. Certain of its parts are felt to belong

---

with one another and, by the same token, are felt to have a manifest separateness from certain other parts. Something along these lines happens when we notice that “hotshots” can be chunked as “hot” followed “shots” or as a repetition of “hots.” It also happens when we notice that the double cross figure, one of Wittgenstein’s hobbyhorses [EXAMPLE 1], can be seen in two incompatible ways: with parts of the same shade going together (when the double cross is seen as a white figure against a black ground or as a black figure against a white ground), or with parts of the same quadrant going together (when it is seen three-dimensionally, as an aerial view of a house’s gables).

**EXAMPLE 1:** Double cross:

So-called “formal” music analysis leverages such gestalt processes. By “formal analysis,” musicians usually mean the analysis of phrase structure, sonata form sections, and suchlike.\(^40\) The term can also be more ecumenically interpreted as referring to any kind of analysis concerned with part-whole relations in music where the parts and wholes in question are temporally extended musical events.

This operation of resolving complex musical wholes into their relatively simpler

---

\(^40\) This is the meaning operative in the title of Douglass Green’s well-known textbook *Form in Tonal Music: An Introduction to Analysis* (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1979).
parts is premised on our ability to partition a stream of musical sound into discrete musical happenings. We do this by experiencing durations of music as having a kind of inner unity and a correlative discontinuity with neighboring episodes. This process may be replicated at a lower level by dividing those durations into similarly unified sub-episodes, or at a higher level by compounding them into similarly unified super-episodes. Sometimes an approach to segmentation is suggested by such musical devices as silence, cessations of attack points, overt alterations of texture, registral shifts, and dynamic contrasts, all of which announce the arrival of the recapitulation of the third movement of Beethoven’s “Moonlight” Sonata:

EXAMPLE 2: Beethoven, Op. 27 No. 2, 3rd mvmt., beginning of recapitulation:

---


42 The topic of segmentation has received much attention from music theorists. Christopher Hasty’s “Segmentation and Process in Post-Tonal Music” is the starting point for any inquiry into this subject. Dora Hanninen’s A Theory of Musical Analysis: On Segmentation and Associative Organization (University of Rochester Press, 2012) is a compendious and systematic contribution to this area of study.
In this passage we feel that distance in both time (pause/silence) and in tone space (break in register) helps to excavate a gulf of distinctness between musical entities that lie on either side of a temporal and tone-spatial fault line. But unity can also, more subtly, persist across such gaps. Take measures 34 and 35 of the middle movement. These we can hear as a cohesive event because they can be assimilated to a single voice-leading procedure (a 6/4 decoration of the dominant chord), even though silence and a large leap intervene between the 6/4 suspension and its resolution:

EXAMPLE 3: Beethoven, Op. 27 No. 2, 2nd mvmt., end of Allegretto section:

43 Such analytical comments, I would hasten to remark, don’t represent a terminal discovery of the form that a piece determinately has, but instead represent a stage in an ongoing process of sifting through, and settling upon, some members of the inexhaustible proliferation of aspects of that we can harness in “forming” our musical experiences.
Further, Wittgenstein’s taxonomy includes aspects “which are mainly determined by thoughts and associations, and others that are ‘purely optical.’”\textsuperscript{44} Marking the difference between the two main aspects of the double cross—black cross on white ground or vice versa—is a “purely optical” affair in that it doesn’t appear to recruit any cognitive capacities worth calling “conceptual.”\textsuperscript{45} We can “say all there is to say” about those contrasting aspectual experiences, perhaps, solely by means of demonstrative gestures, first pointing to the black cross, then pointing to the white cross. Other ways of viewing the figure, such as seeing the white cross as four corners of a piece of paper folded toward the middle,\textsuperscript{46} depend on more, and more sophisticated, conceptual proficiencies, and would seem to be unspecifiable except by means of a “concept-mongering”\textsuperscript{47} public language.

The principal metric aspects of the second movement scherzo of the “Moonlight” sonata might be called “purely auditory,” on analogy with Wittgenstein’s “purely optical” aspects. \textbf{EXAMPLE 4} diagrams these metrical aspects.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{45} One might wish to say that figure-ground aspects call upon elementary spatial and/or color concepts. This will depend on what one’s theory of concepts is.
\textsuperscript{46} I borrow this example from Malcolm Budd, “Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects,” \textit{Mind} January (1987), 4.
\textsuperscript{47} I borrow this expression from Brandom, who uses it often. See, e.g., \textit{Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 184.
\end{flushleft}

The upward-pointing arrows in the example indicate which beats of the first eight measures to hear as strong. This is an aspectual experience one could perfectly well get across by clapping or conducting—by ostensive rather than descriptive means. The analogy between the double cross’s aspects and these metric aspects is strengthened by the fact that one can toggle back and forth between the metric aspects throughout the scherzo, due to the pervasiveness of its iambic rhythmic figure. One can manipulate ad libitum the way the metric “figure” seems to jut out from the rhythmic “ground,” just as one can segue from seeing the double cross as black-on-white to seeing it as white-on-black and back again.

On the other hand, in music too, “sometimes the conceptual is dominant in an aspect” and “the experience of an aspect can be expressed only through a conceptual explanation.” Hearing the iambic figurations as resembling the sound of galloping is something one can do only if one makes use of a sufficiently contentful concept of

---

what it is to gallop. Doing that requires one to be sufficiently conversant with the
associated suite of concepts (LEG, HORSE, GROUND, etc.) without which one’s
understanding of galloping would be imperfect. Hearing the first four measures as a
prolongation of the dominant scale degree (A-flat in the key of D-flat) and the
following four measures as a prolongation of the tonic scale degree (D-flat in the key
of D-flat), though from a certain perspective miles away from hearing the music as
galloping, similarly enlists the deployment of a web of interrelated concepts.49

In many cases, Wittgenstein also observes, one needs to use imagination—
the visualization of what is absent—in order to appreciate an aspect of what is
present.50 We can see a square as half a rectangle, or see the letter “x” as the first
letter of “xylophone,” by mentally juxtaposing what is seen with what is only
pretended-to-be-seen.

Musical aspects sometimes arise out of a comparable blending of what is
“really heard” with what is, for lack of a better term, “audiated.” The decorated A’
section of the second movement of “Moonlight” is expanded by a stuttering
repetition in m. 31 of the first half of the tonic statement of the theme:

______________________________
49 I make the assumption that hearing prolongations presupposes the ability to
distinguish between primary tones and (various kinds of) tones of figuration, and
that this requires one to have and use concepts like PASSING TONE and NEIGHBOR NOTE.
And I make the assumption that hearing something as expressing a dominant scale
degree presupposes the ability to distinguish between dominant scale degrees and
other kinds of scale degrees, and that this requires one to have and use scale-degree
concepts. There is much to be said about what the criteria are for counting as fully
possessing and correctly using a concept. It seems obvious to me that the fullness
and correctness come in degrees. My inclination is to say that one who has only
partial mastery of concept can still have an attenuated perception of the
corresponding conceptual aspect.
50 Ibid., 698.

I find that I can gain an intense auditory impression that m. 31 is an expansion if, in my mind’s ear, I try to hear the phrase closing as it did in the A section, with the melodic line stepping down post-haste from A-flat to D-flat (mm. 6-8 [EXAMPLE 4]). This goes against the grain of what really happens: in actuality, the melodic line gingerly avoids descending to the tonic by leaping away from it by fourths, first from E-flat to A-flat (as necessitated by the repetition), and then from F to B-flat (postponing the F’s resolution to the E-flat of m. 34). The aspect of

---

51 Ramon Satyendra suggested to me that my description evokes interruption more than it evokes expansion. But, as he also noted, interruption of a descent combined with repetition and closure does increase the total amount of time the descent takes up. Perhaps the best thing to call my auditory impression is expansion-by-means-of-interruption-and-repetition, though this is ungainly.
expansion is one I can make vivid for myself by setting up a conflict, or simply a non-identity, between imagined sounds and non-imagined sounds.52

2.3 An Analysis of the Concept of Perceiving As: It is interesting in its own right that much of what Wittgenstein has to say about visual aspects applies, mutatis
mutandis, to musical hearing. But can we state in a more rigorous way what is common to all of these examples, visual and auditory alike, in virtue of which they are instances of the broader phenomenon of perceiving-as? Working through this question will bring us to a deeper understanding of what may be at stake in the project of music analysis.

Wittgenstein says plenty about what kind of evidence we hold to be decisive when determining whether someone is in the state of seeing something as something else. Mostly he touches on telltale ways of gazing, gesticulating, and talking.53 But he makes only glancing reference to the nature of the state that this

52 Similarly, one way of hearing deceptive cadences as deceptions is to imagine hearing a tonic resolution where one in fact hears an off-tonic resolution, which is a way of comparing what actually occurs in a piece with an auditory image of “what was supposed to have happened” or “what a less creative composer would have done.” Recomposition is an analytical technique that can foster this kind of imagining. Recomposing a metrically complex passage so that it is metrically foursquare, for example, is a way to hone one’s ability to hear the original as metrically complex.

53 “If you see the drawing as such-and-such an animal, what I expect from you will be pretty different from what I expect when you merely know what it is meant to be... And if you knew how to play this game, and, given a particular situation, you exclaimed with special expression “Now it’s a house!”—you would be giving expression to the dawning of an aspect. If I heard someone talking about the duck-rabbit, and now he spoke in a certain way about the special expression of the rabbit’s face I should ay, now he’s seeing the picture as a rabbit. But the expression in one’s voice and gestures is the same as if the object had altered and had ended by becoming this or that” (Philosophical Investigations, pp. 205-206). It should be noted that, in general, knowing that x is f is neither necessary nor sufficient for seeing x as f. I can see Duck-Rabbit as a duck picture even if I believe that it fails to be a genuine
evidence is evidence for, to what is constitutive of, rather than indicative of, seeing-as. For instance: “Here perhaps we should like to reply: ... ‘I see the figure as a box’ means: I have a particular visual experience which I have found that I always have when I interpret the figure as a box or when I look at a box.” Or, “How would the following account do: ‘What I can see something as, is what it can be a picture of’? What this means is: the aspects in a change of aspects are those ones which the figure might sometimes have permanently in a picture.”

duck picture because the lines bear an accidental rather than intentional resemblance to ducks. This shows that knowing is not necessary for seeing-as. And I can know that Duck-Rabbit is a duck picture (perhaps based on someone’s reliable testimony) but fail to see its duck aspect. This shows that knowing is not sufficient for seeing as.

Another way of saying this is to say that Wittgenstein doesn’t try very hard to give an analysis of the concept of seeing-as. The view of philosophy as “analysis” holds that philosophy’s mandate is to promote clarity by translating expressions employing some target vocabulary (such as the vocabulary of spatio-temporal objects) into expressions couched in a putatively more primary vocabulary (such as the logical empiricist’s favored vocabulary of sense-data words plus logical connectives). Wittgenstein’s disavowal of this philosophical program is memorialized in the Investigations’ famous rejection of the possibility of successfully analyzing “family resemblance” terms, such as “game.” These are terms whose semantic interpretant is an open-ended range of entities bound together by a tissue of overlapping similarities, rather than a class of objects united by a property that all and only they share.

Another way of saying this is to say that Wittgenstein doesn’t try very hard to give an analysis of the concept of seeing-as. The view of philosophy as “analysis” holds that philosophy’s mandate is to promote clarity by translating expressions employing some target vocabulary (such as the vocabulary of spatio-temporal objects) into expressions couched in a putatively more primary vocabulary (such as the logical empiricist’s favored vocabulary of sense-data words plus logical connectives). Wittgenstein’s disavowal of this philosophical program is memorialized in the Investigations’ famous rejection of the possibility of successfully analyzing “family resemblance” terms, such as “game.” These are terms whose semantic interpretant is an open-ended range of entities bound together by a tissue of overlapping similarities, rather than a class of objects united by a property that all and only they share.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 194. Wittgenstein’s hypothesis hereabouts is that to say we are seeing a drawing as a box is to say that we are presented with the same configuration of sense data that we are typically caused to be presented with when we look at real boxes. He abandons this proposal for reasons made obvious by Duck-Rabbit: changes in what aspect we see when gazing at Duck-Rabbit do not seem to be accounted for by changes in sense-data.

Philosophical Investigations, p. 193. The answer to Wittgenstein’s rhetorical question is that the account won’t do very well at all. There are at least three problems with it. The first is that Wittgenstein’s first proposal (that what we can see something as is what it can be a picture of) won’t work: a small black dot can in fact be a picture of Obama (portrayed as he appears at a very great distance) without our being able to see the dot as Obama in anything resembling the way in which we can see Duck-Rabbit as a duck or a rabbit. The second problem is that Wittgenstein’s second proposal (that the aspects in a change of aspects are those
These proposals don’t stand up to much scrutiny (for scrutiny, see footnotes 54 and 55). To recognize that these proposals are deficient, however, isn’t necessarily to think that Wittgenstein has made a gaffe. Numerous rethinkings and qualifications of a provisionally introduced, initially inchoate idea, and sometimes the sudden abandonment of the idea, are hallmarks of Wittgenstein’s fragmentary, epigrammatic style in the *Investigations*. Thus there is reason to think that his intent is to provoke curiosity and philosophical exploration, not to convince of us his considered view.57 Indeed, Wittgenstein probably felt little pressure to have a considered opinion about the correct conceptual analysis of seeing-as, given that part of the raison d’être of the *Investigations* is to indict the philosophical project of subjecting individual terms to conceptual or semantic analysis—and indeed, to indict philosophical theory-construction generally. “Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.”58

Notwithstanding the anti-theoretical, quietistic leanings of the later Wittgenstein, there is clarity to be gained from trying to define more tightly than he did what it is to perceive something as something else—even if, at the end of the

---

ones which the figure might sometimes have permanently in a picture) is not equivalent, or even remotely close, in meaning to his first proposal, as he alleges it is. The third problem is that the second proposal presupposes an understanding of concept of an aspect, and thus says nothing informative about what kind of thing an aspect is, which was ostensibly Wittgenstein’s purpose.57 There is also the complication that Wittgenstein’s real views are obscured by the patina of subtle irony that overlays many passages of the *Investigations*. The text also frequently takes the form of an unmarked dialogue. This can make it difficult to discern which voice is that of the philosophical protagonist, thus further camouflaging Wittgenstein’s true attitudes.

57 There is also the complication that Wittgenstein’s real views are obscured by the patina of subtle irony that overlays many passages of the *Investigations*. The text also frequently takes the form of an unmarked dialogue. This can make it difficult to discern which voice is that of the philosophical protagonist, thus further camouflaging Wittgenstein’s true attitudes.

58 *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 126.
day, Wittgenstein is correct to think that a final statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for satisfying the concept is a will-o-the-wisp. For simplicity's sake, I focus below on the case of seeing-as, with the assumption that it would be a straightforward matter to generalize what I say so as to cover other sense modalities.

To wit: I am seeing the $x$ as an $f$ to the extent that how to practically take and treat the $x$ as an $f$ is something which is immediately manifest to me through my visual experience of $x$. To return to our favored example, I am seeing Duck-Rabbit as a rabbit picture to the extent that how to go about performing the actions associated with (or constitutive of) according to Duck-Rabbit the status of a rabbit picture is known to me non-inferentially based solely on how Duck-Rabbit looks.\(^{59}\) This set of actions includes things like assessing the picture with respect to its resemblance to actual rabbits, identifying and pointing out the correspondences between specific parts of the canvass and specific parts of rabbits, cataloguing its similarities to and differences from other rabbit pictures, and so on. The force of “non inferentially” is that one's sense of what to do and how to do it is not the terminus of a process in which one consciously extracts consequences from consciously entertained premises. Nor is it a deliberation in which one consciously appraises one's sensory

\(^{59}\) Contrast this with a case where I see what I know to be a picture of a boat but do not see it as a picture of a boat because I see it from a great distance and can't at all discern the lines and shapes on the canvas. How the painting looks is very little guide, in this case, to performing the actions that constitute practically taking or treating it as a boat picture. Thus seeing $x$ and knowing it to be an $f$ does not entail seeing $x$ as $f$. Nor does the entailment go in the other direction: seeing $x$ as an $f$ does not entail knowing (or even believing) that the $x$ is $f$. I might not be able to help seeing a painting as a portrait of my mother (because of an accidental resemblance) even though I know that my mother didn't pose for the picture.
data as a source of justificatory grounds for the selection of some course of action.

Rather, I simply and unreflectively see a way of going about things. More
metaphorically, when I see the $x$ as an $f$, how the $x$ looks is, in and of itself, a kind of
template for how to pattern my actions so that they embody a commitment to $x$’s
having an $f$-status. Or, we could alternately say, the look of the thing is intrinsically a
template for how to comport myself as though the $x$ were an $f$. Perceiving-as (the
genus of which seeing-as is a species) is thus a way in which a particular kind of
situation- or object-specific knowledge-how, a contextual practical capacity for
treating this $x$ as an $f$, is directly furnished by the act of perceiving $x$. We can
describe a Wittgensteinian aspect, then, more metaphorically still, as the reflected
image in consciousness of what Gibson calls an “action possibility” or an
“affordance.”

60 The intended contrast is with something’s appearance being derivatively action
guiding. I have in mind cases where the appearance of a thing is action-guiding only
in conjunction with explicit appeal to auxiliary premises or commitments.
Consciously inferring from the sign’s redness and octagonality that I ought to stop is
different from seeing it as a to-be-halted-in-front-of sign. For a discussion of the
phenomenology of signage that makes particular reference to automobiles and
traffic, see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (San

61 “Ecological” or “interactionist” psychology studies the dynamics of agent-situation
interactions. Gibson, one of the central figures of this school, factored these
interactions into “affordances” and “abilities.” According to James Greeno, in
“Gibson’s Affordances,” Psychological Review (1994), 338, “[a]ffordances and
abilities...are, in [Gibson’s] view, inherently relational. An affordance relates
attributes of something in the environment to an interactive activity by an agent
who has some ability, and an ability relates attributes of an agent to an interactive
activity with something in the environment that has some affordance.” Affordances,
as Gibson explains them, are seen in a situation by an ability-exercising agent.
“Affordances are, in this view, preconditions for activity. The presence in a situation
of a system that provides an affordance for some activity does not imply that the
activity will occur, although it contributes to the possibility of that activity” (Greeno,
p. 340). It would be very interesting to assess the extent to which Gibson’s ideas,
The “dawning” of an aspect, according to this way of making things out, is the acquisition of a kind of knowledge-how that I come to possess because and insofar as something looks the way it does to me. Following out this result a bit, we can state with more exactness what kind of a change a change of aspect is. What changes is not the thing itself, nor, in one sense, the thing’s appearance—for, on one interpretation of “qualitative,” things are qualitatively the same on either end of a change of aspect. The change is, instead, a change in how the thing’s appearance straightaway familiarizes me with a manner of handling or dealing with that thing.

and those of ecological psychology in general, are contiguous with Heidegger’s concept, developed first in *Being and Time*, of an “equipmental life-world” in which we “always already” relate to the objects in our horizon as “tools-for-use.”

---

62 “Dawning” is Anscombe’s loose but lovely translation of Wittgenstein’s “aufleuchtend,” which would be more literally rendered as “lighting up” or “illumination.”

63 This move is reminiscent of David Lewis’s way of denying Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. Jackson’s argument appears in “What Mary didn’t Know,” *Journal of Philosophy* (1983), 291-295 and elsewhere; Lewis’s rejoinder appears in “What Experience Teaches” in *There’s Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument*, eds. Ludlow, Nagasawa, and Stoljar (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 77-103. Jackson has us imagine a scientist, Mary, who knows all the physical facts there are to know about color vision, but who has never seen the color red. Jackson then asks: when Mary sees red for the first time, what kind of a fact does she learn? It is by hypothesis not a physical fact, from which it follows that there are nonphysical facts, from which it follows that physicalism is false. Lewis denies this conclusion by championing the “ability hypothesis,” which says that “knowing what an experience is like just is the possession of...abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize [types of experiences]. It isn’t the possession of any kind of information, ordinary or peculiar. It isn’t knowing that certain possibilities aren’t actualized. It isn’t knowing-­‐that. It’s knowing how. Therefore it should be no surprise that lessons won’t teach you what an experience is like. Lessons impart information; ability is something else. Knowledge-­‐that does not automatically provide know-­‐how” (Lewis, p. 100). The bone of contention between Lewis and Jackson is over the status of phenomenal/non-­‐physical facts. In the present essay, I speak of the “intrinsic character of experience” and “what it is like to see Duck-­‐Rabbit,” but I am agnostic about whether these ways of speaking commit me to the existence of phenomenal/non-­‐physical facts and thus to the falsity of physicalism. I don’t have a
The relevant alteration is an alteration to what mode of conduct is immediately present to my awareness via my sensory relation to an object. Now it looks as though I should call these lines rabbit ears; now it looks as though they bear comparison with a duck’s beak. At each of these moments, how things look to me endows me—without the interposition of conscious inferences or calculations based upon how things look—with a different sense of what to do and how to do it.

2.4 Perceiving-as as Knowledge How: Many things would need to be nailed down to make this account a sturdy one. There are questions left hanging about whether and how being in a state of seeing-as is intrinsically motivating or gives one certain dispositions to act. There are issues relating to how seeing-as is a matter of degree. And there is a great deal to be said about how conscious inferences can be causally responsible for our states of seeing-as (consider how I may see the dagger differently following the inference I draw upon learning that it is made of rubber and has a retractable stage blade), even if it is plausible to say, as I have, that the action-guiding-ness of the resultant aspectual states is noninferential. These topics horse in that race. But it is worth noting that there are overtones of Lewis’s rebuttal to Jackson’s argument in my position that seeing Duck-Rabbit as a duck picture means being in a state where one’s visual experience of Duck Rabbit noninferentially furnishes one with the know-how required to treat Duck-Rabbit as a duck picture.

64 On my account, the more detailed an action guide one’s visual impression is, the more one counts as being in a state of seeing-as. Call this increase in detail an increase in the level of richness of the seeing-as experience. A person who has an experience of seeing-as that is not at all rich in this sense (because his visual experience is very imprecise as an action guide) may nevertheless have the experience very vividly. For example, an entomologist may see a creature as a bee more richly than does a non-specialist whose concept of bees is very coarse-grained. But the non-specialist could be profoundly affected by coming to see the creature as a bee, perhaps because of an acute fear of bees, and thus be in a state of seeing-as that is more vivid than that of the cool-headed entomologist. I am grateful to Daniel Drucker for pressing me to draw this distinction between richness and vividness.
deserve more attention than I can give them here. However, in spite of the account’s still-blurry edges, this much is distinctly visible: aspect perception is fundamentally connected with a practical capacity, a form of knowledge how. Wittgenstein saw the significance of this point. Practically taking or treating the $x$ as if it were an $f$, he is at pains to point out, is a deed the seer-as does, a way she conducts herself with respect to the aspect-wearing object, a performance whose success others can and do judge according to public, shared norms. A failure to see an aspect of something, Wittgenstein assumes, will show up as a diminished capacity to behave toward the thing in the requisite way. “What does it mean,” Wittgenstein asks,

“For me to look at a drawing in descriptive geometry and say: ‘I know that this line appears again here, but I can’t see it like that’? Does it simply mean a lack of familiarity in operating with the drawing; that I don’t ‘know my way about’ too well?—This familiarity is certainly one of our criteria. What tells us that someone is seeing the drawing three-dimensionally is a certain kind of ‘knowing one’s way about’. Certain gestures, for instance, which indicate the three-dimensional relations: fine shades of behaviour.”**65

What we customarily hold to be probative in determining whether other people are in a state of seeing-as, Wittgenstein notices, are fine shades of behavior that evince mastery of a certain way of acquitting oneself in the presence of the aspect-wearing object:

---

65 Philosophical Investigations, 204.
“Now he’s seeing it like this, now like that’ would only be said of someone capable of making certain applications (Anwendungen) of the figure quite freely. The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique.”66

“But how queer for this to be the logical condition of someone’s having such-and-such an experience! After all, you don’t say that one only ‘has toothache’ if one is capable of doing such and such.—From this it follows that we cannot be dealing with the same concept of experience here. It is a different though related concept. It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he has had this experience.”67

Wittgenstein is fascinated by the minute subtleties of our linguistic practice of acknowledging one another as seers-as. This practice, he notices, is one that takes stock of the kinds of capabilities one’s actions put on display. For others to accord to me the status of being a seer-as, I must be able, in a recognizably fluid and facile way, to treat the aspect-wearing object as the kind of thing whose aspect it wears. To count as seeing Duck-Rabbit as a rabbit picture, I must be able to address myself to Duck-Rabbit in a way that, according to a shared and publically assessable standard, befits a rabbit picture. The behaviors that constitute the exercise of this ability are what supply the external evidence that I am seeing Duck-Rabbit as a duck picture, and are thus what entitle others to believe and assert that I am. These behaviors are not, however, what makes it true that I am seeing Duck-Rabbit as a duck picture. What makes it true, if my account has a grain of truth to it, is that how duck rabbit appears to me acquaints me directly with how to do—is an enabling

66 Philosophical Investigations, 208.
67 Philosophical Investigations, 208-209.
condition of my doing—the kinds of things that give others a reason to say
“Parkhurst is seeing it as a duck.”

Wittgenstein at times appears to sloppily collapse this distinction. It might seem that he confuses evidence and truth conditions—mixes up epistemological question with an ontological one—when he says that “the mastery of a technique” is a “logical condition of someone’s having such-and-such an experience.” The “mastery of a technique,” if that means the competent performance of the applicable “fine shades of behavior,” as I said above, does give us good evidentiary grounds for believing that someone is in a state of seeing-as. However, elevating these behavioral performances to the status of a “logical condition” looks like a misstep: there is nothing logically contradictory about someone’s being in a state of seeing-as without also demonstrating the behaviors that alert others to the fact that she is in this state.

This criticism is good, as far as it goes, but there is a way of construing Wittgenstein’s claim about logical conditions so that it does not fall so wide of the mark. Assume that “mastery of a technique,” as Wittgenstein uses it, refers to the same thing as “knowing one’s way around”—i.e., to a capacity for behaving appropriately toward something one perceives. And assume that that seeing-as is, as I have argued, a kind of perceptual experience that constitutively furnishes one with a capacity for behaving appropriately toward something one perceives. On these assumptions, having the capacity to execute a certain set of intricate gestural and verbal behaviors is a “logical condition of someone’s having such-and-such an experience” because the experience in question (seeing-as) consists in “knowing
one’s way around,” consists in having “mastery of a technique” of treating the object in such-and-such a way. If all of this is true, our being able to engage in the relevant “fine shades of behavior” would then be a sine qua non (a “logical condition”) for our being able to see x as an f because to have an aspectual experience just is to have mastery of a certain technique of behaving toward the object.68

2.5 Gaining the Ability to Perceive As: Whether or not Wittgenstein is correct to think that the mastery of a behavioral technique is a logical precondition of undergoing a particular kind of perceptual experience,69 he is correct to think that they have a great deal to do with one another. In particular, the behavioral technique and the perceptual state can mutually foster one another. Getting oneself

68 Wittgenstein’s remark about logical conditions could also be read as an affirmation of logical behaviorism, which is a thesis about the meanings of mental terms (“logical” in “logical condition” might be thought to strongly suggest this). Wittgenstein could then read as claiming that what it means to assert that someone is in a state of seeing-as is that the person has a collection of behavioral tendencies or, even more starkly, that the person is presently engaging in certain behaviors. There is a long, though controversial, tradition of interpreting Wittgenstein as a logical behaviorist. My take on seeing-as inclines me to try to interpret Wittgenstein as making a claim about an identity of capacities rather than about the meaning of a mental term. I find logical behaviorism to be an indefensible thesis, so I am attracted to readings that don’t saddle Wittgenstein with this commitment, but I acknowledge that this requires me to make light of Wittgenstein’s use of the word “logical.”

69 Whether or not that is a sensible thing to say depends on how thick a notion of ability one has. If we think that the ability to treat Duck-Rabbit as a duck picture requires saying the right kinds of things to others when in the presence of Duck-Rabbit, and think that saying the right kinds of things about Duck-Rabbit requires having functional vocal cords, then we might want to say that someone without vocal cords can be in a state of seeing Duck-Rabbit as a duck picture without having the corresponding “mastery of a technique,” which would contradict the claim that the experience presupposes the mastery. But it doesn’t seem to be an outright misuse of “ability” to say that a person with no vocal cords does have the ability to say the right kinds of things about Duck-Rabbit, but is prevented from exercising the ability by his lack of vocal cords. I have nothing invested in settling the question of which of these is a better or more central usage of “ability.”
into a state of seeing \( x \) as an \( f \), in those cases where one doesn’t simply find oneself in that state spontaneously and effortlessly when perceptually presented with the \( x \), can often be a matter of gaining practice in acting out the behaviors that count as treating \( x \) as an \( f \). And it is often true that one cannot fully or expertly treat \( x \) as an \( f \) without having a rich visual experience as of \( x \)'s \( f \)-ness. To take a case that epistemologists make much of, evidently chicken sexers gain the ability to see chicks as female or as male simply by spending enough time carefully observing the selection process of a reliable chicken sexer, who, at least as philosophers relay the example, cannot explicitly state the criteria to which he is responsive in sorting the chickens as he does, other than his own immediately manifest dispositions to sort them that way. He simply sees them as being of one sex or the other, and segregates or labels them accordingly. (One wonders, incidentally, how the first chicken sexer gained the skill, if the philosophers’ description is accurate, but that is a question for another time.) The protégé acquires this capacity to have reliable differential responses to the sex of chicks simply by attending to the maestro’s discriminative activity, without ever being given, and without ever purposefully following, a rule for telling the difference between male and female chicks.

There are contrasting cases where a novice at an activity is provided at the outset with an explicit rule and later internalizes its prescriptions to such a degree that conscious reference to the rule is needless. When one learns to pronounce words written in an unfamiliar alphabet, one at first sounds out the words by consulting a pronunciation table. Later on, one gets to know the sounds of the letters and letter combinations by heart and dispenses with the table. Eventually,
after one follows the memorized pronunciation algorithm for a while, those strings of letters begin to take on the appearance of pronounceable words (we see them as hearable or speakable, if you like) rather than sequences of alien runes. In both the chicken sexer example and in the literacy example, one gains a perceptual ability *en passant*, by beginning to engage in a behavioral practice in an immature and imperfect way, whether that involves following someone else’s lead or following explicit rules one has been given. And, in both cases, one does not become a fully-fledged participant in that practice, does not succeed in doing it just as it is supposed to be done, until one’s perceptions have become refined by enough of the right kind of rehearsal and observance of an accepted way of going about things. The kind of reciprocal determination that has been a recurring theme in this essay is present in such cases inasmuch as engagement in a practice, and the resultant educating and routinizing of one’s bodily and verbal behaviors, has the effect of enhancing and enriching one’s perceptions; and inasmuch as one’s engagement in that practice is brought to perfection only by means of these enriched perceptual powers.

The ear-training classroom is interesting to think about, in connection with the foregoing reflections on how to get oneself into a state of perceiving-as, because the ear-training classroom can be looked upon as a practical laboratory for the acquisition of skills of hearing-as. Consider the ear-training instructor’s efforts to get students to hear triadic sonorities in common-practice tonal musical phrase as dominant chords. Some students gain this ability in a jiffy. It is enough merely to point out to them a few times that in such-and-such a context (here the instructor
establishes a key at the piano) this is the kind of sound that receives the label “dominant” (here she plays $\hat{5}$, $\hat{7}$, and $\hat{2}$ simultaneously). Thereupon, these well-primed students begin to exhibit the “fine shades of behavior” associated with hearing triads as dominant chords: using the word “dominant” in the right way and under the right circumstances, accurately completing harmonic dictation exercises, singing the corresponding tonic note when prompted by a dominant stimulus (provided that they’ve been informed about the relation the concept DOMINANT bears to the concept TONIC), and so on. Other students, by contrast, may require a more drastic intervention. It may be necessary to break things down by presenting a multi-step rule for recognizing dominant chords by ear: first, hear which member of a triad is its root; second, hear this root as the scale’s fifth degree. An oblique way of gaining this conjunction of abilities (hearing the G of a G major triad, in the key of C major, as a root of a triad and as the fifth scale degree), every ear-training teacher knows, is to sing again and again the constituent pitch classes of the triad using vocables that reflect different ways of conceptualizing those constituents: “root-third-fifth-third-root,” “sol-ti-re-si-sol,” “five-seven-two-seven-five,” or whatever. Moreover, this method of singing is not only a means of coming to be able to hear dominant chords. It is also an activity that one can perform with consummate proficiency only when one can successfully hear triads as dominant chords. Thus

70 It is worth flagging a distinction between two kinds of knowledge-how. Following Wittgenstein’s lead, I have explained how seeing-as consists in a kind of knowledge-how, how it is a perceptually-grounded, noninferential state of “knowing one’s way about.” But I also speak of knowing how to perceive $x$ as an $f$ (knowing how to hear collections of scale degrees as dominant chords, for example). This second ability is “meta-practical” with respect to the first: it represents a way of knowing how to be in (or get oneself into) a state of knowing how.
action and perception are here both the means to and the ends of a single musical
*habitus* or *modus vivendi*. This idea is paramount for David Lewin, whom I discuss in
the next section.

**SECTION 3: DAVID LEWIN AND ASPECTUAL HEARING**

3.1 Lewin’s Phenomenological Project: Lewin is one prominent music
analyst whose self-conception and methodology are broadly consonant with the
“aspect-centric” account of musical hearing I have been building up to. In his widely
ranging, widely influential article ”Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of
Perception,”\(^71\) Lewin lays the groundwork for developing a formal model that can
(instruct a computer to) individuate among what he calls “perceptions”\(^72\) of a
harmonically mysterious passage in *Morgengruß*, from Schubert’s *Die Schöne
Mullerin*. The mystery resides in the harmonic spell cast by mm. 12-15, in which
motion from a G minor chord in first inversion (m. 12) to root-position A major
chord (m. 13) is directly succeeded by an exact transposition of those two measures
down a whole step, yielding motion from an F minor chord in first inversion (m. 14)
to a root-position G major chord (m. 15).

**EXAMPLE 6:** Schubert, *Morgengruß*, mm. 12-15

\(^{71}\) David Lewin, “Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception,” *Music
Perception* (1986), 327-392. Hereafter I will use “‘Phenomenology’” (in quotes and
with an upper-case “P”) to refer to Lewin’s article, and “phenomenology” (without
quotes and with a lower-case “p”) to refer to the study of the texture of conscious
experience, particularly as that study is conducted in the works of such
philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Dreyfus.

\(^{72}\) Throughout my discussion of Lewin, I leave the word “perception” in scare quotes
to remind the reader that this is Lewin’s term of art.
Without entering too deeply into the formal niceties of Lewin’s model, we can say, as a blanket statement about Lewin’s objectives, that the model is intended to show how assorted “perceptions” of this passage (and of the slightly wider musical locale Lewin considers, which extends back to m. 9) are differentiated from one another by the following factors: 1) which sonic event acts as the brute acoustical cause of one’s “perception” (Lewin considers events as short as a single measure and as long as seven measures); 2) the musical context relative to which listener interprets that sonic event; the way the listener takes the “perception” in

73 I’m not competent to render an opinion about whether Lewin’s method of constructing formal musical “perceptions” has anything of substance to add to a serious discussion of musical perception within the field of artificial intelligence studies.

74 Strictly speaking, the entities under consideration are sonic events whose means of production is indicated by some number of measures of notated music. For the sake of convenience, Lewin speaks of measures as though they were sonic events rather that instructions for bringing about sonic events.

75 The items in Lewin’s “context” category are also sonic events of which the primary sonic event is a part—though not necessarily a proper part, since one of the “perceptions” Lewin discusses is a “perception” of measure twelve solely in the context of measure twelve. The difference between what Lewin calls “contexts” and what he calls “events” is that “tonal theory,” in some heuristic sense, is understood as a component of each ConteXT” [the odd capitalizations stem from Lewin’s
question to relate to other possible perceptions, events, and concepts;\textsuperscript{76} and the kinds of statements such a “perception” enables or entitles one to make about what one hears. In Lewin’s words:

\[ \text{“p = (EV, CXT, P-R-LIST, ST-LIST). Here the musical perception p is defined as a formal list containing four arguments. The argument EV specifies a sonic event or family of events being “perceived.” The argument CXT specifies a musical context in which the perception occurs. The argument P-R-LIST is a list of pairs (p_i, r_i); each pair specifies a perception p_i and a relation r_i which p bears to p_i. The argument ST-LIST is a list of statements s_1, ..., s_k made in some stipulated language L.”} \]

Lewin’s “Phenomenology” has many strong points. The lucidity with which it describes the significance of and differences among the categories EV, CXT, P-R-LIST, and ST-LIST is not one of them. The nature of the “arguments” that go into the “formal list” of a Lewinian “perception” does not become easier to understand the more one pores over Lewin’s explanations of them.\textsuperscript{77} But, rather than embarking on a sustained critique or reconstruction of Lewin’s model—a critique would be too

\textsuperscript{76} Part of what gives a Lewinian “perception” its particular character is how it is taken by the perceiver to “include,” “reinforce,” “confirm,” “support,” “annihilate,” “deny,” “imply,” “elaborate,” “modify,” “recapitulate,” or “expand” other possible “perceptions.”

\textsuperscript{77} For instance, I have no idea (and I strongly suspect Lewin has no idea) how or whether elements of the P-R-LIST and elements of the S-T-LIST are supposed to be different in kind. Both lists appear to be comprised of statements one could make on the basis of what one hears.
easy, a reconstruction would be too hard—I will pass on without further ado to a place where Lewin’s thinking makes contact with my thinking.

The items Lewin denominates “descriptions”—assertions connected with particular “perceptions”—most closely approximate what I have been discussing under the heading “auditory aspects.” In spite of the fact that he wants to think of them as sentential objects, Many of Lewin’s “descriptions” do not have the form of prose reports of the contents of a “perception,” but are instead graphical representations of strategies for musical listening. For instance, one of the “descriptions” Lewin says is made available by a particular “perception” of m. 14 of “Morgengruß” is depicted by the following analytical sketch:

**EXAMPLE 7:** Schubert, Morgengruß, m. 14

---

78 Lewin does not describe in any detail what this connection consists in. The thought may be that a person who has the “perception” in question is in an epistemic position to make the assertions that appear on the description list. I would have thought, however, that any given perception puts a person in a position to make a very great number of descriptive statements, and I do not know what Lewin’s selection criteria are for placing certain descriptions on the list but not others.
Though non-verbal, this analytical sketch is susceptible to (admittedly unwieldy) verbal paraphrase. Hearing m. 14 as indicated in the analytical sketch involves hearing the Ab-F-C sonority of m. 14 as a I 3 chord\textsuperscript{79} in the local key of D minor (within the overarching context of a global tonic of C major, although that fact is not communicated by the sketch). This requires mentally interpolating the chord’s D-root, which is not literally present in m. 14. The key area of D minor is felt to have begun with the G-minor-six-subdominant of m. 12, which progresses in idiomatic Phrygian fashion to the A-major-dominant of m. 13. Were this dominant chord to have resolved in a predictable manner to its governing tonic, a root-position D minor chord would have resulted, as indicated at position (a) on the sketch. With the sound of this triad in our ear, we can proceed to hear the chord at position (c) as resulting from both 8-7 (D-C) motion in an upper voice, shown at position (b) on the diagram, and also as resulting from chordal inversion effected by motion from an inner-voice A originating with the (imagined) chord at (a). The inner voice A, when it takes up the role of bass at position (c), is chromatically inflected to A-flat, producing a half diminished seventh chord in second inversion as a tonic substitute. On this (for my ears rather strenuous) hearing, one hears the key area of d minor to persist for the entirety of mm. 12-14.

\textsuperscript{79} The figured-bass symbol in the example places a flat sign beneath the numeral “3,” which is unorthodox. When a flat sign by itself appears in the figuration, it indicates chromatic alteration of the third above the bass, so it makes no sense to have a flat sign beneath the number three. This is either a typo or a non-standard way of indicating that the bass note of the second-inversion seventh chord (A-flat) is lowered from its diatonic position (which would be A-natural).
3.2 Lewinian Aspects: There are two good reasons to think that Lewin would be happy to allow me to interpret m. 14, as well as the verbal paraphrase I just gave of it, as being a delineation of a Wittgensteinian auditory aspect. The first reason is that Lewin himself posits a sameness of kind between the “perceptions” he discusses to the two main ways of seeing aspects of Duck-Rabbit:

“A well-known drawing outlines a Gestalt that can be seen as either a rabbit or a duck. In this connection we can construct a visual percept r, perception-of-a-rabbit, and a visual percept d, perception of a duck; evidently both r and d are well-formed and relevant. One can make verifiable statements on a Statement-LIST for r: these are ears; here is the eye; and so on. One can make verifiable statements in the same language about d: this is the bill; here is the eye; and so on.”

