

**GERMAN POLICY AND ITS ACCOMMODATION OF THE TURKISH-
GERMAN MINORITY: AN ANALYSIS OF INTEGRATION AND
MULTICULTURALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

Elisa Warner

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Advised by Damani Partridge

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INTRODUCTION

The overwhelming analyses of Western European relationships to immigrants and minorities of migrant descent have focused on the retroactive measures to integration administered, supported, or else allowed by the state. A plethora of articles focused on themes such as French discrimination of Islamic immigrants through the media (Iftkhar, S. 2013) and German “exclusionary” policy (*e.g.*, Yükleyn, A. 2012; Partridge, D.J.J. 2013) have called attention to the necessity for tighter integration reforms in these countries in order to support the inclusion of immigrants in society. However, such articles tend to ignore and further undermine the vast efforts of these countries in overcoming the multi-layered issues concerning this complex term, “integration,” in respect to Europeans of migrant descent.

In Germany, much heat has brewed over the country’s exclusionary management of the migrant population after the 1961 *Anwerbeabkommen* allowed Turkish migrants to enter the country for work (Hochmuth, H.n.d.). Because neither party thought the migrants would stay longer than the original stipulations of their two-year contracts, Germany never implemented policy that supported their integration in society (Hochmuth, H.n.d.). Today, however, Turkish-Germans represent the largest ethnic minority in Germany today (Duarte, J. 2011). In the worldwide news media, multitudes of stories cover Germany’s “‘failed’ multiculturalism” and lack of integration initiatives in regard to Turkish-Germans (*e.g.* Crossland, D. 2012; Elger, K. et al. 2009; Hawley, C. 2004; Hoff, H. 2011; Osborne, L. 2012). Such articles and assertions like Merkel’s infamous “*Multikulti ist absolut gescheitert*” render feelings that German policy is not effective in maintaining a multicultural state (*Integration: Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert* 2013). This exact claim is the subject of this study, in which I challenge this view by presenting another way of perceiving the situation in Germany today.

Of course, it would be simply incorrect to claim that the Turkish-German minority today faces *no* problems within the realm of societal inclusion. As many of the aforementioned authors have already pointed out, many Turkish-Germans feel excluded from the average German society, and many really are, occupying some of the lowest strata of the socioeconomic ladder (*e.g.* Song, S. 2011; Worbs, S. 2003; Entorf, H. & Minoiu, N. 2004). This can be seen as the reflection of past failed integrative policies or else simple exclusion, because the socioeconomic status of immigrants is directly correlated to the success of integration policy (Entorf, H. & Minoiu, N. 2004).

Because of this, another way to analyze German policy efforts is to seek evidence that state policy is in a progressive position to not only accept changes in its integration policy, but that current policy is becoming more liberal in this decade to the inclusion of minority groups in German society. This analysis is especially important to consider in light of recent events such as the World Trade Center incident on September 11, 2001, when Muslim minorities in the western world became the target of much discussion and scrutiny. Although Islamophobia heightened in the last decade on account of events like this, I seek to find that policy has regardless become more accommodating towards the Turkish-German community, a predominately Muslim minority.

In light of my previous use of the phrase “multicultural state,” what does it mean exactly to be multicultural? Multiculturalism can be defined in many ways, but in its most basic sense, the word refers to any society containing multiple cultures (Anon 2013). In the realm of Turkish-Germans, this study defines multiculturalism by the extent to which the state succeeds in promoting integration (here, a word synonymous with “inclusion”) of these minorities.

The next question is then how best to define integration. I use the typology of integration established by Koopmans *et al.* to best define this term (Ersanilli, E.&Saharso, S. 2011, *see also* Koopmans, R. et al. 2000 and Koopmans, R. et al. 2005). In this typology, two dimensions of integration policy denote integration: 1) individual equality, or “the extent to which citizenship is open to immigrants and the extent to which immigrants receive the same individual rights as the native population of the settlement country,” and 2) a plural support, or the amount of support “for ethnic or religious group formation and granting special rights or exempting cultural groups from general rules. (Ersanilli, E.&Saharso, S. 2011)” In the sense of this thesis, integration is therefore defined in the same way that it is measured: by its effect on society. In preserving the order of Koopmans *et al.* typology (Ersanilli, E.&Saharso, S. 2011), some ways that a state may support integration and thus promote multiculturalism include the following:

In individual equality:

- citizenship laws that are open to accepting more foreigners as naturalized citizens

In plural support:

- an equal, unbiased support of a culture’s religion
- an educational policy that accommodates cultural differences, enabling success for everyone
- an acceptance and further integration of another culture’s arts, foods, languages, and customs

Of these proposed measurements of integration, I chose two which can be easily tied to German policy and can be furthermore measured for effect. These two, the main topics of this thesis,

include: public school policies concerning Turkish-German youth and state policy concerning Islam. Because shifts in policy have occurred since the 1960s, when migrants began working in Germany, this study focuses on policy after September 11, 2001, when, as stated above, the World Trade Tower incident sparked a new conscientiousness for Muslim minorities in the Western world.

The question then also arises as to whether government policy can change the attitudes of its subjects. After all, part of integration is not just whether Turkish-Germans and ethnic Germans are attending the same schools for example, but also whether each student, regardless of ethnicity, is equally included in the educational society. So can policy change attitudes? Current research points to the affirmative.

According to a comparative study on the personal identifications of Turkish-Europeans in three Western European countries, policy is correlated largely to self-identification with the settlement country. The study consisted of phone interviews of second-generation Turkish-Europeans from the Netherlands, France, and Germany (Ersanilli, E. & Saharso, S. 2011). Interviews were conducted by bilingual interviewers, and 57 survey-subjects agreed to a follow-up in-depth interview (2011). The questions were phrased such as “To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?” and answers were given on a scale from 1 “not at all,” to 5 “completely” (2011). Data was organized through regression equations, where Germany was set as the reference (2011). In order to control for socio-economic status, other groups were established by level of education and work (2011).

The researchers looked at two different dimensions of identity: settlement country identification and ethnic identification (2011). Although many other forms of identification could exist for Turkish-Europeans, the researchers explained that these two particular identities were

most likely to be affected by national integration policies (2011). They chose to focus specifically on two groups of Turkish-Europeans: second generation Turkish-Europeans, who were born and raised in the country, or else the “in-between” generation, who were born in Turkey but arrived in the settlement country before the age of six (2011). These two groups were targeted because they had spent the most time in the settlement country, meaning that they were affected by integration policy the longest (2011). Preliminarily, researchers Eranilli and Saharso also established the differences in integration policy between the three European countries they would follow in the experiment: the Netherlands, France, and Germany. The Netherlands was described as holding the most accommodative policy, because of its “ethnic and religious consultative bodies” and the fact that the state funds ethnic and religious broadcasting corporations and schools (2011). France, although refusing to support state-funded religious groups, was still considered to offer a higher degree of individual equality than Germany, because French-born children are automatically considered citizens (2011). In addition, one can acquire French citizenship after only 5 years of residence (2011). Germany, the least accommodating country to immigrants as established by the researchers, requires a long and difficult process to obtain citizenship (2011). It is not until recently (2000) that German-born children were allowed citizenship at birth, and until very recently, they must renounce any other citizenship by age 23 in order to maintain it (2011).

The results proved enlightening, confirming the effects of integration policy on attitudes of those under it (2011). Turkish identification was consistently higher than settlement country identification among all national groups, which was attributed to a sense of cultural pride among this particular group (2011). Perceived discrimination also did not vary among groups (2011). Settlement country identity in Germany, identified as the country with the lowest level of

individual equality and least permeable society for inclusion, remained the *lowest* of the three countries, while this identity in France and the Netherlands stayed the same (2011). This lends evidence to the Social Identity Theory, which states that people want to belong to the higher status group – in this context, this group is assumed to be the settlement country (2011). Thus, where policy allows more inclusion, Turkish immigrants and their families will identify more as part of the settlement society. Further data seemed to imply that “the more people feel perceived as settlement country members, the less they identify as Turk (2011)”, suggesting policy can even reverse social identities. In the controls for education and work, researchers found that those employed identified less with Turks than those unemployed (2011). They reported this as evidence that socioeconomic marginalization is related to stronger ethnic identification (2011).

Ersanilli and Saharso’s findings confirmed that policy affects integration, both politically and psychologically, which is a central assumption of this study (2011). Furthermore, this paper delves deeper into the importance of integration policy – not only in shaping the movements and actions of minority groups in the country, but also their attitudes, which may be the most important aspect of inclusion.

Method

Now that the argument and definitions have clearly been defined, as well as the evidence that German policy can indeed influence integration, I will explain the layout and methodologies of this study.

In order to provide evidence for my argument, I used a combination of primary and secondary sources regarding German policy and their effects on the Turkish-German minority. Because field research is beyond the means of this study, primary sources consisted mostly of the

published research or reports already performed on a particular subject. Secondary sources included scholarly analyses of this research or policy. Data was accumulated either through books or scholarly databases such as PAIS International, ERIC Online, Google Scholar, and EBSCO Host. This data was defined as either journal articles or chapters from scholarly publications, each with inclusive bibliographies to support their assertions. External sites were used where particular information from the given databases was not available, but were scrutinized carefully for validity and accreditation. While newspaper publications were also used where scholarly works cannot be found, these publications were assessed critically for cases of sensationalism or else overly-biased reporting, which should not be found in a quality scholarly publication, and often several articles were cited to support the other. It should, as a side note, further be noted that although I searched for information in support of this view that Germany is making efforts to accommodate Turkish-Germans, I analyzed data supporting the opposing perspective as well. This means that both discussions and research of German exclusionary policy were assessed as well as that of integrative policy, especially where cases of integrative policy may be lacking.

As previously stated, this study consists of two primary aspects of analyses, placed in between a short chapter background of the topic, a small side chapter, and a conclusion/discussion chapter. Each of the two primary analysis chapters is written to include the results of my findings regarding German integrative policy and scholarly discussions regarding the success or failure of these policies. I then analyze and discuss the data in relation to this particular aspect of multiculturalism. The last small chapter, entitled "Perceptions," is the result of observations I made while conducting research, and pertains to integration policy in general rather than the main subject policies at hand in the thesis.

After the brief introduction of the topic, my first substantial chapter discusses German integration policy in school systems. It is recognized that some of the lowest-performing students (that is, those who end up in the *Hauptschule*,) are minority children, including, to a significant degree, Turkish-German students (Partridge, D.J.J. 2013). After the infamous PISA studies in 2000, it became clear that German schools were not performing in the top sectors of Math, Reading or Science skills (Stanat et al 2000). Many blame Turkish-German students for the low PISA scores, because German was not the first language for these students. I seek to challenge these assumptions and discover what other issues may be to blame for the poor performance of these students in comparison to their ethnic German peers. In addition, I analyze the effectiveness of any solutions that have been instigated to counteract these problems, in search of finding evidence that Germany is promoting the integration of Turkish-German minorities. Policies aimed specifically at assisting minority students to improve their education would be an example of *accommodation*, one form of plural support in an integrative society. The demonstration of small-state attempts to accommodate minority Turkish-German students would be an indication of German open-mindedness, with implications towards full implementation by the state or even the country in the future.

The second substantial chapter discusses Germany's accommodation of religion for Muslim minorities. Although levels of religiosity and type of religious affiliation may differ per person asked, Sunni Islam is the predominant religion associated with Turkey and Turkish-Germans (Haug, S., Müssig, S. & Stichs, A. 2009). Especially after the events during and shortly after September 11, 2001, Islam became a relevant symbol in the Western world for any bodies of Near-East descent hailing from associated Muslim states. Because of this, state support of Islam comes as a symbolic reflection of state support of integration of Near-East minorities, even

if some individuals do not particularly associate themselves strongly with Islam. Even today, Islam has come as a controversial topic to many ethnic Germans. In light of assimilationist policies in European countries like France, where the hijab is banished from government-sponsored places, tensions have been high regarding the extent to which Islam may appear in the public sphere – either in the shape of hijabs or of mosques (Erlanger, S. 2011; Partridge, D.J.J. 2013). This study seeks to discover the extent to which Germany has *supported* these forms of religious expression, focusing on both its support of Islam as an institution and the freedom to wear the hijab in the public arena. However, both cases of support and discrimination were analyzed in policy since 2001, in order to assess if progressivity in religion is a mindset shared by German policy-makers at this time.

Because current research seems to hail the negative effects of German policy on the Turkish-German minority, I understood the possibility of limited success in proving the alternative hypothesis in at least one of these fields. Therefore, I utilized scholarly literature in these situations to suggest practical and progressive moves for German policy-makers and social-workers. This action is meant to be supplementary wherever positive data regarding progressivity in German policy lacks.

As aforementioned, a side note chapter entitled “Perceptions” has been included before the conclusion in order to cover an issue brought to mind while conducting research. It briefly explores the role that mainstream perception plays in integration and whether or not this can change.

The last chapter is a brief discussion summarizing the analysis of the last three chapters in order to answer the intended question posed by the thesis: Is German policy effective in

maintaining a multicultural state? Here, all evidence and analyses presented from the entire thesis are jointly placed as arguments for or against this notion.

BACKGROUND

The beginning of large-scale Turkish immigration into Germany took place during the Cold War (Hochmuth, H. n.d.). Pressures between East and West resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, resulting in a drastic decrease in immigration from the East. At the same time, West Germany faced an increasing demand for new workers that was not being met by the local population (n.d.). Because of this, Germany sought a solution that many other Western European countries, including the Netherlands and France, were already doing at the time – hiring migrant workers from economically weaker countries in Europe and the East, offering them the benefits of profiting from an economically booming country while profiting themselves from a temporary work force from *Ausland* (Crul, M. and Schneider, J. 2009).

In the same year that the Berlin Wall was built, Germany signed an *Anwerbeabkommen*, a labor recruitment agreement, with several countries in Europe including Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey (Hochmuth, H.n.d.). During the German economic miracle, or the *Wirtschaftswunder*, migrants from these countries immigrated to Germany for what both parties assumed to be a temporary two years (n.d.). Migrants from Turkey were typically unskilled men from the lowest socioeconomic strata without much knowledge of German language or culture (Crul, M. & Schneider, J. 2009). Between 1971 and 1973, the peak years of Turkish labor migration, half a million Turkish workers came to Germany in order to work (2009). Both the German government and Turkish migrant workers intended for migrant workers to return to their families after their two-year work contracts completed (Hochmuth, H.n.d.). However, due to the insistence of German companies tired of retraining workers, as well as to economic changes in both Germany and Turkey, many Turkish immigrants ended up staying long after their original two-year contracts expired (n.d.). Even after the *Anwerbeabkommen* halted in 1973, many

Turkish wives immigrated to Germany to join their husbands, while Turkish-German children began to be admitted into schools (n.d.). The 1980s and 1990s marked an upturn in Turkish migration when the so-called “in-between generation,” those born in Turkey but raised in Germany, began choosing spouses from Turkey (n.d.).

Today, numbers concerning the amount of all Turkish-Germans in-country disagree because most statistical data only differentiate between foreigners and German citizens (Worbs, S. 2003). However, estimates seem to range between 1.76 to 2.4million people (*e.g.* Duarte, J. 2011;Crul, M. & Schneider, J. 2009;Worbs, S. 2003;Hochmuth, H.n.d.), representing the largest ethnic minority in the country today (Duarte, J. 2011). Today’s Turkish-Germans, often referred to as Germans of migrant descent, are no longer the Turkish migrant workers who came to the country in the days of old. Rather, these people are often second, third, or even fourth generation German-born citizens who happen to have grown up with Turkish roots. Approximately two-thirds of Turkish nationals are younger than 35 years old (Worbs, S. 2003). A majority live in large cities such as Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Munich(2003).In some Turkish-Germanfamilies, Turkish culture is highly preserved. In others, not so much. A large majority of Turkish-Germans are Sunnite Muslim, but not all (Worbs, S. 2003;Haug, S., Müssig, S. &Stichs, A. 2009). It is important to note before proceeding that Turkish-Germans range in religiosity as well as academic success, political opinions, and self-identification. All data relating to Turkish-Germans, Germans of migrant descent, and ethnic Germans always reflect scientifically gathered data and never represent one group in its entirety.

