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WORK AND ITS DISCONTENTS: THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT OF SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS

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THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT OF SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS

by

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PREFACE

In writing this thesis I have tried to accomplish several things:

A) To restore a critical connotation to the concept of ideology.

B) To develop guidelines for interworking psychoanalytic theory and social theory, the latter informed by neo-Marxism.

C) To argue for the importance of extended or depth interview research, and to suggest limitations on the validity of survey research-oriented methodologies for the study of attitudes regarding primary, or "core" social relations.

D) To suggest ways in which the above projects can help inform a critical social practice, especially one aimed at the democratization of the workplace.

The thesis is organized in the following manner:

Chapter one, nominally a review of the history of the use of the concept of ideology, is intended to familiarize the reader with the various modal forms of its employment, and to begin to develop a critical standpoint with regard to them. Thus, starting with Bacon and concluding with Bell and Converse, I sketch each theorist's position and

relate it to certain underlying presuppositions, presuppositions defined in interworked epistemological and sociopolitical terms.

In chapter two I begin with a discussion of the varying status given by Marxist theorists to social actors' interpretations of their situation, and then move to review similar debates within non-Marxist philosophy of social science. This sets up the point that the latter positions, whatever their plausibility, are essentially indifferent to the problems posed by the concept of ideology. To develop these problems I turn to some of Marx's specific writings on that topic, teasing out basic points. Next I elaborate a refined version of the concept of social contradiction, specifying three distinguishable types, and indicate the concept of ideology's particular relevance to the third variety, which is termed a "contradiction between institutional discourses," the term discourse generally connoting systems of representations of social relations. I suggest that we may define ideology as a "metadiscourse" that attempts to resolve or at least ameliorate the experience of such a contradiction, and begin to expand on this notion with reference to the contradiction between hierarchical forms of social relations in the capitalist workplace and democratic-egalitarian forms of social relations as practiced in political institutions, voluntary organizations, and interpersonal life. After giving reasons for regarding this contradiction as "active," as constitutive of suffering and frustration, I stress the necessarily suppressive nature of the containment of this contradiction within the "accord" between labor and capital, and argue that we must conceive of relations of force, and concomitant fear, as internal to ideology. In this light, I urge that we view ideology as a "sociopersonal process,"

i.e. that it should not be regarded as static "thought" but as dynamic "thinking" within forms of social relations. I conclude by suggesting the necessity of moving away from cognitivist, rationalistic models of ideological thinking, and broadly anticipate the contribution of psychoanalysis to our understanding of ideology.

Chapter three begins with a critique of early attempts to interwork psychoanalysis and Marxist social theory, focusing on pivotal conceptualizations in the work of Fromm. Referring to Habermas' general formulation of the concept of "systematically distorted communication" and the contributions of Alfred Lorenzer, I set out a perspective focusing on the communicative status of subjects' representations of social relations, i.e. their relative accessibility to consciousness. Then, using the case of industrial relations within a textile firm as a model, I indicate ways in which different discourses are mobilized and employed within the context of labor-management relations. Most importantly, I outline the general processes by which the mobilization of unconscious discourses occurs, and suggest how those processes supplement the conscious forms of the ideological circumscription of democracy. In other words, I argue that the suppressive dimension of the ideological process, connoting a dimension relatively transparent to consciousness, interworks with a dimension that is relatively inaccessible to consciousness.

Chapter four focuses on the nature of the "critical hermeneutic" or critical interpretive process, and the specific form it took within the interviews presented in the fifth chapter. Thus, I develop a discussion oriented to problematic integration of subjects' reflection upon the "objective" determinants of their condition and

their reflection upon their preconscious and unconscious ways of interpreting those conditions. These considerations pass over into an elaboration of the nature of the interview, in which I argue that we must move beyond standard criticisms of survey research-oriented conceptions of the process and draw upon Kernberg's and Lorenzer's arguments to specify significant psychoanalytic concepts that are of help in understanding the interview process as well as the process of interpretation.

Chapter five begins with an account of the formation of the current set of institutionalized relations between labor and capital in this country, an account that broadly contextualizes the interviews reported. Next, after presenting some considerations regarding the form of presentation of the interview material, I analyze sections of the interviews with "Pat," a young Chrysler worker. The object of the analysis is to illustrate particular forms of ideological thinking, with emphasis being given to the way Pat disengaged his suffering within the plant from the social relations within which it was generated. I point out strong indications of the implication of defensive processing in his discussion of the relations of the plant, and argue that such defensive processing is not to be conceived of as a simple manifestation of "personality dynamics" only, but is a form of thinking mobilized within the social relations of the plant and interclass relations generally, and which is ratified by a "conventional wisdom" that, through its congruence with those forms of thinking, obscures their problematic nature. In such a manner the alienation of the subject from the system of social relations in which s/he participates is compounded by their alienation from their experience of those relations and from their mode

of reflection upon them as well. I conclude by considering the significance of interview material regarding Pat's family history, and suggest the different standpoints from which it may be evaluated.

In chapter six the concerns of chapter four are taken up in a general examination of the relationship between the dialogic parameters of the critique of ideology and the dynamics of political organizations. In that discussion I stress the dilatory impact of Marxism's tendency to conceive of social transformation without sufficient regard for the type of contradiction I have emphasized, and also point to related shortcomings in Leninist organizational doctrine and its associated conception of political education. I conclude with a discussion of criteria for elaborating a research program, and make suggestions for further work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

ORIENTATION TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

Five Orienting Theses

It will be helpful to set out, in the form of five theses, some of the main interests and concerns guiding the discussion. Intended to orient, they only anticipate later arguments:

I) The characteristic employment of the concept of ideology within political discourse recommends it as a point of interrogation of the nature and limits of that discourse. Because critical social theory rests upon the possibility of dialogue forming true representations of the world, and shaping practice in accord with such representations, it is necessary to reconsider formulations used to regulate political discourse, for example the concept of ideology, that in principle deny the possibility of such a dialogue.

II) The phrase "representation of the world" connotes a departure from a realist epistemology and a concomitant correspondence theory of truth. At the same time, despite the failure of this epistemology in the face of criticisms stressing the constitutive character of subjectivity and the mediating role of language, the notion of the "criticism of ideology" still suggests a process that retains some of the clarity and certainty of realism's sense of "objective knowledge." To preserve this sense, the criticism of ideology must no

longer be considered equivalent to the removal of a veil that conceals a "correct" understanding of society from which motivating interests may be "deduced." Indeed, such a form of criticism, modeled according to forms of argumentation in the empirical-analytic sciences, is retained as a moment in the criticism of ideology. But this moment of criticism is subordinated to an overall movement in which the epistemologically relevant ideas of constitutive subjectivity and the mediating role of language are established in the position formerly occupied by ontology or, to move from terminology derived from "first philosophy" to those of dialectics, by reified representations.

Within this movement, the sense of objectivity formed in the subject's practical relation to the social world undergoes considerable revision - the sense of an objectivity of the social order is supplemented and reciprocally mediated by the fact of a subjectivity that expresses itself most clearly in the subject's simultaneous awareness of their own potential, the potential for social innovation, and thus their ability to transcend a "positive" social ontology.

III) The objective character of potentiality may be grasped not only through an appreciation of the succession of sociohistorical forms, of intersubjectivity, that reveal, following Marx, a "species-potentiality" to the subject, but also through the subject's suffering within the social order in which they live. Because ideology pits itself against this proactive dialectic of suffering and potentiality, ideology becomes subject to criticism that may aspire, in a revised sense, to the notion of objective truth. This is particularly true to the extent that institutionally enforced systems of norms and expectations can be demonstrated to be contradictory. In such a context, the subject becomes

a locus of contradiction and a point of its expression. The task of ideology thereby becomes that of excusing the contradictory social order by silencing the subject and thereby suppressing action directed at resolving contradictions.

IV) In consequence, the critique of ideology is not simply concerned with forming adequate representations of outer nature and the social world, but also with the possibility of adequate expression of the socially mediated internal nature of the subject. This obligates the critique of ideology to take on a "metacommunicative" dimension, discussing the preconditions of communication adequate to the situation and experience of the subject. Such a discussion points beyond an emphasis on procedural guarantees and sufficient access to the material resources necessary for communication, to the problem of sytematically distorted communication. To the extent we take personality to represent a characteristic pattern of the representation, expression and, hence, communication of needs, an approach to the study of communicative distortion must, following Habermas and others, refer to a longitudinal and synchronic account of the formation and functioning of personality within the sociocultural field. Further, the notion of critique must be concomitantly expanded to account for the complexities, revealed by psychoanalysis, of the representation process.

V) Most decidedly, ideology is more a sociopersonal process of representation, in a manner reminiscent of Shapiro's discussion of cognitive styles,[1] than a simple collection of beliefs, attitudes, and

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[1] David Shapiro, Neurotic Styles, (New York: Basic Books, 1965): 1-22. I intend a selective reference. Specifically I wish to suggest that the ideological process is, like a neurotic style, a "way of thinking and perceiving...of experiencing emotion...a mode of subjective experience in general..."(p. 1). It is unlike a neurotic

values arrayed in a more or less logical fashion. The latter conception, informed by a social science fetishizing the prediction of behavior and a "rigorous" empiricism, resonates with the predominant moment of reification in ideology, even as it tolerantly designates all such collections "ideology." The idea that a subject simply "holds" beliefs concerning fundamental social relations obscures the manner in which such beliefs represent a crystallization of the tensions between a contradictory society and the individual. It thus also contains an implicit theory of communication, a theory without a moment of critical reflection, that correlates well with the ideological project. That ideological belief both mediates and hypostatizes inner and outer nature, in a manner intended to conserve institutions, should be the cutting edge of the concept's employment.

In sum, the theses express the standpoint of a "neo-Marxism" that is capped by the writings of T.W. Adorno, Alfred Lorenzer, and Jurgen Habermas. The theses urge that ideology criticism base itself on a conception of truth grounded in the "objective negativity" of human potential, a potential immediately linked to the prospect of greater happiness and relief from suffering engendered within contradictory social orders. While not antagonistic to the linkage of this form of critique to affirmations of particular forms of social relations, this standpoint recognizes that the passage into affirmation of certain social arrangements entails a suspension of claims to "objectivity,"

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style in that it bears some relationship to the management of suffering systematically constituted by a social order. Thus I do not wish to adopt Shapiro's claim that these styles are functionally independent from psychic conflict nor, more generally, do I wish to suggest we view ideology as a personal phenomenon. As I shall argue at length, it is a sociopersonal process.

however construed, and must be considered as a separate, succeeding moment of the critical process.

Review

In the following review, a summary discussion of the more significant formulations of the concept of ideology will elaborate the issues raised within the theses. While this discussion will retain some fidelity to the original categories and concerns, the main burden of the discussion will be to establish the framework I wish to work within. This does not entail a "prejudiced reading," in which each formulation is judged in light of its approximation to a "correct" understanding. Rather, the intention is to indicate some of the antecedents of a concept of ideology that is part of a theory of "systematically distorted communication" and to develop some of the foci such a theory incorporates.

The history of the concept of ideology is part of the history of a form of politics in which the legitimation of a system of social relations and of the form of authority supporting those relations increasingly relies upon gaining the populace's reasoned assent. In itself, this amounts to an underspecification of the concept; there is little to distinguish it from, for example, the concept of "myth" in Plato's Republic.[2] Indeed, arriving at a sharp distinction from concepts such as myth is difficult, particularly if we wish to maintain the implication that an ideology is somehow false, in contradistinction to definitions that reduce ideology to belief systems shared by members of a group or class.

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[2] Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. by A.D. Lindsay (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1957), pp. 59-127.

We can avoid appearing to advocate unnecessary conceptual proliferation, however, if we link the concept to the gradual development of bourgeois political forms. Thus we would contextualize Bacon's innovation of the term in the early 17th century by placing him near the outset of a "long wave" of a transformation that supported a drastically altered conception of the nature of the state, the individual, and the ground of obligation. At the leading edge of this transformation was the growth of the bourgeoisie as a significant class (and the reciprocal extension of market relations) and increasing conflict between the bourgeoisie and the feudal order. From the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, the struggle was thematized through the projection of the calculating individual of the market into a similarly calculated relationship with the state, and the critique of a social order denying such a relationship. Among other factors, the exigencies of winning support from other classes, the extension of market relations, the polyglot origins of their own arriviste class, and the protouniversalist religious and secular antecedents of their doctrine encouraged formulations of the bourgeois alternative that generalized the attributes of the bourgeois individual.[3]

In this context, the individual qua "subject" acquired a new dimension. Habermas and others suggest that prior to this transformation the notion of the subject refers to the outcome of the identification of the individual as a subordinated particular, a member of an organic

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[3] Walter Ullman, A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages (Baltimore: Pen nguin, 1965), pp. 200-25.

social category.[4] Subject connotes "subjected to." In the bourgeois period subject comes to express a contradiction between individual and society epitomized in the contractarian system of Hobbes: the individual, in so far as s/he enters into a contract to establish an absolute sovereign, is constituting, while in so far as s/he submits to the absolute sovereign is, in the sense of being afforded conditions of survival via their domination by the monarch, constituted.[5] Despite the extent to which this reified dialectic, a distorted reflection of the transformation then proceeding, sought to contain and suppress the proactive rationality of the individual, it failed, caught up in a legal form that recognizes the contracting individual and thereby prevents their political obliteration. Thus, concepts such as "myth," which in both the Platonic and Levi-Straussian sense imply a system of identifications imposed upon an essentially passive individual, are superseded, and are no longer an appropriate characterization of discourse. Instead of being a factor that is essentially recognized in only a strategic sense as in, for example, The Prince, in the bourgeois period the constitutive rationality of the individual is understood as the ground of the state, of right, and obligation.[6]

Bacon's employment of the concept in the early 17th century only generally anticipated these developments. Firmly tied by office to the English monarchy, and writing during a period in which conflict

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[4] Jurgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere," New German Critique 3 (Fall 1974): p. 53. See also The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 22.

[5] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Baltimore: Penguin, 1978).

[6] Along with the sociopolitical ground of this thematic innovation, a thorough analysis of it prerequisties should refer to the gradual rise in literacy, the growth of the printing industry, etc.

between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie was not systematically manifest, Bacon tightly constrained the social implications of his empiricist critique of "idols." Perhaps nothing illustrates this better than Bacon's choice of a target, the axiomatic, metaphysical doctrines of the universities, against which he pitted an inductive variant of empirical-analytic method. Apparently wishing to avoid the appearance of a recapitulation of the Sophist's attack on idealism's justification of elite rule,[7] Bacon obscured the subversive potential of his epistemology, in part by arguing that its employment would have integrative consequences: "learning doth make the minds of men gentle, maniable, and pliant to government; whereas ignorance makes them churlish, thwaart, and mutinous."[8] Here Bacon blurred the distinction between the bases of the laws regulating nature and society; the objectivity of both natural and social laws assured the coincidence of enlightenment with social harmony. Perhaps more dominant in his thinking, however, was the notion that the development of science would result in a new social hierarchy, presumably interstitial with the existing monarchy. In his New Atlantis the sway of ideology would not be opposed by universal education, but by the "awe" with which the populace would regard the "scientific administrators" of the House of Solomon. Thus the use of religious themes to characterize the form of deference granted men of greater knowledge crystallized the notion that enlightenment will be restricted, and that at the mass level the fruits of inquiry cannot be appreciated by a population Bacon viewed as

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[7] The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology, p. 183.

[8] William Leiss, The Domination of Nature, (New York: George Brazillier, 1972), p. 56.

naturally succumbing to misunderstanding and illusion. In this fashion ideology, at first the target of critique, reappeared as a revised religiosity supporting the power of scientific institutions.

In the writings of the radical Encyclopedists Helvetius and d'Holbach critical empiricism was driven to social consequences vastly different from those portrayed by Bacon. Writing in the France of the early eighteenth century, they lacked Bacon's optimism regarding the ease with which the politically significant sections of the population might be persuaded of the superiority of a social order governed by maxims obtained through scientific research. In the face of an absolutism more intransigent than that faced by Bacon, they were prompted to a more penetrating analysis of the ground of ideology. In contrast to Bacon's naturalization of ideology as a concomitant of human character, they construed ideology to be a socially grounded instrument of corrupt rule. Holbach put it bluntly: "Authority generally considers it in its interest to maintain received opinions: the prejudices and errors which it considers necessary for the secure maintainance of its power are perpetuated by this power, which never reasons."[9] For Helvetius, to whom "education makes us what we are," the problem lay in the determining influence of imperfect government and the clergy, particularly the latter.[10] The removal of these impediments would allow an innate common sense to become available for development, a view recalling the English empiricists in their more egalitarian moments, e.g. Locke in the Second Treatise. Thus the concern with false ideas

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[9] The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology, p. 185.

[10] Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 5:1 (New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 16.

and superstition is associated with the wish to bring about not only a true understanding of natural and social processes, but also the expression of human virtue. In these formulations the criticism of false consciousness transcends strictly epistemological limits to infuse a social theory informing an emancipatory program.

The "ideologues" of late eighteenth century France retained the emphasis on empirical-analytic method as the basis of knowledge of the object world, but downplayed the possibility of an immanent relationship between knowledge and virtue. This adjustment was undoubtedly prompted by the revolutionary purges that, to them, discredited a belief in the primacy of altruism. More modestly, they sought to work out a rigorous materialism, derived from Condillac, that would justify empiricism by tying the process of the formation of ideas to physiological processes.[11] In asserting this reduction, they thereby precluded investigation into the representational process per se, and rendered problematic any attempt to relate that process to the social context. Thus when Cabanis claimed that thought was a function of the brain, as digestion was a function of the stomach, the possibility of an epistemology referring to social processes hinted at by Helvetius was abandoned.[12]

This metaphorical speculation of the ideologues, ironically reminiscent in form if not in content to the metaphysics they wanted to debunk, provided the grist for Napoleon's charge that ideology qua the study of the formation of ideas was a species of metaphysics,

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[11] Emile Brehier, The Nineteenth Century: Period of Systems, 1800-1850 (Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 30.