We see that Lewin considers the perceptual model constructed in “Phenomenology” to have the right kind of structure for formally differentiating between what it is to see Duck-Rabbit as a duck (picture) and what it is to see Duck-Rabbit as a rabbit (picture). From this I conclude that Lewin’s “perceptions” are (appropriately thought of as) Wittgensteinian aspects, and that Lewin himself had no reservations about thinking about them in that way.

The second reason has to do with Lewin’s preoccupation with the interconnectedness of musical action and musical perception. There is a deep affinity between Lewin’s agenda in “Phenomenology” and my treatment of aspects

\[80\] This excerpt belongs to a claim Lewin makes about the impossibility of seeing Duck-Rabbit as a rabbit picture and as a duck picture at the same time, and about the analogous impossibility of mingling contradictory musical “perceptions.” In a paper delivered at the Royal Music Association Music and Philosophy Study Group (London, 2013), Joseph Dubiel criticizes Lewin for holding this view.
in the present essay, an affinity that may be described in Lewin’s expressions of anxiety about the viability of any theory-of-phenomenology-cum-theory-of-music. Lewin spends much of the second half of his article fretting over what he sees as a troubling divorce: that between, on the one hand, a perception-based approach to music theorizing and, on the other hand, “what we call people’s ‘musical behavior,’” a category that includes competent listening, to be sure, but also competent production and performance.81 The worry that dogs Lewin is that it is perilous for music theory to give primary emphasis to “a paradigm in which a ‘listener’ X is ‘perceiving’ some ‘music’ Y that is demonstrably other-than-X,” since to adopt this paradigm is necessarily to give short shrift to “musical action,”82 is necessarily to fail to systematically engage with “ways of suggesting what might be done [compositionally or performatively], beyond ways of regarding what has been done.”83 Accordingly, “...since ‘music’ is something you do, and not just something you perceive (or understand),” Lewin concludes, “a theory of music cannot be developed fully from a theory of musical perception.”

These misgivings highlight a juncture where Lewin’s driving concerns come together with Dewey’s and Wittgenstein’s and, by extension, with mine. The impetus behind Dewey’s attempt to rethink of the nature of artistic appreciation84 is

81 Lewin, 377.
82 Lewin, 377.
83 Lewin, 377.
84 This rethinking, as becomes clear at various moments of Art as Experience, has more to do with proclaiming a vision of what aesthetic appreciation could optimally be than it has to do with giving an innovative account of what aesthetic appreciation matter-of-factually is. Dewey seems to hold the (surely Marx-inspired) view that a society’s aesthetic way of life is an epiphenomenal fallout of the form of economic organization the society adopts. Dewey draws a direct line from the rise of
his dim view of “the conditions that create the gulf which exists generally between producer and consumer in modern society.” These conditions “operate to create also a chasm between ordinary and esthetic experience. Finally we have, as the record of this chasm, accepted as if it were normal, the philosophies of art that locate it in a region inhabited by no other creature, and that emphasize beyond all reason the merely contemplative character of the esthetic. Confusion of values enters in to accentuate the separation. Adventitious matters, like the pleasure of collecting, of exhibiting, of ownership and display, simulate esthetic values. Criticism is affected. There is much applause for the wonders of appreciation and the glories of the transcendent beauty of art indulged in without much regard to capacity for esthetic perception in the concrete.”

Were it not for certain historical anachronisms, Lewin’s grievances against contemporary musical culture could serve as a continuation of Dewey’s diagnosis of the aesthetic maladies of capitalist modernity:

“Our conceiving (and encountering) ‘readers’ of French who neither speak nor write French is just like our conceiving (and encountering) ‘listeners’ to music who do not make music in any way. Indeed we conceive (and encounter) ‘fans’ who watch but do not play ball games, and ‘audiences’ for political debates who do not themselves engage in any political activity but rather watch ‘the politicians,’ listen to ‘them,’ and eventually—perhaps—vote. In other times and places, a region was considered ‘musical’ if its inhabitants habitually made music, one way or another, to the best of their various abilities; nowadays and here, regional music ‘lovers’ boast of their ‘world-class’ orchestras capitalism to the stagnation of western museum culture, which he sees as a “memorial[] to the rise of nationalism and imperialism” whose primary function is to “reflect and establish superior cultural status.” Dewey, Art as Experience, 8-9.  

85 Art as Experience, 10.
whose members probably commute), their concert series of prestigious recitalists, their improved attendance at concerts (especially expensive fund-raising concerts), their superb hi-fi s, their state-of-the-art compact disc players, and so on.”

3.3 Alleviating Lewin’s Worries: But the seeds to a solution, both to the problem Lewin believes afflicts phenomenologically-oriented methods of music theorizing and also to the societal problems that provoke Lewin’s musical-cultural polemic, lie near at hand in “Phenomenology,” and they turn out to be some of the same seeds I’ve been germinating in this essay. This comes into view as we witness Lewin setting up, in order to eventually knock down, a dichotomy whose two opposing elements are the receptive contemplation of music and musical “production and performance not only in the sense of high art but also as manifest in everyday activities of musical ‘noodling.’” “Noodling,” as Lewin uses the word, picks out such activities as

“rhythmic gestures, conscious or unconscious, like patterns of walking, finger-drumming, or nervous scratching; ... singing, whistling, or humming bits of familiar or invented tunes, or variations on familiar tunes; ... timbral productions like twanging metal objects, knocking on wooden ones, making vocal or other bodily sounds without pitched fundamentals or direct phonemic significance, blowing on conch-shells, through hose-pipes, through blades of grass, and so on.”

86 Lewin, 380.
87 Lewin, 378. Lewin also gives a long-winded list of “a whole spectrum of intermediate activities” between high art and noodling, that includes “bad-and-incompetent performances of art, bad-but-somewhat-competent ones (where the performer realizes that a goal has not been attained and has some sense—cognitive or kinetic—of what to do about it), playing in a band or orchestra, or singing in a chorus, at various levels of competence, dancing in more or less structured ways,
This dichotomy is soon unmasked as a false one. Really, as Lewin goes on to argue, our ears are our whole bodies. Ways of gesturing, dancing, manipulating our posture and bearing, and coaxing musical tones from our bodies or from musical instruments, are all partially determinative of how things sound to us, are all themselves “fine shades of behavior” that externally signify, and that may also be the best means of entering into, this or that state of aspectual perceiving. “...[W]hen we play excitedly at the piano upon returning home after a stimulating concert,” Lewin says,

“...we are not executing an aid to perception, or to the memory of perception; rather we are in the very act of perceiving...The same is true when we play fascinatedly again and again over the opening of the finale to the Apassionata; we are not matching the fingers and positions of our right hands to a

performing Lieder or Gospel or chamber music or jazz or rock, informally, semi-formally, or formally, writing passages or pieces of music for informal, semi-formal, or formal groups to play, or for high school bands, orchestras, choruses, or ‘shows,’ improvising solo or in ensemble, putting an ensemble musical score up on the piano rack and ‘fooling around’ with it (making impromptu transcriptions first this way, then that), trying to recover the sound of an ensemble piece from memory by such ‘fooling around,’ on piano or synthesizer keyboards, and so on.”

88 I think that Lewin is insufficiently clear about what he takes exception to. There are at least three distinct things targeted for censure that Lewin unhelpfully runs together in “Phenomenology”: (1) The artificial sundering, particularly in institutions of musical education, of the activities of “creating fresh music...performing existing music...and understanding received musical art”; (2) the failure of phenomenological theories to take productive musical activities (i.e. “creating fresh music” and “performing existing music”) into account; and (3) the lack of appreciation for the fact that musical actions should, in many cases, be thought of as ways of hearing (the fact that “creating fresh music” and “performing existing music” can be ways of “understanding received musical art”). (1) seems to me to be a legitimate complaint, though I think Lewin overstates its gravity. (3) contains an important insight that I believe renders complaint (2) baseless, a point I make in the main body of the text.
preconceived ‘perception’ of the theme; rather we are in the act of perceiving the theme as we move the parts of our bodies to play it; the performances that we essay, in sufficiently competent in gesture, embody a process that is our act of perception.”89

Since musical perception and musical action cannot be neatly separated, it is unsurprising, in Lewin’s estimation, that conveying our aspectual experiences of music to others is often easier to accomplish directly with musical actions rather than indirectly through the mediation of language. “I can’t hear what you mean—play it and give me an idea,”90 we might well say, when communication breaks down as someone tries to verbally specify her aspectual experience but fails to make herself understood—fails to make her understanding of the music understandable to other would-be musical understanders. Wittgenstein, in this vein, remarks that “when my understanding of a theme is expressed by my whistling it with the correct expression, this is an example of such fine shades [of behavior]”91—shades of behavior that clue us in to, and perhaps also show us a way of sharing in, the aspectual experiences someone else is having. Vocal or bodily exertions and phenomenological states, for Lewin and Wittgenstein alike, are as closely interwoven as two sides of the same sheet of paper: “...[T]he way you sing or conduct the first four notes of ‘Joy to the World’ is not something that is separable from the way you perceive structural functions for the notes on which you sing ‘joy’ and ‘world.’ Likewise, your perceptions of Morgengruss are not separable from how long you wait on the fermata at measure 15 before it feels right to go on, when you

89 Lewin, 382.
90 Lewin, 379.
91 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 207.
sing or accompany the song, or when you transcribe it for piano solo. Your perceptions of the song are likewise not separable from how long you want to dwell on the lonely B flat in the piano at measure 12, before allowing the next note of the accompaniment to enter.⁹²

But where, in all of the aforesaid, are the solutions to the problems Lewin thinks to be the worm at the root of phenomenological music theory and contemporary musical culture? Here my answer must be programmatic rather than substantive, a signpost pointing toward the road to a solution rather than a thoroughgoing report of what lies at the end of the road. First, Lewin’s objection to the inherent narrowness of phenomenological inquiry can be met by a proposal that the scope of the classical phenomenological approach be widened in the manner implicitly prescribed by Lewin’s essay. If musical action and musical perception are as inextricably linked as Lewin says they are, then investigations into the phenomenology of musical hearing must also be investigations into the corporeal and communal fabric of embodied and culturally embedded musical “forms of life,” among which are the performative and creative acts that are justly of interest and importance to Lewin.⁹³ As for the difficulties endemic to modernity’s alienating

⁹² Lewin, 388.
⁹³ Another way to put the same point is to say that Lewin’s critique of phenomenology is a critique of one very narrow construal of what it is to give a Husserlian “pure description” of first-personal experience, one that sees this report as limited to the character and quality of “disembodied” intentional states such as perception, memory, and imagination. But the direction phenomenology took post-Husserl (and also to a considerable extent within Husserl’s own oeuvre) was toward developing a theory of the fundamentally embodied, fundamentally social, and fundamentally practical basis of the structure of consciousness or lived experience. The body, and the distinctive phenomenal contribution of kinaesthesis and proprioception, is of signal importance in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological
Compartmentalization of musical life, we can issue a promissory note based on what I just said about opening up phenomenological inquiry to a wider range of musical actions and to input from our physicality and our sociality. It is this: If phenomenological music theory embraces a nexus of activities including (at the very least) performance, composition, and listening, and if phenomenological music theory tasks itself with mapping out the forms of embodiment and enculturation that are the enabling conditions for the fullest realizations of these activities, then phenomenological music theorizing itself could point the way forward, could “show the fly the way out of the bottle,” as Wittgenstein says. It could do this by showing us, in all the sumptuous particularity characteristic of the phenomenological tradition, how what it is like to be a participant in any given musical activity is a function of how that activity is interwoven with one’s participation in a multitude of other musical activities. Lewin roughs out such an insight when he says that “your perceptions of Morgengruß are not separable from how long you wait on the fermata at measure 15 before it feels right to go on, when you sing or accompany the song, or when you transcribe it for solo piano.” Setting out from this point of departure, an in-depth phenomenological investigation would descriptively tabulate the ways in which such activities are inseparable. The investigation might also, normatively and prescriptively, tell us what musical activities we ought to allow to mutually influence one another, tell us which instances of mutual influence we ought to nurture and promote in order to attain the most aesthetically fertile output; and Heidegger, in Being and Time, attempts to trace the indelible phenomenological signature of our (always already) practical, tool-using involvement with our surrounding “life-world.”
musical experiences. These would be steps—albeit a small ones—in the direction of
re-synthesizing or re-integrating a family of musical activities that should by their
nature coincide and interpenetrate, but which currently, to Lewin’s warranted
chagrin, stand at an artificial level of removal from one another, owing to our era’s
pathological push toward musical hyperspecialization.

SECTION 4: MUSIC ANALYSIS, ASPECTS, AND TELEOLOGICAL VALUE

In this culminating portion of this chapter, I bring together materials from
the preceding sections to recommend one way of thinking about the significance
and aims of music analysis.

4.1 Music Analysis and Conceptual Schemes: The Lewin of “Phenomenology”
would, I take it, be amenable to the following statement of what is at the heart of the
music-analytical enterprise: the twin concerns of music analysis, expressed with
maximal generality, are 1) determining what counts as a good way of, as I put it
before, practically taking and treating music and 2) charting the repercussions such
practical resolutions have for how music sounds to us (and vice versa). With
respect to this first sphere of concern, the principal question to settle is: What is the
proper way of relating ourselves, bodily and cognitively, to music? As though music
were an acoustical phenomenon governed by cosmically significant ratios, as
Pythagoreans held? Or (in an updated incarnation of the ancient way of thinking) as
though music were something much of whose interest lies in the algebraic or
geometric properties it exhibits, properties that we may wish to postulate as its
underlying organizational basis, or as the basis of its psychological appeal? Or, very
differently, as though music were a repository of ideology and a congealment of labor, as Adorno supposes? The menu of alternatives is vast. More basically—for it is a question that confronts advocates of all the aforementioned stances equally—what shall count for us as musical objects? To ask that is to ask: how shall we segment musical time and musical space and affix labels to those segmented entities? Will our musical object language have us talking about notes and chords and progressions, or in other terms altogether, perhaps in terms of affective or emotional displays and gestures, or synaesthetically in terms of regions of color? Moving on from our linguistic or conceptual relationship to music to our physical relationship to it (from taking it to treating it—not forgetting, however, the Lewinian insight that these are not separable), how shall we deem it appropriate to react to music with our bodies? Shall we dance and sing? If so, in what manner? Shall we instead reverently listen, and then signal the depth of our reverence with applause at agreed-upon moments? And so on.

We find ourselves in music theory's second sphere of concern when we contemplate how the manifold norms that govern our cognitive and corporeal relations to music have ramifications for how things sound to us. Some, but not all, of the concepts we could bring music under and treat it in accordance with—some of the statuses we might see fit to assign to musical entities—will be such as to induce correlative perceptual aspects in us. The concept augmented sixth chord has this potential; the concept golden ratio, at least as applied to the large-scale form of
lengthy musical pieces, arguably does not. Here is why one might think that this matters. In coming to conclusions about what concepts to deploy in making judgments about music, how aesthetically valuable we find it to be to have a particular aspectual experience can supply us with a reason for deploying the concept associated with that aspect, and thus also a reason for practically taking and treating music as something falling under that concept. Call this position “aesthetic instrumentalism” about music analysis. On this view, what counts as the best suite of concepts to use in conceptually carving up the musical world, or some precinct of it, is partly a function of how rewarding and valuable we find it to undergo the aspectual experiences afforded by the use of those concepts. John Rahn endorsed a token of this type of view thirty-odd years ago when he insisted that “In analyzing a piece the choice of a theory, and then of a description among those possible in the theory, should be made according not to logical or dogmatic but aesthetic criteria; the description that results should be the most musically satisfying description

---

94 The “golden ratio” is the division of a fixed length such that the ratio of the length of the shorter section to the length of the longer section is the same as the ratio of the length of the longer section to the length of the whole. I am not capable of hearing long pieces as grouping into sections whose lengths exhibit the golden ratio. Note, though, that I am denying that this concept has (for me) a corresponding auditory aspect (at least in certain contexts), not denying that this concept could be applied to a musical work in an illuminating or explanatory way. Michael Buchler, in “Reconsidering Klumpenhouwer Networks,” Music Theory Online (2007), raises the question of whether (in my terms, not Buchler’s) there are any auditory aspects corresponding to K-net concepts. See the section III, “The Phenomenology of Displaced Pitch-Class Inversion and Dual Inversion.”

95 I should add, in a Lewinian spirit, that how aesthetically valuable we find an instance of aspect perception to be is not separable from how aesthetically valuable we find it to do the “fine shades of behavior” associated with and facilitated by that experience.

96 I’m making the simplifying assumption that there is what we could call a “unity of cognition and praxis,” such that settling what the right musical concepts are means also settling how music will fit into our plans and actions.
among the alternatives.”97 We can put some flesh on the bones of Rahn’s suggestion by saying this: in deliberating about whether or not to conceive of music as an elaboration of a Schenkerian Ursatz, or as a brocade of permutations of the prime form of a tone row, or as something else, it is necessary to take into account whether the use of this concept gives rise to aspectual experiences we find to be aesthetically valuable. By investing this aesthetic criterion with the authority to exert influence over the choice of a musical theory, we thereby differentiate music theorizing from scientific theorizing. To state the obvious: It would be out of bounds, in deliberating about whether to conceive of matter as being composed of atoms, to appeal to the aesthetic virtues of the aspectual experiences that atomic theory makes available to its adherents.98

This evokes the following picture of musical theory/analysis: The music theorist/analyst is centrally occupied with devising and articulating “interpretive schemes,” codifications of ways of taking and treating music. Part of her aim is to describe the conditions of correct application of the concepts indigenous to a given interpretive scheme and to specify what one must do in order to thereby count as making a correct conceptual application.99 Another part of her aim is to apply those concepts to particular musical objects100 and, in so doing, to personally body forth the actions that are constitutive of such a conceptual application—in Lewin’s

98 Indeed, purely theoretical concepts, those with no observational use at all, don’t seem like they could have associated perceptual aspects, much less associated aspects that would satisfy any sort of aesthetic criteria.
99 This might be likened to music theory, as contrasted with music analysis.
100 This might be likened to music analysis, as contrasted with music theory.
example, “sing[ing] or conduct[ing] the first four notes of “Joy to the World” in line with how “you perceive[s] structural functions for the notes on which you sing ‘joy’ and ‘world.’”

What makes all of this distinctively music-theoretical or music-analytical? What makes what I’ve described a good thing to mean by “music theory” and “music analysis?” The answer is that in music analysis, as Rahn and I (and others) think of it, considerations of aesthetic (musical) value take center stage. This is in contradistinction to modes of scientific inquiry that take music as just one natural object among so many others, subject to the same value-neutral explanatory procedures that rocks and ferns are subject to. Music analysis can define itself

101 This quote suggests that Lewin conceives of music analysis as a procedure meant to fine-tune musical activities (listening, playing, etc.) of the analyst herself. Music analysis is a means of developing the analyst’s own loving relationship with music, and is only derivatively something one publishes or presents for the benefit of others. (I may be putting words in Lewin’s mouth here, but this seems consistent with the view of music analysis as a hermeneutic practice that crystallizes out of Lewin’s analytical writings.) I have the same conception. I refer many times in this essay to “the appreciator” of music and “the analyst” of music. In the picture of music analysis I am trying to paint, they are the same figure.

102 Things are not really this simple. Feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science, for example, argue that value-neutrality is part of the self-mythologizing, but not the reality, of scientific inquiry. See Elizabeth Anderson’s introduction to this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/).

103 Richard Taruskin, in “Reply to Brown and Dempster,” Journal of Music Theory (1989), 162, and in “Catching up with Rimsky Korsakov,” Music Theory Spectrum (2011), 180 bemoans music theorists’ proclivity for treating pieces of music “as though they were rocks or ferns.” In the earlier article, Taruskin makes the charge that Brown and Dempster “want to see and to treat musical works as if they were rocks or ferns or subatomic particles—God’s creations. But of course they are not that; they are creations of God’s creatures, products of culture, coded with human values, expressive of human volition, agents of some form of human communication, individually as well as in the aggregate.” Twenty two years later, he makes the charge that Allen Forte “wants to approach musical documents as if they were natural objects like rocks or ferns or coelacanths or subatomic particles—God’s
against scientific inquiry by permitting the aesthetic merits of auditory aspectual experiences to provide both a standard for the construction or evaluation of music-interpretive schemes and a reason for putting those interpretive schemes to use in particular cases.

4.2 Aspects and Interpretations: This high-altitude description of the purposes of music theorizing makes it easy to overlook the fact that on the ground, the ties that bind interpretations to audible aspects can get quite tangled. For instance, one might initially determine, based on looking at a score, that there are good grounds for applying a particular descriptor to a particular musical object, e.g. the descriptor INVERTED STATEMENT OF THE FUGAL SUBJECT. Thereafter, what one must do to gain the ability to hear a series of notes as an inverted statement of the fugal subject is pretty obvious, even if the discovery of the description’s applicability wasn’t so obvious: just hear how the intervals of the inverted melody span the same distance as, but go in the opposite direction of, the corresponding intervals in the rectus version; learn to pick melody out of its surroundings, perhaps by solfèging it several times before listening; and so on. Other times one may be in command of a certain way of describing a musical structure—say, as exhibiting an interesting or elegant mathematical property—without yet having a notion of what it would be to hear the music as answering to that description, much less a notion of how to get

________________________________________________________________________

creations. But of course they are not God’s creations; they are creations of God’s creatures, who since the expulsion from the Garden of Eden have lived in history. Their creations are not only products of history but also products of culture, coded with human values, expressive of human volition, agents of some form of human communication, individually as well as in the aggregate.” Music theory evidently got worse between 1989 and 2011, prompting Taruskin to introduce coelecanths into his (barely) updated indictment.
good at doing so. In such a case one is faced with the challenge of inventing a brand new method of, so to speak, converting words into heards. Differently still, one may take as one’s starting point a kind of aspectual hearing one is already in the midst of and then try to enunciate with precision the distinguishing features of the implicit interpretive practice that is a precondition for the “dawning” of this kind of auditory aspect. I can imagine a version of the history of music theory where this is how Zarlino’s theory of chordal inversion got up and running. Zarlino noticed that he was hearing triadic sonorities as falling into similarity classes based on their unordered pitch class content, and then developed a way of thinking and talking about a chord as a thing that retains its identity no matter which of its pitch classes happens to be its lowest pitch. The two stages of this watershed moment in the history of musical thought, as I’m imagining it transpired, mutually promoted one another. The nascent aspectual experience instigated the systematization of the interpretive practice, and the systematization of the interpretive practice no doubt had the effect of crystallizing the aspectual experience. What may have been a weak and incipient feeling prior to Zarlino’s eureka moment has since evolved into a palpable and definite one. (The history of music theory doesn’t need to have gone exactly this way for my point to hold.)

4.3 Music Analysis and Teleological Value: Although, as I said at the opening, I feel motivated to resist an exclusively explanatory/scientific picture of music analysis, and although I have tried to uncover a line of cleavage that separates scientific theorizing from musical theorizing, I have no qualms about saying that in

104 I was reminded of this point in a conversation with Joseph Dubiel and Marion Guck.
the kinds of activities I’ve been considering we carry on by conducting “experiments” in which we “test” musical “hypotheses.” Here Dewey reenters the tale and helps me bring it to a close. The kind of music-interpretive activity I have been parsing with the aid of the concept of perceiving-as is, I think quite conspicuously, *experiential* in Dewey’s sense, which means it is *experimental* in an extended sense. It involves grappling with our sonic “environing conditions,” continuously settling and pursuing our goals *qua* participants in a music-interpretive practice, and shaping and extending that practice thereby. One important kind of value to be gleaned from this form of work, we may sympathize with Dewey by thinking, is the value inherent in integral experience as such, the kind of value we become attuned to when “a piece of work finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation.”

My account places music analysis in a Deweyan framework by showing how music analysis takes the values associated with the production of art and places them within the ken of consumers of art. By successfully utilizing an interpretive scheme—which, as Lewin would be quick to remind us, may involve taking part in musical activities that extend beyond the boundaries thought to mark out the


province of the activity of attentive listening—one intentionally produces in oneself the kinds of aspectual experiences that the interpretive scheme makes obtainable. One’s encounter with music thus acquires a purposive structure, becomes something with a goal-directed trajectory, rather than something that merely happens; it becomes something with a provenance and a dénouement—hence something with a history, a mission—not just a starting point and a stopping point. We can conclude, when all is said and done, that a hearing worked out (that “its close is a consummation”) or that it didn’t, that we brought it off or that we didn’t. The possibility of doing that is the possibility of having musical experiences that are storehouses of teleological value, the possibility of making our appreciative encounters with music arenas in which we can exhibit various forms of mastery and revel in our own end-directed expenditures of effort.

I should now be more careful than I have been hitherto about distinguishing between two distinct varieties of value that have cropped up in my account. One is the value that experiences have to the extent that they include as a part of themselves the attainment of an end through the adept use of developed capacities. Different from this, though entwined with it, is the value attached to the end itself. That the two come apart is obvious from the fact that there can be successful and skillful murders as well as ham-handed acts of charity.

I think one might with some justice criticize the Deweyan framework—and thus also my theory, insofar as it moves within that framework—for failing to tell the whole story about aesthetic value by failing to seriously engage with the kind of value that ends have independent of whether and how they are pursued. Dewey, his
readers may note with some disappointment, is interested in the “work of art” only in a manner of speaking, only in that “work” can be interpreted as falling on the “ing” side of what Sellars calls the “notorious ‘ing’/’ed’ ambiguity.” Dewey’s attention is squarely on the process of work rather than the product of work. As we saw, he concentrates on the fulfillment to be gained from work-as-process on both sides of the transaction that takes place between the parties Ernst Bloch identifies as the *Kunstfreund* (art lover/appreciator) and the *künstlerischer Produzent* (art producer). But Dewey is more or less silent about the resulting product and about what it is for the product to harbor value in and of itself. One might feel that this stands as a rebuke to Dewey’s theory, since any theory of aesthetic activity worth its salt should have something to say about the value, and evaluation, of the objects that supply the *foci* of that activity. One might register a similar complaint against my account: making up one’s mind that dominant chords are good things to try to hear in some kinds of music, perfecting one’s ability to hear things that way, and deriving satisfaction from one’s success in doing so, looks to have little to do with the aesthetic excellence of the works of art one uses as occasions for exercising this ability.

Such a complaint is partly unfair to Dewey (and to me, but I’ll defend myself by defending Dewey). Dewey *does* reserve a place in his theory for responsiveness to the inherent value of beautiful objects themselves. In the activity that Dewey

---

107 Latin has two words for work that reflect this process/product distinction: “labor” and “opus.”
takes as archetypal for aesthetic activity generally, i.e. an artist making an artwork, the artist’s conception of what constitutes goodness in this particular artifact—a conception which, as I said earlier, becomes progressively more contentful as the artifact takes on a more and more determinate form—is what is enables the artisan to regard herself as engrossed in an activity that “moves toward a close, an ending...[so that] it ceases only when the energies active in it have done their proper work.”

For the activity to arrive at a culmination rather than arbitrarily halting or breaking off, the artifact must be brought to a final state of concordance with the artificer’s designs, designs that are expressive of a set of aesthetic desiderata. Dewey never says what he thinks these motivating aesthetic desiderata are or should be (he doesn’t defend a substantive aesthetic theory); nor does he give an analysis of what one is doing when one judges that these desiderata are present in some object (he doesn’t defend a meta-aesthetic theory, a theory of aesthetic judgment). But he does realize that this type of judgment and its verdicts are indispensable components of the kind of story he wants to tell because it is only by means of them that the artist’s experience can become integral.

The capacity to make judgments about what is aesthetically good is presupposed by the artist’s capacity to produce objects “under the guise of” the aesthetically good, and is this

---

110 Dewey draws a distinction between the aesthetic appreciation of teleological experience and the aesthetic appreciation of the aesthetic object whose production or consumption may give that experience its teleological shape. "Hence an experience...has its own esthetic quality. It differs from those experiences that are acknowledged to be esthetic, but only in its materials.” (By “materials,” Dewey means the sensuous qualities of an object to which we are aesthetically responsive.”) There is a question about whether the appreciation is aesthetic in the same sense in each case.
judgmental capacity that therefore makes it possible for art-making to be a theater in which the drama of integral experience is enacted.

Something comparable can be said about music analysis. In concocting and carrying out aspectual hearings, the music analyst takes on the mantle of a productive artist: she treats her own sensory experiences of musical artworks as a kind of material that she can craft in accordance with her aesthetic intentions, doing so “under the guise of” what, by her lights, counts as an aesthetically pleasing way of hearing. She thereby synthesizes artistic production and artistic consumption in a way that would be very much to Dewey’s taste. The “products” of her activity—aspectual perceivings—can be more or less pleasing, more or less creative, more or less moving, more or less profound. In short, they are assessable relative to many of the same standards that pertain to artworks. If Rahn is correct, this assessment isn’t idle, for it is appropriate to prefer one mode of musical analysis over another based on the aesthetic merits of the concomitant aspectual experiences. Cast in that light, music analysis looks much more like its own genre of art—albeit one with an essentially appreciative or reverential purpose, even a parasitic quality, a bit like fan fiction—than it looks like a tool of an explanatory science (in the 20th-21st-century sense) of music.

Having gone to some effort to disintricate the scientific image of music theory from the Deweyan-experiential image of it, I would be remiss if I didn’t acknowledge that there is much to be learned from judiciously superimposing these images. Dewey himself is eager to convince us that the deep methodological similarities that affiliate the activities of the natural scientist with those of artist are far more
important than the superficial differences that separate them. Further, it is a commonplace, at least in certain circles, that aesthetic considerations may be accorded some weight in scientific theory construction, and that certain good-making features of scientific theories (parsimony, coherence, etc.) are also legitimately invoked in the giving of aesthetic praise. And, lastly, Dewey thinks of scientific inquiry itself as particularly fertile soil for cultivating integral experiences. Much of what I see as valuable about the music-analytical approach to music (viz., its esteemed teleology) would, for Dewey, be a virtue of an exclusively scientific-experimental approach to music as well. Each of these topics warrants an extended investigation that lies outside the scope of this essay. I motion toward them cursorily, by way of closing, in an attempt stave off the misperception that I intend this paper to be an anti-scientific polemic. I have no desire to exclude or marginalize scientific research into musical phenomena or to stipulate a narrow sense in which I insist the term “music analysis” be used. I do have a desire, though, to exclude or marginalize a one-sided disciplinary self-conception that says that a bona fide experimental science is the only thing the music analysis has a right to aspire to be. On the contrary, music analysts should feel free to regard themselves as aspect peddlers and chasers of integral experience.
CHAPTER 2. Schenker and Kantian Teleology; Or, Schenker’s Organicism Defended

Introduction: Freedom and Necessity: The writings of Schenker’s “critical period,”¹ which commences with *Harmony* and culminates with *Free Composition*, have a bimodal character. On the one hand, these texts represent a meditation on and celebration of musical freedom, as embodied by the genius composer’s uninhibited, “improvisatory”² exercise of musical creativity in spinning out a unique musical foreground. On the other hand, they give voice to Schenker’s veneration of musical laws—immutable, inviolable, and impersonal strictures that define a space of musical legalities.³

¹ I use this phrase to invite a comparison between Kant’s critical trilogy, consisting of *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1787), *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), and Schenker’s tripartite music-theoretical magnum opus *New Musical Theories and Fantasies*, which comprises *Harmony* (1906), *Counterpoint* Book I (1910) and Book II (1922), and *Free Composition* (1935). Kant sought to show how the cognizing self must be epistemically constituted if there is to be any such thing as coherent and intelligible experience generally, and if, in particular, there is to be a legitimate place within the bounds of experience for science, morality, and taste (the subject matter of each of the three critiques, respectively). I believe it can be instructive to view Schenker’s intellectual ambition as, in part, that of specifying what Kant would call the “transcendental conditions” of music. So understood, Schenker’s central problematic could be stated this way: how must our musical minds be configured, what musical “faculties” must we possess, if (experiences of) the musical masterworks are to be fully coherent and intelligible for us?


³ Schenker describes music as “self-generating and absolute in that it is influenced only by itself according to its own laws (*aus sich selbst enstandenen, in eigenen*
The fact that Schenker places such a high premium on freedom—which we
tend to think of in terms of the removal of barriers that stand in the way of
possibilities and opportunities (so-called “negative freedom”)—while at the same
time fervently insisting upon the importance of placing restrictions on, or
recognizing limits to, what is musically licit, might seem to involve Schenker in an
out and out contradiction, or at least to present a symptom of deep tensions teeming
beneath the surface his views. I don’t think that it does.

_Gesetzen absolut sich auswirkenden._” _MW._ vol. 2, p. 94 / Kevin Korsyn, “Schenker
Translation adapted from Korsyn. I later explain what self-generation has to do with
lawfulness.

4 Negative freedom, loosely put, is what someone has when she is “let alone” or “left
to her own devices.” This form of freedom is maximized in proportion to the extent
to which obstacles that stand in the way of the satisfaction of the person’s
preferences and desires are minimized. Such obstacles include coercion by others,
countervailing responsibilities, the rights of others, and so on. Kant draws a
distinction between negative and positive concepts of freedom at the beginning of
Chapter III of the _Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals_ (1785). In the case of
negative freedom, “the will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as
they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it
effective independent of any determination by alien causes.” Positive freedom is
self-legislation, and can be nothing else “but autonomy, i.e. the property that the will
has of being a law unto itself.” _Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals_, trans.
James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 49. To a first degree of
approximation, we can say that positive freedom consists in the freedom to do
something, the possession of ability, power, or authority, rather than in the absence
of restrictions on or deterrents to one’s liberty of choice. The distinction was very
much on the minds of the German idealists and gained renewed prominence during
the second half of the twentieth century through the writings of Isaiah Berlin, most
notably his essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,” which began life as his inaugural
lecture at Oxford in 1958. See note 5 of this chapter for information on Schenker’s
dim assessment of the negative conception of freedom and his espousal of the
positive conception of freedom.
Esteeming freedom and revering rules in the same breath wouldn't have seemed at all problematic to the great thinkers of the German idealist\(^5\) tradition, from whom Schenker draws so much intellectual sustenance, and for whom an inquiry into our status as free beings is by definition an inquiry into the source and legitimation of the canons of thought and of conduct that we are bound by and bind ourselves by. To adduce the theory of *positive* freedom, in the philosophies of Kant and his philosophical progeny, is to show how the freedom to take on responsibilities and obligations, assess the correctness of actions, and hold certain considerations to be authoritative, all presuppose subordination to rules and responsiveness to reasons.\(^6\),\(^7\) Significantly, both rule-following and susceptibility to

\(^5\) I include Kant under the heading “German idealism,” although this term is sometimes used more narrowly to pick out the idealisms of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, et al., in contradistinction to the Kantian “transcendental” idealism to which Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, et al. were responding.

\(^6\) In *Tonwille*, Schenker compares negative freedom unfavorably with positive freedom. The pertinent passage is worth in quoting in full:

“The second obstacle to the correct performance of the masterworks is ignorance of what it is that constitutes freedom of performance. What is freedom of performance? It is the same as freedom in morality or politics. It is what freedom is in general: a highly developed constraint chosen freely by a mind that is knowledgeable about the material at hand. Goethe had in mind the complete unity of the concept of freedom when he said: ‘Only law can give us freedom.’ So did Schiller: ‘The strict bonds of the law tie down only the slavish mind that despises it.’ Once again, therefore, the genius, through his own expertise in synthesis, is also led to the concept of a kind of freedom in performance that is born of constraint. But with common humanity things are otherwise, for people like to understand freedom as the opposite of any constraint whatsoever. And then they carry this false conception over into art where, in the name of ‘freedom,’ they let their completely arbitrary personal point of view hold sway in a similarly arbitrary alternation of moods. One sees, as life and art become mingled with one another, just what harm art suffers when unrefined concepts of life are brought to bear on art, and what blessings, on the other hand, life could acquire, if art’s refined concepts were to find their way into it.”

\(^7\) »Zum zweiten stellt sich einer richtigen Ausführung der Meisterwerke das Nichtwissen um das, was Freiheit des Vortrages ist, entgegen. Was ist Freiheit des Vortrages? Das selbe, was Freiheit im Sittlichen, im Politischen, was
the normative force of reasons (“that peculiar force, at once compulsory and yet not always compelling”) must be recognized as abrogations of negative freedom. Thus, the idealists could all agree, it is in virtue of constraint—being curbed by rules and guided by reasons—that some of the things we do count as free, autonomous, and meaningful actions as opposed to merely causally dictated (and to that extent unfree) behaviors.


Robert Snarrenberg, p. 32. Translation adapted from Snarrenberg.

7 Schenker also touches on the complementarity of freedom and constraint in Meisterwerk: “Only one limit is drawn around all this infinity by genius and melody: it is the limit which nature itself draws with its chord and which man draws with tone-space and the Urlinie. Thankfully, the genius perceives this limit as the necessary guardian and regulator of freedom.” »NUR EINE Grenze ist all dieser Unendlichkeit von Genie und Melodie gezogen: es ist die Grenze, die die Natur selbst mit ihrem Klang und der Mensch mit Tonraum und Urlinie zieht. Dankbar fühlt das Genie dies Grenze als notwendige Schützerin und Reglerin der Freiheit.« MW. vol. 1, p. 205 / Korsyn, “Schenker and Kantian Epistemology,” p. 15. Translation adapted from Korsyn.


