scholars from mainland China (including Jiang herself) under a separate/secondary group is rather dubitable, if not impertinent. Does this method of division suggest that works by mainland Chinese scholars do not belong properly or are secondary to the major schools of works in the English world? It is even more puzzling to note that scholars from Taiwan and Hong Kong, in contrast, are included in the primary group. I find it really hard to understand why such kind of “racial profiling” should be adopted for introducing academic discourses that are meant to promote the spirit of free and fair exchanges of ideas between different cultural traditions.

Despite this questionable method of organization, the quality of the edition and translation is praiseworthy in general, especially considering the good number of translators who have to work on a total of twenty-six articles. The only notable weakness of the book, ironically, is the notes on the original English works. One may suppose this should be the easiest part as it involves only the task of mechanical replication. However, precisely here one finds numerous infelicities and even egregious mistakes such as missing page numbers (p. 141, 332), incorrect journal title (p. 515), erroneous web source information (p. 215), and misspelled editor’s name (p. 195). It appears that the proper handling of English sources and styles remains a formidable task for some Chinese copyeditors.

As my concluding remark, let me put forward a modest suggestion for the compilation of such collective translation of Western philosophical articles, whose number has been encouragingly growing in the past few years. In my view, it is advisable to include at least some brief introduction of the academic and biographical backgrounds of the translators, instead of just listing their names at some marginal places. For the fine collection of essays in this volume would not have been possible without the translators’ strenuous and substantial labor. After all, it makes good sense to honor and applaud the work of translation, whose importance for cross-cultural dialogues can never be overestimated.

Huaiyu Wang
Georgia College & State University, Milledgeville, Georgia


*Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy* succeeds in spite of, and not because of, its formidable length. The volume is divided into three Books, including three extended Keynote essays, an
introduction, and an epilogue. The overarching structure is fairly obvious: the first Book seeks mainly to scrutinize and develop the topic of personhood as it appears in Kant’s three famous critical works; the second aims chiefly to situate Kant’s critical views on personhood in broader cultural and political domains; the third primarily provides comparisons between Kant’s notions of personhood and those developed in Asia, as well as investigations into the difficult historical and conceptual relationships between Kant and Asia. As such, it is especially and almost entirely in the third Book that the volume manages to largely fulfill the promise announced in the book’s title, “East-West Perspectives on Cultivating Personhood,” and it is thus to this part of the volume that I now turn.

Part XII of Book Three, “Kant on Asia and Asia in Kant,” includes Peter K. J. Park’s deliciously polemical “The Exclusion of Asia and Africa from the History of Philosophy: Is Kant Responsible?,” which labors to establish that “Kant [was central in producing] a distinctly modern science of race. Kant is as responsible as [Christoph] Meiners for the exclusion of Asia and Africa from the history of philosophy and for the rise of Eurocentrism in the modern discipline of philosophy.” (p. 790) Park attempts to establish close links between Kant’s philosophy of the history of philosophy and his conceptions of race, with a series of Kant-inflected histories of philosophy written by, among others, Gottleib Buhle, Wilhelm Tennemann, Deterich Tiedemann, and above all, Christoph Meiners. Kant himself does not go unexamined, as Park emphasizes Kant’s remarks such as: “‘[A]ll Oriental peoples are not in the position to establish through concepts a single property of morality or law’.” (p. 789).

This claim by Kant is remarkable when juxtaposed with Klaus-Gerd Giesen’s essay, which argues carefully that “the abuse of Asian hospitality in East India and Formosa by the British, French, and Dutch…led Kant subtly to distinguish between the three rights to hospitality (asylum, visits, trade) and intolerable colonial behavior. The latter must be strongly condemned on the ground of cosmopolitan law. Furthermore, in Kant’s view, colonialism is such a strong abuse of cosmopolitan hospitality that he felt obliged to add in the third Definative Article of Perpetual Peace: ‘… the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the world’ ” (Giesen’s emphasis). (p. 762) This sort of dissociative identity to be found in Kant is especially important because in this regard Kant is, in many ways, representative of European philosophy of the early modern period. Moreover, the troubled tension between cosmopolitan internationalist and folkish racialist sensibilities he exhibits remains a serious challenge for both scholars and lay people across the globe.
Part IX focuses on the work of Mou Zongsan, with authors variously interpreting, extending, correcting, and criticizing a number of his positions on Kant as well as neo-Confucianism (and, in the case of Annie Boisclair’s contribution, even the Buddhist teaching). Parts X and XI contain a host of fascinating comparative efforts that examine, among other topics, Kantian good will and Confucian sincere will (A. T. Nuyen), Kant and Xunzi on the Inclinations (Scott R. Stroud), and self-knowledge in Kant and the Buddha (Emer O’hagan). While the core of the essays with an Asian emphasis are to be found in Book Three, there are a handful of essays in Books One and Two that include discussions that either directly or indirectly involve Asia and Asian philosophy. Eric Nelson attempts to steer between “anthropocentric humanism, with all of its questionable assumptions about ‘the human’ as distinct from animals and the natural world, and an impersonal naturalism that seems to depersonalize and de-individuate the person” (p. 333) by playing Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (*Critique of Judgment*) off of Zhuangzi (both the person and the work). Christian Wenzel explores convergences and divergences between aesthetics and morality in Kant in Confucius, ultimately employing the Kantian notion of purposiveness to help explicate tian and dao, along with the closely related conceptual pair of li and ren. Bernhard Jakl provides an interesting and helpful discussion of the relationship between Kant’s notion of human dignity and the contemporary German constitutional court’s interpretation of that notion, particularly with regard to the Aviation Security Act (*Luftsicherheitsgesetz*) and its implications for international relations.

