The Transformation of the Roman Auxiliary Soldier in Thought and Practice

by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Kathleen Rose (Gilronan) McLaughlin (1955-2011), whose self-sacrifice, encouragement, and love inspired all those around her.
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I would not have been able to complete this dissertation without the aid and support of many advisors, colleagues, and friends. As chair of this project, David Potter always expressed confidence in my ideas and my writing, while also providing expert scholarly and professional advice. Ray Van Dam urged me to carefully consider my assumptions as well as the structure of my argument. I enjoyed discussing theoretical issues with Ian Moyer, while Arthur Verhoogt rightly pushed me to consider context and case studies. Bruce Frier, Sara Forsdyke, and other faculty in the Department of Classical Studies and Department of History provided guidance, intellectual insight, and friendship.

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Needless to say, any and all errors are my own.
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Additional abbreviations used are as follows:

*AE* = *L’Année épigraphique*. Paris 1888-
*CIL* = *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, ed. Th. Mommsen et al. Berlin 1863-
*CLE* = *Anthologia Latina sive poesis latinae supplementum*. II. *Carmina Latina epigraphica*, 1-2, ed. F. Bücheler, 1895-1897 and *Supplementum*, ed. E. Lommatzsch. Leipzig 1926
*HD* = EDH Epigraphische Datenbank Heidelberg. [http://edh-www.adw.uni-heidelberg.de/home](http://edh-www.adw.uni-heidelberg.de/home)
*IANice* = *Inscriptions antiques de Nice-Cimiez (Cemenelum, Ager Cemenelensis)*, ed. G. Laguerre. Paris 1975
*ILAlg* = *Inscriptions latines d’Algérie*, ed. S. Gsell et al. Paris 1922-
*ILAM* = *Inscriptions Latines des Alpes Maritimes*, ed. S. Morabito. Nice 2010
*ILS* = *Inscriptiones latinae selectae*, ed. H. Dessau. 3 vols. Berlin 1892-1916
Abstract

In this dissertation, I investigate the multi-cultural community of soldiers and their families that comprised the Roman imperial institution of the *auxilia*, military units recruited initially from non-citizen provincials, and how their everyday experiences shaped Roman ideas of soldier, “barbarian,” and Romanness. Many scholars believe that auxiliary soldiers were incorporated as Romans in both the legal and cultural sense through their military service. In contrast, I argue that a passive “barbarian” to Roman transformation insufficiently describes their experience. Auxiliaries did not simply adopt a Roman identity but rather altered the very notion of Romanness itself.

I show how Roman officers’ expectations regarding soldiers, as reflected in the writings of Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus, played a major role in shaping how auxiliaries imagined their own position. I analyze the ethnic stereotypes found especially in Caesar, Tacitus, Strabo, Pomponius Mela, and Ovid concerning Batavians and Thracians, two key peoples who contributed large number of soldiers to the auxiliaries, and I argue that auxiliary soldiers adopted and modified these stereotypes to their own advantage. While Roman stereotypes about foreigners and soldiers shaped the image of auxiliaries, individual soldiers nevertheless managed to redeploy these ideas through their everyday practices, in turn shaping what it meant to be Roman. I investigate how auxiliaries adapted to and changed Roman ideals of discipline and hierarchy as expressed in the second-century technical treatise on surveying, *De...*
munitionibus castrorum. An analysis of the archaeological remains of military bases in Britain, the Rhine frontier, Egypt, and Syria reveals not only that the spatial practices and experiences of auxiliaries were more diverse than previously imagined but also that the soldiers themselves contributed to this diversity. Finally, I use funerary iconography, inscriptions, papyri, ostraca, and tablets from auxiliaries stationed in the Alps, Britain, and Egypt to show how auxiliaries’ varied daily interactions contributed to a broader Roman military identity. Ultimately, despite the inertia of barbarian ethnic stereotypes, Roman policy regarding auxiliary units changed, partially through the collective and individual efforts of generations of auxiliary soldiers, thereby transforming the Roman Empire into a multicultural state of near-universal citizenship.
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Soldiers of Ambiguity

After years of ad hoc developments during the civil wars, Augustus began the gradual process of systematically reforming many aspects of the Roman military system. Rather than reverting to a citizen militia model, the Roman Empire maintained a permanent military presence in the provinces, primarily comprising citizen legions and non-citizen auxiliary units. For the first time in Roman history, non-Romans were continuously and extensively called upon to defend a state to which they did not belong. While Italians and other non-Romans often participated in campaigns during the Republic, it was not until the establishment of the Principate that non-citizens were regularly recruited into generally segregated, primarily Roman-controlled military units on a permanent basis. Auxiliary units (alae and cohortes) were smaller and more flexible than legions, providing the Romans with needed cavalry, archers, slingers, and additional infantry troops. These non-Roman soldiers proved to be essential for the defense, policing, and expansion of the Roman Empire.

Auxiliary soldiers inhabited an ambiguous place in both the world and the minds of the Romans. Initially non-citizen soldiers drafted or hired with the promise of citizenship on the completion of service, auxiliaries represented the paradoxical nature of the Empire itself. On the one hand, Romans knew that auxiliaries, like all soldiers, had
the physical potential to either save or destroy the fabric of the Empire. On the other hand, Romans at times had difficulty in firmly placing auxiliaries in their understanding of the world. While many Romans may have whole-heartedly supported the expansion of the Empire, others believed in the need to keep a clear separation between the Roman and the barbarian. Auxiliaries straddled this boundary of Roman and non-Roman, and such ambiguity reinforced the desire on the part of those in positions of power to create a unifying set of practices to change non-citizen civilians into soldiers.

Partly due to this anxiety regarding the practice of using non-Roman soldiers to defend the Roman Empire, the leading actors in the Roman state attempted to transform recruits into effective auxiliary soldiers through coordinated changes in behavior, language, and space. The pace, spread, and impact of these transformations varied by auxiliary unit, period, and location. However, auxiliary soldiers, in their efforts to adapt to such changes in their lifestyle, managed to appropriate and re-imagine these new sets of social practices and mental habits. In turn, the actions and beliefs of these thousands of nameless soldiers, whether intentionally or not, changed not only Roman elite expectations of the behavior and role of the auxiliary soldier, but also influenced the community of the Roman Empire itself.

This dissertation investigates the experiences of non-citizen, provincial soldiers serving in auxiliary units of the Roman Empire and their impact on Roman ideas of soldier, barbarian, and Romanness in the first through third centuries CE. Many scholars believe that auxiliary soldiers were incorporated as Romans in both the legal and cultural sense through their military service.\(^1\) In contrast, I argue that a passive “barbarian” to

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\(^{1}\) Haynes (1999b) argues how service in the Roman auxiliary units transformed the cultural identity of the soldiers and distinguished them from their civilian peers through a form of “Romanization.” More recently,
Roman transformation insufficiently describes their experience. Auxiliaries did not simply adopt a Roman identity but rather altered the very notion of Romanness itself. My study analyzes a wide range of sources, including literary evidence that shaped Roman ideas about soldiers and foreigners, technical treatises on military camp construction, archaeological evidence from frontier communities, monumental art, funerary inscriptions, and personal letters. Case studies of auxiliaries serving in the Alps, Britain, and Egypt show the varied reactions and contributions to changes in everyday practices and ideas. While the institution and the people of the Roman auxiliary units had a limited, but varied, impact upon the daily life of the majority of civilians in the frontier provinces, and while this impact changed significantly according to location and time period, auxiliaries nevertheless affected the lifestyle and ideas of people living in the Roman Empire, both on the frontiers and in Rome itself.

The auxiliaries of the Roman army provide an excellent lens through which to explore the negotiation of power and identity in the Roman Empire. Recruiting (or, depending on the context, conscripting) soldiers into the auxiliaries affected primarily non-citizens of the provinces through the beginning of the third century, although extra-imperial populations were also recruited. A new soldier adopted and created a form of legal and cultural “Roman-ness” through his service in the auxiliaries. If in an “ethnic unit,” he may have acted according to Roman expectations of how a Batavian, Thracian, or other group should act. He learned to speak, perhaps even learned to read and write Latin or Greek. He participated in the official cults devoted to the Roman gods according

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to the official Roman military calendar. He honored the emperor, the standards, and his superiors. He ate a Roman military diet, slept in Roman military forts, and spent his leisure time in Roman military baths, amphitheaters, and brothels. When he died, he commemorated his life using the Roman “epigraphic habit” and Roman cultural iconography. If he reached retirement, he received Roman citizenship and marriage rights, economic benefits, and social prestige. He seemingly became fully “Roman,” legally, socially, and to a large extent culturally, through his service in the Roman auxiliary. Yet what did the average recruit bring to the table? In other words, to what extent did the recruit’s prior dispositions affect his experience of service in the Roman army? Did he passively accept all of these changes, some more radical than others? Did he resist some but not others? In other words, how did service in the Roman military affect a recruit’s identity? Also, to what extent did a normal recruit change the Roman institution itself, change the nature of “Roman-ness”? This dissertation explores these questions.

With the extension of Roman control over the Mediterranean world, Roman soldiers affected the lives of the inhabitants of the newly conquered territories, not only through defeating local resistance but also by actively encouraging (if not imposing) Roman forms of administration, urbanization, and lifestyle on civilians of the provinces. However, power and exploitation can only explain one aspect of imperialism. By focusing exclusively on the top-down nature of the formation of empire, we can lose sight of the role of the conquered in shaping the newly-formed society. Their agency, to be sure, was severely restricted by the power relations at play, in addition to other economic, social, cultural, and physical limitations; nevertheless, to see imperialism as a
simply an imposition of power is to ignore the interdependence of ruler and ruled in the creation of empire. This relationship is made even more complex by the fact that a significant portion of Rome’s soldiers, the auxiliaries, making up over half of all soldiers in the Empire, comprised the very provincial non-citizens they were charged with controlling. Such an interdependence of ruler and ruled led to a wide range of possible interactions between soldiers and civilians.

In addition to the everyday experience of people, this dissertation evaluates how the very ideas surrounding what it meant to be Roman were reinforced, rejected, or problematized by the very existence of the auxiliary units. Elite expectations of the behavior of soldiers and foreigners remained rather steady, despite the importance of foreign troops to imperial security. Military spatial theories, too, generally regarded soldiers with suspicion. Yet it is the practices and behaviors of the auxiliaries themselves, as found especially in funerary monuments, personal letters, and other documents, that illustrate the complex networks of soldiers and their officers, families, friends, and comrades, which, in turn, gradually changed the nature of “becoming Roman.”

1.2 A Brief Historiography on Auxiliaries

The social and cultural history of soldiers and their relationship with the various peoples of the Roman Empire have been a subject of much recent discussion in scholarship. Inscriptions, papyri, and archaeology of military sites has provided scholars

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3 Ando (2000) and Ando (2010) argue for the significant restrictions of individual identity due to imperial power; see also Mattingly (2010).
4 Cheesman (1914): 168, calculates about 220,000 auxiliaries compared to 156,800 legionaries in the mid-2nd century CE; Kraft (1951): 21-68, suggests 220,000 non-citizen regular auxiliaries and 180,000 legionaries. For other estimates, see MacMullen (1980) and MacMullen (1984c).
with a relatively large amount of evidence to explore a wide range of developments for the imperial period. Regarding the auxiliary units in particularly, scholarship has explored aspects of recruitment, the creation and development of the institution as a whole, or close studies on individual units, and even individuals, through the analysis of military diplomas, funerary inscriptions, and literary sources.\(^6\) A new synthesis by Haynes, the first full account of the history of the auxilia from Augustus to Severus in one hundred years, builds off the achievements of his predecessors and contributes to the study of Roman provincial life by integrating a vigorous analysis of archaeological finds, especially for religious practices and daily life.\(^7\) Yet overwhelming scholarship has emphasized the “success” of military service as a method for the integration or incorporation of conquered peoples into the Roman Empire, focusing on the benefit for the state rather than the implications for the individuals and families involved.\(^8\)

My study differs from previous approaches in a number of ways. First, while my focus is on the experiences of auxiliary soldiers and their broader community, I nevertheless recognize the inherent power differentials between officers and soldiers through an analysis of the backgrounds and ideological viewpoints officers would have had when commanding their troops. Stereotypes regarding soldiers and foreigners were prominent aspects of the typical officer’s education and culture, and, I argue, would have

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8 “The success of the army as an instrument in imposing and maintaining the Roman Peace was due not only to the professionalism of the legions and auxiliary units but to the system whereby those whose served in the auxiliaries were converted from barbarians into loyal citizens of the empire,” Hassall (2000): 343.
greatly impacted not only their attitudes and behaviors towards the soldiers, but also those of the auxiliaries themselves. Space and spatial practices, too, were greatly shaped by the power hierarchies inherent in military service. Yet auxiliaries still managed to adapt the use and meanings of spaces to their own use, often in subtle ways. Following recent trends, I also consider the role of service in the auxiliary units in the transformation of individual or collective behaviors and mental habits. By situating the experience of auxiliary soldiers and their families and communities within the larger processes of cultural and social change brought about by the expansion of the Roman Empire, this dissertation contributes to larger debates in the field of history regarding the interaction between power, empires, and personal and group identity.  

1.3 Communities of Soldiers

Ramsay MacMullen’s seminal work, Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire (1963), inspired a generation of scholars to investigate the larger patterns of interaction between soldiers and civil society. Following in this tradition, but focusing on earlier periods, many scholars have explored the extent to which soldiers were separated from or integrated with the civilian population, often taking a regional or provincial approach. Just as with the individual soldier’s experience, the nature of the interaction between Roman auxiliaries and the local population may not fit into a single

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9 While I emphasize the “bottom-up practice” of individual auxiliaries against “top-down doctrine,” I do not image that practice was somehow “an autonomous domain,” as Ando criticizes in his review of a recent work on legal practice in Egypt. Practice was deeply shaped and restricted by the ideologies and materials of power.


model for the entire Empire, as such relationships were based on multiple factors, including unit type, origin of the soldiers, language, economic development of the locality, the strategic importance of the region, and time period. To argue that either a “total institution” or “highly integrated” model can explain imperialism in action in every period or location may simplify an otherwise complex development.\(^\text{12}\) I attempt to balance the need for recognizing the dynamic, differential experience of empire, while also suggesting possible ranges within which such variations could occur.\(^\text{13}\)

In addition, this debate focuses primarily on what the proper role of an army was in the ancient world.\(^\text{14}\) Past scholarship has often evaluated the structure, operation, and role of the Roman using analogies or assumptions based on the modern military of the nation-state.\(^\text{15}\) While I recognize the value in using comparative models to help think about the range of possibilities, I also believe that it is important to try to analyze how Romans themselves depicted soldiers. The role and image of the soldier, and the interaction of that representation with the experiences of soldiers, has received attention by a recent study that combines an analysis Republican historians’ image of soldiers as metaphors for Romanness, virtue, and decline with a comparative study of psychological group-think in the Republican Roman army and that of German soldiers of World War II and Iraqi soldiers of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.\(^\text{16}\) While I question how effective comparison to modern mechanized militaries can be, the stress placed on

\(^{12}\) Of course, neither Pollard (1996), (2000) (total institution) nor Alston (1995) (integrated) suggest this process occurred everywhere at all periods of the Roman Empire, as their examples tend to focus on one province or region.


\(^{14}\) Note especially comments by MacMullen (1963) on the proper role of the army in relation to its decline or de-professionalization.

\(^{15}\) This is a problem not only for the study of Roman history, but also other periods of military history. See especially Wilson (2008): 39-40.

\(^{16}\) Milne (2009).
elite expectations fits in well with my approach.

The auxiliaries and their families stationed on the frontiers were not simply members of a formal state institution. Rather, they formed local communities as well as a broader occupational community of soldiers based on a shared work experience, a marginal yet privileged status with the Empire, and a sense of exclusiveness based on their work and the privileges that went along with it.\textsuperscript{17} Calling the broader community of soldiers an “imagined community,” James has argued that Roman soldiers shared a common sense of purpose and belonging to a wider group, similar to modern notions of nationalism.\textsuperscript{18} Yet even within the broader community of soldiers, there remained distinctive sub-groups, especially between non-citizen auxiliaries and citizen legionaries in the early Empire. Among the auxiliaries, too, there was a great divide between the status, origin, equipment, pay, and funerary and spatial practices of cavalrymen and infantrymen. Individual units, some of which were stationed in the same place for decades, may have had a strong sense of regimental history, but with a varied senses of community over time, as the sources of recruits and behavioral practices slowly changed.

The local military community consisted not simply of auxiliary soldiers but also their families, slaves, and civilian friends, prostitutes, travelers, and traders. It has long been assumed by scholars and excavators that women and children, if at all present in the military community, were housed outside of the walls of the base proper. This assumption derives from the belief that there was no space for them within the base, that the ban on legal marriage for ordinary soldiers prevented them from living with their

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} MacMullen (1984a), although he focuses on legions. For occupational community, see Haynes (1999a) and Haynes (2013): 10-11, both of which rely on modern sociological studies of police and emergency services.
\item \textsuperscript{18} James (1999), (2001), more thoroughly explored in James (2011).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
family within the base, and, more problematic, that the presence of women and children diminished military discipline and effectiveness, and therefore were banned from living in the fort.Recent discoveries of women and children’s shoes in the second-century barracks at Vindolanda and in the rubbish heaps outside bases in the Eastern Desert of Egypt, combined with written evidence of women working at taverns, inns, and/or brothels at the first-century legionary fort at Vindonissa and throughout the bases of the Eastern Desert of Egypt have challenged this assumption. Recently, Allison has analyzed data derived from excavations of legionary and auxiliary bases of the first and second centuries in Germany and, using Zimmerman’s ideas regarding Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Data, she attributed a range of possible activities and gender associations to artifacts. By mapping the presence and distribution of these objects through the forts using pseudo-GIS visualizations, she concludes that women and children were important members of the military community. Rather than being seen as a burden or contrary to discipline, as suggested by some elite literary sources concerned with the ideological importance of military discipline, women and children may have taken on important productive roles within the community. Her approach has the potential to shape not

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19 The marriage ban for low-ranking soldiers is thought to have been implemented by Augustus and later removed by Septimius Severus in 197 CE; see Allison (2011): 162, Scheidel (2007), Watson (1969): 134, Phang (2001): 16-17. But see the new diploma that shows that Severus did not end the ban; see M. A. Speidel (2014a): 333, citing Eck (2011).
22 Her approach has the potential to shape not only future excavations, but also continued analysis of legacy excavation data. A closer analysis of the child and female skeletal remains found in Roman-era pits excavated within the fort at Newstead (Trimontium), Scotland, over one hundred years ago, combined with a closer analysis of the large array of small finds from the site, may provide further evidence of the important role of women and children within the larger military community; see Curle (1911).
23 For example, Juvenal, Satires 6.398-405; Herodian, Histories 3.8.4; see also [Caes.] B.Afr. 75 mentioning baggage trains camp-followers (lixae). Dio 56.20.2–5 noted that “not a few women and children and a large retinue of servants” followed the marching column of Varus when he led the Roman legions to disastrous defeat in 9 BCE.
only future excavations, but also continued analysis of legacy excavation data. But her efforts have also shown that the community of soldiers was not a completely masculine, adult, and martial space, but rather a real living society of complex interactions and identities.24

1.4 Forging Identities and Empire on the Frontiers

The very fact that an auxiliary soldier was partly an instrument of state power suggests that such power and the ideologies derived from it framed the nature of the interactions between soldiers, his superiors, his family, and the surrounding communities throughout all of the Roman world.25 As a negotiated, dynamic construct, identity is shaped, to a large extent, by the existing power dynamics. For example, the common soldier’s identity and status was in constant tension with his commander, his slaves, the surrounding civilians; all of these relationships helped to shape the status and identity of the individual involved.26 While not all cultural change in the provincial Roman context was dictated or even restricted by Roman imperialism, it nevertheless had a strong role in

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24 This data supports comparative historical evidence of the importance of women and children for early modern armies on the march (Lynn (2008)) or for soldiers stationed on the frontiers of British North America (McConnell (2004): 65-72). The Roman frontier situation may have been similar to the British North American colonies, as McConnell describes: “A visitor to any of the garrisons that defined Britain’s western frontier in America encountered small communities, fragments of larger regimental societies. Composed of men, women, and children from all levels of Britain and its colonies, these garrison communities shared much in common with the larger world from which they were drawn. Power, order, and deference were perhaps most visible, reflected in clothing, quarters, and a rigid hierarchy of rank. Yet the ethnic and racial diversity found in these imperial outposts, as well as the presence of women and children, reveal social complexity amid what was on the surface a relatively simple military formation. And with its gender division of labor, the need to accommodate and educate young children, and the tensions inherent between superiors and inferiors, a military garrison came to resemble the small civilian communities that defined the British Atlantic world. The resemblance went even further, with redcoats and their families participating, if only in small ways, in the consumer culture that was emerging within the British Atlantic world” (71-2).

25 For a review on theories of power and ideologies, see Wolf (1999).

26 Phang (2005).
Following others who study the soldiers of the Roman world, I recognize the social, cultural, and even imaginary constraints on the agency of soldiers that were imposed through habits of thoughts and practice, what Giddens calls routinised action and Bourdieu *habitus*.\(^{28}\) Yet their models also allow for individuals to change the broader social structures over time. The complex construction of identity is an amalgamation of various layers of identity, some of which become more salient than others in certain social contexts.\(^{29}\)

Group identity, such as belonging to a certain ethnic or cultural group, can be based largely on the shared factors that united people, such as language use; however, the factors that exclude an individual from group membership can also be very important.\(^{30}\) In certain circumstances, groups can define themselves in relation to or in contrast with others, as has been argued about the Greeks during the Persian Wars.\(^{31}\) Identity is also composed of other factors, such as age, biological sex, social gender, occupation, political affiliations, race, religious beliefs, sexual orientations, social status, and wealth.\(^{32}\) Determining the salience of each factor for an individual at any particular moment is nearly impossible. However, certain aspects of identity for Roman auxiliaries, such as institutional or occupational identity, may have been expressed in particular ways, such as wearing uniforms or carrying a sword or writing Latin in a Greek-speaking community,

\(^{27}\) Woolf (2004) argues that some cultural activity structured itself, as does the coral reef (using Gell’s views on art and agency).


\(^{29}\) Herring (2009), Williamson (2005).

\(^{30}\) Barth (1969), (1994) especially focuses on ethnic groups and “boundary maintenance” between groups.


\(^{32}\) Herring (2009): 130.
and may be interpreted as an important feature of an individual’s sense of self at a particular time.\textsuperscript{33} Certain types of identity, such as occupational identity and gender, may be interconnected and self-reinforcing.\textsuperscript{34} Another example is occupational identity and ethnicity, as in the case of the Batavians in the Roman world and the Manchus in late imperial China as so-called “martial races” believed to be excellent soldiers.\textsuperscript{35} At other times, a soldier may express the value he places on his identity as a member of a family, as in a letter written by a soldier to his mother, or as a member of a certain ethnic group (real or imagined), as in funerary inscriptions that list particular tribe names.\textsuperscript{36}

How one expressed identity in the historical record, and how we can interpret such expressions, remains problematic.\textsuperscript{37} Reading identity into any source, whether written or material, can never truly reveal the actual beliefs and thoughts of the individual involved. Even private letters, which often give us a glimpse into the everyday experience of people in the ancient world, were crafted as pseudo-public documents full of obfuscation and persuasive rhetoric. The crucial component of any historical source, namely context, is often lost or obscured in many of our primary documents. Other public expressions of identity, such as tombstones, provide only one aspect of how the

\textsuperscript{33} On the role of uniforms and dress in expressing identity, see Coulston (2004). Code-switching, that is, the use of certain languages or phrases depending on the context, is explored in great detail by Adams (2003a), (2003c). Language may have been less of an important marker of identity for Romans than for Greeks, suggesting that the importance of language as a marker of identity is contingent on multiple factors and variable depending on the identity; see Wallace-Hadrill (2008), chapter 2. On violence as a social marker of the identities of soldiers, see Gardner (2007a). Institutional identity (military culture) for armies in general, see Wilson (2008).

\textsuperscript{34} Alston (1998).


\textsuperscript{36} Papyrus letter of an auxiliary soldier to his mother: \textit{BGU XV, 2492 = P.Coll.Youtie I, 53 = B. Campbell (1994): no. 149 (1\textsuperscript{st} c. CE, Egypt); see also chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{37} Some scholars think the study of ancient ethnicity is purely a modern concern: “Ancients, on the whole, lost little sleep over issues of ethnicity, and, unlike moderns, did not agonize over their identity” Gruen (2014): 434; see also Gruen (2011), Gruen (2013a), and Gruen (2013b). Yet I still believe that such an inquiry is useful, for while the “ancients” may not have conceptualized race or ethnicity in the same way as moderns, it does not mean that ideas regarding human diversity did not affect their thoughts and actions.
individual wanted to be perceived by his fellow soldiers, locals, or whoever else would frequent graveyards. How a soldier walked, dressed, or talked may have been a function of his job as much as a function of his personal identity. However, it is the transformation of the behavior itself that comes across so clearly, if not the intentions behind them. The everyday practices of auxiliaries, in negotiation with elite expectations, impacted their individual identity and contributed to larger notions of what it meant to be Roman.

Of course, the definition of “Roman” was far from fixed, and, from a methodological perspective, it is difficult to define any cultural or ethnic identity archaeologically. Traditionally, the auxiliaries were believed to have played an active role in cultural change in the provinces, especially when auxiliary veterans returned to the civil sphere. How to label this broader process of social and cultural change in the provinces of the Roman Empire has been increasingly debated. “Romanization,” simply, is insufficient. Yet the debate continues. Alternative models have been proposed, largely based on broader trends in postcolonial studies, but none have been widely adopted. I make no claims to create a new grand theory of cultural and social change in the Roman Empire, nor do I think it is worth the effort.

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39 For example, Gilliam (1965), Dobson and Mann (1973), Millett (1990); see MacMullen (1984b) on Romanization more generally.
41 “Romanization has no explanatory potential, because it was not an active force, the course of which can be traced through a variety of indices, and the level of which can be measured,” Woolf (1998): 7.
42 “Arguably the Romanization debate has consisted of 30 years of expressions of dissatisfaction,” Woolf (2014): 47.
43 Discrepant experience (Mattingly and Alcock (1997), developed more fully in Mattingly (2006) and Mattingly (2010)), bricolage (Terrenato (1998)), creolization (J. Webster (2001)), globalization (Hingley (2005)), Mediterraneanization (Morris (2003), (2005)).
44 “But maybe we should pause for a moment and consider the costs, as well as the benefits, of prolonging the conversation, comfortable and familiar as it is to many of us. Those who bear the heaviest costs are the new entrants to the debate who encounter an ever-growing bibliography of deuterocanonical and exegetical
One of the distinct problems of many of these broad conceptions of identity formation is the limitation or reduction of the agency of the actual historical characters.

In his new synthesis on the *auxilia* from Augustus to the Severans, Ian Haynes seeks to distance himself from his earlier use of the term “Romanization”:

> [This book] examines individually the diverse elements that characterized the lives of soldiers and their families within the looser conceptual notion of incorporation. The advantage of the term ‘incorporation’ over other explanatory models is that it conveys the force with which Roman systems of classification ordered and integrated individuals into provincial society, but does not conflate this pull with debates about the notional ‘Romanity’ of different patterns of material culture. A further advantage of the notion of incorporation is that it evokes the image of forming/joining a body.\(^{45}\)

While I admire Haynes’s attempt to discard the imperialistic baggage of “Romanization,” I find “incorporation” just as dissatisfying. Yes, the Roman imperial system did, in many ways, force individuals to “incorporate” into the Roman body politic, usually, at first, through violent force. Yet what of the individual contributions to the broader construction of Roman culture? Individual auxiliary soldiers were not simply passively “incorporated” into the Roman Empire. While many surely were conscripted, perhaps against their will, their everyday experiences, decisions, and practices nevertheless shaped not only their local military community but also broader ideas of what it meant to be Roman.\(^{46}\) Detecting individual contribution, resistance, negotiation, or simple apathy is often difficult. Still, what I hope this dissertation demonstrates is that


\(^{46}\) “Rather than using a bilateral comparison of Roman and native, which derives from static and essentialist models, let us approach the dynamic process of new cultural formation through the lens of an imperial culture which drew on and reformulated several traditions and allowed various groups to make a variety of choices in different contexts,” Chappell (2010): 104, focusing on how legionaries and auxiliaries contributed to “new cultural formation.” However, by giving agency to an “imperial culture” rather than on the individuals who ascribed to elements of that culture, Chappell falls into a similar trap as those who point to “Romanization” or “incorporation.”
the effort to show alternate views of the discrepant experiences of Empire is a worthwhile exercise that complicates our understanding of imperialism, identities, and military service.

1.5 Evidence and Its Limitations

In this study of the multi-directional negotiation over the transformation of recruits into auxiliary soldiers, it is important to take into account multiple perspectives, those of civilian elite, those of the emperors (or policy-writers), and those of the soldiers themselves. Focusing on those with the large share of power, in terms of cultural influence over practice and ideas, I explore the image of the auxiliary soldier in select authors of Latin and Greek literature of the imperial period. Literary evidence presents its own set of challenges and advantages. Historical narrative, while grounded in actual events or documents, had its own literary rules that shaped its content and style. As a form of representation, historical narrative reflected the audience’s expectations about genre and style, leaving out many aspects of interest to the modern social historian.47 Problems of context, transmission through the manuscript tradition, and simply the elite-centered perspective of many of the literary authors limit the possibility of relying too heavily on such texts for views of the soldiers’ themselves.

Imperial policy, which had the greatest impact on the terms under which soldiers’ experience were shaped, reflected the official view of the behavior and image of the auxiliary soldier. Starting with Claudius and the issuing of diplomas granting citizenship to the auxiliary veteran and his children and conubium to his wife (the right to legal

47 For a good overview of the challenges of using literary texts for Roman history, see Potter (1999).
marriage), the Empire maintained a clearly favorable policy towards auxiliaries, expressed particularly in Roman law. While those rights were slightly limited under Antoninus Pius, with the expansion of universal citizenship under Caracalla, one could argue that auxiliary units would have lost their appeal. How imperial policy adapted to these changes is also of interest. Recruitment practice and distribution of units may also have reflected imperial policy regarding auxiliaries, particularly in response to revolts or ideas of the “martiality” of certain ethnic groups over others. Visual expressions of imperial views, particularly the friezes on Trajan and Marcus Aurelius’ columns, or the provinces coin series of Hadrian, also depict soldiers and offer another opportunity to analyze the consistency (or lack thereof) of imperial depictions of auxiliaries.

This dissertation attempts to integrate a complex body of evidence, both material and documentary, found in Britain, the Lower Rhine region, Egypt, and Syria. My main body of evidence are the documents which have survived at Vindolanda in Britain and in the Eastern Desert of Egypt, notably those along the road from Koptos to Myos Hormos and Berenike. There are many difficulties in using these documents. Luckily, unlike some earlier finds of papyri, the documents of Vindolanda and the Eastern Desert are relatively firmly dated, due in large part to their discovery in controlled excavations.

49 Roxan (1986) and Waebens (2012) on the change in diplomas in 140 CE. For the extension of citizenship and its significance, see Haynes (2013): 87-88.
53 Some have attempted to put the papyri of Karanis in their archaeological context, with mixed results. See van Minnen (1994), Pollard (1998), Gagos et al. (2005), and Stephan and Verhoogt (2005).
However, the fragmentary nature of these documents, and the fact that only certain types of documents survive, limit the possible questions that one can ask of them. Nevertheless, the available evidence is telling, as personal letters show the interactions and connections between different groups of people, and the more official documents suggest that men from various regions of the Empire were brought together into the auxiliaries and used such documentation to structure their lives.\(^{54}\)

Epigraphy also provides insight into how people presented themselves to others. Tombstones, while for the most part non-representative of larger trends, shed light on some aspects of the experience of a soldier (and veteran) of the Roman *auxilia*. The language of the inscriptions and the imagery of the funerary reliefs give us clues into how soldiers may have wanted to be remembered after their death.\(^{55}\) Military diplomas, given to auxiliary soldiers upon their discharge as a sign of citizenship, present their own source of problems, particularly of findspot and context. Nevertheless, they offer certain clues about naming styles and unit types that other sources lack.\(^{56}\) They may also suggest patterns of familial structure and size. There will always be the challenge of using inscriptions (and other evidence) as an index for cultural change.\(^{57}\) Nevertheless, combining multiple types of epigraphic evidence often offers a clearer picture than analysis of one type alone.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{54}\) The official bureaucratic documents also suggest a degree of uniformity in military documentary practices throughout the Empire. See Stauner (2004), but note the criticism of Bowman (2006).


\(^{56}\) Military diplomas, bronze inscribed tablets containing an imperial constitution granting a soldier certain rights, are an important yet challenging source for auxiliaries. For an introduction, see Phang (2007). Fundamental studies include Eck and Wolff (1986), Alföldy et al. (2000), Wilkes (2003), Scheuerbrandt (2009). See also Cuff (2010) and Greene (2011).


\(^{58}\) Mann (2002) notes that the diplomas offer a much different picture of veteran settlement than tombstones, suggesting that his earlier work on legionaries (Mann (1983)) may need modification (although diplomas do not exist for them).
Interpreting meaning in material culture and archaeological remains is just as problematic. I build on previous scholarship that has explored the possibility of using funerary art, dress, and nomenclature as one way of interpreting the reactions of the soldiers themselves.\textsuperscript{59} Attributing the use of certain types of material culture to “ethnic” reasons (claims of common descent and shared history), without any written texts to offer insight into the meaning behind the material culture, is nearly impossible.\textsuperscript{60} However, it is clear that auxiliaries, whether for personal or institutional reasons, used certain types of cultural material that “can be attributed to distinct social practices that were being used to express notions of identity within society.”\textsuperscript{61} Expressions of religious devotion, eating and drinking of certain types of food and drink, the use of space in forts and surrounding communities, and aspects of military dress all give us glimpses of how soldiers may have differentiated themselves from civilians, maintained solidarity among each other, and created a unique type of “Roman” culture on their own.\textsuperscript{62} Material culture can also give us clues to the continuation of pre-Roman religious practices, such as Batavian deposits of coins.\textsuperscript{63} Religious dedications also suggest that simply interpreting material culture based on ethnicity does not take into the range of complexity. For example, it is clear that Palmyrene soldiers in Dura-Europos expressed their religious devotion to their Palmyrene gods differently than Palmyrene merchants, suggesting that social status and

\textsuperscript{60} Some scholars are more optimistic about the possibilities of detecting ethnicity through archaeology (e.g. Jones (1997)). However, I generally agree with Hall and his argument that ethnicity can only be clearly identified through written discourse, J. M. Hall (1997), (2002).
\textsuperscript{61} Mattingly (2010): 215-17.
\textsuperscript{63} Roymans and Aarts (2005).
occupation affected one’s religious practices.\textsuperscript{64}

Another factor in the transformation of the behavior of auxiliary soldiers in the frontiers is space.\textsuperscript{65} First, Roman military units were spread out across the Mediterranean, all serving in various regions with different geographies, climates, and peoples. Individual units also had their own history, whether they were originally ethnic units, or often transferred from province to province, or recruited locally. It is often assumed that the longer a unit stayed in one location, the more integrated it became with the local population (due in part to local recruitment). However, other factors, such proximity to or location within the frontier zone of the empire, may have changed this dynamic.

Roman military communities may have fostered a strong sense of liminality, particularly those stationed near the frontiers. How did the actual space of the forts affect one’s perception of self? If we interpret a Roman military settlement as a social space that embodied certain relations of obligation and expectations, perhaps we could see space as another field of the transformation of auxiliary soldiers’ experience. Walking through the doors of a wooden palisade near Hadrian’s Wall, or bathing in a stone bath in the middle of the Egyptian desert, or watching a gladiatorial contest on the banks of the Euphrates must have created an odd feeling, a feeling of distinction, comfort, perhaps even superiority. For soldiers stationed in cities themselves, the experience may have been quite different, and would have required other ways of differentiation from the

\textsuperscript{64} Dirven (1999): 190-95.

\textsuperscript{65} The bibliography on Roman frontiers is long and complex, to say the least. Essential reading is Whittaker (1994), (1996), (2004a), as well as other contributions to Kennedy (1996). Mattern (1999) is a good study on the image of frontiers in Roman elite strategy and imagination. Frontiers and borderlands are also widely discussed in other fields of history and anthropology. Examples include Rösler and Wendl (1999) and Parker and Rodseth (2005).
civilian community. The intersection of the larger social space of the empire and its frontiers with the “mini-frontiers” separating soldier from civilian, citizen from non-citizen, men from women, and armed from unarmed may have created a distinct sense of community. 66

Artistic sources, such as coin iconography and funerary art, offer their own range of evidence for ideas regarding imperialism and the role of the army. Both imperial coinage and, to a certain extent, provincial coinage reflect the ruling ideology, notably the depictions of the personifications of the provinces and occasionally soldiers. Evidence for interaction between military units and locals is rarely found in the coinage, although some scholars have argued that cities sometimes adopted military religious figures and expressed gratitude to the legions stationed nearby. 67 However, as provincial coinage generally reflects the views of the local notables (with tacit approval by imperial officials), it is ill-suited to provide insight into general attitudes towards the local military units. 68

Funerary art, particularly gravestone reliefs, may suggest to a certain extent what soldiers felt about their own status and role. 69 Images of soldiers defeating barbarians, in particular, may suggest that the deceased identified more with the conquering Roman soldier than the defeated barbarian warrior. However, like most artistic forms, funerary art was limited by the expectations of the genre, therefore restricting the forms and iconography that could be successfully used on the stone. 70 As with other sources,

66 My approach to space is informed by Lefebvre (1991), De Certeau (1984), Giddens (1984), and Scott (2013). See chapter 4 for more discussion.
69 For example, Roymans (2004), chapter 10.
70 Woolf (2004), who emphasizes the ways in which cultural activity (as opposed to Roman imperialism or ecology) structures itself.
funerary art is not an unobstructed view into the hearts and minds of the owners; the images and messages are filtered through many layers, such as generic forms, the skills of the artist, the financial means of the purchaser, and the hopes and ideas of the very one who erected the gravestone (family member, heir, fellow soldier).

Bearing these limitations in mind, I nevertheless argue that it is possible to reconstruct the ideas and practices surrounding auxiliary soldiers. Pulled between multiple worlds as soldiers, barbarians, Romans, provincials, men, husbands, and fathers, these soldiers played a major role not only in perpetuating the power of the Roman Empire, but also in shaping its very meaning.

1.6 Chapter Outline

Scholars have often tried to write their way around the fundamental problem of balancing static sociological description of ancient institutions with their historical analysis of change over time through the structure of their work. For example, some popular narrative structures combine early chapters that focus on (often political) chronological change and later chapters that focus on sociological, almost ethnographical description, with the final chapter focusing on the later Roman Empire.71 I have chosen a different approach. Each chapter focuses on a specific factor in the transformation of the everyday experiences of auxiliary soldiers and their families, while also accounting for change over time. While at times the chronological ranges of each chapter do not align with each other, nevertheless, I believe that this structure allows the reader to trace

71 For example, M. P. Speidel (1994), chapters 1-3 and 10 are political chronological narratives, while 4-9 are sociological, with some acknowledgement of change over time. Similarly, in Haynes (2013), part 1 is chronological, parts 2-7 thematic or sociological.
patterns over time among a wide range of auxiliaries stationed throughout the Roman Empire.

Chapter two explores the role of the image of the soldier in Roman literature and its potential impact on the ideas of military officers and their treatment of soldiers under their command. Soldiers held an ambiguous place in the Roman imagination. On the one hand, soldiers were idealized as brave men who were at the heart of Rome’s greatness. On the other hand, Roman elite feared the potential unruliness of soldiers and believed that strict discipline was required to maintain control at all times. After reviewing the social and educational background of the military officers of auxiliary units, this chapter analyzes two works published in 30/31 CE, a period of stabilization and consensus-building in the reign of Tiberius. Writing for an increasingly more diverse elite audience, Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus nevertheless shared an idealized vision of the military general in relation to soldiers. This image of the soldier remained fairly stable during the Roman Empire and, I argue, shaped not only the officers’ behavior towards their soldiers but also the self-image of the soldiers themselves.

Auxiliaries were more than just soldiers. Drawn largely from the non-citizen populations of the provinces, especially along the frontiers, auxiliaries in many ways were considered “barbarians” by the Roman elite. Literary images of “barbarians,” like that of soldiers, also played a major role in how Roman officers imagined the auxiliary soldiers under their command. Moreover, certain groups in the Empire were believed to have particular military qualities. Chapter three investigates the portrait of the “barbarian” in the Roman imagination as found in literature of the late first century BCE through the early second centuries CE, focusing especially on two groups who may have
been considered “martial races” by the Romans, namely the Batavians and the Thracians. Heavily recruited for service in the auxiliaries, these peoples came to be regarded as fierce soldiers. The strength of these martial stereotypes was such that even the soldiers themselves began to adopt these qualities as their own, while at the same time they attempted to diminish the negative traits imparted on “barbarians.” Auxiliaries and their families navigated expectations about soldiers and “barbarians” on a daily basis, yet the range of possible reactions shows the diverse experiences of empire.

Ideas about auxiliaries based on their occupation and ethnicity were not the only factors that shaped their everyday life. The space of the military bases themselves, as well as the spatial ideologies held by Roman officials, also contributed to a soldier’s practice and ideas. Chapter four considers the anonymous, untitled, early second-century CE treatise on Roman military surveying, the so-called De munitionibus castrorum of Pseudo-Hyginus, and its view of the ideal Roman military camp. Placing this text in its historical and literary context, I argue that De mun. castr. reveals a subtle change in the Roman image of auxiliaries. While considered not nearly as reliable as legionaries, auxiliaries nevertheless were thought to be more trustworthy than other troops drawn from foreign peoples. Auxiliaries still navigated somewhere between “barbarian” and Roman, shaped, in part, by their increasingly professionalization as military units. While the De mun. castr. presents an ideal vision of a camp, frontier archaeology reveals more diversity. Tracing examples of auxiliary bases from the first-century Western provinces, second-century desert outposts in Egypt, and third-century urban based in Syria, this chapter argues not only that the spatial practices and experiences of auxiliaries were more diverse than previously imagined but also that the variety of soldiers themselves
contributed to this diversity.

I further explore the range of possible experiences for auxiliaries under the Empire in chapter five. Length of service, proximity to one’s homeland, and the degree of connection with the local population were all factors that affected an auxiliary soldier’s transformation during military service. Yet one of the most important factors, I argue, is the relation between the Roman state and the soldier’s native community, especially the length of time between the Roman conquest of the soldier’s homeland and the soldier’s service to Rome. Gallic auxiliaries patrolling the Alpine roads a generation or two after their people’s defeat by Rome would have been struck by the imposing monument of the Trophy of the Alps that advertised Rome’s power and defeat of these same tribes. In contrast, the Batavian auxiliaries stationed in Britain still maintained some degree of their own particular ethnic practices, in part by calling their commanding officer “king” and requesting beer to consume. Even recently conquered Dacians, shipped off to serve Rome in the desert stations of Egypt, continued to call themselves by their Dacian names, yet still managed to build relationships with local men and women. As these examples suggest, no single model can explain the divergent experiences of the soldiers involved. They did not simply transform from “barbarians” into Romans. Rather, auxiliary soldiers, their families, and the communities around them evolved along with the Empire itself, subtly shaping and re-imaging the social and cultural life on the frontiers.
Chapter 2

The Image of the Soldier in Roman Thought & Practice

2.1 Introduction

When passing through the country of an ally, the general must order his troops not to lay hands on the country, nor to pillage or destroy; for every army under arms is ruthless, when it has the opportunity of exercising power, and the close view of desirable objects entices the thoughtless to greediness; while small reasons alienate allies or make them quite hostile.72

Dedicating his work on generalship to Quintus Veranius, consul of 49 CE and governor of Britain 57-58 CE, and to other elite Romans of similar distinguished military experience, the Greek philosopher Onasander emphasized a major difficulty of maintaining a standing army.73 His perspective, however, also had a moral component. Collectively, soldiers under arms were considered ruthless, greedy, and exploitative, even towards allies. Writing two generations later, Tacitus agreed with Onasander’s assessment of soldiers in his account of the breakdown of military discipline during the mutinies of 14 CE and the civil wars of 68-69 CE: “Once soldiers had vied with each other in courage and restraint: now they were rivals in insolence and unruliness.”74 Yet the entire success and well-being of the Roman state relied on the strength of its soldiers. The Roman literary elite struggled with how to imagine soldiers. For many, soldiers were

72 Onasander, Strat. 6.10; trans. Oldfather et al.
73 For the dedication, see Onasander, Strat. Proem. 1-2. For Onasander and his relationship with Veranius, see Smith (1998). On similar handbooks, see B. Campbell (1987).
74 Tac. Hist. 3.11.2: ut olim virtutis modestiaeque, tunc procacitatis et petulantiae certamen erat. For more examples from Tacitus, see B. Campbell (1984): 365-71.
a “mixed blessing.” As both the guardians of social order yet often the very source of chaos and destruction, soldiers held an ambiguous place in the worldview of the Roman elite. As with their view towards the rural poor, the elite had a “schizoid view” of soldiers, a mix of both negative and positive qualities, linked to the Roman self-image. On the one hand, soldiers were idealized as the backbone of the state and the source of its power; on the other hand, soldiers were the complete opposite of civilized society: gruff, aggressive, and boisterous.

Due to their traditional rhetorical education, many officers of auxiliary units would have been familiar with the ideas found in literary texts regarding soldiers and “barbarians.” While there is little direct evidence of Roman elite literary views on auxiliary soldiers per se, it is nevertheless possible to recover such views by triangulating, that is, comparing Roman attitudes towards soldiers and towards foreigners, especially those tribes from which auxiliaries were recruited, in order to reconstruct and evaluate their image of the auxiliary soldier. What these views were, and if and how they changed over time, will be the focus of this and the following chapter. I argue that the views of elite literary texts regarding the proper behavior of soldiers and foreigners had a significant impact on how military officers thought about and interacted with auxiliary soldiers, as an officer’s approach to command was shaped largely by the ideas found in literary texts that made up the core of a traditional rhetorical

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75 MacMullen (1963): ch. 4 coins the term, although he focuses on a later period and interactions at the local level.
77 “According to the upper-class view, soldiers were potentially threatening, uneducated men of low degree who should not be allowed to rise above their proper station in life,” B. Campbell (2002): 33.
78 Tacitus’s views of the Batavian auxiliaries who revolted in 69/70 CE are discussed in chapter 3. Shaped by his rhetorical goal of illustrating the moral breakdown of society during civil war, his depiction of the Batavians offers one end of the spectrum of possible views of the elite towards auxiliaries.
education. Auxiliaries themselves, in turn, adopted or challenged these literary assumptions on a daily basis. While these literary views had a remarkable degree of stability over the years, due largely to restrictions of genre, the conservative nature of Roman educational practices, and a deep admiration for *mores maiorum*, they nevertheless were constantly being contested, re-imagined, and re-negotiated in numerous ways by officials, intellectuals, and the auxiliary soldiers themselves.

My argument is based on a number of assumptions regarding the impact of literary depictions of soldiers and foreigners. First is the problem of representativeness. While it is impossible to assess how widely shared an individual author’s views truly were, I nevertheless think that the very presentation of the ideas, as well as the considerable similarity of these ideas across genre and period, indirectly reflects the expectations of the intended audience. Second, while I do not believe that these views were fully shared by all readers, they still impacted their readers’ range of ideas. In other words, just because Tacitus argues that the inhabitants of *Germania* had the same physical appearance\(^\text{79}\) does not necessarily mean that all of his readers would have agreed; nevertheless, this depiction still would have given his readers a frame of reference before encountering a German. Third, it is reasonable to assume that educated, wealthy, male Roman citizens, as well as Italian and provincial elites, that is, the social group that comprised the commanding officers of auxiliary units, would have been exposed to these texts, or at the very least, the ideas expressed in these texts, sharing and debating this ideas in a reading culture that, in turn, shaped their behavior and defined their identity.\(^\text{80}\)

\(^{79}\) Tac. *Germ*. 4.1.

\(^{80}\) W. A. Johnson (2010): 11-12.
While many texts may have shaped the expectations of the elite regarding their role as officers and the behavior of soldiers, a thorough assessment of the image of the soldier in the literature of the Roman Empire and its development over time would require a broad review of texts from a variety of genres, all of which have their own interconnected literary tradition. To gather every example of a soldier would be a daunting task, one beyond the scope of this project. Nor is it necessary. Ancient authors themselves recognized the value in summarizing Greek and Roman literature in order to facilitate participation in elite society. Two texts of the early first century CE especially fit this role. Written in a period of consensus-building and formalization of institutions after the death of Augustus, these texts reflect the shared expectations of the elite, literate Roman society in the early empire and offer some of our best evidence for how elites thought about soldiers, their behavior, and their interaction with others, setting the standard for later authors’ discussions of these issues. This period also saw the development of the permanent standing army, the increasingly regularization of ranks and positions, and the gradual standardization of auxiliary units. Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus both published around 30/31 CE synoptic historical accounts designed to help newly educated elites assimilate to an imperial Roman identity, although one cannot ignore that Valerius’s collection of historical exempla organized by theme especially would have played a large role as a storehouse for exempla for

81 Similarly, military treatises purport to be of great use; these are discussed in chapter 4. Spaulding (1933) provides a brief summary of military treatises in Greek and Latin. See also B. Campbell (1987) and B. Campbell (2004): 13-17. See Ando (2000) for a full treatment on the importance of consensus to Roman rule.


83 Lobur (2007): 213, Bloomer (1992). Skidmore (1996): 105 argues for an audience of traditional elite, education, property-owning Romans. I feel Bloomer's argument that the audience was newly integrated outsiders is more appealing. Such an audience, he claims, would have appreciated a brief overview of Roman aristocratic culture in the form of this work.
declamations. The latter author argues that his work would be of great use to anyone interested in the notable deeds and sayings of the past. Velleius Paternculus, in writing his summary universal history, was partly reacting to the overwhelming size of Livy’s work on the entire history of Rome from its foundation to the early first century CE.\textsuperscript{84} Since the beginning of Velleius’s work is lost, we have no evidence for what his intentions were, beyond dedicating the work to his friend Marcus Vinicius, the son of his former commander, in honor of Vinicius’s consulship in 30 CE, but we can imagine that he, too, would have argued for the utility of his summary version of history.\textsuperscript{85} Whether or not readers believed their authorial claims, the works of Valerius and Velleius offer us important insight into how elites thought about themselves, soldiers, and how best to shape their own behavior as well as that of their soldiers.

Despite the increasing regularization of the \textit{auxilia} and other units of the Roman military during the early to mid-first century CE, Valerius and Velleius did not clearly differentiate between the treatment and behavior of citizen legionaries and non-citizen auxiliaries. Yet their unitary approach to military command clearly aligned with the imperial ideology of this time of growing \textit{consensus} around imperial rule. These authors, rather than emphasizing the distinct differences of the origins and potential behavior of the various troop types, instead chose to elide those differences for the sake of conformity, stability, and unity under the emperor. For the elite, including the officers of the \textit{auxilia}, all soldiers were the same to them: men of lower status and power who

\textsuperscript{84} Woodman (1975), noting the earlier Late Republic tradition of universal summarists of Roman history such as Cornelius Nepos, Varro, and Atticus. Lobur (2007) emphasizes Velleius as a Roman elite reproducing imperial ideology and competing in the cultural capital of the day, with his use of \textit{brevitas} as a cultural display of his learning, authority, and Roman identity.

\textsuperscript{85} Vell. Pat. 1.8.1, 1.8.4, 1.12.6, 2.7.5, 2.49.1, 2.65.2.
required discipline, oversight, and control. Auxiliary soldiers, then, were pulled between the unifying treatment of all soldiers of the emperor and the stubborn ethnocentrism of Roman visions of the barbarian.

I structure this chapter around four main points. First, in order to understand the impact of literary ideas, it is necessary to determine the background of those most likely to have had them and to have acted on them. Therefore, I first consider the commanding officers of the auxiliary units, including their social and geographical origins, their relevant experience (if any) before military service, and their education. While the makeup of officers varied by unit and location, as well as changed over time, it seems clear that even when officers came from the same provinces as the men under their command, a vast cultural, social, and economic gulf separated them from the auxiliary soldiers. Such a degree of separation, combined with the frequent changing of commanding officers, must have encouraged officers to regard soldiers, especially auxiliary soldiers, with suspicion, arrogance, even loathing. I then turn toward the literary theme of the balance between _disciplina_ and _virtus_ in military command, two key elements of the proper Roman soldier. Developing from this theme, the final two sections explore the image of the soldier in the works of two authors of the early imperial period, Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus. The historical _exempla_ which they provide continued to play a large role in the literary and educational tradition of the Roman Empire for many years, offering us an intimate view of the possible ideas held by officers in command of auxiliary soldiers.

