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“Police Pacification of Rio de Janeiro Favelas in the Context of the 2014 FIFA World Cup”

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Introduction

1.1 Abstract

In 2006, FIFA announced Brazil as the host of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. To heighten security measures for the Cup, the Rio de Janeiro state government created the *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora* (Police Pacification Unit or UPP) to regain territorial control of poor communities – called *favelas* – that were governed by criminal groups in the government’s absence. The UPPs diverge from traditional policing practices as they utilize proximity policing in *favelas* to create a more permanent presence with the hope of eliminating drug traffickers and generating trusting relationships with the communities they serve. The implementation of the UPP has failed because UPPs decrees conceptualize the program within existing police structures and rely on the same policing methods used in the past. While the UPPs have successfully fulfilled their goal to reduce some forms of lethal violence in *favelas*, it has been unsuccessful in establishing positive relationships between residents and police that allow for the complete integration of *favelas* into Rio de Janeiro society. Despite this imperfect and incomplete integration, *favela* residents have made their voices heard, thus increasing their participation in civil society and opening a necessary social discourse about police expectations and inequality. I argue that the UPPs, although a short-term strategy, must implement stronger institutional organization and social programming to change policing methods and positively impact the *favela* communities.

1.2 War and Peace in Rio de Janeiro

In the moment in which this sentence was written, the cracks and booms of explosions from bombs and guns ricochet through the streets of Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The local news reports the police have mistaken an innocent resident of Pavão-Pavãozinho, a nearby *favela*, for a *traficante* (drug trafficker). The residents of the *favela* then set fire to the entrance of the *favela* to protest the killing of another member of their community. The police, in the midst of the *confusão* (confusion), are trying to control the unruly members who are shown bolting among tightly packed *barracos* (poorly constructed homes found within the *favela*). The female news anchor discusses the scene on Rua Sá Ferreira, a well-known street in the affluent neighborhood of Copacabana, where police officers roam holding large weaponry. The second half of the television screen contains overhead camera shots, provided by an encircling news helicopter, showing the burning fires lit within the *favelas*. Two of my roommates stand erect at the nearest window, watching the windows of the nearby building illuminate with the light from discharged bombs and bullets. We live on Rua Sá Ferreira. My other roommate points toward the screen and out our apartment window amid explicative exclamations of fear and says, “O país da Copa!” translated “the country of the World Cup.”

A history of tension between the Brazilian government and Brazilian citizens, especially those of the lower classes, manifests in the clashes between the Brazilian police and those who live in *favelas*, otherwise know as “slum” communities in Brazil.¹ This relationship of violence

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¹ This historic relationship first began with the creation of the favelas in the early 1900s and intensified through the military dictatorship with the increased corruption of Brazilian police forces and the widening wealth disparity between Brazilians themselves. This relationship has been further strained with the omnipresence of the upcoming
and crime between favela residents and the police, left untouched for years, has gained international recognition within the past decade with the announcement of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, to be held throughout the country in June and July of 2014. The World Cup, as a mega-event, poses several consequences for the host country but primarily causes the unnatural sped-up process of development of particular regions within host countries. The pressure from both FIFA and the Cup’s international audience historically has led to the host country’s drastic overspending on construction and preparations to host the tournament. The Brazilian government is unique in that its expenditure surpasses any that proceeded it, currently exceeding RS $14 billion in costs, as of 2013. This expenditure, mostly concentrated on the renovation and construction of old and new soccer stadiums, includes various security measures to alleviate the pervasive concern of the general security for incoming international tourists to the various stadiums and the most prominent city for the Cup, Rio de Janeiro. On top of the already required FIFA-approved security measures, including the selection and screening of security officers by FIFA itself despite the fact the cost of such security falls to the responsibility of Brazil, the state government of Rio de Janeiro has created and started to implement the Unidade de Policia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit, UPP) to address the violent interaction between Brazil’s police and favela residents. The UPP continues alienate and exclude residents throughout the “pacification” process. This “us vs. them” exclusion, perpetuated by the Brazilian government, media, and people against favela residents, treats favela residents as if they were insurgents who invaded and disrupt Rio society.

The lines between wartime and peacetime are increasingly blurred in the context of the ongoing struggle between police and favela residents because of the inherent contradiction of the implementation of “pacification” units in what was already supposedly a time of peace. This contradiction of “pacification,” however, is a necessary acknowledgement of the ongoing yet undeclared war occurring throughout all of Rio de Janeiro and in Brazil.

Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, the settings of warlike peacetimes, provide worthy examples of this tension between war and peace. Only 3% of the world’s population lives in Brazil, yet 11% of the world’s homicides occur there. Brazil recorded 47,236 homicides in 2012, placing it as the seventh most violent nation in the world, ahead of countries such as Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The following year, the Brazil Public Security Yearbook found that the homicide rate increased by 12% with 53,646 reported homicides, or one person every ten minutes. Brazilian police, between 2009 and 2013, killed more than 11,000 people, or about six people a day. If you apply these same trends to the homicide rate in 2009 (estimated around 40,500), 2010

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(estimated around 41,700), and 2011 (approximately 43,690 homicides), and then add the 2012 and 2013 homicides to these figures, there are approximately 227,000 total homicides in Brazil between 2009 and 2013. Of these estimated 227,000 homicides, the 11,000 police killings constitute nearly 5% of the homicide rate. This calculation, of course, assumes all police killings were included in the original recorded homicide rates, and does not account for the possibility that some police killings may not be officially recorded. Within Brazil, Rio de Janeiro state has the highest per capita rate of killing. Between the years of 1991 and 2007, Rio reported an average of 6,826 homicides per year. These numbers rival “urban areas of countries in civil war.” There is no declared war in Rio de Janeiro or the country of Brazil, but the homicide rates indicate a different narrative of an unspoken and ongoing conflict.

The police play a prominent role in this undeclared war and the resulting social exclusion, further demonizing favela residents as an entire population of criminals. The police are the first line of government most citizens interact with on a daily basis, and in the favelas of Rio, the police were the only government representatives intervening in these regions. Considering the police stood between the favelas and the government, they do not properly represent nor appropriately reflect the capabilities of the government, often participating in corruptive and illegal partnerships alongside taking punishment into their own hands through extrajudicial actions. Specifically in the favelas, the police reaffirmed the undeclared presence of war through their increasingly militarization and inconsistent interference, “invading” favelas only to shoot potential criminals and then leaving after the bloodshed. The favelas became not only the cause of war, but also the stage. It is within this context the Rio de Janeiro state government declared the creation of the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit or UPP) in 2008, following FIFA’s announcement that Brazil was to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup.

Research Methodology

When I traveled to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in April 2014 to research the implementation and reception of the UPP before the kick-off of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, I had three primary research questions: How does the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro affect the relationships of these communities with the government and those who do not live in the favelas? How has the implementation of the UPP influence the undeclared rhetoric of war, and does the UPP help integrate favelas into the larger Rio de Janeiro society? To answer these questions, I visited three favelas and interviewed government officials, favela residents, and scholars over a six-week period before the beginning of the World Cup in June 2014.

The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, or Police Pacification Unit (UPP), is a special unit within the Rio de Janeiro state government police force. The UPP is a new type of police force

6 Calculated with information that the homicide rate increased 7.5% between 2011 and 2012, resulting in an approximate 43,690 homicides in 2011.
7 Based on the 7.5% increase from 2011 to 2012 and the 12% increase between 2012 and 2013, I safely assumed there had been no increase in the homicide rate from 2008 to 2009, and then 3% increase from 2009 to 2010, and 4.5% from 2010 to 2011.
called a “pacification unit,” which aims to eliminate the criminal groups in favelas and create a more permanent government presence. The UPP was created as a unit within the Military Police, another policing unit operated by state forces. The UPP is unique in its proximity policing approach, and it is the first government-sponsored change in policing. The UPP is also revolutionary in its specific officer training, the less warlike weaponry used by the forces in comparison to other units, and the frame that “violence is an emergency measure rather than a first resort.” The officers themselves are also younger, new recruits with the goal to “limit links to the corrupt practices of previous police generations.”

The implementation of the UPP has failed because UPPs decrees conceptualize the program within existing police structures and rely on the same policing methods used in the past. The UPP has not sufficiently changed the attitudes of both sides and has contributed to the negative perceptions through the UPP’s use of militarization within proximity policing and the absence of social programming in its agenda and practices. Despite this imperfect and incomplete integration, favela residents have made their voices heard, thus increasing their participation in civil society and opening a necessary social discourse about police expectations and inequality. Due to this incorporation of favelas on residents’ terms, the UPP is a necessary step to repair the relationship between the government and the favelas. To be truly effective and properly represent and serve favela populations, the UPP must continue to evolve into a community policing force that incorporates the provision of social programming and public services.

In Chapter 2, I provide a brief history of the favelas and occupants before the creation of the UPP to provide the comparative framework necessary to analyze the effect of the UPP on these communities. In Chapter 3, I introduce the UPP and its conceptualization through the analysis of various government decrees, emphasizing early indications of potential shortcomings. In Chapter 4, I discuss the second phase of the UPP’s creation: the implementation of the UPP in favelas. I first address how the UPP is supposed to be implemented according to the regulations and then compare this procedure to two case studies of favelas that have experienced or are experiencing pacification. In Chapter 5, I analyze the initial consequences of the UPP in relation to its effects on violence rates, the most frequently analyzed data in respect to the UPP. In Chapter 6, I focus on the second part of the UPP’s implications and consequences: the provision of services. I emphasize how these services differ and how the UPP does or does not encourage their provision. I then conclude in Chapter 7 with my overall evaluation of the UPP program alongside various recommendations for the UPP and an analysis of the UPP as a model for other countries.

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Chapter 2: A Rio de Janeiro “favela”

To understand the effects of the UPP, we must first understand how the favelas fit into Rio de Janeiro society before its conception and implementation. This includes their history and definition as “slums,” their social and economic standing, and the primary actors involved in these communities.

2.1 Favelas as “slums”

The word “favela” in Portuguese translates to “slum.” Favelas are prevalent throughout the country, yet their highest concentration is in large, urban areas. The largest groupings of favelas are in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. In Rio, favelas are particularly unique in their construction on the hillsides that loom over the city. Next to some of the richest and most popular vacations spots in Brazil – and also in the world – favelas embody the reality of wealth disparity and inequality that cannot be ignored.

Brazil’s favelas are some of the oldest megaslums in the world. While most megaslums began in the 1960s, the first favela, Morro de Providência, was founded in Rio in the 1880s. Similar to slums, the Official Bulletin of the Brazilian Secretariat of Social Services defines a favela as a “group of dwellings with high density of occupation, the construction of which is carried out in a disorderly fashion with inadequate material, without zoning, without public services, and on land which is illegally being used without the consent of the owner.” Despite Brazil’s recent emergence out of the “third world,” 22% of Rio citizens live in favelas, and 6.5 to 24% of those residents live on “less than the Brazilian minimum wage of about US$300 per month.” The majority of favela residents have darker skin color and would be considered black by the U.S. American definition, but due to the looser definition of race in Brazil, cannot be holistically grouped as “black.” While favelas may not be racial ghettos, they certainly indicate the unequal racial climate of Brazilian society despite its claim to be a “racial democracy.”

Despite their long histories, favelas and their residents are still not welcome into the fold of larger Brazilian society. Favelas are strongly associated with the underclass, and middle class Brazilians and police often view them as the “seedbeds of crime and the homes of drug gangs” and treat residents as possible suspects of undefined crimes. The 1979 Official Bulletin first

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1 Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (Verso, 2007), 27.
4 This definition is handed down from the legal definition of race prevalent in the American south before the Civil War and during segregation. Known as the “one drop rule,” this racial classification implies that any person with any African ancestry or with “black blood” is considered “black.”
defined favelas as “irregular agglomeration of sub-proletarians with no professional capacities, low living standards, illiteracy, messianism, promiscuity, alcoholism, the habit of going barefoot, superstition and spiritualism, lack of healthy recreation, refuge for criminals and marginal types, and spreader of parasites and contagious diseases.” The public often spoke about the favelas as “social cancers” that despoil “one of the most beautiful landscapes of the planet” and are filled with “rebels and gangsters.” This otherization of the favela through association with criminality generated tangible discrimination in Brazilian society. When surveyed in 1979 in regards to xenophobic impact, 59% of favela residents believed “those who live in communities in the urban periphery are discriminated against.” Among this 59%, 32% believed they were discriminated against because of their skin color, 30% because they live in a favela, 20% because they are poor, and 8% because of their attire. Interviews conducted by Perlman in 2011 confirm the continuation of this discrimination, finding that 92% of interviewees mentioned living in a favela and skin color as “bases of discrimination.” 2013 surveys also revealed residents believe, “an address in a favela often means that they do not get the job.”

As a result of these negative connotations, using the term favela has generated public resistance through the creation and use of other names for the communities. The specific rhetoric used to discuss the relationship between police and the favela communities further reflects ongoing discriminatory policy practiced throughout Brazilian society. More than ever, favelas imply criminality, despite the fact that the government neglected these communities and thus welcomed the presence of illicit trade and criminal groups. In direct response to negative association of the term favela, residents now use the terms comunidade (community) or morro (hill) to refer to their hillside communities. The term morro is often used in direct comparison to asfalto (asphalt), used to describe the non-favela communities of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The morro/asfalto distinction also directly implicates the growing wealth disparity between the rich and the poor, as the asfalto references the infrastructure of roads as a signifier of affluence in contrast to the unpaved and hazardous roads characteristic of favelas.

Favela residents are also changing the way they self-identify. In the past, the public often referred to residents of favelas as favelados, however, the term favelado immediately associates the resident as defined by his or her less privileged social identity that comes prepackaged with a reputation of criminality. A favelado is “not just someone who lives in a favela, he or she is thought to be someone who deserves to live there.” Many residents, in an effort to resist both favela and favelado, now call themselves membros da comunidade (“members of the community”) or moradores (“occupants”), a term that cleverly plays off the idea of occupying space and also includes the word morro rather than favela within its pronunciation. Favelas are further associated with the term marginal, which carries a slightly different connotation in Portuguese than in English. In Portuguese, calling someone else marginal implies a criminal connection. This twisting of the original definition of the word “marginal” to include criminal

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6 Perlman, Myth of Marginality, 93.
dimensions has unavoidably generated a philosophy regarding marginalized populations, implying that the subsequent criminality of these isolated groups is more a reflection of individual choices than greater societal fissures.

2.2 Actors battling over the favelas

The favelas and their residents are often assumed to be criminals because of the constant battle for territorial, political, and social control occurring within favela communities. There are three prominent actors battling for control in Rio de Janeiro favelas: the government, the police, and the competitive criminal groups (drug traffickers and militias). The government and the police, although sometimes considered one actor, are two different forces exerting separate types of control in favela communities. While the government has been fairly absent from favelas considering their origins as squatter settlements outside the rule of land and tax laws, its attempts for control manifest primarily in the regaining of political and territorial control of the favelas. The police, while not attempting to gain control for their own use separate from the government, play the role of the coercive apparatus that is physically present in the communities and attempts to deliver on the government’s agenda. Police in favelas, historically, act independently of the government, often establishing personal connections with local criminal groups for the collection of individual benefits, such as bribes and favors. The second group actor is the separate and competing criminal groups that rule and control favelas in the government’s absence. These groups prominently include drug trafficking gangs and militias, both of which opportunistically emphasize on the vulnerable favela population and the lack of police presence in favelas. Drug trafficking, as its name implies, deals in the informal and illegal market of selling and packaging drugs. Drug trafficking gangs commonly fight each for territorial claims as territory affects the size of their market and the range of their control. The less-known but equally pervasive criminal group, militias, exploit favela communities by charging fees for security and other basic services. In the midst of these groups, the favela residents fight for autonomous rule. Through their own organizations, known as Residents’ Associations, they attempt to organize the residents to lobby for policies; however, their voices are silenced amid the noise of the more powerful groups.

