Joseph McCarthy and the Loss of China: A study in fear and panic

By

Adam Ferenz

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Approved By

First Reader
Bruce A. Rubenstein, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor
History Department
University of Michigan-Flint

Second Reader
Frederic Svoboda, Ph.D.
Department of English
University of Michigan Flint
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Introduction and thanks

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The paper you hold in your hands is about a political figure who is quite divisive across the political spectrum. His name has become associated with a period and a style of behavior. Senator Joseph McCarthy, Republican from Wisconsin, has always held a fascination for me because so much has been written and otherwise said about him as a villain, or as a misunderstood hero, that I felt compelled to study him and his actions, for myself. As I approached the project, I made many of the same assumptions others make, such as believing his
involvement in Committees that he had no involvement in, and, as became clear during the process of research, how he was but one-if major-voice, representative of larger, recurring trends within American culture and society. I admit a certain bias in my initial approach, which was to show how and why McCarthy was never right. I had not counted on items of fact such as the Venona Decrypts, which when declassified in the late Twentieth-Century, proved that McCarthy, though his methods were far from pretty, and certainly not excusable, may have been on to something from time to time.

Instead, what emerged was the portrait of a man and a nation emerging into the role of national and world leaders, struggling with ideas about isolation and responsibility and blinded by contradictory feelings of exceptionalism and inadequacy. There was hate, there was blame, and there was fear, panic, desire for power, ego, race, gender, constitutional violations, cowardice and bravery, on the parts of so many people from so many walks of life. I am not trying to reclaim Joseph McCarthy. That I will leave to those who are more politically and socially in line with him than I am. Instead, I hope to clear up many of the mistaken assumptions and block off the blind alleys that lead so many down rabbit holes. McCarthy, in this analysis, is part of a post-World War Two trend with its historic roots reaching back to at least the First World War. This is a study in media and politics, and how one man used and was used by, those who make the news. It is about fear, panic and the dark underbelly of American Culture.
Chapter One: Background To A Menace

The term “McCarthyism” is a misnomer. Not only was the “McCarthy era” not begun by Republican Senator Joseph Raymond McCarthy of Wisconsin, it was not even the first Red Scare; moreover, neither his Senate sub-committee, which he did not chair until 1953, nor the House Un-American Activities Committee, were the first or only such bodies to exist. Following the 1917 Bolshevik takeover of Russia, western Capitalist nations, then in the midst of The Great War, became seized by an overwhelming fear that they would fall to a communist plot and cease to exist as they once had. This fear continued beyond the end of The Great War. In the United States, in the years immediately following The Great War, a panic set in among the people and government officials.

While fears, such as anxiety over the followers of labor leader Luigi Galleani, had existed prior to The Great War, it was not until the war had concluded that a real panic set in. Panics rely on fear, which rely on anxiety, and anxiety often relies on what is known and what is hidden, or secret. Such secrets “act like a Rorschach ink-blot…any qualities may be attributed to it, and no basis for refutation exists.”¹ This is dangerous, creating an arena where opinion becomes as powerful as fact. Such secrets have other attributes, as well, including fostering a sense of community. Political hysteria works in insidious fashion.

A despised, deviant and dehumanized outgroup secretly plots the destruction of the good, fully human men and women who make up the true society. The Red conspirators of 1919 were variously depicted as aliens, foreigners, Jews, vermin, lice, feces, disease, plague, epidemic, mad geniuses, scum, filth, rats, rodents, termites, snakes, criminals, idiots, anti-Christ, devils, sexually licentious, sadistic, perverse, and brutal…these attributes arouse feelings of fear, hatred, disgust, dread and less obviously, feelings of envy. The functions of defining conspirators in these ways is to dehumanize them for the purpose of ‘legitimating’ them as future victims, to ease the guilt that might ensue upon

their eliminations, and to mobilize the masses in support of their extinction. The function of defining the outgroup as dangerous is to arouse anxiety.\(^2\)

Such secrets and their resultant anxiety and rhetoric drove the Red Scares, both in the 1950s and after the Great War. The first major investigatory body of the post-Great War period, dedicated to seeking out Communist influence, was the Overman Committee. Chaired by North Carolina Democratic Senator Lee Slater Overman, the committee existed between September 1918, and June 1919, and consisted of five members. Joining Overman on his committee—which was never officially named—were four additional Senators: Knute Nelson, Republican from Minnesota; Josiah O. Wolcott, Democrat from Delaware; Thomas Sterling, Republican from South Dakota; and William H. King, Democrat from Utah. Importantly, the press became very involved with reporting the findings of the body, which investigated suspected German and Bolshevik influences during the period of the United States involvement in The Great War.

The term “Witch Hunt” was used for the actions of the Overman Committee, and would be recycled in the 1950s. The term was applied during the testimony of Edward Everett Robbins, Republican congressman from Pennsylvania, in an exchange with Senator Sterling of the Overman Committee. Robbins compared the current actions of the committee to those of witch hunts in times past. Addressing Sterling, he said “you are familiar with the old witch-hunt attitude, that when people get frightened at things and see bogies, then they get out witch proclamations, and mob action and all kinds of hysteria takes place.”\(^3\) The media likes terms which inspire emotional responses, because such responses sell newspapers.

\(^1\)Levin, 151
One such article, in the New York Times, dated February 17, 1919, concerned the centralization of industrial power in Russia. This was based on testimony to the Overman Committee by an unnamed witness, who was in charge of a factory in Russia at the time of the Revolution. In the testimony, the witness described the fear of the workingmen in Russia, who “are not Bolsheviki, although they do not dare to say they are something else.” The witness also described the violent means by which dissent was being put down in Russia, pleaded for understanding that the peasantry in Russia was by and large not Bolshevik, and hinted that American assistance would be welcome, by relating a story in which every peasant he encountered denied Bolshevism and became friendly upon learning he was an American Capitalist. This is propaganda at its finest, a report sprinkled with truth yet formulated to fit the demands of the day. The Overman Committee took notice of such stories and used them as evidence in the righteousness of their investigations.

Witch Hunts stir up powerful images of the past, and yet, what is a witch hunt? The Overman committee was one, bent as it was on acting as a propaganda tool against Germany, with Bolshevism as a side-bar. Indeed, the newspapers and the Committee fed off one another, with the Committee “clearly supplementing the propaganda of employer groups and patriotic societies…a vital factor in the development of the Red Scare…with headlines such as “Red Peril Here” and references to Mad Russians and Reds as human scum.” A witch hunt can be narrowly defined as a type of moral panic and under this definition, the Red Scares qualify. Yet, as with all

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5ibid
such panics, there would not have been concern if legitimate reasons did not at some point exist. The bombings of 1919 and 1920 provided those reasons and more.

The Overman Committee was followed by the Lusk Committee, under the guidance of the New York legislature, and in operation from June 1919 to January 1920. Dedicated to active raiding of suspects, the Lusk committee was directed by Archibald Ewing Stevenson, and took place alongside the Palmer Raids. The raids were named after the Attorney General, Alexander Mitchell Palmer, who was frightened by the bombings Luigi Galleani had spearheaded, including one on June 2, 1919, which was detonated not far from where Palmer resided in Washington D.C, and which was the second attempt on his life, following one on May 1, 1919. The attack on Palmer was one of a sweeping attempt on government officials, including most of the Overman Committee. These attempts, over a period of several months, created distress among members of the government. There was inarguably a threat to national and personal security, with bombings occurring nationwide and not directed exclusively at government officials.

The bombings had mainly targeted those who objected to the right of workers to call a strike. After a period of investigation, Palmer, who was portrayed in the liberal media of the time as a man who manipulated the government and media for his own aims, asked for nearly two million dollars from Congress, but received only $100,000. Palmer did so after going in front of Congress and declaring that the money would be used for investigations into:

Ultraradicals or Bolshevists or class-war agitators...we have received so many notices and got so much information that it has almost come to be accepted as fact that on a certain day, which we have been advised of, there will be another attempt to rise up and destroy the government in one fell swoop.9

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8 Avrich, 142
Palmer again addressed Congress, and stated that he was for stricter laws, and in favor of an anti-sedition law for anarchists, a fact reflected in the *New York Times*, dated November 16, 1919. That article, titled “Palmer for Stringent Laws” outlined how Palmer had written a letter to Congress, proposing a law targeting “the IAW, Bolsheviki, Communists and other radical organizations and persons who are preaching through the spoken or printed word the overthrow of the Government of the United States.” Perhaps Palmer’s conditions coming so soon after the end of The Great War had something to do with how they were received.

The *New York Times* article continued, showing how Palmer had suggested that the results of his investigations “…had listed, to date, more than 60,000 persons, practically all aliens, identified with anti-American and disloyal activities and a foundation for action under the deportation laws against the worst of these offenders…” Because of this, Palmer drafted, at the request of Congress and based on these investigations, a law which proposed to define sedition in a new manner.

The law is to redefine sedition and the promotion thereof so as to make amenable to its penalties the organizations, individuals and publications which have been preaching anarchy, Bolshevism, and Communism and contains a section which would do away with the barriers now contained in the law which prevent the deportation of those convicted of anarchy.

In June of 1919, Palmer began to restructure the Justice Department. Toward that end, Palmer worked with J. Edgar Hoover, whom he named to head the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation in August of 1919. That same month, the journalist John Reed, along with his compatriots Benjamin Gitlow and William B. Lloyd, founded a nativist branch of the

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11 ibid
12 ibid
Communist Party of the United States, only months after that party's founding. In spite of their radicalism, the three men did this because they were "naturally suspicious of the alien-dominated language of federations and feared that their own brand of native radicalism would be subverted." Of the bombings, Reed believed "they were planted by some reactionary who wanted to terrify the "ruling class" into destroying the radical labor movement in this country." Hoover, meanwhile, had been busy while head of the Radical Division, which would have kept a close watch on such developments.

In early 1919, John Reed had published his account of the Bolshevik Uprising, Ten Days that Shook the World. When asked about his feelings towards revolution, Reed told a reporter "I have always wanted a Revolution in the United States...Revolution does not necessarily mean a revolution by force. By revolution, I mean profound social change." Men like Hoover and Palmer, like Overman and Lusk, did not care to hear about change to the status quo. Those who hold power are never eager to relinquish it. Politics being a struggle and disagreement about determining who gets what, where, when and how much, there is always resistance to such change, particularly massive social upheaval. The same would happen during the early 1950s, because man does not change his nature in a matter of decades. Reed died in Russia a year later.

Clearly, there was a thread of radicalism afoot. As head of the Radical Division:

Hoover had directed the compilation of files on over 200,000 groups and individuals. The files principally contained information on Communist targets, but also included reports on prominent liberals (for example, Jane Addams and Robert La Follette) and liberal organizations (such as the American Civil Liberties Union).
Hoover, armed with this knowledge, chose to view the agreement of the Labor Department to act against the Communist Party to be one which included as a target The Communist Labor Party. The difficulty for Hoover and Palmer was that Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson claimed Hoover must prove more than merely membership in an organization before a warrant could be issued. Hoover found compliant allies within the Labor department and got his warrants, later denying, as did Palmer and his people, any such requirements had been made known to them. Palmer was seen as weak by those who claimed he did not, in the end, pursue the bombers far enough. His “Soviet Ark”—real name The Buford—of December 1919, was considered a publicity stunt.

Among hundreds of deportees, The Buford carried Emma Goldman, whose “notoriety had begun in 1893 and over the following twenty-five years she had been arrested many times for making speeches ‘menacing to the public order.’” A movement to deport Goldman, however, had existed “since 1907…it was claimed she was actually the mentor of Leon Czolgosz, the assassin of McKinley.” Goldman was but one of several prominent names aboard the ship, which was seen as sending its passengers back to where they belonged, the thinking being radicals were foreigners and foreigners were radicals, and radicals were Communists and Communists were Russian. This was a highly flawed ill-logic, but in the climate of the period, even those who were not Russian, and had been born and raised in the United States, were among those being shipped to “mother Russia.” Yet, it was not The Buford which tipped the scales against Palmer.

17 Murray, 223-224
18 Murray, 207
19 ibid
In an action criticized by many within Justice Department, Palmer allowed Galleani and eight of his associates to exit the country, following a simple conversation between themselves and Federal agents, at the East Boston immigration center, where the men admitted to being anarchists.\(^{20}\) As a result, Palmer found himself fading in power and popularity. Additionally, there was the trouble over Hoover’s actions, less sympathetic men at Labor, including Louis Freeland Post, and harsh press coverage by liberal-leaning magazines like *The Nation* and *The New Republic*.

Post in particular played a vital role, by applying the decision of Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in *Silverthorne Lumber Company v. US*, where information gathered on the basis of the illegal seizure of papers and files could not thereafter be used to incriminate a defendant.\(^{21}\) Post was a devout “believer in freedom of speech and assemblage.”\(^{22}\) Acting on those beliefs, what concerned Post most was both the lack of proper counsel, and the political illiteracy, of many of the aliens under warrant. As a result, Post “refused to throw all anarchists, whether terroristic or pacifistic, into the same pile.”\(^{23}\) Post made enemies through these actions.

On May 1, 1920, a resolution was offered, in the House, to censure Post, and on May 7, Post testified before the House. There, Post “defended his 1239 cancellation of warrants which he had already ordered and concluded his remarks by roundly assailing the Department of Justice for its high-handed procedures and illegal actions.”\(^{24}\) His eloquence and literacy in explaining his actions and admonishing the Rules Committee, that “all agreed the Rules Committee ought to make a graceful withdrawal...they looked much like a person who had picked up a hot poker and

\(^{20}\) Avrich, 168
\(^{21}\) Murray, 247
\(^{22}\) ibid
\(^{23}\) ibid
\(^{24}\) Murray, 249
was trying to find a place to put it."25 The deportation of communists and anarchists faded in importance for the government, even though the threat of bombings would remain into the 1930s. Post died in 1928, unpopular among conservatives. Palmer, who returned to practicing law in 1921, died in 1936, his career unrecovered following the raids that bore his name.

In the 1930s, another wave of anti-Communist feeling began to spread, and it was Congressman Hamilton Fish III who introduced a bill on May 5, 1930, to establish a committee to investigate Communist activities inside the United States. Its chief target at the time was Communist Party USA leader William Z. Foster.26 Fish also wrote an article, for The Annals, in which he began by stating that:

Communism is the most important, the most vital, and the most far-reaching issue in the world, affecting the civilization of the world and the happiness and safety of our people. The merits and the demerits of prohibition sink into insignificance compared to this question of Communism, whose ramifications reach into every human sphere and activity, and which is a great world issue. It may be divided into three parts: the revolutionary or political, the moral or religious, and the economic.27

These sentiments reflected the concerns and beliefs of anti-Communists of the period, and would carry over into the period of Senator McCarthy. On May 26, 1938, the Fish Committee and the McCormack-Dickstein Committee, were combined and reorganized into the House Un-American Activities Committee. It was known at first as the Dies Committee because its chair was Martin Dies, Democrat from Texas. This body was charged with broad powers to investigate allegations of disloyalty or subversion on the part of private citizens and government employees alike, as well as any businesses or organizations suspected of acting as communist or

25 Murray, 249
fascist fronts. Even those simply suspected of having communist or fascist ties were placed under scrutiny. HUAC’s intentions seem to be guided by the principles laid out by Fish.

In 1939, two books were published which helped increase unease over the threat of Communism. Both can be positioned within the sub-fear of The Fifth Column, a concept which came into existence in 1936, during the Spanish Civil War, and which had much in common with the claims made by Fish. The Fifth Column was described thusly “first used by General Emilio de Mola, who had announced that a fifth column was making ready to erupt from within the capital city of Madrid...foreign agents, domestic traitors and enemy dupes would form the backbone.”

Further, it would use a variety of tactics, including “espionage, sabotage, and subversion in order to leave its host country demoralized, divided and militarily unprepared for war.” The practical applications gave immediacy to the threat, which meant that “in the event of an actual invasion, Trojan Horse operatives would assist the enemies’ regular troops.”

Fears of hidden threats work wonders in keeping voters just nervous enough that they do not notice encroachments on their civil rights. The two publications, both reflecting these fears, supported those efforts.

The first book, written by Soviet defector Walter Krivitsky, was titled In Stalin’s Secret Service. Originally serialized in the Saturday Evening Post, the book warned of “Soviet intrigue in Europe and America...OGPU murders outside the Soviet Union, Comintern plots in Germany and attempts by Stalinist agents to pass counterfeit bills in the United States.” Krivitsky was not finished, and increased the level of fear by stating that “the Communist Party of the United

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28MacDonnell, 3
29 ibid
30 ibid
31 MacDonnell, 77
States was more closely aligned than any other with our OGPU and Intelligence Service...many members of CPUSA engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union.”32 The news seemed so horrible it had to be true.

Jan Valtin released the second of the two books, in 1939. *Out of the Night* ended with Valtin “fleeing the secret police of both Germany and the Soviet Union, a final which underscored the popular notion that Stalinism and Hitlerism were two sides of the same coin.”33 In his book, Valtin detailed his capture, torture and turn into a double-agent by the Nazis, as well as his wife’s murder and son’s disappearance.34 A review in *Time* magazine stated that the book showed “the Russian Fifth Column is coterminous with the globe.”35 As Europe became engulfed in War, the United States plodded along, worrying about infiltrators and its own sunken economy.

Within this framework, Martin Dies decided the most important security concern facing The United States was The New Deal. In 1939, Dies released a statement. In it, he asserted that “over 2,850 known Communists held government employment positions....made it clear he believed the White House coddled Communists...and charged Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins with indifference.”36 Dies placed his weight behind a cut in funding to the Federal Theater and Writer’s Projects, “WPA programs in which Communists were involved.”37 In 1940, with concerns growing, Congress passed the Alien Registration Act, known as the Smith Act.

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32 ibid
33MacDonnell, 78
34MacDonnell, 78
35 ibid
36MacDonnell, 79
37 ibid
Dies influenced this legislation, which "made it a crime to advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of destroying any government in the United States by force or violence" while the Alien Registration Act "made membership in a revolutionary group a punishable offense, thus preventing the government from having to prove individual violations of the law." With such acts on the books, the United States was preparing itself for a new political reality.

During The Second World War, HUAC remained occupied with hearings. Chairman Martin Dies released periodic reports. Dies, typically a hands off sort, aside from the Smith Act, was noted for never appearing at the few public hearings he arranged, but had published a report in 1944 "listing 245 Communist- Front Organizations and 344 pages of the names of people (more than 20,000) who had signed petitions, sponsored organizations or appeared on letterheads." This was ample proof that "McCarthy era" fear of communism was not something cooked up by the Wisconsin Senator but already present within American society.

The Dies Committee, with its reports, pointedly targeted "the CIO, CIO Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC) Union for Democratic Action and 'Communist sympathizers' in the Roosevelt administration." Dies targets were wide, and included "Eleanor Roosevelt, whose name appeared on the list 20 times...the Office of Price Administration, Federal Communications Commission, Office of Civilian Defense, and Board of Economic Welfare." Dies also suggested that "Security risks were employed in those agencies and departments" while "conservatives in the House of Representatives mounted a campaign to deny salaries to

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38MacDonnell, 79-80
40ibid
41ibid
those people named by Dies. As the result of such pressure, Franklin Roosevelt issued an Executive Order “setting up an interdepartmental committee to handle complaints of subversive activity, with the Democrats in the House moving to establish a committee of the Appropriation Committee to do likewise.” “Red Fear” and Red Baiting” were neither the exclusive domain of either party, nor were they limited to a specific place and time in American history.

In 1945, twenty-six years after the initial “Red Scare” HUAC became a permanent committee, a position it would hold until its dissolution in 1975. This status occurred after Martin Dies decided not to run for re-election in 1944, and HUAC “was transformed in a smooth parliamentary maneuver by John E. Rankin of Mississippi...with broad investigatory powers.” After World War II, Rankin “wanted to find out whether the Communists are still planning to destroy or overthrow the American system of government.” The Second World War was over, but the Cold War had begun, with the soon-to-be disgraced John Parnell Thomas assuming chairmanship of HUAC.

It was then that the involvement of Senator McCarthy in anticommunist activities became possible, as the people known as the Hollywood Ten and the Whitaker Chambers/Alger Hiss case, rose to prominence in 1947 and 1948, respectively. It can be assumed without stretching credulity that McCarthy took notice of the attention lavished on these cases, and as a new member of the Senate, wanted to make his mark. Any politician worth his salt would have latched onto a security-plus-patriotism issue in the glow of victory following the Second World

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42Ceplair, 65-66
44 ibid
War. McCarthy simply became the most vocal anti-Communist member of the Senate and certainly more strongly than either Thomas or Dies had from the House.

In the case of the “Hollywood Ten”, the Waldorf Statement, released on November 1947 by Motion Picture Association of America president Eric Johnson, effectively ended the employability of not just the ten people named, including Ring Lardner Jr, Dalton Trumbo, Herbert Biberman and Edward Dmytryk, but affirmed the earlier statement by Johnson that he would never “employ any proven or admitted Communist because they are just a disruptive force and I don't want them around.”45 This was important because it was an officially stated position affecting employment not in matters of state security, but in matters of entertainment. The argument was about denying the persuasive power of film to those with non-capitalist leanings, anarchist bents or, simply, those who did not conform to popular social and economic beliefs of the period.

In 1972, Dorothy B. Jones released a study of the Hollywood Ten, in which she searched for evidence of Communism in their filmed works. In “a survey of 159 movies released between 1929 and 1949, in which the Hollywood Ten had credits....31 percent dealt with themes of ‘social significance’, a proportion high compared to the industry’s output as a whole.”46 Of direct Communist propaganda, Jones concluded “there is none.”47 Yet among the Ten themselves, timidity was not the order of the day.

Dalton Trumbo lashed out in the Daily Worker against renegades like John Dos Passos, Arthur Koestler and James T. Farrell, and snarled that the “non-Communist Left” had become the non-anti-Fascist Left. He also claimed that 3.5 million Jews lived in the Soviet Union “under the protection of laws which ban discrimination of any kind.” When Albert Maltz, another of the Ten, dared to suggest in print that a politically committed

work of art ought to be first and foremost a work of art, he was torn limb from limb for his heresy by Dalton Trumbo, Herbert Biberman, Howard Fast and John Howard Lawson: Maltz duly recanted. 48

In addition to control, Communism in Hollywood was about belonging to a group and about ego, factors the media of the day did not widely cover because it did not attract the desired circulation. When Dmytryk testified before HUAC, he said that in Hollywood

a successful person will never say, I got there by hard work and personality. He will say ‘I got the breaks.’ There is such a lingering feeling that their success is not deserved...they look around for some organization that will validate them. The party lays very clever flytraps. 49

Those egos were the same ones with which the Communist Party of the United States had a tenuous relationship, describing treatment of The Ten as ‘Torture by inquisition’ yet considering them to be “posturing beneficiaries of bourgeois entertainment.” 50 There was a disconnection between the every-day and Hollywood, and between the hardcore ideologues within the CPA and the members of The Ten.