CHAPTER I : POLICY IN EDUCATION

Introduction

The German public school system has largely faced attack under the theme of integration due to the stark measurable differences in educational performance between Turkish-German students and their ethnic German counterparts. Due to the German three-tier system, it is more evident than perhaps in other school systems that the majority of Turkish-Germans end up with the lowest educational output as a result of their placement in the lowest-tier schools. With little preparation for higher-education, many Turkish-German students face low prospects in the labor market post-graduation (Worbs, S. 2003). In some perspectives, this pre-destined disadvantage in the low-tier schools is “the process of producing noncitizens” (Partridge, D.J.J. 2013). As a reminder to Germany of this fact, the first world-wide standardized PISA test, conducted in 2000, showed Germany performing below the OECD average in each of the three categories of reading, mathematical, and scientific literacies. The results, analyzed on the topics of socioeconomic status and language acquisition in a benchmark comparison with other OECD nations, suggest a focus on improving accommodation for students in German public schools (Entorf, H.&Minoiu, N. 2004).

The PISA study was conducted in 2000 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in order to assess the competency of 15-year-olds in three areas: literacy, mathematics, and science (2004). PISA was a three-phase standardized test, conducted in 2000, 2003, 2006, and most recently in 2012 (2004, *see also* OECD 2012). In accordance with the sample design of the 2000 test, a minimum of 4500 students and 150 schools were chosen from each OECD country (32 in total, plus 4 non-OECD countries) (2004). The institute’s study findings resulted in the differentiation between “traditional countries of immigration,” that is:

Canada, the USA, Australia, and New Zealand; and European countries (2004). For most of the results, the USA did not fit the outcomes for other traditional countries of immigration, because the authors noted that the performance of traditional immigrants was offset by the arrival of many undocumented migrants, most often across the Mexican border (2004). The authors created a benchmark analysis using statistical regression formulas of both the socioeconomic and language profiles of PISA students from traditional immigrant countries and European countries in order to discover if these factors played any role in performance and if so, to what degree (2004).

In analysis of socioeconomic status in the PISA countries, researchers discovered that the impact curves for the socioeconomic status (SES) of parents on the performance of their children was steepest in Germany, the UK, and the US (2004). This compares to the flattest curves for Finland and Canada (2004). The significance of this assessment is that the socioeconomic status of the parents predicted a large part of student performance in the steepest countries. Researchers calculated the difference in score between natives (defined as students born in the country who spoke the national language at home) and the migration group (defined as students with foreign parents and with the foreign language spoken at home), and found the highest differences in Germany with 105.7 points (2004). This compares to Canada, one of the traditional countries of immigration, where the difference was only 25.5 points (2004). As a result, in Germany, we see a gap in student performance defined by socioeconomic status which furthermore can be correlated with the origins of the parents. It must be noted, however, that students from families with high socioeconomic status out-performed students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in every country (2004).

Interestingly, in Germany, students with foreign parents tended to score lower than native students, while migrants from traditional countries of immigration tended to score higher than the national average – in some countries by significant amounts (2004). Researchers point to differences in immigration policy as an explanation for the data differences, because traditional countries of immigration tend to accept mostly highly-educated foreigners (2004). In addition, they considered the clustering of migrant Germans in the lower sectors of socioeconomic status to be reflective of a poor integration policy in Germany as opposed to the more developed policies of Canada (2004).

Researchers also analyzed language skills, and in an interesting twist noted that “reading proficiency scores of migrant students improved substantially when the language spoken at home is the national language” (2004). Furthermore, they noted that a significant “upward shift in reading literacy due to language skills” can be attributed to Germany (2004). This evidence may suggest that a large problem with student literacy performance comes from a lack of fluency due to the speaking of other foreign languages in the household, which may be due to the fact that foreign parents prefer not to speak the national language at home. OECD researchers concluded that language skills may be more important than socioeconomic status in determining school performance:

Not surprisingly, students not speaking the majority language at home perform much less well [*sic*] than those who do and are much more likely to score among the lowest quarter of students in each country which can affect a country’s average reading score significantly. (2004)

This finding asserts that use of the native language in the household in European countries such as Germany may play a significant role in determining a student’s academic success in the

future. This largely contrasts the role of a foreign language spoken in households in traditional countries of immigration such as Canada, where household use of another language is actually correlated with stronger academic performance (2004).

One must, however, consider the limitations of such a study. Above all, researchers found a correlation between students who spoke a foreign language at home and low test performances; however, this does not imply that speaking a foreign language at home *causes* low test scores. Another likely explanation could be that in households where a foreign language is spoken at home, the parents are unable to meet their children's educational needs due to the parent's own lack of fluency in the host language. Thus the children, although perhaps fluent in the host language, perform worse on tests. We shall discuss the likelihood of each event in further detail in the next pages.

Another limitation observed was that the researchers wanted to simplify cases for data analysis and tended to categorize student families into two specific groups: students with foreign-born parents, whereby the students were assumed to also be foreign-born, and students with native parents, who were also assumed to be native-born and speaking the native language at home with parents. There are many native-born students of foreign-born parents who grew up under the language of their parents. Because this information was not asserted in the research, it cannot be assumed that these cases were also counted or else grouped in one particular category.

However, we will predict for the worst case, although we are extrapolating the results. We shall predict that this latter group is a part of the foreign-born category of poorly-performing individuals on account of socioeconomic status and language, in order to cover all possible solutions where problems may arise. In this way, it is evident that Turkish-German students in monolingual Turkish homes may face more difficulty in school than students whose parents

speak German at home (largely, ethnic Germans). Could this be due to fact that Turkish-Germans have poorer German language proficiency? Or could it be due to other factors, such as that previously mentioned – that parents will be unable to help with homework due to their lack of German language (and likely material) comprehension? Because both proposals are possible problems faced by Turkish-German students, an assessment to policy solutions for *both* issues will be addressed. Have German school systems considered both of these issues, and taken the right steps towards correcting the performance differences? To begin this assessment, we shall first discuss the mechanics of German public schools.

Structure of German Public Schools

The German school system is largely controlled by the *Bundesländer*, or federal states (Worbs, S. 2003). In most states, a child enters the school system through the *Grundschule*, or elementary school. Although entry ages vary among the states, the modal age stands at 6 years old (Crul, M.& Schneider, J. 2009). At the age of 10 years old (except in Berlin and Brandenburg, where the age is 12), the student takes an exam, which, in addition to teacher recommendations, will assign him or her to a respective secondary school (2009).

In most states, students can enter one of three different tracks for secondary school. The *Hauptschule*, considered the lowest-tier school, was originally intended to prepare students for skilled labor and thus focuses on the acquisition of vocational skills (Andell, K. 2008). The *Realschule*, the middle-tier track, utilizes both educational studies and work experience to prepare students for work in the commercial and service sectors (Andell, K. 2008). One can, after the *Realschule*, attend a *Hochschule*, which offers many study concentrations such as informatics, nursing, public management, and design (Andell, K. 2008;

Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften Hamburg 2013). The *Gymnasium*, the highest-tier secondary school, is a purely educational track that prepares students for university (Andell, K. 2008). It is the only track that allows students to study at a university, and thus severely limits students who have been placed in the *Hauptschulen* and *Realschulen* from this choice. Of these three, the most limiting educational track is the *Hauptschule*, because students are not qualified enough to even enter the *Hochschule* (Andell 2008). While it can be theoretically possible to receive the *Gymnasium* leaving certificate (*Abitur*) after being placed in the *Hauptschule*, this task is usually extremely difficult and requires extensive years of study (Baez et al. 2013; Boşol, F. 2013; see also Raiser, U. 2007).

It has already been established that the majority of scholars label German policy as “exclusionary.” To what extent can it be called “exclusionary” in schools? Entorf and Minoiu, the researchers of the aforementioned PISA analysis, assert that socioeconomic status of immigrants is directly correlated to the success of integration policy (2004). To what degree can we assume this is true? And if it is indeed true, can we see a lack of integration policy in schools, or will we have to look elsewhere? For the sake of this study, we will define “exclusionary” to mean any policy that does not accommodate an area of need for Turkish-Germans, such as German language acquisition in schools, for example.

The problem that Germany recognizes is that the majority of Turkish-German students, like their migrant parents or grandparents, are not prepared for higher education. Most students end up in the *Hauptschulen*, falling behind their ethnic German counterparts and becoming “the progeny and reproduction of leftover bodies” (Partridge, D.J.J. 2013). As one Kreuzberg teacher so eloquently explained, the *Hauptschulen* were housing the *Restkinder*—the leftover children

(Partridge, D.J.J. 2013). This can be perceived as the state's neglect of the Turkish-German minority.

In one case study of Turkish-German students and the German public school system, anthropologist Damani Partridge visited a secondary school (*Haupt/Realschule*) in Kreuzberg, a district just outside of Berlin (Partridge, D.J.J. 2013). Here, 80 percent of students were from Turkish- or Arabic-speaking families (2013). In this school, frustrated teachers asserted that many of their Turkish-German students speak worse German than their parents (2013). Some of their theories regarding the reasons for this were mentioned by Partridge:

The newspapers and some teachers blame the influx of Turkish TV (via satellite), Turkish stores, Turkish banks, and Turkish doctors. Many argue that although these people are in Germany, they are living as if it were an extension of Turkey. They are not 'integrating.' (2013)

Here Partridge is asserting the stereotypes carried by several teachers in this Kreuzberg secondary school that their Turkish-German students are simply not proficient in the national language. Our first method will be to assume that they are correct (although scholarly evidence says otherwise, to be discussed later). German teachers in such schools as Kreuzberg feel overburdened and face a cleft in understanding the needs and motivations of their Turkish-German students (2013).

Micro-census data from 2005 of second-generation Turkish-German students show that only 14% of students aged 25-35 finished a preparatory track that would have prepared them for university entry (Crul, M.& Schneider, J. 2009). Only 4% would have earned a university degree or its equivalent (2009). Therefore, the percentage of successful students of Turkish descent who

graduate from a higher-learning institutions in Germany is surprisingly low – less than half the numbers of their Turkish-Dutch neighbors(2009).

Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider, two researchers behind a comparative study of Turkish progeny in Germany and the Netherlands, presented their own speculations regarding these numbers (2009). Their first observation was the entry ages of Turkish-Germans in the *Grundschule* (2009). As aforementioned, most young German students start school at 6 years of age (2009). This compares to the entry age in the Netherlands of 4 years (2009). Crul and Schneider predict disadvantages due to this age difference, stating that the Turkish-Dutch students “have about 2 more years of formal education in a crucial phase of their development and socialization, especially with regard to learning the majority language” (2009). Here, Crul and Schneider bring up the language issue – something previously mentioned by PISA results and the teachers in the Kreuzberg study.

Crul and Schneider continue in their analysis of the differences in the school systems to mention the number of contact hours between German and Dutch students and their teachers (2009). In the Netherlands, the number of face-to-face contact hours with teachers during school for nine-year-olds is 1,019 hours (2009). In Germany, the average number among the *Bundesländer* is only 661 hours, because students tend to attend German schools on a half-day basis (2009). As a result, Turkish-German students receive 10 hours less tuition per week than their Turkish-Dutch neighbors (2009). This lack of training may cause critical deficiencies for young students who may be struggling with the language or basic foundational concepts in education, especially considering the likelihood that their parents may not be able to assist them with classroom material (2009). We have already learned that many migrants who came to Germany were poorly educated, and PISA test results seem to show a correlation between

Turkish-Germans and lower socioeconomic strata. This combines with data which show that 90% of immigrant families preserve their home languages in several forms, and that 30% of parents use only their home language when addressing their children (Duarte, J. 2011). If parents struggle to understand the language of the material or even the material itself, young Turkish-German students face a fundamental disadvantage from the earliest years of their lives, unlikely to pull themselves back up before being separated into the lowest track of the three-tier system by secondary school age.

This last observation of secondary school age was also mentioned by Crul and Schneider, who confirmed the disadvantages of the German school system for Germans of Turkish descent (2009). As previously mentioned, most students are separated into their secondary school track (*Hauptschule*, *Realschule*, or *Gymnasium*) at 10 years of age (2009). Students in the Netherlands, by contrast, are not partitioned in tracks until 2-4 years later (2009). Crul and Schneider note the disparities involved in these differences as a whole:

Coupled with the later start and lower average contact hours, Turkish students in Germany thus have comparatively little time to pull themselves out of their disadvantaged starting position. Moreover, because of the early selection, more students end up in lower qualifying streams (especially *Hauptschule*...) The older selection age in the Netherlands, [by comparison] results in higher percentages of Turkish children moving into more prestigious streams. (2009)

Here, Crul and Schneider confirm the disadvantages noted in the previous paragraph, stating that the age of secondary school entry further cripples Turkish-German students who are already at a disadvantage because of their home situations from being able to rebound and change their fates before the *Hauptschule* track (2009). As previously stated, once students are placed in the

Hauptschule, the chances of entering a higher-level institution are slim, due to the incessant bureaucratic complications for such students.

Some German secondary schools have tried to solve issues regarding language acquisition. In the past, school districts such as Kreuzberg imported teachers from Turkey “essentially to translate in German schools” (Partridge, D.J.J. 2013). They are not credentialed enough to teach and do not carry the same authority as German teachers, but today those who remain play partial administrative functions, what Partridge points to as part of an “administration of failure” (2013). Despite their presence in schools, little success for Turkish-German students has ensued (2013). Some claim that a large reason for the failure of this movement was because Turkish teachers weren’t hired for pedagogical reasons: “The [Turkish teachers] were supposed to play sheriff aides... They were supposed to play the role of police... [It hasn’t worked] because that’s how things were originally structured” (2013). According to this claim, Turkish teachers were never meant to teach children to improve in German language proficiency. Rather, school officials intended Turkish teachers to play disciplinary roles, which may have been more harmful than helpful to the cause of improving student performance.

If German language acquisition is an issue, as the Kreuzberg teachers claim, then a different strategy to improve school performance should commence – one that involves the pedagogy of students to improve their German language skills. If students are not proficient in the language at a secondary school level, their school performance, even if exemplary, will not prepare them for the working world in a German-language society. And if German language acquisition is indeed necessary, then the secondary-school level is almost too late to help Turkish-German students really improve their language skills. Psychological studies on language acquisition demonstrate a critical period of language-learning to peak at seven years of age

(Johnson & Newport 1989). After this, a gradual drop-off of language skill incurs, whereby the skill of syntax and pronunciation acquisition degrades faster than vocabulary (Johnson & Newport 1989; Piske et al. 2001; *see also* Mackay et al. 2001). In this way, language acquisition is optimal at a *primary* level – at the *Grundschule* or earlier.

Although in the past, districts such as Kreuzberg seemed to throw superficial answers like the Turkish teacher solution in response to the language deficiency problem of Turkish-German students, much more systematic answers have been coming recently out of German school districts across the country, suggesting a movement towards accommodation. In 2011, the Hamburg school district tested the effects of bilingual education on both migrant and ethnic German children at the *Grundschule* phase, producing positive results at the outset (Duarte, J. 2011).