2.2.1 Government

The government at the local, state, and national levels has been absent from favela communities over the past century. The Brazilian federal government has refrained from involvement largely because of state autonomy. At the state level in Rio de Janeiro, the Rio state government also remained absent from favelas with the exception of police raids (invasões or invasions) conducted by the Rio de Janeiro Polícia Militar (Military Police or PM). These raids contributed to the negative relationship between favela residents and the state, as police actions, including “arbitrary killings and extortion,” ultimately “ensured that favela residents regarded the state not as an ally, but perhaps their own worst enemy.”[1] The state level also features the Civil Police force, who was kept out of favela communities and further affirmed the invasão culture of the PM and its elite troops, the Special Police Operations Battalion (known as BOPE). At the local level, the Rio de Janeiro municipal government rarely involved itself in the favelas behind

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the argument of their criminality and the lack of resources available at the municipal level to combat more organized crime. The lacking government presence negated the very role of a state to control its repressive apparatus, or maintain a monopoly on violence within its borders. This absence generated vulnerable space in Brazilian society, creating power vacuums where criminal groups could opportunistically gain control and conduct exploitative operations that endangered the favela’s residents. Considering the government’s nonexistence in favelas, favela residents remain confident in the government, stating the most important rights of Brazilian citizens include the “right to support the government,” the “right to respect the authorities,” and the “right to obey laws.” In relation to the government’s violent relationship with the favelas, most surveyed residents commented that, if the government were to do something harmful to them, they would not be able to do anything because “the government is always right” or because they feared repressions actions from the state. These responses, rooted in fearful obedience to a corrupt system rather than devotion to a just one, further affirm the belief in “justiça militar,” or military justice executed primarily by the PM, where the justice system primarily protects the powerful.

The government’s role in favelas has recently changed as the municipal, state, and federal levels develop new focuses on favelas. The new focus includes the deployment of a new type of police force, called the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit or UPP). The UPP is primarily a Rio state government initiative, yet it is supported militarily by the federal government and partially partners with the municipal government.

2.2.2 Police

Between 2009 and 2013, Brazilian police killed more than 11,000 people, or about six people per day. With homicide rates this extreme, international audiences have recently questioned how Brazil’s police can commit such violence with impunity. The militarization of Brazilian police forces not only explains these statistics, but also provides some insight into the logical framework supporting the continuation of such practices. A 2009 national sample survey conducted by the Federal Secretary of Human Rights revealed that 40% of the Brazilian population believed a “good criminal is a dead criminal.” Police, then, are the most logical force to carry out this function of eliminating criminals, considering this type of death falls under the idea of a “normal death,” or the death of people considered undesirable because they commit crimes and use drugs. Although there seems to be ample public support for the police and their actions, there is significant public fear of the police. Amnesty International found that Brazil

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12 Perlman, *Myth of Marginality*, 188.
http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/produtos/anuario-brasileiro-de-seguranca-publica/8o-anuario-brasileiro-de-seguranca-publica.
14 Ignácio Cano (Director of Laboratório de Análise da Violência at the Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro), in discussion with the author, May 2014.
leads the global ranking in the public fear of police torture, where “eight in every ten Brazilians are afraid of being victims of torture in detention cases authorized by the police.”

Brazil’s police are inseparable from their violent history and the resulting ramifications that affect the forces today. Policing was first established to maintain colonial control over African slave populations, and then evolved to policing and suppressing the “dangerous classes” after abolition. These dangerous classes quickly became defined as the poor, who were and continue to be easy scapegoats for the government’s own shortcomings. The police then began to militarize during the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, where the police forces were trained to repress political opposition to the regime. During this same period, death squads composed of police officers formed to execute prisoners and potential threats, reinforcing and legalizing the authoritarian nature of the police and their ruling bodies. After the fall of the dictatorship, the military police and its structure continued and were integrated into Brazil’s new electoral democratic system.

Within Rio de Janeiro state, government officials began to recognize the seriousness of the growing powers of the criminal groups who had steadily taken control of favelas in the last twenty years. The first police program that attempted to correct the military culture of the police launched in 1991 under the supervision of the then Chief of Military Police, Nazareth Cerequeira. The program, named the Grupamento de Aplicação Prático-Escolar (Grouping for School-Practice Application or GAPE), attempted to establish a constant presence in favela communities with a pilot program in Morro da Providência. However, GAPE could not compete with the Military Police and slowly dissolved. The next strategy began under the direction of Luiz Eduardo Soares in 2000, called the Grupomento de Policiamento em Areas Especiais (Grouping for Policing in Special Areas or GPAE). It piloted in the Cantagalo and Pavão-Pavãozinho favelas with the goals to “reduce access to guns and open gun carrying, steer young people away from a life in crime, and eliminate the violent practices of the civil and military police” and “[bring] the police closer to the community and to try to weed out some of the major defects (corruption, violence, abuse of power) which had become institutionalized within the police force.” GPAE also faced significant difficulties, including the inadequate training of its officers, the lack of police motivation, and the lack of state support. The most recent attempt at revolutionized policing practice began in 2008, with the introduction of a new policing “pacification” program: the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit or UPP).

There are four police forces central to our discussion of policing history and its future in Rio: the Polícia Militar, the Força Nacional de Segurança Pública, the Civil Police, and the Unidade de Policia Pacificadora (UPP). To begin, the Polícia Militar (Military Police or PM) is the most militarized of the four and is the Rio de Janeiro state force. The PM is also the largest group of the four, consisting of over 400,000 active members (Brazil). The PM also contains

Special Forces called the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Special Police Operations Battalion or BOPE). These forces are trained specifically in urban warfare and are known for their invasion operations in favela communities. The PM are criticized frequently for their lack of “democratic oversight,” and a 2012 U.N. Council on Human Rights report asked Brazil to begin to eliminate the PM.\(^\text{19}\) The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit, or UPP) is a new policing strategy created in 2008 within the PM that utilizes state sponsorship and new police officers to implement proximity policing methodology into Rio’s favelas. The second most militarized force is the Força Nacional de Segurança Pública (National Public Security Force), a federal force based in Brasilia. The third force, called the Polícia Civil (Civil Police), has over 123,000 members and is another state police force, but is more localized than the PM. Both the PM and the Civil Police are state forces, and an intense rivalry between the two groups exists and generates individual cultures that distrust the other.\(^\text{20}\) This competition discourages and disables cooperation between the forces, further exacerbating the efficiency of the police as a collective unit.

### 2.2.3 Criminal Groups

Criminal groups developed as opportunistic products of the lack of public security plaguing favela communities. These groups, in the government absence, have transformed into “dangerous substitutes for the state resources chronically lacking in the city’s poor communities.”\(^\text{21}\) These groups then take on the role of local dono, or boss, who establishes a local order, a social order, and control the territory.\(^\text{22}\) The maintenance of this order is reinforced by extrajudicial violence carried by each group, used to punish those who break their rules or to resolve conflicts within their territories. Any armed group, whether it be drug trafficking gangs, militia, or another group with territorial domination submits favela residents to its control and forces them to avoid linhas vermelhas, or “red lines,” drawn to deter interference with the groups’ criminal interests.\(^\text{23}\) This system perpetuates fear among favela residents, terrorizing them with the constant threat of unintentionally crossing the line. Both groups avoid or pay off state forces, such as the police, to assure these state actors do not endanger their operations.\(^\text{24}\)

**Criminal Group A: Traficantes (Drug Traffickers)**

The first and most frequently mentioned violent group present in favelas is drug trafficking gangs, or traficantes. The most well-known and widespread gangs include Amigos


\(^{23}\) Ignácio Cano, *Os Donos do Morro: Uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro*, (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Maio 2012), 130.

\(^{24}\) One interviewee stated militias request residents to speak with the ruling militia rather than the local police forces when conflict arises, and that if a resident does not follow this unwritten rule, the militia will come to your home and question why you went to the police. Cano and Duarte, *No Sapatinho*, 69.
dos Amigos (Friends of Friends or ADA), the Comando Vermelho (Red Command), and the Terceiro Command (Third Command). These three groups more predominantly display characteristics of organized crime, as their central bodies are more structured and hierarchical as they stretch across multiple communities. The majority of traficantes, even if they do identify as ADA, Comando Vermelho, or Terceiro Comando, more closely resemble smaller-scale drug operations without ties across favelas. Sharing a gang name does not necessarily imply organized and systemic drug production and trade across communities and may only come into play in times of territorial disputes, which often occur between gang names rather than between cohorts under the same name (for example, ADA and Terceiro Comando may dispute territory, but ADA in favela A will most likely not fight ADA from favela B). These *traficante* groups are much more fractured and unstable, leading them to maintain lower levels of organization and smaller chains of command that usually originate and pull members from one favela for that specific favela’s operations. In terms of the presence of drug trafficking groups, 2013 data cited that 37% of Rio favelas were still controlled by drug traffickers.\(^{25}\)

**Criminal Group B: Milícias (Militias)**

The second major criminal group present in favelas is the milícias, or militias. Ignácio Cano defines militias with five central characteristics: 1) they exert territorial domination over the population in areas suppressed by irregularly armed groups, 2) they cause duress among the favela population, 3) they are motivated by individual profit as their central element, 4) they legitimize themselves as positive alternatives to the drug traffic through the introduction of a protective order, and 5) they include the public participation of armed agents of the state in commanding positions.\(^{26}\) Militias wield considerable amounts of political power, as their operations rely heavily on political favors and interests with the state government as they maintain direct relationships with representatives in public power in exchange for favors and interests integrated with the legislative and justice systems.\(^{27}\) The political influence of militia members can be traced to their membership profile. The majority of their members are current and former members of the Polícia Militar, firefighters, Civil Police, military men, correctional officers, and private security workers.\(^{28}\) Militia members – while including some favela residents – are older, more professional and, because they are former state agents, are more likely to be officially trained in combat and have an extensive knowledge of weaponry.\(^{29}\) Beyond political influence, militias also retain and nurture ties with police.

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2.2.4 Residents

The last and most important group present in favelas is the residents themselves. While the favelas themselves are geographic locations, the people who live there shaped them as “favelas” more than any definition handed down from the government. Despite their intrinsic influence on the development of favela culture and its impact on the rest of Rio society, residents were frequently evicted from their informal settlements as they were systemically destroyed later in the 20th century. In response to these attacks and the lack of basic public services, the Federation of Residents’ Associations of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAMERJ) was created in 1975 after the combination of the city and state of Rio de Janeiro.30 The Residents’ Associations, essentially self-appointed governments created within each favela community, attempt to provide autonomy to favelas while also bridging the gap between residents’ demands and organizations that help provide them. Residents’ Associations became necessary because favela residents did and do not trust the government or the police to represent them or their needs. This is attributable to their historically violent interaction with the BOPE, the fact that Rio police only solve about 3% of reported murders, and the widespread vision the police exist to protect the rich.31

Prior to the introduction of the UPP, residents tended to accept the violent policing in favela as a constant reality with little hope the situation could drastically change. While culture thrived in favelas, the security of residents did not. The UPP has unintentionally begun to slowly change this discourse, inadvertently encouraging favela residents to participate in civil society and demand public security – and thus better policing – as a basic human right.

Conclusion

Prior to the UPP, favelas were already marginalized within Rio de Janeiro society. The absence of formal state influence in favelas led to the intervention of other groups, including the police and criminal factions, who exploited the favelas and their residents for their own benefit. It is within this context the UPP was created and continues to be implemented, inevitably shaping its structure and effectiveness.

30 The history and function of Residents’ Associations as a branch of civil society is a potential topic for future study.
Chapter 3: The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora

This chapter explores the conception of the UPP. The UPP was officially created and promulgated through a series of government decrees. The decrees themselves pose significant challenges to the UPP’s effectiveness, specifically because of its construction within the preexisting policing structure and the relatively insignificant changes in policing methodology.

3.1 An Introduction

The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, or UPP, incorporates all the actors involved in the favelas: the government, criminal groups, the police, and the residents. The UPP’s primary goals include “1) To regain control of territories previously dominated by armed drug factions and establish democratic rule of law in those places, 2) To ensure peace for these communities, [and] 3) To help to break the logic of war existent in the state.” Regaining territorial control, or retomada, is the most crucial goal of the UPP, as “the root of most of the violence is…territorial control.” Territorial control thus implies the expelling of criminal groups from the area and thus gives residents the freedom to come and leave their communities without fear. Entering a favela under the control of a criminal group is more difficult, as whoever wanted to enter has to receive approval from the local boss before entering or have a resident come down to the entrance to retrieve him/her. Another goal of the UPP is to improve the international perception of security leading to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and then 2016 Olympics.

The creation of the UPP comes at Rio de Janeiro’s peak presence on the international stage. From 2007 to 2016, Rio planned nine international events: In 2007, the Pan-American Games; the 2010 5th World Urban Forum; the 2011 World Economic Forum on Latin America; the 2012 Rio+20 campaign; the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup; the 2014 FIFA World Cup; the 2014 World Youth Day; the 2015 celebration of Rio’s 450th year; and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Although bringing the global population to Rio promised increased exposure and tourism, it also required a critical analysis of the state of Rio’s security issues and how they impacted the possibility of both drawing and then hosting an international audience. Favelas quickly became the focal point of this discussion, posing as both “aesthetic staging” and safety problems. The former, aesthetic staging, speaks to the literal high visibility of favelas and what they represent: crime, poverty, inequality, and bad governance. The latter, the safety situation, further builds off the “semantic link between crime and favela” prevailing among the international audience, fostered primarily by internationally acclaimed films such as the City of God (2003) and Tropa da Elite (2007). Outside of reports, statistics of violence, and these portrayals of favelas, the international community has little knowledge of favelas. Considering the widespread reputation of favelas, the UPP policy also aimed to quell fears and the

“journalists’ and international guests’ feeling of security that is crucial for the success of the event[s]” by reaffirming the presence of tightened security policies.

Out of all the events planned for Rio, the mega events – the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics – are the best explanation for why the UPP was finally created and then implemented in Rio with state government support. Although these other events held significant weight for the UPP’s creation, the “timetable and the initiation date of the programme clearly indicate… [it] is primarily a security programme for the coming mega-events.” This timeline holds true: FIFA announced Brazil as the 2014 World Cup host on October 30th, 2007, and the Rio state government quickly announced and implemented the first pilot program in the Santa Marta favela on December 19th, 2008.

Outside of the mega events, other structural and cumulative factors contributed to the UPP’s creation. First, the 2007 Pan-American Games catalyzed the string of new security policies, alongside “sanitation, forced eviction, repression and criminalization of social movements and of poverty” efforts, which “has since been exacerbated by the upcoming realization of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.”

3 In response to the 2007 Games and the announcement of mega events, public perception also changed about “how the police should deal with the favelas, media support, and the announcement that Rio would be host to the World Cup and Olympic Games.”

4 Another key factor impacting the UPP’s creation was Brazil’s flourishing economy and expanding role in the global market, resulting in “intense pressure from human rights groups” to address the poverty and living conditions of favela residents. The last contributing factor was a change in the political climate because of the strong presence of the Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) in the Rio de Janeiro mayor and governor offices alongside the presence of the Workers’ Party (PT) in the Brazilian presidential office, the PMDB’s strong ally. This allowed for political alignment and the opportunity space for Eduardo Paes and Sérgio Cabral – Rio de Janeiro mayor and governor respectively– to collaborate and create the UPP program.

3.2 The UPP Structure

The UPP is monumental in that it is the first proximity policing strategy with official government sponsorship and support. The UPP was first established through a series of decrees drafted and signed by Sérgio Cabral, the Rio state governor, and José Mariano Beltrame, the Rio secretary of public safety. These decrees, official state government documents (Decreto) and military police announcements (Bola da PM) attempt to incrementally create a structure for the UPP, despite its implementation before many of these outlines were generated.

Sérgio Cabral released the first decree, Decreto 41.650 or Bola da PM n° 012, on January 21st, 2009. This decree establishes the UPP under the Military Police, placing the pilot program

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under official state decree even though it was released over one month after the pilot implementation in Santa Marta on December 19th, 2008. Decreto 41.650’s most important detail highlights how the UPP fills a need of the Military Police as “a specialized and technically prepared and adaptable troop to conduct special operations concerning pacification and the maintenance of public order in poor communities.”6 The second decree, Decreto 41.653 or Bola da PM # 013, also signed by Sérgio Cabral, quickly amends the previous decree to explain how UPP officers will be compensated within the new system. This specific decree attempts to remedy the historically poor treatment and inadequate pay of Brazil’s police (around 400 reais per month or US$200), making them more susceptible to accepting bribes and relying on payouts.7 The next official document was not released as an official decree of Cabral, but rather a Military Police Bulletin, Bola da PM nº 022 05, on February 5th, 2009. This bulletin reinforces the powers of individual commanders within individual UPP units stationed within specific communities, and adds structure to the UPPs based on structure already present in the PM.