[12] ibid., p. 36.

destructive of the "sacred principles" upon which the social order is grounded.[13] To the ideologues' laws of mental functioning Napoleon counterposed "history" as the touchstone for assessing the propriety of thought, an invocation serving to mystify the grounds of the public opinion over which Napoleon sought to exercise influence. By endorsing secular irrationality and making it the foundation of order, Napoleon employed the central critical category of the ideologues against them: he accused them of promoting the social conflict they sought to still with their mental mechanics. At this conjuncture, then, we find opposing critical and pejorative connotations linked via the intellectual bad faith of the bourgeoisie. The rationality of criticism is exhausted as soon as instability threatens to follow from it, and irrational sentiment, given supremacy as "history," is then argued to be the appropriate limits of rationality. Against the scientific method wielded by the ideologists, the conservative reaction offers the "heart,"[14] the plausibility of a common sense habituated to existing power relations. To anticipate later arguments, I would claim that it is precisely at this moment of attempted refutation that the conservative criticism of criticism unwittingly yields the most penetrating definition of ideology and exemplifies its function.

With Saint-Simon the negative and relatively open-ended scope of empiricist criticism, only arbitrarily constrained in the moderately

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[13] The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology, p. 187.

[14] ibid., p. 188.

reformist politics of the Enlightenment radicals,[15] was subordinated to a techocratic vision. Arguably only a reformulation of Bacon's rule of the scientists, a reformulation made possible by the dismantling of the power of the aristocracy during the Revolution and the Empire, this famous quotation of Saint-Simon trenchantly asserts the utilitarian dimension of the Enlightenment criticism as it simultaneously advances a productionist ethic to resolve the question of social ends:

> The base of the present national pyramid consists of workers in their routine occupations; the first layers above this base are the leaders of industrial enterprises, the scientists who improve the methods of manufacture and widen their application...The upper layers, which I consider to be composed of nothing but plaster, which is easily recognizable despite the gilding, are the courtiers, the mass of nobles whether of ancient or recent creation, the idle rich, the governing class from the prime minister to the humblest clerk.[16]

The sustained investigation of principles of mental functioning that, to the ideologues, had seemed necessary to establish the connection between the individual and the object world and to thereby discredit idealism, was dropped for a more mundane form of materialism. As the essential feature of social relations increasingly became their economic dimension, and as the expansions and contractions of capitalist production wracked the lives of those incorporated into the new system, the work of the intellectual was increasingly devoted to the investigation, pursuant to their control, of social dynamics. The "paradox" of a simultaneous tremendous increase in the productive forces and the worsening of living standards for broad segments of the

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[15] George S. Sabine and Thomas L. Thorson, A History of Poltical Theory, 4th ed. (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1973), pps. 521-24.

[16] Saint-Simon, Selected Writings, T.M.H. Markham ed. (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1952), p. 80.

population had brought the heirs of the Enlightenment to a point where the promise of the bourgeois revolution was either to be realized with the aid of social theory, or reinterpreted in an apologetic metaphysics. In this context of struggle, the dual connotation of ideology would be preserved.

The ersatz religiosity of Comte's system represented a bastardized synthesis of the two trends we have teased out. Comte reduced epistemology to a coercive psychology of recognition, in which the regulatory notion of the acceptance of social laws is interwoven with empiricism. Thus, the scientific discovery of social laws was also the discovery of new rationalizations for the status quo. Further, instead of resting content with this metatheoretical exclusion of the possibility of criticism, Comte proceeded to elaborate a philosophy of history that sought to sacralize social laws. Once again, the limits of authority demarcate the limits of epistemology; the empiricist critique of false beliefs only clears old idols from the field to make room for new ones, a "priesthood" of scientists that rests its claim to credulity upon its contribution to social progress. As priests they did not formally possess the power of control over social laws that Saint-Simon and his follower Bazard had thought attainable, a possibility that, especially for Bazard, had offered the hope of generalized happiness.[17] However, as managers of mass consciousness, they would be able to promote the conditions which would allow the laws to unfold. Thus the Saint-Simonian ambivalence towards the specific class interests of the bourgeoisie, an ambivalence expressed in an ethic of

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[17] George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 44. Also see Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 274-5.

production that was not committed to existing relations of production, was resolved through the implicit identification of secular religion with the interests of capital. The work of intellectuals was limited, in the last analysis, to propagandizing under the guise of an empiricism completely overdetermined by teleogical categories.

The religious tenor of Comte's system should not simply be dismissed, as does Lichtheim, as an adjunct of Comte's being "not a little mad."[18] Assessments of Comte's mental health notwithstanding, the intertwining of the authority of sense perception and religious authority is rich in implications. While it would be mistaken to see Comte as initiating a retreat from the Enlightenment's assessment of the rational potential of the population - we can find this, for example, in Rousseau's reliance upon the Solonesque "legislator" and "civil religion" - with Comte we find religion being used to facilitate authoritarian rule: "How sweet it is to obey when we can enjoy the happiness...of being conveniently discharged, by sage and worthy leaders, from the pressing responsibility of a general direction of our conduct."[19] This contrasts sharply with Rousseau's so-called "totalitarian" trend, in which nationalism is a centripetal, integrative force;[20] what in Rousseau is a prequesite for participation in the community becomes for Comte the prerequisite for the acceptance of rules derived from historical laws. With the question of the educability of the masses transformed into that of their bamboozlement, the Comtian

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[18] Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism, p. 75.

[19] Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 350.

[20] Jacob Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker and Warburg, 1952), p. 39.

system maximizes the apparent power of the "facts," from which it derives a transhistorical teleology to replace the modest utilitarianism of the social contract, even as it short-circuits the development of the mental discipline needed to perceive them. The outcome is, again, a socially bifurcated epistemology, an empiricism for the elite that accepts the categories within which the facts are constituted, and religion for the masses who may not be so content with the constituent categories.

Contemporary Orientations

Approaches to ideology in the period after Comte can be usefully categorized under five general headings. Marxist approaches, which sought to retain the critical connotation of ideology we have noted in the writings of Helvetius and d'Holbach, will be addressed in the next chapter. Mannheim's formulation, developed in Ideology and Utopia, in some sense represents a transitional position that attempted to maintain some notion of the falsity of ideology even as it stressed the acritical study of ideology as a socially determined system of beliefs. Bell's standpoint replaced the connotation of falsity by critically focusing on the messianic and conflict-promoting character of ideological belief. What we can loosely call acritical approaches have sought to eliminate any critical association of the concept, using it to refer to the system of beliefs embodying a group's world-view and action rationales. Finally, Converse's work stands in a somewhat idiosyncratic position, in that he emphasizes how the highly organized nature of ideological belief, distrusted by Bell, is shown to correlate with a relatively better grasp of political life.

Mannheim's perspective takes two elements of the Marxist approach, ideology as misrepresentation "structurally resembling lies" and as socially determined knowledge, and separates them, the former being reserved for the term ideology, the latter becoming the object of the sociology of knowledge. To quote Mannheim:

> The study of ideologies has made it its task to unmask the more or less conscious deceptions and disguises of human interest groups, particularly those of political parties. The sociology of knowledge is concerned not so much with distortions due to a deliberate effort to deceive as with the varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to the differences in social settings. Thus, mental structures are inevitably differently formed in different social and historical settings.
>
> In accordance with this distinction we will leave to the theory of ideology only the first forms of the "incorrect" and the untrue, while one-sidedness of observation, which is not due to more or less conscious intent, will be separated from the theory of ideology and treated as the proper subject-matter of the sociology of knowledge.[21]

Yet, immediately after making this distinction, Mannheim sought to maintain an unwieldy unity by defining the two approaches as different "conceptions" of ideology. The first, the "particular" conception, sought to explain the "falsity" of an ideological statement with reference to "an intentional or unintentional, conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious, deluding of one's self or of others, taking place on a psychological level and structurally resembling lies."[22] The term "particular" was merited, Mannheim believed, because "it always refers only to specific assertions which may be regarded as concealments, falsifications, or lies without attacking the integrity of

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[21] Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1936), p. 265.

[22] ibid., p. 266.

the total mental structure of the subject."[23] The term "total," on the other hand, referred to the sociology of knowledge's interest in relating that "total mental structure" to social structure, and in discovering how the latter "concretely determines" that mental structure.

The acceptable aspect of Mannheim's proposal, that one might wish to study the influence of social structure on a subject's perspective without immediately leaping to the question of the possible falsity of that perspective, should be retained. But, for our purposes, his categorical attribution of the falsity of ideas to the psychological level is extremely arbitrary. That he seems to sense this by ambivalently retaining ideology as an orienting concept for the sociology of knowledge drives his framework into internal contradiction (and not those suggested by the flimsy criticism of the "Mannheim paradox"). Thus if ideology can refer to "delusion," it must also refer to some form of objective knowledge. Yet, within the sociology of knowledge Mannheim carried out a radical historicization of epistemology, with each class or group necessarily possessing only a one-sided conception of reality that, while not false, is "incomplete." These conceptions can only be made "more comprehensive" through a dialogue of representatives of the various classes and groups - objective knowledge is not attainable. Here Mannheim's interest in preserving Weber's notion of a pluralism of truths, a notion expressly intended to prevent the idea of truth from globally informing a radical politics, pushes him into a logical conundrum that he tries to resolve at the theoretical level, to the detriment of both theory and

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[23] ibid.

epistemology, to say nothing of logic. Had Mannheim explicitly considered the basic Marxist proposition - that the institutions of capitalism are historically contingent, practically constituted, and generative of suffering that might be avoided - and the standard ideological response - that those institutions are a fulfillment of "natural" impulses and that capitalism generates no suffering that is avoidable - attributing the source of falsity to individual psychology would have been "particularly" implausible. Again, the possibility of an open-ended, negative conception of truth was submerged by identifying it with the one-sided interest of those who suffer.

Within non-Marxist social science there is general agreement upon a definition of ideology as an ensemble of beliefs that constitute the orientation of an individual, group, or class to the social order. Beyond this, however, there is considerable variation in analytic frameworks. Writing in his book Social Movements (1951), Heberle equated ideology with "constituent ideas," ideas which, as Oberschall puts it, are "considered most essential to a social movement, that form the basis of its solidarity and of concerted action for the pursuit of common goals."[24] Durkheimian in its emphasis on the prerequisites for cohesion, this definition also reflects a period in which centralized parties of both right and left placed great emphasis upon the contribution to their hegemony of a uniform, homogenous discourse.

In Bell's The End of Ideology the relatively "cool" character of Heberle's approach was replaced by one stressing the passionate, cathartic, committed quality of ideology:

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[24] Cited in Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 27.

> What gives ideology its force is its passion. Abstract philosophical inquiry has always sought to eliminate passion, and the person, to rationalize all ideas. For the ideologue truth arises in action, and meaning is given to experience by the "transforming moment." He comes alive not in contemplation, but in "the deed." One might say, in fact, that the most important, latent, function of ideology is to tap emotion. Other than religion (and war and nationalism), there have been few forms of channelizing emotional energy. Religion symbolized, drained away, dispersed emotional energy from the world onto the litany, the liturgy, the sacraments...ideology fuses these energies and channels them into politics.[25]

In effect, Bell placed himself among the more conservative theorists who associated ideology with social agitation and instability. By understanding ideologies to be doctrines that interwork passion and grievances into a program for action, the question of the relationship between ideology and truth was either not explicitly addressed by Bell or else implicitly declared to be inappropriate. Apparently no understanding, however correct, could justify the passions that threaten to heighten the level of social conflict beyond manageable levels. Thus, even though his criticism of millenarian versions of Marxism seems to rest, at least in part, upon the notion that passionate commitment reduces the capacity of the ideologue for reality testing, Bell rests content with only implicitly mobilizing this notion as a part of a package of prejudices against those who rock the boat; he does not explicitly challenge the truth content of the theories supporting "passion." Ultimately, this critical perspective rests upon Bell's unwillingness to establish an analytic distinction between the substance of ideas and the social contexts within which they are learned and made the basis of practice. In a manner anticipating the "nouvelles philosophes" of contemporary France,

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[25] Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Collier, 1961), p. 395.

Bell tried to secure the indictment of ideological belief through the hypertrophy of its responsibility in the determination of action. We will return to these themes in the conclusion of the present chapter.

Among mainstream social scientists Bell's thesis is now in disrepute, having foundered on recent activism. The pejorative connotation of irrationality has been dropped as an explicit component of analytic definitions. From the standpoint of those concerned with social movements ideology is pertinent to discussions of both the formation of politically significant groups as well as the nature of their goals, their choice of action repetoires, and so on.[26] Other researchers, Converse and McCloskey being the most prominent, have developed this neutral position along lines more consistent with the "empirical" study of ideology, or "belief systems." First, McCloskey: ideology is a "system of belief that is elaborate, integrated, more or less coherent, which justifies the exercise of power, explains and judges historical events, identifies political right and wrong, and furnishes guides for action."[27] The emphasis on elaboration and consistency was further developed as a research focus by Converse in his article "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics."[28] Defining belief systems as "configurations of ideas and attitudes in which elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional

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[26] Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, pp. 178-81. See also Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 203-4.

[27] Herbet McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review 63 (June 1964), p. 363.

[28] Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Sytems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1964).

interdependence,"[29] Converse blended an emphasis on a) the formal properties of thinking, and b) appreciation of the consistency of social policies, in an operationalization of ideology that has provoked a long controversy. Converse thus set himself off from Bell by appropriating the cognitive component of Bell's "ideologue," i.e. a highly ramified, almost axiomatically defined belief system stable over time, and abstracting from the emotional, cathartic dimension stressed by Bell. By demonstrating that the formal logical properties of ideological thinking were positively correlated with an appreciation of the contradictory implications of social policies,[30] Converse, far from simply removing ideology's pejorative connotation, used it to designate a cognitive correlate of rational engagement with political life. Sustained attention to the political, instead of being accompanied by a "close-mindedness" (Rokeach) suited to the satisfaction of emotional needs, correlated with better understanding, and relatively more stable patterns of political allegiance.

From the standpoint we have been elaborating, Converse's conception of ideology qua individual belief system stands out as an attempt by a non-Marxist social scientist to advance some notion of the relative adequacy of political thinking. However, his challenge to Bell falters as soon as we judge it from outside Bell's problematic. This is because Converse, by taking off from the moment of Bell's analysis in

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[29] ibid., p. 207.

[30] Converse's test of the respondent's grasp of the mutually exclusive character of policy alternatives was flawed in its operationalization: that respondent's might, for example, want more public spending and lower taxes could be termed a flagrant contradiction, but it might simply mean that respondent's simply wanted their own taxes lower.

which the latter discusses ideology in terms of irrational aspects of the individual's psychological functioning, preserves the emphasis on the individual's ability to test reality. As we will elaborate in later chapters, such an exclusive emphasis on the testing of external reality conceals the pivotal implication of ideology in the constraint of the individual's (or group or class') capacity to express experiences formed within a social order.

Such a shortcoming is also characteristic of the work of Robert Lane. In his principal book, Political Ideology, Lane defines ideology by essentially fleshing out an ideology qua Weltanschaung position. The "common man of Eastport" has "a set of emotionally charged political beliefs, a critique of alternative proposals, and some modest programs of reform. These beliefs embrace central values and institutions; they are rationalizations of interests (sometimes not his own); and they serve as moral justifications for daily acts and beliefs."[31] Lane does believe that a distinction between the "forensic ideology" - articulated, differentiated, and well-developed - of "conscious ideologists" and the "latent" ideology - "loosely structured, unreflective statements" - of the men he studies is important, but the category ideology as such is not significant in distinguishing subjects. Following the pattern we have noted, Lane thus employs ideology as a category appropriate to the study of any subject, both in their status as objects of social processes - socialization, group pressures, the media - and as thinking subjects who employ particular

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[31] Robert Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 15-16.

forms of conceptualization.[32] Significantly, Lane does not undertake the latter analysis as part of an assessment of the relationship of ideology to reality; he defines epistemology as contemporary social psychologists would define cognitive schema,[33] as a system of ontological and logical categories for the processing of stimuli. The results of schema application are then judged according to whether they contribute to "more or less rigid and exclusive interpretations of world affairs."[34]

Thus Lane's often acute grasp of the influence of social and psychological factors upon what might be abstractly treated as cognitive functions of Hartmann's conflict free ego sphere does not result in any discussion of limitations upon rationality as such, but upon flexibility. A logic that is geared to questions of social compromise and adjustment takes over the discussion as the social interests of the "common man," and Lane's interest in describing the prerequisites of a system based on reflexive compromise and undifferentiated tolerance unite in an indifference to the question of truth. In the last analysis, Lane's discussion, just as Bell's and Rokeach's, does not simply ignore the traditional concerns of epistemology, but implicitly makes those concerns suspect, especially to the extent that rationality is intended to guide political action.

Excursus on Methodology

Taking Converse's work as an example, we should briefly consider the issue of the interrelationship between the theoretical

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[32] ibid., p. 354.

[33] For example, see Perry Thorndyke and Barbara Hayes-Roth, "The Use of Schemata in the Acquisition and Transfer of Knowledge," Cognitive Psychology 11 (1979): 82-106.

[34] Lane, p 353

orientation to ideology we have outlined and the survey-based methodology commonly used to study it. Generally, we would argue that survey-based methodologies have both strengthened the tendency to regard ideology ("belief systems") as an inventory of attitudes, encouraged a shallow, rationalistic model of the subject's relationship with the social order, and confused the analysis of the researcher's relationship to the subject. The latter point has, in an indirect manner, been made by those critics of Converse who argue that his operationalization of belief "consistency" and "constraint" presupposes that the researcher's and the subject's understandings of what constitutes a different belief are the same and,[35] more broadly, that researcher and subject share a similar rationality.[36] These claims, which essentially rest upon a more modest version of Winch's insistence (to be reviewed in chapter two) on the necessity of grasping "forms of life" of a subject instead of criticizing it externally, successfully motivate an implicit corollary criticism, that survey research virtually requires the researcher to impose a conventional logical form (via a combination of statistical techniques and logical inferences) on the beliefs recorded in the survey, a criticism that sets up an argument for more open-ended interviews to develop a better understanding of the subject's own logic. Yet, to the extent one assumes that the beliefs recorded in the survey bear some immediate relationship to action predispositions, survey research can, after accepting the criticism and taking up a more

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[35] J. Pierce D. Rose, "Nonattitudes and American Public Opinion: The Examination of a Thesis," American Political Science Review 68 (June 1974): 626-32.

[36] Nelson, John, "The Ideological Connection or Smuggling in the Goods," Theory and Society 4 (Fall 1977): pp. 421-48.

"open" conception of rationality, still maintain that the shifts in recorded beliefs indicate the possibility of some instability in the subject's adherence to, for example, basic constitutional principles, even though there is a certain stable rationale for this instability.

