

Governing Bodies:  
How the Organization of Social Groups Shapes Political Ambition

by

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## **Dedication**

*For Mom, who would have been proud, and Michael, who is.*

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Any errors are my own.

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## **Abstract**

Nascent ambition is an essential element of democracy that has implications for representation and equality yet we know surprisingly little about who is ambitious and why. I propose a unique framework for understanding nascent ambition, arguing that gender roles and gendered obstacles and opportunities affect its presence in men and women—and that they often do so differently for different social groups. I test this framework using data from the Citizen Participation Study, employing an innovative research design that identifies potential candidates for office and exploits variation across three different social groups—race, class, and religion—in their understandings of women’s roles as mothers and leaders. I then go beyond an examination of roles to analyze the importance of gendered experiences in shaping nascent ambition, focusing on recruitment, participation in single-gendered organizations, and experiencing discrimination. Finally, I look across these social groups to examine how differences between these groups on the dimensions of privilege, narrative, and mutability influence both levels of and ingredients for nascent ambition for the men and women in these groups. I find that both the levels of and the ingredients for nascent ambition vary across groups. My results largely support the roles and experiences framework I propose, revealing that gendered social roles matter more for women’s nascent ambition than men’s. I also find that variations across groups on the dimensions of privilege, narrative, and mutability affect nascent ambition, demonstrating that privilege in particular plays a key role in determining levels of ambition.

## **Chapter One:**

### **What We Don't Know About Political Ambition and Why it Matters**

Political ambition is a central component of many aspects of political life, particularly for issues of competition and representation. Its effects are far reaching—political ambition shapes the behavior of legislators (Herrick and Moore 1993), influences aggregate electoral outcomes (Jacobson and Kernell 1983), and serves to counter extremism (Madison 1788). In short, political ambition is a necessary and desirable aspect of fostering a competitive electoral atmosphere and a thriving democracy. Yet, though political ambition is an exceptionally important factor in a candidate's decision to run for office (Black 1972; Schlesinger 1966; Moncrief, Squire and Jewell 2001), we know surprisingly little about differences in ambition across social groups and the basis for these differences. This lack of knowledge is surprising for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically this absence is glaring because researchers have shown that the existence of social groups, and one's position in these groups, impacts a range of important political behavior including voting and participation (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), passage of different types of bills (Thomas 1991), participation in discussions (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012), perceptions of voters (Terkildsen 1993), and public opinion (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Practically, it is surprising given the underrepresentation of certain groups in elected office—for example women and minority officeholders—which is a concern for both scholars (Carroll 1994; Hardy-Fanta et al. 2007; Sanbonmatsu 2002) and policymakers and activists.<sup>1</sup>

I examine how and why political ambition varies across social groups of women and men, looking specifically at differences in men's and women's ambition by race, class, and religion. I focus on the first inklings of ambition, what Fox and Lawless (2005, 1) term “nascent political ambition—the embryonic or potential interest in office seeking that many citizens possess,” rather than the ambitions of sitting public officials in order to examine ambition at its most essential, without the additional complication of elections, party strategies, or electoral institutions.

I uncover a large degree of variation in which groups exhibit nascent ambition and I argue that both this variation, as well as current findings in the ambition literature, are explained by how social groups are structured. I contend that the segregation of social groups such as race or class permits the existence of different structures of gender within these groups—and that these different structures of gender impact nascent ambition. Put another way, I argue that separation between classes or races allows for variation in ideas about women's role, the opportunities available to women, and the obstacles they face. This means, for example, that ideas about how to appropriately mix motherhood and work are different for white women and minority women. Or that the chance to rub elbows with politicians is higher for college-educated women than their less-educated peers. And ultimately the differences in ideas, opportunities, and obstacles between social groups results in differences in nascent ambition between women and men, both within and across these groups.

I test this theory by undertaking a unique examination—a comparative analysis of gender in America that looks at the structure of gender both within and across social groups. This innovative strategy leverages variation in the structure of gender in three different social groups: race, class, and religion. Examining the structure of gender in this way, across different social

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY); She Should Run; The White House Project; EMILY's List.

groups within one society, provides us the opportunity to see the social organization of gender at work. Comparing what gender means, for example, for conservative Christian women or college-educated men, enables us to see how gender structures our lives, and specifically in my work, nascent political ambition.

I proceed with this analysis in two parts. First, I look closely at how each different social group organizes gender and how this affects ambition for men and women both inside and outside of these groups. In these series of close examinations, I consider two sets of factors that influence nascent ambition: (1) the gendered organization of social roles and (2) the gendered way in which individual opportunities and obstacles are allocated. Second, I look broadly across the three groups—race, class, and religion—to identify dimensions on which these social groups differ and how these differences result in variation in both levels of nascent ambition and the factors that affect nascent ambition.

To closely examine how nascent ambition for men and women varies by race, class and religion, I begin by looking at the effects of how each group organizes gender roles. Specifically I compare how women's roles as mothers and women's self-assessed competence impact nascent ambition differently for men and women in different groups. Doing so allows me to expand beyond the traditional set of explanations offered for gender differences in nascent ambition—largely demographics and ideology—to explain both the results of my analyses as well as earlier results from the literature.

But since social roles alone cannot explain variations in ambition within social groups, I then turn to the role opportunities and obstacles play in the development of nascent ambition. Gerson (1985) shows that the context of women's lives strongly influences their choices—that women's experiences critically shape their goals and dreams. With this framework in mind, I

focus on individual gendered experiences that impact ambition: recruitment, involvement in single-gendered organizations, and experiencing discrimination. I consider how these experiences differ based on the diverse ways gender is structured across race, class, and religion. I examine how these experiences function as pivot points in the development of nascent ambition, emphasizing elements of one's personality and developing resources on which an individual might draw.<sup>2</sup>

In the second stage of my analysis I move beyond these close analyses of how race, class, and religion structure gender to compare the results of these examinations across all three social groups. This cross-group comparison provides a rich analytical opportunity to highlight key features of the social organization of each group and to examine the dimensions on which these groups differ. I focus particularly on three dimensions of comparison: privilege, narrative, and mutability, and how they affect women's and men's ambition in these different groups. Two of the groups, race and class, are clearly defined by privilege while religion, as examined here, is not. Religion has a more crystallized set of narratives around gender that race and class lack. Finally, religion, and to some extent class, are mutable while race is not. Analyzing how these groups differ on these dimensions—and how these distinctions influence the levels of and contributors to political ambition of men and women in these groups—clearly demonstrates the integral role social groups play in ambition formation.

The study of political ambition has largely developed in two realms: literature focused on the development of ambition among scholars of representation and scholars who produce work

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<sup>2</sup> Though the cross-sectional nature of my data do not permit me to trace how these experiences ripple through individuals' lives overtime, thinking about the effects of events in this way is theoretically important. Work by Bowers and Testa (2012) with longitudinal data focusing on parenthood and political participation shows how "having a child alters trajectories of participation in general" and reveals that "the effects of becoming a parent are clearly not constant over time" (27). This work makes us think about parenthood as "a state or condition whose effects vary over time" rather than a static "attribute" (26). See Fox and Lawless (2011a) for evidence that political ambition is dynamic and responsive to changes in life circumstances, such as parenthood, and opportunities, such as recruitment.

based on the rational actor paradigm. My work has implications for both literatures. I extend the current state of the literature on the development of ambition, which has largely focused on women's lower levels of ambition compared to men's, in many ways. First, I document that among certain social groups, such as minority individuals, the level of men's and women's ambition are the same. I also broaden this literature to show that some social divisions, such as religion, do not differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious individuals, while other social divisions, like class, do. In addition to uncovering new results regarding who is and isn't ambitious, my research provides a mechanism—how different social groups structure gender—to explain why different groups of men and women have diverse levels of nascent ambition. I find that social roles shape the development of women's ambition and they do so differently for different groups of women: whites and minorities, conservative Christians, and college-educated and their less-educated peers. I also move this literature forward by highlighting the role that gendered obstacles and opportunities play in the development of ambition. For example, I find that experiencing discrimination, a life experience previously absent from this literature, is almost universally related to higher levels of nascent ambition for women.

My work contributes to the rational actor literature on ambition by highlighting gender differences in the formation of ambition and emphasizing the importance of context for individual behavior. Recent scholarship (Fulton et al. 2006; Maestas et al. 2006) demonstrates that it is problematic to assume common influences on the development of ambition and common models of how ambition influences behavior—standard practice in the rational actor literature on ambition—because life experiences affect ambition and interact with electoral context, influencing the decision to run for office in a gendered way.<sup>3</sup> I build on these insights by

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<sup>3</sup> Fulton et al. (2006) find that female state legislators have less progressive ambition than men, primarily due to child care responsibilities. Despite this disparity, female and male state legislators are just as likely to run for

examining nascent ambition (Fulton et al. (2006) and Maestas et al. (2006) focus on progressive ambition), focusing not only on current life circumstances,<sup>4</sup> and identifying additional factors in ambition formation that may also affect strategic decisions to enter the electoral arena. My work shows that researchers working in the rational actor paradigm who ignore the development of ambition—and who do not account for gender differences in this development—are missing critical pieces of the ambition narrative.

Beyond contributions to the literatures on ambition, including new explanations and new puzzles, the innovative research design of this work—examining gender comparatively by contrasting the structure of gender across a number of social groups—offers a broader model to inform future work. It additionally allows us to see how the broader dimensions that characterize social groups, privilege, narrative, and mutability, impact nascent ambition.

The dissertation proceeds as follows: in Chapter Two I examine the state of the ambition literature and develop my theory explaining variations in nascent ambition through the organization of social groups. In Chapters Three through Five I test my theory by closely examining how the nascent ambition of women and men in each social group—race, class, and religion—is influenced by these groups’ ideas about women’s role, and the opportunities and obstacles women and men in these groups face. In Chapter Six, I look across all three groups, examining dimensions on which these groups differ and discussing their impact on nascent ambition. In Chapter Seven I conclude with the practical concerns and implications of this

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Congress. The authors explain this puzzle by showing that male and female state legislators weigh the prospects of running for office differently—women are more responsive to the probability of winning and the rewards of office. Maestas et al. (2006) detail how serving in a professional state legislature increases progressive ambition for the House, by helping legislators build skills—e.g. fundraising, public policy, coalition building—that candidates need to succeed in higher office. The authors also find that legislators in professional state legislatures are more sensitive to the probability of winning in their decision to run. The findings in both papers underscore the importance of individuals’ life situations in shaping both their ambition and their decision to run for office. This research also demonstrates the importance of considering the formation of ambition and the decision to run as two distinct processes.

<sup>4</sup> Like the type of office currently held or current child care responsibilities.

research, as well as highlighting my key contributions to the field.

## Chapter Two:

### How the Organization of Social Groups Shapes Political Ambition

#### *The importance of political ambition*

Political ambition is a critical part of the decision to run for office (Black 1972; Fowler and McClure 1990; Lawless and Fox 2005; Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2001; Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Schlesinger 1966). Early studies of political ambition and office seeking focused on social-psychological processes (Barber 1965; Lasswell 1930), but Schlesinger's foundational book on candidate ambition (1966) fundamentally changed the field. Schlesinger treated ambitious politicians as rational actors, examining the electoral conditions under which these individuals ran for office. Underlying Schlesinger's research is, "the most reasonable assumption...that ambition for office, like most other ambitions, develops with a specific situation, that it is a response to the possibilities which lie before the politician" (Schlesinger 1966, 8). Schlesinger's assumption about the formation of ambition focused scholars' attention on the precipitating factors that lead to action in a particular moment<sup>5</sup> and numerous scholars followed suit, treating politicians as rational actors (Black 1972; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Kazee 1994) and paying close attention to how outside forces interact with ambition (e.g. incumbency, local issues, the national economy). These studies contribute enormously to our understanding of ambition but their attention to precipitating factors comes at a cost. The basic assumptions of this research agenda marginalize critical questions regarding how ambition develops: What are ambition's potentiating factors that provide individuals the resources to act? How are they distributed among social groups? In short, who has nascent ambition and why?

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<sup>5</sup> For a good theoretical description of precipitating factors (in the case of ambition, the type that would encourage people to run such as an open seat) versus potentiating factors (the resources that allow people to be ready to run, such as education) see Bowers and Testa (2012) on political participation.

Nascent ambition deserves our attention because, as Kazee (1994) observes, “the decisions of potential candidates—decisions made well before the first campaign speech is given or the first advertising dollar is spent—shape the universe of winners in...elections” (4). Ignoring the development and distribution of nascent ambition—ignoring who comprises the realm of potential candidates—creates a serious gap in the rational actor literature on ambition. Scholars concerned with women’s underrepresentation in public office have done the most to fill this gap. Their research reveals that several macro-level factors, including electoral systems (Carroll 1994) and political cultural (Welch and Studlar 1996), affect the dearth of women in politics, but these factors alone are insufficient to explain women’s underrepresentation; micro-level factors, including women’s lower levels of nascent ambition, also play a critical role (Lawless and Fox 2005).

The importance of ambition as an explanatory variable in analyses of women’s underrepresentation led scholars to examine it as a dependent variable. Explanations for the gender gap in political ambition rely primarily on demographic and ideological variables, coupled with political participation (Carroll 1994; Jennings and Farah 1981). Though this literature identifies several important factors that impact women’s ambition, it also faces challenges. It is troubled by sampling concerns, often examining current officeholders or party activists who comprise only part of the pool of potential candidates—specifically, those who are already in the political realm (Costantini 1990). It lacks a theoretical framework that unifies the results of the important, good work scholars have already done. And it is often unconnected to the broader, rational-actor-framed literature on ambition both because it stems from, and remains situated in, the literature on the representation of women, and because it rarely considers the connection between ambition formation and the legislator’s strategic considerations of office

seeking (though see Fulton et al. 2006 and Maestas et al. 2006 for some exceptions).

These two relatively disconnected literatures on ambition mean that work on nascent ambition exists in a mostly segmented fashion, rather than as part of a larger research agenda. As a result, more needs to be done both to unpack nascent ambition and to provide a theoretical framework for it. I tackle both these projects here, digging deeply into women's and men's nascent ambition across a variety of social groups and proposing a new framework to account for results already in the literature and the differences I observe in my analysis. This framework relies on the organization of social groups and the ability to examine the structure of gender comparatively.

### ***Space and Intimacy: The organization of social groups***

I argue that the structure of gender is vital for our understanding of men's and women's nascent ambition. By the structure of gender, I mean both ideas about gender roles and gendered obstacles and opportunities. But the structure of gender is so deeply embedded in society—so seemingly natural—that it is often invisible without a comparator. Earlier studies, frequently due to data limitations, have not put gender in a comparative context, and this lack of context has obscured its workings.

I look at gender comparatively by examining the structure of gender across three different social groups: race, class, and religion. Examining gender comparatively across social groups is an innovative and unique contribution to the literature on women's ambition and representation. It not only allows me to identify variation in ambition among women themselves, a rarely deconstructed group, but also provides a vantage point from which to develop a framework with which to consider ambition more broadly.

The workings of gender are often invisible because of the primary way in which gender inequalities are maintained. Drawing on Goffman, Burns and Gallagher (2010) observe that gender “is a durable inequality... characterized by subtle, cumulative inequality...seen as natural [and] managed by role segregation mixed with intimacy” (430). This quotation highlights a key element that differentiates gender from many other social groups—its inequalities are created through assigning different roles to men and women. That is to say, gender inequalities are maintained mostly through “role segregation” (Jackman 1994, 128).

Jackman (1994) defines role segregation as constraining how group members, in this case women and men, interact with each other in society in three primary ways: what occupations and activities are appropriate, what behaviors are acceptable, and what dress is suitable (129). Put another way, role segregation sets the double standards by which women and men are measured—and individuals’ attempts to violate these roles, for example trying to enter a traditionally male field as a woman or wear a skirt as a man, are not well tolerated.

The importance of role segregation for gender is unique among social groups; the inequalities of other social groups often rely more heavily on spatial segregation. Spatial segregation is primarily characterized by separating groups into the same parts of different facilities, different facilities all together, and different residential areas. To the extent that these facilities are unequal,<sup>6</sup> as is so often the case, this spatial segregation serves to undergird inequalities between groups—for example the separate schools blacks and whites attended before desegregation (Jackman 1994, 134).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> I argue that one of the reasons that religion, as I analyze here, does not have a dimension of privilege is that there is no set of facilities for non-conservative Christians so this spatial segregation is not seen as unequal. Other religions in other areas and in other times do, of course, have this kind of separation of facilities on a religious dimension, including for example, the historic segregation of Jews into ghettos in Europe, and separate restrictions for repairing Coptic and Muslim worship facilities in Egypt.

<sup>7</sup> Of course educational inequality between schools with mostly white and mostly black students has persisted even after desegregation.

Like role segregation, spatial segregation can also make inequality seem innate, especially to members of the dominant group whose lives are seemingly separated by institutional processes and macro-level forces, rather than by individual effort (Jackman 1994, 137). However, when inequalities between groups are maintained primarily through spatial segregation these groups often lack “the sustained and intimate personal interactions...[that provide] members of the dominant group...ready access to the hearts and minds of subordinates” (Jackman 1994, 138). These intimate relationships, more prevalent in role-segregated social groups, lead to people in these groups to “morselize” their experiences rather than see them as part of a larger pattern (Burns and Gallagher 2010, 435). This tendency to individualize contributes to a lack of group consciousness (Gurin 1985), making it harder for members of the subordinate group to grasp the ways in which role segregation produces and maintains inequality—thus making the unequal separation of roles seem quite natural.

It is important to note the role segregation and spatial segregation are not mutually exclusive. In fact, both divide all social groups to some extent. For example, as Jackman notes, the primacy of women’s role in the home historically excludes them from the workplace. However, one method of segregation tends to be more central to maintaining difference. As noted above, structuring inequality through role segregation is particularly pervasive among social groups with high levels of contact. This is why we see such a great degree of role segregation in gender. But the inequalities of other social groups, such as race, are organized primarily by spatial segregation rather than by role separation. In fact, the three social groups examined here, race, class, and religion are all characterized by high degrees of spatial separation. Spatial separation is the most prevalent with race—as Jackman observes, many whites exist in almost complete isolation from blacks (Jackman 1994, 141-2). Classes are

physically separated less than race, though this separation is particularly prevalent in neighborhoods and clubs (Jackman, 1994, 144). Lastly, religion is spatially separated, often not to the same degree as class or race in neighborhoods or in the workplace, but through the existence of special religious facilities that are reserved primarily for members of a particular faith, the temporal separation of a specific time for worship, and the social circles of many churches which are often tightknit (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001).<sup>8</sup>

The variation in how social groups are organized has important implications for the effect of gender on nascent ambition. The spatial segregation among social groups provides room for variation in the structure of gender among different social groups. This point bears repeating as it is central to my analytical strategy: the social groups I examine here—race, class, and religion—have some degree of spatial separation which allows gender to be structured differently for whites and minorities, the upper and lower classes, and conservative Christians compared with others. This is why examining gender’s impact on ambition in conjunction with these other groups is critical: doing so allows me to leverage variation in the structure of gender to compare how it impacts the development of nascent ambition for men and women of different social groups. This analytic strategy throws into relief the role that the structure of gender plays in ambition formation.

***Gender roles and gendered obstacles and opportunities: the structure of gender within social groups***

Before we can compare the structure of gender across social groups, it is important to

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<sup>8</sup> Of course certain religious groups have a high degree of residential separation (for example the concentration of Mormons in Utah or the neighborhoods of the Hasidic Jewish community in New York). And, as previously discussed, it is worth noting that religious groups differ from race and class in that there are not parallel secular facilities. This has implications with regards to privilege, as discussed below.

discuss how it impacts nascent ambition broadly. To do this I look first at ideas about gender roles, then at gendered opportunities and obstacles, highlighting how current findings in the literature fit into this framework and drawing out specific hypotheses.

### *Gender and social roles*

When we examine the literature's findings on the sources of women's and men's ambition through the lens of gender roles, a common thread tying these findings together emerges: the factors that differentiate men's and women's ambition are, largely, factors that relate to women's roles—about women's place, about what is an appropriate career for a woman to pursue, about women's self-evaluation of their competence in a traditionally masculine arena. Lawless and Fox (2005) and Moore (2005) find individual perceptions of qualifications matter for women's political ambition. The role of family responsibilities also impacts women's ambition, however, the results are more mixed—some scholars find family circumstances have little or no effect (Burt-Way and Kelly 1992; Lawless 2014), while other more recent work finds that being married with children limits women's political ambition (Fulton et al. 2006; Lawless and Fox 2005). Numerous scholars find feminist or liberal beliefs about women's roles increase women's political ambition (Costantini 1990; Fox and Lawless 2003; Jennings and Farah 1981). Even when the gender-role dimension is not immediately apparent—for example, Costantini (1990) finds that Democratic women activists are more ambitious than Republican women activists—I contend the findings are fundamentally the result of the parties' positions on women's roles (see also Freeman 1999).

It is worth considering how the timing of these studies impacts their results, particularly with regard to marriage, motherhood, and work, the dimensions of which have changed

dramatically during the course of the development of this literature. Findings from the early 1990s are from an era when the share of traditional stay-at-home mothers had been shrinking for two decades (the share of mothers in married couples who stayed home while their husbands worked shrank from 44% in 1969 to 34% in 1979 to 25% in 1989 (Kreider and Elliott 2010), positive opinions about working mothers had been increasing fairly steadily for more than 15 years,<sup>9</sup> and there was national momentum towards requiring poor mothers receiving federal assistance to work, culminating in the passage of welfare reform (PRWORA) in 1996.<sup>10</sup> It was perhaps a time when work and motherhood seemed increasingly compatible, perhaps even desirable.

Later findings from the early and middle 2000s are from a very different era. The share of married mothers who stayed home while their husbands worked remained almost constant at about one in four between 1989 and 2009 (Kreider and Elliott 2010). After rising for nearly a decade and a half, support for working mothers dropped off in the middle- to late-1990s, hitting a low in 2000.<sup>11</sup> Media narratives arose regarding mothers<sup>12</sup> choosing to “opt out” of the

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<sup>9</sup> Results from General Social Survey. The share of people agreeing or strongly agreeing that a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who doesn't work rose from 48.9% in 1977 to a decade high of 70.3% in 1994. The share of people disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement that a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works rose from 31.8% in 1977 to 58.7% in 1994.

<sup>10</sup> See enactment of “workfare” in Wisconsin under Governor Tommy Thompson in the late 1980s/early 1990s, then-Governor Bill Clinton’s vow to “end welfare as we know it” during his first campaign, resulting in welfare reform. The national context at this time included other watershed moments for feminism and working mothers, include the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the 1992 elections which were both “the year of the woman” and then Vice Presidential candidate Dan Quayle condemning the single motherhood of TV character Murphy Brown.

<sup>11</sup> Results from General Social Survey. The share of people agreeing or strongly agreeing that a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who doesn't work declined from 70.3% in 1994 to 61.7% in 2000 – the lowest rate since 1985. The share of people disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement that a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works declined from 58.7% in 1994 to 53.4% in 2000 – the lowest rate since 1991.

<sup>12</sup> It's worth noticing that most of these narratives revolve around a particular set of professional, married, straight, implicitly white, women. While this type of woman does not represent the reality of work, motherhood, or marriage for most women, she is a powerful symbol in the national conscious.

workforce (Belkin 2003)<sup>13</sup> (though data did not support this assertion (Goldin 2006b)) and narratives about parenting moved towards more intense involvement in children's everyday lives, requiring a greater time investment in children, greater supervision of their everyday activities, and higher levels of involvement later in the child's life (both in the popular press (Aleccia 2013; Lindsey 2012) and in academic work (Ramey and Ramey 2009)).

One factor related to views on motherhood and work since the middle 1990s might offer additional insights: the economy. While women's labor force participation and its acceptance has historically been related to economic circumstance, it is interesting to note that between 1977 and 1993 positive views on working mothers increased, unrelated to ups and downs in the economy. Americans' views on working mothers were largely uncorrelated with the unemployment rate; in fact, the relationship was slightly negative, meaning that lower unemployment rates were related to more positive attitudes towards working mothers.<sup>14</sup> However, looking at data between 1994 and 2012, the situation is markedly different—generally speaking, when unemployment was down during this period (presumably at times it was easier for men to find work), working mothers were judged more harshly. Conversely, in periods when unemployment increased, generally working mothers were viewed more warmly.<sup>15</sup> This variation in the views on working mothers could partially explain why different studies see different results at different time periods—and the link to the unemployment rate suggests when mothers

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<sup>13</sup> Most recently one prominent national voice on women and work, Sheryl Sandberg, focused on the individual limitations holding women back from exceptional professional success, largely ignoring the structural confines women face (Sandberg 2013). Women's (and men's) response to her narrative—that “having it all” is possible with individual balance and perseverance—has been mixed.

<sup>14</sup> Looking at General Social Survey data from 1977 to 1993, correlations for liberal/positive opinions towards working mothers and the unemployment rate are -0.25 and -0.22 respectively for working mothers having a secure relationship and preschool children suffering.

<sup>15</sup> Looking at General Social Survey data from 1994 to 2012, correlations for liberal/positive opinions towards working mothers and the unemployment rate are 0.76 and 0.69 respectively for working mothers having a secure relationship and preschool children suffering. Though not tested in this analysis, would could imagine several plausible reasons the mid-1990s served as a pivot point—the Contract with America, and the growth in talk radio (facilitated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996) and cable news—particularly conservative talk radio and Fox News (launched in 1996).

are more or less likely to negatively judged based on their employment status.<sup>16</sup> This observation aligns with Tilly's (1998) assertions that changes in inequality (in this case mother's welcome in the labor force) are not based on opinion but rather on changes in structure. He notes, "if the transaction costs of a given system of inequality rise dramatically, or the likely benefits of an alternative system increase visibly, shifts in categorical relations occur much more rapidly than an explanation resting on belief alone can account for" (103). I argue that this is what we witness with regards to mothers in the workforce—the shifting transaction costs of keeping mothers in or out of the workforce changed dramatically as the economy changed.

Returning to the broader discussion of the impact on gender and social roles, it's useful to summarize what we've learned and how it will inform this analysis. We've learned that ideas about working mothers and about women's competence matter for ambition and that potential inconsistencies in the literature's findings can be reasonably explained based on the timing of the research. I've argued that these (and other) variables that have mattered in analyses of women's nascent ambition can be usefully categorized as measures of ideas about women's roles—and that doing so provides a mechanism for understanding why certain factors matter, and matter differently for men as compared to women.

To examine how ideas about women's roles influence ambition I leverage the variation in the way that different social groups structure gender (variation I've argued arises from spatial segregation between different social groups) in a comparative analysis. I use this framework of women's roles to theorize about what factors should distinguish the nascent ambition of women and men from different social groups based on the variations in the structure of gender for these

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<sup>16</sup> In fact, even recent evidence points to this. Using survey data from 2011, Lawless (2014) finds family responsibilities are unrelated to women's nascent ambition—women are less likely than men to be interested in running in a variety of family circumstances. This was at the same moment that unemployment was at one of the highest in years—and at the very moment that working mothers were seeing an increase in favor (Schulte 2014).

groups. I test this theory by focusing on two individual-level aspects of women's role that vary across race, class, and religion, the details of which I discuss at length in chapters three through five: (1) understandings of women's roles as mothers, focusing on how the presence of children and opinions on abortion as a proxy for opinions on the centrality of motherhood to women's identity (see Luker 1984); and (2) understandings of women's competence in traditionally male arenas.

### *Gendered Obstacles and Opportunities*

Because broad generalizations about social groups are insufficient to explain intra-social group variation in nascent political ambition, I link gender roles to a second element of the structure of gender: how obstacles and opportunities play an important role in shaping individuals' life trajectories.<sup>17</sup> Gerson's (1985) important scholarship on women's work and family patterns reveals that women's experiences dramatically influence their life choices, demonstrating that even women who begin with similar goals have divergent life paths as a result of the opportunities and obstacles they confront.<sup>18</sup> The focus on gendered obstacles and opportunities has been less prevalent in the literature on gender and ambition, so I also review results from work on participation and politics. Examining these findings through the lens of gendered obstacles and opportunities reveals three experiences that affect, or are likely to affect, women's and men's nascent ambition in a gendered way: recruitment, skills, and experiencing discrimination.

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<sup>17</sup> I am grateful to Nancy Burns for suggesting this avenue of thought. The inclusion of opportunities and obstacles as influences of nascent ambition also builds on important work on progressive ambition by Maestas et al. (2006). These scholars show how differences in the professionalism of state legislatures influence the development of state legislators' progressive ambition.

<sup>18</sup> Specifically she shows that family life and work choices are affected by the presence or absence of a stable relationship, financial need, domestic isolation or devaluation, and the availability of satisfying employment opportunities.

Several scholars show that recruitment, simply being asked to get involved, promotes political action (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and political candidacy (Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2001)—and researchers also show that recruitment for political candidacy is especially critical for women (Lawless and Fox 2005), who are less likely to be self-starters. Maestas et al. (2006) demonstrate that learning relevant skills promotes progressive ambition—and work by other researchers sheds light on when skills relevant for nascent ambition are most likely to be learned: when women are in single-gendered contexts. Women in single-gendered contexts are more likely to have higher levels of participation in discussions (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012) and are more likely to learn skills relevant for public office (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Common single-gendered contexts where women can learn relevant political and leadership skills include organizations (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Jackman 1994) and high school or college athletics (Lawless and Fox 2014; Stevenson 2010). Lastly, researchers show that experiencing discrimination can lead to a stronger sense of collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001), can increase engagement (DeSipio 2002), and can encourage political action (Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein 2011)—all factors likely to increase nascent ambition.

In sum, examination of gendered obstacles and opportunities in previous research suggests I should pay special attention to how men's and women's nascent ambition varies for different social groups based on three different experiences: (1) recruitment, where I link research on self-esteem to research on recruitment and political behavior; (2) participation in single-gendered organizations or athletic teams, where I focus on women's ability to build relevant skills; and (3) experiencing discrimination, where I examine collective identity and engagement. The spatial separation of social groups means these factors vary by group both in likelihood of occurrence—for example, women's athletic participation is generally lower among

minorities, as well as strength of effect—for example, women who come from groups where levels of self-esteem are often lower may need to experience more instances of recruitment prior to having their nascent ambition sparked. I also consider these experiences for men’s ambition, showing their lesser impact on men’s ambition, additionally highlighting their gendered nature.

### ***Privilege, Narrative, and Mutability: Gender and ambition across social groups***

The organization of social groups by spatial separation allows for different structures of gender to emerge across race, class, and religion. The close examinations of these social groups in chapters three through five make it clear that the structure of gender varies across these groups in ways that are deeply influential for the nascent ambition of men and women in these groups. The final section of this dissertation brings these findings together, examining the dimensions on which race, class, and religion differ and how those differences impact gender and ambition. Specifically, in the final segment of this dissertation I unpack three dimensions on which race, class, and religion vary—privilege, narrative, and mutability—and draw out the implications of these differences for men’s and women’s ambition.

#### *Privilege*

First I focus on the dimension of privilege. By privilege I mean that one group is systematically allocated more resources and systematically receives better treatment than their counterpart. Of the groups examined in this analysis, gender, race, and class divide along lines of privilege while religion, as measured in this analysis as conservative Christian or not, does not.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> This is not to say that certain religions are not associated with higher levels of privilege or that individuals of certain faiths are not subject to discrimination—clearly they are. But when measured in broad strokes as is done in this analysis, it is not clear that individuals who are conservative Christians or not have a specific advantage, particularly given the often hidden nature of this division. An analysis of another faith group who arguably lacks

Politics and privilege are deeply intertwined—and I contend that the social organization of privilege among groups will result in different levels of nascent ambition. For groups like race and class, where privilege is constructed primarily through social separation, levels of nascent ambition will be higher for the disadvantaged group because (1) these individuals lack alternative positions of power; (2) they are more likely to develop group consciousness, possibly through experiencing discrimination, which increases engagement; and (3) the lack of intimate relations with the dominant group means individuals in subordinate groups are not invested in the success of the dominant group in the same way that individuals who are subordinated by role segregation are. For groups where privilege is allocated primarily through role separation—for example gender—levels of ambition will be lower for the disadvantaged group because role segregation leaves the lives of advantaged and disadvantaged individuals deeply enmeshed—for example, the way wives benefit from, and are invested in, their husband’s success. As noted above, this inhibits the development of group consciousness and closely ties the personal success members of the subordinate group to members of the dominant one. Finally, for social groups that lack a dimension of privilege, such as conservative Christians and others, levels of ambition should be similar.

In addition to influencing basic levels of ambition, I expect that privilege will also influence what factors impact ambition for different groups. For example, privileged and non-privileged groups have different expectations of women’s roles, specifically with regard to combining motherhood and work: women in non-privileged groups have historically been more accepting of women who are both mothers and workers. I anticipate that these different ideas will mean that the traditional trappings of women’s role—motherhood and marriage—will not

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privileges granted to people not of that faith—for example Muslims, particularly post September 11<sup>th</sup>—might yield a different result, one more similar to race or class.

affect the nascent political ambition of women in non-privileged groups (minority women and less-educated women) the same way they will for privileged women (white women and those with college educations).

I also expect that privilege will drive what opportunities and obstacles are available for individuals and how experiences affect individuals. For example, I anticipate that only ambitious individuals in the most privileged groups (whites and college-educated individuals, especially men) will be able to access social networks that include political acquaintances, thus only their ambition will benefit from them. But I do not think this factor will differentially impact individuals based on their membership in groups where privilege is irrelevant, for example in the case of religion in this analysis. Additionally, I hypothesize that experiencing discrimination, which highlights group-level inequalities, will be an especially powerful factor for women, who are subordinated primarily through social roles. Other groups that are separated by spatial rather than by role segregation are set up to more easily see their disadvantages, thus I do not expect experiencing discrimination to have as powerful an effect on ambition for other disadvantaged groups.

### *Narrative*

The second dimension that differentiates race, class, and religion is the existence of a clear narrative on gender. Religion offers an explicit narrative about gender, spoken with authority, in a specific context. This narrative exists in a defined space, and is told to a community audience whose presence increases the legitimacy of the message. Race and class tells stories about gender differently, in ways that are more often woven into everyday languages

and interactions.<sup>20</sup> In addition to the clarity of the message, who delivers it varies for these groups. For example, because being a conservative Christian is not often a visible identity, strangers do not have the opportunity to police the actions and behaviors of conservative Christians the same way they can individuals of particular racial groups. Together these two aspects of narrative mean messages on gender for conservative Christians remain remarkably consistent—they are mostly coming from group insiders who already believe in the narrative. These two factors mean that conservative Christianity transmits ideas about gender very differently than race and class.

I anticipate that the existence of an explicit narrative on gender will be most visible in the effect on social roles—and will be most powerful for conservative Christian women. Because motherhood is seen as the primary role for women in conservative Christianity (Manning 1999), I expect conservative ideas about motherhood to be associated with lower levels of ambition for women.

### *Mutability*

The final dimension I examine is the mutability of social groups. Race and gender are essentially immutable (Jackman 1994),<sup>21</sup> while class, and to a greater extent religion, can be altered over the course of a lifetime. One very clear aspect of this is the ability to self-select into these groups—particularly a factor for religion in this analysis. I argue that such self-selection implies, at a minimum, a tacit acceptance of narratives on gender. Once again, this points to the

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<sup>20</sup> For example, see recent work by Sue et al. (2007) on racial microaggressions. Though mass media provides cultural narratives regarding gendered expectations about class and race that are consumed by a large audience, I argue seeing a film or television show is substantially different than being part of a congregation listening to a religious figure both in the sense of the community who widely agree with the message and the authority of the messenger.

<sup>21</sup> With the obvious exception of transgender individuals.

idea that social role variables will be stronger for conservative Christian women, who have self-selected into (or at a minimum, not opted out of) a group that has a clear set of ideas about women's role.

### *Summary of theory*

The structure of gender is critical in shaping women's and men's nascent ambition. It affects ideas about women's roles, including those about women as workers and mothers and their competence in traditionally male arenas, as well as the opportunities that are available to women and men and the obstacles they confront—all factors that impact nascent ambition. But the effects of the structure of gender on nascent ambition are often obscured because the social organization of gender, which subordinates women primarily through different social roles, makes it invisible. The structure of gender, and its influence on nascent ambition, becomes visible when we view it comparatively, looking across social groups that have had the opportunity to develop different structures of gender because they are organized by spatial separation.

This study takes advantage of that unique comparative opportunity—the variation in the structure of gender across social groups—to examine how gender affects nascent ambition for men and women. Broadly speaking, I expect that among social groups where women's role outside of the home is more accepted, women's nascent political ambition is likely to be greater. Because gender roles are insufficient to explain variation within social groups, I also examine how gendered opportunities and obstacles shape nascent ambition. I argue that experiences that spark women's interest in politics, provide them the skills to be politically successful, and the opportunities to do so, will make women more likely to be ambitious.

But this work goes beyond looking at the structure of gender within social groups to examine how it affects ambition across these groups. Looking at dimensions on which the groups I examine differ—privilege, narrative, and mutability—I show that differences across groups produce not only variation in levels of nascent ambition but also in the relevant ingredients for ambition. For example, with regards to levels of ambition, I show that the more privileged part of a group is less ambitious when groups are spatially segregated, but more ambitious when groups are segregated by roles. When groups are not divided by privilege, such as religion here, they are also not divided by differences in ambition. In terms of ingredients for ambition, privilege increases the availability of certain opportunities, in turn affecting the importance of these factors in predicting nascent ambition. The mutability and cohesive narrative of conservative Christians elevate the importance of social roles, particularly for women.

### **Chapter Three: Race**

Let's first examine the intersection of gender and race. I begin with race because it offers us some of the starkest contrasts between different structures of gender. This is owed, in large part, to the fact that races in America have been so intensely segregated for centuries, on a variety of dimensions, and while official legal barriers have recently fallen, for many people in the U.S. people of different races still exist in separate worlds. This separation between racial groups has enabled the development of different structures of gender. What is considered the ideal for white women may not be seen as such for minority women—and the obstacles and opportunities women confront are different both from men of their own racial group, as well as women of other racial groups.

Race is also a special case, compared to class and religion, both in terms of the enormous differences of privilege accorded to different racial groups, as well as its essentialized nature. Though it's a social construct, race is similar to gender in that it is seen as immutable, essential, eternal (Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz 2013). Also like gender, it is a publicly visible characteristic and a salient feature used to immediately group, identify and stereotype individuals (Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz 2013). The very public nature of race and gender mean that the narratives about race and gender are part of every interaction and everyone participates in policing the choices, behaviors, and actions of men and women of different racial groups in both subtle and obvious ways.

The powerful impact of race on people's lives means that scholars concerned with

representation have examined ambition and race only occasionally in conjunction with gender. But the studies that investigate racial differences in ambition are small and context specific, for example, Stone's (1980) survey of black elected officials in Michigan or Jensen and Martinek's (2007) study of the New York Supreme Court, and results are largely exploratory or descriptive (Fox and Lawless 2005; Moore 2005). These studies have uncovered significant, albeit inconsistent, differences in ambition among racial groups: Moore finds that minorities are more ambitious than whites of either gender, Fox and Lawless find that blacks are less likely to have considered running for office than whites or Latinos (they find no difference between whites and Latinos), and Jensen and Martinek (2007) find that minority judges of both genders are more ambitious than their white counterparts.

These differences deserve consideration, particularly in light of Fulton et al.'s (2006) findings, which demonstrate that the ingredients for ambition affect the strategic calculations when deciding to seek office. I investigate race and gender as they relate to ambition in detail in this chapter. I proceed as follows: highlighting variation in the gender structures of different racial groups, deriving hypotheses regarding how these structures influence nascent ambition for men and women of different racial groups, performing bivariate analyses to take a first look at men and women, whites and minorities all together and then at the intersections of gender and race, and finally multivariate testing of these hypotheses and robustness checks. Differences between race, class, and religion are occasionally observed in this chapter but are considered fully in a later comparative chapter.

### ***Race, ambition and gender roles***

To begin first with social roles, there is conflicting evidence regarding different racial and

ethnic groups' levels of sex-role egalitarianism. Scholarship spanning several decades documents that minority groups are more supportive of working mothers than are whites (Blee and Tickamyer 1995; Greenman and Xie 2008; Kane 2000), though this finding contrasts with two other, earlier, strains of research on gender egalitarianism across racial groups. The first, using other measures of sex-role egalitarianism, finds little variation among racial groups (Darcy and Hadley 1988; Hershey 1980; Montoya 1996) while the second suggests minorities generally adhere to more traditional gender roles, especially when it comes to politics (Ransford and Miller 1983; Rowan et al. 1996).

I focus initially on the finding that minority groups are more supportive of working mothers than are whites. Behavioral evidence indicates that this belief affects women's actions: Greenman and Xie (2008) find that for almost all minority groups, married women are more likely to work than their white counterparts and that the employment status of married minority women is less sensitive to additional family income<sup>22</sup>—a finding that speaks to key differences in levels of privilege for these groups of women. This acceptance of working mothers has important implications for nascent ambition. Fulton et al. (2006) and others find that parenting is a barrier for women's ambition overall, but if having a child is seen as less of a barrier to political office for minority women, its affect on their nascent ambition or their decision-making calculation when seeking office could be quite different. Given the different levels of acceptance of working mothers for white and minority groups, I expect white women's nascent ambition to be negatively affected by the presence of children while minority women's ambition will not be affected (or will be affected to a lesser extent). Men's ambition should not be affected by the

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<sup>22</sup> In other words, if white married women have the opportunity (due to financial affluence) to leave the workforce, presumably to specialize in domestic work, they are more likely to do so than are other racial/ethnic groups. The one exception here where married women of a minority group are significantly more likely to stay home as family income increases is among Japanese. Interestingly, Greenman and Xie (2008) found that controlling for children does not affect the results (1232).

presence of children. Because the findings on the different levels of acceptance of working mothers between whites and minorities are fairly consistent, I expect examining the effect of children on nascent ambition will be the best test of my theory that the racial variation in ideas about women's roles plays an important role in the formation of nascent ambition.

I also examine how motherhood affects ambition by looking at opinions on motherhood. Luker (1984) makes a compelling case that ideas about motherhood are deeply linked with ideas about women's roles. She finds that people who are strongly committed to traditional women's roles advocate for "women's reproductive roles [to] be given social primacy" (230). For these individuals, motherhood is the central element around which women's lives should be organized. Luker examines opinions about motherhood in the context of abortion, effectively arguing that ideas about abortion are essentially ideas about the significance of motherhood to women's identity. Luker's assertion is supported by empirical evidence—looking at General Social Survey data from 1977-2012, agreeing with the idea that on women should be able to get a legal abortion "for any reason" is positively correlated with views on working mothers, particularly during the time of Luker's analysis and the data used in this dissertation.<sup>23</sup>:

As with working mothers, opinions on abortion also vary by race and ethnicity. In research using the General Social Surveys in the late 1980s (a similar time period for the data used in this analysis), Wilcox (1990) finds that blacks' and whites' opinions on abortion are converging as whites become more conservative. However, he finds that the gender gap among black is larger than among whites: black men are less supportive of elective abortion than white

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<sup>23</sup> From 1977-2012 the correlations are .64 for liberal responses to if a working mother can have just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work and .50 for liberal responses to a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works. From 1977-1993 these correlations are .71 and .65 respectively, making abortion a reasonable proxy variable for the time period of the survey I use here.

men and black women are more supportive than white women.<sup>24</sup> Hispanics in general are more conservative on abortion than whites and Hispanic women are more liberal than Hispanic men (Leal 2003). With regard to political ambition, I expect that women who have more liberal views on abortion (and thus more liberal views on motherhood) to be more likely to have nascent ambition.<sup>25</sup> Because research shows black women as more liberal than white women, I expect their nascent ambition to be larger. However, more conservative Hispanic women are likely to have lower nascent ambition than either of these other groups. Because social conceptions of motherhood are more relevant for women's life choices than men's, I expect that the direction of men's opinions on abortion will have little affect on their nascent ambition.<sup>26</sup> It's also worth noting that abortion maybe a particularly important for whites. Scott and Schuman (1988) shows that blacks are less likely than whites to have strong feelings on abortion. Additionally, abortion is not as central to race-based narratives on motherhood as it is for some of the other groups examined in this dissertation, such as conservative Christians.<sup>27</sup>

A third way I expect that social roles will matter for men's and women's ambition is in their evaluations of their competence. Lawless and Fox (2005) have documented that women's evaluation of their own qualifications is central to their nascent ambition. Ridgeway and Correll's (2004) work provides a mechanism for this finding, arguing that an individual's assessment of what is expected of him or her in a particular situation is related to his or her gender. The authors say that "when hegemonic gender beliefs<sup>[28]</sup> are effectively salient in a

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<sup>24</sup> There was no racial gap for women on the question of traumatic abortion, though black men remained more conservative than white men on this point.

<sup>25</sup> Ideally this measure would be supplemented with other measures of women's roles but none are available in the dataset.

<sup>26</sup> Though note that intensity of opinion (not measured here) may have an effect.

<sup>27</sup> Though certainly race is an important part of the story of abortion rights in the U.S. See for example, the writings of Margaret Sanger, founder of Planned Parenthood.

<sup>28</sup> By gender beliefs the authors mean the core cultural beliefs about gender. They are one half of the gender system (the other half is resources).

situation, hierarchical presumptions about men's greater status and competence become salient for participants, along with assumptions about men's and women's different traits and skills" (517).<sup>29</sup> Running for office is exactly the kind of situation in which these hegemonic gender beliefs are made salient (Correll 2004). Ridgeway and Correll (2004) note, however, that alternative gender beliefs exist in different communities and that these alternative beliefs are influential in shaping women's perceptions and evaluations of their competence. They say, "[f]or example, women are seen as more competent relative to men in the African-American community (Dugger 1998; Collins 1991)" (514). Thus, because black women have an alternative gender belief that relates to competence, we would expect to see black women with higher levels of self-assessed competence than white women, a fact which should reduce the role that this competence assessment plays in the formation of black women's nascent ambition (relative to white women's nascent ambition). Essentially, we should expect for competence among black women to play a role more similar to what it does for men overall. Conversely, we might expect this competence evaluation to play a larger role for black men.<sup>30</sup>

To examine ideas of competence for a wider range of racial and ethnic groups, I rely on a broad meta-analysis of race and self-esteem<sup>31</sup> by Twenge and Crocker (2002). These authors find that self-esteem varies by racial group with blacks having the highest levels of self-esteem followed by whites, Hispanics, Native Americans, and then Asians. These results are most consistent with the cultural explanation that different racial and ethnic groups have different understandings of self-concept and those with higher levels of individualism have higher levels

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<sup>29</sup> It is critical to note two aspects of this theory: first, one does not have to believe the presumptions of higher status, simply being aware that they are the dominant discourse is sufficient. Second, since both men and women are aware of these expectations, women's perceptions of themselves are influenced.

<sup>30</sup> This is more likely to be true if black men and women are thinking about their nascent ambition in a context where they would expect more intra-racial political competitions.

<sup>31</sup> While self-esteem and competence are not identical constructs, the studies Twenge and Crocker (2002) examined include any using global self-esteem, "omnibus measures summing over several areas of competence", and other behavior inventories (375).

of self-esteem.<sup>32</sup> Twenge and Crocker (2002) note that more individualistic cultures, such as black culture, focus more on having self-esteem that is independent and transcends context, thus among more individualist groups self-esteem is less tied to a particular realm or to be based on other's opinions (388). Given these findings, I would expect that minority groups with lower levels of self-esteem (Hispanics, and especially Native Americans and Asians) would be less likely to rate their qualifications highly. I also expect these groups would be less individualistic and thus their self-assessment of their own qualifications should matter more for their nascent ambition because the context will be linked to the assessment to a greater degree. From a gender perspective, the authors find that the gender gap in self-esteem is largest among whites—meaning the gap in self-esteem between white men and white women is larger than among men and women of other races and ethnicities. Thus, I expect that biggest gender gap in self-assessed competence will be among whites.

### ***The impact of obstacles and opportunities on nascent ambition***

I've detailed how ideas about women's role, both with regards to working mothers and competence, vary for different racial groups—variation that I argue arises because of the spatial segregation of racial groups—and I've theorized how these differences might result in different levels of, and ingredients for, nascent ambition. But these broad social understandings of women's role are not sufficient to explain differences in nascent ambition—though racial and ethnic variation in the understanding of gender roles can help explain differences between racial groups, it cannot account for differences in nascent ambition within racial groups. To focus on why certain members of social groups develop nascent ambition, I consider how the

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<sup>32</sup> Though they note that for blacks, whose self-esteem rose for individuals born after the civil rights movement, racial identity may play a larger role than for other minority groups.

opportunities and obstacles women face differs across racial groups. This adds an important contribution to earlier considerations of ambition and opportunities. As Fulton et al. (2006) write, “the development of ambition should be...influenced by long-term considerations, and conditions that persist with little variation over time (such as age and family considerations)” (238). My analysis highlights how short-term opportunities or obstacles can also serve as guides for the development of ambition—opportunities or obstacles that may have long-lasting consequences for the direction of women’s lives, underscoring how forks in the road have shaped women’s paths.

To think about these obstacles and opportunities I draw on Gerson’s (1985) pathbreaking work on women’s work and family choices. Gerson details how women’s experiences powerfully impact their life decisions, demonstrating that even women who begin with similar goals may pursue life paths because of the opportunities and obstacles they confront.<sup>33</sup> Gerson’s attention to life experiences does not extend to men’s choices, but nonetheless provides an important basis for examining what types of opportunities and obstacles promote or impede political ambition and how they differ for men and women. While there may be several types of opportunities or obstacles that affect women’s and men’s ambition differently, I focus on experiences that affect factors related to participation and politics: recruitment, skills, and engagement, and how these experiences differ for men and women.

Recruitment—simply being asked to be involved—encourages political action (Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2001; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), and researchers (Lawless and Fox 2005) have shown that recruitment for political candidacy is particularly important for women, who are not as likely to be self-starters. Thus I expect recruitment to promote nascent ambition, especially

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<sup>33</sup> Specifically she shows that family life and work choices are affected by the presence or absence of a stable relationship, financial need, domestic isolation or devaluation, and the availability of satisfying employment opportunities.

for women. Recruitment should also matter more for individuals who belong to racial and ethnic groups that have lower self-esteem (see above discussion) and rely more on others' feedback for approval. So recruitment should matter least for blacks but most for Asians and Native Americans. In general it should also matter more for women in these groups, whose self-esteem is lower than their male counterparts. It is worth mentioning that while I expect recruitment to matter more for women and some groups of minorities, I expect that privilege will play an important role in who is likely to be recruited, with white men most often targeted by recruitment efforts.

As Maestas et al. (2006) demonstrate, progressive ambition increases when officeholders learn relevant skills. I expect skills to play a role in nascent ambition as well. In particular, I think the opportunity to learn skills relevant for political office will spark nascent ambition. While I predict that skills will matter for both men and women, I argue that women will be more likely to learn relevant skills in particular contexts, namely single-gender contexts such as organizations and athletics.

Women in single-gendered contexts are more likely to participate in discussions (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012) and perform skills relevant for public office (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Organizations are more likely to be single-gendered than other arenas in which people tend to pick up participatory skills, such as church (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Jackman 1994). Thus membership in organizations is more likely to provide women with skills and leadership opportunities that may be less open to women in more mixed-gender areas.<sup>34</sup>

The second area I expect to influence how women pick up skills is involvement in high

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<sup>34</sup> Note that even in women-heavy occupations, many leadership positions are held by men, again making organizations unique (Charles 2003).

school or college athletics.<sup>35</sup> In her work on the impact of Title IX Stevenson (2010) shows that female athletes who benefitted from Title IX saw higher levels of employment and a greater tendency to go into male-dominated fields.<sup>36</sup> Stevenson's research suggests the athletics teaches women skills that are particularly valuable in non-traditional fields for women, including competitiveness and aggression, areas that are otherwise often deemphasized for women. Fox and Lawless (2014) also find that involvement in competitive sports promotes nascent ambition for college students. Athletics may be particularly useful for promoting nascent ambition in politics as it may familiarize women with skills that are especially valuable in a political arena.

Involvement in organizations and athletics should promote nascent ambition for men as well, though I do not expect that the type of setting (church, work, or organization) where skills were developed to matter as much for men—though more racially segregated environments like organizations or church may serve to promote skills for minority men. I also do not expect that athletic involvement will have the same effect on women and men—while athletic participation should still promote nascent ambition for men (see Barron, Ewing, and Waddell 2000 on the education and wage advantages male athletes experience), the effect will not be as large as it is for women since athletics will likely be reinforcing traditionally male qualities.

An additional experience I expect to affect nascent ambition differently for men and women is the experience of discrimination. Researchers have shown that discrimination can lead to a stronger sense of collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001), increase engagement (DeSipio 2002), and encourage political action (Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein 2011)—all

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<sup>35</sup> Note that men did not substantially enter women's athletics as coaches until the 1990s, after Title IX made such work more desirable (Cruz 2009).

<sup>36</sup> The survey used in this paper was fielded in 1989—17 years after Title IX's effects started to be felt. That means that if women graduated high school in 1973, they had some effect of Title IX since many schools started to comply the year after passage, they would be 34 at the time of interviewing. While many women were older, certainly some of the women in the sample were affected by this legislation. And if women were athletes in high school before Title IX the effects of athletics may have been even stronger since the barriers to entry were higher prior to the law's passage.

factors likely to increase nascent ambition. Naff's (1995) examination of women in the federal government found that experiencing discrimination at work does not dampen women's enthusiasm to progress in their career, though it may prompt them to seek different avenues to achieve their ambitions. I expect individuals who are ambitiously motivated to be more likely to have experienced discrimination. While I expect discrimination to have this effect on all groups under consideration, because women and minority groups are more likely to experience discrimination, the experience of discrimination should play a larger role for these groups.

### ***Sample and Measurement of Nascent Ambition***

I have documented important racial and gender variation in a number of factors that I anticipate will impact nascent political ambition, but identifying the appropriate sample of individuals on whom my hypotheses should be tested poses a challenge. Nascent political ambition is a difficult topic to study because it is impossible to know who considered running but decided against it. Scholars have dealt with this difficulty by determining an "eligibility pool" of who is likely to run for office, focusing on individuals who are already in office and have a potential of advancing (Fulton et al. 2006; Mariani 2008), individuals party leaders believe are potential future candidates (Maisel and Stone 1997), surveys of party activists (Jennings and Farah 1981), and individuals who are in the most common professions in various levels of public office (Lawless and Fox 2005). While each of these methods has its advantages, when it comes to the study of race, gender and ambition they are difficult to use because often these samples do not provide sufficient numbers of key groups.

To help circumvent this problem I develop a pool of activists who are potential office holders. To do so I use the Citizen Participation Study, a 1990 nationally representative, in-

person survey of 2,517 individuals. This study oversampled for African-Americans, Latinos, and political activists in order to study political participation among different social groups. Because knowing the determinants of political ambition for the average American, while interesting, is not particularly informative regarding the political ambition for potential officeholders, I generate a pool of activists who are potential officeholders from within the sample. While political activists are not the only pool from which public officials are drawn, political activists are one of the top four professions represented in public office (Lawless and Fox 2005) and this is particularly true for minority office holders (Lawless, March 19, 2009). So while this is not a full pool of potential candidates, this pool allows us to examine what factors are most influential for the formation of nascent political ambition for social groups that differ in both racial and gender composition.

To determine the sub-sample I use the same procedure as Moore (2005). I determine which individuals have been active in at least one of seven different types of activism: (1) participating in or (2) contributing to an election campaign, (3) being active in or (4) contributing to a political or civic organization, (5) attending or (6) serving on a local board or council, (7) being an informal neighborhood activist. I use these types of activism because they are the seven kinds of activism for which respondents were asked if a possible motivation for the action was the individual's desire to run for office or get a government job.<sup>37</sup> Examining individuals who are active in these forms of participation narrows the sample to 1,764 observations.

Individuals are defined as politically ambitious if they responded that their motivation for

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<sup>37</sup> Though other types of activism were asked about in the survey, respondents were not asked if these actions were motivated by the desire to run for office or get a government job. Not asking about every motive for every sort of activity was a decision by the study's principal investigators, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), who stated that "the difficulty in using a common set of reasons for all participatory acts grow of the profound differences among the modes of activity. When pre-tests elicited reactions indicating the respondents considered an item simply too far-fetched...we omitted it from the list" (110).

participation in any of these seven activities was somewhat importantly or very importantly driven by the desire to obtain a government job or run for public office.<sup>38</sup> Based on Costantini and King's (1984) work, Moore (2005) finds that these two motivations are the only two motivations about which Verba, Schlozman, and Brady inquire which load on the political ambition dimension in factor analysis.<sup>39</sup> This method of measuring political ambition also fits with the common standard in the literature that individuals had at least considered running for office or it had crossed their mind (Lawless and Fox 2005).<sup>40</sup> Of the 1,764 individuals in the subsample, 315 (18%) are classified as being politically ambitious. Men and women are equally represented in the activist sample (886 and 878 respectively). There are 522 minorities in the activist sample, 284 of whom are women, 310 of whom are black and 174 of whom are Hispanic.