When Dalton Trumbo complained to fellow blacklisted writer John Bright that he had lost his ability to earn, and quoted a seven-figure loss, Bright admonished Trumbo. “it is deeply immoral to mourn the loss...it is ideological corruption.” 51 Bright continued, stating Hollywood blacklistees “had subverted art and honesty by selling the status quo. Their political activity derived in large part from a recognition of their guilt. And then they wept when they were deprived, not of bread and milk, but of Cadillacs and minks.” 52 A great illustration of how petty

48 ibid
50 Morgan, 547
51 Morgan, 521
52 ibid
the concerns of blacklisted writers were compared to the lives of those living under Stalinist
edicts in Russia is the case of Vsevolod Meyerhold.

Vsevolod Meyerhold, one of the great innovators of Russian theater, with his stylized and
abstract productions, was accused of mysticism and neglect of socialist realism. In 1938,
his theater was ‘liquidated’ as ‘alien to Soviet art’ and on June 15, 1939, he was invited
to condemn himself at a convention of theater directors presided over by the prosecutor of
the purges, Andrei Vyshinsky. Meyerhold said: ‘The pitiful and wretched thing that
pretends to the title of the theater of socialist realism has nothing in common with
art....everything is gloomily well regulated...and murderous in its lack of talent...you have
done something monstrous...in hunting down formalism, you have eliminated art!’
Meyerhold, a man of sixty-five, was arrested and tortured. His interrogator, B.V. Rodus,
broke his left arm and urinated in his mouth. Meyerhold wrote Vyshinsky that, though
one arm was broken, he could still use a pen with the other. On February 2, 1940, he was
shot.53

The lack of understanding and context on both left and right sides of the political
spectrum is staggering. Both sides were all too eager to prove they were correct. The press, films
and radio were all too willing to oblige them. As with religion, there were true believers on both
sides. The loss of men like Meyerhold is the sort of story which demonstrates, for men like
McCarthy, why Communism had to be resisted, and for the Hollywood Ten, why they were
victims of their own egos. It was often ego and self-preservation, which played roles in being
pro-or anti-Communism. In order to protect themselves, men and women fell upon one another,
and few cases illustrate such backstabbing as clearly as the Whittaker Chambers/Alger Hiss
trials.

On August 3, 1948, Whittaker Chambers, who had initially gone to the government in
1939 to tell them, to no avail, of communist infiltration, informed HUAC that Alger Hiss, while
employed by the State Department, had been a Communist, though unlike Chambers, uninvolved
in direct espionage. Hiss denied involvement. Yet, Chambers also told HUAC, in a panel that

53 Morgan, 547
included future United States President Richard M. Nixon, then a Representative from California, that during the 1930s, he had been a member of “a cell of seven men...the other members were Lee Pressman, Alger Hiss, Donald Hiss, Victor Perlo, Charles Kramer”\(^{54}\) and stated that Kramer’s true identity was “Krivitsky...and there was also John Abt and Henry Collins. Harold Ware was the organizer.”\(^{55}\) In testimony at his first trial, Alger Hiss, questioned about Ware, denied knowing if any of the men were Communists. “I knew Harold Ware to the extent that I testified to in 1933 or 1945. It was not my practice then to ask people whom I met casually whether they were Communists.”\(^{56}\) Chambers later wrote in his memoirs of how he had tried to get Hiss noticed in 1939, and been rebuffed.

Chambers wrote that “in August 1948, Adolf A. Berle testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, not long after my original testimony about Alger Hiss and the Ware Group.”\(^{57}\) It had been Berle to whom Chambers had gone in 1939 with the information about Hiss. Chambers recounted that “his memory had grown dim...he had been unable to take seriously, in 1939, any idea that the Hiss boys and Nat Wit were going to take over the Government.”\(^{58}\) Chambers seemed bemused by this, and noted that while “the word espionage was never mentioned...when (Berle’s notes) were taken out of a secret file and turned over to the FBI...Berle himself had headed them *Underground Espionage Agent.*”\(^{59}\) The Hiss case dragged, featuring claims and counterclaims, until December 1948.

\(^{54}\)Chambers, Whittaker *Witness* (New York: Random House, 1952), 543
\(^{55}\)Ibid
\(^{56}\)Chambers, 685
\(^{57}\)Chambers, 466
\(^{58}\)Chambers, 466
\(^{59}\)Ibid
On December 2, 1948, Chambers led investigators from HUAC to a pumpkin on his property, and withdrew 35mm film, placed there by him the day before, which implicated himself and Hiss. Chambers, editor in chief of *Time* magazine, came under intense scrutiny by the media. Columnist Walter Winchell wrote “gee, Whittaker! Time Marxes on...imagine, Time was edited all these years by Whittaker Chambers, self-confessed Communist, accused perjurer, and Russian spy!” A federal grand jury indicted Hiss on two counts of perjury, but Chambers, who admitted to the same offense, was granted immunity for his role as a cooperating government witness. The first trial ended in a hung jury. A second trial convicted Hiss on two counts of perjury, for which, in January 1950, he was given two concurrent five-year sentences, of which he served nearly four. As the 1940s ended, two more cases of Communist infiltration had emerged, causing further concerns, outrage and questions:

In 1949, news stories revealed that Justice Department employee Judith Coplon gave secret FBI materials to a Soviet official. Early in 1950, the FBI arrested Harry Gold and David Greenglass for passing atomic secrets to the Soviets. Greenglass told the Bureau that he had been recruited into espionage by his brother-in-law Julius Rosenberg. In July 1950, the government arrested Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. After a highly publicized trial the two were found guilty. In 1953, the couple received the death penalty. While historians still debate the legitimacy of the Hiss and Rosenberg verdicts, the reality of Soviet espionage is beyond dispute.

In the examples of The Hollywood Ten, The Rosenbergs and Hiss/Chambers, the swirling accusations closely mirrored what later came with Senator McCarthy, and played a role in illustrating how radio, print and film were used on both sides of the issue. There was a spirit of gleeful publicity, or sensationalism. “In bringing the Hiss-Chambers story to light and in publicizing it in sensational fashion, the House committee was obligated as an arm of the

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60Pumpkin Papers. The: Key Evidence in the Alger Hiss Trials http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ltrials/hiss/pumpkinp.html
62MacDonnell. 188
American Congress to do more than it did.\textsuperscript{63} The specialized climate of political, economic and social anxiety which existed in the post-World War Two era, despite the Allied victories over Germany and Japan, solidified around the emergence of Russia. The Allies mistrusted co-victors in the war, as well as China becoming a Communist state and a seeming stalemate in Korea.

What Congress did, within these conditions, was “to be content to stress only the sordid side of the story…encouraged the irresponsible wave of Red-Hunting and of loyalty-impugning that was to culminate in 1950 in the shocking and dangerous tactics of Senator McCarthy.”\textsuperscript{64} The correct, or at least calmer path—its security is questionable—might have been to:

be content in exposing Alger Hiss’s wrongdoing…unique that he alone among the young men of promise in the late thirties were beginning to rise to important posts in the government could have been corrupted by Communist agents such as Whittaker Chambers?\textsuperscript{65}

Sensationalism, grandstanding and fear ruled the day. As Murray Levin writes “the Democratic capacity for repression is subtle and deeply rooted and, for it to flower in America, extreme economic hardship is not necessary.”\textsuperscript{66} Senator McCarthy, with a willing media, was about to take full advantage of that climate offered him.

On February 9, 1950, speaking before the Women’s Republican club of Wheeling, West Virginia, he stitched together from various sources a general attack on the administration’s security policies, and declared: ‘In my opinion the State Department, which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with Communists.’ The Senator claimed he had a list of 205 or 57 names—how many remains a matter of dispute—of Communist Party members who were still State Department employees. In the atmosphere of this period, McCarthy’s attack caught on and he pursued

\textsuperscript{64} Carr, 129
\textsuperscript{65}Carr, 129-130
\textsuperscript{66}Levin, 107
it for all its political value. Stephen J. Spingarn later recalled that McCarthy’s charges ‘caused special trepidations through the entire government of the United States.’

McCarthy did not begin the post-War anti-Communist movement which would one day bear his name, but, for good or ill, he was going to become its face and its voice. He would be scrutinized like few other politicians of his time and as much as he was responsible for his own actions, he is also partially a product of his period, in large part because of media coverage. “the Mass Media helped keep the panic going. Many newspaper editors and reporters expressed scorn for Joseph McCarthy. Nonetheless, the press gave extensive coverage to McCarthy’s accusations and failed to follow up properly his more outrageous charges.” At the same time, films about Communism grew in popularity. “The Communist Trojan Horse also became an important theme for radio shows, comic books, and pulp novels of the period. In fact, long after the McCarthy era had passed, many works of popular culture still based their storylines on the idea of a Red Fifth Column.”

In this social and political atmosphere, Joseph McCarthy ascended, giving form to a renewed, post-War sense of patriotism.

As the 1950s began, America faced a very different world from even the one that had emerged out of the Second World War. China’s transformation to Communism, combined with the Truman administration’s commitment to the ideas of Containment, through involvement in Korea, and financial aid to the Mediterranean, created a new and constraining framework for which politicians to work in. The scholar John Lewis Gaddis writes that:

By presenting aid to Greece and Turkey in terms of an ideological conflict between two ways of life, Washington officials encouraged a simplistic view of the Cold War which was, in time, to imprison American diplomacy in an ideological straitjacket almost as confining as that which restricted Soviet foreign policy. Trapped in their own rhetoric.

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68 MacDonnell. 189
69 MacDonnell. 189
leaders of the United States found it difficult to respond to conciliatory gestures which emanated from the Kremlin following Stalin’s death and, through their inflexibility, may well have contributed to the perpetuation of the Cold War.70

In this context, McCarthy was not a creator, but a leader and a follower, placed into a system with a long history and which was becoming more intractable by the day, in a media fueled frenzy that demanded the most sensational results. The events of the late 1940’s had proven a fertile ground for sowing seeds of mistrust. The time was “right” for a man like McCarthy to emerge.

70Gaddis, 352
Chapter Two: Owen Lattimore and The Demands of Evidence

The accusations leveled by Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin against Owen Lattimore, an until-then-somewhat-obscure expert on East Asian matters, did not exist in a vacuum. As the 1940s ended, the administration of President Harry Truman came under intense scrutiny for being soft on Communism. The scholar Earle Latham contended that “McCarthyism was the function of a conservative drive for power which, frustrated by the reelection of Harry S. Truman in 1948, asserted itself through the legislative branch.”71 In January 1949, Truman remarked on the rise of Red-Hysteria among Republicans, a party that had seen many losses since the mid-1930s, as being linked to “the hysteria-mongering branch of the Republican party…the brains of this anti-Red movement” and named as perpetrators of this trend Karl Mundt and Richard Nixon, in the House, and Homer Ferguson in the Senate.72

White House Security aid Stephen Spingarn presciently noted in January 1950 that “a crusade or holy war entirely devoted to attacking Communism…the holy war type of fight tends to make the single policy of anti-Communism the test of American patriotism.”73 As the 1950s began, McCarthy was not the only prominent anti-Communist voice, because “many right wing republicans were saying the same thing (charges about Truman harboring communists) but none with the same skill in making use of the press.”74 Mindful of consequences for their careers “Reporters had to report what a prominent and controversial senator said, but unfortunately their

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72Morgan, 376
73ibid
efforts to find out if there was any substance in what he charged lagged far behind the damming charges themselves.”75 The press cannot be held wholly responsible for this development.

McCarthy persisted because “it was not the constitutional immunities which adhered to office of the United States Senator, but because of the political immunities which he gained by identification with the Communist issue.”76 By being a populist, McCarthy was able to shield himself behind a reservoir of mass support. Starting with his speech in Wheeling, West Virginia in February 1950, and ending with his censure by the Senate in 1954, McCarthy was the most prominent anti-Communist voice in the government of the United States.

Yet, his personal charge of a committee lasted only from 1953 until 1954. Media portrayal would have one believe that not only was he in charge of HUAC itself, and chaired it from its beginnings in 1938, but also that he lasted there until its demise in 1975. Being a senator, he could not possibly have served on a House, or Congressional, committee. McCarthy’s death from hepatitis, likely caused by alcoholism, in 1957, puts the notion to rest that he served until 1975.

Perception, however, is often more potent than reality, and reality is not as compelling a case of propaganda as misinformation, a fact well understood by both McCarthy and his critics. In order to understand this, one must understand the relationship between McCarthy and the media, and how the media portrayed Communism and anti-Communism. His first national televised appearance was during:

The Tyding’s subcommittee investigation of charges made by him at Wheeling and on February, 20, 1950 when he talked of ‘81 cases’ on the Senate floor. These hearings had begun on March 8 and were broadcast April, 7, 1950 by NBC and CBS on the occasion

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7Nathan, Lewis and Tanenhaus, 21
76 Griffith, 26
of testimony by Owen Lattimore, a consultant on far eastern affairs whom McCarthy had called ‘the top Soviet agent’ in the United States. The fact that the hearing was televised was unusual enough to warrant a two page column in the New York Times.77

The case of Owen Lattimore began when McCarthy was asked for details about the accusations he made of the State Department, in Wheeling, West Virginia on February 9, 1950. It was shortly after, when pressed at an appearance before the newly created Subcommittee on the Investigation of Loyalty of State Department Employees, chaired by Democratic Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, that McCarthy “fingered China expert Lattimore and three others, including a former U.S. Navy commander and his wife.”78 Lattimore’s time at the Institute for Pacific Relations, or IPR, and his associations stemming from that employment, were a source of many of the accusations made against Lattimore by both McCarthy and other anti-Communists.

Lattimore had served during World War Two “as the American government’s liaison with Chiang-Kai-shek and then headed the Office of War Information’s Pacific operations. He had never worked for the State Department.”79 Yet by 1941 “Lattimore, who like most of his fellow China experts, had few illusions of Chiang-Kai-shek’s corrupt and undemocratic regime found that his left of center politics attracted the FBI’s attention…but never found anything on him.”80 The arguments in American government over how to handle the rebellion in China between Communist rebels in Yenan and government led by Chiang-Kai-shek, would form the core of McCarthy’s attacks not just against Lattimore but nearly every accused who came into his orbit.

77Bayley, Edwin R. Joe McCarthy and the Press. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Pres. 1981) 178. This subcommittee on disloyalty in the State Department was chaired by Millard Tydings, Democratic Senator from Maryland.

78ibid


80Schrecker. 247-248
Lattimore, hired by the IPR in 1934, also became editor-in-chief of its magazine, Pacific Affairs, that same year. In 1988, a Chinese Communist operative named Chen Han-Shen, working through Russian channels, divulged how in 1936 “his supervisors dispatched him to the United States to serve as Lattimore’s co-editor at Pacific Affairs, at Lattimore’s personal request.” This is astonishing, because it contradicts much of what Lattimore said. Yet, this is not all. “Chen used his position to carry out espionage activities in New York...but did not tell Lattimore he was working for Chinese intelligence or inform him of his own clandestine activities.”

This is likely, yet Lattimore had requested Chen through Commintern—the communist network—and could not have been oblivious to his leanings. “Historians Ronald Radosh and Harvey Kleher conclude of Lattimore that ‘if he was not actually a Communist, he was certainly an opportunist.' Therefore, one view of Lattimore is that:

Lattimore’s sin was that he had seen, correctly estimated, and politely but firmly warned about, Communist strength in Asia; his advice-to relieve Asians of tyranny and corruption by backing liberal independence movements-had sometimes been asked by Washington but rarely acted upon.

Another view of Lattimore is that he “was a conscious and articulate instrument of Stalinism...that used his reputation as a scholar to disguise his real agenda and when the game was up, surrounded himself with trusting and gullible colleagues.” Regardless, the Owen Lattimore case further gained notoriety in March of 1950. Headlines began appearing in newspapers, such as how “on Monday, March 13, 1950, an inch-high banner headline screamed across the front page of the Baltimore Evening Sun: MCCARTHY CITES LATTIMORE,

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82 Herman, 127
83 Ibid
85 Herman, 128
THREE OTHERS AS PRO RED. The next few weeks were filled with tension, as a reply was awaited from Lattimore. As scholar Joanne Cavanaugh Simpson explains

Owen Lattimore, then director of Hopkins's Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, was in Afghanistan on a special United Nations mission to offer technical and economic aid to that country. Flying first to Peshawar, Pakistan, and then motoring to Kabul, he had been out of touch for weeks. On March 24, an Afghan messenger stepped out of the cold into a crowded, smoky room. He carried a telegram from the Associated Press. By that time, Republic Senator Joseph R. McCarthy had escalated his charge: in a leak to the press, McCarthy named Lattimore the Soviet Union's top espionage agent in the United States, staking his whole anti-communist crusade on Lattimore's guilt.

Lattimore's blunt response to the Senator's charges: 'moonshine.' 'McCarthy's off record ranting pure moonshine-stop,' Lattimore wrote in a cable to the AP. 'Delighted his whole case rests on me as this means he will fall flat on face-stop-exactly what he has said on record unknown here so cannot reply in detail but will be home in few days and will contact you then-stop.'

Senator McCarthy, questioned in the Congressional record in March, 1950, was asked about eighty-one cases of charges he had made. Senator Millard Tydings, chair of the committee, stated to McCarthy that "I am sure, Senator, that you yourself realize that the individuals who are charged with disloyalty to our Government are confronted with one of the most serious charges that can be leveled at a patriotic or other individual." To this, McCarthy responded "especially the 'or other.'" McCarthy was displaying his way of playing with others, politicians and newsmen alike.

With Tydings and his four month investigation, McCarthy also, in the words of William F. Buckley Jr. and L. Brent Bozell was allotted "something less, surely, than the span of time normally allotted to a man for defining himself...yet it was in the course of the Tydings

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87 ibid
88 Full Text of State Department employee loyalty investigation: Hearings before a Sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States, Eighty-First Congress, Second Session, pursuant to S. Res231. A resolution to investigate whether there are employees in the State Department disloyal to the United States. March 8, 9, 13, 14, 20, 21,28, April 5, 6, 20, 25, 27, 28, May 1, 2, 3, 4, 26, 31, June 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 21, 23, 26, 28, 1950 http://archive.org/stream/statedepartment195001unit/statedepartment195001unit_djvumaj1-2
89 ibid
investigation that he earned his stripes as a ‘wholesale character assassin.’

This was also where "McCarthyism, the derisive epithet coined by Owen Lattimore, became, with a boost from the Tydings Committee, a household word…and his charge that the State Department had been guilty of lax security practices was consigned to history as ‘a fraud and a hoax.’ Tydings, a normally conservative Democrat, had been placed in charge of what was about to become a three ring circus, with he and his fellow Senators as ring-masters.

On March 21, 1950, McCarthy had told Tydings “if you crack this case, it will be the biggest espionage case in the history of this country.” This was a bold claim, coming on the heels of the Hiss/Chambers trials, the selling of nuclear secrets by Klaus Fuchs and the ongoing Rosenberg trial. McCarthy told the press that “I am willing to stand or fall on this one. If I am to be wrong on this, I think the subcommittee would be justified in not taking my other cases too seriously.” More evidence and accusations were demanded and presented at the end of March, 1950.

President Truman had requested the FBI file on Owen Lattimore from FBI chief Hoover, who refused to hand over the complete document, but, just in case, began to have the file photocopied. The supervisor of the operation, Alan Harnden Belmont, prepared an analysis of the file. In this document was made mention of “167 wiretaps and intercepted mail involving wholly innocent persons…the warning to Blue Network not to hire Lattimore, the charge that Atlantic-Little Brown was a ‘communist tinged’ publishing house and letters to and from the

91 *ibid*
93 *Feuerlicht.* 64
The charges against Lattimore looked more than bad. They made not only the State Department but the machinery of the Truman administration look inept, when on March 26, columnist Drew Pearson took to radio and preempted McCarthy's game by announcing Lattimore as the man McCarthy had accused of being the top Soviet spy in the United States. McCarthy began looking for the most dramatic evidence he could assemble against Lattimore.

McCarthy found his evidence in the form of Freda Utley, an admitted Communist, and Alfred Kohlberg, an industrialist and noted anti-Communist. On March 23 or 24 of 1950—the date is imprecise—McCarthy had dinner with Kohlberg and, according to Kohlberg, took his version of the story of the 'loss of China' to Communism as gospel, repeating it a week later on the Senate floor, modified only slightly by his interaction with Utley, and managed by a team of writers who organized his speeches, including "Jean Kerr—later his wife—Charles Kerst, former congressman from Wisconsin; Ed Nellor, a reporter formerly with Hearst; Joe's chief investigator and right-hand man, Don Surine." McCarthy was not a one man show.

According to Robert Newman, when it came to credibility, Surine was the biggest liability on McCarthy's staff. "Surine was everything a good investigator should not be: impulsive, inept, cocky, careless. He had been with the FBI for ten years; it was a miracle he had lasted so long. Hoover fired him in 1950 for involvement with a prostitute" and that this came about "during FBI investigation of a white slavery ring. Surine always lied about this, claiming he had resigned from the bureau." It is important to consider the people with whom McCarthy surrounded himself, for it tells much of the man and his judgments. Surine was consistent in one regard. He:

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95 ibid
96 Newman, 219
97 ibid
98 ibid
compounded McCarthy’s recklessness and mendacity...almost singlehandedly got McCarthy embroiled in the fraudulent activities of Charles Davis, a psychotic who fabricated documents intended to discredit John Carter Vincent and who falsely charged Edward R. Murrow with having been on the Soviet payroll in 1934. Davis was denied security clearance by the Department of Defense, yet he was McCarthy’s ‘contact man’ in collecting classified documents from McCarthy’s loyal underground in the military, the CIA, Justice and State.99

It can be surmised that it was owing to Surine that McCarthy so often had to back off his claims. As early as March 29, 1950 McCarthy back-peddled, shifting away from calling Lattimore the top Soviet espionage agent in America. McCarthy said that:

I fear in the case of Lattimore, I may have perhaps placed too much stress on the question of whether or not he has been an espionage agent. In view of his position of tremendous power in the State Department as the architect of our far eastern policy, the more important aspect of his case deals with his aims and whether they coincide with the aims of Soviet Russia. Therefore, forgetting for the time being any question of membership in the Communist Party or participation in espionage, I would like to deal briefly with what this man advocates and what he believes in.100

Lattimore, as so many others were and had been, was being tried for what he-potentially-believed, for what might have been his intentions. What McCarthy wished to do was to “brand Lattimore as a loyal Soviet servant...influencing American policy, which led to the loss of China.” This required McCarthy to overstate Lattimore’s importance at the State Department, which he did when he said “I believe you can ask almost any school child who the architect of our far eastern policy is, and he will say Owen Lattimore.”101 McCarthy was overreaching but that was established as part of his nature.