We can question this saving move from another standpoint, and drive home our other two criticisms. Basically, we would argue that, just as it is incumbent upon the researcher to discover whether or not there is logic and consistency underlying what appears to be illogic and inconsistency, it is also incumbent upon the researcher to appreciate the logic underlying a stable pattern of recorded beliefs. To anticipate the discussion in the second chapter, this is not only the case because we may discover that the stable pattern does not rest upon a consitent value system held by the subject, and instead upon a contingency-oriented logic of action (e.g. "sure I believe in free speech, unless that speech helps set off an effective general strike").[37] To depart somewhat from Converse's concerns, but to stay well within the concerns of survey researchers, we also need to inquire into the nature of affirmations of forms of social relations as recorded in survey research and, specifically, to question to what extent stable affirmation is dynamically related, as we shall demonstrate in chapter five, to a potentially articulable standpoint of disaffirmation. In other words, we need to ask whether ideology is simply an inventory of affirmations as recorded in the questionnaire, or whether it is a process partially culminating in the inventory recorded by the researcher. To the extent the latter is the case (and we shall argue it is) survey research-based

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[37] A strong rationale for this position can be found in Magnusson, David and Endler, N., "Interactional Psychology: Present

conceptions of ideology obscure the process itself and reproduce the affirmative moment of ideology. In this reproduction, the variety of action potentials is also suppressed, not only for the researcher, but for the subject who duly records his/her views and then reads "the polls" to find out what others think. Thus, by not questioning the nature of belief and supplementing its methodology accordingly, survey research is caught up in the ideological process.

The Ideology of Ideology in Contemporary Political Life

It is important to recognize that trends in the conceptualization of ideology are not simply products of an arbitrary classification of approaches within some ordering typology, whose interrelated peak concepts place the subsumed approaches in an artificial relation. Nor is it the case that trends in conceptualization derive their force from "schools," "traditions," or "paradigms," all phenomena conceived in terms of pressures arising from within a culture of intellectuals. Instead, approaches to ideology are shaped and maintained within contexts of intellectual "production" that are preeminently oriented to fundamental political processes, and therefore reflect the complex of forces and interests effective in the political sphere. The thinking and employment of the concept both bears the stamp of, and is encouraged to reproduce, a relationship between interest, truth, and practice standing at the core of the social formation.

Particularly, with regard to its employment in the United States, we can broadly characterize the present situation as one in which the concept is imbued with a relativism shaped within a system of

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Status and Future Prospects" in Magnusson and Endler (eds.) Personality at the Cross Roads, pp. 3-31.

conflict management we will term, following Lowi, "interest group liberalism."[38] Within this context, ideology becomes the term used to characterize the beliefs of a group or class that appears to seek to establish its own interest as hegemonic, instead of recognizing the interests of other groups as legitimate and, hence, as meriting "resource allocation." It follows that ideological thinking threatens to embroil society in the unconstrained conflict that interest group liberalism, like all liberalisms, purports to have tamed. Ideology, instead of being a social phenomenon that critical thought seeks to penetrate, becomes a label for any thought that would threaten to tear the social fabric, a fabric that is actually held together by ideology. The concept of ideology is appropriated by ideology; the process of reflection that the concept is intended to instigate becomes generically anti-social. The tremendous potential for violence and suffering inherent in the social relations of capitalist democracy is thus attributed to the thinking that would reduce that potential by specifying its sources. This presupposes that in a society supposedly dedicated to the individual, the concept of the individual is so penetrated by institutional categories that the critique of institutions is seen as an attack on individuals, a threat to their position in a reified division of labor. Thus the tremendous power of institutions, which often reduces individuals to essential helplessness and dependency, promotes an identification with those same

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[38] Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 71.

institutions.[39] Within this identification social "critique", which assumes the possibility of a dialogue grounded in a potentially generalizable interest, is misconstrued as strategically-oriented, interest-maximizing, "zero-sum" criticism.

In this sense Bell's "End of Ideology" was a significant contribution to the instantiation of the concept in an inventory of anti-critical conceptual reflexes suitable for transforming an effect of social contradictions into a screen obscuring them. To be sure, to the extent that the systematic elaboration of group or class interests had become solely geared to strategic ends, thus conflating and fusing critique with political struggle, Bell's conception could be regarded as a suboptimization, a critique of inordinate ambition. But, as we shall see in chapter five, this situation assumed the crushing of social movements advocating the transformation of capitalism. After their defeat the contention that, for example, the policies of the labor movement held hope for all could be derided as special pleading, a deceitful appeal to the general interest for resources to be consumed privately.

It is by now established that the epistemological dimension of the concept of ideology is heavily determined in its development, or outright suppression, by the most general forms of a logic of "conflict management" and, concomitantly, the exercise of power, prevailing in a society. Of course, the concept of ideology is not the only point at which such concerns crystallize within epistemology. Thus a survey of contemporary epistemology shows that the social implications of

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[39] Otto Kircheimer, "Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise," in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Urizen, 1978), pp. 57-8.

epistemological reflection is increasingly, if ambiguously, immanent to that reflection itself, instead of being offered as an afterthought by the socially conscious philosopher.[40] A grasp of the constitution of facts out of the practical encounter of communities of subjects with the natural and social worlds has eroded the boundary between epistemology and interest reified in the "fact-value dichotomy." Consequently, the concept of ideology, previously justified in part as a pejorative by reference to the ideologue's disregard for the autonomy of facts might, in some discussions, plausibly serve as the primary concept for describing general forms of consciousness, including that associated with the conduct of science.[41] In this context, the vulgarization of the concept, its equation with the notion of a one-sided Weltanschaung, rebounds. Instead of serving as a regulatory antithesis of truth which simultaneously stimulates an interest in it, the concept promotes resignation or a toned-down nihilism.[42]

In this regard, the effort by researchers such as Converse, who have sought to delete the pejorative sense of the term and restore it to the inventory of scientifically applicable concepts, is simply

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[40] Our discussion in the second and third chapters will elaborate on this.

[41] Thus Feyerband discounts the possibility of a strictly neutral observation language and proposes that "Scientific theories are a way of looking at the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences and our conception of reality. We may even say that what is regarded as "nature" at a particular time is our own product in the sense that all the features ascribed to it have first been invented by us and then used for bringing order into our surroundings." See Paul Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism," pp. 28-97 in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell eds. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p.29.

[42] The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology, pp. 198-203.

part of the general trend. Here the issue of an elitist bias, a charge to which he is vulnerable, is beside the point. Despite his attention to the internal coherence of thinking, his primary question is to depict the psychological correlates of unstable patterns of party affiliation, and to show that the majority of the electorate does not grasp the purportedly coherent logic of liberal and conservative postions. Ideological thinking thus becomes thinking congruent with established orientations to social policy, hardly a prima facie guarantee of a relatively superior grasp of truth. Here all that the investigator seeks to gauge is the extent to which the subject can replicate the logic of the outcome of the "aggregation of interests."

To conclude, I would reemphasize that to the extent the concept of ideology escapes being associated with dangerous irrationality, it is typically conceived of as belief propagated in an essentially nonantagonistic relationship between the individual and the social order. In other words, ideology takes on the attributes of a component of "social identity," and thus implicitly refers to the individual's identification with the roles they take up. Again, following Durkheim, it is a concept intended to account for the possibility of group life, not of domination; it is an expected concomitant of social life, shared ideas rooted in a shared existence. If the application of the notion of truth within this framework appears almost as a category confusion, the employment of ideology as part of a theory of domination does as well. Through the unrecognized equation of ideology and presumed social identity, ideology seems to the subject to be an expression of either themselves or their social existence. That, instead of being for-the-subject, ideology might be for-an-Other (here

generally referring to other individuals, groups, or institutions, etc.,in relation to which the subjects orient themselves) is not entertained. Regardless of the extent to which the existence of structures of social relations embodying substantial power differentials are admitted, the rather obvious corollary, that forms of consciousness consistent with the maintainance of those relations are actively established and reinforced, is typically not immanent to the concept. After the emphasis given to just such a standpoint by Enlightenment theorists and Marxism, such an indifference is remarkable.

CHAPTER II

ACTOR UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS

Introduction

In the first chapter I have sketched a critical history of the concept of ideology in which the standpoint of critique was only provisionally set out. In this chapter the task of substantiation and justification will be taken up within an orientation primarily informed by theorists associated with the Frankfurt School.[1] In the presentation I will continue to avoid formal definition of the principal concepts underlying the critical framework, concepts such as subjectivity, reification, and reflection. In large part this is because I am concerned that premature definition may evoke premature closure for the reader, a likely outcome because the concepts derive their meaning and significance within a framework alien to the conduct of social scientific investigation in this country. The nature of this distinction should not be taken as equivalent to the distinction between two theories of an object domain that are composed of different theoretical languages, the way, for example, sociologists often contrast the Marxian emphasis on class relations as a determinants of conflict with the

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[1] I will substantially rely upon the writings of the most well-known "members:" Adorno, Habermas, Horkheimer, and Marcuse.

categories of Durkheimian or Weberian theory.[2] Instead, as Habermas has helped to make clear, the distinction is more appropriately grounded at a level of discussion in which the most fundamental conceptions of human "interest" are under consideration.

Let us briefly consider Habermas's position. While I wish to avoid giving the impression that the argument of the thesis pivots upon acceptance or rejection of Habermas' transcendental deduction of three knowledge constitutive interests (the technical, hermeneutic, and emancipatory), here reference to this part of Habermas' work will help to distinguish the set of concerns promoting the concepts we are interested in. Within the social sciences in this country, the idea of a fact-value dichotomy serves to marginalize (or trivialize) consideration of the interests influencing a subject's perspective. This allows "interest" to be considered as a relatively undifferentiated category, especially in the sense that their epistemological ramifications are uniform. Thus, different interests may be seen as changing the "context of discovery" but not the "context of validation,"[3] claims are made for the "logical unity" of the sciences,[4] and so on. Habermas argues that the technical interest, the interest in maintaining communication with others, and the interest in dissolving symbolically constituted obstacles to human development, interests that can only be "rationally reconstructed" as "determined by conditions governing the reproduction

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[2] For example, see Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, ch. 2.

[3] Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 6-7.

[4] Karl Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences," in Glen Adey and David Frisby, eds. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp. 89-90.

of the species" and are not "susceptible to justification in practical discourse." Thus they are profoundly different from the conventional forms of interest in the way they determine object domains and our experience and relationship to them.[5] To put it in terms other than those used by Habermas, but which retain substantial fidelity to his intention, the technical interest informs social scientific investigation in which people, like the objects of the natural sciences, are taken to be part of a field of phenomena with discoverable properties and tendencies, and thus potentially subject to control through the manipulation of the phenomenal field.[6] The hermeneutic and emancipatory interests, on the other hand, inform an investigation or, rather, an engagement with subjects, in which their real status as subjects capable of symbolically regulating their relations with external nature, their "internal nature," and each other, have absolute priority.[7]

With regard to Habermas' demarcation, we can claim that the concepts of subjectivity, reification, reflection, etc., inform and regulate the conduct of the latter form of science. Thus, in this section of the thesis our task will be to extricate the concept of ideology from problematics which obscure this demarcation and, at the same time, to elaborate what is meant by another "form of science," in Habermas' phrasing, a "critical hermeneutics." Because this can transpire only through a synthesis of disciplines that are

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[5] Jurgen Habermas, "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (1973): p. 177.

[6] Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 308-9.

[7] ibid., pp. 309-11.

characteristically understood to be incompatible or contradictory - here I have in mind the common understanding of the relationship between psychoanalysis and the other social sciences - our approach will be to critically review work with different problematics to draw out points of synthesis that are often only latent. Only at the conclusion of such a review will our conceptual "inventory" be adequate.

The first two parts of the chapter will be devoted to examining the status of actor interpretations within Marxism and the philosophy of the social sciences. In this examination there will be few direct references to the concept of ideology, which will, in effect, be indirectly considered as a subset of actor interpretations. In this respect, then, the emphasis will be upon showing how, within different frameworks, the "specificity" of actors' interpretations in analyses of social orders and social action was subverted.

Next, we will move from that relatively abstract level of concern, a level roughly corresponding to the ontological,[8] to consider

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[8] A difficulty associated with this term should be stressed here. Witin classical philosophy, in the systems of Leibniz, Spinoza, and Descartes, for example, ontological speculation, intended to arrive at knowledge of the primary elements of reality, bore an essentially arbitrary quality. The succession of systems, each founded upon different conceptions of primary elements, served only to discredit the metaphysicians' overall project, not to arrive at a viable system. The impossibility of resolving this arbitrariness without a drastic revision of the conception of the knowing subject eventually led to the crisis of metaphysics in the eighteenth century, of which the flourishing of Humian skepticism was symptomatic. Kant's attempt to resolve the crisis thorugh a sustained reflection on epistemological categories was only partially successful; Hegel's critique of Kant, to the effect that Kant, in the act of reflection, assumed what he wanted to know, was substantially successful in debunking Kant's attempt to combine a static ontology of epistemological categories with the notion of the synthetic achievements of the subject. Since Hegel, the category of ontology has been implausible apart from consideration of the practical matrix within which needful subjects, in engaging the world, are formed within evolving patterns of engagement established in societies. As Adorno has shown, efforts to redeem the classical sense of ontology by asserting

it in relation to the concept of ideology. In this connection the notion of "systematically distorted communication," which at this point we can take, somewhat crudely, to connote a process of communication within which inter- and intrapersonal forces combine to produce inadequacies in subjects' repesentations of their condition, will be introduced.[9] From the standpoint of our concern with ideology, we will take off from Marx's specific discussions of ideology within the context of class relations to elaborate a more general notion of ideology as the symbolic "moment" of a process of the exclusion or suppression of institutional alternatives as part of the legitimation, or "deproblematization," of existing institutions.[10] Thus we will assert the linkage between the concepts of ideology and the reproduction of the social order. We will then move on to argue for an obligation to refer to psychoanalytic theory in understanding how this "ideological project" proceeds. To conclude the chapter we will suggest that the implication of psychoanalytic theory in our analysis raises important questions about the nature of the process of social critique, especially as it is conceived in more "objectivistic" terms.

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the primacy of language (Heidegger) as a ground of constitution have produced, at best, what are by now trivial results (language does mediate all experience) that, if anything, subvert the staticity which is sought. Thus, by pointing to an "ontological" level in our discussion, I use the term as part of an effort to establish a sense of the irreducibility of symbolic processes, an irreducibility that will be "demonstrated" in the course of the chapter.

[9] Jurgen Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," Inquiry 13 (1970): 205-18. See also Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 275-9.

[10] Although it is couched in teleogical terms that are themselves ideological, readers may consider this problem as analogous, in a restricted sense, to the problem of "pattern maintainance" discussed by Parsons.

The Status of Actor Interpretations in Marx's Writings

Hegel's critique of Kant pivoted upon the incorporation of the thing-in-itself, for Kant the self-subsisting material substratum of the object engaged by the subject, back into an idealistically-conceived subjectivity as a superseded moment of self-estrangement. As Marx points out, this move, the form of which is characteristic of each stage of the dialectic in the Phenomenology, requires a complementary one-sided understanding of the subject, "man:"[11] if the materiality of the object can only appear as a moment of estrangement in the Hegelian system, the materiality of man, through which the materiality of the object is established, must also be construed as a moment of estrangement.[12] Thus for Hegel man becomes real only to the extent that he recognizes his conceptual constitution and determination; he is estranged to the extent that he mis-recognizes himself in material determinations. Thus, according to Marx, in the Hegelian system the price of the victory over estrangement is loss of the subject, which, in abstracting from itself to subsume the object, loses itself.

For Marx, Hegel's error lay in transforming the material substratum of subject and object into a subordinated form of mediation of the subject. Marx's correction entailed stressing the materiality of subject and object, humanity and nature, as well as the materiality of the process mediating and transforming them. Whereas for Hegel the becoming of the concept found its telos in the supersession of what were ultimately conceptual contradictions in specific forms of subject-object

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[11] "Man," of course, refers to both men and women.

[12] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), pp. 91-4.

relation, for Marx the becoming of both man and nature flowed from the dialectic driven forward by the action of needful human beings upon an object of need, nature.[13] The issue of assuring the absolute transparency of the object that drove Hegel to the conceptual subsumption of Kant's material substratum was thereby resolved: philosophy no longer traces a process in which the concept seeks to know itself through man, but one in which man seeks to become man. By conceiving of philosophy's task in these terms, Marx undercut the possibility of any fetishism of the concept that would give rise to philosophical anguish if "absolute knowledge" was not guaranteed as an outcome of history.

In Marx's system the ahistorical imperative to realize an "essence," or an ontologically grounded quality of man, is abandoned in favor of a dynamic determined by desires that are unique to particular stages in the dialectic between man and nature.[14] Marx, of course, admitted that, if framed in sufficiently abstract terms, certain needs (e.g. hunger, sex, association) might be characterized as definitive of "human nature." Nonetheless, it is their specific content that is truly "man" in any one period. In relation to what exists, the abstract forms of needs, as Marcuse argued, only suggest the possibility of new concrete expressions instead of any particular expression.[15] In other words, the abstract quality of the concept correctly reflects the essentially negative and open-ended character of needs - through their

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[13] Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx (London: New Left Books, 1971), pp. 28-31.

[14] ibid., pp. 82-4.

[15] Herbert Marcuse, Negations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 69-79.

specific expression they are not simply potentially satisfied, but also made subject to transformation. As such, positive specifications of needs are only retrospectively "true," and are therefore false to the extent that they constrain the future in any way other than as a point of departure.

In Marx's thought the fate of the concept of ideology is tied to but not entirely determined by the fate of the concept in his critique of Hegel. This is because as a social theorist and political strategist Marx dealt with concepts and ideas from a variety of standpoints that prevented or rendered implausible a dogmatic adherence to the most reductive formulations of Marx's critique. We can see this if we trace the development of Marx's thought from the critique of Hegel to the critique of political economy.

Marcuse has characterized the fundamental trend of this development in these terms: "all the philosophical concepts of Marxian theory are social and economic categories, whereas Hegel's social and economic categories are all philosophical categories."[16] While, as Kosik points out, this thesis incorrectly encourages us to adopt an "abolitionist" understanding of the relationship of Marxism to philosophy, a relationship that misidentifies philosophy with idealism and ignores philosophy's continuing presence within Marxism, it nonetheless captures the sense of what can be reconstructed as the second phase of Marx's transition,[17] the simultaneous grounding of the dialectic in the material labor process and the critique of the

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[16] Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 258.