2.2 **Officers of Auxiliary Units: Status, Experience, & Education**

Since officers of the auxiliary units had a great impact on their soldiers’ practices
and ideas, it is necessary to consider the background and education of these men. Two groups of officers led auxiliary units: the commanding officers (prefects or tribunes of entire cohorts or *alae*) and the senior officers (decurions and centurions of sub-units). Commanding officers, in concert with the governor of the province, decided the size and location of a fort, the intricacies of drills and training, the language and religious ceremonies of the unit, and the prerequisites necessary for the eager (or compelled) recruit. Yet their approach to command was not based on extensive professional training or systematic study. Most commanding officers would have understood their role and the role of their soldiers from their traditional rhetorical education based largely on literary texts. Unlike commanding officers, who led a particular unit for a few years at most, decurions and centurions often stayed in the same unit for years, providing continuity and cohesion, often having “more influence and control over the men than did the commanding officer” through their daily enforcement of practices and discipline. Yet even the decurions and centurions, many of whom had risen through the ranks, would have been exposed to the ideas found in these texts during their training in Latin or Greek. While the social and cultural distance between the commanding officers and the rank and file auxiliaries was nearly unsurpassable, the senior officers may have been more understanding towards the men under their command. Nevertheless, the economic

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86 The theoretical strengths of auxiliary units are generally agreed upon, although some dispute the size of the *turae* of an *ala milliaria*. For a chart and chronological issues, see Haynes (2013): 53. Prefects generally commanded most auxiliary units, while tribunes commanded larger (*milliaria*) units or cohorts bearing the title *civium Romanorum*, often at the end of their career. A cavalry *ala* totaled either 480 men (16 *turae* of 30 men each) or 720 to 864 men (24 *turae* of 30 to 36 men each) for an *ala milliaria*. A *cohors peditata* (infantry cohort) totaled 480 to 600 men (6 *centuriae* of 80 to 100 men each), a *cohors peditata milliaria* 800 to 1000 men (10 *centuriae* of 80 to 100 men each), a *cohors equitata* 600 to 720 men (6 *centuriae* of 80 or 60 infantrymen each, 4 *turae* of 30 cavalrymen each), and a *cohors equitata milliaria* 1040 men (10 *centuriae* of 80 infantrymen each, 8 *turae* of 30 cavalrymen each).

87 Gilliam (1957): 156. For a decurion’s relationship with his prefect, see Masclus in chapter 5.
and social difference between these groups, combined with the powerful literary image of the soldier often found in texts at the heart of a traditional education, led to an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion between officers and their men.

Two types of senior officers led the sub-units of each ala or cohort. A decurion commanded a turma comprised of 30 to 36 cavalrymen, with 16 to 24 turmae per ala or 4 to 8 turmae per cohors equitata (part-mounted units). A centurion commanded a century comprised of 80 to 100 infantrymen, with 6 to 10 centuries per cohors peditata or equitata. Part-mounted units (cohors equitata) had both decurions and centurions. In seniority, decurions of an ala ranked highest. Evidence for these senior officers is sparse, yet it seems that many were promoted from the auxiliary ranks after some years of service, therefore potentially having the same social and ethnic background as their subordinates. However, some senior officers were former legionaries (citizens), while others were directly appointed from wealthy provincial civilians (citizens or non-citizens). Sons of veterans or relatives of tribal leaders were other potential candidates. Which practice was the most common is difficult to determine, although it must have varied by unit, region, and time period. The age of these men varied widely, depending

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88 Cheesman (1914): 37.
90 Both miles and eques legionis. Example of a transfer from a legion: AE 2003, 1606 (54-100 CE). Dومaszewski (1908): 53-61, 193, Cheesman (1914): 38-39. Cheesman, contra Domaszewski, rightly points out that transfers from the legions were not limited to the first fifty years of the Empire.
91 Gilliam (1957), based on BGU II 696, lines 17-21 (156 CE) = Sel.Pap. II 401 = Rom.Mil.Rec. 64 (BL XII 15) and P.Mich. III 164, lines 18-20 (242-244 CE) = Rom.Mil.Rec. 20 = B. Campbell (1994): 98 (BL XII 120). Gilliam points out that such practice, while rare, was permitted, similar to such appointments in the legions. The man in BGU II 696, Sextus Sempronius Candidus, may have been related to the prefect of Egypt, Sempronius Liberalis, who appointed him, highlighting the role of patronage, Gilliam (1957): 166 n. 29.
92 Gilliam (1957) argues that promotion through the ranks was normal for the “great majority” of decurions/centurions (164), while Goldsworthy (2003) believes that appointment of wealthy, local aristocrats, without prior military experience, “may well have been the most common practice” (73).
on their background and experience. Their salary, too, separated them from the men under their command, as both decurions and centurions of auxiliary units most likely earned about five times the annual salary as their men.\(^93\)

Such diversity of origin for senior officers makes an assessment of their education challenging. Some degree of literacy and administrative capacity should be expected. In Egypt, centurions often received petitions from civilians seeking redress; some of these officers may have served in auxiliary units.\(^94\) One decurion, Paccius Maximus, who was promoted from the legio III Cyrenaica, was clearly well-educated in Greek, as he demonstrated his intellectual pride by inscribing complex acrostic poems at the religious shrine at Kalabsha in Egypt in the early first century CE.\(^95\) The possibility for further promotion from these ranks to equestrian positions also suggests that at least some of these senior officers had backgrounds in Latin or Greek literature.\(^96\) Such a background was deemed necessary, or at least preferable, for military leadership appointments.

Like the senior officers, the commanding officers of auxiliary units (prefects and tribunes) varied in age, background and experience, their makeup changing over time and differing by region or individual unit.\(^97\) Despite this variety, it seems that the majority of

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\(^93\) M. A. Speidel (1992a): 103-06, although with very limited evidence. See especially the criticism of Alston (1994).


\(^95\) I. Mètr. 168 and 169. See Mairs (2011) for a discussion of these texts in the broader context of religious acrostic poems in Egypt. While the role of the scribe may have been great, Mairs argues that “as well as being aided by a priest, it is not difficult to imagine a well-educated, erudite soldier in one of the companies stationed at Talmis acting, Cyrano de Bergerac-style, as mouthpiece for his less eloquent friends” (293).

\(^96\) Either decurions and centurions could be promoted to centurions of a legion, although decurions are more likely to appear in our evidence. Such promotions may have taken years, and these men would have had to be granted citizenship, Cheesman (1914): 37-39, Gilliam (1957): 165. They also could be promoted to equestrian officer positions, e.g. AE 2003, 1606. See Domaszewsk (1908): 53-54, 56-57.

\(^97\) For general overview of equestrian officers, see E. Birley (1988a), Devijver (1989b), Devijver (1992), Goldsworthy (2003): 64-67. Brunt (1983): 44 emphasizes the difficult nature of the epigraphic evidence, as most of our information relies on commemorations from the second century. He points out that since many officials are known from dedicatory inscriptions commissioned by grateful individuals or communities,
commanding officers came from a wealthy, educated background, as these positions were equestrian in status, that is, second in prestige to the senatorial order. Men usually held the position of prefect of a cohort before advancing to a legionary military tribune (tribunus angusticlavius) and then prefect of an ala, holding each position for about three to four years. Most commanding officers were new to the military, appointed by the provincial governor or the emperor himself from Italian or provincial civilians who were equestrian either by birth or by acquiring the necessary property qualification. Many of these men would have had local experience in municipal careers or as assistants to the provincial governor. Others were former auxiliary decurions/centurions or legionary centurions, especially chief centurions (primipili), who had been promoted to the equestrian rank after a long career. These centurions also may have been equestrian by birth, or they may have been promoted from the ranks. Men who were equestrian by birth normally took up their first military command in their late twenties or early thirties, while former decurions/centurions were generally older, perhaps in their forties. Younger men in their late teens or early twenties occasionally served as auxiliary commanders.

such dedications are much less likely for men who held low-level positions or for men who only held one military position. Therefore, despite the fact that there were more cohort prefectures, tribunes or prefects of alae are much more present in the epigraphic record than those who were only prefects of cohorts.

Augustus sometimes gave the command of alae to young senatorial officers (Suet. Aug. 38; CIL 10.5911 = ILS 912; CIL 6.31742 (31743) = ILS 911). There is no evidence of this practice later.

Claudius changed the order of positions to prefect of a cohort, then prefect of an ala, then tribune of a legion (Suet. Claud. 25). However, this reform did not last long. Years in each post: E. Birley (1988a): 150.

Provincial governors in practice were able to appoint equestrian officers on their own, although officially all such appointments needed to be approved by the emperor. The emperor himself, at times, would make equestrian officer appointments. See A. R. Birley (2003): 3-4.

From Augustus to Trajan, about half of the equestrians who held military command of auxiliary units probably held some non-military government appointment prior to their military command, such as serving in a municipality, on a jury panel, as a clerk to quaestors or aediles, or as a praefectus fabrum (aide-de-camp of the governor), Holder (1980): 72-96.

AE 2003, no. 1606 (54-100 CE): C. Vibius Quartus served as a legionary miles, decurion of an ala, then, reaching equestrian status, served as prefect of a cohort, tribune of a legion, and prefect of an ala. Cf. CIL 3.8739 = CLE 1148; and AE 2006, no. 1790.
probably since they were sons of centurions. A large number of auxiliary commanders were recruited from men who had served as a *duovir*, the highest municipal office in a local community. Normally this position could not be held before one was thirty years old, or perhaps twenty-five years old, suggesting that most auxiliary commanders were in their thirties. According to funerary and dedicatory inscriptions, Italians seem to have predominated in the first century, making up over half of all known auxiliary commanders, but gradually auxiliary commanders were appointed from all parts of the Empire as citizenship began to spread, with nearly eighty percent of auxiliary commanders deriving from the provinces in the third century CE. Prefects from the West were stationed throughout the Empire, while Easterners seem to have initially served only in the eastern provinces. By the third century Easterners were also found in the West.

Surviving letters of recommendation for potential officers show that education, character, and family connections all played a role in promotions to command of an auxiliary unit. Many men acquired their initial command as prefects of cohorts through the patronage of friends or superiors. Cicero’s letters from the first century BCE emphasized attributes that most likely would have been applicable to later periods.

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103 E. Birley (1988a): 151-52, 62, 64 argues that most officers were men in their thirties, pointing to their former municipal careers.
104 See Cheesman (1914): 36-37, 90-101, Brunt (1983), E. Birley (1988b), A. R. Birley (2003). According to the available datable evidence, Devijver (1989c): 120, argues that the equestrian officers were gradually provincialized, with 65% Italians and 35% provincials in the 1st c. CE to 21% Italians and 79% provincials in the 3rd c. CE. He attributes this change to the urbanization “policy” and “centrifugal forces, the recruiting of soldiers, officers, senators, emperors taking place in outlying peripheral areas.”
105 Devijver (1989a). Cheesman (1914): 98 suggests two possibilities for this initial exclusion or “reluctance” of Eastern prefects from serving in the West: either discrimination by the Romans (Easterners thought to be poor soldiers) or Hellene snobbery (Greeks refuse to serve in barbarian west). Other possibilities include just general reluctance to serve away from home, similar to the Thracian auxiliaries in 26 CE (Tac. *Ann.* 4.46).
107 Most letters of recommendation are found in Cic. *Fam.* 13.
Cicero recommended a fellow forensic orator for the post of provincial quaestor (financial assistant to the governor) due to his natural ability, industry, conscientiousness, friendly spirit, good character, personality, pleasantness, usefulness, modesty, good sense, and deference.\textsuperscript{108} Such characteristics were considered important, especially deference, as the relationship between a quaestor and his superior was thought to be similar to one between children and parents.\textsuperscript{109} While there is no mention of practical experience, the qualities Cicero highlighted suggest that adequate performance in a provincial post derived from competence, intelligence, obedience, and interpersonal skills.

Scholars argue that most candidates will have had little to no military experience, as the Romans believed that other qualities were sufficient for at least one's initial military command.\textsuperscript{110} But we should be careful not to judge Roman officers based on anachronistic standards of “professional” soldiers of the modern age.\textsuperscript{111} Most commanders of auxiliary units had previous experience as local leaders of municipalities, as well as owners of large estates. Skills in the management of money, supplies, and people, rather than the “management of violence,” were key aspects of a military officer in the Roman world. Essential skills of military command and drill would have been learned through literary examples, collections of historical \textit{exempla} and Greek tactical

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\textsuperscript{108} Cic. \textit{Fam.} 13.10 (SB 277). The quaestor was elected by the people, while a province was distributed by lot or directly assigned by the Senate, see J. Richardson (1992): 580-84.
\textsuperscript{109} Cic. \textit{Fam.} 13.10 (SB 277).
\textsuperscript{110} Many senatorial governors or imperial legates also had little military experience. See B. Campbell (1975), B. Campbell (1984): 325-47.
\textsuperscript{111} For the professional officer as a product of the nineteenth century, see Huntington (1957): 19, cf. 8-10, where he defines “profession” as a special type of vocation with a “higher calling” in the service of society with the distinguishing characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. For an officer, his expertise was in the “management of violence” (11). For the ideal type of “professional” whose claim to power is based on a monopoly of expertise, see Freidson (2001). For a sociological approach to the professional officer in the United States military of the first half of the twentieth century, see Janowitz (1960).
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theory, and stories and informal training from more experienced men. For the initial appointment, though, character and connections mattered most of all.

Letters of recommendation to provincial governors from the late first and early second century CE reaffirm Cicero’s portrait of a good candidate, suggesting that general reliability, trustworthiness, literary (perhaps legal) education, speaking ability, family background, and perhaps practical experience from running an estate was all the experience necessary to command troops. Pliny wrote a letter for a wealthy and well-born man from his hometown who wanted to become a military tribune in a legion. Pliny emphasized his love of learning (amat studia), rhetorical and legal experience, and his loyalty as a friend. T.Vindol. III 660 (c. 100 CE), a fragmentary letter of recommendation written by an auxiliary commander, perhaps for another commander seeking a position as a tribune in a legion, emphasized education (liberalium studiorum amore) and good character. Governors, themselves generally men of culture and learning, may have enjoyed having “congenial types to entertain them when they toured their province and at their own table at headquarters.” One could expect that equestrian officers might also have preferred centurions or decurions of such a cultured background. Given the possible variations to the cultural background of both

112 Relying on experienced subordinates was common practice for government positions: Frontin. Aq. 1.2 (late 1st c. CE).
113 A. R. Birley (2003) gathers all of the important evidence (Pliny, Fronto, Cerialis at Vindolanda). He suggests (at 5) that administrative and financial experience running an estate and managing the slaves was also thought to be adequate experience for commanding troops, especially since feeding the men was a major part of the job. Unfortunately, he offers no specific evidence for the claim that such experience was considered adequate.
114 Pliny Ep. 7.22.
116 Note especially T.Vindol. II 225, lines 19-23 (c. 100 CE), in which the equestrian prefect Cerialis asks Crispinus, perhaps a senator, to provide “friends” for him so that he can enjoy a “pleasant period of military service” (militiam iucundam). Perhaps these “friends” are senior officers who would serve under Cerialis, although we cannot be certain.
commanding officer and senior officers, though, other factors, such as general
competence, leadership, perhaps even military ability, may well have been determinant
factors in achieving leadership roles.

All of these letters highlight the importance of having influential friends. To
acquire a job, relationships with powerful people were obviously crucial, in addition to
personal attributes. However, it seems that past performance in a position was also a
factor. For equestrian posts beyond initial appointments, such as for the prefecture of an
ala, governors or emperors most likely considered the assessments from former
superiors.117 This practice had its roots in the Republic. When Cicero asked M. Brutus,
governor of Cisalpine Gaul in 46 BCE, to aid Q. Fufidius, a former military tribune in
Cilicia while Cicero was governor, Cicero noted that not only did Fufidius share an
interest in literary pursuits but he also had served Cicero well in his position as tribune.118

Similarly, although without first-hand knowledge, Pliny urged Trajan in 110 CE to favor
Nymphidius Lupus (perhaps by offering him another post), since, as a prefect of a cohort,
Nymphidius had earned “the most abundant testimonial” (plenissimum testimonium) from
two senators, one of whom was probably a provincial governor.119

Past experience, in addition to education, was deemed important for higher posts

Saller agree that patronage and recommendations were important for first appointments to command,
usually the prefect of a cohort. E. Birley argues that men who wanted further promotion needed not only
patronage but also “favourable confidential reports by their superior officers to ab epistulis,” an official
close to the emperor (106). While plausible, he provides no evidence to back this claim. Saller argues that
patronage, not experience, was the most important factor for promotion. A.R. Birley suggests that initial
appointments depended heavily on patronage, but further promotion did require, at times, some showing of
ability. He, too, argues that records of past performance were kept by the ab epistulis. While no exact
“confidential reports” survive beyond the general platitudes found in letters of recommendation, the
extensive daily and periodic reports that survive in the documentary record, which list soldiers’ duties, pay
outlays, sick and absence rates, may have been compiled or analyzed when an officer sought a further
promotion. For these documents, see especially Stauner (2004).

118 Cic. Fam. 13.12 (SB 279).

119 Pliny Ep. 10.87, PME N 25.
and became even more important over time. Writing in the mid-second century CE, Fronto offered a more specific recommendation based on past military experience. He wrote to Claudius Julianus, the governor of Lower Germany, about Calvisius Faustinianus, the son of Fronto’s friend. A former legionary tribune of legio IV Flavia in Pannonia Inferior, Faustinianus was about to serve under Julianus, presumably as prefect of an ala.\(^{120}\) In addition to his personal connection, Fronto emphasized his character, his intelligence, his work ethic, and, notably, that “everyone under whom he has served praises how experienced he is in military matters.”\(^{121}\) He urged Julianus to test Faustinianus “in military duties, in judicial discussions, in letters, indeed in every occasion for practical judgment and courteousness, either serious or casual.”\(^{122}\) Reflecting a third-century senatorial perspective, Dio, through his depiction of Maecenas’ recommendations to Augustus, argued that only equestrians with extensive military and administrative experience should hold senior positions, such as the prefect of the Praetorian Guard or prefect of the troops of Italy.\(^{123}\) As these letters of recommendation suggest, many auxiliary commanders would have been exposed to literary texts during their education, particularly those who were equestrian by birth and served as municipal leaders prior to their military command. The educational background of former legionary centurions, particularly those who had been promoted from the ranks, may have been less extensive than that of those who were equestrian by birth.\(^{124}\) However, former legionary centurions were less likely to have

\(^{120}\) Fronto *Ad amic.* 1.5, *PME* C 66. He later went on to serve as idiołogos Aegypti under his father, who served as prefect of Egypt in 170-173/4 CE.

\(^{121}\) *quam rei militaris peritus, praedicant omnes sub quibus meruit* (*Ad amic.* 1.5).

\(^{122}\) *fac periculum in militiae muneribus, fac periculum in consiliis iudiciaris, fac periculum in litteris, omni denique prudentiae et facilitatis usu vel serio vel remissio* (*Ad amic.* 1.5).

\(^{123}\) Dio 52.24.1-4.

\(^{124}\) Note that in the third century, if not earlier, it seems that the senate may have discriminated against
been appointed as auxiliary commanders after the reign of Claudius, although there are a few later examples. In addition, a few auxiliary units, such as the Batavians, were commanded by their own tribal leaders, particularly in the early first century. To what extent these auxiliary commanders were educated in Latin or Greek literature is difficult to determine, although it is very likely that even tribal and provincial elites would have emulated Roman educational practices, even in the first century CE. Still, the upbringing and education of many potential auxiliary commanders was similar to that of most wealthy Roman males. The family provided young men economic, cultural, social, gender, and behavioral role models. We can imagine a young man aiding his family in the running of their estate, managing accounts, supervising slaves, receiving clients,

former common soldiers who had worked their way into equestrian rank, although not against equestrian who had served as centurions, Dio 52.25.6-7. 

CIL 9.2564, AE 1902 no. 41. Former legionary centurions were still regularly used as temporary commanders of cohorts (praepositus cohortis) and, in the second century, as commanders of numeri (praepositus/praefectus numeri). See Cheesman (1914): 93 and Dobson (1970). 

Cheesman (1914): 91-92. One Treveri unit, ala Treverorum, seems to have been composed of mostly Treveri lead by Treveri officers until its disbandment following its involvement in the uprising of 69/70 CE. Early in the reign of Augustus, many other Gallic tribal or regional units seem to have had Italian officers or officers from tribes different from that of the title of the unit. See Drinkwater (1978): 828-31, based on data in Kraft (1951) and Alföldy (1968). The Batavian prefect at Vindolanda in the early second century was surely educated in Latin letter-writing, and finds of Virgil at the fort suggest that he (or his children) were reading Latin literature. See chapter 5 below. 

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Cf. Woodman (1977): 158-59. This passage suggests that, in Velleius’s view, the Pannonians knew Latin, perhaps even Roman military practice (disciplina) and that a great many of them (plerisque) were literate, perhaps in Roman literary culture, perhaps in their own. 

Osgood (2011b). Quint. Inst. 1.1.4-11 emphasizes the important role of not only a boy's father, but also his mother, nurse, friends, and paedagogus (slave caregiver).
perhaps even accompanying his father or other important men on military service or in
the public forum.\(^{129}\)

One major goal of education was the moral instruction of the student, providing a
value system, rather than preparation for a particular occupation.\(^{130}\) Formal primary
education, provided at home for most wealthy boys, focused on listening, memorizing,
repeating, copying, and writing in both Greek and Latin.\(^{131}\) Grammar, literature,
astronomy, music, geometry, logic, rhetoric, and sometimes philosophy formed the core
of a traditional education, with an emphasis on public speaking.\(^{132}\) While the overall
structure of ancient education was generally widespread throughout the Empire
(progressing from reading and writing, then grammar, followed by rhetoric), local
variation was quite prevalent. In fact, the value and nature of ancient educational practice
and theory were often debated.\(^{133}\) Texts used in the elementary level focused on maxims
and sayings of famous historical figures, often drawn from a few canonical authors.\(^{134}\)

Roman educational practices, as depicted in literary sources, emphasized the important
role of the past as a guide for the present. The customs of the ancestors, the *mores
maiorum*, had a strong influence in Roman literature, social behavior, public procedure,
and private interactions. Used to justify and guide individual or collective views and
behaviors, the *mores maiorum* were often expressed in the historical *exemplum*, a famous
(or infamous) act, speech, or behavior performed by an individual or a group and

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\(^{129}\) Pliny *Ep.* 8.14.4-5 idealizes the republican virtues of young men learning by watching their elders. Cf.
Sen. *Ep.* 6.5; Tac. *Dial.* 34.1; Cic. *Off.* 2.46-47.

\(^{130}\) The moral role of oratory: Tac. *Dial.* 30-32.

\(^{131}\) For an overview of primary education, see Horster (2011); see also Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.35-36; Sen. *Ep.* 33.6-
7, 94.8-9, Cribiore (2001), Marrou (1982), and Bonner (1977). For bilingual education (focusing on future
orators), see Quint *Inst.* 1.1.12-14.

\(^{132}\) See a full discussion beginning at Quint. *Inst.* 1.10.1.


\(^{134}\) Quint. *Inst.* 1.1.36; Sen. *Ep.* 33, 94.
specifically collected, repeated, and reinterpreted for its didactic power. These stories were not merely moralistic tales meant to entertain; rather, they played a large part in determining how a proper Roman was to behave. While one’s father or relatives played a formative role in the teaching of social norms and expectations, it was the *mores maiorum* that set the standard.

The collective cultural pressure to learn these *exempla virtutis* in order to exhibit *virtus* became especially prevalent in the Augustan period. These stories of Roman ancestors informed, reflected, and interacted with all aspects of the imperial project, including the role of the soldier in society. Not only were these *exempla* enshrined in canonical narratives of Roman history, such as the writings of Livy, but they also appeared in the physical landscape of the imperial capital. Augustus, while restoring public works in Rome, left the original foundation inscriptions in place. He also dedicated statues to memorable leaders in the two colonnades of his forum, proclaiming in an edict that he had done this “so that he himself, while he lived, and the leaders (*principes*) of following generations might be forced by the citizens to conform with the lives of these men as their models.” Augustus further transformed this practice by claiming that he himself had offered *exempla* to the Roman people from his own behavior, a claim later emperors would take up as a central aspect of their ruling

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135 For an excellent overview of *exempla* in Roman literature and its role in society, see Lobur (2008): ch. 6.
137 Lobur (2008): 171-72 for Augustus’s exploitation of these cultural attitudes in the formation of the principate.
139 *ut ad illorum velut ad exemplar et ipsae, dum viveret, et insequentium actatium principes exigerentur a civibus* (Suet. *Aug.* 31.5). Compare Augustus’s claim to have revived many dying *exempla maiorum* by introducing new laws: *RGDA* 8.5.
ideology. Young officers of Rome now had to learn and emulate both the exempla of their ancestors as well as the great deeds of the emperor.

Roman authors debated the relative educational value of practical experience, such as following the exempla of great men of the past, and more theoretical instruction (praeccepta), particularly Greek theory. Emulation of past examples, especially Roman examples, was often deemed better for the moral education of a man. For military affairs (res militaris), practical experience and theory were also often debated by the Romans, although it was recognized that practical handbooks, based on either exempla or theory, could be useful. For example, Cicero argued that, in some aspects of life, the Romans were inherently superior to other peoples, particularly in military affairs, due in large part to the exploits of their ancestors:

In fact surely we better and more elegantly maintain the customs and practices of life, as well as domestic and family affairs, and as for the republic certainly our ancestors managed it with better principles and laws. What shall I say about military affairs (res militaris), in which our men have greatly prevailed not only in valor (virtus), but even more so in discipline (disciplina)? Moreover those things which are gained not through literature but through nature should not be compared with Greece nor with any people. For what so great seriousness, magnitude of spirit, uprightness, faithfulness, what so superior virtue, in every type, is in other peoples, that it ought to be compared with our ancestors?

Yet Cicero also recognized the value in studying Greek theory and literature for military advice, as he admitted to have read Xenophon’s Cyropaedia while commanding

RGDA 8.5: [ipse] multarum rer[um exe]mpla imitanda pos[teris tradidi]; cf. Cooley (2009): 144. The Greek translation of the original Latin edict makes it clear that Augustus thought of himself as an exemplum for posterity: αὐτὸς πολλῶν πραγμάτων μέμημα ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς μετέπειτα παρέδωκα. Celsus (Med. Prooem. 12) makes clear that in medicine, as in military science, scholars debated the relative value of theory over experience. Vitruvius (De arch. 1.1.1-2) also highlights the importance of both theory and practical experience for an architect. Quint. Inst. 12.2.29-30 (for an orator).

Tusc. 1.2: Nam mores et instituta vitae resque domesticas ac familiaris nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius, rem vero publicam nostri maiores certe melioribus temperaverunt et instituis et legibus. quid loquar de re militari? in qua cum virtute nostri multum valuerunt, tum plus etiam disciplina. iam illa, quae natura, non litteris adecuti sunt, neque cum Graecia neque ulla cum gente sunt conferenda. quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda?
his troops in Cilicia; in fact, he read it so many times that he wore out the book.\textsuperscript{144}

Xenophon wrote this text in the mid-fourth century BCE as a pseudo-historical account of the life of the Persian king Cyrus the Great (mid-sixth century BCE), basing many of his details, however, on contemporary Sparta. Ultimately a moral treatise about the proper role of the general and political leader, the \textit{Cyropaedia} also offers practical advice for maintaining military discipline, securing supplies, and dealing with troops of various backgrounds.\textsuperscript{145} Nevertheless, perhaps representing Roman ideals, Cicero also praised men for learning military skills through experience and denigrated those who merely learn from books.\textsuperscript{146}

While practical experience was by far preferred, men of no military background, most likely the majority of the prefects of cohorts, had to rely on what they learned in school, in handbooks, and from experienced family, friends, and subordinates. The extent to which the study of \textit{exempla} and handbooks shaped a commanding officer’s thoughts and behaviors in respect to his auxiliary troops varied based on his experience, his background, and the qualities of the men around him. Generally, a young man did not

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{quam contrieram legendo}, Cic. \textit{Fam}. 9.25 (SB 114); cf. \textit{Att}. 2.3 (SB 23). In the same letter, he also seems to have been familiar with a military treatise by King Pyrrhus of Epirus, who fought against Rome in 281-275 BCE, and another work on strategy by Cineas, a minister of Pyrrhus, which was an abridgment of a work by Aeneas Tacticus (4\textsuperscript{th} c. BCE). See Shackleton Bailey (1980): 167. Cicero also offers Cyrus, as described in Xenophon's \textit{Cyropaedia}, as an example of a just ruler to his brother Quintus, governor of Asia (59/60 BCE), reminding him that Scipio Africanus also had read Xenophon for guidance; \textit{Q Fr}. 1.1 (SB 1).

\textsuperscript{145} Specific examples are found in Cyrus’ dialogue with his father (Xen. \textit{Cyr}. 1.6) and his reorganization of his soldiers (Xen. \textit{Cyr}. 2 \textit{passim}). Xenophon also wrote other treatises on the role of the cavalry commander, on horsemanship, and on hunting, all of which were popular in antiquity and often mimicked by later writers. These works are didactic in tone, offering practical advice, but generally concerned with the moral and ethical qualities underlying such activities. In his description of foreign institutions, Valerius Maximus notably beginning with Sparta, which he claims was “closest to the austerity of our ancestors,” praising their rejection of pleasures and luxuries from Asia as well as their martial courage (\textit{virtus}) (2.6.1). Such admiration for Sparta suggests that Greek texts which emphasized Spartan institutions, such as Xenophon’s \textit{Cyropaedia}, may have influenced Roman thought and behavior, particularly in respect to military affairs.

\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Font}. 42-43 (contrasting the exploits of the past with the book-learning of the present), \textit{Balb}. 47 (on Marius; cf. Sall. \textit{Iug}. 85.12-14), \textit{Leg. Man}. 27-28 (on Pompey).
learn how to be a military officer in school; no military academy existed in Rome.\textsuperscript{147} A new officer was responsible for his own training.\textsuperscript{148} Most new officers probably consulted with others for advice, or quickly learned on the job. Given how short appointments generally were, usually only a few years, many would have found such limited preparation adequate. Some would have turned to the \textit{exempla} found in histories or compilations; others would have gleaned as many tips as possible from manuals on military theory, a genre common from the fourth century BCE which contained practical advice for many aspects of military command. Other didactic texts concerning agriculture and estate management, medicine, and military affairs, all of which claim their utility to the reader, may also have been consulted by young men starting a military position.\textsuperscript{149}

All these texts generally agree on the ideal image of the typical soldier. Brave and disciplined, the Roman soldier, guided by his commander, defeated the enemy and expanded (or protected) the Empire. Of course, what the educated elite really thought about actual soldiers came out in other ways, subtly hinted at, put in the mouths of historical or literary characters, often with a subtle sneer of arrogance and loathing.\textsuperscript{150} Soldiers could be violent, greedy, and dangerous, and documentary evidence suggests that some of these negative literary views might be justified.\textsuperscript{151} Nevertheless, the

\textsuperscript{147} B. Campbell (1987).
\textsuperscript{148} Although it seems that some advocated for young men (senators and equestrians) to be trained in the use of horses and weapons at public expense as a way to promote future loyalty and administrative competency. See Dio 52.26.1-2.
\textsuperscript{149} Aulus Cornelius Celsus (\textit{RE} 82), who lived in the reign of Tiberius, considered military affairs (\textit{res militaris}) to be an essential part of one's education, putting it in his encyclopedia which included agriculture, medicine, rhetoric, and perhaps philosophy and jurisprudence. See Quint. \textit{Inst.} 12.11.24.
\textsuperscript{150} E.g., Juv. \textit{Sat.} 16, Tac. \textit{Ann.} 1.16-49 (mutinies of 14 CE), Dio 52.25.6-7, 52.27, 68.7.5, 75.2.5-6.B. Campbell (1984): 9-13.
\textsuperscript{151} “As so it has come about that private citizens are insulted and abused and the army is accused of greed and injustice” (ἐξ οὗ τοῖς μὲν ἴδιόταις ὑφίστ ἐς τοι ἐπηρεάζας γείνε/σθαι, τὸ δὲ στρατιτικὸν ἐπὶ πλεονεξία
idealized image of the Roman soldier, or the behavior of generals who commanded them, often appeared in works consisting of historical *exempla* which focus on two major themes: *virtus* and *disciplina*.

### 2.3 The Roman Soldier and the Struggle between *virtus* and *disciplina*

One feature of the *exempla* that is particularly relevant for our purposes is the role of the Roman general in maintaining the *disciplina* of soldiers while also encouraging *virtus*. More than following orders, *disciplina* encompassed many aspects of controlled martial excellence, reinforced by the interaction between physical actions (tactics, stratagems, training, building, laboring) and ideological forms (oaths, prayers, speeches). Unlike *disciplina*, which encouraged restrained collective action, *virtus* (“manliness”) often meant individual, aggressive martial courage. Roman authors considered both *disciplina* and *virtus* as essential, if often contradictory, elements of the ideal soldier.

Both elements were at the heart of Roman military prowess. Romans believed that competition between soldiers, in both *disciplina* and *virtus*, rather than some sense of unit cohesion or advances in military technology, drove them to success. For example, Caesar, in his battle descriptions in *Bellum Gallicum* and *Bellum Civile*, reflected a shared expectation of Roman culture by emphasizing the importance of the courage (*virtus*) in battle, departing from the dominant Greek military intellectual tradition which, stressing

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152 Definitions of *disciplina* and *virtus*: Lendon (2005): 177-78, 312.
153 Lendon (2005), contra MacMullen (1984a), who bases his model of unit cohesion on a study of post-combat interviews of infantry companies in World War II.
tactics and stratagems, downplayed the role of courage.\textsuperscript{154}

The struggle to balance the \textit{virtus} and \textit{disciplina} of soldiers, as emphasized by the historical \textit{exempla}, became particularly prominent in literature of the Late Republic and early Empire, partly in response to the political and literary elite’s competition over power and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{155} Uncomfortable with the wealth acquired during the conquest of the Hellenistic East and its use as a source of political power by ambitious generals, authors began to depict soldiers as greedy and self-interested, contrasting them with the idealized vision of the citizen-soldier of the ancient past. \textit{Exempla} of generals emphasized the importance of \textit{disciplina}, austerity, and restraint to the preservation of the state.\textsuperscript{156}

After Augustus consolidated power, he promoted the image of the emperor as the ideal general who imposed \textit{disciplina}. Roman law reflected this ideology, emphasizing the importance of soldiers’ obedience and the emperor as a source of this \textit{disciplina}.\textsuperscript{157} While \textit{disciplina} was a necessary element of military command, Roman emperors and officers also reinforced this idealized vision of generals and soldiers as a legitimating ideology. Such an ideology based on traditional values helped to promote stability and to win the cooperation of the elite. Augustus reinforced this ideology by prohibiting

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{154} Lendon (1999).
\item \textsuperscript{155} Phang (2011), Phang (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{156} For example, Livy’s depiction of T. Manlius executing his own son for disobeying orders, telling him, “You have ruined military discipline, by which the Roman state has stood firm until this day” (\textit{disciplinam militarem, qua sitet ad hanc diem Romana res, solvisti}), 8.7.16; cf. 8.7.19, 29.19.3, and 40.1.4: “military discipline had grown slack from extravagance and idleness” (\textit{luxuria et otio solutam disciplinam militarem esse}).
\item \textsuperscript{157} B. Campbell (1984): 300-14 traces the legal penalties and enforcement of military discipline, arguing that the application of military discipline, while initially emphasized by Augustus in order to win over the elite, varied significantly over time due to the individual character of the emperor and the political situation at the time. He emphasizes the importance of balancing the affection, loyalty, contentment, and military efficiency of the troops. However, even military law (e.g. \textit{Dig}. 16.6) was influenced by the literary image of the ideal general and soldier.
\end{itemize}
soldiers from marrying. In addition to practical concerns, Augustus believed that the marriage ban not only strengthened both *disciplina* and *virtus*, but also demonstrated his power and legitimated his rule.\(^{158}\) Despite the administrative and legal difficulties it posed, the marriage ban was maintained until Septimius Severus.\(^{159}\)

With the emperor as the guiding model, military *disciplina* was upheld as the defining virtue of a good governor and was used as a way of assessing a governor’s administration of a province. In its decision in the trial of 20 CE of Cn. Calpurnius Piso, the former governor of Syria, on charges of insubordination, maladministration and the murder of Germanicus, the adopted son of the emperor Tiberius, the Senate claimed the following regarding Piso:

> WHO had corrupted the military discipline established by the deified Augustus and maintained by Ti. Caesar Augustus, not only by indulging the soldiers, *<so that they would not>* obey their superiors in accordance with our most venerable tradition, but also by giving donatives in his own name from the funds of our *princeps*, after which he took pleasure that some soldiers were called “Piso’s men” and others “Caesar’s men,” and also by honoring those who, after assuming such a name, had obeyed himself...\(^{160}\)

This text illustrates a number of key issues. First, the Senate made clear that the emperor was the ultimate source of *militaris disciplina*.\(^{161}\) Second, Piso, as a legate of the emperor, was obligated to maintain discipline among the troops, whose obedience to superior officers was “in accordance with our most venerable tradition” (more

\(^{158}\) Phang (2001).
\(^{159}\) B. Campbell (1978).
\(^{160}\) Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre 52-57: *qui militarem disciplinam a divo Aug(usto) institutam et servatam a Ti. Caesare Aug(usto) corrupisset, non solum indulgendo militibus, *<ne>* his, qui ipsis praesunt, more vetustissumo parerent, sed etiam donativa suo nomine ex fisco principis nostri dando, quo facto milites alios Pisonianos, alios Caesarianos dici laetatus sit, honorando etiam eos, qui post talis nominis usurpationem ipsi pariuisse<n>*t. Text and translation: Potter and Damon (1999): 22-23. See also Damon and Takács (1999) and other articles in the same journal issue. Although Piso was dead (he had committed suicide before he could be brought to trial), his actions were still put on trial, as were his family and associates. They were accused of *maiestas* (treason), line 122.
\(^{161}\) For similar view of the role of the emperor Trajan, see Pliny *Ep*. 10.29.1, “founder and upholder of military discipline” (*conditorem disciplinae militaris firmatoremque*); cf. Pliny *Panegyricus* 6.2 and 18.1 for Trajan as restorer of discipline after the slackness of Domitian.
Piso himself was accused of disobeying his superior, Germanicus, who had been sent by Tiberius to the East with *maius imperium*, that is, greater military and civil authority than local governors.\(^{162}\) The Senate justified the importance of obedience of soldiers by emphasizing ancient tradition, the *ores maiorum*. It also condemned winning obedience through donatives, monetary gifts which were the responsibility of the emperor alone. Not only had Piso stolen funds from the emperor, but he had also sowed the seeds of civil war so that some soldiers took the side of Germanicus, others the side of Piso, leading to Roman soldiers being forced to fight Roman soldiers.\(^{163}\)

It is important to emphasize that the Senate condemned Piso, in addition to breaking Roman law, for “corrupting” military discipline (established and maintained by the emperors) and for disregarding “the most venerable tradition.” This clearly suggests that tradition and the *exempla* of the ancestors, perhaps more so than Roman law, were key to guiding and assessing Roman military behavior.

Examples of soldiers and generals were very important in offering guidance to new officers, but other examples of leadership, such as the running of an estate, also played a role. Cato the Elder, in his treatise on farming from the second century BCE, discusses managerial skills, accounting tips, and handling slave labor on an estate. Many of these ideas would have been applicable to military command, including the view that farmers’ sons are the bravest soldiers.\(^{164}\) Choosing the proper location for an estate, maintaining a strict inventory of supplies, keeping workers busy at all times, and taking

\(^{162}\) *Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre* 29-37. Governors were also bound by *mandata*, guidelines given by the emperor to the governors before they left for their provinces; Piso was specifically guided by such orders, see lines 38-39 and Potter (1996) for other examples. The Senate specifically accuses Piso of breaking Roman law and a senatorial order by disobeying Germanicus, see lines 29-37.

\(^{163}\) *Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre* 45-49.

\(^{164}\) *Agr. praef.* 4.
part in the work itself so as to motivate workers – all of these ideas would have been useful for a military commander. In fact, many of these guidelines match those given to generals by Cyrus in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, further suggesting the widespread view among literary elites on the keys to leadership in different aspects of life. Cato also wrote a treatise on military science (De Re Militari), which unfortunately has not survived in full. Both of Cato’s works remained very popular throughout the imperial period, which later authors, such as Varro (1st c. BCE), Celsus (1st c. CE), Columella (1st c. CE), Frontinus (late 1st/early 2nd c. CE), and Vegetius (late 4th/early 5th c. CE), quoted or adapted (or at least epitomes of them). Such later adaptation again suggests not only the extent to which his ideas were accepted but also their endurance over time.

Disciplina and virtus, as key elements of the elite image of the Roman soldier, continued to appear as major components of literary texts and official texts, especially in relation to the role of the emperor. Writers of the early first century CE, such as Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus, bolstered the importance of these themes through numerous historical exempla. Potential officers, many of whom encountered these ideas through their education, would have carried these views with them in their command of auxiliaries. A close examination of the writings of these two authors allows us to trace these themes and assess their potential impact on elite expectations.

2.4 Valerius Maximus on Soldiers

Valerius Maximus’s goal in publishing Memorable Doings and Sayings, around 30/31 CE, was to collect from famous authors memorable doings and sayings of Romans

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165 Agr. 1-2, 5. While the advice in section five is directed at the farm manager (vilicus), these tips are equally applicable for commanding or supporting officers.
and non-Romans so that a member of the newly incorporated Italian elites or a student performing rhetorical exercises did not have to do lengthy research to find illustrative examples. He dedicated his collection of virtues and vices to the emperor Tiberius, whom (he claimed) gods and men had granted control over the world and who promoted virtues and punished vices. For Valerius, the emperor was the ultimate exemplum, and his very collection of vices and virtues was both a response to and a promotion of the imperial ideology of consensus and the rule of the emperor. Valerius collected many historical exempla, drawing largely on the writings of Cicero, Livy, Varro, and Trogus, in essence, the standardization of the history of Rome produced in the first centuries BCE and CE. These stories comprised the full range of behaviors and ideas that a typical member of the Roman elite drew on when performing the role of leadership in society.

Valerius believed that virtue was open to all people, no matter what their background or their status, as long as one was determined and eager, reflecting, in part, the Roman ideology of inclusive citizenship based largely on merit and not solely on one’s origin. Men and women, Romans and barbarians, rich and poor, free and slave; all had the potential of performing memorable deeds, and all had the potential of rising beyond their humble birth, or falling to the deepest decrepitude. He encouraged comparison between nobles and their social inferiors in order to emphasize this theme.

Despite his inclusive views towards memorable deeds, he still expressed the

166 Val. Max. 1.praef. He does not specify his audience, but these are just examples of the range of possible audiences.
167 Val. Max. 1.praef.
169 Val. Max. 3.3.ext.7.
170 For the intense debates in Roman society about the relation between origin and citizenship, see Dench (2005).
171 Valerius offers multiple examples of “rise and fall” at 3.4-3.5.
shared aristocratic view on the moral inferiority of soldiers. In his discussion of ancient public and private institutions, “the origins (elementa) of this happy life we lead under the best princeps,” Valerius expressed concern, most likely shared by other elites, that soldiers, including auxiliary soldiers, originated from groups of men who had little to no property. He criticized Marius’ change to military recruitment in 107 BCE, when Marius broke the custom of recruiting only men of property into the legions, a custom thought to have been “strengthened by long practice.” Valerius characterized Marius as “an otherwise excellent citizen, but not, however, well-disposed to antiquity because of awareness of his own newness,” that is, because Marius had no senatorial ancestors. Valerius believed that Marius’ motives for changing military recruitment practice were derived from Marius’ own humble backgrounds and the fear that, if the old system remained, someone might denigrate Marius as a low-class commander.

Such a development did not fit into the idealized vision of citizen-soldiers fighting alongside each other. Whether or not Valerius’ speculations about Marius’ motivations are correct, this passage does suggest that the traditional elite believed that soldiers, and all other people of modest background, were morally inferior to the wealthy, cultured elites who commanded them, a view found also in numerous other texts. Valerius was probably expressing the beliefs of many of his colleagues by praising the “modesty” (vereundia) of the people, that is, the propertied classes, who had once offered themselves up for military service so that the commanders did not have to recruit from

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172 Val. Max. 2.praef. huiusce vitae, quam sub optimo principe felicem agimus, quaeam fuerint elementa.
173 Val. Max. 2.3.1 hanc diutina usurpatione formatam consuetudinem.
174 Val. Max. 2.3.1 civis alioqui magnificus, sed novitatis suae conscientia vetustati non sane propitius.
175 MacMullen (1974): 138-41 gathers evidence for the “lexicon of snobbery” and the range of prejudice felt by the literate upper classes for the lower.
the poor. Of course, by the first century CE, it was more likely that officers would command men of a vastly different social status and wealth than their own. Valerius recognized this gap and sought to explain it away by pointing to the individual anxieties of Marius himself, rather than offering his reader guidance on how to address this issue.

Although he valued the *mores maiorum*, Valerius recognized that deviations from the customs of the ancestors may be beneficial at times, particularly in military affairs. He emphasized the mutually supportive role of both skill (*ars*) and valor (*virtus*) in military training, highlighting the importance of both *disciplina* and *virtus* by offering the example of a consul who brought in a gladiator troop to train soldiers in sword skills.\(^{176}\) Valerius also praised a Roman centurion fighting against Capua in 212 BCE, crediting him with the discovery of the tactical innovation of using light-armed infantry who rode into battle along with the cavalrymen, perhaps a precursor to auxiliary troops.\(^{177}\) Despite his misgivings, Valerius did decide to include Marius’s recruitment innovation as another example that improved the martial power of Rome, even if such an innovation was still controversial over a hundred years later.

Even with innovation, including the increased reliance on foreign troops, Valerius nevertheless believed that Roman power and tradition derived from military discipline:

> I now come to the particular distinction and the mainstay of Roman rule, preserved safe and sound up to this time due to beneficial perseverance: the most steadfast bond of military discipline, in whose bosom and guardianship rests the serene and tranquil condition of prosperous peace.\(^{178}\)

Military discipline, fiercely upheld, acquired the leadership of Italy for Roman rule;

\(^{176}\) Val. Max. 2.3.2: “He mixed martial courage (*virtus*) with skill and, in turn, skill with martial courage, in order that the former (*ars*) become stronger by the vigor of the latter (*virtus*) and the latter more cautious by the science of the former” (*virtutemque arti et rursus artem virtuti miscuit, ut illa impetu huius fortior; haec illius scientia cautior fieret*).

\(^{177}\) Val. Max. 2.3.3.

\(^{178}\) Val. Max. 2.7.praef.: *venio nunc ad praecipuum decus et ad stabilimentum Romani imperii, salutari perseverantia ad hoc tempus sincerum et incolumne servatum, militaris disciplinæ tenacissimum vinculum, in cuius sinu ac tutela serenus tranquillusque beatae pacis status acquiescit.*
bestowed control over many cities, great kings, most powerful nations; opened the straits of the Pontic gulf; handed over the overthrown barriers of the Alps and the Taurus mountain; and transformed a beginning from Romulus’s tiny hut into the peak of the entire world.\textsuperscript{179}

For Valerius, military discipline was the source of a general’s triumph, and it was “the most steadfast bond” (\textit{tenacissimum vinculum}) of camp discipline and the close observance of the military system (\textit{militaris ratio}), combined with good leadership, that made Rome prosperous.\textsuperscript{180} Valerius’ characterization of military discipline emphasized three things. First, he compared military discipline to a bond or a chain (\textit{vinculum}), one which both restrains soldiers from lavish living or brazen actions and also guards and protects the state from setback. Second, the ancestors practiced military discipline, which brought its own particular glory (\textit{decus, gloria}), similar to that of victory on the battlefield, and therefore, by definition, ought to be practiced by all Romans.\textsuperscript{181} Third, and most importantly, it was through military discipline that Rome came to power. For example, he believed that the victory of P. Cornelius Scipio over Numantia derived from his restoration of the \textit{virtus} of his soldiers by removing pleasurable things from the camp, such as salesmen, hangers-on, and prostitutes.\textsuperscript{182} Discipline and valor were thought to be closely interdependent, and Valerius’ readers would have taken the message to heart through the multiple examples.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{179} Val. Max. 2.8.praef.: \textit{disciplina militaris acriter retenta principatum Italiae Romano imperio peperit, multarum urbi, magnorum regum, validissimarum gentium, regimen largita est, fauces Pontici sinus patefecit, Alpium Taurique montis convulsa claustra tradidit, ortumque e parvula Romuli casa totius terrarum orbis fecit column}. Cf. 7.2.ext.1a: “our rule takes hold of the growth and protection of itself not so much from the strength of bodies than from the liveliness of minds” (\textit{imperium nostrum non tam robore corporum quam animorum vigore incrementum ac tutelam sui comprehendit}).

\textsuperscript{180} Val. Max. 2.8.praef., 2.9.praef.

\textsuperscript{181} Val. Max. 2.7.praef. (\textit{decus}), 2.7.6 (\textit{gloria}).

\textsuperscript{182} Val. Max. 2.7.1.

\textsuperscript{183} The maintenance of military discipline and loyalty to the state had precedence over loyalty to one’s family, and the multiple stories in Valerius’s work suggests that familial patronage and corruption was still a major concern. See 2.7.3-6, especially the end of section 6: “judging it preferable that a father lose a brave son than that the fatherland lose military discipline” (\textit{satius esse iudicans patrem forti filio quam patriam militari disciplinae care}).
The image of the soldier in these stories of generals imposing military discipline illustrates not necessarily how soldiers actually behaved (although there is probably some level of truth to these stories), but how officers would have thought about the men whom they commanded. Key to our understanding is Valerius’s portrayal of military punishment. Reflecting an aristocratic view, Valerius saw severe punishment as the most legitimate, if not the most effective, form of penalty. Yet officers needed to balance the traditional desire for absolute obedience and strictness with the reality of the power of soldiers, particularly their ability to revolt. Punishments not only had to be legitimate in the eyes of their fellow elites; soldiers, too, had to feel that punishments were fair. A more effective approach may have been shaming and disgracing soldiers into obedience. Valerius offered examples of both.

Military camps could become overflowing with salesmen, prostitutes, and slaves. Soldiers greatly enjoyed getting what they wanted, particularly relief from hard work, preferring to keep the camp in one place or to use slaves and pack animals to carry their arms and rations. Even officers, on occasion, broke with military discipline and disobeyed orders, acted on their own volition, or failed to fight at the opportune moment. Valerius’s examples include instances of negligence, disobedience, acting without orders, cowardice, or revolt. Punishments were sometimes severe, including loss of pay, demotion, dismissal, public shaming, flogging, and even execution. One

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184 For the interaction of disciplina and punishment as a legitimating ideology, see Phang (2008): 111-51.
185 A third possible strategy of punishment, ignored by literary sources but found particularly in later legal and documentary sources, appears to have been a formal bureaucratic review of some sort based on documents, witness, and the service records of the soldier involved. Soldiers may have found this process to be more legitimate than claims of mos maiorum. See Phang (2008): 113, 47-50.
186 Val. Max. 2.7.2.
187 Val. Max. 2.7.5-8.
188 Val. Max. 2.7.15d (loss of pay); 2.7.3 (dismissal); 2.7.4 (flogging and demotion); 2.7.5, 7, 15b (demotion); 2.7.6 (execution); 2.7.8 (stripping and flogging); 2.7.15f (flogging, beheading, no burial or
Roman-imposed punishment for a *praefectus equitum* who had surrendered to the enemy required the prefect to serve out his term of duty barefoot, dressed in a gown with the fringes cut off and an ungirt tunic. He was forbidden from associating with anyone and from using the baths. Such elements (clothing, socializing, and bathing) were essential Roman behaviors; thus, the disgraced officer, in effect, lost his identity. His soldiers were also humiliated, as their horses were reassigned to the units of slingers, most likely foreigners.\(^{189}\)

Although Valerius seems ambivalent about the severe strictness, perhaps cruelty, of some of his *exempla*, a few stories suggest that Romans considered it appropriate to treat allied foreign soldiers differently, even worse, than Roman ones. Scipio Africanus the elder (201 BCE) decided to “borrow some harshness from a cruelty quite alien to himself” to strengthen military discipline among Romans and allies after the defeat of Carthage.\(^{190}\) After he had captured all those Romans and allies who had deserted to the Carthaginian side, he punished the Roman deserters more severely than the Latin allies, in Valerius’s view, by executing the allied Latin deserters (by the sword) and crucifying the Roman ones, the latter a punishment usually reserved for slaves or criminals. Valerius’s discomfort with this example suggests that Roman military commanders may have had less difficulties harshly punishing allied or auxiliary troops than they did punishing Roman soldiers. Further examples of the punishment of deserters, this time foreigners who deserted to the Roman side, demonstrate the belief that not only did

\(^{189}\) Val. Max. 2.7.9. C. Titius, who served with L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (consul 133 BCE) in Sicily against runaways slaves. Note that the units of slingers are called *alae*, a term typically reserved for cavalry units in the first century CE.

