

**A Uyghur-Blind Society?
An Analysis of Racial Priming Theory in the
Chinese Ethnic Context**

A THESIS

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Abstract

The current U.S. literature has a relatively well-developed racial priming theory, asserting that certain racial appeals, especially implicit ones, can bring people's latent biased attitudes to influence their policy preferences. Because similar majority-minority dynamics exist in China among ethnic groups, I tested this theory in China on people's attitudes towards Uyghurs and ethnic minority related issues. I hypothesize that priming exists in China's ethnic context, explicit appeals are not consistently rejected, and depending on whether the "norm of equality" is established in China, appeals will induce very different priming effects. I conducted a survey experiment in Zhejiang province, China and collected over 400 responses from non-Uyghur Chinese with various backgrounds. Ultimately, I found that ethnic priming does exist in China. Explicit appeals are not consistently rejected, and they are actually more effective than implicit appeals. This is different from the U.S. theory and suggests that the Chinese have not adopted the norm of equality. Overall, my research expands the discussion of priming to another society and another identity. It also contributes to the understanding of ethnic relations and public opinion in the contemporary Chinese society.

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Glossary

AR	Autonomous Region
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
GLF	Great Leap Forward
GMD	Guomindang (also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party, Kuomintang, KMT)
NCEE	National College Entrance Examination (also known as Gaokao)
NPC	National People's Congress
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
XUAR	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Introduction

He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious.

-- Sun Tzu, The Art of War

三军之众，可使必受敌而无败者，奇正是也。——孙子兵法 兵势篇

In December 2012, “Xinjiang nut cake” (qiegao 切糕), a street snack usually sold by Uyghur vendors riding a tricycle, suddenly became the buzz word on the Chinese Internet. The official Weibo account of Yueyang, Hunan province’ local police posted (Weibo is China’s equivalent of Twitter):

“Villager Ling went into a fight with Uyghurs due to communication misunderstandings when buying a piece of Xinjiang nut cake. Verbal dispute escalated into a fight and then a mass fight. As a result, two people were injured; and Xinjiang nut cakes of a total worth of about RMB 160,000 (\$ 24,700) were destroyed. Total damage was about RMB 200,000 (\$30,900), including fees for broken motorcycle and injured people. Currently, local police at Pingjiang already detained Ling. The 16 Uyghur sellers were properly compensated and sent back to Xinjiang.”

This post went viral; soon everybody on Weibo was talking about and making fun of it. Netizens calculated and concluded that the per square meter price of nut cake is even higher than Beijing’s per square meter housing price; they joked that President Obama has decided to use several tons of nut cakes to pay the U.S. debt China owns; they even posted pictures of an engagement ring with a piece of nut cake in the middle instead of a diamond. However, under the surface of netizens’ sarcasm were their disgruntlement over the unfair business Uyghur vendors engage in and their anger about the fact that the Uyghur sellers got off easy – police’ fear of ethnic clashes resulted in the ridiculously high amount of compensation to the wrong party. Some, but fewer,

explicitly expressed their disgust for the “cheating Uyghurs”. Certainly more people learned that they better stay away from Uyghur cake vendors to avoid the forced purchases and the potential physical danger. In a sense, this one piece of Xinjiang nut cake embodied many pieces of ethnic circumstances in the Chinese society – the government’s approach to dealing with ethnic minorities and conflicts, the attitudes people have towards minorities (Uyghurs specifically), and the behavior of citizens based on their attitudes.

In heterogeneous societies, stories about majority’s perception of minorities are commonplace. All the way across the Pacific Ocean, in what we like to call a “colorblind society”, Donald Trump has attracted many voters during the Republican presidential primaries because he scoffs at political correctness, invoking minority stereotypes explicitly. He is an outlier when compared to other political figures but that does not mean the rest of the U.S. political elites have not used a majority’s perception of a minority, for example, white American’s attitudes towards African Americans, to achieve political goals. They have taken advantage of a situation wherein white Americans have grown more accepting of racial equality over time but nevertheless continue to harbor negative attitudes towards racial minorities. In order to exploit this ambivalence, politicians have employed indirect appeals in order to obtain their ideal political outcome in campaigns and elections. The most famous case is the William “Willie” Horton ad during the 1988 presidential contest. A political organization linked to the George H. W. Bush campaign created the Horton ad, attacking Michael Dukakis as “soft on crime”. While Dukakis was the Massachusetts governor, Horton, a black man convicted of murder was granted a weekend furlough. During this state approved leave, Horton assaulted a white couple. The advertisement shows Horton’s pictures, but the narrator never mentioned nouns such as “black”, or “race”, exemplifying the strategy of employing implicit racial

messages (Mendelberg 2001). Bush's support skyrocketed after the airing of the Horton ad, and he subsequently won the presidency.

This example demonstrates the potentially profound implications of this kind of political maneuver in a democratic society, where public opinion translates into election results and ultimately policies. Therefore, many scholars have studied the impact of racialized campaign messages. Tali Mendelberg is more closely associated with developing a theory of racial priming which argues that "implicit" (i.e., visual but not verbal) racial cues rather than "explicit" (i.e., visual plus verbal) ones are more effective in activating white Americans' latent negative stereotypes about racial minorities. According to Mendelberg, implicit racial appeals are more effective because white Americans are more inclined to resist explicit messages violating the norm of equality. My honor's thesis takes on the following question: Does this theory work outside of the discussion of race, and outside of the U.S., in other places where majority-minority dynamics exist? In China's case, is the majority group – Han Chinese – receptive to negative appeals about ethnic minorities? Do implicit and explicit messages really differ in effectiveness in a different societal and cultural context?

In this study, I seek to answer these questions, exploring priming theory's applicability to China's ethnic context, specifically on Hans' perception of Uyghurs. Using an original survey experiment, I examine whether and how Han Chinese' political preferences and views change after reading news articles that contain ethnic appeals. In particular, I examine whether negative attitudes about the Uyghurs can be activated by exposure to various kinds of political communication. This project will not only offer new perspectives on public opinion in China but also on the theoretical framework of racial priming in the U.S.

The analysis proceeds as follows. The initial chapter explores the scope of existing U.S. racial priming literature, including Mendelberg's pioneering implicit-explicit model of racial priming and scholars' debate on various nuances of the model. Chapter 2 provides background information on China and its ethnic related issues as well as a limited review of historical, ethnographical, and other empirical researches on the topic of ethnic relations. In chapter 3, I present my hypotheses on whether and how ethnic priming works in China. I also describe the methodology of the study, especially the design of the survey experiment. In chapter 4, we delve into the data of the experiment and the most intuitive results about framing effects. Chapter 5 offers data and results on priming effects. I further investigate the effectiveness of implicit appeals versus explicit appeals as well as terrorism messages versus local crime messages. Chapter 6 is a general discussion of all the findings – whether they support the hypotheses proposed, and what are some limitations of the study. Finally, in chapter 7, I conclude the thesis with a discussion of why this research is important, its broader implications, and the next steps for ethnic priming research in China.

Chapter One

The Theory of Racial Priming in the U.S.

This chapter will present Mendelberg's theory of racial priming, and scholars' debate on her implicit-explicit model. Researchers raise questions about whether explicit appeals really do not work, whether specific racial contents result in different priming effects, and whether certain groups are more susceptible to racial priming than others. They also examined educational attainment and gender as two potential moderators of racial priming.

The Theory of Racial Priming

In *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages and the Norm of Equality* (2001) Tali Mendelberg developed the theory of racial priming, a theoretical approach to understanding the impact of racialized campaign messages. Her argument has four components. First, contemporary white Americans are ambivalent in regards to racial issues. On the one hand, whites genuinely endorse the norm of racial equality, recognizing that it is no longer acceptable to be a racist. On the other hand, they simultaneously harbor resentment towards blacks or negative stereotypes about blacks. They perceive blacks as failing to act in accordance with the American creed of individualism and hard work, and their demands for racial justice as illegitimate. Second, modern-day racial appeals are effective because they are ambiguous. These appeals are implicit and thus could reasonably be about something other than race. Third, Mendelberg argues that implicit racial appeals are effective because they make people's latent racial attitudes more accessible in memory. Implicit appeals can call one's racial views into mind and lead individuals to automatically apply them in their subsequent political decision making

processes. Lastly, the appeals are effective only when the audience is not aware of the racial content. Whites reject explicit racial appeals (i.e. direct verbal references to race) because they clearly recognize that such appeals violate the norm of racial equality. Therefore, Mendelberg maintains that persuasive racial appeals must be implicit, only making oblique references to race. These appeals are typically conveyed through the use of visual images only, circumventing any specific mentioning of race.

In order to assess the theorization, Mendelberg investigates the notorious case of the “Willie” Horton ad, described in the introduction. An examination of the survey data from the 1988 American National Election Study (ANES) renders results consistent with her argument. She finds that the association between whites’ negative racial predispositions and candidate evaluation was the strongest when the ad exposure level was high but the racial message remained implicit. However, after Jesse Jackson’s criticism of the racial nature of the ad, in effect after the implicit ad was charged with being explicit, this association waned.

In addition to examining survey data, Mendelberg conducted experiments investigating the effect of implicit and explicit appeals. By exposing participants to crafted messages with subtle differences, Mendelberg finds that an implicit racial message could place a person who resents blacks and a person sympathetic to blacks at complete opposites on the issue of government intervention in racial matters. However, if the message is not implicitly racial, the power of racial predispositions decreases by nearly 50 percent. In another experiment, Mendelberg discovers evidence that further supports her theory by introducing one extra manipulation – informing the participants whether their views are among the mainstream or violating the norm. The results show that the different effects of explicit and implicit appeals are caused by individuals’ concern for violating egalitarian norms.

Nicholas Valentino, Vincent Hutchings, and Ismail White (2002) extend Mendelberg's theory by investigating the variation in effectiveness of different kinds of implicit appeals and by examining the psychological mechanism underlying racial priming. They created three versions campaign advertisements with the same narration focusing on lower taxes and better health care. None of the treatment conditions include explicit appeals. The "neutral visual" condition did not contain visual race cues. The "undeserving blacks" ad showed African American images when the narrator talks about "spend tax dollar on wasteful government programs" and "an unfair system that only provides health care for some." In the "race comparison" condition, additional images of white were shown when more positive comments, such as "hard-working American", were made. The authors expected the neutral and group comparison ads to result in moderate priming effect. At the same time, they hypothesized that the undeserving blacks ad would lead to the largest priming effect because "the racial message was made salient but was not so blunt as to dampen the effect" (Hutchings and Jardina 2009, 4). The results match their expectations overall, although the different conditions do not provide significantly different outcomes. The authors also demonstrate that implicit racial appeals work because they make racial consideration more accessible in memory.

Skepticism towards the Implicit-Explicit Model

Although the majority of the literature acknowledges that racial priming exists, the debate on the distinction between the effectiveness of the two types of racial priming (i.e. implicit and explicit) continues.

Gregory Huber and John Lapinski have shown the most prominent skepticism towards the implicit-explicit model of racial priming. With a sample of over 6,300 people in a

Knowledge Networks WebTV survey panel, Huber and Lapinski (2006) confirm Mendelberg's claim that individuals reject explicit appeals. However, in contrast with Mendelberg's finding, their research renders the result that implicit messages are no more effective than explicit messages in priming racial resentment in opinion formation. They suggest that priming occurs only among exclusive subsets of the population, and the difference between the two kinds of appeals is insignificant. Their study was criticized in regard to methodology. Mendelberg (2008) contends that because the authors asked respondents pointed questions related to race, measuring racial predispositions, immediately prior to them receiving the experimental treatment, the subjects were "pre-primed". This could explain the insignificant results because effects may have been counteracted by pre-priming. Another criticism raised by Mendelberg (2008) was the reliability of Knowledge Networks WebTV platform. It was known to have issues downloading videos but Huber and Lapinski did not include any question to check whether the participants actually received the treatment in their post-test questionnaire.

Other researchers have questioned the ineffectiveness of explicit messages. Hutchings and Valentino (2003) find that explicit messages may work when certain frames are used. Their research shows that messages about policy conflicts between racial groups can be explicit yet still lead to priming. However, messages conveying racial stereotypes are more likely to work implicitly. Mendelberg (2008) concedes this point but argues that this is still consistent with her theory given that people are more likely to reject messages when they could easily recognize them as racist. People are less likely to reject messages, even though explicit, that appear to be "legitimate policy disagreements with black leaders or activists" (Mendelberg, 2008, 118).

In addition, Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin (2010) argue that explicit racial appeals have not completely disappeared in contemporary politics and are not necessarily rejected by

individuals. They tested the effectiveness of explicit appeals in Georgia, focusing on the gender differences in support for confederate symbols and partisanship. Their results indicate that after being exposed to explicit racial appeals, the support for the Confederate flag does not decline among men. Similarly, white men have lower levels of Democratic identification after receiving explicit appeals. When the racial appeal explains how Confederate symbols are oppressive, they embrace the Republican Party even more. These findings bring Mendelberg's idea that white Americans adherence to the norm of racial equality into question. In the South, the most racially conservative region in the United States, egalitarian norms may not have been adopted evenly across and explicit racial appeals are not necessarily counterproductive. Additionally, the authors point out the confusion of notions between explicit racial appeals and openly racist appeals. They contend that explicit appeals can be created without obvious violation of the norm of equality. For example, the message can "highlight racial differences on salient public policy disputes" (Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010, 11). Similarly, Hutchings and Valentino (2003) argue that explicit appeals can be effective if they are stereotype neutral. Explicit messages can successfully prime individuals if they highlight candidate distinctiveness (Hutchings and Valentino 2003).

Moderators of Racial Priming

The literature on racial priming most notably mentions two potential moderators of priming – education and gender. In questioning the reliability of the implicit-explicit priming model, researchers have reported differential susceptibilities to priming of specific subgroups of the population. Note that when we say a variable act as a moderator of racial priming, it is not about certain groups having more tolerant or intolerant racial attitudes in the first place. It is

about whether those particular groups give more or less weight to racial inclusiveness when fashioning their preferences (Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010, 11). In other words, it is about whether certain groups' (negative) latent attitudes are more easily applied to their policy preferences after being exposed to the treatment.