9 This is not to say that the idealists marched in lockstep with one another on this issue. Each had a different story to tell about the provenance of these rules and reasons. To name perhaps the most boldfaced discrepancy: for Kant, the source of the moral law is autonomous reason alone; for Hegel the source is a concrete, historically-located cultural formation and the institutions and traditions peculiar to it.
I'm not alone in cherishing the thought that such an outlook on freedom contributes to what Heidegger has called the “dignity and spiritual greatness of German idealism.”\textsuperscript{10} For this model ties freedom to the rational and self-legislative capacities that both define us against and ennable us above other creatures. (The beasts of the field can be as negatively free as you please but can never possess any amount of positive freedom.) And although there is much in Schenker's \textit{Weltanschauung} that we should all hold in contempt, I suspect I'm also not alone in finding something dignified and spiritually great in Schenker's profound awe for what is held out by the promise of (positive) musical freedom.\textsuperscript{11}

There is a focal point at the center of these panoramic musings. They indicate that to fully understand and evaluate the most fundamental patterns of Schenker's thought, we must come to grips with how such notions as rule (\textit{Regel}), law (\textit{Gesetz}), validity (\textit{Gültigkeit}), and their parent notion of necessity (\textit{Notwendigkeit}), play a foundational role in shaping Schenker's conception of what it is to be musically free,

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{10} Robert Brandom (\textit{Reason in Philosophy}, 63) names Heidegger as the source of this encomium to German idealism, but does not cite a textual source. I have not been able to locate the phrase in the searchable English translations of Heidegger's works.
    \item \textsuperscript{11} What is held out is, in a word, the very possibility of a communally shared musical way of life in whose context musical works can take on an agreed-upon significance and can thus act as powerful symbolic vehicles of emotional and ethical communication. Schenker views this possibility as a paradise lost. The musical Eden of common-practice major-minor tonality is, for Schenker, a blessed state that human culture (which in his view does not extend beyond the borders of Western culture) attained through the heroic efforts of a succession of artistic geniuses. Humankind subsequently forfeited this state of grace sometime around the death of Brahms, under assault from the deleterious trends of European modernity, such as scientism, parliamentary democracy, and atonality (a motley crew, indeed). Schenker’s theory of music is presented as, among other things, a means of recovering or reconstituting this paradise of musical communicability and community.
\end{itemize}
his conception of what it is to be the originator of a frei Satz.\textsuperscript{12} One part of this task is historical and psychological. It involves figuring out both how these core notions found their way into Schenker’s mind in the first place and why, later on, they migrated to the front of it. Many commentaries do a good job of pinpointing biographical explainantia. Some cite Schenker’s legal education and his exposure at the University of Vienna to post-idealist theories of jurisprudence\textsuperscript{13}; others his coming under the sway of Ernst Mach’s proto-positivistic philosophy of science and advocacy of sensationalism as a psychological and metaphysical doctrine\textsuperscript{14}; and still

\textsuperscript{12}Schenker draws a vital distinction between the complementary concepts of free composition (\textit{freier Satz}) and strict composition (\textit{strenger Satz}). Strict composition, in its strictest incarnation, is species counterpoint, with two-voice contrapuntal settings being of preeminent importance. The extension of the concept of free composition (the set of particular objects the concept denotes) is the set of musical foregrounds of the tonal masterworks. The intension of the concept (the description that constitutes its formal definition) is harder to state. As Carl Schachter notes in “A Commentary on Schenker’s Free Composition,” \textit{Journal of Music Theory} 25 no. 1 (1981), 201, “Schenker believed that the materials and procedures of strict [composition] are always implicit in compositional foregrounds, even in those that seem most at variance with the ‘rules’ of counterpoint.” This helps us to pin down the content of the concept more securely. We can say, subject to further qualification, that a free composition is what comes into being when contrapuntal configurations permissible in strict composition are subjected to an artistic process of “composing out” or “compositional elaboration” (\textit{Auskomponierung}), giving rise to a free (not strict) musical texture.


others Schenker’s close familiarity with the works of Goethe, the great assimilator
and stylizer of the theories of his idealist forbears and contemporaries.\textsuperscript{15}

The other part of the task, equal in importance to the historical part, is interpretive and critical. It requires that we ascertain what precisely Schenker is committing himself to when he applies the concept of necessity (along with its various sub-concepts) to music. It requires, also, that we evaluate whether these commitments are good (consistent, coherent, defensible) ones to undertake. The interpretive-critical task leads us to ask: If one accepts Schenker’s \textit{necessitarianism} (as I shall call the view that I find emerging from Schenker’s talk of music’s “mustyness”), what set of beliefs about music does one thereby make oneself liable for holding? What are the fair-minded objections to these beliefs? And is there a way of expositing Schenker’s necessitarianism that would allow those objections to be diffused or overcome? These questions set the agenda I shall pursue in this chapter.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{SECTION 1: SCHENKER’S NECESSITARIAN CLAIMS}

Across his oeuvre, and especially in his mature writings, Schenker is captivated by the idea that the tonal masterworks possess necessity. A product of


\textsuperscript{16} In the remainder of this chapter, I concentrate largely on the necessity pole of the freedom-necessity axis. I consider this contribution to be a prolegomena to any future study of Schenkerian freedom.
musical genius, he time and again tells us, must be as it is. This tenet is most strikingly expressed when it surfaces in Schenker’s discussions of the minute details

17 Beethoven seems to corroborate Schenker’s conviction with the fatalistic epigraph he inscribes at the head of the final movement of his String Quartet in F major, Op. 135: “Must it be? It must be! (Muß es sein? Es muß sein!).” In contemplating this inscription, Schenker again draws a connection between freedom and lawfulness. Reflecting on the aesthetic and compositional problems raised by introducing a poetic text into the finale of the Ninth Symphony, Schenker writes: “[W]e now see him in the finale as well determined once again to attempt the impossible! One could almost apply to this situation Beethoven’s own words—with only an adjustment of the original meaning—from the last String Quartet Op. 135: ‘Must it be? It must be!’ Yes—it must be!—because Beethoven wanted it to be! But how then, was the impossible to be made nevertheless possible here?” »…so sehen wir ihn nun auch im Finale daraus erflipht, wieder einmal ein Unmögliches zu wollen! Fast könnte man darauf, freilich nur die ursprüngliche Bedeutung varierend, sein eigenes Wort aus dem letzten Streichquartett, Op. 135: „Muß es sein? Es muß sein!” anwenden. Ja, es mußte sein—denn so wollte es Beethoven! Wie war dann aber das Unmögliche hier dennoch überhaupt möglich zu machen?« Heinrich Schenker, Beethovens Neunte Sinfonie: Eine Darstellung des musikalischen Inhaltes unter fortlaufender Berücksichtigung auch des Vortrages und der Literatur (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1912), 257-258 / Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony: A Portrayal of Its Musical Content, With Running Commentary on Performance and Literature as Well, trans. John Rothgeb (Yale University Press, 1992), 234. Schenker answers his own question: “[O]nly one route was left to the master if the impossible was nevertheless to be dared: to divest the vocal strain at least of the stark novelty of its motifs and themes! For if the vocal strain presents a thematic material that is already known to us from what precedes it, there is at least in this thematic relationship a halfway acceptable, independent, and also—note well—musically absolute justification for its appearance! It is, then, the consequent-like quality, so to speak, in this construction—what a great triumph for the absolute musical law!—which is able to make a fundamentally unfulfillable assignment possible nevertheless to fulfill, at least up to a certain point! Precisely this route of an antecedent-consequent construction is the one Beethoven has in fact ultimately taken.” »…so blieb dem Meister, wenn das Unmögliche dennoch gewagt werden sollte, nur der eine Weg mehr übrig, dem Vokalsatz mindestens die krasse Neuheit seiner Motive und Themen zu nehmen! Denn bringt der Vokalsatz ein Themennaterial, das uns schon aus dem Vorausgegangenen bekannt ist, so liegt doch mindestens in eben dieser thematischen Beziehung eine halbwegs annehmbare, selbständige und wohlgermernt auch absolut musikalische Begründung seines Erscheinens! Es ist dann sozusagen das Nachsatzartige in dieser Konstruktion, das—welcher hohe Triumph des absoluten musikalischen Gesetzes!—eine im Grunde unerfüllbare Aufgabe bis zu einem gewissen Grade dennoch zu erfüllen möglich machen kann! Eben diesen Weg einer Vorder- und Nachsatzkonstruktion ist Beethoven in der Tat denn auch schließlich gegangen!«
of particular works. For instance, in Counterpoint vol. 1, Schenker draws our
attention to the b² – f² augmented fourth in bar 27 of Chopin’s Mazurka Op. 24 no. 2.
He observes: “In order to understand the poetic reason for the tritone-sum
bracketed above, and thereby to appreciate the tritone’s necessity, one surely has to
bring to mind the layout of the entire first part.”

---

\textit{Beethovens Neunte}, 258 / \textit{Beethoven’s Ninth}, 234-235. Translation adapted slightly from Rothgeb. Special thanks to Kevin Korsyn for bringing Schenker’s discussion of Beethoven’s incipit to my attention.

18 I confess to being puzzled by Schenker’s use of the adjective “poetic” (\textit{poetisch}). In the subsequent paragraph, where Schenker attempts to specify what it is about the “layout” (\textit{Anlage}) of the first section of the piece that necessitates the “tritone-sum” (\textit{Tritonussume}) b²-a²-f², the reasons he appeals to do not seem distinctively poetic. Rather, the proffered reasons seem to be music-structural: “…by design, the outer sections A₁ and A₂, which are in C major, achieve a contrast of keys within their respective areas by means of the key of A minor. (Note, however, that instead of an actual A minor it pretends to be a genuine “Aeolian” system, so that even at cadences the leading tone G-sharp is completely avoided.) The middle section, B, in similar fashion, provides a contrast to the A₁ and A₂ sections, in that, curiously, instead of F major it pretends to use a genuine “Lydian” system. This is why the composer avoided in bar 3 of our example the tone B-flat, the only pitch that could have completely clarified for us the key of F major (especially after the chromatically altered II).”

19 »Um den poetischen Grund der oben eingeklammerten Tritonussumme zu verstehen und dadurch nun eben erst die Notwendigkeit der letzteren einzusehen, müß man sich wohl die Anlage des ganzen ersten Teilen vergegenwärtigen.« \textit{KPT} Vol. 1, 83 / \textit{CPT} Vol. 1, 57. Translation mine.
EXAMPLE 8: Schenker, *Counterpoint* Vol. 1, Example 44, p. 57:

In a nearby passage, which examines bar 7 of the Andante from Mozart's Symphony No. 39, K. 543, Schenker tells us that “a modulation, for example, can lead to a tritone, and bestows all the more necessity on the tritone precisely through its [i.e. the modulation’s] own necessity.”

EXAMPLE 9: Schenker, *Counterpoint* Vol. 1, Example 47, p. 58:

---

20 »DAß UNTER ANDEREM AUCH Z.B. EINE MODULATION ZU EINEM TRITONUS FÜHREN KANN UND DES LETZTEREN NOTWENDIGKEIT ERST RECHT EBEN DURCH DIE EIGENE ERWEIST, ZEIGT FOLGENDE STELLE.« KPT Vol. 1, 85 / CPT Vol. 1, 58. The intended meaning is somewhat murky. One possible paraphrase is this: the modulation gives rise to (necessitates) the tritone; and since the modulation itself is necessary, the tritone is “all the more” (erst recht) necessary. Whatever precisely Schenker wishes for us to understand by this, it is clear that the remark stems from his view that the parts of a masterwork are all necessary and that, further, they are made necessary by one another, rather than being made necessary by something external to the work.
A few pages earlier, attributions of necessity feature prominently in Schenker’s appraisal of the first movement of Beethoven’s String Quartet Op. 59 No. 3, bars 10-13. Schenker trots out the example to rebut the arguments of music theorists, such as Bellermann and Albrechtsberger, who are given to miscategorizing the use of chromatic steps (e.g., G moving to G-sharp in the same voice\textsuperscript{21}) in free compositions as “exceptions” (Ausnahmen) to the “prescriptions and restrictions” (Ge- oder Verbote) of “contrapuntal doctrine” (Kontrapunktstlehre). One errs gravely, Schenker warns his readers, if one conflates actual musical practices with the pedagogical laboratory\textsuperscript{22} of species counterpoint: “As ill-justified as it is to invoke the practices of sixteenth-century masters alone for the prohibition of chromaticism in the cantus firmus [of a species counterpoint exercise], it is equally improper to impose the same restriction...as a rule without qualification in free compositions.”\textsuperscript{23} This misconception leads inevitably to the false view that genius composers, such as Beethoven, are mavericks who play fast and loose with the

\textsuperscript{21} Schenker quotes Bellermann as saying that “Claude Goudimel, for example, uses the chromatic step G to G-sharp in the motet O crux benedicta (bars 44 and 45). This, of course, should not be imitated in contrapuntal exercises.” »SO WENDET CLAUDE GOUDIMEL Z. B. IN DER MITGETEILTEN MOTETTE: O CRUX BENEDICTA T. 44 U. 45 DEN CHROMATISCHEN SCHRITT G-GIS AN. IN DEN KONTRAPUNKTISCHEN ÜBUNGEN DARF DIES SELBSTVERSTÄNDLICH NICHT NACHGEAHMT WERDEN.« KPT Vol. 1, 72 / CPT Vol. 1, 49.

\textsuperscript{22} I borrow the term “laboratory” from Blasius, who writes that “In Counterpoint I, [species] counterpoint is a laboratory within which musical affect can be isolated, and from which point hypotheses about the psychic operations underlying the affect can be generated: the contrapuntal figure, as a sort of affectual shorthand, is brought into proximity with free composition to show the predominance in that passage from free composition of a particular affect” (Schenker’s Argument, 31).

\textsuperscript{23} »DENN SO WENIG FÜR DEN GEBRAUCH DES C. F. SCHON DIE PRAXIS DER MEISTER DES SECHZEHNTEN JAHHRUNDERTS ALEIN GAR ALS GRUND DES VERBOTES EINES CHROMATISCHEN GANGES GELTEN DARF, EBERSOWENIG DARF DASSELBE VERBOT, DAS ÜBRIGENS BELLEMMANN AUCH FÜR DEN C. F. JA NOCH GAR NICHT BEGRÜNDET HAT, UMGEEKHRT SCHON ALS SOLCHES DOCH AUCH FÜR DEN FREIEN SATZ OHNE WEITERES GELTEN.« KPT Vol. 1, 73 / CPT Vol. 1, 50.
principles of correct voice leading, and that their license-taking, which would otherwise be reproachable, is justified by their Olympian talents. Nothing could be further from the truth, Schenker maintains. Beethoven’s name is a byword for musical freedom, but not because his exceptional gifts exempt him from otherwise universally applicable rules. Beethovenian freedom instead resides in a special capacity—an endowment peculiar to the mind of a genius—for giving musical proof of the principle that “freedom is the appreciation of necessity (die Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit)”:

24 “Tones cannot produce any desired effect just because of the wish of the individual who sets them, for nobody has power over tones in the sense that he is able to demand from them something contrary to their nature. Even tones must do what they must do!” »SOMIT KÖNNEN DIE TÖNE NICHT EINFACH NUR NACH WUNSCH DESSEN, DER SIE SETZ, EINE BELIEBIGE WIRKUNG HERVORBRINGEN; DENN DIEMAND HAT MACHT ÜBER DIE TÖNE IN DEM SINNE, DASS ER AUCH EIN ANDERES VON IHNEN FORDERN KÖNNTE, WO DIE VORAUSSETZUNGEN IHRERSEITS KEINE DANACH SIND. ACH DIE TÖNE SELBST MÜSSEN, WIE SIE EBEN MÜSSEN!« KPT Vol. 1, 21-2 / CPT Vol. 1, 14.

25 This is Engels’s rewording of Hegel’s definition of positive freedom. See Frederick Engels, Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science, trans. Emile Burns (Progress Publishers, 1947), Chapter 11, “Morality and Law, Freedom and Necessity,” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch09.htm. Engels continues: “Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work toward definite ends.” Replace the word “natural” with the word “musical” and you get a declaration that could easily have come from Free Composition. The idea that musical freedom requires comprehension of and capitulation to law appears in “The Organic Aspect of Fugue, As Demonstrated by the First Fugue in C-minor from J. S. Bach’s Well Tempered Clavier (Das Organische der Fuge: aufgezeigt an der I. C-moll Fuge aus dem Wohltemperierten Klavier von Joh. Seb. Bach),” MW. Vol. 2, 66: “just as unique as this fugue is, just so unique is the law that is its law of life: the fugue itself gave birth to this law, not Bach—with the strength of a genius, he only recognized it and submitted to it.” »GENAU SO WIE DIESE FUGE EINMALIG IST, GENAU SO EINMALIG IST DAS GESETZ, DAS IHR LEBENSGESETZ IST: DIE FUGE SELBST HAT DIESES GESETZ GEBOREN, NICHT BACH—MIT DER KRAFT EINES GENIES HAT ER ES NUR ERKANNT UND SICH GEFÜGT.« Quoted and translated by Joseph Dubiel in “When you are a Beethoven: Kinds of Rules in Schenker’s Counterpoint,” Journal of Music Theory 34 no. 2 (1990), 306.
"Who can deny that Beethoven, in view of the motivic circumstances brought to light here, had the right to dare to use such a chromatic progression [in bars 10-13 of the Allegro Vivace of Op. 59 No. 3]—indeed, who can deny that he should have done this and had to do it? And what knowledge Beethoven had, on top of this, in order to be able to prove the necessity of this motivic connection (which in itself absolutely cannot be misunderstood) all the more through its harmonization! Just consider the harmonic succession: C♭7 - G♮7 - C; such seeming incongruity in the sudden conjunction of C♭7 (as V7 of F major) and G♮7 (as V7 in C major); such logic in this succession, nevertheless, exclusively in the service of the motive!26...But why—and this is the core of these remarks—should a chromatic progression that is so internally necessary at this point in the composition (in spite of its cadential character) be represented, under coercion from theoretical considerations, as only an ‘exception,’ or as an ‘unpleasantry’ just because elsewhere (in the cantus firmus, for example) no necessity for such a chromatic progression would be present? It is far better, instead, to understand that each necessity carries its own rule in itself alone.”27

26 The motive Schenker refers to is the ascending half-step motive that first appears in the first bar of the Allegro Vivace (an e¹ on the pickup moving to an f¹ on the downbeat of the bar.) Schenker instructs us to think of the first violin’s line in bars 10-13 as three statements of this motive (a¹-b♭¹, b♭¹-b♮¹, and b♮¹-c²) elided together (a¹-b♭¹-b♮¹-c²). I ignore the finer points of Schenker’s analysis here because 1) they are so elliptical as to be virtually incomprehensible and 2) they do not, as far as I can tell, bear on the argument I am trying to make.

27 °WER KANN ES NUN LEUGNEN, DASS UNTER DEN HIER ZU TAGE TRETENDEN BESONDEREN UMSTÄNDEN MOTIVISCHER NATUR BEETHOVEN DEN CHROMATISCHEN GANG SO ZU WAGEN WOHL DAS GUTE RECHT HATTE, JAE ES WAGEN SOLLTE UND MUßTE? UND WIE WEISS BEETHOVEN DieseS MOTIVISCHEN ZUSAMMENGANG, DER JA SCHON AN SICH DURCHAUS NICHT MISSZUVERSTEHEN IST, AUSSERDEM AUCH NOCH DURCH DIE HARMONISIERUNG ERST RECHT IN SEINER NOTWENDIGKEIT ZU ERWEISEN! MAN SEHE NUR DIE HARMONIEFOLGE: C♭7 - G♮7 - C; WELCHE UNGEREIMTHEIT DOCH SCHEINBAR IN DER PLÖTZLICHEN VERBINDUNG VON C♭7, ALEs EINES V7 IN F-DUR UND G7, ALS EINES V7 IN C-DUR WIE LOGISCH GLEICHWOHL AUCH DIESE FOLGE AUSCHLIESSLICH IM DIENSTE DES MOTIVISCHEN!...WIE SOLLTE ABER—UND DAS IST DER KERN DIESER AUSFÜHRUNGEN—WEIL IRGENDWO ANDERS, ALSO Z. B. IM C.F., KEINE NOTWENDIGKEIT ZU EINEM SCHÖNEN CHROMATISCHEN GANG NOCH VORLÄG, EIN AN DIESER STELLE DER KOMPOSITION UND ZWAR TROTZ DEREN KADENZCHARAKTER SO INNERLICH NOTWENDIGER CHROMATISCHER GANG SCHON DESHALB ALLEIN NICHT ANDERES, ALS NUR EINE „AUSNAHME“ ODER EINE VON DER THEORIE ERPRSESTE „UNANNEHM LICHKEIT“ VORSTELLEN? ES IST VIELMEHR BESSSER ZU VERSTEHEN, DASS Jede
In such passages, Schenker finds particular musical events to be in conformance with a general principle concerning the all-embracing necessity that pertains to all component parts of a tonal masterwork. One formulation of the principle, which springs up first in Schenker’s pre-critical essays, states that the creation of a “true symphony (rechtschaffene Symphonie)” must proceed from a “personal necessity (persönliche Notwendigkeit)” in such a way that, for all compositional details of the work, the composer “had to write precisely this and could not write it in any other way (er musste gerade diese schreiben und konnte sie nicht anders schreiben).”28 In another frame of mind, Schenker depersonalizes this necessity by locating it in the piece itself rather than in its genesis. An artistic creation (künstlerisch Schaffen) of an original genius (Originalgenie) is now distinguished by being one “where the order of the tones willed itself to be thus

---

rather than any other way (Die Ordnung der Töne...sich selbst nun einmal so und nicht anders wollte).29

SECTION 2: OBJECTIONS, METAPHORS

Even if we discount Schenker’s commission of the pathetic fallacy—his personifying musical pieces by investing them with volitions—this still strikes our modern ears as a peculiar way of talking. What should latter-day Schenkerians make of Schenker’s necessitarianism, given its strangeness and given its apparent remoteness from what many find interesting and useful in the analytical technique Schenker pioneered? One option is to write it off as just so much half-baked metaphysics, as quasi-philosophical debris that one must sift through before seizing on the many golden nuggets of musical insight to be found in the stream of Schenker’s music-analytical consciousness. This strain of criticism is levelled against Schenker by Joseph Dubiel,30 who is to be commended both for being one of the first to notice Schenker’s necessitarian streak and also for treating it as something for which we might wish to discover justificatory grounds, in addition to biographical explanations. Dubiel issues a pointed challenge to Schenker’s

29 Ibid, 342, emphasis mine.
30 Dubiel, ibid. Korsyn also notices Schenker’s use of the term Notwendigkeit, and hears it as an echo of Kant’s assertion (as summarized by Robert Paul Wolff) that “knowledge is the assertion of a necessary connection between the subject and the predicate of a judgment.” SKE, 33. The quotation is from Robert Paul Wolff, Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity (Harvard, 1963), 112.
necessitarianism by asking, in effect: what of substance is added to a descriptive proposition about music by placing a necessity operator in front of it?31

“Why anyone would want to respond to a highly esteemed composition by telling a story about how it had to be exactly as it was is something of a mystery in any case—a mystery faintly suggestive of some character defect in the storyteller. Wouldn’t it be enough to say that the piece is as it is, and that hearing it well means realizing how everything about it contributes in a variety of ways to a very full sense of how it is (so that, incidentally, even a small change might make the piece something significantly different—which is not necessarily to say less good)? What of value would be lost under this less grandiose explanatory program? The sense of the composer as inspired somnambulist, perhaps? But what is the value of that?”32

Dubiel’s solution is to redact. Schenker’s audience, he thinks, should read and learn from the descriptive propositions Schenker makes, but should blink their eyes when they run across a necessity operator. In so doing, they will find “no serious difficulty in reading around”33 Schenker’s necessitarian excesses. We can without

31 Formal modal logic uses a necessity operator, “□”, and a possibility operator, “◊”, to represent modalities. “f2 must follow b2,” for example, could be represented by attaching the necessity operator to the atomic sentence “f2 follows b2” yielding “□(f2 follows b2),” which would be read as “necessarily, f2 follows b2.” “f2 doesn’t have to follow b2” could be rendered as “◊~(f2 follows b2),” which would be read as “it is possible for it not to be the case that f2 follows b2.” (The tilde is the logical symbol for negation.)

32 Dubiel, 307. I would rather not to get bogged down in the third-order interpretive business of defending my reading of Dubiel’s reading of Schenker’s reading of Beethoven. Allow me to cut a long story short here by presenting one of Dubiel’s conclusions and taking it as a point of departure from which I go on to develop something midway between a defense and a reconstruction of Schenker’s views—without, however, giving the premises of Dubiel’s argument the attention I acknowledge they deserve.

33 Dubiel, ibid.
penalty train our sights on Schenker’s analytical judgments, Dubiel thinks, while
overlooking anything Schenker may profess to know about the non-contingency of
the musical events singled out by those analytical judgments. Dubiel’s favorable
regard for selective reading has a precursor in Forte’s introduction to the English

34 Similarly, though with less sympathy and intelligence than Dubiel, Bryce Rytting
professes admiration for Schenker’s perspicacity as an analyst while alleging that
Schenker is “a dabbler rather than an expert” in philosophy. In Rytting’s estimation,
Schenker’s frequent allusions to philosophical figures and their ideas have “a largely
decorative function” and create “a deceptive aura of profundity,” a dismissal that
presumably extends to Schenker’s necessitarianism. Bryce Rytting, Structure vs.
Rytting’s condescension is ironic, given his own profound misunderstanding of
Kant’s theory of sensible intuition, a gaffe Korsyn devastatingly lambastes.

35 One might think that my reading of Schenker is also “selective,” in that I don’t
have a great deal to say about some concepts which arguably lie at the heart of
Schenker’s outlook, such as German nationalism and German genius. (I do touch on
the topic of genius in Epilogue 2, but this is tangential to my main thesis.) This
omission is not the result of a belief (à la Forte) that we can and should defang
Schenker by blanking out all the vexing political and philosophical material that
runs through his publications. It is instead an omission that results from pursuing a
question that is small enough to be soluble. My aim is not to provide a
thoroughgoing commentary on any—much less all—of Schenker’s writings; mine is
the more modest aim of examining the implications and possible justification of one
piece of conceptual content found in Schenker’s (primarily late) works. I would like
to lean on Robert Brandom’s defense of his own mode of interpretation: “I take it
that reading a text for its conceptual content is exploring the inferential roles of its
claims: determining what one would be committing oneself to by undertaking such
claims, and what might entitle one to such commitments, what would be evidence
for and against them, and what they would be evidence for or against. The
inferences in question are typically (sometimes, massively) multipremise
inferences. That means that for each claim one has identified as central or
fundamental, there is a choice possible as to the source from which one draws the
auxiliary hypotheses, with which it is to be conjoined in determining its inferential
role.” See Robert Brandom, “Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel:
Idealismus: Deutscher Idealismus und die analytische Philosophie der Gegenwart, eds.
Karl Ameriks and Jürgen Stolzenberg (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2005), 158. It is
not my intention to present a merely “Schenker-esque” theory that is bleached of
any associations with Schenker’s controversial politics, ethics, etc. Rather, seems to
me that the auxiliary hypotheses that determine the inferential role of Schenker’s
fundamental necessitarian claim are (as I go on to argue) propositions one finds
edition of *Free Composition*, which deemphasizes the book’s “polemical and quasi-
philosophical material...[a]lmost none of [which] bears substantive relation to the
musical concepts that [Schenker] developed during his lifetime and [which], from
that standpoint, can be disregarded.”

I respectfully disagree with Dubiel and Forte, but not because I think the
redactive approach is self-evidently ill-‐advised. Without doubt, one *can* profit from
studying Schenker’s analyses, and from doing Schenkerian analysis, without giving a
moment’s thought to the welter of philosophical and political ideas that inform and
color (or, a less sympathetic critic might say, play havoc with) his music-critical
writings. If one’s goal is the highest ratio of musical edification to philosophical
explicitly asserted in the works of Hanslick and Kant, not propositions lurking
somewhere in the morass of Schenker’s reactionary politics. Of course, we should be
interested, at the end of the day, in whether any given position expounded by
Schenker (e.g. his nationalism) contradicts, is consistent with, is consequent upon,
or entails, any other (e.g. his necessitarianism). But this essay represents the mid-
morning rather than the end of the day, interpretively speaking. I do speculate in
Epilogue 3 about how we might try to use Schenkerian necessitarianism to bolster
Schenker’s flimsily supported claims about the ethical urgency of the (preservation
or reclamation of the) Western major-minor tonal system. Conversations with Kevin
Korsyn helped me to think through this methodological point.

36 It is apparent from their back-and-forth in *Music Theory Online* vol. 6 no. 3 (2000)
that Forte and Dubiel have conflicting views about the scope and aims of music
analysis. See Dubiel, “Analysis, Description, and what Really Happens,” Forte,
Responds Again.” To sum up the disagreement: Music analysis, according to Forte,
is tasked with explaining musical structures, both actual and possible; Dubiel, more
ecumenically, wishes to reserve for music analysis an additional descriptive, music-
critical, and music-appreciative role, on top of its established explanatory role. It is
therefore noteworthy that Forte and Dubiel have similar-sounding views about
what is dispensable in Schenker’s work. Note, though, that Dubiel offers a
principled objection to a specific Schenkerian doctrine, and only then helps himself
to the suggestion that we should “read around” that part of Schenker, whereas Forte
is prepared from the outset, without giving anything resembling an argument, to
summarily brush aside everything in Schenker that he sees as philosophical or
polemical—presumably almost everything that isn’t a voice-leading graph or a
clinical description of a voice-leading graph.
puzzlement (not to mention moral outrage), ignoring large swaths of Schenker’s prose is a smart thing to do. On top of this, things are even a little worse for Schenker, *prima facie*, than Dubiel and Forte let on. To the accusations that Schenker’s necessitarian claims are unmotivated, vaguely immoral, and musically beside the point, one might well add the graver accusation that they are flatly unbelievable or borderline unintelligible. What would one even be agreeing to if one agreed that Chopin *had* to put that tritone where he put it? If this means that Chopin was compelled by a supernatural agency to make the compositional choices he made—an idea Schenker appears at times to flirt with[^37]—we should reject

[^37]: “It is a quirk of great talents and geniuses that, like sleepwalkers, they often go the right way by following their instincts, even when they are impeded by something or other—in this case, by the full intention of doing the wrong thing. It is as if a vastly superior force of truth, or of nature, was doing the composing mysteriously behind his consciousness and in his name, without it mattering at all whether the fortunate artist himself wanted to do the right thing or not. If things went according to his conscious intention, how often would his works fail miserably? Unless, that is, the mysterious power were to providentially arrange things for the best... [Beethoven] didn’t guess that behind his back the superior force of nature guided his pen, so that even though he believed himself to be writing in the Lydian mode, for the simple reason that that was what he intended, nevertheless the piece went ahead in F major all on its own.”

Translation mine.
Schenkerian necessitarianism because it is little more than heady occultism.\textsuperscript{38} And if it instead means that the slightest adjustment would worsen the mazurka — if it boils down to the claim that the mazurka \textit{must} be just as it is or fail to be as good as it is—we should reject Schenkerian necessitarianism because it is mysterious what the basis for such an assertion could be.\textsuperscript{39} Are we to imagine that Schenker has, \textit{per impossibile}, considered each of the infinite number of changes that could be made to the piece and rejected every one of them as a disimprovement? Or should we suppose that his immediate and infallible apprehension of the piece’s perfection sanctions his assertions about its immutability?

These questions sound incriminating. But the impulse to respond to Schenker’s necessitarianism with curt dismissal should be tempered by the realization that ”necessity” has a wide range of philosophical usages, and that Schenker’s necessitarian claims have a proportionately large number of candidate meanings. Consider that in the Kantian lexicon,\textsuperscript{40} as Robert Brandom has pointed

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{38} Or we should regard it as fictional or poetical language. I discuss and critique this alternative below.
\textsuperscript{39} This view also gets one into a logical quagmire, as I show in Epilogue 1.
\textsuperscript{40} This is a lexicon with which Schenker was proficient. Korsyn has demonstrated in SKE that Kant’s ideas left a large wake in the current of Schenker’s thought. This is a good place to mention how Korsyn’s goals and methods in SKE differ from mine. Korsyn amasses compelling textual evidence that Schenker took Kantian ideas and grafted them on to the conceptual domain of music. He also argues persuasively that facets of Kant’s theories of time and causation are detectable in Schenker’s theory of musical organization or tonal ”synthesis.” And he makes a convincing case that this gives us a way of silencing those of Schenker’s critics who think his theory is insensitive to issues of temporality. My argument sometimes makes contact with these topics, but is mostly orthogonal to them. I argue that Kant’s theory of teleological explanation, in tandem with Hanslick’s understanding of a musical standpoint, gives us the resources to offer Schenker’s necessitarianism a robust philosophical defense. My position does not conflict with Korsyn’s—indeed, I proceed according to the assumption that all of Korsyn’s main conclusions are
out, “‘necessary’ (notwendig) simply means ‘according to a rule.’” So, for Kant, causal connections (as between, e.g., fire and smoke) are “necessary” because events (alterations of substances) happen in accordance with empirically discoverable natural laws (whether or not those laws themselves cannot be known to obtain with necessity); an analytic assertion “brings necessity along with itself” in virtue of the logical rules of identity and non-contradiction; empirical experience of an external causal order is “necessary” in that it arises out of the unification (or “synthesis”) of the matter of sensation in accordance with the a priori concept (the “category”) of causation, which can be understood as a rule for synthesizing the correct. My arguments also extend certain aspects of Korsyn’s reading, particularly his identification of the Kantian overtones of Schenker’s quest for a musical “principle of causation.” I diverge most markedly from Korsyn in that I regard Kant’s ideas about “purposive” or “final” causation, as developed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, as being highly apposite to Schenker’s analytical approach and to the topic of musical causation, whereas Korsyn explores the impact Kant’s idea of “efficient” causation, as expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason, had on Schenker’s theorizing. I believe these interpretations can, to a certain extent, coexist peacefully, since both models of causation influenced Schenker. As I argue near the end of the chapter, however, I believe the final-causal model supplants the efficient-causal model in Schenker’s late works.

42 An analytic assertion is true in virtue of the meanings of its terms. “All bachelors are married” is analytic, in this sense.
43 Immanuel Kant, Notes and Fragments, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 390 n. 6355. The gist of the note is that both synthetic a priori propositions and analytic a priori propositions are necessary and universal.
44 The law of identity states any given thing is the same as itself and different from everything else. Noted ancient sources of this principle are Plato’s Theaetetus (185a) and Aristotle Metaphysics (1041a16-18).
45 One way of stating this rule is to say that a proposition and its negation can’t both be true at the same time and in the same way. See, e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics 1006b35.
manifold of sensory representations\textsuperscript{46}; geometry is “necessary” because a geometric axiom or proof “signifies a rule of synthesis of the imagination with respect to pure figures in space (bedeutet eine Regel der Synthesis der Einbildungkraft, in Ansehung reiner Gestalten im Raume)\textsuperscript{47} and thereby enunciates an exceptionless principle of the configuration and motion of matter in space; moral conduct gets its “necessity” from the fact that it is conduct which is done in accordance with and out of respect for moral rules which derive ultimately from our rational, self-legisrating nature; and the parts of a plant or animal are “necessary,” inasmuch as they are lawfully configured with respect to the living thing’s innate purposes (viz., self-preservation and procreation).

So too, the species of necessity Schenker attributes to music are multifarious.\textsuperscript{48} We witness Schenker talking about obligations—necessities of conduct—that composers stand under to write music in a certain way, or that music stands under to behave in a certain way\textsuperscript{49}; adverting to musical causation and corresponding musico-causal laws\textsuperscript{50}; invoking logic as an explanation of music’s

\textsuperscript{46} Robert Paul Wolff advances the interpretation that the pure concepts of the understanding (Kant’s “categories,” such as the concept of a property-bearing substance, which pertain to all objects-as-experienced) are second-order rules, rules that lay down strictures upon how we are permitted to formulate first-order synthetic rules, i.e. ground-level empirical concepts, such as the concept DOG. See Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity, 24-5.

\textsuperscript{47} CPR, A140-1/B180.

\textsuperscript{48} Korsyn believes that “Schenker’s term necessity [Notwendigkeit] can also be traced to Kant” (SKE, 33). I wholeheartedly concur, and trace Schenker’s use of “Notwendigkeit” to specific passages of Kant’s third Critique.

\textsuperscript{49} Cf. Schenker’s notion of “obligatory register” (obligate Lage) or his remark that a reaching-over “has obligation (ist gebunden) only to its goal.” FRS, 85 / FC, 47.

\textsuperscript{50} Cf. KPT Vol. 1, 376-7 / CPT Vol. 1, 290-1. In the second volume of Counterpoint, Schenker promises that the slated completion of his theoretical trilogy, Free Composition, will contain a section entitled “Concerning Musical Causality:
inevitability; and (most significantly, for this chapter’s arguments) embracing organic-biological explanation and its characteristic appeals to teleological necessity.

Does noticing the many-sidedness of Schenker’s necessitarianism make it any less problematic? In one way, yes; for the surface variety exhibits a kind of unity-in-diversity that hints at one interpretive strategy. We can try to understand Schenker’s necessitarian language as being anchored in what Lakoff and Johnson call a “conceptual metaphor.” A conceptual metaphor draws expressions from a “source domain” in order to understand a “target domain.” Lakoff and Johnson’s stock example is the metaphorical concept ARGUMENT IS WAR, by means of which one uses the source domain WAR to understand (to “structure,” as Lakoff and Johnson put it) the target domain of ARGUMENT. Within the compass of this conceptual metaphor, expressions such as “attack a position, indefensible, strategy, new line of attack, win, gain ground, etc., form a systematic way of talking about the battling

Retrospective and Epilogue (Von der musikalischen Kausalität, Rückblick und Epilog).” Schenker drafted the essay, but it did not appear in the posthumously published 1935 edition of FC. One of its contentions is that “under causality one has to imagine a drive, a necessity, that justifies the tone just as if it were a living, logically thinking being—as a logical motor, so to speak, which we use analogously to our use of language.” »UNTER KAUSALITÄT HAT MAN SICH EINEN TRIEB, EINEN ZWANG VORZUSTELLEN, DER DEN TON ALS GLEICHSAM EIN LEBENDES, LOGISCH DENKENDES WESEN LEGITIMIERT, ALS LOGISCHE MOTORE SOZUSAGEN, WIE WIR SIE ANALOG UNSERER SPRACHE ZU GEBEN.« Manuscript contained in the Oster Collection, New York Public Library, File 51 / Item 1378. Translation mine. I am grateful to William Rothstein for providing me with his transcription of this text. The quote suggests that Schenker came to view the problem of musical causality as one that could be solved by understanding music in terms of the special kind of causality that pertains to organic life, a position that jibes with my arguments.

52 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
aspects of arguing." An interpretation of Schenker's necessitarian turns of phrase that takes its inspiration from Lakoff and Johnson would notice that the concepts of CAUSATION, LOGIC, DUTY, and ORGANIC LIFE, as applied to the target domain of music, are coordinated by the overarching conceptual metaphor MUSIC MUST BE AS IT IS. Thus the source domain of NECESSITY—which includes the central concept and the subordinate concepts within its orbit, such as LAW, DUTY, and CAUSATION—is brought to bear on the target domain of MUSIC and its ancillary concepts such as HARMONY, MELODY, and COUNTERPOINT. Schenker's application of such concepts to music, so the thinking goes, is intended to bring his audience to a fuller appreciation of the distinctive, though ineffable (thus the need for non-literal speech) ways in which music has an audibly "rule-ish" or "nomic" feel to it. Necessitarianism, under this interpretation, is a metaphorical discourse that gives us an oblique way of talking about what it is like to experience tonal music's FORMAL STRUCTURE, SYNTACTICAL ORGANIZATION, and GOAL-ORIENTED DESIGN, all of which, Lakoff and Johnson would remind us, are themselves metaphorical concepts. Schenker's various appeals to CAUSATION, LOGIC, MORAL DUTY, and ORGANIC LIFE, according to this reading, are meant to

54 Cf. Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination: Is Music Representational?" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 no. 1, Winter (1994), 49: "We may imagine events of a piece to be causally related in various ways. We speak of one musical idea or event growing out of another, of one interrupting or interfering with another, of one preparing the way for another. In many instances we probably imagine that there is a nomological connection of some sort between events without imagining what specifically is the cause of what. This is enough to explain our 'expectation' that a tonic harmony will succeed a dominant seventh, for instance, even if, having heard the piece many times before, we know that the cadence is deceptive. We imagine (subliminally anyway) that causal principles are operating by virtue of which the occurrence of the dominant seventh makes it likely that a tonic will follow, and on hearing the dominant we imaginatively expect the tonic, whether or not we actually expect it."
draw parallels of the following sorts: (1) There is a felt orderliness, or prevailing regularity, to the way musical events succeed and (seem to) impact one another in tonal works, as is the case with the causal alterations that (as Kant would say) comprise the objective temporal order of appearances within empirical experience.\(^{55}\) (2) There is an indescribable compellingness to the rules that govern the tonal fantasies that arise in composer’s imaginations. The composer may or may not become conscious of these rules in and through the performance of this musical “reasoning,” and this is rather like the way the laws of thought in general, namely the laws of formal logic (what Kant calls “pure general logic”) govern, and become apparent to us in, our capacity for reasoning and our dispositions to draw

\(^{55}\) “The effect of musical causality…remained an inherent quality of the dissonant syncope even in instrumental music. There, even in the most advanced stage of development, harmonies appear to be linked more intimately and with seemingly greater necessity the more drastically and obtrusively a tone of one harmony hooks into the flesh of the following one. The higher degree of structural necessity as well as length is then further provided by scale-degrees (including all that derives from them, such as tonality, chromaticism, modulation, etc.) and form! Considering that the artist was able to receive only the major triad from Nature’s domain…we must marvel at the creative power of the human kind to erect, on a foundation so modest, such a proud edifice of musical art, and to imbue it with such strong and compelling necessities. Through these very necessities of a completely individual nature, music acquires “logic” no less than language or the other arts!” »Letzere Wirkung einer musikalischen Kausalität blieb der dissonanten Synkope naturgemäß treu. Auch in dieser, ja selbst in der vorgeschrittensten, erscheinen die Harmonien desto inniger, scheinbar notwendiger verkettet, je drastischer und fremder ein Ton der einen Harmonie sich gleichsam in den Leib der anderen nachfolgenden einhakt. Für die höhere Notwendigkeit des Tonsatzes und der Länge sorgten dann noch die Stufen (und was aus ihnen kommt: Tonalität, Chromatik, Modulation u. s. w.) und die Form! Bedenkt man, dass der Künstler aus den Händen der Natur nur den Durdeiklang (vgl. Bd. I, §8ff.) zu empfangen in der Lage war, so muss man über das schöpferische Vermögen der Menschen staunen, die auf so bescheидener Basis einen so stolzen Bau der musikalischen Kunst aufzuführen und ihn so starke, hohe Notwendigkeiten vermochten! In eben diesen Notwendigkeiten ganz eigener Art besitzt die Musik nicht weniger „Logik,” als die Sprache oder die anderen Künste!« *KPT* Vol. 1, 377 / *CPT* Vol. 1, 291.
But these “rules” of musical thought, unlike the rules that make up the canon of formal logical inferences, can at other times be experienced as norms imposed *ab extra*, prescriptions that may be embraced or from which one

---

56 “After the composer’s imagination has generated a particular pattern, it is positively besieged by a multitude of similar patterns. The force of these is often so irresistible that the composer includes them in the developing content without ever recognizing their similarity. Often—and one can discover this only by an absolutely faithful study of the artwork—the composer would have preferred to conjure up a completely different pattern. But his imagination refuses to change its original direction, and compels him to accept a similar pattern instead.” —So finde ich, dass die Phantasie, nachdem sie ein bestimmtes Gebilde hervorgebracht hat, von vielen Gebilden ähnlicher natur förmlich belagert ist, und es ist die Macht dieser ähnlichen Gebilde über den Componisten oft so unwiderstehlich, das er sie in den zu bauenden Inhalt einschliesst, ohne sich deren Ähnlichkeit gar zum Bewusstsein geführt zu haben. Oft—man erräth es nur bei einer ganz hingebenden Betrachtung des Kunstwerkes—hatte der Componist lieber ein vollständig unähnliches Gebilde heraufbeschwören wollen, und siehe da, —die Phantasie weicht von ihrer erstgefundenen Art nicht ab und drängt ihm nur ein Ähnliches auf.« Heinrich Schenker, “Der Geist der musikalischen Technik,” *Heinrich Schenker als Essayist und Kritiker*, ed. Hellmut Federhofer (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1990), 150 / “The Spirit of Musical Technique,” qtd. and trans. William A. Pastille, “Heinrich Schenker, Anti-Organicist,” *19th-Century Music* 8 no. 1, Summer (1984), 36.