\(^{190}\) *aliquid ab alienissima sibi crudelitate amaritudinis mutuandum existimavit* (Val. Max. 2.7.12).
deserters deserve to be punished, but foreign ones (that is, former enemies) even more so. These examples may suggest that Romans normally had less qualms about imposing harsher punishments on men of foreign background, such as auxiliary soldiers, than on citizen soldiers. Yet Valerius deems the last punishment “a most useful example” (utilissimum exemplum), since “military discipline needs a harsh, abrupt type of punishment, because strength is based upon arms, which, when they deviate from the correct course, will overpower unless they are overpowered.”\(^{191}\) By “arms” Valerius of course means soldiers, therefore sharing the view that all soldiers, including auxiliaries, had the potential to revolt unless an officer maintained military discipline. These memorable exempla represent the sentiment that soldiers needed to be controlled, often with severity and shame.

All soldiers, both legionaries and auxiliaries, were distinctly separated from their aristocratic officers, although some soldiers could prove notable. In his section on resolution (constantia), Valerius offered two examples of centurions under Julius Caesar and Augustus who, when captured, preferred to die as loyal soldiers rather than to serve their opponent (Pompey and Antony, respectively).\(^{192}\) Valerius admired both of these men for their resolution and loyalty, marveling at the one for his “noble spirit” (nobilem animum), despite the fact that he lacked distinguished ancestors.\(^ {193}\) Such resolution in men of more modest background, in Valerius’ view, should be encouraged rather than despised by the nobility. This is notably different from his view of Marius and the

\(^{191}\) Val. Max. 2.7.14: *aspero enim et absciso castigationis genere militaris disciplina indiget, quia vires armis constant; quae ubi a recto tenore desciverint, oppressura sunt nisi oppressantur.*

\(^{192}\) Val. Max. 3.8.7-8. Cf. 9.9.2, in which a centurion kills himself out of loyalty to his general.

\(^{193}\) Val. Max. 3.8.7: “a noble spirit, without any masks!” (*sine ulla imaginibus nobilem animum!*), *imagines* being the death masks of famous ancestors.
recruitment of the poor. Centurions, who upon retirement often acquired equestrian status, represented the new men of wealth and influence. In encouraging nobles to accept these new men, Valerius may have had in mind more than just the Italians who served as centurions in the legions; perhaps he also thought that auxiliary centurions of all backgrounds, citizen and non-citizen alike, had the potential for great deeds.

Since fear, shame, or punishment did not always work, Valerius offered examples of “crafty” (vafer) doings and sayings, an approach that was thought to work well on soldiers of foreign origin. Sertorius, the famous Roman general who, because of the Sullan proscription, turned against Rome and became leader of the Lusitanians in Spain (80-72 BCE), persuaded his new non-Roman soldiers to engage in guerilla warfare, as opposed to their preference for open battle, by offering them the following metaphor.194 Two horses were brought out, one strong, the other weak. Sertorius ordered a weak old man to gradually pluck the tail hairs of the strong horse, and a powerful young man to tear off the tail hairs of the weak horse in one yank. Only the weak old man succeeded. Sertorius told the Lusitanians that the Roman army was like a horse’s tail, in that anyone could defeat the Romans if he attacked them bit by bit, rather than all at once. They got the point: “So barbarian nation, rough and difficult to rule, rushing to its own destruction, saw with its eyes the usefulness which it had rejected with its ears.”195 Such a metaphorical demonstration for “barbarian” Lusitanians, while of course very memorable, may also indicate the Roman perception that newly recruited foreign soldiers

194 Val. Max. 7.3.6. This story was particularly popular in the imperial period and is found, in various forms, in Hor. Ep. 2.1.45-49, Frontin. Strat. 1.10.1, Pliny Ep. 3.9.11, and Plut. Sert. 16. This popularity draws from both the usefulness of this metaphor (Pliny uses it to courtroom strategy), but also from the exemplary status of Sertorius for the Romans, despite his rebellion.
195 ita gens barbara, aspera et regi difficile, in exitium suum ruens, quam utilitatem auribus respuerat, oculis pervidit (Val. Max. 7.3.6).
were not intelligent, or, alternatively, the Roman recognition of the need for middle
ground negotiations, using local metaphors for mutual (mis)understanding.

If Valerius’s views were representative of his educated elite audience, we clearly
see how future officers view soldiers under their command. Soldiers needed to be
constantly monitored, restrained, punished, praised, and controlled. While there was
room for innovation, Roman morals nevertheless remained steady and Roman
commanders needed to be constantly vigilant, always aware that the behavior of their
soldiers impacted the glory of the Roman name. With subtle distinctions between citizen
and allied soldiers, the examples from Valerius Maximus demonstrate that, overall, the
distinct social gulf between officers and soldiers had to be actively, and sometimes
violently, reinforced. Velleius Paterculus’s work of history offered similar examples of
proper officer and soldier behavior, in a chronological framework, ultimately leading up
to the exemplum par excellence, the emperor Tiberius. Velleius’s own experience as a
commander of an auxiliary unit adds credibility to the insight he provided into how auxiliary officers thought about their soldiers.

2.5 Velleius Paterculus on Soldiers

Like other ancient historians, Velleius used his past experience and claims of
autopsy to build the authority of his account.\footnote{Marincola (2009), more fully in Marincola (1997).} Nevertheless, Velleius’s position as a
well-traveled military officer who commanded auxiliary troops under Augustus and
Tiberius provides us with an opportunity to explore how a Roman military commander thought about historical exempla and their relationship to the behavior of officers and

\footnote{Marincola (2009), more fully in Marincola (1997).}
soldiers. While the structure of his work culminates in Tiberius as the ultimate *exemplum*, Velleius’s condensed universal history offers a slightly different elite view of soldiers and foreigners, one formed, in part, by his own background. For Velleius and other new elite, Rome’s story was now Italy’s story. Sharing a common history, common values, and, in Velleius’s view, common blood, Rome and her Italian allies fully shared in the burden and benefits of empire. How open Velleius was to auxiliaries from non-Italian states, however, is far from clear.

Born around 20 BCE into an Italian equestrian family with a history of service in the Roman military, Velleius Paterculus followed in his ancestor’s footsteps by becoming a military tribune of a legion around the age of twenty, serving in Thrace and Macedonia from 1 BCE to perhaps the end of 1 CE. He then joined Gaius Caesar’s staff, during which time he witnessed the meeting on the Euphrates between Gaius and Phraates V, king of Parthia, in perhaps 2 CE. Velleius also claimed to have visited Achaea, Asia, all the eastern provinces, and the Black Sea region around this time. He seems to have drawn much pleasure from the memory of these events, places, tribes, and cities. His

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197 Velleius justifies the cause of the Italians in the Social War (91-87 BCE) in two ways: their military contribution to the expansion and maintenance of the Roman state; and their (imagined) shared descent with the Romans: “Although their fortune was terrible, the cause [of the Italians] was completely just, for they were seeking membership in a state whose empire they were defending with their weapons. Through all the years and all the wars, [they thought that] they had been contributing double the amount of infantry and cavalry [as the Romans], and yet they were not admitted into membership of that state which, because of them, had reached the very summit from which it could despise as strangers and foreigners men who were of the same race and blood” (*quorum ut fortuna atrox, ita causa fuit iustissima; petebant enim eam civitatem cuitis imperium armis tuabantur: per omnes annos atque omnia bella duplici numero se militum equitumque fungi neque in eius civitatis ius recipi quae per eos in id ipsum pervenisset fastigium ex quo homines eiusdem et gentis et sanguinis ut externos alienosque fastidire posset, 2.15.2*).


199 Vell. Pat. 2.101.1-3

200 For the difficulty in dating these events in Velleius’s life, see Woodman (1977): 124-28.

201 Vell. Pat. 2.101.3. Compare Polybius, who also emphasizes his military career and his travels through Africa, Spain, Gaul, and around the Mediterranean (3.59.7, cf. 3.48.12 for the Alps); “Like Polybius, V. is not the armchair ancient historian with whom modern scholars are often required to contend,” Woodman (1977): 127.
later military service as a commanding officer of an auxiliary cavalry unit (*praefectus equitum*, 4 to 6 CE) and as *legatus Augusti* (6 to 12 CE) under Tiberius also allowed him to travel throughout Italy, Gaul, Germania, Pannonia and Dalmatia. While the origin of the troops under his command is unknown, most likely the cavalry were drawn in large part from Gaul and Spain. Briefly returning to Rome in 6 CE, Velleius was elected quaestor for 7 CE, thus joining the senatorial class. After completing more military service with Tiberius in Germany and elsewhere, Velleius returned to Rome with his brother, who had also served in the military with Tiberius, and both participated in Tiberius’ triumph celebrated in 12 CE in honor of his victory in Illyricum. In 14 CE, Velleius continued his ascent in the senatorial class by being designated by Augustus as a “candidate of Caesar” (*candidatus Caesaris*), along with his brother, for the praetorship of 15 CE. He did not achieve the consulship himself, although he was a friend of Marcus Vinicius, the consul of 30 CE and son of Velleius’s former commander, to whom he dedicated his work.

Published in 30/1 CE (the same year as Valerius Maximus’s *Memorable Doings and Sayings*), Velleius’s work, a condensed universal history starting with Greek mythology and ending in 29 CE, with a focus mostly on the Greeks and Romans, can be characterized as more “summary history,” similar to the *Chronica* of Cornelius Nepos (d. 24 BCE), rather than a full-length history of the Romans alone in the tradition of Livy or...
Sallust. However we classify the genre of his work, it is clear that Velleius’s view of the role of military service and the expansion of the empire interrelated with his characterization of the Roman state. In his digression on Roman colonization, Velleius weaved a narrative interconnecting “the extension of citizenship” and the “expansion of the Roman nationality (nomen) by the sharing of its law” in the fourth through second century BCE. In addition to citizenship and law, Velleius argued that the “distinct strictness of the state” with respect to public morals (e.g., opposition to building stone theaters in Rome) was one of the “clearest example of public will.” When Roman armies destroyed Carthage and Corinth in 146 BCE, Velleius, like Sallust, saw a distinct turning point in Roman history. A state once characterized by virtue, tradition, vigilance, military prowess, and attention to public business quickly declined into vice, novelty, indolence, pleasures, and idleness. A literary trope, to be sure, but a depiction that clearly indicates a discomfort with rapid expansion and change.

In his narrative of events after 146 BCE, the supposed beginning of Rome’s decline, Velleius still commented on notable Roman leaders whose success was based partly on their relationship with their troops, suggesting that not all Romans had lost their virtue. Velleius offered a digression on the famous story of Q. Metellus Macedonicus in Spain, the same story related by Valerius Maximus. Offering slightly different details than Valerius, Velleius argued that Macedonicus’ “command was so strict” (tam

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207 Woodman (1975).
209 Cassius censor a Lupercali in Palatium versus theatrum facere instituit, cui in eo moliendo eximia civitatis severitas et consul Scipio restitere, quod ego inter clarissima publicae voluntatis argumenta numeraverim (Vell. Pat. 1.15.3).
210 quippe remoto Carthaginis metu sublataque imperii aemula non gradu sed praecepiit cursu a virtute descitum, ad vitia transcursum; vetus disciplina deserta, nova inducta; in somnum a vigiliis, ab armis ad voluptates, a negotis in otium conversa civitas (Vell. Pat. 2.1.1).
211 Val. Max. 2.7.10.
severum...imperium) that when he ordered legionary cohorts up a steep incline to attack a Spanish city, the soldiers all began to draft their final wills, assuming that they were marching to their certain death. Yet Macedonicus could not be deterred from his decision, due to his steadfastness (perseverantia). In the end he was right, and the soldiers, who thought that they had been sent to their deaths, returned victorious. Velleius noted: “Shame mixed with fear and hope obtained from despair accomplished so much.” That this story was repeated in both authors suggests its notoriety, perhaps indicating that the authors felt that Macedonicus went too far. Nevertheless, Velleius’s assessments makes clear that shame, fear, and even hope in the face of certain doom were crucial aspects of military leadership.

Nevertheless, the ideal general should not be overly cruel or strict. Velleius himself was ambiguous about Macedonicus’ behavior, since he compared Macedonicus, who was known “because of the courage (virtute) and strictness of this deed (severitate facti),” to Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, who was famous because of his exemplo disciplinae. He provided no explanation; he assumed his reader knew the story of Fabius Aemilianus, as his actions served as an exemplum for future Romans. Velleius believed that his typical reader would have already been familiar with Roman history,

\[212\] Vell. Pat. 2.5.2-3.
\[213\] Notice how Velleius uses a word of the same root as severus to describe Macedonicus.
\[214\] non deterritus proposito [perseverantia ducis], quem moriturum miserat miliem victorem recepit: tantum effecit mixtus timori pudor spesque desperatione quaesita (Vell. Pat. 2.5.2). Watt’s app. crit. says that Davies deletes perseverantia ducis, while Kri tz places perseverantia ducis after effecit. I prefer Watt's reading.
\[215\] Vell. Pat. 2.5.3: hic virtute ac severitate facti, at Fabius Aemilianus Pauli <filius> exemplo disciplinae in Hispania fuit clarissimus.
\[216\] Fabius Aemilianus was the elder brother of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (hence why he is mentioned here in Velleius’s narrative, which started with the Scipio’s response to the death of Gracchus in 133 BCE). Aemilianus had served in Spain in 145-144 BCE as consul and proconsul, and again under his brother at Numantia in 134-133 BCE.
particularly the actions of famous generals. How familiar a newly integrated provincial elite would have been with Roman history is difficult to determine; however, this does suggest that perhaps Velleius had a more traditional Roman aristocratic audience in mind.  

Clearly Velleius, while recognizing the success of Macedonicus’ bold and harsh treatment of his troops, nevertheless preferred the more traditional *disciplina* of Fabius Aemilianus. Troops were not considered disposable, and while discipline and training were necessary, cruelty was not encouraged. Velleius again contrasted generals’ approaches to handling soldiers in his description of the actions of Octavian Caesar (the future Augustus) and Domitius Calvinus (proconsul of Spain) in 39 BCE:

> Meanwhile during this period, so that the thing most hostile to *disciplina*, idleness, might not ruin the soldier, Caesar toughened up the army through frequent campaigns in Illyricum and Dalmatia, the endurance of dangers, and the experience of war. At this same time Domitius Calvinus, when he had gained Spain as his province after his consulship, was the originator of an *exemplum* most harsh and comparable to ancient ones: for he clubbed to death a centurion of the first rank named Vibillius for dishonorable flight from the battle line.

Again, the contrast is clear: a general should keep his men sharp, busy, and experienced in battle. Yet at times officers went too far in emulation of *mos maiorum*. Velleius considered Domitius Calvinus an *exemplum*, but not necessarily one that should be followed by all military leaders.

A balance had to be struck between harsh discipline and over-indulgence of

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218 *interim Caesar per haec tempora, ne res disciplinae inimicissima, otium, corrumperet militem, crebris in Illyrico Dalmatiaque expeditionibus patientia periculorum belligique experientia durabat exercitum. eadem tempestate Calinus Domitus, cum ex consulatu obtineret Hispaniam, gravissimi comparandique antiquis exempli auctor fuit: quippe primi pili centurionem nomine Vibillium ob turpem ex acie fugam fusti percussit* (Vell Pat. 2.78.2-3). The campaign in Illyricum was conducted by Gaius Asinius Pollio, not Octavian himself, most likely on behalf of both Octavian and Antony. See Woodman (1983): 192-96. The incident of Cn. Domitius Calvinus and the centurion is also mentioned by Dio 48.42.4; see Poly. 6.37.1-39.11 for *fustuarium*, the clubbing to death of a soldier for desertion.
soldiers. Velleius recognized these qualities in Octavian, describing his response to a mutiny of soldiers in 36 BCE. Velleius offered two valuable lessons for his reader from this example. First, an army, recognizing its collective power, often put aside discipline and tried to gain what it wanted through force, rather than request. Second, the best approach to placating soldiers was by using a mix of strictness and generosity (partim severitate, partim liberalitate). Similarly, Tiberius, in his own response to a mutiny in 14 CE, claimed that the Senate, lacking neither generosity nor strictness, would respond to the soldiers’ demands. An officer’s approach to command had to be firm, yet fair, and soldiers then would be more likely to obey and respect their leader.

In a passage shaped overwhelmingly by politics and traditional moral contrast, Velleius offered a range of possible responses of soldiers that an officer could expect, from cowardly retreat to brave leadership. Contrasting the behavior of Octavian and Antony at the battle at Actium (31 BCE), Velleius portrayed Antony as the anti-type of the ideal general: he preferred to be a companion of fleeing Cleopatra rather than of his soldiers in battle; as general, he should have been strict with deserters, but instead he deserted his own army. Velleius placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of Antony; he admired Antony’s soldiers, who bravely maintained their resolve to fight (constantia pugnandi) even with their leader gone and no hope of victory. Unlike the cowardly

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219 Vell. Pat. 2.81.1; cf. Dio 49.13-14 for the same events, with more details. For other responses to mutinies, see Frontin. Str. 1.9.1-4.
220 For a similar notion of strength in numbers, see 2.113.1; see also Tac. Ann. 1.25.2, 4.2.1.
221 This combination is characteristic of an ideal general; see Woodman (1983): 206.
222 neque gratiae neque severitatis expertem (Tac. Ann. 1.25.3).
223 Cf. Cicero's advice to his brother Quintus in governing a province: one take the well-being and happiness of those ruled as the universal standard, Q Fr. 1.1 (SB 1).
224 Vell. Pat. 2.85.3: Antonius fugientis reginae quam pugnantis militis sui comes esse maluit, et imperator, qui in desertores saevire debuerat, desertor exercitus sui factus est.
225 Vell. Pat. 2.85.4: illis etiam detracto capite in longum fortissime pugnandi duravit constantia et desperata victoria in mortem dimicabatur.
Antony, Octavian appeared as a merciful and patient victor, emulating the clementia (mercy, compassion) of his adopted father, Julius Caesar, by refusing to slaughter his fellow Romans and repeatedly asking them to surrender.\textsuperscript{226} The soldiers reluctantly surrendered, with Octavian guaranteeing their safety.\textsuperscript{227} Velleius characterized Antony’s soldiers as acting collectively in place of their retreating general: they were about to sue for terms, and they were considered to have acted like an excellent general. It was their wayward leader who had acted like the most cowardly soldier.\textsuperscript{228}

Velleius’s most powerful exemplum for military leadership is his depiction of the future emperor Tiberius as general. After Tiberius’ adoption by Augustus in 4 CE, Velleius accompanied Tiberius to Germany as a prefect of cavalry, serving with him in multiple areas for nine years.\textsuperscript{229} While Velleius himself admitted that his description of veteran soldiers weeping at the sight of Tiberius may be difficult to believe, it is clear that Tiberius had a strong relationship with his men, one that any Roman officer ought to have emulated.\textsuperscript{230} Amidst his description of the German campaign, Velleius also discussed the qualities of another admirable military commander, Sentius Saturninus, legate in Germany. Here was a man who excelled in both military and leisurely pursuits:

\begin{quote}
\begin{quote}
a man abounding in many virtues, he was industrious, energetic, foresighted, equally able to bear and to be skilled in military duties, but, when his work had made way for leisure, the same man liberally and sumptuously used up [leisure] to the full, yet in such a way that you would say that he was splendid and cheerful rather than self-indulgent or lazy.\textsuperscript{231}
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 226 Vell. Pat. 2.85.4: Caesar, quos ferro poterat interimere, verbis mulcere cupiens clamitansque et ostendens fugisse Antonium, quaerebat pro quo et cum quo pugnarent. For more examples of Octavian's clemency, see 2.86.2, 2.87.2.
\item 227 Vell. Pat. 2.85.5: at illi, cum diu pro absente dimicassent duce, aegre summissis armis cessere victoriam, citiusque vitam veniamque Caesar promisit quam illis ut ea precentur persuasum est.
\item 228 Vell Pat. 2.85.5: fuitque in confesso milites optimi imperatoris, imperatorem fugacissimi militis functum officio.
\item 229 Vell. Pat. 2.104.3.
\item 230 Vell. Pat. 2.104.4.
\item 231 Vell. Pat. 2.105.2: virum multiplicem [in] virtutibus, navum agilem providum, militariumque officiorum patientem ac peritum pariter, sed eundem, ubi negotia fecissent locum otio, liberaliter lauteque eo abutentem, ita tamen ut eum splendidum atque hilarem potius quam luxuriosum aut desidem diceres. This
\end{footnotes}
The perfect Roman officer: diligent about his duties, but serious about his leisure, as well. Romans recognized the value in such a balance, and Velleius’s portrayal, by linking it closely with that of Tiberius, encouraged such an approach.

Tiberius’s response to the uprising in Pannonia in 6 CE, in particular his treatment of his troops, was the source of Velleius’s greatest praise, claiming how he was “as great a general in war...as an emperor in times of peace.”\textsuperscript{232} Velleius praised his \textit{prudentia} (good sense) and \textit{temperamentum} (moderation) in attacking the enemy, setting up camp, and acquiring supplies.\textsuperscript{233} In 7 CE, Augustus seemed to have panicked because of the uprising. He ordered Tiberius and the local governors to unite their forces, so that a group of ten legions, seventy auxiliary cohorts, perhaps fourteen cavalry \textit{alae}, more than ten thousand veterans, a large number of volunteers, and a great number of allied royal cavalry were all joined in one camp.\textsuperscript{234} Velleius recognized the dangers of this gathering: such a great number of soldiers in one location made this the largest Roman army since the civil wars, and the soldiers themselves knew it, recognizing their strength in numbers and confident of their ultimate victory. Previously, as mentioned above, such a large gathering of soldiers could lead to mutiny or chaos. Tiberius, with his years of experience on campaign, recognized that the army was “too big to be controlled and was not easy to handle.”\textsuperscript{235} Tiberius therefore divided the army into smaller groups, leading part of the army himself over a long and difficult march.

\textsuperscript{232} Vell Pat. 2.113.1: \textit{tantum in bello ducem quantum in pace...principem.}
\textsuperscript{233} Vell. Pat. 2.111.4.
\textsuperscript{234} Vell. Pat. 2.113.1. Suet. \textit{Tib}. 16.1 says that Tiberius had fifteen legions; Velleius is more reliable as he was there.
\textsuperscript{235} Vell. Pat. 2.113.2: \textit{cum eum maiorem quam ut temperari posset neque habilem gubernaculo cerneret}. Woodman (1977): 173 notes that \textit{temperari} and \textit{gubernaculo} are metaphors from sailing.
Not only did a general have to recognize his limitations, maintain discipline, and share in his soldiers’ adversities, but he also had to provide for the health and recovery of his soldiers. Velleius claimed that Tiberius helped all of his soldiers when they were ill, no matter their rank, by providing carriages, litters, doctors, cooking equipment, or bathing gear to those who needed it.\textsuperscript{236} In addition, Tiberius always rode his horse, sat (rather than reclined) at meals, and moderated his approach to punishments and maintaining discipline.\textsuperscript{237} While these are conventional topoi of an ideal general, they may also reflect Tiberius’s self-conscious approach to leadership, one based, in part, on his own imitation of the \textit{exempla} of antiquity, an approach fitting for a future emperor.\textsuperscript{238}

Personal leadership (\textit{manibus atque armis ipsius}), not merely overall command (\textit{ductu}), was key to Tiberius’s victory in Dalmatia in 9 CE.\textsuperscript{239} A general had to share in the dangers of his soldiers. Yet Tiberius’s most admirable quality, according to Velleius, was his judicious use of the soldiers, his unwillingness to put them in unreasonable harm just to win a battle, and his ability to always maintain control:

\begin{quote}
Never did any chance for victory seem favorable to our commander which he could compensate by the loss of a soldier, and whatever was safest always seemed to him to be glorious. He paid more attention to his conscience than his reputation, and never was the general’s plan guided by the judgment of the army, but the army was guided by the foresight of the general.\textsuperscript{240}
\end{quote}

A general’s foresight (\textit{providentia}) was key to success, a virtue which later emperors and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[236] Vell. Pat. 2.114.1-2.
\item[237] Vell. Pat. 2.114.3.
\item[238] Suetonius’ description of Tiberius’ campaigns in Germany (\textit{Tib.} 18; 19 for punishments drawn \textit{ex antiquitate}) seems to confirm the fact that Tiberius drew on historical \textit{exempla}. Note also his concern for the sick on Rhodes (\textit{Tib.} 11.2). Woodman (1977): 174-76 notes the conventional literary topoi and collects many parallel examples, but concludes “there can be little doubt that V. here provides an accurate and personal account of Tiberius’ relationship with his troops.”
\item[239] Vell. Pat. 2.115.4. Could this be a subtle critique of Augustus, who claimed credit for military victories accomplished by his legates, including Tiberius?\textsuperscript{240}
\item[240] Vell. Pat. 2.115.5: \textit{imperatori numquam adeo ulla opportuna ulla est victoriae occasio quam damno amissi pensaret militis, semperque visum est gloriosum, quod esset tutissimum, et ante conscientiae quam famae consultum, nec umquam consilia ducis iudicio exercitus sed exercitus providentia ducis rectus est.}
\end{footnotes}
Tiberius himself promoted as their own.\textsuperscript{241} Again, Velleius emphasized the collective power of soldiers and the necessity for a commander to take charge of any situation. Tiberius’s desire to avoid unnecessary risk with his men was in stark contrast to exempla of generals of old, especially Metellus Macedonicus in Spain.

Tiberius’s new direction in military leadership may have arisen from the so-called professionalization of the standing armies.\textsuperscript{242} Soldiers were increasingly gaining more experience and power through their long service, and therefore they could not be treated as their predecessors were in the past. Recognizing both soldiers’ power and the limited manpower resources of the empire, Tiberius provided a new model of leadership in which officers not only had to maintain discipline but also had to ensure that their soldiers’ concerns were met. Tiberius’s policy seems to have been shared by later commanders, such as Agricola in the battle Mons Graupius in 83/4 CE: “the glory of victory in fighting would be huge, stopping short of shedding Roman blood.”\textsuperscript{243} While Tacitus clearly differentiates between Agricola’s protective treatment of Roman legionaries and his treatment of non-citizen auxiliaries, Tiberius’s treatment of his soldiers does not suggest such discrimination. Perhaps Tiberius recognized the value of all soldiers, auxiliaries and legionaries alike.

Velleius characterized the revolt of legionary troops of Illyricum and Germany in 14 CE as another example of the proper response of an officer to the demands of the soldiers. Claiming to usurp the role of the senate and the emperor, the soldiers tried to

\textsuperscript{241} Woodman (1977): 182-83.
\textsuperscript{242} While often found in discussions of the Roman imperial army, “professional” is often rarely defined (although see “near professional” in de Blois (2000)). Huntington (1957), in an analysis of professional soldiers in the U.S. army, argues that a profession must have expertise, responsibility, and corporateness; he restricts his definition to the officers of the army. For professionalism more broadly, see Freidson (2001).
\textsuperscript{243} Tac. Agr. 35.3: ingens victoriae decus citra Romanum sanguinem bellandi. Agricola arranged his troops in such a way as to keep the legionaries protected while the auxiliaries engaged in battle.
establish their own salaries and length of service, breaking out into unrestrained violence. Tiberius, now emperor, responded with “the maturity of an old commander” (veteris imperatoris maturitas) by varying his response to the soldiers by stopping some of them, offering promises to others, punishing severely the worst offenders, while mildly reproaching others. Velleius emphasized this moderate approach to discipline by contrasting the actions of Tiberius’s sons, Drusus and Germanicus, who were sent to the frontiers to regain control over the troops. Germanicus took the more forgiving approach, while Drusus applied “the ancient, traditional strictness” (prisca antiquaque severitate), violently repressing the revolting soldiers rather than giving in to their demands, for fear of setting a precedent for the future.

Velleius’s work culminates in the final sections with a panegyrical assessment of Tiberius’s reign up until 30 CE. Tiberius had transitioned into the role of emperor, restorer, and peacekeeper. Velleius claimed that Tiberius had restored piety, good government, stability, justice, equity, industry, order, social hierarchy, peace, and prosperity. Tiberius was now the “best leader” (princeps optimus), who “teaches his citizens to act properly by doing so himself, and while he is the greatest in power, he is greater by exemplum.” Velleius confirmed what the earlier examples already have suggested: Tiberius was the ultimate exemplum and citizens ought to emulate his actions.

244 Vell. Pat. 2.125.2. Also described by Tac. Ann. 1.16-52.
245 Vell. Pat. 2.125.3.
246 Vell. Pat. 2.125.4. Tacitus seems to confirm Drusus’s propensity for severity: promptum ad asperiora ingenium Druso erat (Ann. 1.29), while Germanicus gave in to the soldiers’ demands (Ann. 1.36-37).
247 Vell. Pat. 2.126-130. “It is almost as if V. has written a panegyric proper...V. has written a manifesto based on the government's record, a type of 'factual panegyric' which his own history did much to develop,” Woodman (1977): 234-35.
248 Vell. Pat. 2.126.1-4.
249 Vell. Pat. 2.126.5: nam facere recte cives suos princeps optimus faciendo docet, cumque sit imperio maximus, exemplo maior est.
Soldiers, too, came to emulate the emperor as their personal leader. The emperor joined the ranks of the ancestors and his predecessor, Augustus, as a model for proper behavior, a model which many equestrian officers, who depended on imperial patronage for their positions, would have eagerly mimicked.

2.6 Conclusion

Valerius closed his depictions of exempla of courage with a listing of deeds and awards of one particularly experienced soldier. This soldier’s exploits included one hundred and twenty battles; he saved fourteen of his fellow soldiers from death, was wounded forty times in his chest (but never in his back), and marched in a triumph nine times. Such an extraordinary example of a veteran soldier begs the question: would auxiliary soldiers have known these stories? And who benefited from such stories? One wonders if such stories were utilized by recruiting officers, or shared more widely among the general population, as a way of shaping the image of the soldiers in the public mind. Stories of brave soldiers in action appear in other imperial societies, and often are used by the military as a means of recruitment or public relations. These exempla might have spread beyond the literary classes, meandering by word of mouth from Roman officer to centurion, from centurion to legionary, and, perhaps, even to auxiliaries themselves. The

250 “Roman soldiers had no particular affection for the traditions of the upper classes, or loyalty to the Roman state or to any imperial ideal. The entire basis of the army’s position in the state was a personal relationship with the emperor,” B. Campbell (2002): 110, explored fully in B. Campbell (1984). Attributing all soldiers the same motivation, though, may be an overstatement.

251 Val. Max. 3.2.24.

252 Streets (2004): 190-224, explores the interrelated role of elite ideology of martial race ideology and soldiers’ practice in the 19th c. British Empire: “It seems that the hyper-masculine, elite group identity self-consciously fostered by ‘martial race’ regiments did in fact resonate with some recruits. Many found that membership in a privileges military cadre won them social, personal and...economic prestige. However, even while soldiers seem to have accepted martial race identities largely for their own reasons, I argue that they still bought into behaviours and modes of thinking that ultimately benefited the state” (191).
soldiers may have heard them, mimicked them, or adapted them to their own situation. Historical *exempla* not only had the potential to shape the behavior of the officers, but also may have changed the soldiers themselves.

This chapter has explored the diverse backgrounds of commanding and senior officers, suggesting that, overall, there remained a significant social and cultural gulf between officers and the men they commanded, especially auxiliaries. Informed by their shared classical elite education, many of these officers would have entered military service with a series of expectations and stereotypes of how soldiers ought to have behaved. As the *exempla* in the works of Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus demonstrate, soldiers were expected to be unruly, belligerent, and lazy. Only with a firm, and sometimes cruel hand could an officer control them. While neither author clearly distinguishes non-citizen auxiliary troops from their citizen counterparts, there are subtle hints that foreign soldiers were even less trusted and needed to be handled with even firmer discipline. This apparent lack of differentiation between legionaries and auxiliaries, however, suggests that elite sources considered all soldiers similarly. For these authors writing during a period of recovery and *consensus* formation, the empire was a united whole. They willfully downplayed the diverse makeup of the soldiers who defended and patrolled the empire. For soldiers of all type, only through following the *exempla* of ancestors and emperors, it was thought, could soldiers be disciplined for the glory of the Empire. While origin and ethnicity mattered to a certain degree, clearly social status played a significant role in officer-soldier interactions.
Chapter 3
Martial Races? The “Barbarian” as Roman Soldier

3.1 Introduction: The “Barbarian” in the Roman Imagination

Ideas concerning foreign peoples had a long tradition in Greco-Roman literature and art by the time of Augustus.\textsuperscript{253} Savagery, cruelty, and martial prowess were all key components of the typical ideal “barbarian,” although not all foreign groups were described in the same way. The concept of “barbarian” as a type of “totalized stranger” was dichotomous, in that, on the one hand, barbarians were seen as the embodiment of evil and anarchy, while on the other hand, barbarians were removed from the moral decadence of civilized life.\textsuperscript{254} Auxiliaries, as both soldiers and non-citizen “barbarians,” navigated these ethnic stereotypes, contesting some, contributing to others. This chapter explores a series of ethnic stereotypes that most likely influenced the behavior of both officer and soldier alike. Spain, Gaul (including Lower and Upper Germany), Pannonia, and Thrace were the most important sources of known auxiliary recruits prior to Hadrian, while northern Gaul, the Germanies, Pannonia, and Thrace remained important sources of auxiliary recruits into the third century.\textsuperscript{255} Following this pattern of recruitment, this chapter analyzes stereotypes surrounding two important peoples who contributed to the Roman auxiliaries: the Batavians (from Lower Germany) and the Thracians. Like other

\textsuperscript{253} For literature, see Woolf (2011b), Krebs (2011). For art, see Bartman (2011), Ferris (2011).
\textsuperscript{254} Shaw (2000): 374-75.
\textsuperscript{255} Haynes (2013): 105-06.
foreign groups encountered by the Romans, these two ethnic groups were, in part, a fabrication of the imperial project, as the Romans nurtured a certain degree of martiality in these peoples, especially the Batavians.\textsuperscript{256} As will become clear, however, the auxiliary recruits from these peoples did not simply adopt a Roman-imposed martial race ideology, but rather manipulated and contributed to these ethnic stereotypes in a variety of ways.

Ethnic stereotypes, generalizing statements used to describe the behavior and character of members of a specific group of people imagined to have a shared heritage (an ethnic group),\textsuperscript{257} combine to form an overall “typical” image of the particular ethnic group, defined by Bohak as an “ethnic portrait.”\textsuperscript{258} While it is true that many ethnic portraits of certain groups tended to be negative, to deem these descriptions as “proto-racism” or to see Greco-Roman writers as the “inventors” of such ideas is perhaps a bit overstated.\textsuperscript{259} In fact, Greco-Roman writers did not construct ethnic portraits of foreign peoples merely out of the desire to depict foreigners as “others,” so as to define

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\item \textsuperscript{256} Ethnic identities are often reified by imperial power structures, legitimizing or ossifying certain groups at the expense of others; see Shaw (2014) on Africans in the Roman Empire.
\item \textsuperscript{257} Ethnicity is a much discussed topic. For a recent overview, see Herring (2009). My definition generally follows that of J. M. Hall (1997): 2, 19, 32-33 and J. M. Hall (2001): 165, who argues that ethnic identity is a social group identity (not biological), “socially constructed and subjectively perceived,” and “primarily constructed discursively and by reference to a putative shared kinship.” This discourse is primarily written or spoken, but I would argue that visual elements play a large role, as well. Hall argues that language, religion, and culture are merely secondary indicia of an ethnic identity, as ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural boundaries seldom align. His views were largely shaped by sociological theory, such as Barth (1969), who, in addition, also argues that ethnic identity is a type of status superordinate to most other statues, similar to sex and rank, which limits the range of social personalities an individual may assume.
\item \textsuperscript{258} Bohak (2005)
\item \textsuperscript{259} Isaac (2004), more concisely at Isaac (2006). Isaac argues that prototypes of racism were prevalent in Greek and Roman thinking. He defines racism as a form of rationalizing and justifying prejudice. Although he recognizes that these stereotypical views of foreign peoples may not have determined imperial policy, he nevertheless argues that these proto-racist thoughts did shape military and political decisions. For an extended critique of Isaac, see Gruen (2011), Gruen (2013a), and Gruen (2013b). Since the Romans allowed nearly all people to become citizens, then they could not have been racist, in the sense that their views affected policy, argues Millar (2005). See also Sherwin-White (1967), who emphasizes “cultural prejudice” rather than “racial prejudice.”
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themselves, as some scholars argue. Nor were ethnic portraits simply formed as literary devices or generic conventions; they were also social facts. Literary ideas and artistic portrayals of different ethnic groups had the potential to inform the ideas and behavior of their audience. Moreover, ethnic stereotypes were influenced by cross-cultural and cross-ethnic interactions between the stereotyping and the stereotyped groups, shaping, in turn, the expectations and the behavior of both parties in a variety of encounters.

In literary texts, authors used ethnic portraits for a variety of rhetorical purposes. Barbarians were “good to think with,” offering a frame of reference, an imaginative or exotic space on the edge of the known world, an anti-type of the emperor, or a rhetorical device for a joke or an invective. While each ethnic group might have a typical ethnic portrait, authors were able to emphasize individual aspects, depending on their purpose. This diversity of ethnic stereotypes and their uses demonstrates their staying power over time. Such portraits were not completely static, as they were constantly manipulated to suit the circumstances (e.g. noble savage or vicious barbarian). However, there was a fixed range of stereotypes that could be used in order for the allusions to be effective.

Many ethnic stereotypes developed during the initial contact period, when traders

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261 Gruen (2011).
262 Bohak (2005): 209
263 The following paragraph greatly relies on Woolf (2011b) and Woolf (2011a).
from the Mediterranean met new peoples and formed ethnographic knowledge through conversation and dialogue in a “middle ground,” an in-between environment of long-term accommodation, interrelations, and power equality, not yet disrupted by conquest, where cultural production and new meanings derived through creative mutual misunderstandings. While White contends that the middle ground functions as a historical description of a particular time and place as well as a process, other scholars, such as Woolf, have attempted to use this term to describe cultural interactions other than those between French traders and Indians in the Upper Country of French Canada in the early modern period (the pays d’en haut). Despite White’s protests, the term is still useful to capture processes of cultural production beyond this particular period and historical context. Of course, not all stereotypes initially formed on the middle ground. For example, Roman ethnic portraits of the Gauls developed during the wars in central Italy in the 4th-2nd century BCE, and then changed during the Roman conquest of Cisalpine Gaul and again when the Romans first fought across the Alps. Still, we must imagine many instances of early Roman and Greek traders or settlers seeking out cultural “congruences, either perceived or actual,” that “often seemed—and, indeed, were—results of misunderstandings or accidents.” These interpretations, if accepted by both sides, created a process of mutual and creative misunderstanding.

While anecdotes formed from direct observation of the ways of life of alien peoples were important, the majority of this knowledge was shaped through stories and conversations with middlemen, rather than actual interactions with foreigners.

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266 White (2006).
brokers, “Squantos” who acted as translators and guides, played a large role in creating the initial stories and characterizations of these foreign peoples. These original tales developed on the middle ground out of a mixture of the identities of the interlocutors, the nature of the encounter, and the conventions of ethnographical writing. The initial ethnic portraits had an amazing staying power, based largely on the conservatism of Greek and Latin literature, although authors were able to subtly recombine the original tropes. Nevertheless, such was the power of these initial stories that even in the fourth century CE authors still presented certain groups in terms of ethnic stereotypes of five hundred years earlier. Later authors did not have the same extensive intercultural relations to challenge these initial tales; all they could add were little anecdotes based on brief autopsy or official documents.

Can we use these ethnographic passages to assess contemporary ideas about foreign peoples? Woolf thinks not: he argues that they must be treated as “potentially cultural fossils.” He believes that texts such as Tacitus’s *Germania*, written in the late first century CE yet so reliant on tales from the initial interactions with the Germani in the late second and first centuries BCE (and with Celts/Gauls and Scythians before this), can offer only hints of how barbarians actually lived or were even regarded by Romans of Tacitus’s time: “Neither conquest nor cultural change completely effaced the tales first told of barbarians in the last generations of the republic.” While the literary sources present only one form of ethnographic knowledge, Woolf argues that contemporary

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271 Woolf (2011a): 266.
readers were capable of understanding the differences between various kinds of knowledge, such as generalized ethnographic knowledge based on written sources, mythic folk origin stories, or anecdotal knowledge based on autopsy. This was done by mentally compartmentalizing different types of knowledge (“cognitive dissonance”). Readers were able to recognize that “although distinct kinds of information might be artfully interwoven and juxtaposed...they could not properly be used to support or falsify each other.”  

But were all readers this clever? Woolf’s argument is based partly on modern parallels, concluding that since modern (educated elite?) readers can distinguish between literary stereotypes and practical experience, so could ancient readers. While ethnic portraits found in literature may not reflect the actual contemporary thought of the authors themselves (i.e. fourth-century authors didn’t believe that Gauls were really barbarians), different readers might not share the same ability of discerning literary flair from social fact. I imagine that young, inexperienced, naïve readers, particularly those whose only experience of “barbarians” came from books or artistic portrayals, would have been particularly prone to believing the stereotypes found in literature. As I argued in chapter two, when one of these educated, young, rich aristocrats was given command of an auxiliary unit full of non-citizens, the newly-minted officer would approach the group filled with ideas and expectations of behavior based overwhelmingly on his reading of ancient literature.

273 Woolf (2011b): 266. For cognitive dissonance, Woolf relies on Veyne (1988): 54-57. Woolf seems to overlook the psychological discomfort or mental stress felt by people who experience cognitive dissonance, at the heart of Festinger’s original theory; see Festinger (1957).

274 “Balkanized ethnographic knowledge of this kind and similarly fragmented views of the ‘other(s)’ were probably fairly common in antiquity as they are today,” Woolf (2011b): 266.

275 The eagerness of young auxiliary officers, based perhaps in their reading of literary texts and the deeds of great generals, could be deadly, Tac. Agr. 37.6.
Officers had to rely on literature and anecdotes for ethnographic knowledge because the Roman state never established official training manuals or military academies.\(^{276}\) While military treatises did exist and claimed to have been of great use to officers, a young man’s initial ideas regarding certain ethnic groups was shaped largely by his family and his early education.\(^{277}\) A father’s prior military experience also may have influenced his son’s perceptions of foreigners.\(^{278}\) Once able to read and write, a young Roman embarked on a primary education based mostly on texts filled with maxims and moral sayings, as well as short quotations from traditional authors such as Homer, Euripides, Virgil, and others.\(^{279}\) As one progressed into rhetorical education, one studied authors of a variety genres.\(^{280}\) As much as ethnic portraits in these texts helped an author to add color to a narrative, they also reinforced stereotypes which, in turn, may have influenced not only individuals’ understandings and beliefs regarding foreigners, but also, to a certain extent, their approach to leading soldiers of foreign origin under their command.\(^{281}\) If poems, histories, geographies, coins, columns, and arches portrayed Gauls as fierce warriors, would it be surprising if Roman governors, officers, and even auxiliary recruits themselves believed them to have been so?

The image of foreign men in Greco-Roman literature depicted some of them as

\(^{276}\) B. Campbell (1975). At least, no evidence of these have survived until today.

\(^{277}\) B. Campbell (1987). For the important role of parents and primary education in shaping one’s ideas, see Osgood (2011b) and Horster (2011).

\(^{278}\) For example, Velleius Paterculus’ father, who served as a praefectus equitum prior to his son, may have shaped his son’s initial beliefs regarding the Germans and Gauls whom he probably commanded (2.104.3).


\(^{280}\) For example, the list of ‘canonical’ authors in Quint. Inst. 10. He was writing under Domitian (r. 81-96 CE). For Roman historians (10.101-104), he praises Sallust, Livy, Servilius Nonianus, Auffidius Bassus (especially his German War), an unnamed man (probably Fabius Rusticus), and Cremutius Cordus. As Quintillian wrote before Tacitus, the famous historian does not appear on his list. His list, of course, focuses on authors who had good writing style appropriate for a student of rhetoric to study.

\(^{281}\) How much stereotypes influenced official state policy is difficult to determine. See Millar (2005) and Isaac (2006).
innately skilled in battle, whether through blood or culture.\textsuperscript{282} While these beliefs regarding ethnicity and fighting prowess may have reflected reality to a certain extent, such beliefs could, at times, be manipulated by the state or elites to further political or strategic goals, such as recruiting needs. Once established in a larger audience, this “martial race ideology” affected not only the beliefs of the Romans, but also the ideas and behaviors of the so-called “martial races” who made up the recruits of the auxiliary units.\textsuperscript{283} Yet this was not simply a top-down imposed ideology. Rather, the auxiliary soldiers themselves embraced, manipulated, perpetuated, and problematized this dynamic martial race ideology through their own actions and beliefs. This very willingness to adopt and adapt such martial stereotypes may have provided soldiers, consciously or not, a way to gain more power and prestige.\textsuperscript{284} Constantly changing, shifting in emphasis based on time and place, such ideas played a large role in auxiliary soldiers’ lives.

Soldiers who served in auxiliary units inhabited an ambiguous place in the Roman world. They were not only soldiers, but they were also overwhelmingly non-citizen provincials, often of newly conquered peoples and areas.\textsuperscript{285} New recruits had to navigate between two largely separated, yet surprisingly similar sets of expectations of their

\textsuperscript{282} Isaac (2004).
\textsuperscript{283} Enloe (1980) focuses on “ethnic soldiers” as distinct constructs by state institutions for strategic purposes. Streets (2004) focuses on “martial race” ideology in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Britain, namely the belief that some ethnic/cultural groups were biologically or culturally more predisposed to martial prowess. Her work focuses on Scottish Highlanders, Punjabi Sikhs, and Nepalese Gurkhas. Rather than seeing this ideology as a solely a construct by the military leadership, she argues that the recruits often bought into the ideology, adopting the hyper-masculine martial identity as their own. Van Driel-Murray (2003) and Van Driel-Murray (2005) adopt Enloe’s theory to the Batavians under Rome, drawing on parallels with the Gurkhas in the British Empire. Parent (2009) analyzes tribal culture and warrior traditions among Germanic, Thracian, and Mauretanian soldiers.
\textsuperscript{284} Compare how Egyptian priests under Greek and Roman control took on “stereotype appropriation” by starting to act as the colonizing alien culture believed that they should. By doing so, these priest gained power and prestige. See Frankfurter (1998): 225.
\textsuperscript{285} Romans recognized that provinces remained “barbarous” despite conquest, as when Tiberius traveled to see his dying brother Drusus in Germany “through a recently conquered barbarous country” (\textit{per modo devictam barbariam}), Val. Max. 5.5.3.
behavior, reflecting both their role as Roman soldiers and their role as non-citizen “barbarians.” Bearing in mind these beliefs regarding both the proper role of soldiers and the martial prowess of certain tribal groups, we must imagine a number of fresh, young Roman officers traveling to their posts full of purpose, resolve, and ambition. Their shock at finding their soldiers to not be the Gauls that they encountered in their reading of Caesar must have caused a large degree of anxiety, making them uncertain about how to act with their expectations unfulfilled. This anxiety gave the soldiers themselves an opportunity to shape their officers’ ideas to reflect their own views of how they should be perceived and how they should act. While Woolf’s use of the idea of cognitive dissonance might work for a well-read, educated audience, particularly one that has some real-world experience in the provinces, I argue that the likelihood of such an ability to balkanize knowledge and expectations was greatly diminished among the young, naïve, ambitious Roman military officers, those who had the most interaction with auxiliary troops, and who most likely had the greatest effect on shaping their peers’ views of such groups of peoples. How potent ethnic stereotypes found in literature were for these recruits is difficult to measure. Nevertheless, while far from uncontested, these images of barbarians may have, at the very least, shaped the initial interactions between Roman officer and auxiliary recruit, who, in turn, may have manipulated the expectations for his own ends.

3.2 Batavians: Loyal Germans?

In the summer of 70 CE, outside the Gallic city of Trier, the leaders of the so-called Batavian Revolt rallied their troops, “appealing to the Gauls to fight for freedom,
the Batavians for glory, and the Germans for plunder.”\textsuperscript{286} This passage, written by Tacitus around 109 CE, captures the ambiguous position of the Batavians in Roman thought.\textsuperscript{287} Straddling both the physical and the mental boundary between Gauls and Germans on the Lower Rhine, Batavians played a crucial role in the military of the Roman Empire, serving in the auxiliaries, the legions, the fleet, and the horseguard of the Roman emperor.\textsuperscript{288} Moreover, they remained the preeminent “martial race” of the Empire through the early second century, reserved especially for the auxiliaries and the horseguard, a status derived, in part, from their skills on horseback and, as Tacitus points out, their love of glory. Still, for the Romans, the Batavians were Germans and therefore ultimately “barbarians” on whom a range of stereotypes could be applied.

The Batavians were a people who lived near the mouth of the Rhine, between the Rhine and the Waal, in the southern part of the Netherlands around Nijmegen. They had a special military relationship with the Roman Empire and were known especially for their horsemanship.\textsuperscript{289} Their reputation as a “martial race” (or, rather, the Roman expectations surrounding them) seems to have developed gradually over time. The Batavians probably first served as cavalry under Julius Caesar in the 50s BCE\textsuperscript{290} and then

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\textsuperscript{286} Tac. Hist. 4.78.1: Tutor et Classicus et Civilis suis quisque locis pugnam ciebant, Gallos pro libertate, Batavos pro gloria, Germanos ad praedam instigantes.
\textsuperscript{287} “The Batavians occupied an intermediary position between the barbaric Germans on the one hand and the Gauls, who were receptive to Roman culture, on the other,” Roymans (2004): 226.
\textsuperscript{288} The Batavians contributed 8 cohorts and 1 ala, in addition to soldiers for the fleet and the imperial horseguard (Germani corporis custodes), Holder (1982): 113-14; Roymans (2004) argues that 8 cohorts were raised before the reign of Claudius as part of the Batavians treaty obligation to Rome, served in the invasion of Britain in 43 CE, and were withdrawn in 66 CE with legio XIV Gemina in preparation for Nero’s expedition against the Albani in the Caucasus (Tac. Hist. 2.27). These cohorts were disbanded after the revolt of Civilis in 69-70 CE. Soon thereafter, a new series of nine cohorts was raised in Lower Germany, all sent to Britain with Cerialis. Four cohorts took part at the battle of Mons Graupius in 83/4 CE (Tac. Agric. 36). Later, many cohorts were sent to other provinces; see Spaul (1994) and Spaul (2000).
\textsuperscript{289} Roymans (2004), Haynes (2013): 112-17.
\textsuperscript{290} Assuming that they contributed to the Germani in Caes. B.Gall. 7.13.1; cf. 7.65.4 and 70.2-4; B.Civ. 1.83.5 and B.Alex. 29.4; cf. Lucan. Phars. 1.431. Pompey also had Germani among his troops, Caes. B.Civ. 3.52.2, B.Afr. 19.4, 29.1. See also Roymans (2004): 56.
\end{flushright}
as mounted bodyguards for the emperor Augustus and his successors. They seem to have originated beyond the Rhine, as members of the Chatti, a Germanic tribe who lived in the area east of the Middle Rhine. They were settled in the Rhine/Meuse delta sometime between Caesar’s departure from Gaul (51 BCE) and the start of Drusus’s activities in the Rhineland (12 BCE). Similar to the settlement of other Germanic tribes from the eastern side to the western side of the Rhine, the Romans may have actively moved or allocated land to the Batavians, thereby forming a new polity of migrant and indigenous groups around an aristocratic leader and his retinue. Unlike other conquered peoples, the Batavians did not have to pay taxes to the Empire; rather, they were required to contribute a substantial number of soldiers, perhaps as many as one son per household. Hence, their relationship with Rome was predicated on their military prowess and their population size. As Rothe argues, “the role of the Batavi in the Roman army was not just an aspect of their ethnic identity, it was their ethnic identity.”

Tacitus described the Batavians’ supposed origin and relationship with Rome during his narration of their revolt in 69-70 CE:

The Batavians, while they were living beyond the Rhine, were part of the Chatti [a Germanic tribe]. Driven out by civil strife, the Batavians occupied a frontier region on the Gallic coast empty of settlers and also a nearby island, which the ocean surrounds on its front, the Rhine on its

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291 Augustus had German cavalry as personal bodyguard (Dio 55.24.7) in 5 CE, although he briefly dismissed them after the defeat of Varus in 9 CE (Suet. Aug. 49.1). Tiberius revived the German bodyguard (Tac. Ann. 1.24.2); the German bodyguard avenged Caligulus’s death (Josephus Ant. 19.1.15 (119-126)), and Nero is said to have trusted them especially since they were foreigners (Tac. Ann. 15.58.2). Inscriptions in Rome indicate their continuous presence until Galba disbanded them in 68 CE (Suet. Galb. 12.2). For more on the imperial horseguard, see M. P. Speidel (1984a) (reprinted in M. P. Speidel (1992b)), M. P. Speidel (1991), and M. P. Speidel (1994). He sees Trajan’s establishment of the equites singulares Augusti, the new imperial horseguard, in 98 CE as continuing in the tradition of drawing on Germanic tribes.