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<sup>38</sup> Among activists overall, the most common type of activism was organizational involvement—90% of activists were involved with an organization. A quarter (24%) were informal activists, 14% contributed to an organization, and 13% were active in an electoral campaign. Eight percent contributed to a candidate, 4% served on and 1% was involved with a local board or council. The distribution was generally similar for ambitious activists, though participation rates were higher for every category except organizational involvement. The one exception was that involvement in an electoral campaign was substantially higher among ambitious activists. For ambitious activists, 85% were involved with an organization, 31% were informal activists, 31% were active in electoral campaigns, 18% contributed to an organization and 11% contributed to a candidate, 9% served on and 3% was involved with a local board or council. Among activists, 62% participated in one way, 27% participated in two ways, 10% participated three ways, 2% participated four or more ways. More participation was common among ambitious activists, though the plurality still only participated in one way: 44% participated once way, 30% participated two ways, 20% participated three ways, 6% participated four or more ways.

<sup>39</sup> See Moore (2005) for additional information.

<sup>40</sup> Another plausible alternative, suggested by the very smart Abby Stewart, would be to identify individuals as ambitious only if they said they were active because they were interested in running for office. When the sample is limited to this group of individuals (unweighted n=229), there are few changes the comparisons between groups. For example, there are still no significant differences between the shares of minority women and men who are ambitious or the shares of ambitious conservative Christians compared to ambitious non-conservative Christians. The only minor changes are in class—while overall there is a significant difference between the shares of ambitious respondents with and without college degrees, the differences among men and among women are no longer significant (though men are very close). Thus, by and large, using this alternative measure of ambition does not impact the results I present here. To test this on the multivariate models I re-estimated the original models predicting nascent ambition presented in the text which compare individuals who are nascently ambitious with all other activists. I add footnotes in each chapter in conjunction with the relevant model but overall this alternative measure of nascent ambition does not affect the results very much. Generally speaking, the effect size of the significant variables diminishes (though often not for discrimination) but otherwise there are few common threads. Being recruited to participate and marriage were the variables most often affected, though not in a consistent way. By and large the results using this measure support the overall framework I present, in some spots a bit more strongly (for example, among reborn men being an athlete is now a significant predictor of ambition) and in other spots less so (for example, leadership is now significant for men who are not reborn).

Of the 315 ambitious respondents only 129 are women. Minority activists comprise nearly half (151) of the ambitious activists and nearly half of these (71) are women. Nearly two-thirds (99) ambitious minority activist sample is black and 28% (43) is Hispanic.

In Table 1 we can see that there are significant differences between all the groups with minority men and women both outpacing their white counterparts in reporting ambitious reasons for involvement in politics and their communities. As hypothesized, individuals from the less privileged group that is spatially separated, in this case minority individuals, show higher levels of nascent ambition—and this gap is particularly large among women: the share of minority men who are ambitious is double that of white men but the share of minority women who are ambitious is 3.5 times that of white women. But when a privileged group is separated by roles, as theorized, the less privileged group—here women—is less ambitious. This is true for women and men overall and white women and men but importantly, the only the comparison between minority men and women is insignificant.

**Table 1. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by race**

Men 16% (n=186)	Women 10% (n=129)	***
White 11% (n=164)	Minority 26% (n=151)	***
White Men 14% (n=106)	Minority Men 29% (n=80)	***
White Women 7% (n=58)	Minority Women 24% (n=71)	***
White Men 14% (n=106)	White Women 7% (n=58)	***
Minority Men 29% (n=80)	Minority Women 24% (n=71)	

Significance: \*\*\*p<.001

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

I proceed with the analyses in two stages—first looking at bivariate comparisons for both women and men and whites and minorities overall, then at their intersections. This allows me to get a sense of the individual effects of these variables and to see the important differences when we look at the combination of race and gender. I then produce multivariate analyses to examine the effects of social roles and opportunities and obstacles together for groups at the intersection. In all instances the reported results are weighted and the sample size (n) is unweighted.

### *Testing implications: social roles, gender, and race*

I first examine the effect on political ambition of racial differences in ideas about women's roles, focusing on the three facets outlined above—ideas about working mothers, belief about women's roles as mothers, and evaluations of competence. Briefly summarizing the earlier hypotheses about children: white women's nascent ambition should be negatively affected by the presence of children while minority women's ambition should not (or should be affected to a lesser extent).<sup>41</sup> Men's ambition should not be affected by the presence of children. To examine this effect, I test whether or not having preschool-aged children affects nascent political ambition.

Unfortunately the dataset does not have specific measures of opinions on women's roles as mothers. To measure this element I draw on Luker (1984), who argues that opinions on abortion are based on ideas about women's role at home and in society, and use the respondent's opinion on abortion as a proxy, which means the tests of this hypothesis are less than ideal. I expect that more liberal opinions on abortion will be associated with greater nascent ambition for

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<sup>41</sup> Though note that the timing of the survey means that I would expect white women's ambition to be less affected by children than it might be a decade later when the narrative had moved more negatively regarding working mothers.

women, though because of mixed findings on opinions of women’s role, it is unclear if there will be racial or ethnic differences on this measure. I don’t expect that men’s opinion on abortion will affect their nascent ambition.

Lastly in this section, I examine how differences in competence matter for men’s and women’s nascent ambition. Competence is measured through an individual’s self-assessment of leadership. I expect that self-assessed competence will matter more for women than men and more for white women than minority women, particularly because the majority of minority women in this sample are black and research reviewed earlier demonstrates that black’s self-esteem should be more independent than white’s.

In the below tables all variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. It is important to remember throughout these comparisons that the non-ambitious group is still a population of political activists, albeit those who are not motivated for ambitious reasons (in the multivariate model I also compare ambitious activists to all other individuals). Additionally, note the variation in sample sizes, which contributes to the variation in significance. I look first for by gender and race separately, and then by race and gender together.

**Table 2. Social roles by race and gender separately**

	Men		Women		Whites		Minorities	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14% (n=700)	15% (n=186)	15% (n=749)	<b>29%*</b> (n=129)	14% (n=1078)	14% (n=164)	18% (n=371)	<b>34%**</b> (n=151)
Preschool-aged children (respondents <40)	26% (n=330)	19% (n=123)	33% (n=340)	39% (n=85)	30% (n=475)	<b>19%*</b> (n=108)	28% (n=195)	<b>46%*</b> (n=100)
Abortion	0.68 (n=689)	0.64 (n=184)	0.61 (n=739)	0.68 (n=126)	0.65 (n=1070)	0.66 (n=164)	0.60 (n=358)	0.62 (n=146)
Leadership	0.70 (n=699)	<b>0.76*</b> (n=186)	0.66 (n=748)	<b>0.75**</b> (n=129)	0.67 (n=1076)	<b>0.76***</b> (n=164)	0.74 (n=371)	0.75 (n=151)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix A for additional coding information  
Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

As expected, the presence of children differentiates women but not men. However,

contrary to what was expected, ambitious women are more likely to have preschool-aged children than are non-ambitious women. Preschool-aged children also differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious minority respondents—ambitious minority respondents are more likely to have children. However, because preschool-aged children are closely associated with parental age (and younger individuals tend to be more ambitious), I also analyze the difference in ambition for individuals under 40 with and without preschool children. Among this group, having preschool-aged children still differentiates ambitious and non-ambitious minority respondents, but interestingly it differentiates ambitious and non-ambitious whites in the opposite direction: parents of preschool-aged children are less likely to be ambitious among whites but more likely to be ambitious among minorities. Looking at just women under 40 changes the observations for women overall—for these younger women, having preschool-aged children is not related to ambition.

Ideas about abortion, serving as a proxy for beliefs about women’s roles, do not differentiate ambitious respondents for any groups. Lastly, an initial look at the differences between ambitious and non-ambitious respondents in each group underscores the different role self-assessed leadership plays in producing nascent ambition. For minorities, it is irrelevant—in line with expectations for this sample. Among whites, men, and women, ambitious individuals in are significantly more likely to think of themselves as a leader, though the gap is larger for women than men.

Looking at the impact of these factors on political ambition at the intersections of race and gender tells a somewhat different story:

**Table 3. Social roles by race and gender together**

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14% (n=542)	13% (n=106)	15% (n=536)	17% (n=58)	18% (n=158)	22% (n=80)	18% (n=213)	<b>47%***</b> (n=71)
Preschool-aged children (respondents <40)	26% (n=241)	17% (n=70)	34% (n=234)	22% (n=38)	26% (n=89)	27% (n=53)	29% (n=106)	<b>65%***</b> (n=47)
Abortion	0.69 (n=539)	0.64 (n=106)	0.61 (n=531)	0.71 (n=58)	0.64 (n=150)	0.61 (n=78)	0.57 (n=208)	0.63 (n=68)
Leadership	0.70 (n=541)	<b>0.76*</b> (n=106)	0.65 (n=535)	<b>0.76*</b> (n=58)	0.76 (n=158)	0.76 (n=80)	0.72 (n=213)	0.73 (n=71)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages.

See Appendix A for additional coding information

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

The intersectional analysis shows that preschool aged-children only matter for minority women—and they affect their political ambition positively and substantially both among all minority women and for minority women under 40. Opinions on abortion again do not matter. Self-assessed leadership matters, but only for white men and women—not minorities of either gender. And it is worth noting that the gap in self-assessed leadership between non-ambitious and ambitious white women is almost twice that of the gap for white men.

***Testing implications: opportunities for ambition***

To assess the impact of opportunities and obstacles, I again examine gender and race separately, and then together. I first examine recruitment, which I expect to matter more for women than for men. In this dataset the measure of recruitment is not specific to political office but for general political participation. Because the entire sample is activists and many activists are recruited to be involved, I am concerned that this measure will not sufficiently serve as a recruitment measure. To supplement my examination of recruitment, I consider whether or not the respondent has political acquaintances, though this measure is also not ideal as it may better

capture networks than recruitment. Due to their higher levels of privilege, I expect the rates of recruitment of white men will be the highest, regardless of recruitment’s effect on their ambition.

I also look at skills, including the sources of skills. I expect that skills will benefit all participants but that the skills women learn in organizations will be more important than other skills while for minorities skills learned at church will play a larger role because these areas are less likely to be gender or racially integrated, respectively. I examine the role experiences such as athletic participation or discrimination, expecting that athletic participation will be associated with increased nascent ambition for all individuals but especially women and that being discriminated against will also promote political ambition, particularly for women and minorities.

**Table 4. Opportunities and obstacles by race and gender separately**

	Men		Women		Whites		Minorities	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	67% (n=700)	67% (n=186)	64% (n=749)	64% (n=129)	68% (n=1078)	74% (n=164)	49% (n=371)	48% (n=151)
Political Acquaintances	52% (n=700)	<b>64%*</b> (n=186)	50% (n=749)	52% (n=129)	53% (n=1078)	<b>67%*</b> (n=164)	39% (n=371)	41% (n=151)
Overall skills	0.60 (n=700)	<b>0.67^</b> (n=186)	0.51 (n=749)	0.56 (n=129)	0.57 (n=1078)	<b>0.69**</b> (n=164)	0.50 (n=371)	0.49 (n=151)
Job skills	0.50 (n=700)	0.57 (n=186)	0.34 (n=749)	0.36 (n=129)	0.42 (n=1078)	<b>0.55**</b> (n=164)	0.35 (n=371)	0.34 (n=151)
Church skills	0.11 (n=700)	0.17 (n=186)	0.15 (n=749)	0.16 (n=129)	0.13 (n=1078)	0.16 (n=164)	0.15 (n=371)	0.18 (n=151)
Organizational Skills	0.28 (n=700)	<b>0.35^</b> (n=186)	0.25 (n=749)	<b>0.33^</b> (n=129)	0.27 (n=1078)	<b>0.38**</b> (n=164)	0.23 (n=371)	0.25 (n=151)
Athlete	66% (n=700)	<b>76%*</b> (n=186)	46% (n=749)	<b>65%**</b> (n=129)	55% (n=1078)	<b>69%**</b> (n=164)	63% (n=371)	<b>80%***</b> (n=151)
Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion)	12% (n=700)	17% (n=186)	13% (n=749)	<b>35%***</b> (n=129)	11% (n=1078)	<b>20%^</b> (n=164)	23% (n=371)	<b>33%^</b> (n=151)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix A for additional coding information. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

As predicted, ambitious and non-ambitious activists are not differentiated by the first measure of recruitment, direct recruitment to participate in politics. The second measure, having

political acquaintances, shows ambitious men and whites are more likely to know people who hold political office. Ambitious men are more likely to have overall skills gained in any domain, though only organizational skills matter when the three skill domains are differentiated. For women, as hypothesized, only organizational skills make a difference. For whites, all skills except those learned in church matter. For minorities skills are irrelevant. Athletic participation is associated with more ambitious individuals for all groups, though the gap between ambitious and non-ambitious respondents is the smallest among white men. People who have experienced discrimination are more ambitious, with the exception of men.

**Table 5. Opportunities and obstacles by race and gender together**

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	69% (n=542)	74% (n=106)	67% (n=536)	73% (n=58)	57% (n=158)	44% (n=80)	42% (n=213)	52% (n=71)
Political Acquaintances	53% (n=542)	<b>69%*</b> (n=106)	53% (n=536)	65% (n=58)	46% (n=158)	48% (n=80)	34% (n=213)	34% (n=71)
Overall skills	0.61 (n=542)	<b>0.72*</b> (n=106)	0.53 (n=536)	0.63 (n=58)	0.57 (n=158)	0.53 (n=80)	0.44 (n=213)	0.45 (n=71)
Job skills	0.51 (n=542)	<b>0.62*</b> (n=106)	0.34 (n=536)	0.40 (n=58)	0.44 (n=158)	0.38 (n=80)	0.29 (n=213)	0.30 (n=71)
Church skills	0.11 (n=542)	0.16 (n=106)	0.15 (n=536)	0.16 (n=58)	0.14 (n=158)	0.21 (n=80)	0.16 (n=213)	0.15 (n=71)
Organizational skills	0.28 (n=542)	<b>0.38^</b> (n=106)	0.26 (n=536)	<b>0.39*</b> (n=58)	0.24 (n=158)	0.27 (n=80)	0.22 (n=213)	0.23 (n=71)
Athlete	65% (n=542)	75% (n=106)	45% (n=536)	55% (n=58)	73% (n=158)	82% (n=80)	56% (n=213)	<b>78%**</b> (n=71)
Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion)	10% (n=542)	12% (n=106)	12% (n=536)	<b>37%**</b> (n=58)	25% (n=158)	33% (n=80)	21% (n=213)	33% (n=71)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix A for additional coding information. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Again here, ambitious and non-ambitious activists are not differentiated by direct recruitment to participate in politics. Having political acquaintances only matters for white men, who, as predicted, experience the highest rates of recruitment (though white women’s rates are very similar). More ambitious white men are more likely to have overall skills, though when skills are broken into domains, church skills do not differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious

white men. For white women only organizational skills make a difference. Athletic participation is positively related to ambitious individuals for minority women. And experiencing discrimination is only a factor for white women—and quite a strong one—ambitious women report experiencing discrimination more than three times more than non-ambitious women.

In this binary examination, both ideas about women's roles and the obstacles and opportunities men and women face differentiate politically ambitious activists from those who are active for other reasons, though not always in expected ways. Beliefs about women's role, admittedly not ideally measured as opinions on abortion, do not impact ambition. Having preschool-aged children impacts minority women regardless of age, and it associated with higher nascent ambition. Assessments of competence matter for both men and women, but only among whites. Skills matter mostly for whites, and the source of these skills is important. Recruitment is largely irrelevant. Ambition is related to athletic participation for minority women and to discrimination for white women. It's noteworthy that ambitious and unambitious minority men are not differentiated by any of these factors.

### ***Social roles and opportunities together: multivariate analyses***

Because relationships are obscured when race and gender are not taken into account, I analyze separate models for each of the four groups—white men and women, minority men and women. I follow this method of analysis rather than incorporating indicator variables in whole-population models because I expect that the relationships between variables will differ for each sub-group and simply netting out the effect of race or gender will not allow a thorough and satisfactory examination of how each of these sets of explanations influences the likelihood of an

individual being ambitious.<sup>42</sup>

Ambition in my dataset is a binary variable so I estimate my results with a probit model. I include the coefficients as well as the marginal effects since the coefficients are useful only for discerning direct of relationship, relative magnitude, and significance of the relationships. The marginal effect that corresponds to each variable is the change in probability of being ambitious for either a change from 0 to 1 for the binary variables (indicated by a #) or from the lowest category to the highest category for the non-binary variables when the rest of the variables are held at their group-specific means. The significance levels reported correspond to the underlying coefficient. Additional control variables are included for education, family income, age, and marital status.<sup>43</sup> Correlations across all items are reported for all for groups for both the activist sample and the ambitious sub-set of respondents in the appendix. In this discussion I separate the results as above, into social role variables, then into opportunities and obstacles, and finally the control variables for ease of interpretation. The full, combined tables are presented in the appendix. One element to keep in mind in the discussion of the results is the individuals comparison group, who are non-ambitious activists rather than the general population.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> For the curious reader and to ease comparisons of this analysis with other work on gender and political ambition, I include estimates for women and men overall in the appendix. These estimates show that having political acquaintances and being an athlete matter are associated with increased nascent ambition for women and men while increased age and education are associated with decreased nascent ambition for both. Organizational skills increase nascent ambition only for men while being discriminated against increases it only for women. Being married reduces nascent ambition for women.

<sup>43</sup> I also estimated these analyses with one overall skills variable. This method did not affect the substantive results for the other independent variables. Don Kinder smartly suggested that party might play a role in predicting nascent ambition in a way that relates to the social groups I examine here. To test this idea I re-estimated all of the multivariate models presented in the text in two ways, first with a dummy variable for identifying as a Democrat and second with a dummy variable for identifying as a Republican. Generally speaking the changes are small—when a variable becomes significant or insignificant in the re-estimations it was typically borderline in the original models without these dummies. The changes often relate to recruitment, which is not terribly surprising given that individuals who identify with parties are more likely to be recruited; skills; and abortion, which also makes sense considering the clarity of the parties' positions on this issue. Only in 14 of the 64 models examined is party membership itself a significant predictor of either nascent ambition or activism. I mention any changes in each chapter when discussing the relevant model.

<sup>44</sup> Limiting the comparison group to other activists to determine who will be interested in political office among those best positioned to take the step is a key element of this analysis. However, it is still useful to examine how

First I examine the direct effects of all the elements of my theory together, beginning with the effect of social roles on nascent ambition.

**Table 6. Ingredients for nascent ambition by race and gender (social roles)**

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Preschool children #	-0.28 (0.25)	-4% (0.03)	-0.10 (0.26)	-1% (0.02)	0.18 (0.28)	6% (0.10)	<b>0.73**</b> (0.26)	<b>22%</b> (0.09)
Abortion	-0.07 (0.26)	-1% (0.05)	0.13 (0.36)	1% (0.03)	0.23 (0.29)	8% (0.10)	0.28 (0.30)	7% (0.08)
Leadership	0.12 (0.38)	2% (0.07)	0.56 (0.49)	4% (0.04)	0.39 (0.55)	13% (0.18)	0.45 (0.55)	12% (0.15)
Sample Size	599		541		208		256	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.13		0.19		0.11		0.24	
Wald Chi	46.17		46.88		21.16		64.2	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Reviewing the results, we see that opinions on women’s social roles do not affect men’s ambition, as was expected. However, contrary to expectations, social roles measures are unrelated to ambition for white women, too—though the coefficients for white women are all in the expected directions, none are significant. Again, it is worth noting the difficulty in testing this hypothesis in this analysis due to the less-than-ideal measure of women’s roles. The strongest finding among these variables is the relevance of preschool children for minority women, a finding that remains from the bivariate analysis. Politically active minority women are 22% more likely to be ambitious if they have preschool-aged children.

The hypothesized differential effect of children for minority and white women bears out

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these ambitious activists compare to everyone else. When I estimate a probit comparing ambitious activists to the rest of the population (including non-ambitious activists) I find relatively small differences for white men—using the larger comparison group, being an athlete and being contacted to participate are positive significant for white men. I also find small changes for white women—the only difference is that job skills, which only borders on significance, becomes insignificant. There are broader changes for minority activists, perhaps due in part to their smaller sample size. For minority men, when ambitious activists are compared to everyone else rather than non-ambitious activists, church and organizational skills are positive and significant, as is having political acquaintances. The finding that these ambitious activists are less likely to be contacted to participate falls off, as does the significance of the negative finding for education (though it is still close). Among minority women, when ambitious activists are compared to everyone else rather than other activists, age and being discriminated against are no longer significant, while job and organizational skills and leadership are (all are positively related to be nascently ambitious).

in this analysis. It was originally hypothesized that white women’s ambition would be negatively related to parenthood while minority women’s ambition would be less affected or perhaps not affected. While white women’s ambition is not negatively affected (compared to other white women activists), they do not experience the positive effect that minority women do—this gap providing support for the idea that expectations of working mothers differ by race in a way that impacts ambition. Additionally, given the time period of the survey, I hypothesized that children may have less of an impact here than what is found in later research on the role of family in women’s ambition. Notably the effect of self-assessed leadership, which existed for both white men and women in the bivariate results, is not sustained here.

The results for the direct effect of opportunities on nascent ambition are more compelling.

**Table 7. Ingredients for nascent ambition by race and gender (opportunities and obstacles)**

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Recruited for Participation #	0.24 (0.21)	4% (0.03)	-0.02 (0.27)	0% (0.02)	<b>-0.39<sup>^</sup></b> (0.24)	<b>-13%</b> (0.08)	<b>0.37<sup>^^</sup></b> (0.23)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)
Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.36<sup>^</sup></b> (0.19)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.40<sup>^</sup></b> (0.21)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	0.15 (0.23)	5% (0.08)	<b>0.41<sup>^</sup></b> (0.23)	<b>12%</b> (0.07)
Job Skills	0.13 (0.26)	2% (0.05)	<b>-0.46<sup>^^</sup></b> (0.29)	<b>-4%</b> (0.02)	-0.12 (0.34)	-4% (0.11)	0.35 (0.36)	9% (0.09)
Church Skills	0.28 (0.28)	5% (0.05)	-0.02 (0.35)	0% (0.03)	0.55 (0.42)	18% (0.14)	-0.12 (.47)	-3% (0.12)
Organizational Skills	<b>0.40<sup>^</sup></b> (0.23)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.47<sup>^^</sup></b> (0.30)	<b>4%</b> (0.03)	0.42 (0.38)	14% (0.13)	0.51 (0.40)	14% (0.11)
Athlete #	0.28 (0.19)	5% (0.03)	0 (0.20)	0% (0.02)	0.33 (0.28)	10% (0.08)	<b>0.83<sup>***</sup></b> (0.23)	<b>20%</b> (0.05)
Discriminated against #	0.18 (0.26)	4% (0.06)	<b>0.67<sup>**</sup></b> (0.23)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)	0.37 (0.25)	13% (0.09)	<b>0.37<sup>^</sup></b> (0.23)	<b>11%</b> (0.07)
Sample Size	599		541		208		256	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.13		0.19		0.11		0.24	
Wald Chi	46.17		46.88		21.16		64.2	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

This analysis importantly shows that obstacles and opportunities play a larger direct role in nascent ambition than do social roles when considered in the same model. As hypothesized,

recruitment (measured here with both general recruitment as well as political contacts) affected women positively, though the more direct measure of recruitment only mattered for minority women: being recruited to participate increased in the likelihood of an active minority women being ambitious by 10%. White and minority women were both more likely to be ambitious if they had political acquaintances (3% more likely for white women and 12% more likely for minority women), relationships that did not show up in the bivariate analyses. White men were also more likely to be ambitious if they had political acquaintances and surprisingly their increased likelihood—6%—was larger than for white women.

Interestingly, being recruited for participation in general was associated with a likelihood of being less ambitious for minority men. This could reveal the fact that minority men who are active for ambitious reasons are more likely to be self-starters and less likely to require an invitation—which supports my hypothesis that black men (who are the majority of the minority male sample) will be least in need of recruitment when it comes to activating ambition.<sup>45</sup>

As hypothesized, organizational skills mattered for women, though only for white women—having organizational skills increased the likelihood that an active white woman is ambitious by 4%. White men were also benefitted by organizational skills, the presence of which increased their likelihood of being ambitious by 7%. Interestingly, job skills actually decreased the likelihood of active white women being ambitious. One could imagine plausible reasons for this—for example, perhaps active white women with skills are already deeply invested in a career, making them less likely to look towards politics as a job.

Lastly, I look at experiences not yet considered by the literature that I expect to be associated with ambition, particularly for women: athletic participation and experiencing discrimination. As was the case in the bivariate analyses, I find a strong relationship for athletic

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<sup>45</sup> Interestingly this factor did not matter for any group in the bivariate analyses.

participation and minority women—athletic participation for active minority women increases the likelihood they will be ambitious by 20%. There is no relationship for white women. The experience that matters for both white and minority women is experiencing discrimination. Experiencing discrimination increases the likelihood that an active woman is ambitious by 8% for white women and 11% for minority women (in our initial bivariate look this was only significant for white women). With regards to the influence of obstacles and opportunities for women, it is worth noting, since coefficients in probit estimates provide information on the relative influence of variables in the model, the coefficient on discrimination for white women is the largest of all the variables except age. For minority women the most influential variable, aside from control variables, is athletic participation.

**Table 8. Ingredients for nascent ambition by race and gender (controls)**

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Married #	0.20 (0.22)	3% (0.04)	<b>-0.56*</b> (0.24)	<b>-5%</b> (0.03)	-0.06 (0.25)	-2% (0.08)	-0.08 (0.22)	2% (0.06)
Education	<b>-0.96***</b> (0.30)	<b>-17%</b> (0.06)	-0.21 (0.30)	-2% (0.02)	<b>-0.84*</b> (0.41)	<b>-27%</b> (0.14)	<b>-0.85*</b> (0.38)	<b>-23%</b> (0.10)
Family income	-0.09 (0.46)	-2% (0.08)	0.44 (0.48)	4% (0.04)	-0.49 (0.60)	-16% (0.20)	<b>-1.92***</b> (0.60)	<b>-51%</b> (0.16)
Age	<b>-3.59***</b> (0.80)	<b>-65%</b> (0.14)	<b>-3.01***</b> (0.85)	<b>-24%</b> (0.07)	<b>-1.77*</b> (0.83)	<b>-58%</b> (0.27)	<b>-1.57*</b> (0.75)	<b>-42%</b> (0.20)
Constant	0 (0.45)		-0.84 (0.56)		-0.04 (0.59)		<b>-1.04^</b> (0.60)	
Sample Size	599		541		208		256	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.13		.19		0.11		0.24	
Wald Chi	46.17		46.88		21.16		64.2	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

The control variables are fairly influential piece of the story and deserve discussion, particularly education and age. But I start with two variables that only matter for one group each—marriage and family income. Being married decreases the likelihood of white women being nascently ambitious by 5% compared to their other active counterparts. This is especially

interesting when considered in conjunction with the null result on the presence of children for ambitious white women, however, this may speak to family responsibility barriers for women, as well as different gender roles for different racial groups (particularly since this was not significant for minority women). Income affects minority women—moving between extremes on the income scale reduced the likelihood that a minority woman is nascently ambitious by 51%. I suspect this is driven at least in part by the fact that minority women who are higher income are less likely to be searching for a new career, though it does not explain why this is not the case for other groups of individuals as well.

Being less educated is positively associated with ambition for white men, minority men and minority women, increasing their probabilities of being nascently ambitious by 17%, 27% and 23%, respectively.<sup>46</sup> It is worth noting that these relationships are still significant when ambitious activists from these groups are compared to the rest of the population (though the marginal effect is cut in half), so it is not simply a case of the non-ambitious activists being particularly educated, though certainly that is part of the explanation. There is a plausible explanation for this—individuals with less education might be more interested in serving in public office since education is not a requirement for the position and more educated individuals might already have satisfying careers. Lastly, with regard to age, younger individuals are more likely to be nascently ambitious—moving from the bottom to the top of the age bracket reduces the probability of being nascently ambitious by 65% for white men, 24% for white women, 58% for minority men, and 42% for minority women. Though this finding holds for all groups except

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<sup>46</sup> Education is coded into four categories: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate. Individuals with some college report the most nascent ambition—19.2% of these activists are ambitious (n=316). College graduates are the least ambitious—only 9.7% of activist college graduates report being ambitious. Within this group, the rates are lowest for those holding only B.A.s and M.A.s, at 8.2% and 8.4% respectively. The highest rates are for people with doctoral or professional degrees, at 14.1% and 20.9%, though these samples are small (n=28 in each case). Among people with Associates degrees, 11.5% are ambitious.

for minority women when the ambitious activists are compared to the rest of the population, the likelihoods shrink substantially—by around one-third to one-half. So this is driven partly by non-ambitious activists being older—not a terribly surprising finding considering they are likely more established in their careers and not looking for a new path. But in general these individuals are younger than the rest of population, likely stemming from the fact that they are not yet far along on their career pathways.<sup>47</sup>

### *Becoming an activist and selection bias*

As noted earlier, the above results compare ambitious activists with other, non-ambitious activists to determine who among this pool of potential candidates is most likely to want to run for office. What this analysis does not tell us is who becomes an activist in the first place. A great deal of work has discussed who among the public participates (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) so I do not retread that ground in full here. However, it is useful to examine our activist pool in the context of the larger population, particularly with the frame of this analysis—the social roles and opportunities—in mind. This set of analyses provides a fuller understanding of the effect of social organization and circumstances in creating

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<sup>47</sup> With regard to examining party among activists in the race and gender models (see note 43): I find that being a Democrat increases the likelihood of being nascently ambitious for minority men by 16% (\*) but is not significant for any other group, nor does it substantively change any of the other variables in these models. When a dummy variable for being a Republican is included in the models, organizational skills become insignificant for white women, being recruited to participate becomes insignificant for minority men, and being discriminated against becomes insignificant for minority women. For minority women, being a Republican decreases their likelihood of being ambitious by 13% (^). In the alternative specification using interest in running as the only measure for nascent ambition (see note 40): for white men being recruited to participate is significant (6% \*), while having political acquaintances is insignificant; for white women, job skills and marriage are insignificant; for minority men being recruited to participate is insignificant while having preschool-aged children increases the likelihood of being ambitious by 13% (^); and among minority women, being recruited to participate, education, and age are insignificant. For all of these groups, using the alternative dependent variable reduces the effect size of significant factors with the exception of discrimination for minority women which is actually more significant and larger.

our pool of activists from which potential officeholders are theoretically drawn and offers a direct contrast with the factors that differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious activists.

A probit model is again used here to accommodate the binary nature of the dependent variable. In a departure from the earlier model, the skills variable is estimated as a combined index. This is because for both minority women and men having organizational skills perfectly predicts activism, resulting in a dramatic reduction in sample size. Differences due to this model will be noted.<sup>48</sup>

**Table 9. Ingredients for activism by race and gender (social roles)**

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Preschool children #	0.00 (0.25)	0% (0.07)	0.30 (0.20)	9% (0.05)	-0.24 (0.24)	-9% (0.09)	0.04 (0.21)	2% (0.08)
Abortion	0.04 (0.21)	1% (0.06)	<b>0.31<sup>^</sup></b> (0.18)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	0.05 (0.24)	2% (0.09)	-0.08 (0.19)	-3% (0.08)
Leadership	0.04 (0.32)	1% (0.09)	0.12 (0.29)	4% (0.09)	0.07 (0.42)	2% (0.15)	<b>1.18***</b> (0.33)	<b>46%</b> (0.13)
Sample Size	732		717		320		461	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.26		0.25		0.28		0.23	
Wald Chi	120.31		109.16		67.20		106.46	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: recruited for participation, political acquaintances, skills, athlete, discriminated against, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

As with the examination of ambitious individuals, opinions on women’s social roles do not affect men’s activism. Among women, however, these factors matter and they matter differently than in the models where ambitious and non-ambitious activists are compared. Among white women, moving from having the least to most liberal opinion on abortion increases the likelihood that white women are active by 10%. Standing in as a proxy for

<sup>48</sup> In models where the skills are separated, differences aside from the skills variables, there are some changes in the size of the marginal effects but any significance changes are generally small. Among white men being married verges on significance, though the substantive impact is small—being married increases the likelihood of white men being active by 3% in the separated skills model. The most interesting change is that among white women, when skills are separated, opinions on abortion are no longer significant. I suspect this is related to the importance of organizational skills for white women’s activism. In looking at the separated skills variables specifically: among white men and white women, only organizational skills are significant; among minority men, neither job nor church skills are significant; among minority women, job skills are significant (remember the organizational skills variable isn’t available here for minorities).

motherhood, this result indicates that among white women with more liberal understandings of women’s role as a mother, activism is more common. It is worth noting that abortion does not remain significant in the model where skills are separated—instead organizational skills are hugely important. For minority women, having preschool-aged children does not increase the likelihood of activism the way it increased the likelihood of being ambitious among activists. However, minority women’s activism is strongly affected by their self-assessed leadership—moving between extremes on the leadership scales increases the likelihood that a minority woman will be active by 46%. This is particularly interesting in light of the lack of effect for white women, as was expected but not found during the analysis of the activist pool alone.

**Table 10. Ingredients for activism by race and gender (opportunities and obstacles)**

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Recruited for Participation #	<b>0.76***</b> (0.17)	<b>22%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.61***</b> (0.15)	<b>20%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.84***</b> (0.22)	<b>28%</b> (0.07)	<b>0.34^</b> (0.19)	<b>13%</b> (0.07)
Political Acquaintances #	0.03 (0.15)	1% (0.04)	0.12 (0.14)	4% (0.05)	<b>0.78***</b> (0.21)	<b>26%</b> (0.06)	0.33 (0.23)	13% (0.08)
Skills Athlete #	<b>0.99***</b> (0.24)	<b>27%</b> (0.07)	<b>1.11***</b> (0.23)	<b>36%</b> (0.07)	<b>1.13***</b> (0.29)	<b>40%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.06***</b> (0.29)	<b>42%</b> (0.12)
Discriminated against #	<b>0.30^</b> (0.16)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	0.03 (0.14)	1% (0.05)	-0.15 (0.21)	-5% (0.07)	<b>0.49**</b> (0.18)	<b>19%</b> (0.07)
Sample Size	732		717		320		461	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.26		0.25		0.28		0.23	
Wald Chi	120.31		109.16		67.20		106.46	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

When it comes to the effect of experiences on activity, this sample behaves much as one might expect based previous literature: recruitment (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) are key factors for participation. The likelihood of being active increases for all groups when they are recruited to participate. The effects are fairly similar across the groups, though there is greater divergence between minority men and women—the likelihood of being active increases by 22% for white men, 20% for white women, 28% for

minority men and 13% for minority women when they are recruited to participate. Skills matter strongly across the board, though particularly among minority men and women—having skills increasing the likelihood of being active by 27% for white men, 36% for white women, 40% for minority men, 42% for minority women. It is worth noting that this finding seems largely driven by organizational skills for all groups (see footnote 48). Also in concert with earlier findings in the literature (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), having political acquaintances increases the likelihood activism, though only significantly for minority men, increasing their likelihood of being active by 26%. While this factor isn't significant for other groups, it is in the expected direction. The fact that variables central in the participation literature matter for this sample is reassuring—it shows that other analyses in this paper are not based on an unusual sample.

In examining variables more unique to this analysis, being an athlete increases the likelihood of being active for white men by 8% and minority women by 19%. Interestingly experiencing discrimination, which played a strong role in differentiating ambitious and non-ambitious female activists (both white and minority), is not significant here for any group.

**Table 11. Ingredients for activism by race and gender (controls)**

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Married #	0.23 (0.17)	7% (0.05)	-0.06 (0.15)	-2% (0.05)	-0.17 (0.20)	-6% (0.07)	<b>0.40*</b> (0.18)	<b>15%</b> (0.07)
Education	0.18 (0.26)	5% (0.07)	0.32 (0.23)	10% (0.07)	0.36 (0.32)	13% (0.12)	0.03 (0.33)	1% (0.13)
Family income	<b>0.96*</b> (0.41)	<b>26%</b> (0.11)	<b>1.38***</b> (0.39)	<b>44%</b> (0.12)	0.44 (0.51)	16% (0.18)	0.51 (0.48)	20% (0.19)
Age	<b>1.05*</b> (0.50)	<b>29%</b> (0.14)	<b>1.63**</b> (0.48)	<b>52%</b> (0.15)	-0.31 (0.64)	-11% (0.23)	<b>1.84**</b> (0.58)	<b>72%</b> (0.23)
Constant	<b>-1.50***</b> (0.38)		<b>-1.93***</b> (0.41)		-0.66 (0.48)		<b>-2.40***</b> (0.40)	
Sample Size	732		717		320		461	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.26		0.25		0.28		0.23	
Wald Chi	120.31		109.16		67.20		106.46	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, recruited for participation, political acquaintances, skills, athlete, discriminated against.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Among the control variables, having more family income increases the likelihood of being active for both white men and women. Being older increases the likelihood of being active for both all groups except minority men. Being married increases the likelihood of being active for minority women in this model and for both minority women and white men in the model where skills are separated.<sup>49</sup>

From this analysis we can see that our sample of activists is not terribly unusual—the activists here participate for many of the reasons we might expect, namely recruitment and skills—and they tend to be older and wealthier, as the literature would predict. We can also see that the factors that make someone active are not the same as the factors that make someone ambitious. These analyses show that when predicting activism, social roles only matter for women—opinions on abortion for white women and leadership for minority women—notably neither of which mattered in predicting ambition. They also reveal that one experience related to ambition for both white and minority women—experiencing discrimination—is not relevant for activism.

Because ambitious individuals differ both from other activists, as well as the population overall (see footnote 44 and accompanying results in appendix which detail the relatively minor changes in results when ambitious activists are compared to everyone else), the analysis of being an activist raises an additional concern regarding the design of this study: selection bias. Specifically, are the results of what affects ambition among activists are biased because of factors that affect the selection into activism? To address this concern I conduct additional test on the robustness of the results, modeling ambition as a two-step process using a Heckman probit

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<sup>49</sup> Regarding party (see note 43 for more detail on these estimates): including a dummy for being a Democrat does not influence the activism models. Including a dummy for being a Republican makes abortion insignificant for white women. For minority women, being a Republican increases the likelihood of being active by 22%(\*) and having political acquaintances becomes significant (14%^).

where the first step is the selection model (the dependent variable is becoming an activist) and the second step is the outcome model (the dependent variable is being an ambitious activist).<sup>50</sup> Comparing the coefficients and significance levels for the two-stage Heckman probit to the initial models, my results (see appendix) are substantively similar for white men, white women, and minority men both in the selection and the outcome models.<sup>51</sup> The results for minority women are somewhat less stable in the outcome models<sup>52</sup> and the Wald test on the independence of equations reveals that the selection and outcome equations are not independent. The two outcome models (original and Heckman) are compared in the appendix.

This robustness check shows that my results are, on the whole, remarkably stable when

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<sup>50</sup> We cannot simply compare ambition for everyone since we lack information about ambition for people who are not activists. As explained initially, the ambition variable I construct is based on motivations for activism and the nature of this coding means that this variable is only available among those who are active—we do not observe nascent ambition among non-activists since we don't know their motivations for actions never taken. Estimating a Heckman probit is useful because it corrects for biases in the outcome stage that are due to self-selection into the activism (see Maestas et al. 2006 for further discussion on the advantages of this model in the context of ambition). Estimating this model requires we have an identifying model in the selection equation that is not in the outcome model. For this estimation I alter the original outcome model by eliminating one recruitment variable that is essential to the selection model: recruited for participation. This variable was only marginally significant for two groups in the original estimation but it is central to becoming an activist for all groups. See appendix for original model re-estimated without this variable.

<sup>51</sup> By substantively similar I mean the same coefficients are significant and the size of the coefficients are very similar. This is true both when comparing to the original outcome model, as well as outcome models which eliminate the “recruited for participation” variable but do not have a selection model. The only differences for these groups are that for white women and men organizational skills become insignificant in the outcome model (though the direction of the coefficient and size of the predicted effects are similar) and of course for minority men being “recruited for participation” is no longer significant in the outcome model because it was omitted. This isn't to say there is no selection bias for some of these groups but rather that correcting for this bias does not affect the substantive story of the outcome model. Regarding sample selection in the other groups studied here rho is significant for minority men (probability > chi2=0.079), and close to significant for white men (probability > chi2=0.105), though insignificant for white women (probability > chi2=0.903).

<sup>52</sup> The selection model—what factors affect becoming an activist—remains substantively the same except that having political acquaintances is now significant and the level of significance for being recruited to participate has increased. For the outcome models, in the original model we see that politically active minority women are 22% more likely to be ambitious if they have preschool-aged children. In the new model this variable is reduced both in the size of the coefficient and the estimated marginal effect, as well as in significance (p=0.130 in the new model). In the original model self-assessed leadership was not relevant for minority women but in the corrected model its marginal effect is now significant and negative: moving between extremes on the leadership scales decreases the likelihood that a minority woman will be active by 28%. In the original model politically active minority women were more likely to be ambitious if they were recruited, had political acquaintances, were athletes and were discriminated against. In the new model the only experience that is still significant is being an athlete, though the marginal effect is reduced by more than half. It is worth noting that being discriminated against is close to significant in the new model (p=0.125) so the reduction in the significance of this variable is not overly large and the marginal effect remains similar.

selection bias is corrected for, albeit somewhat less stable for minority women. Interestingly Fulton et al. (2006) note in their examination of progressive ambition and gender that estimating a selection model does not alter the substantive or statistical interpretation of their results—thus neither their or my results are strongly affected by selection bias. Though these are only two examples from the literature on ambition, they might suggest that selection bias in ambition studies is less prevalent than one intuitively imagines.

### *Conclusion*

The results of this analysis have important implications. They reveal that, as theorized, what matters for nascent ambition varies widely between groups. The story of nascent ambition is unique for white men, white women, minority men and minority women. There is only one universally important factor in predicting nascent ambition for all groups—age—and only one additional factor, education, matters for three of the four groups.<sup>53</sup> The differences between groups—and the fact that the only similarities are in the control variables—are particularly notable in contrast with predicting activism where recruitment and skills matter for everyone.

These results also show that existing understandings of nascent ambition are rooted in the experiences of whites, particularly white men. The nascent ambition of white women shares certain common predictors with that of white men—predictors that are associated with privilege—but traditional models of ambition miss critical pieces of white women’s story. Additionally, factors such as political acquaintances and participatory skills, which increase the likelihood of nascent ambition for whites, are not part of the story for minority activists. In fact, nascent ambition in minority male activists, admittedly not the central focus of this analysis, is still remarkably unexplained here. In my model there are only three significant factors in

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<sup>53</sup> This is true in both the original and the Heckman selection outcome models.

predicting minority men's nascent ambition—and two of those are age and education.<sup>54</sup> The story of the nascent ambition of minority men remains largely a mystery.

These results largely support the central elements of the roles and experiences framework I propose for examining women's nascent ambition. First, these results show that gendered social roles only matter for women's nascent ambition, not for men's. This is true in any iteration of the model, regardless of comparison group or dependent variable (either nascent ambition or activism). My analyses also support a second critical element of my theory—the impact of gender roles on nascent ambition differs for white and minority women. For example, the presence of preschool-aged children increases nascent ambition among minority women but not among white women—a finding consistent with my hypotheses.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, marriage decreases nascent ambition for white women but not for minority women. While marriage was not a key variable in the theoretical section, this finding is consistent with the general ideas presented about working mothers—that traditional women's roles (such as being a wife) are more of a barrier for white than minority women's nascent ambition.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> The third variable, recruited for participation, is also significant for minority women, though the coefficients have different signs.

<sup>55</sup> While the effect of having preschool-aged children is still positive for minority women in the Heckman selection outcome model, the significance is not as strong.

<sup>56</sup> With regard to social roles, it is also worth noting that in my examinations of becoming an activist—a key first step in this analysis as it sets the pool of potential candidates—the effect of social roles also differs for white and minority women. For example, opinions on abortion, serving here as a proxy for ideas about motherhood, matter for white women's activism but not minority women's. Though my original hypotheses predicted liberal opinions on abortion would increase nascent ambition for women of all groups, given the demographic composition of the reproductive rights movement in the 1980s it is perhaps not surprising to see this finding limited to activating white women—it could be that the connection between women's role and abortion is stronger among whites than minorities. Additionally, leadership matters for minority women's activism but not white women's. To say a bit more on leadership, self-assessed leadership plays an interesting role for minority women's nascent ambition in this analysis. Though it is not significant in the original model assessing nascent ambition, in the Heckman selection model results we see that high-levels of self-assessed leadership are positively related to being an activist for minority women (the selection model), but self-assessed leadership is actually negatively related to nascent ambition among minority women activists (the outcome model). The results of the outcome model are in line with my expectations based on the self-esteem literature—that self-assessed leadership would be less critical for minority women than white women in the formation of nascent ambition. Because of the movement on this variable in the different models estimated here I do not view these results as conclusive, but believe they indicate a need to more deeply examine the different roles leadership plays in the formation of nascent ambition for minority women, ideally

While the results on social roles generally support my hypotheses, their overall effect on women's nascent ambition is relatively muted—sometimes more notable for its absence than its presence. For example, opinions on abortion, used here as a proxy for women's roles, fails to find a foothold in the explanation. In contrast, gendered obstacles and opportunities are more powerful predictors of nascent ambition for women. In a finding unique to this analysis, I show that experiencing discrimination increases nascent ambition for both white and minority women—a finding that supports my hypotheses.<sup>57</sup> For white women, experiencing discrimination is the most powerful factor in predicting ambition other than age.<sup>58</sup> Discrimination is not a factor for white or minority men's nascent ambition.

These results also show that skills learned in particular contexts benefit women's ambition. For white women, learning participation skills in an organizational context increases the likelihood of having nascent ambition.<sup>59</sup> Among minority women, participating in athletics increases this likelihood.<sup>60</sup> These results support my hypothesis that skills learned in single-gendered arenas are likely to promote ambition for women; the nascent ambition of both white and minority women benefits from participating in single-gendered contexts.<sup>61</sup>

To situate these findings regarding gender, race and ambition in a broader framework, I now turn gender and class.

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in a dataset with a larger sample of minority activists which would permit further disaggregation of minority women by race and ethnicity (essential to best examine this question given the findings in the self-esteem literature that point to diverse levels of self-esteem for different minority groups).

<sup>57</sup> This remains true for white women in the Heckman selection outcome model, though the results for minority women decrease in significance slightly.

<sup>58</sup> I measure importance here by size of effect and level of significance. Interestingly, experiencing discrimination does not increase the likelihood of activism for women, only of ambition.

<sup>59</sup> This is especially interesting result in contrast with skills learned on the job, which have a negative effect on nascent ambition.

<sup>60</sup> Importantly this finding is still significant even in the Heckman selection outcome model.

<sup>61</sup> It is worth noting that white men also see a bump in the likelihood of nascent ambition due to organizationally based skills, though not in the selection model.

## Chapter Four: Class

Like race, class also offers the opportunity to comparatively analyze ideas about gender and how they affect nascent ambition. This is because, like race, class involves a certain degree of separation that allows for the emergence of different structures of gender. Class is segregated both by roles, with regard to who does what types of jobs, and space, in terms of neighborhoods lived in, stores and restaurants frequented, and social circles constructed (Jackman 1994).<sup>62</sup> As with race, this separation between classes permits the development of different structures of gender, which means that ideas about women's role and the obstacles and opportunities women face differ for women of lower classes from both those confronting women of higher classes, and men of the same class.

There are, however, important differences between class and race as social groups. Unlike race, class can be dynamic over one's life cycle whereas race cannot, though for many individuals class is fairly sticky.<sup>63</sup> Class is also seen as less essentialized than race, and more mutable (Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz 2013). Class's higher level of mutability may dampen results of the effect of class on nascent ambition and could especially be an issue when class is measured by income, since marriages may result in dramatic changes in class status. Class and

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<sup>62</sup> Jackman (1994) notes that, "...spatial segregation by class in neighborhood and in clubs and organizations approaches the level of racial segregation in those settings." (144).

<sup>63</sup> Auten, Gee, and Turner (2013) look at individuals age 35-40 in 1987 (individuals squarely in the cohort of individuals in my sample) and find that about half of individuals in the bottom quintile were in the same income quintile in 1987 as in 2007 and a quarter had moved up only one quintile, demonstrating limited mobility over an individual's life and "considerable persistence" though admittedly also meaningful movement (896, 906). Individuals in the middle three quintiles tended to move somewhat more, but typically by only one quintile.

race also differ in the way the members of these social groups hear narratives about their groups. Class-based narratives about gender may be subtler than race, and more private because one's class is typically less visible than one's race. This means class-based public commentary on and policing of gender may be less common, though in cases of clear public signals, such as a uniform or job position, narratives will be clearer. This may again mute results, as individuals of different classes are not always identified in a class-based way. Put another way, class may not always be the salient characteristic that defines an interaction, while race, especially among non-whites, almost always is.

It is important to note, however, one area in which class and race are similar—privilege. Both class and race are social groups in which one part of the group is dominant (Jackman 1994; Tilly 1998). As Tilly (1998) contends, the structures and causes of inequality, while differing in detail, are similar across groups. He argues that, “while each set of [unequal] categories carries its own historical baggage, recurrent organizational problems lead to parallel solutions” (169). As discussed in detail later in this analysis, the fact that both race and class divide along the lines of privilege results in similar findings regarding who in these groups harbors nascent ambition.

The chapter proceeds as follows: a discussion of the current state of the literature on class and ambition, an analysis of differences in gender structures of different classes from which I derive hypotheses regarding how these structures might impact nascent ambition for men and women of different classes, and finally bivariate and multivariate testing of these hypotheses. Differences between race and class are periodically noted in this chapter but are given thorough treatment in a later comparative chapter that also includes the third case in this analysis, religion.

### ***Class, gender, and ambition***

While race is certainly a complex concept, how scholars of surveys operationalize race or

ethnicity is fairly straightforward—they almost universally rely on self-reports (Jackman 1994). Operationalizing class is more problematic. Individuals are not always asked to report their class status on surveys and, when they are, they often over report being “middle class.”<sup>64</sup> I measure class primarily using education level (discussed in more detail below) but in order to cast a wide net in for results in the literature, I include multiple measures of class in this discussion, including income, educational level, and occupation (Jackman and Jackman 1983).

Scholars rarely focus specifically on whether or not individuals of different classes have different levels of nascent ambition. This lack of singular focus means that the effect of class on ambition is a story that has to be gleaned from existing analyses in which measures of class often serve as control variables. The results of this gleaning are far from conclusive. Fox and Lawless (2004) and Costantini (1990) find that education has little impact on nascent ambition, though Moore (2005), who looks at nascent ambition by gender, finds education has a negative effect on nascent ambition for both women and men. Another measure of class, income, gets somewhat more consistent results, with some scholars finding that increased income reduces nascent ambition slightly (Fox and Lawless 2004; 2005;<sup>65</sup> though Costantini 1990 sees no effect for income). And using yet a third measure of class, occupation, Moore (2005) finds having a prestigious job is unrelated to nascent ambition for both women and men.

Broadening the concept of ambition to include progressive ambition yields no additional clarity. Maisel and Stone (1997) and Fulton et al. (2006) find income does not effect state legislators’ decisions to run for Congress. Fulton et al. (2006) also find no relationship for education, though Stone (1980) finds that more educated black politicians exhibit higher levels

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<sup>64</sup> Relative to an actual distribution of classes based on income. This is found in both earlier research (Jackman and Jackman 1983) and more recent work—in 2012 the Pew Research Center noted that “Few respondents in either survey placed themselves in the “lower class” or “upper class” categories.” (Morin and Motel 2012).

<sup>65</sup> It’s worth noting these two studies by Fox and Lawless use the same survey.

of progressive ambition.<sup>66</sup> These findings, which run in different directions depending on the study and the measure, make a broader statement about the effect of class on ambition more difficult.

Because the volume of existing work on class and ambition, especially when class is considered in conjunction with gender, is slim, and its results are mixed, it serves us well to turn to work on class and gender structures to develop hypotheses on how these structures interact to impact nascent ambition. The narratives on gender differ by class—the ideas about soccer moms, and Walmart moms, and bluestockings all conjure different class-related ideas about women, what their roles are, and what opportunities or obstacles they might face—and I argue they differ in ways that matter for nascent political ambition.

As highlighted in the discussion of race, social groups that have spatial separation have room to develop different gender structures. One important piece of these structures is ideas about women's role outside the home. Similar to minorities, women's paid work has always been part of a lower income family's survival strategy (Goldin 2006a; 1995).<sup>67</sup> This does not mean, however, that traditional gender roles are rejected among lower class individuals. To the contrary, Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) find that both women and men with lower levels of education are less supportive of a variety of feminist positions, including the idea that women should be involved in politics.<sup>68</sup> So how can these traditional ideas regarding women's role exist in conjunction with women's presence in the workforce? This coexistence is largely enabled by occupational segregation, which permits both lower class women and men to work while

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<sup>66</sup> Perhaps even to a greater extent than race, research on class and ambition, particular for progressive ambition, is troubled by sampling issues because those who are already in office tend to be among the wealthiest and most educated individuals.

<sup>67</sup> Goldin's (1995) equation on women's work decisions (see p. 69), which posits that the decision of how to allocate women's productive capacity is a function of earnings, social stigma of women working in certain jobs, child care needs, and the frontier of possibilities, helps explain the bimodal nature of stay at home mothers.

<sup>68</sup> Their scale here is (1) women should run their homes and leave running the country to men; (2) the respondent would vote for a woman for president; (3) men are better suited for politics.

maintaining gender differences (Jackman 1994). While lower class women have long been in the workforce, they have worked largely in “pink collar” jobs that are seen as women’s work and are thus devalued (Cohen 2013; Hegewisch and Hartmann 2014). I argue this occupational segregation permits lower class women to work without threatening men’s position. However, changes in economic structure in the last several decades make women’s work more of a threat to men’s identity and masculinity (Coontz 2014). At the time of this survey (and in subsequent decades) women were moving into the labor force and into more prestigious jobs and the share of female breadwinners or co-breadwinners who was increasing (Wang, Parker, and Taylor 2013). Men in the lower classes were losing leverage and position in the workforce while women were gaining. Traditionally male jobs that supported a family but did not require a college education, such as manufacturing, were declining as a share of the workforce and the power of unions, which helped to maintain wages in these jobs, was shrinking. Inequality was increasing and wages were stagnating, all of which undermined men’s ability to support their families, especially men who had only graduated from high school. Increasingly the options left available to lower class men were either traditionally female service sector occupations or unemployment (Cherlin 2014).<sup>69</sup>

Meanwhile, upper class women were breaking through numerous gender barriers at work, integrating higher paid, professional occupations (Gerson 1985).<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, their place outside the home and in the workforce has been hotly contested, with some arguing (albeit with little evidence) that these upper class women receive education only to later “opt out” in favor of

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<sup>69</sup> Other work shows that losing a job is more psychologically difficult for men than for women, because men’s identity is more strongly related to work/providing (Belle and Bullock 2009, though they note difficulty for single mothers, too).

<sup>70</sup>See Gatta and Roos (2001) who note, “occupational feminization is providing primarily college-educated white women with the opportunity to move into traditionally high paying, prestigious male occupations” (24).

family life (Goldin 2006b).<sup>71</sup> And their gains have not always been well received by men.

Research shows that when women earn more than their husbands, marital discord can result.<sup>72</sup>

Changes in family circumstances accompanied the economic changes of these decades. A second demographic transition, starting in the 1960s, led to not only more maternal employment but also in delays in marriage, divorce, nonmarital childbearing, and increased cohabitation (McLanahan 2004). McLanahan (2004) ties these changes to social class, arguing that:

“[T]he forces<sup>[73]</sup> driving the transition are leading to two different trajectories for women...the one associated with delays in childbearing and increases in maternal employment—reflects gains in resources, while the other—the one associated with divorce and nonmarital childbearing—reflects losses. **Moreover, the women with the most opportunities and resources are following the first trajectory whereas the women with the fewest opportunities and resources are following the second.**” (608, emphasis added)

Thus, social and economic changes associated with this transition have created increasingly divergent class-based paths for both women and men. The gaps have widened between female haves and have-nots (McLanahan 2014).<sup>74</sup> Meanwhile, lower class men, who are more likely to make less and more likely to be unemployed, are particularly struggling with their role and their

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<sup>71</sup> On pp.16-7 Goldin (2006a) shows that while women who graduate from elite colleges take more time out of the paid labor force than men (spells which are largely precipitated by having children), the total out of work time for reasons other than education for these highly educated women represent only a small fraction of their career (11 %) and that women with advanced degrees opt out the least.

<sup>72</sup> For example, work in sociology indicates increased infidelity among men when women earn more than them (Munsch 2010).

<sup>73</sup> The forces she identifies are the second wave of the feminist movement, new means of birth control, changing labor market, and changes in the welfare state.

