The Ruins of Paradise: Studies in Early Mediterranean Poetics and Cosmology

by

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Bind us in time, O Seasons clear, and awe.
O minstrel galleons of Carib fire,
Bequeath us to no earthly shore until
Is answered in the vortex of our grave
The seal’s wide spindrift gaze toward paradise.

(from Hart Crane’s *Voyages*, II)
For Mom and Dad
Acknowledgments

I fear that what follows this preface will appear quite like one of the disorderly monsters it investigates. But should you find anything in this work compelling on account of its being lucid, know that I am not responsible. Not long ago, you see, I was brought up on charges of obscurantisme, although the only “terroristic” aspects of it were self-directed—“Vous avez mal compris; vous êtes idiot.”¹ But I’ve been rehabilitated, or perhaps, like Aphrodite in Iliad 5 (if you buy my reading), habilitated for the first time, to the joys of clearer prose. My committee is responsible for this, especially my chair Richard Janko and he who first intervened, Benjamin Fortson. I thank them.

If something in here should appear refined, again this is likely owing to the good taste of my committee. And if something should appear peculiarly sensitive, empathic even, then it was the humanity of my committee that enabled, or at least amplified, this, too.

Richard Janko has not only increased my philological rigor many times over; he has also inspired me to want to do it for myself. And by means of his learning, he has led me to those joys and treasures that reside in the ὑφοί and at the edges of the ancient world. Ruth Scodel, both by example and in dialogue, has made me a more sensitive reader of Homer and Hesiod; even if we diverge widely from one another in our understanding of parts of these texts, she has helped me to enrich even my misreadings.

¹ Searle (1983) relates Foucault’s assessment of Derrida as follows: “Michel Foucault once characterized
In addition to conducting me toward more legible prose, Benjamin Fortson, who suffered through reading this project in its extreme infancy (emphasis on its being *infans*), has always offered sage advice on vexed linguistic issues, including when it is better to confess ignorance than to construct Rube Goldberg machines. Gary Beckman, my cognate member, has been generous with his time and patient with my dilettantism: he has offered astute corrections to my estimation of ancient Anatolia and its languages. Finally, Sara Ahbel-Rappe has met me bravely and graciously at the shadowy interface of poetry and philosophy, where she not only helped me refine the language with which I talked about ontology and epistemology, but also encouraged me to push my readings further and to be unafraid of the ineffable.

The Department of Classical Studies at the University of Michigan must also bear some responsibility for this, since they have funded me without stint and encouraged me, even in my pursuit of *phantasmata*. Michelle Biggs, our Graduate Coordinator, has been unflagging in keeping my colleagues and me intact and on course. Even now she performs the invaluable job of sending our dossiers out to prospective employers. I am deeply indebted to her.

H.D. Cameron, too, must be blamed and thanked for what appears, since he read—with patience and good humor—the entire *Iliad* and *Odyssey* with me. This was an ἔξοχος χαρά.

I thank my peers in the department, current and former, who have been willing to hear me talk through my ideas, even when I was doing so obscurantly. My cohort—Clara Bosak-Schroeder, Harriet Fertik, and Ellen Lee (nee Cole), as well as Ellen’s partner, Evan Robert Lee—have supported me, challenged me, and commiserated with me
throughout this process. My good friends, Michael Leese (now at the University of New Hampshire), Amy Pistone, and particularly Matthew Cohn (now at the University of Toronto), have never shied away from reading or listening to even the most malformed of my thoughts. I aspire to both their scholarship and their humanity.
Preface

Otherwise, I will bear some responsibility for what I hope this dissertation can offer its readers: a new insight into the relationship between poetry (broadly defined), mythic narrative, and mortal anxiety about the cosmos and the language with which we describe it. This is an anxiety I have felt deeply since I was very young and realized for the first time that I ultimately focalized all the narratives of my world, that the God I prayed to looked suspiciously like Jambi the Genie from *Pee-wee’s Playhouse*, and that positive assertions of knowledge unsettled that knowledge. This is an anxiety that I nurtured in Rome, in the classrooms of 19 via A. Algardi on the Gianicolo, in the park surrounding the Villa Doria Pamphili, where every day I ran as fast as I could in search of respite from consumptive yearning, and in the *Camposanto Teutonico*, where a stray sarcophagus uttered the mutually consoling words of an ancient Roman couple in banal elegiac couplets. This is an anxiety I applied stubbornly as a method of reading in a seminar on Propertius at the University of Michigan. This is an anxiety I detected in the proem to Parmenides’ hexametric poem ‘*On Nature*’ and the Goddess’ description of men’s *dikraneia*. This is an anxiety I saw ultimately as fueling the oldest extant Greek poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and the even older myths from the Near East about gods, heroes, monsters, and the universes in which they meet one another. Poetry and myth, it seems, are products of a psychopathology of mortal self-awareness.
To conclude this section I thank my friends and family outside the field both for offering sanity (or at least a different kind of insanity) and for earnestly wanting to understand what it is I work on; I thank dear Cherry, who cares not one wink what I think about Homer or Hesiod but loves me tirelessly; and I thank my Mom and Dad, to whom this whole thing is dedicated, because they have loved me and supported without condition, even at times inconvenient for them. I will forever fall short of adequately expressing my gratitude to all of them.

Not one to buck trends, I remind my readers that any infelicities herein—and they are here—are my responsibility.
## Contents

Dedication ii
Acknowledgements iii
Preface vi
Introduction 1

**Chapter 1. In His Image (and Language): theomorphization in anthropogonies**
1.1. Introduction: The birth of Death 4
1.2. The structures of Hesiod’s myth of races 7
1.3. Gold is best 10
1.4. Not at all like gold 12
1.5. Line 166 14
1.6. The afterlife of heroes 19
1.7. Better than bronze 22
1.8. Speechlessness and unmetricality 27
1.9. Unwitting κοσμόμαχοι 30
1.10. Ἀμωσόν γένος 32
1.11. Adam ὁ χρύσεος 36
1.12. Geo- and anthropocentricity 37
1.13. Tending the earth that needs no tending 39
1.14. Features of paradise and the specter of the flood 41
1.15. Living like gods, thinking like gods 44
1.16. The fruits of life and death 47

**Chapter 2. Divine trauma, identity theft, and the poetics of ὀκοσμία**
2.1. Introduction: From assimilation to obliteration 55
2.2. Serpents as architects of identity theft 58
2.3. Anzu and Illuyanka become Storm-gods: An introduction to the etymological attack 61
2.4. Ishmael’s crime: The power of names in Genesis 65
2.5. From etymology to image and formula: Hesiodic Typhon 68
2.6. Weapons as vehicles of transference in ps.-Apollodorus 74
2.7. More simulacra and metepithesis: Nonnus 80
2.8. Synthesis: Re-writing the cosmos from Anzu to Nonnus 82
2.9. A telling slip: Zeus’ neura in Nonnus 87
2.10. A brief look forward: the tragic consequences of wordplay 89
2.11. An Erinyomachy in Aeschylus? 90
2.12. Precocious mortals: Sophocles’ *Trachiniae* 102
# Chapter 3. The dangers of (being) Aphrodite

1. Introduction and synthesis 113  
2. Aphrodites: Apostasis and syntasis 115  
3. Powerful garments, ME’s, and τιμαί: Some correspondences 118  
4. Transgression: The rescue of Aeneas 124  
5. Image and echo: A verbal defense 126  
6. Violating the inviolable: Wounding the goddess 131  
7. Blood that is not blood: Healing the goddess 135  
8. Divine wounds as musical oppression 137  
9. Consolations: Reorienting the goddess 138  
10. Consolations: Paradeigmata of suffering 142  
11. Dione’s threats and Diomedes as guarantor of Zeus’ reign 154  

# Chapter 4. Immortal desire and mortal grief

1. Introduction: Aphrodite and eros 160  
2. Maternal grief 162  
3. Divine suicide? 169  
4. …ο καὶ θανάτοις ρίγιοι άργαλέου 181

Conclusion 187  

Bibliography 192
Introduction

As Genesis 3 comes to a close, God drives Adam and Eve from Eden, but not before addressing a nameless and faceless heavenly audience (3:22):

“Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.”

In contrast with what God tells Adam and Eve, verse 22 shows that God expels the couple to solve a theological crisis, not to punish them. Or rather, the prohibition and attached punishment are shown to be a theological concern. In this project, I examine the literary and intellectual aspects of this crisis among many other examples of cosmological exigency from Ancient Greek, Hebrew, Anatolian, and Mesopotamian sources, using a breadth of materials usually reserved for surveys rather than thesis-driven projects. I aim to demonstrate that these texts are all part of a broad cultural-linguistic milieu, a koinê, that matured in the late Bronze Age and continued to develop through the Iron Age—the age of Homer and Hesiod—and that they mutually inform and enrich one another across geographic and linguistic boundaries.

In broad terms, this project involves defining the intellectual dimensions of the various accounts of cosmic crisis. For example, by tasting the fruit, man acquires one of the features of the divine, from which he was made to be distinct; if he should become immortal, too, he would be, insofar as the minimalism of Genesis admits, just like God.

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2 KJV translation.
The very notion of divinity would thereby dissolve. The language that communicates the system of meaning that depends on the binary opposition between men and gods would then fail to refer sensibly to anything. These threats to the intelligibility of the cosmos are indicated through clever, though sometimes very subtle, linguistic and poetic details. These details stand as pivots around which the narrative turns, from order to disorder to order reaffirmed. Thus, I suggest one discrete, but crucial, socio-(psycho-)linguistic apparatus for the cross-linguistic sharing of ideas.

For while Classicists and Near-Easternists have detailed for some time now the early interfaces between the Greeks and their eastern Mediterranean neighbors, my project emphasizes the shared importance of these precise intellectual items, what I call the poetic indices of cosmic disorder. These indices include etymological figures, misapplication of formulas and epithets, even musical (i.e. metrical) and phonetic play. To me, these units of the language and music most powerfully convey, even actualize, the sense of disorder.

With respect to the political and socio-economic infrastructures that facilitated cross-linguistic exchanges of mythological data, I have largely relied on the work of others (e.g. Burkert 1992, West 1997, Lane Fox 2008, as well as the excellent volume of essays edited by Collins, Bacharova, and Rutherford 2008). The movement of things, people, and ideas around the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas is tremendously complicated, and the bare data is often suggestive and in need of clever synthesis. Although much, often very subtle, work has been done in the service of synthesizing information from across the broader Mediterranean and across the Bronze and Iron Ages, we can still ask other questions about how people thought across languages, and how
stories and the specialized language of certain types of storytelling, i.e. poetry, became
complicit in the movement of thought in the ancient world.

Thus, this dissertation is about how poetics, even across languages, would have
been consumed as such and would have influenced exchange of lexical data and
mythological information; in particular, it focuses on the broadly represented central role
of poetics in the expression of human anxiety about the cosmos in which humans
participate as linguistic beings. One of the main objects of inquiry here is wordplay, and
the ability of wordplay to function both as an expression of climactic peril in a given
narrative—including the danger language itself faces—and as a means of conveyance for
all sorts of mythological and narratological data both within and across idioms; this latter
function might be understood as ‘intertextuality’. As will become clear, my dissertation is
also heavily influenced by the work of Watkins (1995), whose work focuses on Indo-
European rather than Mediterranean poetics, as well as that of Slatkin (1991) who
demonstrates how important the suppressed or latent tradition is for the machinery of epic
storytelling.
Chapter 1.

*In His Image (and Language): Theomorphization in anthropogonies*

1.1 / *Introduction: The birth of death*

In the broadest sense, this chapter deals with the intellectual crises that arise in the earliest accounts from Greece and the Near East of the birth of mankind. In particular, I focus on how structures of language, narrative, and ontology get disturbed in early Mediterranean anthropogonies: the binary opposition between men and gods—the linguistic opposition of the mortality of the one and the deathlessness of the other—is unsteady until demonstrated in stronger, (unsurprisingly) violent terms. In other words, at first, these myths do not take as a given the presence or, more precisely, the emotional burden, of death in the lives of men, in stark contrast with its absence from the world of gods. This assimilation of the first men to the divine produces a kind of cognitive dissonance. Human history must move forward, but this movement is impeded by perfection.

There are, I think, two reasons why ancient Mediterranean peoples imagined early man as almost indistinct from the divine. First, there may be a general sense, in any given present but especially in times of turbulence, that people must be becoming less close to the gods, and so it is natural to imagine backwards from this to a time when men and gods enjoyed commensality at the least. Second, the emotional and intellectual anxiety
that death causes in the present must generate fantasy about worlds and times in which this was not the case. We yearn in part to escape death and its relatives, decay, degradation, and loss, or at the very least the fear and anxiety that we experience because of these realities. In these alternative worlds, men and gods are more similar, with respect to both the external goods to which they have unfailing access and the freedom from passion that this access affords: men live unhaunted by the specter of the evanescence of their environment and apart from the toil that devours the soul when the earth withholds \textit{bios}. Although the earliest myths present these alternative realities as having expired and given way to the current state of things, we also have examples of races of men who, although ostensibly mortal, live in bliss contemporaneously with men who suffer, but are geographically all but inaccessible to them.

In these fantasies, men rarely participate in the deathless state of the gods \textit{per se}; however, the paradises and the activities that take place in those paradises are infused with the blitheness of the gods’ own lives, a mirth that immortality itself seems to confer. In these worlds, although death still apparently subdues men, men appear to feel no anxiety about it. (The situation in Eden is a bit more complicated.)

One obvious result of this freedom from suffering is that the division between men and gods becomes intellectually and linguistically murky. Chapters 3 and 4 will explore how the gods’ blitheness falters when they get wrapped up in narratives that involve human loss: as long as they maintain intimacy with the world that they created and whose natural and metaphysical forces they command, they suffer when it does, and at times they have to remind themselves of their immortality, usually by emphasizing the
mortality of men. These myths provide a secondary aetiology for our remoteness from the divine.

In this chapter, however, I explore how the narrative and linguistic markers of earliest man’s unflagging happiness dissociate him from his mortality, and propose further that the idiomatic *aporia* that results from descriptions of men that look very much like descriptions of gods drives early myth forward: the very machinery of epic story-telling, for example, is fueled by this self-discrepancy. To put it another way, much myth in general, and epic in particular, confronts the intellectual impediments to its own project.

I also explore cases where we might have evidence of cross-linguistic sharing of intellectual ‘data’, i.e. that certain shared features of these myths may be counted as evidence, perhaps tantalizing, but worthy of consideration regardless, of mutual influence among these myths. In later chapters it will become clearer how closely the moments of disruptive grammar in the literature of the different languages resemble one another. In this chapter, the details are somewhat less salient, but they are there; and coupled with the other shared features of paradise, they suggest a rich and deeply self-engaged Sprachbund. While it is speculation, and an unnecessary one at that, to allege that there were multilingual poets who were regularly reading texts or listening to recitations not in their native tongues, it is unthinkable that the early poets of the Mediterranean were not charmed by non-Greek stories or did not appreciate the ring of a certain Near Eastern lexeme.
One of the earliest extant anthropogonies is a Greek one. About one eighth of Hesiod's late 8th-early 7th century poem, *Works and Days* (*WD*), chronicles the successive races of ἄνθρωποι. The passage (109–201), as well as the poem at large, is fraught with textual and interpretive problems. While the rich history of interest in the passage has indicated how these problems impede our already precarious understanding of Hesiod’s poetic programs, there still seems to be little satisfaction at the proposed solutions. I offer here some views that differ to varying degrees from what others have suggested. If these, too, do not satisfy, I hope they will remove at least a few of the roadblocks barring our path to fuller readings of the poem, including the broader literary-intellectual milieu in which it is at least temporally and geographically situated.

This somewhat refractory myth of races already provoked literary responses from a number of Hesiod's readers in antiquity and has challenged a considerable number of modern scholars, especially since Vernant suggested that Hesiod’s ἕτερος λόγος (106) did not simply account for the fall of man from proximity to the divine and distance from evils to increasing exposure to decay and pain,⁴ but is rather “une suite articulée en deux étages” in which “chaque plan, divisé en deux aspects antithétiques, présente deux races formant la contrepartie l’une de l’autre et s’opposant respectivevment comme dikè à ὕβρις.”⁵ More recently, Most challenged many assumptions about the passage’s

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³ “Le mythe hésiodique des races: Essai d’analyse structurale” (1960) and “Le mythe hésiodique des races: Sur un essai de mise au point” (1966). Both essays are included in the 1985 edition of *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs: Études de psychologie historique* (Paris); references are to that edition. The second essay, his 1966 response to Defradas’ critique of his first, clarifies his position and indicates the strength of the structural method for a text like *WD*.

⁴ Vernant (1966:65). Clay (2003:87) correctly counts that δίκη actually does not function at all for the gold men. Even so, the gold men resemble βασιλῆες, as Vernant (1960:27) argues. The gold men are paradigmatic for a world in which δίκη is opposed to ἀδικία.
organization, including some of Vernant’s, when he argued that the men of the heroic age ought to be considered as closely connected with the iron age of Hesiod’s present:

“They share our biological constitution and our moral chances in a way that the gold, silver, and bronze men did not; yet their failure, when they failed, meant annihilation, the worst that could happen to us, and their success, when they succeeded, outstripped anything we can ever hope to achieve ourselves.”

On the surface, the races of men do appear to degenerate from a life of leisure and “living like gods” (112) to a world where hubris runs rampant, unchecked, and so unmitigated by any goods that eventually Aidôs and Nemesis will leave, ostensibly taking with them any “protection against evil” (181–201). Yet this simplification of the scheme has actually confused the story more. The concurrent motif, for example, of the encroachment of old age is “fragmented and obscure.”

Vernant dealt with other interpretive problems, too: the intrusion of the fourth race, which does not have a metallic appellation, into the metallic schema; the iron race’s apparent division into that of the present and that of the imagined future; and the question as to what will happen to the world once the iron race is destroyed. Inviting solutions to some of these issues may emerge collaterally from this study, but other questions strike me as more crucial.

In searching for answers to these questions we will move in a slightly different interpretive direction: in short, I want to use Hesiod’s myth of races for the insights it provides into how early hexameter poetry (1) decided that mortality was a sine qua non

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5 Most (1997:119). His interpretation is based on the sense of προτέρη γενεή (160) and the likely inauthenticity of 173d-e, on which see also West (1978:194–5 ad 173a–e).
6 As Most (1997:105) puts it, “In general, the literary and scholarly reception of this passage in ancient and modern times may be interpreted as a series of attempts to rescue the limpid clarity of what readers have thought to be the Hesiodic myth from the puzzling awkwardness of the Hesiodic text in which it has somehow become trapped”.
7 West (1978:173).
of an account of the cosmos and (2) determined, and experimented with, the mythic and poetic parameters of mortality. In other words, Hesiod’s anthropogony illustrates the ancient mythic, religious, and poetic, what I will sometimes call in shorthand the “intellectual”, fixation on the mortal condition. Furthermore, the poem highlights how mythopoetic components, not just the large-scale narrative but also the more discrete linguistic ones, are involved in proving and transgressing the system of boundaries that gives order to the cosmos. Often, the poet reasserts or clarifies those parameters with similar mythopoetic tools.

These intellectual experiments, particularly those that are couched in terms of bygone and inaccessible eras and places, emerge from competing psychological activities generated by the human condition: as I alleged above, humans may long to be relieved of the anguish of mortality and the harshness of reality, and even fantasizing about lost beatific environments and lifestyles and heartier physiology may provide a remedy of sorts; but on the other hand, these fantasies obscure the otherness of the divine. Without going too far afield for this particular study in imagining the variety of intellectual consequences of such a blurring of distinctions, I argue that one major consequence is that the story-telling project is enervated. Hesiod’s poem, of course, does not, at least as its primary function, emphasize this sort of obsession, but it does reveal the structure and dynamics of mortal self-awareness in the course of issuing a practical protreptic regarding the proper pursuit of ἀρετή.

8 A good deal in my methods aligns with those of Clay (2003). While I do not require the same extent of mutual harmonization between the Theogony and Works & Days that she seems to espouse in her view of Archaic epos, my general sense is that the evocation of particular images can indicate common engagement with common material.
1.3 / Gold is best

With these issues in mind, I examine Hesiod's golden race, particularly the fact that their demise is not, like that of the other races, given a rationale; the annihilations of the other races either directly or consequentially result from their faults. Irked by this, other scholars have attempted to unearth from beneath Hesiod’s minimalism the reasons for the extinction of the golden men. Recently, Jenny Clay gave a practical answer: “the men of the race of gold… d[o] not have the ability to reproduce themselves; and without this ability, they quickly bec[ome] extinct.”9 I will postpone full evaluation of the specifics of this suggestion, but for now I point out that what Clay proposes is a *quo modo* of their annihilation; the moral-ethical “wherefore” remains buried with the race. In other words, even if the golden men die out without procreating, why would the gods make so much worse the subsequent races of men?

Ballabriga approaches the sort of analysis I want to offer here. He suggests that the gods allow the men of the golden race to disappear because they were too similar to the gods:

“Il faut sans doute comprendre, bien que la piété ordinaire refuse de se l'avouer, que les dieux ont besoin de créer l'humanité pour se sentir pleinement dieux. Mais si cette humanité est trop proche d'eux leur divinité ne sera pas assez apparente.”10

Combining this notion of problematic similarity with Most’s interpretation of the paradigmatic functions of the races for Hesiod’s audience, I suggest that the reason for the golden race’s demise is actually indicated by the poet’s reticence about it. The golden

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9 2003:87. Scodel (*per litt. ad* 121) suggests the question of their demise might not be meaningful, and that the race “vanishes because the story requires it.” Even if they have no admonitory function like the subsequent race, and Scodel is right to point this out, their demise is aetiologically important nonetheless, as I will argue throughout this chapter.
men are incompatible with discourse in two deeply connected ways: 1) their perfection is at odds with narrative; and 2) they themselves have no need of the *diversive* power of story-telling. By *diversive*, I mean capable of diverting one’s attentions away from the harshness of reality. This second problem is much graver than it first looks. I will discuss it below.

With respect to (1), I see it working as follows. The golden men have no explicit shortcoming, as their successors all do; while the silver and bronze men may not have variegated lives themselves, their failings—excessive impiety and bellicosity, respectively—directly lead to their demise and therefore provide negative *exempla*. In other words, what they do generates a narrative movement that culminates in their deaths. By contrast, the golden men fail to produce exemplifying narrative; they are not even particularly useful moral paradigms. It is only when they are made *daimones* and become part of the dialectic of modern men that they seem to take on paradigmatic function, but even then not truly in the capacity of moral exemplars, even if they do “watch over *dikai* and wicked deeds” (124). In other words, as *daimones*, the golden men function more as agents of the cosmic moral structure than as morally autonomous (and upright) actors within that cosmic structure. (I will discuss below how this is connected with their *phuê*.)

Thus, the entire vocabulary of human excellence that Hesiod uses to encourage Perses’ reformation would be meaningless in the time of the golden men. Even though they are content, can we ascribe moral lives, let alone ethical frameworks, to the golden men? It would seem to me that the ideas of the *πανάριστος*, of *ἀρετή*, of *δίκη* do not

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11 The mental lives of the golden men is a difficult question; I will discuss it further below.
function in the golden world. In Hesiod’s cosmos the advent of δίκη requires the sublimation of the golden race into the irrecoverable and, as we shall see, nonsensical proto-state of mankind. The poet, in imagining a near-perfect human race remote from eris, confronts a logical impediment: since he cannot introduce strife and psychological turmoil into their epoch, which would make them less golden and paradigmatic, he has to remove them quietly, leaving the audience to wonder why the golden men warranted annihilation.

The role of golden men in the broader context of early myth and thought requires discussion of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Eden in Genesis, a passage intimately connected with the demise of the golden men but seemingly never adduced as a Near Eastern parallel. Before we broaden our scope, however, we must examine the other extinct γένη of Hesiod’s myth and determine whether their respective demises can help us explain the poet’s account of the extinction of the seemingly flawless golden men and show what makes them, while living, problematic for Hesiod’s cosmos and Hesiod’s poetics.

1.4 / Not at all like gold

For the silver, bronze, and heroic races, Hesiod offers an explicit mode and rationale for their respective destructions, although for the heroes we have to look elsewhere for a πρόφασις. For example, Zeus “hides” the silver race because he is angry that they do not extend honors (τιμαί) to the gods (138). These timai ostensibly comprise the actions that are indicated by θεραπεύειν (135) and sacrificing on the altar (136).

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12 See González (2011) for a discussion of πρόφασις in fr. 204 M-W.
Likewise, we learn that the bronze men destroy themselves by overzealously applying themselves to the “works of Ares” (145–6) and end up going to the “moldy house of icy Hades” (154); death takes them, and they “abandon the shining light of the sun” (154–5).

The “divine race of hero men,” whom we will consider first because of their own genetic proximity to the divine as well as their apparent overlap with the iron men, (159) appears, in Hesiod’s eyes, to come to an end after Troy:

166 {ἔνθ’ ἔτοι τοὺς μὲν θανάτου τέλος ἁμφεκάλυψεν,} τοῖς δὲ δίχ’ ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ ἡθε’ ὁπάσσας Ζεύς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατήρ ἐν πείρασι γαίης, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ναίοσσιν ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
170 ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι παρ’ Ὀκεανόν βιαθύδινην·

{There truly did the finality of death enshroud some(?) of them,} while to some(?) father Zeus, Kronos’ son, offered livelihood and dwellings apart from men and settled them at the limits of the earth, and these dwell possessed of a carefree spirit on the Isles of the Blest beside Ocean with his deep eddies.

The nature of Zeus’ actions here and at Cat. fr. 204.99 ff., which West adduces to explain 167 (διχ’ ἀνθρώπων κτλ.), are somewhat elusive, especially given how vexed interpretations of the Catalog fragment are\(^\text{13}\) as well as the problematic status of key lines in the WD passage. By addressing some of the textual and interpretive difficulties scholars have faced, we can begin to adumbrate some of the ‘decadence’ motif insofar as it relates to issues of cosmology and ontology.

\(^{13}\) See González (2011) for the discussion of the problems with particular supplements and the interpretation of the fragment as indicating a tripartite division among the divine, semi-divine, and “regular” humans.
1.5 / Line 166

The first textual complication that we encounter in Hesiod’s account of the heroic age is the status of line 166. Ercolani summarizes the crux well: “A 161 τοὺς μέν = gli eroi nel loro complesso; quindi si hanno due sottogruppi: A = τοὺς μέν 162 e B = τοὺς δὲ 164. Fin qui tutti concordano. Con 166 le interpretazioni divergono.” With respect to the manuscript tradition, line 166 is absent from the two papyri that include the surrounding lines, and Proclus neglects it in his commentary. West argues for its inclusion despite the weakness of the textual evidence for it, pointing out that it would be strange for Hesiod to say that the entirety of the heroic race was transported to the Isles of the Blest. If that were the only possible sense for the lines without 166, West’s argument would be attractive because, as he notes, Elysium does not appear to be the de facto home in the afterlife of the heroes of early epic. (I would caution, however, that, although Elysium and the Isles of the Blest seem to be functionally equivalent by this time, the extreme scarcity of both terms in epic does not help us organize the underworld geography or decide whether they are to be fully equated. Below, I will consider the possible connections of Elysium with Eden.) Ercolani cautiously upholds West’s text and specifies further that those heroes who get to go to the Isle of the Blest are those who died in Troy, as opposed to the Theban fighters. But even a well-reasoned literary argument for the inclusion of a poorly attested line must sustain a hefty burden of proof, and West’s does not. However, it does impel us to confront deeper impediments to interpreting the

14 2010:190 ad 166.
15 Π38 (P. Berol. 21107) and Π40 (P. Strasb. 2684) in West’s catalogue and summary of the ‘Ancient Manuscripts’ (1978:75–8). See n. 21 for a fuller discussion of the textual and literary evidence against the line.
passage. Let us look at the context (158–70), which I leave untranslated here so as not to suggest a reading prematurely:

Zeus Cronides poiese, dikaioteron kai areion, aneroum hrovon theion genos, o kalwontai hemibo, protere geneh kata’ apeirona gaiian. 160
kai touz muen polemos te kakos kai philosze aivn
touz muen xfr epitapilo Thibh, Kadimihi gaihi,
olise marnomenos miLeo enek’ Oidipoda,
touz de kai en nhesin uper meg a laitma thalaszes
es Troiin anagwv ‘Elenh enek’ hrokmoi.

{eno’ h tois muen thanatou telos amfekaluyven}
tois de die’ antrwpon biotov kai hthe’ opassas
Zeus Cronidizes katanassse patir e peira gaih.
kai tois muen naioun anakida thymon exontez...

The sequence of particles has vexed interpreters (I still find myself uneasy about the whole thing.) Most’s interpretation of 161–8 provides an example of just how vexing it can be. 17 (He glosses over the status of line 166 altogether, but his reading of the passage assumes the line’s absence.) He analyzes the heroes indicated by tois de (167), to whom Zeus extended a special afterlife, as contrasting with those indicated by touz muen (161), whom “evil war and dread clashing” destroyed either in Thebes or Troy. 18 From this reading he suggests that the heroes of the Theban and Trojan wars (oi muen) are not being exalted in any way but are rather annihilated precisely because of their subscription to bad eris, which the poet decried earlier in the poem and which Most thinks is paraphrased by polemos te kakos kai philosze aivn of 161. 19 There are a number of problems with Most’s interpretation.

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19 Most (1997:118–9, 123).
For one, his reading requires that lines 161–8 distinguish between those whom war brought to Thebes and Troy and destroyed and those who avoided death and live in Blessed Isles. One problem is that, for this analysis to work, Most needs to read Menelaus’ special status in the *Odyssey* into Hesiod’s poem and further adduces other anonymous Menelaus-like heroes in order to make sense of the plural τοῖς (167), since Rhadamanthys is older than both the Trojan and Theban Wars. And even if we grant Most’s point that Menelaus traditionally enjoys the double boon of being Zeus’ γαμβρός and being peculiarly opposed to large-scale strife (this latter suggestion is really quite unconvincing), Most’s reading demands that we understand that war and dread clashing did not destroy all of those who went to Thebes or Troy.

Yet the contrast offered by the sequence of particles, if we exclude 166, and if we accept that the contrasted elements are groups of people, is expressly between those whom war drove to Thebes and Troy and annihilated and those whom it did not even conduct to those famed locales. The heavy emphasis on the places and the reasons for the fighting indicate that the contrast involves war’s (one almost wants to capitalize Πόλεμος and Φόλοπις) conveyance (ἀγαγών, 165) of the heroes to the battlefields, and not just their annihilation.20 Thus, the inclusion of 166 would be preferable if we wanted Hesiod to be contrasting some of those whom war drove to Thebes and Troy (or the Theban heroes as versus the Trojan?), who were destroyed and simply enshrouded by death, and others who, throughout the tradition, were transported to the Isles of the Blest, having either fallen in the field or died at home.21 In this case it would follow that the first μέν

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20 Most’s compelling connection of line 161 with the description of bad Eris loses its force otherwise.
21 We must remember that death as indicated by οἶλημι is often, but not necessarily, violent. Most includes line 166 in his Loeb text and translation (2006); further his translation seems to indicate that he has had a
(161) does not expect the δέ of 167, but is better taken as indicating the author’s certainty about his equation of the heroes with those who went to Thebes and Troy (and the author’s certainty about the audience’s knowledge of the heroes’ mythic lives). Yet all these interpretive moves are beside the point.

As I mentioned above, West dismisses some sturdy textual evidence against the authenticity of 166, and both West (and Ercolani) and Most seem to take it as a foregone conclusion that the contrasted elements are necessarily the groups of people indicated by the various pronouns preceding the µέν’s and δέ’s. However, this is not necessarily the case, especially in epic. I insist that line 166 must be regarded as an interpolation whose purpose was to square Hesiodic material with Homeric by indicating different fates for different heroes; the interpolator is likewise guilty of a cursory reading.

Solmsen, in his review of West’s handling of the line, believes the line to be an interpolation impelled by the same sorts of interpretive difficulties that West himself faced. On textual grounds alone, the line ought to be omitted. If the two papyri that include the surrounding lines have omitted it (West’s apparatus ought to have indicated the line’s absence with deest), one from the 1st–2nd c. and the other from the early 2nd c., and if Proclus neglected to comment on it, we have good reason to suspect that it is interpolated. That the scholia vetera report the line complicates the picture somewhat.

change of heart regarding Hesiod’s sense, opting to see some of the Theban and Trojan combatants as simply being enshrouded by death and others as receiving a special afterlife. Pindar Ol. 2 refers to a single Isle of the Blest, over which Rhadamanthys presides. Peleus and Cadmus are counted among the inhabitants, and Thetis conducted Achilles there, having persuaded Zeus with her prayers (78–9).

22 Cf. perhaps WD 122. An alternative, as Ruth Scodel suggested to me per litt., is that the µέν of 166 is merely resumptive of the µέν in 161 and that being enshrouded by the end of death is not necessarily preventive of being offered a special after life. Later we will examine whether this is the case, but it suffices here to say that at least some heroes get a special afterlife dispensation.

Furthermore, the line seems phraseologically amalgamated and anomalous, although statistics do us no good here. We should note that the phrase θανάτου τέλος with contracted genitive and in that order is unparalleled in verse before Aeschylus (Septem 905); τέλος θανάτου is found once in the Homeric corpus at Od. 5.326, whereas τέλος θανάτοιο occurs 6x in the Iliad (1x in the Odyssey), and θανάτοιο τέλος occurs 3x in the Iliad (1x in the Odyssey).

Furthermore, the verb ἀμφικαλύπτω, both unverbated and in tmesis, while well represented in Homer, occurs only once elsewhere in the Hesiodic corpus (WD 555) in an entirely different context. While one could argue that Hesiod sees far fewer individuals being enshrouded by death than Homer does, by that same evidence it is arguable that the Homeric context has been cobbled together by the interpolator. That an interpolator is the culprit, and not Hesiod, is perhaps more strongly evidenced by the adverb-particle sequence at the line’s beginning (ἐνθ’ ή τοι or ἐνθ’ ἠτοι). This sequence occurs twice in the Iliad and several times in the Odyssey, but nowhere else in Hesiod. My inclination is to think that an interpolator, who was a fan of Homer, perhaps more of the Odyssey than of the Iliad, came up with line 166 to correct24 the seeming inconcinnity between the destruction of the race (ὤλεσε, 163) and Zeus’ translating them and proffering them Βίοτος in 167.

One more text-critical argument should suffice to support our conclusion that the line is interpolated. Given the naturalness of the interpolation, and its success in aligning Hesiod’s account with Proteus’ words to Menelaus at Od. 4.563–4 (ἀλλά σ’ Ἐλύσιον πεδίον καὶ πείρατα γαίης / ἄθανατοι πέμψουσιν, ὅτι ξανθός Ῥαδάμανθος), it is much

24 See Frazer (1981:271) for the corrective use of ΗΤΟΙ as it applies to this passage. Again, if anything, this is very Homeric, and not very Hesiodic.
more likely that a tradition-oriented adjustment made its way into the text than that it was original to Hesiod and was later overlooked by two scribes, who cannot have been misled by any homoeoarchon or homoeoteleuton. Thus we have to identify other possibilities for Hesiod’s sense; a new close reading may enable us to do just that.

1.6 / The afterlife of heroes

First, we need to reconsider the context of the chronicle of the heroic race. It is fitted into a scheme that is organized by metallic associations, in which each metallic race (including the present race of iron) is envisaged as collectively destroyed, either in the past or in the increasingly ugly future; a collective fate and a shared destruction might be expected of the heroes as well.\(^{25}\) Furthermore, while the ‘heroes’ elsewhere in early epic seem to be synonymous with warrior men, irrespective of divine lineage, Hesiod restricts his commentary to those who are related to or have otherwise special relationships with the divine in two ways. First he refers to the heroes as constituents of a θεῖον γένος, a phrase that appears once elsewhere in early epic: at II. 6.180, the Chimaera is specified as θεῖον γένος οὐδ᾽ ἄνθρωπων.\(^{26}\) Whether and how the emphatic ‘polar addition’—the Chimaera is divine, and not at all of the stock of men (sc. mortals)—bears on WD is unclear, but note that this fourth race is not called ἄνθρωποι;\(^{27}\) the term is only used to

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\(^{25}\) Cf. Ercolani (2010:191 ad 166), who notes that “il parallelismo con le precedenti generazioni spinge a credere che anche qui si descriva l’esistenza degli eroi post mortem.”

\(^{26}\) The adjective θεῖος seems otherwise specialized in Homer. As West (1966:336 ad 731) notes, it is used “in Homer of heroes, heralds, and bards, men with a special relationship with the gods, or men who seem more than human.” West regards the use of the word at Th. 731 as the only instance of it having “our sense of ‘godly’, θεουδής.”

\(^{27}\) The silver race is not referred to as ἄνθρωποι either, but the poet omits that qualification in favor of including the necessary valuation of the race as πολύ χειρότερον. Compare 109–10 with 127–8.
indicate the group from whom the heroes are separated as part of their privilege in the afterlife.

Second, Hesiod notes that this race comprises “those who are called (καλέονται) hêmitheoi” (159–60). While the use of ήμιθεων γένος ἀνδρῶν at Il. 12.23, which is the only instance of ήμίθεως in Homer, enables the poet to give an impression of remoteness and omniscience regarding the destruction of the Achaean wall and perhaps a contemporary practice of referring to the entire host of warriors at Troy as ήμίθεοι,28 the nod to the ‘Myth of Destruction’ makes it likely that Homer here chooses the term to point to the demise of divine offspring specifically, although I do not take it that Hesiod means the sons of gods exactly.29 Hesiod’s use of καλέονται (always as the line-final ‘biceps+final foot’ sequence in early epic) may actually point to a similarly purposeful choice of the term rather than suggest an editorialization by the poet, since καλέονται very often functions as a quasi-copula in early epic.30 Even if Hesiod does not use the term τέκνα θεῶν, as Catalogue’s poet does, the latter appears to be making a general statement about the race of ἥρως, whether they are the immediate progeny of gods or not. Likewise, for Hesiod, the heroes fall under the broad category of ήμιθεοι by virtue of their sometimes forgotten divine lineage, as well as their functioning ἐξ ἦλθαν with half-gods; perhaps the poet recognized the murky parameters of the terms and used them—paradoxically given the resultant scholarly tangle—to simplify his chronicle of the race.31

28 So West (1978:190-1 ad 159, 160), but some of his examples of the term’s use like Sim. 523.1–2 are much more precise than others. On Pl. Crat. 398cd, see n. 27 below.
29 On the wall and the broader milieu, see Scodel (1982).
30 Cf. Il. 5.342, 14.279, h. Aphr 96, etc. On the equation of the copula and καλέονται see Od. 15.433 and LSJ s.v.
31 Socrates, in etymologizing ἥρως to ἔρως, says that “the heroes are hêmitheoi” and that “all of them were born of a male god lusting after a mortal woman or a mortal man after a goddess” (Crat. 398cd).
A third piece of evidence from WD corroborates this reading. At line 167 the description of the afterlife as “separate from the ἄνθρωποι” (167) indicates that the heroes/demigods are in fact a specific race, that which was born of mortal-immortal unions. The ἥρωες whom Hesiod has in mind are to be distinguished from other men because of their lineage and their spheres of activity. That is not to say that Hesiod envisages only ἡμίθεοι at Thebes and Troy, but that the nameless ἄνθρωποι of those wars do not serve a paradigmatic function by pretending to superhuman excellence. (Diomedes, of course, does not appear to have divine lineage, but does become the Iliad’s most effective theomachos.) The moral interpretation that Most offers, namely that the heroes are utterly destroyed because of their subscription to evil strife, oversimplifies the lives of the ἥρωες who were annihilated in war, essentially equating them with the race of bronze, and makes the broad chronicle that Hesiod offers particularized in a way that loses sight of the text.

To summarize, we have determined that either Hesiod was aware of a tradition in which all of the ἡμίθεοι received a special afterlife like the one that is assigned to Menelaus in the Odyssey, or he altered the traditional parameters of this special afterlife to include the ἡμίθεοι as a paradigmatic group. It is dangerous to use, as Most does, Homeric paradigms about the afterlife to conjure up a ‘tradition’ because, as Jasper

32 We can thus identify the semantic range of ποιήσε (158) for the heroes as comprising the mortal-immortal unions that Zeus caused to occur (like that of Aphrodite and Anchises) or those in which he himself participated.

33 The tradition is in general largely a phantom for certain ideas. For example, although Menelaus and Rhadamanthys appear to be the only ones whom Homer transplanted to the Oceanside resort, as West (1966:192–3 ad 167) notes, “By the sixth century… the club has become less exclusive, and admits at least Achilles, Medea, and Diomedes.” Thus we have a relatively early terminus ante quem for the inclusion of a considerable group of heroes in the μακάρων νῆσοι, one of whom, at least, enjoys a ubiquitous tradition regarding his death; I therefore agree with West that Hesiod must be thinking of a significant group here and not just those privileged by being relatively unwarlike in the Iliad.
Griffin made plain, Homer takes pains to minimize fantastic elements, especially those which might interfere with his project of validating the poetry’s peculiar analgesic or, more precisely, deific value: the κλέα ἀνδρῶν are important both because they delight the soul and because they can become the only incorruptible remnants of the ἀνέρες. The difficulty of Most’s method is further amplified by the fact that Hesiod, in the case of the heroes, fits very specifically Greek mythic traditions into a much more broadly represented mythic scheme; the insertion of the heroic race into the metallic organizational motif results in heroes’ obtaining the ‘morphological’ characteristics of that motif—namely 1) a nonspecific account of their collective creation, 2) an illustrative, but generalizing summary of their lifestyles, and 3) either a nonspecific or a generalizing account of the race’s collective demise. For Hesiod, the wars at Thebes and Troy destroyed the heroic/half-god race at large, and Zeus proffered to that race a special afterlife. If 166 be judged inauthentic, there is no need to accept the illusory contrast that Most observes or West’s quibble with the inaccuracy of Hesiod’s statement vis-à-vis the tradition. The heroes’ special afterlife connects them with both the golden race and the gods, indicating their exceptionality vis-à-vis the bronze men, than whom they are δικαίωτεροι καὶ ἄρείονες (158), and vis-à-vis their fully human coevals.35

1.7 / Better than bronze

At this point it makes sense to explore the primary reason for the race’s destruction; that they were destroyed fighting in large-scale warfare over property and

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34 1977.
35 Clay (2003:92) observes that “the comparatives are equally valid in respect to the following age of iron.” Grammatically and practically this is valid, but the pattern in the myth shows that the comparisons of each of the successive races are with the previous race.
Helen provides a *modus* and secondary rationale, since the war was famously a divine machination. The primary, that is cosmic, reason for the race’s demise can be outlined as follows: by virtue of both their genetics and their mythic activities, the latter of which make them ἴσοι θεοῖσι in Homer, they must be at least geographically distinguished from the gods, from whom they descend and to whose ranks they aspire, and from mortal men, with whom they share the allotment of death.\(^{36}\) The problematic status of *WD* 173a–e notwithstanding,\(^{37}\) Hesiod otherwise indicates that Zeus settles the heroes ἐν πείρασι γαίης (168), which, in addition to being δίχ’ ἀνθρώπων (167), is equivalent to τηλοῦ ἀπ’ ἀθανάτων (173a).\(^{38}\) So even if 173a is an interpolation, based on the passages from the *Theogony* in which we find τηλοῦ (or νόσφιν) ἀπ’ ἀθανάτων, we can still suppose that the separation of heroes from the deathless ones, whom they go so far as to injure in Homer, is an idea consistent with Hesiodic cosmology. For example, the passage in the *Theogony* that describes the Echidna, who is not at all like “men or gods” (295–6), tells us that the gods allocated her (δάσσαντο) a cave beneath a hollow rock, apart from immortals and mortals, to be her famed dwelling (301–3). So just as a flesh-eating maiden-serpent hybrid is inhumed because of her incompatibility with men and gods (ἄλλο πέλωρον ἀμήχανον, οὐδὲν ἐοίκος),\(^{39}\) heroes might require isolation from the divine

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\(^{36}\) The question as to the co-presence of ordinary mortals is made more difficult by the partial and problematic preservation of lines 173a–e. If Zeus per 174d established the iron race subsequent to the death/relocation of the heroes, then it would appear that only one race exists at a time. If, however, the line is interpolated, the parallelism is disrupted and one might posit that Hesiod envisions the heroic men as only typologically distinct from the iron race. Most (1997) argues that the heroes are merely an earlier γένος rather than a different γένος from the iron men. The question is perhaps further complicated by the *Odyssey*, where there are vestiges of peoples who still commune with the gods (e.g. the Ethiopians and the Phaeacians). See Scodel (1982:35, 48–50) on the fate of the Phaeacians.

\(^{37}\) See West (1978:194–5 ad 173a–e).


\(^{39}\) *WD* 295; for ἀμήχανον cf. *Th*. 836, which begins the contrafactual statement describing Typhoeus’ near ascent to heavenly sovereignty, and Chapter 3.
(and from other humans) in practical terms because of their own dissonance from the iron age reality of Hesiod’s audience and in structural terms for their ability to unsettle an effectively crystallized Olympus; the ways in which they do so will be more fully explored in Chapter 3.

While it is true that the heroes are sanctioned hybrids and in fact are the instruments of “the annihilation of the monstrous brood” of hybrid monsters at the end of the *Theogony*, the heroes whom Hesiod identifies in the myth of races, especially those who went to Troy, become sources of pain to the gods and in that way recall some of the abovementioned ‘unsanctioned’ entities. We can infer such an underlying principle from Hesiod’s poems, but explicit rationales in other ancient sources for the destruction of the heroic age may lend some more detail to the picture.

