DEPENDABLE COMPUTING ON INEXACT HARDWARE THROUGH ANOMALY DETECTION

by

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To my family
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ABSTRACT

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Reliability of transistors is on the decline as transistors continue to shrink in size. Aggressive voltage scaling is making the problem even worse. Scaled-down transistors are more susceptible to transient faults as well as permanent in-field hardware failures. In order to continue to reap the benefits of technology scaling, it has become imperative to tackle the challenges risen due to the decreasing reliability of devices for the mainstream commodity market. Along with the worsening reliability, achieving energy efficiency and performance improvement by scaling is increasingly providing diminishing marginal returns. More than any other time in history, the semiconductor industry faces the crossroad of unreliability and the need to improve energy efficiency.

These challenges of technology scaling can be tackled by categorizing the target applications in the following two categories: traditional applications that have relatively strict correctness requirement on outputs and emerging class of soft applications, from various domains such as multimedia, machine learning, and computer vision, that are inherently
inaccuracy tolerant to a certain degree. Traditional applications can be protected against hardware failures by low-cost detection and protection methods while soft applications can trade off quality of outputs to achieve better performance or energy efficiency.

For traditional applications, I propose an efficient, software-only application analysis and transformation solution to detect data and control flow transient faults. The intelligence of the data flow solution lies in the use of dynamic application information such as control flow, memory and value profiling. The control flow protection technique achieves its efficiency by simplifying signature calculations in each basic block and by performing checking at a coarse-grain level. For soft applications, I develop a quality control technique. The quality control technique employs continuous, light-weight checkers to ensure that the approximation is controlled and application output is acceptable. Overall, I show that the use of low-cost checkers to produce dependable results on commodity systems—constructed from inexact hardware components—is efficient and practical.
CHAPTER I

Introduction

The continual trend of shrinking transistor size and reducing their operating voltage leads to higher energy efficiency among many other benefits such as high speed operation and smaller size. However, this trend in scaling faces numerous challenges such as decreasing reliability of devices [20], increasing leakage current [21] and rapid increase in the cost of manufacturing [117]. As a result of technology scaling, unreliable components are becoming increasingly common in general-purpose commodity systems manufactured with the ongoing and upcoming generations of semiconductor technology. Industry experts [20] believe that designers face the demanding task of constructing reliable systems from these unreliable components. Along with the unreliability of devices, researchers [21] believe that energy efficiency is the key limiting factor to scaling. For the further advancement of semiconductor industry, solving the problem of constructing energy efficient systems from increasingly unreliable devices is of utmost importance. Therefore there is a dire need to construct systems that generate dependable results, whether faced with the challenge of unreliable hardware or improving energy efficiency.

First, integrated circuits manufactured with scaled-down transistors are less reliable [20,
The reliability of scaled down transistors is a major roadblock in the path of continued scaling. The results of unachieved reliability requirements can at best lead to unsatisfactory user experiences or at worst can tarnish the reputation of the company who designed it. Integrated circuits manufactured at these newer, smaller technology nodes are susceptible to transient and permanent in-field hardware failures even in commodity systems. With smaller and cheaper transistors becoming pervasive in mainstream computing, it is necessary to protect these devices against in-field errors. Moreover, the rate of errors is increasing for integrated circuits manufactured at smaller technology nodes and thus necessitates the need for protection of applications running on mainstream commodity processors. In commodity systems, area and power are primary design constraints, hence, low-cost reliability solutions are preferred.

Second, as we are moving towards smaller and smaller transistor geometries the performance gains and energy efficiency provided by scaling are becoming limited. The rate at which operating voltage can be reduced has slowed because threshold voltage cannot be scaled down any further without increasing leakage power. The threshold voltage of a transistor is usually scaled down along with the operating voltage. This reduction in threshold voltage exponentially increases the leakage current of the transistor, hence the leakage power also increases. Thus, achieving energy efficiency and performance improvement by scaling increasingly provides diminishing marginal returns necessitating the need for innovations across the system stack. One such method is trading off small percentage of program accuracy with a larger gain in performance/energy efficiency. This area of research is broadly known as approximate computing and has recently been explored by many researchers at all levels of the system stack [38, 40, 7, 129], i.e., from programming...
languages [38] to transistor level [49]. However, many of the approximate computing solutions do not address the problem of output quality control. To make approximate computing practical and useful providing dependable results by controlling output quality control is absolutely necessary.

The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. Problems in achieving low-cost reliability and the solutions proposed are briefly discussed in Section 1.1 and the challenges in obtaining good quality results and associated solutions are briefly discussed in Section 1.2.

1.1 Low-cost Reliability

A computer system can fail (malfunction) in numerous ways. Some of the causes of malfunctioning are faults in underlying hardware, software bugs or even user errors. In this work, my focus is on mitigating the effects of inexactness of the underlying hardware on the produced results. Two of most common causes of failure are permanent faults and transient hardware faults. Permanent faults are persistent hardware failures and are not a focus of this dissertation. As the name suggests, transient faults, also referred to as soft errors, are not persistent and do not render the computer system unusable for its lifetime. However, when a transient fault occurs in a computer system, it can corrupt the application output or crash the system. In this dissertation, I focus on the reliability issues caused by soft errors. Soft errors, also referred to as Single Event Upsets (SEUs), are caused by high energy particle strikes from space or Alpha particles or internal to chip voltage fluctuations or circuit crosstalk. Researchers generally agree that system-level soft errors increase with the number of transistor and tighter integration at future technologies [86, 44]. In general,
memories in a chip have been more susceptible to transient faults because memory cells have smaller geometries, higher densities and lower operating voltages. Chandra et al. [28] establish that voltage scaling exacerbates the susceptibility to particle strikes by reducing the critical charge at circuit nodes. They conclude that soft errors in logic (latches, flip-flops), not only memory elements, are an equally concerning problem at smaller technology nodes. Soft Error Rate (SER) is the rate at which a component encounters soft errors. SER for the logic on chip is steadily rising with technology scaling while SER for memory is expected to remain stable [120]. Intel projects that, with increasing chip density, the soft error problem can become a major threat to computer reliability [52].

Memory cells are usually protected by efficient solutions such as parity and/or Error Correcting Code (ECC). The regular structure of memory cells enables application of such solutions feasible. However, no such general solutions exist for errors in arbitrary logic inside a microprocessor. Hence, different efficient solutions are required at circuit, microarchitecture or software level to tackle the problem of soft errors in microprocessor logic. High reliability server class solutions such as DMR (Dual-Modular Redundancy) and TMR (Triple-Modular Redundancy) have high cost in terms of area/performance/power overheads. They are too costly to be practical in commodity market. Other multithreading-based solution, Redundant Multithreading (RMT) [108], run two copies of the original program for error detection. This solution, though, cheaper in comparison to DMR/TMR, has an overhead of running an extra thread for each thread in an application and thus is expensive for commodity market space. A lack of efficient solutions in commodity market space necessitates the need for efficient soft error reliability solutions.

To solve the problem of detecting soft errors cheaply, we propose a profiling-based
software-only application analysis and transformation solution. The goal is to develop a low cost solution which can be deployed for off-the-shelf commodity processors. The solution works by intelligently duplicating instructions that are likely to affect the program output, and comparing results between original and duplicated instructions to produce symptoms. The intelligence of our solution lies in the use of control flow, memory dependence, and value profiling to understand and exploit the common-case behavior of applications. This deviation from common case behavior, i.e. anomaly, possibly indicates the presence of error. For such cases, we propose a low-cost reliability solution (Chapter II). This is a solution to protect data-flow of an application.

Previous studies have reported that as much as 70% of the transient faults disturb program control flow [58, 130], making it critical to protect control flow. Traditional approaches employ signatures to check that every control flow transfer in a program is valid. While having high fault coverage, large performance overheads are introduced by such detailed checking. We propose a coarse-grain control flow checking method to detect transient faults in a cost effective way. Our software-only approach is centered on the principle of abstraction: control flow that exhibits simple run-time properties (e.g., proper path length) is almost always completely correct. Our solution targets off-the-shelf commodity systems to provide a low cost protection against transient faults. The proposed technique achieves its efficiency by simplifying signature calculations in each basic block and by performing checking at a coarse-grain level. The coarse-grain signature comparison points are obtained by the use of a region based analysis. Chapter III describes this technique in more details.
1.2 Quality Controlled Results

Marginal gains from scaling have forced computer architecture researchers to explore alternative avenues such as inexact accelerators to achieve energy efficiency and performance improvements. Computers are designed to produce results that are 100% numerically correct all the time. However, performance and energy efficiency of such systems can be improved by trading-off an exact numerical match of the outputs for performance and/or energy [38].

At the same time, a growing number of applications from various domains such as multimedia, machine learning and computer vision are inherently occasional inaccuracy tolerant, and therefore a good match for this trade-off. For these soft workloads, not all computations are inaccuracy tolerant (e.g., a loop trip count). We propose a compiler-based approach that takes advantage of soft computations inherent in the aforementioned class of workloads to bring down the cost of software-only error detection. The technique works by identifying a small subset of critical variables that are necessary for correct macro-operation of the program. Traditional duplication and comparison is used to protect these variables. For the remaining variables and temporaries that only affect the micro-operation of the program, strategic expected value checks are inserted into the code. Intuitively, a computation-chain result near the expected value is either correct or close enough to the correct result so that it does not matter for non-critical variables. Chapter IV describes this technique in more details.

Approximate computing can also be employed for the aforementioned emerging class of soft workloads. The approximated output of such applications, even though not 100%
numerically correct, is often either useful or the difference is unnoticeable to the end user. This opens up a new design dimension to trade-off application performance and energy consumption with output correctness. However, a largely unaddressed challenge in this area is quality control: how to ensure the user experience meets a prescribed level of quality. Current approaches either do not monitor output quality or use sampling approaches to check a small subset of the output assuming that it is representative. While these approaches have been shown to produce average errors that are acceptable, they often miss large errors without any means to take corrective actions. To overcome these challenges, we propose \textit{Rumba} for online detection and correction of large approximation errors in an approximate accelerator-based computing environment. Rumba employs continuous lightweight checks in the accelerator to detect large approximation errors and then fixes these errors by exact re-computation on the host processor. The lightweight checks work by detecting the anomaly in the series of output produced or by predicting if the accelerator is going to make large error for certain inputs. Rumba exploits temporal similarity commonly found in computing domains amenable to approximation for efficient detection and lightweight error prediction methods, and application idempotence commonly occurring in data parallel computing patterns (e.g., map and stencil) for selective correction. Overall Rumba, dynamically investigate an application’s output to detect elements that have large errors and fix these elements with a low-overhead recovery technique. The detailed working of Rumba is presented in Chapter V.

Another neural network can be used as a checker to predict the error of an neural accelerator. The co-design of checker and the accelerator is an interesting design space that can provide better error vs. energy efficiency trade-offs for certain application. Some applica-
Figure 1.1: A high-level flow diagram of the overall process. Compilation phase performs profiling and an analysis of vulnerable parts of an application. It also analyzes an application, with the help of developer provided annotations, for approximate parts. The checkers are inserted as a part of the compilation process. Recovery for transient errors or to get better quality results is initiated at runtime.

Applications produce excessive error even with the best possible configuration of the accelerator. Hence, such applications as such are not amenable for approximation on an accelerator. However, with a combination of the accelerator and a checker, the error can be brought down to an acceptable level, allowing energy-efficient execution. This idea is explored in Chapter VI.

In this dissertation, I focus on the issues of reliability in traditional applications and quality control in approximate computing for soft computing applications. The working of overall system is shown in Figure 1.1. Application profiling is done at the compile time with a representative set of inputs. With the help of profiling, intelligent duplication is performed. Applications amenable for approximation are also analyzed to insert specific quality control checkers. At runtime, these checker firings control the initiation of recovery. Checkers check for transient errors or bad quality results and are always on, hence, should have very low cost to avoid associated overheads. However, recovery can be a more costly mechanism as it is initiated relatively infrequently. With this overall flow, the specific
contributions of this dissertation are as follows:

1.3 Contributions

- A selective instruction duplication approach that leverages memory profiling and edge profiling in compiler analysis to identify and replicate a small subset of vulnerable instructions not covered by symptom-based fault detection. Novel use of value profiling for the generation of software symptoms.

- A novel abstraction based technique to insert simplified signatures for control flow checking. Under the proposed scheme, more complex signatures can be used to explore trade-offs in performance overhead and fault coverage. A novel region based method to insert checking at a coarse granularity abstracting away the details of fine-grain control flow.

- A fully automated compiler analysis and transformation method that partitions computations among three categories: to be protected by traditional duplication, to be protected by soft value checks or not to be protected. This method also judiciously performs selective duplication and inserts value checks. Our technique does not require any program annotations.

- Light-weight online detection policies using exponential moving average and low-cost error prediction methods to detect large error output elements generated by an approximate computing system. The ability to manage performance and accuracy trade-offs for each application at runtime using a dynamic tuning parameter.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the profile-based code duplication to protect against transient errors. Chapter III describes the control protection mechanism to protect against transient errors. Chapter IV discusses a method to efficiently detect transient faults for soft applications. The methods to control the quality of output results under approximation are proposed in Chapter V. The design space of approximation accelerator is explored in Chapter VI. Finally, Chapter VII concludes this dissertation and proposes possible future extensions.
CHAPTER II

Efficient Soft Error Protection using Profile Information

Successive generations of processors use smaller transistors in the quest to make more powerful computing systems. It has been previously studied that smaller transistors make processors more susceptible to soft errors (transient faults caused by high energy particle strikes). Such errors can result in unexpected behavior and incorrect results. In this chapter, we describe a profiling based technique that protects traditional applications against soft errors. The criteria of evaluation here is any corruption in output is user unacceptable and should be avoided. We propose a profiling-based software-only application analysis and transformation solution. The solution works by intelligently duplicating instructions that are likely to affect the program output, and comparing results between original and duplicated instructions. The intelligence of our solution is garnered through the use of control flow, memory dependence, and value profiling to understand and exploit the common-case behavior of applications. The anomalies are treated as an indication of errors. The overall goal of the work in this chapter is to minimize the number of output corruptions.
2.1 Introduction

Any microprocessor-based computing system is expected to work reliably during its lifetime. A typical set of tasks performed on a commodity level computer system could include video games, web browsing, bank transactions, and more. While running these applications on their computers, users want their experience to be fault-free. Modern computer systems are built using billions of tiny transistors, and even a single transistor failure can render a computer system useless. Most hardware vendors have a lifetime reliability target to achieve an acceptable product quality.

The focus of the work in this chapter is soft errors, or single-event-upsets (SEUs). Soft errors, also referred to as transient faults, are primarily caused by neutron particle strikes from cosmic radiation and alpha particles from packaging material impurities. As the name suggests, transient faults are not persistent and do not render the computer system unusable for its lifetime. However, when a transient fault occurs in a computer system, it can corrupt the application output or crash the system.

Soft errors due to packaging contamination have been reported for several decades. In 1978, Intel Corporation reported that chip packaging modules were contaminated with Uranium from a mine nearby [79]. Neutrons form the atmosphere were to blame in another incident in 1996, when E. Normand [93] detailed single event upsets in RAM chips. A third example of such errors was noted in 2004 by Cypress Semiconductor who claimed a number of incidents related to soft errors [137]. One single error resulted in the crash of a data center while another series of errors caused frequent shutdowns in a massive automotive factory.
The amount of charge released by high energy particle strikes determines whether a transistor will malfunction or not. If the size and operating voltage of transistors in a system is small, it is more likely to be affected by particle strikes. Transistor sizes and operating voltages are decreasing, making future technology generations more susceptible to soft errors [120]. Traditionally, reliability research has focused largely on the high-performance server market. Notable past works in this area have been the IBM S/360 (now Z-series servers) [123, 12] and the HP NonStop systems [15]. Both utilize large-scale modular redundancy for effective fault tolerance. As such, they are not feasible outside mission-critical domains. Additional research has aimed to provide fault protection via redundant multithreading [108, 100, 91, 47, 122]. Since processors which can execute multiple threads simultaneously are increasingly commonplace, the idea of using separate threads for error checking is a possibility. These techniques often require significant extra computations. Diva [9] is a less expensive alternative utilizing a small checker core to monitor computations performed by a larger microprocessor. Lower cost hardware checkers based solutions such as Argus [81] and others [134, 23] require small hardware changes. These hardware checkers based solutions still won’t work for off-the-shelf hardware.

Embedded design spaces have relatively tight cost budgets because of intense competition. In these markets, area and power are primary considerations. Consumers are not willing to pay the additional costs (in terms of hardware price, performance loss, or reduced battery lifetime) for the solutions adopted in the server space. At the same time, reliability requirements are also not stringent; consumers can tolerate glitches in video playback, and infrequent crashes of their desktop/laptop computers (usually caused by software bugs). The key challenge facing the consumer electronics market in future technologies is provid-
ing just enough coverage (the percentage of errors that either get masked or can be detected and recovered from) of soft errors so that the effective fault rate remains at levels. Providing solutions which can achieve this coverage “on the cheap” is the goal of the work in this chapter.

To achieve statistically significant soft error coverage at minimal overheads, we propose a software-only approach for detecting soft errors. This work is built upon two areas of prior research: symptom-based fault detection and software-based instruction duplication. Symptom-based detection schemes recognize that applications often exhibit anomalous behavior (symptoms) in the presence of a transient fault [132, 70]. These symptoms can include memory access exceptions, divide-by-zero, and even mispredicted branches.

At runtime, an individual symptom doesn’t always signify a soft error, but a judicious use of these symptoms can be used to trigger a recovery. Although symptom-based detection is inexpensive, the amount of coverage that can be obtained from a symptom-only approach is typically limited. To address this limitation, we make use of the second area of prior research, software-based instruction duplication [101, 102]. With this approach, instructions are duplicated and results are validated within a single thread of execution. This solution has the advantage of being purely software-based, requiring no specialized hardware, and can achieve coverage of more than 90%. However, the overheads in terms of performance and power are quite high since a large fraction of the application is replicated.

One of the key insights that this work exploits is that the majority of transient faults can either be ignored (because they do not ultimately propagate to user-visible corruptions at the application level) or are easily detected by light-weight symptom-based detection. To address the remaining faults, compiler analysis is applied to identify high-value portions
of the application code that are both susceptible to soft errors (i.e., likely to corrupt system state) and statistically unlikely to be covered by the timely appearance of symptoms. These portions of the code are then protected with instruction duplication. Our solution intelligently selects between relying on symptoms and judiciously applying instruction duplication to optimize the coverage and performance trade-off. In this way, our solution provides a low-cost, high-coverage solution for soft errors in embedded microprocessors targeted for the consumer electronics market [62]. However, unlike the high-availability IBM and HP servers that can provide provable guarantees on coverage, this work provides only opportunistic coverage, and is therefore not suitable for mission-critical applications.

The contributions of this chapter are as follows:

- A software solution which does not need any user annotations in the application to generate reliability-aware code and works on applications written in a variety of languages.

- A selective instruction duplication approach that leverages memory profiling and edge profiling in compiler analysis to identify and replicate a small subset of vulnerable instructions not covered by symptom-based fault detection.

- Novel use of value profiling for the generation of software symptoms.

- Microarchitectural fault injection experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed solution in terms of fault coverage and performance overhead.
2.2 Background and Motivation

2.2.1 Soft Error Rate (SER)

The effect of soft errors is becoming more pronounced as a result of transistor scaling. Aggressive scaling on one hand provides cheaper and more abundant transistors to pack on an individual chip, while on the other hand making each individual transistor more susceptible to soft errors. Traditionally, memory cells are more vulnerable to soft errors because they use smaller transistors to achieve higher densities and have inherent feedback mechanisms that can exacerbate the effect of small disturbances arising due to high energy particle strikes. Memory cells are mostly protected against soft errors by using parity checks or Error Correcting Codes (ECC). Due to shrinking device sizes for implementing logic in processors, the individual transistors in logic are also becoming vulnerable to soft errors. Additionally, combinational logic faults are harder to detect and correct. Shivakumar et al. [120] reported that the SER for SRAM cells is expected to remain stable, while the SER for logic is steadily rising. The aforementioned factors have motivated researchers to propose solutions to protect the microprocessor logic core against transient faults.

Feng et al. [41] and Shivakumar et al. [120] presented data for the effect of device scaling on the failures in time (FIT*) metric. They showed an exponential increase in the SER for future technology generations. Since for future technologies it will be hard to power on all the transistors at once, aggressive voltage scaling is expected to be used. Voltage scaling further exacerbates the problem of soft errors as smaller disturbances in circuits will be able to flip a bit.

*The number of failures observed per one billion hours of operation.
Fortunately, around 75-92% of transient faults get masked (i.e., do not corrupt actual program state) due to architecture- or application-level masking. This masking can also occur at the circuit level. Our experiments show this masking rate to be around 78% collectively from all sources. Accounting for this masking, the raw SER for the present technology generation translates to about one failure every month in a population of 100 chips. For a typical commodity system such as laptop or mobile systems, this failure rate would be unnoticeable. However, in future technology nodes like 16 nm, the user-visible fault rate could be as high as one failure a day for every chip. The potential for this dramatic increase in the effective fault rate will necessitate incorporating soft error tolerance mechanisms into even low-cost commodity systems.

2.2.2 Instruction Duplication

In this Section, we provide an overview of the terminology used and point out the key differences with previously proposed instruction-duplication-based solutions. SWIFT [101] proposed the idea of duplicating instructions in a single thread of execution. The authors of SWIFT explain that a program has executed correctly if all the stores in the program have executed correctly assuming the program only communicates by writing data out through stores. Therefore, SWIFT recursively duplicated instructions by walking the data flow chains of the operands of stores and by protecting the control flow. Shoestring [41] improved upon this idea by considering only global stores and by protecting the control flow only for the immediate branch that affects the execution of a global store instruction. For classifying instructions, the terminology is adopted from Shoestring. The initial analysis phase of our solution classifies instructions into the categories described below.
Figure 2.1: Duplicating instructions in a single thread of execution: Part (a) shows the original code and Part (b) shows the code after the duplicated instructions are inserted. Solid edges represent the data flow edges and dashed edges represent control flow edges. In (b), underlined nodes are duplicated nodes, and C and B nodes represent compare and branch instructions to compare the results from duplicated and original dataflow chains. The node with dashed outline is a symptom generating instruction.

- **Symptom-generating**: these instructions (e.g., address generation of loads and stores.) are likely to produce detectable symptoms if they consume a corrupted input.

- **High-value**: instructions (e.g., operands of I/O system calls.) which are likely to corrupt the output of the program if they consume a corrupted input.

- **Safe**: these instructions (e.g., those directly consumed by symptom-generating instructions.) are naturally covered by symptom-generating consumers.

Figure 2.1 shows the duplication process. Assuming node 2 is an operand of a high value instruction, the duplication starts at this node and walks the data flow chain until a safe instruction (node 3) is encountered. A duplicated instruction is placed just after the
original instruction in program order. Compare and branch instructions are inserted to compare the results and to divert control flow to a recovery basic block. If the results match, the high value instruction is executed normally; Otherwise, recovery is triggered through the recovery basic block. In addition to encountering a safe instruction, the recursive duplication is terminated when 1) no more producers exist, and 2) the producers are already duplicated. Safe instructions are determined based on the probability of whether or not a particular instruction would generate a symptom if corrupted by a soft error.

2.2.3 Proposed Solution Landscape

As previously mentioned, a soft error solution that targets the commodity user space needs to be designed with lower overhead and acceptable coverage as targets. Figure 2.2 (data used from [41]) is a conceptual plot of overhead and coverage trade-off for symptom-based and duplication based fault detection schemes. Our solution is a hybrid of these two techniques and tries to achieve as much fault coverage as possible by leveraging the strengths of each technique. The bottom highlighted region in this plot indicates the amount of fault coverage that results from intrinsic sources of soft error masking, available naturally. The natural masking can occur because of many reasons such as register values being dead (i.e., such registers would be overwritten before they will be read) or Y-branches [131] (i.e., sometimes changing the direction of a conditional branch doesn’t affect the correct program behavior). Among the remaining unmasked faults, symptom-based detection relies mostly on hardware exceptions and their coverage quickly saturates. The saturation of fault coverage provided by symptom based methods is expected because these schemes rely on rare hardware exceptions such as page faults, divide-by-zero, etc. If
Increasing overhead

Increasing fault coverage

 Fault coverage from different sources of masking
(75% - 92%)

More than one failure per day

One failure per month

Figure 2.2: The trade-off between overhead and fault coverage from two existing fault detection schemes: symptom-based detection and instruction duplication-based detection. Also indicated is the region of the solution space targeted by our proposed technique. Our solution is aiming to provide between 90% and 99% coverage with little overhead. The dashed horizontal lines show user-visible failure rate for a single chip in a 16 nm technology node with aggressive voltage scaling. This is a conceptual plot and is not to scale.

more frequently occurring microarchitectural events such as branch mispredicts and cache misses are included as symptoms, then recovery may be triggered more frequently, leading to an unacceptable amount of overhead [132]. In general, symptom-based methods provide good coverage at a relatively low overhead.