Cabral did not release the next decree, Decreto 42.787, until January 6th, 2011, nearly two years after the last document. This decree more concretely describes the implementation process, the structure, and the mission of the UPP. It specifically establishes the four aspects of the UPP: 1) as a proximity police force, 2) the target of the UPP forces as “poor communities, with little institutionalization and a large degree of informality where well-armed criminal groups opportunistically combat the state’s democratic rule of law,” 3) the objectives of the UPP to “consolidate state control over communities that are under the strong influence by armed criminal groups” and “return the local population to peace and tranquility necessary for the public exercise of full citizenship to guarantee both social and economic development,” and 4) the four steps to pacification. While the defining characteristics of the UPP are important, the four steps to pacification more thoroughly explain how the UPP is to act as a proximity police force, interact with the communities which it serves, and meet its objectives. The four steps provide a holistic view of the “pacification” process: tactics, stabilization, UPP implementation, and evaluation and monitoring.8

**Step 1: Tactics**

The primary step to the UPP program is to “regain state control over areas illegally subjugated to armed, criminal groups.”9 To regain territorial control, the decree names the BOPE

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7 Perlman, Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge of Rio de Janeiro.

8 Articles 3-11 in Decreto 42.787 are also noteworthy but not crucial to our complete understanding of the UPP. Article 3 establishes the various attributes and responsibilities of UPP commanders to “I. coordinate, control and prepare doctrine and operations of the UPP... II. plan the implementation of new UPPs... [and] III. establish guiding principles to standardize police procedures.” Article 4 establishes the administrative branch of the UPP. Article 5 establishes ranking within the UPP. Article 6 reaffirms UPP payment. Article 7 establishes testing guidelines for potential UPP officers. Article 8 places any still-existing GPAE programs under the UPP. Articles 9 and 10 establish the biannual monitoring of UPP activities by Secretary of State Security, the General Commander of the Military Police and Coordinator of the UPP, the Instituto de Segurança Pública. Lastly, Article 11 states the Secretary of State Security is responsible for establishing new UPP programs guidelines.

9 See Decreto 41.650, Article 2.
as the force to initially invade into the favela. The entrance of the BOPE is meant to represent “the national flag” and the “reoccupation of national territory that had been under the power of the enemy.”10 Before the BOPE invasion, the invasion is announced to the community in an attempt to entice criminals to leave before the actual assault, making the invasion less confrontational. The police themselves refer to this strategy as guerra avisada, or “advised war,” which both acknowledges the presence of war in the territories and attempts to approach that war with more care.

This strategy is problematic because the BOPE is the epitome of police violence in favelas. The residents’ perception of police has been shaped by their violent and sporadic interactions with the BOPE, leading to the vast distrust of the police in poor communities. The UPP’s peace process essentially begins with the historical perpetrator of war in these areas, and has caused suspicion among residents of the UPP program as a whole.

Step 2: Stabilization

The second step of the program, or the stabilization phase, prepares for the entrance of the UPP. Stabilization, however, is not well defined, and there is no prescriptive description of what stabilization should look like or include. This space, open for interpretation, has allowed military intervention to occur with Força Nacional de Seguridade troops, specifically in larger favelas such as Complexo de Alemão and Complexo da Maré. The Força Nacional occupied both of these communities during the occupation, or stabilization, period because of the “fire power of the factions running them.”11 In response to this firepower, military occupation often includes military grade weaponry.

Step 3: UPP implementation

The third step is the implementation of the UPP itself. The decree states that this phase “occurs when military police especially prepared for the exercise of proximity policing arrive definitively to the community, preparing for the arrival of other public and private services that creates the possibility for the community’s reintegration into democratic society.”12 The actual implementation is left vague, without details of how the UPP should enter or begin its presence in the community. Almost always this implementation includes the construction and then occupation of a UPP base located within the community itself, usually located near the entrance of the favela. The presence of the base is crucial to the success of the UPP as a proximity police force. Without a UPP base within the favela, the UPP delegitimizes itself as a competitive permanent presence.

Step 4: Evaluation and monitoring

The final phase, evaluation and monitoring, aims to continually improve the program. While this step may be the most important to the success and evolution of the UPP, the decree

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11 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.”
12 Governo Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, Decreto No. 41 650.
does not establish how evaluation will be conducted or institute a maintenance system through which improvements can be implemented.

3.3 Policing Methodology

Even before the decrees could collectively impact the structure, implementation, and maintenance of the UPP, the decrees themselves failed to address persistent problems within the police forces. By avoiding these methodological and structural issues, the UPP does not erase their existence, but endangers its own success.

First, the key distinction between the UPP and any previous police strategy or force is its proximity policing methodology. This methodology does prove to be a significant challenge, especially considering it is often mistaken for community policing. While no authoritative definition of proximity policing exists, it can be best described as a policing methodology centered around creating a more consistent police presence in a designated region or neighborhood utilizing stronger spatial proximity through more frequent or constant patrolling. Scholars worldwide have also attempted to better define proximity policing theory and practice. Andressa Somogy de Oliveira, a university student in at the State University of São Paulo, states the goal of proximity policing as to “standardize the actions of UPP police to guarantee professional behavior,” and Danish scholars describe the proximity policing practice as “geographic assignments and long-term affiliation with the local areas [to] provide for a personalization of policing.” Specifically applied to the UPP, the UPP attempts to standardize police behavior and focuses on geographic areas, alongside an augmentation of police presence in pacified areas. While the average ratio of inhabitant to police officer in Rio de Janeiro is 320:1, favelas with the UPP experience a 60:1 inhabitant to officer ratio. Although this increased presence echoes a necessary characteristic of community policing, the UPP is not community policing.

There are two reasons for the distinction between proximity and community policing: 1) community policing implies that police officers working their beats are “autonomous” and make their own decisions because the community trusts them and relates to them. The UPP does not encourage such strong community ties, and forfeits officer independence in favor of a more centralized structure underneath a commander; and 2) Community policing usually includes some type of forum, “or setting where the community tells the police what their priorities are in terms of security and then the police try to address the concerns of the community.” The UPP does not institute forums as a pillar of their interaction with favela members, and is “an experience brought from the outside to address the general need of pacification” rather than an force working with internal representatives to systematically “incorporate the needs of the community.” Community policing also prioritizes the social and economic development of the

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15 Ignácio Cano (Director of the LAV at UERJ), in discussion with Rio Radar, August 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXy6DGFxdhE.
community through programming, while the UPP model more specifically aims to secure peace and therefore provide the potential opportunity for social and economic development while not making those improvements the direct goal. Even more specifically, the activities of many UPP police officers do not reflect community or proximity policing methodology. Ignácio Cano found, based on interviews with officers, that UPP officers spend only 5% of their time meeting with residents, while they spend 16.2% of their time receiving visitors and tourists, and 79.4% detaining and interviewing suspects.  

Although the UPP does spout proximity policing methodology, its decrees did not address or attempt to remedy the longstanding criticisms of the Military Police, including their violent nature, training, and militarized weaponry. Instead of rejecting Military Police practices in favor of new ones, the decrees structurally established the UPP under the Military Police with Decreto 41.650. Placing the UPP within the Military Police does provide the opportunity to change the police from the inside out, but it also has the potential to carry on the legacy of negative police practices. This fact perhaps explains the statistics collected by Ignácio Cano, who discovered that 74.4% of residents had negative feelings about the UPPs when they first began, attributing 16.9% to fear, 28.5% to distrust, and 29% to anger felt by residents. The UPP also places power into the hands of the UPP commanders, allowing for wide variation based on commander beliefs and actions (Article 3). This strategy can be beneficial by allowing individual solutions to fit each community, especially considering “commanders and sub-commanders generally possess visions of the project that reflect the official guidelines.”  

At the same time, UPP commanders are former police officers who are not originally trained to support and perpetuate the UPP mission. Although UPP commanders are increasingly bred for their positions, they wield unreasonable amounts of unchecked power because of the lack of structure, ultimately allowing room for error based on individual variances. This lack of structure allow commanders to overstep UPP goals in favor of their own agenda, causing corruption and negative occurrences that delegitimize the UPP program. These agendas can include bribery schemes with criminal groups, regulations on local business, and damaging interpretations of how to best conduct proximity policing. These interpretations are made possible because the UPP structure fails to definitively target any one threatening group, leaving decisions regarding detainment and interrogation to subjective judgment. Without a clear definition of what composes a “criminal group,” anyone in a favela can be a criminal even without substantial evidence. This logic has led to the creation of mandates that allow police to legally invade any home they choose in search of criminals. Other instances of police oversight have been repeatedly reported, including the aforementioned “warrantless invasion of homes”

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17 Ignácio Cano, Os Donos do Morro: Uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) no Rio de Janeiro, (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, May 2012), 136.
18 For example, the presence of mototaxis in each community varies among favelas occupied by the UPP because of commander preferences. While some commanders decide the exact number of mototaxis allowed, others place no regulations on the business. Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 155.
along with “arbitrary searches and violent confrontations.” With commanders at the forefront of each UPP unit in each individual community, the UPP risks “perpetuating traditional authoritarian control” present in favelas by recreating “a new local boss, substituting the figure associated with crime for a new one, who is invested in legality but perhaps equally harmful.” Even if the power changes from donos (“bosses”) to more benign chefes (“heads”), the power exchange holds potential to emerge as authoritarian control.

Outside of the commanders, there is a more visible shift in the UPP methodology in regards to its officers. Compared to other police forces, the UPP targets younger and inexperienced recruits to avoid officers with previously established corrupt networks in the favelas. Considering their inexperience in the field, UPP officers are not sufficiently trained to conduct effective proximity policing. Officers first undergo six months of normal police training, required for most police forces, and then participate in a one or two week training specified for the UPP. The UPP training mainly consists of visiting UPP commanders sharing their own stories and aims to orient officers to the experience more than provide actual training. In the words of Ignácio Cano, “there’s no material” prepared for UPP training, and therefore “calling it training was a very generous word.” After this short period of preparation, UPP officers are then deployed in the field, expected to understand the complicated landscape of racism, historic violence, lack of trust in police, and wealth inequality that composes the communities they serve. Despite these shortcomings in their training, the UPP does maintain a cleaner image than other policing bodies, as 72.4% of residents interviewed believed “the UPPs have no involvement with corruption,” and “only 6.9% said they believe the pacifying police to be corrupt – making a stark break from past expectations.” 2013 surveys conducted by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Rio de Janeiro Department of Security also revealed that 59.5% of residents believed the number of police officers is “adequate” or “entirely adequate.” In respect to training, 52.3% of residents surveyed believed UPP officers to be “well trained and/or very well trained.” While public perceptions of the UPP have changed based on the advertised differences between the UPP and other police forces, UPP officers remain inadequately trained for their difficult jobs.

The UPP also maintains methodologies prevalent within other Brazilian police forces. First, Brazil’s police are inadequately paid. This legacy continues in the UPP, where “58.9% of UPP police officers believe their salary is ‘horrible or does not exist.’” In the scheme of the negative reputation of Brazil’s police, underpaying officers is a significant factor explaining the widespread corruption in the forces considering most officers enter into bribery schemes to

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21 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 156.
22 Ignácio Cano (Director of LAV at UERJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014; Barbara Musumeci Soares, et.al, “Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora: O Que Pensam os Policiais,” 9.
compensate for their small salaries. Better conditions for officers, especially in the UPP, is a critical improvement needed to ensure the success of the program and the commitment of the officers to their duties as a proximity police force. Conditions appear to be so poor that, when interviewed regarding proposals to better the UPP as a program, 61.3% of UPP officers said they would “improve work conditions for the police,” while only 12.6% responded they would “increase social programming.”

The UPP also struggles with legitimacy amongst its own officers. Many UPP officers expressed they would rather be stationed in a batalhão (“battalion”) of the Military Police than in the UPP. Research conducted in 2011 found that “70% of policeman who work in the UPPs would rather work in normal battalions and not the UPPs,” and one officer interviewed suggested this statistic of 70% is closer to 99%. A study conducted by the Brazil Forum found that officers were also reluctant to serve in more difficult “pacified” communities where violence continues despite UPP presence, generating a “marked antipathy of serving UPP officers toward their job.” Outside of the UPP, other police also look unfavorably on the UPP program and equate proximity methodology to an illegitimate and “soft” form of policing that does not deserve prioritization. Among non-UPP police, 37.4% of those interviewed believed the UPP was “good,” 38.9% “regular,” and 23.7% “horrible or non-existent.” Outside forces are also resentful of the UPP, considering the mass amount of resources flooding the program. Finally, some UPP officers feel favela residents do not respect the UPP because the UPP is seen as “guards” who only monitor “who enters and leaves” the favela. This same officer believed residents “have a different [and greater] respect for the Military Police” because they see them as “police who combat crime and all types of offenses.”

Steps 3 and 4, implementation and evaluation and monitoring phases respectively, create their own consequences that I will discuss in further depth in the following chapters. For the time being, it is important to understand how the decree recognizes these phases as preparation “for the arrival of other public and private services that creates the possibility for the community’s reintegration into democratic society,” even though the program does not intend to implement those services itself. It is clear the UPP does not intend to implement public or private services through the program as the decrees blatantly disregard detailing the evaluation and monitoring process. Although the UPP may attempt to create committees or methods of evaluation, the governing documents do not support a structured measurement of its progress. New programs, especially those addressing a historic societal issue, require institutionalized maintenance. Without a concrete system or methods to conduct the evaluations, programs like the UPP cannot adapt to changing demands to implement widespread, structural change.

26 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 138.
27 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.”
28 Ignácio Cano in discussion with Rio Radar.
30 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 140.
Conclusion

The conceptualization of the UPP clearly indicates the government’s agenda to provide additional security in anticipation for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. Through a small series of government decrees, the UPP is poorly structured and fails to correct policing methodology that does not produce healthy interaction between the police and favela residents. This conceptualization on paper thus troubles its implementation and expansion from the original pilot project.
Chapter 4: Implementing the UPP

The actual implementation phase of the UPP does not solely include the description of UPP implementation originally detailed in Decreto 42.787. The implementation, or execution, process as a whole refers to the execution of each step laid out by the Rio de Janeiro government, including the tactics used to determine which communities receive the UPP, the reality of the stabilization phase, the implementation of the UPP, and then the evaluation and monitoring maintenance to sustain the program.

4.1 Locations of the UPP

In 2006, before the announcement of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, Rio de Janeiro state administration commented, “police operations must…effectively locate crime ‘hot spots’ through extensive research and analysis of crime data and statistics.”¹ However, after the Cup’s announcement, policing practices increasingly targeted more touristic regions of the city of Rio.