<sup>74</sup> This is also exemplified in trends on breadwinning or co-breadwinning mothers, who fall into two primary groups—married, high earning, college-educated women and single, lower-income, less-educated women. See Wang, Parker, and Taylor (2013).

masculinity.<sup>75</sup> Upper class men, because they still typically make more than women, are more likely to be in positions of power, are generally more accepting of women's rise. For these men, especially in recent years, professional women are seen as good marriage partners and women's rise is not, yet, a real threat.<sup>76</sup> But for all groups, class position is central to gender roles and norms—and what it means to be a man and a woman and the essence of how genders interact with each other—are increasingly divergent based on class.<sup>77</sup>

### *Specific hypotheses regarding social roles, gender and class*

Changes in the relationship between gender, family, and work have implications both in terms of ideas about women's role and about the opportunities women and men have, which in turn have implications for women's and men's nascent ambition. This section presents specific hypotheses regarding how women's and men's nascent ambition differs on class grounds, addressing both ideas about social roles and obstacles and opportunities.

Recall that in our discussion of race we captured ideas about social roles using three different measures: the presence of a child, opinions on abortion, and ideas about leadership and self-assessed competence. The first two measures operationalize ideas about women's role with regards to work and motherhood while the third addresses ideas about the capabilities of women and men.

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<sup>75</sup> Goldin (1995) notes that when women working non-white-collar positions, which are disproportionately the positions available to less-educated women, it creates a shame for men. She writes, "only a husband who is lazy, indolent and entirely negligent of his family would allow his wife to do such [manual] labor" (71).

<sup>76</sup> Marital rates for highly educated women have increased (Wang and Parker 2014), as has assortative mating (Greenwood et al. 2014). Higher educated men are also less bothered by their wives' work because it does not signal that they are inadequate providers. According to Goldin (1995): "the social stigma against a wife's working in the white-collar sector may be low because highly educated women across many cultures are given license to work for pay...when a woman takes a job in manual labor she is signaling that her husband is neglectful...but the signal is mixed when a woman takes a white-collar job. She could be an educated woman married to a hard-working man, or she could be an educated woman married to a slothful man" (78).

<sup>77</sup> Of course marital relationships and sexual partnerships are not exclusively heterosexual, though the vast majority of them are. Additionally, expectations about women and men exist regardless of the gender of one's sexual partner.

First with regards to how the presence of a child impacts women's ambition by class, the story is a bit more complicated than it is for race. Remember that support for working mothers was higher among minority groups than among whites. But while, like minority women, women with less education have historically had to work for economic reasons (Goldin 1995), support for working mothers is lower among less-educated groups<sup>78</sup> (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). What's more, as the second demographic transition has occurred and better job opportunities have opened to more educated women, these women have started to participate in the labor force at higher rates than their less-educated counterparts. This would indicate that children would be less of an impediment to ambition for women with higher levels of education who have practice working outside the home and are more supportive of working mothers. However, while support for traditional gender roles is stronger among lower class individuals, as noted above, higher rates of divorce and lower rates of marriage among less-educated, less-well-off individuals have in fact meant that many lower class women are not taking on traditional gender roles but instead have become single parents and sole breadwinners—more masculine roles which might indicate that the actions of lower class women are less constrained by traditional gender roles. Thus, it is not clear if child will be more or less of a barrier for nascent political ambition for upper class women than for lower class women—opinions point in one direction while life circumstances and actions point in the other. As in the analysis of race, I don't expect that men's ambition should not be affected by the presence of children, regardless of class status.

A second measure of women's role and ideas about motherhood, opinions on abortion, are less likely to be differentiated by class. As Luker (1984) successfully argued, opinions on

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<sup>78</sup> Items on the family responsibility scale: (1) a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a woman who does not work; (2) it is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than have one herself; (3) a preschool child is likely to suffer if her/his mother works; and (4) it is better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and the family.

abortion are functionally opinions about the importance of motherhood to women's identity.<sup>79</sup> Though there is class-based variation on abortion attitudes—looking at several decades of data, both Wang and Buffalo (2004) and Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) find more educated women and men tend to have more liberal views on abortion—abortion has been less tied to a class narrative on gender, than it has to other narratives on gender (see, for example, the discussion of abortion and religious gender narratives on pp. 101-104, 142-143). Since the connection between abortion and women's role is less tightly woven into class-based narratives on gender, I expect opinions on abortion to have a similar effect on nascent ambition for women of different classes. In other words, while upper class women overall should have more liberal ideas on abortion than lower class women, for both lower and upper class women liberal opinions on abortion should be more likely to be positively associated with ambition.<sup>80</sup> This is unlike working outside the home, which does have a different meaning for women of different classes. Again, as this is largely a measure of women's role, I expect little impact for men.

Finally on social roles, I address the importance of leadership and self-assessed competence. As noted in the racial analysis, women's evaluation of competence is a key part of their nascent ambition (Lawless and Fox 2005). Again, it's worth highlighting work by Ridgeway and Correll (2004) that suggests the mechanism at work here—they show that an individual's assessment of what is expected of him or her in a particular situation is related to his or her gender, particularly in situations that trigger hegemonic gender beliefs such as running for office. However, alternative gender belief systems do exist (Ridgeway and Correll 2004) which

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<sup>79</sup> Luker (1984) shows the ties between ideas about traditional women's roles and abortion, particularly between abortion and motherhood (see p. 29 for more on this topic).

<sup>80</sup> As a practical matter, dividing women by class divides the distribution of women's opinions on abortion in such a way that likely makes more challenging to find a relationship between opinions on abortion and ambition for women in the subsets of class (because people likely to have more similar opinions are grouped together, decreasing the variation).

influence women's perceptions and evaluations of competence. Because educated women occupy a higher status than their less-educated peers (Ridgeway 2001), it is probable that their overall levels of self-assessed competence will be higher than women with less education (true for men as well). But what is the impact of this self-assessment on nascent ambition by class? Analyses of women and nascent ambition rely largely on educated samples (Fox and Lawless 2011b) and have found that self-assessed competence has a strong effect on ambition for women. It seems likely this will again be the case for the highly educated group of women in this analysis. But will the same relationship exist for less-educated women? Does self-assessed competence also differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious women with less education? Little has been done on this specific question but some research findings suggest that the relationship might not be as strong for lower class women. As discussed above, lower class men are struggling with masculinity and their displacement in the labor market. Partly as a result, lower class women are more likely than their highly educated peers to be independent, more likely to be breadwinners (Wang, Parker, and Taylor 2013). In other words, they are more likely to take on more masculine roles. This may mean that lower class women's self-assessed competence, particularly in a traditionally masculine area such as politics, is less relevant to nascent ambition than it is for higher-class women. And while I would expect self assessed competence for men to be higher than their female counterparts, I'd expect it to be more relevant for lower class men than higher class men, though likely still insignificant.

### ***The influence of opportunities and obstacles on nascent ambition***

As discussed, the existence of different classes—and the separation between them—permits the development of different ideas about women's role in society in a way that affects nascent ambition differently for these groups of women. It also influences the opportunities and

obstacles available to women in a way that impacts nascent ambition. As Gerson (1985) notes, people's paths are shaped by what's available to them, their best alternatives. These alternatives, both at home and work, will be different for women (and men) of different classes. The opportunities and obstacles investigated here fall into three basic categories that are likely to impact women's and men's nascent ambition: recruitment, skills, and experiencing discrimination.

Recruitment is a key factor in increasing political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and political candidacy (Moncrief, Squire, and Jewell 2000), and it is particularly important for women for both of these undertakings (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Lawless and Fox 2005, respectively). The intersection with class also matters because, as Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) note with regard to political participation, "class...remains profoundly important for shaping the contours of the participatory process...social class stratification in participation remains robust and far outweighs that on the basis of race or gender" (379). On the first measure of recruitment, being asked to be involved, I expect women of both classes will have a stronger positive relationship between ambition and recruitment than their male counterparts. But I don't expect that the impact of recruitment will be the same for both groups of women. I anticipate that, as with self-assessed leadership, the relationship between ambition and being asked to be involved will be stronger for higher-class women. By comparison, on the measure of political acquaintances, I expect a story more driven by class privilege. As is the case among minorities, I expect that lower class women and men will be less likely to be in the circle of political acquaintances (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), thus this measure of recruitment should not strongly impact their nascent ambition. However, for higher-class individuals—particularly for higher-class men—because they are in a position to be

exposed to political leaders, having political acquaintances should be more relevant for their nascent ambition.

In addition to recruitment, the literature identifies skills as a key variable for participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and progressive ambition (Maestas et al. 2006). Women are most likely to accrue the necessary skills for political office in single-gendered settings (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001), and the skills source most likely to be single gendered is organizations (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Jackman 1994). I expect women of both classes will draw skills from organizations more than from other sources, but I theorize that organizations will be a particularly important source of skills for lower class women who are less likely to have gotten these skills in another area such as the workplace. This is because, though their workplaces are often highly segregated by gender, the skills in question are often not part of their work. Additionally, even in women-dominated occupations, men often hold most of the leadership positions (Charles 2003).

In addition to organizations, I expect participation in high school or college athletics to matter more for women than men. Stevenson (2010) demonstrates that engagement in athletics increases earnings and entrance into nontraditional careers for women and Fox and Lawless (2014) show that participation in competitive sports increase nascent ambition among college students. As with organizational participation, I hypothesize that athletic participation is particularly important for lower class women who may have fewer opportunities than higher-class women to be in leadership positions. I also expect that men's nascent ambition will increase with additional skills, though single-gendered settings will not be as essential for them. I do expect, however, that similar class divisions will exist for men, and that lower class men will particularly benefit from athletics and non-job-related opportunities.

The last obstacle or opportunity I expect to affect nascent ambition for women and men is experiencing discrimination. As discussed previously, experiencing discrimination can affect factors likely to increase nascent ambition, including encouraging political action (Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein 2011), increasing collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001), and increasing engagement (DeSipio 2002). I anticipate that experiencing discrimination will be more common among more highly educated women, in part because their education is more likely to increase their sensitivity to women's inequality (see Bolzendahl and Myers 2004 on the enlightenment effects of education). I also expect that for both groups of women, experiencing discrimination will increase women's nascent political ambition. Like women, higher education should enlighten men as well to the possibilities of discrimination so I expect experiencing discrimination to play more of a role for college-educated men, compared to their less-educated counterparts (see Weitzer and Tuch 1999, showing that higher class individuals are more likely to perceive racial discrimination), though for both groups of men I expect the effects of discrimination on their nascent ambition to be smaller than for their female counterparts.

### *Measuring class*

Thus far this chapter has taken a broad view of the concept of class, drawing on findings based on income, occupation, and education. But while each of these variables measures social status, their effects are not interchangeable. As Leighley and Nagler (1992) demonstrate in their analysis of class bias in the electorate, different measures of class produce different results for the same question and the choice of measure should be based on what is theoretically appropriate.<sup>81</sup> Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) similarly parse the effects of different measures of

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<sup>81</sup> In their case, they argue income is theoretically appropriate for voting "since government policy is more likely to distinguish among individuals based on income, rather than any other single measure of socioeconomic status" (734).

class, this time with regard to political participation. They argue that while both income and education are indicators of social standing and increase one's likelihood of inhabiting more exclusive social circles, income does a better job than education at reducing the material costs of participation and has a particular effect on political giving. Education, on the other hand, influences participation by conveying citizenship values, skills, and knowledge, ultimately influencing all aspects of participation more than income (with the exception of giving) (136).

So what is the most theoretically appropriate measure of class for this analysis, which is deeply concerned with individual position within a set of social groups? Education, for several reasons. First, this analysis is focused on an individual trait—ambition—rather than a family trait, so it is important to use an individual-level measure of class. Jackman and Jackman's (1983) work on people's understandings of class reveals that among available measures of class,<sup>82</sup> education is the only one based on individual, rather than familial experiences for women. Specifically, regarding how working couples determine their class status they find:

“The figures...are unambiguous. Employed married women play a minor role in family social status compared to their husbands...we see that the husbands of employed women rely exclusively on their own status characteristics – there is not even a hint of any sharing of the wife's status characteristics. [And] it is clear that husbands' characteristics also dominate employed wives' class identifications, with one exception. **Married employed women draw on their own, rather than their husbands' education.**” (145, emphasis added).<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> The available measures of class in the main survey of the Citizen Participation Study are education, occupation and income. These are also the three objective measures of class Jackman and Jackman use in their analysis. It's worth mentioning that Jackman and Jackman's data are from a somewhat earlier time period (1975) than the Citizen Participation Study, though given what Jackman and Jackman find about class, this gap in time is not overly concerning. Specifically their results on what factors people use to make sense of their class position are consistent with the ones used in studies in the 1940s, suggesting ideas about class are persistent (38).

<sup>83</sup> All variables in this analysis are individual, not familial. Additional tests show a similar finding for non-employed

While this alone might be sufficient reason to choose education from the available alternatives as our measure of class, it also has other advantages. Jackman and Jackman (1983) find that education does the best job, compared to income and occupation, of tapping into cultural ideas about class, writing, “occupation and money may be interpreted as objective status criteria, while education is primarily an objective criterion that has a significant cultural and expressive component as well” (37).<sup>84</sup> Since this analysis looks at class as it relates to ideas about gender, using a measure that is connected to cultural aspects of class is beneficial. Additionally advantageous about education for our analysis is that it relates to the class of one’s family of origin (unlike occupation or income) and this is an especially strong relationship for women (Jackman and Jackman 1983).<sup>85</sup> The fact that “education is a link between origin family and current status” (156) is useful for this analysis because it is the best way to get at the class-based narratives on gender respondents heard at a young age, when they are initially learning about gender (Rhodebeck 1996; West and Zimmerman 1987). Lastly, education is useful because the experience of becoming educated in and of itself can impact ideas about women’s role (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Rhodebeck 1996). Even with all of the ways in which education is a good measure for this analysis, if it lacked spatial separation it would not be useful for us. Thankfully for this analysis that isn’t the case—Jackman and Jackman (1983) note that segregation of friend groups based on education is even stronger than segregation based on income.

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wives. It’s worth noting that Jackman and Jackman (1983) attribute the power of education of gender roles—that once part of a marriage, both women and men draw on men’s achievements as class makers but for things that happened prior to marriage (such as the completion of education) both partners can draw on their own experiences.

<sup>84</sup> The cultural measures of class Jackman and Jackman (1983) investigate include how a person believes and feels about things, a person’s style of life, and the kind of family the person comes from (35).

<sup>85</sup> As measured by the reduction in the effect on one’s education on class ID when measures of class of one’s family of origin are added (155).

## *Analysis*

As in the analysis on race, this chapter relies on the main survey of the Citizen Participation Study and constructs an eligibility pool of potential office holders (see pp. 36-38 for more details). Nearly one in five activists in my sample (18%) are classified as being politically ambitious. Men and women are equally represented in the activist sample (886 and 878 respectively). There are 733 college-educated<sup>86</sup> individuals in the activist sample, 339 of whom are women. Of the 315 ambitious respondents, only 129 are women. College-educated activists comprise just over one-third (112) of the ambitious activists and just over one-third of these (40) are women.

In Table 12 we can see significant differences between groups are both gender- and class-based. Women are less ambitious than men overall and when broken down by class and gender, individuals without a college education are more ambitious overall and among men and women separately. As in the analysis of gender and race, here again the less privileged group is more ambitious when the groups are spatially segregated (those with no college) and more ambitious when the groups are role segregated (women).

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<sup>86</sup> “College educated” includes individuals with Associates and Junior college degrees.

**Table 12. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by education**

Men	Women	
16%	10%	***
(n=186)	(n=129)	
No college degree	College degree	**
15%	10%	
(n=203)	(n=112)	
Not-College-Educated Men	College-Educated Men	*
19%	12%	
(n=114)	(n=72)	
Not-College-Educated Women	College-Educated Women	^
11%	7%	
(n=89)	(n=40)	
Not-College-Educated Men	Not-College-Educated Women	**
19%	11%	
(n=114)	(n=89)	
College-Educated Men	College-Educated Women	*
12%	7%	
(n=72)	(n=40)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Having just made the case that education is a better measure of class for my analysis, it is still worthwhile to show the general relationship between family income and nascent ambition.<sup>87</sup>

Again we see that women have lower levels of ambition than their male counterparts (overall gender figures available in above table). We also see that lower income individuals, i.e. those with less privilege, have higher levels of ambition, though the differences are not significant.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Here high income and low income divide the eligibility pool sample at the midpoint.

<sup>88</sup> Though for women the p value is not too far off from standard levels of significance at 0.1225.

**Table 13. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by family income**

High Income	Low Income	
11%	14%	
(n=143)	(n=155)	
High-Income Men	Low-Income Men	
14%	18%	
(n=105)	(n=70)	
High-Income Women	Low-Income Women	
8%	12%	
(n=50)	(n=73)	
High-Income Men	High-Income Women	**
14%	8%	
(n=105)	(n=50)	
Low-Income Men	Low-Income Women	^
18%	12%	
(n=70)	(n=73)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.  
Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

### ***Testing implications: social roles, gender, and class***

As with race, I examine the effect of class differences in ideas about women’s role on political ambition first, focusing on the three aspects outlined above—ideas about working mothers, belief about women’s roles as mothers, and evaluations of competence. I start again with an investigation of bivariate relationships to examine how each of these factors looks individually and then move to multivariate analyses that demonstrate how the factors work in conjunction with each other. I also pursue the bivariate analysis in two parts—first examining the broader categories of gender and class, and then their intersections. The diversity of findings highlights the importance of examining ambition among these subgroups.

To recap the previously outlined hypotheses about women’s role: first, regarding children, the conflicting ways in which class relates to work and motherhood make it unclear how the presence of preschool-aged children will impact the nascent ambition of women of different classes. The presence of preschool-aged children should not impact men’s ambition. Second, using abortion as a proxy for ideas about women’s role at home and in society, I expect

that more liberal opinions on abortion will be linked to greater nascent ambition for women. Importantly, while upper class women have more liberal opinions on abortion than their lower class counterparts should, I don't expect the relationship for abortion opinions to differ by class because class-based narratives on gender roles are not very tightly tied to abortion (especially when compared to some other gender narratives, for example religion). I don't expect that men's opinions on abortion will affect their nascent ambition.

Lastly in this section, I examine men's and women's nascent ambition is affected by differences in competence, as measured by self-assessed leadership. I expect that self-assessed competence will matter more for women than men and more for higher-class women than lower class women, because of lower class women's increasing position as breadwinners and heads of households.

In the below tables all variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. It is important to remember throughout these comparisons that the non-ambitious group is still a population of political activists, albeit those who are not motivated for ambitious reasons (in the multivariate model I also compare to ambitious activists to all other individuals). Additionally, note the variation in sample sizes, which contributes to the variation in significance. I look first for by gender and class separately, and then by class and gender together.

**Table 14. Social roles by education and gender separately**

	Men		Women		College-Educated		Not-College-Educated	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14% (n=700)	15% (n=186)	15% (n=749)	<b>29%*</b> (n=129)	15% (n=621)	13% (n=112)	15% (n=828)	<b>23%*</b> (n=203)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	26% (n=330)	19% (n=123)	33% (n=340)	39% (n=85)	27% (n=289)	<b>16%^</b> (n=71)	32% (n=381)	31% (n=137)
Abortion	0.68 (n=689)	0.64 (n=184)	0.61 (n=739)	0.68 (n=126)	0.71 (n=609)	0.76 (n=111)	0.60 (n=819)	0.61 (n=199)
Leadership	0.70 (n=699)	<b>0.76*</b> (n=186)	0.66 (n=748)	<b>0.75**</b> (n=129)	0.74 (n=621)	<b>0.82**</b> (n=112)	0.64 (n=826)	<b>0.73***</b> (n=203)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix A for additional coding information

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

As hypothesized, the presence of children impacts women’s nascent ambition but not men’s, though not in the way we expected. Looking at the sample overall, ambitious women are more likely to have preschool-aged children than are non-ambitious women. Preschool-aged children also affect the ambition of respondents without a college education—ambitious respondents without a college education are more likely to have children. However, because preschool-aged children are closely associated with parental age (and younger individuals tend to be more ambitious), I analyze ambition differences for individuals under 40 with and without preschool-aged children. Looking at this group, having preschool-aged children only differentiates ambitious and non-ambitious college-educated respondents; college-educated parents of preschool-aged children are less likely to be ambitious than college-educated non-parents—the reverse of what we observed when looking at the effect of children overall. Looking at just women under 40 changes the observations for women overall—among these younger women, having young children is unrelated to ambition.

Contrary to expectations about women’s ambition and ideas about abortion, abortion opinions, serving as a proxy for beliefs about women’s roles, do not differentiate ambitious respondents for any groups. Lastly, self-assessed leadership is significant for all groups but, in

accordance with expectations the differences in levels of self-assessed leadership are the largest and most significant for women and individuals who are not college graduates.

A different story exists at the intersections of class and gender:

**Table 15. Social roles by education and gender together**

	College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14% (n=322)	13% (n=72)	16% (n=299)	12% (n=40)	14% (n=378)	16% (n=114)	15% (n=450)	<b>35%**</b> (n=89)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	24% (n=154)	17% (n=49)	32% (n=135)	<b>15%^</b> (n=22)	29% (n=176)	20% (n=74)	34% (n=205)	48% (n=63)
Abortion	0.72 (n=314)	0.75 (n=71)	0.7 (n=295)	0.76 (n=40)	0.65 (n=375)	0.58 (n=113)	0.55 (n=444)	0.65 (n=86)
Leadership	0.77 (n=322)	0.82 (n=72)	0.71 (n=299)	<b>0.84*</b> (n=40)	0.66 (n=377)	<b>0.73*</b> (n=114)	0.63 (n=449)	<b>0.72*</b> (n=89)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix A for additional coding information

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

The intersectional analysis shows that preschool aged-children only impact the ambition of women who did not graduate from college—and, as they did for minority women, young children affect the political ambition for women in this group positively and substantially.

Notably the difference is still substantial for this group of women under 40, though it is no longer significant. However, among college-educated women under 40, preschool-aged children are negatively related to nascent ambition. This finding clearly demonstrates that being a parent has very different impacts on the ambition of women of different classes. Opinions on abortion are again irrelevant. As hypothesized, self-assessed leadership is higher for college-educated individuals. Also as expected, self-assessed leadership matters for both college-educated and non-college-educated women and the difference between ambitious and non-ambitious college-educated women is particularly large (the largest of any group). It is also more relevant to the ambition of less-educated men than college-educated men.

### ***Testing implications: opportunities for ambition***

To assess the impact of opportunities and obstacles, I again examine gender and class separately, and then intersectionally. I look first at recruitment, which I measure in two ways—first, being asked to politically participate (a specific measure of political office is not available) and second as a circle of political acquaintances. I use the additional measure because my eligibility pool is entirely comprised of activists, many of whom are recruited. For the first measure, I expect a larger impact for women than for men and a larger impact for college-educated women than not-college-educated women. For the second measure, I expect to see a mostly class-based story where the ambition of the most privileged individuals is most affected by having political acquaintances.

Next I examine skills, including their sources. I expect that skills will be associated with higher levels of ambition for everyone but that the skills women, especially less-educated women, learn in organizations will be particularly important because organizations are more likely to be single sex. I hypothesize that athletic participation will be associated with increased nascent ambition for all individuals but especially women, and again, especially for less-educated women. Lastly, I expect that more educated individuals will perceive discrimination more readily and that experiencing discrimination will promote political ambition, particularly for women.

**Table 16. Opportunities and obstacles by education and gender separately**

	Men		Women		College-Educated		Not-College-Educated	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	67% (n=700)	67% (n=186)	64% (n=749)	64% (n=129)	81% (n=621)	86% (n=112)	55% (n=828)	58% (n=203)
Political Acquaintances	52% (n=700)	<b>64%*</b> (n=186)	50% (n=749)	52% (n=129)	58% (n=621)	<b>76%*</b> (n=112)	46% (n=828)	53% (n=203)
Overall skills	0.60 (n=700)	<b>0.67^</b> (n=186)	0.51 (n=749)	0.56 (n=129)	0.72 (n=621)	0.77 (n=112)	0.45 (n=828)	<b>0.57***</b> (n=203)
Job skills	0.50 (n=700)	0.57 (n=186)	0.34 (n=749)	0.36 (n=129)	0.60 (n=621)	0.66 (n=112)	0.29 (n=828)	<b>0.42**</b> (n=203)
Church skills	0.11 (n=700)	0.17 (n=186)	0.15 (n=749)	0.16 (n=129)	0.14 (n=621)	0.18 (n=112)	0.13 (n=828)	0.16 (n=203)
Organizational Skills	0.28 (n=700)	<b>0.35^</b> (n=186)	0.25 (n=749)	<b>0.33^</b> (n=129)	0.35 (n=621)	<b>0.49**</b> (n=112)	0.21 (n=828)	<b>0.28*</b> (n=203)
Athlete	66% (n=700)	<b>76%*</b> (n=186)	46% (n=749)	<b>65%**</b> (n=129)	61% (n=621)	64% (n=112)	52% (n=828)	<b>75%***</b> (n=203)
Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion)	12% (n=700)	17% (n=186)	13% (n=749)	<b>35%***</b> (n=129)	15% (n=621)	<b>32%*</b> (n=112)	11% (n=828)	<b>21%*</b> (n=203)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix A for additional coding information. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

As with race, ambitious and non-ambitious activists are not differentiated by the first measure of recruitment, direct recruitment to participate in politics. The second measure of recruitment, possessing political acquaintances, shows a deep link with privilege—ambitious men and college graduates are more likely to know people who hold political office. Organizational skills matter across the board, though more ambitious men are more likely to have overall skills gained in any domain. The only other skill domain relevant in this analysis is that more ambitious non-college graduates have a higher level of skills gained on the job. This may be indicative of the level of prestige of occupation and could be an instance of these individuals being of a higher class by a measure other than education. It also potentially speaks to the mutability of class—that less-educated individuals are in an occupation to learn participatory skills and thus potentially change classes. Athletic participation is associated with more ambitious individuals for all groups except the college educated, though the gap between

ambitious and non-ambitious respondents is particularly large among women and people without college educations. Individuals who have been discriminated against are more ambitious for all groups except men.

**Table 17. Opportunities and obstacles by education and gender together**

	College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	81% (n=322)	87% (n=72)	82% (n=299)	85% (n=40)	57% (n=378)	58% (n=114)	53% (n=450)	57% (n=89)
Political Acquaintances	56% (n=322)	<b>76%*</b> (n=72)	61% (n=299)	74% (n=40)	49% (n=378)	58% (n=114)	44% (n=450)	45% (n=89)
Overall skills	0.76 (n=322)	<b>0.84^</b> (n=72)	0.68 (n=299)	0.64 (n=40)	0.49 (n=378)	<b>0.60*</b> (n=114)	0.41 (n=450)	<b>0.53*</b> (n=89)
Job skills	0.68 (n=322)	0.72 (n=72)	0.52 (n=299)	0.55 (n=40)	0.37 (n=378)	<b>0.50*</b> (n=114)	0.22 (n=450)	0.29 (n=89)
Church skills	0.13 (n=322)	0.17 (n=72)	0.15 (n=299)	0.20 (n=40)	0.10 (n=378)	0.17 (n=114)	0.16 (n=450)	0.14 (n=89)
Organizational skills	0.36 (n=322)	<b>0.59***</b> (n=72)	0.33 (n=299)	0.32 (n=40)	0.22 (n=378)	0.25 (n=114)	0.20 (n=450)	<b>0.33*</b> (n=89)
Athlete	73% (n=322)	78% (n=72)	49% (n=299)	37% (n=40)	60% (n=378)	<b>76%*</b> (n=114)	45% (n=450)	<b>74%***</b> (n=89)
Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion)	14% (n=322)	21% (n=72)	15% (n=299)	<b>53%**</b> (n=40)	10% (n=378)	15% (n=114)	12% (n=450)	<b>29%*</b> (n=89)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix A for additional coding information. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Looking at the intersectional analysis, we see that ambitious and non-ambitious activists are again not differentiated by direct recruitment to participate in politics. Having political acquaintances only matters for college-educated men. Overall skills are important for all groups but college-educated women. As hypothesized, the ambition of less-educated women is related to organizational skills but interestingly so is the ambition of college-educated men. Less-educated men’s ambition, on the other hand, is related to job skills. Athletic participation only matters for the nascent ambition of less-educated individuals and this finding is particularly strong for less-educated women. Finally, experiencing discrimination only impacts women’s nascent ambition, especially for college-educated women. In fact, experiencing discrimination is the only obstacle

or opportunity that matters for college-educated women's nascent ambition.

As with race, this binary examination of class and gender as they relate to nascent ambition shows that both social roles and the obstacles and opportunities men and women face affect political ambition, though sometimes in unexpected ways. Measures of beliefs about women's role, admittedly not ideal, do not impact ambition. Having preschool-aged children affects women's ambition differently depending on their education level. Assessments of competence matter for all groups except college-educated men. Skills matter for several groups, and the source of these skills is important. Recruitment is largely irrelevant, though having the privilege to be in the right social circles is important. Ambition is related to athletic participation for less-educated individuals and to discrimination for women.

### ***Social roles and opportunities together: multivariate analyses***

Now that we have an understanding of each of these factors individually, it's critical to examine them together. This examination represents a large step forward in the literature. It uses a dataset that is unique in its capacity to examine ambition across different social groups that are often not discussed in the literature on ambition. The analysis also looks at eligible candidates, rather than current officeholders. Additionally, the analysis tests an innovative theory that looks at the impact of both social roles and opportunities on ambition together and demonstrates that the space social groups have enables them to develop different understandings of gender which in turn impact ambition.

As in the analysis on race, I proceed by analyzing separate models for each of the four groups—men and women who graduated from college, and those who did not. I follow this method of analysis rather than incorporating indicator variables in whole-population models

because I expect that the relationships between variables will differ for each sub-group. Simply netting out the effect of education or gender does not permit a thorough and satisfactory examination of how each of these sets of explanations influences how likely an individual is to report being ambitious.

As with the racial analyses, I estimate my results with a probit model. I include both the coefficients and the marginal effects since the coefficients are useful only for discerning direct of relationship, relative magnitude, and significance of the relationships. The marginal effect that corresponds to each variable is the change in probability of being ambitious for either a change from 0 to 1 for the binary variables (indicated by a #) or from the lowest category to the highest category for the non-binary variables when the rest of the variables are held at their group-specific means. The significance levels reported correspond to the underlying coefficient.

Additional control variables are included for family income, age, and marital status.<sup>89</sup>

Correlations across all items are reported for all for groups for both the activist sample and the ambitious sub-set of respondents in the appendix. I separate the results in this section as I did above, into social roles, then obstacles and opportunities, and finally the control variables, for ease of interpretation. The full, combined tables are presented in the appendix. One element to keep in mind in the discussion of the results is the comparison group—the eligibility pool consists of activists, not the general population because I am investigating who among those best

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<sup>89</sup> I also estimated these analyses with one overall skills variable. This method did not affect the substantive results for the non-skill-related independent variables. The overall combined skills variable was not significant for any class subgroup. It's also worth noting that I estimated these original models with minority as an independent variable. There were not changes in the other independent variables for college-educated women or men and the minority independent variable was not significant for either group. For less-educated men, the minority independent variable was significant but there were no other substantive changes. For less-educated women, the minority independent variable was significant and the effects lost a touch of their power (roughly 2 percentage points) but the overall story was very similar.

situated to run for public office.<sup>90</sup>

First I examine the direct effects of all the elements of my theory together, beginning with the effect of social roles on nascent ambition.

**Table 18. Ingredients for nascent ambition by education and gender (social roles)**

	College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Preschool children #	-0.25 (0.26)	-3% (0.02)	-0.10 (0.39)	0% (0.01)	-0.06 (0.25)	-1% (0.06)	<b>0.45*</b> (0.21)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)
Abortion	0.15 (0.29)	2% (0.03)	0.13 (0.40)	1% (0.02)	-0.23 (0.25)	-6% (0.06)	0.14 (0.28)	2% (0.04)
Leadership	0.34 (0.61)	4% -0.07	<b>1.98**</b> (0.72)	<b>9%</b> (0.03)	0.33 (0.39)	8% (0.10)	0.50 (0.43)	7% (0.06)
Sample Size	364		314		464		495	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.21		0.35		0.10		0.19	
Wald Chi	39.74		58.33		33.58		63.95	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against, married, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Reviewing the results, we see that, as with race, opinions on women’s social roles do not affect men’s ambition, as was expected. However, some social roles measures do impact women’s nascent ambition.<sup>91</sup> As in the bivariate analyses, an influential finding among these variables is the relevance of preschool children for less-educated women. Politically active women without a college degree are 7% more likely to be ambitious if they have preschool-aged children. For college-educated women the most important social role variable is self-assessed leadership. They are the only group for whom this variable matters, notable especially because in the bivariate

<sup>90</sup> Limiting the comparison group to other activists to determine who will be interested in political office among those best positioned to take the step is a key element of this analysis. However, it is still useful to examine how these ambitious activists compare to everyone else. When I estimate the probit comparing ambitious activists to the rest of the population (including non-ambitious activists) I find relatively small differences for college-educated men and women—all the same variables are significant and the size of the effects changes only a few percentage points for all the variables except for age. There are somewhat broader changes for less-educated activists. For less-educated women, when ambitious activists are compared to everyone else rather than other activists the size of the marginal effects are cut in half almost across the board. For less-educated men, when ambitious activists are compared to everyone else rather than non-ambitious activists, organizational skills and being an athlete are positive and significant and have marginal effects of 8% and 5% respectively. Also, the marginal effect for age is cut in half.

<sup>91</sup> Again, it is worth noting the difficulty in testing this hypothesis in this analysis due to the less-than-ideal measure of women’s roles.

analysis this variable was significant for other groups, too. Politically active college-educated women are 9% more likely to be ambitious if they have high levels of self-assessed leadership.

The effect of self-assessed leadership for college-educated women confirms expectations—that self-assessed leadership would be most important for the nascent ambition of this group. Diverging directions in evidence made it difficult to theorize about the effect of children for different classes of women—higher class women have more liberal views on working mothers and are more likely to be in the workforce but lower class women have a traditional history of work and are more likely to be single parents and sole breadwinners. The evidence here mirrors the findings for minority women—children are positively associated with ambition for the less privileged group of women.

The results for the direct effect of opportunities on nascent ambition are more influential.

**Table 19. Ingredients for nascent ambition by education and gender (opportunities and obstacles)**

	College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Recruited for Participation #	0.18 (0.28)	2% (0.03)	<b>0.73<sup>^</sup></b> (0.40)	<b>2%</b> (0.01)	0.05 (0.18)	1% (0.04)	-0.05 (0.20)	-1% (0.03)
Political Acquaintances#	<b>0.81**</b> (0.26)	<b>9%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.63*</b> (0.30)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)	0.16 (0.18)	4% (0.05)	0.12 (0.19)	2% (0.03)
Job Skills	<b>-0.73*</b> (0.32)	<b>-9%</b> (0.04)	-0.45 (0.36)	-2% (0.02)	0.18 (0.25)	4% (0.06)	-0.17 (0.28)	-2% (0.04)
Church Skills	0.18 (0.30)	2% (0.04)	0.43 (0.33)	2% (0.02)	0.36 (0.32)	9% (0.08)	-0.40 (0.34)	-5% (0.05)
Organizational Skills	<b>0.91***</b> (0.26)	<b>11%</b> (0.04)	-0.24 (0.37)	-1% (0.02)	0.11 (0.29)	3% (0.07)	<b>0.67*</b> (0.32)	<b>9%</b> (0.04)
Athlete #	0.01 (0.29)	0% (0.03)	-0.29 (0.25)	-1% (0.01)	0.30 (0.20)	7% (0.04)	<b>0.52**</b> (0.20)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)
Discriminated against #	<b>0.58*</b> (0.24)	<b>10%</b> (0.05)	<b>1.01***</b> (0.27)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	0.05 (0.24)	1% (0.06)	<b>0.43*</b> (0.21)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)
Sample Size	364		314		464		495	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.21		0.35		0.10		0.19	
Wald Chi	39.74		58.33		33.58		63.95	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, married, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

This analysis reveals that when obstacles and opportunities are put into the same model as social roles, obstacles and opportunities play a larger direct role in nascent ambition. As hypothesized, both measures of recruitment affect college-educated women's nascent ambition positively—a departure from the bivariate analysis where neither mattered. Being recruited to participate increases the likelihood of active college-educated women being ambitious by 2%. As theorized, political acquaintances were a privilege-based factor, increasing the likelihood of nascent ambition by 3% for college-educated women and 9% for college-educated men.

With regards to skills, as hypothesized, organizational skills matter for women, though only for less-educated women—having organizational skills increases the likelihood that an active less-educated woman is ambitious by 9%. College-educated men also benefitted by organizational skills, the presence of which increased their likelihood of being ambitious by 11%. Interestingly, job skills actually decreased the likelihood of active college-educated men being ambitious by 9%. Recall that job skills also decreased nascent ambition for white women and the possible reason could be the same—these individuals are deeply invested in a career, making them less likely to look towards politics as a job.

The last set of experiences in the model is largely untested in the ambition literature: athletic participation and experiencing discrimination. I find a strong relationship for athletic participation and less-educated women—athletic participation for active less-educated women increases the likelihood they will be ambitious by 7%. There is no relationship for college-educated women and the relationship for non-college-educated men that we saw in the bivariate analysis does not remain here. As in our initial analysis, experiencing discrimination affects the ambition of both groups of women; experiencing discrimination increases the likelihood that an active woman is ambitious by 9% for college-educated women and 7% for less-educated women.

Of note, college-educated men’s nascent ambition also relates to experiencing discrimination. While I hypothesized that more educated groups would be more sensitive to discrimination (true here) the size of the effect for college-educated men (10%) is somewhat surprising.

Since coefficients in probit estimates provide information on the relative influence of variables in the model, it’s worth noticing that the coefficient on leadership for college-educated women is the largest of all the variables except age. For less-educated women the most influential variable, aside from control variables, is organizational skills. None of the non-control variables are significant for less-educated men.

**Table 20. Ingredients for nascent ambition by education and gender (controls)**

	College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Married #	<b>0.55*</b> (0.28)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.82**</b> (0.31)	<b>-5%</b> (0.02)	-0.08 (0.20)	-2% (0.05)	-0.16 (0.24)	-2% (0.03)
Family income	0.21 (0.53)	3% (0.06)	<b>-1.70*</b> (0.67)	<b>-8%</b> (0.03)	-0.17 (0.43)	-4% (0.11)	-0.24 (0.52)	-3% (0.07)
Age	<b>-5.35***</b> (1.25)	<b>-65%</b> (0.16)	<b>-2.85**</b> (0.97)	<b>-13%</b> (0.05)	<b>-2.44***</b> (0.65)	<b>-60%</b> (0.16)	<b>-2.42***</b> (0.66)	<b>-32%</b> (0.08)
Constant	-0.81 (0.76)		<b>-1.81^</b> (1.01)		-0.30 (0.42)		<b>-1.07*</b> (0.46)	
Sample Size	364		314		464		495	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.21		0.35		0.10		0.19	
Wald Chi	39.74		58.33		33.58		63.95	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

The control variables reveal important commonalities and differences for the subgroups. Age is universally important and nascent ambition is higher for younger individuals across the board, especially men. Moving from the bottom to the top of the age bracket reduces the probability of being nascently ambitious by 65% for college-educated men, 60% for less-educated men, 13% for college-educated women, and 32% for less-educated women.

Among women, being married only impacts college-educated women, decreasing their

likelihood of being nascently ambitious by 5% compared to their other active counterparts. This is especially interesting taken in conjunction with the null result on the presence of children for ambitious college-educated women, however, this may speak to family responsibility barriers for women, as well as different gender roles for different class groups (particularly since this was not significant for less-educated women). Conversely for college-educated men, being married increases the likelihood of nascent ambition by 6% but less-educated men see no effect. Income affects only college-educated women—moving between extremes on the income scale reduced the likelihood that a college-educated woman is nascently ambitious by 8%.<sup>92</sup>

### ***Becoming an activist and selection bias***

The above results compare ambitious activists with other, non-ambitious activists to determine who among this pool of potential candidates is most likely to want to run for office. While this is the critical question for the analysis at hand, what we don't know is who becomes an activist in the first place. Many great scholars have addressed who participates (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995); I do not reexamine that question here. What is useful for this analysis, though, is examining how our eligibility pool in compares to the general population through the lens of this analysis—the social roles, obstacles

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<sup>92</sup> Regarding party (see note 43 for more detail on these estimates): in the class and gender models being a Democrat increases the likelihood of being nascently ambitious for non-college-educated men by 11%(\*) and college-educated women by 4%(\*\*\*). Among college-educated women it also reduces the effect size of other significant factors across the board, makes being recruited to participate insignificant, and makes church skills significant (2%^). There are no significant changes for any other group. Being a Republican decreases the likelihood of college-educated women being ambitious by 2%^). There are no other substantial changes in these models. In the alternative specification using interest in running as the only measure for nascent ambition (see note 40): for college-educated men being recruited to participate is significant (4%\*), while being discriminated against and being married are insignificant; for college-educated women, being recruited to participate is insignificant; for non-college-educated men there is no change; and among non-college-educated women, being married significantly increases the likelihood of nascent ambition by 3%(\*\*) while family income reduces it by 6%(\*). For all of these groups, using the alternative dependent variable reduces the effect size of significant factors with the exception of discrimination for college-educated women.

and opportunities. This comparison provides a more thorough understanding of the effect of social organization and circumstances in creating our pool of activists from which potential officeholders are theoretically drawn. It also highlights the differences in what factors relate to activism and which relate to ambition.

A probit model is again used here to accommodate the binary nature of the dependent variable. Because having organizational skills perfectly predicts being an activist for college-educated women and less-educated men, the skills variable is estimated as a combined index.<sup>93</sup> Differences due to this model will be noted.<sup>94</sup>

**Table 21. Ingredients for activism by education and gender (social roles)**

	College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Preschool children #	0.09 (0.43)	1% (0.06)	<b>0.72<sup>^</sup></b> (0.41)	<b>9%</b> (0.04)	-0.08 (0.21)	-3% (0.08)	0.08 (0.16)	3% (0.06)
Abortion	0.34 (0.36)	5% (0.06)	0.31 (0.37)	5% (0.06)	0.04 (0.19)	1% (0.07)	0.14 (0.16)	5% (0.06)
Leadership	0.40 (0.55)	6% (0.08)	-0.25 (0.63)	-5% (0.11)	-0.12 (0.31)	-4% (0.11)	0.38 (0.25)	15% (0.10)
Sample Size	402		360		673		836	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.22		0.21		0.22		0.20	
Wald Chi	46.22		34.93		88.57		104.49	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115, <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: recruited for participation, political acquaintances, skills, athlete, discriminated against, married, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

As with the examination of ambitious individuals, opinions on women’s roles do not affect men’s activism. Among women, there are important differences worth noting in the factors

<sup>93</sup> Recall that in chapter three the same approach was taken because for both minority women and men having organizational skills perfectly predicts activism.

<sup>94</sup> In models where the skills are separated, differences aside from the skills variables are generally small. Among college-educated men being married is no longer significant and the effect of being recruited diminishes substantially. Among college-educated women, when skills are separated, having preschool aged children is no longer significant, and that the negative effect of discrimination on activism is even larger. The effects for family income, recruitment, and age also increase substantially for this group in this model. For less-educated men, being an athlete becomes insignificant. Among less-educated women, leadership edges into significance and the marginal effect is not tiny at 14%. In looking at the separated skills variables specifically: among college-educated men, only organizational skills are significant. For college-educated women, organizational skills perfectly predict activism. Among less-educated men, only job skills are significant and organizational skills perfectly predict activism. Among less-educated women, church and organizational skills are significant.

that promote nascent ambition and the factors that promote activism. For less-educated women, having preschool-aged children does not increase the likelihood of activism, though it does increase the likelihood of being ambitious. However, among college-educated women, having preschool-aged children increases the likelihood of being an activist, but it does not increase the likelihood of being ambitious. These differences underscore the different parenting experiences of women with and without college educations. Neither opinions on abortion or self-assessed leadership matter for either groups of women.

**Table 22. Ingredients for activism by education and gender (opportunities and obstacles)**

	College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Recruited for Participation #	<b>1.17***</b> (0.25)	<b>26%</b> (0.08)	<b>0.41^^</b> (0.26)	<b>8%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.71***</b> (0.16)	<b>24%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.55***</b> (0.14)	<b>21%</b> (0.05)
Political Acquaintances#	0.17 (0.26)	3% (0.04)	0.34 (0.24)	6% (0.04)	0.20 (0.15)	7% (0.05)	0.12 (0.14)	5% (0.05)
Skills	<b>0.82*</b> (0.39)	<b>12%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.95*</b> (0.39)	<b>17%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.13***</b> (0.23)	<b>39%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.18***</b> (0.23)	<b>45%</b> (0.09)
Athlete #	0.33 (0.27)	1% (0.05)	0.20 (0.24)	4% (0.04)	<b>0.25^</b> (0.15)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	0.14 (0.13)	5% (0.05)
Discriminated against #	0.31 (0.35)	4% (0.04)	<b>-0.56^</b> (0.30)	<b>-13%</b> (0.08)	0.02 (0.22)	1% (0.08)	0.13 (0.18)	5% (0.07)
Sample Size	402		360		673		836	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.22		0.21		0.22		0.20	
Wald Chi	46.22		34.93		88.57		104.49	

Significance: ^^p<.115, ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, married, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Looking at obstacles and opportunities, as when it was divided by race, this sample behaves much as one might expect based previous literature—recruitment (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) are central ingredients for participation. The likelihood of being active increases for all groups when they are recruited to participate. The effects are fairly similar across the groups except for college-educated women: the likelihood of being active increases by 26% for college-educated men, 8% for college-educated women, 24% for less-educated men and 21% for less-educated women when they are

recruited to participate. Skills matter strongly across the board, though particularly among less-educated men and women—having skills increasing the likelihood of being active by 12% for college-educated men, 17% for college-educated women, 39% for less-educated men, 45% for less-educated women. It is worth noting that this finding seems largely driven by organizational skills for all groups, though job and church skills play a role for certain groups (see footnote 94). The fact that variables central in the participation literature matter for this sample is reassuring—it shows that other analyses in this paper are not based on an unusual sample of activists.

In examining variables more unique to this analysis, being an athlete increases the likelihood of being active for less-educated men by 9%. Interestingly experiencing discrimination, which played a strong role in differentiating ambitious and non-ambitious female activists of both groups, is only significant here for college-educated women and it is in the opposite direction. Being discriminated against decreases the likelihood of being an activist by 13% for college-educated women.

**Table 23. Ingredients for activism by education and gender (controls)**

	College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Married #	<b>0.46<sup>^</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	-0.37 (0.26)	-6% (0.05)	0.07 (0.16)	3% (0.06)	0.11 (0.13)	4% (0.05)
Family income	0.22 (0.71)	3% (0.11)	<b>1.39*</b> (0.66)	<b>25%</b> (0.11)	<b>1.22**</b> (0.39)	<b>42%</b> (0.13)	<b>1.14***</b> (0.34)	<b>44%</b> (0.13)
Age	0.46 (1.02)	7% (0.16)	<b>1.80<sup>^</sup></b> (0.98)	<b>32%</b> (0.18)	<b>0.96*</b> (0.48)	<b>33%</b> (0.17)	<b>1.54***</b> (0.42)	<b>59%</b> (0.16)
Constant	<b>-1.66*</b> (0.73)		-1.21 (0.86)		<b>-1.35***</b> (0.35)		<b>-1.89***</b> (0.32)	
Sample Size	402		360		673		836	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.22		0.21		0.22		0.20	
Wald Chi	46.22		34.93		88.57		104.49	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115, <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, recruited for participation, political acquaintances, skills, athlete, discriminated against.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Among the control variables, having more family income increases the likelihood of being active for all groups except the most privileged—college-educated men. Its effects on the

likelihood of activism for less-educated individual are sizable: 42% for less-educated men and 44% for less-educated women. Being older increases the likelihood of being active for both all groups except college-educated men and it has a particularly large effect for less-educated women (59%). Being married increases the likelihood of being active for college-educated men, though this doesn't hold in the model where skills are separated.<sup>95</sup>

From this analysis we can see that our sample of activists is not terribly unusual—the activists here participate for many of the reasons we might expect based on years of research: recruitment and skills. We can also see that, as in the race analysis, the factors that make someone active are not the same as the factors that make someone ambitious. These analyses show that when predicting activism, social roles only matter for women and in ways that are different from how they mattered for predicting ambition. They also reveal that an experience linked to ambition for both college-educated and less-educated women—being discriminated against—is either negative or neutral in predicting activism.

One additional check on the results is useful here. Ambitious individuals differ both from other activists, as well as the population overall (see footnote 90 and accompanying results in appendix which details the relatively small changes in results when ambitious activists are compared to everyone else) so one might be concerned that the design of this study: selection bias. Specifically, it's useful to check if the results of what affects ambition among activists are biased because of factors that affect the selection into activism. To address this concern I conduct additional test on the robustness of the results. As in the racial analysis, I model ambition as a

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<sup>95</sup> Regarding party (see note 43 for more detail on these estimates): only the models predicting activism among college-educated women are affected. Being a Democrat decreases the likelihood of college-educated women being politically active by 8% (^) and including this variable makes being married for this group a negative, significant predictor (-7%^). Including a dummy for being a Republican makes being recruited to participate insignificant for college-educated women and makes being married for this group a negative, significant predictor (-8%^).

two-step process using a Heckman probit where the first step is the selection model (the dependent variable is becoming an activist) and the second step is the outcome model (the dependent variable is being an ambitious activist).<sup>96</sup> Comparing the coefficients and significance levels for the two-stage Heckman probit to the initial models, my results (see appendix) are substantively similar for college-educated men, less-educated men, and less-educated women both in the selection and the outcome models.<sup>97</sup> The results for college-educated women are somewhat less stable in the outcome models<sup>98</sup> and analysis suggests that the selection and outcome equations are not independent. The two outcome models (original and Heckman) are compared in the appendix.

This robustness check shows that, as in the race analysis, the results are remarkably stable when selection bias is corrected for, albeit somewhat less stable for college-educated women. Once again it merits mention that Fulton et al. (2006) also fail to find selection bias that impacts the results of their examination of progressive ambition and gender. So this set of class analyses

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<sup>96</sup> We cannot simply compare ambition for everyone since we lack information about ambition for people who are not activists. As explained initially, the ambition variable I construct is based on motivations for activism and the nature of this coding means that this variable is only available among those who are active—we do not observe nascent ambition among non-activists since we don't know their motivations for actions never taken. Estimating a Heckman probit is useful because it corrects for biases in the outcome stage that are due to self-selection into the activism (see Maestas et al. 2006 for further discussion on the advantages of this model in the context of ambition). Estimating this model requires we have an identifying model in the selection equation that is not in the outcome model. For this estimation I alter the original outcome model by eliminating one recruitment variable that is essential to the selection model: recruited for participation. This variable was only marginally significant for one group in the original estimation but it is central to becoming an activist for all groups. See appendix for original model reestimated without this variable.

<sup>97</sup> By substantively similar I mean the same coefficients are significant and the size of the coefficient is very similar. This is true both when comparing to the original outcome model, as well as outcome models which eliminate the "recruited for participation" variable but do not have a selection model. This isn't to say there is no selection bias for some of these groups but rather that correcting for this bias does not affect the substantive story of the outcome model. Regarding sample selection in the other groups studied here—rho is insignificant for college-educated men (probability > chi2 = 0.2408), for less-educated men (probability > chi2 = 0.6882), and for less-educated women (probability > chi2 = 0.4940).

<sup>98</sup> The selection model—what factors affect becoming an activist—remains substantively the same except that having political acquaintances is now significant and the level of significance for being recruited to participate has decreased. For the outcome models, in the new model, obviously recruited for participation is no longer applicable and family income is no longer significant while church skills are (they increase the likelihood of nascent ambition by 3%) and being an athletic is (it reduced the probability of being ambitious by 2%). Note that a probit outcome model reestimated without the recruited for participation variable and without a selection model is extremely similar to the original model.

adds to the evidence that selection bias in ambition studies is less prevalent than one intuitively imagines.

### *Conclusion*

The close examination of class reveals important findings to keep in mind. First a few reassurances—cut this way, our sample of activists again looks like most other samples of activists. The factors that contribute to their involvement are again the same ones we saw in the close examination on race, and ones that have been documented in countless studies: skills and recruitment. Also reassuring for this analysis—as in the race chapter, selection bias is a minor concern.

But what about the meat of the chapter—how does the theory hold up to this test? Once again, we see that the ingredients that impact nascent ambition vary dramatically by social group. As in the race analysis, the only universally important ingredient is age.<sup>99</sup> This once again contrasts with the models that predict activism where non-control variables have universal effects.

As with race, the results in the class models show that ideas about ambition are based on the experiences of the privileged—and factors like political acquaintances only matter among the college educated. And the influence of privilege is not limited to men. The importance of self-assessed leadership, one of the key findings on women's ambition in the last decade, only matters for college-educated women, not their less-educated counterparts. It's also worth noting what we don't find here: an explanation for less-educated men's nascent ambition. While we expected that factors specific to women's role might not be central to this analysis, it's striking that no factors in the model, other than age, predicted nascent ambition for this group. When we

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<sup>99</sup> This is true in both the original and the Heckman selection outcome models.

also consider how few factors were relevant for minority men, it becomes clear that understanding what affects nascent ambition for these two groups—both of whom are underrepresented in political office—should be high on the list of research and public policy priorities. The overrepresentation of men in office, and the basis of many political science models on these men, should not obscure how little is known about the men who are not well integrated into our political system.

By and large these findings support the fundamental pieces of the roles and experiences framework I propose for examining women's nascent ambition. First, these results show, once again, that gendered social roles only matter for women's nascent ambition, not for men's. This remains the case regardless of the iteration of the model, whether comparing to other activists or the general population or predicting nascent ambition or activism. My analyses also again support a second key piece of my theory—the impact of gender roles on nascent ambition differs for women of different social groups. As noted above, self-assessed leadership only increases the likelihood of nascent ambition for college-educated women while the presence of preschool-aged children only increases it among less-educated women. Additionally, as with white women, marriage decreases nascent ambition for college-educated women, but does not impact less-educated women's nascent ambition (nor did it affect minority women's). While marriage was not a key variable in the theoretical section, this finding is consistent with the general ideas presented about working mothers—that traditional women's roles (such as being a wife) are more of a barrier for some women than others.<sup>100</sup> Additionally reinforcing the idea that gendered

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<sup>100</sup> As noted in the initial discussion of this chapter, while less-educated women have more conservative ideas about working mothers, their rates of marriage are lower and divorce rates are higher than their more educated counterparts. Additionally they are likely to be breadwinners and independent while their less-educated male counterparts are struggling in the labor market. Thus the fact that their ambitions are less hampered by marriage is not overly surprising.

institutions like marriage have different implications for women and men: the likelihood of college-educated men being ambitious increases when they are married.

As with the race analyses, the findings about social roles generally support my overall framework but their overall effect on women's nascent ambition is fairly subdued, sometimes more noteworthy for their absence in comparison with another group than their influence. Gendered obstacles and opportunities are more influential predictors of nascent ambition, particularly for less-educated women. In a finding unique to this analysis, I show that experiencing discrimination increases nascent ambition for both college-educated and less-educated women, a result that echoes the findings in the race chapter and again supports my hypotheses.<sup>101</sup> Discrimination among men behaved as expected in some ways—it mattered for college-educated men but not their less-educated counterparts—but this effect was surprisingly large for college men's nascent ambition compared to both groups of women.

These results also show that skills learned in particular contexts benefit women's ambition, though in this case only for less-educated women. These women's likelihood of being nascently ambitious increased if they learned participation skills in an organizational context or if they participated in athletics.<sup>102</sup> These results, especially in conjunction with findings in the race chapter, lend support my hypothesis that skills learned in single-gendered arenas are likely to promote ambition for women.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> This remains true for both groups of women in the Heckman selection outcome model.

<sup>102</sup> Importantly this finding is still significant even in the Heckman selection outcome model.

<sup>103</sup> It is worth noting that college-educated men also see a bump in the likelihood of nascent ambition due to organizationally based skills, though they see a decrease related to job-based skills.

## **Chapter Five: Religion**

The effect of religion, specifically conservative Christianity in the U.S., on women's and men's nascent ambition is our final case. Religion offers an important comparison when juxtaposed with race and class because it differs on several important dimensions. Whereas race and class in the U.S. are both divided by privilege, conservative Christianity is not. Examining a social group where privilege is absent, in comparison with two where privilege is a prominent factor, allows us to show the effect of privilege on nascent ambition. Conservative Christianity also offers an important comparison, in relation to race and class, when it comes to narratives on gender. Narratives about gender in conservative Christianity are more specific than gender narratives in class and race, with sometimes very precise proscriptions regarding men's and women's roles. Lastly, religion, particularly in the U.S. is more mutable than class or race. Because religion can be chosen or changed, adhering to a particular religion indicates, at a minimum, tacit acceptance of that religion's beliefs. Thus, identification with conservative Christianity implies agreement with its gender narratives. The specificity of gender narratives in conservative Christianity and the choice to adhere to that faith provides a critical window into the importance of social roles and nascent ambition. Taken together the differences between conservative Christianity, compared to race or class, on the dimensions of privilege, narrative, and mutability allows us to gain important variation.