Senator McCarthy had accused Latimore, then at work in Afghanistan alongside, but not for, the State Department, of being the top Soviet espionage agent in America, a charge which Lattimore refuted. It was not 1950 but 1949 that real trouble began for Lattimore.

99 Newm an. 219-220
100 Newm an. 222
101 Newm an. 222
Lattimore’s FBI file had been deactivated during the war, but by 1949, previously discredited witnesses were getting a second hearing from the agency, and the file was reopened. As turmoil in China increased, Lattimore began speaking publicly about his disenchantment with Chiang Kai-Shek, urging American policymakers to adjust to the possibility of an eventual victory by Mao Zedong’s Communist insurgency, and arguing that Mao was not necessarily a pawn of Russian Communists. His strong opinions, forcibly expressed, made him powerful enemies, especially those on the right looking for scapegoats for the ‘loss’ of China to the Communists.102

What is presented here only scratches the surface. The FBI file had been reopened because in December 1948, a man named Alexander Barmine fingered Lattimore as part of a Russian spy ring. The files are currently “so heavily redacted it’s hard to assess the statements or glean the details, but they give some idea of what the original charges were based on.”103 Hoover himself sent a memo to the CIA on June 22, 1949 in which he wrote “various informants have identified Lattimore as a possible espionage agent—”and after more details are deleted—“while acting as advisor to Chiang Kai-shek, was divulging information to the Russians.”104 These accusations, along with McCarthy’s, upset Lattimore.

In response, Lattimore noted in Ordeal that he did not understand why these charges were being brought. Lattimore swore that “I do not have a mind like a communist.”105 An interesting comment because of how deeply it speaks to the socio-political atmosphere of post-World War Two America and particularly after Mao took over in China. As one last detail, Chiang Kai-shek’s director of military intelligence, Tai-Li, warned him that in 1941 Lattimore had sent coded messages to Yenan from Chungking.106 Lattimore knew why McCarthy attacked him from this position.

104 Ibid
106 Evans. Blacklisted. 395
I was not a State Department advisor, but he (McCarthy) was not calling me a State Department advisor just out of ignorance. He was using me as an excuse to attack the China policy of the State Department. Evidently, he was hoping to throw the administration off balance in an election year...he was relying on the China Lobby to help him put up a smoke screen.107

If the evidence against Lattimore was true, there was not much smoke needed, and Lattimore’s connection to the State Department was one that the China Lobby, a powerful sector within national politics during the late 1940s and early 1950s, was eager to exploit. In a document dated April 17, 1950, Under-Secretary of State John Peurifoy wrote Tydings that Lattimore had been paid out the Department’s International Funds, as an advisor in Japan in 1945 and 1946108, and further that:

Mr. Lattimore was one of 28 persons to lecture on a program known as ‘Meet the Public’, which was given at the Department’s Foreign Service Institute. He gave one lecture on June 5, 1946. This program was initiated by the Department’s Office of Public Affairs and was designed to bring before departmental personnel the viewpoints of various persons who were working on, or interested in, foreign affairs. In this capacity, Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the Department and received no remuneration.109

Lattimore noted “a pattern” by McCarthy, regarding himself and Phillip Jessup, a fellow diplomat and the attacks against it, charges originally laid out by Alfred C. Kohlberg, described as a “millionaire fanatic who for years had spent a lot of money trying to work up pressure for all out aid to Chiang Kai Shek.”110 The name Kohlberg is important here.

107 Lattimore, 15


109 ibid

110 Lattimore, 6-7
A major player within the China Lobby, Kohlberg was against the Institute of Pacific Relations, and saw them as pro-China, and anti-Shek. Kohlberge held Lattimore responsible for what had happened in China. Kohlberg had once been an importer of linens and laces in China under what would today be considered sweatshop conditions. In 1943, Kohlberg had learned from a Dr. Maurice Williams that, when it came to news about Communist support in China “the central source of most of the untruths about China was the Institute of Pacific Relations.” Kohlberg had earlier been very concerned about what he regarded as what had been “a flow of mendacious reporting from China blinding the Roosevelt administration and the U.S. public about the true (or positive) nature of China’s government and army.” Once the Second World War had concluded, Kohlberg established a newspaper, Plain Talk, to counteract what he deemed as pro-Communist propaganda regarding China.

Along with men like Henry Luce, Kohlberg “demanded unconditional support for Chiang Kai-Shek.” Kohlbergh wrote for a Chinese-Catholic paper, China Monthly, and was a contributor to Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, a “champion in congress of unlimited intervention in China, a part of the China Lobby, involving William J. Goodwin, and Joseph p. Kamp, of the America Betrayed pamphlet.” In 1944 Kamp “refused to list his contributors and was indicted by a federal grand jury on obstruction and defeat of the war effort charges, via the constitutional educational league, which worked in 42 and 43 on seditious grounds against the army and its effort.” Moving on from Kamp, Kohlberg had in 1949 “turned down an invitation to attend a Waldorf-Astoria fund raiser because of his frustration with the Dewey-

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111 Cepair, 127
112 ibid
113 ibid
114 ibid
115 ibid
116 ibid
117 Lattimore, 7
118 Lattimore, 8
dominated party’s refusal to open up the ‘who lost China’ issue.” This was important to Kohlberg, and he made no secret of how he was “ashamed that the Republicans failed to protest the sellout of Eastern Europe and Asia.” His alliance with McCarthy came about because McCarthy was the first major government official to take him seriously.

Moreover “McCarthy’s willingness to take on the administration directly came as a welcome breath of fresh air.” The role of the “China Lobby” must never be discounted when considering McCarthy’s entry into being an anti-Communist, or from why Lattimore and his compatriots became targets. The “loss of China” was the singular global shift of the era, the one repeatedly pointed to as proof of encroaching Communism and chicanery within the United States government.

Amidst all this, the claims about the “China Lobby” by Lattimore, must be given some distance, since they were written in his book *Ordeal By Slander*, a public defense of the charges by McCarthy. Yet, they provide an important entry point for understanding how print media, along with radio and television, and even film, would play a significant part in the misnomer phenomenon called McCarthyism, and the role of China’s ‘loss’ in that era.

Lattimore wrote:

The China Lobby wanted a simplified picture of China with all-out supporters of Chiang Kai-Shek lined up on one side, communists on the other side and nobody allowed in the middle. Independents like myself must be cleared out of the middle of the picture because we knew what we were talking about and because people read our books and articles. The simplest way to clear us out would be by the kind of double-flank attack indicated by the McCarthy charges-calling us Communists and at the same time accusing us of close connections with the State Department. I was beginning to realize now that what made these tactics possible was the deepening atmosphere of uncertainty, suspicion and divided
opinion in America. The charges themselves were flimsy, but they were taking advantage of—and at the same time contributing to—an increasingly nervous and panicky public opinion. Even the ‘top Russian espionage agent’ charge was not something to be laughed off just because of its outrageous falsity. For a long time now fear of spies had been feeding fear of Communist subversion, and fears of Communism had been building up fear of espionage. With nervous fear abroad in the land, it might be easy to smear a man like me who had worked for years in China and in other countries in which communism had become increasingly important.120

There was an air of suspicion, a nervousness and a general desire to conform to standards, out of fear, hatred or ignorance, which normalized certain patterns of behavior in an increasingly nationalistic fashion. What was lost on both sides was that such rampant nationalism mirrored the Communism that was at the center of the attacks in the first place. The failure to report this, and how such questions were avoided, is another facet in how the media mishandled the McCarthy issue.

Lattimore called the accusations by McCarthy “a Goebbels sized lie, so big it must be true, people would think...McCarthy was not the master of just the big lie, but of the middle sized lie and the little ball bearing lie that rolls around and around and helps the wheels of the lie machinery to turn over.”121 The so-called Era of McCarthy illustrates points of view, competing references and spheres of influence. It is politics and social discourse writ large. For all the bluster, one vital component was silence. To this, Lattimore wrote that

If I could be intimidated, or if people could be frightened out of having anything to do with me, it would be a long step toward successful intimidation of all university research and teaching, of the free expression of opinion in the press and on the radio, and of the State Department in its dealings with all independent specialists and consultants.122

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120 Lattimore, 16
121 Lattimore, 9
122 Lattimore, 17
The question becomes, how serious was the threat by both McCarthy and Communism, against freedom of speech, freedom of expression? If Lattimore was innocent, it is a fair question. Lattimore states that his experience in Asia taught him that:

Communism frightens us because our history as a nation has been lived under democracy. We know the benefits of democracy, and we do not want to gamble against any strange doctrine from abroad...to hundreds of millions of people in Asia, communism is not as terrifying as it is to Americans. They have never had any democracy and have no democracy to lose.123

The America of which Lattimore spoke was one which he wrote of as suggesting that dissent, for McCarthy, minoritizes you, and that “any man who thinks independently is in a minority; since the communists are also a minority, accuse the independent thinker of being a commie, then deny he is thinking independently and accuse him of being regimented along with other commies.”124 Lattimore’s words were carefully chosen. They painted a picture of a man who uses the terminology of the anti-communist. If true, then McCarthy was wrong, but if correct, Lattimore was merely being intelligent. This doubt is the great danger of the sort of suspicions that McCarthy is credited with popularizing.

In truth, McCarthy, popularized little, but instead became a vocal front man for existing trends already present within American culture. Other Republicans, including Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and Republican Senator Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska, urged disloyalty investigations, with Wherry calling for Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s job because “he was a bad security risk” and it was Taft who decried “the pro-Communist group in the State Department who surrendered to every demand of Russia at Yalta and Potsdam, and promoted at

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123Lattimore, 219
124Lattimore, 223
every opportunity the Communist cause in China.\footnote{Steinhins, Richard P. and the Research Staff of The Council on Foreign Relations. \textit{United States in World Affairs: 1950}. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations by Harper Brothers, 1951) 57} In \textit{Ordeal}, Lattimore outlines one of these trends when he mentions a friend in the State Department who became frightened after passing along an article from a public magazine.

This friend got to thinking, as a government employee, that she had exposed herself to real danger by helping us at all. She had done nothing that infringed any kind of regulation. But the terrible thing is that she was quite right-she was in real danger. The state of panic government agencies is such that she could have been attacked by anyone snooping for McCarthy. If she had been attacked, her intimidated superiors might very well have reprimanded her, instead of defending her.\footnote{Lattimore. 207}

Evidence exists to contend that the danger was real, and so one question has been answered, which is that there are clear conflicts with the Constitution, in regards to the conduct of the various committees set up to investigate Communist activity. Lattimore wrote that America should be careful in how they conducted these investigations, because:

\begin{quote}
We cannot for our own safety, entrust the expert study of Marxism only to reactionaries who are opposed to all forms of liberalism as well as to Marxism. Still less can we afford to place ourselves in the hands of people whose claim to be experts rests solely on the fact that they are ex-communists.\footnote{Lattimore. 229}
\end{quote}

Lattimore claimed to be concerned about tightening of the control of information under McCarthy and his compatriots. It is fair to consider how balanced such information would be, coming from people who in a court of law, would be treated as hostile witnesses. As Lattimore noted:

\begin{quote}
Beyond the shores of our own country, all the many constructive possibilities of our foreign policy are being frozen by the cold war. The freeze is already so deep that nothing is left of foreign policy but the cold war itself. And yet it should be obvious that the cold war offers no solution either for our own problems or for the problems of the world.\footnote{Lattimore. 226}
\end{quote}
Lattimore’s experience in Asia gave a clue about what might happen if this came to pass and, drawing from his time in Afghanistan, wrote that Afghans were:

Frightened of the idea of being put in the front line of the cold war against Russia when, with the news coming from America, they felt more and more that American backing might be feeble, hesitant and crippled by an irresponsible and fantastic civil war among American congressman and senators.\(^{129}\)

It was against this mindset that Lattimore portrayed himself as fighting when he was finally called before the Tydings committee in spring of 1950. He had at one time been unsure of his next move, yet his support at home, from family and closest friends, gave him the strength to carry on. His wife, Eleanor, wrote two letters, dated March 24 and 25 of 1950, that:

You are going to have the opportunity of a lifetime to affect the future of democracy in this country, McCarthy has staked everything now on this one case, so that if he is thoroughly demolished now his whole house of cards tumbles and his methods and all that he stands for fall with him….you will have saved the 81 people on his State Department list and a lot of other people who will soon be on other lists if he gets by with this. (possibly some of the 81 shouldn’t be saved, but you will have saved the good and the innocent.)\(^{130}\)

On April 12, 1950, at the height of the hearings, a memorandum was circulated. In it, Senator Tydings, always a loyal Democrat, was not going to see his party injured by sleeping with the enemy and “argued that McCarthy and those for whom he ran interference had created an atmosphere of suspicion...stymied the administration’s domestic program and threatened to undercut its highly successful foreign policies.”\(^{131}\) Tydings was not finished, and “suggested the full FBI file on Lattimore, after deletion of names of informants and certification by J. Edgar Hoover, should be shown to the Committee. Next, the files of McCarthy’s eighty-one suspects

\(^{129}\) Lattimore, 13

\(^{130}\) Lattimore, 19

should be made available.”\textsuperscript{132} Tydings, as head of a committee intended to investigate, supposedly from a neutral standpoint, the charges McCarthy had brought forth, demonstrated the exact sort of factionalism and party bias McCarthy was accused of bringing. The public response to the allegations was only beginning.

According to the front page of the April 21, 1950 edition of the \textit{Kentucky New Era}, Senator McCarthy cited Louis Budenz’s sworn testimony concerning Owen Latimore. Budenz had testified that “men...high in the party, Earl Browder, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and Jack Stachel”\textsuperscript{133} were aware of this and McCarthy remarked that “I think the investigating committee ought to subpoena those men and get their story.”\textsuperscript{134} Yet, while McCarthy was charging that Latimore was Russia’s top spy in the United States, Budenz claimed, on the witness stand, that “that accusation was not technically accurate...but he did back up the senator’s contention that communists exercised disciplinary action over Latimore.” What McCarthy did, according to Medford Stanton Evans, was to begin:

a series of interlocking, and incendiary, charges: (1) That the Communist global apparatus had made a sustained attempt to penetrate the U.S. government and subvert its foreign policy decisions, most specifically toward China; (2) that official defenses against such penetration, especially in the State Department, ranged from weak to nonexistent; (3) that the facts about all this had been concealed from the American people—ignored, downplayed, or covered up by the authorities whose job it was to guard against such dangers.\textsuperscript{135}

The following examinations, conducted between March 1950 and May 1950, yielded many moments of candor, as well as confusion, anger and denial over those questions. Issues of loyalty, foreign policy and definitions of patriotism abound within the rambling testimony

\textsuperscript{132} ibid
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Kentucky New Era, The}, April 21, 1950
\textsuperscript{134} ibid
\textsuperscript{135} Evans, Medford Stanton. \textit{McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America}. Human Events. (May 3, 1997. \newline http://www.humanevents.com/1997/05/30/mccarthyism-waging-the-cold-war-in-america/)
presented in the documents, which stretched until June 1950. Several of the witnesses presented seemed to do so out of either personal grudges against Lattimore, or, and perhaps in addition to, self-interest.

To this end, Soviet espionage agent Louis F. Budenz’s appearance before the committee holds much interest. Questioned by Senator Tydings and Senator Theodore Green, Budenz introduced a level of doubt into the proceedings, suggesting that the words used by his former superiors in the Communist Party were, despite claims within the body of the testimony, imprecise and open to interpretation. Tydings asked Budenz about Lattimore and his connection to Jack Stachel, whom Budenz had said described Lattimore as “helpful” and to which Tydings, directing the answer, said “he advised you to consider Lattimore as a Communist?” To which Budenz then replied “yes, sir. I said that Stachel said to consider Lattimore as a Communist in 1944, when he was with Mr. Wallace.”

The Congressional Record shows that Budenz testified about Lattimore being designated “XL” in Communist paperwork. Yet, Budenz denied that there was proof of this. To that end, the following exchange occurred immediately:

Senator Tydings: Were they, as near as you can recollect, his precise words?  
Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.  
Senator Tydings. That Lattimore was "helpful" and that he said for you to "treat Lattimore as a Communist.  
Mr. Budenz: Consider him.  
Senator Tydings: "Consider Lattimore as a Communist?"  
Mr. Budenz; Yes, sir-Wait just a minute about that "helpful." I don't remember that phrase specifically, Senator. I remember Jack Stachel said that Lattimore was helpful in the time of the Amerasia case.138

136State Department, 570  
137State Department, 579  
138ibid
Budenz got this information second-hand, a recurring theme. There was nothing in this portion of the testimony directly linking Lattimore. The absence of evidence is not proof of innocence, nor does it indicate guilt well hidden, but it is important to note how Budenz never had firsthand confirmation from Lattimore, or by observation of Lattimore, that he was a Communist Party member, Budenz continued his testimony. Tydings seemed to become confused, while Budenz remained calm throughout this portion of the proceedings. Budenz stated that Jack Stachel told him in 1944, to “consider Lattimore as a Communist”139 and confirmed that this was not a mere suggestion by Stachel when Tydings asked him if this was normal procedure. Budenz informed him that it would have been impossible for Stachel to make such a statement based on anything less than confirmation.140

Mr. Budenz: This was a regular formula used by Stachel to deal with people who were in the Communist movement.

Senator Tydings: And he said for you to consider him as a Communist?

Mr. Budenz: Yes, sir. He used that, by the way, that phraseology on a number of occasions in regard to other people. That is, I was compelled to know, more or less, as a matter of fact not more or less, but definitely these people.

Senator Tydings: Now, you also said that Lattimore was designated as "XL," I think, or something pretty close to that.

Mr. Budenz: That is right.

Senator Tydings: As a Communist designation?

Mr. Budenz: That is right.

Senator Tydings: Did his signature appear opposite that designation?

Mr. Budenz: Oh no. This is onionskin instructions coming from the Politburo.

Senator Tydings: So, there was nothing to identity Lattimore with the "XL" on the onionskin itself?

Mr. Budenz: Only the instructions given us by the Politburo.141

139State Department, 578-579
140 ibid
141 State Department, 580
Tydings appeared to be leading Budenz, except that Budenz consistently baffled Tydings by offering information, such as the uncertainty regarding the ‘onionskin’. There was also the introduction of clergyman “Father” James F. Kearney’s accusations about Lattimore:

Senator Tydings: In what respect do you claim that Reverend Kearney’s article corroborates your accusations of Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Budenz: Well, in the sense, as Father Kearney says that Mr. Lattimore is the person most responsible for the disaster in Asia, and he goes on to indicate Mr. Lattimore’s views.
Senator Tydings: So that would be what Father Kearney would say—that would accentuate rather than otherwise—it would be in line with what you say. Now, would Father Kearney have any intimate knowledge to your knowledge, that Mr. Lattimore was a Communist, that you did not?
Mr. Budenz: Oh, no, he would not have, not that I know, unless he had something. He was a missionary in the Orient, I believe. In fact, he is on his way back now. The only thing is that his analysis of Mr Lattimore’s views I thought strengthened my own declarations. That is, I did not put it forward as absolutely a mandatory thing, but confirmatory.142

Budenz was examined regarding the end of his direct involvement in the Communist Party, which was limited after his “resignation” from the Party in October 1945, a fact disputed by Senator Green:

Senator Green: Excuse me. I asked that question. He did not resign. A Communist was not allowed to resign. He was expelled.
Mr. Budenz: I am just using it as a general rough term—left the party.
Senator Tydings: Separated from the party.
Mr. Budenz: I didn’t resign. I arranged carefully whereby I wouldn’t resign. In fact, my name is on the letterhead on the date I was received in the Catholic Church of St. Patrick’s. I did that so that I would not be framed. I might explain this to you, Senator.
Senator Tydings: That is not important.
Senator Green: I think it is very important.143

It would be very important if Budenz was unable to verify Lattimore. The questioning continued:

Senator Tydings: You may ask it on your time. In the approximate five years since 1945, did you report Owen Lattimore to the FBI as a Communist, or a Communist agent?
Mr Budenz: I don’t recall that I did. I may have. Senator, but I don’t recall; but, I might say that, Senator, just my regard to my own actions there that I have not reported quite a

142 Ibid
143 State Department, 580-581
few people because I cannot possibly do it.
Senator Green: You have not what?
Mr. Budenz: Reported quite a few. That is the reason I decided to make up this list of hundreds of names so that once and for all I can give the FBI all the names that I had.\textsuperscript{144}

Following this, Budenz denied having mentioned any definite discussion details, with a State Department Agent, in 1947. Tydings demanded Budenz tell of Lattimore's association with the Communist Party, to which Budenz replied that he was uncertain, given the behavior of communists, before pointing a finger at Dr. J.B. Mathews, who headed the House Un-American investigation\textsuperscript{145}:

\begin{quote}
Mr. Budenz: Dr. J. B. Mathews, a well-known investigator, was in charge of the Dies investigation
Senator McMahon: And who was a member of the party at one time?
Mr. Budenz: He says he was not. He was very close to them and was placed with the responsibility of their most important Communist front, the League Against War and Fascism, and broke with them.
Senator Tydings: Didn't you talk also to a special agent of the State Department in 1947?
Mr. Budenz: Well, I cannot recollect that, but I would say that I have had several telephone calls from the State Department representatives, and I have always been very evasive because on the telephone I do not give information. I was trying to show you. Senator, that even in this case, the Senator McCarthy case, I was called by Dr. J. B. Mathews, and he said to me that he had information that I knew that Lattimore was a Communist. I simply said "Whatever I have to say about Lattimore, I will only say before the committee, under subpoena."
Senator Tydings: Would you therefore deny that you said in 1947, to any Representative of the State Department, that you could not be called at that time, you could not recall any incident which definitely would indicate that Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. Budenz: I won't deny it.\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

Budenz seemed afraid of the committee, or at least evasive, and there was obviously much confusion on the part of both interrogator and interrogated. Budenz, questioned by Tydings, said he did not earlier confirm or deny anything because of that earlier discussion being

\textsuperscript{144} State Department, 581
\textsuperscript{145} State Department, 581
\textsuperscript{146} State Department, 582
on the telephone, which he mistrusted. Tydings eventually brought the investigation to a
different figure, that of Stachel.\textsuperscript{147} The following exchange casts doubt on Lattimore’s guilt or, at
the very least on the validity of the testimony by Budenz:

Senator Tydings: But, in this case you had nothing to check up on other than your
conversation with Mr. Stachel, because he was the man that had previously...
Mr. Budenz: Oh, yes; I may have had
Senator Tydings: Excuse me, because I am directing myself particularly to the testimony
that Mr. Stachel and some other people, I think it was Stachel who said "You are to
consider Lattimore as a member of the party?"
Mr. Budenz: That is correct. . . .
Senator Tydings: And you were outlined about more activities there, and you were told
that Lattimore was very helpful.
Mr. Budenz: That is correct.
Senator Tydings: You were also told that the movement was proceeding very favorably
and you knew Lattimore was head of the magazine. Well, now, if you had all that
information in your mind, why would you say, in September 1947, that you did not
recall at that time any incident which definitely indicated that Lattimore was a member
of the party?\textsuperscript{148}

Budenz again played coy, repeating his mistrust of telephones and dancing around
Tyding’s suggestion that Stachel had told Budenz that Lattimore was a Communist.