[17] Karel Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, eds. Robert S. Cohen and Marx Wartofsky, vol. 52 (Boston: D. Reidel, 1976), p. 105.

political economic categories through which that process is conceptualized in bourgeois society. Through his critical engagement with political economy Marx acomplished the historicization of the general categories of the sensuous material activity of the subject, which Marx counterposed to Feuerbach's "passive subject of perception."[18] By examining sections of the Theses on Feuerbach in conjunction with selections from the 1844 Manuscripts we can follow this movement in Marx's thought:

> The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectivity. [First Thesis][19]

> Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. [Eighth Thesis][20]

> We must bear in mind the previous proposition that man's relation to himself only becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to the other man. Thus if the product of his labor, his labor objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of him, then his position towards it is such that someone is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile... [21]

> Only at the last culmination of the development of private property does this, its secret, appear again, namely, that on

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[18] Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 271,

[19] Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 107.

[20] ibid., p. 109.

[21] Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed. by Dirk Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 116.

> the one hand it is the product of alienated labor, and that on the other it is the means by which labor alienates itself.[22]

Marx avoided the positivity normally associated with the view that man is part of nature, a regression that Hegel rejected with the moment of conceptual negation. Yet, the concept, qua mental representation of the subject in relation to nature and other subjects, was given a derivative status. Essentially, it is subordinated to a materialist dialectic in which need, appearing to mediate between the sheer materiality of the person and their consciousness, renders the latter a mere reflection of the former. Thus in Marx's writings the diversity of subject-constituting sensuous practices referred to in the Manuscripts are boiled down to the constitutive practice of the production of technology and of articles of consumption. The analyses of the dialectical development of hearing and of taste presented in the Manuscripts, which point to a many-sided conception of the process of formation of the human subject, lose their specificity within the dialectic of productive activity. A passage from the German Ideology captures this shift quite well:

> The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.[23]

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[22] ibid., p. 117.

[23] Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 114.

Rather than being one constitutive activity among several, the production of the means of subsistence is considered inclusive of the general category of life expression. In this manner the category of human needs, first critically brought into play to justify, in the critiques of Hegel and Feuerbach, the shift to materiality, now becomes subversive of the multi-faceted quality of that category. Through it the historically determined, overwhelming power of the imperative of production is presented as a presupposition of life that becomes life. Thus the movement in which philosophical hypostatizations are superseded through the passage into historical analysis, is covertly reversed by the hypostatization of what is historical. This hypostatization is not carried out simply at the "categorial" level, as Habermas maintains.[24] In fact, it is the tight juxtaposition of Marx's "material" investigations (to refer to the contrasting level identified by Habermas) in the German Ideology with the above passage that sets up an interpenetration of the levels. In the succeeding two paragraphs of his text Marx discussed the historical development of the division of labor, a concept specifying the "form of intercourse" between individuals. Within this concept the preceding "logical" examination of the "premises" of human existence merges with a narrative composed of social categories ("town," "industrial labor," "ownership"). In the latter the importance of the division of labor in history in both the constitution of the most significant social categories and the determination of their interrelationship is amply demonstrated. But the question as to whether this importance rests upon particular forms of the institutionalization of productive activity is not expressly taken

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[24] Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, ch. 2.

up, but is implicitly resolved with reference to the primacy of the "life-process" which it embodies.

It is clear that the strategic context in which Marx sought to carry out his critical disjuncture shaped these formulations: if he had carried the insistence on the historicality of the subject and society to the point we have suggested, he would have seemed to leave the door open to the reintroduction of idealism, disguised as a "meta-analysis" of the preconditions of the primacy of productive activity. Intent upon decisively stamping as "arbitrary" the premises of the airy speculations of the Young Hegelians, Marx incorporated a moment of objectivistic naturalism, the plausibility of which grew in proportion to the spiritualized irrelevance of his opponents. In doing so he failed to pause at the point where the stark necessity of material production takes on a specifically social form that is imbued, in a manner depending upon the social formation, with an ideologically elaborated sense of absolute necessity.

In later writings Marx brought an appropriate regulatory distinction, that between necessity and freedom, to bear upon this question and achieved different results. For example, in the third volume of Capital the the necessary character of production is no longer represented as a logical prerequisite of human existence, but as a complex resultant of "mundane" needs and the specific requirements of the mode of production.[25] Through socializing the means of production it becomes possible for humanity to accomplish the task of production with "the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to,

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[25] Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 320.

and worthy of, their human nature."[26] Outside of this sphere of necessity "begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself," a development which had been stifled by, for example, the maximum extension of the working day by capitalists pursuing profit, a process Marx analyzed at great length.[27]

Another argument made by Marx is also suggestive of the need for a better appreciation of the social determination of homo faber as well as the preconditions of its supersession. The "revolutionary role" of the bourgeosie outlined by Marx in the Communist Manifesto entails the world-wide projection of the capitalist mode of production and the concomitant destruction of all ties between people other "than naked self-interest, than callous cash payment."[28] Thus "the bourgeosie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production and with them the whole relations of society."[29] But in "tearing asunder" the feudal ties that bind people to their "natural superiors" and establishing a social order in which relations are primarily mediated through the market, the bourgeosie not only establishes social relations as contingent (epitomized in the reality of contract law and the myth of the social contract) but the "necessity" of labor as well. Thus the breakdown of feudal relations, within which the peasant, under the coercion of the lord and his vassals, produces beyond his own needs, strips away the

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[26] ibid.

[27] For example, see Karl Marx, Capital, Volume I: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production (New York: International Publishers, 1973), pp. 212-514, passim.

[28] Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 337.

[29] ibid., p. 338.

naturalizing rationales of custom and religion and exposes the artifactual quality of the necessity of surplus production.[30] To follow up our discussion in chapter one, in this context the bourgeois individual, for whom social life increasingly is either experienced as "personal" and self-styled or as a condition imposed by blind social necessity, could emerge as a modal type. It would be within a social existence that was simultaneously unincorporated and alienated that the proletariat could undertake the negation of bourgeois society.

The Labor Ontology and Social Theory in Recent Controversies

That Marx granted labor an exclusive ontological status is most significant to us in two interrelated respects: first, that Marx thereby discredited investigation into the precise ways in which economic relationships and rationales acquire priority and, second, that Marx tended to reduce the terms of reflection upon the social order to a production-facilitating functionalism. At the same time, we have argued that Marx, by pointing to the institutional ground of the primacy of economic activity, suggests an account of their primacy that is not only more consistent with the thrust of the negative ontology regulating his analysis, but also open to elaboration through other theories that are incompatible with his productionist formulations. Drawing upon a distinction offered by Kosik, that between the economic factor and the economic structure, we can both elaborate our critique and relate it to some contemporary discussions within neo-Marxist social theory. Following Kosik, we can define the two concepts in the following manner:

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[30] Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1961), vol. 1:241-251.

> a) Within an analysis of power, economic factor refers to that element of a group or class' power derived from their position in the economy. The term "factor" connotes the understanding that economic power is one element in the overall amount of power (or resources) a group or class possesses. Part of Weber's argument against Marx, to the effect that power rests upon three irreducible but related factors - economic, political, and status - exemplifies this perspective.[31]
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> b) Reference to the economic structure is made as part of an argument that the social order "is formed and constituted" by such a structure. Weber's power components are viewed as "[enjoying] a relative autonomy only within and on the basis of a particular socio-economic formation in whose framework they function, interpenetrate, and interact.[32]

Factor categories are not simply taken as expressions of the underlying economic structure, in the sense that they are a mystified "appearance" of an underlying "reality" and, as such, need to be reductively dissolved through theoretical reinterpretation. At the same time, they are not conceptualized in isolation from the concepts of the underlying structure, nor is their real effect to be conceptualized independently of "effects" of the economic structure. In short, analysis of factor and structure must, both at the categorial level and at the level of empirical effects, trace the dialectical interplay between factor and structure.[33] To grasp this dialectic, the analysis is bounded by

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[31] Kosik, Dialectics of the Concrete, p. 64.

[32] ibid., p. 65.

[33] Here I will take Kosik's spare conceptualization as archetypal of correctives to reductionistic forms of Marxism. There are, of course, substantial differneces between the position I have briefly recapitulated and, for example, that of Ollman, who effectively abandons even a modified version of the economic primacy thesis, opting instead for an "egalitarian" dialectical interplay between all social components. See Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge: New York, 1971). Irregardless of the status of economic processes and relationships in their theories, the correctives all share an emphasis on the conceptual specificity of the noneconomic, and on the inappropriateness of arguing that the implication of the economic in the constitution of the noneconomic

regulatory conceptual antinomies (for example, abstract-concrete, monistic-pluralistic) describing both the movements of analytic thinking and conceptual extremes to be avoided. A sense of the general parameters Kosik advances lies in the following passage:

> Emphasis on the unity of social reality formed by the economic structure might of course become a hindrance to scientific investigation if this unity were mistaken for a metaphysical identity, and if the concrete totality of social reality were to degenerate into abstract wholeness. This explains how contemporary sociology could have achieved certain positive results even though it has abandoned the monistic methodological point of departure and has switched to a detailed examination of particular areas or moments of social reality for which it has created entire independent scientific disciplines (sociology of power, sociology of art, sociology of culture...). In turn, mere insistence on the correct - potentially correct, that is - point of departure will in and of itself, without realizing the truth of this starting point in its concrete totality, lead only to boorish repetitiveness, and will stagnate in a metaphysical identity...[34]

Thus, for example, Weber's claim that a "Protestant ethic" was a necessary condition for the development of capitalism should not be rejected in favor of a view that sees the Protestant ethic, or any other moral justification for capital accumulation, as either a rationalization or merely coincident belief. Rather, it is part of, as E.P. Thompson put it, "class experience," a modality through which "some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs."[35] "Class consciousness is the way in which these

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justifies the effectively complete abstraction of the latter as part of analysis.

[34] Kosik, Dialecics of the Concrete, p. 66.

[35] E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage, 1963), p. 8.

experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms."[36]

Because the conceptual specificity of the interpretations held by social actors is guaranteed by recognizing the synthetic quality of the actor's engagement with history, Thompson's use of "experience" supplements Kosik's argument. In part, the instantiation of the category implies the well-known Weberian injunction: it draws attention to the meaning of a social situation or process for the actors participating in it, and compels us to examine the relationship between a researcher's interpretation of an actor's situation and the actor's own. But we would drive this argument beyond the rather vague rationales offered by Weber. Thus we would insist that attention to actor interpretations is not only undertaken for "heuristic" purposes. Contrary to a standard line of argument represented in the work of Theodore Abel, Weber's "adequacy at the level of meaning" does not simply dissolve into a guideline for concept selection that will ensure valid explanations.[37] Nor are we only interested in, to refer to a view more consistent with Weber's own, the imaginative reconstruction of ideal-typical value constellations which are arguably more or less characteristic of those held by actors. Instead of simply discussing experience and meaning as elements in an explanation, or as entity-like features of social phenomena that we must acknowledge, we would argue,

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[36] ibid., p. 10.

[37] Theodore Abel, "The Operation Called Verstehen," American Journal of Sociology 54 (1948): 211-8.

along with Thompson, that they reflect the point at which "structure is transmuted into process."[38]

With this characterization, made as part of a polemic against Althusser, Thompson seeks to further define the procedure by which historical analysis assures the "historicity" of its concepts and avoids reducing them to "metaphysical" constructs. Thompson asserts the "open" character of Marxian concepts such as class and state, and urges a stance in which the researcher recognizes that "categories are defined in particular contexts but are continuously undergoing historical redefinition, and [their] structure is not pre-given but protean, continually changing in form and in articulation."[39] The real basis for this "open" stance does not lie in the fact that the principal elements of any social formation, its constituent "variables," subtly vary across social formations in both their particular constitution and mode of interrelation. This is because such an view, while acknowledging the particularity of social formations and their ramified development, can easily retain the form of theoretical reification Thompson is most concerned to expose. This is because the adequacy of the concept to the object may be sought in a manner suppressive of the agentic capacity of the actors studied. Thus Thompson charges Althusser with a two-fold error: in addition to Althusser advocating an epistemology justifying static and metaphysical categories, he also advances a separate, but related, attack on the concept of the "subject." We can summarize Thompson's counter by referring to his ironic comparison of Althusser's

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[38] E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), p. 170.

[39] ibid., p. 84.

framework with Smelser's functionalist interpretations of historical development.[40] Despite the vast differences between their conceptualizations of the social order, Althusser and Smelser essentially view individuals as nothing other than their positions in the social order, both in the sense that their behaviours and outlooks are position-determined and in the sense that they are constituted, formed within the context of those positions. To Thompson they thereby "residualize" extra-categorial attributes, and in doing so ensure a theoretical outcome that amounts to nothing other than a compounded determinism.

Thompson's critique demands a separation of the claim that social life is structured from the claim that social life is structure. In justifying this distinction he points to historical documents recording popular struggles with and within these structures, struggles in which people address structures not via the dull identification conveyed by Althusser's use of the term "trager," or "bearers" of social positions, but as individuals aware of the contingency of the mode of life constituted by patterns of relationships. These relationships are experienced not simply as patterned necessity but as objects of choice and commitment, to be maintained and defended. To illustrate, we can refer to a declaration drawn up by lace workers that Thompson includes in The Making of The English Working Class. In the declaration the mechanics consider penalties appropriate for a lace manufacturer who has violated production standards and thereby driven out of work "Seven Hundred of

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[40] ibid., p. 75.

our Beloved Brethren."[41] These men, along with hundreds of thousands of others, understood that the spread of the factory system would displace them from their jobs and drive them into factory towns under great hardship. To oppose this challenge, or what Thompson would call the "pressure" of an encroaching system of production and class relations backed up by state power, the English working class creatively responded with a wide variety of tactical and strategic measures, ranging from machine-smashing to militia formation to mass petitioning, that simultaneously drew upon established "repetoires of contention" (the term is Tilly's) as a communal cource of forms of resistance capable of being modified to meet new exigencies.[42] Thereby the essentially defensive, conservative efforts to limit the expansion of the capitalist order passed over into initiatives aimed at transforming the system itself. Within this context forms of mass and class consciousness evolved out of a complex interplay of material and cultural conditions, power relations, and conjunctural developments constitutive of interpreted experiences.

Thompson's rejoinder to Althusser is also an "argument within English Marxism;" a brief examination of the response of one of his interlocutors, Perry Anderson, will be helpful in further drawing out Thompson's position. Anderson makes two criticisms of interest to us, one aimed at exposing an ahistorical element in Thompson's historical

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[41] Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 550.

[42] Thus military training received during the Napoleonic Wars both established a shared, easily transferable form of communal resistance - the Luddite militias - as well as helped to develop traditions of discipline useful in mounting peaceful mass demonstrations (ibid., p. 681).

account of subjectivity,[43] the other questioning the "voluntarism" that seems to stem from Thompson's critique of conceptual reification.[44] Regarding the former, Anderson points out that both the transparency of social orders and popular capacities for changing them have varied tremendously throughout history - compare, for example, Europe during the Plague to Russia in the years 1917-1923. Thompson's general assertion that human beings are agents, and his stress on the importance of a historiography that allows us to "think ourselves to be free," suggests a certain existentialization (my term) of the human condition. This can easily inform a voluntarism that Anderson singles out in a passage worth quoting as exemplifying the terms of his side of the "argument." Writing about the development of the organization and policies of the Soviet leadership at the time of the revolution, Thompson speculates that the various groupings were "perhaps fortuitously established in power at the time of the revolution."[45] Anderson complains that this "attributes an imaginary liberty of manoeuvre to the Soviet leadership" and also "deprives its emergence of any rational historical causality."[46] "In fact," Anderson counters, "every serious Marxist study of the fate of the Russian Revolution has shown it was the cruel inner environment of pervasive scarcity, allied with the external emergency of imperialist military encirclement, that produced the bureaucratization of party and state in

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[43] Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism (London: New Left Books, 1980), p. 22.

[44] ibid., p. 25.

[45] Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, p. 156.

[46] Anderson, ibid., p. 25.

the USSR."[47] Anderson then secures his point with a metahistorical finale: "the realm of necessity, far from having vanished in the Communist countries, still continues both to reproduce bureaucracy and manacle it."[48]

These passages contain basic misconstruals of the terms of the controversy. At the pen of Anderson, Thompson's critique of the categorial reduction of the subject is resolved into a vague amalgam of voluntarism, an assertion of the irrationality of history, and a premature circumscription of the realm of necessity. In this manner Anderson establishes a false antinomy between the synthetic character of experience emphasized by Thompson, in which subjects interpret conditions and act upon the basis of those interpretations, and the inexorable rationality imposed by historical factors emphasized by Anderson. It might be argued that the resolution of the antinomy rests, on the one hand, upon Anderson's willingness to accept explanations that did not totally rest upon the reconstruction of historical outcomes in terms of readily weighted, nonrandom factors. On the other hand, Thompson would be required to recognize, as Anderson suggests, that the abstraction from certain dimensions of human experience and reflection represented by the employment of concepts like "pervasive scarcity," to refer to Anderson's example, is legitimate for the purpose of arguing for the importance of a "factor." In other words, we could resolve the antinomy by splitting the difference, undoubtedly leaving Anderson to puzzle over what is gained by insisting on the importance within historical analysis of what he terms "irrational" factors.

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[47] ibid.

[48] ibid.

Yet such a "resolution" would be consistent with the desiccated status granted subjectivity in contemporary social science; like those physicists who wish to claim their science does not prejudice religious questions, social scientists express profound sentiments for "man" even as its constituens is relegated to error terms or nagging methodological problems of intercoder reliability, response set bias, etc. Thompson is demanding much more. We can see this by referring to another formulation of his position. Thompson claims that the "affective and moral consciousness" depicted in reductionist explanations as "displaced rationality (ideology)" must instead be understood as "lived experience that is 'handled' in distinctive ways."[49] Again, he is arguing that the subject-object dialectic not be limited to the parameters defined by the concept of the mode of production, in which subjects' interpretations are relegated to the secondary, superstructural category of ideology. But Thompson fails to fully secure his point because he fails to develop it as part of a consideration of the role of historiography in the transformative praxis he supports. He does not make explicit the underlying telos of his critical project, which, far from simply an attempt to convince us of the agentic status of the English working class of the 19th century, is to critique a conception of history which, if incorporated as part of the present, collaborates in its reification. That is, to the extent that a reading of a history of others results in the subject taking up archetypal modes of interpreting self and world, and to the extent that those modes render the subject passive, incapable of exercising praxis-oriented

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[49] Thompson, ibid., p. 174.

reflection in any meaningful sense,[50] such a reading of history only serves to strengthen the sway of established institutions, traditions, etc., over the subject. In this sense history is hardly the study of an object external to the subject, but another field within which the subject can either lose him/herself in the prevailing reification, or recognize him/herself as a potential participant in social transformation.