The coverage versus performance curve is far less steep for instruction duplication; The coverage increases almost linearly with the amount of code duplication. One advantage of instruction-based duplication is that the amount of coverage can be tuned according to an application’s requirements by providing more or less duplication of code.
Figure 2.2 is generated in the context of a single 16 nm chip with aggressive voltage scaling. The fault coverage provided by intrinsic sources of masking translates to more than one failure per day. This level of fault coverage is clearly unacceptable and might result in user visible corruptions very frequently. To achieve a more imperceptible failure rate, the fault coverage must be improved. Symptom-based and instruction-duplication methods combined can provide an acceptable level of coverage.

Neither symptom-based nor instruction duplication-based techniques provide a stand-alone solution to achieve the desired coverage and performance benefits. The proposed solution in this chapter tries to strike a balance between performance overhead and fault coverage by exploiting the strengths of each technique. Figure 2.2 also shows the solution landscape targeted by our solution.

2.2.4 Opportunities for Profile Based Duplication

In the past, profiling information has been successfully used in profile-guided optimizations (PGOs) to improve the performance of a program [48]. GCC [57] and Intel’s compiler (icc) can use profiling information to generate an efficient program binary. Most optimizations based on profiling data work by uncovering previously unexplored opportunities. For example, if a multiply operation generates the same invariant value frequently, then the multiply operation can be optimized away with a check inserted for the correct value. Similarly, edge profiling and memory profiling can be used in optimizations such as partial dead-code-elimination, improved object layout, and more.

In this chapter, we use edge profiling, memory profiling and value profiling for the first time (to the best of our knowledge) in the context of code duplication for protection against
soft errors. With profiling information we can exploit the common case behavior of a program to duplicate only those critical instructions. Different types of profiling information enables us to ignore unnecessary duplication of instructions that are unlikely to cause program output corruption in the presence of a transient fault. For example, in the context of having the same invariant value generated by an instruction, we insert a comparison with the specific invariant value in the code. The failure of this comparison then indicates the possibility of a transient fault and triggers the recovery mechanism via a jump to recovery code.

Specific details on different kinds of profile data used are presented in Section 2.3.

2.3 Proposed Solution

The main underlying observation behind our proposed solution is that 100% reliability is not always required. We need to keep the user visible corruptions at a level users have become accustomed to. Sensitive applications that are required to be executed reliably can be transformed with the compiler techniques developed as a part of the proposed solution. These applications will run marginally slower but will be able to tolerate more soft errors. Our proposed solution uses the idea of instruction duplication in a single thread of execution as explained in Section 2.2.2, and adds profiling-based intelligent tracing of dependences manifesting through memory to generate more efficient duplication code. In essence, our solution uses the dynamic behavior of applications to generate efficient code for transient fault detection.
2.3.1 Overview of proposed solution

Figure 2.3 shows our proposed solution framework in the context of machine-executable generation using the LLVM compiler framework [66]. The first step in this process is to convert the source code of the application to LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR, also called LLVM bit-code). In LLVM terminology, *passes* perform the transformations and optimizations that make up the compiler. Passes operating at the IR level either analyze the IR code or transform it from IR to IR, performing optimizations. Our duplication code framework is written as a pass in LLVM. The reliability-aware code generation pass analyzes and transforms the code by inserting duplicate instructions and comparisons as previously described in Section 2.2.2.

![Figure 2.3](image.png)

*Figure 2.3:* This Figure shows the flow of application compilation. LLVM bit-code is the internal representation of the LLVM compiler infrastructure. Our proposed solution operates at the LLVM bit-code level. Classification and analysis phases identify vulnerable parts of an application, and then the duplication phase protects the most vulnerable instructions by duplicating code.

An intuition behind our idea is that applications predominantly communicate to the external world using I/O library calls, and if we can capture the true input data flow chain of the operands of these calls, we can better protect the program output from getting corrupted. Under this observation, we can capture most, if not all, of the program I/O. This
type of approach is suitable for our low overhead approach as we don’t target 100% fault coverage. We include all library call and function call instructions as high-value instructions. An example where a program doesn’t communicate using library calls is with the use of memory mapped I/O. An application might choose to memory map a file to communicate to the external world. Memory mapped locations can be used just like an array - direct loads and stores can be made to these memory locations. Using our technique, we can consider all stores as high value (at higher overhead) to protect applications with memory-mapped I/O.

We use LAMP [78], a toolset to trace and record the aliasing of memory addresses, to obtain memory profiling information. LAMP allows us to determine the data dependences that manifest through memory by reading and writing values at the same address. While duplicating instructions, our duplication algorithm walks the producer chain, considering the dependences through memory. In the recursive duplication of the producer chains of the operands of high value instructions, whenever a load is encountered, we consider the stores that aliased with the load and duplicate their producer chains too. By considering aliasing stores, the duplication algorithm of our solution achieves better and more useful code duplication. In our solution, the duplication process starts from the operands of library calls (high-value instructions). If a load is encountered during duplication, the compiler pass obtains all the stores that wrote to the address from which the load is reading using the memory profiling information. The duplication process considers these stores as potential candidates that can corrupt program output. The producer chains of these stores are also protected by duplication. The remainder of this section describes the complete process from the analysis of the instructions to code duplication including the insertion of comparison
2.3.2 Overhead Reduction Without Losing Coverage

As mentioned previously, our solution detects soft errors by adding extra instructions in a single thread of execution, incurring a penalty in performance. In this section, we investigate techniques to reduce the overhead by using various kinds of profiling information. In particular, we utilize edge profiling for not protecting infrequently executed instructions, memory profiling to find load and store aliases and identify silent stores, and value profiling to get the information about instructions which produce statistically invariant values. The performance overhead incurred because of instruction duplication can be further reduced by using information about the runtime behavior of applications through profiling. Information about the runtime behavior of programs enables us to remove duplication for protecting the code that doesn’t provide significant fault coverage.

2.3.2.1 Simple Edge Profile based Pruning

The intuition behind this optimization is that frequently executed instructions should not be duplicated to protect an infrequently executed instruction. The probability of a soft error affecting an infrequently executed instruction is relatively low and so to protect such an instruction, unnecessary duplication of frequently executed instructions should not be performed. An example of this is shown in Figure 2.4. At the time of duplicating the instruction (node 4) in \( bb3 \), we check whether its operand-generating instruction (node 2) is executed frequently in comparison to the instruction itself. If this happens to be the case, the duplication is terminated for that particular data flow chain. If this optimization is used,
then node 2 wouldn’t be duplicated and as a result of this, we duplicate fewer instructions.

**Figure 2.4:** This Figure shows an example where execution frequency-based optimization is effective. The solid edges represent data flow edges and dashed edges represent control flow edges. Control flow edges are annotated with the execution frequency of the edge obtained using a profile run. Underlined numbers represent duplicated instructions. While duplicating an instruction in basic block \textit{bb3}, if its operands’ parent basic block is executed 100 times more frequently, then we don’t duplicate its operand.

### 2.3.2.2 Using Memory Profiling Information

We use memory profiling to obtain information about aliasing between loads and stores. Also, memory profiling is used to identify silent stores that exist in an application. Further descriptions of these techniques follow.

**Dependences Through Memory:** As pointed out in Section 2.3.1, to duplicate the true dependences of the producer chains of high value instructions, we need load/store dependence information. Memory profiling provides us with this information. If we have the
memory profiling information available at the time of duplication, intelligent duplication can be performed. e.g., only library and function calls can be considered as high value instructions and only the operands of stores that alias with the loads in the producer chain of library call operands need to be protected.

**Silent Store Optimization:** A silent store is defined as a store that writes the same value to a memory location that is already present at that location. As reported in many previous studies, a significant percentage of total stores are silent. Bell et al. [13] report 18% to 64% of total stores as silent for SPEC95 benchmarks. We have implemented silent store profiling as an extension of the LAMP toolset. In experiments with SPECINT2000 benchmarks, we observed silent stores ranging from 0.01% to 72% of total stores. The presence of high fractions of silent stores can be exploited to our advantage.

For the purpose of this work, while doing recursive duplication, if we encounter a store which is almost always silent then we stop the recursive duplication. Considering the high percentage of stores that exist in benchmark applications, we can save in terms of instruction duplication. The intuition behind this idea is that even if a corrupted value is written by a store it will be written correctly in subsequent executions of the same store. The silent store removal optimization is explained in Figure 2.5 through an example. The duplication starts from the library call by walking the Data Flow Graph (DFG) and whenever a load is encountered, the recursive duplication continues with the operands of the stores that write to the same address as the load. Figure 2.5(a) shows duplication without considering the silent store optimization, and we end up duplicating more instructions. Figure 2.5(b) shows duplication when silent store optimization is enabled. If a store in the recursive duplication
Figure 2.5: This Figure represents the control and data flow graphs for an example code. Solid arrows represent data flow edges and dashed edges represent control flow edges. In part (a), instructions 1 and 2 are both duplicated (seen underlined), with comparisons (C) and branches (B) to recovery code if a comparison fails. L represents a load instruction. If a silent store is on the path of the recursive producer chain, then the duplication process is terminated at that store and no source operands of the store are duplicated, as seen in part (b). The store instruction ‘S’ is assumed to be a silent store for this example.

of a producer chain turns out to be silent, we terminate recursive duplication. This reduces the number of instructions duplicated. We use a threshold of 80% for a store to be considered silent since at runtime, it is not guaranteed that a store considered silent will always write the same value, and if a transient fault affects the store at such an execution instant, our technique will miss the fault. Such instances are expected to be rare because we choose a high threshold to classify a store to be silent.
2.3.3 Software Symptom Generation using Value Profiling

As mentioned in section 2.2.3, fault coverage that can be harnessed by using hardware symptoms saturates quickly (i.e., adding more symptoms doesn’t improve fault coverage by a great extent). We have developed a novel value profiling-based method to generate software symptoms. If an instruction generates the same value almost 100% of the time,
we can use that value and compare it to the value generated by the same instruction at runtime. If the value generated at runtime differs from the one that the instruction generates very frequently, it is assumed that a fault has occurred and the recovery mechanism is triggered. Since for each value comparison we need to insert one compare (cmp) and one branch instruction, these instructions should be only inserted when they provide benefits in comparison to unintelligent duplication of the data flow chain. The benefits can only be seen in cases if the data flow chain is long and the count of instructions which would have been duplicated is greater than 2 (value cmp + branch instruction). In essence, this technique is expected to improve fault coverage by providing software symptoms and reduce overhead by a small amount.

An example where value profiling would be useful is provided in Figure 2.6. Figure 2.6(a) shows straight up duplication without considering value profiling. Say instruction 3 of Figure 2.6(a) generates the value ‘0’ more than 99% of the time during the profiled execution of the program. While doing duplication by recursively traversing the operands, if instruction 3 is encountered in Figure 2.6(b) then an extra compare instruction is inserted to compare the value generated by it to ‘0’. If these two values do not match at runtime, then the recovery mechanism is triggered. Although rare, it is possible that at runtime, the application encounters different inputs and so instruction 3 produces output other than 0. Since this is rare case, the recovery should be initiated only once from the same place; if the comparison fails at a location twice from the same place, such requests for recovery are ignored.
2.4 Experimental Setup

This chapter presents a solution to target soft errors induced by transient faults. The main cause of soft errors in microprocessors is high energy particle strikes. The experiments with high energy particle strikes conducted by Dixit et al. [35] are not feasible in academic studies such as the one presented here. An acceptable alternative to these experiments is the use of statistical fault injections (SFI) into a microarchitectural model of a processor. SFI has been previously used in validating the solutions proposed to solve the problem of soft errors. For the purpose of this work, we use a single bit-flip fault model implemented in the microarchitectural model of an ARM processor.

For profiling the SPECINT2000 benchmarks we have used training data provided in the benchmark suite corresponding to each benchmark. While running the benchmark on the simulator, we utilized test data provided in the benchmark suite. We only use training data for profiling. However, profiling information from multiple runs of a program with representative inputs can be combined easily in our profiling infrastructure.

2.4.1 Compiler Passes

We have used the LLVM [66] compiler infrastructure to implement the reliability-aware code generation pass. This pass uses internal information from other analysis passes such as memory profiling and value profiling to produce bitcode with duplicated instructions. The LLVM code generation framework is then used to generate ARM binaries from the bitcode with duplicated instructions. Some optimization passes such as machine common subexpression elimination can remove the duplicated instructions. We have disabled them during
the phase when LLVM prepares the IR for code generation. In some cases, the instruction scheduling can also interfere with the relative order of symptom generating instructions and duplication. This causes the wrong value to propagate and a delay in generation of symptoms. For such cases, a false dependency can be created to stop such relative movement of symptom generating instructions with respect to duplicated instructions.

Since LLVM supports a number of front-ends (including C/C++), the developed pass is capable of generating reliability aware code for applications written in many languages. The pass takes LLVM IR as input and also produces IR with duplicated instructions. The other benefit of operating at the IR level is that all the code generation targets supported by LLVM (Alpha, ARM, etc.) can be used with the solution presented in this work. We have performed all experiments targeting an ARM architecture. If the LLVM bitcode is target independent, our code duplication framework can be used as-is to generate machine executable for a multitude of targets.

2.4.2 Fault Injection Framework

The fault model used in this work is a single bit-flip model. This model has been widely used in experimental evaluation of the previously proposed solutions to tackle the problem of soft errors. These faults are inserted by flipping a random bit at a random cycle during the course of application run. For the initial experiments, we injected faults randomly into the register file. In our experiments, faults in other microarchitectural structures are not explicitly injected, but faults in other structures predominantly manifest through register file as corrupted states. Thus, the register file is an attractive target for fault injection experiments. Wang et al. [133] showed that the bulk of transient fault-induced failures
are dominated by corruptions introduced from injections into the register file. Overall, our technique is capable of detecting faults injected into other microarchitectural units that affect the program. Thus, injecting faults only into register file is a limitation of our evaluation infrastructure and is not a limitation of our proposed technique. For the purpose of this work, we have used the GEM5 [17] simulator. The simulator was run in ARM syscall emulation mode and modeled the ARMv7-a profile of ARM architecture. We have used a model of the in-order ARM architecture. Since our injection site is the register file, we expect that an out-of-order model wouldn’t affect our conclusions significantly. In fact, we believe that an out-of-order model will improve our results because duplication of instructions in a single thread of execution results in extra instruction level parallelism which an out-of-order model could exploit efficiently. The details of the processor configuration used for the experiments are in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: GEM5 Simulator parameters (models an ARMv7-a profile of ARM architecture).

<table>
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<td>Physical register file size</td>
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<td>Simulation Mode</td>
<td>Syscall Emulation</td>
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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1-I/L1-D cache</td>
<td>32KB, 2-way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 cache (unified)</td>
<td>2MB, 16-way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTLB/ITLB</td>
<td>64 entries (each)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The experimental results shown in this chapter are produced with fault injection trials. At the start of each trial a random physical register and a random bit are selected for injection. The selected bit is then flipped at a random time during the application run and the program executes with this modified register data. We have only used user mode registers to inject faults. Injecting faults in privileged mode registers would yield a higher masking
rate because no benchmarks use these registers and so, injected faults would have no effect. To stress test our technique, we chose to ignore injecting faults in privileged mode registers and as a result, a lower masking rate is observed in comparison to the masking rate reported in previous research [133] efforts with soft errors.

To calculate the statistical significance of a given number of fault injection trials, we use the works of Leveugle et al. [69]. We need 96 fault injection trials for each benchmark to have a 10% margin of error and confidence level of 95%. Ideally, we would like to perform our experiments with a 5% margin of error and a confidence level of 95% but this amounts to 384 trials per benchmark. Considering we have 10 benchmarks and we need perform fault injection experiments for full duplication, the baseline, and our proposed technique, running 384 trials per benchmark would lead to a very long simulation time. The approximate time would be 23040 (3*10*384*2) hours of simulation assuming 2 hours of average runtime for each benchmark. Therefore, we chose 100 fault injection trials for each benchmark to yield results with reasonable accuracy in a timely manner. After the fault injection, the program runs until completion and the log files are collected. At the end of every simulation the log files are analyzed to determine the outcome of the run as described below. The result of each trial is classified into one of four categories:

1. **Masked**: The injected fault did not corrupt the program output. Application-level or architecture level masking occurred in this case.

2. **Covered by symptoms**: The injected fault produces a symptom such as a page fault or divide-by-zero fault so that a recovery can be triggered. The next section describes the recovery support in further detail.
3. **SWDetect**: The injected fault was detected by the extra comparison inserted at the time of duplication.

4. **Silent corruptions or infinite loop**: Faults that produce user visible corruptions, cause early program termination, or do not terminate in definite time are classified into this category.

The result classifications of the injection experiments in this chapter are based on the fact that only user-visible corruptions really matter. From an architecture perspective, this idea of failure may seem inaccurate, but it is consistent with recent symptom-based works and is the most appropriate in the context of evaluating our current work. The main motivation behind our solution is that the cost of ensuring reliability can be reduced by focusing on hiding only the faults that are noticeable by the end user at run-time. Therefore, the metric of importance is not the number of faults that propagate into the microarchitectural state, but rather the percentage of faults that actually do result in user-visible failures.

### 2.4.3 Recovery Support

Our solution relies on the ability to roll back processor state to a clean checkpoint. Wang and Patel [132] indicate that checkpointing and recovery are possible if the fault can be detected within a window of 1000 instructions for speculated pipelines. The results presented in Section 2.5 assume that in modern/future processors, a mechanism for recovering to a checkpointed state of 1000 instructions in the past will already be required for aggressive performance speculation.
2.4.4 Benchmarks

We have used 10 applications from the SPECINT2000 benchmark suite (gzip, vpr, gcc, mcf, crafty, perlbmk, parser, gap, vortex, bzip2) as representative workloads in experiments, and they are compiled with standard -O3 optimizations. In this chapter, multithreaded programs are not considered. However, we do not foresee any problems of using our technique with race-free multithreaded programs. Code duplication in a multithreaded environment may uncover hidden concurrency bugs because the extra duplicated instructions inserted may change the relative ordering of instructions in the simultaneous execution of threads. In the context of embedded systems if the change in execution time affects program output, these programs might not run correctly after partial duplication. Experiments with multithreaded programs are left as an interesting direction to explore further.

2.5 Experimental Results

In this section, the effectiveness of various techniques presented in this chapter is analyzed using the experimental setup described earlier. First, the data for silent stores is presented. We then analyze the maximum amount of fault coverage we can obtain from full duplication. Finally, the effect of using memory profiling for tracing dependences through memory is analyzed in comparison to previous works.

2.5.1 Silent Stores

The % Dynamic silent stores column in Figure 2.7 shows the number of dynamic silent stores as a percentage of total stores for various applications. 176.gcc, 181.mcf,
Figure 2.7: The % Dynamic silent stores bar shows dynamic silent stores as a percentage of total dynamic stores in a benchmark. The high percentage of silent stores in some benchmarks suggest that their presence can be exploited for intelligent code duplication. The % Overhead reduction bar shows the reduction in performance overhead if silent store optimization is used while duplicating instructions. Notice that the benchmarks showing a large percentage of silent stores also show a significant reduction in overhead.

253.perlbmk and 255.vortex show a high percentage of dynamic silent stores and these also show a significant reduction in overhead as shown in the % Overhead Reduction column in Figure 2.7. For the results presented in Figure 2.7, duplication is terminated (see Section 2.3.2.2) only when a static store is silent more than 80% of the time (i.e., if a static store in a benchmark writes the same value already present at a memory location less than 80% of its dynamic execution time, the store is not considered for this optimization). 175.vpr and 253.perlbmk show less reduction in overhead because many static stores in these benchmarks do not cross the threshold of 80%.
2.5.2 Performance Overheads and Fault Coverage

In this subsection, a comparison of our solution is made with previous works using the criteria of performance overhead and fault coverage. If a fault results in masking, SWDetect or symptoms, system can correctly execute the program. Hence, fault coverage is defined as the percentage of injected faults that result in masking, SWDetect or symptoms.

![Overhead comparison among full duplication, profile oblivious duplication, and profile aware duplication.](image)

**Figure 2.8:** Overhead comparison among full duplication, profile oblivious duplication, and profile aware duplication. In full duplication, duplication is not terminated at safe instructions and all branches are also protected. Although profile oblivious duplication uses safe instructions, profiling information is not utilized. This represents a system equivalent to Shoestring. Profile-aware duplication uses safe instructions as well as profiling information.

In this first experiment, we examine the maximum amount of coverage we can obtain by doing the maximum amount of duplication. Since loads are never duplicated to save on memory traffic, the overhead wouldn’t be 100% for full duplication and there will always
be some faults which can escape detection by the duplicated code. The full duplication column in Figure 2.8 shows the performance overhead if the duplication is not terminated at safe instructions and all the branches are also protected by duplication. The full-dup column in Figure 2.9 is the corresponding fault coverage breakdown among the different categories of result classification. Essentially, “Full duplication” data represents the performance overhead and fault coverage with the maximum amount of duplication possible with our scheme. On average, the performance overhead is 50.51% and the coverage of transient faults by combining symptom-based and duplication-based methods is 94%. The performance overheads in this Section are compared to -O3 optimized baseline. Though the overhead is high, it gives improved coverage of faults. In the 164.gzip benchmark, all

Figure 2.9: Coverage breakdown for full duplication (full-dup), profile oblivious duplication (pro-obliv) and profile aware duplication (pro-aware).
unmasked faults are detected by the duplicated code.

The profile-oblivious duplication column in Figure 2.8 and pro-obliv column in Figure 2.9 show the performance overhead and fault coverage numbers if the duplication is terminated at safe instructions and only the immediate branch whose execution affects the execution of high value instruction is protected by duplication. This is equivalent to the Shoestring solution. It reduces overhead but fault coverage decreases from 94% to 92.2%. For the rest of results, we have considered profile oblivious duplication as our baseline values for result comparisons.

A general trend observed in the results is that with lesser duplication, masking goes up. For example, profile oblivious duplication (pro-oblivi) has lower overhead than full duplication (full-dup) on average (Figure 2.8), hence lesser duplication, but has more masking than full-dup (Figure 2.9). This stems from the fact that with less duplication, there a decreased chance of fault detection and therefore a greater chance of fault masking or overall failure since undetected faults result in masking or failure. Since the amount of duplication in an application changes its code structure, randomly injected faults in the same application with different levels of duplication show different behavior.

The profile-aware duplication column in Figure 2.8 shows the overhead if we duplicate the producer chains of library and function calls only (i.e., only library and function calls are considered as high value instructions) and make use of profile information. The pro-aware column in Figure 2.9 shows the corresponding coverage breakdown numbers. In this set of experiments, the effectiveness of using LAMP to trace the dependences through memory and other profiling techniques while duplicating instructions is demonstrated. The overhead is reduced by 41% but the coverage of transient faults provided by the combi-
nation of symptom-based and software duplication stays about the same. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of using the profiling information for efficient duplication. Our technique results in better code duplication, providing the same level of fault coverage seen with our baseline but at 41% lower overhead.

2.5.3 Contributions of Each Technique

So far we have discussed the combined effect of edge, memory, and value profiling on the obtained results. In this section, the contribution of each technique is presented. We have combined the contributions of edge profiling and silent store optimization together and the results in this section are presented for a subset of benchmarks because running 100 fault injection trials for each configuration leads to a large number of simulations. These benchmarks are not handpicked because they show desirable behavior.

The ‘Sl-st and edge profile aware’ column in Figure 2.10 show the reduction in overhead if the silent store and edge profile based optimizations are used. The profile oblivious duplication bar is the baseline overhead. In comparison to our baseline, these two techniques combined result in a 12.78% reduction in overhead. The sl-edge-aware column in Figure 2.11 shows the coverage breakdown among different components. On average, because of software duplication, the combined fault coverage stays the same. As shown in the val-aware column in Figure 2.10, the use of value profiling provides a 5.9% reduction in the performance overhead of duplication on average. Value profiling provides a slight increase in the number of faults covered by duplication while reducing the overhead.

Overall, the experimental results demonstrate that the techniques proposed in this chapter are effective as they provide a significant reduction in performance overhead while still
Figure 2.10: The profile-oblivious column is the baseline overhead. The reduction in overhead if we use the silent store optimization and edge profiling information is shown in the ‘Sl-st and edge profile aware’ column. The value profile aware column shows the reduction in overhead if we use value profile in comparison to our baseline.

maintaining the desired fault coverage levels.

