Buddhist Critiques of the Veda and Vedic Sacrifice:

A Study of Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃsā Chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and Tarkajvālā

by

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yasya kasya taror mūlaṁ yena kenāpi miśritam/
yasmāi kasmāi pradātavyaṁ yad vā tad vā bhavisyati//

One mixes the root of this or that tree with this or that.

It is to be given to somebody. Then something will happen.

(Subhāṣitam from Madhav M. Deshpande’s Samskṛtasubodhini, p. 414)
DEDICATION

To Minkyung

who dreamed the same dream with me
I am fortunate to have the following gurus on my dissertation committee. Professor Madhav Deshpande, my advisor, taught me the dharma of being a Sanskrit scholar. He showed me the world of Sanskrit, inspired me to experience the depth of each line of text, and taught me to appreciate its beauty. Professor Donald Lopez taught me the dharma of professionalism. He guided me to face the real problem and to take the right path. Most importantly, they both demonstrated to me what it means to be a scholar with the manner in which they live their everyday lives. This dissertation is mainly a product of my encounter with these two masters.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK  Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu
AKBh  Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu
D  sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan ’gyur
GBh  Gauḍapādabhāṣya of Gauḍapāda
JM  Jayamaṅgalā
M  Māṭharavṛtti
MHK  Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā of Bhāviveka
MS  Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini
MV  *Mahāvibhāṣā
NA  *Nyāyānusāra of Saṅghabhadra
NRĀ  Nyāyaratṇākara of Pārthasārathi
PP  Prajñāpradīpa of Bhāviveka (PPc: Chinese Translation, PPt: Tibetan Translation)
PV  Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti
PVSV  Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti of Dharmakīrti
ŚBh  Śābarabhāṣya of Śabara (ŚBhF: Śābarabhāṣya on MS 1.1.1-5 edited by Frauwallner (1968), ŚBhK: Śābarabhāṣya on MS 1.1.6-23 edited by Kataoka (2007))
SK  Sāṃkhyaśāstra of Īśvaraśrīnavaśa
Skt.  Sanskrit
SS  *Suvarṇasaptati (金七十論)
ŚV  Ślokavārttika of Kumārila (ŚV co.: Ślokavārttika on MS 1.1.2 edited by viii
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This dissertation examines two Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice that had long histories in Buddhist India, yet ended around the sixth century CE. The last document to inherit the critiques is the ninth Mīmāṃsā chapter of Bhāviveka’s (500-570 CE) Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and its commentary, the Tarkajvālā.

From the earliest texts of their tradition, Buddhists sought to undermine the authority of the canonical Brahmin texts by questioning the integrity of its putative authors and denouncing the immorality of animal sacrifice. These critiques consistently recur in the subsequent Abhidharma literature and provide the basis for Buddhist criticism of the Mīmāṃsakas beginning in the fifth century CE.

The dissertation includes an overview of Bhāviveka’s long chapter on Mīmāṃsā in his Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and reviews previous scholarly opinion on the identity of opponent of the chapter. It next examines how Bhāviveka employed each of the traditional critiques against the new opponent, demonstrating that he drew heavily on the Abhidharma and Sāṃkhya literature to counter the Mīmāṃsaka defense of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, while adding new levels of specificity and sophistication. The dissertation goes on to explore how and why Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita discarded the old strategies and adopted a new
one, declaring the authorless Veda to be unintelligible.

The dissertation concludes that Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃsā chapter is a product of a transitional phase when Buddhists began to perceive the Mīmāṃsakas as a serious threat, resulting in a unique confrontation with Vedic orthodoxy and orthopraxy that drew on anti-Vedic sentiment across the boundaries of Buddhism and Brahmanism.
Introduction

The Veda, the corpus of the earliest documents of Indian civilization, has always been the symbol for the orthodoxy and legitimacy of intellectual pursuits among South Asian religious and scholarly groups. It is in reference to the values for which the word the “Veda” (and “Vedic”) stands that one’s intellectual activity is socially recognized and positioned as demonstrably indicated by the two broad categories of Indian philosophical schools, the “affirmers” (āstika) and the “deniers” (nāstika). The deniers of the Vedic authority, or the “revilers of the Veda” (vedanindaka), Manu prescribes, should be ostracized.1 However nominal the affiliation that one’s tradition has with the Veda, or however scarce one’s thoughts are indebted to the Veda, Brahmins, upon whom intellectual labor is socially entrusted or imposed as the class duty, had to pursue their intellectual goals within the boundaries of and in the acknowledgement of the authority of the Veda.2 And they were constantly open to the critique that they are becoming “nāstika” by contradicting the Veda, as exemplified by the Mīmāṃsaka critic of the Sāṃkhyas in the Yuktidīpikā.3

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1 *Mānavadharmaśāstra* 2.11, “If a twice-born disparages these two [i.e., śruti and smṛti] by relying on the science of logic, he ought to be ostracized by good people as an infidel and a denigrator of the Veda.” (yo ’vamanyeta te tūbhe hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ!); Text and translation are from Olivelle (2005, 94 and 404).

2 See Renou (1965)’s general remark on the “destiny of the Veda” in the post-Vedic period (1-2) and Halbfass (1991, Chapter 1)’s review of it.

3 The Mīmāṃsaka opponent attempted to present the Veda as the common ground of authority (ubhayapakṣaprasiddho hetuh) between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāṃkhyas in the long pūrvapakṣa passage at the *Yuktidīpikā* (Wezler and Motegi 1998) 31:19-34:8. The Mīmāṃsaka arguments introduced therein made the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* explicitly confess (34:10-1): “We do not reject the authority of the Veda.” (na vayaṃ vedasya prāmāṇyaṃ [emended from vedasyaprāmāṇyaṃ] pratyācakṣmahe.) The
Indian Buddhism was born within the Vedic milieu and died within it. Even though they employed the term “nāstika” in different meanings⁴ and abhorred being referred to with that appellation,⁵ the anti-Vedic sentiment is, with varying degrees, prevalent in any Buddhist treatise. From the earliest canonical literature in which the Buddha proclaims the ignorance of Vedic seers (such as the Tevijjasutta) to the tenth to eleventh century logical treatises that formulate a syllogism against the authorlessness of the Veda (such as the Tarkabhāṣā)⁶,

Mīmāṃsaka opponent appears to be Kumārila, as Halbfass (1991:93-4) observes, since the Yutidipikā’s opponent advanced the opinions that “comes surprisingly close to Kumārila’s own argumentation” (ibid., 93) contained in the Slokavārttika, codanā, 231cd-265ab. It is also noteworthy that Kumārila in his Tantravārttika, as Nicholson (2010, 170) and Eltschinger (2014, 67-8) note, treated the Śāṃkhyas as those who are no less heterodox than Buddhists and the Jainas. The relevant passage is translated in Sanderson (2015, 160-1) with an emendation of the text (fn. 12).

⁴ See Nicholson (2010, 172-176) and (2012) for different usages of the terms, āstika and nāstika, in the Jain, Buddhist, and Grammarian traditions.

⁵ Bhāviveka violently reacts to the Yogācāra opponent’s accusation of being nāstika (translated as “nihilist” in the following quote) against the Mādhyamikas. MHK 5.82-3, “[Opponent:] If things have no inherent nature, conventional designations also will not exist. He [who propounds this] is a nihilist to whom one should not talk and with whom one should not dwell together (82). Not only is such a [nihilist] himself destined for an unhappy existence, but he also leads others to misery (83ab). [Bhāviveka answers:] Those words are the vomiting of the putrid meat of hatred. They betray your undigested pride. (83cd)” (prajñāpataḥ api asadbhāvo vastvbhāvo bhavet satī taddṛṣṭir nāstiko ‘kathyah sa hy asaṃvāsya eva ca// svayam āpāyikatve ‘sa paresāṃ ca vipādakah/ iti dveṣāṃisodgāro ‘bhīmāñjīrṇāsūcakah/); translation is from Hoornaert (2002, 131-2). See also Eckel (2008, 281-2). As Hoornaert (ibid., 131, fn. 2) and Eckel (ibid., 65-6) note, the Yogācāra opponent’s accusation is based on a passage from the Bodhisattvabhūmi which declares: “whoever denies designation and reality should be known as the worst kind of nihilist (nāstika).” (prajñaptitattvāpavādāc ca pradhāno nāstiko veditavyaḥ); text is from Hoornaert (ibid.) and translation is by Janice Willis quoted in Eckel (ibid.).

Candrakīrti’s response to the same accusation of “the foremost (or the worst kind of) nihilist” (pradhāno nāstikāḥ) against the Mādhyamikas is rather moderate. In the seventeenth chapter of the Prasannapadā, he just flatly denies the accusation. After having invited an opponent who argues that the Mādhyamikas deny action (karman), actor (kartṛ), and fruit (phala) by establishing the emptiness of everything, and therefore, are the foremost nihilists, Candrakīrti answers: “We are not nihilists, but we illuminate the non-dual road leading to the city of nirvāṇa by means of refuting the two philosophical tendencies [rooted in the concepts] of non-existence and existence. Yet, we do not say that the action, the result, the doer and so forth do not exist. Rather, we establish that it is without own-being.” (na vayaṃ nāstikāḥ. nāstvastitvādavayavādānirāsenā tu vayaṃ nirvāṇapurāṇam adhūtātman abhidvātāyāmah. na ca vayaṃ karmakartrpaḥādikām nāstīti brūmaḥ, kin tarhi niṣvābhāvām etad iti vyavasthāpayāmah).; Text and translation are from Kragh (2003, 89 and 263). (The underlined phrase in the translation is missing in Kragh (ibid.), and thus, inserted.) cf. Prasannapadā (De la Vallée Poussin 1913, 329:13-5). Later in the same work (the eighteenth chapter), Candrakīrti discusses the similar accusation that the Mādhyamikas are infiltrated by nāstikas (nāstikāvīśīṣṭā mādhyamikāḥ) more extensively. See Prasannapadā (ibid., 368:4-369:7).

⁶ See Kajiyama (1966, 90). Mokṣākaragupta’s Tarkabhāṣā is said to contain “the contents that the
Buddhists maintained a critical stance toward the Veda until their demise in the homeland India. Indian Buddhists had always been “revilers of the Veda” and, in this regard, Buddhists were representative nāstikas in the perception of orthodox Brahmins. Within the religiously plural society of the ancient and medieval India, this fact of being revilers of the Veda, therefore, constituted an essential social identity of Buddhists.

Although the anti-Vedic identity is the constant and essential feature that defined Buddhism throughout its career in India, its anti-Vedic tendency had not always been explicit and a systematic disputation against the orthodoxy and orthopraxy of Brahmins. In accordance with the historical vicissitudes of pro-/anti-Buddhist socio-political atmospheres in which Indian Buddhism was situated, its anti-Vedic identity was either emphasized or ignored in determining the validity and legitimacy of its teaching. The more harshly Indian Buddhists were condemned by Brahmins for their anti-Vedic heterodoxy, the clearer and sharper Buddhists revealed their animosity toward the Veda and its cultural norms. In the sixth century, the period marked by the fall of the Gupta empire (320-550 CE), the potential of anti-Vedic Buddhist sentiment finds the momentum to evolve into an organized challenge to Brahmin advocates of Vedic values.

In a series of pioneering and ambitious studies which culminated in Buddhist Epistemology as Apologetics (2014), Vincent Eltschinger correctly pinpoints the sixth century CE as the turning point in the history of Indian Buddhism and, focusing on the prominent figure of Dharmakīrti, attempts to reveal the historical background and the apologetic dimension of the seemingly “purely philosophical” project of Buddhist epistemological school that dominated Buddhist intellectuals until the last moment of Buddhism in India. Eltschinger demonstrates that Buddhist philosophy, in its entirety, finally reached” (Tsukamoto, Matsunaga, and Isoda 1990, 480).

Giovanni Verardi’s recent book, Hardships and Downfall of Buddhism in India (2011), skillfully traces the “ups and downs” of favorable socio-political circumstances for Buddhism throughout its history in India.
Brahmin hostility toward Buddhism increased during the Gupta (and the immediately subsequent post-Gupta) era as exemplified by the sixth (or seventh) century Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and reads the two predominant post-sixth century Buddhist trends, namely, Buddhist Esoterism (Tantrism) and Epistemology, as the Buddhist responses to the ever-increasing Brahmin antagonism. In so doing, he makes an important observation on an aspect of the sixth century Indian Buddhism: “by the sixth century, certain segments of the Buddhist monastic elites shaped the modalities of their self-assertion by contrasting themselves no longer with dissenting coreligionists, but with non-Buddhist challengers.”\(^8\) In short, Indian Buddhists of the sixth century came to be more concerned with inter-religious conflicts rather than intra-religious contentions.

Eltschinger, however, curiously does not clearly thematize the prevalent themes that penetrate the materials that bear witness to the increasing Brahmin hostility and does not explicitly identify the major proponents who theorized the growing antagonistic emotion, thereby providing a philosophical foundation for Brahmin anti-Buddhism program. As he convincingly demonstrates, “apocalyptic” materials from the Brahmin side, towards the sixth century (or after 250 CE)\(^9\), changed the direct cause for the advent of the degenerate Kaliyuga from the foreign rules to the heretical, especially Buddhist, teachings. This fact supports the thesis that Brahmin hostility toward Buddhism was heightened around the sixth century.

Yet, there is a shared concern among the pre- and post-250 CE materials. Whomever should be blamed for the collapse of the universe, be it foreigners or heretical religious teachers, the result is the same: the collapse of the social order governed by Vedic values. They cause the neglect of the Veda, the disorder of the four castes, and the discontinuation of Vedic sacrifice.

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\(^8\) Eltschinger (2014, 95); emphasis in the original.
\(^9\) See ibid., 53.
The author who raised this perennial concern of Brahmins to the level of a philosophical critique at Buddhism with unprecedented severity was, as Eltschinger notes, Kumārila, the sixth-seventh century Mīmāṃsaka. Therefore, one important aspect about the “newness” of sixth-century Buddhism consists in the ascendancy of the Mīmāṃsā school, represented by Kumārila, which intensified and systematized the “old” anti-Buddhist feelings among Brahmins for being anti-Vedic.

Reflecting the growing Brahmin hostility and the Mīmāṃsaka systematic articulation of anti-Buddhist animosity, Buddhist scholarly literature around the sixth century also bears witness to the ascendancy of the Mīmāṃsakas as the major adversary. In the fifth century, the Sarvāstivādin master Saṅghabhadra briefly examined the Mīmāṃsaka ideologies on the Veda for the first time in the history of Indian Buddhism. By the time of post-sixth-century works such as the Madhyamakahṛdaya of Bhāviveka (500-570), the Pramāṇavārttika I along with the Svavṛtti of Dharmakīrti (ca. sixth/seventh century), and the Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita (725-788), the Mīmāṃsakas have become by far the most conspicuous opponents of Buddhism. Buddhist intellectuals had come to perceive the Mīmāṃsakas as a serious threat to Buddhism from the fifth century on. That the recent increase of scholarship on the topic of the Buddhist-Mīmāṃsaka conflicts has mostly focused on the writings of Kumārila, Dharmakīrti and

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10 The most recent proposal for the date of Kumārila is 560-620 CE by Yoshimizu (2015, 43, fn.1).
11 Bhāviveka’s date is rather firm. Frauwallner (1961, 132-4), quoting Ui’s study which is based on Xuanzang’s travelogue (大唐西域記, T 2087), measures Dharmapāla’s date as 530-561 CE. Frauwallner, in the same article (ibid., 136-7), dates Sthiramati to 510-570 CE based on Lévi’s study which reports that “king Gunasena of Valabhi, who is known to have ruled from 558-566 A.D., has a monastery erected for him.” Kajiyaama (1968-9), by pointing to Sthiramati’s critique of Bhāviveka in his commentary on Nagārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (大乘中觀釋論, T 1567), Dharmapāla’s critique of Bhāviveka in his commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (大乘廣百論釋論, T 1571) and Bhāviveka’s indebtedness to Dignāga (480-540 CE), dates Bhāviveka to 500-570 CE.
12 Frauwallner (1961, 137-9) dates Dharmakīrti to 600-660 CE. Krasser (2012) recently challenged this dates and argued that Dharmakīrti belongs to the sixth century based on his observation on the dialogic relationship between the works of Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti, and Kumārila.
13 See Frauwallner (1961, 141-4) for the date of Śāntarakṣita.
Śāntarakṣita also testifies to the significant role that the Mīmāṃsakas played in shaping the agendas for post-sixth-century Indian Buddhist intellectuals.\textsuperscript{14}

This dissertation studies the “newness” of sixth-century Indian Buddhism by highlighting the “oldness” of the problem that the Mīmāṃsakas posed to Buddhists. That is to say, this dissertation does not simply read the sudden Buddhist notice of the Mīmāṃsakas as the emergence of a new threat.\textsuperscript{15} However, it also recognizes that the Mīmāṃsakas caused a change in traditional Buddhist strategies for dispelling the old threat.

The sixth century “Mīmāṃsaka threat,” in its nature, was as old as Buddhism. Despite the fact that the philosophical issues on which Kumārila disagrees with Buddhists in the Ślokavārttika mostly reflect the topics hotly debated across the boundaries of Indian philosophical circles at the sixth/seventh century, the Mīmāṃsaka unease with Buddhists fundamentally originates from their anti-Vedic identity. In this respect, the Mīmāṃsaka challenge was rather familiar to Buddhists. When the Mīmāṃsakas proclaimed the anti-Vedic identity of Buddhists and the latter responded to the attacks, Buddhists already had ready-made answers, inherited and developed from the earliest period of the tradition. Among traditional Buddhist strategies devised to vindicate Buddhists’ anti-Vedic identity, in this dissertation, I only examine two directed against the authority of the Veda and the legitimacy of its accompanying cult, Vedic sacrifice.

However, the post-sixth century Buddhist intellectuals who were confronted, not with Vedic ritualists in general, but with the specific group of the Mīmāṃsakas who armed Brahmin

\textsuperscript{14} To (chronologically) list only a few of them: Taber (2005), Arnold (2005), McClintock (2010), Kataoka (2011), Eltschinger, Krasser, and Taber (2012), and Eltschinger (2014).

\textsuperscript{15} Even though Buddhists began to discuss the Mīmāṃsaka positions from the fifth century on, the school of Mīmāṃsā had existed for long before their first notice. See Clooney (1990, 52-3) for a discussion on the date of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (between the fourth and second centuries BCE), the foundational text of the school.
anti-Buddhist sentiment with highly theorized ideologies on the nature of the Veda, did not merely reiterate thousand-years-old answers. They revived the old answers and made them applicable to the new opponents, and, in so doing, brought them to another level of concreteness and sophistication. Yet, as their knowledge of the Mīmāṃsakas became more rich and accurate over time, Buddhists eventually dispensed with the traditional strategies for criticizing the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. And this abandonment of the old way of coping with Vedic ritualists, I believe, constitutes an important aspect of the “newness” of sixth-century Indian Buddhism. This dissertation attempts to illustrate the process of the abandonment.

To this end, I have chosen a relatively unstudied text, the ninth “Mīmāṃsā” chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā\(^{16}\) (MHK 9)\(^{17}\) together with the prose auto-commentary called the Tarkajvālā (TJ)\(^{18}\) written by, the sixth century Mādhyamika, Bhāviveka (also known as Bhāvaviveka and Bhavya)\(^{19}\) as the main text of the analysis. To be more precise, my thesis on

\(^{16}\) Note that this title (“Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā”) is only attested by the Tibetan translation. As to the problems regarding the title of this work, see Saito (2005). Saito demonstrates that three different names—namely, Tattvānītratā, Madhyamakahṛdaya, and Tarkajvālā—had been used to refer to this work.

\(^{17}\) There are two modern Sanskrit editions for the Mīmāṃsā chapter of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā: Kawasaki (1992a) and Lindtner (2001a, 2001b). The former also includes the edition of the Tibetan text. I rely my reading on Kawasaki edition but I discuss discrepancies between the two editions if there are in the verses that I quote. For the information on the two extant Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in the Tibetan region and the list of the modern editions of each chapters of MHK, see Heitmann (1997, 106-9) and Ye (2009, 316-8).

I use, in general, the abbreviation of “MHK 9” to collectively refer to both the root verses (MHK 9) and the prose commentary (TJ 9) which make up the whole “Mīmāṃsā” chapter titled the “Introduction to the Determination of the Truth of Mīmāṃsā” (mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra). However, whenever it is necessary to be clear about whether the relevant material is found in the commentary, I differentiate TJ (or TJ 9) from MHK 9.

\(^{18}\) For the Tibetan text of the Tarkajvālā, the commentary to MHK, I exclusively used the sDe dge edition: D 3856, Dza 40b7-329b4. Despite the fact that there is a controversy over the authorship of TJ, I see no definitive evidence against Bhāviveka’s authorship and, in this dissertation, I assume that the Tarkajvālā is a work of Bhāviveka as the Tibetan text suggests in the colophon. Cf. TJ D329b2, “dbu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba slob dpon chen po bha byas mdzad pa rdzogs so.” For discussions on this topic, see Ejima (1980, 10ff.), Eckel (2008, 21ff.), Krasser (2011), and He and van der Kuip (2014).

\(^{19}\) As Ejima (1990) has persuasively shown, “Bhāviveka” is the more preferred form among the three in the light of extant Sanskrit manuscripts of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (either used or unused by the first
the “decline” of age-old Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists is based upon a small section of MHK 9 (MHK 9.1-4 and 18-42) which I organized under the heading of “the Veda is not moral” in Chapter Two and other texts that are directly involved in the composition of that section, or which produce, when read in juxtaposition with MHK 9, meaningful information from our retrospective position. Those texts either predate or postdate MHK 9 and are either of Buddhist or non-Buddhist provenance. Most significantly utilized are: Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra*, the above-mentioned polemical treatises of Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, the Śāmkhya commentaries on Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Śāmkhyakārikā* verse 2, the *Yogasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya* (or, collectively, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra*), Śabarā’s *Bhāṣya* on Jaimini’s *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (the *Śābarabhāṣya*), and Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika*. By engaging these texts in the reading of MHK 9, I analyze the dynamic interplay between the groups of people affiliated with those texts—viz. Buddhists, the Śāmkhyas, and the Mīmāṃsakas—explicitly or implicitly represented in the small section of MHK 9 and their different roles in terminating traditional Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists within and immediately after MHK 9.

The dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter One (“Buddhist Forerunners to Bhāviveka’s Critique of Mīmāṃsā”) discerns two consistent Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists found in pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist scholastic literature. I first recognize two separately existent
arguments in the canonical literature from the earliest period of the tradition, which assert that the Veda is a work of ignorant beings and that Vedic sacrifice, which involves animal killings, is an immoral practice. I name them respectively the “critique of the Veda” and the “critique of Vedic sacrifice.” Then I trace the inheritance of these two claims by later Buddhist intellectuals, in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (ca. 2nd cen. CE), the *Tattvasiddhi* by Harivarman (250-350), and the *Nyāyānusāra* by Saṅghabhadra (5th cen. CE) and observe that, in the latter two works, the two critiques are combined; the critique of the Veda came to be subordinated under the framework of the critique of Vedic sacrifice. I have not made an effort to exhaustively collect all textual sources before Bhāviveka that reproduce the two critiques. What I seek to demonstrate in this chapter is that Buddhists have maintained the same stances toward the Veda and Vedic sacrifice and have persistently repeated the same claims about them from about the fifth century BCE to the fifth century CE.

Chapter Two (“How Mīmāṃsaka is MHK 9?”) presents an overview of the entire chapter of MHK 9 and reviews scholars’ previous opinions on the identity of the opponent in MHK 9. MHK 9, unlike other chapters of MHK, has never been subjected to systematic analysis as a “unitary” chapter in its own right, and therefore, I think it is necessary to lay out, albeit in a preliminary way, all the contents of MHK 9 in an organized manner. Without a systematic analysis of its contents as a whole (i.e., as an organic entity of chapter), scholars, based on a part of the text, have expressed doubts about the Mīmāṃsaka identity of the opponent in MHK 9 or proposed some historical figure (Bhartṛhari or Kumārila) as a possible opponent of Bhāviveka in MHK 9. As I review their opinions, I propose at least three different groups as the opponents in MHK 9: the Mīmāṃsakas, theistic groups (especially, the Vaiṣṇavas and the Śaivas), and an
ascetic group who upholds Book 12 and 13 of the *Mahābhārata* as its scripture. This does not mean that Bhāviveka lumps all those groups into one and sees no difference between them. Bhāviveka allots discrete sections to each of those three. Then, why does he criticize them all in the chapter devoted to the critique of the Mīmāṃsakas? It is because, for Bhāviveka, they all elevate their own scriptures—be it the Veda proper or not—to the absolute status traditionally attributed to the “Veda.” That is, Bhāviveka’s inclusion of the critiques on the theistic and ascetic groups in MHK 9 is closely related to the claim that the *purāṇas* or the *Mahābhārata* is the fifth “Veda.” Lastly, concerning the Mīmāṃsā proper section of MHK 9, I suggest that Bhāviveka’s opponent seems to be a Mīmāṃsaka, albeit unknown, who came between Śabara and Kumārila.

While the first two chapters provide the background knowledge for our investigation of the fates of the two traditional Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists, the remaining two chapters trace the reception of the two critiques in MHK 9 and subsequent Buddhist literature. Chapter Three (“Decline of the Critique of the Veda for its Evil Authorship”), by comparatively examining four Buddhist intellectuals’ responses to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda (*vedāpaṇuṣayaṇatva*), demonstrates that Bhāviveka was the only one who continued the critique of the Veda that argues for the evilness of the Veda’s putative author(s). The other three, Saṅghabhadra, Dharmakīrti, and Śāntarakṣita, employed a different rhetoric that equates the “authorlessness” of the Veda with the “meaninglessness” of it, and thereby separated themselves from the traditional critique. Bhāviveka, though the sole proponent of the thesis on the evil authorship of the Veda after Buddhists’ encounter with the Mīmāṃsakas, by compiling rich corroborative materials from the Veda for his thesis, raised the critique of the Veda to another level of sophistication. This strategy of compiling Vedic materials to denounce the Veda was well developed in the Sāṃkhya commentaries on the *Sāmkhyakārikā* 2; I suggest a possible alliance between Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhyas, which had its precedent in Āryadeva’s
Śataśāstra and Vasu’s commentary on it.

Chapter Four (“Decline of the Critique of Vedic Sacrifice”) shows that Bhāviveka was also the only post-sixth century (thus excluding Saṅghabhadra) figure who continued the critique of Vedic sacrifice. However, as the two post-Bhāviveka Buddhists did not even remark on the immorality of Vedic sacrifice, the critique of Vedic sacrifice, unlike the previous case of the critique of the Veda, ended without being replaced. The “future” discontinuance of the critique of Vedic sacrifice, moreover, was hinted at in MHK 9 itself. This becomes more apparent when we read the corresponding discussion in Bhāviveka’s other work, the Prajñāpradīpa, which contains a syllogism almost identical to the Sāṃkhya’s thesis quoted in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika. The syllogism in question does not appear in MHK 9 and, in its place, Bhāviveka introduces the Mīmāṃsaka defense of Vedic sacrifice that seems to summarize the key point of Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhya thesis. By unravelling the complex dialogical relationship between Bhāviveka and Kumārila and tracing the long-held alliance between Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas on killing and its karmic retribution, in this chapter, I try to locate the decline of the critique of Vedic sacrifice within MHK 9.
Chapter One: Buddhist Forerunners to Bhāviveka’s Critique of Mīmāṃśā

The Evolution of Buddhist Critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice in Pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist Materials

1.1 Introduction

Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃśā chapter in the Madhyamakahṛdaya (MHK/TJ 9), like his critique of Vedānta (the eighth chapter), marks one of the earliest Buddhist critiques of the Mīmāṃśā school of Hindu philosophy. Despite its originality, it is much indebted to the preceding Buddhist critiques of Brahmanism. Therefore, in order to evaluate the significance of Bhāviveka’s critique of Mīmāṃśā—that is, to gauge his inheritance from earlier exegetes and his contribution to the Buddhist discourse against this school of Hindu philosophy—it is necessary to investigate the development of the direct Buddhist precursors of MHK 9.

This chapter does not aim to trace all the details of MHK 9 to their source or haphazardly present Bhāviveka’s Buddhist sources. Rather, I focus on two themes that directly influence a portion of MHK 9: the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. Bhāviveka characterizes his

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21 The eighth chapter of MHK, titled Vedāntatattvaviniścaya (The Determination of Reality according to Vedānta), devoted to an examination of the doctrines held by the pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntavādins (rig byed kyi mtha’ smra ba), is the earliest Buddhist source to recognize Vedānta as a school. See Nakamura (1955, 31), Gokhale (1958, 165-6), Qvarnström (1989, 13-6); translation of the chapter title is from Qvarnström (1989, 15, fn.8).

22 Another Buddhist text of the sixth century that takes note of the Mīmāṃśā school is the Maṇimēkalai composed in the Tamil language. See Eckel (2008, 15-7) and Nicholson (2010, 148-54).
opponents, the Mīmāṃsakas, in these terms in the opening verses of MHK 9. Criticisms of these two, each respectively representing Brahmin text and practice, appear in Buddhist literature starting from the earliest Buddhist sources: (Pāli) Nikāya or (Chinese) Āgama materials. As I trace their later developments, I have limited my research to Abhidharma literature and, in the following presentation, have selected only three texts belonging to that category for the analysis. They are the Mahāvibhāṣā (大毘婆沙論; ca. 2nd c. CE), the Tattvasiddhī (成實論) of Harivarman (訶梨跋摩, ca. 250-350 CE), and the Nyāyānusāra (順正理論) of Saṅghabhadra (衆賢, ca. 420-480 CE) all available only in Chinese translations.

Those three texts represent three qualitatively different stages in the history of Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. From the time that the Buddha problematized the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, Buddhist critiques of these two circulated separately without making reference to each other as can be seen in the Mahāvibhāṣā (Stage 1). But the critiques of the two came to be connected when the Brahmin opponent in the Tattvasiddhī puts forward an argument that defends Vedic sacrifice by resorting to the authority of the Veda acknowledged in the world (Stage 2). Connected in this way, these two critiques confront a new challenge in the Nyāyānusāra when the Veda’s authority is claimed not on the basis of external factors but of the authorless and eternal nature of the text itself (Stage 3). And what we see in this last stage is, to

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23 Bhāviveka introduces the Mīmāṃsakas as “shameless people” (anapatrapa) who maintain that Vedic sacrifice (kriyā) is the sole means of achieving liberation (apavarga) in the introductory verse (MHK 9.1). TJ on the verse points to the Veda as the source of their reasoning by stating that the Mīmāṃsakas regard the Veda as “self-arisen” (rang byung), and therefore, “reality” (de kho na nyid). This is confirmed in the second verse (MHK 9.2) which explicitly describes Vedic sacrifice as what is prescribed in the Veda (śāstrokta) and in the commentary (TJ) which presents the Veda as the authorizer (tshad mar byed pa) of various ritual activities.

24 They are contained in the Taishō edition of Chinese Buddhist Canon (dazangjing, 大藏經) respectively as T 1545, T 1646, and T 1562. A Sanskrit fragment is reported to exist in the case of the *Mahāvibhāṣā. Cf. Kragh (2002, 149), “A Sanskrit-fragment of a Vibhāṣā-compendium, found in Kučā, has been identified in the Pelliot collection, but it displays some variants, when it is compared to the Chinese texts of *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra and *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra.” (references are omitted)
my knowledge, the first appearance of the Mīmāṃsakas in Buddhist literature, embedded in existing Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice.

This presentation of a three-stage development of the two critiques, of course, is not meant to be viewed as reflecting the actual evolution of Mīmāṃsā as a school. However, it testifies to the growing presence of the Mīmāṃsakas in the contemporary philosophical circle, or at least as felt by Buddhists. What these materials show instead is that the evolution of Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice was led by Brahmin opponents. The major developmental changes, rather than being initiated by Buddhists, were made to refute newly emerging arguments by ritualistically oriented Brahmins. Harivarman combined the two separate critiques, criticizing Brahmin text in order to criticize Brahmin practice; his opponent demanded that the two be connected. The more elaborate Mīmāṃsaka arguments on the Veda’s validity in the Nyāyānusāra made it impossible for Buddhists after Saṅghabhadra to criticize Brahmins’ act of killing in Vedic sacrifice without discussing the textual authority that sanctions the act. And, in MHK 9, this Mīmāṃsaka pressure finally reversed the structure of the combined critiques by having the criticism of Brahmin practice serve the purpose of criticizing their text.

Viewed from another perspective, however, this implies that Buddhists coped with newly imposed problems by locating and understanding them in the context of already existing discourses. Rather than starting a new discourse for a new problem, Buddhists chose to contextualize the new in the light of the old. And it is because of this aspect of incorporating the new into the old that the development of pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice presented in this chapter should not be seen merely as the prehistory of MHK 9. They equip Bhāviveka with both tools and strategies to counter the Mīmāṃsaka arguments. That is, Buddhist critiques of Brahmin text and practice from the time of the Buddha constitute one of the foundations of MHK 9.
In what follows, I trace pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. I first identify them in the Buddha’s sermons contained in the Nikāya/Āgama materials. Then I examine relevant passages culled from the above-mentioned three Abhidharma texts and lay out the three developmental stages of the critiques. As I close the chapter, I will evaluate the significance of the changes noticeable in the history of the two critiques, particularly focusing on the change made in the last stage.

1.2 The Buddha: Problematizations of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice

Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice began with works attributed to its founder. There are several sutta that directly take up the subject of Vedic sacrifice.25 However, in those sutta, the Buddha does not reject the notion of sacrifice itself. Following his trait of reinterpreting others’—mostly Brahmanical—concepts and thus assimilating them into Buddhist vocabulary,26 the Buddha, rather than advising his Brahmin interlocutors to dispense with Vedic sacrifice, proposes to perform "reinterpreted" sacrifices infused with Buddhist values.27 The proposal is, according to the Buddha, not only to perform sacrifice in a more perfect form; it is

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25 Tan lists three sutta from the Pāli Sutta-piṭaka in which Vedic sacrifice is “demythologized” and “ethicized” (see his introductions to the translations of the following sutta available at dharmafarer.org). They are the Kūṭadantasutta (Dīgha Nikāya 5, vol.1, pp. 127-49), the (Pasenadi) Yañña Sutta (Samyutta Nikāya 3.2.9, pt. 1, pp. 75-6), and the (Uggatasarīra) Aggi Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.44, vol.4, pp. 41-46) (references are to the PTS edition of the texts). However, they are by no means the only sutta that discuss the topic. As Tan’s translation of the entire Tipiṭaka is still in progress, he might add more texts to the list in the future. I would like to add the Ujjaya Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.39) to the list (see fn.11). For their corresponding sūtras in the Taishō canon, use the digital compilation of Anesaki (1908)’s and Akanuma (1929)’s catalogues by Bingenheimer (“A Digital Comparative Catalogue of Āgama Literature” ver. 3) available at http://mbingenheimer.net/tools/comcat/indexComcat.html.

26 For a list of Brahmanical terms that the Buddha uses in his own senses, see Norman (1991), section “2. Terms taken over by the Buddha but used with new senses” (pp. 194-9). Norman also notes a possibility that “the use of Brahmanical terms in a non-Brahmanical sense was taken from the general fund of vocabulary of śrāmanical religions.” (p. 200)

27 Or, as Gombrich (2006[1996], 42) puts it, “the Buddha regularly used the language of his opponents, but turned it into metaphor.”
also to avoid unwanted consequences that would befall the performer as the result of the sacrificial act. That is to say, the Buddha’s reinterpretation lies in showing that Brahmin sacrifice is not the path to the goal that it claims to be fulfilling and that it instead brings negative effects due to its immoral aspects.

Brahmin interlocutors, or, more accurately, questioners, on the other hand, show no attempt to resist the Buddha’s reinterpretation of sacrifice. Also, in those suttas on Vedic sacrifice, the Buddha generally does not comment on the Veda when he criticizes Vedic sacrifice. The presence of the Veda as the background of sacrificial practice is only alluded to when the Brahmin questioners’ qualities are listed.\(^28\) This is not to say, however, that the authority of the Veda is not assumed by the Buddha and the Brahmins who seek advice from him. Indeed, the Buddha’s “humorous and satirical” references to “Brahmins and Brahminism” (Gombrich 1990, 12) undermine the authority of the Veda, but only in an indirect manner. The weight that the Veda carries in the mind of Brahmins is not recorded and the Buddha pays no attention to the high esteem invested in the Veda. As Gombrich notes on the Buddha’s attitude toward the Upaniṣadic notion of “Brahman” (cosmic principle), the authority that the Veda assumes in contemporary Indian society “is not directly mentioned, let alone argued against; the Buddha simply bypasses it.” (2006, 64) The Buddha’s criticism of Vedic ritual, on the surface, is made mainly ethical. It is the sacrificial act itself, rather than the scripture that enjoins such actions, that is at the center of the controversy around Vedic sacrificial practices.

In those sacrifice-related suttas, the element of killing\(^29\) is specifically identified as

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\(^{28}\) For example, as in the Kūṭadanta sutta: “For the master Kūṭadanta is a mantra-reciter, a mantra-expert, a master of the Three Vedas, along with their invocations and rituals, phonology and etymology, and the Itihāsa Purāṇas as the fifth; learned in the Vedic paddas, grammarian, and well versed in nature lore and the marks of the great man.” (Tan 2007, 61); According to Tan, this is a stock description of Brahmin questioners also used in several other suttas. See ibid., fn.50.

\(^{29}\) The Buddha’s uneasiness with the act of “killing” among other features of Vedic sacrifice is most clearly seen in the Ujjaya Sutta (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.39). In the Sutta, the Brahmin named Ujjaya asks the
causing karmically negative effects on its performer. However, these texts lack explanations of, for example, the principle behind the Buddha’s negative judgment of ritual killing or the necessary causal relation between killing and being born in the lower realms.\textsuperscript{30} When asked about the successful performance of sacrifice\textsuperscript{31} or the form of sacrifice that would result in happiness and welfare for a long time\textsuperscript{32}, the Buddha, without unconditionally disregarding the performance of sacrifice, provides the questioners with better forms of sacrifice in which no actual sacrifice of animals occurs yet goal of sacrifice is accomplished.\textsuperscript{33} The disparity between the means and the goal of Vedic ritual perceived by the Buddha is aptly expressed in this phrase: “Even before the sacrifice, one thinks, ‘Let this many animals be slaughtered for sacrifice’. So while thinking one is doing something purifying one is doing something not purifying; while thinking one is doing right one is doing wrong; while thinking one is finding the way to a good Buddha whether he praises sacrifice or not. In the reply, the Buddha makes the act of killing the sole criterion for not praising sacrifice. Cf. “I do not praise all sacrifice, Brahmin, nor do I withhold praise from all sacrifice. I do not praise a violent sacrifice at which cattle, goats, rams, chickens, and pigs are slain, at which various creatures are led to slaughter. For what reason? Because arahants and those who have entered the path to arahantship attend a non-violent sacrifice.” (Bhikkhu Bodhi tr. 2012, 429)\textsuperscript{30} Schmithausen (2000) identifies two strands of arguments for \textit{ahiṃsā} (“abstention from killing/hurting living beings”) in the early Jaina and Buddhist sources. He shows those two strands in the latter source by dividing it into the discourse for lay people which dissuades them from killing living beings “by pointing out its evil consequences in the afterlife or even in this life” (268) and the discourse for those who seek liberation which formulates the “Golden Rule.” The following \textit{sutta} passage that he quotes from the \textit{Samyutta Nikāya} expressively lays out the rule: “I for one want to live and not to die, I want happiness and dislike pain. Since I want to live, etc., it would not be agreeable and pleasant to me if somebody were to take my life. Again, for another person, too, it would be disagreeable and unpleasant if I were to take his life, since he [too] wants to live, etc. Precisely that which is disagreeable and unpleasant to me is disagreeable and unpleasant to the other. How then could I inflict upon the other that which is disagreeable and unpleasant to myself!” (272) I could not find such rationalizations for denouncing the act of killing in the \textit{suttas} that explicitly deal with the problem of Vedic sacrifice.\textsuperscript{31} As in the \textit{Kūṭadanta Sutta} (Dīgha Nikāya 5). See Tan (2007, 65).\textsuperscript{32} As in the \textit{Aggi Sutta} (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.44). See Gombrich (1990, 17), Tan (2003, 208).\textsuperscript{33} The \textit{Kūṭadanta Sutta} lists diverse forms of such sacrifice. After having related the “mythological” sacrifice in which all four castes participated, no animal slaughter was involved, and no labor was imposed on people under the supervision of the Buddha himself as a Brahmin priest, the Buddha tells Kūṭadanta several other “less difficult” forms of sacrifice including “regular giving (\textit{dāna}),” “donating a vihāra,” “going for refuge” and so forth.
rebirth one is finding the way to a bad.”34 Thus, according to the Buddha, the sacrifice conceived by those Brahmins who approached him betrays their own purposes and accomplishes their opposite, namely, impurity, demerit, and rebirth in lower realms.

The Buddha’s attack on the Veda, on the other hand, is recorded in another sutta that does not directly deal with Vedic sacrifice and its element of “killing.” In the Tevijja Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya 13), the Buddha is approached by two Brahmin boys, Vāsetṭha and Bhāradvāja, who want to verify their own teachers’ teaching on the path to the state called “companionship with Brahmā” (brahmasahavyatā) at death. The Buddha ridicules the Brahmins’ practice using several similes and provides the Brahmin boys with his own answer. However, before he proceeds to the main sermon, he first questions Vāsetṭha as to the qualification of the Brahmin teachers on the subject matter by asking: “Is there even a single one of these Brahmins learned in the Three Vedas who has himself seen Brahmā [God] face to face?”35 The Buddha continues to question the qualification of the teachers, the pupils, and the ancestors of those teachers by asking the same question. After hearing negative answers, the Buddha finally turns his criticism to the “authors” of the Veda (expressed as “mantra makers” (mantānam kattāro)), that is, the ancient Vedic Rṣis (pubbakā isayo):

“Well then, Vāsetṭha, what about the ancient seers of the brahmins, mantra makers, mantra preachers—that is to say, Aṣṭaka, Vāmaka, Vāmadeva, Viśvamitra, Jamadagni, Aṅgirasa, Bhāradvāja, Vāsiṣṭha, Kaśyapa, and Bhrigu36—whose ancient mantras and verses are chanted, uttered and collected by the brahmins of today, who sing them and recite them, and having sung them make others sing them, having recited them make others recite them—did they ever say: ‘We know and see when, how and where Brahmā appears?’”

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34 This is a passage from Aṅguttara Nikāya, Sattaka Nipāta, Mahāyaṇa Vagga, Sutta no. 44 translated in Gombrich (1990, 17).
35 Tan (2010, 121).
36 Corrected from “Bhagu.”
“No, master Gotama.”

Thus, having disqualified the authors, preachers, and guardians of the Veda, the Buddha compares them to a series of blind men in which “the first one sees nothing, the middle one sees nothing, the last one sees nothing” and declares Brahmins’ teachings to be “only laughable, mere words, simply empty, utterly vain.” Their teachings are so laughable that they are like a man on the one side of the riverbank who calls out to the other shore (“Come over here, O farther bank, come over here!”) in order to cross the river rather than gathering grass and wood to make a raft. It is because, in order to accompany the god Brahmā, rather than trying to resemble the purity of the god, Brahmins are just chanting mantras: “We call upon Indra, we call upon Soma, we call upon Varuṇa, we call upon Isāna, we call upon Pajāpati, we call upon Brahmā, we call upon Mahiddhi, we call upon Yama.”

The disparity between the means and the goal is once again observed here, but it is important to note that, this time, the disparity is not just implied by pointing out the discrepancy between the immorality of the means (killing) and the goodness of the goal (rebirth in heaven). The mismatch of chanting mantras (the means) and companionship with Brahmā (the goal) is

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37 ibid.
38 ibid., 122.
39 ibid.
40 ibid. 124.
41 This “gathering grass and wood to make a raft” part of the text is lacking in the Pāli version. See T 1 106a16-24, “Vāseṭṭha! Brahmins well-versed in the Three Vedas are like this. It is non-sense for one to aspire to be born in the heaven of Brahmā who rather cultivates the impure practice of the heretics than practicing pure brahmacarya of the śramaṇas. Vāseṭṭha! Suppose that mountains and waters were violently uprisen and people were in flood. There was no boat or raft, nor was there a bridge. A traveler, desiring to cross to the other shore, saw that mountains and waters are violently uprisen, people are in flood, no boat or raft, nor a bridge. That man thought to himself: “I, now, will gather much grass and wood, bind tightly a raft. Am I able to cross to the other shore with my own power?” Then, he bound a raft and, with his own power, could cross the river safely.” (婆悉咤！三明婆羅門亦復如是，不修沙門清净梵行，更修餘道不清淨行，欲求生梵天者，無有是處。婆悉咤！猶如山水暴起，多漂人民，亦無船槳，又無橋梁，行人來，欲渡彼岸。見山水暴起，多漂人民，亦無船槳，又無橋梁，彼人自念:“我今寧可多集草木，牢堅縛槳，自以身力渡彼岸耶?”即尋縛槳，自以身力安隱得渡。)
42 Tan (ibid., 124).
caused by the ignorance of Vedic Brahmins; not only those who are learned in the Three Vedas but also the very authors of those texts. They lack the direct experience/vision of Brahmā, whom they long to be with. On top of this, they make no effort to acquire the qualities they attribute to Brahmā: unlike Brahmā, they have wives, hate, ill will, defiled hearts, and no self-mastery.\textsuperscript{43} Considering all these disqualifications of Brahmins, how should one judge the nature of the text that they authored and preached? The Buddha, before he commences the sermon on the proper way of reaching the world of Brahmā, expresses his disapproval of the Veda in the strongest terms: “Therefore, these Three Vedas are called the threefold desert, the threefold forest, the threefold misfortune of the brahmins learned in the Three Vedas!”\textsuperscript{44}

We may summarize the above discussions from the canonical sources as follows: 1. Vedic sacrifice is criticized by the Buddha because of the immoral, thus karmically negative, act of killing animals. On account of this, though a Brahmin ritualist may perform a sacrificial act in hopes of gaining welfare in this life and beyond, the Buddha claims, they will ultimately fall to the evil path, that is, of being born either as hungry ghosts, animals, or hell beings. 2. The Buddha, in the \textit{Tevijja Sutta}, reveals the absurdity of Brahmins’ project of attaining the world of Brahmā, and, in so doing, challenges the authority of the Veda as \textit{the} religious text by showing its authors’ and preachers’ shortcomings. Given these observations, we may say that the major themes of Buddhist critique of Vedic ritualists (and later the Mīmāṃsakas) that continuously recur in later Buddhist literature are already present in the canonical sources. Those themes are: 1. criticizing Vedic sacrifice by highlighting its immoral aspects and viewing it within the framework of karma and 2. criticizing the Veda by pointing out (or proving) the faults of its author(s).

\textsuperscript{43} See Tan (2010, 125-6)
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 127.
However, these two critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice are not yet presented in a combined form, as we would see from Harivarman’s time on. They are connected, somewhat tangentially, in the *Tevijja Sutta* as it refers to the practice of mantra recitation; the absurdity of ritual practice of chanting mantras indeed contributes to the Buddha’s denunciation of the Veda. But the Buddha’s evaluations of the ritual performance and the authority of the Veda are not directly linked. The focus of the Buddha’s critique is Brahmins’ qualification. It is only through Brahmins’ foolishness that the Veda, as their work, is disregarded. And Buddhists’ criticisms of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, though they seem to be intrinsically related, continue to be made separately in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.

1.3 The *Mahāvibhāṣā*: Separate Circulations of the Two Critiques

The *Mahāvibhāṣā*, extant in two Chinese translations, is a work of enormous size that compiles both (primarily) Buddhist and (subsidiarily) non-Buddhist views on various issues addressed mainly in its root text, the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* by Kātyāyanīputra. The

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45 There are three texts in the Taishō Canon that bear the word “Vibhāṣā” in their title which gave the Sarvāstivādins another appellation namely the “Vaibhāṣika” (the followers of the Vibhāṣā) due to the importance of this text in their school. They are: *Vibhāṣāśāstra* (Vib婆沙論, T 1547) translated by Saṅghabhadra (僧伽跋澄; different from the author of the *Nyāyānusāra*) in 383 CE, *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra* (阿毘曇毘婆沙論, T 1546) translated by Buddhavarman (浮陀跋摩) in 437-439 CE, and *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T 1545; briefly referred to as Mahāvibhāṣā) translated by Xuanzang (玄奘) in 656-659 CE. Among these three texts, while the latter two is the translation of the same work, the first one (*Vibhāṣāśāstra*) is the translation of an independent work but on the same root text, the *Jñānaprasthāna*. The second text, of which only 60 fascicles out of 100 are extant, is incomplete; the remaining portion of the text only covers only about a half of Xuanzang’s translation. Moreover, there are discrepancies between the contents of two works which may imply the development of the text. See Nakamura (1980, 107-8), Tsukamoto, Matsunaga, Isoda (1990, 66), Buswell and Jaini (1996, 113), Kragh (2002, 149).

46 It consists of 200 fascicles and occupies the whole Taishō volume 27.

47 See Buswell and Jaini (1996, 110-9) for the text's wide-range coverage of topics. A summary of the entire text is available at the end of the same volume (Potter, Buswell, Jaini ed. 1996, 511-568) made collectively by Ichimura, Kawamura, Buswell, and Cox.

48 The Sarvāstivādins regard the following seven treatises as the fundamental Abhidharma texts: 1.
Mahāvibhāṣā is an extensive collection of the doctrinal formulations of authoritative scholars and schools of Indian philosophies available until the period of its compilation (c. 2nd cen. CE) from the then dominant Sarvāstivādin perspective; Buswell and Jaini (1996, 110) characterize it as “massive sourcebook of Sarvāstivādin doctrine.” It wielded a powerful influence on later Abhidharma literature, including the famous Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu, as a source of information. Therefore, it would be reasonable to consult the Mahāvibhāṣā for Buddhist opinions accumulated up to the time of its compilation.

Not surprisingly, the Mahāvibhāṣā does not fail to comment on Brahmin text and practice, that is, the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, but, those critiques show no evolution from the time of the Buddha. It inherits the Buddha’s discourses, as far as those two topics are concerned, not only in terms of its points of criticism as well as materials. What we have observed in the Nikāya/Āgama literature is reaffirmed: the element of killing in Vedic sacrifice is specified as a problematic practice in light of karmic law and the authority of the Veda is attacked on the basis of the ignorance of its authors. These points are well expressed in the Mahāvibhāṣā when it discusses the ten unwholesome courses of action (akuśalakarmapatha).

Among those ten courses of action that lead the agent eventually to the non-salutary

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Samgītiparīyāya, 2. Dharmaskandha, 3. Prajñaptiśāstra, 4. Dhātukāya, 5. Vijñānakāya, 6. Prakaraṇa, 7. Jñānaprasthāna. (Listed in the chronological order suggested by Frauwallner 1995, Chap. 2) As the frequently quoted lines from Yaśomitra’s Sphuṭārthā indicate, the Sarvāstivādins lay the central importance to the Jñānaprasthāna by calling it the “body” (śarīra) and the other six its “feet” (pāda). Cf. Sphuṭārthā on AK 1.2b (Shastri 1970-1973, vol. 1, p. 12), “anye vyācaṣate. śāstram iti jñānaprasthānam. taśya śarīrabhūtaśya saḥ pādaḥ. prakaraṇapādaḥ, vijñānakāyaḥ, dharmaskandhaḥ, prajñaptiśāstram, dhātukāyaḥ, saṃgītiparīyāya iti. atas tad api śāstraṃ sānucaram eva.” The Mahāvibhāṣā is basically a commentary on this root text, the Jñānaprasthāna, although it obviously exceeds its role as a direct commentary.

49 Traditionally, based on Xuanzang's note (consisting of two verses) attached at the end of his translation (T 1545, 1004a5-8), the Mahāvibhāṣā is considered to be compiled during the reign of the king Kaniṣka (reigned ca. 132-152). See Hirakawa (1990, 135).

50 This approach obviously does not comprehensively capture the Buddhist view of the period. It omits various literary genres (jātaka, avadāna, etc.) of Nikāya Buddhism and early Mahāyāna literature from its purview.
rebirths, most relevant here⁵¹ are the first and seventh items, viz. killing living beings
(prāṇātipāta) and frivolous prattle (sambhinnapralāpa).⁵² Examples of each evil behavior are
classified according to the causes of such actions, which are the three poisons, viz. desire (rūga),
hatred (dveṣa), and delusion (moha). Both killing and prattle of Brahmins are noted as
originating from the third poison, delusion. They originate from delusion because they blatantly
rationalize their practices without correctly understanding the principle of karma.⁵³ Thus killing
and Vedic recitation in a ritual setting are rationalized by Brahmins as follows:

What is the [killing] originated from delusion? For example, there is a group
[of people] who raise the following view and present the following thesis: All
[animals] such as camels, horses, cattle, sheep, chickens, pigs, and deer are to
be eaten by the sacrificer. Therefore, killing them is no sin.⁵⁴

What is the [frivolous prattle] originated from delusion? For example, there is a
group of Brahmins who raise the following view and present the following
thesis: All these [practices] such as worshipping fire, worshiping diverse gods,
or reciting the Veda and various mantras [cause the practitioners] to attain pure
liberation.⁵⁵

As clearly seen in these passages, Brahmin acts of killing and mantra chanting are again recorded

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⁵¹ Among the ten evil conducts in the list, Brahmins are accused of for committing five: killing, theft
(adattādāna), sexual misconduct (kāmamithyācāra), malicious speech (paiśunyavāda), and frivolous
prattle. Only killing and frivolous prattle, in the Mahāvibhāṣā, are directly related to the Veda and Vedic
sacrifice though others can be said have the Veda as their background. See the next footnote.