But before we can compare across groups, we need to delve deeply into the structure of

gender in comparative Christianity. For as little as has been written about race, class, gender and ambition, even less work exists on religion and women's ambition (see Moore 2005 for an exception<sup>104</sup>). While some studies document that conservative Christians are less supportive of women in politics or of a female president (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004;<sup>105</sup> Davis and Robinson 1996;<sup>106</sup> Hertel and Hughes 1987;<sup>107</sup> Peek, Lowe, and Williams 1991<sup>108</sup>), almost none examine how religion affects women's or men's inclination to enter politics themselves. This is despite the fact that religion offers a rich source of narratives about women's roles (Peek, Lowe, and Williams 1991; Wilcox 1989) and religious institutions have long been centers of political participation, both imparting skills necessary for activism (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) and serving as fertile ground for recruitment (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Nevertheless, conservative Christianity and its narratives about gender clearly impact factors I argue affect women's ambition: ideas about women's role and the opportunities and obstacles women face.

First, it should be noted that there are important distinctions within conservative Christianity regarding, for example, fundamentalism or evangelicalism (Greeley and Hout 2008; Woodberry and Smith 1998; also see Bendyna et al. (2001) on Catholicism and conservative Christianity). I am limited, however, by the availability of measures thus, as in the chapter on class, I cast a wide net in discussing research on conservative Christianity by discussing results related to all of these measures. In my analysis, I use two possible measures of conservative

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<sup>104</sup> As discussed in more detail below, Moore (2005) finds that belief in Biblical literalism encourages ambition for minority women but not white women.

<sup>105</sup> Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) measure gender roles by asking respondents if: (1) women should run their homes and leave running the country to men; (2) s/he would vote for a woman for president; (3) men are better suited to politics. (768)

<sup>106</sup> Davis and Robinson (1996) find orthodoxy predicts opinions about women in politics but not about voting for a female President.

<sup>107</sup> Sexism scale includes (1) married women participating in the workforce (2) being involved in politics (3) running for President (4) remaining at home.

<sup>108</sup> Peek, Lowe, and Williams (1991) include these in a sexism index and find a relationship for both men and women between fundamentalism and sexist attitudes.

Christianity: Biblical literalism and being reborn. This is because, unlike in the class chapter where education had clear benefits when compared to other measures of class for this analysis, neither measure of conservative Christianity is obviously the better choice.

The literature regarding religion's effect on ideas about women's roles, both in the home and in public life, is rich. The vast majority of scholarship reveals that conservative Christians are less supportive of feminism and working mothers than most other religious or non-religious groups in the U.S. (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Ciabattari 2001;<sup>109</sup> Davis and Robinson 1996; Hertel and Hughes 1987). However, this broad characterization of conservative Christians as more traditional on gender issues masks variation on a number of factors, including the variety of measures on which they are more conservative,<sup>110</sup> differences between men and women, as well as among conservative Christian women themselves, and racial differences. I begin this discussion focusing on two areas, ideas about working mothers and abortion. As detailed earlier, generally speaking, I expect motherhood to deter nascent ambition for women, but think that its effect will be less for groups who believe it is acceptable for mothers to work. I measure ideas about motherhood in two ways: ideas about (1) presence of young children and (2) abortion.

Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) find that women who are Catholics and conservative Protestants have more conservative views about abortion and family responsibilities than other women.<sup>111</sup> Davis and Robinson (1996) show that personal orthodox religious beliefs<sup>112</sup> are one of

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<sup>109</sup> Looking at data from 1974-1998 on men only, she finds that fundamentalist men have more conservative opinions about working mothers and especially conservative opinions about women remaining at home and out of political and economic spheres.

<sup>110</sup> A few selected dependent variables just to demonstrate the range of opinions examined: There are analyses on opinions about premarital sex (Hertel and Hughes 1987), pornography (Hertel and Hughes 1987), birth control, and the ERA (Wilcox 1989).

<sup>111</sup> The Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) study examines change in gender attitudes between two time periods (1974-1986) and (1987-1998). I report findings here from the second period, which includes the time period in which my data were collected. This finding also highlights the fact that, as with studies on ideas about motherhood, we must be attentive to when studies on religion and women's role occurred as the effect of conservative Christianity on women's role has changed overtime—as Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) note, “polarization about feminist issues is

the strongest predictors of opinions on abortion, with orthodox beliefs linked to opposition to abortion on demand, as well to the ideas that families suffer when women work outside the home and fail to support a husband's career.<sup>113</sup> Hertel and Hughes (1987) find that fundamentalist Protestants and Catholics are both conservative on abortion<sup>114</sup> and that fundamentalist Protestants/Baptists and Catholics are the most conservative on women's roles as a mother, worker, and in public life.<sup>115</sup>

Evidence suggests that these different ideas about women's role translate into divergent life paths for conservative Christian women, compared to other women. In their review of the literature, Sherkat and Ellison (1999) reveal that women who hold orthodox religious beliefs are less likely to work outside the home, especially if they are married with children and Sherkat (2000) finds that being a fundamentalist Protestant encourages women to leave the labor force early, begin one's career as a housewife and remain at home until children are grown, or never enter the labor force.

There is, however, important variation in how conservative Christianity affects ideas about motherhood. First, there is gender variation. Scholars find that women are more likely to hold fundamentalist ideals (Hoffman and Bartkowski 2008;<sup>116</sup> Sherkat and Ellison 1999) and the

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generally decreasing among women [between the two time periods], cleavages along religious and political lines are becoming more salient in individual's alignment on feminist issues—particularly on abortion" (778). They also find that Catholic men are more conservative on abortion than men overall and conservative Protestant men are more conservative on both abortion and family responsibilities.

<sup>112</sup> Measured as biblical literalism, the course of our lives is decided by God, and right and wrong should be based on God's laws.

<sup>113</sup> Measured as "family suffers when a woman is employed" "husbands as breadwinners, wives as homemakers". Data are from 1991. Interestingly orthodox religious beliefs are essentially unassociated with economic and racial attitudes, revealing its special place for gender.

<sup>114</sup> Interestingly they find that Catholics remain conservative even in cases of rape or incest while fundamentalist Protestants' support for abortion reduces in these circumstances. They suggest this means Catholics' opposition to abortion is based on a "right to life" principle while fundamentalist Protestants' support is based on sexual morality.

<sup>115</sup> Sexism scale includes (1) married women participating in the workforce (2) being involved in politics (3) running for President (4) remaining at home

<sup>116</sup> Hoffman and Bartkowski (2008) argue that this gender difference in adherence to biblical literalist is "a compensatory mechanism that aims to offset their exclusion from position of authority in patriarchal religious

negative association between fundamentalism and feminist ideals is stronger for women than men (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Cook and Wilcox 1991;<sup>117</sup> Peek, Lowe, and Williams 1991<sup>118</sup>). Additionally, the source of the fundamentalism matters. Research cited above sometimes examines the affects of individual beliefs about religion and sometimes looks at the impact of denominational affiliation. Peek, Lowe, Williams (1991) reveal that these measures function differently for women and men: for women beliefs about sexism<sup>119</sup> are related to personal beliefs about biblical literalism—what they term “individual fundamentalism”—whereas for men they are associated with belonging to a fundamentalist denomination. I use measures of individual fundamentalism here and it is important to be aware of these gender differences in interpreting results—because I use an individual measure of conservative Christianity, rather than a denominational one, I expect my results to be stronger for conservative Christian women than men since women are more likely to be biblical literalists and this is also more likely to be predictive of their opinions.

The results from the literature thus far, which indicate the presence of a strong, fairly consistent connection between conservative Christianity and conservative attitudes on women’s roles, particularly for women, lead me to theorize that my measures of women’s role should be particularly important for determining the ambition of conservative Christian women. However,

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organizations” (1246). Their finding holds for both conservative Protestants and Catholics, but not for mainline Protestants.

<sup>117</sup> Using the 1984 ANES Cook and Wilcox (1991) find while religious fundamentalism is negatively associated with ideas about feminism for both women and men, the association is particularly strong for women.

<sup>118</sup> Based on individual fundamentalism. The authors attribute the finding that women’s ideas about sexism are more connected to ideas about fundamentalism than are men’s to the male-dominated culture of religion. Findings are same if they just look at converts.

<sup>119</sup> Items on the sexism scale in this analysis are: Women should take care of the running of their homes and leave the running of the country up to men; If your party nominated a woman for President, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job; Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women; A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work; It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one herself; A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works; It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family. Analysis is limited to whites and for 1985 and 1988.

there is important variation among conservative Christian women that suggests more nuanced hypotheses are appropriate. Although he acknowledges “there is a strong relationship between evangelical Christianity and anti-feminism” Wilcox (1989) shows that within the evangelical community, a sizable group of women are supportive of feminist issues—nearly one-third support abortion on demand and half favor the ERA.<sup>120</sup> This leads me to two hypotheses. First, given the centrality of motherhood to conservative Christian women, the presence of preschool-aged children at home should reduce ambition. Second, in keeping with my earlier hypotheses, I expect that among conservative Christian women, those with more liberal ideas about motherhood, measured here by opinions on abortion, will be more likely be ambitious. And, as I will explore more in chapter six, because of the prominence of the narrative on women’s role in conservative Christianity, I expect my measures of women’s role, particularly opinions on abortion, to have a larger effect on conservative Christian women’s nascent ambition than they have on other groups of women in the class and race analyses. I expect that my measures of women’s role will have little effect on men’s ambition, regardless of their religion.

A final piece of variation to mention is racial. Looking at factors that contribute to women’s and men’s nascent ambition, Moore (2005) finds that belief in biblical literalism encourages political ambition for black, but not white women. While I expect to find that ideas about women’s role play a larger role in shaping ambition for conservative Christians compared to other women, it could be that adhering to this faith is particularly important for minority women, thus I run additional tests to address this question.

The third way I expect ideas about women’s role to matter for women’s and men’s

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<sup>120</sup> Wilcox’s scale of women’s issues includes the ERA, abortion right, government funding of abortion and birth control information. His data set is from 1984. Interestingly, Wilcox finds the variable measuring whether evangelical women make the connection between religion and politics is the strongest predictor of anti-feminist attitudes.

ambition is their evaluations of their own competence. Lawless and Fox (2005) have demonstrated the centrality of competence in predicting the nascent ambition of women overall but how this works among conservative Christian women is unclear. It is possible that conservative Christian women will have absorbed the message that women are not suited to politics (Bolzendahl and Myer 2004;<sup>121</sup> Davis and Robinson 1996<sup>122</sup>), thus reducing their ideas about competence in the political arena. This would indicate that if competence is important for conservative Christian women's ambition in the same way it is important for women overall, conservative Christian women should have lower levels of ambition. However, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) note that "women's religiously based voluntary activity has often functioned as a source of confidence and autonomy" (88) and that women's response to politics as a man's game is to withdraw, but in religion—also largely a man's game—they chose to engage. These findings could indicate that ideas about competence for conservative Christian women, who have practice engaging in and operating in an arena where they are often considered second-class citizens, will be less important for predicting their nascent ambition compared to other women.

### ***The impact of opportunities on nascent ambition***

Religion creates different opportunities and obstacles for women's nascent ambition. Here I look at how these obstacles and opportunities shape women's paths and help explain variation among conservative Christians and their counterparts, once again focusing on the key

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<sup>121</sup> Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) measure gender roles by asking respondents if: (1) women should run their homes and leave running the country to men; (2) s/he would vote for a woman for president; (3) men are better suited to politics. They find that among women belonging to a Baptist and other evangelical sect is negatively associated with the feminist position on this measure. (768)

<sup>122</sup> They show that orthodox religious beliefs (measured as biblical literalism, the course of our lives is decided by God, and right and wrong should be based on God's laws) are one of the strongest predictors for believing that "women not suited for politics".

factors likely to see gender variation in producing nascent ambition: recruitment, skills learned in single-gendered organizations and athletics, and the experience of discrimination.

As noted above, conservative Christian women are less likely to work outside the home, especially if they are married with children (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Sherkat 2000). This absence from the labor market may mean that religious women are less likely to be indirectly mobilized through workplace social networks (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993)—what Bowers and Testa (2012) refer to as “in the path of mobilizers”—and less likely to be thought of as potential candidates for office. However, I again expect that women, who are less likely to be self-starters on the whole, will be more in need of recruitment than men in order to be involved in politics. This creates two different hypotheses on my two measures of recruitment (being asked to participate and having political acquaintances). First, women will be asked to participate less often but when they are asked it will have a positive effect on women’s ambition for both conservative Christian women and their less conservative counterparts. Second, I expect that absence from political networks will mean that conservative Christian women will have fewer political acquaintances than other groups, thus this measure will be less associated with ambition for them. For men overall, I expect that they will need less recruitment to be involved but that they will be more likely to occupy social circles with political acquaintances who might increase their nascent ambition. Because conservative Christianity lacks an element of privilege, I don’t think either group of men are more likely to be in these more elite social circles.

As noted in the race and class analyses, skills are an essential element of participation in politics overall (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) as well as in promoting progressive ambition (Maestas et al. 2006). For women, skills learned in single-gendered organizations are particularly valuable (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Jackman 1994). As such, I expect

organizational skills to play an important role in improving non-conservative Christian women's nascent ambition. But among conservative Christian women, the story is a bit more complicated. As Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) note, the church is a key place for political participation, and Sherkat and Ellison (1999) show that women participate more frequently in religious organizations than do men. Additionally, Hoffman and Bartkowski (2008) suggest that within more conservative Christian churches women are only permitted to pursue power in segregated subgroups (like women's Bible studies). These findings point to the idea that church skills could be a single-gendered source of skills for more conservative Christian women. Among men, the source of skills should be less critical as single-gendered sources are not as relevant for them. But, generally speaking, skills should increase men's nascent ambition for both conservative Christian men and their non-conservative Christian counterparts.

The second single-gendered source for skills is athletics, which improve women's earnings and increase their participation in less traditional fields (Stevenson 2010). Again, while I expect both men's and women's nascent ambition to benefit from athletic participation, I expect the boost will be particularly large for women. I also argue athletic participation will be associated with an increase in nascent ambition for conservative Christians. Since sports have long been associated with leadership and masculinity for Christian men (see, for example, histories on "muscular Christianity" by Hall (1994) and Putney (2001)), athletic participation will likely increase their nascent ambition by associating them with leadership. Because of the strong associations with masculinity, conservative Christian women who decide to become athletes may be more rare—but when they do, they will likely also see a particular boost from sports participation compared to their non-athletic counterparts. Like how the importance of gender roles in conservative Christian narratives makes that variable especially powerful for

conservative Christian women, I expect the muscular Christianity narrative tying athletics to faith will make this a particularly important variable for all conservative Christian's nascent ambition.

The last experience I include in my model is discrimination. As detailed in earlier chapters, because gender is the social group for which collective identity is often the most difficult to create (Gurin 1985), I expect experiencing discrimination, which can result in increased collective identity and engagement, to be particularly strong for women, regardless of their religious affiliation. However, the measure I use for discrimination not only captures feelings of discrimination based on gender, but also those based on religion. Thus assigning the cause for certain experiences to discrimination based on religion—and the extent to which experiencing discrimination promotes collective identity, engagement, and action for men as well as women (DeSipio 2002; Fleischmann, Phalet and Klein 2011; Simon and Klandermans 2001)—may make this a powerful variable for conservative Christian men as well.

### *Analysis*

As in the two close examinations of race and class, this analysis draws on the Citizen Participation Survey (see pp. 36-38 for details). Using an “eligibility pool” of potential office holders, I look at the differences in levels of nascent ambition first across social groups—in this case between conservative Christians and non-conservative Christians—and then at the intersections of these social groups with gender. In comparison to the analyses of race and class, it is worth noting that in this analysis individuals who are not conservative Christians are a less unified group—all they have in common, for the purposes of this examination, is *not* holding specific religious beliefs. While they serve a useful comparison group for conservative

Christians, particularly in comparing religion as a social group with race and class, non-conservative Christians themselves do not receive a unified message about gender roles and are thus not the central story being told.

In a first look at the data, I find that nearly one in five activists in my sample (18%) are classified as being politically ambitious. Men and women are equally represented in the activist sample (886 and 878 respectively). Of the 315 ambitious respondents, only 129 are women. Individuals who are reborn are 571 of the activist sample, 329 of whom are women. Reborn activists comprise about one-third (119) of the ambitious activists and about half of these (57) are women. There are 703 biblical literalists in the activist sample, 404 of whom are women. Biblical literalist activists comprise nearly half (148) of the ambitious activists and nearly half of these (67) are women.

In Tables 24 and 25 we can see that the only significant differences between groups are gender-based. This is an important difference from the class and race analyses, which also revealed differences across those social groups, between whites and minorities and between college-educated and less-educated individuals, and supports my hypotheses regarding privilege and nascent ambition.

**Table 24. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by reborn**

Men	Women	
16%	10%	***
(n=186)	(n=129)	
Reborn	Not Reborn	
13%	14%	
(n=119)	(n=157)	
Reborn Men	Not Reborn Men	
18%	18%	
(n=62)	(n=100)	
Reborn Women	Not Reborn Women	
10%	9%	
(n=57)	(n=57)	
Reborn Men	Reborn Women	*
18%	10%	
(n=62)	(n=57)	
Not Reborn Men	Not Reborn Women	**
18%	9%	
(n=100)	(n=57)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 25. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by biblical literalism**

Men	Women	
16%	10%	***
(n=186)	(n=129)	
Biblical Literalists	Not Biblical Literalists	
14%	13%	
(n=148)	(n=148)	
Biblical Literalist Men	Not Biblical Literalist Men	
20%	17%	
(n=81)	(n=92)	
Biblical Literalist Women	Not Biblical Literalist Women	
9%	9%	
(n=67)	(n=56)	
Biblical Literalist Men	Biblical Literalist Women	***
20%	9%	
(n=81)	(n=67)	
Not Biblical Literalist Men	Not Biblical Literalist Women	*
17%	9%	
(n=92)	(n=56)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

We begin again with an examination of individual items, identifying first what is relevant for men and women and conservative and non-conservative Christians and then looking at how

the results change when we look at the intersections of these groups. Next we proceed to a multivariate analysis of these intersectional groups. Pursuing the analysis in this way, rather than adding indicator variables to a larger regression, has the downside of reducing the sample size but the larger benefit of allowing each individual group to tell their story.

### ***Testing implications: social roles, gender, and religion***

As discussed above, conservative Christians and non-conservative Christians structure gender very differently. In this section I exploit these differences to examine their affect on nascent ambition. I begin with differences in ideas about social roles, focusing on ideas about working mothers, belief about women's roles as mothers, and evaluations of competence. As a reminder, I argue that social role variables will be particularly important in determining conservative Christian women's nascent ambition and that the presence of children will deter ambition for these women. On the second measure of women's role, opinions on abortion as a proxy for ideas about motherhood, I expect that more liberal opinions on abortion will be associated with higher nascent ambition among conservative Christian women. For men, I don't expect that the presence of young children or opinions on abortion will affect their nascent ambition. Lastly in the section on social roles, I examine how differences in competence, measured through an individual's self-assessment of leadership, matter for men's and women's nascent ambition. As before, I expect competence to matter more for women than men. However, among women, the expectations are less clear. It could be that competence is less important for conservative Christian women's nascent ambition since they are more familiar with operating in a male-dominated environment. However, it's also possible these women might have internalized the idea that they are unsuited for politics, which might mean competence matters very much.

In the below tables all variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. It is important to remember throughout these comparisons that the non-ambitious group is still a population of political activists, albeit those who are not motivated for ambitious reasons (in the multivariate model I also compare to ambitious activists to all other individuals). Additionally, note the variation in sample sizes, which contributes to differences in significance. I look first for by gender and religion separately, and then by religion and gender together.

**Table 26. Social roles by reborn and gender separately**

	Men		Women		Reborn		Not Reborn	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14% (n=700)	15% (n=186)	15% (n=749)	<b>29%*</b> (n=129)	15% (n=452)	<b>26%^</b> (n=119)	15% (n=749)	15% (n=157)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	26% (n=330)	19% (n=123)	33% (n=340)	39% (n=85)	32% (n=200)	34% (n=75)	33% (n=317)	<b>20%*</b> (n=105)
Abortion	0.68 (n=689)	0.64 (n=184)	0.61 (n=739)	0.68 (n=126)	0.46 (n=446)	<b>0.57^</b> (n=117)	0.70 (n=738)	0.68 (n=155)
Leadership	0.70 (n=699)	<b>0.76*</b> (n=186)	0.66 (n=748)	<b>0.75**</b> (n=129)	0.69 (n=452)	<b>0.76*</b> (n=119)	0.67 (n=747)	<b>0.76**</b> (n=157)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 27. Social roles by biblical literalism and gender separately**

	Men		Women		Biblical Literalist		Not Biblical Literalist	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14% (n=700)	15% (n=186)	15% (n=749)	<b>29%*</b> (n=129)	16% (n=555)	<b>31%**</b> (n=148)	15% (n=752)	11% (n=148)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	26% (n=330)	19% (n=123)	33% (n=340)	39% (n=85)	32% (n=254)	38% (n=103)	31% (n=327)	<b>16%**</b> (n=91)
Abortion	0.68 (n=689)	0.64 (n=184)	0.61 (n=739)	0.68 (n=126)	0.48 (n=545)	0.52 (n=146)	0.73 (n=743)	0.74 (n=146)
Leadership	0.70 (n=699)	<b>0.76*</b> (n=186)	0.66 (n=748)	<b>0.75**</b> (n=129)	0.66 (n=554)	<b>0.74**</b> (n=148)	0.69 (n=751)	<b>0.78**</b> (n=148)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

As expected, the presence of children differentiates women but not men, though unexpectedly ambitious women are more likely to have preschool-aged children than are non-ambitious women. Preschool-aged children also differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious

conservative Christian respondents—ambitious conservative Christian respondents are more likely to have children by either measure. Because having preschool-aged children is closely associated with parental age, I also look at the difference in ambition for individuals under 40. Among this younger group, having preschool-aged children only matters for non-conservative Christians, but interestingly it shows that parents of preschool-aged children are less likely to be ambitious among non-conservative Christians. For women under 40 having preschool-aged children is not related to ambition.

Ideas about abortion, serving as a proxy for beliefs about women’s roles, matters for conservative Christians using the reborn measure—more liberal individuals are more likely to be ambitious. It is worth noting that this is the only group that has seen a difference in the bivariate analysis on opinions on abortion so far. Lastly, a first look at the differences between ambitious and non-ambitious respondents reveals that ambitious individuals in each of these groups are significantly more likely to think of themselves as a leader, though the gap is larger for women than men.

Looking at the impact of these factors on political ambition at the intersections of religion and gender reveals important differences compared to the broader analysis:

**Table 28. Social roles by reborn and gender together**

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	17% (n=180)	9% (n=62)	15% (n=272)	<b>47%***</b> (n=57)	16% (n=376)	16% (n=100)	14% (n=373)	13% (n=57)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	32% (n=87)	<b>10%**</b> (n=38)	32% (n=113)	<b>66%**</b> (n=37)	31% (n=161)	21% (n=68)	34% (n=156)	<b>18%*</b> (n=37)
Abortion	0.49 (n=178)	0.53 (n=62)	0.44 (n=268)	<b>0.61*</b> (n=55)	0.71 (n=369)	0.68 (n=99)	0.69 (n=369)	0.69 (n=56)
Leadership	0.75 (n=180)	0.77 (n=62)	0.64 (n=272)	<b>0.74*</b> (n=57)	0.69 (n=375)	0.74 (n=100)	0.66 (n=372)	<b>0.79**</b> (n=57)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 29. Social roles by biblical literalism and gender together**

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	19% (n=218)	24% (n=81)	14% (n=337)	<b>44%***</b> (n=67)	13% (n=388)	<b>7%^</b> (n=92)	17% (n=364)	19% (n=56)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	34% (n=102)	28% (n=55)	31% (n=152)	<b>55%*</b> (n=48)	26% (n=171)	<b>9%**</b> (n=58)	37% (n=156)	30% (n=33)
Abortion	0.52 (n=213)	0.48 (n=80)	0.46 (n=332)	<b>0.58^</b> (n=66)	0.73 (n=383)	0.75 (n=92)	0.73 (n=360)	0.73 (n=54)
Leadership	0.71 (n=217)	0.76 (n=81)	0.64 (n=337)	0.71 (n=67)	0.71 (n=388)	0.76 (n=92)	0.67 (n=363)	<b>0.82***</b> (n=56)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

First to note, as theorized, social role variables matter quite a bit for conservative Christian women, though not always in the way I anticipated. What did confirm expectations is that more liberal opinions on abortion are associated with more nascent ambition for both groups of conservative Christian women—the only groups for whom this variable matters in the bivariate analyses in this analysis or in the race and class analyses. This lends support to the idea that the strength of the gender narrative in conservative Christianity will make these variables particularly important to conservative Christian women

Surprisingly, however, by either measure, having preschool-aged children is associated with more nascent ambition for conservative Christian women—and this holds true when looking at individuals under 40. But the surprises regarding children do not stop there—they are associated with lower nascent ambition for men who are not Biblical literalists, men who are reborn and women who are not reborn. It is striking that for several other groups the presence of children is associated with less nascent ambition while for conservative Christian women it is associated with an increase.

On leadership, we see that for three of the four groups of women analyzed having higher self-assessed competence is related to greater ambition which this variable is irrelevant for all

groups of men. Notably the gap is largest among not biblical literalist women.

**Testing implications: obstacles and opportunities for ambition**

To examine how opportunities and obstacles impact ambition, I again assess gender and religion separately, and then together. I first examine recruitment, which I expect to be more important for women than for men, though I expect that political acquaintances will be more central for men’s ambition than women’s. I next examine skills, with the expectation that skills will benefit all participants but that the skills women learn in organizations will be more especially important and the skills conservative Christian women learn at church will play a substantial role for them. Regarding athletic participation, I anticipate conservative Christians, particularly conservative Christian women, will especially benefit. Lastly, I hypothesize that higher nascent ambition for women will be associated with experiencing discrimination, though because my measure of discrimination includes religion, I expect conservative Christian men may also see a boost related to this experience.

**Table 30. Opportunities and obstacles by reborn and gender separately**

	Men		Women		Reborn		Not Reborn	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	67% (n=700)	67% (n=186)	64% (n=749)	64% (n=129)	61% (n=452)	69% (n=119)	66% (n=749)	63% (n=157)
Political Acquaintances	52% (n=700)	<b>64%*</b> (n=186)	50% (n=749)	52% (n=129)	54% (n=452)	<b>69%*</b> (n=119)	53% (n=749)	59% (n=157)
Overall skills	0.6 (n=700)	<b>0.67^</b> (n=186)	0.51 (n=749)	0.56 (n=129)	0.54 (n=452)	<b>0.66**</b> (n=119)	0.54 (n=749)	0.61 (n=157)
Job skills	0.5 (n=700)	0.57 (n=186)	0.34 (n=749)	0.36 (n=129)	0.36 (n=452)	<b>0.47*</b> (n=119)	0.43 (n=749)	0.51 (n=157)
Church skills	0.11 (n=700)	0.17 (n=186)	0.15 (n=749)	0.16 (n=129)	0.25 (n=452)	0.33 (n=119)	0.07 (n=749)	0.09 (n=157)
Organizational Skills	0.28 (n=700)	<b>0.35^</b> (n=186)	0.25 (n=749)	<b>0.33^</b> (n=129)	0.26 (n=452)	<b>0.38*</b> (n=119)	0.26 (n=749)	0.32 (n=157)
Athlete	66% (n=700)	<b>76%*</b> (n=186)	46% (n=749)	<b>65%**</b> (n=129)	50% (n=452)	<b>74%***</b> (n=119)	58% (n=749)	<b>71%*</b> (n=157)
Discriminated against	12% (n=700)	17% (n=186)	13% (n=749)	<b>35%***</b> (n=129)	17% (n=452)	<b>28%^</b> (n=119)	9% (n=749)	<b>19%*</b> (n=157)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 31. Opportunities and obstacles by biblical literalism and gender separately**

	Men		Women		Biblical Literalist		Not Biblical Literalist	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	67% (n=700)	67% (n=186)	64% (n=749)	64% (n=129)	54% (n=555)	65% (n=148)	73% (n=752)	69% (n=148)
Political Acquaintances	52% (n=700)	<b>64%*</b> (n=186)	50% (n=749)	52% (n=129)	53% (n=555)	53% (n=148)	53% (n=752)	<b>68%**</b> (n=148)
Overall skills	0.6 (n=700)	<b>0.67^</b> (n=186)	0.51 (n=749)	0.56 (n=129)	0.50 (n=555)	<b>0.61**</b> (n=148)	0.60 (n=752)	0.67 (n=148)
Job skills	0.5 (n=700)	0.57 (n=186)	0.34 (n=749)	0.36 (n=129)	0.33 (n=555)	<b>0.48**</b> (n=148)	0.46 (n=752)	0.53 (n=148)
Church skills	0.11 (n=700)	0.17 (n=186)	0.15 (n=749)	0.16 (n=129)	0.20 (n=555)	0.20 (n=148)	0.10 (n=752)	0.15 (n=148)
Organizational Skills	0.28 (n=700)	<b>0.35^</b> (n=186)	0.25 (n=749)	<b>0.33^</b> (n=129)	0.22 (n=555)	0.28 (n=148)	0.29 (n=752)	<b>0.40*</b> (n=148)
Athlete	66% (n=700)	<b>76%*</b> (n=186)	46% (n=749)	<b>65%**</b> (n=129)	53% (n=555)	<b>79%***</b> (n=148)	56% (n=752)	<b>67% ^</b> (n=148)
Discriminated against	12% (n=700)	17% (n=186)	13% (n=749)	<b>35%***</b> (n=129)	12% (n=555)	<b>23%*</b> (n=148)	12% (n=752)	<b>25%*</b> (n=148)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

As in the analyses of race and class, direct recruitment to participate in politics does not impact nascent ambition. Political acquaintances are associated with higher nascent ambition for men, but the results do not tell a clear story regarding conservative Christianity—underlining the fact that there is not a clear dimension of privilege for this group. More ambitious men are more likely to have overall skills gained in any domain, though only organizational skills matter when the three skill domains are differentiated. For women, as hypothesized, only organizational skills make a difference. Overall skills are also associated with ambition for conservative Christians, though church skills are not the relevant division. Athletic participation is associated with being more ambitious for all groups. Individuals who have been discriminated against are more ambitious for all groups except men.

Turning to ambition at the intersections, we once again see that the story changes dramatically:

**Table 32. Opportunities and obstacles by reborn and gender together**

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	64% (n=180)	74% (n=62)	59% (n=272)	63% (n=57)	68% (n=376)	61% (n=100)	65% (n=373)	68% (n=57)
Political Acquaintances	56% (n=180)	<b>74%<sup>^</sup></b> (n=62)	53% (n=272)	63% (n=57)	57% (n=376)	64% (n=100)	49% (n=373)	51% (n=57)
Overall skills	0.61 (n=180)	<b>0.71<sup>^</sup></b> (n=62)	0.50 (n=272)	<b>0.60<sup>^</sup></b> (n=57)	0.60 (n=376)	0.64 (n=100)	0.49 (n=373)	0.54 (n=57)
Job skills	0.49 (n=180)	0.58 (n=62)	0.27 (n=272)	0.32 (n=57)	0.51 (n=376)	0.56 (n=100)	0.35 (n=373)	0.40 (n=57)
Church skills	0.25 (n=180)	0.35 (n=62)	0.26 (n=272)	0.29 (n=57)	0.06 (n=376)	0.10 (n=100)	0.09 (n=373)	0.06 (n=57)
Organizational skills	0.27 (n=180)	0.36 (n=62)	0.26 (n=272)	<b>0.40<sup>*</sup></b> (n=57)	0.28 (n=376)	0.33 (n=100)	0.24 (n=373)	0.28 (n=57)
Athlete	64% (n=180)	<b>81%<sup>*</sup></b> (n=62)	41% (n=272)	<b>65%<sup>**</sup></b> (n=57)	68% (n=376)	74% (n=100)	48% (n=373)	63% (n=57)
Discriminated against	16% (n=180)	26% (n=62)	17% (n=272)	31% (n=57)	10% (n=376)	11% (n=100)	9% (n=373)	<b>35%<sup>**</sup></b> (n=57)

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.1, <sup>\*</sup>p<.05, <sup>\*\*</sup>p<.01, <sup>\*\*\*</sup>p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 33. Opportunities and obstacles by biblical literalism and gender together**

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Man		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	54% (n=218)	63% (n=81)	54% (n=337)	66% (n=67)	73% (n=388)	71% (n=92)	73% (n=364)	65% (n=56)
Political Acquaintances	56% (n=218)	58% (n=81)	50% (n=337)	44% (n=67)	53% (n=388)	<b>69%<sup>*</sup></b> (n=92)	52% (n=364)	67% (n=56)
Overall skills	0.56 (n=218)	<b>0.68<sup>*</sup></b> (n=81)	0.44 (n=337)	0.49 (n=67)	0.63 (n=388)	0.67 (n=92)	0.56 (n=364)	0.65 (n=56)
Job skills	0.45 (n=218)	<b>0.58<sup>*</sup></b> (n=81)	0.25 (n=337)	0.31 (n=67)	0.53 (n=388)	0.56 (n=92)	0.39 (n=364)	0.46 (n=56)
Church skills	0.18 (n=218)	0.21 (n=81)	0.22 (n=337)	0.19 (n=67)	0.10 (n=388)	0.15 (n=92)	0.10 (n=364)	0.14 (n=56)
Organizational skills	0.22 (n=218)	0.29 (n=81)	0.22 (n=337)	0.26 (n=67)	0.30 (n=388)	<b>0.40<sup>*</sup></b> (n=92)	0.28 (n=364)	0.39 (n=56)
Athlete	62% (n=218)	<b>82%<sup>**</sup></b> (n=81)	47% (n=337)	<b>73%<sup>**</sup></b> (n=67)	68% (n=388)	71% (n=92)	44% (n=364)	59% (n=56)
Discriminated against	12% (n=218)	18% (n=81)	12% (n=337)	<b>31%<sup>*</sup></b> (n=67)	11% (n=388)	15% (n=92)	13% (n=364)	<b>44%<sup>**</sup></b> (n=56)

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.1, <sup>\*</sup>p<.05, <sup>\*\*</sup>p<.01, <sup>\*\*\*</sup>p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Once again direct recruitment to participate in politics is unassociated with ambition.

Also, having political acquaintances only matters for men, but which type of men depends on the measure of conservative Christianity, which again underscores its lack of a link to privilege.

More ambitious conservative Christian men are more likely to have overall skills, though the

domain is only relevant for one group—job skills for Biblical literalist men. The only group of women for whom skills matter is reborn women and, supporting my expectation that learning skills in a single-gender setting is important for women, organizational skills matter.

As hypothesized, athletic participation is positively related to ambitious individuals for conservative Christians and the size of the gap between ambitious and unambitious individuals is the largest for conservative Christian women. Experiencing discrimination is only a factor for women: for three of the four groups of women, ambitious individuals report experiencing discrimination more than their non-ambitious counterparts.

This bivariate examination once again shows that the ingredients for ambition vary for different groups of individuals. Measures of beliefs about women's role influence the ambition of conservative Christian women—and only them. Having preschool-aged children increases the ambition of conservative Christian women regardless of age, while young children's presence reduces ambition for other groups. Assessments of competence only matter for women. Skills matter mostly for conservative Christians, and the source of these skills is important. Recruitment is largely unrelated to nascent ambition. And ambition is related to athletic participation for conservative Christians and to discrimination for women.

### ***Social roles and opportunities together: multivariate analyses***

This section of analysis I use a multivariate probit model to test the influence of social roles and of opportunities on ambition together. I look at individuals who are not currently officeholders, and because a considerable number of relationships are obscured when the models are not intersectional, I proceed by analyzing separate models for each of the four groups. I include the coefficients as well as the marginal effects since the coefficients are useful only for

discerning the direction, relative magnitude, and significance of the relationships. The marginal effect that corresponds to each variable is the change in probability of being ambitious for either a change from 0 to 1 for the binary variables (indicated by a #) or from the lowest category to the highest category for the non-binary variables when the rest of the variables are held at their group-specific means. The significance levels reported correspond to the underlying coefficient. Additional control variables are included for education, family income, age, and marital status.<sup>123</sup> Correlations across all items are reported for all for groups for both the activist sample and the ambitious sub-set of respondents in the appendix. In this discussion I separate the results as above, into social roles, then into opportunities, and finally the control variables for ease of interpretation. The full, combined tables are presented in the appendix. One element to keep in mind in the discussion of the results is the comparison group—because I am concerned with who among those best situated to run for public has the ambition to do so, I compare nascently ambitious individuals to other activists, not to the general population.<sup>124</sup>

First I consider the effect of social roles on nascent ambition for both of my measures of conservative Christianity.

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<sup>123</sup> I also estimated these analyses with one overall skills variable. In this model the substantive results for the non-skills independent variables are essentially unchanged except that abortion becomes significant for not reborn women with a marginal effect of -5%. Notably, the combined skills variable is significant and positive for Biblical literalist men whereas the disaggregated skills variables are not.

<sup>124</sup> Limiting the comparison group to other activists to determine who will be interested in political office among those best positioned to take the step is a key element of this analysis. However, it is still useful to examine how these ambitious activists compare to everyone else. When I estimate the probit comparing ambitious activists to the rest of the population (including non-ambitious activists) I find relatively few differences. First, the sizes of the marginal effects are generally reduced for almost all groups. Additionally, for the analysis dividing on Biblical literalism, organizational skills become significant across the board (previously they were only significant for non-Biblical literalist men). Among Biblical literalist women, both abortion and family income become insignificant. For the analysis using reborn as the measure of conservative Christianity, marginal effect sizes are also generally reduced. Among reborn men church skills become insignificant and among non-reborn women, job skills become insignificant. For reborn women, organizational skills and being recruited for participation become significant.

**Table 34. Ingredients for nascent ambition by reborn and gender (social roles)**

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Preschool children #	<b>-0.59<sup>^</sup></b> (0.33)	<b>-10%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.78<sup>**</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>10%</b> (0.05)	-0.21 (0.25)	-4% (0.05)	-0.03 (0.27)	0% (0.02)
Abortion	0.45 (0.32)	10% (0.07)	<b>0.80<sup>*</sup></b> (0.33)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	-0.15 (0.30)	-3% (0.07)	-0.48 (0.34)	-4% (0.03)
Leadership	-0.24 (0.54)	-5% (0.12)	0.64 (0.53)	5% (0.04)	0.48 (0.47)	10% (0.10)	<b>1.50<sup>**</sup></b> (0.53)	<b>13%</b> (0.05)
Sample Size	224		306		431		385	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.16		0.30		0.13		0.26	
Wald Chi	30.38		67.36		35.44		69.26	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115, <sup>^</sup>p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 35. Ingredients for nascent ambition by biblical literalism and gender (social roles)**

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Preschool children #	0.01 (0.30)	0% (0.07)	<b>0.55<sup>*</sup></b> (0.28)	<b>7%</b> (0.05)	<b>-0.49<sup>^</sup></b> (0.25)	<b>-8%</b> (0.03)	0.23 (0.25)	2% (0.03)
Abortion	-0.17 (0.30)	-4% (0.07)	<b>0.47<sup>^</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)	0.37 (0.32)	7% (0.06)	-0.44 (0.37)	-4% (0.03)
Leadership	-0.11 (0.48)	-3% (0.12)	0.47 (0.46)	4% (0.04)	0.46 (0.46)	9% (0.09)	<b>1.42<sup>*</sup></b> (0.57)	<b>12%</b> (0.05)
Sample Size	272		368		438		380	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.13		0.25		0.15		0.26	
Wald Chi	25.71		81.56		44.88		71.84	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115, <sup>^</sup>p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Reviewing the results, a few patterns are clear. First, the results for women are almost identical, regardless of what measure is used. Second, as hypothesized, social roles, and especially opinions on abortion, are particularly important for conservative Christian women. Having more liberal ideas about abortion, used here as a proxy for ideas on women's roles, increases the likelihood that a conservative Christian women will be ambitious by 4%-6%, depending on the measure. This finding, which we also saw in the bivariate analysis, is especially notable when we consider that opinions on abortion are not significant for any other group, which supports my argument that the nature of conservative Christian narratives on gender are particularly influential compared to narratives in other groups.

Self-assessed leadership is only important for the nascent ambition of women who are not conservative Christians, increasing the likelihood that they are ambitious by a sizable 12%-13%. It's noteworthy that self-assessed leadership, which was also significant for non-conservative Christian women in our initial analysis of these groups, is the most influential variable for these women's ambition other than age. The literature on conservative Christian women led to conflicting hypotheses regarding the importance of leadership for nascent ambition for this group of women—and the results seem to indicate that perhaps conservative Christian's women's engagement in religion, noted as Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001), as a man's game has made self-assessed competence less essential for their political ambition.

The unexpected finding here is the effect of the presence of children—as we found in our initial analysis, contrary to expectations given the relatively conservative opinions conservative Christian women hold regarding work and motherhood, the presence of preschool-aged children increases the likelihood that conservative Christian women are ambitious by 7%-10%. A possible alternative explanation here is, given the centrality of children and motherhood for conservative Christian women, those women without these young children at home might not believe they have the appropriate biography for office—in other words, it is hard to imagine a childless conservative Christian woman being elected to public office. The effect of children on men is unclear—as in the bivariate analyses, it is negatively related to men's ambition but not in a consistent way across measures. Other social role variables are, as expected, not part of the story for men.

In turning to the effects of opportunities and obstacles on nascent ambition:

**Table 36. Ingredients for nascent ambition by reborn and gender (opportunities and obstacles)**

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Recruited for Participation #	0.30 (0.31)	6% (0.06)	0.36 (0.24)	3% (0.02)	-0.12 (0.20)	-3% (0.05)	0.08 (0.25)	1% (0.02)
Political Acquaintances#	<b>0.69*</b> (0.28)	<b>14%</b> (0.05)	0.22 (0.23)	2% (0.02)	0.13 (0.21)	3% (0.05)	0.14 (0.21)	1% (0.02)
Job Skills	-0.33 (0.33)	-7% (0.07)	<b>0.60^</b> (0.36)	<b>5%</b> (0.03)	-0.01 (0.29)	0% (0.06)	<b>-0.65^</b> (0.34)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)
Church Skills	<b>0.63^</b> (0.37)	<b>14%</b> (0.08)	0.50 (0.37)	4% (0.03)	0.58 (0.48)	13% (0.10)	-0.35 (0.43)	-3% (0.04)
Organizational Skills	0.17 (0.41)	4% (0.09)	0.34 (0.33)	3% (0.03)	<b>0.52^</b> (0.28)	<b>11%</b> (0.06)	0.25 (0.40)	2% (0.03)
Athlete #	0.45 (0.29)	9% (0.05)	<b>0.56*</b> (0.23)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)	0.29 (0.24)	6% (0.05)	0.11 (0.21)	1% (0.02)
Discriminated against #	<b>0.60*</b> (0.28)	<b>16%</b> (0.09)	0.24 (0.26)	2% (0.03)	0.19 (0.27)	4% (0.07)	<b>0.90***</b> (0.27)	<b>14%</b> (0.06)
Sample Size	224		306		431		385	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.16		0.30		0.13		0.26	
Wald Chi	30.38		67.36		35.44		69.26	

Significance: ^p<.115, ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation: preschool children, abortion, leadership, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 37. Ingredients for nascent ambition by biblical literalism and gender (opportunities and obstacles)**

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Recruited for Participation #	0.29 (0.24)	7% (0.06)	<b>0.43^</b> (0.22)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)	-0.09 (0.22)	-2% (0.05)	-0.31 (0.26)	-3% (0.03)
Political Acquaintances #	0.03 (0.25)	1% (0.06)	0.08 (0.22)	1% (0.02)	<b>0.41^</b> (0.21)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.64*</b> (0.27)	<b>6%</b> (0.02)
Job Skills	0.18 (0.36)	4% (0.09)	0.09 (0.33)	1% (0.03)	-0.18 (0.29)	-4% (0.06)	0.00 (0.31)	0% (0.03)
Church Skills	0.21 (0.35)	5% (0.08)	0.02 (0.36)	0% (0.03)	0.45 (0.37)	9% (0.07)	0.25 (0.34)	2% (0.03)
Organizational Skills	0.38 (0.35)	9% (0.09)	0.06 (0.30)	1% (0.03)	<b>0.74**</b> (0.28)	<b>15%</b> (0.06)	0.45 (0.38)	4% (0.03)
Athlete #	<b>0.59*</b> (0.26)	<b>13%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.59**</b> (0.22)	<b>6%</b> (0.02)	0.17 (0.22)	3% (0.04)	0.09 (0.22)	1% (0.02)
Discriminated against #	0.24 (0.29)	6% (0.08)	<b>0.63*</b> (0.27)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	0.30 (0.26)	7% (0.07)	<b>0.88***</b> (0.26)	<b>13%</b> (0.06)
Sample Size	272		368		438		380	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.13		0.25		0.15		0.26	
Wald Chi	25.71		81.56		44.88		71.84	

Significance: ^p<.115, ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation: preschool children, abortion, leadership, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

This analysis shows that obstacles and opportunities have a larger degree of variation than social roles depending on the measure, though there are a few commonalities. Among the commonalities are that for non-conservative Christian women discrimination is, as theorized and

as found in the initial analyses, related to nascent ambition, increasing their likelihood of being ambitious by 13%-14%. Conservative Christian women and men, however, are split depending on the measure—among Biblical literalists experiencing discrimination increases the likelihood that women are ambitious (by 9%) but has no effect on men while among reborn individuals, the likelihood that men are ambitious increases by 16% while women's is unrelated.<sup>125</sup> It's notable that reborn women are the only group of women examined whose ambition is unrelated to discrimination.

Also common across both measures is the impact of athletics on conservative Christian women's nascent ambition. As hypothesized and as we found in the bivariate analyses, participating in athletics is particularly powerful for conservative Christian women, increasing the likelihood that they are ambitious by 5%-6%. Also as hypothesized, athletic participation has a similar effect for conservative Christian men, increasing the likelihood that Biblical literalist men are ambitious by 13% and just missing significance for reborn men.

The last commonality, and an unexpected one, is the relationship between organizational skills for non-conservative Christian men. By both measures, this is the most influential significant variable outside of the control variables. And, contrary to expectations, organizational skills do not matter for any group of women in the religion analysis. Other findings on skills variables were somewhat scattered and often differed from what was found in the initial bivariate analysis. Recruitment variables also have a relatively small role to play. Biblical literalist women are more likely to be nascently ambitious if they have been recruited but they are the only group of women for whom this is the case. Worth noting on the political acquaintances variable is the lack of consistency depending on the measure—this supports my argument that this particular

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<sup>125</sup> When these models are estimated with minority as a variable, discrimination becomes insignificant for reborn men.

religious division is not related to privilege.

**Table 38. Ingredients for nascent ambition by reborn and gender (controls)**

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Married #	0.08 (0.29)	2% (0.06)	0.26 (0.25)	2% (0.02)	0.18 (0.24)	4% (0.05)	<b>-0.89***</b> (0.24)	<b>-9%</b> (0.03)
Education	-0.48 (0.40)	-11% (0.09)	<b>-0.87*</b> (0.35)	<b>-7%</b> (0.03)	<b>-1.04**</b> (0.34)	<b>-23%</b> (0.08)	0.03 (0.33)	0% (0.03)
Family income	-0.25 (0.71)	-6% (0.16)	<b>-2.16**</b> (0.80)	<b>-18%</b> (0.06)	-0.30 (0.51)	-7% (0.11)	0.47 (0.59)	4% (0.05)
Age	<b>-3.43***</b> (1.02)	<b>-76%</b> (0.24)	<b>-3.00**</b> (0.98)	<b>-24%</b> (0.08)	<b>-3.41***</b> (0.86)	<b>-74%</b> (0.19)	<b>-2.30***</b> (0.67)	<b>-20%</b> (0.06)
Constant	-0.31 (0.58)		<b>-1.23^</b> (0.66)		0.43 (0.53)		<b>-1.13^</b> (0.59)	
Sample Size	224		306		431		385	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.16		0.30		0.13		0.26	
Wald Chi	30.38		67.36		35.44		69.26	

Significance: ^p<.115, ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 39. Ingredients for nascent ambition by biblical literalism and gender (controls)**

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Married #	0.06 (0.30)	1% (0.07)	-0.23 (0.20)	-2% (0.02)	0.21 (0.24)	4% (0.04)	<b>-0.59*</b> (0.26)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)
Education	<b>-0.97*</b> (0.40)	<b>-24%</b> (0.10)	-0.57 (0.40)	-5% (0.03)	<b>-1.10***</b> (0.34)	<b>-22%</b> (0.07)	<b>-0.68*</b> (0.33)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)
Family income	0.01 (0.64)	0% (0.16)	<b>-0.82^^</b> (0.51)	<b>-8%</b> (0.05)	-0.46 (0.52)	-9% (0.10)	-0.18 (0.65)	-2% (0.05)
Age	<b>-3.10**</b> (1.00)	<b>-76%</b> (0.25)	<b>-3.23***</b> (0.84)	<b>-30%</b> (0.09)	<b>-3.29***</b> (0.81)	<b>-65%</b> (0.17)	<b>-2.07*</b> (0.82)	<b>-18%</b> (0.07)
Constant	0.13 (0.52)		-0.84 (0.62)		0.02 (0.54)		-1.07 (0.73)	
Sample Size	272		368		438		380	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.13		0.25		0.15		0.26	
Wald Chi	25.71		81.56		44.88		71.84	

Significance: ^p<.115, ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Finally I examine the effect of the control variables on nascent ambition. Here, again, there is quite a bit of consistency in the results, regardless of the measure used. As with the analyses on race and class, age is consistently the most important factor, particularly for men;

younger individuals are more nascently ambitious.<sup>126</sup> Family income, notably, only affects the ambition of conservative Christian women—the wealthier their families are, the less likely they are to be ambitious. Marriage once again has a negative impact on women, but only for one group—non-conservative Christian women. As it did for white women and college-educated women, being married reduces the likelihood that non-conservative Christian women are nascently ambitious, in this case between 6%-9%. As noted in previous chapters, this occurs for all of these groups in conjunction with the result that children do not affect nascent ambition.

The one area of inconsistency in these results is the effect of education—among non-conservative Christian men it is negative by either measure, reducing the likelihood of nascent ambition 22%-23%—but which other groups feel the negative effect depends on the measure used.<sup>127</sup> It is worth noting that the negative relationship between nascent ambition and education is still significant when ambitious activists are compared to the general population, (though the size of the marginal effect is reduced), so the comparison group is not the full explanation. As noted in other chapters, one possible explanation for this is that individuals with less education might be more interested in serving in public office, which does not have an education requirement.<sup>128 129</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Though this finding holds for all groups when the ambitious activists are compared to the rest of the population, the likelihoods shrink substantially. Thus, this is partly the result of non-ambitious activists being older.

<sup>127</sup> Education is coded into four categories: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate. Individuals with some college report the most nascent ambition—19.2% of these activists are ambitious (n=316). College graduates are the least ambitious—only 9.7% of activist college graduates report being ambitious. Within this group, the rates are lowest for those holding only B.A.s and M.A.s, at 8.2% and 8.4% respectively. The highest rates are for people with doctoral or professional degrees, at 14.1% and 20.9%, though these samples are small (n=28 in each case). Among people with Associate's degrees, 11.5% are ambitious.

<sup>128</sup> One final note on these overall models—I also estimated them with race included. The overall take away from that analysis is that among non-conservative Christians the minority variable is sometimes significant—for non-Biblical literalist men and non-reborn women—but otherwise none of these models change. Among conservative Christians, being a minority is significant and positively associated with nascent ambition for all groups, but other changes are fairly minor for men: among Biblical literalist men there are no changes, among reborn men, being contacted for recruitment is significant while discrimination is not. Conservative Christian women see the most changes—among Biblical literalist women family income is no longer significant and neither is abortion (though it is close). Also, the power and significance of athletic participation and being discriminated against are somewhat

## *Becoming an activist and selection bias*

As with the analysis of race and class, I now turn to what factors impact who becomes an activist. While this question already has a rich literature (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), it is useful to examine the eligibility pool I constructed in the context of the larger population. This set of analyses provides a more nuanced understanding of the effect of social organization and circumstances on generating our pool of activists and provides a clear contrast with the factors that differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious activists.

A probit model is again used here. In a departure from the earlier model, the skills variable is estimated as a combined index. This is because for conservative Christian women and

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reduced. Among reborn women, the presence of young children, abortion, and athletic participation are less powerful. Being recruited becomes significant, as do organizational skills, while job skills become insignificant.<sup>129</sup> Regarding party (see note 43 for more detail on these estimates): in the religion and gender models I find that being a Democrat increases the likelihood of being nascently ambitious for three of the four groups of women: non-Biblical literalist women by 4%(^), Biblical literalist women by 4%(\*), and reborn women by 4%(\*). Including a dummy for being a Democrat also makes abortion and family income insignificant for Biblical literalist women and reduces the effect size and significance of abortion for reborn women. For reborn women, job skills become insignificant while being recruited to participate becomes significant (3%^). Given the identification of Democrats as pro-choice and Republicans as pro-life the changes in the abortion variable are not terribly surprising. Among conservative Christian men, being a Democrat increases the likelihood of being significant by 26%(\*\*\*), an unexpectedly large change. For Biblical literalist men, including a variable for being a Democrat makes being recruited to participate significant at 8%(^^) and education insignificant. Including a dummy for being Republican does not impact the models for non-conservative Christians other than the fact that for non-Biblical literalist men being a Republican increases their likelihood of being nascently ambitious by 7%(^^). For conservative Christians, being Republican decreases Biblical literalist men's likelihood of being ambitious by 13%(\*\*), makes abortion and family income insignificant for Biblical literalist women, means being recruited to participate significant (3%^) for reborn women and makes having preschool aged children and church skills no longer significant for reborn men. In the alternative specification using interest in running as the only measure for nascent ambition (see note 40), in the reborn models: for reborn men, having liberal opinions on abortion increases the likelihood of being ambitious by 9%(^^) and being an athlete increases it by 11%(\*); for reborn women, job skills and education are insignificant while church skills and organizational skills are both significant at 4%(^); for men who are not reborn, leadership is significant at 14%(^); and among women who are not reborn, having political acquaintances increases the likelihood of being ambitious by 2%(^), while marriage is insignificant. In the Biblical literalism models: for Biblical literalist men, organizational skills increases the likelihood of being ambitious by 13%(^^); for Biblical literalist women, being recruited to participate and family income are insignificant; for men who are not Biblical literalists, having preschool-aged children is not significant; and among women who are not Biblical literalists, having organizational skills increases the likelihood of being ambitious by 2%(^), while marriage and education are insignificant. Generally speaking, across all of these groups, using the alternative dependent variable reduces the effect size of significant factors.

men, using either measure, having organizational skills perfectly predicts activism, resulting in a dramatic reduction in sample size. Differences due to this model are noted.<sup>130</sup>

**Table 40. Ingredients for activism by reborn and gender (social roles)**

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Preschool children #	<b>-0.97**</b> (0.32)	<b>-33%</b> (0.12)	-0.03 (0.26)	-1% (0.09)	0.42 (0.28)	11% (0.06)	0.24 (0.21)	8% (0.07)
Abortion	-0.31 (0.31)	-9% (0.09)	<b>0.57**</b> (0.22)	<b>19%</b> (0.07)	0.23 (0.26)	7% (0.07)	0.05 (0.22)	2% (0.08)
Leadership	<b>1.31*</b> (0.58)	<b>37%</b> (0.17)	-0.14 (0.36)	-5% (0.12)	-0.16 (0.37)	-5% (0.11)	<b>0.60^</b> (0.34)	<b>21%</b> (0.12)
Sample Size	294		441		558		579	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.35		0.24		0.26		0.24	
Wald Chi	64.99		72.20		96.75		76.97	

Significance: ^p<.115, ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 41. Ingredients for activism by biblical literalism and gender (social roles)**

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Preschool children #	-0.35 (0.25)	-12% (0.09)	0.07 (0.21)	2% (0.08)	0.10 (0.31)	2% (0.07)	<b>0.64*</b> (0.26)	<b>14%</b> (0.05)
Abortion	0.20 (0.25)	7% (0.08)	0.22 (0.18)	8% (0.07)	-0.04 (0.29)	-1% (0.08)	-0.01 (0.28)	0% (0.07)
Leadership	0.29 (0.45)	10% (0.15)	-0.10 (0.29)	-4% (0.11)	0.20 (0.39)	5% (0.10)	0.61 (0.42)	16% (0.11)
Sample Size	386		605		536		491	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.23		0.22		0.28		0.25	
Wald Chi	54.07		101.41		90.73		63.35	

Significance: ^p<.115, ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Unlike in the prediction of nascent ambition, the effects of social role variables are not very consistent across measures in predicting activism. Liberal opinions on abortion, which

<sup>130</sup> In models where the skills are separated, differences aside from the skills variables are generally changes in effect size, not significance, though there are more changes here than in some of the other chapters on race and class. Regarding significance changes: among reborn men and women the skills and age variables are insignificant, among non-reborn men, children become significant and only organizational skills are significant, among non-reborn women, leadership is insignificant (though it is close) and only organizational skills are significant. Turning to Biblical literalists, for men, only job skills are significant and being married becomes significant. No skills are significant for Biblical literalist women. Among non-Biblical literalists, for men, only organizational skills are significant while for women both job and organizational skills are significant.

mattered for conservative Christian women regardless of the measure when predicting nascent ambition, only matter for reborn women when predicting activism. Self-assessed leadership, which mattered for both groups of non-conservative Christian women in predicting ambition, only matters for non-reborn women in predicting activism.<sup>131</sup> Also, having children does not increase the likelihood of activism for conservative Christian women, as it did with ambition—instead it increases the likelihood of activism among one of the groups of non-conservative Christian women, non-Biblical literalists.