292 Tac. Germ. 29.1 and Tac. Hist. 4.12.


294 Van Driel-Murray (2003), Van Driel-Murray (2005). Willems (1986): 394-97 estimates that about 5500 Batavians were serving in the Roman army each year in the middle of the 1st century, requiring about 1.2 men per household every 20 years, implying about 4000 to 6000 households, totally about 30,000 to 40,000 people.

back and sides. Their resources remained intact (a rare thing to occur in an alliance with more powerful men), and they supply only men and weapons to the Empire. After having been trained for a long time by the German wars, soon their reputation was increased by [wars in] Britain, where their cohorts had been sent, which, according to an ancient arrangement, the noblest of their fellow people commanded. There also was a picked troop of horsemen in their home country, with a particular eagerness for swimming, because of which they could burst through the Rhine in unbroken squadrons without losing their weapons and horses. [13] Julius Paulus and Julius Civilis, of royal heritage, surpassed by far the others.296

Similarly, in his ethnography of the peoples and geography of Germania written around 98 CE, Tacitus also indicated the Batavians’ privileged status in the Empire:

Foremost in valor of all these peoples [Germans who live near the Rhine], the Batavians inhabit some of the riverbank and an island in the Rhine. They were once a people of the Chatti, but because of civil strife they crossed into their present lands, where they were to become a part of the Roman Empire. An honorable mark of their long-standing alliance remains, for they are not insulted with tribute or worn down by the tax collector: exempt from the burden of taxes and levies and set aside for use in battle, like weapons and arms they are reserved for wars.297

Tacitus’s characterization of the Batavians is notable for two reasons. First, it implies that the Batavians were believed to be Germans, suggesting that all stereotypes associated with Germans could also be applied to the Batavians. Moreover, the Batavians were believed to be “foremost in valor” (virtute praecipui), characterized “as if they were reserved like weapons and arms put aside for war” (sepositi velut tela atque arma bellis reservantur). They were also thought to be a “warlike race” (ferox gens).298 A brief examination of Roman stereotypes surrounding Germans may help put these characterizations of the Batavians in context. While the range of stereotypes that could


298 Tac. Hist. 1.59
be applied to Germans was limited, different authors emphasized different attributes for their own political, moral, and literary purposes. This ability to manipulate stereotypes within the literary realm may suggest that a similar range of stereotypes was applied to Germans in the real world, including auxiliary soldiers of imagined or real Germanic descent, with certainly qualities emphasized depending on the situation.

The Germans (or Germani) had a special place in the Roman imagination. The exact nature of the development of the differentiation between Celts/Gauls and Germans in Greek and Roman thought is debated, with some arguing that Posidonius, writing in the 70s or 60s BCE, was the first to see the Germans as a separate group.²⁹⁹ From the Augustan period onwards, Roman authors always regarded Cimbri as Germans, driven largely by ideological considerations for classifying them as such.³⁰⁰ Although Caesar’s account of the Germans in his commentaries on the Gallic War written in the 50s BCE is the earliest extant text to identify the Cimbri as Germans,³⁰¹ the lost works of Marius, written in the late second or early first century BCE and the source of Plutarch’s Life of Marius written in the early second century CE, may have provided the first Roman ethnography of the Germans as a distinct people.³⁰² Plutarch offered a glimpse of what may have been a larger ethnographic description of the Germans:

Moreover, their courage and daring made them irresistible, and when they engaged in battle they came on with the swiftness and force of fire, so that no one could withstand their onset, but all who came in their way became their prey and booty, and even many large Roman armies, with their commanders, who had been stationed to protect Transalpine Gaul, were destroyed ingloriously.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ See Rives (1999): 21-24, who argues that Posidonius’s Germanoi were the Germani of north-eastern Gaul described by Tac. Germ. 2.3 who crossed the Rhine.
³⁰⁰ Rives (1999): 271-73, who argues that it is impossible to determine with certainty whether the Cimbri of the second century BCE were Celtic or Germanic.
³⁰¹ Caes. B.Gall. 1.33.4, 40.5.
³⁰² Plut. Vit.Mar. 11.2-7, in which he argues that the Cimbri and Teutones were Germans, not Gallo-Scythians or Cimmerians, as other ancient authors thought.
³⁰³ Plut. Vit.Mar. 11.8 (Loeb trans.); see also 16.2-3 and 19.1-7 (on the Ambrones).
Such emphasis on courage and military prowess, if ultimately derived from Marius, largely shaped later descriptions of the Germans, as well.

Caesar’s account of the Germans in his commentaries on the Gallic War provides us with the first surviving image of the Germans as a distinct, large-scale ethnic group in Roman thought. Caesar’s image of the Germans was shaped, in part, by the Roman desire to order and restructure the other. Krebs labels this Roman discourse about the Germanic north “Borealism,” based on Said’s “Orientalism,” both “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and...‘the Occident’” and “the Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.” Moreover, Roman descriptions of Germans were informed by the typical Greco-Roman image of Celts and Scythians, as well as early climatological and astrological theories about the appearance and behaviors of peoples.

While Caesar’s political motives in justifying his intervention in Gaul were at the heart of his description of the Germans, the image he provided, adapted from an earlier tradition, nevertheless had significant staying power. In book one, Germans are called “wild and uncivilized” men (feri ac barbari) who could easily invade Italy, as the Cimbri and Teutoni had done before; this of course allowed Caesar to present himself as the successor of Marius, who defeated these tribes and protected Italy. Rumors spread by Gauls and merchants about the Germans’ enormous size, amazing courage, splendid military training, and fierce appearance in battle caused immense fear among Caesar’s

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304 Invasion: Tac. Germ. 37.
307 Caes. B.Gall. 1.31.5, 33.4; cf. 6.10.2: “uncivilized and ignorant men” (barbaros atque imperitos homines), referring to the Suebi.
While Caesar placated his fearful soldiers, he still recognized the German skill at cavalry and infantry tactics. Ariovistus, the king of the German Suebi, is said to have boasted of German valor, invincibility, and military training. Yet Ariovistus was not a typical barbarian, according to Caesar; he used strategy and an invocation of past Roman policy rather than merely bravery to defeat the Gauls.

Caesar’s interactions with ambassadors from the German Usipetes and Tencteri tribes who crossed the Rhine in 55 BCE also gave him the opportunity to expand the stereotypes surrounding Germans. Caesar claimed that the German ambassadors held it as customary to never run away. Although they were still engaged in negotiations with Caesar, these Germans attacked a Roman cavalry group who greatly outnumbered them; nevertheless, the Germans won. With renewed negotiations, Caesar characterized the Germans as approaching with “treachery and deceit” (et perfidia et simulatione). Having presented the justification for his response, Caesar proceeded to imprison their ambassadors, attack their camp, enslave their women and children, slaughter most of the men, and receive others as prisoners or perhaps troops. Not all Romans approved of Caesar’s behavior, though, as Cato called for Caesar to be handed over to the Germans in

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308 ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitacione in armis esse praedicabant - saepenumero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse -, tantus subito timor omnem exercitum occupavit, ut non mediocriter omnium mentes animosque perturbaret, Caes. B.Gall. 1.39.1.
309 Caes. B.Gall. 1.48.
310 quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis, qui inter annos XIII tectum non subissent, virtute posse, Caes. B.Gall. 1.36.7.
311 magis ratione et consilio quam virtute, Caes. B.Gall. 1.40.8; cf. 1.44.9, where Ariovistus claims in a letter that he was “not so barbarian-like nor so ignorant” (non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum).
312 Caes. B.Gall. 4.7.3.
313 Caes. B.Gall. 4.11-12.
314 Caes. B.Gall. 4.13.4.
315 Caes. B.Gall. 4.13.6-15.5.
return for his violation of the truce.\footnote{316}{Plut. Vit. Caes. 22.4.}

Caesar’s characterization of Ariovistus and the Usipetes and Tencteri, however, does not fully capture the range of stereotypes concerning Germans. It is in his brief ethnographic digressions on the Suebi in book four and on the Germans as a whole in book six that especially shaped later Roman views on the Germans. Caesar provided an ethnographic description of the Suebi, in part focalized through the ambassadors of the Ubii, largely to justify why he decided to forego attacking the Suebi across the Rhine.\footnote{317}{The Suebi twice awaited Caesar’s attack (Caes. B.Gall. 4.19 and 6.10), and twice Caesar refused to attack them, the second time for fear of lack of grain (6.29).}

The Suebi were “the greatest and most warlike of all the Germans.”\footnote{318}{Sueborum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium, Caes. B.Gall. 4.1.3.}

Their entire social and economic structure was designed to support their warriors who fought on campaigns.\footnote{319}{The agricultural cycle and troop rotation was such that there was no interruption in warfare (Caes. B.Gall. 4.1.4-6).}

Like other northern barbarians, the Suebi had no sense of private property or settled agriculture, instead living on milk, beef, and hunting.\footnote{320}{Caes. B.Gall. 4.1.7-8. Compare Herodotus’s image of the Scythians in book four of his Histories.}

Caesar argued that their diet, daily exercise, “the freeness of their lifestyle,” and the fact that boys grew up with “no duty or discipline” made their strength increase and their bodies huge, an alternative view to that of other writers who stressed the environmental impact on the body.\footnote{321}{quae res et cibi genere et cotidiana exercitatione et libertate vitae, quod a pueris nullo officio aut disciplina adsuefcati nihil omnino contra voluntatem facunt, et vires alit et inmani corporum magnitudine homines efficit, Caes. B.Gall. 4.1.9. Cf. Vitr. De arch. 6.1.3-11 (mid 1\textsuperscript{st} c. BCE) on the environmental impact on bodies and cultural practices.}

Moreover, Caesar highlighted aspects of their culture that related to warfare and expressions of
power. They traded only to sell spoils of war, rather than acquire imports.\textsuperscript{323} In cavalry battles, they often dismounted and fought on foot, and they loathed those who used saddles.\textsuperscript{324} Unlike the Gauls, they did not import wine, for fear that it would make men “soft and weak [literally ‘womanly’] at enduring hardship.”\textsuperscript{325} They also believed that the amount of empty land surrounding their borders demonstrated their power.\textsuperscript{326}

Yet it is Caesar’s ethnographic digression on the Germans in book six, in stark contrast to the Gauls, that provides us with our best image of the Roman ethnic portrait of the Germans.\textsuperscript{327} Unlike the Gauls, who were divided into factions and classes, the Germans were seen to be united for war. With no druids, no sacrifices, nor an elaborate array of gods beyond the sun, moon, and fire, the Germans instead devoted their life to hunting, military activities, and hard work.\textsuperscript{328} Raiding outside their borders was commended as a good form of exercise and as a way to prevent laziness.\textsuperscript{329} Even their sexual practices were shaped by the desire to be the best in warfare; chastity was believed to increase height, strength, and muscles.\textsuperscript{330} Again, simple lifestyles were emphasized by Caesar: animal skins for clothing, bathing in rivers, no settled agriculture, a diet of milk, cheese, and meat, no private property, and a consistent desire to maintain unity, wealth equality, and military prowess by moving their settlements often.\textsuperscript{331} Guests were deemed

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 4.2.1.
\item Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 4.2.3-5.
\item \textit{quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitrantur,} Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 4.2.5.
\item Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 4.3.1. This practice was adopted by the Romans to symbolize their frontiers; see Potter (1992).
\item Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 6.21-24. Previous to this was his ethnographic digression on the Gauls, Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 6.11-20.
\item \textit{vita omnis in venationibus atque in studiis rei militaris consistit; a parvis labori ac duriitiae student,} Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 6.21.3. This is slightly in contrast to the characterization of the Suebi youth in Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 4.1.9.
\item Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 6.23.6.
\item Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 6.21.4.
\item Caes. \textit{B. Gall.} 6.21.5-22.4, 23.7-8.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
sacrosanct and given shelter and food.\textsuperscript{332} Deserted areas around their territory indicated their power but also created a sense of safety for the community.\textsuperscript{333} Yet Caesar did not believe that peoples were frozen in one state; he recognized cultural change, arguing that at one point the Gauls surpassed the Germans in valor and had invaded the area beyond the Rhine.\textsuperscript{334} Caesar attributed this change to the Gallic desire for imported luxuries and their proximity to Roman territory, a literary trope of decadence and decline common in the Late Republic\textsuperscript{335}

Due to the civil wars of the late first century BCE, Roman interactions with Germans may have decreased for a time. With the victory of Augustus over his rivals, however, Germans re-entered the Roman imagination, no doubt shaping later stereotypes.\textsuperscript{336} Before Tacitus’s ethnographic study of the Germans in 98 CE, other authors wrote major works involving the Germans, many of which do not survive in their entirety. Livy began his (now lost) narrative of Caesar’s Gallic wars with a description of the geography and customs of the Germans.\textsuperscript{337} Velleius Paterculus’s brief account of Tiberius’s defeat of the Langobardi in 5 CE describes them as “a tribe fiercer than the usual German ferocity.”\textsuperscript{338} He, too, recognized that barbarians could surpass their origin through education, characterizing Maroboduus, king of the German Marcomanni, as

\textsuperscript{332} Caes. \textit{B.Gall.} 6.23.9.
\textsuperscript{333} Caes. \textit{B.Gall.} 6.23.1-3.
\textsuperscript{334} Caes. \textit{B.Gall.} 6.24.1.
\textsuperscript{335} Caes. \textit{B.Gall.} 6.24.5.
\textsuperscript{336} For Roman-German interactions after Caesar until Tacitus, see Rives (1999): 27-35. Germans served in both Octavian’s and Antony’s horseguards; see M. P. Speidel (1994): 15-18. They continued to serve in the horseguard and auxiliaries under the early emperors.
\textsuperscript{337} \textit{Prima pars libri situm Germaniae moresque continet}, Livy \textit{Per.} 104.1. His account of Drusus’s campaigns against the Germans in 12-9 BCE in books 139 to 142 may also have contained descriptions of Germans.
\textsuperscript{338} \textit{gens etiam Germana feritate ferocior}, Vell. Pat. 2.106.2. Note Woodman (1977): ad loc., “in the reminiscences of an old soldier we could hardly expect anything but a conventional reaction to foreign peoples.”
“noble in background, distinguished in body, fierce in spirit, barbarian more by birth than by mentality” and Arminius, rebel leader of the Cherusci and a former auxiliary in the Roman army, as intelligent beyond that of the usual barbarian, similar to Caesar’s Ariovistus. Just as Caesar depicted the Suebi as challenging enemies, so, too, did Velleius depict the Marcomanni soldiers as brought almost to the standard of Roman discipline through continuous training. In his description of the events leading up to Varus’s crushing defeat in Germany in 9 CE, Velleius offered his most damning ethnic portrait of the Germans. The Germans lulled Varus into complacency by bringing bogus lawsuits before him and claiming that he was resolving their differences through law rather than their customary way of warfare. Yet Velleius saw this as a ruse: “Now the Germans are—a fact that can hardly be believed by anyone except someone who has experienced them—totally cunning, absolutely ferocious, and a race born to lie.”

Despite their apparent adoption of Roman legal norms, Germans were ultimately considered untrustworthy and manipulative of Roman administrative practices.

After Varus’s defeat, authors began to emphasize the deceitfulness and the savagery of the Germans, challenging, in many ways, Caesar’s image of disciplined, yet simplistic warriors. Other lost histories on the Germans and German wars, such as those

339 Maroboduus, genere nobilis, corpore praevalens, animo ferox, natione magis quam ratione barbarus, Vell. Pat. 2.108.2. He was educated in Rome under Augustus (Strabo 7.1.3).
341 Corpus suum custodientium imperium, perpetuis exercitiis paene ad Romanae disciplinae formam redactum, Vell. Pat. 2.109.1; cf. Livy 4.37.7: disciplinae Romanae plus in Volsco exercitu quam in Romanos esset.
342 at illi, quod nisi expertus uix credat, in summa feritate versutissimi natumque mendacio genus, Vell. Pat. 2.181.1. His claims of authority due to his experience in the military and on the frontiers are nicely placed, but somewhat hard to believe: “As so often in V., truth lies behind the literary convention,” Woodman (1977): 192. Cf. Livy 38.17.15.
by Aufidius Bassus and Pliny the Elder, may have also contributed to German stereotypes.\textsuperscript{343} Still, these stereotypes were commonplace in other literature, suggesting that a wide range of Romans shared views on the Germans, with authors highlighting or diminishing different characteristics depending on their goal. Overall, though, poets,\textsuperscript{344} geographers,\textsuperscript{345} philosophers,\textsuperscript{346} and historians\textsuperscript{347} of the early Empire all described Germans as fierce, wild, large, and warlike barbarians.

Tacitus’s \textit{Germania} (98 CE), largely agreed to be a generally ahistorical ethnographic monograph, used Caesar’s description of the Germans as a starting point but instead emphasized their impulsive, emotional behavior, while Caesar emphasized their disciplined devotion to war.\textsuperscript{348} While in many ways Tacitus’s Germans were a

\textsuperscript{344} For example, the adjective \textit{ferus} (“barbarous, aggressive”) became an epithet for Germans among poets; other “Borealic” stereotypes were also attached to Germans; see Virg. \textit{G.} 1.474 and 509, Hor. \textit{Epod.} 16.7, \textit{Carm.} 4.5.26, Ox. \textit{Tr.} 4.2.1, \textit{Pont.} 2.8.39 and 47, 3.4.97, Manil. 1.899, Lucan 1.256-7 and 483, Mart. 14.176, Juv. 13.164.
\textsuperscript{345} Strabo 7.1.2-5 (C290-92) argued that the Germans varied slightly from the Gauls, being wilder, taller, and having yellower hair, but similar in respect to body type, habits, modes of life, and lack of settlements, claiming that Roman knowledge of the Germans was increased by Drusus’s campaigns in the late first century BCE. In his description of ancient Gallic modes of life, which he equates with contemporary German ones (4.4.2-5 (C195-98), deriving in part from Posidonius), he emphasized their military prowess, eagerness for war, simplicity, witlessness, and barbarous and exotic customs. Pomponius Mela 3.26-28 (writing c. 43/4 CE), seemingly following Caesar, described the Germans as courageous, naturally ferocious, who exercised their bodies by hard work and cold climate, their minds by war. They also lived simply, enjoyed swimming, and waged war out of sheer pleasure. They found banditry acceptable, yet lived an uncivilized lifestyle eating raw or frozen meet thawed by their own hands. For other geographers, see Rives (1999): 38-41.
\textsuperscript{346} Sen. \textit{Ira} 1.11.2-3 (stressing the destructive nature of anger): “Who are more courageous than the Germans? Who is more eager for the attack? Who loves weapons more, among which they are born and nourished, which is their only care neglecting all else? Who are more hardened to every type of endurance, since they are largely provided with no covering for their bodies, no refuge against the continual severity of the climate?” (\textit{Germanis quid est animosius? Quid ad incursum acrius? Quid armorum cupidius, quibus innascuntur inmuriunturque, quorum unica ills cura est in alia neglegentibus? Quid induratius ad omnem patientiam, ut quibus magna ex parte non tegimenta corporum provisa sint, non suffugia adversus perpetuum caeli rigorem?}); cf. 2.15.1-4, where the Germans and Scythians are characterized as both free peoples and the angriest peoples.
\textsuperscript{347} Jos. \textit{AJ} 19.120 and 215: German bodyguard avenging the murder of Caligula; Germans have a “innate passion” (\textit{θυμῷ δὲ χρῆσθαι πάτριον ἐπὶ τούς αὐτοῖς}) like other barbarians, not thinking about their actions, but also “robust in body” (\textit{ῥωμαλέοι τε τοῖς σώμασι}) and wanted to avenge Caligula to satisfy their own savagery (\textit{ὠμότης}) rather than the public good. Jos. \textit{BJ} 7.77 (describing the Batavian Revolt of 69-70 CE): Germans attempted to revolt in part because of their rash nature.
\textsuperscript{348} “Disciplined warriors have morphed into impetuous hotheads,” Krebs (2011): 207. Krebs argues that
primitive version of the Romans of the idealized past, they also had negative, impulsive behaviors: “Tacitus consistently depicts the Germani as brave, warlike, and strongly attached to freedom, but also savage, impulsive, and governed by strong emotions instead of discipline and reason.” For example, in contrast to Caesar’s depiction of Germans as valuing hard work, Tacitus claimed that Germans had “bodies that are big but strong only for an attack. They lack the same endurance for work and toils, and they scarcely tolerate thirst and heat, but to cold and hunger their climate and poor soil have made them accustomed.” Also, in contrast to Caesar’s description of Germans engaging in hunting while not acting as warriors, Tacitus emphasized their almost animal-like shift from warriors to lazy, do-nothings:

Whenever they are not waging war, they spend a little time hunting but much more time relaxing, devoting themselves to sleeping and eating. All the bravest and most warlike men do nothing, since the care of hearth, home, and fields is left to the women, the old men, and to all the weakest members of the family; they themselves lounge about—an astonishing inconsistency in their nature, since the same men love idleness as much as they hate peace.

Tacitus follows Seneca’s description of impetuous Germans, emphasizing nature over nurture and contributing to the “borealistic” discourse about peoples from the north, perhaps in an attempt to show them as weaker, more conquerable, in effect, urging Trajan on.

Quotiens bella non ineunt, non multum venatibus, plus per otium transigunt, dediti somno ciboque, fortissimus quisque ac bellicosissimus nihil agens, delegata domus et penatium et agrorum cura feminis senibusque et infirmissimo cuique ex familia: ipsi hebet, mira diversitate naturae, cum idem homines sic ament inertiam et oderint quietem, Tac. Germ. 15.1; cf. Caes. B.Gall. 6.21.3. Animal-like devotion to sleep and food, cf. Sall. Cat. 2.8. Some editors have deleted non in non multum as a copyist’s error, yet it is clear that Tacitus meant to emphasize the lack of activity of Germans when not engaged in warrior; see Rives (1999): 188-89 and Krebs (2011): 205-06.
Most likely deliberately, Tacitus used the verb *hebeo* “to be blunt; to be sluggish” to describe the surprising shift in German warrior behavior—a veiled reference, perhaps, to the Roman image of Batavians and other Germans as “weapons put aside for war.”

When not in battle, Germans acted as if they were blunt weapons, lying about useless. As discussed in chapter two, Romans believed that soldiers needed to be able to endure hard work and disciplined labor. Tacitus’s portrayal may suggest that some auxiliary officers may have also believed that their German auxiliary soldiers were lazy and hotheaded.

After the death of the emperor Nero in 68 CE, a civil war ensued, and the Batavians, under the former auxiliary commander and Batavian nobleman Julius Civilis, led a major revolt against Rome, partially in response to the over-conscription of Batavian soldiers. Tacitus’s narrative of this revolt in the *Histories* characterizes the war as a confusing mix between a foreign and a civil war. As with other literary responses to civil war, Tacitus’s wrote his account with a moralizing twist, often characterizing some participants as foreign invaders, helping the reader to comprehend the complex civil war in terms of morally flawed outsiders: “In defining their dubious conduct against an idealised model of Roman identity, Tacitus (however counterintuitively) positively bolsters his readers’ sense of what it means to be...
The Batavians in this conflict, and especially Civilis, often displayed elements of both Roman and barbarian qualities. Civilis, like other barbarian leaders, was “far cleverer in character than most barbarians,” due in part to his twenty-five years of service in the Roman auxiliaries. His rousing, Roman-like speech highlighting the justification for their uprising ends with a barbarian loyalty oath ceremony. He persuaded Gauls to join his alliance by emphasizing that the Romans had no regard for their provincials: “It is with the blood of provincials that their provinces are won.” Yet he also claimed that the Batavians and the Gauls, not the Romans, were now unified under military discipline, bravery, and the pursuit of liberty, ideal Roman concepts.

But Civilis and his compatriots were still hotheaded and he even grew his hair long, having dyed it red, as a sign of an oath common to barbarians (according to Tacitus).

He makes a naval display before the Romans, partly because of the “typical vanity of his race” (super insitam genti vanitatem). Still, even Civilis could not always control his “savage” German allies. Other instances throughout the narrative highlight the barbarian yet also very Roman tendencies of the Batavians, perhaps more a reflection of Tacitus’s moralizing methods than historical events. Yet the fact that he could do so confirms the varied views that Romans would have deployed regarding barbarians and “barbarian” auxiliary recruits.

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358 ultra quam barbaris solitum ingenio sollers, Tac. Hist. 4.13.2. Twenty-five years of military service: Tac. Hist. 4.32.2. Again, this is a common literary trope.
360 provinciarum sanguine provincias vinci, Tac. Hist. 4.17.2.
361 Tac. Hist. 4.17.
362 quae ubi relata Civili, incensus ira universam Batavorum gentem in arma rapit, Tac. Hist. 4.21.2
363 Tac. Hist. 4.61.1.
364 Tac. Hist. 5.23.2.
365 querente sane Civile et increpante Germanos, tamquam fidem per scelus abrumpere, simulata ea fuerint an retinere saevientes nequiverit, parum adfirmatur, Tac. Hist. 4.60.2-3
Despite these negative stereotypes, loyalty and courage were also seen as positive features of Germans. Tacitus argued that Germanic peoples who had settled in Roman territory were proud of their Germanic heritage, such as the Treveri and Neverii, or, at least, were not ashamed of it, such as the Ubii, even though they lived in the Roman colony of Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium. In Annals, Tacitus emphasized the loyalty of the Batavian cavalry under Chariovalda, who, along with other Batavian nobles, died honorably during Germanicus’s campaigns east of the Rhine in 16 CE. He deliberately juxtaposed the Batavian loyalty to the disloyalty of Arminius, a former auxiliary commander and leader of the Cherusci, whose speech emphasizes German ancestral land rights and freedom. German Frisians brag of German prowess in battle and loyalty. Suetonius even highlighted the “immense loyalty through many trials” of the imperial bodyguard of Germans, which Galba cashiered. Tacitus, too, noted instances of Batavians remaining loyal to Rome amidst the Batavian revolt, although he attributed personal, anti-Civilis motives to them rather than some grander notion of devotion to Rome. Right before his narrative cuts off, Tacitus placed contrite feelings

366 Tac. Germ. 28.4.
367 Tac. Ann. 2.8, 11. Cf. Tacitus’s treatment of Italus, prince of the Cherusci (11.16-18), Gannascus, Chauci leader/traitor under Claudius who had served in the auxiliaries (11.18-19), and Boiocalus, leader of the Ampsivarii, serving in the auxiliaries and helping Rome for 50 years (13.55-56); “These three episodes taken together may reveal the private opinion of Tacitus as a Roman senator—mostly concealed in the rest of the Annals—that barbarians were only admirable when they were on your side, and not always even then,” Sherwin-White (1967): 46-47.
368 Tac. Ann. 2.9-10.
369 Tac. Ann. 13.54.
371 Claudius Labeo, a Batavian aristocrat (we assume) and a prefect of an ala Batavorum, opposed Civilis because of some “petty municipal dispute” (oppidano certamine, Tac. Hist. 4.18.4; see also 4.56.3, 66, 70.2). Julius Briganticus, a Batavian aristocrat, also a prefect of an ala Singularium (“select” cavalry, but not solely of Batavians, Tac. Hist. 4.22.3 and 70.2), was the son of Civilis’s sister who hated his uncle and a loyal ally of Rome (Tac. Hist. 4.70.2, 5.21.1). He died when Civilis and Classicus attacked the Roman auxiliaries at Vada and Grinnes (Tac. Hist. 5.21.1). A Batavian deserter also helps Cerialis gain a tactical advantage over the Germans (Tac. Hist. 5.18).
into the mouths of the Batavian common people and nobles who regretted supporting Civilis in the revolt, recognizing their special status among Roman allies as compared to other provincials: “From us they levy no tribute, only our martiality and our men. That is the closest thing to freedom” (*sibi non tributa, sed virtutem et viros indici. proximum id libertati*). 372

After the Batavian revolt, the Romans continued to raise Batavian units and recruit auxiliaries from the Batavian homeland to fill those units, even into the early second century, a practice unusual for this period. 373 Batavians were often commanded by their own noblemen, unlike other auxiliary units, and it is likely that they maintained this privilege, including their exemption from paying taxes, until sometime in the early 100s. 374 Batavians also continued to appear in the reformed horseguard, the *equites singulares Augusti*, most likely created by Trajan in 98 CE. 375 Roman military necessity seems to have outweighed a sense of revenge or even negative stereotypes regarding barbarians, and, given Tacitus’s narrative as we have it, the Romans most likely placed most of the blame for the revolt on Civilis himself.

Yet a clear tension existed between the image and reality of the Batavian experience. 376 The degree to which Batavians identified as Germans, or were thought to

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372 Tac. *Hist.* 5.25.1-3, quote from 5.25.2.
373 Van Driel-Murray (2009) argues that the majority of recruits to Batavian units were from their home region or sons of local veterans of Batavian origins into the early second century CE. For Batavian units, see Spaul (1994) and Spaul (2000). For individual Batavian auxiliaries in Batavian units, see Derks (2009): 277-80, table B, nos. 19, 21, 25, 26, 28, 31, and 38.
374 van Rossum (2004), who argues that due to a shortage of recruits and more external recruits after the transfer of the Batavian units to the Danube during the Dacian Wars of Trajan, the policy of Batavian-only commanders was revised. This change was also tied the changed status of the Batavian *civitas* in the same period. For Batavian prefects after the Batavian Revolt, see Derks (2009): 281, table D, nos. 2-5, 7, 11-14.
376 “Batavian identity was shaped in the forcefield between internal and external perception – between self-image and the image formed by outsiders – and was then named and appropriated as their own,” Roymans (2004): 221.
be Germans, is difficult to assess, as German ethnicity, as a Roman construct, is rarely visible in Batavian-made sources, although public inscriptions and iconography give us some clues. While many stereotypes surrounding Germans were negative, others were more ambiguous, perhaps even positive, especially for soldiers serving in the auxiliaries. Roymans, in his extensive monograph exploring Batavian identity, argues for a number of aspects of the Batavian self-image, created in concert with Roman expectations.

First, their identity was that of a military people, reinforced through the long-term, large-scale recruitment of soldiers, their professional income, their depictions of themselves as cavalrymen on tombstones, and the deposition of weapons earned in military service in graves and religious sanctuaries. As one of the primary suppliers of soldiers for the Germanic bodyguard of the Julio-Claudian emperors, and later the *equites singulares Augusti*, they may have felt a great degree of honor, maintaining their unusual Greek names as markers of their special status even into the second century. Public memorials of their alliance with Rome found in Nijmegen, such as a statue of Julius Caesar and a column for Tiberius, suggest that, at least at the elite or public level, Batavians valued their relationship with Rome. In addition, the Batavians may have tried

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377 “It is safe to assume that every Batavian soldier who served in the Roman army was familiar with the Roman clichés regarding Germans: the army was the context par excellence in which they were constantly confronted with this image. The Romans wanted to see the Batavians as Germani. This was particularly true of the Rome-based bodyguard of the Julio-Claudian emperors, which was expected to correspond to the clichéd image of fearsome Germanic warriors. They regularly presented themselves as Germans to the Roman public. In their grave inscriptions, however, they emphasised only their tribal identity. Whether the Batavians were happy with the imposed ‘German’ label is doubtful, given the negative barbarian connotations of the term in Roman ethnic discourse. In any event, we note that Lower Rhine auxiliary horsemen had themselves portrayed on their gravestones as Roman cavalry who overwhelmed their barbarian opponents, thereby distancing themselves emphatically from the barbarian ‘other,’” Roymans (2004): 221.

378 Roymans (2004): 221.

379 For the life-cycle and distribution of Roman weapons in Batavian territory, see Roymans (2004): fig. 10.6-7.

380 A. R. Birley (2001): 257-58, following Bellen (1981). Birley argues that a number of the Greek names found at Vindolanda may also be Batavian soldiers rather than slaves or freedmen.
to counter the negative German stereotypes by emphasizing the inclusive elements of Roman identity, especially in first-century auxiliary soldiers’ gravestones and their imagery that emphasized their Roman qualities conquering barbarian enemies (see figure 1).
Yet the Batavians also seemed to integrate their mytho-history within the broader cosmology of the Roman Empire, especially pointing to their mythical founder Hercules. Still, numerous Batavian soldiers through the second and early third century continued to identify themselves as Batavian in epigraphy, especially when serving away from home, and there is evidence that a number of Batavian soldiers returned home after completing their service, perhaps reinforcing a distinct Batavian martial identity. One military diploma from 113 CE shows that the retired auxiliary infantryman, Marcus Ulpius Fronto, son of Pero, and his wife, Mattua, daughter of Silvanus, were both Batavian, suggesting that they had met before he joined or while he was on leave. He had served in the cohors I Batavorum which was stationed mostly in Pannonia. Along with their three daughters, Vagatra, Sureia, and Sata, they settled in a civilian settlement near the fort at Kumpfmühl, near Castra Regina (Regensburg), neither his place of service nor their homeland. Despite the cohort’s probable involvement in Trajan’s Dacian Wars, he and his family somehow managed to maintain a sense of Batavian family life in the Roman auxiliaries.

The Batavians’ long history of military service in the Roman military, their continued recruitment of men from their homeland, and the privilege of having their own aristocratic officers all contributed to their sense of identity as both Batavians and soldiers. The Batavian ethnic identity was formed in large part by a Roman ideology

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381 Roymans (2004): fig. 10.2-3.
382 Roymans (2004): ch. 11.
383 Derks (2009): 277-80, table B.
385 RMD 2.86.
386 Spaul (2000): 211.
387 Roymans (2004), Derks (2009), Roymans (2009), and Willems and Enckevort (2009).
of “martial races” or “ethnic soldiers.” In other words, the Batavians were thought to possess some inborn military character, ready to be shaped by their Roman masters into loyal, courageous troops, similar to the creation of a Gurkha military identity under the British Empire in the 19th century.\textsuperscript{388} As part of this process, Roman preconceived expectations of Batavian military ability were adopted and promoted by the Batavians themselves. Given the often negative stereotypes surrounding Germans, however, we must imagine that many Batavian auxiliaries, like their imperial horseguard counterparts in Rome, would have actively challenged traditional Roman views. Unfortunately, these challenges, whether intentional or not, have largely been lost to history. While the overwhelming view of elite Roman literary texts must have greatly shaped the expectations of Roman officers in command of Batavian and other Germanic auxiliaries, the soldiers themselves, through subtle everyday strategies, some more direct than others, challenged and reinforced these stereotypes in their own varied ways.

3.3 Thracians: Mountainmen and Bandits

Mountainmen, according to Greek and Roman thought, were a “separate and special kind of people,” in part due to thinking about the impact of the environment on people.\textsuperscript{389} Yet they were also considered dangerous, requiring, perhaps, that they be conquered and conscripted, with military service thought to act as a “safety valve” for

\textsuperscript{388} Van Driel-Murray (2003) and Roymans (2004): 221-34. Haynes (2013): 113 reluctantly accepts that the term “martial race” may be applied to how the Romans thought about the Batavians, although he (perhaps rightly) points out that those peoples considered “martial races” under empires tended to be those who willingly collaborated with the imperial power. Note how he criticizes (at p. 136) the use of this term to describe how Romans thought about and maintained recruits for units formed from Syrian tribes and peoples.

alpine aggression.\textsuperscript{390} One of the most prominent peoples known for banditry in antiquity, who also contributed greatly to the Roman auxiliaries from their mountain-dwelling tribes, were the Thracians.\textsuperscript{391} Like the Batavians, they, too, contributed numerous auxiliary units and soldiers during the course of the early Empire, due to both their supposed martiality and to their large population.\textsuperscript{392} And like the Batavians and the Germans, the Thracians were a Mediterranean construct, a label applied to a wide variety of peoples believed to have shared similar origins or customs, and who also had a distinct ethnic portrait. While there is no direct evidence for the Romans considering Thracians a “martial race” reserved for warfare, nor is there clear evidence of Thracians contributing only troops and not tribute, nevertheless, given their ethnic portrait as found in literary evidence, combined with their importance as a source of auxiliary troops and the indications of their continuing sense of self-identity even after years of military service, Thracian soldiers in many ways continued to contribute to their reputation as a people known for their military prowess.

The idea of Thrace was a Greek construct, repeated by later authors, a catch-all term for numerous tribes and peoples who were believed to have similar customs and practices.\textsuperscript{393} Yet authors did recognize separate tribes, as Herodotus (5\textsuperscript{th} c. BCE)

\textsuperscript{390} For “safety valve,” see Lenski (1999), focusing on the Isaurians. He wrote in response to Shaw (1990); see also Shaw (1984).

\textsuperscript{391} Zahariade (2009) gathers all the literary and epigraphic evidence for Thracians and their service in the auxiliaries, including a history of the relationship between Rome and Thracians.

\textsuperscript{392} Thrace provided at least 22 to a maximum of 26 cohorts (20 \textit{Thracum}, 2 \textit{Bessorum}; 16 of these are armoured, about 8 to 12 \textit{alae} (including 3 \textit{alae Gallorum et Thracum}), all raised at different dates; see Zahariade (2009), Spaul (1994), and Spaul (2000). Of course, not all of these units comprised entirely men from Thrace. \textit{CIL} 8.9381 = \textit{ILS} 2763 (early 3\textsuperscript{rd} c. CE?) records 1,000 Bessian recruits sent to \textit{Mauretania Tingitana}; see M. P. Speidel (1977) and M. P. Speidel (1973) (reprinted in M. P. Speidel (1984b)). Large population: Herod. 5.3.1; Strabo 7.frag.47(48); Pomp. Mela 2.16; cf. \textit{Expositio totius mundi et gentium} 50 (5\textsuperscript{th} c. CE): “Thrace is rich in many and strong men in war, for which reason soldiers are frequently recruited from there.”

\textsuperscript{393} Herod. 5.3.2 (except for the Getae), Strabo 7.frag.47(48), Pomp. Mela 2.18.
emphasized the courage and righteousness of the Getae and the martial prowess of the Satrae. A mountain-dwelling people, a sub-tribe of which were the Bessi, who would later become important under Rome, the Satrae were the only unconquered Thracian tribe in Herodotus’s time. They lived in harsh conditions and were known as good fighters. Herodotus’s description also provides unusual social and cultural customs, typical for his approach to non-Greek peoples, including practices of child-rearing, polygyny, premarital sex, tattooing, religious practices, and burial rites. Similar to how the Romans would later characterize the Germans, the Thracians were also thought to consider working the land and trade to be demeaning tasks, preferring, instead, to make money through the spoils of war. Herodotus also claimed that they practiced human sacrifice.

Thucydides (5th c. BCE), however, described the Thracians as treacherous and murderous, while Plato (4th c. BCE) claimed that they were belligerent drunks. Moreover, the Thracians were considered a numerous, well-populated people—a potential threat, if they could only have united.

Roman military expansion in the Balkans in the second and first centuries BCE

394 Getae: Herod. 4.93-96, Satrae: Herod. 7.110-11; cf. Thucy. 2.96.1-2, describing the Getae as mounted archers and the Dii as mountain-dwelling Thracians who were autonomous warriors and Pl. Leg. 4.435e, emphasizing the courage (θυμοειδής) of Thracians.

395 Herod. 5.4-8; cf. Pomp. Mela 2.18-19. For tattoos, see also Strabo 7.5.4 (C315). For Herodotus’s ethnographic techniques, see Bickerman (1952), Hartog (1988), J. M. Hall (1997), and Moyer (2002), emphasizing the agency of the Egyptian priests in Herodotus’s account. While similar sources for Thracian intermediaries are lacking, surely some sort of “Squantos” and traders, beyond Greek colonists, must have informed Herodotus’s work.

396 Herod. 5.6 and 2.167. Plato believed that Thracian women worked the land and raised the cattle and sheep, while the men devoted themselves to war, Pl. Leg. 7.805.

397 Herod. 9.119, the Apsinthian Thracians sacrificed Oeobazus, a Persian general, to their local god. Archaeologists have found human remains, often indicating violent deaths, in pit sanctuaries in Thrace that are often interpreted as sites for human sacrifice; see Hawthorne et al. (2011): 63-65.

398 Thucy. 7.29.4, Pl. Leg. 1.637; cf. Polyb. 27.frag.12 on Cotys, King of the Odrysae, who is unusual for Thracian because he was sober and gentle.

399 Herod. 5.3.1; Strabo 7.frag.47(48); Pomp. Mela 2.16; cf. Expositio totius mundi et gentium 50 (5th c. CE): “Thrace is rich in many and strong men in war, for which reason soldiers are frequently recruited from there.”
reinforced and developed many of these stereotypes of warlike Thracians. But many of the Greek stereotypes were modified to emphasize the cruelty and savagery of the Thracians. Pomponius Mela, writing in 43/44 CE, mostly repeated the stories found in Herodotus, but added more “barbarian-ness,” perhaps shaped by later Roman authors’ descriptions of barbarian peoples. The Thracians were not just numerous, but also savage, ugly, fierce, and merciless. Some Thracians, but especially the Getae, were wild and prepared for death. His depictions may have been shaped especially by Ovid’s *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, both written while in exile in Tomis (Constanța, Romania) on the western coast of the Black Sea between late 8 and 17/18 CE. While his poetry was informed by a literary tradition of depicting the barbarian as the “other”, as all the works considered here, his actual historical experience living among the Getae allowed him to develop their ethnic portrait in order to emphasize the pain and foreignness of his exile. Ovid’s Getae are wild in speech and appearance, violent, savage, animal-like warriors who wore pelts and pants, spoke Greek poorly, and Latin not at all. Yet many of these very same peoples served as soldiers in the Roman military and

400 For a reconstruction of events, based largely on Livy, see Zahariade (2009): 39-58.
401 *Viros benignius alit, non ad speciem tamen, nam et illis asper atque indecens corporum habitus est, ceterum ad ferociam et numerum, ut multi immitesque sunt maxime ferax*, Pomp. Mela 2.16.
402 *Quidam feri sunt et paratissimi ad mortem, Getae utique*, Pomp. Mela 2.18. Florus, writing no earlier than the late 2nd c. CE, summarizes the Thracian Wars in the republic (*Epitome* 1.39) and the Thracian War under Augustus (*Epitome* 2.27), working mostly from Livy but also later authors. In both instances, his descriptions show utterly inhuman cruelty, human sacrifice, drinking out of human skulls, forced abortions, and wild tempers. His depictions may have been shaped by northern military struggles of the Empire at the time.
403 For a recent study, see McGowan (2009). McGowan argues that Ovid’s exile in Tomis was “a poetic place, a literary construct deeply informed by an actual reality,” which Ovid uses to his own rhetorical advantage “to establish an empowering poetic identity whereby the poet on the edge of civilization comes into contact with what is specifically not known in Rome,” giving him, “paradoxically in view of the professed wretchedness of his physical and mental state, power through poetic knowledge” to comment on the Augustan principate (19).
404 Ovid *Tr*. 5.7.10-20, 41-59. Even into the second century, Latin as a written language was very rare in Thrace, usually reserved for official inscriptions. Only a few soldiers used Latin inscriptions in Thrace, too; see Sharankov (2011).
had to navigate these various stereotypes around them.

Thracians, too, were often considered bandits, especially since the under-
urbanized, mountainous regions provided safe havens for tribes. Strabo was the first to
characterize the Thracians of the Haemus Mountain (Stara Planina range, N. Bulgaria) as
bandits:

Then come the peoples who live in the neighborhood of the Haemus Mountain and those
who live at its base and extend as far as the Pontus — I mean the Coralli, the Bessi, and
some of the Medi and Dantheletae. Now these tribes are very brigandish themselves, but
the Bessi, who inhabit the greater part of the Haemus Mountain, are called brigands even
by the brigands. The Bessi live in huts and lead a wretched life. Apuleius, writing in the mid- to late second CE, depicted in his novel *Metamorphoses* the
bandit leader Haemus the Thracian, named after the Thracian mountain, playing on the
reader’s expectation of Thrace’s reputation for banditry, and, more notably, mocking the
often bandit-like behaviors of legitimate Roman soldiers. Haemus even talks like a
military recruiter, calling his fellow bandits *commilitones*, a phrase used by soldiers to
refer to each other, as well as using numerous other military terms.

Yet the most powerful depiction of the ethnic portrait of Thracians, used in a way
very similar to that of the Batavians in order to subtly criticize the imperial project, is
Tacitus’s description of the Thracian revolt of 26 CE. While many of the details of the
battle and of the barbarians are paralleled in the accounts of other battles at other times
given by other authors, Tacitus nevertheless managed to contribute to the ethnic portrait

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405 Strabo 7.5.12 (C318) (Loeb trans.); cf. 7.frag.47(48): “All these [Thracian] tribes are given to
brigandage, but most of all the Bessi.” For bandits in the East, especially Ituraeans, see Strabo 16.2.18
(C755) and Isaac (1992): 54-100; see also Myers (2010), who challenges the traditional view that all
Ituraeans were bandits and Arabs.
407 For a list of military terms in Apuleius, see Fuhrmann (2012): 236n145. Recruiters did try to enlist
bandits; see *IGBulg* 3.1, no. 1126.
of the Thracians as uncivilized bandits. The specific Thracian tribes that revolted were left unnamed, but Tacitus was certain to point out that they dwelled in the high mountains and “lived an uncivilized and hence all the more savage life.” Just like the Bessi in Strabo, living in the mountains was believed to promote not only ferocity, but also the propensity to revolt. Most notably, again, like the Batavians, these Thracians tribes revolted because of their refusal to endure regular troop conscription in the Roman auxiliaries. The Thracian kings even had trouble calling on these mountain tribes for their own troops; if these tribes sent auxiliaries to the kings, they were accustomed to fight only under their own tribal leaders (like the Batavians) and only against enemies in the nearby region. And, as other barbarians, only if they felt like it (ex libidine). Tacitus (and his readers) knew that such refusals to participate in the auxiliaries were doomed to failure. While the number of Roman auxiliary cohorts with Thracian titles shows that Thracians may have served together in the same units, at least initially, Tacitus offered as another cause for the revolt something that surely came true: the barbarians’ fear of being dispersed and mixed with other tribes and stationed (or settled) in other lands.

409 Martin and Woodman (1989): 206, see this digression as a set-piece descriptio pugnae, noting parallels to Sallust (especially to a battle with the Isaurians, another “bandit” people, in 76/67 BCE at Hist. 2.87), Caesar (especially to the battle of Alesia in 52 BCE at B Gall. 7.69-90), Livy, and Tacitus himself.
410 Thraecum gentibus, qui montium editis inculti atque eo ferocius agitabant, Tac. Ann. 4.46.1. For the reading inculti instead of incultu, see Martin and Woodman (1989): 208.
411 “The cause of the revolt (in addition to the people’s character)…” (causa motus super hominum ingenium, Tac. Ann. 4.46.1; cf. Hist. 4.13.2).
412 “The cause of the revolt (in addition to the people’s character) was the fact that they refused to endure conscription and to surrender all their strongest men into our military service” (causa motus super hominum ingenium, quod pati dilectus et validissimum quemque militiae nostrae dare aspernabuntur, Tac. Ann. 4.46.1).
413 ne regibus quidem parere nisi ex libidine soliti, aut, si mitterent auxilia, suos ductores praeficere nec nisi adversum accolas belligerare, Tac. Ann. 4.46.1; for other barbarian instances of ex libidine, see Martin and Woodman (1989): 208. They also note that Tacitus’s choice of archaic or poetic words (ductores, belligerare, the use of aspernabuntur + infinitive) emphasized the “foreigness” of the Thracians.
414 ac tum rumor incesserat fore ut disiecti aliisque nationibus permixti diversas in terras traherentur, Tac.
Like other barbarians who often allied with Rome, the Thracians had a long history of providing Rome with troops, and Tacitus portrayed the Thracian delegates as using that history of loyalty and friendship to their advantage. But they also argued that “if, however, they had slavery imposed on them as if they were a conquered people, they had their weapons, young men, and a spirit ready for freedom or for death.” The delegates then pointed to their mountain strongholds where their wives and parents found refuge and threatened a long and bloody war. Freedom and slavery were conventional themes to be placed in the mouths of barbarians, to be sure, as are many of the other elements of the battle. The Thracian enemies exhibited bravery, traditional pre-battle celebrations, disorder, and disagreement. They kept their families and livestock in their mountain fortresses. Some died on the battlefield, others through disease or thirst, still others through suicide. Even the auxiliaries supporting the Roman legion, both the Thracians under King Rhoemetalces and the cohort of German Sugambrians, exhibited barbarian tendencies. The former fell into a drunken stupor that almost led to their

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415 sed antequam arma inciperent, misere legatos amicitiam obsequiumque memoraturus, et mansura haec, si nullo novo onere temptarentur; sin ut victis servitium indiceretur, esse sibi ferrum et iuventatem et promptum libertati aut ad mortem animum, Tac. Ann. 4.46.2. Both obsequium and amicita were key Roman values, especially among the senatorial elite towards the emperor. Other authors have barbarians point to their iuventus (Vell. Pat. 107.1-2, 114.4) or their willingness to die (Pomp. Mela 2.18). 416 simul castella rupibus indita conlatos et illuc parentes et coniuges ostentabant bellumque impeditum arduum cruentum minitabantur, Tac. Ann. 4.46.3.

417 Some cowardly Thracians, some brave ones; leaping, singing, and dancing “in the manner of their race” (more gentis), 4.47; allied Thracians become undisciplined, over-indulge because of booty, feating, drunken stupor, 4.48; Thracians attack at night, allied Thracians caught off guard, terrified by attack, killed by the Thracians because they were seen as traitors (perfugae et proditores) who were willing to enslave themselves and their country, 4.48; Thracians kept horse and cattle within their fortifications “as is the way with barbarians” (ut mos barbaris), Romans blockade leading to Thracian thirst, death, disease among men, women, and children, 4.49; some Thracians want to surrender, others want to commit suicide, others want to die in battle (conventional disagreement), 4.50; one group kills themselves, another attacks at night; wild shouting (clamore turbido) 4.50; barbarians charge; Thracians urged on by women and children; Thracian bravest dead or wounded; Roman force the rest back into the Thracians’ mountain stronghold at dawn, where they surrender; some tribes remained unconquered in the Haemus mountains because of the early winter. See Martin and Woodman (1989): ad loc. for specific comparisons.
complete destruction, while the latter expressed their eagerness to face danger by creating a barbarous cacophony of songs and weapons equal to that of the enemy.\textsuperscript{418} Barbarians were on both sides, with both negative and positive barbarian qualities leading to their failure or success.

Beyond its demographic qualities, Thrace remained strategically important to the Romans due to its geographical location and the importance of the land routes connecting Italy to the East.\textsuperscript{419} Around 44 CE, the Thracian king Rhoemetalces was murdered by his wife, leading to further unrest. Didius Gallus, Roman governor of Moesia, then fought a substantial campaign in Thrace involving perhaps two legions.\textsuperscript{420} Thrace was soon annexed and placed under the command of a procurator directly answerable to the emperor. While the old Thracian administrative system by districts was maintained, and Greek cities along the coast still flourished, Roman colonies and roads were soon built through the region, including military highways through the Haemus mountains.\textsuperscript{421} Auxiliary cohorts and alae of Thracians were raised, including the \textit{cohors I Thracum} and \textit{cohors II Thracum}, which, along with a cohort from Pannonia, were stationed in the province \textit{Germania} in 65 CE, just over twenty years after the annexation.\textsuperscript{422} The fears of the Thracians of Tacitus’s story came true.

Thracian recruits’ reactions to stereotypes were probably mixed, as often the case in the context of imperial discourse. Just as with their Batavian counterparts, military service most likely had a great impact on Thracian self-image. The surviving

\textsuperscript{418} Thracian auxiliaries, Tac. \textit{Ann}. 4.48.1-2; Sugambrian cohort, Tac. \textit{Ann}. 4.47.3.
\textsuperscript{422} \textit{RMD} 79 (65 CE).
documentary evidence suggests that a significant number of Thracian soldiers maintained their original names while in service, while some adopted mixed Romano-Thracian names.\(^{423}\) Others indicated their origin by naming specific Thracian communities or regions, rather than broadly Thracian.\(^{424}\) Many auxiliary veterans of Thracian origin also returned to their homeland after service, although this may be due, in part, to the large number of military diplomas found in the region.\(^{425}\) Some even preferred to marry Thracian women. One military diploma granted to a retired auxiliary cavalryman and his wife in 125 CE shows that they were both Bessi and had five children.\(^{426}\) While he did not serve in a Thracian-titled unit, his unit (and his family) may have been involved in the Dacian campaign of Trajan.\(^{427}\) Although the findspot of the diploma is unknown, it may be possible that they settled in Thrace. Documentary evidence from Egypt suggests that often, especially in the first century CE, Thracian cavalrymen served together in the desert outposts.\(^{428}\) Different contexts may have encouraged the maintenance of certain Thracian aspects of identity, especially when numerous Thracians served together in relatively isolated outposts. Thracian soldiers, especially elite cavalrymen, may also have desired to conform to Roman expectations of behavior (barbarian or soldier), while still maintaining a certain degree of pride in both their heritage and their accomplishments, such as Longinus, son of Sdapezematygus. A *duplicarius* in *ala I Thracum* stationed in Camulodunum (Colchester, UK) in the first century CE, his tombstone depicts him as a

\(^{423}\) Zahariade (2009): 214, summarizing the data found in his appendices.