⁵² In the same list appearing in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the third item, i.e., sexual misconduct also
deals with a specific Vedic ritual called “Gosava.”

⁵³ After listing the examples of killing motivated by delusion, the *Mahāvibhāṣā (MV (T 1545) 605c21-2)
comments: “Such killings are called [killing] originated from delusion because they are confused about
the principle of karma and its fruit, and raise malicious slander [regarding karmic principle].” (如是等
殺名從癡生. 以迷業果起邪謗故.)

⁵⁴ MV 605c12-4: “云何從癡生？如有一類起如是見立如是論：駝馬牛羊雞豬鹿等，皆為祠祀人所食
用. 以是殺之無罪.”

⁵⁵ MV 606c11-4: “云何從癡生？如有一類婆羅門起如是見立如是論：諸有祠火，或祀
餘神，或誦吠陀諸咒術等. 一切皆得清净解脫.”; the underlined character (祀) is, following the
footnote in the Taishō text, taken as “祠.”
and problematized separately. In the Buddhist presentation of the Brahmin argument, ritual killing is justified in terms of the sacrificer’s purpose of eating, not in relation to the authority of the Veda. The recitation of the Veda is absurd because of the presumed goal: pure liberation. However, unlike the suttas discussed in the previous section, the Mahāvibhāṣā lacks any deliberate criticism or reinterpretation of those practices from a Buddhist point of view.

Nonetheless, the negative evaluations of the practices are evident from their immediate context. Both the killing and frivolous prattle of Brahmins are, at any rate, listed as examples of unwholesome courses of action that cause evil rebirth in the future. The low esteem in which Buddhists held Brahmin practices is also suggested by their juxtaposition to the practices of a foreign barbarian group called “Maga” who serve as the example in Bhāviveka’s syllogism of proving evil authorship of the Veda (MHK 9.31) and are invoked over and over in later Buddhist literature that is closely related to Buddhist disputation against the authority of the Veda.

Apart from the above passages on the ten unwholesome courses of action, I cannot locate any other passage that presents explicit criticism of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice in the

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56 For the general information on and textual references to the Magas in the Buddhist literature, see Silk (2008). In the Mahāvibhāṣā, the Magas are accused of for committing patri-/matricide (605c16-21) and incest (606a16-21; see Silk (438-9) for the translation).

57 For the reference to the Magas in MHK 9, see Kawasaki (1992, 509-16), Halbfass (1991, 107-8), van der Kuijp (2006, 196-9), Silk (2008, 439). Halbfass has collected post-Bhāviveka Maga (also referred to as “Persians” (pārasīka)) references (see pp. 126-7, fn. 101). What I would like to add to the observations made by those scholars is that, first of all, Bhāviveka’s information on the Magas is, as acknowledged by Bhāviveka himself, second-hand knowledge. Bhāviveka says in TJ on MHK9.31, “The Magas and so forth refer to perverse ascetics. They are Persians and so forth who reside in foreign (mleccha) countries and their position is known as follows.” (ma ga la sogs pa phyin ci log gi brtul zhugs can. par sig la sogs kla klo’i gnas na gnas pa de dag gi grub pa’i mtha’ ni ’di liar grags te.) (emphasis added) Secondly, from Bhāviveka’s time on, Buddhist authors’ purpose in referring to the Maga case changes from criticizing Brahmin practice (as in the Mahāvibhāṣā, by juxtaposing their cases with Brahmins’) to refuting the authority of their text, i.e., the Veda. A separate study is needed to fully show this change of the purposes of references to the Magas’ “murderous and lustful” practices by Buddhist authors. See 3.3.2 Bhāviveka’s Reading of Abhidharma Discussions over Ten Unwholesome Courses of Action (akuśalakarmapaṭha) in MHK 9.31.
Mahāvibhāṣā. Other passing references are made simply to neutrally record Vedic practices and to criticize the Upanisadic idea of self (ātman). There is even a passage that uses the authority of the Veda assumed on the part of the Brahmins to refute the authority of the Brahmin caste. There is one passage, however, that is strongly reminiscent of the Tevijja Sutta. As the Mahāvibhāṣā comments on a line of its root text, the Jñānaprasthāna, it quotes a sūtra that disregards the authority of Vedic seers more explicitly, though not in as dramatic a manner as the Tevijja Sutta.

[In the Jñānaprasthāna, Kātyāyanīputra says:] “If a doubt arises regarding suffering, is this suffering? Is this non-suffering?”
Q. Why does [Kātyāyanīputra] undertake this discussion?
A. It is because he wants to discern the meaning of a sūtra. It is said in the sūtra. “A Brahman, as there was something to discuss, visited the Buddha’s

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58 For example, MV 57c28-58a12 (on the Brahmin boys' memorization of the four Vedas (四吠陀書) with the aid of a rope (繩) in a hand).
59 For example, MV 999b15-27. This passage introduces the opinion of “those who assert that ātman is without limitation and will survive death” (執我無邊死後有想論者). It speaks of the Upanisadic concept of ātman and there are two forms of the assertion. The first form of it, in which they argue ātman is a physical entity, they cite a sentence from the Veda (明論): “There is puruṣa of self. Its size is vast and its boundary is hard to measure. Its luminosity is like the sun. All ignorant beings, though they are residing in front of it, are not able to see it. Once one comes to know this self, he or she is able to overcome birth, old age, sickness, and death. If not, there is no overcoming the [already] determined destination.” (有我士夫, 其量廣大, 邊際難測, 光色如日. 諸冥闇者, 虽住其前, 而不能見. 要知此我, 方能越度生老病死. 異此更無越度理趣.) It is clear from this passage that the word “minglun” (明論; the Veda) is used in its broad sense that includes the Upanisads. The second form of the argument, which takes non-physical thing as self, does not mention the Veda.
60 MV 523c02-28. A Jātaka story is quoted in which the Buddha was a candāla king named “Three Hooks” (三鉤), Ānanda his son named the “Ears of a Lion” (師子耳), and Śāriputra a Brahmin priest named “Chijian” (池堅). When the king asked the Brahmin to marry his son to the Brahmin’s daughter, the Brahmin was infuriated since the king’s caste was the lowest and his was the highest. To show that one’s caste status is not a fixed one, the king demonstrated that he was the Brahmin creators of the Brahmi script (梵書字), the Kharoṣṭī script (佉盧瑟吒書字), and finally, the Veda and its auxiliaries (吠陀論及彼眷屬) along with other mundane treaties. The Brahmin, having verified the king’s statements, consented to the marriage.
61 There are more passages that comment on or just mention the Veda and Vedic sacrifice in passing. I do not deal with them since they offer little information regarding the inquiry of this chapter.
62 This is direct quotation from the Jñānaprasthāna. T 1544, 920b08, “若於苦生疑，此是苦耶？此非苦耶?”
63 This is a translation of “有因論” in the phrase “有因論，婆羅門.” I am not sure about its meaning. The
place and asked him as follows: ‘Śramaṇa, Gotama! Doubt is extremely unusual; it is difficult to overcome and not easy to overcome.’ The Bhagavat said: ‘Yes, it is just so. Brāhmaṇa! Doubt is extremely unusual; it is difficult to overcome and not easy to overcome. Why is it so? In ancient times, there were Brāhmaṇas who made the Veda and made mantras. The most important (or famous) among them are ten: (1) Aṣṭaka, (2) Vāmaka, (3) Vāmadeva, (4) Viśvāmitra, (5) Jamadagni, (6) Aṅgiras, (7) Bhāradvāja, (8) Vaśiṣṭha, (9) Kaśyapa, and (10) Bhṛgu. All those brāhmaṇas, though respected by the world, could not overcome doubt and ended their lives. Therefore, know that doubt is indeed difficult to overcome.’”

The sūtra, though it says this [about “doubt”]64, does not analyze it in detail. That sūtra is the fundamental source for this discussion. What has not been said by it must be explained here. Therefore, [Kātyāyanīputra] undertakes this discussion.65

The sūtra quoted in this passage reminds one of the Tevijja Sutta, most notably, because it has the same list of the ten Vedic seers in the same sequence. It also characterizes them as the “makers of mantra” (造咒術者) and it adds that they are the “makers of the Veda” (造明論者). It only differs in that, while the Tevijja Sutta rhetorically asks the Brahmin interlocutor Vāseṭṭha to confirm that those seers are also ignorant of the object of their pursuit, Brahmā, the sūtra in the quotation conclusively states that they have ended their lives without having resolved their doubts. And both sūtras, in so doing, characterize the Veda as the work of ignorant people.

Given its vast size, the above materials gleaned from the Mahāvibhāṣā indeed can only corresponding part in the older version of the text (T 1546, 55c04) has it as “有事論，婆羅門，” thus rendering “cause/reason” (因) as “thing/matter” (事).

64 ‘The older version of the text explicitly says the bracketed part. T 1546, 55c13-4, “佛經說疑，不廣分別。”

65 MV 68b16-29, “‘若於苦生疑，此是苦耶？此非苦耶？’乃至廣說。問。何故作此論？答。為欲分別契經義故。如契經說。有因論，婆羅門，重詣佛所，作如是問：‘沙門，婆羅門：疑甚為希，有難度非易度。’世尊告言：‘如是如是。婆羅門，疑甚為希，難度非易度。’所以者何？有古昔婆羅門造明論者，造咒術者，上首有十。一頞瑟搫迦，二婆莫迦，三婆莫提婆，四毘濕縛蜜多羅，五闍莫鐸耆尼，六鴦耆羅，七跋羅墮闍，八婆死瑟搋，九迦葉波，十勃栗瞿。如是等諸婆羅門，世雖尊敬，諸婆羅門，皆不度疑而命終。是故知疑甚為難度。’契經雖作是說而不廣分別。彼經是此論所依根本。彼所不說者，今應說之。故作斯論。”
be viewed as meager. Since the Mahāvibhāṣā, along with other Abhidharma texts, have not yet
been approached for a systematic retrieval of Buddhist attitudes toward Brahmanical cultures and
ideas, any conclusion that could be drawn from the materials collected here may need to be
revised with a more comprehensive outlook. Notwithstanding this limitation of the present
investigation, it seems plausible to assume that the Buddhists represented in the text were not
greatly concerned with their Brahmanical surroundings. Or, at least as far as the Veda and Vedic
sacrifice are concerned, it seems that there was no novel development (or direct engagement with
the Buddhist critiques) from the Brahmin side in the defense of the text and the practice that
early Buddhists perceived as offensive. This can be seen from the fact that there is no discernible
development of the arguments, from the Nikāya/Āgama materials, in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Although
ritual killing and recitation of the Veda are systematically categorized as the representative forms
of unwholesome conduct originating from delusion, what they are accused of remains essentially
the same: Killing animals in a ritual setting is karmically negative and chanting the Veda is
ineffectual for the ultimate goal of liberation. Regarding the latter, it is again noted in the passage
above, though as a quotation, that the Veda is the work of ignorant people whose doubt had not
been resolved before their death. These two critiques of Brahmin text and practice are still
presented as unconnected to each other.

1.4 Harivarman’s Tattvasiddhi: Connecting the Two

An advance in the discussion on the Veda and Vedic sacrifice is recorded in another Abhidharma
text, the Tattvasiddhi of Harivarman (ca. 250-350 CE), which deals extensively with
controversial issues among various early Buddhist schools. The advance, as it appears in the

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66 For the most updated information on modern scholarship as well as traditional accounts of
text, is initiated by Brahmin opponents. However, as we will see in this section, Harivarman adds little to Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice. He does not take the evolution of Brahmins’ arguments seriously and, when the occasion requires, he repeats the same critique that appears in previous sources. Still, his document ushers in a new stage in the history of Buddhist propaganda against Brahmanism because Brahmins in the *Tattvasiddhi* justify their sacrificial practice in the name of the Veda.

According to his biography,67 Harivarman was born into a Brahmin family of Central India and was educated in diverse disciplines, which included the study of the Veda. As Katsura (1974, 16-22) notes, Harivarman’s Brahmanical background is somewhat attested by his rather frequent—compared to other Abhidharma texts—references to Brahmanical literature, including the Veda, its six auxiliary sciences (Vedaṅga), epics, and philosophical treatises of Brahmanism, especially those belonging to the Vaiṣeṣika, Śāṁkhyā, and Nyāya schools. In this section, however, I will not consider all of those references.68 I will concentrate on the relevant passages contained in the hundredth chapter titled “Chapter on Three Karmas” (*三業品*), as they are the most illuminating with regard to the topic of Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice.

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67 This work, Biography of Harivarman (*訶梨跋摩傳*), written by Xuanchang (玄暢; 416-484) is quoted in *Compilation of Notices on the Translation of the Tripiṭaka* (*出三藏記集*; T 2145) 78b28-79b25. The major events of Harivarman’s life recorded in this work is concisely summarized in Katsura (1974, 14).

68 Six references to the Veda found in the *Tattvasiddhi* are collected in Katsura (1974, 16 and fn. 26). Katsura gives translations of four passages among them.
The chapter, as its title indicates, is about three types of karma, namely, wholesome (kuśala), unwholesome (akuśala), and indeterminate (avyākṛta) karmas. It begins with the opponent’s question on the definition of wholesome karma. A preliminary answer is given that wholesome karma is something by which, when it is complete, one can “grant good things to others” (與他好事), and the word “good” (好) is further defined as “pleasurable” (樂; *sukha), “wholesome” (善; *kuśala), and “meritorious” (福; *punya). The Brahmin identity of the opponent is hinted at from the very beginning. When the author defines wholesome karma, he states that it comes from the act of giving (布施), observing the precepts (持戒), or compassion (慈), but not from such acts as bathing (洗浴).  

But this basic definition soon reveals its weakness as the opponent cites several examples that seem to contradict general karmic principle if we follow the definition. Those examples include the cases of a skillful physician and an adulterer. The opponent argues that, according to Harivarman’s definition, the former would gain demerit while treating patients with acupuncture and moxibustion because they cause suffering, whereas the latter would obtain merit because he brings pleasure to other people’s wives by having sex with them. Confronted with

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69 Tattvasiddhi (T 1646) 292a1-5.
70 These counter-examples are initially introduced in the form of the opponent’s objection at Tattvasiddhi, 292a5-7 and 292a8-9. Interestingly, Kumārila puts forward a similar argument in the Ślokavārttika. See ŚV co. 235cd-237ab and 244cd-245ab translated in Kataoka (2010, pt. 2, 487-8 and 494). Halbfass (1991, 90) aptly summarizes the issue: “If reciprocity were indeed the foundation of dharma and adharma, of reward and punishment, how could this apply to such obvious, though “victimless,” violations of the norm as illicit drinking? And if benevolence and the production of well-being or pleasure were dharma, would a sexual act with the wife of one’s guru, a mortal sin (mahāpātaka) according to the dharmaśāstra rules, not be an act of dharma? One should leave aside the criteria of pleasure and pain in trying to determine what is right and wrong in the sense of dharma and adharma.” Kumārila, unlike Harivarman’s opponent, lists the examples of drinking instead of a good physician and specifies the object of sexual intercourse to the wife of one’s own guru. However, the purpose of listing those examples is the same: he cannot accept “pleasure and pain” as the criteria for the matter of dharma, that is, the principle of the world. The fact that Harivarman (c. 250-350 CE) records an objection similar to Kumārila’s as a pūrvapakṣa implies that Kumārila’s argument may be a reiteration of an old theme that was current among generic Vedic ritualists even in the third (or fourth) century. Kumārila does not seem to consider Harivarman’s reply (see below) that it is the actor’s own intention rather than the sensual reception of the act’s recipient that would determine the nature of karma. This neglect of Buddhist theory of karma is
those obvious counter-examples, Harivarman immediately discloses the fundamental principle of the Buddhist theory of karma. Just as the Buddha declared “by karma, I mean intention,”71 in Buddhism, it is ultimately the actor’s intention that determines the action’s karmic value rather than the resultant pleasure or suffering that another might receive from the action. Accordingly, the physician would obtain merit and the adulterer demerit since their actions are based on good will (善心) and sexual desire (婬欲) respectively.72

Then, in the subsequent objection, the opponent approaches the issue in several different ways. One of the themes that he brings to the controversy is the authority of certain books, among which is the Veda. After quoting a mundane law-book (世法經; *dharmasūtra?) that prescribes the duties (dharma) of the four castes (varṇa) to absolve the warrior caste (kṣatriya) of any sin accrued from killing, the opponent cites the Veda.

Also, the Veda says: “When one kills, he obtains merit.” In other words, when one kills a sheep with Vedic mantras, that sheep will be born in heaven.73 The Veda is what the world believes in.74 Also, [the Veda] says: “If the victim really deserves to die, killing him or her is not sinful just as the seers of five

because Kumārila takes the Sāṃkhya, rather than Buddhists, as his opponent in his defense of ritual killing in the Ślokavārttika. See 4.2 Once Again on Bhāviveka-Sāṃkhya Alliance.

71 Āṅguttara Nikāya vol. 3, p. 415, “cetanāḥ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi.”; this sentence is quoted and emphasized for its importance for understanding the Buddha’s doctrines by Gombrich (1990, 16) and (2006 [1996], 51).

72 Tattvasiddhi 292a5-292b1.

73 Cf. Ṛg Veda 1.162.21, “Truly in this way you do not die nor are you harmed: you go to the gods by paths easy to travel.” (translated in Jamison and Brereton 2014, 346) Alsdorf (2010, 37) reports a similar view from the Mahābhārata: “The same conclusion, in spite of its somewhat different course, has the concern of a conversation between a sacrificing priest (adhvaryu) and an ascetic (yati), who accuses him of himsā in the sacrifice of a ram (MBh. XIV 28, Deussen 1922:927ff.). The adhvaryu retorts promptly that the ram is not ruined but, according to the Veda, participates in heavenly bliss; its component parts will enter into the corresponding elements, the sun, etc., its life into heaven.”

74 Katsura (1974, 16) translates this passage as follows: “Moreover, it is said in the Veda: ‘One can obtain merits even by killing a living being, as e.g., when one kills a goat while reciting a mantra of the Veda, the goat will be born in Heaven after death.’ The Vedas are believed (only) by ordinary people.” Among other differences between his and my translation, I would note one. The entire passage is the words of the opponent. Therefore, the word “(only)” that Katsura inserted in his translation should be deleted; the sentence in question is meant to give credibility to the Veda by showing the general opinion of the world, not to discredit the quoted Vedic sentence.
supernatural powers were able to kill people by means of mantra.” It is not possible to say that those seers are sinful. How can sinners conduct such a [supernatural] act? Therefore, know that by killing one obtains merit.75

This objection by Harivarman’s opponent is indeed an epoch-opening statement and its significance needs to be examined in some detail.

First, the Brahmin opponent, as depicted by Harivarman, now draws upon the Veda to prove that Vedic sacrifice is karmically not negative but positive. As we have seen in the previous sections, the Brahmin opponents represented in the (pre-Harivarman) Buddhist literature do not mention the Veda when their practice of ritual killing is criticized. There, the critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice remained unconnected. The opponent in the Tattvasiddhi, however, does not simply name the Veda as the authority of his action. He directly quotes the Veda as the rationale behind the practice. In this way, the Veda is now explicitly marked as the background behind Vedic sacrifice.

Second, the opponent makes a conscious allusion to the authority of the Veda when he says “the Veda is what the world believes in” (違馱經是世間所信). And, by saying so, he reminds the Buddhist opponents of the weight of authority invested in the Veda by the general public. And, lastly, this Brahmin opponent further tries to establish the authority of the seers (神仙; *ṛṣī) of the Veda by referring to their supernatural capability, maintaining that their act of killing is karmically positive, that is, a meritorious action.

However, Harivarman pays little attention to this novel move of the opponent to demonstrate the karmic merit of killing through recourse to such authorities as the Veda and Vedic Rṣis. He does not comment on the authority of the Veda at all. To him, it is as if the world’s

75 Tattvasiddhi 292b19-24, “又違馱經說：‘殺生得福.’ 所謂以違馱語咒殺羊，羊死生天，違馱經是世間所信。又說：‘若實應死者，殺之則無罪。如五通仙能咒殺人，不可言神仙有罪。罪人云何能成此事？故知殺生得福.’”
belief in the Veda is completely irrelevant: “I have already replied to what you said, that is, ‘the
Veda says that by killing living beings one obtains merit.’ That is to say, there is no merit in
killing.” The authority of Vedic seers, on the other hand, though not extensively discussed, is at
least actively challenged: “[Even people down to] the Caṇḍālas can also kill people by means of
mantra. The sages are the same. They are able to commit [killing] by following the words [of
mantra] because of their evil mind. Also, this [killing by means of mantra] is accomplished
based on their powers of merit [accumulated in the past]. [However,] as they deprive [others’]
lives, they obtain demerit [which will bear a fruit in the future].” In short, Harivarman’s points
are: (1) the authority of the Veda and Vedic seers cannot be indiscriminately accepted and (2) the
karmic value of an action should be determined based on the moral nature of the intention that
motivated the action.

The significance of this first debate on the karmic value of ritual killing in this chapter of
the Tattvasiddhi lies in the introduction of the theme of the authority of the Veda and Vedic seers
in relation to Vedic sacrifice, though it is simply overlooked by Harivarman. In the middle of the
chapter, the opponent launches the second attack, again taking recourse to the authority of the
Veda and Vedic seers, but, this time, the debate is invoked by Harivarman’s argument.
Harivarman argues that killing is to be abandoned because it is abandoned by all the “good
people” (善人) such as the Buddha, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, and śrāvakas. His listing of
“good people” seems to elicit an objection from the opponent; with this word the opponent finds
an opportunity to assert the opposite.

Question. Acts such as killing are what good people also follow. As the Veda
orders them to perform a ritual to [be born in] heaven they, following the order,

76 Tattvasiddhi 293a9-10, “汝言‘違馱經說殺生得福.’ 是語先答. 謂殺無福.”
77 The meaning of the phrase “by following the words [of mantra]” (隨語) is not entirely clear to me.
78 Tattvasiddhi 293a26-8, “栴陀羅等亦能以咒術殺人. 仙人亦爾. 以惡心故, 隨語能成. 又此人福力
故能成. 以奪命故得罪.”
kill sheep.  

“Good people,” to this Brahmin opponent, are not the Buddha and bodhisattvas; it is Vedic ritualists who are deemed “good people.” At first glance, this objection seems similar to the objection in the first debate in that it points to the Veda as the source for the practice of ritual killing. However, the relationship of the Veda to the act of killing differs in the two passages. In the first, the role of the Veda in the opponent’s argument is to rationalize Vedic sacrifice. The Vedic sentence “when one kills, he obtains merit” (殺生得福) was quoted to karmically justify the act of killing; thus, it can be said, in the first case, the Veda provides a “theoretical” background to Vedic sacrifice. In the second, however, the Veda’s more direct engagement in the sacrifice is noted. The opponent says that there is the Vedic sentence “perform a sacrifice for the sake of heaven” (為天祠) and good people “obey the command” (聽令) and “kill sheep” (殺羊). In other words, Vedic sacrifice is shown as the actualization of a prescription in the Veda. Here we see an inkling of Mīmāṃsā; their idea of the absolute authority of the Veda to command what is to be done (dharma) is reflected in the opponent’s argument, but without the characteristic Mīmāṃsaka doctrines.

To meet this objection, Harivarman resorts to the old Buddhist strategy of denouncing the authors of the Veda, but not without an original element.

Answer. They are not good people. Good people always seek to benefit others and cultivate compassionate mind equally toward enemies and friends. How can such good people obey [the Vedic command] to kill living beings?! Those people made this scripture [that is, the Veda] with the mind of passion, hatred, and delusion. With the desire to be born in heaven, they enchant other sentient beings.

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79 Tattvasiddhi 293b27-8, “問曰。是殺生等, 善人亦聽。違馱經中, 爲天祠故, 聽令殺羊.”
80 This may be the translation of the stock sentence “svargakāmo yajeta” (One, desirous of heaven, must sacrifice).
81 This refers to the practice of loving-kindness (maitrī; Pāli mettā) one of the four items of the apramāṇa (immeasurable) or brahmavihāra (divine abiding). The sermon on those four was preached to the Brahmin interlocutors by the Buddha at the end of the Tevijja Sutta after the denunciation of Brahmins including the authors of the Veda.
beings. Because of the power of [previous] merit, they are able to perform this act. Also, such [evil acts] as killing is what an enlightened being cannot conduct. Therefore, know that they are not meritorious.\(^{82}\)

This is familiar Buddhist rhetoric, repeated from the time of the Tevijja Sutta. The makers of the Veda are ignorant, and, due to their ignorance, their work, the Veda, should not be trusted.

However, something more is attributed to them in the quotation. In the Tevijja Sutta and the sūtra quoted in the Mahāvibhāṣa, only their intellectual (or spiritual) ignorance was noted; Brahmins were ignorant of the god Brahmā in the former and they remained doubtful even up to their death in the latter. In this passage, Harivarman extends the range of their deficiencies to cover, not only delusion, but all three poisons. The Veda is defined as the work of authors trapped in passion, hatred, and delusion. Hence, in Harivarman’s presentation, the Veda is not merely a collection of foolish talk, completely irrelevant to the ultimate goal. It is also morally problematic since it is authored with the specific intention to deceive and kill in order to accomplish the authors’ own goal of reaching heaven. The good people, reminiscent of Vedic seers, may magically enchant other beings because of the merit they accumulated in the past, but regardless of such capability, they earn demerit for ritual killing.

Harivarman’s contribution to the development of Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists can be found here. He introduces the standard of morality in the Buddhist assessment of the authors of the Veda, Vedic seers or “good people” as expressed in the quote. His contribution seems to be forced, however, at least in his presentation: it is not Harivarman but his opponent who first connects the problem of sacrificial killing to the authority of the Veda. Harivarman thus had to ascribe immorality to Vedic seers in his objection to the opponent’s characterization of

\(^{82}\) *Tattvasiddhi* 293b28-293c4, “答曰. 此非善人. 善人者常求利他, 修慈悲心怨親同等. 如是人者, 豈當聽殺生也! 是人貪恚濁心故造此經. 求生天上, 咒他衆生. 以福力故, 能成是事. 又此殺等, 得解脫者之所不為. 故知不善.”
“killers of animals” as “good people.” Harivarman, it seems, following his opponent’s lead, simply defines them as bad people, and, in so doing, adds a moral dimension to the Buddhist evaluation of Vedic seers.83

1.5 Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra: Emergence of the Mīmāṃsakas

Harivarman’s Brahmin opponent is an orthodox Vedic ritualist who regards Vedic commands as compulsory mandates and who rationalizes Vedic sacrifice by citing from the Veda. It is in the voice of this Brahmin, recorded in the Tattvasiddhi, that we know that Brahmins were aware of Buddhist criticism of Vedic sacrifice and that they developed a defense against it: an appeal to the authority attributed to the Veda by the public at large and by its leaders called “good people.” Backed by the authority of the Veda, the opponent attempts to absolve Vedic sacrifice of any negative karmic effect.

The task of Harivarman, in accordance with the opponent’s argument, was, first, to shatter the authority of the Veda, rather than to expose the immorality of Vedic sacrifice, in order to show that Vedic sacrifice is a groundless act of killing. He does this by simply ignoring the

83 This chapter “On Three Karmas” has one more reference to Vedic sacrifice towards the end. Harivarman, in the effort to establish “karma” as “intention,” refers to one Brahmin argument that was briefly introduced as the words of the opponent in the first quotation in this section. Therein, the opponent vindicates Brahmin ritual killing by asserting that the victim will be reborn in heaven when the killing is accompanied by the recitation of Vedic mantras. Harivarman introduces a variety of this argument and uses it to support his own argument: “Also, [even according to your position,] in the rituals to heaven, [a priest] intentionally kills a sheep with the meritorious mind, and thus, makes the sheep be reborn in heaven. Since [the priest] kills [the sheep] with meritorious mind, he would have merit. If it is not the case, all killings [in a ritual] would obtain either merit or demerit [without a fixed rule as prescribed in the Veda].” (Tattvasiddhi 294b27-9: 又於天祠中，以福心故殺羊，令羊生天。以福心殺故，則有福德。若不爾者，一切殺生皆得福得罪。) It is hard to evaluate the significance of this passage, as it is Brahmins’ argument employed to support Buddhists’ thesis. If it reflects the Brahmin position without a refraction, it is important in that it shows Brahmin self-consciousness of moral issues involved in the practice of ritual killing. And, more importantly, it implies that Brahmins subjected their ritual practices to the law of karma according to which, in its most basic form, moral action begets pleasurable experience and immoral action suffering.
world’s respect for the Veda and then by questioning the qualification of the authors of the Veda. In so doing, the traditional critiques of the immorality of Vedic sacrifice and of the ignorance of Vedic seers come to be connected. They are not combined in order to be merely juxtaposed, however. Reflecting the structure of the opponent’s argument, Harivarman addresses the disqualifications of the authors of the Veda in the context of his critique of Vedic sacrifice. Thus, the critique of the Veda comes to be completely subsumed under the framework of the critique of Vedic sacrifice.

This structure of Harivarman’s argumentation in which the authority of the Veda and Vedic seers is discussed within the framework of the critique of Vedic sacrifice continues in the next work of our inquiry, Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra. Toward the end of his commentary on the first verse of the fourth chapter in the Abhidharmakośa by Vasubandhu, Saṅghabhadra engages in a debate with a certain Brahmin opponent who asserts that ritual killing brings about a favorable result to the performer. This fourth chapter is the chapter on karma, titled “Karmanirdeśa.” The first verse lays out the basic schema of the Abhidharma theory of karma by stating that all the varieties found in the world are caused by karma and karma is of two kinds, viz. intention and actions motivated by intention. Given this context, what Saṅghabhadra’s opponent argues, or what Saṅghabhadra takes to be the argument, is that the act of killing in

84 Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra is a critical commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu. His critical stance toward Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika-inclined interpretation of the Vaibhāṣikas’ Abhidharma system and his strategy of revealing the unorthodox nature of Vasubandhu’s thoughts are studied in Park (2014, 47-132). Park (51) summarily observes as follows: “In sum, Saṅghabhadra’s exegetical focus in the Nyāyānusāra is to trace, if possible but not always, Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika biases back to their origins, namely the positions of Śrīlāta and his Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika school, and then to demolish all of them by the root. This approach presupposes that Saṅghabhadra viewed Vasubandhu as belonging to—or at least as falling under the sway of—this heterodox Buddhist faction, namely the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas.”

85 This debate with a Brahmin opponent over the karmic status of Vedic sacrifice does not appear in the corresponding sections of Vasubandhu’s own commentary, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, and that of the Abhidharmadīpa, which is the last extant work of the Vaibhāṣikas.
Vedic sacrifice overrides the law of karma, or, understood in a less strong form, constitutes an exception to the law.

This short section is exclusively devoted to the topic of Vedic sacrifice, unlike Harivarman’s sporadic discussion. It covers one page in the Taishō edition of the text and can be divided into three parts. These parts as a whole reiterate the structure observed in the Tattvasiddhi. Saṅghabhadra begins the section by introducing the argument of a Vedic ritualist on the positive karmic effect of ritual killing and ends it by confirming that Vedic sacrifice is not the means of attaining favorable results. Under this framework, Saṅghabhadra deals with the arguments that (1) ritual killings preceded by Vedic mantras do not cause unfavorable results in the future (Part 1), (2) the Veda is a definitive means of knowledge (pramāṇa) because its sound is eternal and its author is non-existent (Part 2), and (3) the Veda is a definitive means of knowledge because its words are the transmission of what Vedic seers directly experienced (Part 3).

Parts 1 and 3 are, to varying degrees, direct evolutions of the previous critiques. Part 1 presents more elaborate arguments of both Brahmin and Buddhist positions on the killing accompanied with mantra-chanting first observed in the Tattvasiddhi. In part 3, on the other hand, Saṅghabhadra inherits the attack on the qualifications of Vedic seers; however, it is done in an entirely novel fashion. The authority of the seers is invoked by the opponent in order to prove

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86 Nyāyānusāra (T 1562; hereafter, NA) 530b14-531b16.
87 NA 530b14-5.
88 NA 531b13-5
89 NA 530b14-530c4.
90 Usually the word “pramāṇa” (valid means of knowledge) is translated into one Chinese character “liang” (量). But, in the Nyāyānusāra in Xuanzang’s translation, the word “量” is often accompanied with another word “定” which I take to mean “definitive” in the compound. Therefore, “definitive means of knowledge” is the translation of the compound “定量” not of the Sanskrit word “pramāṇa.”
91 NA 530c4-531a10.
92 NA 531a10-531b16.
the *pramāṇa*-status of the Veda. Saṅghabhadra, in the course of the refutation, adds something new: a discussion of the Buddha’s qualification. Thus, these two parts evolved from, or at least were thematically inherited from, the previous literature. They encompass part 2, which records arguments that bear a strong imprint of the Mīmāṃsakas for the first time in Buddhist literature. This Brahmin in the *Nyāyānusāra* argues in favor of Vedic sacrifice in the name of the Veda whose authority is founded on its being a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). It is proven to be so on the basis of the Mīmāṃsā doctrines such as *Śabdanityatva* (Eternality of Vedic Sound) and *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* (Authorlessness of the Veda). Although an appeal to the authority of the Veda has been already made by Harivarman’s opponent, it is indeed a fresh argument since now the authority is not based on external factors (for example, the opinions of the general public and good people) but solely on the Veda itself. And this fresh argument from the Brahmin side is woven into the two previous Buddhist critiques.

Saṅghabhadra’s opponent seems to be well aware of Harivarman’s discussion. It is not only because he maintains the same thesis that “injury to sentient beings in a ritual setting, when preceded by Vedic mantras, brings about favorable results.”93 He also seems to have learned a lesson from the previous encounter with Buddhists. Harivarman’s Brahmin, as we have seen, refers to the case of a good physician as a counter-example to the Buddhist theory of karma; that is, if Buddhists hold that one gains karmic merit when one give pleasure to others, a good physician would obtain demerit since he imposes pain on his patients. Harivarman refutes this by saying that the physician will not gain demerit since his action is motivated by good will. Saṅghabhadra’s Brahmin, as if he has absorbed Harivarman’s point of critique, reformulates the argumentation and identifies Vedic ritualists with good physicians. Like good physicians, when

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93 NA 530b14-5, “祠祀明咒爲先，害諸有情，能招愛果.”
Vedic priests kill sheep and so forth, they intentionally seek to benefit the victims.\textsuperscript{94} He even adduces, but this time self-defeatingly, the case of the notorious Saṃsāramocakas (脱生死者) who kill insects and worms in order to free them from the round of saṃsāra, that is, out of good intention.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{94} This is not entirely a novel argument. Though it does not make use of analogy of “physician” and is not put in the mouth of opponent, Harivarman also takes advantage of this argument that Vedic ritualists kill the victims with good will to send them to heaven in order to support his own thesis that the karmic value of an action is determined by the intention of the actor. See above fn. 65.

\textsuperscript{95} For extensive research and references to the Saṃsāramocakas (“liberators from samsāra”), see Halbfass (1991, 97-111). Kataoka (2012) adds this reference by Saṅghabhadra to Halbfass’ list of references. However, as he introduces Saṅghabhadra’s argument, Kataoka confuses the words of the opponent with that of the author; in short, the Saṃsāramocaka case is initially introduced by the opponent, not by Saṅghabhadra. Kataoka (356-7) writes and translates: “Refuting the opponent, Saṅghabhadra mentions the problematic case of the saṃsāramocakas (脱生死者), who claim that they kill worms, ants, etc. (by using swords and sticks) for the benefit of these creatures: (1) The liberators from samsāra, who injure worms, ants, etc. with the thought of benefiting worms, ants, etc., too, would bring about desirable fruits. (2) [But] it is not the case that fruits [of ritual killing and killing by the liberators from samsāra] can be different [when] both kill creatures similarly for the benefit [of the victims], whether by means of mantras or swords and sticks.” In his translation, consisting of two sentences, Kataoka considers both to be the words of Saṅghabhadra. However, when we take both (1) and (2) to be the words of one and the same person, we get a strange argument that may be attributed to the opponent not to the author. What (2) is saying is that there is no difference in terms of the karmic result between the ritual killing and the killing by the Saṃsāramocakas. And what (1) is saying is that the killing by the latter “would bring about desirable fruits.” When we combine two sentences, what the translated passage is saying is that both Vedic ritualists and the Saṃsāramocakas would gain desirable fruits by performing their acts of killing. This cannot possibly be Saṅghabhadra’s argument against the Mīmāṃsakas. In fact, Saṅghabhadra’s comment on the case of the Saṃsāramocakas appears later (see below). To clarify the context of the whole passage that Kataoka paraphrases following the above translation on p. 357, I translate them all here.

“[Question:] In a ritual setting, [the priest] intentionally seeks to bring benefit and pleasure to the victims such as sheep by means of [reciting] Vedic mantras. Therefore, the killer, though he injures sentient beings, just like a good physician, does not invite painful results. [It is like] the Saṃsāramocakas, who injure worms and ants with the mind to bring benefit and pleasure, definitely invite favorable results [from their practice].

[Answer:] Even though [the killer], by means of either Vedic mantras or knife and club, kills sentient being for the sake of the benefit and pleasure [of the victims], they are not different in terms of the result [from other cases of killing]. The killer obtains merit or demerit essentially based on the difference of good and evil nature of one’s own mind. Likewise, the victimized sheep or ant must obtain merit or demerit based on [the moral state of] its own mind. It is not that one can generate merit in the victim by forcibly killing it and that [the victim] having it as the cause, invites a favorable result in the future. The Saṃsāramocakas’ injury of other sentient beings does not constitute the cause of good results; it only invites bad results. Likewise, [even though] one recites Vedic mantras before [killing animals] in the ritual setting, it will only invite unfavorable results.” NA 530b18-27, (pūrvapakṣa:) 祠祀明咒意欲利樂所害羊等。故能害者, 異害有情, 猶如良醫, 不招苦果。脱生死者, 亦以利樂蟲蟻等心, 害蟲蟻等, 應招
Saṅghabhadra’s reply consists of two points. First, the intention of the killer is irrelevant for the victim’s karmic fruit; one receives one’s own karmic merit/demerit solely based on one’s own intention. Simply speaking, one cannot generate others’ merit on behalf of them as Vedic ritualists and the Samsāramocakas purport to do. Secondly, Vedic ritualists cannot prove “objectively” their own good intentions, unlike good physicians. In the latter’s case, both the physician himself and the attendants witness the recovery of the patients; they impose pain to give the patients comfort in this life, not the next. However, what both Vedic ritualists themselves and the attendants witness at the sacrificial site is the victimized animals’ expression of unbearable pain. They do not directly witness the effect of the priests’ good intention, and furthermore, they lack any rational explanation for how it benefits the victims. Though not entirely expressed in the language of pramāṇa-discourse that would later prevail in Indian Buddhist philosophical works, the second point amounts to saying that there is no “direct perception” (pratyakṣa) and “inference” (anumāna) to prove the necessary relationship between the priests’ good intention and its effects, such as the victim’s birth in heaven. And it gives the opponent a good opportunity to introduce the third means of knowledge, scripture (śabda), to justify Vedic sacrifice: “Even if the killer and the attendants do not directly witness it, since the Veda is the definite means of knowledge, we know that killing living beings in a ritual setting

愛果. [uttarapakṣa:] 非以明咒或以刀杖，同為利樂殺害有情，果容有異。如能殺者，要依自心善惡有殊，得福非福。如是所殺羊等蠶等，應由自心得福非福。非由強殺令彼福生，以之為因當招愛果。如脫生死者，害他有情，不為善果因，但招惡果。如是祠祀明咒為先，亦應唯招非所愛果。) For more materials on the Samsāramocakas in the Jaina literature, see Granoff (1992), Dundas (1995).

96 NA 530b21-7, “非以明咒或以刀杖，同為利樂殺害有情，果容有異。如能殺者，要依自心善惡有殊，得福非福。如是所殺羊等蠶等，應由自心得福非福。非由強殺令彼福生，以之為因當招愛果。如脫生死者，害他有情，不為善果因，但招惡果。如是祠祀明咒為先，亦應唯招非所愛果。”

97 NA 530b27-530c04, “良醫於彼，非同法喻。以諸良醫為欲利樂諸有病者，勤加救療令他安樂現非後生，醫及傍人知功驗果。雖令病者暫苦觸身，而彼良醫不生非福。然彼自許‘羊等愚癡，不能了知福與非福。’既被殺害現苦難任，雖說未來當招愛果，而能殺者及彼傍人俱不現知，亦無理證。故所引喻非與法同。”
does not generate demerit.”

Then, why should the Veda be considered to be a *pramāṇa*? In the answer to this question, we see the debut of Mīmāṃsaka reasoning on the stage of Buddhist literature.

It is because the substratum of the sound of Vedic mantras is eternal. In other words, since there is no author of the Veda as a whole and the words of mantras therein exist spontaneously, it is qualified to be the definitive means of knowledge. Only this (i.e., the Veda) [is the definitive means], not others.99

Two characteristic Mīmāṃsā doctrines on the Veda are present, viz. *śabdanityatva* and *vedāpauruṣeyatva*.100 The latter supports the former while the former forms the main reason for the Veda’s being a *pramāṇa*. Two propositions express the doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda: (1) There is no author of the Veda in its entirety (諸明論無製作者) and (2) The mantra portion, among others, of the Veda (於中咒詞) exists spontaneously (自然有). What the opponent intends to prove with these two propositions is the doctrine of the eternality of sound: the substratum or essence (體) of the sound of Vedic mantras (明咒聲) is eternal (常).

Despite the clear and succinct articulations of the two major Mīmāṃsaka doctrines in the quotation, the opponent’s argument as a whole seems to be slightly askew from the standard Mīmāṃsā position. What he asserts is not the eternality of the entire Veda but only the mantra portion. Although he denies authorship for the entire Veda, he then unnecessarily confines spontaneous existence to the mantra portion. This emphasis on the mantra portion is at odds with our understanding of the Mīmāṃsakas’ position, which prioritizes the *vidhi* (command) portion over the other two—the *arthavāda* (complimentary expressions) and *mantra*—treating them only

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98 NA 530c4-6, “殺者傍人雖不現證，而由明論定量故知，祠祀害生不生非福.”
99 NA 530c6-8, “以明咒聲體是常故，謂諸明論無製作者，於中咒詞自然有故，能爲定量。唯此非餘.”
100 I analyze Saṅghabhadra’s critique of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda in 3.2 *Is the Veda Intelligible? Saṅghabhadra’s and Bhāviveka’s Divergent Reactions to the Authorless Veda.*
subsidarily.\textsuperscript{101}

Thus, the thesis expected from a stereotypical Mīmāṃsaka, in the most general terms, would be that the authorless Veda is the authoritative means of knowledge because it teaches us the duty \textit{(dharma)} of Vedic sacrifice with its unconditional commands \textit{(vidhi)}; the thesis would not be that mantras used in sacrifice are authorless and eternal, and therefore, a means of knowledge. By focusing on the mantra portion, Saṅghabhadra’s opponent gives the impression that he is carrying the agenda of Part 1 (i.e., ritual killing preceded by mantra recitation) over to Part 2 instead of presenting himself with the new vision of the Mīmāṃsakas. In the course of doing so, the prescriptive dimension of Vedic authority, observed in Harivarman’s text, is completely lost in the quoted passage.

The suspicion becomes stronger with the opponent’s argument in Part 3. After

\textsuperscript{101} For a concise presentation of the Mīmāṃsakas’ understanding of the hierarchical relationship between the three parts of the Veda, see Śaṅkara’s “admirable summary” of their position as a \textit{pūrvapakṣa} in his \textit{Brahmasūtrabhāṣya}: “[1. On \textit{Arthavāda}:] Alternatively, they (=the Upaniṣads, i.e., \textit{arthavāda} passages) are adjunct to injunctions [that prescribe ritual] activities in order to make known their agent, deity, etc.; or they are meant to enjoin other activities such as adornation. For it is not possible that they provide information about an existing thing, because an existing thing is the object of [other means of knowledge] such as perception, and because no human purpose \textit{(puruṣārtha)} is served in providing information about [an existing thing], by which nothing is to be gained or lost. It is for this reason that, in order to avoid that [Vedic statements] like ‘He wept’ be without purpose, [such statements] are stated to serve a purpose in that they eulogise pan injunction] in (MS 1.2.7:) ‘Because they form one sentence with an injunction, they [serve a purpose] by eulogizing injunctions.’ [2. On \textit{Mantra}:] \textit{Mantras} such as \textit{iṣe tvā} (TaitS 1.1.1) have been stated to be connected with ritual acts as being expressive of [ritual] activity and the means thereto. [3. On the supremacy of \textit{Vidhi} over the two:] For this reason Vedic sentences are nowhere seen to have purpose except in connection with injunctions, nor would this be possible. Nor is an injunction possible that pertains to the existing aspect of a thing, because an injunction concerns an activity. It follows that the Upaniṣads are adjuncts of injunctions [that prescribe ritual] activities by making known the own forms of the agent, deity etc. required by the ritual act.” ([1] \textit{kartṛdevatādiprakāśanārthatvāna vā kriyāvidhiśeṣatvam, upāsanādikriyāntaravidhānārthatvatvān vā/ na hi pariniṣṭhītavastupratipādanaṁ sambhavati, pratyaksādīviṣayatvat pariniṣṭhītavastunāḥ, tatpratipādane ca heyopādeyarahite puruṣārthāhāvāt/ ata eva so ‘rodī iti evamādīnāṁ ānarthhakam mā bhūd iti vidhīnā tv ekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṁ syuḥ iti stūvakatvānārthatvatvām uktam/ [2] mantrānāṁ ca iṣe tvā ityādīnāṁ kriyātatsādhanābhidhāyakatvēna karmasamavāyitvam uktam/ [3] ato na kvacid api vedavākyānāṁ vidhīsamspārṣan antareṇārthatvādā dvṣṭopapannā vā/ na ca pariniṣṭhīte vastusvarūpe vidhiḥ sanbhavati, kriyāviṣayatvād vidheḥ/ tasmāt karmāpaksatkarḍdevatādīsvarūpāprikāśanena kriyāvidhiśeṣatvām vedāntānāṁ/); Text and Translation (with the numbered (1-3) headings added) are from Bronkhorst (2007, 35-6).
Saṅghabhadra’s refutations on the eternality and authorlessness of the Veda, the opponent falls back on the authority of Vedic seers in order to argue once again for the pramāṇa-status of the Veda.

If then, one should argue: all the sounds of the Veda are the definitive means of knowledge because they are subsumed under the ultimate teaching. In other words, those enjoyable fruits that the Veda speaks of are what have been [directly] seen by great seers (*maharṣi) with their utmost holiness. Since [the Veda] is the transmission [of those fruits seen by rṣis], it is subsumed under the ultimate teaching. If one follows [the words of the Veda], he will obtain all manners of favorable results, but, if one violates them, he would encounter unfavorable results.102

Reference to the category of scripture, the third means of knowledge, is more explicitly made here. The opponent tries to prove the validity of the Veda by showing that the Veda is included in the category of scripture expressed as “ultimate teaching” (至敎). And he seems to prove that the Veda is included in that category by making use of another term for the category itself. Since this category of scripture is also called the “words of trustworthy people” (āptavacana), if one can demonstrate that Vedic seers are “trustworthy” (āpta), then the Veda that records Vedic seers’ vision, as the words of the āptas, comes to belong in the category of scripture. Hence, in this argument, the āpta-status of Vedic seers is the most crucial factor in proving the Veda to be a scripture, thus granting pramāṇa-status to it. The opponent, however, does not make any effort to prove the trustworthiness of Vedic seers; it is simply declared, rather than argued for, when he says that they have “utmost holiness” (至圣).

This gesture of relying on Vedic seers, who have no role in Mīmāṃsā, is enough to make one suspicious of the Mīmāṃsaka identity of this opponent. What is more strange is that it seems that the opponent is trying to establish the Veda as a pramāṇa based on the complimentary

102 NA 531a10-3, “若爾應說，諸明論聲，至敎所收，故為定量。謂明論說可愛果等，是諸大仙至聖所見。彼傳說故，至敎所攝。若順便獲諸可愛果，違便現遭不可愛報。”
portion \((arthavāda)\) of the text. This portion is strongly suggested when the opponent says “those enjoyable fruits that the Veda speaks of” \((明論說可愛果)\). In Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics, those Vedic sentences that praise the fruit of the rituals \((arthavāda)\) are only given a secondary role of orientating people to do what is to be done \(i.e.,\) Vedic sacrifice as indicated by Vedic commands \((vidhi)\). Given this, the opponent’s effort to establish the authority of the complimentary section by recourse to the “holiness of Vedic seers” appears all the more unusual if we consider him to be a Mīmāṃsaka.

However strange a Mīmāṃsaka the opponent is, it is his argument that provokes Saṅghabhadra to renew the old Buddhist critique of Vedic seers. This old but rather uncomplicated critique is focused on exposing their disqualification regarding the ultimate goal they propose to achieve through Vedic practices. But Saṅghabhadra shifts the focus to the validity of seers’ qualifications by introducing pramāṇic language into the discourse, with the same goal of revealing the disqualifications of Vedic seers and their work, the Veda. The reasons why he rejects the Veda are simple but systematic:

It is not so. The utmost holiness realized by those seers venerated by you cannot be confirmed by direct perception \((現量; pratyakṣa)\); nor is it inferable by means of inference \((比量; anumāna)\). Therefore, those transmitted words are not included in the ultimate teaching.\(^{103}\)

The argumentation is very straightforward. As the seers’ qualification is neither perceived nor inferred, the record of their experience cannot be considered as scripture. In short, the seers’ state of holiness is beyond the human range of investigation. But the idea behind this argumentation is revolutionary. Saṅghabhadra investigates the scriptural status of the Veda by means of direct perception and inference. That is to say, the validity of scripture as a means of knowledge should

\(^{103}\) NA 531a13-5, “不爾。汝等所敬諸仙所證至聖，非現量得，亦不可以比量准知。故彼傳說非至敎攝。”
be checked by the means that are available to humans. The supra-human domain comes under human control in this schema.

Thus, to prove that the Veda is scripture, one is required to directly perceive at least “a small bit of the favorable results” mentioned in the Veda. And then, based on this observation, one can confirm the proposition that the words of the Veda are not empty. This, in turn, inferentially proves the scriptural status of the Veda. Without satisfying these steps to prove the scriptural status of the Veda, the opponent’s defensive arguments would be no more than “foolish words of respect.”104 This challenge to the opponent is almost like a demand to express one’s position in the format of the “three part syllogism” later formalized by Dignāga. We can thus reconstruct the following syllogism with the words that Saṅghabhadra requires the opponent to state:

[thesis (pratijñā):] The transmitted teaching of the utmost holy experience realized by them is included in the ultimate teaching (彼證至聖驗所傳敎是至敎攝).

[reason (hetu):] [It is because] what is said [in the Veda] is not empty (所說非虛).

[example (dṛṣṭānta):] [Just like such and such] favorable fruits seen by great seers and mentioned in the Veda (大仙所見明論所說可愛果等).

Saṅghabhadra’s opponent, thus criticized, quite naturally requires the same for the Buddha's teaching.105 This questioning of the Buddha’s qualification as the teacher of the ultimate

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104 This is a paraphrase of the following paragraph. NA 531a15-9, “謂汝所敬大仙所見明論所說可愛果等，汝等曾無能少現見，可以准驗‘所說非虛’，由此比知‘彼證至聖驗所傳敎是至敎攝。’故汝所說是愚敬言，詎能了知眞至敎相?”

105 NA 531a19-21, “But the utmost holiness realized by the great master venerated by you is not confirmed by you through direct perception either. However, you admit the utmost holiness [of the Buddha], and thus, what has been said by him comes to be included in the ultimate teaching. Then, the rest [including the teaching of Vedic seers] should be thus. Why don't you admit their (=the seers’
teaching may indicate the opponent’s Mīmāṃsaka identity, although it is not an explicit questioning of the specific quality of the Buddha's omniscience (sarvajñatva), which the Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila would later address.

Saṅghabhadra meets this challenge by proving the Buddha’s qualification, using the standard he himself set for the opponent. The gist of his argument is that the elimination of the three poisons can be realized if one follows the Buddha’s teaching. The evidence of this elimination is one’s gradual but fundamental dissolution of the attachment to self (我執; ātmagrāha), which can only be achieved by the Buddha’s teaching on “no self” (無我; anātman). It is this doctrine that essentially distinguishes Buddhist from non-Buddhist teachings. The lack of the teaching of no self demonstrates Vedic seers’ attachment to self, proving that they are still bound by passion, hatred, and delusion. Therefore, the Veda, the work of those seers, is not authoritative and Vedic sacrifice, like all deeds, is subject to the universal law of karma.

1.6 Conclusion
Saṅghabhadra takes a detour to arrive at the same conclusion already made by Harivarman: Vedic seers are not free from the three poisons and Vedic sacrifice that their literary work espouses is a karmically negative action. These two ideas have been there from the earliest Buddhist literature. We have seen that these two critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, which circulated independently in the Nikāya/Āgama literature and the Mahāvibhāṣā, came to be connected in the Tattvasiddhi. We also observed that the connection is not a combination of the teaching alone?” (且如仁等所敬大師所證至聖，亦非仁等現量所得。而許至聖，彼所說敎是至敎攝。餘亦應然．何獨不許?)

106 This is amount to the establishment of the reason (hetu) part of the above syllogism, that is, “what has been said is not empty.”
107 This is a summary of NA 531a21-531b16.
two but rather the inclusion of the critique of the Veda within the framework of the critique of Vedic sacrifice. This latter theme of killing also frames Śaṅghabhadra’s section; he opens and closes it by making references to Vedic sacrifice. Within this framework, he discusses the problems of ritual killing accompanied by mantra recitation (Part 1), the eternal and authorless Veda that legitimizes Vedic sacrifice (Part 2), and the validity of the Veda as the transmission of Vedic seers’ vision (Part 3). What he does with this three-part argumentation is to confirm the same familiar two conclusions.