This argument may be carried further. If Thompson's underlying aim is to highlight the historical interworking of subjectivity and history so that subjectivity may be evoked in the present, he must necessarily rely upon the ability of his own contemporaries to refer to their own experience through some general, informal rules of correspondence to the experiences of others whom they read about, in order for this evocation to occur. In other words, for Thompson's work to succeed in its evocation, he must not rely simply upon the "objective" properties of the period which he describes, but also upon those "properties" of his readers prerequisite to their grasping the subjectivity he strives to elaborate, contra Althusser, Smelser, and others.

The thrust of Thompson's metahistorical framework remains underdifferentiated within his work because Thompson implicitly conceives of the evocative power of historiography as deriving from the dialectical empiricism he proposes. Within that framework Thompson assumes that if concepts are kept open and a clear understanding of the agentic properties of the people studied infuses the historical

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[50] Extensive consideration will be devoted to this idea in chapters three and four.

narrative, an essentially objective demonstration of the practically synthetic capacities of people will be achieved. As I will indicate over the course of the next two chapters, such a demonstration can be more firmly grounded. This is not to argue that Thompson's critique of theoretically embedded processes of reification, which he intertwines with a Marxist historiography intended to support the categorial redemption of the subject, is necessarily doomed to complete ineffectiveness. To rely, as Thompson essentially does, upon the exemplary power of the individual, group, and class subjects he studies, is thoroughly consistent with the important and effective tradition of a social history with political intentions. The point is, and here we can only anticipate arguments to be made later, that the objectivistic presuppositions of Thompson's critical method, informing his conception of the researcher and of his audience, is not fully adequate to the form taken by reification.

Actor Interpretation in Non-Marxist Social Science

Thompson's argument against the theoretical denigration of the significance of actor interpretations derives both from his appreciation of the role of consciousness in the process of history and of the role of historiography in the process of critical enlightenment of his contemporaries.[51] Within non-Marxist social science science the

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[51] A full account of the underpinnings of his polemic with Althusser would necessarily refer to their contrasting views of the role of a radical party. Although willing to criticize the policies of the Communist party leadership in the aftermath of the electoral fiasco of 1978, Althusser maintained a Leninist conception of the leadership role of the party, a conception that strongly shaped his basic writings of the sixties and early seventies. See especially Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970). His writings in that period were, in important respects, a defense of the party leadership's claim to unchallenged strategic analyses and revisions of analytic frameworks, and a challenge to the validity of

assertion of the importance of actor-understandings has not been prompted by an interest in affirming the proactive, transformative role of the subject. Instead, the significance of actor-understanding has been claimed in order to question research in which a) the researcher conceptualizes social phenomena in a manner insensitive to actor conceptualizations[52] or, more radically, b) the researcher programmatically excludes actor-conceptualizations from the research process on essentially ontological grounds, for example, by reducing thought to a physiological state.[53] The major critical paradigms have typically been, in a strong sense, "counter-ontologies." They have asserted the "fact" of actor-interpretations and the "meaningful nature" of social phenomena as part of a conception of research that, while eschewing the emphasis on prediction, retains in an important respect a component of the "objectivistic" understanding of the appropriate results of research. That is, the goal of research, to "understand," entails a conception of the researcher as a "describer" of phenomena that are intrinsically meaningful, as opposed to the objects of the natural sciences, which are extrinsically meaningful. As we shall see,

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criticisms from younger workers and students. Thompson has favored a more democratic conception of the party; his criticism of conceptual reification is consistent with the critique of vanguardist notions that often try to suppress mass attitudes that are "bourgeois."

[52] Thus Rudner disposes of arguments for attending to actor understanding by conflating them with arguments that research must somehow reproduce the experience of the actor, and advocates a naive program of "scientific description" of social phenomena. See Richard Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), pp. 82-3.

[53] For example, Skinner, linking the methodological program of the "functional analysis" of behavior to an attack on the idea of "free will," proposed an ontology in which ideas were the epiphenomena of the interaction of physical states of the organism and the environment. See

such a conception of research, which seeks to portray situations "as they are" for the actor, entails conservative implications for the study of ideology.

In our review of positions advocating the irreducibility of actor interpretations it is appropriate to start with a brief reference to Dilthey. This is because his work prompted a critical response that culminated with Weber, who, in turn, provided an orientation to actor interpretations that, in less rigorous terms, is widely accepted in the social sciences of this country.

Dilthey argued that the objects of the "cultural sciences" were expressive of the intentionality of a subject, an intentionality which might be reproduced by an observer. The law-determined regularities through which nature might be known were thus displaced in the realm of the cultural sciences by the utilization of the objective experience of the cultural object, e.g. an action or a work of art, to accomplish the "transposition" of the observer back into the position of the actor. Only then, Dilthey believed, would the coherent psychic impetus lying behind the act of creation be graspable. To secure the possibility of "objective" knowledge of the constellation of themes composing this impetus, Dilthey resorted to the assumption of a universal structure of experience, ensuring a commonality of experiential categories between subjects and their interpreters.[54]

Culminating Rickert and Windelband's critique of Dilthey's objectivism, Weber abandoned the possibility of attaining a "congruent"

B.F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1953), pp. 23-42.

[54] Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, ch. 7.

understanding of the intentionality expressed in cultural objects, and instead sought to systematize the assumptions underlying the explicitly reconstructive activity of the historian and the social scientist. Thus Weber developed the concept of the ideal type, along with associated categories of motivation (purposive-rational, value-rational, traditional, and affectual-emotional) that were intended to characterize the range of rationales for social action from the standpoint of the scientist concerned with their relative accessibility.[55]

The significance of interpretive understanding was ambivalently defended by Weber: sociology is a "science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects."[56] On the one hand, social action must be understood because only the rationale revealed through the work of understanding will establish a link between objectified moments in an action sequence. This reading seems consistent with the following:

> ...if adequacy in respect of meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the degree of uniformity and how precisely its probability can be numerically determined, it is still an incomprehensible statistical probability...Statistical uniformities...constitute "sociological generalizations" only when they can be regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective of a course of social action.[57]

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism embodies this proposition; Weber does not simply rely upon the empirical correlation of the Protestant faith with capitalist development to make

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[55] Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 104.

[56] Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), p. 88.

[57] ibid., pp. 99-100.

his case, but devotes the greatest effort to demonstrating a thematic compatibility ("elective affinity") between Protestantism and capitalism. Yet other statements leave the door open to another conception of the conduct of social inquiry, one in which the identification of the regular cooccurence of events takes priority and interpretation acquires an heuristic significance only:

> The analysis of the historically given configuration of those "factors" and their significant concrete interaction, conditioned by their historical context and especially the rendering intelligible of the basis and type of this significance would be the next task to be achieved...For all these purposes, clear concepts and the knowledge of those (hypothetical) "laws" are obviously of great value as heuristic means - but only as such.[58]

To resolve this tension, we might advance a provisional demarcation of objects of inquiry that would both justify and order the fluctuations in the status of interpretations as part of an explanation of social phenomena. For example, the extended transformation of a mode of life, as in a society undergoing capitalist development, is a process necessarily understood in part through the extension, contraction, synthesis, and formation of systems of meaning, the framework of norms and beliefs, as well as changes in the system of production, demographic shifts, and so on. In this research context the social scientist may identify important conjunctures or crises in which elaborated systems of meaning (e.g. respect for legally established forms of political contention) become particularly important in determining "unique" actions (for example, the varying respnse of different groups to the dissolution of the Provisional Assembly by the Bolsheviks). Other

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[58] Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," in Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, eds. Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977): 27.

research questions may not require a thorough understanding of actor rationales; condition and response may be suitably linked via action logics of the "purposive-rational" type. Thus, that surviving villagers rebuild higher up a hill after a devestating flood may be "satisfactorily" explained with reference to simple prudence and may thereby become more appropriately addressed by statistical as opposed to interpretive research simply because of the relative transparency of the situation.

The point remains, however, that Weber did not elaborate such a distinction, one that would have begun to provide the terms of a resolution within which social scientists would make explicit the grounds for their relative prioritization of motive types. Instead, he left the gate open to vague references to intepretive heuristics and lent his authority to the suppression of a frank consideration of the goals and options open to interpretive social science. Thus the search for statistical regularities was carried out against an unrecognized background of assumptions about the extent to which the scientist can assume some a priori understanding of actor interpretations, a background which was continually dragged to the foreground by philosophers and social scientists working within epistemological traditions emphasizing the constitutive processes of the subject. Of greatest interest to us here are those writers who have employed Wittgenstein's theory of language games in order to argue for the importance of interpretation.

Wittgenstein, Winch, and Schutz

In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein cast loose from his earlier interest in justifying an empiricist version of realism

and adopted the view that philosophy's task did not lie in the rigorous demarcation of meaningful (empirically verifiable) from meaningless statements, but instead lay in the elucidation of "language games," complexes of speech and action, that were the ground of meaning. In sharp contrast to his earlier epistemology, Wittgenstein stressed the importance of the consensual validation of successful attempts at rule following. Thus "experience," which in the Tractatus could assume an unmediated form - "The blue spot appears against a green background" - was taken to be mediated by scociolinguistic forms. Demarcation continued to be a concern of philosophy, but only in the relativistic sense that since each language game was considered to be ordered by rules commonly understood by its participants, rules might be broken and thus, within the terms of the particular language game, meaningless or absurd statements and action generated. Elements of language were no longer fixed in their meaning through a steady relationship to particular objects, but instead derived meaning from their internal relationships to each other. Thus, in much the same way as Neurath and Carnap adopted coherence theories of truth and attempted to clarify the foundations of coherence, Wittgenstein sought to grasp the process of rule acquisition and application whereby individuals learned to participate in "forms of life."[59]

In The Idea of A Social Science Winch attempts to extend Wittgenstein's reworking of philosophy to the social sciences to justify the rejection of non-interpretation oriented research into social

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[59] Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis: Bobbs -Merrill, 1967), ch. 4 passim.

phenomena.[60] According to Winch, behaviors cannot be categorized and interrelated by the scientist in a manner which ignores its relationship to an encompassing "form of life." By supplanting the system of "rules" ordering the form of life of the observed actors with a system of rules interrelating operationalizations of theoretical concepts, the objectivistic researcher only succeeds in establishing the preconditions of nomological analysis by alienating him/herself from the "object," and thus, paradoxically, from the source of regularities. This is not to suggest that Winch advocates some form of Weberian rapprochement. To the contrary, Winch believes non-interpretive research contradicts the ideal of social behavior as rule-governed, and cannot be introduced in any sort of supplementary fashion. Thus Winch argues against Weber's belief that statistical tests can be used to check interpretations by saying that statistics offer us no way of improving upon an interpretation which statistics might suggest to be faulty.[61] Further, he claims that since the ground of behavioral regularities, rule systems, may change, behavioral systems will change as well. Therefore, generalizations are impossible without reference to rule systems; it is more plausible to refer to the rule system directly to predict the behavior appropriate to the rule system that is in force.

The rational kernel of Winch's argument can be drawn out through a consideration of Schutz' distinction between types of interpretive constructs, outlined in his paper, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences." Schutz contrasted the conduct of

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[60] Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).

[61] ibid., p. 113.

natural science with the conduct of social science by comparing the relationship of the constructs employed by scientists to those employed by social actors:

> It is up to the natural scientist and to him alone to define, in accordance with the procedural rules of his science, his observational field, and to determine the facts, data, and events within it which are relevant for his problem or scientific purpose at hand...But the observational field of the social scientist - social reality - has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives...The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this soical reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within their social world. Thus, the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by the actors in the social scene...[62]

But, having recognized the specificity of actor constructs Schutz proceeds to an ambiguous recommendation: the scientist should construct, in Schutz' terms, an "homunculus" or set of homunculi to whom s/he attributes motives, goals, and roles. In regulating these attributions s/he must apply criteria of logic, apparently understood in universalized terms (i.e. noncontradiction, purposive-rational propriety), as well as the "postulate of adequacy:"

> ...that each term in such a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the real world by an individual actor as indicated by the typical construct would be understandable to the actor himself as well as to his fellow-men in terms of common-sense interpretations of everyday life.[63]

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[62] Alfred Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," in Dallmayr and McCarthy, Understanding and Social Inquiry, p. 233.

[63] ibid., p. 237.

That the two criteria may contradict - universal purposive-rational logics need not inform the actor (recall the critique of Dilthey) - indicates a reluctance on Schutz' part to commit himself as fully as Winch to the actor's system of rules as the absolute ground of interpretation. When he argues that "logical consistency" is a good test of the "objective validity" of an interpretation, the category "objective" begins to overwhelm the subject's own standpoint. On this issue Winch is simply more cogent. But Winch's insistence that a category mistake underlies the employment of statistical technigues in the study of rule-governed behavior is unecessarily purist.[64] As Roche points out, we may want to reserve the notion that some rules are consistently followed, while others are not, and try to determine the frequency of rule-following. Further, and more important with respect to the typical interests of the social sciences, we may want to identify statistical relationships among "abstract" phenomena such as poverty and crime, thereby potentially using statistics as an heuristic for interpretive work.

Buttressed by Schutz' analysis, Winch's argument for the necessity, the inescapability, of interpretation is successful. The most dogmatic "anti-interpretationist" must recognize that much behavior is explicitly rule-determined and is thus contingent upon the subject's willingness to follow rules. Again, interpretation is imposed by the nature of the "object" of study. It is conceivable, as I have pointed out, that the anti-interpretationist might choose to delimit his field of investigation to areas within which s/he believes attention to actor

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[64] Maurice Roche, Phenomenology and the Social Sciences (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 258.

understandings is irrelevant to prediction. For example, s/he might choose to study the effects of climate upon emigration rates, and elect not to study mediating variables, such as class structure. Such a strategy would warrant at least two objections, or caveats: a) they should remain open to the likelihood that sociocultural mediations are significant and, b) they should beware of the covert imputation of a "common-sense sonsciousness" to mediate between cause and effect. But the fact that the caveats are directed at the possible theoretical explanation of relationships that are discovered points to the major flaw in Winch's position: he has preempted a discussion of research goals, and their relevance to the issue of causal vs. interpretive accounts. In effect, Winch has tried to resolve via category explication what may be framed as practical research decisions. That is, it is "legitimate," within the terms of prediction oriented research, to question the extent to which understanding actors will help predict their behavior. Again, it may be possible to categorize research problems according to the indispensability of actor understandings for attaining satisfactory confidence in prediction and thus to engage in interpretive work on a case by case basis. In this regard, we can argue that Winch has forgotten to extend his "form of life" category to encompass the various tendencies in social science.

Taken without modification, Winch succeeds in rendering interpretive social science a desirable object of cooptation. This is simultaneously an advance and a regression in relation to Weber. On the one hand, by arguing that rule following is the real basis of action he makes a stronger argument for its relevance to causal analysis. On the other hand, his conception of understanding, which in Weber still

retained some of Dilthey's emphasis on the appreciation of another "way of life," a more inclusive concept, seems to be aimed at attaining a truer "knowing" of a paradoxically more object-like subject. The subject is now a follower of rules, and the researcher's relationship to the subject entails gathering an inventory of them. Thus there is no reason to believe that Winch is urging a view of the subject, and of the subject-researcher relationship, that is distinguishable from that found in the literature on computer simulations of decision-making. Especially in institutions where decision processes are highly formalized in order to stabilize timetables, political bargaining, information flows, etc., rules take on an "if A, then do X" form that, if incorporated into an analysis along with statements of relevant conditions, can lead to accurate predictions.[65] Winch's argument brings us no further than this formulation of contingency logics, and thus stands as nothing more than a recommendation for role analysis.

At this point in our discussion the critical implications of this charge are obscure. This is because Winch's assumptions regarding the nature of the social context of rule systems remain undefined. Within Winch's own argument, such a lack of definition undoubtedly stems from the ontological focus of his investigation. Wishing only to assert the effective existence of rule systems, Winch is interested in the prerequisites of sociality as such. The question remains as to how the ontological argument might inform the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological framework of an interpretive social science. In making this judgment, of course, it is impossible to proceed in a purely

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[65] For example, see John Crecine, "A Computer Simulation Model of Municipal Budgeting" in J. Dutton and W. Starbuck, The Computer Simulation of Human Behavior (New York: John Wiley, 1971).

"deductive" fashion. One must take into account existing orientations in the social sciences and assess whether a cetain "elective affinity" exists between Winch's position and other programs. When we consider Winch's stress on rule following, a clear parallel with the orientations of Durkheim and Parsons emerges. Particularly in the latter's system, in which the concept of "role" establishes a symmetry between institutional objectives and individual identity, such overwhelming importance is given to the task of answering the question "How is society possible?" that deviance is conceived of as essentially the absence of one of the prerequisites of sociality, e.g. a failure in moral socialization.[66] Winch, by defining the individual as a rule follower ("How is the enactment of a language game possible?") would seem to promote a similar view of deviance.

Even if we assess the affinity with the self-consciously conservative assumptions of Parsons more circumspectly, objections remain. To see this, we can distinguish between two different models of rule following that are arguably corollaries of Winch's position. The first, which we will term the one-dimensional model regards societies as systems of rules which are learned by members of the society. "Deviant" or "anomic" behavior, behavior contrary to rules, is regarded following the approach of Durkheim or Parsons, as essentially unregulated, or inexplicable in terms of rules. A two-dimensional model (2D), on the other hand, eschews this pejorative characterization of rule breaking, and appreciates its purposive-rational (or value-rational or traditional quality). In other words, it maintains that rule breaking follows rules

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[66] Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Avon, 1970), p. 218.

as well. As justification we might point to the manner in which rebellious or revolutionary behavior seems to be patterned into the "repertoires of contention" we have referred to above. That is, far from being random and irrational, such behavior is informed by established traditions of protest that specify action appropriate to types of grievances. Thus the 2D model appears to be adequate to the conceptualization of conflicts entailing rule breaking, and therefore escapes the criticism derived from the critique of Durkheim and Parsons. Generally, then, we would argue that Winch's approach is not vulnerable to the charge of interpretive inadequacy, as long as the issue is one of providing some rule-based interpretation of behavior.