57 Cf. Hanslick’s remarks on musical logic: “...we recognize the valid conclusion of a group of tones, as is shown by the fact that we call it a “Satz.” We feel exactly as we feel with any logical deduction when its sense is finalized, although the kind of truth that is present in each case is incommensurable.” —Ebenso erkennen wir das vernünftig abgeschlossene einer Tongruppe, indem wir sie einen „Satz“ nennen. Fühlen wir doch so genau wie bei jeder logischen Periode, wo ihr Sinn zu Ende ist, obgleich die Wahrheit beider ganz inkommensurabel dasteht.« Music’s laws, according to Hanslick, “live instinctively in every cultivated ear—though not in the form of something we are aware of scientifically—which accordingly senses what is organic and rational in a collection of tones, or what is nonsensical and unnatural in it, through mere intuition, without using a logical concept as a criterion or point of comparison.” —Sie leben, wenngleich nicht in der Form wissenschaftlichen Bewusstseins, instinktiv in jedem gebildeten Ohr, welches demnach das Organische, Vernunftgemäße einer Tongruppe, oder das Widersinnige, Unnatürliche derselben durch blosse Anschauung empfindet, ohne dass ein logischer Begriff den Maßstab oder das tertium comparationis hierzu abgäbe.« *VMS*, 62 / *OMB*, 31. Translation mine. Cf. also Schenker’s neologism “Tonvernunft” (tonal rationality) which appears in *MW*. vol. 2, 94, discussed by Korsyn in SKE, 14.
may feel alienated, much like moral or ethical duties. And (4) musical pieces are in a host of ways plantlike, in that they “grow” from a “seed” or “kernel” or “germ,” and then “bloom,” “branch,” “exfoliate,” and so on.

The Schenker-as-metaphorician reading has much to recommend it. It identifies a common source of several different vocabularies Schenker exploits, and

---

58 Schenker believes that firm discipline (strenge Zucht) must be used to bring a student to “actually recognize and experience the laws of music” (die Gesetze der Musik wirklich erkennen und erleben), as a result of which the student will eventually come to love them (wird er sie auch lieben). FRS, 17 / FC, xxii. This brings to mind Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, which argues for the importance of accustoming moral agents, through education and the cultivation of fitting sentiments, to love the moral law for its own sake.

59 “Does the Urlinie signify freedom or constraint? This question can be answered succinctly as follows: The Urlinie signifies freedom insofar as it comes as a freely sent gift from heaven and is not gained by force. But it carries just as much constraint with it as a person needs in order to escape the kind of wild freedom that he can’t at all master. In the past, such a question wouldn’t have come up at all. Even though they composed under the irresistible force of the Urlinie, the great masters nevertheless felt completely free; these days, of course, things are completely different. For the person struggling to keep track of the Urlinie, it signifies only constraint. Additionally, today one feels even the most benevolent necessity as a superfluous constraint, having fallen prey to a falsely conceived freedom that rips the human soul asunder into a thousand pieces.” »BEDEUTET DIE URLINIE FREIHEIT ODER ZWANG? DIESE FRAGE IST KURZ SO ZU BEANTWORTEN: DIE URLINIE BEDEUTET FREIHEIT, SOFERN SIE ALS EIN FREIES HIMMELSGESCHENK KOMMT UND DURCH KEINEN ZWANG ZU ERREICHEN IST. DOCH FÜHRT SIE IN EINEM SO VIEL ZWANG MIT SICH, ALS DER MENSCH BEDARF, UM EINER WILDEN FREIHEIT ZU ENTRINNEN, DIE ER ÜBERHaupt NICHT MEISTERN KANN. EHEDEM WÄRE EINE SOLCHE FRAGE GAR NICHT AUFGETAUCHT. ÜNTER DEM UNWIDERSTEHlichen ZWANG DER URLINIE SCHAFFEND, FÜHLTE SICH DER GROSSE MEISTER DENNOCH VÖLLIG FREI. HEUTE IST ES FREILICH ANDERS. WER DER URLINIE ERST NACHZUGEHEN HAT, DEM BEDEUTET SIE ZWANG ALLEIN. UND AUCH AUSSERDEM EMPIFINDET MAN HEUTE—ZUM OPFER EINER FALSCH VERSTANDENEN FREIHEIT GEWORDEN, DIE DIE MENSCHENSELE IN TAUSEND STÜCKE AUSEINANDERREIST, STATT SIE ZU FÜGEN—AUCH DIE WOHLTÄTIGSTE NOTWENDIGKEIT ALS ÜBERFLÜSSIGEN ZWANG.« MW. Vol. 1, 197 / MA Vol. 1, “Further Considerations of the Urlinie (Fortsetzung der Urlinie-Betrachtungen),” trans. John Rothgeb, 110.

60 Cf. Vaihinger’s quip about Kant: “To the slogan ‘Kant as metaphysician’ one can just as well counterpose the slogan ‘Kant as metaphorician.’” Quoted in Clayton Crockett, A Theology of the Sublime (New York: Routledge, 2001), 3. Vaihinger saw in Kant a precursor to his own theory of the “as if,” as set out in The Philosophy of ‘As If’
it permits us to categorize seemingly problematic expressions that draw on those vocabularies as figurative rather than as erroneous. This attraction probably explains why the secondary literature contains so much discussion of Schenker’s metaphors, particularly in connection with his much-vaunted organicism.

Commentators such as Korsyn, Snarrenberg, Hubbs, Solie, Pastille,

(\textit{Die Philosophie des Als Ob}), which seeks to understand metaphysics and morality as useful fictions that offer indispensable practical benefits to human life.

Kevin Korsyn, “Schenker’s Organicism Reexamined,” \textit{Intégral} 7 (1993), 82-118. Of all the interpreters listed, Korsyn has the most nuanced view of Schenker’s organic vocabulary. His suggestion that “organicism…can function as a regulative concept, in Kant’s sense” (118) is an astute one, not least because it is a suggestion that Kant himself makes. A regulative concept, for Kant, is one that can never be fully exemplified in experience. The concept of the world as a complete, unified, and causally connected whole is this sort of concept, since the human cognitive and sensory apparatus is in principle incapable of gaining complete knowledge of the totality of existent things across the infinite expanse of space and time. But such a concept, Kant argues, can nevertheless guide (regulate) empirical inquiry. The concept of an ordered cosmos, though it cannot be adequately instantiated in empirical experience, is still useful because it exerts pressure on us to seek the cause for every effect and to organize our concepts systematically and hierarchically, as the cosmos is (presumed to be) organized. The idea of God is also regulative: “We declare, for example, that the things in the world must be so considered as if they had their existence from a highest intelligence. In such a way the idea is properly only a heuristic and not an ostensive concept, and it indicates, not how an object is constituted, but rather how we, under its guidance are to seek the constitution and connection of objects of experience in general” (CPR, A670-71/B698-699). And, in concert with Korsyn, Kant explicitly claims that the concept of a natural organism is “a regulative concept (\textit{regulativer Begriff}) for reflective judgment (\textit{reflektierende Urteilskraft}), allowing us to use a remote analogy with our own causality in terms of purposes (\textit{unserer Kausalität nach Zwecken}) generally to guide our investigation of objects (\textit{Nachforschung über Gegenstände}) and to meditate regarding their supreme basis (\textit{obersten Grund}).” \textit{CJ}, 255/§65/5: 375. I would push back gently against Korsyn’s claim that “we can see that organicism is not a scientific doctrine, despite the proliferation of biological metaphors in organicist thought” (91). The masterminds behind the development of有机ism, the German idealist and romantic philosophers, conceived of themselves as laying down the conceptual foundations for a science of life. Fascinatingly, these philosophers saw the experience and production of artworks as being importantly enmeshed (in ways that are too complicated to enter into here) with the project of erecting a complete and correct \textit{Naturwissenschaft}. That peculiarity may provide
Cherlin,66 Tarasti,67 Cook,68 Keiler,69 Duerkson,70 Clark,71 their many disagreements notwithstanding, univocally treat Schenker’s organicism as at bottom a metaphorical exercise. The conceptual metaphor interpretation I just sketched extends this interpretive paradigm so that it embraces Schenker’s logical, ethico-legal, and causal descriptions of music. This reading has the virtue, if indeed it is a

ammunition to modern-day critics who regard the organicists as shoddy scientific thinkers. But organicism is a scientific doctrine, even if it is a bad one. A lively account of the organicist movement and its scientific ambitions is given by Robert Richards in The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (University of Chicago Press, 2002). I agree, however, with Korsyn’s underlying point, which is that modern science has abandoned the organicist program of explanation: “The comparison of a work of art to a biological organism is not a reduction to a physical explanation; in the organicist appeal to nature, nature is not an impersonal mechanism as it is for modern science” (ibid.). I would lightly qualify this statement by noting that, for the Kantian organicist, nature is an impersonal mechanism. Kant never denies that the natural world is closed under physical causes. But it so happens, he thinks, that certain denizens of the Naturwelt, namely living things, cannot be understood by us without our having recourse to teleological methods of investigation, which are distinct from mechanistic explanations.

virtue, of exculpating Schenker by treating his necessitarianism as only a manner of speaking—a stylistic calling card—rather than as a substantive view that saddles Schenker with outré metaphysical commitments concerning music’s modal status. Schenker’s "new way of talking about music in terms of certain governing metaphors of organic unity" may remain problematic as a form of rhetoric, perhaps for moral and political reasons, but at least Schenker is exonerated of charges that he is a lousy philosopher, since he is shown to have no real philosophical pretensions in the first place.

---

73 It is something of a cliché that organicist thought has been discredited by its later appropriation by 20th-century European fascism. See Daniel Gasman, “Organicism and Nazism,” World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia, eds. C. Blamires and P. Jackson (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1996), 487-488. For the record, I find this guilt-by-association reasoning (which says that an proposition can be disproved solely by appeal to the character defects of those who came to believing it) to be a philosophically unrespectable counterpart of the genetic fallacy (which says that a proposition can be disproved solely by appeal to the character defects of those who originally thought it up).
74 Although I find it rhetorically useful to introduce the metaphorical reading of Schenker as a foil to my own interpretive approach, I should already blur the distinction between the two by making some needed qualifications. It is unlikely that Lakoff and Johnson would accede to the idea that classing Schenker’s necessity talk as metaphor has the effect of whitewashing it or rendering it philosophically inert. For them, metaphorical comparisons are an ineliminable feature of all of our thought and speech, so the fact that some use of language or manner of thinking is metaphorical shows nothing at all about how philosophically perilous or innocuous it is. (I can’t help but see this as providing a reductio on Lakoff and Johnson’s view. If metaphor is everywhere, it is nowhere: when all thought and speech is held to be pervasively metaphorical, we have at that point lost hold of the distinction—between what is figurative and what isn’t—that made it worthwhile to talk about metaphors in the first place. In short, I believe Lakoff and Johnson give us a theory of concepts, or a theory of the unavoidable comparativity and conceptuality of thought and speech, not a theory of metaphor. But I cannot embark on an extended critique of their theory at this time.) Further, it would be an oversimplification to say that I think Schenker’s necessitarian claims are literally true simpliciter. My claim, to proleptically limn it, is that Schenker’s claims of necessity are grounded in teleological judgments concerning part-whole and part-part relations in music,
This interpretation gets a lot of things right. I cheerfully acknowledge the centrality of figurative language in Schenker’s writing, and I don’t deny that Schenker’s flair for vivid speech and poetic conceit\textsuperscript{75} comes across strongly when he talks about music as one would talk about a plant or animal, legal code, causal connection, or syllogism. But this tells only half the story. For it is also the case that the claims of necessity Schenker makes on behalf of Chopin’s and Mozart’s tritones, and other similar claims, can be explained as serious assertions that are judgments, moreover, which are made from a special epistemic standpoint (the musical standpoint) within which we ignore a wide variety of known facts. For Kant, as I go on to discuss, teleological judgments do not give us “objective knowledge” of objects. They instead serve to orient the systematization of our knowledge of nature by prompting us to regard organisms as if they were intelligently designed—a cognitive attitude, he thinks, from which there are epistemic and investigatory benefits to be reaped. And the musical standpoint, as I go on to discuss, is a fictionalizing or make-believe stance wherein we pretend that certain facts do not obtain. It is unclear to me how the concept of \textsc{literal truth} maps onto Kant’s idea about the regulative employment of teleological concepts or onto the Parkhurst/Strawson/Hanslick idea about a musical standpoint, but it is clear to me that it would invite confusion to say that Schenker’s necessitarian claims are literally true. But it would also be a distortion to say that Schenker’s necessitarian claims are metaphors on a par with “Juliet is the sun.” If Schenker’s necessitarian claims are literally true, they are so in some heavily qualified sense; and if they are metaphorical, they are so also in some heavily qualified sense.\textsuperscript{75} Sometimes the appearance that Schenker is speaking with metaphorical abandon is an artifact of translation. In Borgese’s translation of \textit{Harmonielehre}, passages like this one abound: “Nature in her beneficence has bestowed on us the possibility of enjoying the euphony of the perfect fifth even if it does not occur exactly in the second octave, which is its natural abode; likewise we are able to enjoy the euphonic major third without waiting for its appearance, as scheduled by nature, in the third octave” »...\textsc{schenkt uns die gültige Natur den Wohlklang der Quint, auch wenn diese nicht gerade in der zweiten Oktave fällig ist, wo ihre eigentliche Heimat ist, und ebenso erfreuen wir uns der wohlklingenden großen Terz, ohne dass sie programmgemäss erst in der dritten Oktave zu erscheinen braucht.}« \textit{HL}, 41-2 / \textit{H}, 28. The anthropomorphic tone is muted if we abstain from Borgese’s practice of capitalizing “Nature” (it is capitalized in the German, but so are all nouns) and of using the English feminine pronouns “she” and “her,” to translate “sie” and “ihr” when those stand in apposition to the grammatically feminine “\textit{Natur.” Borgese’s “Nature” is personified and gendered to an extent that Schenker’s “\textit{Natur}” is not.
underwritten by a serious philosophical thesis.\textsuperscript{76} I believe, in other words, that there is a way of taking Schenker at his word about musical necessity and at the same time thinking he is of sound mind. The way is this: we must come to appreciate how Schenker’s necessitarianism is rooted in musical absolutism—very roughly, the stance that music is an autonomous and self-subsistent art form—and musical organicism—very roughly, the view that the structure of musical works can be grasped by using the same form of judgment that is employed in grasping the structure of biological entities. The absolutism and organicism Schenker needs to take on in order to earn the right to his necessitarian lingo are views expressly defended by Hanslick and Kant, respectively, views which implicitly lie behind many of the most familiar Schenkerian ways of talking about music.

My argument comes in three stages. In telescopic form, they look like this:

(1) I argue that Schenker’s assertions about music’s “absolute nature” should be taken as (or taken as resting upon) a prescription that music be apprehended from what I will call the “musical standpoint.” In cursory outline, this is a

\textsuperscript{76} Nicholas Cook cautions us against “the widespread error of turning Schenker into a philosopher” (\textit{The Schenker Project}, 15). Cook is consistently supercilious in his treatment of the philosophical side of Schenker’s work, depicting him as a dilettante given to “patching and matching” ill-chosen and “half-understood snippets” from the works of prominent thinkers (ibid., 45). Oddly enough, throughout much of the book Cook goes to great trouble to document Schenker’s philosophical influences and to tease out the philosophical implications of his musical theories, and one of his central theses has to do with the depth and breadth of Schenker’s Hegelianism. There is something self-defeating about Cook’s efforts to be sensitive to the philosophical resonances of the works of a thinker whom he regards as a poseur who was “not above making philosophical howlers” (ibid., 14).
state where one declines to attend to any non-auditory features of one's experience.

(2) I argue that when one occupies the musical standpoint, one is moved to theoretically investigate musical works as, or as if (als ob), organisms. Schenker's graphs, we shall see, efficiently deliver the results of this type of investigation, and his necessitarian prose is in some sense parasitic on his graphic technique. His organicism, we can therefore say, is methodological rather than rhetorical.

(3) I argue that methodological organicism underlies and justifies Schenker's claims that the musical events that comprise a masterwork must be as they are.

The arguments for (1) make use of a Kantian thought experiment borrowed from Peter Strawson's *Individuals* and material from Hanslick's epochal treatise on musical aesthetics, *On the Musically Beautiful (Vom Musikalisch-Schönen)*. The arguments for (2) and (3) take their cue from Kant's theory of biology as set out in the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*, the second half of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.77

77 While it is both true and interesting that Schenker was directly and indirectly influenced by Hanslick's and Kant's writings, my project is not the genealogical one of tracing their impact on Schenker's thought. What I aim to do is reconstructive and justificatory. I explain how Schenker should have elucidated his autonomism and organicism in order to defend his necessitarianism. But this exercise in Schenkerian apologetics also yields interpretive fruit. There is strong pressure to interpret a thinker of Schenker's stature as making (some kind of) sense, and Schenker's necessitarian claims make sense, I contend, if they are the claims of a Hanslickian autonomist and a Kantian organicist. My defense of Schenker's necessitarianism, if
SECTION 3: ABSOLUTISM

Schenker is persuaded that music enjoys pride of place among the fine arts because of its “absolute nature” (absolut Charakter, das Absolut der Musik). What does it mean to say that music has a nature that is “absolute?” It is in part a semantic or semiotic claim about music’s self-reflexivity. Thus:

“Musical motives, unlike words, do not possess the good fortune of being able, all on their own, to elicit either representations of objects or concepts. If a word is only a sign for something—that is, for an object or for a concept that assimilates objects in itself—then the musical motive is only a sign for itself; or, better, it is nothing more and nothing less than itself...[Music] recognized its powerlessness successful, should boost our credence that Schenker would have welcomed being characterized as a Hanslickian autonomist and Kantian organicist, a conjecture which is made all the more likely by the fact that Schenker was a studious admirer of the texts in which Hanslick outlines his autonomism and Kant outlines his organicism. Strictly speaking, Schenker could be a Hanslickian autonomist and a Kantian organicist without ever having come into contact with Hanslick’s or Schenker’s writings, so long as he held the array of commitments that define these positions.

78 “It would have been so much easier for [Schopenhauer] if he had grasped the absolute nature of music first of all from the study of counterpoint. By starting there, he could perhaps have grasped all the better the final secret of the world, the secret of its own absolute existence, by understanding the dream of the creator of the world as a similarly absolute occurrence.” »UND WIE LEICHT HÄTTE DANN DER PHILOSOPH, WENN ER AUS DEM KONTRAPUNKT HERAUS ZUNÄCHST AUCH NUR DAS ABSOLUTE DER MUSIK BEGREIFEN UND SICH ANEIGNEN KÖNNTE, VON HIER AUS DANN VIELLEICHT DESTO BESSER AUCH DAS LETZTE GEHEIMNIS DER WELT, IHR EIGENES ABSOLUTES DASEIN, DEN TRAUM DES WELTENSCHÖPFERS ALS EIN ÄHNLICH ABSOLUTES EREIGNIS ZU VERSTEHEN.« KPT Vol. 1, 25 / CPT Vol. 1, 16. Translation adapted from Rothgeb and Thym.
to promote understanding except by clarifying individual motives and tonal successions through repetition and similarity.” 79

“Music was destined to reach its highest culmination in the likeness of itself, turning away from all worldly things.” 80

79 »DENN ES BESITZT DAS MUSIKALISCHE MOTIV NICHT WIE DAS WORT DEN SEGNE N, DURCH SICH SELBST DIE GEGENSTÄNDLICHKEIT, DEN BEGRIFF AUSZULÖSEN. IST DAS WORT EBEN NUR EIN ZEICHEN FÜR ETWAS, D. H. EINEN GEGENSTAND ODER EINEN BEGRIFF, DER IN SICH DIE GEGENSTÄNDE VERARBEITET, SO IST DAS MUSIKALISCHE MOTIV NUR EIN ZEICHEN FÜR SICH SELBST ODER, BESSER GESAGT, NICHTS MEHR UND NICHTS WENIGER, ALS ES SELBST... [D]ER TON... SAH... WOHL BALD... SEINE OHNMACHT, UM DAS VERSTÄNDNIS ANDERS WERBEN ZU KÖNNEN, ALS DURCH DEUTLICHMACHTUNG EINZELNER MOTIVE UND TONSCHRITTE MIT DEN MITTELN DER WIEDERHOLUNG UND DER ÄHNLICHKEIT.« “Der Geist der musikalischen Technik,” 137-8. Translation mine. Korsyn notices that this passage has a counterpart in On the Musically Beautiful. According to Hanslick, “the essential difference” between speech and sound “consists in the fact that in speech, sound is only a sign, that is, a means to the end of expressing something that is completely separate from the means, while in music sound is a thing, in the sense of something that occurs as an end in itself.” »DER WESENTLICHE GRUNDUNTERSCHIED BESTEHRT ABER DARIN, DASS IN DER SPRACHE DER TON NUR EIN ZEICHEN, D. H. MITTEL ZUM ZWECK EINES DIESEM MITTEL GANZ FREMDEN AUSZUDRÜCKENDEN IST, WÄHREND IN DER MUSIK DER TON EINE SACHE IST, D. H. ALS SELBSTZWECK AUFTRITT. « VMS, 88 / OMB, 42, translation mine. Quoted in Korsyn, “Schenker’s Organicism,” 108. Also cf. Schenker, HL 3 / H 3: “Every art, with the exception of music, fundamentally consists in nothing but the association of ideas drawn from nature and reality, indeed the association of great and globally significant ideas. In all cases nature is the archetype; art the ectype, be it in word, color, or form. We know immediately which part of nature the word, the color, or the sculptural work signifies. With music things are different. Here, inherently, there is an absence of any such unambiguous association with ideas from nature.” »ALLE KÜNSTE, DIE MUSIK AUSGENOMMEN, SIND IM GRUNDE NUR IDEENASSOZIATIONEN DER NATUR UND DER WIRKLICHKEIT, ALLERDINGS GROSSE UND WELTUMSPANNENDE IDEENASSOZIATIONEN. ALLEMAL IST DIE NATUR VORBILD, DIE KUNST DEREN NACHBILD, SEI ES IN WORT, FARBE ODER FORM. WIR WISSEN SOFORT, WELCHEN TEIL DER NATUR DAS WORT, WELCHEN DIE FARBE UND WELCHEN DAS PLASTISCHE WERK BEDEUTET. ANDERS IN DER MUSIK. HIER FEHLT VON HAUS AUS JEDER ARTIGE UNZWEIDEUTIGE ASSOZIATION ZUR NATUR HINÜBER.« Translation mine.

80 »MUSIK... [WAR] BESTIMMT, IHRE HÖCHSTE STEIGERUNG IN DER ABWENDUNG VON ALLEM STOFF DER WELT, IM GLEICHNIS IHRER SELBST ZU ERREICHEN.« FRS, 146 / FC, 93.
It is in part, too, a claim that music is a sovereign art form, one not beholden to any criteria extrinsic to it:

“The absolute character of tonal life, as initially established in the study of counterpoint, means the emancipation of tonal life from every external purpose, whether it be words, the stage, or generally the narrative aspect of any kind of program. The self-sufficiency of tones places the composer under the obligation to adapt himself to their independent existence and to treat as secondary every purpose with which music can possibly be associated.”⁸¹

At his most extreme, Schenker explains music’s absolute nature as being a product of its drastic, constitutional dissociation from everything that isn’t music. Music “seems independent of the world (sie von der Welt so losgelöst erscheint)” and is “released, by virtue of its inborn world of motivic association, from any need to establish connections with the external world.”⁸² In what he intends as a

---

⁸¹ »MIT DEM ABSOLUTEN CHARAKTER DES TONLEBENS, WIE IHN ZUM ERSTEN MAL EBEN DER KONTRAPUNKT FESTSTELLT, IST NUN ABER AUCH ZUGLEICH DIE EMANZIPATION DES TONLEBENS VON JEGLICHEM ÄUSSEREN ZWECK, MAG ES DAS WORT, DIE BÜHNE, UND ÜBERHAUPT Das ANEKDOTISCHE IRGEND PROGRAMMS SEIN, VON SELBST GEGEBEN. DAS IN SICH SELBST RUHENDE DER TÖNE ZWINGT DEM KOMPONISTEN DIE VERNICHTUNG AUF, SICH DEM EIGENLEBEN DER TÖNE ANZUBEQUEMEN, UND JEGLICHER ZWECK, DER ALLENFALLS DER MUSIK VERSCHNAPFT SEIN KANN, EIN ZWEITES SEIN ZU LASSEN.« KPT Vol. 1, 23 / CPT Vol. 1, 15. Translation mine.

⁸² “One understands all the better why music—secure in its tonal effects and, freed, by virtue of its proprietary association of motivic ideas, from any concern for establishing connections with the external world (in contrast with the other arts)—reveals a character which aestheticians and philosophers have readily observed but poorly understood; one understands why music seems to independent of the world.” »MAN ES DANN DESTO BESSER WEISS, WARUM DIE TONKUNST, IN IHREN EIGENEN TONWIRKUNGEN GEBORGEN UND IN IHREN UREIGENEN IDEENASSOZIATIONEN DES MOTIVISCHEN AUCH ALLER SORGE ENTHOBEN, NOCH AUSSERDEM (Gleich den übrigen Künsten) an die AUSSENWELT ANKNÜPFEN ZU MÜSSEN, Eben den von Philosophen und Ästhetikern wohl
repudiation of Schopenhauer’s musical aesthetics, Schenker declares that “music in not the ‘heart of things’; on the contrary, music has little or nothing to do with ‘things.’”83 With such statements Schenker comes closest to what the German idealist tradition understands by “the absolute” (das Absolut, das Unbedingt). The absolute, the vanishing point of Kant’s philosophy84 that later becomes the Archimedean point of Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophies,85 is that which is “unconditioned” (bedingungslos). Crudely, to say that something is unconditioned is to say that it does not possess, or cannot be known to possess, a determinate (bestimmt) or limited (begrenzt) mode of being (Seinsart), a way of existing that is defined by how it excludes and is excluded by other determinate ways of existing.86 The absolute, it follows from this, is not subsumable under discrete empirical concepts, which serve to classify objects as having certain determinate properties

beobachteten, aber schlecht verstandenen Charakter offenbart; warum sie von der Welt so losgelöst erscheint.« KPT Vol. 1, 24/ CPT Vol. 1, 15.

83 »Nicht „das Herz der Dinge“ ist die Musik, nein, sie will mit dem „Dingen“ überhaupt nicht viel oder gar nichts zu tun haben.« KPT Vol. 1, 24/ CPT Vol. 1, 16. Schenker singles out Schopenhauer as his intended sparring partner in this passage. But Schenker is taking jabs at a straw man. As I discuss later in the essay, Schopenhauer would have found nothing to object to in Schenker’s claim that music has nothing to do with “things.”

84 A leitmotif of the first Critique is that knowledge of the unconditioned (e.g., knowledge of God, knowledge of the world-whole) is forever beyond the reach of our finite, discursive intellects, however much the inferences of our faculty of reason might deceive us into thinking otherwise. We must therefore, Kant admonishes in the “Dialectic” of the first Critique, be ever vigilant against succumbing to reason’s illusions, must not venture out beyond the threshold or vanishing point of the conditions of human cognition.

85 For example, Hegel, in the opening of his Phenomenology of Spirit, turns the Kantian philosophy on its head by claiming that knowledge is only of the absolute.

86 A simple example: something that is red is “conditioned” or “limited” inasmuch as being red is a mode of being that is defined by how it precludes and is precluded other modes of being, viz., being blue, being green, being yellow, etc. The idealists’ use of the word “limited” becomes clearer when we reflect on how mutually exclusive properties “hem each other in” in the space of properties.
and as lacking certain others. Thus the absolute cannot be identified with, cannot overlap with, and cannot form any finite part (any “moment”) of “nature” or the “external world” (die Natur, die Außenwelt), terms which, in the idealist jargon, stand for the domain of discrete, conceptualizable spatio-temporal objects.

This points up the fact that, taken at face value, Schenker’s statements about musical absolutism seem outlandish—perhaps even more so, at first blush, than the necessitarianism I ultimately want to use them to explain. Schenker seems willfully blind to what should be blindingly obvious counterexamples: Music is capable of referring to or being about non-musical things, and does so regularly and conspicuously; music is a cultural practice dependent in a variety of ways on the activities of practitioners of culture, not something that floats free of its conditions of production; music is often instrumental to our non-musical purposes (healing

---

87 To rephrase this in the language of note 86 of this chapter: empirical concepts assign particular modes of being to objects.
88 If meaning and reference are conventionally codified by users of symbolic systems (linguistic communities and their members), as seems indubitable, then sonic patterns (musical or otherwise) can mean or denote anything they are individually intended and communally taken to mean or denote. The codes according to which music points to things outside of itself are topics of study for musical semioticians, who take it for granted that music has extramusical referential capacities and that it routinely bears linguistically paraphrasable meanings. Thus when Kofi Agawu cites “a Wagnerian leitmotif; a word painting in Monteverdi, Lassus or Handel; the depiction of a narrative in a Liszt or Strauss tone poem; and the expression of verbal images in the accompaniment to a Schubert song” as “examples of intrinsic or iconic reference,” this is not intended to spark debate. The observations that “a leitmotif, for example, bears the weight of an assigned reference,” or that “in painting words, the composer finds—often invents—an iconic sign for a non-musical reality” are similarly inarguable, and stand as indictments of (what appear to be) Schenker’s contentions about the radical semantic limitedness of music. See Kofi Agawu, Music as Discourse: Semantic Adventures in Romantic Music (Oxford University Press, 2009), 27.
89 Cf. Korsyn, “Schenker’s Organicism Reexamined,” 95: “By clothing genius in the authority of nature, organicist thought risks making inflated claims for art, as if one
the sick, soothing the restless, stirring patriotic sentiments); ergo music stands in copious “connections with the external world."

Questions: What can Schenker be driving at? How can we avoid thinking that his absolutism is sheer lightheadedness, when it denies so much that is undeniable?

Answer: We can hold that Schenker is not, with his assorted professions of musical absolutism, making a naturalistically descriptive claim about music’s objective character. Instead, we should think, he is making a normative claim on us, making a demand that we should regard music from a special standpoint.

Schenker’s absolutism is more tenable (for him) and more tractable (for us) if it has less to with what properties music has and more to do with what proprieties we are to observe in cognizing music. When such proprieties of listening are observed, as I shall argue, music counts as (or is experienced as) “absolute.”

SECTION 4: THE MUSICAL STANDPOINT

could somehow erase all traces of human origins and imperfections from what are, after all, the products of human labor, as if a work of art could possess the same inevitability and necessity possessed by a natural organism.” As I argue further on in this essay, the claims of Schenker’s organismic may not seem so inflated if we acknowledge that it has a perspectival or standpoint-sensitive dimension to it.

We should not forget that Schenker has much to say about the exigencies of instrumental performance, about how to correctly and efficiently execute ornaments at the keyboard, about what fingerings are most effective in Beethoven’s piano sonatas, and suchlike. These discussions presuppose that music is the product of human labor—a way of being in connection to the “external world,” if anything is. Once we realize that many of Schenker’s statements about music’s absolute nature can be taken as prescriptions about the cognitive attitude we ought to adopt toward music, it becomes possible to square Schenker’s musical absolutism with his acceptance, evident in all of his practical writings, of the commonsense notion that music is a perfectly worldly thing that is produced and consumed by embodied creatures.
4.1: Strawson: I look to P. F. Strawson's *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* as a blueprint for constructing a normative interpretation of Schenker's absolutism. I then show that an argument for normative absolutism is the centerpiece of Hanslick's *On the Musically Beautiful*.

Chapter 2 of *Individuals* tries to resolve the Kant-inspired question of whether a non-solipsistic consciousness (a thinking thing that can mark a distinction in thought between self and non-self) must possess a conceptual scheme in which the basic entities are extended bodies occupying three-dimensional space. Strawson begins with the assumption that sight and touch are the only sense modalities that essentially, rather than derivatively, afford us representations of spatially-located objects. If we can then show that “a being whose experience was purely auditory [could] have a conceptual scheme which provided for objective particulars,”

Strawson reasons, we will have shown that it is possible for one to differentiate between what is and what is not identical to oneself without having the conceptual resources to locate objects in space. Whether a purely auditory being (one that is, so to speak, “all ears”) could have knowledge of objective particulars is to be discovered by performing a thought experiment in which we

“...imagine ourselves, our ordinary selves, with all our ordinary conceptual and linguistic apparatus at our disposal, writing reports on a special part of our experience. The part is defined by the description given of the purely auditory world. But the writing of our reports is governed by an important rule. The rule is that we are not, in writing our reports, to make use of any concepts which

---

derive their function from the fact that this special part of our experience is in fact integrated with our experience at large, forms part of a wider whole. All the concepts or expressions we employ must find their justification within the part of our experience in question. They must all be concepts or expressions of which we find the use essential or convenient merely in order to do justice to the internal features of [the auditory] part of our experience.”

Strawson’s answer to the question about conceptual schemes is less important for our purposes than is his method of answering it, with its appeals to the fiction of a purely auditory world. Purely auditory worlds, we learn, are ones where no referential/semantic or causal/existential relations obtain between sounds and non-sounds—trivially, because no objects of a non-auditory nature exist at all. In these worlds, Bishop Berkeley might have said, esse ist audiri. Significantly, Schenker’s assertions about musical absolutism all come out true when evaluated at (possible, non-actual) purely auditory worlds. In purely auditory worlds, sounds are “self-sufficient” (selbstständig) because they are not brought into existence by non-sounds (as when the hammer hits the piano’s strings); they are “absolute” (unbedingt) because their modes of being are not determined or limited by non-sonic modes of being (as when a sound’s quality is determined by how the

---

92 Strawson, *Individuals*, 82.
93 Strawson concludes that a purely auditory being is capable of non-solipsistic experience so long as its experience is structured by something analogous to space. This quasi-spatial role could be played, Strawson thinks, by an omnipresent (or perhaps, to avoid spatial language, “semper-audible”) “master sound” in relation to which all other sounds are heard.
94 “To exist is to be heard.” Berkeley’s *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710) uses the phrase esse est percipi (“to exist is to be perceived”) as a slogan for his subjective idealism, the metaphysical doctrine according to which there is no such thing as mind-independent matter.
harp is struck or how the chorus is joined); and the musical motive signifies only itself (ist nur Zeichnen für sich selbst) because there nothing else—nothing non-sonic—for the motive to signify. Since, as Strawson says, “the description of the universe of discourse in question specifies that it contains no sensory items other than sounds,”95 a Strawsonian Tonwelt96 emancipates musical sounds from “external purpose” (äußeren Zweck) by the sheer annihilation of everything that is external to them.

But so what? Schenker didn’t live in a purely auditory world and neither do we, so it may seem like idle speculation to reason about what is true at some distant precinct of logical space. This possible-worldly reasoning, though, has an actual-worldly application. The fact that Schenker’s pronouncements about music’s absolute nature are true at a purely auditory world, I take it, is a clue that these

95 Strawson, ibid.
96 Schenker uses the term Tonwelt ("tonal world") in Harmony in order to inscribe a boundary-line that divides music from nature: “The musical series becomes and individual in the tone-world only when it recurs within the succession of sounds. And, as in nature generally, a drive to procreate manifests itself in music. It is precisely this drive to procreate that enacts the drama of repetition. We should finally get used to confronting tones as creatures. We should get used to accepting that they harbor a biological drive, the kind that inheres in living things. We have before us an equation: In nature: procreative drive → repetition → individual species; in the tone-world, in just the same way: procreative drive → repetition → individual motive.” »...so wird die Musikalische Reihe, erst wenn sie sich in der Reihe wiederholt, zu einem Individuum in der Tonwelt. Und wie in aller Natur, so offenbart sich auch in der Musik der Trieb der Fortpflanzung, durch welchen eben jene Wiederholung in Szene gesetzt wird. Man gewöhn sich endlich, den Tönen wie Kreaturen ins Auge zu sehen; man gewöhne sich, in ihnen biologische Triebe anzunehmen, wie sie den Lebewesen innewohnen. Haben wir doch schon hier vor uns eine Gleichung: In der Natur: Fortpflanzungstrieb → Wiederholung → individuelle Art; in der Tonwelt ganz so: Fortpflanzungstrieb → Wiederholung → individuelles Motive.« HL, 6 / H, 6, translation mine.
pronouncements proceed from a set of value judgments about 1) what outlook on
music we ought to adopt when we engage with music aesthetically. 2) what kinds of
things, consequently, we should allow ourselves to think, feel, and say about music
in our capacities as aesthetic judges. Specifically, we can read Schenker's absolutism
as directing us to cultivate an *as-if* attitude, to conceive of music as if music existed
at a purely auditory world. To put this spin on Schenkerian absolutism is to urge
that it is not in the first place *ontological*, a view about what kind of “substance”
music is and what kind of properties it bears, but rather *deontological*, a view about
the content of the correct norms of musical hearing.

4.2 Hanslick (and Schopenhauer): Not coincidentally, the musical absolutism
Hanslick propounds in *On the Musically Beautiful* receives an explicitly deontological
grounding. The normativity of Hanslick's absolutism can be underscored by
juxtaposing Hanslick's views with superficially similar but far more metaphysically
committal views of Schopenhauer—views which Hanslick seems to have partially
digested and then regurgitated in non-metaphysical form.

---

97 “Absolutism” could refer to the value judgment that says that music ought to be regarded in such-and-such a way. Or it could refer to the body of statements one would (be inclined to) make about music if one accepted that value judgment. These are distinct but, somewhat sloppily, I will use “absolutism” to refer to both indifferently, since my arguments don’t stand to gain much from being fussy about the distinction.

98 My normative reading of Hanslick comports with a passing suggestion Hanne Appelqvist makes in “Form and Freedom: The Kantian Ethos of Musical Formalism,” *The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics* 40-41 (2010-2011), 83. She writes, suggestively if rather vaguely, that “if there is a normative aspect in *On the Musically Beautiful*, then it is related, not to music as such, but to us in our roles as listener…While the formalistic truism of music’s content as tonally moving forms does not yet tell us what these forms are or how they are to be performed or developed, it nevertheless encourages the listeners to focus on the music itself.”
Music’s “realm” (Reich), according to Hanslick’s celebrated aphorism, “is truly not of this world.”99 This exact phrase reappears in his discussion of the composer’s vocation. Since the composer “composes and thinks in tones in abstraction from all objective reality,”100 she therefore and thereby “creates from within that which has not its like in Nature, and which, therefore, unlike the other arts, is truly not of this world.”101

By implicating music in what sounds like a dualistic metaphysical scheme, one in which the world of nature (gegenständlichen Realität) is counterpoised by an otherworld (Anderswelt) that is wholly different in kind (in German philosophical

---

99 »IHR REICH IST IN DER TAT NICHT VON DIESER WELT.« VMS, 63 / OMB, 30. I can’t resist pointing out a serendipitous pun. This could be translated errantly with the English sentence “music’s realm lies in the act (in der Tat) and isn’t of this world (von dieser Welt).” This sounds like an epigrammatic way of stating the position I impute to Hanslick. On my interpretation, Hanslick is out to teach us what proprieties of listening—task responsibilities concerning acts of auditory perception—we ought to observe in our experiences of musical sounds, not out to teach us what empirical (weltlich) properties sounds must have in order to count as music.