However, Śaṅghabhadra’s presentation of these two ideas is more complex. It is not the length of the discussion. It is the style of his argumentation, especially in terms of the sophisticated philosophical terms that he uses and the systematic approach that he takes. What, then, makes his discussion different from those of his predecessors?

First, it is the increased specificity of the opponent’s identity. In earlier sources, the opponents’ arguments are not introduced and, even if they are represented, their assertions are so general as to be attributed to any generic, or more precisely, orthopraxic Vedic ritualist regardless of his philosophical affiliation. In contrast, Śaṅghabhadra’s anonymous opponent puts forward specific arguments strongly reminiscent of Mīmāṃsā. Indeed, the assertions that the sound of the Veda is eternal and the Veda is without an author are the hallmarks of the Mīmāṃsakas. We have also seen, however, that those arguments do not fit squarely into the standard positions of the Mīmāṃsakas. Nonetheless, I would tentatively posit him as a Mīmāṃsaka until an attempt to more accurately identify this opponent can be made in a separate study.

The immediate change caused by the emergence of this Mīmāṃsaka opponent in the context of Buddhist critiques of the Veda and Vedic sacrifice, most evident in Part 2, is that Śaṅghabhadra, unlike his predecessors, had to devote more space to the discussion of the Veda in order to criticize Vedic sacrifice. It was necessitated by the opponent, whose the defense of Vedic
sacrifice was based on the ideologies formed around the nature of the Veda. Accordingly, the focus of Saṅghabhadra’s refutation shifted from the act of killing to the eternal and authorless Veda. And this movement of the critique from the practice to the text seems to be confusion caused by the Mīmāṃsaka arguments. From Part 1 to Part 2, the opponent changes the focus from the efficacy of Vedic mantras to the authority of the Veda. Saṅghabhadra refutes these one by one. Yet, what Saṅghabhadra misses is the unseen but powerful idea behind the opponent’s thinking: that text can legitimate practice.

This unnoticed idea continues to characterize, albeit beneath the surface, the discussion in Part 3 where Saṅghabhadra explicitly speaks the language of pramāṇic discourse. This is another feature that adds complexity as well as sophistication to his argumentation. Saṅghabhadra even appears to agree with the idea, when he actively argues for the validity of the Buddha’s words upon the opponent’s request. However, this was not total submission to Mīmāṃsaka reasoning. Just before he argues in this way, he resets the relationship between text and practice. Saṅghabhadra argues that, insofar as a text can be verified by means available to a human, that is, by perception and inference, the text is considered to be a scripture that can have authority over human practice. The approach of Saṅghabhadra to this problem is well-reasoned. Yet, however rational it might seem, one cannot avoid the impression that the discussion over scriptural authority could be unnecessary, since the topic at hand is Brahmin ritual killing, not the authority of the Veda.

Just as Harivarman connected the two disparate critiques following his opponent’s lead, Saṅghabhadra came to discuss the relationship between text and practice as the Mīmāṃsaka arguments pushed him in that direction. He could have questioned the innate relationship between the Veda and Vedic sacrifice presupposed in the Mīmāṃsaka arguments. In doing so, he would have pointed out the irrelevance of textual authority over an action and reemphasized the
old Buddhist argument that the act of killing is karmically negative under any circumstance. Instead, Saṅghabhadra follows the opponent’s argument as he refutes it, and, by doing so, he lets the Mīmāṃsaka set the agenda for the whole discussion. This deference to the Mīmāṃsaka structure of argumentation made it difficult for him to directly make reference to Brahmins’ actual act of killing. With Saṅghabhadra’s willingness to discuss practice in relation to text, Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice became a critique of text rather than of practice. The textual tone of the critique grows thicker after Saṅghabhadra. From Saṅghabhadra’s time on, the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice cannot be made without reference to the authority of the Veda, as molded by the Mīmāṃsāka project of viewing Vedic sacrifice, not as a mere act of killing, but as a textually sanctioned activity. The Mīmāṃsaka schema captured Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice.
Chapter Two: How Mīmāṃsaka is MHK 9?

An Overview of MHK 9 and a Review of Opinions on the Identity of the Opponent in MHK 9

2.1 Introduction

Bhāviveka’s MHK 9 is the first extensive Buddhist confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas, although it was not the first mention and critique of them in a Buddhist text. MHK 9 is the ninth chapter of Bhāviveka’s independent magnum opus, the Madhyamakahṛdaya consisting of the root verses (kārikā; MHK) and the prose commentary titled Tarkajvālā (TJ) divided into eleven chapters. Six chapters (chapters 4-9) are designed to refute the doctrines of other schools, two of which are Buddhist and four of which are non-Buddhist. MHK 9 is devoted to a review of the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsā school and has the largest number (167) of verses among such polemical chapters. Yet, although MHK 9 is extensive and rich, a number of scholars have denied that Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9 is the Mīmāṃsakas. As a consequence, the significance of MHK 9 in the history of Buddhist-Mīmāṃsaka polemics has not received sufficient attention.

The major problem in identifying Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9 with the Mīmāṃsakas is that Bhāviveka often seems to introduce and refute claims that are not associated with the Mīmāṃsā school or individual Mīmāṃsakas known from extant sources, a problem noted in Chapter One as we review Saṅghabhadrā’s section on the Mīmāṃsakas. Saṅghabhadrā’s opponent puts forward two hallmark Mīmāṃsaka doctrines—the authorlessness of the Veda
(vedāpauruṣeyatva) and the eternality of the words of the Veda (śabdanityatva)—which enabled us to characterize the section as the first Buddhist encounter with the Mīmāṃsakas. The position of the opponent, however, fluctuates. As we have seen, Saṅghabhadra’s opponent first attempts to defend animal sacrifice by presenting the Veda as an authorless text. Then, in response to Saṅghabhadra’s critique, he presents the Veda as the record of the ancient seers’ vision. Moreover, the opponent’s prioritization of the mantra portion over other sections of the Veda does not correspond to our knowledge of the Mīmāṃsakas, who invest absolute authority in Vedic injunctions (vidhi)—often found in the Brāhmaṇas—and subordinate other elements of the Veda, including mantras.

If we expect Bhāviveka to exclusively discuss the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines in MHK 9, we encounter a similar problem, despite its title, “Introduction to the Determination of the Truth of Mīmāṃsā” (mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra). But the potential for confusion is greater here than in Saṅghabhadra’s section since Bhāviveka introduces more opinions foreign to Mīmāṃsā as we know it and discusses them more extensively than Saṅghabhadra. Those seemingly non-Mīmāṃsaka elements prompted scholars to doubt the Mīmāṃsaka identity of the opponent and to discredit Bhāviveka for not faithfully representing the views of the Mīmāṃsakas as attested in the Mīmāṃsaka sources.

The questionable portions of MHK 9 do not overlap with the portion where Bhāviveka presents his versions of the two traditional Buddhist anti-Vedic critiques. Thus, it is not my primary aim to analyze those “heterogeneously non-Mīmāṃsaka” portions of MHK 9. However, scholars who doubt the identity of Bhaviveka’s opponent in MHK 9 do so as if their views relate to the chapter as a whole, despite being based on a small portion of the text. It is thus necessary to review them to see if MHK 9 is really not about the Mīmāṃsakas.

Before undertaking this task, however, I will present an overview of the structure and
contents of MHK 9 as a “chapter” (pariccheda; le’u) as it presents itself.

2.2 A Brief Note on the Structure of MHK 9

MHK 9, on the most basic level, consists of two parts: the official pūrvasas (the Opponent’s Arguments; MHK 9.1-17) and the official uttarasas (the Refutation of the Opponent’s Arguments; MHK 9.18-167). That is to say, Bhāviveka first reports and summarizes the arguments of the opponent, in this case, the Mīmāṃsakas, in the first seventeen verses of the chapter and then proceeds to refute those arguments in the remainder of the chapter. This is the common framework of all the polemical chapters (4-9) in the Madhyamakahṛdaya. The representative work to adopt this structure in the Madhyamaka school is Nāgārjuna’s Vigrhayavartani, where Nāgārjuna introduces the opponent’s objections in the first part and then answers them in the latter part. In MHK 9, Bhāviveka first has the Mīmāṃsakas advance their arguments and then refutes them in sequence.

The official pūrvasas are marked by Bhāviveka’s short introductory remark at the beginning of the chapter and by their initial location in the chapter. Bhāviveka indicates the beginning of a new chapter by introducing “some shameless people” (eke ... anapatrapāḥ) in the first verse of MHK 9 and outlines their doctrines in the next sixteen verses. The first seventeen verses (MHK 9.1-17), therefore, constitute the section of the official pūrvasas. At the eighteenth verse, Bhāviveka notes that, from that verse (MHK 9.18) on, he will examine (parīkṣante) the doctrines introduced thus far equitably, without falling into partiality.

MHK 9.1, “There are some shameless people who revile the right paths leading to liberation (apavarga), viz., meditation and wisdom, arguing that the attainment of it [is possible] by means of [performing] rituals (kriyā) alone.” (eke ‘pavargasanmargadhyānajñānapavādinah kriyāmātrena tatprāptim pratipādyānapatrapāḥ/)
Although the subsequent verses of MHK 9 can be termed, as a whole, simply the “uttarapakṣas,” I distinguish three different types among them: the official uttarapakṣas, the independent discussions on MHK 9.11, and the contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas.

The official uttarapakṣas directly discuss and refute the Mīmāśakas’ claims addressed in the official pūrvapakṣas. Bhāviveka marks them in his critique by reiterating the keyword or paraphrasing the key point of the pūrvapakṣa verses. Such marker words or phrases resemble the use of pratīka by a commentator, which has the function of indexing the author’s comments to the relevant place of the root text. It should be noted, however, that Bhāviveka’s markers cannot be reduced merely to pratīkas, as they often, especially when he paraphrases, reveal Bhāviveka’s understanding of the opponent’s argument; in those cases, they are not simply pointers embedded only for referential purposes. TJ, as a commentary on MHK, also usually indicates the pūrvapakṣa verse that the reader needs to refer to when Bhāviveka changes his object of critique.

The second type of text in MHK 9 is the independent discussions. Strictly speaking, these do belong to the “official uttarapakṣa” type, since they are Bhāviveka’s responses to one verse, MHK 9.11, located in the official pūrvapakṣas. However, I distinguish them from other uttarapakṣas because of their length and contents. They constitute more than half of the verses of MHK 9 (93 out of 167 verses; MHK 9.59-151) and their contents are most “problematic” in the sense that it seems unlikely that they are directed against the Mīmāśakas. They are subdivided into five sections. Each of the independent discussions is marked by the fixed phrase “[therefore,] it is reasonable that the Three (that is, the Veda) is rejected” (yuktaṃ yat tyajyate

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109 MHK 9.18, “The truth-seekers, who are specialized in words’ meaning (śabdārtha) and reasoning (nyāya), having abandoned the poison of falling into partiality, will examine it [that is, the Mīmāṃsaka positions propounded so far] here [in the following].” (tad atrāpi parīkṣante yathābhūtagavesiṇah/ pāṣaṇataviṣaṃ hitvā śabdārthanyāyakvidāh/)
trayī), constituting the fourth quarter (i.e., pāda d) of the five verses at which new independent discussions begin.\(^{110}\) This marker phrase is taken from the pūrvapakṣa verse, MHK 9.11d, which all five discussions seek to refute.\(^{111}\)

In addition to these, the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas and the independent discussions, there is a third category of text in MHK 9. It may be called “contextual” pūrva-uttarapakṣas, since these texts treat topics derived from the main discussions. They appear intermittently to invite further rejoinders from various opponents on a given topic, like Q&A in which Bhāviveka responds to expected counter-arguments to his theses. The best example of this kind is MHK 9.32-42 in which Bhāviveka introduces a series of rejoinders to his thesis on the evil authorship of the Veda and then rebuts them.\(^{112}\) Such Q&A occurs throughout the chapter (except for the first seventeen official pūrvapakṣa verses) and they are clearly marked as such by words such as, cet, yadi, and atha, all of which can be understood to mean “against my thesis that has just been put forward, if you further argue that...”\(^{113}\) It is important to note that we cannot automatically assume that the opponent who challenges Bhāviveka in this type of contextual pūrvapakṣa is a Mīmāṃsaka. Bhāviveka sometimes provides a note on the identity of the opponent in the TJ

\(^{110}\) They are: MHK 9.59, 9.94, 9.120, 9.127, and 9.139.

\(^{111}\) Krasser (2012, 561, fn. 65) notes that this marker phrase is repeated in MHK 9 but mistakenly correlates the five independent discussions with the pūrvapakṣa verse MHK 9.17.

\(^{112}\) This part will be analyzed in Chapter Four Decline of the Buddhist Critique of Vedic Sacrifice.

\(^{113}\) This is not always the case in the present Sanskrit edition of MHK 9. For example, MHK 9.130ab (abhоjanādаu punyаm ca тyāgаt pāpanivṛttivat; “It is meritorious to fast, as it is a form of renunciation, just as ceasing to perform evil actions.”), though being an opponent’s “contextual” objection to Bhāviveka’s thesis advanced in MHK 9.129ab (nānnapānaparityāgaḥ svargaprāpaka iṣyateḥ; “abstaining from food and drink is not a means to attain heaven”), does not contain any of those markers. However, this reading of MHK 9.130ab common to both the Kawasaki and Lindtner editions might need an emendation. As Kawasaki notes, the underlined part of MHK 9.130ab is transcribed as “cetyāśāt” in Samkrtyāyana’s copy (Gokhale 1994, 48) and Kawasaki changes it to “ca tyāgāt” based on Tucci’s photocopies of the manuscript and Tibetan translation of the passage. However, the Tibetan translation of the second quarter (pāda b) of MHK 9.130 does not only suggest “-tyāśāt” would change into “-tyāgāt” but also that the word “cet” is also a part of the verse by containing its Tibetan equivalent “zhe na” (spangs phyir sdig spangs bzhin zhe na). Therefore, it may need to be emended as “cet tyāgāt.”
To summarize, MHK 9 is basically consists of three different types of text. The official pūrva-uttarapakṣas form the core of the chapter. In it, Bhāviveka first lays out the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines and criticizes them one by one in sequence. In the middle of official uttarapakṣas, we find a series of five independent discussions that occupy more than a half of MHK 9 and that are solely devoted to the refutation of one pūrvapakṣa verse. Lastly, throughout the chapter, Bhāviveka, whenever the occasion arises, considers expected rejoinders to his arguments from various opponents. In the subsequent two sections, I will outline the contents of MHK 9 by dividing it into two parts, viz. the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas and the independent discussions. The contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas, as they do not discuss independent but derivative topics, and thus, do not form independent sections, will not be discussed separately. However, important ones among them will be referred to in the following summaries.

2.3 An Overview of the Official Pūrva-Uttarapakṣas

The official pūrva-uttarapakṣas, to my understanding, can be divided into three sections. Each of those sections advances a reason to reject the scriptural status of the Veda against the Mīmāṃsakas’ apologetics of the Vedic authority. Thus, those three sections collectively adduce three reasons to deny that the Veda can be a religious scripture. The three reasons are: 1. the Veda is not moral, 2. the Veda is not rational, and 3. the Veda is not omniscient.

This threefold division of the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas is not a “natural” division of the text. A more natural manner of dividing it would be to divide the text in accordance with the separation-lines in the text itself. This would result in discrete Mīmāṃsaka arguments presented
in the official *pūrvapakṣas*, paired with Bhāviveka’s examination of each of them. However, I think those separate discussions of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines can be grouped into three larger sections. In other words, Bhāviveka, although his main objective is to refute the Mīmāṃsaka claims, seems to posit three independent theses against Vedic authority as he refutes them, by arranging the opponent’s arguments and his counter-arguments in a specific sequence.

The following summaries are mainly based on the root verses (MHK) as they are understood in the commentary (TJ) and, as noted, the contextual *pūrva-uttarapakṣas* are often disregarded.

### 2.3.1 The Veda is not moral (MHK 9.1-4, 18-42)

Bhāviveka, as he opens the chapter, characterizes the Mīmāṃsakas as “shameless people” who argue that liberation (*apavarga*) can only be achieved through ritualistic means (*kriyā*). The rituals that they uphold based on their scripture (*āgama*) involve grains, animals, ghee and copulation with a partner (1-2). The Veda, which prescribes such ritualistic actions, is the Āgama in the true sense of the term as its lineage of recitation has never been broken. This is a valid means of obtaining knowledge (*pramāṇa*) since, unlike scriptures of human origin, it is authorless in that there is no memory of its author (3-4).

As he commences his criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines, Bhāviveka contrasts himself and his fellow Buddhists (or only the Mādhyamikas?) with the shameless Mīmāṃsakas.

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114 The official *pūrva-uttarapakṣas* may be divided into nine sections according to this scheme. They are: 1. On the authorlessness and immorality of the Veda (1-4, 18-42), 2. On the Veda as a sole source for imperceptible things (5, 43), 3. On the eternality of words (6-7, 44-49), 4. On the *pramāṇa*-status of verbal knowledge (8-9, 50-54), 5. On the notion of *apūrva* (10, 55-58), 6. On the social acceptance of the Veda (11, 59-151), 7. On the universalistic understanding of the Veda (12, 152-154), 8. On the role of inference vis-à-vis scripture (13-14, 155-158), and 9. On the omniscience of the Buddha and the authoritativeness of his words (15-17, 159-167).
by defining the former as the “truth-seekers” (yathābhūtagaveśin) (18). The quality of being “uninterrupted” (anupaccheda) cannot be the standard for determining something as a scripture, for, if it were, all scriptures would qualify. The important thing is whether they are true (tattva) and, in this regard, the rituals that the Veda suggests for the goal of liberation must be irrational (19-22).

The Mīmāṃsaka assumption that, among scriptures, the Veda alone is truthful because it is authorless is unfounded: Human utterances can also be truthful and there is no similar example of an authorless text that would support the case of the Veda. Or, in a certain sense, Buddhist scripture is also authorless, and therefore, the quality of being authorless cannot be the standard of the Veda being the scripture in the true sense of the term (23-5). Contrary to the their assumption, however, the authorship of the Veda must be assumed, since counter-arguments to the Mīmāṃsakas’ claim for the authorlessness of the Veda can be put forward (26) and the Veda, as linguistic material, conforms to human understanding (29-30). Moreover, we may infer that the putative author of the Veda is an evil being based on the immoral practices that the Veda prescribes (31).

This section ends with the opponent’s vindication of killing animals and drinking liquor in Vedic sacrifice and Bhāviveka’s refutation of each of those rejoinders (32-42).

Thus, this section deals with two major Mīmāṃsaka doctrines: their promotion of Vedic sacrifice as an exclusive means to attain the ultimate religious goal and their justification of the authority of the Veda by positing it as an authorless text. This section, as the main object of analysis of this dissertation, will be studied in depth in Chapters Three and Four.
2.3.2 The Veda is not rational (MHK 9.5-10, 43-58)

In a series of six verses, the Mīmāṃsakas advance three arguments to establish the authority of the Veda and reconfirm that the rituals prescribed in the Veda is the means to achieve the ultimate goal. The three arguments are: 1. Without the Veda there can be no understanding of things that have no visible evidence (5), 2. The relationship between words and their meanings is eternal (6-7), 3. Verbal knowledge from the Veda is a separate category of pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge), different especially from inference (anumāṇa) (8-9). In verse 10, the notion of apūrva (lit. “unprecedented”) is introduced.115 By arguing that this force of making the desired result happen is manifested only by ritual actions, the Mīmāṃsakas again state that the goal of liberation (mokṣa) can be realized through ritual means alone.

Bhāviveka dismisses the first argument by briefly affirming that those things declared to have no visible sign to infer their existence are in fact knowable through inference, that is, without the help of the Veda. Moreover, he adds in TJ, the veracity of knowledge from a scripture (e.g., the Veda) whose truth cannot be inferred cannot be ascertained (43). He then reviews the Mīmāṃsakas’ arguments for the eternality of words and their relationships with meanings, and points out the logical fallacies (44-48ab). This process of negating the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of words’ eternality (śabdanityatva) seems to have been undertaken in order to assert that verbal knowledge is contingent upon linguistic convention (saṃketa) (48cd).

This is a necessary step for his next argument: that scripture does not constitute a

115 Kataoka (2000) considers this verse, MHK 9.10, as he attempts to reconstruct the pre-Śabara Mīmāṃsaka theory of ritual action (termed “Dharma-abhivyakti-vāda”). It was, according to his study, predominant until the time of Kumārila but was not inherited by Śabara and Kumārila. Kataoka comments that the Mīmāṃsaka opponent’s use of the term “apūrva” instead of “dharma” (as recorded in Bhartṛhari’s works) in MHK 9.10 is characteristic (169). It is to be noted, however, that TJ glosses on the word “apūrva” as follows: “The word ‘apūrva’ is the synonym of the word ‘dharma’” (sngon med pa’i chos bya ba ni chos zhes bya ba’i tha’i thig go; TJ D276a7). In TJ on MHK 9.5, Bhāviveka’s opponent also uses the expression “sngon med pa’i chos” which can be rendered as “‘apūrvadharma’” (TJ D275a3).
separate category of pramāṇa. Knowledge from scripture is instead a sub-category of inference because there is no difference between them. One similarity between them, among many, is that both inference and scriptural knowledge depend on the memory of relationship; just as inferring fire from smoke requires prior knowledge of their relationship, knowledge from the Veda is dependent upon linguistic convention (50-54).

Bhāviveka passes over the Mīmāṃsaka argument that apūrva is manifested by ritual actions. Rather, he attempts to prove that apūrva, as a result of an action, is a non-eternal entity because ritual actions are not different from ordinary actions. Insofar as they are actions, their fruits are impermanent. Thus, it is not reasonable to assume that ritual actions bring about liberation; they are nothing more than actions. Therefore, one cannot conquer death by ritual means, as the Mīmāṃsakas assume. This path is extolled only by those incapable of intellectual investigation (55-58).

These discussions contribute to the theme “the Veda is not rational.” Bhāviveka’s refutation of the three Mīmāṃsaka arguments focuses on demonstrating that the Veda must be subject to examination by human reasoning. First, by showing that there is no unique object to which the Veda has exclusive access, he denies that the Veda offers access to a realm of knowledge that human perception and inference cannot reach. Then, by arguing that words are not eternal entities that have an eternal connection with their meanings, and therefore, that understanding of them is dependent upon the previous linguistic norms, Bhāviveka tries to equate verbal communication with inference. When the process of obtaining knowledge from scripture is thus equated with that of inference, scriptural knowledge comes to be subject to the rules of inference. Having divested the Veda of the Mīmāṃsaka ideologies that make the Veda immune to any reasoned critique of its contents, Bhāviveka is enabled to criticize the Vedic means for liberation, that is, Vedic sacrifice, with a reasoned argument: Vedic sacrifice cannot be
a means to achieve liberation because it is not different from ordinary action; as action, its result must be impermanent.

### 2.3.3. The Veda is not omniscient (MHK 9.12-17, 152-167)

There are three more Mīmāṃsaka agendas that Bhāviveka considers in the official pūrvapakṣas. Unlike the former arguments, they contain specific Mīmāṃsaka critiques against Buddhists. They begin by proclaiming the Veda to be the ultimate root of all knowledge because it contains all (12). Then they proceed to denounce Buddhists for reviling such scripture with reasoning (13-14) and criticize the quality of omniscience attributed to the Buddha and the authority of his words (15-17).

To the claim that the Veda is the source of all knowledge, Bhāviveka, while acknowledging the existence of some good teachings in the Veda, defines the Veda as a “pile of shit” (mi gtsang phung po). Any good teachings in it were unwittingly included or stolen from others’, for example, Buddhists’ scripture (152-154).

With this insult, Bhāviveka seems to argue that a scripture should contain truth rather than all knowledge. To correctly evaluate a given scripture, one needs to use inference to investigate whether it is rational or irrational. But, in doing so, he also observes that the tool of inference, ultimately, should be abandoned when one crosses the river of the knowable (155-156). He warns that those fools who follow the words of a scripture composed by the ignorant will never escape the pit of saṃsāra. They are like blind men, devoid of “the eyes of inference” (rjes su dpag pa’i mig) (157-158).

Finally, Bhāviveka defends the omniscience of the Buddha and the authoritativeness of his words against the Mīmāṃsakas’ critique. Although omniscient beings are not observed in the
present, as the Mīmāṃsakas argue, the word “omniscience” is still applied to foundational masters of heretic traditions such as Jaimini of Mīmāṃsā, Kapila of Sāṃkhya, and Kaṇāda of Vaiśeṣika in the figurative sense of the term. The figurative usage of a word presupposes a real object of denotation, and therefore, an omniscient being must exist (159). Also, the Mīmāṃsaka claim that the Buddha is not omniscient because he is a human being is wrong since Bhāviveka does not admit the “humanness” of all three bodies of the Buddha (viz., dharmakāya, sambhogakāya, nirmāṇakāya) (160). After having discussed the omniscience of the three gods—Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva—who create, maintain, and destroy the world (161-163), he answers the opponent’s further questions about the scope and veracity of the Buddha’s teaching (164-165). The authority of the words of such an omniscient Buddha cannot be repudiated simply because they are composed or they revile the Veda, as does an unauthoritative Jain scripture, since the treatises of the Mīmāṃsakas are also composed and the authority of Jain scripture is not denied because it opposes the Veda (166-167).

The discussions in this section as a whole seem to refute the idea that the Veda is an all-inclusive scripture that encompasses all objects of knowledge, and thus, that it is the fountain of all other texts. To counter this claim, Bhāviveka first describes most teachings of the Veda as trash. As the next discussion implies, what matters in determining the value of a scripture is that its veracity is verifiable by means of inference. In light of this background, the final discussions on the Buddha’s omniscience, though mainly a defense of it, appear to be an attempt to contrast the “omniscience” of the Veda, the all-inclusiveness of knowledge, with the authentic “omniscience” embodied in the Buddha, that is, the rational or logically correct form of omniscience.
2.4 An Overview of the Independent Discussions on MHK 9.11

The five independent discussions (MHK 9.59-151) are commentaries on one official pūrvapakṣa verse, MHK 9.11. Therefore, we need to first look at the opponent’s verse in order to outline the structure of those five sections.

[pāda ab:] This is the ancient splendid path that gods (such as Brahmā) and seers (such as Garga and Vasiṣṭha) rejoice in and learned people desire.

[pāda cd:] It is reasonable that the Three is rejected by those people outside the Vedic fold, for example, women and Śudras (along with Buddhists).116

According to TJ, the first two discussions are directed against the first line of the pūrvapakṣa verse (pāda ab),117 and the other three are against the second (pāda cd).118 And, although it is not marked as such in TJ, I further speculate that the first discussion is a response to the word “gods” (deva) and the second to the word “learned people” (śiṣṭa).119 This division of the first two discussions is based on their content; the purpose of the first is to discredit, morally and intellectually, the three gods, namely, Brahmā, Śiva, and Viṣṇu, while the purpose of the second is to ridicule the illogic of presupposing the existence of a Creator God. This may be taken as mockery of “learned people” for having such a ridiculous idea. Viewed in this way, the first two independent discussions are to deny the prestige of the celebrated beings of Hindu tradition (gods and orthodox Brahmins) by revealing their moral and intellectual defects.

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116 MHK 9,11, “devarṣijaśiṣṭeṣṭaṃ purāṇaṃ vartma śobhanam/ vedārthabāhyaiḥ strīśūdraiḥ yuktaṃ yat tyajyate trayī/”; additions in parentheses are based on the TJ commentary on the verse. See TJ D276b3-5.

117 As he introduces the first verse of the first independent discussion (MHK 9.59) in TJ, Bhāviveka quotes the first quarter (pāda a) of MHK 9.11 and says that he will first focus his criticism on that part of the verse. TJ D290b3, “drang srong lhas bsten dam pas ’dod/ (9.11a) ces bya ba la sogs pa'i phyogs snga ma'i lan brjod par bya ba'i phyir smras pa.”

118 As he introduces the first verse of the third independent discussion (MHK 9.120) in TJ, Bhāviveka quotes the last two quarters (pāda cd) of MHK 9.11 and says that from that point on he will direct his critique to that second half of the verse. TJ D305b2-3, “phyi rol dmangs rigs bud med gzugs/ ’dzin pas rigs ldan gsum ’di spangs/ (9.11cd) zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa de yang skyon dang bcas pa nyid yin pas, spong pa nyid yin gvi ma brtags pa ni ma yin no zhes bstan pa'i phyir.”

119 See Deshpande (1993a) and (2009) for an analysis of the term “śiṣṭa” as understood in the tradition of Sanskrit Grammarians.
The other three discussions, on the other hand, seek to demonstrate that it is indeed reasonable for everyone—that is, not just women, Śudras, and Buddhists—to reject the Veda. They can be also viewed as arguing that the Brahmins’ derogatory use of those social labels (Śudra, woman, and Buddhist) in the pūrvapakṣa verse is unfounded. There is a long discussion on the equality of the four castes in TJ right before the third discussion, and the latter three discussions point out the absurdity of Vedic doctrines from the Buddhist perspective. In this manner, the derogatory labels of Śudra and Buddhist are contested. However, there is no argument given against the Brahmins’ neglect of women.

2.4.1. The First Independent Discussion (MHK 9.59-93): The Hindu trinity is morally and intellectually defective.

The first discussion contains Bhāviveka’s thoughts on the three major Hindu gods—Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva—who collectively form one entity, with three aspects of creating, maintaining, and destroying the world (trimūrti). Given that the entire discussion is provoked by the Mīmāṃsaka argument that “the Vedic path is rejoiced in by gods,” it is interesting that Bhāviveka takes the word “gods” (deva) to mean Hindu gods rather than Vedic gods. Bhāviveka’s attack on the Hindu gods indeed does not seem to be appropriate for the atheist Mīmāṃsakas. It seems all the more unlikely for this section to be anti-Mīmāṃsaka, given that the introductory verse of the discussion refers to the three gods as the authors of the Veda (trayīmārgapraṇetṛ). The nature of this discussion may have originated in Bhāviveka’s peculiar notion of the Veda, which we shall discuss later.121

120 TJ D304a3-305b2.
121 See 2.5.1 The Second Independent Discussion: The Mīmāṃsakas are not the sole opponent in MHK 9 (1).
The entire discussion can be divided into three parts, in which Bhāviveka discusses Śiva’s evil behavior (63–5), Viṣṇu’s evilness and the abstract conception of him (66–86), and the unity of the three and their inability to protect dharma (87–93). Apart from a passing remark at MHK 9.63, Bhāviveka only touches on Brahmā’s evilness in TJ; on MHK 9.59, he portrays Brahmā as evil because of his incestuous desire for his granddaughters.122

After a set of contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas that confirms that bad karma cannot be removed even with supernatural powers (60–2), Bhāviveka lists the evil deeds of Śiva (śūlin). He fell in love with Tilottamā (63), burned down the city of Tripura, and hurt Pūṣan’s teeth and Bhaga’s eyes at the Dakṣa’s sacrifice (64). He killed Brahmā, drinks liquor, and is full of sexual desire (65). According to TJ, each verse respectively shows that Śiva possesses the three poisons of passion, hatred and ignorance.

Bhāviveka tries to prove the same for Viṣṇu. He (keśava, hari) robbed demons of their lives and riches (66), stole others’ women and wealth, drank liquor, and killed living beings as savages and robbers do (67). If he commits such evil acts to protect dharma (dharmagupti; 68) as some say, he should stop stealing others’ wives and wealth (69). Occasions of adharma must be created by Viṣṇu himself and this shows his ignorance of the consequences of such creation. If he protected the world with desire, he would be a slave of desire. He cannot protect the world out of compassion, since he would be deceiving the world by making it suffer (71). Lastly, seeing Viṣṇu’s discrimination against Asuras, it cannot be assumed that he is a compassionate. (72). How can Hari who commits evil deeds motivated by the three poisons be called the “best among men” (puruṣottama)? (73)

Having thus impugned the morality of Viṣṇu, Bhāviveka introduces another abstract form (mūrti) of him that surpasses being (sattva), non-being (asattva), and both being and non-

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122 See TJ D291a5-292a1.
being (sadasattva); upon seeing it, an ascetic (yati) becomes liberated (74-5). In his review of this “superior” (parā) form of Hari, Bhāviveka questions the logic of such a conception of him. This abstract form cannot be different from his lower forms, namely, the ten avatāras, nor can it be the same (76-7). As he is inexpressible, he cannot be called “superior”; as he is not existent, he is not the “cause” (kāraṇa); and, as he is not even born, he is not “immortal” (acyuta) (78-9). If the immortal one is a being, he would perish and if he is a non-being, he is non-existent, like a flower in the sky. He cannot be conceived contradictorily as being both being and non-being. He is said to be inexpressible like the notion of “Ātman”; in both cases, they cannot be described as “inexpressible” (anabhilāpya) as long as they have such appellations (80-2).

Bhāviveka concludes the section on Viṣṇu by rejecting the possibility of the liberation of the devotees of Hari (haribhakta). They cannot be liberated by seeing avatāras fabricated only to save the world in emergencies. Nor can they be liberated by practicing their yoga, that is, by retracting their senses like a turtle and reciting “Oṃ.” This is because the vision of Hari (haridarśana) is a conceptual thought (parikalpitā dhī) (80-4).

Toward the end of the discussion, Bhāviveka treats the three gods collectively. He points out that they are not free from the three poisons (87) and notes that to be a protector of dharma, it is necessary either to teach the true dharma or to achieve liberation oneself (88). He then argues that the unity of those three gods is impossible, given the discrepancies among their scriptures (89-91ab). He concludes by declaring that the three Hindu gods cannot be regarded as protectors of dharma since they do not teach the right dharma and their spiritual achievements are inferior (91cd-93).

2.4.2. The Second Independent Discussion (MHK 9.94-119): The notion of a Creator
God and Śaiva tantric methods of liberation are absurd.

The second independent discussion can be divided into two parts based on the subjects of discussion. In the first part (95-113), Bhāviveka reviews and criticizes various characteristics attributed to the notion of God (īśvara). Though this part may be directed against the Śaiva (Bhāviveka calls God by the name of “Rudra” in verse 109), he does not mention the name of Śiva or other epithets and does not allude to other characteristics of him. Rather, the opponent’s views suggested in this part most resemble ideas contained in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, which exalts Rudra as the monotheistic God. The second part (114-8), on the contrary, is explicitly directed against the Śaiva; as he begins this part, in TJ, Bhāviveka remarks that he proceeds to criticize the “teachings of the Śaiva Tantra” (shi ba’i rgyud; or the Śivatantra?).

Bhāviveka opens the discussion by declaring that the Veda is filled with illogical doctrines (ayuktiyukta) (94). Then, having referred to the relevant discussion in chapter three of MHK (tattvajñānaiṣaṇā), he states that he will review the notion of the Creator God (95). God cannot be the creator of Self (ātman) and dharma and adharma. Neither the body of beings at present nor the body of beings at the beginning of the kalpa are created by him; these are only a result of past deeds (96-98).

In a series of nine verses, Bhāviveka reviews the opponent’s conception of God. God’s power cannot be caused by merit (punyakṛta), as it would make him dependent upon meritorious deeds (99). It cannot be uncaused (akasmāt) either, since, then, there would be no difference between him and others (100). If God’s essence lies in his consciousness (jñasvabhāva), everything in the world would be endowed with consciousness, since the product resembles the producer (101). By the same reasoning, if God is the cause (hetu) of the world, the world should possess eight supernatural powers such as the ability to become as small as an atom (aṇiman) (102). If he is the actual doer (karmakartṛ) of all beings’ acts, it is he, instead of others, who
should be tormented in hell (103). Suffering would not cease, since the cause of it, God, is eternal \((nitya)\) (104), and it is not reasonable to assume that God, the unitary being \((eka)\), has manifold functions (105). In short, God is a conglomerate of curious ideas, viz. that he is eternal, partless \((anavayava)\), subtle \((sūkṣma)\), and the cause of the world (106). Finally, if creation were the play \((krīḍā)\) of God, he would be not God since he would depend on the sense of pleasure (107).

Then follows a series of mocking verses. Bhāviveka pays homage to Rudra, whose name is fitting to his nature: he is the one who enjoys observing the miserable state of animals, hell beings, and humans (108-9). Nonsensical phenomena prevail in the world of his creation, for example, the vile are wealthy and the righteous live like parasites (110-2). Only karma accounts for the variety of the world, and, for the reasons stated thus far, the other two gods, viz. Brahmā and Viṣṇu \((kṛṣṇa)\), cannot also be held as the Creator \((sṛṣṭikartṛ)\) (113).

The second part of this independent discussion demonstrates that the soteriological scheme of the Śaiva tantra is wrong. Bhāviveka lays it out as follows: one restricts the senses, fixes the mind on Śiva, meditates on the syllable of “Oṃ,” holds attention at the heart, and, with the mind thus concentrated, repeatedly meditates on an object such as earth. Then, when Śiva \((īśa)\) is pleased, a yogin would conquer death (114-5). Bhāviveka flatly dismisses the possibility of liberation through such practice. Liberation is not possible as long as there is an awareness in the mind (116) and as long as the devotee enjoys the vision of Śiva \((sthānudarśana)\) (117). The suffering that a Śaiva yogin strives to end cannot be counteracted as long as the cause of that suffering is the eternal lord (118).

To conclude, Bhāviveka states that the illogicality of the Śaiva is common to other advocates of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Ātman, and therefore, intellectual delight must not be taken in the notions of God \((īśa)\) and the like (119).
2.4.3. The Third Independent Discussion (MHK 9.120-126): Sin cannot be washed away or transferred to others.

The remaining three independent discussions have the common purpose of proving that Buddhist rejection of the Veda is not unfounded. The three initial verses of the discussions express this common purpose by having the same second line: “as one witnesses such and such bad teachings in the Veda, it is reasonable that the Veda is rejected” (drṣṭvā durvihitam trayāṃ yuktam yat tyajate trayī).

The third independent discussion argues for two things: First, it is unreasonable to assume that sin (pāpa) can be washed away with water. Second, it is unreasonable to assume that karma can be transferred to others, like buying and selling goods (120).

Bhāviveka first characterizes sin as something that cannot be touched, seen, or moistened; it is placed in the mind as a dispositional impression (vāsanā). Thus, it cannot be washed away with water (121). Thus, even water from the Puṣkara and Gāṅgā cannot eliminate sin just as sewage water at home cannot (122). If one could wash away sin, those born with sin, such as the blind and deaf, would no longer suffer (123). It is just absurd to imagine that one commits a sin and removes it by bathing at the sacred bathing place (tīrtha). In that case, there would be no sinners at all. By extension, the opponent’s opinion that it is ātman inside that is purified by water is also wrong (124).

Sin (pāpa) cannot be transferred to others, as it is amorphous, just as the three poisons are not transferable (125). It is not reasonable to suppose that one can give merit (puṇya) to others or take it from them; karma is something bound to one’s own mind like pleasure and pain (126).
2.4.4. The Fourth Independent Discussion (MHK 9.127-138): Self-mortification is useless and the Buddhist practice of eating meat is not to be censured.

The fourth independent discussion is peculiar. Midway through it, the topic is diverted from the Hindus’ extreme form of self-mortification to the Buddhist meat-eating practice. In accordance with the shift of the topic, Bhāviveka changes his offensive tone to an apologetic one as the discussion proceeds.

As we can see in the initial verse that criticizes the Hindu practice of jumping into a fire in order to reach the world of Brahmā, the opponent in this section is the ascetics (127). Bhāviveka points out that jumping into a fire (agniprapāta) only harms one’s life instead of bringing about the attainment of Brahmā’s world (128) and refers to another ascetic practice of abstaining from food and drink (annapānaparityāga) for the sake of heaven (129). He further notes that renunciation is not in itself meritorious (130); what is important is to renounce evil, and eating food in itself is not evil (131).

In the subsequent TJ commentary, Bhāviveka specifies the Mahābhārata (rgyas byed) as the scripture that endorses and propounds the ascetic practice of fasting and quotes fifteen verses from it to show the inner contradictions among them. At the end of the quotations, he introduces an outsider’s critique of Buddhist meat eating. Then, even on the kārikā level, the discussion suddenly turns into an apologetic for Buddhist meat-eating. As he alludes to the scripture of Śrāvakayāna (nyan thos kyi theg pa’i gzung), Bhāviveka states that it not sinful to eat meat that is pure in terms of three points. That is, if the eater has not seen, heard, or wondered whether a living being was killed for the sake of himself or herself, it is not demeritorious to eat meat (132). Eating meat is not motivated by evil intention and is only to counteract hunger (133).
Meat is not an impure object (134) and, likewise, fish is not impure (135). Ascetics (dka’thub) who accuse Buddhists of killing because they eat meat do not have a conclusive argument that meat eating is sinful since the ascetics themselves kill by wearing animal skin (136). Moreover, by eating meat, one does not impose pain on any living being (137). Meat-eating is not the cause of passion as some might argue; passion arises even in grass-eating cows (138).

2.4.5. The Fifth Independent Discussion (MHK 9.139-147): Trees do not have consciousness.

The last independent discussion accuses the Veda of the ill-formulated teaching that immobile insentient plants have consciousness (caitanya) (139). From the Buddhist perspective, trees (taru) are not included in the four categories of beings: those born from eggs, from wombs, from moisture, and born spontaneously. Even when they are cut right in half, they do not tremble (140). If mimosa trees are claimed to have consciousness because they fold their leaves (141), one may note that a hair, an apparently insentient object, also coils itself up in the vicinity of fire (142). Trees cannot be asserted to have consciousness because they heal; even liquor that has gone bad can be restored (143). One may further argue for the sentience of trees based on the following five reasons: they beget the same species, they grow old, they have a feeling of enmity (or longing), they are born in a specific season, and they sleep. However, one may find counter examples that would make each of the reasons unestablished or inconclusive (144-6). Trees of this world, like sword trees in hell or jewel trees in heaven, are born from the karma of sentient beings (147).

Before proceeding to reply to the next pūrvapakṣa verse (MHK 9.12), Bhāviveka inserts a set of contextual pūrva-uttarapakṣas and considers the claim that the Veda is truthful since it is
taught either by Brahmā or ancient seers. TJ unambiguously attributes this claim to the Mīmāṃsakas (*dpyod pa pa*) (148). Brahmā’s teaching, Bhāviveka answers, may be erroneous, just as Prajāpati’s teaching is (149). Even if one come across some truthful words, it does not follow that all his words are truthful since the words of cowherds and madmen’s words are sometimes true (150). The seers’ supernatural knowledge of the past and future does not cover all of the past and future, like that of pretas and others (151).

2.5 Is Bhāviveka’s Critique Directed against the Fifth Veda? Measuring the Mīmāṃsaka-ness of the Independent Discussions

We have thus sketched the structure and contents of MHK 9. In so doing, we have discerned three components that constitute the chapter as a whole and have attempted to delineate, on the most general level, the main arguments. With this general picture of the chapter in mind, let us, in this and the next section, review previous opinions on the identity of Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9. Just as the contents of the two parts of MHK 9, the official *pūrva-uttarapakṣas* and the independent discussions, are outlined separately, we shall divide scholars’ opinions into two groups according to the parts of MHK 9 they base their claims on. To my knowledge, there has been no argument on the identity of the opponent in MHK 9 that considers both parts of the chapter. We begin by reviewing the opinions formulated based on the independent discussions.

2.5.1 The Second Independent Discussion: The Mīmāṃsakas are not the sole opponent of MHK 9 (1)

The independent discussions are quite distinctive from the official *pūrva-uttarapakṣas* in terms of their topics of discussion. Their subject matter is conspicuously Hindu in nature. The Hindu
trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva that are the main object of criticism in the first two discussions are not only foreign to Mīmāṃsā, they are to the Veda as well. Criticisms of ablution in the sacred tīrtha, fasting, and the belief in the sentience of trees seem to be made in reference to Hindus in general rather than the Mīmāṃsakas.

Inclusion of those discussions on apparently “Hindu” topics in the chapter devoted to Mīmāṃsā has led scholars either to discredit Bhāviveka as a historical informant or to inappropriately attribute certain ideas presented in the independent discussions to the Mīmāṃsakas. Nicholson’s remark represents the first inclination. In the context of discussing Bhāviveka’s MHK as one of the earliest instances of doxography in India,123 Nicholson (2010, 152), in reference to the second independent discussion, states:

Bhāviveka begins with the two schools that he elsewhere maintained do have some soteriological usefulness, the Hīnayāna and Yogācāra schools. Like most Indian polemicists, his portrayal of his opponents is not always reliable as a historical source. For instance, he ascribes to Mīmāṃsā the belief that a God created the world, when in fact most recorded schools of Mīmāṃsā are atheistic.

Nicholson’s statement is problematic since Bhāviveka nowhere attributes the notion of the Creator God to the Mīmāṃsakas. As the fixed phrase common to all the introductory verses of the independent discussions that marks them as such clearly expresses (“[therefore,] it is reasonable that the Three (that is, the Veda) is rejected”), Bhāviveka’s criticism in those discussions is directed at the Veda rather than the Mīmāṃsakas. Using criticism of the Veda against the Mīmāṃsakas is justifiable since the ultimate objective of their project is to defend the authority of the Veda and its sacrificial norm. Bhāviveka may freely attack the value most cherished by the opponent, regardless of how the Mīmāṃsakas seek to safeguard it.

123 Due to the polemical nature of Bhāviveka’s work immanent in the pūrva-uttarapakṣa structure, Nicholson (2010, 154) refrains “from labeling the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā as a doxography, in spite of its obvious importance to historians.”
The real problem lies instead in the fact that the contents of the Veda that Bhāviveka refers to do not belong to the Veda as we know it. The second independent discussion based on which Nicholson made this statement begins with the critique of the idea that God (īśvara) created the world (jagat). As noted, this may be a critique of one of the Upaniṣads, namely, the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad,\(^{124}\) which is regarded as a forerunner of the later Šaiva tradition (Flood 1996, 153 and 2003, 205). There Bhāviveka (94-113) refers to God only with the word “īśvara,” and in one instance, he calls him Rudra (109). The characteristics that Bhāviveka lists, such as being eternal (nitya), unitary (eka), and the cause (kāraṇa) also match those of Rudra eulogized in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. If Bhāviveka indeed had that specific Upaniṣad in mind in that section, his critique is in accordance with the objective he announces in the introductory verse, that is, showing the rationality of rejecting the Veda.

However, Bhāviveka speaks of eight masteries (siddhi) of Šiva (102) and, as he introduces MHK 9.114, he explicitly proclaims that, from that verse on, he shall examine one specific doctrine of the Šaiva Tantric tradition: “In order to prove that the teaching of Dhyānayoga (bsam gtan gyi rnal 'byor) of the Šaiva Tantra (shi ba'i rgyud) is also unreasonable, the following has been stated.”\(^{125}\) Therefore, in the second independent discussion, Bhāviveka, although he sets his own objective to reveal that the Veda is filled with irrational doctrines (ayuktiyukta), what he really examines there is the Šaiva notion of God and the Šaiva soteriological scheme. And he does not conceal this fact.

I think the discomfort we feel in Bhāviveka’s act of criticizing the Šaiva doctrines while calling them Vedic, or his act of confusing the Veda with the Šaiva scriptures, is due to his peculiar notion of the Veda expressed in the commentary on the last verse of the discussion.

\(^{124}\) For the text and translation of the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad, see Olivelle (1998, 414-433).

\(^{125}\) TJ D303a5-6, “shi ba'i rgyud las bstan pa'i bsam gtan gvi rnal 'byor yang mi rigs pa nyid du bsgrub pa'i phyir smras pa.”
There, Bhāviveka states that with the refutation of the Śaivas’ Dhyānayoga, others—the advocates of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Ātman—are also refuted (119ab) and declares that intellectual delight is not to be taken in the notion of God and so forth (īśādi) since they are irrational (ayukta) (119cd). TJ, commenting on the second line of the verse focusing on the expression “and so forth” (ādi), lists the objects with which one should not be delighted:

Therefore, as their tenets are faulty, we do not take pleasure in Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara, and the tenets of the Veda that they follow and teach either. This elaboration of “and so forth” includes the tenets of the Veda (rig byed kyi grub pa’i mtha’) and they are qualified as something followed and taught by the three Hindu gods. The subsequent passage of TJ is interesting in that Bhāviveka, as if he expects the reader’s immediate objection to such a qualification of the Veda, presents his thoughts about it.

The fourfold division of the Veda and the like is not reasonable either. Its divisional system proposed in the works such as the Essence of the Mahābhārata (the Mahābhāratasārā?) is not reasonable either. Why? It is because the Veda is one. It is because it is nothing other than Prajāpati. It is because it is born from [his] mouth, shoulder, thigh, and feet. For example, it is like the following case. Panasa fruits of a Panasa tree hanging on its trunk, branches, root, and twigs are not different; they are same.

In this passage, Bhāviveka refuses to acknowledge the ordinary division of the Veda into the four Vedas, namely, the Rg, Sāma, Yajur, and Atharva. It is not only that that standard division of the Veda is denied. Bhāviveka is not willing to accept any sort of “division” of the Veda, including

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126 MHK 9.119, “etena śeṣāḥ pratyuktā brahmaśeṣāḥ maśeṣāḥ prītiś caivam ayuktatvān neśādau dhīyate dhīyati?”
127 TJ D303b7–304a1, “des na grub pa’i mtha’ skyon can yin pa’i phyir, kho bo cag ni tshangs pa dang khyab ’jug dang dbang phyug chen po dang de dag gis nye bar brten cing bstan pa’i rig byed kyi grub pa’i mtha’ la yang dga’ bar mi byed pa yin no.”
128 TJ D304a1-3, “rigs bzhi’i dbye ba la sogs pa yang mi rigs la. rgyas byed kyi snying po la sogs pa las de’i dbye ba’i tshig ’byung ba yang mi rigs te. gang gi phyir, rigs gcig nyid yin te. skye dgu’i bdag po las gzhan ma yin pa’i phyir. kha dang dpung pa dang brla dang rkang pa las skyes pa yin pa’i phyir. dper na pa na sa’i shing gi sdong po dang yal ga dang rtsa ba dang yal ga phre’u la sogs pa las byung ba’i pa na sa’i ’bras bu ni gzhan ma yin te, gcig pa nyid yin pa bzhi no.”
the proposal of the *Mahābhārata*sāra, because the Veda is one. However, this does not imply that Bhāviveka considers the Veda to be a single text. When he speaks of the “oneness” of the Veda, Bhāviveka points to the oneness of the source shared by plural texts rather than confining the term “Veda” to a certain individual text. For that shared source, Bhāviveka refers to a certain cosmogonic narrative, resembling the Puruṣasūkta (Ṛg Veda 10.90), according to which all Vedas came from the body of the Vedic creator Prajāpati. Then he provides felicitous imagery to explain what he means by the “oneness” of the Veda. Just as fruits dangling on any parts of a Panasa tree are commonly called Panasa fruits, any text, as long as it shares the common origin, can be called a Veda.

The second independent discussion, along with the other independent discussions, awaits future research that would compare its contents with other relevant materials both within and without Buddhist literature. Only an in-depth study from the comparative perspective would enable us to confidently identify the opponent in this section, and thereby, to locate it properly in the history of Buddhist polemics against outsiders. However, with reservations, we may observe that Bhāviveka engages with Śaiva doctrines and soteriology and would expect that, based on this observation, future research would illuminate the identity of the specific trend or sect among the various Śaiva traditions being examined in the second independent discussion.129 We cannot simply disregard Bhāviveka, based on this portion of text, as being “not always reliable as a historical source” simply because such theistic contents are included in the “Mīmāṃsā” chapter. For Bhāviveka, the Veda, for which the Mīmāṃsakas aspire to be the foremost saviors, includes those texts putatively attributed to Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. In this regard, he may have found an

129 In this regard, Eltschinger (2014, 91, fn. 219) leaves a valuable note: “The Mīmāṃsā chapter (= 9) of Bhāviveka’s MHK is replete with allusions to and criticism of sectarian Hindu beliefs and practices. Alexis Sanderson kindly informs me that MHK 9.62 and 9.114-115 paraphrase PSū [=the Pāṣupatasūtra] 5.20, 4.4-5, 5.37 and 25, and 5.40.”
opportunity in MHK 9 to criticize, along with the Mīmāṃsakas, those who elevate purānic and
tantric texts ascribed to those gods to the prestigious status of the Veda or those who argue that,
like those “extra-Vedic” texts, the Veda itself was composed by those Hindu gods.

2.5.2 The Fourth Independent Discussion: The Mīmāṃsakas are not the sole opponent
of MHK 9 (2)

Some scholars, based on the independent discussions, have attributed a seemingly non-
Mīmāṃsaka doctrine to the Mīmāṃsakas. For example, Kawasaki (1985)’s pioneering study and
translation of part of the fourth independent discussion assumes that the opponent in that section
is the Mīmāṃsakas. In so doing, whether he intends it or not, he eventually ascribes the
opponent’s arguments to the Mīmāṃsakas.

The fourth independent discussion, as summarized above, first discusses ascetic
practices such as jumping into a fire and abstaining from food and drink, and then proceeds to
defend the meat-eating of Buddhists. Kawasaki’s paper focuses on the second “meat-eating” part
of the discussion; his general understanding differs from mine because he states that Bhāviveka
“shows a negative attitude toward meat-eating, as is natural thing for a sixth century Indian
Mahāyāna Buddhist.” (ibid., 174-5) This is contrary to my reading of the text, but I will not enter
into the details of the problem here. What I would like to note is that Kawasaki, with no
justification, presupposes Bhāviveka’s opponent to be a Mīmāṃsaka, as shown in the following
passage in which he attempts to reconcile the obvious anti-vegetarian arguments of Bhāviveka
with his assessment that Bhāviveka maintains a negative stance toward meat-eating.