Huber and Lapinski (2006, 2008) provide evidence for education acting as a moderator for racial priming. They argue that citizens with high levels of political sophistication (i.e. higher levels of educational attainment) are more likely to engage in "self-prime". However, in the absence of racial cues, the less sophisticated individuals (i.e. the less educated) are unlikely to bring their latent attitudes to bear. Therefore, they hypothesize that priming effects will be larger for the less educated individuals. At the same time, the less sophisticated do not reject explicit appeals as illegitimate, which means that the effects of implicit and explicit appeals on their opinions should not be that different. Consistent with their hypotheses, they find that in the control group, the racial predispositions of the more educated respondents are a more powerful predictor of their opinions compared to the less educated. Furthermore, for the less sophisticated respondent, implicit racial appeals increased the effect of racial predispositions on opinions significant for three of the four policy areas included in their survey (Huber and Lapinski 2008). The authors also argue their point from the mechanism point of view. They claim that to reject explicit racial appeals for violation of the norm of racial equality, individuals need to have an attachment to the egalitarian norm, recognize the violation of the norm, and be able to reject the message if the norm is violated. All three of these processes are harder for the less educated respondent. On the contrary, Christopher Federico (2004) finds a "paradox of education" – education actually strengthens the relationship between perception of people on welfare and

global welfare attitudes, but only when welfare recipients are black. Although the research does not focus on racial priming, the contradictory expectations are worth noting.

Nicole Yadon (2012) finds that education appears to play a role in moderating priming, although the results are mixed and sometimes run counter to Federico or Huber and Lapinski's expectations. However, various other studies have not found a similar education effect (Mendelberg 1997; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). In addition, most of the literature has found that in general, explicit messages are rejected regardless of respondents' level of educational attainment (Mendelberg 2001; Slocum 2001; White 2007). Thus, whether the mechanism is in fact as difficult for the less sophisticated as Huber and Lapinski claim is unclear. It could also be the case that the three processes identified by the authors are inaccurate altogether.

Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin (2010) address gender as a potential moderator for racial priming. They find that after being exposed to an explicit treatment, the support for Confederate symbols declines, but only among women. In addition, explicit appeals result in a lower level of Democratic identification among men, but the effects are weaker and less consistent among women. They argue that on average, white women have internalized the norm of racial equality more completely than white men. Thus, women prioritize tolerance more than men do, and are less receptive to explicit racial appeals. Yadon (2012) also supports the idea that gender may be a moderating factor. In three separate scenarios (i.e. support for health care, influence of the working class, and views of government services) only one gender group is primed (but in each of these cases, the primed group actually took a more liberal stance).

Although scholars disagree on the nuances of racial priming effects, the majority of the literature acknowledges that explicit racial appeals are mostly ineffective whereas implicit appeals are effective. However, the entire debate takes place within the American political context. No research, to my knowledge, has examined the applicability of Mendelberg's theory outside of the United States. Therefore, my research adds to the literature in investigating the same set of issues in a different country – China. The next chapter will provide some background information on China and its ethnic relation issues.

Chapter Two

Uyghurs and Ethnic Relations in China

This chapter focuses on China and its ethnic-related issues. It provides background information about the ethnic composition and relations in China, preferential policies made by the Chinese government to promote equality, and the anti-Uyghur attitudes and various forms of discrimination. The studies incorporated in this review are mostly historical, ethnographical, or qualitative. Note that due to the lack of quantitative research conducted in China on the topic of ethnic relations (which is most closely related to my approach), the review offered in this chapter is very limited.

History of Xinjiang and Uyghurs

The Qing dynasty conquered the Xinjiang region in the late 1750s but lost control over it after the 1864 uprisings among Hui (Chinese Muslims) and Uyghurs (Turkic Muslims), which had been sparked by the imperial state's decline following the Opium War. The Qing later reconquered it in the late 1870s and established Xinjiang as a province in 1884. After the reconquest, the Qing adopted a "more assimilative and Sinicizing approach" (Millward 2007, 148), making Xinjiang's top political and military authority predominantly Han for the first time. In the Xinjiang War of 1937, Manchu warlord Sheng Shicai seized control of the province and adopted ethnic policies different from his predecessors. He recognized Uyghur as an ethnic category. "Uyghur" entered official and common use to apply to the Turki-speaking, non-nomad population of southern Xinjiang. He also employed prominent non-Chinese individuals in his government (Millward 2007). Sheng later switched camp to Guomindang (GMD). In 1942, the

Nationalist Government announced a campaign to develop and populate north-western China, actively promoting Han colonization of Xinjiang, ignoring the ethnic and nationalistic sentiment of Xinjiang's non-Chinese people. Despite the Three District Revolution and the establishment of Second East Turkistan Republic in 1944, the GMD did not lose control of the region until People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Xinjiang in 1949. After the peaceful transition, Xinjiang's top leadership of the autonomous region in the three districts was invited by Mao Zedong to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), but died in a mysterious plane crash. The newly appointed delegation agreed to abandon all calls for autonomy.

The subsequent rule of People's Republic of China (PRC) Uyghurs experienced was full of ups and downs. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) created new local administrative and party organs, started to recruit non-Han party members and officials, and introduced "autonomy". Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was established in 1955. It endeavored both to distance the CCP from the assimilation of the GMD and to avoid encouraging separatism in key frontier areas (Millward 2007, 243). However, the CCP made it clear that "no one should mistake 'autonomy' for independence" (Zhu 2000, 335). Afterwards, Maoism and the subsequent disasters such as the Great Leap Forward (GLF), and the Cultural Revolution pushed the PRC's policies in Xinjiang to be more assimilation-oriented. There was an upsurge in Han migration during the GLF, which led to great disaffection in Xinjiang. During the Cultural Revolution, a small percentage of Xinjiang's Turkic people organized insurrections and movements for East Turkestan independence. The life of the rest of the people was significantly negatively impacted due to the cultural agenda of the Cultural Revolution which was aimed

squarely at “minority customs”. Ritual celebrations were forbidden; Uyghur musical instruments were condemned as “feudal”; not to mention private trading in the bazaars (Millward 2007).

After Mao’s death in 1978, Deng Xiaoping directed the official minority policies away from Han chauvinism and returned to the non-assimilationist stance of the early 1950s. Religious restrictions were loosened; many non-Han cadres who had been purged were rehabilitated; the “local autonomy” model was restored and strengthened with increasing number of non-Hans in government organs. The 1980s did see the emergence of Uyghur expressions of grievance through publications and demonstrations in Xinjiang. However, up to this point, the resistance mainly came from the pro-Soviets and the secularists. Although Islam was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution as “feudal superstition”, religious belief did not itself constitute as the reason for political purges (Millward 2007).

In the 1990s and the 2000s, one could see an increase in English sources that depict Uyghur unrest and separatism partly due to foreign journalists’ increased access to information. Although there were sporadic episodes such as the Baren incident of 1990, the demonstration in 1995 on demanding arrested imam’s whereabouts, the 1997 protest on government’s ban on m äshr äp (a type of popular social club), the terrorist attacks in Urumqi (the capital city of XUAR) in 1997, the crackdowns made the next decade calm. Since the 2009 Shaoguan incident where Uyghur and Han workers at a factory in Guangdong had a violent dispute caused by allegations of sexual assault on Han women by Uyghur co-workers, we see a series of ethnic conflicts and terrorist attacks: the 2009 Urumqi riot, the 2010 Aksu bombing, the 2011 Hotan attack, the 2013 Bachu clashes and Shanshan riots, the 2014 Kunming Railway Station attack etc. Most of these incidents happened in XUAR.

Ethnic Composition and Regional Autonomy

China is ethnically dominated by a single group – the Han, constituting 91.6 percent of the population. The remaining 8.4 percent are the 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities (over 110 million). The Uyghurs, the fourth largest ethnic minority group (10.1 million people), is almost half of China’s ethnic Muslim population (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2011). Although the Uyghur population is not large in terms of percentage, its distinctive appearance, dress, diet, religion, and its concentration in the west border region have made its members one of the most visible and restive ethnic minorities (Distelhorst and Hou 2014; Kaltman 2007).

Since its founding in 1949, PRC has pursued a modified Leninist approach to ethnic minority incorporation (Distelhorst and Hou 2014). The pillar of China’s current ethnic policies is regional autonomy for ethnic minorities (minzu quyu zizhi 民族区域自治) (Shan and Chen 2011). An autonomous region (AR, zizhi qu 自治区) is an entity that has a high percentage of population that belongs to a particular minority ethnic group. AR is a first-level administrative subdivision (same as province) but with limited administrative, political, and legal autonomy (Sautman 2010) (see Appendix 1 for a map of China including provinces and ARs). There is a modification power that allows autonomous regions to make laws or regulations that diverge from the central government with higher level permission. This type of entity where ethnic minorities are concentrated exists for smaller administrative units as well (prefecture, county, and township). Generations of CCP leadership have emphasized the importance of ethnic regional autonomy, declared it as one of the “fundamental political institutions” and among the “three insists” (sange jianchi 三个坚持), and promised government’s strict adherence. Yet some criticize such “autonomy” as a sham because the number one power holder, the Party Secretary, is usually still a Han Chinese. Currently, all five of the AR Party Secretaries are Han.

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China's largest administrative division, is located in the northwest, bordering Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The ethnic composition of Xinjiang is approximately 40 percent Han, 46 percent Uyghur, and the rest are other ethnic minorities. However, in the capital city of Urumqi, Han Chinese citizens are the majority. In areas like Xinjiang, where the government perceives a significant separatist threat, autonomy is the most underdeveloped. For example, Xinjiang's prefecture level and county level party secretaries are all Han and none of Xinjiang's twelve autonomous areas has yet promulgated its own autonomy regulation (zizhi tiaoli 自治条例) (Sautman 2010).

Preferential Policies and Promotion of Equality

The Chinese government has its own version of Affirmative Action to help ethnic minorities, usually being referred to as “preferential policies” (youhui zhengce 优惠政策). They cover a wide range of issues, including education, family planning, poverty, criminal justice, etc.

One of the most discussed preferential policies towards ethnic minorities in Chinese society today is about education. Because the educational attainment of ethnic minorities still remains behind the Han majority, universities are supposed to “relax” their admission standards to an appropriate extent for ethnic minority students. Participation of ethnic minorities in higher education has been promoted in three ways – awarding bonus points to minority applicants in the National College Entrance Examination (NCEE, Gaokao 高考) (keep in mind that the NCEE score is the sole determiner of which university a student is admitted to), offering special preparatory classes to ethnic minority students enrolled in the university with scores lower than the minimum before they are integrated into the regular student body, and establishing

nationality institutes that mostly admit ethnic minority students (Clothey 2005; Gladney 1998; Min 1997; Wang 2007). Even with all these efforts, minorities are still not well represented in higher education, especially in top-tier universities.

Other social policies that aim at assisting ethnic minorities include accommodations in family planning and criminal justice (He 2005; Gladney 2004; Sautman 1998; Sautman 2010). The PRC has accorded more liberal treatment to minorities in regard to marriage and childbirth. In general, ethnic minorities have the right to marry younger than the minimum age requirement for Han citizens. The government also makes exceptions so that minority family can have multiple children. Today, the PRC Population and Family Planning Law states that family planning should be introduced to the ethnic people but leaves the making of local family planning regulations to local people's congress or its standing committee. Currently, according to the XUAR Population and Family Planning Regulation, minority families are permitted to have up to four children.

In the criminal justice realm, the CCP introduced the criminal policy referred to as “two restraints and one leniency (liang shao yi kuan 两少一宽)” in 1984. The policy states that there should be fewer arrests, fewer executions, and greater leniency in treatment when dealing with ethnic minority criminals. The policy has discouraged local police from taking immediate action when they encounter minority suspects, thus fostering rampant crimes committed by certain ethnic groups and angering the Han Chinese (Shan and Chen 2009). In legal and civil disputes, authorities throughout the nation tend to side with ethnic minorities for the sake of preserving ethnic unity, even to the dissatisfaction of the Han (Lai 2010). In July 2010, CCP's Central Propaganda Department, Central United Front Department, and the State Ethnic Affairs Commission published an opinion (yijian 意见) that expressed government's intention to abolish

“two restraints and one leniency”. Note that the leniency here contrasts with the over-incarceration of minorities elsewhere in the world (Sautman 2010)

From the economic development and employment perspective, the CCP has policies that help both localities and individuals. The 2005 State Council White Paper *Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China* lists many practices of the central government with the purpose of supporting and assisting ethnic autonomous areas, including giving prominence to speeding up the development (e.g. grand strategy for the development of western China in 2000), giving priority to infrastructure projects, providing financial support, and assisting enterprises in managing foreign trade. Specific efforts that impact minority individuals include launching large-scale poverty alleviation drive, increasing input into social services in ethnic autonomous areas (e.g. medical care and access to radio and TV broadcasts), and even establishing a brick-tea reserve system due to its importance in the everyday life of ethnic minorities. Scholars have also noticed preference policies towards ethnic minorities in state bank loans to help start businesses (Sautman 1998), state programs that sponsor Uyghurs for work outside of Xinjiang (Ma 2007), preference for minorities in career advancement in the CCP (Sautman 1998; Shih, Adolph and Liu 2012) and state sector hiring (Zang 2011).

Besides the substantive policies, the Chinese government has taken a firm stance on promoting ethnic equality, at least on the surface level. The Constitution of PRC states in the preamble that:

“The People’s Republic of China is a unitary multi-national State created jointly by the people of all its nationalities...In the struggle to safeguard the unity of the nationalities, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han

chauvinism, and to combat local national chauvinism. The State will do its utmost to promote the common prosperity of all the nationalities.”

Note that “nationalities” is used here in the same sense as “ethnic groups” is used in this paper. “All nationalities” include the Han and the 55 officially recognized ethnic minority groups.

Article 4 of the Constitution also stresses equality and the elimination of discrimination:

“All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any act which undermines the unity of the nationalities or instigates division is prohibited.”

In addition, the Constitution devotes an entire section to “The Organs of Self-Government of National Autonomous Areas” – the regional autonomy described in the previous section of this chapter. It establishes the principle of having minority quotas in representative bodies – National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Central Committee. Other bodies such as CPPCC, CCP Party Congress, All-China Federation of Women also have minority quotas. This requirement trickles down to lower level bodies as well. The principle of “equality and unity of ethnic groups” is heavily emphasized in textbooks of all levels of education. Reiteration of the policy appears frequently in the media as well.