However, the lion’s share of the material in Books One and Two is dedicated to specific topics of personhood in Kant’s works; some defend established positions in the literature, while others venture further afield. Chong-Fuk Lau argues that Kant’s treatments of self-cognition in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*) should not be understood as “descriptions about the structure and operations of the human mind,” but rather as “a conceptual analysis of the structure of cognition of the finite rational being as such” (p. 100), while Andrew Brook investigates the place and significance of transcendental reflection (*Überlegung*) in the development of Kant’s thought. Wolfgang Ertl offers an analysis of the compatibility between “causal closure and the non-naturalness of reason” (p. 217), while Ulrich Seeberg argues that since “the unity of human personhood is based upon the unity or reason” (p. 287), we ought to look toward aesthetic judgment to find the grounds of such unity. Bart Vandenabeele likewise suggests that aesthetic judgments are central to personhood for Kant because they ultimately “[join] together the most personal contingent feelings of pleasure (or
displeasure) with a necessary, universal, and cosmopolitan idea of humanity” (p. 309), while Günter Zöller looks at the relationship between Kant’s appropriation of certain conceptions from the political domain for use in his ethics and psychology. Connecting with a contemporary concern, Ronal Green and Natascha Gruber discuss Kantian perspectives on stem cell research, with Gruber arguing particularly “against those who claim that Kant’s ethics is compatible with hESC research.” (p. 361) These are just a small sample of the essays on offer, as the total number, not including the three lengthier keynotes, is sixty-four.

Interestingly, the keynote essays reverse the proportional focus of the volume as a whole, as Patricia Kitcher’s essay is the only one that focuses solely on Kant. She discusses “the spontaneity of thought and action” (p. 36), ultimately arguing that “we lose what is most persuasive in Kant’s cognitive theory and in his moral theory by closely aligning the two.” (p. 37) Günter Wohlfart, in barbed but loose and often entertaining prose, contends that “for Kant, devoted only to cold abstract duty, the warm feeling of compassion is weak and always blind” and thus it needs tempering by the likes of Kongzi, Mengzi, Huainanzi, and Zhuangzi. Chung-ying Cheng’s contribution works toward “a Confucian-Kantian synthesis” whereby Confucian ren can be understood as both a kind of perfect virtue as well as a perfect duty of virtue (p. 89).

The fact that the main portion of the volume reverses the orientation of the keynote essays brings us to some of the problems with the text. First and foremost, given the purported titular topic, too much of the work focuses tightly on relatively narrow interpretive issues centering entirely on Kant, with the result that the vast majority of the first two-thirds of the text pay no significant attention to Asian philosophy or Asia more broadly. Second, it is simultaneously too long and too short: many times I found myself just getting fully immersed in an essay only to have it end rather abruptly, with the author occasionally citing length limitations, while at other times I felt as if material was being essentially duplicated. In other words, this text would have benefited from a slightly different editorial approach: the total number of essays should have been significantly lower, while the length limit of each should have been significantly higher. A similar shift in emphasis would have helped address the imbalance in focus noted above. Third, the essays vary in terms of quality: some are fully worked out and elegantly argued, while others seem to be early and somewhat sketchy forays. As the text comes out of a conference, this is to some extent understandable, but given the other problems, it would have benefited from further editing.
All that said, *Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy* should find a happy home in libraries, bookshelves of scholars, and homes of interested lay readers. On balance, its positives outweigh its negatives, and it will hopefully contribute to correcting some of the imbalance in scholarship evident in its own pages.

Aderemi Artis

*University of Michigan, Flint, Michigan*