Senator Tydings: I do not blame you for saying over the telephone, "I don't care to
discuss it," or I don't blame you for saying on the telephone that, "This is
something I might want to talk to you privately about"; but, instead of picking one of
the things that would have protected the position you rightly wanted to protect, did
you not say at that time, "I am unable to recall at this time any incident which
definitely would indicate that Lattimore was a member of the party?" And to convey
the impression to your own Government, after you left the Communist Party, that you
had nothing in mind that would show Lattimore was a member of the Communist
Party?
Mr. Budenz: I did not have the time or energy to check carefully on the facts I had
before me. I always do that, and I have made that reply, incidentally, more than once,
along similar lines.\textsuperscript{149}

So, Budenz had “neither the time nor the energy” to be careful regarding facts which
led to accusations? How reliable could such a man be? Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
Jr., of Massachusetts, became enraged, calling the interrogation of Budenz "a complete waste of time."\textsuperscript{150} Tydings and Green then turned attention to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who worked with Lattimore at the Institute of Pacific Relations, who despite his affirmations of Lattimore, also admitted he was not in a position to know, without any doubt, if Lattimore was or was not a communist. Field stated he had no certain knowledge of Lattimore as a Communist. Field was in a position to know, since he was then serving a prison sentence for contempt over a case concerning his involvement in the founding of \textit{Amerasia}.\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Amerasia} was a magazine published from 1937-1947, which focused on Far-Eastern affairs.

The magazine had caused concern within the United States government. Indeed, in the words of Medford Stanton Evans, the controversy surrounding \textit{Amerasia} is the key to understanding McCarthy:

The core of McCarthy’s case was that security problems at the State Department and the course of U.S. policy in Asia were indissolubly connected. His chief exhibit—much cited in his early speeches and before the Tydings panel—was the improbable tale of the small pro-Communist journal, \textit{Amerasia}. McCarthy capsuled the case on February 20, presented a fat dossier on it to Tydings, then discussed it at even greater length on the Senate floor on March 30. For McCarthy, this was the touchstone of pro-Communist subversion in our country and of official complicity with it.\textsuperscript{152}

This was not the first time the magazine had entered public debate:

\textit{Amerasia} had previously burst into public view—to disappear as quickly—in June 1945. Agents of the FBI, after many weeks’ surveillance, had arrested two editors of the journal and one of its frequent writers, along with three U.S. government officials (Andrew Roth, Emmanuel Larsen, John Stewart Service) accused of feeding them secret data. Coincident with the arrests, the bureau reaped a harvest of roughly 1,000 government documents in the possession of the defendants. These dealt much with Asian matters, and many bore the label ‘secret,’ ‘top secret,’ or ‘confidential.’

\textsuperscript{150} ibid
\textsuperscript{151}Schrecker, Ellen. \textit{Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents}. (New York: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1994) 66
McCarthy said "of the nature of Amerasia, there could be little doubt" and pointed to its backers, including "its chief financial angel, Frederick V. Field, a notorious propagandist for the Soviet Union, named by Elizabeth Bentley as the Communist Party's domestic commissar for Asian matters." This was the same Field whom McCarthy had earlier recommended for subpoena.

Amerasia, without any question, was replete with Communists and Communist sympathizers, and the list of their names, activities and legal entanglements is illuminating:

The principal editor was Philip Jaffe, a long-time Soviet apologist, friend of Communist Party boss Earl Browder, and zealous fan of Bolsheviks in China. Its staffers and writers included a veritable galaxy of identified Communists, pro-Communists, and fellow travellers. (Indeed, among its former employees, still hobnobbing with Jaffe, was one Joseph Bernstein, known to the FBI as an active Soviet agent.)

The biggest fish caught in the Amerasia net was State Department official Service, one of Vincent's "China hands" who like his Treasury Department roommate had sent a steady stream of dispatches back from China attacking Chiang and urging that we dump him (sample: "We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic groups... we need feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang.") On returning to the United States in April 1945, Service immediately took to hanging out with Jaffe (whom he supposedly had just met), delivering copies of his reports, and commenting that "What I said about the military plans is, of course, very secret" (recorded by FBI surveillance).

Given all this, McCarthy said, J. Edgar Hoover believed he had an "airtight case," and Justice Department officials geared up for prosecution. Then, for some mysterious reason, Justice decided to downplay the matter and treat it as a minor indiscretion; Service got off scott-free and was restored to State Department duties. Jaffe and Larsen escaped with fines, and all the others walked. In essence, the whole thing was shoved under the official rug, to be conveniently forgotten. It was, McCarthy charged, a security breach and cover-up of immense proportions...We now know, however, that all of this was false, and that McCarthy was right in what he said. The whole thing was fixed from the beginning, engineered by Elizabeth Bentley's agent Lauchlin Currie, operating from the White House, and carried out by Washington wheeler-dealer Thomas Corcoran. The truth of this emerged a decade ago when FBI wiretaps from the '40s came to the surface:

\[\text{Evans, McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War (May 30, 1997)}\]
these showed Currie, Corcoran, Service and Justice officials conspiring to deep-six the case, and succeeding.\textsuperscript{154}

The \textit{Amerasia} case was in mind as the congressional testimonies continued throughout 1950. Hoover was alarmed at McCarthy's claims and "caused a search to be made to see if he had gone overboard in 1945; he had never said anything like it" in regards to the case being air-tight.\textsuperscript{155} The involvement of John Service is noted by author Richard H. Rovere in his work \textit{Senator Joe McCarthy}. Concerning Service, Rovere wrote:

He was a bona fide State Department man who had had a good deal of difficulty in security proceedings, and who had, in 1945, admitted to turning over government documents to \textit{Amerasia}...Service was not a communist. On the contrary, he was a highly regarded career diplomat, and his involvement in the \textit{Amerasia} case was not as damaging as it first appeared-since the documents were not secret.\textsuperscript{156}

Such details did not matter to either side of the Committee in the atmosphere of the time. During Lattimore's first round of hearings with McCarthy, the Senator from Wisconsin made a number of claims about the professor from Johns Hopkins. Among these were falsehoods about Roosevelt appointing Lattimore as adviser to Chiang-Kai-Shek, since he could only have nominated him, on advice of Henry Wallace, who did not, with Lattimore's support, betray Shek, nor did Lattimore lead the Pauley mission and not ever did the State Department send Lattimore to Afghanistan, since it was The United Nations-Lattimore's ultimate employer-who had that authority.\textsuperscript{157} Congressional testimony had already shown the initial case against Lattimore to be one based on evidence, which, as presented, was lacking in credibility.

On April 6, 1950, Lattimore's appearance before the Tydings committee was televised, in an event that brought both McCarthy and Lattimore to the American public at large. McCarthy

\textsuperscript{154}Evens, \textit{McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War} (May 30, 1997)
\textsuperscript{155}Newman, 222
\textsuperscript{157}Newman, 223
was not allowed to cross-examine Lattimore, and the Democrats arranged for it to be the reading of a statement by Lattimore. Tydings, while engaged in the hearings, seemed to go back and forth on the question of Lattimore's guilt, but was for the moment in the Lattimore camp following Lattimore's statement to the committee.\textsuperscript{158} Lattimore's statement on freedom of speech was "lengthy and hard-hitting...denouncing McCarthy to his face...lecturing McCarthy that 'he who contributes to the destruction of this process is either a fool or an enemy of his country.'\textsuperscript{159} Lattimore had won this public battle, but it was far from over for either side. "Lattimore lamented his tawdry persecution, but on television it was McCarthy who endured the ordeal."\textsuperscript{160} McCarthy would be forced to regroup as the hearings continued both with and without himself and Lattimore.

At those Congressional hearings, one day in late April of 1950, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr began to question if Budenz was capable of grasping the gravity of his testimony before giving the microphone to Senator Green:

Senator Green: In other words, what you have given already is the extent of the help that you feel able to give the committee in its work.
Mr. Field: I don't believe I can do anything more, Mr. Senator....
Senator Tydings: Now, do you or do you not know, of your own knowledge, of any disloyal acts to our Government that Owen Lattimore has ever performed?
Mr. Field: Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Lattimore has in no sense or on any occasion been disloyal.\textsuperscript{161}

Tydings and Field's next interaction reaffirmed the later's stance that Lattimore's loyalty was to the United states, despite pressure from Senator Green. Tydings questioned Field about the work he did with Lattimore at the Institute for Pacific Relations and also the magazine

\textsuperscript{158}Doherty, Thomas. \textit{Cool War, Cold Medium, Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture}. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) 127
\textsuperscript{159}ibid
\textsuperscript{160}Doherty, 127
\textsuperscript{161}State Department, 729
Amerasia, which Field maintained was logical given Lattimore’s worldwide acknowledgement as an expert in Asian affairs. Tydings specifically asked Field if Lattimore inserted propaganda into the magazine, in the following exchange:

Senator Tydings: Do you or are you in a position to say whether or not at any time during your association with Mr. Lattimore, and the Pacific relations unit, that Mr. Lattimore, directly or indirectly engaged in any conversation, any undertaking, any intrigue, or any other act which had for its purpose the placing of either persons on the payroll of the magazine and institute on the one hand, or the insertion of articles that were calculated to be there other than for the purpose of the magazine proper, upon the other hand?
Mr. Field: No, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tydings: I have no more questions.
Senator Hickenlooper: Are you in a position, Mr. Field, to know whether or not Mr. Lattimore is or is not a Communist?
Mr. Field: No. I put the answer very differently, Senator. I said that — I put it in two ways: One, that to the very best of my knowledge, he was not; and, on some other occasion, I believe I said that I had no grounds whatsoever for believing he was a Communist. 162

This is an important distinction. He did not answer that Lattimore was or was not a communist, but rather that he himself had no grounds for believing that Lattimore was. Field maintained that he and Lattimore were not of a mind on certain issues, in an exchange with Republican Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa:

Senator Hickenlooper: Mr. Field, you had associations with Mr. Lattimore over a considerable period of time in connection especially with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Would you say that Mr. Lattimore's social and political views with respect to policies in the Orient and social and political views in the United States quite generally coincide with yours as a result of your experience with him?
Mr. Field. That is an extremely difficult question to answer, Mr. Senator. 163

Field instead testified that he and Lattimore were not of the same view on political matters in the Orient over the preceding decade, and refused to incriminate himself when

162State Department, 730
163State Department, 732
Republican Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa asked him about specifics of social and political differences. Field, given his background in Communist activity, was either lying in order to protect a fellow Communist or, at least, fellow traveler, or saying that Lattimore did not qualify as a Communist. This would line up with the idea of Lattimore as an opportunist of the highest order.

As the investigation continued, Tydings, eager to be done with the proceedings and seemingly convinced already of Lattimore’s complete innocence, encouraged Field to discuss whether or not these names were linked to communist activity. John C. Vincent, whom Field was certain had never been a communist, was listed, along with Haldor Hanson and John S. Service, by Senator Tydings as people of interest to the investigating committee and of possible relation to Owen Lattimore. Field, with an acknowledged background in Communist activity, swore these three men were not guilty as charged.\(^{164}\)

Of his appearances before the Tydings committee, Lattimore reflected upon what he thought McCarthy’s remarks about the accused men and how it had gotten to the point of holding an investigation:

I read McCarthy’s speech, which had taken him more than four hours to deliver, and I realized that McCarthyism is not a thing to be fixed, it is an octopus to be fought. Psychologically, the very fact that I was innocent made the whole nightmare more paralyzing. The charges against me built up a circumstantial picture of a man who might have existed. I was not that man, but those were the charges I had to refute. If I was not careful, I might fall into a trap. People might think I was trying to defend myself against real charges.\(^{165}\)

Lattimore was not so much defending himself of real charges—although they did in fact exist and may, in fact, have been at least partially true— as he was an expert speaking of

\(^{164}\)State Department, 732-733

\(^{165}\) Lattimore, 28
practicality and reality, and being charged for his knowledge, rather than his sympathies. The manner of the staging of the charges had intertwined the two. The reality of those living on the borders of the Iron Curtain, or behind it, was important to understand:

What a native of central Asia saw across the soviet border was not Soviet propaganda. It was fact-unpalatable perhaps to Americans, but demonstrably true at that time. Neighbors of the Russians in Asia saw improvements of this kind in soviet territory, and were excited by them—especially the younger people. For these same people America, if they knew about it at all, was a fairy tale land unreal and far away. They had no way to use the things America stands for as a guide to action in the situations in which they actually lived. ...unless we find a way of handling this problem, America will become, for the growing generation of a large part of Asia, more and more an imaginary land, a land of daydreams, perhaps, but not a land that sets the standards of what men do in their ordinary lives. Russia will become more and more the land of reality. We can only get into the lives of these people eventually, by the propaganda of action, things done by Americans that are beneficial to other peoples—not by the propaganda of words over radio, or even words and pictures in pamphlets and leaflets.  

Access to information, and the ability to determine for one's self was the real issue Lattimore believed was at stake. A uniformity of belief could settle in, which would be detrimental to the United States. Edward P. Morgan, Chief Counsel of the Tydings Committee, and Lattimore antagonist, a member of the hearings, under the auspices of Hickenlooper, is referenced in the next passage:

It is one of the basic assumptions on which American citizenship and patriotism have been built up that a man born a foreigner can become a citizen as loyal as a native born American. This assumption applies to a man born, in say Russia, who first reaches America at age twenty eight. But the implication in Morgan's question was that a native born American who had spent most of his life in China until he was twenty eight might not be a loyal American when he returned to his own country.  

166 Lattimore. 186
167 Lattimore. 189
Morgan is notable because he was a Washington insider, an attorney who, having been an aide to Hoover in investigations against subversive activity, was now on the Committee as a favor to Senator Green. During his questioning, Lattimore presented a case of McCarthyism, as it had come to be known, as a deadening, anti-intellectual, paranoid hypocrisy utilized by cowards and vipers who ganged up to attack hard working men and women. It would be unfair to either side to consider this as true in whole. Lattimore’s response speaks to the anxieties experienced by those accused by Tydings, McCarthy and others.

As such, *Ordeal by Slander* is an important volume in the relation between the media and their reportage of “McCarthyism.” Morgan’s actions demonstrated these dangers when he asked Lattimore “...has your thought been essentially what is best for the Chinese people, as distinguished from what might be perhaps best for the United States of America?” Lattimore wrote that “one of the dangers of this is that a man may soon be in danger of being called a disloyal American if he thinks it would be all right for the Chinese people to have what is best for the Chinese people.” Here, issues of colonialization and empire become evident. This is also important in understanding Lattimore, for with such comments, it is easy to believe he would have suggested allowing Korea to lose, and that, whether for political gain and ideology, or out of misguided belief that “the people” would be better served, had some level of sympathy towards Communist takeovers in Asia.

Instead of investigating this, measures were taken to steer away from this, as testimony continued in the Congressional hearings. In late April and early May 1950, Freda Utley, a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, was scheduled to speak about Lattimore, but

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168 Fried, 63
169 ibid
170 Lattimore, 190
then excused from testimony in order to give her time to arrange the files she would testify on.

Her answer and interaction with Tydings was met with exasperation, because of her lack of preparedness and the delay this caused in examining Lattimore. Utley also testified that her statements would be based on both Lattimore’s writings and utterances. Senator Tydings rightfully questioned her on the veracity of these claims, to which she responded she would have supporting facts. There was then discussion of how the testimony would need to be delayed until the following Monday or Tuesday, but before that commenced, a new question was raised, of Lodge’s desire to question Lattimore in Executive Session. Senator Tydings and Senator Lodge spoke of their eagerness to conclude the investigations but disagreed that the hearings be continued in the open, with Lodge saying:

> Then that puts me in the position of either being unable to get the answers to questions which I regard as essential to help me reach a conclusion, now will I allow the asking of questions which will hamper work of the investigative agencies and possibly besmirching the characters of innocent persons and possibly injure American position abroad. 

Lodge’s eagerness seems to be grandstanding, as by this point in 1950, the investigations were so far underway that those who might have been guilty would not only have had time to have covered their tracks, but the continued presence of lightly documented accusations could be equally said to have damaged American position abroad, to say nothing of the perception that men like Joseph McCarthy had on American image in other parts of the globe, while Utley’s testimony had supported her earlier claims to McCarthy, which were supported by the FBI. The chief claim made by her, and the only one about which the FBI agreed

\[\text{Footnote 171: State Department, 734}\]
\[\text{Footnote 172: State Department, 735}\]
with Utley, was that “Lattimore’s writings followed the Communist line.” This was hardly proof of Lattimore being the master spy that McCarthy alleged.

Budenz’s time as a professional witness neared its end. Many in both the upper and lower chambers grew weary of him. In May 1950, Senator David Chavez of New Mexico said of Budenz that “this man has impeached and exposed himself as a devious, conspiratorial, warped personality…I do not think he knows truth from falsehood anymore.” While Budenz’s star faded, McCarthy’s desire to be noticed would only grow. This was a desire shared by other Republicans.

In late April of 1950, Senator Taft sensed that the real battle would be over President Truman’s foreign policy and mourned that “differences in the Republican Party are so great that it is hard for us to take a combative position on any particular aspect.” This division is noted by historian John W. Malsberger, who “has documented a divide between those he labels ‘old guard obstructionists and new conservatives.’ Malsberger is convinced that this was rooted in post-New Deal anxieties, while fellow historian Athan G. Theoharis, extrapolated by contending that the divide was three-fold. “the extremists were constant and sharp critics of the foreign policies of Roosevelt and Truman, the partisans less so and the moderates could be won over to bi-partisanship.” With the Republicans fractured, extremism had the potential to go unchecked.

By the end of June 1950, McCarthy had become only slightly transparent with the FBI, giving documents that the FBI either already had or knew about and most of which “were

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172Newman 225
174Caute, 124
175Ceplair, 136
176ibid
177Ceplair, 137
discarded as false, meaningless, irrelevant, fraudulent, or hopelessly vague.” 178 In that same month, Stephen Spingarn told President Truman that the administration had the capability “to counter and neutralize Communist activities in this country” because of the way in which “the FBI had placed ever-increasing emphasis upon the activities of Communists in our midst.” 179 This reveals that much of the real “Red Hunting” was not happening with the Senate and House, but rather through the FBI.

As the case against Lattimore began to fray around the edges, many Democrats and some Republicans, in regards to McCarthy’s tactics, demonstrated “growing distaste...but to the loud acclaim of the American public, McCarthy continued to tantalize with hints of further sensational disclosures.” 180 On July 6, 1950, McCarthy addressed the War in Korea, then still being referenced as a police action. McCarthy again brought Owen Lattimore to attention. McCarthy began by speaking of domestic Communism, often directing his words towards President Truman:

The American people realize that we cannot invoke a moratorium on fighting Communists and traitors at home, any more than we can invoke a moratorium on fighting them abroad, without completely disastrous results....Frankly, Mr. President, I think the Communists within our borders have been more responsible for the success of communism abroad than Soviet Russia has been responsible for that success. I strongly feel, and I do not think that there can be any question about it, that had it not been for the planners in our State Department, who went along 100 percent with Stalin in Poland and who went along 100 percent with him in Asia, the entire face of the world would have a different complexion as of today. I agree with the historian who once said ‘If this Nation is ever destroyed, it will not be destroyed by enemies from without but by enemies from within.’ Mr. President, in that connection I should like to call attention to what the great architect of our Far Eastern Policy had to say, not 2 or 5 years ago, but on the 17th day of July 1949, as quoted in Compass-Owen Lattimore, who had been advising the State Department—and this is a direct quotation ‘the problem in Korea is to allow Korea to fall, but not to let it appear that we pushed her.’ That is the program that Acheson and his crowd accepted lock, stock and barrel. That is the program they put into effect, until President Truman made the sudden change of policy of 4 or 5 days ago. If the program of

178 Newman, 225
179 Morgan, 375
180 Stebbins, 58
Own Lattimore—the program of allowing our friends to fall but not making it appear that we were pushing them—had not been bought and put into effect by the State Department. The blood of American boys would not be consecrating the hills and valleys of Korea today.¹⁸¹

This was the same Lattimore whom the State Department had used, sparingly, as a consultant, a fact not to be bothered with, and of whom, publicly at this point in time, the worst that might be said about him was that like so many others, and despite—or perhaps because of—his affection for the Asian world, he was guilty of naivété regarding popular movements in Asia.

McCarthy was not finished, and turned his wrath on the press:

Mr. President, today the same columnists who have always headed the smear brigade against those who would expose Communists and traitors at home have now wrapped themselves in the American flag and are attempting to convince the American people—by some strange, twisted reasoning—that the best way to aid our fighting men is to protect the traitors who are responsible for sending them almost bare-handed against tanks in the mud of the valleys of Korea. As Samuel Johnson said ‘patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.’¹⁸²

McCarthy survived the collapse of the initial Lattimore case. He did this by “challenging Truman to open the government’s loyalty files...McCarthy insisted that the evidence to support his charges against the State Department could be found in the files.”¹⁸³ Truman had blocked McCarthy’s attempts at opening the files for months. McCarthy, in turn, played victim to the press, by stating that “you can be sure of this: if those files would prove that McCarthy was a liar, they would damn well be opened at sunrise tomorrow morning.”¹⁸⁴ Yet, it can be said that even if Lattimore was not what he said he was:

Neither was he what McCarthy claimed he was, and had McCarthy proceeded with the great care and diligence the case demanded, he could have emerged vindicated. But McCarthy did not, and by inflating the Lattimore case in order to salvage his position he

¹⁸²Matusow, 47-48
¹⁸³Feuerlicht, 65
¹⁸⁴ibid
had instead damaged it. He had also damaged his relationship with FBI director Hoover, who was privately furious with McCarthy's mishandling of the sensitive data he had supplied. In the end, McCarthy learned an important lesson: to be more careful in deciding who was a spy and who was merely a fellow traveler, Stalinist sympathizer, or a 'loyalty risk.' But the behavior of Lattimore and his supporters communicated another less noticed lesson: while liberal opponents decried McCarthy's methods as smear, distortion and misrepresentation, they were willing to do at least the same—and even worse—to discredit him.\(^{185}\)

The interplay of politics and dissemination of information and disinformation, through media outlets, including print journals, magazines and newspapers, as well as radio, television and even films, books and plays, is important to understanding the phenomenon known as McCarthyism. It is one which takes its name from a man who came to an idea late, and who left after a comparably brief period. The focus on this one individual speaks greatly to American Culture and its obsession with celebrity. Robert Griffith wrote of the period, "if the Cold War explained the objective circumstances from which McMarthyism erupted, it did not explain its style, rhetoric or mass appeal."\(^{186}\) It is not apparent that any one source or explanation can solve the answer to the why or how of this question. Griffith suggests that the focus ought to be on understanding how the:

> Political definition of McCarthyism, the charge of 'communism in government' was not just a response to status anxieties or to the tensions of the cold war, but was generated by the American political system. (McCarthy) rose to power because of a political dynamic created during the late nineteen forties by a band of Republican partisans as they scrapped and clawed their way toward power.\(^{187}\)

In this environment, McCarthy thrived. Yet, even in his early days, during the accusation against Lattimore, he was not allowed to run roughshod and completely unfettered. Through all this, McCarthy was not without his critics. "McCarthy was denounced of his charges July 20.

