THE INFLUENCE OF PERCEIVED AUTHENTICITY AND HONOR ON INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE

by

Laura L. Rees

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Business Administration)
in The University of Michigan
2014

Doctoral Committee:

      Professor Jeffrey G. Sanchez-Burks, Co-Chair
      Professor Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Co-Chair
      Professor Richard P. Bagozzi
      Professor Phoebe C. Ellsworth

DEDICATION

To my dad, who was one of the most earnest people I've ever known.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

young(er) student in her mechanisms seminar, and her perceptive query of "what exactly are you trying to elaborate?" has stayed with me since, compelling me to ask myself this question often, and to strive continually for clarity and thoughtfulness in my writing. I am so thankful for her support, encouragement, insightfulness, genuine enthusiasm for ideas, and constructive, developmental feedback whenever I propose some new bizarre research question or study. I am the luckiest person in the world to have Kathie as a mentor. She exemplifies all that I hope to become as a scholar. Thank you, Kathie.

Rick Bagozzi has graciously devoted so much of his time to my development, both professional and personal. From answering questions at all hours during SEM class to sitting with me at length to discuss the contributions, limitations, and next steps for my research, Rick has given above and beyond to my growth as a scholar. Few are able to ask as probing questions as Rick, nor have such thoughtful responses to offer as possible solutions. Rick's amazing ability to mentor both the person as well as the scholar is something I admire greatly. I am fortunate to be able to count Rick as a mentor and an academic role model. I have learned so much from him.

Phoebe Ellsworth has been such a valuable contribution to my development and growth as an emotions scholar. She has always encouraged me to ask questions critically and creatively, and in seminar continuously urged me to keep thinking independently about emotions research. Her intrinsic interest in different perspectives, innate intelligence, quick wit, and zeal for learning motivates and inspires me. I respect and admire Phoebe's scholarship immensely, and sincerely appreciate her willingness to provide expertise and feedback on my research.

There are many others who have contributed enormously to my professional and personal development, and who continue to help me along this journey. Shirli Kopelman has willingly given countless hours of her time to help me become a better teacher and, more importantly, to

think about life as opportunities rather than a set path I have to follow. Karl Weick stretched my thinking and my intelligence in ways that I never thought possible, and which have made me a better scholar for it. Gretchen Spreitzer has always brightened the world around her, showing me how to truly appreciate life and feel an amazing sense of gratitude for all its possibilities. Jerry Davis was the first faculty member I ever spoke with at Michigan, and convinced me from that first conversation—and our discussion of Excel and Death Stars—that this was a truly remarkable and captivating place to be. Lance Sandelands was a wonderful mentor during my first time teaching, and taught me the invaluable lesson that slowing down to think can be one of the most important tasks we do. Jane Dutton has generously offered some of the most attentive and constructive feedback on my work as my research program has developed, and I am forever grateful to her. Dave Mayer has always welcomed me into his office to talk, about life, research, or whatever was on my mind, and has shared his smile and his advice equally kindly. Leigh Plunkett Tost has helped me navigate many of the intricacies of the dissertation and my final year, and I am glad to have had her help and encouragement along the way. I am also extraordinarily grateful to my non-Michigan academic family, including Anat Rafaeli, Hillary Anger Elfenbein, and my new Vanderbilt colleagues Tim Vogus and Bruce Barry. I am so lucky to know you and to have benefited so much already from your wisdom, support, and enduring belief in me and my work. Thank you for being my constant inspiration.

I am forever grateful for the help of research assistants Niki Gopalan and Will St. Lezin. I would also like to thank Lillian Chen and Michael Payne for all their help and encouragement in the lab and beyond. I could not have completed this research without these exceptional individuals.

Of course, I am eternally grateful for the dear friends I have found at Michigan. You are my family. Samir Nurmohamed is the best cohortmate I could have asked for, and I am honored to call him a close friend and colleague. Thanks for keeping it real, and for being there every step of the way. To Beatriz Pereira, Otavio Bartalotti, Heeyon Kim, Adithya Pattabhiramaiah, Mike Palazzolo, Charu Gururaj, and Gabriele Paolacci—what can I say other than I love you all and am a better person for knowing you. Your friendship means the world to me, and I look forward to the adventures ahead—geographical distance is nothing when I have friends like you. I thank as well the M&O students of past and present, especially Marlys Christianson and Chak Fu Lam, who are both dear friends and respected colleagues. Also to Santhosh Suresh, Jeff Bednar, Brent Rosso, Kathryn Dekas, Matt Karlesky, Chris Myers, Ruthy Beer, Bo Kyung Kim, Tamara Ansons, Jenny Olson, Linda Hagen, Stephanie Carpenter, Suntae Kim, Maddy Ong, Yong Hyun Kim, Marta Battiston, and Johan Chu—thank you for your friendship and all the moments, large and small, that you have shared with me. I am proud to be your lifelong colleague and friend.

To Rebecca Jones and Jenn Amico, what words would adequately express how grateful I am to know you? You have been there for me through everything. I love you both more than I can say. I am thankful as well for my family, who have been an enormous influence on where and who I am today. To the teachers who have meant so much to me, who believed in me, and who encouraged me to expand my world—especially Ms. Bouvier and Mr. Rue—thank you.

And last but certainly not least, thank you to Jason Stornelli, my Canadian, who has been there and supported me ever since those late-night walks home from studying in the law library during first year. We create some of the best stories together (which you kindly suffer through as I retell them with dramatic flair). I could not have done this without you. Thank you for keeping me sane (mostly). Most importantly, thank you for believing in me, love.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

ABSTRACT

While facial expressions have been commonly studied from the expresser's perspective, less work has examined how expressions are interpreted, and how interpretation influences interpersonal interactions. I draw from multiple areas of research—social judgments from facial expressions, expression authenticity, cultural influences on interpersonal judgments, and the influence of social judgments on interpersonal outcomes—to address four questions. First, how does authenticity influence the interpretation of expressions in business relationships? Second, what are the consequences of interpretation for evaluating or deciding how to structure business agreements with others, even in initial interactions? Third, how might cultural influences— especially those that might prompt individuals to attend more v. less carefully to subtle cues of authenticity, like honor—shed light on interpretation differences? Fourth, what organizational conditions might help facilitate authenticity, and is authenticity beneficial?

In Chapter 2 I develop my foundational theoretical argument for linking authenticity and honor and the relevance of both for organizational life. In Chapter 3 I test how individuals' sensitivity to honor concerns influences their judgments of and reactions to (in)authentic others. Across three experiments and an interview-based study, I find that those from honor cultures, shown previously to be more sensitive to interpersonal cues, and those from honor-conducive work environments more positively(negatively) evaluate and react to (in)authentic others than those less influenced by honor. In Chapter 4 I examine authenticity in organizational life more broadly, and test the relationship between group size and group-level authenticity. Across three survey-based studies I find that group size is negatively related to group-level authenticity, at both organizational and team levels, such that smaller(larger) groups are characterized by more(less) authenticity. Further, authenticity is positively associated with the beneficial group-level characteristic of psychological safety. Overall, this work demonstrates that, first, the

influence of authenticity on individuals' judgments is strengthened when honor concerns are made salient, either through cultural or organizational factors. Second, authenticity can be facilitated by certain organizational conditions, and has positive effects on employees. Together, this research demonstrates the importance of authenticity and honor for interpersonal interactions in organizational contexts, and suggests many promising avenues for continued research.

Chapter 1:

Introduction

"The ability to judge nonverbal behavior may be fundamental to human intelligence."
– Ambady & Weisbuch, 2010a

The goal of this dissertation research is twofold: first, I examine how and when the authenticity of facial expressions influences the interpretation of that expression in business relationships, and the consequences of this interpretation for outcomes like the structure of business agreements. Second, I also examine specific conditions that may help facilitate the emergence of authenticity in workplace interactions and what this means for the outcome of interactions that occur in a broader group and organizational environment characterized by authenticity. Overall, facial expressions provide a rich source of social information in interacting with others, offering information that observers use to infer the feelings, goals, motives, and intentions of the expresser (e.g., Van Kleef, 2010). Yet most research since Darwin's (1872) seminal work on the universality of emotional expressions has focused on the act of expression itself rather than on how perceivers interpret and react to others' expressions, particularly as the perceived authenticity of expressions varies. In this research, I examine how and when the *interpretation* of others' (in)authentic expressions influences interpersonal interactions and their consequences in business relationships. I also examine what conditions may facilitate an overall environment in which authentic expressions are encouraged, and the implications of such an environment for interpersonal interactions and workplace outcomes.

Interpreting others' facial expressions and judging them based on this interpretation is ubiquitous in daily life. The professor who enters a classroom with a bright, authentic smile on the first day of a course may be perceived as more likeable than a professor who offers only an inauthentic smile, and students may subsequently infer from his smiling behavior how well he will teach the upcoming course. A political candidate who frowns during an important speech may be perceived as more serious about the policy discussion at hand than an alternative candidate whose expression seems lackluster, and she may in turn gain more of voters' confidence than her opponent (cf., Todorov et al., 2005). Moreover, we make such judgments quickly and unconsciously, often within 100 milliseconds of seeing a face (Willis & Todorov, 2006). Given the immediate and significant consequences of these judgments for how we interact and conduct business with others (e.g., Krumhuber et al., 2007), how can we understand the influence of our interpretation of someone else's facial expression on our judgment and reactions toward the person, particularly if the expression is inauthentic, or faked (v. authentic, or genuine)? More broadly, what contextual conditions would facilitate the development of a norm of authenticity when interacting with others at work, and how might such a norm be useful for individuals and teams?

In this work, I connect four areas of management research—social judgment of others from facial expressions, authenticity in expression, cultural influences on interpersonal judgment, and the influence of social judgment on interpersonal and work-related outcomes—to address four main questions. First, how does expression authenticity influence the interpretation of that expression in business relationships? Second, what are the consequences of this interpretation for evaluating others or deciding how to structure business agreements with them, even in initial, brief interactions like meeting a potential business partner for the first time?

Third, how might cultural influences—particularly those that might prompt individuals to attend more v. less carefully to subtle cues of authenticity—shed light on individuals' interpretation differences? Fourth, what organizational conditions might help facilitate authenticity in the workplace, and is authenticity beneficial for interacting individuals in these environments? In sum, my dissertation examines the implications of authenticity for individuals and interactions that are situated in particular cultural and organizational contexts.

First, if authenticity does matter to interpersonal judgment, what factors explain variation in people's interpretations and judgments of authenticity? Prior research suggests two considerations must be jointly taken into account. On one hand, the immediate implications for observers should be equivalent: for example, it is important for every observer to gauge accurately whether the new coworker will tell the boss a lie or gossip about him/her, or whether the unfamiliar mechanic will overcharge him/her, so attuning to cues that could potentially prove helpful in interacting with others should be adaptive and thus employed by individuals. This suggests that people should have a basic sensitivity to potentially informative cues like the other person's authenticity. However, on the other hand, empirical findings also demonstrate that individuals of lower-status are more likely than higher-status individuals to be acutely attuned to potential cues that may impact their self-worth, standing in society, or psychological self (Henry, 2009). Indeed, research shows that even minute, indirect cues from others can influence self-worth and meaning (Wrzesniewski et al., 2003). These individuals typically react strongly to cues of intention and care greatly about how society values them. For these individuals, then, authenticity may be particularly valuable.

One cultural group that seems to fit this description is referred to as a culture of honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Honor-motivated individuals can be found

across the globe, independently of national borders; countries having honor sub-populations include the US (namely, the US South), Europe (the UK, Spain, Portugal), most of Central and South America, and much of the Middle East and North Africa. Numerous US Presidents have come from honor cultures, such as Abraham Lincoln, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton. Yet honor is rarely studied as other than an explanation for increased rates of violence among such populations (Nisbett, 1993). In contrast to the focus in prior honor research on the prevalence of violence and aggression, I argue that the implications of honor for interpersonal interactions extend beyond violence. I contend that the underlying logic of honor as balancing the tension between one's internal sense of self-worth and the external sense of self-worth as recognized by others suggest that honor could influence how individuals judge others on a variety of interpersonal dimensions such as trust and warmth, and even competence. In particular, such judgments should be influenced by honor concerns in situations of uncertain outcomes, limited resources, and limited formal organizational oversight—the historical conditions that have traditionally given rise to cultures of honor and that make honor-motivated individuals particularly sensitive to being taken advantage of (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Thus, overall, and drawing from several streams of research, I argue that individuals will judge others differently depending on others' displays of authentic versus inauthentic smiles, and that this process will be moderated by the perceiver's relative sensitivity to honor concerns. I further argue that group size will influence the emergence of authenticity within the group, such that because of relational and behavioral norm factors, smaller groups should exhibit more authenticity within the group than larger groups. In turn, this increased authenticity should lead to beneficial outcomes for both individuals and groups.

I use multiple methods to answer the research questions I have posed (i.e., the influence of authenticity on interpersonal relationships and the workplace, and the potential moderating role of culture) and incorporate the concept of full-cycle research, which calls for rigorous examination of the phenomenon in question in both the field and the lab (Chatman & Flynn, 2005). Across studies, I use experimental, interview, and survey techniques to test my theoretical arguments. The combination of methods allows me to (1) manipulate both authenticity and the salience of honor concerns in a particular context to isolate if and to what extent perceived authenticity influences individuals' reactions to others (via experiments), (2) keep my theorizing grounded in contexts and actual individuals' experiences in situations wherein discretionary judgments and decisions about others are both important and consequential (via interviews), and (3) examine how characteristics of work environments like group size influence authenticity in interactions and implications of this authenticity for organizational life (via broad-sample surveys). Together, this breadth and depth of studies allows me to develop and empirically test multiple aspects of the theoretical development argued in this dissertation, and to replicate and triangulate my findings in complementary ways.

The next sections include both theoretical and empirical chapters. In Chapter 2 I focus on theoretical development of how perceived authenticity influences interpersonal interactions in organizational life, and how cultural factors like honor that interact with perceived authenticity in the workplace may significantly inform how individuals judge and engage with each other. In Chapter 3 I incorporate both lab- and field-based studies to empirically test whether an individual's sensitivity to honor concerns influences how (s)he judges an unknown other when this other person is smiling (in)authentically. The combination of lab and field studies enables me to examine my hypotheses in multiple ways, ensuring both more rigorous testing of the

hypotheses as well as maintaining the chapter's firm theoretical and practical footing in individuals' real experiences in organizational settings involving discretionary interpersonal decision-making. The initial laboratory-based studies allow me to measure the influence of honor on interpersonal judgments in a controlled setting, while the field and lab context of small business loans I also employ in this chapter supports a more grounded theory approach, using qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques (cf., Miles & Huberman, 1994) to explore the role of quick interpersonal judgments in approving loan applications. The grounded theory approach emphasizes data collection and analysis as a hand-in-hand process with theoretical development and understanding of the question at hand; as a research method it allows the investigator to approach a problem from the lens of a general question and develop and test specific theoretical conclusions as they emerge from the data themselves (Martin & Turner, 1986). This approach thus allows me to develop more nuanced understanding of how, if at all, facial expression consciously or unconsciously influences decisions in small business loans above and beyond typical considerations like credit scores and business plans. The insights yielded from this stage then inform the experimental design for the final study in this chapter.

After having established the importance and relevance of perceived authenticity to interpersonal interactions in Chapters 2 and 3, I then shift the focus in Chapter 4 to explore contextual factors that may facilitate the creation of a broader climate of authenticity among individuals at work. I employ survey methodology in this chapter to examine the influence of smaller work worlds—fewer members in an organization and team—on the emergence of authenticity in that work environment, and the positive ramifications of authenticity for other important group outcomes like psychological safety. Finally, in Chapter 5 I outline the expected contributions of this collective body of work as well as discuss limitations of the current studies.

I close by discussing several broad implications of the chapters presented in this dissertation. First, by combining the heretofore unrelated topics of authenticity and honor, we are able to understand more about when and how authenticity is received at work and the importance of cultural factors in influencing authenticity's role in interpersonal interactions. Second, the research presented here highlights the benefit of recognizing and attuning to both the expectations and norms for authenticity in a given environment as well as how authenticity may influence interpersonal relationships when dealing with global or intercultural groups. Third, this research also underscores that authenticity may be critical to judgments of trust in an initial encounter, when misunderstandings may be likely and when parties are still evaluating each other. However, authenticity may not be universally valued as a cue in judging others but may instead be particularly important for those motivated by honor concerns—those balancing the tension between one's internal and external sense of worth and the need to protect oneself from being taken advantage of. To conclude Chapter 5 I also suggest several areas for future study that I plan to pursue in this program of research going forward.

Chapters 2-4 were created as related yet stand-alone papers. As such, I have thus structured the work in discrete chapter format to facilitate the journal submission process as much as possible from the beginning, with the recognition that this format required that critical theorizing and construct discussion be similar across relevant chapters. However, in order to maintain the clarity of these chapters as complementary components of a larger, cohesive single dissertation I have minimized direct repetition of arguments and theorizing across chapters whenever possible, particularly in Chapters 2-4.

Chapter 2:

Authenticity and Honor in Organizational Life

Abstract

In this chapter I connect the seemingly disparate literatures on authenticity in facial expression and honor as a culturally relevant factor in interpersonal decision-making to argue that those motivated by honor concerns will judge and react more strongly to perceived authenticity than will those less motivated by honor. I first review the role of perceived cues in making interpersonal judgments about unknown others, and the role of the face and facial expressions in social judgments, particularly as moderated by culture-specific norms in facial expression and interpretation. I further discuss authenticity in facial expression in particular, and the importance of context for understanding how authenticity is received by others. I then integrate prior research on honor as a cultural influence on interpersonal relationships to argue that honor, while often associated with violent and aggressive acts in order to protect one's honor, is fundamentally concerned with the tension between one's internal and external sense of worth. In turn, this ambivalent (both internal and external) sourcing of self-worth leads honor-motivated individuals to be sensitive to being taken advantage of, and thus particularly attuned to cues regarding the intentions of others. Thus, given prior work on both authenticity and honor, and this conceptualization of honor as a balancing act between the internal and the external, I propose that individuals motivated by honor will more positively evaluate authentic facial expressions and more negatively evaluate inauthentic expressions than those less motivated by

honor. Further, I argue that individuals immersed in honor-conducive organizational

environments that mimic the conditions that have historically led to the emergence of honor

cultures will react similarly to cues of authenticity. Together, this suggests several promising

future research avenues for the fruitful study of authenticity and cultural factors like honor in

organizational life.

2.1 Introduction

Expressions of emotion in public view rarely go unnoticed. Often, they can become newsworthy events in themselves. Two memorable examples in recent years illustrate the power of public displays of emotion to take on a life of their own: the unimpressed look of 2012 internet meme fame of US Olympic gymnast McKayla Maroney at receiving a silver medal became one of the year's most popularly shared and imitated sports photographs, while the dramatically animated expressions of New York City sign language interpreter Lydia Callis while translating for NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg during a Hurricane Sandy press conference have generated multiple television spoofs. When President Barack Obama shed tears during a press conference about the Sandy Hook, CT, school shooting in 2012, many saw it as counter-evidence to the claim that Obama appears overly aloof.[1] When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton teared up at a 2008 campaign stop while discussing having passion for her country, some claimed it was evidence of her weakness, and was a significant detriment to her Presidential campaign.[2] Others quickly came to her defense, citing it as evidence of Clinton's humanity and ability to relate with others.[3] The face, an individual and relatively uncontrollable characteristic ostensibly unrelated to ability, competence, or many other characteristics assumed independent of one's physical appearance, seems irrefutably compelling in how we make judgments of other people. Consequently, it is reasonable to propose that the face is perceived as an important window—and may even be the first available window if the person is unknown or unfamiliar—into another person's character.

---

[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/9746910/US-school-shooting-President-Obama-cries-as-he-expresses-condolences-to-victims.html

[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/opinion/08dowd.html?pagewanted=all

[3] http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/01/06/hillary-tears-up.html

People's judgments of and reactions to this window into another's character have the potential to influence a myriad of daily life activities. The stranded motorist on an unfamiliar road must decide quickly whether to entrust his car to the mechanic who greets him as he pulls his disabled car into the lot. The new professor in town must decide which real estate agent to trust to get her a good deal on a home purchase. The small business loan officer, reviewing a borderline loan application, must decide whether the applicant can be trusted to repay the loan. The entrepreneur, forging many new partnerships with suppliers, customers, and other potential partners, must make many judgments forecasting the trustworthiness and value in each relationship to be created. In short, the judgments perceivers make are important in such environments, because these judgments of the other party's intentions, trustworthiness, and character are critical to the perceiver's subsequent interactions with the expresser—interactions that may shape the entire course of the individuals' relationship with each other.

Why exactly would these judgments be critical to perceivers? In the next sections I describe the ubiquitous nature of quick judgments of unknown others—in particular, arguing that it occurs whenever we interact with someone in a business transaction, no matter how brief the transaction. I discuss both the need for trust in interactions and how social judgments like trustworthiness and warmth can be significantly based on something as potentially fleeting as someone's facial expression. I highlight the relevance of authenticity to interpersonal judgments by discussing the formation of these judgments in terms of how a perceiver interprets someone's intentions from the perceived authenticity of that person's expression. I argue that cultural considerations such as honor influence the interpretation that perceivers ascribe to someone's expression and that this interpretation varies depending on the authenticity of the person's expression. In turn, perceivers' differing interpretations of someone's expressions can bear

important implications for how the perceiver reacts to that person, thereby consequentially changing how the process of interacting unfolds between them.

2.2 Facial Expressions and Culture in Interpersonal Judgments

Lack of Cues and Need for Trust

Superficial business relationships such as taking one's car in for repairs may seem of little serious concern. Why, after all, would anyone need to care about a one-off interaction with a random car mechanic, flight attendant, or waiter at an out-of-town restaurant they are unlikely ever to see again? However, even secure, long-standing business relationships began with a single interaction, and that first meeting can shape the entire course of the relationship. For some, chance meetings can even be the bulk of doing business. The taxi driver, for example, must decide quickly how trustworthy each potential new fare is, and must make such assessments many times every day (Gambetta & Hamill, 2005). Economist Robert Frank argues that facial expressions can be main determinants of individuals' gut reactions toward someone, and that these instinctual reactions drive our responses toward others even after considering more objective pros and cons (Frank, 1988). For example, even if a person is believed guilty of some transgression, smiling individuals are likely to be shown more leniency than non-smiling individuals because the smile is viewed as a signal of trustworthiness (LaFrance & Hecht, 1995). Thus, from entrusting one's car to an unknown service mechanic to forming first impressions of someone new at work, trusting relative strangers is ubiquitous in daily life. In sum, all relationships, no matter how superficial or deep and long-lasting, begin with a first impression of the other person—an impression that both shapes how we interact with the person in the moment and sets the stage for how, and even if, we interact with them in the future.

Interacting with others can be especially problematic when the other person is relatively unknown and the partnership requires trust. Indeed, trust is argued to be critical for economic exchange to happen (Arrow, 1974). A powerful example involves individual micro-lenders on the popular lending site Prosper.com who lend money to individuals seeking loans. Lenders can choose which individuals they lend to, and in what amount. Like any lender, however, Prosper.com lenders are not certain to get their money back, making lenders vulnerable to lendees. Indeed, there is inevitable uncertainty in an unsecured peer-to-peer loan of this type. The only information lenders have about applicants is that which is publicly available on the lendee's Prosper.com webpage. Much of this information is written directly by the applicant, and unlike income, credit score, and other financial factors, is not validated by Prosper. Although this information is thus unverifiable and potentially untrustworthy, lenders have been found to rely significantly on lendee's narrative accounts when making loan decisions, using the narratives applicants provide of their own trustworthiness to anticipate future loan performance (Herzenstein et al., 2011). Moreover, differences in inferred trustworthiness depending on the narrative provided occur even when objective information such as credit history and requested amount remains the same across hypothetical applicants (Sonenshein et al., 2011). Such findings illustrate how varying qualitative information can significantly influence one's reaction to quantitative information, allowing individuals to create different holistic interpretations of identical quantitative data depending on the qualitative cues. These qualitative cues provide contextual information that allows a perceiver to craft a coherent "story" about the target that the individual perceives (cf., Adaval & Wyer, 1998).

Indeed, objective and verifiable cues about the other person may be in short supply in situations in which there is no time or opportunity to gather additional information: a wildland

13

firefighter, for example, must work with a transient team of unknown firefighters in a crisis, trusting them, quite literally, with his life. The wildland firefighter's team, unlike typical firefighting units, is assembled in the moment, only after the fire starts burning, and thus involves a high-stress crisis situation in which actors do not know each other but must make effective, fast decisions. Even in situations where cues are available, such as with a loan applicant whose credit scores are readily at hand, some sense must be made of these cues. For example, how untrustworthy is the loan applicant with a questionable credit score reflecting a single youthful indiscretion that the applicant has ever since tried to redress? Situations like this in which there are few cues available, or when the available cues lend themselves to ambiguous interpretation, may prompt the use of shortcuts or heuristics to gauge the person's intentions and trustworthiness.

Moreover, it is important to note that even in such direct money-exchange situations as Prosper.com, it is not the *verifiability* of the cues about the person in question that make a difference to the decision made. Instead, it is *perceiving* the cues that influences an individual's decision-making regarding an unknown other, regardless of the accuracy of the cues or the perception of them. This distinction highlights the relatively greater importance of a perceiver's subjective interpretation of the behavior of the person being judged over any sort objective understanding of the behavior. That is, for deciding about an unknown other, the truth—as it pertains to the interpersonal decision being made—may be effectively in the eye of the beholder.

2.3 What Is Perceived: Use, and Accuracy, of Shortcuts and Heuristics to Judge Others

What exactly, however, is the eye of the beholder perceiving? Importantly, the use of heuristics in decision making has been well-documented to lead to bias (Tversky & Kahneman,

1974). Using interpersonal cues to judge an unknown other could similarly lead to biased decision-making about the unknown other if the perceived cues are imperfectly correlated with that person's character (cf., Gifford, 1994). In one study, for example, interviewers' judgments of job applicants based on applicants' nonverbal behaviors during an interview were unreliably related to the applicants' actual characteristics, being simultaneously accurate about some qualities and inaccurate about others (Gifford, et al., 1985). On the other hand, people have also been found to use nonverbal cues to infer characteristics of unknown others with some degree of accuracy, even when the judgment is in a different domain than the cue observed (see Ambady & Weisbuch, 2010a, for a review of several related studies). Indeed, since the days of Aristotle's *Physiognomonica*, we have wondered whether nonverbal behaviors are truly codes for personality dispositions or merely false positive indicators. However, the lack of consensus on the accuracy of cues in judging unknown others' personalities has certainly not diminished either academic or lay interest in how to better leverage cues in judging the basic goodness and badness of others.

For deception in particular, the pull of lie detection seems irresistible: books like the recent *Liespotting: Proven Techniques to Detect Deception* (Meyer, 2011) and even television shows like the short-lived *Lie to Me* have popularized the notion that with some training we can all become human lie detectors. Scholars have long debated whether individuals are capable of detecting lying, with some studies finding that some people are naturally better than others (Carter & Weber, 2010), perhaps particularly in implicit rather than explicit, conscious recognition (ten Brinke et al., 2014). On the other hand, at least one meta-analysis provides evidence that, in general, humans are not very skilled at discerning deception above chance as long as the liar himself is credible (Bond & DePaulo, 2006).

A recent study has directly examined the question of how good we are at detecting deception in social interactions given certain nonverbal cues, finding that non-verbals like touching one's face or hands, crossing one's arms, and leaning away from the other person are essential to how trustworthy we judge an unknown other to be and how we react to the person based on this assessment. Further, these cues do positively correlate with how accurate we are in such assessments, improving accuracy in judging trustworthiness by 37% (DeSteno et al., 2012). In fact, their study illustrates that use of non-verbals to infer the intentions of others is so ingrained in us that, surprisingly, we even use these cues to judge the trustworthiness of humanoid robots. Thus it seems that the use of shortcuts like non-verbal actions to inform our judgments of others is both hard to avoid and evolutionarily useful; the more accurate we are in assessments of unknown others, the greater our chance of survival. Overall, while the question of accuracy is not likely to be definitively answered soon, continued investigation of how particular nonverbal cues may be perceived, agnostic of accuracy, is at the very least critical for understanding how the interpretation of cues and subsequent social judgment of unknown others occurs.

Perceiving Facial Expressions as Cues

The role of the face in particular as a source for nonverbal cues about an unknown other person has been of interest to both scientific and lay audiences since ancient physiognomy work suggesting that facial features were directly indicative of personality characteristics. Politicians are advised on how to express emotion appropriately (Bucy & Newhagen, 1999), and well they might be so advised—inferences of competence based on facial appearance of unknown politicians have been shown to predict future outcomes of congressional elections above chance (Todorov et al., 2005). Moreover, such judgments of others occur with amazing speed, within

microseconds of seeing the person's face (Todorov et al., 2005). Indeed, a large body of work on "thin-slicing," or the judgment of others from small, static or only seconds-long glimpses of them, has highlighted the importance to interpersonal relationships of immediate, even subconscious reactions to others based on nonverbal cues like facial expressions (see Ambady & Weisbuch, 2010b, for a review).

Expressiveness as a critical interpersonal signal of benign or malignant intentions may be particularly useful among strangers when one's judgment has significant personal or even financial consequences. For example, in a financial trust game in which a person's payoff depends on whether the counterparty cooperates or not, brief video clips of the potential partner showing either an authentic or a faked smile influenced the first person's decisions to cooperate or not with the counterparty, and also whether to play with him in the first place (Krumhuber et al., 2007). Players' inferences of the counterparty's trustworthiness mediated this effect, with people inferring higher trustworthiness from those showing authentic expressions. Similarly in another study, individuals showing symmetric smiles were anticipated to be more cooperative in the dictator game and were offered more resources by the observing partner (Brown & Moore, 2002). Indeed, genuine smiles are associated with more altruistic versus less altruistic individuals (Brown et al., 2003). In general, people use such facial cues in context to judge others and develop a reasonably cogent mental picture of what is happening in the scene, particularly when little else is known about what is going on (e.g., Cline, 1956; Jones, et al., 2006). Overall, facial expressions serve as an important heuristic in people's formation of interpersonal judgments.

Social Judgments and Facial Expressions

Many studies have examined individuals' judgments of emotional expressions in isolation (for accuracy in identifying the target emotion) or in customer service contexts (e.g.,

Grandey et al., 2005; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). In fact, emotional displays are often considered an integral part of the work role itself (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988). However, most have focused solely on generalized US-based contexts and few have considered cultural differences in the expression, perception, and behavioral and judgmental consequences of expressing emotions on the face. I argue that understanding how (in)authentic expressions are perceived bears significant implications for cross-cultural work interactions defined broadly— even those occurring between citizens of the same country but who may come from different cultural backgrounds—and which little research has examined to-date.

Exploring what social judgment based on facial expressions means requires accepting the underlying assumption that facial expressions are fundamentally an act of communication between individuals. Such an assumption lends credence to the notion that social judgment based on expressions is a useful tool to the observer tasked with deciding what to think about the other person. Emotional expressions provide a rich source of social information in interacting with others, offering information about the expresser that helps observers infer the expresser's feelings, goals, motives, and intentions (Van Kleef, 2010). Taken to the extreme, Fridlund's Behavioral Ecology View of emotional expression posits that expressions, rather than indicators of felt or faked emotions, are better understood as messages that benefit the survival of the vigilant perceiver (Fridlund, 1997). In this argument, understanding facial displays has basic evolutionary merit because of the assumed value of the expressions as a signal of the expresser's intentions to act. Thus the more accurately one could interpret these messages, the more likely one was to survive.

Though the question of evolutionary survival per se may be less pressing in modern times, at their very core, expressions like smiling remain a fundamentally social act; individuals

18

smile more when they are in the presence of others (Kraut & Johnston, 1979) and even when they are alone but believe others are nearby (Fridlund, 1991). However, although growing in theoretical popularity, the notion of expressions as a form of social communication informing an individual's interpretation of another person remains nascent in empirical work. Most research since Darwin's work on the universality of facial expressions (1872) has focused on expression itself rather than on the interpretation of expressions (i.e., what perceptions and behaviors perceivers engage in due to expressions).

Yet the act of communicating with another via facial expressions is deeply rooted in cultural norms. Although the universality of basic emotions like happiness and sadness is well-accepted, cultural norms dictate both how and when such emotions are expressed and how they are interpreted.

Cultural Embeddedness of Social Judgment Based on Emotional Expression

Following foundational work establishing the universality of a handful of what are called basic emotions, such as happiness and sadness (cf., Ekman, 1999), researchers in recent decades have begun developing a more nuanced understanding of what universality of emotional expression means. Such work shows that emotional expressions are, in essence, culturally dependent in numerous ways, including what emotions are displayed, how these emotions are expressed, and what meaning is attributed to expressions. Like dialects of language, facial emotion expressions differ across cultures not only in terms of how they are judged by observers (Jack et al., 2011; Masuda et al., 2008), but also in how a particular emotion is expressed physically (Elfenbein et al., 2007).