To better understand what regions the UPP does target, we can utilize the city’s dividing lines created by the Rio de Janeiro state government’s Instituto de Segurança Pública (Public Security Institute or ISP). The ISP divides the state of Rio into seven sections, each designated as their own “RISP,” or “integrated security regions” of Rio de Janeiro.² The ISP first created RISPs in January 2007 alongside the creation of “AISPs,” or “integrated security areas,” which are smaller geographic regions located within RISPs. The designation of RISPs and AISPs aimed to create a more structured analysis of violence through crime statistics based on geographic occurrence.³ Figures 1 and 2 below list and display each region indicated by each RISP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISP</th>
<th>Location (Original Portuguese)</th>
<th>Location (English Translation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RISP 1</td>
<td>Capital (regiões Sul, Centro e Norte)</td>
<td>Capital (South, Center, and North Zones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISP 2</td>
<td>Capital (região Oeste)</td>
<td>Capital (West Zone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISP 3</td>
<td>Baixada</td>
<td>Baixada Fluminense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISP 4</td>
<td>Niteroi e região dos lagos</td>
<td>Niteroi and the Microlakes region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISP 5</td>
<td>Sul Fluminense</td>
<td>South Fluminense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISP 6</td>
<td>Norte Fluminense</td>
<td>North Fluminense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISP 7</td>
<td>Região Serrana</td>
<td>Micro Serrana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RISPs are important to the implementation of the UPPs, as they indicate which areas of Rio the UPP targets. Since its initial implementation in 2008 in the Santa Marta favela, UPP units have drastically favored RISP 1 (Capital: South, Center, and North Zones). From 2008 to 2010, the UPP installed 11 more units in RISP 1 favelas. From 2010 to 2012, 15 more UPPs appeared in RISP 1, and from 2012 to 2014, 12 more UPPs were installed in RISP 1 (Figure 3). In the same time frame, RISP 2 (West Zone) accumulated three UPP units, two of which – Cidade de Deus and Jardim Batan – were implemented shortly after Santa Marta in January 2009. The third UPP unit in RISP 2 was then implemented in the Vila Kennedy favela in late May of 2014, over three years later. The last RISP and second-to-last UPP implementation finally reached RISP 3 (Baixada Fluminense) with Mangueirinha in late May of 2014.\(^{5}\)

\(\text{Figure 3: Number of UPP units installed per RISP from 2008-2014} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>RISP 1</th>
<th>RISP 2</th>
<th>RISP 3</th>
<th>RISP 4</th>
<th>Total UPPs</th>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Favela</th>
<th>Implementation Date</th>
<th>RISP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santa Marta</td>
<td>12/19/2008</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cidade de Deus</td>
<td>02/16/2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jardim Batan</td>
<td>02/18/2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babilônia e Chapéu Mangueira</td>
<td>06/10/2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavão-Pavãozinho e Cantagalo</td>
<td>12/23/2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladeira dos Tabajaras/Cabritos</td>
<td>01/14/2010</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Providência</td>
<td>04/26/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Borel</td>
<td>06/07/2010</td>
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<td>07/01/2010</td>
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<td>Andaraí</td>
<td>07/28/2010</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Salgueiro</td>
<td>09/17/2010</td>
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<td>10/30/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macacos</td>
<td>11/30/2010</td>
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</tr>
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<td>São João, Quieto e Matriz</td>
<td>01/31/2011</td>
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<td>Coroa, Fallet e Fogueirinho</td>
<td>02/25/2011</td>
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<td>Escondidinho e Prazeres</td>
<td>02/25/2011</td>
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<td>Complexo de São Carlos</td>
<td>05/17/2011</td>
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<td>Mangueira</td>
<td>11/03/2011</td>
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<td>Vidigal</td>
<td>01/18/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fazendinha</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Brasília</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adeus/Baiana</td>
<td>05/11/2012</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alemão</td>
<td>05/30/2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatuba</td>
<td>06/27/2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fé/Sereno</td>
<td>06/27/2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parque Proletário</td>
<td>08/28/2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Cruzeiro</td>
<td>08/28/2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocinha</td>
<td>09/20/2012</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguinhos</td>
<td>01/16/2013</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacarezinho</td>
<td>01/16/2013</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caju</td>
<td>04/12/2013</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Barreir/Tuiuti</td>
<td>04/12/2013</td>
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<td>Cerro-Corá</td>
<td>06/03/2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arará/Mandela</td>
<td>09/06/2013</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lins</td>
<td>12/02/2013</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camarista Méier</td>
<td>12/02/2013</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangueirinha</td>
<td>02/07/2014</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Kennedy</td>
<td>05/23/2014</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4:** UPP implementations in various communities. All data collected from UPP official website, [http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp](http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp).

Why does it matter the majority of UPPs units are located in RISP 1? RISP 1 is primarily considered the “South Zone” of Rio de Janeiro, which includes most tourist attractions, including
Maracanã Stadium, the Christ the Redeemer statue, and Copacabana and Ipanema beaches. The favelas targeted by the UPP are located where “7 percent of the population live but which accounts for 50 percent of the formal employment in Rio and produces 33 percent of the city’s GDP.” Cano further comments these locations indicate the UPP is “strongly influenced by the city’s mega events, beginning with the 2014 World Cup, including the area surrounding the stadium and the tourist areas,” and these areas within RISP 1 are located in “central areas,” occupied by the “middle-upper class,” and are “strategically visible” for purposes of advertising for the coming mega events. By targeting RISP 1 favelas, the UPP largely ignores the most violent areas of the state. Many critics of the UPP recognize this disparity and vouch for UPP implementation in the “areas of greatest lethality,” such as Baixada Fluminense or the West Zone. It is not a coincidence that most of these areas are controlled by militias. In comparison, drug traffickers control most of the RISP 1 favelas, as they desire to be closer to their customers: the wealthy. This clear separation between UPP and non-UPP favelas “leaves a dangerous double standard in which, in some favelas, the state promotes a peaceful solution based on mediation and communication, while at the same time, in others, it retains the war-like tactics developed by the police force over the last 50 years.”

Of the 38 installed UPPs, only 4 are located outside of RISP 1, and each favela outside of RISP 1 has a legitimate reason or strategic purpose for UPP installation. Cidade de Deus, the second favela to receive the UPP after Santa Marta in February 2009, is the infamous favela featured in the 2002 internationally acclaimed film, City of God. Ignácio Cano explains Cidade de Deus as “a random occurrence” with the UPPs, considering a local police commander individually drove UPP implementation in the favela. However, Cidade de Deus is also located very closely to the Linha Vermelha, an expressway that connects downtown Rio de Janeiro to Barra da Tijuca, a common tourist destination west of the South Zone of Rio. Jardim Batan, the third favela to receive the UPP, was also on the national and international radar. In May 2008, a group of militiamen tortured several journalists from the “O Dia” newspaper in Jardim Batan. In response to this incident, the UPP entered Batan, the only favela controlled by militia with UPP presence. Vila Kennedy, the most recent implementation, is also located in RISP 2 and was occupied in response to ongoing violent criminal group activity. Lastly, the first UPP in RISP 3, located in Mangueirinha, aims to displace one of the strongest drug trafficking gangs, the Comando Vermelho (“Red Command”), whose “most important post” was located in Baixada. By moving into RISP 3, UPP forces are now attempting to target outposts based on gang activity itself, rather than targeting more general geographic regions located near tourist areas.

4.2 Case Study A: Santa Marta

The first UPP unit was implemented in the Santa Marta favela as a pilot program on December 19th, 2008. Santa Marta was an ideal location for the UPP pilot for multiple reasons.

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6 Perlman, Myth of Marginality, 188.
7 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 25.
9 Ignácio Cano in discussion with the author, May 2014.
10 “Primeira UPP da Baixada Fluminense é inaugurada em Duque de Caxias.”
First, Santa Marta is a relatively small favela with a population of around 3,900 residents and 1,176 homes, making the UPP an insulated and easily controllable pilot. Second, Santa Marta has defined boundaries that “provide little opportunity for territorial expansion” and complicate the reentrance of criminal groups as there is only one entrance into the favela and it is bordered by the Funicular Railway on one side, a constructed wall on the other (called the “Eco Barrier”\textsuperscript{12}), and thick forest and rocks at the top. Third, Santa Marta already had confirmed tourism possibility, as tourists were already visiting the area to see the Michael Jackson statue erected in one of the plazas to commemorate the 1996 filming of his music video for the song, “They Don’t Care About Us.” Today, this particular area draws about 10,000 visitors a month.\textsuperscript{13} Lastly, the state government had already began to expand social programming in Santa Marta through the State Urban Development Program, which helped install sewage, drainage and water distribution networks alongside “improvements in the road system, paving of public areas, construction of the second section of the funicular railway, slope retention works, construction of housing units and improvements made to existing ones.”\textsuperscript{14} In summary, Santa Marta’s popularity can be attributed to “its prime location, with easy access via one of the main roads in Botafogo, São Clemente Street; its proximity to downtown and the neighborhoods of the South Zone; [and] its relatively small size, with well-established borders.” Based on these factors, implementing the UPP in Santa Marta became an attractive possibility and reality.

Santa Marta is widely considered to be the “model UPP”; however, Santa Marta still does not holistically represent ideal “pacification.”\textsuperscript{15} On the one hand, violence decreased and the provision of social programs increased after the installation of the UPP. On the other, Santa Marta remains a conflicting account of cultural oppression alongside an irreconcilable increase in crime. Similar to other “pacified” favelas, Santa Marta has experienced heightened regulation of several cultural events, including the necessity of police permission to hold parties within the favela and events in the street. While Santa Marta may boast the aforementioned improvements, residents question why “there are open doors [because of police policy where they can enter any home without reason] and people who are hungry… For whom is this public policy?”

Santa Marta boasts a clean record: there have been no recorded homicides in Santa Marta since the beginning of the pacification efforts. This high ratio is explained by Santa Marta’s high police-to-inhabitant ratio in comparison to the rest of Rio, where Santa Marta has nearly one policeman for every 37 inhabitants, while the “average statewide ratio is one for every 320 inhabitants.”\textsuperscript{16} Malgorzata Loj in his \textit{Evaluation of pacification reform in Rio de Janeiro} explains violence overall has not necessarily decreased: “Violence [overall] has risen by 157% in 2009, 2007% in 2010, and 214% in 2011 in relation to 2008,” while threats and disappearances also

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item [15] Maré resident and UNIRIO student, in discussion with the author, May 2014.
\item [16] Klaubert and Kruger, “Armed peace.”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
increased significantly – by 111% and 800% respectively – from 2008 to 2011. These increases can be misleading, as they often reflect an increase in the number of reports of violence filed by residents, rather than an actual increase in the occurrences of these crimes. Thus, violence rates may not have increased, but the reports of them have, a potential positive signal that the UPP had gained the public trust. This potential legitimacy of the UPP, however, is again complicated by a survey of 100 Santa Marta residents, conducted by the Getulio Vargas Foundation in 2011 following the implementation of the UPP, which revealed that only 18% believed the UPP was “adequately prepared to deal with the community’s problems.”

The Santa Marta UPP program, however, did result in increased social programming. Following the implementation of the UPP, the State Urban Development Program was discontinued in 2010 but then reinstated in 2012 with R$8.1 million in funds. Alongside the involvement of similar programs, the territory has opened up to “visitors and residents from the formal city, as well as government involvement – electricity and water services are regularized, for example, taxes and fees are increasingly paid, and… there is greater interest in the potential of the community and property values.” The area has also increased its tourism efforts, and about 200 tourists visited Santa Marta daily after UPP implementation. Rio’s state government then launched the Rio Top Tour program, which included the formal set up of information panels for tour guides and monitors. This program also included the construction of the Monorail, or the “rail-car service located on the edge of the favela” that transports residents and tourists up and down the favela. Santa Marta’s cable car has also served as an example for other favelas who also received cable car-esque installments, including both Rocinha and Complexo de Alemão. A counselor of the Rio de Janeiro Engineers Club, Alcebíades Fonseca, cited that the “system in Santa Marta facilitates access for disabled people, allows for waste disposal and its construction is much cheaper, with a projected installation that corresponds to only 20% of the total value of the imported cable car project presented by the Rio government.” These services, while attributable to the UPP and pacification efforts, are also unique to Santa Marta: most UPPs do not incorporate the provision of state, public, social services into their agenda.

For these reasons, Santa Marta is not necessarily a model UPP within itself, and the continued implementation and expansion of the UPP proves the Santa Marta “model” is not as universal or applicable to other favelas as originally hoped.

4.3 Case Study B: Complexo da Maré

Complexo da Maré is a conglomeration of fifteen, smaller neighborhood favelas located in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro, thus making it the largest favela with a total population of 130,000 residents, a total area of nearly 210,000 square meters, and more than 43,000 homes. In comparison to other large favelas in Rio, Maré trumps the two other mega slums, Complexo

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18 Caixeta Carvalho and Damásio Silva, “Tourism and slums: A study about Favela Santa Marta and the role of Pacification Police Units in Rio de Janeiro.”
de Alemão and Rocinha, which host nearly 70,000 residents each. Similar to these other neighborhoods, Maré hosts more than just residents. These three communities are well known for their heavy criminal group presences and often contain territorial claims from multiple criminal factions in separate areas of the favela. Maré is unique in its combination of both drug trafficking and militia groups, boasting both the Terceiro Comando and ADA trafficking gangs and the fifth largest presence of militias in all of Rio de Janeiro.  

The Importance of Maré

Maré, along with Alemão and Rocinha, became a crucial test of the scale of the UPP and its ability to revolutionize even the most difficult areas of the city. Unlike the first implementation locations – Santa Marta, for instance – Alemão, Rocinha, and Maré all were of “overriding significance” because they posed significant problems to pacification considering the presence of multiple criminal groups. Complexo do Alemão was first occupied by the military in November 2010 as a political act to showcase the sincerity of the government’s commitment to eliminate drug kingpins but was not a part of UPP installation. Alemão was then occupied again and the UPP was officially installed in March 2012; however, the special battalion of the Military Police, the BOPE, reoccupied Alemão in March 2014 “to secure the perimeter of the entire area as the special forces went in search of the drug kingpins.” Rocinha was first occupied in November 2011 by the military police, and the UPP was officially installed in September 2012 according to official UPP timetables. Considering both Alemão and Rocinha officially installed the UPP, they are both considered to be “pacified” communities; however, the UPP has not “pacified” the turmoil nor improved daily life. Alemão and Rocinha display the negative results of unprepared, scaled implementations of the UPP: ongoing turmoil, increased militarization, and resident exclusion from the pacification process.

The occupation of Maré mirrors the experiences of Alemão and Rocinha. Maré was first occupied by the military police on March 30th, 2014. According to the same UPP database, Maré has not yet officially installed the UPP and is therefore not in the final stages of “pacification.” For this reason, all discussion about the pacification process in Maré will focus on steps one and two as described in Decreto 42.787: tactics and stabilization. Despite occupation of Maré in March 2014, the initial “tactics” phase experienced unexpected resistance. As a result, the current governor of Rio de Janeiro, Luiz Fernando Pezão, requested the use of national force on July 15th, 2014, and federal army troops were mobilized after Brazil’s Justice Minister, José  


Eduardo Cardozo, authorized deployment on August 12th. President Dilma Rousseff, then on the campaign trail as the president reelect for the October 2014 presidential election, visited Maré on September 13th and authorized the extension of the presence of the 2,700 officers through December. Despite the military occupation, criminal groups have continued to exert territorial claims in Maré on various occasions.

The Maré occupation was not well received by the various communities within Maré. Many residents felt disrespected and excluded from the occupation process as a result of police actions. These actions included the creation of a legal mandate that justified the invasion of any home deemed searchable by the police, the breaking down doors of homes without warning, and the murder of ten residents in Maré in July 2014. In response to these events, Maré residents led protests alongside increasing Internet and social media activity to mobilize popular discontent. Residents frequently used the popular hashtags #OqueaMarétem (“what Maré has”), #dedentrodaMaré (“inside Maré”), and #Marévive (“Maré lives”) during the occupation period to express and organize dissatisfaction with the occupation. Residents’ complaints range from the lack of services (“We don’t want just police. We want health, education, homes, and basic sanitation”), to the increased presence of tourists (“How many hours until the first gringos/tourists begin to pass through the streets of Maré?”), to residents’ fear (“Scared by the police operation that is going on here in the Gaza Strip of Maré. The state brings everything but peace!”). A female educator with 17 years of experience in Maré further expatiated on a social media blog about the “military occupation did not resolve the problems from before. The traffic never left. The solution is to create a neighborhood, open and pave the streets, and provide basic sanitation for all.” Many Maré residents question the warlike occupation of Maré, where soldiers with military-grade weaponry roam the streets and tanks sit on street corners. Many Maré residents continue to express the difficulties of the occupation period in Maré:

“Who are the war tanks here in Maré for? Our taxes are being used for the spectacularization of the State, for the political and commercial propaganda in the media and the criminalization of poverty. These forces could be helping to improve the roads in the favelas […] instead of standing around and wasting fuel with these tanks. They could be bringing construction materials to remodel houses, instead of brandishing their rifles and these features of psychopaths. They could be creating properly equipped community

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29 Santiago, Raull @raullsantago post on Twitter, April 1, 2014.
30 Adriana Diah @adriana_diah, post on Twitter, March 30, 2014.
31 Thaís Cavalcante @tcavalcantes, post on Twitter, March 12, 2014.
32 Sabóai, “Acessos do Complexo da Maré estão sob forte vigilância do Exército.”
hospitals, with quick and effective service, instead of these command centers to kill. But I think this is a tremendous utopia."

“For residents, the most cruel thing is that you no longer know or recognize the place where you live. You also don’t recognize that identity [of being from that neighborhood]. I spent a lot of time in my life creating this identity with this place, but I have to understand that this process of pacification is independent from what I know because I no longer see anything I saw before. This is cruel. It is also cruel is what the media sells, the media’s portrayal that people believe that says there is peace here… there is not peace. It’s ridiculous because this peace was never given to me. That peace denied my right to security. We believe in this crazy logic that we are developing peace, but what is peace? No one wants to speak about war, but everyone who speaks about war with this perception speaks about peace. Boys who are 16, 12, or 17 years old already have a very contextualized view of war.”

Despite opinions of anger and vast criticism, residents in Maré maintain the hope that the occupation will “bring basic, public services, the right to come and go as we always have, and that the police will act within the laws and be patient with their acceptance into the community.” The Maré community itself is taking action to begin to provide themselves with services through community participation in lieu of government provisions. For example, a group of Maré youth gathered in September 2014 to begin a map-making project for the community to reject human rights violations. Although these actions are difficult to self-organize, Maré residents show a commitment to improving their living conditions. Maré continues to be occupied by the Força Nacional de Seguridade Pública and does not show signs of near future implementation of the UPP; however, the “pacification” process has already delegitimized the program in the eyes of many Maré residents.