Anti-Uyghur/Minority Attitudes and Discrimination

Despite government’s seemingly genuine efforts to promote equality among ethnic groups, it is hard to say whether the Chinese people have adopted “the norm of equality”. This is

because anti-minority attitudes are still openly expressed and social discrimination against minority groups is still pronounced in the Chinese society.

Scholars disagree on the level of ethnic tensions between the Han and ethnic minorities. Sautman (1998, 2010) contends that the various preferential policies since the founding of PRC in 1949 have not really translated into strong manifested ethnic tensions. Among the increasing number of “mass incidents” or public protests on a wide variety of issues such as pollution and corruption, there seems to be a lack of demonstrations by Hans about preferential treatment towards ethnic minorities. However, Millward (2007) claims that relations between ethnic groups, particularly between Uyghur and Han, are tenser compared to the start of the 21st century. The lack of open acts of protest or oppression just points to the fact that the tension between the two groups usually manifests itself in more mundane ways such as slurs. To be clear, there is little doubt that since the 2008 Lhasa and 2009 Urumqi uprisings, ethnic tensions have been rising and Hans’ resentment towards Uyghurs and Tibetans has become more vocal, especially in the online community. Nevertheless, these two arguments have different focuses: Sautman concentrates on the tension specifically derived from preferential policies while Millward evaluates the overall situation; Sautman mainly views the issue from the Han perspective whereas Millward mentions negative attitudes from both sides; Sautman considers the issue on a national level and Millward focuses on the Xinjiang region. Because of the geographical concentration of the Uyghur population in the west border region, it makes sense that tensions might be high in regions where Hans are perceived as intruders while in other parts of China, where Han population’s engagement with minorities is very limited, exist fewer ethnic tensions. Recall that almost all of the conflicts mentioned in the history section took place in XUAR. This study only concerns Han Chinese’ perception of Uyghurs and was conducted in the

east coastal region of China where ethnic issues have relatively low prominence. Therefore, it is arguably more suitable to employ Sautman's evaluation when developing hypotheses.

Hans' negative stereotypes of ethnic minorities do not just concentrate in the remote border areas. Muslim minorities (including Uyghurs) are generally viewed as exotic, less educated, lazy, unwilling to work hard, violent, criminal, unreasonable, primitive, and savage (Cliff 2012; Gladney 2004; Kaltman 2007; Millward 2009; Zang 2011). There is also increasing complaints of reverse discrimination in college admissions (Jin and Wang 2007; Teng and Ma 2005; Wang 2010; Yan and Li 2012). Some of these perceptions are very similar to the stereotypes African Americans suffer from. One complaint that grew much more salient since the 2009 riot is the "ungrateful Uyghurs" (Clarke 2011; Hayes and Clarke 2015; Kaltman 2007; Millward 2009). Some people believe that Uyghurs have received so many benefits from preferential policies and XUAR has been developing so fast with the help from the central government. However, Uyghurs are not grateful for all the help and still try to create tension through uprisings and terrorist attacks (e.g. 2014 Kunming train station terrorist attack). Furthermore, Uyghurs are increasingly related to the phrase "violent terrorists" (baokong fenzi 暴恐分子) in the media. Compared to the previously mentioned stereotypes, this is more severe in nature because of the much higher perceived level of threat associated with it.

In Chinese academia, there have been proposals supporting the attenuation of minority rights. The Peking University sociologist and ethnologist Ma Rong supports major changes in government ethnic policies – scaling back minority rights but obviating state fragmentation and solidifying minority ties with multi-ethnic Chinese society. Wang Yingguo, a retired Nanjing University Chinese literature professor, wrote an article after the Urumqi riot that might have reflected some extreme sentiments at the time. He advocates for determinedly engaging in

assimilation, dissolving ethnic autonomous areas and cancelling all policies that give minorities unique rights (Wang 2009). Sautman (2010) criticizes these proposals calling for actions that, to varying degrees, will impair minority interests and hence worsen interethnic and minority/state relations. He contends that the government should expand, rather than curb, minority rights.

Scholars have also documented various forms of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the Chinese society. By conducting a national field experiment, Distelhorst and Hou (2014) find that unelected local officials were 33 percent less likely to provide assistance to citizens with ethnic Muslim names than to ethnically unmarked peers. In the labor market, because China's preferential policies were devised when the state sector was very strong, the shrinkage of the sector has led to an increase in discriminatory hiring and layoffs that negatively affect some minority groups, such as Uyghur males (Maurer-Fazio, Hughes, and Zhang 2008). In Urumqi, Uyghurs earn 31 percent less than Han Chinese; everything being equal, Uyghur workers earn 52 percent less than Han workers in non-state sectors (Zang 2011). A variety of minorities in Beijing also reported perceptions of job discrimination (Hasmath 2009). In addition, urban police crackdowns have targeted Muslim enclaves for petty crime and some ethnic Muslims believe themselves to be unfairly targeted by law enforcement (Kaltman 2007; Sullivan 2013)

Aforementioned preferential policies and official narratives seem to indicate that the Chinese government genuinely wishes to promote the "norm of equality" in Chinese society and address the problems with corrective measures. However, considering its suppression of separatism, lack of actions in addressing discrimination, and restrictions on religious practice which impact large number of ethnic minorities (Sautman 2010, Shan and Chen 2011), many would argue that the Chinese government is only making "pseudo-efforts" – forcing minorities

to integrate, managing general public's beliefs, and reserving the means to increase hostility. Even if this is true, I contend that it does not matter for this particular study. The entire project is based on the *perceptions* of non-Uyghur Chinese, not the *facts* about government's practices. The average Chinese person with limited access to information would believe that the government is trying to help ethnic minorities. For example, the complaint about "the ungrateful Uyghurs" is based on the recognition that minorities are being helped by the authority. However, one needs to note that the public's awareness of governmental efforts is not equal to the successful establishment of the "norm of equality". It is conceivable that the former has an opposite effect, promoting anti-minority attitudes. At the same time, it is also possible that the public received the narrative and genuinely believe that "56 ethnic groups are one big family."

This chapter provides background information on China's ethnic policies. It also captures the anti-Uyghur or minority attitudes and discriminations in the Chinese society. The majority-minority group dynamic between Hans and Uyghurs makes one question whether the government is successful in establishing the "norm of equality". Given that the U.S. priming theory is based on the assumption that white Americans endorse this norm, the results of this study might be able to provide some insights on the true progress of ethnic equality in China. Before we delve into the particularities of this research, it is worth noting that Uyghurs' case in China is different from Africans Americans' case in the U.S. in various aspects: Uyghurs have a different religious belief from the majority group; Uyghurs are geographically extremely concentrated; irredentists or separatist views exist in Uyghurs' case; Uyghurs are frequently related to terrorism; Uyghur-Han relation issues overlap with land and natural resources in Xinjiang. Racial tensions between blacks and whites in the U.S. generally do not involve these components. Precisely because of the dissimilarities, this study can shed light on the possibility

of broadening the discussion of priming to minority groups in societies in general. In the next chapter, I will list and explain my hypotheses based on the current literature, as well as describe the methodology of the study.

Chapter Three

Examining Ethnic Priming in China

In this chapter, I will detail my hypotheses for whether and how priming works in China's ethnic context. In addition, I will describe the methodology of the study, especially the design of the survey experiment.

Hypotheses

First, I expect that ethnic priming exists in China. It is reasonable to think that after being exposed to treatments containing ethnic content, respondents would behave differently according to their ethnic predispositions when they were presented some policy choices. People who are tolerant of ethnic minorities will be less likely to oppose preferential policies towards the minority groups compared to people who are intolerant, precisely because of their predispositions. There is no obvious reason to believe that Chinese people, no matter how high or low they place on the resentment scale, all behave the same after receiving treatments with ethnic-related content. If this hypothesis is true, at least some coefficients of the interaction terms of treatments and ethnic resentment score should be significant.

One might object to this by saying that Chinese people could be completely non-responsive to ethnic appeals. I consider three possible scenarios that could lead to the non-responsiveness. First, Chinese people do not have negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities, or they do not think or care about ethnic minority related issues at all. They are immune to ethnic appeals that after receiving such appeals, no negative thoughts will come to their mind. These claims are inconceivable given the fact that there are complaints about preferential policies and

social discrimination against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. The second scenario is the complete opposite: Chinese people think about ethnic issues all the time – the negative attitudes are constantly in the forefront of people’s mind that no effect can be observed comparing treatment and control groups. If this is true, then by definition priming cannot occur because people do not have *latent* attitudes towards the ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, this scenario is extremely unlikely as well. Even in the U.S., where racial issues are so prominent, people do not always think about race when choosing policy preferences, which is why the U.S. literature has found racial appeals to be effective. In China, ethnic-related concerns are less prominent and are accompanied with a relatively low level of tension (Sautman 1998; Sautman 2010), at least in the coastal region where this study was conducted. Thus, one should expect people to harbor some latent attitudes towards the ethnic minorities. Lastly, it could be the case that Chinese people recognize the appeal but are so good at rejecting it (no matter explicit or implicit) that researchers could not detect any shift in people’s policy preferences. This is slightly more conceivable than the other two scenarios, and there is probably no good evidence to directly counter the speculation. Nonetheless, recall Distelhorst and Hou’s (2014) finding that local officials were less likely to provide assistance to citizens with ethnic Muslim names than to ethnically unmarked peers. If the politically more sophisticated officials could not conceal their bias against ethnic minorities, it is difficult to imagine that the average Chinese citizens are better at hiding their real attitudes.

My second hypothesis is that explicit appeals will not be consistently rejected. In the U.S. context, the study conducted in the South by Hutching, Walton, and Benjamin (2010) has already shown that explicit racial appeals are not necessarily rejected by individuals. Although most of the racial priming studies have been conducted in the Northeast and have shown people’s

endorsement of the “norm of equality”, their results question the idea that egalitarian norms have been adopted across the country. In China, it is even more questionable that people have completely adopted the norm due to the fact that discrimination against Uyghurs and some other ethnic minority groups have been way more pronounced. Therefore, one should expect explicit appeals to be effective at least in some instances as well. In regards to statistical results, this means that respondents in explicit treatment groups should be more likely to embrace anti-Uyghur/minority policies overall than respondents assigned to control.

The third hypothesis concerns the effectiveness of implicit and explicit appeals in inducing priming effects. If the government has succeeded in establishing the norm of ethnic equality, one would expect Mendelberg’s implicit-explicit model to apply to China – only implicit appeals are effective in priming people’s latent attitudes. However, considering the lower levels of ethnic tension and prominence of ethnic issues in areas where this study was conducted, it is reasonable to think that the latent attitudes primed by the implicit message will be weaker among Chinese than among Americans. Alternatively, if the norm of equality is not accepted by Chinese people, which certainly can be true given the more overt discrimination in the Chinese society, it is hard to predict the exact relationship between the two types of appeals when comparing their effectiveness. Nevertheless, it should be expected that under this circumstance, implicit appeals are no more effective than explicit appeals. People are not afraid of violating the convention when expressing negative attitudes because there is no such convention. They do not need to worry about violating the norm when being exposed to explicit appeals. It is possible that implicit and explicit messages are very similar in priming people’s attitudes. This can be caused by people’s elevated ability to recognize implicit appeals – thus essentially renders those appeals explicit. Or, the two types of appeals truly induce similar levels

of priming. A similar case can be made for the possibility that implicit messages are less efficacious – either people are less capable of identifying implicit appeals, or they are really less effective.

Fourth, I hypothesize that messages describing terrorist attacks elicit more significant priming effects than messages describing local crimes. Because of the much greater gravity of the terrorism situation than local crime, it should be intuitive that the former will result in bigger priming effects. People are expected to be angrier, more scared, more anxious, and more likely to express their latent negative attitudes. If the hypothesis is true, one would see generally bigger coefficients (that are statistically significant) for interaction terms of a condition and the resentment score in regressions for terrorism treatments than local crime treatments, when comparing them respectively to the control group.

To reiterate in a clear fashion, here are the four hypotheses I proposed in this section:

Hypothesis 1: The Chinese will respond to messages about the Uyghurs by bringing their latent attitudes about this group to bear on their policy preferences.

Hypothesis 2: Explicit appeals are not consistently rejected by the Chinese.

Hypothesis 3(a): If the norm of equality exists in China, only implicit appeals are effective in priming, but less so than in the U.S.

Hypothesis 3(b): If the norm of equality does not exist in China, implicit appeals are no more effective in priming than explicit appeals.

Hypothesis 4: Appeals regarding terrorist attacks are more effective in priming than appeals regarding local crimes.

Methodology

Very few scholars have used survey experiments to examine the policy preferences of the Chinese people. I designed my surveys and treatments with the following objectives in mind: first, I sought to determine whether ethnic priming exists in China; second, I wanted to examine whether implicit and explicit messages prime Chinese people differently; third, I hoped to learn whether the gravity of the situation described in messages affects priming.

The design mostly follows the general format of the current U.S. racial priming studies. The participants of the study completed a short survey before receiving the treatment (see Appendix 2). This pre-survey included demographic questions and modified questions of the “racial resentment scale” widely used in the U.S. literature concerning race. The questions were revised to match the cultural context of China. For example, the original racial resentment scale contains the statement “Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” However, it was hard to specify comparable social groups for the Chinese case, as they have not usually been classified based on racial or ethnic identities. Thus, the modified version stated, “Many groups in our country have faced disadvantages and overcome them without special treatment, Uyghurs should do the same.” I also adjusted the statement to simplify the mandarin translation while making the best effort to maintain the original intent of the questions in the scale. For instance, the original statement reads “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” I changed this into an explicit mentioning of discrimination “Nowadays, Uyghurs are discriminated by many in the society.” Note that the question utilized a formation that usually leads to less inhibited answers and higher professed levels of intergroup antipathy, compared to when asking about the behavior of the respondents themselves (Posner 2004). The pre-test also

included a question about sympathy towards Uyghurs, which did inquire about participants' behavior. The question requested respondents to answer how often they have felt sympathy for Uyghurs. This is another attempt to elicit participants' genuine attitudes towards the minority group – people are generally more inclined to respond honestly when questions are framed in positive expressions (in this case, sympathy) than when questions are framed negatively (e.g. “How often have you discriminated against Uyghurs.”).