Interestingly, and in a departure from earlier analyses of race and class, social role variables affect men’s activism in this model. Reborn men’s likelihood of being active increases by 37% when they move from the lowest to the highest point on the leadership scale and decreases by 33% when they have preschool-aged children. It is also worth noting that when this model is estimated with separated skills, children are a positive, significant factor in predicting the activism of men who are not reborn.

**Table 42. Ingredients for activism by reborn and gender (opportunities and obstacles)**

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Recruited for Participation #	0.36 (0.28)	10% (0.08)	<b>0.70***</b> (0.21)	<b>23%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.80***</b> (0.19)	<b>24%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.57***</b> (0.17)	<b>20%</b> (0.06)
Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.52*</b> (0.26)	<b>15%</b> (0.07)	0.18 (0.18)	6% (0.06)	0.07 (0.18)	2% (0.05)	0.04 (0.18)	1% (0.06)
Skills	<b>0.89*</b> (0.37)	<b>25%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.20***</b> (0.29)	<b>40%</b> (0.09)	<b>0.97***</b> (0.26)	<b>28%</b> (0.07)	<b>0.84**</b> (0.28)	<b>29%</b> (0.10)
Athlete #	-0.30 (0.30)	-8% (0.08)	0.30 (0.19)	10% (0.06)	<b>0.33^</b> (0.18)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	-0.01 (0.16)	0% (0.06)
Discriminated against #	<b>0.65*</b> (0.30)	<b>15%</b> (0.06)	-0.18 (0.24)	-6% (0.09)	0.01 (0.26)	0% (0.08)	-0.13 (0.25)	-4% (0.09)
Sample Size	294		441		558		579	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.35		0.24		0.26		0.24	
Wald Chi	64.99		72.20		96.75		76.97	

Significance: ^p<.115, ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

<sup>131</sup> Though note this variable isn’t significant in the model where skills are separated.

**Table 43. Ingredients for activism by biblical literalism and gender (opportunities and obstacles)**

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Recruited for Participation #	0.26 (0.22)	9% (0.07)	<b>0.58***</b> (0.17)	<b>21%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.95***</b> (0.20)	<b>26%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.56**</b> (0.20)	<b>16%</b> (0.06)
Political Acquaintances #	0.32 (0.21)	10% (0.07)	0.21 (0.16)	8% (0.06)	0.13 (0.19)	3% (0.05)	0.12 (0.21)	3% (0.06)
Skills	<b>1.06***</b> (0.30)	<b>35%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.16***</b> (0.25)	<b>44%</b> (0.09)	<b>0.95**</b> (0.32)	<b>24%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.06***</b> (0.31)	<b>28%</b> (0.08)
Athlete #	-0.03 (0.22)	-1% (0.07)	<b>0.33*</b> (0.15)	<b>12%</b> (0.06)	0.27 (0.21)	7% (0.06)	-0.13 (0.20)	-4% (0.05)
Discriminated against #	0.14 (0.26)	4% (0.08)	-0.08 (0.22)	-3% (0.09)	0.19 (0.29)	5% (0.07)	-0.09 (0.26)	-3% (0.07)
Sample Size	386		605		536		491	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.23		0.22		0.28		0.25	
Wald Chi	54.07		101.41		90.73		63.35	

Significance: ^p<.115, ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, married, education, family income, age.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Once again, as in the class and race analyses, in looking at the effect of experiences on activity we see what we would expect based previous literature: recruitment (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) are key factors for participation. The likelihood of being active increases for all groups except conservative Christian men when they are recruited to participate. The effects are fairly similar across the groups, ranging from 16%-26% with, interestingly, non-conservative Christian men at the higher end for both measures. Notably, though, while being recruited does not affect the activism of conservative Christian men, my second measure of recruitment—having political acquaintances—does have an effect, increasing reborn men’s likelihood of being active by 15%. Skills matter strongly across the board, though especially for conservative Christian women, increasing their likelihood of being active by 40%-44%. It is worth noting that this finding seems largely driven by organizational skills for many groups (see footnote 130). The fact that variables central in the participation literature are also central for this sample is reassuring.

The other experiences in my model are less critical for activism than ambition. Being discriminated against only increases activism for one group of conservative Christian men and being an athlete only improves the likelihood of activism for two groups: Biblical literalist women and non-reborn men. Given hypotheses regarding these variables for ambition, it is not terribly surprising they are less critical here. I would expect the benefits of athletic participation to be less pronounced for participation, for which leadership skills are less important. And experiencing discrimination has consistently been less of a predictor of activism throughout these analyses.

**Table 44. Ingredients for activism by reborn and gender (controls)**

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Married #	0.01 (0.28)	0% (0.08)	0.18 (0.21)	6% (0.07)	0.21 (0.19)	6% (0.06)	-0.01 (0.17)	0% (0.06)
Education	0.56 (0.42)	16% (0.12)	-0.05 (0.31)	-2% (0.10)	0.01 (0.31)	0% (0.09)	<b>0.52<sup>^</sup></b> (0.28)	<b>18%</b> (0.10)
Family income	<b>1.38*</b> (0.61)	<b>39%</b> (0.17)	<b>1.09*</b> (0.51)	<b>36%</b> (0.17)	<b>1.35**</b> (0.46)	<b>39%</b> (0.13)	<b>1.17*</b> (0.46)	<b>40%</b> (0.16)
Age	<b>1.38<sup>^</sup></b> (0.80)	<b>39%</b> (0.23)	<b>1.14<sup>^</sup></b> (0.65)	<b>38%</b> (0.21)	0.66 (0.57)	19% (0.16)	<b>1.94***</b> (0.54)	<b>67%</b> (0.18)
Constant	<b>-1.98***</b> (0.59)		<b>-1.52**</b> (0.49)		<b>-1.50***</b> (0.46)		<b>-2.12***</b> (0.47)	
Sample Size	294		441		558		579	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.35		0.24		0.26		0.24	
Wald Chi	64.99		72.20		96.75		76.97	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115, <sup>^</sup>p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 45. Ingredients for activism by biblical literalism and gender (controls)**

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Married #	0.34 (0.22)	12% (0.08)	0.09 (0.17)	3% (0.06)	0.05 (0.21)	1% (0.05)	-0.23 (0.20)	-6% (0.05)
Education	<b>0.58<sup>^</sup></b> (0.34)	<b>19%</b> (0.11)	0.10 (0.28)	4% (0.10)	-0.01 (0.34)	0% (0.09)	0.34 (0.30)	9% (0.08)
Family income	0.74 (0.55)	25% (0.18)	<b>1.22**</b> (0.41)	<b>46%</b> (0.15)	<b>1.29*</b> (0.54)	<b>33%</b> (0.13)	<b>1.32*</b> (0.54)	<b>35%</b> (0.14)
Age	0.10 (0.67)	3% (0.22)	<b>1.26*</b> (0.51)	<b>47%</b> (0.19)	<b>-1.38*</b> (0.62)	<b>35%</b> (0.16)	<b>2.17***</b> (0.66)	<b>57%</b> (0.17)
Constant	<b>-1.26**</b> (0.48)		<b>-1.63***</b> (0.39)		<b>-1.74***</b> (0.52)		<b>-2.03***</b> (0.59)	
Sample Size	386		605		536		491	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.23		0.22		0.28		0.25	
Wald Chi	54.07		101.41		90.73		63.35	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115, <sup>^</sup>p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Included in the estimation but not shown here: preschool children, abortion, leadership, recruited for participation, political acquaintances, job skills, church skills, organizational skills, athlete, discriminated against.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Among the control variables, being married has no effect for any group while education increases activism for only two groups. Having family income increases the likelihood of being active for almost all groups, as does being older. What's perhaps most notable here is the dramatic differences in the control variables regarding activism and ambition—in many cases they point in the exact opposite direction. What is key to take away from this analysis, as was true in the class and race analyses: these activists are not atypical—they participate for the reasons we would expect, namely recruitment and skills—and the factors that lead someone to be active are not the same ones that lead that person to be ambitious.<sup>132</sup>

Because ambitious individuals are different both from other activists and the population overall (see footnote 124 and results in appendix which details the relatively small changes in results when ambitious activists are compared to everyone else), it is important to perform one

<sup>132</sup> Regarding party (see note 43 for more detail on these estimates): including a dummy for being a Democrat has no effect on Biblical literalist models while in the reborn models the only change is for reborn men—education becomes significant (20%<sup>^^</sup>) while age becomes insignificant. Including a dummy for being a Republican only substantially changes one variable in the religion models: for Biblical literalist men in the new model being married increases their likelihood of being politically active by 12%<sup>^^</sup>.

additional robustness check for selection bias to ensure that the results we see regarding what impacts ambition among activists are not biased due to factors that affect selection into activism.

To address this concern I model ambition as a two-step process using a Heckman probit where the first step is the selection model (the dependent variable is becoming an activist) and the second step is the outcome model (the dependent variable is being an ambitious activist).<sup>133</sup>

Comparing the coefficients and significance levels for the two-stage Heckman probit to the initial models, my results (see appendix) are somewhat less stable than they are in the class and race analyses. Results are substantively similar for non-reborn women and men, and men who are and are not Biblical literalists,<sup>134</sup> and women who are and non-Biblical literalists.<sup>135</sup> The results for reborn men<sup>136</sup> and women<sup>137</sup> and women who are Biblical literalists<sup>138</sup> are somewhat

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<sup>133</sup> We cannot simply compare ambition for everyone since we lack information about ambition for people who are not activists. As explained initially, the ambition variable I construct is based on motivations for activism and the nature of this coding means that this variable is only available among those who are active—we do not observe nascent ambition among non-activists since we don't know their motivations for actions never taken. Estimating a Heckman probit is useful because it corrects for biases in the outcome stage that are due to self-selection into the activism (see Maestas et al. 2006 for further discussion on the advantages of this model in the context of ambition). Estimating this model requires we have an identifying model in the selection equation that is not in the outcome model. For this estimation I alter the original outcome model by eliminating one recruitment variable that is essential to the selection model: recruited for participation. This variable was only marginally significant for one group in the original estimation but it is central to becoming an activist for all groups. See appendix for original model reestimated without this variable.

<sup>134</sup> By substantively similar I mean the same coefficients are significant and the size of the coefficient is very similar. This is true both when comparing to the original outcome model, as well as outcome models which eliminate the “recruited for participation” variable but do not have a selection model. The only differences worth noting that the size of the marginal effects for non-reborn women and Biblical literalist men are larger in the two-stage Heckman probit. This isn't to say there is no selection bias for some of these groups but rather that correcting for this bias does not affect the substantive story of the outcome model. Regarding sample selection in the other groups studied here, rho is insignificant for non-reborn men (probability>chi2=0.9739), non-reborn women (probability>chi2=0.1274), Biblical literalist men (probability>chi2=0.1168) and non-Biblical literalist men (probability>chi2=0.9537).

<sup>135</sup> The selection model—which measures what factors affect becoming an activist—remains substantively the same. For the outcome models, in the new outcome model is virtually the same except that political acquaintances is no longer significant and the sizes of the marginal effects for the variables are larger. The rho for the heckprobit is insignificant, though, at (probability>chi2=0.4596).

<sup>136</sup> The selection model—which measures what factors affect becoming an activist—remains substantively the same. For the outcome models, reborn men see the largest change in the new outcome model—none of the variables are still significant other than age. The rho for the heckprobit is insignificant, though, at (probability>chi2=0.889).

<sup>137</sup> The selection model—which measures what factors affect becoming an activist—remains substantively the same. For the outcome models, in the new outcome model job skills and abortion are no longer significant and the sizes of the marginal effects for the variables are larger. The rho for the heckprobit is insignificant, though, at (probability>chi2=0.375).

less stable in the outcome models. The outcome models (original and Heckman) for these groups are compared in the appendix.

This robustness check, while it shows somewhat less stability than in other chapters, still largely indicates that selection bias is not a major concern for this analysis overall. In combination with Fulton et al.'s (2006) observation of a lack of selection bias in their examination of progressive ambition and gender this suggests that selection bias in ambition studies may not be prevalent.

### *Conclusion*

The findings in this third close examination of social groups and their effect on nascent ambition demonstrate again that, as theorized, the factors that affect nascent ambition vary widely between groups—models of nascent ambition should not be one-size-fits all. Age is once again the only factor that affects all groups and only education comes in a close second for widespread influence.<sup>139</sup> As in the race and class analyses, this variation regarding what affects ambition for different groups stands in striking contrast with predicting activism where the non-demographic factors of recruitment and skills matter for nearly everyone.

These results once again lend support the key elements of the roles and experiences framework I propose for examining women's nascent ambition. First, these analyses show that gendered social roles matter more for women's nascent ambition than men's, though this

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<sup>138</sup> The selection model—which measures what factors affect becoming an activist—remains substantively the same. For the outcome models, in the new outcome model being an athlete, having preschool-aged children, and abortion are no longer significant and the sizes of the marginal effects for the other variables are larger. Being recruited is obviously no longer in the model. The rho for the heckprobit is insignificant, though, at (probability>chi2=0.268). Note that in the outcome model without contact that does not have a selection model, abortion and family income are no longer significant.

<sup>139</sup> Education does not affect nascent ambition for white women, Biblical literalist women, reborn men or not reborn women. It is not a control variable in the class estimates. This is true in both the original and the Heckman selection outcome models.

analysis is not quite as clear cut as the class and race analyses. The results also support a second critical element of my theory—the impact of gender roles on nascent ambition differs for different groups of women. For example, more liberal opinions on abortion increase nascent ambition among conservative Christian women but not among non-conservative Christian women—a finding consistent with my hypotheses and indicative of the importance of women’s role in the conservative Christian narrative on gender. Additionally, self-assessed leadership increases nascent ambition for non-conservative Christian women but not for their conservative Christian counterparts.

As in earlier analyses, gendered obstacles and opportunities are also powerful predictors of nascent ambition for women. Consistent with earlier chapters, I show that experiencing discrimination increases nascent ambition for almost all groups of women, a result that supports my hypotheses.<sup>140</sup> Discrimination is only a factor for reborn men, and not when the selection model is used. Additionally, as theorized, athletic participation has different effects for women in different social groups. In line with expectations regarding the importance of athletics in narratives on muscular Christianity, athletic participation promotes ambition among conservative Christian women (and men) while not among their non-conservative counterparts.

Lastly, recalling the earlier results of class and race analyses, it merits mentioning that no group here is as unexplained as minority men and non-college-educated men were in the earlier chapters.<sup>141</sup> Given what we have shown about the relationship between privilege and the relevant variables for men, this underscores the lack of privilege at work in dividing conservative and non-conservative Christians.

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<sup>140</sup> It isn’t significant for reborn women.

<sup>141</sup> Though note that reborn men do see a drop off in the number of significant predictors when a selection model is used.

## **Chapter Six: Privilege, Narrative and Mutability**

### **Comparisons of race, class, and religion as they impact gender and ambition**

Race, class, and religion are some of the key defining elements of individuals' lives, shaping their ideas, goals, and opportunities. One largely unexplored area is their impact on political ambition, despite the fact that who wants to run for office—and who comes to hold it—has significant effects on political life and public policy. I argue that the spatial segregation of these groups allows them structure gender differently—to place different emphases on certain aspects of gender—and that these different emphases result in different kinds of cumulative disadvantages for women's ambition. Put another way, I leverage how gender is differently embedded in social groups to shine a light on how it affects individuals' nascent ambition across groups, both in terms of level of ambition and the relevant ingredients for it.

The close examinations of race, class, and religion have shown that the levels of men's and women's nascent ambition, and the factors that influence it, differ based on their membership in particular groups. But thus far my research has only marginally addressed elements of a broader case-study analysis comparing these three groups. Such an analysis provides important insights into how social groups function with respect to ambition and merits discussion here. To undertake this analysis I compare race, class, and religion on three dimensions on which they differ: privilege, narrative and mutability. Woven throughout this analysis is gender, specifically with regards to how these dimensions affect the way gender influences nascent ambition.

This sort of comparative case-study analysis faces particular methodological issues, most

notably overdetermination. I take a similar view as Jackman (1994) in her work on inequality:

“...[T]he inferential process throughout the analysis will necessarily take interpretive liberties. My purpose is to exploit the distinctive features of the three cases in order to explore new propositions about the ideological dynamic of long-term relations of inequality...the three [cases]...should be conceived as comparative case studies, each selected purposively to through a different angle of light on the ideology of inequality”  
(121)

With both the benefits and limitations of this kind of analysis in mind, I begin first with privilege.

### *Privilege*

When I say a group is privileged I mean that it is systematically allocated more resources and systematically receives better treatment than its counterpart. It is the opposite of oppression, which in the words of Haslanger (2000), “is a structural phenomenon that positions certain groups as disadvantaged and others as advantaged or privileged in relation to them” (39). Among the groups I analyze, race and class divide along lines of privilege—there are clearly advantaged individuals (whites and individuals with higher class status) and clearly disadvantaged individuals (minorities and individuals with lower class status) (Haslanger 2000; Jackman 1994; Tilly 1998). Religion, as measured in this analysis as conservative Christian or not, does not divide along lines of privilege.<sup>142</sup> Gender, of course, also has a dimension of privilege in which men are advantaged. But while privilege for race, class, and gender might operate similarly (Tilly 1998), the construction of privilege for these groups differs (Jackman 1994). As discussed

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<sup>142</sup> If I had examined different religious groups—notably visible religious minorities—privilege would come into play. But in the U.S. it is not clear that individuals who are conservative Christians or not have a specific advantage, particularly given the often hidden nature of this division.

in chapter two, for race and class, which are most often characterized by spatial separation, there is a degree of social distance that accompanies privilege. Gender, on the other hand, is structured by social role differentiation—privilege is intimately present, and, for that very reason, often goes unrecognized.

I theorize that the different ways in which privilege operates for these groups substantially affects ambition. I argue that because politics and privilege are both so deeply intermingled with power, differing levels of privilege will result in different levels of ambition. For groups like race and class where the privilege is constructed through separation—where distance makes clear the haves and the have-nots—levels of ambition will be higher for the disadvantaged group. This is for three reasons. First, because the privileged segment of a social group hoards opportunities (Tilly 1998) the less-privileged segments will have fewer opportunities in a variety of universes (for example, educational or employment opportunities). The lack of opportunities in these arenas will make the world of politics more appealing. In a sense, the nascent ambition of these less privileged groups benefits from their lack of possibilities in other realms. Second, social separation between groups permits the development of a greater sense of consciousness (Gurin 1985), which facilitates a desire for action and in particular political action, thus increasing the nascent ambition of less privileged groups. Third, as a function of the spatial separation of these groups, the fortunes of the disadvantaged are not closely tied to those of the advantaged. This is likely to encourage individuals from disadvantaged groups, who feel their interests are not represented, to run.

For groups where privilege is allocated through role separation—for example gender—levels of ambition will be lower for the disadvantaged group. This is because the creation of difference through role separation, rather than spatial separation, leaves the lives of advantaged

and disadvantaged individuals deeply enmeshed, making it difficult for disadvantaged individuals to develop a conscious understanding of the structural constraints they face. What's more, even if such an understanding develops, working to ameliorate these inequalities requires asking the advantaged group to relinquish some of its privilege. Being closely tied to the advantaged group makes this a difficult request to contemplate because it carries a personal consequence.

In sum, the effect of privilege on ambition is that groups with similar levels of privilege will have similar levels of ambition and groups with different levels of privilege will have different levels of ambition—and that these different levels of ambition will be a function of how the privilege is created. Disadvantaged groups will have higher levels of ambition when privilege is created through spatial separation, while advantaged groups will have higher levels of ambition when privilege is created through role separation. The implications of this theory for this analysis are 1) individuals who are conservative Christians should have the same levels of ambition as non-conservative Christians, because neither group is clearly privileged over the other; 2) minority individuals and those with lower class status should be more ambitious than their white and higher class counterparts—and the distance should be especially large between minority individuals and whites, among whom the difference in privilege is most pronounced; and 3) women will have lower levels of ambition than will men, though the social distance between social groups, such as whites and minorities, also permits the development of different set of gender norms for different racial groups which will allow this gap to vary by social group.

In addition to affecting basic levels of ambition, I expect that privilege will also influence what factors impact the ambition of different groups. As one measure of the effect of social roles on ambition this analysis looks at how motherhood, specifically the presence of young children,

impacts ambition. Because women are almost always the primary caregivers for children, and because of the primacy of motherhood as a women's role, I hypothesize that women will be substantially more affected by the presence of young children than will men. However, I argue that not all groups of women will be affected in the same way. Women who are disadvantaged—especially minority women and those with lower class status—have not traditionally had the luxury of choosing between motherhood and the paid workforce. I hypothesize that for these women the traditional trappings of women's role—motherhood and marriage—will not reduce ambition to the same degree as for privileged women (white women and those with college educations) because a woman's roles as a mother and a worker have historically been more accepted in these communities.

I also expect that privilege will drive what opportunities and obstacles are available for individuals. Some opportunities—for example, access to powerful individuals—are facilitated by one's membership in a particular social group. I anticipate that ambitious white and college-educated men—the most privileged groups—will be able to access social networks that include political acquaintances and thus their nascent ambition will benefit the most from this factor. But ambitious individuals from other, less privileged groups, will not have access to the same individuals and thus will not see the same positive association.

Lastly, I anticipate that opportunities and obstacles will provide some disadvantaged groups a lens with which to view privilege. Since women are disadvantaged in systemic ways that are often difficult for an individual to see (Burns and Gallagher 2010), I expect that when they are made aware of these disadvantages their ambition will increase. One such experience that would activate women's awareness of their disadvantage is experiencing discrimination. Thus, I hypothesize that women who have experienced discrimination will have higher levels of

ambition. Other groups that are separated by space rather than by role segregation, are set up to more easily see their disadvantages, thus I don't expect experiencing discrimination to play as central a role for these other disadvantaged groups.

### *Narrative*

The second dimension that differentiates race, class, and religion is the existence of a clear narrative on gender. Conservative Christianity's narrative about gender is explicit, largely consistent, spoken with the voice of authority, and delivered in a specific context. This narrative exists in a defined space and is told to a community audience whose presence validates the legitimacy of the message and who does not have an opportunity to question it.

Race and class narratives about gender are different—they are more often woven into everyday languages and interactions, particularly for race, which is a “marked category” (Haslanger 2000).<sup>143</sup> The everyday language and gendered experiences of conservative Christians are different—while conservative Christians certainly have familial and friend interactions that reinforce the gender norms of conservative Christianity, conservative Christianity typically lacks the visible social cues that class, and especially race, offer strangers the opportunity to judge and police gendered expectations.<sup>144</sup> That means messages on gender for conservative Christians remain remarkably consistent—they are mostly coming from group insiders who already believe in the narrative. These two factors mean that conservative

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<sup>143</sup> Gender, of course, is also a marked category. On race narratives, see work by Sue et al (2007) on racial microaggressions. While there are cultural narratives regarding gendered expectations about class and race that are consumed by a large audience, I argue seeing a film or television show is very different than being part of a congregation listening to a religious figure both in the sense of the community who agree with the message and the authority of the messenger.

<sup>144</sup> While Christianity overall has certain markers, the cross, for example, it isn't clear to an observer what a cross signifies—it may signify belief in a liberal strain of Christianity, such as Anglicanism. Of course other religions that have visible social markers, such as the *hijab*, allow both community and non-community members to readily judge and police gendered expectations.

Christianity transmits ideas about gender very differently than race and class.

I anticipate that the existence of an explicit narrative on gender will be most visible in the effect on social roles. Specifically, I think the explicit, consistent gender narrative for conservative Christians will affect the ambition of conservative Christian women and that this influence will show up in the prominence of the role of motherhood for conservative Christian women (Manning 1999; Sherkat 2000<sup>145</sup>), precisely in the effect of one particular measure—opinions about abortion as a proxy for motherhood. I argue that more conservative ideas about motherhood will be associated with more conservative views on abortion (Luker 1984), thus holding a conservative view on abortion will be linked to lower levels of ambition. I expect the link between abortion and motherhood to be particularly tight for conservative Christian women due to the primacy of abortion in the conservative Christian narratives on gender. The lack of such an explicit narrative on motherhood, particularly with regard to abortion, will lead to a lesser effect of opinions on abortion for other groups of women.

I also expect the strength of narrative to reveal itself in another variable—athletic participation. Historically there is a narrative of “muscular Christianity” in which athletic achievement glorifies God (Hall 1994; Putney 2001). Given this connection, I expect that athletic participation to be a particularly important factor for conservative Christians’ nascent ambition compared to their non-conservative Christian counterparts.

### *Mutability*

Lastly, I examine the permanence of social groups. Race and gender are immutable, “marked categories” (Haslanger 2000), while class, and to a greater degree religion, can be

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<sup>145</sup> As Sherkat (2000) notes “cultural orientations [about conservative Christians view of women’s roles] are sustained in tight knit communities and reinforced through strict socialization” (354).

changed. As highlighted above, the inability to change groups is also linked to others' ability to perceive group membership—again, conservative Christianity is a largely hidden social group while class, and even more so race, are publically visible. But there are more implications for mutability than just how narratives are delivered and received. Another central aspect of mutability is the opportunity to self-select into these groups—particularly a factor for religion. I argue that such self-selection implies, at a minimum, an implicit tolerance of—and likely agreement with—narratives on gender. Once again, this indicates that social role variables will be particularly strong for conservative Christian women, who have self-selected into (or at a minimum not abandoned) a group that has explicitly ideas about women's role.

*Ambition and social groups*

A first look at results reveals some support for the above theories on how different dimensions impact the levels of women's and men's nascent political ambition. The below tables show what share of activists, a likely group of potential office holders, are politically ambitious.<sup>146</sup>

First, we see that, as expected given the structure of their privilege, male activists are significantly more ambitious than female activists.

**Table 46. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by gender**

Men	Women	
16%	10%	***
(n=186)	(n=129)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.  
Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

This is true for white women when compared to white men as well, though not for minority men

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<sup>146</sup> Note that “n” signifies the number of ambitious individuals in the sample.

and minority women—their levels of ambition are similar. And race also plays a role—as expected, minorities are significantly more ambitious than whites and this is true overall, as well as when comparing white and minority men and white and minority women.

**Table 47. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by race**

White 11% (n=164)	Minority 26% (n=151)	***
White Men 14% (n=106)	Minority Men 29% (n=80)	***
White Women 7% (n=58)	Minority Women 24% (n=71)	***
White Men 14% (n=106)	White Women 7% (n=58)	***
Minority Men 29% (n=80)	Minority Women 24% (n=71)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Class, measured here as having a college degree, also produces different levels of ambition.<sup>147</sup>

Individuals who do not have a college degree are significantly more ambitious than those who have a college degree. This is also true when we compare men with and without college degrees and women with and without college degrees. Additionally, as for men and women overall, men are once again significantly more ambitious than women both among those with and without college degrees.

<sup>147</sup> One could imagine other useful measures of class, including family income and occupation. Occupation was problematic in that non-workers would be excluded from the analysis. Family income also posed challenges because it might not speak to individual's status in the world. Moreover, some "blue-collar" jobs, associated with traditional gender narratives, may pay reasonably well. Using college, however, isolates an individual class-based experience. College degree holders include associate's and bachelor's. See pp. 74-76 for additional information regarding the measurement of class.

**Table 48. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by education**

No college degree	College degree	**
15%	10%	
(n=203)	(n=112)	
Not-College-Educated Men	College-Educated Men	*
19%	12%	
(n=114)	(n=72)	
Not-College-Educated Women	College-Educated Women	^
11%	7%	
(n=89)	(n=40)	
Not-College-Educated Men	Not-College-Educated Women	**
19%	11%	
(n=114)	(n=89)	
College-Educated Men	College-Educated Women	*
12%	7%	
(n=72)	(n=40)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.  
Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Lastly, religion’s effect on ambition is measured in two ways—by examining two measures of what I call here “conservative Christianity”: respondents who are born again and those who believe the Bible is the word of god (“Biblical literalists”).<sup>148</sup> As expected religion, which I’ve argued in this case is not divided by privilege, differs from the class and race results in that the levels of ambition are the same for individuals, regardless of whether or not they are conservative Christians. Notably, we again observe that men are significantly more ambitious than women in this social group, too.

<sup>148</sup> There is, of course, a substantial amount of overlap between these groups, though they are distinct with more Catholics likely being captured in the second measure. When the results hold for both groups, I simply refer to the group as “conservative Christians”.

**Table 49. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by reborn**

Reborn	Not Reborn	
13%	14%	
(n=119)	(n=157)	
Reborn Men	Not Reborn Men	
18%	18%	
(n=62)	(n=100)	
Reborn Women	Not Reborn Women	
10%	9%	
(n=57)	(n=57)	
Reborn Men	Reborn Women	*
18%	10%	
(n=62)	(n=57)	
Not Reborn Men	Not Reborn Women	**
18%	9%	
(n=100)	(n=57)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

**Table 50. Differences in percent of ambitious respondents by biblical literalism**

Biblical Literalist	Not Biblical Literalist	
14%	13%	
(n=148)	(n=148)	
Biblical Literalist Men	Not Biblical Literalist Men	
20%	17%	
(n=81)	(n=92)	
Biblical Literalist Women	Not Biblical Literalist Women	
9%	9%	
(n=67)	(n=56)	
Biblical Literalist Men	Biblical Literalist Women	***
20%	9%	
(n=81)	(n=67)	
Not Biblical Literalist Men	Not Biblical Literalist Women	*
17%	9%	
(n=92)	(n=56)	

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

This first set of results offers evidence of the importance of privilege for social groups and ambition: for both race and class—where privilege is created by spatial separation<sup>149</sup>—the less

<sup>149</sup> In looking at social distance as a indicator of oppression and prejudice, recent data show an interesting result on social distance and education: Americans overall report a higher level of unhappiness if an immediate family member married someone who did not go to college (14%), compared to someone of a different race (11%). Having an atheist marry into the family creates the highest level of discomfort (49% of people report being unhappy) (Dimock et al. 2014).

privileged group has higher levels of ambition. When this dimension is absent—as it is with religion—ambition levels do not differ. And, as hypothesized, the reverse is true for gender: where privilege is created by social roles men, the more privileged group, have a higher level of ambition than women in almost every instance.

### ***Ingredients for Ambition***

#### *Descriptive results*

I compare ambitious and non-ambitious activists on two important contributors to ambition: social roles and opportunities and obstacles. I first look at descriptive bivariate comparisons, summarizing these results here and noting when the dimensions of privilege, narrative, and mutability are relevant. Tables with the results are available in the appendix and are discussed in more detail in the individual chapters focusing on race, class, and religion.

Both social roles and opportunities and obstacles play important roles in differentiating ambitious and non-ambitious individuals. A few ingredients for ambition appear important for nearly all groups of women. For example, higher levels of self-assessed leadership and, as hypothesized, experiencing discrimination are positively associated with ambition for almost all groups of women. But leadership matters for only a few groups of men—and discrimination matters for none. Conversely, some things that several groups of men benefit from—for example job-based skills and political acquaintances—do not affect ambition for any group of women. The gender divides on these issues are largely universal.

Nevertheless, important differences exist among women. Having young children moves some women away from ambition while pushing others towards it. As expected, opinions on abortion are only relevant for conservative Christian women. And men see differences as well,

including on athletics, political acquaintances, and skills.

Looking at social roles in finer detail, self-assessed leadership plays a strong role. At the broader level of analysis—looking at groups prior to breaking them down intersectionally—ambitious individuals of all groups except minorities have significantly higher levels of self-assessed leadership than do non-ambitious individuals. Looking at the intersections, however, shows women mostly drive this finding—it persists for almost all groups of women but only a few groups of men.<sup>150</sup> This is consistent with previous work on the importance of feeling competent for women’s ambition, as well as expectations about how competence matters differently for different racial groups.

Consistent with expectations of the strength of the narrative in shaping ideas on gender, abortion only matters on measures of religion—and when the intersections between religion and gender are examined, it is clear that women are driving this result. Conservative Christian women with more liberal opinions on abortion are more likely to be ambitious.

The story of children is more complicated. Focusing on individuals under 40 who have preschool-aged children, we see that having children mostly affects women’s ambition—but it moves them in multiple directions. While ambition and preschool-aged children are unrelated for women under 40 overall, this masks a wide variation in results. College-educated and not reborn women with young children are less likely to be ambitious, while minority and conservative Christian women with young children are more likely to be ambitious. These initial results offer mixed support for the hypotheses—minority women were not affected in the same way as white women, confirming initial expectations—but the positive association between children on conservative Christian women’s ambition was unexpected. As expected, preschool-aged children

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<sup>150</sup> The finding remains true for all groups of women at the intersections except minority women and Biblical literalist women. It only persists for white and non-college-educated men.

are unrelated to ambition for men under 40 with two exceptions: reborn and Biblical literalist men with young children are less likely to be ambitious

Turning to obstacles and opportunities, we see no groups are affected by being recruited to participate. But an alternative measure of recruitment, having political acquaintances, does matter. Ambitious individuals are more likely to have political acquaintances if they are men, white, college-educated, or, interestingly, either reborn or not Biblical literalists. As we dig deeper, we see that, as anticipated, men are driving these results: when each of these groups is analyzed by gender, the only intersectional groups that show positive associations between ambition and political acquaintances are men: white men, college-educated men, reborn men, and men who are not Biblical literalists. Privilege matters for having these networks—among men of different classes and racial groups, the more privileged group has a positive association between ambition and having political acquaintances. But this association changes for religion depending on the measure used, supporting the idea that religion, as analyzed here, does not have a clearly privileged side.

Having participatory skills is positively associated with ambition for a number of groups, but the source of the skills matters. Church skills do not differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious individuals for any groups. When job skills matter, they matter for men: white men, not-college-educated men, and men who are Biblical literalists all see positive associations between ambition and job skills.<sup>151</sup> Only organizational skills play a role for women. Among women overall, white women, not-college-educated women and reborn women, ambitious individuals have significantly higher organizational skills than non-ambitious individuals. Organizational skills also influence some groups of men; men overall, white men, college-

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<sup>151</sup> They matter for not college-educated individuals, conservative Christians, and whites, but when these groups are viewed intersectionally, jobs skills are not associated with ambition for any group of women.

educated men, men who are not Biblical literalists see a positive association between organizational skills and ambition. The fact that women benefit from organizational skills rather than job skills supports expectations regarding the importance of organizational involvement for women, especially when their job prospects might be more limited than men's and they lack other opportunities for single-gendered arenas in which to learn skills.

Ambitious individuals are almost universally more likely to have been athletes at the broader level of analysis—only college-educated individuals overall do not see a positive association between athletics and ambition. When these are broken down by gender, however, only certain groups still see this association. Interestingly, the divide is largely not by gender—both men and women still see this association among people who do not have a college degree, and, as expected given the narratives on muscular Christianity, people who are conservative Christians. As expected, the gap between ambitious and non-ambitious individuals is larger for these groups of women than for their male counterparts, meaning being an athlete is especially important to women's ambition. Ambitious minority women are also more likely to be athletes.

Lastly, experiencing discrimination is positively associated with ambition for almost all groups of women—the only two who do not see a significant difference in the bivariate analyses are minority women and reborn women.<sup>152</sup> Experiencing discrimination does not differentiate ambitious and non-ambitious men. This finding offers support for the idea that when groups are separated by roles, such as women and men, seeing privilege may be more difficult for women but experiences like being discriminated against may increase awareness of a lack of privilege—and thus contribute to nascent ambition.

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<sup>152</sup> Though notably the gaps for these two groups of women are still quite large, even if they are not significant.

### *Multivariate results*

Below I discuss results from probit models. Additional results in the appendix include those for a two-stage Heckman probit model to account for any selection bias. These results show that selection bias is, on the whole not a large concern and the results from the initial probit estimations are very robust.<sup>153</sup> Because comparing the results of sixteen models is cumbersome, and it is easy to get lost in the details, I summarize the results discussed in detail in earlier chapters broadly here, with an eye towards common patterns and relationships with the dimensions of privilege, narrative, and mutability.

Stepping back from specific expectations for a moment, in a broad sense, these results demonstrate that no two groups come to ambition in the same way—and that assuming common paths for ambitious individuals ignores critical elements of the story. Even when levels of ambition are not different—for example in the religion analysis—the factors affecting ambition vary. In fact, there is only one universally similar factor: age. Moving between extremes on the age scale decreases the likelihood that everyone is ambitious, though the decline is much sharper for men. But these results clearly demonstrate that social group membership is influential for ambition formation.

Looking first at social role variables broadly, we see these variables matter more in looking at individuals divided by religion—less so by class or race. This finding suggests the importance of self-selection into a community. Religion is the most mutable of the three cases I examine—it's the easiest for an individual to join or abandon—thus finding that social roles are more important when individuals are grouped by religion indicates a possible relationship between self-selection into a group and adherence to social roles.

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<sup>153</sup> The largest differences are for college-educated women, minority women, reborn men, and Biblical literalist women, though tests did not suggest selection models were required in all of these cases. In a few other cases there were slight differences.

Specifically, as expected, opinions about abortion only matter in predicting ambition among conservative Christian women. For these groups, moving from the most conservative to most liberal opinions on abortion makes these women 6% and 4% more likely to be ambitious, respectively. This finding underscores the importance of the strength of the religious narrative regarding women's place for nascent ambition.

Having preschool-aged children increases the likelihood of being ambitious for conservative Christian women, minority women, and women without a college education. The implication here—that children are positively associated with ambition but only for some groups of women—highlights how different social structures impact ideas about women's role and in turn their nascent ambition. As hypothesized, there is a sizable difference in the effect of children on the ambition of disadvantaged women (minority women and women with less education who have been balancing motherhood, particularly single motherhood, with working outside the home for generations) and their advantaged counterparts.

The finding that for more conservative Christian women having children is associated with higher levels of ambition was surprising. One possible explanation is that women in these groups need to have children in order to fulfill their roles. Much in the way that men are expected to have children to be perceived as a good family man, a woman who wanted to be a leader conservative Christian community would need to fit the model of a good Christian woman—and children are part of the package. Additionally, it may be the case that children open an opportunity for “selfless ambition” for these women. Wanting to hold office to enact change for children, rather than for another, more “selfish” reason, might allow a woman to effectively balance her ambition with conservative Christian ideas about women's role. Much in the way occupational segregation allows women to work in appropriately feminine, non-threatening jobs,

children might serve as a sort of occupational segregation for ambition, allowing women to be both ambitious and appropriately feminine. Interestingly, for two groups of men—those who are reborn and those who are not Biblical literalists, having children reduces the likelihood of being ambitious. This negative effect of children for any groups of men was unexpected.

Leadership only matters for women—and having higher levels of self-assessed leadership increases the likelihood of being ambitious for college-educated women, and women who are not conservative Christians. For all of these groups, this is one of the most powerful positive influences on ambition. As expected, men do not experience the same bump. Interestingly, the literature on women and ambition has focused heavily on women’s self-confidence as a reason for the lack of female candidates (Lawless and Fox 2005). However, this appears to be a factor only for what one might think of as potential Democratic candidates. Considering women who fit this profile (not conservative Christians, college-educated) are the majority of female politicians, it is perhaps unsurprising that women’s lack of confidence has received so much focus. But these results suggest a lack of confidence is not the key barrier to political ambition for some other, traditionally less well-represented groups of women.

Being recruited to participate has a positive effect on a few groups of women, though the effects are relatively small.<sup>154</sup> Having political acquaintances benefits the ambition of both men and women, but almost exclusively those in privileged groups. It increases the likelihood of being ambitious for white men (6%), white women (3%), college-educated men (9%) and college-educated women (3%). This differs from the bivariate results but still fits with the general theory expectation that privilege and political networks are connected. Having political acquaintances also has positive effects for other groups—reborn men and both men and women who are not Biblical literalists—though again the fact that it effects both conservative and non-

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<sup>154</sup> It has a negative effect for minority men, decreasing their likelihood of being ambitious by 13%.

conservative Christians underscores the lack of privilege associated with these social groups. Consistent with my hypothesis, this variable is not significant for any disadvantaged group with the exception of minority women, though this finding does not hold in the selection model.<sup>155</sup>

Being an athlete increases the likelihood of being ambitious for conservative Christian women, minority women and women without college degrees. It has a much larger effect for women than men—only one group of men, Biblical literalists, sees an increase in the likelihood of being ambitious because of being an athlete. These findings confirm the expectation that, the strength of narrative in religion, in this case on muscular Christianity, is particularly strong for this group.

As expected, being discriminated against is a powerful variable—it increases the likelihood of being ambitious for almost all groups of women with one exception, reborn women. Other than age, this is the most universally important variable for women's ambition and supports the idea that among groups where privilege is based on role segregation, such as gender, seeing privilege may be difficult but experiencing discrimination may bring inequalities between women and men to light—and thus increase nascent ambition. Also as expected, this is particularly powerful variable for some of the more privileged groups, including college men, who are more likely to be aware of discrimination and less likely to feel its effects.

Unexpectedly, it also increases the likelihood of being ambitious for reborn men.

Though marriage is part of the set of control variables, it is worth noting that being married reduces the likelihood of being ambitious for several groups of women, including white women (-5%) and college-educated women (-5%).<sup>156</sup> This is particularly interesting in contrast with the effect of having children. If we consider being married and having children part of a

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<sup>155</sup> One set of variables I do not discuss in this section is skills. This is for two reasons: (1) I did not have specific expectations for skills based on narrative, mutability and privilege and (2) they exhibit no clear pattern.

<sup>156</sup> As well as women overall in the general gender model.

traditional package of expectations about women's roles, privileged women's ambition is decreased when they fall in these traditional categories (married), while disadvantaged women's ambition is increased (for children).

Looking beyond just the privilege dimension, the combination of decreased ambition among married women and increased ambition among their parenting counterparts is also true for conservative Christian women: having preschool-aged children increases the likelihood of ambition among conservative Christian women, being married decreases the likelihood of being ambitious for women who are not conservative Christians. Among men, this counterpart effect with marriage and children is not true, though college-educated men are more likely to be ambitious if they are married.

Also worth noting among the control variables that family income only effects women's likelihood of being ambitious—and as family income increases the likelihood of being ambitious drops for a diverse set of women.<sup>157</sup> Education, when it has an effect, reduces the likelihood of ambition for a number of groups.

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<sup>157</sup> College-educated women, minority women, and conservative Christian women.

## **Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Implications**

Nascent ambition is an essential element of our democracy that has implications for representation and equality, yet we know surprisingly little about who has it or how it develops. I propose a unique framework for understanding nascent ambition, arguing that gender roles and gendered obstacles and opportunities affect its presence in men and women—and that they often do so differently for different social groups. I test this framework using an innovative research design that identifies potential candidates for office and exploits variation across race, class, and religion in the way these groups structure gender. I look first at variation in social groups' understandings of women's roles as mothers, workers, and leaders, then analyze the importance of gendered experiences in shaping nascent ambition, focusing on recruitment, participation in single-gendered organizations, and experiencing discrimination. I demonstrate that levels of nascent ambition, and the factors that influence it, vary widely but often predictably for different groups of women and men. Finally, I look across social groups in a comparative analysis to examine how differences between groups on the dimensions of privilege, narrative and mutability affect both levels of and ingredients for ambition.

The results of this analysis have important implications. They reveal that, as theorized, what matters for nascent ambition varies widely between groups. There is only one universally important factor in predicting nascent ambition for all groups—age. The differences between groups are particularly notable in contrast with predicting activism where recruitment and skills are nearly universally important. These results also show that existing understandings of nascent ambition are rooted in the experiences of privileged individuals—what impacts the ambition of

minority and less-educated men remains nearly a black box requiring further research.

My results largely support the central elements of the roles and experiences framework I propose for examining women's nascent ambition. First, these results show that gendered social roles matter a great deal more for women's nascent ambition than for men's. My analyses also support a second critical element of my theory—the impact of gender roles on nascent ambition varies for different groups of women. For example, as predicted, the presence of preschool-aged children increases nascent ambition among minority women but not among white women. Ideas about abortion are important for conservative Christian women but not for other groups of women. Self-assessed leadership increases nascent ambition for college-educated women but not for less-educated women.

While the results on social roles generally support my hypotheses, their overall effect on women's nascent ambition is relatively muted—sometimes more notable for its absence than its presence. The one exception to this observation is conservative Christian women, for whom the influence of social roles is comparable to the influence of opportunities and obstacles. For other groups of women, however, gendered obstacles and opportunities are more powerful predictors of nascent ambition. In a finding unique to this analysis, I show that experiencing discrimination increases nascent ambition for nearly all groups of women, but almost no groups of men.

These results also show that skills learned in particular contexts benefit women's ambition. For white and less-educated women, learning participation skills in an organizational context increases the likelihood of having nascent ambition.<sup>158</sup> Among minority, less-educated, and conservative Christian women, participating in athletics increases this likelihood. These results support my hypothesis that skills learned in single-gendered arenas are likely to promote

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<sup>158</sup> This is especially interesting result in contrast with skills learned on the job, which are negatively related to nascent ambition for white and not reborn women but positively associated for reborn women.

ambition for women; the nascent ambition of several groups of women benefits from participating in single-gendered contexts.<sup>159</sup>

My results also demonstrate how the dimensions of different groups affect ambition, both in the level of ambition and its ingredients. For example, I show that privilege affects levels of ambition, revealing that when there are different levels of privilege between two groups which are spatially segregated, such as race and class, the less privileged group has higher levels of ambition—but when such privilege is maintained by role segregation, such as gender, the more privileged group has higher levels of ambition. I also show that in the absence of privilege, such as conservative Christianity, levels of ambition do not vary across groups. I reveal that narrative matters impacts the ingredients for ambition and when a social group has a consistent, coherent narrative—for example, like the narrative of conservative Christianity on women’s place or muscular Christianity—these variables have special influence for these individuals that they don’t for other groups.

### *Theoretical contributions*

This work is one of the few studies of the development of ambition that pays deep attention to the differences in ambition across different social groups—and my results have key implications for researchers working on this topic. My work shows taking an intersectional view of gender is critical for studies of ambition. It also moves this literature forward by highlighting the role that gendered obstacles and opportunities play in the development of ambition. Finding that obstacles and opportunities matter more than social roles for most groups—though notably not conservative Christian women—is an important contribution; it demonstrates how short-term

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<sup>159</sup> It is worth noting that white and college-educated men and men who are not conservative Christians also see a bump in the likelihood of nascent ambition due to organizationally based skills.

experiences can serve as guides for the development of ambition—opportunities or obstacles may have long-lasting consequences for the direction of individual’s lives. From a research-design standpoint, my innovative strategy—identifying a pool of potential candidates and leveraging variation in the way that social groups structure gender—provides a potential roadmap for other researchers doing similar analyses.

My work also contributes to the rational actor paradigm, long dominant in ambition research, by highlighting the importance of context for individual behavior and delineating differences across social groups in the formation of ambition. Recent research (Fulton et al. 2006; Maestas et al. 2006) shows that assuming common influences on the development of ambition and common models of how ambition influences behavior—standard practice in the rational actor literature on ambition—is problematic. I build on these insights by examining nascent ambition and identifying additional factors in ambition formation, some of which may also affect strategic decisions to enter the electoral arena.

With regard to research on ambition specifically, this dissertation offers another, unexpected contribution—the lack of selection bias apparent in the models. With only a few exceptions, accounting for who became an activist did not change the results of the models examining who among activists was ambitious. This finding, which is supported by earlier research by Fulton et al. (2006), suggests that becoming an activist and being political ambitious are relatively separate processes and suggests possible new avenues of research.

More broadly, this dissertation uses a novel research design, the exploitation of differences between social groups to examine gender comparatively, that scholars might find useful in other contexts as well. This design, which allows me to deconstruct different elements of gender by intersecting it with other groups, could be fruitful for scholars who have an interest

in disaggregating social groups and identifying nuances within these groups. For example, scholars who research how race affects employment outcomes might find it useful to examine race intersected with religion or region to identify what is common for minority individuals and what is unique based on their position as a black person in the South compared to a Latino in California. How does race in these different contexts result in inequality—are there universal features or disparate paths? Moving beyond social groups, a similar type of design might be used to more deeply analyze other common control variables, such as marriage—for example, how does the experience of marriage effect political participation among same-sex compared to opposite-sex couples? What is universal about marriage compared to specific about same-sex or opposite-sex marriage?

Practically speaking, this theoretical research design could also be applied in some cases using other estimation techniques, for example, propensity score matching. In matching one compares two groups, a control and a treatment group, to determine if there is a different in an outcome variable. One might imagine using matching on my data, as an alternative strategy to evaluate if having a particular experience, for example participating in athletic or experiencing discrimination, would result in differences in ambition.<sup>160</sup> To use matching in this case one would model the probability of receiving this treatment (in this case the probability of being an athlete or experiencing discrimination) and then observe differences in nascent ambition (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). By comparing results across different social groups, one could determine if the nascent ambition of men and women in different social groups is affected differently by these treatments.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Propensity score matching is most appropriate when the treatment is dichotomous and there are a large number of observations (Rubin 1997).

<sup>161</sup> Using propensity score matching has some advantages. First, though a regression model is more efficient (assuming correct specification), matching is more robust (Rosenbaum 2001). Furthermore, unlike linear models,

While this research design is an innovative way to use existing data to address this question, different types of data and different approaches to the research would shed additional light on the questions raised here. With regards to measurement, some variables I use here are not ideal for operationalizing the concepts in my theory. For example, I use opinions about abortion as a proxy for women's roles (see p. 29) but a more direct measure of ideas about work and motherhood might provide a better test for my theory.<sup>162</sup> My measures of recruitment are focused on political participation, rather than running for office—a more explicit question regarding candidate recruitment would be useful. The measure of discrimination I use is focused on individual experiences but being able to parse the potentially different effects of individual discrimination versus perceived discrimination against one's group (a powerful predictor of political participation (Miller et al. 1981; Sanchez 2006)) would enable researchers to better understand how experiencing discrimination influences ambition. And on a very basic level, it would be ideal to be able to examine how the results I see based on my constructed measure of nascent political ambition, created using motivations for taking certain political actions, differ from those based on a more direct measure of nascent ambition like the one used by Fox and Lawless (2004, 271) who simply inquiry "Have you ever considered running for office?"

Additional research on this topic would also benefit from a larger survey that has even more oversampling of certain groups—for example different racial and ethnic groups—to allow for a more nuanced examination of group differences. For example, some of the research I review on self-esteem and competence suggests diverse hypotheses for different groups of

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matching does not consider treated and control individuals in the same way, which means that matching looks at the outcome for an individual given an actual received treatment rather than predicting their response to a treatment they did not receive (Rosenbaum 2001). Matching also has the advantage of being non-parametric, thus it does not enforce the same structure on the data as regression models do and allows for different relationships between variables at different points in the data (Greene 2003). A propensity score is additionally useful in a large study where propensity scores should be able to account for most of the bias on the observed covariates (Rubin 1997).

<sup>162</sup> See Burns and Gallagher (2010) for a good discussion on the different measures of gender roles scholars employ.

minority women. Having data with a sufficient number of minority respondents to be able to explore these differences would be ideal. Additionally, the data used in this analysis are particularly focused on activists but other types of individuals are also overrepresented in political office (Fox and Lawless 2003). Examining a larger eligibility pool that encompasses some of these other groups, including lawyers, businesspeople and educators, would help provide a fuller picture of nascent ambition among possible candidates.

Lastly, having longitudinal data would shed additional light on some of my findings. For example—does having children actually make minority women more ambitious or are ambitious minority women more likely to have children? This question would be more easily resolved if I could observe individuals overtime. And as I noted earlier in this analysis, we might expect the effects of some of the factors I examine to change overtime. Having longitudinal data would allow us to see if, for example, having children precipitates an increase in nascent ambition for minority women that is sustained over a number of years or wanes once they are grown.

The changing nature of these factors across a respondent's lifetime also raises the possibility that they will change overtime. This highlights an additional limitation of this research, its historical context. The data used in this dissertation were gathered 25 years ago. Subsequent changes on a variety of factors including women's economic contributions, ideas about women's role, a growing association between conservative Christianity and privilege,<sup>163</sup> increased recruitment of particular individuals, changing considerations regarding candidacy (such as finances and social media) as well as other societal changes suggest the critical importance of testing these hypotheses with new data.

While the results are certainly not timeless, I argue that many of these factors would continue to matter in data gathered today, albeit in different ways than they did 25 years ago.

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<sup>163</sup> See, for example, Michael Lindsay's 2007 work on the growing political power of the evangelical movement.

Importantly, social groups are still organized in much the same way, divided by roles and spatial segregation, which allows for different structures of gender to arise, meaning a comparative analysis of gender is still very much possible. Thus that the framework I propose in this research—examining nascent ambition as a function of gender roles and gendered obstacles and opportunities—continues to be useful. What is important is recognizing how the impact of these roles and experiences may differ now and identifying other factors that may be relevant. For example, the effect of athletics participation may be weaker now as larger numbers of women participate in athletics. This does not necessarily mean athletics is no longer related to nascent ambition but rather that the pioneers may have benefitted in ways that subsequent generations will not. Similarly with regard to participation in single-gendered organizations, though research shows the gender composition of groups still matters for social interactions (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012), some single-gendered opportunities are declining (for example, the reduced enrollment in women’s colleges (Neason 2014)). This may mean that while participation continues to matter for nascent ambition, fewer women will have this experience. And of course as discussed earlier in the research (see pp. 14-17), ideas about women as workers and mothers are in flux, not moving in a consistently liberal direction as some might have expected but rather varying as a function of the economy—meaning the effects of these factors are temporally sensitive and need to be interpreted within their historical context.

Thus while the relative impact of certain factors on nascent ambition will likely change and researchers should be attentive to the dynamics overtime, the general framework I propose will continue to be a useful approach for considering differences in nascent ambition. I think this is especially true with respect to the discussion of how privilege, narrative, and mutability influence nascent ambition. These remain useful dimensions on which to compare race, class,

religion and gender because while they may change slightly overtime—for example limited economic mobility or assortative mating may reduce the mutability of class—they continue to be extremely powerful factors in shaping relationships between different social groups.

### *Practical implications*

Despite the age of these data, some of the younger individuals in this sample are now in a prime position to run for office, thus considering these results in our current political context has value and yields several practical insights. First, it suggests that our focus on women's ambition as a central factor in holding women back from political parity (Lawless and Fox 2005) ignores the experiences and path to ambition for many groups of women, particularly less-educated, minority women—in short, those least likely to be considered as candidates. Second, it sheds light on a puzzle that scholars have investigated in recent years: why does minority women's share of political office continue to rise while women overall have plateaued (Hardy-Fanta et al. 2006; Scola 2006). Finally, it suggests fruitful avenues to increase women's political participation may not lie exclusively in remaking women's roles but rather in ensuring women have particular experiences that encourage ambition, such as athletic participation or involvement in single-gendered organizations. Perhaps most interestingly, it suggests that experiencing discrimination promotes ambition. While of course discriminating against women as a means of increasing ambition is ludicrous, framing the experiences women already have in a discrimination framework and highlighting the pervasive, everyday sexism women experience may serve to increase their political ambition.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> On this front, the important work being done, often by young women regarding issues of sexual assault and street harassment may have the lucky unintended consequence of increasing women's ambition. See, for example, the advocacy groups Know Your IX (<http://knowyourix.org>) and Hollaback! (<http://www.ihollaback.org>).