Especially in Maré, the “pacification” process has not changed the rhetoric of war and thus does not integrate its residents into Rio society. Despite this reality, Maré residents have utilized their opposition to pacification to generate a social discourse around unity and discrimination. Through their complaints on social media, their exposure of reality through nontraditional forms of media, and the increased reporting of crimes, favela residents demand better policing practices. The incorporation of favelas has not been perfect nor has it been part of the UPP program, yet residents have carved out their own space to participate in civil society and let their voices be heard. Unintentionally, the UPP created the platform for the discontent, and subsequently encouraged the public demand for residents’ opinions. For this reason, the UPP must continue despite its shortcomings.

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33 Clarke, “Maré Vive: Opiniões da Comunidade Sobre a Ocupação Policial.”
34 Maré resident and UNIRIO student, 2014.
4.4 Comparison

Both the Santa Marta and the Complexo da Maré cases offer noteworthy data for evaluating the UPP program. First, their significant differences greatly impact these results, and must be utilized to understand in what conditions the UPP supposedly thrives.

**Figure 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Santa Marta</th>
<th>Complexo da Maré</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>3,900 residents</td>
<td>130,000 residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of homes</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>43,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Location</td>
<td>South Zone, Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>North Zone, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISP &amp; AISP</td>
<td>RISP 1 (AISP 16)</td>
<td>RISP 1 (AISP 22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of location</td>
<td>Christ the Redeemer, favela</td>
<td>Highway, Linha Vermelha and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>itself popular among tourists</td>
<td>Linha Amarela metro lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPP implementation date</td>
<td>12/18/2008</td>
<td>03/30/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal group presence</td>
<td>One drug trafficking faction</td>
<td>Multiple factions, including</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>both traffickers and militias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacification status</td>
<td>Pacified</td>
<td>Not pacified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community response to</td>
<td>Little resistance</td>
<td>Significant resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pacification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on sheer numbers, Santa Marta trumps Complexo da Maré as an ideal environment to experiment with a new program. With an estimated 3,900 residents and 1,176 homes, Santa Marta has only 3% of Maré’s population and less than 3% of Maré’s homes. In addition to these facts, Santa Marta is considered to be one cohesive neighborhood of residents who identify specifically with living in Santa Marta. Maré, on the other hand, is already sub-divided into fifteen neighborhoods within the larger complex, making overarching reforms difficult to implement without altering them to fit each community. Even if the UPP did attempt to isolate and then address just one neighborhood in Maré, the smallest neighborhood, Conjunto Bento Ribeiro Dantas, has 3,000 residents and is located directly next to Vila do Pinheiro, a neighborhood with nearly 16,000 residents. The size of each community also impacts the presence of criminal groups, as numerous factions control larger communities, like Maré, and smaller communities usually have one ruling _dono_. While only one drug trafficking faction controlled Santa Marta, Maré was a war zone between militias and several trafficking groups, including _Comando Vermelho, Terceiro Comando, and Amigos dos Amigos_.

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38 Adriana Facina (Professor of Anthropology at UFRJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014.
Their implementation dates, Santa Marta in December 2008 and Maré in March 2014, correlate with their geographic locations and AISP. Even though they are both located within RISP 1, they are patrolled by different police units in their respective AISP, 16 and 22. These AISP reflect their locations within RISP 1, with Santa Marta in the South Zone of Rio and Maré in the North Zone. Santa Marta is closely located to tourist attractions alongside being a tourist attraction in itself. While Maré is not geographically proximate to any large tourist attractions, it does border the highway from the Galeão Rio de Janeiro International Airport into the South Zone of Rio and is close to the Linha Vermelha and Linha Amarela metro lines. Both favelas, then, interact with tourists. Based on their geographic locations alone, Santa Marta and Maré pose drastically different security concerns to tourists and therefore were prioritized in accordance with that direct potential threat level.

Lastly, their implementation processes showcase the variation in acceptance of the UPP and the difficulty in scaling the operation. Santa Marta experienced a rather easy occupation and UPP implementation overall, leading to its model “pacification.” Considering it was the pilot program, Santa Marta residents did not actively resist the program. Maré, however, is still not “pacified” and has no UPP presence. With the continued delay of “pacification” alongside continuing unrest and violence, residents are increasingly resisting the occupation and losing faith in the pacification efforts. This resistance may occur in protests, but the vast majority of the discontent took to the Internet in an effort to spread awareness beyond Maré’s borders and connect with other favelas experiencing the same difficulties.

Conclusion

The implementation locations of the UPP specifically indicate the target of the UPP: the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, where a majority of tourists and mega events would and will be taking place. The specific case studies of the pacification experiences of Santa Marta and Complexo da Maré reveal the varied experiences of the UPP dependent on each community. The comparison of the two favelas showcases the difficulty in scaling the project from Santa Marta, a small favela with limited variables, to Complexo da Maré, the largest favela in Rio with numerous uncontrollable factors influencing the success of the UPP program.

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39 Raquel Willadino (Director of Observatório de Favelas), in discussion with the author, May 2014.
Chapter 5
The Implications and Consequences Part 1: The UPP and Violence Rates

Given the structure of the UPP within the Military Police, there are two defined possible measures of the success of territorial control by the government. The first is the primary focus of the UPP in the government decrees: to reestablish order, and therefore decrease violence through measurement of violent crime rates. The second, discussed in Chapter 6, concerns the availability of services.

5.1 The Effect of the UPP on Violence Rates

The UPP first measured its success in terms of the impact of territorial control on violence rates in “pacified” communities. This measure was used because a large part of the UPP, as described by one officer, was to “establish peace” in favelas.1 This peace is then directly associated with the elimination of criminal groups in these communities. Yet, there is no authoritative source for accurate violence rates recorded in “pacified” communities. Estimates vary, and therefore contradicting evidence muddles any analysis of whether the UPP does definitively lower violence rates.

Initially, violence rates decreased in the first communities. This positive news was based largely on the Santa Marta pilot, which boasted a zero-homicide rate. Beyond the pilot, data collected in 2013 by the Public Safety Institute of the State of Rio de Janeiro stated the “homicide rates in the first 29 favelas to receive UPPs is 8.7 per 100,000 residents.”2 Data reported by the non-government organization, the Brazilian Forum for Public Security, corroborated this evidence, stating the homicide rate dropped by 80% in favelas with UPP presence.3 Further evidence provided by the Folha de São Paulo also supported the claim, stating that from 2012 to 2013 there had been a respective drop in lethal crime from 68 victims to 50 victims in UPP areas.4 The homicide rate also experienced significant drops (see Figure 6): the homicide rate nearly halved between 2005 and 2014, policing killings decreased by over 60% from 2007 to 2012, and homicides decreased overall by over 50% throughout Rio.5 Based on these improvements, “specialists estimate that around 5,000 murders were prevented since the

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1 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 141.
inauguration of the pacifying police units,” and the UPPs were credited for saving an “estimated 60 lives a year per 100,000 inhabitants.”

**Figure 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Homicide Rate 2007</th>
<th>Policing Killings in the State 2007</th>
<th>Homicide Rate throughout Rio 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42 per 100,000 residents</td>
<td>24 per 100,000 residents</td>
<td>1,330 killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Difference</td>
<td>43% decrease</td>
<td>62% decrease</td>
<td>56% decrease</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite these significant improvements in lethal violent crimes, violence continues within and outside of favelas. Within the city, violence rates increased in 2013 and 2014, including homicide rates alongside other forms of reported violent crime, including theft, rape, and domestic violence (see Figures 7 and 8). After initial drops in homicide rates in the city of Rio, the homicide rate increased by 10% in 2013. In the first six months of 2014, the homicide rate had already increased by 11%, with “3,463 murders registered between January and August 2014.” Compared to 2013, “homicides, car theft, and robbery have increased across Rio state during the first eight months of 2014, compared to the same period last year.” The number of street robberies increased by 7% from 2012 to 2013 and then again by 41% from 2013 to the first months of 2014, while car thefts specifically increased by 31%. Based on this evidence, the UPP did seem somewhat responsible for the initial decrease in violent crime rates from 2010 to 2012; however, the recent rise in rates solidifies the UPP has not entirely fulfilled a complete and stable reduction in violent crime through territorial control.

**Figure 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Homicide Rate 2013</th>
<th>Street Robberies 2013</th>
<th>Homicide Rate 2014</th>
<th>Street Robberies 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,148 homicides</td>
<td>7% increase</td>
<td>3,463 homicides</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Difference</td>
<td>10% increase</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>41% increase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This spike in violence is most likely attributable to the relocation of violence from UPP-occupied favelas to surrounding favelas and areas of Rio de Janeiro. Even before the UPP, however, one resident expressed the overflow of crime from the favela to the asphalt as “gangs [were] dealing drugs to the rich kids…but they were starting to get into the kidnap game as well.” This spillover and relocation of violence before and after the UPP “strengthen the idea of

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9 Cresce o número de assaltos nas comunidades do Rio com UPPs”; Pachico, “Why is Crime Rising Across Brazil's Rio de Janeiro State?”

10 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.”
fragmentation of the social fabric and spatial segregation.”11 Once the UPP began, it did not and does not eliminate the criminal groups; however, it forces them out of their original communities and into other areas of the city. A favela resident attributed this rise in violence to the fact that when traficantes specifically go to another favela, “they aren’t from the same faction as the other criminal groups there, and they don’t know the people there,” so they are more likely to be violent.12 The displacement of the groups then results in the displacement of the crime, leading groups to “re-territorialize other locations.” Perhaps this strategy is intentional, as “the state would prefer to face criminals (and the bloody consequences) in more peripheral parts of the city.”13 Despite this possibility, the relocation of crime has caused the “metropolitization of crime.” For example, violence in Rio de Janeiro’s metropolitan region – known as Rio’s interior – increased in the first eight months of 2014, an “approximate 19 percent increase from the same period in 2013.”14 As a result of either crime relocation or a lack of police presence, violence also increased in the areas of Baixada, the North Zone, and the West Zone. Increased crime also appeared in Niterói, a municipality of the state of Rio, and residents protested to improve security in the region.15

Although the UPP showed promising signs of limiting violent crime, not all forms of violent crime declined. As displayed in Figure 8, the Laboratório de Análise da Violência (Laboratory for Violence Analysis or LAV) at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (LAV at Rio de Janeiro State University or UERJ) found the number of victims of disappearances (desaparecimentos), intentional injuries (lesões dolosas), domestic and familial violence (violência doméstica e familiar), threats (ameaças) and rape (estupro) increased, alongside the increase in occurrences of thefts (furtos) and drug-related crimes (crimes relativos a drogas). A necessary explanation of increased crime could very well be a positive indicator of the success of the UPP: more residents may now be reporting incidents of violent crime, when in the past they may not have. Increased reporting of crime often signals an increased trust in the rule of law and judiciary system, ultimately translating as a heightened confidence of residents because of the UPP’s presence or in the UPP itself. The increased rates of reported violent crimes could also mean more disappearances, rapes, etc. are actually occurring within the communities. Some believe the latter, attributing this increase in violent crime to the replacement of the previous dono of the favela, who “kept a degree of order within the community” through extrajudicial violence.16 For example, “if a girl was the victim of rape, she could appeal to the gang bosses for justice and if the perpetrator were found, he would be executed.” As the UPP does not pose the same threat of punitive, extrajudicial action on favela residents, perhaps violent crime has increased.

12 Cajú resident and UNIRIO student, in discussion with the author, May 2014.
14 Pachico, “Why is Crime Rising Across Brazil's Rio de Janeiro State?”
16 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.”
Figure 8: The “Numero médio de casos por mês e comunidade” column compares the average number of each occurrence before “Pré UPP” and after “Pós UPP” the UPP was implemented. The right hand column, “Taxa média por mês e comunidade (por 100,000 hab.)” then compares the average rate of the occurrences per month per 100,000 residents. Source: Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 32.

I contend that violence rates have increased for one of two reasons. First, I agree that residents most likely feel more comfortable reporting crimes, and therefore the number of violent crimes reported has increased. The second concerns the target of the UPP. As I previously discussed, the UPP primarily targets drug trafficking groups, demonstrated through both its rhetoric and its implementation locations. The number of violent crimes is also increasing, notably those such as threats, robbery, rape, and domestic violence, because the UPP largely ignores the presence of militias. While the UPP may target drug trafficking and only successfully eliminates how well armed traficantes are, it does not attack the militias, the more violent group of the two. Militias pose a greater threat to public security and the development of favelas as they not only cause violence, but they intertwine their extrajudicial activities with the Brazilian political system.

5.2 Criminal Groups Revisited

While both drug trafficking gangs and militias may exploit favela communities for their own benefits and profit, their level of organization varies and ultimately influences their potential threat level and the impact they have on favela residents. To discuss this level of organization, I will use two terms established by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): criminal enterprise, and organized crime.\textsuperscript{17} Criminal enterprise is described as “a group of individuals with an identified hierarchy, or comparable structure, engaged in significant criminal activity,” including any legal or illegal entity. Organized crime, on the other hand, is “any group

having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole.” Although both *traficantes* and *milícias* can be labeled as organized crime based on the FBI definition, it is necessary to differentiate their organizations beyond a rating of “low level” or “high level” of organized criminal activity. Based on this logic, I argue the most common form of drug trafficking gang more accurately falls under the “criminal enterprise” category, while militias more fully embody the elements of organized crime.

**Figure 9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization level</th>
<th>Traficantes</th>
<th>Milícias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member profile</td>
<td>Criminal enterprise</td>
<td>Organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member origins</td>
<td>Youth (10 years old - early 20’s)</td>
<td>Professionals, former police officers, firefighters, and politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of group</td>
<td>Drug trafficking</td>
<td>Extortion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary region</td>
<td>South Zone (Zona Sul, RISP 1)</td>
<td>West Zone (Zona Oeste, RISP 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over favelas (2013 data)</td>
<td>37% of Rio favelas</td>
<td>45% of Rio favelas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence rates (2011 data)</td>
<td>Traficantes, police, and all other compose remaining 55%</td>
<td>45% of the murders that occurred in Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police relations</td>
<td>Bribery and drug transactions</td>
<td>Close ties that allows collaboration and political ties, resulting in less investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognized groups</td>
<td><em>Comando Vermelho</em>, <em>Terceiro Comando</em>, <em>Amigos dos Amigos</em></td>
<td><em>Liga de Justiça</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of UPPs in previously occupied territories</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Criminal Group A: Traficantes*

Beyond their size and scale, drug trafficking groups are less organized than militias. Part of the reason is the average age of members. Drug gangs primarily consist of young, male favela residents considered to fall in the following age groups: childhood development (10-12 years old), adolescents (13-19 years old), and the early years of young adulthood (18-35 years old).18 The population of young adults involved in drug trafficking primarily consists of the earlier years of young adulthood because of the short lifespan of traficantes that does not often surpass the early 20s.19 Although members of drug gangs often get involved earlier than members of militias, young and literally short-lived members simply do not produce consistent hierarchy to generate

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substantial organization. Many of these gangs rely temporarily on their current local boss for direction, and once one boss is killed, either his murderer steps into his role or lower ranking officials within the gang battle for the spot. This type of hierarchy is neither consistent nor systematic, leaving much variation between bosses and ultimately little time to create a sustainable and unbreakable hereditary system. Hereditary system does exist, however, within local networks based on family relations, further explaining the fragmented structure between favelas and the lack of cohesive action or strategy.  

Janice Perlman further confirms that “the traffic is not a ‘parallel power’…it is not a substate or a substitute for the state. There is a vacuum where the state should be, and the traffic has stepped into that vacuum unopposed by any governmental authority and accountable to no one except itself.”

Despite their lower level of organization and my classification as a “criminal enterprise,” traficantes still significantly and negatively impact favela communities. Drug trafficking groups still conduct substantial illegal activity that results in extrajudicial violence, territorial disputes, extortion, bribery, and blackmail. These assertions of power originate in how traficantes became the donos do morro (bosses of the favela/hill). In the transitional phase from the Brazilian military dictatorship to their current electoral democracy in the early 1980s, violent crime surged as criminal groups seizing and controlling marginalized areas of Rio. Drug trafficking gangs primarily exist to generate income through the sale of drugs to fulfill the international demand for illegal drugs. Without government presence or suppression, drug gangs became militarized to defend their respective territories from the state and each other. Territorial claims were further exacerbated with the help of the police, who helped establish bocas, or publicly known, fixed drug-selling spots, that would not be targeted by police in exchange for bribes. Once territorial claims were established and in need of protection, one could “only gain access to the settlements by armed force or in consultation with the drug lords; [and] even social projects and public infrastructural measures could only be implemented through negotiations with the respective gangs.”