\(^{185}\)Herman, 128
\(^{186}\)Griffith, 24
\(^{187}\)Griffith, 25
1950, in words by fellow senators 'unusually strong...which called attention once more to the constitutional immunity enjoyed by the members of the Senate and House of Representatives.'\(^{188}\) McCarthy was held accountable, and by his fellow Senators. Why did the media present him as an unassailable villain, immune to the checks and balances of the system he seemed determined to undermine?

These immunities were an American tradition, which was of British origin and, directly, from British political tradition. "as Jefferson well stated, the immunity (for leaders) originated in England...It developed as a privilege asserted by the parliament of England against the prerogatives of the King, in order to fulfill its function as an independent branch of government."\(^ {189}\) It was the same protection of which McCarthy had taken full advantage.

Those were the very rights which had led to McCarthy, with little initial evidence needed for presentation, in accusing Lattimore and starting the hearings with Hickenlooper, Lodge and Tydings. Of those three, Lattimore took exception to Hickenlooper's questions to him, and remarked that Hickenlooper implied "any 'allegation' of leftism is proof and that 'volumes of allegations' must be proof of extreme leftism."\(^ {190}\) Considering this, Lattimore opined that "it implies a man of 'very brilliant and great ability' is a tricky man-and this anti-intellectualism is, of course, an essential part of the campaign for thought control and against independent thinking."\(^ {191}\) Further, for Lattimore, this also "implies left is an absolute term...but left of what, and left to when? A man can be left of Taft, and still not a leftist to the majority of Americans. A

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\(^{189}\)Yankwich, 962

\(^{190}\) Lattimore, 193

\(^{191}\) Lattimore, 194
man can be left of Roosevelt, and still, to most Americans, be neither dangerous or
disloyal...." What was Lattimore onto?

The witch hunting of which McCarthy is a part is recruited from ex-communists, and pro-
facists, America Firsters, anti-semites, Coughlinites, and similar fringe fanatics of the
political underworld. It was groups like these that Hitler used to run interference for him,
causing the confusion and dismay that he and his real backers, the big time reactionaries,
needed in order to take over the state. But these vanguards of facism cannot be dismissed
as lunatics. Their purposes are diverse, but all of them lead up to the training and
indoctrination of strong-arm groups. In the meantime, they flourish on dissension, turmoil
and notoriety...their most important function is not to turn up real communists, most of
who are already known to the FBI, but to assert brazenly that they have a sinister
underworld, instinctive knowledge that the kind of person you are is the kind of person a
communist is....McCarthyism has not yet been successful in establishing thought control,
but it is using well tried propaganda methods in its efforts to do so.

No less a source than George Kennan, who served in the State Department as an expert
on Russia for over twenty five years, and whose “X-Letter” became the bedrock of government
policy regarding containment of Communism, believed that something sinister was about D.C. at
this point in time. On April 17, 1951, Kennan lectured in Chicago that over the past year:

Myths and errors are being established in the public mind more rapidly than they can be
broken down. The mass media are too much for us...McCarthyism has already won, in
the sense of making impossible the conduct of an intelligent foreign policy. The result is
that there is no place in public life for an honest and moderate man...

Kennan was not finished. As John Lewis Gaddis notes, Kennan, while addressing a
crowd at the University of Notre Dame, warned of lingering McCarthyism that it fed on
contempt for artists and writers and described it as anti-intellectual. In May of 1954, at Notre

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192 ibid
193 Lattimore. 222
195 Gaddis, George F. Kennan. 490
Dame, and before the censure of Joseph McCarthy by the Senate, Kennan remarked of McCarthyism that:

If unchallenged, its practitioners would reduce the range of respectability to only themselves, the excited accusers...excluding anyone not engaged in the profession of denunciation...having lived for years in totalitarian states, I know where this sort of thing leads.196

Indeed Kennan did, for he had seen the rise of Stalin in Russia, and seemed to be comparing that totalitarian mindset to McCarthy. An important question to keep in mind was, how deliberate was this on the part of McCarthy, and how much of a role did media coverage have to do in persuading the American people into being for or against what Senator McCarthy agitated for? How unfair is it to call McCarthy, himself, totalitarian? How much of his message and actions were based in fact, and how much in grand self-promotion?

On August 1, 1950, McCarthy “read to the Senate an affidavit by one Willy Foerster alleging that in 1938 he brought a letter to Owen Lattimore from a man in Japan who was later executed by the Japanese as a Russian spy.”197 What is interesting about this is how the media ignored this. “the Associated Press did not bother to put this item of ‘news’ on the wire, so McCarthy wrote a letter to every daily newspaper in the country complaining about the Associated Press’s action (or inaction).”198 This was not the end of the battle, because the Associated Press said it had covered “all newsworthy aspects of the Senator’s campaign but in this case it was concluded the Senator’s statement lacked news value.”199 Combined with Lattimore’s earlier, though not known until later, use of Commintern channels, much doubt is cast on Lattimore’s innocence.
Lattimore and McCarthy encapsulates the debate over speech, action and evidence as presented to the public through means of mass communication. McCarthy serves as a great example of an unfortunate figure in American Politics, the populist demagogue. Yet his example is more complex than a man who lied, cheated and bullied his way to the top, which is one interpretation of his life. McCarthy was neither the completely popular trailblazer, nor the utterly reviled villain some accounts make him out to be. As usual, the truth lies in the middle, and the job of the historian is to illuminate the unvarnished facts.

Free Speech, Public Interest and National Security are more than buzzwords. They are signposts in the story of one of the most remarkable periods of United States History. What this period tells us about ourselves is important because its lessons are as relevant today as they were over sixty years ago. The first case against Owen Lattimore was not the end of Professor Lattimore, and was only the beginning of the comet-like Senatorial career of Joseph McCarthy. McCarthy would never completely forget about Lattimore, but he would move on.

In part, McCarthy did this because of pressure from fellow Senators. "whether or not other anti-communists openly opposed McCarthy (and some, particularly the liberal anti-communists quite clearly did so) it is improper to automatically identify McCarthy with the entire anticommmunist movement."200 It is with this pressure in mind that McCarthy began to shift his attention elsewhere, to other issues within first the Truman administration and then that of Dwight David Eisenhower, and along the way, make friends and enemies on both sides of the aisle and across radio, film and television. Led by a man who, through a combination of bad judgment, eagerness to play to the crowd and a seeming inability to understand the damage he

wrought to friend and foe alike, was unsuited to the task he had appointed himself. The McCarthy Era had only just begun.
Chapter Three: Security, Enemies and Patriotism

As the first case against Owen Lattimore, under the Tydings Committee, was wrapping up its investigations, other investigations and measures were being put into place. One such was a security act, named after Democratic Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada. "in February 1949, Pat McCarran introduced a bill to provide greater military aid to Chiang. Acheson opposed it, saying it would only prolong the hostilities and suffering."201 This was met with scorn by Senators McCarran, Bridges, Wherry and Knowland, who "described the government's White Paper of August-drafted by the State Department, it washed America's hands of the outcome of the Chinese Civil War-as a whitewash."202 This was the origin of the "betrayal" the China Lobby would not let die.

Senator McCarran had earlier tried to "sponsor a rider to an appropriations bill giving the Department of State full authority to dismiss any employee suspected of disloyalty..."203 Undaunted by this failure, McCarran instead threw his weight behind the Mundt-Nixon bill, which had been debated since 1948, requiring all Communists to register. McCarran then "added to it other anti-communist provisions that had been floating around and maneuvered to turn this omnibus anti-Communist bill into the Internal Security Act."204 It was a turning point in American politics.

The McCarran Internal Security Act passed the Senate by a vote of 70-7 in September, 1950. The Act required that:

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201C aute, 309
202 ibid
203C epIair, 95
204C epIair, 96
all Communist and Communist front groups register with the attorney general, set up a Subversive Activities Control Board to determine which organizations had to register, broadened the definition of espionage and sabotage, provided for the detention of suspected subversives in the event of a crisis.205

An anonymous Senator remarked “those who faced the electorate this year would be taking too great a risk if they voted right because of the popular lack of understanding and hysteria over the issue.”206 The lack of leadership was astounding. One ally of McCarthy who had begun to question him was Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Republican of Maine. She believed that “one of the main objectives of the federal government should be the exposure and eradication of communism in the United States...but had begun to question the ‘validity, accuracy, credibility and fairness of McCarthy’s charges.”207 Smith showed remarkable poise and respect for the structure of government through her hesitation to attack McCarthy, which was because:

she had been urged to do so by radio commentator Ed Hart and newspaper columnist Doris Fleeson...but hesitated because she thought it was up to Democratic Senators to respond to attacks on a Democratic administration. She finally decided to act, composed her statement, showed it to George Aiken (Republican-Vermont) and asked five other liberal Republican senators to join them.208

Shortly before the McCarran Act was passed, “Margaret Chase Smith and six other Republican Senators issued what they called a ‘Declaration of Conscience’ in which “without mentioning any names it accused ‘certain elements’ of the Republican party of trying to gain victory through ‘the selfish exploitation of fear, bigotry, ignorance and intolerance.”209 Smith, as a new Senator, was taking a great risk, but:

205Feurelicht, 75
206Griffith, 29
207Ceplair, 94
208ibid
209Feurelicht, 75
she believed in Senatorial courtesy, which McCarthy constantly flouted...a hardworking legislator who attended roll calls and was prepared for hearings...McCarthy was sloppy and shot from the hip....she liked facts and clarity, whereas McCarthy was a great obsurer and twister of facts. She thought his February 20th speech was character assassination.210

In an atmosphere which allowed McCarthy’s behavior, it is unsurprising that a bill such as The Internal Security Act would pass. Yet this is also the atmosphere that birthed McCarthy, who, until shortly before he had leveled his accusations against the State Department:

had little knowledge of Communism or interest in subversion, before deciding that he needed a defining issue for his re-election bid. At some point later in the process, he probably believed in what he was saying, but in two ways, his form of anti-communism is appropriately characterized as manipulative. First, unlike many nonpolitical anticommunists, McCarthy (and a number of his Republican colleagues in the Senate) cynically utilized anticommunism in large part as a means of advancing their careers. Second, as part of career-driven manipulation, he often attacked individuals, even though he had absolutely no basis for believing they had communist connections.211

What is saddening, and further evidence of the lack of governmental leadership viz the McCarran Act, was how “the detention provision, or concentration camp amendment, was the contribution of such legendary liberals as Hubert Humphrey, Paul Douglas and Herbert Lehman.” Truman had attempted to stop the McCarran Act, which he considered “Unconstitutional and unworkable, but in both houses of Congress, liberals and moderates joined conservatives in overriding the veto and six concentration camps were immediately built in order to house up to 26,500 prisoners.”212 Allying himself with the supporters of the McCarran Act, McCarthy would shift his attention specifically from Owen Lattimore to broader targets, as well as those who failed to support the McCarran Act.

210Morgan, 394
211Redish, 24
212Feuerlicht, 75-76
Nearly McCarthy’s first action was to go after Margaret Chase Smith. While never named in her speech, McCarthy knew of whom she spoke. On her way to deliver the speech, she met McCarthy and informed him that her coming words would be about him, but would not be named, at which he threatened the once vice-presidential hopeful with the withholding of Wisconsin’s electoral votes.\(^{213}\) In her speech, Smith said:

> Those of us who shout the loudest about Americanism are all too frequently those who, by our own words and acts, ignore some of the basic principles of Americanism: the right to criticize, the right to hold unpopular beliefs; the right to protest; the right of independent thought.\(^{214}\)

Reflecting on this period, former Democratic Senator Charles Edward Potter of Michigan recalled that in 1951:

> McCarthy used his seniority and dumped her off the Senate Investigating Committee...when the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections under the chairmanship of Senator Guy Gillette attempted, in 1951, to determine whether expulsion proceedings should be instituted against Joe.\(^{215}\)

Potter also revealed that:

> Margaret Smith had objected vigorously as a member of the committee when McCarthy charged it with being guilty of ‘stealing from the taxpayers’ and of being ‘completely dishonest’ because it was trying to investigate his financial record.\(^{216}\)

This example of McCarthy’s punitive nature is not shocking, but neither is the concern of political opponents in uncovering discrepancies with one another’s finances. While politics are real, and involve people and their lives, it is also a game, played to win; while criminal activity cannot be condoned, it would be naïve to suggest that such cruel attempts are not commonplace. Nobody within the political sphere can remain there for long without “getting dirty” and nobody who achieves high office can do so without having stepped on a few necks on the way up the

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\(^{214}\)ibid


\(^{216}\)ibid
political ladder. For McCarthy, the media greatly assisted the public in seeing him in action. The media, however, was not McCarthy’s main objective.

The establishment of the McCarran Committee is not when McCarthy began his “Great Crusade” for he had already done that in Wheeling, West Virginia. It is often remembered, incorrectly, that McCarthy went after members of Hollywood’s inner circle. This is mostly untrue. As Thomas Doherty notes:

> It was not the McCarthy Committee, but the McCarran Committee that investigated subversive content in motion pictures and television; and it was not McCarthy but a confederation of private organizations and special interest groups that purged television of artists deemed ‘controversial personalities.’ McCarthy’s focus was mainly intramural, aimed at government, not media. The McCarthy committee (officially, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by McCarthy from 1953-1954) is most often confused with the House Committee on Un-American Activities...Perversely, McCarthy is given too much credit for McCarthyism.\(^\text{217}\)

McCarthy’s targets were government employees, not directors, actors, writers, producers and technicians. McCarthy is remembered “along with prescient politicians like Estes Kefauver, Richard Nixon and Dwight Eisenhower—who possessed a keen eye for the main chance of the new medium.”\(^\text{218}\) McCarthy was allowed to become a strong man, with a shiny new technology to spread his message.

McCarthy and McCarran would become increasingly involved in loyalty boards, then proliferating following the adoption of the Internal Security Act. As explained by Andrea Friedman:

> While Loyalty boards often flattened out the complexity of an individual’s political life, collapsed ideologies and categories, and mistook dissent and progressive activism for disloyalty and subversion, they were, at least in part, responding to the reality of left

\(^{217}\)Doherty, 15-16

\(^{218}\)Doherty, 16
unionism, in which workers rights advocates, anti-racism activists and communists, encountered and influenced each other.\textsuperscript{219}

In this sense, what the McCarran Committee represented could be construed as risk management. The question was at what price for freedom and liberty. Unconcerned with such matters, McCarran and McCarthy proceeded with their investigations. What emerged was a rivalry between the Senate, led by McCarthy and McCarran, and the House. In January 1951, the Senate “established a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee that was intended to rival HCUA: this was the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, whose chairman in 1951 and 1952 was Pat McCarran.”\textsuperscript{220} McCarran used his power to investigate Officers in the Foreign Service who had warned that the Chiang Kai-shek government was weak and corrupt; of Owen Lattimore and the Institute of Pacific Relations; of subversive aliens; of Communism in youth groups; of subversive infiltration of radio, television, and the telegraph industry; passport policy; subversive control of five unions; of espionage by Soviet-bloc diplomats; of Communist teachers; and of the political records of American employees of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{221}

It is telling that McCarthy “was not even a member”\textsuperscript{222} of the McCarran investigations into Lattimore and the IPR. This was because “Republican elders still refused to trust him with any serious power and worked to keep him confined to his PSI satrapy.”\textsuperscript{223} PSI was the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, of which McCarthy was now a senior member.

In December of 1950, McCarthy had an altercation with journalist Drew Pearson, in the Sulgrave Club in Washington D.C. Pearson had been the journalist who had first published Lattimore’s name, a leak that most sources believe “came from hard-liners in the State

\textsuperscript{219}Friedman, Andrea. \textit{Strange Career of Annie Lee Moss: The: Rethinking Race, Gender and McCarthyism}. (\textit{The Journal of American History}, vol 94 no 2, September 2007) 450

\textsuperscript{220}Caute, 104
\textsuperscript{221}ibid
\textsuperscript{222}Herman, 183
\textsuperscript{223}ibid
Department.\textsuperscript{224} After initially supporting McCarthy, Pearson had pulled away from the Senator, in part because of a close friendship with frequent McCarthy target and Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, but also "because he was disgusted by the senator's vicious attacks on State Department personnel."\textsuperscript{225} Pearson had revealed "the senator's income tax troubles, his 'quickie' divorces, and his obnoxious behavior during the Malmedy probe."\textsuperscript{226} All these were facts McCarthy wished had been left in the past, and in the case of his income, was partly responsible for his removal of Margaret Chase from the Committee she had been assigned to.

It is important to understand Pearson, who wielded immense power in the media of his day. He was described as:

A strong and fervent liberal, he was a political commentator, investigative journalist, gossip columnist, and blackmailer all rolled into one. No other single person, neither journalist or politician, looms as large in the effort to derail McCarthy—not even William Evjue. Virtually every scandal that opponents used to besmirch McCarthy's reputation and brand him a shameless demagogue, from his 'reckless smears' of Owen Lattimore to lying about his war record to his financial shenanigans with Lustron, can be traced to a Drew Pearson column.\textsuperscript{227}

Pearson recalled the physical incident as being egged on by Mrs. Ansberry, who seated the two men closely at the same table during dinner in order to see what would happened, and Pearson overheard McCarthy telling his dining companion that his next speech "would be a blockbuster that would end Pearson's career."\textsuperscript{228} One of the people at the table mentioned McCarthy's tax problems, causing McCarthy, according to Pearson, "to put his thumb and index finger behind

\textsuperscript{224}Schrecker, Many, 170
\textsuperscript{225}Oshinsky, 179
\textsuperscript{226}Oshinsky, 180 According to Arthur Herman's 53rd page of his work, \textit{Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America's most hated Senator}, the Malmedy Probe refers to the investigation by the U.S. government of the 1944 Malmedy Massacre, and, how, while new to the Senate, McCarthy came under criticism for accusing the investigators, without evidence, of the use of torture to gain confessions, and thereby the U.S. Army of misconduct.
\textsuperscript{227}Herman, 232
\textsuperscript{228}Oshinsky, 180
the nerves at the back of my neck, gouging me as hard as he could, and said ‘you come out and we will settle this.’ After being separated, dinner was finished at different tables.

Afterward, the two men met in the coat room following their meals. McCarthy smiled and said “Well, Drew, a pleasant evening, isn’t it?” and then wheeled around and kneed Pearson twice in the groin—an instinctive move, the senator explained later, to protect him from assassins.” McCarthy’s attack continued, as he “floored him with an open-handed slap, at which point Richard Nixon burst onto the scene yelling ‘let a Quaker stop this fight’ grabbing McCarthy’s arm and pulling him from the room.” McCarthy was unrepentant about the attack.

The newspapers had a field day, and on December 15, 1950, McCarthy took to the Senate floor. “protected by Senate immunity, he called Pearson a ‘Moscow-directed character assassin’ and launched an attack on Pearson’s sponsor, the Adam Hat Company, as being supportive of Communism.” Soon after “Pearson filed a $5.1 million libel suit against McCarthy…which dragged on until it was dropped in 1956.” McCarthy proved himself combative both in and out of politics and his feud with Pearson would haunt him for the rest of his career.

The dismissal of General MacArthur by President Truman, in April 1951, led McCarthy to attack General George C. Marshall. In January 1950, Senator Robert Taft had accused “a group within the State Department” of working to rid China of Chiang-Kai-shek, a move McCarthy claimed was how “Acheson and Marshall had ensured that the Kremlin gained a

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229 ibid
230 ibid
231 ibid
232 Morgan, 412.
233 ibid
friendly government in China and that America gained a bloody and pointless war in Korea.234

McCarthy, reaching back to his earlier claims, contended that Marshall was the one:

who imposed an arms embargo and a truce when Chiang’s forces were at the height of
their power...and the villains were John Patton Davies, John Stewart Service, Raymond
P.Ludden and John M. Emerson at the State Department, as well as General Joseph
Stillwell, Brigadier General Evans Carlson, Agnes Smeley (a journalist who befriended
the Red Army during the Long March) and an academic expert, Owen Lattimore.235

In some other sectors, the view of how Communism operated was shifting, as noted by
scientist Werner Von Braun during an article in the April 21, 1951 issue of The New Yorker.
Von Braun was quoted as saying “the difference in the Cold War and arms race with Russia and
Communism would be that after the war, America looked for brains and Russia went after
labor.”236 This indicates a clear concern about numbers, and it is reasonable to consider that if
Communism in the Russian style, the mode of Stalin and Lenin, was enacted by a large number
of people interested in raw power, that this would alarm those in Washington, D.C. and their
constituents. How this large workforce supposedly came to be would be one of the central
questions of McCarthy’s next major accusation.

On June 14, 1951, on the floor of the Senate, McCarthy read into the record a sixty-
 thousand word speech damming Secretary of Defense General George C. Marshall, which
pushed McCarthy further into the spotlight and signaled the divide between his early career and
his eventual fall from grace. Historian Ted Morgan noted that “there was no rational reason to go
after this American icon. Perhaps Joe the giant-killer wanted to cut down to size one of the few
American statesmen held above reproach.”237 The speech was not written by McCarthy, but

234Caute, 310
235 ibid
237Morgan, 413
instead written by “Forrest Davis, a deeply conservative onetime editorial writer for the Cincinnati Enquirer.” What is notable in McCarthy’s attack on Marshall is both the tone and the content.

Richard Rovere wrote that, “the body of the speech was not an attack on General Marshall’s patriotism. It was a study of Allied high strategy with a good deal of emphasis on General Marshall’s role.” Unlike the attack on Lattimore and the members of the IRP, McCarthy was not yet admitting to questioning the commitment to America that Marshall held, but asserting that he had made mistakes. McCarthy soon tried to prove that these mistakes were results of Communist infiltration within the government and military.