Raising Awareness: The Hamburg Study and Bilingual Programs

This Hamburg study was a social experiment conducted in a multi-ethnic *Grundschule* in Hamburg (2011). Hamburg is remarkable because it boasts the largest percentage of Germans of migrant descent (2011). Case study participants, *Grundschule* students of both migrant and ethnic German backgrounds, respectively, were placed in classes of nearly 50/50 ratios on the basis of ethnicity (2011). According to Duarte, the curriculum, dubbed the “dual-language enrichment model,” included courses taught in both the migrant language and German (2011). All students were immersed in both languages as a learning tool for six years, and results demonstrated that “the two-way bilingual students displayed a considerable advantage when compared to other bilinguals in immersion classes” (2011). This means that not only migrant children benefited from this model, but also ethnic German students. This case study presents a

model of successful integration policy in the Hamburg school district, where a migrant language was utilized as a part of the official curriculum to improve learning for all students (2011).

However, one must be careful in the analysis of such a study. Firstly, the case study does not directly include the results for Turkish-German classrooms; rather, the class consisted of a small sample of Portuguese-Germans and ethnic Germans (2011). The small sample size of the case study limits the possibilities of extrapolation to other minority environments. Could Turkish-German students from culturally different backgrounds perform the same in such an environment? This is uncertain until studies are released concerning these students specifically.

Secondly, as school systems remain currently, it would be difficult to promise a 50/50 or even near 50/50 ratio of Turkish-Germans and ethnic Germans in every bilingual class. In order to do this, new problems arise: Would policy need to include busing students as well (Partridge, D.J.J. 2013)? Oftentimes, the lack of diversity in classrooms can be related to socioeconomic status, which physically separates ethnicities (Partridge, D.J.J. 2013). Furthermore, even designing these sorts of bilingual programs for every immigrant language might be unreasonable due to the vast diaspora of immigrant languages and cultures (although Berlin offers many successful EU bilingual schools)(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007, *eg see Aziz NesinGrundschule*2014, *Berlin Bilingual School* 2014, *Nelson Mandela Schule*2014).

And lastly, many might argue, should we expect all Germans to have to learn migrant languages such as Turkish in a German-speaking land? This is a question beyond the bounds of this study, and one that certainly would require a change in overall attitudes among both ethnic Germans and Germans of migrant descent (see chapter on *Perceptions*).

So although the case study presents a possible (but perhaps unrealistic) solution to the de facto segregation appearing under the current educational policy, it should be noted that the

Hamburg study should be viewed more so in light of its symbolic purpose as a change in attitudes towards integration and inclusion rather than an exact model. In this study, Hamburg school districts were willing to incorporate bilingual programs into their school systems in order to accommodate Turkish-German minorities. The study was established on research that contradicted those of the Kreuzberg teachers, whereby Hamburg believed, with sufficient background evidence, that “younger generations are normally more proficient in German than first-generation immigrants” (Duarte, J. 2011; *see also* Baumert et al. 2003 and Chlosta 2003). This conclusion is much more positive than that posited by the Kreuzberg teachers, because it suggests that the progeny of Turkish migrants have more potential for success than previous generations if given the proper resources for educational improvement. The study was further cultivated on progressive beliefs asserted by the *Treaty of Maastricht*, that the “European union [*sic*] can only be achieved through the maintenance of *diversity*” (2011). Although German identity will be discussed further in later chapters, it is enough here to say that the Hamburg study presents a higher social equality for Turkish-Germans in relation to Kreuzberg, because it encourages diversity as a part of the natural system, and in this way includes Turkish-Germans and other minority groups.

Thus the Hamburg bilingual schools present a positive example of German policy in a multicultural city, where the goal was to improve the education of minority groups who tended to perform worse academically due to a lack of proficiency in German in comparison to their ethnic German peers. This example of accommodative policy in a German state is not rare since Germany’s disappointing performance in the 2000 PISA tests. Now, many German states host numerous solutions for students who are at risk of falling behind in the classroom, targeting students such as those of migrant descent who face the aforementioned problems of either

possible language difficulties or lack of homework help outside of school. These new attempts, unlike the Turkish teacher solution, attempt to target the problems directly by providing students with access to resources to improve their language skills and education rather than mask the problems through exclusionary means. In this way, Germany is recognizing the sources of minority problems while its policies towards integration in schools are shifting towards the belief in accommodation and inclusion of German minorities. We will now analyze PISA's effect on the German educational system and some of these other accommodative measures proposed, in order to assess the measure and the scope to which German policy is accommodating Turkish-German students.

PISA's Effect on Germany

The formerly discussed PISA tests were arguably a major wake-up call for Germany regarding her educational system. The first assessment in the OECD PISA assessment series in 2000 yielded bitter results for Germany, a country who prided itself as the birthplace of many famous scientists. One reviewer of education, Herbert Ertl, argues that Germany reacted quickly and drastically to the public embarrassment resulting from her poor performance worldwide on the test (2006). In a review entitled *Educational standards and the changing discourse on education: the reception and consequences of the PISA study in Germany*, Ertl points to three particular areas of education most affected by the PISA study: political discourse, curriculum development processes, and academic discourse on education (2006). He describes the political discourse as a "wide-ranging reform agenda," pointing to the development of multiple programs to improve education, as well as newly established national standards for student performance (2006). In curriculum development, Ertl explains that new principles surrounding student

performance as feedback measures were instigated, as well as an added emphasis on competence orientation (2006). A greater focus became dedicated to teachers and their methods of education in the framework of academic discourse rather than pointing to the students, a new concept for the country (2006).

Ertl was not the only observer of a massive change in policy due to PISA test results. Two researchers, Kerstin Martens and Dennis Niemann, wrote a comparative review for the Association of German Politics, demonstrating that the PISA tests had a remarkably profound impact for German Educational Politics in comparison to the United States (2013). In their study, Martens and Niemann compared the PISA-related media coverage of Germany vs. the United States in order to demonstrate the relative importance to which Germany took PISA results (2013). In comparison to the United States, where less than 25 newspaper articles were discovered in the New York Times and the Washington Post pertaining to the tests, Germany's *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* posted over 250 corresponding articles – the second highest coverage of the tests of the 22 countries studied (2013). As discussed earlier, the PISA results revealed something else besides the poor academic standing of many German students: a hole in the German social system. Martens and Niemann note that “in no other industrialised country is academic success so strongly determined by a child’s socio-economic or migration background as Germany” (2013; *see also* Entorf, H. & Minoiu, N. 2004; Stanat et al 2000). In this way, students of lower socio-economic status were performing not only *below* their ethnic German counterparts, but *far* below them (Stanat et al 2000; Martens, K. & Niemann 2013; Entorf, H. & Minoiu 2004). Martens and Niemann, like Ertl, point out that Germany had never before been challenged on their self-perceived notions of premier education until the PISA results (Martens, K. and Niemann 2013, Ertl, H. 2006). Because of this, the actual results sent a

shockwave throughout the country, reaching personal households as German newspapers covered the tests more than any other country analyzed except Spain (2013).

Both Ertl and Martens and Niemann detail the changes agreed upon by the German government for education reform. In a relatively short amount of time, Germany agreed to a national reform agenda, something hardly expectable under normal circumstances, because the education system is typically controlled autonomously by the 16 *Bundesländer* (Ertl, H. 2006, Klieme *et al* 2003). The official experts' report confirmed the miracle of the occurrence when it stated, "the development of nationally uniform educational standards and performance criteria represents a very drastic turning-point within the federal system of the Federal Republic of Germany" (2006). In this way, a unitary consensus was reached on the subject of improving education in the country, demonstrating the importance of this topic in the public sphere. In another surprising measure, the coordinators of educational policy in the *Bundesländer* agreed to instill a national body "responsible for quality assurance in education beyond the level of the individual Länder," for the first time in 60 years (2006). This establishment of an oversight committee was a revolutionary step for the country, because some educational autonomy had been taken away from the 16 *Bundesländer* for the first time while educational decision-making power was given to a national group. Furthermore, the country encouraged new programs aimed at helping those on the lower edge of the PISA results, offering special funding to encourage the growth of these programs (2006). Encouraged programs included the *Vorschulen*, to be discussed later, to assist in German language acquisition, primarily in young children before the *Grundschule* age. Others were proposed educational programs aimed specifically at improving the education of students such as Germans of migrant descent who may be falling behind in academic performance.

Educational support: Ganztagschulen

One of these nationally funded measures for improving PISA results encourage schools to switch to full-day operation. The predominance of *Ganztagschulen*, literally “all-day schools,” has been a fairly recent phenomenon since the turn of the century, but the schools have continued to sprout all across the country in the past decade (Fischer, N.&Klieme, E. 2013). Although many all-day schools in Germany were intended to improve student education (and ultimately test scores), very little research has been conducted as to the efficacy of the schools since their development. One study from the German Institute of Educational Research measured the quality and effectiveness of all-day schools by utilizing reports from StEG (*Studie zur Entwicklung von Ganztagschulen*), a government-sponsored study on the development of these schools (2013; *see also* StEG-Konsortium 2010). Here, we shall use data relevant to the schools’ potential accommodations for children of migrant descent and focus on their effectiveness in the *Grundschule*. As previously stated, the *Grundschule* is the stage in most need of accommodative policies, because students are tested into their educational tracks by the end of the *Grundschule* phase. Because of this, primary school children need assistance at this early age in order to be academically prepared for their placement tests. As a result, *Ganztagschulen* for primary school-aged children should be focused on bringing in students of migrant descent and offering academic help for those who may not be able to receive this at home.

For those who grew up in an all-day system, it might be puzzling why Germany has finally *started* to instigate all-day schooling at a time when many nations worldwide already have all-day programs. This is linked to a historical shift in schooling from full to half days at the end of the 19th century, when schools began to accommodate student schedules – at the time,

students were also working on farms or in factories. In addition, traditional belief among health professionals in Germany was that attendance in both morning and afternoon classes may be detrimental to health (Wiggers, H. 2012). Although other countries such as France and the United States continued in their all-day programs, German belief in the hazards of an all-day system remained. In 1992, a survey on educational values yielded 47% of women and 46% of men who believed that all-day preschool programs would be “detrimental to their child’s development” (O’Reilly, J. & Fagan, C.1998, 184-185). At this time, only 19% of those asked preferred their children to be in all-day schools rather than standard half-day schools (1998). For many years, the idea of a half-day system was considered not only the norm, but the best option for child development (1998). In this way, the relatively sudden shift to all-day schools can be seen as a sort of radical shift from German tradition, brought upon by the educational wake-up call of the PISA tests at the start of the 21st century.

Today, the *Ganztagsschule*, one of these nationally funded programs for improving PISA results, is tremendously popular among school systems throughout the country (Ertl, H. 2006; Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013). According to the Federal Ministry of Education, the measures would “improve the integration of pupils with a migration background into German society” and “contribute to eradicating the social inequalities of the social system” (Ertl 2006). By this design, the *Ganztagsschulen* should appropriately assist students of migrant descent like Turkish-Germans by moving to erase differences caused by socio-economic status or ethnic background. While only 4951 all-day schools existed in Germany in 2002 (that was 5% of all schools in 2003), 11,825 such schools have existed since 2009, indicating a growth of over 100% within the last decade (Fischer, N. & Klieme, E.2013; Ertl, H. 2006). In 2009, 47% of schools in Germany were considered “all-day schools” (2013). It must be noted, however, that

the definition of all-day school in Germany differs from how many educational systems abroad define it (2013). According to the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the *Länder* in the Federal Republic of Germany, all-day schools must consist of “at least seven hours per day [of after school activity] on at least three days per week” (2013). The activities must have “conceptual relationship with the lessons in the morning,” meaning they must hold educational value corresponding to those topics learned in the morning section of class, and the schools must offer a midday meal on days that the all-day schools are in session (2013). Thus, many schools offer “open-all-day” programs, where participation in the full-day program is voluntary (2013). In “compulsory” all-day programs, participation is mandatory for at least three days of the week (2013).

Ganztagsschulen differ in the activities they offer based on the direction of special staff recruited to provide all-day support for students (Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013). Activities offered include homework support, academic enrichment, remedial courses, non-academic enrichment (eg. sports, theatre, etc.), and supervision (eg. daycare) (2013). In 2009, remedial courses and academic enrichment were used approximately 25% of the time, while both homework help and supervision were utilized by students about 31% of the time (2013). Non-academic enrichment, in the form of extracurricular activities, was used 64.8% of the time in all-day schools (2013).

From a mere glance at the activities offered by *Ganztagsschulen*, it appears that they certainly have the right “equipment” to improve education for those Turkish-German students in the *Grundschule* who have yet to be separated into their educational destinies. Researchers studying the all-day schools held positive predictions for the schools, stating, “In particular, benefits are expected to accrue for those students who are in need of special support, for

example, children and adolescents from immigrant families...it is argued that all-day education will provide ‘at-risk’ groups with necessary support” (Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013). Here, researchers point to the programs available at all-day schools as providing the accommodation and resources required for Germans of migrant descent to succeed. Remedial courses were, after all, specially designed for the “integration” of Germans of migrant descent (to use the words of the researchers), and provide assistance for difficult courses such as math and science, where students may lack help at home (2013). In addition, homework help gives interested students access to educational resources when their parents may not be able to help. This, if effective, could weaken the “link between academic achievement and social background,” the performance gap which we have already seen is highest in Germany, demonstrated by PISA test analyses (Stanat et al 2000, Entorf, H. and Miniou, N. 2010). The concept of the *Ganztagsschule* demonstrates Germany’s commitment to improving education by also accommodating Turkish-Germans and other Germans of migrant descent.

But are the attempts only half-hearted? Some could say so. While *Ganztagsschule* literally means “all-day school,” the official definition of an all-day school in Germany only demands full day sessions 3 out of 5 days per week, and determines all-day status based on if the school offers the programs, not if the students attend (Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013). Furthermore, although the schools are referred to as “all-day,” they appear to be merely afterschool programs rather than a continuation of the morning school session (2013). And while multiple educational programs are offered to students, the overwhelming majority chooses to participate in non-academic enrichment, most likely because sports are more engaging to young students. In some ways, it appears that the *Ganztagsschule* does not deliver on its educational components as originally intended.

The researchers argued that non-academic enrichment in the form of extracurricular activities reap academic benefits for students, because research in the United States has found positive correlations between extracurricular participation and academic performance (Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013). However, cross-cultural comparisons between extra-curricular activities and academic performance cannot be made to any degree of accuracy, because extra-curricular activities are often prerequisites for higher education in the United States. As a result, the correlation may be seen in the opposite light, such that those with high academic performance *seek out* extracurricular participation because they are on a college preparatory track. In addition, extra-curricular activities often cost money to participate in, suggesting that those of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in them. This also correlates to higher academic performance, because socioeconomic status and academic performance, are logically linked (American Psychological Association 2014). Thus, it is difficult to link non-academic enrichment in German all-day schools with academic improvement. Because of this, all-day schools do not appear to deliver thus far on their promises for academic achievement if one merely studies the rates of attendance in academic vs. non-academic activities during the day.

Although pre-PISA statistics on *Ganztagsschulen* did not find them to be significant improvements, they found them to be more successful in comparison to half-day schools when controlling for social background (Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013). In addition, they seemed to fare better than half-day schools on aspects of social integration, which may be because students are around each other for longer periods of time (2013). In this way, research from past decades has provided evidence that all-day schools can be more beneficial to Germans of migrant descent than half-day schools, although these benefits remain undefined (2013). Very little research since 2003 has been conducted on the educational effectiveness of today's *Ganztagsschulen*, which

have since sprouted into widespread popularity, but the results can be expected to differ from previous studies because the schools sprouted in the midst of Germany's "educational revolution," where radical changes to educational procedures are likely to differentiate these results from former ones.