100 »DER KOMPONIST DICHTET UND DENKT. NUR DICHTET UND DENKT ER, ENTRÜCKT ALLER GEGENSTÄNDLICHEN REALITÄT, IN TÖNEN.« VMS, 153-4 / OMB, 74, translation mine. Payzant gives this inaccurate translation: “He then...creates from it something which has no counterpart in nature and hence none in the other arts, indeed none in this world.” The “it” in “creates from it” is, in Payzant’s translation, in grammatical apposition to “his own introspection” (Konzentration seines Innern), which makes it sound like Hanslick’s claim is that the composer shapes or molds her own introspection, as though her introspection were some kind of material like wood or clay. Hanslick’s intended claim, though, is that the composer makes something aus sich heraus, which could be idiomatically translated as “spontaneously” of “of her own accord.” It is best captured by the more literal “from within,” which is how Cohen’s translation reads. Payzant also, unaccountably, has Hanslick saying that what the composer produces “has no counterpart (hat keine seinesgleichen)” in the other arts. But what Hanslick means to say—and the German is completely unambiguous—is that music, unlike the other arts (ungleich den andern Künsten) is not the simulacrum of anything in nature (in der Natur nicht seinesgleichen hat).
parlance: a Zweiweltenlehre or Zweiwahrheitenlehre), Hanslick seems to align himself with another philosopher for whom music and metaphysical dualism were closely intertwined: Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s entire philosophical system grows up around a sustained attempt to pry apart two metaphysical provinces. The one is “objective reality” (Objektität),\(^\text{102}\) which for Schopenhauer is equivalent to “the world of appearances” (die Welt der Erscheinungen, sinnlichen Welt) or “the world-as-representation” (die Welt als Vorstellung). The other is an unconceptualizable domain of pure Will\(^\text{103}\) (Wille), of which the aforementioned appearances are representations (Vorstellungen), i.e. ways in which Will is “objectified” in and by the cognitive-perceptual achievements of human subjects. To bluntly paraphrase one of Schopenhauer’s cornerstone theses: Will underlies all individuation of empirical phenomena insofar as our appetitive natures are ultimately responsible for the manner in which we carve up the world with concepts. However, Will itself is not brought to knowledge by our cognition of those concept-bound phenomena. Rather, Will is brought into the ken of our understanding along two non-cognitive or non-conceptual routes. The first route is our unmediated, non-representational awareness of our somatic state, the

\(^{102}\) Here, “objective” means something closer to “comprised of / constituted by objects” than to “demonstrably factual.” In the present context, being an object is not in opposition to being an appearance. For Schopenhauer, as for Kant, objects are appearances, in the sense that all and only the things that can appear to us in empirical experience are time-bound objects. Schopenhauer’s dualism is indebted to the momentous distinction Kant’s makes in the first Critique between appearances (Erscheinungen) and things-in-themselves (Dinge an sich). Wholly un-Kantian is Schopenhauer’s idea, worked out in The World as Will and Representation, that the way things are in themselves is revealed to us through a nonconceptual self-awareness of our own embodied, desirous natures. His name for what is thus revealed is “Will.”

\(^{103}\) I capitalize “Will,” as do most English translations of Schopenhauer’s works.
awareness of what it is like to have the affective yearnings and aversions our flesh pulsates with incessantly. Thus we learn about Will in the first instance by willing, which, in Schopenhauer’s analysis, is at heart a response to the body’s clamorous dissatisfactions. The second route is our aesthetic experience of music, specifically “an affective mode of experiencing [music] that resembles what Schopenhauer also claims exists in the inner experience of our body as uniquely our own.”\textsuperscript{104} Music, unlike the other arts, is not mimetic, does not place before us any “representings” that could be assessed with respect to their fidelity to some collection of “representeds” (the connection with Schenker’s stance is obvious). So, William Tell is represented for us variously by the representings contained in Florian’s novel, Schiller’s drama, Goethe’s epic poem,\textsuperscript{105} and Dalí’s series of paintings—but Schopenhauer would adamantly deny that Rossini’s overture could do the same thing. Instead, music functions to make us feel, directly and without the intercession of concepts, the primal reality of Will (\textit{die Urwelt}).\textsuperscript{106}

At several pivotal junctures of \textit{On the Musically Beautiful}, Hanslick signals his wholesale appropriation of the Schopenhauerian idea that music’s ideal (\textit{geistig}) content discloses itself to us in a nonconceptual fashion. For example:

“It is thought that composing is the translating of some kind of conceptualized material into tones. On the contrary, the tones themselves are the untranslatable, primal language. Indeed from the very

\textsuperscript{105} Hanslick mentions these works in \textit{VMS}, 166-7 / \textit{OMB}, 80.
\textsuperscript{106} This is a makeshift sketch of the outlines of Schopenhauer’s views, not an interpretation or a defense of them.
fact that the composer is compelled to think in tones, it follows that music has no content, since every conceptual content must be capable of being thought in words.”

“Never does an archetype confront us in music’s form of appearance; the archetype is therefore absent from the ambit of our conceptual repertory. Music does not replicate any already familiar, already named object, and for that reason music provides no content for the kind of human thought that subsumes things under determinate concepts.”

The second quote recalls the reasoning that leads Schopenhauer to station music at the pinnacle of his aesthetic system. The point of the non-musical fine arts, Schopenhauer thinks, is to give sensible form to “archetypes” (Urbilder) or “Platonic ideas,” (platonische Idee). Self-consciously emulating Plato, Schopenhauer denominates these entities “the original forms of all things, [which] can be described as truly existing (ὄντως ὄν), since they always are, but never become and never

---

107 »SIE DENKEN SICH DAS Komponieren ALS Übersetzung EINES Gedachten StOFFS IN TÖNE, während doch die Töne selbst die unÜbersetzbare Ursprache sind. Daraus, dass der Tondichter gezwungen ist, in Tönen zu denken, folgt ja schon die Inhaltslosigkeit der Tonkunft, indem jeder begriffliche Inhalt in WORTEN müsste gedacht werden können.« VMS, 172 / OMB 82, translation adapted from Payzant.

108 »DAS Urbild ihrer Erscheinungsform begegnet uns nirgend, fehlt daher in dem Kreis unserer gesammelten Begriffe. Es wiederholt keinen bereits bekannten, benannten Gegenstand, darum hat Musik für unser in bestimmte Begriffe gefasstes Denken keinen nennbaren Inhalt.« VMS, 166 / OMB, 80, translation mine. “Urbilder” is Schopenhauer’s term for the Platonic forms that govern empirical appearances (Erscheinungen, Erscheinungsformen) and that explain why those appearances are as they are. The Urbilder are themselves an “objectification” (Objektität, Schopenhauer’s own coinage) of the underlying, un-objectified first principle (Urprinzip), i.e., Will. Unlike objective appearances (which are also “objectifications” of will), however, Urbilder are (unlocated, non-temporal) abstract objects rather than (determinately located, temporally bound) concrete objects.
pass away.” The non-musical arts imitate objective appearances (empirical things) and allow us to intuit, in a state of detached, Will-abnegating reflection, the Platonic ideas that those objective appearances participate in. (Thus in Gauguin’s *Tahitian Woman and Two Children*, Schopenhauer might say, we can perceive the Form of Motherhood, the metaphysical essence that inheres in all, and only in, mothers, but which cannot be intuited in our necessarily interested and Will-driven experiences of actual mothers.) Schopenhauer reserves a very different role for music. Music allows us to have direct, pre- or proto-conceptual truck with the Will qua thing-in-itself. A rough-and-ready version of Schopenhauer’s argument for this conception of music could run thus: 1) there is a wide-ranging and deep analogy or structural isomorphism between the way Will manifests itself in objective appearances and the way Will manifests itself in musical sounds, and this constitutes music’s meaning; 2) but our epistemic access to the meaning of music, unlike our epistemic access to the meanings of objective appearances, is not mediated by concepts; 3) thus music grants us unmediated access to Will’s all-pervading nisus or impelling force as it is in itself, apart from the concept-deploying cognitive activities that whip it into conceptual shape. Schopenhauer is prepared to say, on the basis of this line of reasoning, that music brings us into closer epistemic

---


110 Much of Schopenhauer’s discussion of music is given over to making an inventory of these cross-domain correspondences. For example, he thinks there is a structural analogy between the bass line in a polyphonic piece and the way Will is objectified in inanimate nature (dirt and rocks and so forth). Most commentators are pessimistic about how successful these analogies are. I am not concerned to defend or criticize them here, but my sense is that they have been approached with too much easygoing hostility and too little philosophical imagination.
proximity with the aboriginal truth of the universe than does any other kind of experience, save our attentive contemplation of our own acts of volition.  

Hanslick is thus squarely in Schopenhauer’s camp when he claims that music lacks the kind of conceptually articulated representational content (Gehalt) present in the kind of art that imitates or signifies particular ideas, objects, or events. Such mundane trifles are of little account from the exalted vantage point one ascends to in the experience of music, an art-form which, as Hanslick’s decidedly Schopenhauerian turn of phrase has it, provides a “sonic likeness of the universe’s grand movements.” Hanslick could well be acting as Schopenhauer’s spokesperson when he says that music is preeminent among its sister arts because it enables us to “feel the infinite (das Unendliche fühlen),” and because “man

---

111 The important difference between contemplating music and contemplating the exercise of our power of volition is that the former, according to Schopenhauer, allows us to be temporarily freed from the shackles of willing, whereas the latter is (by definition) a state in which we are at Will’s behest.
112 »...EIN TÖNENDES ABBILD DER GROSSEN BEWEGUNGEN IM WELTALL.« Translation adapted from Zöller, 132. As Zöller notes, this phrase appears only in the first edition of Vom Musikalisch-Schönen. For that reason it does not show up in either of the two published English translations (Payzant’s is based on the eighth edition, Cohen’s on the seventh). Bewegung, in this context, has Schopenhauerian resonances. As Lydia Goehr notes, Schopenhauer makes frequent use of the term to “highlight the dynamic tensions in all the arts, from architecture to music.” See Lydia Goehr, Elective Affinities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 11.
113 The Infinite (das Unendliche) is more closely associated with Hegel’s philosophy than with Schopenhauer’s. For Hegel, the Infinite is that which is not limited by anything else, since something’s being finite consists in its being bounded in by things distinct from it. In the Hegelian philosophical idiom, “the Infinite,” “the Absolute,” “the Whole” (das Ganz), and “the True” (das Wahre) are more or less fungible. The Infinite is equivalent to the Whole because only the totality of all that exists is infinite, i.e. free of limitation by stuff external to it. The Infinite is equivalent to the True since, according to Hegel, everything is what it is in relation to absolutely everything else, which he takes to mean that only a concept of the whole can do justice to (can provide a “true account” of) any finite “moment” of the whole. Although he doesn’t share Hegel’s preoccupation with infinity,
discovers afresh, in music, the whole universe *(so findet der Mensch wieder in der Musik das ganze Universum).*"114

4.3 Hanslick’s Non-metaphysical Absolutism: The specter of Schopenhauer undeniably hovers over these and many other parts of *On the Musically Beautiful.* However, several axial passages of the book, those around which I think its most noteworthy arguments revolve, support a reading of Hanslick’s position that doesn’t encumber him with Schopenhauer’s heavy metaphysical baggage.115 “The most necessary requirement, if we are to absorb music in an aesthetic fashion” Hanslick tells us, “is that we hear the piece of music for its own sake, whichever piece it is, and however exactly we may comprehend it.”116 The “requirement” *(Forderung)* Hanslick speaks of, the *sine qua non* of the aesthetic experience of music, isn’t an *ontological* requirement that sounds must be one way rather than another in order for us to have a musical experience of them. Hanslick is not trying to name some

Schopenhauer does frequently draw equivalencies between infinity and Will, such as this one: “But the earth-spirit would smile and say: ‘The source from which the individuals and their powers flow is inexhaustible, and is as boundless as are time and space; for, just like these forms of every phenomenon, they too are only phenomena, visibility of the will. No finite measure can exhaust that infinite source; therefore undiminished infinity is still always open for the return of any event or work that was nipped in the bud. In this world of the phenomenon, true loss is as little possible as is true gain. The will alone is; it is the thing-in-itself, the source of all those phenomena.” Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Representation*, 183-4. 114 Quoted and translated in Zöller, 134.

115 How much Schopenhauer’s metaphysical baggage actually weighs is an open question. I do not explore the possibility here of giving Schopenhauer the kind of deflationary, epistemological reading I give Hanslick, but I do not see any reason not to attempt one.

116 »DIE NOTWENDIGSTE FORDERUNG EINER ÄSTHETISCHEN AUFNAHME DER MUSIK IS ABER, DASS MAN EIN TONSTÜCK UM SEINER SELBST WILLEN HÖRE, WELCHES ES NUN IMMER SEI UND MIT WELCHER AUFFASSUNG IMMER.‹  VMS 136-7 / OMB 66.
illustrious natural property common to all musical sound sequences in virtue of which they count as musical—a property which, if Schopenhauer is to be believed, somehow permits these sounds to act as envoys from a supernatural realm.

Hanslick is instead giving utterance to a normative requirement, one that obliges the listener to get herself into a particular psychological or cognitive posture with respect to what she hears. “Pure intuition” (reine Anschauung) is Hanslick’s name for this state:117 “The hearer appreciates the piece of music being played in a state of pure intuition; every material interest must lie far away from him.”118

Entering into a state of pure intuition does not preclude attaining a scientific (wissenschaftlich) understanding of music. Far from it: Aesthetics (Ästhetik), as Hanslick thinks of it, is a systematic investigation of those aspects of music that “pure intuition” lays bare.119 As such, “[a]esthetics alone, as the science of the

---

117 See also VMS/OMB 4/7, 45/93, 57/119, 58/120, 63/131, and 66/136. Payzant and Cohen both translate this as “pure contemplation.” “Contemplation,” though, connotes cogitation and deliberation, whereas Anschauung has more the sense of merely “beholding” or “looking upon.” Hanslick cannot have been unaware of Kant’s extremely influential use of the term reine Anschauung, which is customarily translated (following Kemp Smith’s English edition of the first Critique) as “pure intuition.” In Kant’s transcendental idealism, space and time are known to us via “pure intuitions.” The means that our knowledge of the structure of space and time is singular (it is knowledge of only one spatial extent and only one temporal series), immediate (it is nonconceptual knowledge), and non-empirical (it is not knowledge gained by sensory perception). Hanslick, of course, is not employing “pure intuition” as an orthodox Kantian term of art—instead, he seems to be productively misunderstanding or misusing Kant’s technical terminology. To flag this fact, I prefer to give “pure intuition” for reine Anschauung.

118 » IN REINER ANSCHAUUNG GENIEßT DER HÖRER DAS ERLINGENDENE TONSTÜCK, Jedes STOFFLICHE INTERESSE MUSS IHN FERN LIEGEN.« VMS, 4-5 / OMB, 8, translation mine.

119 Today we find it strange that Hanslick introduces “pure intuition” into the “strictly scientific framework” (streng wissenschaftliche Gerippe) of what he hopes to establish as an “‘exact’ science of music, after the model of chemistry or physiology” (eine exakte Musikwissenschaft nach dem Muster der Chemie oder Physiologie). VMS, 72-3 / OMB, 35. Hanslick’s contemporaries did not see this as undermining his
beautiful in art, has the task of understanding music solely in its artistic aspect, and thus also the task of acknowledging only those of its effects that music, as a product of the human mind, by means of configuring elementary factors in a particular way, produces when one purely contemplates it."\textsuperscript{120} Reassessed in the context of his description of the discipline of aesthetics, Hanslick’s talk about music’s “realm” no longer sounds like it flows from his acceptance of a “two-worlds” ontology according to which music belongs to, or places us in communion with, an un- or other-worldly realm of Kantian noumena or Schopenhauerian Will. Music's Reich is not a disparate Seinsbereich (“realm of being”), an order of existence completely heterogeneous from the lived-in world (Lebenswelt); music’s Reich is a Geisterreich (“intellectual realm,” “realm of normativity”\textsuperscript{121}) in the sense of a specialized standpoint from scientific credentials. Ferdinand Peter Graf von Laurencin (1818-1890), a partisan of the New German School who wrote a book-length commentary on Hanslick’s treatise (\textit{Dr. Hanslicks Lehre vom Musikalisch-Schönen: eine Abwehr} (Leipzig: Matthes, 1859)), singled out Hanslick’s “scientific method” (\textit{Wissenschaftlichkeit}) for commendation: “Hanslick’s little book is a masterpiece in miniature: it is impossible to express oneself more flowingly, and, from the viewpoint of scientific method, more satisfactorily than Herr Dr. Hanslick has accomplished here.” Quoted and translated in James Deaville, “Negotiating the ‘Absolute,’” \textit{Rethinking Hanslick: Music, Formalism, and Expression}, eds. Grimes, Donovan, and Marx (University of Rochester Press, 2013), 21

\textsuperscript{120} »...ALLEIN DIE ÄSTHETIK, ALS LEHRE VON KUNST SCHÖNEN, HAT DIE MUSIK LEDIGLICH VON IHRER KÜNSTLERISCHEN SEITE AUFZUFASSEN, ALSO AUCH NUR JENE IHRER WIRKUNGEN ANZUERKENNEN, WELCHE SIE ALS MENSCHLICHES GEISTESPRODUKT, DURCH EINE BESTIMMTE GESTALTUNG JENER ELEMENTARISCHEN FAKTOREN, AUF DIE REINE ANSCHAUUNG Hervorbringt.« \textit{VMS, 136 / OMB, 66.} It is not wholly clear what Hanslick means by “elementary effects (elementarischen Faktoren).” One way to interpret him is as referring to the basic psychological effects of simple tonal combinations. These, according to Schenker, are isolated and examined in the study of strict counterpoint. \textsuperscript{121} For Hegel, at least as Habermas and Brandom interpret him, \textit{Geist} refers to the domain of normativity (the space of reasons, justifications, warrants, duties, rules, oughts, etc.) in general. Thus to say that Hanslick’s musical \textit{Reich is geistig} is doubly appropriate: \textit{Geistig} can be taken to mean both “normative” and “cognitive,” and I contend that Hanslick’s arguments concern the proper \textit{norms} of the aesthetic
which to mentally conceive (*geistig erfassen*) musical sounds. Hanslick advocates a
mode of aesthetic investigation in which we abstract from certain items of
perceptual content and thus, as he says, “take in” (*aufnehmen*) only a proper subset
of the things we could conceivably attend to while experiencing music. Music
belongs to another “realm” only in that we (are under an obligation to) consider it or
contemplate it in a state of indifference or inattention to otherwise salient aspects of
this realm, i.e. the naturalistically conceived order of things.\(^{122}\)

Material interest (*stoffliche Interesse*), in particular, must be put out of mind.
As Hanslick for the most part uses the term, a “material interest” has to do with “the
tendency of the feelings to become stirred up”\(^{123}\) by music. “Interest,” in this
connection, is a *double entendre*. One thing it refers to is our desire that music
“should fill us alternately with reverence, love, jubilation, and melancholy,”\(^{124}\) i.e.
our *interest* in being materially affected by musical sound. “Interest” also betokens
our proneness to mistakenly think that what is specifically *of aesthetic interest* in

\(^{122}\) “Indeed, for what they call the ear, for the cochlea or the eardrum, no Beethoven
composes. However, the imagination—which is configured so that it is susceptible
to auditory sensations, and with respect to which “sense” signifies something
completely different than a mere speculum for examining the surfaces of
appearances—enjoys in conscious sensuality music’s sounding forms, its self-
arranging tones, and abides in the free and immediate intuition of them.” »Ja, was sie
eben Ohr nennen – für das „Labyrinth“ oder „Trommelfell“ dichtet kein Beethoven.
Aber die Phantasie, die auf Gehörsempfindungen organisiert ist, und welcher der Sinn
etwas ganz anderes bedeutet, als ein blosser Trichter an die Oberfläche der
Erscheinungen, sie genießt in bewusster Sinnlichkeit die klingenden Figuren, die sich
aufbauenden Töne, und lebt frei und unmittelbar in deren Anschauung.« *VMS*, 61-2 /
*OMB*, 30, translation mine.

\(^{123}\) »...die Tendenz, Affekte in sich erregen zu lassen.« *VMS*, 8 / *OMB*, 5.

\(^{124}\) »...uns abwechselnd mit Andacht, Liebe, Jubel, Wehmut erfüllen« *VMS*, 7 / *OMB*, 5.
music is (the portrayal and impartation of) such feelings (Gefühle). This error begets a further error, that of taking music’s “power and disposition to arouse any feelings it pleases in the hearer”\(^{125}\) to be the “specific essence of music (spezifische Wesen der Musik),” the decisive factor that “differentiates music from the other arts (die Musik vor den übrigen Künsten charakterisiere).”\(^ {126}\) When Hanslick says that “imagination as the activity of pure intuition (die Phantasie, als die Tätigkeit des reinen Schauens)”\(^ {127}\) eschews material interest, part of his meaning is that we are making an ethical error, in the broad sense of an error of conduct, if we value music in proportion to, and distinguish it from the other arts on the basis of, its admitted propensity to “lay claim upon the feelings” (den Gefühlen vindizieren).\(^ {128}\)

“Material interest” also has a second, further-reaching significance. Hanslick claims that if the “material” (Stoff) or “content” (Inhalt) of an artwork, as contrasted with its “form” (Form), is equated with the “thoughts and events” (Gedanken, Ereignisse)\(^ {129}\) represented by the art work, then “in this sense of ‘material,’ as the subject matter or topic dealt with in the work, music in fact has no material.”\(^ {130}\) To set aside material interests, in this second sense, means refusing to allow any Gedanken or Ereignisse, any non-musical “material” (Materie, Gehalt) that music

---

\(^{125}\) »Die Macht und Tendenz, beliebige Affekte im Hörer zu erwecken.« VMS, 9 / OMB, 5.

\(^{126}\) VMS, 9 / OMB, 5.

\(^{127}\) VMS, 6 / OMB, 4.

\(^{128}\) VMS, 7 / OMB, 5. Vindizieren is a technical legal term that refers to a process of establishing legal ownership of something in order to have it removed from someone else’s possession delivered into one’s own custody. For background on Hanslick’s legal training, see Anthony Pryer’s “Hanslick, Legal Processes, and Scientific Methodologies,” Rethinking Hanslick, 52-69.

\(^{129}\) VMS, 167 / OMB, 80.

\(^{130}\) »Einen Inhalt in dieser Bedeutung, einen Stoff im Sinne des behandelten Gegenstandes hat die Tonkunst in der Tat nicht.« VMS, 162 / OMB, 78.
might accidentally or designedly evoke or resemble, to be of interest to us. This is
the thought Hanslick wishes to convey with his many allusions to music’s “ideal”
(*geistig*) nature. Predictably, though still culpably, several commentators\(^{131}\) have
tried to interpret Hanslick’s allusions to *Geist* as metaphysically-loaded attempts to
consign music to some kind of Platonic heaven of ontologically “immaterial
(*körperlos*)”\(^{132}\) or “spiritual (*geistig*)” forms.\(^{133}\) But, considering Hanslick’s decided

\(^{131}\) Mark Burford, “Hanslick’s Idealist Materialism,” *19th-Century Music* 30 no. 2
(2006), 171, asserts that Hanslick “took Hegel’s aesthetic and clung to the
metaphysical premise of the ‘Idea’ or ‘Spirit’ in music, though in a newly interpreted
sense” and that “in his attempt to characterize music’s essence, Hanslick did not so
much reject musical metaphysics as, to a certain extent, reconceptualize it by
arguing that the ideal content of music is a product of a human spirit, not a
transcendent one.” In “German Humanism, Liberalism, and Elegy,” *Rethinking
Hanslick* 174, Nicole Grimes asserts that “Hanslick’s opposition is not to vocal music,
program music, or music with any kind of autobiographical or literary
allusion…rather it is to music that seeks to be understood in terms of its
extramusical content, and not its musical content—that is its tones, latent within
which are the ideal content or spiritual substance (*geistiger Gehalt*), and thereby
music’s metaphysical status.” Pryer’s “Hanslick, Legal Processes, and Scientific
Methodologies,” *Rethinking Hanslick* 60-61, mentions the many “concepts that
Hanslick introduced to effect the metaphysical turn of his treatise—‘idea,’
‘substance,’ ‘form,’ and so on,” and accuses Hanslick of “gradually assimilating
metaphysical attributes to empirical ones in an aesthetic maneuver he seems to
think of as ‘embodiment’ (*Verkörperung*)—a catch-all term frequently found in
aesthetic writings, but which has almost no explanatory force, and which often
seems to combine the physical and metaphysical in ways as puzzling as the mind-
body problem.” None of these commentators do justice to—or, for that matter, even
try to do justice to—the palpable anti-metaphysical thread of Hanslick’s thought.

\(^{132}\) Hanslick does say that on account of its incorporeal material (*durch ihr
körperloses material*) music is the most ideal (*geistigste*) of the arts. But he
immediately adds that it is simultaneously, on the side of its
abstract/nonrepresentational play of forms (*von Seiten ihres gegenstandlosen
Formenspiels*), the most sensuous/carnal (*sinnlichste*) art form. *VMS*, 105 / *OMB*, 51.
These remarks are very difficult to reconcile with one another if they are supposed
to be pronouncements about music’s metaphysical status. However, it is clear from
a host of other similar passages that this is an *epistemic* claim (and a very Kantian
sounding one, at that) to the effect that both sense and understanding make a
contribution to musical cognition. For example, in the chapter entitled “The
Aesthetics of Feeling (*Die Gefühlsästhetik*),” Hanslick observes: “The word ‘intuition’
preference for speaking in epistemological terms about judgment and cognition rather than in metaphysical terms about existence and essence, it is open to us to

has for a long time been applied to all sensory appearances and not merely to visual representations. And it corresponds quite well to the act of attentive listening, which consists in a successive contemplation of sonic forms. Imagination, moreover, is not at all a self-contained domain: Just as it draws its spark of life from sense impressions, it straightaway transmits its radii, in turn, to the activity of the understanding and of sensation. That fact, however, is tangential to the true comprehension of the beautiful.” »DAS WORT „ANSCHAUUNG,” LÄNGST VON DEN GESICHTSVORSTELLUNGEN AUF ALLE SINNESERSCHEINUNGEN ÜBERTRAGEN, ENTSPRicht ÜBERDIES TREFFLICH DEM AKTE DES AUFMERKSAMEN HöRENS, WELCHES JA IN EINEM SUKZESSIVEN BETRACHTEN DER TONFORMEN BESTEHT. DIE PHANTASIE IST DABEI KEINESwegS EIN ABGESCHLOSSENES GEBIET: SO WIE SIE IHREN LEBENSFUNKEN AUS DEN SINNESEMPFINDUNGEN ZOG, SENDET SIE WIEDERUM IHRE RADII SCHNELL AN DIE TÄTIGKEIT DES VERSTANDES UND DES GEFÜHLS AUS. DIESES SIND FÜR DIE ECHTE AUFFASSUNG DES SCHÖNEN Jedoch nur GRENZGEBIETE.« VMS, 8 / OMB, 4, translation mine.

133 The unwary reader may gain the false impression that Hanslick thinks there is something ghost-like about music from his comment (mentioned in note 132) that “music is the “most ideal” (geistigste) of the arts because of its “incorporeal material” (körperlos Material), as well as from his many references to its “abstract play of forms” (gegenständlos Formspiel). But it is easy to accommodate these remarks to the deflationary reading I prefer: music is the “most intellectual” (geistigste) art because in listening to it appropriately we allow ourselves to consider only its intra-musical patterns, not its extra-musical connection to objects (Gegenstände, Körper).

134 Hanslick makes it unambiguous that the view he defends is a view about what we are and aren’t supposed to take into consideration when we aesthetically judge musical sounds: “The unity of musical disposition is what characterizes the four movements of a sonata as organically connected, not their connection with objects thought of by the composer. When poetic leading-strings such as these are surrendered and purely musical ones contrived, then one finds no other type of unity among the parts besides musical unity. Aesthetically speaking, it is a matter of indifference whether Beethoven selected specific programs for all his compositions; we do not know what they were, hence they do not exist for the work. What is present to us is the work itself, apart from any verbal commentary. Just as the jurist pretends that whatever is not in the court record is not in the world, similarly nothing is present to aesthetic judgment that exists outside of the work of art. If the movements of a composition appear unified to us, this cohesiveness must have its basis in musical determinations.” »DIE EINHEIT DER MUSIKALISCHEN STIMMUNG IST’S, WAS DIE VIER SÄTZE EINER SONATE ALS ORGANISCH VERBUNDEN CHARAKTERISIERT, NICHT ABER DER ZUSAMMENHANG MIT DEM VOM KOMPONISTEN GEDACHTEN OBJEKTE. WO SICH DIESER SOCH POETISCHES GÄNGELBAND VERSAGTE UND REIN MUSIKALISCH ERFAND, DA WIRD MAN KEINE ANDERE EINHEIT DER TEILE FINDEN, ALS EINE MUSIKALISCHE. ES IST ÄSTHETISCH GLEICHGÜLTIG,
ob sich Beethoven allenfalls bei seinen sämtlichen Kompositionen bestimmte Vorwürfe gewählt; wir kennen sie nicht, sie sind daher für das Werk nicht existierend. Dieses selbst, ohne allen Kommentar, ist’s, was vorliegt, und wie der Jurist aus der Welt hinausfingiert, was nicht in den Akten liegt, so ist für die ästhetische Beurteilung nicht vorhanden, was außerhalb des Kunstwerks lebt.

Erscheinen uns die Sätze einer Komposition als einheitlich, so muss diese Zusammengehörigkeit in musikalischen Bestimmungen ihren Grund haben.« VMS, 78 / OMB, 37. Translation adapted from Payzant. Hanslick’s verb hinausfingieren is difficult to render in English. A literal translation would be something like “pretend away” or “make a pretense of jettisoning.” Hanslick sees an analogy between musical listening and courtroom procedures based on his belief that jurists evaluate a case as though their knowledge is limited to what is admitted into evidence in the courtroom and then make a ruling based solely on this artificially limited set of facts. Similarly, aesthetic “jurists” base their evaluations solely on what is internal to the work itself—its constituent sound patterns—while ignoring whatever else may be the case about the work’s connection to non-auditory facts. It is interesting that Hanslick, like Strawson, finds it convenient to convey this idea by talking about imagination and worlds: according to Strawson, we are to imagine a purely auditory world; according to Hanslick, we are to make-believe that certain facts have been expelled from the world.

135 One telling piece of evidence against a metaphysical reading of On the Musically Beautiful is that Hanslick has virtually nothing to say about metaphysics. In fact, Hanslick’s only mention of metaphysics in the entire tract has an anti-metaphysical ring to it: “The aesthetic research into and explanation of poetry and the visual arts is far in advance of that of music. Experts in those fields have mostly abandoned the delusion that the aesthetics of any particular art may be derived through mere conformity to a universal metaphysical concept of beauty (special versions of which nevertheless apply to each art). The servile dependence of the various special aesthetics upon a supreme metaphysical principle of a universal aesthetics is steadily yielding to the conviction that each particular art demands to be known through its specific technical characteristics and understood on its own terms.” »Die Poesie und die bildenden Künste sind in ihrer ästhetischen Erforschung und Begründung dem gleichen Erwerb der Tonkunst weit voraus. Ihre Gelehrten haben größtenteils den Wahn abgelegt, es könne die Ästhetik einer bestimmten Kunst durch bloßes Anpassen des allgemeinen, metaphysischen Schönheitsbegriffs (der doch in jeder Kunst Reihe neuer Unterschiede eingehl) gewonnen werden. Die knechtische Abhängigkeit der Spezial-Ästhetiken von dem obersten metaphysischen Prinzip einer allgemeinen Ästhetik weicht immer mehr der Überzeugung, dass jede Kunst in ihren eigenen technischen Bestimmungen gekannt, aus sich selbst heraus begriffen sein will.« VMS, 2 / OMB, 1-2, translation adapted from Payzant.
interpret his words as prescriptions that music’s listeners must hold irrelevant concepts and events at some kind of experiential distance.\textsuperscript{136}

The intellectual kinship between Hanslick and Strawson is by now unmistakable. Hanslick’s invocations of “pure intuition” gesture at an idea that can be given a more crystalline expression using Strawson’s terminology. The idea, \textit{in nuce}, is that to regard music in its artistic aspect (\textit{Musik als Kunst behandeln}\textsuperscript{137}), we disregard (abstract from) all facts about it that are not purely auditory, all facts not articulable within the conceptual framework of a Strawsonian auditory report. That is the idea I mean to convey when I say, hereafter, that music demands

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} At various points in \textit{On the Musically Beautiful}, Hanslick indicates what sort of data is irrelevant to “scientific contemplation” of music, which “should never ascribe to or presuppose of music any other concept than the aesthetical.”
\item »\textsc{Wissenschaftliche Betrachtungen jedoch dürfen der Musik nie einen anderen Begriff beilegen oder voraussetzen, als den ästhetischen.}« \textit{VMS}, 140 / \textit{OMB}, 67. We should not pay heed to what is in fact causally responsible for a piece of music’s being the way it is, such as the states of mind that influenced a composer’s choices (\textit{VMS}, 66 / \textit{OMB}, 33), nor what causal powers music in fact has over us, emotionally and physiologically (Chapter 4, “Analysis of the Subjective Impression of Music [\textit{Analyse des subjektiven Eindruckes der Musik},” et passim); we should not look to the psychoacoustic foundations of musical perception nor the mathematical structures that inhere in music (\textit{VMS}, 83-6 / \textit{OMB}, 40-2); we should not search for parallels between music and language (\textit{VMS}, 87-90 / \textit{OMB}, 42-4); we should not let music prompt us to visualize fictional tableaux (\textit{VMS}, 77-9 / \textit{OMB}, 37-8); and we should not concern ourselves with historical, cultural, scientific, and economic circumstances surrounding the production and consumption of musical artworks (\textit{VMS}, 78-9 / \textit{OMB}, 38-9). All of this represents, in Stoltzfus’s appraisal of Hanslick’s core tenets, a strict refusal to bring before one’s consciousness “any natural, historical, emotive, or poetic program of description or justification.” See Philip Stoltzfus, \textit{Theology as Performance: Music, Aesthetics, and God in Western Thought} (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006), 121.
\item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{VMS}, 8 / \textit{OMB}, 5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
to be heard from the musical standpoint; and it is the idea, as I argued above, that underpins Schenker’s “declaration of independence” on behalf of absolute music.138

SECTION 5: ORGANICISM AND KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY

5.1 Introduction: Aesthetics’ mandate, as decreed by Hanslick, is to uncover the “formal laws of beauty” (formellen Schönheitsgesetzen),139 the “laws of [music’s] inherent organic workings” (die Gesetze ihres eigenen Organismus),140 the “laws of [music’s] construction” (die Gesetze seiner Konstruktion),141 the “primordial law of harmonic progression” (Urgesetz der harmonischen Progression),142 and the “primitively basic laws” (primitiven Grundgesetzen) of music.143 Only with knowledge of these (so-called) laws does it become possible to explain “the

138 It is also an idea that helps give sense to Schenker’s references to the “unique nature of the tonal world” (der eigenen Art der Tonwelt, TW vol. 5, 16) and to the genius’s “feeling for tone-space” (das Tonraumgefühl, MW vol. 2, 204). The latter, for Schenker, is similar to (because it is an innate capacity) but distinct from (because not everyone has it) the normal person’s sense of space and time, Kant’s a priori forms of intuition. Quoted and translated in SKE, 2.
139 VMS, 170 / OMB, 81.
140 VMS, 6 / OMB, 11.
141 VMS, 76 / OMB, 36.
142 VMS, 30 / OMB, 64.
143 VMS, 63 / OMB, 30. Payzant gives “fundamental laws of nature” for primitiven Grundgesetzen. But Hanslick is quite clear that music’s aesthetic laws are non-natural: “One should be on guard against the error of thinking that this tonal system (our present one) necessarily exists in nature. The fact that that these days naturalists glibly and unwittingly deal with musical relationships as if it were self-evident that these are natural forces, in no way stamps the laws governing music as natural laws; they are rather a consequence of our endlessly expanding musical culture.” »MAN HÜTE SICH VOR DER VERWECHSELUNG, ALS OB DIESES (GEGENWÄRTIGE) TONSYSTEM SELBST NOTWENDIG IN DER NATURE LÄGE. DIE ERFahrung, DASS SELBST NATURALISTEN HEUTZUTAGE MIT DEN MUSIKALISCHEN VERHÄLTNISSEN UNBewUSST UND LEICHT HANTIEREN WIE MIT ANGEBOREnen KRÄFTEN, DIE SICH VON SELBST VERSTEHEN, STEMPELT DIE HERRSCHENDEN TONGESETZEN KEINESWEGS ZU NATURGESETZEN; ES IST DIES BEREITS FOLGE DER UNENDLICH VERBREITETEN MUSIKALISCHEN KULTUR. « VMS, 145 / OMB, 70, translation adapted from Payzant.
satisfying rational character that can abide in music’s formal structures in and of themselves”\textsuperscript{144} as well as music’s peculiar “significance and sense of consequentiality” (\textit{musikalische Sinn und Folge}).\textsuperscript{145} The notion of a musical standpoint helps to make sense of the odd-sounding demand that musical aesthetics should aspire to the condition of a nomological science. Since the notional entities we meet with when we purely intuit music are, in Hanslick’s indelible formulation, nothing more than “animated sonorous forms” (\textit{tönend bewegte Formen}),\textsuperscript{146} it follows that “the elemental components of music are sound and [purely musical] motion.”\textsuperscript{147} Hence, Hanslick takes it, a duly \textit{wissenschaftliche} inquiry into music \textit{qua} music must be a search for laws governing patterns of tonal (harmonic-melodic) motion. He writes: “The concept of motion has hitherto been neglected to a remarkable extent in the investigation of music’s nature and effect; in our opinion it is the most important and fruitful concept.”\textsuperscript{148} To remedy this lacuna, Hanslick calls for the establishment of a field of musical kinetics/dynamics, a study of the “attribute of motion and of development across time” (\textit{Eigenschaft der Bewegung und der zeitlichen Entwicklung})\textsuperscript{149} exhibited by “animated sonorous forms” taking

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{VMS}, 63 / \textit{OMB}, 30. \\
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{VMS}, 63 / \textit{OMB}, 30. \\
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{VMS}, 59 / \textit{OMB}, 29. \\
\textsuperscript{147} "\textit{Das Elementarische der Musik [ist] der Klang und die Bewegung.}" \textit{VMS}, 120 / \textit{OMB}, 58, parenthetical insertion mine. \\
\textsuperscript{148} "\textit{Der Begriff der Bewegung ist bisher in den Untersuchungen des Wesens und der Wirkung der Musik auffallend vernachlässigt worden; er dünkt uns der wichtigste und fruchtbarste.}" \textit{VMS}, 27 / \textit{OMB}, 11, translation mine. \\
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{VMS}, 61 / \textit{OMB}, 29.
\end{flushleft}
shape and impinging upon one another as they wend their way through musical
space.\footnote{It may seem odd that Hanslick combines a demand that we abstract from certain
aspects of our empirical experience of music with a demand that we hold aesthetic
investigations to the standards of the canonical nomological sciences. The first
demand would seem to hinder our ability to adequately comply with the second
demand. Much of the weirdness of Hanslick's proposal goes away when we
realize—and I think we can view this as the fulcrum of Hanslick's and Schenker's
arguments—that music admits of a form of explanation from the musical standpoint
that is different in kind from the explanations that pertain to it from an acoustical or
psycho-physiological standpoint. This is akin to how the behavior of human agents
admits of explanation from a humanistic (Geisteswissenschaftlich) standpoint, which
regards people as free, rational actors motivated by reasons and values rather than
as mechanistic automata carried along ineluctably by causal forces. Hanslick does
not deny—in fact he unstintingly affirms—that there are scientific explanations to
be given of acoustical and physiological facts about music and music perception. But
such explanations do not form part of a science of aesthetics, Hanslick argues, since
they do not address music insofar as it is an art.}

Hanslick's projections of a science of musical beauty\footnote{Scruton, in his review of Dahlhaus's Esthetics of Music, notes that Hanslick's
definition of (the content of) music as tönend bewegte Formen relies on a
metaphorical use of "motion." He uses this point to try to unravel Hanslick's whole
program, arguing that "a theory that tries to explain musical works in terms of
musical movement is not a theory of music at all: it 'explains' its subject only by
blocking the path to explanation." Royal Musical Association Research Chronicle 17
no. 1 (1981), 115. It seems safe to say that Scruton would disapprove of my
sympathetic treatment of Hanslick's views about aesthetic explanation. But Scruton
stands on shaky ground in objecting to Hanslick in this way. Scruton's explicit
assumption, that motion can only be imputed to music metaphorically, is far from
uncontentious. Why not think that "motion" simply has multiple literal senses? The
sentence "there is motion from an E-flat up to a G in the first measure of the Eroica," we
might reasonably suppose, is literally true and non-metaphorical—in any event,
it is miles away from "Juliet is the Sun." Scruton's implicit assumption, that nothing
with metaphorical content can do explanatory work—i.e. that metaphorical speech
is unfit to answer "why" questions—is even more contentious.} are more
programmatic than substantive. As we just saw, he has plenty to say about what a
consummate Musikwissenschaft should accomplish (it should discover the laws of
motion that support explanations of the musically beautiful\textsuperscript{152}) and even more to say about what subject matter this discipline must hold at bay (acoustics, psychology, physiology, history, economics, etc.). But he supplies no examples of putative aesthetic laws, nor does he describe any procedures for discovering them. Schenker's work, it has been suggested,\textsuperscript{153} takes up this torch, bringing to maturity the \textit{musikwissenschaftlich} program Hanslick inaugurates. My preceding arguments permit us to put a finer edge on this proposal: Schenker's work, as I shall indicate, tries to bring to fruition Hanslick's vision of nomic explanation undertaken from the musical standpoint.