It is only because the opponent of this chapter [=MHK 9] is the Mīmāṃsakas
who approve of animal sacrifice in a ritual setting and because he
[=Bhāviveka] discusses the topic of meat-eating with such Mīmāṃsakas solely
from a logical viewpoint that he manifests a tone in the arguments different
from the anti-meat-eating arguments of Chinese and Japanese Buddhists who advocate morality by emphasizing the spirit of compassion.\textsuperscript{130}

There is an internal contradiction in this passage. The purpose of the whole passage is to explain why a sixth-century Indian Buddhist, Bhāviveka, presents different, that is, anti-vegetarian arguments that are not found in East Asian Buddhist tradition. Kawasaki lists the Mīmāṃsaka identity of the opponent and the polemical context of Bhāviveka’s arguments as the first reason. That is to say, it is because of the fact that Bhāviveka’s argues against the Mīmāṃsakas who allow bloody sacrifices that Bhāviveka demonstrates an anti-vegetarian tendency, which is in fact unnatural to him. However, does it make sense to argue against vegetarianism with those who slaughter animals in their rituals?

That the opponent is not a Mīmāṃsaka in the anti-vegetarianism section is hinted at when the fourth independent discussion turns from the criticism of absurd austere practices to defense of the Buddhist meat diet. After having denounced the opponent’s thesis that fasting is meritorious (9.130cd-131), in TJ on MHK 9.131, Bhāviveka presents another point of attack, namely, internal inconsistencies in the scripture of the opponent. And the scripture of the opponent in this context is, as Bhāviveka identifies, the Mahābhārata (rgyas byed).\textsuperscript{131} The Tibetan word rgyas byed has been in fact identified as the Mahābhārata by Kawasaki (1992b, 140-1) himself in reference to this same text.

To illustrate his points, Bhāviveka quotes fifteen verses from the Mahābhārata and divides them into four groups so that he can demonstrate the internal contradictions within each group. For example, in the last group of Mahābhārata quotes, Bhāviveka first cites a verse that urges one to fight and die on the battlefield, and promises a heavenly abode to the warrior. Then

\textsuperscript{130} Kawasaki (1985, 175); translated from Japanese.
\textsuperscript{131} TJ D308a5, “Since there is the following contradiction between the former and later parts in [your] scripture, that is, the Mahābhārata, it [i.e., your pro-fasting argument] is not rational.” (rgyas byed la sogs pa’i lung las ’di ltar snga phyi ’gal ba yang yod pas, rigs pa ma yin te.)
he contrasts that verse with another verse that warns that one who does harm to others will fall into a hell. Finally, he quotes the famous Golden Rule, “do not do to others what is not agreeable to oneself” (na tat parasya saṃdadyāt pratikūlaṃ yad ātmanah). I could only identify four verses among the fifteen from the *Mahābhārata*, but it is significant that all four are from *Mahābhārata* Books 12 (Śāntiparvan) and 13 (Anuśāsanaparvan), which espouse Brahmanical renunciatory values (esp., *ahīṃsā*) sometimes overlaid with the Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics (esp., the *Mokṣadharma*).

The immediate response of the opponent to this critique also reveals that the opponent is an upholder of that portion of the *Mahābhārata*.

Even though Buddhists are sarcastic toward others and criticize others while thinking “we are abiding by dharma,” it is well known that they themselves make a great effort to eat meat. One cannot obtain meat without killing the life of sentient beings, and in this respect, they [the meat-eating Buddhists] are devoid of compassion. Therefore, they, like animal hunters, commit sin.

Here we encounter the “no meat without killing” logic, which Alsdorf (2010[1962]) finds at *Mahābhārata* 13.116.26. However, this logic is not merely declared in passing in that one verse. In the subsequent verses, it is paraphrased (“the killer kills a living being for the sake of

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132 *Mahābhārata* 13.114.8ab. It is translated in TJ D308b7-309a1 as “rang la rjes su mi mthun pa, de ni gzhan la mi bya ste.”

133 The second quote (TJ D308a6-7) corresponds to the *Mahābhārata* 12.214.4 and 13.93.4, the fifth (TJ D308b1) to 12.236.10, the ninth (TJ D308b3) to 12.80.17, and the fifteenth (TJ D308b7-309a1) to 13.114.8. The numbering of the *Mahābhārata* is be noted according to the Critical Edition. For Book 12 and 13 see Belvalkar (1948-1954) and Dandekar (1966), respectively.

134 TJ D309a1-2, “sangs rgyas pa ni ’di ltar bdag nyid chos la gnas pa yin no snyam du sens shing gzhan la kha zer zhing dmod par byed kyang, rang nyid sha za ba la ’bad pa cher byed par grags la; sens can srog ma bcad par ni sha nyes par mi ’gyur bas, des na snying rje dang bral ba yin pa’i phyir, ri dwags kyi rngon pa la sogs pa bzhin du sdig pa byed pa nyid yin no.”

135 *Mahābhārata* 13.115.26 (acc. to Alsdorf’s numbering) [13.116.26 in the Critical Edition], “For flesh is certainly not produced from grass, wood or stone! Flesh comes from the killing of creatures, therefore it is a sin to eat it.” (na hi māṃsam ṭṛṇāt kāṣṭhād upalād vāpi jāyate. hatvā jāntum tato māṃsam, tasmād doṣas tu bhakṣane.); the text and translation are from Alsdorf (2010, 3, fn.6)
the eater”\textsuperscript{136} and “killing of animals is done for the sake of the eater”\textsuperscript{137}, and the positive propositions are explicitly drawn from that logic (“if there is no eater, then there would be no killer”\textsuperscript{138} and “if it [=meat] is prohibited from eating, killing would cease”\textsuperscript{139}). Such logic is further employed to accuse not only the [meat-]eater (\textit{khādaka}) but also the buyer (\textit{krāyaka}) of the sin of killing (\textit{vadha}).\textsuperscript{140}

The non-Mīmāṃsaka identity of Bhāviveka’s opponent is also reflected in Bhāviveka’s arguments themselves throughout the section, since most of the opponent’s arguments that he critically examines are found in the \textit{Mahābhārata} 13.114-117 in which “the most detailed treatment of the theme of \textit{ahimsā} and vegetarianism is located” (Alsdorf 2010, 34). In one verse formulated directly against the opponent’s “no meat without killing” thesis quoted above, Bhāviveka explicitly reveals that the opponent is not a “householder-oriented” Mīmāṃsaka but an ascetic.

If you think eating meat is [tantamount to] killing a living being on the basis of that reason, then your reason would be inconclusive because of [the counter example of] wearing animal skin.\textsuperscript{141}

The verse does not respond to the critic’s point. Instead, Bhāviveka turns it on the opponent for wearing leather. TJ elaborates on his logic: “If there is no ascetic (\textit{dka’ thub}) who wears animal skin, there would be no killing of [animals] such as Śarabha.”\textsuperscript{142} Therefore, when all the evidence is considered, it is reasonable to conclude that the opponent in the anti-vegetarianism

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[136]{\textit{Mahābhārata} 13.116.29cd, \textquotedblleft ghātakah khādakārthāya tam ghātayati vai narah?	extquotedblright\}
\footnotetext[137]{\textit{Mahābhārata} 13.116.30cd, \textquotedblleft khādakārtham ato himsā mṛgādīnāṃ pravartate!	extquotedblright\}
\footnotetext[138]{\textit{Mahābhārata} 13.116.29ab, \textquotedblleft yadi cet khādako na syān na tadā ghātako bhavet?	extquotedblright\}
\footnotetext[139]{\textit{Mahābhārata} 13.116.30ab, \textquotedblleft abhakṣyam etad iti vā iti himsā nivartate!	extquotedblright\}
\footnotetext[140]{\textit{Mahābhārata} 13.116.37-8, \textquotedblleft yo hi khādati mâṃsāni prāṇināṃ jīvitārthinām/ hatānāṃ vā mṛtānāṃ vā yathā hantā tathaiva saḥ// dhanena krāyako hanti khādakaś copabhogataḥ/ ghātako vadhahandhābhhyām ity eṣa trividho vadhah!/\textquotedblright\}
\footnotetext[141]{MHK 9.136, \textquotedblleft māṃsādāḥ prāṇighātī cet tannimitattvato mataḥ/ ajanidharair hetoh syād evam vyabhicāritāi?	extquotedblright\}
\footnotetext[142]{TJD310a2-3, \textquotedblleft gang pags pa la sogs pa thogs pa ’i dka’ thub med na, sha ra ba la sogs pa gsed par yang mi ’gyur ro.	extquotedblright\}
\end{footnotes}
section of MHK 9 is not the Mīmāṃsakas but, rather, Brahmanical renunciants who base their arguments on the 12th and 13th Books of the Mahābhārata.

2.5.3 The Fifth Independent Discussion: The Mīmāṃsakas are not the sole opponent of MHK 9 (3)

In his work, *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism*, Schmithausen (1991) investigates the opinions of later Buddhist authors. He is drawn to the fifth independent discussion of MHK 9 in which Bhāviveka argues that trees do not have sentience (*sacittakā hi taravo na*). Schmithausen leaves numerous valuable philological notes along with rigorous identifications and explanations of the often unfathomable terms for various kinds of plants. As he commences his section on MHK 9, Schmithausen (ibid., 83-4) expresses a doubt about the Mīmāṃsaka identity of the opponent in the fifth independent discussion and suggests that:

...whereas in the Madhyamakahṛdaya and in the Tarkajvālā the arguments are found in the chapter against the Mīmāṃsā,—the Brahmanic school of the methods of exegesis of Vedic ritual texts; but actually they are, perhaps, rather directed against Vedic texts (śruti) and the authoritative Brahmanic tradition (smṛti) themselves.

Schmithausen makes three observations in this passage. The first is that Bhāviveka’s arguments seem to be not against the Mīmāṃsakas to whom the chapter of MHK 9 is devoted. In the footnote, he states that he could not find “a pertinent discussion in an early (Pūrva-)Mīmāṃsā text.” As we have seen thus far, this is a problem for all the independent discussions. Second, he points out that Vedic texts might be the object of Bhāviveka’s criticism. In this regard, he quotes the introductory verse of the fifth independent discussion in which, along with all the other

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143 from MHK 9.140; Schmithausen (1991, 79, fn. 443) reads it as “sacetanā hi taravo na.”
144 Ibid. 83-4.
145 See ibid., 83, fn. 467.
introductory verses of the independent discussions, Bhāviveka explicitly states that it is the Three (trayyī), the Veda, that is to be scrutinized in the subsequent section.146 Schmithausen also points to the former part of his study in which he collects from Vedic corpus “sufficient evidence that not only animals but also plants as well as seeds and even water and earth were, more or less naively, believed to be living and even sentient” (ibid., 3).147

Lastly, Schmithausen states that Bhāviveka’s discussion may be in reference to the smṛti texts. Quoting Kawasaki’s study, he lists smṛti texts such as the Manusmṛti and the Yājñavalkyasmṛti as examples of texts that contain arguments for the sentience of plants.148 Then he notes that the opponent’s argument contained in TJ on MHK 9.139 closely resemble the arguments presented in the Mahābhārata 12.177.10-8 “according to which plants are sentient beings like men, etc., because they have all the six senses (and the corresponding perceptions)” (ibid., 87-8, fn. 493). I do not wish to enter into in-depth analysis of the parallelism between the two works based on Schmithausen’s keen observation, but I would like to underline the fact that Bhāviveka’s opponent’s arguments in the fifth independent discussion are again, like those in the fourth one, found in the Mahābhārata, specifically, Book 12.

The portion of TJ upon which Schmithausen’s observation is based is not a quotation but a paraphrase of the opponent’s arguments, and therefore, there is a certain limitation in arguing that Bhāviveka is criticizing the doctrines of the Mahābhārata based on that passage. Toward the end of the fifth independent discussion, however, Bhāviveka seems to quote directly from the Mahābhārata and assume it to be the opponent’s scripture:

[In your scripture] the following teaching is found: “Ahiṃsā is the supreme dharma” (‘tshe ba med pa chos kyi mchog). Therefore, [for you,] if one always engages in the act of eating, then one comes to participate in injuring others

146 See ibid., 84, fn. 468.
147 See the footnote (14) to this sentence.
148 See ibid., 84, fn. 469.
(ʼtše ba; Skt. hiṃsā); how can there be dharma? [Moreover,] how can one become liberated from sansāra? If those who aspire to liberation do not eat food, they would die. If they eat, since they injure living beings [by eating], the dharma would decline. Therefore, those who imagine that trees have sentience are tormenting themselves [by contradicting themselves].

In this passage, Bhāviveka supposes that his opponent is maintaining two incompatible positions. One is that plants are sentient, and this is the thesis that Bhāviveka refutes throughout the fifth independent discussion. The second position, which, he argues, contradicts the first, is that the value of “non-injury” (ahimsā) is the highest principle. It is not compatible to uphold both positions because if one is committed to the vow of ahimsā (non-killing of living beings) and, at the same time, regards even plants as endowed with life, then there is nothing that one can eat.

To show the dilemma of the opponent, Bhāviveka quotes a sentence that must be a pāda (quarter) of a verse, since it has seven syllables in its Tibetan translation. I wonder whether it is a quotation from the Mahābhārata’s vegetarianism section (13.114-117) in which Bhīṣma emphasizes to Yudhiṣṭhira that “ahimsā is the supreme dharma” (ahimsā paramo dharmaḥ) at 13.116.25a and 13.117.37a. With this evidence of a direct quotation, and given Schmithausen’s observation of the parallelism between MHK 9 and the Mahābhārata, I think it is reasonable to conclude that the opponent in the fifth independent discussion is, as it was the case in the fourth, advocates of the Mahābhārata, particularly Books 12 and 13, as their scripture.

In the process of reviewing previous scholars’ opinions on the identity of the opponent, each based on one of the independent discussions of MHK 9, we have thus far noted that Bhāviveka’s opponent in those discussions is not the Mīmāṃsakas. To arrive at a more accurate

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149 TJ D315b3-4, “ʼtše ba med pa chos kyi mchog ces bstan pa ’byung bas, des na kha zas kyi bya ba la rtag tu spyod pa na, ʼtše ba la ’jug pa nyid du ’gyur ba ’i phyir, chos kyang ga la yod de? ʼkhor ba las ji ltar grol bar ’gyur te? thar pa ’dod pa rnams zas ma zos na ni ʼchi bar ’gyur la, zos na ni srog chags la gnod par ’gyur bas chos nyams par ’gyur ro. des na ljon shing la sens yod par rtog pa ’dis ni bdag nyid la gnod pa byed pa yin no.”
picture of Bhāviveka’s opponent in that part of MHK 9, we need, first of all, to attend to a large number of quoted verses in TJ and compare them with the relevant Sanskrit literature. However, before undertaking the task, some guidelines for future research might be suggested. First, Bhāviveka seems to challenge the authority of scriptures promoted and labeled as the Veda by the advocates. Each introductory verse to the independent discussions makes it clear that Bhāviveka aims to denounce the Veda (trayyī). Second, Bhāviveka seems to be mainly concerned with two different kinds of the text—purānic and epic literature—which are not only claimed to be the “fifth Veda,” but the “Veda of the Vedas” (Pollock 1989, 610). The purānic texts seem to be involved in the first and second, that is, “theistic” independent discussions, while the Mahābhārata is deeply engaged in the remaining three independent discussions. However, we also need to consider the Śaiva Tantras as we pursue the investigation since Bhāviveka specially notes in the second part of the second independent discussion that he is criticizing the teaching of the Śaiva Tantra. Lastly, we need to imagine a group exclusively affiliated with the Books 12 and 13 of the Mahābhārata as Bhāviveka’s opponent in the third, fourth, and fifth independent discussions. For the latter two discussions, we are on fairly solid ground although not all the quotations contained there have yet been identified with the Mahābhārata. As for the third independent discussion, although a close examination of its contents is still a desideratum, I suspect that Bhāviveka is criticizing the practice of ablution in the sacred rivers recommended in the Mahābharatā Book 13.

2.6 Who is the Mīmāṃsaka in MHK 9? Measuring the Mīmāṃsaka-ness of the Official Pūrva-uttarakṣas

Apart from the independent discussions, the ideas being discussed and examined in the official
\textit{pūrva-uttarapakṣas} seem to be, at least on first reading, Mīmāṃsaka doctrines. Encompassing several hallmark Mīmāṃsaka doctrines laid out especially in the \textit{Tarkapāda} (\textit{Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.1-32}) such as the authorlessness of the Veda (\textit{vedāpauruṣeyatva}) and the eternality of words (\textit{śabdanityatva}), the official \textit{pūrvapakṣas}, the first seventeen verses of MHK 9, seem to be genuine Mīmāṃsaka claims, and Bhāviveka’s refutation of them, i.e., the official \textit{uttarapakṣas}, appears to be addressed to them. Upon close reading, however, the Mīmāṃsaka arguments do not squarely fit the Mīmāṃsaka sources at our disposal. A systematic comparison of Bhāviveka’s report on the Mīmāṃsakas with the extant Mīmāṃsaka materials will be necessary in order to accurately map MHK 9 in the history of Indian philosophy. As a preliminary step toward that goal, in this section, I would like to review the previous opinions on this matter.

\subsection*{2.6.1 Is Bhāviveka’s Opponent Bhartṛhari?}

In a series of works, Kawasaki (1973, 1974, 1976, 1992a) examines the contents of the official \textit{pūrvapakṣas} and presents his view on the identity of the opponent in MHK 9. Based on the Japanese translation of the verses of MHK 9.1-17 (1973, 1992a) together with the English translation of excerpts from TJ (1976), Kawasaki summarizes the opponent’s arguments in the official \textit{pūrvapakṣas} in eight points: 1. sacrificial rituals are the sole means to achieve liberation, 2. such rituals are exclusively defined by the Veda and all other teachings on \textit{dharma} are based on the Veda, 3. the Veda is authorless because its author is not remembered and it has been transmitted without interruption, 4. words are eternal and they have eternal relations with their meanings, 5. the Veda is to be considered as an independent means of knowledge discrete from perception and inference, 6. the Veda is not to be criticized by the means of logic, and lastly, 7. an omniscient being does not exist.
After having summarized the official *pūrvapakṣas*, Kawasaki (1973)\(^{150}\) observes that these points are again discussed later in Śāntarakṣita’s polemics against Kumārila, however, none of Bhāviveka’s seventeen verses are found in the former’s *Tattvasamgraha* or in the latter’s *Ślokavārttika*. He further remarks that, although Šabara’s commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* includes discussions of Bhāviveka’s opponent’s agendas, each of the terms that the latter uses and the arguments that he makes for the most part do not coincide with those of the *Śābarabhāṣya*. On the basis of these two facts, each of which excludes Kumārila and Šabara as the possible candidate for Bhāviveka’s opponent, Kawasaki calls for a third, albeit unknown, figure who would connect our knowledge of Mīmāṃsā and the Mīmāṃsaka arguments presented in the official *pūrvapakṣas* of MHK 9.

In this regard, Kawasaki, quoting Nakamura’s study on the early Vedānta,\(^{151}\) notes that Bhāviveka quotes a verse from Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya* (1.42) at MHK 9.14.\(^{152}\) As Kawasaki states, although they do not match word by word, there is no significant difference between those two verses, and therefore, it may be said that Bhāviveka is quoting Bhartṛhari’s verse as a *pūrvapakṣa*.\(^{153}\) On the basis of this single quotation, along with other circumstantial evidence, Kawasaki advances a thesis that “the doctrines of Mīmāṃsā introduced by Bhāviveka may not be particularly different from the contents of the *Vākyapadīya*” (81). To support his thesis, Kawasaki points out that the context and many of the terms used in the *Vākyapadīya* 1.30-42 overlap and that, despite the historical contestation between the grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇa*) and the Mīmāṃsakas, they both share the traditionalist attitude toward the Veda and its sacrificial

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\(^{150}\) Since all the four publications of Kawasaki make the same argument, I will mainly make reference to his earliest and most detailed paper, Kawasaki (1973).


\(^{152}\) Lindtner (1992) also takes note of Bhāviveka’s quotation of *Vākyapadīya* 1.42.


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norm. In Kawasaki (1974, 1120), a variant of this thesis also appears: “there is a probability of Bhavya’s getting his knowledge on the Mīmāṃsakas through some grammarian’s works.”

Kawasaki’s suggestion to seek Bhāviveka’s opponent not among the Mīmāṃsakas, but rather the grammarians is indeed valuable and is to be retained as a possibility. However, his thesis needs much proof and analytical demonstration. For example, the fact that the official pūrvapakṣas of MHK 9 and the Vākyapadīya 1.30-42 share a common context cannot be established by a single sentence; it needs meticulous comparison of the two texts. The historical rivalry and cooperation between the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas over Vedic orthodoxy and orthopraxy is also an important and interesting topic to be investigated. However, without specifying the common doctrine of the two parties, their general tendency of being “Vedic traditionalists” cannot be used to make the Mīmāṃsakas into grammarians and vice versa. Lastly, it has not been conclusively established that Bhāviveka quotes Bhartṛhari at MHK 9.14. Despite the nearly identical content of the two verses, as Nakamura has noted and as Kawasaki himself acknowledges, Bhāviveka also quotes the same verse in his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 9.3. Significantly, in that context, the verse is put forward not by the Mīmāṃsakas (or others affiliated with any Brahmanical school) as in MHK 9 but by those Buddhists of another school, namely, the Vātsīputrīyas. It is not Bhāviveka but the his commentator Avalokitavrata who identifies the verse as that of Bhartṛhari and, in this regard, there is a possibility that Bhāviveka attributes the verse to whoever claims that scripture is superior to human reasoning. Kawasaki (1973, 82) also suggests the possibility that the verse circulated among Brahmanical intellectuals before Bhartṛhari.154

Although it would be worth comparing MHK 9 and the grammarians’ work, especially, the Vākyapadīya, I think the Mīmāṃsaka imprint in MHK 9, particularly in the official

154 See also Saito (2005, 833, fn. 7).
pūrvapakṣas, is rather clear. There Bhāviveka points out important issues that the Tarkapāda of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MS 1.1.1-32) and the Śābarabhāṣya address. The first two (9.1-2) can be viewed as a representation of MS 1.1.2 in which dharma is exclusively defined as the ritual means (artha) prescribed by the Veda (codanālakṣaṇa) whereas the next two verses (9.3-4) can be seen as a summary of Śabara’s discussion on the distinction between man-made speech and the authorless Veda.155 MHK 9.5 corresponds to MS 1.1.4-5 in that both argue for the impossibility of obtaining knowledge of things beyond human perception without the Veda. MHK 9.6-7 introduces the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the eternality of words (śabdanityatva), the topic of MS 1.1.6-23. Therefore, up to MHK 9.7, it may be said that Bhāviveka follows the order of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Śābarabhāṣya.

However, the arguments of his opponent contain some elements that cannot be found in those two—the Mīmāṃsāsūtra and the Śābarabhāṣya—the earliest extant Mīmāṃsaka works. For example, MHK 9.8-9 introduces the Mīmāṃsaka objection to the Buddhist subordination of scripture (śabda) as a kind of inference (anumāna) which is not dealt with in the Śābarabhāṣya. Only in the work of the next Mīmāṃsaka author whose writings are extant, Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, do we find an extensive discussion of that topic.156 Also, the Mīmāṃsaka critique of omniscience introduced in MHK 9.15-17 can only be found in Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika157 and his lost work, Bṛhaṭṭīkā.158 Although the universalistic vision of the Veda expressed in MHK 9.12 is, as Kasaksi (1976, 12, fn.5) observes, seemingly a quotation from the Mahābhārata, and although it is presented in a rudimentary form, it is also reflected in Kumārila’s other work, the

155 See Śābarabhāṣya (Frauwallner 1968) 18:3-20:2.
156 See the Šabdapariccheda section under Ślokavārttika on MS 1.1.5.
158 See Kataoka (2011, pt.2, 35ff). Some of verses of the Bṛhaṭṭīkā are, allegedly but most probably, quoted in the last two chapters of Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha as the pūrvapakṣas.
Tantravārttika\textsuperscript{159} but not in Śabara’s commentary.

It is evident that Bhāviveka’s summary of the Mīmāṃsaka arguments in the official pūrvapakṣas captures a certain stage of development of the Mīmāṃsā school after Śabara. And it is tempting to suppose that Kumārila is Bhāviveka’s opponent mainly because he is the next Mīmāṃsaka to whom we have access and it is in his works that we can locate the above discourses that are found in MHK 9 but not in the Śābarabhāṣya. However, the major problem in supposing Kumārila is Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9 is that Bhāviveka (500-570)\textsuperscript{160} is generally dated earlier than Kumārila (600-650)\textsuperscript{161}.

2.6.2 Is Bhāviveka’s Opponent Kumārila?

Despite the generally acknowledged relative chronology of Bhāviveka and Kumārila, Krasser (2012) reversed the order and argued that Bhāviveka seems to be aware of Kumārila and to refute the latter in MHK 9. His thesis on Bhāviveka’s familiarity of Kumārila’s works is based on the fact that, in MHK 9, Bhāviveka introduces the Mīmāṃsaka critique of the Buddha’s omniscience, which is “not very important” to Śabarasvāmin but rigorously formulated by his successor Kumārila (580). Therefore, “one can easily read Bhāviveka as refuting Kumārila, unless one wants to postulate an unknown forerunner of Kumārila from whom he inherited all these ideas...” (565). Between two options of having Kumārila or an unknown pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsaka as Bhāviveka’s opponent in MHK 9, Krasser opts for the first and concludes that “the material on the notion of omniscience suggests that the MHK, or at least portions of it, presuppose Kumārila.” (577)

\textsuperscript{159} See Tantravārttika on MS 1.3 (Smṛtipāda). See also de La Vallée Poussin (1902) and Halbfass (1991, Chapters Three and Four).

\textsuperscript{160} See Kajiyama (1968-9).

\textsuperscript{161} See Kataoka (2010, 112).
It is indeed reasonable to posit Kumārila as Bhāviveka’s possible opponent on the basis of a post-Śabara topic (the Buddha’s omniscience), which is present in MHK 9. However, the evidence that Krasser adduces for the thesis is rather scanty and his comparative analysis of MHK 9 and Kumārila’s works is not precise. Under the heading of “2. Bhāviveka and Kumārila,” Krasser lists six points the first five of which (2.1-5) seek to demonstrate the correspondence between the works of two figures; the last (2.6) argues that there is another Mīmāṃsaka—before Kumārila—involved in MHK 9.

First, Krasser lists two half-verses, each from MHK 9162 and Ślokavārttika (ŚV),163 which argue for the same thesis: an omniscient being does not exist since such a being is not observed today. These match each other in content but it cannot be said, as Krasser does, that their wording is the same; they simply express the same idea. It is also to be noted that Kumārila’s half-verse is a part of his argument164 that the established pramāṇas cannot be used to establish the existence of an omniscient being, which is absent in MHK 9.

Second, Krasser notes two correspondences between MHK 9 and Kumārila’s works. Bhāviveka’s opponent, at MHK 9.15cd, says that the idea of the Buddha’s omniscience is fabricated for the sake of winning worldly esteem (lokapakti) whereas Kumārila states, in the Brhaṭṭīkā as well as in the Ślokavārttika165, that the idea seems “attractive (only) to devotees” (śraddadhāneṣu śobhate).166 In the following sentences of the two works, Kumārila, in reference to the Buddhist claim that the Buddha’s teaching even flows out from a wall, wonders whether such teaching is from the Buddha, Brahmin-deceivers (brāhmaṇavaṇcaka), or wicked ghosts

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162 MHK 9.15ab, “But an omniscient being does not exist at all, because it is not seen today.” (na cāsti kaścit sarvajño nedānīṃ dṛśyate yataḥ); translation is from Krasser (2012, 559).
163 ŚV on codanā sūtra (MS 1.1.2), 117ab, “First, an omniscient being is not seen by (ordinary) people like us today.” (sarvajño dṛśyate tāvan nedānīṃ asmadādibhiḥ); translation is from ibid.
164 See Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 332ff.).
165 See ibid., 370ff.
166 Tattvasaṃgraha, 3242d; text and translation are from Krasser (ibid., 560).
Krasser observes in this regard that Bhāviveka also attributes the Veda to an evil being in MHK 9.31. I wonder, however, whether those two instances correspond to each other. Is it the same thing to argue that your teaching is concocted only to gain worldly fame and that your teaching only appeals to your own small group of devotees? Also, is it reasonable to suppose that Kumārila’s act of attributing the Buddha’s teaching to “evil-minded ghosts” motivated Bhāviveka’s denunciation of the Veda as a work of an evil being? As we have seen in the last chapter, Buddhists, from the time of Harivarman on, contended that the author of the Veda was a morally depraved being. Bhāviveka is not the first one to adopt such a strategy.

As for the third point, Krasser introduces MHK 9.16 in which Bhāviveka’s opponent argues for two things: 1. the Buddha’s words are not a pramāṇa and 2. the Buddha is not omniscient. Then he quotes two sample sentences from the Brhaṭṭīkā in which Kumārila argues the same. This observation is not objectionable; however, one cannot but have an impression that those claims are too general to be used to confirm Bhāviveka’s knowledge of Kumārila’s works. Anyone who is hostile to Buddhism would deny the pramāṇa-status of the Buddha’s words and the omniscience of the Buddha.

The fourth point seems to be on the mark. In the Brhaṭṭīkā, Kumārila, regarding the knowledge of an omniscient being, “only allows that a person can know everything other than the dharma (sarvam anyad vijānānaḥ puruṣah).” (Kataoka 2011, pt. 2, 321, fn. 356). Bhāviveka, in MHK 9 and in PP, responds to an opponent who claims that the Buddha does not know “the path to heaven and liberation” (mtho ris byang grol lam zhe na; MHK 9.164c).

Krasser’s fifth and last point seems to be self-refuting. Krasser (565) notes that Bhāviveka “in MHK 9.19 refutes the possibility that the authority of the Veda can be established on the basis of its uninterrupted transmission” while Kumārila, similar to Bhāviveka, “in ŚV codanā 133-136 refutes the possibility that the omniscience of the Buddha can be established on
the basis of an uninterrupted transmission.” Krasser seems to assert that Bhāviveka, having seen that Kumārila denies the validity of Buddhists’ claim based on an uninterrupted tradition, applies the same critique against the Mīmāṃsakas. However, Bhāviveka advances such a critique only because, in the official pūrvapakṣa verse MHK 9.4, his opponent argues for the āgama-status of the Veda based on the uninterrupted transmission of the Veda through generations.167 In short, Bhāviveka’s opponent uses a strategy that is explicitly rejected by Kumārila.

Krasser (2012)’s study, which correctly discerned post-Śabara Mīmāṃsaka arguments in MHK 9 and properly correlates such contents with a post-Śabara author, Kumārila, points in the right direction for a future study of MHK 9. His study is indeed invaluable considering that it courageously challenges the generally accepted chronological order of the Indian masters. Nevertheless, the problem should be approached in a more systematic manner accompanied with more detailed analysis of the contents and contexts of both masters’ works. Sampling seemingly corresponding ideas from their works can be an effective means to show a plausible possibility and to formulate a hypothesis that overturns the previous scholarly norm at the initial stage of research. To take the next step, however, we need studies that compare the systematically divided units of texts and that place more value on the specificity of their arguments. With only a comparison of textual materials that can be generally termed “material on the notion of omniscience,” the discussion cannot produce meaningful information beyond that of the chronology of Bhāviveka and Kumārila.

Problems involved in determining the Mīmāṃsaka opponent in MHK 9 provocatively introduced by Krasser (2012) are still open and call for the attention of scholars. I do not intend to go into detail here; this dissertation is not devoted to them although in Chapter Four, I

167 MHK 9.4cd, “Because its tradition (of transmission) has not been interrupted, this is the [real] scripture. In the absence of it...” (saṃpradāyāṇupacchedād āgamo ’sau tadatyaye’).
obliquely address the necessity of taking Kumārila into account as we read MHK 9. However, before closing our review, I would like to make preliminary observations related to the identity of the Mīmāṃsaka in MHK 9 and suggest a possibility that Bhāviveka’s opponent might be a Mīmāṃsaka, although unknown, who postdates Śabara and predates Kumārila. The following points are notes for future research, and therefore, need to be developed and elaborated in separate studies.

First, the official pūrvapakṣa of MHK 9 do not fully reflect Kumārila’s arguments even when they discuss post-Śabara Mīmāṃsaka topics; some of them appear to be adaptations of older discourses to new contexts. For example, as stated above, the Mīmāṃsaka critique of the Buddhist practice of subordinating scripture (śabda) to inference (anumāna) begins to appear in the śabdaripiccheda section of Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika on MS 1.1.5. Part of Kumārila’s critique is that the linguistic means of obtaining knowledge lacks three marks (trairūpya) with which, as Buddhists themselves lay out, a sound inference must be equipped.168 As this is a central argument of Kumārila, Śāntarakṣita, the later Buddhist who examines Kumārila’s contention against Buddhists, does not fail to quote this position as a pūrvapakṣa.169 The Mīmāṃsaka critique contained in the official pūrvapakṣas of MHK 9.8-9, though criticizing the Buddhist subordination of scripture as a means of obtaining knowledge, does not contain such an argument.170 Instead, they advance three arguments against the Buddhist denial of the pramāṇa-

168 See ŚV on MS 1.1.5, Śabdaripiccheda, 98, “tasmād ananumānatvaṃ śābde pratyakṣavad bhavet/ trayāpyarahitatvena tādṛṣṭiṣayavarjanāt/”
169 See Tattvasamgraha 1497.
170 MHK 9.8-9, “1. This [means of knowledge, i.e., scripture] is different from inference, because it is a valid means of knowledge, just as another valid means of knowledge [for example, perception (added based on TJ paraphrase: “mgon sum gyi tshad ma bzhi no”), or just as cognition [from perception and inference] that covers [respectively] one and many objects [cognition from scripture covers both objects]. 2. [The scripture (śabda) is an independent pramāṇa] because it is the cause of the thoughts on the things whose relationships with their signs are invisible. Or, 3. it is because it is the cause of generating thoughts on [things of] different realms.” (anumānāt prthak cāsau pramāṇatvāt tadanyavat/ ekānekārthaviṣayāpratipattir yathāpi vā// adṛṣṭalingasambandhapadārthamatihetuḥ/
Second, Bhāviveka’s opponent argues for a doctrine that had already been overcome within the Mīmāṃsā tradition itself at the time of Kumārila. Bhāviveka’s opponent lists four reasons for the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the eternality of words at MHK 9.7. The third reason is that words are recognized as one and the same all the time (pratyabhijñānataḥ). The relevant discussion in Mīmāṃsā literature appears in the Śābarabhāṣya on MS 1.1.20 (saṃkhyābhāvāt) where Śabara argues that people recognize (pratyabhijānanti) a word to be the same when uttered many times. Then the opponent responds that, if this is so, then, thought and action (buddhikarmaṇi) would also become eternal since they are also recognized to be the same when they are repeated (pratyabhijñāyete). Up to that point in the dialogue between Śabara and the opponent, Śabara’s argument for the eternality of words is based on their recognizability; to express that idea he consistently relied upon the word “to recognize” (abhi+√jñā). However, he suddenly changes the vocabulary and answers in an ambiguous language.

This does not affect our position; because these two [that are, thought and action] are not directly perceived (na...pratyakṣe); if they were directly

\[ bhinnagocaradhījanmakāranatvād athāpi vā// \]

\[ 171 \] In the Vṛttikāra quotation section of the Śābarabhāṣya, the Vṛttikāra invites an opponent who argues (SBhF 48:16-7): “Scripture is not a basis of dharma. It is because, when one performs Vedic sacrifice, he does not see the fruit of it, and, at the other time [when the result of the sacrifice appears], the ritual act does not exist [any more]. [Therefore, scripture] is not a pramāṇa.” (animittaṃ śabdaḥ. karmakāle phalādarśanāt kālāntare ca karmābhāvāt, pramāṇam nāstīti.) As the Vṛttikāra answers this objection, he defines the term ‘pramāṇa’ as follows (SBhF 48:18-20): “With whatever means we attain knowledge, such [means is to be recognized as] a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Also with scripture, we attain knowledge. Therefore, scripture is also a valid means of knowledge just as perception is.” (yena yena hi pramiyate, tat tat pramāṇam. śabdenāpi pramīyate, tataḥ śabdo ‘pi pramāṇam, yathātva pratyakṣam.) This definition of the term ‘pramāṇa’ seems to be the meaning of 9.8ab in which Bhāviveka’s opponent argues for the independent pramāṇa-status of scripture based on the reason of “its being a pramāṇa” (pramāṇatvāt) with the example of perception (mngon sum). See the previous footnote.
perceived (atha pratyakṣe), they also would be eternal.  

In this passage, Śabara no longer uses the word “to recognize” and introduces the new word “perception” (pratyakṣa) into discussion. Jha (1933, 39), after having translated the above passage, remarks: “This is an obscure passage.” Then he suggests reading the passage according to Kumārila’s interpretation, which claims explicitly that “we (the Mīmāṃsakas) do not take ‘recognition’ as a proof of the eternity [of words]” (nāsmābhiḥ pratyabhijñānam nityasādhanam iṣyate/). To Kumārila, the sudden introduction of “perception” by Śabara is meant to point out that the opponent’s inference that aims to negate the eternality of words based on the common feature of recognizability shared by words, thought, and action is contradicted by a stronger pramāṇa, that is, perception, since words are perceived to be one and the same. Therefore, Kumārila is not the Mīmāṃsaka who argues for the eternality of words based on their recognizability in MHK 9.7.

Interestingly, just before Kumārila proclaims that the Mīmāṃsakas do not take recognizability as the valid proof, he considers, in a series of six verses, a preliminary opinion held by someone, in the commentator Pārthasārathi’s words, “who only knows a partial truth” (ekadeśin), according to which Śabara speaks of “perception” in order to deny the recognizability of thought and action. Since recognizability presupposes perceptibility, by denying the perceptibility of thought and action, on this interpretation, Śabara intends to deny their recognizability. By reading the word “perception” (pratyakṣa) in Śabara’s passage as a ground for “recognition” (pratyabhijñāna), this interpretation attempts to safeguard

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172 ŚBhK (Kataoka 2007) 536:5, “naiṣa doṣah. na hi te pratyakṣe. atha pratyakṣe nitye eva.”; translation is from Jha (1933, 39).
173 ŚV, śabdaniyatvādhikaṇa, 389ab.
174 See ŚV, śabdaniyatvādhikaṇa, 389-392.
175 See ŚV, śabdaniyatvādhikaṇa, 379-384.
176 Nyāyaratnākara on ŚV, śabdaniyatvādhikaṇa, 379 (585:11), “tatraikadeśy āha.”
177 ibid., 379, “na tayoḥ pratyabhijñānam etad eva kilocyate/ pratyakṣatvanishekha pratyakṣena hi tad bhavet/?”
“recognizability” as valid evidence for the eternity of words. However, Kumārila rejects such an interpretative possibility since it is contradicted by everyone’s knowledge; such interpretation is far-fetched and is only possible by a forced interpretation of Śabara’s words (vācā...kliṣṭayā).\(^{178}\) What we can glimpse in Kumārila’s refutation of another possible interpretation of the difficult passage of Śabara is that there may have been someone before Kumārila (but after Śabara) who maintained that words are eternal because they are recognized to be the same. This opinion, if it was held by someone, exactly matches that of Bhāviveka’s opponent who lists the recognizability of words as one of the reasons for the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the eternity of words.

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have outlined the structure and contents of MHK 9 (2.2-4) and reviewed scholars’ views on the identity of Bhāviveka’s opponent (2.5-6). Although MHK 9 is compiled as one chapter under the title of “Introduction to the Determination of the Truth of Mīmāṃsā” (mīmāṃsātattvanirṇayāvatāra), we have seen that its contents are heterogeneous. Despite this, however, we have also seen that the various elements are clearly distinguished and constitute discrete sections of the chapter. While the Mīmāṃsaka agendas proper are discussed in the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas, the arguments that are unlikely to have been advanced against the Mīmāṃsakas are collected as independent discussions, collectively forming a response to one verse (MHK 9.11) of the official pūrvapakṣas. It is evident that those five independent discussions are directed against the non-Mīmāṃsaka opponents: Unlike the atheistic

\(^{178}\) ibid., 385, “evaṃ tu prayabhijñānam vācoktam kliṣṭayānayā/ na ca śakyam nirākartum sarvalokaprasiddhitah/?”
Mīmāṃsakas, the opponents in the first and second independent discussions worship the three Hindu gods and believe them to be the Creator of the universe. The opponents in the third, fourth, and fifth independent discussions, again unlike the sacrifice-oriented Mīmāṃsakas, show that they seek to cleanse their sin by taking baths in the sacred rivers, practicing asceticism such as fasting, and upholding *ahimsā* as the principle of the prime importance. They even rebuke Buddhists for eating meat. The contrast between the opponents’ positions in the official *pūrva-uttarapakṣas* and the five independent discussions is clear.

We have to assume that MHK 9 has more than one purpose. It is a chapter written to refute not only the Mīmāṃsakas but many others whose views are not compatible with each other. Then, why does Bhāviveka compile his critiques of various opponents who do not share the same view in a single chapter, MHK 9? Does he see a certain unity in those different opponents? Or, is there a special reason to collect the critiques of those opponents who differ from one another in one place? Here, I quote the most celebrated verse by Dharmakīrti as a concise summary of the Buddhist charge against Brahmins.

1. [Believing in the] authority of the Veda, 2. claiming something [permanent] to be agent, 3. seeking merit in ablutions, 4. taking pride in one’s caste, and 5. undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination.\(^{179}\)

In the verse, Dharmakīrti lists “five signs of complete stupidity” (*pañca liṅgāni jādye*) and those five signs, at first glance, resemble the topics dealt in MHK 9, especially when we consider Karṇakagomin’s commentary, which understands the second to be a critique of a Creator God\(^{180}\)

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\(^{179}\) *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.340, “vedaprāmāṇyaṃ kasyacit kartrvādah snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepaḥ/ saṃtāpārambhah pāpahānāya ceti dhvastaprajñāne pañca liṅgāni jādye!/*” Translation is from Eltschinger, Krasser, Taber (2012, 77-8).

\(^{180}\) Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 25) translates the second sign, seemingly reflecting Karṇakagomin’s commentary, as “doctrine of the Creator according to someone [such as Naiyāyikas] (or doctrine that something [permanent] is the agent [of actions]).”
and associates the fifth with the example of fasting.\textsuperscript{181}

In fact, each of those five signs constitutes the separate agendas of the individual sections of MHK 9. As Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 26) observes, sign 1 (\textit{vedaprāmāṇyam}) is most applicable to the Mīmāṃsakas and Bhāviveka discusses this topic of the authority of the Veda in the official \textit{pūrva-uttarapakṣas}. Sign 2 (\textit{kasyacit kartṛvādah}), the doctrine of Creator God, is the subject of the second independent discussion of MHK 9. The first independent discussion, which mainly accuses the three Hindu gods of evil behavior, can also be said to be a discussion of this subject. Sign 3 (\textit{snāne dharmecchā}) is the topic of the third independent discussion. Sign 4 (\textit{jātivādāvalepah}) does not form a separate section in MHK 9; nevertheless, as noted above, between the second and third independent discussions, Bhāviveka inserts a digressive discussion of considerable length on the nature of Brahminhood. Sign 5 (\textit{saṃtāpārāmbhaḥ pāpahānāya}) is examined in the fourth independent discussion. What is not mentioned in Dharmakīrti’s list of the signs of stupidity but included in MHK 9 is the belief in the sentience of plants, which is the topic of the fifth independent discussion.

Given this correspondence between Dharmakīrti’s list and the agendas of MHK 9, it seems that around the sixth and seventh centuries\textsuperscript{182} Buddhist intellectuals had a more or less fixed list that they shared to lay out their critiques of the common enemy, orthodox and orthoprax Brahmins. And, while Dharmakīrti sees “stupidity” as the common characteristic of all those who possess five signs, Bhāviveka makes it clear that they share an unfounded absolute trust in the symbol of the Veda. As Bhāviveka fixed phrase “therefore it is reasonable that the Veda is rejected” (\textit{yuktam yat tyajyate trayī}) makes clear, the non-Mīmāṃsaka five independent discussions are devoted to denouncing the authority of the “Veda,” whatever text the opponents

\textsuperscript{181} See Eltschinger, Krasser, Taber, (ibid., 77, fn. 171 and 78, fn. 174).
\textsuperscript{182} According to Krasser (2012), Dharmakīrti also belongs to the sixth century.
designate with that name. In this regard, we can conceive MHK 9 as a chapter in which Bhāviveka collects all of his critiques of the advocates of various “Vedas” under the name of the advocates of the Veda proper, the Mīmāṃsakas.

In the next two chapters, we shall delve into a portion of the “Mīmāṃsa proper” section, in which Bhāviveka accuses the Veda proper of its immorality. This is the first third of the official pūrva-uttarapakṣas. I have divided that portion again into two parts—the first consists of MHK 9.1-4 and 9.18-31 and the second of MHK 9.32-42. In each of these Bhāviveka continues the argument against the Veda and Vedic sacrifice discussed in Chapter One. By reading that small portion of MHK 9 in depth and comparing it with the contemporary as well as subsequent texts directly related with it, I would like to explore a change in the traditional Buddhist critiques of Vedic ritualists that resulted from their encounter with the Mīmāṃsakas.
Chapter Three: Decline of the Buddhist Critique of the Veda for its Evil Authorship

3.1 Introduction

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Veda is authorless. This peculiar Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda (vedāpaurosyevatva) contrasts well with Buddhist critique that the Veda is the product of ancient seers who are intellectually and spiritually unqualified (pre-Harivarman) and morally inferior (post-Harivarman). These contrasting views on the authorship of the Veda drew the attention of scholars of Buddhism and Mīmāṃsā, who suggested that the Buddhist critique of the Veda might have been an important factor in the Mīmāṃsakas’ adoption of the doctrine of authorlessness of the Veda from the time of the earliest document of the school, the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini (MS) generally dated to the fourth to second centuries BCE.183

In his discussion of Buddhist critique of the Veda, Jayatilleke (1963) traces two ideas on its authorship in early Brahmanical literature. One is that the Veda is “derived directly from a divine omniscient being, namely Prajāpati or Brahmā” (191) who are often identified with each other in the Brāhmaṇas.184 This view is found in the Brāhmaṇas and early Upaṇisads. According to the other view, the Veda is the record of the visions of ancient seers (ṛṣi) capable of perceiving the supernatural. This is attested in the Nirukta 1.20.185 Noting the second idea’s development in

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183 The date for the final compilation of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra is not certain. For discussions on dating this sūtra, see references cited in Verpoorten (1987, 5) and Clooney (1990, 52-3).
184 Jayatilleke (1963, 178-9) lists places where either Prajāpati or Brahmā play the role of the creator of the Veda and where they are identified with each other.
185 Nirukta 1.20 (translated in Sarup 1921, 20), “Seers had direct intuitive insight into duty. They by oral instruction handed down the hymns to later generations who were destitute of the direct intuitive insight.
the Naiyāyikas’ conception of the “words of a trustworthy person” (āptavacana), Jayatilleke assumes that the Buddhists oppose this view, which presupposes the supernatural capability of ancient seers. He suggests (191-2) that the Buddhist critique of ancient seers as the authors of the Veda might have contributed to the Mīmāṃsakas’ decision to abandon the strategy of founding the authority of the Veda on the author, thus eradicating authorship, divine or human, from the Veda. However, he cautions that this is “difficult to say with any degree of certitude.” (192)

Clooney (1990), based on his reading of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, accepts Jayatilleke’s suggestion. Over the series of six sūtras (MS 1.1.27-32), marked as the “section on the authorlessness of the Veda” (vedāpauruṣeyatvādhiṇḍikaraṇa), Jaimini presents an inchoate version of the doctrine and considers the opponents’ argument that the Veda is a human composition, since some Vedic hymns are named after Vedic seers.186 In Jaimini’s rejoinder to this objection in MS 1.1.30,187 as Clooney (168) puts it, “it is conceded that the ṛṣis are intimately connected with the texts that bear their names, but the connection is defended in a way that minimizes it.” Based on this reading of MS, Clooney “supports what Jayatilleke has proposed as a possibility, that the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of apauruṣeyatva may have been set forth in response to the Buddhist

The later generations, declining in (power of) oral communication, compiled this work, the Veda, and the auxiliary Vedic treatises, in order to comprehend their meaning. Bilma = bhilma (division) or illustration.” (sāksātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvus. te ’varebhṛō ṭāksātkṛtadharmanabhya upadeśena mantrān samprādṛō upadeśāya glāyanto ’vare bilmagrahanāyemam grantham samāmnāsiṣur vedām ca vedāṅgāni ca. bilmaṃ bhilmaṃ bhāsanam iti vā.)

186 MS 1.1.27, “Some people say that the Vedas are similarly composed (saṃnikarṣa) because they are named after persons.” (vedāṃś caīke saṃnikarṣaṃ puruṣākhyāḥ/) (translation is from Clooney (ibid., 166)). Clooney understands the word saṃnikarṣa of this sūtra in the sense of “being composed” as it is used in that sense in the immediately preceding sūtra, that is, MS 1.1.26. Śabara’s commentary, however, explicitly states that the word is used in the sense of “modern.” See Śābarabhāṣya on MS 1.1.27, “saṃnikṛṣṭakālāḥ kṛtakā vedā idānīṃtanāḥ.” It is also to be noted that, while Jaimini’s sūtra only states that some Vedic hymns are “named after persons,” it is Śabara who identifies the “persons” as Vedic seers by enumerating four examples of such hymns, viz. Kāṭhaka (named after Kaṭhaka), Kāḷāpaka (named after Kalāpaka), Paippalādaka (named after Pippalāda), Mauhula (named after Muhula).

187 MS 1.1.30, “The names (connected with various texts) are due to expounding (and not due to composing) the texts.” (ākhyā pravacanāti/) (translation is from Clooney (ibid.)).
critique of Vedic authority.” (215:fn. 64) The sequence would be as follows: 1. Buddhists (as in the Tevijja Sutta) questioned Vedic seers’ supernatural ability and thereby undermined their authority. 2. In reaction to the Buddhist critique, the Mīmāṃsakas (represented by Jaimini) minimized the traditional role of the seers by conceiving them not as the composers but as the expounders of the Veda.

I do not intend to assess this thesis. Instead, I would like to look into later Buddhists’ responses to this doctrine. Jayatilleke and Clooney’s thesis that the Mīmāṃsakas formulated the idea of the authorless Veda in reaction to the Buddhist critique implies that the Mīmāṃsakas intentionally linked their doctrine with the Buddhist critique of the Veda. However, such linking does not seem to have been universally noticed or acknowledged by later Buddhist thinkers. In what follows, I first analyze two divergent reactions of earliest Buddhists to confront the Mīmāṃsakas, Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka, to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine (3.2). It is only Bhāviveka who continues the traditional Buddhist strategy of attributing the Veda to a certain immoral author. To analyze his strategy in more detail, in the second section (3.3), I examine Bhāviveka’s critique of the Veda focusing on one verse and the extensive commentary on it, i.e., MHK and TJ 9.31. Bhāviveka’s efforts to confront the Mīmāṃsakas with the old strategy, however, is not inherited by later Buddhist authors such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. As we will briefly see in the third section (3.4), they follow Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of declaring the “unintelligibility” of an authorless text. Thus, the consistent Buddhist argument on the Veda that began in its earliest literature end in the confrontation with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda.

3.2 Is the Veda Intelligible? Saṅghabhadra’s and Bhāviveka’s Divergent Reactions to the
Authorless Veda

Like his immediate predecessor Harivarman, Saṅghabhadra, as we saw in Chapter One, attributes the three poisons of passion, hatred, and delusion to Vedic seers. However, Saṅghabhadra does not directly connect such critique of the Veda with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. It is only when the opponent retreats from the original position that the Veda is without an author and takes recourse to the authority of Vedic seers that Saṅghabhadra brings in the traditional strategy of dismissing the spiritual capability of the seers. Against the Mīmāṃsakas’ doctrine, however, he puts forward quite a different answer and does not try to argue for the necessity of positing an author of the Veda, let alone mentioning the defects of such an author.

The fact that Saṅghabhadra’s opponent withdraws from the original position of total negation of authorship and introduces the seers as a medium for the formation of the Veda is one of the reasons that leads us to wonder whether the opponent is an orthodox Mīmāṃsaka or not. Interestingly, in Bhāviveka’s MHK 9, such arguments also appear that attempt to base the authority of the Veda on associated beings, for example, Brahmā, Prajāpati, or authoritative sages. In MHK 9.148-151, Bhāviveka introduces the opponent’s argument that the Veda is truthful because it is either taught by the god Brahmā or by sages (148) and sequentially refutes each of the two reasons (149-151).

It is hard to tell whether such arguments based on the authority of beings with supernatural abilities had indeed been put forward by the Mīmāṃsakas. However, in the verse of the official opponent section (9.11) to which MHK 9.148-151 replies, the opponent does not argue that the Veda is taught by either Brahmā or seers. In that verse, the opponent merely says that: “[The Veda] is the ancient auspicious path, and it is what gods (such as Brahmā) and seers
(such as Garga and Vasiṣṭha) rejoice in and what the learned people desire.” It is Bhāviveka who interprets this line as arguing that the Veda is taught by Brahmā or by those who know the past and future, that is, sages (thub pa). Hence, Bhāviveka may have introduced these arguments not because they are actual assertions of the Mīmāṃsakas but to dispel prevalent ideas about the extraordinary origin of the Veda. These two arguments, as Jayatilleke notes, existed around (or prior to) the Buddha’s time.

Instead of these seemingly non-Mīmāṃsaka arguments, let us focus on the authentic Mīmāṃsaka position on the origin of the Veda, that is, the doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda, introduced in Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka’s works, and compare their answers to that specific doctrine.