One important consideration when designing the pre-survey was minimizing the possibility of “pre-priming”. Huber and Lapinski’s (2006) study received criticism in regards to this because they administered the survey, which has race-related questions at the end, immediately before respondents received their treatments. This practice might have triggered certain racial attitudes in both control and treatment groups and thus, may have led to an underestimation of the priming effects. Although it was not realistic for me to create a gap between conducting the pre-survey and participants receiving the treatment due to logistic concerns, I strived to avoid the potential contamination of results. I put all the Uyghur attitude related questions towards the beginning of the survey, mixed with questions that only differed in social groups mentioned. The social identities included women, the poor, people with disabilities, and migrant workers, all of which are typically viewed as groups that are subjected to discrimination or hardship. The wording of the questions was identical. The rest of the survey asked many distraction questions, completely unrelated to the topic of interest, including the number of hours of television respondents watch every week, and the sports respondents play. In addition, the sentence immediately before the stimulus reads “The article is randomly selected from a group of articles on various topics.” These designs aimed to keep people unaware of the

real purpose of the study – measuring ethnic attitudes towards Uyghurs, ensuring the minimization of the possibility of “pre-priming”.

The crucial part of the design was creating different versions of news articles that were used as treatments and control in the survey experiment. Again, I modeled my design after the general format of racial priming researches, where after finishing the pre-survey, participants read news articles that contained ethnicity-related issues. My treatment stories were about crime, whereas the control story was on nutrition. I styled the stories to resemble authentic news articles as closely as possible. I used the masthead of “Tencent – Dazhewang” (腾讯•大浙网) for the treatment stories, which is a popular source of online news that covers local stories in Zhejiang province, where my research took place. The masthead of “NetEase – Health” (网易健康) was used for the control story. NetEase is another popular web portal in China, from which the control article was originally picked. I employed the same font and formatting as used by articles that appear on the two websites. My aim was to convince the participants that they were reading real new articles so that the responses would be as genuine and accurate as possible. For all versions (both treatments and control), I kept the articles around 350 words, so that the participants would not be deterred by the length of the articles and not finish reading them. It is another precaution against unintended aspects of the experiment affecting the result. The manipulation check question included in the post-survey asks about specific information that was mentioned in the middle or towards the end of the passages. In this way, I was able to discern fairly confidently whether the participants actually read the news articles in its entirety. Even though I kept the articles relatively short, to ensure that participants received the treatments, I put all the “important” information that distinguished the four treatment designs near the beginning

of the passages. These designs were implemented to circumvent the criticism against Huber and Lapinski (2006) that their respondents might not have actually received the treatment.

Because the treatments were in Chinese, the applicability of the U.S. literature concerning effective code words used in racial priming is unclear. At the same time, I have not identified any Chinese literature that addresses similar topics (although I would expect Chinese to quickly associate terms like “pickpockets” and “terrorism” with Uyghurs). As a result, I did not deliberately add any terms or translation of code words in order to induce priming – the crime stories in their entirety served the purpose.

To achieve the goal of investigating whether different messages prime people differently, the treatments followed a two-by-two design – explicit message versus implicit message, local crime versus terrorism. I minimized the differences between the four treatment articles to ensure that the results would not be affected by other elements of the treatments. Two of the articles contained explicit ethnic cues – specific mentioning of “Uyghur” in the title and the content of the article and the name of the suspect that was clearly Uyghur to Chinese respondents. The latter was picked from a list of popular Uyghur names from online sources. These articles also included a picture of an adult male that would typically be identified as Uyghur by Chinese. On the other hand, the implicit ethnic cue articles only contained the picture of the suspect, without any reference to perpetrators’ ethnic identity. The name of the suspect was excluded as well. The only difference between the terrorism articles and the local crime articles was the additional sentence in the first paragraph “the police suspect this incident to be part of a series of small terrorist attacks.” Table 1 showcases the specific differences among the four treatments (for complete treatment and control stories, please refer to Appendix 3 through 7).

Table 1: Ethnic Appeals Design				
Narrative	Local Crime Explicit	Local Crime Implicit	Terrorism Explicit	Terrorism Implicit
Title	Three Uyghur Males Stab and Rob Pedestrian	Three Males Stab and Rob Pedestrian	Three Uyghur Males Stab and Rob Pedestrian	Three Males Stab and Rob Pedestrian
Picture	Picture of Uyghur Male	Picture of Uyghur Male	Picture of Uyghur Male	Picture of Uyghur Male
First Paragraph	<p>Three Uyghur males were apprehended on November 19 after stabbing and robbing a pedestrian.</p> <p>...</p> <p>The man with a knife, Batur Ezmet (picture on the left), stabbed the victim three times...</p>	<p>Three males were apprehended on November 19 after stabbing and robbing a pedestrian.</p> <p>...</p> <p>The man with a knife (picture on the left) stabbed the victim three times...</p>	<p>Three Uyghur males were apprehended on November 19 after stabbing and robbing a pedestrian. The police suspect this incident to be part of a series of small terrorist attacks.</p> <p>...</p> <p>The man with a knife, Batur Ezmet (picture on the left), stabbed the victim three times...</p>	<p>Three males were apprehended on November 19 after stabbing and robbing a pedestrian. The police suspect this incident to be part of a series of small terrorist attacks.</p> <p>...</p> <p>The man with a knife, (picture on the left) stabbed the victim three times...</p>

All four treatments contained the same picture of an adult male that would typically be identified as Uyghur by Chinese. The choice of picture was also crucial to the design. It served as the single ethnic cue of the implicit stories. The respondents needed to be able to clearly identify the individual as Uyghur. Fortunately, choosing a picture that satisfies this requirement was not particularly difficult due to Uyghurs' distinguishable physical appearances from Han (Distelhorst and Hou 2014; Kaltman 2007). I picked three pictures of Uyghur males online and tested them with some Chinese individuals. Their reactions to the pictures confirmed that it was reasonable to expect an average Han Chinese person to be able to recognize the adult males as Uyghur. Two of those pictures were put on reserve just in case. Right before the distribution of

the survey, I did switch to one of the pre-tested but reserved pictures due to the fact that the black-and-white printing lead to some difficulties in the recognition of the person's ethnic identity in the originally chosen picture. The picture I used did not have this problem and was to some extent better because the person did not look menacing at all while the man in the original picture did look somewhat threatening. I adjusted the online version correspondingly. The online articles were also black-and-white in order to ensure maximum control. The control article did not contain any picture.

The control story originally titled "*Can Eating an Egg Everyday Help You Lose Weight?*" was selected from the NetEase Health section. It was then shortened to similar length compared to my treatment stories and retitled "*Is Eating More Eggs Better for You?*" to match the content more closely based on the cuts made. This article did not concern ethnicity or politics related issues in any way, and thus served as an ideal control story, and a baseline for the study.

Besides the manipulation check mentioned before, testing whether participants actually received the treatment, the post-survey mainly focused on respondents' policy preferences on ethnic minority related issues (see Appendix 8). Participants' egalitarian views and income levels were also included. There was a risk of respondents being primed by the post-survey itself. I managed to add some distraction questions into the post-survey, asking about different social groups' representation in congresses and governments at all levels (other groups mentioned included men, women, rich, middle-class, working-class, and poor people). However, considering the length of the survey and the uniqueness of ethnic minority related policy issues, it was hard to include more questions for distraction purposes while engaging the respondents. The tradeoff was necessary.

A convenience sample was used in conducting this survey experiment. I chose to employ both electronic and printed versions of the survey. Even though it was convenient, I was aware that conducting the entire experiment using Qualtrics online would further hurt the variety of respondents' backgrounds, especially in terms of educational attainments and family income levels. Researchers sometimes criticize the usage of similar online survey websites in the U.S. such as MTurk because the majority of the survey takers are self-identified liberals. The option of distributing printed surveys would allow me to reach a wider variety of participants. Therefore, in order to obtain a more diverse sample, I combined the two methods to collect responses.

Based on previous researches by Mendelberg and Hutchings and his colleagues, I anticipated needing approximately 50 respondents per cell to take part in my research. Thus, 250 respondents in total were needed to complete the survey. However, the fact that the study is conducted in China added difficulty in predicting the number of surveys sufficient for rendering reliable results. I eventually decided to change the number of surveys I planned to administer and aimed to get as many responses as possible. Although the procedure changed in the middle of the study, at the time, I had not examined the results, done any analyses, or even coded the data. The change in the collection rule was not an attempt to obtain more interesting results. Thus, there was not an increase in the likelihood of getting a significant result just by chance, which is a criticism many scientific studies face. All respondents were offered the opportunity to receive ten yuan (around two dollars) as compensation.

To keep the surveys distributed as randomly as possible, I used Qualtrics' randomization feature for the online version and used the sample function in R for the print version. By coding the conditions, I was able to generate a randomized sequence in R and followed that sequence when distributing surveys. In the end, this method resulted in approximately even numbers of

each type of treatment condition and a slightly higher frequency of the control condition – 88 received “local crime-explicit” treatment, 94 received “local crime-implicit” treatment, 82 received “terrorism-explicit” treatment, 82 received “terrorism-implicit” treatment, and 99 received control condition. When using confederates to distribute print surveys, I would give them the copies in the appropriate randomized order. I also instructed them to distribute the surveys in the same order in which they were received.

After coding collected responses and excluding the non-usable ones (participants did not answer most of the survey questions or failed to correctly answer the manipulation check question), I performed statistical analyses using linear regressions. Pertinent items included in the pre-survey, the measure of family income, and the treatments were independent variables; relevant items included in the post-survey (except income) served as dependent variables. All variables were scaled to a range of 0 to 1. Variables pertinent to ethnic attitudes were coded with 0 signifying most tolerant of ethnic minorities and 1 signifying most intolerant of ethnic minorities. The use of these coding schemes aimed to facilitate results interpretations and cross-variable comparisons (Achen 1982).

Chapter Four

Descriptive Statistics & Results on Framing Effects

This first chapter on data and results presents the basic descriptive information about the sample and the framing effects appeared in the results. Note that framing effects are not the focus of the project. However, they are the most straightforward to present and the most intuitive to interpret when examining the results. The framing effects found seem to caution one against assuming the applicability of Mendelberg's implicit-explicit model in China.

Descriptive Statistics of the Sample

Although not a representative sample, the respondents who participated in my study come from a variety of backgrounds. Out of the 445 total respondents, 251 were male, 192 were female, and 2 people chose to not disclose information on gender. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 70 years old, and the mean age was 33.5 years old. Almost half of the respondents were under 30 years old; a quarter were between 30 and 40 years old, and the remaining quarter were over 40 years old. In regard to educational attainment, 10.8% of the respondents have never enrolled in high school; 25.6% had at least some high school education but had no college experience; 55.1% of the sample had college degrees or were attending college while 8.5% had advanced degrees or were pursuing advanced degrees. In response to the question concerning traveling experience, the majority (53.0%) of the participants said they had never traveled outside of mainland China while 28.5% answered that they had rarely done so; 13.71% of the respondents disclosed that they travel sometimes and the remaining 4.7% percent identified themselves as frequent travelers outside of mainland China. When asked about household annual

income, 64 respondents (14.5% of the sample) declined to answer; 20.4% reported that their annual household income was less than 50,000 yuan (approximately 7,660 dollars); 25.9% lived in a household that made between 50,000 – 100,000 yuan per year; 29.0% made between 100,000 – 300,000 yuan per year, and 10.2% made more than 300,000 yuan per year. To provide some context, the 2014 *per capita* disposable income of urban households in China is 28,844 yuan according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China.

There were 8 participants (1.8% of the sample) who identified themselves as ethnic minorities. None of them were Uyghurs and only 2 were Muslims (Hui, which is a minority group that generally does not suffer much societal discrimination). Because they constitute such a small portion of the sample and are unlikely to react significantly differently from the general Han population, they were included in the sample and analyses. Statistical analyses also show that when these subjects are removed from the sample, the results do not really differ.

The randomization across five conditions worked well on all demographic variables except educational level. Two treatments groups are significantly different in this attribute while each of them is not significantly different from the other three conditions. After testing, controlling for education actually does not affect the results of statistical analysis significantly. However, in order to avoid potential criticism, I chose to be conservative and perform all the analyses controlling for educational attainment. Unlike the conventional U.S. practice of making education a dummy variable (whether the respondent has a college degree or not), I chose to code the variable on a 0 to 1 scale but with four possible values. This decision was driven by the diverse educational backgrounds of the sample, and the lack of evidence that obtaining a college degree is an important threshold in China as it is in the U.S. Chinese students who enter college

generally do not drop out, which is why when recoding the education variable, I grouped respondents with college degrees and students who were in college into one category.

In addition to excluding the individuals who answered the question about the content of the articles they read wrong, I performed t-tests to examine whether my respondents actually received the treatments, utilizing their answers to questions in the post-survey regarding their emotions. Based on the content of the articles, one would expect the respondents exposed to the treatment stories to be angrier, more scared, and more anxious, than people who read the control story. Statistical results confirmed this expectation – individuals who received treatments were significantly more likely to have those emotions than individuals who were in the control group. Another reasonable expectation might be that among the treatment stories, the two about terrorism should be more likely to elicit the previously mentioned emotions than the two about local crime. This turned out not to be the case – I was not able to reject the hypothesis that terrorism conditions led to higher levels of negative emotions among respondents than local crime conditions. This information suggests that data analyses on priming effects might not support the fourth hypothesis about terrorism appeals being more effective than local crime appeals.

After completing the survey, many respondents questioned the purpose of the research. They were surprised that the study was about attitudes towards ethnic minorities. The feedback was a good indicator that the distraction questions worked well in concealing the real purpose of the research. Recall the criticism Huber and Lapinski (2006) received about pre-priming, my participants' feedback suggests that pre-priming effects were at least curbed to some extent.

Framing Effects

Here I explore framing effects by comparing all treatment groups with the control group and with one another in order to examine whether reading an article about a crime committed by Uyghurs influences participants' policy preferences and opinions on ethnic-related issues. Again, this is not the focus of this project, but these results are the most straightforward to present. The results seem to suggest that one should not assume the applicability of the U.S. implicit-explicit model in China. Below are the significant results that emerged from the data. Recall that if one believes that Mendelberg's implicit-explicit model should apply to China, then generally people should be more intolerant of policies that benefit ethnic minorities under implicit conditions than under explicit conditions.