In a pungent ripost to Brown and Dempster's "The Scientific Image of Music Theory," Richard Taruskin derides the impulse, one he sees as endemic to the discipline of music theory, "to see and to treat musical works as if they were rocks or ferns or subatomic particles—God's creations."\textsuperscript{154} In the next leg of my argument, 

\textsuperscript{152} It is not altogether clear whether Hanslick supposes that we use inductive reasoning to discover "laws" that tell us what determinate set of motion properties must obtain in order for a musical sound sequence to be beautiful—but, at any rate, many of his comments have that flavor (one which Kant would have found distasteful, given his views about the non-conceptuality of judgments of the beautiful). Hanslick quite clear about the fact that aesthetic investigation is to be carried within the musical standpoint; he is not clear about how to carry it out once we enter that standpoint, or about what kinds of discoveries we are supposed to make by carrying it out correctly.

\textsuperscript{153} Cook, \textit{The Schenker Project}, 60-70.

\textsuperscript{154} Richard Taruskin, "A Reply to Brown and Dempster," \textit{Journal of Music Theory} 33 no. 1 (1989), 155-64. Taruskin continues: "But of course they are not that; they are creations of God's creatures, products of culture, coded with human values, expressive of human volition, agents of some form of human communication, individually as well as in the aggregate." I believe Schenker's impulse to treat musical works as if they were ferns is defensible, and I also believe that his writings demonstrate that this impulse need not extinguish one's motivation to make a study of music's cultural, value-affirming, and communicative dimensions. (Nobody could reasonably accuse Schenker of neglecting these!) In disagreeing with Taruskin, I am
I will make much of a distinction that would probably irritate Taruskin: the difference between treating a musical work as if it were a rock or a subatomic particle and treating it as if it were a fern. There’s no novelty in saying that Schenker does the latter. But there is novelty in saying what it means to say this about him. My aim in the next section is to show that Schenker’s organicist analyses, and the necessitarian language that works hand in glove with them, are not of a piece with “all the fantastical descriptions, characterizations, and verbal paraphrases of musical works” which, according to Hanslick, are “either metaphorical or false.”155 They are instead of a piece with the kind of investigation into the dynamic structure of living things that Kant believes to be 1) an indispensable technique of biological inquiry and 2) a close cousin of the kind of judgment we perform when we assess the beautiful in art and nature.

My closing argument is five-pronged:

1) Considered from the musical standpoint, Schenker believes, pieces of tonal music confront us as what Kant calls “natural ends” (*Naturzwecke*).

2) As such, according to Kantian arguments, tonal music must be judged teleologically.

3) Teleological judgment, as Kant describes it, involves discerning (a) the reciprocal means-ends relations that hold among the piece’s constituent parts—

---

not thereby agreeing with those with whom Taruskin disagrees. I strongly oppose Brown and Dempster’s vision of music theory as a prediction-generating, natural-law-discovering inductive method, and I believe that they do considerable violence to Schenkerian thought by trying to force it into the procrustean bed of Popper’s Deductive-Nomological Model of scientific explanation.

155 »*All die phantasierichen Schilderungen, Charakteristiken, Umschreibungen eines Tonwerks sind bildlich oder irrig.*« *VMS, 62 / OMB, 30.*
discerning, in other words, how the functioning of every part both enables and is enabled by the functioning of every other part, and also (b) discerning how the whole to which those parts belong is the “ground of the possibility” (Grund der möglichkeit) of those parts.

(4) Schenker’s analytical graphs record and convey such judgments / acts of discernment.

(5) Such judgments / acts of discernment license the attribution of necessity to (the existence or properties of) the thusly related, thusly dependent parts.

5.2 Natural Ends and Teleological Judgment: The argument becomes easier to follow once the jargon is unscrambled. We begin with “end” (Zweck).

An end or purpose, according to the definition Kant provides in §10 of his third Critique, is “the object of a concept in so far as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object [the

\[\text{156 “Schenker’s Organicism Reexamined” reminds us that even though we must “understand organicism more precisely” in order to know how to contextualize Schenker within the lineage of organicist thinkers, nevertheless “[i]t would be naïve to expect a formal definition of [‘organicism’],” for “as Nietzsche said, ‘only that which has no history is definable’” (p. 88). I have a more sanguine view about the compatibility of historical mindfulness and definition-giving. Nietzsche’s point is well taken, if it is an admonition to remember that as terms persist through history their meanings can shift, expand, and take on an accretion of disparate, even contradictory, significances. Consider, for instance, how many conflicting notions are now encoded in the term “liberal.” But to accept the point that a term may be associated with an ever-fluctuating set of concepts—and to accept that the term is therefore refractory to unified formal definition—we must be able to individuate and compare the heterogeneous concepts covered by the term. Otherwise how could we know that they conflict, or know that a single word harbors several of them? So, it is indeed naïve to expect the term “organicism” to have a monolithic meaning across all the texts it appears in. And it is ipso facto naïve to assume that all artworks recognized as organically coherent are organically coherent in precisely the same sense. But it is not naïve to ask, as I do, whether the content of one concept encompassed by the polysemous term “organicism” (here, Kant’s definition) makes contact with something that is essential about Schenker’s thought and practice.\]

133
real ground of its possibility).”\textsuperscript{157} The computer I am typing this essay on, to take an example near to hand, answers to this definition. First, it is an object (a \textit{Gegenstand}, by which Kant means a thing that is individuated by the location it occupies in space and time, and of which we gain knowledge by using concepts to organize the intuitions delivered by sensation). And second, the concept of this (type of) computer played a role in the coming-to-be of the actual computer: an engineer (suppose for simplicity’s sake) conceived of this (type of) computer, and carried out (or arranged for) the construction of it in accordance with her concept of it. That her computer-concept occupies a place in the causal history of the computer’s coming-to-be is revealed by the fact that the questions “why does this computer exist?” or “why is this computer the way it is?” solicit a description of some person’s (or persons’) rational, telic activity and a description of the concept that orchestrated the activity. Finally, the computer is the “object of [this] concept” in that the computer in fact bears the “marks” (\textit{Merkmale}) that supply the criteria for the correct application of the computer-concept on the part of concept users. In short, with respect to objects-as-ends, the concept that an observer puts to service in gaining empirical knowledge of the object is the very same concept that the object’s producer follows in bringing the object into existence.

We can specify, further, that an end is a “natural end” (\textit{Naturzweck}). Simply enough, to be a natural end, a thing must satisfy the above definition of an end while failing to be a “product of art,” that is, a manufactured object in which, Kant says,\textsuperscript{157}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{157} »So ist Zweck der \textit{Gegenstand} eines \textit{Begriffs}, sofern dieser als die \textit{Ursache} von \textit{jenem} (der \textit{reale Grund} seiner \textit{Möglichkeit}) angesehen wird.« \textit{CJ} 64 / §10 / 5:220.
\end{footnotesize}
vestigium hominis video (“I see the trace of a man”).\textsuperscript{158} This proviso introduces additional complexities: “If...we cognize something as a natural product and at the same time as an end, hence as a natural end...then more must be said. I would say, provisionally, that a thing exists as a natural purpose if it is both cause and effect of...

\textsuperscript{158} Kant takes this quote from Vitruvius’ De Architectura (ca. 15 BC), which relates the story of Aristippus. After being shipwrecked and washing up on the shore of Rhodes, Aristippus saw geometric figures traced in the sand and exclaimed, “There is hope, for I see the trace of a human being!” The passage of CJ that contains this reference casts light on the Kantian concepts I am leveraging in my interpretation of Schenker. “Suppose that someone coming to a seemingly uninhabited country perceived a geometric figure, say a regular hexagon, traced in the sand. As he reflected on this figure, working out a concept for it, reason would make him aware, even if obscurely, of the unity of the principle [required] for producing this concept. And so, following reason, he would not judge that such a figure is made possible by the sand, the adjoining sea, the wind, or even animals that leave footprints familiar to him, or by any other nonrational cause; for it would seem to him that coming across such a concept [a regular hexagon], on that is possible only in reason, is so infinitely contingent that there might as well be no natural law for it at all, and hence that such an effect could also not have been caused by anything in nature which operates merely mechanically, but could have been caused only by the concept of such an object, a concept that only reason can provide and compare the object with. It would seem to him therefore that, although this effect [the figure] can be considered a purpose, it cannot be considered a natural purpose, but can be considered only a product of art (vestigium hominis video).”
itself (although in two different senses).”159 Kant designates two characteristics of organisms, corresponding to the aforesaid “two different senses” (zweifachem Sinne), that grant them a special kind of unity not found in non-organic nature. This unity, Kant maintains, entitles us—indeed requires us—to regard living beings as natural ends, and makes it appropriate to use a “teleological way of judging” (teleologische Beurteilungsart) in studying them.

The first characteristic has to do with the organism’s status as an end. It is constitutive of something’s being an end, Kant reasons, that “the possibility of its parts (as concerns both their existence and their form) must depend on their relation to the whole. For since the thing itself is an end, it is covered [befasst] by a concept or idea that must determine a priori everything that the thing is to

159 »UM ABER ETWAS DASS MAN ALS NATURPRODUKT ERKENNT, GLEICHWOHL DOCH ALS ZWECK, MITHIN ALS NATURZWECK, ZU BEURTEILEN: DAU...WIRD SCHON MEHR ERFORCERT. ICH WÜRDE VORLÄUFIG SAGEN: EIN DING EXISTIERT ALS NATURZWECK, WENN ES VON SICH SELBST (OBGLEICH IN ZWEIFACHEM SINNE) URSACHE UND WIRKUNG IST.« CJ 250/§64/5:371. The most severe complication is that, on the face of things, it seems that it should be impossible for something to be both naturally occurring (not a product of art) and at the same time an end. Concepts and concept-users come as a package deal in Kant’s philosophy, because concepts are a type of “representation,” that is, an “inner determination of the mind” (A 197/B 242), and are thus mind-dependent entities. As such, concepts would seem to possess causal powers only derivatively, only inasmuch as concept-users do or make things in a concept-guided fashion. This appears to rule out the possibility that an effect could be caused by a concept “independently of the causality of the concepts of a rational being outside of it [i.e. a rational being who is distinct from the effect] [ohne die Kausalität der Begriffe von vernünftigen Wesen außer ihm]” (252/§64/5:373), which would have to be the case in order for it to count as a natural end. Kant threads the needle here by arguing that an organism’s distinctive unity is only intelligible to us if we judge the organism as an end, even though we are not in a position to know that the organism was actually fashioned by a rational creative agency. Since we know with certainty that the organism does not derive from human ingenuity, we must judge the organism as if (als ob) it were rationally constructed by a supersensible author (God), while remaining agnostic about the identity, indeed about the very existence, of a rational constructor.
contain.”160 An example helps elucidate this first criterion. We cannot, Kant would tell us, understand the reason a rabbit has feet—i.e. understand the bare presence of the feet, how they are “possible as concerns their existence” (möglicher nach ihrem Dasein)—without understanding the role that the feet play in the entire functional system that is the rabbit-whole161 (ihrem Beziehung auf das Ganze). Nor can we understand why the feet have the particular shape and make-up they have—i.e. understand how they are “possible as concerns their form” (möglicher nach der Form)—without understanding how that exact configuration enables them to fill that exact role adequately. Further, the feet would cease to be feet—except, as Aristotle teaches us to say, “homonymously”162—were they to be severed from the rabbit-whole and placed on a keychain. In all of these senses, then, the rabbit’s parts are “made possible” by the whole. To judge the parts to be existentially and formally dependent on the whole in this manner, Kant believes, simply is to judge the thing to be (or to judge it as if it were) rationally designed. For in judging that something non-accidentally corresponds to a concept of a particular kind of whole—a concept which specifies what kind of parts there shall be and how those

160 »ZU EINEM DINGE ALS NATURZWECKE WIRD NUN ERSTLICH ERFORDERT, DASS DIE TEILE (IHREM DASEIN UND DER FORM NACH) NUN DURCH IHRE BEZIEHUNG AUF DAS GANZE MÖGLICH SIND. DENN DAS DING SELBST IST EIN ZWECK, FOLGELICH UNTER EINEM BEGRIFF ODER EINER IDEE BEFASST, DIE ALLES, WAS IN IHM ENTHALTEN SEIN SOLL, A PRIORI BESTIMMEN MUSS.« CJ 252/§65/5:373.
161 Pun intended.
162 “Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except homonymously, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their function and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they are homonymous.” Aristotle, Politics 1253a19-25, trans. B. Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton University Press, 1984), 1988.
parts shall be shaped and positioned with respect to one another—we find ourselves compelled to think of the parts as existing, and as existing in the particular way that they do, so as (as though intended) to satisfy the stipulations of the concept of the whole. That is, we appeal to the content of that concept of a rabbit in answering “why” questions about the fact of the existence of the rabbit’s foot as well as “why” questions about the mode of existence of the rabbit’s foot. To do this is, in Kant’s terms, to treat the concept as the “ground” of the object, and is a way of using idea of rational design to facilitate our cognition of the object. This is analogous, Kant thinks, to what we do when we cognize artifacts (which are the paradigmatic Zwecke) that can be known positively to be manufactured in conformity with a concept.

The second hallmark of the organic has to do with the organism’s status as natural. In Kant’s words:

“A second requirement must be met if a thing that is a product of nature is yet to have, within itself and its inner possibility, reference to ends, i.e., if it is to be possible only as a natural end, independently of the causality of the concepts of a rational being outside of it. This second requirement is that the parts of the thing combine into the unity of a whole because they are reciprocally cause and effect of one another’s form. For only in this way is it possible that the idea of the whole should conversely (reciprocally) determine the form and combination of all the parts, not as cause—for then the whole would be a product of art—but as the basis on which someone judging this whole cognizes the systematic unity in the form and combination of all the manifold contained in the given matter.”163

163 »SOLL ABER EIN DING, ALS NATURPRODUKT, IN SICH SELBST UND SEINER INNER MÖGLICHKEIT DOCH EINE BEZIEHUNG AUF ZWECKE ENTHALTEN, D. I. NUR ALS NATURZWECK UND OHNE DIE
In judging the rabbit's foot to be “made possible” by the (concept of) the whole, as detailed above, one judges the entire rabbit to be (or judges the entire rabbit as though it were) rationally designed, i.e. as though it were something above and beyond a chance product of the blind, aimless to-and-fro of natural mechanisms, the senseless collision of particle against particle. The rabbit is thus judged as

KAUSALITÄT DER BEGRIFFE VON VERNÜNFTIGEN WESEN AUSSER IHN MÖGLICH SEIN; SO WIRD ZWEITENS DAZU ERFORDELT: DASS DIE TEILE DESSELBEN SICH DADURCH ZUR EINHEIT EINES GANZEN VERBINEN, DASS SIE SIE VON EINANDER WECHSELEITIG URSCHE UND WIRKUNG IHRER FORM SIND. DENN AUF SOLCHE WEISE IST ES ALLEIN MÖGLICH, DASS UMGKEHRHT (WECHSELEITIG) DIE IDEE DES GANZEN WIEDER UM DIE FORM UND VERBINDUNG ALLER TEILE BESTIMME: NICHT ALS URSCHE—DENN DA WÄRE ES EIN KUNSTPRODUKT—SONDERN ALS ERKENNTNISGRUND DER SYSTEMATISCHEN EINHEIT DER FORM UND VERBINDUNG ALLES MANNIGFALTIGEN, WAS IN DER GEGEBENEN MATERIE ENTHALTEN IST, FÜR DEN, DER ES BEURTEILT.²⁵²/§65/5:373.

Kant sees nature as a domain of lawfulness, as contrasted with a non-natural realm of freedom to which we belong insofar as we are moral beings. A major result Kant derives in the first Critique is that we must believe every facet of nature to be determined by natural laws of “mechanism” or “efficient causation.” Yet Kant does not believe that we can succeed in using these laws to explain a special kind of unity and coherence we apprehend in organic phenomena. He gets this idea across, rather awkwardly, by saying that from the perspective of the nexus of efficient causation, these unities must appear quite “accidental,” i.e., not determined by natural law. But since we are compelled to regard all empirical phenomena as, in one way or another, lawful, we are accordingly compelled to find a way of regarding these unities so that they appear non-accidental and thus explicable. Kant’s much discussed précis of this idea is this passage from the Critique of the Power of Judgment: “Moreover, so far is objective purposiveness, as a principle for the possibility of things of nature, from being connected necessarily with the concept of nature that it is rather this very purposiveness to which we primarily appeal in order to prove that it (nature) and its form are contingent. For when we point, for example, to the structure of birds regarding how their bones are hollow, how their wings are positioned to produce motion and their tails to permit steering, and so on, we are saying that all of this is utterly contingent if we go by the mere nexus effective in nature and do not yet resort to a special kind of causality, viz., the causality of ends (the nexus finalis); in other words, we are saying that nature, considered as mere mechanism, could have structured itself differently in a thousand different ways without hitting on precisely the unity in terms of a principle of purposes, and so we cannot hope to find a priori the slightest basis for
though it were an end; but if this end is to be, in addition, *natural*, it cannot have its parts determined (made to be as they are) by the *techne* of a human craftsman.

Once Kant has ruled out the two forces that could determine the parts of the object from the outside—blind mechanism and human artifice—he takes himself to have proved the actuality of the (allegedly) sole remaining possibility: the parts condition *themselves*, reciprocally, “from within,” not haphazardly, but in accordance with the concept of the whole, in the end-directed (part-depending-on-whole) way that is characteristic of determination by concepts.165 Thus, Kant concludes,

---

165 Strictly speaking, there are two strata of reciprocal conditioning that pique Kant’s interest: part-to-whole reciprocal conditioning and part-to-part reciprocal conditioning. Although a brief aperçu of how they fit together requires us to ignore some of the minutiae of Kant’s account, it is still profitable to give one. The first stratum involves parts conditioning wholes and wholes conditioning parts. In Kant’s view, parts condition wholes mechanistically. Minimal constituents of matter interact according to physical laws to aggregate into larger material constellations having a particular character. Wholes condition parts teleologically (a situation that only pertains to organisms), in that the concept of the whole is the basis of our judgment of the parts. We can only make organic unities intelligible to ourselves by viewing them as though they were fashioned so as to accord with a concept of a whole that contains dynamically interacting, internally articulated parts. To judge organisms in that way, Kant thinks, we must direct our attention to the second stratum of reciprocal conditioning. Viewing an organism as though the whole determined the parts is a matter of appreciating how the parts reciprocally qualify
in such a product of nature, just as each part exists only as a result of all the rest, so we also think of each part as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, i.e., as an instrument (organ). But that is not enough, (for the part could also be an instrument of art, in which case we would be presenting its possibility as depending on an end as such, but not yet on a natural end.) Rather, we must think of each part as an organ that produces the other parts (so that each reciprocally produces the other). Something like this cannot be an instrument of art, but can be an instrument only of nature, which supplies all material for instruments (even those of art). Only if a product meets that condition [as well], and only because of this, will it be both an organized and a self-organizing being, which therefore can be called a natural purpose.\footnote{167}

one another by fulfilling the roles meted out to them by the concept of the whole. In coming to this kind of appreciation, we gradually approximate a totalizing understanding of how the functioning of every part in some measure enables, and is in some measure enabled by, the functioning of every other part. This synopsis makes clear why Kant sometimes speaks as though part-on-whole dependence and part-on-part reciprocal dependence are the same thing: to make a judgment of the former in some sense just is to make a judgment of the latter.\footnote{166} The kind of togetherness exemplified by an inanimate, nonartifactual object’s agglomeration of parts is not true unity, but rather mere contiguity. According to Kant, this latter condition is fully explicable in terms of the properties of mutually externally parts taken in isolation. We can, for example, exhaustively explain the why a piece of granite hangs together as it does simply by appealing to the properties of, and laws governing, individual bits of quartz, mica, and feldspar; and we do not believe, of any particular bit of quartz in a chunk of granite, that the concept of granite, or the “whole” that instantiates the concept (the entire rock), explains the existence or constitution of that bit of quartz. Not so with rabbits (et. al.), whose unity is invisible from the perspective of the rabbit-parts considered in one by one, and whose characteristically purposive, holistic integration we can make comprehensible to ourselves only if we understand the concept of a rabbit-whole as the judgmental ground of (our analysis of) those parts’ individual qualities and communal coordination. In reply to Taruskin, then, we can say that rocks and ferns couldn’t be more different—for only the latter provide rightful occasion for teleological judgment—and that judging music as one judges ferns is, from a Kantian perspective, radically distinct from judging music as one judges rocks.\footnote{167}
Judging teleologically is the sole means of understanding that and how “the functioning of an organic part is a means to the functioning of the other parts and of the whole, i.e., the continuing survival of the organism, which survival in turn comprises the very (combined) functioning of the parts, and serves thereby the functioning of each part.”  

To illustrate: my kidney is necessary to the proper functioning of my endocrine system (inter alia), and both of these “parts” of me contribute to the continued functioning of the symphony of vital elements that is my body. The successful functioning of the entire body itself supports and maintains the kidneys and endocrine system (et al.) as individual constituents thereof. And I judge my body teleologically insofar as I come to see how system and constituent, as well as one constituent and the next, mutually advance one another’s specific functions and promote the self-sustenance of this coordinated, internally diverse biosystem.

In and through teleological judging, it follows from the above characterization, we come to recognize that and how organisms have, as Kant notoriously puts it, “purposiveness without a purpose” (Zweckmässigkeit ohne WERDEN); SONDERN ALS EIN DIE ANDERN TEILE (FOLGLICH JEDER DEN ANDERN WECHSELEITIG) HERVORBRINGENDES ORGAN...UND NUR DANN UND DARUM WIRD EIN SOLCHES PRODUKT, ALS ORGANISIERETES UND SICH SELBST ORGANISIERENDES WESEN, EIN NATURZWECK GENANNT WERDEN KÖNNEN.« 253/§65/5:374.

168 Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 124.

169 The principle of purposiveness without a purpose is what unites the two halves of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, which are the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and Critique of Teleological Judgment. Both judgments of taste and teleological judgments of organisms, according to Kant, are judgments in accordance with the principle of purposiveness without a purpose. What specifically these kinds of
Zweck). Their purposiveness (or end-directedness) consists, as with artifacts, in a certain primacy of the macrocosm over the microcosm, although organisms’ purposiveness is manifested not in the causal dependence of an object on the concept that determines the object’s existence and character, but instead, as Zuckert explains, in “dynamic, reciprocal relations between past, present, and future: as means to ends, the parts of the object are unified with one another, and with the whole—they are ‘there’ because of the effects they will have (which are]useful for one another or the whole).” Organisms are judged to be purposive, to paraphrase Zuckert paraphrasing Kant, when and because we become sensible of how their judgment have in common, on Kant’s view, is an especially vexed topic about which there is little consensus in the secondary literature. Zuckert interprets Kant as holding that teleological judgments represent organisms as exhibiting “purposive causal relations without a purpose,” which “violate the objective temporal order,” while the aesthetic experience of the beautiful, as expressed by a judgment of taste, gives a “representation of an object as an individual, its properties as reciprocally determining the intelligibility of one another” (Zuckert, 369). In the former case, the reciprocal conditioning present is supposedly that of bi-directional causation, while in the latter case the reciprocal conditioning is contentual rather than causal, a qualification of the significance and intelligibility of the content of the various parts of the artwork by one another. Admittedly, bi-directional causation is an extremely problematic, maybe incomprehensible, concept, and, admittedly, Zuckert’s characterization of aesthetic judgment sounds quite close to my way of cashing out Schenker’s analytic method. There could, therefore, be reason to think that Schenker’s analytical judgments could be cogently explained as akin to judgments of (specifically natural) beauty rather than as akin to teleological judgments of organisms. However, the decision about which of the two judgmental models to use to understand Schenker’s analytic procedure becomes less important the more similar aesthetic judgments and teleological judgments are to one another. As Zuckert describes them, they are similar enough that the choice of which one to use to interpret Schenker becomes something of a matter of taste. Because of Schenker’s prioritization of causal and botanical descriptions of musical relations, and because of the (somewhat surprising) dearth of references to beauty in Schenker’s writings, I find it more compelling to read him in light of Kant’s theory of biology rather than his theory of beauty, but I suspect many of the same points could be made either way.

Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology, 124.
behavior manifests an orientation toward the future—not, as in the case of the creation or functioning of artifacts, by being directed at a definite state of affairs yet to come, as when the use of the hammer is directed at a final consummation of its use, the completion of the building. Purposiveness in an organism is a matter of being directed at the open-ended prolongation of the organism's life and activity. On the other side of the coin, organisms’ “purposelessness” is revealed by the fact that their purposiveness is internal—it is not imposed from the outside by the conceptually contoured ends/purposes striven for by a maker or user, as is the case with an artifact. Here it is helpful to quote at length Zuckert’s elegant encapsulation of Kant’s challenging and desultory argument:

“As internally purposive, the organism must be understood [by contrast with how artifacts are understood] as characterized by internal purposive temporal relations among its parts/functions, which are not only influenced by one another, but also “anticipate” the future states of the organism. That is, the present functioning of the liver cell is not only to be understood as an end (or effect), influenced by the functioning of other parts, but also as a means towards the end of the organism’s survival, as intrinsically, internally directed towards the future (to do what it does because it will have certain effects). That future state, as purpose, defines the present activities of the parts, but it also, reciprocally, is understood as determined by the present state and functioning of the parts, for it constitutes survival, i.e., the continuation precisely of the present, interdependent functioning of those parts. The purposive functioning of an organism is not an externally related series of events, but an internally future-direct, interdependent system of dynamic relations. As purposive without a
purpose, organisms have, in other words, histories, not merely chronologies; they are characterized, as Kant writes, by an entirely new form of causality (V: 375), one...with a different temporal form.”

5.3 Schenker and Causation: The significance of all this for understanding Schenker’s organicism can be summed up succinctly: when we occupy the musical standpoint, tonal masterworks beckon us to regard them as natural ends. From other standpoints, this is not so. From the standpoint of everyday experience music is rightly regarded as a product of human artifice—as an end, but not as natural. From the standpoint of scientific theorizing, what call for explanation in music are physically instantiated acoustical properties and the physically instantiated psychomotor events by which we institute those properties (as performers and composers) or respond to those properties (as listeners). But the musical standpoint blocks both of these paths to understanding musical phenomena. From the musical standpoint, as On the Musically Beautiful attests, there are no humans, no vibrations propagated through a material medium, no neurons, and so on. There are only, as Hanslick astutely perceives, animated sonorous forms. Hence “why” questions about the existence and qualities of these sonorous forms and their animation can only be answered—assuming that the answer, like the “why” question, is internal to the musical standpoint—by describing the lawfulness of these forms’ interplay, the principles that underlie their “agreement and opposition

171Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology, 124-5. For Kant, regular causal judgments are judgments of one-way dependence in time: effects follow (are conditioned by, are determined by, are grounded on) temporally antecedent causes. By means of teleological judgment, we judge organisms to display grounding relations (causality, dependence, conditioning) that defy subsumption under the standard unidirectional causal category.
(zusammenstimmen und widerstreben), [of] their retreat and approach (Fliehen und sich Erreichen), [of] their ascension and dying away (Aufschwingen und Ersterben).”

Before it dawned on him that the interplay of animated sonorous forms could be seen (or heard) to share in the distinctive form of codependence that radiates throughout the parts of a living thing, Schenker followed a hunch that the lawfulness to be sought in music by an explanatory music theory was the lawfulness of what Kant, following the scholastic tradition, calls efficient causation. An efficient cause is what initiates a diachronic alteration of a substance, as when an infection by the flu virus at T1 causes my temperature to be elevated at T2. Since they are temporally unidirectional, efficient-causal laws are non-reciprocal: with efficient causes, the fact that the cause causes (grounds, conditions) the effect entails that the effect doesn’t cause (ground, condition) the cause. Such laws may be thought of as functions that take a cause-event as their input and return a (unique, distinct, and temporally subsequent) effect-event as their output.173

This model of causation held appeal for Schenker at least up through the Counterpoint volumes. In Counterpoint Vol. 2 we find Schenker making the eyebrow-

172 VMS, 58 / OMB, 28.
173Carl Hempel’s view is that causal “covering” laws are propositions that say that whenever event of type C occurs in circumstances K, there will be an event of type E shortly thereafter. A covering law is therefore a mapping, or function, from event-types and background circumstances to other event-types. This view is set out by Hempel in, among other places, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965). Donald Davidson defends a similar view "Causal Relations," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), 691-703. I am grateful to Dmitri Gallow for sharing this insight and for providing these references. I am, of course, riding roughshod over many more sophisticated things one could say about the nature of efficient causation.
raising claim that when more voices are introduced into a contrapuntal setting, it becomes less “difficult to infer from a preceding harmony the one that is to follow,” owing to the greater extent to which of “causalities asserts themselves” (Kräftiger melden sich die Kausalitäten) or the greater extent to which “causal force” (ursächlichen Kraft) is present in the voice leading.\textsuperscript{174} In a better-known passage from \textit{Counterpoint} Vol. 1, Schenker opines that “[t]o understand more fully the spirit latent in the historic development of our art, it is prudent to find precisely in the dissonant syncope a means of establishing a purely musical causality.”\textsuperscript{175} Following the maturation of this contrapuntal mannerism in Renaissance-era polyphonic vocal music, according to the official Schenkerian history of musical style, “the effect of musical causality...remained an inherent quality of the dissonant syncope even in instrumental music. There, even in the most advanced stage of development, harmonies appear to be linked more intimately and with seemingly greater necessity the more drastically and obtrusively a tone of one harmony hooks into the flesh of the following one.”\textsuperscript{176}

The dissonant syncope—a prepared suspension appearing on a strong beat and demanding resolution by descending step on the following weak beat —is, at the very least, a good prototype to begin with if one’s hope is to fill out a comprehensive catalogue of efficient-causal musical laws, laws that state what kinds of musical events reliably follow upon other kinds of musical events. With pretty

\textsuperscript{174} »NOCH IST DAHER IM ZWEISTIMMIGEN SATZE AUS EINER ABGELAUFENEN HARMONIE AUF DIE FOLGENDE ZU SCHLIEßEN EINIGERMASSEN SCHWIERIG...« KPT 2, 6-7 / CPT 2 6-7.
\textsuperscript{175} »WILL MAN DEM VERBORGENEN SINN DER ENTWICKLUNGSGESICHTE UNSERER KUNST NÄHERKOMMEN, SO EMPFIEHLT ES SICH, GERADE IN DER DISSONANTEN SYNKOPE EIN TECHNISCHES MITTEL REIN MUSIKALISCHER KAUSALITÄT ZU SEHEN.« KPT 1, 376 / CPT 1, 291.
\textsuperscript{176} See note 54.
robust regularity, dissonant syncopes do get prepared and then resolved by descending stepwise motion in tonal music—and, as Hume taught us, and as Kant never denied, our causal judgments are based on (nothing more than) perception of the “constant conjunction” of two kinds of events. Before discussing how this inchoate conception of musical causation ripened into Schenker’s conception of musical-organic causation, we should pause to consider how, in his initial quest for efficient-causal laws, Schenker had an unlikely bedfellow in Hugo Riemann, or at least in those contemporary music theorists who have resuscitated the transformational aspects of Reimann’s theories. Transformational music analysis, as practiced by certain of Riemann’s present-day exponents, can, at least in some of its applications, be regarded as hunt for rules, rules that state what kind of musical event must ensue provided that some other musical event takes place first. Speaking quite generally, a musical transformation (Riennanian or otherwise) is a function that maps some musical object onto some other musical object. The classical Reimannian transformations are the “P” (parallel) transformation, which maps a major triad onto a minor triad with the same root (“P” takes G major to G minor) and vice versa (“P” takes G minor to G major), the “L” (Leittonswechsel) transformation, which maps a major triad onto the minor triad whose root is four half steps above (“L” takes G major to B minor) and vice versa (“L” takes B minor to G major), and the “R” (relative) transformation, which maps a major triad onto the

---

177Hume uses this phrase throughout his *Treatise of Human Understanding* (1738) and his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748). It is so obvious that this musical rule lacks the universality and determinateness of a genuine efficient-causal law that the disanalogy requires no commentary. Sagely, Schenker later abandoned this fruitless conception of musical causation and replaced it with an extremely fruitful notion of musical teleological causation.
minor triad whose root is three half steps below (“R” takes G major to E minor) and vice versa (“R” takes E minor to G major). We can use these transformations, and iterations thereof, to label chord sequences, as Cohn does for the chord string D-flat-major → F minor → A-flat major → E major → C-sharp major, which appears in a passage of *Parsifal*:


There is a thinly-veiled analogy between finding “cycles” of neo-Riemannian transformations in triadic music—chains of chords that display a constant pattern of chord transformation—and discovering efficient-causal laws in nature. Musical analysis that sets out to descry neo-Riemannian transformation cycles in tonal pieces is, when distilled down to its essential motives, interpretable as a search for rules (or, in the Kantian idiom, “time-determinations”) that correlate events
together into lawful, temporally unidirectional, successions. Riemannian analysis\textsuperscript{178} is thus “mechanical,”\textsuperscript{179} in Kant’s sense, in that it aims to itemize the empirically observable regularities according to which musical events directly succeed one another in the forward flow of time.\textsuperscript{180} This point can be put even more starkly by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[	extsuperscript{178}] It may be tendentious to say that Riemannian analysis consists fundamentally in a hunt for cycles. It can of course be put to other uses, and perhaps some of it lacks the temporally linear, beads-on-a-string quality I am ascribing to it. Still, it strikes me that the basic attraction of this analytical method is that it allows us to label “chord progressions” that flout the usual, “grammatically-correct” Roman numeral patterns. For this reasons, bars 143-176 of the second movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, which runs through 18 triads of an RL cycle, are especially ripe for (or, as I have heard it put, “prove the validity of”) neo-Riemannian analysis. See Richard Cohn, “Neo Riemannian Operations, Parsimonious Trichords, and Their ‘Tonnetz’ Representations,” \textit{Journal of Music Theory} \textbf{41} no. 1, Spring (1997), 36.
\item[	extsuperscript{179}] “In particular, in the second part of the Critique of Judgment, the Critique of Teleological Judgment, Kant is concerned not with causality as the transcendental conditions of experience in general but with the possibility of causally explaining concrete parts of nature and, more specifically, corporeal nature. Kant phrases this discussion in terms of the mechanical explicable of the natural world, where the mechanism of nature, as he tells us, is the determination of nature ‘according to the laws of causality.’” See Angela Breitenbach, “Kant on Causal Knowledge: Causality, Mechanism, and Reflective Judgment,” \textit{Causation and Modern Philosophy} (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.
\item[	extsuperscript{180}] This assessment resonates with Rings’s thoughtful comparison of transformational and Schenkerian analytical methodologies: “[A transformational apparatus] encourages one to adopt an analytical technique that we might call \textit{prismatic}, in which phenomenologically rich local passages are refracted and explored from multiple perspectives...A Schenkerian sketch, by contrast, joins its various structures into an integrated account of an entire work or passage. In this sense, we might characterize transformational methodology as genuinely \textit{analytic}—refracting a passage into multiple esthetic streams—while Schenkerian analysis is \textit{synthetic} in its integration of elements of harmony, counterpoint, and so forth into an overarching account of a piece or passage. This is not to deny that a Schenkerian analyst might explore multiple alternative analyses of a passage, or tease out ambiguities revealed by a sketch. Rather, it is simply to observe that any \textit{single} Schenker [sic] sketch proposes a richly synthesized picture of the music in question, while transformational or GIS accounts tend toward prismatic refraction into multiple (and sometimes incommensurate) esthetic perspectives.” Rings, Steven. \textit{Tonality and Transformation}. Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 38. I do not know whether Rings shares my view that Schenkerian analysis and transformational analysis are concerned with different kinds of “determination” (final-
returning to the idea of a musical standpoint: neo-Riemannian analysis can be understood as attempting to give a mechanistic account of a purely auditory world, as though a piece’s Tonwelt were subject to the categorial principle that Kant attempts to prove in the Second Analogy of the first Critique: “everything that happens presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule.” A neo-Riemannian transformation cycle presumes to answer the question “why does this musical event come after that musical event?” or “according to what rule does this succession of musical events transpire?”

5.4 Musical Causation cum Musical Organicism: Eventually, Schenker changed his mind and came to believe that the tonal masterworks recalcitrantly thwart our attempts to construe them as being thoroughly determined by merely causal/reciprocal/organic and efficient-causal/unidirectional/mechanical, respectively). But I think he might ratify my reading. He contrast Schenkerian analysis’ “integrated account” and “richly synthesized picture”—terms which suggest a holistic, organic kind of judgment—with transformational analysis’ “esthesic streams,” “single harmonic successions,” and “local musical effects” (emphases mine)—terms which suggest irreversible time-successions and concatenations of successive events.

181 CPR, A188.

182 My claim about temporal unidirectionality may seem to be belied by the fact that the same neo-Riemannian relation obtains between, e.g., G major and B minor no matter which order they appear in. I am grateful to Kevin Korsyn for reminding me. The analogy is buttressed when we broaden its scope from individual transformations to transformational cycles. It is not the case that the chords that express a complete RL cycle, for example, would do so irrespective of what order they appear in. Revealing comparisons might be made between Schenker’s emphasis on reciprocal conditioning and other music-analytical methods that allow one to calculate the degree to which the occurrence of certain kinds of musical events elevates the statistical likelihood that certain other kinds of musical events will follow, whether at the level of chord successions, sonata form subdivisions (as in Hepokoski and Darcy’s Elements of Sonata Theory), schemata (as in Gjerdingen’s A Classical Turn of Phrase: Music and the Psychology of Convention), or something else.
mechanical laws. The lynchpin discovery that holds together Schenker’s later theoretical contributions, I would go so far as to say, is the discovery that the tonal masterworks project an alternative natural order in which we may detect the dual marks of organic unity that for Kant are constitutive of life itself—the “final causality” (Kausalität nach Zwecken) of part-on-whole dependence and part-to-part reciprocal conditioning. We can let Schenker speak for himself on this point, for he

183 Perhaps it is better to assume that Schenker was never deluded about that manifest truth, and that what he came to understand was that the way he had been tempted to talk about musico-causal laws had the undesirable implication that tonal music is mechanistically determined. Schenker’s thinking about mechanism is rich and complicated, as Korsyn’s study of Schenker’s “Geist” essay has made us aware. “Schenker’s title, ‘The Spirit of Musical Technique,’” Korsyn writes, “already foreshadows...deconstruction. Spirit, of Geist, and technique are antithetical terms. While Geist is a privileged Romantic term, technique is a term from which the Romantics distanced themselves because of its associations with the rational and the mechanical. In terms of the classic opposition between organism and mechanism, Geist belongs to the organic side, technique to the mechanical. To speak of a spirit of musical technique is to deconstruct this opposition by inscribing each term within the other, destabilizing the hierarchy that privileges Geist.” “Schenker’s Organicism Reexamined,” 102. I would add the comparatively flat-footed observation that in Schenker’s mouth, “mechanical” (mechanisch) is nearly always a pejorative, although the target he casts this aspersion at shifts somewhat across his career. In “The Spirit of Musical Technique,” Schenker encourages us to view the study of counterpoint as akin to practicing mechanical exercises for cultivating finger dexterity, but cautions us against the error of thinking that counterpoint in free composition (Bach’s counterpoint, in particular) is merely mechanical, as this would be to devalue it unjustly. See Pastille’s translation of the Geist essay in Cook, The Schenker Project, 323. In the “Contribution to the Study of Ornamentation,” Schenker bemoans the vacuity of superficial, mechanical virtuosity at the keyboard, exclaiming “away with mechanical, finished finger facility!” Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik: als Einführung zu Ph. Em. Bachs Klavierwerken (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1903, 2nd ed. 1908) / ed. & trans. Hedi Siegel, “A Contribution to the Study of Ornamentation,” Music Forum 4 (1976),99. In Meisterwerk, Schenker declares that Rameau’s overly verticalized chordal thinking results in musical pieces comprised of mechanical successions (MA, “Rameau or Beethoven? Creeping Paralysis or Spiritual Potency in Music?” / MW, Rameau oder Beethoven? Erstarrung oder Geistiges Leben in Der Music, 6). In Free Composition Schenker has sharp words for “mechanical” music theories, which encourage mechanical readings of pieces (FC 112) and mechanical thinking on the part of students (FC 161).
is uncharacteristically straightforward about it in all of his major post-Counterpoint writings:

“Every diminution must be defined by its determinate membership within the whole, membership which is rendered organically authentic and precisely verifiable through the dictates of voice-leading. In each diminution, even one of the lowest order, the whole lives and moves; not even the most miniscule part exists apart from the whole. The chief difficulty, not only in fashioning the diminution out of the background and middle ground, but also in reconstructively tracing the diminution back to its relation to the middleground and background (in analysis), has to do with the necessitation (die Bindung) of the diminution by the whole.”