The pertinent fragments of the *Catalogue* (frr. 1, 204 M-W), though difficult to piece together fully, point to deliberate action on the part of Zeus to bring an end to the miscenagation of gods and men and ostensibly clean up the remnants of such an epoch. The *Cypria* (fr. 1 Bernabé) describes Zeus’ motive as wanting to lighten the overpopulated earth (Γῆ βαρουμένη according to the Scholium to *Il.* 1.5) of the burden of men, and the Scholium to *Il.* 1.5 adds a moral component by indicating the absence of piety among men (μηδεμίας ἀνθρώπων οὐσῆς εὐσεβείας). The moral component in part echoes evidence from Euripides’ *Orestes* (1640–2), where Apollo explains to Menelaus

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40 Clay (2003:155)
41 While it is perhaps dangerous to read the Homeric tradition into Hesiod’s scarcity of detail, we should not shy away from imagining how Hesiod encountered and engaged the exploits of heroes detailed in the Homeric poems. After all, for Hesiod, humans are genetically connected with divine violence.
why he must choose another bride, since the immortal Helen is to take her place next to Castor and Polydeuces:

... ἐπεὶ θεοὶ τῷ τῆσδε καλλιστεύματι Ἕλληνας εἰς ἕν καὶ Φρύγας συνήγαγον θανάτους τ’ ἐθήκαν, ὡς ἀπαντλοίεν χθονὸς ὡβρισμα θνητῶν ἀφθόνου πληρώματος.

... since the gods brought together in war the Hellenes and the Phrygians by means of her beauty, and thereby wrought their deaths, so that they could lessen from the earth the wantonness of the unstinting number of mortals.

The moralizing and utilitarian rationales that are found in the *Cypria*, the Scholium to the *Iliad*, and Euripides also appear in *Genesis*, the Babylonian epic of Atra-ḥasis, and other Near Eastern sources. However, all these texts obscure or elide the primary psychological infrastructure of the myth-type summarized above.

We can uncover this infrastructure by recognizing that the heroes are granted the mythical abundance of the golden men because they struggled for divinity and by their struggling produced *kleos*, whereas the golden men, as I mentioned above, are incapable of being sung about (for very long) because they were privy to the inalienable plenty of the divine; while the golden men may have ‘kingly *geras*’ (126), they end up perhaps even more νόνυμνοι than the bronze men. A few points must be clarified: Most seems to interpret the translation of mortals to the Isles of the Blest as fully eliminating death from their fates. This is not a foregone conclusion, since, given the elevated status of the μάκαρες, it is likely that the statement of a hero’s establishment there is euphemistic: ‘Menelaus [died and] went to the Isles of the Blest’ is more probable than ‘He forewent
death by going to the Isles of the Blest’. Although the two ideas seem functionally synonymous, Orphic salvation language at least preserves the indispensability of experiencing death to receiving immortality, though one need not look beyond the English repertory of euphemisms for dying to see that transmission or movement to another, paradisiacal, place occurs post atque ob mortem. In Homer, the lexeme τλάω and its congeners are marked for a similar bivalence: one suffers, but one also endures. The heroic men suffer and perish like us, but because of their divine blood, and no less their symbolic pursuit of the divine, they are, in special cases, given golden paradise and retain a famous name, which becomes the charge of poetry.

Thus the preferable reading of Hesiod’s chronicle of the heroic age is that the poet is indicating in general terms that the Theban and Trojan wars brought about the race’s end. Zeus established these ἡμῖθεοι on the Isles of the Blest. Thus, the heroic age is still exemplary for the present because the heroes provide extensive and ethically complicated μῆθοι by virtue of their struggles, however practically foreign they may be to Hesiod’s audience. By contrast, the golden men experience even death without struggle (116); it is as gentle as sleep and not consequent upon the activities of their lives. Their nearness to the divine in lifestyle, therefore, is hardly counterbalanced by their experience of death. They thus become a symbolic part of the moral infrastructure of Hesiod’s cosmos, employed as a group of δαίμονες (122) who protect mortal men (123) and grant wealth (126).

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45 The fantastic elements of the Cycle, especially the apparent apotheoses of Achilles and Memnon, perhaps problematize this distinction. On the Cycle, the fate of heroes, and fantasy see Griffin (1977).
46 That of Scodel (1982).
47 Perhaps more precisely the end of the semi-divine age.
1.8 / Speechlessness and unmetricality

Unsuitability for myth itself, therefore, becomes one of the latent aitia for the demise of the races that Hesiod enumerates in his ἔτερος λόγος. This is indicated by his qualification of the silver and bronze races. The silver man lives an “utterly infantile” existence for a hundred years by his mother’s side “in his home” (130-1). Since to be μέγα νήπιος is to be utterly baby-like,48 and as the departure from home is a necessary precondition of the epic hero’s mythic life, we can surmise that the silver man’s remaining at home for one hundred years as a nursling impedes his progress toward appropriateness for heroic and didactic myth. (As I argued above, the heroic age is paradigmatic for Hesiod.) What the silver men eventually do once they “have come to the measure of youth” (132) is wholly opposed to the heroic, and therefore mythic functions, of the ἡμίθεοι: they have ἀλγεία on account of their ἄφραδίαι (133-4), which include their inability to keep themselves from committing ἀτάσθαλος ὑβρίς against one another and their unwillingness to serve the gods and perform sacrifices as is themis for men to do (134–7). One is reminded of Odysseus’ men’s fate (Od. 1.7–9):

αὐτῶν γὰρ σφετέρησιν ἄτασθαλίσιν ὅλοντο,
νήπιοι, οἱ κατὰ βοῦς Ὑπερίονος Ἡλίοιο
ήσθιον· αὐτάρ ὁ τοίσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἠμαρ.

For they perished by virtue of their atasthaliai, the fools!
They gobbled down the cattle of Hyperion Helios, and he took away their day of return.

48 Whether or not νήπιος is etymologically connected with ἴπω is irrelevant, since the context here connects the term with babies. While it would be especially neat for the present argument if the silver men were to be viewed as actually incapable of speaking, we can only guess at the extent to which Hesiod imagined the silver-men as infants.
49 The etymology of this word and its Greek congeners is unknown. Hesychius’ explanation, ἀπὸ τοῦ ταῖς ἄταις θᾶλλειν, while false on formal grounds (namely the length of the initial α), does a good job of covering the examples of ἄτασθαλίαι in epic. We might say that it indicates an obliviously self-destructive, and thereby foolish, subscription to wickedness. See Beekes (2010:s.v.).
Although Odysseus’ comrades are collectively destroyed for their own recklessness, they do function in the myth and retain names. (We will let aside the role of Odysseus’ own failings in the destruction of his men.) In other words, Odysseus’ men are heroes who suffer a moment of destructive (silver-aged) folly, while, according to Hesiod, the silver men know only witlessness, which apparently becomes punishable when they reach puberty. We might say that as soon as heroes commit ἄτασθαλίαι they become subject to summary destruction; or more precisely, the apparent incapability of Odysseus’ men to learn from their ἄτασθαλίαι commits them to a structural role in the poem: their folly is paradigmatically opposed to Odysseus’, in that he counterbalances (and outdoes) his own folly with examples of métis.

The issue with the bronze men is not entirely dissimilar from that of the silver; after all, as Vernant argues, I think persuasively, they are not explicitly worse than the silver men, just οὐδὲν ὁμόιον (144). Although they do not receive the τιμή of being hypochthonic μάκαρες like the silver men, this discrepancy could be due to the symbolic value of the golden and silver ages as seemingly better and worse βασιλῆες, if we follow Vernant’s reckoning; but we should qualify Vernant in light of our assessment of the logos. The silver men might represent the worst parts of the βασιλῆες—the Iliad, after all, begins with dueling temper tantrums between kings—but the ethical lives of the gold men are more complicated, as we will continue to explore throughout this chapter.

The bronze men, by contrast, devote themselves fully to the “lamentable works of Ares” and “acts of hubris”; they are proto-heroes, brutish, malformed. The

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51 Although ἄπλαστος (148) means “unapproachable” and not “unformed”, they seem to be somewhat misshapen.
foregrounding of their devotion to the “moaning works of Ares” is telling. Even in the *Iliad*, Ares is somewhat out of place; he embodies the intensity of battle, both the superhuman and the bestial capabilities of men in war, but not the civilized human ones, such as intellect, planning, and restraint. He has to be compartmentalized or deactivated.

Moreover, the bronze men resemble the Hundredarmers in the ineluctability of their χεῖρες, and the Cyclopes in the absence of bread from their diet. They are consummate warriors, so essentially so that they cannot generate or participate in society. They may not even be fit for hexameters. Hesiod emphasizes the pervasiveness of bronze in their lives by way of a cumbersome hexamer-and-a-half (up to the feminine caesura of the second line) (150–1):

\[
\text{τῶν δ' ἦν χάλκεα μὲν τεύχεα, χάλκεοι δὲ τε οἶκοι, χάλκῳ δ' εἴργάζοντο.}
\]

Their arms were bronze and bronze were their homes, and they worked with bronze.

In order to scan the *principes* of the fourth and fifth feet, one must pronounce the synecphoneses, and although that of –εα of χάλκεα is unnecessary for its scansion, it is imaginable that the proximity of the other two influences successive recitations of the line to adopt the phonological change. The spondaic two feet that begin line 151, in addition to picking up bronze ‘excess’ of 150, carry on the rhythmic ungainliness.

To summarize thus far, we have noted that each of the races possesses defining characteristics that make them unfit for the cosmos vis-à-vis either the divine (the silver, the heroes) or themselves (the bronze), and unfit for the poem because of the monotony

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53 Against this reading, perhaps, is the fact that for all instances of χάλκεα in Homer (4 or 5) the –εα sits in places where it can be bisyllabic. By the same token, however, fewer than 4% of the much more plentiful τεύχεα require synecphonesis of the bisyllable, but it does here.
of their narratives. The heroes are somewhat more useful in didactic terms since they embody a mixture of goods and ills like that experienced by the present men.

1.9 / Unwitting κοσμόμαχοι

The golden age is unfit to continue for anachronistic reasons, which we began to abstract to the following axiom: if myth and its enunciation in logos (to use Hesiod’s term at 106) constitute the principal method by which we know ourselves and communicate about our differences and deficiencies, and the means by which we (post-lapsarian) ἄνθρωποι access the divine, which is necessarily Wholly Other, at least with respect to their deathlessness, then the golden men, who know only divine surfeit, fail to maintain the divine. In other words, since the gold men live ὡστε θεοί (112), when we retroject Iron Age religious and cosmological constructs onto them, they fail to recognize the θεοί. The conception that the divine ontologically depends on both the existence and the otherness of men is not deeply concealed in, let alone absent from, early Greek or Mediterranean thought. The Hymn to Demeter (h. Dem.) testifies to such a concept:

καὶ νῦ κε πάμπαν ὀλέσσε γένος μερόπων ἄνθρώπων
λιμοῦ ὅπ’ ἄργυλέης, γεράων τ’ ἐρυκυδέα τιμήν
καὶ θυσίων ἠμερεῖν Ολύμπια δόματ’ ἔχοντας,
εἰ μὴ Ζεὺς ἐνόησεν, ἐφ’ δ’ ἐφράσσατο θυμῷ. (310–3)

And now the entire race of mortal men would have died from painful hunger and would have deprived those who hold Olympian homes of the glorious honor of gifts and sacrifices, had not Zeus taken notice, and understood it in his heart.

A comparison with the Hittite Telepinu myth indicates that the threat of the apodosis in the hymn is cosmic. Besides the annihilation of the human race, the loss of the gods’
θυσίαι can be more than a matter of inconvenience for them. The following, from KUB 17.10 i 17, narrates the analogous height of calamity:

DUMU.LÚ.U₉.LU.MEŠ DINGIR.MEŠ-ša ki-iš-ta-an-ti-it ḫar-ki-ya-an-zi

Men and gods are dying of hunger.

Perhaps owing to its general concision, the Hittite myth does not connect mortal hunger and divine hunger as causally related, but the details of the *h. Dem.* suggest that the situation could be read as “men are dying of hunger, and are therefore not sacrificing to gods, who in turn are dying of hunger.” Evidence from Hittite ritual, especially blood ritual, suggests that a human intermediary was required to provide the appropriate divine portions to the gods—“the victim’s heart, its liver, and a cut or two of its meat.” Thus while both narratives have an angry god bring the cosmos to the edge of catastrophe, just below the surface these myths acknowledge that the divine exists by virtue of the attentions of the mortal.

But how can the golden mortal, who is no different from the divine other than by his being overcome by somniform death, recognize the divine? This sleep-like death, more than just demonstrating the extent to which the golden men know no κήδεα, fails to distinguish sufficiently the golden race from its makers. For either the race dies *en masse* and is thus not witness to death at all, or, as is more likely since θνῆσκον (116) is imperfect, they are simply unbothered by the gentle demise of their congeners, since they have an unfailingly “care-free thumos” (112). So although Clay’s suggestion that the golden men are unbothered by women and therefore do not reproduce themselves

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54 Cf. KUB 24.3 ii 4’–17’, a plague prayer from Mursili II, and Beckman (1989:100–1).
56 cf. Scodel (*per litt.: ad locc.*).
remains possible as a practical cause of their demise, Hesiod does not emphasize that fact as an imperfection or as the ‘failure’ of the golden experiment, as he does the idiocy and impiety of the silver men or the insatiable zeal for Ares of the bronze men; remember, too, that the *logos* of the progression of ages is *heteros* vis-à-vis the preceding *logos*, which deals with woman’s hand in man’s troubles (90–5). Furthermore, the example of Adam and Eve in *Genesis* 2–3 shows a cosmos in which men and women live together but are not compelled to procreate until they have eaten of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil and are punished. As will be discussed later, it turns out that ‘Good and Evil’ is not purely a moral merism, but generally an aesthetic capacity to discern good from bad. Given YHWH’s reaction to Adam and Eve’s achievement of this knowledge, we might even suggest that “knowledge of good and evil” indicates omniscience in this case.

1.10 / Ἅμουσον γένος

Hesiod does, however, use language that indicates that the golden race is problematically similar to the divine as well as preclusive of the Muses’ function. To begin with, Hesiod summarizes the *logos* he is about to deliver thus: ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοί τ’ ἄνθρωποι (108). I take this controversial line to mean that Hesiod intends to divulge the extent to which men have become separated from gods after being in a

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57 Furthermore, this account of Pandora is much less invested in gender commentary than the parallel account in the *Theogony* (521–616).
58 Procreation is part of God’s instruction to the couple at *Genesis* 1:28, but the Eden myth is generally considered to be isolated from the creation account of *Genesis* 1.
state of communion and ontic closeness. At line 112 he tells us that they “lived like gods, possessed of a heart unafflicted by κήδεα.” Proclus comments on ὡς τε θεοὶ δ’ ἔξων as follows:

εἰκότος οἱ παντὸς καθαρεύοντες πάθους καὶ τῷ χρυσῷ διὰ τούτο τῷ ἁσίπτῳ καὶ καθαρῷ ὀμοιοθέντες ὀμοιότατοι τοῖς θεοῖς λέγονται εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ θεοὶ πρώτοι εἰσὶν ἀπαθεῖς, αἱ ψυχαὶ δὲ κατὰ μίμησιν ἐκείνων ταύτης τυχάνουσιν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας.

Ostensibly, since they (the golden men) are clean (καθαρεύοντες) of all suffering, and being like incorruptible and pure (καθαρῷ) gold by virtue of this, they are said to be most like (ὁμοιότατοι) the gods; for the gods are also principally (πρώτος) unsuffering, and in line with their imitation of the gods, the lives [of the golden men] hit upon this very happiness.

The adverb πρώτως indicates that, for Proclus at least, the gods’ apatheia is their principal identifying feature. (Of course, as this dissertation shows, gods can be made to suffer, but their zero-state is to be free from it.) The golden men’s enjoyment of such a state, namely their possession of an untroubled heart (ἄκηδῆς θυμός), brings them into direct conflict with the principal purpose of the Muses: to be a “means of forgetting ills and a respite from cares” (Th. 55). Clay is onto something when she wonders under what circumstances the gods, who have an easy life, might be in need of musical therapy. Her answer is “perhaps only once, after the defeat of the Titans, when the other gods had to become reconciled to Zeus’s rule, as their next song (71–74) indicates.”

The goddesses’ remaining function, Clay observes, is to ply their healing powers in the

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59 Cf. West (1978:178 ad loc.); for a discussion of the interpretive history of the line and its status see Carrière (1991), Ercolani (2010:167 ad loc.), and most recently Van Noorden (2015:69–71), whose reading accords with mine. There is no text-critical reason for regarding the line as spurious, and many of those who would excise it base their readings on a rather restricted reading of ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι, and seem to overlook the appropriateness of the tense of the verb to the myth of races. The perfect is not the aorist, especially for a lexeme like γέγονα, which often functions as a copula.

60 Pertusi (1955:50–1).

61 In fact, the Muses are described at Th. 61 as ἀκηδέα θυμόν ἔχουσα. The only other figure in Hesiod (or Archaic epos) besides the Muses and the golden race thus described is the race of heroes once they have been relocated to the Isles of the Blest (WD 170).

human realm. Ostensibly, these healing powers are channeled through ἄνδρες ἀοιδοί (Th. 98–103):

εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πένθος ἔχων νεοκηδέϊ θυμῷ ἀζητᾷ κραδήν ἀκαρῆμενος, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὸς Μούσας θεράπων κλεῖα προτέρων ἄνθρώπων μηνήσει μάκαράς τε θεούς οἱ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσιν, ἀἰψ ὁ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται οὐδὲ τι κηδέων μέμνηται...

For if someone has even grief in his mind, a mind freshly beset with care, and groans as he aches at heart, and a bard, the henchman of the Muses, will sing of the famed exploits of earlier men and the blessed gods who hold Olympus, straightaway this man will forget his angst and will not remember his cares.

A world with a golden race does not require, or at least limits, the offices of the Muses, at least as Hesiod sees them. Alongside this issue one might argue that the golden men do not produce any κλέα; what would their stories be like? That the golden men are alive during Cronus’ reign and before the birth of the Muses, far from troubling this point, confirms it. These men are alien to a cosmos which knows of fierce struggle and reconciliation; if Zeus’ violent ascent to sovereignty is envisioned as taking place during the era of the golden men, the poet passes over it in silence, maintaining the anthropocentricity of the narrative and isolating the serenity of the golden men from any divine strife. When a Zeus-ruled cosmos is in place, the advent of the Muses is at hand.63 Such a teleological reckoning of the golden age aligns with the form and content of the myth as a whole.

Hesiod provides another detail on the golden men’s carefree life: that far from being victims of wretched old age, the golden men αἰεὶ δὲ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὀμοῦσι / τέρποντ’ ἐν θαλήσι κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν ἀπάντων (114–5). One is reminded of the activities

63 See the discussion of Clay (2003:645) of Pindar fr. 31 (Snell-Maehler), a scrap from the Hymn to Zeus.
of the apotheosized Heracles, who ἁυτός δὲ μετ’ ἀθανάτοις θεοῖσι / τέρπεται ἐν θαλήσι καὶ ἔχει καλλίστηρον Ὄδη (Od. 11.602–3), though his wraith can still be viewed armed and glowering among the shades. 64 With these lines and the ὁμόθεν of 108 in mind, it is enticing to read a double entendre in ὁμοῖοι at 114: the golden men are “always the same with respect to their arms and legs” and “always the same [as the gods] with respect to their arms and legs”. 65 All the same, the vision of the golden race seems to be connected with a time before the dissolution of divine–mortal communion at Mekone.

One final, yet important, point about the golden men will lead us into our analysis of Genesis 2:25–3:24. No explicit mention is made of the intellectual activities or capabilities of the golden men, although one might suggest that their generally being at ease (ἐθελημοί / ἥσυχοι 118–9) approaches such a statement, nor is this reticence particularly meaningful to the reader until he reads about the silver men, who differ from the golden men with respect to their φυή and νόημα. This particular pairing of nouns is rare enough in Archaic epos to mark it. Thus we can retroject some sort of latent, and better, νόημα onto the golden men; it is likely that the statement that “they lived like gods” (112) accommodates, but does not emphasize, their being endowed with some sort of divine intellect in addition to being granted access to the limitless sustenance that is normally reserved for the divine. But it is complicated. An examination of Genesis might compels us to conclude that the silver race, as a correction to the failed ‘experiment’ (to

64 On the scholarly debate over these lines, namely over the apparent incongruousness of Heracles’ having an ἔιδωλον and being immortal on Olympus, see Heubeck (1989:144 ad loc.). Similar phrasing is used of the Muses at Th. 65; see West (1966:177 ad loc.).

65 The phrase is somewhat strange, despite its clarity. The lexeme ὁμοῖος and its congers appear to be used more often in Homer and Hesiod in negative statements and in comparisons of distinct persons.
use Clay’s term)\(^6\) of the golden age, is deliberately made stupid, because that is one mode of disjoining them from the divine. On the other hand we ought not equate Adam and Eve’s coming to self-awareness with the golden *noêma*.

1.11 / *Adam ὁ χρύσεος*?

It has long been suspected of *Genesis* 2:4b–3:24, which describes the story of man’s short life in and expulsion from Eden, that its author, whom we will call the ‘Yahwist’ in keeping with current majority practice, incorporated traditional data which go back to the “oldest cultural stratum of Mesopotamia.”\(^6\) The passage further bears a number of striking resemblances to Hesiod’s account of the golden men as well as to the *Odyssey*, from individual images and motifemes to the psychological infrastructure that we began to detail above. This infrastructure defined the cosmological antinomy between mortal self-awareness and immortality.

Of course, early Greek material has its origins in the East as well. In the end we can only guess as to whether redactors of *Genesis* ever handled Hesiodic material or heard the *Odyssey*, or whether Homer, Hesiod, and the redactors of *Genesis* mutually handled the same Near Eastern traditions, but it remains useful to demonstrate how much the myths align with one another, especially when we keep in mind that Greeks and the land of Israel had frequent and widespread contact during the Persian period,\(^6\) the most likely era for the redaction of materials and episodes that are set in Eden.\(^7\) If *Genesis*

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\(^6\) 2003:86.
\(^6\) Speiser (1964:19).
appropriated material from Hesiod and Homer, in addition to the Mesopotamian tradition, of which the Greeks, too, made use, then the chronicle of the golden men and similar Greek visions of especially blessed men served the redactors’ vision of man’s origins first and foremost.

1.12 / Geo- and anthropocentricity

If WD is the anthropocentric counterpart to the theo- and cosmocentric vision of the Theogony, the account of the beginnings of the world in Genesis 2–3 focuses on man’s first experiences, rather than his being merely consequential to a series of divine acts. Speiser’s summary is fitting:

The contrast [between Genesis i and Genesis ii 4b] is immediately apparent from the respective initial sequences. The first account starts out with the creation of “heaven and earth” (i 1). The present narrative begins with the making of “earth and heaven” (ii 4b). The difference is by no means accidental. In the other instance the center of the stage was heaven, and man was but an item in a cosmic sequence of majestic acts. Here the earth is paramount and man the center of interest.70

Likewise, Hesiod wants to tell us what the state of man is vis-à-vis the gods (108), not how the cosmos at large has taken shape, which is the purview of the Theogony.

Furthermore, man as a literal product of the earth is emphasized: “God Yahweh formed man from clods in the soil and blew into his nostrils the breath of life. Thus man became a living being.”71 The word for man, ’ādām, is clearly playing on the consonance and assonance of the word for soil ’dāmā. The Yahwist may be engaged in folk etymology, but his readers will no doubt understand that man (Adam) is an earthling.72

70 1964:18.
71 Gen. 2:7. Translation by Speiser (1964:14). All translations of passages from Genesis are his, unless otherwise noted.
While the Myth of Ages does not offer the same etymological play, and the obscure derivations of ἄνθρωποι and μέροπες (109, 143) are not likely to yield any help, man does enjoy etymological association with earthly material elsewhere, namely rocks.73

Furthermore, the hiding of the golden, silver, and bronze ages by the earth (κατὰ γαῖα κάλυψε[ν])74 looks a lot like the ‘return to materies’ that God posits for Adam (3:19):

“…Until you return to the ground,
For from it you were taken:
For dust you are
And to the dust you shall return!”

The first three metallic races do not become dust or earth, and we might hesitate to understand them as relinquishing their respective raw materials to a state of latency within the earth, but Hesiod might have imagined the metals, if not necessarily in terms of their existence, at least in terms of their technological viability, as symbolic reliquiae of the races.75

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73 Ehoeae (ff. 2–6, 234 M-W); (λαός–λαός) Pi. Ol. 9.46-56; cf. Scodel (1982:43).
74 WD 121, 140, 156.
75 Hesiod’s explanation as to why the Bronze men use bronze for everything (151: μέλας δ’οὐκ ἔσκε σιδήρος) confirms that the actual existence of the various metals is at least in part envisioned, although Ruth Scodel (per litt.: ad 151) argues that “Hesiod does not mean that iron ores were not in the earth, but that the Bronze Men did not use iron.” Although Hesiod might not himself think that, discovery of the metals and making them technologically usable must have been thought as synonymous with their coming into existence. There is something tantalizing, too, about the personification of bronze in Homer as νηλεής (cf. the admittedly different personification of gold as ἄφθιτος or ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήραος). Although Hesiod does not call the bronze men “pitiless”, he does say the have a “heart of adamant” (147) and that they are “unapproachable” (148), and from the other side we see the metallization of ruthless hearts (σιδήρος, χάλκεος) all over Homer (and cf. Patroclus’ complaint to Achilles about his pitilessness (16.33–5), where he both calls Achilles νηλεής and alleges that the “sun-beaten rocks” fathered him). So although good Bronze Age heroes fight with bronze rather than iron or steel, one cannot help but wonder whether the pitilessness of the bronze they use is meant on some level to index the ruthlessness of their forebears. After all, heroes are essentially Bronze Men with moderation.
1.13 / Tending the earth that needs no tending

One of the more remarkable features of the chronicle of the golden men is the seeming anachronism of their actions at 118–119: οἶ δ’ ἐθελημοὶ / ἥσυχοι ἔργῃ ἐνέμοντο σὺν ἑσθλοίσιν πολέσσιν. As West and Ercolani have noted, the idea of ‘tillage’ or ‘working’ the field is not apt for Hesiod’s golden men, because the earth gives them ‘bounteous’ and ‘unstinting’ fruit αὐτόματη (117–118). 76 Ercolani suggests that ἐνέμοντο, in accordance with Homeric usage, must mean ‘to portion out’ (‘spartivano’), and that ἔργα are the ‘prodotti’ of the earth, but the comparanda that he adduces do not support this reading. I suggest that the golden men are to be understood as going about their work, but that it has no bearing on the earth’s productiveness; perhaps their work is merely to reap. Thus they can be ἐθελημοὶ and ἥσυχοι. The application of a phrase for agricultural labor to a context where labor in the modern sense is utterly alien strikes us as paradoxical, and it is hard to expect Hesiod did not recognize this.

Though less pointedly than Hesiod’s golden world, Eden also involves man’s tending the earth that appears to provide for him automatically. At 2:9, “God Yahweh caused to grow various trees that were a delight to the eye and good for eating, with the tree of life in the middle of the garden and the tree of knowledge of good and bad.” 77 Although the passage does not explicitly designate the trees as automatically giving their fruit, the description of them as a ‘delight to the eye and good for eating’ indicates that they were fully fruiting purely as a consequence of God’s having caused them to grow.

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76 West (1978:181) and Ercolani (2010:171) ad loc. Ercolani’s reading aligns with Σ and Tzetzes.
77 The translation of kol as ‘various’ is perhaps better replaced with ‘every’ or ‘every kind’, though the sense of variety is not absent. LXX has πᾶν ξύλον ὥρμιον.
This phrase calls to mind the vision of Alcinous’ garden in *Od. 7*, where, after the short catalogue of the types of trees growing within the garden—pears, pomegranates, apples ‘with splendid fruit’, sweet figs, and olives (115–6)—we are told that these trees are always fruiting, irrespective of the season (117–9):

\[
\text{τάων οὐ ποτε καρπὸς ἀπόλλυται οὐδ’ ἀπολείπει}
\chiείματος οὐδὲ θέρευς, ἐπετήσιος· ἄλλα μάλ’ αἰεὶ}
\zεφυρή πνεύουσα τὰ μὲν φῦει, ἄλλα δὲ πέσσει.
\]

Never does the fruit of these trees perish nor abate, neither in winter nor summer; it is present all year round. Instead [of the normal seasonality], ever does a blowing westerly cause some fruit to grow, and others to ripen.79

In *Genesis*, the infinitive absolute construction of God’s command to Adam ‘to eat freely’ of the trees of the garden (except of the tree of knowledge of good and bad) (2:16–7) suggests that the licit trees provide fruit without end. Yet God puts Adam in the garden to ‘work it and watch over it’ (2:15). The details of these tasks are obscure and unstressed; in like fashion human labor in the garden of Alcinous is unmarked,80 though it specifically involves reaping and trampling the fruit (*Od. 7.124*). The idea seems to be that, although Adam and those who tend Alcinous’ garden are performing labor by making it accessible or culinarily usable, they can do it without worrying about any insufficiency of produce. Adam collects the bounty and maintains the regulations of the garden, namely abstinence from tasting of the tree of knowledge.

78 As Louden (2011:125) notes, the four rivers of Eden accord well with the four fountains on Ogygia (5.70–1), as does the rest of the vision of the Ogygian landscape. While I do not necessarily agree with Louden on the extent to which Book 5 therefore “creates” (quotation marks are Louden’s) Odysseus within the *Odyssey*, Odysseus does ‘fall’ it seems, upon leaving Ogygia, from proximity to immortality; one might say that because he is πολύμητς/πολύτλας, Odysseus, as we know him, is deactivated in the Ogygian paradise.

79 For the comparison of this passage with *WD* 172–3, the description of the Isles of the Blest, cf. Garvie (1994:188 ad *Od. 4.543ff.*). In the next section I will discuss the watering of the garden.

80 See Garvie’s note *ad loc.* (1994:189).
1.14 / Features of paradise and the specter of the flood

Connected with this peculiar plenitude is another marked feature of the garden: its abundance appears without rain. There are no green, crop-bearing fields because there is no precipitation (2:5), but for the garden “a flow would well up from the ground and water the whole surface of the soil…” (2:6). Besides the inapplicability of agriculture to Eden, the absence of rain entails the absence of the peril of flooding of the type that we see at 6:5–8:22. Thus, while the ‘Flood’ narrative in Genesis, especially those parts ascribed to the Yahwist, demonstrates its closest affinities to the Gilgamesh Epic, the absence of rain as an explicit feature of a paradisiacal locale appears in early Greek epic, though not in Hesiod. The most explicit and famous passage is Od. 4.563–8, where Menelaus recollects Proteus’ words to him indicating the special afterlife that awaits him:

Αλλὰ σ’ ἐς Ἑλύσιον πεδίον καὶ πείρατα γαῖης
ἀθάνατοι πέμψουσιν, δόθι ξανθὸς Ῥαδάμανθυς,
τῇ περ ῥήμητι βιοτῇ πέλει ἀνθρώποισιν·
οὐ νυφετός, οὔτ’ ἄρ χειμών πολὺς οὔτε ποτ’ ὀμβρος,
ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ζεφύροιο λιγὺ πνείοντο αἰεὶς
Ὡκεανὸς ἀνίησιν ἀναψύχειν ἀνθρώπους…

But the deathless ones will send you to the Elysian plain and the edges of the earth, where tawny Rhadamanthys is. There men have the easiest lifestyle. There is no snow, no excessive winter storm, never any rain; rather Ocean ever sends up the gales of clear-blowing Zephyrus to cool men.

While rain is not the only climatic phenomenon absent from Elysium, its absence is emphasized by the absolute temporal modality of οὔτε ποτ’ ε[ς]. The special thicket in Scheria in which Odysseus hides himself at the end of Book 5 is likewise impervious to

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81 Alcinous’ garden has two springs, which appear to take care of the watering needs of the orchard and the citizens (Od. 7.129–31); as Louden (2011:125) notes, Ogygia’s four fountains (Od. 5.70–1) parallel those in Eden.

the rain (and the wind and the sun) (474–82). In addition to providing an important contrast with Odysseus’ most recent hardship, escaping the violent sea after two-and-a-half days of near-drowning, the lair’s imperviousness to the elements recollects Proteus’ description of Elysium a book earlier and anticipates Alcinous’ garden in Book 7. It is no coincidence that Menelaus learns of his special dispensation from the Old Man of the sea in the midst of his vexed nostos. Thus, it is by way of these affinities that the nexus of mythic material that includes the ‘Flood’ in the capacity of an annihilating catastrophe and the features of Paradise is woven. With that in mind, we might suppose that the fair climes of Paradise are understood as cosmic remuneration for destruction via deluge, at least in the Greek material. On the other hand, for the redacted Hebrew bible the compensatory value of clement weather attaches itself to the lapsarian myth, which is considered chronologically prior to the Flood. Alternatively, one might say that the Hebrew material repurposes a vision of Paradise for the lapsarian myth.

83 The same temporal modality that applied to the rain’s absence from Elysium (οὐδὲ ποτὲ) is applied to the shining of the sun here (479). The adverbial διαμπερέζι modifies the rain’s inability to penetrate Odysseus’ lair (480). It probably goes with περάσκε here (διαμπερέζι < *περ-) (“The rain does not make it all the way through [the canopy]”), although it can carry temporal modality either alone (cf. Od. 8.245) or in combination with other temporal adverbs (cf. Il. 15.70). The absence of sunshine is recollected by the description of the Cimmerians (11.15–6), who have strong chthonic affinities (cf. Frame 1978), and the Νεκυία in general. This lair, like the Phaeacian episode as a whole, functions as a threshold separating destruction from salvation: Odysseus has not been revived fully, but he has for the time being escaped a watery obliteration. Furthermore, as Hainsworth (in Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth, 1988:287 ad 478–80) notes, these same lines are used at 19.440–2 to describe a wild boar’s lair and may amplify Odysseus’ bestial nature here.

84 Theocritus’ vision of the nymphs consoling Hylas after pulling him into the water consolidates this notion poetically and lexically (13.53–4): Νύμφαι μὲν σφετέροις ἐπὶ γούνασι κοῦρον ἔχοσαι / δακρυόεντι ἀγανοῖσι παρεψύχοντ’ ἐπέεσιν (“The nymphs held the weeping boy on their knees and tried to console him with gentle words.”) Hylas, teary though he may be, has drowned, and the nymphs literally ‘cool him with tender words’, just as Zephyrus cools (ἀναψύχειν) men in Elysium. The Idyll’s coda tells us that the preceding account conveys how Hylas μακάρων ἄρτημετα (72), and I suspect that the nymphs’ breath is central to his becoming makar. Cf. h. Dem. 238, where, in addition to anointing Demophoön with ambrosia, the disguised Demeter “breathes sweetly down upon him” (ἡδὺ καταπνείουσα), one which see Richardson (1974:239 ad 238).
Without suggesting any direction of influence, I should close this section with one other tantalizing connection between Elysium and the Garden of Eden. After God banishes Adam and Eve “he stationed east of the Garden the cherubim and the fiery revolving sword, to guard the way to the tree of life” (3:24). Both the cherubim and the fiery revolving sword have garnered much attention: in the 1950s and 1960s scholars were divided between naturalistic interpretations—the fiery revolving sword is lightning—and folkoristic interpretations—it is a magical weapon and many Near Eastern gods have magical weapons. Hendel, however, was disturbed by the asymmetry between the guardians of the Garden, and he concludes from comparanda that the “flame of the whirling sword” is a minor deity, just like the cherubim, who themselves might be fire deities. What I suggest here, however, is that irrespective of their godhood, we should still imagine both the cherubim and the fiery whirling sword as weapons of Yahweh, like the lightning and thunder of Zeus. In fact, over a century ago Foote concluded that the cherubim were essentially the storm cloud in both its benign and terrifying capacities, upon which Yahweh was sometimes said to fly (Ps. 18:10, cf. Is. 19:1). Zeus, we recall, not only plied thunder and lightning, but he also rode the storm-wind or storm-cloud, known as the aigis.

Far more vexing than the identity of the guardians of Eden, but perhaps connected with them, is the etymology of Ἑλύσιον. Irrespective of the ultimate derivation of the word, the connection of an alternative afterlife (apotheosis) with places struck by

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85 Hendel (1985:672).
86 1904:282.
lightning, which are ἄβατος, is already ancient, although not in our earliest sources.\(^8^9\)
That the connection is omitted in Homer is unsurprising. In any case, it is not difficult to understand Eden as a pedon made abaton by virtue of God’s striking it with lightning.

1.15 / Living like gods, thinking like gods?

Above we spoke of the ontological problems involved in the golden men’s similarity to the divine. Here we can refine our terms by bringing in the expulsion from Eden and the explicit awareness of such problems, which that episode seems to have. The first acknowledgment of the reason for God’s barring Adam and Eve from eating of the tree of knowledge comes at 3:5. In response to Eve’s announcement that eating of the tree entails death (3:3), the serpent responds, “You are not going to die. No, God well knows that the moment you eat of it your eyes will be opened and you will be the same as God in telling good from bad.” Thus comforted, the woman eats and gives some to Adam, and he eats (3:6). Their eyes are opened and they become aware of their own nudity (3:7). Then, after indicating to the snake, the woman, and the man their respective punishments, and making clothing for the man and his wife (3:14–21), at 3:22 God says to some unidentified heavenly retinue, which is possibly the rest of a henotheistic pantheon, “Now that the man has become like one of us in discerning good from bad, what if he should put out his hand and taste also of the tree of life and eat, and live forever!”

\(^8^9\) See Burkert (1960/1961). A couple of Attic inscriptions (IG II² 4964, 4965), likely in reference to the adytum (see LSJ s.v. ἄβατος), very intimately connect that capacity of Zeus to lightning and the untroddability of the place.
As Speiser signals in his comment on the ‘Fall’, the stem \( \text{yd} \) (‘telling’ at 3:3 and ‘discerning’ at 3:22) does not just signify ‘to know’, but more especially ‘to experience’ and thereby ‘to come to knowledge’,\(^{90}\) the lexeme in LXX is \( \gammaινώσκω \) ‘recognize’, not \( \text{o}i\text{d}a \) ‘know’. Furthermore, ‘good and bad’ ought not be thought of as restricted to moral matters. Speiser compares 2 Samuel 3:36, where Barzillai confesses that his capacity to appreciate ‘good and bad’ vis-à-vis physical and aesthetic pleasure has been dulled by his age.\(^{91}\)

As we discussed above, Hesiod does not describe the golden men’s intellectual condition in precise terms, but one might suspect that in living like gods they possess a \( \nu\eta\mu\alpha \) similar to that of the gods. So, even though they exist \( \nu\sigma\phi\nu \ \acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\rho \ \tau\epsilon \ \pi\omicron\omicron\upsilon\nu \ \kappa\alpha\imath \ \dot{o}\i\iota\zeta\upsilon\omicron\varsigma \) (113) and enjoy themselves in festivities and good cheer \( \kappa\alpha\kappa\tilde{\omicron} \ \dot{e}k\tau\omicron\omicron\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu \ \acute{\alpha}p\acute{\alpha}n\tau\omicron\nu \) (115), they do not, on the surface, seem to bear the same ignorance that is emphasized in the case of Adam and Eve; Hesiod does not make the golden men into primal ingénusés, as the Yahwist does Adam and Eve, who come to divine knowledge and then must be expelled from the garden lest they also achieve immortality by tasting of the tree of life (3:22–3). Instead, Hesiod seems to underscore the golden race’s almost total ontological closeness to the divine. But the golden men are ignorant in a way—of suffering, of \( \text{ponos} \). Their \( \dot{h}\imath\sigma\nu\chi\acute{\iota} \)—their being \( \dot{e}\theta\epsilon\lambda\eta\mu\imath\omicron\omicron\imath \)—seems to be creepily innate, unchangeable, slavish. As discussed above, even though they die, whereas the gods do

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\(^{90}\) 1964:26.

\(^{91}\) 1964:26. Clark’s statement on ‘Good and Evil’ (the traditional translation of the pair) is likewise apt: “Man takes upon himself the responsibility of trying apart from God to determine whether something is good for himself or not” (1969:277); cf. Van Seters (1992:133 n.71), who quotes Clark.
not, it is a death that does not cause ὀϊζύς for them. So we might maintain that their better noëma is divine in a way: it accords with the will of the gods and the nature of the cosmos. So then we can be more precise about the silver men: their noëma is worse than that of the golden men in that they are thoroughly οὐκ ἔθελημοί.

I think we can be even more precise about Genesis, and perhaps about the golden men. At 3:22 God seems to connect logically the knowledge of good and evil with the impulse to gain immortality: before eating from the Tree of Knowledge, man had no awareness of his mortality, or at least did not know enough to decide that innate mortality is a bad thing. Although Eve explains the prohibition to the Serpent and seems to understand the concept of death, her modification of the instruction (“neither shall ye touch it”, 3:3) and her use of the conjunction pen suggest that she thinks that the fruit itself will kill her. God’s injunction depends on her misunderstanding, and the Serpent plays on it. But now that Adam and Eve have tasted of the fruit, God fears that they will be dissatisfied with natural process of dying and eat of the Tree of Life. In other words, Adam and Eve are no longer ἔθελημοι and ἥσυχοι. Thus we have a sort of catch-22 situation across texts: on the one hand, self-awareness and the ability to determine that mortality is bad—and presumably the ensuing disquiet—result in the removal of access to immortality, expressly because knowledge and immortality equal divinity; on the other hand, unflappable contentment with mortality, perhaps because it is painless, seems to muddy the distinction between mortals and immortals.

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92 Ruth Scodel (per litt.) points out to me that ἥσυχοι and ἔθελημοι appear to mean that the golden men are content with the status quo, are content to reap the unstinting harvest, and are content to die peacefully.
1.16 / The fruits of life and death

The notion that intellectual autonomy, or at least the conceit of self-awareness, is a principal feature of mortality that impedes the attainment of immortality seems to be part of a larger system of thought regarding the place of death in the cosmos: death is a cosmic constraint, the inalienable counterpart to life, a sort of architectural tool which builds and maintains cosmic structure, enables change, and thereby indicates the changeless. This project cannot explore the epistemological ramifications of such an idea, nor can it practically tackle the convoluted history of engagement with that notion for even a relatively circumscribed group, notwithstanding the problems of such a circumscription, like the ‘pre-Socratics’. Its purview must instead be constrained to detailing the early mythological outcomes of the conceptual framework, outcomes which automatically establish what we might term ‘the poetics of mortality’. This poetic configuration can be used in conjunction with broader comparative work to supply us with a hermeneutic tool for certain remarkable passages in early Greek literature, specifically *Iliad* 5, where Aphrodite is wounded by Diomedes.

Before we come to one of the more matter-of-fact visions of the ‘indispensability’ of death to the cosmos, found in the Ugaritic *Ba’al Cycle*, we will catalogue and comment briefly on a few models from early Mediterranean literature that posit death as a price for immortality. From Homer, two expressions of this concept stand out, the one in part because of its relevance to both Indo-European studies and formulaic analysis, the other in part because of its rich reception history: 1) Achilles’ recognition and acceptance of his allotment at *Il*. 9.413 (losing his νόστος is the price of ‘imperishable fame’); and 2) the loss of a dove, which Zeus has to replace with a new one, during the acquisition of
ambrosia (Od. 12.61-5).93 In the first instance, the only imperishability that is available to
the heroes of the Iliad emerges through the report of their glorious deeds, and it turns out
that one pays for the realization of that kleos by facing and succumbing to mortal peril.94
In the second example, immortality qua immunity to the processes of decay costs life.95

We see transactions of this type elsewhere in early Greek poetry; while the
economy is not explicitly zero-sum, there does appear to be a balancing of ontological
ledgers. For example, we are told that not only did Tantalus suffer punishment, according
to Pindar, for stealing ambrosia and nectar from the gods and distributing them to his
ὡλικές σωμπόται (Ol. 1.60–3), but also, his son Pelops, who had received immortality on
much the same terms as Ganymede (40–5), also suffered by being sent back to be
“among the swift-fated tribe of men” (65–6). While this story serves in part to account
for the tomb of Pelops, which was close to the altar of Zeus at Olympia (93),96 it also
solidifies Pindar’s epinician poetics, whose value is predicated on the intractable
economy of immortality and mortality in the cosmos. The gods punish Tantalus, but they
do not rescind his immortality; instead, in order to account for Tantalus’ unlawful
distribution of the materials that made him imperishable (οἷσιν ἄφθιτον θῆκαν, 63-4), the
gods make Pelops θνητός once more. As with Zeus and the ambrosia-fetching doves in
the Odyssey, the responsibility for maintaining the economy of immortality and mortality
is diffused.

94 To be sure, the Odyssey does not overturn this economy fully, but it does adjust it so that nostos is
facilitated by kleos, and kleos is preserved by a successful nostos: the kleos Odysseus himself generates and
sings of among the Phaeacians also teaches the Phaeacians how to be good hosts, namely by not eating him
and sending him quickly and safely on his way (on which, see Most 1989); presumably, for this same kleos
to reach Ithaca, Odysseus has to survive, since Poseidon has guaranteed that the Phaeacians will no longer
have contact with men.
96 Kirkwood (1982:56 ad loc.)
This economy plays out in conceptions of seasonality, too; the reckoning of time itself is predicated on the alternation of life and death, of bloom and decay. Deities who are associated with seasons, like Persephone and Dionysus, participate in these cycles by being subject to violent experiences like forced *katabases* and *sparagmoi*. These violent experiences impel the accounting of time and define death as something unfailingly consequential to life. The regulatory function of the seasons, of cycles, and more broadly of the alternation between life and death, even presents itself in some of the smaller ‘arithmetical’ details of the rape of Persephone. For example, while the *Hymn to Demeter* mentions only that Persephone ate a single pomegranate seed (371–2, 411–2), thereby symbolically accepting Hades’ hospitality, in later accounts she eats a number of seeds, a detail that somehow corresponds to her seasonal sojourn to the Underworld. Persephone and Dionysus, then, by virtue of their associations with the Underworld and with the King of the Underworld, underscore the indispensability of death to mortal intellectual activity.