Social normative display rules indicating *what* emotions are in general considered more ideal can differ substantially across cultures. These display rules are taught to children from a

young age, further propagating the norms. People learn at an early age what emotions are appropriate to experience (Eid & Diener, 2001), and thus, express. For example, childrens' storybooks in Asia incorporate more calmness as a desirable positive affective state, whereas storybooks in the US involve more exuberant displays of happiness as desirable (Tsai et al., 2007). As Tsai and her colleagues show, Asian and American children shown photographs of children in both calm and excited states also indicate the culturally appropriate image as the preferred one—with Asian children preferring the picture of the calm child and American children preferring the more excited child. However, such differences are not simply due to individualistic versus collectivistic ideas of harmony and should not be painted with such a broad brush; for example, in collectivistic Latin American countries such as Mexico, the cultural script of *simpatía* encourages expressions of positive emotions, unlike collectivistic East Asian countries but much like the individualistic US (e.g., Ruby et al., 2012).

Additionally, *how* emotional expressions are displayed—that is, the actual physical facial movements involved in expressing a particular emotion—differs across cultures. For example, Tsai and Chentsova-Dutton (2003) show that even among seemingly homogeneous European-Americans living in the US for several generations, those with Scandinavian ancestry, where emotional control is more normative, were less facially expressive than those with Irish ancestry, where expression is more normative. Elfenbein and colleagues' work has supported the notion of expression accents (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Elfenbein et al., 2007; Marsh et al, 2003). These accents mirror verbal accents, in that they are particular to a specific culture, independent of language, just as British English is distinguishable from American English. For example, a contemptuous expression for a French Guyanan can be reliably distinguished from a contemptuous expression for a French-speaking person from Montreal, although both have the

same native language and are expressing the same emotion of contempt (Elfenbein et al., 2007). Further, expression accents can be detected with many emotional expressions; even within the six basic emotions—happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, and surprise—such accents are distinguishable. Typical British smiles can be distinguished from typical American smiles by noting the additional AU 15 (lip corner depresser) muscle movement absent in American smiles, leading the British to show more bottom teeth on average than Americans, while Australian smiles are also distinguishable from American smiles (cf., Marsh et al., 2007). Further, these cultural differences lead to key biases; like recognizing a familiar verbal accent, individuals are better able to recognize emotions when expressed by someone of a familiar culture (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003), and are also better able to guess the nationality of expressive vs. neutral individuals (e.g., those putting their accent on display are easier to identify; Marsh et al., 2003).

Finally, the *meaning* that is attached to particular emotional displays also depends on culture above and beyond differences in what emotion is expressed or how it is expressed. Given the weak correlation between felt emotions and particular facial expressions (see Fernández-Dols & Crivelli, 2013, and Reisenzein et al., 2013, for reviews), expression interpretation differences can be significant even for emotions that fit within display norms and are commonly expressed and thus quite familiar. Smiling, the ubiquitous signal of happiness, can indicate excitement and interest in a job interview (in the US) as well as foolishness (in Russia; Molinsky, 2005). The customer service mantra of "service with a smile" that is well-established in the US as part of an impression management-oriented culture is considered less favorably as a show-like production, or Mickey Mouse culture, in France (Hallowell et al., 2002). Such variations in interpretation exist for negative emotions as well. For example, the prototypical nose scrunch indicating a

disgust face can be interpreted as an expression of either disgust or anger, depending on the context in which the face is seen (Pochedly, et al., 2012).

Together, a growing body of research provides evidence that *what* emotions are displayed and *how* they are displayed is influenced by culture. Further, the *meaning* of what is displayed—the social judgment that a perceiver of emotional displays conveys on the expresser—can also differ by culture, even within identical, professional settings such as a job interview. However, although research has begun to explore the overall general impact of expressions on social interaction and perceivers' judgments, this work has not yet examined how cultural and situational context factors in particular may influence individuals' reactions to perceived authenticity in others' expressions. To address this issue, in the next sections I first discuss prior findings on authenticity in interpersonal interactions and argue that interpretation of and reaction to authenticity may depend on cultural boundary conditions not yet fully examined by theoretical or empirical research. Specifically, I connect authenticity in interpersonal interactions to the cultural factor of honor and argue that the integration of these two seemingly disparate literatures suggests that individuals' reactions to authenticity may be significantly influenced by sensitivity to honor concerns in organizational contexts.

2.4 Authenticity

What Authenticity Is…and Is Not: A Note on Authenticity Vs. Genuineness

A variety of disciplines have distinguished what authenticity is and is not. Defining authenticity is not a straightforward task, as numerous scholars have argued for a clear distinction of the difference between authentic and genuine. Such scholars argue that "being genuine is not the same as being authentic. Authenticity can be fabricated…authenticity suggests

the attributes of the original *thing* are reconstructed, but does not necessarily refer to the genuine construct" (Kopelman, 2014, p. 6). While such a strong divide between the two terms may seem at first glance overly officious, even basic dictionary definitions introduce a fundamental challenge, suggesting that authenticity can mean both what is real and what is deliberately constructed to appear real. Merriam-Webster defines the word authentic as "real or genuine, not copied or false," "true and accurate," and "made to be or look just like an original" (Merriam-Webster online, 2014). We may incorporate this use of the term when we excitedly tell our friends about enjoying "authentic Indian food" at the new restaurant in downtown Boston; with the proper ingredients and ambiance the food may be authentic, but it is not genuine. Indeed, the notion of fabricating authenticity, while seemingly an oxymoron, appears both in common language and in behavior. Advising someone to "act naturally" in a job interview is encouraging the person to create a believably authentic demeanor, despite the individual's likely stress and jitters.

A memorable example of the potential complexity in authenticity is that of country Western music. Authentic country music as it is commonly known by fans has been purposefully crafted to look and sound a certain way to satisfy shifting tastes and circumstances. Sociologist Richard Peterson in a fascinating and in-depth examination of how country music is an example of fabricated authenticity (1997) demonstrates that what began as "old-timer" fiddling music evolved from this via a very conscious process of joint creation by performers, promoters, and fans of both music and film into what is now known as authentic country music (and named thus only in the 1950s, p. 194). Over time, the image of authenticity for country music shifted from that of the old-timer to the hillbilly to the modern cowboy-focused personas sporting the ubiquitous cowboy hats and boots. Country music, Peterson argues, was across decades of

transformation viewed as a "rustic alternative to urban modernity" that needed the "right *look* for the country music artist—a look that, to be seen as authentic, had to fit the image implied in the music, in the lyrics, and most important, in the expectations of audiences," (Peterson, 1997, p. 55). In defense of this deliberate crafting of the image of country, one magazine article declared that 20th-century country music "is as authentic as any written hundreds of years ago. [The songs] capture the taste and depth of such music, and an honest and authentic hillbilly song, invented today, is still an authentic folk song," (Peterson, 1997, p. 194). Indeed, country music is not alone in this continual creation of and quest for authenticity, as sociologist David Grazian has outlined in his work on the construction and meaning of authenticity in urban blues clubs in Chicago (Grazian, 2005).

How is the distinction between authenticity and genuineness relevant for studying the impact of expression authenticity on interpersonal interactions? I highlight the focus on authenticity in this work mainly because of the explicit focus in this chapter on the perceiver of expressions; for the perceiver, like the connoisseur of country music, what matters for interpreting and reacting appropriately to an expression is whether the expression is authentic— does it have all the attributes of what would be displayed if the emotion behind the expression were real? Since perceivers can never know if an expression is truly genuine, focusing on an individual's reactions to perceived authenticity is both practical and theoretically justified given the importance of perception to subjective experience and subsequent subjective evaluation (e.g., MacCannell, 1973). Expression authenticity as it is studied empirically relies on the presence of particular muscle contractions in the face; while it is widely accepted that certain muscles move only involuntarily (i.e., when an emotion is genuinely being expressed), other recent work has argued that even these ostensibly involuntary movements can be learned and produced somewhat

at will (Thibault et al., 2012). Continued investigation and replication of such controversial findings is necessary before definitive conclusions can be drawn, but highlighting the authenticity of facial expressions allows us to remain agnostic as to the cause of the expressions—e.g., if the expresser is deep vs. surface acting in order to influence others (Côté & Hideg, 2011; Gross, 1998). Given this, in this chapter I focus specifically on authenticity in expressions and in the next sections discuss why perceiver's judgments of and reactions to (in)authentic expressions from others arguably should depend significantly on the context in which the expression is perceived as well as characteristics of the perceiver (i.e., their sensitivity to honor concerns).

Authentic Expressions and Authenticity as Interpersonal Cues

While recent empirical findings have demonstrated the potentially detrimental effects on interpersonal relations of displaying inauthentic expressions for a variety of emotions, such as anger (Côté et al., 2013), smiles are a particularly compelling expression for examining the effects of (in)authenticity on perceivers. Smiles may be common in organizational contexts, á là the "service with a smile" mantra (cf., Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988), yet they are actually quite complicated to interpret. Both context and the authenticity of the smile must be considered when understanding how smiles are perceived and how perceivers react to them.

The Importance of Context, Independent from Authenticity, in Perceiving Expressions

Context matters a great deal in interpreting even pleasant, common expressions like smiles. The professional smile displayed in a business context in the United States is not a ubiquitous signal of happiness or even politeness. In other contexts smiles may take on entirely different meanings: in the wild, for example, primates smile to indicate submissiveness and to forestall aggression (Preuschoft, 1992). A recent paper illustrates this notion vividly. In a set of

studies examining the relationship between pre-match posed photographs of professional fighters and actual match performance, Kraus and Chen (2013) found that fighters who smiled more intensely in their pre-match photographs facing them off against an opponent performed worse in the actual match. Supporting the notion that smiling can show subordinate status, outside raters judged the smiling fighter as less dominant, hostile, and aggressive than the non-smiling fighter. Ostensibly, the non-smiling fighter in turn then might have felt increased confidence in his own dominance by seeing his opponent's seemingly submissive smile. Thus, whether a smile—even a posed one—is seen as professional or submissive seems to depend significantly on the context. Even in work contexts where smiles may be in general considered indicative of positivity toward the target of the smile, differences in smiling behavior may appear. Beyond fundamental differences across individuals in how widely some people versus others typically move their mouths in smiling, another major distinction between smiles is whether the smile is an authentic expression of emotion or forced in order to fufill one's own or institutional goals.

Smile for the Camera! Authentic and Inauthentic Smiles

Comparison of an inauthentic to an authentic smile has been famously explained as "the first obeys the will but the second is only put into play by the sweet emotions of the soul" (Duchenne, 1862/1990, p. 126). The authentic smile is called a Duchenne smile in honor of the pioneering French scientist who first used electrodes attached to the face in order to stimulate particular muscle movements. As both Darwin and Duchenne argued, the genuine smile is one in which the smile reaches the eyes and is considered a marker of felt enjoyment (sometimes called the "enjoyment smile"). Specifically, the *orbicularis oculi*, the circular muscle surrounding the eye cavity, contracts, leading to the appearance of crows' feet at the outside corners of the eyes, bulging under the lower eyelid, and lowering of the outside of the eyebrows. Together, this

collection of movements comprises Action Unit 6, or AU6, in the Facial Action Coding Scheme

(FACS) system of objectively coding facial movements (Ekman & Friesen, 1976).[4] The

movement of the lip corners up in a typical smile is AU12 in the FACS scheme, and is an easy

movement to make voluntarily—it is this movement of the *zygomatic major* which causes the

mouth to stretch outwards and upwards when smiling. AU6, on the other hand, is considered

very difficult to move voluntarily, and as such, determines the basic difference between a

genuine and a forced smile. Both types of smiles involve the mouth in AU12, but only the

authentic (Duchenne) smile simultaneously involves AU6 activation. Given the difficulty of

voluntarily moving AU6, the Duchenne smile is considered an authentic representation of how

the person really feels (Duchenne, 1862/1990). The non-Duchenne, AU12-only smile, on the

other hand, can easily be posed at will and thus is less indicative of someone's true feelings. The

non-Duchenne smile is easily deployed, for example, when the situation requires it—for

example, when a customer service agent is required to smile at all customers regardless of the

agent's actual mood.

A significant body of work has examined the antecedents and consequences of such

emotional labor. Emotional labor work can be defined as the purposeful regulation of emotional

expressions, typically via purposefully inducing or inhibiting expressions in order to express

what is considered appropriate for the situation (Hochschild, 1979). While the negative effects of

emotional labor, such as burnout and stress (Grandey, 2003), have been well documented, both

situational and personal factors can mitigate these consequences for the individual. For example,

having higher levels of perceived personal control over expressions (Grandey et al., 2005) and

being extraverted (Judge et al., 2009) both reduce the cost of emotional labor to the expresser.

---

[4] The FACS is a facial taxonomy classifying facial muscle movements and delineating the muscle movement
combinations commonly associated with various emotional expressions.

However, although service with a smile may be required by an organization or role standards and likely comes at some cost to the expresser, research shows that authenticity is often considered only as a secondary, extra-role dimension of judgment (Grandey et al., 2005). Such work may seem to suggest that authenticity in interpersonal interactions at the workplace is of minor importance. However, no work to my knowledge has yet examined when authenticity might be a significant cue in judging others within divergent cultural scripts. Overlooking how authenticity might be interpreted differently by people following different cultural scripts hinders our understanding of the potential importance of this facial cue for interpersonal judgments.

How Might Authenticity Be Interpreted?

Evidence exists to indicate that individuals are skilled at consciously and unconsciously judging the authenticity of emotional expressions (Frank et al., 1993; McLellan et al., 2010), and *ceteris paribus*, prefer authentic expressions in their interactions with others. In fact, people are physically attracted to authentic smiles, being more likely to move toward a person showing an authentic smile and away from a person showing an inauthentic smile or neutral expression (Miles, 2009). At a subconscious level, individuals also tend to evaluate the broader situation more positively when an authentic vs. inauthentic smile is present. For example, even when observers do not report seeing differences in a target's facial expression, observers more favorably judge t-shirts worn by an authentically smiling individual than those worn by the same individual when smiling inauthentically or looking neutral (Peace et al., 2006). Indeed, liars have been shown to display more fake smiles than those telling the truth (Biland et al., 2008), perhaps suggesting that, while not a perfect metric, someone showing a fake smile may be perceived less favorably, as someone potentially trying to deceive.

On the other hand, inauthentic expressions exist for a variety of reasons and inauthentic smiles can also have positive consequences, particularly for the expresser. Forced, inauthentic smiles are often employed as part of the formal work role (Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988) and can lead to positive evaluations by both customers and supervisors. Inauthentic smiles can also be used to mask true feelings or even disguise lying (Ekman et al., 1988), thus protecting the expresser. Indeed, inauthentic smiles are a powerful and evolutionarily adaptive tool to manipulate others; even infants recognize the social impact on others from smiling, engaging by eight months of age in anticipatory smiles—smiles that involve turning one's head toward another person, ostensibly in expectation of a positive response from the perceiver (Jones & Hong, 2005).

Overall, although inauthentic smiles may be successfully employed by expressers for a variety of reasons like job demands or manipulation of others, given the difficulty in faking authentic expressions both because of emotional labor costs and the physical challenges of moving the AU6 muscle voluntarily, for perceivers, authenticity could plausibly serve as a reliable gauge of another's intentions. In this way, variation in our sensitivity to the intentions of others could moderate our general preference for authenticity in expressions in interpersonal interactions. That is, individuals who are particularly attuned to cues about another person could in turn be more sensitive to perceived authenticity in the other person that those who are less attuned to such cues. Further, sensitivity to the intentions of others may vary depending on various cultural or contextual factors. In the next sections, I argue that honor is one such cultural factor, and that individuals motivated by honor concerns are likely to express more sensitivity to subtle interpersonal cues of another's intentions than are individuals less motivated by such concerns. I discuss prior research on honor and focus on the conceptual foundation of honor as balancing the tension between internal and external sources of self-worth as the mechanism

explaining why individuals motivated by honor concerns may plausibly react to authenticity more positively, and inauthenticity more negatively, than those less motivated by honor.

2.5 Honor

The term honor is used in many ways in scholarly work as well as daily life. For example, a person is considered honorable if (s)he does the right thing in a difficult situation. Honor in this way is considered a virtue or moral character, and is the subject of examinations of honor in the military, such as how willing troops are to risk their lives for the sake of duty and commitment in combat situations (Mandel & Litt, 2013). This understanding of honor relies on the person's actions—did this person do what is considered right in this situation? If so, the person is considered honorable. In turn, honor is also conferred on someone by the judgments of others. When we show respect to someone we admire we are attributing honor to them; we often decide to honor individuals by showing them respect or even publicly offering them awards. The Biblical commandment to honor one's parents draws upon this conceptualization of honor as an attitude and behavioral response toward someone. A third use of the term honor also exists, and incorporates aspects of both of the previous definitions. This conceptualization of honor highlights the social and constructed nature of honor that is dependent on both the self and others. This use of honor signals a person's reputation—how are this person's actions judged by others? Honor in this sense is both earned (e.g., by doing the right thing in a difficult situation) and conferred (others decide to attribute honor to someone, leading to an individual's reputation as an honorable person) and is the foundation I use to examine the concept of honor as critical cultural dimension influencing how individuals' interactions and sense of worth are inextricably linked.

Historical Basis of Honor

While the term culture has a multitude of working definitions (more than one hundred, by some counts; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952), one definition uses the term cultural syndromes. A cultural syndrome describes a "pattern of shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, self-definitions, norms, role definitions, and values that is organized around a theme" (Triandis, 1996). A culture of honor is characterized by individuals who focus on the theme of honor, or "the value of a person in his own eyes [a focus on the internal], but also in the eyes of his society [a focus on the external]" (Pitt-Rivers, 1966, p. 21). Traditionally, honor arises in a culture when several conditions are present: when resources are limited and at risk of being stolen, when formal law and order is lacking, and when individuals are faced with uncertain economic outcomes and may be compelled to defend themselves and their families against potential dangers like thieves (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). This type of honor is at least millennia old, and is rooted in the more nomadic living styles of the past. In Biblical times, the defilement of Dinah, a daughter of Jacob, by a prince of the city prompted two of her brothers to slay not just the perpetrator, but all the men in the city, laying waste to the entire community in order to defend what they perceived as a clear affront to the family's honor.[5] Although relative newcomers to the area and much smaller in number than the surrounding tribes, the brothers were willing to risk the security of the family's living amongst other tribes in the area in order to uphold the family honor. This single-minded and violent defense of honor is necessary when people have no centralized form of government that can help maintain order, and individuals are faced with defending their own precarious resources from potential marauders. Such conditions also explain the confluence of honor as virtue (doing the right thing) and honor as virility (being strong and tough) common in honor cultures but considered separate constructs in other cultures (Cohen &

---

[5] As told in Genesis 34 of the Bible.

Leung, 2012). Such was the condition of life in Biblical times and for many of the rural, herding peoples of Scotch-Irish descent that later populated the US South and have become the focus of much of Western honor culture literature. In such societies one's worth to oneself and to society was at risk whenever there was a risk of being taken advantage of, or even being seen as someone who could be taken advantage of—as in the case of Dinah, when allowing the affront to go unpunished would have made the Israelites seem weak and vulnerable.

What Honor Culture Is…and Is Not

Honor is the tension and balance between a focus on the internal and the external for validation of one's sense of worth and standing in society. As the noted historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown (1982; p. 14) so eloquently explained:

> Honor has three basic components, none of which may exist wholly independent of the other. Honor is first the inner conviction of self-worth. Seemingly, that sense of personal completeness would comply with modern notions of individuality: all men are created equal…The second aspect of honor is the claim of that self-assessment before the public…The third element is the assessment of the claim by the public, a judgment based upon the behavior of the claimant…Honor resides in the individual as his understanding of who he is and where he belongs in the ordered ranks of society…It is, at least in traditional terms, both internal to the claimant, so that it motivates him toward behavior socially approved, and external to him, because only by the response of observers can he ordinarily understand himself. The internal and external aspects of honor are inalienably connected because honor serves as ethical mediator between the individual and the community by which he is assessed and in which he also must locate himself in relation to others.

The concept of honor has captured the attention of historians and social psychologists because it offers a way of understanding the cultural motivations of proud (Pitt-Rivers, 1966) and often violent backcountry and warrior-like peoples (Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). The concept of honor has been used to explain leniency toward, and even support for, violence committed for the sake of honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). The resurgence of academic interest in the effects of honor beginning in the 1990s, influenced greatly by researchers at the University

of Michigan (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994, 1997; Cohen et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 1999; Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), has, perhaps unsurprisingly, since focused largely on the aggressive and violent tendencies of honor-motivated people. In recent years a growing number of cross-country comparisons of honor have also emerged, although many of these studies have remained centered on the relationship between honor and aggression (Baldry et al., 2013; Cihangir, 2013; Severance et al., 2013; van Osch et al., 2013). Importantly, however, honor is not violence, and the link between honor and violence well-established by prior work has also been challenged in recent work (cf., Chu and colleagues' empirical reanalysis and argument against the honor-violence proposition; Chu et al., 2000). While the cognitive and physiological priming of aggression is indubitably related to honor affronts (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996), even among children (Brown et al., 2009), it is only one possible outcome of being motivated by honor concerns in interpersonal relationships. To that end, and supporting the notion that no culture is honor*less*, other work has examined how the value of honor manifests differently across societies, from the Mediterranean to Northern Europe (Helkama et al., 2013; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a; Schneider, 1971) as well as South America, the Middle East, East Asia, and New Zealand (Guerra, 2013), without focusing explicitly on aggression.

Further, given the risk in over-reacting to an affront that might otherwise be ignored, honor-motivated individuals have also been shown to be *less* reactive to initial, small offenses than those less motivated by honor (Cohen et al., 1999). Prior work has also shown that honor-motivated individuals do not unilaterally react aggressively to others in situations of conflict, and can actually deal with conflict better than those not motivated by honor (Harinck et al., 2013). Rather, the aggressiveness associated with honor is found particularly in situations of personal honor affronts, when an individual has been directly or indirectly challenged (e.g., Cohen et al.,

1996; Cross et al., 2013). Further, in situations not involving honor affronts, honor-motivated individuals have been found to act surprisingly prosocially, going to great lengths to show reciprocity in repaying even a small favor (Leung & Cohen, 2011).

Honor-based cultures can perhaps be best understood by contrasting them with two other cultural logics, those of dignity (e.g., Canada) and face (e.g., East Asia). That is, while dignity cultures believe that self-worth is intrinsic and inherent to the individual, honor cultures believe that self-worth comes both from the individual's inherent value as well as the value of the individual conferred on him by his peers, and thus, can be both lost and gained—or even appropriated by someone else. Face cultures, on the other hand, believe that self-worth is mainly conferred from other individuals, and is something that must be protected in order not to be lost (for excellent descriptions and comparisons of honor, face, and dignity cultures, see Leung & Cohen, 2011). For the individualistic dignity-motivated person, the focus is on the self and the self's sense of worth, that is, "the conviction that each individual at birth possessed an intrinsic value at least theoretically equal to that of every other person" (Ayers, 1984; p. 19). In contrast, for the collectivistic face-motivated person, the harmonious and hierarchical relationship with others is an important part of one's sense of self and worth, and the preservation of face for the self and others is incumbent on both the group as well as the individual (Sanchez-Burks & Mor Barak, 2005; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). In turn, the honor-motivated individual could in some sense be reflective of the overlap in a conceptual Venn diagram relating components of both dignity and face cultures. That is, the honor-motivated individual balances the tension between the individualistically-focused internal sense of worth (believing in one's honor) and the more collectivistically-focused external sense of worth (claiming honor that must be validated by others). Without this balance between the external and internal components to self-worth and

well-being, individuals are not concerned with honor as it is understood in honor culture contexts—instead, they may be more concerned with either dignity (internal) or face (external).

If honor may be conceived as an ambivalent juxtaposition of one's internal and external sense of worth, what does the concept of honor contribute to our understanding of interpersonal and cultural relationships beyond other well-established concepts addressing aspects of internal and external worth? For example, on one hand, honor as an individual motivator for behavior seems closely related to the internally-focused concept of self-esteem. Self-esteem is defined by an individual's general feelings about him- or herself in terms of how satisfied with oneself, proud of oneself, feelings of worth on an equal plane with others, respect for and positive attitude toward oneself that an individual has (Rosenberg, 1965). Self-esteem could be expected to be highly correlated with a cultural focus on dignity, which, as discussed previously, is one's conviction that a person's intrinsic value is equal to that of others (Ayers, 1984) In a culture of dignity, self-worth is sourced from within, and is an internal valuation (Leung & Cohen, 2011). While honor culture individuals do value the internal sense of self-worth, this sense is incomplete without the balancing component of the external validation of one's worth (Pitt-Rivers, 1966; Wyatt-Brown, 1982). In this sense, self-esteem may mirror the internal component to honor motivations, but ignores the external component and is thus related to, yet distinct from, honor.

From the opposite, externally-focused perspective, one might also plausibly argue that, given the reliance of honor on the external validation of others, honor is merely having a good reputation. A reputation may be defined as a "set of beliefs, perceptions, and evaluations a community forms about one of its members" (Anderson & Shirako, 2008; p. 320). Indeed, Wyatt-Brown (1982) explicitly discusses honor in terms of reputation: if one is known as

honorable one has a good reputation, and it is protecting this reputation that motivates individuals influenced by honor concerns. It is worth noting that for an honor-driven individual, honor may be the aspect of reputation that is most predominant and central to identity, thus also in practicality equating the two in terms of the individual's daily life. However, we must tread carefully: honor as reputation is useful in understanding how to situate honor in relation to important interpersonal research constructs. Yet while honor is an important component of reputation, the terms are not synonymous. One may assert or claim a certain positive reputation (e.g., "I am an honest person"), or act consistently with certain positive reputational norms (e.g., exhibiting honest behavior), but one may also claim other less positive types of reputation (e.g., as a Casanova). Put simply, a reputation in itself has no valence without a preceding qualifier. Thus a more accurate understanding of honor, rather than honor as reputation, would be to understand that there are some individuals who value an honor reputation. Honor is reputation for these individuals in the same way that face is reputation for face cultures.

Together, these distinctions between honor and self-esteem and honor and reputation are critical for understanding the underlying tension and continual balancing act between the internal and the external for the honor-driven person. In effect, the honor individual is ambivalent in terms of the source and validation of honor. On the one hand honor is internal, like self-esteem and dignity. Yet on the other hand, honor relies on the external component to survive—like reputation and face, without the social environment an individual's honor remains unvalidated. It is this combination of the simultaneous reliance on the self and others that distinguishes honor from more independent, self-oriented cultures and more interdependent, other-oriented cultures. I propose that this complex and ambivalent nature of honor may prompt individuals to be more attuned to their environment to help address the inherent dissonance and tension involved in

honor.[6] Carefully attuning to one's environment is also likely to help safeguard against being

taken advantage of and thus losing honor—a major and continual concern for honor-driven

individuals. Thus, specifically, I propose that honor, or a sensitivity to the interplay between both

the self and others for one's value, will lead to more positive reactions to the interpersonal cue of

perceived authenticity and more negative reactions to perceived inauthenticity.

2.6 Relevance of Honor in Organizational Life Via Individual and Organizational Culture

Honor-culture individuals. Traditionally, an individual is categorized as belonging to a

culture of honor if they grew up in such a culture (cf., Cohen et al., 1996, as a commonly used

metric to classify individuals as honor-culture or not). Studies using such classifications have

nearly always relied on geographic boundaries to determine honor culture—that is, in effect, if

an individual or institution is located in an honor region, the person or firm is considered an

honor culture entity (but see IJzerman et al., 2007, for a notable recent exception). As expected,

empirical work using various scales to validate such geographic assumptions have largely

verified that those with a background in honor cultures are more motivated by honor concerns

than those without this background (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002b).

However, notwithstanding military-based and other studies examining honor as defined

by one of the first two types of honor based on behavior (moral character and doing what is

right) or others' actions (showing respect to someone), studies directly investigating how being

from an honor culture influences work life are still rare. A few initial research findings do

suggest that honor may have at least a cursory impact on organizational functioning. For

example, a notable study on the influence of honor in interpersonal judgments has shown that job

---

[6] Research on emotional ambivalence has shown that simultaneously experiencing multiple conflicting emotional states can prompt individuals to pay more attention to information and cues around them, thinking more broadly and considering more alternative perspectives before acting (Rees et al., 2013).

applicant reviewers in honor cultures respond more favorably to applicants who confess to having committed a felony for an honor-based reason (i.e., accidentally killing someone who had an affair with the person's fiancée) rather than for a non-honor-based reason (i.e., stealing a car to get money; Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). Similarly, a second study in the same paper demonstrated that newspaper stories—wherein the reporter was entirely unrelated to the crime and not in a position of any sort of formal judgment of the violent offender—were also more sympathetic toward honor-related violent offenders vs. non-honor-related violent offenders, presenting the offender's actions as more justified. Similar results have been found for honor-related vs. non-honor-related violence as judged by police officers in other honor cultures (e.g., Afghanistan, Baldry et al., 2013). Although the examples of murder and violence in these studies may be considered extreme or particularly sensational by some, such examples indicate that individuals in honor cultures are, at least in these cases, influenced by honor concerns in their judgments of others in workplace contexts.

It remains an empirical question whether honor-motivated individuals faced with non-violent situations at work would still be influenced by honor in their interactions with others. Limited recent empirical research suggests such an effect is possible: Cross and colleagues have demonstrated, for example, that although both non-honor-motivated and honor-motivated individuals (as determined by nationality) endorse directly confronting someone when the person acts offensively in a work environment, such as purposefully making someone look bad in a work team, honor-motivated individuals more strongly endorse verbal confrontation (Cross et al., 2013).

Further, the underlying logic of honor as a balance in the tension between the internal and external sources of worth suggests a converse to violence may also be true: that in the same way

that honor can lead one to act with revenge (negative reciprocity) and more readily forgive those who respond in kind in the case of violence following honor affronts, honor could plausibly also lead one to act with increased integrity and positive reciprocity (e.g., increased commitment to someone else) when no honor threat is present. Such a notion is supported by empirical research demonstrating that honor individuals will go to great lengths to repay a favor (Leung & Cohen, 2011) or show hospitality (Wyatt-Brown, 1982), even to strangers.

The conceptualization of honor as encompassing both the internal and the external for well-being and success further suggests that gaining community status and worth is a logical and relevant concern for interpersonal business interactions. That is, those motivated by honor need to be concerned not only with avoiding the loss of honor as is relevant when affronted, but also with *gaining* honor on a daily basis, and should become well-practiced in spotting and taking advantage of opportunities to do so. The honor-motivated businessperson, for example, may gain status by forging a profitable relationship with a new client, as his reputation and worth benefit from the boost to his business. Moreover, scenarios involving the potential for honor-enhancing positive reciprocity within successful client or other business relationships seem more probable in business contexts than violence-inducing honor affronts, and, unlike the white male samples of many honor studies, would be plausibly generalizable to all genders and demographic groups in an affected context.

It would then seem plausible that when in uncertain circumstances, the businessperson's heightened sensitivity to honor concerns may prompt him to act differently, consciously or unconsciously, relative to one less concerned with honor. The honor-motivated businessperson is likely to be highly motivated to distinguish between potential honor-enhancing opportunities and honor-threatening situations, and to react accordingly. Indeed, empirical research has shown that

those from honor cultures are better able to handle a conflict situation constructively, as long as they are not personally insulted, than are those from other cultural backgrounds (Harinck et al., 2013). Thus, given the fairly intense focus on violence as an instantiation of honor, and the overall paucity of theoretically-driven empirical studies of honor in business, there seems to be ample room for increased understanding of how the concept of honor may influence business relationships and organizational life writ large.

Admittedly, it must be noted that the importance to the American work culture of keeping emotional influences and attention to relational cues to a minimum in work contexts (c.f., Sanchez-Burks, 2002) suggests that there is also strong reason to believe that honor may not be that relevant to business interactions. Along the same lines as learning to follow emotion-related work norms that begin to be inculcated in childhood (Hochschild, 1979), those espousing honor-related concerns should learn to tamper those inclinations in work contexts in order to fulfill professional role expectations. Yet, although people can and do act to follow the expectations of others, even when ethically questionable (Burger et al., 2011), deep-set cultural values tend to consciously and unconsciously manifest themselves in a myriad of psychological, biological, and behavioral ways even in seemingly insignificant interactions (Cohen et al., 1996). Thus, while no empirical work to my knowledge as yet addresses this issue, honor is likely to have an influence on workplace interactions for those individuals driven by honor considerations.

Emergence of honor relevance within organizations. Prior empirical work has demonstrated that workplaces themselves embody cultural scripts. Organizational cultures are created, either purposefully, from the top-down, by influential leaders and their actions (Schein, 2004) or organically, from the bottom-up, as individuals interact with each other normally at work and over time fall into normative patterns of interactions. The majority of studies of honor

in organizations to-date has aligned with this approach, but has focused on the alternative conceptualizations of honor from what I advocate here. For example, a limited body of work has explored how honor (as moral character and virtue) and organizational life are related in the sense that some organizations may embody a type of honor in their very ethos, such as the military (Olstoorn, 2006). The US military Cadet Honor Code states that, "A Cadet will not lie, cheat, steal or tolerate those who do," based on a 1962 West Point speech by General Douglas MacArthur in which he declared that "Duty, Honor, Country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be. They are your rallying points…" (USMA, 2014). Physically-oriented martial honor as evidenced by military service has also been linked with broader concepts of character and integrity—acting in an upstanding, trustworthy manner—for those of an honor-culture background (Cohen & Leung, 2012). In fact, the military is not alone, with a growing number of universities and business schools endorsing at least some form of collective code of honor and/or ethics, a movement notably being led by students themselves (e.g., the MBA Oath, Anderson & Escher, 2010; Morris, 2009).