### 3.2.1 Saṅghabhadra’s Reaction

Saṅghabhadra’s answer to the doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda is short and simple. In his section on the Mīmāṃsakas (part 2), as we saw in Chapter One, the opponent begins to defend the practice of sacrificial killing based on the authority of the Veda by stating that the Veda is a definitive means of knowledge (定量; pramāṇa). On being questioned about reasons for the Veda’s authoritativeness, the opponent declares that the sound of Vedic mantras is eternal and, to support the eternality of Vedic mantras, he refers to their authorless nature. In the remaining portion of part 2, Saṅghabhadra presents arguments designed to refute the eternality of Vedic sound. The refutation of authorlessness can be found only in the following two sentences.

Also, sound not originated from intellect is only heard by the ears and does not

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188 MHK 9.11ab, “devarṣijaṣṭaśiṣṭaṃ purāṇaṃ vartma śobhanam”
189 MHK 9.148, “yathārtho hi trayīmārgo brahmokter vaidyakādivat/ aitīnāgatatajñair vā taduktes cet prasādhyate//”
190 For the division of Saṅghabhadra’s section on Mīmāṃsā, see 1.5.
express any fixed meaning. Since you have already admitted that the Veda is not preceded by intellect [by presenting it as an authorless text], it cannot be included in the definitive means of knowledge.\textsuperscript{191}

What Saṅghabhadra points out in this passage is that not all sounds are able to convey meaning to their listeners. Only those sounds specifically formulated by the speaker’s intellect can express their intended meaning; the speaker’s intellect must precede the articulation of sound for it to be intelligible. The Veda, imagined to be authorless by the Mīmāṃsakas, is not preceded by any intellect, and therefore it must be concluded that the Veda is unintelligible. Though this logical step of confirming the unintelligibility of the Veda is skipped in Saṅghabhadra’s text, it is strongly implied in his discussion and needs no explicit statement. Then, Saṅghabhadra, countering the Mīmāṃsakas’ attempt to establish the Veda as the basis of their sacrificial practices, proceeds to propose that the Veda cannot be regarded as a definitive means of knowledge.

Saṅghabhadra’s refusal to acknowledge the Veda as a valid means of knowledge is based on the premise that only intellectually articulated sounds are meaningful. This premise is elaborated in more detail when Saṅghabhadra, against Vasubandhu, attempts to prove the existence of the abstract entity called “word” (nāma) differentiated from mere sound (ghoṣamātra).\textsuperscript{192} In refuting Vasubandhu’s argument that the separate stipulation of the abstract entity “word” is extraneous when we define linguistic expressions as sounds “confined to convey specific meanings by the speakers” (yo ‘rtheṣu kṛtāvadhir vaktṛbhīḥ),\textsuperscript{193} Saṅghabhadra

\textsuperscript{191} Nyāyānusāra (T 1562; NA), 530c14-6, “又非覺慧所發音聲，唯可耳聞，無定詮表。既許明論非覺為先，是則亦應非定量攝。”

\textsuperscript{192} For a discussion on the debate between Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra over this issue, see Cox (1995, 159-69) and her translation of the relevant section from the Nyāyānusāra (ibid., 377-99).

\textsuperscript{193} This is the basic stance of Vasubandhu to this issue expressed in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (Pradhan 1975; AKBh) 80:24-5. The passage to which Saṅghabhadra directly criticizes in the following quote is the subsequent passage: AKBh, 81:5-10.
demonstrates his basic understanding of linguistic communication.

The speaker first bears the intended word in his or her mind and only then formulates a thought as follows: “I will issue forth such and such speech in order to express to others such and such meaning.” After this, the speaker articulates sounds in accordance with that thought. The sounds generate phonemes and the phonemes again generate words. And the words at last manifest meanings. Based on this logical chain of transformation, I say sounds generate words and words can manifest meanings. This principle must be so as propounded here. If [the speaker] first did not bear the [intended] word in his or her mind, even if he or she generates sounds, as there is no fixed [meaning] to be expressed, it cannot make others comprehend its meaning.\footnote{NA, 414b3-9, “然能說者，以所樂名先蘊在心。方復思度：‘我當發起如是如是言。為他宣說如是如是義。’由此後時，隨思發語。因語發字。字復發名。名方顯義。由依如是展轉理門，說語發名，名能顯義。如斯安立，其理必然。若不以名先蘊心內，設令發語，無定表詮，亦不令他於義生解。” cf. Cox (1995, 386-7).}

The purpose of presenting this communication scheme is to emphasize the necessity of postulating the abstract entity of “word” different from mere sound. Toward the end of the passage, Saṅghabhadra illustrates his point by imagining a situation in which the speaker, without having a word in mind in advance, formulates sounds. Such “sound making” does not convey any meaning since the speaker did not posit any “word” in the mind beforehand. Positing a “word” in the mind is not just an act of intending to produce a certain sound; rather, when one bears a word in mind, he or she is then able to formulate an intention to convey a certain meaning to others with a certain sound pattern. The abstract entity called “word” is the receptacle of the speaker’s intention, since it provides a place where the speaker matches the sound aspect and the meaning aspect of language according to the linguistic contract made at the beginning of this era (\textit{kalpa}).\footnote{NA, 413b17-22, “[Q] Is the referent [of a word] (\textit{artha}) expressible or inexpressible? [A] In fact, it can be summarily said that the referent is not expressible. [Q] If then, why, on the basis of a word such as “elephant,” the referent such as an elephant is understood? Why does it not produce other understanding? …… [A] There is no such fault because [the relation between word and referent] is provisionally established. That is to say, people at the beginning of this era (\textit{kalpa}) concordantly
intention because, through this sound-meaning entity “word,” the speaker coordinates a sound pattern with an intended meaning so that he or she can articulate sounds in a specific, communicative manner. In this respect, the act of intending to speak is nothing other than bearing a word in one’s mind. And the act of having a word in the mind, in turn, is nothing other than coordinating a sound pattern with a meaning that one wishes to convey to others according to the social convention.

Saṅghabhadra’s theory of language explains the process by which an idea is communicated from one linguistic agent to another by laying out the elements involved in any instance of communication. That is to say, all the elements involved in this communicative chain of “(speaker) intention – word – sound – phoneme – word – comprehension (listener)” are needed for an event of communication to be successful. In the light of this scheme, an authorless Veda, lacks the critical element of a speaker and, consequently, intention. Intending to speak is an intellectual act of coordinating sound and meaning, and the authorless Veda, which does not permit this intellectual activity, cannot be considered meaningful. Therefore, any linguistic encounter with the Veda is a priori a failure. The Veda does not produce any kind of knowledge, let alone definitive knowledge.

Saṅghabhadra thus does not connect the traditional critique of Vedic seers with his criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorless Veda. Rather than concluding that the Veda must have a human author to question his authority, Saṅghabhadra tentatively accepts the Mīmāṃsakas’ assertion and simply applies his linguistic theory to their doctrine. By doing so, he established various words of different [sound-]images regarding various referents. As this [relation between word-images and their referents] has been transmitted to each other [that is, from generation to generation,] concerning all word-images, our understandings do not go awry.” (義爲可說不可說耶？如實應言，義不可說。若爾何故，因象等言，解象等義，非顛倒解？…… 無斯過失，假安立故。謂劫初人，於種種義，共立種種差別想名。由此相傳，於諸名想，解無顛倒。) cf. Cox (1995, 381).
concludes that the Veda is an unintelligible text.

### 3.2.2 Bhāviveka’s Reaction

Unlike Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of drawing out the consequences of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine to its inevitable end that the Veda is unintelligible, Bhāviveka offers a faithful succession of the traditional arguments. However, Bhāviveka’s discussion is not or could not be a simple repetition of the old critique. The pre-Bhāviveka participants did not have to dispute with their opponents over the existence of an author of the Veda. Their discussions acknowledged the attribution of the authorship of the Veda to Vedic seers, whose existence was not questioned by either party of the debate. The task of Buddhists was to prove the defects of those authors, whose existence was accepted by the opponents. But Bhāviveka’s opponent is the Mīmāṃsakas who do not accept any sort of authorship of the Veda, human or divine. To argue against the Mīṃāṃsakas for any defect in the Veda’s authorship, one must first prove the existence of an author.

Bhāviveka’s response to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda consists of eight verses (MHK 9.24-31). Among those eight verses, only one, MHK 9.31, in which Bhāviveka formulates a syllogism that proves the evil authorship of the Veda, inherits the traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda. What Bhāviveka does in the first seven verses (24-30) is to lay the groundwork: proving the existence of an authorship against the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine.

Bhāviveka’s inheritance of the traditional critique, i.e., MHK 9.31 that ends the section on authorlessness will be analyzed in the next section. Here I attend only to the “groundwork.” In order to contrast Bhāviveka’s strategy with that of Saṅghabhadra and later Buddhists, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, I will only highlight two arguments expressed in three verses. The
first is the somewhat eccentric argument that, in a certain sense, Buddhist scriptures are also authorless. Since Śāntarakṣita later mentions this line of reasoning, we examine Bhāviveka’s thesis of the “authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures” for the sake of comparison. The second argument is that the Veda, as linguistic material, engenders understanding, and therefore, must be a human product. This is the directly opposite approach to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of authorlessness when compared to that of Saṅghabhadra; this approach, we shall see, is unique among those Buddhists who confronted the Mīmāṃsakas.

(1) The Authorlessness of Buddhist Scriptures

Bhāviveka states the first argument in terms of logical fallacies in the Mīmāṃsaka argument that “the Veda, as it is not a human product, is the valid means of knowledge.”[196] MHK 9.24 specifically mentions two fallacies of the reason that “it is not a human product” (apuruṣakartṛtvā): first, there is no similar case of an authorless text to support the Mīmāṃsaka claim (asādhāraṇatā); and second, to opponents like Buddhists who accept no unproduced entity,[197] the reason does not hold, and therefore, it cannot be used to support any claim (asiddhārthatā). After having thus criticized the Mīmāṃsaka argument for being erroneous, Bhāviveka argues for the authorlessness (akartṛtvā) of Buddhist scriptures using a specific understanding of the term:

If [you assert that] the authorlessness [of the Veda] is because of its continuous repetition, Buddhist scriptures are also authorless. It is because Buddhas repeat what has been fully realized by previous Buddhas.[198]

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[196] MHK 9.3cd, “vedo ’puruṣakartṛtvāt pramāṇam iti grhyate/” Note that this is the same assertion to which Saṅghabhadra responds.
[197] TJ D280a3, “sangs rgyas pa la ni byas pa ma yin pa cung zhig kyang yod pa ma yin par grags pas, de gzhan la ma grub pa nyid kyang yin no.”
What Bhāviveka seems to argue in this verse is this. If the term “authorlessness” is used to describe the situation in which many people throughout the ages say the same things, Buddhist scriptures can also be called authorless texts. It is because, as TJ interprets, “what has been taught, after having completely awakened, by previous Buddhas has been taught by the Blessed one without adding or omitting a letter.” TJ notes an implication of this argument: “Therefore, as the words of the Buddha are also repetitions and [accordingly] are not something produced, they are the valid means of knowledge.” Here Bhāviveka’s purpose in arguing for the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is explicit. If the Veda is authoritative because it is authorless, the Mīmāṃsakas cannot argue that the Veda alone is authoritative. Should they use such an argument, the Mīmāṃsakas must admit the authority of Buddhist scriptures as well.

In this respect, Bhāviveka’s thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures may be taken to be an argument formulated only to refute the Mīmāṃsaka’s claim without believing his own argument. In short, Bhāviveka may be making the case only to meet the demand of the context, that is, the confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas. However, in one passage of his other work, the Prajñāpradīpa, in the same context of criticizing the Mīmāṃsakas, Bhāviveka states this argument in more detail. Here, his mode of argumentation is firmer as if it is his objective to establish the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures as his own position. Right before Bhāviveka presents the following rejoinder, the Mīmāṃsakas, as introduced by Bhāviveka, denied the authority of Buddhist scriptures because they have a human author, that is, the Buddha.

The reason that you present, “there is an author,” is not valid. Why? It is

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199 TJ D280a5, “sngon gyi sangs rgyas kyis rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas bstan pa de dag nyid yi ge mang nyung med pas bcom ldan ’das kyis bstan pa yin no.”
200 TJ D280a5-6, “de’l phyir sangs rgyas kyi gsung yang rjes su bstan pa yin gyi byas pa ni ma yin pas tshad ma yin yin no.”
201 This passage only appears in the Chinese translation of the work (PPc). The Tibetan translation (PPt) does not contain this discussion, nor does Avalokitavrata’s commentary comment on it.
because [the Buddha’s effortless words] are witnessed to have an effect of saving sentient beings. The Tathāgata, without any effort, spontaneously brings out [his] words just as the heavenly drum, independently [of a drummer], resonates in the sky. [Also,] as there is neither agent nor receiver according to our teaching, [the reason] that you established, “there is an author,” is not valid.  

Bhāviveka’s argument in this passage is qualitatively different from that of MHK 9.25 because here he does not insist on the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures in the limited sense of the term, that is, authorlessness in terms of verbatim repetition of the same teaching. He rather argues for another kind of authorlessness truer to its meaning, just as the Mīmāṃsakas do: authorlessness in terms of origin.

The task of proving the non-existence of an author of Buddhist scriptures, at first sight, seems to be impossible, since the ultimate source of Buddhist scriptures must be the mouth of the Buddha, that is, a human being, and it is precisely for this reason that the Mīmāṃsakas reject the validity of Buddhist scriptures, as indicated above. Bhāviveka’s rejoinder does not, however, attempt to deny that Buddhists regard their own scriptures as the words of the Buddha (or buddhas). Instead, Bhāviveka attempts to show that the medium of an enlightened being (i.e., a buddha) is tantamount to no medium in the context of communicating truth. The Buddha speaks “effortlessly” (無功用) and his words pour forth “spontaneously” (自然). Hence, the Buddha does not intentionally formulate his words; exactly the same message of all buddhas is spoken from the Buddha’s (or any buddha’s) mouth. No human element is involved in the Buddha’s speech, just as the heavenly drum resonates without human engagement. In addition to this analogy, Bhāviveka brings in the hallmark doctrine of his own school: emptiness. As a representative Madhyamaka master, Bhāviveka, from the outset, does not acknowledge the

202 PPC (T 1566), 119b17-21, “若有作者，汝出因義不成。何以故？見有可化衆生故。如來無功用，自然而出言說。猶如天鼓空中自鳴。如我法中作者受者皆無故，汝立有作者義，是因不成。”
ultimate existence of any being, including the speaker (and listeners) of Buddhist sūtras.

It is clear from this passage from the Prajñāpradīpa that Bhāviveka’s thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is not fabricated simply to refute the Mīmāṃsakas. Although he does not go so far as to eradicate the existence of the Buddha as the speaker of Buddhist scriptures as the Mīmāṃsakas do with the Veda, by showing the absence of a human element in the Buddha’s speech and the ultimate emptiness of linguistic agents in the composition of Buddhist sūtras, Bhāviveka presents Buddhist sūtras literally as authorless texts. We will return to this peculiar vision of Bhāviveka regarding the authorship of Buddhist scriptures later, when Śāntarakṣita also discusses this strategy of presenting one’s own scripture as an authorless text against the Mīmāṃsakas.

(2) The Intelligibility and Authorship of the Veda

Regardless of whether Bhāviveka thinks Buddhist scriptures are authorless without reference to the Mīmāṃsakas, his first argument, when employed in the debate with the Mīmāṃsakas, undermines the force of the Mīmāṃsaka claim that the Veda is the sole authority and a unique example of an authorless text. The second argument that the Veda is intelligible and therefore must be a human product, on the contrary, actively demonstrates that the Mīmāṃsakas’ claim of the authorlessness of the Veda is wrong. Here, Bhāviveka sets the most important stepping stone to continue the traditional critique of the Veda. In order to argue for the evil authorship of the Veda, he must prove the existence of an its author.

Over two verses (MHK 9.29-30), Bhāviveka tries to confirm that the Veda is a human work by emphasizing that the Veda is linguistic material. In the first (9.29), he lists three reasons to regard the Veda as linguistic material: 1. Vedic statements (vedavākya) are linguistically comprehensible (pratipattyā), 2. they conform with linguistic format (anugunyena), and 3. they
have the tradition of oral, that is, linguistic recitation (varṇāmnāyā). After having highlighted
the linguistic aspect of the Veda by elaborating each of these reasons, TJ takes a further step by
locating language in human beings.

Therefore, how can you say that this [the Veda] is not produced by a human? Because a linguistic expression is produced by the articulatory points (sthāna), organs (kāraṇa), and efforts (yatna), we infer that there is no linguistic
expression that is not born [through such a human process]. Therefore, [your argument] that the Veda is not produced by a human does not stand.203

Every instance of linguistic expression must be accompanied by human elements. It must be
produced through a combination of breath travelling through articulatory points such as breast, throat, and lips, a movement of articulatory organs such as tongue, and an articulatory effort made by the speaker. After having observed how linguistic material comes into being, Bhāviveka
infers that such a human process is the necessary condition for any linguistic expression. In other words, human agency or involvement must be accepted in any linguistic material including the Veda. To arrive at this conclusion, Bhāviveka adds, one does not need to resort to inference. It is
common sense that no linguistic expression manifests causelessly from the sky or mountains.204

To prove the human authorship of the Veda, Bhāviveka also points out that the Veda is
“the cause for engendering thoughts [in people’s minds] on the intended meaning (or object)”
(vivaksārthadhījanmakāraṇatvād).205 Here Bhāviveka’s approach to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of Vedic authorlessness differs most from that of Saṅghabhadra. While the latter focuses on the
absence of an author, as assumed by the Mīmāṃsakas, and draws out an unwanted (for the

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203 TJ D281a2-3, “des na, ’di skyes bus byas pa ma yin pa yin zhes bya ba ji la bu yin. gnas dang byed pa
dang ’bad pa la sogs pa gang dag gir yi ge mgon par bsgrubs pa las, rjes su dpag nas, ma skyes pa’i yi
ge ni yod pa ma yin pas, rig byed ni skyes bus byas pa ma yin no zhes bya ba ma grub la.”
204 See TJ D281a3-4, “rjes su dpag pa dang ’gal ba dang grags pas kyang gnod pa yang yin te. ’jig rten
na ni skye dgu’i ’bad pa la ltos nas yi ge mgon par’ grub pa mthong gi, glo bur du nam mkha’ ’am ri la
sogs pa las ni ma yin no.”
205 See MHK 9.30.
Mīmāṃsakas) consequence, i.e., the unintelligibility of the Veda, the former, from the outset, acknowledges that the Veda is intelligible and endowed with communicative function. Just as regular words like “water,” “earth,” and “sky” express objects corresponding to those words and create thoughts in others’ minds about those objects, the Veda performs the basic communicative function of language. If nothing distinguishes the Veda from other linguistic materials, it must have human authorship.206

It is noteworthy that Bhāviveka does not use the unintelligibility of the Veda to attack the Mīmāṃsakas. The Brahmanical fear of the inability of understanding the meaning of the Veda is expressed from a very early period, as attested by Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (c. 2 cen. BCE).207 As he enumerates the purposes for learning the science of grammar (vyākāraṇa) in the beginning of the treatise, Patañjali says that the Veda would become fruitless when it is only memorized without understanding the content (yat adhītam avijñātam). Just as dried fuel would never blaze without fire, mere recitation of the Veda (nigada) would bear nothing.208 To prevent Vedic reciters from mindlessly memorizing the Veda, Patañjali stresses the need to study his own discipline, grammar.209 Patañjali’s remark shows that it is one thing to memorize the Veda and it is another to understand its meaning.210 Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of driving the Mīmāṃsakas to

206 See TJ D281a6-7, “de bzhin du, chu sa mkha’ zhes bya ba ni chu dang sa dang nam mkha’i don mngon par brjod pa can gyi tshig yin la; de lta bu la sogs pa’i rig byed kyang brjod pa’i don gyi blo skyed ba’i rgyu yin pas, ji ltar na ‘di skyes bus byas pa ma yin.”
207 The Nirukta of Yāska (ca. 5th cen. BCE), much older than the Mahābhāṣya, also introduces and refutes the opinion that the Vedic mantras are meaningless (“anarthaka hi mantrāḥ”) in I.15-16. See Sarup (1921, 15-17)’s translation. This is known as the “Kautsa controversy” since Yāska attributes such opinion to a figure named Kautsa who is, according to Renou (1965, 47), also an author of a Prātiṣākhya of the Atharvaveda.
208 Mahābhāṣya (Kielhorn 1892) 2:15-6, “yat adhītam avijñātam nigadenaiva śabdyaṭe/ anagnav iva śuskaidho na tat jvalati karhi cit?”; The source of this quotation is unknown. See Joshi and Roodbergen (1986, 42, fn. 120).
209 Mahābhāṣya 2:17, “Therefore grammar should be studied so that we will not recite a meaningless sound.” (tasmāt anarthakam mā adhīṣmahi iti adhyeyam vyākaraṇam.)
210 For an analysis of the section of the Mahābhāṣya to which I refer here, see Deshpande (1993b, Chapter 2).
admit that the Veda is unintelligible may have been a sarcastic comment on this discrepancy between two levels of knowing: memorizing and understanding the Veda. Those Brahmins who mechanically memorize the Veda without proper understanding are indeed embodiments of Saṅghabhadra’s thesis. Their recitations are not preceded by intellect, and therefore, the Veda recited by them qualifies as an authorless text. That is, while they recite the words of the Veda, they do not articulate the sound of the Veda with an intention to convey meaning. Such an authorless text is, therefore, unintelligible to its Brahmin reciters. Saṅghabhadra’s thesis, “the Veda is unintelligible since it is authorless,” is exemplified by its reciters.

The Mīmāṃsakas, like Patañjali, find the raison d’être of their discipline in the study of the Veda beyond mere memorization. However, they do not consider the possibility that the Veda is an unintelligible text. The Veda not only conveys knowledge through linguistic means, but knowledge from the Veda is definite in the sense that its veracity does not fluctuate like human statements. Moreover, for the Mīmāṃsakas, there is no doubt about the contents of knowledge that the Veda conveys. The Veda causes humans to know the duty of rituals (karmāvabodha), and, in order to fulfill the purpose of the Veda, the study of Mīmāṃsā or inquiry into Vedic duty (dharmajijñāsā) should be undertaken after having completed memorization. Mere memorization (adhyayanamātra), Śabara argues, would bear no fruit. Bhāviveka’s argumentation seems to be made in reference to this Mīmāṃsaka tradition, which does not doubt the intelligibility of the Veda. The Mīmāṃsakas believe that the Veda is linguistic material and that it creates knowledge in its human listeners. These two beliefs are confirmed by Bhāviveka in his argument. Based on

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211 Śābarabhāṣya (Frauwallner 1968; ŠBhF) 24:6-7, “upadeśa iti viśiṣṭasya śabdasyoccāraṇam. avyatirekaś ca bhavati tasya jñānasya. na hi tad utpannam jñānaṃ viparyeti.” See also ŠBhF 18:13-5, “viplavate khalv api kaścit puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyayaḥ. na tu vedavacanasya mithyātve kimcana pramāṇam asti.”

212 ŠBhF 12:11-4, “tad ucyate: atikramisyāma imam āmnāyam. anatikrāmantō vedam arthavantaṃ santam anarthakam kalpayema. drṣṭo hi tasyārthah karmāvabodhanāṁ nāma. na ca tasya adhyayanamātrāt tatrabhavanto yājñikāḥ phalam samāmananti.”
these, Bhāviveka infers that the Veda must be a human product, because 1. no linguistic material is observed apart from a human process (MHK 9.29) and 2. as long as the Veda is linguistic, the knowledge it conveys must be an “intended meaning” (vivakṣitārtha; MHK 9.30).

The discrepancy between Saṅghabhadra’s and Bhāviveka’s strategies of countering the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda may be explained by their different points of reference. While Saṅghabhadra may have general Vedic reciters in mind when he asserts that the authorless Veda is meaningless, Bhāviveka deduces the existence of an author of the Veda, referring specifically to the Mīmāṃsaka presuppositions regarding human reception of the Veda. What is significant, historically speaking, in these two divergent approaches to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine during the fifth and sixth centuries is that each represents the past and future Buddhist policy of rebutting the authority of the Veda. Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of declaring the Veda as unintelligible can be said to have paved the way for future Buddhists; it is inherited by later Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita as we will see below. Bhāviveka’s strategy of demonstrating the existence of an author of the Veda is, on the contrary, inherits the old critique of the Veda. His work seems to be the last document attesting to this trend. In the next section, I analyze Bhāviveka’s thesis in MHK and TJ 9.31 which, as the culmination of Bhāviveka’s critique of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of authorlessness, is designed to prove that the Veda is authored by an evil being.

3.3 Proving the Evil Authorship of the Veda: An Analysis of Bhāviveka’s Critique of the Veda (MHK/TJ 9.31) with Reference to the Commentaries on Sāṃkhyakārikā 2

After having established that the Veda is intelligible linguistically, and therefore, must be endowed with a human author, Bhāviveka, in MHK 9.31, presents a syllogism to prove that the
putative author of the Veda is an evil being. Then, to corroborate his thesis, in the commentary, TJ 9.31, he compiles examples from the Veda that illustrate the Veda’s evil teachings. One of the problems in approaching this material is that all of the Vedic quotes collected in TJ 9.31 are only extant in Tibetan, making it difficult to recover the original Sanskrit. Their original Sanskrit is critical in this case since, in their Tibetan translations, it is difficult to discern even the basic meaning of the sentences.

Given this difficulty in understanding the material contained in TJ 9.31, I must defer the task of deciphering and identifying the Vedic quotations. Instead, I would like to highlight one fact: Bhāviveka’s collection of Vedic quotes includes almost all the quotes that the Sāṃkhyas compiled in their commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā 2 (SK 2). Sāṃkhya, as an ascetic tradition, maintained a critical stance toward Vedic sacrificial culture from the beginning and such an attitude is epitomized in the second verse of the Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa which declares that Vedic sacrifice (ānuśravika) is impure (aviśuddhi). Under this verse, Sāṃkhyya commentators list quotations from the Veda to demonstrate its impurity. Since this practice of supporting one’s criticism of the Veda by systematically (that is, not fragmentarily) quoting it is not found in Buddhism before Bhāviveka, it is likely that he is imitating the Sāṃkhyas in confronting the authority of the Veda in TJ 9.31.

However, Bhāviveka was not the first Buddhist to pay attention to the Sāṃkhyas’ critical attitude toward the authority of the Veda and sought a possible alliance with them against their common enemy, Vedic ritualists. Āryadeva’s Šataśāstra together with Vasu’s commentary on it already presented their favorable opinion of the Sāṃkhyas with specific reference to SK 2, long

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213 See van der Kuijp (2006, esp. 196-9) for an analysis of the portion of text from, Bhāviveka’s another work, the Prajñāpradīpa along with Avalokitavrata’s commentary, which corresponds to MHK/TJ 9.31. Though they correspond in arguing for the evil authorship of the Veda, neither the Prajñāpradīpa nor Avalokitavrata’s commentary matches the richness of Vedic sources in TJ 9.31.

before Bhāviveka (3.3.1). Bhāviveka’s allusion to this verse is not as obvious as theirs due to the context of the Abhidharma literature he is reading as he writes MHK/TJ 9.31 (3.3.2). However, given that most of the Vedic quotes that the commentaries on SK 2 cite are also found in TJ 9.31, Bhāviveka seems to have consulted the Sāṃkhya commentaries or at least draws upon a common source shared among those with anti-Vedic sentiments (3.3.3). After thus analyzing the contents of MHK and TJ 9.31, I will assess the significance of Bhāviveka’s critique of the Veda (3.3.4).

3.3.1 A pre-Bhāviveka Instance of Buddhist-Sāṃkhya Alliance

This peculiar case of Buddhist-Sāṃkhya partnership was already noticed by Chakravarti (1975 [1951], 5): “In his Śata-śāstra, Āryadeva also refers to the same attitude of the Sāṃkhya towards sacrificial performances in a quotation from a Sāṃkhya work.” This statement needs to be revised for three reasons. First, though the text bears only one title “*Śata-śāstra*” (百論) in Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation made in 404 CE, it is a composite work consisting of Āryadeva’s sūtras (修妒路) and Vasu’s commentary. And it is Vasu, rather than Āryadeva, who quotes a Sāṃkhya text. Second, that quotation is from the second verse of the *Sāmkhyakārikā* in which it is declared that Vedic sacrifice is “united with impurity, destruction, and relative superiority and inferiority” (*aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktah*; 祀法不淨無常勝負相故).215 Chakravarti may have failed to recognize this famous line due to the fact that Vasu identifies his source with the word “*Sāṃkhya-sūtra*” (僧佉經)216 which Tucci (1981 [1929], Āryadeva’s Śataśāstra, 18) translates as “the Sūtras of the Sāṅkhya” without any reference to the *Sāmkhyakārikā*. Lastly, the *Śataśātra* does not merely “refer to” the Sāṃkhya; rather, when the

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215 This is the translation quoted in the *Śataśāstra* (T 1569, 170b23-4); The translation by Paramārtha in the *Suvarṇasaptati* (T 2137, 1245b11) is: “有濁失優劣.”
216 *Śataśāstra*, 170b23.
surrounding context is duly appreciated, it is obvious that the Buddhists (i.e., Āryadeva and Vasu) side with the Sāṃkhyas against their common opponent, Vedic ritualists. As we will see, the Sāṃkhya “influence” is more ingrained.

Vasu’s quotation of SK 2 is made toward the end of the first chapter of the Śataśāstra titled “Chapter on Renunciation of [both] Sin and Merit” (捨罪福品) and the relevant discussion is occasioned by Vedic ritualists’ rejoinder: “Eternal merit does not renounce its cause; therefore it must not be renounced.”\(^{217}\) Vasu, as he comments on Āryadeva’s sūtra, introduces, on behalf of the opponent, the case of the Aśvamedha (馬祀; “Horse Sacrifice”) to exemplify the point: the eternal fruit can be obtained. Thus, for the opponent, there are fruits that do not perish, and therefore, it is not to be argued, as the chapter title indicates, that even “merit” (福) should be abandoned. The opponent adds that such eternal fruits can be gained through Vedic sacrifices such as Aśvamedha.

After having adduced two reasons for objection, viz. 1. merit has dual aspect of giving pleasure (與樂) and giving suffering (與苦) and 2. a limited cause cannot produce an unlimited fruit, Āryadeva offers an interesting remark on Vedic sacrifice.

One should renounce even pure, though still contaminated (有漏, sāsrava), merit since it is not eternal; how much more for merit mixed with sin (雜罪福)?\(^{218}\)

As to the first part of the sūtra, nothing is noteworthy; describing “pure merit” as contaminated and advising the rejection of such merit based on its non-eternal nature aligns well with the basic Buddhist attitude toward merit. But Āryadeva’s sūtra becomes very non-Buddhist when he describes the fruit of Vedic sacrifice as “merit mixed with sin.” Can a Buddhist consider Vedic

\(^{217}\) Ibid., 170b7: “常福無捨因緣故，不應捨.” cf. Tucci (1981, Śataśāstra, 17). Tucci translates the first phrase (“常福無捨因緣故”) as “merit is eternal; because the cause is not renounced”; but this does not conform to the syntax.

\(^{218}\) Ibid., 170b21-22, “有漏淨福，無常故，尚應捨，何況雜罪福?!”
sacrifice as a means to produce any merit \( (puṇya) \) although it is mixed with sin \( (pāpa) \)? It is the commentary on this sūtra in which Vasu quotes a passage from SK 2.

It is [mixed] because, in Vedic sacrifice (業) such as Aśvamedha (馬祀), there are sins such as killing. Moreover, according to the *Saṃkhyaśāstra* (僧佉經), it is said: “The means of sacrifice is [endowed] with aspects of impurity, non- eternity, and relative superiority and inferiority.” Therefore, [merit] is [also] to be renounced [along with demerit or sin].

Vasu’s quotation is clearly made to support the Buddhist argument that he and Āryadeva put forward against Vedic ritualists. Given the regular practice of Buddhist argumentation in which one first presents the reasoned argument \( (yukti) \) and then corroborates one’s position with scripture \( (āgama) \), we may even venture to state that in the present case the Saṃkhya quotation plays the role of Buddhist scripture. But this favorable gesture toward, or reliance on the Saṃkhyaśas is not limited to the commentator Vasu.

In commentaries on SK 2, we encounter the Saṃkhyaśas’ evaluation of Vedic sacrifice as of “mixed nature” \( (miśrībhāva) \). This expression is first found in the Gauḍapādabhāṣya (ca. 500-600 CE).

Gauḍapāda, having pointed out the impure aspect of Vedic sacrifice such as killing in Aśvamedha, notes: “Even though what is laid down by Śruti and Smṛti is dharma, still, as it is of mixed nature, it (i.e., such dharma) is united with impurity.”

Vācaspati Miśra (9th or 10th century CE), on the other hand, in his commentary on SK, the Tattvakaumudi, specifically points

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219 Ibid., 170b22-4, “如馬祀業中，有殺等罪故。復次，如『僧佉經』言：『祀法不淨無常勝負相』故。是以應捨。”

220 This expression “mixed nature” \( (miśrībhāva) \) is, in addition to the Gauḍapādabhāṣya, also used in two other commentaries, the Saṃkhyaśaptatītriti (Solomon 1973a, 8) and the Saṃkhyaśāstra (Solomon 1973b, 6), in the same context. The latter says: “The injunction of the Veda is united with impurity since it is mixed with evil actions such as those cited above.” \( (iyevamādinā pāpakarmanānā miśrībhāvānā aviśuddhiyuktaḥ vedavidhiḥ) \) The Saṃkhyaśaptatītriti has almost the same sentence with slight variations: “iyeyam pāpakarmanānā mānānā ca miśrībhāvād aviṣuddhiyuktā veda iti.”

221 Gauḍapādabhāṣya on SK 2 (Colebrooke and Wilson 1837, appendix, 3), “yady api śrutismṛtivihito dharmas, tathāpi miśrībhāvād aviṣuddhiyuktau iti.” (the unnecessary double consonant in “dharmmas” is removed).
to an older authority of the Sāṃkhya tradition, Pañcaśikha, for this evaluation of Vedic sacrifice. According to Pañcaśikha, Vedic sacrifice is “slightly mixed”; however, the fruit of that mixture of sin is “removable and endurable” (svalpaśaṅkaraḥ saparāhāraḥ sapratyavamarṣa iti).²²²

Vedic sacrifice is mixed with a few sinful elements, Vācaspati explains, because one engages in the act of killing animals (paśuhiṃsā). But these negative elements can be easily removed by expiatory rites (prāyaścitta). Even when one is careless and does not perform such rites, that small drop of suffering produced by them is indeed bearable to “someone who has already plunged into the great nectar-lake of heaven” (svargasudhāmahāhradāvagāhin).²²³

Pañcaśikha is a quasi-mythical figure known as one of the oldest teachers of the Sāṃkhya school, listed along with the founding figures, viz. Kapila and Āsuri; his name is often “symbolically” invoked by the later Sāṃkhyas only to “attribute a great variety of hallowed Sāṃkhya or Yoga notions.” (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987, 117) Moreover, given the doubtful attribution of many quotations in the Yogabhāṣya to Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati in his Tattvavaiśāradī (Chakravarti 1975, 115), we may doubt the authenticity of Vācaspati’s attribution of the above-cited opinion on Vedic sacrifice to Pañcaśikha. However, since the more lengthy quotation that begins with the sentence quoted by Vācaspati (that is, svalpaśaṅkaraḥ...) is also found in the Yogabhāṣya on the Yogasūtra 2.13,²²⁴ we may be at least assured that the evaluation of Vedic sacrifice as “mixed with sin” is not Vācaspati’s invention but comes from an older tradition.

In this regard, I wonder whether Āryadeva is adopting this Sāṃkhya view when he speaks of “merit mixed with sin” (雜罪福). Although Āryadeva does not repeat the later part of

²²² See Tattvakaumudī (Dravida 1917) 10:6-8.
²²³ See ibid., 10:8-17.
²²⁴ Yogabhāṣya (Sastri and Sastri 1952) 156:5-8, “pradhānakarmay ūpāgamanam. yatredam utkam – ‘syāt svalpaḥ samkarah saparāhāraḥ sapratyavamarṣaḥ kuśalasya nāpakarsāyalam. kasmāt? kuśalam hi me bahv anyad asti yatrāyam āvāpaṁ gataḥ svarge ‘py apakarsām alpaṁ karisyati” iti.”
the sentence, that is, that the sinful portion of the fruit is “removable and endurable,” the act of characterizing the fruits of Vedic sacrifice as fundamentally “merit” (福) itself suggests that he is here alluding to a non-Buddhist trend of thought. This hint was accordingly taken by his commentator Vasu, who was quick to cite SK 2. Viewed in this way, what Āryadeva does in the present context to refute Vedic ritualists’ claim is to confront them with yet another enemy, the Sāṃkhyas.

3.3.2 Bhāviveka’s Reading of Abhidharma on the Ten Unwholesome Courses of Action (akuśalakarmapatha) in MHK 9.31

Like Āryadeva and Vasu, Bhāviveka makes use of the Sāṃkhyas’ negative views on Vedic sacrifice expressed in SK 2 when he, against the Mīmāṃsakas, argues that the Veda is authored by an evil being. This argument is posited as a conclusion to his repudiation of the Mīmāṃsakas’ claim that the Veda has no author. That is, after having “logically” demonstrated that the Veda must have a human author in MHK 9.24-30, Bhāviveka takes one further step: the Veda not only possesses an author, its putative author is evil. This thesis on the Veda’s authorship is expressed in the format of a syllogism in MHK 9.31; TJ on this verse corroborates the thesis with ample evidence from Vedic texts. And, since many of those evidential quotation that prove the evil authorship of the Veda in TJ overlap with those Vedic quotes that Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2 use, Bhāviveka appears to ally himself with the Sāṃkhyas in MHK/TJ 9.31.

However, unlike Āryadeva and Vasu, Bhāviveka’s reference to Sāṃkhyas is not explicit. This is evident not merely because he does not mention a Sāṃkhyya text as Vasu does; rather the difficulty in discerning his alliance with the Sāṃkhyas is because the Sāṃkhyya element appears in a predominantly Buddhist context, namely, discussions of the ten unwholesome courses of
action in Abhidharma literature. Thus, to discern Bhāviveka’s use of the Sāṃkhya source in MHK/TJ 9.31, it is imperative first to understand its Abhidharma background and then to locate features that cannot be explained solely from Buddhist sources. I will undertake this task of sifting the Sāṃkhya source from the Buddhist one in the next subsection. Here, by attending to the verse (MHK 9.31) itself and considering its Abhidharmic background, I will offer preliminary information to approach the Vedic quotations collected in TJ 9.31.

MHK 9.31 reads as follows:

[Thesis:] Moreover, it is inferable that this text, the Veda, is produced by an evil person, [reason:] because it [teaches such evil things as] killing creatures, drinking liquor, and telling lies, [example:] just like the treatise of the Magas.225

This verse, in accordance with Bhāviveka’s predilection for syllogism, consists of three parts that, taken as a whole, prove the thesis (pratijñā), that is, the evil authorship of the Veda (asatpuruṣakartrkāh). The immoral practices of Brahmins—such as killing, drinking, and lying—are adduced as the reason (hetu) for the thesis. Lastly, to confirm the concomitance between the evil authorship and the evil teaching, Bhāviveka corroborates his inference with an example (dṛṣṭānta), that is, the treatise of the Magas (magaśāstra). Thus, just as the evil treatise of the Magas has the evil authors, (the Magas themselves), based on the evil nature of the Veda, Bhāviveka reasons, we need to presume an evil author behind the Veda. TJ begins with the confirmation on the known facts about the Magas.

The Magas and so forth refer to those people with perverse practices. They reside in foreign countries such as Persia and their positions are known as follows.

225 MHK 9.31, “anumeyaś ca vedo ‘yam asatpuruṣakartrkāh/ bhūtaḥimsāsurāpānamithyokter magaśāstratvā//” According to Kawasaki (1992, 415), the manuscript reads the underlined word as “-kryokter” and Lindner (2001a, 95) and (2001b, 17) emend it as “-kriyokter.” I have followed Kawasaki only because the Tibetan translation rendered that final item of the compound as “brdzun smra phyir” (MHK/TJ D281b1). Kawasaki also records a suggestion by V. Gokhale (or by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana?, noted as “VS” which is not listed in the abbreviation (p. 406)) to read it as “-mṛṣokter.”
[They maintain, for example, the following things:] Because they harm the earth, killing ants and so forth is not immoral conduct. By piling up [their] horns when one kills bulls, one goes to the heaven [after this life]. Likewise, [they also maintain that] when one fumigates [oneself with smoke] by burning the hearts of animals, one will be born in an elevated residence, that is, the superior heaven. Similarly, [they maintain the following:] Since all women are like mortars, flowers, fruits, cooked food, steps to a bathing place, roads and so forth, it is not good to say that one should not approach [for sexual purposes, one’s] mother, sisters, daughters and the like.

Is there any difference between the Veda and those Magas’ theses that speak of such [evil] things?226

In this report on the tenets of a group called “Maga,” Bhāviveka explicitly mentions that his information is based not on firsthand knowledge, but what is known in the world about them (’di ltar grags te). For him, their immoral tenets that promote the practice of killing and incest are well known. Thus, what Bhāviveka attempts in this verse is to transfer the well-known immorality of the Magas, along with all the connotations of the word “foreigner” (mleccha), to a putative author of the Veda. By shifting the evil nature from the one (the Magas) to the other (a putative author of the Veda) based on the similarity of their teachings, the Veda, the text that is authorless for the Mīmāṃsakas, is proved to be a text authored by an evil being.

In Buddhist literature ranging from the earlier Abhidharma texts such as Karmaprajñapti (dated to early centuries of the Common Era)227 to the later Mahāyāna texts such as Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha (eighth cen. CE),228 the reference to the Magas of Persia is

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226 TJ D281b1-4, “ma ga la sogs pa phyin ci log gi brtul zhugs can, par sig la sogs kla klo'i gnas na gnas pa, de dag gi grub pa'i mtha' ni 'di ltar grags te. sa la gnod pa byed pa yin pa'i phyir, grog ma la sogs pa bsdad pa ni, chos ma yin pa ma yin no. ba lang bsdad na, rwa brtsegs pa la brten nas, mtho ris su 'gro bar 'gyur ro. de bzhin du, phyugs kyi snying bsregs pas bdugs na, gnas mthon po gong ma'i nam mkhar skye bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba lta bu dang. de bzhin du, hud med thams cad ni gun dang me tog dang 'bras bu dang g.yos zin pa'i zas dang khrus bya ba'i 'bab stegs dang lam zhes bya ba la sogs pa dang 'dra ba yin pas, ma dang sring mo dang bu mo la sogs pa la bgyod par bya ba ma yin no zhes zer ba ni legs pa ma yin no. zhes smra bar byed pa'i ma ga'i grub pa'i mtha' de dang rig byed la khyad par ci zhih yod de.” cf. Kawasaki (1992, 509-10)’s translation of this passage.

227 For the reference to the Magas in this text, see Silk (2008, 436-7).

228 Halbfass (1991, 126, en. 101) collects the post-Dharmakīrti references either to the Magas (maga) or
continually made, and those references indeed attest to the knowledge of the Magas’ tenets among Buddhist intellectuals. However, Bhāviveka’s “use” of the Maga case is different from that of previous texts; this difference can be summarized as follows.

First, the references to the Magas in previous texts differ from Bhāviveka’s in their purposes. While Bhāviveka draws upon the Magas’ tenets to prove the evil authorship of the Veda, previous sources cite the Maga case in order to criticize Brahmins in general. For example, the Mahāvibhāṣā cites the Magas’ views on killing (prāṇātipāta) and sexual misbehavior (kāmamithyācāra) in the context of the ten karmically unwholesome courses of action (akuśalakarmapatha). As the Mahāvibhāṣā lists the Magas’ views in the relevant sections, it curiously presents, side by side, Brahmins’ perverted views; in other words, it juxtaposes

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229 Mahāvibhāṣā (T 1545; MV) 605c16-21, “Also, in the western region from here, there are Mlecchas (foreigners) called Maga (ch. Mujia). They raise this views and posit this thesis: Parents (father and mother) became fragile, old, and sick. If one kills them, he or she would obtain merit and it does not count as sin. Why? Those who are fragile and old, as all their sense organs are decayed and defunct, cannot drink or eat. If they die and obtain new and excellent organs again, they [would be able to] drink fresh warm milk [again]. If one gets sick, mostly he or she are distressed by pain and agony. Since they become liberated from [the present suffering] when they die, killing them is no sin.” (又此西方有蔑戾車名曰目迦，起如是見，立如是論：父母衰老及遭痼疾，若能殺者得福無罪。所以者何？夫衰老者諸根朽敗不能飲食。若死更得新獲諸根，欲新煖乳。若遭痼疾多受苦惱。死便解脫故殺無罪。)

230 MV 606a16-21, “In the West there are mleccha (barbarians) called Maga who produce such views as these, and establish such theories: there is absolutely no sin in behaving lustily with one’s mother, daughter, elder or younger sister, daughter-in-law or the like. Why? All women-kind are like ripe fruit, like prepared food and drink, a road, a bridge, a boat, a bathing spot, a mortar and so on. It is the custom that beings use these in common, and therefore there is no sin in behaving lustily towards them.” (又此西方有蔑戾車名曰目迦，起如是見，立如是論：母女姊妹及兒妻等，於彼行欲悉無有罪。所以者何？一切母邑，皆如熟果已辦飲食道路橋船階梯臼等，法爾有情共所受用，是故於彼行欲無罪。)

Translation is from Silk (2008, 437-8).
Brahmins’s views on killing231 and sexual misbehavior232 with the Magas’. And, in so doing, although the text does not explicitly comment on this juxtaposition, it alludes to their similarities. This practice of juxtaposing Brahmin and Maga views continues in later Abhidharma literature such as the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and two hostile commentaries on it, the Nyāyānusāra and the Abhidharmadīpa, in the same context of discussing the list of ten unwholesome courses of action.233 Thus, we may conclude that, before Bhāviveka, the Magas’ immorality was primarily used to compare them with Brahmins and, by doing so, implicitly criticizing Brahmins. Bhāviveka’s reference to the Magas is made to denigrate, not Brahmins, but their text, the Veda.

Second, pre-Bhāviveka references do not speak of the “treatise” (śāstra) of the Magas.234 They only relate the views held by the Magas and do not assume they exist in the form of “text.” When we consider this silence on the existence of the treatise of the Magas in previous sources and the fact that Bhāviveka supplies no new information on the Magas, it seems that Bhāviveka is simply reiterating the information on the Magas in the previous Abhidharma literature. It is thus plausible that Bhāviveka groundlessly assumed the existence of the Maga

231 The Mahāvibhāṣā lists the case of “one group of people” (一類) who sees no sin in killing animals in a ritual setting since they will be eaten by sacrificers after a sacrifice. (MV 605c12 – 14, “如有一類起如是見立如是論：駝馬牛羊雞豬鹿等，皆為祠祀人所食用，是以殺之無罪.”) Though the text does not clarify the identity of this “one group of people,” it seems evident that the expression denotes Brahmin priests who kill animals in their sacrificial rituals. This case of Brahmin sacrificers is the first item in that category, while the Maga case is listed as the third example; between them lies the second case of those who do not see any fault in killing beings harmful to human.

232 As for sexual misconduct, the Mahāvibhāṣā attributes the following opinion to Brahmins: “Brahmins raise this view and posit this thesis: ‘All Brahmins ought to accumulate four wives, Kṣatriyas three, Vaiśyas two, and Śūdras one. If a Brahmin does not fill this number [of wives], it is no sin to have sex with others’ wives.’ However, when they have sex, they have a conception that [those wives do] belong to others.” (MV 606a13-16, “婆羅門起如是見立如是論：諸婆羅門應畜四婦，刹帝利三，吠舍應二，戍達羅一。婆羅門等數若未滿，婬他妻室亦無有罪。然彼時起屬他想.”)


234 Durvekamiśra is the sole exception. He speaks of a “Persian text” in his commentary on Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭikā: “mātur vivāhasya kramah paripāṭir upadiśyate yena pārasīkaśāstreṇa tadvat.” (Malvania ed. 15:17)
And it is also plausible that Bhāviveka made this groundless assumption in order to endow the Magas—whose evil nature is certain for his audience—with a text corresponding to the Veda. Only by supposing the existence of the Maga treatise could Bhāviveka propose the syllogism whose legitimacy hinges on the similarity between the contents of the Maga treatise and the Veda. Bhāviveka likely took this step in order to adapt the Abhidharma materials to the context of his confrontation with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda.

MHK 9.31 is a “logical” conclusion reached by Bhāviveka from his reading of Abhidharma discussions on the ten unwholesome courses of action. He made the Buddhist derogatory views of Brahmins—only hinted at by the juxtaposition of their cases to those of the Magas—explicit by stating that the Veda is like the Magas’ treatise (magaśāstravat). He also transforms Abhidharma materials to meet the newly emerging opponent of the Mīmāṃsakas who claim that the Veda is without an author. The critique now aims at the Brahmins’ text, the Veda, instead of Brahmins themselves, and the Magas, accordingly, are given a text that can be compared with the Veda. What is missing in this process of transformation, however, is evidence that the Veda actually contains teachings comparable to those of the Magas. It is the task of TJ to present such evidence. For this purpose, Bhāviveka could not simply reuse the materials contained in his Abhidharma sources in their entirety, since they make no reference to the Veda. In other words, some of them lack the essential feature that Bhāviveka needed, that is, Vedic origin. To fill this lacuna, Bhāviveka presents a series of Vedic quotation which includes the Sāṃkhyas’ collection.

3.2.3 Correspondence of the Vedic Quotes between the Sāṃkhyya Commentaries
on SK 2 and TJ on MHK 9.31

TJ 9.31 contains quotations from the Veda, sometimes with short evaluative comments, which are collected to testify to its evil nature. They can be divided into six groups based on specific accusations. Those accusations are: killing (tshe ba, hiṃsā), sexual misconduct (bgrod par bya ba ma yin pa la bgrod par bya ba, agamyāgamana), drinking liquor (chang btung ba, surāpāna), stealing (ma byin par len pa, adattādāna), lying (brdzun du smra ba, mṛṣāvāda), and prattle (ngag kyal ba, pralāpa). They do not fit into any of the established lists of precepts or wrongdoings. Despite Bhāviveka’s direct inheritance, in formulating his thesis on the evil authorship of the Veda at MHK 9.31, from the Abhidharma discussions on the ten unwholesome courses of action, it cannot be his framework since “drinking liquor” is not contained in the list of akyakarmapatha. Although the five Buddhist lay precepts (pañcaśīla) correspond to the first five items, the five precepts do not seem to be the model for Bhāviveka’s collection since TJ adds the sixth item “prattle.” One can think of similar Hindu

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235 PP (PPf D215b4-5 and PPC(T1566), 119c15-7), on the contrary, only lists the first three (killing, sexual misconduct, and drinking liquor) in the same context of proving the evil authorship of the Veda. See Van der Kuijp (2006, 196) for a translation of the text both from Tibetan and Chinese. He also emends the text of Avalokitavrata’s commentary on that passage and translates it in pp. 197-8.

236 TJ D281b4-6.

237 TJ D281b7-282a6.

238 TJ D282a6-282b1.

239 TJ D282b1-3; This is the only case which the “heading” word for the accusation (that is, “taking what is not given” (ma byin par len pa)) is not attested in the text. However, it is clear that Bhāviveka intends to refer to the specific wrongdoing classified as “stealing” as he cites the same quotations which Abhidharma literature—from the Mahāvibhāṣa through AKbh to NA and AD—lists under the heading of “stealing” (adattādāna).

240 TJ D282b3-283a4.

241 TJ D283a4-283b5.

242 Ten unwholesome courses of action (akyakarmapatha) consist of: killing (prāṇātipāta), theft (adattādāna), sexual misconduct (kāmamithyācāra), lying (mṛṣāvāda), malicious speech (paiśunyavāda), frivolous prattle (pralāpa), verbal abuse (pāraṣyavāda), covetousness (abhidhyā), malice (vyāpāda), and wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi).

243 Five precepts of the Buddhist laity consists of abstention from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, and drinking liquor.
lists such as the five great sins (*mahāpātaka*)\textsuperscript{244} and the Sāṃkhya-Yoga five “abstentions” (*yama*)\textsuperscript{245} for ascetics, but neither exhausts the six accusations of TJ.

In what follows, I list the Vedic quotations found in both TJ 9.31 and the Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2, or more precisely, on the word “impurity” (*aviśuddhi*) of SK 2. The Sāṃkhya commentaries, taken as a whole, accuse the Veda of teaching five of the six items of TJ - killing, sexual misconduct, drinking, lying, and prattle. Except for one case (the case of Gosava), instances of the correspondence between TJ and the Sāṃkhya commentaries are not found in Abhidharma literature. What this correspondence means is hard to determine. Given that TJ contains many more quotations from the Veda, it is unlikely that Bhāviveka copied those materials from Sāṃkhya commentaries. Nevertheless, it remains possible that he was inspired by the Sāṃkhya commentaries and independently collected similar sentences from the Veda. The reverse process—the Sāṃkhyas’ copying from TJ—is also a possibility. The exact relationship between them cannot be ascertained, in part because Bhāviveka is generally dated to 500-570 CE and most of the Sāṃkhya commentaries below are vaguely assigned to 500-600 CE (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987, 15-6).

Still, despite all the uncertainties, the following seems to be certain. Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas shared a stock list of Vedic passages to be easily cited, much like clichés, whenever one undertook an argument against Vedic ritualists.