Drug traffickers are by far and away the most recognized group for their violence by Brazilians and non-Brazilians. The most infamous portrayal of their ruthlessness is the 2002 film, City of God (Cidade de Deus), which follows the story of a young, black, male favela resident named Buscapé, or Rocket, as he finds himself in the middle of an ongoing war between several groups in the Cidade de Deus favela. Throughout the film, sensationalized portrayals of opposing groups of traficantes who torture and murder each other for territory, and the concluding scene establishes the cycle of violence by showcasing a young group of boys preparing to take over the previous groups’ trade networks. This film, along with other films that showcase favelas primarily as the residence of criminals (Tropa da Elite, for example),

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contributed to the international perception of insecurity within Brazil and specifically Rio de Janeiro.

Although traficantes pose a significant security threat as the proxy for the state in over one third of Rio’s favelas, the Rio state government has done little to change this reality. A large reason for this lies in the corruption within Rio’s police forces and politicians, who often establish links with drug lords and then require payouts of “up to 50 percent of the drug lords’ profits [that then go] to the police and officers of the criminal justice system.” Traficantes have also managed to gain significant control over their communities through their intermediary relationship with Residents’ Associations and building a form of trusting relationship with residents. The drug traffickers often build connections with Residents’ Associations through their shared status of convivente, or cohabitant, implying the intermediate relationship that results from their common presence in and origin from the favela. The Residents’ Associations, in these relationships, do not support the extrajudicial functions of the traffickers, but attempt to mediate their control. This relationship often results from a unique system of trust that can exist between residents and the local traficantes, one that is based in the security functions drug traffickers offer. These security practices primarily include extrajudicial violence that serve as reactionary consequences to the presence of other crime within the favela, including rapes, domestic abuse, and robberies.

Although this security comes at the expense of extrajudicial and sometimes unpredictable violence, it still guarantees some forms of security residents find valuable, despite the reality of daily shootouts and violence perpetuated by the state. In some instances, residents portray traficantes as Robin Hood archetypes who are “victims of injustice” driven by the state, who take from Rio’s rich and use drug money to give to their own poor, who maintain the “just revenge” or “self defense” moderation of violence, and who are “indistinguishable from the common man.” This portrayal defends traficantes and criticizes the state, reflecting frustration with the lack of government action rather than showcasing unyielding support for criminal groups. This archetype also hails from the reality that most traficantes originate from the favelas where they operate. As one student, who lives in the favela of Cajú, explained, “Before the UPP, the majority of traficantes were whatever guy you grew up with and played in the street with. It was your friend who became a traficante, so then he knew your mom and he respected older people and your friends – not that I’m defending traficantes – but you had this relationship with them.”

24 Glenny, “Rio: the fight for the favelas.”
26 In Cidade dos Homens, younger children praise one of the well-known traficantes as he walks through the streets of the favela and hands out money. These children chant, “Gives us money because he can, Espeto’s the man!”, ultimately epitomizing the Robin Hood archetype of taking from the rich and giving to the poor. Cidade dos Homens, DVD, October 2002-December 2005.
27 In each regard, traficantes conduct “just revenge” violence to punish wrongdoers within the favela who commit rape, robberies, etc., and use “self defense” violence when dealing with the unjust police forces and state system. A scene in Cidade dos Homens further justifies these forms of violence, when one boy defends his consideration to join a drug trafficking gang: “You don’t see the good side of it here in the favela. There aren’t any rapes, robberies, or fights.”
28 As favela residents, traffickers are members of the favela often before they join the gang present in their favela. Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits. (The New Press, 2000).
29 Cajú resident and UNIRIO student, in discussion with the author, May 2014.
Although the UPP has focused on drug traffickers rather than militias, the trafficking of drugs still exists. The UPP has, however, reduced the number of arms possessed by each group and the volume of trafficking and sales.\(^{30}\)

**Criminal Group B: Milícias**

Militias maintain strong police ties as a negotiation tool to protect their own operations. First, police view militias as the lesser of two evils in comparison to the drug traffic and allow their continuation considering many militia members are also police officers. Militias also actively avoid shootouts with the police, unlike traficantes, generating a mutual acceptance of each other and an argument that favelas with militias are safer than those with traficantes.\(^{31}\) Militias are also state-like in their operations because of their access to privileged information about police action, and they often conduct their activities with knowledge of police preferences.\(^{32}\) Lastly, police do not thoroughly investigate militias. The investigators, usually police intelligence units, are usually involved in the militias themselves and, therefore, give the government smaller lists of suspects, handing over “only 40 or 50” names when the list “should have 700 names on it.”\(^{33}\) These ties increasingly discouraged and continue to deter thorough investigation of militias, their actions, and their negative influence.

Militias are also primarily located in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro, where communities are further displaced from downtown Rio and more difficult to patrol by police officers. The West Zone is, unsurprisingly, the most violent region of Rio de Janeiro state but receives less attention than the South Zone in the media.\(^{34}\) Although little information about large-scale militia operations is available, militia operations can resemble drug trafficking in that they operate within individual communities. However, there are multi-community militias, the largest of which calls itself the *Liga de Justiça*, or “Justice League,” and uses the Batman symbol as its logo.\(^{35}\) Based on their stronger system of hierarchy and their increased professionalism, militias are undoubtedly more organized with stronger hereditary systems of power. This degree of organization more accurately fulfills the definition of an organized criminal group, rather than a lower level criminal enterprise.

Militia operations have several facets. First, militias focus the majority of their operations on resource and service extortion for profit within the favelas. These resources and services


\(^{35}\) Martins, “Operação prende 16 pms no rio, entre eles, comandante de batalhão.”
include gas, cable, water, internet, and alternative transportation (i.e. motor taxis, vans). Militias utilize their political connections to impact elections and often influence the currais eleitorais, or electoral votes, by coercing favela residents to vote for candidates nominated by the militias. In many cases, militia bosses themselves are often the candidates for these political positions of the state legislature, and studies show correlation between militia domination and the electoral candidates who dominate certain regions. For this reason, various Brazilian politicians have recently denounced militias, calling them a “tumor” and the “new social cancer.” Their interconnected relationship with politics showcases their high levels of organization and their impact on the favelas beyond their physical presence, supporting their label as groups more closely embodying the organized crime definition. To maintain a monopoly on violence within their territories, militias also charge fees for local, “private security” for favela residents, which includes carrying out extrajudicial killings. Militias commit high levels of violence because militia members are often compromised of people who do not live in the favelas themselves and are often from communities and higher-class condominiums. Militias are external forces, and they “are more violent on the communities... unlike drug dealers who live among the residents.”

The history of militias proves them to be much more recent entities than the traficantes. In 2004, militias controlled only six favelas in Rio. Ten years later, over 145 militias control over 28 neighborhoods. A separate 2013 report conducted by scholars at the State University of Rio (UERJ) stated militias control 45% of Rio’s favelas, or about 90 favelas. The earliest version of the militias arose during the 1964-85 military dictatorship, when death squads such as the Homens de Ouro (“Golden Men”) were principally “police officers who carried out private justice for local businesspeople, principally in the favelas.” Many residents and NGOs associate this label of “death squads” or grupos de exterminio, with militias. The label continues because of the intensification of militia actions in recent years, which often resembles these early death squads in how they demonstrate the “new relationship between security forces and crime [consisting of the] direct participation in the criminal exploitation of communities, instead of merely passive operation, for example, by means of corruption.”

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36 For example, in the Nova Iguaçu favela in Baixada Fluminense, militias charge a R$ 10 fee per home for water. Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 17; Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro.”

37 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 59; Pachico, “Why is Crime Rising Across Brazil’s Rio de Janeiro State?”

38 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 79.

39 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 79.

40 Is Rio’s Tough Love Strategy Against Violence Working?”

41 For example, in the Nova Iguaçu favela in Baixada Fluminense, militias charge a R$ 10 fee per home for water. Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 17; Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro.”


44 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 71.

Militias were not recognized as criminal groups that posed a significant threat to state power until May 2008. Before 2008, the Rio de Janeiro state governor, Sérgio Cabral Filho, openly supported the militias alongside Rio de Janerio mayor, Eduardo Paes.46 In preparation for the 2007 Pan American Games, another multi-sport event held in Rio de Janeiro in July, the media further exalted the militias as defenders of the poor against the problems created by the drug trade, and militias were able to publicly expand throughout Rio as a form of additional security force for the games.47 In May 2008, militias tortured a group of journalists from the Brazilian newspaper “O Dia” in the Batan favela in Rio’s West Zone. Following their torture, Rio’s Legislative Assembly approved a Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry or CPI) in June 2008 to investigate militias and their actions.48 The CPI then released an extensive report, identifying potential militia members and recommendations for the Public Prosecutor’s Office.49 Following Batan and the CPI’s findings, Sérgio Cabral and the Secretary of Security both publicly denounced militias as organized criminal groups.50 Cabral then urged his colleagues to “reject the notion that the militias are the lesser of two evils” and “compared the recent rise of the militias to the situation in Colombia, where the involvement of paramilitary fighters has further muddied the country’s long-running battle against Marxist guerrillas.”51 The negative discourse surrounding militias was further compounded by a report released by Rio’s Subsecretaria de Inteligência (Sub secretary of Intelligence), who proved that of the 171 communities with militias, 119 (almost 70%) had not previously belonged to any criminal group. This information thus debunked the myth of the militia as a crusade against trafficking, because it affirmed that militias were present in communities previously unoccupied by drug traffickers and were therefore conducting their own operations not as protectorates of the poor, but as their exploiters.52 Following this revelation, the 2010 film Tropa da Elite 2: O Inimigo Agora é Outro (The Elite Squad 2: The Enemy Within) contained negative portrayals of militias present in various favelas. Then, in 2011, speculations regarding the militias’ role in murdering Niteroi judge, Judge Patrícia Acioli, forced a local politician and State Deputy, Marcelo Freixo, to flee Brazil in “fear of retaliation for his campaign to fight these organized crime groups,” after he received death threats supposedly from militias.53

The violence of militias exceeds that of drug trafficking groups. Much like traficantes, militias are also responsible for much of the rampant extrajudicial violence. A 2011 report released by the Rio de Janeiro Homicide Division cited militias as “responsible for almost half of the homicides in Rio,” or 45% of the murders that occurred in 2011. The remaining 55% of homicides, then, encompass the more systematic homicides committed by drug traffickers and the police, and also random homicide cases. These homicides committed by militias include both disputes over territory with other groups, including other militias and traficantes, and also

47 Fernandes Junior, “Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) na era dos Mega Eventos na Cidade do Rio de Janeiro.”
48 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 15.
50 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 18 and 61.
51 Reel, “In Rio's Slums, Militias Fuel Violence They Seek to Quell.”
52 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 17.
53 “Militia Gangs Control Nearly Half of Rio Favelas.”
extrajudicial killings. In terms of disappearances, it is not possible to conclude whether disappearances are a practice more closely associated with militias or traficantes, but there are no doubts that both of these groups commit this type of crime. While traficantes, for the most part, do not allow domestic abuse and see it as a violation of their social order, residents report that militias will allow domestic abuse against women because men are allowed to do most anything, and the Maria da Penha law does not exist in areas of militia.

The public opinion about militias reveals that many residents prefer traffickers to militias. Beyond simple interview responses stating which they prefer, residents further describe their impressions of the linkage between militias and the police. Several beliefs circulate regarding militias and their state involvement. Some believe militias do not often battle for territory with traficantes because militias “come with the force, with the ‘support’ of the police, with strength of the police apparatus.” Other residents have seen police and militia members drinking together at parties in the favela, and use this reasoning as evidence of their ties. The last piece of evidence lies in the uncertainty of the current standing of militias. While militia members used to be more openly disclosed in 2006 and 2007, now residents are unsure if militiamen are ex-police, current police, or civilians. This uncertainty generates the feeling that militias are “phantasmal” in a way, due to their undetermined positions and capacities for intimidation, and many residents speak with doubt, multiple contradictions, ambiguities, and omissions that “revealed terror” when discussing militias.

Currently, several reports reveal the growing links developing between Rio’s militias and drug gangs. The Rio crime investigative bureau “has documented several cases involving militias that have agreed to allow drug traffickers to operate in militia territory, in exchange for a fee. Militias have also recruited gang members to work with them.” Authorities first observed potential collaboration between the two groups in 2010, when police “recorded phone conversations of militia members discussing weapon sales with gangs in Alemão” right before the occupation of Alemão by military forces. This potential collaboration worries several organizations dedicated to favela residents and the preservation of their rights, as many assert this expansion of political influence and networks could strengthen both groups against state authorities. Another reality of this collaboration is the expansion of the drug trade, as militias become increasingly interested in profiting from marijuana and cocaine sales than from “neighborhood extortion schemes.” If they remain fractured and competitive as they are now, traficantes and militias will be easier to divide and conquer; however, if they unite, they hold the potential to wield significant and more stable power in and across favelas. Despite this possibility, the Rio de Janeiro state government largely ignores the militias in favor of focusing on traficantes, and ultimately does not directly target militias.

5.3 Police violence

While the UPP has reduced violence rates overall, the largest impact of the UPP on violence rates has been within the police forces themselves. Before the arrival of the UPP, the

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54 Cano, *Os Donos do Morro*, 60-81.
55 Pachico, “Why is Crime Rising Across Brazil’s Rio de Janeiro State?”
56 Reel, “In Rio’s Slums, Militias Fuel Violence They Seek to Quell.”
57 Pachico, “Why is Crime Rising Across Brazil’s Rio de Janeiro State?”
"auto de resistência" was a characteristic label on many police reports of deaths caused by police officers. *Auto de resistência* implied the deceased had somehow resisted police custody or authority that then led to their “accidental” or unintended death at the hands of the police. As the officers themselves register them, *auto de resistência* deaths are not heavily investigated; however, when *auto de resistência* deaths are investigated, autopsies of the corpses “reveals strong indications of execution,” implying many *autos de resistência* are not “resistance” deaths at all, but rather execution-style murders by police officers. In 2011 alone, “42% of registered deaths were labeled *auto de resistência* in the states of Rio and São Paulo… the majority of which were against blacks.”

This grave picture pre-UPP opened opportunity space for the revamping of the police forces. Initially, many hopefuls believed the UPP may work toward this restructuring of the police forces that would de-emphasize militarization in favor of community policing practices. Ignácio Cano also initially believed the UPP had the capacity to change the police as a whole when interviewed in August 2011 by RioRadar:

“The bet on the table – and it is just a bet – is whether we can use the UPPs to reduce violence in these 18, or 20, or 50 communities, and if we can use the UPPs to change, on the one hand, the way police conduct themselves: police doctrine, police training… Up till now, the highest reference of policing is the special units battalion, which killed hundreds of people over the last few years. And this is considered to be elite police, so we have to change that and we have to show them that elite police are those that get themselves into dangerous circumstances without producing any causalities both for themselves and for the public. This is a big challenge because it’s not just the police, many people in Rio de Janeiro – politicians, journalists, and normal citizens – still think policing is getting a machine gun, going to a place where there are criminals, and shooting and winning a so called ‘war.’”

During my interview with Ignácio Cano, nearly three years later in May 2014, Cano expressed disappointment in the actual achievement of the UPP in changing the police force as a whole:

“It is all part of the bigger picture and the bigger problem that the UPPs have not managed to inspire the overall model of public security. There is still an exception... what would be expected is, they should inspire the whole policing strategy in Rio. Also, the intervention of the BOPE was also important because we hoped to transform the BOPE along the way… For example, we interviewed BOPE officers and BOPE command and they said, ‘Some of our officers say, “sergeant, we don't like being here, what're we doing here, sitting.’ So transforming this very deadly unit was also one of the main targets... the UPP was a huge opportunity to transform the police. This was probably its most...”

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59 Ignácio Cano (Director of the LAV at UERJ), in discussion with Rio Radar, August 2011, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXy6DGFxdhE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXy6DGFxdhE).
important trait, and it’s also the biggest of our frustrations that we have not made any progress in that.”