However, such discussions of honor in the military and business schools conflate honor as the balance of internal and external self-worth with honor as ethical, responsible, and accountable—i.e., virtuous—behavior. Honor as used in both the military Cadet Honor Code as well as the MBA Oath is concerned with the latter, and is a ripe area for studies in ethics and morality. Honor as a balance between the internal and external, however, is honor as understood by the swashbuckling cowboy, the gritty American herdsman, and a host of other so-named "cultures of honor." Although it is, to my knowledge, underexplored in organizational research, this type of honor is likely to be relevant in certain organizational contexts. For example, cultural

research has demonstrated that it is unlikely that a particular culture would be totally devoid of a given cultural dimension, but that the dimension may manifest itself in markedly different ways across cultures (e.g., no culture should be considered "faceless;" Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). Such context-specific effects of a cultural dimension may also be likely in organizations in which strong situational forces mimic those that historically led to cultures of honor within societies. That is, in organizational contexts (like those described below) in which resources are scarce, direct organizational oversight may be lax or minimal, at least in some domains, and economic outcomes are both uncertain and very important to the individual, people may develop a sensitivity to honor concerns. In particular, honor may become increasingly salient the more individual worth is tied to individual performance and success within the organization. In this sense, honor is dynamically constructed in the organizational environment, creating a "tool-kit" of cognitions, emotions, and behaviors (DiMaggio, 1997) that is relevant and thus likely to influence individuals' judgments and actions in a particular context (Wong & Hong, 2005).

The combination of these factors of scarce resources, minimal direct oversight, and uncertain outcomes in an organizational context, at first glance, may seem extreme or unlikely—few organizations, it may be argued, exhibit a free-for-all, non-regulated competition for resources. However, certain contexts may plausibly embody the modern organizational equivalent of the Scotch-Irish frontiersmen of historical honor significance. More closely examining these organizational contexts by incorporating the conceptualization of honor as a paradox between the internal and external may help shed new light on how workplace interactions unfold similarly across seemingly disparate industries like banking, medicine, and academia.

For example, when a small business loan is directly backed by a bank, the small business loan officer reviewing that loan application typically makes a final recommendation about the application to an underwriting group and/or a panel of fellow bankers. While loan officers must follow general guidelines for lending set forth by the bank, given the imperfect information associated with the probability of future success of any particular small business, loans offered directly by the bank (rather than backed by the government) are somewhat discretionary in nature. A loan officer, tasked with advising on how to allocate the bank's limited funding resources, is typically the only banker to read a full application (thus signaling non-complete oversight by the bank), and may be held responsible to his group for a loan's success or failure. In such conditions sensitivity to maintaining and protecting one's honor may become salient to the loan officer.

Another potentially relevant organizational context may be that of apprenticeships. For example, medical residents compete with one another for scarce resources like placement and advancement within their field of practice, face more interpersonal oversight from individuals at higher levels (e.g., a resident as overseen by an attending physician) than from the organization as a whole, and, given limited positions for advancement, face uncertain outcomes of daily and relative career success at work (e.g., getting a job at a more v. less prestigious hospital). Medical residents also face public scrutiny from those around them and must balance the tension between their internal sense of worth ("I am a good doctor") and the external sense of worth ("my attending praised my work today") in a high-stress and fast-paced environment. Research-focused academia may also be considered to resemble an apprenticeship model in that graduate students and young faculty may have little significant organizational oversight beyond advisors or mentors, are competing for resources like grants and course load forgiveness, and face

uncertain outcomes of job placement success and tenure. Together, these examples illustrate the potential for applying the concept of honor to studies of organizational life.

Thus, integrating prior work on authenticity and separate social-psychological and cultural research on honor, I propose that given the conditions that facilitate sensitivity to honor—scarce resources, uncertain outcomes, and limited oversight—individuals sensitive to and motivated by honor concerns are likely to attend more to perceived cues about others than are those less motivated by such concerns. Overall, as facial expressions are an immediate and obvious visible cue to someone else's intentions, the honor-motivated individual is likely to develop a sensitivity to the potential information about the other person that is embedded in such cues of (in)authenticity, and react accordingly to this perceived information in order to safeguard the balance of his/her internal and external sense of worth and forestall the risk of being taken advantage of. That is, I suggest that individuals motivated by honor should more positively evaluate perceived authenticity in others and less positively evaluate perceived inauthenticity in others compared to those less motivated by honor.

Proposition 1: Individuals motivated by honor concerns, such as those from honor cultures, will more positively evaluate (e.g., in terms of warmth, trustworthiness, and competence) an individual showing authentic facial expressions and more negatively evaluate an individual showing inauthentic expressions than those not motivated by honor concerns.

Further, in a work environment that mirrors conditions historically leading to cultures of honor, even individuals not explicitly born into a culture of honor may be likely to develop a sensitivity to honor concerns at work, both for gaining as well as not losing honor. Contexts in

which resources are scarce, oversight is limited, and outcomes are uncertain can involve a lack of information (e.g., Dosi & Egidi, 1991) and/or the "equivocality of inputs," or information that lends itself to multiple possible, even conflicting interpretations (Weick, 1979). In such contexts individuals may develop sensitivities to cues, like paying attention to subtle facial expressions, that may help them make sense of and survive in a given environment. Indeed, Schein's (1990, p. 111) definition of culture in organizations highlights that culture arises as individuals in an organization invent, discover, and develop patterns to cope with issues, and that these ways of perceiving and reacting are found to have worked adequately enough to have gained validity and durability. For individuals in honor-conducive work contexts, developing means to reduce the inherent uncertainty in important outcomes—to identify cues of the intentions and trustworthiness of those one depends on, for example—would be extremely valuable to gaining and maintaining one's sense of worth at work. In effect, a type of honor culture may arise in these contexts, and parallels between an individual in an honor-conducive work context and the individual who grew up in an honor-based culture may be substantial and worthy of study. Thus, I argue that much like honor-culture individuals (e.g., those who grew up in an honor culture),

Proposition 2: Individuals immersed in honor-conducive environments will more positively evaluate (e.g., in terms of warmth, trustworthiness, and competence) an individual showing authentic facial expressions and more negatively evaluate an individual showing inauthentic expressions than those not motivated by honor concerns.

2.7 Discussion

By integrating separate literatures on authenticity and honor, in this chapter I have argued that individuals who are motivated by cultural background or organizational environment to be sensitive to the balance between internal and external self-worth and the risk of being taken advantage of are likely to attend and react to cues of (in)authenticity more strongly than are others less motivated by honor. While prior empirical findings have provided evidence that authenticity may be generally preferred to inauthenticity, the conditions under which authenticity may be more or less valued are not fully understood. This chapter is a first step in exploring how authenticity and individuals' culturally-influenced motivations in judging others are, jointly, likely to affect interpersonal interactions in organizational life. Understanding more about the role of authenticity in business is also a particularly timely topic of study given recent controversial findings indicating that individuals may actually be capable of learning how to fake authentic expressions (Thibault et al., 2012). Such a proposition counters a long history of theoretical and empirical work establishing that authenticity is nearly impossible to pose on command, and suggests significant implications for the study of emotions and emotional labor, expressions, and interpersonal interactions in organizational life. Further, understanding how expressions and other nonverbal forms of communication in interactions are differently perceived and received depending on various cultural and contextual factors can help inform how culture more broadly—both cultural background and cultural elements determined by the situation—influences relationships in organizations.

The Role of the Nonverbal in Interpersonal Interactions

Nonverbal behaviors such as facial expressions are not merely redundant with verbal behavior; we are held accountable for our expressions separately from our verbal behavior, as

evidenced by a well-established body of work examining the meaning and importance of unintentional or leaked nonverbal actions (e.g., see Darwin, 1872; and Ekman & Friesen, 1969, for early examples). In particular, differences in smiling behavior between authentic smiles, wherein the smile reflects felt positive emotion, and inauthentic smiles, wherein the smile reflects one's desire to be seen as feeling positive emotion when it is not actually felt, have become well-accepted as both measurable (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1982) and of practical importance (e.g., in customer service contexts, Grandey et al., 2005). However, little empirical work has yet examined smile authenticity in business contexts outside of customer service roles, where smiling can be considered an explicit and fundamental part of the formal work role (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). Further, no work to my knowledge has examined the influence of specific cultural scripts on how smiling may be interpreted at work beyond nationality- or country-level analyses (cf., Molinsky, 2005; Ruby et al., 2012). Such an approach, while useful for understanding broad trends and differences across cultures in facial expression and interpretation, likely overlooks potentially important but generally neglected sources of cultural differences and does not consider potential interactions between such cultural variables and the particular context they are studied in (cf., Gelfland et al., 2007). In this chapter I have focused on the heretofore unexamined interaction between perceived authenticity as an interpersonal cue and honor as an intra-cultural difference that may, because of its fundamental concern with individuals' ambivalently-sourced sense of worth, have potentially important consequences for how interpersonal judgments in business relationships are formed.

Future work should also explore whether there are situations in which individuals' culturally-influenced judgments of others would result in *less* positive reactions to perceived authenticity in expression. That is, it is plausible that in certain circumstances, authenticity may

negatively moderate an individual's judgment of another person. While counterintuitive, a reversal of the positive moderation effect of culture on reactions to authenticity proposed in this chapter is possible if authenticity were perceived as reflecting badly on the expresser or his/her intentions. For example, in a face-oriented culture in which one's accountability to the harmony the group is an important part of social control and which may supersede the needs of any particular individual in a given moment (cf., Gelfland et al., 2004), an authentic expression of joy at having received a substantial award for one's individual performance at work may evoke negative judgments of the expresser for a face-motivated perceiver. In this case the authentic expression may be viewed as less socially acceptable than expressing a controlled, inauthentic, polite smile acknowledging the recognition and, as an interpersonal cue, may be seen as indicative of the expresser showing an off-putting desire for personal glory, leading to overall more negative judgments of the authentic vs. the inauthentic expresser. Similarly, an expresser authentically laughing at someone who has just embarrassed him- or herself might garner negative reactions from others in many, or even most, cultural contexts, as authenticity in this case could easily be perceived as demonstrating that the expresser is rude and unkind. Future work should more specifically examine how authenticity as a perceived cue of another's intentions may lead to either relatively more positive or more negative judgments of the expresser, depending on the specific cultural factor or context in question.

Building on the Work of Giants to Herald the Next Step in Culture Research

While both national and organizational or professional culture have been shown to influence individuals' behaviors within their organizations independently (e.g., Merritt, 2000), even multinational studies examining how culture influences work have focused largely on how organizations function within a particular culture, and how culture changes the organization's

global culture at a local level (Morris et al., 2008). Studies shedding light on how multinational firms operate with a purported single organizational culture while operating across nations are crucial for understanding our increasingly global world, yet they are also necessarily bounded by national and geographic borders that may not mirror the natural patchwork of "cultural borders." Indeed, even within the US scholars have argued for at least four (Fischer, 1989) to as many as eleven (Woodard, 2012) distinct historical cultural backgrounds that continue to influence life in the US today. In this vein, some studies have taken a non-national approach to understanding the influence of individuals' cultural backgrounds on worklife, such as Sanchez-Burks and colleagues, who compared how Protestants vs. Catholics (Sanchez-Burks, 2002) and Mexican Americans vs. Anglo Americans (Sanchez-Burks et al., 2000) within the US typically relate to each other in work settings. However, these studies, too, have relied on preset geographical or other "hard" distinctions like demographics for defining cultural influence. Relying on national or other boundaries to understand cultural differences among people is a valuable but necessarily bounded approach to understanding the linkages between culture and organizational life.

Further, prior empirical work demonstrates the danger in over-associating cultural scripts with value judgments about various related outcomes. For example, individualism in groups, broadly considered as detrimental to group cooperation and organizational productivity, also counterintuitively leads to more creativity than collectivism in groups (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). In a similar vein, honor individuals have been shown to be initially more forebearing than others in response to small provocations (Cohen et al., 1999), and standards of hospitality are taken very seriously in many honor cultures (e.g., Wyatt-Brown, 1982). Furthermore, assuming a culturally-influenced outcome as a basic fundamental component of a cultural script may also actually exacerbate its confirmation in empirical studies (cf., Miller, 1999), further narrowing

prematurely how a cultural script is perceived and studied in scholarly work before it has been

sufficiently examined in cross-cultural studies (cf., an investigation of aggression in dignity and

face cultures as well as in honor cultures, Severance et al., 2013).

Overall, research on culture in organizational life is still a fascinating and promising area

of study. For example, what began as broad research on the basic cultural psychological

differences between "East" and "West," or individualists and collectivists, has matured into work

investigating more specifically how such differences influence individuals' lives at work. Recent

scholarly work has also begun exploring more nuanced understandings of the individualism-

collectivism divide, by examining how topics like honor can help shed light on various forms of

collectivism (Uskul et al., 2010). However, as Gelfland and colleagues (2007) argue in their

comprehensive review of cross-cultural research in organizational behavior, there is still much

more to be done to move cultural research beyond the excellent and foundational prior work that

has relied heavily on broad value-based distinctions such as individualism v. collectivism.

For example, as I have argued, honor may be more relevant to certain organizational

contexts like banking, medicine, and academia than previously understood. However,

incorporating honor into cultural-organizational research even more broadly than the contexts

suggested in this chapter may also provide fruitful avenues for future research. Another

potentially interesting interaction context involving scarce resources, limited oversight, and

uncertain outcomes occurs when low status and stigmatized individuals are involved. Low status

and stigmatized people have also, like honor individuals, been associated with high rates of

violence in response to threats to the self (Henry, 2009). Individuals of low status, from a

stigmatized group, or who are otherwise interested in improving their status may be dependent

on higher-status others for resources, recognition, and sense of worth, and have been shown to

pay more attention to relevant interpersonal cues around them than do individuals of higher

status (Flynn et al., 2006; Kaiser et al., 2006). Yet they are also acutely aware of the need to rely

on themselves for survival and a sense of worth, and are likely to be influenced by the "stigma of

charity" attitude of those of higher status (Fothergill, 2003). Thus, low-status individuals may be

counterintuitively motivated by honor concerns. Low-status individuals may exhibit similar

behavior to medical residents, loan officers, or young academics, for example, when faced with

honor affronts in uncertain work contexts. Indeed, many of the explanations for the relationship

between honor cultures and rates of violence may easily be extended to understanding violence

in mixed-status communities (cf., Henry, 2009). Future research should explore this and other

implications of honor for low-status individuals and how these implications relate to those for

others in honor-conducive work environments.

In sum, how individuals react to authenticity in facial expressions may be significantly

influenced by both the perceiver's own cultural background and the organizational culture

surrounding him or her. The goal of this chapter is to integrate separate, rich histories of research

on both authenticity in facial expressions and the cultural factor of honor to explore how

individuals motivated by honor may be particularly sensitive to (in)authentic cues from others in

interpersonal interactions. This integration suggests relevant cultural boundary conditions for

individuals' reactions to (in)authenticity as well as promising new avenues of research for

examining the role of both authenticity and honor in a global, culturally-complex working world.

Chapter 3:

What Your (In)Authentic Expression Means to Me:

Social Inferences in Initial Business Encounters

ABSTRACT

The goal of this research is to examine how and when the authenticity of facial expressions influences the interpretation of that expression in business encounters, and the consequences of this interpretation for meaningful outcomes like the creation and structure of business relationships. In this chapter, I connect four areas of management research—social judgment of others from facial expressions, authenticity in facial expression, cultural influences on interpersonal judgment, and the influence of social judgment on interpersonal and work-related outcomes—to address how individuals' interpretations of and reactions to facial expression authenticity may be culturally influenced in business contexts. Whether judging a potential small business loan applicant or simply taking one's car for repairs, interpersonal inferences about and reactions to someone in an initial encounter can shape the entire course of a business relationship. Across four studies, including both experimental and interview techniques, I examine and find support for the notion that concern for honor, or the balance between internal and external sources of self-worth, influences individuals' interpersonal inferences about and reactions toward the (in)authenticity of others in work life. Through this research I hope to expand our theoretical and practical understanding of how individual and contextual differences,

such as concern for honor in business contexts, can influence interpersonal judgments and

reactions based on expression authenticity in consequential ways.

3.1 Introduction

The goal of this research is to examine how and when the authenticity of facial expressions influences the interpretation of that expression in business encounters, and the consequences of this interpretation for meaningful outcomes like the creation and structure of business relationships. Facial expressions provide a rich source of social information in interacting with others, offering information about the expresser that helps observers infer the expresser's feelings, goals, motives, and intentions (e.g., Van Kleef, 2010). The Behavioral Ecology View of emotional expression posits that expressions, rather than indicators of felt or faked emotions, are better understood as messages that benefit the survival of the vigilant perceiver (Fridlund, 1997). Yet most research since Darwin's work on the universality of facial expressions (1872) has focused on expression itself rather than on the effects of expressions on others (i.e., what perceptions and behaviors perceivers engage in due to expressions). Further, except for notable work on emotional labor—intentional, often required displays of facial expressions in work environments (e.g., Grandey et al., 2005)—little research to date has examined the influence of the interpretation of facial expressions in the context of business encounters. In this chapter, I examine how and when the *interpretation* of others' expressions influences interpersonal interactions and the consequences for business relationships.

The interpretation of others' facial expressions and subsequent judgment based on this interpretation is ubiquitous in daily life. We may judge the professor who enters the room with a bright, authentic smile as more likeable than one who does not smile authentically, and infer from this behavior how well he will teach the upcoming class. We may judge the frowning politician as more dedicated to his stated policy of economic reform than the politician who states a similar policy but whose expression seems unengaged in his own speech, and vote

accordingly (cf., Todorov et al., 2005). Moreover, such judgments can happen quickly—within 100 milliseconds of seeing a face—and unconsciously (Willis & Todorov, 2006) and can have immediate and significant consequences for how we interact and conduct business with others (e.g., Krumhuber et al., 2007). Given this, how can we understand the influence of our interpretation of someone else's facial expression on our judgment and reactions toward the person, particularly if the expression is inauthentic, or faked (v. authentic)?

In this chapter, I connect four areas of management research—social judgment of others from facial expressions, authenticity in facial expression, cultural influences on interpersonal judgment, and the influence of social judgment on interpersonal and work-related outcomes—to address three main questions. First, how does facial expression authenticity influence the interpretation of that expression in business relationships? Second, what are the consequences of this interpretation for workplace outcomes such as performance evaluations or the structure of business agreements, even in initial, brief encounters like meeting a potential coworker or client for the first time? Third, how might cultural influences—particularly those that could prompt individuals to attend more v. less carefully to subtle cues of authenticity—shed light on individuals' interpretation differences? In sum, this chapter examines the personal and organizational implications of cultural variation in the interpretation of expression authenticity.

3.2 Inferences from Expressions Like Smiles in Initial Encounters

Forming inferences very quickly about another person's intentions toward you, often based on little information, and reacting to the situation based on those inferences, is ubiquitous in daily life. When a new customer walks toward a customer service agent, for example, does the agent say hello and expect a pleasant exchange, or prepare for the customer's wrath at having

bought a faulty product? A snap judgment about the customer's intentions (will the customer

storm away to demand to see a higher-level manager?) and inferences about the person's ability

to carry them out (is the customer bluffing?) are both critical elements in deciding how to

respond, e.g., with a mix of affability and wariness. Subtle nonverbal cues can help you

distinguish between a friendly new boss (easy gait and open body posture) and a possible danger

(aggressive walk and angry face) and infer whether the person bodes well for you. Although

simple examples, we engage in such interactions with other people every day: how do we decide,

for instance, to trust a particular car mechanic or potential new business partner? Judgments in

such scenarios involve inferring both others' intentions and their ability to carry them out.

Indeed, Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2007) examined both intention (warmth) and ability

(competence) in the context of interpersonal social cognition, and found that these two broad

dimensions are universal in social cognition.

While many verbal (e.g., word choice) and nonverbal (e.g., tone of voice, style of dress)

cues about another person may be available, one interpersonal signal that has been shown to

guide individuals' judgments of the warmth and competence of an unknown person is the

person's facial expression. Facial expressions in context can help those perceiving the

expressions to make sense of what is happening in an otherwise ambiguous situation (e.g., Cline,

1956; Jones, et al., 2006). For example, individuals have been shown to use the authenticity

(Brown et al., 2003) and symmetry (Brown & Moore, 2002) of smiles to determine expressers'

likelihood of cooperating or being altruistic in interpersonal interactions like trust-based financial

games. Indeed, such biases in judgment may not be without merit; liars have been found to

display more fake smiles than those who are telling the truth (Biland et al., 2008). More broadly,

however, smiling in general is associated with trustworthiness. In fact, guilty smilers have been

found to receive reduced punishment compared to guilty-non-smilers because of this association between smiles and trust (LaFrance & Hecht, 1995). Overall, a perceiver's instinctual reactions to someone based on his or her facial expressions have been argued to persist even when other more objective information about the person is available (Frank, 1988). However, it is the combination of the objective and subjective that helps individuals make sense of others. Indeed, people use non-verbal and contextual information along with objective data to create a coherent story about a person (cf., Adaval & Wyer, 1998), and the consistency between verbal and non-verbal cues is important in forming such interpersonal judgments (Friedman, 1979).

An excellent demonstration of the power of the subjective in forming a judgment of another person is the popular peer-lending site Prosper.com. On this site, micro-lenders select among requests for loans, and are able to decide which applications to support as well as in what amount. However, much of the information available about a particular applicant is self-reported by that applicant, and cannot be validated completely. While income, credit score, and other financial data is more objectively reliable, lenders have been found to use qualitative cues such as applicants' own narratives about their need for funding, trustworthiness, and reasons for certain objective scores (e.g., an applicant may offer an explanation for a prior bad credit score) to anticipate future loan performance (Herzenstein et al., 2011). To illustrate the weight of these narratives in lenders' judgments of applicants, Sonenshein and colleagues (2011) tested lending behavior in both the field and the lab, and found that applicants' accounts significantly influenced lending even when objective data like credit history remained constant. Importantly, these studies showed that lenders inferred applicants' trustworthiness from these accounts, but that this inferred trustworthiness was not actually associated with improved loan performance. Together, these results emphasize the importance for trust in economic exchange (Arrow, 1974)

as well as the significance of individuals' qualitative interpretation of cues in determining their reactions to others.

Further, such inherent subjectivity in forming interpersonal judgments supports the notion that both culture and context may be important determinants for how facial expressions impact interpersonal interactions. In fact, empirical work has explored both cultural and contextual influences on emotion interpretation, and has found that expressions are culturally dependent in numerous ways, including what expressions are preferred and thus displayed more frequently (Eid & Diener, 2001; Ruby et al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2007), how these displays are expressed, and what meaning is attributed to them. Like dialects of language, facial expressions differ across cultures not only in terms of how they are judged by observers (Jack et al., 2011; Masuda et al., 2008), but also in how a particular emotion is expressed physically (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Elfenbein et al., 2007; Marsh et al., 2003; Marsh et al., 2007).

The surprising weak correlation between felt and expressed emotions must also be considered in discussions of facial expressions (see Fernández-Dols & Crivelli, 2013, and Reisenzein et al., 2013, for reviews). Such research highlights the importance of focusing explicitly on expression interpretation above and beyond the expression itself. For example, perceivers' interpretations of a particular expression can differ dramatically because of the surrounding context, especially for common expressions like smiles that fit within cultural display norms. While context influences the interpretation of both positive and negative expression (e.g., the nose scrunch indicating disgust can also be viewed as an expression of anger; Pochedly et al., 2012), smiles are one compelling illustration of how perceivers may judge an expression vastly differently depending on context.

Although smiles play a fundamental, positive role in interpersonal judgments, with smiling faces judged as more competent, sincere, and attractive compared to identical neutral faces (Reis et al., 1990), smiles are actually quite complicated to interpret. On one hand, smiles are common and often well-received. People are generally attracted to smiles and prefer them over neutral expressions directed toward them (Jones et al., 2006). Individuals' emotional labor to increase the presentation of positive expressions like smiling in order to fulfill social norms or work role expectations is commonplace at work (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Grandey, 2003; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989). Individuals in social settings (i.e., settings when other people are around) like the work environment are also more likely to experience positive emotions than those in solitary settings (Larson et al., 1982; Diener et al., 1984), thus also increasing the supply of positive expressions one is likely to see in work contexts.

However, despite our preference for smiles and the ubiquity of smiles in social settings, the interpretation of a smile in a given context is variable. Smiling at strangers can be considered an invasion of privacy, as in Scandinavia (Nucci et al., 2000), an inappropriate workplace exchange with customers (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989), or a basic and even automatic form of politeness and social regulation, as in the US (Prkachin & Silverman, 2002). Moreover, smiles can also indicate a variety of negative or self-conscious emotions like embarrassment (Keltner & Buswell, 1997), and more malignant intentions like slyness or intimidation as with the evil grin of the playground bully. At work, smiles can be either culturally inappropriate (Molinsky, 2005) or required (thus often faked to fulfill job demands; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). Yet even required smiles to fulfill company culture or policy norms may be interpreted differently depending on the norms of the broader national culture (e.g., the case of the Four Seasons entering the French

market; Hallowell et al., 2002), demonstrating the need to consider both culture and context jointly in unpacking how expressions are interpreted in a given scenario.

Overall, a rich body of literature on the influence of both culture and context on smiling behavior and interpretation suggests that both may help shed light on how the authenticity of smiles in particular shapes interpersonal judgments in the workplace. Although the authenticity and interpretation of various positive and negative expressions like sadness, joy, anger, or contempt pose interesting theoretical and practical questions for business encounters, smiles serve as a particularly compelling expression to test how cultural and contextual influences on the interpretation of expression authenticity inform inferences about someone else.

However, how does authenticity influence individuals' reactions to smiles in work environments in particular, given both the inherent complexity in interpreting smiles in general, and the myriad of findings demonstrating that, on the one hand, smiling may be valued in work environments, even if it is faked (e.g., Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993), but on the other hand, may be interpreted quite negatively at work depending on cultural and contextual factors (e.g., Molinsky, 2005; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1989)? Indeed, while smiles may be required for both cultural (e.g., to smooth interactions) and organizational (e.g., to fulfill the "service with a smile" mantra) reasons, authenticity may be considered a non-critical aspect of one's job—a nice-to-have rather than a necessity for good performance (Grandey et al., 2005). One possibility to reconcile such findings with other empirical work showing that authenticity generally leads to more positive judgments even when it is not consciously recognized (Peace et al., 2006) is to explore whether differences in perceivers' reactions to authenticity may be the result of differences in ability and/or motivation to attend to interpersonal cues.

Prior research has demonstrated that some individuals do tend to pay more attention to interpersonal cues than others. For example, status differences have been associated with attentional differences, so that individuals of lower status tend to attend and react more to others than do those of higher status because of the potential impact on lower status individuals' lives (e.g., via needed resources) that such higher status people have (Flynn et al., 2006). Perhaps unsurprisingly, lower-status individuals are also more likely to react to cues that may impact their self-worth, psychological self, or standing in society as a potential way to compensate for their status (Henry, 2009). Recent, related work on the local-ladder effect supports this notion. This research shows that sociometric status—one's standing in external face-to-face groups like friends or coworkers—influences well-being more than overall socioeconomic status (Anderson et al., 2012), suggesting that reacting to status-relevant cues from others may be explained by efforts to improve one's well-being.

It is also plausible that such differences in attention to cues may extend beyond prior findings on status. That is, there may be other cultural and contextual factors that prompt some individuals to develop increased sensitivity to interpersonal cues. Further, individuals who are more attentive to others, thereby noticing more cues, are also likely to be significantly influenced by the cues they perceive, especially when little is known about the other person's intentions. For these individuals, then, authenticity may be particularly valuable. For example, individuals playing a financial trust game inferred the trustworthiness of an unknown partner and changed their playing behavior—in terms of whether to play with the partner, and if so, to cooperate or not—depending on whether the partner expressed an authentic or inauthentic smile (Krumhuber et al., 2007). Indeed, the classification of smiles as either authentic or inauthentic is well-established, with the crows' feet eye wrinkles, bulging under the lower eyelid, and lowering of

the outside of the eyebrows of the authentic smile considered nearly impossible to enact

voluntarily and thus a sign of actual felt emotion (Duchenne, 1862/1990; Ekman & Friesen,

1976). Thus, the difficulty in voluntarily posing an authentic smile could explain individuals'

general preference for authenticity. Beyond this, though, variation in how individuals respond to

authenticity might be explained by differences in individuals' ability and/or motivation to attend

to subtle interpersonal cues like the presence of crows' feet around the eyes.

Broadly, then, what cultural and/or contextual factors are likely to influence an

individual's perception of and reaction to authenticity? I argue that individuals who are uniquely

attuned both to the internal (a sense of self-reliance) and the external (a focus on others for one's

self-worth) may be especially sensitive to interpersonal cues like authenticity. This sensitivity is

plausible because of the need to balance the internal with the external; this value placed on the

external should make these individuals particularly attuned to cues that may influence the

external and thus challenge the balance. One cultural group fitting this description is often

referred to as a culture of honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Honor-based

individuals are not an insignificant minority: they are found across the globe, independent of

national borders. Countries with honor sub-populations include the US (namely, the US South),

Europe (the UK, Spain, Portugal), most of Central and South America, and much of North Africa

and the Middle East. Yet honor is rarely studied as other than an explanation for increased rates

of violence in honor populations (Nisbett, 1993). In contrast, I argue that the implications of

honor for interpersonal interactions extend beyond violence. I contend that the underlying

cultural logic of honor suggests that honor could plausibly and significantly influence how

individuals judge unknown others on a variety of interpersonal dimensions such as trust, warmth,

competence, and even expected performance. In particular, it is the balance and tension between

an internally- and externally-sourced sense of self-worth that prompts individuals concerned with honor to attend to cues about themselves they receive from others (the external) and react to these cues to protect themselves (and the internal sense of worth) from being taken advantage of.

3.3 Honor: Balancing Internal & External Drives Sensitivity to Being Taken Advantage of

Honor can be defined as "the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society" (Pitt-Rivers, 1966, p. 21). That is, "honor is first the inner conviction of self-worth…[second] is the claim of that self-assessment before the public…[third] is the assessment of the claim by the public, a judgment based upon the behavior of the claimant…only by the response of observers can he ordinarily understand himself" (Wyatt-Brown, 1982; p. 14). While honor has been associated with increased rates of aggression in response to affronts (cf., Nisbett & Cohen, 1996, for an excellent review), fundamental to the core of honor is the need to balance one's internal and external sense of worth. Balancing this tension leads the honor-motivated individual to be especially concerned with not being taken advantage of. To be taken advantage of would challenge both the individual's internal sense of worth, for letting it happen, and the external sense of worth, for believing that others would think worse of him or her because of it.

The broader environmental factors that traditionally gave rise to the emergence of sensitivity to individual honor in a society illustrate how this unique tension between the internal and external developed, and why honor is unfortunately so frequently associated with aggression. Historically, the single-minded and violent defense of honor linked to honor cultures arose in areas often literally and figuratively on the fringes of society: where no centralized form of government to help maintain order existed, resources were limited and/or unstable, and individuals were faced with defending their own precarious resources from potential marauders

63

(for example, in herding communities, where livestock could more easily be stolen than could crops in a farming community). The US "Wild West" and many of the rural herders of Scotch-Irish descent later populating the US South faced just these conditions, and consequentially have become known as strong honor cultures. In these cultures one's honor was foundationally dependent on being seen as someone who could not be taken advantage of without serious consequences. Importantly, because being taken advantage of in such a society was a continual risk, one's honor (internally-sourced worth that was also claimed and acknowledged externally) was of utmost importance and constantly needing protection and maintenance. Further, although gun-slinging images of Wild West cowboys or Appalachian backcountry folk in the "lawless South" may now seem anachronistic, honor moments still occur in many small ways every day, from facing the bully on the playground to refusing to allow a work colleague to claim one's ideas as his own. In effect, honor is salient for individuals who have acculturated—either via cultural background or organizational context—to balancing internal and external worth.

Importantly, for individuals motivated by honor, one's honor—the balance between the internal and the external—is mutable, suggesting these individuals should be particularly attuned to perceived cues from others regarding others' intentions toward them. Thus, given the focus of honor-motivated individuals on the importance of the external for maintaining honor (and managing tension between the internal and external), it is plausible that honor-motivated individuals will react differently to the facial expressions of others compared to those less motivated by honor concerns. In particular, these individuals should positively(negatively) evaluate and react to (in)authenticity to a stronger degree than should those less motivated by honor.

From Inferences to Behavioral Reactions

Impressions of another person's attributes based on expressions are, in turn, likely to influence how a perceiver subsequently reacts to the expresser. In general, one's overall impression of another person creates a "halo" whereby other judgments are influenced. A well-established literature on impression management and the halo effect have shown, for instance, that factors such as liking influence outcomes like performance reviews independently of objective performance (e.g., Wayne & Kacmar, 1991). Such biases can occur because of attribute substitution, whereby a person judges someone on a target dimension by thinking about (substituting) another, more heuristic, readily-available attribute (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).

Therefore, in sum, I propose that inferences about and reactions to unknown others should be influenced by honor concerns particularly in situations when interpersonal cues may be especially valuable, that is, when little is known about the other person, such as when forming a relationship with a new business partner. Such a scenario is likely to highlight to the honor-motivated individual the salience in that moment of the potential to be taken advantage of in some way by the other person, a situation that would directly challenge the individual's balance between internally- and externally-sourced self-worth. Thus, drawing from several streams of research, I argue that individuals will judge others differently depending on others' displays of authentic versus inauthentic smiles, and that this process will be moderated by the perceiver's concern for honor, or a sensitivity to the balance between internal and external sources of self-worth. In turn, these judgments will influence the behavioral reactions (e.g., funding a loan) that perceivers take toward expressers.