The advent of intellectual activity, of self-awareness, as we saw in the case of Adam and Eve, renders unavailable a cosmos that was devoid of death, or, perhaps more precisely, devoid of the emotional anxieties and traumas that death naturally generates; knowledge of Good and Bad presupposes the experience of their diametric opposition. For much of the literature that we have thus far discussed, the broad identifying feature of the visions of paradise is timelessness, which is by itself nonsensical to the cognitive framework of mortals; limits, *peirata*, and their apprehensibility by the faculty of

97 On lines 124–9 of fr. 204 M-W, I agree with Clay (2003:173), *contra* West (1961:133), that it does not in fact detail the advent of seasonality, which he sees as having been absent from heroes’ lives till then.
discrimination constitute ‘intelligibility’. The limitless only becomes intelligible insofar as it constitutes what is beyond the discernible or measurable, as that which does not participate in or fails to be discerned by our critical faculties. It is telling that the paradisiacal locales in the Greek material and the Hebrew alike are circumscribed; the unavailable other requires containment at the outset, and is hardly sustainable thereafter, except as part of the cosmic structure. This is proved by how the activities that take place in Alcinous’ garden are detailed. Replete with vague, largely deictic (ἐνθα at 114, 122, 127), topography and activity that must be unceasing, as the pervasive present tense suggests, the description reads like an ecphrasis. That the human activity takes place without identified subjects maintains the sense of the timeless. But what if death (or ‘Death’) were eradicated from the cosmos, and not just mitigated in specialized inaccessible locales? The myths that pose this possibility also give the inevitable response: it does not come to fruition.

For example, at Iliad 5.395, Dione introduces Hades as the third in a trio of gods who seemingly suffered gravely at the hands of a mortal, namely Heracles:

100 Garvie (1994:189 ad 123-5, cf. 186 ad 112-131) recognizes the scant description of human labor and the ‘vagueness’ of the subjects, and suggests that the passage (like the description of Ogygia) is to be contrasted with the description of Laertes tending his garden, in which nothing—not even ‘leek-beds’—grows without κομίδη (24.247).

101 Koechly (1861) condemned ll. 398-402, and West (1998) brackets them. The text-critical argument against their genuineness is relatively weak. Line 401 is identical to 900, but the surrounding lines from each passage are different. Contra Leaf (1900:222 ad loc.) and Macurdy (1912:251), I do not think these lines smack of violent interpolation. Leaf’s analysis rests in part on a misunderstanding of how σχέτλος (403) relates to the preceding lines. It does not function, pace Leaf and Kirk, as an exclamatory nominative
Among them (i.e. the other gods who had been wounded) monstrous Hades suffered a swift arrow, when that same man, the son of aegis-bearing Zeus, shot him in Pylos among the corpses and gave him over to pains. And Hades went to the palace of Zeus and tall Olympus grieving in his heart, pierced with pains; the shaft had been driven into his weighty shoulder, and it distressed his spirit. But Paieon spread painkilling drugs on the wound and cured him. For Hades was in nowise mortal.

The passage is strange, but this strangeness accords with the considerable peculiarity of the broader context. Importantly, the son of Zeus, Heracles, wounds the ruler of the dead; although Hades is distinct from Thanatos in Homer, Fontenrose has argued persuasively that this episode exemplifies a set of myths in which Heracles fights Death; Hades and Thanatos are isomorphic. Besides the difficulty that some critics have had in identifying the exact nature of the reference to Pylos, it is convincingly pointed out that Pylos is the gate (pylê) to the underworld.

Despite being given over to pains, however, Hades does not succumb to them; Paieon himself ‘kills’ his agony and cures him. The most surprising detail of the episode, that Hades makes his way to Olympus, has largely gone without remark. I propose that Dione (and therefore the poet) intends to indicate that the wounding of

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102 We will discuss some of these strange features in Chapter 3 in connection with Aphrodite’s wounding, the event that precipitated Dione’s muthos here.
107 Excepting Kirk’s note (1990:103 ad 398–402) that it is surprising that it “does not provoke more comment.”
Hades generated even more cosmological alarm than did the wounding of Hera or the near-death experience of Ares. By virtue of Hades’ being permitted to mount Olympus and his being treated by their chief of medicine, the Iliad, which insists upon the distinction between mortals and immortals at the same time that it tests that distinction, reaffirms not only the inescapability from but also the necessity of death within its cosmos. As Agamemnon notes, Hades is ἀδάμαστος (Il. 9.158).

In similar fashion Mot in the Ba’al Cycle is incapable of being subdued, although this quality is put to the test by Anat, and not by a mortal. Watson argues that Text 6, column II, of the Ba’al-texts from Ugarit, detailing Anat’s confrontation with and sound defeat of Mot, the god of death and enemy to fecundity, does not in fact represent some fertility rite wherein Mot is connected with the fruits of the field, nor does it symbolize the desacralization of grain; rather, it quite straightforwardly describes Anat’s annihilation of Mot for his killing of Ba’al. The text, as Watson renders it, proceeds as follows:

She seized divine Mot:
With a sword she split him;
With a pitchfork she winnowed him,
With fire she burned him,
With millstones she ground him,
In the field she scattered him.
His fragments the birds did eat,
His portions the fowl did finish,

108 See also the motivic analysis of Fontenrose (1959:13–7), where he connects the Ba’al-Mot (and Ba’al-Yam) episodes with the Typhonomachy and its Greek congeners.

109 He refers specifically to the Corpus des tablettes cunéiformes alphabétiques (Herdner 1963). This collection is generally referred to by the German abbreviation KTU (Keilalphabetische Texte aus Ugarit); the English abbreviation, also cited with some frequency, is CAT (Cuneiform Alphabetic Texts). The numbering of the texts is obviously uniform across languages. Because I will uniformly cite Hittite texts by the German abbreviation of their publications (KBo, e.g.), I will use KTU here.

Piece by piece.\textsuperscript{111} Watson concludes that “it is only by actualizing a curse upon [Mot] that Anat may counteract his malevolence and make possible the subsequent restoration of fertility on the earth. In order for Life to return to Ugarit, Death must die.”\textsuperscript{112} Regardless of whether one is convinced of the conclusions that Watson reaches by way of his lexical analysis of the passage,\textsuperscript{113} which leads him to rule out the notion that Mot is being connected with fertility rites or grain in any way whatsoever, the cosmological symbolism attached to the myth remains. Death transgresses his boundaries to hunt and consume Life.\textsuperscript{114} By smiting Mot, Anat restores it.

In KTU 1.6, Ba’al is reanimated and re-ascends the throne of heaven. Soon, however, Mot recovers, too, and Ba’al and Mot fight like animals till exhaustion. El, who formerly appeared partial to Mot, finally indicates that he has withdrawn his support, and Mot recognizes the sovereignty of Ba’al. Although Mot is circumscribed, what becomes apparent, especially in KTU 1.3-4, where Ba’al calls on the gods to recognize his sovereignty, and Mot refuses, is that Death remains outside the purview of the heavenly, ‘bio-centric’ realm; although he eventually recognizes Ba’al’s sovereignty there, something he was unwilling to do before, he remains in the underworld as the

\textsuperscript{111} Watson (1972:61). The translation is Watson’s. On the analogy of the Homeric image of men becoming the ‘prey’ and/or ‘plaything’ of the birds (and dogs) (\textit{Il.} 1.4, \textit{Od.} 3.271), I am disinclined to accept that the image of Mot’s dismembering and scattering has much to do with harvesting \textit{per se}, but it does lend itself rather easily to an allegorical reading.

\textsuperscript{112} Watson (1972:64).

\textsuperscript{113} Cf. the response to Cassuto by Kapelrud (1963), who anticipates in some ways Watson’s objections, too.

\textsuperscript{114} Gordon (1955, \textit{apud} Cassuto) translated the relevant passage thus: “I did hunt Aliyan Ba’al, / I made him like a lamb in my mouth, / like a kid in my gullet”. According to KTU 1.5 Ba’al descends to the underworld and subjects himself to the torpor of the dead, but it does not appear that he has a choice in the matter. The body that is found at the edges of the earth is a ritual substitute, and appears to serve as evidence to the other gods of Ba’al’s demise.
inescapable antithesis to Ba’al. This episode demonstrates “something that everyone knew: even the god of life must share the universe with death.”\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{115} Smith and Pitard (2009:3).
Chapter 2. Divine trauma, identity theft and the poetics of ἀκοσμία

2.1/ Introduction: From assimilation to obliteration

In Chapter 1, we confronted the problems that arise when early generations of humans seem too similar to gods in early Mediterranean anthropogonic myth. One main issue is that narrative itself gets stunted—what can the golden men do, other than be blissful beneficiaries of goods that do not fail, without failing to be golden? Furthermore, if the golden men live like gods and die gently, can they be expected to see themselves as different from the gods? Or, even if they recognize this difference, does it carry any emotional weight for them? Why it matters how they think of the gods and their own mortality is indicated by the silver race’s explicit failures of piety: the silver race is impious, but the golden men might be pre-religious; in Genesis, Cain and Abel perform the first sacrifices, the worse and the better, but their parents, while in the Garden, don’t seem to have religion, unless we consider maintenance of the Garden itself a religious duty. I do not think we should, since Adam, like the golden men, probably performs his work free from anxiety about its efficacy. In other words, either we try to accept that work can be stripped of the notion of effort, or the golden men and Adam do not really do anything. Thus, proto-man’s paradise does not admit narrative, and the introduction into that world of activity, like work, ends up being either nonsensical or disruptive.

This problem—the need to get past this fantasy in order to describe the world as it really is, replete with suffering, internecine strife, and sickness—requires solution, and
the solution, like the problem, involves both narrative action and individual linguistic items and complexes of these items, what we might call poetics. In the end men get separated from gods, and the cosmic structure becomes stable again; das ganz Andere reasserts itself. Mortals\textsuperscript{116} must, by definition, die; but they must also self-identify as subject to \textit{mors}. Fantasies about a cosmos in which the opposite would be true must always be measured and counterbalanced. If they are not, then the phenomenological cosmos of the present becomes nonsensical, since it remains recognizable and communicable in both literary and nonliterary speech through linguistic \textit{sêmata}, complexes of \textit{sêmata}, and oppositions among \textit{sêmata}, all of which serve to parse degrees of difference and similarity, affinity and disjuncture: if the denotation of a sign (e.g. mortal/mortality) is predicated on an action (e.g., dying), and that action is obviated or remains unrecognized, then the sign fails.\textsuperscript{117}

In the last chapter, I dealt with the products of the tension between mortal yearning and a certain obsession with maintaining the fixity of the cosmos; the obsession is probably born of man’s tragic awareness of his mortality. In this chapter, I examine a different, though related, peril that the cosmos faces: its structures are in danger of being ‘obliterated’ when a malevolent and multiform or shapeshifting agent encroaches upon the signifier(s) of benevolent cosmic entities. Perhaps these particular myths emerge from a recognition of an external disorder, the sometimes unexpected and difficult occurrences

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{116}Like Latin \textit{mortales} “those liable to \textit{mors},” Greek refers to humans as \textit{thnêtoi} “those liable to \textit{thanatos}.” More precisely, it seems that both \textit{mortales} and \textit{thnêtoi} are dead. See de Vaan (2014) \textit{sub} ‘morior’.
\textsuperscript{117}There may be a worthwhile distinction to be made here: on the one hand, mortality still means something to us and to the poet, even if he imagines men as able to overcome death (or ignorant of it) or as living like gods, but the category suffers a set of novel contingencies; on the other hand, the golden men might not ever involve such a category in their own daily discourse.
\end{flushleft}
within the *topocosm*,\(^{118}\) as well as the alternating seasonal, though probably more so the unseasonable, processes of array and disarray, efflorescence and decay.

With that in mind I turn my focus temporarily from issues of theomorphization to a particular motif and particular poetic apparatus that point to the engagement with, disruption, and (sometimes) the reassertion of cosmic stability, particularly through the mythical personae that in many ways underpin the cosmic structure by virtue of the stability of their identities. By ‘identity’ I mean one’s scope of influence, one’s appearance and accoutrement, and certainly one’s name within the *Kunstsprache*. When the persona to whom a certain identity belongs comes under attack, the identity itself is subject to theft, with an array of consequences for the mythical persona as well as his environment. Identity theft, then, as well as the relationship of that theft to *akosmia* in ancient Mediterranean myth, is the subject of this chapter.

The instances of identity theft that most interest me take place on the level of the word, the phrase, the formula; identity theft, as I see it, constitutes a linguistic and poetic offense in the Mediterranean *koinê*, and thus requires linguistic and poetic remedy. In certain cases, these linguistic offenses and remedies are accompanied by imagistic and motifemic\(^{119}\) transgressions and countermeasures.

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\(^{118}\) Gaster (1961:24) defines the *topocosm* as “not merely the human community of a given area or locality but the total corporate unit of all elements, animate and inanimate alike, which together constitute its distinctive character and ‘atmosphere.’”

\(^{119}\) Here I delineate motif from motifeme by level of specificity. If the motif is ‘identity theft’ in the larger context of cosmic struggle, the ‘motifeme’ could be the ‘disfigurement’ that enables the identity theft or even the weapon that is used in the disfigurement.
2.2 / Serpents as architects of identity theft

The most salient examples of this type of identity theft appear in a broadly represented myth that will be familiar to most students of ancient literature: the battle between the hero-god and the serpent, what we will call the dracontomachy. In these myths, with some variation but with considerable—and fortunate—continuity, a fearsome serpent or creature with serpentine features threatens the sovereignty of the ruling god, in many cases a storm deity, and the storm deity must defeat this serpent to maintain his rule and preserve the intelligibility of the cosmos, no less than its proper balance of mortification and reinvigoration; in the event that the storm deity were to be defeated for good, it seems that the mortification of the topocosm would not be counteracted.

There are examples of the cosmic serpent, as well as the dracontomachy, in Indo-European and Near Eastern sources alike.

In Greek materials, Zeus’ battle with the snaky monster known as Typhon or Typhoeus or Typhaon insinuated itself into the imagination of Greek poets and

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120 This neologism is not ancient, like Titanomachia, which is attested as a title of an epic poem often ascribed to Eumelos (see West 2002), nor does it seem to be attested in scholarship, like Typhonomachy (e.g. in West 1966, Too 1998, and Goslin 2010).

121 The most comprehensive study of this type of myth, and an indispensable foundation to motivic analysis of many important Greek and Near Eastern myths, is that of Fontenrose (1959). More recently, Watkins (1995) examined the Indo-European dracontomachies in particular.

122 Gaster (1950 [1961]) provides a useful introduction to seasonal rituals and their literary and creative outcomes in myth, but he overestimates the applicability of seasonal cycles in the case of Telepinu and similar myths in the Near East; as Gordon (1949:4) notes, the Levant, for example, is not subject to extreme seasonal variation, but it is victim at times to drought. The vanishing god myth, therefore, is principally about the unexpected and devastating issues of the natural world.

123 Interestingly, the utter defeat of the storm deity is always found to be close at hand, but never fulfilled. In Greek, as we will see this assumes the shape of a counterfactual statement. Interesting work has been done in recent years on counterfactuals in epic narrative. We will discuss that modality when we come to it.

124 We maintain that these are not mutually exclusive categories as regards mythic material, but for convenience’s sake, we will sometimes refer to them to indicate virtual linguistic identity, although that categorization is not without problems.

125 On the variety of Typhoeus’ names, Jay Fisher (2009:2) quips that “[l]ike the abnormal and indefinite shape of the monster himself, the name [of the monster] lacks a definite shape.” Illuyanka’s name, it turns out, has interesting variety, too, on which see Katz (1998). There may also be some wordplay going on
mythographers from the 8th century B.C. to the 5th century A.D.: Homer alludes only briefly to the fight, but Hesiod gives us considerable detail about both his polyphony and the battle itself; Pindar, in his first Pythian victory ode, for Hieron of Aetna, also known as Hieron of Syracuse, for the chariot race, deploys a mythic aition for the Sicilian volcano, the “pillar of heaven” that unfailingly restrains the monster, who occasionally “sends up the most terrible jets of Hephaestus”; a 2nd century A.D. mythographer, whom we will call Apollodorus, has it that Zeus is temporarily defeated and mutilated—Typhon severs Zeus’ sinews with a sickle, perhaps the same one with which Zeus’ father, Cronus, castrated Zeus’ grandfather, Uranus. I pass over the Prometheus Bound and the Seven Against Thebes and Pausanias and Rome altogether: both Virgil and Ovid mention Typhon. At least part of the reason why these poets and mythographers were so fascinated by Typhon must have been the same reason why students of comparative myth continue to be: Typhon closely resembles θεῶν πολέμιοι, as Pindar would have called them, from the Near East. The Hebrew Bible may have several: besides Yam and Leviathan, the serpent in Genesis may embody this motif. He certainly does threaten the sovereignty of the divine, as we discussed in Chapter 1. In Anatolia, we encounter Illuyanka and Hedammu; in Mesopotamia, we see Tiamat. Some other monsters who have no obvious snaky features are pertinent. Scholars have done well to point out the typological affinities of Typhon with these Near Eastern monsters, but one major deficit in the discussion has been the failure to explore his connection with Anzu, the Babylonian “thief of the Tablets of Destiny”.

with the dragon’s name and the ‘blindness’ or ‘darkness’. Recall that Illuyanka steals the Storm-god’s eyes, and Ullikummi was blind.
Although scholars have adumbrated some of the similarities between the battle narrative in the Anzu myth and that in Hesiod, I argue that the connections between Anzu’s story and Typhon’s in general, but especially the version in Nonnus, run much deeper than has been previously considered. By the end of this, perhaps we will be able to imagine a model of cross-linguistic sharing of mythic and linguistic data that involves much more than a superficial reckoning of lexical items and broad narrative sequences: in fact, verbal artistry itself, especially etymological play, seems to have been every bit as salient a feature as the larger narrative structures and themes. The function of this etymological and other grammatical play within the individual myths was indispensable to the large-scale narrative of these myths throughout the Mediterranean, and this indispensability is in part responsible for the relative isomorphism of these myths in spite of the huge geographic and chronological distances among them. We have something, then, like a Mediterranean poetic—perhaps a metapoetic—*koinê* lasting maybe two-and-a-half millennia.

We should bear in mind here that these myths about cosmic monsters do not disengage entirely from the mortal–immortal issue that occupied the first chapter. For example, both versions of the myth of Illuyanka involve in rather poignant terms the tragedy of a mortal helper who comes too near to the gods in the course of aiding them.\(^{126}\)

We can begin to conclude that mortals in the Mediterranean mythological mind both

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\(^{126}\) See Beckman (1982:25). In the first version, a mortal, Hupasiya, agrees to help the goddess Inara bind the snake if she sleeps with him; she complies but shuts him up in a house and instructs him not to look out the window, lest he want to go home. As he does, the text becomes badly broken, but it is likely that he comes to some bad end. In the second version, the Storm-god’s son is directed to marry into the Snake’s family and ask for the Storm-god’s eyes and heart back. When he sees that his father means to kill the snake, he demands that he be killed along with him.
upset and preserve the divine, often simultaneously; as we will see in Chapter 3, Diomedes clarifies the divine in the course of disrupting it.

2.3 / Anzu and Illuyanka become Storm-gods: An introduction to the etymological attack

At the beginning of the Standard Babylonian version of Anzu, after Enlil, the chief of the gods, assigned the commissions of all of the gods (I.61), he “entrusted Anzu to the entrance of the shrine” that contained the ṭuppi šimmāti (DUB NAM.MEŠ), the “tablets of destiny” (I.64). Anzu quickly grew covetous of Enlil’s position. The text does not give us this emotional detail outright, but Anzu focalizes Enlil’s resplendent deeds and garb (I.66-7), and then “decides” to steal divine supremacy. The Akkadian for “divine supremacy” translates literally to “Enlil-ness”. As Brisch notes, the prologue to Hammurabi tells us how Anu and Enlil decided that Marduk should have this Enlil-ship. So while Enlil bathes, Anzu takes the Tablets of Destiny (I.79-81), and now wields ellilūtu (I.82): he has become Enlil in the capacity of supreme ruler of the cosmos.

What happens to Enlil confirms this assessment: šuḫarrur dEN.LIL₂ (“Enlil was deathly still”). And he remains defunct, and silent, until Ninurta vanquishes Anzu and reclaims the Tablets of Destiny (III.20-1). Only then does Enlil open his mouth.

Furthermore, the sacred shrine of Enlil is “stripped of its awe-inspiring radiance” (I.86). Because of Enlil’s onomastic association with the heavenly mountain, Duranki, of which

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127 The transliterated text is that of Amar Annus (2001). This text and translation, which I modify at times, are to be accessed here: http://oracc.museum.upenn.edu/cams/anzu/corpus. 128 2013 (ORACC).
129 cf. Inanna’s temporary mortification in the Descent of Inanna in general, but also the repeated injunction against her “opening her mouth against the rites of the underworld.” (from ETCSL translation)
the shrine is the central part, as well as the description elsewhere of Iškur/Adad,\textsuperscript{130} another Storm-god who later gets syncretized with Teššub/Tarḫun, as namurrû (“of awesome radiance”),\textsuperscript{131} we may understand that Enlil himself has ceased to be awesomely radiant and thereby deprived the shrine of its radiance; however, whether this particular radiance is owing to divinity in general, as with the Greek gods, or to a particularly stormy radiance is unclear, although a detail from later in the narrative suggests the latter.

In addition to Enlil’s becoming defunct, Anzu, whose name does not speak to his being stormy, appears have assimilated Enlil’s capacity for storminess, although the identity of Enlil as a Storm-god is oddly contentious. I find the arguments against understanding EN.LÍL as a “Lord of the Storm” as an extension of “Lord of the Wind” slightly specious:\textsuperscript{132} Enlil might not storm everywhere he shows up, but neither does Zeus nor Teshub for that matter. I do think, \textit{contra} Stone,\textsuperscript{133} that Enlil’s “blowing an evil storm” in \textit{The lament for Sumer and Urim} shows more than just “apposite imagery for… a powerful, devastating god”; he is fulfilling a specifically stormy role of his alongside a host of other gods who are also bringing destruction in their own ways, e.g. Enki’s blocking the river waters and Utu’s neglect of equity and justice. In any case, when Ninurta eventually comes to face off against Anzu, the hero is markedly stormy (II.28-34):

\begin{quote}
The hero heard the utterance of his mother.\newline
He writhed, he became furious, and he went off to his mountain.\newline
My lord seized the seven battles.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{130} Stevens 2013 (ORACC).\textsuperscript{131} \textit{CAD}, s.v. namurrû.\textsuperscript{132} See Jacobson (1989).\textsuperscript{133} 2013 (ORACC).
The hero seized the seven destructive winds, the stirrer-up of dust, the seven dust storms. He launched a ferocious war, he initiated battle. The gale attended at his side for the battle.

Anzu responds with some storminess of his own (II.36-7):

Anzu saw him and became furious with him. He ground his teeth like a storm demon, and he covered the mountain with his fearsome radiance.

The word here for fearsome radiance, *melammu*, is effectively synonymous with *namurru* in I.86: the two are even paired in a description of Ishtar.\(^\text{134}\) Furthermore, in *Lugal-e I 1*, *melammu* is used of Ninurta, specifically in the capacity of the storm!\(^\text{135}\) So although *melammu* is used of divine radiance in general, I argue that a more precise valence is in play here.

Although the *dramatis personae* are fewer in the Hittite myths of Illuyanka, and the narrative is considerably more minimalist in general than in *Anzu*, we see the same basic narrative structure: the usurper, here a snake, defeats the Storm-god and incapacitates him, before a human agent helps the god kill the villain. Given the minimalism, it is striking that the Hittite myth involves the same type of wordplay in the defeat of the Storm-god. This defeat assumes flesh, as it were, in the Serpent’s theft of the Storm-god’s heart and eyes:

The Serpent overcame (*tarḫta*) the Storm-god and took (*dāš*) [his heart and eyes].\(^\text{136}\)

I propose the following summary analysis: first, the motifeme represents the temporary defeat of the hero and his resultant disfigurement, if we are thinking in Propp’s terms,

\(^{134}\) *CAD* s.v. *melammu*.

\(^{135}\) *CAD* s.v. *melammu*.

\(^{136}\) KBo III 7 iii.3′–4′ per Beckman (1982). I translate *tarḫ*-* ‘overcome’ (rather than ‘defeat’ as Beckman) because it recognizes not just the outcome of the battle but the potentially shifting power hierarchy. The directionality of the semantics will be of use later. The ‘heart and eyes’ as the object of ‘took’ is easily supplied from the ensuing instruction of the Storm-god to his son.
which causes ‘real or potential loss of status or power’,\textsuperscript{137} moreover, it threatens to reintroduce the processes of the violent usurpation of heaven\textsuperscript{138} and to confound the ability of language to structure and engage the cosmos, as we shall see. The latter threat, not fully separable from the first, poses startling epistemological consequences for the myth’s audience. As scholars have long noted,\textsuperscript{139} “the dragon symbolizes Chaos, in the largest sense, and killing the dragon represents the ultimate victory of Cosmic Truth and Order over Chaos.”\textsuperscript{140} The Truth and Order of the Cosmos is threatened when the Storm-god is at first overcome, because, in semiotic terms, the \textit{verum factum} that the Storm-god is preeminent is unsettled and the \textit{signifiant} of his everlastingness as King of Heaven changes hands.

If, as Watkins cleverly noticed, we read out the Storm-god’s Hittite name, which is hidden beneath the shorthand Sumerogram $^d$IM-\textit{an}, we pronounce a clever and troubling etymological figure, \textit{Illuyankaš Tarḫunnan} (or \textit{Tarḫuntan}) \textit{tarḫta}. The Serpent of Chaos (\textit{Illuyankaš}) has overcome (\textit{tarḫta}) the Overcomer (\textit{Tarḫuntan}).\textsuperscript{141} We should compare the death of the minor character Iliadic character, Damasus (“The Subduer”), at \textit{Il}.12.183–6 (δουρὶ βάλεν Δάµασον… δάµασσε δὲ μν μεμαὐτα); Louden, in his remarks on this figure, points out that Damasus’ name “exists solely for the sake of wordplay.”\textsuperscript{142} But in the myth of Illuyanka the etymological figure accomplishes more than a coy poetic

\textsuperscript{138} For example, those seen in the \textit{Song of Kumarbi}; cf. also the Hittite version of the Hurrian \textit{Song of Ulikummi}, text by Güterbock (1951, 1952), where the Stone usurper temporarily causes the Storm-god to abdicate. Many have noted the similarities between the \textit{Song of Ulikummi} (the entire \textit{Kumarbi Cycle}, really) and Hesiod’s \textit{Theogony}. West (1966), Bernabé (2000), and López-Ruiz (2010) are a few of the more recent ones.
\textsuperscript{139} Watkins (1995:299), who follows Fontenrose, Ivanov, and Toporov.
\textsuperscript{140} Watkins (1995:299).
\textsuperscript{141} Watkins (1995:324, 343 \textit{inter al.}).
\textsuperscript{142} Louden (1995:29).
flourish. It enacts a semiological violation of the Storm-god, which is then vivified by his mutilation: because of the verb’s particular semantics and the effectively agentive nature of the Storm-god’s cognate name, one could say that Illuyanka has become Tarḫun, and the Storm-god—like poor Damasus—now both having failed to live up to and having lost his namesake, also can no longer be expected to do the sorts of things the Storm-god used to do, like provide life-giving rain. As it stands, the Babylonian myth does not seem to stress the problems of etymology, and the Hittite material is scant on detail, so we must look elsewhere for explicit recognition of the threats that etymology poses.

2.4 / Ishmael’s crime: The power of names in Genesis

An episode from the first book of the Hebrew Bible lends force to our interpretation of the Hittite myth. Despite the fact that no snakes are involved in Ishmael’s perceived crime and subsequent expulsion, the episode is germane to the dracontomachies that we are investigating because it involves succession myth; in morphological terms Ishmael turns out to be a ‘usurper’ or, to be more precise, a ‘pretender’. More importantly, Ishmael’s action is entirely borne out by an etymological figure, owing to the characteristic minimalism of the Bible. Furthermore, depending on

144 Zeus in Nonnus’ Dionysiaca, treated below, recognizes raining as one his main functions while commenting pointedly on what the ultimate success of Typhoeus/Typhon would mean.
145 Beckman (per litt.) has cautioned that it is impossible to know how salient such etymological figures would have been to the average hearer or reader of this text, but I insist that 1) there is no dearth of evidence of marked etymological figures from the ancient Mediterranean, which explicitly call attention to themselves, and 2) it is beside the point whether everyone would have heard this figura and ascribed the same meaning to it that I do, since the poetic phenomenon remains across languages. The question of consciousness, while important to think about, seems to have no bearing on what I am treating as part of the deep structures of these types of myths. It must certainly have been shifting.
the original text, the figure may have been syntactically identical to the figure in the myth of Illuyanka: the usurper performs an action cognate with the name of the object and victim—and threatens the proliferation of the line of Abraham and Sarah right at the start.

At *Genesis* 21:9–10, Sarah observes Ishmael, Abraham’s son by Hagar the Egyptian, performing an action somehow related to ‘laughing’, although it is sometimes loosely translated ‘playing’ or faultily interpreted as ‘mocking’.  

Sarah reacts by demanding that Abraham cast Ishmael and Hagar out and insists, “No son of that slave is going to share inheritance with my son Isaac!” The reaction of Sarah would by all accounts looks like a *non sequitur*, if there were not more to Ishmael’s action.

As it turns out, Ishmael’s ‘laughing’ involves a pun; this is not in and of itself surprising, since the OT is famous for lexical play. This particular pun, however, is loaded. Ishmael’s action, expressed by the Hebrew participle *metsahek*, is cognate with Isaac’s name, *yitshak* (‘s/he will laugh’). As Alter suggests, one could say that Sarah has observed Ishmael ‘Isaac’-ing. That *metsahek* ends verse 9, while Isaac’s name ends verse 8, confirms the connection. Sarah feels that Ishmael is infringing upon Isaac’s identity, and she fears lest Ishmael thereby displace Isaac from his role in the patriarchy of Israel and overturn the promissory covenant between God and Sarah that was articulated at 17:15–22.

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146 See n. 35.
147 26:10
149 This reading is supported by Sarah’s exclamation at 21:10: “No son of that slave is going to share inheritance with my son Isaac.”
150 See Alter (1996:98) for a brief summary of the interpretive history.
So while the traditional translation “mocking” may not be apt on linguistic grounds,\textsuperscript{151} a linguistic analysis still demonstrates that Ishmael has transgressed; that the participle is in the Piel form, which often has intensifying force, may indicate that the transgression is a violent one.\textsuperscript{152} Moreover, if the original text, i.e. the Vorlager to LXX, actually did modify the participial phrase metsahek with min yitshak “with her son Isaac,” which is absent from the Masoretic Text (MT) “perhaps through haplography,”\textsuperscript{153} then we have a comparandum that comes even closer to the etymologically mediated identity theft that we see in the myth of Illuyanka. If only temporarily, as the Serpent becomes the Storm-god, so Ishmael becomes Isaac.\textsuperscript{154}

Interestingly, for Isaac’s progeny, a play on Jacob’s name presupposes his usurpation of Esau’s birthright and blessing (27:36): “[Esau] replied, ‘Did they name him Jacob (y’qb) so that he should cheat (wy’qbyny) me twice? First he took away my birthright, and now he has gotten away with my blessing! Haven’t you saved a blessing for me?’ he pleaded.” Speiser notes that the verb ‘cheat’ literally means ‘be at my heel’.\textsuperscript{155} In this case, identity theft validates the line of Jacob rather than threatens it. As with Isaac and Ishmael, the covenant with the mother, implicit in the detail at 25:28 that Rebekah was fonder of Jacob than of Esau, is preserved. A fuller study of Biblical material might reveal more such parallels, but for now we have more dragons—and enabling mothers—to deal with.

\textsuperscript{151} So Speiser (1964:155 ad 21:9); while “mocking” may be a fitting translation for the intensive form of the verb (the Piel), the absence of the preposition b- argues against it.
\textsuperscript{152} Pratico and van Pelt (2009:§26.2).
\textsuperscript{153} Speiser (1964:155 ad 21:9).
\textsuperscript{154} An interesting development of the pun in chapter 21 is to be found at 28:8, where Abimelech sees Isaac metsahek with Rebekah, though Isaac had said she was his sister. Isaac fulfills his namesake, even if only narrowly, and through this act he is able to sojourn in Gerar, and Abimelech recognizes his greatness.
\textsuperscript{155} 1964:207 ad loc.
2.5 / From etymology to image and formula: Hesiodic Typhon

Greek material certainly knows of a myth in which a dragon who attempts identity theft occupies a central role: the Typhonomachy. It details Zeus’ combat against the Earth-born draconic monster known as Typhoeus, Typhon, or Typhaon. Several versions of this myth survived antiquity, and we will consider them before we can determine just how the ‘identity theft’ motif was deployed. The various accounts of Typhoeus and his fight with Zeus bear striking resemblances to Illuyanka and his struggles with the Storm-god of Nerik.¹⁵⁶

The oldest Greek exemplar of this myth was composed by Hesiod, although Homer, too, alludes briefly to the Typhonomachy (Il. 2.781–3). In Hesiod’s account, after Zeus drives the Titans from heaven, Gaia and Tartarus procreate Typhoeus, a frightful snaky beast and an elemental nightmare. At this point in the poem, Hesiod has already told us that Typhaon [sic] is said to have slept with the “baneful Echidna” (306–7); the Echidna, as we noted in Chapter 1, was confined to a hollow cave because her hybridity required that she be situated outside the world of men and gods (302). Thus, long before the Typhonomachy takes place, we know that Typhoeus will be some sort of cosmic abomination.

But Typhoeus proves to be more dangerous than a simple hybrid: he is a shapeshifter.¹⁵⁷ At 825 Hesiod describes him as having a “hundred heads of a snake, a terrible serpent” (เติบ ἑκατὸν κεφαλαί ὀφιῶν δεινοῖο δράκοντος). One wonders whether

¹⁵⁶ Fontenrose (1959) discusses a number of the motivic resemblances that these myths share on both Thompson’s index and his own supplementary one. My discussion, like Goslin’s (2010), is interested in the narrative and poetic result of some of these results. Unlike Goslin, I focus on the poetic-linguistic apparatus that the various author-redactors use to indicate that the instability of identity is a semiotic problem.
¹⁵⁷ West (1966:386 ad 831–5).
Hesiod’s calling Typhon an *ophis-drakōn* could be a calque on Illuyanka, which Jay Katz argues is a compound of the IE ‘snake’ and ‘eel’ words and with which he compares Latin *anguilla*.\(^\text{158}\) Furthermore, at 826 the heads are said to be “licking with murky tongues” (γλώσσησι δονωθήσι λελιχμότες), while at 826–7, his eyes are said to “sparkle fire” (δόσσε… πῦρ ἄμάρυσσεν). This juxtaposition of Typhon’s fearsome radiance and his darkening apparatus recalls Anzu, who, as we saw above, both darkened the sanctum of Enlil and shed radiance on the mountain to which he absconded with the kingship (II.36–7); furthermore, after Ninurta answers Anzu’s question about who the hero-god is (II.44–7, see below §2.7), “darkness was established and the face of the mountain was covered as the sun, the light of the gods, grew dark” (II.50–1).

But Hesiod’s Typhon is also polyphonic. He sequentially (ἄλλοτε μὲν… ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖτε) emits a number of different voices (bull, lion, dog, serpent).\(^\text{159}\) Of particular import here is the description of his first φωνή “voice” (830–1): ἄλλοτε μὲν γὰρ / φθέγγονθ’ ὡς τε θεοῖσι συνιέν… (“At one time [the heads] gave voice as if for the gods to understand it”). Although he is making the same kind of noise as the human larynx (φθόγγος), the language he speaks is “of course that of the gods.”\(^\text{160}\) It is specifically the primary emission of this voice that anticipates an attempt on Olympus: Typhoeus is a god who

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\(^\text{158}\) Katz (1998), but see de Vaan (2011) s. ‘anguilla’. Richard Janko *per litt.* reminds me that ὁφίς is cognate with *anguis*.

\(^\text{159}\) As regards Typhon’s polyphony, Too (1998) and Goslin (2010) discuss these thematic elements with great sensitivity, although Too’s project at large suffers from a number of problems, some rather grave, as Halliwell’s review (2001) details.

\(^\text{160}\) West (1966:387 *ad* 831). Also, as Goslin (2010: 356) tells us, citing Collins (1999), “only when the Muses convert their divine *ossa* into *audē* are they able to communicate their knowledge to Hesiod.”
knows and can use the gods’ language. During (perhaps in spite of) his more bestial soundings he displays Zeus-like elements in particular.\textsuperscript{161}

For example, the second voice that Typhoeus emits signals his infringement upon Zeus’ identity and province: \texttt{ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖτε / ταῦρον ἐριβρύχεω μένος ἀσχέτου ὀσσαν ἀγάρου} (831–2) “again at another time / [the heads sound] the voice of a loud-bellowing bull, unrestrained in fighting spirit, proud.” Though the line is syntactically somewhat awkward, the identity of the animal and the direct object of \texttt{φθέγγον[ται]} “they emit as sound” (831) can stand comment: the bull (especially a stately one) has connections with the Storm-god in the Near East and among the Hittites, as well as with Zeus; thus, in Nonnus’ version of the Typhonomachy, Zeus, after asking Cadmus for help and instructing him, turns into a bull and flees the scene (\textit{Dionys.} I. 408–9). Although one may object that these lines merely catalogue a series of noisy, potentially fearful animals in the poet’s mind, the lexeme \texttt{ὀσσα} for “voice” must be marked, since it recalls that very voice of the Muses in the hymn that Hesiod sings to them at the beginning of the poem (10, 43, 65);\textsuperscript{162} I would add that in the Homeric world \texttt{ὀσσα} denotes both “rumor”, which Zeus dispatches, as well as his personified messenger (\texttt{Ὅσσα}).\textsuperscript{163} Thus Typhoeus has taken the Zeus-issued report and made it bestial.

The next indication that Typhoeus threatens to break into Zeus’ domain and usurp his dominion also bears the closest ‘poetic’ resemblance to the etymological play that we observed in the Hittite and the Hebrew. Following the description of Typhoeus, Hesiod

\textsuperscript{161} Too (1998:20) interprets Typhoeus as offering a “simulacrum of the divine”, while Goslin (2010:353) focuses on the disorderly nature of Typhoeus’ vocality. It is clear, though, that the two interpretations are to be taken as coordinate threats: on the Storm-god, King of Heaven, AND on the order that has emerged from Chaos. As it stands, the two are mutually codependent.

\textsuperscript{162} Collins (1999), Goslin (2010).

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Il.} 2.93, 24.413; \textit{Od.} 1.282, 2.216; \textit{LSJ} s.v. \texttt{ὀσσα}. In certain cases the personification is more salient than in others.
introduces the battle with a past counterfactual statement at 837-8: καὶ κεν ὁ γε θνητοῖς καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἄναξεν, / εἰ μὴ ἄρ’ ὥδ’ νόησε πατήρ ἄνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε (“And [Typhoeus] would have lorded over mortals and immortals, had not the father of men and gods sharply noticed.”). This couplet involves two formulae and a syntactic pattern that will be quite familiar to the reader of archaic epic. The syntactic pattern, which comprises both lines, is a standard Homeric counterfactual in which the non-fulfillment of the non-action of the protasis (“if X had not done Y [but s/he did]”), confounds the potential of the apodosis.164 While καί νῦ κεν ... εἰ μὴ serves as a common epic pattern,165 if we limit to the verb νοέω “notice, understand, plan” the action of the protasis that prevents the fruition of the apodosis, some interesting results emerge: the formula καί νῦ κεν... εἰ μὴ... [ἐ]νόησε[ν], occurs four other times in the Iliad, once in the Odyssey, and once, in a statement of crisis similar to this one, in the Hymn to Demeter (310–3), on which we remarked in Chapter 1:

καί νῦ κε πάμπαν ὀλέσσε γένος μερόπων ἄνθρώπων
λιμοῦ ὡπ’ ἀργυλέης, γεράτων τ’ ἐρικυδέα τιμήν
καὶ θυσίων ἡμέρσεν Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἔχοντας,
εἰ μὴ Ζεὺς ἐνόησεν, ἐξ’ ἔφρασσατο θυμόν.

And now the entire race of mortal men would have died from painful hunger and would have deprived those who hold Olympian homes of the glorious honor of gifts and sacrifices, had not Zeus thought, and planned in his heart.

The resemblance to the Hittite Telepinu myth suggests that the threat of the apodosis in the hymn is cosmic: besides the annihilation of the human race, deprivation of the gods’

165 As West (1966:388 ad loc.) notes, it occurs “altogether twenty-seven times in Il. and Od., also h. Dem 310”.
θυσίαι might be devastating for them. Although it is true that ambrosia and nectar function as the gods’ principal preservatives, maintaining their immunity to age and decay, the savor of sacrifices probably held a broadly analogous function in ritual; if ambrosia and nectar serve to insulate the gods from men with regard to their invulnerability to θφίσις “decay”, then sacrifices can be understood as binding the gods to men à propos the same. The “suspended animation” (κακόν κόμα) that Hesiod envisions for divine forswearers of oaths (Th. 793–8), the result of being punished with deprivation of ambrosia and nectar, might supply the appropriate horror at the idea of being bereft of θυσίαι.

The next formulaic element that Hesiod employs at Th. 837–8 comprises (from the trithemimer onward) the apodosis of the counterfactual statement and redeploy one of the ‘polar’ idioms that describe Zeus’ dominion over the entire cosmos ([ὁς] θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι ἀνάσσει “[who] lords over mortals and immortals”). Although this particular ‘dynastic’ formula appears less frequently than the ‘paternal’ one that describes his omnipotence, πατὴρ ἄνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, even in its rarity it ought to be considered formulaic, given the simple morpho-syntactic shift of the verb ἀνάσσω (“rule, lord”) from present indicative in a relative clause to the modal aorist indicative in a past

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166 Cf. KUB 24.3 ii 4’–17’. As Beckman (1989:100) notes, “The gods were literally dependent on the offerings presented by humans, who, conversely, could only thrive when the deities who controlled the basic processes of nature were well-disposed toward the agriculturalists and stock-breeders.”

167 Clay (1983:147). She notes that “[t]he original efficacy of ambrosia and nectar lies in their powers as preservatives and age retardants rather than as agents of immortality.” She points out that Hebe, one of whose duties in Olympus is οἰνοχοεία, is not simply “Youth”, but “the flowering or peak of the process of growth.”

168 The translation of κακὸν κόμα is Clay’s (115).

169 cf. also the Hittite Hahhimas myth with the discussion by Fontenrose (1959:125–6). The text and a discussion of it are to be found in Gaster (1961:283–294).

170 Nineteen times between Homer and Hesiod, not including the Scutum.

171 Only once in Homer (Il. 12.242), twice in Hesiod (Th. 506, and modified at 837, as discussed), and once in Mimnermus fr. 7.
counterfactual apodosis. Thus, what the *Dichtersprache* maintained as one of the identifiers *par excellence* of the lord of men and gods becomes apodotic potential for Typhoeus in the event that Zeus’ “intellect” fails.\(^{172}\)

As I mentioned above, the other threat that is given flesh and voice in Typhoeus is a return to Chaos, the undifferentiated gap. Many have commented sensitively on this in the past fifteen years, but a rough summation of the argument is that Typhoeus presents himself as ἀκοσμία incarnate in general, and as a polyphonic, polymorphic mess in particular, whose victory and consequent supremacy over the universe would both invalidate man’s location in the cosmos and enfeeble his ability to communicate with the divine.\(^{173}\)

What is important here, however, is that Zeus does take notice of the threat, and, before overcoming Typhoeus in the ensuing battle, is resituated into his role of preeminence by way of the abovementioned formula that describes his paternal dominion; or rather, we might say that the poet recognizes the threat that he has posed to his own poetic idiom and avails himself of that idiom’s other constituents to allay the threat. The deployment of this formula here is critical because of its non-transferability; although kingship can be usurped, as earlier the period of heavenly succession showed, Zeus’ role as progenitor cannot plausibly be transferred to a usurper. As Ruth Scodel points out to me,\(^{174}\) the formula strikes one as even more pointed when one remembers that Zeus is not the biological father of all the gods, nor is he precisely the father of men;

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\(^{172}\) *Zeus’ capacity for νοεῖν perhaps represents both the potential and an absolute and abiding paradigm for the human technical acumen that emerges as a result of Typhoeus’ defeat. On ‘Typhon’s defeat and the imposition of civilizing order’ see Goslin (2010:366–70).*

\(^{173}\) *See Collins (1999), Clay (2003), Goslin (2010) (to whose bibliography on discussions of the Typhonomachy I am indebted), Lopez-Ruíz (2010), among others.*

\(^{174}\) *per litt.*
his appellation as πατήρ then probably points to his perceived psycho-social roles as cosmic protector, provider, and lawgiver.\textsuperscript{175} We might even add that the dynastic idiom is demonstrably not a foregone conclusion in the context of the myth, whereas the paternal idiom is backward-looking and presupposes the reality of the dynastic one as it applies to Zeus. The poet may even, if only unconsciously, have availed himself of the aforenoted disparity of frequency between the two formulae. In other words, the stability of Zeus’ ‘paternal’ identity as it is achieved in formula, as well as its preeminence over his dynastic identity, is upheld by statistics. In any case, Typhoeus in all his lawlessness could not fill the role of πατήρ, even if he should become ἄναξ.