A more fundamental line of criticism of Winch's prescription for interpretation would refer not to the possibility that the notion of "rules" will be given conservative connotations, but that it commends a naivite regarding actor motivations and, implicitly, actor reconstructions of their action rationales. That is, to the extent it requires a researcher, when giving an account of an action, to simply attend to the actor's account of their action, and to consider this account as expressing the rule (or logic or rationale) for their action, Winch's prescription fails to consider the complexity of the process lying behind the actor's formulation of a "good enough reason" for their action. To put it another way, it fails to consider the manner in which the actor's discourse on their action, which we can conceive of as composed of characterizations or representations of self, of others, and of their interrelation, is a motivated achievement of the subject, an

outcome of a process of selective self-interpretation carried out within constraints imposed by the social order.[67]

The Social Context of Ideological Representation: Marx

The appropriate referential context of ideology is the society in which it is thought, in which it gives "orientation." Thus to say that a subject's discourse on their action is ideological is to place that subject and their process of discourse formation in a relation to their society; more specifically, in relation to certain "core" institutions, processes, and their composite social relations through which the human species reproduces itself.[68] Reference to species reproduction is not intended to imply that ideology is a concomitant of essentially natural processes. Instead, ideology is a possible characteristic of the discourses through which subjects represent themselves within core social relations.

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[67] Similar emphases inform the work of Goffman (see Irving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959) and Garfinkel (see Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Jersey City, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). While I regard their work as important, as it stands their conception of this "process of selection within constraints" abstracts from crucial dimensions of the process. On the one hand, as Gouldner has argued, the social context of the institutional settings they focus upon is ignored. See Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, pp. 378-95. On the other hand, the implication of psychoanalytically defined processes of representation is suppressed. Thus, while constitutive activities of subjects within interpersonal fields is retrieved - as Garfinkel would put it, subjects are not seen as sociological or psychological "dopes" - that process of constitution is situationalized and conceived of in inappropriately cognitivist terms. The justification for this criticism lies ahead.

[68] I will consider the concept of "core" institutions, processes, and their composite social relations as an open category, but here take it to refer to the the institutions that are customarily considered important, those of the economic, political, judicial, educational, and military spheres, as well as the family. Hereafter I will refer to core institutions, etc., as "core social relations," unless a distinction seems merited.

As is well known, in his discussions of the nature of ideology and the conditions supporting it Marx stresses the context of class relations. Consistent with the critique of idealism we have outlined above, in the discussion in The German Ideology of the origin and nature of "ruling ideas," Marx's primary interest is to show that the principal ideas or thematizations of a society are expressive of the "dominant material relationships," of the "relationships which make one class the ruling one...," and are not in themselves determinative of the social formation itself.[69] Marx accounts for the appearance of the rule of ideas with reference to several processes. Greatest attention is given to a critical reconstruction of Stirner's "proof" of the "hegemony of the spirit in history." As Marx points out, Stirner first separates ideas from their class origins and gives them a determinative status, then links successive ruling ideas to each other and portrays them as "acts of self-determination on the part of the concept," and then finally compensates for the mysticism of this approach by attributing their sequential appearance to "thinkers," who are lauded as "the manufacturers of history."[70]

Marx argues that these analytic arrors are framed by an idealism that covertly preserves itself with a "great man" view of history, and complement a set of social and political processes attendant to the struggle of the bourgeoisie to attain social predominance.[71] In the period of their sharpest contention with the

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[69] Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 136-9.

[70] ibid., p. 139.

[71] Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Surveys From Exile, David Fernbach, ed. (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 146.

precapitalist order, the interests of the bourgeoisie tend to be framed in "universal" terms, suggesting a commonality of interest with other subordinate classes. Indeed, to an extent this commonality was genuine - the hitherto ruling class is a common oppressor, and the constrained development of the future ruling class obscures its exploitative relationship to its coalition partners. At the same time, strategic rationales give this tendency a deliberate, intentional quality, and thereby "universalization" is partially grounded in either compromise or misrepresentation.[72]

More generally, Marx comments on the tendency for dominant classes to legitimate their rule by claiming it is consistent with transhistorical laws and principles; for example, "in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending form mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an "eternal law."[73] Ideologists, "thinkers of the class" who make the "perfecting of the illusion of class about itself their chief source of livelihood" actively formulate and promulgate these beliefs, realizing a division of labor in which they rationalize the pursuits of the "active members" of the class. These "organic intellectuals, to use Gramsci's phrase, employ

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[72] The decrees issued by the Constituent Assembly on August 4, 1789, exemplify both the tendency towards "universalization" and the kinds of rationales informing it. As Barrington Moore points out, the Assembly's issuance of the "death certificate of the Ancien Regime" was intended not only to curtail the power of the aristocracy, but also to show the rioting peasantry that the Third Estate's interests were substantially harmonious with their own. Thus the decrees, which included abolition of the tithe and of feudal obligations upon persons, etc., expressed both the bourgeoisie's aspirations to rule the new order as well as to lead it. See Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 78.

[73] Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 137.

the ruling class' control over "the means of mental production" to secure an hegemony that, in a fundamental sense, is as opaque to the members of the ruling class as is is to those of the dominated classes.

This sense of opacity increases if we move from explicit vindications of class rule to consider conceptual frameworks that, far from directly addressing often contentious political questions, appear to simply reflect the reality of social relations even as they constitute them. In Marx's work, of course, this is represented in the distinction between the critique of religion and political doctrine and the critique of political economy. Marx was quite appreciative of the problems accompanying critical analysis of this latter framework. While he would scorn the apologetics of "vulgar" polticial economists who deliberately abandoned classical political economy's recognition of the antagonism between social classes, he essentially held their opportunism lay in the denial of a contradiction. Thus Marx was sympathetic with Ricardo's inability to explain, within the constraints of bourgeois political economy, the impoverishment of sections of the working class as the forces of production grew.[74]

Perhaps Marx's most detailed discussion of these constraints occurs in the section on commodity fetishism in the first volume of Capital:

> [When commodities are fetishized] the social character of men's labor appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labor: because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labor...there is a definite social relation

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[74] Maurice Dobb, "The Trend of Modern Economics," in E.K. Hunt and J.G. Schwartz eds., A Critique of Economic Theory (Baltimore: Penguin, 1972), pp. 44-5.

> between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.[75]

Commodities are attributed this quality when the specific social relations linking individual producers are obscured because the production of use values is carried out for general market exchange. Under these conditions the particularity of the commodity each individual produces is submerged under the rubric of exchange value, both in the sense that all commodities, qua quantities of exchange value, become qualitatively alike and because similar commodities are given more or less identical exchange values. Human labor is "homogenized," and "social actions take the form of the action of objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them."[76]

The critical insight that the value of commodities is based upon the socially necessary labor time required for their production, not simply some intrinsic property of the commodity, reveals not so much an incorrect understanding of the nature of the commodity, but the manner in which a particular order of social relations gives rise to its own occlusion.[77] Marx takes pains to make certain that the reader does not mistakenly assume that Marx's reflective insight dissolves the fetishism: "this fact appears to the producers, notwithstanding the discovery above referred to, to be just as real and final, as the fact, that, after the discovery by science of the component gases of the air,

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[75] Karl Marx, Capital, vol. I: The Process of Capitalist Production (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 72.

[76] ibid, p. 75.

[77] I.I. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Labor Theory of Value (Detroit: Black Red, 1970), p. 6.

the atmosphere itself remains unaltered."[78] To assume otherwise would take us back to the Hegelian view, in which reflective thought frees itself from its own bonds and material practice is negated. The "materiality" of the fetishism of commodities, its social basis in a system of exchange that is, in turn, ultimately grounded in and given impetus by the necessity of the appropriation of nature, and constitutes the fetishism as "real," as a lived aspect of daily life. Only through the establishment of a "community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the conbined labour-power of the community" will this alienation of human powers be undone.[79]

In this analytic context, Marx argues that particular forms of religion, "reflexes of the real world," presuppose alienation within the sphere of commodity production:

> And for a society based upon the production of commodities, in which the producers in general enter into social relations with one another by treating their products as commodities and values, whereby they reduce their individual private labor to the standard of homogenous human labor - for such a society, Christianity with its cultus of abstract man, more especially in its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most fitting form of religion.[80]

Again, religion is a secondary alienation; Christianity packages an anthropomorphized commodity - God - to be revered by abstracted workers bearing uniform souls. In these passages the categories of bourgeois economy, all ultimately grounded in commodity fetishism, set up the

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[78] Marx, ibid., p. 74.

[79] ibid., p. 78.

[80] ibid., p. 79.

essential alienation of human powers that is the secular basis of religion and idealism. We see that, from this standpoint, false consciousness is not, as is often maintained, simply a misperception, a failure to see an "objective" reality.[81] Such a definition is more consonant with the above concept of "ruling ideas" that are foisted on a population that is divorced from the "means of mental production" and who thus cannot arrive at a more accurate understanding of their condition.

We can summarize our account of Marx's analysis with reference to our comments earlier in the chapter, in which we emphasized what might be called the social construction of the "necessary" or axiomatic character of forms of social relations, or reification. For Marx, the success of ideology, understood here as a representation of the horizon of possible social relations, depends principally upon a shifting synthesis of:

a) A legitimating discourse in which the representations of social relations, especially the relations of production, gain an ontological status. For example, in The Wealth of Nations Smith's claim that "men everywhere truck, barter, and exchange" screens out the historical contingency of the capitalist mode of production, and gives it the appearance of an expression of natural social impulses.

b) A stark interest on the part of a dominant class, which not only exercises effective control over the mode of production, but "the means of mental production" (the educational system, the media, etc.) and a political and juridical apparatus that the dominant class

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[81] Norman Geras, "Marx and the Critique of Political Economy," in Robin Blackburn, ed. Ideology in Social Science (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 292.

can use to maintain the framework which both constitutes and benefits it.

c) A practical discourse, rooted in the framework of social relations, which designates the understandings of self, other, society, and nature that people must necessarily adopt to survive. Marx gives special attention to the categories of commodity exchange, an attention which they merit, for unless the individual is willing to conceive of him/herself as the seller of a commodity, and participate in the market on those grounds, they cannot enter into social exchange and acquire the means of subsistence.

d) Displacements, e.g. religion, in which human strivings are transformed and satisfied in fantasy.

Within this syntheis, the subject's reflection upon their situation becomes a whirl of understandings in which institutions alternately seem to be as natural as stone, or to be based on ruthless power, or as the rules of the game that must be "realistically" followed, or as mere existence that is less significant than the "next life." It is necessary to add more dimensions to this analysis but, as we shall emphasize, it is crucial to appreciate the fate of the perception of power within it: while, in a raw sense, it is the likelihood of sanctions that seem to hold the ideological consciousness together, the correllated understandings that ignore power acquire a certain independence. For example, within capitalist society, one can justify one's belief that no social alternatives are possible with reference to Adam Smith, or by pointing to the poverty of those who do not sell their labor power. Power itself seems to be something that

merely allows one a certain advantage within the system; its system-constitutive role, and the subject's relation to it, is obscured.

Critique as Social-Theoretical Mediation

In retrospect, the self-confidence of Marxism rested not only upon an analysis of crisis tendencies in capitalism but also upon a rationalist conception of the subject. If tradition lay like a weight upon the brain of the living, that weight could be removed by a persistent radical critique, undertaken within developing organizations, that exposes the source of the degradation of labor, business cycles, and wars over resources and markets and points to the opportunities for historical supersession of the capitalist system. Subjectivity, understood here as the self-conscious participation by the individual in a collective transformation of the social order to better meet human needs and realize human potential, was to emerge when the reified representations of capitalism were dissolved via criticism linked to revolutionary praxis.

In his essay "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," Lukacs exemplified this perspective:

> The historical knowledge of the proletariat begins with knowledge of the present, with the self-knowledge of its own social situation and with the elucidation of its necessity (i.e. its genesis). That genesis and history should coincide or, more exactly, that they should be different aspects of the same process, can only happen if two conditions are fulfilled. On the one hand, all the categories in which human existence is constructed must appear as the determinants of that existence itself (and not merely of the description of that existence). On the other hand, their succession, their coherence and their connections must appear as aspects of the historical process itself, as the structural components of the present...
>
> This in turn assumes that the world which confronts man in theory and in practice exhibits a kind of objectivity which - if properly thought out and understood - need never stick fast in an immediacy similar to that of forms found earlier on. This objectivity must accordingly be comprehensible as a constant

> factor mediating between past and future and it must be possible to demonstrate that it is everywhere the product of man and of the development of society.[82]

Central to this process is the category of mediation, "a lever with which to overcome the mere immediacy of the empirical world...not something (subjective) foisted on to the objects from outside ["not an ought opposed to their is"]...[But] the manifestation of their authentic objective structure."[83] Grasping the objective structure of the capitalist system simultaneously discloses the concrete position of the individual worker within that structure. To relate to that structure "concretely," i.e. to act to supersede it in a manner that satisfactorily accounts for the objective possibilities made available by the given social structure, the worker needs to take up the standpoint of a proletarian, acting as part of a class.[84] Thus comprehension of the nature of capitalism produces a movement of subjective transformation in which the worker's self-interpretation as an individual cum commodity is dialectically superseded via a reflection mediated Marx's analysis of capitalist society.

Lukacs self-criticism, that he tried to "out-Hegel Hegel" and, ignoring "material factors," covertly restore a teleology in which the poletarian class-subject would supersede alienation in a movement informed by Marxism,[85] blurs more substantive questions. Here I do not intend simply to refer to classical Marxism's tendency to underestimate

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[82] Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Boston: MIT Press, 1972), p. 159.

[83] ibid., p. 163.

[84] ibid., pp. 197-9.

[85] ibid., p. xxii.

capitalism's ability to forestall major crises by increasing its coordination capacities through essentially extra-market agencies, especially the state. Taken in isolation, such a theoretical problematic assumes a fundamentally naive attitude regarding the social constitution of needs: to put it simply, it continually asks whether capitalism can continue to "deliver the goods" and fails to ask whether capitalism can manage demands and their articulation so that they are consistent with capitalism's capacities. From the standpoint of our concerns, it promotes an understanding of ideology that one-sidedly stresses ideology's occlusion of superior institutional alternatives, and thus ignores or downplays ideological thinking as a process of constrained adjustment in which, generally, the "surplus repression" maintained by the social system limits the "surplus demands" that develop within it.

Three Types of Social Contradictions

In speaking of "surplus demands," attendant frustrations, and a process of constrained adjustment, we implicitly raise the question of the content of the surplus demand, its object, and its occasion. Here I think it is appropriate to avoid an extended abstract discussion of associated questions, such as the natural vs. the social source of demands and, instead, immediately focus our attention upon the established complex of core institutions, the institutional reference of ideology, and the ways they generate frustration. To an extent following the work of relative deprivation theorists, we will regard institutional failure as a condition in which either the "outputs" of an institution or the form of life practice it constitutes is judged to be inadequate,

in terms of some standard, by the people who receive outputs or participate within the institution.[86]

Institutional performances may come to be termed inadequate in a variety of contexts: necessary "inputs" may be lacking (crops may fail, populations may be decimated by disease) or institutions may undergo shocks that limit their capabilities (wars may disrupt communications, markets, etc.). What interests us most here are inadequate performances that stem from "contradictions" in the social order itself, and which thus stem from tendencies that are integral to the institution (or social order). Here our employment of the term will require more elaboration than is customary. Habermas offers a satisfactory, if sketchy, general definition: to say that a social system is characterized by contradictions indicates that "its organizational principle necessitates that individuals and groups repeatedly confront each other with claims and intentions that are...incompatible."[87] From our standpoint, a contradiction can be fostered either through clashes of <u>imperatives</u>, either internal to single institutions or a set of institutions, or as a clash between <u>discourses embedded in forms of social relations</u>, most typically grounded in different institutions. Regarding the first type of contradiction between imperatives, what we will call an "internal

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[86] As Skocpol has pointed out, relative deprivation theory as a theory of collective action stresses the minimal insight that people rebel when they are angry, and offers little in the way of a systematic theory of the conditions (e.g. changing class structures) promoting anger. See Theda Skocpol, <u>States and Social Revolutions</u> (New York: Cambridge, 1979), pp. 9-14. Here I wish to appropriate only the theory's stress on the socially mediated character of a sense of deprivation, and not its hyperabstractions.

[87] Jurgen Habermas, <u>Legitimation Crisis</u> (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 27.

institutional contradiction," the most clearcut instances can be found in the capitalist economy. For example, when capitalists maximize profits by lowering wages to the point where workers cannot buy the commodities produced, a tendency towards a realization crisis, a tendency immediately unalleviated by countertendencies within the economy and one that appears as a crisis of overproduction/ underconsumption, ensues.

Contradictions between imperatives guiding different institutions in capitalist society seem to have a less "generic" character in the sense that they are often in part determined by contradictions in the economy. As an example of this type of contradiction, we can point to that between the imperative of profit maximization (and the related, but not identical, interest on the part of capitalists to control their units of capital), and state policies developed to moderate business cycles and guarantee employment and a socially established minimum level of consumption for politically significant sectors of the population. The political sphere thus increasingly acquires an adversarial potential vis-a-vis guiding principles of the economy and its institutions, a potential realized in a variety of ways. For example:

- Punishing units of capital that employ privleged market positions to extract a level of profit that threatens the viability of other capital units or the economic system as a whole.

- Establishing a system of income supports for labor that, even as it helps maintain consumption reduces the impact of unemployment and thereby limits capital's ability to pit the "reserve army of the unemployed" against employed labor to reduce wages.

- Using tax revenues to support selected units of capital that are not economically viable but which, if allowed to dissolve, would have a negative impact upon the regional and national economy.

Contradictions of the second type do not immediately possess the nature-like quality of the first; it is precisely to subvert that quality that the institutional complex giving rise to these contradictions develops. It is true that they often take a form in which the goal of managing the system's operation is not an immediate issue per se, as when particular groups seek to maintain their position or to gain advantages throuugh extra-market means. However, because these struggles ultimately refer back to contradictions stemming from the disjuncture between the social character of production and private accumulation and disposal of the surplus, they cannot be considered accidental to the economic system. At the same time they are, in a strong sense, external to it; they represent an unwillingness on the part of participants in the economy to regulate their expectations via a discourse entirely subordinated to the logic of capitalist accumulation. Such a discourse, set out in detail in neo-classical economics, defines participants in the economy as possessers of factors of production - land, labor, capital - to whom is due a return proportionate to their market-determined contribution to the value of the commodities produced. Because, in light of other plausible discourses and concomitant normative systems, the allocation of values that results from participation in a "pure" capitalist economy is unjust and inadequate, state intervention is deemed necessary to readjust allocation outcomes. Thus discourses external to that of the capitalist economy come to supplement (and subvert) it.