3.4 Overview of Studies

I use both experimental and interview techniques to answer the research questions I propose and incorporate the concept of full-cycle research (Chatman & Flynn, 2005). This means I am examining the phenomenon in both the field and lab across multiple contexts, using multiple research methods in order to more effectively triangulate and generalize the findings. Critically, my choice of methods and contexts is driven by the conceptualization of honor that I have proposed: that is, honor as balancing both an external and internal sense of self-worth, thereby leading to increased sensitivity to being potentially taken advantage of. In this chapter I test two specific contexts to investigate this understanding of honor and the potential effects of this definition on whether honor concerns influence inferences based on facial expression in work life situations. This two-pronged approach allows me first to establish the influence of honor on authenticity interpretation with individuals that we know from prior research are sensitive to honor concerns (i.e., U.S. Southerners), and second, to expand these initial results to test the influence of honor on those who may for particular organizational context reasons also be sensitive to honor concerns (i.e., small business loan officers). By using multiple methods across these two contexts I am further able to triangulate the relationships linking interpersonal interactions, authenticity, and honor in work life.

These contexts also directly incorporate the notion that cultural scripts are not necessarily mutually exclusive or bound solely by geography, in that even those not typically considered as likely to use a particular cultural script may call upon non-dominant cultural scripts if those scripts are primed by the situation. For example, Trafimow and colleagues (1991) found that subjects from individualistic cultures could retrieve collectivistic self-cognitions when appropriately primed, and that the reverse was also true for subjects from collectivistic cultures.

Such findings gave rise to the idea of cultural "baskets of marbles," such that individuals possess various self-concepts (baskets) which, once activated, then allow related cognitions and the most salient cultural script (marbles) to influence individual behaviors (Trafimow et al., 1991). Similarly, further empirical work in cultural priming has shown that cultural differences are the result of variance in the consistent salience of cultural concepts, (e.g., individualism v. collectivism; see Oyserman & Lee's 2008 meta-analysis). This growing body of work reaffirms the importance of investigating cultural scripts as potentially both mutable and primable (made salient in a particular context).

As recent research has begun investigating, individuals from cultures not traditionally considered honor-based can still vary in terms of their concern for honor, with those higher on honor reacting similarly to more traditional honor-culture individuals (IJzerman et al., 2007). Similarly, individuals may also vary in their sensitivity to honor based on their work environment. That is, individuals facing a work context wherein internal and external self-worth must be balanced, where being taken advantage of (and being publicly judged for it) is possible or even likely, and where individuals may be relatively self-reliant in terms of protecting their own interests, may develop a sense of honor in their business relationships. In such conditions attending carefully to even subtle cues about another person when making an interpersonal judgment may be both necessary and evolutionarily adaptable within the organization. While it remains to be seen, empirical evidence supporting the notion that organizational context may facilitate individuals' development of sensitivity to honor concerns would suggest a plethora of promising new avenues for research exploring how cultural factors like honor might be more broadly relevant to studies of organizational life. This possibility in particular motivates the two-

pronged approach I take in this chapter: examining the influence of authenticity on interpersonal

judgments for (1) geographically-based honor as well as (2) organizationally-motivated honor.

Thus, to investigate whether honor concerns influence inferences based on facial

expressions in work life, I use multiple contexts and methods to test whether those in situations

where honor concerns are likely to be salient—either due to childhood culture or work

environment—interpret and react differently to (in)authentic facial expressions. Finding

differences in reactions to (in)authentic expressions in each of these contexts would support the

understanding of honor as I have proposed—honor as a concern with being seen as someone not

to be taken advantage of—and shed light on its importance to interpersonal business interactions.

Notably, this conceptualization of honor would also help broaden honor-focused research in

organizational contexts beyond reliance only on subjects who grew up in honor-based cultures.

As an initial examination of my hypotheses, however, I examine whether individuals from

honor-culture backgrounds react differently to (in)authentic smiles than do individuals not from

an honor background (Study 1), and whether these differences may be further intensified by

priming the salience of honor for these individuals in that particular moment (Study 2).

3.5 Study 1: Capturing the Phenomenon—Honor and Inferences

This experiment examines the effect of honor culture on interpersonal judgments of

smiling individuals based on the authenticity of the individual's smile. In this study, concern for

honor was determined by following seminal prior studies examining honor differences based on

geographic location (e.g., Cohen et al., 1999; Fischer et al., 1999).

Method

     Participants. Participants were recruited using an online paid subject pool (Amazon's Mechanical Turk; Burhmester, Kwang, Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, Ipeirotis, 2010). The survey was restricted to being viewable only by individuals in the US who had a high past approval rating (95% or greater) indicating their history of doing quality work for the pool. 101 participants (42 male, 59 female; Mage = 32.15) received $1 for the 15-minute study.

     Procedure. Participants were told they would be completing a series of short tasks designed to understand more about how they perceive and judge others in social contexts. No deception was used in this study; participants were told on the first page that "the purpose of this study is to examine the impressions you form of others in particular everyday contexts." Participants were presented with a brief scenario in which they were asked to imagine that they were forced to pull into a nearby, but unknown, auto mechanic's shop to have their car serviced after an emergency light came on. They read that the service mechanic approached them, were shown an image of this mechanic, and then asked to judge the mechanic on several dimensions.

     The image of the mechanic was the main independent variable. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two expression authenticity conditions: authentic (AU6 activation) or inauthentic (no AU6 activation). Participants saw one of two FACS-coded faces: a middle-aged white male showing an authentic smile (AU coding: 6C, 7C, 12C, 25B) or the same individual showing an inauthentic smile (AU coding: 12C, 25B; Ekman, et al., 2002). These two faces were chosen to keep the demographic characteristics of the target constant by using the same individual for both conditions, and for keeping the particular mouth muscle movement and activation levels often associated with smiling (12C and 25B) identical between the images. Thus the smile of the individual between conditions differed only in terms of eye muscle movement

and activation (6C and 7C), with the activation of AU6, commonly referred to as crows' feet around the eyes, distinguishing the authentic and inauthentic smiles.

After viewing the image of the smiling individual, participants were told to assume that the car was repaired with no problems and were then asked to rate the individual while keeping the person's face in the back of their mind. Participants rated the individual on competence and warmth (6 items each on a 5-point scale, 1=not at all to 5=extremely; Fiske et al., 2002). Participants then completed the final demographics part of the study, indicating their age, gender, nationality (only US participants were included in analysis), and which US states they had lived in for at least 6 years of their childhood from ages 0-18.

Measures

Culture of honor status. Following prior studies investigating Culture of Honor, childhood rather than current or all previous states of residence were considered indicative of having been exposed to—and presumably instilled with—a Culture of Honor during critical childhood development years (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996). Thus this final demographic question allowed participants to be distinguished as either Southern or non-Southern. Participants were considered Southern if they had spent at least 6 years of their childhood in a Southern state, defined as Census Divisions 5, 6, and 7 and including the states of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas (Cohen et al., 1996; available online at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf). Following Cohen and colleagues (1996), the District of Columbia was not counted as Southern since it is unlikely that D.C. truly represents Southern Culture of Honor. Further, the inclusion or exclusion of the 2 D.C. respondents did not alter the results obtained from the analyses described below, thus the

70

exclusion of D.C. in the Southern category is not discussed further. Thus, of 101 total participants 38 were coded as Southern according to the procedure outlined above. The remaining 63 were classified as non-Southern.

   Judgments about the target. Competence was measured using a 6-item scale (Fiske et al., 2002), including the items competent, confident, capable, skillful, efficient, and intelligent. Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.90 overall, and did not differ by respondents' Southern status (Cronbach's α = 0.92 for Southern and 0.89 for non-Southern participants). Warmth was also measured using 6 items (Fiske et al., 2002) including warm, friendly, well-intentioned, trustworthy, good-natured, and sincere. Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.93 overall, and did not differ by respondents' Southern status (Cronbach's α = 0.94 for Southern and 0.93 for non-Southern participants). Thus competence and warmth items were averaged at the participant level to a single competence and a single warmth value for each respondent.

Results and Discussion

   A 2 (culture: Southern v. non-Southern) x 2 (authenticity: authentic smile v. inauthentic smile pictured) ANOVA was performed on both the competence and warmth ratings of the smiling target. For competence, neither the main effect of culture, $F(1, 97) = -0.12$, $p = 0.90$,[7] nor of authenticity, $F(1, 97) = 0.33$; $p = 0.75$, was significant. However, as hypothesized, a significant Culture x Authenticity interaction was found, $F(1, 97) = 3.29$, $p = 0.02$. Consistent with hypotheses, Southerners rated the inauthentic smiler as significantly less competent ($M = 3.38$, $SD = 0.71$) compared to the authentic smiler ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 0.67$), $t(97) = 2.16$, $p = 0.03$, Cohen's $d = 0.69$. Surprisingly, Non-Southerners rated the inauthentic smiler as significantly *more* competent ($M = 3.78$, $SD = 0.53$) compared to the authentic smiler ($M = 3.41$, $SD = 0.71$), $t(97) = -2.28$, $p = 0.03$, Cohen's $d = 0.61$. This effect was unexpected and not predicted in the

---

[7] All *p*-values are 2-tailed.

hypotheses, which argued that those not from honor cultures should not differentiate between the smilers as much. This study provides evidence that, in fact, smilers may actually be punished in terms of interpersonal judgments in non-culture of honor areas for smiling authentically.

Although seemingly counterintuitive, such a result is plausible given work on standards of workplace professionalism, particularly recent research on Protestant Relational Ideology in the US (Sanchez-Burks, 2002; 2005). Protestant Relational Ideology (PRI) refers to a culture's ideology concerning the appropriateness of emotional and relational concerns in work settings, with high-PRI cultures, such as the US, considering such concerns inappropriate (Sanchez-Burks, 2002; 2005). Thus for those in general less personally concerned with socially-conferred status, general norms of professionalism may take precedence. That is, while facial cues may not seem relevant for one's status in this case, they are instead relevant in terms of indicating how well one is behaving in accordance with accepted standards of conduct—i.e., acting professional by not appearing overly emotional in work settings. The authentic smiler in such situations may seem at best clueless and at worst even acting like a fool, akin to smiling in a job interview in Russia. The smiler may thus be judged unfavorably because his facial accent stands out from the group; he is, in effect, expressing emotion inappropriately for the situation and will be judged accordingly (cf., Bucy & Newhagen, 1999).

Further, Southerners also rated the authentic smiler as significantly more competent compared to Non-Southerners' ratings of the authentic smiler, $t(97) = -2.18$, $p = 0.03$, Cohen's $d = 0.64$, whereas Southerners rated the inauthentic smiler as significantly less competent than the Non-Southerners rated them, $t(97) = 2.21$, $p = 0.03$, Cohen's $d = 0.67$.

For warmth judgments, the main effect of culture, $F(1, 97) = -1.14$, $p = 0.26$ was not significant. However, the main effect of authenticity was significant, $F(1, 97) = 2.24$; $p = 0.03$,

Cohen's $d = 0.31$, indicating that authentic smilers were rated overall more warm ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 0.82$) than were inauthentic smilers ($M = 3.37$, $SD = 0.82$). Moreover, as hypothesized, a significant Culture x Authenticity interaction was found, $F(1, 97) = -2.43$; $p = 0.02$. Consistent with hypotheses, Southerners rated the inauthentic smiler as much less warm ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 0.88$) compared to the authentic smiler ($M = 4.02$, $SD = 0.66$), $t(97) = 2.94$, $p < 0.01$, Cohen's $d = 0.99$. Non-Southerners did not rate the inauthentic smiler ($M = 3.46$, $SD = 0.77$) differently compared to the authentic smiler ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 0.83$), $t(97) = -0.15$, $p = 0.88$. Further, Southerners also rated the authentic smiler as significantly more warm compared to Non-Southerners' ratings of the authentic smiler, $t(97) = -2.41$, $p = 0.02$, Cohen's $d = 0.77$. Southerners and Non-Southerners did not rate the inauthentic smiler differently on warmth, $t(97) = 0.96$, $p = 0.34$ (see Figure 3.1). These results show that those from cultures of honor rate authentic smilers as much more warm than inauthentic smilers, or than those not from cultures of honor rate smilers of either type. Thus, it appears that authentic smilers are particularly valued by culture of honor individuals, at least in terms of warmth.

Insert Figure 3.1 about here

Together, these results provide initial evidence that individuals assumed to be more vs. less attuned to interpersonal cues from unknown others do judge these others differently on the common interpersonal judgment measures of competence and warmth, based on the authenticity of the smiler's facial expression. In the next study I examine whether the salience of honor can be primed and thereby intensify the relationship between (in)authenticity and interpersonal relationships for individuals from honor cultures.

3.6 Study 2: Primed Honor Salience in Context

This experiment examines the effect of priming the salience of honor in a given moment. In this study, the salience of honor for individuals in an honor culture was either highlighted to individuals via a writing task, or not highlighted at all, before individuals were asked to judge smiling others, described broadly as individuals they might meet at work. I expected a moderating effect of priming honor salience such that those who had been primed would show even stronger differences in judgments of (in)authentic smilers than those who were not primed.

Method

Participants. Participants were students enrolled in a business course at a large Southern university in the United States. A total of 172 students participated for course credit. To avoid any potential confounds with other cultural scripts beyond honor, ten participants were removed before any analyses were conducted since they indicated their nationality was not US. These participants are thus not discussed further. Thus 162 participants (61 male, 68 female, 33 who declined to report gender; Mage = 20.25) were retained for further analyses.

Procedure. Participants were told they would be completing a short study regarding interacting with others in daily work life. This study followed a mixed-model repeated measures design, in which the between-subjects factor was the honor salience condition and the within-subjects factor were the (in)authentically smiling individuals participants saw. For the between-subjects factor, participants were first randomly assigned to one of two writing task conditions, either an honor salience prime or a neutral work prime.[8] In the honor salience prime individuals were asked to recall a time when someone they were close to criticized them in public at their workplace (for a current or past full- or part-time job), or if they had never worked, during an

---

[8] See Appendix A for a description of the development of this prime as well as a pilot study to test its effectiveness at priming a concern for honor.

extracurricular activity. Participants then described the image that was most vivid to them about the experience, and were instructed to write as detailed a description as possible, pretending they were actually in the scene and remembering how they felt during the event. In the neutral work prime, participants were asked to recall the most recent day they were at work (or, if they never worked, the most recent extracurricular activity they participated in), and write about the most vivid image from that day. They were also instructed to write a detailed description, pretending they were actually in the scene and remembering how they felt during the event.

Following the writing task, participants then completed the within-subjects portion of the study. Participants were first told they would see a series of eight people one at a time on the next screens. They were asked to imagine that each of these people was a person that they might meet in their workplace. Participants were instructed to indicate their gut reactions to each person after seeing the person's picture; given that forming impressions of others quickly is an important aspect of conducting business in a fast-paced world, participants were instructed to respond simply with their immediate judgments of the individuals they saw, without worrying about choosing a "right" or "wrong" answer.

Participants then saw a series of eight headshots from the Beaupré and Hess (2003) database of individuals showing a variety of authentic and inauthentic smiles of various intensities. Eight images were chosen in order to reduce any confounds for race (only Caucasian images were chosen), smile intensity (one medium-intensity inauthentic and one medium-intensity authentic image was chosen for each individual), and gender (two women and two men were chosen), and to keep the task at a reasonable length and avoid response fatigue. Thus, two images (authentic and inauthentic smile) from each of four individuals (two white women, two white men) were included in the stimulus. Participants were told they might see the same

individual more than once; images were shown in a random order to avoid any possible order effects. Each headshot flashed on the screen for one second. After each image, participants indicated their impression of the person they saw on competence (1 item) and warmth (2 items, trustworthy, and warm and friendly) on a five-point scale from 1=not at all to 5=extremely (adapted from Fiske et al., 2002).

Participants next completed a series of scales to measure the importance of honor concerns (five items adapted from Rodriguez-Mosquera et al., 2008), how much the participant endorsed dignity and face (four and seventeen items, respectively, from Leung & Cohen, 2011), and the participant's level of self-esteem (ten items from Rosenberg, 1965). Dignity, face, and self-esteem were included to ensure that the honor prime could be shown to influence honor without influencing related cultural scripts (dignity and face) or individual differences like self-esteem (since participants in the honor condition recalled events in which they had been criticized publicly). Finally, participants answered demographic questions including nationality (as noted above, participants were excluded if they indicated other than US), age, and gender.

Measures

Importance of honor. At the conclusion of the study, participants were asked to think back to the event they described in the writing task, and to indicate the extent to which they thought the following five statements were important (1 = not at all important to 5 = extremely important): "others seeing me as someone who deserves respect," "others regarding me as someone who is not to be disrespected," "my social image," "caring about the implications of my actions for my social image," "and defending myself from criticism" (adapted from Rodriguez-Mosquera et al., 2008). Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.80; items were thus averaged at the participant level to a single honor value for each respondent.

Judgments about the target. Competence was measured using one item (adapted from Fiske et al., 2002). Warmth was also measured using two items (adapted from Fiske et al., 2002) including trustworthy, and warm and friendly. Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.90 overall for all four judgments (warmth and trust for the authentic smiler and warmth and trust for the inauthentic smiler), and did not differ by respondents' primed condition (Cronbach's α = 0.89 for honor salience prime and 0.90 for neutral prime participants). The two warmth items were averaged at the participant level to a single warmth value for each respondent.

Results and Discussion

Honor salience manipulation check. Three individuals were removed from further analyses at this stage because review of their responses to the writing prompt revealed that they did not follow instructions or indicated they did not remember a time when they had been criticized in public. Manipulation check analyses on the remaining 159 participants confirmed that participants in the honor salience condition reported that the honor items were more important to them ($M = 3.89$, $SD = 0.57$) than participants in the neutral condition ($M = 3.67$, $SD = 0.76$), $t(156) = -1.99$, $p = 0.05$, Cohen's $d = 0.32$. Further, participants in the honor salience and neutral conditions showed no differences by condition for dignity (honor condition: $M = 4.05$, $SD = 1.34$, neutral condition: $M = 4.09$, $SD = 1.21$, $t(157) = 0.21$, $p = 0.83$), face (honor condition: $M = 4.30$, $SD = 0.83$, neutral condition: $M = 4.14$, $SD = 0.70$, $t(157) = -1.35$, $p = 0.18$), or self-esteem (honor condition: $M = 3.18$, $SD = 0.54$, neutral condition: $M = 3.26$, $SD = 0.52$, $t(156) = 1.06$, $p = 0.29$). These checks validated that the salience of honor, and no other potentially relevant constructs, was manipulated with the prime in this study.

Judgments about the target. As hypothesized, a mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with honor salience condition as a between-subjects factor and the (in)authentically

smiling headshots as within-subject factors revealed a significant interaction effect for warmth judgments, $F(1, 157) = 4.34$, $p = 0.04$. Additional analyses (see Figure 3.2) revealed the pattern of the interaction results. Participants who had been primed with honor salience in a work context rated authentic smilers as more warm ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 0.51$) than they rated inauthentic smilers ($M = 3.22$, $SD = 0.59$), $t(77) = -5.33$, $p < 0.01$, Cohen's $d = 0.39$. Participants who wrote about a recent day at work also rated authentic smilers as more warm ($M = 3.26$, $SD = 0.54$) than they rated inauthentic smilers ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 0.50$), $t(80) = -3.09$, $p < 0.01$, Cohen's $d = 0.20$. Further, the main effect for honor salience condition was not significant, $F(1, 157) = 2.39$, $p = 0.12$, indicating that it is not the case that those primed with the salience of honor unilaterally rated individuals more favorably regardless of smile type. Instead, differences in ratings appear only when smile type as authentic or inauthentic is taken into consideration. Once smile type is factored into the analyses, the interaction effect shows that while authenticity is always rated more favorably than inauthenticity, those primed with the salience of honor in that context judge authentically smiling others as the most warm and trustworthy. Thus, authenticity leads to more favorable warmth ratings particularly when the judger is primed with the salience of honor in the judgment context.

Insert Figure 3.2 about here

For competence judgments, a mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with honor salience condition as a between-subjects factor and the (in)authentically smiling headshots as within-subject factors revealed a directional but non-significant interaction effect for competence judgments, $F(1, 157) = 1.73$, $p = 0.19$. Additional analyses (see Figure 3.3) uncovered the pattern

underlying this surprising non-significant result. Participants who had been primed with honor salience in a work context rated authentic smilers as more competent ($M = 3.31$, $SD = 0.59$) than they rated inauthentic smilers ($M = 3.14$, $SD = 0.60$), $t(77) = -3.35$, $p < 0.01$, Cohen's $d = 0.27$. Participants who wrote about a recent day at work also rated authentic smilers as more competent ($M = 3.16$, $SD = 0.54$) than they rated inauthentic smilers ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 0.50$), $t(80) = -1.98$, $p = 0.05$, Cohen's $d = 0.15$. Further, the main effect for honor salience condition was not significant, $F(1, 157) = 1.72$, $p = 0.19$, indicating that, as for warmth, it is not the case that those primed with the salience of honor unilaterally rated individuals more favorably regardless of smile type. Instead, differences in ratings appear only when smile type as authentic or inauthentic is taken into consideration. However, these results do differ from those for warmth judgments. That is, once smile type is factored into the analyses, results show that authenticity is always rated more favorably than inauthenticity. While not expected, this finding may be the result of the overly vague context description at the beginning of the study—participants were told that the images would be of someone they might meet at work, with no further information on the rank, title, salary, or job standing of the person pictured.

Insert Figure 3.3 about here

Together, these results show that when honor is salient, we make even more favorable judgments for authentic smilers, with the strongest, most reliable effects for warmth judgments (which are considered primary; Fiske et al., 2007). Further, it appears that differences in judgments based on cues of authenticity can be primed in context if the individuals being primed are already sensitive to honor concerns—as students in the US South would be.

Given the findings from Study 1 and 2, it seems that authenticity does influence interpersonal interactions when two conditions are present: first, when individuals can make discretionary interpersonal judgments about someone when initially meeting them, and second, when individuals are particularly sensitive to subtle cues of perceived authenticity. When individuals have no discretionary decision-making abilities regarding an unknown other—such as a fast-food worker taking someone's drive-thru order—subtle interpersonal cues are unlikely to have as much weight in interpersonal judgments. On the other hand, when individuals are able to make discretionary judgments and are sensitive to such cues, then authenticity is more likely to moderate the influence of authenticity on judgments, prompting these individuals to more favorably react to authenticity than inauthenticity. However, although these conclusions are supported by the empirical findings from the prior two studies, it remained to be seen whether authenticity would influence consequential discretionary decisions in individuals' normal working lives. Thus, in the next phase of research I moved to a field context in which discretionary decisions are both a vital part of individuals' work as well as likely to be inherently important to the individuals' sense of worth in their jobs. I chose small business lending as an appropriate context.

Small business lending is a context in which interpersonal judgments have both significant and measurable outcomes; whether a loan gets funded, and if so, under what terms is an easily measured indication of a loan officer's judgment of the loan applicant. Such decisions are excellent measures of discrete behavioral reactions to someone over and above any internal judgments of the individual's competence and warmth. Moreover, although lending is very driven by numbers and financial calculations, numbers are not the full story. Trust between borrowers and lenders is critical, with character being explicitly named as one of the commonly

known Five Cs of Credit, along with capital, collateral, capacity, and conditions. This unique balance of numbers and interpersonal judgment of character makes small business lending a particularly promising context in which to study how much interpretation of interpersonal cues influences loan decisions.

To tackle this question, I explored the world of small business loans via two methodologies. First, I interviewed small business loan officers in order to learn more about how they perceive interpersonal decisions are made in lending decisions. Using the broad themes and insights gained from these interviews, as well as the theorizing I have proposed above—that subtle subjective cues like a person's facial expression may significantly influence judgments about the person—I designed an experimental study to more explicitly test how interpersonal cues like face-to-face interactions might influence loan decisions in discrete, measurable ways.

3.7 Authenticity and Small Business Loan Decisions

The World of Small Business Loans

Small business owners typically look to loan providers for funding in order to make capital improvements such as renovations to their businesses or other business expansion and improvement efforts. Potential entrepreneurs can also search for loans in order to open a small business. The two main sources of funding are through banks or through governmental Small Business Administration (SBA) programs. The SBA offers a variety of loan categories to help small businesses with general funding needs, equipment, and even disaster relief.[9] The SBA defines small businesses differently by industry, with definitions based on average annual

---

[9] http://www.sba.gov/loanprograms

receipts (typically varying from \$0.75M to \$35.5M, and \$14.5M on average) or average number of employees (with an upper limit from 100 to 1,000 in most cases).[10]

Banks can either work with the SBA to offer loans to small business owners, or offer loans directly from the bank. If loans are offered through the SBA, the bank must follow SBA protocol throughout. Loans offered directly by the bank are somewhat more discretionary in nature and follow guidelines set forth by the individual institution.[11] However, as part of his or her job duties, as evidenced by the interviews described below, the individual loan officer does bear some leeway in which applicants he chooses to propose that the bank fund vs. those he recommends not funding.

To develop more nuanced understanding of how, if at all, facial expression of emotions consciously or unconsciously influences decisions in small business loans above and beyond typical considerations like credit scores and business plans, I followed characteristics of a grounded theory approach in the next two studies, using qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques (cf., Miles & Huberman, 1994) to explore the role of quick interpersonal judgments in approving small business loans. The grounded theory traditionally emphasizes data collection and analysis as a hand-in-hand process with theoretical development and understanding of the question at hand; as a research method it allows the investigator to approach a problem from the lens of a general question and develop and test specific theoretical conclusions as they emerge from the data themselves (Martin & Turner, 1986). Across the qualitative interviews described below as well as the experimental study developed based on these interviews, I explored how perceived authenticity—as inferred from the interviewees' discussions of trustworthiness and

---

[10] http://www.sba.gov/category/navigation-structure/contracting/contracting-officials/small-business-size-standards; http://www.sba.gov/content/small-business-size-standards. In nearly 60% of cases, based on NAICS industry codes, the limit for employees is 500.
[11] Interview with J.

other characteristics regarding the perceived intentions of the loan applicant, and explicitly controlled for in the experimental design—influences lending decisions.

3.8 Study 3: Preliminary Qualitative Research with Small Business Loans

In this study I conducted interviews with small business loan officers in order to discern how, if at all, loan officers viewed loan application approval as a discretionary process and if perceived, potentially indirect cues about the loan applicant's authenticity (i.e., inferences about the applicant's intentions) influenced this process. My goal through these interviews was to learn more about the loan officer's role in analyzing both the physical loan application as well as the small business owner. Although I took pains to avoid asking leading questions, I was particularly interested in exploring how conscious the interpersonal judgment process is for loan officers, and to what degree loan officers explicitly recognize and value subtle cues about the loan applicant. Further, given the exploratory nature of this part of the research, and to avoid influencing interviewees' responses, I did not ask specifically about crow's feet and smiling behavior in interviews, but did ask each interviewee about the importance of face-to-face communication in their loan decision-making process. If individuals highlighted this as an important aspect of their job, I asked additional follow-up questions. If individuals did not respond in detail to the original face-to-face question, I did not press the issue further.

Method

Participants and procedure. I conducted interviews with fifteen experienced small business loan officers using snowball and opportunistic sampling techniques to include a wide variety of bank officers across the US. I used semi-structured qualitative interview techniques to examine the role of loan officers' interpersonal judgments of small business loan applicants.

Since this study was intended to help shed light on the broad question of how interpersonal interactions in a particular business context—in this case, judging potential small business loan applicants—happen, and whether concepts related to an applicant's perceived authenticity influenced these decisions, no mention of authenticity was explicitly made in any interview. Instead, interviews centered on understanding broadly how small business loan applicants and bankers first forge relationships and interact with each other.

In total I conducted 15 interviews (11 male, 4 female respondents) for this preliminary qualitative research. The loan officers ranged from having around a decade to more than thirty-five years of experience in commercial banking, with two bankers having retired recently. In addition, two individuals were loan officers at the same bank at the time their interviews were conducted and one individual represented a connected network of community banks rather than a single institution. Thus, in total, although a majority of loan officers had had experience at more than one bank during their years as a loan officer, the interviewees represented current employment at eleven discrete banking institutions. These institutions also included a wide variety of types of banks located across the US, from small-to-medium-sized community and regional banks to large national banks.

Interviews ranged from thirty minutes to almost two hours, with two individuals electing to respond to interview questions in writing rather than verbally, producing more than one hundred pages of transcripts and field notes (for three non-recorded interviews). I coded the transcribed interviews in an iterative fashion to detect emerging themes, alternating between conducting additional interviews and coding until reaching theoretical saturation, or the point at which further data analysis did not generate new theoretical insights (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Results and Discussion

The timely nature of this study, occurring after banks had had a few years to react and adapt after the 2008 global financial crisis, and as they continue to face increased scrutiny from regulating bodies as a result, was not lost on my interviewees, or on me over time, as I continued speaking with lenders across various types of institutions. Initially I was skeptical about how much loan officers would openly discuss their interpersonal judgment process. It seemed plausible, for instance, that in the post-2008 world small business loan officers would be loath to rely intentionally on any aspect of the "human element," as multiple interviewees called it, in lending decisions. Loan officers are understandably wary of making discriminatory or unfair lending decisions, both for their own conscience as well as a result of external oversight. As J[12] stated, "[lenders] are under the microscope a lot more than [they] used to be, with the auditors and the FDIC coming a lot more often than they used to." However, although I expected typical issues of self-report and self-selection with the loan officers who agreed to speak with me, I was overall struck by the candor and humanness with which loan officers shared their experiences as lenders with me.

As I spoke with lenders, I quickly came to understand that lending is unsurprisingly a very numbers-driven enterprise, but it is still deeply rooted in the human element of decision-making. These two components combine to create tension in how loan decisions are made. Indeed, lenders repeatedly highlighted the constant need to balance the financial information, or numbers story, with the personal story and relationship with the borrower. Lenders further spoke at great length about the lenders' responsibility to the client, over and above any formal guidelines or rules, and how this customer-focused motivation influenced the need to protect

---

[12] Interviewees are all designated with single-letter identifiers to protect the confidentiality of themselves and their institutions.

both one's own and the bank's interests and viability. Together, these themes underscored the overall intensely personal nature of interpersonal judgments and interactions in small business lending, as I discuss below. Further, for each major theme discussed below, Table 3.1 provides an additional sample of quotations supporting various arguments within each theme.

However, it is important to note that two lenders, O and N, stood out from the beginning of my analysis as having a fundamentally different mindset about the lender's role in lending decisions. These two individuals described the process as much less personal and discretionary and repeatedly highlighted the need for both bankers and banks to protect themselves against auditing charges for violating any of the post-2008 financial crisis regulations. Thus, as relevant below, I specifically address how these two individuals occasionally provided a striking and unusual counterpoint to the analysis of the other lenders. Rather than casting doubt on the validity of the consensus among the other lenders, however, the perspective of these two individuals simply underscores how small business lending in some banks has been particularly affected by the financial crisis, and how this differs from the way in which many other banks, like J's, have chosen to react to the crisis.

Assessing the Complete Package: Using Objective and Subjective Information

The five Cs. The five Cs of credit are a well-known concept in lending, and immediately highlight the complexity of small business loans in terms of needing to balance so many elements of the entire package of information to arrive at a final decision about any given applicant. As R explained, "We really look at something called the Cs of credit…and the five Cs of credit are capacity, collateral, character, you know…all of the things that represent a loan for us. And those are all important things." C, an experienced lender and CEO of a small community bank, stated, "Of the Cs of credit—cash flow, collateral, etc.—the number one is character."

In particular, the need to balance the perceived importance of the character element of the five Cs with each of the other more numerical components (capital, collateral, capacity, and conditions) is especially challenging. M, a lender in a large national bank, took this a step further, saying that quantifying character is "very difficult to do, because it is a combination of everything." To that end, both the character and financial components need to be consistent before a lender feels comfortable making a recommendation on the loan. As S described, "When we're getting financial information to get a better understanding of the numbers, we're also evaluating the capability of the business owner at the same time, by the way they answer…so you're doing the financial analysis, but you're also doing the character analysis as well." J described one particular instance in which the consistency between character and financials was strikingly lacking, causing the loan not to be funded: "After those first few meetings, I felt really good. I thought, 'Well, if the financials back this up, we'll be able to do this for him.' And when we looked at [the financials], it was very clear in a short time that what he was telling me was garbage." As R explained, however, the need for consistency between character and financials works both ways to help or hurt a loan. She described one instance, for example, in which "the numbers were great, but the people just weren't honorable and they were trying to pull a fast one…fraud happens."

Further, within this balancing act, lenders emphasized the additional role of character as a lens for interpreting the financial information. M elaborated on C's sentiment, explaining matter-of-factly the importance of character, in conjunction with the financial information, in the way the bank assesses loan applications:

> The numbers are just to kind of get a conversation started. I look at the historical financials and I start formulating my questions…and then you try to get comfortable with the five Cs of credit. But character is the main one that trumps them all. You can't have the cashflow, the capital position, and not have the

character, that has to be in there as well. If not, then all the numbers don't represent themselves the way they are because you don't trust where they are coming from or what these people are involved in.

P, in a large national bank, agreed: "I don't think you can make an accurate decision just based upon the financials. The financials tell a story, but management really tells the story of the financials."

In contrast, N, a long-time lender in a small bank that had become much more sensitive to regulatory requirements following the 2008 crisis, downplayed the character element somewhat:

Well, you certainly want to learn who this person is...But in the end, the numbers have to be there before a lender can proceed [with the loan]. But the lender certainly takes the time to talk to these people and find out what their goals are, and what they've got in mind, and I know that character plays a part in this thought process. But in the end, the numbers have got to be right before we can even make the loan.