2.6 / Weapons as vehicles of transference in ps.-Apollodorus

Another account that bears on the the etymological figure in the Illuyanka myth, while at least fifteen hundred years younger than the Hittite text in terms of date of composition, must have been colored by the same very old material.\textsuperscript{176} The prose version of the Typhonomachy that was ascribed to Apollodorus describes for Zeus a fate similar to Tarḫun’s (\textit{Bibl.} I.6.3). In contrast with how Hesiod shows Zeus making short work of the monster, ‘Apollodorus’ recounts how Zeus wounds Typhon with the Sickle of Succession, but the snaky pretender overpowers Zeus, severs his νεῦρα “sinews” with that very sickle and hides them in the Corycian cave.\textsuperscript{177} Hermes and Aigipan then

\textsuperscript{175} He is not even peculiarly unimpeachable in those capacities.
\textsuperscript{176} See Lane Fox (2008:299–318) for the relationship of the Hittite materials to the Greek, especially as regards the geography, landscape, and local cultic history. Lane Fox demonstrates how the prose version (as well as the poems of Oppian and Nonnus) has “much more authority than the late date of their authors suggests” (302).
\textsuperscript{177} Puhvel (1987:29).
manage to sneak past Delphyne, whom Typhon has stationed at the cave to guard the stolen goods, and recover the sinews for Zeus. Zeus eventually defeats Typhon.

Although this version approaches the minimalism of the Hittite version, the detail of the sickle stands out. It plays a central motifemic role, not in the Illuyanka myth, but in a similar succession story, the *Kumarbi Cycle*. Hoffner describes the sickle as “the primeval copper cutting tool with which they cut apart heaven and earth.”

This echoes Puhvel’s colorful summary of the solution to the thitherto ineluctable Ullikummi: “So the primeval cutting tool is dusted off, and Ullikummi’s base is severed.” As the tableau of traditions behind the *Bibliotheca* takes on more and more detail, the fact that ps.-Apollodorus accepted this primeval cutting tool as an accretion to Zeus’ weaponry means that when Typhoeus wrests it from him and injures him with it, Zeus’ quintessential role, that of the ultimate Usurper, becomes part of the Serpent’s identity. Moreover, we may infer that the theft of Zeus’ muscles, which are analogous to the heart and eyes that the Hittite god loses, results in his inability to ply his usual weaponry: weaponless Zeus is no Zeus at all, as Nonnus confirms in scintillating detail in the 5th century C.E. Before looking forward to the *Dionysiaca*, however, we must not let the concision of ps.-Apollodorus suffice for comment.

By outfitting Zeus with the sickle at the beginning of the episode, the mythographer turns him into a usurper in parallel with the Cronus of Hesiod and the Tarḫun of the Ullikummi myth; by way of the sickle the Storm-god can be dispossessed of his identity in addition to his sovereignty, the two being intimately connected. Because

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of the abovementioned reticence of ps.-Apollodorus, as well as the symbolic potency of
divine equipment in general, it follows that the tool that we have dubbed the ‘sickle’ is
symbolically empowered by its tradition and its semantic range. The word that ps.-
Apollodorus uses for this sickle is ἅρπη. Proposed IE cognates include Latin sarpio/sarpo
‘to cut off, prune, trim’ (from root *srp-). While this falls in line with the use of the
Greek sickle in general and its use in Hesiod in particular, I contend that its Greek
cognates add breadth to the semantic field of the tool, making it not just the archetypal
castration tool, but the implement for usurpation via identity theft. After all, in the
Theogony Gaia fashions a δρέπανον “reaping hook” (161–2), not a ἅρπη, for the
castration of Cronus, nor does Gaia indicate exactly what “repaying [Uranus’] sin”
(τεισαίμεθα λῶβην, 165) involves. Yet Hesiod later specifies that the δρέπανον of 162 is
a ἅρπη when Cronus accepts it at 175 and uses it to castrate Uranus (179, although at
188, the tool is simply referred to as ἀδάμαντι). I argue that Hesiod means to indicate
before the act itself that the reaper’s ‘scythe’ becomes the usurper-identity thief’s
‘sickle’; the lexical shift is marked.

181 See Beekes (2010) s.v. ἅρπη.
182 For the fortuitous resemblance of the West Semitic word ḥrb ‘sword’, see West (1997:291), Burkert
(1992:39, 85–7). If the resemblance reflects either etymology or ancient perception, then the destruction
and dismemberment of Mot, which was discussed in Chapter 1, comes into play: Anat uses a ḥrb. But for
an analogy of a weapon whose name is invested with a particular function in the context of succession
myth, cf. Baal’s battle with Yam, the dragon. There, as Gaster (1961:116) notes, Koshar, who is analogous
to Hephaestus, supplies Baal with “two divine bludgeons, Aymr and Ygrsh, which possess the magical
quality of being able to spring from his hand automatically.” Gaster further explains that Koshar “speeds
[the bludgeons] on their mission by playing on their names. Since that which is called YGRSH at once
suggests the Semitic root g-r-sh, “expel,” it is urged to ‘expel’ Yam from his throne, Stream from the seat of
his dominion.’ Similarly, that called AYMR suggests a Semitic word, m-r-y, meaning ‘drive.’ It is therefore
urged to “drive” Yam from his throne, Stream from the seat of his dominion.”
183 In Pindar and afterward, the verb δρέπω is used of ‘gaining possession of’, ‘enjoying’ and the like, with
objects like τιμάν and θέαν. See LSJ s.v.
184 Though the particulars are beyond the scope of the present study it is worth suggesting here that, in line
with objects of other precious or rare metals we see in Homer, the “adamantine” δρέπανον becomes
possessed of the divine will, transcending its formal function to take on a particularly theological one. One
thinks of Hephaestus’ automata, both sets of Achilles’ armor, the electrum dogs of Alcinoos, and perhaps
The delimitation of ἅρπη to a usurper’s tool in early epic must have taken place because of the frequent use of the related verb ἁρπάζω (derived from ἁρπαγή, which is first attested in Solon), which describes the violent appropriation of people, animals, and things. Things that are snatched with the verb ἁρπάζω in the Iliad include, but are not limited to, the following: Helen (3.444); (in a simile) cattle and sheep (5.556, cf. 12.305, 13.199, 17.62, where the simile of the lion ‘snatching’ the best heifer is adduced to describe Menelaus’ stripping (ἐσύλα) of Euphorbus’ armor); the dead Ascalaphus’ shining helm (13.528); the ashen spear with which Euphorbus strikes the dazed Patroclus (16.814); the whelps of a lioness to which Achilles, groaning in lament over Patroclus’ death, is compared (18.319); and the lamb or hare snatched by an eagle, to which Hector is compared in his duel with Achilles (22.310). These all seem to be things that either belong to another or are being snatched from their normal spheres of existence (sometimes simply life).\(^{185}\)

The enriched semantic range of the ἅρπη is further confirmed by the epithet applied to it in the two places in which it appears in the Theogony (175, 180): καρχαρόδους “sharp-toothed”. Elsewhere in Hesiod (WD 604, 196) and the Iliad (10.360, 14.198) the adjective describes not just dogs in general, but hunting dogs in particular; we are no longer dealing with an implement from agricultural vocabulary,\(^{186}\) but the perfect

\(^{185}\) The other objects of ἁρπάζω in the Iliad include a stone that Hector, in an exceptional display of strength, picks up (12.445) and Achilles’ spear, which misses Hector, but is snatched up and returned to the thrower by Athena (22.276). These objects can also be understood in terms of their being wrested from one sphere of possession or operation for the enjoyment of the snatcher (or him whom the snatcher matronizes). To these objects we can add the persons of Ganymede, Halyone, and Sarpedon on the verge of being slain by Patroclus.

\(^{186}\) West (1966:218 ad 175) warns against inferring from the weapon a harvest origin for Cronus. In Oppian (H. 5.257), the ἅρπη, as West (1966:218 n. 1) notes, is a whaling tool.
instrument for rapacity and usurpation. If the ‘copper’ cutter from The Song of Ullikummi is endowed with an expansive mythic history, being empowered by its former use as the tool for severing heaven from earth, then the ἅρπη in ps.-Apollodorus, following its use in Hesiod, carries the force of a similar, albeit much lengthier and more diversely executed, process of mythologization; ps.-Apollodorus shows how thematic material (the heavenly usurpation) has come to be concentrated on a particular motifeme (the heavenly usurpation tool); Hesiod shows how etymology and epithet, in addition to mythic collocation, accomplish this concentration of tradition onto a single item.

To confirm the nature of the broader thematic material, we can look again at Illuyanka, where the Serpent takes (Hitt. dā-) the Storm-god’s eyes and heart as well as his namesake “the Conqueror” without the use of a tool, to ps.-Apollodorus, where the tool is present, is itself taken, and is used against Zeus. Perhaps without understanding it but nonetheless interestingly, ps.-Apollodorus has subjected the tool of usurpation to usurpation itself, thereby introducing a dangerous semiotic element: the wrestling of the ἅρπη, the tool which we have demonstrated is etymologically invested with the task of usurpation, is analogous to Illuyanka’s wrestling of the name par excellence of the Hittite successor god.

Matthew Cohn per litt. reminded me of an interesting passage in Aristophanes’ Wasps (1030-5), wherein “the adjective ‘saw-toothed’ [is applied] to the usurper, Cleon, whose polymorphism implicates him in typhonic monsterism, chaos, duplicity, etc.” At Knights 511, the Chorus sings of the poet who “boldly advance toward τυφώς and ἐριώλη”, the typhoon and hurricane being Cleon. On men being parsed in terms of divine monarchy and its threats, see Brock (2013:10–4).

KUB 33 106 iii; ANET 124–5. Fox (2008:303) comments on the adamantine sickle thus: “surely [it is] the same sickle which had castrated Heaven and which the Hittite gods were to use in their next round of battles.” Although cherts and flints must have been one of the original materials for sickles in the Aegean and “Cypriot flint knappers were still making chipped-stone blades for threshing sledges in the 1950s” (Kardulias and Yerkes 2011:108), in southern Mesopotamia, “little stone was available on the floodplain”, and by the Ur III period, copper was the standard material for tools, including sickles (Trigger 2003:280). It is thus unsurprising to have the sickle represented by diverse materials in these myths.
The consequences of this danger for ps.-Apollodorus’ Zeus is that his sinews are severed and hidden in a bearskin (ἐν ἄρκτου δόρῳ) by Typhoeus,189 while he is deposited in the Corycian cave in Cilicia, until Hermes and Aigipan,190 escaping the notice of the Delphyne, the serpentess whom Typhon placed there to guard the bagged νεῦρα,191 steal them and restore them to Zeus, so that he regains his ἵσχυς “strength.”192

189 Scarpi (2001) does not remark on the detail of the bearskin, and Fox (2008:303) says that the detail is unique to ‘Apollodorus’. I wonder whether it is meant to be a countermeasure to the aegis, which, Ben Fortson per litt. reminds me, Watkins (2000) argues was originally a hunting-bag. As Betz (1992:64 n. 184 ad PGM IV.1380-4) notes, the association of Typhon with the constellation of the Bear is Egyptian; the Bear represents the soul of Typhon, who murdered Osiris (see Plutarch De Is. et Os. 21, 359D); Scarpi (2001:450 ad I.6.3 [39-44]) does note that “del resto il combattimento di Zeus e Tifone può trovare un ulteriore parallelo nel conflitto per la successione dinastica tra Osiride e Seth, interpretato dai Greci come Tifone.” Zeus remarks on the insufficiency of the aegis at Dionysiaca (380-1): άγις ἐμόι μονή περιλείπεται· ἄλλα τί πέξαι / αἰγὶς ἐμῇ Τοφόνῳ ἐρείδμαινομαι καραυνῷ; (I have only my aegis left; but what will my aegis do contending against Typhon’s bolt?). There is also the very strange fragment of Heraclitus (Kahn 45, D. 120, M. 62) from Strabo (I.1.6): ἱρὰ καὶ ἐσπέρας τέρματα ἡ ἄρκτος καὶ ἀντίον τῆς ἄρκτου, οὕτως ἀρίθμοι Διός. (“The limits of dawn and evening are the Bear and, opposite the bear, the Warder of shining Zeus.”) Kahn (1979:161–2) interprets this “as a commentary on” D. 94 (‘Ἡλιός οὐχ ὑπερβησμένη μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἕραν χαίνον δικής ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουν), arguing that “Arcturus is presented here as the guardian of the Bear… because the Bear stands for the pole and hence for the fixed regularity of solar and astral cycles. Its stellar guardian will preserve the measures of cosmic justices after the sun has set.”

190 This is a very interesting set of details. The Kôrykion antron was famously a grotto dedicated to Pan on the south-west side of Parnassus above Delphi (Paus. 10.32.7), but there were others, namely in Cilicia and Caesarea, on the latter of which see Berlin (1999). The Cilician Kôrykion antron is known from Strabo (14.5.5). He tells us the following: μετὰ δὲ τὸν Καλύκαδνον ἡ Ποικίλα λεγομένη πέτρα κλίμακα ἐγὼσα λατομητὴν ἐπὶ Ελεύτειοικαν ἐγώουσαν. ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀνεμοῦν ἄκρα ὀμώνυμος τῇ προτέρᾳ, καὶ Ἐρνίμοιος νῆσος καὶ Κώρυκος ἄκρα, ὑπὲρ ἡς ἐν εἴκοσι σταδίοις ἐστὶ τὸ Κωρύκιον ἄντρον, ἐν ὃ τὸ ἄριστος κρόκος φύεται. … ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἄντρον αὐτὸτ ἔφεν πηνὴν μεγάλην ποταμὸν ἐξεισέλατο καθαρὸ τῇ καὶ διαφανοὶς ὄδασος, εὐθὺς καταπίπτεται ὑπὸ γῆς· ἐνεχθεὶς δὲ ἄφανθας ἐξεισιν ἐπὶ τὴν θαλάσσαν· καλοῦν δὲ Πικρὸν ὄνομα. (“And after the Calycadnus, there is the so-called Poecile rock, which has a staircase hewn out of it leading to Seleucia. Then the Anemurium, a promontory with the same name as the former, and to the isle of Crambusa and the promontory of Corycus, above which, within twenty stades, is the Corycian cave, wherein the very best coccus grows… And there is another cave right there possessed of a great spring that sends forth a river of pure and transparent water, which falls down beneath the earth. And carried on invisible it issues into the sea. They call it Bitter Water.”)


192 Bibl. I.6.3 [42–3].
If the Near East, Hesiod, and ps.-Apollodorus offer us minimalist narratives, then Nonnus picks up the slack: his Typhonomachy spans nearly two books and some thousand or so lines of his admittedly monstrous *Dionysiaca*. Although Typhon attacks the entire cosmos, his ultimate quarry is Zeus himself. Below, I will discuss further the theft of Zeus’ weaponry and his *neura*, since those details more closely recall Anzu’s engagement with Ninurta than his original theft of the Tablets of Destiny. The process of transmission involves elaboration, compression, and redistribution of narrative data. Here, I will just point out Nonnus’ use of the identity theft motif. In beseeching Cadmus to come to his aid and “play the syrinx” (1.378), the Storm-god voices his fears (1.379–87):

...ἡμετέροις γὰρ
τεῦχεσιν οὐρανίος κεκορυθμένος ἐστὶ Τυφωεύς.
αἰγὶς ἐμὸι μοῦνη περιλέπεται· ἀλλὰ τί ῥέξει
αἰγὶς ἐμὴ Τυφῶνος ἐρίθιμανοσα κεραυνῷ;
δείδαι, μὴ γελάσει γέρων Κρόνος, ἀντίβιοι δὲ
ἀκραιαῖς σιχένα γαῦρον ἄγηνορὸς Ἰαπετοῦ·
δείδαι μνθότοκον πλέον Ἑλλάδα, μὴ τις Ἀχαιῶν
ὑέτιον Τυφῶνα καὶ ὑψιθεῖντα καλέσσῃ
ἡ ὑπατον, χραίνων ἐμὸν οὖνομα...

For Typhoeus is helmed with my heavenly weapons. All I’ve left is my aegis. But what will my aegis do contending against the bolt of Typhon? I fear lest old Cronus should laugh, and I shudder at the haughty neck of manly Iapetus. Even more I fear myth-birthing Hellas, lest any of the Achaeans call upon “Typhon the Rainmaker,” and “Typhon who Watches on High,” or “Typhon Most Lofty,” thereby defiling my name.

The nature of Zeus’ fear is patent. In the first place, he doubts the power of his aegis against “Typhon’s bolt”, a pointed inversion of *Iliad* 20.400–1, noticed by Piccardi as
well, where “Ares stabbed the tasseled / awful aigis, which not even the bolt of Zeus overpowers” and recalls the transference of storminess in Anzu. Other than Nonnus’ opportunity to turn Homer on his head, why does Zeus doubt the efficacy of aegis? After all, the aegis, besides being a hunting bag, is essentially the storm-cloud, fringed as it were with Zeus’ lightning. Perhaps its inefficacy now is the direct result of its being stripped of its awesome radiance, which arises from Zeus’ control of lightning. Of course, the thunderbolt is not analogous to the Tablets of Destiny, in that it is not a text, but the thunder and the lightning do communicate divine will and index Zeus’ power.

In addition to thinking himself not up to challenging Typhon in battle, Zeus fears the laughter and mockery of those whom he himself had deposed. Most importantly, however, he fears being displaced from his epithets, and thereby being bereft of his offices. More precisely, Zeus shudders at the idea of Typhoeus replacing him with respect to these epithets and offices in Greek myth and, perhaps crucially, cult; Nonnus’ Zeus knows that his existence depends upon the µῦθοι to which Hellas gives birth. The idea that his name might no longer be uttered in the contexts in which it usually would be might recollect the silence of Enlil after Anzu’s theft, and more clearly it mirrors a trope in the Lugal-e, where, to paraphrase Selena Wisnom, rebel lands start worshipping Ninurta’s stone enemy, Asag, instead of him, and the insistent description of this stone monster in stormy terms reflects Asag’s usurpation, not just of Ninurta’s

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193 Piccardi (2006:166 ad 381–2.)
194 This may recollect the deposed Kumarbi’s rôle in Ullikummi’s attack on heaven.
195 As Piccardi (2006:166 ad 386) points out, “L’epiteto [ὑέτιος]… è l’unico dei tre ad essere attestato anche nel culto.”
power, but of his attributes, “right down to his epithets”: once again, the Storm-god’s sovereignty is imperiled by an attack on his signifants.

2.8 / Synthesis: Re-writing the cosmos from Anzu to Nonnus

After Anzu finishes blustering about, he identifies himself by his recent (mis)deed and poses to the hero a question (II.40–2):

“I have taken away all of the divine powers, and I assign the commissions of the gods. Who are you who have come to battle with me? Give your reason.”

The lexeme for power in the Akkadian is parṣum, which functions here as Sumerian ME can. As an example, the MEs are what Inanna absconds with in Inana and Enki, and the ME of the underworld is what Inana illicitly covets during her katabasis, on which see Chapter 3. It is important that Anzu also says that he assigns the divine commissions. The Akkadian for commission or office is térzu (cf. Hebrew tôrāh < yrh). This lexeme also denotes verbal reports, and so we might easily identify térzu and Latin fatum: what Anzu pronounces will hold sway over the cosmic order. And this is exactly what happens when Ninurta makes his first attack (II.60–7):

From the handhold of the bow he launched an arrow. The arrow did not approach Anzu, but returned. Anzu called out to it: “Arrow that has come, return to your reed-bed; frame of the bow, return to your forest; bow-string to the ram’s tendon, arrow flight to the bird.” Carrying the tablet of destinies of the gods in his hand, the bow-string and the bow launched an arrow, but it did not approach his body.

In essence, Anzu has rendered Ninurta’s attack inert by verbally undoing the technology of the champion’s bow and arrow. All of the components of the bow and arrow are

196 Wisnom per litt.
197 CAD s.v. parṣum.
disintegrated from one another. But I contend that Anzu has inadvertently undone himself with this curse, which I will discuss in the next section.

In the case of Illuyanka, there is no indication that the snaky usurper has any designs on the rest of the cosmos; other than the mutilation of Tarhun, Illuyanka seems relatively benign. Hesiod’s deployment of the formula, discussed above, may index Zeus’ role as distributor and maintainer of the gods’ timai. Ps.-Apollodorus does not give Typhon a chance to do anything besides mutilate Zeus.

In Nonnus, however, a good portion of the episode is taken up with Typhon’s recasting the cosmos in his image. Here Nonnus involves exceptionally intricate and subtle verbal artistry to “undo” the older cosmos and rewrite it as Typhon’s. Moreover, that Nonnus presents Typhon’s assault on heaven as an attack on heavenly identities is borne out in some of the details of his violence against the constellations. His violation of the ‘twin fishes’ and the ram is telling (1.180–3):

καὶ διδύμως ἐπὶ πόντον ἀπ ’ αἰθέρος Ἰχθύας ἑλκών  
Κριὸν ἀνεστυφέλιξ, μεσόφαλον ὠλύμπου,  
γείτονος εἰαρινοῖο πυραυγέος ὑψόθι κύκλου  
ἀμφιταλαντεύοντος ἵσοξυγον ἃμαρ ὀμίχλη.

And dragging the twin Fish from the upper air and flinging them into the sea, he beat up the Ram, the star that acts as navel of Olympus, above the fire-sparkling orb of its springtime neighbor, as it balances day yoked-in-equal-measure to darkness.

Typhoens “arrête le cours du temps”198 and furthermore, at least as far as the Pisces are concerned, explicitly bereaves the signs of their identity as heavenly fixtures.

Typhoens goes on to deploy his “crooked snaky army” (ὀφίων σκολιῶν στρατόν) against other astral bodies (187), in a way stealing the identity of each; each snake

198 Vian (1976 [2003]:147 ad 183).
duplicates a marked feature of the constellation that it attacks, mostly in binding or poisoning terms. One of Typhoeus’ ὀφίς-appendages “gamboled over the spine of the heavenly Serpent (Δράκων), hissing war” (189–90); another “bound tightly (σφήκωσατο) with a chain [already] enchained (δέσιμον... δεσμῷ) Andromeda” (192); another, specified as a δράκων κεράστης “horned snake”, “encircled the forked horn (κεραίς) of Taurus the same shape as his own (ἰσοτύπου)” (193–4); the same one “tormented the similarly shaped (ἀντιτύπους) Hyades, the form of the crescent Moon, with open jaws” (195–97); the venom-shooting baldric of interlacing serpents girdled (ἐμιτρώσαντο) the Ox-drover” (197-8); attacking another astral serpent (Ὄφις), one of Typhoeus’ snakes “frisked around the viperous (ἐχιδήεντα) arm of Ophiuchus” (199–200) and “twined a second garland around the Garland (Στεφάνῳ στέφος) of Ariadne” (201).

The grammar of two of these encounters requires a closer look, since we are after all invested in how both language—by which I mean the lexicon, the grammar, and their products (e.g. epithets and formulae)—and image accomplish the totality of the identity theft. Nonnus describes the attack on Taurus and the Hyades thus (193–7):

...ὁ δὲ γλωχῖνι κεραίης ἱσοτύπου Ταύρου δράκων κυκλοῦτο κεράστης, οἰστρήσας ἑλικηδὸν ὑπὲρ βοέοι µετώπου ἀντιτύπους Ὑάδας, κεραίης ἱνδαλµα Σελήνης, οἰγοµέναις γενύεσσιν.

One, a horned snake, entwined itself on the fork of the horns of Taurus, the same shape [as its own], and revolving in a circle above the ox’s forehead, threatened with opened jaws the Hyades resembling [it?], [a cluster in] the shape of the horned moon.

199 Cf. 2.42–52, where Typhoeus’ various animal forms devour the self-same animals on the earth, and 2.281–313, where Typhoeus threatens to overturn the identities of the Olympians.
200 Presumably mimicking the crescent moon formation of the Hyades.
Although the snakes are mimicking the constellations, the morpho-syntactic status of ἴσογόπου (194) and ἀντιτύπους (196) effect a startling hypallage. The constellations become the representations, the μιμήματα; at the very least the original and the impostor are confused. That the Hyades are further described as an ἰνδαλμα “likeness, phantom” of the crescent moon further complicates the direction of mimesis. Here the chaos, the ultimate threat that Typhoeus poses against the cosmos, is directly connected with problems of identity.

The Moon, however, refuses to yield to the monster’s onslaught (219). She rallies the astral troops, and Typhoeus decides to turn his attention towards the seas and commits his first identity theft, to be distinguished from the abovementioned identity thefts that his snaky appurtenances accomplish. Having made the waters essentially uninhabitable with his girth (263 ff.), he rends an island and hurls it (287–90):

καὶ βοθίου τριόδοντος ἔχον μίμημα Τυφωεύς, χειρὸς ἀμετρήτου ταμών ἐνοσίχθοι παλμῷ νήσου ἀλκρήπτωτος ἀποσπάδα πέξαν ἀρούρης, ῥίψε παλινδίνητον ὅλην σφαιρὴν ἐνοσίχθος ἐλίξας.

And Typhoeus, wielding an imitation of the abysmal trident, with the Earth-shaking palm of his immeasurable hand cut away an island, the torn-off coastline of plow-land that borders the sea, and hurled it whirling back on itself, the whole thing, causing it to spiral like a ball.

While it is true that Typhoeus becomes connected with Poseidon through their shared role as “déclenche[ur] de le cataclysme”, Typhoeus’ taking on “l’aspect du dieu” is not really “assez naturelle.” In fact, Typhoeus has accomplished something quite

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201 It is possible and perhaps preferable to understand the appositive κεραῆς...Σελήνης as describing the shape of the snakes with their gaping jaws, but its closeness to Υάδας cannot be ignored. Both Rouse (1940) and Vian (1976 [2003]) take the phrase as being in apposition to the Hyades. This conforms with the V-shape (the horns and nose of Taurus) formed by the brightest stars in the Hyades.

remarkable here, for nowhere outside of Nonnus is ἐνοσίχθων applied to anyone but Poseidon. The god of the sea is called ἐνοσίχθων because “he moves the immovable earth.”

But here he is nowhere to be found, and Typhon has taken his place, even though he only wields a simulacrum of Poseidon’s equipage. But Typhoeus’ ultimate quarry is Zeus himself.

Just as Hesiod’s Zeus can retain his identity against the onslaught of Typhoeus because of his ‘paternal’ identity (Th. 838), which was affirmed by a formula whose connotations cannot be solely literal, Nonnus’ Zeus avails himself of his bloodline. After he describes what is at stake for the cosmos, Zeus implores Cadmus to bewitch Typhoeus with his shepherd’s pipe, appealing to the hero’s stock (393-5):

εἰ δὲ Διὸς λάχες αἵμα καὶ Ἴναχίης γένος Ἰοῦς,
κερδαλέης σύριγγος ἀλεξικάκω σέο μολὴ
θέλγε νόον Τυφῶνος.

If you’ve got the blood of Zeus and the stock of Inachian Io, charm the mind of Typhon with the protective strain of your tricky syrinx.

Zeus is referring to his being the great-grandfather of Cadmus, through Epaphus, Belus, and Agenor. Furthermore, Cadmus refers in Book 3 to Belus as the Libyan Zeus, by which he means Zeus-Ammon (292–4):

καὶ Διὸς Ἀσβύσταο νέην ἀντίρροπον ὁμφήν
Χαονίη βοώσι πελειάδι διψάδες ἀμιοὶ
μαντιπόλοι.

And the parched, oracular sands shout the new song of Zeus Asbystes, a counterpoise to the Chaonian dove.

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203 Plut. fr. 106 (Sandbach).
204 Cf. Cadmus’ account of his line (3.257-98). Rose (1940:31 ad 393) is mistaken to show Libya as Epaphus’ wife and not his daughter, as Cadmus himself tells Electra.
205 Note the clever use of the rare lexeme for sand ἅμιος. See LSJ s.v.
Thus, by invoking his genetic connection to Cadmus, which is not subject to the same confusion that the throne of heaven and the heavens themselves are, Zeus, on the one hand, indicates to the audience, since Cadmus does not yet know his destiny, that the threat to Zeus’ sovereignty is a threat to Cadmus’ eventual claim to Zeus-born, Zeus-directed sovereignty; in a sense the founding myth of Thebes stands to be obliterated. On the other hand, as someone whom we might call διογενής “Zeus-born,” Cadmus is expected to live up to his pedigree. In other words, the overwhelming presence of Zeus’ name in the heroic vocabulary, which presumes Zeus’ ability to fill the role of nurturer of hero-kings and therefore presumes his own sovereignty, counterbalances the startling epithetic and etymological play that attends Typhoeus’ attack. The order here is important: just as in Hesiod, ‘Zeus ἀναξ’ or ‘βασιλεύς’ gets plausibly destabilized, but then ‘Zeus πατήρ’ provides the protection against this destabilization. Moreover, Zeus is able to erect another lexical defense by describing, albeit proleptically, Cadmus’ strain as ἀλεξίκακος “warding off evils”, thus aligning Cadmus’ salvific function with that of Heracles, Hermes, and Zeus himself.

2.9 / A telling slip: Zeus’ neura in Nonnus

So how does Cadmus help Zeus out? As we noted above, Zeus doubts that his aegis will avail him appropriately against the bolt that Typhon stole from him at the beginning of the poem (Zeus is occupied with raping Europa):

Καὶ παλάμας τανύσας ὑπὸ νεῦματι µητρὸς Ἀροῦρης

206 Hellanicus (fr. 109, Jacoby 4), Lucian Gallus 2.
207 Aristophanes Peace 422.
208 Directly in epigraphic evidence, by hypallage in Nonnus (Dionys. 5.275), where it describes the winds Zeus sends, and obliquely in Homer, where it describes µῆτις (Il. 10.19-20).
And with a nod from Mother Earth, Cilician Typhoeus stretched out his hands and stole the snowy weapons of Zeus, the weapons of fire.

The juxtaposition of the odd “snowy weapons” with “the fiery weapons”, as well the mention of Cilicia, must point to Pythian 1 specifically, where “l’immagine dell’ Etna freddo e bianco di neve prepara il contrasto con la policroma descrizione dei torrenti di fucio, fumo e lava,” and ps.-Apollodorus more loosely, where Zeus’ neura are mentioned as severed, but no mention is made of his weaponry.

But when Cadmus, Zeus’ shepherd helper, charms Typhon with his syrinx-playing, the monster is convinced to give him Zeus’ neura (1.511–2):


[Typhon] gave the sinews as a guest-gift to tricky Cadmus, the sinews that fell to the earth once in a Typhomachy.

There has yet been no mention of such a battle in the poem, and this has puzzled everyone. While ps.-Apollodorus is the most obvious forerunner of this strange detail, I think Nonnus’ ποτὲ is looking past Apollodorus to Anatolia—the detail of the neura being a guest-gift looks like Illuyanka giving Tarhun’s heart and eyes to the Storm-god’s son with similar generosity—and to Babylonian Anzu, and the ram’s tendon. This accounts for ps.-Apollodorus’ failure to mention Zeus’ usual weaponry and Zeus’ seeming bodily integrity in Nonnus. In fact, Zeus is seen to be re-possessed not of musculature but weaponry.

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Just as Cadmus charms Typhon into self-destruction, Anzu is undone by words—his own. After Ninurta’s initial failure, the hero instructs Sarur, his numinous mace and messenger, to bear the bad tidings to Ea, the god of wisdom and magic among other things. Ea, having heard the story in full, prescribes how Ninurta will be able to defeat Anzu (II.106-12):

“Tire him out so that he may let fall his wing tip in the opposing of the storm wind. O Lord, take hold of your arrows towards the rear. Cut off his wing tips and strike them off left and right. Let him look at his wings so that they take away the utterance of his mouth. He will call out ‘wings to wings’; you must fear him still. Draw from the handhold of your bow, let the arrow go like lightning. Let wingtip and wing play like butterflies.”

Although the instructions are murky in translation, Ea’s prediction that the wounded Anzu will call out kappa ana kappi (“wing to wing”) is crucial. I disagree with Reiner that Anzu’s cry (“My wing! My wing” in her reckoning) is simply ineffective nonsense. Rather, I think Ea has realized that Anzu’s own faculty of speech is the means to his undoing. Just as Anzu had uttered to Ninurta’s weaponry in their first encounter kappa ana issuri [GUR-MEŠ] at line 65 of the second tablet, instructing the “wing” of the arrow to return to the bird, by chanting “wing to wing”, he has made the arrow that Ninurta presently shoots effective again! This is confirmed by the fact that when Ninurta carries out Ea’s instructions, abru kappa ušebira šukuda (“He made the arrow pass through wingtip and wing”).

2.10 / A brief look forward: the tragic consequences of wordplay

In this section we refocus our investigation from broad-scale identity theft to the

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211 III.15.
accrual of identifying features of vanquished foes, and the effects of exerting that identity in subsequent violent encounters. Furthermore, this accrual of identity appears to occur in conjunction with the enhancement of the victor’s weapon by the victory, and the problematic outcomes involve etymological figures to no small degree. Issues of language and order are to the fore.

Unsurprisingly, we still encounter allusions to cosmic battles and succession myth, but our focus falls upon the outcomes, anticipated or real, of plying appropriated identities. Here it is the hero-gods who take over identities. Of course, we will also continue to deal with snakes, since they seem to be ubiquitously implicated in identity theft.

2.11 / An Erinyomachy in Aeschylus?

It was none other than Fontenrose, whose monumental study of Indo-European and Near Eastern snakes *Python* (1959) has yet to be surpassed in terms of sheer exhaustiveness, who noticed Aeschylus’ predilection for snaky images in the *Oresteia*. In an article entitled “Gods and Men in the Oresteia” Fontenrose argues against previous scholars’ assumptions that Zeus wants Agamemnon and Orestes to be punished in the trilogy, and asserts that the Erinyes, whom Zeus *can* send after criminals, act on their own in the *Choephori* and the *Eumenides*. He goes on to parse the intimate verbal relationship between Clytemestra’s character and the vision of the Erinyes, noting the heavily serpentine language that both Cassandra and Orestes use to describe the former: for example, when Orestes notes that his father died “in the coils and convolutions / of

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212 1971:86 (Ag. 55–9).
the dread Echidna” (Ch. 248-9), he has identified her with a species of Κήρ; the Erinyes of
course is another species of death spirit.\textsuperscript{213} Although Fontenrose does not push the point,
he does recognize the affinities between the Aeschylean cosmic struggle, wherein the
Olympians are pitted against chthonic ‘older’ deities, and Chaoskämpfe like the
Typhonomachy and Pythonomachy.\textsuperscript{214} I will be a little less subtle than Fontenrose here,
and suggest that Aeschylus has fully assimilated and thereby preserved many of the
images and much of the language of older dracontomachies, including the etymological
figures that function as one of the main modes of violence in these myths. Aeschylus’
modification of this etymological component in particular is splendid, in that it gets
turned back on the transgressing deity, in this case the Erinyes. Thus I will focus on the
Erinyes as they appear in the Eumenides in particular, since it is in this third play of the
trilogy that the action comes closes to a full dracontomachy.

Before discussing the climactic etymological moment, I will suggest that
Aeschylus’ vision of the Erinyes not only aligns them with cosmic serpents in general,
but emphasizes their unclassifiable nature in particular. They are wholly other than the
world of men and gods, and as such they thwart the language of men and gods, when it is
applied to them.

We first become aware of the Erinyes when the Pythia staggars out of Apollo’s
temple, unable to hold herself up (34–8).\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{213} 1971:98.
\textsuperscript{214} 1971:98 n. 29.
\textsuperscript{215} Podlecki (1989: 132 \textit{ad} 36) notices that Aeschylus uses two extremely rare words and suggests “that the
poet has the Pythia lapse into a formal, even antiquated, mode of expression to mark her discomposure.”
Groeneboom (1952: 95 \textit{ad} 34-8) discusses the relationship of σωκεῖν to Hermes’ epithet (Σῶκος) at \textit{Il.}
21.72. If these words are religiously marked in any way (are the Pythia’s movements are somehow inspired
during the normal course of her carrying out her duties?), then we might suggest that she is indicating that
the Erinyes’ transgression into the temple of Apollo has disrupted her normal priestly state. Neither the M
Terrible things to tell! Terrible things for the eyes to see sent me back out of the temple of Loxias, such that I have no strength nor can I stand up straight. I run with my hands—there’s no footspeed in my legs. An old woman who’s afraid is nothing, barely a child.

The Pythia presents herself as having been utterly enfeebled by what she saw, and introduces her affliction by noting that her faculties of speech and sight have been assailed. The neuter plural substantive δεινά both semantically and morphologically indicates something that is difficult or impossible to express with accuracy. On the one hand, δεινά could refer to the entire sight within the temple, both Orestes the gory suppliant and the Erinyes who surround him; on the other, the priestess’ description of Orestes at 43–4 (“[holding] a lofty-born (ὑψιγέννητον) branch of an olive tree / garlanded chastely (σωφρόνως) with bright (ἀργῆτι) fleece”), seems measured, admiring,216 as if in spite of his bloody hands. It is likely then that δεινά is appropriate only because the Erinyes are present.217

The Pythia goes on to describe the Erinyes first as women (46–7), but then recants that description (48). Next she “striv[es] to make the unparalleled somehow more comprehensible, [and] grasps at a comparison ready-to-hand”218 in the Gorgons (48) before recanting that, too (49); she tries once more by comparing them to the Harpies, but

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216 Cf. Podlecki (1989:133 ad 43), who remarks on the solemnity of the image, and Sommerstein (1989:89 ad 43–5) who asserts that σωφρόνως “suggests that, polluted though he is, Orestes does belong to civilized humanity.”

217 Cf. Sommerstein (1989:87 ad 34). We discuss the collocation δεινά... δρακεῖν below.

218 Podlecki (1989:133 ad 48ff.).
finds that association, too, unapt, seeing as the Erinyes are “wingless” (51). Finally, she stresses that in addition to their ghastly snoring (53) and the awful drip from their eyes (54), they bear a get-up (κόσμος) that is “not lawful to bring before the images of the gods nor into the homes of men” (οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν ἀγάλματα / φέρειν δίκαιος οὔτ’ ἐς ἀνθρώπων στέγας) (55–6). Podlecki recognizes that this statement issues a note that resounds throughout the play: the Erinyes are wholly separated from the Olympian gods as well as from humans.219 We can say more: although with much more specificity than Hesiod, Aeschylus echoes here the Archaic poet’s description of the Echidna, on whom we remarked above. To reiterate, because the Echidna “is not at all like mortal men or deathless gods” (Th. 295–6) in her monstrosity, the gods apportioned her a famed dwelling “far away from the deathless gods and mortal men” (Th. 301–3). Also, as Fontenrose notices, Orestes’ imagination of Agamemnon as having died ἐν πλεκταῖσι καὶ σπειράμασιν / δεινῆς ἐχίδνης (Ch. 248–9) echoes Aegisthus’ triumphant observation of Agamemnon ὑφαντοῖς ἐν πέπλοις Ἐρινύων… κείμενον (Ag. 1580–1).220

Noting one further connection of the Erinyes with their snaky congeners will prepare us to comment on the startling etymological element of Apollo’s threat to the dread goddesses at 181–3. As Illuyanka took the eyes and heart of Tarhun, and ps.-Apollodorus’ Typhon took Zeus’ sinews, each rendering his victim temporarily defunct, the Erinyes drink the blood of their victims to similar effect. Furthermore, while neither the Hittite snake nor Typhon consumes the stolen bodyparts, the effect of the corporeal injury is to empower the assailant. Likewise, the Erinyes’ own language suggests that they sustain themselves by drinking the blood of their victims: at 263–6 (in an astrophic

219 1989:134 ad 56.
220 1971:98.
portion of the second parodos) the Erinyes tell Orestes, who is embracing the βρέτας (259), that he “need[s] to grant us in exchange [for his mother’s spilt blood] drink / the ruddy claret (πελανόν) from your living limbs; from you / I hope to have the meal (βοσκάν) of an ill-to-drink draught (πώματος δυσπότου)”; then, in the introduction to the choral ode (299–306), the chorus-leader tells Orestes that he will go to perdition (ἔρρειν) (301), “a bloodless feast for divinities” (ἀναίματον βόσκημα δαμόνων) (302), and that while yet alive he will feed them, despite the fact that he has not been slaughtered at an altar, seeing as he was nurtured for and consecrated to them (ἐμοὶ τραφείς τε καὶ καθερωμένος) (304). It is clear from the Eriny(e)s’ language that they envision Orestes’ blood as their sustenance, which is disturbing enough, but the Erinyes parse their expected feast in terms of a sacrifice that does not fit the bill of a sacrifice since Orestes is οὐδὲ... σφαγείς (305), and they describe the result for Orestes in equally ambiguous language. The ode that follows these lines clarifies that the Erinyes see their function as in part waging psychological warfare on their victim, withering him (ἰσχνάνασ[α] in 267 and ἀφνά in 333) by means of derangement (παρακοπά, / παραφορὰ φρενοδαλής in 329–30; ὑπ’ ἀφρονὶ λῦμα in 377); the fate that awaits a victim of the Erinyes is monstrous, anathematic to the normal order of things.

Thus in the end, although the Erinyes may rightfully claim that it is their λάχος (334), which “Moira spun out for them to have securely” (335), to harry evil-doers until death, the issue at hand is one of conflicting jurisdiction (as well as interpretation). Thus until the matter is settled in the Areopagus, at which point the Erinyes become the Eumenides, we observe a Chaoskampf-on-the-brink, during which the powers of Night
threaten to infringe upon the powers of the Olympians, namely Apollo (and coordinately Zeus), as well as their sense of order, language, and music.\textsuperscript{221}

The situation in which the element of infringement is clearest comes very early, when the Erinyes are seated in Apollo’s temple. After instructing Hermes to conduct Orestes safely to Athens (89–93), Apollo threatens the Erinyes with violence, if they should not leave his temple. The language of his threat is remarkable (179-84):

\verb|
έξω, κελεύω, τῶνδε δωµάτων τάχος
χώρειτ’, ἀπαλλάσσοµεθα µαντικῶν µυχῶν,
µή καὶ λαβοῦσα πτηνόν ἄργηστήν ὄριν
χρυσὶστάτου θῶµυγγος ἐξορµύµενον
ἀνής ὑπ’ ἄλχοις µέλαν ἀµ’ ἀνθρώπων ἄφρον,
ἐµοῦσα θρόµβους οὐς ἀφεῖλκυσας φόνου.
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Get out! I order you, quickly leave this temple, get out of this oracular sanctum, lest you meet with a winged, bright snake, rushed on from this string of beaten gold, and in your pain send up the black foam from men, vomiting up the clots of gore that you drew off.\textsuperscript{222}

Watkins, in his chapter on “Hermes, Enualios, and Lukoworgos: The Serpent-slayer and the Man-slayer”, begins with the anonymous tragic fragment \textit{TrGF} 2, Adesp. 199: \textit{ἀργὴν ἐπεφνεν} (“he slew the snake”).\textsuperscript{223} He recalls how Hayden Pelliccia pointed out to him that this formula, with the obscure word for snake \textit{ἀργῆς}, must explain the epiclesis \textit{Ἀργεῖφόντης}. This epithet is most often used of Hermes, and rarely of Apollo, as Watkins

\textsuperscript{221} As Halden (1965:39) notes, “Again and again we hear of songs which are no songs, music which is no music and songs of joy which turn into lamentation.” Cf. Podlecki (1989:156 \textit{ad} 308–9 and 158).
\textsuperscript{222} A secondary sense of \textit{θρόµβους...φόνου} could be “which you drew off from the slaughter,” indicating, in addition to the material of the \textit{thromboi}, the source of their gory sustenance.
\textsuperscript{223} 1995:383. For the fragment and ancient discussion of \textit{ἀργῆς}, see Nauck (1964:746 Achaean fr. 1, and 880 Adesp. fr. 199), from whose apparatus we learn the following: Harpocation, the Alexandrian grammarian, relates that Aeschines on the definition of \textit{ἀργῆς} says that “it is rather credible to say that the Dorians, especially the Argives, called the \textit{ὄφις} the \textit{ἀργῆς}, as Achaean does in the \textit{Adrastus.”} Hesychius does not mention Achaean, but defines it similarly: \textit{ὄφις...δράκοντος}. Ulrichs conjectured that \textit{ἀργὴν ἐπεφνεν} were Achaean’ words.
notes, and was already explained in antiquity as ‘serpent-slayer’.\footnote{Watkins (1995:383) cites Eustathius 183.12 who glosses the epiclesis as ὀφιόκτονος.} Pelliccia also adduced the above lines, which have all of the elements of the basic formula (in bold), even if they have been disjoined somewhat.\footnote{Cf. Watkins (1995:384–5): “We can observe in this magnificent inversion of the basic formula the same elements in collocation, reinforced by the framing verse-final focus position (and the intervening homoeoteleuton -ov ... -ov preparing φύοντο).”} Here we can add to the observations of Pelliccia and Watkins and enrich our sense of the force of basic formula even more.