Despite Cano’s frustrations that the UPP have yet to revolutionize police practices and deflect attitudes surrounding the undeclared war, some police actions have noticeably changed. From the beginning to the current stage of the UPP (as shown on Figure 10 below), victims of *auto de resistência* decreased from almost 6 victims per 100,000 residents to less than 1. In addition, a LAV report stated the number of deaths during “police interventions…passed from .5 per month to almost zero.” Despite the evidence of progress toward bettering the police forces, a study conducted by the Public Security Institute (ISP) found the number of homicides in police action increased more than 60% from June 2013 to August 2014, from 144 deaths to 89 victims. Within *auto de resistências* specifically, police labeled two deaths during police action in the Morro de Foguteiro “*autos de resistência*”; however, further investigation revealed the reported accidental deaths were execution-style killings.

![Figure 10: The number of auto de resistência deaths decreased dramatically following the implementation of the UPP in both UPP and police units in the rest of Rio (”resto da cidade”). The left bar compares communities with the UPP, while the right bar represents the general (and lower) numbers throughout the rest of the city. Source: LAV](image)

Other incidents of violence delegitimize the UPP program. The first and largest scandal involving the UPP is known in Rio by one name: Amarildo. Amarildo Dias De Souza was a

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60 Ignácio Cano (Director of Laboratório de Análise da Violência at the Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro), in discussion with the author, May 2014.

61 Cano, *Os Donos do Morro*, 32.

father of six, a bricklayer, and a resident in the favela of Rocinha. In July 2013, he disappeared. Following his prolonged disappearance, his family successfully pursued a public outcry against his disappearance, leading to mass demonstrations in Rio de Janeiro and on social media with the slogan, “Onde está o Amarildo?” or “Where is Amarildo?” Following this attention, investigators took over the case and later revealed UPP officers had detained Amarildo in the midst of a drug trafficking investigation. They then announced that Amarildo, an epileptic, died while being tortured at the UPP base in Rocinha. Ten members of the UPP, including the then-UPP commander of Rocinha, were originally charged with torturing, murdering, and then hiding the body. In total, 15 officers were imprisoned for the torture and death of Amarildo, including the UPP commander and sub-commander of Rocinha at the time of Amarildo’s disappearance.

The Amarildo case jeopardized the legitimacy of the program and continues to negatively impact the UPP’s reputation as a recurring criticism.

In 2014 alone, several events continued to taint the reputation of the UPP in Rio society. In April 2014, police violence in the Pavão-Pavãozinho favela resulted in the death of a well-known resident, Douglas da Silva. DG, as he was called, was a dancer on the TV program Esquenta on TV Globo. The death of the dançarino (dancer) in this favela closest to the richer, more touristy regions of Rio then sparked protests amongst the residents, resulting in the event described at the very beginning of this work. In late June 2014, police were involved in the killing of ten residents in Maré, and further protests ensued. In late September 2014, police shot another innocent in Complexo de Alemão, sparking more protests. In addition to these killings by police officers, several officers have also died while serving on their respective UPP forces. Again in Complexo de Alemão, Cano commented, “five policemen have been killed” in 2014 alone.”

National Public Radio also broadcasted statistics that “At least 87 policemen were killed in 2014 in Rio state alone...[and] other groups such as police unions say the number is at least triple that.” Each violent interaction continues to reduce the credibility of the program as an innovative and trustworthy strategy, in turn aggravating the already-vicious cycle of distrust between favela residents and police.

While the UPP does show promise for changing the rhetoric within Brazilian police forces, their violent nature is not necessarily developed within the forces themselves. In 2009,

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68 Ignácio Cano (Director of LAV at UERJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014.

the Federal Secretary of Human Rights, within the federal government, found that 40% of the Brazilian population interviewed believed a “good criminal is a dead criminal.” 

Perhaps violent tendencies toward perceived “criminals” begin before an officer joins the police force. If so, police violence must be addressed as a reflection of larger society and then countered by police training and practicum to ensure police violence does not continue to rule policing practices. If not, police training and practices must change to transform this violent mentality grown within the forces themselves.

Perhaps the UPP did decrease the prevalence of violent crime overall, or perhaps it decreased only some forms at the expense of others. Either way, the UPP does attempt to install a system of legitimate protection for favela residents through the “establishment an order that, although guaranteeing some rights at the expense of others, permits the creation of rules to regulate conduct, the active participation and recognition of state agents as integrators of these groups, [and] control of the territory and of the population that had been ruled by an irregularly normalized armed group.” 

Although its efforts are not perfected and must continue to evolve, the UPP does attempt to de-regularize the previous prevalence of violence.

**Conclusion**

The UPP’s effect on violence rates proves to be a haphazard collection of evidence with multiple conclusions. While the UPP does target criminal groups, it mainly focuses on drug traffickers and effectively ignores militias, thus ignoring a large portion of the violence that occurs outside of Rio’s RISP 1 region. In terms of police violence, the UPP appears to be effective in slightly changing policing mentality through calling attention to its militarization; however, it has yet to produce widespread, holistic change throughout the various forces. The focus on violence rates over social programming also signifies the emphasis on the undeclared war, affirming that favelas are known for their violence above all else and militancy is the solution.

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70 Cano in discussion with the author, May 2014.
Chapter 6
The Implications and Consequences Part 2: The UPP and Services

The second potential result of the UPP and territorial control, and the primary hope for the UPPs made clear by residents, is the provision of services to favela communities. These services can be broken into two categories: commercial services, as defined by increased consumerism and marketing to residents; and public, social services, including increased availability of, access to, and quality of services typically provided by the government to its citizens.

6.1 Commercial services

The UPP opened the door to increased business and commercialized services within favelas. The entrance of various businesses and services has two results: 1) it has increased the number of options available to favela residents who were not previously provided in the favelas, and 2) it has increased the cost of living and contributes to the gentrification of the favelas.

More options

The entrance of the UPP has undeniably changed the way favela residents participate in Brazilian society as consumers and contributors. A study conducted by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas found that “23% of businesses in the five favelas [of Pavão-Pavãozinho-Cantagalo, Chapéu Mangueira-Babilônia, Santa Marta, Cidade de Deus and Batan] had grown since UPPs were installed.”1 Communities with UPPs have also received “Comérico Legal,” a program that brings “representatives from financial institutions, micro-entrepreneurs and local business people together to discuss future possible economic growth through incentives and credit lines.” Despite hopeful steps forward, much of the growth in favelas is within larger businesses and does not reflect an increased protection of small, local business.

If favela residents do not yield significant disposal incomes, why do companies see favelas as burgeoning opportunity spaces? There are several advantages to expanding into favela markets, most notably the amplified exposure of their brands, the possibility of expanding their customer base and sales, and the possibility of creating corporate social responsibility programming that can actively contribute to favela development while also strengthening reputations as positive forces in Rio society. NBS, or “No bullshit,” is a large communications company located in Botafogo in Rio de Janeiro. In November 2012, NBS created a new project, called “Rio+Rio,” in an effort to “generate benefits for [its] clients and benefits for the communities” through “social business.”2 Rio+Rio is installed in the Santa Marta favela because it is “located near [the NBS office] as they go back and forth between NBS and the Santa Marta office, and because it was first to be pacified, it is small, [and] it has security.” In terms of company benefits, Rio+Rio provides the three advantages listed above: 1) they promote their clients’ brands (for example,

2 No Bullshit Rio+Rio Program (NBS, marketing company based in Rio de Janeiro), in discussion with the author, May 2014.
Boticário, a cosmetics company, provides professional cosmetics training to women to teach skills and promote their product; 2) they help sell their clients’ products to residents (to “bring private services to help with the creation of reintegration opportunity”); and 3) they improve NBS’ reputation while attempting to improve equality in the community (“NBS understands that private enterprise has a role in… bringing higher quality of life to disadvantaged people and integrating these people into Rio society”). Rio+Rio is considering expanding to another “pacified” favela because it can send workers to favelas with UPP presence. Perhaps the increased entrance of services with the possibility of increasing economic activity in favelas is a positive attribute of the UPPs, despite the potential consequences of gentrification.

Gentrification

The “pacification” of favelas has resulted in the extension of private service into favela market areas, including electricity, TV and wireless Internet, many of which had been previously pirated from other sources. These additional services intensify the cost of living in favelas that many residents are unable to afford. The smallest rise in prices – in bus fares, for example, which sparked mass protests in July 2013 before the Confederations Cup – affects the poorer classes more than any other socioeconomic group in society, making their daily lives significantly more difficult. Alongside the rest of Rio de Janeiro, property values have increased inside of favelas, making it more difficult for residents to maintain their standard of living in their own communities. The rent of barracos (“shacks” found in favelas) has increased in these areas, and led to a “reduction in income for many inhabitants.” During the interview with a carioca student, Phellipe Azevedo, he described the change in finances for favela residents in his home neighborhood, Cajú. He described, “The same day the UPP entered [Cajú], a TV company entered and began to sell TVs.” After this initial shock, he explained how prices have changed: “In the past, restaurants cost R$2, and now the same restaurant costs R$3 or R$4. This is the same as prices in the South Zone… but the salaries of favela residents haven’t changed. So I don’t eat at restaurants in Cajú, or outside of downtown or in the South Zone. I always eat lunch for about R$2, so I can’t even eat lunch in my own neighborhood.” Although not a firsthand account, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Brazil Institute and Graciano Lourenço Fernandes Junior both echo these concerns with their convincing summaries of the potential negative economic effects of the UPP:

“…With UPPs also comes the other side of the formalization: a crack down in informal businesses, which may hinder entrepreneurship; a rise in the cost of living since more people will start paying for water and electricity, as well as taxes; and, finally, gentrification because some people may not be able to afford living in pacified communities where rent is likely to appreciate in value, which is an inevitable consequence.”

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4 UNIRIO students (Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro Theatre Program) in a discussion with the author, May 2014.
“In contrast to self segregation, induced segregation appears in the form that some authors call ‘white removals,’ but we prefer to use the term ‘induced removals,’ in which residents of favelas where the UPPs were implemented end up leaving the favela because of the rising cost of living, including being unable to afford the new water prices, electricity, cable television, Internet (previously supplied irregularly and sometimes illegally)…”

The increased price of living in areas with UPP has many favela residents questioning whether they can continue to afford to live in their respective neighborhoods. As mentioned in Chapter 4, many of the favelas with UPPs are found on hills with the most coveted real estate in all of Rio de Janeiro. Vidigal, the favela located on the hill called “Dois Irmãos,” holds one of the most spectacular views of Ipanema beach. The induced gentrification of favelas such as Vidigal would open space for private business and tourism to occupy these areas and profit from their prime locations. Perhaps the UPP does aim to establish long-term security in current favelas, but this security may hope to create a new future for these areas rather than empower the current favela communities and their residents.

Increased gentrification would also encourage tourism in favelas, generating income for businesses outside of the favela. Especially in the era of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympics, residents debate over services aimed to accommodate tourists and whether they provide commercial or social gains. The upcoming mega-events call for increased tourist attractions throughout the country, and favelas are a viable option for travel plans as some businesses now offer guided favela tours. These tours, made possible and more accessible the teleférico, will take tourists through the maze streets of the slums of the largest cities for a fee, transforming the criminalization of poverty into the spectacularization and commodification of poverty. The best example of questionable new services is the installation of the newly constructed cable car transportation systems in Complexo de Alemão, called the teleférico or the “Bondinho do Alemão.”

The teleférico opened in the summer of 2011 and has six stations connecting the various neighborhoods of Alemão. Outside of the glamour of being the first and only mass transit system via cable car in the city, the teleférico is “used by only seven percent of favela residents.” This perhaps is related to the ticket categories, which target tourists with elevated prices and allow one round-trip free ticket per resident on a daily basis. Residents heavily criticize the teleférico as a tourist gimmick that promotes favela tourism within Alemão, attributing to a further sensationalization “valorization of urban poverty areas.”

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teleférico’s intended potential, Matthew Shaer for the New York Times reports, “the recurring violence has kept visitors away, and the neighborhood residents preferred to use cheaper motorbike taxis.”

It thus goes unused by both populations.

### 6.2 Social Services

Before the UPP, state-provided, public services did not exist in favelas. These social services were instead provided by non-governmental and non-profit organizations comprised of both favela and non-favela residents in an attempt to provide basic human needs. These groups included Residents’ Associations, organized within the favelas themselves, and NGOs such as Cidade Unia, a social movement that connects organizations from Rio’s favelas. Despite the existence of these advocacy groups, the government continued to underrepresent and ignore favelas, delegating them little say in the decisions made regarding their communities. As a result, many favela residents looked to the UPP as a source of hope for social programming and positive government attention; however, the reality is the UPP does not incorporate any social programming into its agenda, structure, or practices. This is visible at the most basic level within the UPP forces themselves, as only “33% of UPP police believed that ‘helping resolve infrastructure problems’ was part of their attributions.”

As a result, Justiça Global reports “most occupied favelas still lack healthcare, daycare, schools, social assistance and outlets for recreational activities, [and] residents of occupied favelas themselves criticize these UPP installations by contrasting the presence of police with the absence of social programming.”

The most common misconception about the UPP is its connection with a program formerly known as the “UPP Social,” now named “Rio+Social.” Despite its former name of UPP Social, Rio+Social is “completely separated from the UPPs in its independent work.” This misunderstanding often leads to the conclusion that the Rio de Janeiro state UPP policing program incorporates social programming; however, Rio+Social only “exists alongside the UPP because [Rio+Social] exclusively enters into pacified areas with the UPP…but the work is very different, as the UPP focuses on security, and [Rio+Social] focuses on public policy for economic, social, and urban development of favelas.” The idea of the UPP Social originated in the Rio de Janeiro state government under the Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Social Welfare and Human Rights. The project was then handed off to the Instituto Pereira Passos (Pereira Passos Institute or IPP), an organization of the Rio de Janeiro municipal government, where it officially began as an “international technical cooperation project with UN-Habitat” and was

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16 Government official (preference to remain unidentified), in discussion with the author, May 2014.
renamed “Rio+Social” in 2014.17 As described by the current President of the IPP, Eduarda de La Rocque, Rio+Social maintains several projects and goals:

“The program generates data on risks related to the built environment, which affect living conditions, social cohesion and urban inequalities. A rapid participatory mapping (MRP) methodology is employed annually to generate information on public infrastructure and the quality of the built environment in pacified slums. Indicators are compiled on landslides and geological risks, drainage and sanitation infrastructure, street lighting and other components of the built environment. The program supports slum upgrading policies by providing the housing, civil defence and dozens of other departments with data on favela settlements and with access to networks and partnerships.”

To accomplish these tasks, the program consists of 3 teams: 1) the territorial management team, who collects data on public services and operates within pacified favelas on a permanent basis; 2) the information management team, who processes this public service data; and 3) the institutional management team, who “coordinates relations and facilitates connections and partnerships between the various municipal government departments in order to improve the quality and efficiency of public expenditures in favelas.”

Rio+Social has many redeemable qualities that must be more thoroughly integrated with the UPP. First, they set the commendable example of consistently hosting forums between the government and residents, sometimes incorporating UPP officers into the discussion.18 Forums, a key aspect of community policing methodology, would provide more contact-time between officers and residents, ultimately resulting in increased trust and perhaps policing practices that better fit the community they serve. Rio+Social also attempts to incorporate favela residents into their data collection and programming processes through the work of their territorial management teams, which most directly interacts with favela residents and works alongside residents by providing training while also creating a network for research and collaboration across favela communities experiencing pacification. By partnering with residents or utilizing residents themselves as UPP officers, the UPP could begin to transform into a community policing force comprised of members from the community itself.

Although Rio+Social sets an example of government-sponsored social programming, it can still improve. Rio+Social only enters communities after the UPP enters and “pacifies” them. This fact – the primary reason for the misconception that the UPP and Rio+Social are connected – excludes a large portion of Rio’s favelas and correlates police action with the provision of public services. Instead of anticipating and thus attempting to address the lack of opportunity that plagues favela communities and leads to illicit economies such as drug trafficking, Rio+Social is a reactionary mechanism. The counterargument to this idea remains the proclaimed inability to enter communities that have not yet been pacified; however, by partnering with already-existent

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18 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 145.
organizations in favelas without the UPP, Rio+Social could begin to enter communities and provide social programming before the arrival of the UPP.