The role of instincts and face-to-face. To balance character with the other Cs, according to many bankers, requires both sensitive instincts and experience. Lenders then use this intuition to guide their subsequent exploration and analysis of the application. As P explained, "If your gut's saying, 'don't do it,' there are many ways to dig a lot deeper. You ask for more information because you want to back up everything." Indeed, C suggested one way would be to take more time to form an evaluation the lender is comfortable with, so that he might "purposefully slow the process to allow you and me to have enough interactions for me to ferret out the feelings that I'm having" via additional meetings, site visits, and questioning of the applicant's management and business capabilities.

Face-to-face meetings are a significant influence on lenders' instincts. Indeed, thirteen of the fifteen respondents highlighted that face-to-face conversations are a critical part of the initial judgment phase of a loan application. Face-to-face is one of the most important ways to begin a client relationship; as R stated, "to establish trust, face-to-face is crucial. You have got to meet

your client." As P argued, "I don't think the financials always tell the true picture of what's going on out there. So I always take the time [to meet the borrower upfront], that's the first thing I do. Always. I will never submit an application without meeting them." This initial judgment phase matters, because, as R explained, you "can get a pretty good feel, talking to somebody, how they are going to be in the relationship, [from that] first meeting." As R further elaborated, "There's some element of looking face-to-face at someone, and watching body language to see if there's a sense of honesty and credibility about them." M agreed with this claim, stating, "I always get a sense when I first meet someone. I am not always right! But I always get a sense...It goes further than their credit score…the human aspect, especially in my job, will never go away."

However, the two lenders who were especially sensitive to new regulatory requirements offered a stark counterpoint to the overall consensus that face-to-face and instincts are important components of the decision-making process. O explained that, while several face-to-face meetings would occur before the formal application is filed, after a loan is in process in-person conversations are "zero to none." N agreed, stating that "Actually just physically schedule a visit, you know…I don't know that there's a lot of that." O further highlighted that discretion in loan decisions, as would be informed by events like face-to-face meetings, is "sometimes not available for loan officers," and that instead the client financial worksheet would "have all of the answers."

Broader environmental cues to character. Lenders also take advantage of other subjective cues, including by observing the borrower's employees and the workspace in general. As P described, "You learn so much just by walking into somebody's office…You're looking at how management interacts with their employees…there are some that you can just tell he doesn't

respect the employees and they don't respect him." P continued by recounting an instance in which the office décor seemed overly ostentatious, and how he was struck in that first meeting that the office environment seemed suspicious—an instinct that later proved correct: "That company has since gone out of business, and I think there was a lot of fraud involved with that. Just by that one conversation you could tell there were problems with that company." As S also described, information about a potential new customer can also be gleaned from the broader community, from the "reputations they build" through "other relationships that person may have had" with vendors, current customers, and others in the community.

Discretion in Judgments

Judging overall willingness to repay. Together, the conjoint assessment of the five Cs for a specific loan applicant informs the lender's conviction of the applicant's willingness to repay—perhaps the most critical part of the decision to fund a loan. As R stated, "Our attention as bankers is…everything is great now but in a couple of years down the line…things can deteriorate. So then you really see the character of the customer. How are they going to react once they have losses, once they can't repay your loan, how are they going to react?" S echoed R's thought, stating that lenders always need to know "if they have a downturn, will they have the backbone and the will to address the problems and sacrifice personally?" M elaborated on this theme, explaining how the character component is a crucial input into forming a judgment about an applicant's willingness to repay:

> It's nearly impossible for a loan to pass all the way through without the character. It's an all-encompassing part of the whole equation….I have to be vigilant in whether or not I feel good about the people and it's not really about whether they can repay the loan, because you can look at the numbers and see if they can repay. It's about willingness to repay the loan.

Discretion in decision and terms. Once the willingness to repay is evaluated, this appraisal feeds into the lender's decision to fund the loan, and if so, under what terms. Given the increasing number of fair lending practice regulations, the lender's ability to exercise discretion is particularly pronounced in how the deal terms are structured. As J explained, "We have a lot of discretion. Once they're approved for the dollar amount, what we do with that dollar amount is up to us…I always like to go back to [the customer] with at least two options for the funding of that loan." S described a similar experience, stating that "the lender does have a fair amount of discretion on [loan terms] if it's within their loan authority. Our lenders have authority up to $200,000, and then anything over that has to go to committee." R agreed, stating, "I handle the pricing of things…that's mainly my job, to determine where I put my pricing and where I put my interest rates…we do have the discretion with pricing based on all these variables." Even with a more highly-regulated bank like M's, from the information that the lender inputs the pricing and risk models "spit out a rate, and then from there, you do have some discretion, there are things you can change like taking out the fees or a product." T summarized a lender's basic level of discretionary power well, by stating simply: "Loan officers typically have discretionary loan authorities given to them—these will usually vary based upon the experience and expertise of the officer. However, within those authorities the loan officer can usually act autonomously as long as the loan application meets the guidelines for the loan product." H expressed a similar perspective: "Let's say the numbers don't quite work out one way, you can change the terms and conditions of the loan…It's like reworking the equation to see if you can arrive at the right answer."

Assessing the complete package of both objective and subjective information, incorporating instincts based on face-to-face meetings and other inputs to inform final

discretionary decisions, and, in general, feeling comfortable with borrowers all combine to allow bankers to commit to their clients to an extraordinary degree. The initial judgment of a client is paramount to the banker exactly because of the downstream commitment to the customer that a small business lender has. That is, lenders are highly motivated to form reliable interpersonal judgments because of the cost to them in terms of both fulfilling customer relationship needs as well as meeting the demands of various regulatory and personal performance metrics. Put simply, maintaining good customer relationships is high-cost, and collecting on too many defaulted loans or charging-off too many completely failed loans hurts the banker both personally and professionally.

Lenders' Relationship with the Customer

Trust and experience. A major part of the lender's role at the bank is dealing with customers. This starts with increasing the number of loan applications that are submitted and then sifting through them to find promising, trustworthy applicants. R explained this role succinctly: "I am the one who goes out to drum up business, to establish a relationship, to establish trust." Trusting the customer is a vital component of the relationship for bankers; as P explained, "It's kind of hard to get something approved if you don't trust them. If I don't trust them, I probably won't do a deal—because if you're banking with them then there's a relationship there. And if there's no trust…I can't think of one of my customers I wouldn't trust right now."

Experience is a major element for bankers to learn when to trust someone. S explained how lenders develop intuition for trust formation: "Experience is the greatest teacher, particularly with loaning money. I'm sure I'm going to make future mistakes…by trusting someone that takes advantage of that trust. That's just part of life, people disappoint you. But the

92

key is that much more people *don't* disappoint you, and honor your trust, than those that don't."

C echoed this sentiment, explaining that "when you walk into a room you can size people up pretty quickly. And after a very short period of time you can assess a level of honesty, integrity, and credibility with them. But I will say that over the course of a career doing this hundreds, thousands of times you begin to recognize cues earlier."

Time on the ground. Part of being able to recognize cues earlier is putting in the time on the ground—spending time with borrowers and getting to know their businesses well. P highlighted the importance of the banker taking the time to get to know the client and his or her business: "You have to understand what [the company] does and understand the cash…it's more about learning about the business and management at that first meeting, then you look into the financials. Then do the financials make sense based on what you learned about the company?" As M explained, "It's one thing to imagine it on paper and it's another to actually go see it in person." Further, this time on the ground helps foster a strong bond between banker and borrower, such that the borrower feels as if the banker understands the borrower's position. As R described, "When someone says, 'this is my business'…and he takes the time to show his business, his assets, his inventory, whatever…I like that. I like someone that takes pride in his business and he wants to establish a relationship with you…that is what I have always appreciated from business owners; when they take the time out of their schedules and life." In turn, this in-depth understanding of what the borrower is facing in his or her business helps foster the high level of commitment that bankers feel toward clients.

Commitment to the customer. The commitment to the customer begins even before the loan has been approved. Lenders feel obligation to provide good service to the customer from the moment he or she walks in the door. As M pointed out, "We are very relationship based. I will

tell prospective customers up front that if they are just looking for a transaction and they are just shopping rates, it is probably not a good fit." According to P, good bankers believe that "it's not really worth my time if [pricing] is all the business owner wants, because I'm going to deliver the best product out there for you, and I'm going to give you the best service. So when you need something, when you have a problem…my customers know they can call me anytime, call me on my cell phone. I will take care of the problem." Indeed, the majority of banks who highlighted this type of commitment to the customer explicitly outlined the importance of this commitment in the bank mission statement or elsewhere on their "about us" website page, with one bank going so far as to feature an easily-spotted "Customers' Bill of Rights" online. This may be even more so the case with small community banks who can have very customized, rather than nationally standardized, websites.

Serving as a liaison between the customer and bank. Part of this commitment to the client is serving as a mediator between the banking institution and the customer. This liaising happens from the moment a lender decides to recommend that a loan application be funded, further highlighting the need for the lender to feel comfortable with that client. As J explained, "That's why it's important in my position to really get to know the client, because I'm kind of the spokesperson for the client. When I go to the underwriters, I'm going to bat for that client." Even O, whose bank had become intensely rules-focused, admitted that she felt compelled by the personal aspect of commitment to the client, working within the rules to help borrowers: "the desire to help is always there, but the logical ground behind it is a different thing. I position myself as an advocate between client and bank and always consider alternative solutions and requirements" to get the loan done. As the relationship progresses, this mediation role becomes even more pronounced. As H described:

You really become the liaison between the bank and your client, you're trying to appease both sides. So you turn into a negotiator, really, and you try to convey the message the way that it needs to be heard. On the bank side it may be really strong, but when you deliver that message to your client, who may also be your friend, you temper it quite a bit to where it doesn't seem as strong.

Importantly, the commitment to the client persists even if the loan gets in trouble, as long as the lender and customer have maintained a good relationship. For example, J described a recent incident in which he was able to modify loan terms to suspend a client's payment for two months to help the cash flow following a family emergency. As J pointed out, "Not every financial institution is going to do that. Some of them are just going to hold the screws to [the client] and say, 'You're paying us.'" For others, having to take drastic measures like closing down a business is intensely personal. M described one poignant experience: "I couldn't sleep at night…I was just shaking the whole time, to have to go up to somebody and close down their business, and take their house…that's tough." As P reflected, "Through 2008-2009, I probably learned more about banking in those two years than in any other time of my career, and I've been doing this for twenty years. But I just looked at is as, there are a lot of companies we had to help work though things. Rather than kick them out of the bank, it was 'how can we get you through this?'" Even banks that are more rules-based emphasized that actually collecting on collateral is a "last resort." N described "trying to give [problem borrowers] some breathing room, to get back on their feet."

Moreover, lenders feel some responsibility even to those borrowers who do not get approved. P stated that if a loan application is ultimately rejected, he "explains why we can't do something, so that they understand…I explain why we turned it down, because really, you're helping the business owner out. You're educating them on what the bank is looking for, because

if they know what the bank is looking for, they know their areas of weakness, and they know where they need to work on [things]."

Overall, then, lenders are faced with many competing demands: their own desire to serve the customer, their need to make reliable judgments about applicants in order to protect themselves and the bank, and the obligation to satisfy all regulatory constraints. In other words, they face both internal motivations—being professional and doing the job well by serving the customer—and external motivations—compliance and bank success—that jointly influence lenders' general sense of success and worth on the job. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these internal and external motivations create further tension for the loan officer, who must balance the two.

Tension between Internal and External Motivations

Internal motivations: Being professional, discerning character, & doing the job well. While character and subjectively-informed assessments of loan applicants is considered a vital component of the lender's job, lenders are also understandably eager to remain professional in their evaluations. As J stated, "I know there's not a formula, a character formula, but I feel like there could be even more training and better processes to follow as a lender. I'd like to see more things like that. I think other lenders would, too." These lenders recognize the balancing act between subjective and objective information, and how each can dramatically color interpretation of the other and thus, the applicant's entire request. As S elaborated,

> You have to have a good logical reason [for making a loan]. It can't be based on emotion. I've told our lenders, "This isn't a popularity contest. We have to do business with people who sometimes we don't like." If it's a logical decision based off your concern of risk if they'll pay back the loan, then dig deeper and find out why you have that instinct. But make sure it's not just a dislike of somebody. Because there are people who are arrogant and egotistical, and quite honestly a lot of those people are fairly successful because of their ego. So you can't make it into whether I like somebody or dislike them. It's got to be a logical, reason-based judgment call. And it can't just be off purely an emotion.

Lenders are proud of their role in the lending decision, and take the experience necessary to becoming an expert very seriously. While J pointed out how valuable his bank's regular training sessions are, many bankers overtly prided themselves on how they have developed significant skills over their years as a lender that cannot be gained other than through experience in honing the requisite instincts and abilities to assess the complete loan package. As R argued,

> There are not too many [young] bankers that have the years of experience that kind of know what a bank will do, that know all of the questions to ask to support a credit decision…it takes time to become a banker, it takes years to become a banker and to have the expertise. People coming out of college say they want to be bankers….they go out and they don't know the questions. So they just go out and they say, "well, this guy is a personable person"…we can't send them out on the street to try and develop business for us…it takes time to become a banker and it takes time to ask the proper questions.

However, a significant part of a lender's development is also learning how to handle the myriad of external constraints he or she faces, both from the bank and from broader governmental regulatory oversight.

External motivations: Compliance & bank success. N explained the need to consider the bank's perspective as a consideration in every loan decision, stating that: "The way that we have to look at it is, if the business fails, are you going to be able to make the payment?...They have to have the ability to pay whether or not the business makes it. That's the bank's point of view…the bank is going to look at your credit first, they're going to look at your collateral. You know, what have you got put up? And that's even more important than ever these days." While every bank has failed loans and charge-offs, these need to be rare in order to ensure the bank's survival. As H explained, "In taking a loan application…what you're trying to do is predict the future, and you have to be right more than ninety-nine percent of the time in order to thrive as a bank." M also agreed that banks are "not in the business of taking too much risk." As N noted, "the banks are trying to protect themselves."

For some banks, ensuring bank solvency and avoiding violating external regulations is quite paramount. For such banks, like N's, "We have a system we go by and it's pretty concrete. We have a rates sheet type thing…the auditors have made us mandate something like that…it's pretty stringent." Even lenders, like M, who freely argued for the importance of discretion in assessments admitted that banks "are pretty highly regulated in small business by the federal government. We have certain thresholds that we have to adhere to that other parts of the bank do not…any small business loan…gets a lot of scrutiny to make sure you are compliant." J further highlighted banks' need to be careful not to step over the line of legality, noting that:

> Some banks right on their website will say under their loan criteria that character is listed as one of the things they consider. You have to be careful when you talk about character and the lending process, because you have to incorporate fair lending. When the auditors come in they're looking at "here are your standards"…We're under the microscope now, so our due diligence on the underwriting side, or the credit side, is extremely important now.

For bank's like N's, however, the stance on following the rules is even clearer: "It's a regulation. In [a lender's] mind they might think this or that [about the applicant], but if they don't make the loan, if all the numbers are there, we can be in big trouble if we don't make a loan…that would be breaking the law." For all banks, however, C pointed out the need for the bank to be constantly vigilant against "the handiwork of people who are able to pull the wool over people's eyes," to avoid paying the price later.

Together, the internal and external motivations create a tension within the loan officer, who must balance these often competing concerns. While lenders like O and N, whose banks have taken a firm stance on regulatory guidelines, this tension is somewhat removed—these lenders are not given the opportunity to exercise as much discretion, and so any individual judgment about a loan applicant or any specific loan's performance is less tied to the lender's decision-making process. N succinctly explained this lack of tension within the banker when the

decision is based almost solely on the logical, numbers-driven part of an application: "unless it's a CPA error…as far as [for] me, it's black and white." For other lenders, however, balancing the tension is much more complex.

Managing the tension between the internal & external. Broadly, a lender feeling as if he or she is doing a good job (internal motivation) and also upholding standards for the bank (external motivation) was discussed by many bankers. As H said, "It's the bank's money you're risking, and you're risking your own personal reputation. And all this to try to make good decisions. And you don't ever like getting really hoodooed or someone conning you when you think that you know how to make good decisions." P eloquently elaborated further:

> You know what, I would never put my reputation on the line. I would never put a loan on just because I have a [sales] goal and I'm going to stretch this or stretch that…it's not worth it. It's just not worth the headache. Plus then, you're scrambling, you're trying to make things right, it's just not worth it. There are a lot of bankers that get paid by what they put on [the books]. And we do here, but to me, that's not part of the deal. Let's say you put on a bad loan, two years from now, you're spending all this time trying to collect on it, and credit's going to say "well, you don't make good decisions," or your boss is going to say you don't make good decisions. You don't want people questioning your ability to make decisions….I don't take risks like that, it's just not worth it. That's why you get to know the people as well as you can before you make a loan.

Bankers accomplish this balance between their own interests and those of the bank and customer via several means. For example, C explained how he helps protect himself by "putting covenants in place that trip red flags early on and give [him] the right to come back to the table to restructure…structuring it in such a way as to protect [his] position." However, he did further note the caveat that his experience is that "you cannot adequately structure a deal to offset character." J expressed a very similar sentiment, explaining that:

> That's the tough part, because we want to pay attention to character. We want to develop that trustworthy relationship. We want to get to know our clients. However, when we approve a loan, and the auditors come in and they call me into

an interview…they want to know every reason, and it has to be backed up with documentation. It's a very delicate balance, and it's hard.

In sum, the rich narratives described by these lenders demonstrate that small business lending, while strongly influenced by regulations from both banks and the government, is still a very personal job, incorporating many aspects of the "human element" referred to by many bankers. Lenders are tasked with assessing the complete package of an applicant, calling on their understanding of the five Cs, face-to-face meetings, instincts, and other subjective cues in addition to the financial information. When they are permitted to use discretion, as they most frequently are, they apply their overall evaluation of an applicant's willingness to pay—a signal of that client's intentions toward the bank if the loan were funded—to decide loan terms. This high bar lenders employ to make their initial interpersonal judgment and trust decisions seems quite rational given the intense level of commitment that lenders show toward their clients once they are approved.

Additionally, this type of working environment suggests a tension between the internal motivations lenders face—being professional, reliably discerning character, and doing their jobs well—with the external motivations they face—complying with regulations and ensuring the bank's survival. Thus, like those sensitive to honor concerns, lenders may plausibly be particularly attuned to cues of perceived authenticity in another person because of this tension. Indeed, through lenders' own recounting of their interpersonal judgment process it becomes evident that lenders' initial judgments are influenced by the perceived authenticity, trustworthiness, and character ("does this applicant mean what they say?") of loan applicants. While no research to my knowledge has yet examined the role of honor in small business lending, lenders' descriptions and interpretation of their experiences in lending suggest that, as for honor-motivated individuals, lenders may show reliable preferences for authentic vs.

100

inauthentic individuals. Thus, the following experiment builds on the rich accounts of the lenders interviewed to test specifically how the first moments of an initial meeting with a loan applicant might influence the immediate reaction that the applicant receives. Specifically, to connect the world of small business loans to the prior findings from Studies 1 and 2, participants in Study 4 were asked to judge a hypothetical small business loan applicant smiling either authentically or inauthentically, and recommend loan terms for that applicant.

3.9 Study 4: Implications of Authenticity in Loan Applications

Based on prior experimental findings in peer-to-peer lending (Herzenstein et al., 2011; Sonenshein et al., 2011) and the preliminary qualitative research described above, it seemed possible that perceived authenticity in a loan applicant could influence loan decisions, at least on the margin. Thus, this experiment was designed to test whether authenticity influenced loan decisions when loans were analyzed in a more controlled setting than available through interview techniques, and if so, to what degree (i.e., as measured through variance in recommended loan terms like interest rate and maturity).

Method

Participants. Participants were students enrolled in upper-level Accounting courses in a large Midwestern university in the United States. A total of 153 students (96 male, 47 female, 10 who declined to report gender; Mage = 20.06) participated for either the chance to win a $25 Amazon.com gift card or course credit. While these participants were not small business loan officers, all students had taken introductory Accounting in a prior term and were currently enrolled in an upper-level Accounting course, thus making this student sample experienced and

knowledgeable about typical loan terms and performance metrics, firm valuations, and other financial analyses.

Procedure. Participants were told that they would be reviewing and judging a hypothetical small business loan application. No deception was used in this study; participants were informed that the hypothetical application was designed based on knowledge gathered from interviews with small business loan officers such that the application was representative of what a typical application might look like. Participants were also reminded that the application was hypothetical, so that no participant would mistakenly believe they were reviewing an actual application.

Participants were first randomly assigned to be presented with one of two scenarios to help get them in the mindset of being a small business loan officer. Participants were asked to imagine that they were either (1) an officer in a large, impersonal bank wherein there was little discretion in loan decisions, and officers were rewarded simply based on how well they followed the guidelines, rather than how well a loan performed, or (2) an officer in a small, community-oriented bank wherein there was a great deal of discretion in loan decisions, and officers were rewarded based on how well a loan performed. These two scenarios were designed to test whether explicitly stating the degree of discretion a loan officer has in decision-making would sway how much authenticity influenced final loan decisions. It is plausible, for instance, that by clearly stating the loan officer has a high degree of discretion, authenticity might more strongly influence decisions than if a loan officer were informed that they should merely follow the rules. Note, however, that participants were not given any formal rules or guidelines to help them in their analysis of the application; thus any difference in judgments based on the scenario that participants read would indicate a significant influence of mindset on decision-making.

Furthermore, although these scenarios were not a direct manipulation of honor as for Study 2, in this way the level of discretion an individual was told they have might also conceivably influence how salient honor (internal and external worth) is for that individual in the decision-making process. That is, an individual who has a high level of discretion in decisions might be more attuned to the salience of how coworkers and supervisors judge the outcome of his or her decisions (external source of self-worth), and feel more poignantly a personal attachment to the applicants and their loan outcomes (influencing his or her internal sense of self-worth), thereby demonstrating an increased sensitivity to honor. On the other hand, an individual with little discretion may feel personally removed from the decision, and thus face no benefit or risk to honor based on his or her decisions. Thus, these scenarios, if found to prime honor, would help shed light on how exactly organizational contexts could facilitate honor as an important consideration for individuals in these contexts (i.e., by highlighting how much a decision's outcome falls on the shoulders of the decision-maker).

Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions, either an authentic or an inauthentic loan applicant. Participants viewed one of two hypothetical loan applications. Each loan application contained the following information: (1) a brief bio of the applicant, who was presented as the founder and owner of a small woodworking furniture company, along with a photograph of the applicant smiling either authentically or inauthentically, depending on condition (images from Beaupré & Hess, 2003), (2), summary information on the company's operations, typical products and clientele, history of growth, and need for a loan to expand operations, (3) customer testimonials, (4) detailed product and financial information, including net income, order distribution information, sales figures and projections, (4) analysis of market opportunity and the firm's relative advantage over competitors, including historical and projected

data, (5) detailed description of the request for funding and what the loan would be used for (physical expansion and new equipment purchases), (6) a summary of current challenges faced by the company (e.g., rising materials costs), and (7) business and personal financial statements (e.g., balance sheet and income statement). Based on the interviews from the preliminary qualitative analyses, as well as several rounds of reviewing with a current loan officer at a major financial institution and several Accounting instructors at the university, followed by multiple rounds of revision of the materials, this information was deemed comprehensive enough such that participants would be able to plausibly judge the application but brief enough such that the study would not be overly onerous for participants. Further, the application was also intentionally designed to be a marginal case, such that neither approval nor disapproval of the loan was obvious, and thus some variation in appropriate loan terms across participants would be realistic. Moreover, after the first page of information a small copy of the applicant's photograph appeared at the top of the page, along with the firm's name and logo (a handsaw and wood board). As on the bio page, on the final page of the application a large photograph of the applicant was featured, along with the company's name and logo. Importantly, the two application conditions contained entirely identical information except for the authenticity of the smile of the pictured applicant.

Participants were then asked to complete a series of judgments of the loan applicant and make a decision about funding the loan. Participants were able to refer back to the application materials as much as they liked while completing this part of the study. After answering these questions, participants responded to the honor scale from Study 2 and basic demographics questions including age, gender, and nationality (note all participants were retained in the

analyses reported below as this study did not depend on regional culture or manipulating honor as for Studies 1 and 2).

Measures

> ***Judgments about the target and application.*** Participants responded to the competence and warmth scales from Studies 1 and 2, as well as items measuring how likely it was that they would approve the applicant, if the decision were up to them (seven-point Likert scale from Very Unlikely to Very Likely), the interest rate they would recommend for the loan if it were approved (in increments of 0.25% between 3-7%, anchored by <3% to >7%; i.e., <3%, 3.0%, 3.25%, etc.), and the maturity in years they would recommend for the loan if it were approved (in one-year increments from <5 to >8 years; i.e., <5, 5, 6, 7, 8, or >8 years). These ranges for interest rate and maturity were based on feedback from the same informants who helped in the development of the application materials. Cronbach's α for competence was 0.88 and for warmth was 0.90. Thus both competence and warmth were averaged at the participant level to single values for each respondent.

> ***Honor scale.*** Participants responded to the five-item honor salience scale as for Study 2. Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.83 and was thus averaged to a single value for each respondent.

Results and Discussion

> Ten students were removed at this point before any further analyses for failing to follow the instructions to complete the study in one sitting, without stopping and restarting their work (these ten students took on average 38.75 hours to complete the study).

> Surprisingly, highlighting the level of discretion an individual has in the loan decision-making process, while an important consideration for the loan officers interviewed, did not in this study influence the salience of honor for the participants in this sample. That is, participants

who put themselves into the mindset of a loan officer with a high level of discretion did not indicate that honor was more salient for them ($M = 3.64$, $SD = 0.75$) compared to participants who put themselves into the mindset of a loan officer with a low level of discretion ($M = 3.72$, $SD = 0.78$), $t(132) = 0.59$, $p = 0.55$. This indicates that there was no difference in concern for honor between the level of decision-making discretion conditions, thus these two conditions were collapsed in all further analyses.

Several reasons for the lack of difference in honor based on loan officer mindset may exist. First, discretion as a factor in decision-making may not be directly related to the salience of one's honor, or the balance between internally- and externally-sourced self-worth. Second, while the participants in this study were reasonably knowledgeable about financial information and loan applications, they had no direct loan officer experience. Asking them merely to put themselves in the mindset of a loan officer may not have been a strong enough manipulation to lead to any significant differences in honor salience, even if discretion is related to honor. Thus, the lack of differences by loan officer mindset found here may be the result of an unintentionally weak manipulation, or because the manipulation was unrelated to the variable of interest (honor). Future studies should more explicitly prime the salience of honor for individuals judging loan applications, in order to test whether honor does indeed moderate the general preference for authentic applicants found in this study. Honor might be more directly primed, for example, by asking respondents to write about a time at work in which their honor was challenged (e.g., as per Studies 1 and 2, as an unrelated task)[13] or by asking respondents to imagine that someone

---

[13] This manipulation was not feasible in this study design due to the study setup. Asking participants to respond to an "unrelated" writing prompt before completing their analysis of the loan application would not have been a believable cover story since the study was presented to students as explicitly involving an analysis task directly relevant to the course material the students had learned.

directly connected to the loan (the applicant and/or the respondent's work supervisor) had in some way called the participants' honor into question.

For several reasons, it seemed somewhat unlikely that the differences in warmth and competence based on smile authenticity that were found in the previous studies would be found so overtly here. First, participants were presented with a considerable amount of information in the application materials about the applicant's warmth (his family life was discussed at some length in his bio) and competence (the full history of the company's performance and the applicant's experience in his profession were described in detail). Second, as highlighted by the loan officers in their interviews, judgments of loan applications must be fair and have no appearance of discrimination. Instead, decisions must be backed by objective data. For these two reasons, then, it is plausible that no differences in judgments of competence or warmth would be expected. Indeed, participants did not rate the authentic smiler to be significantly different in terms of competence ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 0.64$) or warmth ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 0.63$) compared to the inauthentic smiler ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 0.59$ for competence and $M = 3.90$, $SD = 0.68$ for warmth), $t(141) = 0.14$, $p = 0.89$ (for competence), and $t(141) = -0.83$, $p = 0.41$ (for warmth).

However, given the loan officers' explicit discussions of the relatively higher level of discretion possible in loan terms, more overt differences in behavioral reactions to (in)authentic smilers in terms of the actual loan recommendation were expected. Participants judged applications in three ways: likelihood of recommending that the loan be approved, and if the loan were approved, under what interest rate and maturity (duration of loan) terms. Variation in judgments of interest rates and maturity terms, in particular, could easily be substantiated by the financial information given in the loan application materials. Furthermore, since loan terms are related to the expected value of the loan itself rather than personal judgments of the loan

applicant, differences in recommended loan terms across applicants would not seem

discriminatory or capricious in the same way as might judgments of the applicant's personal

competence or warmth.

Indeed, as might be expected based on the repeated message from the loan officers that

they have less discretion over loan approvals than they do over the terms once a loan is

approved, participants did not differ in terms of how likely they would be to recommend the loan

be approved for either authentically ($M = 5.23$, $SD = 1.09$) or inauthentically ($M = 5.14$, $SD =$

0.98) smiling applicants, $t(137) = -0.55$, $p = 0.59$. However, consistent with the loan officers'

explanation of the relatively higher level of discretion in loan terms after a loan is approved,

participants did recommend a higher interest rate for inauthentically ($M = 11.31$, $SD = 4.00$, or

approximately 5.33%)[14] vs. authentically ($M = 9.91$, $SD = 4.44$, or approximately 4.98%) smiling

applicants, $t(138) = 1.96$, $p = 0.05$, Cohen's $d = 0.33$. Participants also recommended shorter

maturity for inauthentically ($M = 2.92$, $SD = 1.24$, or approximately 5 years, 11 months) vs.

authentically ($M = 3.34$, $SD = 1.20$, or approximately 6 years, 4 months) smiling applicants,

$t(137) = -2.04$, $p = 0.04$, Cohen's $d = 0.35$. These results show that, overall, participants

recommended offering an inauthentic applicant a loan that charged an interest rate 0.35% higher

with a five months shorter duration than the loan recommended for the authentic applicant.

Together, a higher interest rate and a shorter loan duration—a worse deal for the

borrower given that the borrower is paying more to borrow the money and must also repay the

principal sooner—imply that the participants trusted inauthentically smiling applicants less than

authentically smiling applicants. That is, participants wanted more insurance against risk (higher

interest rate) and a quicker payback time (shorter maturity) for inauthentic applicants. Further,

---

[14] Interest rate responses were coded according to a 19-point scale for ease of analysis in whole numbers, such that <3%=1, 3%=2, 3.25%=3, etc. Thus, a score of 11 indicated an overall recommendation of 5.25% and 12 a recommendation of 5.5%.

given that interest rate and maturity were not significantly correlated ($r = -0.12$, $p = 0.17$), I calculated a composite interest rate X maturity variable for each participant by reverse-scoring the maturity item. In this way a higher value (higher interest rate combined with higher reverse-scored maturity) indicates a stricter loan agreement for the borrower. This comparison was also significant; participants recommended worse overall loan terms for inauthentically ($M = 46.79$, $SD = 23.83$) vs. authentically ($M = 36.81$, $SD = 22.17$) smiling applicants, $t(137) = 2.54$, $p = 0.01$, Cohen's $d = 0.44$.[15]

Together, these results provide additional empirical evidence for the notion that authenticity influences interpersonal interactions at work, even in the face of considerable additional objective and subjective information about the person being judged. Overall, experienced Accounting students tasked with judging a hypothetical small business loan applicant recommended worse loan terms for applicants who smiled inauthentically than for applicants smiling authentically. That is, participants recommended higher interest rates and shorter maturity terms for inauthentic vs. authentic smilers, even though all other information about the applicant being judged remained constant across conditions. This suggests that participants trusted inauthentic applicants less, and wanted more surety from these applicants (via stricter loan terms) that the loans would be repaid. Thus, it seems that authenticity does influence individuals' behavioral reactions to unknown others at work in measurable, discrete ways, and importantly, these differences in reactions persist even when considerable other, arguably more relevant, information about the person is available.

---

[15] Note that the means and standard deviations in this composite-score comparison are not directly interpretable as interest rates and maturity times are in different units (percentage points vs. years). This composite score is meant to illustrate the combined effect of interest rate and maturity deal terms on inauthentic vs. authentic applicants. Based on the results described here, participants recommend authentic applicants receive lower interest rates and extended loan durations compared with inauthentic applicants, and, combined, these recommendations indicate inauthentic applicants receive overall worse loan agreements from the borrowers' perspective.

3.10 General Discussion

Across diverse studies using a variety of research methodologies, I examine the relationship between expression authenticity and the cultural influence of honor in interpersonal judgments in business contexts. This variety of contexts and methodologies allows me to triangulate how authenticity and honor, or sensitivity to the tension between internal and external, may interact to influence interpersonal interactions.