First we emphasize what Apollo’s threat means for the Erinyes. Having been struck by his arrow, they would vomit up their sustenance, their βοσκή as they call it. Although Apollo does not elaborate on what would follow upon the disgorging of their meal, we can easily conclude that they would be deprived of it. Therefore, on the analogy of the gods and their thusiai as well as what results from their being deprived of ἀμβροσία/νέκταρ according to Hesiod (see above §2.3), we can say that the Erinyes, if they were to be struck by Apollo’s special arrow, might suffer something functionally similar to a κακὸν κῶμα or worse; in line with the broader vision of the cosmic struggle, it is worth expressing that the Erinyes seem to be sustained on that from which the gods, in order to be ἀναίμωνες and thereby deathless, abstain.

Second, Apollo’s weapon is more than just a “kenning”,\footnote{Pace Sommerstein (1989:114 ad 181).} “oracular circumlocution”, or “bombast”;\footnote{Pace Podlecki (1989:144 ad 181).} rather it involves a stunning etymological figure that functions as a quasi-magical verbal attack. On the one hand, by referring to his arrow as an ὄφις Apollo could be playing with the homonymy and homophony of the Homeric lexeme ἴός ‘arrow’ and the tragic word ἴός ‘poison’, often of snakes.\footnote{Of the Erinyes themselves at Eu. 478.} I do think that poison is in play here, given the symptoms that Apollo envisions for the Erinyes. In this
case there are two latent etymological figures achieved by ὄφις alone: first, Apollo is threatening to shoot a snake with a snake; second, the god is threatening to poison them, which brings his threat securely into the realm of magic to which the Erinyes’ own δέσμιος ὃμνος (306) belongs.

It is the first latent etymological figure that is of more interest here because it belongs to the same category as ‘Tarḫuntan tarḫta’ and the pun in Genesis. At least verbally, naming the arrow an ὄφις is important because it enables the type of affliction that Apollo envisions, namely being bereft of sustenance and thereby vanquished. I argue further that both πτηνόν and ἀργηστήν enhance this sense. Although it is natural to refer to an arrow as winged, it is marked that Apollo is using a winged snake to attack “wingless” (ἄπτεροι in 51) snake-like creatures; his threat emphasizes their deficiency. Second, although ἀργηστής can mean something like “bright” or “swift” here, I contend that Apollo means something much more insidious. If Aeschylus felt the full strength of the collocation that Pelliccia and Watkins recognized, and if Hermes’ presence in the immediately preceding lines is any help, ἀργηστής could mean something like “snake-eating” here, thereby solidifying the potency of the verbal weapon. That the second element of the adjective could have been felt to have come from the ἐδ-root here is upheld both by Aeschylus’ own use of ὀμηστής (Ag. 827) to describe the metaphorical lion that leapt over the Trojan walls and “lapped up its fill of royal blood” (828) as well as Hesiod’s use of ὀμηστής at Th. 300, which locally modifies ὃφις (299), to describe the

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229 Or white as at Sept. 60 (cf. the ἄργης μαλλός of Eu. 44).
Echidna. What Apollo threatens to do, then, is to give the Erinyes a taste of their own medicine, as it were, to disrupt their identity and render it defunct by replicating it, modifying it, and attacking them with it, just as Nonnus’ Typhoeus sends out his snaky appurtenances to supplant the constellations with μιμήματα of them.

Two questions remain: 1) how does the image of the Erinyes laying siege to a suppliant at Apollo’s temple fit into the play’s opening as well as Apollo’s mythic history as the play acknowledges it, and 2) why should Apollo possess snake arrows in the first place? Answering the first question should indicate the answer to the second as well. In the her opening soliloquy, the Pythia recounts in brief how Apollo came to possess the ‘mantic seat’ of Delphi, a seat which changed hands from Gaia the πρωτόμαντις (12) to Themis (2–4), to the Titaness Phoebe (4–7), and finally to Apollo (‘Phoebus’ 8) himself as a birthday gift (7) from his grandmother. The Pythia emphasizes the non-violent, willing transfer of sovereignty over Delphi down the line of chthonic deities to Olympian Apollo. Nowhere is the Pythonomachy mentioned. And although it is likely, if mythological chronology were to be extracted from the Apollonian myth complex, that Apollo here is understood to have already defeated the Python, such an episode would perhaps be extraneous to a hymnic proem (φροιμάζομαι 20). It would not however be extraneous to the hymn’s narrative content. Thus the very first line the priestess utters following her conclusion of her hymn, her first line since observing the Erinyes alludes to the Pythonomachy (34):

230 ὤμο- + ἐστο- (*ed-to) > ὡμηστής as Sihler (1995:82 § 87) explains, “[w]hen neither vowel [i.e. neither the vowel ending the first ingredient nor that beginning the second ingredient in a compound] is high the first vowel is without effect and the second is replaced by its long counterpart.”

231 I thank Matthew Cohn per litt. for posing these as worthwhile questions as well as for pointing out the lack of mention of a Pythonomachy.

232 [Θέμιδος] θελόσις οὐδὲ πρὸς βίαν πινός (5) according to the Pythia.
Truly terrible to tell! Terrible for the eyes to see!

The pair δεινὸν δερκομέν, present participle paired with cognate accusative, begins three lines in the *Iliad*, and seems to indicate something like “looking terrible” or “having a terrible look [to one’s eyes]”, while here the cognate verb δρακεῖν is epexegetic of the exclamatory substantive δεινά. I propose that, in addition to the surface resemblance of the verb δρακεῖν to the noun for snake of the same root, i.e. δράκων, the collocational history of the latter with δεινός anticipates the snakiness of the Erinyes in general and associates them with Typhoeus and the Typhonomachy in particular.

To begin with, while two of the three instances of δεινὸν δερκομέν in the *Iliad* modify warriors about to engage in single combat, Paris and Menelaus (3.342) in the first instance and Ajax and Diomedes (23.815) in the second, the third instance modifies the intricacy on Agamemnon’s shield at 11.37:

τῇ δ’ ἐπὶ μὲν Γοργώ βλοσυρῶπις ἐστεφάνωτο
δεινὸν δερκομένη, περὶ δὲ Δείμος τε Φόβος τε.

And on the shield the grim-looking Gorgon was wreathed, looking terrible, and around her were Fear and Flight.

The Gorgon has snaky affinities, which are suggested here by the parallelism between her presence on the shield and the “blue-black δράκοντες stretching toward the neck” on Agamemnon’s breastplate several lines earlier (26). But this connection is tendentious on its own.

The pair δεινὸς δρακόν yields firmer results. After Apollo entrusts Hermes with the conveyance of Orestes to Athens, Clytaemestra’s ghost appears to the chorus of sleeping

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233 In fact, the description of the snakes on the breastplates, “three of them like rainbows, which Zeus establishes in cloud as a sign to mortals” (27–8), calls the aegis to mind.
Erinyes and begins to harangue them for falling asleep on the job. When the Erinyes respond only with μυχμοί and ὅμοι, Clytaemestra discerns that they are sleeping and diagnoses what has happened to them (127–8):

"Ὑπνός Πόνος τε κύριοι συνωμόται
deinῆς δράκαινης ἐξεκήραναν μένος.

Sleep and Toil, those master conspirators, enfeebled the fighting spirit of the terrible dragoness!

Thus, although the Pythia has a difficult time likening the Erinyes to any creatures with which she is familiar, without meaning to, she already identifies their typology in her exclamation at 34.\(^{234}\)

For although δράκοντες are not uncommon in early Greek, δράκαιναι, when referred to as such, appear with less frequency. The only extant δράκαινα that appears in in earlier Greek literature is the dragoness of the ‘Pythian’ *Hymn to Apollo*, who must refer to the Python, although she is not named thus in the Hymn itself.\(^{235}\) The Hymn contains the detail that the dragoness nurtured the δεινόν τ’ ἀργαλέον τε Τυφάονα πῆμα βροτοῖσιν (301). So, although she is not δεινή herself, she is the τροφός of a δεινὸς δράκων. After all, Hesiod knows Typhoeus as exactly that (824–5):

καὶ πόδες ἀκάματοι κρατεροῦ θεοῦ· ἐκ δὲ οἱ ὄμοι
ἡν ἑκατὸν κεφαλαὶ ὅφιος δεινοῖο δράκοντος...

And he had the indefatigable legs of a mighty god. And out of his shoulders issued a hundred heads of a terrible serpent.

Thus, we might conclude that the Pythia’s and Apollo’s opening encounters with the Erinyes serve as a doublet to a subsumed reference to the Pythonomachy (and

\(^{234}\) Podlecki (1989:140 ad 128) suggests that the singular δράκαινα “may show that Clytemnestra is also hinting at herself, for at Cho. 249 Orestes calls her a ‘dread viper’.”

\(^{235}\) Janko (1982:77; 1986:43) dates the Pythian hymn (179–end) to c. 586 BCE, and West (2003:10) similarly dates it to “shortly after the First Sacred War, when the Delphic sanctuary was wrested from Crisa’s control by an alliance of Phocians and others and Crisa itself was destroyed (591/590 BC)…”.
secondarily to the Typhonomachy); this fits well with the broader vision of *Chaoskampf* that Aeschylus puts on display. Note well that it is important for answering the second question, why Apollo avails himself of snake-arrows, to understand that Aeschylus has not merely replaced the Pythonomachy with an Erinyomachy in Apollo’s mythic history. Rather, he has compressed the former into collocations, typological resemblances, and, I contend, Apollo’s weaponry.

One the one hand, we might say that ἀργυριστής, if it is a pun meaning something like ‘snake-eating’, refers backward to Apollo’s defeat of the δράκαινα. In this line of thought, ἀργυριστής could come to modify an arrow of Apollo’s owing to the success of the encounter or could signal the arrow’s prior and inherent potency. On the other hand, ἀργυριστής could function more anticipatorily than retrospectively, and could refer to the present potency of the arrow that Apollo threatens to shoot. In this line of thought, again the epithet could be proleptic (“by virtue of what it is going to do to you, Erinyes, the arrow is thus ἀργυριστής”), or it could refer to the arrow’s inherent capabilities. The possibilities here are not mutually exclusive, nor have I exhausted all potential permutations of the reference. But if we keep in mind that ἀργυριστής modifies ὀφίς and adduce a striking comparandum, then we can reasonably speculate as follows: 1) the arrow indicates the subsumed tradition about the Pythonomachy, and 2) its potency against the Erinyes is evidenced by this tradition and possibly secured by it; the arrow is empowered as a snake because Apollo slew a snake, thereby becoming Pythios and perhaps appropriating special features from his vanquished foe.

The Greek mythic tradition includes a number of cases like this, wherein a divinity comes to bear both the name and a feature of a vanquished foe as part of his or
her martial equipage, although sometimes only one or the other. Above we noted the case of Ἀργεῖφόντης, however the first element is to be understood; to that we may add, on Watkins’ passing suggestion, Bellerophontes, the first element of whose name is etymologically all but intractable, but could be snaky. As regards the acquisition of special equipment from a vanquished foe, we recall the case of Athena, who flayed an array of vanquished foes and subsequently wore their skin; one of them was Pallas, which provides one etymology for her epithet. We also know of Heracles and the Nemean lion. Another of Heracles’ feats, however, at least as Sophocles deploys it in the Trachiniae, may clarify what seems to be going on with Apollo and his ὀφίς-arrow in the Eumenides: that feat is the killing of the Lernaian hydra.

2.12 / Precocious mortals: Sophocles’ Trachiniae

Deianeira’s tale of receiving Nessus’ dying gift, in addition to bearing on the nature of the mythic material that is wrapped up in Apollo’s threat to the Erinyes, introduces another issue of pragmatics that is closely related to identity theft: the consequent absorption of identity. This is an important process to consider, since symbols whose scope becomes enlarged abut and infringe upon neighboring symbols. In the case of Heracles, who absorbs the Hydra, one of his cosmic antagonists, into his armament, the effect is dire. Apollo suffers no such effect, and this is a point of distinction between the divine and the heroic.

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236 The βT scholia (ad II. 6.155) tell us the following (odd) origin for his name: Λεωφόντης πρότερον ἐκαλεῖτο. Βέλλερον δὲ ἵππη φονεύσας οὕτως ὄνοµασται (“He was formerly called Lion-slayer, but since he slew Belleros with horsemanship, he is thus called [sc. Slayer of Belleros]”).

237 As he notes (1995:385 n. 4), Zenodotus preferred a byform, Ellerophontes, for Bellerophon’s name in II. 6; the first element could somehow be related to the biform of Illuyanka, Elliyanku, which fits with the Chimaera’s being partly a snake, as Janko (per litt.) reminds me.

238 See Henrichs (1977) on the various versions.
The passage under investigation has been much discussed because of the difficulty of the details in 572–4, although the lines are “clear in general terms.” After summarizing the context, I will briefly refer to the status of the problem before proposing an alternative reading. A successful philological reckoning of the passage requires that we keep in mind the purposeful ambiguity of Nessus’ words.

At 555–581, Deianeira recounts to the Trachinian women how she came to possess the κηλητήριον “love-charm” (575) with which she thinks she can prevent Heracles from loving any other woman in her stead (576–7). Nessus, she recalls, attempted to rape her while ferrying her across the river Evenus (565), only to be shot by Heracles (566–7), who was employing arrows dipped in the Lernaian Hydra’s poison. As Nessus lay dying, he advised her to collect the blood from around his wounds, where it had commingled with the Hydra’s poison. Deianeira thinks that this philter should serve as an effective love charm, but Nessus knew that he was prescribing a fatal poison; this bivalence is built into the language. As Easterling notes, “In each case [where oracular language is involved] the implication is that the knowledge exists—the message is there, available and unchanging—but it only becomes intelligible in the light of events.” To be more precise, the knowledge only becomes intelligible to the characters in the light of events; surely, the audience member, who is no doubt familiar with the tale, acknowledges the true meaning almost instantly.

In the case of Nessus’ ambiguity, the false meaning and the true are wrapped up in what is best described as a (nearly intractable) grammatical difficulty beyond the

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240 1982:3. “Only when Heracles is gripped in the torment of the robe can the Chorus see that ‘release from toils’ meant death (821–30).”
double meaning of the τρεφ- root here. The problem lies in the details Nessus gives about
his wounds and the Hydra’s poison (572—4):

\[\text{ἐὰν γὰρ ἄμφιθρεπτον αἶμα τὸν ἐμὸν σφαγὸν ἑνέγκῃ χερσίν, ἤ μελαγχόλους ἐβαψεν ἰοὺς θρέμμα Λερναίας ὕδρας, ἐσται φρενὸς σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον τῆς Ἡρακλείας, ὥστε ἕτιν' εἰσίδων στέρξει γυναῖκα κεῖνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον.}\]

I defer translating these lines, since the syntax of the phrase ἦ... ὕδρας is under question,
but Easterling’s reckoning of the general sense is tentatively useful:

‘If you take the coagulated blood from my wound, darkened by the Hydra’s poison on Heracles’ arrow, you will have a charm to win your husband back.’\(^\text{241}\)

I should also note that whereas the MSS agree on the text here, modern editors have
offered emendations to a couple of words: Page suggested ὄ in place of ἦ (573); Madvig and Dobree conjectured μελάγχολος... ἰός (573–4), and Wunder μελαγχόλου... ἰοῦ. All three of these proposed emendations appear to be generated by the difficult syntax of 572–4. The syntax and therefore the sense are difficult; but they are not intractable.

First of all, we should recall that Deianeira later realizes that the Hydra’s poison
remains pernicious despite being carried in blood (714–8):

\[\text{τὸν γὰρ βαλὸντ’ ἄτρακτον οἶδα καὶ θεὸν Χείρωνα πημήναντα, χὸνπερ ἀν θίγῃ φθείρει τὰ πάντα κνώδαλ’· ἐκ δὲ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ὀλεῖ καὶ τόνδε;}\]

For I know that the arrow that struck Nessus was one that beset even the god Cheiron with pain, and it destroys any of the whole host of wild creatures that it touches. How won’t this black poison from Nessus’ wounds, which coursed through his blood, kill even Heracles?

\(^{241}\) 1982:144 \textit{ad} 572–5.
Thus, Deianeira must have been deluded to think that Nessus’ blood would somehow lessen the perniciousness of the Hydra’s venom. With that in mind we can go back and disentangle many of the grammatical knots and account for Nessus’ deceptive ambiguity, which caused Deianeira’s deadly misunderstanding.

The first grammatical difficulty is one about which scholars have disagreed for some time: both the internal sense and external syntactic function of θρέμα Λερναίας ὀδρας (574). Many understand this phrase as a periphrasis for the Hydra herself, based on the analogy of phrases in Homer with βίς, ἵς, μένος, σθένος + gen. of the person. Importantly, Long challenged the identification of θρέμα κτέλ. as periphrastic, demonstrating that the parallel examples given for periphrases with θρέμα either do not stand up to close analysis or consist in a descriptive genitive (τὰ νεογένει παιδῶν θρέμματα, Plato Lg. 790D). I contend further that, while all the periphrases in Homer refer to a characteristic heroic vigor or strength, and are thus synecdochic, by contrast, θρέμα, if periphrastic, would serve no metonymic function; nowhere does one find something like ἀνήρ Τειλαμάχο. Long argues that θρέμα... ὀδρας clearly means the ‘Hydra’s poison.’ Davies concurs. For one understanding of the lines, I agree.

Yet Long omits to parse how the phrase functions in the rest of the clause, and leaves West bemused and suggesting a rather perplexing grammatical analysis: West wants θρέμα Λερναίας ὀδρας to be understood as in apposition to an understood χολήν

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242 This summary of the differing views is paraphrased from Easterling (1982:144 ad 572–6).
244 Long (1967:276). He also rightly rejects as irrelevant the parallels from the Trachiniae of φάσμα ταύρου from line 509 and φάσμα ὀδρας from line 837 (275, 277).
245 Furthermore, although Heracles calls the Nemean lion a θρέμα “creature” at 1093, at 1099 he refers to the “three-headed dog of Hades” (1098) as δεινῆς Ἐχίδνης θρέμα.
247 1991:159-61 ad 572ff.
Easterling (like West) is not convinced that θρέμμα, if we accept Long’s understanding of it as ‘poison’, could be the subject of ἐβαψεν. Davies adopts Dobree’s (and Hermann’s) emendation to μελάγχολος... ἱός, circumventing that difficulty. I am hesitant to emend the text given the “striking homogeneity of the tradition,” nor is θρέμμα likely to be part of some double accusative. Excepting the special cases in Aristophanes, modification of βάπτω is carried out by datives of material or prepositional phrases with ἐν or εἰς.

As Long notes, θρέμμα in 574 clearly picks up on ἄμφιθρέπτον in 572 (and is possibly recalled at 834). I propose that the unparalleled adjective ἄμφιθρέπτον must indicate more than coagulation, but only after we come to θρέμμα and figure out the double entendre. Thus we need to take θρέμμα first as a ‘coagulated liquid’ in parallel with the coagulated blood of Nessus. The subject of ἐβαψεν, a verb used elsewhere of stabbing, is an understood Ἡρακλέης or οὗτος, and θρέμμα is therefore in apposition to ιοὺς: thus we read, “… where Heracles dipped his black-galled arrows, the coagulated

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248 1979:111. Davies (1991:160 ad 572ff.) notes that none of the parallels West cites “presents us with an understood word in apposition to an extant word or phrase, and such a construction I find very strained.” I have to admit that I would be equally nonplussed by West’s reckoning, even if the construction were paralleled.
251 See West (1979:111). He rightly points out that the two exempla of the double accusative with βάπτω are not parallels for our construction here.
252 See below, n. 145.
253 West (1979:111) cites S. Aj. 95, [Aesch.] P. V. 863, and E. Ph. 1577-8.
254 So West (1979) and Long (1967). Davies (1991:161) prefers to read μελάγχολος... ἱός, making it the subject of ἐβαψεν and understanding θρέμμα as in apposition to it. The object, on his reckoning, is an understood ‘blood.’ Although Davies approximates the kenning I understand to be in place, his reading strikes me as less natural. Supplying ‘blood’ as the object (from σφαγῶν in 573) seems strained any way you look at it: there is no parallel double accusative construction with βάπτω, as West (1979:11) notes; nor is it likely, as Davies seems to take it, that Nessus is specifying the blood that the arrow/poison (he rightly says that the difference in context is likely very great) has dyed or imbued. Either way, he comments no further on the circumlocution.
liquid of the Lernaian Hydra.”\textsuperscript{255} This of course makes no sense as it is, and we are forced to take ιούς as ‘poison[s]’: “…where Heracles dipped the black-galled poisons, the coagulated blood of the Hydra.” It is this primary reading that deceives Deianeira; she believes that Nessus is saying that his blood has mitigated the danger of the Hydra’s poison.

But if we take θρέμμα likewise as ‘growth’ or ‘nursling’, since that is its usual usage, then we can understand the deceit; whether the primary referent of θρέμμα is the poison product or some metaphoric nursling, it hardly makes sense in the context of the myth to say that the ‘θρέμμα of the Hydra dipped its arrows’ anywhere.\textsuperscript{256}

But what does this mean? I propose that the phrase μέλάγχολοι ἱοι (573–5) secures the sense that the arrows are to be envisioned as a \textit{mimēma} of the Hydra, and a foreboding one at that. Just as Aeschylus does with ὄφις in the \textit{Eumenides}, Sophocles is playing on the homonymy/homophony of ιός ‘arrow’ and ιός ‘[snake] venom’. Heracles’ arrows, endowed as they are with poison, are the θρέμμα resultant from Heracles’ violence and the Hydra’s virulence. The difference in number between the plural ιούς and θρέμμα is appropriate given the Hydra’s nature. That we are to see Heracles’ arrows as snakes, the likely brood of a draconic monster,\textsuperscript{257} is supported further by the noise the arrow makes as it pierces Nessus’ lungs: διερροϊζησεν (568). Before the 1\textsuperscript{st} century CE, the verb διαρροιζέω is unattested outside of this line. The verb ροιζέω, on the other hand, is better attested, being the noise of whistles (\textit{Il.} 10.502, \textit{Od.} 9.315), whizzing arrows (\textit{Il.}

\textsuperscript{255} West (1979:11) also takes θρέμμα as appositional, but to an understood χολήν: “Sophocles now wants to remind us why Heracles’ arrows were μέλαγχολοι...”. I find this to fall short of the full force of the image, and to be just as unwieldy as the unlikely double accusatives against which West argues.

\textsuperscript{256} This is West’s (1979:11) finding as well.

\textsuperscript{257} Although cf. 1098–9, which recognize Cerberus as the δεινῆς Ἐχίδνης θρέμμα.
16.361), and snakes hissing (Th. 835 of Typhoeus, A.R. 4.129);\textsuperscript{258} certainly the flying arrows’ sound and probably the whistles of men are theriophonic.

But whistles and hisses are not decisive on their own. Luckily, the words of the chorus itself in all likelihood confirm the identity of the poison-tipped arrows and the \theta\rho\acute{\epsilon}μ\mu\alpha (831–4):

\begin{verbatim}
ει γάρ σφε Κενταύρου φονίαι νεφέλαι
χρείε δολοποιῶς ἄναγκα
πλευρά, προστακέντος ιοῦ
δὲν τέκετο θάνατος, ἐτρεφε\textsuperscript{259} δ’ αἰώλος δράκων...
\end{verbatim}

For if the treacherous duress of the Centaur anoints his sides with gory cloud, as the poison that Death fathered and the spangled snake nurtured\textsuperscript{260} clings fast…

As Easterling summarizes, “[t]he Chorus trace the disaster to its sources, Nessus and the Hydra, metaphorically representing Heracles’ violent struggle in the robe as a physical encounter with these two monsters.”\textsuperscript{261} She notes further the “faint foreshadowing” of Hyllus’ words at 770–1 (ἐἰτα φοινίας / ἕχθρας ἔχιδνης ἱὸς ὡς ἔδαίνυτο).\textsuperscript{262} At this point, a translation seems called for:

\begin{verbatim}
εάν γάρ ἄμφιθρεπτον αἷμα τῶν ἐμῶν
σφαγῶν ἐνέγκῃ χερσίν, ἥ μελαγχόλους
ἔβαψεν ἵῷς θρέμμα Λερναίας ὕδρας,
ἐσται φρένός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον 575
τῆς Ἴρακλείας, ὡστε μίτιν’ εἰςιδιὸν
στέρξει γυναῖκα κείνος ἀντὶ σοῦ πλέον.
\end{verbatim}

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\textsuperscript{258} Later (i.e. in LXX), of birds and streams.
\textsuperscript{259} The MSS read ἔτεκε here, but most commentators prefer Lobeck’s ἐτρεφε for a number of philological reasons. See Jebb (1892:125 \textit{ad} 834), and Long (1967:277–8), who argues for θρέμματι instead of φάσματι in 837 (cf. Jebb 196), and Easterling (1983:177–8 \textit{ad} 834–5). West (1979:11) also accepts Lobeck’s conjecture without comment. Even if ἔτεκε were correct, there is little practical difference between a τέκος and a θρέμμα.
\textsuperscript{260} Or “clotted”, as Janko \textit{per litt.} reminds me.
\textsuperscript{261} 1982:177 \textit{ad} 831–40.
\textsuperscript{262} Easterling (1982:177 \textit{ad} 831–40).
For if you carry in your hands the clotted blood from my wounds, where he dipped his black-galled arrows, the nursling of the Hydra, you will have a charm for the mind of Heracles, such that, even if he sees another woman, he will not love her more than he loves you.

Conquering heroes and divinities, it seems, have the power to appropriate the essence of their vanquished foes into their armament, into their own identities. In the case of Heracles, by using the Hydra’s poison he has enabled the slain monster to confer her dangerous identity upon his weaponry. This transference of identity is facilitated by the verbal link between the word for ‘arrow’ and the word for ‘[snake] venom’. When Heracles then uses this modified weapon against Nessus, the dying Centaur seizes on the opportunity to engender a retributive weapon that will arise from and in the form of the very two creatures, the Hydra and Nessus, that Heracles slew. Nessus presages the nature of this weapon in his use of derivatives of τρέφω. Finally, we can point out the pernicious ambiguity of lines 575–6 (ἔσται φρενός σοι τοῦτο κηλητήριον / τῆς Ἡρακλείας...), the apodosis of the condition. What Deianeira hears is “you will have this philter as a charm over Heracles’ mind”, but the proximity of the dative σοι to φρενός and the delay of τῆς Ἡρακλείας suggests a second reading: “Your mind, Deianeira, will be deluded [viz. into thinking that this is a benign love charm].” This is the nature of verbal art. This is sympathetic magic at its most devastating.263

As Faraone rightly comments on Heracles’ pleas for pity (1070–75), “Heracles, who elsewhere in the play is called the greatest and best of men… has been reduced to a weak… maiden. He also makes it clear that this transformation was the work of a

female."\(^{264}\) Deianeira, who is ἀνανδρος (1062),\(^{265}\) has caused Heracles to become a παρθένος (1071), θῆλυς (1075). Regardless of the question of intent, Deianeira has lived up to her name, and has joined the ranks of destroyers, appropriators, and stealers of identity. As Heracles refers to her, she is Hyllus’ πατροφόντης μήτηρ (1125), or perhaps simply, Πατροφόντης.\(^{266}\)

2.13 / Preliminary conclusions

Over the course of these first two chapters, I have argued that poetics and grammar itself are implicated in a broad spectrum of mythic narratives. Problems of language and problems of classification disrupt the cosmic structure, and often the power of language and the reassertion of its classificatory ability serve to set it aright.

In this chapter specifically I have demonstrated that attempts on the heavenly throne or on a place in the line of succession many times involved unsettling the namesake of the victim of the attack. In extreme cases, such as that which Nonnus composed, the cosmos was literally replaced by the snaky minions of chaos, while the prime assailant took over the epithetic complexes of his victims (Poseidon and Zeus). In a few of these cases, a poetic countermeasure like a non-transferable formula, or an appeal to unassailable patrilineage, was deployed.

Finally, I examined a related mythopoetic phenomenon: the assumption and redeployment of an identity that was appropriated from a foe who was vanquished in the

\(^{264}\) 1991:126.

\(^{265}\) κοῦκ ἀνδρος codd. See Easterling’s note (1982:207 ad loc.)

\(^{266}\) cf. S. O.T. 1440–1: ἀλλ’ ἢ γ’ ἐκείνου πᾶσ’ ἐδηλώθη φάτις, τὸν πατροφόντην, τὸν ἄσεβὴ μ’ ἀπολλύναι (“But the oracle’s pronouncement of that [sc. instruction] is completely manifest, that I, the father-slayer, the impious one, be damned.”) Though the evidence is scant, it might not be inappropriate to say this byform of πατροφόνος is specialized.
prehistory of a current myth. In some cases this accrual of identity enabled the victor-god to lord his enhanced, identity-disrupting weaponry over an antagonist; in one case, the conquering hero unwittingly fashioned his own demise by preserving the essence of a noxious enemy that he had previously overcome.

The results of our inquiry thus far have suggested that the narratives of many myths are fueled by issues of categorization, of sphere of action, of naming and transgressing the limits imposed and regulated by *nomina*. Mortals pretending to immortality upset a central organizing feature of the cosmos. Snaky monsters, which are understood in many cases as *a priori* unclassifiable, attempt to displace the Storm-god from his throne. In so doing they threaten the life-giving powers attached to the names no less than the mythic functions of the god.

If the habits and systematic associations which provide a symbol with its sign-action are called into question by a new and antithetical action or association, not only does the symbol start to collapse, but the system of associations, which obtains *a posteriori*, get called into question. Can Tarḫun ever rightly be known as the ‘Overcomer’ if he is overcome by Illuyanka? Does a binary opposition of mortals to immortals mean anything, if mortals accede to the lifestyle or the freedom from cares (at least the ones Greeks might have classified as θυμοβόρος) that only immortals are supposed to know? These questions, among many other versions of them, indicate that, even before the pre-Socratics asked what, if anything, subsisted beneath names, even before Parmenides assigned a binary classification to deceptive *doxa*, story-tellers, myth-givers, and communities were troubled by the seeming arbitrariness of signage, by the absence of an identifiable *a priori* justification for any immutable cosmology.
Men may come to expect to die because that is what they witness without fail, generation after generation, but other realities can be imagined and versified. Yet against this fantasy experience persists, and the integrity of some unchanging other is given preference over the fantasy. For as long as there exists an Inaccessible and a Not-us, then men can continue to fantasize about participating in it and can ask it, rationally or not, for some symbol, some instance of its eternity, as a token of its benevolence. And by this symbolic participation men come to hope for more. And the cycle persists.
Chapter 3. The dangers of (being) Aphrodite

3.1 / Introduction and synthesis

In the first two chapters we examined how the ancient Greeks and their Mediterranean neighbors imagined the organization of the universe as well as the perils that the organization faces. In Chapter 1, I detailed how anthropogenic narratives present man’s onetime nearness to the gods as eventually unsettled, perhaps because the notion itself is disruptive; we determined that the very language of such anthropogenies demonstrates that the divine stands in danger of being rendered meaningless if men are subject to the same goods, the same automatous environment, the same freedom from anxiety about death that the gods enjoy. Narratives about the Fall highlight the incompatibility between mortal fantasy and the ability of language to describe the structure of the cosmos, between what we might call mortal yearning for immortality and the very impulse of narrative and story-telling: lack, conflict, and distance impel narrative movement.

In the second chapter, we observed another imagined threat to the cosmos. This threat presents itself and is eventually overcome in *Chaoskämpfe*, battles between the forces of disorder and the champions of stability. These forces of disorder often show up as snakes, the natural world’s shape-shifter par excellence. Nonnus certainly makes it clear why snakes are appropriate polymorphs, when he shows the snaky appurtenances of
Typhon coiling themselves into all sorts of shapes in order to mimic and effectively replace the constellations.  

We determined, then, two fronts on which the battle for cosmic stability gets waged: on one side, the division between men and gods, which is a prerequisite for mytho-religious communication, threatens to dissolve when narratives bring men and gods into close contact; on the other side, agents of chaos also threaten to upset the meaningfulness of the language that determines the ordering of the universe and man’s place within it. These are not envisaged as purely intellectual threats: on the first front, myths show in sometimes stark detail the violence that breaks out among men who aspire to immortality; on the second front, the natural world, the relative predictability of whose cycles and internal boundaries allows men make use of its life-giving properties and avoid its death-dealing ones, becomes confounded, unpredictable, and sometimes fully pernicious.

It becomes apparent in a couple of cases that these two fronts were not totally isolated from one another: for example, in the two versions of the Hittite myth that details the battle between Tarhun and the serpent Illuyanka, the mortal helpers of both versions die, probably because, in the course of helping the Storm-god, they have transgressed the boundary between mortals and immortals, a fascinating tragic detail in an otherwise minimalist account.  

In this chapter we explore the coalescence of these two cosmic issues further in the strange case of Aphrodite of Book 5 of the Iliad: there, she appears to threaten cosmic

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267 While gods have been known to metamorphose into all sorts of things, sometimes to nefarious ends, I should think that the snake is a different, more illicit, kind of shape-shifter in that he or she has no form except for what shape it decides to coil itself into.

268 As Beckman (1982) points out.
stability on both fronts simultaneously. This vision of her as such a formidable threat to
the order of the universe emerges in part out of her complicated genetics: even if she
resembles Indo-European Dawn goddesses, she bears even more striking
correspondences to Near Eastern goddesses of love. It is these Near Eastern
goddesses in particular who themselves bear troubling features for the kosmoi in which
they operate.

3.2 / Aphrodites: Apostasis and syntasis

In this section I do not try to add much to the discussion of Aphrodite’s origins: I
concede that, especially on matters of this goddess’ mythic history, diachrony remains
elusive. This unapproachability does not mean that the question of her origins is not a
worthwhile one for trying to elucidate some of the interfaces within the complex of those
origins; it is rather to say that the question is largely useless if it is aimed at locating a
simplex ‘Aphrodite’, especially since Aphrodite’s relationship with the Eastern goddesses
with whom she is thought to have syncretized is variable within the Greek land- and
seascape. As Budin has argued, on Cyprus Aphrodite and Ashtart were identified (a so-called interpretatio), whereas in the rest of Greece Aphrodite slowly became
orientalized. I would add, however, that in Homer it may be the case that the

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269 See Boedeker 1974. Her connection of Aphrodite with IE Dawn goddesses is useful; her vexed etymology for Aphrodite’s name is less so.
270 I stress again that categories like Indo-European and Near Eastern, when considered as mutually exclusive, are virtual at best. It is of course apparent that the Greeks recognized themselves as opposed to an array of ‘Others’, incorrectly at times, but on the ground it is much more likely that a cultural-linguistic koiné is responsible for the sharing of literary and intellectual artifacts of diverse origin.
271 While eroticism is part of these goddesses’ domain, it is not always fronted to the extent that it is for Aphrodite.
272 Budin (2003) does, however, do some good work for diachrony with the archaeological evidence.
interpretatio of ‘Aphrodite’/Ashtart, whom we will call Cypriot Aphrodite, gets amalgamated with the Inanna-Ishtar that the Lycians must have known about from Hittite- and other Luwian-speaking peoples; after all, Cypriot material on its way to Ionia likely passed along the coast of Lycia.

In short, Homeric and the Hesiodic visions of Aphrodite cannot, without ceasing to be our earliest Greek literary Aphrodites, be stripped of their Near Eastern vestments (this metaphor will come to appear appropriate in the discussion of the goddess’ vestments). At the same time, we should not think of her as simply an Eastern import into a daughter pantheon of the Indo-Europeans.274

Moreover, this issue of origins is by no means peculiar to Greek Aphrodite among the Mediterranean/NE host of ‘Aphrodites’. As Rivkah Harris notes, “[t]he history of the syncretism and fusion of the Sumerian Inanna with the Akkadian Ishtar is complex and problematic.”275 Harris’ article discusses Inanna-Ishtar as paradox on a “fundamental and irreducible” level, even as regards the spectrum of order–chaos or structure–antistructure.

I suggest that the diachronic snarl we encounter for Aphrodite is perhaps owing to the synchronic one already present in the role of Inanna(-Ishtar). I am not alleging that some conscious confusion of origins for Aphrodite took place (although why not?); rather, I am positing that the synchronic set of problems expected of Inanna-Ishtar, her innate contradictoriness, more precisely her considerable multiplicity, made her especially prone to movement into Greek myth and especially apt for attachment to

274 Summaries of attempts to distill an origin for Aphrodite, etymologically, cultically, etc. can be found in Boedeker (1974), Friedrich (1976), West (2000), Budin (2003, cf. 2004), Beekes (2010). The communis opinio, at least regarding her name, is that it is of Semitic origin, although the details of sound change are still not agreed upon.

native or inherited goddesses who themselves wield expansive, sometimes disruptive power. For even if we concede that Aphrodite in some ways maintains vestiges of an IE Dawn goddess, perhaps as a hypostasis, by the time of the Homeric poems she is functionally all but displaced from that role.

Furthermore, as we will show, there is a complex of important connections to Inanna-Ishtar in the Aphrodite of the *Iliad*, in which we find some analogs to the issues that the Mesopotamian goddess poses in the myths in which she features. These correspondences may shed some light on the cultural and theological framework for the wounding of Aphrodite at the hands of Diomedes in *Iliad* 5. First, we will engage with a potential connection between Aphrodite and her Near Eastern analogs from *Iliad* 14. Then we will deal with the oddities of Aphrodite’s wounding, namely the method by which she saves Aeneas, her wound at the end of Diomedes’ spear, and her consolation by Dione. Part of the discussion involves a reckoning of the passage in terms of the Homeric *Kunstsprache*; part involves contextualizing the passage in a broader linguistic and mythological milieu. As will become apparent, these two sides of the analysis often go hand in hand: the poet enriches his artistic idiom both through internal play (etymological, metrical, phonetic) and by opening up his lexical and mythological repertoire to non-native material. Given the peculiarity of the passage, it seems better at this point to talk of the poet recognizing and engaging with the foreignness of certain

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276 Budin (2003:282) concludes likewise: “There is ambiguity in the Greek portrayal of Aphrodite, just as, for the Greeks, there was perceived ambiguity concerning the origins of this goddess and her arrival into Greece.”

277 The vestiges of her associations with the Dawn goddess are compelling and certainly deserve to be explored as germane to our discussion of the episode in *Iliad* 5.
elements rather than merely preserving an inherited tradition that had already come to terms with Near Eastern material.

3.3 / Powerful garments, ME’s, and τιμαί: Some correspondences

One of the more arresting correspondences between Aphrodite, as she appears in the *Iliad*, and Inanna-Ishtar involves the magical seductive garment, the κεστὸς ἱµᾶς in Homer. In his note on *Il. 14.214–7*, lines from the prelude to the *Dios apatê*, Janko adduces the parallel of Inanna, who is “stripped of her ‘breast decoration’ as of all else” in the *Descent... to the Nether World (ANET 55).* This observation hints at the importance of Inanna’s being stripped.

The story goes that Inanna makes her way through the seven gates of the Underworld to stand before Ereshkigal, her sister, whose nature is also contradictory. At each gate she is stripped of pieces of her getup, which seem to correspond to or in effect function as the ME’s; Kramer translates these ME’s as *(divine) ordinances,* elsewhere *(divine) decrees.* These are not just *de facto* Inanna’s birthright, the *Inanna and Enki* myth shows us. In that myth, Inanna first acquires ostensibly all of them or at least a great number beyond expectation, and Enki attempts but has a difficult time

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278 1992:184–5. The detail of the seven gates of the underworld is reflected in *CTH 324 (A* iv 14–9 = 2 §27 Hoffner, 1998),* one version of the Telepinu myth. There, as Hoffner (1998:17) translates, “The gatekeeper opened the seven doors. He drew back the seven bars. Down in the Dark Earth stand bronze vats. Their lids are of lead. Their latches are of iron. That which goes into them doesn’t come up again; it perishes therein.”

279 Heffron (2013) notes that she is associated with both death and birth; she is both Mother Earth and a virgin goddess. Classicists will quickly call to mind Gaia/Gê and Nyx. And we might also keep in mind, that Nergal, Ereshkigal’s consort, is the god of war.

280 West (1997:239, 383–4) notes that the clothing of gods and heroes in abstraction has NE parallels.

281 1950:361; 1951: *passim*; in a note to line 14 of the text, where Inanna arrays herself in the ME’s, Kramer tells us they are thought of as the origin and controls of “civilization” (quotation marks Kramer’s, indicating that ‘civilization’ may itself be problematic). But see also Green’s review of Farber-Flügge (1976) and Harris (1991:267 n. 33) for bibliography on the ME’s.
retrieving them despite sending a platoon of monsters after her getaway boat. Suffice it to say for now that the ME’s seem in part to be analogous to the τημαί of the *Theogony* and comprise the Sumerian gods’ cultic and mythic identities.\(^{282}\) That Inanna acquires so many, including “heroism, power... the plundering of cities”,\(^{283}\) will be an important point of comparison when we deal with Aphrodite’s issues in *Il. 5*.

At the seventh and final gate of the Underworld, Inanna, in spite of her protestations, is stripped of her breastplate, which is what is usually connected functionally with the κεστός.\(^{284}\) After this *pala*-garment, the garment of ladyship,\(^{285}\) is removed, Inanna is killed, and her corpse is hung on a hook and has to be revived by the *kalaturru* and *kurgurru*, whom Enki has fashioned and endowed with the food and water of life. Thus it seems that Inanna is prepared for death by first being divested of her τημαί, which are contained or represented in part by her breastplate. It is quite possible then that the breastplate, which is collocated in the *Descent* with other beautifying apparatus, is involved to some degree in the seductive elements of Inanna’s nature; that Inanna is collocated in Near Eastern charms involving fruit, just as Aphrodite is in Greek myth, either strengthens that possibility or suggests that the various associations of Inanna are compressed for Aphrodite.\(^{286}\)

If we are right that the myth of Inanna’s *katabasis* and death involve the idea that the goddess’ essence is in part connected with her apparatus, then, it seems to be mirrored

\(^{282}\) As Green (1976:284) notes, what is unusual about Inanna is that she acquires so many and such varied powers.

\(^{283}\) From Segment D of translation of the ‘Inanna and Enki’ myth from Oxford’s *Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature (ETCSL)*.

\(^{284}\) As Janko (1992:184–5) notes, κεστός is not a noun but a verbal adjective from κεντέω modifying ιμάς, but for the sake of brevity, I will do as Callimachus does and deploy it as a substantive.

\(^{285}\) ‘Inanna’s descent to the Underworld’, translated by Black et al. (2006).

\(^{286}\) Faraone (1990:235–6); see below on the Old Babylonian hymn parallel.
by the case of Aphrodite. When Hera, apparently needing Aphrodite’s special strap in order to deceive Zeus in *Il.* 14, asks the love goddess to help her reconcile Ocean and Tethys, a strange but apparently effective prevarication on her part, Aphrodite accedes because Hera “sleeps in Zeus’ arms”; as Janko notes, the reason Aphrodite gives for agreeing ironically foreshadows the real reason for Hera’s request. At *Il.* 14.214–21, Aphrodite hands over the κεστός:

* ἤ, καὶ ἀπὸ στήβεσθιν ἑλύσατο κεστὸν ἰμάντα
  ποικίλον, ἐνθὰ δὲ οἱ θελκτήρια πάντα τέτυκτον
  ἐνδ’ ἐν μὲν φιλότητι, ἐν δ’ ἰμεροῦ, ἐν δ’ ὀσφυστὺς
  πάρφασίς, ἤ τ’ ἐκλεων νῦν πῦκα περ φρονεόντων,
  τὸν ρα’ ὦ εὐμπαλε χερσίν ἐπος τ’ ἐφατ’ ἐκ τ’ ὀνόμαζε:
  “τῇ νῦν τοῦτον ἰμάντα τεῷ ἐγκάτθεο κόλπῳ
  ποικίλον, ὃ ἐνὶ πάντα τετεύχαται· οὐδὲ σὲ φημὶ
  ἄπροκτὸν γε νέεσθαι, ὃ τι φρεσὶ σῆσι μενοινᾶς.”

She spoke and undid the intricate embroidered strap from her chest, whereupon all manners of charm are wrought for her. Thereupon is sex, and desire, and sweet nothings, and beguilement, which steals even wise wits from careful men. She put it in her hands and spoke and addressed her: “Now place this intricate strap on your bosom, on which everything has been wrought. I suspect you won’t come back unsuccessful, whatever it is you purpose in your heart.”

The strap therefore contains the τιμή/μοῖρα that Aphrodite is said to receive in the *Theogony* after the story of her birth (203-6):

* ταύτην δ’ εξ ἀρχῆς τιμὴν ἔχει ὧδε λέλογγε
  μοῖραν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,
  παρθενίους τ’ ὀάρους μειδήματά τ’ ἐξαπάτας τε
  τέρψιν τε γλυκερὴν φιλότητά τε μειλιχίην τε.

And from the beginning she’s held this honor and hit upon this allotment among men and the immortal gods, the sweet-nothings of maidens, and smiles, and beguilements, and sugary delight, and lovemaking, and honey-sweetness.