\(^{424}\) Bessi (Haemus mountains; the most numerous group), Caeni (Hellespont lowlands), Coeleletaes, Denthelatae, Sai (plains of the Aegean coast), Sappaei (related to the Odrysae; mountains and lowlands), Serdi, and the Thraci; see Zahariade (2009): 72-81, and fig. 10 p. 372.

\(^{425}\) Roxan (1997): 487.

\(^{426}\) RMD 4.235; cf. RMD 5.348 (118 CE, Bessian couple, one child, serving in Germania Inferior).

\(^{427}\) He served in the *ala I Flavia Gaetulorum*; see Spaul (1994): 124.

\(^{428}\) *O.Did.* 63 (dumped ca. 88-96 CE) lists numerous Thracians, although they served in different *turmae*. See also *O.Did.* 334-36 (dumped ca. 88-96 CE).
powerful cavalryman riding victorious over a fallen barbarian (see figure 2). 429

While the language, style, and message of the tombstone conform to Roman practices, Longinus still identified as a Thracian serving in a Thracian unit and indicated both his

429 RIB 201.
father’s name and his local region, Sardica. Whether this was a sign of pride, or merely conformed to epigraphic formula, Longinus (or his heirs) made the choice to list both aspects of his Roman and his Thracian identity.

3.4 Conclusion: Impact on Soldiers?

What generals, administrators, and local recruiters thought about how a soldier was supposed to behave shaped not only how a military leader treated his troops, but also how the soldiers themselves thought about their own actions and beliefs. While factors shaping different behaviors must have varied enormously, ranging from a fear of punishment to a sense of guilt, honor, or responsibility to the group, it is nevertheless clear that soldiers behaved in large part due to the thoughts and actions of their superiors.

Of course, all social interaction is based on a degree of negotiation and interplay. Soldiers were not automatons, merely parroting their officers’ commands. As ancient historians themselves make clear, soldiers, individually or collectively, could have a huge impact on their conditions of service, their pay, and even their own leadership, including the emperor. It is the very fact that soldiers had a large share of the potential for violence that allowed them to have so much influence. Each soldier had the power to shape his own existence; to what extent and under what circumstances varied significantly.

The examples from Greek and Roman literature of the ethnic portraits developed around Germans/Batavians and Thracians show their lasting impact and their general parameters, but also their flexibility. While many elite authors may have simply copied tropes and characterizations from earlier texts with little to no reflection on the image of

\[^{430}\text{An alternate reading of his name is Longinus Sdapeze, son of Matygi.}\]
the specific group in contemporary society, we must not imagine that all readers would have recognized this. Many of the ideas found in these texts would have spread throughout the rumor mills of the Roman world, from marketplaces, temples, homes, to even frontier military bases. To expect that all readers would have been able to separate out fossilized images of ancient barbarians from contemporary ones is perhaps too optimistic. Ethnic stereotypes have a nasty propensity for remaining and seeping into one’s expectations, often subconsciously. We should not be surprised if many Roman officers carried similar views with them onto the battlefield and into the forts.

Just as ancient elite authors could manipulate these stereotypes for their own uses, so could the stereotyped peoples themselves. Both the Batavians and the Thracians embodied, confirmed, or reinforced their ethnic portraits. Auxiliary soldiers played a major role in this, particularly in the first century CE. Yet we must imagine also that individual soldiers in their everyday interactions would have modified, challenged, or emphasized different stereotypes for their own advantages. While such daily negotiations of identities and expectations are often lost to us, the remaining documentary evidence does suggest that in many ways, the auxiliary soldiers and their families played a more active role in shaping Roman discourse about the “other” than previously thought.
Chapter 4

Living Like a Soldier: Transformation of Space

4.1 Introduction

[The soldiers’ camp] becomes nearly like when an army enters its native city. For there each man, turning aside immediately from the gates, proceeds to and arrives at his own home without error, because he already knows, in general and in particular, where his city’s lodgings are. Nearly the same thing occurs in the Roman camp.431

A soldier’s second fatherland is this residence, and it has a rampart instead of city walls, and his own tent is each soldier’s house and home.432

They divide the interior of the camp into well-arranged streets, and they place the tents of the officers in the middle and the general’s tent in the very center, like a temple, as if a city suddenly appears, including a forum, a place for craftsmen, and benches for centurions and tribunes, where they pass judgment if there are any disputes.433

A soldier’s particular glory is in the camp: that is his fatherland, that is his home.434

In the eyes of ancient authors writing during Rome’s domination of the Mediterranean world, a military camp was a soldier’s home away from home, his “second fatherland,” a nascent city in form and function. An array of ideas shaped the layout of military bases.435 Defense, discipline, order, and loyalty motivated the Roman designers.

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431 Polyb. Hist. 6.41.10-12: γίνεται τι παραπλήσιον, οἷον ὅταν εἰς πόλιν εἰσίη στρατόπεδον ἐγχώριον. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ διακλίναντες ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν εἰσέλθωσιν ἐκαστοὶ προάγουσι καὶ παραγόνται πρὸς τὰς ἱδίας οἰκήσεις ἀδιαπτῶς, διὰ τὸ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος γινόσκειν ποῦ τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν αὐτὸς ἢ κατάλυσις. τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον τούτος καὶ περὶ τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν συμβαίνει στρατοπεδεῖας.

432 Livy 44.39.5: patria altera militaris est haec sedes, vallumque pro moenibus et tentorium suum cuique militi domus ac penates sunt.

433 Jos. BJ 3.82-3: ῥυμοτομοῦσι δ’ εὐθαθέτος εἴσω τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ μέσας μὲν τὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων σκηνὰς τίθενται, μεσαίτατον δὲ τούτων τὸ στρατήγιον ναῷ παραπλήσιον· ὃσπερ δὲ ἐν σχεδίῳ πόλις καὶ ἀγόρα τις ἀποδέχεται καὶ χειροτέχνας χωρίον θόκοι τε λοχευοὺς καὶ ταξιάρχοις, ὅπερ δικάζοντοι, εἰ τινὲς διαφέροντο.

434 Tac. Hist. 3.84.2: propium esse militis decus in castris: illam patriam, illos penates. Cf. Veg. 2.25 “armed city” (armatam...civitatem).

435 Following James (2011): 171, I use the term “base” instead of “fort” in order to account for the variety in types and purposes of military spaces. “Fort” tends to imply an inherently defensive structure, which
Yet so did fear, especially fear of foreign soldiers. Auxiliary soldiers, straddling the ambiguous boundary between Roman and barbarian, complicated these Roman ideals and contributed to the meanings of military spaces. For some auxiliaries, camps did become a “second fatherland,” especially for those who spent the majority of their adult lives in military bases. For others, the camp remained a foreign land, a reminder of past defeats, an outpost filled with struggle, boredom, and death.

The spatial order of Roman military bases was far from fixed. The Roman Empire never imposed a unitary model on the design of military bases for auxiliary soldiers. Regional variation flourished, allowing for significant differences in the experiences of auxiliaries stationed on the frontiers of Britain, the caravan roads of Egypt, or the cities of Syria. Any sense of pan-imperial conformity in spatial organization, as stressed in elite literary texts and many frontier archaeological reports, is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of military bases in the Western provinces, particularly those positioned on the British and Rhine frontier. The layout and use of space noticeably varied from place to place, especially from province to province.436 The design and construction of bases also changed over time, especially as units became more settled in the second century CE. The location of bases varied, too. Isolated road posts, large multi-unit military complexes, and bustling frontier cities all served as homes for soldiers. It is this mix of similarities and difference that shaped the relationship between the immediate group and the larger imagined community of soldiers.437

436 For provinces as the basis for patterns in military base construction, see Lenoir (2011): 375-9.
437 James (1999): 14, 17, using “imagined community” from Anderson (1991). While Anderson uses this term to explain features of modern nationalism, James argues that the term can equally apply to the experience of Roman soldiers, in that the soldiers of the Roman Empire was a major, well-defined, self-aware identity group that shared a common military culture, imagined because most soldiers could not experience the community as a whole. His unitary view of Roman military culture, however, reflects
Each individual added to the dynamic understanding and experience of the space, in effect, contributing to the creation of this military culture as expressed through a system of shared symbols. The thoughts and actions of auxiliary soldiers, derived in part from their particular cultural and social backgrounds, interacted with the spatial practices not only of their fellow soldiers, but also of the local civilians, especially when stationed in urban spaces. Yet these ruptures in meaning may not have been as radical as expected, as often auxiliary soldiers were stationed close to their original recruitment areas. This tendency grew more prevalent over time, and generally soldiers of Western origins stayed in the West, while Eastern soldiers stayed in the East. Even when large distances separated a soldier from his homeland, broad common cultural practices between a soldier and the local community, such as Batavians serving in northern Britain, may have lessened the divergence in spatial practices. Maintenance of ties to one’s homeland also may have diminished feelings of rupture. Still, disruptive events must have heightened the significance of these variances in an auxiliary soldier’s experience of space. Major military campaigns involving numerous units from across the Empire, such as Trajan’s Dacian Wars in the early second century, or the transfer of units newly raised from conquered peoples into distant foreign lands, such as the stationing of Dacian units in the desert of Egypt soon after their defeat, surely increased tense negotiation over mostly the conditions during the third century CE.

438 “Milites were active participants in creating this military culture, within which they interpreted, developed and probably subverted many elements in their own ways, and made their own contributions at various levels, to mainstream official regimental identities, and their own identities as individual soldiers,” James (1999): 17.


440 Derks and Roymans (2006) on returning veterans and Van Driel-Murray (2012), who emphasizes the role of women in maintaining ethnic distinction (see also Rothe (2014) on the role of women).
spatial practices. Meanings attributed to military bases, while generally stable from day to day, nevertheless shifted and swayed with each new recruit and varied significantly according to one’s own individual context.441

Upon arrival at his assigned post, a new recruit to a Roman auxiliary unit began to form his own interpretation of the military base. The physical makeup of his surroundings, combined with his own preconceived notions of space and Roman soldiers, shaped this interpretation. This new living and working space, along with the material culture associated with it, conveyed an array of meanings. While written or symbolic systems most clearly express meaning, material media serve “to solidify, reify, and sometimes naturalize what would be transient spoken meanings, being relatively durable and involved in repetitive practices,” in other words, “objects...can be metaphors, but they are solid ones.”442 Objects, including buildings and architecture, are heavily dependent on the context in which they are being used. Whether one uses an object in an unconscious, routine way, such as eating food out of a particular bowl, or in a deliberate or discursive way, such as carrying a sword to demonstrate power, greatly changes an object’s meaning.443 Therefore, the new recruit’s view of the military base was not static, nor was the base’s impact on him. Early in his stay, he may have challenged the intentions of the original designers, perhaps by scribbling a graffito on his barracks’ wall.

441 My understanding of the construction of social space, and the interconnected role of agents and institutions, is informed by Alston (2002): 4-43, Perring (2002): 3-6, Revell (2009), Gardner (2007a), all relying largely on Giddens (1984) and his theory of structuration in which both social structures and agents play an active role in the continuous construction of society. These approaches to Roman space also discuss the importance of social space as argued by Lefebvre (1991) and Soja (1996). Allison (2001) urges scholars to look at the data itself, especially for household assemblages, and warns against relying on spatial theorists such as Lefebvre, whose theories are often based on outdated data. For a broader approach to space in a Roman imperial context, see Nicolet (1991).
443 For swords as a sign of power and Roman military identity, see Coulston (2004) and James (2011).
in order to claim his possession of the space or to memorialize his name as a member of
the group. As time moved on, and as he became more accustomed to his new situation,
he may have begun to reinforce those hidden spatial ideologies. His understanding of
public and private behavior, personal space, sleeping habits, or eating preferences may
have collided with the views of his roommates, and, even more likely, his commanding
officer, especially for auxiliaries under the command of officers of different origins.

Women and children wandering around the base, or perhaps even sharing his room with
him, may have been a sign of comfort or of frustration. With each new assignment, the
soldier needed to modify his behaviors and ideas in response to the space around him.

Space, as a social construct, develops out of the overlapping of physical and
mental concepts of space, and acts both as a product and a producer of social action.
Michel de Certeau’s theories on everyday experiences of space are useful here, especially
his distinction between the official “strategies” of institutions and the structures of power
(“producers”), which attempt to fix spatial meaning, and the “tactics” of individuals
(“consumers”), who navigate spaces in ways never fully determined by hegemonic
cultural practices. Auxiliaries, of course, were not merely consumers of space, but also

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444 See Baird (2011a) for graffiti in Dura-Europos.
445 Scholars speculate that soldiers slept in bunkbeds, with one man per bed and two men per bunk; see A. Johnson (1983): 171-72. Yet we can imagine a range of spatial arrangements based on troop types, the presence of families, or cultural expectations of personal space. King (1999) is the standard account for Roman military food practices, postulating an increase in the consumption of pork and cattle at military bases when compared to provincial communities in Northwest provinces.
446 Women and children in military bases: Allison (2011); Vindolanda: Van Driel-Murray (1993), Van Driel-Murray (1994), Van Driel-Murray (1995), Van Driel-Murray (1997, 1998), Greene (2011); Vindonissa: M. A. Speidel (1998); Eastern Desert of Egypt: Cuvigny (2006): 361-98; German provinces: Allison (2013). There are some major methodological difficulties of reading gender and age in material finds; see Allason-Jones (1995) and Allason-Jones (1999), but I find the evidence convincing that women and children were not only present in bases but may have even resided in some.
447 For an excellent brief review of the development of spatial theory, including the works of Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Giddens, and Soja, see Scott (2013): 170-71.
producers. Not only did their labor build bases but their own beliefs and ideas shaped the very meaning of the space. This endless struggle between institutions and individuals framed the experience of auxiliary soldiers in Roman military spaces, and those spaces, in turn, shaped the institutional and cultural identity of the soldiers who lived there.

Despite the considerable pressures of the Roman military hierarchy, individual auxiliary soldiers nevertheless contributed in meaningful ways to shape the seemingly Roman, disciplined, masculine space into a complex zone of multiple layers of ethnic, social, and cultural interactions. Of course, reconstructing the impressions of individual soldiers is nearly impossible. Yet a careful analysis of Roman military surveying treatises, architectural remains, and material culture illuminates the impact of the spatial transformation upon the soldiers, and how, in turn, the soldiers themselves changed the use and interpretation of the space by their own actions and ideas derived, in part, from their own diverse backgrounds.

In this chapter, I begin my investigation by focusing on an anonymous, untitled, early second-century CE treatise on Roman military surveying, the so-called *De munitionibus castrorum* of Pseudo-Hyginus, our best evidence for the official “strategies” of Roman military spatial meaning under the Empire. While not an official state-generated document, this treatise nevertheless provides valuable insight into the thought-processes of the same elites who served as officers in the Roman military and who had the largest impact on the construction of military social space. Placing this treatise within its historical and literary context, I argue that its proposed arrangement of internal military space reflected an official spatial ideology towards auxiliary soldiers, due, in part, to the ambiguous status of auxiliary soldiers and Roman distrust of foreign soldiers.
I then turn to possible unofficial “tactics” of spatial meaning through a study of the military spaces themselves, as uncovered by archaeological excavation. Drawing on examples from archetypal bases on the northern frontier in the first century, small desert stations in second-century Egypt, and an urban garrison in third-century Syria, I explore the possible ways in which individual spaces within military communities were used, imagined, and contested. Not only was there little conformity in the spatial design of military bases across the Empire, especially when comparing Eastern and Western provinces, but also the shared or divergent cultural background of the auxiliary soldiers themselves greatly impacted their experience of military bases. For some auxiliary soldiers, the military base truly became a “second fatherland,” as suggested by elite ideology. Yet to claim the same experience for every soldier conceals what must have been a challenging, lonely, and violent existence for many.

4.2 Roman Military Space: Official “Strategies” of Spatial Meaning

During the early Empire, military units were often on campaign during the summer months, residing in temporary camps and sleeping in tents, while in the winter troops lived in semi-permanent camps with stone or wooden foundations for their tents. In certain regions, especially in the Eastern provinces, troops resided in or near cities and towns. Over time, as the Roman provincial armies became increasingly stationed on the frontiers far outside of Italy, permanent structures were built to provide launching points for further campaigns. Despite this local variety and change over time, the ruling elites of the Roman Empire maintained an array of hegemonic “strategies” (to use de Certeau’s term) that attempted to fix the spatial meaning of the base as a location of discipline and obedience through a generally common architectural style and arrangement of space
within each military base. While far from uncontested, this elite military ideology nevertheless had a significant longevity, in large part due to the ancient practice of historiography, ancient authors’ use of earlier authors, and their respect for the customs of their ancestors (mos maiorum). This spatial strategy shaped not only the design of military communities but also, more importantly, structured the very everyday life of auxiliary soldiers.

New configurations of troops of varied origins and abilities drove professional Roman military surveyors to reevaluate how military space was organized. Writing most likely in the early second century CE in the wake of Trajan’s conquest of Dacia, one unnamed surveyor, called “Pseudo-Hyginus” by modern scholars, outlined his own method of camp surveying, arguing that it was an improvement over current practice:

“As much as I was able, lord brother, according to my inexperience, I have followed up on all the authors in brief, and I have indicated everything in a systematic way in this booklet whatever they have established about the arrangement of summer camps, before I established the units. To this day no author has shown in writing the rules for every attempt at surveying, on account of which I hope that our concern will be appropriately pleasing to you. (46) Thus we have explained their types [i.e. the types of units] and we have arranged the entire army in their places. We have even shown what unit ought to be changed, if it should be necessary. But if alae should be placed in the rear tenting area and infantry cohorts or part-mounted cohorts in the forward tenting area with no compelling need, without a doubt it is a sign of the surveyor’s inexperience. This could be clearly observed, namely that, if there should be no part-mounted cohorts in the army at all, we put the 500-horse alae on the sides of the quaestorium, so that the rear tenting area may have cavalry. (47) On the other hand, as far as the placement of legions and the division of units are concerned, which displays difficulties even for experts in the internal arrangement [of military camps], I have worked out with intense concentration a method of surveying, researched by me, pertaining to the number of legions, so that, if you would deign to order it, I would be the first to bring this new method of surveying to your magnitude, which, I hope, will please you, if you will first consider the ordinary method of surveying.”

[449] [Pseudo-Hyg.] De mun. castr. 45-47: In quantum potui, domine frater, pro tirocinio meo in brevi omnes auctores sum persecutus et quidquid circa compositionem castrorum aestivalium instituerunt, in hoc libello, priusquam numeros instituerem, sub rationem omnia declaravi. Praecepta in omni inceptatione metationis scribendo nullus auctor <in> hunc diem ostendit, propter quod spero sollicitudinem nostram digna tibi placitam. (46) Exposuimus itaque suas species et universum exercitum suis locis constitutimus; ostendimus etiam, si necessum fuerit, quis numerus commutari debeat. Quodsi alae in retentura positas fuerint et pedites <in> praetentura sive cohortes equitatae nulla necessitate cogente, sine dubio metatoris imperitiae signum est. Illud plane poterit observari ut, si cohortes equitatae in eo exercitu omnino <non>
The significance of *De mun. castr.* lies not only in what it can tell us about the spatial configuration of soldiers within military bases, but also in how it characterizes these configurations in relation to Roman assumptions about the behavior of soldiers of various origins and abilities. More importantly, a close analysis of this text reveals the limited ways in which auxiliary soldiers themselves may have changed Roman military spatial practices over time. I argue that the placement of auxiliary soldiers within military bases was influenced by the proven reliability of auxiliaries in Roman military operations. Despite instances of revolts led by auxiliaries in the first century CE, by the time *De mun. castr.* was written around 100 CE, auxiliary soldiers had become a fundamental part of the Roman military. Their non-citizen status or so-called “barbarian” origins still played a minor role in their position within the base, but their proven reliability led the author to place them in a position of relative importance. While the author praised the reliability of the legionaries, “the most faithful provincial troops,” he still recognized that the auxiliaries, too, were faithful provincial troops by placing them in a position of importance within the base. Both the legionaries and the auxiliaries surrounded the less reliable troops of foreign, non-citizen status, the *nationes* and *symmacharii*. The military bases, therefore, provided an ideal model of Roman society through the spatial organization of the troops within it. The Empire’s ability to incorporate foreigners into its network of power contributed to this shift in camp design, but ultimately it was the behavior of auxiliaries themselves that shaped the military space

*fuerint, ponamus alas quingenarias lateribus quaestorii ut retentura equitatum habeat. (47) Nam quod ad legiones dispositas et dividuos numeros pertinet, quod et peritis compositione difficultates ostendet, methodum metationis a me exquisitam, ad numerum legionum pertinentem intento ingenio elaboravi, ut, si dignatus fueris inuengere, novitatem metationis ad magnitudinem tuam primus adferam, quae tibi, spero, placebit si primum cottidianam metationem tractabis.*
While his bold claims of innovation and superiority to his predecessors may not entirely be true, as they are common tropes in Greco-Roman literature, this author’s booklet remains our best source for any investigation into the principles behind Roman imperial military space design and the treatment of various troop types, including the auxiliaries. This small treatise suggests improvements for the regular practice of measuring and allotting space in the establishment of military camps. Offering this booklet to most likely a colleague in the military, this anonymous surveyor hoped that his novel way of surveying (*novitatem metationis*) would please his addressee when the latter compared it to the usual kind of surveying (*cotidianam metationem*, 47). Our anonymous author believed that his proposals offered a better way of calculating the space necessary for multiple configurations of military units stationed in one camp, including legions, *alae*, and *cohortes*, a task which, he claimed, caused even experienced surveyors difficulties. While surely informed by some degree of practical experience in military surveying, this is also a theoretical work, based in part on previous unnamed authors.

The author discussed general rules for laying out the camp and for the deployment of various military units within it (1-22), offered detailed calculations for the required space and configuration of a theoretical army composed of variety of unit types (23-44),

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450 For the "incorporation" model, see Haynes (2013): 1-10, 22-25.
451 I primarily use the edition of Lenoir (1979), although I have consulted Grillone (2012) for alternate readings. The extent Latin text is about twenty-three pages in the Lenoir’s Budé edition. Complete English translations are found in Gilliver (1993) (Grillone’s text, but translation based on Lenoir; this translation has a number of flaws), Miller and DeVoto (1994): 59-114 (text and translation based on Lenoir; useful Latin index included, although the Latin text does not follow Lenoir completely), and Ian A. Richmond’s unpublished 1925 translation, written as a Christmas present for F.G. Simpson, with notes and a brief correction by Brian Dobson, in Appendix A of A. Richardson (2004): 69-78 (note that Richmond’s account of the manuscripts is flawed). An English translation of sections 12-14, 49-50, and 57-58 is found in B. Campbell (2004): nos. 277-78. A general introduction to the text and its problems is D. B. Campbell (2009a).
expounded his method and purpose in writing (45-47), briefly summarized various types of camp fortifications (48-55), and offered tips on how to choose the best location for a camp, including what locations are best avoided (56-58).

The author’s name, the title of his work, and the date when it was written are unknown. The text that survives in the oldest manuscript bears a meaningless title and lacks a beginning or an ending.\(^{452}\) While the opening dedication is lost, the author addresses his “little book” (libellus, 10, 45) to his “lord brother” (domine frater, 45) and “your magnitude” (magnitudinem tuam, 47). The first address suggests that the author and the recipient were of the same social class, most likely equestrian military officers, as

\(^{452}\) We know the beginning is lost since the author makes reference to “cohorts mentioned above” (cohortium supra scriptarum) in the first surviving chapter. For the manuscripts and editions, see Lenoir (1979): xvi-xxvi. The oldest manuscript to contain this text is Codex Arceianus, Cod. Guelf. 36.23 Aug. 2° at the Herzog August Bibliothek (Bibliotheca Augusta) in Wolfenbüttel, Lower Saxony, Germany. It includes numerous texts related to the practice of surveying and land distribution under the Romans, the so-called Corpus Agrimensorum. The codex is in two parts. The first part, part A, is the more recent of the two, a wonderfully illustrated parchment manuscript, written probably in Ostrogothic-controlled Rome, perhaps among Boethius’ circle, in the early sixth century CE. The second part, part B, is not illustrated, and was probably written in Northern Italy in the late fifth or early sixth century CE. Our text, which I abbreviate De mun. castr., appears in part B and begins at folio 124 verso, column B, line 15 (image 00312 at http://diglib.hab.de/mss/36-23-aug-2f/start.htm?image=00312) and ends at folio 135 verso, column A, line 13 (image 00334 at http://diglib.hab.de/mss/36-23-aug-2f/start.htm?image=00334). My folio numbers match those on the Herzog August Bibliothek’s website (based on the most recent binding of the codex) and differ from those of earlier editors. No title was written at the beginning of the De mun. castr. in the original 4\textsuperscript{th}/5\textsuperscript{th} century hand. In the intercolumnal margin, though, there does appear a large cross and the words “Liber Hygini de castrametatione”; however, this is the hand of Friedrich Ebert, who wrote a noticia codicis on 10 July 1821, now attached to the beginning of the codex. The only potential title for the text appears as INCIPIT LIBER HYGINI GROMATICI in small red uncialis in the top margin (not in the column) of folio 123 recto (image 00309 at http://diglib.hab.de/mss/36-23-aug-2f/start.htm?image=00309), three pages before the beginning of De mun. castr. The hand of this incipit is not the same as that of the main text; Richmond (in A. Richardson (2004): 77) identifies the hand as that of a scribe at Bobbio in the ninth century. Under this incipit at folio 123 recto, column A, line 1 to folio 124 verso, column B, line 14, appear fragments of a work on geometry (attributed, hesistantly, to Marcus Terentius Varro by Bubnov (1899): 419, text at 503-08), with no apparent connection to De mun. castr., although the first editor, Pieter Scriverius, did include it in his text of De mun. castr. published as Hygini Gromaticus sive de Castrametatione liber, in Fl. Vegetii Renati comitis, aliorumque aliquot veterum De Re Militari libri. Accedunt Frontini Strategematibus eiusdem auctoris alia opuscula. Omnia emendatiuis, quaedam nunc primum edita à Petro Scriberio. Cum commentariss aut notis God. Stewechii & Fr. Modii, (Lugduni Batavorum: Officina Plantiniana Raphelengij, 1607), 67-80, at 69-71 [PDF 297-299] http://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucm.5323609423. At the end of De mun. castr. is LIBER GROMATICUS HYGINI DE DIVISIONIB. AGRORÙ. EXPLICIT. INC. LIB. HYGINI GROMATICUS, preceded by a line of black and red ornamental dots. Neither the incipit nor the explicit (De divisionibus agrorum) match the contents of the text.
equestrian officers often addressed each other as “lord brother.” Perhaps the author was a praefectus castrorum, an officer of equestrian rank who had usually worked his way up through the centurionate and played a large role in camp logistics. He most likely had served as a military surveyor sometime during his career. The second address, “your magnitude,” has led some scholars to think that his reader or dedicatee was the emperor. However, such humble words, including his reference to his “inexperience” (tirocinio, 45), are most likely literary formulae found in everyday language but also in other technical writers, including works on surveying. His reference to previous authors (45, 48) suggests that he had conducted some research, perhaps indicating that he had access to a library. Maybe he was a retired military officer, similar to Velleius Paterculus, Pliny the Elder, Frontinus, or Balbus. It is generally agreed that the author’s

453 For some examples of domine frater (and variants) between military officers around the same time as the purported date of this text, see T.Vindol. II 247, 248, 250, 252, 255 (see note to line 20), 260, 289, 295, 306, 345; T.Vindol. III 611, 623, 756.
454 Nowhere in the treatise does the author specifically state that he had ever served as a military surveyor, but it is a very probable assumption. Despite the author’s attempt to distinguish himself from experts in surveying (although this may simply be a rhetorical strategy) in section 47, Lenoir (1979) characterizes the author as a “technician” who had a “taste for, or at least acceptance of, technical terms of surveying and especially of military surveying” and who wrote “a theoretical treatise on military surveying” based on both theoretical research and practical experience (xv-xvi). See also Grillone (2012): 10-12, who calls the author a “serious person, prepared theoretically and equipped with long practical experience” who, despite some stylistic oddities, “was not entirely devoid of grammatical learning” but whose language nevertheless belongs to “one layer away from the literary.”
455 Lenoir (1979): comm. §§135-36 argues that the addressee was Trajan, since Pliny addresses Trajan as magnitudo tua in Ep. 10.31.1; 10.61.5; Panegyr. 61; cf. 42.1. Lenoir (1979): xvi also suggests the text was dedicated to Trajan. But the author’s reference to “our emperor’s comites” (comitibus imperatoris nostri, 10) suggests that he was not directly addressing the emperor. Praise of the reader (even a non-emperor) is found in other writers, e.g. Balbus, Ad Celsum Expositio et Ratio Omnium Formarum (ed. Guillaumin (1996)): “you represent the high point of our science” (te studiorum nostrorum manere summam, Praef.1 = B. Campbell (2000): 204), “the one who, among his coevals, has the greatest capacity in this activity” (qui inter eos in hac parte plurimum possit, Praef.2 = B. Campbell (2000): 204), you “a man of considerable influence” (vir tantae auctoritatis, Praef.16 = B. Campbell (2000): 206).
456 Scholars have debated whether tirocinio meo indicates his inexperience in military surveying or in writing (for various views, see Lenoir (1979): xi, or because his method is new Grillone (2012): comm. ad loc. Yet, as Grillone (2012): 10-11 n. 8 points out, this is most likely a simple formula of humility, e.g. Balbus, Ad Celsum Expositio et Ratio Omnium Formarum (ed. Guillaumin (1996)), who had military experience: “the rudiments of my inexperience” (tirocinii rudimenta, Praef.3 = B. Campbell (2000): 204) and “my modest talent” (mediocritatis meae, Praef.16 = B. Campbell (2000): 206).
name found in the manuscript, Hyginus, another writer of surveying texts in the same manuscript, is an error. For various reasons, scholars traditionally give the text the title *De munitionibus castrorum* “Concerning the fortification of a camp” (which I abbreviate as *De mun. castr.*) or *De metatione castrorum* “Concerning the surveying of a camp” and attribute it to “Pseudo-Hyginus”, rather than simply to an anonymous author. The date of the text is also heavily debated, but I agree with scholars who date it to the early second century CE, specifically to the reign of Trajan (98-117 CE), based on its language, its description of military units, and the general literary context of the reign of Trajan as one of the flourishing of military or technical treatises.

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457 Early scholars attributed the text to Hyginus (so-called Gromaticus), whose other works on surveying also appear in the *Codex Arcerianus*, based solely on the *incipit* and *excipit* in the manuscript. However, A. Gemoll (1877) compared the Latin language and style of Hyginus, Hyginus Gromaticus, Frontinus, Siculus Flaccus, and M. Iunius Nipus (all present in the *Codex Arcerianus*) with that of *De mun. castr.* and determined that the author of the latter text was neither Hyginus nor Hyginus Gromaticus. Later scholars therefore often refer to the author as Pseudo-Hyginus. For more on identifying the author, see Lenoir (1979): vii-viii, xi-xvi and Grillone (2012): 11-12.

458 Early scholars offered numerous alternatives for the title. Raphael Mapheus Volaterranus, in his *Urbanorum Commentariorum* (Rome, 1506), Book 4, folio 56 recto, reports that Georgio Galbiato (the amanuensis of Cardinal Merula) found a manuscript in 1493 in Bobbio whose contents include “Higinus de limitibus agrorum et metatione castrorum”; see Blume et al. (1848, 1852): vol. 2, 11 n. 13, Thulin (1911a): 34 n. 4, and Reeve (1983). Pieter Scriverius, upon the suggestion of fellow humanist Jo. Is. Pontanus (*Codex Arcerianus*, folio VII recto), used the title *De castrametatione* in his first edition of 1607 based largely on *Codex Arcerianus*. Scriverius also reports (p. 68) that Volaterranus, *Urbanorum Commentariorum*, Book 30, offered the title *De castris metandis*. The title *De munitionibus castrorum* first appeared in the manuscript Vatican lat. 3132, a copy of *Codex Arcerianus* made between 1504 and 1544, and this title influenced later scholars. Although Scriverius and, later, Schelius (1660), continued to call the text *De castrametatione* or *De metatione Castrorum*, the name *De munitionibus castrorum* was propagated by nineteenth-century editors Lange (1848), W. Gemoll (1879), and Domaszewski (1887): repr. 1972, whose text became the standard edition. Lenoir (1979) continued to use the title *De munitionibus castrorum*, followed by many Anglophone scholars, while Grillone (1977), and his new edition Grillone (2012) promote the title *De metatione castrorum* as one that better captures the actual contents of the entire work, and not just the final quarter of the text. For discussion of the title, see Lenoir (1979): vii-viii and Grillone (2012): 12-14.

459 Based on internal evidence, especially how the text’s descriptions compare to what we know about the Roman military and its evolution over time, the text is generally agreed to be a product of the second century CE, although some offer more precise dating, such as the reign of Trajan (98-117 CE) (Lenoir (1979)). See D. B. Campbell (2009a), Lenoir (1979): xvi, 111-33 and Grillone (2012) for summary of the various arguments. Domaszewski (1887) first suggested Trajan, followed by Lenoir (1979), Strobel (1984) and M. P. Speidel (1994), while previous editor Lange (1848) preferred the beginning of the second century, as does B. Campbell (2004). Lachmann, in Blume et al. (1848, 1852), on stylistic grounds, dates it to the fourth century, which most scholars have rejected. Grillone (1987), Grillone (2012) (following Af
Despite these textual difficulties, *De mun. castr.* is representative of Roman elites’ view towards military space and is part of the larger body of technical writings about land surveying and military technology in the Roman imperial period. After centuries of expansion and conquest, space was firmly in the minds of the Romans. An entire body of literature developed in the early Empire that tried to determine the best possible ways to measure, distribute, and exploit the land for the benefit of Rome. Like the military treatises discussed in chapter two, these texts claim to offer advice to their reader, often based on a mix of theoretical research, historical *exempla*, and the personal experience of the authors. Many texts on land surveying survive in one manuscript compiled in the late fifth and early sixth centuries CE, known by scholars as the *Corpus Agrimensorum Romanorum*, which included the *De mun. castr.*, although early scholars edited it separately since it discussed military surveying rather than civilian surveying. Yet the

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Ursin and ultimately Mommsen) suggests the early third century, E. Birley (1953), (1966), (1981), (1982) argues for the middle years of Marcus Aurelius (160s CE), while Frere (1980) (contra Birley) points to Domitian (late 80s/early 90s CE).


461 For an introduction to the manuscript, see Reeve (1983). Essential studies of the manuscripts that contain *CAR* are Thulin (1911a) and Thulin (1911b), correcting earlier editorial errors. The most complete edition of the *CAR* is still Lachmann’s edition in Blume et al. (1848, 1852) = L. For its contents, see Dilke (1971): 227-30 and B. Campbell (2000): 450-51. Lachmann’s edition was the first to exclude *De mun. castr.*, excluding also a fragment attributed to Epaphroditus and Vitruvius Rufus (in Guillaumin (1996)) and several related mathematical texts (in Bubnov (1899): 494-553, including the mathematical text that precedes *De mun. castr.* at pp. 503-508, which he cautiously attributes to Marcus Terentius Varro. For his reasons, see p. 419). Thulin’s edition, Thulin (1913) = T, offers many improvements over Lachmann’s, but includes only Julius Frontinus (1-19, plates 1-8), Agennius Urbicus (20-51, plates 8-10), *Commentum* (51-70, plates 11-13), Hyginus (Campbell’s Hyginus 1) (71-98, plates 14-48), Siculus Flaccus (98-130), Hyginus Gromaticus (Campbell’s Hyginus 2) (131-171). Relying mostly on Lachmann and Thulin’s texts, although offering a few new readings, with English translation, is B. Campbell (2000) = C. He includes all the authors covered in Thulin and most of the excerpts from named and anonymous authors in Lachmann, but again excludes *De mun. castr*. The newest edition and French translation, with an extension introduction, notes, and commentary, are Guillaumin (2005) = G (Hyginus Gromaticus (Hyginus 2)
fact that this text was compiled together with other surveying texts suggests that the Romans themselves, if not only the later copyists, considered military and civilian surveying as part of the same technical practice. The writings of surveyors in the Corpus offer an account of the expansion of the Empire and the accompanying changes in landholding patterns. Moreover, their explicit theories and practices of land division are often confirmed by archaeological evidence, such as boundary stones, land record inscriptions, and aerial photography. As symbols of Roman power and conquest, land division schemes, including the surveying of military camps, represented the complete control Rome had over the property of the defeated peoples of the Mediterranean world.\footnote{462}

Surveyors themselves had a wide range of experiences and backgrounds, but nevertheless played a crucial role in the maintenance of Roman power. Many surveyors may have worked in both military and civilian spheres, laying out military camps as well as new cities, especially settlements for veterans.\footnote{463} The design of some cities even


\footnote{463 “Although the two branches were separate [civilian and military surveying], and although civilian surveying itself was divided into land and building spheres, all went hand in hand for many purposes. The younger men would tend to be enrolled as military surveyors, then acting on this experience turn to civilian surveying. And since the latter often involved settling ex-legionaries, who better than a volunteer ex-legionary to measure up and record their land?” Dilke (1971): 43, yet B. Campbell (2000): lii n. 163 claims that there is no evidence for military surveyors becoming civilian surveyors on retirement. For an ex-legionary (evocatus Augusti) land surveyor for a veteran colony, see Hyginus 1 G 2.48 = C 89.13-20 (ca. 100 CE): “Recently when an imperial reservist, a man of military training but also very skilled in our profession, was allocating lands in Pannonia to veterans, according to the wishes and generosity of the
seems to have resembled that of a military camp. In response to the need to distribute more land to veterans at the beginning of the Empire, as well as to assess land for the census and the land-tax and to continue establishing boundaries for private and public land, more surveyors were required. They increasingly developed into a professional group with a clear sense of training, status, and self-assurance. Parallel to other professions, over time surveyors seemed to gain the respect of the educated elites and emperor Trajan Augustus Germanicus, he wrote down and recorded on bronze, that is, on the maps, not only the (total) area that he was allocating, but also at the end of the boundary line included the area of each settler; so, when the survey of the allocation was complete, he wrote down the area, listing the length and breadth. Therefore, no disputes and litigation could occur among the veterans about these lands. (Nuper ecce quidam evocatus Augusti, vir militaris disciplinae, professionis quoque nostrae capacissimus, cum in Pannonia agros veteranis ex voluntate et liberalitate imperatoris Traiani Augusti Germanici adsignaret, in aere, id est in formis, non tantum modum quem adsignabat adscripsit aut notavit, sed et extrema linea uniuscuiusque modum comprehendid: uti acta est mensura adscriptionis, ita inscripsit longitudinis et latitudinis modum. Quo facto nullae inter veteranos lites contentionesque ex his terris nasci potuerunt.) (Campbell trans.). Campbell notes that this is probably referring to the foundation of Poetovio (Ptuj) soon after the Dacian Wars in 106 CE, or perhaps before the end of 102 CE, since Trajan is not given the title Dacicus, which was granted at the end of 102 CE (cf. ILS 2426, 9085). An evocatus is a soldier retained beyond the normal service time span, usually to act as a specialist.

Hyginus (2 Gromaticus), Constitutio <Limitum>, 6.6-8 (G) = C 143.40-6 (with Illustration 92) = T 144.9-17 (with fig. 93) = L 180.1-9 (with fig. 154) (G dates him to ca. 75-77 CE): “In some colonies that were established later, for example, Ammaedara in Africa [Haïdra, Tunisia], the decumanus maximus and the kardo maximus start from the town and are drawn on limits through the four gates as in the case of a military camp, like wide roads. This is the most attractive system of establishing limits. The colony embraces all four areas of the allocated land and is close to the farmers on every side, and all the inhabitants have equal access to the forum from all sides. Similarly in military camps the groma is set up at the crossroads where men can assemble, as to a forum.” (Quibusdam coloniis postea constitutis, sicut in Africa Admederæ, decumanus maximus et kardo a civitate oriuntur et per quattuor portas more castrorum ut viae amplissimæs limitibus diriguntur. Nam colonia omnes quattuor perticae regiones continet et est colentibus vicina undique; incolis quoque iter ad forum ex omni parte aequale. 8. Sic et in castris groma ponitur in tetrante qua velut ad forum conveniatur:) (Campbell trans.; see C p. 293, Illustration 92 (from MS P)). B. Campbell (2000): 390 n. 19 notes that the III Augusta legion established its first camp at Ammaedara, before moving to Theveste in the late 1st c., and then to Lambaesis. After the legion left Ammaedara, it became a Roman colony largely made up of veterans: colonia Flavia Augusta Emerita Ammaedara. As Campbell recognizes, there is a similarity between military camps and some cities, “but this should not be pressed too far,” since the roads of a camp did not usually intersect in the middle of the camp. Nevertheless, he suggests that “land divisions and the design of military camps evolved in a parallel fashion, with a degree of mutual influence,” (390 n. 19).

Balbus (“our profession” professionem nostram G præf.15 = C 205.40), Hyginus 1 (“the integrity of our profession” fides professionis G 3.15 = C 95.38), Siculus Flaccus (“our profession” professio nostra G 1.1 = C 103.3), Hyginus 2 Gromaticus (“our profession” professio nostra G 20.3 = C 161.36), Urbicus (using Frontinus or another earlier source; landholders tried to force surveyor to act against the “integrity of his skill” and there are many things in a “profession” sinceritas artis...professione C 47.46-49.1 = T 50.17-19).
imperial administrators. Even Frontinus, a distinguished senator and governor, wrote on surveying practice. Yet the status and educational background of surveyors varied. Usually under the Empire most surveyors were of a lower social status than senators or equestrians. Of the forty-one non-military surveyors known by name from Italy and the provinces, as found on inscriptions, eleven were freedmen (including seven imperial freedmen), nine were slaves (including six imperial slaves), and the rest were of uncertain status, although none seems to have been of senatorial or equestrian rank. Still, we can imagine that the profession of surveying, and the variety of tasks that went along with it, was practiced by a wide range of individuals with various statuses and educational backgrounds, with those of higher social status having more education and more say in legal or boundary decisions. Legal status does not necessary determine one’s practical skill or theoretical education, as slaves and freedmen may well have been highly educated and skilled in surveying, geometry, and law. Although we do not know the details of the typical education of surveyors, most would have had a general education in literature, history, and mathematics. Most surveying skills, such as

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466 Cicero, *De Off.* 1.151 thought that medicine, architecture, and teaching were respectable occupations for certain social classes. Varro, *RR* 1.10.2 recognized that surveyors had their own technical terminology and had to know the different methods of measuring land throughout Roman-controlled territories. Vitruvius (1.1.1-12) argues that architecture is a distinct science (*scientia*) and discipline (*disciplina*). Columella, *RR* 5.1.3-4 (mid-1st c. CE) distinguishes between the *disciplina* of farming with the *professio* of architecture and the *scientia* of land surveyors (*geometrarum*). See also *RR* Praef.3, where Columella lists surveying as a discipline which has masters under whom people study, as in other disciplines, but in contrast to farming, which has no teachers. Domitian sent a surveyor to the procurator of Corsica to help settle a land dispute (*FIRA* I, no. 72 = McCrum and Woodhead (1961): no. 460), while Pliny and Trajan discussed surveyors during Pliny’s tenure in Bithynia (*Ep.* 10.17B-18). For the development of professions and their claim to expertise knowledge and power, see Freidson (2001).

467 Julius Caesar may have written a letter about the origins of land surveying during his colonial settlements (Cassiodorus, *Demonstratio Artis Geometricae*, L 395.15-396.6).


470 For the epigraphic evidence, see B. Campbell (2000): l n. 150-51.

471 For the role of surveyors in legal disputes, especially from the third century CE on, see esp. Dig. 11.6 (Ulpian) and the other legal evidence gathered in appendix 6. B. Campbell (2000): 475-77.

orientation, boundary marking, and map-making, would have been learned on the job under a more experienced surveyor. Such was their “professional pride” that surveyors even indicated their skill on their tombstones.473

Military surveyors, such as the author of De mun. castr: at one point in his career, were usually ordinary soldiers with the status of immunis.474 Surveyors served in legions, praetorian cohorts, and auxiliary units, and their main duties included laying-out military camps and veteran colonies, measuring provincial land under military control, surveying roads and frontier bases, and perhaps creating military maps and itineraries.475 Evidence for surveyors in auxiliary units is sparse, but suggestive. Only two inscriptions survive that list mensores in cohorts, and even the word mensor is ambiguous.476 Still, the texts
colleague and mentor Celsus on ways to improve surveying through the study of geometric figures, criticizes his fellow-surveyors who do not give the study of geometry the importance it deserves: “It seemed disgraceful to me that if asked how many kinds of angles there were, I should reply ‘many’” (Foedum enim mihi videbatur si genera angulorum quot sint interrogatus responderem multa, G Praef.15 = C 204). Rather, he sees the practice of surveying as an essential aspect of the liberal arts: “For, in my opinion, technical skill (ars) provides ample material for all liberal studies” (Omnium enim, ut puto, liberalium studiorum ars ampla materia est, G Praef.6 = C 204).

473 The first-century CE tombstone of Lucius Aebutius Faustus from Eporedia (Ivrea), North Italy, has an inscription and a relief depicting his profession: “Lucius Aebutius Faustus, freedman of Lucius (Aebutius), of the voting-tribe Claudia, surveyor (mensor), member of the Board of Six (sevir), erected this monument while still alive for himself and his wife Arria Aucta, freedwoman of Quintus (Arrius), and their children, and the freedwoman Zepyra” (CIL 5.6786 = ILS 7736 = Plate 1 in B. Campbell (2000)). Above the inscription in the pediment is a shield and spears, perhaps indicating that he was a military surveyor (Dilke (1971): 39). Since he was a freedman, though, he probably was not a military surveyor and the shield and spears may simply indicate valor (B. Campbell (2000): xlviii). Beneath the inscription is a relief of a dismantled groma, the tool of the surveyor. Above the groma is the symbols of a sevir: two fasces with protruding axes (symbolizing Roman authority) and between them a bench with cushion and footstool. That Faustus was honored as a sevir by his local community suggests something of the status of surveyors. See also the long inscription set up by Nonius Datus, veteran and reservist of Legion III Augusta in Africa, in 152 CE celebrating his technical skill in assisting with the planning and construction of a water-channel for the town of Saldae (modern Bejaia or Bougie) in Mauretania Caesariensis (CIL 8.2728 = ILS 5795 = B. Campbell (1994): no. 204). See Cuomo (2011) for more on Datus.
474 Immunes were soldiers who were exempt from fatigues, such as gathering wood, food, water, or other simple tasks. See Le Bohec (1994): 47, 60, based ultimately on Dig. 50.6.7 (Tartuttiens Paternus, d. 182 CE).
475 Sherk (1974) gathers most of the evidence. At 549, he argues that each legion had eleven surveyors based on CIL 3.8112 (228 CE), with each cohort having one surveyor, except for the first double-cohort, which had two. B. Campbell (2000): li n. 156 rightfully argues that there is no evidence to suggest that this inscription was typical.
476 A mensor could be a surveyor, or he could be a measurer of grain, i.e., the officer in charge of soldiers’ rations.
seem to conform to the broader pattern illustrated above. The first inscription, found in Cyrenaica, dates to the late first or early second centuries CE: “Marcus Aemilius, son of Marcus, Macer, of the turma of Anicius V[---]ianus, surveyor of the First(?) Cohort of Spaniards, lived 40 years, served 18 years. His brother [put this] here.”

The fact that the soldier is both a citizen and also a son of a citizen suggests that he may have had access to a Roman education prior to enlisting, perhaps in Spain. Yet our other example, dated to late second, perhaps early third century, depicts a man from a very different background: “To the shades. To Maximus, son of Dasas, surveyor of the First Cohort of Asturians, of the century of Coe[---]unius Quintinus(?), served 18 years, lived 38 years, a Dalmatian citizen from the town Magab[---] and to Bato, son of Beusas, optio of the above cohort, of the same century, served 18 years, lived 40 years, from the town Salvium, Apies [set up this monument.]”

Here a surveyor shares a tombstone with a fellow under-officer, suggesting perhaps some degree of financial hardship (or, more

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477 HD000841 = AE 1985, 843 (Le Glay) = AE 1983, 941 (Reynolds): M(arcus) Aemiliu[s] / M(arci) f(ilius) Macer / tur(ma) Anic(i) V[---]ian(i) me(n)s(or) c(o)h[ortis] I(?) Hispan/orum an(n)o/[r]um XXXX aer/a XIX fra[ter] / hic [posuit]. Le Glay offers the improved reading in line 4 of tur(ma) Anic(ii) V[---]ian(i) for Reynolds’ Turanicu[s] / IARI. Reynolds dates the inscription to the Augustan/Julio-Claudian period (14 BCE – 68 CE) based on letter forms, the absence of dis manibus, the use of the nominative case for the dedicatee, the formulas aera and ex equite cohortis in another inscription published with this one, and the possibility that the names of the other inscriptions published with this one derive from Spain. She does not definitively identify the unit, but suggests it could have served in Cyrenaica during and after the subjugation of the Marmarides (a tribe south of Cyrene) under P. Sulpicius Quirinus (consul 12 BCE) of the Augustan period, perhaps when he was proconsul of Crete and Cyrene ca. 15 BCE (Florus 2.31 = 4.12.41). More plausibly, Le Glay suggests that the unit is the cohors I Hispanorum equitata found in Egypt at the end of the 1st c. (CIL 16.29 (83 CE), CIL 3.141472 (99 CE)), dating the unit’s occupation of Cyrenaica to unrest in the province following the rectifications of royal borders under Vespasian and Domitian or to the Jewish revolt of 115 CE. For more on this unit, see Alston (1995): appendix 1 and Spaul (2000): 112-13. The listing of a soldier’s turma before his cohors or ala on an epitaph is rare; see CIL 13.7052 (Germania Superior, Mogontiacum, 54-68 CE) and AE 1993/98, 274 (Pannonia Superior, Carnuntum).

positively, a fond relationship). The name Maximus is a common Roman nickname, but
the names Dasas, Bato, and Beusas are Dalmatian or Pannonian names. Maximus, unlike
Macer from the previous inscription, died a non-citizen. His name and origins may
indicate a humbler background than Macer, as well.

The new model of military camp building proposed by the *De mun. castr.* is just
one example of the larger movement of scholars and practitioners to integrate Greek
theoretical knowledge with Roman practical experiences in warfare, while claiming to
surpass the attempts of their predecessors.\textsuperscript{479} While it is unclear if the author of *De mun.
ciastr.* ever had served as a surveyor in an auxiliary unit, he nevertheless seems to have
been a military surveyor who had extensive knowledge of contemporary military
practices and surveying techniques.\textsuperscript{480} Yet his self-deprecating claim to have reviewed all
previous authors in brief “as much as I was able...according to my inexperience” causes
pause.\textsuperscript{481} Such humble language is common in literature of this type. Our author,

\textsuperscript{479} Apollodorus Mechanicus, a Syrian-Greek architect and engineer from Damascus, later famous for
designing the Forum of Trajan, wrote a technical treatise on the tactics of conducting a siege called
*Poliorketika* (*Siege-matters* or *Siegecraft*), probably around 100 CE, before the First Dacian War of 101-102 CE. It is most likely addressed to Trajan, with whom he had previously went on military campaigns. Apollodorus, like *De mun. castr.*, recognized the importance of not simply theoretical designs, but practical ones, as well. Text, translation, and commentary found in Whitehead (2010), using the text of Schneider (1908) (without the app. crit.) and the page and line numbers of Wescher (1867). See also B. Campbell (2004): no. 280-81, pp. 03-06 for translations of sections 137.1-138.17 (importance of siegecraft) and 152.7-156.1 (how to set fire to a wall; construction of ram-bearing tortoises), and Commarre and Ercolani (1999) for a revised version of Schneider’s text, app. crit., Italian translation, notes, and color prints of the manuscript illustrations. See also the study of Blyth (1992), the basis for much of Whitehead (2010). Apollodorus’ contemporary, Aelian, a Hellenistic philosopher, addressed his *Taktika Theoria* (*Tactical Theory*) to Trajan sometime between 106/7 and 113 CE, after Trajan’s victory over the Dacians. His work, like his first-century BCE predecessor Asclepiodotus, was based on the lost tactical treatise of Posidonius (c. 135 - c. 51 BCE), who probably modelled his own treatise on that of Polybius, also lost. Aelian called his *Tactical Theory* a “Greek theoretical work and a polished inquiry” (Ἑλληνικὴν θεωρίαν καὶ γλαφυρὴν ἱστορίαν) into the tactics of the past, especially evoking those of Alexander the Great (Praef.6). For him, “this science is the most useful of all sciences” (τὸ μάθημα τοῦτο πάντων ἐστὶ χρεωδέστατον) (1.7). Text is Köchly and Rüstow (1855). Translations, introductions, and notes: Devine (1989), B. Campbell (2004): no. 136, Sestili (2011). The section numbers are based on Devine. My translations are based on Devine and Campbell, modified. Fundamental study of Aelian, in relation to Arrian, is Stadter (1978).