\textsuperscript{244} Cf. Manusmṛti 11.55, “Killing a Brahmin, drinking liquor, stealing, and having sex with an elder’s wife—they call these ‘grievous sins causing loss of caste’, and so is establishing any links with such individuals.” (*brahmahatyā surāpānam steyam gurvaṅganāgamah/ mahāntī pātaṁy āhūḥ saṁyogaś caiva taiḥ saha//*); text and translation are from Olivelle (2005, 847 and 217-8). See also the remark of Kane (1953, 15): “…among the early sūtra works there was no general agreement about the nature and number of mahāpātakas, upaṁpātakas and other classes of sins, even though as early as the Chāndogya Upaniṣad the mortal sins had been declared to be five.”

\textsuperscript{245} Cf. Yogasūtra 2.30, “Abstinence from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from incontinence and from acceptance of gifts are the abstentions.” (*ahimsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ//*); translation is from Wood (1914, 178).
The Case of Aśvamedha and Puruṣamedha

For killing, TJ lists only phrases such as “cattle should also be killed” (ba lang yang gsad par bya’o). However, the last quotation in the killing section refers to a specific sacrifice, the Horse Sacrifice (rta dag gi mchod sbyin; Aśvamedha). The Vedic injunction says “in the Horse Sacrifice, pierce each horse with five hundred needles and harshly torment them. Then offer them into the fire.” This is an injunction for the three—chief (mahiṣī), favorite (vāvātā), and neglected (parivṛktī)—wives of the royal sacrificer who use needles to indicate the lines along for the dissection of the horse by the Adhvaryu priest.

In the previous Abhidharma literature, the case of ritual killing is alluded to, but the Horse Sacrifice is not. The commentaries on SK 2, on the other hand, are almost unanimous in identifying Aśvamedha as evidence for the Veda’s impurity. Beginning with the Suvarṇasaptati (金七十論, T 2137; SS) translated into Chinese by Paramārtha between 557 and 569, most of the commentaries quote the same unidentified verse that refers to Aśvamedha, viz. the Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (Solomon 1973a, 7; V1), the Sāṃkhyaavṛtti (Solomon 1973b, 5; V2), Gauḍapāda’s Bhāṣya (Colebrooke and Wilson 1837, 3; GBh), the Māṭharavṛtti (Sarma and Vangiya 1970, 6; M), and the Yuktidīpikā (Motegi and Wezler 1998, 31; YD), with the exception of the Jayamaṅgalā (Sarma and Vangiya 1970; JM) and the Tattvakaumudī.

\[246\] TJ D281b6, “rta dag gi mchod sbyin la, rta re re la khab lnga brgya lnga brgya btsugs la, shin tu zug gzer dang ldan par byas nas, sbyin sreg bya’o.”

\[247\] See the Dumont (1948, 450)’s summary of this stage of Aśvamedha: “Then the Mahiṣī, the Vāvātā, and the Parivṛktī mark out, by means of needles, the lines for the dissection of the horse’s body. The Adhvaryu or one of his assistants then cuts the horse’s hide in order to take, for the oblation of the omenta, the fat that serves as a substitute for the omentum of the horse. The assistants of the priests then cut the other victims open, and pull out the omenta, which are to be offered into the fire.” The Taittirīya Brāhmāṇa 3.9.6 (trans. ibid., 482-3) describes this process but does not mention the number of needles. For a detailed analysis of Aśvamedha, see Jamison (1996, 65-88).

\[248\] T2137, 1245b17-9.
According to the [scriptural] instruction for Aśvamedha, on the second day, six hundred animals minus three animals (i.e., totaling 597 animals) are bound to the sacrificial posts and then killed.

Thus, TJ 9.31, like the Śāṅkhya commentaries, points to the same sacrifice to prove the evilness of the Veda, although it does not cite the same verse. However, it is not that Bhāviveka fails to quote this verse, which must have been famous among the Śāṅkhyas. Bhāviveka quotes this verse at TJ on MHK 9.2 where he, as in TJ 9.31, collects a number of Vedic quotations.

MHK 9.2 belongs to the pūrvapakṣa, that is, the opponent’s section. As the quotation of this verse makes clear, the pūrvapakṣa is not an innocent presentation of the opponent’s tenets; it is rather an ironic picture of the opponent, with all the points of attack that would surface in the author’s own critique (the siddhānta) embedded. The Vedic quotations compiled under MHK 9.2 are also filled with, at least to the outsiders, absurd and immoral words of the Veda. One is the infamous line from the Taṇṭiriṇa Brāhmaṇa 3.4.1.1-4 on Human Sacrifice (puṇḍramedha): “1. To the Power of the Order of the Brāhmaṇas he (i.e., the Sacrificer, or the Adhvaryu acting for the Sacrificer) offers as a victim a Brāhmaṇa. 2. To the Power of the Order of the Kṣatriyas, a Kṣatriya. 3. To the Maruts, a Vaiśya (i.e., a member of the third Order). 4. To Hardship, a Śūdra (i.e., a member of the fourth Order).”

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249 Aśvamedha is basically a three-day Soma sacrifice preceded and followed by a year of preparatory and concluding ceremonies. See Dumont (1948, Introduction).
250 I have used the text in YD (ibid.), “ṣaṭśatāni niyujyante paśūnāṃ madhyāya ṣani/ aśvamedhasya vacanāt ūnāni paśubhis tribhiḥ/”
251 TJ D271b7, “bar gyi dus la bab pa na/ byol song drug gam bdun sbyar bya/ rta yis gtsang ma’i tshig yin no/ nyung la byol song gsum gyis so/” One of the interesting points of this Tibetan translation is that in the second pāda it says: “Six or seven animals are to be bound [the sacrificial posts].” This shows that the translators of TJ (i.e., Atiśa and his disciple Nag tsho Lo tsā ba Tshul khrims rgyal ba) read “six hundred” (ṣaṭśatāni) as “six or seven” (drug gam bdun; *ṣaṭsaptāni) in their manuscript. The translation of “aśvamedhasya vacanāt” into “rta yis gtsang ma’i tshig yin no” may indicate the translators had “aśvamedhasya” instead of “aśvamedhasya” (“-medhya” in the sense of “gtsang ma,” that is, “pure”).
252 Text and translation from Dumont (1963, 178), “1. brahmaṇe brāhmaṇam ālabhate. 2. kṣatrāya rājanyam. 3. marudbhyo vaiśyam. 4. tapase śūdram.” (Vedic accents are omitted). The corresponding Tibetan translation in TJ (TJ D272a2) is: “bram ze la ni bram ze bsad/ rgyal rigs kyi ni rgyal rigs bsad/ ma ru dag la rje rigs te/ dka’ thub dag la dmangs rigs so/” This Tibetan passage is first identified in
verse is also quoted in V1 (7), M (6),\(^{253}\) and YD (31).\(^{254}\)

In sum, in Bhāviveka’s accusation of the Veda for teaching killing, with specific examples of Aśvamedha and Puruṣamedha, we see correspondences between the Sāṃkhyya commentaries and TJ (9.2 and 31) but not between the Abhidharma source and TJ.

**The Case of Gosava**

TJ refers to two cases when accusing the Veda of sexual perversity. One is a specific ritual named “Gosava” (D281b7-282a4) and the other deals with a rather general occasion in which the sacrificer desires sexual intercourse (D282a4-6). Between these two, the first seems to have been notorious among the opponents of Vedic sacrifice, since all three sources—Sāṃkhyya, Abhidharma, and TJ—cite more or less the same Vedic prescription for this ritual.\(^{255}\) The TJ version reads:\(^{256}\)

> Sexual approach to those whom should not be approached in such a way is also sanctioned [in the Veda]. Such is illustrated in the sacrifice of those under the cow-vow. It is said: “After having performed a cow-sacrifice, for a year, a Brahmin should live under the cow-vow. One should drink water and chew grass like a bull; should mount the mother; should also mount the siblings of mother; should also mount [others] of one’s own lineage. Wherever one finds those [females] to be entered and stayed, there he does it.”\(^{257}\) When one behaves

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\(^{253}\) The quotation in both V1 and M includes the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 3.4.1.6 (but not 3.4.1.5), “6. To Hell, the killer of a man.” (6. nārakāya vīrāhaṇam.) See Dumont (ibid.).

\(^{254}\) YD only quotes the first line, that is, “1. brahmaṇe brāhmaṇam ālabhate.”

\(^{255}\) It is noteworthy that even Hindu authors, like Bhartṛhari, expressed negative views of Gosava. One Hindu text, the Garudapurāṇa, even explicitly prohibits Gosava along with another two sacrifices, as we have seen, problematized by the Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists, viz. Aśvamedha and Puruṣamedha. See Thite (1972, 197).

\(^{256}\) There are two corresponding Sanskrit texts to this translated passage from TJ. One is the Jaminīya Brāhmaṇa 2.113 (Caland 1919, 157) and the other is the quoted passage in V1 (7-8). The text quoted in AKBh (241) and Abhidharmadīpa (154) which copies AKBh lack the last two sentences of TJ.

\(^{257}\) In translating this sentence I consulted the corresponding passage quoted in V1 (8): “yatra yatra
like a bull, he would be victorious over the whole world.”

Two Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2, V1 (7-8) and M (6), and three Abhidharma texts, AKbh (241), NA (577a13-5), and Abhidharmadīpa (154), refer to this same ritual. To this passage, Bhāviveka adds information on Gosava, not directly from a Vedic text, but based on a certain “branch of learning that helps understanding [of the Veda]” (rtogs pa la phan pa’i yal ga) and Brahmīns’ justification of the ritual. This additional part, which is not found in other Sāṃkhya or Abhidharma sources, seems to serve as the source of information on Gosava for Avalokitavrata when he comments on Bhāviveka’s PP.

The Case of Sautrāmaṇi

Glossing the phrase “drinking liquor” (chang ’thung ba) of Bhāviveka in PP, Avalokitavrata specifies the Vedic ritual called Sautrāmaṇi (rendered as “sau ta ma nī”). Bhāviveka seems to have that ritual in mind, since TJ also speaks of the ritual called “nor bu skud pa la bskus pa” (TJ D282a7). I am unsure how to reconstruct the Sanskrit name for the ritual from this Tibetan translation, but Sautrāmaṇi seems that “nor bu” corresponds to “maṇi” and “skud pa” to “sūtra”

cainām upaviṣṭāṃ vindati tatra tatropaviśati.” It may rather correspond to the Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa version of it (“yatra yatraināṃ viṣṭhā vindet, tat tad vitiṣṭheta.”), but then the meaning of the TJ sentence would be like “wherever nature’s call finds him, there he does it.” However, taking “zhugs shing ’dug pa” (entering and staying) as “viṣṭhā” (as in JB) in the sense of “excrement” is more unlikely comparing to reading the same as “upaviṣṭā” (as in V1) in the sense of “seat.”

258 TJ D281b7-282a2, “bgrod par bya ba ma yin pa la bgrod par bya ba yang rjes su gnang ngo zhes ba lang gi brtul zhugs can gyi mchod shbyn las bstan te. bram zes ba lang gi mchod shyin byas nas, lo gcig gi bar du, ba lang gi brtul zhugs la gnas par bya ste. ba lang bzhin du chu btung zthing rtswa yang gcad par bya la; ma la yang bzhon par bya; ma’i span zla la yang bzhon par bya; rang gi rigs la yang bzhon par bya ste. gang dang gang du zhugs shing ’dug pa der med pa de dang de la spyad cing ba lang bzhin du spyad na, jig rten thams cad las rgyal bar ’gyur ro zhes bya ba.”

259 M only mentions the name gosava without any further clarification.

260 See TJ D282a2-4.

261 The passage in which Avalokitavrata discusses Gosava (PPT D203a2-4) is translated in van der Kuijp (2006, 198) and Silk (2008, 441, fn. 17).

262 See van der Kuijp (2006, 196 and 198).
(See Negi 1993-2005, vol. 7 and 1, s.v.). If this conjecture is plausible, the translation shows that the translators of TJ were unfamiliar with this Vedic ritual since the name of the ritual, Sautrāmaṇī, has nothing to do with the words sūtra and maṇi according to the traditional understanding of its name. The Vedic tradition connects the ritual with the myth in which the Aśvins reinvigorate Indra who improperly consumed Soma, and thus, “the word sautrāmaṇī is derived from the word sutrāman, an epithet of Indra” (Kolhatkar 1999, 13) who “has good protection” (sutrāman) of the Aśvins.

As the ten unwholesome courses of action of Buddhists do not contain this “wrongdoing” of drinking liquor, Abhidharma literature does not make reference to the Sautrāmaṇī ritual in that context. The Sāṃkhya commentaries, on the other hand, decry the Vedic ritual for the drinking intoxicating beverages, though only in passing. JM (67) mentions “drinking soma” (somapāna) as one of the reasons for the impurity of Vedic sacrifice. V1 (8) also lists “drinking what should not be drunk” (apeyapāna) but glosses it as “drinking surā” (surāpāna) without mentioning a specific ritual. Lastly, M (6) directly mentions the fault of “drinking surā” in the context of Sautrāmaṇī. Though the Vedic quotations cited by Bhāviveka in this case do not appear in the Sāṃkhya sources, it is still significant that Bhāviveka problematizes the act of drinking liquor and refers to this ritual despite silence on this point in his immediate resource, Abhidharma literature.

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264 The word “surā-” in surāpāna is misprinted as “sura-.”
265 Sautrāmaṇī is not the only ritual in which surā (“a kind of beer prepared from grains”) is used. It is used in some of both domestic (grhya) and solemn (śrāuta) rituals. See Kolhatkar (1999, 2-3).
266 “sautrāmanyāṃ surāpānam.”
The Case of Vedic Lies

There is a verse cited in the Sāṃkhya commentaries and the Abhidharma texts that enumerates five occasions in which lying is permitted: “Oh King, playful lying, lying to women, in marriage, or in danger of death, does not hurt; one says that these five lies are not transgressions.” However, Bhāviveka does not quote this verse, perhaps due to its non-Vedic origin. De la Vallée Poussin (1988-90, 737, fn. 303) lists several texts that may have served as the source, but none of them can be classified as śruti, that is, the “Veda” proper, and V1 (8) explicitly introduces the verse by calling it smṛti (“atha smṛtāv apy uktam”). A verse from a secondary authoritative work like this is of no use to Bhāviveka, who wants to prove the evil authorship of the Veda.

Yet there is one verse commonly found in one commentary on SK 2 and TJ. The *Suvarṇasaptati*, extant in Chinese, provides the following Vedic passage: “O thou animal! Thy father, thy mother and thy kindred all approve of thee. Now thou art about to abandon thy present body to be reborn in the heavens.” Though it does not match Ṛg Veda I.163.13, which Takakusu (1931, 4, fn.1) refers to, the text itself specifies the Veda (皮陀) as its source. TJ’s quote (TJ D282b3-4) only differs by listing more groups of assenters that can be subsumed under

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267 AKBh (241:12-5), “na narmayuktam anṛtam hinaṣṭi na strīṣu rājan na vivāhakāle/ prāṇātyaye saryadhanāpahāre pañcāntāny āhur apātakāni/” Translation is from de la Vallée Poussin (1998-90, 646). V1 (8) and V2 (6) cite this verse.

268 The works listed by de la Vallée Poussin are the Mahābhārata, Gautama(-dharmaśūtra?) and Vasiṣṭhasmṛti. He also mentions the 13th cen. Jaina work, the Śyādvādamaṇḍī. Nance (2012, 77, fn. 6) also identifies this verse as Mahābhārata 1.77.16.

269 Translation is from Takakusu (1931[1904], 3-4). SS, 1245b16-7, “獸！汝父母及眷屬悉皆隨喜汝．汝今捨此身，必得生天上．”

270 See Jamison and Brereton (2014)’s translation of the verse: “The steed has gone forth to the highest seat, to his father and mother [=Heaven and Earth]. He should go to the gods today, for he is most pleasing (to them); then he expresses his hope for desirable things for the pious man.” (vol.1, 349)

271 Curiously, in the quarrel between an ascetic opponent (yatī) and Vedic ritualist (adhvāryu) that Alsdorf (2010, 37-8) reports referring to the Mahābhārata, the ascetic argues against the opponent that one should obtain consents from the family members and friends of the victim before sacrificing it.
the term “kindred” (眷屬): brothers (spun zla), siblings (mngal gcig pa), and those of the same family lineage (rigs gcig pa). This Vedic quotation is a sheer lie for Bhāviveka because it is absurd to assume that completely dull animals can give assent and one cannot go to heaven without accumulating wholesome karma by oneself.272

The Case of Bawdy Prattle

In one of the Vedic passages about prattle, Bhāviveka unusually speaks in the first person, saying “the following is what I have heard” (bdag gis 'di ltar thos te). The ritual that Bhāviveka reports is called “the Bark-clad” (shing shun can). Although the entire meaning of the relevant passage273 is not clear, it seems that the ritual consists of 1. winning the debate with a female Brahmin who expounds (or recites?) the Veda and 2. the winner and the female Brahmin having sexual intercourse. The first two components of this ritual remind me of the coupling of a Vedic student (brahmacārin) and a prostitute (puṃścalī) on the Mahāvrata day (that is, New Year’s day), which marks the end of a year-long Gavāmayana sacrifice. Jamison (1996, 96) summarily notes this component of the ritual: “The two are stationed such that the student is within the vedi, the whore outside it. They both insult each other, in tones reminiscent of the bawdy dialogues in the Aśvamedha, and copulate.” Although the female figure in Bhāviveka’s report is a Brahmin, there are common elements between them: the male and the female first exchange words and then have sex. In this two-step process, sexual intercourse is more conspicuous, but Bhāviveka lists it under the heading of prattle (ngag kyal ba; pralāpa). There is one Śaṅkhya commentary,

272 TJ D282b4-5, “byol song rnams ni sems kun du rmong pa yin pas, gnang ba ster ba yang rigs pa ma yin la, rang gi dge ba’i las byas pa med par, mtho ris su 'gro ba yang med do.”
273 TJ D283b1-2, “gzhan yang bdag gis ‘di ltar thos te. mchod sbyin shing shun can zhes bya ba su la yang rig byed smra bar byed pa’i bram ze mo dang rtsod pa las de rgyal bar gyur to. de nas des de dang 'khrig pa spyad pa las, aa shvad tha’i ‘bras bu za ba skyes te. de rig byed kyi slob dpon yin zhes grag go.”
the Māṭharavṛtti dated to the ninth century CE (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987, 291), that problematizes this sexually charged verbal exchange by listing “priests’ prattling on about their own desire with a slut” (raṇdayā saha svecchālāpaś ca rtvijām; M 6).

3.2.4 Assessing Bhāviveka’s Critique of the Veda in MHK/TJ 9.31

The correspondences between TJ and the Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2 indicate that Vedic passages deemed immoral were known to the anti-Vedic camp of intellectuals. Although this cannot be used to prove Bhāviveka’s actual use of the Sāṃkhya commentaries, the correspondence strongly implies Bhāviveka’s adoption of the Sāṃkhya strategy of challenging Vedic authority. This is because, while the collecting of immoral Vedic quotations is well developed in the Sāṃkhya commentaries on SK 2, such a practice is not found in the antecedent Buddhist literature. Nevertheless, Bhāviveka’s alliance with the Sāṃkhyas is not as explicit as that of Āryadeva and Vasu. His alliance is merely hinted at compiling immoral passages from the Veda rather than adopting the Sāṃkhya view without a critical comment (like Āryadeva) or citing the Sāṃkhya text in the place of Buddhist scripture (like Vasu). These differences in the degree of alliance with the Sāṃkhyas seems to be caused by the different identities of their opponents. In their respective contexts, Āryadeva and Vasu opposed Vedic ritualists and Bhāviveka opposed the Mīmāṃsakas. It is important to note that the Sāṃkhyas did not oppose the Veda as a whole, only a specific portion that prescribes Vedic sacrifice.

In one episode in the Mokṣadharma portion of the Mahābhārata, a certain Kapila, bearing the same name of the founder of Sāṃkhya, expresses his sympathy for a cow being dragged to sacrifice by saying “Alas, ye the Vedas.” When confronted by Vedic authority

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274 See Chakravarti (1975, 5-6).
represented by the sage Syūmaraśmi, who entered into the body of the cow, Kapila restricts his
critical stance to the “work” (karma) portion of the Veda and shows his preference for the
“knowledge” (jñāna) portion of the Veda.275 This somewhat limited criticism of the Veda is also
reflected in the SK 2 itself. Although it relegates Vedic means (i.e., Vedic sacrifice) to the level of
mundane means such as Āyurveda (see SK 1) as far as its efficacy in removing human suffering
is concerned (drṣṭavād ānuśravikāḥ; SK 2a), it still does not completely deny the value of Vedic
sacrifice when it says that the Sāṃkhya way of discriminating the manifest, the unmanifest, and
the knower (vyaktāvyaktajñavijñānāṭ; SK 2d) is superior (śreyān; in SK 2c). What is being
argued is not a total rejection of the Veda or Vedic sacrifice, but only the superiority of the
Sāṃkhya means of knowledge.

However clearly this “limited” critique of the Veda is expressed in the writings of the
Sāṃkhyas, it must have been viewed as dubious at best by the Mīmāṃsakas, who take the
entirety of the Veda, though with special emphasis on the “work” portion, as authoritative. To the
Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṃkhya statement that Vedic sacrifice is united with impurity, destruction,
and relativity (sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktah; SK 2b) and their compiling of Vedic sentences
to prove the three defects of Vedic sacrifice are nothing other than attacks on Vedic orthodoxy.
The Sāṃkhyas, with their critique of the Vedic cultural norm, went to an extreme and, by doing
so, risked their membership in the loose association of Brahmanical intellectual circles,
collectively termed “āstika.” Thus it is unsurprising to see that the Yuktidīpikā in its commentary
on the word “impurity” in SK 2b invites a Mīmāṃsaka opponent276 to declare that the intention
of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of SK, is to point out the superiority of the Sāṃkhya method rather
than to denounce the Veda altogether.277 In this sense, the confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas in

275 See ibid. and Houben (1999b, 502) for this episode and relevant references.
276 The Mīmāṃsaka opponent in the Yuktidīpikā is most probably Kumārila. See Halbfass (1991, 93-4).
the *Yuktidīpikā* reveals the Sāṃkhyas’ deep affiliation with the Veda beneath their derogatory remarks on Vedic sacrifice.

Bhāviveka’s confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, forces him to break with the full alliance with the Sāṃkhyas exemplified by Āryadeva and Vasu. The Sāṃkhyas’ critique of Vedic sacrifice was good enough for Āryadeva and Vasu, who were refuting Vedic ritualists who assert the eternity of the fruit of Aśvamedha. However, when the opponents begin to base the legitimacy of Vedic sacrifice on the authority of the Veda, and thereby, move the debate from the morality of Vedic sacrifice to scriptural authority, Buddhists cannot, at least explicitly, cooperate with the Sāṃkhyas, who accept the authority of the Veda, at least in a limited a sense. Bhāviveka’s “alliance” with the Sāṃkhyas is therefore not made with the common goal of criticizing the immoral nature of Vedic sacrifice. Rather, the parallelism found between TJ 9.31 and the Sāṃkhyya commentaries on SK 2 is limited to copying the strategy and sharing the source. That is to say, the strategy and source of the Sāṃkhyas, through Bhāviveka, came to serve a different goal of proving the evil authorship and denigrating the authority of the Veda as a whole.

In this process, the Mīmāṃsakas played the role of “splitter.” By questioning their

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Sāṃkhyas in their double positioning *vis-a-vis* the Veda: “... proto-Sāṃkhyas survived at all over the centuries as a system—and this in spite of the dominance of rationality in its earliest phases—because of its simultaneous association, in a kind of love-hate relationship, with the wide-spread and well-established Brahmanism or Bramanical ritualism.” (*emphasis* in the original) See also ibid., p. 175. It is noteworthy that, in Vācaspati’s commentary on SK 2, one may notice that the “rebellious” spirit of the Sāṃkhyas, so to speak, is arrested and domesticated to the Mīmāṃsaka scheme.

This strategy of the Mīmāṃsakas to discuss Vedic sacrifice only in terms of the Veda and its hermeneutics in disregard of moral problems involved in Vedic sacrifice, is well expressed in MS 1.1.2: “Dharma is that which is indicated by (known by means of) the Veda as conducive to the highest good.” (*codanālaṅkaṇo ’rtho dharmah*) (Translation from Jha 1933, 4). Four syllogisms that Bhāviveka formulates as the conclusion of MHK/TJ 9.31 (TJ D283b5-284a1) are specifically directed at this sūtra. The first, third, and fourth reject the *pramāṇa*-status of the Veda concerning dharma while the second refutes the Mīmāṃsaka understanding of the term “dharma” as sacrificial activities exemplified in, for example, Śabara’s commentary on MS 1.1.2 (See ŚBh 20:3-11).
attitudes, not toward Vedic sacrifice but toward the Veda, they successfully forced Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas to choose between mutually exclusive options of pro- and anti-Veda. In other words, by drawing the nominal but normative line between āstika and nāstika around the authority of the Veda, the Mīmāṃsakas succeeded in attenuating the shared discontent with sanguinary sacrificial culture among the ascetic traditions of Buddhism and Sāṃkhya, requiring either a deep-rooted antagonism or sympathy to the eternal signifier of Indian orthodoxy, the Veda.

3.4 The Fate of the Traditional Critique of the Veda in the post-Bhāviveka period

The Mīmāṃsakas’ doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda received greater attention from Buddhist philosophers after Bhāviveka. We will consider in this section the critiques made by two, namely, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. Their engagement with the Mīmāṃsa system in general and with the doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda in particular are as extensive as that of Bhāviveka, and therefore, for a full appreciation of their arguments, they need to be independently analyzed. Our approach here will be selective in accordance with our comparative concern. The purpose of discussing their positions is only to show that they do not employ the traditional critique of the Veda against the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine and they curiously inherit the strategy of Saṅghabhadra, which declares the unintelligibility of the Veda. The continuation of Saṅghabhadra’s strategy is highlighted in the case of Dharmakīrti, since he does not show any awareness of Bhāviveka’s effort to link the traditional critique of the Veda with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. In the case of Śāntarakṣita, on the contrary, we see evidence that later Buddhists consciously chose to adopt Saṅghabhadra’s or Dharmakīrti’s strategy of refuting the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda over that of Bhāviveka. Viewed in this way, the
traditional critique of the Veda can be said to terminate with Bhāviveka as it was no longer inherited by later Buddhist intellectuals.

3.4.1 Dharmakīrti’s “Can the Veda Speak?” Policy

Dharmakīrti’s strategy of countering the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda is lucidly epitomized in the title of the joint work by Eltschinger, Krasser, and Taber (2012): *Can the Veda Speak?* It contains a rigorous translation of the concluding part of Dharmakīrti’s extensive excursus on the critique of the Mīmāṃsakas at the end of the first chapter of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV 1.312-340) along with his auto-commentary (*svavṛtti*) (PVSV 164:24-176:16). The title unambiguously indicates that Dharmakīrti, like Saṅghabhadra, does not link the traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine and employs the strategy of revealing the undesirable consequence that the Veda is an unintelligible text if it is, as the Mīmāṃsakas claim, without an author.

However, Dharmakīrti’s engagement with this doctrine is far more extensive than that of Saṅghabhadra, and therefore, a multitude of arguments are employed to refute the Mīmāṃsaka claim. As Eltschinger (2012, 14-5) summarizes the situation, from diverse arguments employed by Dharmakīrti in this section, we may discern two main threads:

1. As Dharmakīrti strongly insists upon in an earlier passage, by denying the Veda any human agency and hence intentionality, the Mīmāṃsaka deprives it of any meaning, for meaningfulness depends on conventions (*sanketa, samaya*) that are nothing but shared semantic intentions (*vivakṣā, vaktur icchā/abhiprāyaḥ*). An authorless scripture could only be unintelligible and devoid of truth value.

2. But there is yet another reason why the meaning of the Veda, granted it exists, cannot be arrived at by the Mīmāṃsaka unless he contradicts his own claim that humans, qua humans, cannot perceive supersensible things. Since Vedic words have an invisible relation to invisible

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things, no one can pretend to ascertain what they really refer to. (numerals are added)

Despite minor arguments that cannot be easily subsumed under this summary, Dharmakīrti’s section on the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda on the whole consists of two principal strategies. First he argues that the Veda, being an authorless text, cannot bear any meaning, and second, even if we suppose the meaningfulness of it, the Mīmāṃsakas cannot decipher its meaning since they do not admit a human capability of perceiving supersensible things, such as the relation between Vedic words and their putative supersensible referents. Among these two, the first exactly matches the argument of Saṅghabhadra that the Veda, which is speech not preceded by an intellect, does not convey any meaning. In what follows, in order to document the thesis that the first thread of Dharmakīrti’s arguments is, if not a direct inheritance from Saṅghabhadra, then at least in line with Saṅghabhadra’s strategy, I extract Dharmakīrti’s remarks that represent this thread from his section on the authorlessness of the Veda.

The whole strategy of demonstrating the unintelligibility of the Veda could not have been more poignantly expressed than in the following verse of Dharmakīrti.

Therefore, what valid cognition is there that the [Vedic] statement [which is ordinarily taken to mean] “One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra” doesn’t mean “One should eat dog meat”?279

This verse shows the meaninglessness of the Veda by rather maliciously interpreting the stock example of the Vedic injunction, “one who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra,” as meaning “one should eat dog meat.” This deliberate semantic distortion of the Vedic injunction is possible from subsequent verses and commentaries on them, mainly because, for Dharmakīrti, language is a system of conventions that operate in accordance with the speaker’s intention.

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279 PV 1.318, “tenāgnihotram juhuyāt svargakāma iti śrutau khādec chvamāmsam ity eṣa nārtha ity atra kā pramāḥ/”; translation is from Eltschinger, Krasser, Taber (2012, 40).
Over the three verses (PV 1.327-9), negating the Mīmāṃsakas’ contention that the word-meaning relationship is natural, Dharmakīrti argues that language is a conventional system that is instrumental in conveying the speaker’s intention (1.327ab), and consequently, the word-meaning relationship is arbitrary rather than necessary (1.329ab). Accordingly, the authorless Veda has no fixed meaning (1.327cd, 1.328d). In the course of commenting on these verses, Dharmakīrti differentiates two orders, of nature and of convention, and points out that language belongs to the latter. The major difference between the two orders lies in the necessity of the “explanatory rule” (paribhāṣā). Those that belong to the order of nature (svabhāvabheda) such as the color “blue” are perceived, without any explanation, by sense organs (indriyagamya). On the contrary, it is improper to apprehend those which belong to the order of convention (sāmayika) such as the “insignia of a king” based on their natures, that is, as things themselves, since understanding the significance of such things requires an explanatory rule (tadapekṣapratīti) and their meanings conform to the intention of their users (icchāvṛtti).

If the nature of language is a conventional system operating in conformity with the speaker’s intention, then the meaning of Vedic words, employed without any specific intention, cannot be ascertained. The word-meaning relationship is conventional, and therefore, arbitrary (svātantrya; as in PV 1.329a). Thus a word does not have a necessary relationship with any meaning and stands in relation to every meaning equally (sarvatra tulyatva), not having a natural relationship with any of them (kvacid apratibandha). The linguistic convention is specifically designed for the purpose of illuminating the speaker’s intention (vivakṣāprakāśana) and it is characterized by the function of announcing the speaker’s intention (abhiprāyanivedana). It is

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280 For translation see ibid., 58-61.
281 This is an explanatory paraphrase of PVSV on PV 1.328c (173:2-5) translated in ibid., 60.
282 For a concise presentation of this “semantical principle” with information on relevant passages found in Dharmakīrti’s works and later commentaries on them, see Tillemans (1997).
the speaker’s intention, tailored to be conveyed to others by this conventional system, that restricts a word to designate a specific meaning. In the case of the authorless Veda (*apauruṣeya*) in which neither an intention to speak nor a conventional system suited for expressing that intention is found, there can be no restriction (*niyama*) of the meaning of the text, and consequently, there can be no knowledge about it (*tajñāna*).  

With these arguments, Dharmakīrti confirms what we have observed in Saṅghabhadra’s argumentation: Any linguistic encounter with the Veda, as long as it is assumed to be authorless, is *a priori* a failure.

It is this impotence of Vedic words to convey their own meanings that justifies Dharmakīrti’s interpretive violence to the Vedic injunction. Dharmakīrti explains: “A [Vedic] sentence such as “One who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra” is neither [inherently] close to nor remote from any [particular] meaning; [hence] we do not see any distinctive property [of the sentence which would determine] that its meaning is that one should pour ghee, etc., into a certain element [i.e., fire] in a way that is admissible [to Brahmins], but not that one should eat dog meat.” As this explanatory note makes clear, the rationale behind Dharmakīrti’s malicious interpretation is the fact that the word-meaning relationship is arbitrary and the conventional relationship between them does not operate without the speaker’s intention. Other scriptures are intelligible, as Dharmakīrti subsequently elaborates, specifically because the original teachers (*upadeṣṭṛ*) or the speakers (*bruvāṇa*) of those scriptures possess an intention to make their teaching known to others (*lokaprattyāyanābhiprāya*) and, in accordance with such intention, they observe the linguistic conventions of the world (*lokasaṃketaprasiddhi*). In the case of the Veda, on the contrary, we cannot expect such desire for communication from anyone,

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283 This is an explanatory paraphrase of PVSV on PV 1.327 (172:19-24) translated in Eltschinger, Krasser, Taber (2012, 59).

284 PVSV 167:11-4, “kvacid apy arthe prayāsattiviprakāṣaraḥṣaraḥṣayaṃvaghihvitaṃ juhuyāt svargakāma ityādivākyasya bhūtaviśeṣe yathābhikāmatam ghrātita prakṣiped ity ayam arthaḥ na punah śvamāṃsam khāded iti nātiśayam paśyāmah.”; translation is from ibid., 40-1.
and therefore, the Veda, unlike other scriptures, must be unintelligible.\textsuperscript{285} Dharmakīrti’s refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda contains richer content than what is presented here; a separate analysis is needed to have an overall picture of his project. However, by pulling one theme from his discussion of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, one thing becomes evident: Dharmakīrti inherits Saṅghabhadra’s—rather than Bhāviveka’s—strategy of refuting the idea that the Veda is authorless. What has also become clear is that proving the unintelligibility and the evil authorship of the Veda are different. Just as Bhāviveka does not consider the unintelligibility of the Veda as a possibility, Dharmakīrti makes no effort to prove the existence of an author and his evil nature. That is to say, Dharmakīrti’s engagement with the Mīmāṃsakas does not involve the traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda via its author(s).

\textbf{3.4.2 Śāntarakṣita’s Prioritization of Saṅghabhadra-Dharmakīrti’s Strategy over Bhāviveka’s}

The place where Śāntarakṣita discusses the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda is the chapter titled “Examination of the Revelation (i.e., the Veda)” (śrutiparīkṣā) in the \textit{Tattvasaṃgraha} (Shastri 1968; TS). This extensive chapter of 725 verses and accompanied by Kamalaśīla’s elaborate commentary (\textit{Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā}, ibid.; TSP) is divided into two sections: the opponent’s views (pūrṇapakṣa; vv. 2084-2350) and their refutations (uttarapakṣa; vv. 2351-2809).\textsuperscript{286} Throughout the chapter, Śāntarakṣita takes up the Mīmāṃsaka view of the Veda, which includes its authorless and eternal nature.

As was the case with Dharmakīrti’s critique of the Mīmāṃsakas, a comprehensive and

\textsuperscript{285} See PVSV on PV 1.318 (167:16-21) translated in ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{286} Verse numbers are according to Shastri (1968) edition.
systematic analysis of this long portion of the text is inappropriate and unnecessary here. In accordance with our purpose of comparing post-Bhāviveka thinkers with Bhāviveka on the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda and, ultimately, of showing that the traditional critique of the Veda became obsolete after Bhāviveka, I only focus on several verses from the concluding section (vv. 2786-2809) of Śāntarakṣita’s chapter. What I would like to demonstrate is this: Śāntarakṣita, although he was aware of Bhāviveka’s strategy of countering the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, employed it only in a limited way, finally opting for Saṅghabhadra and Dharmakīrti’s strategy on the unintelligibility of the Veda.

Śāntarakṣita shows familiarity with two of Bhāviveka’s arguments. The first is that the Veda is a work of an evil being (MHK 9.31), and the second is that Buddhist scriptures are also devoid of authorship (MHK 9.25). Śāntarakṣita reiterates these two arguments in a limited manner, but his versions are highly reminiscent of Bhāviveka’s original formulations. As he reiterates the first argument, Śāntarakṣita, though alluding to Bhāviveka’s strategy of providing quotations from the Veda, does not argue for their evil authorship. Rather, he argues that the Veda *may have been* authored by a human being.

Also, it is clearly possible (*sambhāvyate*) that the Veda originates from a human as it speaks of sexual misconduct, killing of living beings, and [telling] lies. [Other] characteristics of the Veda such as being hard to pronounce, vulgar, corrupt, and repugnant to the ears are also found in the words of the heretics (*nāstika*).287 These verses resemble MHK 9.31 when it enumerates the immoral items that the Veda teaches and compares the Veda with the teaching of the heretics (instead of the treatise of the Magas). The similarity between those verses becomes more evident when Kalamaśīla lists the relevant

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Vedic quotations, though in a concise fashion compared to that in TJ 9.31. However, despite the similarities between Śāntarakṣita’s verses and MHK 9.31, what they attempt to achieve is quite different. Unlike MHK 9.31, Śāntarakṣita does not seek to prove the evil authorship of the Veda. He does not even argue that the Veda must be endowed with a human author. Śāntarakṣita states the authorship of the Veda merely as a possibility. Śāntarakṣita’s silence on the nature of the Veda’s putative author must be called peculiar, since what he observes in those two verses is that “the characteristics of the Veda such as teaching sexual misconduct are also found in the words of the heretics.” In other words, it is rather strange for Śāntarakṣita not to comment on the immorality of the Veda or its putative author while pointing out conspicuously immoral teachings as characteristics of the Veda (vedadharma).

Immediately after showing that the characteristics of the Veda are also found in works of human origin, thereby suggesting the possibility of the same human origin for the Veda, Śāntarakṣita changes his strategy against the Mīmāṁsakas, specifically attacking Kumārila’s claim that the Veda is not a human work since the everlasting Vedic lineage is a lineage of recitation that does not tamper with the Veda. It is at this juncture that Bhāviveka’s thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures reappears.

Moreover, with this mode [of reasoning], no [scripture] whatsoever would be of human origin since even the words of the Buddha can be inferred to be such

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288 See TSP (vol. 2, 896) on TS 2786-7.
290 TS 2341, “vedasyādhyayanam sarvaṃ gurvaḥyayanapūrvvakam/ vedādhyayanavācyatvād adhunādhyayanam yathā”/” This is the direct quotation from the Ślokavārttika’s “Sentence” chapter (vākyādhikarana), verse 366. Compare the TJ passage that provoked Bhāviveka to formulate the thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures. TJ D275a1-2, “By Manu, Yājñavalkya, Vyāsa, Vasiṣṭha and so on, by those sages, the Veda has been taught, but not composed by them. The words and tradition of the Veda have been successively reproduced by a lineage of ancient sages, and this lineage of transmission has never been interrupted; for this reason it is called Āgama.” (ma nu dang dza ga nya ba la ka la dang 'hya sa dang aa shtsa la sogs pa'i thub pa rnams kyi kyang rig byed rjes su bstan pa yin gyi, byas pa ni ma yin te. rig byed kyi yi ge dang lungs mthar gyis thub pa snga ma'i rgyud las rjes su bsgrosh sning brgyud nas 'ongs pa rgyun ma chad par byung ba yin pa'i phyir, lung zhes bya bar bstan pa yin no.)
[that is, authorless]. That (=the words of the Buddha) is said to be his (=the Buddha’s) because it was [merely] manifested[, that is, not created,] by him.\textsuperscript{291}

This version of the thesis resembles Bhāviveka’s presentation in the \textit{Prajñāpradīpa} in that it relegates the Buddha to the medium of Buddhist scriptures. However, it does not go as far as Bhāviveka’s version to state that the Buddha is tantamount to non-medium and that a Mādhyamika, based on the doctrine of emptiness, recognizes no agent including, the speaker of Buddhist sūtras, from the beginning. The difference between Bhāviveka’s and Śāntarakṣita’s thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is not just a difference in intensity of the same argument. Śāntarakṣita further elaborates the thesis and, in so doing, clarifies that this thesis is only for the sake of refuting the Mīmāṁsakas’ argument. That is, Śāntarakṣita, unlike Bhāviveka, does not allow himself to be seen to argue for the authorlessness of Buddhist sūtras as his own tenet.

Śāntarakṣita restricts the implication of his claim in two ways. First, he explicitly specifies that this is not what Buddhists claim. As he rather ironically expresses it:

\begin{quote}
If you (=the Mīmāṁsakas) rejoin that such [a thesis of the authorlessness] is not argued for by Buddhists [themselves], [I would answer:] why do they not think in that same line of reasoning?\textsuperscript{292}
\end{quote}

This is his way of criticizing the Mīmāṁsaka argument for its irrationality: “If this matter is endowed with rationality, then why would Buddhists not admit this? It is because it is not reasonable for a considerate person to reject a rational matter.”\textsuperscript{293} Thus, it is clear that the thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is not what Buddhists, as considerate people, take to be true. It is employed only to show the Mīmāṁsakas that their tactic of proving the


\textsuperscript{292} TS 2791ab, “\textit{parair evaṃ na ceṣṭaṃ cet tulye nyāye na kiṃ matam?”}

\textsuperscript{293} TSP on 2791 (vol. 2, 897:21-3), “\textit{yady ayam artho yuktupetah syāt, tadā kimiti bauddho nābhypagacchet? na hi nyāyopapanne ‘rthe prekṣāvato ‘nabhypagamo yuktaḥ.”}
authorlessness of the Veda based on the uninterrupted tradition of its recitation fails.

Let it be that such is not the thesis of the other party [i.e., Buddhists]. However, because of [the logic of your own] reasoning, it is doubted to be so.294

In short, “we are saying,” as Kamalaśīla interprets, “that for you [i.e., Kumārila] by [your own] reasoning, such [an absurd consequence that Buddhist scriptures are also without an author] would follow.”295

This absurd consequence would follow from the Mīmāṃsaka argument essentially because Kumārila takes a logical leap when he concludes that the Veda is without an author on the basis that the tradition of the Vedic recitation is everlasting. What we can deduce from the fact that the tradition is everlasting is only that “it is beginningless” (anāditā), but “not that it is independent of the human” (anarasaṃśraya). And, if Kumārila’s logic is to be followed, nothing in the world is new, and, in this sense, everything is beginningless. Even an original thought formulated by an author’s intuition is, in fact, initiated under the influence of pre-existing subjects and notions. In other words, it must be admitted that any idea or tenet (siddhānta), however creative it is, initially came into being under the influence of others.296 Therefore, should Kumārila take the everlasting tradition of Vedic recitation to entail the authorlessness of the Veda, he must admit that other scriptures are also authorless.297 Just as one’s recitation of the Veda is accomplished under the influence of one’s guru, all religious and philosophical tenets are formulated under the influence of others. If we were to turn this beginningless intellectual debt into a concept of “authorlessness” as Kumārila does, every intellectual tradition would be authorless.

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294 TS 2791cd, “mā bhūd vaievam parasyeṣṭir nyāyāt tv āśamkyate tathā!?”
295 TSP on 2791 (897, 24-5), “tathāpi nyāyād evam āpadyate bhavata iti brūmahe.”
296 See TSP on 2796 (899:11-2), “ye ’pi tāvat svapraṭibhāracitasāṅketāḥ siddhāntāḥ teṣām api yathāśrutārthavikalpavasāvēnaiva pravrṭteḥ parasaspankarabalēnaiva pravrṭtih.”
297 TS 2795, “api cānāditā siddhyed evam nānarasaṃśrayayāt tasmād akṛtatāve vā syād anyo ’py āgamo ’kṛtaḥ!?”
Since the Mīmāṃsakas understand the authorlessness of a scripture as the mark of its authority, this vicious logical consequence of Kumārila’s logic (or logical leap) would further legitimize and authorize the validity of every tradition, however morally depraved it is (e.g., the Persians’ custom) or however intellectually inadequate it is (e.g., the tenets of the heretics).298 Kumārila’s logic, devised to prove the exclusive authority of the Veda, thus comes to establish the authority of all intellectual traditions inclusively. As this Mīmāṃsaka project of successively translating “beginninglessness” (anāditā) into “authorlessness” (apauruṣeyatva) and the latter then into “authoritativeness” (pramāṇatva) de facto applies to all intellectual traditions, Śāntarakṣita finally doubts the usefulness of the project itself: “Even if such authorlessness is established, what merit is there for you? [There would be none] since your whole effort [was to establish the authorlessness] as the ground for [exclusive] truthfulness.”299 The Mīmāṃsakas’ final objective of attributing “truthfulness” to the Veda would never be achieved when all other scriptures, like the Veda, are authorless since they—the Veda and other scriptures—mutually contradict each other.300

In the course of nullifying Kumārila’s argument, Śāntarakṣita instrumentally employs Bhāviveka’s thesis on the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures. Applying Kumārila’s logic, first of all, to the case of Buddhist scriptures enables Śāntarakṣita to demonstrate the inherent flaw in the Mīmāṃsaka project of basing the authority of the Veda on its authorless feature. However, at the same time, Śāntarakṣita, unlike Bhāviveka, claims that the thesis of the authorlessness of Buddhist scriptures is presented only for the sake of refuting the Mīmāṃsakas, stating that it is not the position advocated by Buddhists and that Kumārila’s logic applies, not only to Buddhist

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298 See TS 2796, “tathā hi pārasīkādvivahārāh parāśrayāh/ nāstikānāṃ ca siddhāntah parasamśkārabhāvākāh!”
299 TS 2797, “īdṛṣyakṛtakatve ca kāh siddhe ‘pi guṇas tava/ avaitathyanimittam hi yatno ‘yaṃ bhavato ’khilah!”
scriptures, but also to all other scriptures. In this manner, Śāntarakṣita restricts the implication of Bhāviveka’s thesis and thereby controls its possible interpretive range. His approach toward Bhāviveka’s project of proving the evil authorship of the Veda is the same. By suggesting the human authorship of the Veda merely as a possibility, while alluding to Bhāviveka’s collection of evil quotations from the Veda at TJ 9.31, Śāntarakṣita, although he is clearly reading MHK 9, significantly weakens the original claim.

Śāntarakṣita’s heavy dependence on Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, is pervasive throughout the Tattvasamgraha,301 and his basic stance toward the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda is directly indebted to Dharmakīrti. Hence, rather than detailing Śāntarakṣita’s inheritance from Dharmakīrti, I would like to focus on the two verses (2806-7) found toward the end of the “Examination of the Revelation” chapter to demonstrate Śāntarakṣita’s policy of prioritizing Dharmakīrti’s opinion over Bhāviveka’s in his engagement with the Mīmāṃsakas’ “authorlessness” doctrine.

Before we proceed to analyze those concluding verses, let us recall basic facts about Bhāviveka’s and Dharmakīrti’s strategies of countering the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. Bhāviveka continues the traditional critique of the Veda, and in so doing, formulates a syllogism, in MHK 9.31, to prove the evil authorship of the Veda (vedo ‘yam asatpurusakartṛkaḥ). Bhāviveka supports his thesis by listing evil teachings found in the Veda (bhūtahiṃsāsurāpānamithyokter) and corroborates his case with the example of the treatise of the Magas (magaśāstravat).

Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, shows no awareness of such traditional critique and inherits Saṅghabhadra’s position that an authorless text is an unintelligible text. When we read Śāntarakṣita’s verses with these two contrasting views in mind, it is clear that Śāntarakṣita is

301 See McClintock (2010, 75ff.) for an assessment of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s intellectual debt to Dharmakīrti as regards their pramāṇa theories.
drawing upon both trends of thoughts but, at the same time, gives primacy to Dharmakīrti’s over Bhāviveka’s strategy. This policy of prioritizing Dharmakīrti’s strategy is unambiguously expressed in the following two verses.

The fools [i.e., Brahmins], like Persians to their custom (svācāre pārasīkavat), are attached to the Veda whose form and meaning are unintelligible to humans, and for that reason, which is like darkness [rather than light as you assume]. Those [Brahmins], for whom the meaning of it [i.e., the Veda] remains unintelligible, just like [Persians], engage in evil acts such as killing living beings (pravarttante prāṇiḥiṃsādikamlmaṣe) as a consequence of the flow of their past sinful [karma].

In these two verses, Śāntarakṣita alludes to the reason (hetu) and the example (dṛṣṭānta) of Bhāviveka’s syllogism at MHK 9.31. The example of the Maga treatise is changed into “Persians” (pārasīka); the “people” of Persia replace their “text.” The reason of the Veda’s teaching on evil acts such as killing is changed into Brahmins’ engagement in such acts; the “acts” of Brahmins replace the “injunctions,” that is, the textual basis of their acts. With these modifications, in Śāntarakṣa’s presentation, the object of critique is changed from the Brahmins’ text, the Veda, to the Brahmins themselves. What is instrumental in both of those changes is the idea that the Veda is an unintelligible text. That is to say, as long as Śāntarakṣita regards the Veda as an unintelligible text, he cannot reproduce the elements of Bhāviveka’s syllogism without modification.

Bhāviveka compares the Veda with the Magas’ treatise; he finds them to be similar in teaching evil conducts. But, if one assumes that the Veda is meaningless, the similarity between them does not hold, since the Magas’ treatise is blamed for flagrantly justifying immoral acts, not for being meaningless. In the first verse, therefore, immorality is not the basis of comparison.

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302 TS 2806-7, “narāvijñātarūpārthe tamobhūte tataḥ sthite/ vede ’nurāgo madānāṃ svācāre pārasīkavat// avijñātatadarthāś ca pāpanisyandayogataḥ tathaivāmī pravarttante prāṇiḥiṃsādikamlmaṣe//”
Since the natures of the Veda and the Persian text (if one assumes its existence), are dissimilar, Śāntarakṣita changes the objects of comparison to people, viz. Brahmins and Persians, and notes the similar “blindness” of their faiths or obsessions, respectively, to the Veda and immoral practices. In the second verse, on the other hand, the immorality of Brahmins is noted and the similarity between Brahmins and Persians is also observed. However, unlike the case of Persians, Brahmins’ blind faith in the Veda does not explain their immoral practices. This is because the Veda does not produce any meaning for them, and hence, the Veda has nothing to do with Brahmin practice. Śāntarakṣita draws on the law of karma to explain the cause of Brahmins’ evil practices, and in this process, the Veda becomes almost extraneous to his critique of Brahmins.

We may summarize the significance of Śāntarakṣita’s verses as follows: It is certain that Śāntarakṣita reads and refers to MHK 9.31. However, Śāntarakṣita, in a more fundamental manner, subscribes to the idea that the Veda is an unintelligible text maintained by Saṅghabhadra and Dharmakīrti. It is impossible to harmonize this idea with MHK 9.31 since the latter, being a syllogism to prove the evil authorship of the Veda, presupposes a human author, and necessarily, the intelligibility of the Veda. As he combines both trends, Śāntarakṣita subjugates MHK 9.31 under the principle of the unintelligibility of the Veda. In the course of this subjugation, the thesis of MHK 9.31, the evil authorship of the Veda, is entirely abandoned and, as we have seen, the attenuated form of it—the existence of a human author—is only suggested as a possibility. Other elements of MHK 9.31, the reason and example, are also distorted in accordance with the principle of the unintelligibility of the Veda. The Veda, as an unintelligible text, no longer plays the role of the textual basis for Brahmins’ killing animals in Vedic sacrifice, and accordingly, the comparison is made between people, not between texts. In short, as a consequence of Śāntarakṣita’s prioritization of the Saṅghabhadra-Dharmakīrti thesis over Bhāviveka’s, traces of MHK 9.31 are found, but only in a distorted manner.
3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have reviewed Bhāviveka’s continuation of the traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda and compared his position with those who came before and after him in the context of their encounters with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. In doing so, we have observed that there were two different and mutually incompatible tracks of countering the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine for those Buddhists. The first track, taken solely by Bhāviveka, is to prove the human authorship of the Veda based on its intelligibility and to demonstrate the evil nature of the putative author by adducing immoral teachings from the Veda. The second track is to draw the undesirable consequence from the Mīmāṃsaka argument that the Veda, being devoid of an authorial intention, must be a meaningless and unintelligible text. This second track of refuting the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine was initiated by Saṅghabhadra and followed by later representative Buddhist thinkers such as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. Given that the well-established Buddhist tradition of problematizing and criticizing the spiritual and moral defects of the authors of the Veda (Vedic seers) is discontinued after Bhāviveka, I conclude that the traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda via its author within the Indian Buddhist tradition became obsolete in the sixth century. As a conclusion, in what follows, I would like to comment on the historical significance of the contributions of the four thinkers to this process, that is, the decline of the traditional critique of the Veda.

It is Saṅghabhadra (fifth century) who anticipated the decline. If the Mīmāṃsakas formulated their doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda through their confrontation with the Buddhist critique of the Veda as Jayatilleke and Clooney suppose, this linkage goes unnoticed by Saṅghabhadra. As we have seen in Chapter One, Saṅghabhadra actually criticizes Vedic seers, as
the authors of the Veda, for not being free of the three poisons. However, it is important to note that he does not employ the critique of the Veda against the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. The timing of his use of the old critique of the Veda is when the opponent withdraws from the original position and begins to advocate the authority of the Veda as the work of Vedic seers. When the opponent maintains the authorlessness of the Veda, Saṅghabhadra merely notes that the Veda would be an unintelligible text. This correlation between the ideas of “authorlessness” and “unintelligibility” is the key contribution of Saṅghabhadra to the later development of the Buddhist policy of confronting the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine.