2.6 Related Work

This section describes the work that is related to our proposed solution. Software instruction duplication is an approach which is extended in our work in an effort to increase fault-coverage while reducing performance overhead and eliminating the need for additional hardware support. In this case, redundant execution can also be achieved in software without creating independent threads as shown by Reis et al. [101]. The previous works in
software-based instruction duplication are [41, 101], the most closely-related works to our solution. Our work differs from these works in the following ways:

- Our work makes novel use of value profiling to generate extra software-based symptoms.

- SWIFT [101] considered all the stores as starting point for duplication. Shoestring [41] improved upon that by considering global stores and all functions calls as starting point for instruction duplication. Our solution starts duplicating instructions only from library and function calls and then uses memory profiling to find the true load/-
store dependencies. In this process, only the important stores get considered as high value and a lesser duplication overhead is achieved.

- Silent store profiling information is incorporated in this work for the first time.

- Unlike some of the previous works, our solution is not tied to a specific ISA. We take a fresh approach, and instruction duplication is implemented instead at the IR (Intermediate Representation) level. This enables greater applicability, as IR-level implementation allows for a wider target base, being useable on a multitude of different processor architectures.

Other works such as CRAFT and PROFIT [102] improve upon the SWIFT solution by leveraging additional hardware structures and architectural vulnerability factor (AVF) analysis [92], respectively. Compiler-based instruction duplication delivers nearly complete fault coverage, with the added benefit of requiring little to no hardware cost. However, in order to achieve this, solutions like SWIFT can more than double the number of dynamic instructions for a program, incurring significant performance and power penalties which are costly to implement in embedded devices. Latif et al. [65] present a software based solution which exploits data representation for fault detection. It doesn’t handle arbitrary C/C++ programs.

With respect to other hardware and software based solutions, our solution’s ability to achieve high levels of fault coverage with very low performance overhead, and all without any specialized hardware, sets it apart.

Some recent solutions have also suggested the idea of distributed checking in the core for various components. Argus [81], for example, relies on a series of hardware checker
units to perform online invariant checking to ensure correct application execution. Our solution differs from all of these techniques because it does not require any special hardware modifications.

Our proposed solution also makes use of symptom-based detection, which relies on anomalous microarchitectural behavior to detect soft errors. A light-weight approach for detecting soft errors, ReStore [132], analyzes symptoms including memory exceptions, branch mispredicts, and cache misses. In our proposed solution, extra symptom generating instructions are introduced based on value-profiling data. The strength of symptom-based detection lies in its low cost and ease of application. mSWAT [53] presented a solution which detects anomalous software behavior to provide a reliable system. It requires special simple hardware detectors to detect faults.

One final approach to soft error tolerance targets another aspect of the microarchitecture, the register file. Register file protection schemes are based on the premise that faults occurring in the register file are statistically more likely to corrupt the output of the program. As ECC is applied to main memory to protect against soft errors, the same technique can also be applied to the register file. Solutions like the one presented by Montesinos et al. [87] build upon this insight and only maintain ECC for those registers most likely to contain live values. ECC protection would only be helpful if the soft error corrupts a register after it has been written; If faulty data gets written to registers, ECC is simply useless. In contrast, our solution can detect errors which occur elsewhere in the architecture but propagate to the register file. Similarly, Blome et al. [18] propose a register value cache that holds duplicates of live register values to aid in the protection process.
2.7 Conclusions

The relentless desire to scale transistor size will increase the rate at which soft errors occur during the time when the processor is in use. As a result, it is necessary to provide protection against soft errors not only for mission-critical applications but also for important applications running on commodity processors. The high overhead of techniques to protect against soft errors for mission-critical computing systems is not acceptable for applications running on commodity processors. We make novel use of value profiling for generating software symptoms. In this chapter, we presented a solution that uses profile-based compiler analysis to selectively duplicate instructions. Our profile based selective duplication results in a reduction of overhead of 41% in comparison to a previously proposed solution while maintaining the same level of fault coverage.
CHAPTER III

Low Cost Control Flow Protection Using Abstract Control Signatures

70% of the transient faults disturb program control flow [58, 130], making it critical to protect control flow. Traditional approaches employ signatures to check that every control flow transfer in a program is valid. While having high fault coverage, large performance overheads are introduced by such detailed checking. In this chapter, we propose a coarse-grain control flow checking method to detect control faults in a cost effective way. Our software-only approach is centered on the principle of abstraction: control flow that exhibits simple run-time properties (e.g., proper path length) is almost always completely correct. Our solution targets off-the-shelf commodity systems to provide a low cost protection against transient faults. The proposed technique achieves its efficiency by simplifying signature calculations in each basic block and by performing checking at a coarse-grain level. The coarse-grain signature comparison points are obtained by the use of a region based analysis. The overall goal of this technique is to minimize the number of control flow disturbances.
3.1 Introduction

In the quest to make chips faster, cheaper and energy efficient, transistors are being scaled down in size. As silicon technology is moving deeper down into the nanometer regime, reliability of microprocessors is emerging as a critical concern for manufacturers. Factors such as increasingly smaller devices, reduced voltage levels, and increasing operating temperatures exacerbate the problem of reliability of these components. Furthermore, billions of transistors are packed into modern microprocessors, and a fault in even a single transistor has the ability to corrupt the output of the application or crash the entire system.

In this chapter, we focus on the reliability concerns caused by soft errors. Soft errors, as described in Section 2.1 of the Chapter II, are caused by high energy particle strikes from space or circuit crosstalk in an electronic circuit. A high energy particle such as a neutron from cosmic rays or an alpha particle from packaging material impurities releases charge in the circuit that in turn can disturb the functionality or the charge stored at a semiconductor device. As the name suggests, transients faults do not cause permanent damage to the chip and devices work correctly once the effect of the fault is over.

The semiconductor industry has reported many instances of the problems caused by soft errors over the last few decades. Other than the real life instances of soft errors mentioned in the introduction of chapter II, Cypress semiconductor reported that a single soft error caused a billion-dollar automotive industry to halt every month [137]. In 2005, HP also reported [89] that cosmic rays were the cause of frequent crashes of its 2048-CPU system installed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. These studies illustrate the issues caused by soft errors and necessitate the need for reliability solutions at all levels (e.g., circuit,
Traditionally, memory cells have been more vulnerable to transient faults and are usually protected by mechanisms such as parity checks or Error Correcting Codes (ECC). The use of smaller transistors to implement logic circuits in microprocessors increases susceptibility of logic circuits to transient faults. Shivakumar et al. [120] reported that Soft Error Rate (SER) for the logic on chip is steadily rising with technology scaling while SER for memory is expected to remain stable. SER is the rate at which a component encounters soft errors. Also, SER scales with number of transistors and level of integration [44]. Without actively addressing these issues, SER is expected to rise significantly in new products. Moreover, previous studies [58, 130] reported that more than 70% of the transient faults lead to disturbance in control flow and are the cause of control flow errors. Control flow errors are defined as the incorrect change in the sequence of instructions executed by processors under the influence of external events such as soft errors.

Traditional solutions in server space for reliability have provided fault tolerance via DMR (dual-modular redundancy) and TMR (triple-modular redundancy). IBM Z-Series [12] servers and HP NonStop [15] systems are two pioneers of such schemes. These solutions incur a large energy and/or performance overhead and are not directly applicable in the embedded design space. Signature based solutions [94] employ signature updates in every basic block and check that all control flow transfers lead to a correct target address. This checking results in high instruction overheads due to the combination of computing, updating, and checking the unique control signatures of each potential control flow edge. Typical performance overheads of prior work are on the order of 75% (Section 3.2.3 describes such techniques in detail).
In this chapter, we propose Abstract Control Signatures (ACS) to provide a practical low cost solution for Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) embedded microprocessors to protect against control flow target (i.e., the branch destination address) errors [60]. These errors are usually not covered by redundancy-based data protection techniques [41, 62], yet they lead to a disproportionately high number of incorrect executions. ACS is a software-only solution and does not require any modifications in the hardware. Our solution is based on the principle of abstraction and the insight that control flow that exhibits simple but repeated properties of correctness is almost always entirely correct. ACS achieves abstraction by checking simpler properties (e.g., path length) and promoting control flow signature checking from individual basic blocks to group of blocks.

ACS is targeted for COTS commodity systems. In the commodity embedded market, achieving performance targets in a cost-effective manner is of paramount importance. Due to the associated cost of providing high reliability, commodity systems typically cannot target 100% protection against faults. Our solution is designed considering these requirements of embedded market space. The proposed solution provides opportunistic fault coverage but does not guarantee 100% fault coverage and hence is not applicable to mission critical systems. The contributions of this chapter are as follows:

- A novel abstraction based technique to insert simplified signatures. Under the proposed scheme, more complex signatures can be used to explore trade-offs in performance overhead and fault coverage.

- A novel region based method to insert checking at a coarse granularity abstracting away the details of fine-grain control flow.
- A global signature based method for protecting control flow transfers through call and return instructions.

- Microarchitectural fault injection experiments to validate ACS.

### 3.2 Background and Motivation

In this section, we present background details that are necessary to understand ACS and discuss the motivation behind the approach.

#### 3.2.1 Fault Detection

In order to protect against transient faults, detection of these faults is a necessary first step. Fault detection can be achieved by introducing some form of redundancy. For example, time redundancy involves executing the same instructions twice on the same hardware, space redundancy involves executing the same instructions on duplicate hardware and information redundancy involves usage of parity, ECC etc. High reliability systems typically use a mixture of fault detection techniques such as DMR/TMR and/or ECC for protection against soft errors. These solutions are too expensive in terms of energy/performance/area overheads (∼100%) to be used in the embedded market. A relatively inexpensive class of solutions for commercial market use time redundancy based software-only techniques. Data flow and control flow checking are usually employed in software-based techniques [94, 95, 19, 130, 41] against soft errors. Data flow checking ensures that computation (e.g., addition) is correct. Software-based data flow checking techniques work by replicating instructions. Control flow protection techniques usually employ signatures to
ensure correct control flow [94, 130]. A brief comparison of related technique to ACS

Table 3.1: Brief comparison of ACS with other techniques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data flow</th>
<th>Control flow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Branch</td>
<td>calls/rets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High overhead</td>
<td>DMR, TMR SWIFT [94]</td>
<td>DMR, TMR SWIFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDDI [95]</td>
<td>EDDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DMR, TMR ALLBB</td>
<td>DMR, TMR ALLBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDDI</td>
<td>(ret only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low overhead</td>
<td>Shoestring [41]</td>
<td>ACS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ProfileBased [62]</td>
<td>ACS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACS+ProfileBased</td>
<td>ACS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

is shown in Table 3.1. The techniques are classified based on their relative performance overhead and whether they handle data flow errors, control flow errors or both. Control flow protection techniques are further classified into two categories based on whether they protect branches and call/ret instructions. The techniques are also classified based on their relative performance overheads. Techniques having overhead $\sim$70% or more are in high overhead row and those with $\sim$40% or less in low overhead row. Typically low overhead techniques reduce overhead by sacrificing on fault coverage. A more detailed description of related work is presented in Section 3.6.

Figure 3.1: Control flow target errors are $\sim$2.5x as likely to cause incorrect executions.

Figure 3.1 shows the number of incorrect executions resulting from errors in register files (corrupting the data) and branch targets for SPECINT2000 benchmarks. A high masking rate ($\sim$75%) for data errors is consistent with the reported masking data in previous
works [41, 133]. On average, errors in the branch targets are \(\sim 2.5x\) more likely to result in incorrect executions. Hence, in this chapter, we focus on efficient detection of control flow errors, in branches as well as call/ret instructions, and our technique can be combined with previously proposed [41, 62, 94] code duplication based solutions for a complete solution (see Section 3.5.3 for a combined solution).

### 3.2.2 Control Flow Errors

![Diagram of control flow errors](image)

**Figure 3.2:** Control Flow Target Errors: Corruption of branch target can result in nearby (Type A) or far away (Type B) displacement of control flow.

To better understand control flow protection techniques, we need to comprehend the various cause of control flow errors. A control flow error can occur in a non-control flow (e.g., *add*) or in a control flow (e.g., *branch*) instruction. A non-control flow instruction of the application can be converted into a control flow instruction by a soft error thus erroneously affecting control transfers. Errors occurring in control flow instructions can be divided into two categories: Firstly, **control flow condition errors** are caused by the errors in the direction of a conditional branch. Secondly, **control flow target errors** are caused by the errors in the destination of a branch. Branch conditions are usually protected by data
flow protection schemes by duplicating the computation leading to a condition. As shown later in Figure 3.10 (Section 3.4.3), the errors in branch targets result in disproportionately high number of incorrect executions. Hence, we focus on the control flow disturbances caused by the errors in branch targets. From here onwards, unless otherwise specified, the use of control flow errors with respect to ACS refers to the errors in branch targets.

Figure 3.2 shows a part of a Control Flow Graph (CFG) containing 4 Basic Blocks (BBs). Two types of errors that affect branch target are also shown in the Figure. Type A errors cause the erroneous jump to nearby locations and Type B errors direct the control flow to far away locations. Type A errors cause the program to skip a few instructions and are more likely to result in masking or program output corruptions. In contrast, Type B errors are more likely to crash the program either by directing the control flow to out of program scope or to a different function in the same program. In Section 3.3, we describe how our proposed method handles these control flow errors.

3.2.3 Signature Based Techniques and Associated Overheads

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.3:** Basic signature scheme: If the correct control flow transfer takes place, $G$ at dest$_{BB}$ would be equal to $s_2$ otherwise not.
Many of the previously proposed software-only techniques for control flow protection embed signatures or assertions into BBs at compile time [94, 45, 4]. This section briefly describes the fundamentals of these signature based techniques, especially CFCSS [94]. CFCSS assigns a unique signature $S_i$ to each BB in the program. A general purpose register (G) is used to hold the signature of the currently executing BB. G is initialized to the signature of first BB when a program starts. Subsequently, whenever a transition is made from src_BB to dest_BBs the value of G is updated with the newly computed value. This new value is calculated by taking the xor of G and the static signature difference (xor) of src_BB and dest_BB. After this, G should be equal to the unique signature assigned to dest_BB. A comparison of G with unique value of dest_BB is inserted in dest_BB to make sure that control flow is correct. If this comparison fails, an incorrect control flow transfer has taken place. A simple case of this scheme is shown in Figure 3.3. For a complex case of branch-fan-in nodes, extra dynamic adjusting signatures must be inserted to avoid aliasing [94]. This necessitates the need for multiple signature updates in branch-fan-in nodes and dynamic signature computation in predecessors BBs of the branch-fan-in nodes. These extra updates contribute to the overhead of such a scheme.

Essentially, every BB in the application contains signature computation or update instructions as well as comparison instructions for ensuring correct control flow. The cost of embedded signature checking at runtime in every BB can be prohibitive, making these techniques impractical. We have implemented CFCSS and in our experiments on small benchmarks (the same ones used in CFCSS [94]) we observe, on average, a performance overhead of 68%. Though, for Insertsort benchmark from the set of benchmarks, it is as high as 222%. For real representative benchmarks from SPECINT2000, we observe up to
a 144% overhead (75% on average) for the CFCSS technique. The opportunity to reduce this huge overhead is one of the motivations behind proposing ACS.

3.3 Abstract Control Signatures

![Diagram of Abstract Control Signatures]

**Figure 3.4:** Abstract signatures: The whole program is divided into regions at a higher abstraction level. Such regions are enclosed by dashed light blue (grey) lines in this Figure. Every region is assigned a signature. Every abstract region updates its signature based on the control transfers among the BBs inside it. These signatures are only checked in other abstract regions.

Fundamentally, there are two critical aspects of any signature based control flow protection scheme. The first is signature computations (or updates) in each BB and the second is signature comparisons (or checking) to check for erroneous control flow. These two
computations are the main contributors to the performance overhead of signature-based control flow checking schemes. To reduce performance overhead, we propose raising the level of abstraction of signature checking and simplifying signature updates in every BB. The abstraction level is raised by working at the levels of regions*. The whole program is divided into regions that are larger than just a BB. These regions are more than just a collection of BBs and ideally should possess certain properties that help in minimizing the number of signature comparisons and signature updates. Each region has a signature variable associated with it. For example, one desirable property of regions is to have a single entry point so that the associated signature variable need not be initialized at every entry point. As shown later (Section 3.3.2), this reduces the number of required signature comparisons. The signature variable associated with a region is checked in other regions that are the target of the control flow edges from the region under consideration. Essentially, signature information flows between these abstract regions. The signature associated with each region represents the correctness of control flow internal to that region. In this sense, checking control flow outside regions abstracts away the details about control flow inside a region, hence the name ACS (Abstract Control Signatures). A high level diagram for ACS concept is shown in Figure 3.4. In Figure 3.4 the signature $sig1$ is associated with region 1 and is updated inside the BBs of region 1. Assuming a BB in region 1 has a control flow edge to a BB in region 3, $sig1$ would only be checked in that BB in region 3.

*In this chapter, region is used to refer to a single entry multiple exit code section that satisfies the following property among others: loop back edges are only allowed to the entry node (see Section 3.3.1).
3.3.1 Design of ACS

The idea of ACS is very generic and can be realized in various ways. ACS can be implemented by forming regions at various granularity levels and different signature updates according to the required trade-offs in performance overhead and fault coverage. The signature update inside each BB can also be tuned. For example, the signature update inside each BB can be as simple as having a parity bit set/reset and the corresponding check would be to check against 0 if even number of blocks were traversed and against 1 if odd number of blocks were traversed. These updates can be more complex such as usage of hash functions or xors. Similarly, the region formation can also be customized. For example, if the region is a single BB then this scheme is the same as regular signature checking in each BB.

For ACS implemented as a part of this chapter, we have made following choices for signature updates and regions. We use a simple counter variable as the signature. For signature updates, we increment the signature by 1 in the beginning of every BB. The intuition behind using increment by 1 is as follows: Consider 2 points in a program, X is a region entry and Y is the corresponding region exit. If control reaches X, we expect it to reach Y. If in going from X to Y, a valid number of BBs are traversed and the first instruction in each of those BBs is executed, we hypothesize that control flow is likely correct. Obviously, this is not always true, but our experiments have confirmed that small disruptions (fault in the lower bits of the branch target) in the control flow will result in changes to the path length due to positioning of counter updates at the beginning of BBs and large disruptions (fault in upper bits) will result in Y never being reached. Thus,
if the hypothesis is statistically true, individual control transitions need not be checked with minimal loss in fault coverage. This allows only the higher level information to need checking. To see the usefulness of such counters, let us consider the control flow errors shown in Figure 3.2. On one hand, Type B errors (far away erroneous jumps) that would transfer control from one region to another, are easily caught. On the other hand, Type A errors (nearby erroneous jumps) are likely to skip the signature updates, so they are also caught. We use intervals [3] as regions because of the desirable properties they possess.

**Intervals:** An interval is a set of BBs such that every BB except the header BB in the interval has its predecessors in the interval. An interval satisfies the following, and many other, properties.

1. The header block of an interval dominates all the BBs in that interval. Basically, this implies that control can only enter at the header node of an interval.

2. If a loop is part of an interval then the loop header and interval header are the same. The header BB of a loop is the target BB of back edges in that loop.

Figure 3.5 shows an example of intervals for a CFG that has nested loops. Interval 1 contains only \( bb1 \) and its header is also \( bb1 \). Interval 2 contains all the remaining blocks shown in the Figure. Interval 2 contains a loop and note that loop header \( bb2 \) is also the header node of the interval 2. Another interesting observation is that the outer loop is never contained in a single interval. We use intervals formed according to the maximal interval definition [88]. A **latch BB** of a loop is defined as the block that has a branch to the header of the loop. For example, \( bb\_latch1 \) is the latch block for the inner loop starting at \( bb2 \).

A basic overview of the implemented scheme is shown in Figure 3.6. The counter \( C_1 \)
Figure 3.5: Intervals in the Figure are shown by enclosed dashed light blue (gray) lines. This Figure shows two intervals for a control flow graph that has a nested loop.

(signature for the shown region) is incremented by 1 in each BB, and in the successor BB of bb4, a check would be inserted to make sure that the value of $C_1$ is 3. In the presence of a control flow error, assume that the transition happens such that after bb1, either signature updates of bb2 or bb3 is skipped or bb4 is executed. The signature value would not be 3 in the successor BB of bb4 and this would be detected. We put the increment as the first instruction in the BBs so that the signature won’t get updated in case of small erroneous jumps. Thus, very small changes to the branch target are caught because of this positioning of signature updates.

However, if we naively insert the increments in each BB of the program, the counter value at the exit points of the interval will depend on 1) the path taken during runtime 2) the particular exit taken. For example, consider the CFG shown in Figure 3.7. If at runtime,
Figure 3.6: Every interval is associated with a signature. In our scheme, signatures are simple counters. The signature is initialized in the header and incremented by 1 in other blocks. The signature checks are made in the BBs that are destination BBs of exits out of an interval.

Edge $bb1 \rightarrow bb2$ is traversed, the signature value at the exit out of $bb3$ would be 3 since each BB increments signature by 1. However, if the edge $bb1 \rightarrow bb3$ is traversed signature value at the same point would be 2. Another similar problem exists if there are multiple exit points from an interval. The signature values at the exit points of an interval would be different if the exits originate from different BBs. Different signature values from an interval exit would imply that checks would need to be inserted with different values. To solve this problem, we make sure that from every exit out of an interval, the same signature value needs to be checked no matter which exit is taken. To tackle the aforementioned problems, we have developed a method to calculate extra balancing increments required along edges. The details of this method are described in the next subsection.
3.3.2 Calculating Balancing Increments

The goal is to calculate the extra balancing increment required to be inserted along the imbalanced edges in the CFG. Figure 3.7 shows an imbalanced CFG. An imbalanced CFG implies that at every exit there could be multiple signature values depending on the path traversed during runtime. If the CFG is not balanced, we will need to check against multiple values at exit points. Checking against multiple values will require multiple comparison instructions.

We solve these problems by using a technique of slack distribution, a modified version of the algorithm used by Chu et al. [31] for optimal work partitioning. Our adapted version of the technique works as follows: First, every exit out of an interval is connected to a
dummy exit node. All BBs in the interval are assigned a \( fCount \) of 0. All \( \text{edgeWeights} \) are initialized to 1 and represent an initial increment along the associated edge. \( fCount \) is a number associated with each BB that represents the path length from the header of an interval to the BB under consideration. The algorithm starts from the header BB of the interval. By iterating over predecessors, the sum of \( \text{edgeWeight} \) and \( fCount \) for each predecessor is calculated. \( fCount \) for the current block is then maximum value over all predecessors. This can be written as follows: 

\[
\text{fCount}(bb) = \max_{x \in \text{predecessors}(bb)} (\text{fCount}(x) + \text{edgeWeight}(x \rightarrow bb)).
\]

For every interval, this calculation is repeated until there is no change in \( fCount \) value of any BB. The pseudo code of the algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. Every BB is also associated with a number called \( bCount \). \( bCount \) is the number calculated starting from dummy exit nodes and traversing the predecessors. \( bCount \) are initialized to \( fCount \) for each BB. Using an algorithm similar to the one shown in Algorithm 1, \( bCount \) is calculated for every BB in the interval. The update equation of \( bCount \) is as follows: 

\[
\text{bCount}(bb) = \min_{x \in \text{successors}(bb)} (\text{bCount}(x) - \text{edgeWeight}(x \rightarrow bb)).
\]

Note that during the calculation of \( fCount \) and \( bCount \) only the successors and predecessors that are in the interval are considered. The dummy_exit block is considered a part of the interval during analysis. Once the \( fCount \) and \( bCount \) calculation is completed for every BB in the interval, the amount of extra balancing increment to be inserted along an edge between \( srcBB \) and \( destBB \) can be calculated as follows: 

\[
\text{extraIncrement}[srcBB \rightarrow destBB] = \text{fCount}[destBB] - \text{edgeWeight}[srcBB \rightarrow destBB] - bCount[srcBB].
\]

Figure 3.7 shows an example of extra increment calculation for a CFG. Numbers on the left side of blocks represent \( fCount \) and numbers on right side of the BB represent \( bCount \). Numbers on the edges are the extra increments required to be inserted along that edge. e.g.,
based on the algorithm described above edge \( bb1 \rightarrow bb3 \) edge gets an increment of 1 and edge \( bb1 \rightarrow bb4 \) gets an increment of 2. Once this step is executed, all the required increments are inserted along all edges of an interval.