\textsuperscript{480} A “technicien” who wrote “un traité théorique sur l’arpentage militaire” Lenoir (1979): xv-xvi.

\textsuperscript{481} [Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr. 45: in quantum potui...pro tirocinio.*
however, does not seem to be a typical military surveyor. Rather, he should be compared to another author found in the *Corpus Agrimensorum*, Balbus.\(^{482}\) Similar to the author of *De mun. castr.*, Balbus addressed his treatise on measurements and geometrical shapes to a colleague, Celsus, whom he praised as the “high point of our studies” and “a man of considerable influence” whose own surveying techniques proved very useful to Balbus while on campaign in Dacia with the emperor Trajan.\(^{483}\) Balbus claimed that, while preparing this book for public distribution in order to improve surveyors’ understanding of measurement, angles, and figures, he was “lured away” from his writing by the “famous expedition of our most revered emperor.”\(^{484}\) He turned away from writing and “thought about nothing but the glory of war” (*nec quicquam aliud quam belli gloriam cogitabam*), helping the emperor with his surveying skills by measuring roadways, surveying bridges, and determining the height of mountains that needed to be stormed.\(^{485}\) Yet he found that practical experience rewarding. Claiming that his military duties had improved his surveying skill, he turned back to writing this more theoretical treatise, believing that “technical skill (*ars*) provides ample material for all liberal studies.”\(^{486}\)

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\(^{483}\) Balbus G Praef.1 = C 204; *te studiorum nostrorum manere summam*; G Praef.16 = C 206: *vir tantae auctoritatis*; G Praef.10 = C 204; G Praef.10 = C204 is translated by Campbell as “Through your intervention the use of the *ferramentum* (surveying instrument) revealed these (lines), when part of the work had been brought into the line of sight” (*hos intervento tuo operis decisa ad aciem parte ferramenti usus explicuit*). Both Lachmann and Campbell read *intervento tuo operis*, while Guillaumin reads *interventuro operi* (“for the work which would arise between them (the lines)”). The manuscripts have a variety of readings, although this is likely another way for Balbus to praise Celsus. Guillaumin (1996): 3 dates the text to Trajan, claiming that Balbus was on the Dacian expedition and wrote between 102 and 106 CE. Dilke (1971): 42 dates the text to Domitian, claiming that Balbus was on Germanic campaigns in 89 CE. B. Campbell (2000): xxxix-xl argues that the text could date either to Domitian’s campaigns against Dacians between 85 and 92 CE or Trajan’s defeat of the Dacians in 106 CE.

\(^{484}\) Balbus G Praef.7 = C 204: *Intervenit clara sacratissimi imperatoris nostri expeditio, quae me ab ipsa scribendi festinatione seduceret*.

\(^{485}\) Balbus G Praef.8-12 = C 204.

\(^{486}\) Balbus G Praef.6 = C 204: *Omnium enim, ut puto, liberalium studiorum ars ampla materia est.*
After Trajan had conquered Dacia, he released Balbus from his duties, who then completed his book, a clear attempt to connect theoretical geometric material with applied agrimensoric techniques. Like the author of *De mun. castr.*, who combined practical military experience with more theoretical calculations, Balbus attempted to bridge the gap between professional technical surveyors and the great scientific writers.

The Romans had a long tradition of building fortified camps while on campaign. They believed, probably incorrectly, that this practice began in the third century BCE when they copied the technique of Pyrrhus of Epirus during his campaigns in Italy; it was most likely an indigenous Roman or Italian development. Even in the late first century CE, Frontinus, senator, consul, general, governor of Britain, and author of books on military science, surveying, strategy, and aqueducts, thought that the surveying of military camps (*metatio*) of Pyrrhus’s day still informed contemporary practices. Our fullest account of early Roman camp design is found in a discussion of the Roman constitution in book six of Polybius’s history of the rise of Rome in the Mediterranean

487 For more on the relationship between pure geometry and applied geometry and Balbus’ relationship to earlier Greek writers, such as Euclid (G 6.7 = C 214.11), Geminos, and Heron of Alexandria, who also wrote on artillery, see Guillaumin (1996): 6-15. Balbus refers to Greeks or Greek mathematical vocabulary often, see G 2.3 = C 206.37; G 2.4 = C 206.40; G 4.3 = C 208.30; G 5.19 = C 212.27; G 5.21 = C 212.32; G 5.22 = C 212.33; G 6.3 = C 214.2; G 6.5 = C 214.8. Balbus (G 3.3-7 = C 208.5-11) differentiates between a *rigor* (used in the surveying on the land itself to establish a straight boundary) and a *linea* (whatever is drawn on the map to represent the straight boundary). He then (G 3.8 = C 208.13) attempts to connect the surveying *rigor* with the geometric *linea*.

488 Frontinus *Strat.* 4.1.14: “In ancient times the Romans and other peoples used to make their camps like disorderly nomadic huts, here and there by groups of cohorts, since the ancients were only acquainted with city walls. Pyrrhus, king of the Epirotes, was the first to establish the custom of confining an entire army within the same rampart. Later the Romans, after defeating Pyrrhus on the Arusian Plains near the city of Maleventum [in 275 BCE], captured his camp, and, noting its plan, gradually came to the surveying [of a camp] (*metatio*) which is now done. (*Castra antiquitus Romani ceteraeque gentes passim per corpora cohortium velut mapalia constituere soliti erant, cum solos urbm muros nosset antiquitas. Pyrrhus Epipolatum rex primus totum exercitum sub eodem vallo continere instituit. Romani deinde, victo eo in campis Arusinis circa urbem Maleventum, castris eius potiti et ordinatione notata paulatim ad hanc usque metationem, quae nunc effecta est, pervenerunt.*) See also Livy 35.14, but Plut. *Pyrrh.* 16.4-5, reflecting sources earlier than Frontinus’s, depicts Pyrrhus as admiring the arrangement of the Roman camp.
world. Writing around the mid-second century BCE, he believed it was the consistency and simplicity of the camp plan that made the Roman camp such an effective component of military superiority, as it was based on “one simple plan concerning encampments, which they use at all times and in all places.” Surveying the land for the camp was quick and easy for troops, “since all the measurements are fixed and familiar.” The layout of the camp was so predictable that the troops knew exactly where to set up their tents, just like soldiers know where their houses are when they return home to their own city.

While the De mun. castr. does in part follow Polybius’s earlier model of the Roman camp, it nevertheless offers its own suggestions for the use of space based on the new role of the auxiliaries and the continuous tension in Roman thought towards the role of foreign soldiers serving Rome. Both the De mun. castr. and Polybius’s description of a Roman camp demonstrate that the organization of the camp reinforced the military hierarchy and maintained a sense of difference among troop types of various origins and abilities through their separate distribution throughout the camp. Practical concerns may have guided the overall design of the camp (spacing, consistency, central location of commanders), but it is nevertheless clear that a Roman sense of order, control, and social hierarchy contributed to the location and orientation of the units, and that the physicality of the space itself, in turn, maintained and justified these same ideas.

The author of De mun. castr. described an arrangement and distribution of space

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489 For an outline of some of the problems associated with book 6 of Polybius, including its structure, its date of composition, its sources, and its conclusions about the Roman state, see Walbank (1972): 130-56.
491 Polyb. Hist. 6.41.5: ὡς ἀπάντων ὁμιλοῦν καὶ συνήθων ὤντων διαστημάτων.
492 Polyb. Hist. 6.41.9-12, esp. 10: “[The soldiers’ camp] becomes nearly like when an army enters its native city” (γίνεται τι παραπλήσιον, ὃν ὄνταν εἰς πόλιν εἰσῆ ἐκεῖνός προσεπάτων ἐγκώριον).
within the camp that reflected a carefully crafted hierarchy imposed on the physical space (see figure 3). The center area of the base (*latera praetorii*) was considered the seat of power. The general’s headquarters (*praetorium*) held the center, with the tribunes and legates stationed along the main road (*via principalis*) fronting the central area.\(^{493}\) Flanking the *praetorium* on either side, radiating out from the center towards the ramparts, resided the guards, the companions of the emperor, and the Italian praetorian infantry and cavalry, with the *primipilares* (elite senior centurions) and *evocati* (recalled retirees) intermixed with the praetorians.\(^{494}\) Next to the praetorians were stationed the elite cavalry imperial guards (*equites singulares imperatoris*), comprised of former auxiliary cavalrymen who served in *alae*.\(^{495}\) Next to them were the auxiliary *alae* (500-man cavalry units).\(^{496}\) If the camp contained two legions, the first cohort of each legion, along with the legions’ banner-carriers (*vexillarii*), were stationed outside the *alae*, followed by other legionary cohorts immediately adjacent to the ramparts.\(^{497}\) Thus the base reflected the Roman world and hierarchy: the emperor and his advisors in the center, followed by the elite Italian Praetorian Guard, the elite cavalry imperial guard, the elite auxiliary cavalry (*alae*), the first cohort of the legions, and finally the other legionaries.

Where these two texts differ, however, is in their positioning of allies or


\(^{494}\) [Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr.* 6-7 (praetorian infantry and cavalry, *primipilares*, *evocati*, emperor’s advisors/officials); 9 (guard station/*statio*); 10 (emperor’s companions/comites imperatoris).

\(^{495}\) [Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr.* 23 (*alae*).

\(^{496}\) [Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr.* 7-8 (*equites singulares imperatoris*); see M. P. Speidel (1994). For Polybius, a small portion of foreign cavalry and infantry, the *extraordinarii* (ἐκτραορδιναρίοι), selected for their fighting ability, were stationed in the central area near the commanding officers, Polyb. *Hist.* 6.26.6, 31.1-4.

\(^{497}\) [Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr.* 3-4 (first cohorts), 4-5 (*vexillarii*), 2 (legionary cohorts).
auxiliaries in relation to the legionaries. In the forward area, starting from the central
road running from the praetorium to the front of the camp and heading toward the right and left outskirts of the camp, Polybius stationed first the legionary cavalry, then the legionary infantry, then the allied cavalry, and finally the allied infantry, whose tents face outward toward the rampart (see figure 4). Thus the arrangement of troops radiated out from the central road with citizen units first, followed by allied units. Any remaining allied or foreign troops were stationed in the back of the camp. In a way, Polybius’s depiction of the Roman military camp reflected the Roman worldview: an ordered space

498 Polyb. Hist. 6.29-30. For more on Polybius’s camp, see Fabricius (1932).
499 Polyb. Hist. 6.31.9. Note that this plan could be adjusted if more allies were present, although they are generally stationed in the same locations; Polyb. Hist. 6.32.2.
in which Rome was at the center, with non-Romans orbiting in deferential obedience. Surrounding the camp on guard duty along the rampart were velites (γροσφομάχοι), Roman citizen legionaries regarded as the youngest, most inexperienced soldiers, perhaps even the poorest.⁵⁰⁰ No allied or foreign troops are mentioned as guards, suggesting that the Romans may not have trusted them.

In *De mun. castr.*, similar to Polybius, soldiers were arranged by their relative status, competence, or loyalty. Closest to the emperor or general was the area called the *scamnum* in which the officers of the legions and the officers of the praetorian cohorts encamped; the officers of the auxiliary units stayed with their own troops, perhaps reflecting a concern for the loyalty of these non-citizen units.⁵⁰¹ This area was quite large for the number of men involved (1 legate per legion, 6 tribunes per legion, 1 prefect per praetorian cohort), again, reflecting their rank and status.⁵⁰² Beyond the *scamnum* and the *via principalis* in the front area of the camp (*praetentura*), additional auxiliary *alae* were stationed, and beyond them Mauri cavalry and Pannonian “hunters” (*veredarii*).⁵⁰³ The rear area of the camp (*retentura*) contained the *quaestorium*, where the ambassadors

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⁵⁰¹ [Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr*. 15 (*scamnum*), 16 (prefects of *alae* stationed with their troops), 27 (centurions/decurions with the *cohors equitata quingenaria*); the prefects of the auxiliary cohorts are not mentioned. *Scamnum* is a surveying term that means two times wider than long (Lenoir (1979): 58-59). Note that in section 15, manuscript *A* says the location of the *scamnum* was *intra viam principalem*, suggesting within the *latera praetorii*; Gemoll emends the text to *infra viam principalem*, which Lenoir accepts.
⁵⁰² For each half-row (from the *via praetoria* to the *via sagularis*), it is recommended that 120 feet in width (if facing the *via principalis*) and 60 feet in length (along the *via praetoria*) be allotted for the *scamnum* ([Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr*. 36). Assuming three legions and four praetorian cohorts, which would include 3 legates, 18 tribunes, and 4 prefects, a total of 25 men, each man received at least 4.8 feet in width. Compare this to the camel-driver (5 feet) ([Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr*. 29), the *ala* cavalryman (3 feet) ([Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr*. 34), the cohort cavalryman (2 ½ feet plus a fifth of that measure = 5/2 + (5/2 : 5) = 25/10 + 5/10 = 3 feet; see Lenoir (1979): 35), and the infantryman (literally “provincial soldier” *miles provincialis*) (1 foot plus a fifth) ([Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr*. 25).
of the enemies, the hostages, and the booty were protected by guards.\textsuperscript{504} On either side of the \textit{quaestorium} were stationed more guards and then the lowest status units, namely the infantry or mounted auxiliary cohorts, as well as any additional allies (\textit{symmacharii}) and the remaining peoples (\textit{reliquae nationes}).\textsuperscript{505} The \textit{nationes} listed reflect the diversity of the non-citizen inhabitants of the Empire: Cantabri (West), Gaetuli (South), Palmyrenes (East), Dacians (Northeast), and Britons (Northwest).\textsuperscript{506} Unlike in Polybius’s model, where the legionaries are stationed in the central part of the front area of the camp, in \textit{De mun. castr.} legionaries are positioned around the perimeter of the camp in cohorts, surrounding all the foreign, allied, and auxiliary troops with citizen soldiers. Thus, the space of the camp is shaped to represent the symbolic space of the entire Empire, with all ranks and statuses in their proper place (emperor in the center, elites close by, lowly infantry auxiliaries and foreigners from across the Mediterranean on the outskirts), all surrounded by the protective guard of the Roman citizen legions, just as the legions defended the actual frontiers of the Roman Empire.

The author of \textit{De mun. castr.} considered both auxiliaries and legionaries to be provincial troops, somehow separate in status from allies (\textit{symmacharii}) and peoples/tribes (\textit{nationes, gentes}). By the early second century CE, legionaries were usually recruited from citizens living in the provinces, as Italians seemed to prefer to
serve in praetorian or other Rome-based units. Yet the author considered legionaries to be the most faithful and reliable of the provincial soldiers, more so than the auxiliaries: “The legions, because they are the most reliable (\emph{fidelissimae}) provincial military ranks, should camp at the rampart so that they may guard the fortification and, with their number, enclose the army levied from the tribes within a bodily wall.”507 Surrounded by full legionary cohorts around the perimeter of the camp, foreign troops recruited from allied tribes were also hemmed in by auxiliary units on the inside: “And along the other lanes [in the rear section of the camp], the infantry or cavalry [auxiliary] cohorts will have to face the Quintana Avenue, and beyond them the allies and remaining foreigners will have to camp, and thus it will happen that the foreigners will be contained on every side, as written above.”508 Despite his mistrust of foreign soldiers, the author seemingly believed that auxiliaries were competent provincials, loyal enough to be stationed in the interior of the camp, closer to the commanding officers, generals, and perhaps even the emperor himself. Still, the legionaries were considered the most reliable provincial troops.

The rationale behind this author’s view of the various troop types is not entirely

507 [Pseudo-Hyg.] \emph{De mun. castr.} 2 (ed. Lenoir (1979)): \emph{Legiones, quoniam sunt militiae provinciales fidelissimae, ad vallum tendere debent, ut opus valli tueantur et exercitum gentibus imperatum suo numero corporali in muro teneant}. Grillone (2012) suggests mixtum for \emph{imperatum}; MS A has meatum.

508 [Pseudo-Hyg.] \emph{De mun. castr.} 19: \emph{Et per reliquas strigas cohortes peditatae vel equitatae ad viam quintanam spectare debent; et super symmacharii et reliquae nationes tendere debent; et ita fiet ut omni parte nationes, ut supra scriptum, continaeantur}. Grillone (2012) suggests supra symmachares and \emph{et supra scripta} instead of \emph{ut supra scriptum}. Lenoir (1979): comm. §§77-79 argues that symmacharii does not indicate a particular type of unit, but rather a group of units. \emph{Nationes} should also be considered as such, but perhaps \emph{symmacharii} is a more specific group with a slightly different status than \emph{nationes}, whom he considers the least Romanized, since they use their own language ([Pseudo-Hyg.] \emph{De mun. castr.} 43) and perhaps even their own leaders and weapons and techniques. On the question of the relationship between \emph{nationes} and \emph{numeri}, see Lenoir (1979): comm. §§138-42. \emph{Symmachi} are found only on one Latin inscription, dating to the early 2nd c. CE after Trajan’s (or Domitian’s) Dacian Wars: \emph{AE} 1935, no. 12 = Smallwood (1966): no. 301 (improved reading of \emph{AE} 1926, no. 88): \emph{C. Sulpicio Ursulo, praef(ecto) symmachiariorum Asturum belli Dacici...}
clear, and there seems to be a slight tension in his suggestions. First, if the legionaries are the most loyal troops, then why position them on the exterior, farthest from the emperor? Perhaps they provide defense against potential external enemies. Or, more likely, it seems that their role was to provide surveillance of the troops stationed within the camp, that is, monitor their movements and prevent them from leaving. Of the provincial troops, that is, excluding the praetorians who were largely Italian, the legionaries were considered by him to be the best. The key word is fidelissimae, which I have translated as “the most reliable” but could easily be translated as “the most loyal.”

Did the author believe that the legionaries were more trustworthy because of their ability as soldiers, or because of their loyalty to the emperor? Perhaps the author chose this ambiguous word on purpose, and competency and loyalty were not separated in his mind. Furthermore, he compared the reliability of the legionaries to provincial troops other than the auxiliaries, namely the vexillarii, legionaries forming a detachment that had been temporarily separated from its own legion. He believed that the vexillarii of the legions should not camp at the rampart “since their commander [the commander of the vexillarii] would not be together <with them>, and if by chance the rampart were breached by the enemy, the legion and their commander [the commander of the vexillarii] would argue that it happened because of the vexillarii.” The vexillarii, stationed in the camp separate from

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509 See OLD fidelis 1.c. for “loyal” (specifically ascribed to troops, allies) and 3 for “reliable.”
510 For vexillarii, see Lenoir (1979): comm. §133.
511 [Pseudo-Hyg.] De mun. castr. 5: Vexillarii legionum...ad vallum, si fieri potest, ideo tendere non debent, quod legatus eorum pariter non sit et si casu ab hoste vallum interruptum fuerit, legio et legatus eorum per vexillarios factum esse contendet. Scholars have translated this passage in multiple ways. Lenoir (1979) translates “because the legate does not have the same authority over them...the legion and its legate” taking both instances of legatus as the commander of a legion stationed in the camp, and pariter as somehow governing the genitive pronoun eorum. Grillone (2012) argues that legatus refers to the legate of the vexillarii, translating “because their legate is not camping with them,” interpreting pariter as a reference to location. For legates camping in a different location than their units, see [Pseudo-Hyg.] De mun. castr. 15. Miller and DeVoto (1994) ambiguously translates legatus eorum as “their legate” in both instances without
their commanding officer, were therefore thought to be less able to properly defend the rampart, unlike the other legionaries not detached from the rest of their unit.

The reliability of the auxiliaries, on the other hand, was ambiguous. The author clearly believed that these troops, when compared to other provincial soldiers, were not as competent or loyal as the legionaries. Still, they were thought to be more competent or loyal than the troops drawn from foreigners and allies, which the auxiliaries surrounded from the inside. He believed that it was best for military discipline (*disciplina militaris*) to keep soldiers together with their own units, even in crowded conditions in the camp.\footnote{[Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr.* 39.} This allowed for easy movement when on the march. It also allowed units to hear their orders altogether, especially if their orders were given to them in their native language, such as for the allies and the *nationes*.\footnote{[Pseudo-Hyg.] *De mun. castr.* 43: The allies (*symmacharii*) and the other peoples (*nationes*) “should not be divided more than three times, nor should they be far from one another, in order that they hear the order orally (lit. “by means of a live watchword”), in their own language,” i.e., not in Latin (*symmacharios et reliquas nationes quotiens per strigas distribuimus, non plus quam tripertiti esse debentum nec longe abalterutrum ut viva tessera suo vocabulo citationes audiant*). This implies that orders for auxiliaries were most likely given in Latin. Onasander, *Strat.* 26 argues that the general should communicate the countersign not by voice but by gesture, “in order that when confusion arises the soldiers may not have to trust to the spoken watchword alone—for the enemy hear this so often that they are able to get it—but also to the countersign. This is most useful in the case of allies [of the tribes] who speak a different language (πρὸς τὸς ἐπιρογλώσσους συμμαχίας τῶν ἔθνων), for, unable to speak or understand a foreign tongue, they differentiate between friends and enemies by this countersign” (trans. Oldfather et al.).} This allowed for easy movement when on the march. It also allowed units to hear their orders altogether, especially if their orders were given to them in their native language, such as for the allies and the *nationes*. Yet this very segregated arrangement of units, especially those of foreign origin, may have actually reinforced their sense of identity as people separate from the Romans. Arrangement seems to have been based largely on the level of professionalization or reliability of troops, not simply on citizenship status or origin. While for practical or logistical reasons it seems logically to keep soldiers of the same unit or language together, symbolically, the recommendations of *De mun. castr.*
reinforced a sense of distinctiveness and difference, even among the more trusted auxiliaries.

Even if he was only describing a theoretical camp as an improvement to the standard practice of camp design, this anonymous author’s suggestions ought to have weight. His views of the reliability of troops, shaped by a traditional education and military experience, align well with what we know of the Roman elite’s ambivalent feeling towards foreign troops. Surely many of the young Roman officers in command of auxiliary units shared these views towards soldiers and foreigners. Just as in other Roman depictions or characterizations of auxiliaries, here, too, in a treatise on the proper arrangement of soldiers within a military base, auxiliary troops straddle the nebulous boundary between Roman and foreigner, trustworthy and treacherous, faithful and fickle.

The creation, even the description, of a Roman camp “was a discursive practice constituting Roman power, analogous to the enclosure and regimentation of space in early modern and modern barracks, workshops, schools, and prisons.”514 Both Polybius and the De mun. castr. created a military space shaped by assumptions regarding the behavior of soldiers and barbarians. The arrangement of units within each camp reflected the great distance between the non-Roman periphery and the Roman center in the Roman worldview. For these authors, the Roman Empire was an ordered space in which Rome was at the center, with non-Romans orbiting in deferential obedience. Yet this space and the thoughts driving its construction did not remain completely static. Different aspects could be emphasized and challenged by the officers and soldiers involved. Even though both texts share many similarities, I have argued that De mun. castr. demonstrates both

Roman fears about foreign soldiers and also the increasingly integrated role of auxiliaries in the Roman army. This tension between expectations and behavior reveals itself in different ways when we turn to an analysis of the material remains of auxiliary military bases in the Roman world.

4.3 Roman Military Space: Unofficial “Tactics” of Spatial Meaning

As the Roman military occupation along the frontiers of the Empire became increasingly stationary, permanent military bases were built to provide long-term accommodations for the troops. Military bases were originally only fully occupied during the winter or other periods of inactivity, but during the first century CE soldiers began to occupy bases year-round, although probably in fewer numbers during the campaigning season.\textsuperscript{515} Permanent bases, like temporary camps, provided protection for soldiers when they were sleeping, eating, or resting, and offered accommodation for an auxiliary unit, units, or part of a unit, rather than an entire provincial army on campaign. Rather than simple defensive structures, bases acted as important organizational nodes for supplies, communications, training, and further offensive operations. Military bases also served as the heart of the military community, where ideas regarding the behavior of auxiliary soldiers were imposed, contested, and modified.

These permanent bases created an environment where soldiers and officers negotiated the practice of power on an everyday basis. All spaces, as elements of material culture, create meaning, but they are also attributed with meaning by the actors moving through them. Particular zones within a larger space can become defined not

\textsuperscript{515} Dobson (2009).
only by their physical arrangement, but more importantly by the range of practices that occur within them. The extent to which the official view on the design of military camps actually affected the different levels of meaning created by permanent bases is difficult to assess. We may reasonably assume that many commanding officers of auxiliary units shared expectations similar to those of the author of *De mun. castr.* and other elite authors, as argued in the previous chapter. These commanders may have been in charge of the construction of auxiliary bases, although it seems that legionary troops usually built bases for auxiliary units, at least in the first century CE. Such a degree of coordinated control might lead one to expect that bases throughout the Empire followed a standard plan. When considering the excavated remains, however, we find that individual bases vary in size, layout, and use of space. Patterns do emerge, and certain buildings appear in similar locations, yet the degree of local divergence from a model plan encourages us to investigate not only these differences and their causes, but also the possible effects of these variations on ideas of social space and power.

In this section, I shift my focus away from top-down, official views on military space. Instead, I attempt to uncover possible unofficial “tactics” employed by auxiliary

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517 There is no epigraphic evidence for auxiliary units building permanent bases until the Hadrianic period in northern Britain. From then on auxiliaries did work on buildings, but to what extent the legions were still involved in providing craftsmen or basic guidelines is unknown. *CIL* 3.6627 (Koptos, Egypt; late 1st c. CE?) points to both legionaries and auxiliaries rebuilding forts in the Eastern desert. It is clear from the large number of practice camps around some bases that auxiliary units were capable of building camps, if not permanent bases. See A. Johnson (1983): 43-44 and Hanson (2009).
518 “It is a commonplace that all Roman forts are different because they were built by different units for different garrisons at different times. Yet at the same time, at least from the Flavian period onwards, they show a remarkable consistency of design and layout, indicating adherence to a number of general principles,” Hanson et al. (2007): 654. Variation in auxiliary bases has long been recognized, although it seems that Roman frontier archaeologists expect a certain degree of conformity in fort design. Scholars have attributed this variation not merely to the size or type of unit garrisoned in the base, but also the topography of the site, the building material available, and the traditional construction practices of the legionary builders. See A. Johnson (1983): 291 and 44 for different legionary methods of construction.
soldiers to attribute meaning to these spaces in a routine, often unconscious way. These tactics were influenced by, but not completely controlled by, the official spatial meanings of the designers and officers. Additional factors, such as the origin of the troops, the relationship between troops and local civilians, and the length of time that a unit was stationed in one base all impacted an individual’s experience. We cannot expect that new recruits from vastly different backgrounds would have experienced Roman military spaces in the same way, but often our data is not sufficient to determine these tactics at an individual level. Nevertheless, by exploring a range of possibilities for the creation and negotiation of social space beyond those suggested by our official literary sources, we can begin to imagine alternate experiences of Roman military space. I argue that while the structures of power and the push for conformity greatly influenced an auxiliary soldier’s experience of military space, local variation in spatial orientation and spatial function demonstrates a larger degree of influence by the soldiers themselves than has previously been suggested.

I consider a small number of well-excavated auxiliary bases, spread throughout the Empire and over the first three centuries CE, in order to represent the wider picture. Military bases excavated in Britain and on the Rhine/Danube frontier offer the best examples of military spaces of the first century CE in which the auxiliary units were drawn largely from men of a cultural background similar to that of the surrounding community. These military bases were closely linked to each other through a complex network of roads and rivers, supporting a greater degree of conformity and mobility.

520 For a useful brief overview of the development, organization, and typology of military camps and the extra-mural communities, see Hanel (2007), although he focuses mostly on the West.
between stations. While scholars often look to these Western military bases as the “norm” for auxiliary troops, I complicate this view by considering the very different military bases of the Eastern provinces. Smaller and seemingly more isolated than their Western counterparts, the watchtowers and bases along the roads of the Eastern Desert of Egypt in the second century CE were sites of intense cultural contact. Recently conquered Dacian cavalrymen from north of the Danube were stationed in Egypt and formed complex relationships with Greco-Egyptian infantry, Roman officers, and local Egyptian women, while still maintaining a shared sense of their own Dacian identity. The small, intimate quarters of desert outposts, where soldiers often shared accommodations with travelling civilian traders, were radically different from their counterparts in the West and encouraged spatial negotiation. Finally, the garrison at Dura-Europos in Syria provides key evidence for a military site located in an urban setting in the third century CE, where soldiers and civilians of similar cultural backgrounds interacted yet also remained spatially separate. As the frontiers increasingly became more stable over time, the nature of all military spaces changed significantly, and overarching statements about everyday life in a typical Roman military base have to be made with caution. Military bases in the pre-Flavian period (27 BCE – 69 CE) especially show a large degree of variety, with conformity becoming more widespread between the late first and late second centuries CE, at least in the West. Such tendencies are tied to other changes in the organization of the Roman military and wider trends in Roman society, and I will draw some conclusions on their larger implications.

There are significant methodological problems for analyzing excavated Roman military spaces. Our evidence for the type of unit garrisoned within a base is often very
limited or non-existent, due in part to the lack of extensive excavations of base interiors as well as a dearth of written records tied to particular sites. In order to overcome this hurdle of definitive evidence, Richmond attempted to define a range of fort-types to match the known types of auxiliary units, concentrating on examples from the Flavian period (69–96 CE) and later. Assuming that one unit resided in one base, Richmond attributed auxiliary unit types to specific fort-types based on the overall dimensions and area of the base, as well as the number, size, and internal arrangement of the barracks, stables, and storage areas. Many scholars have critiqued his methodology, especially his assumption of one auxiliary unit per base, as there are many examples of garrisons comprised of part of a single unit, parts of several units stationed together, or more than one complete unit. Failing to find any consistent relationship between a base’s size and its epigraphically attested primary garrison in a study of over 200 examples across Europe, Bennett argued that Roman auxiliary units were not standardized in size and that some bases held garrisons composed of more than one unit (or parts of a multiple units). It was probably more frequent in the pre-Flavian period (27 BCE – 69 CE) for legionaries to share a base with auxiliaries, yet how often or to what extent is difficult to tell. It seems that bases constructed for a single unit were the exception rather than the rule. Certain clues can indicate the presence of cavalry, such as the barracks found at

521 Richmond (1955).
523 Bennett (1986).
524 Literary evidence suggests that auxiliaries and legionaries were stationed together during pre-Flavian period: Tac. Ann. 12.45 (Gorneae, Armenia), Jos. Bel. Iud. 4.486 (Adida, Jericho). Maxfield (1986) argues that the presence of legionary troops in auxiliary forts during this period has been greatly exaggerated.
the bases at Wallsend and South Shields that contained urine pits for horses. Yet often, lacking other definitive evidence, our only certainty is that some bases held auxiliaries without specifying whether they were infantry or cavalry, whether they belonged to one or more units or parts of units, or whether legionary detachments were also stationed there.

Beyond attributing unit types to individual bases, difficulties also arise in attempting to determine the function(s) of a particular building or room based on the architecture or the objects found there. For auxiliary bases in the Western provinces, almost all excavated architectural remains consist only of foundations trenches, post-holes, or stone foundations; little evidence remains of the actual walls or roofs. In the East, especially in Egypt and Syria, walls often remain up to a few meters high, yet it is often difficult to determine the varying architectural building phases. Buildings and rooms varied in their use, degree of separation, or even conceptualization by their inhabitants over time. In addition, the nature of the deposition of objects found in excavations has to be assessed carefully, as objects placed in a room long after it had been abandoned may not reflect the actual earlier function of that room. Ancient notions of “private” and “public” were also often quite different from our own. For example, a house not only may have provided living space for the household (family members, slaves, other dependents) but also may have acted as a location for the storage of agricultural produce, craft production, trade, the reception of clients or friends, or other more “public” activities. When possible, it is important to consider the impact of the

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526 Hodgson and Bidwell (2004).
cultural practices of the wider community when attributing functions or meanings to spaces.\textsuperscript{528}

Before discussing local variations, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview of the “typical” base for auxiliaries. Here I will focus on the generally permanent base first developed in the early first century CE in the West, which usually ranged in size from about 1 to 5 hectares in internal area.\textsuperscript{529} The defenses and structures were constructed of wood and turf (usually in the first century CE) or stone (late first century CE and later), although the material used varied by location and even building, and both turf/timber and stone were considered permanent building materials.\textsuperscript{530} Later I will also consider military bases associated with cities, as well as smaller outposts (often called “fortlets”) along roads, in order to get a sense of the range of possible accommodations for auxiliary troops.

Under Augustus and Tiberius (27 BCE – 37 CE), military camps typically were polygonal in shape, often conforming to the landscape, while the internal buildings (when known) followed a regular grid pattern. These camps were usually temporary, but some sites remained in use for years. By the late first century CE, the typical permanent base usually took a playing-card shape (a rectangle with rounded corners), often with a ratio of 3:2 length to width, the ideal shape recommended by \textit{De mun. castr.}\textsuperscript{531} Using terms

\textsuperscript{528} Nevett (2009).
\textsuperscript{529} This is Johnson’s definition of the size of a fort. A hectare is 10,000 square meters (100 m x 100 m), or about 2.47 acres. A. Johnson (1983): 2 defines a “fortress” as a military base (usually for legions) of around 20 hectares.
\textsuperscript{530} This is true only of the northern provinces. Bases built in North Africa and Egypt, often where there is a shortage of timber, were constructed using mud-brick or stone. Variations in this broad chronology can also be seen depending on the province, the type of unit at the fort, and even between buildings or rooms with a fort. See Hanson (2009).
\textsuperscript{531} [Pseudo-Hyg.] \textit{De mun. castr.} 21. This shape is ideal, he claims, because it allows breezes to lessen the heat of the army and because this ratio also ensures that the trumpets (\textit{classica}), signaling changing of guards, and the bugle (\textit{bucinum}), signaling a sudden attack, can be heard throughout the camp. \textit{Veg. Mil.}
derived from descriptions of temporary marching camps by Polybius, *De mun. castr.*, and other sources, scholars have labeled the various roads, gates, and sections of excavated bases, as it is clear that excavated bases conform to at least the basic principles of these temporary camps (see figure 5). Approaching the base, one first came upon one or more ditches (*fossae*) surrounding it. After crossing the ditch by a bridge or causeway, one then found the next main defense, an earthen rampart (*vallum*) or stone wall (*murus*), with angle and interval towers. Usually a base had four gates: two in the centers of the short sides, and two about a third of the way along the long sides. The “front” gate (*porta*

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1.23 is more flexible with the shape of the camp, basing it on the nature of the site. Compare Vitr. *De arch.* 1.6, who urges that city streets be aligned to allow wind to blow through the city.

prae
toria) was located on the short side of the base closest to the side gates, while the “rear” gate (porta decumana) was on the opposite short side.\textsuperscript{533} Entering through the front gate, one walked along a main road (via praetoria) through the front area of the base (praetentura). Barracks, storehouses, stables, and workshops usually lined the via praetoria on either side. Directly ahead, in the middle of the central area of buildings (latera praetorii), was the entrance to the headquarters (principia). In front of the headquarters and meeting at a right angle with the via praetoria was the other main road of the base (via principalis), which ran straight from the two side gates. Other typical buildings in the central area included the house of the military commander and his family (praetorium), one or more granaries (horreum / horrea), and sometimes another building, such as a hospital (valetudinarium) or workshop (fabrica). Behind the headquarters, in the back half of the base (retentura), a road (via decumana) led to the rear gate. Barracks and other buildings filled this area. A road along the inside of the rampart (via sagularis) allowed easy access to all the crossroads of the base. Often hearths, ovens, and latrines were located in the area between the rampart and the main buildings (intervallum). The commander’s house sometimes had its own latrine. Frequently a bathhouse was built outside the base walls. In addition, the larger military community of civilians and traders constructed houses and other buildings outside the walls, creating a sort of attached “civilian” neighborhood or town (vicus).

Although there was significant variation over time and from region to region, \textsuperscript{533} [Pseudo-Hyg.] De mun. castr. 56 urges that the porta praetoria should always face the enemy. Veg. Mil. 1.23 agrees with [Pseudo-Hyg.], but adds that the gate could also face the east (perhaps influenced by Christian practice) or in the direction of the proposed marching route. Permanent bases did not strictly adhere to these guidelines, A. Johnson (1983): 41. Veg. also adds that the porta decumana was the gate through which delinquent soldiers were taken to be punished, while [Pseudo-Hyg.] (56) argues that this gate should be at the highest point of the camp. Tac. Ann. 1.66.2, describing an early 1\textsuperscript{st} c. CE camp, says that the porta decumana was further from the enemy and the safest gate for flight.
most excavated permanent bases in the West reflect this standard plan in terms of outline (shape, defensive works, axial gates, rectilinear roads) and interior arrangement (three broad zones, central headquarters flanked by a large courtyard house, long barracks or store buildings, etc.).\textsuperscript{534} This suggests that the leaders of the Roman military established and maintained this regular pattern from place to place in order to provide a consistent physical structure of routine and discipline for auxiliary soldiers throughout the Empire, creating, in a sense, a “disciplining of space” and a “theatre of control.”\textsuperscript{535} The actual construction of the camp helped reinforce discipline among the troops. Military labor, especially the building and rebuilding of military bases, often merely to keep the troops occupied, reinforced their obedience and their officers’ control over them.\textsuperscript{536} For camps located in a relatively secure position (\textit{loco securiori}), \textit{De mun. castr.} recommended that the troops dig a ditch (\textit{fossa}), at least “for the sake of discipline” (\textit{causa disciplinae}), if not for actual defense.\textsuperscript{537}

The repeated features of military bases acted as external and internal divisions typical of social organizations. For example, the walls and ditches of the base may have helped to create a sense of internal community, dividing (at least symbolically) soldiers from the outside world.\textsuperscript{538} In a less secure position (\textit{loco suspicior i}), \textit{De mun. castr.}
argued that troops should build a rampart (vallum). The Romans treated the rampart as “sacred, for the sake of the instruction” of the troops.\textsuperscript{539} By equating the protective wall with a sacred object, the Romans hoped to create a sense of fear and awe for the soldier who contemplated desertion, especially in hostile territory. In turn, the wall acted as a boundary-marker between soldiers and outsiders, perhaps facilitating the creation of a sense of community within the walls.\textsuperscript{540} Roman officials also used religion as a strategy for controlling the meaning of space, and, in turn, the identities of soldiers. Roman generals of the mid-Republic, and even the early Empire, were said to have used a shaming punishment to reinforce the religious symbolism of the rampart. Cowardly soldiers were expelled from the camp, beyond the rampart and the ditch, and given barley to eat instead of wheat rations.\textsuperscript{541} Forcing men to sleep outside the camp and eat barley was a symbolic expulsion from Roman military society and the Roman food system. This practice assumed that soldiers were affected by shame and cared about the thoughts of their peers and superiors (or at least about their safety and their diet).\textsuperscript{542} By the third century CE, Roman law also reinforced the sanctity of the rampart, imposing capital punishment upon any soldier who scaled the rampart; however, if he merely crossed the ditch, he was only expelled from the army.\textsuperscript{543}

Two key features of the military construction of space shaped its typical design: the limited private or individual space in relation to the dominance of the public or

\textsuperscript{539} [Pseudo-Hyg.] De mun. castr. 50: causa instructionis sanctum est cognominatum.
\textsuperscript{540} Gardner (2007a): 102.
\textsuperscript{541} Livy 10.4.4; Val. Max. 2.7.15.b and Front. Strat. 4.1.18 (280 BCE); Front. Strat. 4.1.19 (263/1 or 246 BCE); Livy 24.18 (216 BCE); Front. Strat. 4.1.23 and Val. Max. 2.7.10 (143 BCE); Front. Strat. 4.1.26 and Val. Max. 2.7.9 (133 BCE). Corbulo under Nero (50s-60s CE): Tac. Ann. 13.36.5; Front. Strat. 4.1.21.
\textsuperscript{542} Phang (2008): 142-43.
\textsuperscript{543} Dig. 49.16.3.17-18 (Modestinus Poen. 4): Nec non et si vallum quis transcendent aut per murum castra ingrediatur; capite punitur. (18) Si vero quis fossam transiluit, militia reicitur.
corporate space, and the major differentials in power, based largely on the different sizes and locations of the headquarters (principia) and the commanding officer’s residence (praetorium) in relation to the barracks.\footnote{Gardner (2007a): 106-07.} It is the variable nature of the relationship between these types of spaces that demonstrates the constant negotiation of power and identity played out in the everyday life of the military community.

One consistent feature of nearly every first-century military base in the Western provinces was the headquarters (principia).\footnote{A. Johnson (1983): 104-32.} Centrally placed and located at the junction of the two main streets of the base, the principia included a large courtyard surrounded by colonnaded walkways, similar to a forum in a Roman town. An imposing structure, often the largest single building in the base, and usually the first one in the base to be converted into stone, the principia offered an official space for the reinforcement of Roman ideals of discipline, hierarchy, and power. Here the soldiers gathered for various military and religious activities, and one can imagine that this space provoked many soldiers to feel an often conflicting range of emotions, such as loyalty, religious awe, fear, perhaps even anger. Behind the courtyard was a range of rooms. The central room of the range is usually identified as the unit’s shrine (sacellum or aedes). Holding religious images of the imperial cult, military standards of the unit, and the treasury, the sacellum was the heart of the base, a physical manifestation of the motivating factors of the soldiers: their emperor, their unit, and their pay.

Yet even these official spaces varied widely in size and layout. Most scholars attribute these differences in detail to chronological or regional factors. For example, in his review of Schönberger’s final excavation report of the auxiliary base at Künzing in
Raetia, Breeze noticed that the *principia* contained seven rooms at the rear, a number of chambers on the sides, and no crosshall in the rear, but a forehall at the front parallel to the *via principalis*. He describes these features as “rare in Britain but common in Germany.” Such regional variety could be attributed to the different building techniques of the different legions stationed in the different provinces, as legions are usually thought to be in charge of base construction, at least in the first century CE.

Alternatively, one could suggest that the auxiliary units themselves played some role in shaping the layout of even the most Roman of spaces, such as the *principia*. Whatever the cause of the variety, its very existence demonstrates that despite the seemingly standardizing discourse regarding the layout of bases, no military space provided the same experience for every soldier.

The locations and relative sizes of the barracks and the commanding officer’s residence (*praetorium*) in Western bases also reinforced the military hierarchy and differences in rank, wealth, and power. The commanding officer (including his family and staff) by far received the most domestic space in the base, usually around 20-30% of the total area of the fort, similar in size to the *principia*. Of course, the term “domestic” may not be completely appropriate, as it is clear that many official or manufacturing activities also occurred in the *praetorium*. The centurions or decurions, on the other hand, were generally stationed in a large suite on the end of a barracks block, while the common soldiers had to share a space (*contubernium*) within the barracks.

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548 For example, in period three at Vindolanda, the excavators identified the building where the correspondence of the commanding officer were found as the *praetorium*. Evidence of metal- and leather-working were also found in this structure. See “Exhibitiong>History>Period 3” at Vindolanda Tablets Online [http://vindolanda.csad.ox.ac.uk/](http://vindolanda.csad.ox.ac.uk/) and R. E. Birley (1994): 54-91.
generally no larger than thirty square meters with seven other men, perhaps even horses, slaves, or family members.\textsuperscript{549}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>Date (CE)</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Area in m\textsuperscript{2} of principia</th>
<th>Area in m\textsuperscript{2} of praetorium</th>
<th>Area in m\textsuperscript{2} of individual centurion’s or decurion’s quarters</th>
<th>Area in m\textsuperscript{2} of individual contubernia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valkenburg</td>
<td>39/40 – 41/42</td>
<td>Germania Inferior</td>
<td>Katwijk, Netherlands (near mouth of Old Rhine)</td>
<td>a vexillatio from cohors III Gallorum equitata</td>
<td>1.4 ha / 3.5 acres</td>
<td>c. 900</td>
<td>c. 870</td>
<td>51.04 – 79.2</td>
<td>17.4 – 24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oberstimm 1b</td>
<td>c. 40 – 69/70</td>
<td>Raetia</td>
<td>South of Ingolstadt, Germany; Upper Danube</td>
<td>unknown; probably a cohors equitata</td>
<td>1.43 ha / 3.5 acres</td>
<td>c. 548</td>
<td>c. 560</td>
<td>93.5 – 97.75</td>
<td>21 – 24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanstallon</td>
<td>55/65 – c. 80</td>
<td>Britannia</td>
<td>Bodmin, Cornwall, SW England</td>
<td>unknown; probably a cohors equitata</td>
<td>0.89 ha / 2.2 acres</td>
<td>c. 208</td>
<td>c. 250</td>
<td>28.12 – 60.48</td>
<td>24.42 – 30.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elginhaugh</td>
<td>79/80 – 86/88</td>
<td>Britannia</td>
<td>Dalkeith, Midlothian, Scotland</td>
<td>unknown; probably a vexillatio of an ala quingenaria</td>
<td>1.56 ha / 3.85 acres</td>
<td>c. 495</td>
<td>c. 678</td>
<td>84 – 102</td>
<td>11.6 – 16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Künzing 1</td>
<td>c. 90 – c. 120</td>
<td>Raetia</td>
<td>SE of where the Isar joins the Danube</td>
<td>cohors III Thracum civium Romanorum equitata</td>
<td>1.96 ha / 4.9 acres</td>
<td>c. 1172</td>
<td>n/a (prob. c. 1000)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>c. 30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 1. Size of “domestic” space in auxiliary bases in the Western provinces in the first century CE}\textsuperscript{550}

Spaces were also more elaborate and complex the higher up the chain of command. A \textit{praetorium} often had an internal courtyard surrounded by a colonnaded walkway, multiple chambers of varying sizes and of various functions, higher-status pottery (such as fine tableware), and even a private latrine. A centurion or decurion’s quarters, attached at the end of the barracks block, also had multiple chambers,

\textsuperscript{549} The proportion of the barracks block given over to officers’ quarters is usually around 23-25\% of the total length, see Hanson et al. (2007): 67.

\textsuperscript{550} Valkenburg: Glasbergen and Groenman-Van Waateringe (1974); Oberstimm: Schönberger (1978); Nanstallon: Fox and Ravenhill (1972); Elginhaugh: Hanson et al. (2007); Künzing: Schönberger (1975). For a more complete study of barracks in relation to other spaces within military spaces, see Davison (1989).
sometimes a latrine, and could be painted quite elaborately, as demonstrated by the mid-
second-century wall-painting at the auxiliary base at Echzell.  Fine tableware, such as
samian ware (terra sigillata) from southern Gaul found in the end suites of the barracks
at Elginhaugh, also indicates that these spaces reflected the status and wealth of their
inhabitants. On the other hand, the common soldiers’ contubernium usually consisted
of two rooms, the front for storage and the rear for sleeping. How the eight or so men
actually shared the sleeping quarters is unknown, and while some scholars suggest that
each soldier slept in a separate bunkbed, it is more likely that soldiers slept in much
closer quarters than modern tastes. Two men to a bed was probably common, and if
soldiers had female companions or children, they may have shared the bed, too.
Alternatively, family or slaves may have slept in upper story lofts. Different cultural
backgrounds would have shaped a soldier’s comfort level with such close personal space.
Recent evidence of urine pits found in barracks at Elginhaugh, Wallsend, and South
Shields in Britain demonstrates that cavalrymen may have stabled their horses in the front
room of the contubernium, but since only three horses could fit in the front rooms, it has

552 Hanson et al. (2007): 396.
553 A. Johnson (1983): 171-72, especially the fig. 131 on p. 172, suggests that men slept in bunkbeds, with
one man per bed. This reconstruction is based on excavations of an ala fort at Heidenheim, Raetia, in
which excavators found small postholes on three sides of the rear room of the contubernium, creating three
areas of 80 x 200 cm, “probably the remains of bedsteads for bunk beds which originally lay opposite the
fireplace and long the side walls,” A. Johnson (1983): 171. For comparison, modern North American
single (twin) beds are typically 99 x 191 cm, while camp cots are about 76 x 191 cm. However, since the
ala were higher status and also cavalrymen, they normally had more space, with 3 to 4 men sharing a room,
as opposed to eight infantrymen in cohortes.
554 Comparative evidence from 18th and 19th century frontier forts on the British colonial and American
frontier suggests that most men slept in bunkbeds, but shared a single bed with another man, with the result
that there were four men per bunk. When a soldier was given the privilege of keeping his wife and family
with him, they often shared his single bed; see Dunnigan (1999): 27-37 and McConnell (2004): 53-72. I
imagine that similar tight quarters may have been experienced by soldiers in Roman military bases. In
addition, we cannot assume based on modern notions of personal space or privacy that auxiliary soldiers,
coming from a range of cultural backgrounds, all felt the same way toward their limited (or abundant)
personal space. The reconstructed auxiliary barracks block at Arbeia Roman Fort and Museum in South
Shields has a single king-sized bed for four people.
been thought that only three cavalrymen shared the backroom, as opposed to the
traditional eight infantrymen.\textsuperscript{555} This suggestion conforms to the greater status and pay
of cavalrymen as compared to infantrymen.\textsuperscript{556}

While the general size and orientation of these spaces, especially the domestic
spaces, seem to have conformed to the elite ideologies of discipline and hierarchy, other
evidence suggests that soldiers, at times, did not blindly follow the spatial strategies of
their superiors. Rather, subtle variations in the construction and use of spaces points to a
range of possible spatial tactics used by the soldiers that were at odds with traditional
military discipline. The evidence is sparse, and by no means unambiguous, but it is this
very ambiguity that ought to force us to reflect on multiple interpretations, rather than
trying to conform them to overarching ideologies or preconceived notions of propriety.

We must first question our assumptions when investigating architectural remains.
Many excavation reports of Roman bases provide “theoretical” layouts based on a few
excavated trenches and, more questionably, on the assumption that the layout of the base
was symmetrical or followed a consistent model. This is a particular problem for
barracks, as the number and size of \textit{contubernia} most likely varied much more than most
excavation plans would allow. Too many straight lines and too much conformity have
been imposed on the excavated remains by the excavators themselves, often without
explicitly describing the rationale behind their supplements and restorations.\textsuperscript{557}

\textsuperscript{555} Hanson et al. (2007): 69 and Hodgson and Bidwell (2004). See also Hodgson (2003): 71-80, which
includes comparative examples from the Danube frontier.
\textsuperscript{556} For the pay of Roman soldiers, see M. A. Speidel (1992a) and M. A. Speidel (2014b). For an alternate
view, see Alston (1994).
\textsuperscript{557} This tendency is most apparent in the plan for period 1 of Künzig, in which Schönberger restores the
entire plan, including eight identical barracks in the \textit{praetentura} (Beilage 1.1). However, upon closer
inspection of the actual trenches, one finds that the majority of these barracks and their internal
arrangements are largely based on speculation or comparanda from plans which themselves had been
restored (Beilage 5 & 6).
Closer inspection of the often limited architectural remains does suggest some possibility for local intervention by the soldiers themselves. By analyzing the mortared stone foundations of the barracks at the Roman base at South Shields, near the eastern end of Hadrian’s Wall, excavators have determined that each individual *contubernium* had a different construction style for its front wall.\(^{558}\) They also found that a number of these front walls included stones inscribed with images of male genitalia (*phalli*), interpreted as good luck symbols. The excavators suggest that both of these features point to the construction of the *contubernia* by the soldiers who were to inhabit these spaces. If true, although this evidence is from the third century CE, it does suggest the possibility that soldiers played a larger role in shaping their own “domestic” space.

Regimented, uniform differentiation in hierarchies of space seems to have been a driving feature of many auxiliary bases in the Western provinces. Evidence from Egypt, however, reveals that such conformity varied greatly by province, and even by region within each province. Excavations and surveys of military bases along the road from the town of Koptos (Quft) on the Nile to the port of Myos Hormos on the Red Sea point to a military spatial orientation that was greatly shaped by the resources and geography of the desert (see figure 6).\(^{559}\) Built most likely during the Flavian period due to an increase in trade between the Mediterranean world and India, as well as increased “barbarian” attacks on the road, these bases housed troops who policed the desert, carried official

\(^{558}\) Specifically the barracks newly built in the southeast corner of the fort in c. 225/35 CE. See Hodgson and Bidwell (2004): 143.

communications between the Nile and the Red Sea, and guarded the wells (hydreumata). The bases also served as stopping points for both official and civilian

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travelers along the road.\textsuperscript{561} Two bases (\textit{praesidia}) along the route, Krokodilo at al-Muweih and Maximianon at al-Zerqah, provide the best architectural and documentary evidence. Ostraka, ceramics, and others finds discovered within the external dumps show that Krokodilo was intensely occupied during the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian (late first – early second centuries CE), while Maximianon was in use for about one hundred years or more (mid-first century – early third century CE).\textsuperscript{562}

These two bases are notably smaller than the typical auxiliary bases in the Western provinces, with Krokodilo about 0.23–0.28 hectares (0.57–0.68 acres) in area and Maximianon about 0.27–0.36 hectares (0.66–0.89 acres), less than a quarter of the size of a typical Western auxiliary base.\textsuperscript{563} The familiar layout of \textit{De mun. castr.} does not apply here; rather, the acquisition and protection of water sources at the centers of the bases seem to have been the leading principles behind their design, reflecting different needs than those in the Western provinces.\textsuperscript{564} Each base has only one gate and rounded towers. Square in shape, the bases have internal central wells, similar to bases on the northern half of the road from Koptos to Berenike and some bases in Syria, but different from other Egyptian bases of the Eastern Desert.\textsuperscript{565} The internal buildings generally abut the walls of the base, with simple single-cell rooms that rarely interconnect.