McCarthy allowed the trouble he had stirred to fester. Rovere, no friend to McCarthy, asserts of McCarthy’s attack on Marshall’s conduct in the Second World War and China that:

There was a case to be made against General Marshall; like a great many Americans of his time, he was unprepared for leadership in global strategy and global diplomacy. He was unable to see, as Winston Churchill, for one, could see, beyond the immediate conflict with fascism to the developing conflict with the Soviet Union and Communist China. This is only to say that while he served the republic well, he served it with somewhat less foresight than one can, with hindsight, wish he-and with him most of our war leaders-had shown.

William F. Buckley Jr. and L. Brent Bozzell take a more serious view of McCarthy’s intent regarding Marshall:

McCarthy has said that he did not call Marshall a traitor. Strictly speaking, he is correct. And, in fact, a year after making his speech, McCarthy wrote: ‘If [Marshall]...made mistakes, that is no disgrace. Only those who do nothing make not mistakes. To prove that Marshall made mistakes does not indict Marshall of being either incompetent or of

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238 ibid
239 Rovere, 175
240 Rovere, 177
following the Communist cause'; and to the direct question, ‘did you accuse Marshall of being a traitor, McCarthy answered ‘no.’\textsuperscript{241}

McCarthy was very careful, in one regard. By never \textit{directly} accusing Marshall of being either a Communist or a traitor, McCarthy gave himself what he thought was room to escape if the accusations against Marshall turned against him as they had against Lattimore. Again, Buckley and Bozell note that “it is unreasonable to conclude...that McCarthy was charging Marshall with anything less than pro-Communist. In so doing, McCarthy aroused more resentment than any other single act in his stormy career-save his attack on Philip Jessup.”\textsuperscript{242}What McCarthy did was to “impugn Marshall’s loyalty on the grounds that, over a number of years, his policy decisions advanced the Communist cause.”\textsuperscript{243} This would be, as already noted, a pivotal moment in how McCarthy was perceived.

In particular, McCarthy took exception to the Marshall Plan for European Recovery and pointed to U.S. Communist Party leader Earl Browder’s book \textit{Our Path in War and Peace} as “the blueprint...for indiscriminate benevolence abroad comprehended in the Marshal Plan...this massive and unrewarding boondoggle.”\textsuperscript{244} McCarthy then launched into his most hyperbolic section, mentioning “a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous venture in the history of man. A conspiracy so black that...its principles shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.”\textsuperscript{245} McCarthy was desperate to link the many strings of his perceived conspiracy to “lose China” to Communism and the result of this desperation began to lose him support in the Senate.

\textsuperscript{241}Buckley Jr. and Bozell, 388
\textsuperscript{242} Buckley Jr. and Bozell. 388
\textsuperscript{243}Buckley Jr. and Bozell, 389
\textsuperscript{244}Morgan, 413
\textsuperscript{245}ibid
For his part, "Marshall refused to comment. If he had to explain that he was not a traitor at this point in his life, he told friends, it was not worth the trouble. He retired that September at the age of seventy-one, disgusted with the political climate."246 For McCarthy, the result of this initiated:

a slight drop in temperature among his Republican claque, a slight distancing to avoid contamination. On October 22, 1951, at a press conference in Des Moines, Senator Taft said bluntly ‘I don’t think one who overstates his case helps his own cause...his extreme attack against General Marshall was one of the things on which I cannot agree with McCarthy.’247

Marshall chose the correct path by refusing engagement. “he seemed to be unaffected by the slander and hysteria swirling beneath him. Given his intense dislike of partisan politics, McCarthy’s attack may have reinforced his determination to retire as soon as possible.”248 Soon after, Democratic Senator William Burnett Benton of Connecticut, chiefly known as the publisher of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, decided the time was right to remove McCarthy from public life by attempting to have him expelled from the Senate.

Benton was “a founder of UNESCO...the Voice of America and in 1945...became Assistant Secretary of State, taking charge, appropriately, of the department’s expanding overseas information programs...in 1949 he was selected to fill the seat of Raymond Baldwin.”249 Benton therefore had a considerable resume outside either chamber of Congress and, seemingly, very little to lose by attacking McCarthy. It was Benton who:

As a rookie, raised his voice against McCarthy...in March 1950, he had defended Acheson and Jessup. In May, he joined in the Democrats’ brief oratorical counteroffensive against McCarthy. In November, he won election to the last two years
of Ray Baldwin’s term after a campaign in which he claimed to have ‘faced up to the McCarthy issue in every speech.’

The historian Arthur Herman suggests that

Benton…understood by profession what McCarthy understood by instinct: how much modern politics involved manipulation of the mass media. The Benton and Bowles agency had transformed advertising on radio through singing commercials and product surveys.

In February 1951, saddened by the loss of Millard Tydings because of the machinations of McCarthy, Benton had proclaimed that “the junior senator from Wisconsin is out to be the judge, jury and prosecutor of the State Department. By this appointment, he becomes his own kangaroo court.” Benton was outraged at the conduct McCarthy had displayed both in his accusations against members of the State Department but also his interference in the election campaigns of his opponents.

Benton found himself pitched against McCarthy. McCarthy said that

While Benton was Assistant Secretary of State, he worked hand in glove with the Crimson clique which have been so bad for America and so good for Communist Russia. The exact number he personally brought into government is not fully known at this time. No wonder he squeals and screams in panic as the McCarran Committee starts to uncover some of them.

In response, Benton calmly repeated his same line, that “I regard Senator McCarthy as a menace to our American way of life.” It is worth noting that Benton was “a frequent television industry critic and proponent of FCC-supervised censorship.” It is not to defend McCarthy that it must be said there is hypocrisy afoot when one censor goes after another for the same actions.

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250 Fried, 197-198
251 Herman, 196
252 Fried, 198
253 Herman, 196
254 Potter, 163
255 Ibid
256 Doherty, 68
When McCarthy accused members of Congress of having Communists on staff, Benton responded by saying

McCarthy should hand over to the United States District Attorney any evidence he has to support his charge that several members of Congress have known Communists on their staffs. If he doesn’t turn over the evidence, he is derelict in his duty as a citizen and as a United States Senator. It is time that we put a stop to these reckless charges. He has never proved one of them.\textsuperscript{257}

McCarthy then, in a letter—\textit{he refused to appear before them—}told the Gillette Subcommittee on Elections and Privileges that “the Benton-type material can be found in the \textit{Daily Worker} almost any day of the week and will continue to flow from the mouths and pens of camp followers as long as I continue to fight against Communists in Government.”\textsuperscript{258} McCarthy’s mistake was having announced this in Atlanta, and by association, linking Benton ally Tom Hennings. McCarthy had written a scathing letter to Hennings, made public, in which he linked Hennings and his staff directly to the Daily Worker.\textsuperscript{259} This was an act of which a fellow Senator said that:

\begin{quote}
McCarthy will never be got by the Bentons. McCarthy will never be got, here, by the State Department. But a while back in June, he made a big mistake by attacking Marshall. He made a mistake down in Georgia the other day by asserting some senators have Communists on their payroll. But he made the biggest mistake of all now in taking on Tom Hennings. Tom is one of us.\textsuperscript{260}
\end{quote}

With this, McCarthy lost support among southern Democrats. As the election of 1952 loomed, McCarthy went on Edward R. Murrow’s \textit{See it Now}, early in 1952 and accused Benton of “hiding behind his congressional immunity ‘to smear McCarthy’ and Benton responded by waiving his immunity. McCarthy promptly sued him for two million dollars in libel.”\textsuperscript{261} It was a

\textsuperscript{257}ibid  
\textsuperscript{258}ibid  
\textsuperscript{259}Oshinsky, 220  
\textsuperscript{260}Oshinsky, 221  
\textsuperscript{261}Feuerlicht, 88
futile case, and as such, McCarthy launched into an investigation of Benton, including prompting investigations, where he "refused to appear, because he would have been subject to perjury charges if he lied under oath."\textsuperscript{262} McCarthy finally provided what he claimed was proof, in the form of exhibits "proving Benton was a ‘propagandist’ who had been ‘paralleling’ the Communist party line for years."\textsuperscript{263} The Gillette Committee continued weakly investigating, amounting to absolutely nothing of consequence.

In mid-1952, McCarthy, using an especially faulty syllogism, asserted that "if the \textit{Daily Worker} proved that Communists hated McCarthy, and Benton hated McCarthy, what did that make Benton?"\textsuperscript{264} Benton’s hopes of re-election were dashed. Not so much by McCarthy, but by his own inability to capture the public’s attention and do anything about McCarthy. Benton’s parting remark was that he believed "a young and militantly conservative Yale graduate named William F. Buckley Jr, who had published a newsletter attacking Benton’s record as pro-Communist, was ‘a potentially dangerous young man.”\textsuperscript{265} It seemed that McCarthy was winning, but the truth was that his critics were simply not speaking as loudly or effectively as his supporters.

The 1952 Presidential election had become the battleground on which the results of McCarthy’s accusations against Marshall largely played out. Having withstood, if barely, Benton’s attempt, McCarthy now had to stand up to growing dissatisfaction within his own party and a lack of support from the very top.

Eisenhower, whose ties were to the moderate Eastern wing of the party, disliked McCarthy. But he also shrank from confronting him. The defining moment occurred

\textsuperscript{262} Feuerlicht, 89
\textsuperscript{263}ibid
\textsuperscript{264}Belfrage, 147
\textsuperscript{265}Herman, 206
during the election campaign when Ike’s political advisors forced him to delete a favorable reference to George Marshall from a speech he was going to give in Milwaukee. McCarthy had attacked Marshall in June 1951 when he delivered a sixty thousand-word speech accusing the distinguished military leader of participating in the Democratic administration’s conspiracy to betray both Eastern Europe and China to the Communists. Though McCarthy’s diatribe was part of a broader GOP campaign against Truman’s handling of the unpopular Korean War, it was one thing to criticize the president. It was another to blast someone as eminent and widely respected as Marshall. And many republicans, as well as Democrats, felt McCarthy had gone too far. Eisenhower was among them. The Republican presidential candidate despised the Wisconsin senator but he did not want to divide the party by taking him on. So he limited his campaign statements to generalities about decency and fair play when his handlers added an unwanted appearance in Wisconsin to his schedule, Ike decided to use the opportunity to praise Marshall and condemn the way McCarthy attacked him. At the very last minute, however, he pulled the passage from his Milwaukee speech the professional politicians in his entourage had convinced him that such a direct rebuke to McCarthy might split the Wisconsin GOP and lose to the state in November. Ike’s reluctance to confront McCarthy would continue after the election.266

McCarthy nonetheless took advantage of the July 4, 1952 Republican National Convention, in Chicago, and performed what:

liberals would later dismiss as coup de theatre…four ringing sentences, each punctuated with thunderous approval: ‘I say one Communist in a defense plant is one Communist too many. One Communist on the faculty of one university is one Communist too many. One Communist among the American advisers at Yalta was one Communist too many. And even if there were only one Communist in the State Department, that would still be one Communist too many.’267

The result was a flurry of activity from the press. Drew Pearson’s assistant Jack Anderson “co-wrote a scurrilous little book, McCarthy: The Man, the Senator, the Ism, and interviewed neighbors from Grand Chute to scrape together evidence that McCarthy had been a bully and liar even as a child.”268 The New York Post published an “anti-McCarthy series that dredged up stories about Quaker Dairy, his ‘quickie divorces’ and even accused him (falsely) of

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266Schrecker, Many, 255-256
267Herman, 204
268ibid
having a homosexual on his staff in 1947." The gender-attack on McCarthy is among the most interesting and telling of all the attacks by or against the Senator.

Of this, Andrea Friedman writes that:

McCarthy did not introduce the practices and policies of political repression and sexual oppression that constituted the domestic cold war, and many of those practices and policies outlasted him. Nonetheless, he inhabits our memories as their most visible representation...The smearing of senator McCarthy reveals much about the sexualization of cold war politics....demonstrates that cold war liberals not only subscribed to the cultural logic of the lavender scare; they employed some of its tactics to pursue their own ends...cold war liberals established their anti-Communist credentials by embracing a rhetoric of masculine virility.

Ellen Schrecker contends that McCarthy simply used this rhetoric to further his own cause:

Homosexuality was so far beyond the realm of acceptability that it rarely figured in any discussion of the CP’s sexual practices. There were, it is true, intimations that Communism was somehow effeminate. Joe McCarthy led the charge with his diatribes against the ‘Communists and queers’ in the State Department and his macho disdain for its lead, ‘the Red Dean [Acheson] of Fashion.’ But class antagonisms shaped McCarthy’s language as much as homophobia did.

This was the result of McCarthy having, in the words of Richard Rovere “discovered that homosexuality was regarded as a factor in security judgments, and he worked this for what it was worth...it gave lesser demagogues...a corner of McCarthyism to work for themselves.” This was an attack that McCarthy himself would endure.

In July 1952, McCarthy had angered the publisher of the Las Vegas Sun, Hank Greenspun, by “calling him an ex-Communist and Army deserter. Greenspun paid him back by running articles claiming that ‘it is common talk among homosexuals in Milwaukee who

269 ibid
271Schrecker, Many. 148
272Rovere. 153
rendezvous at the White Horse Inn that Sen. Joe McCarthy has often engaged in homosexual activities." That McCarthy quickly married his long-time assistant, Jean Kerr, shortly after these allegations, did not help his protestations.

McCarthy was not without support. Ahead of his re-election, McCarthy had cast his light on new targets. He also found new allies, among them a bright pair of young men from a family in Massachusetts. John and Robert Kennedy were the sons of Joseph Kennedy, a businessman and former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who McCarthy had known since the late 1940s. As M. Stanton Evans tells the story "Jack Kennedy had entered the hardline anti-Communist lists before the 1950 arrival of McCarthy, denouncing Owen Lattimore, John K. Fairbank, the IPR and the Acheson policy in China in terms McCarthy himself could not have faulted." Robert would become, and remain, the closest of the brothers to Senator McCarthy, despite a relatively short official relation to him.

Robert Kennedy worked for McCarthy from December 1952 until July 1953, at which point he resigned. Instead of becoming the Senator’s chief legal counsel, McCarthy had opted to go with another young man, Roy Cohn, who “was all of twenty-five years old but already a veteran Communist-hunter and in certain circles well regarded…Cohn was the son of a Democratic judge from New York City…Jewish, observant…part of the Ed Flynn Machine.” The choice of Cohn makes sense and yet can be shown as one of McCarthy’s greatest blunder. Cohn’s credentials included:

A Liberal Democrat by upbringing and affiliation, he now developed considerable anti-Red expertise by working on the trials of Communist Party Leaders, a grand jury investigation of suspected American Communists employed at the United Nations. a
perjury indictment of Owen Lattimore and, by his own account the most traumatic, he was part of the prosecutorial team that secured the conviction of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for espionage conspiracy.\textsuperscript{276}

Despite all this, rumors had dogged Cohn for years about his sexual orientation, and after McCarthy was elected to a second term, these allegations would once again be used against McCarthy by his critics, and by McCarthy against those same critics. What McCarthy had done in the year and a half since attacking General Marshall had been to shield himself from one blow after another, brought on largely by his own immense talent for grandstanding and overreaching. During this period, McCarthy partially lost sight of the goal of righting the wrong, in his mind, of “losing China” to Communism.

During the Presidential Campaign of 1952, in August of that year, a reporter named Murray Kempton, of The New Yorker, asked General Eisenhower about the accusations against General Marshall. The response by Eisenhower is telling, and reveals a deep level of disgust with outrages within his party.

‘General’ Kemp asked, ‘what do you think of those people who call General Marshall a living lie?’ Eisenhower’s face flushed beet red. He jumped from behind his desk and shook his finger at Kempton. His voice was angry and harsh. ‘How dare anyone say such a thing about General Marshall, who was a perfect example of patriotism and loyal service to the United States. I have no patience with anyone who can find in his record of service for this country anything to criticize.’\textsuperscript{277}

The election of Dwight David Eisenhower as President of the United States brought about a new set of challenges. No longer could McCarthy attack a Democratic administration. He was left with either the ghosts of the distant past, the remnants of the previous administration or those who were not in agreement with him within his own party. McCarthy had largely left his

\textsuperscript{276}Evans, \textit{Blacklisted}, 450
\textsuperscript{277} Smith, Jean Edward. \textit{Eisenhower In War and Peace} (New York: Random House, 2012) 527
old nemesis, Owen Lattimore, to the McCarran Committee, who in December 1952, coinciding with Cohn’s involvement “was indicted on seven counts of perjury stemming from his testimony to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. In May 1953, four of the seven perjury counts were dismissed by U.S. District Court Judge Luther W. Youngdahl, and the other three counts declared of doubtful materiality.” Yet, a Republican president had been sworn into office and McCarthy’s power seemed to assure him and his accusations of a continued presence.

Eisenhower, however, was no friend of McCarthy. “a timid chief executive, Eisenhower wanted to avoid making enemies, particularly in Congress. Orders went out telling members of the administration not to question McCarthy—and those like Stassen who did were publically humiliated.” Eisenhower was biding his time, while other Republican leaders hoped to minimize McCarthy and the reputation he was giving the party. As such, in January 1953 “he was given the chair of the Government Operations Committee, a panel given to humdrum chores….Senator William Jenner of Indiana would lead the Internal Security Committee while Taft claimed ‘we’ve got McCarthy where he can’t do any more harm.” The chains did not long hold McCarthy, who “took command of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations…whose loose mandate let McCarthy lead it anywhere, and named Roy M. Cohn chief subcommittee counsel.” McCarthy was going to step up his program, but it was a program in need of new direction, or, perhaps, a recommitment to prior direction.

To this end, Michael Paul Rogin suggests that McCarthyism was “significantly not a fascist movement. It lacked an economic program, was free of anti-Semitism, did not challenge

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278 Ceplair, 108.
281 Ibid
local elites and provided no physical violence. McCarthyism grew out of rural politics.\textsuperscript{282} This explained why McCarthy’s base was always in the Midwest and why the loss of the southern Democrats was such a blow to his ambitions. As McCarthy took control of the ISS, he would have to navigate these realities, aware of them or not.

\textsuperscript{282}Rogin, 215
Chapter Four: Broadcast News, Dishonorable Discharge

Starting in 1953, Senator McCarthy once again took aim at the State Department by going after its broadcasting arm. The Voice Of America service, then administered by the State Department’s United States Information Agency, came under renewed criticism-McCarthy had spoken of them since 1950-for their broadcasts being slanted in favor of Communism. The specific charges McCarthy leveled, in February 1953, were:

First, two powerful radio transmitters were deliberately being built where they would not be effective. Second, ‘very sinister influences’ were trying to stifle anti-Communist propaganda broadcasts to Latin America. Third, Hebrew-language broadcasts to Israel had been canceled as part of a ‘pattern’ of aiding the Communist cause. Fourth, the director of religious programming was an atheist.

The Voice of America had a history going back to 1942. It had in 1953 received “a fifty million dollar Congressional appropriation for a worldwide ring of transmitters designed to penetrate the Iron Curtain and reach every corner of the globe.” According to Ellen Schrecker, the VOA was “an unhappy amalgam of vociferously anti-Communist East European émigrés and idealistic New Dealers left over from the Office of War Information, torn by a struggle over whether it should be an objective news outlet like the BBC or a more overtly propagandistic one.” The conflict within the VOA allowed McCarthy to expand his review of its practices because each camp was willing to destroy the other to get what it wanted.

Republicans had been eyeing the Voice of America and the Information program since at least 1945, with party leaders convinced that they were “full of Communists, left-wingers, New Dealers, radicals and pinkos.” McCarthy now attempted to go after the flow of information. By

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283Feuerlicht, 103
284Coute, 321
285Schrecker, Many, 256
attacking the VOA and IP, McCarthy was calling attention to agencies involved in the dissemination of information around the globe, including Eastern Europe and Asia.

The deeper Roy Cohn and his assistant, Gerard David Schine, involved themselves with the investigations, the more their focus with VOA seemed to change. According to Richard Rovere, “almost the first thing Cohn and Schine did was move to New York, where Schine had a suite in the Waldorf Towers. There they interviewed underground members, and there, later, they examined the people the underground had fingered.” The ‘underground’ was The American Underground, one of the factions within VOA, and which was “organized by a Rumanian refugee named Paul Deac, and had begun forwarding information about ‘subversive’ employee to Senator McCarthy and his friends in the press-Howard Rushmore, Ralph de Toledano and George Sokolsky.” Throughout the investigation, McCarthy had made use of television to broaden the audience his message reached.

McCarthy turned the hearings of his subcommittee into something of a traveling circus, where McCarthy “usually in Washington, or New York, occasionally further afield in locations such as Albany and Boston, chaired myriad hearings-closed hearings, open hearings, executive sessions, one-man hearings, and full committee hearings.” Among those called to session was author Howard Fast. Questioned by Roy Cohn, Fast refused to answer Cohn’s query about Fast’s past as a member of the Communist Party on First and Fifth Amendment grounds, and reiterated the point when asked about which of his books were published while a member of the CP. McCarthy continued in Washington, where from March 3-6, 1953, he “probed the record

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287 Rovere, 197
288 Oshinsky, 267
289 Doherty, 127
290 Matusow, 73-74
of Reed Harris, deputy administrator for the State Department’s Internal Information Administration, and acting administration of the Voice of America. 291 The investigation into Voice of America was merely an excuse to get into the files of the International Information Agency.

On February 23, 1953, a program manager named Alfred Puhan “accused Harris of trying to eliminate the entire VOA Hebrew language service, which was beamed to Israel—at a time of anti-Semitic purges behind the Iron Curtain.” 292 During March hearings on Harris, “Raymond Kaplan, a forty-two-year-old Voice of America engineer, jumped in front of a truck and was killed near the MIT campus in Cambridge.” This is the only time in the entire history of McCarthy’s career where a suicide was in any way directly linked to his actions.

The details are that “Kaplan was the liaison man between MIT and the Voice when the sites for the Baker transmitters were chosen. The coroner ruled that he killed himself out of fear that he would be called before the McCarthy Committee.” 293 This was because of Kaplan leaving “a letter for his wife and son, where he wrote: ‘I am the patsy in any mistakes made...once the dogs are set on you, everything you have done since the beginning of time is suspect...I can’t take the pressure any more.’” 294 Some considered it murder, giving as evidence that Kaplan “had seemed eager to testify and had made a hotel reservation in Washington in case he was held overnight.” 295 It is just as likely that Kaplan had an accident as committed suicide but such is the mythic power of terror surrounding McCarthy that it is easy to believe the worst and attribute it to that mighty force called McCarthyism.