## Appendix

Table 51. Correlations among activists, white men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.1567*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	0.0122	0.0505	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0055	0.0524	<b>0.1573*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	0.0131	<b>-0.1676*</b>	<b>0.0861*</b>	<b>0.1259*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>0.0681*</b>	0.0599	<b>0.3692*</b>	<b>0.1976*</b>	<b>0.1121*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	0.0153	<b>-0.2964*</b>	0.0652	<b>0.1097*</b>	<b>0.1832*</b>	0.0667	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0478	0.0538	<b>0.2204*</b>	<b>0.2332*</b>	<b>0.2280*</b>	<b>0.2677*</b>	<b>0.2288*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	<b>0.0731*</b>	<b>0.0742*</b>	0.0545	<b>-0.0853*</b>	<b>0.0918*</b>	<b>0.1067*</b>	<b>-0.1049*</b>	<b>0.1297*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0241	-0.0225	0.0593	<b>0.1020*</b>	-0.0615	<b>0.1085*</b>	-0.0133	-0.0328	0.0037	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2260*</b>	<b>-0.1550*</b>	<b>0.0889*</b>	-0.0066	<b>0.1034*</b>	0.0670	<b>0.1381*</b>	-0.0083	0.0109	<b>-0.1114*</b>	1.0000			
Education	0.0405	<b>0.0847*</b>	<b>0.2447*</b>	<b>0.3239*</b>	<b>0.1046*</b>	<b>0.4079*</b>	<b>0.0838*</b>	<b>0.2661*</b>	<b>0.1445*</b>	<b>0.1106*</b>	-0.0397	1.0000		
Family incomes	<b>0.0919*</b>	0.0170	<b>0.3126*</b>	<b>0.1966*</b>	<b>0.1089*</b>	<b>0.4534*</b>	<b>0.0764*</b>	<b>0.1855*</b>	0.0591	-0.0434	<b>0.3170*</b>	<b>0.2964*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.2461*</b>	0.0578	<b>-0.1695*</b>	0.0269	<b>0.1118*</b>	<b>-0.2808*</b>	<b>0.0860*</b>	0.0168	<b>-0.0915*</b>	<b>-0.1433*</b>	<b>0.2104*</b>	<b>-0.1751*</b>	0.0053	1.0000

n=599, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 52. Correlations among activists, white women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.0202	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.0130	<b>0.1046*</b>	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0016	-0.0204	<b>0.1198*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.0950*</b>	<b>-0.0849*</b>	<b>0.0836*</b>	<b>0.2488*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	-0.0384	<b>0.2328*</b>	<b>0.3514*</b>	<b>0.1421*</b>	0.0346	1.0000								
Church skills	0.0319	<b>-0.2847*</b>	0.0645	0.0237	<b>0.1932*</b>	0.0117	1.0000							
Org. skills	0.0112	0.0520	<b>0.2078*</b>	<b>0.1205*</b>	<b>0.1831*</b>	<b>0.1376*</b>	<b>0.2553*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	-0.0024	-0.0317	<b>0.1078*</b>	0.0404	0.0126	0.0679	-0.0001	<b>0.1036*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0008	<b>0.1150*</b>	<b>0.0965*</b>	<b>0.0734*</b>	0.0277	<b>0.1768*</b>	-0.0165	0.0398	0.0575	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2059*</b>	-0.0256	-0.0227	0.0395	<b>0.0783*</b>	<b>-0.0867*</b>	<b>0.0717*</b>	0.0255	-0.0195	<b>-0.1869*</b>	1.0000			
Education	0.0420	<b>0.1274*</b>	<b>0.2293*</b>	<b>0.3161*</b>	<b>0.1993*</b>	<b>0.4104*</b>	0.0563	<b>0.1570*</b>	<b>0.0935*</b>	<b>0.0801*</b>	-0.0573	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.0151	<b>0.1251*</b>	<b>0.2085*</b>	<b>0.2413*</b>	<b>0.1441*</b>	<b>0.2925*</b>	0.0543	<b>0.1812*</b>	0.0708	0.0560	<b>0.4085*</b>	<b>0.3618*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.3621*</b>	<b>-0.1298*</b>	<b>-0.2732*</b>	0.0344	<b>0.1142*</b>	<b>-0.3083*</b>	0.0222	-0.0108	-0.0460	<b>-0.1121*</b>	-0.1519	<b>-0.2021*</b>	<b>-0.1995*</b>	1.0000

n=541, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 53. Correlations among activists, minority men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.1183*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	0.0825	0.0150	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0264	<b>0.1986*</b>	0.0937	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0892	0.0681	0.0560	<b>0.1598*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>0.1656*</b>	0.0522	<b>0.2933*</b>	0.1130	0.0772	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0980	<b>-0.3660*</b>	0.0432	-0.0674	0.0837	0.0119	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0987	0.0137	0.0784	<b>0.1497*</b>	<b>0.1229*</b>	<b>0.2124*</b>	<b>0.2529*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.0850	<b>0.1603*</b>	<b>0.1652*</b>	0.0119	0.1038	<b>0.1931*</b>	-0.0487	0.0295	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0270	0.0769	0.0176	<b>0.2489*</b>	-0.0173	<b>0.1264*</b>	-0.0623	0.1091	0.0400	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.3112*</b>	<b>-0.1613*</b>	0.1133	0.0338	0.0095	<b>0.1581*</b>	<b>0.2038*</b>	<b>0.2600*</b>	0.0852	0.0351	1.0000			
Education	-0.0021	<b>0.3392*</b>	<b>0.1918*</b>	<b>0.3033*</b>	0.1068	<b>0.4503*</b>	<b>-0.1647*</b>	<b>0.2043*</b>	<b>0.3614*</b>	0.0714	0.0770	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.0658	<b>0.1342*</b>	0.1062	<b>0.1383*</b>	-0.0178	<b>0.4232*</b>	0.0200	0.0450	<b>0.1838*</b>	0.0456	<b>0.1988*</b>	<b>0.3274*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.1747*</b>	<b>-0.1580*</b>	-0.0427	-0.0084	<b>0.2023*</b>	-0.0608	<b>0.1731*</b>	<b>0.1300*</b>	<b>-0.2024*</b>	-0.0350	<b>0.1409*</b>	<b>-0.1331*</b>	-0.0861	1.0000

n=208,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 54. Correlations among activists, minority women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	0.0756	1.0000												
Leadership	<b>-0.1067*</b>	<b>0.1941*</b>	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.1012	<b>0.1333*</b>	<b>0.1655*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.2169*</b>	<b>0.1675*</b>	<b>0.1514*</b>	<b>0.2958*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>-0.1120*</b>	<b>0.2723*</b>	<b>0.2373*</b>	<b>0.3923*</b>	<b>0.2165*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	<b>-0.1401*</b>	-0.0990	<b>0.1546*</b>	<b>0.1665*</b>	<b>0.2250*</b>	0.0657	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0792	0.0513	<b>0.2695*</b>	<b>0.3074*</b>	<b>0.2066*</b>	<b>0.2513*</b>	<b>0.3811*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	<b>0.1039*</b>	-0.0676	0.0313	-0.0011	<b>-0.2114*</b>	0.0188	0.0641	-0.0005	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0157	0.0591	<b>0.1629*</b>	<b>0.1718*</b>	<b>0.1047*</b>	<b>0.1946*</b>	<b>0.1102*</b>	0.1009	0.0094	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.3247*</b>	0.0482	<b>-0.1808*</b>	0.0625	<b>-0.1508*</b>	-0.0086	-0.0371	-0.0765	0.0473	-0.0068	1.0000			
Education	-0.0715	<b>0.3403*</b>	<b>0.1925*</b>	<b>0.3037*</b>	<b>0.1594*</b>	<b>0.4352*</b>	0.0759	<b>0.2128*</b>	0.0189	0.0950	0.0150	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.0910	<b>0.2650*</b>	<b>0.1368*</b>	<b>0.2601*</b>	<b>0.1063*</b>	<b>0.3962*</b>	0.0450	<b>0.2626*</b>	<b>0.1073*</b>	0.0792	<b>0.3290*</b>	<b>0.4362*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.3888*</b>	<b>-0.2128*</b>	0.0489	-0.0238	<b>0.1505*</b>	<b>-0.1579*</b>	<b>0.1946*</b>	<b>0.1094*</b>	<b>-0.2519*</b>	0.0349	<b>-0.1828*</b>	<b>-0.1783*</b>	<b>-0.1888*</b>	1.0000

n=256,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 55. Correlations among ambitious activists, white men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.3476*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.0535	0.1360	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0974	0.1116	<b>0.3503*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0778	-0.0814	0.0403	-0.0146	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>0.2029*</b>	-0.1565	<b>0.1793*</b>	-0.0922	0.0650	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0199	<b>-0.3302*</b>	0.0955	<b>0.2421*</b>	<b>0.2056*</b>	0.0568	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0363	-0.0837	0.0903	<b>0.3222*</b>	<b>0.2952*</b>	<b>0.2645*</b>	<b>0.2400*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	-0.0379	-0.0300	0.0095	<b>-0.3250*</b>	-0.1436	0.1171	<b>-0.1917*</b>	0.0323	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0635	0.0934	0.1502	0.0159	-0.1422	0.1354	-0.0850	0.0188	0.1587	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2733*</b>	<b>-0.3556*</b>	<b>0.2715*</b>	<b>0.1870*</b>	0.0655	<b>0.1753*</b>	0.1149	<b>0.1893*</b>	0.0596	-0.0721	1.0000			
Education	0.0018	0.0649	<b>0.2578*</b>	<b>0.3189*</b>	0.0944	<b>0.3328*</b>	0.1177	<b>0.4839*</b>	<b>0.2127*</b>	<b>0.1810*</b>	<b>0.1870*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.1508	<b>-0.2945*</b>	<b>0.1767*</b>	<b>0.2205*</b>	0.1034	<b>0.4347*</b>	0.1531	0.1396	-0.1060	-0.0705	<b>0.3254*</b>	<b>0.2597*</b>	1.0000	
Age	-0.1510	-0.0593	-0.0503	<b>0.2825*</b>	<b>0.1680*</b>	<b>-0.3380*</b>	<b>0.1730*</b>	0.0197	<b>-0.2126*</b>	-0.0180	<b>0.1673*</b>	-0.1122	0.1505	1.0000

n=99,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 56. Correlations among ambitious activists, white women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.0176	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.0908	0.0041	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	<b>0.2963*</b>	0.1366	0.0852	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	<b>0.3504*</b>	-0.0804	<b>0.6289*</b>	<b>0.2345*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>-0.3116*</b>	0.1896	<b>0.2327*</b>	<b>0.2556*</b>	0.0409	1.0000								
Church skills	0.1156	-0.1164	0.0498	0.1215	<b>0.2694*</b>	0.0254	1.0000							
Org. skills	0.1544	0.0403	-0.1036	-0.0923	0.0815	0.0172	<b>0.2853*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	<b>0.2442*</b>	0.0591	-0.1730	-0.0078	-0.1525	0.0608	-0.0398	<b>0.2511*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0534	0.1940	0.0098	<b>0.2309*</b>	-0.0136	0.0921	-0.0737	-0.1595	0.1174	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.5404*</b>	0.0471	-0.1906	0.0599	0.1903	<b>-0.3073*</b>	0.1995	<b>0.3131*</b>	0.0847	-0.1617	1.0000			
Education	<b>-0.4127*</b>	-0.0043	<b>0.2599*</b>	<b>0.2440*</b>	0.1607	<b>0.3690*</b>	0.0199	<b>-0.2954*</b>	-0.1313	<b>0.2712*</b>	<b>-0.6731*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.0837	0.0611	<b>-0.2658*</b>	0.1754	<b>-0.3287*</b>	-0.0207	-0.1970	0.1850	<b>0.4687*</b>	-0.1240	0.1066	-0.0759	1.0000	
Age	-0.0810	-0.2148	<b>0.3654*</b>	0.0642	<b>0.4192*</b>	0.1068	0.1503	-0.1274	<b>-0.2913*</b>	-0.1035	0.0736	0.1017	-0.2166	1.0000

n=54,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 57. Correlations among ambitious activists, minority men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.0920	1.0000												
Leadership	<b>0.2350*</b>	0.0866	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	0.1156	<b>0.3017*</b>	<b>0.3295*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.1099	-0.1306	0.1067	0.1582	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>0.2447*</b>	0.1377	0.1979	<b>0.2344*</b>	<b>0.2864*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.1048	<b>-0.4459*</b>	0.0587	-0.0628	<b>0.3883*</b>	<b>0.2950*</b>	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.1108	-0.0071	0.1689	<b>0.2424*</b>	<b>0.2395*</b>	0.1955	<b>0.2630*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	-0.1007	0.1171	<b>0.2500*</b>	<b>0.2335*</b>	0.1153	<b>0.3026*</b>	<b>0.2488*</b>	0.1803	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.1082	<b>0.2494*</b>	<b>0.2212*</b>	<b>0.4226*</b>	-0.0594	<b>0.3069*</b>	-0.1451	<b>0.2455*</b>	<b>0.2926*</b>	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.3321*</b>	<b>-0.2082*</b>	0.1554	-0.0211	-0.1052	-0.0023	0.0972	0.1429	-0.0238	0.1307	1.0000			
Education	0.0506	<b>0.3012*</b>	<b>0.2858*</b>	<b>0.3318*</b>	0.1008	<b>0.3389*</b>	-0.0655	<b>0.2546*</b>	<b>0.3671*</b>	<b>0.4773*</b>	0.0117	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.0918	0.0738	0.0505	0.0916	0.1188	<b>0.3555*</b>	0.0812	0.0330	0.1507	-0.0444	<b>0.2471*</b>	0.0825	1.0000	
Age	-0.0630	-0.0761	-0.0956	-0.0123	0.0470	0.0296	0.0014	0.0026	<b>-0.2647*</b>	-0.1083	<b>0.2592*</b>	<b>-0.2414*</b>	0.1673	1.0000

n=70,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 58. Correlations among ambitious activists, minority women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	0.1306	1.0000												
Leadership	<b>-0.2640*</b>	0.1222	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0759	0.0775	0.0535	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.2948*</b>	0.0885	<b>0.2445*</b>	<b>0.3223*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	-0.1854	0.0560	0.0532	<b>0.4188*</b>	0.0845	1.0000								
Church skills	<b>-0.2252*</b>	-0.1544	0.0731	0.1097	<b>0.2631*</b>	<b>0.2342*</b>	1.0000							
Org. skills	<b>-0.2619*</b>	-0.1153	<b>0.2379*</b>	<b>0.2547*</b>	<b>0.3382*</b>	<b>0.2304*</b>	<b>0.3894*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.1364	0.0171	-0.1152	-0.0975	<b>-0.2345*</b>	<b>-0.2426*</b>	0.0346	<b>-0.2505*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0761	-0.0150	0.0499	<b>0.3594*</b>	0.0830	<b>0.2541*</b>	0.1342	<b>0.2857*</b>	-0.1139	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.3873*</b>	0.1936	-0.1696	0.1231	-0.2067	0.0962	-0.1619	-0.0187	<b>0.2517*</b>	0.0644	1.0000			
Education	0.1227	0.1974	<b>0.2494*</b>	<b>0.2192*</b>	0.0856	<b>0.2746*</b>	0.1104	0.1623	<b>-0.2555*</b>	0.1176	0.0742	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.1687	0.0356	<b>0.2704*</b>	0.1801	<b>0.2210*</b>	<b>0.3258*</b>	<b>0.2216*</b>	<b>0.4814*</b>	0.0403	0.0086	<b>0.4939*</b>	0.1921	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.5456*</b>	0.0121	0.1611	0.0924	<b>0.4049*</b>	0.1578	0.1796	0.2033	-0.1542	-0.1797	-0.1824	0.1348	<b>0.2334*</b>	1.0000

n=63,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 59. Correlations among activists, college-educated men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000												
Abortion	<b>-0.2700*</b>	1.0000											
Leadership	0.0845	0.0204	1.0000										
Recruited for participation	-0.0227	0.0237	-0.0153	1.0000									
Political acquaintances	0.0109	<b>-0.1651*</b>	-0.0060	0.0232	1.0000								
Job skills	<b>0.1109*</b>	0.0122	<b>0.2845*</b>	<b>0.1130*</b>	<b>0.1563*</b>	1.0000							
Church skills	0.0633	<b>-0.3532*</b>	0.0371	0.0640	<b>0.1398*</b>	-0.0235	1.0000						
Org. skills	-0.0438	0.0506	<b>0.2238*</b>	<b>0.1867*</b>	<b>0.2447*</b>	<b>0.2348*</b>	<b>0.2361*</b>	1.0000					
Athlete	0.0357	0.0409	0.0634	<b>-0.1434*</b>	<b>0.0952*</b>	0.0782	<b>-0.1105*</b>	<b>0.1733*</b>	1.0000				
Disc. against	0.0355	-0.0304	-0.0021	-0.0281	<b>-0.1107*</b>	0.0492	-0.0107	-0.0729	<b>-0.1064*</b>	1.0000			
Married	<b>0.2370*</b>	<b>-0.1851*</b>	0.0755	-0.0541	0.0664	<b>0.1213*</b>	<b>0.2229*</b>	0.0785	0.0022	-0.0107	1.0000		
Family incomes	<b>0.0984*</b>	-0.0735	<b>0.1693*</b>	<b>0.1140*</b>	<b>0.1795*</b>	<b>0.4148*</b>	0.0649	<b>0.1385*</b>	0.0691	-0.0861	<b>0.3377*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.1702*</b>	-0.0416	-0.0326	-0.0204	<b>0.2466*</b>	<b>-0.1409*</b>	<b>0.2243*</b>	<b>0.0995*</b>	<b>-0.1133*</b>	<b>-0.0891*</b>	<b>0.2648*</b>	<b>0.2284*</b>	1.0000

n=364, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 60. Correlations among activists, college-educated women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000												
Abortion	0.0128	1.0000											
Leadership	-0.0426	0.0730	1.0000										
Recruited for participation	<b>-0.1133*</b>	-0.0254	0.0561	1.0000									
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.1263*</b>	0.0159	0.0271	<b>0.2080*</b>	1.0000								
Job skills	<b>-0.1616*</b>	<b>0.2586*</b>	<b>0.3675*</b>	-0.0141	0.0555	1.0000							
Church skills	-0.0587	<b>-0.3382*</b>	0.0575	-0.0194	<b>0.1704*</b>	-0.0171	1.0000						
Org. skills	0.0475	<b>0.0947*</b>	<b>0.2599*</b>	0.0685	<b>0.1222*</b>	<b>0.1217*</b>	<b>0.2377*</b>	1.0000					
Athlete	0.0542	-0.0492	0.0652	<b>-0.1582*</b>	-0.0760	-0.0136	0.0927	0.0353	1.0000				
Disc. against	-0.0036	<b>0.1199*</b>	0.0267	0.0178	<b>0.1008*</b>	<b>0.1283*</b>	0.0073	0.0067	-0.0287	1.0000			
Married	<b>0.2345*</b>	<b>-0.1226*</b>	0.0279	<b>0.1450*</b>	<b>0.1415*</b>	-0.0523	0.0225	0.0217	-0.0806	<b>-0.1603*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	<b>-0.1321*</b>	0.0454	<b>0.1364*</b>	<b>0.2556*</b>	<b>0.1655*</b>	<b>0.2118*</b>	-0.0476	<b>0.1132*</b>	-0.0712	<b>0.0968*</b>	<b>0.4767*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.3129*</b>	<b>-0.1132*</b>	<b>-0.2510*</b>	<b>0.2368*</b>	<b>0.2262*</b>	<b>-0.2466*</b>	<b>0.1755*</b>	0.0817	-0.0677	-0.0649	<b>-0.1197*</b>	0.0408	1.0000

n=314, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 61. Correlations among activists, not-college-educated men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000												
Abortion	-0.0725	1.0000											
Leadership	-0.0172	0.0194	1.0000										
Recruited for participation	-0.0158	0.0557	<b>0.1342*</b>	1.0000									
Political acquaintances	-0.0180	<b>-0.1377*</b>	<b>0.1061*</b>	<b>0.1778*</b>	1.0000								
Job skills	0.0596	0.0366	<b>0.3151*</b>	<b>0.1055*</b>	0.0406	1.0000							
Church skills	-0.0370	<b>-0.2878*</b>	0.0696	<b>0.0844*</b>	<b>0.1901*</b>	<b>0.0956*</b>	1.0000						
Org. skills	-0.0700	0.0129	<b>0.1210*</b>	<b>0.1751*</b>	<b>0.1703*</b>	<b>0.1764*</b>	<b>0.2116*</b>	1.0000					
Athlete	<b>0.1048*</b>	<b>0.0826*</b>	0.0492	<b>-0.0853*</b>	0.0726	0.0738	<b>-0.0814*</b>	0.0304	1.0000				
Disc. against	-0.0265	-0.0223	<b>0.0779*</b>	<b>0.1827*</b>	-0.0179	<b>0.0967*</b>	-0.0181	0.0100	<b>0.0857*</b>	1.0000			
Married	<b>0.2342*</b>	<b>-0.1158*</b>	<b>0.0931*</b>	0.0371	<b>0.0960*</b>	<b>0.0817*</b>	<b>0.0843*</b>	-0.0065	0.0146	<b>-0.1425*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	<b>0.0798*</b>	0.0525	<b>0.2699*</b>	<b>0.1556*</b>	0.0242	<b>0.3820*</b>	0.0591	<b>0.1149*</b>	0.0130	-0.0248	<b>0.3026*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.2822*</b>	<b>0.0901*</b>	<b>-0.1885*</b>	<b>0.1180*</b>	<b>0.0812*</b>	<b>-0.2645*</b>	0.0115	0.0220	-0.0726	<b>-0.1615*</b>	<b>0.1482*</b>	<b>-0.0783*</b>	1.0000

n=464, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 62. Correlations among activists, not-college-educated women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000												
Abortion	-0.0074	1.0000											
Leadership	-0.0029	<b>0.0909*</b>	1.0000										
Recruited for participation	0.0012	-0.0408	0.0655	1.0000									
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.1365*</b>	<b>-0.1051*</b>	0.0657	<b>0.2594*</b>	1.0000								
Job skills	0.0325	<b>0.1666*</b>	<b>0.2297*</b>	<b>0.1391*</b>	-0.0169	1.0000							
Church skills	0.0355	<b>-0.2147*</b>	<b>0.1027*</b>	<b>0.0897*</b>	<b>0.2188*</b>	0.0535	1.0000						
Org. skills	-0.0439	-0.0134	<b>0.1466*</b>	<b>0.1591*</b>	<b>0.2077*</b>	<b>0.0931*</b>	<b>0.3115*</b>	1.0000					
Athlete	0.0126	-0.0391	<b>0.1362*</b>	<b>0.0845*</b>	-0.0019	<b>0.1287*</b>	-0.0311	<b>0.1115*</b>	1.0000				
Disc. against	0.0223	<b>0.0778*</b>	<b>0.1593*</b>	<b>0.0800*</b>	-0.0458	<b>0.1962*</b>	0.0087	0.0613	<b>0.1143*</b>	1.0000			
Married	<b>0.2109*</b>	0.0588	<b>-0.0745*</b>	0.0515	0.0011	-0.0691	0.0739	0.0202	0.0183	<b>-0.1427*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.0090	<b>0.1305*</b>	<b>0.1273*</b>	<b>0.1815*</b>	<b>0.0904*</b>	<b>0.2116*</b>	<b>0.1254*</b>	<b>0.2030*</b>	<b>0.1248*</b>	-0.0206	<b>0.4201*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.4074*</b>	<b>-0.1381*</b>	<b>-0.2159*</b>	0.0067	<b>0.1120*</b>	<b>-0.2923*</b>	-0.0196	-0.0001	<b>-0.0989*</b>	<b>-0.1107*</b>	<b>-0.1744*</b>	<b>-0.2529*</b>	1.0000

n=495, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 63. Correlations among ambitious activists, college-educated men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000												
Abortion	<b>-0.2278*</b>	1.0000											
Leadership	0.1545	-0.0736	1.0000										
Recruited for participation	0.0444	-0.1357	0.1827	1.0000									
Political acquaintances	<b>0.2092*</b>	<b>-0.2467*</b>	0.1866	-0.0020	1.0000								
Job skills	0.1972	-0.0298	0.1273	-0.0318	<b>0.5501*</b>	1.0000							
Church skills	<b>0.2878*</b>	<b>-0.4677*</b>	0.1202	0.1737	0.1356	0.0944	1.0000						
Org. skills	-0.0953	0.1713	<b>0.2513*</b>	<b>0.3199*</b>	0.1066	<b>0.3466*</b>	0.1296	1.0000					
Athlete	0.0432	-0.0499	<b>0.3160*</b>	-0.1818	-0.1834	-0.0535	0.0082	0.0787	1.0000				
Disc. against	0.0131	0.1375	0.0938	<b>-0.5214*</b>	-0.0359	-0.0182	-0.1215	-0.0740	0.1873	1.0000			
Married	<b>0.2348*</b>	-0.1507	<b>0.2291*</b>	-0.0808	-0.0039	-0.0420	<b>0.2146*</b>	0.0960	<b>0.3993*</b>	0.0701	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.1709	<b>-0.4414*</b>	0.0997	-0.1230	<b>0.5424*</b>	<b>0.5885*</b>	<b>0.2739*</b>	-0.0538	-0.0054	0.0310	0.0595	1.0000	
Age	0.1183	<b>-0.4558*</b>	-0.1058	0.0563	<b>0.2747*</b>	-0.0012	<b>0.4312*</b>	-0.0346	-0.1911	-0.0254	0.0507	<b>0.4223*</b>	1.0000

n=66,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 64. Correlations among ambitious activists, college-educated women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000												
Abortion	0.0533	1.0000											
Leadership	0.1647	<b>0.5554*</b>	1.0000										
Recruited for participation	-0.1106	<b>-0.2747*</b>	<b>-0.3735*</b>	1.0000									
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.4374*</b>	<b>0.5097*</b>	<b>0.4404*</b>	-0.0590	1.0000								
Job skills	<b>-0.1264</b>	<b>0.2726*</b>	<b>0.2948*</b>	<b>0.3381*</b>	0.2636	1.0000							
Church skills	-0.2060	0.1074	-0.0091	0.2414	<b>0.3368*</b>	0.0431	1.0000						
Org. skills	-0.0537	<b>0.2791*</b>	0.1136	0.0786	0.1953	0.2148	<b>0.6088*</b>	1.0000					
Athlete	-0.0038	0.0753	0.2029	<b>-0.3754*</b>	0.1697	-0.0876	-0.0345	-0.0168	1.0000				
Disc. against	-0.0412	-0.0362	<b>-0.2977*</b>	-0.2300	-0.2089	-0.2595	-0.0995	-0.0697	0.0312	1.0000			
Married	<b>0.5168*</b>	-0.0116	0.0902	0.2027	-0.0773	-0.0188	0.0643	0.0403	0.1636	0.0090	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.0609	-0.1299	-0.0329	0.2382	0.0892	0.0593	-0.1867	-0.0277	0.2050	0.1899	<b>0.3931*</b>	1.0000	
Age	-0.1270	0.2353	0.1583	<b>0.2813*</b>	<b>0.4359*</b>	0.0462	<b>0.5131*</b>	0.2179	-0.0104	<b>-0.3443*</b>	0.0527	0.0121	1.0000

n=40,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 65. Correlations among ambitious activists, not-college-educated men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000												
Abortion	<b>-0.2874*</b>	1.0000											
Leadership	-0.0433	0.1174	1.0000										
Recruited for participation	-0.0628	<b>0.1814*</b>	<b>0.2877*</b>	1.0000									
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.2128*</b>	-0.1035	-0.0337	0.0124	1.0000								
Job skills	<b>0.1762*</b>	<b>-0.1677*</b>	0.1250	-0.0210	-0.0338	1.0000							
Church skills	-0.1542	<b>-0.3227*</b>	0.1011	0.1485	<b>0.2838*</b>	0.1067	1.0000						
Org. skills	-0.0438	<b>-0.3013*</b>	-0.1102	<b>0.2320*</b>	<b>0.3035*</b>	0.1274	<b>0.3334*</b>	1.0000					
Athlete	-0.0975	0.0108	-0.0360	<b>-0.2326*</b>	-0.0782	<b>0.1739*</b>	-0.0982	0.0059	1.0000				
Disc. against	0.0496	0.0978	0.1486	<b>0.2577*</b>	<b>-0.2387*</b>	0.1348	-0.0691	0.0187	<b>0.1615*</b>	1.0000			
Married	<b>0.3008*</b>	<b>-0.4113*</b>	<b>0.2096*</b>	<b>0.1736*</b>	0.0257	<b>0.1925*</b>	0.0674	<b>0.1732*</b>	-0.1063	-0.0840	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.1049	<b>-0.1611*</b>	0.0789	<b>0.3048*</b>	-0.0888	<b>0.3331*</b>	0.0536	0.1277	-0.1258	<b>-0.2142*</b>	<b>0.4162*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.1943*</b>	0.0622	-0.0189	<b>0.2683*</b>	0.1160	<b>-0.3248*</b>	0.0416	0.0932	<b>-0.2127*</b>	-0.0242	<b>0.2414*</b>	0.0678	1.0000

n=108,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 66. Correlations among ambitious activists, not-college-educated women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000												
Abortion	0.0617	1.0000											
Leadership	<b>-0.1941*</b>	-0.1119	1.0000										
Recruited for participation	0.1700	<b>0.1878*</b>	0.1057	1.0000									
Political acquaintances	0.1189	-0.1763	<b>0.4152*</b>	<b>0.3186*</b>	1.0000								
Job skills	<b>-0.2105*</b>	0.0570	0.0083	<b>0.2414*</b>	-0.1323	1.0000							
Church skills	0.0383	<b>-0.2520*</b>	0.0647	0.0364	<b>0.2093*</b>	0.0907	1.0000						
Org. skills	-0.1224	-0.0855	0.0136	0.0735	<b>0.2654*</b>	0.0601	0.1741	1.0000					
Athlete	<b>0.2734*</b>	0.0688	-0.1769	0.1272	<b>-0.2856*</b>	0.1619	0.0457	0.0353	1.0000				
Disc. against	0.1329	0.1230	0.0744	<b>0.3905*</b>	0.0418	<b>0.2578*</b>	0.0402	0.0489	0.1234	1.0000			
Married	<b>0.4040*</b>	<b>0.2109*</b>	-0.1669	0.1846	0.1382	-0.0836	0.0924	<b>0.1862*</b>	-0.0113	0.0077	1.0000		
Family incomes	<b>-0.3007*</b>	0.1286	-0.0207	<b>0.2304*</b>	0.0165	0.1699	0.0417	<b>0.4908*</b>	0.1426	-0.1264	0.1295	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.3249*</b>	<b>-0.2621*</b>	<b>0.3143*</b>	-0.0159	<b>0.3859*</b>	0.1323	-0.0153	-0.0942	<b>-0.3439*</b>	-0.0414	-0.0334	-0.0360	1.0000

n=80,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 67. Correlations among activists, reborn men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.1736*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	<b>0.1651*</b>	0.0638	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	<b>0.1545*</b>	0.0260	<b>0.2708*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0114	<b>-0.1553*</b>	0.0835	<b>0.2538*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>0.1479*</b>	0.1087	<b>0.3282*</b>	<b>0.3419*</b>	0.1032	1.0000								
Church skills	0.0357	<b>-0.3101*</b>	0.0563	<b>0.1563*</b>	<b>0.2068*</b>	<b>0.1974*</b>	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0938	0.0353	<b>0.1495*</b>	<b>0.2867*</b>	<b>0.1527*</b>	<b>0.3165*</b>	<b>0.4446*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	<b>0.1324*</b>	<b>0.1190*</b>	<b>0.2768*</b>	0.0008	<b>0.1137*</b>	<b>0.2069*</b>	-0.0695	<b>0.1223*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0421	0.0682	0.0412	<b>0.1553*</b>	<b>-0.1754*</b>	<b>0.1743*</b>	-0.0562	-0.0617	-0.0809	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.1765*</b>	<b>-0.1106*</b>	<b>0.1177*</b>	0.0425	0.0668	0.0206	0.0583	-0.0293	0.0272	<b>-0.1130*</b>	1.0000			
Education	<b>0.2347*</b>	0.1044	<b>0.2742*</b>	<b>0.3854*</b>	<b>0.1141*</b>	<b>0.4578*</b>	<b>0.1603*</b>	<b>0.3324*</b>	<b>0.2786*</b>	0.0708	0.0462	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.0752	0.1016	<b>0.2194*</b>	<b>0.3333*</b>	0.0988	<b>0.4588*</b>	<b>0.1745*</b>	<b>0.2625*</b>	<b>0.1891*</b>	-0.0033	<b>0.3017*</b>	<b>0.3715*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.2509*</b>	0.0867	-0.0581	0.0033	0.0881	<b>-0.3308*</b>	0.0254	-0.0273	<b>-0.2042*</b>	-0.1040	<b>0.2827*</b>	-0.0858	-0.0561	1.0000

n=224, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 68. Correlations among activists, reborn women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.0463	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.0130	0.0733	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0053	-0.0062	<b>0.2858*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0640	<b>0.1488*</b>	<b>0.1028*</b>	<b>0.2677*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>-0.1178*</b>	<b>0.1678*</b>	<b>0.2974*</b>	<b>0.2961*</b>	<b>0.1332*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	0.0213	<b>-0.1150*</b>	<b>0.1973*</b>	0.0303	<b>0.1624*</b>	<b>0.1871*</b>	1.0000							
Org. skills	0.0468	<b>0.1011*</b>	<b>0.3125*</b>	<b>0.1218*</b>	<b>0.2146*</b>	<b>0.1889*</b>	<b>0.3043*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	<b>0.1187*</b>	-0.0680	<b>0.1475*</b>	-0.0168	-0.0694	-0.0366	0.0118	<b>0.1770*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0055	<b>0.1509*</b>	<b>0.1431*</b>	0.0698	0.0688	<b>0.1412*</b>	0.0043	0.0431	0.0200	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2173*</b>	0.0015	-0.0522	0.0822	<b>0.0950*</b>	-0.0237	-0.0039	-0.0633	-0.0118	<b>-0.1262*</b>	1.0000			
Education	0.0087	<b>0.1220*</b>	<b>0.2522*</b>	<b>0.3624*</b>	<b>0.2080*</b>	<b>0.3439*</b>	<b>0.1548*</b>	0.0758	-0.0038	0.0184	0.0735	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.0204	0.0910	<b>0.1775*</b>	<b>0.3855*</b>	<b>0.1860*</b>	<b>0.2954*</b>	<b>0.1095*</b>	<b>0.1462*</b>	0.0087	0.0011	<b>0.4923*</b>	<b>0.3910*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.4164*</b>	-0.0762	<b>-0.1680*</b>	-0.0067	-0.0165	<b>-0.1781*</b>	-0.0165	-0.0825	<b>-0.1806*</b>	-0.0612	<b>-0.3541*</b>	<b>-0.2129*</b>	<b>-0.2726*</b>	1.0000

n=306, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 69. Correlations among activists, not reborn men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.1173*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.0619	<b>0.1354*</b>	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0535	<b>0.0916*</b>	<b>0.1096*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0368	<b>-0.1170*</b>	0.0489	<b>0.1286*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	0.0209	0.0426	<b>0.3675*</b>	<b>0.1105*</b>	<b>0.1318*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0363	<b>-0.1517*</b>	-0.0060	0.0736	<b>0.1775*</b>	0.0154	1.0000							
Org. skills	<b>-0.0973*</b>	0.0524	<b>0.1865*</b>	<b>0.2780*</b>	<b>0.2831*</b>	<b>0.2483*</b>	<b>0.2255*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.0534	0.0566	0.0164	-0.0732	0.0568	0.0734	<b>-0.1220*</b>	<b>0.0924*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0119	0.0138	0.0718	<b>0.1076*</b>	0.0086	<b>0.1195*</b>	-0.0388	0.0069	<b>0.0816*</b>	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2467*</b>	<b>-0.1316*</b>	-0.0213	0.0244	<b>0.0828*</b>	0.0395	<b>0.1283*</b>	0.0748	-0.0142	-0.0685	1.0000			
Education	0.0120	0.0700	<b>0.2797*</b>	<b>0.2470*</b>	<b>0.1579*</b>	<b>0.4469*</b>	0.0259	<b>0.2738*</b>	<b>0.2341*</b>	<b>0.1517*</b>	-0.0085	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.0648	-0.0501	<b>0.3124*</b>	<b>0.1539*</b>	<b>0.0860*</b>	<b>0.4133*</b>	<b>0.0909*</b>	<b>0.1350*</b>	0.0155	0.0295	<b>0.2834*</b>	<b>0.3412*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.2462*</b>	0.0029	<b>-0.1878*</b>	<b>0.0850*</b>	<b>0.0887*</b>	<b>-0.2667*</b>	<b>0.1821*</b>	0.0690	<b>-0.1419*</b>	<b>-0.1323*</b>	<b>0.2400*</b>	<b>-0.2394*</b>	-0.0257	1.0000

n=431,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 70. Correlations among activists, not reborn women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.0164	1.0000												
Leadership	0.0163	<b>0.1580*</b>	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	<b>-0.0909*</b>	-0.0142	0.0012	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.1871*</b>	<b>-0.1052*</b>	<b>0.0994*</b>	<b>0.2945*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	-0.0096	<b>0.2903*</b>	<b>0.3301*</b>	<b>0.1502*</b>	<b>0.0913*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	0.0225	<b>-0.1883*</b>	-0.0453	<b>0.1226*</b>	<b>0.2211*</b>	-0.0586	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0414	0.0180	<b>0.1862*</b>	<b>0.1942*</b>	<b>0.1834*</b>	<b>0.2785*</b>	<b>0.2785*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	-0.0420	-0.0731	<b>0.0870*</b>	0.0635	-0.0047	<b>0.0893*</b>	0.0448	0.0197	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0499	0.0785	0.0832	0.0591	0.0456	<b>0.1458*</b>	-0.0296	<b>0.0841*</b>	<b>0.0964*</b>	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2263*</b>	0.0292	-0.0155	0.0554	-0.0099	-0.0499	0.0546	0.0809	0.0104	<b>-0.1787*</b>	1.0000			
Education	0.0198	<b>0.1138*</b>	<b>0.1760*</b>	<b>0.3131*</b>	<b>0.2404*</b>	<b>0.4572*</b>	<b>0.0920*</b>	<b>0.2129*</b>	<b>0.1153*</b>	<b>0.1114*</b>	<b>-0.0937*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.0563	<b>0.1926*</b>	<b>0.1784*</b>	<b>0.1919*</b>	<b>0.1427*</b>	<b>0.3611*</b>	0.0504	<b>0.2683*</b>	<b>0.1091*</b>	0.0798	<b>0.3503*</b>	<b>0.3843*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.3421*</b>	<b>-0.2202*</b>	<b>-0.2822*</b>	0.0811	<b>0.1958*</b>	<b>-0.3660*</b>	<b>0.1504*</b>	0.0559	-0.0589	<b>-0.0846*</b>	-0.0487	<b>-0.1866*</b>	<b>-0.1555*</b>	1.0000

n=385,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 71. Correlations among ambitious activists, reborn men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.1808	1.0000												
Leadership	<b>0.3469*</b>	-0.2029	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	0.1064	-0.0620	<b>0.3520*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	0.1013	<b>-0.2702*</b>	0.0670	0.0050	1.0000									
Job skills	0.0993	-0.0083	0.1839	<b>0.3053*</b>	0.1333	1.0000								
Church skills	0.2142	<b>-0.4467*</b>	0.1250	0.0787	<b>0.3952*</b>	0.1234	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0176	-0.1703	0.1917	<b>0.2795*</b>	0.1952	<b>0.5433*</b>	<b>0.3152*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.1528	0.0761	<b>0.2654*</b>	-0.0278	-0.0805	<b>0.3503*</b>	0.0300	<b>0.3200*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0136	0.0184	0.1487	<b>0.3318*</b>	<b>-0.6064*</b>	0.1930	<b>-0.2320*</b>	-0.0959	0.1633	1.0000				
Married	0.0957	<b>-0.5103*</b>	<b>0.3968*</b>	0.1744	0.1270	0.1252	0.1835	<b>0.2506*</b>	-0.0145	-0.1729	1.0000			
Education	<b>0.2571*</b>	-0.0909	<b>0.3115*</b>	<b>0.4678*</b>	0.0734	<b>0.4377*</b>	0.0828	<b>0.4087*</b>	<b>0.2708*</b>	0.1311	<b>0.2816*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.0274	-0.1997	0.2055	<b>0.2979*</b>	0.1402	<b>0.3055*</b>	<b>0.2561*</b>	<b>0.3562*</b>	-0.0970	<b>-0.2485*</b>	<b>0.5549*</b>	<b>0.5059*</b>	1.0000	
Age	-0.1001	<b>-0.2247*</b>	0.0119	0.1707	0.0723	<b>-0.2204*</b>	<b>0.2460*</b>	0.0056	<b>-0.2673*</b>	-0.0534	<b>0.3171*</b>	0.0372	<b>0.2321*</b>	1.0000

n=59,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 72. Correlations among ambitious activists, reborn women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.0962	1.0000												
Leadership	<b>-0.2714*</b>	0.2063	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0865	0.0841	<b>0.2788*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0716	0.2108	<b>0.2559*</b>	<b>0.5260*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>-0.4592*</b>	-0.0477	0.1733	<b>0.2719*</b>	0.0728	1.0000								
Church skills	<b>-0.2351*</b>	-0.1027	0.0017	0.0649	0.1973	0.1973	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.2197	<b>0.2495*</b>	0.0303	<b>0.3574*</b>	<b>0.4203*</b>	0.1850	<b>0.2330*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	<b>0.2899*</b>	-0.1531	<b>-0.3845*</b>	-0.0795	-0.1862	-0.1676	-0.0936	-0.1591	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0461	0.2003	0.1796	<b>0.2532*</b>	<b>0.3659*</b>	0.0857	0.0970	<b>0.5414*</b>	-0.0341	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2856*</b>	0.0432	-0.1461	0.1018	-0.0439	-0.1071	-0.1351	0.0955	<b>0.3672*</b>	-0.0922	1.0000			
Education	-0.1528	0.1063	0.1097	<b>0.3035*</b>	0.1466	<b>0.3351*</b>	<b>0.2584*</b>	-0.0091	-0.1052	0.0976	-0.2150	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.1357	0.0100	-0.0296	<b>0.3872*</b>	0.2131	<b>0.2881*</b>	0.0772	<b>0.4148*</b>	<b>0.2378*</b>	0.0528	<b>0.5721*</b>	-0.0124	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.4393*</b>	-0.0330	0.1372	<b>0.3155*</b>	<b>0.3737*</b>	<b>0.2348*</b>	<b>0.2796*</b>	0.0412	-0.0333	0.1017	<b>-0.2871*</b>	<b>0.2808*</b>	0.1408	1.0000

n=52,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 73. Correlations among ambitious activists, not reborn men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.3221*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.0891	<b>0.3066*</b>	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.1260	<b>0.3603*</b>	<b>0.2970*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.2708*</b>	0.0882	0.0520	0.0763	1.0000									
Job skills	0.1529	-0.0247	<b>0.2298*</b>	-0.0785	0.0937	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0583	<b>-0.3035*</b>	0.0253	0.1256	0.1560	<b>0.1879*</b>	1.0000							
Org. skills	<b>-0.1766*</b>	-0.0155	0.0157	<b>0.3329*</b>	<b>0.3736*</b>	<b>0.2599*</b>	<b>0.1821*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.0093	-0.0670	-0.0328	<b>-0.3018*</b>	-0.0272	0.1717	<b>-0.2785*</b>	0.0204	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0826	<b>0.2251*</b>	0.1418	-0.0594	0.1123	<b>0.2111*</b>	-0.0467	0.0641	<b>0.2053*</b>	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.3281*</b>	-0.1685	<b>0.1755*</b>	0.1093	0.0202	<b>0.1747*</b>	0.0760	0.1744	0.0498	0.0816	1.0000			
Education	-0.0281	<b>0.1808*</b>	<b>0.2158*</b>	<b>0.3279*</b>	0.1629	<b>0.4824*</b>	0.0186	<b>0.4977*</b>	<b>0.2112*</b>	<b>0.2531*</b>	0.1680	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.0685	-0.1274	0.1618	<b>0.2245*</b>	0.1280	<b>0.4522*</b>	0.1710	0.1387	0.0011	<b>0.1950*</b>	0.1665	<b>0.2669*</b>	1.0000	
Age	-0.1049	0.0242	-0.0977	<b>0.2343*</b>	0.1469	<b>-0.3042*</b>	0.0036	0.0322	<b>-0.2520*</b>	-0.0397	0.1735	<b>-0.2511*</b>	0.1256	1.0000

n=90,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 74. Correlations among ambitious activists, not reborn women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	0.1777	1.0000												
Leadership	0.1482	0.1923	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0353	0.2102	<b>-0.2407*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.1040	-0.0069	<b>0.5512*</b>	0.1431	1.0000									
Job skills	-0.2185	<b>0.3651*</b>	0.0950	<b>0.2919*</b>	0.0518	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.1223	-0.0853	0.0598	0.2109	<b>0.2880*</b>	-0.0372	1.0000							
Org. skills	0.0591	-0.1179	-0.0454	-0.0498	0.0484	0.0905	<b>0.2782*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.1930	0.2106	-0.0917	<b>-0.2751*</b>	<b>-0.3861*</b>	-0.0765	-0.0592	0.2264	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0056	0.0236	-0.0995	0.2055	-0.0904	0.1090	-0.0295	-0.2331	-0.0532	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.5125*</b>	0.0741	0.2148	0.1068	0.0771	-0.1664	0.1111	0.2177	0.1048	-0.0349	1.0000			
Education	<b>-0.2358*</b>	0.2126	0.1051	<b>0.2418*</b>	<b>0.2581*</b>	<b>0.3377*</b>	0.0653	-0.0041	<b>-0.4449*</b>	<b>0.3274*</b>	<b>-0.2855*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.1041	0.1912	-0.2128	<b>0.2711*</b>	-0.2039	0.0366	0.0752	<b>0.3558*</b>	<b>0.2737*</b>	-0.0080	0.1733	0.2271	1.0000	
Age	-0.1283	-0.1547	<b>0.3777*</b>	-0.0231	<b>0.4267*</b>	0.1030	0.1907	-0.0668	<b>-0.3134*</b>	-0.2085	0.2151	-0.0653	<b>-0.2382*</b>	1.0000

n=50,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 75. Correlations among activists, biblical literalist men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.1105*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	0.0253	0.0566	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	0.0752	0.0153	<b>0.2746*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	0.0465	<b>-0.1389*</b>	<b>0.1819*</b>	<b>0.1735*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>0.2193*</b>	-0.0197	<b>0.3723*</b>	<b>0.2365*</b>	<b>0.1751*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0373	<b>-0.3606*</b>	0.0790	<b>0.1128*</b>	<b>0.1393*</b>	0.0900	1.0000							
Org. skills	0.0284	0.0197	<b>0.1768*</b>	<b>0.2975*</b>	<b>0.2374*</b>	<b>0.2460*</b>	<b>0.4032*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.0836	<b>0.1578*</b>	<b>0.1708*</b>	0.0441	0.0949	<b>0.1610*</b>	-0.0837	0.0435	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0422	-0.0390	<b>0.1067*</b>	<b>0.1853*</b>	<b>-0.1276*</b>	<b>0.1712*</b>	-0.0250	-0.0620	0.0096	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2471*</b>	-0.0016	-0.0640	0.0148	0.0776	-0.0649	0.0728	0.0484	-0.0495	<b>-0.1706*</b>	1.0000			
Education	<b>0.1691*</b>	0.0489	<b>0.2594*</b>	<b>0.3401*</b>	<b>0.1690*</b>	<b>0.4117*</b>	<b>0.1084*</b>	<b>0.1870*</b>	<b>0.2580*</b>	<b>0.1318*</b>	-0.0695	1.0000		
Family incomes	<b>0.1196*</b>	0.0243	<b>0.2864*</b>	<b>0.2221*</b>	0.0550	<b>0.4056*</b>	0.0884	<b>0.1695*</b>	<b>0.1950*</b>	0.0269	<b>0.2023*</b>	<b>0.3516*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.2860*</b>	0.0993	<b>-0.1624*</b>	<b>0.1094*</b>	<b>0.1290*</b>	<b>-0.3623*</b>	0.0641	0.0790	<b>-0.1749*</b>	<b>-0.1339*</b>	<b>0.2879*</b>	<b>-0.1132*</b>	-0.0018	1.0000

n=272, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 76. Correlations among activists, biblical literalist women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.0395	1.0000												
Leadership	0.0460	<b>0.1026*</b>	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0125	<b>-0.1247*</b>	<b>0.1712*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.1799*</b>	0.0057	<b>0.1179*</b>	<b>0.2834*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	-0.0639	<b>0.1130*</b>	<b>0.3208*</b>	<b>0.1860*</b>	0.0490	1.0000								
Church skills	0.0441	<b>-0.1857*</b>	<b>0.1859*</b>	<b>0.1114*</b>	<b>0.2185*</b>	<b>0.1697*</b>	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0327	0.0369	<b>0.2997*</b>	<b>0.1417*</b>	<b>0.1808*</b>	<b>0.2611*</b>	<b>0.3189*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.0523	-0.0269	<b>0.1023*</b>	<b>0.1236*</b>	-0.0119	<b>0.1168*</b>	-0.0324	<b>0.1735*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.0163	0.0354	0.0806	0.0440	-0.0201	0.0820	0.0058	0.0415	-0.0129	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.1572*</b>	<b>0.1008*</b>	0.0156	0.0262	0.0344	0.0291	0.0478	-0.0151	0.0625	<b>-0.1250*</b>	1.0000			
Education	0.0157	0.0489	<b>0.2496*</b>	<b>0.3837*</b>	<b>0.1882*</b>	<b>0.4008*</b>	<b>0.1584*</b>	<b>0.1117*</b>	<b>0.1053*</b>	0.0263	0.0528	1.0000		
Family incomes	<b>-0.1127*</b>	0.0565	<b>0.2233*</b>	<b>0.2627*</b>	<b>0.1534*</b>	<b>0.3012*</b>	<b>0.1090*</b>	<b>0.1825*</b>	0.0788	-0.0025	<b>0.4337*</b>	<b>0.3804*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.3981*</b>	<b>-0.1018*</b>	<b>-0.2589*</b>	-0.0122	<b>0.0942*</b>	<b>-0.2253*</b>	-0.0005	-0.0273	-0.0392	<b>-0.0918*</b>	<b>-0.2533*</b>	<b>-0.2206*</b>	<b>-0.2042*</b>	1.0000

n=368, \* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 77. Correlations among activists, not biblical literalist men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.1330*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	0.0103	<b>0.0887*</b>	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0224	0.0290	<b>0.0959*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0194	<b>-0.1382*</b>	0.0098	<b>0.1418*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	-0.0407	<b>0.1161*</b>	<b>0.3672*</b>	<b>0.1605*</b>	<b>0.1244*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0144	<b>-0.1657*</b>	0.0345	<b>0.1355*</b>	<b>0.1806*</b>	0.0548	1.0000							
Org. skills	<b>-0.1344*</b>	-0.0036	<b>0.1811*</b>	<b>0.2474*</b>	<b>0.2396*</b>	<b>0.2554*</b>	<b>0.1700*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.0481	-0.0083	0.0541	<b>-0.1328*</b>	0.0718	<b>0.0903*</b>	<b>-0.1205*</b>	<b>0.1115*</b>	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0384	0.0588	0.0522	0.0500	-0.0012	0.0697	-0.0150	0.0114	-0.0039	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.1869*</b>	<b>-0.2126*</b>	<b>0.1114*</b>	0.0611	<b>0.0955*</b>	<b>0.1192*</b>	<b>0.1591*</b>	0.0404	0.0629	-0.0446	1.0000			
Education	-0.0195	0.0719	<b>0.2890*</b>	<b>0.2326*</b>	<b>0.1238*</b>	<b>0.4266*</b>	<b>0.0882*</b>	<b>0.3360*</b>	<b>0.1957*</b>	<b>0.1437*</b>	0.0482	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.0663	-0.0026	<b>0.3032*</b>	<b>0.1988*</b>	<b>0.1452*</b>	<b>0.4778*</b>	<b>0.0945*</b>	<b>0.1392*</b>	0.0193	-0.0353	<b>0.3516*</b>	<b>0.2887*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.2105*</b>	-0.0433	<b>-0.1383*</b>	-0.0075	0.0699	<b>-0.1885*</b>	<b>0.1252*</b>	0.0046	<b>-0.1114*</b>	<b>-0.1250*</b>	<b>0.2024*</b>	<b>-0.2117*</b>	-0.0404	1.0000

n=438,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 78. Correlations among activists, not biblical literalist women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	0.0120	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.0758	0.0614	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0596	0.0719	0.0110	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	<b>-0.0897*</b>	-0.0317	0.0488	<b>0.2758*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	-0.0538	<b>0.2634*</b>	<b>0.2920*</b>	<b>0.1550*</b>	<b>0.1089*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0315	<b>-0.1906*</b>	-0.0053	0.0397	<b>0.1603*</b>	-0.0398	1.0000							
Org. skills	0.0275	0.0101	<b>0.1395*</b>	<b>0.1581*</b>	<b>0.2293*</b>	0.0594	<b>0.3009*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.0118	-0.0529	<b>0.1116*</b>	-0.0705	-0.0448	0.0056	0.0425	0.0249	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0013	<b>0.1198*</b>	<b>0.1079*</b>	<b>0.1024*</b>	<b>0.0888*</b>	<b>0.1923*</b>	0.0445	0.0811	<b>0.1241*</b>	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2567*</b>	-0.0337	-0.0634	<b>0.1296*</b>	0.0420	<b>-0.0918*</b>	0.0094	0.0657	-0.0728	<b>-0.1861*</b>	1.0000			
Education	0.0177	0.0749	<b>0.1101*</b>	<b>0.1978*</b>	<b>0.2770*</b>	<b>0.3530*</b>	<b>0.1103*</b>	<b>0.1801*</b>	0.0627	0.0665	-0.0279	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.0103	<b>0.1745*</b>	<b>0.1203*</b>	<b>0.2283*</b>	<b>0.2111*</b>	<b>0.3130*</b>	0.0689	<b>0.2333*</b>	0.0268	0.0506	<b>0.4355*</b>	<b>0.3840*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.3686*</b>	<b>-0.1760*</b>	<b>-0.2224*</b>	0.0798	<b>0.1378*</b>	<b>-0.3589*</b>	<b>0.0898*</b>	0.0491	<b>-0.1308*</b>	<b>-0.1152*</b>	<b>-0.0978*</b>	<b>-0.1855*</b>	<b>-0.1568*</b>	1.0000

n=380,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 79. Correlations among ambitious activists, biblical literalist men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	<b>-0.2983*</b>	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.0917	0.0922	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.1314	0.0809	<b>0.3581*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0998	-0.0747	<b>0.2797*</b>	<b>0.3114*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>0.1991*</b>	-0.0386	0.1748	0.1905	0.0211	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.1346	<b>-0.4570*</b>	0.1415	0.1308	<b>0.4048*</b>	-0.0084	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0328	-0.0487	<b>0.2936*</b>	<b>0.4220*</b>	<b>0.4640*</b>	<b>0.2873*</b>	<b>0.3538*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	-0.1521	0.1642	<b>0.2117*</b>	-0.1590	-0.1423	<b>0.2633*</b>	0.0665	-0.0147	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.1841	0.1489	<b>0.2311*</b>	<b>0.2789*</b>	<b>-0.1959*</b>	0.0854	-0.0967	-0.0157	0.1668	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.3145*</b>	<b>-0.4070*</b>	0.1552	<b>0.1969*</b>	0.1065	0.1362	0.1195	<b>0.1959*</b>	<b>-0.2275*</b>	-0.1917	1.0000			
Education	0.0001	0.0575	<b>0.3683*</b>	<b>0.3732*</b>	<b>0.2818*</b>	<b>0.2522*</b>	0.1469	<b>0.3261*</b>	<b>0.2573*</b>	<b>0.2241*</b>	0.0887	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.1311	<b>-0.2817*</b>	0.1227	<b>0.2036*</b>	0.0101	<b>0.3276*</b>	0.0827	0.1055	-0.1279	<b>-0.1975*</b>	<b>0.4619*</b>	<b>0.2227*</b>	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.2437*</b>	<b>-0.1992*</b>	-0.0052	<b>0.2297*</b>	0.1384	-0.1538	<b>0.2945*</b>	0.0902	-0.1290	0.0746	<b>0.2068*</b>	0.1292	<b>0.2387*</b>	1.0000

n=74,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 80. Correlations among ambitious activists, biblical literalist women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	0.0630	1.0000												
Leadership	-0.1360	<b>0.2394*</b>	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	-0.0975	-0.1258	0.1157	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.1868	0.0310	<b>0.4562*</b>	<b>0.3888*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>-0.2987*</b>	0.0434	0.0828	0.2108	0.1227	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0777	<b>-0.2368*</b>	0.0354	0.0140	<b>0.3016*</b>	0.0418	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.1753	0.0545	<b>0.2454*</b>	0.0980	<b>0.4369*</b>	<b>0.2186*</b>	<b>0.2858*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	<b>0.2858*</b>	0.0509	-0.0912	<b>-0.2444*</b>	-0.1021	0.0246	0.0819	0.0131	1.0000					
Disc. against	-0.0090	-0.0841	-0.1199	<b>0.2979*</b>	-0.0641	0.0469	-0.0490	-0.0431	-0.1036	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.3899*</b>	<b>0.2428*</b>	-0.0502	0.0461	-0.0021	0.1374	0.0481	0.2062	<b>0.3635*</b>	-0.1714	1.0000			
Education	-0.1361	-0.1143	0.0450	0.1939	-0.0064	0.1025	0.0023	-0.1598	<b>-0.3240*</b>	0.1832	<b>-0.2298*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	<b>-0.2713*</b>	-0.0721	0.1435	<b>0.2451*</b>	<b>0.2924*</b>	<b>0.2346*</b>	0.1908	<b>0.5519*</b>	0.0697	-0.0586	<b>0.3974*</b>	0.1512	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.3190*</b>	0.0467	<b>0.3057*</b>	0.0871	<b>0.4645*</b>	<b>0.2393*</b>	<b>0.2684*</b>	0.2091	0.0311	<b>-0.2471*</b>	0.0023	0.0328	0.1879	1.0000

n=61,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 81. Correlations among ambitious activists, not biblical literalist men