Given their small size, it is perhaps not surprising that there is a lack of any

\textsuperscript{561} That is, serving as \textit{khans} or caravanserai, in which travelers are housed inside the defenses; see Cuvigny (2006): 239-40.
\textsuperscript{563} Krokodilo internally measures 48.10 m east to west and 47.60 m north to south (about 52 m by 53.30 m including the walls), while Maximianon internally measures 51.80 m east to west and 51.22 north to south (about 59/60 m on each side, including the walls and towers). See Cuvigny (2006): 79 and 100.
\textsuperscript{564} For an analysis of the military architecture of the bases on the road to Myos Hormos in comparison to other Eastern forts, see esp. Cuvigny (2006): 235-62, including comparative charts and plans.
clearly discernible hierarchy in space in these desert bases. There is evidence of central
buildings near the wells, and while it is difficult to identify these structures as true
principia based on the limited excavated remains, their central position near the gates of
the base could point to their function as an official command post that observed the
movement of people in and out of the base.\textsuperscript{566} At Maximianon, the central room along
the southern circuit wall directly across from the gate was excavated (room 37), as it was
much larger than the other rooms (7 x 4 m). Excavators uncovered a series of three
benches, with a niche placed in the central section of the back wall, coated with lime.\textsuperscript{567}
Reddé identified this room as the sacellum/aedes (shrine), which in other bases would
have been located in a centrally placed principia.\textsuperscript{568} He suggests that the imperial busts,
statues, and military standards could have been placed on the benches or in the niche.
Limited excavations of two rooms along the southern wall at Krokodilo revealed only
that the interior walls of the rooms were coated with mud mortar. A lack of many finds in
the interior of this base suggests that the soldiers probably cleared the base of material
prior to abandoning it.\textsuperscript{569} A small bath was installed in the northeast corner of
Maximianon, with a series of rooms interpreted as a kitchen located nearby.\textsuperscript{570}

No clear evidence of a praetorium exists at Krokodilo, although the excavators
suggest that the rooms in the northwest corner may have played this role, based on
parallels with Maximianon. Guard-duty rosters found on ostraka at Maximianon mention
the κόξα πρετορίο (coxa praetorii, “angle of the praetorium”), leading the excavators to

\textsuperscript{567} Cuvigny (2006): 105.
\textsuperscript{569} Cuvigny (2006): 83.
\textsuperscript{570} Cuvigny (2006): 106-08, 247. For more on military baths in Greco-Roman Egypt, see Redon (2009); for the West, see Revell (2007) and Bidwell (2009).
identify a series of four interconnecting rooms in the southwest corner of the base on the wall opposite the gate as the *praetorium*, the office and living quarters of the *curator* of the base.\(^{571}\) This space equals about 60 m\(^2\) in internal area, only about twice the size of the other typical rooms.\(^{572}\) The corner room of the *praetorium* (room 51) was found filled with soil nearly 2 m high, unlike the other rooms, which were empty. The soil protected the walls, and upon excavation it was revealed that the walls were covered with a clay mortar coated with white plaster, which in turn was covered with a greenish clay.\(^{573}\) This suggests that the walls of the room were decorated, perhaps reflecting the status of the *curator*. The layers of soil reveal a number of changes to the floor level over the years, and finds include five clay balls bearing the pattern of a cavalryman, perhaps serving as document seals of the *curator*, as they were found in levels low enough to be considered occupation levels (or at least early abandonment levels).\(^{574}\)

At Krokodilo, the rooms abutting the walls (which the excavators identified as “barracks”) are about 5.9 m in length and 3.3–6 m in width (about 19.5–35 m\(^2\)), comparable in size to the individual *contubernia* in Western bases.\(^{575}\) At Maximianon, the best preserved base on the route to Myos Hormos, a similar arrangement of buildings existed. The rooms abutting the walls on the south, west, and north side of Maximianon are generally simple spaces, similar in size to those at Krokodilo.

The difference in size and complexity of the *curator*’s space and that of the other soldiers does not suggest a large degree of separation in status and power. The

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The spatial arrangement seems to support this view. In these smaller bases, then, the spatial “strategy” of the architects and builders was less focused on the reinforcement of discipline and hierarchy. The experience of soldiers stationed in these smaller outposts may therefore have been quite different than those of their counterparts in larger, more regimented bases along the British and Rhine frontiers.

The military bases of Krokodilo and Maximianon, along with the other praesidia along the Myos Hormos road, offer a clear indication of the variegated nature of Roman military space. Soldiers were stationed at these bases in groups of about 15–17 men, although it has been suggested that up to 64 soldiers may have been stationed at each base. The commanding officers of the bases do not seem to have been of a much

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577 Reddé (Cuvigny (2006): 244-47), based on the average size of the bases and the number of rooms, assuming 4 to 6 men per contubernium, and assuming that not all space inside the base was occupied at one time, estimates that about two turmae occupied each base (one turma = 30 to 32 men); he then argues that the road to Myos Hormos, with its 6 to 8 bases occupied at the same time, mobilized about one entire ala (= 16 turmae). He argues that it is reasonable to assume that the garrison of each base in normal times was about 30 men, or one turma or its equivalent (247). Cuvigny, however, based on the ostraka listing those on duty in the guard towers (pp. 307-9), estimates that there were 15-17 men per base. Yet Cuvigny also tries to estimate the total population (civilian and military) at each base by using an average figure of 9-10 m² of roofed floor space per person; the results are startling: at Krokodilo, the total occupants could be 116, at Maximianon, 100. Does this mean that civilians made up the majority? And that space was set aside for travelers? Or is this method of estimation not valid? See the table at Cuvigny (2006): 309. See also Cuvigny (2005): 2-5.
greater status or power than the soldiers themselves. Civilians clearly lived in the bases, some for many years at a time. They may have even outnumbered the soldiers in the base.\footnote{Cuvigny (2006): 311.} While infantry soldiers were largely recruited from the Greco-Egyptian population of the towns along the Nile, many of the cavalrmen came from Thrace or Dacia. This mixed cultural environment, combined with the lack of a clearly articulated hierarchy of space, must have created a very different working and living experience for the auxiliary soldiers. The harsh climate and seemingly isolated nature of the bases was somewhat mitigated by the rather more homogeneous spatial orientation. Personal letters, many of which were found at these desert stations on excavated ostraka, show that in fact these soldiers maintained complex ties of friendship, patronage, and other types of relationships between bases and the Nile valley. Examples of these relationships are explored further in chapter five.\footnote{Cuvigny (2005): 4-5 argues strongly against the traditional view that sees these soldiers as bored and isolated. Rather, the documents suggest a vibrant community of civilians, soldiers, travelers, men, women, and children.}

While small desert military bases in Egypt forced auxiliary soldiers of various backgrounds to interact, the spatial arrangements of urban bases in the Eastern provinces encouraged similar daily interactions between soldiers and civilians, many of whom shared cultural backgrounds. Dura-Europos, located on the middle Euphrates, gives us key insight into the nature of military space within an Eastern urban context (see figure 7).\footnote{For a general introduction, see Pollard (2000): 44-58, Baird (2014): 20-25. The preliminary reports from the 1928-1937 excavations will be cited as Dura Prelim, while the final reports will be cited as Dura Final. I.Dura = Frye et al. (1955).} Founded as a Greek Seleucid city in ca. 300 BCE, Dura-Europos fell under Parthian control in the second century BCE. The Parthians fortified the city, as it held a key point on their western frontier. Dura-Europos was later briefly occupied by the
Romans in 115 CE, then permanently held by Rome from 165 to 256/7 CE, when the

Figure 7. Dura-Europos (Europos-Dura) (Image by La Mission Franco-Syrienne d’Europos-Doura (MFSED), https://sites.google.com/site/europosdoura/Home)
Sassanian Persians besieged and conquered the city. They soon abandoned it, and the site was generally deserted until French and American excavations in the early twentieth century. It is doubtful that the evidence from Dura is necessarily representative of Roman military occupation of cities throughout the Eastern provinces, especially since most of our evidence relates to the final days of the Roman military occupation of the city leading up to the final siege in 256/7; nevertheless, the data is suggestive of possibilities.\footnote{Problems with dating and stratigraphy, particularly of small finds, makes the Dura evidence additionally challenging.} Problems with dating and stratigraphy, particularly of small finds, makes the Dura evidence additionally challenging.

Dura under Roman occupation had a complex history of civic development and cultural expressions from Syrian, Greek, Parthian, and Roman inhabitants, many of whom drew on an array of religious practices, from local Syrian or Greco-Roman cults to Jewish and Christian worship, and wrote in an array of languages and scripts, such as Greek, Latin, Palmyrene, Hatrean, Aramaic, Safaitic, Syriac, and Middle Persian.\footnote{Soldiers of the auxiliary units derived largely from inhabitants of Eastern provinces and cities, such as Palmyra. A shared cultural background may have helped facilitate soldier and civilian interactions, since Palmyrenes had already been living in Dura for a long time before these soldiers.} Yet the spatial arrangements of the military quarter, cut off from the rest of the city, suggests some degree of difference in experience.

Roman legionary vexillations and auxiliary units occupied the northwestern part

\footnote{For the unrepresentative nature of the evidence from Dura, see Millar (1993): 438.}{For the changing nature of civic performance and identities, see Andrade (2013): 211-44. For the array of languages, see Millar (1993): 445. The complex relationship between written evidence, onomastics, and ethnic or linguistic identity in Dura is explored by Baird (2014): 256-62, who agrees with Bagnall (2011): 104 in that although Greek was the language of public business and formal literacy, and Latin was used for the formal documents of the Roman military, it is possible that a form of Aramaic was the most frequently spoken language at Dura, as suggested by the appearance of some contracts in Syriac.}{Dirven (1999).}
of the city by the second decade of the third century CE. While the entire perimeter of the city was fortified and defended by soldiers, the excavators believed that this northwestern section of the city was a “military quarter,” as most of the new military buildings were constructed there. The size of this “military quarter,” while difficult to determine conclusively, was about eight to twelve hectares, much larger than the auxiliary bases in the West in the first and second centuries CE, but smaller than typical legionary fortresses. In block E7 excavators identified a building as the headquarters of the legionary forces (called praetorium in the reports, but properly called a principia) and another building in the same block as the possible headquarters or archive of the auxiliary units, especially the cohors XX Palmyrenorum, located in the “Temple of Azzanathkona.” Directly west of block E7 is block J1, where the excavators identified a courtyard house as the residence of the legionary commander (properly called the praetorium). Also, the excavators claimed that a mud brick wall separated, at least partially, the military sector from the civilian sector of the city. This wall, according to the published plan, starting just south of Tower 21 of the western city wall (south of block J8) and heading east four blocks (until block F7 at D street), was 1.65 m wide and had one gate ca. 3 m wide at B street, wide enough to allow vehicle traffic through it.

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584 Pollard (2000): 48-50. For a recent re-examination of the military base within the city, including a magnetometry survey revealing more structures, see James (2007) and James et al. (2012). See now also Baird (2014): 111-54.
586 The principia is identified by its architectural plan, as well as inscriptions and graffiti referring to legionary vexillations; see Dura Prelim 5, 205-18, and the dedicatory inscription to Caracalla at Dura Prelim 5, 218-21, no. 556. The auxiliary headquarters is identified by graffiti and papyri relating to cohors XX Palmyrenorum; see Dura Prelim 5, 216-217, 295-303.
587 The legionary commander’s residence was identified on the basis of its position in relation to the principia, which the excavators claimed was similar to that of bases in the Western provinces; see Dura Prelim 5, 235-237.
588 Dura Prelim 9, pt. 3, 69.
589 Dura Prelim 9, pt. 3, 69; Dura Prelim 7, plate within rear cover (plan of the city); Dura Final 7, 17, fig. 4 = James (2004); James (2007): 38-39.
inscription found in a house occupied by soldiers in block E8, north of block F7, suggests that the wall was constructed in 211/2 or 217 CE at a length of one hundred paces.  
Recent excavations at the east end of this “camp wall,” from the gate on B street to D street, show that the wall across the western half of D street had already been abolished by 256 CE, perhaps previously by the Persians, as the city was held by them ca. 253 CE or earlier. These excavations also show that this camp wall did not run beyond D street continuously eastwards to the amphitheater, although it has been argued that E street and F street were blocked off in some other way. James argues that the purpose of this wall was not defensive, but rather was to provide internal security, surveillance, and control of the movement of people in and out of the military area. Other military buildings included an amphitheater (block F3) at the southeast corner of the base, several bath buildings (block E3, F3), and some religious spaces.

During the military occupation of the city, a number of houses within the “military quarter” were converted into accommodations for soldiers, including houses in blocks K5, J7, E8, and E4, although the full extent of military accommodation within the base is unclear. Such conversion is evident by significant architectural changes to the structures, such as blocking doors and creating new ones. Evidence of military occupation of the city outside the “military quarter,” such as wall-paintings, graffiti, and items of military dress, was also found in houses throughout the city, suggesting that

590 I.Dura 59.
592 James (2007): 43. Pollard (2000): 48 sees this wall as separating soldier from civilian, although he, too, recognizes the walls permeability.
593 James (2007): 44, suggests that the bulk of the ordinary soldiers, most of whom probably did not have families even though they were allowed to at this time, probably accommodated the converted buildings along 8th Street, that is, E8, J2, J4, J6, J8, and the parts of blocks K south of 8th Street that were included in the military base by the mud brick wall.
soldiers were not restricted to occupying the northwest area of the city, at least at the end of the Roman occupation. There are examples of houses outside of the “military quarter” that show signs of major structural changes, suggesting that perhaps these houses were only occupied by soldiers temporarily at the end of the Roman occupation, rather than the more permanent changes to houses within the “military quarter” itself. Nevertheless, during the final Sassanian siege, it seems unlikely that soldiers were merely “billeted” within civilian houses outside of the “military quarter,” as suggested by Pollard; rather, it is more likely that the civilians had fled at this point, and that the Roman soldiers had occupied most of the houses within the entire city, making Dura, in effect, “not an urban site with a military garrison, but an urban site that had in its entirety become a military garrison.”

Within the “military quarter” a number of typical Durene courtyard houses were converted to military use, most likely in the reign of Caracalla (211-217 CE) or later. The barracks-house in block E4 is the best published example of converted civilian housing, and the interpretation of its remains again exemplifies the desire of

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594 Examples include the “House of the Roman Scribes” (house A in block L7), containing portraits of Roman junior officers; houses in block M8 ( legionary graffiti); house C in block C7 (κοντοβερνάλιον / contubernales graffito); a house in block L5 (stamp with Latin name; graffito depicting a soldier holding a standard); house H in block G7 (tombstone of Julius Terentius, tribune of cohors XX Palmyrenorum); military equipment in houses A and B in block G1. See Pollard (2000): 55, Baird (2011b), Baird (2012).
595 Pollard (2000): 55-56, citing Dura Prelim 6, 301. However, due to the lack of thorough documentation of housing by excavators, some structural changes may have occurred but were not recorded.
596 Billeting: Pollard (2000): 54-56; quote from Baird (2012): 166, focusing on houses in block G1, in the “agora” district, who argues for the spread of the Roman garrison throughout the city at the final stages of Roman occupation, ca. 253-256/7, based on finds of military equipment and epigraphic evidence, following the analysis of Dura military equipment by her doctoral advisor Simon James, Dura Final 7, 236.
597 These barrack conversions are dated generally through structural relationships with the surrounding street levels, which are then related to the military buildings which contained dedicatory inscriptions. No houses were dated by pottery. For recent approaches of incorporating small finds with the published architectural reports, see Baird (2011b), Baird (2011a), Baird (2012), and more fully in Baird (2014).
archaeologists to assign auxiliary units to barracks based on size of space alone. It is identified as military housing based on finds of military equipment in the rooms and soldiers’ graffiti (mostly Greek, some Latin) on the walls. Located southeast of the “praetorium” (i.e., the principia, E7), immediately south of the bath (E3), and immediately north of the amphitheater (F3), the barracks-house of E4 was at the crossroads of numerous important military buildings. Structural remains suggest a series of modifications over time, but there are no firm dates for these phases. The excavators recognized that the building was “radically altered...a considerable time after its original construction” by the blocking of old doors, cutting of new ones, removing one partition wall, and adding two new partition walls. They attributed this modification to soldiers of the cohort Ulpia equitata civium Romanorum, which was attested in Dura starting between 185-192 CE, although the excavators assumed that the unit arrived at the end of Lucius Verus’s Parthian campaign in ca. 165 CE. They based this attribution to the size of space alone, as they believed that the space seems to have held a century, that is, 60-90 men plus four officers of this attested cohort. Another possibility they suggested is that the house held the immunes of the administrative staff of the tribune. An additional modification to the building occurred around 210 CE, when the cohort XX Palmyrenorum arrived in Dura.

598 Dura Prelim 6, 4-48, esp. 19-48; plan: plate II; room 23, south wall, mural fragment: plate XL, 4; room 33, wall decoration: plate XLI, 2. A recent survey of one of the two houses in block K5 was conducted in 2005 and showed modifications to the structure very similar to those of E8 and E4, see James (2007): 38, 44.
599 Dura Prelim 6, 19.
600 Dating of phases of house in block E4: Dura Prelim 6, 30-32; inscriptions mentioning cohort II Ulpia equitata: Dura Prelim 1, 42-44, no. 1 (185-92 CE; the reading Paphlogonum) later abandoned); Dura Prelim 5, 225-29, no. 561 (194 CE, found in the “Temple of Azzanathkona”, block E7); perhaps Dura Prelim 2, 83-86, no. H1.
601 Dura Prelim 6, 28-29.
602 The dating of this modification is based on the relationship of the building architecture to the
Once again we see the variety in expressions of Roman military space, this time in a converted civilian house. Yet the overall spatial orientation of the buildings in the “military quarter” do replicate, to a certain extent, that found in newly-built military bases in the West. Clearly, the Roman spatial “strategy” could be modified to fit the local situation while also maintaining the key elements of the traditional military base. In these situations, however, auxiliary soldiers may have had more leeway in their engagement with the space, shaping the non-standard buildings and niches to their own needs and desires. The evidence from abandoned settlements such as Dura and the praesidia of the Egyptian desert, particularly the written evidence, offers intriguing examples of this diversity in experience, some of which will be explored in the next chapter.

Overall, the spatial layouts of military bases throughout the Empire were shaped not only by the official “strategies” of the initial designers, but also by province, geography, and the very men inhabiting them. While the overall layout was fairly stable over time, particularly in the Western provinces, building materials and spatial distribution did change, often for reasons beyond what our evidence can tell us. By examining newly built military bases on the Western frontiers in the first century, praesidia guarding the desert roads of Egypt in the second century, and urban spaces converted into military use in Syria in the third century, this section has traced the spatial and temporal variety of Roman military space. Of course, this analysis does not suggest that these examples demonstrate a trend over time, a shift from wooden forts to fortified cities. What they do show is the overall variety in Roman military spatial expressions surrounding street levels, and connecting them to foundation inscriptions from nearby buildings.
and provide a clear check to the proscriptive views of the elite literary sources.

The push from above was great, and the archaeological evidence demonstrates that Roman military spaces do reflect a certain degree of conformity that greatly affected an auxiliary soldier’s experience of military space. Yet no two military bases were identical. The Romans did not impose a singular model military space throughout the Empire. Certain standards were set and local modifications allowed. While geography and local political or strategic considerations played an important role in the design of these spaces, such variety leaves open the possibility of the influence of the soldiers themselves on the creation and meanings behind these spaces. When considering the archaeological remains, we must be open to these variations in meaning and attempt to hold in check our assumptions based on the spatial “strategies” of elite literary authors. While we cannot truly uncover the full range of possible experiences and ideas that shaped and were shaped by these spaces, we can at least hesitate before imposing our own.

4.4 Conclusion

My analysis of De mun. castr. in the context of other scientific and technical treatises in the early second century CE suggests that Roman elites went to great lengths to stipulate the spatial “strategies” of military spaces. Changes to the Roman military camp between Polybius in the mid-second century BCE and the De mun. castr. reflected, in part, the increased reliance of Rome on auxiliary soldiers. While military surveyors debated the best practices of designing and constructing military spaces, the soldiers themselves contributed to their design and greatly shaped the meaning and experience of military spaces. Subtle variations in the treatment and positioning of auxiliary soldiers in
relation to other units within this theoretical military camp confirm the often ambiguous place that auxiliaries held in the Roman imagination.

While many frontier bases by the early second century CE did not have a large mixed garrison of legionaries, auxiliaries, and foreign units, sentiments similar to those found in De mun. castr. influenced their design. The archaeological evidence derived from these military bases in Britain, the Rhine frontier, Egypt, and Syria seems to confirm that any assessment of military bases as purely disciplined, masculine, Roman spaces masks the very diversity of the experiences of these contested spaces. The individual cultural context of the military bases and the surrounding communities also greatly shaped the spatial meanings. In Britain and the Rhine frontier during the first century CE, auxiliary soldiers of cultural backgrounds similar to the surrounding community most likely shared expectations of spatial practices and would have found the hierarchical structuring of military spaces to be somewhat familiar. Dacian auxiliary soldiers stationed in the small desert road outposts of Egypt, though, would have perhaps been surprised by the small, less differentiated spaces and spatial functions, especially with civilian travelers sharing the spaces. The urban experience of auxiliaries at Dura-Europos, mixed with legionaries yet somewhat separated from civilians, would have offered a different experience altogether, especially during the Persian siege of the city. Still, we have no direct evidence to suggest how exactly a soldier may have felt about living in a frontier base or a city garrison. But traces of the everyday practices of soldiers, and the very diversity yet unity of the spatial design, seem to confirm that auxiliaries had more impact on Roman notions of military space than previously allowed.

Military bases, while ultimately designed for both the protection and control of
the troops, in many ways aligned with Livy and Tacitus’s assertion that the base was a soldier’s home. Yet the meanings attributed to the arrangement and the practices within a military base did not simply reflect those of their Roman designers. As a socially constructed space, built largely through the sweat and blood of the soldiers themselves, a military base served as a focus of contestation and negotiation. Was it designed to protect the soldier from external attack, or imprison him with its walls? Was it the soldier’s home-away-from-home, a new city, a haven for civilization, or was it simply a workplace of toil, isolation, disease, and death? Was it a source of unity, comradery, and “Romanness”, or segregation, hierarchy, and power, teetering on the edge of barbarity?

The military spaces of auxiliary soldiers serving Rome played multiple roles, from practical to ideological, varying over time and space, from person to person. Yet within this variety are traces of commonality and a never-ending tension between elite strategies of spatial control and the everyday tactics of soldiers and their families in contesting and navigating these spaces.
Chapter 5

Acting Like a Soldier: Transformation of Practice

5.1 Introduction

Sometime in the last quarter of the first century CE, an auxiliary soldier named Cutus struggled to write in Latin while stationed in a small outpost in the Eastern Desert of Egypt. Almost certainly not a Latin speaker by origin, as suggested both by his Thracian name and his poor orthography, Cutus was by no means an experienced scribe. Still, his hand is firm and his letter forms are consistent, perhaps suggesting that he received some degree of instruction in writing. On a small ostrakon, he practiced writing the names of his fellow soldiers, including the letter “b”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>O.Did. 63</th>
<th>Dumped ca. 88-96 CE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tur(mac) · Norbano · Dinis</td>
<td>of the squadron of Norbanus, Dinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tur(mac) · An&lt;n&gt;i · Ditenis</td>
<td>of the squadron of Annius, Ditenis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tur(mac) · Lo&lt;n&gt;gino · Hezbeni(s)</td>
<td>of the squadron of Longinus, Hezbenis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tur(mac) · Baso · Bitos</td>
<td>of the squadron of Bassus, Bitos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tur(mac) · Curnieli · Iulis</td>
<td>of the squadron of Cornelius, Iulius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tur(mac) · Sareni · Dise.</td>
<td>of the squadron of Sarenus, Disea (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tur(mac) · Aseni · Bitus</td>
<td>of the squadron of Asinius, Bitus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.. , Desas Doles</td>
<td>B..us Desas (or Deses?) Doles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b b b b b</td>
<td>b b b b b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 l. Norbani 3 l. Longini 4 l. Bassi 5 l. Corneli, Iulius 7 l. Asini

For his name and suggestions about his background and handwriting, see Bülow-Jacobsen’s commentary to O.Did. 334.

We can assume the author of this list of names is Cutus because the handwriting matches private letters written by Cutus (O.Did. 334-36). For other examples of writing exercises in military settlements of the Eastern Desert, see O.Claud. I 179-90.

603 For his name and suggestions about his background and handwriting, see Bülow-Jacobsen’s commentary to O.Did. 334.

604 We can assume the author of this list of names is Cutus because the handwriting matches private letters written by Cutus (O.Did. 334-36). For other examples of writing exercises in military settlements of the Eastern Desert, see O.Claud. I 179-90.
He also wrote personal letters to his fellow soldiers, greeting each by name:\footnote{605}{Cutus also wrote \textit{O.Did.} 336 (dumped ca. 77-92 CE), of which only lines 6-7 are legible: \textit{salutem Dinis / Mu[ca]po[r]i} • \textit{ffilio} •, “Greetings to Dinis, son of Mucapor,” who is mentioned also in \textit{O.Did.} 63 and 335.}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textit{O.Did.} 334 & Dumped ca. 88-96 CE \\
\hline
Cutus · Drozeus · salutem · \\
ut · Logino curatoriu · et · \\
Antoniui · sixoplixo · et · \\
Bitu · semiaphoiri · et · Dales \\
et · Dinis Mocapor · f(ilio) · ex mea · \\
opuras · uino · haperis · ut · \\
excipiâ . . um · [. . ] [ . . ] [ . . ] relico quas \\
] habis hopiras \\
] uino · si tibi casum · \\
] , uirant · ut · \\
asilam · \\
o & Cutus to Drozeus, greetings, \\
as well as to Longinus the \textit{curator}, \\
aptonius the \textit{sesquiplicarius}, \\
Bitus the \textit{signifer}, Dales, \\
and Dinis, son of Mocapor. Through my 
\textit{doing you have (?) wine... \\
\hline
1 l. Drozei & 2 l. Longino curatori; ut = et, or ut = ita ut, “as well as” \\
4 semiaphri in \textit{semiaphori corr.} & 3 l. Antonio sesquiplicario \\
6 l. opera uinum habetis/habebitis? habueris? & 9 l. habes operas \\
12 perhaps the name C]asilam, cf. \textit{O.Did.} 429.9 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textit{O.Did.} 335 & Dumped ca. 88-96 CE \\
\hline
Cutus · Tarula · salut<e>m · \\
rugu ti frati- \\
{\(r\)} · quas h<\(<\)a>bis mea<\(<\)s> \\
drac(mas) · XXXIV · \\
salutem · Longino nost(ro). & Cutus to Tarula \\
greetings. \\
I ask you, brother, \\
for the 34 (?) drachmas of mine \\
that you have. \\
Greetings to our Longinus.\footnote{606}{The \textit{salutem} formula in line 5 belongs to an opening formula of a letter, not the end. Perhaps Cutus was unable to decline \textit{salutare} correctly. The editor translates \textit{Longino nost(ro)} as “our friend Longinus”. However, since Longinus is a \textit{curator}, perhaps “our \textit{curator}” would be more appropriate.}} \\
1-2 l. Tarulae & 3-4 l. rogo te frater \\
4 l. habes & 6 l. Longino \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Cutus’s documents reveal more than a semi-literate soldier struggling to write in Latin. What is very noticeable is the clear distinction he made between cavalrymen and their officers. In Cutus’s writing exercise, six cavalrymen bear Thracian names, and all serve in squadrons commanded by decurions with Roman names.\footnote{607}{Dinis, Ditenis, Hezbenis, Bitos, Disea/Dizias, Bitus, Desas/Deses, and Doles/Dolens are all Thracian names. See Cuvigny’s commentary to \textit{O.Did.} 63 and the index to \textit{O.Did.} vol. 1. These soldiers were detached from their main units, either \textit{cohortes} or \textit{alae}, and were stationed alongside Cutus or elsewhere in the Eastern Desert. It is very difficult to determine from what units the soldiers of the Eastern Desert were detached. See Cuvigny (2012): 12-15. I doubt that Cutus was just practicing random names.} In his letters, Cutus writes to his Thracian comrades, but then proceeds to greet all of the other soldiers.
stationed with the recipient in order of seniority, starting with Longinus the *curator* (commander of the outpost).\footnote{Notably Bitus, a man with a Thracian name, is a *signifer*, a standard bearer. Breeze (1974): 278-86 gathers the evidence for under-officers of the *auxilia*. While his chart on p. 281 suggests that a *signifer* was higher in rank than a *sesquiplicarius*, the underlying evidence is less than clear, and, as he notes, the career structure of the *auxilia* had a great deal of flexibility. Even if Bitus is of a higher rank than Antonius, it is still noticeable how Cutus arranges Bitus as the first man in the list of Thracian soldiers (besides the recipient).} Cutus also reveals his financial relationship with another Thracian, Tarula. While it is difficult to determine the origins of the officers who have Roman names, it is significant that the Thracian cavalrymen still maintained their personal names, even two or three generations after Thrace was annexed in 44/45 CE.\footnote{Many Thracians served as auxiliary soldiers, especially cavalrymen; see Zahariade (2009). For the annexation, see Osgood (2011a): 122-25 and Wilkes (1996): 555-56.} One of the men listed, Dinis, shared his name with one of the leaders of the Thracian revolt of 26 CE who, according to Tacitus, was the first to surrender to the Romans.\footnote{For the revolt, see Tac. *Ann.* 4.46-51, with Dinis at 4.50.2.} One wonders if the soldier stationed in Egypt knew the story of his namesake. Yet these documents also reflect a Roman military practice, in the form of letter-writing, that emphasized rank, hierarchy, as well as financial exchange, while still showing individual cultural difference through individuals’ names.

These brief documents reveal the social and cultural complexities of service in Roman auxiliary units. Auxiliaries came largely from the empire’s borderlands, spaces of social mixing, mercurial politics, and, perhaps in the minds of some Roman ideologues, cultural backwardness in need of control. At the same time, auxiliaries were expected to quickly become the bulwark of the very same polity that had conquered their home region. How did auxiliaries navigate these murky waters? What kinds of identities did they fashion in their various particular contexts? And how did these identities reinforce or challenge imperial politics? This chapter focuses on changes in the patterns of practice...
of auxiliaries, in other words, their sporadic, fragmentary, and ever-changing expressions of identities as found in written and material culture. I emphasize the individual voices and practices of members of the auxiliary community and the heterogeneity of their responses to Roman control, cultural change, and identity (re-)formation. Unlike other approaches that stress harmony or unity, my approach highlights difference, discord, and discomfort, while also recognizing degrees of conformity. This chapter complicates previous teleological, Rome-centric models of identity formation that emphasize the incorporation of these diverse individuals into the Roman Empire. Auxiliary soldiers, far from being a static, homogeneous group, were not simply passively incorporated into the Roman military community. Each individual actively adopted and reinterpreted Roman expectations, military spaces, and cultural forms by drawing on their own particular backgrounds and expressed their discrepant experiences in a variety of ways, which, in turn, changed the very idea of what it meant to be a Roman.

As with any change in status or identity, each individual’s experience was shaped largely by his own specific context. While the actual enrollment process into a military unit was most likely fairly standard throughout the Empire and probably rather stable over time, the transformation of both practices and mental habits went beyond simply swearing an oath or receiving a lead seal necklace. Processes of identity formation, created in competition with other social groups, often remain hidden in the ancient record. As argued in the last chapter, the living and working space of military bases, as

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611 Mattingly (2010): 213-14, who emphasizes “discrepant experience.”
613 For the standard description of the enrollment process, although with little discussion of potential change over time, see Davies (1989a). For the lead seal necklace received by the recruit, see Acts of Maximilianus 1.1-5 (295 CE) = B. Campbell (1994): no. 5.
614 Bourdieu’s habitus is useful here, that is, a habitual disposition in behavior, thought, and feeling formed through a complex interplay between individual and society, although usually emphasizing a top-down
both a product and producer of social action, played a large part in shaping the practices of everyday life for the auxiliary soldier. This chapter focuses on aspects of behavioral change by examining more closely the individual in relationship to the larger military community. The discursive interplay between individual and institution, between agent and structure, in the creation and the reproduction of social norms are complex, intertwined, and often far from evident, especially for ancient societies. To what extent did the structures and the constraints of military life create a sense of conformity and camaraderie, or reinforce social difference and hierarchy? To what extent did the recruits’ own background contribute to these developments? In addition, identifying the salience of a particular component of one’s identity at any given time is also very difficult. Yet certain aspects of an auxiliary soldier’s identity, especially ethnicity/origin, familial role, gender, citizenship status, and especially occupational identity, were often expressed in interconnected and self-reinforcing ways. While the surviving sources cause numerous problems for interpretation, dating, and even reading, it is clear that an auxiliary soldier’s practices did change over time, even if the intentions and feelings behind them are not always evident. Although many top-down impositions of expectations created by imperial ideology, stereotypes held by officers, military hierarchy and law, and spatial structures greatly affected their behavior, auxiliary soldiers nevertheless cultivated a distinct sense of self that was continuously being shaped by

process of social and cultural reproduction through some degree of education; Bourdieu (1977), Bourdieu (1990). Some scholars, such as Phang (2008), have used his theories as a way to think about Roman military ideologies.

Giddens’s structuration theory is most helpful in thinking about this complex relationships between agents and structures, and on the role of institutionalized action and routinization, that is, the process by which social acts are created and transmitted. See Giddens (1984), Bryant and Jary (1991), Craib (1992). For applications of Giddens and other social theorists to cultural change in ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, see Morris (2000), Alston (2002), Woolf (2004), Gardner (2007a), Revell (2009), and Scott (2013), among others.
historically contingent social interactions.

Given the complexity of both the processes behind behavioral change and the evidence created by them, numerous approaches and narrative frameworks could be used to analyze these changes. By no means is my approach the only possible investigative method. My primary concern is twofold: one, to focus on the experience of individual soldiers as much as possible, without ignoring the larger pan-imperial context or implications of their actions; and two, to avoid as much as possible the traditional static image of the Roman army so often found in scholarly and popular publications. Given the often fragmentary and dispersed nature of the evidence, as well as the comparatively slow pace of institutional change in the ancient world, it is indeed tempting to assume that evidence found in the second or third century is applicable to earlier or later time periods.\(^\text{616}\) In what follows, I make a concerted effort to arrange the evidence in its proper geographical and chronological framework, while acknowledging the often unavoidable need to speculate where evidence is lacking.

This chapter explores individual stories, spread over time and space, in order to suggest possible developments in behavioral transformation among auxiliary soldiers from the final years of Augustus in the early first century to the middle of the second century. Emphasis is placed on recovering the voices of individuals as expressed in documents and monuments closest to their experience in life, while examples from material culture are woven throughout. As with all documents, letters and funerary monuments are shaped and restricted by their own genres and cultural norms.\(^\text{617}\) While

\(^{616}\) For example, statements such as these regarding enrollment procedures with little to no qualification or justification: “The [military enlisting/conscription] processes in the later Roman Empire reflect the methods of the Principate,” Davies (1989a): 14.

\(^{617}\) Regarding Roman provincial culture as a whole, rather than seeing it produced by human agency
the cultural and social fluidity of Roman society acted as the most important context for
the development of an epigraphic culture, especially in the military, the individual desire
to expend the resources to set up a funerary monument varied based on wealth, area, local
competition, and perhaps even an anxiety about the future and posterity.618 Alternatively,
auxiliary soldiers might have set up funerary monuments as a way to seek “legitimization
through form” and make “tenuous claims on a desired status” especially because of their
“liminal positions within society.”619 Additional filters, such as the intermediary role of
the scribe in writing documents, or the role of the heir or family (or even the inscriber or
artist) in shaping the epitaph or sculptural themes of the funerary monument, also
potentially dampen the voice of the individual.620 Despite these challenges, I believe that
these fragmentary yet compelling stories offer crucial insight into the range of possible
experiences of auxiliaries and their varied contributions to Roman imperial culture.

I organize my examples both chronologically and geographically, radiating out
from the imperial center to the farthest reaches of the frontiers in order to map out the
discrepant experiences of auxiliary soldiers through time and space. A common thread
ties these stories together: the challenges and benefits for individuals, descended from
conquered peoples, who served their imperial master in a state institution both near home
and further abroad. Recognizing the immense power disparities inherent to military
service, I first offer a possible reading of the complex struggles that auxiliaries from
recently conquered peoples may have felt while serving in the shadow of imperial

monumental propaganda. Through a comparison of the ambitious *Tropaeum Alpium*, a triumphal monument dedicated to Augustus that lists the Alpine tribes he claimed to have conquered, with the humble tombstone of an auxiliary stationed nearby whose homeland was listed on the trophy, I highlight the potential conflicting feelings of auxiliary soldiers serving soon after their people’s defeat. From the Alps to Great Britain, I then consider the multicultural dynamics of the Roman frontiers at Vindolanda in the early second century CE as found in a personal letter from a subordinate soldier to his officer. As a somewhat privileged ethnic group within the Roman auxiliaries, these Batavian soldiers and their Batavian officers maintained a certain degree of traditional cultural practices that both complemented and complicated Roman military forms of social control. Yet soldiers were often stationed far from their homeland in cultural contexts completely at odds with their previous experiences. Turning then to the road outposts in the Eastern Desert of Egypt in the mid-second century CE, I analyze how recently conquered Dacians from north of the Danube managed to bridge cultural divides and maintain relationships with local Greco-Egyptian soldiers and women. Through these case studies, I demonstrate the varied practices of auxiliary soldiers in their everyday lives, and how these practices contributed to the makeup of Roman imperial culture and experience. While not nearly as influential as emperors in shaping imperial culture, individual auxiliary soldiers and the community around them nevertheless continued to contest and shape Roman expectations about soldiers, barbarians, and provincials.

5.2 Gallic Auxiliaries in Alpes Maritimes in the Early First Century

One of the most significant monuments embodying both Roman power and
conquest was the so-called *Tropaeum Alpium* (“Trophy of the Alps,” also known as the *Tropaeum Augusti*) at La Turbie, a small French village about 15 km northeast of Nice (see figures 8 and 9).\(^{621}\) It was built about 500 m above sea level on the highest point on the *Via Julia Augusta*, a road, restored in 13/12 BCE, connecting Gaul to Rome.\(^{622}\) The *Tropaeum Alpium* marked the border between the provinces Gallia Narbonensis and Alpes Maritimae and the 9\(^{th}\) Italian region. Dedicated in 7/6 BCE to Augustus by the Roman senate and people, the huge structure, about 50 m high, consisted of a temenos and a square podium, topped by a roofed circular colonnade. The metopes above the architrave of the colonnade held reliefs in a local style (breast plates, ornamental ox-skulls, bows of ships, etc.), while behind the colonnade, the niches on the wall of the cylindrical shell held statues of Drusus, Augustus’ potential heir, and other Roman generals.\(^{623}\) On top of the colonnade, a stepped dome was crowned with a cuirassed statue of Augustus with two Gallic or Alpine captives kneeling at his feet.\(^{624}\) This monument of conquest was dedicated soon after the *Ara Pacis* was dedicated to Augustus in Rome (9 BCE), which presented a much different, more peaceful depiction of the Roman leader. As Silberberg-Peirce points out, Augustus and his supporters were careful to differentiate between how information was presented to citizens in the capital and how it was presented to conquered peoples in the provinces.\(^{625}\)

Epigraphic messaging reinforced the architectural vision of conquest and


\(^{622}\) Date of road based on milestones; see Barruol (1969): 33.

\(^{623}\) Date: *ILAM 358* (see below); Description: Formigé (1949): 47-75. Roman monumental trophies developed over time from temporary battlefield memorials to permanent monuments, based on both Hellenistic Greek and Gaulish traditions; see Silberberg-Peirce (1986): 312 and, more comprehensive, Charles-Picard (1957).

\(^{624}\) Formigé (1949): 74-75.

permanent domination over the landscape. On the western face of the podium was the dedicatory inscription, positioned there in order to emphasize Rome’s power to all travelers from the provinces into Italy of Rome’s power. At 17 m wide and 3.66 m high, this monumental message celebrated subjugation of 45 Alpine tribes from 25 to 14 BCE by Augustus and his legates (see figure 9). While it is difficult to estimate how many provincials would have been able to read the entire text, the layout and size of the text alone reinforced the power of Augustus and underscored the conquered nature of the listed tribes. The first three lines of text, the first two listing Augustus’ names and title, the third Senatus populusque Romanus, are double the size of the subsequent six lines of text, reserved for the names of the conquered Alpine tribes. Two winged Victories carrying laurel wreaths surround the first three lines of the inscription, while the entire text is framed on both sides by two bas-relief panels showing a pair of kneeling male and female captives chained to the base of tree trunk trophies. The trophies are decorated with Alpine weapons, armor, standards, and animal-horn trumpets.

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626 On the role of trophies as expressions of permanent political power over a landscape, see Hölscher (2006).
627 The inscription is reported by Pliny NH 3.136-138 and was restored on the monument itself by Formigé (1949): 51-61 and Formigé (1955): 101-02, on the basis of Pliny’s account and 140 fragments found at the site; see also Barruol (1969): 32-44. There are some differences between Pliny’s text and Formigé’s restored text, such as the number of letters for (i.e. abbreviated vs. non-abbreviated forms of) Augustus’ titulature and the formula senatus populusque romanus, as well as the inversion of vennonetes and Venostes (Barruol (1969): 36). These differences are probably because Pliny consulted a text in Rome, not the monument itself (Barruol). These difficulties affected the spelling of the names of the tribes, but only for those on the last three lines of the inscription. Various scholars differ on the spelling of the names of some tribes, see ILAM p. 432-433.
Figure 8. Modern restoration of the Trophy of the Alps (plate 51, Formigé (1949)).
To *imperator* Caesar Augustus, son of the deified [Caesar], *pontifex maximus*, fourteen times *imperator*, seventeen times with tribunician power, the Senate and Roman People [dedicated this] because, through his generalship and auspices, all Alpine peoples who were spread out from the upper to the lower sea [i.e. the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas] were reduced [to a province] under the rule of the Roman people.629 (line 5) The conquered Alpine peoples: the Trumpilini, the Camunni, the Vennonetes, the Venostes, the Isarci, the Breuni, the Genaunes, the Focunates, the four peoples of the Vindelices (the Cosuanetes, the Rucinates, the Licates, the Catenates), the Ambisontes, the Rugusci, the Suanetes, the Calucones, the Brixentes, the Leponti, the Viberi, the Nantuates, the Seduni, the Veragri, the Salassi, the Acitavones, the Medulli, the Ucenni, the Caturiges, the Brigiani, the Sogiontii, the Brodionti, the Nemaloni, the Edenates, the (V)esubiani, the Veamini, the Gallitae, the Triullatti, the Ectini, the Vergunni, the Egui(i), the Turi, the Nemeturi, the Oratelli, the Nerusi, the Velauni, the Suetri.630

The *Tropaeum Alpium* dominated the landscape and could be seen by any traveler along the road or the coast. Clearly, a viewer would have been struck by the large size of the name *Augusto* and *Senatus populusque Romanus*, the images of the Victories, the trophies, the enslaved captives, as well as the statues and the massive size of the monument itself. In addition, the names generally reflect the geographical arrangement of the tribes themselves, northeast to southwest (not chronological, as once thought), in

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629 *sub imperium p(opuli) R(omani) sunt redactae*: cf. Caesar BG 5.29.4, *Galliam sub populi Romani imperium redactam*. Perhaps the Senate and/or Augustus were echoing Caesar’s language here.

effect, visual mapping the conquered peoples. The long list of tribes reaffirmed their defeat by Augustus and his generals, while also reminding the viewer (or reader) of the power of Rome. As noted by Silberberg-Pierce in her excellent study of Augustan monuments in Gallia Narbonensis, this monument, like other monuments in the province, marked a new frontier crossroad, and “to make one’s way through or around them was a rite of passage that signified a change of spiritual and political space – a rite of passage into, out of or through ‘Roman’ space. All peoples, indigenous and foreign alike, would inescapably be confronted with them.” This included Roman auxiliary soldiers who often traveled along these roads.

About 15 km west of the Tropaeum along the Via Julia Augusta lay the town Cemenelum (Cimiez, now a neighborhood of Nice, France), just beyond the change from “Roman” to “provincial” space. Cemenelum first served as the capital of the military district (praefectura) of Alpes Maritimae, administered by a praefectus civitatum in Alpibus Maritimis, and later became the provincial capital under Nero when Alpes Maritimae became a province. A garrison of auxiliary cohorts was stationed there in the early first century CE, as funerary stelae (tombstones) of soldiers serving in Cohors I Ligurum and II Ligurum, recruited from the surrounding area, have been discovered, as well as those belonging to soldiers of the Cohors Gaetulorum (from North Africa) and nautici (sailors, probably from Nice or Fréjus). The Ligurian cohort remained in

Cemelenum at least until 69, if not later, and may have continued to recruit from the local population, perhaps even the mountain tribes. The town had a small amphitheater which could contain about 500 spectators (the strength of a cohort) and probably was built for the soldiers. There was also a possible small circus, similar to those found in certain camps of Rhine military bases.

Auxiliaries serving at Cemelenum in the first century CE, many of whom were probably drawn from the recently conquered Alpine peoples, surely had ambiguous feelings about their military service. Imagine that a cohort patrolling the *Via Julia Augusta*, perhaps a generation or two after the Roman conquest of the Alps, saw, in the distance, the menacing presence of the *Tropaeum* rising over the horizon. As the young soldiers approached, they first noticed the gleaming statue of a cuirassed Roman general at the top, his feet surrounded by chained prisoners. Upon closer inspection, statues of various triumphant Roman generals appeared from beneath the colonnade. Perhaps these statues reminded the soldiers of their own commanding officer, most likely an Italian, whom they may have respected or loathed. Yet the most distinguishing feature of the *Tropaeum* was its western wall, covered by the immense Latin inscription flanked by reliefs of trophies with captives chained to their bases. Perhaps one newly recruited (or conscripted?) soldier, having learned a smattering of Latin, slowly read the first line of text, much larger than the rest: *Imperator Caesari divi filio Augusto*. Realizing that this was the same Augustus of their families’ stories, the emperor and conqueror whose image littered the provincial landscape with statues and coins, many of the soldiers would have held the monument in awe. Yet some, perhaps only a few, would have looked at it in

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contempt. Slowing trudging up the hill toward the base of the monument, only then would they have realized what the rest of the inscription said: here were listed the names of the peoples of the Alps, conquered by Augustus, the *gentes Alpinae devictae.*

Reactions to such listing of names would have varied, depending on one’s attachment to a sense of tribal identity. Alternatively, a soldier could see the name of an enemy tribe and be happy to see that the Romans defeated them. One of the soldiers may have noticed the name of his people in the eighth line of the Latin inscription: Brodionti, most likely a misspelling of Bodiontici, a people dwelling about 150 km northwest in the town of Dinia (modern Digne). Years later, as he lay on his deathbed at the military base in Cemelenum, yet before he could retire from military service, perhaps the same man wrote in his will how his tombstone should look: a simple bordered stele, about 64 cm high with a rounded top, with a Celtic shield as an emblem in the central register of the rounded top (see figure 10). Below, inscribed clearly, although not perfectly, in a field surrounded by double-molding:

Lucenius, son of Rutanus, Bodionicus [by origin], soldier of the Cohort of Ligurians, of the century of Domitius. His heir made [this monument] according to his will.

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636 “The martial imagery of much Roman art undoubtedly aroused some resentment among provincials, but that resentment will have been substantially tempered among those who ceded to Rome the right to govern themselves and their world,” Ando (2000): 304.

637 The Brodionti are identified as the Bodiontici who lived in Dinia (Digne) by Barruol (1969): 385. See Pliny HN 3.37: *Adiectit formulae Galba imperator ex inalpinis Avanticos atque Boditionicos, quorum oppidum Dinia* (“The emperor Galba (in 69 CE) added the Avantici and the Bodiontici, whose town is Dinia, to the formula” (probably *ius Latii*)). See also Pliny HN 3.137 (Brodionti) and Rivet (1988): 247-50 on Digne (modern Digne-les-Bains, capital of the Alpes-de-Haute-Provence department in France). A bronze tablet dated to 20 February 187 CE and found at Thoard, not far from Digne, records a convocation of decurions in the *curia* of MAADB, thought to be an abbreviation for *m(unicipii) A() A() D(iniensium) B(odionticorum)*, with AA indicating a few different possibilities; see *ILAM* 22 = *ILN* II, Digne, 3 = *AE* 1961, no. 156.

638 For the Celtic shield (*scutum*), see *ILAM* 196 and *IANice* 50.

639 *ILAM* 196 (pre-Flavian) = *IANice* 50 (1st half of 1 CE) = *CIL* 5.7890 (p. 902, 931): *Lucenius, Rutani f(ilius), Bod(ionicus), / mil(es) co[i] or(is) Lig(urum), / [> (centuria)] Domiti. / H(eres) ex testamento / fecit.* “The use of the nominative would suggest an earlier date than those using the dative, a fact borne out by the knowledge that *cohors Ligurum* had been the garrison of Cemelenum for some time (Tac. Hist. 2.14)” (Holder (1980): 164); also the absence of a dedication to Manes suggests early first century (*ILAM* 196). Note that the letter *F* in line 5 is written on top of the letter *T*, see *IANice* 50, p. 70.
The monument and the message together suggest his ambiguous place in the Roman world, yet one which he tried to assert in death. The *nomen gentile* Lucenius is very rare, perhaps Celtic in origin, or maybe Latin. The name of his father, Rutanus, is a Celtic name, perhaps Ligurian. Significantly, this man identified himself as *Bodionicus*, that is, a Gallic tribal name. The lack of the Roman *tria nomina* and voting tribe suggests that he died without having received Roman citizenship. Yet he was also

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640 *ILAM* 196 and *IANice* 50 comm.
641 Only if the *tria nomina* and *tribus* (voting tribe) are present can we be certain that a person was a Roman citizen. In an extensive study of naming practices among auxiliaries in the Early Principate (27 BCE to early second century), Saddington (2000): , esp. 174-76, argues that there was no single pattern of naming among auxiliaries; names varied based on social customs of different areas, varying naming practices upon recruitment, status differentials between ranks, and personal choice. In the West in the early imperial period, most auxiliaries, even after discharge, preferred to use their single peregrine name with a patronymic, often determined by their community of origin. Even on military diplomas granting them citizenship, usually the single peregrine name with patronymic is listed.
proud of his status as a soldier of the Cohort of Ligurians, a locally raised auxiliary unit, under the command of a man with a Roman name. The shield, too, reflected his Celtic identity, or, just as likely, it may have reflected his role as a soldier. The very fact that he used Latin and a tombstone showed his willingness to participate in Roman military cultural practices. The frequent abbreviations, not uncommon for military tombstones, made the epitaph “a text for insiders to read, only fully comprehensible to those with the requisite cultural expertise, which involved much more than a knowledge of Latin.”

What Lucenius truly felt regarding his identity and status can never be recovered. Still, his funerary monument and the practices that surround its creation show that he actively asserted his position as a son of a Celt, a Bodionticus, a soldier, a comrade, a subordinate, a Latin-speaker, and, perhaps, even a Roman.

Other stelae from Cemelenum of other auxiliary soldiers also show similar attributes: Latin inscriptions, a mix of Roman and indigenous names, and a mix of military and perhaps also indigenous iconography. This group of monuments, therefore, suggests that while an auxiliary soldier was generally limited by the generic constrictions of Roman military funerary practices and epigraphy, he still had some degree of choice in asserting his name, his status, and the decorations of his tombstone. Another member of the Lucenius’s tribe stationed at Cemelenum in the early first century, although probably not in the same cohort, similarly expressed his tribal origins, mixed with pride in his military service, on his tombstone (now lost):

To Titus Aurelius, son of Demencelo, Bodionticus [by origin], of the cohort of Marines, of the century of Eripo. His heirs [made this monument] according to his will.