Create dummy_exit block and connect all exit edges to this block;
Initialize all edgeWeight to one;
Initialize all fCount to zero;
change = 1;
\textbf{while} change \textbf{do}
\hspace{1em} change = 0;
\hspace{1em} \textbf{for each} bb in Interval \textbf{do}
\hspace{2em} maximum = \text{max}(fCount(x) + \text{edgeWeight}(x \rightarrow bb)) \text{ for } x \text{ in predecessors[bb] and } x \rightarrow bb \text{ is not a backEdge;}
\hspace{2em} \text{if } fCount[bb] < maximum \text{ then}
\hspace{3em} change = 1;
\hspace{3em} fCount[bb] = maximum;
\hspace{2em} \text{end}
\textbf{end}
\textbf{end}

\textbf{Algorithm 1}: Algorithm for calculating \textit{fCount} for every BB in an interval.

\subsection{3.3.3 Error Detection Analysis}

Let \( C_i \) be the counter associated with an interval. Every block inside that interval updates the counter by 1 and at every exit out of the interval the counter value should be the maximum path length (since we insert balancing increments) through that interval. Let that max value for an interval be \( CMax \). If \( C_i \) is not equal to \( CMax \) when control exits out of the interval then the control flow inside the program got disturbed. For all the intra-interval control flow errors, if any update to the path length counter is skipped, the path length calculation would be wrong and hence the control flow error will get caught. Erroneous jumps to other intervals are detected as the path length is not correct at the entry point of those intervals. However, there could be multiple paths of same length inside
the interval. In the presence of single errors, the probability of traversing a different path of the same length path and still having the same \( CMax \) at exits is very low as explained below. We refer to this probability as aliasing probability. Consider two BBs \( BB_i \) and \( BB_j \) and assume that an error occurs while executing the branch in \( BB_i \) transferring control to \( BB_j \). In such a case and under single bit errors, aliasing occurs if all of the following three conditions are satisfied:

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{pathLength}(BB_j) &= \text{pathLength}(BB_i) + 1 \\
BB_j &\notin \text{successors}(BB_i) \\
BB_i &\text{jumps to the first instruction of } BB_j
\end{aligned}
\]

\( \text{pathLength}(BB_i) \) is the length of the path (number of BBs required to be traversed) from the interval header to \( BB_i \). The first condition implies that the path length at erroneous destination block should be 1 more than source block. The second condition requires that \( BB_j \) is not a valid successor of \( BB_i \) according to the CFG and the third condition requires the jump to be at the beginning of the BB. If the jump is not at the beginning of the \( BB_j \), the counter update would be skipped and the error would be caught. Fortunately, this a very specific case, so the aliasing probability is very low, dependent on the structure of the CFG. For SPECINT2000 benchmarks, the probability of such an aliasing is on the order of \( 10^{-5} \). This is calculated by analyzing the CFG for such a case. This probability encompasses the aliasing probability between predecessor blocks (an erroneous jump between two predecessors) of a common successor BB in the same interval. An erroneous change in branch condition can transfer control to a statically valid target in the CFG and is another case of
alising. We assume that such a case can be handled by data flow protection methods.

### 3.3.4 Insertion of Checking Instructions

An important part of the technique is to find the BBs where the comparison instructions should be inserted. Each interval has a unique signature variable. We compare this variable with the statically known $CMax$ to test that the proper number of increments occurred. For our initial implementation, we chose to insert checks at all the exit points of an interval and in the latch block of loops. However, this is suboptimal and in the next section we show that how this can be further optimized.

### 3.3.5 Optimization for Loops

![Figure 3.8: Optimizing signature checking for loops: The checks on signatures are moved out of loops to exit blocks so that they are not executed in each iteration.](image)

**Figure 3.8:** Optimizing signature checking for loops: The checks on signatures are moved out of loops to exit blocks so that they are not executed in each iteration.
A naive way to insert a checking instruction for a loop is as shown in Figure 3.8(a). The latch block contains the checking instruction (the instruction that compares \( C_1 \) to 3). However, in this situation, the check is executed once every loop iteration. This can be optimized as shown in Figure 3.8(b). In the optimized case, the checking instruction is moved out of the loop and check is now made against a remainder. Essentially, a multiple of loop path length gets tested by the remainder. Remainders are a costly operation and one important issue to consider here is the fact that loop increments are inserted in such a way that the remainder is always taken by a power of two. This is shown in Figure 3.8(b), in \( bb4 \) counter \( C_1 \) is incremented by 2 instead of 1 to make sure that remainder by 4 is taken. If this is the case the remainder instruction can simply be converted to a bitwise and instruction (e.g., remainder by 4 can be computed as bitwise and with 3).

### 3.3.6 Call and Return Instructions

A source of control flow transfers are call and return instructions. In this chapter, we propose a new technique to protect the control flow from caller to callee header and the return from callee to caller. The idea is akin to the path length approach used for branches except each function call has a unique path length (a unique number) that is checked upon entry of the callee and upon return to the caller to ensure call/returns go to and return from proper targets. We make the path length unique for each function to ensure that there is no aliasing among calls to different functions. The technique works as follows: Let \( F \) be the set of all the functions in an application. Every \( f_i \in F \) is assigned a unique code such a
way that the following is true.

\[
\text{HammingDistance}(\text{ACode}(f_i), \text{ACode}(f_j)) > 1
\]

\[
\forall f_i, f_j \in F \text{ and } i \neq j
\]

For binary numbers \(a\) and \(b\), Hamming distance is equal to the number of positions at which the corresponding bits in \(a\) and \(b\) are different. Simply put, Hamming distance is the number of errors required to transform \(a\) to \(b\), and vice versa. \(\text{HammingDistance}(a, b)\) is the Hamming distance between \(a\) and \(b\). \(\text{ACode}(f_i)\) represents the code assigned to \(f_i\). Every function in the application is assigned a unique code in a way such that the Hamming distance between any two codes is greater than 1. This ensures that there is no aliasing among calls because of erroneous transition from one function to another function in presence of single bit errors. Figure 3.9 shows an example of instrumented code. The Global Signature Register (GSR) is updated before and after the call as shown. RConst is a convenient constant (power of 2) chosen in a way such that the costly remainder operation can be converted to simple bit shift operation. 34 is the Hamming code assigned to the function Foo.

![Figure 3.9](image-url)
Inside the callee, the GSR is updated in the entry BB of the callee and return BB of the callee. This ensures that other calls inside Foo can use the same type of instrumentation. If source code of a call (e.g., library calls) is not available then the increments inside the callee cannot be inserted and only the increments around the call are inserted. In such a case, the transition to the beginning of the callee cannot be checked but the instrumented code ensures the return from callee should be right after the call instruction. Calls through pointers and compiler built-ins (i.e., compiler intrinsics) are treated in the same way as library calls.

### 3.4 Experimental Setup

A common practice in the literature to evaluate transient fault detection solutions is to use Statistical Fault Injections (SFIs) into a microarchitectural model of a processor. We believe that SFI provides the opportunity to inject faults into various hardware structures and hence are close to real transient fault scenarios. SFI has been previously [41, 101] used in validating the solutions proposed to protect against soft errors.

#### 3.4.1 Compiler Transformations

We have used the LLVM [66] compiler infrastructure to insert ACS into an application’s code. Firstly, application source code is converted into LLVM’s internal representation called LLVM IR (Intermediate Representation). ACS is implemented as a pass over LLVM IR. ACS insertion pass should be run after all the optimization passes on IR so that these passes do not interfere with ACS code. Our ACS insertion pass takes IR as input and
as output it generates IR with signature computations and checks embedded into it. An LLVM interval formation pass is internally run and the information is used to insert control flow checking signatures. Some optimization passes such as constant propagation in code generation phase can propagate the constant initialization of signatures into the next BB. This can effectively remove the effect of inserted signature from the BB where the signature was initialized to its successors BBs. We have disabled such optimizations during the phase when LLVM prepares the IR for code generation.

3.4.2 Benchmarks

We have used 11 benchmarks from the SPECINT2000 benchmark suite (gzip, vpr, gcc, mcf, crafty, perlbmk, parser, gap, vortex, bzip2, twolf) as representative workloads in experiments. All these benchmarks were compiled with -O3 option of gcc frontend for LLVM. SPECINT2000 benchmarks. In the context of embedded systems, if the change in execution time affects program output, these programs might not run correctly after control flow protection. We do not consider multithreaded benchmarks in this chapter. However, we do not foresee any problems of using ACS with multithreaded programs.

3.4.3 Fault Injection Campaign

To evaluate the proposed approach, we ran an extensive fault injection campaign. An acceptable way in literature to model transient faults is using single bit-flips. These faults are inserted by flipping a random bit at a random cycle during the course of the application run. We injected faults in the register file (a large part of the processor’s architectural state) and branch targets. A fault in a register used as branch target or in the computation
Incorrect executions caused by control flow faults

Figure 3.10: The incorrect executions as a percentage of unmasked faults caused by disturbance in control flow targets. Faults are injected in register file as well as branch targets. Of branch targets for indirect branches can disturb the control flow. Figure 3.10 shows the results of this experiment and Y-axis in the Figure is incorrect executions caused by control flow target errors as a percentage of the unmasked faults. The results show that a large percentage (on average 42%) of the unmasked faults result in incorrect executions and are caused by control flow faults. 175.vpr and 300.twolf (100% bars in the Figure 3.10) have high masking rate and all the remaining incorrect executions for these two benchmarks are caused by control flow faults. Even though the size of branch target (32 bit) is smaller than register file (16 registers of size 32 each), the contribution of branch target errors to incorrect executions is disproportionately high. Hence, control flow faults are an important category of faults to consider. Therefore, for the rest of the experiments, we chose to inject faults in branch targets only. Injecting faults in branch targets represents stress testing (a pessimistic case) control flow protection schemes since all the injected faults are guaranteed to disturb the control flow and subsequently do not inflate coverage numbers as they
result in less masking compared to data errors as shown in Figure 3.1. The same method of fault injection is used for the baseline (CFCSS). To inject a fault, the program runs normally until it encounters the first control flow instruction after the selected random point is encountered. Once the control flow instruction is selected, a random bit is selected from the target address of the control flow instruction. This selected random bit is flipped to complete the injection of fault. Faults in PC (Program Counter) and other address circuitry are expected to disturb the control flow in a similar manner. Our technique is also capable of detecting faults injected into other microarchitectural units that affect the program control flow.

We used the GEM5 [16] simulator to simulate the workloads and implemented fault injection infrastructure into this simulator. The simulator was run in ARM syscall emulation mode and modeled the ARMv7-a profile of ARM architecture. To obtain performance overhead, workloads are simulated in an out-of-order model of the target processor. We use atomic model for processor configuration to inject control flow faults. The details of the processor configuration for out-of-order model used for the experiments are in Table 3.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processor core @ 2GHz</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simulation configuration</td>
<td>out-of-order core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation mode</td>
<td>Syscall emulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical integer register file size</td>
<td>256 entries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorder Buffer Size</td>
<td>192 entries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue width</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memory</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1-D cache</td>
<td>64KB, 2-way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1-I cache</td>
<td>32KB, 2-way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTLB/ITLB</td>
<td>64 entries (each)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have chosen to inject 1100 faults per technique to evaluate the solution. The statis-
tical significance of these faults can be calculated by leveraging the work done by Leveugle et al. [69]. The calculation for our experimental setup shows that we need 96 fault injection trials for each benchmark to have a 10% margin of error and confidence level of 95%. Note that the margin of error only applies to fault coverage data. The performance overhead shows the exact simulation cycles consumed by the simulator. Therefore, we chose 100 fault injection trials for each benchmark to yield results with reasonable accuracy in a timely manner. After the fault injection, the program runs until completion. The result of each simulation trial is classified into one of the following five categories:

- **Masked**: The injected fault did not corrupt the program output. Application-level or architecture-level masking occurred in this case.

- **HWDetect**: The injected fault produces a symptom such as a page fault so that a recovery can be triggered. A fault is considered under this category only if the symptom is produced within a number of cycles (2000 for our experiments) after the fault was injected.

- **CFDetect**: The injected fault was detected by the control flow checking instructions inserted at the time of compiler transformation.

- **Failure**: The injected fault resulted in out-of-bound address access and resulted in simulation termination. Also, faults causing infinite loops in the program are classified under this category.

- **SDC**: Faults that corrupt the program output are classified into this category. These are Silent Data Corruptions.
Traditionally, the fault tolerance research community considers a program to be correct if the architectural state is correct at every cycle. Li et al. [73] showed that 17.6% of the multimedia and AI applications showed correct results even though they had architecturally incorrect states. We believe that user-visible program output corruptions truly matter to end users and cycle-by-cycle correct architectural state is not important to them. So in the context of evaluating this work, a program is considered to have executed correctly if the final output of the program matches. The result classifications of the injection experiments in this chapter are based on the fact that only program output corruptions really matter. Therefore, for this work we do not regard the number of faults that propagate to the microarchitectural state as a metric of importance. The percentage of faults that actually do corrupt program output are considered harmful because these faults corrupt program output without any hint of failure and represent the worse case scenario.

3.4.4 Recovery Support

ACS, like CFCSS, is a detection-only solution for control flow errors. Once a control flow error is detected, we rely on a recovery mechanism to recover from the detected error. A software-only recovery scheme such as Encore [42] or checkpointing-based recovery schemes can be used in conjunction with our solution. Feng et al. [41] and Wang et al. [132] proposed that future microprocessors with aggressive performance speculation will need recovery support. If available, the same scheme can be used by our solution. However, the cost of checkpointing-based and software-only schemes increases with respect to the number of instructions executed from recovery point. So, one important target for our scheme is to keep a bound on fault detection latency.
3.5 Experimental Evaluation and Analysis

Using the experimental setup described in Section 3.4, we obtain performance overhead and fault coverage results. Figure 3.11 shows the performance overhead measured in terms of runtime. These overheads are in comparison to unmodified applications compiled at -O3 optimization level. CFCSS shows the runtime overhead for the CFCSS scheme [94] and CFCSS_ivl bar shows the instruction overhead if the interval information is used in conjunction with CFCSS to insert checking at a coarser granularity. CFCSS_ivl has the xor (same as CFCSS) signature update inside every BB and in contrast to CFCSS only signature checking is moved at a coarser granularity. Also, CFCSS_ivl does not have any loop optimizations (Section 3.3.5). The third and fourth bar for each benchmarks shows the runtime overhead when we use ACS. ACS_w/o_calls_rets bar in this Figure shows the overhead without the protection for calls and returns (Section 3.3.6) and ACS_w/_calls_rets the overhead if protection for calls and rets is included. Overall, the performance overhead
Figure 3.12: CFCSS bar shows the fault coverage for CFCSS and CFCSS_ivl shows the fault coverage with checking inserted using interval information. ACS_w/o_calls_rets shows the fault coverage without protection for calls/returns and ACS_w/o_calls_rets shows the fault coverage if calls/returns are also protected.

is 75%, 57.8%, 11% and 28.8% for CFCSS, CFCSS_ivl, ACS_w/o_calls_rets and ACS_w/_calls_rets, respectively. We have also measured the impact of code size expansion on application binaries and on average code size overhead is 22% with ACS. The code size overhead is largest for 176.gcc showing largest performance overhead. To give more insight on the reduction in overhead, we measured the number of intervals and basic blocks in benchmarks. On average, there are 13302 basic blocks and 1993 intervals across the evaluated benchmarks and the number of checks required to be inserted are 2461. This represents a 5.4x decrease in the number of checks by abstracting from BBs to intervals.

In the next experiment, we explore the fault coverage provided by these techniques. We define fault coverage as the percentage of faults out of total injected faults that do not result in Silent Data Corruptions (SDCs). SDCs are the most harmful errors because the program silently corrupts data while the user thinks that application worked as expected. The faults classified in HWDetects imply that these symptoms can be used to trigger recovery [41, 132]. Each bar in Figure 3.12 shows the distribution of faults among different categories when the instrumented application runs with fault injections. The four bars are
the fault distribution for CFCSS, CFCSS_ivl, ACS_w/o_calls_rets and ACS_w/_calls_rets and the average fault coverage for these techniques is 98.8%, 98.4%, 96.6% and 96.3%, respectively. All these techniques reduce the number of SDCs in comparison to unprotected application, but ACS without calls/rets protection has only 11% performance overhead in comparison to 75% performance overhead of CFCSS.

### 3.5.1 Fault Detection Latency

Another important metric with regard to fault detection techniques is the detection latency. Fault detection latency is directly related to the overhead of a recovery scheme. A longer latency implies that either the fault cannot be recovered or the recovery overhead would be high. Figure 3.13 shows the latency of ACS with respect to CFCSS. *WithIn2K* represents the number of faults detected in less than 2000 (2K) cycles of injections. Similarly, *WithIn5K*, *WithIn10K* and *WithIn100K* represents the number of fault detected within...
5000, 10000 and 100000 cycles of injection, respectively. These categories are cumulative and faults classified under WithIn5K include all the faults detected with in 5K cycles, i.e., it subsumes the faults classified under WithIn2K. Similar rules apply for faults detected with in 10K and 100K cycles. The bars in the figure are normalized with respect to the number of faults detected in WithIn2K. For example, the WithIn5K bars represent the ratio of the number of faults detected with in 5K cycles and number of faults detected with in 2K cycles. In case of ACS, on average, WithIn5K contains 2% more than WithIn2K. Similarly, WithIn10K and WithIn100K contain only 3% and 5% more faults than WithIn2K. The same numbers for CFCSS are 0%, 1% and 1% for 5K, 10K and 100K cycles, respectively. Overall, ACS only increases the detection latency for at most 5% of the faults detected within 2K cycles.

### 3.5.2 Analysis of SDCs

In this subsection, we discuss some of the cases that escape the detection by CFCSS and ACS control flow methods and eventually result in silent data corruptions. LLVM IR supports the `switch` statements as the terminating instruction of BBs. When the code generation phase converts this switch statement to machine instructions, it is converted into multiple branches. Since these branches were not visible to our code instrumentation pass, these do not get protected by ACS or CFCSS. Some of the faults that affect such unprotected branches eventually cause SDCs. One way to handle these `switch` statements is to convert all the `switch` statements to `if-else` in the LLVM IR itself before running our code instrumentation pass. Another frequent case of SDCs is the faults that displace target address (i.e., faults in low order bits) only by few instructions usually result in SDCs. For
example, we noticed that a fault in second bit of target address of a back edge caused only two extra instructions to be executed. Those two extra instructions happened to be immediate \textit{mov} instructions and they just disturbed the value of two registers. Affected registers were written to memory and hence caused SDC. A similar problem also exists with CFCSS.

\subsection{Data and Control Flow Protection}

In this subsection, we present the results for combining a profile-based data flow \cite{62} and our proposed control flow solution. Figure 3.14 shows the performance overhead on the primary vertical axis and fault coverage on the secondary vertical axis when a combination of ACS and profile based data flow protection is used. SWDetects category in the fault outcome classification represents the number of faults detected by software (both data and control flow) and other category are same as previously mentioned. Control flow condition errors are handled by duplicating the computations for branch conditions. A combined solution incurs an average performance overhead of 47.4\% and provides 96.5\% fault coverage. The binary is 35\% larger and overhead on dynamic instructions is 55.4\%. SWIFT \cite{101} is another solution that used data duplication. By leveraging the ideas from CFCSS, SWIFT also enhances control flow protection. In comparison to ACS with data duplication, SWIFT incurs an increase of: 2.3x for dynamic instructions, 2.3x for binary size and 1.53x for execution time over the same set of benchmarks as used in this work even though the performance overhead of SWIFT was measured on a aggressive server class workstation targeting a different ISA (IA64) than our evaluations (ARM). An IA64 system can take better advantage of instruction level parallelism introduced by duplication.
3.5.4 Discussion and Limitations

Similar to other signature based schemes [94, 4], ACS cannot detect faults in branch conditions. Though other schemes [127, 45] can detect errors in a branch condition if the error occurs after the branch condition is evaluated. This still misses the errors happening before condition evaluation and in variables used in evaluation of that condition. Corrupt branch conditions or other variables used to compute branch conditions can cause control flow condition errors. These errors in branch conditions can be handled by combining ACS with data flow protection based methods as described in Section 3.5.3. In this chapter, we focus on the faults in branch targets and other variables used in computing branch targets.

In the presence of an error in the inserted checking code, the following scenarios can occur: 1) If the check evaluates to True, then the error in signature comparison branch
will result in skipping the signature updates of next basic block, hence the error will be
caught at the next check. 2) If the check is wrong (i.e., an error has already occurred), then
considering that a transient fault is a rare event, a second error in this short span of time in
signature comparison is probabilistically unlikely to occur.

In LLVM, the CFG is the basis of data flow analysis and many optimizations. To
facilitate this data flow analysis, LLVM doesn’t allow the address of a BB to be taken and
then jump to it. Jumps to a location specified in a variable can only exist in the form of
call instructions and for other control flow instructions target BBs are known at LLVM IR
level. So at LLVM IR level, there is no special handling for indirect branches is required.

3.6 Related Work

Control flow protection is becoming an increasingly important concern for reliability
researchers. Two particularly noteworthy pieces of software-only work in this area are
CFCSS [94] and ECCA (Enhanced Control Flow Checking using Assertions) [4]. In our
experimental results, we have compared our work with CFCSS in detail. ECCA assigns a
unique prime identifier to each BB in the program and checks prime identifier at runtime
using an assertion in every BB. The authors of [130] reported that ECCA incurs 150%
memory overhead. Venkatasubramanian et.al [130] use parity in each BB to check for
correct control flow. Control flow is checked by special variables inserted in each routine.
The main difference with respect to these techniques and ACS lies in the fact that we raise
the level of abstraction for checking and the signature update is simplified in each BB. Borin
et al. [19] presented a control flow error detection technique where the signature checks are
made in 1) every BB, 2) only in the BBs with back edges and BBs with return instructions, 3) only in BBs with return instructions and 4) only at the end of the application. This previous work reports 77% overhead for the case 1 and 37% for the case 3, in comparison to 11% overhead of ACS. Fault coverage data or detection latency for these different checking granularity is not reported in the paper. It is expected that delaying the checking to loop end points (blocks with back edges) and function ends (return blocks) will result in relatively more failures and program corruptions or will affect detection time. CEDA [127] is an assertion based scheme that assigns static signatures while minimize aliasing. The overhead of CEDA for common benchmarks is 27.1% in comparison to 11% of ACS. CEDA work also presents comparison with CFCSS and YACCA [45]. The performance overhead of CEDA reported in that paper is comparable to CFCSS for the chosen five benchmarks with a slightly better fault coverage. Since ACS has lower overhead than CFCSS, it will also have lower overhead than CEDA. The paper reports YACCA’s overhead even larger than that of CFCSS and CEDA.

A comparison with SWIFT [101] is already described in Section 3.5.3. Other works such as CRAFT and PROFIT [102] improve upon the SWIFT solution by using additional hardware structures and architectural vulnerability factor (AVF) analysis [92]. Our goal in this work is to make the control flow protection practical for commodity embedded systems by reducing the performance overhead. Our experimental results demonstrate that this can be achieved at significantly less performance overhead than these previously proposed techniques.

Symptom detection based solutions rely on anomalous microarchitectural behavior to detect soft errors. A light-weight approach for detecting soft errors, ReStore [132], an-
analyzes symptoms including memory exceptions, branch mispredicts, and cache misses. mSWAT [76] presented a solution which detects anomalous software behavior to provide a reliable system. It requires special simple hardware detectors to detect faults. These techniques are orthogonal to ACS, as they rely on specialized hardware. If available, they can be leveraged along with ACS to increase the number of faults detected under HWDetects category.

A category of previous works related to control flow protection are watchdog processor based solutions [77]. The general idea of these techniques is to have a watchdog processor, along side the main processor, that monitors and checks the program executing on the main processor. These solutions rely on the availability of watchdog processor and in some cases even propose specific changes to the watchdog processors. A variety of watchdog based solutions [127, 82, 75] are proposed in literature by modifying some aspect (e.g., changing the type of signatures) of the technique. Some recent solutions also suggest the idea of distributed checking in the core for various components. Argus [81], for example, relies on a series of hardware checker units to perform online invariant checking to ensure correct application execution (data flow as well as control flow). Argus achieves very low overhead by adding extra hardware. In comparison to these techniques, ACS targets COTS components and does not require any hardware changes.

An interesting approach to soft error reliability is using Redundant Multithreading (RMT). AR-SMT [108] introduced the idea of RMT on SMT cores; The work is done by a leading thread, and the trailing thread checks for the correctness. Subsequent works [100, 46] in this category have tried to reduce the overhead due to RMT. All these techniques come with the overhead of running an extra thread which executes a skeleton of the origi-
nal program.

Another compiler assisted solution for control flow checking uses extra hardware to minimize the overhead [71]. It requires compiler, as well as hardware changes. Ours is a software-only approach to produce protected programs.