In addition, Rio+Social can further emphasize the importance of art and culture in pacified and non-pacified favelas alike. Unfortunately, the arrival of the UPP into favela communities often signals a halt in art production and cultural activities, including baile funk dances, graffiti, and other forms of art created by residents. Adriina Facina, a professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) who studies cultural production in favelas, expressed frustration at the declining cultural production in “pacified” communities. She described the UPP as an “obstacle…even though people continue to produce art because they are resistant and because it is important in their lives. But it is difficult because of the vigilance and the censorship” that exists in pacified communities.\(^\text{19}\) This declining production is associated with the prohibition of cultural activities inside pacified favelas, including baile funk dances – which were banned because they are “historically connected to the prejudice of the criminalization of favelas” – and “popular forms of relaxation in the favela, the majority of which utilize public spaces, the street, street corners…because these characteristics are part of the social life of the favelas.” Other forms of art have also been erased, including the destruction of graffiti art and a well-known staircase art piece in Complexo de Alemão. Professor Facina associates these restrictions on art to the “negative vision of the UPP in Complexo de Alemão,” as residents now link the UPP with the “repression of cultural events, artistic production, the lack of security that began with assaults in the community, robberies, and the continuing presence of the drug trade…[all] events that did not happen before the UPP.”

Community-driven art proves itself a worthwhile venture in Projeto Morrinho, an arts project created by several favela youth in the Vila Pereira da Silva (also called Pereirão) favela. Projeto Morrinho, or “the small favela project,” is comprised of hundreds of painted bricks arranged in a representation of a favela community. The project has received international coverage from National Geographic magazine and continues to build upon its project with increasing collaboration with favela youths, providing an avenue to criticize and highlight the life of living in a favela.\(^\text{20}\) While many youth want to represent daily life, the founders of the project aim to redirect the project away from focusing on the undeniable violence that dictates the lives of many residents, as they believe “you already see so much violence on TV, drug trafficking, [and] war,” so they instead encourage youth to “represent other things, to represent romance, people in love, if you go to a baile funk dance and you see a girl…make this story.”\(^\text{21}\) The founders see themselves as a “positive focus” for their favela and other favelas. Projeto Morrinho is also unique in that Vila Pereira da Silva is not occupied by the UPP, despite its location in the South Zone. In fact, the founder described the relationship between the project and the police as “very distant, because we do not mix with either the police or drug traffickers.”

In terms of the Rio de Janeiro state UPP policing strategy, the UPP does not incorporate nor embrace social programming into its agenda or practices. To transform from proximity to community police forces, the UPP can learn from and collaborate with Rio+Social to provide

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\(^{19}\) Adriina Facina (Professor of Anthropology at UFRJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014.


\(^{21}\) Projeto Morrinho Founder, in discussion with the author, May 2014.
more basic services, dialogue with favela members, and thus gain the trust of and gain respect for residents to more thoroughly serve their needs. Until this point, the UPP has focused more heavily on violence rates over the provision of services because it is “easier to quantify violent deaths than to measure social needs and how much they’re being met.”22 Perhaps “setting up police pacification units (guys with guns in snappy uniforms, who’ve had six months’ training) looks a great deal easier than mapping and meeting needs for trash collection, health care, public lighting, education, day care, legal aid, and so much else,” but there is value for both the UPP and Rio+Social in collaboration as each would work to better their relationships with residents while simultaneously improving the lives of residents.

Conclusion

Despite the entrance of new services, commercial services require additional payment for the same services that were previously free, and the majority of the growth occurring inside favelas still remains in the hands of outsider big businesses. In terms of social services, the UPP does not offer social programming and could learn from the Rio municipal government’s program, Rio+Social, to more thoroughly incorporate and provide public services to the communities it serves.

Conclusion: Evaluating the UPP

6.1 Success or failure?

To define the UPP as a success or a failure, we must identify in what aspect we are conducting the evaluation. As a multi-faceted project attempting to target a complicated and historically significant issue of police violence and marginalization, the UPP cannot and does not simply “succeed” or “fail.” My initial research sought to discover how the UPP affects the relationship between the favelas and the government, and how this possible change in relationship affects the undeclared war and the possible integration of favelas into Rio society. My first question addresses whether UPPs improve the relationship between the government and the favelas with several factors:

- Does the UPP improve the relationship because it improves the lives of favela residents through decreased violence?
- Does the UPP improve the lives of residents through better policing practices in which residents are involved?
- Does the UPP improve the lives of residents through establishing the government has a stake in favela communities?

Respectively, the UPP does not necessarily improve the lives of residents with less violence; the UPP does improve upon previous policing practices and perhaps impacts the mentality and actions of the police; and the UPP does establish the government’s stake in the communities, but not necessarily because it cares about residents as much as it cares about its international reputation as a tourist destination.

The second factor concerns how this change in relationship can impact two potential goals of the UPP: to eliminate the rhetoric of or end the undeclared war itself, and to integrate favela residents as recognized and valued members of Rio. Considering the change in relationship between the government and the favelas is minimal, the tangible yields so far are also minimal. Yet the yields are also much greater than they were before the UPP due to the increased public awareness of these issues. In a way never before acknowledged or supported by the state government, the war between the government and the favelas is recognized and even defined as a problem. In terms of favela integration, people from the asfalto are more aware of the marginalization of favelas while others are taking conscious steps toward better integration. The societal position of the favela seems to be shifting as more cariocas recognize the necessity of favelas, their residents, and their cultures as an integral part of what makes Rio, Rio. Although the international media does not accurately report on the UPP, the UPP has drawn attention to the favelas and led to critical analysis of the policies and stigmas affecting the residents. Perhaps these impacts are not yet tangible; but perhaps they demonstrate the beginning of a slow and gradual, albeit still painful, process of integration.

Overall, the structure of the UPPs does not attempt to remedy the legacy of the Military Police or significantly improve its policing strategies. As a result, the UPP has various negative implications and consequences in its implementation that inevitably detract from the possible positive change in the relationship between the government and the favelas. The UPP has not
countered the war between these two actors, but has instead made itself an extension of the government with slightly less militarization. The message of the UPP does not ring out clearly as peaceful, and therefore does not drive a peacekeeping mission. Instead, it poses itself as a temporary security force necessary for the upcoming mega-events, created and maintained only to protect the Brazilian elite alongside international tourists. In the wake, the well being of favela residents and their needs are sacrificed once again as the government’s attention turns to its own interests. Despite the program’s shortcomings, the UPP opened up a public discourse about police practices and their impact on favela residents. As a result, residents can now showcase their opposition through open resistance and promote their own participation in civil society through voicing their complaints and demands. The UPP was and continues to be a necessary program to strengthen ties between the government and favelas, but it must continue as a longer-term strategy to yield any significant and transformative results. The UPP must learn from these first eight years and continue to evolve, incorporating suggestions from favela residents.

6.2 Recommendations

In 2011, Cano optimistically evaluated the state of the UPP: “The ultimate criteria is, is the life of the people who live in these communities better than it used to be? And the answer is clearly yes. Is it perfect? The answer is clearly no. Can it be improved? Absolutely. So the question is how can we make it better.” The latter part of this evaluation stands true in 2015, as we optimistically assume the continuation of the UPP and then attempt to improve it. I have three main recommendations for the UPP program: to redefine the program and its objectives, to change policing methodology, and to extend the UPP program. All of these recommendations aim to strengthen the conceptualization, the implementation, and the prevalence of negative implications and consequences currently associated with the UPP program.

Redefine program and objectives

The UPP must redefine itself from a temporary security strategy to a long-term commitment to favela residents. The UPP must first define itself as its own branch of the police force, removing itself from under the control of the Military Police. With this move, the Military Police must also de-militarize and agree the UPP is the primary representative of the government in favela communities. As its own unit, the UPP will remove itself from the competitive nature of the Brazilian police force as a whole, separating itself from the hedonic treadmill of corruption and payouts that encourage inefficiency and ineffectiveness among the police. The UPP must then redefine its objectives from maintaining current policing practices and dedicating itself to community-based service based on the input from the favela communities themselves. Instead of defining themselves as “peacekeepers,” the UPP must see itself as the representatives and protectorates of favela residents with the goal to provide quality services to these populations. As opportunities in favelas and trust in the government and its forces increase, the UPP will become an ingrained and highly valued part of favelas. Alongside their roles in favelas themselves, the UPP must designate itself as the future model of Brazilian police forces as a whole and work toward changing police mentalities through their example. The UPP then becomes more than a community police force; it becomes a force within the police themselves that advocates for better policing practices.
Change policing methods

The UPP must reconsider one of the most basic elements at its conception: proximity policing. The UPP must begin the process of converting from proximity policing to community policing practices. The current state of proximity policing as exercised by the UPP maintains a relationship between officer and resident based on fear and impunity. To effectively gain the trust and showcase the mutual respect between the UPP and the favelas they serve, police officers must first recognize their positions as servants of the community, rather than donos of the territory. To convert to community policing, the UPP must actively organize and participate in public forums to exchange dialogue between residents and officers, draw future officers from the communities themselves, organize and provide social programming and public services provisioned by the state, and be trained to understand the marginalization of favela residents before entering into their communities. More consistent and honest feedback between officers and residents will incorporate residents into the public security process, giving them agency and the ability to voice their concerns and needs. With this information, UPP officers can more accurately provide the appropriate services and thus establish relationships with the communities.

The most important of these tasks – that will inevitably influence and strengthen the other jobs expected of a community policing force – is to provide and engage in social programming. These public services will build trust between officers and residents, more thoroughly integrate officers into communities, and provide necessary and previously nonexistent amenities and activities for favela residents. The UPP police strategy must either partner with or learn from the Rio+Social program provided by the Rio municipal government, adopting the collaborative approach that incorporates residents into the decision-making and information dissemination processes. These social programs must not be an afterthought to pacification, but rather precede pacification to begin providing the necessary services. Whether or not pacification is scheduled in a specific community, the state government of Rio de Janeiro must establish itself as a government supportive of the favelas through social programming and public services. By setting this precedent, perhaps favela communities themselves will more actively protest against their donos and demand government presence. This demand will not only reaffirm the government’s policies and practices, but will also showcase a newfound confidence in the government that has not and does not exist throughout favelas.

Extend the UPP program

As discussed in Chapter 4, the UPP has clear focus areas based on the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. These focuses included certain regions of Rio de Janeiro and a specific timeline of implementation. Both of these focuses must expand in order to generate real change through the UPP. First, the UPP must extend its reach beyond the RISP 1 region of Rio de Janeiro. Instead of targeting communities that are closely located to tourist attractions, the UPP must emphasize its focus on the most violent communities to validate its goal to decrease violence rates in the state. By only focusing on territories occupied by drug traffickers located in the South Zone, the UPP largely ignores the extortion and violence occurring in communities outside of the city’s center. This strategy essentially designates which areas of the city are off limits to violence, while demarking the regions where violence and criminality will be ignored.
and tolerated. The UPP must begin to acknowledge and then target criminal groups outside of the expected drug trafficking rhetoric, most notably militias, and catalyze anti-corruption campaigns within the police and within the political system. Outside of the actual locations of UPP forces, the UPP must also extend to acknowledge the complicating factor of scale in its expansion within larger communities, such as Complexo do Alemão, Rocinha, and Complexo da Maré. When the pacification process plans to enter large communities, it must account for this expansion and be flexible to change its policies as the process unravels. The current UPP process does conceptually allow for this space; however, the implementation realistically does not.

**Evaluation**

Within the few pacified communities, perhaps the most basic question is the best to ask: are the favelas better off now with the UPP than they were before, without the UPP? Again, it depends: the UPP does not immediately – or even in the first five years of implementation – generate positive change in the favelas across Rio; however, in the longer-term outlook of the city, the UPP was a necessary step in the right direction of integrating favelas into the folds of larger society. In the short-term, the UPP raises the possibility that perhaps life is better in some favelas. In Santa Marta, the UPP has caused positive change and security. As Cano describes, “We are not in an ideal situation but any stretch of the imagination, but we have to compare to what we had before. What we had before is people being killed regularly, shoot outs occurring every day, people being afraid of taking their kids to school, people being unable to go back home. So compared to that, it's a huge success. But if you compare it to policemen in Denmark, of course it's not a big success.” For the residents of Santa Marta, this change is palpable; however, in Complexo da Maré, the UPP has generated a stronger presence of war than had before between its rival criminal factions. To improve the experiences of favela communities with the UPP and communities without the UPP, the UPP must become a long-term strategy.

If the UPP continues past its current termination date in late summer of 2016, after the completion of the 2016 Olympic Games, it has the potential to convert this newfound focus on policing and effort to change practices into actual change within or through the UPP, or incite other activists to push for more sustainable change in other sectors of society. The masses remain skeptical of this possibility. Many – including 70% of UPP officers interviewed by Cano – believe the UPPs are “temporary” and were created only to provide security for the World Cup and the Olympics. If the UPP does indeed terminate as soon as the Olympics finish, the possibility of long-term change no longer exists. I agree with one interviewee, who described pacification as “a process of twenty, thirty years. It is forming a new generation.” To be effective, the UPP must continue, but not necessarily indefinitely. To eradicate the problems of police violence and marginalization built successively over the past fifty to one hundred years, the UPP needs to continue to evolve over a sustained period of time beyond the original eight years allotted for the program. This promise of commitment will not only change the landscape

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2 No Bullshit Rio+Rio Program (NBS, marketing company based in Rio de Janeiro), in discussion with the author, May 2014.
of police practices, but it will change the relationship between favelas and the government as the
government declares itself as a long-term investor in the future of the favelas and their residents.
Under these conditions, residents may attempt to incorporate the UPP into their communities and
criminal groups will be forced to permanently disband or relocate. Without commitment,
violece will continue as residents push against policy they believe is temporary, and criminal
groups prepare to reenter into their previous territories.

6.3 UPP as a Model

Why is the UPP even being considered as a potential model? Cano explains the UPP as
“an innovative… almost revolutionary… model within the police,” but is this true? Some blame
the Brazilian government’s “glossy exhibition” of the UPP as “something miraculous” that can
be sold to other countries. Others blame the professional image management of the program for the
widespread attention:

“[The UPP] runs its own press office as well as a well-maintained website… which
provides information on current developments – in English, too! In addition, UPP police
officers are trained in media relations. Journalists, social scientists and foreign
delegations are welcome to visit UPP stations, where they are supplied with information
(on the programme’s achievements). This intensive public-relations work has given rise
to the predominantly positive news reports. In the media, UPP police officers are
presented as close to the community, helpful and friendly. One key visual motif is that of
officers posing with children – often displaying a tender and caring physical contact.”

Despite all this noise, is the UPP really a model and, if so, a model of what? The UPP
could be a model of an attempt to revolutionize policing practices from the inside out. It could be
a model for sparking the discussion of the provision of public security as a fundamental right of a
nation’s citizens. It could be a model for slum integration into emerging market economies with
the use of the police. It could be a model for a strategy to decrease violence in areas with
abnormally high rates. If the UPP is to be used as a model, most importantly, it must be seen as
an incomplete version. The UPP is an effective model only if it used as a reference to construct
another model or as inspiration; however, its direct replication and application would be
anachronistic. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is a specific location with a specific history and thus a
specific set of problems. Ignácio Cano further explains the specific circumstances of Rio that
make the UPP potentially untranslatable:

“I think [making the UPP a model] only makes sense when you have heavy gunfire, when
you have a lot of shoot outs, and you have territorial control by armed groups. In this

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3 Cano, Os Donos do Morro, 143.
4 Ignácio Cano (Director of the LAV at UERJ), in discussion with Rio Radar, August 2011,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXy6DGFxdlE.
5 Malte Steinbrink, “Festifavelisation: mega-events, slums and strategic city-staging - the example of Rio de
Janeiro,” Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin 144, no. 2 (November 2013), 137,
http://www.academia.edu/3990824/Festifavelisation_mega-events_slums_and_strategic_city-
staging_the_example_of_Rio_de_Janeiro.
circumstance, I think it's a good strategy. In all other circumstances, I think it is very expensive and not very efficient strategy. For example, if you have a death squad, they don't patrol the entrances of the favela, they don't ask you who you are when you come in, they go at night and they kill whoever they think they have to kill. So having policemen walking up and down will not alter, it will be very expensive and will probably not hinder their ability to kill. So, just an example to say it makes full sense given these conditions. In any other, probably not the best strategy... because it's expensive and it does not cover all types of crimes.”

What works in the favelas will not necessarily work in other mega slums around the world, such as in the kamponds of Jakarta; in Neza-Chalco-Itza in Mexico City; in Dharavi in Mumbai; or in Orangi Town in Karachi, Sindh. The UPP, as one of the first of its kind, does initialize a movement to integrate slums into their surrounding societies and right the historic distance between the government and Brazil’s poor that can be translated to other regions and countries. The UPP has yet to officially break the undeclared war occurring in Rio de Janeiro, but its goals of peace, with time, may slowly result in a more accurate reality of peacetime.

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6 Ignácio Cano (Director of LAV at UERJ), in discussion with the author, May 2014.
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