Current research on the attendance of *Ganztagsschulen* can provide preliminary indications to the potential success of the schools. As aforementioned, a successful accommodative school would provide Turkish-Germans in the *Grundschule* with effective educational resources before they are partitioned into one of the three secondary school tracks. Researchers predicted all-day schools would benefit these students the most based on the programs offered by the schools. However, the programs are only useful if students are able to utilize them. The target students of all-day schools – *Grundschule* children of low socioeconomic status – are significantly underrepresented among attendees to the optional all-day programs when compared to their peers of higher socioeconomic status (Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013). Researchers have related this to the employment status of the parents, because parents of low socioeconomic status tend to be unemployed and thus do not require *Ganztagsschulen* to occupy their children in the afternoons (2013). Hence we see that although *Ganztagsschulen* may be able to provide support for minority Germans, they face larger problems in the realm of the social sphere in their abilities to bring students into the schools.

Thus far, significant improvements in the education of Germans of migrant descent have not been measured in current research. The 2012 PISA results showed Germany 20 points above the OECD average at 16th place in the world (lower this year than in previous years due to the recent participation of Asian countries), demonstrating a clear improvement for the country in the realm of education (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2012).

However, even with the country's new programs such as the *Ganztagsschulen*, the performance gap based on socio-economic status does not appear to have changed significantly, and still lies below the OECD average (2012). What is this saying about Germany? About her accommodative policies? Is it the policy itself that fails Germans of migrant descent, or is something else at play here? (*see the chapter on Perceptions*).

All in all, the concept of the all-day school has the potential to be an effective solution to accommodating some Turkish-German students who may not be receiving educational guidance at home. Programs including homework help and remedial courses may offer the student more resources and teacher-to-student contact hours than the half-day option, and thus promote the success of the student when preparing for the secondary school placement tests. However, the execution of such programs currently seems to fail the students, as attendance in educational programs is only half-utilized in comparison to non-academic programs. Additionally, the target students, primary school students of low-socioeconomic backgrounds, tend to attend all-day schools in noticeably lower numbers than their higher-socioeconomic status peers, defeating the role of some optional all-day schools. The 2012 PISA results reflect the low efficacy of these schools thus far, showing low improvements for low-socioeconomic status students by the secondary school age. By this assessment, we see that Germany has shifted its focus to the accommodation of Turkish-Germans and other Germans of migrant descent, but the execution of the policy itself appears half-hearted, and thus far has not demonstrated clear improvements for the integration of more Turkish-Germans in the job market.

Pre-School Programs in Language Acquisition: Vorschulen and Kitas

As we have now seen an example of widespread policy change towards accommodation in the realm of educational resources in schools, we will now analyze growing reforms in language acquisition programs. Since the PISA exams, language acquisition has largely come into focus as an area in need of improvement, and was thus also mentioned in the reform proposals for improving Germany's ranking (Ertl, H. 2006). The *Vorschule*, a class similar to the American kindergarten, can be considered one widespread approach to language improvement in Germany. Although they are generally designed to prepare students for primary school and emphasize concepts such as how “to sit at a desk and concentrate on their work[sich diszipliniert an einen Tisch zu setzen und sich auf eine Aufgabe zu konzentrieren]” (Paradisi.de 2014), they function strongly in German language promotion. In Hamburg, *Vorschulen* are encouraged for young children learning German as a second language because of the belief that language acquisition is more effective the earlier it is begun (Hamburg Schulsystem n.d.). With the same belief, the German *Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen, und Jugend* (The Federal Ministry for Families, Senior Citizens, Women, and Children) funded a program in 2011 entitled, “*Offensive Frühe Chancen: Schwerpunkt-Kitas Sprache & Integration*,” with the idea of giving children from linguistically disadvantaged backgrounds equal opportunity in education by the time they reach primary school (Bundesministerium 2014). In this program, children attend *Schwerpunkt Kitas*, preschools that emphasize language acquisition. *Kitas* are government-funded and available for children over the age of one year (German Missions in the United States 2013). However, traditionally it has been somewhat difficult to find available *Kita* spots due to high demand for the services (Wiggers, H. 2012; Vogt, S. 2013).

Even less research has been conducted on the effectiveness of *Vorschulen* and *Kitas* than on *Ganztagsschulen*. However, many states and cities claim that *Kitas* have been successful in providing language support. In Berlin, the mayor's office boasts federal reports commending Berlin *Kitas* and their "excellent framework" (*hervorragende Rahmenbedingungen*) for the promotion of language development (Der Regierende Bürgermeister 2014). Youth Minister Martina Münch in Brandenburg has claimed that *Kitas* have been a success in the last few years, stating: „Der Anteil der Kinder mit Sprachförderbedarf ist von 19,7 Prozent im Jahr 2010 auf rund 16 Prozent in diesem Jahr gesunken. Das zeigt: Die Sprachförderung in *Kitas* ist ein Erfolg [The portion of children with language support needs has sunken from 19.7 percent in 2010 to about 16 percent this year. This shows that language support in *Kitas* is a success]” (Land Brandenburg 2013). However, due to the unscientific nature of these claims, we will refrain from using them as a basis of assessment and will therefore discuss the requirements that they should maintain in order to promote German as a second language based on second-language acquisition research.

Because education has pushed the issue of language support to gross popularity in Germany today, many forms of research exist on how best to execute these programs. One study, conducted by the Migration Policy Institute and Bertelsmann Stiftung, looked at language programs across the world and analyzed the keys to success of the best countries and conversely areas of improvement for less successful countries (Christensen, G. & Stanat, P. 2007). A survey was given to schools in fourteen countries and posed questions about an individual school's language support program (2007). The topics of the survey included hours spent in the classroom, learning strategies, "explicit curricula" and standards (if any), and the amount of students receiving support (2007). While the study did not note how Germany fares in primary

school language support, they noted that Germany was among those countries that did not provide language support for students of secondary school age. Programs in Australia-Victoria, Canada-British Columbia, and Sweden were among those listed for successful language programs, while Germany, Luxembourg, and the French community of Belgium were among those listed as “less successful” (2007).

A primary feature to the successful programs appeared to be consistency and systematic approaches towards language promotion with children (Christensen, G. & Stanat, P. 2007). In British Columbia, young children were in language programs for six hours a week (2007). Schools had to ensure that both their children and teachers were provided certain baseline criteria before receiving funding from the government, which read as the following:

- “An English-language assessment must confirm that students require additional support to succeed in the standard curriculum” (2007).
- “Schools must have an instruction plan developed with a teaching specialist to meet the needs of the student. The plan is subject to regular reviews” (2007).
- “Students must receive additional services, such as special instruction in language acquisition or writing, or in-class assistance” (2007).
- “Schools must provide supports to teachers to address the language needs of their students” (2007).

Here, we see that the British Columbian government plays an active role in language support programs, instilling structure and standardization throughout the province. Among their mandates for funding include the assertion that children must first demonstrate need for the program, and then that schools must have specialized plans and services to meet the child’s needs.

Teachers play an important role as well. Here, the Ministry of Education insists that teachers must also receive support in order to help their students. ESL (English as a Second Language) teachers in British Columbia are trained specifically to teach English in these settings (2007).

In Sweden, another “successful” country for language support programs, Swedish as a Second Language (SSL) programs are also highly systematic (Christensen, G. & Stanat, P. 2007). Instead of the standard Swedish classes, students take an SSL course alongside their other classes (2007). There is a national curriculum for SSL, which means that children are expected to reach the same levels of proficiency after completing the program (2007). In fact, the demands of the program are so similar to the standard Swedish classroom that SSL classrooms are considered equivalent to Swedish classrooms when applying for higher education (2007). Like British Columbia, Swedish SSL teachers are supposed to be trained specifically for teaching Swedish as a second language (2007). In this way, we see that these successful language programs include the components of definitive goals across the country or province, and provide students with regular contact hours in second language support. In addition, teachers are trained specifically for second language classrooms and are qualified to teach their own language in a systematic way. Thus, students are set to reach certain goals by a set amount of time, and are ensured the support they need to reach this.

In Germany, however, the report found less positive results. They characterized Germany as “less successful” based on the wide variations in student language performance, and noted that language support programs tended to be “less systematic,” offering the example that the programs are only available for primary school students (Christensen, G. & Stanat, P. 2007). The report also noted that less successful countries such as Germany “tend not to have explicit

curriculum framework documents or certification programs for teaching second-language learners” (2007). This means that second-language programs in Germany are not standardized for students to achieve certain goals, and that teachers themselves are not trained specifically to teach their proficient language to new speakers. In this way, both teachers and schools do not seem to be as prepared to handle students who require language support. No standardized goals are set for language-acquisition programs, and the language programs themselves seem to focus mostly on younger children rather than featuring a sustained long-term curriculum.

As a result, the study suggested improvements for countries like Germany to improve their language programs. Among these were effective language-learning models, ensuring that programs have proper goals for their students, and that teachers are trained to teach second-language acquisition (Christensen, G. & Stanat, P. 2007). The report emphasized a focus on consistency in language support as well, recommending programs include students of all ages (2007). The Council of Europe, another international group, analyzed German language support programs and in a preliminary study agreed with this recommendation, including the recommendation that support be “ongoing instruction in basic skills” (Knapp, W. 2006). This is reminiscent of both the Canadian and Swedish programs, where students are consistently placed in language support settings, ensuring regular contact hours with language support resources. However, because the MPI/Bertelsmann Stiftung report was issued in 2007, it is difficult to determine whether programs have changed since then because no follow-up report has been conducted. After all, the instigation of the *Schwerpunkt-Kitas* program began four years later in 2011, while programs such as the *Ganztagsschulen* have risen to mass popularity after 2009, two years after the study (Bundesministerium 2014; Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013).

Although Berlin and Brandenburg claim their *Kitas* promote success, research does not demonstrate that *Kitas* follow any of these aforementioned recommendations consistent with successful language programs. Employees for *Kitas* tend to be persons with child-care backgrounds, not DaF (*Deutsch als Fremdsprache*, German as a Foreign Language) backgrounds (Wiggers, H. 2012; Knapp, W. 2006). According to the Council of Europe report, many pre-school teachers do not even have university degrees (Knapp, W. 2006). And it is *Vorschulen*, not *Kitas*, who provide any school-like structure for students (Müller, S. 2014). The environment in *Vorschulen* and *Kitas* for young children differ quite grandly from those recommended for proper language development.

In this sense, can one conclude the environment of pre-school programs such as *Vorschulen* and *Kitas* conducive to a language-learning environment? The Council of Europe's preliminary report may give some indication. In their assessment on language support programs in Germany, the Council of Europe claimed that most students exiting *Kitas* still are not prepared for the language level of primary schools (Knapp, W. 2006). In fact, research has showed a slow-down in second-language acquisition in the last year of pre-school, what researchers suggest may be due to the child's lack of language knowledge at this point compared to their peers (2006). Thus, their more fluent peers may take more opportunities to speak and thus limit the student's chance to practice (2006). In this way, the study points to the difficulties of mass group learning for students who may be behind their peers in language-acquisition (2006). As a solution, the Council suggested teachers constantly encourage their young students to participate despite their struggles, and to have students work in small groups (2006). In addition, personalized support plans should be drawn up for each student, if possible (2006). The Council also suggested that teachers in pre-school environments be educated, as it makes sense for them to have at least

basic academic training before providing appropriate language support (2006). While *Kitas* and *Vorschulen* may have changed since this report was published, data from current sources suggest otherwise (Wiggins, H. 2012). This suggests that although *Kitas* may be beneficial in providing children from non-German-speaking backgrounds immersion in the national language, it may not be entirely conducive to providing efficient language “support” for young children in the sense that the children will be systematically guided into their appropriate language levels by the beginning of the *Grundschule* phase.

To conclude, preschool programs themselves may present useful tools for immersing children in the German language, but by no means appear to be the single factor contributing to improvements in student performance as Berlin and Brandenburg have suggested, and furthermore should not attempt to be the single factor in language support. While language acquisition *is* best begun at an early age, language support programs should be consistent throughout a child’s entire schooling, and include both more structured programs as well as trained teachers.

However, this said, Germany has certainly taken early measures to improve accommodation not only for the Turkish-German minority, but for all Germans of migrant descent. Although the programs may still contain flaws, the development of new resources and systematic ways to approach both education and language-acquisition for this target community continues on. While PISA tests revealed Germany’s shockingly low performance in 2000, new programs in response to these tests have only started to bloom, with *Ganztagsschulen* reaching nearly 12,000 in 2009, and the program for *SchwerpunktKitas* beginning in 2011 (Fischer, N. & Klieme, E. 2013; Bundesministerium 2014). Even mass research regarding the progress of such programs has not yet been published, providing further evidence to the recentness of such

measures. These facts in themselves give indication to the rise in accommodative measures that Germany has taken since the turn of the century, with the goals of promoting integration in the country's multicultural realm. In this way, we can see a shift since 2001 towards accommodation rather than exclusion in the realm of German policy towards education. In conclusion, German policy is headed toward progressive ends in education in comparison to past integration policy, but many more years of trial and error, research studies and failed attempts may be required to finally garner success for both Turkish-Germans who feel disadvantaged to their ethnic German peers as well as for German officials anxiously awaiting a future rise in PISA rankings.

CHAPTER II : POLICY IN RELIGION

Introduction

Now that we have analyzed the extent of German accommodation policy for Turkish-Germans in promoting integration through education, we will now focus on the extent of government accommodation in the realm of religion. This topic is particularly controversial in the European political sphere at this time; both France and the Netherlands among others have debated and confronted this issue with dramatically different courses of action. We discuss Germany's accommodative policy of Islam because they are recognized as demonstrating some of the least involvement in such issues as of yet (Dolezal, M., Helbling, M. &Hutter, S., 2010).However, moves toward political action have been more persistent in the last 15 years from both the German government and Turkish and Islamic political groups. Because accommodative policy of Islam is not as concrete as that of education, we shall analyze progress as of today. This means that we seek to discuss the political direction to which Germany appears oriented and question their ultimate goals and definitions of Muslim integration. Furthermore, we shall analyze current policy and political gestures as of yet, and conclude by recommending future political action, using research and scholarly discussions as support.

According to the study *Muslim Life in Germany* (more on this study later), the government estimates that 2,561,000 Muslims of Turkish origin live in Germany today, constituting the largest Muslim ethnic group in the country by far (Second according to the study is Muslims from "Southeast Europe," who number a mere 550,000) (Haug, S., Müssig, S. &Stichs, A., 2009). According to their estimates, Turkish-German Muslims account for 81.4% of the total population of Turkish-origin people in Germany, with 14.7% estimated to have no religion, 2.7% estimated to be Christian, and 1.2% estimated to be of other, non-Jewish religions (2009). Of the 81.4% Muslims, over 75% associate themselves with Sunni Islam (2009).

Seventeen percent identify themselves as Alevi, and a little over 5% associate themselves with denominations such as Shiite, Sufi, Ahmadi, or other (2009). Here, we can see that not *every* Turkish-German identifies as Muslim, and for those who do, many are not in complete agreement as to how Islam should be practiced. However, it would be irresponsible to ignore the role of religion in the Turkish-German community due simply to the diaspora of religious affiliations among this ethnic group. The majority of Turkish-Germans belong to the denomination of Sunni Islam, and an overwhelming majority of Turkish-Germans in general encompass the denominations belonging to the Islamic faith (2009).

In the past two decades, there has been a shift in social views, as the status of Turkish-Germans in country has shifted from the “Guest Worker” label to “Muslim (*German bigotry shifting from race to religion* 2013, *see also* Halm, D. 2013).” In the midst of heightened Islamophobia in recent decades, this title poses particular difficulties for an ethnic group already suffering from the disadvantages associated with low socio-economic status. Now, Turkish-Germans must deal with both the real and perceived disadvantages that come with being Muslim in an age where the “Muslim” label is tied with “terrorism” (Halm, D., 2013), as well as face the socio-economic disadvantages tied to their former label of coming from “Guest Worker” origins – even if, for many, neither of these labels are accurate. The role of perceptions in integration will be discussed in greater detail in the next section (*see Perceptions*).