In Study 1, individuals from honor-based cultures were shown to favor authentic smilers in their interpersonal judgments, with individuals not from honor-based cultures distinguishing less between (in)authentic smilers, and in the case of competence, actually penalizing the authentic smilers. In Study 2, analyses showed that priming the immediate salience of honor for those sensitive to it further exacerbates differences in judgments for authentic vs. inauthentic others. That is, when primed with the salience of honor, individuals evaluate authenticity even more positively. In Study 3, small business loan officers, who must balance their own needs with those of the bank and borrower, highlighted the importance of knowing the client and developing a bond of trust between officer and client in order to make an informed judgment of the five Cs, or complete package, of any applicant. For these lenders, who risk significant reputational as well as financial costs for recommending a bad loan, trust and confidence in clients' character is often first formed via face-to-face meetings and initial gut reactions and comprises a significant component of loan approval and successful loan relationships. Study 4 investigated the relationship between instinctive initial judgments and loan decisions further by asking subject matter experts to judge hypothetical loan applicants. The results demonstrate that given the same quantitative and qualitative information except for the authenticity expressed on the face, judgers recommend harsher loan terms to inauthentic vs. authentic applicants.

Overall, these findings support the notion that facial cues can and do influence consequential interpersonal judgments in realistic settings in which individuals are likely to be sensitive to internal and external influences on their sense of self-worth. In turn, these individuals are also likely to be attuned to subtle interpersonal cues of others' intentions toward them. Across multiple experimental studies, and supported by the narratives of those who face significant tension between internal and external cues of success and worth, the results demonstrate that individuals who are more likely to be sensitive to interpersonal cues are found to both implicitly and explicitly favor authenticity in others. Moreover, this sensitivity moderates the effect, such that these individuals react more positively to authentic vs. inauthentic others above and beyond any expected general preference for authenticity. Taken together, these results connect multiple streams of prior research, including interpersonal judgments based on facial expressions and authenticity, and the cultural influences and consequences of these judgments.

Future Research

Although this chapter has taken initial steps in understanding how social judgment from facial expressions, the authenticity of those expressions, and cultural influences on social judgment relate to consequential interpersonal and work-related outcomes, many open questions at the intersections of these areas of management research remain.

For example, although not explicitly addressed in the current studies, it is plausible that individuals, regardless of their concern for honor, may judge others' facial expressions differently if these other individuals are known to be from another culture than the judger. Recent work on the cultural accents of facial emotional expression demonstrate that individuals do show intra-cultural biases in how well individuals are able to recognize facial expressions, with individuals recognizing expressions from those of the same culture more accurately than

they recognize expressions from those not of the same culture (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Elfenbein et al., 2007; Marsh et al, 2003). Individuals may thus show less discrimination in their judgments of those from different cultures—in effect, giving them more of the benefit of the doubt in judgments—than those from the same culture. Future empirical work is needed to investigate the possibility that people may make judgments differently depending on whether they believe the individual being judged is from the same culture. Would a Southerner or loan officer highly concerned with balancing the internal and external make different inferences about another person if that person were known to be from a very different culture? In an increasingly global world, such inter-cultural interactions are a ripe area for continued empirical examination.

It must also be noted that trust and other interpersonal judgments like competence and warmth are not static characteristics of a relationship, but a living part of the relationship and likely to change over time depending on both individuals and context (Fulmer & Gelfland, 2013). While this chapter has investigated the critical first stage of inferences about someone in new relationship development, future analyses should examine the intertemporal dynamics of trust and other judgments as business relationships develop. While honor may influence how initial judgments and evaluations are made, it is plausible that over time these judgments and evaluations may be revised based on other, stronger cues. In effect, the inauthentic smiler may be forgiven for his facial behavior after time has passed and trust or other characteristics have otherwise been validated. Whether initial assessments of someone that are influenced by authenticity later predict how the dynamics of judgment and evaluations in the relationship unfold, change, and possibly diverge over time is an interesting and potentially fruitful avenue for research. It is as yet unknown what kind of long-term influence, if any, judgments of someone based on authenticity in smiling behavior may have on a relationship.

Further, the conceptualization of honor as concern with being seen as someone not to be taken advantage of, and the evidence found in these studies suggesting that honor may be more relevant in business contexts than previously understood, opens a plethora of promising new avenues of research. First, a one-sided view of honor as an explanation for violence ignores the potential ability of honor individuals to exhibit more finely-tuned judgments of others based on subtle cues that may be undervalued by those less motivated by honor. The individual who distinguishes the authenticity of smiles and uses this distinction as informative for interpersonal judgment may in fact be a valuable asset to any organization tasked with making difficult decisions about new or unknown people. Future research should investigate this question more explicitly; long-term analysis of small business loan performance correlated with initial judgments of the applicant, for example, could help shed light on whether initial interpersonal judgments based on facial expression or other subtle cues is actually related to later performance. Finding evidence that initial judgments do actually predict later loan performance would be of immense theoretical and practical importance.

Future research should also further explore how manipulation of the salience of honor concerns in a particular context influence subsequent judgments and reactions. Honor has often been primed through use of physical means meant to offend the subject's honor and elicit a violent reaction, most often by bumping into the study participant (i.e., as memorably crafted by Cohen et al., 1996). However, the conceptualization described and examined in this chapter does not necessarily rely on violence either as an instigator or result of honor concerns. Rather, as demonstrated in this chapter, it is likely that honor can be reliably primed in a very business-relevant way, by asking subjects to describe a time when they were publicly criticized at work. Such public criticism is likely to prime one's sense of concern for both internally- and

externally-sourced self-worth. Indeed, the possibility of priming honor has been suggested in the

literature (cf., Oyserman & Lee, 2008), yet beyond the studies reported here only one paper to

my knowledge has explicitly primed the concept of honor (Cohen & Leung, 2009). The

possibility of priming the salience of honor suggests also a host of other contexts in which being

concerned with both internal and external components of self-worth is likely to be relevant and

could be studied using both experimental and non-experimental techniques, such as in mobs,

gangs, professional wrestling or fighting, automobile sales, political races, and many others.

3.11 Contributions

In this chapter I draw on multiple domains of research—social judgment of others from

facial expressions, authenticity in facial expression, cultural influences on interpersonal

judgment, and the influence of social judgment on interpersonal and work-related outcomes—to

connect honor as a cultural script with the interpretation of facial expression authenticity. I focus

on how expression interpretation influences an individual's judgment of and reaction toward

someone else dependent on the individual's concern for honor, or being concerned with both

internally- and externally-sourced self-worth. Whether judging a potential loan applicant or

simply taking one's car for repairs, interpersonal inferences about and reactions to someone in an

initial encounter can shape the entire course of a business relationship. Through this research I

hope to expand our theoretical and practical understanding of how individual and contextual

differences, such as concern for honor in business contexts, can influence those judgments and

reactions.

FIGURES

Figure 3.1: MTurk, Judgments of Service Station Worker for Car Repair (Study 1)

Warmth Judgments

Error bars represent +/- 1 between-groups std error; * p<.05, **p<.01; all tests reported as 2-tailed

Competence Judgments

Error bars represent +/- 1 between-groups std error; * p<.05, **p<.01; all tests reported as 2-tailed

115

Figure 3.2: Judgments of Warmth & Trustworthiness in Mixed-Model Design (Study 2)

Warmth & Trustworthiness Judgments

Figure 3.3: Judgments of Competence in Mixed-Model Design (Study 2)

Competence Judgments

TABLES

Table 3.1: Evidence for Lenders' Considerations in Lending Decisions

Theme	Evidence
Assessing the Complete Package	
Five Cs	"At the small business level, we make decisions based on the entire package. [Other banks], for many of the customers we deal with, it is absolutely mathematical. If you applied for a loan, they'll pull your credit score, they'll pull a Dun & Bradstreet report, it'll generate a yes or no computer-based decision, and that's it. It's metric." (C)
	"Objectively one of the ways we measure character is by looking at someone's credit history. If you go back and they have a long credit history of always paying their loans as agreed, that's a sign of someone who is trustworthy, credible, honest, committed, and responsible. So character measurement isn't just subjective. The credit report isn't just to measure capacity, it's also to measure character as well." (S)
Instincts	"Everything on paper looked good, but I had a gut feeling that there was something about the business owners. I couldn't really put my finger on it, but there was something…I thought maybe I am being overly sensitive…I went and did some more research and started asking more questions directly…but everything came back [clean]…but now based on experience when I have a gut feeling I take it seriously…and it may just come down to asking twenty more questions until you get down to what that gut is. I just didn't go far enough that time…But once you experience things you can kind of tell, you can get better at recognizing character." (M, describing a painful charge-off)
Face-to-face	"You can tell so much about a person…once you sit and you listen to their story, that's why you have to meet with them." (P)
	"Typically that one-on-one face-to-face is a good indicator of where that loan's going to go…nine times out of ten, the initial meeting is a good indicator of where that loan's going to go…You learn so much from that first meeting, and typically it adds up when you see the financials." (J)
	"I think face-to-face is key. We wouldn't do all of this stuff online or over the phone. So much of how we communicate is not by words but by expression, facial expressions and gestures. Even on the phone you lose something, you lose a lot in that communication. Certainly through emails and all that you lose a tremendous amount. So we've tried to do our [loans] through face-to-face as much as possible…The customer tends to like that too, that they actually have someone. Even the younger generation want to interact face-to-face, they don't want to do it all by email and phone calls and all that." (S)
	"Number one, there's no replacing face-to-face. If I can look into someone's eyes and determine by interaction that there is a spirit of credibility there, they're already way down the road, because whatever they introduce, as numbers, as a business plan, has a ring of credibility to that…Some people won't look you in the eyes. I think there's just a feel about people that something feels right or

	something doesn't feel right…There's a tremendous amount of credibility established in that first face-to-face interview, or not…(then, repeating himself somewhat to emphasize his point) There's some element of looking face-to-face at someone, and watching body language to see if there's a sense of honesty and credibility about them. Sometimes that can be determined pretty quickly upfront, sometimes you have to do a bit more research…I can't tell you how many times people have come with reasonable, good business plans, but number one, as I sat across the table from them and heard their story, looked at their eyes, and then did a little bit of background checking on them, if I couldn't get comfortable with a relationship, it ends there." (R)
Discretion in Judgments	
Overall willingness to repay	"There are times when we get a good first impression of someone, and then you pull the curtain forward and it's not so good. And you say, 'Whoa, what happened here?' You're surprised. And sometimes they have a great explanation…We have a jaundiced eye, though, once we see that. They really have to convince us that despite their past, they're going to meet their obligations, and are good risk going forward. But honestly it's conflicting [information], and a lot of times it's not an easy decision." (S) "Typically, with small business lending, the way they've run their business, their history with that business, plays a lot into how they treat their obligations and whether or not they're going to pay us back." (J)
Discretion in decision & terms	"You have to meet certain figures [like] debt service coverage ratios, there's one format and that's the format used by the entire bank, [but] interest rates are discretionary…really it's up to the relationship manager [in terms of] where do we want to price it…and there are always reasons for waivers." (P) "With small business, though, [we can be] more flexible in the sense of [for example] what we can use for collateral. We can use a *lot* of different things for collateral so there's flexibility with that." (J)
Lenders' Relationship with the Customer	
Trust, experience, & time on the ground	"Being more of a community bank that's relationship-oriented…there's a lot of red tape with the SBA program, and I understand why. They don't have the ability to measure character like we do. And they're on the hook for a guarantee, and they're relying on us, a third party, to make that character evaluation. So they really have to go based on the numbers more than we do [because they can't meet the customer]." (S)
Commitment to the customer	"The numbers are still important, very important. I mean money pays back money. But still a lot of discretion is given to those that we've built a level of confidence and trust in. And small businesses have good years and bad years…Particularly with long-standing customers, we don't overreact to having a bad year. If they've had a history of performing, and they have a plan…we certainly tend to trust them and give them time." (S)

Tension between Internal and External Motivations	
External: Compliance & bank success	"[Lenders] have all the regulations, we have to do annual certification, compliance training." (H) "…The government has mandated so much of that stuff. Because when we were audited, we had to prove that we did a rate sheet, we have to prove that we didn't go over the credit score, we have to prove all those things now. So there's just not a lot of room for error…on the front end it's all about the numbers…It used to be that smaller banks could do a lot more, and now that's not true. We're probably being looked at under the microscope more than even the corporate banks are…those days [of more discretion] are gone, it's really about the credit and the numbers." (N) "From the banker standpoint we have to minimize our risk, we can't afford to take the loss…because we just rent money, and we get only a very moderate return on our loan." (R)
Tension between internal & external	"Maybe the pendulum has swung too far in this direction [of no discretion in loans] but it was out of some preservation that we had to. We had to hold onto our capital or we were going to be criticized." (H) "We have all been put in a position where we have wanted to help someone but we have been unsure. In agreeing to the [applicant's] request you have to remember you have to protect the bank's interest and structure the transaction as best you can to do this." (T) "Especially when you are in an industry like banking, where you are highly regulated and there are a lot of rules that you have to follow, you have to be careful about what judgment you are going to use because it has to be legal. You know, you can't just say, 'he's a creep, I'm not doing that loan!' There has to be some legal backing to it as well. You definitely don't want to get into trouble. It gets a little frustrating at times, because you have to stay inside that little box. But at the same time, that character box has many facets to it." (M) "I did get a little bit of a sting after that…Loans are classified in the bank [regardless of] performance, and are given a grade for the regulators…I made the loan but after it went to our audit review they automatically rated it as 'criticized' because the borrower had had a bankruptcy in his past. So that only hurt me, it did not hurt the borrower. That was an instance when I exercised my right [of discretion] and I did not get any gold stars at the bank for doing that…after my personal performance was criticized I was not as happy about making that loan, even though I still believed in him." (H, describing a time she decided to approve a loan against bank policy)

Chapter 4:

When Does Size Matter? An Authentic Work Climate Is Facilitated by Smaller Groups

Abstract

The concept of group-level climate of authenticity refers to the level of emotional safety felt by group members to express their feelings within the group. However, little is known about what organizational and group characteristics may facilitate the emergence of such a climate, or, in turn, what beneficial effects on interpersonal interactions a climate of authenticity might foster. This article tests the relationship between group size, group-level climate of authenticity, and subsequent group-level psychological safety. Across three studies I demonstrate that smaller groups are characterized by more emotional authenticity within the group than are larger groups, and this effect exists at both the organizational and team level. Further, team size is associated with team-level authenticity above and beyond organizational-level authenticity, suggesting additive effects of both immediate and superordinate group size on authenticity. Group authenticity is in turn positively associated with the beneficial group-level characteristic of psychological safety. Together, these studies suggest one benefit of small teams is the higher authenticity small teams may foster among group members, which in turn leads to advantageous group outcomes like higher psychological safety.

4.1 Introduction

Members of organizations and teams often have to attune to and adjust the emotions they are expressing to others like clients, coworkers, and supervisors, either amplifying, or up-regulating, some emotions, such as when customer service agents are instructed to engage in "service with a smile" (Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988), or suppressing, or down-regulating, other emotions (Grandey et al., 2010). Indeed, emotion regulation can be a critical part of job expectations for many workers (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987). Such emotion work can have a significant influence on interpersonal interactions and serve as a source of work strain for employees (Côté, 2005). On the other hand, having a climate of emotional authenticity, wherein group members feel able to express their true feelings internally within the group, can help reduce the negative costs of customer-facing emotion work for group members (Grandey et al., 2012). However, little is known about what group factors or characteristics might facilitate the emergence of such a climate of authenticity, nor how authenticity might have direct, positive consequences for the group. In this chapter I argue that an important antecedent of authenticity among group members is group size. That is, one as-yet unexplored benefit of small teams may be the higher emotional authenticity present in these teams vs. larger ones. In particular, I describe a series of studies that examine (1) how group size is related to group climate of authenticity at both organizational and team levels, and (2) how a climate of authenticity can involve cross-level effects from the organization to the team. I further examine (3) how, together, organizational- and team-level authenticity lead to positive relational outcomes for the team.

4.2 Past Findings on Group Climate of Authenticity

The construct of an organizational or group climate describes "shared perceptions among members of an organization with regard to aspects of the organizational environment that inform role behavior, that is, the extent to which certain facets of role behavior are rewarded and supported" (Zohar & Luria, 2005, p. 616). Recent work has argued for the importance of studying individuals' authenticity in the workplace in particular, including development of scales to measure overall authenticity in terms of how true to oneself, in touch with the "real me," and not "needing to do what others expect me to do" that individuals feel at work (van den Bosch & Taris, 2014) as well as the level of emotional authenticity, or how free and safe to express their feelings to others people feel (Grandey et al., 2012), that exists in the workplace. The recent theoretical development of an emotional authenticity construct in particular has been based on a growing body of work examining overall psychological safety in the workplace—that is, overall, how comfortable people are being themselves.

The concept of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999; items including "Members of this team are able to bring up problems and tough issues," reverse-scored "People on this team sometimes reject others for being different") and the related construct of participative safety (items including "People feel understood and accepted by each other," "Everyone's view is listened to even if it is in a minority," Anderson & West, 1998; West, 1990) both address the idea of a supportive work climate in which people feel able to voice their thoughts and opinions without being judged by their coworkers. These constructs describe an environment of trust rather than threat. In particular, psychological safety has become a well-known construct for understanding team learning and team members' comfort with interpersonal risk-taking, in terms of discussing errors and seeking feedback to improve performance (Edmondson, 1999). A

climate of psychological safety has been associated with a host of beneficial implications for both individuals and teams, including a higher sense of vitality and energy (Kark & Carmeli, 2009) and increased performance (Singh et al., 2013) for individuals and higher creativity (Kark & Carmeli, 2009) and quality improvement (Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006) for groups, in addition to improved performance (Baer & Frese, 2003).

Importantly, the concept of emotional safety within teams—a climate of authenticity—is distinguishable from the more general concept of psychological safety in multiple ways. Conceptually, emotional safety may be a requisite precursor to psychological safety; if individuals do not consider themselves free to express how they feel to each other, they are not likely to consider themselves free to risk making a mistake, being different, or asking others for help (see psychological safety scale items; Edmondson, 1999). This distinction between emotional and psychological safety has been further clarified empirically, with emotional safety focusing on how much team members feel they can share their emotions with each other (Grandey et al., 2012) and psychological safety focusing more on team learning: how unique skills and talents are valued within the team, how team members respect each other, and how much team members undermine others' efforts, particularly when team members take risks by pinpointing mistakes or raising issues (Edmondson, 1999, 2002).

4.3 Past Findings on Group Size and Group Processes and Outcomes

A great deal of theoretical and empirical scholarly research has focused on the question of ideal group size, examining if and how various components of team composition, task design, context, and leadership relate to team performance (see Stewart, 2006, for a review of recent studies). While the ideal group size may depend heavily on the type of task that needs to be

performed (Stewart, 2006), many arguments have been made supporting both larger and smaller teams as being more optimal. Overall, empirical findings have been mixed as to whether small or large teams lead to better performance (see Gooding & Wagner, 1985, and Stewart, 2006, for reviews). Indubitably, both sides are likely correct—there is plausibly no unilaterally perfect team size, as both larger and smaller teams have certain strengths and weaknesses.

On one hand, large teams provide more opportunity for dividing work and for acquiring resources by reaching out to others outside the team. Ostensibly, this logic suggests that larger teams should complete work more quickly, but this belief may also lead managers to overestimate the capabilities and underestimate the process losses of larger teams (Staats et al., 2012). On the other hand, the smaller the group, the proportionately more each person counts toward the group whole: in a four-person group each person represents 25% of the group, but in a ten-person group each person represents only 10% of the group. Importantly, the more indispensable a group member perceives him- or herself to be to the group, the more motivated (s)he is to contribute to the group's success, regardless of ability (Hüffmeier & Hertel, 2011). Indeed, decline in motivation, such as when individuals feel less responsible for the group's performance, has been argued to be a significant cause of a common finding that the work of a group is often counterintuitively less than the sum of its individual members (i.e., the Ringelmann effect; Ingham et al., 1974).

Interpersonally, group members have a strong effect on how others interact with the environment and with each other. As the classic smoke-filling room (Latané & Darley, 1968), someone loudly falling off a chair in the next office (Latané & Rodin, 1969) and other clever studies have demonstrated, people look to others in the group for cues about how to behave in that environment. For example, according to the large body of findings on the bystander effect,

the more people in a group of bystanders, the less likely any one person is to help someone in need (Latané & Nida, 1982). However, other research has challenged such a straightforward relationship. Early work on group size suggested that as group size increases, the effect of other group members on an individual's actions decreases after a certain point (e.g., in one study beginning with groups of five individuals; Rosenberg, 1961) because additional voices can be presumed to be not wholly independent of other group members' behaviors and thus lose some influence (Asch, 1956).[16] Further research has also demonstrated that it is not merely group size that influences member behavior, but that both group size and the relationship among group members interact to influence behavior in the group; if group cohesiveness can be preserved in large groups, then group size and helping behaviors are positively rather than negatively related (Levine & Crowther, 2008; Rutkowski et al., 1983). Even distant precursors to cohesion, such as a simple expectation of interacting with group members again, have been found to help mitigate the negative implications of the bystander effect (Gottlieb & Carver, 1980).

Group Size and Relational Loss

How exactly is the level of cohesion in the group related to group size? Mueller's (2012) investigation for why individuals perform worse when they are in larger teams found that the larger the group, the more relational loss there is—that is, the less team members perceive that support in the team is available, including emotional support for difficult situations—resulting in poorer individual-level performance. This concept of relational loss included how much team members perceived that other members would offer information, constructive criticism, help, and emotional support.[17] Importantly, Mueller's findings showed that this relational loss was

---

[16] It is worth noting, however, that early replication attempts of nonlinear effects of group size on conformity did not always find significant results (e.g., Gerard et al., 1968).

[17] However, the sub-component of emotional support was measured in this paper by asking respondents how much a feeling of trust existed within the group. While trust is critically related to emotional support, one may argue that

detrimental to team members above and beyond the typically-assumed process loss components of motivation and coordination that have been argued to exist in larger groups (Steiner, 1972). Given that larger groups are likely to experience more relational loss in comparison to smaller groups, it is plausible that group size and the level of emotional and psychological safety in the group are negatively related.

4.4 Group Size and Climate of Authenticity

As a group increases in size, each individual member may feel less responsibility toward or compulsion to offer support to any other given individual, given the costs to an individual's time and effort from having more connections in the team to maintain (Mueller, 2012). The less support within the group, the less able and safe members may feel to share their feelings with other group members. Further, the larger the group, the more likely the formation of rifts in the group, leading to individuals not belonging to a core group or sub-group to feel isolated and become emotionally withdrawn (Kahn, 1993), and thereby less willing to contribute to a climate of authenticity in the group and share feelings with group members. On the other hand, empirical work has shown that as group size decreases, group members become more attentive of their own behavior and are more concerned with following behavioral norms in the group (Mullen, 1983). Thus, the smaller the group, the more cohesive it may be, and consequentially the more safe individual members may feel to share their emotions with each other, creating reinforcing emotion cycles within groups, in which group members are influenced by and react to others' emotional displays when interacting with them (Hareli & Rafaeli, 2007). That is, the smaller the group, the more emotionally safe the group is, encouraging members to share their feelings. In

---

emotional support may be better captured by measuring the amount of emotional safety, or feeling safe expressing and sharing emotions with others, that exists within a group.

turn, the more members share their feelings, the more this sharing becomes a behavioral norm and creates a reinforcing feedback loop in the group. Together, these effects support the creation and maintenance of a strong climate of authenticity environment in smaller vs. larger groups. Thus,

Hypothesis 1: The level of emotional authenticity in a group is negatively associated with larger group size and positively associated with smaller group size: larger groups are associated with less authenticity, while smaller groups are associated with more authenticity.

Given inconsistencies in the size-performance link found across organizational-level vs. subunit- or team-level studies (see Gooding & Wagner, 1985, for a review), it is also plausible that authenticity and size may relate to each other both within and across levels. On one hand, although authenticity across levels may vary simply based on the particular individuals and tasks involved, perceptions of authenticity at a higher (organizational) level of analysis may also influence perceptions of authenticity at a lower (team) level of analysis. This may be the case because perceptions of climate at the organizational level are positively related to perceptions of the same climate dimension at the team level, and, further, these team-level perceptions can in turn mediate the effect of organizational-level perceptions on team-level outcomes (Zohar & Luria, 2005). However, while organizational-level authenticity is likely related to team-level authenticity, team-level authenticity can also be determined by other variables, given that a given group within an organization may enact, adapt, or change how the organizational climate is endorsed and displayed at the group level in a myriad of ways (Anderson & West, 1998). Together, this reasoning suggests that:

127

Hypothesis 2: Group size at a lower level of analysis (i.e., the team rather than the organization) is negatively associated with authenticity at that level, holding constant the authenticity at a higher level of analysis (i.e., the organization). That is, team size will have an independent effect on team-level authenticity over and above the effect of organizational-level authenticity on team-level authenticity, such that larger teams are associated with less authenticity, and smaller teams are associated with more authenticity, holding organizational-level authenticity constant.

Why the Size-Authenticity Relationship Matters for the Group

Although group members' relationships with each other and perceptions of group psychological safety have been shown to coevolve in a reciprocal type of relationship (Schulte et al., 2010), I propose specifically testing here whether group emotional safety (climate of authenticity) precedes group psychological safety. Both emotional and psychological safety may be deemed important components of beneficial "relational coordination" within teams (cf., Carmeli & Gittell, 2009). However, given that emotional safety is plausibly a logical requisite for psychological safety, and that positive, high-quality relationships among group members such as would be encouraged by a sense of emotional safety within the group have been shown to foster increased psychological safety directly (Carmeli & Gittell, 2009), I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3: Authenticity, or emotional safety, mediates the relationship between group size and group psychological safety.

In sum, building on prior work on authenticity, and drawing from the long history of scholarly research on the effects of group size on group processes and outcomes, I hypothesize

that group size and emotional safety, or a climate of emotional authenticity, will be negatively related. Further, I propose that this size-authenticity relationship will span levels within the organization and will influence how group members subsequently interact with each other.

4.5 Overview of Studies

In three studies, I examine evidence that group size is related to group-level climate of authenticity, and that authenticity is positively related to other beneficial group characteristics, such as the level of psychological safety present in the group. In Study 1 I examine the relationship between organization size and the level of emotional authenticity in the organization. In Studies 2 and 3 I focus on team-level authenticity and psychological safety. Although prior studies have demonstrated measurable differences in processes and outcomes for groups of specific sizes (e.g., Menon & Phillips, 2011), for Studies 2 and 3 I do not focus on groups of specific sizes pitted against each other—groups of four people compared to groups of five people, for instance—but instead analyze how authenticity among group members changes between relatively smaller vs. larger groups. Across all studies, the survey-based study design with workers asked to respond about their own personal work experience and environment is motivated by the emphasis in recent empirical work involving team size that has focused on studying teams in a more natural environment outside the laboratory (cf., Mueller, 2012).

4.6 Study 1: Organization Size and Climate of Authenticity

Method and Measures

Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited through a convenience sample of contacts collected from undergraduate students in a core business course at a large Midwestern

university in the US. Students received one point of course credit as part of their semester participation grade for submitting names of employees who would be willing to respond to a short survey administered by the university. Students who submitted at least three contact names received credit even if their contacts did not respond to an emailed survey link. A total of 359 employees (292 full-time, 19 industries, Mage = 42.06) responded to the emailed link and answered survey items including seven items measuring organizational climate of authenticity (adapted from Grandey, et al., 2012 to incorporate perceptions of safety at the organization rather than team level; as used by Carmeli & Gittell, 2009; e.g., "It is safe to show how you really feel with this organization," Cronbach's α = 0.82). Respondents also indicated the size of their current employer as well as their tenure there (both measured in increments rather than discrete numbers, to simplify the study for respondents), and indicated additional overall judgments of the firm's employees such as the level of trust they had in their coworkers and the level of benevolence they judged their coworkers to act in accordance with.

Results and Discussion

For simplicity's sake given the small number of Southerners and to avoid needing to control for childhood home, only non-Southern respondents were included in the final sample, N = 329, Mtenure = 6-10 yrs.[18] Individuals were classified as working for either a small-, medium-, or large-sized organization, with approximately one-third of respondents indicating they worked for organizations of fifty employees or less (classified as small), while one-third indicated they worked for relatively much larger organizations of more than one thousand (classified as large;

---

[18] Southerners (individuals who indicated they had spent at least six years of their childhood in a Southern state (Cohen et al., 1996)) were excluded from this and the next study given prior findings that cultural differences between the South and non-South in the US contribute to differences in how individuals interact with each other and react to certain emotionally-laden displays from others (Cohen, et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 1999). Excluding the small proportion of Southerners that appeared in the samples from Studies 1 and 2 thus helped ensure that any findings in these studies were not driven by potential cultural differences. However, as noted in Study 3, given the large proportion of Southerners in that sample, these individuals were retained for all Study 3 analyses.

the remaining one-third indicated that their organization included between fifty-one and one-thousand employees and was classified as medium-sized). Results show that individuals employed by a small organization (50 employees or less) indicated that a climate of authenticity was more endorsed at their workplace ($M = 4.92$, $SD = 1.15$) than did individuals employed by a large organization (more than 1,000 employees; $M = 4.59$, $SD = 1.01$), $t(180) = 2.11$, $p = 0.04$, Cohen's $d = 0.31$; see Figure 4.1).

Further, a simple linear regression examining the effect of organizational size (small, medium, and large) on authenticity indicated a significant relationship between organizational size and endorsement of authenticity. Regression results show that the smaller the organization, the more employees state their organization and coworkers support a climate of authenticity in interpersonal interactions ($B = 0.17$, $SE = 0.08$, $p = 0.03$, 95% confidence interval 0.02 to 0.33).[19]

Moreover, no differences were found between individuals in small vs. large organizations for how competent, warm, or benevolent they considered their coworkers, nor how much integrity they rated their coworkers as having or how much they trust them (all ps > 0.05). Thus, it does not seem that individuals who work at small organizations are generally considered more competent, warm, benevolent, trustworthy, or acting with more integrity than individuals in large organizations. Rather, it seems that those who work in small organizations may value and help endorse a climate of authenticity more than do those who work in larger organizations.

Insert Figure 4.1 about here

---

[19] While medium-sized organizations ($M = 4.98$, $SD = 0.99$) did not differ from small-sized organizations in terms of climate of authenticity, $t(183) = -0.35$, $p = 0.73$, medium- and large-sized organizations did differ, $t(191) = 2.73$, $p = 0.01$, Cohen's $d = 0.39$. This result suggests that authenticity may be endorsed in organizations until the organization becomes quite large, with more than one thousand employees.

4.7 Study 2: Within- and Across-Level Effects

To replicate and extend the prior study, employees were again recruited through student contacts at a large Midwestern university. Students in a core business school undergraduate course (none of whom overlapped with the students from the previous study) received course participation points for submitting the names and email addresses of working individuals, and these individuals were then emailed about the study described here. Employees' participation was entirely voluntarily and it was made clear to both participants and students that students' credit was in no way dependent on the employees' participation in the study.

Method and Measures

Participants and procedure. A total of 382 US employees (341 full-time, 18 industries, Mage = 43.24) answered the climate of authenticity survey items from the previous study, (Grandey, et al., 2012; e.g., "It is safe to show how you really feel with this organization"; Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.84$). Respondents also indicated the size of their current employer as well as their tenure there. These measures were included to test the replicability of the previous study's authenticity findings. In addition, to expand on the findings from the previous study, participants also responded to team-level measures including how many people they interacted with closely on a daily basis as well as the climate of authenticity scale at the team level (e.g., "It is safe to show how you really feel with this group of people"; Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.85$). Items were adapted slightly to read "this group of people" instead of "team" since participants were asked to answer with respect to the people they worked with closely on a daily basis—even if these individuals were not on a specified team per se. I chose to use "this group of people" to avoid falsely limiting responses to those individuals who belonged to named teams at the expense of those who may work in team-like situations more broadly. For this and Study 3, team size was grouped

by fives, such that individuals indicated whether they worked with 1-5 others, 6-10 others, etc. This measurement style simplified the study for participants, and is based on prior work showing that for teams, groups have been considered small up to six people (Menon & Phillips, 2011), and empirical work has shown that performance gains decrease after group size increases beyond four or five members (Yetton & Bottger, 1983). Thus I use cutoff points in increments of five to delineate teams of successively and relatively larger size. Overall, the team-level measures allow testing for the effect of team size on both organizational-level and team-level authenticity climate above and beyond the influence of the organization's size.

Results and Discussion

As for the prior study, only non-Southern respondents were included in the final sample, $N = 355$, Mtenure = 6-10 yrs. Using the same classification system as for the prior study, individuals were classified as working for either a small-, medium-, or large-sized organization, with 24.9% of respondents indicating they worked for small organizations of fifty employees or less, 33.3% indicating they worked for medium-sized organizations, and 41.8% indicating they worked for relatively much larger organizations of more than one thousand employees. Although these buckets of organization size were somewhat unequal, they reflected the diversity in the respondent pool and were kept the same as for the prior study in order to compare results. Replicating the findings from the prior study, ANOVA results comparing small and large organizations show that individuals employed by a small organization indicated that a climate of authenticity was more endorsed at their workplace ($M = 4.88$, $SD = 1.07$) than did individuals employed by a large organization (more than 1,000 employees; $M = 4.48$, $SD = 1.00$), $t(233) = -2.89$, $p < 0.01$, Cohen's $d = 0.39$; see Figure 4.2).[20]

---

[20] Similarly to the prior study, in this sample medium-sized organizations ($M = 4.68$, $SD = 1.03$) did not differ from small-sized organizations in terms of climate of authenticity, $t(204) = -1.40$, $p = 0.16$. However, contrary to the prior

To further test the replicability of the prior study's findings, a simple linear regression examining the effect of organizational size on climate of authenticity indicated a significant relationship between organizational size and endorsement of authenticity. Regression results show that the smaller the organization, the more employees state their organization and coworkers support a climate of authenticity in interpersonal interactions ($B = 0.20$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.01$, 95% confidence interval 0.07 to 0.33).