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	-0.0407	1.0000												
Leadership	0.1309	0.1795	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	0.1182	<b>0.2081*</b>	<b>0.2959*</b>	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	-0.0353	<b>-0.2395*</b>	-0.1628	<b>-0.2200*</b>	1.0000									
Job skills	0.1477	-0.0734	<b>0.1832*</b>	-0.0563	<b>0.2416*</b>	1.0000								
Church skills	0.0610	<b>-0.1965*</b>	0.0617	<b>0.1804*</b>	0.1041	0.1708	1.0000							
Org. skills	-0.0367	<b>-0.2029*</b>	-0.0593	<b>0.2334*</b>	0.1282	<b>0.2917*</b>	0.1516	1.0000						
Athlete	-0.0185	-0.0660	-0.0526	<b>-0.2510*</b>	-0.0514	0.0573	<b>-0.2556*</b>	0.1219	1.0000					
Disc. against	<b>0.2382*</b>	<b>0.2046*</b>	0.1149	-0.0874	-0.0987	0.1350	-0.0846	0.0647	<b>0.2391*</b>	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.2095*</b>	<b>-0.1958*</b>	<b>0.2846*</b>	0.1407	-0.0203	0.1720	0.0730	<b>0.2157*</b>	<b>0.1898*</b>	0.0892	1.0000			
Education	0.0602	0.0831	<b>0.1829*</b>	<b>0.3046*</b>	-0.0407	<b>0.4558*</b>	0.0442	<b>0.5425*</b>	<b>0.2445*</b>	<b>0.2777*</b>	<b>0.2382*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	0.1289	<b>-0.2059*</b>	0.1267	<b>0.2348*</b>	<b>0.2027*</b>	<b>0.5721*</b>	<b>0.1938*</b>	0.1691	-0.0126	-0.0124	<b>0.1922*</b>	<b>0.2382*</b>	1.0000	
Age	0.0158	-0.0204	-0.1040	0.1610	0.1075	<b>-0.3314*</b>	0.0269	-0.0635	<b>-0.2774*</b>	-0.1061	<b>0.1814*</b>	<b>-0.3186*</b>	0.0576	1.0000

n=85,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

Table 82. Correlations among ambitious activists, not biblical literalist women

	Preschool children	Abortion	Leadership	Recruited for participation	Political acquaintances	Job skills	Church skills	Org. skills	Athlete	Disc. against	Married	Education	Family income	Age
Preschool children	1.0000													
Abortion	0.1931	1.0000												
Leadership	<b>-0.3637*</b>	-0.0674	1.0000											
Recruited for participation	0.1775	<b>0.4717*</b>	-0.1890	1.0000										
Political acquaintances	0.1360	0.0771	0.2192	0.2331	1.0000									
Job skills	<b>-0.3027*</b>	<b>0.3174*</b>	-0.0294	<b>0.4326*</b>	-0.2327	1.0000								
Church skills	-0.0987	0.0576	0.0070	0.1884	0.1823	0.0913	1.0000							
Org. skills	0.0867	-0.1044	<b>-0.2779*</b>	0.1225	0.0069	-0.0511	<b>0.3695*</b>	1.0000						
Athlete	0.2012	0.0799	<b>-0.3866*</b>	-0.1264	<b>-0.4083*</b>	-0.0834	-0.1329	0.1604	1.0000					
Disc. against	0.1146	<b>0.3861*</b>	-0.0686	<b>0.2822*</b>	-0.0903	0.0885	0.0295	0.0001	0.1646	1.0000				
Married	<b>0.5796*</b>	0.0709	-0.1434	<b>0.2859*</b>	0.1808	<b>-0.3429*</b>	0.0572	<b>0.2565*</b>	0.1073	0.0890	1.0000			
Education	<b>-0.3731*</b>	<b>0.3102*</b>	<b>0.2793*</b>	<b>0.3302*</b>	<b>0.3027*</b>	<b>0.4129*</b>	0.0975	-0.0369	<b>-0.2829*</b>	0.1379	<b>-0.3168*</b>	1.0000		
Family incomes	-0.0135	0.0294	-0.2149	<b>0.2498*</b>	-0.1534	0.1663	-0.1682	0.2287	<b>0.2757*</b>	0.0678	<b>0.3111*</b>	0.2146	1.0000	
Age	<b>-0.2597*</b>	<b>-0.2906*</b>	0.1699	0.1434	0.2340	-0.1188	0.0728	<b>-0.2593*</b>	<b>-0.3413*</b>	-0.2137	-0.0227	0.0629	-0.1302	1.0000

n=50,\* indicates significance at 0.1 or better

## Bivariate Results

Table 83. Social roles by race and gender separately

	Men		Women		Whites		Minorities	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14%	15%	15%	<b>29%*</b>	14%	14%	18%	<b>34%**</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	26%	19%	33%	39%	30%	<b>19%*</b>	28%	<b>46%*</b>
	(n=330)	(n=123)	(n=340)	(n=85)	(n=475)	(n=108)	(n=195)	(n=100)
Abortion	0.68	0.64	0.61	0.68	0.65	0.66	0.6	0.62
	(n=689)	(n=184)	(n=739)	(n=126)	(n=1070)	(n=164)	(n=358)	(n=146)
Leadership	0.7	<b>0.76*</b>	0.66	<b>0.75**</b>	0.67	<b>0.76***</b>	0.74	0.75
	(n=699)	(n=186)	(n=748)	(n=129)	(n=1076)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 84. Social roles by race and gender together

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14%	13%	15%	17%	18%	22%	18%	<b>47%***</b>
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	26%	17%	34%	22%	26%	27%	29%	<b>65%***</b>
	(n=241)	(n=70)	(n=234)	(n=38)	(n=89)	(n=53)	(n=106)	(n=47)
Abortion	0.69	0.64	0.61	0.71	0.64	0.61	0.57	0.63
	(n=539)	(n=106)	(n=531)	(n=58)	(n=150)	(n=78)	(n=208)	(n=68)
Leadership	0.7	<b>0.76*</b>	0.65	<b>0.76*</b>	0.76	0.76	0.72	0.73
	(n=541)	(n=106)	(n=535)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 85. Opportunities and obstacles by race and gender separately

	Men		Women		Whites		Minorities	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	67%	67%	64%	64%	68%	74%	49%	48%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)
Political Acquaintances	52%	<b>64%*</b>	50%	52%	53%	<b>67%*</b>	39%	41%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)
Overall skills	0.6	<b>0.67^</b>	0.51	0.56	0.57	<b>0.69**</b>	0.5	0.49
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)
Job skills	0.5	0.57	0.34	0.36	0.42	<b>0.55**</b>	0.35	0.34
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)
Church skills	0.11	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.13	0.16	0.15	0.18
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)
Organization Skills	0.28	<b>0.35^</b>	0.25	<b>0.33^</b>	0.27	<b>0.38**</b>	0.23	0.25
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)
Athlete	66%	<b>76%*</b>	46%	<b>65%**</b>	55%	<b>69%**</b>	63%	<b>80%***</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)
Discriminated against	12%	17%	13%	<b>35%***</b>	11%	<b>20%^</b>	23%	<b>33%^</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=1078)	(n=164)	(n=371)	(n=151)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 86. Opportunities and obstacles by race and gender together

	White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	69%	74%	67%	73%	57%	44%	42%	52%
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)
Political Acquaintances	53%	<b>69%*</b>	53%	65%	46%	48%	34%	34%
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)
Overall skills	0.61	<b>0.72*</b>	0.53	0.63	0.57	0.53	0.44	0.45
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)
Job skills	0.51	<b>0.62*</b>	0.34	0.4	0.44	0.38	0.29	0.3
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)
Church skills	0.11	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.21	0.16	0.15
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)
Organizational skills	0.28	<b>0.38^</b>	0.26	<b>0.39*</b>	0.24	0.27	0.22	0.23
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)
Athlete	65%	75%	45%	55%	73%	82%	56%	<b>78%**</b>
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)
Discriminated against	10%	12%	12%	<b>37%**</b>	25%	33%	21%	33%
	(n=542)	(n=106)	(n=536)	(n=58)	(n=158)	(n=80)	(n=213)	(n=71)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 87. Social roles by education and gender separately

	Men		Women		College Educated		Not College Educated	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14%	15%	15%	<b>29%*</b>	15%	13%	15%	<b>23%*</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	26%	19%	33%	39%	27%	<b>16%^</b>	32%	31%
	(n=330)	(n=123)	(n=340)	(n=85)	(n=289)	(n=71)	(n=381)	(n=137)
Abortion	0.68	0.64	0.61	0.68	0.71	0.76	0.60	0.61
	(n=689)	(n=184)	(n=739)	(n=126)	(n=609)	(n=111)	(n=819)	(n=199)
Leadership	0.7	<b>0.76*</b>	0.66	<b>0.75**</b>	0.74	<b>0.82**</b>	0.64	<b>0.73***</b>
	(n=699)	(n=186)	(n=748)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=826)	(n=203)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.  
 Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 88. Social roles by education and gender together

	College Educated Men		College Educated Women		Not College Educated Men		Not College Educated Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14%	13%	16%	12%	14%	16%	15%	<b>35%**</b>
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	24%	17%	32%	<b>15%^</b>	29%	20%	34%	48%
	(n=154)	(n=49)	(n=135)	(n=22)	(n=176)	(n=74)	(n=205)	(n=63)
Abortion	0.72	0.75	0.7	0.76	0.65	0.58	0.55	0.65
	(n=314)	(n=71)	(n=295)	(n=40)	(n=375)	(n=113)	(n=444)	(n=86)
Leadership	0.77	0.82	0.71	<b>0.84*</b>	0.66	<b>0.73*</b>	0.63	<b>0.72*</b>
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=377)	(n=114)	(n=449)	(n=89)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.  
 Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 89. Opportunities and obstacles by education and gender separately

	Men		Women		College Educated		Not College Educated	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	67%	67%	64%	64%	81%	86%	55%	58%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)
Political Acquaintances	52%	<b>64%*</b>	50%	52%	58%	<b>76%*</b>	46%	53%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)
Overall skills	0.6	<b>0.67^</b>	0.51	0.56	0.72	0.77	0.45	<b>0.57***</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)
Job skills	0.5	0.57	0.34	0.36	0.60	0.66	0.29	<b>0.42**</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)
Church skills	0.11	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.18	0.13	0.16
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)
Organization Skills	0.28	<b>0.35^</b>	0.25	<b>0.33^</b>	0.35	<b>0.49**</b>	0.21	<b>0.28*</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)
Athlete	66%	<b>76%*</b>	46%	<b>65%**</b>	61%	64%	52%	<b>75%***</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)
Discriminated against	12%	17%	13%	<b>35%***</b>	15%	<b>32%*</b>	11%	<b>21%*</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=621)	(n=112)	(n=828)	(n=203)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 90. Opportunities and obstacles by education and gender together

	College Educated Men		College Educated Women		Not College Educated Men		Not College Educated Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	81%	87%	82%	85%	57%	58%	53%	57%
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)
Political Acquaintances	56%	<b>76%*</b>	61%	74%	49%	58%	44%	45%
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)
Overall skills	0.76	<b>0.84^</b>	0.68	0.64	0.49	<b>0.60*</b>	0.41	<b>0.53*</b>
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)
Job skills	0.68	0.72	0.52	0.55	0.37	<b>0.50*</b>	0.22	0.29
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)
Church skills	0.13	0.17	0.15	0.20	0.10	0.17	0.16	0.14
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)
Organizational skills	0.36	<b>0.59***</b>	0.33	0.32	0.22	0.25	0.20	<b>0.33*</b>
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)
Athlete	73%	78%	49%	37%	60%	<b>76%*</b>	45%	<b>74%***</b>
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)
Discriminated against	14%	21%	15%	<b>53%**</b>	10%	15%	12%	<b>29%*</b>
	(n=322)	(n=72)	(n=299)	(n=40)	(n=378)	(n=114)	(n=450)	(n=89)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 91. Social roles by reborn and gender separately

	Men		Women		Reborn		Not Reborn	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14%	15%	15%	<b>29%*</b>	15%	<b>26%^</b>	15%	15%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	26%	19%	33%	39%	32%	34%	33%	<b>20%*</b>
	(n=330)	(n=123)	(n=340)	(n=85)	(n=200)	(n=75)	(n=317)	(n=105)
Abortion	0.68	0.64	0.61	0.68	0.46	<b>0.57^</b>	0.70	0.68
	(n=689)	(n=184)	(n=739)	(n=126)	(n=446)	(n=117)	(n=738)	(n=155)
Leadership	0.7	<b>0.76*</b>	0.66	<b>0.75**</b>	0.69	<b>0.76*</b>	0.67	<b>0.76**</b>
	(n=699)	(n=186)	(n=748)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=747)	(n=157)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 92. Social roles by biblical literalism and gender separately

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	17%	9%	15%	<b>47%***</b>	16%	16%	14%	13%
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	32%	<b>10%**</b>	32%	<b>66%**</b>	31%	21%	34%	<b>18%*</b>
	(n=87)	(n=38)	(n=113)	(n=37)	(n=161)	(n=68)	(n=156)	(n=37)
Abortion	0.49	0.53	0.44	<b>0.61*</b>	0.71	0.68	0.69	0.69
	(n=178)	(n=62)	(n=268)	(n=55)	(n=369)	(n=99)	(n=369)	(n=56)
Leadership	0.75	0.77	0.64	<b>0.74*</b>	0.69	0.74	0.66	<b>0.79**</b>
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=375)	(n=100)	(n=372)	(n=57)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 93. Opportunities and obstacles by reborn and gender separately

	Men		Women		Reborn		Not Reborn	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	67%	67%	64%	64%	61%	69%	66%	63%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)
Political Acquaintances	52%	<b>64%*</b>	50%	52%	54%	<b>69%*</b>	53%	59%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)
Overall skills	0.6	<b>0.67^</b>	0.51	0.56	0.54	<b>0.66**</b>	0.54	0.61
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)
Job skills	0.5	0.57	0.34	0.36	0.36	<b>0.47*</b>	0.43	0.51
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)
Church skills	0.11	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.25	0.33	0.07	0.09
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)
Organization Skills	0.28	<b>0.35^</b>	0.25	<b>0.33^</b>	0.26	<b>0.38*</b>	0.26	0.32
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)
Athlete	66%	<b>76%*</b>	46%	<b>65%**</b>	50%	<b>74%***</b>	58%	<b>71%*</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)
Discriminated against	12%	17%	13%	<b>35%***</b>	17%	<b>28%^</b>	9%	<b>19%*</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=452)	(n=119)	(n=749)	(n=157)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 94. Opportunities and obstacles by biblical literalism and gender separately

	Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	64%	74%	59%	63%	68%	61%	65%	68%
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)
Political Acquaintances	56%	<b>74%<sup>^</sup></b>	53%	63%	57%	64%	49%	51%
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)
Overall skills	0.61	<b>0.71<sup>^</sup></b>	0.50	<b>0.60<sup>^</sup></b>	0.60	0.64	0.49	0.54
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)
Job skills	0.49	0.58	0.27	0.32	0.51	0.56	0.35	0.40
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)
Church skills	0.25	0.35	0.26	0.29	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.06
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)
Organizational skills	0.27	0.36	0.26	<b>0.40<sup>*</sup></b>	0.28	0.33	0.24	0.28
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)
Athlete	64%	<b>81%<sup>*</sup></b>	41%	<b>65%<sup>**</sup></b>	68%	74%	48%	63%
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)
Discriminated against	16%	26%	17%	31%	10%	11%	9%	<b>35%<sup>**</sup></b>
	(n=180)	(n=62)	(n=272)	(n=57)	(n=376)	(n=100)	(n=373)	(n=57)

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 95. Social roles by reborn and gender together

	Men		Women		Biblical Literalist		Not Biblical Literalist	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	14%	15%	15%	<b>29%*</b>	16%	<b>31%**</b>	15%	11%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	26%	19%	33%	39%	32%	38%	31%	<b>16%**</b>
	(n=330)	(n=123)	(n=340)	(n=85)	(n=254)	(n=103)	(n=327)	(n=91)
Abortion	0.68	0.64	0.61	0.68	0.48	0.52	0.73	0.74
	(n=689)	(n=184)	(n=739)	(n=126)	(n=545)	(n=146)	(n=743)	(n=146)
Leadership	0.7	<b>0.76*</b>	0.66	<b>0.75**</b>	0.66	<b>0.74**</b>	0.69	<b>0.78**</b>
	(n=699)	(n=186)	(n=748)	(n=129)	(n=554)	(n=148)	(n=751)	(n=148)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 96. Social roles by biblical literalism and gender together

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Preschool-aged children	19%	24%	14%	<b>44%***</b>	13%	<b>7%^</b>	17%	19%
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)
Preschool-aged children (respondents under 40)	34%	28%	31%	<b>55%*</b>	26%	<b>9%**</b>	37%	30%
	(n=102)	(n=55)	(n=152)	(n=48)	(n=171)	(n=58)	(n=156)	(n=33)
Abortion	0.52	0.48	0.46	<b>0.58^</b>	0.73	0.75	0.73	0.73
	(n=213)	(n=80)	(n=332)	(n=66)	(n=383)	(n=92)	(n=360)	(n=54)
Leadership	0.71	0.76	0.64	0.71	0.71	0.76	0.67	<b>0.82***</b>
	(n=217)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=363)	(n=56)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 97. Opportunities and obstacles by reborn and gender together

	Men		Women		Biblical Literalist		Not Biblical Literalist	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	67%	67%	64%	64%	54%	65%	73%	69%
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)
Political Acquaintances	52%	<b>64%*</b>	50%	52%	53%	53%	53%	<b>68%**</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)
Overall skills	0.6	<b>0.67^</b>	0.51	0.56	0.50	<b>0.61**</b>	0.60	0.67
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)
Job skills	0.5	0.57	0.34	0.36	0.33	<b>0.48**</b>	0.46	0.53
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)
Church skills	0.11	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.10	0.15
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)
Organization Skills	0.28	<b>0.35^</b>	0.25	<b>0.33^</b>	0.22	0.28	0.29	<b>0.40*</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)
Athlete	66%	<b>76%*</b>	46%	<b>65%**</b>	53%	<b>79%***</b>	56%	<b>67%^</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)
Discriminated against	12%	17%	13%	<b>35%***</b>	12%	<b>23%*</b>	12%	<b>25%*</b>
	(n=700)	(n=186)	(n=749)	(n=129)	(n=555)	(n=148)	(n=752)	(n=148)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 98. Opportunities and obstacles by biblical literalism and gender together

	Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious	Non-ambitious	Ambitious
Recruited for Participation	54%	63%	54%	66%	73%	71%	73%	65%
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)
Political Acquaintances	56%	58%	50%	44%	53%	<b>69%*</b>	52%	67%
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)
Overall skills	0.56	<b>0.68*</b>	0.44	0.49	0.63	0.67	0.56	0.65
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)
Job skills	0.45	<b>0.58*</b>	0.25	0.31	0.53	0.56	0.39	0.46
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)
Church skills	0.18	0.21	0.22	0.19	0.10	0.15	0.10	0.14
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)
Organizational skills	0.22	0.29	0.22	0.26	0.30	<b>0.40*</b>	0.28	0.39
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)
Athlete	62%	<b>82%**</b>	47%	<b>73%**</b>	68%	71%	44%	59%
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)
Discriminated against	12%	18%	12%	<b>31%*</b>	11%	15%	13%	<b>44%**</b>
	(n=218)	(n=81)	(n=337)	(n=67)	(n=388)	(n=92)	(n=364)	(n=56)

Significance: ^p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001. All variables are coded 0-1. Binary variables are represented as percentages. The measure “overall skills” is a combination of job, church, and organizational skills. See Appendix for additional coding information.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

### Multivariate Results

Table 99. Predicting ambition, original model (DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Activists only. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists) Race

		White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.28 (0.25)	-4% (0.03)	-0.10 (0.26)	-1% (0.02)	0.18 (0.28)	6% (0.10)	<b>0.73**</b> (0.26)	<b>22%</b> (0.09)
	Abortion	-0.07 (0.26)	-1% (0.05)	0.13 (0.36)	1% (0.03)	0.23 (0.29)	8% (0.10)	0.28 (0.30)	7% (0.08)
	Leadership	0.12 (0.38)	2% (0.07)	0.56 (0.49)	4% (0.04)	0.39 (0.55)	13% (0.18)	0.45 (0.55)	12% (0.15)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.24 (0.21)	4% (0.03)	-0.02 (0.27)	0% (0.02)	<b>-0.39^</b> (0.24)	<b>-13%</b> (0.08)	<b>0.37^^</b> (0.23)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)
	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.36^</b> (0.19)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.40^</b> (0.21)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	0.15 (0.23)	5% (0.08)	<b>0.41^</b> (0.23)	<b>12%</b> (0.07)
	Job Skills	0.13 (0.26)	2% (0.05)	<b>-0.46^^</b> (0.29)	<b>-4%</b> (0.02)	-0.12 (0.34)	-4% (0.11)	0.35 (0.36)	9% (0.09)
	Church Skills	0.28 (0.28)	5% (0.05)	-0.02 (0.35)	0% (0.03)	0.55 (0.42)	18% (0.14)	-0.12 (.47)	-3% (0.12)
	Organizational Skills	<b>0.40^</b> (0.23)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.47^^</b> (0.30)	<b>4%</b> (0.03)	0.42 (0.38)	14% (0.13)	0.51 (0.40)	14% (0.11)
	Athlete #	0.28 (0.19)	5% (0.03)	0 (0.20)	0% (0.02)	0.33 (0.28)	10% (0.08)	<b>0.83***</b> (0.23)	<b>20%</b> (0.05)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	0.18 (0.26)	4% (0.06)	<b>0.67**</b> (0.23)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)	0.37 (0.25)	13% (0.09)	<b>0.37^^</b> (0.23)	<b>11%</b> (0.07)
Controls	Married #	0.20 (0.22)	3% (0.04)	<b>-0.56*</b> (0.24)	<b>-5%</b> (0.03)	-0.06 (0.25)	-2% (0.08)	-0.08 (0.22)	2% (0.06)
	Education	<b>-0.96***</b> (0.30)	<b>-17%</b> (0.06)	-0.21 (0.30)	-2% (0.02)	<b>-0.84*</b> (0.41)	<b>-27%</b> (0.14)	<b>-0.85*</b> (0.38)	<b>-23%</b> (0.10)
	Family income	-0.09 (0.46)	-2% (0.08)	0.44 (0.48)	4% (0.04)	-0.49 (0.60)	-16% (0.20)	<b>-1.92***</b> (0.60)	<b>-51%</b> (0.16)
	Age	<b>-3.59***</b> (0.80)	<b>-65%</b> (0.14)	<b>-3.01***</b> (0.85)	<b>-24%</b> (0.07)	<b>-1.77*</b> (0.83)	<b>-58%</b> (0.27)	<b>-1.57*</b> (0.75)	<b>-42%</b> (0.20)
	Constant	0 (0.45)		-0.84 (0.56)		-0.04 (0.59)		<b>-1.04^</b> (0.60)	
Sample Size	599		541		208		256		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.13		.19		0.11		0.24		
Wald Chi	46.17		46.88		21.16		64.2		

Significance: ^^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 100. Predicting activism (DV: Activism. Sample: Entire Sample. Comparison: activists v. non-activists) Race

		White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.00 (0.25)	0% (0.07)	0.30 (0.20)	9% (0.05)	-0.24 (0.24)	-9% (0.09)	0.04 (0.21)	2% (0.08)
	Abortion	0.04 (0.21)	1% (0.06)	<b>0.31^</b> (0.18)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	0.05 (0.24)	2% (0.09)	-0.08 (0.19)	-3% (0.08)
	Leadership	0.04 (0.32)	1% (0.09)	0.12 (0.29)	4% (0.09)	0.07 (0.42)	2% (0.15)	<b>1.18***</b> (0.33)	<b>46%</b> (0.13)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	<b>0.76***</b> (0.17)	<b>22%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.61***</b> (0.15)	<b>20%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.84***</b> (0.22)	<b>28%</b> (0.07)	<b>0.34^</b> (0.19)	<b>13%</b> (0.07)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.03 (0.15)	1% (0.04)	0.12 (0.14)	4% (0.05)	<b>0.78***</b> (0.21)	<b>26%</b> (0.06)	0.33 (0.23)	13% (0.08)
	Skills	<b>0.99***</b> (0.24)	<b>27%</b> (0.07)	<b>1.11***</b> (0.23)	<b>36%</b> (0.07)	<b>1.13***</b> (0.29)	<b>40%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.06***</b> (0.29)	<b>42%</b> (0.12)
	Athlete #	<b>0.30^</b> (0.16)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	0.03 (0.14)	1% (0.05)	-0.15 (0.21)	-5% (0.07)	<b>0.49**</b> (0.18)	<b>19%</b> (0.07)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	0.22 (0.27)	5% (0.06)	-0.05 (0.24)	-2% (0.08)	-0.12 (0.21)	-4% (0.08)	-0.12 (0.19)	-5% (0.07)
Controls	Married #	0.23 (0.17)	7% (0.05)	-0.06 (0.15)	-2% (0.05)	-0.17 (0.20)	-6% (0.07)	<b>0.40*</b> (0.18)	<b>15%</b> (0.07)
	Education	0.18 (0.26)	5% (0.07)	0.32 (0.23)	10% (0.07)	0.36 (0.32)	13% (0.12)	0.03 (0.33)	1% (0.13)
	Family income	<b>0.96*</b> (0.41)	<b>26%</b> (0.11)	<b>1.38***</b> (0.39)	<b>44%</b> (0.12)	0.44 (0.51)	16% (0.18)	0.51 (0.48)	20% (0.19)
	Age	<b>1.05*</b> (0.50)	<b>29%</b> (0.14)	<b>1.63**</b> (0.48)	<b>52%</b> (0.15)	-0.31 (0.64)	-11% (0.23)	<b>1.84**</b> (0.58)	<b>72%</b> (0.23)
	Constant	<b>-1.50***</b> (0.38)		<b>-1.93***</b> (0.41)		-0.66 (0.48)		<b>-2.40***</b> (0.40)	
Sample Size	732		717		320		461		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.26		0.25		0.28		0.23		
Wald Chi	120.31		109.16		67.20		106.46		

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 101. Model with selection compared to original model for minority women

		Minority Women (Heckman Probit outcome model)		Minority Women (Original outcome model)	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.31 (0.20)	12% (0.08)	<b>0.73**</b> (0.26)	<b>22%</b> (0.09)
	Abortion	0.23 (0.16)	9% (0.06)	0.28 (0.30)	7% (0.08)
	Leadership	<b>-0.70*</b> (0.29)	<b>-28%</b> (0.12)	0.45 (0.55)	12% (0.15)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	- (0.23)	- (0.06)	<b>0.37^^</b> (0.23)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.15 (0.12)	6% (0.05)	<b>0.41^</b> (0.23)	<b>12%</b> (0.07)
	Job Skills	-0.18 (0.19)	-7% (0.07)	0.35 (0.36)	9% (0.09)
	Church Skills	-0.33 (0.21)	-13% (0.08)	-0.12 (.47)	-3% (0.12)
	Organizational Skills	0.33 (0.24)	13% (0.10)	0.51 (0.40)	14% (0.11)
	Athlete #	<b>0.22^</b> (0.13)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.83***</b> (0.23)	<b>20%</b> (0.05)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	0.22 (0.14)	9% (0.06)	<b>0.37^^</b> (0.23)	<b>11%</b> (0.07)
	Controls	Married #	-0.16 (0.16)	-6% (0.06)	-0.08 (0.22)
Education		<b>-0.48^</b> (0.26)	<b>-19%</b> (0.10)	<b>-0.85*</b> (0.38)	<b>-23%</b> (0.10)
Family income		<b>-1.59***</b> (0.38)	<b>-62%</b> (0.15)	<b>-1.92***</b> (0.60)	<b>-51%</b> (0.16)
Age		<b>-2.48***</b> (0.38)	<b>-98%</b> (0.15)	<b>-1.57*</b> (0.75)	<b>-42%</b> (0.20)
Constant		<b>1.87***</b> (0.18)		<b>-1.04^</b> (0.60)	
Sample Size	406 (256 uncensored)		256		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	-		0.24		
Wald Chi	1.10e+08		64.2		
Wald test of indep. equations	20.41***				

Significance: ^^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 102. Heckman probit model. (DV: Nascent Ambition in outcome model, activism in selection model. Sample: Full. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists in outcome model, activists v. non-activists in selection model) Race. Outcome model:

		White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.25 (0.23)	-6% (0.05)	-0.12 (0.28)	-1% (0.02)	0.09 (0.29)	3% (0.09)	0.31 (0.20)	12% (0.08)
	Abortion	-0.08 (0.24)	-2% (0.06)	0.12 (0.33)	1% (0.03)	0.18 (0.28)	5% (0.08)	0.23 (0.16)	9% (0.06)
	Leadership	0.06 (0.37)	2% (0.10)	0.55 (0.51)	4% (0.04)	0.34 (0.51)	10% (0.14)	<b>-0.70*</b> (0.29)	<b>-28%</b> (0.12)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Political Acquaintances#	<b>0.31^</b> (0.19)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.39^</b> (0.23)	<b>3%</b> (0.03)	0.24 (0.23)	7% (0.07)	0.15 (0.12)	6% (0.05)
	Job Skills	-0.04 (0.26)	-1% (0.07)	<b>-0.49^^</b> (0.31)	<b>-4%</b> (0.05)	0.04 (0.34)	1% (0.10)	-0.18 (0.19)	-7% (0.07)
	Church Skills	0.19 (0.28)	5% (0.07)	-0.04 (0.35)	0% (0.03)	0.59 (0.42)	17% (0.12)	-0.33 (0.21)	-13% (0.08)
	Organizational Skills	0.29 (0.24)	8% (0.06)	0.45 (0.34)	4% (0.03)	0.42 (0.36)	12% (0.10)	0.33 (0.24)	13% (0.10)
	Athlete #	0.17 (0.19)	4% (0.05)	0 (0.20)	0% (0.02)	0.31 (0.27)	8% (0.07)	<b>0.22^</b> (0.13)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)
	Discriminated against #	0.10 (0.26)	3% (0.07)	<b>0.67**</b> (0.23)	<b>9%</b> (0.07)	0.29 (0.23)	9% (0.07)	0.22 (0.14)	9% (0.06)
Controls	Married #	0.09 (0.22)	2% (0.05)	<b>-0.55*</b> (0.25)	<b>-5%</b> (0.04)	-0.08 (0.24)	-2% (0.07)	-0.16 (0.16)	-6% (0.06)
	Education	<b>-0.96***</b> (0.27)	<b>-25%</b> (0.10)	-0.23 (0.34)	-2% (0.04)	<b>-0.81*</b> (0.41)	<b>-23%</b> (0.12)	<b>-0.48^</b> (0.26)	<b>-19%</b> (0.10)
	Family income	-0.34 (0.46)	-9% (0.13)	0.36 (0.71)	3% (0.04)	-0.46 (0.59)	-13% (0.17)	<b>-1.59***</b> (0.38)	-62% (0.15)
	Age	<b>-3.48***</b> (0.79)	<b>-91%</b> (0.21)	<b>-3.09**</b> (1.13)	<b>-25%</b> (0.28)	<b>-1.70*</b> (0.80)	<b>-48%</b> (0.24)	<b>-2.48***</b> (0.38)	<b>-98%</b> (0.15)
	Constant	0.91 (0.62)		-0.68 (1.45)		-0.47 (0.58)		<b>1.87***</b> (0.18)	
Sample Size (uncensored)	732 (599)		717 (541)		320 (208)		406 (256)		
Wald Chi	49.84		45.59		15.47		57.25		
Rho	-0.64		-0.11		0.45		-1		
Wald test of indep. equations	2.62^^		0.01		3.07^		20.41***		

Significance: ^^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Selection model:

		White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.02 (0.25)	1% (0.07)	0.30 (0.20)	9% (0.05)	-0.21 (0.24)	-8% (0.09)	0.01 (0.19)	-1% (0.08)
	Abortion	0.08 (0.21)	2% (0.06)	<b>0.31<sup>^</sup></b> (0.18)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	0.06 (0.24)	2% (0.09)	-0.06 (0.14)	-2% (0.05)
	Leadership	0.05 (0.32)	1% (0.09)	0.12 (0.29)	4% (0.09)	0.08 (0.42)	3% (0.15)	<b>1.15***</b> (0.29)	<b>45%</b> (0.12)
	Recruited for Participation #	<b>0.78***</b> (0.16)	<b>22%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.60***</b> (0.15)	<b>20%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.86***</b> (0.22)	<b>29%</b> (0.07)	<b>0.33**</b> (0.12)	<b>13%</b> (0.04)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Political Acquaintances #	0.05 (0.15)	1% (0.04)	0.12 (0.14)	4% (0.05)	<b>0.79***</b> (0.21)	<b>26%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.34**</b> (0.11)	<b>13%</b> (0.04)
	Skills	<b>1.00***</b> (0.24)	<b>27%</b> (0.07)	<b>1.10***</b> (0.23)	<b>35%</b> (0.07)	<b>1.13***</b> (0.29)	<b>41%</b> (0.10)	<b>0.99***</b> (0.22)	<b>39%</b> (0.09)
	Athlete #	<b>0.31*</b> (0.15)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	0.03 (0.14)	1% (0.05)	-0.12 (0.21)	-4% (0.07)	<b>0.48***</b> (0.14)	<b>19%</b> (0.05)
	Discriminated against #	0.22 (0.26)	6% (0.06)	-0.05 (0.24)	-2% (0.08)	-0.10 (0.21)	-4% (0.08)	-0.21 (0.15)	-8% (0.06)
Controls	Married #	0.20 (0.17)	6% (0.05)	-0.06 (0.15)	-2% (0.05)	-0.18 (0.20)	-6% (0.07)	<b>0.38*</b> (0.17)	<b>15%</b> (0.06)
	Education	0.14 (0.26)	4% (0.07)	0.32 (0.24)	10% (0.07)	0.30 (0.33)	11% (0.12)	0.13 (0.26)	5% (0.10)
	Family income	<b>0.97*</b> (0.41)	<b>27%</b> (0.11)	<b>1.38***</b> (0.39)	<b>44%</b> (0.12)	0.45 (0.52)	16% (0.19)	0.39 (0.37)	15% (0.14)
	Age	<b>1.10*</b> (0.50)	<b>30%</b> (0.14)	<b>1.63**</b> (0.48)	<b>52%</b> (0.15)	-0.32 (0.64)	-12% (0.23)	<b>1.59***</b> (0.37)	<b>63%</b> (0.14)
	Constant	<b>-1.55***</b> (0.38)		<b>-1.93***</b> (0.41)		-0.69 (0.48)		<b>-2.23***</b> (0.21)	
Sample Size (uncensored)	732		717		320		406		
Wald Chi	49.84		45.59		15.47		57.25		
Rho	-0.64		-0.11		0.45		-1		
Wald test of independent equations	2.62 <sup>^^</sup>		0.01		3.07 <sup>^</sup>		20.41***		

Significance: <sup>^^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 103. Predicting ambition, original model without “recruited for participation” as an independent variable.  
(DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Activists only. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists) Race

		White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.27 (0.24)	-4% (0.03)	-0.10 (0.27)	-1% (0.02)	0.17 (0.28)	6% (0.10)	<b>0.70**</b> (0.26)	<b>21%</b> (0.09)
	Abortion	-0.05 (0.26)	-1% (0.05)	0.13 (0.36)	1% (0.03)	0.18 (0.29)	6% (0.10)	0.26 (0.30)	7% (0.08)
	Leadership	0.17 (0.39)	3% (0.07)	0.56 (0.49)	4% (0.04)	0.30 (0.53)	10% (0.18)	0.46 (0.54)	12% (0.14)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.37*</b> (0.19)	<b>7%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.40^</b> (0.22)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	0.09 (0.23)	3% (0.07)	<b>0.51*</b> (0.24)	<b>14%</b> (0.07)
	Job Skills	0.12 (0.26)	2% (0.05)	<b>-0.46^^</b> (0.29)	<b>-4%</b> (0.03)	-0.09 (0.34)	-3% (0.11)	0.48 (0.36)	13% (0.09)
	Church Skills	0.30 (0.28)	5% (0.05)	-0.02 (0.35)	0% (0.03)	0.55 (0.43)	18% (0.14)	-0.15 (.47)	-4% (0.12)
	Organizational Skills	<b>0.44^</b> (0.24)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.47^^</b> (0.30)	<b>4%</b> (0.03)	0.36 (0.38)	12% (0.13)	<b>0.63^^</b> (0.39)	<b>17%</b> (0.11)
	Athlete #	0.24 (0.19)	4% (0.03)	0 (0.20)	0% (0.02)	0.38 (0.28)	11% (0.08)	<b>0.84***</b> (0.23)	<b>20%</b> (0.05)
	Discriminated against #	0.21 (0.26)	4% (0.06)	<b>0.67**</b> (0.24)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)	0.26 (0.24)	9% (0.08)	<b>0.39^</b> (0.24)	<b>11%</b> (0.07)
	Controls	Married #	0.20 (0.22)	4% (0.04)	<b>-0.56*</b> (0.24)	<b>-5%</b> (0.03)	-0.04 (0.25)	-1% (0.08)	0.12 (0.22)
Education		<b>-0.86**</b> (0.29)	<b>-16%</b> (0.06)	-0.21 (0.29)	-2% (0.02)	<b>-0.98*</b> (0.41)	<b>-32%</b> (0.14)	<b>-0.77^</b> (0.39)	<b>-20%</b> (0.10)
Family income		-0.07 (0.46)	-1% (0.08)	0.44 (0.50)	4% (0.04)	-0.58 (0.59)	-19% (0.20)	<b>-1.98**</b> (0.63)	<b>-52%</b> (0.16)
Age		<b>-3.47***</b> (0.80)	<b>-64%</b> (0.14)	<b>-3.02***</b> (0.82)	<b>-24%</b> (0.07)	<b>-1.83*</b> (0.83)	<b>-60%</b> (0.28)	<b>-1.59*</b> (0.75)	<b>-42%</b> (0.20)
Constant		0.01 (0.44)		-0.84 (0.56)		0 (0.60)		<b>-1.00^</b> (0.60)	
Sample Size		599		541		208		256	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.13		0.19		0.10		0.23	
Wald Chi		42.36		45.18		21.01		57.25	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 104. Predicting ambition, new comparison group (DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Full. Comparison: ambitious activists v. all others) Race

		White Men		White Women		Minority Men		Minority Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.25 (0.24)	-3% (0.02)	-0.05 (0.24)	0% (0.01)	0.13 (0.23)	3% (0.06)	<b>0.62**</b> (0.23)	<b>10%</b> (0.05)
	Abortion	-0.11 (0.23)	-1% (0.03)	0.17 (0.35)	1% (0.02)	0.21 (0.25)	5% (0.06)	0.09 (0.24)	1% (0.03)
	Leadership	0.10 (0.36)	1% (0.05)	0.53 (0.46)	3% (0.02)	0.50 (0.40)	12% (0.09)	<b>0.83^</b> (0.49)	<b>11%</b> (0.07)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	<b>0.41*</b> (0.20)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)	0.18 (0.26)	1% (0.01)	-0.12 (0.22)	-3% (0.05)	<b>0.51*</b> (0.22)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)
	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.38*</b> (0.19)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)	<b>0.35^</b> (0.20)	<b>2%</b> (0.01)	<b>0.38^</b> (0.21)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.36^</b> (0.21)	<b>6%</b> (0.04)
	Job Skills	0.27 (0.25)	4% (0.03)	-0.38 (0.28)	-2% (0.02)	-0.20 (0.30)	-5% (0.07)	<b>0.57^</b> (0.32)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)
	Church Skills	0.27 (0.27)	4% (0.04)	0.04 (0.34)	0% (0.02)	<b>0.66^^</b> (0.41)	<b>16%</b> (0.10)	-0.09 (0.45)	-1% (0.06)
	Organizational Skills	<b>0.60**</b> (0.23)	<b>8%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.74*</b> (0.30)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)	<b>1.05**</b> (0.38)	<b>25%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.03**</b> (0.40)	<b>14%</b> (0.06)
	Athlete #	<b>0.29^^</b> (0.18)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)	-0.04 (0.20)	0% (0.01)	0.20 (0.23)	4% (0.05)	<b>0.89***</b> (0.21)	<b>12%</b> (0.03)
	Discriminated against #	0.20 (0.25)	3% (0.04)	<b>0.67**</b> (0.22)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	0.25 (0.21)	6% (0.06)	0.14 (0.21)	2% (0.03)
Controls	Married #	0.20 (0.21)	2% (0.02)	<b>-0.52*</b> (0.23)	<b>-3%</b> (0.02)	-0.19 (0.21)	-5% (0.05)	0.24 (0.19)	3% (0.03)
	Education	<b>-0.88**</b> (0.29)	<b>-11%</b> (0.04)	-0.11 (0.29)	-1% (0.01)	-0.51 (0.35)	-12% (0.08)	<b>-0.61^</b> (0.36)	<b>-9%</b> (0.05)
	Family income	0.03 (0.39)	0.3% (0.05)	0.63 (0.42)	3% (0.02)	-0.04 (0.48)	-1% (0.11)	<b>-1.70**</b> (0.57)	<b>-24%</b> (0.08)
	Age	<b>-3.06***</b> (0.75)	<b>-40%</b> (0.09)	<b>-2.51**</b> (0.85)	<b>-13%</b> (0.04)	<b>-1.47*</b> (0.67)	<b>-35%</b> (0.16)	-0.53 (0.66)	-7% (0.09)
	Constant	<b>-0.70^</b> (0.40)		<b>-1.59**</b> (0.51)		<b>-1.05*</b> (0.47)		<b>-2.41***</b> (0.54)	
Sample Size		732		717		320		461	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.14		.20		0.10		0.23	
Wald Chi		55.98		54.67		24.29		83.62	

Significance: ^^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 105. Predicting ambition, original model (DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Activists only. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists) Class

		College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.25 (0.26)	-3% (0.02)	-0.10 (0.39)	0% (0.01)	-0.06 (0.25)	-1% (0.06)	<b>0.45*</b> (0.21)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)
	Abortion	0.15 (0.29)	2% (0.03)	0.13 (0.40)	1% (0.02)	-0.23 (0.25)	-6% (0.06)	0.14 (0.28)	2% (0.04)
	Leadership	0.34 (0.61)	4% -0.07	<b>1.98**</b> (0.72)	<b>9%</b> (0.03)	0.33 (0.39)	8% (0.10)	0.50 (0.43)	7% (0.06)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.18 (0.28)	2% (0.03)	<b>0.73^</b> (0.40)	<b>2%</b> (0.01)	0.05 (0.18)	1% (0.04)	-0.05 (0.20)	-1% (0.03)
	Political Acquaintances#	<b>0.81**</b> (0.26)	<b>9%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.63*</b> (0.30)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)	0.16 (0.18)	4% (0.05)	0.12 (0.19)	2% (0.03)
	Job Skills	<b>-0.73*</b> (0.32)	<b>-9%</b> (0.04)	-0.45 (0.36)	-2% (0.02)	0.18 (0.25)	4% (0.06)	-0.17 (0.28)	-2% (0.04)
	Church Skills	0.18 (0.30)	2% (0.04)	0.43 (0.33)	2% (0.02)	0.36 (0.32)	9% (0.08)	-0.40 (0.34)	-5% (0.05)
	Organizational Skills	<b>0.91***</b> (0.26)	<b>11%</b> (0.04)	-0.24 (0.37)	-1% (0.02)	0.11 (0.29)	3% (0.07)	<b>0.67*</b> (0.32)	<b>9%</b> (0.04)
	Athlete #	0.01 (0.29)	0% (0.03)	-0.29 (0.25)	-1% (0.01)	0.30 (0.20)	7% (0.04)	<b>0.52**</b> (0.20)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)
	Discriminated against #	<b>0.58*</b> (0.24)	<b>10%</b> (0.05)	<b>1.01***</b> (0.27)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	0.05 (0.24)	1% (0.06)	<b>0.43*</b> (0.21)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)
Controls	Married #	<b>0.55*</b> (0.28)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.82**</b> (0.31)	<b>-5%</b> (0.02)	-0.08 (0.20)	-2% (0.05)	-0.16 (0.24)	-2% (0.03)
	Family income	0.21 (0.53)	3% (0.06)	<b>-1.70*</b> (0.67)	<b>-8%</b> (0.03)	-0.17 (0.43)	-4% (0.11)	-0.24 (0.52)	-3% (0.07)
	Age	<b>-5.35***</b> (1.25)	<b>-65%</b> (0.16)	<b>-2.85**</b> (0.97)	<b>-13%</b> (0.05)	<b>-2.44***</b> (0.65)	<b>-60%</b> (0.16)	<b>-2.42***</b> (0.66)	<b>-32%</b> (0.08)
	Constant	-0.81 (0.76)		<b>-1.81^</b> (1.01)		-0.30 (0.42)		<b>-1.07*</b> (0.46)	
Sample Size	364		314		464		495		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.21		0.35		0.10		0.19		
Wald Chi	39.74		58.33		33.58		63.95		

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 106. Predicting activism (DV: Activism. Sample: Entire Sample. Comparison: activists v. non-activists) Class

		College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.09 (0.43)	1% (0.06)	<b>0.72<sup>^</sup></b> (0.41)	<b>9%</b> (0.04)	-0.08 (0.21)	-3% (0.08)	0.08 (0.16)	3% (0.06)
	Abortion	0.34 (0.36)	5% (0.06)	0.31 (0.37)	5% (0.06)	0.04 (0.19)	1% (0.07)	0.14 (0.16)	5% (0.06)
	Leadership	0.40 (0.55)	6% (0.08)	-0.25 (0.63)	-5% (0.11)	-0.12 (0.31)	-4% (0.11)	0.38 (0.25)	15% (0.10)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	<b>1.17***</b> (0.25)	<b>26%</b> (0.08)	<b>0.41<sup>^^</sup></b> (0.26)	<b>8%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.71***</b> (0.16)	<b>24%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.55***</b> (0.14)	<b>21%</b> (0.05)
	Political Acquaintances#	0.17 (0.26)	3% (0.04)	0.34 (0.24)	6% (0.04)	0.20 (0.15)	7% (0.05)	0.12 (0.14)	5% (0.05)
	Skills	<b>0.82*</b> (0.39)	<b>12%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.95*</b> (0.39)	<b>17%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.13***</b> (0.23)	<b>39%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.18***</b> (0.23)	<b>45%</b> (0.09)
	Athlete #	0.33 (0.27)	1% (0.05)	0.20 (0.24)	4% (0.04)	<b>0.25<sup>^</sup></b> (0.15)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	0.14 (0.13)	5% (0.05)
	Discriminated against #	0.31 (0.35)	4% (0.04)	<b>-0.56<sup>^</sup></b> (0.30)	<b>-13%</b> (0.08)	0.02 (0.22)	1% (0.08)	0.13 (0.18)	5% (0.07)
Controls	Married #	<b>0.46<sup>^</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	-0.37 (0.26)	-6% (0.05)	0.07 (0.16)	3% (0.06)	0.11 (0.13)	4% (0.05)
	Family income	0.22 (0.71)	3% (0.11)	<b>1.39*</b> (0.66)	<b>25%</b> (0.11)	<b>1.22**</b> (0.39)	<b>42%</b> (0.13)	<b>1.14***</b> (0.34)	<b>44%</b> (0.13)
	Age	0.46 (1.02)	7% (0.16)	<b>1.80<sup>^</sup></b> (0.98)	<b>32%</b> (0.18)	<b>0.96*</b> (0.48)	<b>33%</b> (0.17)	<b>1.54***</b> (0.42)	<b>59%</b> (0.16)
	Constant	<b>-1.66*</b> (0.73)		-1.21 (0.86)		<b>-1.35***</b> (0.35)		<b>-1.89***</b> (0.32)	
Sample Size		402		360		673		836	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.22		0.21		0.22		0.20	
Wald Chi		46.22		34.93		88.57		104.49	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 107. Model with selection compared to original model for college-educated women

		College Women (Heckman Probit outcome model)		College Women (Original outcome model)	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.16 (0.33)	1% (0.02)	-0.10 (0.39)	0% (0.01)
	Abortion	0.01 (0.38)	0% (0.02)	0.13 (0.40)	1% (0.02)
	Leadership	<b>1.51*</b> (0.63)	<b>8%</b> (0.03)	<b>1.98**</b> (0.72)	<b>9%</b> (0.03)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	- (0.40)	- (0.01)	<b>0.73^</b> (0.40)	<b>2%</b> (0.01)
	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.65*</b> (0.27)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)	<b>0.63*</b> (0.30)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)
	Job Skills	-0.11 (0.33)	-1% (0.02)	-0.45 (0.36)	-2% (0.02)
	Church Skills	<b>0.51^</b> (0.30)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	0.43 (0.33)	2% (0.02)
	Organizational Skills	-0.14 (0.34)	-1% (0.02)	-0.24 (0.37)	-1% (0.02)
	Athlete #	<b>-0.38^^</b> (0.24)	<b>-2%</b> (0.01)	-0.29 (0.25)	-1% (0.01)
	Discriminated against #	<b>0.78***</b> (0.24)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)	<b>1.01***</b> (0.27)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)
	Controls	Married #	<b>-0.82**</b> (0.29)	<b>-5%</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.82**</b> (0.31)
Family income		-0.92 (0.60)	-5% (0.03)	<b>-1.70*</b> (0.97)	<b>-8%</b> (0.05)
Age		<b>-1.81*</b> (0.84)	<b>-10%</b> (0.05)	<b>-2.85**</b> (0.97)	<b>-13%</b> (0.05)
Constant		<b>-1.79*</b> (0.86)		<b>-1.81^</b> (1.01)	
Sample Size	360 (314 uncensored)		314		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	-		0.35		
Wald Chi	55.57		58.33		
Wald test of indep. equations	6.45*				

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 108. Heckman probit model. (DV: Nascent Ambition in outcome model, activism in selection model. Sample: Full. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists in outcome model, activists v. non-activists in selection model) Class. Outcome model:

		College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.24 (0.26)	-3% (0.03)	0.16 (0.33)	1% (0.02)	-0.06 (0.25)	-2% (0.06)	<b>0.46*</b> (0.21)	<b>5%</b> (0.03)
	Abortion	0.10 (0.29)	1% (0.04)	0.01 (0.38)	0% (0.02)	-0.24 (0.25)	-6% (0.07)	0.18 (0.27)	1% (0.02)
	Leadership	0.28 (0.61)	4% (0.08)	<b>1.51*</b> (0.63)	<b>8%</b> (0.03)	0.33 (0.39)	8% (0.10)	0.54 (0.43)	5% (0.04)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Political Acquaintances#	<b>0.77**</b> (0.26)	<b>10%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.65*</b> (0.27)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)	0.15 (0.19)	4% (0.05)	0.14 (0.19)	1% (0.02)
	Job Skills	<b>-0.79*</b> (0.32)	<b>-11%</b> (0.06)	-0.11 (0.33)	-1% (0.02)	0.13 (0.28)	3% (0.07)	-0.07 (0.30)	-1% (0.03)
	Church Skills	0.15 (0.30)	2% (0.04)	<b>0.51^</b> (0.30)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	0.34 (0.33)	9% (0.08)	-0.32 (0.34)	-3% (0.04)
	Organizational Skills	<b>0.86***</b> (0.26)	<b>12%</b> (0.04)	-0.14 (0.34)	-1% (0.02)	0.08 (0.30)	2% (0.08)	<b>0.74*</b> (0.32)	<b>7%</b> (0.03)
	Athlete #	-0.03 (0.29)	0% (0.04)	<b>-0.38^^</b> (0.24)	<b>-2%</b> (0.01)	0.29 (0.20)	7% (0.05)	<b>0.54**</b> (0.20)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)
	Discriminated against #	<b>0.54*</b> (0.25)	<b>10%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.78***</b> (0.24)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)	0.05 (0.24)	1% (0.06)	<b>0.45*</b> (0.21)	<b>5%</b> (0.04)
Controls	Married #	<b>0.46^^</b> (0.29)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.82**</b> (0.29)	<b>-5%</b> (0.02)	-0.09 (0.20)	-2% (0.05)	-0.15 (0.23)	-1% (0.02)
	Family income	0.20 (0.53)	3% (0.07)	-0.92 (0.60)	-5% (0.03)	-0.25 (0.46)	-7% (0.12)	-0.03 (0.53)	0% (0.05)
	Age	<b>-5.30***</b> (1.23)	<b>-73%</b> (0.21)	<b>-1.81*</b> (0.84)	<b>-10%</b> (0.05)	<b>-2.48***</b> (0.65)	<b>-64%</b> (0.22)	<b>-2.09*</b> (0.92)	<b>-19%</b> (0.13)
	Constant	-0.29 (0.86)		<b>-1.79*</b> (0.86)		-0.11 (0.62)		<b>-1.61*</b> (0.78)	
Sample Size (uncensored)	400 (364)		360 (314)		673 (464)		836 (495)		
Wald Chi Rho	34.46 -0.42		55.57 0.91		31.02 -0.14		56.62 0.39		
Wald test of indep. equations	1.38		6.45*		0.16		0.47		

Significance: ^^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Selection model:

		College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.09 (0.42)	1% (0.06)	<b>0.71<sup>^</sup></b> (0.40)	<b>9%</b> (0.04)	-0.07 (0.21)	-3% (0.08)	0.08 (0.16)	3% (0.06)
	Abortion	0.35 (0.36)	5% (0.05)	0.37 (0.36)	7% (0.06)	0.04 (0.20)	1% (0.07)	0.14 (0.16)	5% (0.06)
	Leadership	0.38 (0.56)	6% (0.08)	-0.16 (0.63)	-3% (0.11)	-0.11 (0.31)	-4% (0.11)	0.37 (0.25)	14% (0.10)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	<b>1.17***</b> (0.25)	<b>26%</b> (0.07)	0.37 (0.24)	7% (0.05)	<b>0.71***</b> (0.16)	<b>24%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.55***</b> (0.14)	<b>21%</b> (0.05)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.17 (0.26)	3% (0.04)	<b>0.37<sup>^^</sup></b> (0.23)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)	0.20 (0.15)	7% (0.05)	0.12 (0.14)	4% (0.05)
	Skills	<b>0.83*</b> (0.39)	<b>13%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.99**</b> (0.38)	<b>18%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.13***</b> (0.23)	<b>39%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.18***</b> (0.23)	<b>45%</b> (0.09)
	Athlete #	0.32 (0.27)	5% (0.05)	0.21 (0.24)	4% (0.04)	<b>0.25<sup>^</sup></b> (0.15)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	0.14*** (0.13)	5% (0.05)
	Discriminated against #	0.33 (0.34)	4% (0.04)	<b>-0.63**</b> (0.29)	<b>-14%</b> (0.07)	0.02 (0.22)	1% (0.07)	0.14 (0.18)	5% (0.07)
Controls	Married #	<b>0.44<sup>^^</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>7%</b> (0.05)	-0.32 (0.25)	-6% (0.05)	0.07 (0.16)	2% (0.06)	0.11 (0.14)	4% (0.05)
	Family income	0.26 (0.72)	4% (0.11)	<b>1.27<sup>^</sup></b> (0.66)	<b>23%</b> (0.11)	<b>1.21**</b> (0.39)	<b>42%</b> (0.13)	<b>1.16***</b> (0.34)	<b>44%</b> (0.13)
	Age	0.54 (1.01)	8% (0.16)	<b>1.92*</b> (0.97)	<b>34%</b> (0.18)	<b>0.97*</b> (0.48)	<b>34%</b> (0.17)	<b>1.53***</b> (0.42)	<b>59%</b> (0.16)
	Constant	<b>-1.70*</b> (0.73)		-1.34 (0.86)		<b>-1.36***</b> (0.36)		<b>-1.89***</b> (0.32)	
Sample Size (uncensored)	400		360		673		836		
Wald Chi	34.46		55.57		31.02		56.62		
Rho	-0.42		0.91		-0.14		0.39		
Wald test of independent equations	1.38		6.45*		0.16		0.47		

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 109. Predicting ambition, original model without “recruited for participation” as an independent variable.  
(DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Activists only. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists) Class