First, I examined the framing effects when using the control group as the reference category. So, the comparisons were between participants who read the treatment stories and those who read the control article about nutrition and health. For the question asking about the perception of police's efforts on preventing crimes, respondents who received the local crime-implicit treatment were significantly more likely to say that the police was already doing enough ($t = -2.50, p > |t| = 0.013$) whereas other treatments did not shift respondent's opinion. When asked about their opinions on lenient ethnic minority crime policies, participants who read the terrorism-implicit article tended to think that the leniency was unreasonable ($t = 2.16, p > |t| = 0.031$).

Because one of the goals of the project is to explore the effectiveness of different appeals, it makes sense to compare the treatment conditions directly. When I set the local crime-explicit condition as the reference category, it turned out that when asked about minority representation in congress, respondents in the terrorism-implicit group were significantly more likely to believe that there were not enough ethnic minorities in people's congresses at all levels ($t = -2.19, p > |t| = 0.029$).

When the local crime-implicit condition was the reference category, some additional significant results emerged, all of which were from the respondents under the terrorism conditions. For the crime prevention question, the respondents who received the terrorism-explicit treatment were much more likely to think that the police was doing too little on preventing crimes than respondents who received the local crime-implicit treatment ($t=3.22$, $p>|t|=0.001$). The minority representation question rendered significant results again as well. The terrorism-explicit conditions made respondents more likely to think that there should be more ethnic minority delegates in congresses (terrorism-explicit: $t=-2.46$, $p>|t|=0.014$; terrorism-implicit: $t=-2.71$, $p>|t|=0.007$). Other results emerged from questions about governmental help towards Uyghurs (the terrorism-explicit appeal made people more oppose to it; $t=2.15$, $p>|t|=0.032$) and Han leadership in government (the terrorism-explicit appeal made people more likely to think that there were too many Hans in the leaderships of government at all levels; $t=-2.31$, $p>|t|=0.021$).

Regarding the dependent variables, I found that questions about police' efforts in crime prevention and ethnic minority representation in National People's Congress and local people's congresses at all levels produced significant results most consistently. With different treatment groups serving as the reference category, the local crime-implicit treatment rendered the most results. Although what is presented above is on framing instead of priming, one should notice that the majority of the effects are inconsistent with the expectations corresponding to the U.S. theory mentioned at the beginning of this section. Among the seven relevant results reported, only two of them corroborate the expectations of the implicit-explicit model.

Once again, the analyses above are about framing effects instead of priming. The results indicate great uncertainty in regard to matching with Hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b) mentioned in the

last chapter. The mixed patterns serve as a preliminary evaluation, suggesting that maybe one should not assume Mendelberg's implicit-explicit model to hold its validity in China's ethnic context. The analyses in the next chapter about priming effects should shed more light on whether the reality is consistent with my hypotheses.

Chapter Five

Data & Results on Priming Effects

This chapter presents results related to priming, the focus of the study. I first provide a brief explanation of the choice of independent variables capturing respondents' ethnic attitudes. Then, I compare treatment groups with the control group in order to determine whether priming exists. Afterwards, specific comparisons are made between implicit and explicit appeals, and between crime and terrorism messages.

Variables about Attitudes

In the pre-test survey design, four items measured people's latent attitudes towards Uyghurs – three of them were designed to correspond with the racial resentment scale, devised by Kinder and Sanders (1996) and widely used in U.S. literature concerning race. The scale is based on the contention that “blacks do not try hard enough to overcome the difficulties they face and that they take what they have not earned.” The methodology section of the paper detailed the modifications I made to the scale in order to fit the cultural context of China. Table 2 provides the original version of the scale and the modified version I employed in this study. The survey provided four choices “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.” There was no neutral option – respondents were “forced” to answer whether they agree or disagree with the statements. In addition, the pre-test also asked participants to indicate how often they have felt sympathy for Uyghurs. All the responses were coded into a range of 0 to 1, with 0 indicating the most tolerant or friendly attitude towards ethnic minorities and 1 signifying the most intolerant or hostile attitude towards minorities. Again, questions with the exact same wording but inquire

about other social identities associated with negative stereotypes served as distractions, mixed into the questionnaire.

Table 2: Racial/Ethnic Resentment Scale	
Original	Modified
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.	Success comes from hard work; if Uyghurs would only work harder they could be as successful as Hans.
Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.	Many groups in our country have faced disadvantages and overcome them without special treatment, Uyghurs should do the same.
Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	Nowadays, Uyghurs are discriminated by many in the society.

Because the methodology was borrowed from a different cultural context, heavily relying on race-related literature in the U.S., I wanted to exercise caution in data analyses. There is no evidence that these questions are able to correctly measure Chinese people's latent ethnic attitudes, especially when their efficacy in studies on American society is even debated (Bobo and Tuan 2006; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). In order to ensure that using the U.S. racial resentment scale is a valid practice in the Chinese context, I performed Cronbach's internal consistency check on the three modified questions. The check rendered an $\alpha < .6$, meaning that the three questions should not be combined into one scale. I subsequently tried various combinations, including the sympathy question as well. Findings show that the Cronbach's test produced an $\alpha > .6$ when the first two questions of the scale were combined. Therefore, the questions about "not working hard enough" and "receiving special treatment" were converted into one scale (still with values between 0 and 1). The last and also the most heavily modified question in the scale about "discrimination in the society", along with the sympathy measure, were analyzed separately as independent variables. Among these three different measures aimed to accurately describe Chinese people's ethnic attitudes, the combined scale provided the most

normal distribution with a decent spread. Therefore, in order to avoid misleading results, what I present in the following sections of this chapter only concerns the two-question scale (see Appendix 9 for a summary of respondents' answers to the ethnic attitude questions and the distribution of the final two-question scale).

Does Priming Exist?

This section only explores whether priming exists in a crude fashion. The control group served as the reference category in the regressions. All four conditions and their corresponding interaction terms with the two-question ethnic resentment scale were included in the regressions. Again, all regressions controlled for respondents' educational attainment. First, I examine the survey questions that clearly asked about ethnic minority issues. Then, I shift the focus to questions that did not reference ethnic minorities directly.

Ethnicity-Related Issues


Support for Lenient Minority Crime Policy

“As you may or may not know, in 1984 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China introduced the criminal policy referred to as “two restraints and one leniency (liang shao yi kuan),” stating that there should be fewer arrests, fewer death penalties, and greater leniency when dealing with ethnic minority criminals. Do you think this policy is reasonable nowadays?”

Perspectives on whether the lenient ethnic minority crime policy was reasonable shifted significantly differently for respondents with opposite predispositions towards ethnic issues after they were exposed to the terrorism-explicit appeal (interaction term: $t=2.19$, $p>|t|=0.029$). Respondents who scored low on the resentment scale (i.e. ethnic liberals, tolerant of Uyghurs)

became more supportive of the policy. However, respondents who scored high on the resentment scale (i.e. ethnic conservatives, intolerant of Uyghur) were more likely to think that the policy is unreasonable after reading the terrorism explicit article. Therefore, participants were primed. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this kind of priming does not correspond with Mendelberg’s theory because she contends that only implicit appeals can elicit priming effects. Here the treatment that led to priming was explicit.

Figure 1: Support for Lenient Minority Crime Policy
Control vs. Terrorism-Explicit



Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on preferential policies. All variables are coded 0-1.

Support for Laws that Accommodate Ethnic Traditions


“Do you agree that laws should accommodate ethnic traditions?”

This was another question to which participants with different latent attitudes responded differentially after receiving treatments. The local crime-implicit treatment successfully

stimulated the ethnic liberals and conservatives to react differently when they were asked about their opinions on laws accommodating ethnic traditions (interaction term: $t=-2.36$, $p>|t|=0.019$). Here the tolerant respondents were more hostile towards the policy after the treatment while the intolerant respondents were friendlier towards the policy after the treatment. The discrepancy in people's reactions does not match the U.S. priming theory. The implicit-explicit model would have predicted that under an implicit treatment, the ethnic conservatives would be more likely to disagree with the statement, and the ethnic liberals would be more likely to agree with the statement. This study found the opposite result.

Interestingly, one of Mendelberg's experiments demonstrates that under some circumstance, low-resentment individuals show more negative attitudes towards African Americans. In her study, an extra manipulation produced this change. She informed those participants that their views were among the mainstream, not violating the societal norm. Only then did they become much more likely to choose conservative racial policies and candidates. The results from this study did not rely on additional information at all. As such, it is hard to explain what caused these confusing shifts in policy preferences. I will provide some potential explanations in the next chapter.

Figure 2: Support for Laws that Accommodate Ethnic Traditions
Control vs. Local Crime-Implicit




Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on preferential policies. All variables are coded 0-1.

Han in Government Leadership

“In general, do you think there are far too few, a little bit too few, just about the right number, a little bit too many, or far too many of people from the groups below (Han) in leaderships of the central government and local governments at all levels?”

When asked about Han representation in government leadership at all levels, there was a significant discrepancy in how people with differential predispositions on ethnic minorities reacted to the local crime-explicit treatment (interaction term: $t=2.38$, $p>|t|=0.018$). Similar to the question on minority crime policies, after being exposed to an explicit condition (although previously it was the terrorism-explicit condition that delivered a significant interaction), the

ethnic liberal respondents adopted even more pro-minorities stances when evaluating policies, expressing the belief that Han individuals were over-represented in government leaderships. The ethnic conservative respondents, on the other hand, showed more support to anti-minorities policies, stating that there were too few Han people in governments at all levels. Judging from the overlaps in confidence intervals, both shifts were (close to) significant. The reaction of the ethnic conservatives went against the U.S. model because the explicit appeal successfully primed those individuals' latent negative attitudes. Again, I found the priming effect, but it does not match the expectations derived from the U.S. model.



Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on preferential policies. All variables are coded 0-1.


Non Ethnicity-Related Issues

Assessment of the Number of Lazy People in the City

“Do you agree that the city has too many lazy people?”

This question did not directly ask about respondents’ opinions on ethnic minority-related policies. However, it did try to reflect people’s attitudes towards minorities with the use of a “code word.” Recall that one of the negative stereotypes of Uyghurs is that they are lazy. Similar to the use of phrases such as “people on welfare,” “poor people,” and “violent crime” in the U.S. studies as racial code words (Slocum 2001), “lazy people” was designed to serve as an ethnic code word in the Chinese context. Due to the lack of research in this regard in China, and the relatively small number of ethnic minorities in the coastal region, where this study was conducted, the merit of this design is unconfirmed. Nevertheless, the question rendered a borderline significant result for the terrorism-explicit condition (interaction term: $t=1.84$, $p>|t|=0.066$). The general trend corresponded with the two explicit treatment cases described previously. Within the control group, the tolerant and intolerant individuals shared similar opinions. After being exposed to the terrorism-explicit treatment, the ethnic liberals moved towards disagreeing with the statement while the ethnic conservatives displayed the opposite reaction.

Figure 4: Assessment of the Number of Lazy People in the City
Control vs. Terrorism-Explicit



Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on ethnic minorities. All variables are coded 0-1.


Egalitarian Views – Equal Treatment

“Do you agree that if people were treated more equally in this country we would have fewer problems?”

This question aimed to gauge respondents’ egalitarian views after receiving treatments, and revealed two significant results, both concerning the terrorism conditions. Figure 5 shows terrorism-explicit treatment’s different effects on high and low resentment individuals (interaction term: $t=3.05$, $p>|t|=0.002$). Again, the explicit appeal made the low-resentment respondents express more egalitarian views and the high-resentment respondents more likely to voice anti-egalitarian opinions. Interestingly, the baselines (within the control group) for the tolerant and the intolerant are significantly different (no overlap of confidence intervals on the

left side of the figure). In the control group, the ethnic liberals actually held less egalitarian views compared to the conservatives. A plausible explanation is that the respondents who had more “progressive” views on ethnic minorities might also hold more “progressive” views on wealth. In the Chinese society, this could mean that they are more supportive of a market economy, more likely to believe that the wealthy became rich because of hard work, and more likely to be unconcerned about income inequality. Therefore, the respondents in the control group might have answered this question relying more on their views about income equality than ethnic equality.


Figure 5: More Equal Treatment Leads to Fewer Problems
Control vs. Terrorism-Explicit



Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on ethnic minorities (in this case, less egalitarian views). All variables are coded 0-1.

For the terrorism-implicit condition, priming operated in ways that are consistent with Mendelberg’s theory. This is the only result in this section that suggests that the U.S. model is

applicable in the Chinese context. The interaction term between the terrorism-implicit condition and the ethnic resentment score was significant ($t=2.24$, $p>|t|=0.026$). After exposure to an implicit appeal, the high-resentment respondents' latent negative attitudes were primed. Thus, those participants showed less egalitarian views when responding to the question. The low-resentment respondents, on the other hand, were more likely to express their support for equality.



Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on ethnic minorities (in this case, less egalitarian views). All variables are coded 0-1.

The results reported above confirm my hypothesis – ethnic priming exists in China. I observed effects both for questions that specifically addressed ethnic-minority issues and for questions that did not ask about respondents' opinions on ethnic minorities directly. However, the pattern I discerned is inconsistent with the U.S. racial priming theory. Most of the priming effects I found were under the explicit conditions, which support the second hypothesis that Han

Chinese do not consistently reject explicit appeals. After exposure to the explicit treatments, the ethnic conservatives were more likely to express their anti-minority stances, and the ethnic liberals were more likely to become even firmer supporters of pro-ethnic minority policies. In addition, the results seemed to provide some preliminary evidence for the situation described in Hypothesis 3(b). In the next section, I further explore the effectiveness of implicit and explicit appeals and hope to reach a more definitive conclusion on which scenario proposed in Hypothesis 3 is closer to the reality.

Implicit versus Explicit Appeals

This section examines the relative effectiveness of implicit and explicit appeals. Direct comparisons between the two types of appeals were made using explicit condition as the reference category. To ensure the reliability of the results, I only compared the two types of appeals under the same story frame (either about local crime or about terrorism). These comparisons allowed me to see whether the ethnic liberals and conservatives reacted to the two appeals differently by examining the significance of the interaction terms. Afterwards, I performed regressions on each treatment conditions, with interactions, using the control group as the reference category. By doing this, I was able to contrast the effectiveness of implicit and explicit messages by comparing p-values and coefficients. As with previous analyses, all regressions controlled for respondents' educational attainment.