Insert Figure 4.2 about here

To test the effect of team size on both team- and organizational-levels of authenticity, I conducted a mediation analysis. I hypothesized that organizational-level authenticity would strongly influence team-level authenticity, thus mediating the relationship between organization size and team-level authenticity. It is also plausible that team size would influence team-level authenticity directly, above and beyond the influence of organizational authenticity. Thus, I included team size as a separate input into team-level authenticity climate in the regression.[21] Using bias-corrected bootstrapping methods for estimating indirect effects, drawing 5,000 random samples (Hayes, 2013), the regression results showed a significant indirect effect from organization size to team-level climate of authenticity (see Table 4.1). Bootstrap estimation of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect (0.0669 – 0.2323) further supports mediation. That is, smaller organizations lead to teams with higher levels of an authenticity climate, via the influence of organization size on the authenticity climate of the organization as a whole. Further,

---

study, medium- and large-sized organizations also did not differ, $t(263) = 1.54$, $p = 0.12$. Overall, as this finding largely replicates the pattern found in the prior study, and as the main comparison of interest is small v. large organizations, medium-sized organizations are not discussed separately in ANOVA analyses.

[21] Three individuals were removed at this stage for indicating that they did not work with anyone else on a daily basis.

as would be expected, team size has an effect on team-level authenticity climate above and beyond the organizational size and authenticity effects. The results show that the smaller the team, the more individuals state that their teammates support a climate of authenticity in interpersonal interactions ($B = 0.15$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < 0.01$, 95% confidence interval 0.06 to 0.23).

Insert Table 4.1 about here

Together, these findings replicate and extend the findings from the prior study. That is, the smaller the organization, the more likely a climate of authenticity is endorsed in the organization and this organizational-level authenticity in turn positively influences team-level authenticity. Further, the smaller the team, independently of the size of the organization, the more likely a climate of authenticity is endorsed within the team. In the following study, I test whether these findings can be extended to show that authenticity subsequently influences other positive team characteristics, like the level of psychological safety in the group.

4.8 Study 3: Authenticity as Mediator Between Group Size and Psychological Safety

To replicate and extend the prior studies, as well as examine the influence of climate of authenticity on important team-level outcomes, I recruited participants from an online paid participant pool. In this study, I examined whether authenticity climate affects another important team-level variable, that of psychological safety. Because of the theoretical development of the climate of authenticity construct as related to yet distinct from that of psychological safety (Grandey et al., 2012), I expected that smaller team size would lead to higher team psychological safety via increased authenticity at the team level. Moreover, given the evidence from the prior

study that organization size also influences team-level authenticity through organizational authenticity, I further hypothesized that organizational authenticity would similarly positively influence team-level psychological safety. Exploring authenticity as an antecedent of psychological safety has not yet been investigated in empirical work. Thus, this study was designed to test the full model in Figure 4.3, both replicating and extending the prior two studies. Further, while I argue that authenticity leads to psychological safety, this study design also allows me to test the reverse causal hypothesis, that psychological safety leads to climate of authenticity.

Insert Figure 4.3 about here

Method and Measures

Participants and procedure. A total of 402 online paid participants (279 full-time, working in more than 18 industries, Mage = 29.98, Mtenure = 4.60 yrs.) answered the organization and team climate of authenticity (Cronbach's α = 0.87 for organization and 0.90 for team), organization and team size, and other items from the previous study. Rather than the five-year increments that tenure was measured for the prior two studies, time at the organization was measured in one-year increments for this study. All of these measures were included to test the replicability of the previous two studies' findings. In addition, to expand on the findings from the previous study, participants also responded to team-level measures of psychological safety (e.g., "It is safe to take a risk with this group of people," Edmondson, 1999; Cronbach's α = 0.87). Testing for the influence of team and organizational authenticity climate on team-level

psychological safety helps expand the previous studies' findings to show that climate of authenticity is related to important and beneficial team-level characteristics.

Results and Discussion

The proportion of Southern respondents in this study was so large (31.8%) that all respondents were included in the analyses so as not to unduly restrict the final sample. Including the full sample in all analyses also provides a more conservative test of the replicability of the findings from Studies 1 and 2. Using the same classification system as for the prior study, individuals were categorized as working for either a small-, medium-, or large-sized organization, with 31.3% of respondents indicating they worked for small organizations of fifty employees or less, 48.1% indicating they worked for medium-sized organizations, and 20.4% indicating they worked for relatively much larger organizations of more than one thousand employees. These buckets of organization size reflected the diversity in this particular respondent pool and were kept the same as for the prior studies in order to compare results. Similarly to the findings from the prior study, ANOVA results comparing small and large organizations show that individuals employed by a small organization indicated that a climate of authenticity was more endorsed at their workplace ($M = 4.64$, $SD = 1.15$) than did individuals employed by a large organization (more than 1,000 employees; $M = 4.29$, $SD = 1.27$), $t(206) = -2.05$, $p = 0.04$, Cohen's $d = 0.29$; see Figure 4.4).[22]

Insert Figure 4.4 about here

---

[22] Similarly to the prior study, in this sample medium-sized organizations ($M = 4.53$, $SD = 1.13$) did not differ from small-sized organizations in terms of climate of authenticity, $t(317) = -0.80$, $p = 0.42$. Medium- and large-sized organizations also did not differ, $t(273) = 1.57$, $p = 0.12$. Overall, this replicates the pattern found in the prior study, and as the main comparison of interest is small v. large organizations, medium-sized organizations are not discussed separately in ANOVA analyses.

Similar to the prior study's findings, a simple linear regression examining the effect of organizational size on climate of authenticity indicated a significant relationship between organizational size and endorsement of authenticity. Regression results show that the smaller the organization, the more employees state their organization and coworkers support a climate of authenticity in interpersonal interactions ($B = 0.17$, $SE = 0.08$, $p = 0.04$, 95% confidence interval 0.01 to 0.33).

To test the effect of team size on both team- and organizational-levels of authenticity climate, I conducted a mediation analysis. As previously stated, I hypothesized that organizational-level authenticity climate would strongly influence team-level authenticity climate, thus mediating the relationship between organization size and team-level authenticity climate, and that team size would influence team-level authenticity climate directly, above and beyond the influence of organizational authenticity. Thus, I included team size as a separate input into team-level authenticity climate in the regression.[23] Using bias-corrected bootstrapping methods for estimating indirect effects, drawing 5,000 random samples (Hayes, 2013), the regression results showed a significant indirect effect from organization size to team-level climate of authenticity (see Table 4.2). Bootstrap estimation of the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect (0.0039 – 0.2614) further supports mediation. That is, smaller organizations lead to teams with higher levels of an authenticity climate, via the influence of organization size on the authenticity climate of the organization as a whole. Further, as would be expected, team size has an effect on team-level authenticity climate above and beyond the organizational size and authenticity effects. The results show that the smaller the team, the more individuals state

---

[23] Twelve individuals were removed at this stage for indicating that they did not work with anyone else on a daily basis.

that their teammates support a climate of authenticity in interpersonal interactions ($B = 0.11$, SE $= 0.04$, $p = 0.01$, 95% confidence interval 0.03 to 0.18).

Insert Table 4.2 about here

Next, I conducted a mediation analysis to test the effect of both organizational and team size on team psychological safety via the influence of size on authenticity at both the organizational and team levels. Again using bias-corrected bootstrapping methods for estimating indirect effects with 5,000 random samples (Hayes, 2013), separate regression results for organization and team showed significant indirect effects from both organization and team size to team-level psychological safety (see Table 4.3a and 4.3b). Bootstrap estimation of the 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects of both organization size (0.0163 – 0.2649) and team size (0.0186 – 0.2166) further supports mediation. That is, smaller organizations and smaller teams within organizations lead to teams with higher levels of psychological safety, via the influence of size on the authenticity climate of both the organization and the team. Further, the reverse causal mechanism, that team size leads to team climate of authenticity via team-level psychological safety, is not supported by the results (indirect effect 95% confidence interval = -0.1762 – 0.0096).

Insert Tables 4.3a and 4.3b about here

Together, these findings replicate and extend the findings from the prior two studies, and show that authenticity is related to other positive team outcomes like psychological safety. That

139

is, the smaller the organization and team, the more likely a climate of authenticity is endorsed at both levels, and the higher the level of psychological safety present in the team.

4.9 General Discussion

While authenticity as a group-level characteristic may be one way to alleviate burnout and stress caused by the work environment and job demands, and can help employees manage daily emotion regulation needs, little is known about how authenticity might emerge within teams. Given the potential for relational loss in larger teams, and the likelihood of strong behavioral norms and cohesion in smaller groups, I have argued that group size is one path by which authenticity may be facilitated. To test this hypothesis, the three studies described in this article are the first to explore, to my knowledge, the relationship between group size and group climate of authenticity. The negative relationship between group size and climate of authenticity was replicated across studies and demonstrated that smaller groups are more likely to be conducive to emotional safety for group members than are larger groups, across both organization and team levels. Moreover, team size influences team-level climate of authenticity above and beyond the effects from organizational-level climate of authenticity. Together, these studies suggest that an as-yet underexplored benefit of small teams is the increased emotional safety that these team members feel within the group. This finding builds on and expands prior work demonstrating that one cost of larger teams is the increased relational loss that such teams experience (Mueller, 2012). Further, these results also support the notion that higher emotional safety experienced in smaller groups leads to increased psychological safety, a beneficial team characteristic associated with a myriad of both individual- and team-level positive effects.

Together, these studies are a first step in exploring both antecedents and consequences of authenticity in groups.

These findings also suggest several promising avenues for future research. First, while the current studies demonstrate that group size is an important determinant of group authenticity, other group-level characteristics are likely to facilitate the emergence of authenticity as well. For instance, it may be the case that, given the importance of visual nonverbal cues like body and facial movements in interpreting emotional communication (e.g., Aviezer et al., 2012), simple colocation of group members may be a central ingredient for encouraging a norm of authenticity in the group. That is, group members who are not located in the same physical space may have a more difficult time perceiving and interpreting emotional information from others, thereby impeding the emergence of a self-reinforcing climate of authenticity. Future research should explore how physical characteristics of the group, such as colocation or the frequency with which individuals see each other, influence the formation of a climate conducive to emotional authenticity.

Second, these results are the first to show, to my knowledge, that internally created group-level characteristics may give rise to psychological safety. That is, Edmondson's seminal (1999) work, as well as numerous later studies (Hirak et al., 2012; Leroy et al., 2012; Nembhard & Edmondson, 2006; Singh et al., 2013), demonstrated that team structures like organizational and context support (e.g., resources, information, and rewards) and leader behaviors—structures that are determined more by outside forces, the organization, or the leader than by the team members themselves—facilitate psychological safety in the group. However, the studies in this chapter demonstrate that psychological safety can also be fostered via group characteristics that are largely under team members' control, like how much team members share their feelings with

each other. Future research should continue to examine other potential mechanisms by which team members' actions, independently from the leader's or organization's actions, may directly influence positive team-level characteristics like psychological safety (e.g., Schulte et al., 2010). Investigating such relationships would help further unpack the processes through which team members themselves jointly and directly shape the interaction patterns and behavioral norms that comprise the team experience.

Designing the perfect team for maximal performance is the Holy Grail for many managers, tasked with organizing and deploying talent in beneficial and productive ways for organizations and individuals. One particular aspect of team design seems to have fascinated both scholars and practitioners for many decades: the question of what the ideal group size is and how groups of different sizes influence both individual and team performance (e.g., Thomas & Fink, 1963). Although managers may not always be able to create teams of specific sizes, the findings in these studies suggest several practical implications for managers. For example, managers who must oversee large teams may help buffer their teams from lowered emotional safety due to the large team size by encouraging team members to share feelings openly with one another. Managers might schedule time during team meetings to discuss how members are feeling about group progress or interpersonal interactions within the team. Managers might also help facilitate team emotional safety by sharing their own emotions with team members. By creating a safe environment for members to share and express their feelings with each other, managers could thereby create a strong sense of authenticity even within larger teams. Authenticity, as evidenced by the findings presented here, could then lead to increased psychological safety and further beneficial outcomes for the team.

Thus, another interesting area for future research is to explore how emotional safety may influence other team processes and outcomes, such as idea generation, innovativeness, and performance, that have previously been associated with beneficial interpersonal relationships within teams like those that exist when psychological safety is present. Given the well-documented potential for negative repercussions like stress and burnout associated with employees engaging in emotion regulation at the workplace, it is plausible that increased authenticity in smaller groups may facilitate group members' interactions and well-being in a myriad of intra- and interpersonal ways.

In sum, across three studies I find evidence that group size is related to group-level climate of authenticity, which is in turn associated with group-level psychological safety. Smaller groups exhibit more authenticity within the group than do larger groups, at both the organizational and team levels. Further, the authenticity in smaller groups is positively associated with higher levels of beneficial team characteristics like psychological safety within the group. Together, these studies suggest that authenticity may be facilitated by certain group characteristics like size, and that authenticity may be useful for team members' abilities to speak up, ask questions, voice concerns, and improve both individual and group well-being and performance. Put simply, one positive aspect of small teams beyond those previously articulated by empirical research is that smaller worlds may be more emotionally authentic worlds, making individuals freer to express how they really feel and creating productive working conditions for groups and the people in them.

Figure 4.1: Organizational Size and Endorsement of a Climate of Authenticity (Study 1)

Error bars represent +/- 1 between-groups std error; * p<.05, **p<.01; all tests reported as 2-tailed

Figure 4.2: Organizational Size and Endorsement of a Climate of Authenticity (Study 2)

Error bars represent +/- 1 between-groups std error; * p<.05, **p<.01; all tests reported as 2-tailed

**Figure 4.3: Theoretical Model and Components Tested by Studies 1-3**

Figure 4.4: Organizational Size and Endorsement of a Climate of Authenticity (Study 3)

Error bars represent +/- 1 between-groups std error; * p<.05, **p<.01; all tests reported as 2-tailed

Table 4.1: Regression Analyses Examining Mediation of Organization Size on Team Climate of Authenticity by Organizational Climate of Authenticity (Study 2)

	Team Climate of Authenticity			
	B	SE B	LLCI	ULCI
Organization Size[a]	-0.08	0.06	-0.04	0.20
Organization Climate of Authenticity	0.54***	0.04	0.45	0.63
Team Size[a]	0.15***	0.04	0.06	0.23
R^2		0.31		

n = 331.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
[a]Note: For ease of interpretation, organization and team size are reverse-scored. A significant positive coefficient indicates that smaller groups are associated with higher authenticity scores.

Table 4.2: Regression Analyses Examining Mediation of Organization Size on Team Climate of Authenticity by Organizational Climate of Authenticity (Study 3)

	Team Climate of Authenticity			
	B	SE B	LLCI	ULCI
Organization Size[a]	-0.11	0.06	-0.22	0.01
Organization Climate of Authenticity	0.74***	0.03	0.68	0.81
Team Size[a]	0.11**	0.04	0.03	0.18
R^2		0.56		

n = 389.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
[a]Note: For ease of interpretation, organization and team size are reverse-scored. A significant positive coefficient indicates that smaller groups are associated with higher authenticity scores.

Table 4.3: Regression Analyses Examining Mediation of Organization Size on Team Psychological Safety by Organization Climate of Authenticity (Study 3)

	Team Psychological Safety			
	B	SE B	LLCI	ULCI
Organization Size[a]	-0.06	0.06	-0.17	0.05
Organization Climate of Authenticity	0.74***	0.03	0.67	0.80
R^2			0.54	

n = 389.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
[a]Note: For ease of interpretation, organization size is reverse-scored. A significant positive coefficient would indicate that smaller groups are associated with higher safety scores.

Table 4.4: Regression Analyses Examining Mediation of Team Size on Team Psychological Safety by Team Climate of Authenticity (Study 3)

	Team Psychological Safety			
	B	SE B	LLCI	ULCI
Team Size[a]	-0.02	0.03	-0.08	0.03
Team Climate of Authenticity	0.84***	0.03	0.79	0.90
R^2			0.73	

n = 390.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
[a]Note: For ease of interpretation, team size is reverse-scored. A significant positive coefficient would indicate that smaller groups are associated with higher safety scores.

Chapter 5:

Discussion

5.1 Overall Summary and Contributions

While I have outlined the theoretical and practical contributions of this dissertation research within the individual chapters presented above, several overarching themes deserve brief discussion. First, in Chapters 2 and 3 in particular, I draw on multiple domains of research to connect the idea of honor as a cultural script with the interpretation of authenticity in facial expression. I focus in this research on perception and interpretation—both subjective processes—in particular as I argue that perception is in the eye of the beholder. It is the critical eye of the beholder, in turn, that determines how that person judges someone else. Interpersonal judgments in initial interactions can shape the entire course of a relationship, and thus demand understanding of how individual differences, such as concern for honor, can influence those judgments.

Further, although honor at its inception as a cultural script was inextricably linked to violence in order to protect one's honor, and, as many researchers have shown, can help explain the violent peculiarities of the US South (e.g., increased rates of both homicide and forgiveness of honor-induced crimes), honor is about more than violence. At its heart honor is an attention to the balance and agreement between intra- and interpersonal judgments of oneself, an appreciation that how one is viewed by one's society should matter to one's self-worth. In some sense, honor is ambivalent, it is both individualistic and collectivistic. It is selfish in its focus on

the individual's personal sense of self-worth but community-based in its reverence for the importance of others to the very core of one's worth as a member of society. This contradiction, it could be argued, can explain the paradox of the overly-friendly Southerner who suddenly explodes in anger when provoked (cf., Cohen et al., 1999). A one-sided view of honor as an explanation for violence ignores the potential ability of honor individuals to exhibit more finely-tuned judgments of others based on subtle cues that may be undervalued by those less motivated by honor. Moreover, honor motivations need not necessarily be geographically determined; it is plausible that individuals immersed in honor-conducive organizational environments that mimic the conditions that have historically led to the emergence of honor cultures will react similarly to cues of authenticity. Overall, given the association of smile authenticity with genuinely felt emotion and inauthenticity with sometimes darker motives such as deceit, the individual who distinguishes the authenticity of smiles and uses this distinction as informative for interpersonal judgment may in fact be a valuable asset to any organization tasked with making difficult decisions about new or unknown people.

In general, understanding the cultural underpinnings of authenticity perception can also shed light on potential sources of miscommunication between those of different cultural backgrounds. As shown by the data presented in the preceding chapters, the (in)authentic smiler may be judged quite differently depending on the cultural background of the judger. Knowing one's audience can thus help both the judger and the smiler understand how a facial expression may be interpreted, and the potential consequences of this interpretation for whether, and how, the two individuals interact with each other.

In Chapter 4 I take a step back from isolated dyadic interactions and interpersonal judgments based on perceived authenticity to explore contextual factors that may facilitate the

creation of a broader climate of authenticity among individuals at work. I find empirical

evidence that the smaller the group one is interacting with, the freer group members feel to

express their emotions to other group members. This general sense of emotional safety in the

group is also positively associated with beneficial group characteristics like psychological safety,

or the sense that asking questions, pointing out problems, or raising issues are valued and non-

threatening behaviors. Together, Chapters 2-4 demonstrate that perceived authenticity is an

important determinant of interpersonal judgments in work environments, and that individuals'

interactions can differ based on how authenticity is interpreted, and whether it exists at all.

Overall, authenticity, and context-relevant cultural influences that shape how authenticity is

perceived and interpreted, seem to have significant implications for relationships at work.

5.2 Next Steps and Future Research Directions

I have focused in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation on the problem of interpersonal

judgments in initial interactions in business contexts such as with an auto mechanic or in the

initial relationship-development phase of business partnerships, such as when meeting a potential

new client (e.g., as for small business loan officers). Given other, potentially stronger cues such

as repeated interactions with a person, in which initial judgments may be proven incorrect or in

need of revision, or even observing body movements in conjunction with facial expressions (cf.,

Avezier et al., 2012; DeSteno et al., 2012), it is plausible that the face may be ignored when

other information about the person being judged is readily available. Future work could pair

various congruent or incongruent qualitative information or other personal cues with

(in)authentic facial expressions to determine if any differences in judgment exist when the

authenticity of the smile may seem of lesser importance than another more obvious interpersonal

cue (e.g., a colleague's positive recommendation of someone paired with that person showing an inauthentic smile). Further, like Rome, given that reputations and relationships are not built in a day, longitudinal analysis of small business loan officers' relationships with their clients, for example, could shed light on the coevolution of impressions and relationships, or how first impressions shape subsequent relationship development and later impressions are in turn shaped by the developing relationship.

Although an individual's relative sense of worth is fundamental to understanding the cultural script of honor, honor and other concepts like self-esteem and reputation are not interchangeable concepts. I have incorporated several theoretical arguments relevant to self-esteem and reputation, such as previously argued distinctions between the related cultural factors of dignity (Ayers, 1984) and face (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Sanchez-Burks & Mor Barak, 2005; Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998), and Anderson and colleagues' (Anderson et al., 2012) local-ladder theory of status within one's immediate community, given the obvious connection between each of these constructs with the notion of honor as increasing one's attention to the ambivalent balance of internally- and externally-sourced self-worth. However, whether groups typically considered lower status, such as minorities, would react to (in)authenticity in expressed smiles in the same way as honor individuals do remains an empirical question and one worthy of future study.

The theoretical development and empirical studies in this dissertation have purposefully focused exclusively on business contexts such as taking one's car to a service station, meeting a new colleague at work, or approving a loan applicant. However, examining the influence of attention to honor concerns in social contexts poses interesting questions. Would the effects found here replicate in social contexts? Empirical and theoretical work on Americans' relative

increase in attention to interpersonal and emotional cues in social vs. work contexts (Sanchez-Burks, 2002; 2005; Weber, 1904/1930) suggests that the differences between culture of honor individuals and non-culture of honor individuals in their judgments of expression authenticity in business relationships may be attenuated in social contexts. Future research should investigate whether introducing a social aspect to interpersonal judgments such as those studied in this dissertation may prompt those who adhere less to culture of honor norms to prefer authenticity more than was found in the current studies.

Further, as argued in Chapter 3, although it is not explicitly addressed in the current package of studies, it is also plausible that individuals, whether from honor cultures, motivated by honor concerns, or not, may judge individuals differently if these individuals are known to be from another culture. Recent work on the cultural accents of facial emotional expression demonstrate that individuals do show intra-cultural biases in how well individuals are able to recognize facial expressions, with individuals recognizing expressions from those of the same culture more accurately than they recognize expressions from those not of the same culture (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Elfenbein et al., 2007; Marsh et al, 2003). Individuals may thus show less discrimination in their judgments of those from different cultures—in effect, giving them more (or less) of the benefit of the doubt in judgments—than those from the same culture. Future empirical work is needed to investigate the possibility that people may make judgments differently depending on whether they believe the individual being judged is from the same culture.

While both lay theory and empirical work emphasize the importance of the face in expression, interpretation of facial expressions alone is likely only a first step toward understanding how emotional interpretation influences interpersonal interaction. Recent work

has highlighted how surprisingly important the body, in addition to the face, may be in interpretation. Overall, strangers' judgments of others' personality based on bodily poses and facial expressions shown together are strikingly accurate (Naumann et. al., 2009), suggesting that the body does have at least some confirmatory role in interpreting the face. New empirical studies have pushed this argument further, suggesting that without the body, isolated faces are highly ambiguous cues of what the person is actually expressing. This has been found to be, perhaps counterintuitively, significantly prevalent in the case of intense emotions—when positive and negative expressions should ostensibly be most distinct and discernible (Avezier et al., 2012). Avezier and colleagues (2012) argue that people rely heavily on body cues such as arm tensing and flexion to create a cohesive impression of what the person is feeling: a tennis player's grimacing face with arms stretched upwards indicates victory clearly and obviously, while the same face with arms down and fists clenched indicates defeat. Controversially, these findings suggest that in fact it may be the body that drives accurate interpretation, not the face as previously accepted. However, whether similar results on the importance of non-facial cues are found for less intense emotional expressions remains an unanswered question. Overall, these findings highlight the importance of understanding the relative contributions of the body—and whether some body parts such as arms may be more useful than other parts—versus the face in expression. Taken together, although the studies presented here—particularly those in Chapter 3—shed some light on the question of facial expression in interpersonal judgments, the social information conveyed by the face and the body, both separately and in conjunction with one another, remains a ripe and promising area for additional research.

Finally, as outlined in the preceding chapter, much work remains to be done before authenticity writ large—including the level of emotional safety within the group, beyond the

authenticity perceived between two unknown others—is fully understood. While the empirical results here demonstrate that one antecedent of authenticity within groups is the sheer size of the group, it is likely that many different types of group characteristics and behaviors may influence the emergence of authenticity among individuals. Further, authenticity may also be positively associated with many other positive downstream individual and group outcomes, beyond psychological safety. The preceding chapter is a first step in uncovering the potentially rich relationship between authenticity and individuals' experiences at work, but the role of authenticity in organizational life remains an exciting and potentially fruitful area for future exploration.

In sum, in this dissertation research I have examined cultural variation in reactions to perceived authenticity, and the implications of this variation for work interactions defined broadly, even between those of the same nationality but who hail from different cultural backgrounds. I propose honor as one such important source of cultural variation, given the importance of the ambivalence and tension in one's sense of worth for individuals driven by honor concerns. These individuals should, for the reasons outlined in the previous chapters, attend more to subtle cues of intention and trustworthiness, such as those that might be interpreted from the authenticity or inauthenticity of facial expressions. In addition, authenticity also bears potential relevance for interpersonal interactions beyond initial encounters. Individuals in smaller groups seem especially prone to foster a general climate of authenticity within the group, and the more free individuals feel to express to others, the more the group benefits from an increased sense of safety in interpersonal interactions. Broadly, while authentic expressions may be perceived somewhat differently depending on cultural factors like honor, authenticity in organizational contexts seems to be overall a beneficial interaction norm between individuals at

work, whether between strangers or within team groups, suggesting that the topic of authenticity in organizational life, its influence on individuals and organizations, and its boundary conditions, all remain promising areas for continued investigation.

Together, the chapters presented in this dissertation address four main questions. First, how does expression authenticity influence the interpretation of that expression in business relationships? Second, what are the consequences of this interpretation for evaluating others or deciding how to structure business agreements with them, even in initial, brief interactions like meeting a potential business partner for the first time? Third, how might cultural influences—particularly those that might prompt individuals to attend more v. less carefully to subtle cues of authenticity—shed light on individuals' interpretation differences? Fourth, what organizational conditions might help facilitate authenticity in the workplace, and is authenticity beneficial for interacting individuals in these environments? This dissertation has attempted to address these questions by theoretically and empirically probing the implications of authenticity for individuals and interactions that are situated in particular cultural and organizational contexts.

Appendix A

Pilot Study: Honor and Endorsement of Authenticity; Priming the Salience of Honor and Measuring It with a Continuous Scale

This study examines whether the salience of honor can be primed, and whether it can be measured using a continuous scale.

Method

Participants. Participants were recruited using an online paid subject pool (Amazon's Mechanical Turk; Burhmester, Kwang, Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, Ipeirotis, 2010). The survey was restricted to being viewable only by individuals in the US who had a high past approval rating (99% or greater) indicating their history of doing quality work for the pool. 155 participants (62 male, 93 female; Mage = 33.51) received $0.75 for the 7-minute study.

Procedure. Participants were told that they would be completing a series of short tasks designed to understand more about their experiences, thoughts, and feelings when interacting with others in social contexts. No deception was used in the study. Participants first completed a "Life Event Writing Task" that was designed to prime the salience of honor. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. One condition was designed to prime concern for honor, particularly how the person was viewed and judged by others—a scenario designed to challenge participants' balance between their internally- and externally-sourced self-worth due to a disruption in the external component. Participants in this condition were presented with the following scenario (cf., Ashton-James et al., 2009):

Recall a time in your life in which someone you were close to criticized you in public. For example, you might remember a time when a coworker criticized your work in front of other coworkers while you were there and could hear what was being said. You may have felt anger, shame, or a variety of emotions at the time. You may have felt that others would think worse of you because of the criticism.

In the box below, describe the image that is most vivid to you about the experience. Write as detailed a description of this image as possible. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel what you felt from learning about your experience. Try to relive the experience as you write, pretending you are actually there and remembering how you felt during the experience, the details of the scene, etc.

Participants in the non-honor priming condition were merely asked to write about an

event that had happened to them during that day:

Recall your actions from today.

In the box below, describe the image that is most vivid to you about today. Write as detailed a description of this image as possible. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel what you felt from learning about your experience. Try to relive the experience as you write, pretending you are actually there and remembering how you felt during the experience, the details of the scene, etc.

After completing the prompt above, participants were asked to complete a five-item

honor scale (adapted from Rodriguez-Mosquera et al., 2008, to reflect concern for an

individual's—rather than family's—honor). In addition, to test whether concern for honor could

be linked to endorsement of a climate of authenticity at work, participants also completed a

seven-item climate of authenticity scale (items modified from Grandey, et al., 2012, to reflect

endorsement of authenticity overall in the workplace rather than within a particular work team).

Further, given the potential for individuals to differ along the related cultural logics of

face and dignity (Leung & Cohen, 2011), testing whether honor is empirically distinct from both

face and dignity concerns in terms of its relationship to individuals' endorsement of authenticity

was also a focus of this study. Although all three cultural logics are conceptually distinct from

one another and can have varying behavioral ramifications for those influenced by the respective

logics, honor is in some sense a special case overlapping significantly with both dignity and face

across some dimensions.[24] For example, honor, concerned with both internal and external

valuations of the self, parallels to some extent both dignity (reliant on an internal valuation of the

self) and face (reliant on an external valuation; Leung & Cohen, 2011). Both honor and face are

concerned with the opinions of others, while both honor and dignity are influenced by internal

feelings of shame and guilt over wrong actions. All three highlight the importance of reciprocity

or tit-for-tat to regulate interpersonal interactions. Thus, while honor, dignity, and face are

distinct cultural logics in their own right, it is reasonable to believe that they may not be

completely unrelated to each other. It is plausible, for example, that when a public honor

affront—an external challenge to one's sense of honor in the moment—is salient to individuals,

honor and dignity could be negatively correlated given their opposing stances on the importance

of the external (public) as a source of self-worth, while honor and face could therefore be

positively correlated given both incorporate the external as a component of self-worth. In a

situation like the scenario posed to participants here, the balance between the external and the

internal has been upset, creating increased tension for one's sense of honor and, in particular,

highlighting the external component as particularly salient at that moment while questioning the

validity of the internal sense of worth.

As such, both dignity and face, although not directly manipulated, were measured in this

study. Participants completed a four-item dignity scale and a seventeen-item face scale (Leung &

Cohen, 2011). Participants then completed the final demographics part of the study, indicating

---

[24] See Trafimow, et al., 1991, for a discussion of how cultural logics need not be mutually exclusive. Instead, it may simply be the case that individuals are more or less likely to pull from a certain logic in a given situation, and that what logic is pulled from can be primed.

their age, gender, and which US states they had lived in for at least 6 years of their childhood from ages 0-18.

Measures

   Concern for honor. Participants indicated on a five-point scale how important each of the following items was to them (1=not at all important to 5=extremely important): "others seeing me as someone who deserves respect," "others regarding me as someone who is not to be disrespected," "my social image," "caring about the implications of my actions for my social image," and "defending myself from criticism." Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.75, thus the items were averaged at the participant level to a single honor value for each respondent.

   Endorsement of authenticity at work measure. Items were measured on a seven-point scale (1=not at all to 7=extremely) and included items like "at work, expressions of feelings should be respected," and "it should be safe to show how you really feel at work." Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.73, thus the items were averaged at the participant level to a single authenticity value for each respondent.

   Dignity and face measures. Dignity was measured using a four-item scale including items like "how much I respect myself is far, far more important than how much others respect me," and "no one can take a person's self-respect away from him or her." Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.80. Face was measured using seventeen items, including "I will not complain publicly even when I have been treated unfairly," and "I am more affected when someone criticizes me in public than when someone criticizes me in private." Cronbach's α for this scale was 0.90. Thus both dignity and face items were averaged at the participant level to a single dignity and a single face value for each respondent.

Results and Discussion

  Honor manipulation check. A simple t-test comparing honor scores between participants in the honor v. non-honor conditions was performed. As hypothesized, a significant difference was found $t(153) = -2.65$, $p = 0.01$, Cohen's $d = 0.43$. Those primed with an honor affront reported significantly higher concern for honor ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 0.64$) compared to those not primed with honor ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 0.73$).

  Honor and authenticity. Linear regression analysis using the continuous measure of honor shows that honor and endorsement of a climate of authenticity at work are positively related ($B = 0.20$, $SE = 0.09$, $p = 0.02$, 95% confidence interval $0.0209 - 0.3811$). Importantly, this relationship holds when controlling for both dignity and face (honor: $B = 0.22$, $SE = 0.09$, $p = 0.02$, 95% confidence interval $0.0281 - 0.3984$), neither of which are significantly related to endorsement of authenticity at work (see Figure A.1). These results highlight the significant and unique relationship between honor and authenticity—those more concerned with honor are also more likely to prefer a culture of emotional authenticity in the workplace. Individuals concerned with honor, as argued previously, may be most sensitive to interpersonal cues from others, thus preferring authentic (and ostensibly more reliable) cues.