There is a large body of related work in Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [1] for computer security against external software attacks. CFI works by making sure that all the control transfer occur as determined by the static CFG. The failure model targeted by CFI schemes is very different from soft errors failure mode. In CFI, constant destinations (direct branches) are statically verified and while computed (dynamic branches) are verified for correct destination by instrumenting the code. Soft errors can affect the direct as well as indirect branches and hence CFI, as is, is not directly applicable for soft errors. Though direct branches can also be protected in a manner similar to dynamic branches, but the already high overhead (20%-60% for dynamic branches only) would become prohibitive.

Path profiling [11] finds the execution count of a path in a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). It is a related problem to our work and gives an unique number for each path in a DAG. However, we want to have a balanced path length along with information about edges in the path to insert balancing increments. This can not be obtained with path profiling. Moreover, usually profiling is created with training inputs but later the program might be executed with a different set of inputs. In ACS, we need the correct path length with the current inputs a program is executing. Therefore, the data produced by off-line profiling can not be used in ACS.
3.7 Conclusions

The ever increasing desire to create powerful and efficient microprocessors, with each successive new generation, has led to the use of increasingly smaller transistors into these devices. Aggressive scaling makes transistor devices more susceptible to transient faults. To tackle the problem of control flow protection at minimal performance overhead, we have proposed Abstract Control flow Signatures (ACS). ACS achieves its efficiency by working at a coarse-grain level than the previously proposed signature based techniques and also by simplifying signature updates in each basic block. ACS reduces performance overhead, on average, from 75% down to 11% while maintaining the similar level of fault coverage in comparison to a previously proposed approach (CFCSS [94]).
CHAPTER IV

Harnessing Soft Computations for Low-budget Fault Tolerance

A growing number of applications from various domains such as multimedia, machine learning, and computer vision are inherently fault tolerant. However, for these soft workloads, not all computations are fault tolerant (e.g., a loop trip count). In this chapter, we propose a compiler-based approach that takes advantage of soft computations inherent in the aforementioned class of workloads to bring down the cost of software-only transient fault detection. The technique works by identifying a small subset of critical variables that are necessary for correct macro-operation of the program. Traditional duplication and comparison is used to protect these variables. For the remaining variables and temporaries that only affect the micro-operation of the program, strategic expected value checks are inserted into the code. Intuitively, a computation-chain result near the expected value is either correct or close enough to the correct result so that it does not matter for non-critical variables. The overall goal here is to minimize the number of user unacceptable output corruptions. Exact output is not necessary in the aforementioned classes of applications if an user can
4.1 Introduction

An increasing number of both current and emerging workloads from domains such as multimedia, machine learning, computer vision, etc., either compute on approximate data and/or produce results that have subjective interpretations, i.e. the quality of the output is subjectively judged by a human. Such applications can inherently tolerate more faults while still producing user acceptable outputs. User acceptable outputs are the program outputs where either the user can not differentiate between an output in presence of a fault or the output is useful even in presence of fault. Multimedia computations such as encoding/decoding of audio, images and video are examples of such applications. Such computations are referred to as soft or imprecise computations [24, 72] in the literature. Also, other applications from domains such as machine learning and computer vision use probabilistic algorithms that are inherently tolerant to a certain degree of faults.

As Chapter II and Chapter III, the focus of this chapter is on the faults caused by soft errors. Soft errors, as mentioned in the introduction of Chapter II, are caused by high energy particle strikes from space or Alpha particles. Soft errors can also be caused by circuit crosstalk or random noise. The silicon-chip technology is becoming more susceptible to soft errors with each new generation due to decreasing transistor sizes and increasing transistor density. Soft Error Rate (SER) for the logic on chip is steadily rising with technology scaling [120]. SER is the rate at which a component encounters soft errors and SER scales with number of transistors and level of integration [44]. With increasing chip density, In-
tel expects the errors caused by cosmic rays to increase and become a limiting factor in
design [52]. Soft computing workloads have high levels of inherent fault tolerance. For
the workloads that have subjective interpretation of results, fault detection efforts can be
directed only to the parts of the program that when perturbed produce user unacceptable
outputs. As a result, there is an opportunity to reduce the overhead of fault protection for
these applications. In this chapter, we analyze and identify the nature of faults that cause
unacceptable outputs and propose an efficient software-only fault detection scheme that
exploits soft computations.

The inherent fault tolerant nature of soft computing applications raises an important
question: *Do these applications require any fault protection at all?* The answer to this
question is "yes, they do" because not all computations in soft computing applications
are fault tolerant. As identified by the works in the field of approximate computing [113,
39, 10], a program has certain computations that can be approximate for user acceptable
outputs, while the computation of other parts of the program needs to be precise. For
example, correctness of a variable that holds the number of frames of video to be decoded
is more important for user acceptable output than the computation of a single pixel in a
frame. To differentiate errors causing the user acceptable outputs from to the ones causing
unacceptable outputs, we refine the definition of silent data corruption to **Unacceptable
Silent Data Corruptions** (USDCs). USDCs are the incorrect program outputs in presence
of a fault that are below an acceptable quality but the program completes execution without
terminating prematurely and behaving abnormally.

Our solution takes advantage of *not-so-strict* requirement on program output correct-
ness and protects only the critical parts of the computation. To this end, we analyze the
nature of soft computations and propose a compiler-based software-only approach for identifying USDC-causing variables automatically and inserting relevant detection code. Our approach does not require any program annotations and works by identifying critical variables that, if corrupted, affect the program output significantly as a single corruption either affects many computations or has repeated impact on computation. Variables that carry a state across iterations in a loop are examples of such critical variables. Computation of critical variables is protected using traditional replication, duplicating their producer chain and inserting a check [41]. Expected value checks are inserted on other variables to make sure that they stay in a compact range obtained by profiling. We hypothesize that a deviation outside this range is unlikely to happen in program execution under normal conditions. Any deviations within the checking range is unlikely to cause a USDC. Hence, expected value checks represent checking substantial abnormal behavior of a program while allowing insignificant corruptions. In this manner, soft checks are performed on soft computation because they are low overhead, while hard checks are sparingly used on critical variables.

The major contributions of this chapter are as follows:

- A fully automated compiler analysis and transformation method that partitions computations among three categories: to be protected by traditional duplication, to be protected by soft value checks or not to be protected. This method also judiciously performs selective duplication and inserts value checks. Our technique does not require any program annotations.

- We analyzed soft computing benchmarks from various domains such as multimedia, machine learning, computer vision, etc., to identify the nature of computations and
to develop compiler heuristics. We also implemented fidelity metrics to measure the objective quality of the outputs.

- Fault injection experiments are performed to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed scheme. We show that, on average, at 19.6% performance overhead, SDCs can be reduced from 15% down to 7.3% and USDCs from 3.4% down to 1.2% in comparison to an unmodified application. This unacceptable silent data corruption rate is even lower than a traditional full duplication scheme that has 57% overhead.

4.2 Motivation

4.2.1 Soft Computations

Soft computations can tolerate relatively higher numbers of errors than other applications that require their results to be numerically-precise. Soft computing has been previously exploited in trading off accuracy for energy efficiency [113, 39] or execution time [85]. In this chapter, we propose to exploit such computations for trading off the cost of providing reliability with the accuracy of results. However, all parts of these error tolerant applications are not equally error tolerant. For example, errors in loop variables might cause a significant portion of the output to be corrupted. The computation of such variables needs to be precise.

In order to define the level of acceptable degradation, we need to evaluate whether the output of an application is acceptable to the end user. Naturally, the tolerable amount of degradation is application dependent and different quality metrics are required for different applications. For example, an objective metric for the acceptable quality of a decoded
image is to have Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) above a certain threshold. Higher PSNR implies a better quality image. Similarly, the output of a data classification algorithm (machine learning application) can be acceptable if the number of correctly classified test data in presence of a fault does not significantly differ from the classification quality in the absence of the fault. The type of quality measure metric used for different applications and thresholds for them to be of accepted quality are provided later in Section 4.4.2.

Figure 4.1: Difference between decoding (part (a)) of an image in a fault-free environment and decoding in presence of faults (part (b) and (c)). Though the decoded image in part (b) does not numerically match with fault free decoding, the difference is not perceptible. The distortions in part (c) are perceptible (top-right corner) and thus the output is unacceptable.

In Figure 4.1, we demonstrate how the faults might affect the output of an application. We injected faults into various runs of a jpeg image decoder and analyzed the outputs. The experimental setup for injecting faults is described in Section 4.4. Figure 4.1 shows an example of a decoded image under three scenarios. Figure 4.1(a) is the decoded image when no fault was injected in the application run. Figure 4.1(b) is the decoded image when a fault was injected and the output is numerically incorrect but the difference is not perceptible. Figure 4.1(c) shows the unacceptable output in presence of a fault. The top-right portion of Figure 4.1(c) is significantly distorted due to incorrect pixel values. The pixels in both
Figure 4.1(b) and Figure 4.1(c) do not numerically match with the ones in Figure 4.1(a). However, the primary difference between these two figures is that in Figure 4.1(b) only few of pixels are incorrectly computed thus causing an imperceptible difference while in Figure 4.1(c), a large slice of pixels are incorrectly calculated causing a perceptible change. We further analyzed the propagation of the faults in each of these cases. The fault in Figure 4.1(b) only corrupts the output of an addition by a small amount while calculating inverse discrete cosine transform, hence causes only small output disturbance. However, the fault in Figure 4.1(c) causes error in decoding Huffman-compressed coefficients for a block of data, hence corrupting a lot more data. This shows that for soft computing style application it is critical to protect the computations that affect a large amount of output.

4.2.2 Silent Data Corruptions

Traditionally, the fault tolerance research community only considers a cycle-by-cycle match of architectural state as the correct execution of a program. This strict notion of program correctness is called Architecturally Correct Execution (ACE) [90]) and is used in many hardware based reliability solutions. However, Li et al. [73] showed that 17.6% of the multimedia and AI application runs produced correct results even though they had architecturally incorrect states. Feng et al. [41] believe that the user-visible output corruptions truly matter, and Khudia et al. [62] also leverage this idea of application level correctness. A program is said to have an SDC, if in presence of a fault, the program completes execution without terminating prematurely and behaving abnormally but the output of the program is incorrect. These are most harmful type of faults because they silently corrupt the output of the program while the user thinks that program worked correctly. Hence, a
number of previous works [54, 55, 41] have analyzed SDCs and focused on reducing them.

![Figure 4.2](image)

**Figure 4.2:** SDCs are divided into acceptable SDCs and unacceptable SDCs. Unacceptable SDCs are further divided into the ones due to large and small instruction output value changes. Soft checks using expected values can detect unacceptable SDCs (up to 14% of total SDCs) due to large instruction output value change.

As briefly mentioned before, an exact output match is not critical for the end user in case the output is of high fidelity. Traditionally, SDC-free execution is considered as a criterion for correctness. However, for soft computations the program can be assumed to have correctly executed even if it generates numerically incorrect but high fidelity outputs. This notion of having acceptable corruption is not applicable for all types of computations, e.g., most of the SPEC CPU benchmarks but is applicable to soft computation benchmarks. For our work, we divide the SDCs further into two categories: Acceptable Silent Data Corruptions (ASDCs) and Unacceptable Silent Data Corruptions (USDCs). ASDCs are the SDCs that are admissible to the user due to the negligible differences compared to fault free execution. However, USDCs are the SDCs that change the output significantly such that it is not acceptable to the user.
We performed fault injection experiments on unmodified soft computing benchmarks to quantify the USDCs caused by faults that force large disturbance on the generated values by instructions. The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 4.2. The experimental setup and description of these benchmarks are presented later in Section 4.4. The Y-axis in the graph plots total SDCs caused in the fault injection experiments. Each column is divided into ASDCs and USDCs. USDCs are further divided into the SDCs that were due to a large and small value changes in the corrupted instructions. On average, 77% of the SDCs result in ASDCs and 14% in USDCs with large value changes. ASDCs are the errors that result in user acceptable outputs and therefore nothing needs to be done for these. USDCs that are caused by large output value change of a computation can be detected by having expected value checks. Expected value checks, obtained by profiling (Section 4.3.3.1), make sure that the output does not deviate outside a compact range. Although 14% might not seem like a very large percentage but one must view this in the proper context as USDCs are the worst of all.

4.3 Solution: Analysis and Design

4.3.1 Overview

We analyze a number of benchmarks to find out the most vulnerable computations in soft applications to develop our compiler heuristics. These analyses involve fault injections and then investigating fault propagation. The outcome of the program is correlated back to the fault injection variable. Once these patterns are identified, we make compiler heuristics to insert checking code in the application. As mentioned previously, all the computations in
a program are not soft computations. Precise computation of parts of the program that can adversely affect the program output should be maintained. In our experiments we found that the heuristics we have developed work well across a wide range of soft applications.

```c
for (crc = init; len >= 32; len -= 32){
    register unsigned long data;
    data = mad_bit_read(&bitptr, 32);
    ... tableVal = crc_table[(data >> 24) ^ ...];
    crc = (crc << 8) ^ tableVal;
    ...
}
...  
```

**Figure 4.3:** The code snippet from *mp3dec (mad)* [50] benchmark. The variables that are dependent on their own values in the previous iterations are underlined. A corruption in such variables is more likely to result in unacceptable outputs.

To show frequently occurring computations in soft computing applications, we show a code snippet from *mp3dec (mad)* [50] benchmark in Figure 4.3. In our experiments with various benchmarks, we have noticed that a corruption in the variables that carry state across loop iterations is more likely to result in USDCs. We define such variables as **state variables** and these variables are underlined in this figure. State variables include loop iteration variables. Intuitively protecting state variables makes sense as state variables have a *snowball effect* on the subsequent computations, because the error not only affects the current iteration but it also propagates to future iterations. Protecting such variables is critical to minimize the user unacceptable outputs because errors in these variables are likely to cause significant changes in the output of a program. Loop index variables are also state variables and an error in loop index variables have the potential to change the output significantly by increasing or decreasing the number of iterations executed.
\[
\text{crcD} = \text{init}; \\
\text{for} (\text{crc} = \text{init}; \ \text{len} >= 32; \ \text{len} -= 32)\
\quad \text{register unsigned long data;} \\
\quad \text{data} = \text{mad_bit_read}(\&\text{bitptr}, 32); \\
\quad \ldots \\
\quad \text{tableVal} = \text{crc_table}[(\text{data} >> 24) \land \ldots]; \\
\quad \text{crc} = (\text{crc} << 8) \land \text{tableVal}; \\
\quad \text{crcD} = (\text{crcD} << 8) \land \text{tableVal}; \\
\quad \text{if} (\text{crc} \neq \text{crcD}) \\
\quad \quad \text{recover_and_continue_execution();} \\
\quad \ldots \\
\ldots
\]

**Figure 4.4:** The code snippet from Figure 4.3 with \(\text{crc}\) variable duplicated. For the sake of brevity, the duplication of other state variables (those shown in Figure 4.3) is not shown in this figure. Variables postfixed with \(D\) are duplicated variables.

We protect state variables by duplicating the producer chains of such variables. Producer chain of a variable can be obtained by the recursive traversal of its use-def chain. The effect of duplicating the producer chain of one such variable \(\text{crc}\) is shown in Figure 4.4.

Line 9 in Figure 4.4 is the duplicated line and variables postfixed with \(D\) are the duplicated variables. For the purpose of exposition, we deliberately show duplication of only a single variable in this example. A more detailed and complete example of duplication is presented later in this section.

In general, some variables and instructions generate a value or a range of values frequently [25]. Generation of such values is more common in soft computations due to the repetition of same calculation on different inputs. A check for these frequent values or a range of values produced by an instruction can help protect against corruption. A range check is inserted for such variables and the range is obtained by profiling, as explained later in Section 4.3.3. Figure 4.5 shows a value range check inserted for a variable on line
... for (crc = init; len >= 32; len -= 32) {
    register unsigned long data;
    data = mad_bit_read(&bitptr, 32);
    ...
    tableVal = crc_table[(data >> 24) ^ ...];
    if (tableVal < V1 && tableVal > V2)
        recover_and_continue_execution();
    crc = (crc << 8) ^ tableVal;
    ...
} ...

Figure 4.5: The code snippet from Figure 4.3 with expected value check inserted on variable tableVal. Assume that the value generated lie within the range [V1, V2] (Obtained by profiling). This is a simple example of inserting value checks and more detailed examples are shown later in Section 4.3.3.

7. This is assuming that the variable tableVal lies between V1 and V2. If the duplication were to be performed for tableVal, its input data and data's producer chain would also need to be duplicated. Thus the value checks help to save on cost of duplication. Again for the purpose of exposition, Figure 4.5 only shows a simple example.

If an instruction generates the same value frequently then this value can be used to check the output of that instruction at certain opportunistic points in an application. The use of frequently generated values for soft checks is a novel idea but frequently generated values by an instruction has previously been used in various optimizations [25, 135]. For example, if a multiply operation generates the same invariant value frequently, then the multiply operation can be optimized away with a check inserted for the correct value. Racunas et al. [98] also make use of certain consistent bounds on intermediate data in their hardware-based scheme. The intuition behind such value range checks is that if the instructions produce values between a previously seen ranges (in the profile data) the output would not
Figure 4.6: Instruction duplication in a single thread of execution. Instructions marked with double circle are duplicated instructions. The instruction marked with \textit{ld} is a load instruction. We do not duplicate loads to save on memory traffic.

be significantly affected and is expected to be acceptable. These checks are soft checks in the sense that they check the expected output values of instructions.

Overall, the foundation of our work is based on the following two observations:

1. First, if the program variables in the main loops of applications that have state across iterations are corrupted, they are more likely to result in unacceptable output. Protecting these variables is critical for reducing USDCs.

2. Second, many soft computing benchmarks use the same calculations on different inputs repeatedly such that generated values are in a range. If in presence of an error, the value generated is within this range, it is probabilistically unlikely to have a USDC in such a case. An expected value check on such instructions is inserted to protect against soft errors.
Figure 4.7: Depending on the generated values, one of the three different types of value checks can be inserted. Part (a) shows a single value check inserted if a single value is frequently generated by an instruction. If two values are most frequently generated, the check in part (b) is inserted. However, if the values generated lie in a range, a range check as shown in part (c) is inserted.

4.3.2 Recomputing State Variables

State variables are a critical part of an application and corruption in these variables propagates to subsequent iterations of the loop. They are protected by duplicating the producer chain of such variables and then inserting a comparison between original producer chain and duplicated producer chain of such variables. The technique to identify state variables is described in Section 4.4.1. Figure 4.6 shows an example of such a duplication process in form of a data flow graph. Each circle represents an instruction (or destination variable of that instruction). The solid arrows are data flow edges and dashed arrows represent inter-iteration loop dependences. The instructions marked with \texttt{ld} is a load instruction. The instructions marked with double circle are duplicated instructions. The state variable in this figure is variable 5. The producer chain of instruction 5 is duplicated as shown in Figure 4.6(b). To save on memory traffic, the producer chain is terminated whenever a \texttt{load} instruction is encountered. The reason for this is that a fault in data flow input for load (address operand) is more likely to result in a symptom such as out-of-bound access. Such symptoms can be used as an indication of soft error \cite{41, 132} and a recovery can be
triggered.

4.3.3 Expected Value Checks

In soft computing benchmarks, same calculation on different inputs is performed repeatedly. Moreover, in general some instructions produce the same value almost all the times [25]. To cover the values produced by an instruction, we devise three different types of value checks as shown in Figure 4.7. Figure 4.7(a) shows the data flow graph before and after the value checks are inserted. Instruction 1 produces the value $V_1$ frequently so a check with $V_1$ is inserted. Similarly, Figure 4.7(b) shows the code before and after value checks if the instruction generated two values $V_1$ and $V_2$ most frequently. Finally, Figure 4.7(c) shows the data flow graph before and after a range check is inserted on an instruction that produces values in a range $[V_1, V_2]$. To optimize the number of value checks, we came up with two optimizations for long producer chains.

**Optimization 1:** A naive insertion of value checks on all the instructions that produce values amenable for one of the checks in Figure 4.7 might lead to a prohibitively large number of checks. Hence, to reduce the number of checks, we insert value checks deeper in the producer chain. Figure 4.8 shows an example of such an optimization. If the values produced by instruction 1, 3, 4 and 5 are amenable for value checks, a value check is only inserted on the value produced by instruction 5.

**Optimization 2:** While duplicating instructions, if in a long producer chain, an instruction produces a value amenable to checks, the duplication is terminated and a value check is inserted. An example of this is shown in Figure 4.9. In this example, instruction 4 produces value(s) or a range. In our duplication framework, if such a situation is encountered
Figure 4.8: Optimization 1 for long producer chains: this figure shows an example of a case where multiple instructions in the producer chain of an instruction are amenable for value checks. In order to minimize on number of checks, value check should only be inserted for an instruction lower in the producer chain.

the recursive duplication of producers is terminated and one of the value checks is inserted instead.

Figure 4.9: Optimization 2 for long producer chains: if an instruction amenable to value check is encountered in producer chain, the duplication of producer chain of critical variables is terminated at that point and a value check ($vChk$) is inserted as shown.
4.3.3.1 Value Profiling:

The frequent values or the range of values produced by an instruction are obtained using value profiling. In general, during the profile run, collecting all the values produced by an instruction has very high overhead. An optimization to this is to maintain a fixed set of most frequently produced values by each instruction. Since we also need a range of values produced by an instruction, we have modified this traditional value profile. Essentially, we require a histogram with bins as values produced corresponding to each instruction. However, the future values are unknown, so deciding the histogram bin size before running the program is not possible. We have adopted a modified version of the On-line histogram algorithm [14] for this purpose. Our adopted version of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.

**Algorithm 2**: Algorithm for obtaining histogram of the values produced by an instruction.

| Input: A histogram \( h = ([lb_1, rb_1], m_1), ... ([lb_B, rb_B], m_B) \), a value \( v \) |
| Output: A histogram with \( B \) bins |
| if \( v \in [lb_i, rb_i] \) for some \( i \) then |
| \( m_i = m_i + 1 \) |
| end |
| else |
| Add \([v, v, 1]\) to the histogram \( h \). Histogram \( h \) can now potentially have \( B+1 \) bins; |
| Sort the bins. Denote the sorted bins by \( ([lp_1, rp_2], m_1), ... ([lp_{B+1}, rp_{B+1}], m_{B+1}) \); |
| Find a bin \([lp_i, rp_i]\) that minimizes \( lp_{i+1} - rp_i \); |
| Replace the bins \( ([lp_i, rp_i], m_i), ([lp_{i+1}, rp_{i+1}], m_{i+1}) \) by the bin \( ([lp_i, rp_{i+1}], m_i + m_{i+1}) \); |
| end |

The algorithm takes a histogram \( h \) of size \( B \) as an input. The number of bins \( B \) are pre-decided and are set to 5 in our experiments. Initially the input histogram to this algorithm can be empty. This histogram is maintained for every value generating instruction in the
program during profiling phase (a one time off-line process). \((lb_1, rb_1, m_1)\) is a bin
frequency pair and \(m_1\) represents the number of values generated by a particular instruction
between and including lower bound of the bin \((lb_1)\) and upper bound of the bin \((rb_1)\).

**Input:** A histogram \(h = (lb_1, rb_1, m_1), \ldots (lb_B, rb_B, m_B)\) with sorted bins, a
threshold on range \(R_{thr}\)

**Output:** A frequent range \((lp, rp, m)\)

Pick a bin \((lb_i, rb_i, m_i)\) such that \(m_i = \max(m_1, \ldots, m_B)\);
initialize \(\text{retBin} = (lb_{ret}, rb_{ret}, m_{ret})\) with \((lb_i, rb_i, m_i)\);
Denote the bin left to \(\text{retBin}\) by \(\text{leftBin}\) and the one to the right by \(\text{rightBin}\);
\(\text{leftBin} = (lb_{left}, rb_{left}, m_{left})\) and \(\text{rightBin} = (lb_{right}, rb_{right}, m_{right})\);
while \((rb_{ret} - lb_{ret} < R_{thr})\) and still unconsidered bins do
  if \(m_{left} \geq m_{right}\) then
    \(\text{retBin} = (lb_{left}, rb_{ret}, m_{left} + m_{ret});\)
    \(\text{leftBin} = \text{next leftBin};\)
  end
  else
    \(\text{retBin} = (lb_{ret}, rb_{right}, m_{ret} + m_{right});\)
    \(\text{rightBin} = \text{next rightBin};\)
  end
end
return \(\text{retBin};\)

**Algorithm 3:** A greedy algorithm for obtaining compact range on the values produced
by an instruction.

Once we have the bin-frequency pair for all the value generating instructions in an
application, the next step is to obtain a tight range of lower and upper bound where most
of the values generated by an instruction are concentrated. This information is calculated
and used while inserting the value checks in the application source code. This is obtained
by a greedy algorithm that works by picking a bin that has highest frequency and extends
this bin towards left or right while the range size lies within a threshold. This algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 3.