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West helpfully adduces an Old Babylonian Ammi-ditana hymn celebrating Ishtar as “She of joy, clothed in love, / adorned with fruit, seductive charm, and sex”. There is yet, however, a strange disparity between how the narrator describes what is embroidered on Aphrodite’s strap and what the goddess tells Hera is on it. On the one hand, πάντα (220) could just be shorthand for θελκτήρια πάντα (215), and one could assume that Hera knows what “everything” consists of. On the other hand, one cannot help but think of the shield of Achilles, on which everything really is wrought. Furthermore, we ought to compare the ‘Inanna and Enki’ myth, where the goddess does acquire seemingly all of the habitudes of civilization. There is no reason to think that the Greeks of the Iron Age and earlier did not have to reconcile their adoption of an all-powerful goddess, and one who thought of herself as such, with their own theological framework. A later Orphic hymn is quite explicit about the extreme breadth of Aphrodite’s dominion (Orphic h. 55.1–7):

Οὐρανία, πολύμηνε, φιλομμειδής Αφροδίτη, ποντογενής, γενέτειρα θεά, φιλοπάννυχε, σεμνή, νυκτερία ζεύκτειρα, δολοπλόκε μήτερ Ανάγκης· πάντα γὰρ ἐκ σέθεν ἔστιν, ὑπεζεύξω δὲ <τε> κόσμον καὶ κρατέεις τρισσὼν μοιρῶν, γεννᾶς δὲ τὰ πάντα, ὃς τ’ ἐν οὐρανῶι ἔστι καὶ ἐν γαίῃ πολυκάρπῳ ἐν πόντῳ τε βυθῶι

Heavenly one, much-hymned, smiling Aphrodite, sea-born, mother goddess, lover of nightlong festivals, hallowed, nocturnal yokestress, wile-weaving mother of Necessity. For everything issues from you, and you put the cosmos under the yoke and you rule over the three domains, and you engender all, as many things as there are in the sky and on the fruitful earth and in the depth of the sea.

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289 ETCSL: ‘Inanna and Enki’.
Another striking parallel between Hesiod and Homer involves the ensuing scene of Zeus and Hera’s lovemaking (346-53):

\[ Ἡ ῥα καὶ ἄγκας ἐμαρπτε Κρόνου παις ἦν παράκοιτιν· τοῖσι δ᾽ ὑπὸ χθῶν διὰ φύεν νεοθηλέα ποίην, λωτόν θ᾽ ἑρσὴντα ἴδε κρόκον ἥδ᾽ ὑάκινθον πυκνὸν καὶ μαλακόν, δὲ ἀπὸ χθονὸς ύψόσ᾽ ἐεργε. τῷ ἐν λεξάσθην, ἐπὶ δὲ νεφέλην ἐσσαντο καλὴν χρυσείην· στιλπναὶ δ᾽ ἀπέπιπτον ἐερσαι. \]

So he spoke and Cronus’ son took his wife by the arms. Beneath them the ground sprouted grass, newly verdant, and dewy clover, and crocus, and hyacinth, thick and soft, which kept them high aloft off the ground; on this the two of them lay, and were covered over in a fine, golden cloud. Scintillating dewdrops fell from it.

As Janko and West note, the image of the grass, herbs, and flowers springing up beneath them, in addition to providing comfort to Zeus and Hera and fulfilling the demand of dignity, illustrates the concept that the activity of the love-goddess brings about verdure.\(^\text{290}\) Besides the close parallel at Th. 194, where grass springs up under Aphrodite’s first steps on land,\(^\text{291}\) Inanna is associated with a bed of flowers in a praise song of Išme-Dagan (100–105).\(^\text{292}\)

Inanna, the lady of heaven and earth ……, chose me as her beloved spouse. She put attractiveness in my waist-belt (?), looking at me with her life-giving look, as she lifted her radiant forehead to me, to make me step onto the flowery bed.

Consorting with Inanna, it seems, enhances one’s beauty. Interestingly, in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, we see the narrative details of the praise song shaken up somewhat: at 148, Anchises chooses the disguised Aphrodite as his spouse (… ἐμὴ δ᾽ ἄλοχος κεκλῆσαι ἦματα πάντα); at 155–8, Aphrodite makes her way toward Anchises’ bed with


\(^{291}\) I wonder, too, if the στιλπναὶ ἐερσαι correspond in any way with the bloody ραθάμιμμες at Theogony 183.

\(^{292}\) ETCSL ‘A praise poem of Išme-Dagan’
eyes cast downward (… φιλομειδής δ’ Ἀφροδίτη / ἔρπε μετασπερφθείσα κατ’ ὄμματα καλὰ βαλοῦσα / ἐς λέχος…); she removes her jewelry, which the poet first summarizes at 162 as κόσον… φαεινόν (!!), after which man and goddess lie literally and literally right next to each other (167: ἀθανάτῃ παρέλεκτο θεᾷ βροτός);293 and after Anchises and Aphrodite have sex, while Anchises is fast asleep, Aphrodite resumes her divine beauty and stature (171–5).

The exceptional scene of divine sexual intercourse in the Iliad seems to be unparalleled, at least in Greek sources. But an almost exact parallel for this scene appears in ‘A balbale (?) to Inanna (Dumuzid-Inanna P)’. After Inanna encourages Dumuzi to “plough her genitals” before Segment B of the text breaks off, Segment C begins with five very fragmentary lines followed by what looks like a description of the result of Dumuzi and Inanna’s sexual congress:

The holy embrace ……. Fresh fruits (?) and shoots ……. As she arises from the king’s embrace, the flax rises up with her, the barley rises up with her. With her, the desert is filled with a glorious garden.294

I suggest that the responsive fecundity of the ground beneath Zeus and Hera occurs precisely because Aphrodite has been involved, not just abstractly, but by lending Hera the strap. Thus Aphrodite’s τιμή and her ME, both her essence and her ordinance, have temporarily accreted to Hera along with the garment. As we will discuss in the next section, it may be the case that Aphrodite’s wounding scene is connected with this motif as well.

293 See Faulkner (2011:232–3 ad loc.) for parallels in Greek, Latin, and Vedic.
294 ETCSL: ‘A balbale (?) to Inanna (Dumuzid-Inanna P)’
3.4 / Transgression: The rescue of Aeneas

At this point, we turn to *Iliad* 5, the bulk of Diomedes’ *aristeia*. Inspired by Athena with fighting strength and rashness (1–2), Tydeus’ son goes on a rampage: he almost kills Aeneas, wounds Aphrodite, and later injures Ares, although Athena’s ‘hand’ in Ares’ injury is much heavier. We begin with his encounter with the Dardanian prince. Diomedes picks up a monstrous stone and hurls it at Aeneas, hitting him in the hip, “where the thigh turns in the hip-socket, which they call the little cup” (305–6), breaking the tendons and ‘shoving’ off the flesh. Aeneas falls to his hands and knees and at 310 “dark night envelops his eyes” (ὅσσε κελαινή νῦξ ἑκάλυψεν).

In commenting on the phraseology of Aeneas’ injury, Kirk compares the formula τὸν δὲ σκότος ὀσσ’ ἑκάλυψεν, which occurs eleven times in the *Iliad* and normally implies dying rather than fainting. In fact, ‘normally’ is understated: in every instance in the *Iliad*, the formula indicates someone’s dying, as do all three occurrences of the verse-long formula τὸν δὲ κατ’ ὀφθαλμὸν ἔρεβεννή νῦξ ἑκάλυψεν. On the other hand, the specific formula that is used to indicate Aeneas’ peril, κελαινή νῦξ ἑκάλυψεν, possibly recurs at 11.356, where Diomedes’ spear-cast strikes Hector in the helmet, which Apollo had given the Trojan prince (τὴν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων, 353). The helmet rebuffs the spear, and “black night envelops” Hector, indicating that the hero has been dazed, probably concussed. The formula has one more variation, which appears at

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295 For general discussion of darkness and mist covering the head of those aggrieved, asleep, or dead see Onians (1954:420–423).
296 This figure does not include the close variant of 16.325: κατὰ δὲ σκότος ὀσσ’ ἑκάλυψεν. West (1998, 2000), following the MSS, consistently prints the formula with both the ephelcystic *μ* and the syllabic augment (with corresponding elision of the accusative dual morpheme ~*ε*).
14.439, 298 where once again (I dare say almost laughably) poor Hector gets the worst of an encounter with a proxy for Achilles, 299 this time Ajax, who hits him in the chest with a large stone. Hector’s comrades bring him to the Xanthus (i.e. the Scamander) to recover, and the prince “…vomited up blood / and again he sank backward to the earth, and down upon his eyes / black night brought her veil (νυξ ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα), and the missile was yet beating down his life (βέλος δ’ ἐτι θυμόν ἐδάμινα)” (437–9).

Thus we have a basic formula DARKNESS COVERS EYES, which fifteen out of eighteen times in the Iliad indicates death or dying; two out of the three cases in which it does not are also the only two occurrences of the κελαινή νύξ subspecies of the basic formula. It is possible that the exceptional collocation of this subspecies with an escape from death determines the function of the adjective-noun pair as indicating merely the loss of consciousness, but unless κελαινή νύξ was understood as qualitatively different from σκότος and ἐρεβεβευνή νύξ, we should assume that the poet meant to indicate that Aeneas and Hector were experiencing death, just as other heroes do. 300 The further

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298 We might also compare the “cyan cloud” that envelops Polydorus at 20.417 after Achilles’ spear passes through his belly “beside the navel” (416). The “black cloud of grief (ἄχεος)” that envelopes Hector (17.591) and Achilles (18.22) is a variation of the motif clearly delineated from the nexus we are handling by the presence of the adjectival genitive.

299 On Diomedes’ role as Achilles’ proxy, see in particular Andersen (1978).

300 For a more conservative assessment of the formulae, see Dyer (1974:32), who overemphasizes, in my estimation, the episodes of fainting, and misreads the cases of Telephorus and Deiphobus. Aristonicus, in his commentary Περὶ τῶν σημείων τῆς Ἰλιάδος καὶ Ὀδυσσείας, explains why the doublet indicating Hector’s loss of consciousness 11.356 is obelized and asterisked by Aristarchus: ὡς ἐπ’ Αἰνείου· οὐ γέγονε γάρ σφοδρά πληγή, ὡς ἐπ’ Ἀινείου· οὗ “θλάσσε δὲ οἱ κοτύλην” (Ε 307) πῶς οὖν ἑσκοτώθη; Since he did not receive quite the blow Aeneas did, there was no reason for his ‘blacking out’ (πῶς οὖν ἑσκοτώθη). (Friedländer (1853) inserted ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐ.) The apparent ignorance about head injuries notwithstanding, Aristonicus’ use of σκοτῶθη perhaps indicates an ancient understanding of the proximity or equivalency of the formula used to describe Aeneas’ near-death experience to that of the death experience. Zenodotus omitted 11.356, and both Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus athetized it. See West (1998 app. crit. ad loc.).
explication of the lines from Book 14 that the missile was “yet beating down Hector’s life-force” supports this assessment.301

Moreover, the encounters of Aeneas and Hector with Diomedes are marked as special by the collocation in both cases of divine aid: in the case of Hector’s concussion, the poet recalls the divine donor of the piece of armor which saves Hector, namely Apollo; in the case of Aeneas’ devastating hip injury, a divinity herself rescues him and suffers terribly for it. I argue here that Aphrodite’s rescue of Aeneas, because of the hero’s being in extremis as far as the Kunstsprache is concerned (had the poet stopped with 310, the audience would have understood that Aeneas was dead), involves a theological crisis, a demonstration of the dangers, even on the level of language, of divine intervention in the affairs of heroes. Aphrodite, I will argue further, is peculiarly apt to be the offending divinity, in part because of her multiform identity and her problematic set of powers.

3.5 / Image and echo: A verbal defense

The particular formula for the near-death experience (which for efficiency’s sake we will call the ‘veil-of-night formula’) that the poet applies to the case of Aeneas gets used, I argue, because it sets the poet up to counteract it on several levels of expression during Aphrodite’s exceptional rescue effort. We quote the scene, from night’s envelopment of Aeneas’ eyes to Aphrodite’s intervention (310–6), in full:

… ἀμφὶ δὲ ὄσσε κῆλαινη νῦξ ἐκάλυψεν

301 My assessment comports with that of Katz (2000) on the *wes- root in Indo-European. To summarize, Katz argues that clothing root (seen in Latin vestis and Greek ἐννυμί) is connected with vesper and ἔσπερος—the Indo-Europeans imagined Night as donning a shroud—and that the shroud is particularly a funereal one. Katz (2000:76 and n. 26) discusses both the collocations of νῦξ and καλόπτω in Homer.
καὶ νῦ κεν ἕνθ’ ἀπόλοιτο ἂναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνείας,
εἰ μὴ ἄρ’ ὀξὺ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη,
μήτηρ, ἢ μιν ὑπ’ Ἀγχίση τέκε βουκόλεον·
ἀμφὶ δ’ ἐδὲν φίλον ὕπον ἐχεῦσατο πήξει λεύκῳ,
πρόσθε δὲ οἱ πέπλοι φαεινοῦ πτύγματοι ἐκάλυψεν
ἐρκὸς ἔμεν βελέων...

And about his eyes dark night placed her veil, and now
Aeneas, lord of men, would have died on the spot, had not
the daughter of Zeus, Aphrodite, taken keen notice, Aeneas’
mother, who bore him to Anchises, [having slept with him]
while he was shepherding. About her dear son she shed her
two white arms, and in front she veiled him with the fold of
her shining robe, to be a defense against missiles.

The music as well as the grammar of the passage is critical for understanding the
momentousness of the episode. First, the veil-of-night formula, κελαινὴ κτλ., comprises
one version of the so-called ‘paroemiac’. This colon occurs independently in other
meters, e.g. at the beginning of Archilochus’, Stesichorus’, and Ibycus’ strophes. It
appears to be a versatile unit of composition, perhaps one of the two larger building
blocks of the hexameter; the importance of this versatility will become clear when we
detail the musicality of the rescue. Second, in terms of the death-dealing formula’s
phonemic qualities, it involves a marked alternation of k and l sounds in the pattern k–l–
k–l. Third, the positions of ἄμφι and ἐκάλυψεν at verse beginning and end provide a nice
word picture.304

303 Cf. Janko (1992:10) for other possible combinations of building blocks. I am inclined to see the
hexameter as emerging from paroemiac following on the hemiepes (as West, Haslam), given the prevalence
of the latter, not only in lyric clausulae but also in the pentameter, which combines with the hexameter to
make the somewhat obscure and demonstrably old elegiac distich.
304 Ben Fortson per litt. reminded me of the iconic power of ἄμφι and καλύπτω surrounding the clause.
Aphrodite’s two-step countermeasure engages and overturns the musical as well as the word-image qualities of the death knell.\(^{305}\) At 314 the poet manipulates the grammar of the veil-of-darkness formula: he redeployes the adverb ἀμφί and supplants the dark subject of ‘covered’ with the white object (‘arms’) of ‘poured’.\(^{306}\) In doing so, he also reverses the consonantal scheme above k-l(k-l) to a degree by using the adjective λευκόω, a so-called phonetic reversal. For the second step of the rescue (315), the poet replaces the paroemiac of ‘dark night covered’ with ‘of the shining [robe] the fold she covered’. In so doing, he provides echoes of the phonetic qualities of the veil-of-night formula: first, the syllable following the short anceps of the paroemiac,\(^{307}\) φαεινοῦ (<*φαϝεσ-ν-οῦ)\(^{308}\) ‘shining’, more or less reverses the vocalism of the analogous syllable in the veil-of-night formula, κελανή (*κελα-ν-η)\(^{309}\) ‘dark’; second, the ‘fold [of the shining robe]’ πτύγμα (315) both occupies the same metrical position as ‘night’ νύξ (310), namely the princeps of the fifth metron, and echoes its vocalism, as well as the post-vocalic velar articulation; finally, as regards the grammar, the line-ending ionic ἐκάλυψεν is shared by both lines, but in the rescue formula, the verb’s valence has expanded to include a subject agent, the object used to cover, and the dative object of the adverb.

\(^{305}\) Katz (2000:76 n. 26) also noticed the “white magic” of Aphrodite’s rescue, without commenting on the musical features of the passage.

\(^{306}\) Statistically, univerbated ἀμφικάλυπτω appears much more frequently in Homer than the verb in tmesis. The only two examples of the preverb ἀμφί separated from ἐκάλυψε are the identical lines 5.310 and 12.356, which also display the less frequent contracted biceps of the fourth foot. But these statistics cannot necessarily help us decide whether we are dealing with a case of genuine tmesis or an original fronted preverb. That καλύπτω appears both with and without preverbs in identical images (i.e. of death) only complicates the picture. This is all to say that it appears that the poet of these lines probably had at his disposal and employed the syntactic versatility of a marked verbal lexeme to highlight the exceptionality of this episode. On all the possibilities of constructions with καλύπτω in Homer, see Dyer (1964), who insists that the verb is a religious lexeme (31, 32).


\(^{308}\) Beekes (2010) s.v.
Thus the principal echoic parallels are: DARK:SHINING and NIGHT:FOLD. It is important to note that, beyond the antinomy between the items of the first pair, in tragedy κελαινός comes to qualify things specifically on which the sun does not shine, especially the underworld and its agents, like the Erinyes, whereas φαεινός is used both of Zeus’ eyes and Dawn in Homer. Although κελαινός might not be as marked in Homer as it is in tragedy, its use as a qualifier of blood as well as of night allows us to imagine that Aphrodite has countered night with dawn, the chthonic with the heavenly, and death with new life. Although there is no inherent antinomy between night and the fold of a robe, one of the vehicles of Dawn’s light in Homer’s repertoire of metaphors involves the robe, as in Ἡώς κροκόπεπλος; thus, this echoic parallel also involves some imagistic opposition.

We ought not understate the power of such an echo as we have here, especially because it is signposted by the repetition of ἀµφικάλυπτω. I borrow Young’s simultaneous defense and criticism of the 19th century Pindarist, Metzger:

… the repetitions of words [in Pindar] (and of ideas, phrases, imagery, etc., which are just as important and frequent as recurrent words) were not mere word-play, but a real and vital part of the natural tools by which the poet expresses himself fully, consistently if he so desires, and by which ideas are developed and relationships between ideas are expressed.

Although this particular criticism involves Pindar and not Homer, in general “such resonances and echoes must have frequently influenced the direction of oral composition.

310 LSJ, Chantraine (1983) s.v.
311 Aesch. Pers. 433.
312 id. Ag. 462.
313 Il. 13.3.
314 Od. 4.188.
315 e.g. at Il. 1.303 et alibi.
316 Il. 8.1 et alibi.
and oral performance… to enhance the perception of both performer and audience.”

In this particular case, we perceive rather clearly that Aphrodite is in a sense mimicking death in order to overcome it; the poet evokes and then undermines the expectations that have been established by *Dichtersprache.* The rescue technique is, after all, unparalleled.

The normal divine rescue involves either casting a cloud or darkness over the attacker’s eyes or over the rescued person’s body to make him invisible, as Aphrodite did with Paris at 3.381. The reason for the difference in technique is clear enough. First, if Aphrodite were to cast mist over Diomedes’ eyes, she would be infringing upon the clarity of vision Athena granted him at 127 (ἀχλὴν ἀυτῷ τοι ὀφθαλμοῦ ἔλον, ἤ πρὶν ἐπηέν). It may be that part of the reason for Athena’s ophthalmic treatment is to prevent rescues like that of Idaeus by Hephaestus at 23 (σάωσε δὲ νυκτὶ καλύψας). Furthermore, an attempt on Aphrodite’s part to employ a similar tactic to Hephaestus’ or the one she herself uses in Book 3 might be obviated by Athena’s preeminence in battle and Aphrodite’s inability to affect Athena elsewhere (*h. Aph.* 7–8). One explanation for Aphrodite’s new rescue tactic is that darkness is already cast around Aeneas, and it must be counteracted. Admittedly this requirement could be motivated by narrative concerns (it would sound silly to cast darkness around a character already enveloped in darkness)

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319 We might compare Apollo’s coming νυκτί ἐσκός at *Il.* 1.47. Feeney (2014:190) comments on the metaphor as follows: “…since he has been called Φοῖβος, ‘bright/radiant,’ only four lines before, the oxymoronic power of the comparison to night is chilling.” One of the primary catalytic moments in the *Iliad* involves the counterpoise between how the audience has come to think of Phoebus Apollo and how he appears when he is peculiarly wroth at the Greeks.
rather than by concerns about the proper rescue of a hero who is shrouded in death’s veil, but then we would have to deem the musical and imagistic effects exceptionally fortuitous. That the situation requires such a tactic does not, it seems, mean that it is without problems for Aphrodite or the poet.

Recall that the explicit purpose enunciated in the hemiepes-long epexegetic infinitive of 316, ἐρκος ἐμεν βελέων, is a practical complement to these theological and imagistic constraints;\(^{321}\) it is also the link between Aphrodite’s exceptional rescue technique and her equally exceptional wound. For although the garment is a viable ἐρκος to begin with, ostensibly because of its being ‘immortal’ (ἀμβροσίου at 338), it explicitly fails to protect the goddess.\(^{322}\) There may be a correspondence between Aphrodite’s violation of powers of night and Inanna’s descent to the underworld, but we will postpone our discussion of the nature of that correspondence until we deal Zeus’ consolation and admonishment of his wounded daughter.

3.6 / Violating the inviolable: Wounding the goddess

After all, Aphrodite’s success will come at a price. Diomedes’ henchman, Sthenelus, mindful of his comrade’s instructions, gives Aeneas’ horses to Deipylus and drives his own to support Diomedes (319–30). Diomedes makes his attack (330–9):

\[
\ldots \ δ \ δε \ Κύπριν \ επάχετο \ νηλέϊ \ χαλκον, \\
γινόσκον \ δ τʼ \ ἀναλκις \ ἔην \ θεος, \ ουδε \ θεας \ \\
τας \ αι \ τʼ \ άνδρον \ πόλεμον \ κατα κουρανεουσιν, \\
ουτʼ \ άρʼ \ Αθηναηι ὤτε πτολπορθος \ Ενυω. \\
άλλʼ \ οτε \ δη \ ρʼ \ εκίχανε \ πολιν \ καθʼ \ διμλον \ ὑπάζων, \\
\]

\(^{321}\) An explanation included among the bT scholia is that the point of the robe is to make him invisible, but, as Kirk (1990:94 \emph{ad} 314–5) notes, ἐρκος all but assures that the robe is meant to be a protective garment.

\(^{322}\) The poet could simply mean that the robe belongs to a goddess, or even that it has been spritzed with some divine unguent, but the point remains that divine objects are not easily compromised by natural forces, including the impetuousness of men.
And [Diomedes] rushed at Kypris with the pitiless bronze, recognizing that she was an unwarlike goddess, and not one of the goddesses who marshal men in war, neither Athena nor Enyo, sacker of cities. When he did reach her, giving chase through the thick fray, thereupon, the son of stout-hearted Tydeus stretched out and stabbed the soft extremity of her arm as he leapt at her with the sharp spear. At once the spear bore right through the skin above the base of the palm, through the immortal robe, which the Graces themselves had fashioned.

As the first wound a god receives in the *Iliad*, the poet makes it remarkable. Diomedes, endowed with the perspicacity Athena gave him (127) recognizes that Aphrodite is one of the goddesses who is ἀνάλκης. By way of contrast, Anchises, when confronted by Aphrodite and her scintillating outfit, is able only to suggest that she is a goddess, “Artemis or Leto or golden Aphrodite, / or high-born Themis or owl-eyed Athena” (*h.Aph* 93–4). Although it is true that Anchises did not get the same ophthalmic enhancement from Athena, recall that Athena’s action at 5.127 is not to give Diomedes the ability to recognize Aphrodite specifically, but merely to remove the ἀχλύς covering his eyes so that he could recognize immortals as such. She does not even give him instructions as to how he ought to recognize her; thus Aphrodite’s ἀνάλκημα must be

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323 Kirk takes ἀνδρῶν as going with πόλεμον, but provides an unconvincing rationale as to why we ought not to take it with the denominative verb κοιρανέω. As early as Hesiod (*Th.* 330), the verb governs a genitive. The other examples of the use of the verb in Homer are absolute. Furthermore, there is only one other instance in the Homeric corpus where ἀνδρῶν could be taken as modifying πόλεμον: *II.* 7.36 (where Athena asks Apollo, πῶς ἐμοι αὐτοὺς πόλεμον καταπαύσεις ἄνδρών;). The verb καταπαύω governs an accusative of the person stopped and a genitive of the thing from which they are made to stop, but, given that Athena’s question recalls and modifies Apollo’s exhortation at 29 (παύσω ἐμοί πόλεμον καὶ δηϊοτῆτα), an “effortless” variation according to Kirk (1990: 235 *ad* 36), there is no reason why the genitive ἀνδρῶν cannot be understood as a genitive of separation in some sort of hypallage (“How do you intend to get the men to stop from the battle?” < “How do you intend to get the battle to stop from the men?”).

324 The arm’s extremity (viz. the hand), Kirk (1990: 96 *ad* 339) reminds us, is later specified as the wrist (*χέιρ* ἐπὶ καρπῷ, 458). The adjective πρυγνός, he notes, is used as a noun here.

325 In the ensuing lines Anchises includes the Graces and the Nymphs as possibilities.
discernible because of her unwarlike getup, and this indicates to Diomedes that it is acceptable to attack her. This level of inductive reasoning on Diomedes’ part is not problematic, but I suggest that Aphrodite’s ἀνάλκεια is contextually marked by the preceding rescue effort, the course of the spear, and both the synchronically broad and the diachronically somewhat difficult semantics of ἀλκή.

In the first place, we ought to remember the syntax of 5.315, where καλύπτω has a nominative agent subject, an accusative ‘covering’, and the person covered in the dative, governed probably both by ἁμφί and a sense of advantage. This syntax with the verb καλύπτω mirrors that of instances where Ajax covers someone in the dative with his tower shield in the accusative (8.331=13.420, 17.132): ἀλλὰ θέων περίβη καὶ οἱ σάκος ἁμφεκάλωψε. (Are we meant to remember the Greek protector par excellence?)

Furthermore, we have concluded that the epexegetic ἕρκος ἐμεν βελέων (316) seems to make sense because of the immortal nature of Aphrodite’s garment. In the ensuing wounding scene, the garment is found to be imperfect in its function as ἕρκος, even though during this moment of deficiency—and not when she uses it successfully as a ἕρκος—the poet calls it ‘immortal’. Even if ‘immortal’ is not meant to call inviolability to mind in 338, and just refers to its belonging to a divinity, the proximity of this wardrobe malfunction to the robe’s earlier successful function still stands. The poet does not need to have Diomedes stab her through the garment; the narrative would be certainly less awkward if he found some uncovered part of the goddess to aim for. A pragmatic explanation of the course of the spear would be more tendentious than to grant that the detail of the spear’s course through the deathless robe is important.
The concept of ἀλκή we may offer us an approach to an answer. The standard etymology, which is phonologically unproblematic, has ἀλκή come from the zero grade of the root that gives us ἀλέξω (־*h₂(e)lk, *h₂lek-s-) ‘protect’. Our zero-grade noun ought to then mean something like ‘protection’, ‘defense’ or ‘defensive capability’, but the semantic field has increased to include ideas of ‘might’ and ‘general fighting prowess’, and these seem to predominate in Homer over the zero definition of ‘protective capability’. One can suppose easily enough that, by way of the word’s collocation with μένος, ἀλκή ends up having a kind of synecdochic utility when not paired, being capable of indicating both offensive and defensive might, and not always simultaneously, or sometimes more broadly than both.

As Collins argues, ἀλκή is also associated with possession, especially by Ares. He suggests that Hector, having put on Achilles’ armor, which he has stripped from Patroclus, “does not merely feel stronger as a result of putting on the armor; rather, the armor acts as a vehicle for him to be possessed by Ares.” It also becomes clear in other cases that Collins explores that ἀλκή, as it is divinely proffered, is subject to economy; like kudos, to which it is linked, ἀλκή is dispensed ultimately by Zeus, and in a given situation Zeus can give it to one man and not the other, as Nestor indicates to Diomedes (Il. 8.139–44) in response to a stroke of thunder.

I suggest that this economy may be central to Aphrodite’s wounding scene, not least because Aphrodite is susceptible to accretions and transferences of essence; Aphrodite is not simply ἄναλκις, but rather becomes so in the course of protecting

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326 Beekes (2013) s.v.
327 1998:18; discussion of ἀλκή passim.
Aeneas. In other words, since the detail of the robe perhaps recalls the ἀλκή achieved by donning immortal armor, Aeneas is to be understood as donning not just immortal armor, but the garb an immortal usually wears; since the economy of ἀλκή demands that the protection that is afforded also induce some lack, in this case for Aphrodite herself, the goddess has made herself vulnerable. Another distinct possibility is that the function of the garment is internally focalized through Aphrodite; perhaps she mistakenly believes at 5.316 that it will function as a viable “defense against missiles,” and Diomedes just happens to stab her instead of Aeneas. Of course, by itself this application of the complex of ἀλκή to this scene is speculative, nor could this economy alone explain the apparent theological difficulty that a bleeding god presents, which has to be resolved by the poet’s subsequent explication of ἰχώρ.

3.7 / Blood that is not blood: Healing the goddess

’Ιχώρ, however, is not the first term the poet uses to describe the substance that flows from Aphrodite’s fresh wound. First he calls it ἄµβροτον αἷμα (339), which Kleinlogel renders both "unsterbliches Blut" owing to the connection to ἄµβρόσιος (cf. immortalis), but also, by recalling the pairing βρότον αἵματος, "unbluthaftes Blut." The reason gods do not have the same blood as men, the poet tells us, is that they neither eat grain nor drink wine (341): οὐ γάρ σῖτον ἐδούσ’, οὐ πίνουσ’ αἴθοπα ἵνα. As Kirk describes this aetiology, the lines “are a dramatic theological innovation,

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329 Further supporting this idea of transference of essence in general and the economy of immortality in particular is the blackening of Aphrodite’s skin at 354 (… μελαίνετο ἀδερ δέ χρόα καλόν). This staining accompanies the ‘pains’ she suffers. For Hades these selfsame pains need to be overcome or ‘killed’ themselves, as Watkins (1995: 396) indicates.
330 Not oxytone βροτόν κτλ., as Kirk (1990: 97 ad 339-42) or as West (1998) prints it in his text (e.g. at 7.425).
cast in... quasi-hieratic form, wholly in accord both with the Homeric tendency to minimize many of the more carnal aspects of the gods and the needs of this particular wounding. I would add that this aetiological detail as regards divine existence seems to be marshalled for the sake of explaining the nature of a divine wound, specifically what may be a relatively recent or peculiarly Homeric vision of divine wounds. The comparanda that Dione adduces to console Aphrodite, which we will explore in the next section, seem to support this idea of a quasi-religious refashioning of the divine.

Aphrodite’s wound, then, functions as a *paradeigma* of the transition from the older, perhaps more Near Eastern, vision of the gods to the poem’s new theology. Interestingly, part of the paradigm may involve the refashioning of mythic and linguistic material from Anatolia, although the latter is quite uncertain; but one cannot help but look at the strange lexeme for divine blood and see the Hittite word for blood, *ešhar*.

Yet Hittite *ešhar* is difficult to connect with ἰχώρ, being rather the cognate of εἰαρ. Nevertheless, there remains something tantalizingly familiar about *KUB* 3.16+ ii 8′–11′ (*CTH* 311), an excerpt from the legendary Hittite account of the campaigns that Sargonic king Narām-Sîn waged in Anatolia. In this excerpt (trans. Beckman) “the ruler commands that a scout be dispatched to perform the following test on terrifying beings encountered by his forces:”

When he proceeds to pierce(!) them with a spear and cut them with a blade(?)—if [blood] spurts forth from them, they are human, and I shall go against them (in battle). If blood does not spurt forth from them, they are deities, and I will not go against them.335

332 1990: 96 ad 339–42.
333 Cf. Kirk (1990:96 ad 339–42) for mention of the “ancient Mesopotamian concept of the gods actually feeding on sacrificial animals offered by mortal worshippers...”.
335 2011:95.
The Sargonic ruler, it seems, has determined a means of avoiding becoming a full-blown *theomachos* like Diomedes, although it is perhaps an indication of the ruler’s general *asebeia* that he uses violence against potentially divine creatures to determine whether or not it is prudent to attempt violence against them.\(^{336}\) Importantly, he proves his potential adversaries for the “index of mortality,” namely the presence of *ešḫar*.\(^{337}\) In the Sumerian *Vorlage* to the Cuthean Legend of Narām-Sīn (itself the template for the Hittite version), whose earliest copies date to ca. 2000 B.C., the gods, especially Inanna, are offended and withdraw their favor from Akkad, though it is unclear why.\(^{338}\)

With a shriek, Aphrodite drops Aeneas (343), and Apollo catches him and covers him (ἔρυσατο) in a dark cloud (κυανέῃ νεφέλῃ) (344–5), lest anyone shoot him in the chest and take his life (345–6). One wonders whether this secondary rescue by Apollo is meant to provide a paradigm for the proper salvation of a mortal by a god.

3.8 / Divine wounds as musical oppression

Meanwhile, Iris conducts Aphrodite out of the moil to her brother Ares, whom she begs for his chariot so that she may make her way to heaven. A few details of this transitional scene are worth exploring. First, the poet emphasizes in nearly superfluous

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\(^{336}\) Richard Janko (*per litt.*). reminds me of the irony of this action. Furthermore, when Diomedes encounters Glaucus in Book 6, at line 129 he says “I would not fight with heavenly gods” (οὐκ ἄν ἐγὼ ἐπουρανίοις ἐπουρανίοις) before telling the story of Lycurgus. When Diomedes reiterates his point about being unwilling to fight against gods (141), he concludes by saying “but if you are of [the race] of mortals, who eat the fruit of the field, come closer, so that you may sooner reach the edges of destruction” (142–3). According to Kirk (1990:175 *ad* 142), the line end (ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδουσιν) recurs only in the *Theomachy* at 21.465. Kirk notes that the “idea of mortals as cereal-eaters recalls the distinctions of diet, and of blood versus ἰχώρ,” which are emphasized in Book 5. More precisely, mortal diet explains mortal blood, so again, Diomedes, like Narām-Sīn, is saying, “If you bleed, let’s fight!”

\(^{337}\) Beckman (2011:95). The same test appears in the Standard Babylonian version of the Cuthean Legend of Narām-Sīn, but instead of “deities,” a list of four groups of maleficient demons is provided as possible identifications of the miraculous horde (Astour 1976:577 n.61).

\(^{338}\) Bacharova (2008:94).
detail that Aphrodite still suffers from the wound (352-4): τείρετο δ’ αἰνῶς / ... / ἀχθομένην ὀδύνησι, μελαίνετο δὲ χρόα καλόν. The last detail, the darkening of Aphrodite’s skin, recalls both the image and the music of Aeneas’ affliction: the opening two syllables of the line-ending paroemiac in 354, με-λαί-ν-, are parallel to κε-λαί-ν- in 310. And when Iris and Aphrodite find Ares, at 357 the wounded goddess “collapses to her knees” (ἡ δὲ γνὺξ ἐριποῦσα), just as Aeneas had at 309. Thus we have an elaborate ring-composition organized not only by narrative parallelism, but also imagistic and conceptual opposition, as well as echo. The ring shows that Aphrodite has assumed in a way the wound that Aeneas initially suffered:

[WOUND] > COLLAPSE (309) > DARKNESS (310) > LIGHT (314-5) > [WOUND] > DARKNESS (354) > COLLAPSE (357)

We ought not hesitate at this point to say that Aphrodite has fully assimilated Aeneas’ wound to her own being.

3.9 / Consolations: Reorienting the goddess

In addition to the editorial explication of ἰχώρ, which serves in part to allay the theological absurdity of a bleeding goddess, Dione’s consolation of Aphrodite re-contextualizes the goddess’ wound with the memory of earlier episodes of gods who suffered at the hands of mortals. This consolation achieves several effects: 1) Aphrodite’s suffering is recast as something that has happened to other members of the Olympians, which is to say that, if the wound initially called to mind the more carnal aspects of Near Eastern theology, it is now reimagined as an anachronistic contingency, rather than a
cultural one; 2) it reiterates the dangers born of the interaction between mortals and immortals and demonstrates this danger through poetic and linguistic structuring, in addition to the narrative details; 3) if ‘Kypris’ was initially showing her more eastern visage, particularly that of the incorrigible Inanna, then this scene, in conjunction with Zeus’ subsequent address of the goddess, restricts her sphere of power somewhat.

The first detail that needs to be considered is the appearance of Dione in the role of Aphrodite’s mother. This genealogical detail might strike one as strange when set alongside the more famous genealogy of Hesiod’s *Theogony*, where she emerges from the foam that is generated about the genitals of Ouranos, which Kronos had thrown into the sea (188–92):

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μήδεα δ’ ώς το πρώτον ἀποτμήξας ἀδόμαντι
κάββαλ’ ἀπ’ ἡπείρου πολυκλάστω ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
ὡς φέρετ’ ἀμ πέλαγος πουλὺς χρόνον, ἀμφὶ δὲ λευκὸς
ἀφρός ἀπ’ ἀθανάτου χρῶς ὄρνυτο· τὸ δ’ ἐνι κούρη
ἐθρέψθη.
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And when at first [Kronos] had cut off the genitals with the flint and tossed them from the dry land into the crashing sea, the sea bore them along for a long time, and about the immortal skin arose white foam: in it grew a young girl.

In the first place, one cannot help but wonder whether the details of this birth-story for Aphrodite, particularly the anatomical ones, appear transformed in *Iliad* 5, which appears to be an *ad hoc* invention by the poet rather than an inheritance; even if Hesiod’s composition is younger, he might be more traditional, and Homer does have a tendency to suppress and allude to, rather than eradicate, variant or non-compliant traditions.

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339 Also “coagulated”, Richard Janko *per litt.* reminds me.
340 See West (1966:211–3 ad 154–210) on the complex etiological nature of the scene as well as the Near Eastern parallels for the castration.
341 Cf. Slatkin (1995) on the function of Thetis and her mythic tradition in the *Iliad*. 
In Hesiod’s universe, by the violent act of Kronos, Aphrodite is the child of Heaven and the half-sister of the Erinyes, the Giants, and the Meliai \(^{342}\) (185–7), to whom Earth, having received the ‘bloody drops’ from Ouranos’ wound, gave birth. Thus at least two of her congeners have violent associations, and all three have chthonic ones. Furthermore, Aphrodite’s birth here precedes that of the Olympians proper; however, in the *Iliad*, Aphrodite is entirely Olympian, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, whose name is demonstrably a feminized Zeus.

If this genealogy for the goddess is a peculiarity of Homer’s, perhaps more precisely a peculiarity of Book 5, then we ought to determine why Dione might have been assigned the role of Aphrodite’s mother. Kirk suggests that, in addition to the suppression of “carnal extremes”, the “new but temporary addition” of Dione provides an apt comforter in a mother and also a variation on Ares’ (5.869ff.) and Artemis’ (21.505ff.) respective consolations at the side of Zeus. \(^{343}\) In the first place, Dione’s role at Dodona, other than as consort of Zeus, does not afford much help here. Second, Kirk’s suggestion that a mother is an apt comforter for a goddess seems unsatisfactory when we recall that it is Zeus who provides comfort to Artemis in Book 21, a fact Kirk that notes.

It turns out that the suppositions of G.D. Hadzsits, nearly eighty years before Kirk’s commentary, come very close to the explanation I would like to propose here, even if his might strike us as a bit misdirected toward allegorical reading. Hadzsits, apparently arguing from the premise that Aphrodite is through-and-through an import, proposes the following scenario:

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\(^{342}\) See West (1966:221 *ad* 187) on their obscure identity.  
\(^{343}\) 1990:99.
When the Greeks welcomed the great goddess from the East, whose life-creating animus pervaded the whole Universe, the choice of Dione from among the autochthonous Greek divinities, as mother of Aphrodite, brought the latter goddess into the closest association with the body of Greek beliefs, by reason of Dione’s great antiquity. 344

He suggests further that beneath this obvious mechanism of adoption are two conceptual factors: their common association with life and fertility, and their common identification with moisture as a creative element in the universe.

As regards the importance of Dione’s antiquity, it is hard to judge what the Homeric poet understood of the chronological development of the Greek pantheon and its members, and one would be hard-pressed to explain the variant visions of Dione in two of the oldest literary recognitions of her: besides *Iliad* 5 we have Hesiod’s placement of Dione among the Oceanids (*Th.* 353). Furthermore, Dodona’s antiquity does not necessarily entail the same for Dione, especially since the two are not explicitly connected in either Homer or Hesiod. Perhaps Dione is a subtle index—like the poet’s use of Kypris here—of the genealogy we see in Hesiod, if Dione as an Oceanid is a metonym for the sea.

It is also important to remember that, whatever accretions from the East coalesced with native Greek, Indo-European, and substrate goddesses to produce Aphrodite, those Eastern accretions could not have been simplex, since large-scale syncretism among Eastern goddesses had been taking place for some time, even within a single pantheon, it seems. (It actually seems somewhat misguided to talk of monolithic or synchronic pantheons in the Near East.) Smith argues convincingly that Israelite Yahweh is the result

344 1909:38.
of one such process of syncretism among Canaanite deities.\textsuperscript{345} And there are certainly several ‘Queens of Heaven’ (who are also Queens of the Sea) in the East, but here I will suggest in passing the relevance of three Semitic goddesses, Asherah, Astarte, and Anat. In short, in both the Ugaritic and the Biblical literature—although there are only indirect allusions to Anat in the OT—the three goddesses appear as intimately connected with both Baal and Yahweh and seem to go through both diachronic and synchronic syncretisms with one another, aided by the similarity of the names Asherah and Astarte and perhaps consciously motivated by the attachments of the latter to prostitution.\textsuperscript{346}

3.10 / Consolations: Paradeigmata of suffering

The strangeness of the scene continues as Dione contextualizes Aphrodite’s injury and suffering with a tradition of other gods who have suffered at the hands of mortals. In a way, the scene reads like a typological analysis, and perhaps we can use that characteristic to discover certain psychological and poetological elements that are either subtle or absent. Dione’s concision is, after all, rather remarkable. We provide the speech in full (381–404):

\begin{quote}
Τὴν δ’ ἡμεῖς ἔπειτα Διώνη, δία θεάων·
“τέπλαθι τέκνον ἐμόν, καὶ ἀνάσχεο κηδομένη περ’
πολλοὶ γάρ δὴ τλήμεν Ολύμπια δόματ’ ἔχοντες
εξ ἄνδρῶν, χαλκέ’ ἄλγε’ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοιοι τιθέντες.
τλή μὲν Ἀρης ὅτε μιν Ὡτος κρατερός τ’ Ἐπιάλτης
παῖδες Ἀλωῆος, δήσαν κρατερῷ ἐνὶ δεσμῷ·
χαλκέω δ’ ἐν κεράς δέδετο τρισκαίδεκα μήνας·
καὶ νῦ κεν ἐνθ’ ἀπόλοιτο Ἀρης ὅτος πολέμοιο,
εἰ μὴ μητρυὴ περικαλλῆς Ἡερίβοια
Ἐρμέα εξέκλεψεν· δ’ ἐξέκλεψεν Ἀρης
ὡς τειρόμενον, χαλεπὸς δὲ ε ἄσφαλς ἑδάμων.
τλή δ’ Ἡρη, ὅτε μιν κρατερός πάις Ἀμφιτρύωνος
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{345} 2002.
\textsuperscript{346} Day (2010); cf. Smith (2002).
δεξιτερόν κατὰ μαζὸν ὀίστῳ τριγλώχιν
βεβλήκε· τότε καὶ μν ἄνήκεστον λάβεν ἄλγος.
τῇ δ’ Ἀθῆς ἐν τοῖσι πελόριοι ὁκὸν ὀίστόν,
εὐδεί μν ὁμός ἄνήρ γὰρ Ῥόδος αἰγίχοιο
ἐν Πόλῳ ἐν νεκύεσσι βαλὼν ὀδύνησιν ἔδωκεν· αὐτάρ ὁ βῆ πρὸς ὅδωμα Δίως καὶ μακρὸν Ὄλυμπον
κήρ ἄχεων ὀδύνησιν παπαμένοις· αὐτάρ ὀἰστὸς ὁμὼ ἐν στιβαρῷ ἡλήλατο, κήδε δὲ θυμὸν.
τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ Παιήων ὀδυνήφατα φάρακα πάσσων
ἡκέσατ’· οὐ μὲν γάρ τι καταθνητός γε τέτυκτο.
σχέτλιος, αἰσυλοεργὸς, ὃς τὸξοισιν ἔκηδ εἴθεος ὃς Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν.”

Then Dione, most brilliant of goddesses, answered her. Endure my child, and hold yourself up, grieved though you are. For many of us who have Olympian residence have suffered at the hands of men: different men have afflicted different gods with harsh pains. Ares suffered, when strong Otus and strong Epialtes, the children of Aloeus, bound him in a strong bind: they bound him up in a bronze jar for thirteen months. And now Ares, insatiate of war, would have perished from that, had not their stepmother, beautiful Eeriboia, told Hermes. And he absconded with Ares, who was already worn out, and the harsh fetter was beating him down. Suffered, too, Hera, when the staunch son of Amphitryon had shot her beneath the right breast with his three-pronged shaft. At that point she took on incurable pain. Suffered, too, monstrous Hades a swift shaft, when that same man, the son of aegis-bearing Zeus, shot him in Pylos and gave him over to pains. At that point he made his way to the house of Zeus and tall Olympus, grieving at heart and pierced with pains; the shaft had been driven into his bulky shoulder, and beset his spirit. But Paeion applied painkilling drugs and healed him. For he was nowise mortal. The incorrigible, wicked-doer, who did not shudder at doing wicked things, who vexed the gods who hold Olympian homes with his arrows.