This change in public discourse is important to the study of integration and accommodation in Germany. The additional label of “Muslim” contributes now to a salient feature with which to measure German integration policy – religion – because it is another key feature that separates the Turkish-German minority from the ethnic German majority. In addition, those who practice Islam often suffer both direct and perceived discrimination from

society as a whole as well as the job market, resulting in underprivileged status on account of religion. Therefore, promoting integration and multiculturalism means confronting this inequality and promoting equal privileges for all. Has Germany accommodated the practice of Islam or else supported German Muslims in the face of discrimination?

Religion and Integration

As previously discussed, Germany is often described as “exclusionary” for her *laissez-faire* approach towards integration – refusing to act legally to enforce the accommodation of ethnic minorities. In a religious setting, Germany’s “exclusionary” policy means scarce legal recognition of Islam. This entails no tax support for mosques (although churches and synagogues are granted “corporate status,” as discussed later), as well as, until recently, the lack of Islam classes in schools, even though Christian classes already exist (Dolezal, M., Helbling, M. & Hutter, S., 2010). For other factors, such as the providing places for the call to prayer, ritual burials or slaughters, Germany has simply not taken a stance, which compares favorably to some countries such as Switzerland, where some such practices for Muslims are outlawed, but unfavorably to countries such as Austria, who have made these available in order to accommodate their Muslim citizens (2010).

From time to time, Germany has been forced out of her shell to take further political stances towards Islam. With the well-known FereshtaLudin debate and the discussions over young Muslim girls in swimming classes sent to the national judiciary, the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* (Federal Court) has enabled the country (or else the states) to take a political stance on the tolerance of the country towards Islam in the very public sector of school. The rulings of the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* and the state courts are reflective of attitudes of the

country and are therefore useful in measuring the extent of accommodation to which Germany has come so far.

In the first of these two debates, a naturalized German citizen of Afghani descent, FereshtaLudin, was denied employment in a public school system in Baden-Württemberg due to the fact that she wore a hijab, the typical religious headscarf worn by some Muslim women (Heinig, H.M., 2007). However, Ludin's would-be employers did not fire her on account of the religious potential of her headscarf, but rather because she refused to remove it despite being asked (2007). Ludin challenged her employer's rights to ask her to remove the scarf, pointing out that the state had no regulations against wearing the headscarf in schools (2007). In quick retaliation, the Baden-Württemberg legislature passed a law banning the headscarf the next day (2007).

The case was brought before the Federal Courts to determine the school system's rights not to hire Ludin on account of her headscarf (2007). By this point, the case became about much more than Ludin and Baden-Württemberg – instead, this was about Germany's tolerance of women wearing the headscarf, and how the federal government would limit or else accommodate it (2007). In a very politically safe gesture, the Federal Courts left the decisions up to state courts, claiming that the “risks” of influencing children by the headscarf and the religious tensions of each region of the country differed and were therefore best determined locally (2007). The Court also stated that a teacher who wears the headscarf did not “*per se*” represent government religious practice, nor did it provide any threat, except where an “abstract danger” exists (again, to be determined by each state) (2007). In this way, the Federal Courts washed themselves of the responsibility of denying religious freedoms and instead left the matter to the highly differential states. As a result of this case, now more than 10 years old, eight of the

sixteen federal *Bundesländer* have passed “neutrality laws” banning the headscarf and other religious symbols in public institutions, unless, in some cases, they are Christian (Herber, L.2013).

In another well-known debate in schools, a 13-year-old girl of Moroccan descent asked the court to exempt her from participation in mixed-sex swimming classes, claiming that it was against her religious principles to see boys in the class half-naked, even if she herself were covered in the full-body burqini bathing suit for conservative Muslim girls (*Burqini Ruling: Court Says Schools Can Require Co-Ed Swims*, 2013, *see also* Cohen, 2013). The courts ruled that integration took higher precedence than religious arguments and thus all Muslims must participate in the same gym classes as non-Muslims (2013). However, not every state proposes mixed-sex gym classes. Although some conservative Christian states in the south separate gym classes by sex, the girl’s state of Hesse refused to follow this example and remained insistent that participation in mixed classes should not be a problem if she wears the burqini (2013). In one form of counter-argument, the girl’s party argued that being forced in a situation where she had to wear the burqini, which was claimed to be “an ugly plastic bag” by the family’s lawyer, led to “ridicule and isolation,” which prevents the exact integration that state officials are aiming for (2013). In an ironic twist of public opinion, the Federal Court actually supported a Muslim girl from having to participate in a mixed gym class back in 1993 (2013). However, things have changed in twenty years and German courts now find themselves remaining distant from this old ruling, claiming today that their judgments favor “integration” (2013).

In both of these very famous court cases of the 21st century, Germany seems to fail to accommodate Muslim German needs. In comparison to the Netherlands, where Islam is much more accommodated, Germany’s policies appear to be lacking severely. As stated much earlier,

the Netherlands is one of the most accommodative countries in Europe towards diversity, as seen by the many different government-approved religious consultative bodies, as well as their publicly-funded broadcasting corporations and Islamic schools (Ersanilli, E. & Saharso, S. 2011). Dutch integration policy, according to the definitions in this thesis, is much more integrative because they recognize and accommodate Islamic groups.

However, in comparison to Germany's neighbors to the west, France, Germany has remained relatively more accommodative of Islam. In the matter of the headscarf and the swimming class debates, France's policy of *laïcité* has prohibited Muslim girls in France from any public form of religious expression (Samuel, H. 2009, *see also e.g.* Muslim veil ban urged in French universities 2013). In schools, Muslim females are forbidden from wearing the headscarf, and burqinis are even illegal in many public swimming pools (Samuel, H. 2009). By France's so-called *laïcité* (secularism), Muslims are forced to assimilate into the greater society at large (which is very traditionally Catholic) and cannot expect any form of accommodation for religious practice, due to the fact that France chooses to remain highly separate from religion.

Despite the fact that Germany appears to be exclusionary and non-accommodative of Islam and German Muslims, there is some evidence that the country is beginning to accommodate. However, this direction is still ambiguous and will depend on how future leaders organize the next steps towards accommodation of this minority. In addition, it will also depend on how the country chooses to define integration.

As of today, many Turkish-Germans and other German Muslims are stuck in the middle of integration debates – arguments, both offensive and defensive, centering on whether or not they “fail to integrate” (*see e.g.* Popp, M., Gezer, Ö., and Scheuermann, C. 2011; Stein, T. 2011; Study Shows Turkish Immigrants Least Integration in Germany 2009, Immigration in Germany:

Young Turks Increasingly Favor Integration and Religion 2012). A variety of these articles from media sources to academic discourse have focused specifically on this topic, suggesting that Muslims are not integrated in German culture. From Chancellor Angela Merkel (then CDU spokesperson)'s words, "Multikultiistabsolutgescheitert [*commonly translated to: Multiculturalism has utterly failed*]" to news articles about "Germany's Unhealthy Obsession with Islam" from the leading news magazine *Der Spiegel*, it is apparent that Muslim Germans cannot simply blend in with German society (Integration: Merkel erklärt Multikultifür gescheitert. 2010, Schieder, R. 2011; *see also* Osborne, L. 2012). In Huntington's well-known thesis, *The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order*, Huntington claims that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with the West (Doerschler, P. & Jackson, P.I., 2011, *see also* Huntington, S.P. 2011). Taking recent events as evidence, Huntington's advocates claim that a fundamental Islam rejects Western democratic principles, while they fear a growing Islamic political movement that will encourage the reinstatement of Islamic law in Western Europe (2011). Is the state of German Muslim integration as dreadful as Huntington and his advocates claim? According to Huntington's theory, German Muslims could never be integrated into society by definition of being Muslim. However, much newer research is saying otherwise, demonstrating that German Muslims demonstrate increased social and cultural integration, and are economically and educationally more successful than in previous decades (Foroutan, N. 2013). In order to test these multiple claims, two researchers conduct surveys to discover where German Muslims really stand. In the study, *Do Muslims in Germany Really Fail to Integrate? Muslim Integration and Trust in Public Institutions*, Peter Doerschler and Pamela Irving Jackson strive to measure and compare German Muslims' trust in the political system as evidence of both their loyalties and enthusiasm towards German institutions (2011). In this way, one level of

integration, *political* integration – trust in the system – can be methodically measured and assessed (2011).

In this study, Doerschler and Jackson analyze results from the 2008 German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) (2011). The ALLBUS was conducted using clustered random sampling of non-institutionalized adults over 18 years of age across the country (2011). The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews that assessed different levels of trust in federal and local institutions, the health and education systems, the Supreme Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*), and political parties, as well as respondents' beliefs regarding the concept of democracy and democracy as it is practiced in Germany (2011). Almost 3% of all 3,469 respondents in this survey self-identified as Muslim, which is within with the proportional range of German Muslims predicted by federal institutions (Haug, S., Müssig, S. & Sticks, A., 2009). In order to test for Huntington's theory that religious Muslims would be less keen on democracy, Doerschler and Jackson used a self-reported measure of religiosity, ranked from 1-7, to categorize Muslim respondents (2011). A self-score of 7 would identify a stronger commitment to Islamic ideals (2011).

Results suggested positive involvement from German Muslims even when compared to their non-Muslim counterparts (2011). While both non-Muslims and Muslims supported the theoretical concept of democracy in equal numbers, Muslims showed significantly *more* support for the German democratic government than non-Muslims (2011). However, support from both groups of the German government was much lower than support for democracy as a whole (2011). This indicates an all-around concern of the affectivity of the German government in responding to citizen needs and interests. In addition, German Muslims ranked the institutions they trusted in a similar fashion to non-Muslims, ranking institutions such as the local

government more trustworthy than the federal government (2011). However, remarkably, German Muslims demonstrated significantly higher trust for both the education and health systems than German non-Muslims (2011). They were also more trusting of the Supreme Court and judiciary than non-Muslims, which may be surprising considering some perceivably anti-Muslim rulings in the last decade (*refer to FereshtaLudin case, above*). Both Muslims and non-Muslims shared a similar distrust for the police (2011).

According to Doerschler and Jackson's research, Muslims appear just as excited as or even more excited about the democratic institutions in Germany than non-Muslims (2011). According to the survey, while German non-Muslims appreciated the idealized democracy in the same proportions as non-Muslims, they appear to be even more supportive of democracy as practiced in Germany than non-Muslims (2011). In addition, their support for the German education system, health system, and even judicial branches were significantly higher than their non-Muslim counterparts, something one would not expect to see from non-supporters of democracy and a democratic society, keen to return to Islamic law (2011). When responses for political trust from Muslim subjects were computed for correlations with their religiosity, no statistically significant relationship was found, indicating that political trust does not decrease with religiosity (2011). With these results, Doerschler and Jackson conclude, "Fears of a 'clash of civilizations' in which Muslims espouse anti-democratic attitudes and behavior that are prone to extremist tendencies are simply unfounded" (2011). Here, the researchers state that these results pose evidence towards the debasement of claims that strong religious ties pose a threat to democracy, as claimed in Huntington's thesis and by advocates thereof.

So what may have caused these results? Survey data show that only 14% of the 93 German Muslims interviewed for the ALLBUS were actually born in Germany (2011). In terms

of health education, Doerschler and Jackson noted that in the home countries of many Muslim respondents (most notably Turkey, Iraq, and Afghanistan), the health care systems rank relatively low compared to more developed countries (70th, 103rd, and 173rd in the world, respectively), while Germany's health care system ranked 25th in the world (2011). For German non-Muslim respondents, 87% of whom were born in Germany, recent changes to the system may be a reason for distrust in the system (2011). However, for the majority of non-Native Muslims, the system may be a welcome improvement. As a result, the difference in trust may be due more to the respondent's citizenship backgrounds than their religion (2011). This may also explain Muslim support for democracy as practiced in Germany, the judicial system, and the education system as well – if respondents came from unstable or corrupt nations, the stability, order, and social system may appeal to them as new immigrants. Native respondents may not have experienced anything else and so compare today's institutions only to what they know from the “golden past.”

Doerschler and Jackson's study send a clear message towards the role of German Muslims in the integration debate. Unlike the question posed in much public discourse, German Muslims appear to be – at least within the framework of political integration – integrated. Not only do German Muslims appear to be on par with their non-Muslim counterparts in political trust (and by extension, loyalty), but they appear to be even *more* enthusiastic about the system than even native Germans, which Doerschler and Jackson saw as both a gift and a curse (2011). On the positive side, they see the enthusiasm of German Muslims as an opportunity for further inclusion into the state: “if the doors to political participation are opened to them, they are attitudinally disposed to be strong supportive citizens” (2011). Pointing to similar evidence from Britain, France and the Netherlands, Doerschler and Jackson claim that Muslims appear to be the

perfect citizens for political involvement because of their enthusiasm towards government institutions, if given the chance (2011). However, the researchers posited a warning:

Significantly lower levels of political trust among non-Muslims may negatively affect their views of government and, more specifically, its efforts to respond to Germany's Muslim population. Skepticism and distrust of government may actually undermine important programs designed to bridge real value and cultural differences, which remain the source of the ignorance that fuels prejudice and discrimination. (Doerschler, P. & Jackson, P.I., 2011)

Here, the researchers argue that the negativity of non-Muslim (and notably, native German) sentiments towards government institutions may pose difficulties in political action to improve integration. If native Germans do not support government programs to improve relations and encourage integration, then the problem of integration lies not with foreign bodies, but with the host country.

The researchers feared the limitations of language in this study, claiming that many potential Muslim respondents may have not been able to participate in this study due to language difficulties and thus did not represent viewpoints that might be characteristic of this group (2011). However, many German Muslims today were either born in Germany, grew up in Germany, immigrated under the new laws, or spent at least 40 years in the country since entering as a migrant worker, indicating that a large majority should be competent in answering survey questions (*see Background*). While the sample size of German Muslims appeared small, it reflected accurately the proportion of Muslims in country in relation to German non-Muslims (2011). Doerschler and Jackson's findings show that not only are German Muslims like Turkish-Germans compatible with Western political society, but that they are, by some definitions,

politically integrated (2011). Survey results showed societal activism in the form of participation in voluntary organizations to be similar, demonstrating that Muslim groups are not merely sedentary, separate groups from German society (2011). Some of this activism on the part of Turkish-Germans can be viewed by their political involvement in groups such as the *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*(ZMD) and the Islam Council, two large German Muslim activist groups.

If this isn't enough evidence of Muslim integration, further research has also demonstrated that high degrees of religiosity coincide with other definitions of integration in areas where religion is accommodated as well. In one study from 2011 entitled, *Integration and religiosity among the Turkish second generation in Europe: a comparative analysis across four capital cities*, researchers Fenella Fleischmann and Karen Phalet investigated correlations between religiosity and "integration" (as defined by education, intermarriage, and employment status), as well as potential links to perceived discrimination, national policy, and cultural identity (Fleischmann, F. & Phalet, K., 2011). By utilizing a cross-national survey, Fleischmann and Phalet were better able to compare differences in religious accommodation policy in four different European countries: Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium (2011). Their results not only further confirmed the compatibility of Islam and Western European society, but also revealed the necessity of an accommodative government in protecting religious freedoms.

Fleischmann and Phalet's integration study utilized Turkish-Europeans they defined as second-generation and tested four hypotheses relating religiosity to societal factors (2011). These hypotheses included the following: 1. Second-generation Muslims will be less religious with more integration (Secularization hypothesis), 2. The second generation will be more religious if their parents were religious (Religious vitality hypothesis), 3. Second-generation Turkish-

Europeans will be more religious where they perceive more discrimination, and 4. There will be an inverse correlation between religiosity and integration where Islam is least accommodated, and zero or even positive correlations where it is (2011). To test this latter hypothesis, Fleischmann and Phalet established that of all four countries, Germany had the least amount of accommodation for Islam, citing the privilege of Christian churches in the country as literally profiting from their status as corporations of public law (2011). Because Islam has not been granted the same privileges, Islamic organizations remain both politically and financially disadvantaged in comparison (2011).