An important point to note here is that value profiling is an offline process (needs to
be done once per benchmark) and this overhead does not directly impact the performance
overhead of our technique. The frequent values or frequent range of values are obtained by profiling the program on representative inputs. An application instrumented with expected value checks might generate value check failures at runtime even if there are no errors (false positives). However, this is not a correctness issue and could only lead to unwanted recovery initiations. If a check fails, recovery from the check should be executed once and if the same check fails again after recovery further recovery should not be executed for that check. False positives rate is analyzed in Section 4.5.

### 4.4 Experimental Setup

We have evaluated our work by using Statistical Fault Injections (SFIs) into a microarchitectural model of a modern microprocessor. This same method is used by previous works [41, 62, 90] to evaluate reliability solutions. SFI is performed by introducing bit flips randomized in both time and space.

#### 4.4.1 Source Code Transformations

We use the LLVM [66] compiler infrastructure to insert duplication code and expected value checks into the application’s source code. At first, application source code is converted into LLVM’s internal representation called LLVM IR (Intermediate Representation). Our solution is implemented as a pass over LLVM IR. Passes operating at the IR level either analyze the IR code or transform it from IR to IR, performing optimizations. Valueprofiling is implemented as a separate pass. The IR is instrumented to collect value profiling information. Our duplication pass uses information from other analysis passes such
## Table 4.1: The benchmarks and their acceptable quality metrics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benchmark (Benchmark Suite)</th>
<th>Description (Category)</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Fidelity Measure (Threshold)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jpegenc and jpegdec (media-bench [67])</td>
<td>A JPEG image encoder and decoder (image)</td>
<td>flower.ppm and flower.jpg, grid.ppm and grid.jpg</td>
<td>Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) (30 dB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiff2bw (mibench [50])</td>
<td>A tiff format to BW converter (image)</td>
<td>galaxy.tiff, stars.tiff</td>
<td>PSNR (30 dB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>segm (SD-VBS [128])</td>
<td>Image segmentation (Computer vision)</td>
<td>qcif, sim_fast</td>
<td>Segment matrix mismatch (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tex_synth (SD-VBS [128])</td>
<td>Texture synthesis (Computer vision)</td>
<td>qcif, sim_fast</td>
<td>Output matrix mismatch (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g721enc and g721dec (media-bench [67])</td>
<td>audio encoding and decoding (audio)</td>
<td>universal.pcm, clinton.pcm</td>
<td>Segmental SNR (80 dB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mp3enc and mp3dec (mibench [50])</td>
<td>mp3 encoding and decoding (audio)</td>
<td>large.wav, small.wav</td>
<td>PSNR (30 dB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h264enc and h264dec (media-bench II [43])</td>
<td>h264 video encoding and decoding (video)</td>
<td>foreman1.yuv and 4CIF.264, foreman2.yuv and test.264</td>
<td>PSNR (30 dB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kmeans (in-house)</td>
<td>Clustering algorithm (Machine learning)</td>
<td>color100, edge100</td>
<td>Cluster assignment mismatch (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>svm (svm-light [59])</td>
<td>Support vector machine (Machine learning)</td>
<td>train.dat, test.dat</td>
<td>Classification error (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as value profiling to produce bitcode with duplicated instructions and value checks. The LLVM code generation framework is then used to generate ARM binaries from the modified bitcode. **Identifying State Variables:** LLVM IR is in Static Single Assignment (SSA) form. At IR level, the state variables can simply be identified by looking the *phi* nodes in loop headers. A *phi* node merges all the incoming versions of the variable to create a new name for it. State variables have two incoming definitions—one from outside loop definition and the other from inside loop updates—at loop headers and are represented by *phi* nodes in loop headers.

### 4.4.2 Benchmarks and Fidelity Measures

We have collected a variety of benchmarks (a total of 13) that represent soft computations from various domains and at least two benchmarks from each of the following five categories: image, audio and video processing; computer vision; machine learning. These benchmarks represent a good mix of soft computations and we did not hand pick these benchmarks to show a desirable behavior. A brief description of these benchmarks along with their source benchmark suite is given in Table 4.1. Different inputs are used for profiling and running the benchmarks. These profiling and test inputs are given in column 3 of the table. Column 4 in the table shows the fidelity metric used to evaluate the quality of the produced outputs. This is an application dependent metric and different metrics are used for different benchmarks. Column 4 also shows the threshold used for acceptable quality results. Higher PSNR represents a better quality image and video. We chose 30 dB as threshold for PSNR and 80 dB for segmental SNR for acceptable quality. Similar threshold values are used by Thomas et al. [126]. For machine learning and computer vision...
benchmarks, outputs with more than 10% deviations are not considered acceptable. All these benchmarks are compiled with their suggested compiler options. We use Clang [34] as a frontend to generate bitcode for LLVM. Figure 4.10 shows the total number of state variables, duplicated instructions and inserted value checks as a fraction of the total static IR instructions. At most, only 11.4% of the static IR instructions are duplicated and only 8.3% of total static IR instructions have expected value checks on them.

![Graph showing the total number of state variables, duplicated instructions and inserted value checks as a fraction of the total static IR instructions.](image)

**Figure 4.10:** shows the total number of state variables, duplicated instructions and inserted value checks as a fraction of the total static IR instructions. The static code duplication and expected value checks are not more than 12% of the total static IR instructions.

### 4.4.3 Fault Model and Injection Experiments

The proposed approach is evaluated by injecting a number of faults in each application run. The traditional single bit-flip [53, 73, 126, 41] in the processor state is used to model transient faults. At a random cycle during the program execution, a register is randomly selected first and then a randomly selected bit in that register is flipped. Wang et al. [133] showed that, on aggregate, as much as 70% of the total failures due to faults in pipeline
structures such as register file, register alias tables, register free lists, instruction input and output operands etc. results in register file inconsistencies. Thus, the register file is an enticing target for fault injections and similar to previous works [41, 62], we evaluated our work by injecting faults into the register file. Please note that protecting register file by ECC would be able to cover faults occurring in register file itself but not the faults that occur in other hardware structures and then propagate to register file. Overall, our proposed technique is capable of handling faults in other microarchitectural units that affect the program. A fault in a register can also affect the data dependent control flow. Our solution have protection against such faults either by state variables duplication or by value checks. However, it does not provide protection against faults that affect branch targets. For protecting against branch target faults, a previously proposed [60] signature-based low-cost solution can be used in conjunction with our proposed approach.

Table 4.2: GEM5 Simulator parameters (models an ARMv7-a profile of the ARM architecture).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processors core @ 2GHz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simulation configuration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical integer register file size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorder Buffer Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue width</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1-D cache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1-I cache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTLB/ITLB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We used the GEM5 [16] simulator to simulate the workloads and implemented fault injection infrastructure in this simulator. The simulator was run in ARM syscall emulation mode and modeled the ARMv7-a profile of ARM architecture. The performance overheads are obtained using an out-of-order model of the target processor and fault coverage results.
are obtained using an atomic model of the target processor.

The details of the processor configuration for out-of-order model used for the experiments are in Table 4.2. We injected a total of 13000 faults per technique to evaluate the proposed solution, i.e. 1000 fault injection trials for each of the 13 benchmarks. Work by Leveugle et al. [69] can be used to calculate the statistical significance of the fault injection results. The calculation for our experimental setup shows that the with 95% confidence, margin of error for fault coverage results is 3.1%. After the fault injection, the program runs until completion. The result of each simulation trial is classified into one of the following five categories:

- **Masked**: The injected fault did not corrupt the program output. Application-level or architecture-level masking occurred in this case. Also faults that generate acceptable quality results are classified into this category.

- **HWDetect**: The injected fault produces a symptom such as a page fault so that a recovery can be triggered. A fault is considered under this category only if the symptom is produced within a number of cycles (1000 for our experiments) after the fault was injected.

- **SWDetect**: The injected fault was detected by the software checks inserted at the time of source code transformation.

- **Failure**: The injected fault resulted in out-of-bound address access and resulted in program termination. Also, faults causing infinite loops in the program are classified under this category.
Figure 4.11: The fault outcome distribution among different categories is shown. Column original shows the distribution for original unmodified code. The fault distribution with code duplication and code duplication along with value checks is shown in Dup only and Dup + val chks, respectively.

- **USDC**: Faults that generate unacceptable data corruptions are classified into this category. These are the SDCs that do not have acceptable output.

### 4.4.4 Recovery Support

The proposed solution is a soft error detection-only solution. Once a soft error is detected, we rely on a recovery mechanism to recover from the detected error. Previously proposed solutions such as Encore [42], a software-only recovery scheme can be used for recovery. Checkpointing-based recovery schemes can also be used in conjunction with our solution. Moreover, previous works [41, 132] propose that in future processors, recovering from a checkpointed state of ∼1000 instructions would be required for aggressive performance speculation. Such a recovery scheme, if available, can also be integrated with our solution.
4.5 Experimental Evaluation and Analysis

Two of the most important parameters of any reliability scheme are its performance overhead and provided fault coverage. We obtained performance overhead and fault coverage results using the experimental setup described in the above section. We use the simulated runtime of the application as a performance measure and use this runtime to compare the performance of different techniques. Our overall technique is a combination of critical variable checks by duplication and value checks. To analyze the contribution of each of these, we present results for both.

Performance Overhead: Figure 4.12 shows the performance overhead measured in terms of runtime. Dup only column shows the performance overhead if the duplication of state variables is performed and no expected value checks are inserted. The mean performance overhead of Dup only is only 7.6%. Dup + val chks column for each benchmark
shows the performance overhead if the duplication of the producer chains of state variables and expected value checks are inserted. *Dup + val chks* also includes the two optimizations described in Section 4.3.3 that arise out of the interaction between duplication and inserting value checks. The mean performance overhead for *Dup + val chks* is 19.6%.

Four benchmarks *jpegdec, tiff2bw, mp3dec, h264dec and tex_syn* see a relatively bigger increase in performance overhead from *Dup only* because these benchmarks have a number of instructions amenable for value checks. It is interesting to note that the overhead of *svm* is lower for *Dup + val chks* than *Dup only* even though we found that the number of dynamic instructions are higher in *Dup + val chks*. This is due to the lower data cache misses and branch mispredicts in the later case. The average overhead of full duplication technique (not shown in Figure 4.12) also used by Khudia et al. [62] is 57% for the benchmarks used in our work. Full duplication is maximum amount of duplication possible without duplicating loads/stores.

![Figure 4.13](image)

**Figure 4.13:** Each column represents the silent data corruptions as a percentage of total faults. The stacks in each column further divide the silent corruptions between acceptable program outputs and unacceptable data corruptions.

**Fault Coverage:** We analyze the fault coverage results for unmodified, *Dup only* and *Dup + val chks* by injecting faults using the setup described in Section 4.4. If a fault results
in Masking, SWDetect or HWDetects, system can correctly execute the program. Hence, fault coverage is defined as the percentage of injected faults that result in Masking, SWDetect or HWDetects. First, faults are injected into original unmodified applications and their outputs are classified among Masked, SWDetects, HWDetects, Failures and USDCs based on the effect of the fault on the application execution. The results for this classification are shown in Figure 4.11. Y-axis in the figure plots the percent of total injected faults into an application. Results of fault injections into unmodified applications are shown in first column (Original) for each benchmark. Original column does not have any SWDetects because there are no software checks in the binary. Faults in unmodified applications generate 3.4% USDCs. Second, fault coverage of state variable only duplication is shown in Dup only column. It improves fault coverage for all the benchmarks and reduces SDCs and USDCs. Dup only, on average, has 1.8% USDCs. Finally, Dup + val chks column show the fault coverage if the duplication of state variables along with expected value checks and all optimizations are used. Dup + val chks has only 1.2% USDCs. We have also calculated the USDCs for full duplication and this is not shown in a already dense Figure 4.11. The USDCs rate for full duplication is 1.4% at 57% performance overhead. Please note that loads/stores are not duplicated in full duplication, hence there are a number of faults that escape detection. This result shows that selective duplication along with value checks is a more efficient way than soft computation unaware full duplication to protect soft computation workloads.

Acceptable SDCs: Another important analysis is the number of acceptable outputs among silent data corruptions. In this experiment, we break down the SDCs further between Acceptable SDCS (ASDCs) and Unacceptable SDCS (USDCs). Figure 4.13 shows
the result of this analysis for unmodified, Dup only and Dup + val chks. Each column in Figure 4.13 represents the total number of SDCs for the corresponding benchmark. For example, for kmeans 4.2% of the total injected faults into the unmodified (Original column) application resulted in SDCs. Each column is further divided into ASDCs and USDCs. On average, the SDCs are reduced from 15% down to 9.5% when going from Original to Dup only while USDCs are reduced from 3.4% down to 1.8% for the same and SDCs are reduced from 15% down to 7.3% when going from Original to Dup + val chks while USDCs are reduced from 3.4% down to 1.2% for the same. It is interesting to note that mp3enc and h264enc have higher SDCs for Dup + val chks than Dup only. This is due to the interaction of code duplication for state variables and expected value checks. An optimization (Optimization 2 in Section 4.3.3) that we implemented to minimize performance overhead is to insert value checks instead of code duplication wherever beneficial in terms of performance overhead. This, however, in some cases can result in more SDCs if critical value checks are left out.

Sensitivity of results to different inputs: To ascertain the insensitivity of results to input variations, we performed 2-fold cross-validation on our results. We switched test and train inputs, i.e. test input was used to obtain profile data and train input was used in fault injection runs, to obtain fault coverage results for Dup + val chks. We performed cross-validation on jpegdec and kmeans from two separate fields. Cross-validation was performed only on these two benchmarks due to a large number of runs required for obtaining fault coverage results. The average performance overhead difference is 3%. The difference between Masked, SWDetect, HWDetect, Failures and USDCs is only .2%, .45%, .05%, .15% and .15%, respectively.
**Impact of False Positives:** A false positive occurs when one of the value checks fails at runtime in the absence of a fault. In such cases, an unnecessary recovery needs to be triggered. A high false positive rate increases the overhead due to unnecessary recoveries in a fault detection and recovery system. For pipeline-flush based recovery, Racunas et al. [98] calculate that 1 recovery initiation per 1000 instructions does not degrade the performance significantly (2% to 6%). This degradation in performance is dependent on the particular recovery technique. In comparison, in our case, the average false positive rate across all the evaluated benchmarks is as low as 1 value check fail per 235K instructions. For our current implementation, the profiling is done only on one input but the false positive rate can be further reduced by combining profiling form multiple inputs and thus inserting checks only on more stable invariant values.

**Comparison with prior work:** Thomas et al. [126] define the notion of Egregious Data Errors (EDCs) for the outputs that deviate significantly from error-free outputs. Their work develops heuristics for placing detectors by analyzing the pointer and control data affected by a fault. In contrast, the main novelty of our scheme lies in the judicious combination of selective use of expensive duplication for critical state variables and inexpensive value checks for non-state parts of an application. The coverage of their scheme is measured assuming ideal (100% detector accuracy (without implementing backward-slice duplication based error detectors). Memory dependence (reaching stores for loads) in backward slice is not considered and hence coverage with actual implemented detectors is expected to be lower. At 20% and 25% performance overhead (extra LLVM IR instructions) they report a 85% and 86% coverage of EDCs with ideal detectors, respectively. In comparison, even though it represents comparing IR instruction overhead and ideal detector coverage
with runtime overhead and actual detector coverage, our technique shows 82.5% actual implemented detectors coverage of USDCs at 19.6% performance overhead (runtime).

4.6 Related Work

Li et al. [73] propose the notion of application level correctness and also introduce the concept of acceptable quality. We have used acceptable output quality measure in evaluating our work. The idea of user acceptable outputs has been used in previous research [39, 10, 85] to trade-off between energy efficiency/execution time and output solution quality. Li et al. [72] also previously proposed a light-weight recovery mechanism and soft instruction classification. They show a fault coverage of 96% with relaxed definition of correctness in comparison to 97.8% of fault coverage of our solution. Performance overhead of their technique is not reported in the paper. In comparison, we propose a technique to utilize the soft computing nature of applications and insert expected value checks to propose a low cost fault detection solution.

There are a number of solutions proposed in the area of Software Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT). SWIFT [101] uses instruction duplication in a single thread of execution. SWIFT protects the stores by duplicating their computation. Follow-up work on SWIFT such as CRAFT and PROFIT [102] improved upon SWIFT by adding additional hardware and Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) analysis. However, the overhead of SWIFT is 1.41x even on an aggressive ILP-friendly Intel Itanium processor (more favorable for exploiting ILP offered by interleaved duplication). Our proposed solution only has 19.6% performance overhead on a ARM processor.
Shoestring [41] used the idea of protecting only global stores in order to lower performance overhead. Khudia et al. [62] improved Shoestring by utilizing profiling information. Both of these solutions, unlike our solution, do not use the notion of user acceptable outputs and do not incorporate application domain characteristics to increase the efficiency of their proposed solution. We compare with error detector placement work by Thomas et al. [126] in Section 4.5. Sundaram et al. [124] propose selective replication of instructions that has 30% to 75% performance overhead. Cong et al. [32] propose an approach to protect instructions based on their criticality. The technique is a combination of static analysis and dynamic monitoring. The authors report energy savings and overhead of runtime monitoring but a combined performance overhead for duplication and runtime monitoring is not reported. Pattabiraman et al. [96] derived program level detectors using static analysis to find the best location for detectors to be placed in program to avoid system crashes. They identify certain properties such as fanout and lifetime from dynamic dependence graph of the program for detector placement. Unlike our work, their focus is not on reducing the large output corruptions but to avoid system crashes and in fault containment.

Likely program invariants have previously been used in checking validity of data streams, detecting software bugs [37, 51, 136], to minimize the corruption of executing applications [97] and lower SDC rates due to permanent hardware faults [109]. Range-checks used in this work are also a form of likely invariants. However, we combine range-based checks with duplication to provide an effective transient fault detection solution. For transient faults (usually a single-bit upset), range-based checks should be frequent while permanent hardware faults continuously produce error hence sparing use of range-checks suffices. Our solution is optimized to have low-overhead even though relatively frequent checks are
required to detect a single-bit upset. Other than high-cost high-reliability server class solutions such as DMR (Dual-Modular Redundancy) and TMR (Triple-Modular Redundancy), an approach to soft error reliability is Redundant Multithreading (RMT). Since processors which can execute multiple threads simultaneously are increasingly commonplace, the idea of using separate threads for error checking is a possibility. AR-SMT [108] introduced the idea of RMT on SMT cores. The actual work is done by a leading thread, and the trailing thread checks for the correctness. Subsequent works [100, 99] in this category have tried to reduce the overhead of RMT still needing to run an extra thread for each existing thread in the program. Shye et al. [121] explore process level redundancy in applications to provide transient fault detection. In comparison, our solution does not need to run any extra thread/process to provide fault detection.

There exist a number of hardware based solutions to provide protection against soft errors. In comparison, our solution is able to achieve high fault coverage with a low performance overhead without needing any specific hardware additions. Racunas et al. [98] present an hardware mechanism that can identify 85% of the injected faults to ensure that much of the program intermediate data falls within certain bounds. Their use of bounds on intermediate values in hardware is similar to our use of value checks in software. Argus [81] relies on a series of hardware checker units to perform online invariant checking to ensure correct application execution. Lee et al. [68] propose hardware-based scheme for partitioning failure critical and non-critical data into soft-error prone and soft-error protected caches. Soft error detection by anomalous microarchitectural behavior has been used by researchers to propose reliability solutions. Symptoms such as memory exceptions, branch mispredicts and cache misses are used in ReStore [132] to detect soft errors. These
symptoms are an attractive way to detect soft errors at a relatively low cost. However, fault coverage starts to saturate as more symptoms are included and performance overhead starts rising. For example, using cache miss as a symptom might result in too many false detections. mSWAT [53] presented a solution that detects anomalous software behavior to provide a reliable system. mSWAT requires special simple hardware detectors to detect faults. Our solution, however, uses only the available symptoms such as page faults to classify faults under HWDetects category.

4.7 Conclusions

The relentless pursuit of technology scaling in order to gain performance, energy efficiency and higher densities have made transistors more susceptible to soft errors. A growing number of applications from domains such as multimedia, computer vision, machine learning etc. do not need their output to be 100% correct. This numerically incorrect but acceptable output property of such applications can be exploited to provide an efficient fault tolerant solution.

In this chapter, we propose a software-only solution that exploits the inherent fault tolerant nature of soft computing applications. Our solution duplicates producer chains of certain critical variables and inserts expected value checks on other variables. We show that a combination of these two is helpful in reducing the number of unacceptable silent data corruptions. Overall, on average, SDCs are down from 15% to 7.3% and unacceptable SDCs are down from 3.4% to 1.2% in comparison to unmodified application. The performance overhead of the proposed technique is only 19.6% and it does not require any
hardware modifications.
CHAPTER V

Rumba: An Online Quality Management System for Approximate Computing

Soft applications mentioned in the previous chapter are inherently inaccuracy tolerant to a certain degree. Hence, these are naturally amenable to approximate computing and approximate computing can be employed to trade-off accuracy for energy efficiency/performance gain for such applications. The approximated output of such applications, even though not 100% numerically correct, is often either useful or the difference is unnoticeable to the end user. However, a largely unaddressed challenge in the area of approximate computing is quality control: how to ensure the user experience meets a prescribed level of quality. Current approaches either do not monitor output quality or use sampling approaches to check a small subset of the output assuming that it is representative. While these approaches have been shown to produce average errors that are acceptable, they often miss large errors without any means to take corrective actions. In this chapter, we consider application that are amenable to approximate accelerators and the output quality is defined per-application basis.
5.1 Introduction

Computation accuracy can be traded off to achieve better performance and/or energy efficiency. The techniques to achieve this trade off fall under the umbrella of approximate computing. Algorithm specific approximation has been used in many different domains such as machine learning, image processing, and video processing. Different algorithms in these domains have been approximated by programmers to achieve better performance. Video processing algorithms are good candidates for approximation as occasional variation in results will not be noticeable by the user. For example, a consumer can tolerate occasional dropped frames or a small loss in resolution during video playback, especially when this allows video playback to occur seamlessly. Machine learning and data analysis applications also provide opportunities to exploit approximation to improve performance, particularly when such programs are operating on massive data sets. In this situation, processing the entire dataset may be infeasible, but by sampling the input data, programs in these domains can produce representative results in a reasonable amount of time.

However, algorithm specific approximation increases the programming effort because the programmer needs to write and reason about the approximate version in addition to the exact version. Recently, to solve this issue, different software and hardware approximation techniques have been proposed. Software techniques include loop perforation [2], approximate memoization [29, 110], tile approximation [110], discarding high overhead computations [111, 115], and relaxed synchronization [105]. Furthermore, there are many hardware based approximation techniques that employ neural processing modules [40, 7], analog circuits [7], low power ALUs and storage [113], dual voltage processors [38], hardware-based
fuzzy memoization [5, 6] and approximate memory modules [114]. Approximation accelerators [40, 129, 36] utilize these techniques to trade off accuracy for better performance and/or higher energy savings. In order to efficiently utilize these accelerators, a programmer needs to annotate code sections that are amenable to approximation. At runtime, the CPU executes the exact code sections and the accelerator executes the approximate parts.

These techniques provide significant performance/energy gains but monitoring and managing the output quality of these hardware accelerators is still a big challenge. A few of the recently proposed quality management solutions include quality sampling techniques that compute the output quality once in every N invocations [111, 10], techniques that build an offline quality model based on the profiling data [10, 40].

However, these techniques have four critical limitations:

• As the output quality is dependent on the input values, different invocations of a program may produce results of different output qualities. Therefore, sampling techniques are not capable of capturing all changes of the output quality. Moreover, it is highly possible to miss large output errors because only a subset of outputs are actually examined, i.e., monitoring is not continuous. Also, profiling techniques do not work efficiently if the profiling data is not representative of all possible inputs.

• Using these quality management techniques, if the output quality drops below an acceptable threshold, there is no way to improve the quality other than re-executing the whole program on the exact hardware. However, this recovery process has high overhead and it offsets the gains of approximation.

• These techniques measure the quality of the whole output that is usually equal to the
average quality of each individual output element, e.g., pixels in an image. Previous works [40, 7] in approximate computing show that most of the output elements have small errors and there exist a few output elements that have considerably large errors, even though the average error is low. These large errors can degrade the whole user experience. For example, having a few pixels with high error in an image can be easily noticed by a user. Existing quality management techniques treat all errors equally but large errors have noticeable effect on the perceivable output quality.

- Tuning output quality based on a user’s preferences is another challenge for the hardware-based approximation techniques. Different users and different programs might have different output quality requirements. However, it is difficult to change the output quality of an approximate hardware dynamically.