The entire speech strikes me as a short hymn to the gods who suffered or perhaps to the offending mortals. Its structure is highly rigid, but not inorganic. First, Dione encourages Aphrodite to take heart, to “endure” her pains. The quasi-hieratic formulation, τέτλαθι... καὶ ἄνάσχεο, recalls Hephaestus’ attempt to console his mother in Book 1,

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347 See Lohmann’s (1970:53–54 n.93) brief analysis of the speech’s composition, which is a combination of ring composition and parallel composition.
after she is been threatened by Zeus for her meddlesomeness, but with the roles reversed: Hephaestus addresses Hera as μῆτερ ἐμή (2nd metron + princeps of third metron), while Dione addresses Aphrodite as τέκνον ἐμῶν (same metrical position). In this way we get a sense of Diomedes’ power to inflict terror on at least Aphrodite: Aphrodite’s distress at Diomedes’ brazenness parallels Hera’s fearful silence at Zeus’ threat. Furthermore, the collocation in Book 1 of the imagined result of an Olympian row that might arise from a quarrel between Zeus and Hera, namely that Zeus could knock all the Olympians from their heavenly seats if he wanted (580–1), may bear on Aphrodite’s conclusion that the Danaans are now waging battle against the immortals (379–80: οὔ γὰρ ἐπὶ Τρώων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν φύλους αἰνή, / ἀλλ’ ἣδη Δαναοὶ γε καὶ ἄθανάτοις μάχονται): to Aphrodite, wounded and terrified as she is, the threat to the immortals posed by mortal θεόμαχοι mirrors Hephaestus’ admittedly more valid concern about Zeus’ wrath. We may draw conclusions later about how Diomedes functions within the larger framework of the Iliad’s theological concerns.

As Kirk notes, τέτλαθι “is the first of five successive uses of τλάω.” The verb provides a lexical node that will connect the gods that Dione lists with Aphrodite, although the imperative “means ‘endure’ rather than something closer to ‘suffer’ as in the other instances.” In fact, this lexical bivalence is quite pointed: the ability of a divinity to ‘endure’ is indexed directly by his or her ‘suffering’. This conforms with the examples of divine τλημοσόνη that Dione provides her daughter as part of her consolatory speech: the extremeness of the suffering, nearly to the point of death in the case of Ares, emphasizes the theological absurdity, and therefore the impossibility of such cases

349 1990:100 ad 382.
350 Kirk (1900:100 ad 382).
reaching the point where the gods’ appellation as “deathless ones” makes no sense. At the same time it introduces a complex of myths wherein immortals, perhaps because of their deathlessness, can be shown to suffer awfully from the violence of men.

The first example that Dione adduces, that of Ares, is marked as distinct from the other two by the detail that the Aloadai, and not Heracles, are the perpetrators. This fact strikes me as strange, since Dione introduces the list by saying that many gods have suffered at the hands of ἄνδρες (384). Although Otus and Ephialtes are certainly considered mortals, as the story in the Nekyia shows, they are “of monstrous size... [and] equivalent... to Typhoeus and the Titans as rebels against Zeus.” But Dione’s point must be that many immortals have suffered at the hands of mortals. Her use of ἄνδρες to mean θνητοί is oblique, but parallels the obliqueness of Ὀλύμπια δόματ’ ἔχοντες (383).

The next detail, of the binding of Ares by the Aloadai, is fascinating and part of a rich Mediterranean mythological nexus. As Teffeteller has argued, the confinement of the war-god parallels the binding and confinement in the Underworld of the Hittite Storm-god in the strange and fragmentary ‘Canaanite’ myth of Elkunišra and Ašertu, and incarceration in jars is a form of capital punishment among the Hittites. Garcia, Jr., picking up on the work of Stokes, West, and Johnson, and based on the description of

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Kirk (1990:100–1 ad 385–7). In the Nekyia, they are not classified as ἄνδρες or anything else. We are merely told that they were the tallest and fairest after Orion, who is understood as a giant (ps.-Apollodorus 1.25) and a possibly a hero (Diodorus Siculus 4.85), depending on whether Diodorus meant by his comparison of him with the heroes with respect to “greatness” and “brute force” that he was an exceptional specimen among that race. They were also buboniform (and nightmarish) (see Janko 1982:408 ad 13.478–80, 2010:138–41; for bibliography on Hittite ‘Canaanite’ myth, see especially p. 133 n.1. That myth apparently involves cuckolding, like the story of Ares and Aphrodite in the lay of Demodocus. Hoffner (1997:219–20), cited by Teffeteller (2010:140–1, nn. 37–8).
Tartarus in the *Theogony*, a passage whose authenticity has been doubted,\(^{354}\) points out that the “brazen jar” in which Ares is imprisoned is Tartarus itself.\(^{355}\)

As for why Ares is incarcerated, the bT scholiast’s remark that the binding of Ares was in revenge for Ares’ killing of Adonis seems out of place, “like Hellenistic aetiology,” according to Kirk;\(^{356}\) we need not try to unearth a rationale for the episode, since Dione’s main point is merely that other gods have been victimized by men.

We can perhaps say something, however, about the length of Ares’ confinement, for elsewhere in early epic we hear of a discrete length of time that gods are said to be punished and suffer. At *Theogony* 795-803, Hesiod tells us that gods who break oaths are punished in the following way:\(^{357}\)

![Greek text]

[The oathbreaker] lies breathless for a full year, and not ever does he approach ambrosia and nectar, his sustenance, but rather he lies breathless and voiceless on spread beds, and an evil coma veils him over. And when he finishes out this ailment for a great year, in exchange for one trial another more grievous trial is accepted: for nine years he is bereft of his share in the gods who live forever, nor ever for nine whole years does he take part in their council or feasts.

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\(^{354}\) See note 86.


\(^{357}\) The extensive description of Styx, which includes the following punishment, has been marshaled as evidence for the authenticity of the description of Tartarus (721–819) in the poem. See Johnson (1999). West (1966:357 ad 72–819) argues compellingly that this portion of the description of the underworld is genuine.

\(^{358}\) Text is that of West (1966).
The poet provides us with two discrete time measurements: the coma lasts a great year (however we are to imagine its length\(^{359}\)) and the suspension from divine activities nine years. Furthermore, we are provided a number of details about the punishment, all of which involve deprivation: they are breathless (795 and 797, with two different lexemes), unable to approach ambrosia and nectar (796–7), voiceless (797), and eventually unable to participate in Olympian affairs (801–3). Garcia, Jr.’s sensitive reading of the complex temporalities invoked in the Homeric poems is applicable here, but with some modification.\(^{360}\) On Hera’s wound, to which we will turn briefly, he comments as follows:

> Although ageless... and immortal, Hera comes to experience human time through the physical pain of her wound, for she must endure incurable [ἀν-ήκεστον] pain when she is shot by Herakles... The physical pain ensnares Hera in mortal time.\(^{361}\)

While I agree that pain introduces a novel, para-mortal, experience to the gods who feel it, the pain’s incurability in Hera’s case does not fetter Hera to mortal time; rather the pain is grafted onto immortal time-reckoning by virtue of both its being incurable and its being suffered by an immortal. For while mortal bodies are eventually overcome by incurable pains or otherwise deteriorate before the pain ever abates, the incurable pain is assimilated to her deathlessness. Perhaps it is rather a trenchant paradox: immortals can feel incurable pain, a mortal experience that indexes death, forever. When we turn to the details of Hera’s wound we will suggest just how pointed the detail of the incurability of her pain might be.

\(^{359}\) See West (1966:376 ad loc.).
\(^{360}\) 2013.
\(^{361}\) 2013:184.
As it stands, Garcia, Jr.’s comment seems more applicable to Ares’ imprisonment and perhaps the divine oath-breaker’s punishment in Hesiod, since there finite sentences are mentioned, and the suffering of the gods who are involved is connected with those discrete timeframes: Ares’ near-death experience is somehow linked with the thirteen months during which he is imprisoned, as if, despite his agelessness and deathlessness, the finitude of his incarceration afflicts him as it would a mortal prisoner; the hypothetical oath-breaker in Hesiod is afflicted with complete privation of function (νήφτμος—ἀνάπνεωστος—ἀναυδος—ἀπάμειρεται) for the duration of his sentence. Perhaps ironically, during the coma or, as is likely, causing it, the foresworn cannot approach ambrosia and nectar (i.e. ‘deathlessness’). Although the deprivation of these preservatives does not kill the god, it renders him temporarily defunct.

Yet Ares’ condition seems decidedly worse than that of the oath-breaker. He would have perished, except for the help of Eeriboia, a murky figure in the mythological record, and Hermes. For we are told that, when Hermes broke him out, Ares was “at that point being worn down, and the grievous bond was subduing him” (391). Garcia, Jr.’s point that τείρω is a lexeme befitting mortal exhaustion or consumption is on the mark, but the fact remains that the aspect of both the participle τείρομενον and the finite verb ἐδάμνα are progressive; no end, no completion, is discernible. But what can we make of

362 Of course, unlike the oath-breaker in Hesiod, whose sentence is prescribed, Ares’ thirteen month stint is merely how long it takes before Hermes rescues him. It is nonetheless interesting that that length of time is logically connected with his deteriorated state at the moment of jail-break.
363 With these two cases we ought to compare the indentured servitude of Apollo, who is made to serve Admētos, variously for killing the dragon or for killing the Cyclopes, since they fashioned the bolt of Zeus, with which he had killed Asclepius. Fontenrose (1959:87), following Phillipson (1944), observes that “Admetos is the invincible, a form of Hades... Apollo’s servitude means his sojourn among the dead.”
364 Pace Garcia, Jr. (2007: 446), both τείρομενον and ἐδάμνα are imperfective in aspect, not stative or simple.
the counterfactual statement? The rescue involves two steps: the first, which is properly
the protasis of the counterfactual statement, and therefore the condition that makes the
apodosis contrafactual, is the announcement by the Aloadai’s stepmother to Hermes; the
second, the actual rescue, is no longer part of the conditional statement. Therefore, it
stands to reason that Hermes’ ability to rescue Ares was predicated on his finding out
about his imprisonment. Had Eeriboia not shared that information with Hermes, Ares
would have remained imprisoned; but I suspect that he would not have died in the sense
of being destroyed. Rather he would have been rendered indefinitely defunct in a fashion
similar to the punishment of the oath-breaker. If this seems like ontological hair-splitting,
I insist that deciding exactly how the poet imagines that gods can suffer is crucial for
determining precisely what is the psychological and philosophical infrastructure of the
poem as regards its insistence upon division of men and gods, especially when it calls
into question that division.

In addition to the depiction of an overcome Ares, I propose that the poet uses the
features of epic language to indicate the subjugation of the war-god. For example, in line
385, there is a marked difference between Ares’ name (Ἀρης), an iambus, bare of
epithets and the paroemiac-long names of the Aloadai, which end the line (Ὠτος
κρατερός τ’ Ἐπιάλτης), plus the continuation of their appellation into the beginning of the
next verse (παῖδες Ἀλωῆος); the onomastic imbalance may be further heightened by the
fact that Ares becomes the insignificant-seeming enclitic accusative μιν in the clause in
which the Aloadai are the giant subject. Perhaps more significantly, when we are told that
the fetter was subduing Ares, the war-god, as object of ἔδαµνα, is represented by the
other enclitic 3rd person accusative pronoun ἤ (<*ϝε). Of the nearly seventy places in
Homer where the poet uses this enclitic pronoun, only here is it used of a god. It is hard to determine whether is the result of accident, or whether there could have been a lexical distinction in Ancient Greek analogous to the T-V distinction in second person pronouns in many modern languages. Either way, it sounds as if Ares has been reduced to a single short syllable.

The introduction of Hera’s suffering (392) is identical in structure to the introduction of Ares’ suffering at 385. The formula, τλῆ... GOD, ὅτε μιν ASSAILANT, postpones the verb of assault until the next line, thereby fronting the abovementioned onomastic imbalance. In Hera’s case, she is overwhelmed by the paroemiac-long patronymic(+modifier) of Heracles: κρατερός πάϊς Ἀμφιτρύωνος. Like Epialtes and the ‘fetter’ the Aloadai use to bind Ares, Heracles is called κρατερός “mighty”. Formally, this adjective is neither comparative nor contrastive (like δεξιτερός or ὀρέστερος), but given the context and the otherwise lazy-seeming repetition of the word, one wonders whether the poet has called upon the resemblance of the adjectival suffixation here to the comparative/contrastive suffix to inculcate further the extraordinary nature of the mythic material into this scene. After all, in each case that Dione provides, the mortal assailant(s) and their equipment have proven “mightier” than their victims.

The details of Hera’s wound affliction are less full than in the case of Ares. We learn in succinct terms where on her body she was shot (δεξιτερὸν κατὰ μαζόν), what kind of arrow it was (τριγλώχινι366), and what the result was (ἀνήκεστον λάβεν ἄλγος).367

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366 This exceedingly rare descriptor (5x in the entire Greek corpus!) shows up in one other place in Homer, at Il. 11.507, where Paris shoots Machaon (interestingly) in the right shoulder with a “three-tongued shaft.” The wounding of Machaon terrifies the Achaeans, since he is a “doctor worth as much as many / at cutting out arrows and applying gentle drugs” (514–5: ἱητρὸς γὰρ ἀνήρ πολλῶν ἀντάξιος ἄλλων / ἰοὺς τ’ ἔκτάμενιν ἐπὶ τ’ ἣπα φάρμακα πάσσειν). One wonders whether there is something about an explicitly “three-
The only other use of the adjective ἀνήκεστος in the Homeric corpus occurs when Poseidon threatens (ἅπειλήσω, 15.212) that there will be “incurable” χόλος between himself and Zeus in the event that Zeus will not let Troy be sacked. As indicated above, I think that the adjective fits better with immortality; thus pain, which may be primarily a mortal experience, gets immortalized, and in that way creates an intractable paradox, namely that Hera is subjected to mortal experience in the indefinitude of immortal time.

Finally, Dione presents the case of Hades. This time the poet modifies the structure slightly. While 395 does start with the expected τλῆ + GOD, here the verb is not absolute as in 385 and 392, but takes a direct object, ὡκὸν ὀϊστόν. And although Hades is πελώριος in 395, in 396 he, like Ares and Hera is reduced to µιν, while Heracles’ name occupies the second metron onward.

The details of Heracles’ encounter with Hades are somewhat obscure and there is little agreement as to what the phrase ἐν Πύλῳ ἐν νεκύεσσι indicates. Furthermore, the following lines, 398–402, have been suspected and were deleted by Koechly as an interpolation from 899–904 of the same book, the description of Ares’ healing by Paieon.

tongued” arrow and issues of curability. If the γλωχίς is to be understood as a barb (cf. LSJ s.v. and the scholia to Sophocles’ Trachiniae 680–1), then a triple-barbed arrow seems especially apt to beset those who are struck by one with pains, and not easily cured ones, we might say binding ones; one might compare the “triple-barbed” isle (Sicily) that lays atop Enceladus (Call. Aet. 1.36).

367 As with Ares, the reasoning or the occasion for the wound of Hera is not stated explicitly. But the bT scholia mention that some thought Hera received the wound in the same battle against the Pylians in which Hades got his, while others say that Heracles wounded her out of revenge for her not letting him nurse when he was an infant (ἤ δὲ ἱστορία ὅτι ἐν τῇ πρὸς Πυλίους µάχῃ αὐτὴν ἐτρώσεν. οἱ δὲ φασίν ὅτι, διότι νήπιον ὄντα ὡκύ λίμασεν αὐτὸν σπάσαι τὸν ἰδιὸν µαζόν, ἐτρώσεν αὐτήν).

368 Compare Artemis’ χόλος in Bacchylides 5.103–4 (to Hieron), where it is ἄνικατον on account of Oeneus’ impiety in her regard. This line must be a clever intertext on the part of Bacchylides.

369 See Kirk (1990:102 ad 396–7) for the variant suggestions in the scholia; he is inclined toward the interpretation (of Aristarchus) that the phrase indicates that this encounter took place at the entrance to the underworld, but see also Janko (1986:49).
Kirk seems not to notice Koechly’s deletion,370 and West does not seem to feel strongly one way or the other about them, although he brackets them.371 Yet the textual evidence for interpolation is weak at best. The only line shared by the two passages is τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ Παιήων ὀδυνήφατα φάρμακα πάσσων (401; πάσσεν at 900, with 901=402 unknown to Aristarchus, neglected by the scholia and omitted by a number of manuscripts). Furthermore, no manuscript is missing lines 398–402, and the bT scholia comment on them; it seems Aristarchus felt them to be secure.

As regards arguments about the logical interruption posed by lines 398–402, I find Leaf’s and West’s assessments wrongheaded. The relative clause in 404 is a reminder that Heracles is the offending party, a reminder needed because the poet has taken several lines to describe the (admittedly surprising but pointed) fact of Hades’ removal to Olympus; Heracles is not named here, but referred to by his actions. In the same way, Dione does not immediately name Diomedes at 406, but refers to him as τοῦτον. Thus, with this relative clause, Dione finishes her paradeigma, and the poet closes this ring.372 My understanding of the composition of the speech thus far, expanded

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370 1990:102–3 ad 398–402. He comments on them as if they are secure, noting that Hades’ ascent to Olympus surprisingly has not provoked more comment.
371 1998:156. West (2001:192) comments as follows: ‘Koechly’s deletion of these lines deserves to be taken seriously. Hades’ withdrawal to Olympus and his treatment by Paieon cannot have been an essential part of the original myth, and indeed the idea of his ever entering Olympus is startling. The abrupt change of subject back to Heracles in 403 lends weight to the suspicion of interpolation. The only justification for the lines is that they introduce a complementary element into Dione’s consolatory speech: not only should Aphrodite bear in mind that other deities before her have suffered violence at the hands of mortals but they have the option of retiring to Olympus and finding easy healing there—as indeed in a moment Dione herself will heal Aphrodite’s little wound. Even so, the lines do interrupt the rhetorical structure, and they reflect Ares’ healing by Paieon in 899–904 rather than Aphrodite’s by Dione.’ Although Lohmann (1970: 53–54 n.93) reckons them a later interpolation on account of their not fitting within the ring composition that he outlined (“die Verse... sind daher deutlich als späterer Zusatz erkennbar”), he overlooks the parallelism that West (2001:192) mentions, as well as the parallelism between Hades’ removal to Olympus and Ares’ salvation. His reckoning of the speech’s composition is anemic.
372 Lohmann treats this speech in his chapter on “die kombinierten Formen”, which use both ring composition and parallelism.
and modified from Lohmann’s, is as follows:

1) Dione begins her speech (382) by framing the opposition between suffering (here, κηδ-) and enduring, and playing on the bivalence of the lexeme (τλα-);

2) Dione then (383-4) justifies (γάρ) her imperatives to Aphrodite by saying that gods (referred to obliquely by the residence on Olympus) have formerly suffered (τλα-, demonstrating the bivalence of the lexeme) at the hands of men, another opposition;

3) Dione provides three parallel examples (385-402) of such suffering in nearly the same structure (GOD SUFFERED when MAN ASSAILED him/her); each example is given an outcome, with the first and third examples demonstrating the availability of relief:

   a) Ares was rescued,
   b) Hera received an incurable wound,
   a’) and Hades withdrew briefly to Olympus to be cured by Paeion;

37/2/1’) Dione closes her general paradeigma (402-4) by invoking both the endurance mentioned in 382, but obliquely this time and through the specific moral to be derived from the recuperation of Hades (402: οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κάταθνητός γ’ ἐτέτυκτο) and reiterating that gods have (again, referred to obliquely by their residence on Olympus) suffered (κηδ-) at the hands of men, specifically Heracles. This fourth section is thus organically connected with the final exemplum, the general paradeigma, and the introductory opposition that Dione invoked.

At line 403 Dione moves from the mostly theocentric content of the preceding lines to a moral evaluation of Heracles as a theomakhos. Heracles is σχέτλιος and αἰσυλοεργός, she says, because he felt no qualms about performing αἴσυλα [ἐργα], namely besetting the gods with cares (ἔκηδε, 404) by means of his arrows. The language is precise and loaded. The etymological figure in 403 (αἰσυλοεργός) is not tautological, since ὅ τ’ οὐκ ὃθετ’ αἴσυλα ρέξων actually explains the entire appraisal σχέτλιος αἰσυλοεργός; perhaps we ought to delete the comma between the two

373 Noticed also by Lohmann (1970:53–4 n.93).
374 It should be noted that αἰσυλοεργός is the reading of Aristarchus and looks like “the kind of etymological appendage not uncommon in Homer” (Kirk 1990:103 ad 403–4); for comparanda see West’s (1998:156) critical apparatus ad loc. The manuscripts all have ὀβριοεργός.
adjectives. And it is important that Dione specifies what is entailed by Heracles’ hard-hearted and wicked deeds. The besetting of gods with cares (κηδ-) may seem frivolous alongside the gruesome wounds and death that men suffer, but there may be a subtle theological point. For at 24.525–6, Achilles, who among mortals is perhaps most in a position to understand the status of gods as opposed to that of men, advises Priam about the lifestyle of the immortals:

\begin{quote}
ως γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι ζωεῖν ἀχυμένοισι· αὐτοῖ δὲ τ’ ἀκηδέες εἰσί.
\end{quote}

For the gods spin out for wretched mortals to live in vexation, but they themselves are carefree.

Recall, too, the overarching problem of Hesiod’s gold men, which I discussed in Chapter 1: they are too much like the gods by virtue of the fact that they live possessed of an ἀκηδής θυμός (WD 112). So even if Heracles, the Aloadai, and Diomedes cannot overcome the physiological immortality of the Olympians by injuring them, they can afflict the gods’ mental health in a way that could be seen as ‘mortalizing’ them.

3.11 / Dione’s threats and Diomedes as guarantor of Zeus’ reign

Having characterized the impiety of Heracles and, by association, the Aloadai, Dione returns to the present issue of Aphrodite’s wound and Diomedes’ hand in it. Thus the ring, which opens with Dione’s encouraging Aphrodite to “endure” in spite of her grief, moves to the recollection of analogous suffering by other gods, and turns to an evaluation of their assailants, closes with a lengthy evaluation of Diomedes’ criminality as she sees it (405-415):

\begin{quote}
σοὶ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνήκε θεά γλαυκώπις Ἀθήνη· νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἴδε κατὰ φρένα Τυδέος νῦς ὅτι μᾶλ’ οὐ δηναῖος δὲ ἀθανάτοις μάχηται,
\end{quote}

154
οὐδὲ τί μὲν παῖδες ποτὶ γούνασι παππάζουσιν ἔλθοντ’ ἐκ πολέμου καὶ αἰνῆς δηιοτῆτος. τὸν νῦν Τυδείδης, εἰ καὶ μάλα καρτερός ἐστιν, φραζέσθω, μὴ τίς οἱ αμείνων σεῖδο μάχηται, μὴ δὴν Ἄγιαλεια περίφρων Ἀδρηστίνῃ ἐξ ὑπνου γοόωσα φίλους οἰκῆς ἐγείρῃ κουρίδιον ποθέουσα πόσιν, τὸν ἄριστον Ἀχαϊῶν, {ἰφθήμη ἄλοχος Διομήδεως ἱπποδάμου.}  

But against you the owl-faced goddess Athena sent him. What a fool! Tydeus’ son does not know in his wits that not at all long for this earth is the man who fights against the immortals. Nor at all do his children sit on his knees and call him “Papa” as he returns from battle and horrid violence. Thus now, even if he is rather staunch, let Tydeus’ son keep in mind lest he fight someone stronger than you; else, shrewd Aigialeia, Adrestus’ daughter, will long rouse her household from their sleep with her wailing as she yearns for her husband, that best of the Achaeans, Aigialeia that noble wife of Diomedes tamer of horses.

In spite of the unambiguousness of Dione’s threats here, neither the Iliad nor the tradition knows of any actual harm to have come to Diomedes: he has “an uneventful nostos to Argos.”

Still, the specificity of Dione’s language deserves comment. In the first place, the knowledge that Dione says Diomedes does not have, namely that theomakhoi tend to die quickly, is distinct from the threat directly related to him and his household. Line 407, “that whoever fights against the immortals is really not long for this world” is a general gnome, and line 408, although applicable with respect to the detail of the children to most of the men in the poem, seems to refer by virtue of its specificity and “intimacy” to a specific outcome for a theomakhos.

Besides the examples that Dione adduces to assuage Aphrodite’s distress, the poem knows of other theomakhoi and their downfalls: in Book 6 (132–41) we hear of Lycurgus’ persecution of Dionysus, which results in the assailant’s blinding and early

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death; in Book 16 (700–11) Patroclus attacks the walls of Troy relentlessly in the face of Apollo before being rebuffed, and shortly thereafter Hector kills him with Apollo’s help; and in Book 21 Achilles struggles with the river Scamander, and is nearly drowned before Hera bids Hephaestus intervene. According to the summary of the Aithiopis in Proclus, Apollo is partly responsible for Achilles’ death. And as regards Dione’s examples, we know from Odyssey 11.316–20 that the Aloadai are killed by Apollo before they reach manhood and pile Pelion on top of Ossa; the Iliad refers to Heracles’ death, in which Hera is implicated (18.119).

Furthermore, if we look beyond Greek literature to Near Eastern myth, we find scenes eerily analogous to this one. West draws numerous parallels between our episode in Iliad 5 and Near Eastern literature.\footnote{1997:361–3.} One of them involves Gilgamesh’s rejection of Ishtar,\footnote{Cf. also Theocritus Idyll 1.105–3, where Daphnis mocks Aphrodite and tells her to betake herself back to Anchises or Diomedes(!), the connection of which to Gilgamesh was noted by Hunter (1998:96 ad 105) following Halperin (1983:190–1).} wherein he cites the bad ends suffered by her previous lovers, and Ishtar’s subsequent rage: the spurned and insulted goddess demands that Anu send the Bull of Heaven after Gilgamesh to kill him, but Gilgamesh and his comrade Enkidu dispatch the Bull and gain glory (VI). But while Gilgamesh is not killed for his \textit{θεομαχία}, Enkidu is in Table VII.

Yet the content of Dione’s general \textit{gnome}, namely the image of the children, and the threat specifically leveled at Diomedes, which is focalized through his wife Aigialeia, bear resemblances to the Hittite myths of Illuyanka. In one of the “mutually supplementary versions” of the myth,\footnote{Beckman (1982:24 n.87).} a mortal hero(?) named Hupasiya assists the
goddess Inara in tying up the Serpent and his children. The condition whereby Hupasiya agrees to help the goddess is that he be able to sleep with her. Thus following the Serpent’s defeat, Inara settles Hupasiya in a house on an outcropping of Tarukka and insists that he not look out the window, for he will see his wife and children. He disobeys, sees them, and demands to go home. The text breaks off, but some scholars expect that he is killed. Similarly, in the other version, the mortal offspring and helper of the Storm-god is killed along with the Serpent. Beckman comments as follows on the deaths of the two mortal protagonists:

Although the direct causes of their destruction are different... both mortal protagonists are punished for a too intimate relationship with the deities whom they aid... While Ḫupašiya clearly demonstrates hubris by his demand for the favors of Inara and the anonymous son of the Storm-god is a blameless tragic figure trapped by his social obligations, both have nonetheless crossed the line separating mortals from deities.379

In a sense, Inara, who is the daughter of the Storm-god, parallels Athena, and Hupasiya parallels Diomedes, although there is clearly no sexual element to Athena’s support and employment of Diomedes. Furthermore, there is a parallel notion that the mortal theomakhos or aide is in a way a guarantor of the reign of the Storm-god. Although this is essentially explicit in the Hittite myth, in Iliad 5 it has to be inferred from subtle details.

One of those details is how Diomedes is actually employed by Athena to injure Aphrodite. As I argued above, Aphrodite, though perhaps unaware of it, presents a challenge to the cosmic order under the reign of Zeus until she is assimilated into the Zeus-centric paradigm. So I propose that here Athena employs Diomedes specifically for the purpose of forcing this assimilation, which is achieved through her wound, her

379 1982: 24-25
education at the hands of Dione, and her admonishment at the hands of Zeus.

That Diomedes is in a sense re-purposed toward this end is evident from how Athena ignores the wounded Diomedes’ prayer to be able to pay back the vaunts of Lycaon, the Lycian archer who wounded him, and instead enables him to discern and engage with Aphrodite (128–32). This non sequitur shows that Athena’s investment in Diomedes’ aristeia is oriented towards the goal of ‘correcting’ Aphrodite’s behavior.\textsuperscript{380}

After all, once Dione finishes her speech, Zeus tells Aphrodite that love is her concern but not the “works of war” (428-30): this is not a reminder,\textsuperscript{381} but the initial assignation of her τιμή, which she receives in the \textit{Theogony} (203) when she joins the race of θεοί (202).

Meanwhile, Diomedes attacks Apollo, overstepping the bounds of Athena’s instruction at 130–1 (μή τι σὺ γ’ ἀθανάτοις θεοίς ἀντικρὺ μάχεσθαι / τοῖς ἄλλοις).\textsuperscript{382}

Apollo’s warning is marked (440–2):

φράζεο, Τυδείδη, καὶ χάζεο, μηδὲ θεοῖν
Ἴς’ ἐθέλε φρονέειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ ποτε φῦλον ὁμοίον
ἀθανάτον τε θεῶν χαμαί ἐρχομένον τ’ ἀνθρώπων.

Careful, Tydeus’ son, and give way, and do not be willing to think on par with the gods, since never is the race of immortal gods and men who walk the earth the same.

In the first place, the imperative φράζεο recalls Dione’s third-person imperative φραζέσθω (411). Thus Apollo becomes the mouthpiece for Dione’s forewarning. Second, the structure of the double imperative, interrupted by the vocative, echoes the double imperative at the beginning of Dione’s consolatory speech to Aphrodite (382: τέτλαθι, τέκνον ἐμόν, καὶ ἀνάσχεο...). Just as Dione’s orders begin to deactivate Aphrodite’s grief,

\textsuperscript{380} Eustathius 530.10 \textit{ad loc.} notes Athena’s ἔννοια προαναφωνητική ῥητορικὸς τοῦ μέλλοντος.
\textsuperscript{381} \textit{Pace} Kirk (1990: 105 \textit{ad} 428-30).
\textsuperscript{382} See Kirk (1990:105–6 \textit{ad} 434–5).
as well as her boundary-crossing behavior, Apollo’s orders momentarily deactivate Diomedes’ theomachic hubris; it will be reactivated later when he wounds Ares, although Athena is much more proactive in that encounter. Finally, as Andersen seems to suggest, the instruction not to (continue) making himself equal to the gods in mind appears to recall Diomedes’ very name, which he renders “god-like cunning.” One wonders whether we could take it another way, namely that Diomedes has fulfilled the machinations (μῆδεα) of Zeus by wounding Aphrodite, but has now transgressed that capacity by attacking Apollo.

383 HE 208, sub “Diomedes”.
Chapter 4. Immortal desire and mortal grief

4.1 / Introduction: Aphrodite and eros

In the previous chapter I examined how Aphrodite causes trouble in Iliad 5, both within the cosmos of the poem and for the poetic idiom itself. First, she transgresses her erotic dominion and participates in war. Second, she comes dangerously close to upsetting the distinction between mortals and immortals by rescuing her son Aeneas when he is in extremis: it is here that she also unsettles the stability of a formula that the poet often employs to herald the death of a hero. The process of destabilization is both subtle and linguistically complex. The result for Aphrodite is a wound on the wrist, a bit of spilt god-blood. This wound proves innocuous, but it causes the goddess distress as if she were a mortal.

One explanation for the troublesomeness of this Aphrodite is that she has retained features of her much more powerful and much more troublesome Near Eastern analog, Inanna-Ishtar. A number of textual-linguistic clues suggested as much to us. But the Iliad’s Aphrodite is not just a slave to genetics or analogy: her inclination to cause problems involves how early Greek poetry envisaged erotic love and yearning and their function within the cosmos. In short, the power of Aphrodite is dynamic, both generative and destructive, functional more than structural, and in that way capable of changing structures. Empedocles will later position Aphrodite as a basic entity alongside and acting on the “roots” in conjunction with Strife, but he does not seem to discuss whether or not
Love and Strife co-depend; in early myth, Aphrodite and Strife seem to be two sides of the same coin.\(^{384}\)

After all, Aphrodite impels the deathless gods to come into sexual contact with mortals, and these sexual unions produce demigods, men who perform superhuman feats and who often possess preternatural beauty, but die, often young, but otherwise through the usual processes of decay and degradation, *phthisis*. But at some point in the mythological reckoning of history, this miscegenation of gods and mortals explicitly comes to a stop. Indeed, the Greeks were fascinated by the circumstances of this epoch’s end. Yet the psychological and intellectual impulse behind this particular complex of myths remains subtle. In other words, what exactly the Greeks determined was problematic with divine-human intercourse is far from obvious.

So whereas in the first chapter I examined mortal fantasy about immortality and its attendant bliss, in this chapter I address the issue of the gods’ sexual and emotional experience of mortality. Yearning and sexual fulfillment of that yearning, it seems, compromise the power, specifically the immortality, of the Olympians, including Zeus. This makes good sense: yearning involves, by definition, a response to lack, and yearning after potential lovers who are mortal is to yearn for something that is constantly progressing toward permanent absence, toward irremediable lack: the progeny of these unions, too, while capable of ascending to divine brilliance in discrete moments or series of moments, also decay or are snuffed out. Divine genetic material or, if we want to stretch the idea, immortality itself, dies with them. But the remedy, at least at first, is not

\(^{384}\) On Yasumura’s reckoning, “... Aphrodite's power of love is characterised by its control over the interrelations of all living creatures—which inevitably involves the other gods and goddesses. The mode by which her power operates is problematic: her activity directly attacks other gods and, as a consequence, could pose a challenge to the Olympian order” (2011:149).
to offer these children immortality. Instead, mortals suffer more and die. The economy of death and deathlessness remains zero-sum. In fact, I will show that immortal recovery from quasi-human distress must involve an increase in suffering on the part of mortals, especially mortal lovers. *Pathos* can be neither created nor destroyed: it can only be diffused or transferred.

At first glance, this would seem paradoxical. Why would gods not deify their mortal lovers and mortal progeny? At times they have. At times they seem to want to but are prevented by *themis*. This question is complicated, but part of the answer involves our discussion from Chapter 1: divinity as an idea is destabilized as the number of participants increases, especially when those participants were once subject to death.

4.2 / *Maternal grief*

In the last chapter, Aphrodite’s “maternal solicitousness,” to borrow a phrase from Harris’ discussion of Inanna-Ishtar, was evidenced by her illicit rescue of Aeneas. In fact, Aphrodite’s protective swaddling of Aeneas closely parallels the expressions of Ishtar’s motherly persona vis-à-vis Mesopotamian kings.

This parental devotion is of course not unique to Aphrodite and her congeners. Furthermore, other gods are not always as successful in protecting their children from their often violent fates. In this section, I assess both the type and the function, both narrative and theological, of the emotional distress that the gods experience because of the suffering of their mortal offspring. I will conclude that the lines between men and

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385 From Harris (1991:269–70): “She (Ishtar) held you in her kind arm (like a child)” and “In her loving bosom she embraced you and protected your whole figure.” Slatkin (1991:25) speaks of Thetis’ “maternal solicitude” in the *Aethiopis*. 
gods are blurred not just because demigods have divine blood, but also because the gods become bound up in mortal experience through the act of lamenting the death of their children. Foley makes this very point in explaining the theology of the Eleusinian mysteries, but she underemphasizes the extent to which grief and lamentation actually begin to enact an ontological change;\textsuperscript{386} gods who are suffering grief do not just confront mortality and find it abhorrent and unpleasant, but start to be spoken of in terms that begin to call their deathlessness into question. As with the “near death” of Ares in \textit{Iliad 5}, a action generates a new \textit{logos} that, in turn, nearly brings about an unconscionable action, the death or mortality of the deathless. Grief, then, like wounding, diminishes divinity. This process will help us to reassess the longer \textit{Homer\textsuperscript{ic} Hymn to Aphrodite (h. Aphr.)}, a poem that has received several treatments in the last ten years,\textsuperscript{387} and more closely integrate the issues of the power struggles on Olympus with the \textit{pathos} of the mortal condition.

Achilles’ divine mother, Thetis, though ostensibly a minor deity in that she is not a resident of Olympus, provides one of the more memorable examples of divine grief on behalf of her child. Almost twenty-five years ago, Slatkin demonstrated how Thetis wields immense allusive power in the \textit{Iliad}, and this allusive power is achieved largely through the depictions of her plight on account of her mortal son, Achilles.\textsuperscript{388} One particular scene is worth reexamination here. At 18.428–37, Thetis goes to Hephaestus to ask for a new set of special armor for Achilles, since his first set was lost to Hector when Patroclus, who donned it at the time, fell under the spear of the Trojan prince:

\textsuperscript{386} 1994:84–97.  
\textsuperscript{388} 1991.
τὸν δ’ ἧμεῖσθ’ ἔπειτα Θήτις κατὰ δύκρυ χέουσα:
“Ἡραίστ’, ἣ ἄρα δὴ τις, ὅσι τι θεάι εἰσ’ ἐν Ὄλυμπῳ, τοσσαδ’ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἀνέσχετο κήδεα λυγρά ὅσσ’ ἐμοὶ ἐκ πασέων Κρονίδης Ζεὺς ἔλεγ’ ἐδωκεν; ἐκ μὲν μ’ ἄλλων ἄλλων ἄνδρὶ δάμασσεν, Αἰακιδῆ Πηλῆ, καὶ ἔτην ἀνέρος εὐνὴν πολλά μάλ.’ οὐκ ἔθελοσσα. ὃ μὲν δὴ γήραι λυγρῶ κεῖται ἐνὶ μεγάροις ἀρημένοις. ἄλλα δὲ μοὶ νῦν, ὃν ἐπεί μοι δόκει γενέσθαι τε τραφέμεν τε ἡρώων.”

And then Thetis, shedding a tear, responded: “Hephaestus, is there any goddess on Olympus who endured as many wracking cares in her heart as Zeus, Cronus’ son, gave to me out of all the goddesses? Of the daughters of the sea he submitted me to a man, Peleus, Aeacus’ son, and I suffered the bed of a man, exceedingly unwilling though I was. Indeed he lies in his great halls worn out by baneful old age, but now I’ve got other cares, since he gave me a son to bear and to rear to be exceptional among heroes.”

There are many striking features of the beginning of Thetis’ complaint to the Smith-god.

One that stands out in particular is her initial query, which may in large part be rhetorical (viz. “Of course no Olympian goddess has suffered this much!”), but seems to have an element of earnestness in it, seeing as she goes on to define her exceptionality in terms of the ἅλιαι. Irrespective of the question’s rhetorical timbre, how Thetis phrases her affliction indicates that she thinks it is unparalleled: κήδεα λυγρά is rather marked.

The context here alone—Thetis mentions that Peleus is laid up with old age and will go on to tell Hephaestus how Patroclus has been slain (454–6) as well as call her son ὡκύωρος (458)—shows that the goddess’ “grief” is connected with the mortality of those about whom she cares and of those about whom they care. I suggest that κήδεα are precisely “cares” that attend those whose relatives have died or are moribund. Given the context, this ought not be surprising, but I suggest further that κήδεα are a particularly
human and therefore humanizing experience. I will note in passing here that Greek κηδεία is cognate with English hate.389

The only other instance of the pairing κήδεα λυγρά in the Iliad occurs in Book 5 in reference to Diomedes’ slaughter of the two sons of Phaenops, Xanthus and Thoön. By killing the two of them, Diomedes “left behind for their father wailing and wracking grief” (156–7: πατέρι δε γόον και κήδεα λυγρα / λείπ[ε]). In this passage, too, the father of the heroes is worn out (τείρετο) by γῆρας λυγρόν (153). The collocation of Phaenops’ old age and the obliteration of his only heirs—he had not sired another son to whom he could leave his possessions (154)—serves to emphasize his extreme aporia; in his case, χρωσταί end up dividing up his possessions. Furthermore, the collocation of γόος with the “wracking cares” must refer to funeral rites, at least generally. We could say, then, that Thetis, seeing as Peleus is immobilized in Phthia, anticipates having to perform the funereal rituals on behalf of the family.

Indeed this is exactly what, in Odyssey 24, Agamemnon tells Achilles happened after his death:

μήτηρ δ’ ἐξ ἀλὸς ἦλθε σῶν ἀθανάτης’ ἀλήσιν ἄγγελίς ἔδωσα· βοή δ’ ἐπὶ πόλτον ὄρφει θεσπεσίη, ὑπὸ δὲ τρόμος ἠλυθε πάντας Ἀχαιοίς, καὶ νῦ κ’ ἀνατζαντες ἤβαν κούλας ἐπὶ νήμας, εἰ μὴ ἀνήρ κατέρυκε παλαιά τε πολλά τε εἰδός. Νέστωρ, οὗ καὶ πρόσθεν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή· ὄ σφιν ἐδ φρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν· ἱσχεθ’, Ἀργείοι, μὴ φεύγετε, κοῦροι Ἀχαιῶν. μήτηρ ἐξ ἀλὸς ἦδε σῶν ἀθανάτης’ ἀλήσιν ἔρχεται, οὗ παιδὸς τεθνηότος ἀντιόωσα. 50 ὡς ἔφαθ’, οἱ δ’ ἔσχοντο φόβου μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί. ἀμφὶ δὲ σ’ ἔστησαν κούραν ἄλοιπο γέροντος οἵτιν’ ὀλοφυρόμεναι, περί δ’ ἀμβροτα εἴματα ἔσσαν. Μοῦσαι δ’ ἐννέα πάσαι ἀμειβόμεναι ὅπι καλῆ 55 θρήνεον· ἐνθα κεν οὗ τιν’ ἀδάκρυτόν γ’ ἐνύησας.

389 Beekes (2009:s.v.).
And your mother came out of the sea with the deathless sea-
nymphs, hearkening to the announcement. A prodigious scream
rushed over the sea, and trembling fear came upon all the
Achaeans. And now they would have jumped onto their hollow
ships, had not the man who knows many ancient things checked
them, Nestor that is, whose counsel, even before, seemed best.
He, being kindly disposed to them, advised them and spoke up
among them: “Stop, Argives! Do not flee, young Achaeans. This
is his mother, who has come with the deathless sea nymphs, to
care for her dead son.” So he spoke, and the stout-hearted
Achaeans checked their flight. The daughters of the Old Man of
the sea surrounded you, wailing pitifully, and they enshrouded
you in immortal clothes. And the Muses, nine in all, sang the
dirge, responding to one another with lovely voice. At that point
you would not have seen anyone among the Argives who wasn’t
crying. For such was the dirge that the shrill Muse raised. For
seventeen days and nights, all the same, we wailed for you,
immortal gods and mortal men alike.

Although this passage has provoked many worthwhile questions,\footnote{390} I want to focus here on the fact that, although the Danaans begin the funereal rite appropriately (43–6) by carrying Achilles’ corpse back from the battlefield, washing and anointing the body, crying the requisite ‘hot’ tear, and cutting their locks, the ritual is fulfilled only with the participation of the sea-goddesses and Muses, and especially Thetis. In fact, the funeral brings mortals and immortals into the same arena of activity, much like the state of things before Mekone and much like the situation with the Aethiopians, who still enjoy commensality with the gods.

In the rest of early hexameter poetry the pairing κήδεα λυγρά occurs four times: once, in \textit{Odyssey} 11, where Alcinous praises the skill with which Odysseus has narrated the κήδεα λυγρά of his comrades and himself, clearly in reference to the deaths of the

\footnote{390} See Heubeck (1992:366 \textit{ad} 24.60) for a summary of the issues and the history of engagement with the passage.
Ithacan king’s hetairoi and his grief on account of them;\(^{391}\) twice in Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, once when Zeus is said to have devised (ἐμήσατο) “wracking cares” for men by hiding fire,\(^{392}\) and once when Pandora is said to have done the same by scattering the baneful contents of the pithos;\(^{393}\) and once in the *Homerik Hymn to Demeter* (h. Dem.), when Metaneira sees Demeter placing Demophoön in the fire.\(^{394}\) Although the two examples from Hesiod are interesting, in that both are collocated with the larger narrative of the separation of gods from men, the episode in *h. Dem.* makes it quite clear that κήδεα λυγρά are the experiences of a bereft parent:

And now [Demeter] would have made him ageless and deathless had not well-girdled Metaneira in her witlessness kept watch from her fragrant bedchamber and seen. She shrieked and smacked her thighs in terror for her child and was deeply unhinged in her spirit, and in her wailing she addressed her son winged words: “My child, Demophoön, this strange woman is hiding you in the blaze and setting wailing and wracking cares upon me.”

Demeter aborts the process of immortalizing Demophoön and chastens Metaneira for her folly, before revealing herself and giving instructions regarding her worship. Although

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\(^{391}\) The pair occurs at 11.369, but see lines 362–84 for context.

\(^{392}\) 49–50.

\(^{393}\) 95.

\(^{394}\) 249. One wonders whether the κήδεα λυγρά in the *Odyssey* and in *WD* suggest a special “paternal” relationship between Odysseus and his men and Zeus and men in general. As we discussed in Chapter 2, Zeus’ paternal identity is more psychosocial than actual. As we will see below, Zeus does seem to mourn for his actual son and the combatants of the Trojan war at large in similar ways.
the Demophoön episode serves an etiological function in *h. Dem.*. The theological-narratological implications of the episode situate the myth at large in the broader context of early Greek literary thought. Felson-Rubin and Deal read the episode thus:

> The resolution of the Demophoön episode not only refocuses attention on Demeter’s relationship to the gods and her recovery of Persephone, but also... motivates... Demeter to see that shortsighted and ineffectual interference in divine plans belongs to the realm of human folly... Her own initial and ineffectual withdrawal from the gods was in fact like Metaneira’s failure to recognize and accept divine gifts.