“The detail remains a most problematic concept so long as it is not proved to be a determinate detail of a determinate overarching unity. There is no such thing as a detail solely in itself, but rather only within the context of a whole of which the detail is a precise part.”

184 »ALLE DIMINUTION MUSS IN EINER BESTIMMTEN, DURCH STIMMFÜHRUNGSZWANG ORGANISCH BEGLAUBIGTEN UND GENAU NACHWEISBAREN ZUGEHÖRIGKEIT ZUM GANZEN FESTGELEGT SEIN. IN JEDER DIMINUTION, AUCH DER NIEDERSTER ORDNUNG, LEBT UND WEBT DAS GANZE, MIT NICHT DAS GERINGSTE TEILCHEN OHNE DAS GANZE. DIE BINDUNG DER DIMINUTION DURCH EIN GANZES BILDET DIE HAUPTSCHWIERIGKEIT, SIE SOWohl AUS EINEM HINTER- UND MITTELGRUND ZU ERSCHAFFEN, WIE UMGEkehRT, SIE AUF IHREN MITTEL- UND HINTERGRUND AUCH NUR NACHSCHAFFEND ZURÜCKZUFÜHREN.«

185 »"DAS DETAIL" BLEIBT SO LANGE EIN VERLEGENHEITSBEGRIFF, SO LANGE ES NICHT ALS DAS BESTIMMTE DETAIL EINER BESTIMMTEN ÜBERGEORDNETEN EINHEIT ERWIESEN WIRD. DETAILS AN SICH GIBT ES NICHT, NUR IM ZUSAMMENHANG MIT EINEM GANZEN, DESSEN TEIL ES EBEN IST.«

184 »ALLE DIMINUTION MUSS IN EINER BESTIMMTEN, DURCH STIMMFÜHRUNGSZWANG ORGANISCH BEGLAUBIGTEN UND GENAU NACHWEISBAREN ZUGEHÖRIGKEIT ZUM GANZEN FESTGELEGT SEIN. IN JEDER DIMINUTION, AUCH DER NIEDERSTER ORDNUNG, LEBT UND WEBT DAS GANZE, MIT NICHT DAS GERINGSTE TEILCHEN OHNE DAS GANZE. DIE BINDUNG DER DIMINUTION DURCH EIN GANZES BILDET DIE HAUPTSCHWIERIGKEIT, SIE SOWohl AUS EINEM HINTER- UND MITTELGRUND ZU ERSCHAFFEN, WIE UMGEkehRT, SIE AUF IHREN MITTEL- UND HINTERGRUND AUCH NUR NACHSCHAFFEND ZURÜCKZUFÜHREN.«

185 »"DAS DETAIL" BLEIBT SO LANGE EIN VERLEGENHEITSBEGRIFF, SO LANGE ES NICHT ALS DAS BESTIMMTE DETAIL EINER BESTIMMTEN ÜBERGEORDNETEN EINHEIT ERWIESEN WIRD. DETAILS AN SICH GIBT ES NICHT, NUR IM ZUSAMMENHANG MIT EINEM GANZEN, DESSEN TEIL ES EBEN IST.«

184  "Alle Diminution muss in einer bestimmten, durch Stimmführungszwang organisch beglaubigten und genau nachweisbaren Zugehörigkeit zum Ganzen festgelegt sein. In jeder Diminution, auch der niedersten Ordnung, lebt und webt das Ganze, mit nicht das geringste Teilchen ohne das Ganze. Die Bindung der Diminution durch ein Gänztes bildet die Hauptschwierigkeit, sie sowohl aus einem Hinter- und Mittelgrund zu erschaffen, wie umgekehrt, sie auf ihren Mittel- und Hintergrund auch nur nachschaffend zurückzuführen.«

185  "Das Detail" bleibt so lange ein Verlegenheitsbegriff, so lange es nicht als das bestimmte Detail einer bestimmten übergeordneten Einheit erwiesen wird. Details an sich gibt es nicht, nur im Zusammenhang mit einem Ganzen, dessen Teil es eben ist.«

"In the _Urlinie_ the miracle of creation fulfills itself on a grand scale; it alone is the muse of all improvisatory creation, all synthesis; it is the beginning and the end of the piece, its very imagination. In the _Urlinie_, the composer becomes a visionary; he is drawn to it as though to the primordial mothers; and, as though he were intoxicated by the details of it and by its dictates, he chooses for his tones a merciful fate full of agreement between their individual lives and an entity that lies both beyond and behind them, as a ‘Platonic idea’ in music,” a fate full of discipline and morals and order, even in the foreground, where turmoil, chaos, and disintegration seem to manifest themselves.”

“We see that in breadth, direction, and internal motion, in repetition of subdivisions and key and so on, all the parts of the line mutually condition one another, with the power and blessing of organic life coursing through every vein. Motive and diminution, as offshoots of the line, color the _Urlinie_ segments, individual scale steps, and modulations, and relate the parts to one another so the whole is bound together all the more securely.”

---

186 »_IN DER URLINIE VOLLZIEHT SICH DAS SCHÖPFUNGSWUNDER IM GROSSEN, SIE ALLEIN IST MUSE ALLER STEGREIFSSCHÖPFUNG, ALLER SYNTHESE, SIE IST ANFANG, END DES STÜCKES, DESSEN PHANTASIE ÜBERHAUPT. IN IHR WIRD DER KOMPONIST ZUM SEHER, ZU IHR ZIEHT ES IHN WIE ZU DEN URMÜTTERN, UND WIE TRUNKEN VON IHREN AUSKÜNFTEN UND WEISUNGEN BESCHEIDET ER SEINEN TÖNEN EIN GNADENREICHES SCHICKSAL VOLL ÜBEREINSTIMMUNG ZWISCHEN IHR EM EIGENLEBEN UND EINEM ÜBER UND HINTER IHNEN SEIENDEN (ALS EINER „PLATONISCHEN IDEE” IN DER MUSIK), EIN SCHICKSAL VOLL ZUCHT UND SITTE UND ORDNUNG SELBST DORT, WO IM VORDERGRUNDE SICH AUFRUHR, CHAOS ODER AUFLÖSUNG ZU ZEIGEN SCHEINT.« _TW_ 1, 23 _/ WT 1, “The Urlinie: A Preliminary Remark (Die Urlinie: Eine Vorbemerkung),” 22.

Schenker’s quote shows a slippage, characteristic of Kant’s discussions of organic life, from talking about the relation of parts to their surrounding whole to talking about the relation of parts to the idea of the whole.

187 »_WIR SEHEN FERNER ALLE TEILE DER LINIE IN GRÖßE, RICHTUNG UND INNERER BEWEGUNG, IN WIEDERHOLUNG VON UNTerteilungen und Tonart u. s. w. einander bedingen, in alle ADErn KRAFT UND SEGEN DES ORGANISCHEN VERSTROMENd. MOTIV UND DIMINUTION, ALS SPRÖSLINGE DER LINIE, VERFÄRBErn URLINIE-ABschnittE, EINZELNE STUFEN, MODULATIONEN UND SETZEN SO DIE TEILE GEGEINANDER, UM DESTOP ESTER DAS GANZE ZU BINDEN.« _TW_ 2, 17, translation adapted from William Pastille, _Ursatz: The Musical Philosophy of Heinrich Schenker_, 62.
With all that in mind, we can offer the following gloss on Schenker’s graphic technique: Schenker’s analytical graphs diagrammatically represent teleological judgments of musical sounds as carried out from within the musical standpoint.

This result places at the interpreter’s disposal the surgical instruments for dissecting Schenker’s voice-leading graphs so as to “give a semantics” of his analytical symbology. As the most rudimentary exercise in this type of meta-music-analysis, consider the simple slur that Schenker uses to group together the elements of a passing motion (Durchgang), which Schenker exalts as the archetypal “composing-out” (Auskomponierung—in the contemporary Schenkerian vernacular, this signifies the “prolongation” of a “principal tone” by the introduction of subordinate “tones of figuration” that “elaborate” it). This is illustrated in Figure 5 from Free Composition:

EXAMPLE 12: Schenker, Free Composition, Figure 5188:

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{\textcopyright 2023}
\end{array} \]

The d\(^1\) in the diagram is a passing tone, we may say, owing to how it is “conditioned by” (bestimmt) both of the tones that it passes between. It has the

---

188 In saying what is “being said” by the Figure 5, I ignore for simplicity’s sake the c that gives consonant support to the e\(^1\) and c\(^1\), thereby reinforcing their roles as bookends of a Durchgang. If the tone succession e\(^1\)-d\(^1\)-c\(^1\) were instead counterpointed against a sustained B or G in the bass, for example, we would read the e\(^1\) and c\(^1\) as incomplete upper and lower neighbors, respectively, to d\(^1\).
quality or determination (Bestimmung\textsuperscript{189}) that it has—call it “passingness”—only by dint of the position it occupies relative to the adjacent tones poised a diatonic step above and below it. Schenker says as much, though more tersely: “A passing tone is, by definition, dependent on its surrounding consonant tones.”\textsuperscript{190} He could also have added that the boundary tones of a passing motion, in turn, possess their individualizing Bestimmungen—beginning and ending, terminus a quo and terminus ad quem—in virtue of the mediating presence of the intervening passing tone. The three elements of a Terzzug thus reciprocally determine one another’s “musical disposition (musikalisch Character),” as Hanslick says, or one another’s “meanings (Bedeutungen)” or contributions to “tonal content (tonal Inhalt),” as Schenker prefers to put it. In expatiating on how the elements of a passing motion mutually condition one another, we’ve thereby described how such elements are “made possible” by the whole that they collectively comprise (the entire passing motion). It is only when d\textsuperscript{1} is heard in relation to the entire passing motion—not when it is heard all by itself, or solely in relation to its predecessor e\textsuperscript{1}, or solely in relation to its descendant c—that it receives its badge of identity, comes into its own as the kind of thing that, in this specific context, it is. Its nature is knowable, or hearable, only as a nature that is fully embedded in, and that emerges out of, the totality of a relational complex.

This painstaking procedure of parsing a lone Durchgang may be applied, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, to all of the miscellaneous tone-groupings indicated by the stems

\textsuperscript{189} Bestimmung also means “purpose,” a fact which accords nicely with the telic reading of Schenker’s graphs I am attempting to give.

\textsuperscript{190} »EIN DURCHGANG IST SCHON DEM BEGRIFFE NACH VON DEN IHN UMGEBENDEN KONSONANTEN TÖNEN ABHÄNGIG.« FRS, 42 / FC, 13.
and slurs that appear in Schenker's graphic “reductions” of entire tonal pieces. Those musical case studies that stand at the summit of Schenker's intellectual and musical development, the analyses found in *Free Composition* and *Five Graphic Musical Analyses* (*Fünf Urlinie*-Tafeln), afford us a sweeping view of the Schenkerian ideal: that of using graphical depictions of recursive tonal dependency relations in order to make explicit 1) how each of a musical piece’s parts (individual tones and contextually segmented groupings of tones) possesses an utterly unique sonic identity, a proprietary role that the part acts out by *interacting* in an utterly unique manner with its utterly unique fellow parts; and 2) how this congeries of parts communally institutes, and has its dynamic being within, an utterly unique integral whole.  

The meaning of any given use of a Schenkerian symbol, we can say loosely, is a function from ordered collections of notes (foregrounds of pieces) to sets of such part-to-part and part-to-whole relations. It goes without saying that these functions

---

191 There is a shallow objection here that should be staved off. Someone superficially acquainted with Schenker’s method might think that he is bent on homogenizing pieces by condensing them down to a small number of background structures. If such background structures are mistaken for the relevant wholes, then it will seem that Schenker’s objective is the opposite of demonstrating the utter uniqueness of a given musical whole. However, the *whole*—the entire piece in all of its specificity—should not be mistaken for the *species*—the contrapuntal model that best captures the background structure that this piece shares with many other pieces. Wholes are radically, concretely particular; species are abstractly general. Wholes, in the sense that should interest us here, exemplify species (of whatever sort) in a *sui generis* way. The same dialectic between species and individual that is present in Schenkerian analysis is present in Kantian biology. On the basis of the teleological judgment of many individuals, Kant believes, we are entitled to make generalizations about the defining features of the species to which those individuals belong. By observing many congeneric individuals, we come to detect the “mean contour which serves as a common standard for all, a floating image for the whole genus, which nature has set as an archetype underlying those of her products that belong to the same species.” *CJ* 82-3/§17/5: 151-2.
get very complicated very quickly, since the set of dependency relations picked out by the application of a Schenkerian analytical symbol to a piece changes based on how other analytical symbols have been applied to the piece. Take the simple tone sequence c¹-b-a-b. The dependency relation picked out by slurring the first c¹ to the subsequent b is different based on which of those two notes gets stemmed:

**EXAMPLE 13:** Tone sequence c¹-b-a-b:

![Musical notation image]

In the first analysis, b prolongs c¹ as its (incomplete) lower neighbor and is itself prolonged by its (complete) lower neighbor a. In the second analysis, b is prolonged by a double neighbor figuration (the upper neighbor c¹ being incomplete). Generally speaking, the meaning of any (application of an) analytical symbol in a Schenkerian graph is a meaning that is not intrinsic to the symbol, nor one that is determined by its interaction with nearby analytical symbols, but instead holistically, by its role within the economy of the all the interdependent symbols superimposed on the piece. For instance, in Schenker’s famous graph of the C-major Prelude from Bach’s *Well-Tempered Clavier* Book 1, the slur that joins the soprano’s initial e¹ (bar 1) to its upper neighbor f¹ (bars 2-3) only comes to have the meaning that f¹ is neighbor to the Kopfton (rather than simply that it is neighbor to any old
e\textsuperscript{1}) in virtue of the application of the thick beam that connects e\textsuperscript{1} with the ensuant d\textsuperscript{1} and c\textsuperscript{1} of the *Urlinie*, which do not arrive until the very end of the prelude:

**EXAMPLE 14:** Schenker’s graph of the C-major Prelude from Bach’s *Well-Tempered Clavier* Book 1:

Reciprocally, the thick beam only comes to mean that (among other things) the soprano’s d\textsuperscript{2} in bar 35 descends from an e\textsuperscript{1} *that butted up against a registral ceiling fixed by its upper neighbor f\textsuperscript{1}*(or however you want to put it) in virtue of the e\textsuperscript{1}-to-f\textsuperscript{1} slur that is hierarchically subordinate to the thick beam.\textsuperscript{192} Thus a particular use of a Schenkerian analytical symbol, just like the musical “part” it analyzes, gets its meaning from its relation to other individual symbols and to the graph they conjointly form.\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{192} There are cover tones in bars 6 and 8 (a\textsuperscript{1} and g\textsuperscript{1}, respectively) that lie above the f\textsuperscript{1}. But the f\textsuperscript{1} still forms an upper boundary with respect to the basic pattern of descending tenths between bass and soprano that organizes the first half of the prelude. For my purposes it doesn’t really matter what counts as a genuine registral ceiling.

\textsuperscript{193} We can distinguish between the meaning of a particular use of a symbol and the meaning of a type of symbol. Schenkerian slurs in the abstract (as a type) might be said to mean (among other things) that the first note of the slur (whatever it is) can be verticalized with the final note (whatever it is). I am here interested, rather, in
5.5 How Organicism Justifies Necessitarian Language: The last piece of the jigsaw—always the easiest to put in place—is the question surrounding Schenker’s ascription of necessity to particular musical happenings. The puzzle is completed by this Kantian dictum: seemingly paradoxically, but only seemingly, teleological judgments are judgments both of what is thoroughly particular to a specific object as well as of what is universal (lawful, necessary) in it. “[T]he principle of purposiveness,” Zuckert writes, “as a principle of means-ends relations [reciprocally instituted between and among parts of a whole], comprises a form of the lawfulness of the contingent, a ‘necessity’ that holds precisely for and of the particular, contingent, diverse character of (parts of) objects.”194 For a flourishing human body to keep on in its current state of flourishing, its liver must continue to do its job, must act and be acted upon in the particular way that it does and is; and the particular way in which the liver is both an effect and a cause depends on the sum of its contingent properties.195 In making a teleological judgment, whether of flora and

the particular set of dependency relations that correspond to a particular slur as applied to a particular piece. Semanticists who are uncomfortable with using the word “meaning” to talk about the significance of particular applications of symbols as well as the significance of symbol types should substitute whatever theoretical term they would prefer to use instead of “meaning.” The meaning of “meaning,” as concerns music-analytical symbols, is an extremely interesting topic, but not one that I can grapple with here.

194 Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology, 117.
195 Here I use “contingent properties” in the Kantian sense of properties not necessitated by the transcendental conditions of experience. Categorical properties such as BEING A SUBSTANCE OR BEING CAUSED BY SOMETHING OR HAVING CAUSAL CONSEQUENCES are necessary. Properties such as BEING VODKA OR BEING CAUSED BY THE FERMENTATION OF POTATOS are contingent.
fauna or of music, we make ourselves sensible of how every last part\textsuperscript{196} must make its \textit{sui generis} contribution if the whole is to perform its characteristic activity\textsuperscript{197} in its characteristic way. And we make ourselves sensible of how each part’s functioning \textit{must} abet, in order to be abetted by, the functioning of every other part. Teleological judgment thus reveals to us that, in organically unified objects, what is contingent is also what is necessary, inasmuch as judgments of part-to-part reciprocal conditioning and part-on-whole dependence apprise us simultaneously of how a given part is unique and how it \textit{has to be} uniquely that way. When Schenker enjoins us to “grasp the necessity” (\textit{verstehen die Notwendigkeit}) of Chopin’s tritone, this is the kind of epistemic condition I believe we should feel enjoined to enter into.

“Reductive analysis,” therefore, is a misleading epithet for how Schenker strove to document and transmit his experiences of organic-musical unity.\textsuperscript{198} The phrase suggests a process of stripping away what is inessential, of breaking down what is complex, to arrive at the quintessence of a piece of (or all pieces of) music.

Quite to the contrary, I suggest, Schenker’s examination of pieces, like the Kantian

\textsuperscript{196} There are difficulties I will turn a blind eye to about what the minimal parts of an organism are. How far down must one go before the teleological judgment is complete? Perhaps the thing to say is that at the imaginary limit of successful organicist inquiry, every last part will have been teleologically pigeonholed.

\textsuperscript{197} For organisms, this characteristic activity is that of promoting their own continued functioning and the continued functioning (the persistence through reproduction) of the species; for musical masterworks, Schenker argues, this characteristic activity is that of bringing to completion the basic schema of consonance-dissonance-consonance, or stasis-departure-arrival, that is embodied harmonically and melodically in the \textit{Ursatz}.

\textsuperscript{198} For further grievances about the infelicity of using the term “reductive” to describe Schenker’s analyses, see Edward Laufer’s review of Oster’s translation of \textit{Der Freie Satz}, \textit{Music Theory Spectrum} 3/1 (1981), 158-84, and Arnold Whittal “Schenker and the Prospects for Analysis,” \textit{The Musical Times} 121/1651 (1980), 560-2. Kevin Korsyn and Wayne Petty have also stressed this point many times in conversation with me.
biologist’s examination of organisms, is concerned with all the blooming, buzzing contingency and particularity with which this piece does what it is supposed to do, fulfills its characteristic function in its own way. Kant, without igniting much controversy, considers survival (of individual and of species) to be the thinnest, most undiversified, least specific end that all organisms prosecute. More controversially, he thinks that an organism’s means of survival—its self-locomotive, self-nutritive, self-formative, regenerative, and species-reproductive powers—could not be adequately grasped by intellects like ours apart from teleological judgment. By performing this kind of judgment, we have seen, the judge maximally diversifies organisms by discovering in what particular respect each organic part conduces to, and is in return nurtured by, the conglomerate organism’s wellbeing.

By the same token, but with great controversy, Schenker holds that tonal pieces, all and one, project a comparable future-directed striving, an élan vital that drives and directs a piece’s growing, complexifying, self-replicating (repetition engendering), unified persistence through time. For Schenker, as for Kant, that organic characteristic is what is brought to consciousness and made an object of knowledge by teleological judgments.

199 “An organized being is thus not a mere machine, for that has only a motive power, while the organized being possesses in itself a formative power; and indeed one that it communicates to the matter, which does not have it (it organizes the latter): thus it has a self-propagating formative power, which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that is, mechanism).” »Ein organisiertes Wesen ist also nicht bloss Maschine, denn die hat lediglich bewegende Kraft; sondern sie besitzt in sich bildende Kraft, und zwar eine solche, die sie den Materien mitteilt, wleche sie nicht haben (sie organisiert); also eine sich fortpflanzende bildende Kraft, welche durch das Bewegungsvermögen allein (den Mechanism) nicht erklärt werden kann.« Cf, 253/§65/5:374.
SECTION 6: CONCLUSION

With that I conclude my drawn-out response to Dubiel’s glancing question about “why anyone would want to respond to a highly esteemed composition by telling a story about how it had to be exactly as it was.” If what I have said is correct, then within the shadowy thicket of Kant’s philosophy of biology we have found a clearing where Schenker’s necessitarian claims can be seen in a brighter and more favorable light. One might still worry that even if my efforts have made the claims seem better, they haven’t yet made them seem good, for they still give off an odor of triviality. I’ve contended, in chorus with Kant and Schenker, that being organically unified consists in being made up of parts that demonstrate the “necessity of the contingent.” But this makes it redundant for Schenker to single out Chopin’s tritone to trumpet its necessity: Chopin is in the Schenkerian pantheon of geniuses, so his works are by definition masterworks; masterworks are by definition organically unified; and organic unities are by definition made up of “necessary” components. Once one has said that it is Chopin’s tritone, all subsequent talk of necessity becomes superfluous.

So I must concede that it is a tautology when Schenker attributes necessity to the particular component parts of acknowledged masterworks. But we should be careful not to miss the forest for the trees. From a broader perspective that takes into account the conceptual foundations of Schenker’s graphic technique, it is obvious that his animating concern is not for us to know that necessity inheres in a tone tout court; it is for us to know how necessity inheres in a tone dans ce cas.
particulier. Moreover, what is valuable about Schenker’s necessitarian language is not how fascinatingly informative it is about the particular notes he used it to refer to. Its primary value turned out to be as a heuristic for interpretation: we followed Schenker’s Notwendigkeit down a rabbit hole and discovered something of the wonderland of Schenker’s musico-philosophical ethos and imagination.

I’ve just told a long tale whose happy ending is that I’ve vindicated one way in which Schenker is disposed to talk about music. I did this by showing how attributing necessity to a musical event is something one is justified in doing once one has succeeded in performing a teleological judgment. This kind of judgment, I argued, is the beating heart of Schenker’s music analytical modus operandi, as instantiated above all by his graphic procedures. So that I am not accused of being a dogmatic philosophical underlaborer in the Schenkerian movement (which, after all, is pretty obsolescent these days), allow me to say a final word about how partial my vindication of Schenker is by insisting on how wrong Schenker remains on several scores. (1) I would be the last to defend the view that only common-practice Western tonal music, of all the many musics there are, furnishes listeners with rightful occasion to perform teleological-organic judgment. (2) I can see no good reason to accept that amenability to being judged teleologically is a sufficient condition for a piece of music to possess aesthetic merit, as William Pastille has argued Schenker believes;200 nor can I see a good reason to accept that this is a

200 William Pastille, “Schenker’s Value Judgments,” Music Theory Online 1 no. 6 (1995). As I demonstrated in this essay, a simple passing tone is amenable to teleological judgment, as are the (in themselves aesthetically vacuous) background and middleground structures Schenker theorizes about. This shows that amenability to teleological judgment is not a sufficient condition for aesthetic merit.
necessary condition, a view Schenker reiterates obsessively. (3) I'm doubt that Schenker's mature graphic technique is the only good way to denote teleological judgments about music—although it is an excellent way, and one must admire the elegance and novelty of Schenker's notational innovations. (4) I'm certain that the kind of musical experience chronicled by a Schenkerian graph is just one among a plurality of types of musical experience that are worth having, not the *ne plus ultra.* (5) And, finally, I don't think, as I suspect Schenker does, that musical organicism entails / is entailed by, or even suggests / is suggested by, Schenker's vile reactionary politics—musical organicism, in my view, is not even guilty by its association with Schenker's vicious breed of conservatism, just unfairly tainted by being juxtaposed with it. So, although I've tried to make Schenker the beneficiary of my adherence to what Donald Davidson calls the “principle of rational accommodation,” which states that we “make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement,”²⁰¹ there is still a sizable remainder of disagreement left over between me and Schenker. Schenker being Schenker, though, it would be troubling if anything else were the case.

This chapter has been long and intricate, with many twists and turns, so a concise restatement of my main contentions is the best way to close.

1) Schenker's absolutism makes the most sense if we regard it as (being equivalent to or premised upon) a Hanslickian prescription that we occupy the musical standpoint.

2) From the musical standpoint, tonal music only admits of explanation if it is judged to have the defining qualities of organisms: the reciprocal conditioning of part by part and the dependence of part on whole.

3) Thus, according arguments borrowed from Kant, we can only cognize musical “organisms” by judging them teleologically, as we must judge *bona fide* biological phenomena.

4) Schenkerian analysis should be understood as a form of (or a manner of visually representing) teleological judgment.

6) Hence (conclusion #1) the deep sense in which Schenker is an organicist is not that he uses metaphors containing botanical words—it is that his analyses conform to Kantian precepts governing biological investigation.

7) Teleological judgment of a whole grounds the ascription of (a special kind of) necessity to its parts.

8) Hence (conclusion #2) Schenker’s necessitarian claims are revealed to have their basis in his (non-metaphorical) organicist approach.
EPILOGUE 1. More Thoughts on Dubiel’s Objection

Any pearls of interpretive wisdom there are in Chapter 2 took shape around the grain of sand provided by Dubiel’s anti-necessitarian objection. Recall that in preference to Schenker’s “grandiose explanatory program,” which seeks to show that, how, and why musical pieces must be as they are, Dubiel likes a more modest analytical agenda that restricts itself to acknowledging “that a piece is as it is, and that hearing it well means realizing how everything about it contributes in a variety of ways to a very full sense of how it is (so that, incidentally, even a small change might make the piece something significantly different—which is not necessarily to say less good).”\(^1\) However, the thrust of my argument in Chapter 2 is that Schenker’s necessitarianism and Dubiel’s proposed alternative are not mutually exclusive—and, in fact, that they aren’t even distinct.\(^2\) I’ve held that Schenker’s necessitarianism is grounded in a form of judgment that is distinguished from other forms of judgment (e.g. causal judgment) by its orientation toward (1) the conditioning relations that obtain between every part(‘s activities) and (those of) every other part, as well as (2) the dependence relations that obtain between every

\(^1\) Dubiel, “When you are a Beethoven,” 307.

\(^2\) One could try to preserve some distance between Dubiel’s and Schenker’s programs by saying that Dubiel’s does not require one to make modal claims about music (i.e. claims about necessity), whereas Schenker’s necessitarianism is essentially modal. The distance can be minimized by noting that in the case of an organically coherent musical work, saying “how it is,” as Dubiel wishes to, just is to characterize its defining network of reciprocal determinations (Wechselbestimmungen, a term that Fichte and Schelling make extensive use of), as Schenker wishes to, which just is (according to Kant) to characterize how the “necessity of the contingent” is exhibited by the piece’s parts.
part(s activities) and (that or those of) the circumferent whole. The way I’ve connected the dots between Schenker’s absolutism, organicism, and necessitarianism allows us to see that Schenker is seriously and systematically engaged in “realizing how everything about a piece contributes in a variety of ways to a very full sense of how it is.” The fact that “a small change might make the piece something significantly different” is consistent with the Kantian “teleology” I attribute to Schenker. A seemingly miniscule alteration to a piece could well have a ripple effect that extensively reconfigures the relations of reciprocal co-dependence that radiate throughout it, thus requiring that we once again make a full “audit” (in both senses) of its organic coherence.

The end of Dubiel’s parenthetical statement ([“…which is not necessarily to say less good”]) suggests the following construal of Schenker’s necessitarianism.3

(1) Schenker thinks a masterwork would have less aesthetic value were it to undergo any small adjustment. Thus (2) Schenker’s claims about necessity can have as their basis the conclusion of the following argument: (P1) Masterworks are by nature perfect; (P2) Changing a masterwork would make it worse and therefore non-perfect; (PC1) Thus changing a masterwork would yield something that isn’t a masterwork; So (C) each masterwork, in order to remain a masterwork, cannot change—it must be as it is.

---
3 I do not know if this is what Dubiel has in mind, but is the reading brought to mind by what he says.
4 Schenker is transparent about this: “Idea, perfection, masterwork are one concept: by achieving perfection, the masterwork partakes of the external life of the idea…Perfection is true life, a true eternity.” MW vol. 1, 7 / MA vol. 1, 1.
If this is the reasoning behind Schenkerian necessitarianism, Schenker is in hot water. We can begin to feel the heat when we consider that, plausibly, enough small changes suffice to transform any masterwork into any other, just as, plausibly, enough substitutions, omissions, and additions of individual words suffice to transform any literary work into any other. This fact, in conjunction with the premise that changing a masterwork is the same as marring it (P2 from the argument above), has some unpalatable consequences. If we change masterwork A into masterwork B (via a series of small changes) and then change masterwork B back into masterwork A (via the inverse series of small changes), the view on offer entails that what we end up with is something aesthetically worse than what we began with (since we marred it twice by changing it twice). But what we end up with is, by hypothesis, formally identical to what we began with, since we returned the piece to its original state after altering it. This result, that something is worse than something it is identical to, is either incoherent or just too weird to be believed, depending on how one wishes to work out the details.5

5 I am traipsing over a tricky question about what exactly it means to “change” a piece of music, as well as a tricky question about what exactly it means for the musical objects on either side of the “changes” to be “identical.” It violates non-contradiction to say that something is less good than itself (at the same time, in the same respect, etc.). But maybe that’s not the result my thought experiment gives. We could instead try interpreting it as having the consequence that two distinct musical objects 1) have different levels of aesthetic value but 2) have the same musical-formal properties. This is not a logical contradiction, just (to my ear, anyway) a very eccentric proposal. An analogous case in the visual arts, though, may not strike us as all that strange: perhaps we have no reservations about thinking that an original painting and its formally identical forgery possess different levels of aesthetic value. Given his other commitments, however, it would be strange for Schenker to think that two distinct musical pieces that have identical formal properties, which he holds to be the sole determining factor of a piece’s aesthetic value, have non-identical levels of aesthetic value.
It is in line with the principle of charity that my interpretation does not have Schenker making a blunder like this. Schenker is not saying, as I hear him, that for a masterwork to be as good as it is, it must do precisely as it does. He is saying that for a piece to do or be (precisely) what it does or is, its parts must do or be (precisely) what they do or are, and vice versa. Even a small change has the potential to ramify throughout a piece’s network of reciprocity and complementarity, and thus has the potential to require us to consider anew the part-to-part conditioning relations and part-on-whole dependence relations which together constitute, in Dubiel’s words, “how it is.” It remains open to Schenker to think that an emendation to a masterwork might or might not make it worse, might or might not yield something that hangs together less pleasingly than the original. What the result won’t be is

---

6 Clearly, a small change doesn’t have to have a domino effect like this. For instance, we would probably find that substituting one ornament for another (replacing a mordant with an inverted mordant, or what have you) leaves the rest of the piece’s fabric of mutual conditioning relations more or less intact. Indeed, Schenker’s theory of hierarchical levels (Schichten), which I’ve scarcely discussed, guarantees that some mutual conditioning relations can be added or subtracted at a higher level (closer to the foreground) without necessitating the revision of others at a lower level (closer to the background). Succinctly but jargonistically: inserting or removing an appoggiatura here or there won’t change whether the piece is a five-line.

7 I doubt Schenker would be comfortable with the idea of improving a masterwork, since “perfection [and] masterwork are one.” Off the top of my head, I can think of a few ways of interpreting this pronouncement. (1) Masterworks all have an infinite amount of the same kind of aesthetic value (as Kant thinks human subjects are all infinitely morally valuable) and thus admit of no ranking except an n-way tie for first place; (2) or the aesthetic virtues of each masterwork are so radically different from the virtues of the others as to render them incommensurable—all are perfect, but differently perfect, such that one is strictly incomparable with another; (3) or maybe all masterworks are infinitely aesthetically valuable (perfect), sometimes comparably so, sometimes not—i.e., sometimes two of them have an infinite amount of a the same kind of aesthetic value, sometimes an infinite amount of an incommensurable kinds of aesthetic value. All these principles could be appealed to
something that hangs together in the same way. If that sounds trivial, like an announcement that changing something makes it different, it is important to bear in mind that Schenker’s point is not that differences are differences. It is that differences, even apparently minimal or localized ones, can have significant repercussions for how we are to cognize the unique unity of a work of music.

EPILOGUE 2. The Place of Genius in Schenker’s Theory

Even if my interpretation accomplishes its stated aims, one may protest that it commits a sin of omission. What has become of the hero of Schenker’s narrative, the (specifically German) musical genius? The genius looms large in Schenker’s gospel of tonal music—from its nativity story featuring the discovery of the dissonant syncope by the Renaissance masters, to the miracles of beauty wrought by the hands of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Chopin, and Brahms, and culminating with a passion play in which Schoenberg and Stravinsky nail music to the cross of atonality and neo-classicism. An interpretative reconstruction of Schenker’s organicism that does not accord a central place to the genius, so criticism might run, can be at best a bowdlerization and at worst an unrecognizable distortion of Schenker’s own telling of the tale.

The problem for my interpretation may run even deeper. Not only do I ignore genius—I seem to make it impossible to pay it any attention at all. The musical in order to rule out certain stupid-sounding questions about comparative aesthetic value, e.g., “Which is better, Don Giovanni or Beethoven’s Ninth?”

8 To round out the analogy: Schenker’s writings herald the resurrection of our tonal heritage and our musical salvation by means of it.
standpoint, the center of attraction I find Schenker’s organicist thought and method orbiting around, is not a vantage point from which we can catch sight of geniuses and their superhuman talents: a (possible, non-actual) purely auditory world is not one where Beethoven has a counterpart.\footnote{According to one way of thinking about possible worlds (David Lewis’s), to consider the possibility that, e.g., Beethoven might have died in 1828 is to think about a possible world in which Beethoven’s counterpart (the merely possible entity that corresponds to the actual-worldly Beethoven) dies in 1828. I take it as given that purely auditory worlds, since they are comprised solely of auditory properties, contain no Beethoven counterparts, and do not play a role in counterfactual reasoning about Beethoven.} Statements about genius, to put it another way, are not expressible in a Strawsonian auditory report; and the genius’s beliefs, desires, capacities, and so forth cannot be the \textit{explanans} of a musical \textit{explanandum} if the explanation is to form a part of a Hanslickian science of aesthetics, which must not cross the narrow boundaries marked out by the “pure intuition” of “animated sonorous forms.” If this is so, how can I take into account Schenker’s belief that the genius is personally responsible for, and uniquely capable of,\footnote{Schenker thinks that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive musical categories: “masterworks of the musical genius” and pieces that are “not organic at all.” \textit{MW} vol. 2, 22. I take this to imply that only works of genius are organic and that only organic works are works of genius.} producing musical coherence, i.e. instituting the purposiveness without a purpose that musical tones can have in common with organic life? Is it possible to reconcile the notion that a \textit{Tonwelt} is purely auditory with Schenker’s conviction that “the divine power of genius...sets the world of tones [\textit{Tonwelt}] in motion according to laws of the human soul”\footnote{\textit{TW} vol. 2, 45 / \textit{WT} vol. 1, 91. The continuation of this quote gives a more complicated picture of the relation between the genius and the world of tones: “The divine power of genius...sets the world of tones in motion according to the laws of the human soul \textit{to the extent that}, \textit{vice versa}, \textit{this world sets that soul in motion}.}
To ameliorate these worries, I again call on Kant’s assistance. First, I draw an analogy between the place genius occupies in Kant’s aesthetic theory and the place genius occupies in Schenker’s musical theory. This analogy allows me to defend giving short shrift to genius in Chapter 2. Then I draw an analogy between Kant’s God and Schenker’s genius. This analogy shows how the figure of the genius could be integrated into the interpretation I give in Chapter 2 and also gives us a way of understanding Schenker’s comments about the genius’s preternatural powers of perception.

Unsurprisingly, given what we know about Schenker’s philosophical inclinations, one detects many commonalities between Kant’s and Schenker’s treatment of genius. Both Kant and Schenker hold that the genius does not produce a beautiful object by conforming to the dictates of a determinate concept or by cleaving to an academic rule—even if it remains the case that such production is somehow principled, involves technical skill, and is deliberate rather than haphazard.  

Both think that the genius’s inventiveness is stoked by instinct, inspiration, or “nature,” and that geniuses tend not to be able to explain how they

---

*according to its own laws*” (emphasis mine). Thus, Schenker claims, the reciprocal conditioning that was previously internal to musical work itself is now displaced and mutated into an extrinsic relation between the musical work and its conditions of creation.

12 “Every art presupposes rules, which serve as the foundation on which a product, if it is to be called artistic, is thought of as possible in the first place.” *Cf.,* 175/§46/5:308.
make beautiful art. Both interpret the ability to create beautiful art as the ability to give sensuous presentation to an aesthetic idea, a special kind of thought to which no determinate concept is fully adequate. And both agree that the genius’s special

13 “The artist, who is more securely seated in his instinct than in his conscious knowledge, continues to be guided by the former rather than the latter” HL 33 / H 21.