  Honor v. face v. dignity. Simple bivariate correlations reveal that honor, face, and dignity are all significantly correlated with each other (see Table A.1). Honor and dignity, as expected, are negatively correlated, while honor and face are positively correlated. This supports the notion that for a scenario in which one's honor has been challenged publicly (upsetting the balance between the internal and the external and highlighting the relevance of the external), it is the importance placed on external evaluations of the self that relates honor (external focus) and

dignity (internal focus) as well as honor and face (both external) to each other. Further, as would be expected from this rationale, dignity and face are negatively correlated.

Further, participants' honor-priming condition was significantly related to their scores for dignity, $t(153) = 3.01$, $p < 0.01$. Those primed with an honor affront reported significantly lower endorsement of the logic of dignity ($M = 4.57$, $SD = 0.1.37$) compared to those not primed with honor ($M = 5.17$, $SD = 1.11$). Honor-priming condition was not significantly related to face, however, $t(153) = -1.41$, $p = 0.16$. Thus, priming honor by highlighting a past affront to honor (being criticized publicly, thereby lowering external self-valuation), also lowers participants' endorsement of an internal (v. external) sense of self-valuation. For honor individuals, emphasizing the external component to self-valuation seems to lower the importance of the internal component of self-worth in that moment. Although honor and face, both relevant to an externally-validated sense of self, were positively correlated, highlighting an honor affront perhaps surprisingly did not significantly raise individuals' concerns for face. It is possible, however, that individuals' concerns for face were not influenced over and above the influence on the external that was captured by the honor items. Together, these results further demonstrate the distinct yet related nature of the cultural logics of honor, face, and dignity, and the unique relationship between honor and authenticity.

Figure A.1: Summary of Priming Results on Honor, Dignity, Face, and Authenticity

TABLES

Table A.1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations.

	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Honor	3.45 (0.70)			
2. Dignity	-0.21**	4.88 (1.28)		
3. Face	0.23**	-0.32**	4.21 (0.96)	
4. Authenticity	0.18*	0.07	0.06	5.34 (0.78)

Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported along the diagonal.
*$p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, two-tailed

Table A.2: Regression Analyses Examining Honor, Face, and Dignity on Endorsement of Authenticity.

	Endorsement of Authenticity			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	SE B	B	SE B
Honor	0.20*	0.09	0.22*	0.09
Face			0.04	0.07
Dignity			0.08	0.05
R^2	0.03		0.05	

n = 155.
*$p \leq .05$.

References

Adaval, R., & Wyer, R. 1998. The role of narratives in consumer information processing. *Journal of Consumer Psychology,* 7(3), 207-245.

Ambady, N., & Weisbuch, M. 2010a. Nonverbal behavior. In S. T. Fiske, D.T. Gilbert & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology,* 464-497.

Ambady, N., & Weisbuch, M. 2010b. Thin-slice vision. In R. B. Adams, Jr., N. Ambady, K. Nakayama, & S. Shimojo (Eds.), *Social Vision,* 28-247, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, C., Kraus, M., Galinsky, A., & Keltner, D. 2012. The local-ladder effect: Social status and subjective well-being. *Psychological Science,* 23(7), 764-771.

Anderson, C., & Shirako, A. 2008. Are individuals' reputations related to their history of behavior? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 94(2), 320-333.

Anderson, M., & Escher, P. 2010. *The MBA Oath: Setting a Higher Standard for Business Leaders.* New York: Penguin.

Anderson, N., & West, M. 1998. Measuring climate for work group innovation: Development and validation of the team climate inventory. *Journal of Organizational Behavior,* 19, 235-258.

Arrow, K. 1974. *The Limits of Organization.* New York: Norton.

Asch, S. 1956. Studies of independence and conformity: A minority of one against a unanimous majority. *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied,* 70(9), 1-70.

Ashforth, B., & Humphrey, R. 1993. Emotional labor in service roles: The influence of identity. *Academy of Management Review,* 18(1), 88-115.

Ashton-James, C., Maddux, W., Galinsky, A., & Chartrand, T. 2009. Who I am depends on how I feel: The role of affect in the expression of culture. *Psychological Science,* 20(3)340-346.

Avezier, H., Trope, Y., & Todorov, A. 2012. Body cues, not facial expressions, discriminate between intense positive and negative emotions. *Science,* 338, 1225-1229.

Ayers, E. 1984. *Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th-Century American South.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Baer, M., & Frese, M. 2003. Innovation is not enough: Climates for initiative and psychological safety, process innovations, and firm performance. *Journal of Organizational Behavior,* 24, 45-68.

Baldry, A., Pagliaro, S., & Porcaro, C. 2013. The rule of law at time of masculine honor: Afghan police attitudes and intimate partner violence. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,* 16(3), 363-374.

Beaupré, M., & Hess, U. 2003. In my mind, *we* all smile: A case of in-group favoritism. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 39, 371-377.

Biland, C., Py, J., Allione, J., Demarchi, S., & Abric, J.-C. 2008. The effect of lying on intentional versus unintentional facial expressions. *European Review of Applied Psychology,* 58, 65-73.

Bond, C., & DePaulo, B. 2008. Individual differences in judging deception: Accuracy and bias. *Psychological Bulletin,* 134(4), 477-492.

Brown, R., Osterman, L., & Barnes, C. 2009. School violence and the culture of honor. *Psychological Science,* 20(11), 1400-1405.

Brown, W., & Moore, C. 2002. Smile asymmetries and reputation as reliable indicators of likelihood to cooperate: An evolutionary analysis. In S. P. Shohov (Ed.), *Advances in Psychology Research 11,* 59-78. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Brown, W., Palmetta, B., & Moore, C. 2003. Are there nonverbal cues to commitment? An exploratory study using the zero-acquaintance video presentation paradigm. *Evolutionary Psychology,* 1, 42-69.

Bucy, E., & Newhagen, J. 1999. The emotional appropriateness heuristic: Processing televised presidential reactions to the news. *Journal of Communication,* 49, 61-69.

Buhrmester, M. D., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. 2011. Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? *Perspectives on Psychological Science,* 6, 3-5.

Burger, J., Girgis, Z., & Manning, C. 2011. In their own words: Explaining obedience to authority through an examination of participants' comments. *Social Psychological and Personality Science,* 2(5), 460-466.

Carmeli, A., & Gittell, J. 2009. High-quality relationships, psychological safety, and learning from failures in work organizations. *Journal of Organizational Behavior,* 30, 709-729.

Carter, N., & Weber, J.M. 2010. Not Pollyannas: Higher generalized trust predicts lie detection ability. *Social Psychological and Personality Science,* 1(3), 274-279.

Chatman, J., & Flynn, F. 2005. Full-cycle micro-organizational behavior research. *Organization Science,* 16, 434-447.

Chu, R., Rivera, C., & Loftin, C. 2000. Herding and homicide: An examination of the Nisbett-Reaves Hypothesis. *Social Forces,* 78(3), 971-987.

Cihangir, S. Gender specific honor codes and cultural change. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,* 16(3), 319-333.

Cline, M. 1956. The influence of social context on the perception of faces. *Journal of Personality,* 2, 142-158.

Cohen, D., & Leung, A. 2009. The hard embodiment of culture. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* 39, 1278-1289.

Cohen, D., & Leung, A. 2012. Virtue and virility: Governing with honor and the association or dissociation between martial honor and moral character of U.S. Presidents, legislators, and justices. *Social Psychological and Personality Science,* 3(2), 162-171.

Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. 1994. Self-protection and the culture of honor: Explaining Southern violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* 20(5), 551-567.

Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. 1997. Field experiments examining the culture of honor: The role of institutions in perpetuating norms about violence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* 23, 1188-1199.

Cohen, D., Nisbett, R., Bowdle, B., & Schwarz, N. 1996. Insult, aggression, and the southern culture of honor. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 70(5), 945-960.

Cohen, D., Vandello, J., Puente, S., & Rantilla, A. 1999. "When you call me that, smile!" How norms for politeness, interaction styles, and aggression work together in southern culture. *Social Psychology Quarterly,* 62(3), 257-275.

Côté, S. 2005. A social interaction model of the effects of emotion regulation on work strain. *Academy of Management Review,* 30(3), 509-530.

Côté, S., & Hideg, I. 2011. The ability to influence others via emotion displays: A new dimension of emotional intelligence. *Organizational Psychology Review,* 1(1): 53-71.

Côté, S., Hideg, I., & van Kleef, G. 2013. The consequences of faking anger in negotiations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 49(3), 453-463.

Cross, S., Uskul, A., Gerçek-Swing, B., Alözkan, C., & Ataca, B. 2013. Confrontation versus withdrawal: Cultural differences in responses to threats to honor. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,* 16(3), 345-362.

Darwin, C. 1872. *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.* London: John Murray (1st ed.).

Diener, E., Larsen, R.J., & Emmons, R.A. 1984. Person X situation interactions: Choice of situations and congruence response models. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 47, 580-592.

DeSteno, D., Breazeal, C., Frank, R., Pizarro, D., Baumann, J., Dickens, L., & Lee, J. 2012. Detecting the trustworthiness of novel partners in economic exchange. *Psychological Science,* 24, 1-8.

DiMaggio, P. 1997. Culture and cognition. *Annual Review of Sociology,* 23, 263-287.

Dosi, G., & Egidi, M. 1991. Substantive and procedural uncertainty: An exploration of economic behaviours in changing environments. *Journal of Evolutionary Economics,* 1(2), 145-168.

Duchenne, B. 1990. *The Mechanism of Human Facial Expression or an Electro-Physiological Analysis of the Expression of the Emotions* (A. Cuthbertson, Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1862)

Edmondson, A. 1999. Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 44(2), 350-383.

Edmondson, A. 2002. Managing the risk of learning: Psychological safety in work teams. In West, M. (Ed.), *International Handbook of Organizational Teamwork,* London: Blackwell.

Eid, M., & Diener, E. 2001. Norms for experiencing emotions in different cultures: Inter- and intranational differences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 81(5), 869-885.

Ekman, P. 1999. Basic emotions. In T. Dalgleish & M. Power (Eds.), *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion,* 45-60. New York: Wiley.

Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. 1969. Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception. *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes,* 32(1), 88-106.

Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. 1976. Measuring facial movement. *Environmental Psychology and Nonverbal Behavior,* 1(1), 56-75.

Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. 1982. Felt, false, and miserable smiles. *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior,* 6(4), 238-252.

Ekman, P., Friesen, W., & Hager, J. 2002. *Facial Action Coding System: The Manual.* Available on CD ROM from Research Nexus division of Network Information Research Corporation, Salt Lake City, UT.

Ekman, P., Friesen, W., & O'Sullivan, M. 1988. Smiles when lying. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 54, 414-420.

Elfenbein, H., & Ambady, N. 2003. When familiarity breeds accuracy: Cultural exposure and facial emotion recognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 85(2), 276-290.

Elfenbein, H., Beaupré, M., Lévesque, M., & Hess, U. 2007. Toward a dialect theory: Cultural differences in the expression and recognition of posed facial expressions. *Emotion,* 7(1), 131-146.

Fernández-Dols, J., & Crivelli, C. 2013. Emotion and expression: Naturalistic studies. *Emotion Review,* 5(1), 24-29.

Fischer, A., Manstead, A. S. R., & Rodriguez-Mosquera, P. M. 1999. The role of honor-related individualistic values in conceptualising pride, shame, and anger: Spanish and Dutch cultural prototypes. *Cognition and Emotion,* 13, 149-179.

Fischer, D. 1989. *Albion's seed: Four British folkways in America* (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fiske, S., Cuddy, A., & Glick, P. 2007. Universal dimensions of social cognition: Warmth and competence. *TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences,* 11(2), 77-83.

Fiske, S., Cuddy, A., Glick, P., & Xu, J. 2002. A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 82(6), 878-902.

Flynn, F. J., Reagans, R. E., Amanatullah, E. T., & Ames, D. R. 2006. Helping one's way to the top: self-monitors achieve status by helping others and knowing who helps whom. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 91(6), 1123.

Fothergill, A. 2003. The stigma of charity: Gender, class, and disaster assistance. *Sociological Quarterly,* 44: 659-680.

Frank, M., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. 1993. Behavioral markers and recognizability of the smile of enjoyment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 64(1), 83-93.

Frank, R. 1988. *Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions.* New York: W. W. Norton.

Fridlund, A. J. 1991. Sociality of solitary smiling: Potentiation by an implicit audience. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 60(2), 229-240.

Fridlund, A. J. 1997. The new ethology of human facial expressions. In J. A. Russell & J. Fernandez-Dols (Eds.), *The Psychology of Facial Expression,* 103-129. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Friedman, H. 1979. The interactive effects of facial expressions of emotion and verbal messages on perceptions of affective meaning. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 15, 453-469.

Fulmer, C., & Gelfland, M. 2013. How do I trust thee? Dynamic trust patterns and their individual and social contextual determinants. In K. Sycara, M. J. Gelfand, & A. Abbe (Eds.), *Models for Intercultural Collaboration and Negotiation.* New York: Springer.

Gambetta, D., & Hamil, H. 2005. *Streetwise: How Taxi Drivers Establish Customers' Trustworthiness.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Gelfland, M., Erez, M., & Aycan, Z. 2007. Cross-cultural organizational behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology,* 58, 479-514.

Gelfand, M. J., Lim, B.-C., & Raver, J. 2004. Culture and accountability in organizations: Variations in forms of social control across cultures. *Human Resource Management Review,* 14, 135–160.

Gerard, H., Wilhelmy, R., & Conolley, E. 1968. Conformity and group size. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 8(1), 79-82.

Gifford, R. 1994. A lens-mapping framework for understanding the encoding and decoding of interpersonal dispositions in nonverbal behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 66(2), 398-412.

Gifford, R., Ng, C.F., & Wilkinson, M. 1985. Nonverbal cues in the employment interview: Links between applicant qualities and interviewer judgments. *Journal of Applied Psychology,* 70(4), 729-736.

Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research.* New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Goncalo, J. A., & Staw, B. M. 2006. Individualism–collectivism and group creativity. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 100(1), 96-109.

Gooding, R., & Wagner, J. 1985. A meta-analytic review of the relationship between size and performance: The productivity and efficiency of organizations and their subunits. *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 30(4), 462-481.

Gottlieb, J., & Carver, C. 1980. Anticipation of future interaction and the bystander effect. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 16, 253-260.

Grandey, A. 2003. When "the show must go on": Surface acting and deep acting as determinants of emotional exhaustion and peer-rated service delivery. *Academy of Management Journal,* 46(1), 86-96.

Grandey, A., Fisk, G., Mattila, A., Jansen, K., & Sideman, L. 2005. Is "service with a smile" enough? Authenticity of positive displays during service encounters. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 96, 38-55.

Grandey, A., Foo, S., Groth, M., & Goodwin, R. 2012. Free to be you and me: A climate of authenticity alleviates burnout from emotional labor. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology,* 17(1), 1-14.

Grandey, A., Rafaeli, A., Ravid, S., Wirtz, J., & Steiner, D. 2010. Emotion display rules at work in the global service economy: The special case of the customer. *Journal of Service Management,* 21(3), 388-412.

Grazian, D. 2005. *Blue Chicago: The Search for Authenticity in Urban Blues Clubs.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Gross, J. J. 1998. The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. *Review of General Psychology,* 2, 271–299.

Guerra, V., Giner-Sorolla, R., & Vasiljevic, M. 2013. The importance of honor concerns across eight countries. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,* 16(3), 298-318.

Hallowell, R., Bowen, D., & Knoop, C-I. 2002. Four Seasons goes to Paris. *Academy of Management Executive,* 16, 7-24.

Hareli, S., & Rafaeli, A. 2007. Emotion cycles: On the social influence of emotion in organizations. *Research in Organizational Behavior,* 28, 35-59.

Harinck, F., Shafa, S., Ellemers, N., Beersma, B. 2013. The good news about honor culture: The preference for cooperative conflict management in the absence of insults. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research,* 6(2), 67-78.

Hayes, A.F. 2013. *Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis.* New York: Guilford Press.

Helkema, K., Verkasalo, M., Myyry, L., Silfver, M., Niit, T., Manganelli, A-M., Andreeva, G., Stefanenko, T., Dubovskaya, E., Tikhomandritskaya, O., & Stetsenko, A. 2013. Honor as a value in Finland, Estonia, Italy, Russia, and Switzerland. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,* 16(3), 279-297.

Henry, P. 2009. Low-status compensation: A theory for understanding the role of status in cultures of honor. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 97, 451-466.

Herzenstein, M., Sonenshein, S., & Dholakia, U. 2011. Tell me a good story and I may lend you money: The role of narratives in peer-to-peer lending decisions. *Journal of Marketing Research,* 48, S138-S149.

Hirak, R., Peng, A., Carmeli, A., & Schaubroeck, J. 2012. Linking leader inclusiveness to work unit performance: The importance of psychological safety and learning from failures. *The Leadership Quarterly,* 23, 107-117.

Hochschild, A. 1979. Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology,* 85(3), 551-575.

Hüffmeier, J., & Hertel, G. 2011. When the whole is more than the sum of its parts: Group motivation gains in the wild. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 47, 455-459.

IJzerman, H., van Dijk, W., & Galluci, M. 2007. A bumpy train ride: A field experiment on insult, honor, and emotional reactions. *Emotion,* 7(4), 869-875.

Ingham, A., Levinger, G., Graves, J., & Peckham, V. 1974. The Ringelmann effect: Studies of group size and group performance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 10, 371-384.

Jack, R., Caldara, R., & Schyns, P. 2011. Internal representations reveal cultural diversity in expectations of facial expressions of emotion. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,* 1-7.

Jones, B., DeBruine, L., Little, A., Conway, C., & Feinberg, D. 2006. Integrating gaze direction and expression in preferences for attractive faces. *Psychological Science,* 17(7), 588-591.

Jones, S., & Hong, H-W. 2005. How some infant smiles get made. *Infant Behavior & Development,* 28, 194-205.

Judge, T., Woolf, E., & Hurst, C. 2009. Is emotional labor more difficult for some than for others? A multilevel, experience-sampling study. *Personnel Psychology,* 62, 57-88.

Kahn, W. 1993. Caring for the caregivers: Patterns of organizational caregiving. *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 38(4), 539-563.

Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. 2002. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), *Heuristics of Intuitive Judgment: Extensions and Applications*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kaiser, C. R., Vick, S. B., & Major, B. 2006. Prejudice expectations moderate preconscious attention to cues that are threatening to social identity. *Psychological Science,* 17, 332–338.

Kark, R., & Carmeli, A. 2009. Alive and creating: The mediating role of vitality and aliveness in the relationship between psychological safety and creative work involvement. *Journal of Organizational Behavior,* 30, 785-804.

Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. 1997. Embarrassment: Its distinct form and appeasement functions. *Psychological Bulletin,* 122(3), 250-270.

Kopelman, S. 2014. *Negotiating Genuinely: Being Yourself in Business.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Kraus, M., & Chen, T-W. 2013. A winning smile? Smile intensity, physical dominance, and fighter performance. *Emotion,* 13(2), 270-279.

Kraut, R., & Johnston, R. 1979. Social and emotional messages of smiling: An ethological approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 37(9), 1539-1553.

Kroeber, A., & Kluckhohn, C. 1952. Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions. ***Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology,*** 47(1), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Krumhuber, E., Manstead, A., Cosker, D., Marshall, D., Rosin, P., & Kappas, A. 2007. Facial dynamics as indicators of trustworthiness and cooperative behavior. ***Emotion,*** 7(4), 730-735.

LaFrance, M., & Hecht, M. 1995. Why smiles generate leniency. ***Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,*** 21(3), 207-214.

Larson, R., Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Graef, R. 1982. Time alone in daily experience: Loneliness or renewal? In L. A. Peplau, & D. Perlman (Eds.), ***Loneliness: A Sourcebook of Current Theory, Research, and Therapy,*** 40–53. New York: Wiley Interscience.

Latané, B., & Darley, J. 1968. Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 10(3), 215-221.

Latané, B., & Nida, S. 1981. Ten years of research on group size and helping. ***Psychological Bulletin,*** 89(2), 308-324.

Latané, B., & Rodin, J. 1969. A lady in distress: Inhibiting effects of friends and strangers on bystander intervention. ***Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,*** 5, 189-202.

Leroy, H., Dierynck, B., Anseel, F., Simons, T., Halbesleben, J., McCaughey, D., Savage, G., & Sels, L. 2012. Behavioral integrity for safety, priority of safety, psychological safety, and patient safety: A team-level study. ***Journal of Applied Psychology,*** 97(6), 1273-1281.

Leung, A., & Cohen, D. 2011. Within- and between-culture variation: Individual differences and the cultural logics of honor, face, and dignity cultures. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 100(3), 507-526.

Levine, M., & Crowther, S. 2008. The responsive bystander: How social group membership and group size can encourage as well as inhibit bystander intervention. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,*** 95(6), 1429-1439.

MacCannell, D. 1973. Staged authenticity: Arrangements of social space in tourist settings. ***American Journal of Sociology,*** 79(3), 589-603.

McLellan, T., Johnston, L., Dalrymple-Alford, J., & Porter, R. 2010. Sensitivity to genuine versus posed emotion specified in facial displays. ***Cognition & Emotion,*** 24(8), 1277-1292.

Mandel, D., & Litt, A. 2012. The ultimate sacrifice: Perceived peer honor predicts troops' willingness to risk their lives. ***Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,*** 16(3), 375-388.

Marsh, A., Elfenbein, H., & Ambady, N. 2003. Nonverbal "accents": Cultural differences in facial expressions of emotion. ***Psychological Science,*** 14(4), 373-376.

Marsh, A., Elfenbein, H., & Ambady, N. 2007. Separated by a common language: Nonverbal accents and cultural stereotypes about Americans and Australians. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,* 38(3), 284-301.

Martin, P., & Turner, B. 1986. Grounded theory and organizational research. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science,* 22, 141-157.

Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & Van de Veerdonk, E. 2008. Placing the face in context: Cultural differences in the perception of facial emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 94(3), 365-381.

Menon, T., & Phillips, K. 2011. Getting Even or Being at Odds? Cohesion in Even- and Odd-Sized Small Groups. *Organization Science*, 22(3), 738-753.

Merriam-Webster. Accessed March 2014. Available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/.

Merritt, A. 2000. Culture in the cockpit: Do Hofstede's dimensions replicate? *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,* 31(3), 283-301.

Meyer, P. 2011. *Liespotting: Proven Techniques to Detect Deception*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin.

Miles, L. 2009. Who is approachable? *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 45, 262-266.

Miles, M., & Huberman, A.M. 1994. *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Miller, D. T. 1999. The norm of self-interest. *American Psychologist,* 54(12), 1053.

Molinsky, A. 2005. Language fluency and the evaluation of cultural faux pas: Russians interviewing for jobs in the United States. *Social Psychology Quarterly,* 68, 103-120.

Morris, M., Podolny, J., & Sullivan, B. 2008. Culture and coworker relations: Interpersonal patterns in American, Chinese, German, and Spanish divisions of a global retail bank. *Organization Science,* 19(4), 517-532.

Morris, T. 2009. "The Oath: An Ethics Promise at the Harvard Business School." *Huffington Post,* June 5, 2009. Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-morris/the-oath-an-ethics-promis_b_211624.html.

Mueller, J. 2012. Why individuals in larger teams perform worse. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 117, 111-124.

Mullen, B. 1983. Operationalizing the effect of the group on the individual: A self-attention perspective. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 19, 295-322.

Naumann, L., Vazire, S., Rentfrow, P., & Gosling, S. 2009. Personality judgments based on physical appearance. ***Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,*** 35, 1661-1671.

Nembhard, I., & Edmondson, A. 2006. Making it safe: The effects of leader inclusiveness and professional status on psychological safety and improvement efforts in health care teams. ***Journal of Organizational Behavior,*** 27, 941-966.

Nisbett, R. 1993. Violence and U.S. regional culture. ***American Psychologist,*** 48, 441–449.

Nisbett, R., & Cohen, D. 1996. ***Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South.*** Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Nucci, L., Saxe, G., Turiel, E., Eds. 2000. ***Culture, Thought, and Development***. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Olsthoorn, P. 2006. Honor and the military. ***International Journal of Applied Philosophy,*** 20(1), 159-172.

Oyserman, D., & Lee, S.W.S. 2008. Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. ***Psychological Bulletin,*** 134(2), 311-342.

Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. 2010. Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. ***Judgment and Decision Making,*** 5(5), 411-419.

Peace, V., Miles, L., & Johnston, L. 2006. It doesn't matter what you wear: The impact of posed and genuine expressions of happiness on product evaluation. ***Social Cognition,*** 24(2), 137-168.

Peterson, A. 1997. ***Creating Country Music: Fabricating Authenticity.*** Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Pitt-Rivers, J. 1966. Honour and social status. In J. Peristiany (Ed.), ***Honour and Shame,*** 19-78. London: England: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Pochedly, J., Widen, S., & Russell, J. 2012. What emotion does the "facial expression of disgust" express? ***Emotion,*** 12(6), 1315-1319.

Preuschoft, S. 1992. "Laughter" and "smile" in Barbary macaques (*Macaca sylvanus*). ***Ethology,*** 91, 220-236.

Prkachin, K., & Silverman, B. 2002. Hostility and facial expression in young men and women: Is social regulation more important than negative affect? ***Health Psychology,*** 21(1), 33-39.

Rafaeli, A., & Sutton, R. 1987. Expression of emotion as part of the work role. ***Academy of Management Review,*** 12(1), 23-37.

Rafaeli, A., & Sutton, R. 1989. The expression of emotion in organizational life. ***Research in Organizational Behavior,*** 11, 1-43.

Rees, L., Rothman, N., Lehavy, R., & Sanchez-Burks, J. 2013. The ambivalent mind can be a wise mind: Emotional ambivalence increases judgment accuracy. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 49, 360-367.

Reis, H., Wilson, I., Monestere, C., Bernstein, S., Clark, K., Seidl, E., Franco, M., Gioioso E., Freeman, L., & Radoane, K. 1990. What is smiling is beautiful and good. *European Journal of Social Psychology,* 20, 259-267.

Reisenzein, R., Studtmann, M., & Horstmann, G. 2013. Coherence between emotion and facial expression: Evidence from laboratory experiments. *Emotion Review,* 5(1), 16-23.

Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., Fischer, A. H., Manstead, A., & Zaalberg, R. 2008. Attack, disapproval, or withdrawal? The role of honour in anger and shame responses to being insulted. *Cognition & Emotion,* 22(8), 1471-1498.

Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. 2002a. Honor in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,* 33(1), 16-36.

Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. 2002b. The role of honor concerns in emotional reactions to offenses. *Cognition and Emotion,* 16 (1), 143-163.

Rosenberg, L. 1961. Group size, prior experience, and conformity. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 63(2), 436-437.

Rosenberg, M. 1965. *Society and the Adolescent Self-Image.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ruby, M., Falk, C., Heine, S., Villa, C., & Silberstein, O. 2012. Not all collectivisms are equal: opposing preferences for ideal affect between East Asians and Mexicans. *Emotion,* 12(6), 1206-1209.

Rutkowski, G., Gruder, C., & Romer, D. 1983. Group cohesiveness, social norms, and bystander intervention. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 44(3), 545-552.

Sanchez-Burks, J. 2002. Protestant relational ideology and (in)attention to relational cues in work settings. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 83(4), 919-929.

Sanchez-Burks, J. 2005. Protestant relational ideology: The cognitive underpinnings and organizational implications of an American anomaly. In R. Kramer & B. Staw (Eds.) *Research in Organizational Behavior,* 26, 265-305.

Sanchez-Burks, J., & Mor Barak, M. (2005). Interpersonal relationships in a global work context. In M. Mor Barak (Ed.), *Managing Diversity in the Age of Globalization: Toward a Worldwide Inclusive Workplace,* 114–168. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Sanchez-Burks, J., Nisbett, R., & Ybarra, O. 2000. Cultural styles, relationship schemas, and prejudice against out-groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 79(2), 174.

Schein, E. 1999. Organizational culture. *American Psychologist,* 45(2), 109-119.

Schein, E. 2004. *Organizational Culture and Leadership.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Schneider, J. 1971. Of vigilance and virgins: Honor, shame and access to resources in Mediterranean societies. *Ethnology,* 10(1), 1-24.

Schulte, M., Cohen, N., & Klein, K. 2010. The coevolution of network ties and perceptions of team psychological safety. *Organization Science,* 23(2), 564-581.

Severance, L., Bui-Wrzosinska, L., Gelfland, M., Lyons, S., Nowak, A., Borkowski, W., Soomro, N., Soomro, N., Rafaeli, A., Efrat-Treister, D., Lin, C-C., & Yamaguchi, S. 2013. The psychological structure of aggression across cultures. *Journal of Organizational Behavior,* 34, 835-865.

Singh, B., Winkel, D., & Selvarajan, T. 2013. Managing diversity at work: Does psychological safety hold the key to racial differences in employee performance? *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology,* 86, 242-263.

Sonenshein, S., Herzenstein, M., & Dholakia, U. 2011. How accounts shape lending decisions through fostering perceived trustworthiness. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 115, 69-84.

Staats, B., Milkman, K., & Fox, C. 2012. The team scaling fallacy: Underestimating the declining efficiency of larger teams. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 118, 132-142.

Steiner, I. 1972. *Group Process and Productivity.* New York: Academic Press.

Stewart, G. 2006. A meta-analytic review of relationships between team design features and team performance. *Journal of Management,* 32(1), 29-54.

Sutton, R., & Rafaeli, A. 1988. Untangling the relationship between displayed emotions and organizational sales: The case of the convenience stores. *Academy of Management Journal,* 31, 461-487.

ten Brinke, L., Stimson, D., & Carney, D. 2014. Some evidence for unconscious lie detection. *Psychological Science,* 25(6), 1-8.

Thibault, P., Levesque, M., Gosselin, P., Hess, U. 2012. The Duchenne marker is *not* a universal signal of smile authenticity—but it can be learned! *Social Psychology,* 43(4), 215-221.

Thomas, E., & Fink, C. 1963. Effects of group size. *Psychological Bulletin,* 60(4), 371-384.

Ting-Toomey, S. 1988. Intercultural conflict styles: A face-negotiation theory. In Y. Y. Kim and W. Gudykunst (Eds.), *Theories in Intercultural Communication.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Ting-Toomey, S., & Kurogi, A. 1998. Facework competence in intercultural conflict: An updated face-negotiation theory. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations,* 22(2), 187-225.

Todorov, A., Mandisodza, A., Goren, A., & Hall, C. 2005. Inferences of competence from faces predict election outcomes. *Science,* 308, 1623-1626.

Trafimow, D., Triandis, H. C., & Goto, S. G. 1991. Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 60(5), 649.

Triandis, H. 1996. The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. *American Psychologist,* 51(4), 407-415.

Tsai, J., & Chentsova-Dutton, Y. 2003. Variation among European Americans in emotional facial expression. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology,* 34, 650-657.

Tsai, J., Louie, J., Chen, E., & Uchida, Y. 2007. Learning what feelings to desire: Socialization of ideal affect through children's storybooks. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* 33, 17-30.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science,* 185, 1124-1131.

United States Military Academy at West Point. Accessed January 7, 2014. *Honor Code.* Available online at http://www.usma.edu/scpme/SitePages/Honor.aspx.

Uskul, A. K., Oyserman, D., & Schwarz, N. 2010. Cultural emphasis on honor, modesty or self-enhancement: Implications for the survey response process. In J. A. Harkness, M. Braun, B. Edwards, T.P. Johnson, L. Lyberg, P. Ph. Mohler, B.E. Pennell, & T.W. Smith (Eds.), *Survey Methods in Multinational, Multiregional and Multicultural Contexts,* 191-202. New York: Wiley.

Van den Bosch, R., & Taris, T. 2014. Authenticity at work: Development and validation of an individual authenticity measure at work. *Journal of Happiness Studies,* 15, 1-18.

Van Kleef, G. 2010. The emerging view of emotion as social information. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass,* 4/5, 331-343.

Van Osch, Y., Breugelmans, S., Zeelenberg, M., & Bölük, P. 2013. A different kind of honor culture: Family honor and aggression in Turks. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,* 16(3), 334-344.

Wayne, S., & Kacmar, K. 1991. The effects of impression management on the performance appraisal process. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 48, 70-88.

Weber, M. 1904/1930. *Protestant Ethic & the Spirit of Capitalism.* Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, Inc.

Weick, K. 1979. *The Social Psychology of Organizing.* Reading, MA: Addison-Westley.

West, M. 1990. The social psychology of innovation in groups. In M. West & J. Farr (Eds.), *Innovation and Creativity at Work: Psychological and Organizational Strategies* (p. 309-333). Chichester, England: Wiley.

Willis, J., & Todorov, A. 2006. First impressions: Making up your mind after a 100-ms exposure to a face. *Psychological Science,* 17, 592-598.

Wong, R., & Hong, Y-Y. 2005. Dynamic influences of culture on cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. *Psychological Science,* 16(6), 429-434.

Woodard, C. 2012. *American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America.* London: Penguin Books.

Wrzesniewski, A., Dutton, J., & Debebe, G. 2003. Interpersonal sensemaking and the meaning of work. *Research in Organizational Behavior,* 25, 93-135.

Wyatt-Brown, B. 1982. *Southern Honor: Ethics & Behavior in the Old South.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Yetton, P., & Bottger, P. 1983. The relationships among group size, member ability, social decision schemes, and performance. *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,* 32, 145-159.

Zohar, D., & Luria, G. 2005. A multilevel model of safety climate: Cross-level relationships between organization and group-level climates. *Journal of Applied Psychology,* 90(4), 616-628.