I would like to be somewhat more precise here. Metaneira’s exclamation of what the *χείνη* has caused, namely *γόος* and *κήδεα λυγρά*, are just what the goddess is attempting to obviate while she herself mourns for her lost daughter. Although Demeter is not described as being afflicted with *κήδεα λυγρά*, Helios does demand that she stop her *µέγας γόος* (82). And although Persephone is technically immortal, that she is snatched by Death certainly complicates her divinity.

> Furthermore, “Demeter’s mourning ritual, elaborated several times (40ff, 90ff, and 304), includes such gestures of grief as tearing her headdress, refusing food and other comforts, wearing dark mourning clothes, wailing, etc.” These actions and abstentions serve to “mortalize” the goddess to an extent, and when she reveals herself after Metaneira’s interruption and holes up in her new temple, she has foisted her grief and her temporary mortality onto a mortal woman and the cosmos at large: what results is not only Demophoön’s remaining mortal, but also humankind’s being brought to the brink of annihilation. To be sure, Foley is sensitive to the ways in which the “*Hymn* is unique in

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395 Foley (1994:114): “Demophoön's story serves above all in the *Hymn* to motivate the foundation of the Mysteries (because Demeter has failed to immortalize a mortal) and to stress the tragic inevitability of the mortal lot.”


archaic Greek poetry for the degree of humanization its gods experience. But I would argue that much of early hexameter poetry confronts these very issues, and furthermore that it does so by a certain, though subtle, misapplication of the poetic and intellectual idioms in which it deals. The result is that, more than merely encountering mortality, gods suffer a legitimate, if conceptual, vulnerability. To counterbalance this, mortals end up suffering even more. The division between men and gods, obscured by divine experiences of grief, gets re-clarified through an increase in mortal suffering. But before I talk more about the violent diffusion of grief, I will look more closely at some of the lexical indices of Demeter’s “mortalization” in the hymn.

4.3 / Divine suicide?

Even before Demeter learns exactly what has happened, she hears her daughter’s plaintive cry (39). At lines 40–1, “sharp grief seized her heart, and she rent the veil about her ambrosial hair with her own hands” (ὀξὺ δέ μιν κραδίην ἄχος ἔλλαβεν, ἄμφι δὲ χαίταις / ἀμβροσίαις κρηδέμνα δαίζετο χερσί φιλησι...); she has begun to mourn. Except for the detail of her hair being ambrosial, these two lines paint a picture of very human mourning.

In the first place, the collocation of ἄχος and κραδίη in early epic is used almost exclusively of mortals, such as Odysseus, Diomedes, Achilles, and Penelope. Just once,
at *Iliad* 15.208, does the pair describe the affliction of a god. Poseidon, in response to Iris’ report of Zeus’ displeasure and not-so-veiled threat, yields grudgingly (208-10):

... τόδ’ αἰνὸν ᾧς κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἰκάνει ὀππότ’ ἐν ἱσόμορον καὶ ὀμὴ πεπρωμένον αἰσὴ νεικείειν ἑθέλησι χολωτοῖς ἐπέεσσιν.

This terrible grief afflicts my heart and spirit, whenever he’s willing to rebuke with wrathful words someone who is equally apportioned and who has been dealt an equal share.

Janko notes that the two words for ‘lot’ here bear no allusion to fate or death,⁴⁰⁰ but the nature of Zeus’ threat (163-5: φραζέσθω δὴ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν / μὴ μ’ οὐδὲ κρατερός περ ἐὼν ἐπιόντα ταλάσσῃ /μεὲναι, ἐπεὶ εὐ φημὶ βὴ πολὺ φέρτερος εἶναι... / “Let him bear in mind and heart then, lest—especially since he is not at all mightier—he dare withstand me when I come after him, since I claim to much more capable of violence than he…” ) and Poseidon’s concession do point to a diminution of his status; the specter of some catastrophe of Poseidon’s divinity looms. In a sense, because of his continued close participation in the war of men and thereby his being disjoined from the race of the gods—part of Zeus’ order is that he “either go among the tribes of gods or into the brilliant sea” (161)—Poseidon’s divinity may be compromised, even if only cognitively or in rhetoric, and this is accomplished in part by the Poseidon’s adoption of human form.⁴⁰¹

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⁴⁰¹ In fact, in all of Homer, the κραδίη is used of gods only three times (in more than fifty instances): here of Poseidon, and twice of Zeus, first, when Achilles suggests to his mother that she may have some emotional leverage with Zeus (1.394–5), and then when Zeus himself contemplates saving Sarpedon (16.435–8), a scene which presents Zeus at his most human, as we will discuss below. Achilles’ use of κραδίη could be understood as a projection of human anatomy onto divine relations or even Thetis’ earlier assimilation of divine relations into human terms, since Achilles says that this is what Thetis used to claim in the house of Peleus. To be sure these assimilative moments were probably not jarring for the ancient audience, but even so, they function as part of the subtle machinery that blurs the lines between god and men in early epic. The cognate word for heart, κῆρ, is applied to gods three times in the *Iliad*, of wrathful Apollo (1.44), terrified Hera (1.569), and unanimous Zeus and Hera (15.52).
Next, the detail that Demeter rends her headdress is remarkable. Foley compares the actions of Hecuba and Andromache in *Iliad* 22, although she is not quite right to say that they, too, tear their veils. At 405–6 Hecuba begins to tear out (τίλλε) her hair and hurls away (ἀπὸ... ἔρριψε) her veil, and at 466–72 Andromache faints, tossing off her elaborate headdress as she falls. Thus, Demeter’s act of mourning seems to be a goddess’ modification of human mourning; in other words, it would be alarming for the goddess to tear her hair, “ambrosial” as it is, so she instead rends the covering, and rather violently, as δαίζω is a verb better suited to the cleaving of flesh, usually fatally. One instance in which δαίζω does not involve the cleaving of human flesh is when Achilles, beside himself at the news of Patroclus’ death, rends his own hair (18.22–7):

\[
\text{ὡς φάτο, τὸν δ’ ἄχρεος νεφέλη ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα·}
\text{ἄμφοτέρῃς δὲ χερσίν ἐλών κόμιν αἰθολόεσσαν}
\text{χεύσατο κύκ κεφαλῆς, χαρίν δ’ ἔχασεν πρόσωπον·}
\text{νεκταρέω δὲ χιτῶνι μέλαιν’ ἄμφοτέραις τέφρη.}
\text{αὐτὸς δ’ ἐν κοίνησι μέγας μεγαλωστὶ τανυσθεὶς}
\text{κέπτο, φίλησι δὲ χερσὶ κόμην ἔφερεν δαίζων.}
\]

So spoke Antilochus, and a black cloud of grief enshrouded Achilles, and taking the sooty dust with both hands he poured down upon his head, and sullied his lovely face. And black ash sat upon his unctuous tunic. And he himself, huge, lay stretched out vastly, and he defiled his hair by tearing it.

This passage bears much similarity to the passage in *h. Dem.* Edwards is right when he notes that here “the language of mourning is mingled with that of death, for defiling the head with dust is the sign not only of extreme grief...” Even before Achilles defiles himself, the cloud of grief recalls very distinctly the cloud of death that occupied much of our discussion in Chapter 3. It also resembles the mist that seizes the windows in the

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Hittite myths about disappearing gods, which is the first step in the sequence of malignant changes to the cosmos in those myths. Furthermore, as Edwards notes, (ἐν κονίῃσι μέγας μεγάλωστι) τανυσθεὶς / κεῖτο is otherwise used of a corpse. We should also note, as does Edwards, the double contrasts in 24–5 between χαρίεν and ἔσχυνε on the one hand, and the “nectarous” tunic and the ash that dirties it on the other: that which is paradigmatically lovely, in fact the most lovely, gets besmirched; that which is deathless is blanketed in death. But what of δαίζω? Achilles is not merely plucking his hair, as Hecuba does in Iliad 22. Rather, he is tearing it with murderous violence, which is clearly self-directed. Antilochus is right to hold his hands.

Similarly, we might read Demeter’s actions as quasi-suicidal. At line 42 Demeter substitutes her headdress, which, in addition to being ‘ambrosial’, was probably envisioned as golden or at least resplendent, for a ‘cyan’ shawl (κυάνεον δὲ κάλλιμα κατ’ ἀμφοτέρων βάλετ’ ὀμον). We might compare Demeter’s exchange of headdresses with Telepinu’s putting his shoes on the wrong feet before going missing. I am not in full agreement with Slatkin on the detail of the black garment. On lines 38–44, which describe Demeter’s initial experience of ἔχος, Slatkin argues as follows:

This gesture of Demeter covering herself with a dark shawl has

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405 See Hoffner (1998) for a number of these myths. The phrase GIŠlu-ut-ta-a-uš kam-ma-ra-a-aš IŠ-BAT, contains the Akkadian verb sabātu, which is used of demonic possession as well as the seizure of people by the underworld (cf. Greek ἀιρέω).
407 At Il. 17.279–80 Ajax is described as surpassing all the Greeks in beauty and fighting accomplishment except for Achilles (Αἴας, ὃς περὶ μὲν ἀέρις, περὶ δ’ ἐργα τέτικτο / τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ’ ἀμύμονα Πηλείωνα). Cf. Il. 2.673–5, where Nireus, king of Syme, is described as the κάλλιστος ἄνηρ after Achilles to come to Troy (2.674=17.280). Zenodotus omitted this line since he athetized 673 and 675, but Aristarchus maintains it, and Philodemus, On the good king 20.5, makes reference to it. See West (1998: app. crit. ad loc.)
408 1991:145 ad 18.25.
409 It makes most sense in this context that Antilochus fears lest Achilles harm himself, as Edwards (1991:146 ad 32–4) argues. Achilles' hands, after all, when directed at others, are ineluctable.
410 CTH 324 A i 5–9.
been shown to signify her transformation from a passive state of grief to an active state of anger. In contrast to the image of the black cloud that surrounds a dying warrior or a mourner, here the goddess’s deliberate assumption of the dark garment betokens her dire spirit of retaliation, the realization of her immanent wrath.\footnote{1991:92–3.}

Slatkin seems to have confused the course of the narrative, since Demeter has not yet learned what transpired. She knows only that her daughter has disappeared. Her assumption of the dark cloak, which recalls the dark cloud of death, and her subsequent actions lead directly to Hecate’s arrival and camaraderie. I suggest instead that Demeter’s assumption of the black shawl, the nine-day δαδουχία, and her abstention from nectar and ambrosia, all prepare her to receive Hecate’s assistance in finding out what has happened to Persephone. In other words, Demeter, as an initiand herself, ritualizes a katabasis \footnote{Foley (1994:4) rightly translates this as “Then for nine days divine Deo roamed over the earth”, but, given the context, as well as the weird element of the daidoukhia, it is not hard to imagine a second layer of meaning that envisages Demeter making her way to the underworld.} (47: ἐννήμαρ μὲν ἐπειτά κατὰ χθόνα πότνια Δηὼ...).\footnote{1991:91. Cf. Kim (2000:126) on Achilles’ pity: “The theme of his pity thereby develops into that of his mēnis, which is the thematic equivalent of his pitilessness... Achilles’ pity for his friends killed by the enemy entails, by the very nature of that pity, his pitilessness toward the enemy; the κῆδεα of his friends entail, through Achilles’ response to those κηδεα, the κῆδεα of the Trojans.”} Inasmuch as she is able, she mortifies herself in order to gain access to chthonic information. Note that when Hecate meets Demeter on the tenth day of her roaming, “when resplendent dawn arrived” (51), she comes bearing a torch (52), like Demeter herself at 47–8, as if the space where Demeter roams remains untouched by Dawn’s light. In this way, like Achilles, Demeter is both mourner and deceased. To be sure, we ought not allege a sharp distinction between grief and wrath, for Slatkin is right that later in the hymn the black shawl indexes her wrath.\footnote{1991:91.} And this is the point: divine grief, inasmuch as it compromises divinity, leads to divine wrath, which through its destructive power reinvigorates divinity as wholly other than
humanity.

The detail of Demeter’s abstention from nectar and ambrosia should be familiar from our discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 of the divine forswearer, a comparison that often goes overlooked because scholars have tended to overemphasize aetiological readings vis-à-vis the Eleusinian mysteries.\footnote{Richardson (1974:165–6 \textit{ad} 47), for example. Clay (2006:202–3) recognized this tendency as well.} Even if the fasting of initiates was meant to imitate the sorrow of Demeter,\footnote{Richardson (1974:167 \textit{ad} 47)} it is unsatisfactory to say that the detail of Demeter’s fasting in the poem is aetiological for this initiatory practice without considering exactly what physiological and psychological effects fasting has on the gods. Note that, at least until Hecate conducts her to Helios, Demeter is explicitly silent. When Hecate asks about Persephone’s rape and admits ignorance about who the culprit is (55–8), Demeter does not answer (59): ὦς ἂρ’ ἔφη Ἐκάτη· τὴν δ’ οὐκ ἠµείβετο µῦθο…. The important contrast between Hecate’s speech and Demeter’s non-response in these lines has been ignored in favor of connecting her silence to the ritual silence of the initiand.\footnote{Richardson (1974:171 \textit{ad} 59–61); Foley (1994:40 \textit{ad} 59–60), citing Clay (1989:219 n.64), does say that Demeter’s silence “suggests shock and grief.”} But it is important that nowhere else in Greek does one see the negation of ἠµείβω, when it refers to speech.\footnote{In the Aesopic fable (329) on the raven who was envious of the swan’s whiteness, the raven, despite his ablutions, is unable to change his color (οὐκ ἠµείβεν).} It cannot be by chance that the poet chooses to negate the lexeme \textit{par excellence} of epic dialogue. Moreover, Demeter’s silence, when seen alongside her refusal of ambrosia and nectar, recalls the ἄνωδος oathbreaker of \textit{Th.} 797.\footnote{See §3.8.} But Demeter does not fall into a coma.

After Helios tells Demeter who is to blame (Zeus), attempts to console her by suggesting that Hades is no mean son-in-law, and chides her for both her γόος and her
χόλος (75–87), at his rebuke ὀμοκλή (88),⁴¹⁹ Demeter withdraws, even more grief-stricken, although this grief is becoming indistinct from wrath (90–4):

τὴν δ’ ἄχος αἰνότερον καὶ κύντερον ἰκετο θυμόν.
χωσαμένη δῆπεται κελαινεφέϊ Κρονίον
νοσφισθείσα θεῶν ἄγορήν καὶ μακρὸν Ὅλθμον
ἄχετ’ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώποιον πώλας καὶ πίονα ἔργα
εὖδος ἀμαλδύνουσα πολύν χρόνον:

A more dread and more dogged grief came to her heart. And angry now at black-clouded Cronus’ son, she abandoned the assembly of the gods and tall Olympus, and went to the cities of men and the rich fields, diminishing her beauty for a long time.

The nature of this renewed ἄχος is complex. The pairing αἰνότερον καὶ κύντερον appears once in Homer, at Od. 11.427, “as a term of censure of women.”⁴²⁰ I rather think that the notion of shame that Richardson sees in the usage of κύντερος in Homer is actually secondary to the sense of banefulness.⁴²¹ As Richardson himself points out, at h. Dem 305–7, we see the “physical correlative” of Demeter’s grief:⁴²²

αἰνότατον δ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπὶ χθόνα πουλβότειραν
ποίησ’ ἀνθρώποις καὶ κύντατον, οὐδὲ τι γαῖα
σπέρμα’ ἀνεύε: κρύσταν γὰρ ἐυστέφανος Δημήτηρ.

And over the earth, abundant in nourishment, she made a most dread and dogged year for men, and not a single seed did the earth send up. For Demeter with her lovely crown was hiding it.

We can say more. What is more grievous and more “dogged” for the goddess earlier eventually becomes that which is superlatively baneful for men (and the other gods). The affliction of the goddess and her abstention from ambrosia and nectar is transformed into

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⁴¹⁹ Cf. the opening to one version of Telepinu (Text 2 in Hoffner), where the god seems to respond to a threat or a rebuke before departing: “Telepinu […] screamed: ‘Let there be no intimidating language.’ [Then] he drew [on the right shoe] on his left foot, and the left [on his right foot].”
⁴²⁰ Richardson (1974:177 ad 90) is actually referring only to κύντερον, but cites this line as evidence.
⁴²¹ Cf. the English adjective dogged (OED s.v.).
⁴²² Richardson (1974:177 ad 90).
famine and the threat of annihilation for men.\textsuperscript{423} (Should we think of Achilles’ refusal of food and drink, his being sustained on nectar and ambrosia, and his supernatural violence, which makes men fodder for the birds and dogs?) In the first place, the poet undercuts the matter-of-factness of earth’s principal feature in the formulaic system, namely that it is “much-nourishing”.\textsuperscript{424} Second, the counterpoise between the mankind’s being on the brink of annihilation and the grief of the goddess is mediated through her own apparent decline toward death. In the lines preceding these, Demeter is seated in her temple where “far off from all of the makares / she remained wasting away in yearning for her low-girdled daughter” (303–4).\textsuperscript{425} This “diminution” of Demeter’s being, which repeats nearly verbatim line 201 (the opening trochee is ἦστο instead of μίμνε), must also recollect her diminution of her own εἶδος in line 94, where the rare and somewhat elusive lexeme ἀμαλδύνω is used.

In extant early hexameter poetry, ἀμαλδύνω is found in only three other places, all in the \textit{Iliad} in reference to the destruction of the Achaean wall.\textsuperscript{426} Formally it is of unclear etymology, although connections with *\textit{smel-d} (or *\textit{h₂mel-d}?) ‘melt’ are

\textsuperscript{423} Della Casa (2010:101) comments similarly on the relationship between Telepinu’s footwear mishap and the disarray of the cosmos: “This image suggests that the harmony of the cosmos was in danger, that the normal order of things was altered. The hasty movement and the confusion present in this first image foreshadow the coming crisis, which upsets the world due to the god’s feeling of anger. Right from the start, this personal imbalance becomes a collective imbalance, spreading out towards all living beings, objects, and even gods.”

\textsuperscript{424} In Homer, when χθών occurs in the dative, πουλυβότειρα is the only epithet used of it, although an epithet is not always used. When it is in the accusative, and an epithet is employed, πουλυβότειρα is used three times, δῖος once, and βωτιάνειρα once, at \textit{Od}. 19.408, where Odysseus reveals and etymologizes his name. There, too, the epithet might be deployed somewhat wryly, since the hatred of men and women throughout the world would seem to neutralize the earth’s ability to nurture ἀνέρες. Although there is nothing marked about the context of the other places where πουλυβότειρα is used, the earth’s capacity vis-à-vis the heroes of the war is more as their receptacle than as their nurturer.

\textsuperscript{425} \ldots μακάρων ἀπὸ νόσφιν ἁπάντων / μίμνε πόθῳ μινόθουσα βαθυζώνοιο θυγατρός.

\textsuperscript{426} The most sensitive treatment of the Achaean wall, both with respect to its place in the broader traditions about the destruction of [one race of] humans and with respect to its function within the \textit{Iliad}’s narrative, remains that of Scodel (1982).
tempting, especially since Hesychius glosses ἀμέλδειν (an apparent byform of μέλδω) as τῆκειν and στερίσκειν. Although the single use of μέλδομαι in Homer (21.363), in the simile of the cauldron being boiled and melting the bacon fat within it, to which the Scamander’s being boiled by the blast of Hephaestus is compared, involves heat, the lexeme usually emphasizes the fluidity of the resulting substance that is melted. Perhaps Homer is playing with the suitability of this simile, since at 366 the Scamander οὐδὲ ἔθελε προρέειν, ἀλλ’ ἱσχετο· τεῖρε δ’ ἀὕτη… (“He did not want to flow forth, but was checked; the seething breath [of Hephaestus] was wearing him out.”). But we should remember that to melt something is to cause it to soften and thereby cause it to flow, principally by the addition of liquid. This is clearly the case with Poseidon and Apollo’s destruction of the Achaean wall (12.18–9):

Indeed at that point Poseidon and Apollo were contriving to melt the wall by bring against it the might of the rivers…

Scodel comments as follows:

The destruction of the wall entails the obliteration of the great funeral mound which the wall incorporates, so that the passage is similar to 21.316-323, where Scamander threatens to bury Achilles, so that he will require no tomb; Poseidon’s declared motive for destroying it shows that this is a reduction of the Achaeans’ κλέος. They are scattered like the founders of Babel, almost “nameless” like the Bronze

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427 See Beekes (2010: s.v.). Formally, Benjamin Fortson (per litt.) assures me, the connection is tenuous at best. But Sihler (1995:§90) does connect ἀμαλδύνω and μέλδω, and suggests that this shows that the prothetic vowel of the former cannot come from a laryngeal. We might compare ἀστεροπή and στεροπή. Semantically, things are closer, but we are still on unsure ground. For the possible overlap with τῆκειν, whose Armenian cognate means to moisten or get wet, see Theocritus Idyll 1, where Daphnis ‘melts’ (82) away and becomes part of the river (140).

428 The noun ἄδυτη is from ἡσεύτη- ‘seethe’. See Beekes (2010: s.v.).

429 Cf. Ares’ being worn out by the jar in Il. 5.385–91. Interestingly, this vision of heat so intense that it checks the flow of a liquid corresponds with a model of theoretical thermodynamics wherein maximum order, what we would think of as occurring at absolute zero (-273.15 C), is achieved by making a system infinitely hot.

430 Cf. the close of the ring at 12.31: τεῖχος ἀμαλδύνας· ποταμοίς… The other place where ἀμαλδύνω occurs is 7.463, where Zeus suggests destroying the wall once the Achaeans have gone home.
Can we possibly connect Demeter’s disguise (perhaps ‘dysguise’ would be better) to the destruction of the wall? To what extent the poet means us to recollect the Achaean wall is hard to determine, since Demeter’s self-disfigurement seems easily remedied, but the verbal echo in εἶδος ἀμαλδύνουσα (94) of τεῖχος ἀμαλδύναι (12.18) (=τεῖχος ἀμαλδύνας at 32) is unmistakable. Of course, I do not think we should imagine that Demeter is liquefying or melting her beauty, but on some level, she is not just disguising it; she is obliterating it, erasing it. We should also recall Hermes’ fear in Aristophanes’ Peace:

ἀλλ’, ὦ μέλ’, ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἀμαλδυνθῆσομαι, / εἰ μὴ τετορήσω ταύτα καὶ λακήσομαι
(“But, my friend, I will be melted by Zeus / unless I shrilly announce these things [viz. to him].”).

Once Demeter’s grief becomes wrath, she resumes her divine μέγεθος καὶ εἶδος without much ado (275) and shoves off old age (276). But before the full epiphany takes place after the aborted immortalization of Demophoön, Demeter partially reveals her divinity. Scholars seem largely to have overlooked how this partial epiphany fits into the psychological drama of the poem, again in favor of connecting the narrative with the ritual narrative at Eleusis.

431 1982:48 n. 38. Poseidon and Apollo’s destruction of the wall does not, in fact, diminish the heroes’ kleos; in fact, they become ‘authors’ of a flood myth, to which heroic kleos is attached and around which it is amplified.

432 Pace Olson (1998:150 ad loc.), ἀμαλδύνω there is probably not to be connected with ἀμαλός. In Homer, this rare adjective is used of very young animals, who are thereby vulnerable (cf. Callimachus fr. 502). It appears to be used only of an enfeebled old man in Euripides’ Heracleidai 75, and I do not think that Aristophanes has this in mind. Hermes probably imagines being lightning-blasted by Zeus (cf. Anchises’ anxiety about having slept with Aphrodite in the h. Aphr.).
εἶξε δὲ οἱ κλισμὸι καὶ ἐδριάσθαι ἄνωγεν.

ἀλλ’ οὐ Δημήτηρ ὀργήφορος ἀγλαόδωρος

ηθέλεν ἐδριάσθαι ἐπὶ κλισμὸι φαεινοῦ,

ἀλλ’ ἀκέουσα ἐξεῖ ἀκόμη καὶ ἅμματα καλὰ βαλοῦσα,

πρὶν γ’ ὅτε δὴ οἱ ἔθηκεν Ἴμιβή κέδν’ εἰδοῦι

πηκτὸν ἔδος, καθύπερθε δ’ ἐπ’ ἀργύφεον βάλε κόας.

ἐνθά καθεξειμένη προκατέσχετο γερσὶ καλύπτρην.

ὅτεν δ’ ἄφθογγος τετιηθετέ στίον’ ἐπὶ δίφρου,

οὐδὲ τιν’ οὔτ’ ἐπεὶ προσπτύσσετο οὔτε τι ἐργῷ,

ἀλλ’ ἀγέλαστος ἀπαστος ἐδητύος ἡδὲ ποτήτος...

[Metaneira] sat beside the pillar of the sturdily built house,

holding a child, a new shoot, beneath her breast. His sisters ran

beside her, but Demeter stood, feet on the threshold, and her

head touched the rafter, and she filled the doorway with divine

radiance. Reverence, and awe, and pallid fear took hold of them.

Metaneira yielded her bench to her and bade her take a seat. But

Demeter, conductor of seasons, giver of shining gifts, was

unwilling to sit upon the shining bench; rather, silently she

waited, her beautiful eyes cast downward, until, in fact, fine-

thinking Iambe set a compact stool, and threw a silvery fleece

down upon it. There the goddess sat and with her hands she held

her veil before her face. For a long time she sat speechless and

suffering upon that bench, nor did she greet anyone with a word

or a gesture, but unlaughing, and not tasting food or drink...

Foley does note how “the contrast between mortal and immortal is augmented by a
doubly emphasized difference in height; not only is Demeter taller than mortals, but

Metaneira is seated in a chair.”433 But Metaneira has a νέον θάλος (“new shoot”) at her

breast and is surrounded by her daughters. Thus, there is a competing contrast between

the bereaved and (notwithstanding this partial epiphany) wizened goddess and the intact

issue of the mortal woman. This seems to be amplified by the shifting focalization in the

scene: we see Metaneira’s abundance through Demeter’s eyes, and Demeter’s divine

radiance through Metaneira and her daughters’. Furthermore, although this partial

epiphany reminds us that Demeter has not actually mortalized or mortified herself, as I

433 1994:44 ad 189–90.
am suggesting that her various gestures seem to have, it also emphasizes how diminished she is. For example, given how far the negating οὐ in 192 sits from ἦθελεν (193), we might hear line 192 (ἄλλ’ οὐ Δημήτηρ ὀρηφόρος ἀγλαόδωρος) first as “[it was] not Demeter, who conducts the seasons and gives splendid gifts”. Furthermore, the goddess aborts her own epiphany and counteracts the αἰδώς of the onlookers by casting her eyes downward—a display of αἰδώς—and her subsequent silence and motionlessness (i.e., once Lambe has fetched her the appropriate seat), alongside her refusal to eat and drink, connect her once more with the divine oathbreaker at Theogony 793–8.435

We should also note how she is addressed, by both the daughters of Celeus and Metaneira herself. Once Demeter has sipped the kykeon, Metaneira hails the goddess, but only as γύναι (213), although she does comment on the nobility and charm in her eyes.436 Earlier, at the “Maiden’s Well” (99), Metaneira’s daughters hailed Demeter as γρηῢ παλαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων (113). Notwithstanding how Callidice goes on to reason that Celeus and his brothers would receive her because she is θεοείκελος (159), these initial addresses are unique alongside Anchises’ address of Aphrodite in the h. Aphr. (93–7), where he runs through a number of goddesses (“Artemis or Leto or golden Aphrodite / or noble-born Themis or gray-eyed Athena”), the Graces, and the glen-, river-, and swamp-nymphs as possible identities of the female before him, or even Odysseus’ address of the mortal Nausicca at Od. 6.149–85 (“I clasp your knees, queen! Now are you goddess or mortal?”). So although Demeter’s divinity might be responsible for her resemblance to

434 Compare Aphrodite’s casting down of her eyes as she makes her way to Anchises’ bed (h. Aphr. 155–157) and Olson (2012:217 ad 155–6).
435 See §2.5, §3.10.
436 Again αἰδώς (214) is the pivot around which the drama rotates, and here it empowers Demeter.
divinity, it only achieves that much, namely her appearing noble enough to be called “god-like”; it does not prompt those who meet her to wonder whether she is divine.

4.4 / ...ὁ καὶ θανάτου ῥήγιον ἄργαλέου

If she is not dying, perhaps old age is the key. Demeter commits the closest thing to a divine suicide by subjecting herself to old age. We should compare the fate of Tithonus as Aphrodite tells it in the h. Aphr., when she explains to Anchises why she would not immortalize him. Dawn—ηπίη!—forgets to ask Zeus to preserve Tithonus’ ἡβη, when she asks Zeus for her mortal lover’s deathlessness (220–4). 437 Although Dawn and Tithonus have a lovely time together while he remains young, once old age changes his form, her desire for him dwindles quickly. She does keep him in her home and feeds him both sitos and ambrosia (232), a combination of sustenance that scholars have pointed out indexes Tithonus’ being between fully functional divinity and mortality. 438 What is interesting about Tithonus, however, is that, whereas his body disintegrates entirely, his voice persists (236): τοῦ δ’ ἤτοι φωνῆ ῥεῖ ἀσπετος… (“his voice flows ineffable…”). 439 One of the main marks of the diminution of Demeter’s status is her voicelessness.

Aphrodite goes on to describe why she would not subject Anchises to Tithonus’ fate, and how her eternal suffering now has begun (243–55). 440

437 On Tithonus and the envisagement of abhorred old age, see also the ‘New Sappho’ (P. Köln 21361 and 21376) on old age and Mimnermus fr. 4 West, which is the source for the quotation in the section’s title. These poems and others are adduced by Olson (2013:243 ad 218–38).
439 On this somewhat strange locution, see Faulkner (2008:276 ad 237) and Olson (2012:252 ad 237–8).
440 On the otherwise unattested χείσεται (<χάσκω) and ὀνομαστόν (codd. ὀνότατον), see Olson (2012:259–60 ad 252–4).
οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτα μ’ ἄχος πυκνᾶς φρένας ἀμφικαλύπτοι.
νῦν δὲ σε μὲν τάχα γήρας ὁμοίων ἀμφικαλύψει
νηλείας, τὸ τ’ ἔπειτα παρίσταται ἄνθρωποις,
οὐλόμενον καματηρόν, ὅ τε συνέχουσι θεοὶ περ.
αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ μέγ’ ὀνείδος ἐν ἀθανάτοις θεοίς
ἔσσεται ἠματα πάντα διαμπερές εἶνεκα σεῖο,
ο’ πρὶν ἐμοῖς ὀξής καὶ μήτις, αἰς ποτε πάντας
ἀθανάτους συνέμειξα καταθνητήσα γυναιξι,
τάρβεσκον· πάντας γὰρ ἐμὸν δάμνασκε νόμιμα.
νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκέτι μοι στόμα χειστεί ἐξονομῆναι
τοῦτο μετ’ ἀθανάτοις, ἐπεί μάλα πολλὸν ἄσθην
σχέτλιον οὐκ ὀνομαστόν, ἀπεπλάγχθην δὲ νόοιο,
παῖδα δ’ ὑπὸ ἥλων ἐθέμην βροτῷ εὐνηθείσα.

Then grief would not enshroud my dense wits. But now soon indiscriminate old age will enshroud you—pitiless—which stands next to humans, accursed, wearying, which the gods abhor especially. But for me there will be great contumely among the deathless gods all days and forever because of you, the gods who formerly were afraid of my whispers and plans, by which I at some point caused all the deathless ones to sleep with mortal women. For my intellect used to overcome all of them. But no longer will my mouth open to say this aloud among the deathless ones, since I’ve been utterly deluded—harsh and unspeakable thing!—I’ve been driven out of my mind, and I put a child beneath my girdle by bedding with a mortal man.

Although Olson’s assessment that Aphrodite “no longer has any motivation to exercise her power [viz. of making gods sleep with mortals], for the fun has gone out of the game” is not wrong,441 it falls short of exploring what is entailed by this ‘noetic’ failure. The fact is that she realizes that it was never a game, and this has to do less with the erotic aspects of her sleeping with Anchises than with her newfound maternity. And, in fact, the ways in which Aphrodite glosses over the tenuous applicability of the Ganymede and Tithonus myths—as Olson rightly notes, if Dawn was νηπίη not to ask for eternal youth for

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Tithonus, then something else is going on in Anchises’ case—to Anchises’ situation suggest that the “dread grief” that she suffers could nod to something quasi-historical.

For even if Zeus should be considered nasty for granting such a cruel wish to Dawn, i) why would Aphrodite not characterize it as such? and ii) why would she not narrate that she herself had asked but had been denied such a request by Zeus? I do not think the answer is quite that she does not actually want Anchises as a lover, and although I think that the poem is concerned to emphasize the distance between mortals and immortals through the extreme intimacy (ἀγχίθεοι δὲ μάλιστα at 200) of the Anchisids with the gods, one more detail suggests that Aphrodite’s impending maternity is the crux: Zeus’ abduction of Ganymede obviously does not result in any children, and Aphrodite makes no mention of any progeny of Dawn and Tithonus. Hesiod (Th. 986–7) tells us that “to Tithonus Dawn bare Memnon of the bronze helm / king of the Aethiopians, and lord Emathion”, and the Aethiopis ascribed to Arctinus of Miletus makes Memnon the slayer of Antilochus and the victim of Achilles. The Aethiopis also tells us that Dawn procured immortality for Memnon. (Presumably, since he was cut down in the prime of youth, his immortality also entailed agelessness, unlike his father’s.) So either the poet of the hymn imagines Dawn and Tithonus as childless, or the immortality of Memnon is suppressed, in part because the events of the Trojan War have not yet occurred, but it bears on the lot that Anchises gets here. In other words, there are three variations—in this poet’s estimation—of the possibilities when gods love mortals:

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442 2012:253 ad 239–46 for discussion and bibliography.

443 As I think more about this text and Il. 20 (and even Il. 5), the historical fact of the Aeneidae increasingly strikes me as plausible. For the sake of not straying too far from the topic of this chapter, I will avoid engaging that question head-on, but I imagine that my assessment of the poem’s structure could be applied (cautiously) to arguments for their historicity.

444 Faulkner (2008:261 ad 200), following van der Ben (1986), notices a pun on Anchises’ name.

i) homosexual and non-progenitive erotic love, wherein the mortal lover can be given deathlessness and agelessness, especially if the *erastês* is Zeus;\(^{446}\) ii) heterosexual love that does or does not produce offspring, the lover(-father) is given a diminished immortality, and the son, if there is one, is given immortality, but seems to have no offspring; or iii) heterosexual love wherein the father is denied both immortality and agelessness but becomes the progenitor of a line that will last forever (196–7: σοὶ δ’ ἔσται φίλος νιός, δὲ ἐν Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει, / καὶ παίδες παίδεσσι διαμπερές ἐκγεγάονται· / “You will have a son who will rule among the Trojans, and children will be born to children forever…”).\(^{447}\)

But our interest here is in Aphrodite’s affliction. And this emerges from her announcement of Aeneas’ name (198–199): τῷ δὲ καὶ Αἰνείας ὄνοµ’ ἐσσεται οὐνεκά μ’ αἰνόν / ἔσχεν ἄχος, ἕνεκα βροτοῦ ἀνέρος ἐμπεσον εὐνῇ (“And his name will be Aeneas since dreadful (ainon) grief held me / because I fell into the bed of a mortal man”).\(^{448}\) I think this grief has less to do with having sex with a mortal man itself—after all Anchises and his male family members are especially beautiful (201)—than with the product itself, Aeneas, Smith’s “nursling of mortality”. The apodosis at 243—“grief would not enshroud my wits”—although logically connected with her inability to offer Anchises immortality, seems rather to do with the interconnectedness of that inability to immortalize (and preserve the youth of) Anchises and the birth of the mortal Aeneas. In other words, her pregnancy prevents the immortalization of Anchises, and the inability to

\(^{446}\) See Smith (1981:72) on the negative aspects of Ganymede’s abduction.

\(^{447}\) This accords with Smith (1981:95–7), who talks about the social aspects of immortality, namely the disruption and loss of normal family relationships. See Faulkner (200:256–7 *ad* 197) for problems with ἐκγεγάονται.

\(^{448}\) See Faulkner (2008:258 *ad* 199) for discussion of the difficulty of ἑνεκά.
immortalize Anchises indexes her pregnancy. And we know from *Iliad* 5 how that grief gets Aphrodite into trouble. Perhaps the etymology of Aeneas’ name in 199–200 and the “enshrouding grief” of 243 point specifically to Aphrodite’s folly in *Iliad* 5, where she enshrouds (ἀμφικαλόπω) Aeneas to save him from death, and where, once she has been stabbed, we see her beset with terrible grief (352–4): ἥ δ’ ἄλδουσ’ ἀπεβήσετο, τείρετο δ’αἰνός. / τὴν μὲν ὅρ’ Ἡρίς ἐλοῦσα ποδήμενος ἔξαγ’ ὀμίλου / ἀγθοῦνην ὀδύνησι… (“And she avoided Diomedes and went away, and she was dreadfully worn out. / Iris the wind-footed took her and conducted her out of the fray / as she was aggrieved with pains”).449

Although it is not pellucid from the earliest sources, it seems as though Aphrodite’s suffering actually does diffuse to Anchises. At the end of the hymn, the goddess warns him against divulging that he slept with “fine garlanded Cytherea” (287). The result would be that “Zeus in his anger will blast him with a smoking bolt” (288).450 “Check yourself,” she insists at 290, “and do not mention my name—beware the wrath of the gods!” At this threat Aphrodite takes off, and the poet closes his hymn. As Olson notes, however, “that Aphrodite was Aeneas’ mother is commonplace in the *Iliad,*” and therefore he must not have kept his relationship with the goddess secret: some ancient sources “conclude that he was accordingly punished in the way referred to here.”451 Aside from the allusion in 284, where Aphrodite instructs Anchises on how to respond to queries about Aeneas’ mother, to *Il.* 20.206, where Aeneas goes on to vaunt his divine

449 There is a play on Aeneas’ name with αἰνός at *Iliad* 13.481–2. See Olson (2012:233 ad 196–9) for a list of other heroes’ whose names get folk-etymologized.

450 Ζεὺς σε χολοσάμενος βαλέει ψολόεντι κεραυνῷ.

lineage to Achilles,\textsuperscript{452} we might detect an internal echo that suggests that Aphrodite’s \textit{atê}, which brought her to this point might have ‘infected’ Anchises as well. For the protasis of Aphrodite’s warning at 286, \textit{εἰ δὲ κεν ἐξείπης καὶ ἐπευξεῖ άφρονι \θυμῷ}, may pun on the goddess’ name. And since \textit{ἔρος}, which deludes even gods, seized Anchises (91), it is hard to imagine he is exactly \textit{σώφρων} after this episode.

\textsuperscript{452} Pointed out by Olson (2012:273 \textit{ad} 284–5).
**Conclusion**

This study, like many of the objects of its inquiry, is unfinished, brutish perhaps. It is hybridized along lines of both method and content and engages with a variety of texts spanning some twenty-five hundred years, from Mesopotamia to Sicily, in order to approach a level of panopsia about the sharing and transformation of mythic material in the ancient Mediterranean. At the same time, it examines a number of discrete, often intractable units of language and (one hopes) sheds some light on some mythic details that are shrouded in murk. Myopia sometimes results.

But this investigation has never been just about the infrastructure—geographic, linguistic, and cognitive—of cultural and literary koines. Rather it was about beginning to describe the machinery of myth and poetry with respect to a certain complex of (to use a somewhat heavy-handed term) neuroses about cosmic structure, death, and language. For example, I proposed that mythic narratives seem to be moved by the recognition that categories of mortal and immortal, benevolent and malevolent, *themis* and *ou themis*, are contingent and shaky, and that one mechanism of destabilization—what we might call the linguistic moment of recognition—involves grammatical play and ambiguity. We do not simply imagine narratives that involve man’s assimilation to the divine, shape-shifting snakes’ threats to the Lord of the Storm, and bleeding goddesses; we demonstrated the inherent unsteadiness—at the very least the contingency—of our linguistic signifiers. The secondary hypothesis was that these linguistic ‘moments’ must have been salient as such;
as a result, they either accompanied the exchange of mythic material or facilitated it (or both). This process is largely unobservable, but I proposed that besides the representation of the phenomenon across languages, the various ‘blips’ (perhaps the misunderstanding of *ikhôr* is one) that are found in proximity to them demonstrate at least semi-conscious engagement with these features.

In a sense, then, what may be said to emerge from this study is a new theory of myth and poetry. Although we would not call all myth poetry in the strong sense, we can at least say that the myth that is under investigation here, metrical or not, involves itself in poetics, which I operationally define as the marked usage (or the misuse) of the phonological qualities of words and groups of words, or the symbolic repurposing of certain idiomatic elements (e.g., metaphors, epithets, and formulae), in order to generate a new textual meaning or subvert an old one. This theory might appear to be an extension of Straussian theory, the modification being that, instead of myth’s being seen as offering “a logical model capable of overcoming contradiction,” it is in fact the non-logic that carries the *mythos* forward. In other words, it is the emotional and intellectual *aporia* that the insoluble contradiction generates that leads to narrative violence, which forces the contradiction to be practically, though importantly not intellectually, solved.

This sort of Deconstructionist reading, if it avoids the pitfalls of Derridean obscurantism, could really be a valuable tool for tracking the rhythms of trauma and recovery in ancient myth: reconciliation generates its own type of anxiety, and perhaps undercuts itself. Although far outside the purview of this particular project, Vergil’s

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Aeneid, I think, makes itself particularly available to this sort of reading. More germane, perhaps, are the intractable ethical and moral convolutions in, say, the Oresteia.

In other words, the fantasy of avoiding death and the trepidation about the universe’s crumbling into disarray are both momentarily aborted or allayed through violence. Yet we continue to fantasize, and we continue to feel deep anxiety. Thus, myth can provide a temporary anodyne, but is hardly curative.

Furthermore, the deep (both profound and latent) tragedy of much myth, which 5th century tragedy concentrates and amplifies more than any other genre, enables catharsis—Proclus’ suggestion that the gods are καθαρεύοντες πάθους could also describe our (fleeting) mental state when we read or hear or watch myth—but our daily lives, intransigently mortal, sully our νοῦς once we exit the mental and emotional space of reading, and watching, and listening. Perhaps we can imagine Inara’s prohibition against Hupasiya’s looking out the window lest he see his family as having encoded this process. (Perhaps she implies something like, “Since you’ve slept with me and aided the Storm-god, you are god-like, but mortal yearning yet crouches outside.”) Given the other version of the Illuyanka myth, in which the Storm-god’s son dies along with the snake, as well as Hittite’s euphemistic conflation of divinity and death, we might also read Hupasiya through Plato.

454 Particularly that offered by the Phaedo (66c–67a): καὶ τότε, ὃς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυµοῦµεν τε καὶ φαµεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήµενος, ἐπεὶ δὲν τελευτήσωµεν, ὃς ὁ λόγος σηµαινεῖ, ζῶσιν δὲ οὐ, εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶδαν τό πάντα τοῦ σώµατος μηδὲν καθαρός γνώναι, δυοῖν θάτερον ἢ οὐδάµατο ἢστον κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦχα ἡ ψυχή ἔσται γεγονότα ὁ σώµατος, πρῶτον δ' οὐ, καὶ ἐν ᾗ ἢ ἵνα ἐξώμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω εἰσόµεθα τὸ εἰδέναι, εἰσ’ ὃν μίλωσα µηδὲν ἰµιλόµεν τό σώµατι μηδὲ κοινονώµεν, ὃτι οἶµαι ἀνάγκη, µηδὲ ἀναπιστῶµεθα τῆς τοῦτοῦ φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύοµεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἐκεῖ ὃν θεῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπολύσει ἡµᾶς· καὶ εὐθεία µὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόµενοι τῆς τοῦ σώµατος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός µετα τοῦτον τὸ εἰσόµεθα καὶ γνωσόµεθα οὗ ἠµῶν αὐτῶν πάν τὸ εἰλικρινὲς, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἰσός τῷ ἄλλῳ; / “And then, so it seems, we’ll have that which we desire and say we are lovers of—wisdom—when we die, as the argument indicates, but not while we’re alive. For if it is not possible to
But we have gotten ahead of ourselves here. One of my main interests in undertaking this study was to try to determine just how early myth anticipates the sometimes polemical cosmological and epistemological statements of the pre-Socratics, particularly Parmenides fr. 6, where the goddess roundly abuses mortal doxastic reason as subjecting men to a “wandering nous” (line 6), as well as the Heraclitean riddles regarding the ontological (or maybe the epistemological) relationship between immortals and mortals, life and death (and sleep and wakefulness). That is to say, I suspect that the moments of cosmological and linguistic *aporia* in much early myth are wrapped up in the *palintropia* that the goddess ascribes to the third path. Even though this is primarily an epistemological model, Parmenides’ goddess parses the experience in terms that would seem to index the emotional angst generated by this wandering. Heraclitus’ riddles often generate a similar *aporia*. For both of them, but explicitly for Parmenides, linguistic *aporia* (*amêkhaniê* for Parmenides) results in an insoluble and delusive phenomenological cosmos.

So what we might say, then, about all of the episodes that we have brought under study here is that they represent a projection of a collective (un)consciousness of the instability, or at least the extreme contingency, of our cognitive-linguistic models of our universe, including the role of our death, which, unlike for the golden race, generates deep aching in us. In case this should seem reductive, let me say that these myths ought
not be treated as fully isomorphic to one another; but there is a sense in which they all are capable of reducing heaven, like all else in our universe as we know it and signify it, to rubble.
Bibliography