Relatively, the other European countries participating in the study fared better in their accommodation of the Muslim minority (2011). The Netherlands' system was considered the most "advanced" due to the opportunities presented to Muslims to build their own institutions (2011). According to Fleischmann and Phalet, Muslims in the Netherlands have taken the most advantages of these opportunities, establishing both local mosque associations and state-funded Islamic broadcasting networks and Islamic schools (2011). Since the 1980s, Islam's status in the Netherlands is considered, at least from a lawful standpoint, formally equal to Christianity and other religious groups (2011). Belgium and Sweden were stated to lie somewhere in the middle, both legally recognizing Islam but showing preference towards Christian institutions (2011). In Belgium, Muslims were recognized as equal to the Catholic Church since 1974 but were not permitted access to public funds until they set up a nationally representative Islamic council, which did not occur until recently (2011). In Sweden, Muslims also enjoy state funding and officially recognized status, but the Swedish Lutheran Church profited from a privileged position until the second half of the twentieth century, and their legacy still remains (2011). With this in mind, Fleischmann and Phalet searched to discover the correlation of these policies with

religiosity (2011). They predicted in their last hypothesis that accommodative countries like the Netherlands would show positive correlations between religiosity and integration, while unaccommodative countries like Germany would show negative correlations (thus agreeing with the secularization hypothesis) (2011).

In order to measure these factors, Fleischmann and Phalet analyzed data from the TIES project (The Integration of the European Second generation) (2011). Random samples were collected in this survey in different ways, depending on the city (2011). In Amsterdam and Stockholm, subject data was provided through public records, while subjects in Brussels were found through the screening of Turkish-Belgian neighborhoods (2011). In Berlin, data was collected by screening for Turkish-origin names (2011). The second generation was defined by Turkish-Europeans between 18 and 35 years (2011). All random samples reported low response rates of 29-31%, which researchers claimed should be kept in mind during the study (2011). Other measures were carefully controlled for, including parental education and background profiles (2011). Structural integration as defined by the study was defined by educational attainment (lower secondary or less, vocational, academic upper secondary, tertiary qualifications), employment status (working, unemployed, full-time student, inactive participant), and ethnicity of the partner (non-Turkish, Turkish). Multi-group structural equation models were used to analyze the data (2011).

Results supported the idea of religious vitality in all cities, as Turkish-European Muslims who attended Koran lessons as children or whose parents attended the mosque regularly were identified as highly religious (2011). Contrary to popular belief, the idea of reactive religiosity was unsupported after accounting for religious socialization, structural integration, and

controls(2011). The reactive religiosity hypothesis warrants that religiosity rises with perceived discrimination as a cultural reaction to feeling unwelcome (2011).

In the field of structural integration, Fleischmann and Phalet concluded the same compatibilities between Islam and structural integration that Doerschler and Jackson concluded of political integration. In their discussion, Fleischmann and Phalet claim, “Our finding of differential associations, in particular the lack of support for an inverse relationship of integration and religion in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm, strongly suggests that there is nothing inherent in Islamic faith which would stand in the way of the integration of second-generation Muslims in European societies” (2011). Models for a negative correlation between integration (as defined by educational and labor market attainment) and religiosity did not fit in these cities (2011). The ethnicity of one’s partner also seemed to hold no effect on religiosity (2011). As a result, evidence from this study, too, demonstrates that the religiosity of Muslims has little to do with integration in democratic society.

However, one alarming difference from this study stands out – the results from Berlin. As Fleischmann and Phalet predicted, statistical analyses of TIES data in Berlin showed negative correlations between religiosity and integration as defined by every one of the three measured categories (2011). Fleischmann and Phalet called this support of the secularization hypothesis, which states “the erosion of religion through modernization processes” (2011). This means that with more “structural integration” – that is, more job market or educational involvement, among others, religious identification will decline (2011).

So what happened with Berlin? If religiosity and integration are compatible in Amsterdam, Brussels, and Stockholm, what is it about Berlin that makes the two incompatible? As stated before, part of Fleischmann and Phalet’s hypothesis predicted secularization *only* where

accommodation was least provided. Like Algerians in France (Doerschler & Jackson 2011), many Turkish-Germans may feel that religiosity poses a hindrance to acceptance in societies where Islam is not officially recognized. Because the government does not support Islam in the same way they support Christian churches, Muslims may feel that remaining with the faith signifies or will signify that they “refuse to integrate” into German society. To be religious may symbolize a constancy with Turkish culture that by definition rejects German culture. In any case, where freedom of religion in the form of formal acceptance of Islam is recognized and accommodated, Muslims appear to be just as religious regardless of their levels of integration. In Berlin, Muslims lose religiosity with further integration into German society.

Could it be that religious Turkish-Germans simply refuse to integrate in Germany, while Turkish-European groups in the other four countries are more agreeable? This view is unlikely. Pre-research analyses determined that Turkish immigrants from every country except Sweden came from similar guest-worker origins, then later brought their families. In Sweden, most Turkish immigrants came as refugees. Although this is not exactly the same status as guest worker, refugees often hold similar socio-economic status in society due to the limited resources they bring upon immigration and their potentials to also hold language difficulties (Fleischmann, F. & Phalet, K., 2011). In Sweden, the Turkish-Swedish population only accounted for 0.7% of the whole population, but in the other three countries, the Turkish diaspora accounted for 1.5-3.1% of the total population, the highest being from Germany (Fleischmann, F. & Phalet, K., 2011). The likelihood of policy a role in the correlations of religiosity and integration in Turkish-Europeans appears a much more salient and powerful explanation for these results than the communities within, although the communities themselves would certainly play a role.

Although one cannot effectively determine cause and effect of the correlations from this study, policy-makers should not use questions in the data to remain *laissez-faire*. From a policy standpoint, the data provides enough evidence to show that correlations exist between integration and religiosity only in Berlin, where policy is least accommodative towards Turkish-German Muslims. A failure to act due to the lack of cause-effect relationships is turning a blind eye to the clear correlations that exist in these fields. One should assume the worst and focus on promoting tangible change rather than conclude that the results are due to the philosophies of others.

In some evidence of this cause-effect correlation, SawsonChebli, foreign policy advisor to Berlin's ministry for interior and sports and founder of Berlin Muslim activist group JUMA, claims that many Muslim parents urge their daughters not to wear the headscarf, and therefore that those few who do, like teacher FereshtaLudin, choose to do so out of their own free will, despite the risks of discrimination (Herber, L. 2014). Similar stories have come out of France (Fleischmann, F. & Phalet, K., 2011), where women choose not to wear the headscarf due to the likelihood of discrimination and fewer job market opportunities. In one of Germany's own cultural evidences, the once-popular German TV show *TürkischfürAnfänger* (Turkish for Beginners) demonstrated evidence of the same internal struggles for young Muslim women (*TürkischfürAnfänger* 2006-2009). In one episode, Yağmur, a devout Muslim of Turkish descent, feels she cannot be accepted by her Greek boyfriend as long as she wears the hijab (2006-2009). This is fueled by another Muslim class friend, who takes off her hijab as soon as her parents leave sight (2006-2009). All of these examples show that many devout Muslim women struggle between honoring their religion and attempting to be successful in a Western land. Even in mainstream German media, the struggles of being a Muslim woman and balancing the pressures

from society to remove the headscarf are all too obvious and real, and many real-life Muslim women wanting to wear the headscarf confirm these issues too.

In light of this research, as well as the unique findings of Berlin secularization, one question among many arises: What does Germany mean by integration of Muslims? Doerschler and Jackson's research shows that politically, German Muslims are integrated into society (2011). However, when measured by structural means, the most integrated Muslims in Germany are those who are not very religious, although this is not necessarily true elsewhere. And although research demonstrates that many Muslims are integrated into social and cultural life than previously believed, public discourse argues over how they are not or how they should be integrated. Does one have to be less religious in Berlin to be "integrated?" In German society, can a woman wear the headscarf and be considered "integrated?"

Let's return to the Fereshta Ludin case. Ludin came to Germany with her family at 14 from Afghanistan (German Cause Celebre: A Teacher's Head Scarf 2003). Both of her parents were educated, as her father was a diplomat and her mother a teacher (2003). Ludin herself, who married a German, completed her tertiary education in Germany to become a teacher and was naturalized in 1993 (2003). She decided of her own free will to start wearing the headscarf as a young adult to the surprise of her family (2003). Ludin, in many ways, could be considered "integrated" into German society (2003). She spoke very good German, received higher education from German institutions, and came from a relatively well-to-do family. She even married a German citizen. Despite this, Ludin was still ostracized by the German society at large, betrayed by the school system, the federal courts, and the state legislature, who refused to support her rights to practice her beliefs. Should they have?

In one argument, Hans Heinig claims that the headscarf presents a “symbolic ambiguity” contrary to the principles of a Western democratic society (Heinig, H.M. 2007). In an article about the FereshtaLudin case, Heinig states:

In Iran and Turkey as well as in European migrant circles, it stands in part for a political Islam which gives little weight to open democratic elections, the concept of fundamental rights inherent to all human beings, the separation of church and state, and the equality of all religions. This Islam cannot be reconciled with the Basic Law, so the headscarf wanders into the hazy territory of unconstitutional symbols. (Heinig, H.M. 2007)

In Heinig’s view, the headscarf can symbolize, in some views, a radical anti-democratic Islam, and therefore may confuse other citizens as to the wearer’s loyalties. With this mode of thinking, it may be perceivably justified to ban the headscarf on account of the activity associated with it, but this view is ignorant and foolhardy on account of at least the following the two reasons:

Firstly, the headscarf is and was since the beginning of Islamic tradition asked of women on religious grounds. According to many Islamic scholars, several hadith (Islamic religious texts) are devoted to the belief that women should cover themselves, and many believe the head to be included in this. Although the necessity of the headscarf is debated among women, many conservative Muslim women wear it in respect of the faith. Therefore, it represents a religious symbol according to Islam, not a militant one. In this way, while some view removing the headscarf to be establishing “neutrality” by showing no particular favor to any religion, it destroys freedom of religion by causing women who would otherwise wear the headscarf to be forced into perceived “sin” by society. Because of this, “neutrality” laws end up favoring

Christianity, where no head-covering is typically required, while punishing Jews and Muslims who cover their heads on religious grounds.

Secondly, to claim that the headscarf symbolizes anti-democratic principles seems equally as ridiculous as banning the color red or the sickle because it can be tied to communist principles. Suggesting that all women who wear headscarves may potentially belong to radical parties is a hostile behavior grounded in stereotypes against Muslim peoples. Every ethnic or religious group has the potential to pose a threat to any other group, but they must not be defined by this potential. Rather, Heinig fails to point out the millions of Turkish-Germans, Turkish citizens, and Muslims around the world who are dedicated to peace and democratic values. In conclusion, to debase the headscarf on account of claims that it represents acts of terrorism and anti-Western values is a xenophobic and unfounded approach towards other cultural traditions. This ignorant viewpoint is dangerous, as it may actually lead to a lack of integration due to a hostile misconception of those viewed as “foreign bodies.”

In one view of the headscarf’s symbolism, Damani Partridge uses the word “foreign bodies” to describe Germans from perceivably “exotic” backgrounds, such as Turkish-German Muslims and Afro-Germans. In the case of Muslim women who choose to wear the headscarf, he argues that some Germans may oppose it because it symbolizes a refusal to partake in traditional German society. This participation does not refer to joining society as ordinary citizens, but rather to refusing to play the role of exotic members of German society. Partridge’s anthropological study pointed to a common belief that women who wore the headscarf were not making themselves “seen” and thus blocked themselves off to the society around them. The only way to truly be accepted in this society, it seemed, was to remove the headscarf and in so doing

replace the women's true identities with a socially acceptable one. In this way, Partridge classified these mentalities as a form of "exclusionary inclusion" (Partridge, D.J.J. 2013).

Political Action

By other perspectives, can it appear that Germany is beginning to accept Islam in the example of the Dutch? Thus far, Germany has taken few steps to provide legal accommodation for its Muslim population. If the federal court's ruling on the FereshtaLudin case is any indication, the national government attempts to take no position or responsibility in such matters. However, in some ways, Germany has opened up to Islam by seeking to understand and form partnerships with the Muslim minority. Here, we will analyze a few political movements in the country and their potentials towards change. Although it may appear that Germany is not accommodative towards its Turkish-German Muslim population, I argue that they are beginning to accept its presence in German society and seek to appease this population rather than stomp it out.

In one legal mark towards integration, Hamburg has taken steps to formally recognize Islam. In a "gesture of tolerance," Hamburg officials formed an agreement with the Muslim community in 2012, recognizing their rights and taking action towards accommodating them (Reimann, A. 2012). Although the agreement reaffirmed many citizens' rights as stated in the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), it was a symbolic gesture towards the recognition of German Muslims as German citizens (2012). In addition, the agreement established recognition of Muslim holidays (2012). Although this hardly changes anything for most Muslim residents of Hamburg, many still applaud the significance of the initiative (2012). Furthermore, Hamburg allows school teachers to continue to wear the headscarf unless dispute arises, but so far no teachers are known

to wear the headscarf in the city (2012). As a whole, most of the Hamburg initiative has caused hardly any change (2012). However, it is a form of accommodation towards German Muslims, as it can be viewed as signifying a declaration of Muslim rights in the city. It has received widespread appraisal from across the country, even in FereshtaLudin's southern state of Baden-Württemberg, and some hope to see its adoption in these other states (2012).

However, the Hamburg initiative has its limitations, a little of which has already been discussed. It doesn't really serve much purpose outside of symbolism, and it merely guarantees that the German Muslim community has a similar recognition to the German Christian and Jewish community, but not necessarily the same rights (2012). Judaism, as well as several denominations of Christianity, including Lutheran, Catholic, Mormon, Seventh-Day Adventist, Mennonite, Baptist, Methodist, Christian Scientists, and even Salvation Army groups have corporation status according to German law (U.S. Department of State. 2014) and thus still hold an advantage in earning tax money for the construction and maintenance of churches, etc. And national holidays remain based in Catholic tradition, where everyone is granted a day off, not just Christians. For Muslim holidays, only Muslims may take a day off, which signifies that the land is still fundamentally partial to Christianity, granting those of the latter faith more privilege. A true recognition of the equality of faiths would include a similar holiday system, as well as access to state funds in order to build mosques and Islamic programs in the example of the church. However, this said, one must be conscious of the fact that even some Christian groups, such as Jehovah's witnesses, were denied corporation status rights, although they are Christian (Miller, 1998). These facts play back into the earlier question of the role of intolerance in institutional decisions.

All in all, the Hamburg Initiative does not do very much. However, it's symbolic significance and its reception in other states demonstrates that Germany is willing to open up to the Muslim minority in the country and begin dialogues between this community and the government. The German state of Bremen has since passed similar legislation that protects Muslim community properties, approves the construction of traditional-style mosques, and supplies halal food at prisons and hospitals, among other things (Stefan, D. 2013, *see also* Farhat, A. 2013).

Other government programs in recent years have sought to reach out to both the Muslim and non-Muslim community in order to bridge understandings between these groups in the country. Most notably, the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz* (German Islamic Conference) has attempted to investigate issues of inequality and injustice against German Muslims, with a focus on tolerance and understanding to what the Conference recognizes as a relatively new religion in Germany.