Ethnicity-Related Issues


Support for Lenient Minority Crime Policy

As expected, the question on lenient ethnic minority crime policy rendered significant results. Implicit and explicit appeals about terrorism prompted different reactions among the

ethnic liberals and conservatives (interaction term: $t=-2.67$, $p>|t|=0.008$). Respondents who were tolerant of ethnic minorities were more likely to oppose leniency towards ethnic minorities after reading the terrorism-implicit story than after reading the terrorism-explicit story. The intolerant respondents showed the opposite tendency. While this might at first glance seem counter-intuitive, it matches the pattern that I observed in the “laws should accommodate ethnic traditions” question in the previous section.

Subsequently, I ran two regressions that compared either the terrorism-implicit condition or the terror-explicit condition to the control group, including their respective interactions with the ethnic resentment score. Similar to what was reported in the last section, the discrepancy in how people with different predispositions towards ethnic minorities reacted to the explicit treatment was significant (interaction term: $t=2.26$ $p>|t|=0.025$, coefficient=0.437). However, the implicit treatment did not produce a significant result. From the outcome of these two regressions, it is reasonable to think that here, under the terrorism story frame, the explicit appeal was more effective than the implicit appeal.

Figure 7: Support for Lenient Minority Crime Policy
Terrorism-Explicit vs. Terrorism-Implicit



Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on preferential policies. All variables are coded 0-1.


Support for Bonus Points for Ethnic Minority Students in Gaokao

“Do you agree that eventually bonus points for ethnic minority students taking the National College Entrance Examination should be eliminated?”

From Figure 8, one can see that this question about bonus points in Gaokao produced a similar result as the last question. The behavior of individuals differed significantly when making a direct comparison between the terrorism implicit and the terrorism explicit appeals (interaction term: $t=-3.04, p>|t|=0.003$). The signs of the slopes were the same as the previous question, demonstrating the same confusing pattern: respondents with tolerant predispositions were less supportive of the preferential policy after reading the article with the implicit appeal than after reading the explicit ethnic message; respondents with intolerant predispositions took more pro-

minority stances when exposed to the implicit appeal. The two separate regressions with the control group as the reference category had results that were significant at .10 level (terrorism-implicit interaction term: $t=-0.334$ $p>|t|=.090$ coefficient=-0.334; terrorism-explicit interaction term: $t=0.342$ $p>|t|=.077$ coefficient=0.342). Comparing the two coefficients, the implicit appeal and the explicit appeal appeared to be approximately equally effective in shifting people’s opinions on minority bonus points in Gaokao, just in opposite directions. Only the explicit message made people more likely to voice their anti-minority policy preferences.

Figure 8: Support for Minority Bonus Points in Gaokao
Terrorism-Explicit vs. Terrorism-Implicit




Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on preferential policies. All variables are coded 0-1.

Support for Laws that Accommodate Ethnic Traditions

At this point, one should be able to spot the pattern in these significant cases that made direct comparisons between implicit and explicit appeals. Figure 9 shows the same general trends

in how people with dissimilar latent attitudes answered the survey questions differently after being exposed to the implicit and the explicit appeals. The discrepancy in their reactions was significant (interaction term: $t=-2.69$ $p>|t|=0.008$), but unlike the last two questions, here the comparison was between the two local crime treatments, not terrorism. The separate regressions showed very significant result for the local crime-implicit and control comparison (interaction term: $t=-2.68$ $p>|t|=0.008$ coefficient=-0.456), but not the local crime-explicit and control comparison. Neither condition was effective in priming respondents' latent negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities. Again there was the distinction between effective in shifting respondent's opinions and effective in priming latent negative attitudes. The implicit appeal moved people's opinions but did not make them more likely to express their intolerant stances. The U.S. theory would not have predicted this outcome. In Mendelberg's model, implicit appeals should prime respondents' negative attitudes and make them less likely to embrace preferential policies towards the ethnic minorities.

Figure 9: Support for Laws that Accommodate Ethnic Traditions
Local Crime-Explicit vs. Local Crime-Implicit



Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on preferential policies. All variables are coded 0-1.

Han in Government Leadership

When directly comparing the local crime explicit and implicit conditions, the coefficient of the interaction term was not significant because both conditions prompted shifts in the same direction. The local crime-implicit article did not necessarily significantly shift respondents' policy preferences to thinking there were too few Hans in leaderships of central and local governments (interaction term: $t=1.14$ $p>|t|=0.256$ coefficient=0.184). However, the local crime-explicit article significantly helped to expose the concealed negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities significantly ($t=2.71$ $p>|t|=0.007$ coefficient=0.412). Here the explicit condition was more effective in priming respondents' negative predispositions.

Ethnic Minorities in Government Leadership

“In general, do you think there are far too few, a little bit too few, just about the right number, a little bit too many, or far too many of people from the groups below (Ethnic Minorities) in leaderships of the central government and local governments at all levels?”

Because of the significant result from the last question, one would expect to see the same from this question. Since government leadership positions can only be held by either Hans or ethnic minorities, respondents who answered that there were too many Hans for the last question should state that there are too few ethnic minorities for this question (unless they were thinking in terms of absolute numbers, not proportions). Therefore, I would expect this question to produce some significant results as well. However, none of the results from this question were significant, indicating the potential inconsistency in respondents' answers. This could be due to the low level of political knowledge of the average Chinese citizen or the fact that ordinary Chinese citizens are not very proficient in responding to surveys that include questions that are political in nature.

Support for 56 Ethnic Groups Are One Family


Do you agree that “56 ethnic groups are one family”?

This question referred to a very famous saying that people almost always mention when discussing ethnic relations in China. It represents a very conventional belief of the society, and interestingly the question demonstrated one of the few results that conformed to the U.S. racial priming theory to some extent. The reactions were significantly different for the high-resentment and low resentment individuals (interaction term: $t=2.24$ $p>|t|=.027$ coefficient=0.313). People who were intolerant of ethnic minorities were more likely to disagree with the statement after exposure to the local crime-implicit appeal than after exposure to the local crime-explicit appeal.

This was consistent with Mendelberg’s theory that only implicit appeals are effective. However, under the explicit condition, the ethnic liberals actually held more intolerant views towards minorities, and this difference was significant (non-overlapping confidence intervals on the left side of the graph).

After running separate regressions comparing the local crime-implicit and the local crime-explicit treatments to the control group, neither regression had a significant interaction term. According to the U.S. theory, the local crime-explicit interaction term should have an insignificant p-value, which was confirmed in this case. I was not able to verify the implicit treatment’s priming effects on respondents. Nevertheless, it is promising that the outcome reported in the previous paragraph is in accordance with the U.S. implicit-explicit model.

Figure 10: 56 Ethnic Groups Are One Family
Local Crime-Explicit vs. Local Crime-Implicit



Notes: Confidence intervals in the figure are 95%. Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate more intolerant views on ethnic minorities. All variables are coded 0-1.

Non Ethnicity-Related Issues

Assessment of the Number of Lazy People in the City

To reiterate, this question intended to employ “lazy people” as a “code word”. Ideally, respondents would make the association between this phrase and the Uyghurs in the city when reading the question. This is another case where the direct comparison did not produce significant results due to the change in the same direction induced by the terrorism-implicit and the terrorism-explicit appeals. Comparing the two positive coefficients in separate regressions with the control group as the reference category, one can claim that here the terrorism-explicit message was more effective in priming people’s negative ethnic attitudes than the terrorism implicit message (terrorism-explicit interaction term: $t=2.03$ $p>|t|=0.044$ coefficient=0.431; terrorism-implicit interaction term: $t=1.35$ $p>|t|=0.178$ coefficient=0.295). The fact that the p-value of the terrorism-implicit interaction term was not significant does not really jeopardize the tentative conclusion since it only indicates that the terrorism-implicit condition did not change opinions that much.

Egalitarian Views – Equal Treatment

Recall the results reported in the previous section that explored whether there were priming effects in China; this was the only question that rendered two significant results – both for the terrorism-implicit condition and the terrorism-explicit condition. Here when directly comparing these two treatments, the coefficient of the interaction term was not significant because both conditions actually prompted shifts in the same direction. The respondents expressed less egalitarian views after both of the treatments compared to the control condition. With the two regressions that examined each treatment separately, this was a rare case that a very reliable comparison could be made because they both had significant p-values for the interaction

terms (terrorism-implicit interaction term: $t=2.29$ $p>|t|=0.023$ coefficient=0.397; terrorism-explicit interaction term: $t=2.92$ $p>|t|=0.004$ coefficient=0.521). These coefficients suggested that the explicit appeal was more effective in priming respondents' latent negative attitudes than the implicit appeal. In other words, the explicit appeal made high-resentment individuals more likely to disagree with the statement that equal treatment would diminish the problems China faces, compared to the implicit appeal.

From the results reported above, I observed the pattern that explicit appeals were generally more effective than implicit appeals, in opposition to the U.S. theory. Even when implicit appeals were effective in changing opinions, they tended to not shift respondents' stances in directions that the implicit-explicit model would have predicted. This is consistent with the fact that the previous section finds most of the significant priming effect cases to be under explicit conditions. Several questions rendered results that corresponded with Mendelberg's model to some extent, but they were in the minority.

Crime versus Terrorism Appeals

The previous section explored the effectiveness of implicit and explicit appeals in priming. Here, I compare the effectiveness of crime and terrorism appeals, which is not a part of the U.S. theory but relevant to China's case. Mendelberg's theory does not explore whether the gravity of the issue mentioned in an appeal is important in eliciting priming. Recall that the general stereotypes of Uyghurs include both "criminals" and "terrorists". Presumably, these two stereotypes trigger very different levels of threat for an average person – terrorist attacks are much more severe situations than local crimes. In this section, I try to investigate whether

terrorism messages, compared to local crime messages, would make implicit or explicit appeals more effective. Similar to the previous section, I only compared treatments with the same type of appeal (either implicit or explicit). I ran regressions on specific conditions with interactions. The control group served as the reference category. Again, all analyses controlled for respondents' educational attainment. I first report the results under explicit conditions, then continue into implicit conditions. To reiterate, the only difference between the local crime and terrorism messages was the sentence "the police suspect this incident to be part of a series of small terrorist attacks."

Local Crime-Explicit versus Terrorism-Explicit

Support for Lenient Minority Crime Policy

A previously noted, the comparison between the terrorism-explicit condition and the control group revealed a significant result (interaction term: $t=2.26$ $p>|t|=0.025$, coefficient=0.437). Therefore, I further examined the effect the local crime-explicit condition induced. It turned out that the regression with the control group as the reference category did not have a significant interaction term. This insignificance suggests that the terrorism appeal was probably more effective in priming than the crime appeal. This supports my fourth hypothesis, albeit limited to explicit messages.

Han in Government Leadership

The local crime-explicit condition significantly helped reveal respondents' latent attitudes, in that the high-resentment individuals were more likely to express support for fewer ethnic minorities in government leaderships ($t=2.71$ $p>|t|=0.007$ coefficient=0.412). Nevertheless, the corresponding effect of the terrorism-explicit condition was marginal (interaction term: $t=1.06$

$p=0.289$ coefficient=0.183). This seems to indicate that, at least for this question, the local crime condition was more effective than the terrorism condition, which opposes the hypothesis.

Assessment of the Number of Lazy People in the City

The previous result of this question showed that the terrorism-explicit treatment significantly induced priming ($t=2.03$ $p>|t|=0.044$ coefficient=0.431). Thus, I compared it to the local crime-explicit condition regression. The outcome was not statistically significant. To some extent, this suggests that the terrorism message was more effective than the crime message, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4.

Egalitarian Views – Equal Treatment

In the previous section, this question allowed me to draw more reliable inferences because both coefficients for the paired comparison were significant. However, just as with other analyses within this section, the paired separate regression comparisons only produced a significant result in one of the conditions. The terrorism-explicit appeal elicited ethnic priming (interaction term: $t=2.92$ $p>|t|=0.004$ coefficient=0.521). Nonetheless, the local crime-explicit treatment was not as efficacious (interaction term: $t=1.57$ $p>|t|=0.117$ coefficient=0.245). So, the terrorism message appeared to be more effective, bolstering our hypothesis.

Local Crime-Implicit versus Terrorism-Implicit

Support for Laws that Accommodate Ethnic Traditions

The regression comparing the local crime-implicit treatment with the control condition resulted in a significant interaction ($t=-2.68$ $p>|t|=0.008$ coefficient=-0.456). The corresponding comparison between the terrorism-implicit treatment and the control group, however, did not provide a significant result. Nonetheless, notice that the significant coefficient was negative for the local crime-implicit regression, meaning the treatment actually made the ethnic conservatives

more accepting of minority-friendly policies. Therefore, one should characterize the results of this question as neither implicit treatment was effective in priming respondents' negative latent attitudes.

Egalitarian Views – Equal Treatment

From the previous section, one should have learned that the terrorism-implicit condition significantly induced priming (interaction term: $t=2.29$ $p>|t|=0.023$ coefficient=0.397). However, the corresponding local crime-implicit treatment regression showed an insignificant interaction. Under the implicit framework, this corroborates our hypothesis that terrorism messages are more effective than local crime messages in priming. For this question, the respondents who received the former were more likely to voice their opposition to egalitarian views.

The results indicate mixed patterns of the efficacy comparison between terrorism messages and local crime messages. The terrorism appeals made the explicit conditions “more effective” in priming than the local crime appeals did (with the exception of the “Han in government leadership” question). However, there was not enough evidence to reach a definitive conclusion for the implicit conditions. This was expected because previous results in this study indicate that implicit appeals in general are not as effective in priming Han Chinese' latent negative attitudes. Note that for each of the paired comparisons, only one of the specific treatments produced a significant result. The tentative conclusions presented above were not based on comparing coefficients, but simply examining which regressions rendered significant interactions. Therefore, it is important to clarify that the statement about a treatment being “more effective” was merely referring to the contrast of *having* and *not having* priming effects, not

necessarily which treatment induced more priming. In the next chapter, I will discuss in more detail the finding reported in this chapter.