14 Schenker, alluding to the Gospel of John, calls music “the idea made flesh” (TW, vol. 4 22 / WT, vol. 1, 161). See also his discussion in Free Composition of artistic ideas (FC 161-2, “Omissions from the Original German Edition”), thoughts whose boundlessness outstrips the finite circumstances of everyday life. This discussion of ideas shouldn’t be confused with Schenker’s denigration of “idea composers” earlier in Free Composition (FC, p. 27). Somewhat confusingly, Schenker does not appear to be using this appellation “idea composer” to refer to the likes of Berlioz or Liszt, composers whose musical choices often have their rationale in the extra-musical ideas contained in narratives or texts. Schenker instead applies the label to composers whose pieces arise from the successive, “mechanical” aggregation and manipulation of motivic material. Since these composers “base their compositions on some ‘melody,’ ‘motive,’ or ‘idea,’” rather than on the Auskomponierung of the Ursatz, they cannot succeed in creating coherent, integral wholes. Schenker doesn’t name any names, but this pejorative use of “idea,” together with Schenker’s commendation of “content…rooted in the voice-leading transformations and linear progressions whose unity allows no segmentation or names of segments” (emphasis mine) strongly suggests that the “idea composer” Schenker is loosing his arrows at is Schoenberg. “Idea” (Gedanke) is something of an incantatory buzzword in Schoenberg’s theoretical writings, and his twelve-tone compositional method (based on permutations on the “melody” or “motive” of a dodecaphonic row) and analytical approach (based on the “developing variation” of a melodic cell) could both be described with some justification as “segmentational.” Cook professes to hear Hanslickian overtones in Schenker’s use of “idea” in this passage of Free Composition. He takes Schenker to be criticizing programmatic composers whose stock-in-trade is, as Cook says, the “preconceived idea expressed in musical terms” (Nicholas Cook, “Schenker’s Theory of Music as Ethics,” The Journal of Musicology 7 no. 4, 426). I doubt very much that Schenker has is taking his lead from Hanslick in this instance. Hanslick never complains about a “motivic” approach to composing, as Schenker does in this passage. Quite to the contrary, Hanslick seems to think that great composers do and should base entire compositions on a single motive: “Through this deep-seated, mysterious power, into the workings of which the human eye will never penetrate, there resounds in the mind of the composer a theme, a motif. We cannot trace this first seed back to its origins; we have to accept it simply as given. Once it has occurred in the composer’s imagination, his activity begins, which, starting from this principal theme or motif and always in relation to it, pursues the goal of presenting it in all its relationships” (OMB, 32).
office is to be a font of exemplary originality, a figure whom subsequent geniuses will learn from and subsequent non-geniuses will imitate.\(^\text{15}\)

More important than these correspondences, which are admittedly fairly generic, is the following congruence: the way Kant’s theory of genius relates to his theory of aesthetic judgment is analogous to the way Schenker’s theory of genius relates to his music-analytical theory—which, as I have argued, can be read as a musical application of Kant’s theory of teleological judgment. Henry Allison has pointed out that Kant’s theory of genius is “parergonal” to his theory of aesthetic judgment. By this, Allison means that Kant’s theory of genius "serves to frame

\(^{15}\) “In art (as in other fields) all blessings come only from above, from the genius, and below this region there is in fact neither progress, nor evolution, nor history, but for the most part only imitation, and what is more, only poor imitation based on current misconceptions of genius.” Schenker, *Die letzten fünf Sonaten von Beethoven: Op. 110* (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1914), 24, quoted and translated in William Pastille, “Schenker’s Value Judgments,” *Music Theory Online* 1 no. 2 (1995). Kant is not the sole source of the Schenker’s conception of genius, and there is no special reason to think that he is the primary source, either. The tenor of Schenker’s remarks, and the special emphasis he places on genius, seem more an inheritance from Schopenhauer than from Kant. Nicholas Cook, in “Schenker's Theory of Music as Ethics,” is among the many commentators who argue that Schenker’s theory of genius repurposes Schopenhauer’s claims about the genius’s unusual capacities. But Kant still lies in the background, since Schopenhauer, in *The World as Will and Representation*, is himself reacting to and developing upon the discussion of genius in Kant’s third *Critique*. This has been noted by, among numerous others, Peter Kivy, in *The Possessor and the Possessed* (Yale University Press, 2001), 65. Thus we can say that, in this respect, Schenker received the mantle of Kant from the hand of Schopenhauer—as, according to Count Waldstein, Beethoven was to receive the mantle of Mozart from the hand of Haydn. For his part, Kant did not invent his theory of genius out of whole cloth. According to Henry Allison, Kant “was quite cognizant of contemporary discussions of the nature of genius, including those of the Herder and the proto-romantic *Sturm und Drang* movement, Alexander Gerard, Francis Hutcheson, and Johann Georg Sulzer, and attempted to incorporate much of what he read into his own account.” See Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 391 n. 27 and 394 n. 62. Allison bases his remarks on Giorgio Tonelli, “Kant’s Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779): Part II," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (1966), 209-224.
Kant’s theory of taste, rather than constituting an essential part of it.”  At the point in the third Critique at which Kant introduces his theory of genius, he has already given us an account of the form and content of pure judgments of taste and a description of what sort of faculty (judgmental power) epistemic agents must have in order to perform such judgments. Kant has, to his own satisfaction at least, proven that such judgments are non-conceptual, in that something’s being beautiful doesn’t follow from the fact that it instantiates this or that concept, and that they are universally binding, in that such judgments represent themselves as having a claim to everyone’s assent. In commencing his investigation of genius, Kant then turns to the question of how it is possible for someone to produce objects that are fitted to being so judged. Kant elaborates his theory of genius by enumerating the aptitudes and dispositions that a person would need to have in order to be the originating cause of a beautiful art work. Kant’s character study of the genius, though, does not qualify his core theory of aesthetic judgment, nor does it serve to corroborate or defend that theory. Rather, Kant’s theory of genius seeks to deduce facts about artist’s psyches based on facts about how aesthetic judgment works and based on the agreed-upon proposition that (at least some of) those artist’s creations can and should elicit aesthetic judgments. In particular, Kant thinks that geniuses

16 Allison, ibid., 272
17 If judgments of the beautiful were conceptual, we could in principle definitively prove things to be beautiful, which Kant denies. See CJ, §§1-5.
18 Kant appears convinced that this universalizing force is encoded in the semantics of sentences such as “this is beautiful,” which allegedly explains why we don’t say “this is beautiful to me.” See CJ, §§ 6-9.
19 The form of argument is this: for beautiful artworks to be possible, their creators must have such-and-such powers. Beautiful artworks are actual, so their creators do have such-and-such powers.
must be, in a way that non-geniuses cannot be, conduits through whom nature fulfills its ends.20 Both natural objects and works of art excite our feeling for beauty in the same way (both, owing to their form, occasion a “harmony of the faculties”) and for the same reason (both exemplify a form of “indeterminate lawfulness” by being amenable to being judged in respect of their non-efficient-causal reciprocal conditioning relations between part and part and between part and whole). They differ chiefly in that, in the case of artworks, the human body and mind are among the “materials” that nature “uses” to implement aesthetically significant relations of purposiveness without a purpose within a sensuous medium. Fine art and natural beauty, then, are not one another’s complementary opposites in Kant’s aesthetic theory. Instead, fine art is a species of natural beauty, distinguished from other species by the fact that, in it, nature’s expression of its “indeterminate lawfulness” is accomplished by means of the genius’s creative activities.

20 “Genius itself cannot describe or indicate scientifically how it brings about its products, and it is rather as nature that it gives the [standard or rule by which to judge]. That is why, if an author owes a product to his genius, he himself does not know how he came by the ideas for it; nor is it in his power [Gewalt] to devise such products at his pleasure, or by following a plan, and to communicate [his procedure] to others in precepts that would enable them to bring about like products. (Indeed, that is presumably why the word genius is derived from [the Latin] genius, [which means] the guardian and guiding spirit that each person is given as his own at birth, and to whose inspiration [Eingebung] those original ideas are due.)...Nature, through genius, prescribes the rule not to science but to art, and this also only insofar as the art is to be fine art.” CJ, 175/§46/5:308. Schenker, too, is of the view that the genius is the instrument of nature: “A great talent or a man of genius, like a sleepwalker, often finds the right way, even when his instinct is thwarted by one thing or another or...by the full and conscious intention to follow the wrong direction. The superior force of truth—of Nature, as it were—is at work mysteriously behind his consciousness, guiding his pen, without caring in the least whether the happy artist himself wanted to do the right thing or not. If he had his way in following his conscious intentions, the result, alas! Would often be a miserable composition. But, fortunately, that mysterious power arranges everything for the best.” HL, 76-7 / H 60.
The way the theory of genius fits into the architecture of Kant’s overall view is obvious even from a superficial reading of the relevant parts of the third Critique: theoretical priority is squarely on the side of Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment rather than his theory of genius. That is, Kant is only in a position to derive facts about the nature of genius because he has already devised a theory of what aesthetic judgment consists in, and he only finds himself with reason to discuss genius at all because he has independent motivations (the completion of his catalogue of the mind’s powers) for pursuing the topic of judgments of taste. Genius, it is fair to say, is of systemic but not intrinsic interest to Kant.

Not so for Schenker. Schenker’s references to genius are far more frequent and prominent than Kant’s. And they differ in quality as well as quantity. Schenker’s unalloyed enthusiasm for figure of the genius, which one does not detect in Kant’s matter-of-fact descriptions, comes across in this passage:

“Among men, the true genius is...an elemental drive, so to speak: the hunger, the thirst, and love of mankind as a whole...In the true genius, man and art counterbalance each other,...his ethical powers take part in his artistic productions, and also vice versa. The ideal of the genius in relation to art: to apprehend all situations as particular, to distinguish them from one another, and to address the presently given situation in accordance with nature, which dwells within it. Mankind, however, suffers precisely in not being capable of producing such an art. The study of the realizations in works of genius according resigns itself to this incapacity in order to learn the art of decision-making. In his way the genius artist surpasses even the religious founders, great philosophers, moralists, and politicians, who to be sure set out beautiful goals for mankind in beautiful words and thoughts but never—to speak pianistically—give the fingering to that end as well, that is, never teach the
realization. If only Christ, e.g., had been able also to give the fingering needed for the realization of his main precept!"21

Outpourings like this one have led several commentators to maintain, in concordance with what does seem to be Schenker’s own self-conception, that his theory is first and foremost a theory of the nature of the musical genius. However, I think that Schenker’s enraptured tone has kept us from noticing that his theory of genius, like Kant’s, is parergonal to a more basic conception of how judgment of tonal pieces must proceed. The crux of Schenker’s theory, as I have argued, is the view that there is a way of regarding and cognizing music that has a unique claim to aesthetic viability and explanatory adequacy—i.e., regarding music from the musical standpoint and cognizing it as an “organism.” A further, optional step one could take is to explore the possibility that there is a way that producers of music must be constituted, with respect to their auditory and musical-creative powers, if they are to be capable of producing pieces of music whose distinctive form of coherence makes those pieces fit for being so regarded and so cognized. The fact that Schenker is disposed to get overwrought as he explores this possibility, and the fact that he explores it so manically, do not change the fact that his theory of genius is conceptually subordinate to his theory of judgment, in that the former is derived from, and cannot be understood apart from, the latter. Commenting on music’s emergence from its pre-tonal dark age, Schenker says that “[m]usic became an art

only when a series of tones arose that demanded to be understood and felt as a whole, as a self-contained entity."\(^{22}\) His analytical theory can be seen to answer two of the questions raised by this progressive, teleological view of musical history: what is it to understand and feel music as a whole or as a self-contained unity? And: what is it about music (and about its listeners) that permits it to issue a demand that it be understood and felt in this way? An additional question, but one which strictly speaking takes us outside the purview of Schenker’s organicist theory of analysis, is: who is responsible for giving music these attributes, and which aesthetic-musical capacities and talents must such a person possess?

Irrespective of the actual historical order in which Schenker developed these two sides of his theory, the order of conceptual primacy is as follows. First we must understand and accept that, for example, "all musical content arises from the confrontation and adjustment of the indivisible fundamental line with the two-part bass arpeggiation," and that "a background and a middle-ground [are] indispensable prerequisites of a musical work of art."\(^{23}\) Only then can we derive, or even make sense of, the claim that "[w]hereas non-geniuses, whether in composing or listening, always fail when it comes to musical succession, the genius connects the freedom in foreground successions to the requirements of the passing tones in the background," or the claim that "the genius alone creates out of the background of


\(^{23}\) *FC*, 3-4
tonal space, out of the first *Urlinie* passing tones."\textsuperscript{24} Simply put, if one is going to spell out the traits of genius *in terms of* features one judges music to have when one judges it organically/teleologically, one must already take oneself to understand the nature of that judgment and those features. The Schenkerian genius, I therefore suggest, is a theoretical entity one has reason to postulate only posterior to the construction of a theory of musical organicism.

This is a revisionary reading of Schenker, in that I, unlike Schenker, see the genius standing at the periphery of his theory rather than at its core. But my argument is not that Schenker’s theory of genius is unimportant for interpreters of Schenker, nor is it an argument that the figure of the genius should have been less important to Schenker than it was. There can be no doubt that, in light of other commitments he held, Schenker had excellent reasons for being preoccupied with genius. Suppose, in concert with Schenker, that the tonal masterworks have, as compared with other kinds of music, and perhaps as compared with all other forms of art, both unsurpassed aesthetic merits and—as Schenker often tantalizingly but puzzlingly claims—a unique power to be ethically salubrious.\textsuperscript{25} And suppose, further, that the existence of geniuses is a necessary condition for the creation of a tonal masterwork. If one accepts these assumptions, one has compelling reasons to promote the cultivation of genius and to adopt and instill an attitude of reverence toward it, as Schenker clearly intends his writings to do. Moreover, if the place Schenker's theory of genius occupies in his broader theory of music is the one I say


\textsuperscript{25} See Epilogue 3.
it occupies—that of an entailment of his theory of judgment—it is important for interpretive and justificatory reasons to know whether the theory of judgment really does imply the theory of genius, and it is also important to know whether the theory of genius is correct. For if the theory of genius is false but is implied by the theory of judgment, then the theory of judgment is likewise false. My intention in calling Schenker’s theory of genius “parergonal,” then, is not to minimize its importance, but instead to explain why an account of its importance can only be given after one has given an account of the theory of judgment it stems from, which was the task I undertook in Chapter 2. That is why, in giving a Kantian amplification of Schenker’s theory of musical judgment, I did not find it necessary to engage extensively with aspects of Schenker’s theory of genius, or to incorporate the genius into my arguments about the teleological dimension of Schenker’s thought. Those tasks are downstream from the one Chapter 2 immersed itself in.

Hence we are led to contemplate the characteristics of genius by considerations that arise within, but point beyond, the musical standpoint, viz. considerations about the nature and possibility of musical coherence. This state of affairs highlights another striking point of overlap between Schenkerian and Kantian thought. Just as the musical genius is undiscussable within the framework of the musical standpoint, yet is intimated by reflections on musical unity that lead one outside the boundaries of that standpoint, Kant’s God is likewise uncognizable within the “human standpoint” of empirical experience, even though belief in His existence is suggested and supported by our experience of and reflections upon nature’s systematic, purposive unity (as Kant contends in his adaptation of the
argument from design near the end of the third *Critique*). The Kantian deity stands outside the realm of nature as an unknowable, though in some attenuated sense inferable, condition of the world’s existence and character. I believe we can accord a parallel status to the Schenkerian composer-genius. He (and for Schenker, true to form, the genius is invariably a he) is the enabling condition of the existence and character of a *Tonwelt*, even though he does not, and cannot, belong to such a world, and even though his actions are not, and cannot be, be appealed to in an organicist explanation of the make-up and organization of a musical work (i.e. a Schenkerian graph).

There is an entire book, perhaps several, to be written about the theological side of Schenker’s conception of genius. Schenker’s discussions of genius, especially in *Meisterwerk* and *Tonwille*, regularly invoke divine attributes and allude to the Bible. Let one example suffice for illustration:

“Let there be light’ resounds in the inner being of the genius, but these words have stirred therein only the first tonal organisms, so that when this organism becomes fruitful and multiplies according to its kind, this kind is nevertheless not the same as that of any other tonal organism.”

Less overtly, Schenker transfers to the composer-genius a host of predicates associated with a traditional conception of the Judeo-Christian creator God. For example, Schenker often “coquettes”—to use Marx’s word for his own playful,

---

26 *TW* vol. 3, 17 / *WT* vol. 2, 113. The quote brings together many of Schenker’s obsessions: God, genius, the Old Testament (“let there be light,” “according to their kind,” and “be fruitful and multiply” are readily identifiable phrases from The Book of Genesis), organicism, and uniqueness.
subversive redeployment of Hegel's dialectical logic—with the notion that composers are immortal: “Mozart’s resurrection is eternal! He came from another world and returned to it. He will live on eternally!”

Brahms, too, participates in this aspect of divine perfection: “Brahms was one of the greatest, a genius—he created from the background and therefore remains in the background for eternity.”

Another such transference, one that is of particular interest in connection with Schenker’s Kantianism, may be seen in Schenker’s conception of how the composer-genius comprehends the totality of a musical whole. In Free Composition, Schenker approvingly quotes Mozart’s (almost certainly apocryphal) testimony about his own power to intuit the entirety of a piece in a single mental coup d’oeil (or coup d’oreille):

“...and the work is really almost completed in my mind, even if it is very long, so that afterward I can see it in my mind's eye with a single glance, like a beautiful picture or a lovely person. And not all in succession, as it must come later, do I hear it in my imagination, but somehow all at once. That is a real feast! All the finding and doing happens in me just as in a powerful, beautiful dream. But this hearing it all, all at once, is still the best.”

Schenker’s fascination with the thought that composers are capable of a special kind of totalizing, instantaneous perception goes back at least as far as his 1894 essay “Musical Hearing” (Das Hören in der Musik):

27 WT, vol. 1, 71.
29 FC, 128-9. Schenker also cites similar remarks from C.P.E. Bach (“One must have a vision of the whole piece”), Beethoven (“Also in my instrumental music I always have the whole before my eyes”) and Brahms (“More from the whole!”).
“In the literature of music there are works that came about in such a way that within the endless chaos of fantasy, the lightning flash of a thought suddenly struck down, at once illuminating and creating the entire work in the most dazzling light. Such works were conceived and received in one stroke, and the whole fate of their creation, life, growth, and end already designated in their first seed.”

One year later, in “The Spirit of Musical Technique,” Schenker similarly notes that “it can happen that the imagination of the composer (and also the imagination of an extraordinary listener) surveys the entire content, despite its consecutive nature, from a bird’s eye view, so to speak.”

The comparison these remarks make salient is between, on the one hand, a normal or unschooled listener who comprehends the successive moments of a musical in piecemeal fashion, according to the order in which the consecutions are contingently (or seemingly contingently) presented, and, on the other hand, the musical genius who can wrap his mind and ear around everything at once and can “grasp the necessity.” I cannot help but think that this comparison has a Kantian pedigree. Kant contrasts what he calls a “discursive intellect,” which achieves cognition of objects by means of “sensible intuition,” to a “divine intellect,” which is capable of knowing objects through pure “intellectual intuition.” Sensible intuition involves the application of concepts to what is passively received in sensation. Knowledge of objects, for such an intellect, is a matter of discerning, within the

---

31 Schenker/Pastille/Cook ibid., 328.
manifold deliverances of sense, the finite collection of “marks” (Merkmale) whose presence is necessary and sufficient for the correct application of an empirical concept. A given act of cognition, on the part of a sensible intellect, is of necessity, then, 1) limited to what is given to the subject it through its receptive faculty of perception and 2) limited to some finite set of characteristics (a subset of the infinite number of characteristics latent in what a Kantian would call the “unsynthesized manifold”) that are singled out by the application of a determinate concept.

Having given this positive characterization of the sensible intellect, we can characterize an intuitive intellect negatively, by saying that it is not limited in those two respects. But what we have thereby negatively characterized is utterly foreign to us: discursive intellects are our familiar human intellects, sensible intuition our familiar human intuition, and the alternative to these has no more than bare imaginability for us, and not the least prospect of being carried out by us. As Beiser states, “Kant was compelled to deny intellectual intuition [to human subjects] because of two central doctrines of the first Kritik: that all knowledge, including self-knowledge, is discursive, requiring the application of concepts; and that all knowledge, including self-knowledge, is empirical, demanding a manifold given to sensation. The first doctrine forbids the immediacy, the second the intellectuality, of intellectual intuition.”

What we are left with after removing the conditions of sensibility and conceptuality from the human understanding is not clear (Kant emphasizes that the intuitive intellect must remain mysterious to us), but the idea, nevertheless—or

perhaps for that very reason—exerted a powerful attraction for the generation of idealists following Kant, as noted by Lovejoy:

“For the antithetic to “Understanding,” therefore, Fichte and Schelling adopted the term ‘intellectual intuition’ (intellektuelle Anschauung)...It too was an expression to which Kant had recently helped to give currency. In several passages he contrasts “sensible intuition,” familiar to us in our perceptual experience, with a possible “intellectual intuition” such as natural theology had ascribed to the deity, the Urwesen. The latter mode of perception is distinguished, not only by its assumed freedom from the forms of time and space and the categories of the Understanding, but above all by the assumption that its object is not given up to it from without; i.e., the object and subject are not mutually external. But the possibility for us mortals of such a direct quasi-perceptual knowledge Kant had (although inconsistently) denied. Fichte had, however, used the term to express the Ego’s immediate consciousness of its own activity...Neither the term nor the notion, then, was of Schelling’s invention; and there is a measure of justification for the elegantly expressed remark of Liebman that the intellektuelle Anschauung was simply “raked out of Kant’s soiled linen.” 33

With his description of the “lightning flash of thought” that visits a composer in a moment of inspiration, Schenker is, consciously or unconsciously, transposing into a new key Kant’s (and subsequent idealists’) notion of a form of knowledge that is not receptive but productive; 34 not time bound, successive, and fragmentary, but

34 Since the divine intellect does not passively receive the deliverances of sensation from outside, the sole alternative, Kant thinks, is that its intellectual intuition serves to bring about the object intuited, with “absolute spontaneity,” which amounts to creating an object by simply thinking about it. Kant expresses this idea, turgidly to be sure, by saying that for a divine intellect there is no distinction between what is actual and what is possible.
instantaneous and all-encompassing; not directed at a finite and partial set of marks, but inclusive of the infinitely replete particularity of the whole. This standard of perfection, while not fully attainable for the non-genius, can nevertheless be used as a “regulative ideal,” an asymptotic point we non-geniuses can use to orient the cultivation of our musicianship.\textsuperscript{35} Subjecting ourselves to the rigors of a Schenkerian musical education, primarily by gaining practice at subjecting pieces of music to the rigors of Schenker’s method of analysis, is a way, Schenker thinks, of approximating that ideal, a way of partaking in the “feast” of perception Mozart rhapsodizes about—even if the analyst’s repast can never be quite as lavish as Mozart’s. How might Schenkerian analysis do this? The answer can be gleaned from a series of analogies between Schenkerian analysis and intellectual intuition: Schenkerian analysis is not receptive and passive, but involves an element of re-composition and re-creation as one moves, in one’s musical imagination, between a piece’s various structural levels; Schenkerian analysis is not flat-footedly time-bound, in the thrall of a bewildering, moment-to-moment onrush of musical sounds, but tries to understand how a presently-sounding musical event hearkens back and points proleptically forward to (indeinitely many) other events in the past and future, events to which it is symbiotically joined; Schenkerian analysis does not examine an isolated portion of a piece detached from its surrounding and defining context, but strives to give the fullest possible accounting of that context; and

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. Korsyn’s suggestion that organicism is a regulative ideal, in “Schenker’s Organicism Reexamined,” \textit{Integral} 7 (1993), 118. Korsyn suggests there that the concept of organicism could be a regulative ideal that directs our investigation of musical works. I suggest here that the concept of the musical genius’s form of perception could be a regulative ideal that directs our musical Bildung.
Schenkerian analysis does not attend solely to the presence some finite set of marks in virtue of which a piece exemplifies some determinate concept (e.g. a generic category like sonata form or key of B-flat major), but seeks to conduct a synoptic surveillance of the unique set of reciprocal conditioning relations that make this piece different from all others—the features that give us reason to esteem its individuality.

EPILOGUE 3. Schenker's Theory of Music as Ethics: A Criticism and a Suggestion

Part of the intensity of purpose, the firebrand’s zeal, that Schenker's music-analytical writings exude is a product of his deep, albeit rather inchoate, conviction that the aesthetic and musical precepts he defends have great moral gravity. Among Schenker’s recent commentators, Nicholas Cook has given the most attention to Schenker’s moralizing cast of mind. Cook submits Schenker’s work as evidence in favor of Janik and Toulmin’s claim that in fin-de-siècle Vienna “a critique of any of the arts was implicitly a critique of culture and society as a whole.” Accordingly, Cook tries to see Schenker’s “critique of the virtuoso’s exclusive concern for the events of the musical surface” as “at the same time an attack on the superficial values which had, in Schenker’s view, become characteristic of society at large.”

The polemical knives Schenker uses to shred Hans Von Bülow’s editorial practices, Cook thinks, also have this double edge, the sharpness of which may be felt in this

jab from Schenker’s *Contribution to the Study of Ornamentation*: “But in such an outwardly hectic life, one that encompassed so many different activities, where would Bülow have found even an atom of time to think about a small space in Bach’s turns?”

These passages are fascinating, and they give us much to unpack, but I doubt that they can support the conclusion Cook rests on them—namely, that “Schenker’s theory of music was conceived...as at the same time a theory of ethics.” Schenker’s complaints about superficial virtuosos and dilettantish musical polymaths are, no question, partially complaints about a way of life, and so I’m happy to say that to that extent they have ethical force. But given that this is all that Cook proffers as justification for the ambitious claim that Schenker’s theory is “ethical rather than aesthetic” (emphasis mine), I’m inclined to think that Cook’s ambition outruns his powers of justification, and that “theory of ethics” is a big name for a little thing. Much the same goes for Cook’s identification of Schenker’s “essentially ethical approach to the compositional process.” That phrase rings many of the right bells. But what does it mean? And is it an approach that we should take seriously and consider adopting as our own? All Cook gives us by way of elucidation is this: “If, like Kraus, Schenker believed that the artist’s supreme duty was to return to the ‘origin,’ and if in music this meant creating out of the background, then music like Stravinsky’s [which has no background] was inadequate or irresponsible in an

---

40 Cook, ibid., 436
ethical sense.”41 What reason, though, is there for the word “ethical” to appear in the conclusion of Cook’s inference? If Cook thinks that Schenker’s theory is “essentially ethical” on the grounds that Schenker thinks there is a way composers should compose, Cook and I have differing opinions about how one should use the phrase “essentially ethical.” To be sure, Schenker expresses plenty of normative attitudes, attitudes about what is good and about how things ought to be. But only some expressions of a normative attitude deserve the label “ethical.”42 “Murder is wrong,” intuitively, does deserve it. The claims that composers should ensure that their music has certain formal properties and that Stravinsky is open to criticism for not giving those properties to his music, intuitively, do not deserve it—or, if they do, one would like to be told why they do. As far as I can tell, Cook illegitimately concludes that Schenker is an ethicist from the fact that Schenker is a norm-exasser.

For all that, though, Cook is right: Schenker is an ethicist. Schenker’s allusions to tonal music’s specifically moral preciousness are superabundant in his writings, particularly those of his “critical period” (Harmony through Free Composition).43 Take, for example, his injunction that we must resist the decline of the tonal system: “[W]here the composer unmistakably reveals his intention to ruin the diatonic system we have not only the right but, even more, the moral duty to resent the deceit against our art to and to expose the lack of artistic instinct which

41 Cook, ibid., 427
42 Still fewer, I suppose, deserve the label “essentially ethical,” but that is a subtlety I will disregard.
43 Given the copiousness of morally-charged statements in Schenker’s works, it is weird that Cook rests his arguments on passages that are not overly moralistic.
manifests itself here even more drastically."\textsuperscript{44} Statements like this one make it otiose to argue that Schenker’s musical theorizing has an ethical complexion. Take any one of Schenker’s late publications, open to any random page, read any random paragraph, and you are likely to gain an strong impression that, for Schenker, music is deeply implicated in questions of right and wrong, questions of good and evil, questions of how to live a flourishing human life, and questions of how best to constitute a political community. We don’t need to have it demonstrated to us that Schenker saw himself as spearheading an ethical mission. What we need is an explanation of how, if at all, it could be the least bit reasonable for Schenker to have that self-image.

Cook makes no attempt to unearth the underlying justifications for Schenker’s belief that his crusade on behalf of a parochial, aristocratic musical style (common-practice major-minor art music) was morally righteous. Yet it is jarring to encounter that belief, and it cries out for a rationale that Schenker never gives.\textsuperscript{45} Disappointingly, Cook is content to shrug his shoulders and note that Schenker’s inability or unwillingness to disintricate the musical from the moral now seems odd to us: “Schenker’s essentially ethical approach to the compositional process may no longer seem congenial or even plausible,” especially since “what was for Schenker a

\textsuperscript{44} H, 290.

\textsuperscript{45} Jarring for us, anyway. Part of the task of the history of ideas and of historical philosophy is to try to reconstruct the systems of belief relative to which views that sound crazy to us did not sound crazy to those who held them. Part of the reason Schenker felt no pressure to give arguments for his musical moralism, I should think, is that such arguments would have seemed obvious or shopworn to a contemporary audience in a way that they could not possibly seem obvious or shopworn in our radically different intellectual climate.
discovery of the essential nature of music becomes, for us, an observation of style.”46

Ultimately, all Cook really has to say on this score is that Schenker’s musical moralism is foreign to our sensibilities—too shrill for our ears—and is out of line with modern-day views about the scope of aesthetics, which we often treat as though it were detachable from the wider extent of value theory. Perhaps all we can do, Cook seems prepared to say, is gaze uncomprehendingly into the abyss that Stephen Peles calls “the unbridgeable cultural chasm between our world and Schenker’s.”47

Of course, to arrive at that pessimistic conclusion, all we needed to do was read Schenker, be confused by him, and throw up our hands. But what we want out of a commentator was not someone to remind us that we don’t understand Schenker adequately. We want someone to help us improve the adequacy of our understanding, someone who can help us bridge the cultural chasm or climb down into it with us.

Admittedly, Cook does play the Vergil to our Dante a little bit. He settles on the modest proposal that there is a watered-down way in which Schenker’s thinking is ethical that we can manage to understand (in spite of our cultural distance) and, having understood, perhaps also manage to accept. This has to do with Schenkerian theory’s prescriptive, rather than descriptive, purport. “A Schenkerian analysis,” Cook says, “is not primarily a description of how a piece is, in fact, heard; it is rather

46 Cook, ibid., 429
a prescription for imagining it in a certain manner, or hearing it imaginatively.”

Hence “the point of Schenkerian analysis” is not to state facts about how we hear music or about how music objectively is, but is instead “bring about a new, and more adequate, manner of listening to music.”

Cook is entirely correct to claim that Schenkerian analysis is prescriptive in this way. But accepting this claim, I would hasten to add, doesn’t bring us much closer to understanding the tone of ardent moral proselytizing that suffuses Schenker’s prose. What we need to fathom is what kinds of commitments could fuel the fervor with which Schenker rants against “an unbelievably foolish and mindless method of music education, which can only have arisen from the spirit of the masses and of business,” a pedagogical method in which “[i]mmorality prevails, a turpitude in musical life in general.” We want to know what Lebensanschauung could lead one to assert that “by giving the tones everything that they require as concerns nature and art the genius at the same time brings the moral law of justice to fulfillment.” In the face of these red-blooded proclamations, Cook’s insight that Schenker’s analyses

48 Given that this is the solution Cook arrives at, I find it curious that he endorses Leo Treitler’s directly contradictory view that “when Schenker speaks about how the listener hears things, he really means to be saying how they are. His analyses concern the musical object.” Leo Treitler, “History, Criticism, and Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony,” 19th-Century Music 3 (1980), 199, quoted in Cook, ibid., 435. Really meaning to be saying how listeners should hear (Cook’s view) is inconsistent with really meaning to be saying how musical objects really are (Treitler’s view).

49 It is incorrect to say that Schenker thinks of this manner of listening as wholly new. He thinks the great composers of the common-practice era engaged in it. See Epilogue 2.

50 Indeed, I have defended a similar view in print. In “Fraught with Ought: An Outline of an Expressivist Meta-Theory,” Music Theory Online 19 no. 3, I hold that all music-analytical statements have prescriptive force.
prescribe a way of imaginatively engaging with music, although an insight worth having, seems pretty anemic.

I should now stop criticizing Cook and start doing what I criticize Cook for not doing: finding reasons that could (by Schenker’s own lights) support Schenker’s musical moralism. I’ll offer only one. Arguments I have already given about the teleological nature of the judgments recorded and transmitted by Schenker’s graphs, together with some arguments Kant makes in the third Critique about how aesthetic judgments and teleological judgments can support us in our moral vocation, make it easier to see why someone might observe no sharp distinction between aesthetic criticism and moral criticism. I’ll begin with Kant and work my way back to Schenker, and will fly at a fairly high altitude throughout—I don’t want to get too deep into the weeds in what is intended to be a breezy epilogue.51

Both judgments of natural beauty and judgments of organic teleology, Kant argues in the dénouement of the third Critique, prompt us to reconsider the nature of nature itself in such a way that our moral fortitude becomes more steadfast. “[I]n its beautiful products,” according to Kant, nature “displays itself as art, [i.e., as acting] not merely by chance but, as it were, intentionally in terms of a lawful arrangement and as a purposiveness without a purpose; and since we do not find this purpose anywhere outside us, we naturally look for it in ourselves, namely, in what constitutes the ultimate purpose of our existence: our moral vocation.”52

Nature is lawfully designed, it seems to us when we experience its beauty, as if with

51 Also, caveat lector: I allow myself here and there to lapse into Kantese to save the space and trouble it would take to give a translation into contemporary analytic philosophese.
52 CJ, 168/§42/V:302.
a view to exciting the special pleasure characteristic of successful aesthetic judgment. This leads us to conceive of ourselves (mankind) as nature’s point and purpose, as the crowning achievement of its purposive functioning. But if we ourselves constitute nature’s end, nature must be hospitable to our defining end, must permit the consummation of the moral project that is ours, Kant believes, in virtue of our rational constitution: the realization of the highest good (*summum bonum*), the founding of the Kingdom of Ends in which virtuous action is invariably rewarded with proportionate happiness. Natural beauty, then, is an antidote to the moral alienation we might otherwise feel if we held nature to be an insuperable obstacle to the completion of our moral assignment.

Judgments concerning organic teleology likewise have the effect, Kant argues, of reinforcing our moral perseverance. Kant holds that just as we may judge a single organism teleologically, by judging its parts in terms of reciprocal means-ends relations and in terms of their subservience to the operations of the whole, so too does it lie within our judgmental power to view organisms themselves as reciprocally related constituents of a wider ecosystem. This leads us to look upon the entirety of nature as a purposively structured, on analogy with the purposiveness of the individual living thing. We are thereafter compelled to seek a final, global end toward which the sum total of organic nature is directed as a means—just as, a few links down on the Great Chain of Being, we sought to discover the localized functional role of an individual living thing. This final end, in order for it to be truly final, in order for it to be a buck-stopping end, must be something about which we cannot wonder what further purpose it might serve. This
constraint entails that the buck-stopping end cannot be something in or of nature—one of nature’s finite “moments”—for it was a presupposition of our systematic teleological conception of nature that every such finite part was a means to an end distinct from itself. We must thus assume that the final purpose of nature is something unconditioned, something which is not for the sake of anything separate from it. The most promising candidate for filling this role, Kant thinks, is the absolutely and unconditionally binding moral law, as obeyed and respected by rational autonomous agents who legislate their own actions according to it, and who thereby establish themselves as the constituency of a “realm of freedom.” Kant thinks that we are, on these grounds, rationally permitted to assume that nature is not only amenable to, but is in some sense an accomplice in, the successful prosecution of our moral endeavors. To proceed according to this assumption, Kant then reasons, is to conceive of nature as if it were the creation of the supersensible, beneficent God in whose existence morality directs us to believe. Adopting this conception of nature, therefore, has the benefit of inoculating us against moral despair. A debilitating sense of hopelessness might descend upon us were our rational faith in nature’s conduciveness to morality not a counterweight to the bleak and unignorable empirical evidence that human beings are “subject by nature...to all the evils of poverty, illnesses, and untimely death, just like all the other animals on earth, and will always remain thus until one wide grave engulfs them all together...and flings them...back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were drawn.”

\[53\] *CJ*, 341/§87/V:452.
efficacious moral action, is thus a corollary of both judgments of natural beauty and teleological judgment, and these together, by precipitating our reflection on nature’s seeming designedness, “drive[] us to seek a theology” and consequently are a “propadeutic” to theological inquiry.

In addition to prompting us to hold nature in a different regard, judgments of the beautiful, in particular, prompt us to hold ourselves in a different regard, in a way that similarly redounds to our moral efficacy. In particular, aesthetic experience, because it is a disinterested pleasure in beautiful form, “prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest.” This helps us to cultivate an affective attachment to the moral law (the categorical imperative), i.e. to love it (in addition to respecting it), which is impossible to do out of personal interest, owing to the categorical imperative’s universalizing form. But such love, by integrating the moral law into one’s economy of emotions and desires, nevertheless personalizes the law and makes it to some extent “one’s own” (notwithstanding its absolute and universal bindingness on all rational agents), thereby preventing us from feeling alienated from the demands of duty.

Further, shared experiences of the beautiful—as grounded in a sensuous but also intellectual form of pleasure that only we humans can enjoy (since we are both embodied and rational, unlike animals, which are solely embodied, and unlike a possible “purely rational being” gifted with the power of “intellectual intuition”)—

54 These considerations are connected with Kant’s well-known saying that beauty is a “symbol” for morality (§59). The basic idea is that judgments of the beautiful are structurally isomorphic to moral judgments (because disinterested, freely conformant to law, universal, etc.) in such a way that the former somehow support or promote the latter.
can be a source of social cohesiveness, and can perhaps also effect a positive transformation of the character of our group arrangements. Beautiful art “promotes the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communication,” and hones one’s “capacity for being able to communicate one’s inmost self universally,” thus promoting a shared “feeling of participation” that disposes us to be mindful of our common humanity and sends a potent reminder that we are duty-bound to have unfailing regard for the moral status of others.\textsuperscript{55}

I can now wrap things up right away, for my final suggestion is simple. Teleological judgments and aesthetic judgments are both understood by Kant as judgments of part-to-part and part-to-whole reciprocal conditioning relations (the difference between the teleological kind and the aesthetic kind is immaterial at the moment). And both are at least very helpful, and at most nigh on indispensable, as buoys to our rational faith in ourselves as competent and committed maximizers of moral goodness in the world. They can also, by various mechanisms that Kant outlines, encourage us to love the moral law, and they can deepen and strengthen our feelings of communicative openness toward members of the communities in which we have our public existence.

How do we get from there to the moral potency of tonal music? Organically coherent tonal music, Schenker dogmatically believes, has a unique capacity, as compared with other musics and as compared with other artistic media, to elicit such judgments from us. And this kind of music is furthermore special, he could also

\textsuperscript{55}This resonates with Schenker’s dream of a community “guided through the euphony of art...to shape all institutions of his earthly existence, such as state, marriage, love, and friendship.” \textit{CPT} vol. 2, 20.
reasonably believe, because of how it thereby hones our aptitude for making such judgments generally, even in non-musical contexts—by, among other things, giving us practice in freeing our judgments from exclusive adherence to the nexus *effectivus*, the series of efficient-causal relations). Synthesizing Kant’s and Schenker's views yields a picture of tonal music in which its multiple moral significances are readily visible. From the premise that perfecting our ability to assess tonal music’s reciprocal conditioning relations fosters our general propensity for successfully performing judgments of beauty and teleology (whether of art of all kinds, individual organisms, biosystems, or the entirety of nature), we can conclude that habituating ourselves to appreciating tonal music in accordance with Schenkerian norms of listening can confer several moral advantages on us. To wit, if Kant’s arguments work, and if Schenker’s beliefs about tonal music are true (two enormous ‘if’s, I confess), tonal music (or the proper experience of it) can undergird our faith in God, bolster the optimism with which we approach our moral struggles, and galvanize both the relations of sociability that bind together particular cultural formations and the relations of respect that bind together the entire human family. These prospects alone, I think, are sufficient to motivate Schenker’s (or anyone else’s) musical moralism—though they may seem like dim prospects, given how contestable Schenker’s beliefs about tonal music’s unique powers are, and given how resistible, even fantastical, Kant’s form of argument may seem to us.

---

56 To put it in Kant’s terms, organic musical judgments could be a “symbol” for actual teleological judgments of organic nature because of the close kinship of form between these judgemental types.
My aim in this final epilogue was to show that Schenker could have a reason, one broadly consistent with his general outlook, for being a musical moralist. Even if I pulled that off, two giant questions stand unaddressed. First, is there textual evidence that Schenker believed any such thing? My hunch: maybe, but probably soft evidence at best.\(^{57}\) Second, is it something we ourselves can find at all believable? My hunch: maybe, but certainly not on the basis of my thumbnail sketch of Kant’s controversial arguments.\(^{58}\) But must I leave a full reckoning of those questions for some other time, or for someone else’s dissertation.

\(^{57}\) Not that such evidence makes or breaks the arguments I gave in this epilogue: it is worthwhile to give an historically appropriate philosophical justification for a view Schenker expressed without thinking that his writings contain such a justification, and without thinking that Schenker was capable of or interested in giving such a justification.

\(^{58}\) Not that such believability makes or breaks the arguments I gave in this epilogue: I was trying to articulate a justification Schenker could accept. It is icing on the cake if we too find it, and the view justified, acceptable.
Bibliography


11.


Korsyn, Kevin. “Schenker’s Organicism Reexamined.” *Intégral* 7 (1993): 82-


Schenker, Heinrich. *Der Tonwille*. Vienna: Albert J. Gutmann, 1921 [Vol. 1],
1922 [Vol. 2], 1922 [Vol. 3], 1923 [Vol. 4], 1923 [Vol. 5], 1923 [Vol. 6], 1924 [Vol. 7],
1924 [Vol. 8-9], 1924 [vol. 10].

Schenker, Heinrich. *Der Tonwille*, edited by William Drabkin, translated by
Ian Bent et. al.. Oxford University Press, 2004 [Vol. 1], 2005 [Vol. 2].


Snarrenberg, Robert. *Schenker’s Interpretive Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge


Stoltzfus, Philip. *Theology as Performance: Music, Aesthetics, and God in

Strawson, P.F. *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. London:
Methuen, 1959. 66.

Tarasti, Eero. “Metaphors of Nature and Organicism in the Epistemology of