To address these issues, we propose a framework called Rumba∗, an online quality management system for approximate computing [63]. Rumba’s goal is to dynamically investigate an application’s output to detect elements that have large errors and fix these elements with a low-overhead recovery technique. Rumba performs continuous light-weight output monitoring to ensure more consistent output quality. Rumba’s design is based on the following two observations:

First, approximation error can be accurately predicted by simple prediction models such as *linear*, *decision tree*, and *moving average*. Second, we observe that code regions or functions that are amenable for approximation are often *pure*. Pure code regions just read their inputs and only write to their outputs without modifying any other state. Such sections

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*The name Rumba is inspired from Roomba®, an autonomous robotic vacuum cleaner. It moves around the floor and detects dirty spots on the floor to clean them.*
can be safely re-executed without any side effects. It gives us the benefit of re-executing the loop iterations to fix the erroneous output elements with low overhead.

Rumba has two main components: detection and recovery. The goal of the detection module is to efficiently predict output elements that have large approximation errors. Detection is achieved by supplementing the approximate accelerator with a low-overhead error prediction hardware. The detection module dynamically investigates predicted error to find elements that needs to be corrected. It gathers this information and sends it to the recovery module on the CPU. In order to improve the output quality, recovery module re-executes the iterations that generate high error output elements.

To reduce Rumba’s overhead, recovery is done on the CPU in parallel to detection on the approximate accelerator. The recovery module controls the tuning threshold to manage output quality, energy efficiency and performance gain. The tuning threshold determines the number of iterations that need to be re-executed.

The major contributions of this work are as follows:

- We explore three light-weight error prediction methods to predict the errors generated by an approximate computing system.

- The ability to manage performance and accuracy trade offs for each application at runtime using a dynamic tuning parameter.

- We leverage the idea of re-execution to fix elements with large errors.

- 2.1x reduction in output error with respect to an unchecked approximate accelerator with the same performance gain. Detection and re-execution decrease the energy savings of the unchecked approximate accelerator from 3.2x to 2.2x.
5.2 Challenges and Opportunities

The ability of applications to produce results of acceptable output quality in an approximate computing environment is necessary to ensure a positive user experience. Output quality control for approximate programs is important for the wide adaptation of this technology.

![Figure 5.1: Typical cumulative distribution function of errors generated by approximation techniques. A large number of output elements have small errors while a few output elements have large errors.](image)

5.2.1 Challenges of Managing Output Quality

The following are the main challenges of output quality management in an approximate computing environment.
Figure 5.2: An example of variation in image quality with the changing distribution of errors. Subfigure (a) is the original image without any errors. Ten percent of the pixels in (b) have 100% error while the rest of the pixels are intact. All pixels in (c) have 10% error. Although these two images have the same average quantitative output quality (90%), errors in Subfigure (b) are more noticeable.

Challenge I: Fixing output elements with large errors is critical for user experience.

We analyze the distribution of errors in the output elements generated by an application under approximation. Previous studies \cite{40, 110, 111} reported that the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the errors of an approximated application’s output follows the curve shown in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1 shows a typical CDF of errors in output elements when total average error is less than 10%. This figure shows that the most of the output elements (about 80%) have small errors (lower than 10%). However, there are few output elements (about 20%) that have significant errors.

Although the number of elements with large errors is relatively small, they can have huge impact on the user perception of output quality. Figure 5.2 demonstrates this. In this figure, we generate two images by adding errors such that the overall average error is 10% in both images. Figure 5.2(a) is the original image. In Figure 5.2(b), only 10% of pixels have 100% errors while the rest of pixels are exact. On the other hand, all pixels in Figure 5.2(c) have about 10% error. Even though the overall output error is the same for both
the generated images, errors in Figure 5.2(b) are more noticeable than Figure 5.2(c) to the end user. This shows that to effectively improve the output quality, a quality management system should reduce the long tail of high errors.

**Challenge II: Output quality is input-dependent.** Another characteristic of approximate techniques is that output quality is highly dependent on the input [40, 110, 111, 10]. In this case, these techniques must consider the worst case to make sure that the output quality is acceptable. To show this, we run an image processing application called *mosaic* that generates a large image using many small images. The first phase of this application computes the average brightness of all input images. To approximate this phase, a well-known approximation technique called loop perforation [2] is used. Loop perforation drops iterations of the loop randomly or uniformly. Therefore, in this case, instead of computing the average brightness of all the pixels, the approximate version computes the average brightness of a subset of the pixels.

Figure 5.3 shows the output error for 800 different images of flowers [80]. Average error of all the images is about 5% but there are many images that have output error above the average, up to a maximum of 23%. Therefore, an approximate system in the worst case (23% error) may produce unacceptable quality results. However, if a quality management system can reduce the unacceptable outputs, the aggressiveness of approximate techniques can be increased to get better performance and/or energy savings.

Also, since the output quality is highly input-dependent, previous quality managing systems such as quality sampling or profiling techniques might miss invocations that have low quality. In order to solve this problem, a dynamic light-weight quality management system is required to check the output quality for all invocations.
Figure 5.3: Mosaic application’s output error for 800 different images of flowers. This data shows that the output quality is highly input-dependent.

**Challenge III: Monitoring and recovering output quality is expensive.** One of the challenges that all approximate techniques have is monitoring the output quality. In order to solve this problem, continuous checks are necessary. Such checks cannot compute the exact output, but instead need to be predictive in nature. Different frameworks [111, 10] suggest running an application twice (exact and approximate versions) and comparing the results to compute output quality. Unfortunately, it has high overhead and it is not feasible to monitor all invocations. Running exact and approximate at all times will nullify the advantages of using approximation.

To reduce this overhead, these frameworks utilize quality sampling techniques that check the quality once in every N invocations of the program. Therefore, if the invocations that are not checked have low output quality, these frameworks will miss them due to the input dependence of output quality (Challenge II).
Challenge IV: Different users and applications have different requirements on output quality. In an approximation system, the user should be able to tune the output quality based on her preferences or program’s characteristics. Software-based approximation techniques are better at tuning the output quality. However, for hardware-based techniques, it is a huge challenge. For example, in a system with two versions of functional units, exact and approximate, it is hard to control the final output quality dynamically.

5.2.2 Rumba’s Design Principles

To overcome the four challenges, Rumba exploits two observations found in the kernels that are amenable to approximation: predictiveness of errors and recovery by selective re-execution.

![Graph](image)

**Figure 5.4:** Exact output, approximate output and relative errors in the approximate output. The relative errors in the approximate output are higher for some inputs than the others and are more easily predictable than the output itself.

**Predictiveness of Errors:** Rumba’s detection module is based on the observation that it is possible to accurately predict the errors of an approximate accelerator using a computation-
ally inexpensive prediction model. Figure 5.4 shows exact output (a Gaussian distribution), approximate output produced by an accelerator and errors in approximation. For this case, it is visually clear that errors are concentrated on certain inputs. Hence, a simple prediction model can separate cases of high errors accurately.

Rumba dynamically employs light-weight checkers to detect approximation errors. A threshold on the predicted errors is used to classify errors in the output elements as high. Therefore, Rumba targets output elements with high errors as mentioned in Challenge I. Also, since Rumba has light-weight checkers, the checks can be performed online for all the elements of each invocation (Challenge III).

**Recovery by Selective Re-execution:** In computing, a *pure* function or code region only reads its inputs and only affects its outputs, i.e., it does not affect any other state. In other words, pure functions or code regions can be freely re-executed without any side-effects. Similar characteristics have been previously used in recovering program from external errors simply by re-executing [42, 64]. Such functions or code regions naturally occur in many data-parallel computing patterns such as map and stencil. We analyzed the data parallel parts of the applications in Rodinia benchmark suite [30] and found out that more than 70% of them can be re-executed without any side effects. Rumba detects this characteristic using these previous techniques to identify such regions in applications. A more detailed description of recovery is given in Section 5.3.1. It is not a new restriction imposed by Rumba as previously proposed approximate accelerators [40, 7] require functions or code regions to be pure to be able to map them to an approximate accelerator.

Therefore, if Rumba detects that one of the accelerator invocations generates output elements with large error, the Rumba recovery module can simply re-execute that iteration
Figure 5.5: A high-level block diagram of the Rumba system. The offline components determine the suitability of an application for the Rumba acceleration environment. The online components include detection and recovery modules. The approximation accelerator communicates a recovery bit corresponding to the ID of the elements to recompute with the CPU via a recovery queue.

to generate the exact output elements. In this case, there is no need to re-run the whole program to recover those output elements (Challenge III). Also, using this technique, Rumba can manage the performance/energy gains by changing the number of iterations to be re-executed to target Challenge IV.

5.3 Design of Rumba

5.3.1 Overview

Approximation errors can be broadly divided into large errors and small errors. Approximation accelerators generate a large number of small errors and relatively few large errors as shown in Figure 5.3. Rumba is a detection and recovery scheme for errors in an approximate computing system. Rumba is specifically designed to detect these large errors by a light-weight checker and then fix these errors. Rumba makes the output of an approximation accelerator computing system acceptable by reducing the long tail of large errors. Alternatively, with Rumba’s error correction capabilities, it will be possible to dial up the amount of approximation, thus improving performance and/or energy savings, while still
producing user acceptable outputs.

A high-level block diagram of the Rumba system is shown in Figure 5.5. The offline part of Rumba system consist of two trainers. The first trainer finds the optimal configuration of the approximate accelerator for a particular source code. The second trainer trains a simple error prediction technique based on the errors produced by the accelerator trainer. The configuration parameters for both the approximate accelerator and the error predictor are embedded in the binary.

The execution subsystem of Rumba is shown in the same figure. For the purpose of exposition, we assume that the design of our approximation accelerator is similar to the one proposed by Esmaeilzadeh et al. [40]. However, the same design principles can apply to other accelerator based approximate computing systems. As shown in the figure, the core communicates to the accelerator using I/O queues for data transfers from the core to the accelerator and back from accelerator to the core. Rumba's execution has two components: detection and recovery modules.

The annotated approximate part of the application code gets mapped to the approximation accelerator [40, 7]. We augment the approximate accelerator by an error predictor module to detect approximation errors. A variety of prediction techniques can be used to predict these errors. We explore three light-weight checkers that are implemented using three simple error prediction techniques. These error predictors are described in Section 5.3.2. Once a check fires, i.e., approximation for that particular output element is larger than a tuning threshold (determined by the online tuner based on user requirements), a recovery bit for the iteration generating that particular element is set in the recovery queue as shown in Figure 5.5. The CPU collects these bits from the recovery queue and
re-executes the iterations that their recovery bit is set. Output merger chooses the exact or the approximate output as final result. A more detailed description is in Section 5.3.3. Another important aspect of Rumba is the dynamic management of output quality and energy efficiency. By controlling the threshold at which the checker fires, Rumba can control the number of iterations to be re-executed. This tuning process is discussed in Section 5.3.4.

5.3.2 Light-weight Error Prediction

An important first step is the inexpensive detection of large approximation errors in output elements. Since it is not known beforehand which output elements will have large errors, runtime checks should be employed for all the output elements. Therefore, the light-weight nature of these checkers is of paramount importance. Complex checkers to detect large approximation will offset the gains of approximation and, thus, are not desirable. A desirable dynamic checker should have low overhead and still be accurate at predicting errors in output elements.

A dynamic checker does not have access to the exact results, hence, the errors in approximate output cannot be computed by comparing with the exact result. Computing exact values is not an option because that negates the benefits of employing an approximation system. The Rumba detection module needs to detect large approximation errors by using inputs to the accelerator or the approximate output produced by the accelerator. We call a method an input-based method if the method calculates errors using the inputs to the accelerator. Similarly, if the errors are detected by just observing the accelerator output, such a method is called an output-based method. For input-based methods, approximation errors can be obtained using a simple predicting model on inputs in the following two ways:
• Errors by Value Prediction (EVP): predict the output using a model and then get the error by comparing it with the approximate accelerator’s output.

• Errors by Error Prediction (EEP): predict the errors directly using a model.

In our experiments, we observed that if we use the same Prediction model it is more accurate to predict the errors directly than computing the errors by first predicting the output. We analyzed errors in the approximation of a Gaussian distribution and found that average distance between exact approximation errors and errors obtained by EVP and EEP is 2.5 and 1, respectively, i.e., EEP is more accurate. Therefore, we use simple prediction models to predict errors in the approximation. We explore two input-based methods and one output-based method to detect errors.

5.3.2.1 Error prediction using a linear model:

The first error prediction method is a linear error predictor and is an input-based method. A linear error prediction method predicts error by computing a linear function of inputs to the accelerator. Equation 5.1 shows the linear function that is calculated to compute the error. The number of terms \((x; s)\) are determined by the number of inputs to the code section that is mapped to the approximate accelerator. A linear model requires relatively simple computations in the form of multiply-add operations. Hence, the online prediction of errors for a particular input does not add much energy overhead. The weights \((w; s)\) and constant \(c\) are determined by offline training.

\[
err = w_0 \times x_0 + w_1 \times x_1 + \ldots + w_{N-1} \times x_{N-1} + c \tag{5.1}
\]
where \( x_i \) is the \( i \)th input, \( w_i \) is the weight for the \( i \)th input and \( c \) is a constant.

### 5.3.2.2 Error prediction using a decision tree:

![Decision Tree Diagram]

**Figure 5.6:** A decision tree with a depth of 3 in decision nodes. For this example, it predicts errors based on two inputs. The leaf nodes (gray) give the approximation errors. The coefficients (\( c_i \)s and \( v_i \)s) are determined by offline training.

The second error prediction method is a decision tree and is also an example of input-based methods. An example of error prediction using a decision tree is shown in Figure 5.6. This model contains decision and leaf nodes. The decision nodes typically have two branches and uses one of the inputs to decide on whether to traverse the left or right child. This process continues until it reaches a leaf node in the tree. Leaf nodes store the predicted error. Training data is used to determine the values of constants used in making decisions at the decision nodes and predicted error at the leaf nodes. The computation required in a decision tree is dependent on the depth of the tree structure. We limit the tree depth to 7 in our experiments. Only comparison operations are required to implement this decision tree and hence it is not a computationally expensive error prediction method.
5.3.2.3 Error prediction using moving average:

The third error prediction model is using moving average as the general trend of data in the sequence. This moving average based method is an output-based method because it just observes the accelerator outputs to find out the erroneous elements. The difference between current element and the moving average can be used to detect large errors in a number in the sequence. In this work, we used Exponential Moving Average (EMA) which can be calculated by the formula shown in Equation 5.2.

\[
EMA = (e \times \alpha) + (Previous\ EMA \times (1 - \alpha))
\]  

(5.2)

where \( e \) = Current element, \( \alpha \) = Smoothing factor = \( \frac{2}{1+N} \) and \( N \) = Number of elements in the history.

EMA computes the exponential moving average over a window of output elements and compare it to each output element to compute the difference. If the difference is higher than a tuning threshold, the detection module marks the output element as erroneous.

Once an application is deemed fit for approximation on the accelerator, it is transferred to the accelerator augmented with an error predictor. The dynamic check for each output element is the predicted error greater than a tuning threshold. If this predicted error is greater than a tuning threshold, a large approximation error is suspected and the check fires.

**Predictor Hardware:** Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(b) show the hardware for the linear error and decision tree error predictors. An approximate accelerator is augmented with these hardware to predict errors. Coefficient buffers are circular buffers and contain weights and
constants for the linear model and decision constants and errors for the decision tree model.

The coefficients are transferred to these checkers via a config queue (the same queue is used
to transfer accelerator configuration) between the CPU and the accelerator.

**EMA** detects large approximation errors by comparing the current approximate outputs
with the history of previously computed approximate outputs. The history is represented
by EMA, the detection module keeps the EMA and calculates the approximate error in the
current approximate output by comparing it with EMA.

Figure 5.7: Hardware for the approximation error predictors.

![Figure 5.7](image)

Figure 5.8: An example of overlapping the re-computation of elements by the CPU with the
approximation accelerator. For example, a large error is detected in iteration 0 by the accelerator and
the CPU recomputes this iteration while accelerator is working on the execution of iteration 1 and 2.
5.3.3 Low-overhead Recovery

Rumba’s recovery module on the CPU gets an iteration’s recovery bit via the recovery queue. If the corresponding bit of an iteration is set, the recovery module re-executes that iteration and commits the re-computed output while discarding the accelerator output for that input. The results received by the CPU from the approximation accelerator are directly committed to their final destination if the corresponding recovery bit is not set in the recovery queue. This is how Rumba merges approximate outputs from the accelerator with the exact outputs obtained by re-execution on the CPU.

The CPU and the accelerator work in a pipelined fashion, i.e., while accelerator is working on an iteration, the CPU recomputes a previous iteration. An example of such an arrangement is shown in Figure 5.8. For this example, the checks fire for output elements of iterations 0, 2, 5 and 6. The CPU re-computes iteration 0 while the accelerator is working on iteration 1 and 2. Similarly, re-computation of iteration 2 is overlapped with the execution of 3 and 4 on the accelerator and so on. In such a setup, the CPU can recompute 50% of the output elements, assuming a 2x gain for the accelerator, and still keep up with the accelerator provided the elements to recompute are uniformly distributed.

5.3.4 Online Tuning

The tuning threshold of Rumba is used as a threshold for the dynamic checks to determine if the current output has large error. A larger threshold value will result in fewer iterations to be re-executed. This, in turn, will cause higher energy savings but lower output quality. Rumba’s tuning threshold can be determined by user specified requirements
either on energy consumption or output quality. Online tuning can be programmed in three modes:

**TOQ Mode:** In this mode, user specifies the target output quality (TOQ). The goal of this mode is to make sure that all output elements have better quality than TOQ. Therefore, Rumba compares the predicted quality with TOQ and re-execute iterations that have lower quality than TOQ.

**Energy Mode:** If a user specifies an energy target to achieve, Rumba calculates the number of iterations (iteration budget) it can re-execute while staying in the energy budget. For each invocation, it monitors the number of re-executed iterations. If it goes over the iteration budget it stops re-executing and increases the tuning threshold for the next invocation. If the current invocation is finished and Rumba still stays within the iteration budget, the tuning threshold is decreased. This would result in more iterations to be re-executed for the next invocation and thus improves output quality while staying in the same energy budget.

**Quality Mode:** If a user is more concerned about achieving the best output quality, Rumba maximizes re-execution of iterations on the CPU until the current invocation of accelerator finishes. The accelerator performance gain in comparison to the CPU determines how many elements the CPU can recompute and still keep up with the accelerator. If the CPU is not fully utilized during recovery, it implies that it can fix more iterations so the tuning threshold is increased for the next invocation. If accelerator finishes the current invocation and the CPU still has iterations to re-execute, the tuning threshold for the next invocation is increased. This results in lesser number of re-executions for the next invocation.
5.3.5 Error Detector Placement

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.9:** Shows the design choices for the relative placement of input-based detectors with respect to the accelerator. Configuration in part (a) adds delay, thus impacting overall performance, in the path to invoking accelerator. Configuration in part (b) wastes energy on invocations of the accelerator that have large error.

An important design choice for input-based methods is the relative invocation of the error predictor with respect to the accelerator. An input-based detector can be placed in one of the ways shown in Figure 5.9. Figure 5.9(a) (Configuration 1) shows the error detector placement before sending the inputs to the accelerator and Figure 5.9(b) (Configuration 2) shows the error detector placement if the error detector and accelerator simultaneously start working on inputs. These configurations provide different trade-offs in the design space. Configuration 1 saves the unnecessary accelerator invocations, hence saves energy, for the cases when error detector detects an error. However, since error prediction precedes the accelerator invocation, it delays accelerator computation, hence, has performance overhead. Energy is wasted in Configuration 2 for accelerator invocations that have errors greater than the threshold. However, error detector in this configuration does not add any delay in the invocation of the accelerator, hence, does not add to performance overhead. In our experiments, to minimize the impact on performance overhead, we use Configuration 2. Error detector placement for output-based methods is straightforward and should be invoked after accelerator invocation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Train Data</th>
<th>Test Data</th>
<th>NN Topology (Rumba)</th>
<th>NN Topology (NPU)</th>
<th>Evaluation Metric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>blackscholes</td>
<td>Financial Analysis</td>
<td>5K inputs</td>
<td>5K outputs</td>
<td>3-&gt;8-&gt;8-&gt;1</td>
<td>6-&gt;8-&gt;8-&gt;1</td>
<td>Mean Relative Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Signal Processing</td>
<td>5K random fp numbers</td>
<td>5K random fp numbers</td>
<td>1-&gt;1-&gt;2</td>
<td>1-&gt;4-&gt;4-&gt;2</td>
<td>Mean Relative Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inversek2j</td>
<td>Robotics</td>
<td>10K random (x, y) points</td>
<td>10K random (x, y) points</td>
<td>2-&gt;2-&gt;2</td>
<td>2-&gt;8-&gt;2</td>
<td>Mean Relative Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jmeint</td>
<td>3D Gaming</td>
<td>10K pairs of 3D triangles</td>
<td>10K pairs of 3D triangles</td>
<td>18-&gt;32-&gt;2-&gt;2</td>
<td>18-&gt;32-&gt;8-&gt;2</td>
<td># of mismatches</td>
</tr>
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<td>Compression</td>
<td>220x200 pixel image</td>
<td>512x512 pixel image</td>
<td>64-&gt;16-&gt;64</td>
<td>64-&gt;16-&gt;64</td>
<td>Mean Pixel Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kmeans</td>
<td>Machine Learning</td>
<td>220x200 pixel image</td>
<td>512x512 pixel image</td>
<td>6-&gt;4-&gt;4-&gt;1</td>
<td>6-&gt;8-&gt;4-&gt;1</td>
<td>Mean Output Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Image Processing</td>
<td>512x512 pixel image</td>
<td>512x512 pixel image</td>
<td>9-&gt;8-&gt;1</td>
<td>9-&gt;8-&gt;1</td>
<td>Mean Pixel Diff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Applications and their inputs.

5.4 Experimental Setup

We evaluate Rumba with a Neural Processing Unit (NPU) style accelerator [40]. Although we evaluate Rumba using a NPU-style accelerator, the design of Rumba is not specific to an accelerator as the core principles can be applied to a variety of approximation accelerators [129, 7]. We use the same hardware parameters as used by the NPU work for modeling the core and the accelerator. The remainder of this section describes the benchmarks, accelerator outputs and energy modeling setup used to evaluate the effectiveness of Rumba.

**Benchmarks:** We evaluate a set of benchmarks from various domains that map to approximate accelerators. The benchmarks represent a mix of computations from different domains and illustrate the effectiveness of Rumba across a variety of computation patterns.
We use the same set of benchmarks as used in the NN accelerators [40, 7]. A brief description of these benchmarks along with their domain, train and test data is given in Table 5.1. Rumba NN (Neural Network) topology column in the table shows the NN topology used by Rumba. For example, 6->4->4->1 for kmeans implies that the NN has 6 inputs, two hidden layers of 4 neurons each and 1 output. The final column in this table shows the NN topology used by the unchecked NPU. In all cases, Rumba’s error detection capabilities make it possible to chose a smaller or equal, therefore efficient, NN. The output quality of applications is usually measured by an application specific error metric [111, 110, 40]. This application specific error metric is given in the evaluation metric column in Table 5.1. We use Mean Pixel Difference for images and target a 90% output quality because SAGE showed that more than 86% of the images (from an image quality assessment database [118, 138]) with quality loss (according to Mean Pixel Difference metric) less than 10% were equivalent to “Good” or “Excellent” ratings by human subjects. 90% output quality is in commensurate with the previous works in approximate computing [40, 10, 113].

**Accelerator Output:** We obtain the accelerator output (approximate output) by implementing NN using pyBrain [116] library. We find the best NN configuration by searching the NN topology space. The best configuration for our case is the smallest NN that does not produces excessive errors. The NN topology space is large thus the NN we consider have at most 2 layers and the number of neurons are restricted to at most 32 neurons in each layer (same restriction as in NPU [40]).

**Energy Modeling:** We run each application using the GEM5 [16] simulator to calculate the different microarchitectural activities. These activities are fed to McPAT [119], which calculates the baseline energy for the entire application. We use an X86-64 model for the
Table 5.2: Microarchitectural parameters of an X86-64 cpu used in experiments.

cpu core and the microarchitectural parameters are given in Table 5.2. The accelerator design is an 8-Processing Elements (PEs) NPU and uses the same parameters for various structures of the PEs as given in the NPU paper [40]. We model the energy of the multiply-and-add for the linear error model and comparator in the same way as in the NPU paper. We calculate the energy for the light-weight checkers separately. The energy of these checkers and the energy of re-computation of elements on the CPU are combined to calculate the total energy for a particular scheme.

5.5 Evaluation

We evaluate Rumba for output quality, energy savings, false positives and the coverage of large errors. We also analyze the energy savings of Rumba for different target output qualities.