Such a development can, as we shall argue, supplement the antagonism contained within the type of contradiction we are most interested in here, the contradiction of divergent discourses embedded within forms of social relations. Unlike the other types of contradiction, which are most appropriately conceived of in terms of institutional goals, this type manifests itself when incompatible discourses are simultaneously constitutive of the meaning given to interpersonal relations within the same social - most significantly, institutional - context. To us, while contradictions of the second type tend to be grounded more in the institutionalized employment of one discourse in the regulation of the outcomes of another institutionalized discourse, while leaving the internal structure of the other institution alone, contradictions of this third type are specifically related to internal structures.

Hierarchical and Democratic-Egalitarian Discourses

In the rest of our discussion we will consider the contradiction between the hierarchical forms of decision-making and control that are characteristic of the capitalist firm and the democratic-egalitarian relational model that is realized to varying degrees in areas of social life in this country, most notably the political and legal spheres, and in voluntary organizations and extra-institutional interactions. I have two general reasons for this choice. First, the contradiction is not only clearly defined in a logical and substantive sense, but it is also an active, manifest contradiction. That is, the hierarchy/democracy contradiction both constitutes and is evidenced in historical and contemporary manifestations of worker discontent that often stems from the suffering

engendered by "having to take orders" and "being told what to do," a discontent that is often associated with attempts to leave firms and, more to the point, to demands for more participation and control on the part of workers.[88] Thus it should be stressed here that when we speak of the constitution or basis of the contradiction, we are referring to a contradiction between discourses that are practiced and lived out, and which are more important to participants in defining their relations with each other, than merely "hypothetical" discourses or forms of life.[89] Thus when we refer to the ideological circumscription of democracy, we are not referring to the occlusion of certain disembodied "values" as potential alternatives to hierarchical relations, but the demarcation of the system of relations within the firm against a system of interpersonal schemas, if you will, that may potentially be extended into the firm from spheres of life practice external to it.[90]

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[88] As evidence of the contradiction I would point to the rising interest in job participation schemes as a way to increase productivity, the popular fascination with self-employment, the union movement's vacillating espousal of increasing job participation,etc.

[89] One might object that this emphasis on suffering arising from contradictory discourses conflates physical suffering, resulting from the pace and duration of work, etc., with suffering stemming from a variety of "status conflict" implied in the notion of contradictory discourses. In response, I would argue that physical suffering would tend to encourage an ameliroative response along the lines suggested by the alternative discourse. Further, in a somewhat different vein, it seems implausible to regard the experience of physical suffering as isolable from the experience of the contradiction. This is because the subject will tend to interpret their physical state, and thus to identify what is suffering, in terms informed by the contradiction. There are, of course, limits to this process of interpretive overdetermination but, once reached, presumably such a degree of suffering would inform an ameliorative response: the subject would seek to escape from their "absolutely" immiserated state.

[90] Here we can quote Dahl and Lindblom to both support our main point concerning the active nature of the contradiction and to clarify our emphasis on the institutionalized quality of the contradiction in discourses:

Second, not only is the contradiction active, but it is potentially decisive in terms of the preservation of capitalist relations of production per se. By way of supporting this claim, we will begin with a definition of those relations, drawn from Dobb's general discussion of problems in defining the capitalist mode of production. After noting the dangers of arriving at a definition that overlooks significant variations across economies, he concludes:

> Thus Capitalism [is] not simply a system of production for the market - a system of commodity production as Marx termed it - but a system under which labour-power had "itself become a commodity" and was bought and sold on the market like any other object of exchange. Its historical prerequisite was the concentration of ownership of the means of prodcution in the hands of a class, consisting of only a minor section of society, and the consequential emergence of a propertyless class for whom the sale of their labour-power was their only source of livelihood. Productive activity was furnished, accordingly, by the latter, not by virtue of legal compulsion, but on the basis of a wage contract.'[1]

In a formal sense, hierarchical decision-making structures are not in themselves essential components of capitalist relations of

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> So long as the legitimacy of managerial control is in doubt, not only is cooperation inhibited but workers cannot accede to control of management without damaging their own sense of respect. In a culture like that of the United States, where the goal of reciprocal control is highly valued, there is bound to be a deep-seated conflict between the control of a "private" management and the ordinary citizen's conception of legitimate control.

Again, we would argue that the poignancy of the conflict does not simply stem from the discrepancy between the discourse organizing the relations of the firm and certain values, but from the fact that those values are realized in relations external to the firm. To put it succinctly, it is not just that workers "want" something different; in a strong sense they "are" someone different outside of the firm. See Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), p. 480.

'[1] Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1963),p. 7.

production, and thus their replacement cannot be considered fundamentally antagonistic to the capitalist system. As Ellerman has pointed out, models of democratic decision-making in the plant are in principle consistent with capitalist ownership, as long as democratic decision-making does not infringe upon the capitalist's ultimate control of the means of production.[92] But the practical consequences of their implementation suggests consequences not forseeable in a formal analysis. First, there is some evidence of significant problems in limiting the growth of demands for further democratization once participation in decisions is granted.[93] This results from a variety of factors, including workers' interest in ensuring that their power of decision is not superfluous in relation to the power of other agents, the erosion of the naturalized legitimacy of "management prerogative" once those prerogatives have been arbitrarily redefined, etc. Ultimately, participation schemes appear to exacerbate the tension, typically repressed in the contemporary hierarchical firm, between centralized decision-making intended to maximize labor productivity and decentralized forms in which worker and community interests are capable of representation.

This is not to suggest an absolute practical incompatibility. Because democratic-egalitarian forms achieved a doctrinal coherence as part of the bourgeois critique of feudalism, they

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[92] David Ellerman, "Capitalism and Workers' Self-Management," in Workers' Control, eds. Gerry Hunnius, G. David Garson, and John Case (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 11. Just what constitutes "ultimate control" is debatable, but it would seem to include the ability to liquidate the firm, make major investment decisions, and to guarantee some rate of return on equity.

[93] Daniel Zwerdling, Workplace Democracy (New York: Harper Row, 1980), pp. 19-30.

are immediately linked to, in the context of the contradiction we are considering, countervailing rationales establishing property right as an absolute. Their capacity to generate and support challenges to hierarchical control in particular, or capitalist relations of production in general, is thereby limited unless they are elaborated in doctrines systematically addressing the issue of property rights. Yet it is clear that to the extent egalitarian and democratic forms are viable external to the system of production, they create conceptions about appropriate forms of interaction, of relations between self and other that are not only incongruous with hierarchy, but may also override the sanctity of property rights if such rights threaten those forms.'[94]

If contemporary implementations of participation schemes tend to release social and psychological dynamics incompatible with capitalist control, we can also point to tendencies in capitalist development that undercut democratic and egalitarian forms. Generally, within the sphere of production itself, the development of the forces of production under capitalism, as Braverman has persuasively documented, has consistently been informed by the intention of rendering workers powerless and replacable, "deskilling" their jobs by simplifying their component operations and transferring intellectual tasks to a stratum of industrial engineers and technicians.'[95] In contrast to the transparency of this process, capitalism's antagonism, expressed at the political level, toward popular participation and genuine mass democracy can be

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'[94] Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 34.

'[95] Braverman, Harry, Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

less easily tied to the core logic of capitalist development. Thus, the growth of the capitalist state, while appropriately conceptualized in terms establishing a functional relation to capitalist accumulation (as in, for example, James O'Connor's analysis of the functional relationship between state infrastructural expenditures and capital accumulation) establishes and strengthens bureaucracies that must be conceived as relatively autonomous vis-a-vis these functions, and constitutive of interests independent of them.[96] Nevertheless, whether one considers the remarkable constriction of the "universe of political discourse" in this country,[97] or examines the evolution of political parties,[98] or takes up the history of the cooptation or repression of left poltical tendencies,[99] or reads of the Trilateral Commission's concern that democratic institutions have come to be "destabilizing,"[100] etc., it is clear that the logic of capitalist development urges, if not absolutely necessitates, a political strategy of management and containment of the social power of the labor force.

In sum, we are claiming that the collateral development of democratic-egalitarian forms and the capitalist mode of production has

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[96] James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), p. 7.

[97] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), chs. 1-2.

[98] For example, see Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1977), pps. 305-13.

[99] James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).

[100] Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracy to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975).

not culminated in a smooth integration. Instead, democratic-egalitarian forms, unless sufficiently circumscribed in the range of their institutionalization and the scope of their powers, can be elaborated to drastically limit capital's ability to dispose over the means of production and to garner the broad range of power and privleges associated with that control. The social relations of the workplace thus represent a pivotal zone of contention within the field of a struggle between classes that is constituted and sparked by the types of contradiction we have classified. It is within the development of this struggle that what Bowles and Gintis have termed interclass "accords" take shape:

> By an accord, we mean a mutually accepted joint redefinition and consequent reconstitution of political reality by antagonistic classes or class fragments. Through an accord classes redefine their interests and their identities so as to produce a novel logic of social action. An accord is a reorganization of society on two levels: institutions and tools of political discourse. On the institutional level, the accord results in the admission of a new set of organizational forms (associations, unions, commission, electoral laws and practices, etc.), and corresponding to these, a new specification of organiztional legitimacy. On the communicative level, the accord results in the creation of new communicative tools. These tools provide a common framework for political discourse across contending groups, express the moral legitimacy of the newly acquired institutional forms, are admitted by speakers and hearers as intelligible and worthy of information and are affirmed in all the major institutions of daily life.[101]

In introducing the interview material in the fifth chapter we will, pursuant to a more concrete contextualization of the interview, present a brief history of labor relations in this country that will outline specific dimensions of the accord currently in effect.

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[101] Herbert Gintis, "Communication and Politics: Marxism and the Problem of Liberal Democracy," Socialist Review 50-51 (March- June 1980): 220-21.

A General Definition of Ideology

At this point we can work together, in a preliminary fashion, the concepts of contradiction, discourse, and ideology within a framework stressing the communicative dimensions of the accord. We can simply state that the accord seeks to preserve core social relations by establishing parameters, or systematized constraints, upon the articulation of demands through the various discourses embedded in the social order. It attempts to limit the quantity and quality of demands such that core social relations, and the distribution of power and privlege derived from action within them, are not subjected to demands for change beyond limits that are defined with varying degrees of clarity and to which "parties" to the accord are varyingly committed, depending upon their definition of (and, in a sense, recognition of) their interests. Ideology is a characteristic of a discourse on the discourses that are ordered, limited, and interworked by subjects seeking to represent their needs and interests in a social order that, because of its contradictory quality, tends to prompt representations of needs and interests antagonistic to core social relations. In other words, ideolgy is a metadiscourse that expresses the intention to integrate the various institutionalized discourses of the social order, and thus entails an ensemble of patterns of representation for managing experiences that are formed within contradictory institutionalized discourses.

In developing this conception of ideology, we should give great emphasis to ideology's regulatory quality. To put it succinctly, all to often the concept of ideology is used to characterize a "presence," i.e. the manifest content of a particular statement, when it

is just as much a quality of what is absent, a plausible yet unarticulated representation on the part of a subject. Such an understanding of ideology, which has vaguely informed so much debate, for example, over the validity of the concept of "false consciousness" and the limits of dogmatically empirical accounts of power,[102] is immanent to the concept of an accord within a contradictory social order, especially one in which contradictions between institutionalized discourses are sharp. In social contexts in which "totalitarian" resolutions of this type of contradiction are not possible (it is debatable whether one ever is),[103] and particularly in the case of the contradiction in which we are interested, ideological metadiscourse must entail a substantial "practical" dimension stressing the consequences for the actor if they violate institutional discourses, e.g. start criticizing hierarchical relations in the factory. In his essay "Sociology and Psychology" Adorno addresses this issue:

> Fear constitutes a more crucial subjective motive of objective rationality...Today anyone who fails to comply with the economic rules will seldom go under straight away. But the fate of the declasse looms on the horizon. Ahead lies the road to an asocial criminal existence: the refusal to play the game arouses suspicions and exposes offenders to the vengeance of society even though they may not be reduced to going hungry and sleeping under bridges. But the fear of being cast out, the social sanctions behind economic behavior, have long been internalized along with other taboos, and have left their mark on the individual...This atavistic and often exaggerated social fear, which latterly, to be sure, can at any moment revert to real fear, has gathered such force that, however thoroughly one might

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[102] I will have more to say about these issues in the fifth chapter.

[103] Here I use the term "totalitarian" as an ideal-typical construct of a social order in which enacted social relational forms, characterized by substantial power differentials, are essentially structurally homologous across all institutions, and in which traditions capable of being enacted as contradictory practices have been dissolved.

> see through its irrationality, it would nevertheless take a moral hero to cast it aside.[104]

Given the lack of attention it receives in the social sciences, it is almost impossible to overemphasize the role of fear in shaping the subject's process of self-representation within discourse, and in increasing their amenability to ideolgical forms of representation. We will have more to say of this role in succeeding chapters. But at this point we would add a major caveat. Even though explication of the regulatory aspect of ideology should incorporate a moment that explicitly refers to a simple dynamic of positive and negative rewards, we should not simply regard the concept of ideology as part of a socially organized aversive mechanism. Even though the threatened employment of power to defend core social relations does appear to make learning theory style interpretations of the individual's mental processing plausible, we would argue that such an approach vastly underestimates the complexity of that mental processing and, concomitantly, impoverishes our understanding of the ideological circumscription of democracy. To anticipate the discussion in the following chapters, ideological forms of interpretation occur within and are supported by a broad engagement between the subject and the social order in which the nominally "private" representational categories of the subject and the "public" categories of ideology are interworked within a communicative context informed by coercive social relations. Thus suffering is managed through a stream of understandings in which a potentially antagonistic relationship between the subject and the social order is both <u>suppressed</u> (for example, the subject no longer

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[104] T.W. Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," <u>New Left Review</u> 46 (December 1967): 71.

considers themselves to be a person whose rights and powers are unnecessarily denied) and repressed to the extent that unconscious mechanisms, grounded in unconscious discourses, play a role in the suppression of antagonistic understandings of self and society. What incentive-based interpretations of mental processing reconstruct as a form of conscious decision not to press for changes in core social relations (e.g. the subject simply perceives the social relations of work as impossible to change and chooses to regard those relations as possessing a pecuniary significance only) is instead a process in which the subject's standpoint, from which they give value to social relations, cannot be so easily grasped by themselves and those who talk with them. In short, coercion, and the concomitant exclusion of desires incompatible with core social relations, is experienced by the subject within a constellation of orientations, some of which may not be recognized.

In this light, the conceptualization of the process of retrieving the agentic status of the subject outstrips the framework suggested by Thompson. In trying to correct the reductionistic analyses of his contemporaries Thompson sucessfully avoids the abstractions of Lukacs by arguing that social critique must be concretely grounded in the myriad of traditions, customs, and habits of subjects. But, as we have seen, in Thompson's work this has the consequence of rendering suspect any critical standpoint that would even partially rely upon concepts that call consciousness into question. Thus Thompson believes that the concept of ideology inevitably derives its significance from reference to a class self-understanding and project imposed by intellectuals. The upshot of this is that the regulatory notion of

"agent" is linked only to the objective possibility of transformative action aimed at core social relations, and is mute regarding the question of subjects better grasping vicissitudes in the manner in which they conceive of social relations. In his effort to ensure that the call to transformative action is not bound up with the demand that subjects suppress prior self-understandings under abstract concepts, a development ratified as "the maintainance of class discipline" under Stalinism, Thompson fails to incorporate Marx's general analysis of ideological consciousness, and closes off the development of that analysis and the possibility of linking it up to a genuinely liberatory theory of critical reflection. It is to this possibility that we will now turn our attention.

CHAPTER III

REFLECTION, REPRESENTATIONS, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Introduction

The principal task of this chapter will be to develop a theory of the suppressive and repressive features of the ideological process. To accomplish this, we will need to attend to the following questions:

a) How may we distinguish between various statements made by a subject, such that it is possible to judge the relative adequacy of those statements to the subject's lived experience, i.e. to their experience of needs and their satisfaction?

b) Can we define certain basic processes that are determinative of the relative adequacy of the subject's representation of their condition, and link them to the ideological "discourse on discourses," or "metadiscourse?"

We can address these questions under the rubric of an elaboration of Habermas' notion of "systematically distorted communication." In his writings this concept occupies a particularly important position, connoting:

1) At the metatheoretical level, one of the principal terms for redefining the program of critical social theory to include a specifically interpretive dimension.

2) At the theoretical level, an interface between psychoanalytic and social theory.

3) At the practical level, an appreciation of forms of interpersonal relations consistent with the goals of working towards and constructing institutional arrangements most congenial with human potential.

Perplexingly enough, Habermas has not concentrated on working up the concept along the lines that seem most compelling. That is, he has not developed the psychoanalytic/social theory interface to "exemplify" the concept through actual studies of subjects' communications. Instead, for reasons that we shall discuss in chapter four, Habermas has chosen to use his highly fruitful initial considerations,[1] which certainly point in that direction, to motivate an investigation into the social-psychological and "universal pragmatic" foundations of communicative competence, wherein studies of subjects' communication are essentially presupposed.

In seeking to fill in this lacunae, I have chosen to refer directly to the writings of Alfred Lorenzer, upon whom Habermas draws heavily in his appropriation of psychoanalytic theory and his formulation of the concept of "systematically distorted communication." This choice was informed by two main considerations: a) the summary nature of Habermas' discussion left out material useful to developing a research approach and, b) my desire to selectively disengage from certain conclusions drawn by Habermas, which will be pointed out below. To introduce the consideration of Lorenzer, it will

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[1] See Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, ch. 12; Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," passim.

be worthwhile to recall our most explicit interrelation, in reference to Lukacs, of the concepts of subjectivity, reification, and reflection. As will be recalled, for Lukacs, this recovery essentially entailed the revolutionary abolition of a reified social order in which individuals were both objectively powerless and lacked the necessary conceptual mediations to penetrate the constitutive categories of the social context of their domination. Revolution was part of a process that disclosed and developed human powers in a manner that would guarantee the transparency of the social order and, hence, of the subject. The necessity of production would thus not be allowed to imbue historically contingent social relations with fatality; subjects would be able to understand the social order (and, in a strong sense, themselves) as potentially constituted through the collective creation of social institutions formed formed in light of consensually grounded criteria. Subjects, then, would know themselves as both constituted and living within social relations which would be intended to promote not the power of a particular class, but a general well-being. Ultimately, a collective process of theory-mediated reflection guided by a view of humanity emphasizing, among other values, equality, free expression, and the transparency of the social order will guide the constitution of a new social order.