Bhāviveka (sixth century), viewed in comparison with other thinkers, is peculiar in that he shows no doubt regarding the meaningfulness of the Veda. His reaction to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, taken as a whole, seems to support the Jayatilleke-Clooney thesis. That is, Bhāviveka reacts as if the traditional critique of the Veda is nullified by the Mīmāṃsakas when they eradicate its authorship. Bhāviveka’s arguments to prove the intelligibility, the human authorship of the Veda, and lastly, the evil nature of that authorship can be viewed accordingly as an attempt to recover and revitalize the official Buddhist attitude toward the Veda by providing concrete and detailed supporting materials. However, since later Buddhists did not inherit his strategy, Bhāviveka’s version of the traditional critique of the Veda marks the doctrinal and temporal culmination of the critique.

The two post-Bhāviveka Buddhists end the traditional critique of the Veda in different ways. Dharmakīrti (sixth or seventh century) does not consider the traditional critique of the Veda as a possible option to be employed against the Mīmāṃsakas and elaborates on Saṅghabhadra’s contention that the authorless text is unintelligible. The absence of the traditional critique of the Veda in Dharmakīrti’s engagement with the Mīmāṃsakas implies the following: 1.
Dharmakīrti opts for Saṅghabhadra’s strategy of dealing with the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine. 2. the Mīmāṃsakas whom Dharmakīrti criticizes no longer fall back on the authority of Vedic seers to establish the authority of the Veda; the need to directly attack the seers, the putative authors of the Veda, is not present in Dharmakīrti’s writing. While we can infer that Dharmakīrti chooses to dispense with the traditional critique of the Veda only indirectly through its absence, Śāntarakṣita (eighth century) explicitly selects Saṅghabhadra-Dharmakīrti’s strategy over Bhāviveka’s by showing his familiarity with Bhāviveka’s arguments. As we have seen, Śāntarakṣita restricts the force of Bhāviveka’s arguments, subjugating them to the principle of the unintelligibility of an authorless text.

When we lay out the reactions of these four Buddhist thinkers to the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda in this fashion, it appears that the traditional critique of the Veda died out because it was not selected by Indian Buddhists of the fifth to eighth centuries as an effective manner of confronting the newly arisen opponent, the Mīmāṃsakas. That is to say, the earlier Buddhist strategy of countering the Brahmin advocacy of the Veda was not adopted by later Buddhists (except for Bhāviveka) who confronted, not Vedic ritualists in general, but particularly the Mīmāṃsakas. The Buddhist tradition of accusing the authors of the Veda of having spiritual and moral defects came to be lost, but not without repercussions, as later Buddhists encountered the Mīmāṃsaka group of Vedic ritualists who eliminated authorship from the Veda possibly under the influence of the Buddhist critique of the Veda.
Chapter Four: Decline of the Buddhist Critique of Vedic Sacrifice

4.1 Introduction

By comparing the reactions of several fifth- to eighth-century Buddhist authors to one specific Mīmāṃsaka doctrine (the authorlessness of the Veda), we saw in the last chapter how the original Buddhist strategy of demeaning the intellectual and moral capacities of the Veda’s authors is not inherited by later Buddhist intellectuals with the exception of Bhāviveka, who invested his thesis on the evil authorship of the Veda with concrete examples from it. This marks the doctrinal and temporal culmination of the traditional Buddhist critique of the Veda.

The critique of Vedic sacrifice is another major form of Buddhist critique of Vedic ritualists, developed from the earliest period of Buddhism. As we have seen in Chapter One, the main point of this critique is that killing animals in a ritual setting should be abandoned since the act of killing is karmically negative, and accordingly, would bring about a negative fruit to the actor in the future. We also observed that this tendency to criticize animal sacrifice is a well-established Buddhist tradition. Along with the critique of the Veda for its defective authorship, the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice is attested in pre-Bhāviveka texts, including the sacrifice-related suttas, the Mahāvibhāṣā, the Tattvasiddhi, and the Nyāyānusāra.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that Bhāviveka also marks the end of the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice. In his two works, the Prajñāpradīpa and MHK 9, Bhāviveka continues to criticize ritual killing in Vedic sacrifice in his polemics against the Mīmāṃsakas. However, a
comparison between Bhāviveka and post-Bhāviveka Buddhists cannot be adopted to show the
decline of the critique of Vedic sacrifice. This is because, to my knowledge, later post-Bhāviveka
Buddhist authors do not confront the Mīmāṃsakas on animal sacrifice. In the case of the critique
of the Veda, although post-Bhāviveka Buddhists do not inherit the discourse, they expressed their
views on the Veda by initiating a different line of argument against the Mīmāṃsakas; they argued
that, if it is to be assumed authorless, it must be an unintelligible text. However, regarding
Brahmins’ ritual killing, they offer no opinion.

While Buddhists criticized Vedic sacrifice from the beginning, the Mīmāṃsakas only
began to defend animal sacrifice very late. The early Mīmāṃsā authors Jaimini (2nd c. BCE?) and
Śabara (5th c. CE?) curiously do not respond to the persistent Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice.
Considering the Mīmāṃsakas’ response to the Buddhist critique of the Veda from the earliest
document of the school, the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MS), at least according to the Jayatilleke-Clooney
thesis,303 it is strange, as Clooney (1990, 216) puts it, that “Jaimini is silent on the topic of the
killing of animals and indeed offers no defense against the charge that this hiṃsā is
irreligious.”304 Jaimini’s silence is continued by Śabara, whose commentary is the next oldest
extant text of the school. Commenting on the codanāsūtra (MS 1.1.2), Śabara considers whether
ritual killing in the Śyena sacrifice is dharma (duty) or not. But the “killing” considered by
Śabara is not animal sacrifice but killing an enemy as the result of a sacrifice.305 In other words,

303 See Chapter Three, 3.1 Introduction.
304 Clooney (ibid.) adds: “At best (and putting it somewhat crudely) his [=Jaimini’s] view seems to be that
animals are not “used” in the sacrifice, only parts of animals.”
305 See Halbfass (1991, 89-90). Śabara seems to be motivated by an objection that must be similar to that
of Harivarman. As we have seen in Chapter One, when the opponent attempts to justify Vedic sacrifice by
drawing upon the magical power of Vedic seers who can kill by means of mantra, Harivarman argues that,
though they practice such sorcery because of merits accumulated in the past, they would gain demerit by
using that power for killing others. Harivarman claims that one gains demerits by practicing Vedic
sacrifice with special reference to the black magic type, and Śabara seems accept that criticism by
removing black magic sacrifices from the realm of dharma defined by the Veda (codanālakṣaṇa) and thus
rescues the Veda from serving immoral purposes such as killing (hiṃsā). See Chapter One, 1.4
ritual killing that is discussed by Śabara as problematic is killing external to Vedic sacrifice itself, that is, killing that is not committed during the sacrificial session. In this sense, Śabara, like Jaimini, shows no awareness of the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice. The first Mīmāṃsaka who acknowledges the outsiders’, including Buddhists’, critique of ritual killing is Kumārila (6th or 7th c. CE). As concisely but masterfully analyzed by Halbfass (1991), Kumārila defends ritual killing and refutes the outsiders’ censure in two works, the Ślokavārttika (ŚV) and the Tantravārttika (TV).

The last Buddhist works to consider Vedic sacrifice are Bhāviveka’s PP and MHK 9; thus, they belong to the sixth century CE. The first Mīmāṃsaka works to defend ritual killing in Vedic sacrifice are Kumārila’s ŚV and TV; thus, they belong to either the sixth or seventh century CE. In short, when Buddhists stopped criticizing Vedic sacrifice, the Mīmāṃsakas started defending it. The phenomenon that I call the “decline of the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice” occurred, therefore, with the emergence of the defense of Vedic sacrifice.

However, those two events cannot be a mere coincidence. The Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice was specifically directed at Vedic ritualists and, after Saṅghabhadra, the same accusation was employed against the Mīmāṃsakas. Kumārila’s apologetics for ritual killing was

Harivarman’s Tattvasiddhi: Connecting the Two.

A similar argument found in Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra, noted in Kataoka (2012, 354), seems to already assume the Mīmāṃsakas’ (like Śabara’s) acceptance of the adharmic status of black magic sacrifices. T1562, 530b16-7, “If that is the case, this action of killing by recourse to black magic or curse, such as causing [one’s enemy] to suffer fever or to end [his] life, would be accepted as [the cause] that can bring about a desirable fruit.” (若爾，呪術或以厭禱，令遭熱病，乃至命終，應許此殺能招愛果.) (trans. from Kataoka (ibid.); to convey a better sense of “應,” the underlined phrase needs to be changed to “should be accepted.”) Note that Saṅghabhadra, contrary to Harivarman, does not argue for the karmically negative status of black magic performed by Vedic seers. Instead, he employs a prasaṅga (reductio ad absurdum) against the Mīmāṃsakas, knowing that they would not accept that black magic sacrifices are meritorious. Therefore, if we maintain the dates assigned to Saṅghabhadra (430-490 CE) and Śabara (500-560 CE), it is not Śabara, but an earlier Mīmāṃsaka, who first conceded the unmeritorious status of black magic in Vedic sacrifice.

306 See especially pp. 89-97.
likewise directed against the outsiders such as Buddhists who criticized it. There must have been a certain interaction between the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas. By attending to the dynamics between the vanishing critique on and the emerging defense of Vedic sacrifice around the sixth and seventh century CE, we may be able to discern a historical logic for why Buddhists stopped censuring Brahmin ritual killing.

The textual sources most relevant to our inquiry are the last Buddhist and the first Mīmāṃsaka works that discuss ritual killing. As noted, they are Bhāviveka’s PP and MHK 9 and Kumārila’s ŚV and TV. The nature of Kumārila’s apologetics in ŚV and TV and their presence in Bhāviveka’s works differ considerably, and, it is ŚV that bears closer dialogic relationship to the latter works. Therefore, in what follows, I compare PP’s and MHK 9’s sections on ritual killing, only using the relevant ŚV section to determine the Mīmāṃsakas’ role in the decline of the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice.

4.2 Once Again on the Bhāviveka-Sāṃkhya Alliance: Two Nearly Identical Syllogisms Held by Two Different Groups Against Two Yet Different Groups

Comparing Bhāviveka’s criticism of and Kumārila’s defense of ritual killing in PP and ŚV, we find two almost identical syllogisms about the karmic consequences for the ritual killer. The one in PP is presented as Bhāviveka’s own argument; the other in ŚV as the opponent’s argument to be refuted by Kumārila. Let us first consider the syllogism found in PP.

[thesis:] An action characterized as killing [conducted] in a sacrificial ground brings about, to the agent [of killing] in the future lifetime, the karmic fruit similar to the fruit that is brought about [to the sacrificial victim] in this life at that [sacrificial] ground. [reason:] it is because [the sacrificial killing] is a specific kind of action. [example:] For example, it is just as [an act of] giving
[brings about a corresponding result to the giver in the future].

To prove the thesis that the ritual killer would be killed in his future lifetime just as the victim is killed by him, Bhāviveka notes that ritual killing is not outside the karmic law of reciprocity between the agent’s karmic fruit and the result of the agent’s action imposed on the receiver. It is just as, when an agent gives something to others, he or she will gain karmic fruit similar to that which the recipient of the gift gains.

This syllogism, although appearing in the context of Bhāviveka’s critique of the Mīmāṃsakas, is not put forward against the Mīmāṃsakas. It is rather made against the Materialists ('jig rten rgyang phan pa, Skt. lokāyata) who are immersed in the teachings of the advocates of the Veda (rig byed smra ba, Skt. vedavādin) to the extent that they, in support of the Mīmāṃsakas, vindicate the dharma-status of ritual killing just as they justify ordinary non-ritual killing as irrelevant to future retribution. Thus, although the syllogism criticizing ritual killing has nothing to do with the Lokāyatas, it is addressed to them, rather than to the Mīmāṃsakas, since the Lokāyatas align themselves with the Mīmāṃsakas and even publicly defend them against the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice.

Kumārila, on the other hand, in his defense of ritual killing, introduces the following syllogism as the opponent’s critique of the Mīmāṃsakas.

[Objection:] [thesis:] Killing produces for its performer after death a fruit

307 PP D216a2-3, “mchod sbyin gyi gnas su 'tshe ba'i mtshan nyid kyi bya ba gang yin pa de ni tshe 'di la de'i gnas la 'bras bu ji lta bur mngon par sgrub par byed pa de lta bu kho na'i 'bras bu tshe phyi ma la byed pa po la mngon par sgrub par byed pa yin te, bya ba'i khyad par yin pa'i phyir, dper na sbyin pa bzhin no.”

308 See PP D215b7-216a1, “Even the Materialists (lokāyata), following the instruction of the sinful Veda-advocates (vedavādin), argue as follows: The action characterized as killing in a Vedic sacrifice, just like the action characterized as killing outside the sacrificial context, is not adharma, since the Veda (śāstra) does not teach any adharma; therefore, your example [i.e., “just as an action characterized by killing in a non-ritualistic space” (dper na mchod sbyin gyi gnas ma yin par 'tshe ba'i mtsan nyid kyi bya ba bzhin no; PP D215b7)] does not hold.” (gang dag 'jig rten rgyang phan pa dag pas kyang sdig che ba rig byed smra ba'i tham lag gi rjes su zhugs nas, mchod sbyin gyi gnas su 'tshe ba'i mtsan nyid kyi bya ba ni, mchod sbyin gyi gnas ma yin par 'tshe ba'i mtsan nyid kyi bya ba ltar, chos ma yin pa ma yin te, bstan bcos las chos ma yin pa mi ston pa'i phyir, dpe ma grub bo zhes zer ro.)
similar to that of its target, [reason:] because it is a kind of action, [example:] like a giving enjoined in the [Vedic] teaching[, that gives a similar fruit to its performer after his death].

As Bhāviveka’s syllogism in PP is not extant in Sanskrit, a direct word-to-word comparison between the two syllogisms is impossible. However, the syllogism of Kumārila’s opponent seems to match Bhāviveka’s almost word for word, with the exception of the example. Both theses highlight the analogy between the victim’s death and the karmic retribution that would befall the killer by using the “just as ... such” construction (“ji lta bu...de lta bu” in PP and “yāḍṛk...tathāvidham” in ŚV) and they both mention that the time of that retribution is the future lifetime (“tshe phyi ma” in PP and “pretya” in ŚV). The reason in PP syllogism is an exact Tibetan translation of that part in ŚV syllogism (bya ba’i khyad par yin pa’i phyir in PP and “kriyāviśeṣatvāt” in ŚV). Kumārila’s opponent also adduces the act of giving (dāna; corresponding to sbyin pa of PP syllogism) as a supportive example of his thesis, but qualifies it as “being enjoined in the Veda” (śāstroktā-). This qualification indicates that both the addressee of this syllogism, unlike those of PP syllogism, belong to orthodox religious groups that acknowledge the authority of the Veda. Kumārila’s opponent, by presenting the example of “giving” (dāna) qualified as an act enjoined in the Veda, defines “giving” as a Vedic value and, at the same time, appeals to the authority of the Veda with an expectation that his syllogism would not be refuted by the Mīmāṃsakas.

Scholars, along with at least one traditional commentator on ŚV, concur that Kumārila’s opponent is the Sāṃkhyas. Umbeka (730-790) notes that Kumārila introduces this syllogism,

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309 ŚV co. 235cd-236ab, “viṣaye śyāḥ phalaṃ yāḍṛk pretya kartus tathāvidham/ hiṃsā kriyāviśeṣatvāt sūte śāstroktadānavat”; Translation is from Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 487). For the sake of discussion, I broke down the opponent’s syllogism into parts by adding the headings (e.g., “[thesis:]”) to Kataoka’s translation.

formulated by the Sāṃkhyas, in order to refute it.\footnote{ŚVTṬ 109:22, “idānīṃ sāṃkhyoktam eva prayogadūṣaṇāyopanyasyati, viṣaye ‘syā iti.’” Sucarita (ŚVK 183:10) simply describes the opponent as “someone skilled in inference” (kaścid anumānakusalaḥ).} Halbfass (1991, 116, fn. 11), in his overview of the contents of Kumārila’s defense of ritual killing, briefly opines that “Sāṃkhya ideas seem to be the main target of Kumārila’s argumentation in this section.” Houben (1999a, 146) also comments on the identity of Kumārila’s opponent in the same vein: “Although Kumārila does not mention his opponents by name, they have here been identified primarily as Sāṃkhyas.” Based on these testimonies, we may conclude that the syllogism quoted by Kumārila is one maintained by the Sāṃkhyas against—or, perceived by Kumārila to be against—the Mīmāṃsakas.

We again witness the partnership between Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhyas that we noted in Chapter Three with their common use of a collection of quotations on evil teachings from the Veda found between TJ 9.31 and the Sāṃkhyya commentaries on SK 2. The present case of Bhāviveka-Sāṃkhyya alliance is more meaningful. The correspondence between TJ 9.31 and the commentaries on SK 2 was of materials, not of views. Although Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhyya commentators shared the same materials, what the Sāṃkhyya commentators claimed was the “impurity” (aviśuddhi) of Vedic sacrifice, while Bhāviveka’s objective was to prove the “evil authorship” (asatpuruṣakartrka) of the Veda. Here, in PP and ŠV syllogisms, they express the same view with the same wording. Nevertheless, two differences should not be overlooked. First, the Sāṃkhyas showed their orthodoxy in the ŠV syllogism by qualifying the example of “giving” as enjoined by the Veda. Second, the addressees of the two syllogisms are different; PP syllogism is directed against the Lokāyatas and ŠV syllogism is against the Mīmāṃsakas.
4.3 Pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist-Sāṃkhya Alliance: Shared Doctrine on the Act and Karmic Fruit of Killing in the Yogabhāṣya and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

There is one problem in confirming the partnership between Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhyas from the correspondence between the syllogisms of PP and ŚV: there is no Sāṃkhya work with the syllogism quoted by Kumārila. In fact, there is no similar formulation of the Sāṃkhya view against Vedic ritualists in general, or the Mīmāṃsakas in particular.

The Yogabhāṣya’s commentary on Yogasūtra 2.34 has been referred to as a possible source of the Sāṃkhya view on ritual killing by some scholars (Halbfass 1991, 116, fn. 11 and Kataoka 2011, pt. 2, 486, fn. 683). But, when we look at the Yogabhāṣya (YBh) passage, we notice that it contains a general Sāṃkhya view on the act of killing that lacks the sophistication of the syllogism. Although in agreement with the ŚV syllogism on the most basic level, YBh 2.34 cannot only be considered an inchoate version of the Sāṃkhya syllogism. Furthermore, the entire content of YBh 2.34 seems to be of non-Sāṃkhya provenance. As was the case with PP and ŚV syllogisms, YBh 2.34 exactly matches another Buddhist text, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh). The correspondence of the underdeveloped version of ŚV syllogism in YBh with AKBh implies 1. that the PP and ŚV syllogisms evolved from preexistent doctrines on killing and its karmic consequences and 2. that a Buddhist-Sāṃkhya alliance had already been forged at that early stage. Such a pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist-Sāṃkhya alliance was likely made possible by the Sāṃkhya adoption of Buddhist views contained in AKBh.

The Yogabhāṣya, attributed to a certain Vyāsa,312 is known to have been compiled under

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312 Maas (2013) argues for the single authorship of the Yogasūtra and the Yogabhāṣya (collectively called Pātañjalayogaśāstra) and, in support of his argument, presents internal (61-4) and external (57-61) evidences. He summarizes his view as follows: “The original source of information for Vyāsa’s alleged authorship is unknown to me. It could be a reflection of the memory that a single person called Patañjali collected some sutras from older sources, composed some sutras himself, arranged (vi+vas) the sūtra part of the śāstra and provided it with his own philosophical explanations which later came to be known as the Yoga Bhāṣya.” (68) Maas (2013, 65) also dates the work: “If one accepts the PYŚ to be a unified whole,
the influence of one branch of the Śāṃkhya tradition headed by Vindhyavāsin\textsuperscript{313} (ca. 300-400 CE) who, according to Paramārtha (499-569 CE),\textsuperscript{314} defeated Buddhamitra, the teacher of Vasubandhu.\textsuperscript{315} And, according to Frauwallner (1973, vol. 2, 318-9), it was around the time of this Śāṃkhya master, Vindhyavāsin, that Śāṃkhya first took the doctrine of karma from the outside. YBh 2.34 documents Śāṃkhya’s recent adoption of the doctrine of karma as applied to the case of killing.

YBh 2.34 consists of three parts. In the first (YBh 218:8-219:8), the Bhāṣya elaborates on Yogasūtra 2.34; it lists and expands the classification of “sinful thoughts” (vitarka) such as killing (hiṃsā) and stresses the need to cultivate the opposite. In the second (219:8-220:6), it lists three different actions that constitute an act of killing and three results corresponding to each

\textsuperscript{313} Bronkhorst (1985) collects traditional authors’ testimony to Patañjali’s authorship of the Yogabhāṣya (203-5), and then observes the correspondence between the theoretical positions attributed to Vindhyavāsin in the Yuktidīpikā and those of the Yogabhāṣya (206-8). Based on this observation Bronkhorst (208) proposes two possibilities regarding the authorship of the Yogabhāṣya: “1. Vindhyavāsin considered himself a follower of Patañjali (patañjali); 2. Vindhyavāsin wrote the Yogabhāṣya in the name of Patañjali.” Maas (2013, 64-5) also considers, citing Aklujkar, two evidences that support Vindhyavāsin’s authorship of the Yogabhāṣya.

\textsuperscript{314} See Takakusu (1900, 281-6).

\textsuperscript{315} See Larson (1999) for his assessment of the Yogasūtra and the Yogabhāṣya as documents of the “Neo-Śāṃkhya,” represented in the figure of Vindhyavāsin, who revised the previous Śāṃkhya system as reflected in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Śāṃkhyaakārikā in polemical encounter with Buddhists. He states (727): “To identify these two streams of philosophizing, however, is not to say that classical Yoga philosophy is nothing more than a combination of Śāṃkhya and Buddhist thought. It is, rather, an updating of the old Śāṃkhya, a creative intervention in the “tradition text” of Śāṃkhya in an attempt to bring the old Śāṃkhya into conversation with many of the issues that were developing in the early classical period, that is, ca., the fourth and fifth centuries of the Common Era. The hybrid formulation, or this new and updated “tradition text” is a kind of Neo-Śāṃkhya (hence, my inclination to agree with Frauwallner and others that it is primarily the creative innovation of Vindhyavāsin), and, thus, it is neither a mistake nor an accident that the Yogasūtrakāśikā is entitled Sāṃkhyaapravacanabhāṣya, or “A Commentary on an Interpretation of the Śāṃkhya.”” See also Larson and Bhattacharya (1987, 146).
action that would befall a killer. In the third (220:6-7), the Bhāṣya states that these three different kinds of actions and results accompany any violation of the five “abstentions” (yama), which begins with “non-violence” (ahimsā).316 To the Yogasūtra 2.34, the Bhāṣya adds the contents of the second and the third parts; it is the second that is most relevant to our inquiry. I cite it in full:

1. And to continue, the killer, first of all, hurls down the vigor of the victim, then causes him pain by falling upon him with a knife or something of the kind, and afterwards, even deprives him of life.

2. As a result of taking away [the victim’s] vigor, his own animate or inanimate aids begin to have their vigor dwindle away. As a result of causing pain, he himself experiences pain in hells and in [the bodies of] animals and of departed spirits and in other [forms]. As a result of uprooting [the victim’s] life, he himself continues [his own life], from moment to moment, at the very point of departure from life. And, even while wishing for death, he somehow [continues to] live since the retribution of pain, the fixed retribution [corresponding to his act of severing the life of the victim], must be experienced [before his death].

3. And if somehow the act of killing be mixed with merit, [and thereby,] even if he obtained happiness, it would be [on condition that] his length of life be short.317

In passage 1, the Yogabhāṣya lists three actions involved in an act of killing and, in 2 it lists three fruits that correspond to each action. Then, in 3, it appends a note, as if in anticipation of a possible objection that would cite a counter-example of the killer having happiness despite his act of killing. Halbfass and Kataoka may have referred to this passage as representing the view of Kumārila’s opponent, since the second passage indicates the similarity observed between the actions involved in killing and the karmic consequences caused by them. By taking away the

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316 I exclude the last sentence (YBh 220:6-7) from consideration; it says that those who contemplate the results of evil actions do not put their minds on the sinful thoughts.

317 YBh 219:8-220:6, “tathā ca hiṃsakas tāvat prathamam vadhyasya víryam ākṣipati. tataś ca śastrādinipātena duḥkhayati. tato jīvitād api mocayati. tato víryākṣepād asya cetanācetanam upakaraṇam kṣīnavíryam bhavati. duḥkhotpādān narakatirikręparamāś dūḥkhān anubhavati. jīvitavāpayaparopaṇāt pratikṣānam ca jīvitātaye vartamāno maraṇam icchān api duḥkhavipākasya niyatavipākavedāniyataḥ kathām cet evocchvasīti. yadi ca kathām cet punyāvāpagatā hiṃsā bhavet, tatra sukhaprāptau bhaved alpāyur iti.”; modified translation of Wood (1914, 184-5).
victim’s vigor (vīryākṣepat), the surroundings of the killer lose their vigor (kṣīnavīrya); by causing pain in the victim (duḥkhotpādāt), the killer experiences pain (duḥkham anubhavati) in the form of lower rebirth; by depriving the victim of life (jīvitavyaparopanāt), he lives “on the edge of the life” (jīvitātyaye).

However, although the passage illustrates that one reaps results similar to what one does to the victim, it differs from the ŚV syllogism in four ways. First, it does not generalize the relation between actions and retributions. Though it enumerates specific karmic fruits corresponding to specific acts, it does not say that they are similar to each other. The thesis of the ŚV syllogism (“Killing produces for its performer after death a fruit similar to that of its target”) argues for the general similarity between action and karmic fruit. On this score, YBh 2.34 can only be considered to be reflecting an inchoate stage of the ŚV syllogism. Second, YBh 2.34 does not refer to the general karmic law whereas the reason in the ŚV syllogism clearly indicates that ritual killing is just an instance of general action, and thus, cannot be an exception to karmic law. Third, in YBh 2.34, there is no mention of the ŚV syllogism’s example, i.e., the act of giving. Lastly, the doctrine on the act of killing and its karmic result is not put in a polemical context; it is expounded as a general law rather than being argued for against an opponent party.

Regardless of the merit of YBh 2.34 in illuminating the identity of Kumārila’s opponent, the more important fact is that the whole passage seems to adapted from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 4.85 (AKBh 4.85). The immense influence of Vasubandhu’s works on the Yogasūtra has long been noted by scholars: “There is little doubt in my mind that the only reasonable conclusion to draw from these citations is that the Yogasūtra is heavily dependent on Buddhism and probably via the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika formulations as set forth in Vasubandhu II’s Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya.” (Larson 1989, 133-4). When Larson is drawing on de la Vallée Poussin’s work that “has systematically studied the terminology of the Yogasūtra
vis-à-vis comparable terminology in Buddhist texts and especially found in the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu (II)” (ibid., 133). Based on de la Vallée Poussin’s study, Larson himself collected more “terminologies” from the *Yogasūtra* that reflect Buddhist influence (ibid., Appendix B).

The parallelism found between YBh 2.34 and AKBh 4.85 is, however, not of terminologies but of ideas. When they are read side by side, it looks as if the author of YBh 2.34, having read AKBh 4.85, rewrote the contents in different words. Let us first read the *Abhidharmakośa* 4.85 on which AKBh 4.85 comments:

> All the other courses of action have retributive results, outflowing results, and predominating results. The result is threefold, because one makes him suffer, because one makes him die, and because one destroys his vigor.

This verse states that every course of action (*karmapatha*) has three kinds of result, with special reference to killing (*prāṇātipāta*), the first of the ten unwholesome (*akuśala*) courses of action. The first and second line of the verse are separated by a long commentary that enumerates the specific results of the ten unwholesome courses of action, with several sets of questions and answers. Then AKBh 4.85, after introducing the second line, compiles the three results of killing that have been already enumerated.

> Because one causes suffering, there is a retributive result, that is, suffering in hell; because one makes him die, there is an outflowing result, that is, his life is short; and because one destroys his vigor, there is a predominating result, that

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318 Also, it is the parallelism between the *Yogabhāṣya* (not the *Yogasūtra*) and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. I do not mean that the *Yogasūtra* 2.34 is uninfluenced by the latter. The contents of the *Yogasūtra* 2.34 is also from the *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Bhāṣya*. De la Vallée Poussin has already noted the parallelism between the *Sūtra* and the *Kośa* verse in the footnote of his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa* 85cd (1988-90, 746:fn.413): “Compare Yogasūtra, ii.34.”

Although presented in Ābhidharmika terminology for different kinds of fruit (phala), the basic idea of AKBh 4.85 and YBh 2.34 is the same: three actions are involved in one act of killing, and therefore, there are three fruits. One conspicuous difference is the fruit resulting from the primary (maula) action of severing the life of the victim. Here in AKBh 4.85 it is said that one has a short life as the result of making the victim die, while in YBh 2.34 the result of “uprooting the victim from life” is a life full of pain that one cannot escape even if one desires to die. However, YBh 2.34 does mention the fruit of “short life”; as an addendum, it says that when killing is somehow mixed with merit (kathāṃcit punyāvāpagatā hiṃsā), although the killer obtains happiness, his life is short (alpāyus).

While the fruit of “painful life” seems to come from a source different from AKBh 4.85, the addendum reflects the following question and answer in AKBh 4.85.

[Q] But, one would say, a human existence, even if it is short, is the retribution of a good action. How can one regard it as an outflowing result of murder?
[A] We do not say that this existence is the result of murder; we say rather, that a murderer will have a short life by reason of the murder; murder is the cause which renders a human existence short.322

320 I have changed “external things” (ibid., 670) to “external herbs” (bāhyā oṣadhayaḥ). De la Vallée Poussin, who translated the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in 1923-31, could not consult the Sanskrit text; the Abhidharmakośa was first published in 1946 (by V.V. Gokhale) and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in 1967 (by P. Pradhan). The Chinese translation by Xuanzang on which de la Vallée Poussin based his translation indeed speaks of “external things” (外物; T 1558, 90c25). However, the earlier Chinese translation by Paramārtha has it as “external plants, herbs and etc.” (外草藥等; T 1559, 245c13).


322 AKBh 4.85 (254:5-7), “alpam api āyur manusyeṣu kuśalaphalam. tat katham prāṇātipātasya niṣyandaphalam bhavati? nocyate tadevāyus tasya phalam. kim tarhi? tenālpāyur bhavatīti. ato ‘ntarāyahetuḥ prāṇātipātās tasyāyuṣo bhavatīti veditavyam.” (trans. from de la Vallée Poussin 1988-90, 669) I deleted from de la Vallée Poussin’s translation the phrase “an existence otherwise caused by a good action” attached to the last sentence. The Sanskrit text and Xuanzang’s translation (“應知殺業與人命根作障礙因令不久住”; T 1558, 90c7-8) do not contain the corresponding expression. De la Vallée Poussin’s addition seems to reflect the explanatory notes by Xuanzang’s disciple Fabao (法寶). See T
Vasubandhu considers a possible contradiction in giving a “short human life” as the fruit of killing and he distinguishes “human life” and “short life” as the fruit of different actions; that is, the former is the fruit of a good action and the latter is the fruit of killing. Vasubandhu does not say a “short human life” is a “mixed” (āvāpagata) result. However, YBh 2.34 seems to be inspired by this passage, attaching the addendum as an afterthought.

The correspondence between YBh 2.34 and AKBh 4.85 is fascinating. It shows that the Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists shared the same doctrine about the act of killing and its karmic fruit. AKBh 4.85 does not present a developed form of the argument either. That is to say, like YBh 2.34, when compared to the PP and ŚV syllogisms, AKBh 4.85 lacks reference to the similarity between an act and its fruit, the general principle of karmic law, and the example of giving. It is also not situated in a polemical context. AKBh 4.85 and YBh 2.34, in short, represent a prior version of a shared understanding on the act and karmic result of killing between Buddhists and the Sāṃkhyas when compared to PP and ŚV syllogisms.

We see parallel instances of Buddhist-Sāṃkhya partnership on the topic of killing and its karmic fruit but with different degrees of development. As noted, the doctrine presented in AKBh 4.85 and YBh 2.34 lacks the four elements that would make them the direct sources of the PP and ŚV syllogisms. To my knowledge, there is only one text that documents a transition from AKBh-YBh to PP-ŚV. Strictly speaking, it only records a transition from AKBh to PP. It is Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra (NA), where two of the four conditions that prevent us from regarding AKBh 4.85 as the source of the PP syllogism are satisfied. NA explicitly states that the relationship between the act of killing and its karmic fruit is one of similarity; this marks an important developmental step toward the thesis of PP syllogism. In addition, Saṅghabhadra’s

1822, 674b17ff. Nevertheless, this seems to be a correct understanding of the passage.

See the previous footnote.
whole discussion is directed against the Lokāyatas, that is, Bhāviveka’s opponent.

4.4 Explaining the Transformation of the Older Alliance into the PP and ŚV syllogisms

We saw in Chapter One that the *Nyāyānusāra* by Saṅghabhadra, a hostile commentary to the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Bhāṣya*, is the first Buddhist consideration of Mīmāṃsaka arguments. Saṅghabhadra introduced them when he commented on the first verse of the fourth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*, devoted to the topic of karma (*karmanirdeśa*). That first verse lays out the basic scheme of Buddhist karma theory.

> The variety of the world is born out of karma. It (=karma) is intention and that which is produced by it (=intention). Intention is mental karma and vocal and bodily karmas are born from it.324

Vasubandhu simply uses this verse to explain the elementary materials of Buddhist karma theory in his *Bhāṣya*. Yet Saṅghabhadra understands it in a peculiar way; to him, the first *pāda* (quater) of the verse (“The variety of the world is born out of karma”) is addressed to those who deny that an impure action such as killing brings about a painful fruit for the agent. And, as he criticizes their views, Saṅghabhadra does not refer to the rest of the verse where the “intention” factor, essential to Buddhist notion of karma, is introduced. His opponents in this section do not even accept that the world operates according to the karmic law and that the diversity within it is determined by karma alone. It is only after Saṅghabhadra refutes their opinions that he proceeds to explain the rest of the verse.325

324 AK 4.1 (192), “*karmajam lokavaicitryam, cetanā tatkṛtaṃ ca tat/ cetanā mānasam karma, tajjam vākkāyakarmanī/*”

325 See NA 531b16ff. It may be said that the two long disputations with the opponents who deny the law of karma comment only on the first word of AK 4.1 “born out of karma” (*karmaja*; 由業生) since he resumes his commentary with the explanation on the second word “the variety of the world” (*lokavaicitryam*, 世別).
Although Saṅghabhadra does not clearly specify differences among his opponents, we can discern, based on the contents, that this long commentary on AK 4.1a is made up of two separate sections against the Lokāyatas (Materialists) and the Mīmāṃsakas. The latter is unmarked, but the first group is marked twice by expressions that characterize them such as “those who compliantly commit evil and who avoid disputation” (隨順造惡怯難論) and “those who hate reason(ing)” (惡因論者). The Lokāyata identity of the opponent is hinted at by the word “compliantly” (隨順), the second character (順, “to accord with”) of which is used in the Chinese translation of Lokāyata, Shunshiwaidao (順世外道), which literally means “the heretics who accord with the mundane world.”

Concluding his debate with the Lokāyatas, Saṅghabhadra states:

There is no such fault. Since we can discern many events when one carries out an action, when one receives the fruit [from that action], various fruits originate. In other words, when people carry out an action, [for example,] those who kill living beings [in one act of killing,] make the victims experience pain, sever their lives, take away and destroy the light of their dignity by intimidating them. Therefore, when they receive the fruit, there are three [different fruits] similar to [those three actions]. That is to say, since they tormented others, as the retributive fruit, they receive extremely heavy pain in the hell realm. Since they sever others’ lives, as the outflowing fruit, they receive extremely short lives [even] in the good rebirths. Since they destroyed others’ dignity, as the predominating fruits, all external things such as herbs reduce their light of spirit. Therefore [in this scheme], there is no fault of relating cause and result in the reversed manner.

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326 The Mīmāṃsaka section that we have analyzed in Chapter One begins with the phrase “some maintain” (“有執”; NA 530b15). We can infer the opponent’s identity based only on their arguments.
327 NA 529a7.
328 NA 529c23.
329 NA 530b2-9, “無如是失. 以造業時, 能辦多事, 故受果位, 亦有種種差別果生. 謂造業時, 諸殺生者, 令他受苦, 隔斷他命, 令他怖畏失壞威光. 故受果時, 有三相似. 謂苦他故, 於地獄中, 受極重苦, 爲異熟果. 斷他命故, 於善趣中, 受命極促, 爲等流果. 壞他威故, 感外藥物, 皆少精光, 爲增上果. 故無因果成翻對失.”
Here Saṅghabhadra reiterates what has been said in AKBh 4.85: there are three actions and three fruits in one act of killing. He adds comments that the actions and their fruits are similar in form. He notes in the last sentence that cause and result cannot be related in the reversed manner; for example, torturing others cannot result in one’s happiness.

These comments, interspersed in the enumeration of three actions and three fruits, are made because the opponent, the Lokāyatas, relate “evil action” (惡行) with “pleasurable experience” (樂). The opponent, for instance, maintains that “hunting animals” (獵獸) generates “happiness” (歡悅) in the agent without knowing that such happiness is only temporary and the fruit of the act of hunting will be a painful experience, since every action begets a corresponding fruit. A similar case is winning wealth and high status from killing enemies in the battlefield. But if one argues that the act of killing is the cause for such rewards, one should accept that one could obtain the same by killing one’s friends. Thus, the wise do not enjoy such small pleasure that brings about great suffering.330 There is a strict causal relationship between seed and fruit: sweet and bitter seeds respectively beget sweet and bitter fruits. “Likewise, if one generates pain or pleasure in others, those actions respectively bring about painful or pleasurable fruits to oneself.”331

Saṅghabhadra’s disputation with the Lokāyatas over the karmic status of the act of killing bridges the gap between the AKBh 4.85 and the PP syllogism. By explicitly stating that the act and karmic consequence of killing are consistent, it anticipating the thesis of the PP syllogism. By situating AKBh 4.85 in the polemics against the Lokāyatas, it foreshadows the polemical context of the PP syllogism. Moreover, because the whole discussion is occasioned by Saṅghabhadra comments on one word “karma-born” (karmaja), general karmic law as

330 See NA 529b15-22.
331 NA 529c29-530a02, “如是若造苦樂他業，如次應招自苦樂果.”
exemplified in the reason of the PP syllogism can also be said to be prefigured. Saṅghabhadra’s section differs from the PP syllogism only in that the subject matter of killing is not confined to ritual killing and the example of “giving” is not employed.

In the Sāṃkhya tradition, we do not have a document like the Nyāyānusāra, which bridges the gap between the YBh 2.34 and the ŚV syllogism. Must we then assume that the near identical wording of the PP and the ŚV syllogisms is the result of a Sāṃkhya reproduction of Bhāviveka’s syllogism as their own, as they did with the contents of AKBh? It is difficult to determine who took whose syllogism first. However, given that the doctrine of karma is not indigenous to the Sāṃkhya tradition, it is probable that it was the Sāṃkhyas who copied Bhāviveka’s syllogism. In this regard, this is the opposite of the Bhāviveka-Sāṃkhyas alliance discussed in Chapter Three.

However, just as Bhāviveka and the Sāṃkhyas had different motives for using the same Vedic passages, the difference between the PP and ŚV syllogism should be discerned. The Sāṃkhyas’ adoption of Bhāviveka’s syllogism was not an exact duplication. As has already been pointed out, the ŚV syllogism introduces two new features to PP syllogism. First, they qualified the example of giving as being enjoined by the Veda. As the Sāṃkhyas do not oppose the Veda per se but rather oppose Vedic orthopraxy, that is, ritual killing, their qualification of “giving” is not incongruous, and an appeal to the authority of the Veda fits well in the context of their confrontation with the Mīmāṃsakas. Therefore, the introduction of the qualification to the example in the PP syllogism is a reasonable, and, in a sense, necessary emendation for the Sāṃkhyas. However, the second change they introduced to the PP syllogism is less easy to explain. Why did they employ the PP syllogism, originally formulated against the Lokāyatas, against the Mīmāṃsakas?

As noted, when Saṅghabhadra discusses the position of the Lokāyatas and the
Mīmāṃsakas side by side as he comments on AK 4.1a, he criticizes both parties on the same score. To Saṅghabhadra’s perception, they both deny the general law of karma and, for that reason, they both are ignorant of the universal law that generates and explains the diversity of the mundane world. However, although both groups commit the same error, Saṅghabhadra criticizes each of them separately in an unconfused manner. It is against the Lokāyatas that he reiterates and develops the contents of AKBh 4.85. Likewise, although the PP syllogism itself is a critique of Vedic sacrifice and its wider context is Bhāviveka’s critique of the Mīmāṃsakas, when he presents it, Bhāviveka unambiguously specifies that the target is the Lokāyatas who side with the Mīmāṃsakas. In sum, if we assume that the PP syllogism is an evolution of AKBh 4.85, then it appears that Buddhists after Vasubandhu utilized its content—the three actions involved in one instance of killing and the corresponding three karmic retributions—against the Lokāyatas.

As no Sāṃkhya text of the same period, fifth and sixth centuries CE, attests to the Sāṃkhya use of YBh 2.34, we do not know the polemical context in which the Sāṃkhya s used it. However, there is a later document that suggests that the Sāṃkhya use may have been different from that of Buddhists.

YBh 2.34, like Vasubandhu’s AKBh 4.85, discusses the act of killing in general, without reference to ritual killing in Vedic sacrifice. There is no indication that the word “killing” (hiṃsā) in the Yogasūtra implies ritual killing. It also does not indicate any underlying polemical purpose. YBh 2.34, at least ostensibly, describes the principle of karma in the case of killing rather than arguing for it. Vācaspati (ninth or tenth century), however, in his commentary (the Tattvavaiśāradī) on YBh, understands the “killing” in YBh 2.34 in the limited context of Vedic sacrifice. After having explained the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya on it, he states:

By tying [the victim] to a sacrificial post (yūpa), one first casts away the vigor, that is, exertion, which is the basis of bodily actions from the victim, namely, to tame animals and the like. With this [act of binding], the animal becomes
impotent. [The meaning of] the rest [of the Bhāṣya passages] is very clear.\textsuperscript{332}

In this explanation, the very general description of the first act of killing in YBh 2.34 (“one casts away the victim’s vigor” (vadhyaśya vīryam ākṣipati)) is specifically understood as referring to the act of binding an animal to a sacrificial post (yūpaniyojana). Vācaspati concludes his commentary on this verse after discussing this act, but it is reasonable to infer that he would have interpreted the other two acts of killing in the sacrificial context.

Vācaspati’s understanding of this verse may reflect the traditional Sāṃkhya-Yoga understanding of Yogasūtra 2.34, which developed after the composition of the Bhāṣya. If so, it shows that, unlike the Buddhists, who understood AKBh 4.85 as describing killing in general and used it against the Lokāyatas, there was a tendency in Sāṃkhya to view the killing in YBh 2.34 in the restricted sense of ritual killing, thus interpreting the same doctrine as a critique of upholders of Vedic sacrifice, for example, the Mīmāṃsakas.

\textbf{4.5 The Emergence of the Mīmāṃsaka Defense of Ritual Killing in MHK 9}

We have thus far discussed the oblique relationship between Bhāviveka’s PP and Kumārila’s ŚV. Although Kumārila introduces a syllogism almost identical to Bhāviveka’s in PP, Kumārila’s opponent has been identified as the Sāṃkhya by a traditional commentator as well as modern scholars. It has also been demonstrated that Buddhists and the Sāṃkhya, even before Bhāviveka, held the same view of the karmic retribution of killing. Thus, when he invites the opponent’s argument, Kumārila is confronting Bhāviveka’s view of ritual killing as held by others, the Sāṃkhya. Furthermore, Bhāviveka did not formulate the PP syllogism directly

against the Mīmāṃsakas. The obliqueness of the PP-ŚV relationship can be summarized as follows: Kumārila indirectly confronts Bhāviveka who criticizes the Lokāyatas via the Sāṃkhyaś who transferred Bhāviveka’s opinion to their polemics against the Mīmāṃsakas.

When we shift our attention from PP’s section on Vedic sacrifice to Bhāviveka’s more elaborate critique in MHK 9, we observe that, although Bhāviveka largely reiterates the structure and content of PP’s section in MHK 9, he introduces a new argument by the opponent, in the form of a syllogism that is essentially a reconfiguration of the PP and ŚV syllogisms, with their elements rearranged in such a manner that the whole argument is presented as the Mīmāṃsakas’ claim. The differences between this new “reconfigured” syllogism in MHK 9 and the PP/ŚV syllogisms reflect Kumārila’s critique of the ŚV syllogism, and, in this sense, the new MHK 9 syllogism appears to be Kumārila’s opinion. In other words, when we compare the PP/ŚV/MHK 9 syllogisms together with Kumārila’s reply to ŚV syllogism, it seems that Bhāviveka, after having written the PP syllogism, read Kumārila’s response to the ŚV syllogism, and then introduced Kumārila’s opinion as the MHK 9 syllogism. In contrast to the oblique relationship between PP and ŚV syllogisms, Kumārila’s opinion seems to be directly engaged in MHK 9 syllogism.

Both the PP and MHK 9’s sections on ritual killing, or both versions of the critique of Vedic sacrifice, are structurally subordinate to Bhāviveka’s critique of the Veda. In the case of MHK 9, Bhāviveka, immediately after arguing for the thesis of the evil authorship of the Veda in MHK/TJ 9.31, presents the critique of Vedic sacrifice as a supplementary Q&A session (MHK 9.32-42). PP’s critique of Vedic sacrifice is likewise subordinate to the critique of the Veda. After presenting a syllogism—exactly corresponding to MHK 9.31—on the evil authorship of the Veda (PP D215b4-5; PPf 119c15-7) based on the similarity found between the teachings of the Veda
and the Maga treatise\footnote{333} such as killing living beings, Bhāviveka discusses the karmic status of ritual killing because the opponent raises the following objection to Bhāviveka’s thesis that the Veda is a work of an evil being.

\[\text{[thesis:] Ritual killing prescribed by the Veda is not \textit{adharma}, [reason:] because it is completely protected by [accompanying] mantras, [example:] for example, just as eating poison [protected by mantra does no harm to the eater].}\footnote{334}

What is striking about this objection, which Bhāviveka introduces as a possible objection to his thesis of the evil authorship of the Veda, is its banality. As we saw in Chapter One, this is the same assertion with which Saṅghabhadra begins his section on the Mīmāṃsakas in his commentary on AKbh 4.1a.\footnote{335} As noted in the same chapter, another predecessor of Bhāviveka, Harivarman, also introduces the argument that ritual killing cannot be karmically negative since it is accompanied and thereby protected by Vedic mantras.\footnote{336} Hence, this opponent’s argument that ritual killing is karmically safe because of power of Vedic mantras is not being newly made to refute Bhāviveka’s thesis. It is a reiteration of older arguments from at least the days of Harivarman (ca. 250-350).\footnote{337}

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{333} Or the “treatises of Persians or the like” (\textit{par sig la sogs pa’i bstan bcos}; PP D215b5). However, PP\textsubscript{T} further specifies Persians as the Magas (波西目伽論; PP\textsubscript{T} 119c17).
\footnote{334} PP D215b5, “\textit{bstan bcos las ’byung ba’i tshe ba ni chos ma yin pa ma yin te, gsang sngags kyis yongs su gzung ba’i phyir, dper na dug za ba bzhin no.”; cf. PP\textsubscript{T} “韋陀中說殺生者不是非法. 以咒力禳不畏殺罪故. 譬如以咒毒不害人.”
\footnote{335} See 1.5 \textit{Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra: Emergence of the Mīmāṃsakas}; here I reproduce the relevant passage: “Some assert: In the ritual setting, when Vedic mantras are [recited] before killing sentient beings, it brings about favorable results [to the actor of killing]. As it is not a random slaughter, there is no previous fault [of bringing a short life to the actor in the future].” (NA 530b14-6)
\footnote{336} See 1.4 \textit{Harivarman’s Tattvasiddhi: Connecting the Two}; here I reproduce the relevant passage: “Also, the Veda says, "When one kills, he obtains merit." In other words, when one kills a sheep with Vedic mantras, that sheep will be born in heaven. The Veda is what the world believes in.” (T 1646, 292b19-21)
\footnote{337} Attempts to eliminate any negative future consequence for the sacrificer by means of reciting mantras are attested in the Veda itself; the opponent’s argument that mantra recitation can counteract such negative effects seems to be based on such practices prescribed in the Veda. As Schmidt (1968, 646) states, “the whole ritual is pervaded by acts meant for immediately eliminating any killing and injury—the acts of appeasing (śānti).” As can be seen in the examples of such acts of appeasing that Schmidt (ibid., 647-8)
By calling the argument “banal,” I do not deny its historicity or suggest that Bhāviveka is dealing with an obsolete argument that needs no refutation. As we can see in the following quote from Śaṅkara (eighth century CE), there were continuous attempts to defend ritual killing by recourse to the efficacy of mantra both before and after Bhāviveka.

Even if one would accept that it leads to demerit: because it is possible to remove this [demerit] by means of mantras—just as poison etc. [is removed by mantras]—the Vedic rites need not produce the effect of suffering; just as swallowing poison with a mantra [need not produce the effect of suffering].

By pointing out that PP’s opening pūrvapakṣa is a repetition of the older argument, I do not suggest that Bhāviveka is confronting a straw man. Rather, my point is that such an argument does not reflect opinions of the (pūrva-)Mīmāṃsakas. Bhāviveka may be dealing with the traditional argument by generic Vedic ritualists that was inherited by some later thinkers such as Śaṅkara but not by the mainstream tradition of the Mīmāṃsakas.

MHK 9’s section on Vedic sacrifice begins by quoting the same argument, that ritual killing is protected by mantras. But, immediately after introducing that argument, Bhāviveka appends a new argument that is not found in PP’s section on ritual killing.

If [you argue that:]

1. [thesis:] [Ritual] killing is not considered to be something that produces an undesirable result, [reason:] since it is protected by mantras, [example:] just collects, they are basically verbal acts; or, to borrow the words of Tull (1996, 224), “these seem to have been constituted of little more than verbal subterfuge.” For example, the following is prescribed to appease the violence done to the sacrificial victim who is suffocated: “With the words: ‘Whatever of you is wounded, whatever of you is stopped (=killed), of that become purified, beautify yourself for the gods,’ he has made unwounded whatever they have wounded by making it go (=by killing it), that he appeases.” This is part of Schmidt (ibid.)’s translation of the passage from the Maitrāyani Samhitā 3.10.1.  

338 Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 5.10.6, “abhyupagate ‘py adharmahetutve mantrair viṣādivat tadapanayopapatteḥ na duḥkhakāryārmbhanyaopapattiḥ vaidikānāṃ karamaṇāṁ — mantreneva viṣabhaksanasyeti.”; Text and Translation are from Houben (1999a, 149).

339 The Tibetan translation (“gnod sems mi ’dod pa’i ’bras bu mi sbyin, ’dod pa’i byin.”) does not correspond to the Sanskrit text. Translation according to the Tibetan would be: “If [you argue that:] a malicious intention does not bring about an undesirable result; it [rather brings about] a desirable one.” The Tibetan is supported by TJ, which speaks of desirable results from Vedic sacrifice.
as consumption of (mantra-protected) poison (is helpful for one’s illness).\textsuperscript{340}

Or, 2. [reason:] because it is prescribed in the Veda, [example:] just like the act of giving.\textsuperscript{341}

In this one verse, Bhāviveka introduces two syllogisms of the opponent to prove the thesis that ritual killing does not have negative karmic consequences. The first syllogism adduces the same reason and example Bhāviveka already noted in PP. The second syllogism contains an updated addition to the opponent’s arguments reminiscent of the Sāṃkhya syllogism in the ŚV, itself a variant of Bhāviveka’s syllogism in the PP.

Let us take a closer look at the two syllogisms to discern the differences between them.

It important to note that the holders of these two syllogisms are different: the ŚV syllogism belongs to the Sāṃkhyaśas while the MHK 9 syllogism is the Mīmāṃśakas’.

Thesis-

[ŚV:] Killing produces for its performer after death a fruit similar to that of its target,

[MHK 9:] Killing is not considered to be something that produces an undesirable result,

Reason-

[ŚV:] because it is a kind of action,

[MHK 9:] because it is prescribed in the Veda,

Example-

[ŚV:] like giving enjoined in the [Vedic] teaching.\textsuperscript{342}

[MHK 9:] just like the act of giving.

\textsuperscript{340} Insertion based on TJ D284a3, “sngags kyis yongs su bzung ba ’i dug zos pa na nad la phan par ’gyur ba bzhin no.”

\textsuperscript{341} MHK 9.32, “viṣopayuktivad dhimsā yadi mantraparigrahāti nābhīṣṭāniṣṭaphaladā śāstroter vāpi dānavat//”

\textsuperscript{342} As noted above, the translation of ŚV syllogism is from Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 487).
The first noticeable difference between the two syllogisms is that the MHK 9 syllogism moved the phrase “enjoined by the Veda” (śāstroktā-) in the example of the ŚV syllogism to the reason (śāstrokteḥ) and, by doing so, replaced the reason of the ŚV syllogism with that phrase. In this process, the reason of ŚV syllogism is discarded. This replacement indicates that the Mīmāṃsakas did not consider ritual killing to be subject to the karmic law that regulates the relationship between action and effect. By transforming the qualifying phrase in the Sāṃkhyas’ example into the reason of the syllogism, the Mīmāṃsakas imply that the authority of the Veda is not something to be established by citing its injunctions on positive acts such as giving. In other words, the act of giving brings a positive fruit not because of karmic law; rather it begets such a result because, like ritual killing, the act of giving is sanctioned by the Veda. The Veda for the Mīmāṃsakas is an absolute authority, even overriding the presumably universal law of karma. Therefore, the reason section of any syllogism used to prove the relationship between an action enjoined by the Veda and its corresponding fruit can only be the Veda itself. Unlike other actions, ritual actions and their fruits are regulated by Vedic—not karmic—law.