Chapter Six

Discussion of Findings

In this chapter, I will connect the results reported previously with the hypotheses and provide potential explanations. I will also point out the limitations of the study. In sum, the experiment results provided some good evidence to evaluate the hypotheses proposed, although not all the hypotheses were supported and there were certainly some peculiar results that did not fit into the general pattern.

First, I was able to confirm that priming exists in China. It can be induced by questions that specifically address ethnic minority policies *and* questions that do not mention minorities specifically. This takes priming out of the U.S.-specific racial context. It suggests that priming may be a “universal” phenomenon. As long as there is an in-group-out-group dynamic where the majority group holds some latent negative attitudes towards the minority group, messages containing stereotypical minority-related appeals could make people belonging to the majority group more likely to embrace anti-minority policies or express anti-minority sentiments.

Second, it is true that explicit appeals are not consistently rejected in China. In fact, ethnic priming mostly took place after respondents were exposed to explicit conditions. Most significant interactions in the general analyses were for explicit conditions. The same was true when comparisons were made for specific conditions and the control group. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Given the various negative stereotypes and discrimination against the ethnic minorities are much more pronounced in China than in the U.S., the Chinese seem to care less about “political correctness.” Therefore, explicit appeals do not deter them much from expressing anti-minority attitudes.

The most crucial and interesting component of the U.S. priming theory is that explicit appeals are not likely to work while implicit appeals are able to prime people's latent attitudes towards blacks. This is based on the assumption that white Americans endorse the "norm of equality" and try to avoid violating it. In Chapter 3, I proposed two sets of hypotheses based on the possible scenarios concerning the establishment of this norm in the Chinese society. Due to the fact that results from the experiment diverge from the implicit-explicit model starkly – explicit appeals appeared to be more effective than implicit appeals – it is reasonable to state that the "norm" is not established. This indicates that despite government's preferential policies and efforts to promote equality officially, the goal has not been achieved. At least in my sample, the Chinese were not afraid of expressing their negative attitudes under explicit appeals. This suggests that if the Chinese government is serious about promoting equality among all ethnic groups, they still have a long road ahead. Note that despite the reported findings in the previous chapter, the majority of the post-survey questions and conditions did not provide statistically significant results.

One noticeable question showed results that were more consistent with the U.S. theory compared to the rest: "Do you agree that '56 ethnic groups are one family'?" Ethnic conservatives were more likely to disagree with the statement under the implicit treatment than under the explicit treatment. This question addressed what was the closest to a norm among all the survey questions. The statement is almost unavoidable when discussing ethnic minority related issues, and most of the Chinese are familiar with it. In my sample, 83.90% of the respondents stated that they strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. In the related question that asked whether participants think any ethnic groups should not be considered a part of this family, only 11 out of the 430 respondents answered affirmatively. Therefore, the specific

outcome of this question could be a sign suggesting that if the norm of equality among ethnic groups is established, Han Chinese are likely to behave similarly to white Americans in terms of responding to racial or ethnic appeals.

Returning to the general pattern, I found that the explicit appeals were more likely to make the high-resentment respondents display their latent attitudes in policy preferences. The low-resentment respondents, on the other hand, either were not affected or were more likely to support pro-minority policies under the explicit appeals. At the same time, the implicit appeals made the ethnic conservatives more likely to embrace preferential policies towards ethnic minorities but made ethnic liberals more likely to oppose such policies. These patterns are very different from the U.S. implicit-explicit model. The latter one concerning the implicit appeals was extremely counter-intuitive. Here I attempt to provide potential explanations.

The most straightforward explanation would be that these two groups of people are fundamentally different in certain characteristics. Nonetheless, after examining all the demographic information I collected in the survey (gender, age, educational attainment, travel experience, and income) there seemed to be no significant differences between the two groups in these attributes. Of course, there could be other variables that render the two types of respondents' incomparable. However, the two potential moderators of priming addressed by the U.S. literature — education and gender — were not the likely reasons why high and low resentment groups moved in different directions after being exposed to treatments. Because of the unobservable traits, this can still be a potential explanation.

Another possibility is that the respondents were not necessarily thinking about ethnic minorities when answering the post-treatment survey. Some alternative reasons may have driven their responses. If the respondents chose their policy preferences based on their attitudes towards

crime in general, which is related to their predispositions on ethnic minorities but not so highly correlated, it could lead to unexpected patterns of reactions. If this is the case, one would find that in the control group, respondents' resentment scores do not really correlate with their answers (i.e. high resentment participants were not more likely to favor anti-minority policies, and low resentment participants were not more likely to opt for minority-friendly stances). This was confirmed by exploring the correlation between the resentment scores and the various post-survey question results. Although the current information does not contradict this explanation, more evidence is needed before one could conclude that this is the actual mechanism. Note that this does not conflict with the fundamentals of priming, because the "real cause" of opinion change is also related to attitudes towards minorities. There could be other mechanisms that explain the confounding patterns I found in the study, and this aspect of the research on ethnic priming in China definitely needs more exploration.

Concerning the last hypothesis I raised in Chapter 3, I received mixed and inconclusive results from my sample. Because the rationale of the original hypothesis contains an emotional component, the lack of strong pattern could be because the treatment conditions elicited similar levels of negative emotional responses. Recall that I performed t-tests comparing respondents' answers to questions concerning emotions after reading the articles. It turned out that the levels of all three emotions (i.e. angry, scared, and anxious) that the terrorism conditions and the local crime conditions elicited were similar across the treatments. This could be the reason why there was no strong pattern for the effectiveness of the terrorism and crime messages. Maybe the additional sentence "the police suspect this incident to be part of a series of small terrorist attacks" was not enough to convince the respondents that the threat of terrorism was imminent.

This study has some limitations due to the methodology employed. The most obvious is the fact that the entire design of testing priming was transported directly from the U.S. I expect similar designs to have similar effects on people, but after all, the design was used in a completely new environment and cultural context. For example, racial resentment scale's effectiveness in discovering Americans' latent attitudes has been extensively tested in the U.S.; whether or not it would similarly enable researchers to learn Chinese people's real attitudes about ethnic minorities remained uncertain. In addition, questions that attempt to utilize "code words" that work in the U.S. could fail to bring respondents to think about ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the study used a convenience sample from the coastal province of Zhejiang, China. It was not a representative sample. There might be regional differences concerning people's attitudes and levels of acceptance of the norm as suggested by Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin (2010).

Another concern is whether respondents answered the survey honestly or reflective of their real opinions. Although I provided monetary compensation as an incentive for participants to answer honestly, surveys containing political content could lead to severe self-censoring among the highly educated Chinese. They might not want to disclose their discontent with government policies in fear of being discovered and punished by the Party. The less educated Chinese, however, are not likely to encounter surveys with political content. Thus, they might not be sophisticated enough to understand the questions and choose the options that reflect their real attitudes.

Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to find out whether some of these limitations actually affected the results reported in this thesis. I pointed them out here in order to caution researchers who might be interested in doing priming studies in China in the future.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
-- Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*
先知迂直之计者胜，此军争之法也。——孙子兵法 军争篇

Researchers in the U.S. have established a model of racial priming to understand how different types of racialized messages influence one's political decision making. In this thesis, I have attempted to jump outside of the binary racial discussion in the U.S. literature and expand the theory to a different in-group-out-group dynamic – the Han versus other ethnic minority groups, especially the Uyghurs in China. The results support that ethnic priming exists in China. Depending on their predispositions towards ethnic minorities, Han Chinese do change their policy preferences following exposure to ethnic messages. However, the implicit-explicit model does not seem to apply to this case: explicit appeals are not consistently rejected; in fact, they are the more effective kind of appeals compared to the implicit ones. This indicates that one of the assumptions in the U.S. model might not be met – the “norm of equality” among ethnic groups is not yet widely accepted by Han Chinese thus they do not try to avoid violating it. Messages that contain ethnic appeals did not shift people's opinion across the board, but I did observe effects for questions pertaining to law and social policy, government leadership, perceptions of the society, and egalitarian views. Although there are large discrepancies between how priming operates in China and in the U.S., the difference in assumptions suggests that the priming theory does not lose its value across borders or culture.

This project also raises many questions and provides potential directions for future studies. Researchers should investigate the confusing pattern under implicit appeal conditions

where ethnic liberals are more likely to oppose minority-friendly policies whereas ethnic conservatives are less likely to do so. In addition, scholars can explore different groups' susceptibility to priming, searching for moderators of ethnic priming in China. This study was conducted in a coastal province. Because of the regionally concentrated tension, experiments conducted in the west border region might produce different results. Furthermore, testing how priming operates with other minorities in China would provide interesting avenues of exploration. Tibetans and Huis might be two intriguing options. The former group suffers stereotypes similar to Uyghurs, as they are often seen as ungrateful, restive, and associated with separatism as well as terrorism. In contrast, the latter is a Muslim group but generally is not subjected to much discrimination. They usually do not have distinctive physical characteristics, and are viewed more favorably by Han Chinese because they are "cleaner". In order to make them recognizable, images in the implicit appeals design can include ethnic clothing. A comparison among these three ethnic minority groups and all the aforementioned directions would provide more insights on how ethnic priming works in China.

From these results, China still has a long road ahead in promoting ethnic equality. If the Chinese government genuinely wishes to have an equal society, they should make a two-step effort. The first is to reach the stage that the U.S. is at right now, where the society accepts the norm of equality and rejects overt expressions of negative stereotypes. Due to the extremely small population of ethnic minorities and their geographical concentration, a movement all across the country demanding equality is unlikely, which puts more burden on the government to communicate the messages of equality to the general public. Afterwards, as Mendelberg suggests in her book, comes the much more challenging task of confronting the predispositions that lead

people to stereotype, fear, or resent the minority group. If Chinese authority truly values “harmony,” they should make a concerted effort to achieve these goals.

However, recall that some claim that the CCP is making “pseudo efforts” to address ethnic discrimination; while they publicly endorse ethnic equality, they are also preserving mechanisms to stimulate anti-minority sentiment when it is politically expedient. If this “pseudo efforts” assertion is true, then it is unfortunate that this study possibly just provided the authority with some advice on how to induce the effects more efficiently when they need the hostility and fissure to avoid negative domestic repercussions following future crackdowns or human rights violations against ethnic minorities.

No matter which scenario is true, the idea that political elites have the capability to subtly and tacitly manipulate public opinion utilizing a society’s stereotypes and misconceptions is deeply troubling. We can only hope that the elites in China are truly committed to making “56 ethnic groups’ brothers and sisters one big family” and can refrain themselves from taking advantage of the concept of priming. Hopefully one day, China will reach that “new frontier” of ethnic equality.

Appendix 1: Map of China



Source: Nations Online Project (2015)

Appendix 2: Pre-Test Survey

1. What is your gender?
 - a. Female
 - b. Male

2. What is your age? _____ years

3. What is your ethnic identity? _____

4. What is your occupation? _____

We would like to ask you several questions about different groups in society.

5. Below are some statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
a. Success comes from hard work; if women would only work harder they could be as successful as men.				
b. Success comes from hard work; if Uyghurs would only work harder they could be as successful as Han.				
c. Success comes from hard work; if the poor would only work harder they could be as successful as the rich.				
d. Many groups in our country have faced disadvantages and overcome them without special treatment, women should do the same.				
e. Many groups in our country have faced disadvantages and overcome them without special treatment, Uyghurs should do the same.				
f. Many groups in our country have faced disadvantages and overcome them without special treatment, the poor should do the same.				
g. Nowadays, women are discriminated by many in the society.				
h. Nowadays, Uyghurs are discriminated by many in the society.				
i. Nowadays, the poor are discriminated by many in the society.				

6. We are interested in people's financial circumstances these days. Would you say that you and your family living with you are better off, neither better off nor worse off, or worse off financially than you were a year ago?
 - a. Better off
 - b. Neither better off nor worse off
 - c. Worse off

7. Is religion an important part of your life, or not?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

8. In general, do you think the government is doing a good job raising people's standard of living?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

9. In general, do you think China is playing a more important role on the world stage than before?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

We would like to ask you several questions about sympathy for different groups in society.

10. Please tell us how often you have felt sympathy for Uyghurs.
 - a. Always
 - b. Often
 - c. Sometimes
 - d. Seldom
 - e. Never

11. Please tell us how often you have felt sympathy for women.
 - a. Always
 - b. Often
 - c. Sometimes
 - d. Seldom
 - e. Never

12. Please tell us how often you have felt sympathy for people with disabilities.
 - a. Always
 - b. Often
 - c. Sometimes
 - d. Seldom
 - e. Never

13. Please tell us how often you have felt sympathy for the poor.

- a. Always
- b. Often
- c. Sometimes
- d. Seldom
- e. Never

14. Please tell us how often you have felt sympathy for migrant workers.

- a. Always
- b. Often
- c. Sometimes
- d. Seldom
- e. Never

15. What is your highest level of formal education you have completed or you are currently pursuing? Please check the appropriate box.

Elementary school		College or tertiary vocational/technical school	
Middle school		Currently pursuing college or tertiary vocational/technical degree	
High school or secondary vocational/technical school		Master's or above	
Currently pursuing high school or secondary vocational/technical school degree		Currently pursuing Master's degree or above	
Please specify if none of the choice applies: _____			

16. How government makes policy has nothing to do with opinions from people like me.

- a. Yes
- b. No

17. Some people think that women should have an equal role with men in the workplace, others think that women's place is in the home. What do you think?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Equal with men in the work place						Women's place is in the home

18. How many hours of television do you watch every week?

- a. Less than 5 hours
- b. 5 to 10 hours (not including 10 hours)

- c. 10 to 20 hours (not including 20 hours)
- d. 20 or more hours

19. How often do you travel out of mainland China


- a. Frequently
- b. Sometimes
- c. Seldom
- d. Never

20. Do you play any of the following sports (choose multiple if applies)?

- a. Soccer
- b. Basketball
- c. Ping pong
- d. Badminton
- e. Tennis
- f. Golf
- g. None of the above

Thank you for answering all the questions above. Now, you are going to read an article. The article is randomly selected from a group of articles on various topics.

Appendix 3: Local Crime-Explicit Treatment



Three Uyghur Males Stab and Rob Pedestrian



Three Uyghur males were apprehended on November 19 after stabbing and robbing a pedestrian. The three men allegedly stabbed the pedestrian three times and stole victim's wallet and cellphone worth more than 1000 yuan combined. Three men approached the pedestrian from behind. The man with a knife, Batur Ezmet (巴图尔·艾孜买提) (picture on the left), stabbed the victim three times, once in the chest, once on stomach, and once on right leg. After grabbing victim's wallet and cellphone, the three perpetrators ran to a car waiting across the street.