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643 ILAM 191 (reign of Nero at the latest) = JANice 51c = CIL 5.7885 et add. p. 931 (with reading cohors Ligurum): T(itus) Aurelio De/mencelonis f(filio) Bo/dionti(c)o coh(ortis) n(au)t(ic)o(rum) / > (centuria) Eriponi her(es) / e(x) t(estamento).
Here, more so than Lucenius, an auxiliary soldier decided to advertise his Roman military status, yet still remained mindful of his Gallic origins. The mention of his century suggests that he died before he could retire. At first glance, one might assume that his Latin praenomen and gentilicum, with his indigenous patronymic Demencelo, might signify that he was a Roman citizen. But in place of the voting tribe, which was typical for new citizen inscriptions of the early first century, he instead chose to indicate the Gallic tribe of his origin. Rather than a Roman citizen, we could see him as a non-citizen auxiliary who, perhaps in emulation of his Roman officers, decided to adopt a Latin two-part name. Or maybe this was the name given to him by his superiors upon joining the auxiliaries. Either way, the soldier actively promoted his imperial identity on his tombstone, a reminder of the complex cultural forces at work among the community of auxiliaries.

Serving in the shadow of a monument memorializing their people’s conquest, neither Lucenius nor Titus Aurelius overtly challenge Roman claims of power. In many ways, by choosing to set up tombstones using Roman military cultural forms and the Latin language, these auxiliary soldiers were perpetuating Roman imperial domination in the provinces. Yet they also memorialized their identity as Bodiontici, an Alpine people who resisted Roman rule but were eventually conquered by Augustus. While the tribal name may have been memorialized in the official title of the town of Dinia, which was granted Latin rights in 69, the name no longer appeared in funerary inscriptions after the auxiliary soldiers serving in Cemelenum died in the early first century. Later, recruits

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644 As suggested by ILAM 191.
645 Pliny HN 3.37 (granted Latin rights). m(unicipii) A() A() D(iniensium) B(odionticorum) (187 CE), ILAM 22 = ILN II, Digne, 3 = AE 1961, no. 156. Dinia may have been a colony, as suggested by the
from Dinia served in legions, not auxiliary units, indicating their hometown of Dinia, not the Bodiontici. Whether Bodiontici continued to serve as auxiliaries into the second century is unknown.

5.3 Batavian Auxiliaries in Britain in the Late First and Early Second Centuries

Around the year 100 CE, in the far reaches of northern Britain on the edge of the Roman frontier, a band of auxiliary soldiers was growing thirsty. Masclus, their decurion, was anxiously awaiting new orders from the prefect Flavius Cerialis, the commanding officer of their unit, who was still back at their base, Vindolanda. Masclus dictated a letter to a scribe who wrote it with ink on a small, thin piece of wood, no larger than a postcard, scored down the center for easy folding. The letter begins:

Masclus to Cerialis his king, greetings. Please, sir, give instructions as to what you want us to have done tomorrow. (5) Are we to return with the standard to (the shrine at?) the crossroads all together or every other one (i.e. half) of us? Likewise…[sir, be] most fortunate and be well-disposed towards me.

Masclus wrote the final greeting in his own hand “vale,” and then handed it back to the scribe to write the postscript: “(P.S.) My fellow-soldiers have no beer. Please order some to be sent.” Finally, the letter was folded closed, tied shut, addressed on the back: “To Flavius Cerialis, prefect, from Masclus, decurion.”

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inscription of an aedile found in Narbo Martius (Narbonne), but the reading is contested; see AE 1994, no. 1178 = CIL 12.4903 = CIL 12.6037a (1st c. CE, letter-forms). The common opinion is that Dinia was a Latin colony in the beginning of the Julio-Claudian period and was retrogressed to a municipium in the second century.

646 CIL 3.13481 = AE 1896, no. 23 and CIL 7.122. Bodiontici also served in cohors III Alpinorum stationed in Dalmatia in the early to mid-first century CE, see CIL 3.8495 and CIL 3.9907 = 14321,05. Another Bodionticus in cohors II Ligurum in Cemelenum in the early first century CE (fragmentary): CIL 5.7902 = IANice 57b.

647 T.Vindol. III 628 (ca. 100 to 104/5 CE): Left-hand front side (i): Masclus Ceriali regi suo / salutem / cras quid uelis nos fecisse / rogó dòmine praé/cipìás utrumpe / cum uexsilló · omnes / rediemus an alter/ni compiñum · aequé Right-hand front side (ii): [ 1 or 2 lines missing] felicissim[u]r[s] / et sis mihi propitius / (manu 2?) uaele / (manu 1) ceruasem commilitones / non habunt quam / rogó iubeas mitti Back of (ii): F[i]l[ia]ju Cēriali / praepexit(o) / (Space of 1 line) / a Masclo dec(urione) Apparatus ii.5. read habent. Trans. Bowman & Thomas, modified.
This letter provokes a number of intriguing questions for the social and cultural experience of auxiliary soldiers in the Roman army. Why did Masclus address Cerialis as rex (“king”) in the opening of the letter, but call him praefectus (“prefect”) in the address on the outside of the letter? To what extent was the Latin of this letter Masclus’s own creation, and what role did the scribe play? And why was there beer in the Roman army, especially since the Romans were so famous for their wine? More broadly, what does this letter suggest about the changes in practices among auxiliary soldiers serving Rome?

At the time Masclus was writing, around 100 to 105 CE, the Ninth Cohort of Batavians occupied Vindolanda. As explained in chapter three, the Batavians had a special military relationship with the Roman Empire in which they contributed military recruits in lieu of taxes. They contributed to cavalry under Julius Caesar, mounted bodyguards (Germani corporis custodes) for the emperor Augustus and his successors, as well as numerous auxiliary units. Some of these auxiliary units were commanded by Batavian noblemen. Despite their revolt under Civilis in 69-70 CE, the Batavians once again contributed soldiers to auxiliary units and the mounted bodyguard of the emperor, reformed by Trajan into the equites singulares Augusti. The Ninth Cohort of Batavians, even though it was stationed at Vindolanda, seems to have continued to recruit from the Batavian homeland and to have maintained prefects, decurions, and centurions drawn from their own people. That continued practice of maintaining native leadership and recruits suggests that a sense of Batavian ethnic identity, shaped largely by military service, may have influenced the behavior of the auxiliaries serving in the Ninth Cohort.

Flavius Cerialis, as a prefect of a Batavian auxiliary unit, was a Roman citizen.
But he was also most likely of Batavian ethnic origin. He was a man of wealth and status, like all prefects a member of the equestrian order. He was probably about 30 years old, born right after the end of the Batavian revolt. The Roman nomen “Flavius” was the family name of the emperors from 69-96 CE. Flavius Cerialis’s family was probably granted Roman citizenship by the emperor Vespasian as a reward for their loyalty to Rome during the Batavian revolt. The name “Cerialis” was also a Roman name, derived from the Roman general Quintus Petillius Cerialis, Vespasian’s son-in-law and the Roman general who put down the Batavian revolt, suggesting that Flavius Cerialis’s family had some patronage ties to the Roman general. Thus, Flavius Cerialis was named after both a Roman emperor and a Roman general.

Documents from Vindolanda demonstrate that Flavius Cerialis was well-educated, well-connected, and had a highly educated and cultured wife and friends. The best evidence is provided by a letter written by Claudia Severa, the wife of another military commander in Britain, to the wife of Cerialis, Sulpicia Lepidina. In it, she politely invites Lepidina to her birthday party:

(scribe’s hand) Claudia Severa to her Lepidina, greetings. On 11 September, sister, for the day of the celebration of my birthday, I give you a warm invitation to make sure that you come to us, to make the day more enjoyable for me by your arrival, if you are present (?). Give my greetings to your Cerialis. My Aelius and my little son send him (?) their greetings. (Claudia’s hand) I shall expect you, sister. Farewell, sister, my dearest soul, as I hope to prosper, and hail. (Back/Outside) (scribe’s hand) To Sulpicia Lepidina, wife of Cerialis, from Severa.

651 Perhaps Lepidina was also of Batavian descent, like her husband. The family name Sulpicia suggests that Lepidina or one of her forebears was granted citizenship during the brief reign of the emperor Sulpicius Galba (68-69 CE).
This letter contains the oldest example of a Latin document written in a woman’s own hand, lines 11-14 on the right-hand side. Cerialis and his wife maintained numerous relationships with other military officers and their families through letters. These letters show that Roman auxiliary officers and their families, despite their ethnic origins, nevertheless participated in key components of elite Roman culture, such as the exchanging of letters and mutual gift-giving. Such practices will have separated the officers from their men significantly, even when they may have shared a similar ethnic origin.

Unlike prefects, many centurions and decurions of auxiliary units were promoted from the rank and file soldiers, so it is safe to assume that Masclus was most likely a Batavian, promoted from the ranks.653 His single name derives from the Latin word *masculus*, meaning “manly”; however, this was not a Roman name. The name was most likely adopted upon joining the army and may be a simple translation of his original Batavian name.654 Why he adopted a Latin name is unknown, although one could assume that it implied a choice on his part to assert a certain degree of status and prestige, perhaps even identifying with Roman military power.655 The fact that his name means “manly” might also be an expression of his own sense of virile prowess, assuming, of

653 Gilliam (1957), commenting on *P.Mich. III 164 = Ch.L.A. V 281 = C.Pap.Lat. 143 = Rom.Mil.Rec. 20* (242-244 CE, Egypt), recognizes that while most auxiliary centurions and decurions were probably originally “ordinary villagers and peasants” (156), there is evidence that some may have been appointed from wealthy curial provincial civilians, tribal leaders, or sons of veterans. Although we could speculate on his social origin, perhaps based on his handwriting of *vale*, we can assume, at least, that Masclus was ethnically Batavian and had some degree of knowledge of Latin.


655 Mullen (2007) explores possible reasons behind onomastic choice in Celtic and British names from the epigraphic record of Bath, showing that the Latin *duo* and *tria nomina* formulae were adopted in Britain in more “Romanized” contexts with an absence of Celtic names, unlike the situation on the Continent where there was more syncretism due to earlier conquest.
course, he had some say in choosing his name. It may also be the case that Masclus only used this name when writing in Latin or among soldiers and used his traditional ethnic name among family and friends.\textsuperscript{656} Although there is no evidence for this practice among Batavians, such “double-naming” practices do appear, but often in Greek-speaking or North African contexts.\textsuperscript{657}

Beyond his own name, Masclus’s use and manipulation of the Latin language also contribute to his own complex identity as a Batavian soldier in a Roman auxiliary unit. Of course, the extent to which this letter reflects Masclus’s own word choice is difficult to determine, and how his spoken Batavian or Latin language might have influenced his written Latin is also unclear.\textsuperscript{658} The cursive handwriting, the old-fashioned spellings (\textit{vexsillo} in left side line 6), and the punctuation (interpuncts: mid-level dots in lines 6 & 8, and apices: accents over vowels in lines 4-6 and 6 on the right side) demonstrate that a scribe, and not Masclus himself, most likely wrote the letter.\textsuperscript{659} Still, I believe that Masclus was significantly involved in the composition of the content of this letter, if not the exact language.\textsuperscript{660} His hesitation regarding where to take his troops, his subtle

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Similar to the use of different languages in different “domains” in a multilingual society. The sociolinguist term “domain” (promulgated by Fishman, based on Schmidt-Rohr; see Clackson (2012): 37-38) refers to a social context which might be appropriate for different language use, such as family, friends, education, employment, religious worship, i.e. a situation in which a different language was more appropriate. See Clackson (2012): 50-52 on women’s preference for Coptic instead of Greek in late antique Egypt.
\item The use of “double-names,” in which a Greco-Macedonian name was used in one context, and an Egyptian name (in Ptolemaic Egypt, see Clarysse (1985)) or Semitic name (in Dura-Europos, see Pollard (2007)) in another, could indicate social status, rather than ethnicity or origin. See also Cooley (2012): 300-07 for language choice in inscriptions. \textit{AE} 1961, no. 17 (Olbasa/Belenli, Lycia and Pamphylia) and \textit{AE} 1991, no. 1427 (Macedonia) are examples of Latin tombstones for auxiliary veterans in which double-names are given: one their Roman name, the other their name in a local language (using the formula \textit{qui et}). See also the bilingual Latin-Libyan tombstone of the Roman military veteran with the double-name Caius Julius Gaetulus / Keti, son of Maswalat, from the tribe of the Misicri in Thullium, a town north of Madauros in North Africa (\textit{CIL} 8.5209 = \textit{ILA}lg. 1.137 = \textit{AE} 2005, no. 1692); see Shaw (2014): 531-32.
\item See Clackson (2012) on language maintenance and interference.
\item Adams has studied the Latin of the Vindolanda tablets extensively and has applied theories from sociolinguistics to help interpret them, especially issues of multilingualism and language contact. He has
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
urgency for orders for tomorrow, his courteous (yet playful?) address to his “king,” and his self-conscious referral to his “comrades” in his request for beer all point to his active involvement in the production of the letter.

Although it is difficult to determine how “literate” Masclus himself may have been, what is important is the fact that auxiliary soldiers at all levels, but especially officers, were expected to engage with the written word.661 Yet the degree of formality of language use varied significantly by context. We should not assume that a single document, as a whole, belongs to a certain linguistic variety or register; rather, we need to be aware that more than one sociolinguistic marking can be present in one text.662 For example, Masclus’s letter has some substandard verb morphology, perhaps related to the Latin spoken in camp, such as the use of the third person plural ending –unt in the second conjugation verb habeo (right side, line 5) (habunt instead of habent) and rediemus (left side, line 7) as an alternative for the more common redibimus. Yet his use of the perfect infinitive fecisse (left side, line 3) in reference to the completion at some future time of their duties shows some sophisticated nuance on his part. The use of the perfect infinitive in this way, instead of the present infinitive, is a feature found only in legal language and some poetry, although it may have been an aspect of the locally spoken Latin.663 Masclus may have chosen this old-fashioned language to express some sense of formality when addressing his commanding officer and Batavian “king.”

661 “Military bureaucracy was so powerful that all soldiers were made personally aware of the value of written records throughout their service, even when not every man could create them himself. The information that the written word conveyed could result in very definite material benefits to the individual. It also served to define his financial status and safeguard his legal rights,” Haynes (2013): 328.

662 Halla-aho (2010).

Masclus’s Latin reflected his ambiguous place as a Batavian auxiliary soldier in the Roman army. Tied to the maintenance of Batavian practices, or perhaps the reimagining of Roman expectations, is Masclus’s referral to his fellow soldiers, his *commilitones* (right side, line 4). Often used by emperors and generals when addressing their troops, the term *commilito* encompassed not only military personnel from vastly different social statuses, but also soldiers serving in different units.\(^{664}\) This might suggest that Masclus was in charge of troops outside of his own unit, as well as fellow Batavians. Or, perhaps Masclus was saying “*your* fellow-soldiers,” in a sense, calling on Cerialis in his role as benefactor to his men. This ambiguous use of the word *commilitones* reinforced the relationship among Masclus, Cerialis, and their fellow-soldiers as both soldiers and, perhaps, as men of a shared ethnic background.

The relationship of deference and respect between the decurion Masclus and his commanding officer Cerialis was expressed by Masclus’s use of the word *rex* “king” in line 1.\(^ {665}\) It is a problematic word, because Romans traditionally avoided the word *rex* ever since they drove out their king and established a republic nearly 600 years before.\(^ {666}\) Some scholars interpret *rex* as a term for “patron,” drawing on the example of one other military letter from a context that does not suggest any sort of traditional, non-military relationship between a king and his client.\(^ {667}\) Other scholars argue that *rex* indicated Flavius Cerialis’s royal Batavian heritage, as Batavian officers were often of royal

\(^{664}\) Lendon (2006).
\(^{665}\) Cuff (2011) discusses this issue at length.
\(^{666}\) Dickey (2002): 106-07 on *rex*. She claims that *rex* can be used as a term of address for a patron by a client. However, the evidence she cites is based largely on Horace and Martial, although she does discuss this text and *P.Mich.* VIII 472 = *CEL* 147 (see below). *Regina* appears as a complimentary address to a woman with power in *CIL* 4.2413h (Pompeii), but the context is not entirely clear.
\(^{667}\) The editors of *T.Vindol.* III 628, Bowman and Thomas, argue for this, based on *P.Mich.* VIII 472 = *CEL* 147, a letter from Claudius Tiberianus to Longino Prisco: *domin[a] et reg[a] suo.*
descent in the first century.\textsuperscript{668} Perhaps it was a mix of both. The title \textit{rex} was written in the body of the letter, along with \textit{dominus}, the traditional Roman address to a superior.\textsuperscript{669} However, Cerialis’s official military title, \textit{praefectus}, appears on the outside address. This varied use of titles indicates that Masclus was attempting to flatter Cerialis in the body of the letter, perhaps hinting at his royal descent, while also adhering to the proper forms of a letter in the Roman army by addressing him by his military rank in the outside address. This is not to say that Cerialis was actually a king. Rather, it is best to interpret this phrase as a respectful form of address with a slight insider reference to a shared Batavian background. Cerialis’s status was shaped by both Roman and Batavian marks of rank: his Roman citizenship, his Batavian nobility, and his leadership of a Batavian auxiliary unit in the Roman military. Such language reflected the strong sense of Batavian identity maintained and celebrated through service in the Roman army.\textsuperscript{670}

In addition to the various forms of address used by Masclus, the request for beer also expressed his and his soldier’s varied identities. Since it appears as a postscript, one could expect that it was an afterthought. Or, perhaps the beer was the real reason for writing the letter in the first place.\textsuperscript{671} \textit{Cervesa} (right side, line 4) is a Celtic loan word found in a few Vindolanda tablets and known to Pliny the Elder in his description of Gaul.\textsuperscript{672} A brewer of beer, a \textit{cervesarius}, is attested in another tablet.\textsuperscript{673} This beer was made from a type of malt called \textit{bracis} or \textit{braces}, another Celtic loan word, also found in

\textsuperscript{669} Often found in Pliny’s letters to Trajan, see Coleman (2012): 194-99.  
\textsuperscript{670} As concluded by Cuff (2011).  
\textsuperscript{671} “One wonders if the beer was the real reason for the letter, artfully placed at the end of a request for instructions which was only an excuse for writing,” A. R. Birley (1997): 279.  
\textsuperscript{672} Adams (1995): 128; Pliny \textit{NH} 22.164.  
\textsuperscript{673} \textit{T.Vindol.} II 182.14.
a number of texts from Vindolanda and also known to Pliny the Elder.\textsuperscript{674} A bracarius, a “malt-maker,” and perhaps even a bracarium, a “malt-house” appear in the documents at Vindolanda.\textsuperscript{675} Beer may have been brewed in the military base or, at the very least, it was acquired from civilian traders nearby. Tied to beer and malt is of course barley (hordeum), often found in large quantities in accounts and inventories found on site. One such account lists numerous entries for barley and beer, a very un-Roman beverage, as well as wine, sour wine, and fish-sauce, that is, more traditional Roman beverages and sauces.\textsuperscript{676} The account may have come from the domestic administration of the prefect’s household, but it is possible that the breakdown between an officer’s household and his soldiers’ supplies was not always clear cut. It is notable that entries for beer (3 modii, about 6 gallons) are larger than that for wine (1 modius 14 sextarii, about 3 gallons), perhaps indicating that the prefect shared the beer with his soldiers. One could also imagine that the barley found in the inventories was used not simply for animal feed, but for brewing additional beer.

Beer served as an important marker of cultural identity and could have been manipulated by auxiliary soldiers in order to assert a range of roles. Most scholars who have commented on beer in the Roman army have not recognized its cultural significance.\textsuperscript{677} Beer, like food, is an embodied material culture, a product made specifically by humans to be destroyed by ingestion, and acts as a way of symbolizing and creating one’s self-identity.\textsuperscript{678} Beer, rather than wine, seems to have been popular

\textsuperscript{675} Braciarius: T.Vindol. III 646.back.2; \textit{im braciario}: T.Vindol. III 595.i.3 note.
\textsuperscript{676} T.Vindol. II 190 (ca. 100-104/5 CE). For a recent introduction to Roman foodways, see Banducci (2013).
\textsuperscript{678} Dietler (2006): 232.
among troops recruited from northern Europe and slowly spread to soldiers recruited from elsewhere. On a first-century votive stone found in Trier, a discharged soldier of the Roman fleet on the Rhine called himself a negotiator cervesarius (a “brewer businessman”). And drinking alcohol was probably enjoyed by many soldiers, as suggested by a soldier’s epitaph from Antioch Pisidia in Galatia: “While I lived, I drank; you who are living, drink with pleasure.” But it is not simply that beer was more available than wine, which seems to have been also easily available. Rather, the auxiliary soldiers’ desire for beer changed Roman behavior, even the Roman language. On the other hand, Flavius Cerialis, as both a Batavian nobleman and a well-educated Roman, and having bought into the Roman martial race ideology regarding northern barbarians, supplied these Batavian soldiers beer in order to reinforce their stereotypical martial spirit. It is impossible to determine the ultimate cause of this desire for beer, whether it originated among the men themselves or was taken up by them because of Roman stereotypes. Nevertheless, as an important marker of cultural identity, beer could be manipulated by the soldiers and their officers for various goals.

Not only did beer reinforce a sense of Batavian identity, it was also used to motivate men to follow orders through an idiom of generous hospitality. Michael Dietler, an anthropologist and archaeologist of Iron Age Gaul, suggests that both alcohol and

680 ILS 2238: “Titus Cissonius Sergia, son of Quintus, veteran of the V Gallica legion: ‘While I lived, I drank; you who are living, drink with pleasure.’ His brother, Publius Cissonius Sergia, son of Quintus, made [this]” (Titus) Cissonius Q(uinti) f(ilius) Ser(gia) vet(eranus) / leg(ionis) V Gall(icae) / dum vixi / bibi libenter bibite vos / qui vivitis // P(ublius) Cissonius Q(uinti) f(ilius) Ser(gia) frater / fecit), discussed by Davies (1989b): 199.
681 Evidence of wine at Vindolanda other than accounts: finds of amphora fragments from Spain, see Funari (1991).
682 On barbarian drunkenness and lack of restraint (both in vices and in violence) as a literary motif, see Rives (1999): 216, on Tac. Germania 23.1.
feasts were used by the indigenous peoples of Gaul and other societies as a mechanism for mobilizing labor, reinforcing political authority, and shaping and expressing social relations.\textsuperscript{683} Masclus’s request suggests a sort of \textit{quid pro quo}: provide the men beer by tomorrow, then we’ll follow orders. Significantly, traditional Celtic beer, unlike wine, could not be stockpiled, as it spoiled within a few days of fermentation.\textsuperscript{684} In other words, Masclus and his men could not be too far away from base, and Flavius Cerialis had to often resupply these men. Masclus, and Cerialis too, may have recognized the important role alcohol played in their military community. By providing men beer, Cerialis motivated them to complete their tasks, reinforced his role as their superior officer and patron, and created a sense of obligation and camaraderie. Masclus, too, by requesting the beer, situated himself as a mediator between Cerialis and the soldiers, in effect, acting as the social glue that helped to bind the community together, as both a Roman military unit and a Batavian cultural center.

The cultural heritage of Batavians serving in Vindolanda may also have been preserved through food, in addition to beer. \textit{T.Vindol.} II 208, found in Room VIII of the Period 3 \textit{praetorium}, which has been identified as a kitchen, contains a fragmentary list of ingredients, perhaps a culinary recipe, as suggested by the editors.\textsuperscript{685} The writing is in a competent cursive hand that used interpunct often. While the exact nature of the recipe is uncertain, the editors suggest a preserve of some kind due to the presence of a garlic mixture (\textit{alliatum}), spiced wine or pickling liquor (\textit{conditum}), and perhaps salt and

\textsuperscript{683} Dietler (1990), Dietler and Hayden (2001), Dietler (2006), and more broadly, Dietler (2010). His model is derived largely from modern ethnographic studies. For a similar approach to Roman glass found at native Iron Age sites in Scotland, see Ingemark (2014).

\textsuperscript{684} Dietler (2006): 238. Without distillation or the use of hops as a preservative (not discovered until the 9\textsuperscript{th} century), beer production and consumption was rather restricted both spatially and temporally.

\textsuperscript{685} For the room and its identification, see R. E. Birley (1994): 70-72.
Most notably, though, the appearance of the word *batavico* in line 2 may suggest that Cerialis’ staff prepared traditional Batavian meals for the household, or even for the soldiers of the base. As with beer, Cerialis may have utilized traditional feasts to motivate his men, reinforce his authority, and perpetuate Batavian foodways while integrating other imperial culinary practices.

As Masclus’ letter suggests, the Batavians serving in Vindolanda lived in a world shaped by their complex role as ethnic soldiers in the Roman army. Rather than simply maintaining or abandoning aspects of their native culture, these men actively re-imagined and re-deployed traditional Batavian practices and behaviors in a new Roman, military social setting. Some were more capable than others, mixing sophisticated expressions in the Latin language with more traditional Batavian forms of address. Yet it is clear that some auxiliary soldiers, such as Masclus, may have been aware of the role ethnic stereotypes played in shaping behavioral expectations, and manipulated them to fit their own needs. As a decurion, Masclus was more practiced in the Latin language and the bureaucratic paperwork of the Roman military than the common soldiers under him. He may have even had a close relationship with Cerialis due in part to his long service or higher status. Still, this letter shows how Masclus used their shared Batavian identity to both challenge and reinforce Cerialis’s authority. Yet, as Cerialis’s food and wine inventories suggest, the prefect, too, maintained distinctive Batavian culinary practices alongside Roman cultural practices. We might even suggest that the auxiliary soldiers themselves, the *commilitones* of Masclus, played a role in this exchange. Behind

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686 Cf. *Apicius* De re coquinaria 3.9.
687 *T.Vindol*. II 208.2: *batauico*. The note suggests “we might envisage...a noun followed by something like *batauico [more paratum].”
688 For additional culinary practices at Vindolanda, see A. R. Birley (2002): 151-52.
Masclus’s simple request for beer was a group of disgruntled auxiliaries who needed a little liquid motivation. Or maybe Masclus was rewarding good behavior. While there are numerous possibilities for their motives, in the end, the tastes, desires, and cultural practices of the auxiliary soldiers, as expressed through Masclus, shaped and contributed to the broader dynamics of Roman military practice and occupational identity.

5.4 Dacian Auxiliaries in the Eastern Desert of Egypt in the Second Century

Soon after Masclus wrote his letter to Cerialis, the Ninth Cohort of Batavians was sent to join the Emperor Trajan in the conquest of Dacia, a kingdom north of the Danube in modern-day Romania. A year later, in 106 CE, the Romans were triumphant. Trajan later commemorated his victory on the famous column set up in Rome that narrated the conquest of the Dacians. After their defeat, many Dacians were conscripted into the Roman auxiliaries and sent throughout the Empire, including to military bases (praesidia) in the Eastern Desert of Egypt. There these new Dacian auxiliary cavalry soldiers adjusted to their new situation, continuing many of their original practices, adopting new ones, and contributing to life among auxiliaries, and ultimately, shaped the continually changing nature of “being Roman” in the Roman frontiers.

Some of these Dacian soldiers learned Latin or Greek and adopted the practice of exchanging letters with fellow Dacians, as well as other peoples in the Eastern Desert.

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689 The fundamental study on Trajan’s Dacian Wars is Strobel (1984). On the Batavians’ role in it, see Strobel (1987).
690 For Trajan’s Column, see Cichorius (1896-1900), Lepper and Frere (1988), and updated bibliography and images from Cichorius’ edition at Ulrich (2014). For the depiction of barbarians in Trajan monumental art, see Ferris (2003) and Coulston (2003).
691 E.g. O.Did. 64 (ca. 110-115): list of soldiers, many of whom had Dacian names. Dana (2003) gathers most of the data.
Writing was a part of everyday life for all types of auxiliary soldiers, no matter what their background. Even if a soldier could not read or write himself, he would have noticed the immense importance of written documentation for military life. Letters of recommendation, personal letters, receipts for pay and rations outlays, loan agreements, contracts, marriage agreements, wills, accounts, lists, official reports, discharge documents, diplomas granting them and their family citizenship, graffiti, jar labels, religious dedications, tombstones, and monumental inscriptions surrounded the soldier. Auxiliaries lived in an institutional world of writing, one whose power derived in large part by controlling and dispersing information. Recent excavations in Egypt have uncovered many ostraka carrying more ephemeral sorts of documents such as accounts, lists, official reports, and personal letters. Some ostraka even bore drawings on them. Unlike the wooden Vindolanda tablets, ostraka cannot be sealed shut, and often the text continues onto the back. Letters passed among numerous Roman military stations throughout the Eastern Desert, connected by a state-run system of military cavalrymen who carried official documents, personal letters, and packages. Informal civilian travelers and transferred soldiers also carried letters.

Roman Egypt’s cultural and linguistic context was very different from Roman Britain’s. Egypt’s rich history of powerful kingdoms (Egyptian, Persian, Greek) made it far more urbanized and cosmopolitan, and Greek was the written language of

693 For example, at the praesidium of Krokodilô, on the Koptos to Myos Hormos road, the following documents, which common soldiers might have handled, have been published so far: military administration, such as daily records of official mail delivery (O.Krok. 1-4, 24-40), personal letters (O.Krok. 93-100), owner’s labels on goods and products (O.Krok. 101-119), parole or watchword for each day of the month, with which soldiers could identify each other (O.Krok. 120-151).
694 O.Did. 466-479.
695 For this system, see the introductions to Cuvigny (2006): vol. 2 and Cuvigny (2012).
communication, even in the Roman army. Only rarely do we find Latin documents, usually confined to Roman soldiers, veterans, or official documents. While it is indeed true that Latin was a “super-high prestige language” whose use was a symbolic expression of imperial power and authority, the choice of language, at times, could simply be a matter of asserting identity, albeit one tied to the Roman state.

The Roman military had a substantial presence in Egypt, with many groups of soldiers stationed throughout the Delta, the Nile Valley, and the Eastern and Western Deserts (see ch. 4.3 above). Dacian auxiliary soldiers stationed in Egypt in the early second century almost always served in cavalry units. Many of these Dacian soldiers retained their original name, rather than adopt a Latin name upon conscription, as usually happened among Greco-Egyptians serving as infantrymen in Roman military units. Lists of names of soldiers found in the documents of Egypt often separated soldiers by the origin of their names, that is, Dacian names were grouped together, then Greco-Egyptian names, then Latin names. The soldiers also thought of themselves as men

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696 Clackson (2012): 47-50 argues that vernacular languages were used alongside Latin or Greek in the countryside of Syria and Egypt (perhaps even in provinces of the Roman Empire as a whole), and probably also in the towns, in situations of “stable bilingualism” (a linguistic term describing situations in which the use of two or more languages are maintained within a single community over a long period of time), contra MacMullen (1966) (reprinted in MacMullen (1990)), who argues for a multilingual urban space and a monolingual rural space.

697 Evans (2012), who notes “To describe the content of these Latin texts, generalizations are dangerous, and any categorization will be somewhat crude...while there are indeed many military communications of various sorts, a private letter from a soldier may not be at all ‘military’ in content. We also find numerous texts pertaining to the civil administration, legal documents, private letters, inscriptions and graffiti of the ‘I was here’ type or of a religious character, and epitaphs. In addition, there are a number of literary and para-literary texts” (517). For the variety of Latin documents, see P.Mich. VII.

698 Evans (2012): 518-19, focusing on the papyrus letters of Claudius Terentianus, a fleet and legionary veteran (Karanis, early 1st c. CE).


700 Although see O.Ka.La. inv. 37, a letter in Latin mentioning two Dacian infantrymen in the cohors II Thebaeorum, found at Umm Balad and mentioned at O.Krok. 98.

701 All the cavalrymen present in O.Krok. have Dacian names. Cuvigny, introduction to O.Krok. on onomastics.

702 O.Did. 64 (ca. 110-115): seven Dacian names, three Greco-Egyptian names, two Latin names, then one
apart, with some calling each other “fellow countrymen” (συνπολίται) in letters. It does not seem that the Roman military administration required the Dacians to change their name. Perhaps the Roman officers recognized the value in maintaining a strong sense of Dacian identity, one informed by Roman stereotypes and recent experience of Dacian martial prowess. Similar to the Batavians and the Thracians discussed in chapter three, the Dacians in the Eastern Desert were in many ways a “martial race” for the Romans.

Despite their seemingly distinctive status, the Dacian auxiliary soldiers did not keep to themselves. Rather, they seem to have integrated within the desert military community, maintaining ties with fellow soldiers, civilian traders, and local women. Around 120 CE, only about fifteen years or so after Rome’s conquest of Dacia, a Dacian auxiliary soldier named Claudius stationed at the praesidium of Didymoi in Egypt received two letters written in Latin from a neighboring outpost: one from a Greco-Egyptian woman, Demetrous, and one from his Greco-Egyptian fellow-soldier, Numosis. The two letters were written on the same side of an ostrakon in the same hand, perhaps written by Numosis. The letters read:

isolated Dacian (or Thracian) name. See also O.Claud. II 402-404.
703 O.Did. 398 (dumped ca. 115-120): unknown Dacian who greets Diorblikos (Diurpliz?) and all his fellow countrymen; O.Krok. 98 (ca. beginning of 109 CE), a letter in which all the names are Dacian: the cavalryman Dekinais writes to his fellow soldier Kaigiza and greets his two fellow cavalrymen named Zoutula and Pouridour. At the end of this letter, Dekinais mentions that he has heard that the prefect of Egypt had issued the order that “all Dacians” should be led to Alexandria, but does not say why. Cuvigny suggests that the governor either wanted to stage a kind of a military show by entering Alexandria escorted by hundreds of Dacian horsemen or that he intended to group the Dacian cavalrymen into their own unit, who were until then distributed among the auxiliary units of Egypt (the ala Vocontiorum in Koptos for the Eastern Desert), perhaps to serve somewhere else in the empire.
704 The editor suggests that Claudius, despite his Latin name, was Dacian because he does not seem to have known Greek (hence why the letter was written in Latin) and because he was stationed with Diurponais, a Dacian.
705 The editor suggests that perhaps Numosis himself wrote it. He notes that the scribe probably spoke Greek and had a good knowledge of Latin letters, but a poor knowledge of the Latin language, using a phrase-book or glossary to translate mechanically from Greek into Latin. The editor points to other
(convex side) Demetrous to Claudius, greetings. I want you to know that I have not received (anything) from the curator concerning your living quarters. When I received the wheat, I made it all into bread. Now I ask you this: protect yourself from everyone until I come to you, lest anyone deceive (attack?) you.

Numosis to Claudius, his brother and master, greetings. Write to me how you want your living quarters to be sold so that I can sell it. (concave side) Greet Crescens, my countryman. Ask if he received the little sandal(?). Greet Diurponais. Farewell. 706

This document, just like Masclus’ letter, was found in a Roman auxiliary environment. Yet, apart from the shared written language and general form of the letter, the contents and the characters are much different. I map out these complex identities and relationships below (table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Status / Occupation</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demetrous</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Greco-Egyptian</td>
<td>wife / girlfriend of Claudius? baker?</td>
<td>nearby outpost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudius</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Dacian (?)</td>
<td>auxiliary soldier; husband / boyfriend of Demetrous?</td>
<td>Didymoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numosis</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Greco-Egyptian</td>
<td>auxiliary soldier; friend of Claudius, yet lower in status</td>
<td>nearby outpost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crescens</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Greco-Egyptian; “countryman” of Numosis</td>
<td>auxiliary soldier</td>
<td>Didymoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diurponais</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Dacian</td>
<td>auxiliary soldier</td>
<td>Didymoi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Relationships at Didymoi

examples of several letters written on the same piece of writing material: O.Did. 383 (Philokles to Sknips, Philokles to Kapparis; ca. 110-15 CE), T.Vindol. III 643 (Florus to Calavir(us), Florus to Titusca; 100 to 104/5 CE), P.Tebt. II 416 (Kalma to Sarapias, Kalma to Protos; III CE), SB III 6263 = Sel.Pap. I 121 (Sempronius to Saturnila, Sempronius to Maximus; 2nd half of II CE). He argues that the present example, of several people writing to the same person, was to save trouble for the letter carrier: “our ideas of privacy of letters do not apply.”

706 O.Did. 417 (ca. 120-125, dumped ca. 125-140 CE): Convex side: Demeteru Claudio salute. scire te uolo conia non acc/epi a quatoris esopera co/ntubernio. sicot abui / frumentum omnia pa/ne feci. nuc oc te rogo, serua te ab omnes / doneico ego at te uen/io, ne qui te inponant. / Numosis Claudio frat/eri et magisteri suo / salute. comodo uis ue/nire contubernio / scribire mi ut ego [s. . . ] / [-1-2-] pose uendere. Concave side: saluta Crescenti / conterane meum. / interroga si acepit / esabario. Saluta / Diurpona. / (Space of 1 line) / uale. Apparatus: convex.1. read Demetruns, read salutem; convex.2. read quoniam (corr); convex.3. read curatore (corr), read supra (corr); convex.4. read sicut, read habui; convex.5. read omnes; convex.5-6. read paines; convex.6. read nunc, read hoc; convex.7. read omnibus; convex.8. read donec (corr), read ad; convex.9. read imponant; convex.10-11. read frat[ri]; convex.11. read magistrio; convex.12. read salutem, read quomodo (corr); convex.12-13. [read ne[ndere (corr, ed. prin.)]]; convex.13. read contubernium (my ed.); convex.14. read scribe; convex.15. read possem, i.e. possim; concave.16. read Crescenti; concave.17. read conteraneum; concave.18. read accepit; concave.19. esabario; perhaps sambarium, a diminuitive form, with rhotacism, from σάμβαλον, a dialect-form of σάνδαλον (sandal). Trans. Bülow-Jacobsen, modified.
The mention of the *curator* (a military officer in charge of a *praesidium*) and *contubernium* (a soldier’s living quarters), as well as their Latin and Dacian names suggest that the men were auxiliary soldiers. But why did Demetrous, a woman with a Greek name, and Numosis (or Numosius) write to Claudius in Latin, when nearly all other letters recovered from this area were written in Greek? What was the relationship among these three people, as well as Crescens (a man with a Latin name) and Diurponais (a man with a Dacian name)? How did Dacians, recently conscripted into the Roman army, adjust, socially and culturally, to their new environment? And why is the Latin so riddled with spelling variances, what we might call errors? Clearly some degree of language interference is present, most likely from the scribe who may have known Greek better than Latin.\(^7\) A range of possible interpretations are available, as so often with personal letters. Yet the possibilities give us a clear sense that Dacian auxiliaries maintained complex social ties with the community around them.

Numosis and Crescens were countrymen, perhaps both from Egypt, since Numosis did not call Claudius or Diurponais (the Dacian) his countryman. Could Claudius, with his Roman name, have been a citizen? Or was he a Dacian who took up a Roman name? Probably the latter, although it is difficult to determine.\(^8\) Numosis addressed Claudius as brother and master, while in another letter Claudius addressed Numosis as son.\(^9\) We should not take the familial titles literally; they were most likely respectful terms for fellow soldiers, with Claudius being the elder. Other, more fragmentary letters show that Claudius and Demetrous, and Claudius and Numosis,

\(^7\) See Evans (2012): 523 for non-native speakers used as scribes among Roman soldiers.
\(^8\) The editor suggests that Claudius might be Dacian, but does not comment on his legal status.
\(^9\) *O.Did.* 419 (dumped ca. 115-120 CE).
sustained their relationships in both Greek and Latin.\footnote{O.\textit{Did.} 419 and 418 (dumped ca. 115-120 CE).} It is probable that Claudius knew Latin better than Greek, while Numosis and Demetrous knew Greek better than Latin, but that they attempted to accommodate each other by attempting to write in the alternate language.

More intriguing is the relationship between Demetrous and Claudius. Was she his wife? Girlfriend? Slave? Prostitute? Roman military practice prevented the legal marriage of soldiers, although we have plenty of evidence to suggest that this did not prevent soldiers from taking up unofficial wives during service, whether the women were willing or not.\footnote{Phang (2001). For the rape culture of Roman soldiers towards female slaves, see Phang (2004). She rightly points out that its naive to assume that soldiers’ union with non-Roman women was a form of cultural assimilation (assuming the women to be relative social equals); rather, the power differentials probably led to a very little cultural assimilation. Whittaker (2004b) presents a somewhat more cheery picture.} Other documents from the Eastern Desert show that prostitutes worked at these military bases on monthly contracts, which were taxed by the state, and their labor was often managed by male or female merchants and traders.\footnote{Cuvigny (2006): 383-89 and in corrigendum of the 2nd edition in the section \textit{Quitana} pp. 689-93 (2006), and Cuvigny (2010).}

Yet the concern in Demetrous’s message is puzzling. She was clearly worried for Claudius’ safety. She also seems to have been managing Claudius’ affairs with his military supervisor, the \textit{curator}, in addition to making bread.\footnote{Women could manage the business affairs of soldiers, see \textit{P.Mich.} VIII, 479 (early 2\textsuperscript{nd} c., Alexandria?)}, in which a woman (Tabetheus) has to forward some letters to the strategos. See also Gilliam (1967), discussing \textit{P.Col.} VIII, 221 = \textit{SB X}, 10530 = \textit{Ch.L.A.} XLVII, 1448 (143 CE; Ophieion, Thebes), a receipt issued by a deceased auxiliary soldier’s mother recognizing that she received her son’s \textit{deposita}, money saved by the soldier with his unit. The \textit{deposita} also include payment for his weapons and tent.} Could they have had a legitimate relationship? It was not unheard of for local Egyptian girls to fall in love with soldiers; in an unpublished letter from a neighboring road station, an Egyptian man bitterly recounted how a prostitute whom he had previously hired had refused to go with


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him “out of love for a Dacian.”\textsuperscript{714} Perhaps Dacians seemed exotic, powerful, and wealthy. I imagine that their appearance would have struck many people in Egypt as unusual, if not attractive, especially if they retained their distinctive facial hair. Still, as soldiers under the employ of Rome, these Dacian auxiliaries represented the imperial power. Their complex relationships with fellow Dacians, other auxiliaries, and local women contributed, if perhaps in only a small way, to the continued negotiation over Roman imperial culture and identity.

5.5 Conclusion

Through an examination of these tombstones and letters in their vastly separated, yet still ultimately connected environments, I have demonstrated that the military community of the Roman auxiliaries was one of complex cultural and social dynamics. Rather than seeing these soldiers and their families as on a progressive journey from “barbarian” to “Roman,” it is far more important to explore the diverse experiences of these individuals. Clearly their experiences were different, shaped by their rank, location, and the length of their service. More important, I claim, was the relationship of their native people to the Roman state, affected, in part, by how long their community had been conquered and incorporated into the Empire. The Gallic auxiliaries serving in the shadows of a monumental reminder of their people’s defeat must surely have felt differently about their military service than the Batavians at Vindolanda with their relatively privileged position. Recently conquered Dacians, forced (or volunteering?) to serve in the deserts of Egypt, maintained a degree of cultural separation through the use

\textsuperscript{714} O.Krok.inv. 244 (inventory number provided by A. Bülow-Jacobsen, personal email, 22 March 2013). The letter is mentioned in Grimal (1997): 370, although he does not specify the inventory number.
of native names, yet still managed to appropriate Roman military forms of communication as well as to integrate with local Greco-Egyptian soldiers and women.

Letters, I argue, often offer the best evidence for this type of analysis, although material culture has much to add. While funerary inscriptions may have reflected the heirs’ intentions or standardizing customs, individuals had somewhat more freedom when writing letters. Masclus was able to play with Batavian stereotypes and traditions while asking for beer. Demetrous could assure her Dacian lover of her loyalty and diligence, while Numosis greeted fellow-countrymen and foreign friends. Yet both these groups of auxiliaries also participated in the broader military economy. Purchasing living quarters, crafting bread from wheat, sending sandals, demanding beer; these material objects, just as the letters themselves, was the glue that bonded this disparate group together. It is through these brief glimpses in letters that the everyday practices can be imagined.

Most importantly, we need to recognize and reaffirm the agency of the many unnamed individuals who contributed to, and vastly complicated, the social world of the Roman frontiers.715 Behind these tombstones and letters lies a vast array of hidden people who nevertheless played an important role in the history of the Roman Empire. The Gallic comrades who put up the tombstone for Lucenius the Bodionticus, the unnamed thirsty Batavian soldiers under the command of Masclus, the numerous women and children who left their shoes behind at the desert outposts: all of these individuals influenced, in their own way, the broader Roman community.716 Whether through beer, bread, love, or language, auxiliary soldiers played an integral role in the life of the

715 “History is a democrat. It is or it should be respectful of all human beings alike, not only those that dominate in the report through their position and their art,” MacMullen (2009): 98.
716 For the shoes of women and children at Didymoi, see Leguilloux (2006): 104-05.
Roman Empire.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

To navigate the often conflicting ideas and expectations regarding what it meant to be a soldier, a “barbarian,” a Roman, and perhaps even a member of a “martial race” must have been a confusing process. Even the daily act of walking within the military base was a form of negotiation. The individual tactics that auxiliaries used to meet, exceed, or challenge these expectations are mostly hidden or lost. Yet hints remain. Whether maintaining one’s native personal name, building a family with fellow provincials, or simply requesting a refreshing beverage, soldiers found ways to make sense of their surroundings. Their constant contestations, with some more significant than others, contributed to the meanings and experiences of not only the local military community, but even, I argue, the broader Roman world.

In his recent synthesis on the Roman auxilia and the making of provincial society, Haynes ends by emphasizing the Empire’s “success,” its survival, its endurance, and how “the Empire had to reconcile” the contradictions and oppositions surrounding the auxiliary soldier, and how the Empire offered opportunities to these soldiers and their families to have new focuses of identities. Yet what did the Empire take away, destroy, and sacrifice to make that success? Not simply human lives but human cultures and

societies were forever altered and even lost by the expansion of the Roman Empire. In the experience of auxiliaries, soldiers were forced to fight against kinsmen, endure dehumanizing stereotypes, and live under highly supervised conditions. While it is arguable whether or not the economic and social advances military service brought the soldier and his family compensated for these difficult circumstances, even the successful veteran, granted Roman citizenship after twenty-five long years of service, experienced a degree of loss of self for the glory of Rome.

This dissertation has shown the restrictions and possibilities of the experiences of auxiliary soldiers. As discussed in chapter two, officers of auxiliary units came from wealthy, powerful, and educated backgrounds. Their view of soldiers and “barbarians” was deeply shaped by their education. As the *exempla* from the writings of the first-century authors Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus show, soldiers were believed to require constant discipline, both as a means of control and as a way to strengthen military prowess. Yet auxiliaries were more than just soldiers. They also had to navigate Roman stereotypes about “barbarians” and other foreigners. Certain peoples were regarded as “martial races” by the Romans. They imparted certain behavioral expectations upon individuals derived from these ethnic groups. The varied yet similar stereotypes surrounding Batavians and Thracians, as shown in chapter three, clearly shaped Roman recruitment practices as well as how Roman officers imagined these men.

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Collectively, the barbarians were thought by the Romans to be objects of conquest; individually, barbarians were thought to be able to transform into Romans: “But these ‘barbarians’ failed in the Roman mental world to attain to civilization, and were therefore the proper object of conquest, seizure, resettlement and, where necessary, death. On the other hand, though in a primitive, pre-civilized, man/animal state, individual ‘barbarians’ were capable, by a process of acculturation, of transformation into Romans. But that transformation almost always depended on the coercive break, the violent threshold, of conquest and domination that formed the antechamber of cultural death – the first step to ‘becoming Roman’ entailed the annihilation of their own cultural identity,” Shaw (2000): 378.
But auxiliaries did contest and even reinforce these stereotypes, especially through the adoption of martial imagery on tombstones. While the daily negotiations between soldiers and officers is generally lost to us, the very fact that some auxiliaries adopted and adapted these stereotypes suggests that they had a significant impact on the Roman imagination.

Auxiliaries were not simply restricted by Roman expectations and ideals. The physical space of military bases also imposed limitations to their practices. Still, to assume that a pan-imperial spatial standard developed does not completely encapsulate the variations that are present in the archaeological record. While it is clear that “strategies” of spatial practice were discussed among Roman officials, as shown by the second-century treatise *De munitionibus castrorum*, the remains of frontier bases suggest more variety in the everyday “tactics” of individuals and communities. Moreover, as the author of *De mun. castr.* implied, the Roman views towards auxiliaries evolved over the first hundred years of professional development. Legionaries were still considered the most reliable troops, yet the auxiliaries were to be trusted more so than other foreign troops. The examples from Western frontier bases, road outposts in the deserts of Egypt, and urban bases in the East demonstrate the possible spatial variety available to auxiliary soldiers. Such spaces encouraged a diverse range of interactions among auxiliary soldiers, their officers, their families, and the civilian communities. A hint of these dynamics was explored in chapter five, through the regional and chronological case studies drawn from a range of auxiliaries throughout the Empire. Gallic auxiliaries patrolled near the monumental reminder of their defeat, the Trophy of the Alps, yet still practiced the Roman funerary custom of raising tombstones with Latin inscriptions for
their dead. Batavian auxiliaries on the frontier of Britain manipulated ethnic customs by addressing their superior as “king” and demanding beer, while recently conquered Dacian auxiliaries maintained close-knit friendships among fellow Dacians as well as local populations. All of these interactions demonstrate the subtle, yet extensive impact of auxiliaries on Roman frontier society.

Beyond their own frontier and military milieus, auxiliaries made significant contributions to the larger patterns of Roman imagination and practice. As explored in chapters two and three, Roman commanding officers of auxiliary units could deploy an array of stereotypes and expectations regarding soldiers, “barbarians,” and ultimately “Romanness” when interacting with their troops. But to claim that equestrian officers left their military service after a few years with little to no changes to their views towards soldiers and foreigners would be grossly underestimating the extent of interactions and influence that soldiers had over the ideas of their officers. Yes, the literary image of soldiers and “barbarians” remained rather stable during the course of the Roman Empire. But, as the Tacitus’s account of soldiers’ revolts at the death of Augustus suggests, soldiers had influence over their officers, especially in times of crisis. Even in relative peaceful times, though, auxiliary soldiers shaped their officers’ views of soldiers and “barbarians,” challenging some stereotypes and reinforcing others. We could imagine officers returning to Rome after a few years commanding auxiliaries with new ideas or reaffirmed views, in turn, shaping the views and approaches of policy makers, artists, and even the broader Roman community.

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719 Tac. Ann. 1.16-49, especially Percennius’s speech in 1.17. While this discord is among legionaries, it nevertheless represents the potential power and influence of soldiers. Note that Germanicus had threatened to suppress the legionary revolt by using auxiliaries (1.36).
Auxiliary soldiers also shaped the formation of Roman imperial culture. Far from being passively incorporated into a “successful” or “enduring” Empire, auxiliary soldiers contributed to the everyday life of the Roman Empire in meaningful ways. Some readily accepted elite stereotypes of discipline and martiality, as suggested by the Batavian adoption of military imagery in tombstones. Others attempted to retain some ethnic distinction by maintaining personal names, such as the Dacians in Egypt, or by referring to their recently conquered tribes of origin, as the Bodionicus auxiliary did on his tombstone. Daily practices within military bases perpetuated, challenged, or complicated Roman spatial norms, while interactions with local provincials generated new stages for imperial cultural formation. Auxiliaries did not “Romanize” the provinces. Rather, through everyday relationships among soldiers, officers, and civilians, these individual agents of empire, who had been recruited from defeated peoples, helped to transform the imaginary and practical forms of what it meant to be a participant in the Roman Empire.

Other aspects of the lives of auxiliary soldiers deserve to be explored. On the one hand, ethnic stereotypes and images of ideal soldiers were not limited to elite literary texts. Artistic depictions and monumental iconography also contributed to the spread of these ideas, both at Rome and in the provinces. The variations of family life, both in service and after retirement, might also complicate our picture of a largely male, military experience. Roman military bases were bustling communities, full of families, friends, and even enemies. What the veterans brought home with them, economically, socially, culturally, even psychologically, also impacted provincial society. While funerary monuments have been thoroughly studied as documents and artistic objects, the ceremonies and meanings surrounding them and the people who made them ought to be

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considered more closely, as well.

While clearly not a “middle ground” environment, service in a Roman auxiliary unit did allow for some degree of negotiation, accommodation, and change. Soldiers of foreign background came into service with their own expectations of proper military behavior, while their Roman officers may have had completely different expectations. Training, discipline, battle, and daily interactions allowed for a negotiation of sorts, one based on a significant differential in power, but negotiation nonetheless. Ultimately, Roman policy regarding auxiliary units changed, partially through the collective and individual efforts of generations of auxiliary soldiers. Despite the inertia of “barbarian” ethnic portraits, the Roman Empire transformed into a state of near-universal citizenship. By the early third century, the auxilia no longer served as the repository of ambiguous “barbarian”/Roman soldiers. Auxiliary soldiers, their families, and the communities around them contributed to the deeply contested development of Roman imperial culture through their everyday practices. Still, stereotypes towards foreign troops remained, and future “barbarians” and Romans continued to debate the role of soldiers, “barbarians,” and Romanness for generations to come.
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