With this change of the reason, the MHK 9 syllogism presents a thesis different from that of ŚV. In the latter, karmic law is a universal law. Thus, karmic law is the binding principle of all actions, including rituals. In the case of ritual killing, the agent should therefore receive what he imposes on others. Simply put, according to the Sāṃkhyas, the killer will be killed just as animals are killed by him. The Mīmāṃsakas’ thesis is quite different. They do not concede that karmic law is applicable to the case of ritual killing. Therefore, they do not acknowledge the analogy between ritual killing and its fruit. What they argue in the MHK 9 syllogism is that ritual killing does not bring an undesirable consequence to the agent. However, according to the paraphrase of the thesis in the commentary (TJ 9.32), the Mīmāṃsakas’ argument is more than a passive denial of the accusation. They correlate all scripturally enjoined acts with beneficial
consequences.

Whatever [acts] prescribed in the śāstra (=the Veda) bring about desirable results. Just as giving and morality [which are enjoined in the Veda], for example, [do bring about desirable results], [those scripturally enjoined acts including ritual killing] bring about [desirable results such as] pleasurable enjoyment and rebirth in heaven [to the agent].

Thus, when compared to the ŚV syllogism, MHK 9, by using the phrase of the ŚV syllogism—“enjoined by the Veda” (śāstrokta)—as the reason, argues for a different thesis, yet with the same example of “giving.” It argues that ritual killing, rather than incurring negative karma for the killer, begets a desirable fruit because that is prescribed in the Veda. In the process, the example of “giving,” although common to both syllogisms, assumes a different function in the MHK 9 syllogism. While in ŚV the act of giving is employed to exemplify the analogy between an action and its fruit, the same act of giving in the MHK 9 syllogism is but one of the acts whose performance and fruit are prescribed in the Veda.

The fact that the MHK 9 syllogism argues for the opposite thesis to that of the ŚV syllogism and that its reason and example are composed of the words of the ŚV syllogism suggests that the two syllogisms are in dialogue. The MHK 9 syllogism may be a Mīmāṃsaka answer to the Sāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism. It is noteworthy here that Kumārila’s criticism of the ŚV syllogism includes all the characteristics of the MHK 9 syllogism that make it different from the ŚV syllogism.

After having quoted the ŚV syllogism as the opponent’s argument, Kumārila criticizes it in seven verses (ŚV co. 236cd-243ab). In his reply, though not in the form of syllogism, we find all the elements that constitute the MHK 9 syllogism. First, in ŚV co. 237cd-239ab, Kumārila...
makes four statements that can be rearranged in the following sequence for the sake of comparing it to MHK 9 syllogism:

1. By putting a Vedic injunction into an action, one gains the fruit prescribed in the Veda.344
2. And no such fruit is negative; that is, all the fruits of ritually enjoined actions are not related to the experience of suffering.345
3. Even in the case of “giving,” the subsequent positive fruit is not according to the principle of the similarity between an action and its fruit; by giving, one gets a fruit that is prescribed in the Veda.346
4. Ritual killing, by statements 1 and 2 and as exemplified in 3, begets a positive fruit.347

Statement 1 corresponds to the reason of the MHK 9 syllogism. For ritual actions, the regulating principle for an action and its fruit is Vedic prescription rather than karmic law. Statement 2, like TJ 9.32’s paraphrase of the thesis of MHK 9 syllogism, is a universal proposition that correlates Vedic actions exclusively with positive consequences. Statements 3 and 4 are applications of statements (or rules) 1 and 2 to the cases of giving and ritual killing. In the former, Kumārila corrects the role of the example of giving—not to exemplify karmic law but to provide an example of an act enjoined by the Veda. Lastly, statement 4 directly matches the thesis of the

344 ŚV co. 238a, “One should attain the fruit that is understood from the injunction.” (vidhiṣṭiṣṭamḥ phonāpāitous).; translation is from Kataoka (2011, pt. 2, 489).
345 ŚV co. 238b, “And [the fruit understood from the injunction] is not by nature pain.” (aduḥkhaṁ makatā tathā); translation is from ibid.
346 ŚV co. 238cd-239a, “And it is not heard [in the Veda] that the giver should have a fruit similar to the delight of the receiver.” (na ca yā sampradānasya prītis tādṛk phonām śrutam śrutam dātā); translation is from ibid.
347 ŚV co. 237cd, “[He has the fault of] contradiction, too. For [in the case of a Vedic killing] there should be a [good] fruit similar to that [which arises] in the case of giving.” (virudhatā ca, yādṛg ghi dāne tādṛk phonām bhavet); translation is from ibid.
MHK 9 syllogism: ritual killing does not produce an unfavorable result.

These four statements, taken as a whole, make the same argument as the MHK 9 syllogism: ritual killing brings a beneficial result since it is enjoined in the Veda just as another enjoined act, giving. From this Mīmāṃsaka viewpoint, the most problematic element of the Sāṃkhyaś ŚV syllogism is its reason: that ritual killing as just another kind of action (kriyāviśeṣa). Ritual killing, for the Mīmāṃsakas, is not just another kind of action but an action enjoined by the Veda, and for this reason, its fruit is also under the jurisdiction of the Veda. That the fruit of ritual killing is to be determined by the verdict of the Veda is somewhat confused by the Sāṃkhyas’ use of the example of giving. Acts of giving and killing differ sharply in their results for the recipients of those acts, causing the Sāṃkhyas to misunderstand the inner mechanism of action and its fruit. They think that the act of giving produces a beneficial result because it produces a beneficial effect for the receiver of the gift. They fail to understand that retribution is governed by the Veda. To dispel their confusion, Kumārila considers other acts that, although also enjoined by the Veda, cannot be approached from the perspective of their impact on others.

[Your reason ("because it is another kind of action") is [rather] necessarily connected with the contradictory proposition [to your own]. It is because of other examples such as the acts of muttering prayers (japa), pouring ghee into fire (homa), and the like which do not make others suffer [or be pleased, but should be considered beneficial] because they are enjoined by the Veda.348

In this verse, Kumārila suggests that the Sāṃkhyas should consider other ritual acts such as muttering prayers and pouring ghee into a fire. If such acts are used as the example in the ŚV syllogism, one cannot argue that ritual killing brings a painful consequence because it causes pain for the victim. No one is visibly helped or harmed when ghee is poured into a fire. As

Sucarita comments, “If the object of the act of muttering prayers is [the prayer] being muttered, what is being done to it [when one mutters a prayer]? We see that no other thing suffers or is favored [by such acts].” Moreover, the Śāṃkhyas, as orthodox Indian intellectuals, must accept that muttering prayers is a beneficial practice, but not because it pleases others; the object of this act, the prayer being muttered, cannot be pleased by it. The practice of muttering prayers is accepted as beneficial by both the Śāṃkhyas and the Mīmāṃsakas solely because it is an act enjoined by the Veda. Ritual killing must therefore also be accepted as a beneficial act.

Thus, although the Śāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism presents the reason, “because it is a kind of action,” assuming a universal similarity between an action and its fruit, a consideration of prayers and oblations leads to the opposite thesis. Just as muttering prayers brings a beneficial effect to its agent—which the Śāṃkhyas, as orthodox Brahmins, must acknowledge—solely because it is enjoined by the Veda, ritual killing also begets a beneficial fruit to the killer. As the commentators on this verse formulate it, the ŚV syllogism implies a counter-syllogism that refutes itself.

[thesis:] Killing animals in the Agnīṣomīya sacrifice is a beneficial action (artha), [reason:] because it is enjoined by the Veda, [example:] just as the acts of muttering prayers and the like [are beneficial acts].

This syllogism by Sucarita presents the Mīmāṃsakas’ reaction to the Śāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism in the briefest terms. The Mīmāṃsakas, unlike the Śāṃkhyas, think that ritual killing is

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349 ŚVK 185:17-8, “japasya yadi tāvaj japyamānam viṣayāḥ, kim tasya phalam? anyasya tu na kasyacīt pīdāmugrahau drṣyete.”
350 cf. ŚVK 185:14-6, “But they [i.e., acts such as japa and homa] are understood to be beneficial solely because they are enjoined by the Veda. Therefore, with those examples, it is possible to establish that ritual killing enjoined by the Veda is a beneficial act.” (coditatvāmātreṇaiva tu te ‘ṛthatayāvagatāḥ. atas taddṛṣṭāntenaiwa coditā hiṃsā artha iti śakyate sādhayitum.)
351 The most representative text in which the word “artha” is used in the sense of “beneficial act” is MS 1.1.2 (codanālakṣaṇo ‘thro dharmah) under which the whole discussion on ritual killing is occasioned.
352 ŚVK 185:21, “daiṅkapasaṃhinās arthaḥ, vihitavāj, japādivat.” Parthasārathi also formulates a similar syllogism. NRĀ (Śāstrī 1978) 88:8, “agniṣomiyahinās sukhakāri, coditavāj, japādivat.”
beneficial—or, as Parthasārathi puts it, it “brings about happiness” (sukhakarī); all acts done according to Vedic injunctions are, by their nature, irrelevant to the experience of suffering (aduḥkhātmakatā). It is important to note that the thesis and reason of this syllogism are basically identical to the MHK 9 syllogism. The two different examples should not cause us to doubt that the MHK 9 syllogism is Mīmāṃsaka; Kumārila’s commentators use of the examples of prayers and pouring ghee to contrast the Mīmāṃsaka with that of the Sāṃkhyas, not because the Sāṃkhyas’ example of giving is inadequate.

Let us recall that Bhāviveka had a syllogism in PP almost identical to the Sāṃkhyas’ ŚV syllogism. The PP syllogism is not reiterated in MHK 9. Rather, in the opening verse of MHK 9’s section on ritual killing, he adds a syllogism that reflects the Mīmāṃsakas’ critique of the ŚV syllogism. In short, the major difference between the PP’s and MHK 9’s sections on ritual killing is that, in the latter, Bhāviveka omits the PP syllogism and lists, as a new Mīmāṃsaka position on the matter, the MHK 9 syllogism, which contains the contents of Kumārila’s critique of the ŚV syllogism. Does this mean that Bhāviveka included the revised version of PP’s section after having read Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhyas? This is a possibility. However, what prevents us from conclusively affirming that Bhāviveka and Kumārila were contemporaries, or more precisely, that MHK 9 and ŚV are based on the materials discussed here is Bhāviveka’s uneven presentation of Kumārila’s views. This will be discussed in the next section.

Regardless of whether Bhāviveka knew about Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhyas’ syllogism, there is one significant fact about the MHK 9 syllogism that we can confirm. The MHK 9 syllogism is the first Buddhist record of a documentable Mīmāṃsaka view on ritual killing. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, Kumārila’s text is the first Mīmāṃsaka document that contains a defense of ritual killing. We do not know how pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsakas responded to criticism of ritual sacrifice or if they had such a strategy. Buddhist
literature before MHK 9 is unaware of any defense of ritual killing peculiar to the Mīmāṃsakas. Although other Mīmāṃsaka doctrines such as the authorlessness of the Veda and the eternity of Vedic sounds are discussed for the first time in Saṅghabhadra’s NA, there, the opponent was still speaking in the language of the generic Vedic ritualist on the topic of ritual killing. Those traditional arguments of Vedic ritualists, as we shall see, are also repeated as the opponent’s assertions (pūrvapakṣa) in Bhāviveka’s PP and even in MHK 9, which is specifically devoted to the Mīmāṃsakas. However, among those old arguments, one new syllogism is introduced in MHK 9 and its view is genuinely Mīmāṃsaka, attested in Kumārila’s defense of ritual killing.

The MHK 9 syllogism is the first Buddhist reference to the Mīmāṃsakas’ stance on ritual killing. It is the point at which the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice first engages with the Mīmāṃsakas’ objection.

4.6 A Hypothesis on the Decline of the Critique of Vedic Sacrifice

The MHK 9 syllogism, although reflecting a genuine Mīmāṃsaka voice on the topic of ritual killing, is not the only opinion that Bhāviveka introduces as the opponent’s arguments. His discussion of Vedic sacrifice is appended as a Q&A session to his discussion of the Veda at MHK 9.31; it consists of eleven verses (MHK 9.32-42). The last two (41 and 42) are about drinking liquor (madyapāna) during the sacrifice, and thus, do not belong to the critique of Vedic sacrifice proper. In the first nine verses (32-40), Bhāviveka introduces four arguments of the opponent; the MHK 9 syllogism is one. Except for the MHK 9 syllogism, the other three arguments in support of ritual killing are not typically Mīmāṃsaka.

As we have seen, the first argument, listed along with the MHK 9 syllogism at MHK 9.32, that the negative effect of ritual killing can be counteracted by Vedic mantras, has been
appearing in Buddhist literature since Harivarman. The second argument is the MHK 9 syllogism; it shares the same thesis with the first but attempts to prove it based on the Mīmāṃsaka view of the role of the Veda in determining ritual action and its fruit.

In the third argument (MHK 9.36), the opponent again argues that ritual killing does not bring an undesirable fruit but, here, because the *raison d’être* of animals is to be killed in Vedic sacrifice.

If you think - [thesis:] Killing animals in Vedic sacrifice does not bring about an undesirable fruit [to the killer], [reason:] because [they are] for the sake of that [that is, the sacrifice], [example:] just as the act of cooking for the sake of Brahmins is [regarded to be] desirable [that is, a beneficial act].

As he interprets this verse, Kataoka (2012, 359) takes the reason of the syllogism as meaning that ritual killing—not animals—is for the sake of Vedic sacrifice. He speculates that this idea represents a Mīmāṃsaka view that would later develop into Prabhākara’s position on the issue of ritual killing. He states: “Similarly, the action of killing can be regarded as a beneficial cause that will bring about a desirable fruit for a slayer in the future, because it is for the sake of ritual and not for the sake of the slayer. Ritual killing is ‘for the sake of that’ (*tādarthyā*).” Later (360), after having observed “Prabhākara holds the same view that ritual killing can be justified because it is ‘for the sake of ritual,’” Kataoka proposes that “the view mentioned by Bhāviveka might also be attributed to Bhavadāsa, or possibly other forerunners of Prabhākara.” (ibid.)

Kataoka’s suggestion that this view represents another line of the Mīmāṃsā tradition, that is, Prabhākara’s (not Kumārila’s), is stimulating. However, the view presented in that syllogism is not that ritual killing is “for the sake of ritual and not for the sake of the slayer.” Rather, when we consider the context in which the syllogism is introduced, Bhāviveka’s

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353 The corresponding discussion of this argument in PP is found at PP D216a3-7.
354 MHK 9.36, “yājñe paśūnāṁ hīmśā cen nāṇiṣṭapaḷādāyinī tādarthyād brāhmaṇārthā hi yathēṣṭā pacanakriyāḥ?”
opponent is vindicating ritual killing on the grounds that animals are created for Vedic sacrifice. This is clear from the verse that Bhāviveka cites in TJ, right before MHK 9.36, as the background of the opponent’s syllogism.

The Self-arisen one (Svayambhū?) by himself created animals for the sake of Vedic sacrifice. Therefore, as they have the purpose [of being used] in it, Vedic sacrifice is dharma. It is like in the case of this example. That is, it is just as killing [a living being] for the sake of [serving] a Brahmin is not adharma.\(^{355}\)

It is in reference to this verse that Bhāviveka writes in MHK 9.36, “because [they are] for the sake of that” (tādarthyāt). In other words, what is expressed in that phrase is that “animals,” rather than “ritual killing,” are for the sake of Vedic sacrifice. This view does not correspond to Prabhākara’s view that considers the purpose of the “act” rather than the “object” of ritual killing. Bhāviveka also clearly states in his own objection to MHK 9.36, “animals are not created for Vedic sacrifice.”\(^{356}\) The issue of the debate in MHK 9.36-7 is the raison d’etre of the sacrificial victim, not whether ritual killing is for the sake of sacrifice or performer, as Kataoka (2012) assumes.

The idea that animals are created to be sacrificed is attested in a classic work on Brahmin orthopraxy. As Schmidt (1968, 630-1) notes, in the Manusmṛti 5.39, we encounter the same idea in a slightly different fashion: “In [5.]39 it is stated that killing (vadha) on ritual occasions is to be considered as non-killing (avadha) since animals were created for the sake of sacrifice by Svayambhū, and since the sacrifice is meant for the welfare of the whole world.”\(^{357}\)

Since the first line of the above verse of Bhāviveka’s opponent (rang nyid rang byung gyur pa yis/ mchod sbyin don du byol song bskyed/) is the exact Tibetan translation of the first line of


\(^{356}\) TJ D285a7, “byol song rnams ni mchod sbyin gyi phyir bskyed pa ma yin.”

\(^{357}\) See also Alsdorf (2010 [1962], 20).
Manu 5.39 ("The Self-existent One himself created domestic animals for sacrifice"; यज्ञार्थम्
पशावहस्रष्टहस्ययमेवस्याम्बधुवाः)358, they are likely different versions from a common
source. That source belongs to all Brahmin ritualists, not just to the Mīmāṃṣakas.

The Brahmin belief that animals are created for Vedic sacrifice is attested in pre-
Bhāviveka Buddhist literature. In a short treatise attributed to Āryadeva on the Hīnayanists’ and
heretics’ notions of “liberation” (涅槃; nirvāṇa) in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra,359 this view is ascribed
to “the masters of the Veda” (圍陀論師; Vedavādin?).

Question: Which class of heretics teaches that the God Brahmā is the cause of
nirvāṇa?
Answer: The fourth class of heretics, the Vedavādins, teach as follows. From
the navel of the god Nārāyaṇa is born the great lotus flower. From the lotus
flower is born Brahmā, the forefather of creatures. This Brahmā creates all
things, the living and the lifeless. ... All earth is a sacrificial place for the
performance of deeds which bring merit. Brahmā produces all flowers and
plants, which a man shall offer to him. He creates mountains and fields, birds
and animals, such as domestic pigs, sheep, asses, horses and so on. If one kills
these in the sacrificial place and offers them to the God Brahmā, one thereby
attains the world of Brahmā. This is called nirvāṇa.360

Although the idea that animals are created for sacrifice is not explicitly stated as a proposition as
it was in MHK 9 and the Manusmṛti 5.39, this passage concisely expresses the same idea.

According to the masters of the Veda, Brahmā created the earth and its residents, and defined the
former as the sacrificial field and the latter as the sacrificial agents and objects. Vedic sacrifice is
sole site where all of Brahmā’s creatures can have meaningful relationships for the ultimate

358 Text and Translation are from Olivelle (2005, 565 and 140).
359 The title of this work (T 1640; 提婆菩薩釋楞伽經中外道小乘涅槃論) is translated by Nakamura
(1955, 93) as the “Śāstra by the Bodhisattva [Ārya-]Deva on the Explanation of Nirvāṇa by [Twenty]
Heretical and Hīnāyāna [Teachers] Mentioned in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.”
360 T 1640, 157a11-8, “問曰. 何等外道說梵天是涅槃因? 答曰. 第四外道圍陀論師說. 從那羅延天
臍中生大蓮華, 從蓮華生梵天祖公. 彼梵天作一切命無命物. ...... 一切大地是修福德戒場. 生一切
華草以爲供養. 化作山野禽獸人中豬羊驢馬等. 於界場中殺害供養梵天. 得生彼處名涅槃.”; translation is from Nakamura (1955, 94).
purpose of man’s liberation. In this world of sacrifice, men are born to sacrifice and animals are born to be sacrificed. The upholders of this worldview are named the masters of the Veda, a generic word for Brahmins.

The last opinion that Bhāviveka considers in MHK 9’s section on ritual killing is again an argument typical of generic Vedic ritualists. In MHK 9.38, Bhāviveka, by asserting that “this killing committed inside the sacrificial ground (vedī) brings about an undesirable fruit to the agent in the future” (antarvedyāṃ ca himseyam ... anīṣṭaphaladā kartur āyatāṃ), refers to the opponent’s argument, according to the introductory remark of TJ, that “if one kills [animals] inside the central sacrificial ground, an undesirable result will not arise.”361 As Bhāviveka refutes it, he rephrases it in a significant fashion: “Killing (bsad pa) in the central sacrificial ground is non-killing (ma bsad pa)”362

This view is expressed in the last quarter (pāda d) of the Manusmṛti 5.39 above: “Within the sacrifice, therefore, killing is not killing.” (tasmād yajñe vadho ’vadhaḥ)363 The Manusmṛti repeats this view, “the categorical contention that killing for sacrifice is not killing” (Alsdorf 2010, 20), again in 5.44: “When a killing is sanctioned by the Veda and well-established in this mobile and immobile creation, it should be regarded definitely as a non-killing; for it is from the Veda that the Law has shined forth.”364

Furthermore, the Manusmṛti’s contention is an expression of the Brahmin attitude toward ritual killing comes from a much older period of Vedic ritualism. Even in the Ṛg Veda, there is a verse that denies the sacrificial victim’s death (or the priests’ killing of the victim). In the Horse Sacrifice (Aśvamedha), Ṛg Veda 1.162.21 “is employed in the ritual sūtras at the

361 TJ D285b2-3, “dbus kyi mchod sbyin gyi gnas su bsad na mi ’dod pa’i ’bras bu mi ’byung ngo.”
362 TJ D285b4, “dbus kyi mchod sbyin gyi gnas su gang bsad pa de ma bsad pa yin no.”
363 Text and translation are from Olivelle (2005, 565 and 140).
364 Manusmṛti 5.44, “yā vedavihitā himśā nityāśmimś carācare/ ahimśām eva tām vidyād vedād dharma hi nirbabhau/” Text and translation are from Olivelle (ibid.).
moment when the horse is put to death” (Jamison 1996, 78): “Truly in this way you do not die nor are you harmed; you go to the gods by paths easy to travel.” (Jamison and Brereton 2014, 346) This denial of ritual killing as killing, or the equation of ritual killing and non-killing, continued in later Vedic texts such as the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. Apart from this, there is also a passage in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (8.15) which, although not denying that ritual killing is an act of killing, makes killing in the context of Vedic sacrifice an exceptional case that helps one attain the final goal of reaching the world of Brahmā. Therefore, the fourth argument of Bhāviveka’s opponent does not represent a uniquely Mīmāṃsaka view of ritual killing.

Among the four arguments that Bhāviveka introduces as the opponent’s defense of ritual killing, apart from the second MHK 9 syllogism, the other three are found in the sources common to Vedic ritualists and they are recorded as such in pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist texts. It is noteworthy that the Mīmāṃsakas do not inherit this strategy of vindicating animal sacrifice. While the pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsā authors show no interest in discussing the topic, Kumārila, as Halbfass (1991, 112-3) remarks, “does not try to explain away the ritual slaughter of animals (*paśuḥiṃsā*), or to justify it by reconciling it with the ideal of ahiṃsā.” For Kumārila, “to defend the Vedic dharma, including its animal sacrifices,” just as the *Manusmṛti* does, “would amount to abandoning it.” Halbfass continues to comment on Kumārila’s stance as follows: “It has to be accepted in its own right, without relying on external, merely human and potentially relative standards. Only the Veda itself can uphold the authority and identity of its dharma.” (ibid., 111) This evaluation of Kumārila’s section on ritual killing by Halbfass well expresses the fundamental difference between the MHK 9 syllogism and the other three arguments that

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365 See Houben (1999a, 118).
367 See Schmidt (1968, 631) and Houben (1999a, 115)
Bhāviveka considers. The former, unshamed by the accusation of killing, merely states that ritual killing, as enjoined by the Veda, is indissolubly linked to non-suffering, while the latter attempt to excuse ritual killing by explaining how the generally negative consequence of killing does not accrue to the killer in the sacrificial context. The Mīmāṃsakas, despite being staunch traditionalists in advocating ancient ritual values, renounce the traditional strategy to defend them.

Despite this difference between the ritualists and the Mīmāṃsakas, Bhāviveka’s mixture of their opinions in his Mīmāṃsaka opponent shows that he saw the Mīmāṃsakas as the successors of Vedic ritualists. For this reason, he transfers the older Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice to his section on the Mīmāṃsakas in PP and to MHK 9, as if that traditional critique was still valid against a newly emerging opponent. Yet Bhāviveka updates the opponent’s arguments in MHK 9; PP’s section does not include a Mīmāṃsaka voice on ritual killing. Rather, the PP syllogism seems to serve as a pūrvapakṣa of Kumārila after being adopted by the Sāṃkhya. As we have seen, the PP syllogism is discarded in MHK 9 and, in the latter work, Bhāviveka introduces a genuine Mīmāṃsaka argument on ritual killing (MHK 9 syllogism), one that reflects Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhya’s ŚV syllogism. Bhāviveka thus newly incorporates the Mīmāṃsaka position in MHK 9. Nevertheless, it remains surrounded by other arguments that cannot be attributed to the Mīmāṃsakas. By presenting the Mīmāṃsakas among Vedic ritualists, Bhāviveka shows that he sees the Mīmāṃsakas as traditional Vedic ritualists.

Given the fundamental difference between these two responses to the critique of ritual killing, the traditional ritualist arguments seemed doomed to obscurity, unworthy of Buddhist attack. The Buddhists would take the Mīmāṃsakas as their major opponents. Śāntarakṣita, for example, who unquestionably postdates Kumārila, does not consider arguments that do not belong to the Mīmāṃsakas, such as those found in MHK 9. In fact, Śāntarakṣita does not even
broach the topic of ritual killing; the critique of Vedic sacrifice is not present in his
*Tattvasaṃgraha*. Śāntarakṣita does not even take issue with the position on ritual killing that can
be ascribed to the Mīmāṃsakas. This may be because the Mīmāṃsakas’ position on ritual killing,
such as Kumārila’s, is less a defense of ritual killing than a confirmation of the Mīmāṃsaka
doctrine that the Veda is the sole and absolute authority that, within its monopolized domain of
dharma, overrides human reasoning. Although Kumārila responds to critiques of ritual killing,
his responses are not apologies but restatements of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine epitomized in MS
1.1.2 (*codanālakṣaṇo ’ṛtho dharma*) that Vedic injunctions enjoin beneficial actions and they are
to be implemented. To such a Mīmāṃsaka response, Buddhists cannot simply criticize ritual
killing. The Mīmāṃsakas fully acknowledge that it is a kind of killing, but that killing in Vedic
sacrifice is scripturally sanctioned. To reply, the Buddhist critique of Vedic sacrifice must be
transformed into a critique of the Veda.

This is clearly seen in Bhāviveka’s answers to the MHK 9 syllogism (MHK 9.32cd) which claims that ritual killing does not bring about an undesirable fruit since it is prescribed in
the Veda (*śāstra*) like the act of giving. In his rejoinder to this claim, Bhāviveka focuses his
critique on the reason section of the syllogism, specifically on the Mīmāṃsaka use of the word
“śāstra.”

If [the word “śāstra” in your reason] is just employed in the sense of your own
scripture[, that is, the Veda, even the tenets of] the Saṃsāramocakas would be
justified. But, if the reason is employed in the general sense [of “prescribed in
scripture”], that is not valid to others. ³⁶⁸

Bhāviveka discerns two possible meanings of the word “śāstra” and shows that neither can make
the syllogism valid. When one takes the word to mean the Veda, the scripture for the

³⁶⁸ MHK 9.35, “śvaśāstra eva ced ukte siddhaḥ saṃsāramocakah/ sāmānyena ca hetūktau syād
anyatarāsiddhatā//”
Mīmāṃsakas, and thereby refers to the authority of the Veda for the purpose of justifying ritual killing, it would result in granting an authority to anyone who rationalizes the act of killing with absurd reasons. The Saṃsāramocakas claim that they are liberating small beings from saṃsāra by killing insects.\footnote{See TJ D284b5-6.} Should the Vedic injunctions on ritual killing be granted authority, the Saṃsāramocakas’ tenet (grub pa’i mtha’) of killing small beings must be regarded as authoritative by the Mīmāṃsakas. On the other hand, when the word is taken in the general sense of “scripture,” the reason of the syllogism is merely false because Buddhist scriptures, for example, do not teach that killing brings a favorable fruit.\footnote{See TJ D284b6-285a1.}

What we observe in Bhāviveka’s answer to MHK 9 syllogism is that the topic of discussion is diverted from ritual killing to the authority of the Veda. This change is not unexpected, since the Mīmāṃsakas make no effort to deny that ritual killing is an act of killing or to resort to other forces, such as that of mantras, to counteract the negative effect caused by killing. Ritual killing is only indirectly defended via the authority of the scripture that enjoins it. The prime Mīmāṃsaka project is to safeguard the authority of the Veda not Vedic sacrifice. Once the authority of the Veda is secured, Vedic sacrifice, as its implementation, needs no justification. For this reason, the Mīmāṃsaka defense of ritual killing must be a reconfirmation of the absolute trustworthiness and authority of the Veda. And, against such an argument, the target of the Buddhist critique must be changed to the Veda.

4.6 Conclusion

The absence of post-Bhāviveka material on Vedic sacrifice suggests that the older Buddhist attacks on ritual killing were neglected and discarded, although there is no positive evidence to
prove that they stopped after Bhāviveka. I have assumed that MHK 9 is the last document to contain a Buddhist critique of Brahmin ritual killing.

As noted in passing, in the entire section of MHK 9 on the ethical problems of Vedic sacrifice (MHK 9.32-42), the majority of verses (32-40) devoted to ritual killing are appended as a Q&A session after MHK 9.31, the culmination of Bhāviveka’s critique of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. As an appendix to MHK 9.31, the section does not have a corresponding Mīmāṃsaka argument in the “official” opponent’s section (MHK 9.1-17). The absence of a Mīmāṃsaka defense of ritual killing in those first seventeen verses is significant, since the rest of MHK 9 is, as a whole, formatted as Bhāviveka’s refutation of Mīmāṃsaka positions presented in that initial section. Therefore, the critique of Vedic sacrifice is structurally marginalized in MHK 9, lacking a corresponding Mīmāṃsaka defense in the “official” pūrvapakṣa and by being subordinate to MHK 9.31, that is, the critique of the Veda.

Yet Bhāviveka places his critique of Vedic sacrifice right after MHK 9.31. The corresponding section in PP has the same structure: Bhāviveka first posits his thesis on the evil authorship of the Veda and then adds the discussion on ritual killing. A more curious fact about those sections in PP and MHK 9 is that the opponent’s arguments there are not those of the Mīmāṃsakas (with the exception of MHK 9 syllogism). This is not to say that those arguments are imaginary. As we have seen, those arguments were made in representative Vedic texts. However, they do not belong to the Mīmāṃsakas. It is probable that there were Mīmāṃsakas during Bhāviveka’s days who actually defended their practice of ritual killing with arguments from widely accepted works such as the Manusmṛti. However, we must remember that the first two Mīmāṃsaka authors of surviving works of the school were silent on the topic and Kumārila, the first to offer comments on ritual killing, advocated arguments qualitatively different from those of the older Vedic ritualists.
Bhāviveka might have seen a chance to criticize Vedic ritualists’ claims while refuting the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda. To prove the evil authorship of the Veda, Bhāviveka adduces the Vedic injunctions on killing beings and drinking liquor. Thus, he might have expected that Vedic ritualists would respond by resorting to the typical rhetoric of defending ritual killing. However, it is noteworthy that the defense of ritual killing had been superseded by the ideal of *ahiṃsā* as early as the *Manusmṛti*. Alsdorf (2010), in his examination of the rules on meat-eating in the *Manusmṛti*, discerned three historical layers and interpreted the latter two as “successive stages of historical development.” (ibid., 17)371 Two of the three arguments of Vedic ritualists in MHK 9 are found in the second layer (5.27-44) which, while acknowledging the value of *ahiṃsā* in general, nevertheless attempt to justify ritual killing by equating the practice with non-killing and arguing that the *raison d’être* of animals is to be killed in Vedic sacrifice. This effort to reconcile Vedic ritualism with the ideal of *ahiṃsā* is altogether abandoned in the third layer of the *Manusmṛti* (5.45-55) “which explicitly appeals to the rule of *ahiṃsā*, and unconditionally brands any partaking of meat as immoral, and praises the merit of a total commitment to vegetarianism in the highest terms.” (ibid., 21; *emphasis* in the original)

This transition, in which the value of *ahiṃsā* overpowers and finally supersedes Vedic ritualism observed in the passage of the *Manusmṛti*, cannot be taken to mean that the large groups of Brahmins stopped the practice of animal sacrifice. As Houben (1999a) shows, later Vedānta intellectuals such as Śaṃkara (8th c.), Rāmānuja (11th c.) and Madhva (13th c.) defend animal killing in Vedic sacrifice with age-old arguments. However, the final victory of *ahiṃsā* over ritual killing attested in the *Manusmṛti* indicates that Brahmins, or at least a certain group of them, began to problematize animals sacrifice. And this fact makes it less probable that

371 See also comments on Alsdorf’s differentiation of three layers by Schmidt (1968, 626ff.) and Heesterman (1984, 120ff.).
Bhāviveka, while arguing against the Mīmāṃsakas, saw an occasion to criticize the opinions that had been abandoned by the advocates themselves.

Bhāviveka’s inclusion of non-Mīmāṃsaka opinions on ritual killing in his sections on the Mīmāṃsakas may say more about Bhāviveka than about his opponent. By quoting the objections of generic Vedic ritualists as the Mīmāṃsaka rejoinder to his thesis of the evil authorship of the Veda, Bhāviveka reveals his perception, or misperception of the opponent. Bhāviveka sees the Mīmāṃsakas as the successors of those Vedic ritualists who represent the second layer of the Manusmr̥ti’s codes on meat-eating, called “Masters of the Veda” (as in Āryadeva’s work cited above) in previous Buddhist literature. Thus, the entire section on ritual killing in PP might be an inheritance from and repetition of arguments in older sources that did not deal with the Mīmāṃsakas. Bhāviveka nevertheless updates the opponent in MHK 9 by including one genuine Mīmāṃsaka position on ritual killing.

What seems crucial in Bhāviveka’s update is Kumārila’s critique of the Sāṃkhyas in his ŚV. We have discussed how Bhāviveka’s own syllogism (PP syllogism) resembles the Sāṃkhyas’ in ŚV (ŚV syllogism) and how Kumārila’s critique of the latter is reflected in the Mīmāṃsaka position in MHK 9 (MHK 9 syllogism). I do not argue that Bhāviveka actually read Kumārila and revised his section of PP in MHK 9 accordingly. Bhāviveka’s revision may be motivated by the argument of a certain Mīmāṃsaka before Kumārila who criticized the Sāṃkhyas. However, the fact that Bhāviveka does not continue the PP syllogism in MHK 9 suggests that Bhāviveka discarded the syllogism for some reason. The fact that Bhāviveka newly introduces the MHK syllogism as the opponent’s argument strongly suggests that the reason is the Mīmāṃsakas’ critique of that syllogism. Although Kumārila’s section on ritual killing in ŚV appears to explain the difference between PP’s and MHK 9’s section on ritual killing, what I would like suggest is not that the change was made in reaction to Kumārila but that Bhāviveka began to notice the
Mīmāṃsaka position on the matter of ritual killing.

Still, the first appearance of the Mīmāṃsaka position is mixed with the older Vedic ritualists’ defenses of ritual killing in MHK 9. This again testifies that Bhāviveka does not distinguish the two groups: the Mīmāṃsakas to him must have been a particular group among ritualist Brahmins, whom Buddhists have long condemned for killing animals. Although Bhāviveka corrected one of his arguments in PP as he confronts this newly emergent group of ritualists, he did not correct the genealogical framework in which he locates the Mīmāṃsakas. They are, to Bhāviveka, still Brahmins who recorded their temporal ascendency in the second layer of the Manusmṛti’s section on meat-eating. But, when Buddhists after Bhāviveka finally came to notice the fundamental difference between the Mīmāṃsakas’ position on ritual killing and that of ritualist Brahmins, they may have thought that the defenses of ritual killing listed in MHK 9 should not be ascribed to the Mīmāṃsakas. They thus may have felt no need to discuss arguments already abandoned by the upholders of the Veda themselves. And, considering that a critique of the Mīmāṃsakas’ defense of ritual killing must eventually be directed at the authority of the Veda itself, as we have seen with Bhāviveka’s case, the issue of killing in Vedic sacrifice may have not been deemed by post-Bhāviveka Buddhists a proper line of attack against the Mīmāṃsakas. In this process of understanding the Mīmāṃsakas, who were later perceived as the major Hindu opponents by Buddhists after Bhāviveka, Buddhists no longer addressed the issue of killing in Vedic sacrifice, and thereby, their critique of Vedic sacrifice came to an end.
Conclusion

Indian Buddhism was never an isolated phenomenon; Indian Buddhists were in constant contact with practitioners of other religions. This single fact makes it imperative to view every aspect of Indian Buddhism as a product of historical conflicts and negotiations between Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Explaining the doctrine of no self (anātman) or non-killing (ahiṃsā) as essential features of Buddhism without proper references to the Upaniṣadic notion of self (ātman) or Vedic cult of animal killing (yajñe hiṃsā) is inadequate. Sensitivity to inter-religious and inter-sectarian dynamics is a prerequisite for any historical understanding of Indian Buddhism. The tasks of mapping Buddhists’ relationships with other religious practitioners and of tracing changes in these relationships throughout the course of their histories in the homeland must be priorities for modern scholarship on Indian Buddhism. However, such research is rarely undertaken and, even when such attempts are made, they are often governed by holistic perspectives on Indian religious diversity, imagining that there are certain natures intrinsic to “Indian” and “religious” encounters with others.

This dissertation has studied the histories of two Buddhist critiques developed to cope with Vedic ritualists. In tracing their histories, special attention has been paid to Buddhists’ relationships with two specific groups of Vedic Brahmins, viz. the Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāṃkhyaśas, highlighting their respective roles as immediate adversaries and distant collaborators in two Buddhist anti-Vedic critiques. The findings of this dissertation bear on the general frames through which we view the nature of interrelationships between religiously heterogeneous
groups of ancient and medieval India.

Here, in conclusion, I would like to consider whether the two most prevalent models—viz. inclusivism and exclusivism—apply to Bhāviveka.\(^{372}\) In reflecting on the applicability of these two models to describe Bhāviveka’s attitude toward outsiders, I would suggest that a certain flexibility is needed as we approach Indian polemical scholarly texts (śāstra).

Although Bhāviveka’s attitude toward outsiders has never been subjected to a serious and extensive inquiry, it is often characterized in terms of inclusivism. Building upon the concept of inclusivism as propounded by its initial exponent, Paul Hacker, Wilhelm Halbfass unfolded the explanatory potential of the concept by demonstrating its applicability not only to Brahmanical and Hindu but also to Buddhist and Jaina intellectuals’ manners of handling the religious plurality of their times. As he discusses Buddhist inclusivistic tendency, Halbfass mentions Bhāviveka as one of the Buddhist authors who manifested an inclusivistic attitude toward outsiders.\(^{373}\) To corroborate Bhāviveka’s inclusivism, Halbfass refers to a passage from the third chapter of MHK (tattvājñānāśaṅgā) where Bhāviveka equates the Buddha with the Vedāntin notion of brahman and declares the latter as the equivalent of the Buddhist term

\(^{372}\) Classical formulations and elaborations of the concept of inclusivism to describe the typical Indian trait of approaching religious others are found in Hacker (1995, Chapter 11) and Halbfass (1988, Chapters 19 and 22). Recently, there have been critiques of inclusivistic understanding of Indian religious plurality and arguments that the exclusivistic model should be adopted. Verardi (2011, 11) well expresses the gist of the criticism: “I do not share the inclusive paradigm that assumes that in ancient India, for all the recognized differences, there was—we speak here of the structured systems—a single development model, broadly shared by all the forces in the field. I see India as the only civilization of the ancient world that generated two opposing models of social and economic relations that coexisted for a long time in conflict, whatever the attempts to reduce or mask the incompatibilities.” See also the following remark by Sanderson (2015, 159) who explains Indian religious diversity without recourse to inclusivism: “The long-entrenched contrary view, that the Indian religions were essentially tolerant, cannot reasonably be maintained in the face of the carefully formulated views of the adherents of these Indian traditions and evidence of sporadic outbreaks of intolerance and persecution. … this must be explained not through an argument from essence, …, but in terms of a balance of influence in which no one religious tradition was in a position of such strength that it could rid society of its rivals, a balance of power sustained by the policy of governments.”

\(^{373}\) See Halbfass (1988, 357) and (1991, 66).
“nirvāṇa.” Referring to the same text,374 Eckel (2008, 7-8), although with closer attention to the irony of Bhāviveka’s arguments, affirms Bhāviveka’s inclusivism when he identifies the Buddha with brahman. Appropriating the central term, brahman, of the Vedāntins, and making it one’s own by infusing the term with the new meaning of nirvāṇa is indeed an inclusivistic way of understanding religious others and implying one’s own superiority over them.

We also observe Bhāviveka’s inclusivistic attitude toward the Vedāntins in other chapters of MHK. As he confronts the Śrāvakas’ attempt to exclude Mahāyāna from the Buddha’s teaching (buddhokti) by likening it to the system of Vedānta (vedāntadarśana), Bhāviveka surprisingly acknowledges the similarity between (Mahāyāna) Buddhist and Vedāntic teachings, but only in an inclusivistic way: “Everything that is well spoken in the Vedānta is taught by the Buddha.”375 Criticizing previous interpretations of this half-verse of Bhāviveka, Qvarnström (1989, 103) states: “Gokhale, Nakamura and others take this to mean that Bhavya had a favorable attitude towards the Vedānadarśana, but in the light of MHK/TJ 8.86 the intention is quite the reverse.” MHK/TJ 8.86 on the basis of which Qvarnström is critical of the other interpretation, however, merely draws out what is implied in MHK 4.56. While the latter only alludes to the Buddhist origin of “well spoken” (sūkta) Vedāntic teachings, the former explicitly states that the Vedāntins longed for the impeccable Buddhist teachings and made it their own.376 Both passages show that Bhāviveka acknowledged certain good points in the tenets of Vedānta and then asserted their Buddhist origin.

Although Bhāviveka’s approach to Vedānta, as Qvarström points out, does not simply

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374 The text under discussion is MHK/TJ 3.289-290. The entire passage is translated in Eckel (1992, 169). See also Gokhale (1961-2).
entail his favorable reception of the opponents’ views, it does not imply “the reverse,” that is, an unfavorable attitude toward or total rejection of Vedānta. Rather, it fulfills the classical definition of inclusivism by Hacker (1995, 244-5): “It consists in claiming for, and thus including in, one’s own religion what really belongs to an alien sect.” Thus, Bhāviveka observes that “the ātman theory of the Vedānta school and the non-self theory of Buddhism are identical in content” (Nakamura 1965, 295) and further argues that as long as the Vedāntins regard “non-origination” (ajātitva) as the general characteristic of ātman, such understanding of ātman is well founded and without fault (nirdoṣah sopapattiḥ). Bhāviveka first claims the resemblance, if not complete identity, between the Mādhyamika and Vedāntin concepts and he includes the Vedāntic idea in Buddhism by declaring that every well-spoken Vedāntic doctrine originates from the Buddha’s teaching. This is an unmistakably inclusivistic approach toward the religious and philosophical other, the Vedāntins.

Nevertheless, inclusivism is not the only interreligious strategy of Bhāviveka. Regarding the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines, Bhāviveka shows no willingness to observe any “well spoken” points and has no intention of arguing that they had a Buddhist origin. As we have seen in the dissertation, against the Mīmāṃsaka idea of the authorlessness of the Veda, Bhāviveka posits the evil authorship of the Veda. He also emphasizes the universal applicability of karmic law against the Mīmāṃsaka legitimization of ritual killing. When Bhāviveka formulates the thesis “the Veda is not a means of knowing dharma” against the Mīmāṃsā thesis “dharma is beneficial acts defined by the Vedic injunction,” he is excluding the Veda from the realm of dharma. Yet, Bhāviveka also exhibits an inclusivistic stance to the Veda toward the end of MHK 9. He

377 See Qvarnström 1989, 104. Cf. MHK 8.95, “iḍṛśo yady abhipreta ātmā hi bhavatām api/ nāmādibahusādharmyān nirdoṣah sopapattiḥ!”
378 TJ D284b5, “rig byed ni chos rtogs pa la tshad mar gyur pa ma yin te.”
379 MS 1.1.2, “codanālakṣaṇo artho dharma.”
recognizes “some well-spoken statements” (legs bshad 'ga’ zhib) in the Veda and likens them to “some jewels inside a pile of shit” (mi gtsang phung po rin chen 'ga’ zhib). Moreover, a possible Buddhist origin of those “jewels” is also hinted at in the commentary.380 Such an inclusivistic approach to the Veda, however, is not an act of acknowledging certain goodness either in the Mīmāṃsaka doctrines or in the “action-oriented” portion of the Veda (kriyākāṇḍa) prioritized by the Mīmāṃsakas.381 Exclusivism dominates MHK 9.

On the other hand, Bhāviveka’s attitude toward the Sāṃkhya cannot be reduced either to inclusivism or to exclusivism. His critical reviews of the Sāṃkhya doctrines forms a separate

380 TJ D317a4-5, “Nevertheless, to those who are like jewelry specialists, the following thought occurs: ‘The precious dharma like this did not originate from here. On the contrary, someone [must] have collected it from Buddhist scriptures and others and mixed that into it [=the Veda]. It is just like a jewel such as lapis lazuli (vaidūrya) does not originate from a pile of shit on the street of a village inhabited by ordinary people.’” (rin po che brtag pa la mkhas pa 'dra ba rnams la 'di lta bu'i shes pa 'byung ste: “di las ni chos rin po che 'di lta bu 'byung ba ma yin gyi; gzhan du na sangs rgyas pa la sogs pa'i gzhung las bitus nas de'i nang du bsres pa yin te. skye bo tha mal pa rnams kyis nye bar spyad pa'i grong bar gyi srang na mi gtsang ba'i phung po yod pa las bai dzurya la sogs pa'i rin po che 'byung ba ma yin pa bzhin no.”)

381 Although it is not explicit in the text of MHK itself, it seems that Bhāviveka holds different—that is, opposite—opinions with respect to the “action-part” (kriyākāṇḍa) and “knowledge-part” (jñānakāṇḍa) of the Veda. MHK 9.20-22 seem to allude to this division of the Veda and express Bhāviveka’s varying assessments of them. In MHK 9.20, Bhāviveka states that the rational part of a scripture should be examined first: “If it is argued that [only] those words that survive the inquiry of rationality are [qualified to be called] a scripture, first of all, such words must be examined. Then [other insignificant] sayings of it [are to be examined] later.” (yat parīkṣākṣamaṃ yuktyā vacanaṃ cet tad āgamaḥ/ tad eva tāvan mīmāṃsyam paścāt tenoditaṃ hi yat//) After having suggested examining a scripture by focusing on a part of it, in the subsequent two verses, Bhāviveka emphasizes that it is knowledge (jñāna) rather than ritual actions (kriyā) that is regarded as the means to the ultimate goal of liberation (mukti) by everyone (kun la rab tu grags pa'i phyogs). Cf. MHK 9.21-2, “Let it be asserted in it [=the Veda] that liberation is from knowledge because that (i.e., knowledge) is the antidote to it (i.e., ignorance). It is similar to the case where one recovers from illness due to medicine since the latter is the antidote to sickness. Ritual actions cannot be considered to be [a means of] attaining liberation since they are [just] actions, like an act of ploughing. Or, it is because they, being non-cognitive acts, are verbally expressible. Or, it is because they last [only for] a limited time.” (tatra tatpratipakṣatvā jñānān mukti itīṣyatām/ āmayapratipakṣatvād aśadadhād vyādhimuktivat// kriyātvān na kriyābhīṣṭā kṛśvān muktavyāuptaye/ adhītve sati vācyatvān mitakālatvato 'pi vā//) (MHK 9.22c “adhītve sati vācyatvān” is hard to translate; the Tibetan text differs from it: “blo ma yin phyir brjod bya'i phyir” (It is Because they are non-cognitive acts and because they are verbally expressible.) No explanation of this part of the verse is found in TJ.) Such divergent evaluations of the Brāhmaṇas (kriyākāṇḍa) and the Upaniṣads (jñānakāṇḍa) of the Veda partly explains Bhāviveka’s different approaches to the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, who respectively prioritize the former and latter portions over the other.
chapter of MHK, and therefore, it is not necessary to point out that the Sāṃkhyas were one of the major opponents to Bhāviveka.\textsuperscript{382} However, we have seen that Bhāviveka emulated the Sāṃkhyya trait of collecting immoral teachings of the Veda and used an almost identical syllogism to denounce Vedic sacrifice. In short, Bhāviveka, albeit implicitly, collaborated with the Sāṃkhyas against their common enemy, Vedic ritualists. Furthermore, there is a curious record on Bhāviveka’s identity in Xuanzang’s travelogue that may indicate his more intimate relationship with the Sāṃkhyas.

Not far to the south of the city is a great mountain cliff, which was the place where the Śāstra-master Bhāviveka stayed at the Asura Palace to wait for the advent of Maitreya Bodhisattva as a Buddha. The Śāstra-master was a man of magnanimous disposition with deep and sublime virtues. He was outwardly clad in the garb of the Sāṃkhyas and inwardly glorified the learning of Nāgārjuna.\textsuperscript{383}

In this passage, Bhāviveka is portrayed as having two discrete identities that seem to constitute his social and personal identities. Bhāviveka expressed himself as a Sāṃkhyya in his clothing (僧佉之服) but his inner aspiration was directed toward Madhyamaka philosophy (龍猛之學). This composite identity does not conform to an inclusivistic or exclusivistic framework. Nor does it indicate that Bhāviveka was syncretic; each identity forms a different aspect. The reason why he wanted to socially present himself as a Sāṃkhyya is not clear from Xuanzang’s short record. Unless Bhāviveka’s intention in wearing the Sāṃkhyya clothing was ironic, a certain feature of the Sāṃkhyas must have been appealing to Bhāviveka as a mode of presenting himself to the public. Given the analysis of this dissertation, that feature may have been the Sāṃkhyas as


\textsuperscript{383} T 2087, 930c25-8, “城南不遠有大山巖，婆毘吠伽(唐言淸辯)論師，住阿素洛宮，待見慈氏菩薩成佛之處。論師雅量弘遠，至德深邃。外示僧佉之服，內弘龍猛之學。” I slightly modified Li (1996, 316)’s translation.
Brahmanical ascetics who opposed Vedic sacrifice. This adoption of a feature of the opponent does not include the other school within oneself in order to claim one’s superiority over it. It is more plausible to consider the possibility that Bhāviveka wanted to gain certain social capital by maintaining two disparate identities.

Inclusivism and exclusivism alone do not explain Bhāviveka’s strategies of confronting others, nor do they explain the general interreligious attitude of Indian intellectuals throughout history. This is not to say that they play no role. Bhāviveka’s case indicates that one could simultaneously deploy both strategies toward different opponents. Nor were these the only options for Indian intellectuals.

From Bhāviveka’s case, one can conclude that it is legitimate to analyze the sixth-century religious situation in units of separate schools or traditions. However, individual schools’ attitudes toward others were not predetermined; they were the products of dialogical encounters between intellectuals of different traditions. In other words, ancient and medieval authors were not employing a predetermined policy—such as inclusivism and exclusivism—to outsiders. Indeed, separate identities between schools, depending on the topic of debate, may be blurred.

The portion of MHK 9 under the heading of “the Veda is not moral” and studied in this dissertation (MHK 9.1-4 and 18-42) demonstrates a Buddhist author’s management of the resources available to him in order to confront a newly emerged opponent, the Mīmāṃsakas. In the course of refuting the Mīmāṃsaka claims, Bhāviveka draws upon information and strategies accumulated in sources that do not belong to his own Madhyamaka school. He thereby crosses the boundaries, or rather, transcends the boundaries between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna and between Buddhism and Sāṃkhya to form a larger community of anti-Vedics against Vedic ritualists. Thus, in the portion of MHK 9 considered here, the confrontation is not merely Buddhists versus Mīmāṃsakas, but, more properly, the Ascetics versus the Householders. Such a
confrontation was possible because Bhāviveka, the last upholder of the two traditional Buddhist critiques against Vedic ritualists, actively incorporated the Sāṃkhya challenges to Vedic authority, indirectly supporting the Sāṃkhya cause of \textit{ahimsā}.

This dissertation does not exhaust the valuable information on sixth-century Buddhists’ relationship with other Hindu groups, not only in MHK 9, but in the “Mīmāṃsā proper” sections of MHK 9. There is still much to excavate with the aid of texts that were directly involved in Bhāviveka’s composition. In Chapter Two, I laid out the basic contents of MHK 9, proposed sections that can be investigated separately, and considered the identity of the opponents in each section. I also suggested a perspective for conceiving MHK 9 as a unitary chapter, despite its various opponents of incompatible identities. According to my analysis, MHK 9 has a greater purpose than merely refuting the Mīmāṃsakas. It is designed to counteract the movements that arose under the symbol of the Veda, both the Veda proper and scriptures elevated to the status of the Veda by its advocates.

MHK 9 is an anti-Vedic discourse, a \textit{nāstika} manifesto. It is a systematic expression of the Buddhist identity as \textit{nāstika} that was maintained throughout the history of Buddhism in India. When a detailed analysis of the entire chapter has been made (continuing the work begun here), we will be able to write a history of the Buddhist confrontation with Vedic Brahmins. It will be a history of Buddhist struggles for legitimacy against the Veda, \textit{the symbol} for Indian \textit{dharma}.  

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