291 Doherty, 128
292 Morgan, 438
293 Morgan, 439
294 Morgan, 440
295
McCarthy took this opportunity to say that "Mr. Kaplan had no fear of this committee whatsoever' and added that sinister forces, not suicide, had probably done him in."296 This statement was followed shortly thereafter by Cohn and Schine's book-burning tour of the Information Program's overseas libraries. McCarthy's investigation of Harris ended in a televised showdown which

exemplified the scattershot injustice of the video courtroom. The hearing opened at 10:30 and was scheduled to conclude, by prior agreement between ABC and McCarthy, at 12:30, at which time ABC affiliates were to resume local programming. Having complained of unfair treatment during his previous televised testimony, Harris was promised an opportunity to read a written statement on air. However, he was not called to testify until late in the morning and did not begin reading his statement until 12:23. At 1230, ABC cut the feed to permit local affiliates to return to regularly scheduled programming, thus interrupting Harris mid-exculpation. (Only Washington affiliate WMALV-TV stayed with the Harris statement...the decision by ABC to cut off Harris's testimony incited a mini-'equal time' imbroglio. Suspecting bias, the viewers demanded that Harris be give airtime to respond to McCarthy. 'the episode showed more clearly than anything else how both Senator McCarthy and television are putting show business considerations above the minimum canons of fair play and responsible journalism' protested Jack Gould.297

McCarthy had reached what was the absolute peak of his powers in the Senate when, in March of 1953, as his investigation of VOA concluded, he "forced the State Department to rescind a directive to Voice employees permitting them to decide for themselves whether they wished to talk informally with committee staff members in the absence of a Senator."298 Further it was ordered that "Henceforth, all employees would be expected to cooperate fully in all of the Committee's work. McCarthy also induced the State Department to forbid the Voice of America to quote Communists even if such quotation would serve its purposes."299 It was in this atmosphere that Schine and Cohn embarked on their embarrassing tour of Europe.

296Oshinsky, 271
297Doherty, 129
298Matusow, 73
299Matusow, 73
Between April 4 and April 21 of 1953, Schine and Cohn went to Europe and had stops in “Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, Bonn, Vienna, Belgrade, Athens and Rome...the press coverage of dozens of reporters and photographers, followed the pair from city to city, pouncing on everything they did.”

One example was railing against economic extravagance...and wound up personifying it-apparently at government expense...despite receiving $2,000 in counterpart funds, the pair went on a huge spending spree, charged everything to the American Embassy and then ran out on their hotel bill.

The purpose of the trip was “to purge the State Department’s overseas libraries, which harbored, so the Senator claimed, thousands of subversive books by ‘Communists, pro-Communists and former Communists, anti-anti-Communists.’” This resulted in new guidelines, and “an outright ban on books by ‘any controversial persons, Communists, fellow travelers, et cetera.’ Within a day, someone had deleted the ‘any controversial persons’ but the ‘et cetera’ remained.” Among the items burned were works by “Whittaker Chambers, NAACP head Walter White and the Secretary of State’s own cousin, diplomatic historian Foster Rhea Dulles. For lack of storage space in a few installations, some of the discarded items were burned.” The result was a black eye on the Senate. Schine and Cohn slunk back to Washington, D.C. to hide behind McCarthy, who found himself under renewed assault for overstepping his bounds with his recent investigations.

In the middle of this battle, McCarthy found himself a potential nominee for President of the United States, with major publications suggesting it:

300 Oshinsky. 279
301 ibid
302 Schrecker. Many. 257
303 ibid
304 ibid
Newsweek and the New York Times were speculating that McCarthy was aiming for the White House in 1956. Fearing for the nation, former President Truman made a nationally televised speech in which he accused ‘this Administration’ of ‘shameful demagoguery’ and defined McCarthyism as a ‘horrible cancer [that] is eating at the vitals of America.’ Even Republicans began to grow nervous. Eisenhower’s brother publically described McCarthy as ‘the most dangerous menace’ to the nation.\textsuperscript{305}

At the same time, the Korean War was coming to a close. McCarthy had long railed against American involvement in Korea. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson had claimed that “Korea saved us” because of how it convinced Congress to increase defense spending. Between 1947 and 1950, defense spending had “never exceeded $60 billion; after 1953, it never fell below $143 billion...an increase of $200 million.”\textsuperscript{306} Military concerns loomed large in the mind of the public, a fact upon which McCarthy would soon capitalize, because as the United States involvement in Korea ended, so did the public’s immediate concern with matters in Asia, the platform upon which McCarthy had built his reputation.

That platform, the “Loss of China” and the parties he held responsible, within the State Department, were never far from McCarthy’s thoughts at any time during any of his myriad investigations. McCarthy’s armor began to show chinks when in 1953, Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, backed Charles Bohlen as ambassador to the Soviet Union over McCarthy’s protests, yet did not “back up foreign aid administrator Harold Stassen in March 1953 when he lashed out against McCarthy for having ‘undermined’ the nation’s foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{307} This demonstrated the delicate balance Eisenhower was trying to achieve, because he was aware that:

moderate Republicans had come to believe that the Wisconsin Senator was hurting the administration. Stassen, after all, had once been close to McCarthy and had helped him

\textsuperscript{307}Schrecker, Many. 258
block the 1951 nomination of Phil Jessup to the UN. If Eisenhower would not back someone with such strong political credentials as his own foreign aid administration, McCarthy might well become unstoppable.308

Eisenhower was playing a long game with McCarthy, and people would have noticed the chinks in the armor if McCarthy had not been so terrifying for so long. Eisenhower intended to allow McCarthy to hang himself, and told his brother Milton Eisenhower, “I just won’t get into a pissing contest with that skunk.”309 Over the next year, hanging himself is precisely what happened as the Senator from Wisconsin used his committee and the medium of television to place himself at center stage in a crusade over a cause that fewer and fewer cared about.

On June 19, 1953, after unsuccessful last-minute appeals, the Rosenbergs were executed. None rejoiced over this more than McCarthy and Surine, who were out to get all the traitors, including Lattimore. Surine was working on a bill for McCarthy to introduce that would cover Lattimore’s major crime, ‘policy treason.’ As Lou Nichols reported this new offense ‘by this Surine means an instance where through manipulation of top-level policy which would deliver a whole country of group of nations as contrasted against an individual act of espionage or sabotage.310

This led to the so-called Fifth Amendment Communists. Of these, McCarthy said “a witness’s refusal to answer whether or not he is a Communist on the grounds that it might incriminate him is the most positive proof obtainable that the witness is a Communist.”311 This led to great abuses of the Constitution, where the accused had no true recourse to address the accusations they faced, and allowed “committees to ply reluctant witnesses with damaging questions in the confident expectation that they could not answer them.”312 Witnesses had no alternatives, and McCarthy basked in the glow of the attention he received.

308 Schrecker, Many. 258
309 Smith, 590
310 Newman, 444
311 Schrecker, Age. 59
312 Schrecker, Age. 59
Over the spring and summer of 1953, McCarthy tantalized the public through the media by “barring them (the media) from less fruitful sessions on ‘security grounds’ then giving his account of what happened. Thus a witness who invoked the Fifth turned up in the afternoon papers as ‘a leading espionage agent.’ Over that spring and summer, the story of Harry Dexter White, who passed away in 1948, was brought back into the spotlight.

When asked if this was a result of McCarthyism, President Eisenhower responded that “I do not particularly understand the term and haven’t another word to say about the matter.” Cedric Belfrage writes that this is evidence of how “Although McCarthy had nothing to do with the White affair...McCarthyism was now the word for what caused the distress.” In late September 1953, McCarthy, having entered the lexicon, turned his attention to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and signaled the beginning of the end of his career.

On October 12, 1953, McCarthy released a statement regarding Fort Monmouth. In this statement he claimed that he had “found traces of extremely dangerous espionage...striking at our entire defense against atomic attack.” McCarthy then claimed that “top secret’ documents from Fort Monmouth showed up in East Germany; at another briefing, McCarthy surmised that the spy ring set up by Julius Rosenberg ‘may still be in operation.’ The result was massive newspaper and television coverage. McCarthy’s relations with the Army were already frosty, given his attack on General Marshall. These new allegations did little to engender any further affection.

313Belfrage, 202
314Belfrage, 203
315ibid
316Fried, 272
317ibid
Related to the Army investigations was the case of Milo Radulovich, who came to greatest notice when the October 23, 1953 episode of the CBS series *See It Now*, hosted by journalist and broadcaster Edward R. Murrow, examined what Radulovich, a Dexter, Michigan based Air Force Reserve officer, had endured because of the climate of the period, one which had seen the McCarran Act adopted and which allowed McCarthy to operate in the manner to which he had become accustomed.

Within the program itself, neither McCarthy, who was not directly involved, or McCarthyism was mentioned, and Radulovich was presented as “an Everyman...and as in the movies, the strength of character of the common man conquers his persecutors in the last act.”\(^{318}\) Murrow showed his audience what Radulovich was accused of: guilt by association. In this way, the program became a warning against the actions of McCarthy and his followers. As Murrow explained through Radulovich’s own words:

> A military security board has recommended Radulovich be severed from the service as a security risk because he has ‘maintained a close and continuing relationship’ with his father and sister. Radulovich is fighting the decision, he says, because ‘anybody labeled with a security risk in these days-especially in physics or meteorology-simply won’t be able to find employment in his line of work.’\(^{319}\)

Fred Friendly, Murrow’s producer and partner, and Murrow himself, felt this case was vital. Murrow said, in a plea to his audience as much as to the government:

> We believe that the son shall not bear the inequity of the father—even though that inequity be proved and in this case it was not...whatever happens in this whole arena of the relationship between the individual and the state, we will do it ourselves. It cannot be blamed upon Malenkov or Mao Tse Tung, or even our allies. And it seems to us—that is, Fred Friendly and myself—that this is a subjected that should be argued about endlessly.\(^{320}\)

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\(^{318}\)Doherty, 169

\(^{319}\)Ibid

\(^{320}\)Doherty, 170
Five weeks later, Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of the Air Force, appeared on See It Now, and announced that “it is consistent with the interests of national security to retain Lt. Radulovich with the United States Air Force Reserve. He is not in my opinion a security risk.” This was a major achievement for a television program to impact policy, and heralded a shift in coverage of McCarthy. It was but one of many blows to Senator McCarthy beginning in the fall of 1953.

In early November 1953, Cohn and McCarthy blundered. G. David Schine “the subcommittee’s unpaid consultant, received his draft notice.” Instead of encouraging him to serve, McCarthy and Cohn meddled. “Despite efforts by McCarthy and, more specifically, Roy Cohn to secure a special assignment or direct commission for Schine. In early November, he was inducted as a private.” The timing was suspicious, because “at the same time the Senator and his aides were seeking unusual privileges for private Schine, the Army was trying to convince McCarthy to ease off on the Monmouth investigation.” The Eisenhower Administration saw trouble ahead and proceeded with caution.

In November 1953, Eisenhower wrote Attorney General Brownell that ‘we must search out some positive way to put ourselves on the side of individual right and liberty as well as on the side of fighting Communism to the death...the Communists are a class set apart by themselves. Indeed, I think they are such liars and cheats that even when they apparently recant and later testify against someone else for his Communist convictions, my first reaction is to believe that the accused person must be a patriot or he wouldn’t have incurred the enmity of such people. So even when these ‘reformed’ Communists have proved useful in tracking down some of their old associates, I certainly look for corroborating evidence before I feel too easy in my mind about it.’

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321 Doherty, 170
322 Fried, 273
323 ibid
324 ibid
325 Newman, 449
Also in November 1953, a dentist named Irving Peress came to McCarthy's attention. In October of 1953, Peress had made Captain in the United States Army. In November, Peress, "claimed 'federal constitutional privilege' on all questions relating to membership in subversive organizations. In January 1953, he was called to active duty and shipped to Fort Lewis, Washington for further assignment to the Far East Command." The Peress case would become the entry point of the Army-McCarthy hearings.

What McCarthy was interested in with Peress was "that the Army bureaucracy and its own loyalty board had totally botched Peress's case-not only permitting him to stay in the Army, in clear violation of the law, but actually promoting him." McCarthy revealed to the public that "Peress had never been questioned about his background by a board of inquiry or a security officer. He could not know that the Army had not asked because it already was aware of Peress's past, and the Army was not going to enlighten McCarthy." The stage was set for a pitched battle between McCarthy and the Army.

Regarding the Army-McCarthy hearings, David Caute writes that:

The final act of hubris was to take on the Army, charging that in the highest reaches of the Pentagon, Communist sympathizers were shielding Soviet spies, and that in order to protect them Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens had attempted to blackmail and smear McCarthy and his loyal staff.

McCarthy considered the case of Irving Peress and his promotion as having given him "the key to Communist infiltration of our armed forces." Issues of loyalty and freedom of speech can be found within the case of the Army-McCarthy hearings and with the history of the

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326Oshinsky, 365-366
327Herman, 248
328ibid
329Caute, 107
330Belfrage, 208
various investigations by Senator McCarthy. Considering a time and place where the McCarran Act had led to further loyalty boards, and where invoking a Constitutional right was seen as proof of treasonous behavior, scholar Edward A. Shills offers this commentary:

Oaths of allegiance are part of the ceremonial of solidarity. They carry no weight in the protection of the security of a country because that must be concerned with the gravely alienated. Loyalty oaths are part of the process of drawing the line around the society of the loyal and excluding the disloyal from participation in that society. Even when the products of espionage are considerable, it is still far from certain that espionage is either very harmful to its victims or very beneficial to its instigators. The knowledge that one is penetrating the secrets of the other side is reassuring and strengthening to the morale of the power which gains the secrets. It is more doubtful whether the knowledge gained by espionage makes so much difference...331

Peress had requested a discharge, one day after McCarthy demanded his court-martial, on February 2, 1954.332 Two weeks later, McCarthy called:

Brigadier General Ralph W. Zwicker before the subcommittee and demanded from him the names of all the officers who had been involved in Peress’s discharge. When Zwicker refused on advice of army counsel John Adams, McCarthy berated the officer as ‘not fit to wear that uniform’ and charged that he ‘did not have ‘the brains of a five-year-old.’333

McCarthy would not fall based solely on the ire of the Army, alone. Instead, his bullying of a government employee, Annie Lee Moss, coupled with anti-McCarthy broadcasts by Edward R. Murrow and the behavior of Roy Cohn would finally seal his fate. None of these alone was the reason McCarthy fell. His fall would be a combination of factors, and each of these would be linked to the end of his popular platform. The last year of McCarthy’s dominance of the Senate coincided with the end of the Korean War and the distancing in the minds of the public of China becoming a Communist state.

332 Griffith, Politics, 246
333 Griffith, Politics, 247
The case of Annie Lee Moss, according to M. Stanton Evans, is that of "the quintessential McCarthy martyr, the most famous of all McCarthy cases...a case that says a lot about McCarthy, his critics and standard histories of the era."\textsuperscript{334} Annie Lee Moss was a communications clerk in the Army Signal Corps. At the time of her appearance before the Senate Subcommittee, she was forty-eight years old. Moss came to McCarthy’s attention as an object lesson, he hoped, in the failure of loyalty boards.

Throughout the hearings, Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat from Missouri, waged a battle of words and will with McCarthy, mainly over the ideal of freedom of speech and demonstration. Symington “was disturbed by McCarthy’s stubborn insistence that federal employees had a higher duty to give him secret information than to obey the law.”\textsuperscript{335} In response to McCarthy’s repeated summons of witnesses and demanding information, backed by loyalty boards, the McCarran act and a general climate of unease, Symington opined that “If McCarthy is right, we haven’t got a good government, we haven’t got a bad government, we just don’t have any government at all.”\textsuperscript{336} Symington’s words foretold a change in opinion of McCarthy and McCarthyism.

Moss had been suspended from her job “when called to a previous meeting with McCarthy and branded a Communist. She was being brought in now, McCarthy said, as an example of how the Army ‘coddled’ Communists.”\textsuperscript{337} Yet it would be the Moss case that, in the words of Thomas Reeves, "blackened Cohn’s reputation as an investigator, and helped shatter Joe’s nationwide popularity."\textsuperscript{338} Cohn’s first mistake was relying on the word of Mary Markward.

\textsuperscript{334} Evans, \textit{Blacklisted}, 528
\textsuperscript{335} Fried, 286
\textsuperscript{176} ibid
\textsuperscript{337} Potter, 107
\textsuperscript{338} Herman, 333
an FBI informant who had worked undercover in the Communist Party in Washington from 1943-1949. Markward, questioned as to whether or not she had personal confirmation of Moss, responded “no, I don’t specifically recall that I do know her as a person.” This uncertainty was only the beginning of trouble for Cohn and McCarthy, who had learned of Markward “in the midst of his campaign against the Department of the Army.” McCarthy, once again, dove headfirst without careful consideration of evidence.

McCarthy, as preamble to Moss’s testimony, stated “this woman, Annie Lee Moss, who is handling the encoding, decoding, the routing of classified work, has been an active member of the Communist Party.” Moss had however been cleared in the 1940s by her loyalty board, which determined that:

there were ‘no reasonable grounds’ to believe that she was disloyal, and she was permitted to retain her job…the same charges were resuscitated in 1951, when Moss, now an employee of the State Department of the Army, was reinvestigated in the wake of a revision of the army’s loyalty-security regulations.

Andrea Friedman contends that “Moss became simultaneously a sign of the decline of McCarthyism and of the ascendency of the liberal racial order secured by anticommunism and enlightened white leadership.” This is because Moss was part of what Friedman called “the postwar global remapping and Cold War that emerged from it that ensured that domestic race relations would be critically enmeshed with international issues.” During the hearing, on March 11, 1954, Robert Kennedy received word that the organizer supposedly behind Moss, ...

339 Herman, 334
340 ibid
341Friedman, Strange Career, 458
342 Herman, 334
343Friedman, Strange Career, 448
344Friedman, Strange Career, 446
345Friedman, Strange Career, 452
Robert Hall, was in fact not the same Robert Hall. One was a white, Communist organizer and the other an African-American union organizer.

Cohn became flustered when informed of this discrepancy, and said “I don’t know that it was. Our information is that it was the same Rob Hall...I think that might be something we should look into and get some information on.” This was not the only bungling of the facts of the Moss case. Markward presented her against Moss within this climate, and did so having “kept no copies of the records and reports she sent the FBI from 1943-1949...relied on her memory in her congressional appearances and as a woman deeply committed to the anticommmunist crusade, she was hardly unbiased.” The implications of this would crystallize in the treatment Moss received by media figures, such as Edward R. Murrow, who would present her in such a state that Moss was reduced to victimhood.

For one thing, Murrow and other members of the media did not give McCarthy or Cohn credit for just how accomplished Moss was. Andrea Friedman writes that one theory holds:

Moss chose to collude in her portrayal as an ignorant victim. Whether or not she ever ‘knowingly’ joined the Communist party, she knew more about it than she pretended. But Moss also knew a great deal about how to survive in the racist milieu of the nation’s capital. She drew on well-learned lessons about racial etiquette as well as her political skills and community connections to respond successfully to this attack on her livelihood and her loyalty. What appeared as stupidity was really an effective act of self-preservation and it is not in the least surprising that presumptions of African-American incompetence shaped both the presentation and the reception of Moss’s testimony. The Moss case became a fiasco because of how rushed and contradictory the facts surrounding Moss, her supposed activities and even her identity, had been, because of Cohn’s demand for swift action. Senator Potter later wrote that:

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346Oshinsky, 402
14* Freidman, Strange Career, 457
12a Friedman, Strange Career, 465
It was also brought out that there were three Annie Lee Mosses in Washington alone. If any one of the three women named Annie Lee Moss who lived in Washington at that time was a Communist, research should certainly have determined which one it was: the hearsay evidence of a corroborating witness could have been produced by bringing in the witness to confront the suspect. Then, if this Annie Lee who had been called in (or whichever one) might have been the true suspect, McCarthy would have had a case. As it was done, this woman who did appear had been suspended from her job—and what person at her low-level income can afford to be out of work for even one day?—and the pattern of her life had been permanently damaged.349

Yet, Moss may not have been completely innocent. The FBI had a long and detailed file on her:

The Moss named by Markward had been a cafeteria employee, lived for a time with a Hattie Griffin, and received The Daily Worker—All this testified to by Markward on February 23. The Moss appearing before McCarthy, by her own account, had been a cafeteria worker, lived for a time with Hattie Griffin, and received The Daily Worker. As the authorities knew but the public didn’t, there was a long paper trail on Mrs. Moss and her security record with the federal government, first at the GAO and then with the Army. The trail would get even longer in August 1954—six months after Symington, Murrow and others depicted Moss as a victim of McCarthy’s slipshod methods—when the Army suspended her from duties. This action was based on a series of charges addressed to Moss that tracked closely with the intel provided by Scoop Jackson—but with one riveting addition: ‘you [Moss] are reported to have been given Communist Party membership book number 37269 for 1943.’350

The See It Now broadcast of March 16, 1954, was made by Murrow to “be out of her element, and out of her depth...the picture guileless African-American servility...described in the press as ‘a humble, poverty stricken Negress.’”351 Here, Murrow begins to editorialize, rather than, as he claimed ‘let the cameras and participants speak for themselves.’ Murrow’s voice intrudes as:

his sarcastic tones italicize the implausibility of so unintelligent a woman being a Soviet intelligence agent. ‘this woman, under suspicion because of charges made by Senator McCarthy and Roy Cohn, alleged to have examined and corrected secret and encoded overseas messages, attempted to read the uncoded words of her suspension notice.’352

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349 Potter. 108
350 Evans. Blacklisted. 535
351 Doherty. 181
352 Doherty. 182
The historian Arthur Herman suggests that, for Cohn and McCarthy, what happened next was best explained by how:

political opponents turned the missteps of these two to their own advantage. Once again, the press and the American public opinion came to believe that the real problem was not the Army, Annie Lee Moss, and communism, but McCarthyism. As in the Fred Fisher case, their misperception was reinforced by the television image, which presented itself as an ‘objective eye’ that cannot lie—but in fact misled Americans about the real Annie Lee Moss from that day to this.353

Cohn and McCarthy found themselves reeling. The Moss debacle—for debacle it was—had shown them as incompetent, impatient, selfish and vindictive. Murrow’s See It Now “A Report on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy” had a profound impact on the viewing public, and prompted a response by McCarthy himself. The Report itself, is a mixture of fact and fiction which “works by exploiting expectations of the news report against expectations of the rhetorical accusation and uses the trope of irony to lever itself from objectivity into argument.”354 In this way, Murrow went from “observer” to full critic and combatant.