One of the most notable achievements from the conference is its 436-page published work entitled *Muslim Life in Germany*. This study was conducted by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees for the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, and served primarily as an analysis of survey data of 17000 Muslims in the country (Haug, S., Müssig, S. & Stichs, A. 2009). The study followed immigrants from traditionally Muslim countries, and inquired about their beliefs and religious activity (2009). The study found an approximate total of 3.8 to 4.3 million Muslims in the country, a larger amount than previously predicted (2009). Also importantly, they uncovered varying proportions of Muslim denominations, as well as non-Muslim groups within these surveyed areas (2009). There was a large variation in the consistent practice of religious ritual among Muslims, including headscarf usage (2009). In the realm of education, over 50% of

Muslims with origins in Iran, Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa showed high levels of education (2009). This contrasts sharply with both the Turkish Muslim and non-Muslim communities, which demonstrated the lowest rates of education, followed closely by Germans with origins in Southeast Europe (2009).

The survey was conducted by phone interviews (37), and researchers attempted to create random samples that effectively accounted for each ethnic group (2009). The samples were collected in a manner similar to many other German integration studies, in which a list of names was extracted out of telephone directories and subjects were asked whether or not they were Muslim (2009). Although a large percentage of those called did not participate in the survey, there did not appear to be significant situational differences between those who did not participate and those who did (2009). Because a large proportion simply refused to participate, researchers pointed to data that claims only weak correlations between refusal to participate and background factors (2009), signifying a higher confidence that the data is correct. The survey completed a total of 6 004 telephone surveys (2009).

Since 2006, the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz* has focused its efforts on easing sentiments towards Muslim integration into Germany. The conference, which includes representatives from both the non-Muslim and Muslim communities, meets during legislative periods to discuss “hot topics” in Islam and the practice of Islam in Germany (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2014). In 2013, the DIK launched programs to reduce social polarization in the forms of anti-Muslim prejudice, anti-Semitism, and Islamism (religious extremism). Despite arguments that the DIK has been ineffective (*eg see* MuslimehaltenIslamkonferenzfürsinnlos 2013, Steuergelder: Deutsche IslamkonferenzkostetdreiMillionen Euro 2014, Kern, S. 2014) the conference, which met 40 times during the 2013 legislative period, claims to have ended in effective discourse and

produced results. Besides social polarization, the DIK focused on promoting gender equality within the Muslim minority as well as the promotion of Islamic studies courses in schools across the country. The conference is a positive demonstration of the state's desire to open dialogues with the Muslim community and accommodate their needs.

This latter focus, the establishment of Islamic courses in schools, has many smaller political roots in several states, but has been most recognized after its total state-wide implementation in primary schools in Nord-Rhein Westphalia in the 2012-2013 school year (AICGS 2012; *see also* Smale, A. 2014). Discussions for *Islamunterricht* in NRW are discussed in the news as far back as 2008 with movements from both Muslim groups such as the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (established in March 2007) and the German educational ministry, although some limited form of it has existed since 1999 (Lakotta, B. 2008; Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2014). Serious problems concerning the lack of qualified teachers have been an issue at its start and continue to be an issue, as programs expand across the state. Several other states, including Niedersachsen, Bayern, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Württemberg, and Hessen, also provide some state-supported form of Islamic education in select schools (2014). In Hamburg, where state-supported Islamic courses are also offered, the state has agreed to change the leadership on curriculum-writing under its new initiative (Reimann, A. 2012). Now, Muslim and Alevi groups will be able to work alongside the Protestant church in writing the curriculum (2012).

The idea of Islam classes has been proposed and supported in states like NRW for both non-Muslim and Muslim populations in the country. For some, the classes finally provide a form of recognition of the country's second largest religion. For others, the classes ensure the country's security by teaching a non-Wahhabist version of Islam to children from Muslim

backgrounds (Smale, A. 2014). In this way, the state is also able to “inoculate young people against more extreme religious views while also signaling state acceptance of their faith” (2014). Despite some rough beginnings in NRW concerning the lack of qualified teachers, the courses appear to be running without too much problem (Hummel, U. 2013; *see also* Schmid, B. 2012; Kaddor, L. 2013). For Hamburg, the coming puzzle will be how to accurately represent Muslim populations in writing the coursework from a Muslim perspective. Shia and Sunni populations tend to disagree on fundamental perspectives towards the leadership of Islam and one’s proper behavior in practice (Aslan, R. 2011). As a result, the state will have to decide how best to avoid discordance and overrepresentation of specific religious groups.

Considering centuries’-worth of Christian influence in what is today Germany, some could perceive Germany’s efforts as impressively progressive. So far, Germany has failed to succumb to total *laïcité* as her neighbors in France, but many factors remain blurry. Although many German states offer Islamic courses, the fact still stands that half the *Bundesländer* in Germany have legally banned teachers from wearing the headscarf in schools. And while states like Hamburg and Bremen have recognized the rights of their Muslim communities, they have passed almost no legal accommodation, but rather restated rights that already exist. However, contradictory these things may sound, Germany’s actions show, aside from the headscarf ban, movement in a positive direction towards social justice for German Muslim populations.

Research reports from the Migration Policy Institute have also assessed the political and religious circumstances in Germany and offered their own suggestions towards its improvement. The Migration Policy Institute, a self-proclaimed “nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank,” is stationed in Washington, DC and publishes anything ranging from reports to fact sheets to online journal articles analyzing migration and refugee policies internationally. In their report *Identity and*

(Muslim) Integration in Germany, the MPI analyzed perception and policy towards German Muslims with a migration background (Foroutan, N. 2013). We will cover the role of perceptions in integration in the next section. In terms of government policy towards Muslims in everyday work, the MPI made four suggestions for future actions to reduce tensions in integration (italics added for emphasis):

1. “*Challenge racism and xenophobia*” (2013) - The Institute referred to two particular government programs as good examples thus far – *Vielfalt tut gut. JugendfürVielfalt, Toleranz und Demokratie* (“Diversity is good for us. Youth for Diversity, Tolerance and Democracy”), and *Toleranzfördern – Kompetenzstärken* (“Advance Tolerance – Improve your Skills). Both were praised for promoting tolerance on a very personalized, community-based level, and more of these programs were recommended.
2. “*Monitor the rise of right-wing populist parties*” (2013) – The Institute here referred to three groups in particular – the extreme right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD), Pro Deutschland, and Die Freiheit. These groups tend to be associated in Germany with racism, ethnocentrism, or other forms of xenophobia. Although the Institute did not mention this, the German Parliament has tried multiple times to censor the NPD, but the proposals have always fallen short of execution (SPIEGEL).
3. “*Enforce equal employment initiatives*” (2013) – Here, the MPI proposes initiating affirmative action programs in the workplace that ensure that Germans with a migration background are better represented. In addition, they suggested supporting programs such as the *Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz* (General Equal Treatment

Act), which allows one to go to court if they feel they have been discriminated against in the workplace.

4. “*Continue the Deutsche Islam Konferenz*” (2013) – The Institute supports the work of the DIK, calling it a “major step” in forming dialogues between the German state and the German Muslim population. Despite difficulties, the MPI calls the conference both “relevant” and “productive.”

These listed propositions from the Migration Policy Institute are suggestions to German state institutions in the promotion of integration and equality for German Muslims in the country. In short, the MPI has proposed that the government support open dialogues and community-based anti-xenophobia campaigns, as well as legislating against and/or censoring retroactive forms of prejudice. In addition, the MPI has proposed several other strategies for reducing negative perceptions of Muslims in the country, to be discussed in the next section.

In addition to the suggestions from the MPI, I propose the following, perhaps more politically difficult, recommendations to improve relations with the German Muslim population:

1. *Allow teachers to wear the headscarf in schools* – Because the Federal Courts did not claim that teachers wearing the headscarf represented the government *per se*, the government is stating that the headscarf is not a problem to them as long as it is not a problem to the states. As previously discussed, arguments that the headscarf is a form of “symbolic ambiguity” in schools is one form of ignorance and in many ways demonstrates associating a simple religious practice of millions with a violent, negative stereotype caused by the actions of a few. To suggest that a headscarf can be associated with violence is suggesting that Islam and all Muslims can be associated with violence – a dangerous position to take. In this way, allowing teachers to wear

- the headscarf may be symbolic of tolerance, a rejection of these above-stated ideas against peoples of a different faith.
2. *Support the building of mosques in the same way church construction is supported* – Granting Islam corporation status, however, may be the most difficult of the proposed measures, because the corporation status of some groups, such as the Catholic and Lutheran churches in Germany, is based on centuries' worth of connections between the country and the church – Germany's role in the Holy Roman Empire, and then also their role in the Reformation with Martin Luther and the establishment of the Lutheran church. In addition, some may argue that granting Islam corporation status may mean granting other groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses and possibly Scientologists equal status, which would be an extremely involved process. Because of sheer numbers of Muslim followers in Germany and the evidence that Islam is not contradictory to democracy, Germany should consider granting Islam corporation status in a gesture of tolerance.

- If Germany is not yet ready to take such drastic steps, simple symbolic agreements such as the Hamburg initiative, if adopted across the country, may be one preliminary form of support for Islamic institutions. In this way, German Muslims may be legally better-protected against forms of prejudice when building mosques. In addition, they may profit from lower levels of perceived racism against their religion.
3. *Provide Muslims with a representative group in government* – Here, I suggest that the government sponsor the development of a German Muslim group, representing a fair spectrum of legitimate Islamic denominations (Sunni, Shi'a, Alevi), to work as an advisory board with the government in affairs that may affect Muslim populations.

This would not be an extension of the DIK – rather, there are a few major differences. Firstly, the council may work as an advisory board for up-and-coming legislative decisions, rather than work actively to initiate programs in the community. They will help provide Muslim perspectives on national/state legislations in order to represent the large group of German Muslims who are underrepresented in the *Bundestag*. In addition, the council should consist of all Muslim members, as these are the only people that can offer perspectives based on personal experience. While the details of their whereabouts in the legislative process are here unclear, government institutions should consider such a presence wherever needed for advice on the best way to tackle integration issues within the German Muslim community.

Here, I suggest largely symbolic forms of tolerance. Allowing women to wear the headscarf, promoting more initiatives like the Hamburg initiative, and providing an advisory German Muslim voice in political institutions would not only demonstrate an acceptance of German Muslims in the country, but it would also empower this minority to speak on their own behalf in forums where they will be heard, symbolizing that the traditional Germany is making space to work with its newest citizens as she moves on into the next decades of advancement. Only when healthy relationships between government institutions and the Muslim minority commence will levels of perceived racism and talks of integration begin to decline.

In conclusion, Turkish-Germans today find themselves in the middle of a rapidly changing Germany. Because statistically, most Turkish-Germans are Sunni Muslim, we focused this chapter on the accommodative policy of the dominant religion, Islam, as signs of Germany's openness to integration policy as opposed to exclusionary measures. Even for those who are Christian, Alevi, or Jewish, all Turkish-Germans face the difficulties of the "Muslim stereotype"

ted to their ethnicity in the country, which affects job market choices and the levels of perceived racism one feels. Examples such as the FereshtaLudin and swimming pool debate suggest that Germany is not totally accommodative of the German Muslim minority, although they do not demonstrate the degree of powerful assimilative sentiments as France. Some recent state and national efforts suggest that Germany is becoming more accommodative to Islam, as we see the rise of Islamic classes in schools, state-wide agreements of equality, and a national conference dedicated to opening dialogues between government institutions and German Muslims, as well understanding Islamic communities in Germany. Only future legislative acts can demonstrate which direction Germany will head for – closer to assimilation policies like France, or accommodative policies like the Netherlands – but the country is finally, in the 21st century, making an admirable start at including this minority in the country. Better late than never.

This chapter concluded with suggestions for improvement, given by both myself and the Migration Policy Institute. All in all, the main points are to open up dialogues with the German Muslim community and prevent the spread of racism and discrimination, as well as to demonstrate more actively that the state accepts the presence of Islam. In these ways, a slowly progressing Germany can more rapidly improve its integration appeal and minimize tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

ADDITIONAL WORD: PERCEPTIONS

The main focus of this thesis has been to investigate the role of accommodative policy in the inclusion of Turkish-Germans in German society. I have discussed specific accommodative programs as well as laws and agreements that have worked for or against this minority in terms of promoting their educational success or else their religious freedoms. However, I cannot finish such a discussion on integration policy without questioning the role of perception in integration. Can policy alone cause the inclusive changes we call integration? Or does it take a “change in the narrative,” so to speak, before real change can occur? The former implies that government has total control over the status of integration in the country, while the latter suggests that external factors play a significant role as well.

I will bring up one example that I stumbled upon during my research. During my studies on education initiatives to help Turkish-German students thrive in the classroom, my mentor sent me a pamphlet from the Open Society Justice Initiative (2014). Inside were testimonials from students, parents, and teachers in the Berlin public school system witnessed or experienced injustice. One article, from a teacher in the system, stated:

In my years of experience as a teacher I have observed again and again how, when it comes to recommending children to continuing higher education, family background is given special importance...A [secondary-school] recommendation [of a migrant student] will read, “the family cannot support the child.” Or, “The child comes from a family not invested in education.” I have also heard the throwaway comments – “stay with what you know,” “not everyone has to be an academic, we need garbage men too” and so on. This basic attitude often continues in secondary schools and higher education, too. (Open Society Justice Initiative 2014)

Although one testimony cannot demonstrate the commonality of such an occurrence, this one isolated account is in itself a shocking claim. Here, this teacher asserts that students of migrant descent have often been branded based on stereotypes of their familial backgrounds as unworthy of higher education, with no mention as to the quality of the students' abilities. In this way, any institutional programs utilized by the student to be qualified for the Gymnasium would be of no consequence due to stagnant stereotypes of the "migrant worker family" who is poor and uneducated. No matter how many of the government's programs a Turkish-German student took advantage of, he or she would still likely never attend a university if under the guidance of such teachers as in the example.

Before I continue to another example I found in my research on religion, I want to actively return to the question I posed at the beginning: *can policy alone bring about integration?*

In my quest to uncover more information about accommodation in religion, I discovered that modern views of Islam as a controversial practice are not isolated to this century. Contrary to what many may think, the view of Islam as an "alien practice" has been around for at least 20 years, and this is likely not even the first instance of anti-Islamic sentiments. Samuel Huntington's infamous "Clash of Civilizations" speech was published in 1996, and much discourse on Islam during this decade echoed his question of whether Islam (and by association, "eastern traditions") were compatible with "modern" Western culture (Huntington's Thesis was covered briefly in Chapter II). However, a shift in discourse occurred after September 11, 2001, when the Twin Towers were infamously struck in an act of terrorism by culprits who identified themselves as Muslim. Very quickly, public discourse changed to discussions of Muslims as

“terrorists” (Halm, D., 2013, diaspora Turkey, US state report Germany). In Germany, this meant a new threat from the largest minority of the country: Turkish-Germans. All of a sudden, threats felt local and even the neighborhood grocery shop owner could be perceived by new stereotypes as potential terrorists.

I would like to point out that these incidents are not isolated simply to Germany or Europe – they were also occurring in the United States. Perhaps many can recall tensions with Muslim groups as early as 1979 with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and the hostage crisis in Iran, as well as Western involvement in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict after World War II, among many others. Depictions of the “Muslim terrorist” have been popular in movies even before the 21st century, with one particular example, Arnold Schwarzenegger’s “True Lies,” coming immediately to mind. Such perceptions, ingrained in Western minds based on political events in the last century, have carried on into the 21st century.

After terrorist activities tragically “hit home” in the United States on September 11, 2001, anti-Islam sentiments became ever more obvious all across the Western world. As stated in Chapter II, research from the University of Bielefeld stated that ethnic German labels on their neighbors of Turkish descent were shifting from “migrant worker” to “Muslim.”