		College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.24 (0.26)	-3% (0.02)	-0.09 (0.37)	0% (0.02)	-0.06 (0.25)	-1% (0.06)	<b>0.45*</b> (0.21)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)
	Abortion	0.16 (0.30)	2% (0.04)	-0.01 (0.38)	0% (0.02)	-0.23 (0.25)	-6% (0.06)	0.14 (0.28)	2% (0.04)
	Leadership	0.36 (0.62)	4% (0.07)	<b>1.79**</b> (0.65)	<b>9%</b> (0.04)	0.34 (0.39)	8% (0.10)	0.50 (0.44)	7% (0.06)
	Political	<b>0.80**</b> (0.26)	<b>9%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.66*</b> (0.29)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)	0.17 (0.18)	4% (0.04)	0.10 (0.19)	1% (0.03)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Acquaintances #	<b>-0.73*</b> (0.32)	<b>-9%</b> (0.04)	-0.40 (0.36)	-2% (0.02)	0.18 (0.25)	4% (0.06)	-0.18 (0.28)	-2% (0.04)
	Church Skills	0.18 (0.30)	2% (0.04)	0.41 (0.32)	2% (0.02)	0.36 (0.32)	9% (0.08)	-0.40 (.34)	-5% (0.05)
	Organizational Skills	<b>0.95***</b> (0.26)	<b>12%</b> (0.04)	-0.16 (0.36)	-1% (0.02)	0.12 (0.29)	3% (0.07)	<b>0.67*</b> (0.32)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)
	Athlete #	-0.01 (0.29)	0% (0.04)	-0.40 (0.26)	-2% (0.01)	0.30 (0.20)	7% (0.05)	<b>0.52**</b> (0.20)	<b>7%</b> (0.02)
	Discriminated against #	<b>0.56*</b> (0.25)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	<b>1.01***</b> (0.27)	<b>11%</b> (0.05)	0.07 (0.24)	2% (0.06)	<b>0.43^</b> (0.22)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)
	Married #	<b>0.53^</b> (0.27)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.79*</b> (0.32)	<b>-5%</b> (0.02)	-0.08 (0.20)	-2% (0.05)	-0.16 (0.24)	-2% (0.03)
	Family income	0.23 (0.53)	3% (0.06)	<b>-1.42*</b> (0.63)	<b>-7%</b> (0.04)	-0.16 (0.44)	-4% (0.11)	-0.26 (0.53)	-3% (0.07)
Age	<b>-5.31***</b> (1.25)	<b>-65%</b> (0.15)	<b>-2.53**</b> (0.97)	<b>-13%</b> (0.06)	<b>-2.41***</b> (0.66)	<b>-60%</b> (0.16)	<b>-2.44***</b> (0.53)	<b>-32%</b> (0.09)	
Constant	-0.70 (0.77)		-1.22 (0.95)		-0.31 (0.42)		<b>-1.07*</b> (0.46)		
Sample Size		364		314		464		495	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.21		0.33		0.10		0.19	
Wald Chi		38.86		59.71		32.00		57.97	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 110. Predicting ambition, new comparison group (DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Full. Comparison: ambitious activists v. all others) Class

		College-Educated Men		College-Educated Women		Not-College-Educated Men		Not-College-Educated Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.24 (0.26)	-2% (0.02)	0.08 (0.37)	0% (0.02)	-0.01 (0.23)	0% (0.04)	<b>0.36^</b> (0.18)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)
	Abortion	0.17 (0.29)	2% (0.03)	0.09 (0.42)	0% (0.02)	-0.18 (0.21)	-3% (0.03)	0.15 (0.26)	1% (0.02)
	Leadership	0.23 (0.59)	2% (0.06)	<b>1.93**</b> (0.68)	<b>8%</b> (0.03)	0.27 (0.33)	5% (0.06)	0.55 (0.41)	4% (0.03)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.28 (0.26)	2% (0.02)	<b>0.82*</b> (0.39)	<b>2%</b> (0.01)	0.21 (0.17)	4% (0.03)	0.17 (0.19)	1% (0.01)
	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.77**</b> (0.25)	<b>7%</b> (0.02)	<b>0.68**</b> (0.29)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)	0.26 (0.17)	5% (0.03)	0.06 (0.18)	0% (0.01)
	Job Skills	<b>-0.61*</b> (0.29)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)	-0.32 (0.36)	-1% (0.02)	0.36 (0.23)	6% (0.04)	-0.00 (0.26)	0% (0.02)
	Church Skills	0.18 (0.30)	2% (0.03)	0.38 (0.31)	2% (0.01)	0.39 (0.30)	7% (0.05)	-0.30 (0.32)	-2% (0.03)
	Organizational Skills	<b>1.01***</b> (0.25)	<b>10%</b> (0.03)	0.02 (0.37)	0% (0.01)	<b>0.47^</b> (0.28)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	<b>1.08***</b> (0.32)	<b>8%</b> (0.03)
	Athlete #	0.05 (0.28)	0% (0.03)	-0.31 (0.25)	-1% (0.01)	<b>0.29^</b> (0.17)	<b>5%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.50**</b> (0.18)	<b>4%</b> (0.01)
	Discriminated against #	<b>0.55*</b> (0.24)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.88***</b> (0.26)	<b>7%</b> (0.04)	0.09 (0.21)	2% (0.04)	<b>0.38*</b> (0.19)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)
Controls	Married #	<b>0.61*</b> (0.27)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.97***</b> (0.30)	<b>-5%</b> (0.02)	-0.09 (0.18)	-2% (0.03)	-0.06 (0.22)	0% (0.02)
	Family income	0.10 (0.48)	1% (0.05)	<b>-0.99^</b> (0.57)	<b>-4%</b> (0.02)	0.09 (0.34)	2% (0.06)	-0.04 (0.48)	0% (0.04)
	Age	<b>-5.09***</b> (1.23)	<b>-51%</b> (0.12)	<b>-2.27*</b> (0.92)	<b>-9%</b> (0.04)	<b>-1.81**</b> (0.57)	<b>-31%</b> (0.09)	<b>-1.81**</b> (0.70)	<b>-13%</b> (0.04)
	Constant	-1.09 (0.75)		<b>-2.60**</b> (0.94)		<b>-1.19***</b> (0.36)		<b>-1.95***</b> (0.41)	
Sample Size		402		360		673		836	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.23		.30		0.12		0.20	
Wald Chi		46.16		59.58		52.01		72.08	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 111. Predicting ambition, original model (DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Activists only. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists) Reborn

		Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	<b>-0.59<sup>^</sup></b> (0.33)	<b>-10%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.78<sup>**</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>10%</b> (0.05)	-0.21 (0.25)	-4% (0.05)	-0.03 (0.27)	0% (0.02)
	Abortion	0.45 (0.32)	10% (0.07)	<b>0.80<sup>*</sup></b> (0.33)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	-0.15 (0.30)	-3% (0.07)	-0.48 (0.34)	-4% (0.03)
	Leadership	-0.24 (0.54)	-5% (0.12)	0.64 (0.53)	5% (0.04)	0.48 (0.47)	10% (0.10)	<b>1.50<sup>**</sup></b> (0.53)	<b>13%</b> (0.05)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.30 (0.31)	6% (0.06)	0.36 (0.24)	3% (0.02)	-0.12 (0.20)	-3% (0.05)	0.08 (0.25)	1% (0.02)
	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.69<sup>*</sup></b> (0.28)	<b>14%</b> (0.05)	0.22 (0.23)	2% (0.02)	0.13 (0.21)	3% (0.05)	0.14 (0.21)	1% (0.02)
	Job Skills	-0.33 (0.33)	-7% (0.07)	<b>0.60<sup>^</sup></b> (0.36)	<b>5%</b> (0.03)	-0.01 (0.29)	0% (0.06)	<b>-0.65<sup>^</sup></b> (0.34)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)
	Church Skills	<b>0.63<sup>^</sup></b> (0.37)	<b>14%</b> (0.08)	0.50 (0.37)	4% (0.03)	0.58 (0.48)	13% (0.10)	-0.35 (0.43)	-3% (0.04)
	Organizational Skills	0.17 (0.41)	4% (0.09)	0.34 (0.33)	3% (0.03)	<b>0.52<sup>^</sup></b> (0.28)	<b>11%</b> (0.06)	0.25 (0.40)	2% (0.03)
	Athlete #	0.45 (0.29)	9% (0.05)	<b>0.56<sup>*</sup></b> (0.23)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)	0.29 (0.24)	6% (0.05)	0.11 (0.21)	1% (0.02)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	<b>0.60<sup>*</sup></b> (0.28)	<b>16%</b> (0.09)	0.24 (0.26)	2% (0.03)	0.19 (0.27)	4% (0.07)	<b>0.90<sup>***</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>14%</b> (0.06)
Controls	Married #	0.08 (0.29)	2% (0.06)	0.26 (0.25)	2% (0.02)	0.18 (0.24)	4% (0.05)	<b>-0.89<sup>***</sup></b> (0.24)	<b>-9%</b> (0.03)
	Education	-0.48 (0.40)	-11% (0.09)	<b>-0.87<sup>*</sup></b> (0.35)	<b>-7%</b> (0.03)	<b>-1.04<sup>**</sup></b> (0.34)	<b>-23%</b> (0.08)	0.03 (0.33)	0% (0.03)
	Family income	-0.25 (0.71)	-6% (0.16)	<b>-2.16<sup>**</sup></b> (0.80)	<b>-18%</b> (0.06)	-0.30 (0.51)	-7% (0.11)	0.47 (0.59)	4% (0.05)
	Age	<b>-3.43<sup>***</sup></b> (1.02)	<b>-76%</b> (0.24)	<b>-3.00<sup>**</sup></b> (0.98)	<b>-24%</b> (0.08)	<b>-3.41<sup>***</sup></b> (0.86)	<b>-74%</b> (0.19)	<b>-2.30<sup>***</sup></b> (0.67)	<b>-20%</b> (0.06)
	Constant	-0.31 (0.58)		<b>-1.23<sup>^</sup></b> (0.66)		0.43 (0.53)		<b>-1.13<sup>^</sup></b> (0.59)	
Sample Size	224		306		431		385		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.16		0.30		0.13		0.26		
Wald Chi	30.38		67.36		35.44		69.26		

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 112. Predicting ambition, original model (DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Activists only. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists) Biblical Literalists

		Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.01 (0.30)	0% (0.07)	<b>0.55*</b> (0.28)	<b>7%</b> (0.05)	<b>-0.49^</b> (0.25)	<b>-8%</b> (0.03)	0.23 (0.25)	2% (0.03)
	Abortion	-0.17 (0.30)	-4% (0.07)	<b>0.47^</b> (0.27)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)	0.37 (0.32)	7% (0.06)	-0.44 (0.37)	-4% (0.03)
	Leadership	-0.11 (0.48)	-3% (0.12)	0.47 (0.46)	4% (0.04)	0.46 (0.46)	9% (0.09)	<b>1.42*</b> (0.57)	<b>12%</b> (0.05)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.29 (0.24)	7% (0.06)	<b>0.43^</b> (0.22)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)	-0.09 (0.22)	-2% (0.05)	-0.31 (0.26)	-3% (0.03)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.03 (0.25)	1% (0.06)	0.08 (0.22)	1% (0.02)	<b>0.41^</b> (0.21)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.64*</b> (0.27)	<b>6%</b> (0.02)
	Job Skills	0.18 (0.36)	4% (0.09)	0.09 (0.33)	1% (0.03)	-0.18 (0.29)	-4% (0.06)	0.00 (0.31)	0% (0.03)
	Church Skills	0.21 (0.35)	5% (0.08)	0.02 (0.36)	0% (0.03)	0.45 (0.37)	9% (0.07)	0.25 (0.34)	2% (0.03)
	Organizational Skills	0.38 (0.35)	9% (0.09)	0.06 (0.30)	1% (0.03)	<b>0.74**</b> (0.28)	<b>15%</b> (0.06)	0.45 (0.38)	4% (0.03)
	Athlete #	<b>0.59*</b> (0.26)	<b>13%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.59**</b> (0.22)	<b>6%</b> (0.02)	0.17 (0.22)	3% (0.04)	0.09 (0.22)	1% (0.02)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	0.24 (0.29)	6% (0.08)	<b>0.63*</b> (0.27)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)	0.30 (0.26)	7% (0.07)	<b>0.88***</b> (0.26)	<b>13%</b> (0.06)
Controls	Married #	0.06 (0.30)	1% (0.07)	-0.23 (0.20)	-2% (0.02)	0.21 (0.24)	4% (0.04)	<b>-0.59*</b> (0.26)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)
	Education	<b>-0.97*</b> (0.40)	<b>-24%</b> (0.10)	-0.57 (0.40)	-5% (0.03)	<b>-1.10***</b> (0.34)	<b>-22%</b> (0.07)	<b>-0.68*</b> (0.33)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)
	Family income	0.01 (0.64)	0% (0.16)	<b>-0.82^^</b> (0.51)	<b>-8%</b> (0.05)	-0.46 (0.52)	-9% (0.10)	-0.18 (0.65)	-2% (0.05)
	Age	<b>-3.10***</b> (1.00)	<b>-76%</b> (0.25)	<b>-3.23***</b> (0.84)	<b>-30%</b> (0.09)	<b>-3.29***</b> (0.81)	<b>-65%</b> (0.17)	<b>-2.07*</b> (0.82)	<b>-18%</b> (0.07)
	Constant	0.13 (0.52)		-0.84 (0.62)		0.02 (0.54)		-1.07 (0.73)	
Sample Size	272		368		438		380		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.13		0.25		0.15		0.26		
Wald Chi	25.71		81.56		44.88		71.84		

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 113. Predicting activism (DV: Activism. Sample: Entire Sample. Comparison: activists v. non-activists) Reborn

		Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	<b>-0.97**</b> (0.32)	<b>-33%</b> (0.12)	-0.03 (0.26)	-1% (0.09)	0.42 (0.28)	11% (0.06)	0.24 (0.21)	8% (0.07)
	Abortion	-0.31 (0.31)	-9% (0.09)	<b>0.57**</b> (0.22)	<b>19%</b> (0.07)	0.23 (0.26)	7% (0.07)	0.05 (0.22)	2% (0.08)
	Leadership	<b>1.31*</b> (0.58)	<b>37%</b> (0.17)	-0.14 (0.36)	-5% (0.12)	-0.16 (0.37)	-5% (0.11)	<b>0.60^</b> (0.34)	<b>21%</b> (0.12)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.36 (0.28)	10% (0.08)	<b>0.70***</b> (0.21)	<b>23%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.80***</b> (0.19)	<b>24%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.57***</b> (0.17)	<b>20%</b> (0.06)
	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.52*</b> (0.26)	<b>15%</b> (0.07)	0.18 (0.18)	6% (0.06)	0.07 (0.18)	2% (0.05)	0.04 (0.18)	1% (0.06)
	Skills	<b>0.89*</b> (0.37)	<b>25%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.20***</b> (0.29)	<b>40%</b> (0.09)	<b>0.97***</b> (0.26)	<b>28%</b> (0.07)	<b>0.84**</b> (0.28)	<b>29%</b> (0.10)
	Athlete #	-0.30 (0.30)	-8% (0.08)	0.30 (0.19)	10% (0.06)	<b>0.33^</b> (0.18)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	-0.01 (0.16)	0% (0.06)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	<b>0.65*</b> (0.30)	<b>15%</b> (0.06)	-0.18 (0.24)	-6% (0.09)	0.01 (0.26)	0% (0.08)	-0.13 (0.25)	-4% (0.09)
Controls	Married #	0.01 (0.28)	0% (0.08)	0.18 (0.21)	6% (0.07)	0.21 (0.19)	6% (0.06)	-0.01 (0.17)	0% (0.06)
	Education	0.56 (0.42)	16% (0.12)	-0.05 (0.31)	-2% (0.10)	0.01 (0.31)	0% (0.09)	<b>0.52^</b> (0.28)	<b>18%</b> (0.10)
	Family income	<b>1.38*</b> (0.61)	<b>39%</b> (0.17)	<b>1.09*</b> (0.51)	<b>36%</b> (0.17)	<b>1.35**</b> (0.46)	<b>39%</b> (0.13)	<b>1.17*</b> (0.46)	<b>40%</b> (0.16)
	Age	<b>1.38^</b> (0.80)	<b>39%</b> (0.23)	<b>1.14^</b> (0.65)	<b>38%</b> (0.21)	0.66 (0.57)	19% (0.16)	<b>1.94***</b> (0.54)	<b>67%</b> (0.18)
	Constant	<b>-1.98***</b> (0.59)		<b>-1.52**</b> (0.49)		<b>-1.50***</b> (0.46)		<b>-2.12***</b> (0.47)	
Sample Size	294		441		558		579		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.35		0.24		0.26		0.24		
Wald Chi	64.99		72.20		96.75		76.97		

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 114. Predicting activism (DV: Activism. Sample: Entire Sample. Comparison: activists v. non-activists) Biblical Literalists

		Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.35 (0.25)	-12% (0.09)	0.07 (0.21)	2% (0.08)	0.10 (0.31)	2% (0.07)	<b>0.64*</b> (0.26)	<b>14%</b> (0.05)
	Abortion	0.20 (0.25)	7% (0.08)	0.22 (0.18)	8% (0.07)	-0.04 (0.29)	-1% (0.08)	-0.01 (0.28)	0% (0.07)
	Leadership	0.29 (0.45)	10% (0.15)	-0.10 (0.29)	-4% (0.11)	0.20 (0.39)	5% (0.10)	0.61 (0.42)	16% (0.11)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.26 (0.22)	9% (0.07)	<b>0.58***</b> (0.17)	<b>21%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.95***</b> (0.20)	<b>26%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.56**</b> (0.20)	<b>16%</b> (0.06)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.32 (0.21)	10% (0.07)	0.21 (0.16)	8% (0.06)	0.13 (0.19)	3% (0.05)	0.12 (0.21)	3% (0.06)
	Skills	<b>1.06***</b> (0.30)	<b>35%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.16***</b> (0.25)	<b>44%</b> (0.09)	<b>0.95**</b> (0.32)	<b>24%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.06***</b> (0.31)	<b>28%</b> (0.08)
	Athlete #	-0.03 (0.22)	-1% (0.07)	<b>0.33*</b> (0.15)	<b>12%</b> (0.06)	0.27 (0.21)	7% (0.06)	-0.13 (0.20)	-4% (0.05)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	0.14 (0.26)	4% (0.08)	-0.08 (0.22)	-3% (0.09)	0.19 (0.29)	5% (0.07)	-0.09 (0.26)	-3% (0.07)
Controls	Married #	0.34 (0.22)	12% (0.08)	0.09 (0.17)	3% (0.06)	0.05 (0.21)	1% (0.05)	-0.23 (0.20)	-6% (0.05)
	Education	<b>0.58^</b> (0.34)	<b>19%</b> (0.11)	0.10 (0.28)	4% (0.10)	-0.01 (0.34)	0% (0.09)	0.34 (0.30)	9% (0.08)
	Family income	0.74 (0.55)	25% (0.18)	<b>1.22**</b> (0.41)	<b>46%</b> (0.15)	<b>1.29*</b> (0.54)	<b>33%</b> (0.13)	<b>1.32*</b> (0.54)	<b>35%</b> (0.14)
	Age	0.10 (0.67)	3% (0.22)	<b>1.26*</b> (0.51)	<b>47%</b> (0.19)	<b>-1.38*</b> (0.62)	<b>35%</b> (0.16)	<b>2.17***</b> (0.66)	<b>57%</b> (0.17)
	Constant	<b>-1.26**</b> (0.48)		<b>-1.63***</b> (0.39)		<b>-1.74***</b> (0.52)		<b>-2.03***</b> (0.59)	
Sample Size	386		605		536		491		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.23		0.22		0.28		0.25		
Wald Chi	54.07		101.41		90.73		63.35		

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 115. Model with selection compared to original model for reborn men

		Reborn Men (Heckman Probit outcome model)		Reborn Men (Original outcome model)	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.46 (0.61)	-9% (0.06)	<b>-0.59<sup>^</sup></b> (0.33)	<b>-10%</b> (0.05)
	Abortion	0.47 (0.35)	11% (0.15)	0.45 (0.32)	10% (0.07)
	Leadership	-0.28 (1.08)	-6% (0.30)	-0.24 (0.54)	-5% (0.12)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	-	-	0.30 (0.31)	6% (0.06)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.69 (0.57)	16% (0.06)	<b>0.69*</b> (0.28)	<b>14%</b> (0.05)
	Job Skills	-0.33 (0.40)	-8% (0.15)	-0.33 (0.33)	-7% (0.07)
	Church Skills	0.59 (0.39)	14% (0.13)	<b>0.63<sup>^</sup></b> (0.37)	<b>14%</b> (0.08)
	Organizational Skills	0.24 (0.42)	5% (0.09)	0.17 (0.41)	4% (0.09)
	Athlete #	0.43 (0.32)	9% (0.13)	0.45 (0.29)	9% (0.05)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	0.61 (0.46)	17% (0.09)	<b>0.60*</b> (0.28)	<b>16%</b> (0.09)
	Controls	Married #	0.07 (0.30)	1% (0.07)	0.08 (0.29)
	Education	-0.46 (0.52)	-11% (0.20)	-0.48 (0.40)	-11% (0.09)
	Family income	-0.25 (1.24)	-6% (0.33)	-0.25 (0.71)	-6% (0.16)
	Age	<b>-3.34***</b> (1.00)	<b>-77%</b> (0.78)	<b>-3.43***</b> (1.02)	<b>-76%</b> (0.24)
	Constant	-0.07 (2.41)		-0.31 (0.58)	
Sample Size		294 (224)		224	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		27.87		0.16	
Wald Chi		-0.23		30.38	
Wald test of indep. equations		0.02			

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 116. Model with selection compared to original model for reborn women

		Reborn Women (Heckman Probit outcome model)		Reborn Women (Original outcome model)	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	<b>0.73*</b> (0.30)	<b>16%</b> (0.10)	<b>0.78**</b> (0.27)	<b>10%</b> (0.05)
	Abortion	0.57 (0.43)	9% (0.05)	<b>0.80*</b> (0.33)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)
	Leadership	0.58 (0.58)	9% (0.08)	0.64 (0.53)	5% (0.04)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	-	-	0.36 (0.24)	3% (0.02)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.17 (0.24)	3% (0.04)	0.22 (0.23)	2% (0.02)
	Job Skills	0.46 (0.41)	8% (0.05)	<b>0.60^</b> (0.36)	<b>5%</b> (0.03)
	Church Skills	0.30 (0.39)	5% (0.05)	0.50 (0.37)	4% (0.03)
	Organizational Skills	0.22 (0.35)	4% (0.05)	0.34 (0.33)	3% (0.03)
	Athlete #	<b>0.44^^</b> (0.27)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.56*</b> (0.23)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	0.25 (0.26)	5% (0.06)	0.24 (0.26)	2% (0.03)
	Controls	Married #	0.15 (0.27)	2% (0.04)	0.26 (0.25)
	Education	<b>-0.78*</b> (0.34)	<b>-13%</b> (0.11)	<b>-0.87*</b> (0.35)	<b>-7%</b> (0.03)
	Family income	<b>-2.30**</b> (0.77)	<b>-38%</b> (0.38)	<b>-2.16**</b> (0.80)	<b>-18%</b> (0.06)
	Age	<b>-3.00***</b> (0.90)	<b>-49%</b> (0.41)	<b>-3.00**</b> (0.98)	<b>-24%</b> (0.08)
	Constant	-0.17 (1.47)		0.26 (0.25)	
Sample Size		441 (306)		306	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		53.87		0.30	
Wald Chi		-0.63		67.36	
Wald test of indep. equations		0.79			

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 117. Model with selection compared to original model for biblical literalist women

		Biblical Literalist Women (Heckman Probit outcome model)		Biblical Literalist Women (Original outcome model)	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.38 (0.33)	11% (0.08)	<b>0.55*</b> (0.28)	<b>7%</b> (0.05)
	Abortion	0.28 (0.28)	7% (0.06)	<b>0.47^</b> (0.27)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)
	Leadership	0.34 (0.46)	9% (0.10)	0.47 (0.46)	4% (0.04)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	- (0.22)	- (0.02)	<b>0.43^</b> (0.22)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)
	Political Acquaintances #	-0.03 (0.27)	-1% (0.07)	0.08 (0.22)	1% (0.02)
	Job Skills	-0.17 (0.37)	-4% (0.12)	0.09 (0.33)	1% (0.03)
	Church Skills	-0.19 (0.32)	-5% (0.10)	0.02 (0.36)	0% (0.03)
	Organizational Skills	-0.04 (0.26)	-1% (0.07)	0.06 (0.30)	1% (0.03)
	Athlete #	0.34 (0.33)	9% (0.05)	<b>0.59**</b> (0.22)	<b>6%</b> (0.02)
	Discriminated against (race, sex, or religion) #	<b>0.57*</b> (0.26)	<b>18%</b> (0.10)	<b>0.63*</b> (0.27)	<b>9%</b> (0.05)
	Controls	Married #	-0.26 (0.19)	-7% (0.07)	-0.23 (0.20)
	Education	-0.44 (0.34)	-11% (0.10)	-0.57 (0.40)	-5% (0.03)
	Family income	<b>-1.28*</b> (0.56)	<b>-33%</b> (0.30)	<b>-0.82^^</b> (0.51)	<b>-8%</b> (0.05)
	Age	<b>-3.26***</b> (0.73)	<b>-84%</b> (0.48)	<b>-3.23***</b> (0.84)	<b>-30%</b> (0.09)
	Constant	0.72 (1.29)		-0.84 (0.62)	
Sample Size		605 (368)		368	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		79.89		0.25	
Wald Chi		-0.75		81.56	
Wald test of indep. equations		1.23			

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 118. Heckman probit model. (DV: Nascent Ambition in outcome model, activism in selection model. Sample: Full. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists in outcome model, activists v. non-activists in selection model) Reborn. Outcome model:

		Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.46 (0.61)	-9% (0.06)	<b>0.73*</b> (0.30)	<b>16%</b> (0.10)	-0.22 (0.26)	-4% (0.05)	-0.11 (0.25)	-2% (0.06)
	Abortion	0.47 (0.35)	11% (0.15)	0.57 (0.43)	9% (0.05)	-0.18 (0.32)	-4% (0.07)	-0.45 (0.31)	-10% (0.07)
	Leadership	-0.28 (1.08)	-6% (0.30)	0.58 (0.58)	9% (0.08)	0.46 (0.47)	10% (0.11)	<b>1.07^</b> (0.62)	<b>24%</b> (0.10)
	Obstacles and Opportunities	Political Acquaintances#	0.69 (0.57)	16% (0.06)	0.17 (0.24)	3% (0.04)	0.12 (0.21)	3% (0.05)	0.08 (0.20)
	Job Skills	-0.33 (0.40)	-8% (0.15)	0.46 (0.41)	8% (0.05)	0.01 (0.34)	0% (0.07)	<b>-0.80**</b> (0.28)	<b>-18%</b> (0.10)
	Church Skills	0.59 (0.39)	14% (0.13)	0.30 (0.39)	5% (0.05)	0.58 (0.48)	13% (0.10)	-0.46 (0.36)	-10% (0.10)
	Organizational Skills	0.24 (0.42)	5% (0.09)	0.22 (0.35)	4% (0.05)	<b>0.47^</b> (0.28)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	0.15 (0.31)	3% (0.07)
	Athlete #	0.43 (0.32)	9% (0.13)	<b>0.44^^</b> (0.27)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	0.31 (0.25)	7% (0.05)	0.11 (0.18)	2% (0.04)
	Discriminated against #	0.61 (0.46)	17% (0.09)	0.25 (0.26)	5% (0.06)	0.17 (0.28)	4% (0.07)	<b>0.80**</b> (0.27)	<b>24%</b> (0.09)
Controls	Married #	0.07 (0.30)	1% (0.07)	0.15 (0.27)	2% (0.04)	0.18 (0.24)	4% (0.05)	<b>-0.74**</b> (0.26)	<b>-17%</b> (0.06)
	Education	-0.46 (0.52)	-11% (0.20)	<b>-0.78*</b> (0.34)	<b>-13%</b> (0.11)	<b>-1.08***</b> (0.34)	<b>-24%</b> (0.11)	-0.28 (0.37)	-6% (0.11)
	Family income	-0.25 (1.24)	-6% (0.33)	<b>-2.30**</b> (0.77)	<b>-38%</b> (0.38)	-0.33 (0.56)	-7% (0.13)	-0.20 (0.64)	-5% (0.16)
	Age	<b>-3.34***</b> (1.00)	<b>-77%</b> (0.78)	<b>-3.00***</b> (0.90)	<b>-49%</b> (0.41)	<b>-3.46***</b> (0.87)	<b>-76%</b> (0.31)	<b>-2.70***</b> (0.59)	<b>-61%</b> (0.32)
	Constant	-0.07 (2.41)		-0.17 (1.47)		0.45 (0.88)		0.48 (1.02)	
Sample Size (uncensored)	294 (224)		441 (306)		558 (431)		579 (385)		
Wald Chi	27.87		53.87		36.41		82.38		
Rho	-0.23		-0.63		-0.02		-0.75		
Wald test of indep. equations	0.02		0.79		0		2.32		

Significance: ^^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Selection model:

		Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	<b>-0.96**</b> (0.32)	<b>-32%</b> (0.12)	-0.04 (0.26)	-1% (0.08)	0.42 (0.28)	11% (0.06)	0.23 (0.21)	8% (0.07)
	Abortion	-0.28 (0.41)	-8% (0.12)	0.55 (0.22)	18% (0.07)	0.23 (0.26)	7% (0.08)	0.04 (0.22)	1% (0.08)
	Leadership	<b>1.31*</b> (0.59)	<b>37%</b> (0.17)	-0.15 (0.35)	-5% (0.12)	-0.16 (0.37)	-5% (0.11)	<b>0.62^</b> (0.34)	<b>22%</b> (0.12)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.36 (0.29)	10% (0.08)	<b>0.71***</b> (0.20)	<b>23%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.80***</b> (0.19)	<b>24%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.54**</b> (0.19)	<b>18%</b> (0.06)
	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.53*</b> (0.26)	<b>15%</b> (0.07)	0.18 (0.18)	6% (0.06)	0.07 (0.18)	2% (0.05)	0.04 (0.18)	1% (0.06)
	Skills	<b>0.90*</b> (0.37)	<b>25%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.19***</b> (0.29)	<b>40%</b> (0.09)	<b>0.97**</b> (0.26)	<b>28%</b> (0.07)	<b>0.84***</b> (0.26)	<b>29%</b> (0.09)
	Athlete #	-0.30 (0.30)	-8% (0.08)	0.30 (0.19)	10% (0.06)	<b>0.33^</b> (0.18)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	0.02 (0.16)	1% (0.06)
	Discriminated against #	<b>0.65*</b> (0.31)	<b>15%</b> (0.06)	-0.20 (0.24)	-7% (0.08)	0.01 (0.26)	0% (0.08)	-0.11 (0.25)	-4% (0.09)
Controls	Married #	0 (0.29)	0% (0.08)	0.16 (0.21)	5% (0.07)	0.21 (0.19)	6% (0.06)	0 (0.17)	0% (0.06)
	Education	0.55 (0.44)	15% (0.12)	-0.06 (0.30)	-2% (0.10)	0.01 (0.31)	0% (0.09)	<b>0.53^</b> (0.28)	<b>18%</b> (0.09)
	Family income	<b>1.35^</b> (0.70)	<b>38%</b> (0.20)	<b>1.02*</b> (0.50)	<b>34%</b> (0.17)	<b>1.35**</b> (0.46)	<b>39%</b> (0.13)	1.18** (0.45)	41% (0.15)
	Age	<b>1.41^</b> (0.82)	<b>40%</b> (0.24)	<b>1.05^^</b> (0.64)	<b>35%</b> (0.21)	0.66 (0.57)	19% (0.16)	<b>1.96***</b> (0.54)	<b>68%</b> (0.18)
	Constant	<b>-1.99***</b> (0.60)		<b>-1.43**</b> (0.50)		<b>-1.50***</b> (0.46)		<b>-2.15***</b> (0.47)	
Sample Size (uncensored)	294		441		558		579		
Wald Chi	27.87		53.87		36.41		82.38		
Rho	-0.23		-0.63		-0.02		-0.75		
Wald test of independent equations	0.02		0.79		0		2.32		

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 119. Heckman probit model. (DV: Nascent Ambition in outcome model, activism in selection model. Sample: Full. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists in outcome model, activists v. non-activists in selection model) Biblical literalism. Outcome model:

		Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.13 (0.29)	4% (0.11)	0.38 (0.33)	11% (0.08)	<b>-0.50<sup>^</sup></b> (0.26)	<b>-8%</b> (0.05)	0.01 (0.34)	0% (0.06)
	Abortion	-0.23 (0.28)	-8% (0.10)	0.28 (0.28)	7% (0.06)	0.36 (0.32)	7% (0.07)	-0.46 (0.37)	-8% (0.07)
	Leadership	-0.19 (0.49)	-6% (0.17)	0.34 (0.46)	9% (0.10)	0.43 (0.48)	9% (0.09)	<b>1.22<sup>^</sup></b> (0.73)	<b>21%</b> (0.12)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Political Acquaintances#	-0.08 (0.25)	-3% (0.09)	-0.03 (0.27)	-1% (0.07)	<b>0.40<sup>^</sup></b> (0.21)	<b>8%</b> (0.05)	0.48 (0.35)	8% (0.04)
	Job Skills	-0.08 (0.32)	-3% (0.11)	-0.17 (0.37)	-4% (0.12)	-0.17 (0.33)	-4% (0.07)	-0.30 (0.36)	-5% (0.09)
	Church Skills	0.06 (0.33)	2% (0.11)	-0.19 (0.32)	-5% (0.10)	0.44 (0.38)	9% (0.07)	0.12 (0.33)	2% (0.05)
	Organizational Skills	0.36 (0.35)	12% (0.11)	-0.04 (0.26)	-1% (0.07)	<b>0.71*</b> (0.30)	<b>14%</b> (0.06)	0.27 (0.37)	5% (0.05)
	Athlete #	<b>0.52*</b> (0.25)	<b>17%</b> (0.08)	0.34 (0.33)	9% (0.05)	0.19 (0.23)	4% (0.04)	0.16 (0.20)	3% (0.04)
	Discriminated against #	0.21 (0.29)	7% (0.10)	<b>0.57*</b> (0.26)	<b>18%</b> (0.10)	0.30 (0.27)	7% (0.07)	<b>0.71*</b> (0.32)	<b>16%</b> (0.08)
Controls	Married #	-0.05 (0.29)	-2% (0.10)	-0.26 (0.19)	-7% (0.07)	0.20 (0.24)	4% (0.05)	<b>-0.54*</b> (0.27)	<b>-10%</b> (0.07)
	Education	<b>-0.96**</b> (0.37)	<b>-33%</b> (0.14)	-0.44 (0.34)	-11% (0.10)	<b>-1.13***</b> (0.34)	<b>-23%</b> (0.11)	<b>-0.79*</b> (0.31)	<b>-14%</b> (0.13)
	Family income	-0.26 (0.62)	-9% (0.22)	<b>-1.28*</b> (0.56)	<b>-33%</b> (0.30)	-0.50 (0.55)	-10% (0.13)	-0.65 (0.67)	-11% (0.18)
	Age	<b>-2.67*</b> (1.05)	<b>-91%</b> (0.30)	<b>-3.26***</b> (0.73)	<b>-84%</b> (0.48)	<b>-3.32***</b> (0.83)	<b>-67%</b> (0.30)	<b>-2.62***</b> (0.80)	<b>-45%</b> (0.43)
	Constant	1.01 (0.71)		0.72 (1.29)		0.05 (0.91)		<b>0.08</b> (1.53)	
Sample Size (uncensored)	386 (272)		605 (368)		536 (438)		491 (380)		
Wald Chi	26.49		79.89		45.30		68.18		
Rho	-0.66		-0.75		-0.04		-0.73		
Wald test of indep. equations	2.46		1.23		0.00		0.55		

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Selection model:

		Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.30 (0.25)	-10% (0.09)	0.04 (0.21)	2% (0.08)	0.10 (0.32)	2% (0.07)	<b>0.65*</b> (0.26)	<b>14%</b> (0.05)
	Abortion	0.23 (0.25)	8% (0.08)	0.22 (0.18)	8% (0.07)	-0.04 (0.29)	-1% (0.08)	-0.03 (0.28)	-1% (0.07)
	Leadership	0.26 (0.45)	9% (0.15)	-0.11 (0.29)	-4% (0.11)	0.20 (0.40)	5% (0.10)	0.68 (0.45)	18% (0.12)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.29 (0.20)	10% (0.07)	<b>0.59***</b> (0.16)	<b>21%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.95***</b> (0.20)	<b>26%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.47^^</b> (0.29)	<b>13%</b> (0.08)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.29 (0.20)	10% (0.07)	0.20 (0.15)	7% (0.06)	0.13 (0.20)	3% (0.05)	0.14 (0.21)	4% (0.06)
	Skills	<b>1.09***</b> (0.29)	<b>36%</b> (0.10)	<b>1.14***</b> (0.25)	<b>43%</b> (0.09)	<b>0.95**</b> (0.32)	<b>24%</b> (0.08)	<b>1.05***</b> (0.30)	<b>28%</b> (0.08)
	Athlete #	-0.04 (0.22)	-1% (0.07)	<b>0.33*</b> (0.15)	<b>12%</b> (0.06)	0.27 (0.21)	7% (0.06)	-0.13 (0.20)	-4% (0.05)
	Discriminated against #	0.12 (0.25)	4% (0.08)	-0.07 (0.23)	-3% (0.09)	0.19 (0.30)	5% (0.07)	-0.08 (0.26)	-2% (0.07)
Controls	Married #	0.29 (0.22)	10% (0.08)	0.07 (0.17)	3% (0.06)	0.05 (0.21)	1% (0.05)	-0.24 (0.19)	-6% (0.05)
	Education	<b>0.57^</b> (0.34)	<b>19%</b> (0.11)	0.13 (0.28)	5% (0.11)	-0.01 (0.34)	0% (0.09)	0.34 (0.30)	9% (0.08)
	Family income	0.71 (0.53)	24% (0.17)	<b>1.15**</b> (0.40)	<b>43%</b> (0.15)	<b>1.29*</b> (0.54)	<b>33%</b> (0.14)	<b>1.45*</b> (0.60)	<b>38%</b> (0.15)
	Age	0.19 (0.67)	6% (0.22)	<b>1.20*</b> (0.50)	<b>45%</b> (0.19)	<b>1.38*</b> (0.62)	<b>-35%</b> (0.16)	<b>2.23***</b> (0.68)	<b>58%</b> (0.17)
	Constant	<b>-1.26***</b> (0.48)		<b>-1.57***</b> (0.38)		<b>-1.74***</b> (0.52)		<b>-2.09***</b> (0.61)	
Sample Size (uncensored)	386 (272)		605 (368)		536 (438)		491 (380)		
Wald Chi	26.49		79.89		45.30		68.18		
Rho	-0.66		-0.75		-0.04		-0.73		
Wald test of independent equations	2.46		1.23		0.00		0.55		

Significance: ^^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 120. Predicting ambition, original model without “recruited for participation” as an independent variable.  
(DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Activists only. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists) Reborn

		Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	<b>-0.54<sup>^</sup></b> (0.32)	<b>-10%</b> (0.05)	<b>0.82<sup>**</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>11%</b> (0.06)	-0.22 (0.25)	-4% (0.05)	-0.03 (0.27)	0% (0.02)
	Abortion	0.45 (0.32)	10% (0.07)	<b>0.76<sup>*</sup></b> (0.33)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	-0.18 (0.31)	-4% (0.07)	-0.48 (0.35)	-4% (0.03)
	Leadership	-0.16 (0.53)	-4% (0.12)	0.73 (0.52)	6% (0.04)	0.46 (0.47)	10% (0.10)	<b>1.47<sup>**</sup></b> (0.54)	<b>13%</b> (0.05)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Political	<b>0.75<sup>**</sup></b> (0.27)	<b>16%</b> (0.05)	0.30 (0.23)	2% (0.02)	0.12 (0.21)	3% (0.05)	0.15 (0.21)	1% (0.02)
	Acquaintances #	-0.30 (0.33)	-7% (0.07)	<b>0.68<sup>*</sup></b> (0.35)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	0.01 (0.30)	0% (0.06)	<b>-0.64<sup>^</sup></b> (0.35)	<b>-5%</b> (0.03)
	Church Skills	<b>0.61<sup>^</sup></b> (0.37)	<b>14%</b> (0.08)	0.42 (0.36)	3% (0.03)	0.58 (0.47)	13% (0.10)	-0.34 (0.43)	-2% (0.04)
	Organizational Skills	0.25 (0.40)	5% (0.09)	0.38 (0.32)	3% (0.03)	<b>0.48<sup>^</sup></b> (0.28)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	0.25 (0.39)	2% (0.03)
	Athlete #	0.42 (0.30)	9% (0.06)	<b>0.56<sup>*</sup></b> (0.22)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)	0.31 (0.24)	6% (0.05)	0.11 (0.21)	1% (0.02)
	Discriminated against #	<b>0.66<sup>*</sup></b> (0.30)	18% (0.10)	0.25 (0.26)	2% (0.03)	0.17 (0.27)	4% (0.07)	<b>0.91<sup>***</sup></b> (0.28)	<b>14%</b> (0.06)
	Controls	Married #	0.06 (0.29)	1% (0.06)	0.23 (0.24)	2% (0.02)	0.18 (0.24)	4% (0.05)	<b>-0.88<sup>***</sup></b> (0.24)
	Education	-0.41 (0.41)	-9% (0.09)	<b>-0.80<sup>*</sup></b> (0.35)	<b>-7%</b> (0.03)	<b>-1.08<sup>**</sup></b> (0.34)	<b>-24%</b> (0.08)	0.05 (0.32)	0% (0.03)
	Family income	-0.13 (0.69)	-3% (0.15)	<b>-1.95<sup>*</sup></b> (0.80)	<b>-16%</b> (0.06)	-0.32 (0.51)	-7% (0.11)	0.49 (0.60)	4% (0.05)
	Age	<b>-3.29<sup>***</sup></b> (1.01)	<b>-73%</b> (0.24)	<b>-2.66<sup>**</sup></b> (0.93)	<b>-22%</b> (0.08)	<b>-3.45<sup>***</sup></b> (0.86)	<b>-75%</b> (0.19)	<b>-2.29<sup>***</sup></b> (0.67)	<b>-20%</b> (0.06)
	Constant	-0.38 (0.57)		<b>-1.36<sup>*</sup></b> (0.64)		0.43 (0.53)		<b>-1.11<sup>^</sup></b> (0.58)	
Sample Size		224		306		431		385	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.16		0.30		0.12		0.26	
Wald Chi		29.46		60.97		35.30		66.47	

Significance: <sup>^</sup>p<.115 <sup>^</sup>p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 121. Predicting ambition, original model without “recruited for participation” as an independent variable.  
(DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Activists only. Comparison: ambitious v. non-ambitious activists) Biblical literalism

		Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	0.02 (0.30)	1% (0.07)	<b>0.56*</b> (0.28)	<b>7%</b> (0.05)	<b>-0.50^</b> (0.26)	<b>-8%</b> (0.03)	0.21 (0.26)	2% (0.03)
	Abortion	-0.16 (0.30)	-4% (0.07)	0.38 (0.28)	4% (0.03)	0.36 (0.32)	7% (0.06)	-0.49 (0.39)	-4% (0.03)
	Leadership	-0.03 (0.47)	-1% (0.12)	0.51 (0.45)	5% (0.04)	0.44 (0.47)	9% (0.09)	<b>1.45*</b> (0.59)	<b>12%</b> (0.05)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Political Acquaintances #	0.07 (0.25)	2% (0.06)	0.17 (0.22)	2% (0.02)	<b>0.40^</b> (0.21)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.61*</b> (0.26)	<b>5%</b> (0.02)
	Job Skills	0.21 (0.34)	5% (0.09)	0.14 (0.33)	1% (0.03)	-0.17 (0.29)	-3% (0.06)	-0.06 (0.32)	0% (0.02)
	Church Skills	0.20 (0.34)	5% (0.08)	-0.05 (0.36)	0% (0.03)	0.44 (0.37)	9% (0.07)	0.21 (.35)	2% (0.03)
	Organizational Skills	0.46 (0.35)	11% (0.09)	0.10 (0.30)	1% (0.03)	<b>0.71**</b> (0.28)	<b>14%</b> (0.06)	0.42 (0.38)	4% (0.03)
	Athlete #	<b>0.56*</b> (0.27)	<b>13%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.59**</b> (0.21)	<b>6%</b> (0.02)	0.19 (0.22)	4% (0.04)	0.12 (0.22)	1% (0.02)
	Discriminated against #	0.31 (0.30)	9% (0.09)	<b>0.65*</b> (0.28)	<b>9%</b> (0.06)	0.30 (0.26)	7% (0.07)	<b>0.82**</b> (0.26)	<b>11%</b> (0.05)
Controls	Married #	0.06 (0.29)	1% (0.07)	-0.26 (0.20)	-3% (0.02)	0.20 (0.24)	4% (0.04)	<b>-0.64*</b> (0.27)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)
	Education	<b>-0.89*</b> (0.41)	<b>-22%</b> (0.10)	-0.41 (0.41)	-4% (0.04)	<b>-1.13***</b> (0.34)	<b>-22%</b> (0.07)	<b>-0.71*</b> (0.33)	<b>-6%</b> (0.03)
	Family income	0.05 (0.64)	1% (0.16)	-0.75 (0.53)	-7% (0.05)	-0.48 (0.52)	-10% (0.10)	-0.24 (0.65)	-2% (0.05)
	Age	<b>-2.96**</b> (1.00)	<b>-73%</b> (0.25)	<b>-3.07***</b> (0.80)	<b>-29%</b> (0.09)	<b>-3.31***</b> (0.81)	<b>-66%</b> (0.17)	<b>-2.20*</b> (0.87)	<b>-19%</b> (0.08)
	Constant	0.06 (0.52)		-0.78 (0.61)		0 (0.54)		-1.07 (0.76)	
Sample Size	272		368		438		380		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.12		0.23		0.15		0.25		
Wald Chi	22.30		73.82		43.77		70.80		

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 122. Predicting ambition, new comparison group (DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Full. Comparison: ambitious activists v. all others) Reborn

		Reborn Men		Reborn Women		Not Reborn Men		Not Reborn Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	<b>-0.67*</b> (0.30)	<b>-7%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.63*</b> (0.26)	<b>5%</b> (0.03)	-0.07 (0.24)	-1% (0.04)	0.04 (0.23)	0% (0.01)
	Abortion	0.26 (0.29)	4% (0.04)	<b>0.63*</b> (0.29)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)	-0.08 (0.26)	-1% (0.04)	-0.45 (0.32)	-2% (0.02)
	Leadership	0.30 (0.47)	4% (0.07)	0.59 (0.50)	3% (0.02)	0.26 (0.42)	4% (0.07)	<b>1.34**</b> (0.47)	<b>7%</b> (0.03)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.33 (0.28)	5% (0.04)	<b>0.45*</b> (0.23)	<b>2%</b> (0.01)	0.11 (0.20)	2% (0.03)	0.25 (0.24)	1% (0.01)
	Political Acquaintances #	<b>0.83**</b> (0.28)	<b>13%</b> (0.04)	0.25 (0.22)	1% (0.01)	0.18 (0.20)	3% (0.03)	0.17 (0.20)	1% (0.01)
	Job Skills	-0.16 (0.32)	-2% (0.05)	<b>0.55^</b> (0.33)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	0.11 (0.27)	2% (0.05)	-0.43 (0.32)	-2% (0.02)
	Church Skills	0.55 (0.36)	8% (0.05)	0.39 (0.35)	2% (0.02)	0.56 (0.47)	9% (0.08)	-0.41 (0.42)	-2% (0.02)
	Organizational Skills	0.39 (0.41)	6% (0.06)	<b>0.78*</b> (0.32)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)	<b>0.72**</b> (0.27)	<b>12%</b> (0.05)	0.50 (0.40)	3% (0.02)
	Athlete #	0.31 (0.28)	4% (0.03)	<b>0.53**</b> (0.20)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	0.31 (0.21)	5% (0.03)	0.15 (0.20)	1% (0.01)
	Discriminated against #	<b>0.63*</b> (0.28)	<b>12%</b> (0.07)	0.18 (0.23)	1% (0.01)	0.16 (0.25)	3% (0.05)	<b>0.79**</b> (0.26)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)
Controls	Married #	-0.05 (0.27)	-1% (0.04)	0.30 (0.23)	1% (0.01)	0.18 (0.22)	3% (0.03)	<b>-0.81***</b> (0.23)	<b>-5%</b> (0.02)
	Education	-0.42 (0.37)	-6% (0.05)	<b>-0.70*</b> (0.33)	<b>-3%</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.83**</b> (0.31)	<b>-14%</b> (0.06)	0.16 (0.31)	1% (0.02)
	Family income	-0.04 (0.57)	-1% (0.08)	<b>-1.65*</b> (0.65)	<b>-8%</b> (0.03)	-0.01 (0.43)	0% (0.07)	0.76 (0.51)	4% (0.03)
	Age	<b>-2.85**</b> (0.96)	<b>-41%</b> (0.14)	<b>-2.30*</b> (0.90)	<b>-11%</b> (0.04)	<b>-2.64***</b> (0.76)	<b>-44%</b> (0.12)	<b>-1.60*</b> (0.68)	<b>-8%</b> (0.04)
	Constant	<b>-1.19*</b> (0.52)		<b>-1.97**</b> (0.63)		-0.55 (0.46)		<b>-2.06***</b> (0.54)	
Sample Size		294		441		558		579	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.20		.29		0.11		0.24	
Wald Chi		40.01		76.88		40.27		67.77	

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

Table 123. Predicting ambition, new comparison group (DV: Nascent Ambition. Sample: Full. Comparison: ambitious activists v. all others) Biblical literalism

		Biblical Literalist Men		Biblical Literalist Women		Not Biblical Literalist Men		Not Biblical Literalist Women	
		Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect	Coefficient	Marginal Effect
Social Roles	Preschool children #	-0.08 (0.27)	-1% (0.04)	<b>0.47*</b> (0.24)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.42^</b> (0.24)	<b>-5%</b> (0.02)	0.23 (0.24)	2% (0.02)
	Abortion	-0.11 (0.25)	-2% (0.04)	0.34 (0.26)	2% (0.01)	0.27 (0.28)	4% (0.04)	-0.42 (0.34)	-3% (0.02)
	Leadership	-0.02 (0.39)	0% (0.07)	0.42 (0.43)	2% (0.02)	0.36 (0.42)	5% (0.06)	<b>1.48**</b> (0.53)	<b>9%</b> (0.04)
Obstacles and Opportunities	Recruited for Participation #	0.28 (0.22)	5% (0.04)	<b>0.61**</b> (0.21)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)	0.21 (0.22)	3% (0.03)	-0.11 (0.25)	-1% (0.02)
	Political Acquaintances #	0.19 (0.23)	3% (0.04)	0.06 (0.19)	0% (0.01)	<b>0.42*</b> (0.20)	<b>6%</b> (0.03)	<b>0.60*</b> (0.26)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)
	Job Skills	0.44 (0.33)	8% (0.06)	0.10 (0.31)	1% (0.02)	-0.13 (0.26)	-2% (0.04)	0.09 (0.30)	1% (0.02)
	Church Skills	0.20 (0.33)	3% (0.06)	0.03 (0.35)	0% (0.02)	0.45 (0.36)	7% (0.05)	0.20 (0.33)	1% (0.02)
	Organizational Skills	<b>0.58^</b> (0.34)	<b>10%</b> (0.06)	<b>0.54^</b> (0.29)	<b>3%</b> (0.02)	<b>0.96***</b> (0.28)	<b>15%</b> (0.5)	<b>0.65^</b> (0.39)	<b>4%</b> (0.02)
	Athlete #	<b>0.47*</b> (0.22)	<b>8%</b> (0.04)	<b>0.58**</b> (0.20)	<b>3%</b> (0.01)	0.17 (0.21)	3% (0.03)	0.06 (0.22)	0% (0.01)
	Discriminated against #	0.23 (0.26)	4% (0.05)	<b>0.46^</b> (0.24)	<b>3%</b> (0.03)	0.30 (0.25)	5% (0.05)	<b>0.83***</b> (0.24)	<b>9%</b> (0.04)
	Controls	Married #	0.10 (0.26)	2% (0.04)	-0.09 (0.18)	0% (0.01)	0.14 (0.22)	2% (0.03)	<b>-0.62**</b> (0.24)
Education		<b>-0.74**</b> (0.34)	<b>-13%</b> (0.06)	-0.33 (0.35)	-2% (0.02)	<b>-0.93**</b> (0.32)	<b>-14%</b> (0.05)	<b>-0.58^</b> (0.30)	<b>-4%</b> (0.02)
Family income		0.14 (0.52)	2% (0.09)	-0.64 (0.47)	-3% (0.02)	-0.14 (0.41)	-2% (0.06)	0.22 (0.58)	1% (0.04)
Age		<b>-2.53**</b> (0.90)	<b>-44%</b> (0.15)	<b>-2.58***</b> (0.75)	<b>-13%</b> (0.05)	<b>-2.73***</b> (0.73)	<b>-42%</b> (0.12)	<b>-1.53^</b> (0.79)	<b>-9%</b> (0.05)
Constant		<b>-0.77^</b> (0.45)		<b>-1.69**</b> (0.56)		<b>-0.76^^</b> (0.48)		<b>-1.89**</b> (0.66)	
Sample Size	386		605		536		491		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.14		0.23		0.14		0.25		
Wald Chi	32.28		94.21		56.23		73.69		

Significance: ^p<.115 ^p<.100, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Citizen Participation Study—Main Survey

## Variable coding

All variables are coded 0-1. When a / occurs it means a question was asked once for each of the instances separated by the slash.

### Groups:

*Minority* - All individuals who self-identified as non-white.

*College educated* - All individuals with a college degree, including those with Associates and Junior college degrees.

*Low/High Family Income* - The eligibility pool sample is split at the midpoint of family income, at \$40,000.

*Biblical Literalist* – Believes the Bible is the word of God.

*Reborn (born again)* – Respondent is committed to Christ.

*Ambition* - Responded that “I might want to run for office some day” or “I might want to get a job with the government some day” were somewhat or very important motivations for participating in or contributing to an election campaign, being active or contributing to a political or civic organization, attending or serving on a local board or council, being an informal neighborhood activist.

### Social roles

*Preschool children* – If affirmed that have one or more toddlers living at home.

*Abortion* – Response to below scale coded such that 1 means it is a personal choice and 0 is never permitted.

Some people feel that a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. (Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point number 1.) Others feel that, by law, abortions should never be permitted. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people would have opinions somewhere in between at points 2,3,4,5, and 6.) Where would you place yourself on this scale?

*Leadership* – Scale measuring if the individual affirmed the following statements:

I usually count on being successful at everything I do.

I like to assume responsibility.

I like to take the lead when a group does things together.

I enjoy convincing others of my opinions.

I often notice that I serve as a model for others.

I am good at getting what I want.

I am often a step ahead of others.

I often give others advice and suggestions.  
Cronbach's alpha: .72

### Obstacles and Opportunities

*Recruited for political activity* – Binary variable indicating if the respondent answered affirmatively to any of the following items:

We are interested in learning about the kinds of people who ask others to take part in community life. In the past twelve months have you received any request directed to you personally to take some active role in a local, public or political issue in your community -- perhaps to serve on a board, or to work with others on such an issue or to go to a meeting on some community issue?

In the past twelve months have you received any request directed to you personally asking you to contact a government official—asking you to write to or talk to a government official?

In the past twelve months have you received any request directed at you personally to take part in a protest, march, or demonstration?

Thinking about the elections we have had since January 1988, during these election campaigns, have you received any request directed to you personally to work for or contribute money to a candidate for public office, a party group, a Political Action Committee, or any other organization that supports candidates?

Cronbach's alpha: .59

*Political Acquaintances* – Binary variable indicating that the respondent knew at least one of the following:

A current member of Congress (House or Senate).

A current member of the state legislature (either house).

A member of the local elected council in your community.

A member of some other local official board.

*Skills* – Scale measuring if the individual affirmed the following statements:

At your job/place of worship/organization have you in the last six months...

Planned or chaired a meeting?

Given a presentation or speech?

Gone to a meeting where you took part in making decisions?

Written a letter?

Cronbach's alpha: .81

*Athlete* – Binary variable indicating if the respondent was somewhat or very active in high school or college sports.

*Discriminated against* – Binary variable indicating if the respondent responded affirmatively to the following question: There is much talk these days about discrimination on the basis of [sex or gender] on jobs, or school admissions, or housing, or in other important things. In the last five years, have you yourself been discriminated against on the basis of your sex/race/religion?

### Control variables

*Married* – If indicated was in a marriage or marriage-like relationship

*Education* – Four category variable: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate (including associates/junior college).

*Family income* - Which of the income groups listed on this card includes the total 1989 income before taxes of all members of your family living in your home? Please include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. (If uncertain: what would be your best guess?). Coded 0-1, 15 categories.

*Age* – *Continuous variable.*

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