A witness called 110 and 120 around 9:45 p.m. saying that three suspects had stabbed a pedestrian and requested an ambulance. The victim was taken to the hospital, and is now in stable condition.

A police officer at a nearby station saw the getaway car fleeing west. Police chased the vehicle for half an hour before the vehicle lost control and crashed into the central green belt. The suspects then fled from the vehicle, running into nearby shrubbery. All three suspects were apprehended by police officers on foot, and are now under police custody. This is the third time in a month that a stab-rob-and-run incident occurred in Xihu district of Hangzhou.


三名维族男子捅伤抢劫路人

11月19日，三名维吾尔族男子因捅伤并抢劫路人被逮捕。据悉，三名嫌疑人在捅了路人三刀后抢走了其钱包和手机，价值总计超过一千元。三名男子从身后靠近路人。持刀歹徒巴图尔·艾孜买提（左图）在受害者胸口、胃部、右腿连捅三刀。三名歹徒在抢走受害者的钱包及手机后跑向在马路对面等待的接应车辆。

一名目击者在晚上9点45分左右拨打了110和120，向警方通报了三名嫌疑人捅伤路人的情况并叫了救护车。受害者被送往医院救治，目前情况已经稳定。

一名在附近执勤的警官目击逃逸车辆向西驶去。在被警方追击半小时后，该车失去控制撞向中央绿化带。三名嫌疑人随后弃车跑进附近的树丛。三人均被警方徒步抓获，目前在派出所拘留。此次事件是这个月来杭州市西湖区发生的第三起捅伤抢劫路人逃逸的事件。

Appendix 4: Local Crime-Implicit Treatment



Three Males Stab and Rob Pedestrian



Three males were apprehended on November 19 after stabbing and robbing a pedestrian. The three men allegedly stabbed the pedestrian three times and stole victim's wallet and cellphone worth more than 1000 yuan combined. Three men approached the pedestrian from behind. The man with a knife (picture on the left) stabbed the victim three times, once in the chest, once on stomach, and once on right leg. After grabbing victim's wallet and cellphone, the three perpetrators ran to a car waiting across the street.

A witness called 110 and 120 around 9:45 p.m. saying that three suspects had stabbed a pedestrian and requested an ambulance. The victim was taken to the hospital, and is now in stable condition.

A police officer at a nearby station saw the getaway car fleeing west. Police chased the vehicle for half an hour before the vehicle lost control and crashed into the central green belt. The suspects then fled from the vehicle, running into nearby shrubbery. All three suspects were apprehended by police officers on foot, and are now under police custody. This is the third time in a month that a stab-rob-and-run incident occurred in Xihu district of Hangzhou.

三名男子捅伤抢劫路人

11月19日，三名男子因捅伤并抢劫路人被逮捕。据悉，三名嫌疑人在捅了路人三刀后抢走了其钱包和手机，价值总计超过一千元。三名男子从身后靠近路人。持刀歹徒（左图）在受害者胸口、胃部、右腿连捅三刀。三名歹徒在抢走受害者的钱包及手机后跑向在马路对面等待的接应车辆。

一名目击者在晚上9点45分左右拨打了110和120，向警方通报了三名嫌疑人捅伤路人的情况并叫了救护车。受害者被送往医院救治，目前情况已经稳定。

一名在附近执勤的警官目击逃逸车辆向西驶去。在被警方追击半小时后，该车失去控制撞向中央绿化带。三名嫌疑人随后弃车跑进附近的树丛。三人均被警方徒步抓获，目前在派出所拘留。此次事件是这个月来杭州市西湖区发生的第三起捅伤抢劫路人逃逸的事件。

Appendix 5: Terrorism-Explicit Treatment



Three Uyghur Males Stab and Rob Pedestrian



Three Uyghur males were apprehended on November 19 after stabbing and robbing a pedestrian. The police suspect this incident to be part of a series of small terrorist attacks. The three men allegedly stabbed the pedestrian three times and stole victim's wallet and cellphone worth more than 1000 yuan combined. Three men approached the pedestrian from behind. The man with a knife, Batur Ezmet (巴图尔·艾孜买提) (picture on the left), stabbed the victim three times, once in the chest, once on stomach, and once on right leg. After grabbing victim's wallet and cellphone, the three perpetrators ran to a car waiting across the street.

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
三名维族男子捅伤抢劫路人

11月19日，三名维吾尔族男子因捅伤并抢劫路人被逮捕。警方怀疑此案是一系列小规模暴力恐怖袭击的一部分。据悉，三名嫌疑人在捅了路人三刀后抢走了其钱包和手机，价值总计超过一千元。三名男子从身后靠近路人。持刀歹徒巴图尔·艾孜买提（左图）在受害者胸口、胃部、右腿连捅三刀。三名歹徒在抢走受害者的钱包及手机后跑向在马路对面等待的接应车辆。

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Appendix 6: Terrorism-Implicit Treatment



Three Males Stab and Rob Pedestrian



Three males were apprehended on November 19 after stabbing and robbing a pedestrian. The police suspect this incident to be part of a series of small terrorist attacks. The three men allegedly stabbed the pedestrian three times and stole victim's wallet and cellphone worth more than 1000 yuan combined. Three men approached the pedestrian from behind. The man with a knife, (picture on the left) stabbed the victim three times, once in the chest, once on stomach, and once on right leg. After grabbing victim's wallet and cellphone, the three perpetrators ran to a car waiting across the street.

A witness called 110 and 120 around 9:45 p.m. saying that three suspects had stabbed a pedestrian and requested an ambulance. The victim was taken to the hospital, and is now in stable condition.

A police officer at a nearby station saw the getaway car fleeing west. Police chased the vehicle for half an hour before the vehicle lost control and crashed into the central green belt. The suspects then fled from the vehicle, running into nearby shrubbery. All three suspects were apprehended by police officers on foot, and are now under police custody. This is the third time in a month that a stab-rob-and-run incident occurred in Xihu district of Hangzhou.

三名男子捅伤抢劫路人

11月19日，三名男子因捅伤并抢劫路人被逮捕。警方怀疑此案是一系列小规模暴力恐怖袭击的一部分。据悉，三名嫌疑人在捅了路人三刀后抢走了其钱包和手机，价值总计超过一千元。三名男子从身后靠近路人。持刀歹徒（左图）在受害者胸口、胃部、右腿连捅三刀。三名歹徒在抢走受害者的钱包及手机后跑向在马路对面等待的接应车辆。

一名目击者在晚上9点45分左右拨打了110和120，向警方通报了三名嫌疑人捅伤路人的情况并叫了救护车。受害者被送往医院救治，目前情况已经稳定。

一名在附近执勤的警官目击逃逸车辆向西驶去。在被警方追击半小时后，该车失去控制撞向中央绿化带。三名嫌疑人随后弃车跑进附近的树丛。三人均被警方徒步抓获，目前在派出所拘留。此次事件是这个月来杭州市西湖区发生的第三起捅伤抢劫路人逃逸的事件。

Appendix 7: Control Story¹



Is Eating More Eggs Better for You?

Eggs are nutritious. The nutrient most used by human body is protein. An egg weighs around 50 grams, and 7 grams of it is protein. The proportion of protein eggs have is suitable for human need, and easy to absorb. It is high quality. Protein is indispensable for muscle building. Consuming abundant amount of protein leads to muscle growth, increase in metabolism, and weight loss. However, is it true that the more eggs you eat the better?

Although eggs are nutritious, it is not good for you if you eat too many. Eating too many eggs results in too high of a protein level in your body, this can be harmful. Sometimes it can cause symptoms of protein toxicity. In addition, egg yolks contain high level of cholesterol, which is not good if you consume too much. Regular people can eat one to two eggs every day. However, if you are an athlete or personal trainer who is building muscles, you can eat several more. We recommend eating egg white only starting from the second egg.

There are many ways to cook eggs, and we recommend boiled or steamed eggs. Many people like eating fried eggs, but the edges can be burnt, forming toxic chemicals. Boiled egg is easy to cook and nutritious, but you need to pay attention to timing. Do not boil an egg for too long – five to seven minutes is enough.

鸡蛋吃得越多越好吗？

鸡蛋营养丰富，其中最为人们所利用的是其蛋白质，一个鸡蛋约 50 克，其中便含有 7 克的蛋白质。鸡蛋的蛋白质的比例合适人体生理需要，容易被吸收，是一种优质蛋白。而蛋白质是肌肉增长不可获取的营养，摄入充足的蛋白质促使肌肉生长，提高代谢，有助于减肥。那是不是鸡蛋吃得越多越好呢？

鸡蛋虽然营养，但是多吃也不好。多吃鸡蛋，体内蛋白质含量过高，则对人体有害。有时会出现“蛋白质中毒综合征”。另外，蛋黄中含有较高的胆固醇，多吃无益。一般人一天吃 1-2 个即可，但是如果有增肌需要的运动员或者健身教练，可以多吃几个鸡蛋。建议从第二个鸡蛋开始就不要吃蛋黄了，只吃蛋白即可。

鸡蛋的烹饪方式多种，建议尽量水煮或蒸。煎鸡蛋很多人都爱吃，但是煎鸡蛋边缘会被烤焦，形成有毒的化学物质。水煮鸡蛋简单并且营养，但是水煮时间要把握好，不要煮太久了，一般煮 5-7 分钟就可以。

¹ “Yitian chi yige jidan neng jianfei ma?” 一天吃一个鸡蛋能减肥吗？ [Can Eating an Egg Everyday Help You Lose Weight?], *NetEase Health*, accessed October 16, 2015, <http://jiankang.163.com/15/1014/07/B5SDVKK10038002S.html>.

Appendix 8: Post-Test Survey

21. What does the story you just read entail?
 - a. Recommendations on ways to cook eggs
 - b. How three suspects fled the crime scene
 - c. Victim of a crime died after being taken to the hospital
 - d. Xiaomi will sell its cellphones in the U.S.
 - e. The more eggs you eat the better

22. Did the story make you feel happy?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

23. Did the story make you feel sad?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

24. Did the story make you feel angry?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

25. Did the story make you feel scared?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

26. Did the story make you feel proud?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

27. Did the story make you feel anxious?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

28. Did the story make you feel disgusted?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No

29. Do you think the government is doing too much, about the right amount, or too little on preventing terrorist attacks?
 - a. Too much
 - b. About the right amount
 - c. Too little

30. Do you think the police is doing too much, about the right amount, or too little on preventing crimes?
 - a. Too much

- b. About the right amount
- c. Too little

31. Some people think that the central government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Uyghurs. Others think that the government should not make any special effort to help Uyghurs because they should help themselves. What do you think?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Government Help						Help Themselves

32. As you may or may not know, in 1984 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China introduced the criminal policy referred to as “two restraints and one leniency (liang shao yi kuan)”, stating that there should be fewer arrests, fewer death penalties, and greater leniency when dealing with ethnic minority criminals. Do you think this policy is reasonable nowadays?

- a. Very unreasonable
- b. Unreasonable
- c. Reasonable
- d. Very reasonable

33. Do you agree that eventually bonus points for ethnic minority students taking the National College Entrance Examination should be eliminated?

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly Disagree

34. Do you agree that laws should accommodate ethnic traditions?

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly Disagree

35. In general, do you think there are far too few, a little bit too few, just about the right number, a little bit too many, or far too many of people from the groups below in the National People’s Congress and local people’s congresses at all levels?

	Far too few	A little bit too few	Just about the right number	A little bit too many	Far too many
Men					
Women					
Han					
Ethnic minorities					
Rich people					

Middle-class people					
Working-class people					
Poor people					

36. In general, do you think there are far too few, a little bit too few, just about the right number, a little bit too many, or far too many of people from the groups below in leaderships of the central government and local governments at all levels?

	Far too few	A little bit too few	Just about the right number	A little bit too many	Far too many
Men					
Women					
Han					
Ethnic minorities					
Rich people					
Middle-class people					
Working-class people					
Poor people					

37. Do you think there should be more, no more no less, or less Han people in the leadership of autonomous regions/prefectures/counties/etc.?

- a. More
- b. No more, no less
- c. Less

38. Do you agree that the city has too many lazy people?

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly Disagree

39. Do you agree that “56 ethnic groups are one family”?

- a. Strongly Agree
- b. Agree
- c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly Disagree

40. Are there any ethnic groups you think should not be considered a part of this family? Please specify which ethnic group(s) if your answer is “yes”.

- a. Yes _____

- b. No
41. Do you agree that our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed?
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
42. Do you agree that this country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are?
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
43. Do you agree that it is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others?
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
44. Do you agree that if people were treated more equally in this country we would have much fewer problems?
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree nor Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
45. What is your total annual household income?
- a. Less than 30000 yuan
 - b. 30000 – 50000 yuan (not including 50000 yuan)
 - c. 50000 – 75000 yuan (not including 75000 yuan)
 - d. 75000 – 100000 yuan (not including 100000 yuan)
 - e. 100000 – 150000 yuan (not including 150000 yuan)
 - f. 150000 – 300000 yuan (not including 300000 yuan)
 - g. 300000 – 500000 yuan (not including 500000 yuan)
 - h. 500000 yuan or more
 - i. Prefer not to answer

Appendix 9: Respondents' Ethnic Attitudes

Ethnic Resentment Scale				
Statements	Percentages			
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Success comes from hard work; if Uyghurs would only work harder they could be as successful as Han.	8.62	47.71	41.04	3.63
Many groups in our country have faced disadvantages and overcome them without special treatment, Uyghurs should do the same.	2.71	26.92	63.12	7.24
Nowadays, Uyghurs are discriminated by many in the society.	18.10	58.60	19.46	3.85

Ethnic Sympathy Measure					
Question	Percentages				
	Always	Often	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
Please tell us how often you have felt sympathy for Uyghurs.	4.51	8.35	27.54	28.67	30.93

Two-Question Ethnic Attitude Scale							
Score	0	.165	.33 or .335	.5	.665 or .67	.835	1
Percentage	1.59	4.99	20.63	32.20	33.33	5.22	2.04

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