Fueling many of these new views was the media presence across Europe, reporting sporadic crimes as those of terrorist and specifically “Muslim” origin rather than that of a mentally unstable man, suggesting that Muslims have a stronger likelihood of committing murderous crimes. (Second Boston Marathon bombing suspect captured. 2014*; *see also* Attack on French soldier ‘religiously motivated’. 2014**, Volkery, C., 2014), as well as connecting Islam with negative stereotypes such as misogyny (*in relation to a particular event involving the ‘Free Amina’ case in France, see* Beusman, C. 2013, Bouazza, B. 2013; *see also* Hagberg, A.

2013). All of a sudden, Turkish-Germans could be perceived as a potentially dangerous, fundamentalist and misogynistic Muslims, although Turkey is one of the most secularized Islamic countries in the world. In Germany, a simple association of Turkish political group IGMG (*Islamischen Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs*) placed strategically next to a large picture of a malicious-looking Osama bin Laden in pamphlets for schoolchildren in Bayern demonstrate the kinds of perceptions that many in Germany associated with Islam and Turkish-German Muslims (Turkish Diaspora). In 2010 Thilo Sarrazin, in another infamous example, wrote a bestseller on the genetic deficiencies of Turkish-Germans and the limits of their religion (Sarrazin, T. 2010). The wide support for his book suggests that many in Germany shared his frustrations and at least associated Turkish-Germans with negative stereotypes. This is evident from the behavior of teachers in schools, as we just witnessed from the Open Society Initiative, and even from the frustrated teachers that Partridge met in Kreuzberg (*see* Chapter I: Policy in Education). Even mainstream TV Shows such as the once-popular *Türkisch für Anfänger* depict perhaps sarcastically the Turkish teenage boy as an uneducated gangster and his younger sister as a devout stay-at-home mother-in-the-making, reflecting the broader stereotypes of society (*Türkisch für Anfänger* 2006).

I return to this question one more time: can policy alone bring about change? Although the given facts may mislead many to suggest that my view is “no,” I believe, to the contrary, that it can. Maybe you can recall a comparative study presented at the introduction of the thesis, led by Ersanilli and Saharso. The study focused on integration politics and the level to which Turkish-Europeans self-identified with their country. The study found that Turkish-Europeans identified themselves more with their country of settlement where policy was more accommodative (Netherlands) than where it wasn't (Germany). This suggests that policy had the

power to change Turkish-European attitudes to connect with their country of settlement. If policy can change Turkish-European perceptions on their own self-identities, why can't it also have the power to change the attitudes of ethnic Germans who carry old stereotypes of Turkish-Germans and other Germans of migrant descent?

In another example, some could even argue that neutrality laws in France (and Germany) have changed Muslim perceptions of Islam. Because religion is so personal and many are very passionate about it, it is a shocking thing to consider. However, I would like to refer to a study from Chapter 2, where I stated the anecdotes of the woman wearing the headscarf. Women who choose to wear the headscarf are, according to statistics gathered by the DIK, almost always associated with higher levels of religiosity (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2014). Yet oftentimes they are discouraged by family members from wearing the headscarf. In France, it is illegal to wear the scarf in schools. Thus, even the most religious girls must put the law above Islam. In this way, I argue that policy has changed Muslim perceptions towards Islam. Once thought to be of absolute necessity by many, the headscarf is, in many cases, now left only for prayer. This is because of policy where Muslim women were allowed *no choice* but to act in this respect. As a result, younger Muslim girls may also grow up in a culture where they do not feel the same religious need to wear a headscarf. This is a powerful effect caused by policy – again, leading me to believe that changing negative stereotypes through policy is fully possible.

The next question is *how*. How can institutions promote integration by altering negative stereotypes towards the Turkish-German minority? One answer is to simply open more dialogues. Open forums where ethnic Germans and Turkish-Germans work together and learn from the either. According to the famous Robbers' Cave Study, psychologists found that even

working together towards the same goals promoted integration and understanding among young children, with the implications understood to embody adult populations as well (Belsky, J. 2010).

The Migration Policy Institute posited another set of recommendations to Germany policy-makers in order to reverse negative stereotypes of German Muslim populations. These recommendations included the following:

“Review school books” – This recommendation comes after claims that many stereotypes of migrants as well as Muslims and people of color are ingrained in textbook material (Georg-Eckert-Institut, Auswärtiges Amt 2014; “In Schulbüchern wird der Islam zurückwärts gewandt dargestellt“ 2011; Islam.de 2013). As a result, the MPI recommends rewriting these books to eradicate such stereotypes.

1. “Diversify collective symbols” – Symbols or representatives of national identity, such as government agencies and advertising campaigns could contain a more diverse group of people in order to symbolically redefine Germany as a country of many different kinds of people.
2. “Develop media guides for how to represent Muslims” – Here, the MPI feels that the general media, including journalists and those responsible for TV shows do not know how to respectfully portray Muslims and have a particular affinity to using stereotypes. Thus, educating them on the politically correct way to depict this population may change the perceptions of the public audience.
3. “Communicate academic findings concerning positive integration achievements” – Some examples of positive integration include the Hamburg case study mentioned in Chapter 1 and even the research from Doerschler and Jackson in Chapter 2. Sharing the progress of

integration may change age-old perceptions associated with “parallel Turkish-German societies” and promote a more positive way of viewing this population.

4. “Communicate that the skills and potential of people with a migration background are valuable as well as necessary resources for the entire country” – This statement is rooted in a German history that has struggled to find identity in claims of common heritage. The MPI suggests rewriting this identity to include its “*de facto* heterogeneity,” and urges the country, if only out of sheer political strategy, to celebrate its multicultural image in today’s globalized world.

These five recommendations imply the power of government policy on changing citizen perceptions. In altering the stereotypical way Germans are used to seeing or learning about Turkish-Germans, the government can change underlying mindsets towards this group. In addition, actively promoting diversity and celebrating it can demonstrate not only that the government will not accept discriminatory behaviors, but will also signal to the Turkish-German population that they are welcome in German society.

Finally, I propose one last suggestion, this to the Deutsche Islam Konferenz: that they teach those things which they are learning in the conference to the public in a far wider scope. One very important finding from their most well-known study, *Muslim Life in Germany*, was also hidden on page 27, and discussed nowhere in major news media sources:

A further important result of the study is that fundamentalist attitudes, which are primarily characterised by religious attitude patterns, are not to be equated with Islamism. This is characterised by the political manifestation of religious convictions, such as the primacy of religion over democracy and the

disassociation from democratic interpretations of law. (Haug, S., Müssig, S. &Stichs, A. 2009)

In this statement, the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz* makes a differentiation between religious conservatism and political activism based in the establishment of a primarily religion-based society. In this way, I interpret the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz* to have broken stereotypes against Muslims by recognizing differences among people – and stating that, from their research, high levels of religiosity to not correspond to anti-democratic principles (*see also the research from Doerschler and Jackson in Chapter 2*). As a government report, this publication has significance, because it represents state conclusions about Islam. The publication *Muslim Life in Germany*, discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, also included several demographic facts about Turkish-Germans that may help to expel stereotypes about *all* Turkish-Germans. As a result, I recommend speaking about these results in classrooms and active dialogue spaces in order to reduce prejudices and these negative perceptions that work so retroactively against integration policy.

To conclude this section, the question of perception and its role in the integration debate has been a serious question of mine throughout my thesis studies. This section was meant to pose the same questions to reader, but without extinguishing hope in promoting social justice. Yes, there are many occurrences of prejudice against the Turkish-German minority, either based on race, religion, or socio-economic status, and poses a hindrance to integration. But also *yes*, policy can play a role in diminishing its influence as well, by opening dialogues and actively working against discriminatory stereotypes that sometimes creep through school textbooks, dialogues, or TV shows unintentionally. The state has the ability to prevent these things, and also to share the multitudes information they have learned in collaboration with the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz* –

but this depends on government attitudes and perceptions as well. Before promoting progressive action, the state must recognize negative perceptions and inequalities, and then be willing to invest the time and money to diminish this, because without policy to change attitudes, Germany's integration policy is only a set of rules and programs to promote parallel societies rather than one inclusive Germany.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

A large focus on German domestic policy today concerns its stance towards the integration of many of its minority populations and thus the maintenance of a multicultural state. With strong assimilationist policies in France and the relatively exemplary inclusionist policies in the Netherlands, Germany is situated between two extreme forms of integration policy. Germany, which has often been labeled “exclusionist” for their hands-off approach at managing integration, has in many ways been forced or else pulled to take a stance on one issue or another. As a result, I argue that they are slowly building a form of non-exclusionary integrative policy – one that, however weakly, is leaning towards the inclusion of its minority populations.

In this thesis, we have defined the terms “integration” and “multiculturalism” to highlight the goals of the discussion. “Integration” has been here defined as the methods for including minority populations into mainstream society, and was often defined in like terms to the word “inclusion.” However, differences ensue between the terms “assimilationist integrative policy” and “inclusionist integrative policy” – assimilationist policy promotes the notion that minority groups should adapt themselves to the culture of the traditional majority population, while inclusionist policy suggests that minority groups may be included in society without changing their identities. In the latter policy, minority identities are welcome as an encompassing characteristic of the state’s identity, and the state takes on a role of preserving this identity as well as the traditional one. In this thesis, we have focused on Germany’s progress in promoting an inclusionist policy through the accommodation of a particular minority in the country.

We have focused almost solely on this particular minority, Turkish-Germans, because they constitute not only the largest minority in Germany today, but also arguably the minority most in need of accommodative policies. Because of the country’s history of exclusionary policy as well as the fact that many Turks arrived in Germany as guest workers with little to no

education, their families today often occupy the lowest strata of the socioeconomic ladder, with clear disadvantages in several categories of society due to their identities as both Turkish-Germans and Muslims.

One of the primary things this thesis has noted through its discourse is that the Turkish-German community is *not* on equal grounds with the ethnic German community. In the two fields we investigated, education and religion, we saw stark inequalities in terms of Turkish-German performance in schools and rights to practice Islam, in comparison to their ethnic German counterparts. In schools, Turkish-Germans are occupying the largest percentages of the *Hauptschulen*, the lowest-tier secondary schools. Because of differences in education of their parents and therefore lack of proper resources, Turkish-German children and adolescents are not able to obtain the same degree of help in educational matters as ethnic German children, whose parents are statistically more likely to have a higher-level degree based on socioeconomic status. In addition, although we questioned the real degree of severity of this problem, we investigated claims that some Turkish-German students may not be familiar enough with German to succeed in school. As a result, such characteristics set children back at an early age, which only leads them to the lowest-tier paths and thus no chance at reversing their fates by the time they are linguistically competent.

Because of this data, we investigated efforts in German educational policy to determine if students were being helped in these areas, which would fall under our definition of accommodative policy and thus integrative policy towards Turkish-Germans. Since Germany's embarrassingly low PISA results in the 2000 tests, the country has made great progress in initiating programs to assist those from socioeconomically underprivileged backgrounds that may lack educational or language-assistance resources. Some of these programs include the

Grundschule classroom from the Hamburg study or else *Ganztagsschulen* for primary and secondary school students. Based on these programs, we argue that Germany is making progress out of the realms of exclusionary policy and moving towards the inclusion of Turkish-Germans through attempts to overcome social hindrances that do not accommodate inclusion of this minority in education. However, despite the attempts to improve social mobility for low-SES Turkish-Germans in the country, we questioned the seriousness of their actions. For example, while *Ganztagsschulen* have been widely adopted across the country, the definition of such schools requires them to be in session only 3 out of 5 days and in many cases is optional. In addition, although they offer homework help and remedial courses, their most attractive offer is intramural activities, which may pose a distraction to children who should really be actively engaged in academic help. Despite this, Germany's aims are certainly much more progressive than in previous years, which helps to dispel myths about total exclusion within the German state.

Next, we studied the realm of religion, a highly controversial feat. While education seems self-explanatory in providing equal opportunity for all, religion asks to define the German identity and asks what other identities, if any, are acceptable inclusions in this definition. In many ways, I argue that this field has not yet been developed, as federal government policy still remains relatively *laissez-faire* on the issue. As examples, I give the fact that Islam is still not granted corporation status, although several denominations of Christianity as well as Judaism are. In addition, I point to the federal ruling on the case of Fereshta Ludin and the right of female Muslim teachers to wear the headscarf in schools. The federal government refused to give a concrete answer, stating that the states should decide whether or not this was acceptable (and to which 50% of states said it was *not*).

This said, I sought programs whereby government institutions actively sought to understand Islam and German Muslims, as Sunni Islam is the predominant religion of the Turkish-German community. It is often perceived as a characteristic of the Turkish-German community, regardless of whether or not a Turkish-German practices this, which is why the accommodation of the religion is also symbolic of Germany's openness to inclusion of minority populations.

Councils like the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, as well as the establishment of Islam classes in schools and the Hamburg initiative, are symbols of some progress towards tolerance and accommodation beginning in Germany. The Deutsche Islam Konferenz actively seeks to enter the German Muslim community and understand it, and publications such as *Muslim life in Germany* illustrate the new understanding that the government has achieved thus far. In addition, the conference brings together members of both the Muslim and non-Muslim community, bridging gaps and encouraging forms of dialogue between communities.

Both the establishment of Islam in schools and the Hamburg initiative were good examples of state-initiated programs aimed at accommodating German Muslims. The establishment of Islam classes in schools was a symbolic form of recognition of German Muslim needs, despite the fact that Islam does not have legal corporation status in Germany. The Hamburg initiative, although not necessarily a program, was a state-supported agreement stemmed in trying to achieve equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in the state. This initiative, as well as the Bremen initiative, also actively recognized the Turkish-German community, and responded symbolically by forming a legal agreement that affirmed Turkish-German rights to equality. Although it caused no huge political change, both the Hamburg and

Bremen initiatives are steady steps towards state tolerance and further accommodation of German Muslim communities like the large Turkish-German Muslim community.

Because these were really the only great examples of accommodation in religion in Germany, I posed several suggestions for improvement, utilizing advice from the migration policy institute as well as advice based on my own research. In short, these points suggested opening more dialogues and holding the state accountable for promoting tolerance and equality in the country. Through this, bridges towards collaborative work can be fashioned and a truly inclusive society in terms of religion may be possible.

Because there was not much room for the role of non-governmental institutions or else mainstream society in my thesis, I wanted to end by posing the question of the role of perceptions in this quest for integration. Can policy alone attack these issues and cause change, or must personal attitudes change first? To this I argue that policy does indeed play a large role, not only in promoting integration legally, but also in changing personal attitudes towards it. Ideas of changing personal attitudes before changing policy should never be used as an excuse not to act. Instead, efforts at institutionally opening minds should be considered. For example, the opening of dialogues and support of tolerant programs for youth should be initiated, as well as ridding schools of educational material that promotes stereotypical views of Turkish-Germans or simply German Muslims (Foroutan, N. 2013). Through this, policy will enable the growth of open-minded citizens and promote ideas of equality within German society. This may, in time, lead to political progress towards further accommodation of minority populations in the country.

To conclude, I would like to suggest that mainstream ideas of a totally “exclusionary” Germany are in reality not realistic claims. In fact, Germany has in more recent years opened up, however slowly, to promoting integration of the Turkish-German community through initiatives

aimed at accommodating them where inequalities may exist in education and religion. However, this does not mean that Germany is totally inclusive, and many years' progressive policy must compensate in order to achieve such means. With this data, however, we can understand that Germany is making some pains to positively include their largest minority into mainstream society, in a way that I argue leans closer to inclusionist policy than assimilationist policy. Based on this data, I suggest supporting Germany in its efforts towards understanding their minority populations and encouraging them to take national action, wherever possible, against intolerance and institutional inequality. In this way, Germany may find that investing in inclusionist integration not only saves money in the long run, but promotes a healthy society that can together outperform discordant societies in academic, industrial, and political realms.

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