5.5.1 Output Quality

Output Error: Output errors are measured using the application specific metric given in Table 5.1 on the whole application output. Figure 5.10 shows the output error with respect to the number of output elements fixed for different techniques under consideration.
Figure 5.10: Output error with respect to the number of output elements fixed.

Output error is directly related to the output quality. Output error of 5% represents 95% output quality. The y-axis of each plot in this figure shows the output error, while the x-axis shows the number of elements that need to be fixed to achieve that particular output error. 

*Random* fixes a given percentage of randomly selected output elements. For example, for fixing 10% of the elements *Random* selects 10% of output elements randomly and then recomputes them. Similarly, *Uniform* shows the output error when a given percentage of output elements to be fixed are chosen uniformly among all output elements. *Ideal* has the oracle knowledge about the approximation errors in all the output elements and it uses this oracle knowledge to fix a given percentage of the output elements. The data for *Ideal* is generated by sorting approximation errors in output elements by the error magnitude and then fixing the highest error elements. For example, to obtain output error when 10% of the elements are fixed for the *Ideal* scheme, the top 10% approximation error elements are fixed. Finally, *EMA, linearErrors* and *treeErrors* represent the output error when the errors
Figure 5.11: False positives at 90% target output quality. Ideal have zero false positives. A low number of false positives for linearErrors and treeErrors indicate their effectiveness in detecting large approximation errors.

are calculated by using the prediction models described in Section 5.3.2.

The techniques that are closest to the Ideal line in these plots represent the best possible achievable results. For a point on the x-axis, if the corresponding y value for a technique is close to y value of Ideal at the same x point, the technique is closer to the ideal case. For inversek2j, if 30% elements are fixed, Ideal, Random, Uniform, EMA, linearErrors and treeErrors will have 2.1%, 9.7%, 9.6%, 5.9%, 2.6 and 2.7% output errors, respectively. Hence, linearErrors and treeErrors are better techniques than Random, Uniform and EMA but worse than Ideal.

These plots also show that for some benchmarks (e.g., kmeans) linearErrors performs better and for others (e.g., blackscholes) treeErrors performs better. Overall, error prediction accuracy of a particular scheme is benchmark dependent.

**False Positives:** A false positive is a large error detected by a particular scheme that
was not actually a large error. An error prediction scheme will have a false positive if
the predicted error is high but the actual error is not. It is important to have low numbers
of false positives for a technique for it to be practical. A high number would imply that
the CPU would need to fix a large number of elements thus partially offsetting the gains
of approximation. Figure 5.11 shows the number of false positives for 90\% target output
quality, i.e., 10\% output error in output elements. For example, the first bar from the left
for the blackscholes benchmark represents 32\% false positives for Random if we target
90\% output quality. Random and Uniform have a large percentage of false positives since
these techniques randomly and uniformly, respectively, pick approximate output elements
to fix and do not have any detection method. Ideal does not have any false positives since
it has oracle knowledge of the errors in output elements. On average, Ideal, Random,
Uniform, EMA, linearErrors and treeErrors have 0\%, 14.8\%, 14.5\%, 13.3\%, 2.1\% and
.76\% false positives for 90\% target output quality. linearErrors and treeErrors show a very
low percentage of false positives and thus are effective at detecting large approximation
errors.

**Fixed Elements:** Figure 5.12 shows the number of elements that are need to be fixed
(recomputed) to achieve 90\% output quality. A lower number of fixes implies that the
energy overhead of re-execution on the CPU will be lower. Hence, a technique that fixes
lower number of elements to achieve the same quality is better. For example, on average,
Random requires 41\% (29\% more than Ideal) of the output elements to be fixed to achieve
10\% output error. In comparison to Ideal, linearErrors and treeErrors just require 9\% and
6\% extra elements to be fixed to achieve the same output quality, respectively.

**Large Error Coverage:** Relative coverage is defined as the normalized ratio of de-
tected large errors (larger than 20%) and the total number of fixes required. This ratio is normalized with respect to Ideal. This shows how good a prediction scheme is with respect to Ideal. Figure 5.13 shows the relative coverage of large errors for 90% target output quality. For example, the first bar from the left for blackscholes benchmark represents that relative coverage of Random is 29.2%. The relative coverage of scheme is high if it fixes a less number of elements to cover more large error elements for a given target output quality. On average, linearErrors and treeErrors are able to achieve 57.6% and 67.2% relative coverage, respectively.

5.5.2 Energy Consumption and Speedup

Figure 5.14 shows the energy consumed by various techniques in comparison to the CPU baseline for a target output quality of 90%. This figure shows the whole application energy savings. First column (labeled NPU) for each benchmark represents the energy
Figure 5.13: Relative coverage of large errors at 90% target output quality. Ideal has 100% coverage.

savings of the unchecked NPU, i.e., no error checking mechanism is employed. NPU [40] reduces, on average, the CPU energy consumption by 3.2x. Note that since NPU does not have any fixing mechanism for large errors and so the output application quality is not always 90%. Without fixing any errors, output error, on average, is 20.6%. The other bars from left to right for each benchmark show energy consumed by Ideal, Random, Uniform, EMA, linearErrors and treeErrors schemes, respectively. The energy consumption shown for each of the schemes in this figure includes energy required to recompute the elements on the CPU and also the energy required for the checkers in the accelerator. As also observed in the NPU work [40], kmeans has very little energy gains and achieves slowdown because the code region that gets mapped to the NPU is very small and can be efficiently executed on the CPU itself. Energy savings of sobel decrease significantly for linearErrors and treeErrors schemes because this particular benchmark requires relatively large number of re-executions due to the lower prediction accuracy of errors.
Figure 5.14: Energy consumption of Rumba, including the cost of re-computation and the energy used for the prediction of large approximation errors. treeErrors saves 2.2x energy while the unchecked NPU saves 3.2x energy.

Figure 5.15 shows the speedup all the schemes described earlier. Each scheme also factors in performance loss due to re-execution on the CPU if the CPU cannot keep up with the accelerator. Since Rumba (linearErrors or treeErrors) overlaps recovery on CPU with the accelerator execution, it is able to maintain the same speedup (2.1x) as the NPU. Our energy savings and speedup for the NPU baseline are close to the ones given in the NPU paper [40] but do not exactly match as we use different neural network libraries and simulation infrastructure.

Time for prediction: Figure 5.16 shows the time taken by the two error predictor model normalized with respect to the NPU. For all the benchmarks, linearErrors and treeErrors require less time than the NPU. Therefore, the predicted error is always available before NPU finishes and the NPU never needs to wait for the error predictor to finish, i.e., error prediction does not slow down the NPU.
Figure 5.15: Speedup of each technique with respect to the CPU baseline. Rumba (linearErrors or treeErrors) maintains the same speedup (2.2x) as the NPU.

Rumba reduces approximation errors overall by 2.1x (20.6% to 10%). Rumba achieves this error reduction while maintaining the same performance improvement as the NPU accelerator but reduces the energy savings from 3.2x to 2.2x in comparison to the unchecked NPU.

5.5.3 Case Studies

Energy vs. Output Quality: Figure 5.17 shows the energy consumption of different schemes with varying requirements on output quality for the fft benchmark. Energy savings for the unchecked NPU for fft is 3.3x. As expected, Ideal achieves the best energy savings among all techniques. treeErrors achieves energy savings close to the Ideal scheme for higher target error rates (> 7%). Note that the gap between treeErrors and Ideal increases as the demands on output quality increases (greater than 97%). This is because Ideal knows exactly which elements to fix to achieve certain target output quality while treeEr-
**Figure 5.16:** Time used by error prediction models in comparison to the NPU. This is normalized with respect to the NPU. Error prediction model are faster in all the cases, hence, the accelerator never needs to wait for the error prediction model to finish execution.

...rors (or linearErrors) must predict such cases. This causes the false positives for treeErrors (or linearErrors) to start increasing, requiring more re-computation and more energy consumption. Thus, the gap between Ideal and treeErrors (or linearErrors) is larger at high demands on output quality.

**CPU Activity:** In this second case study, we show an example of the CPU activity in conjunction with the accelerator. The top half of Figure 5.18 shows the percentage difference of each output element (on y-axis) with treeErrors for 200 elements (on x-axis). To achieve 10% target output error, a tuning threshold of 0.33 is required on this percentage difference (y-axis). The bottom half of the figure shows the CPU activity. The accelerator and the CPU work in tandem, i.e., the CPU fixes the detected large approximation errors while the accelerator executes other iterations. Only 30 elements out of these 200 (15%) are above this threshold and thus the CPU can keep up with an approximate accelerator as fast as 6.67x.
5.6 Related Work

Approximate computing, where the accuracy is traded off for better performance or higher energy efficiency, is a well-known technique. Approximate computing techniques can be broadly classified into two categories: Software-based and hardware-based approaches. Software-based approaches are usually algorithmic modifications and can be utilized without any hardware modifications. Loop perforation [2] is one of the well-known software approximation techniques which skips the iterations of loops randomly or uniformly. Rinard et al. [107] use early phase termination technique to terminate parallel phase as soon as there are too few remaining tasks to keep the processor busy to prevent the processors from being idle and wasting energy. Sartori et al. [115] introduce a software approximation technique which targets control divergence on GPUs. Paraprox [110] is a software framework which detects patterns in data parallel applications and applies different approximation techniques such as loop perforation, approximate memoization, and
tile approximation based on the detected patterns. All these software approximation techniques need a quality management system to monitor the output quality and control the aggressiveness of the approximation during execution.

Different hardware approximation techniques have also been proposed to save energy while improving performance. EnerJ [113] proposed hardware techniques such as voltage scaling, width reduction in floating point operations, reducing DRAM refresh rate, and reducing SRAM supply voltage to reduce energy consumption. Esmaeilzadeh et al. [38] demonstrated dual-voltage operation, with a high voltage for precise operations and a low voltage for approximate operations. The low-voltage pipeline introduces faults in the operations and hence these operation are approximate. We compare against the hardware neural network [40] proposed by the same authors extensively in our results section. Du et al. [36] also use hardware neural networks to trade off accuracy for energy savings. Amant et al. [7]
design limited precision analog hardware to accelerate approximable code sections. Other works [125, 129] design different approximate accelerators. Sampson et al. [114] improve memory array lifetime using approximation. Flikker [74] is an application-level technique that reduces the refresh rate of DRAM memories which store non-critical data. The Rumba quality management system can be added to these hardware-based approximation techniques to control and improve their output quality.

There exist a few quality management solutions to control quality in an approximate computing system. Ansel et al. [8] use a genetic algorithm to find the best approximate code that provides the acceptable quality. In this work, the programmer writes runtime low overhead checking functions to verify output quality online. However, Rumba can automatically manage the output quality without programmer’s help. CCG [112] is another quality monitoring technique. In this technique, while GPU runs the approximate version, the CPU is responsible to check the quality of a subset of data for the next invocation. To reduce the performance overhead of monitoring, size of the subset that is processed by the CPU is small and thus, CCG’s accuracy to predict the output quality is limited. Unlike CCG, Rumba has light-weight checkers and therefore, it can investigate larger subset of the data compared to CCG.

Green [10] is a framework that developers can use to take advantages of approximation opportunities to achieve better performance or reduce energy consumption. Green builds a quality of service model based on the profiling data that gets used at runtime. In order to make sure that output quality is acceptable, Green checks the output quality once in every N invocations. SAGE [111] is an approximation framework for GPUs that automatically generates approximate versions of the input program using skipping atomic expressions,
compressing data, and tile approximation. SAGE also uses a similar quality sampling strategy as Green to check the output quality frequently. However, in contrast to these techniques, because of its light-weight checkers, Rumba checks all invocations to reduce large errors and to make sure that the output quality is acceptable for all invocations. Some other techniques [26, 27, 106, 104, 83] statically analyze applications assuming an input distribution to reason about the output quality under approximation. Such techniques do not need sampling but can only handle limited computational patterns and approximation methods.

PowerDial [56] is a framework that dynamically monitors the application’s performance during runtime. When the performance drops below target performance, PowerDial will increase the aggressiveness of the approximation to match the performance requirements. Their goal is to maximize accuracy while maintaining application’s performance. Several probabilistic reasoning models [84, 27, 22, 103, 29] are also introduced to compute the probability of the output being wrong. In contrast, Rumba dynamically monitors the output quality during runtime and recovers from the large errors generated by an approximation technique.

Hardware reliability for soft computations and approximate computing share the same basic underlying philosophy. Hardware reliability solutions [61, 126, 72] for soft computations aim to allow errors in error tolerant parts of an application with the goal of lowering the cost of reliability. The idea of re-execution has previously been used in the context of reliability to recover against hardware faults [33, 42]. We leverage this idea in the context of recovering against approximation errors and it fits well with the nature of the code regions (pure) that are mapped to approximate accelerators.
5.7 Conclusions

Approximate computing can be employed for an emerging class of applications from various domains such as multimedia, machine learning and computer vision. Approximate computing trades off accuracy for better performance and/or energy efficiency. However, the quality control of approximated outputs has largely gone unaddressed. In this chapter, we propose Rumba for online detection and correction of large errors in an approximate computing environment.

Rumba predicts large approximation errors by light-weight checkers and corrects them by recomputing individual elements. Our results demonstrate that Rumba is effective at predicting large errors and follows an ideal case very closely. Across a variety of benchmarks from different domains, we show that Rumba reduces the output error by 2.1x in comparison to an accelerator for approximate programs while maintaining the same performance improvement. To achieve this, the Rumba framework reduces the energy savings, on average, from 3.2x to 2.2x in comparison to an unchecked accelerator.
CHAPTER VI

Neural Accelerator and Checker Design Space Exploration

Previous chapter shows that error prediction is feasible, cheap and practical to build. It also demonstrated the predictability of approximation errors with the help of cost effective and simple methods. Most of the errors in approximate accelerators are small but large errors do matter for approximate computing. Approximation errors can be effectively predicted using input-based simple prediction methods (e.g., decision tree) or output-based methods (e.g., EMA). We deliberately restricted the error prediction models to be decision tree and linear methods in the previous chapter to keep the cost of checkers low. However, another neural network can also be used to predict errors of the neural accelerator. However, that raises several interesting questions. For example, how big the size of such a neural network checker can be before we nullify the gains of approximation? This chapter explores the answer to this question and related trade-offs of accelerator and a neural network checker.
6.1 Introduction

Error prediction is an effective method to control the large errors produced by an approximate accelerator, e.g. a Neural Processing Unit (NPU). Error prediction can also be performed using another neural network. Let us first take a look the process of training a neural checker in the context of approximation error prediction. Figure 6.1 shows how we train an error prediction method. First, using a set of inputs, the NPU model is trained. Once an NPU model is obtained, approximate outputs are produced using a second set of train input. Errors are calculated by comparing the exact output for second training set and approximate output. Now this second set of inputs and calculated errors are used to train another neural network to obtain the error predictor model. This model is used to predict errors online on a previously unseen test set.

Using another neural network is particularly interesting if the NPU is constructed from a neural fabric. If we have a computation fabric that can be configured to construct neural network of different sizes, the NPU and the checker can be constructed from the same fabric. In such a case, a natural question is what is the trade off between the size of the NPU and the size of checker? In this chapter, the design space of the accelerator and checker is investigated. This chapter of the dissertation investigates the answers to following questions:

- Does some application become amenable to approximation if we use an error checker?
- Is it better to have a big NPU and no error checker or an NPU combined with an error checker?
Can a combination of an NPU and an error checker provide better quality and better energy efficiency?

Given a neuron computation fabric, how can we divide the neurons among the NPU and the checker to get better output quality along with energy efficiency, i.e., should more neuron be allocated to the NPU or more to the checker?

### 6.2 Exploration Setup

As briefly mentioned, the idea is to explore the co-design of accelerator and the error checker design. We also aim to analyze various trade-offs related to error and energy efficiency of such a co-design. To answer the questions raised in Section 6.1, we trained different configuration of neural checkers and decision trees of various depths. These configuration were then evaluated in conjunction with various NPU configuration for output error and energy cost analysis. The neural network topology space is large thus the NN we consider have at most 2 layers and the number of neurons are restricted to at most 128 neurons in each layer. For each layer the number of neurons considered are 1, 2, 4, 8, 16,
32, 64 or 128 for the NPU configuration as well as checker configuration. Thus, we have 72 (8 (one layer only) + 8*8 (two layers)) total configurations for the NPU and similarly 72 configuration of the checker for each NPU configurations. Hence, total configurations explored are 5184 (72*72) for NPU vs NN checker. For example, let us assume if NPU configuration has two hidden layers of size 32 each. For this configuration, each of the 72 NN configuration were trained as error predictor and the cost versus error trade offs are analyzed. Decision tree checkers were restricted to a max depth of 7 to restrict the number of total designs.

6.3 Experimental Results

Figure 6.2 shows energy cost versus error for different NPU versus NN and decision tree checker configurations for Blackscholes benchmark. Each circle on this graph is a combination of a particular configuration for the NPU and a particular configuration of the NN checker. For example, a point on this graph can corresponds to an NPU configuration of two hidden layers of 32 neurons each and a checker NN configuration that have 8 neurons in a single layer. The points represented by indexed square are the configurations that does not have any checker, i.e., these are NPU only design points. A single square on this graph shows the error and cost for no accelerator, i.e., all the computations are performed exactly on the CPU. Points shown by a cross sign correspond to an NPU and decision tree of certain depth. On the x-axis of this graph is the cost of a configuration relative to the CPU. CPU has a cost of 1 and output error of 0% as shown in the figure. In this figure, output error for a configuration is shown on the y-axis. The number in the box corresponding to each design
Figure 6.2: Error versus cost design points by pairing of different NPU configurations with different configurations of the NN checker and decision tree checker of different depths. This data is for *Blackscholes* benchmark and only some selective configurations are labeled and shown. All pairing of configurations are shown in Figure 6.3 for *Blackscholes* benchmark.

point is the number of neurons in each hidden layer. For example, the box with 64->64 and 8->8 implies that the NPU has two hidden layers of 64 neurons each and the checker has two hidden layers of 8 neurons each. Similarly, the box with 64->64 and 5 implies that the NPU has two hidden layers of 64 neurons each and the decision tree checker has a depth of 5. This figure only shows some selective points and labels them. A total of 5761 design points are possible for a benchmarks and for *Blackscholes* all these are plotted in Figure 6.3. Similarly, Figure 6.4 shows the design space exploration result for the *fft* benchmark.

Some trends are clearly demonstrated in these figures. First, there is no NPU config-
Figure 6.3: Error versus cost design points by pairing all explored different NPU configurations with different configurations of the NN checker. The data shown in this graph is for Blackscholes benchmark.

So if 20% error is not acceptable in output then this benchmark can not be approximated with an NPU accelerator. NPU only designs are efficient in terms of energy but have high error (All are in top left half of the plot). Second, with the combination of the NPU and a checker we can improve energy efficiency with respect to the CPU and keep the error low as well. Third, a benchmark that produces unacceptable output is able to produce acceptable outputs with a combination of the NPU accelerator and an NN or decision tree checker.

We have explored the NPU-checker design space for all the benchmarks used in Chapter V. Table 6.1 shows a summary of the results for all the benchmarks. NPU only column shows the whole application output error and energy cost (as a fraction) relative to the CPU.
Figure 6.4: Error versus energy cost design points for the FFT benchmark.

for an efficient NPU configuration that has no checker. Half error design column shows the error and energy cost for a Pareto-optimal npu-checker design that has approximately half the error of NPU only design. The last column in this table also shows the checker type that is able to achieve the given half error design. Table shows N/A for Half error design for the sobel benchmark. sobel has very low error with almost all the configuration of the NPU, hence, we do not get much benefits of using of a checker with this benchmark. The results in this table demonstrate that the best checker type to achieve 50% less error is application dependent.

Overall, the results show that NPU-checker co-design provides many choices and a user can pick a design based on the error requirements for a particular application.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application</th>
<th>NPU only</th>
<th>Half error design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Output error (%)</td>
<td>Energy cost (x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blackscholes</td>
<td>21.53</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fft</td>
<td>12.69</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inversek2j</td>
<td>12.92</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jmeint</td>
<td>35.89</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jpeg</td>
<td>19.49</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kmeans</td>
<td>10.41</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sobel</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Summary of design space exploration results. *NPU only* column shows the application output error and cost relative to the CPU for an efficient NPU configuration that has no checker. *Half error design* column shows the error and cost for a Pareto-optimal NPU-checker design that has approximately half the error of the *NPU only* design.

### 6.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, the design space of the NPU accelerator and the checker is explored. The design space exploration highlights few important trade-offs. For some benchmarks, an NPU-only design might not give acceptable output error. In such cases, a combination of the NPU and checker is a good alternative. We can obtain different design points that have different error versus energy efficiency trade-offs. Overall, NPU combined with a checker is a better accelerator design than the NPU accelerator alone.
CHAPTER VII

Conclusions and Future Directions

As transistors are becoming smaller and smaller, integrated circuits constructed out of these transistors are becoming increasingly susceptible to transient faults. Traditional solutions to protect against these failures are expensive in terms of performance/energy/area overheads. In this thesis, I have proposed low-cost software only methods to protect against transient faults for applications from various domains. These methods intelligently combine traditional duplication and other novel ways of symptom generation to detect transient faults (Chapter II, III and IV).

Also, in the path of performance scaling, energy has become the limiting factor [21]. Therefore, designers have started to explore alternative methods such as heterogeneous cores and accelerator for achieving energy efficiency and improving performance. At the same time, a class of emerging applications from domains such as multimedia, machine learning, computer vision do not require 100% numerically correct output. Many of these applications either compute on sensor data and/or produce results that have subjective interpretations, i.e., the quality of the output is subjectively judged by a human. These two trends of marginal gains in energy efficiency by scaling and increasing number of approx-
imate applications go well with each other. Approximate computing is at the intersection of both of these trends and works by trading off accuracy of application outputs to achieve energy efficiency and/or improve performance. A slew of approximation solutions has recently been proposed [40, 111, 115, 2]. A key challenge for such systems is to provide acceptable quality of outputs. Providing acceptable output quality is critical in making such systems practical. We propose Rumba for online detection and correction of large errors in an approximate computing environment (Chapter V). The co-design of the accelerator and the error checker is explored in Chapter VI.

One of the main themes of this thesis is the exploitation of anomalies to provide acceptable results. Anomalies can be used to construct systems with good enough answers using inexact components. Such systems with good enough answers are going to be a norm in the future as these are efficient and faster. Many of the methods and ideas explored in this thesis can be further expanded and combined with other ideas in a variety of contexts. In Chapter IV, the method to find out the variables that are going to cause unacceptable silent data corruptions is based on heuristics. Bornholt et al. [22] proposed an interesting of representing uncertainty and finding out the distribution of program variables. This uncertainty information can be combined with the heuristics developed in Chapter IV to improve the coverage of unacceptable silent data corruptions.

We have explored quality control using error prediction methods in the context of an accelerator based approximate computing environment. We believe that error prediction is an equally feasible technique for other approximation methods such as Truffle architecture [38] that has two pipelines: a high voltage pipeline for exact operations and a low voltage pipeline for inexact operations. For example, a prediction method can be trained...
to predict if an operation is going to make large error on the low voltage pipeline. If this
happens to be the case, such an operation can be executed on the high voltage pipeline.

The large errors are fixed using prediction methods in the hope that they improve the
perceived and average output quality. However, a still challenging problem in this area is
to find out how exactly intermediate results affect the final output quality of an application.
Finding a solution to this problem is a practically useful direction of further research.

An attractive area of research that was explored in Chapter VI is the accelerator design
space. It shows the usefulness of error prediction. The chapter demonstrates that some of
the applications that produce unacceptable quality with the accelerator alone, and hence
hitherto deemed as not amenable to approximation, can take advantage of approximation
with the help of error prediction methods. An interesting direction is to find out which
applications become amenable to approximation with a combined design of an accelerator
and error prediction methods.

We have explored hardware checkers for quality control in approximate computing
because they are energy efficient. Software checkers can also be used, however, an open
question is the effect of software checkers on total energy savings. Along the similar lines,
the whole NPU can be implemented in software as well. Esmaeilzadeh et al. [40] reported
that the overhead of a software implementation of the NPU, on average, is 20x for the
evaluated benchmarks. However, we postulate that a special and highly optimized software
implementation can outperform if the amount of computation approximated by the neural
network is significant. No such benchmarks exist in the current set of evaluated benchmarks
but finding out a set of such benchmarks is a worthy direction of research.

Let us assume that the code region approximated on the accelerator is a loop and has N
inputs and M outputs. We can unroll the loop the k times and can construct an NPU with kN inputs and kM outputs instead of just N inputs and M outputs. A fascinating question and a direction of research is finding out the scenarios where such loop unrolling is beneficial in terms of the quality of output results.
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