For Cohn’s part in McCarthy’s fall, it was because how, once again he had erred in “acting out of the arrogance of McCarthy’s unrestricted power, ordered Schine’s commander to grant him privileged treatment. The uproar that followed led to the Army-McCarthy hearings.”355 For Cohn, who had once stated “Steven’s is through as Secretary of the Army—we will wreck the Army”356 as punishment for how Schine had not gotten preferential treatment, it must have come as a deep shock. As the Army-McCarthy hearings officially began on April 22, 1954, the nation seemed divided into those who still believed in the Senator from Wisconsin, and those who, like

353Herman, 337
355Stone, 1401
356Potter, 281
Murrow, Eisenhower and many of McCarthy’s fellow Senators, had grown weary of feeling they must watch their step.

Arthur Herman makes the case that “on television, McCarthy’s skill in probing and exposing hostile witnesses made him look like a bully. His sardonic sense of humor looked heavy-handed, his invocations of the Communist threat stilted and out of place.” For a man who had been made by media, it would be the great mass media of the age which finally exposed him. For these hearings, McCarthy gave his usual chairmanship to Senator Mundt, since McCarthy was one of the charged. In this case, he was accused, along with Roy Cohn, of inappropriate pressure on the Army to favor Schine. In return, McCarthy suggested that Fred Fisher, a young lawyer in the firm handling the prosecution of his case, ought to be looked at for Communist involvement. The stage was set for an explosive finale to the most divisive years of the immediate post-War era.

Instead of a case turning on Communists within the State Department, McCarthy had been led down the path of self-satisfaction by Roy Cohn, exposing him as weak, unreliable and less interested in the truth than in personal glory. The Army had not forgotten what McCarthy had done to General Marshal, and this was, in some ways, a comeuppance for McCarthy. The combination of Fisher, Cohn, McCarthy and Joseph N. Welch, lead counsel for the Army, was going to end the so-called McCarthy Era.

The crux of the matter is a backroom deal. This allowed Welch to proceed against McCarthy, and Cohn, who had, without telling McCarthy, arranged a deal where Cohn would not mention Fisher, who worked in Welch’s firm and had once belonged to the National Lawyers

357Herman. 258
Guild, a listed affiliate of the Communist Party, if Welch did not bring up Cohn’s delinquent draft status through both World War Two and Korea.\textsuperscript{358} Writing at the time of McCarthy’s downfall, James Rorty and Moshe Decter opin that:

McCarty has often show signs of a peculiar tendency to strike out wildly, unreasonably and unnecessarily, at real or imagined obstacles. Witness, for example, his gross insult to General Zwicker or his predictably unsuccessful diversionary attack on H. Struve Hensel, or his unexpected charges against a young Republican attorney, Frederick Fisher. These gratuitous attacks have cost him no little in public sympathy, and have made him unnecessary enemies. Such behavior is essentially visceral rather than rational, and thus it is not inconceivable that Senator McCarthy should unthinkingly destroy himself by a succession of such maneuvers.\textsuperscript{359}

Geoffrey Stone makes a salient point in terms of those who wish to revise history to excuse all the actions of Senator McCarthy:

To be sure, even the revisionists concede that McCarthy lied, bullied, abused, and humiliated innocent individuals. But what McCarthy contributed, they argue, was a fearless, stubborn, unyielding insistence on pursuing a profoundly important inquiry in the face of Democratic obstructionism. Confronted by a concerted liberal effort to sweep under the carpet the Democratic failure to protect our national security at a time of great peril, McCarthy was an essential lightening rod. Even if he was wrong in the details, the argument goes, he was right in the big things. This is wrong, and dangerously so. The goal or preserving the nation’s security from unlawful espionage, sabotage, and foreign influence is certainly legitimate—indeed, compelling—and there were well-justified concerns about these matters during the Cold War. But a democracy is about means as well as ends. As the Supreme Court has consistently recognized in protecting our fundamental rights, not only must the ends be compelling, but the means must be necessary. It disserves our history to say that Joseph McCarthy meant well but merely went about it the wrong way. McCarthy’s methods violated the most fundamental norms and the most essential values of the American Constitutional system. There is simply no defending, or mitigating that reality.\textsuperscript{360}

As McCarthy went through the Army hearings, it became obvious to all how sloppy his recent choices had been, and how harmful Roy Cohn’s vicious temper had been to McCarthy’s

\textsuperscript{358} Morgan, 496
\textsuperscript{360} Stone, 1405
cause. Cohn had even approached Robert Broeck Stevens, Secretary of the Army, in order to aid Schine. Because of this “the army charged it was pressured and threatened by McCarthy and Cohn...McCarthy countered that Stevens and his colleagues were protecting Communists and compromising Army security.”

As Stone concedes, in reference to the Venona Decrprts “certainly, at the height of the Cold War, a small, highly disciplined cohort of Communists, working in secret with Agents of the Soviet Union, sought to harm the United States...a group of 200-400 people.” McCarthy might have done well to have gone after these, whom the FBI certainly knew some of and whose unmasking betrayed Hoover’s trust in McCarthy. Instead, McCarthy misrepresented the materials available to him in order to contribute to the cause Alfred Kohlberg had radicalized him on, the Loss of China.

In the majority of cases, the State Department or Army was not only at the center of McCarthy’s investigations, but the policy in question had to do directly with the period of American involvement in China, or indirectly in policies McCarthy felt had adversely affected the outcome of Chiang-Kai-shek’s rule. So it was that McCarthy faced the hearings in April 1954. For Fred Fisher, the first target of McCarthy’s ire during the hearing meant to investigate McCarthy and Cohn’s meddling with private Schine, Welch had already vetted and dismissed him, having anticipated McCarthy’s response. “When he had been putting his staff together in preparation for the hearings, Welch had wanted to bring Fred Fisher, a young associate from his

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361 Glazer, Lewis and Tanenhaus. 25
362 the top secret name given by the United States government to an extensive program to break Soviet codes and read intercepted messages between Moscow and its intelligence stations in the West. The program was launched in February 1943 by the U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service, forerunner of the National Security Agency. The cables in question were dispatched between 1940 and 1948. While between 1947 and 1952, most of the intercepted messages susceptible to decoding were read, the effort to crack open as many cables as possible lasted until 1980. Romerstein, Herbert and Eric Breindel Venona Secrets. The: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors. (Regenery Publishing: Washington, DC. 2000) 3
363 Stone. 1404
law firm, to Washington with him. But Fisher informed him he had once been active in the National Lawyers Guild and the Army’s advisers decided to drop him from the team.\textsuperscript{364}

Ultimately, it was not that McCarthy went after a Communist, an ex-Communist or an innocent man. It was his public conduct which finally gave the government and the American people a view of what McCarthy was really all about.

This was a view they did not particularly care for. During examination of Cohn and McCarthy, McCarthy interrupted Welch:

In view of Mr. Welch’s request that information be given once we know of anyone who might be performing any work for the Communist party, I think we should tell him that he has in his law firm a young man who has been for a number of years a member of an organization named by various committees, named by the attorney general, as I recall, as ‘the legal bulwark of the Communist party. I have hesitated bringing that up but I have been rather bored with your phony requests to Mr. Cohn here that he personally get every Communists out of government before sundown. Therefore we will give you the information about the young man in your own organization.\textsuperscript{365}

The crowd was stunned. Roy Cohn would later write that he was “horrified when McCarthy spoke out.”\textsuperscript{366} Despite Cohn’s pleas not to bring up Fisher, lest Welch bring up Cohn’s own lack of a military record, McCarthy had persisted, and Welch obliged him with a blistering critique.

For once, it was not McCarthy’s accusations that seared itself into the public consciousness, but the victims reply. ‘Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your cruelty or your recklessness...So, Senator, I asked Fred to go back to Boston. Little did I dream you could be so reckless and cruel as to do an injury to that lad. I fear he shall always bear a scar needlessly inflicted by you. If it were in my power to forgive you for your reckless cruelty, I would do so. I like to think I am a gentle man but your forgiveness will have to come from someone other than me.’ McCarthy again began to attack Welch’s associate. Welch then apologized to Cohn and turned back to

\textsuperscript{364}Schrecker, \textit{Many}, 263
\textsuperscript{365}Feuerlech, 135
\textsuperscript{366}ibid
McCarthy. ‘Let us not assassinate this lad any further, Senator. You have done enough. Have you no sense of decency, sir? At long last? Have you left no sense of decency?’

Neither McCarthy nor Cohn returned from this scathing rebuke. By June, McCarthy’s poll numbers had gone from half the nation approving of him to just over a quarter. The rest of the summer would be equally troubling for both men. The Army-McCarthy hearings ended on June 17, 1954. Shortly after, Welch was invited to the White House, where:

Eisenhower congratulated him on a job well done. Welch replied, if nothing else, the hearings had kept McCarthy on television for thirty-six days, long enough for the people to observe him up close. The President agreed, of course. That had been his strategy all along.

Eisenhower, who had repeatedly refused to “get down in the gutter with that guy” as regards McCarthy, had instead given the Senator from Wisconsin a body blow—and completely within the limits of the law. Vermont’s Ralph Flanders, a Republican Senator, had put forth a proposal “to deprive McCarthy of his committee chairmanship…the day after the Fisher incident…but soon changed his strategy…to censure.” The content of Senate Measure 301, introduced July 30, 1954 was “Resolved, that the conduct of the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. McCarthy, is contrary to senatorial tradition and tends to bring the Senate in disrepute, and such conduct is hereby condemned.” McCarthy was nearly without support.

As the summer of 1954 ended, Arthur Watkins, Republican Senator from Utah, oversaw the proceedings based on Flander’s movement for McCarthy’s censure. The members of the committee “assumed that the Senate could punish prior conduct…and they were: encouragement of federal employees to break the law; receipt of classified documents from executive files;

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367Feuerlich, 136-137
368McCarthy’s Downfallhttp://www.mtholyoke.edu/~lldsie/McCarthyism/downfall.html
369Oshinsky, 471
370Schrecker, Many, 265
371Morgan, 500
abuse of Senate colleagues and abuse of General Zwicker.” The hearings began August 31, 1954. In late September, the first report of the Watkins committee was released and on November 8, 1954, the Senate began open debate on the report of Watkin’s findings.

On December 2, the resolution to censure Senator McCarthy was carried 67-22. The days of McCarthy ruling the Senate were over. The end of Joseph McCarthy as an effective politician is not the end of his story. The important point to keep in mind is, as David Oshinsky writes:

it was the Democratic victory in 1954, not censure, that stripped McCarthy of most of his power. He was no longer chairman of Government Operations, which meant he no longer controlled the staff, the budget, or the targets to be probed. His position was that of an anti-Eisenhower Republican in a Democratic Congress. He was now a minority voice within a minority party—and a discredited voice at that.  

Joseph McCarthy spent the rest of his term, shunned by his fellow Senators, and in gradually declining health. The press no longer covered what he said, and his arguments on the Senate floor were often given to half empty chairs. McCarthy found himself unable to rehabilitate his public image and salvage his career. From the heights of accusations against the State Department in 1950, to being the most feared Senator in the land and chair of his own committee in 1953, to being completely disgraced less than a year later, McCarthy had a meteoric rise and fall, swept along by social tides that, with the end of the Korean War and flagging interest in Asian matters, had rendered his special entry into Communist infiltration—the Loss of China-moot to those with power and the public at large. He died on May 2, 1957, at the age of forty-eight, at Bethesda, from what was officially labeled acute hepatitis, but which was whispered and generally acknowledged to be complications from years of over-indulging in various spirits.

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372 Oshinsky, 477
373 Oshinsky, 495
Chapter Five: End of an Era

The events and legacies of the McCarthy era are not limited to the four years in which McCarthy dominated the Senate, nor even to his lifetime. McCarthyism persisted beyond the days of hunting Communists, and has become a byword to mean many things. As Murrow said, McCarthy only exploited an existing climate of fear. Ted Morgan, in noting that it existed well before McCarthy himself, defined McCarthyism in the same terms as the dictionary, in that it was, or is “the political practice of publicizing accusations of disloyalty or subversion with insufficient regard to evidence...the use of dubious methods of investigation in order to suppress evidence.”

Senator Flanders, in starting his battle against McCarthy, had stated that

He is doing his best to shatter the party whose label he wears...what is his party affiliation? One must conclude that his is a one-man party and that its name is McCarthyism. He dons his war paint, he goes into his war dance. He emits his war whoops. He goes forth to battle and proudly returns with the scalp of a pink Army dentist.

This was how McCarthy was viewed by many, not only at the end but throughout his career in the Senate. Edward A. Shills writes that a “legislative body which abandons its responsibilities to the populace which has elected it diverges from the rule of law as much as does a legislature which renounces its constitutional powers to the executive.” In the Era of McCarthy, this delicate balance was hard to find, as, from fear or in hopes of boosting a career, many politicians on both sides of the aisle and in every branch of government, seemed to become spectators to McCarthy’s roughshod behavior.
McCarthy, while a bully, and in violation of both the rules of Senatorial conduct and etiquette, with methods that were more often than not absolutely deplorable, was later vindicated, in part, by the Venona Decrpypts, which "combined with the Comintern documents, reveal that there existed an active communist underground in the United States composed of members of the CPUSA, who aided the Soviet intelligence service in many capacities."\textsuperscript{377} McCarthy was not the only person working toward rooting out such activity and persons. McCarthy failed in many ways.

Chiefly, McCarthy, as proven during the Army hearings, could not get out of his own way, and often stabbed everyone in the back, seemingly without understanding how they could possibly take offense. Alcohol is only a partial explanation. A monumental ego, a need to be in the spotlight and a desire to be viewed in the forefront of the political game, get closer to explaining McCarthy.

McCarthyism, as understood here, was "born out of the dimly understood reality of America's postwar global role. The postwar equation consisted of two inimical great powers, one of which had a subversive group in the other's midst, masquerading as a political party."\textsuperscript{378} By the time of his censure, "the Senate abjured 'McCarthyism' only insofar as it impinged upon institutional properties...for McCarthy's outrages against individual rights and freedoms had been ignored."\textsuperscript{379} As Herbert Lehman, Democratic Senator from New York put it "we have condemned the individual but we have not yet repudiated the 'ism'."\textsuperscript{380} He was correct. That very summer, in August 1954, the Communist Control Act had passed the Senate, with only two

\textsuperscript{377} Redish, 74
\textsuperscript{378} Morgan, 514
\textsuperscript{379} Fried, 310
\textsuperscript{380} ibid
votes against it, an act which treated both party existence and membership as criminal institutions actions.

Joseph McCarthy is dead. A socio-political trend, existent prior to his arrival, but renewed and given broader attention, lives on in popular culture, as a buzzword, an insult and a category of behavior. McCarthyism persists because it speaks to something in the American character and in human nature. It is petty. It is cruel. It offers, seemingly, a safe harbor.

Benjamin Franklin stated in 1755 to the Pennsylvania Assembly, "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." It is true. When McCarthy came on the scene in 1950, he arrived at the height of fears over Soviet influence and Chinese conversion to Communism. This allowed the China Lobby to at least partially dictate which direction he pursued his investigations. What the China Lobby failed to understand was the tenuous nature of Chinese socio-political realities at the time.

Politically, withdrawal of American Military presence could accelerate the Sino-Soviet Clash that the experts expected and thus turn Mao into another Tito. Even recognition of Mao’s government was possible in such a situation. In January 1950, Aceheson articulated this policy and sketched a U.S. ‘defense perimeter’ in the Western Pacific that included neither Formosa nor Korea. Although essentially correct, such assessments ignored the antagonism the Communists had developed against the United States for aiding Chiang during the Chinese Civil War, as well as the American public’s continued emotional commitment to China. The old and emotional public commitment to ‘saving’ China led to a belief that this critical area had now been permanently ‘lost’ to the Soviets and that such a loss constituted a devastating defeat for the United States.381

McCarthy himself gets far too much attention for the era named after him. Not only were others more directly active in eradicating communism, but others abused the system just as much as he did. The House Un-American Activities Committee, not McCarthy, was responsible for the blacklist that affected Hollywood through the 1960s. McCarthy neither began nor contributed to

381 Stoler, 178
that, and had no interest in what movie folk were doing. His concern was political, and this is because his aims emerged from the China Lobby. President Truman, asked about McCarthy in the oral-history memoir *Plain Speaking*, said that

Oh yes, and I’ve told you that he was just a no-good son of a bitch. And he was a coward. You take a damn demagogue, and he’s always a coward. And what you have to do with a coward, you have to fight him, and I did. I cussed him out every chance I got. And of course, it wasn’t just McCarthy. A fella like that couldn’t have got anywhere if he’d been fought from the very beginning. They didn’t do it, though. A man like that—it’s like a sickness. It isn’t going to disappear if you just ignore it. If that was the case, we wouldn’t need doctors, would we? And the others, the people who know a man like that is up to no good but who encourage him for strictly partisan reasons. People like Taft...he knew that what McCarthy was saying wasn’t true, that he was demagoguing the issue for all it was worth and he knew that was a dangerous thing to do because while I never did agree with him on much of anything at all, I think he understood the history of this country. But he said, you know, that if McCarthy didn’t have the facts in one case, he should keep on making accusations until he got to one where he could come up with the facts. Now that’s where the real danger comes from; it isn’t only the demagogues, it’s the ones who encourage them, who’ll do anything in the world to win an election. They’re just as bad.382

Truman’s response to McCarthy was not uncommon. Many did wish for him to go away and his actions caused frustration, even among his supporters. Truman thought of Eisenhower’s approach to McCarthy in stark terms, calling him “A coward...he hasn’t got any backbone at all, and I think he ought to be ashamed for what he did, but I don’t think there’s any shame in him at all.”383 What this demonstrates was how out of touch Truman was with the power McCarthy ever so briefly wielded.

The McCarthy Era was not as simple as a schoolyard fight with the local bully. It was far more complex, consisting of international and domestic tensions reaching back to the First World War. McCarthy’s tactics were incorrect. While some of his targets were correct, the treatment

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383 Miller, 130
they received should not be dismissed. Nor, however, should it be put entirely at McCarthy’s feet as the founder of a movement. The movement simply adopted his name. It might be more appropriate to call it the State Department Failure Investigations Era, but the press likes less wordy terminology.

World War Two was a tremendous fight; one which while “popular” still had major dissenting factions. The post-war handling of the Asian world, the so-called “Loss of China” is impossible to separate from McCarthy, as it is the one thread which came up repeatedly in all his investigations. Each major target at the State Department or the Army, had ties to China, the Pacific Theater of the Second World War, or to other actions in Asia, in the 1920s and 1930s. When those targets, such as Peress, failed to pass the test of Chinese/Asian links, McCarthy had lost his thesis. McCarthy himself may have lost, but the trend of anti-Communism continues to the present, though far less vehemently.

Noted McCarthy critic Richard M. Fried wrote that “McCarthy was the symbol and exemplar of McCarthyism, but not its single cause, and liberal opponents of the ‘ism’ often did themselves a disservice in allowing themselves to be transfixed by the man.”384 Fried also makes note of how, today, the battle has shifted to the push and pull between liberal and conservative, and “Liberalism has in some circles become the dreaded ‘L-word’...but while this may amount to a disturbing absence of comity in American politics, it does not represent a new McCarthy era.”385 In these ways, the wound of McCarthy and the true legacy of the era carries on, because the terms have come to have social meaning, grown over time and inflamed by passions and frustrations little understood historically by many of those who now use them.

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384 Fried, Men, 313
385 Fried, Nightmare, 201
Even at the time, there was a lack of clear understanding or, perhaps, an intended-or not-obfuscation of facts. The example of Arthur Miller’s play *The Crucible* is notable because of what it suggested and because of Miller’s own background. As Arthur Herman wrote:

With McCarthy gone, anti-Stalinist liberals found themselves at war again with the old Popular Front mentality, which the cold war had driven from the scene. A host of intellectuals and writers and ex-fellow travelers chafed under the restrictions about appearing pro-Soviet or too anti-American. Arthur Miller’s play *The Crucible*, which appeared to great critical acclaim in 1953, had epitomized their moral self-righteousness as well as their sense of injury. It equated the naming of former Stalinists to congressional committees with the trial and hanging of accused witches in Puritan Salem (although the fact that Miller could bring out such a play at the supposed height of the McCarthyite ‘terror’ seemed to undermine that claim.) Alarmed by this, Richard Rovere took time off from his forthcoming biography of McCarthy to write a penetrating critique of Miller’s work for the *New Republic*, entitled ‘Arthur Miller’s Conscience.’ He noted how ‘naming names’ had become the cardinal sin when discussing Communist associations, both past and present, rather than those associations themselves. ‘One could almost say that Miller’s sense of himself is the principle that holds ‘informing’ to be the ultimate in human wickedness’—as opposed, to, say, working for or supporting a political cause such as Hitler’s or Stalin’s (as Miller, a former Communist, had once done) As a liberal, Rovere believed in a ‘free play to the individual’s moral judgments’ and affirmed that ‘in recent years, Congressional committees have posed the single largest threat to this freedom.’ But as an anti-Communist, Rovere recognized that ‘not all informing is bad...the question of guilt is relevant...Those who would commit real crimes—a hit and run driver, or a spy or a thief’ need to be informed against, if the social order is to be preserved.386

The danger here is that the message and the messenger have become intertwined, and the guilt and bad behavior of one stained the other to the point of complete discredit. One legacy of the McCarthy era has been silence. Such were the tragedies of the period that the response has been incredibly disproportionate. The McCarthy era is over, yet its tremors reverberate to the present. American politics have always been like this, and are unlikely to change. Perhaps it should be McCarthy’s frequent target, Dean Acheson, who gets one of the last words. In a letter to Truman in 1953, Acheson “lamented how McCarthy’s ‘bastardization’ of American politics

386 Herman, 311-312
would actually weaken the fight against the ‘monolithic’ communists."387 It is then fitting to say that McCarthy was both his own best friend and his own worst enemy, and that he created and destroyed himself within a framework of fear and panic that had a limited shelf life in the postwar era.

McCarthy’s popularity gave him a legacy for which he never asked. It gave an era its name, one which could just as easily be called the Second Red Scare. More simply, it should be seen as what it was, a stage in the Cold War that began after the end of the Second World War, and was fought on misguided grounds by those who truly believed they were doing right. It should not, in either McCarthy or the China Lobby’s case, be viewed as heroic for their conduct. Instead, history must judge them on their actions and their results and those have proven a mixed bag of half-truths and outright fabrications with no small measure of hysteria.

Yet, there was a threat, and McCarthy was one of those who did battle with what he believed were his countries’ enemies. None can say what might have happened if McCarthy had instead gone after ensuring old age pensions, instead of fighting Communism, or if he had taken a more tactful approach in rooting out those within the State Department who were Communist influenced against the best interests of the United States. The China Lobby chose poorly in selecting Joseph McCarthy as its front man in Washington.

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