Psychoanalytic theory suggests that such a conception of the recovery of subjectivity, in which the process of recovery is mediated by a social theory of the historical constitution of a reified institutional framework, fails to adequately account for subjective and intersubjective processes implicated in the process of reification. Broadly put, if the subject not only apprehends the

institutional framework in a manner that is informed by categories that are unconscious, but also feels tied to that framework through needs defined in such categories, the process of social-theoretical mediation of the framework of social relations must be supplemented by a theoretical mediation of intrapersonal processes. Subjectivity vis-a-vis a reified social order must be interworked with a subjectivity vis-a-vis unconscious self- and other-representations.

The Interworking of Social Theory and Psychoanalysis

What are the terms through which this supplementary mediation may be carried out? Here it is important to distinguish the framework we will propose from some earlier attempts to interwork psychoanalysis and critical social theory. In contrast to our approach, in which unconscious processes are assessed in terms of their contribution to the ideological suppression of reflection on suffering within contradictions in the social order, earlier approaches, particularly those of Reich and, to a slightly lesser degree, Fromm sought to use psychoanalysis to understand how social orders would "produce" individuals by shaping patterns of instinctual gratification compatible with the social relations and tasks particular to given social strata. To elaborate, we will take as a characteristic example Fromm's 1932 essay, "The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology: Notes on Psychoanalysis and Historical Materialism," in which he writes:

> ...psychoanalysis...seeks to know the psychic traits common to the members of a group, and to explain these common psychic traits in terms of shared life experiences. These life experiences, however, do not lie in the realm of the personal or the accidental - the larger the group is, the more this holds true - but rather they are identical with the socio-economic situation of this particular group. Analytical social psychology seeks to understand the instinctual apparatus of a

> group, its libidinous and largely unconscious behavior, in terms of its socio-economic structure.[2]

Regarding the analysis of ideology, psychoanalysis would complement historical materialism in those instances where ideology was not so much "an immediate expression of economic interests;" thus, more generally, it was indispensable in "establishing the correlation between economic substructure and ideological superstructure."[3]

There are two critical questions posed by Fromm's proposal: a) whether the congruence of the typical "libidinal structure" of a group's members with the patterns of instinctual gratification made available by the social order is really what "cements" them to the social order and the social order and b) whether this congruence need be conceived of in characterological terms. From the standpoint of a comprehensive social theory, employment of the concept of character (qua pattern of the management of libidinal and aggressive drives) would have the virtue of referring to the interface between social system-relevant behavioral tendencies and central dynamics of personality functioning. But to suggest that it should serve to exhaustively define the interface of the individual and the social order implies a necessarily high degree of integration between the individual and the social order, that the terms of the adjustment made by the individual are ego-syntonic. In part, these implications follow from the particular connotation Fromm gives the concept of character. As we have noted, his reference to character occurs within a context framed by a discussion of the common life

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[2] Fromm, Erich, "The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology: Notes on Psychoanalysis and Historical Materialism," in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds., The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Urizen, 1978), p. 483.

[3] ibid., p. 491.

experiences of a group that flow out of its socio-economic situation. For Fenichel, writing in The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, the utility of the concept lies in its distinction of a stance taken by the ego toward a neurotic process:

> The formula, "in a neurosis that which has been warded off breaks through in an ego-alien form" [is not valid with reference to character disorders] since the form is not ego-alien, the elaboration of the defense sometimes being more manifest than its failure...Instead of a living conflict between impulse and defense, frozen residues of former conflicts are found. These ego restricting modes of behavior are not necessarily experienced as alien; the patient may consciously agree with them or even not be aware of them.[4]

From the standpoint of the psychoanalytic theory of therapy the concept of character refers to the therapeutic difficulties posed by the ego-syntonicity of the defensive conflicts underlying the subject's malaise. The routinized and elaborated defensive patterns will be more or less extensive depending upon such factors as the strength of the repressed wish, the severity of the superego, and the range of behaviors in the culture which can be incorporated as part of the defensive process. Thus the question of the analysand's character, as opposed to his/her directly experienced conflicts, will be therapeutically significant to varying degrees. In considering using the concept of character to explain behavior and attitudes that are system-appropriate (both in their content and in their routinized form) the investigator will therefore need to distinguish not only between degrees of rigidity, but also need to consider the extent to which the rigidity is grounded in the personality as opposed to the social position and the extent to which the social postion may be framed so as to mobilize trends in the

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[4] Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of the Neuroses (New York: W.W. Norton, 1946), p. 464-5.

personality so that postion and personality gradually infiltrate each other. Only by doing so will s/he address the social implications of character in a fashion adequate to its psychoanalytic formulation.

In this light, Fromm, Reich, and others must be criticized for hypostatizing a tendency toward system-personality integration through the employment of the tendency's culmination as the concept for understanding any form of psychosocial interarticulation. From our perspective, it is more judicious to approach the question of ideology without assuming that replications of behavioral and attitudinal patterns across members of a group reflect a common characterological base. We propose that investigation proceed by examining particular sectors of social life to see how subjects' thematizations of those sectors are interworked with expressions of unconscious processes and elements. The intention of such an investigation would be to form a picture of those unconscious processes and elements that seem to be most relevant to subjects' conceptualizations of particular sectors of social life.[5] In this manner we avoid assuming that the subject's affiliation to particular core social relations rests upon an extensive

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[5] Fromm's over-reliance on character is related to his later tendency to conceive of drives in terms that abandoned any reference to the biological substratum of human motivation, tendency criticized by Fenichel. Fenichel argued that drives to "enjoy nature's beauty" and "the drive to work" were correctly posed to the extent that their social origins were stressed, but that Fromm had erred in trying to claim that they were "genuine strivings" in abstraction from instincts. It would appear that the theoretical tensions entailed in character's mediating role were resolved in favor of the social pole of the dialectic. The seemingly "progressive" moment of this move, that it emphatically points to the social order as the matrix of human nature and thereby encurages transformative efforts, dissolves as soon as we recognize the triumph of the integrationist moment of the theory: with sufficient abstraction, any behavior can be regarded as expressive of a drive. See Otto Fenichel, "Psychoanalytic Remarks on Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom," in The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel: Second Series (New York: W.W. Norton, 1957), pp. 268-70.

characterological congruence, a questionable assumption that quickly raises an even more questionable implication: must we assume that character change must accompany a change in the subject's affiliation to core social relations? Especially when we are considering contradictory institutional discourses, such a standpoint can lead to absurd conclusions, e.g. the coexistence of an "hierarchical" and a "democratic" character structure in the same individual. Rather, we would argue that it is more judicious to abstractly postulate the effect of the unconscious as a potential source of constraint upon reflection on alternative social forms, and suspend judgment on the extent to which consideration of specific alternatives is as heavily determined by unconscious representations as the concept of character implies.

In other words, within the proposed framework we would secure the relevance of Freud's work by referring to his most basic insight: that in the process of communication, which we take to include both intra- and intersubjective moments of communication, the process of representation is "overdetermined," in more or less powerful ways, by unconscious understandings of the subject's relationships with others. These unconscious understandings, grounded in particular constellations of self, object, and affect (i.e. they do not represent the subject in isolation, but in an affectively charged relation to an object, most significantly another person), are in their most explicit form repressed in the unconscious. In derivative form, they infiltrate the subject's conscious and preconscious understandings of social relations, the way they understand themselves, the other person(s), what they desire, and what they must fear. Stated in the most general way, this infiltration, by giving to social relations a significance which

the subject cannot reflect upon and thereby reconsider, renders the subject incapable of thoroughly considering those relations in light of criteria they choose to bring to bear. With reference to our specific concern, the ideological circumscription of democracy, the hierarchical relations of the sphere of production, which can be examined from a standpoint combining the collective interest in the appropriation of nature with an interest in improving work life through its democratization, are represented and understood in such a way that they are believed to be beyond criticism.

The Communicative Status of Representations

Working within the object relations paradigm of psychoanalysis, Alfred Lorenzer has made the most extensive contribution to developing a theory of this process of distorted communication. Of greatest immediate interest to us are those sections of his Sprachzerstorung und Rekonstruktion in which a naive conception of the representational function of language is critiqued through a reconstruction of the representational capacity of language as revealed in therapeutic dialogue.[6] The naive conception essentially maintains that there is no distinction between the subject's understanding of the meaning of their articulation of needs and interests and any putative "true" meaning.[7] As such, according to the naive conception a subject's

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[6] Alfred Lorenzer, Sprachzerstorung und Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), ch. 3 passim.

[7] It would be mistaken to understand the naive conception as simply theoretically obtuse, a stubborn denial of the findings of psychoanalysis. Such an understanding would overlook the social significance of the assumption that subjects can form representations of their needs. Particularly in the context of the rise of capitalist democracy, the social significance of true representation reflects the achievement of forms of social interaction in which individual representations of their particular interests are accepted as legitimate

self-reflection on their statements would entail an examination of their logical consistency, the extent to which they apparently incorporate all pertinent interests of the subject in light of their current situation, and the possiblity of a reformulation of more immediately recognized interests in light of others that may be advanced by other dialogue participants.

Lorenzer's standpoint is constructed as a series of distinctions made between three forms of representation: symbol, stereotype, and sign (Symbol, Klischee, Zeiche). Symbols are arrayed in complex, many-sided syntheses of the range of situations that are significant in the subject's relationship with an object. Unconscious stereotypes, on the other hand, are one-sided images of self and object that, compared with symbols, abstract from the range of situations. They are a representation of a particular situation, a "scene" (Szene), in the biography of the subject that has been "excommunicated in the process of repression...excluded from communication in language and action."[8] To cite Lorenzer's example, a subject's symbolized representations of his mother are arrayed in a complex informed by the history of his relationship with her. The symbols thus attain a degree of synthesis and integration in a complex image of the mother and of the

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contributions to a process of collective will formation in which the individual's interests are recognized. Thus the naive view is not to be explained and criticized as a holdover of Enlightenment rationalism, etc. Instead, it must also be consdered as a justification of whatever individuality is accorded to the individual. This is essential, as we shall see, in arriving at a better understanding of the nature and opportunities for the development of a "critical hermeneutics" in this society.

[8] ibid., p.113. In the original, "im Vorgang der Verdrangung >>exkommuniziert<<...aus der Kommunikation in Sprache and Handeln ausgeschlossen wurden."

relationship with her. In the case of stereotyped representations, on the other hand, the mother-image is divided up into discrete elements, each ultimately corresponding to the way the mother appeared to the child at a particular conjuncture in their relationship.' Thus stereotypically represented scenes are, compared with symbol arrays, fragments of the subject's set of representations of their relationship with an object, a fragment that may be integrated with other symbolized repesentations or clusters of representations in the course of therapy, allowing the subject to assess the erstwhile fragment in light of other aspects of the object. Until then the stereotype cannot be evoked as part of a simple memory process. Instead, the stereotype is evoked as affect and behavior within contexts reminiscent of the original scene (Urszene).

This is the most important feature of the stereotyped object-relation (Interaktionform): in contrast to symbolized, composite representations of relations with an object, which within the secondary process may be explored through trial-action, the stereotyped object relation in effect "presents itself" to the subject as an action imperative.

This distinction is based upon inferences drawn from the fundamental difference between patterns of "normal" and "neurotic" behavior. While the former is subject to retardation and alteration through a conscious process basically conforming to what we have called the naive conception of reflection on motives and interests, the latter is impervious to such a process: the subject is said to experience a "compulsion to repeat," a compulsion that is most decisively resolved

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' ibid., p. 114.

through the reflective recovery of the scenically based stereotype. This implies that symbolic representations allow the relationship between subject, affect, and object to be consciously and preconsciously mediated by the subject. The subject may thus select from an array of needs or motives that, on the basis of their grasp of the real potential of the relationship, are more or less appropriate, prioritize them, and so on. Such a grasp transpires not simply through action, but also through imagined trial action that the subject "conducts" at a conscious and preconscious level.

Stereotypes, on the other hand, are representations of the relationship that cannot be mediated through other representations. Again, this is to say that they are situationally dependent: they are evoked within a situation reminiscent of the original scene. It is also to suggest that the subject's subsequent "handling" of the stereotypically bound impulse will also be informed by defensive processes of which the subject is not conscious, and which, as such, do not unfold in relation to the subject's grasp of the reality of their situation. In this sense, stereotypes and the concomitant defensive sequence, are "alien" to the reality-oriented ego of the subject.

This ego-alien character of the stereotype is perhaps most evident in the case of phobias. As an example, we can take the case of a young woman suffering from acute shyness around men. The underlying stereotype is a representation formed within her childhood, possibly within her relationship to a father who entertained seductive fantasies towards his daughter, and encouraged physical closeness, only to become angry with her when she would respond. Over the course of her

maturation, the representation is elaborated into a general sense, abstracted from the original scene, that the desire for sexual relations with a male will be accompanied by punishment. The subject is incapable of retarding the playing out of the unconscious desire-punishment scene, and instead relieves the anxiety associated with the ego-alien, readily stimulated conflict by fleeing from its stimulus.

Stuck in a pattern of avoidance, the young woman will be expected to account for her seclusion, both by significant others and by her own observing ego, and will attempt to weave her behavior into a culturally acceptable life project.[10] She will thereby rationalize her behavior, perhaps by denigrating the value of participation in public life and complaining of the coldness of others. The new cognitive construct (or schema, script, etc.) will consequently acquire the automatic quality of the behavioral-affective dimension of the scenic constellation. Initially adopted to "give a reason for her conduct," the rationalization will, depending upon other factors, for example whether the woman must find work, will gradually become a life rationale that will more or less extensively regulate her beliefs and behavior. Thus the stereotype, initially "manifested" only as behavioral impulses and counterimpulses, infiltrates and constrains the secondary process as an ideational complex containing beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral injunctions relevant to some segment of the social order. That is, as Lorenzer puts it, in the secondary process the stereotyped behavior is "mixed with symbolically mediated action." This can only have the result that the process of symbolic mediation, of reflection, itself becomes

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[10] This does not only refer to some need to render her new behavior consistent, in a logical sense, with her established patterns

mediated through the defensively distorted representatives of the excommunicated stereotype. While hitherto the system of symbols and related action logics may have been transparent to the subject in the sense that no significant motivational elements were beyond recovery through reflection and thus explicit retardation and alteration, the system is increasingly opaque to the subject.

We can conceive of this reciprocal mediation and its concomitant opacity in several ways. First, the relationship between the ideational representatives of the stereotype and the system of symbols and action logics can be broadly understood as more or less mutually exclusive or open to synthesis. In the case of the young woman, a contradictory relationship would be one in which, for example, the development of the phobia would require substantial curtailment of established activities, perhaps to the degree that she might be said to have "become a recluse." A synthetic relationship, more germane to our discussion of the circumscribing function of ideology, would entail an interworking of the developing phobia with established activities. For example, instead of withdrawing to a life away from men, the symptoms might, through the subject's own formulation of a "life style" or with sufficient assertiveness training and other cognitively oriented therapies, be limited to the habit of avoiding crowds at festive occasions, when by tacit consensus sexual restrictions are relaxed to some degree, or by not going out for a drink with her coworkers. Other areas of life might not be altered in an clearcut manner, but could undergo more subtle changes. For example, although she may have already

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of thought and action, but also to begin to effect an adjustment in her expectations of gratification.

opposed unionization of the plant in which she works, the development of her phobia might make her feel even less willing to encourage the increasing conflict with her male boss that would be attendant to a unionization drive, and thus even more recalcitrant in her attitudes, to the point where plausible arguments, e.g. prospective wage increases through unionization, are essentially ignored.

Here we should emphasize that the analysis of the terms of synthesis should not begin with the assumption that the mediation of the symbolized realms of the subject's life is tantamount to the subsumption of previously symbolically represented objects under a signifier that solely reflects unconscious processes. This common approach to the psychoanalytic interpretation of social phenomena seems to derive from an approach to "mental illness" in which all is explained with reference to the subject's malfunctioning.[11] Instead, the logic and sense of the relationship acquires, for the subject, an "additional dimension," with an indeterminate impact upon the subject's mental processing and behavior. Lorenzer offers the flawed but useful analysis of the representational complexes evoked and enacted in an employer's quarrel with his boss:

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[11] Within political science, Lasswell's formulation, "Political movements derive their vitality from the displacement of private affects upon public objects," epitomizes both the overt theoretical reductionism and the underlying elitism of this approach. That this displacement may be encouraged by the social order and that irrationality may in part be attributable to contradictions in social processes is theoretically suppressed as Lasswell refers to Freud's own reductionistic assessment of the conflict between civilization and instinct. See Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 173-203. Within anthropology, Kardiner and others fell into a related reductionism with their derivationist approach to the analysis of social institutions. See Abram Kardiner, The Psychological Frontiers of Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 23-47.

> In a precise analysis of his behaviour we find a mixture of reality-based behavior (e.g. the patient treats his employer politely, as his role requires), of the fulfillment of instinctual needs (he has outbursts of fury, which are a reproduction of his early infantile behavior), of reactions (the employer plays the game in which he allows the authoritarian father to be evoked), of rationalization (the employer himself is truly despotic), of defensive procedures...[12]

Schematically, Lorenzer presents the "mixing-up of object repesentations" this way:

"Employer" = employer (+father)

> The part in brackets is dynamically dominant, the other is dominant in consciousness. But both are effective together.

"Employer" = employer + father.[13]

There is another side to this process. Lorenzer would suggest that the original repression of dimensions of the relationship with the father has the effect of decreasing the emotional significance of the father. At the level of conscious representations, this transforms symbols into "signs":

> There is an increasing emptying out of meaning, that is to be understood as a weakening of the emotional significance of the object...the transformation of symbols into signs at the same time means an increasing objectification. Signs differ from symbols in having a one-to-one relationship; that is, a perfection of denotation with a reduction in the range of connotation. In this transformation what is significant is isolated and delimited as an object...object-representations more and more lose their relational character. In a formal analysis of signs the psychological experience of lack of warmth

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[12] Lorenzer, Alfred, ibid. p. 125. My translation. In the original: "Wir finden bei genauer Analyse seines Verhaltens ein Gemisch aus realitatsangemessenem Verhalten (der Patient behandelt z.B. seinen Vorgesetzten rollengerecht hoflich), von Erfullung von Triebbedurfnissen (er bekommt Wutausbruche, die ein Reproduktion seines furhkindlichen Verhaltens sind), von Reagieren (der Vorgesetzte macht sas Spiel mit, indem er den autoritaren Vater evozieren last), von Rationalisierungen (der Vorgesetzte ist selbst recht despotisch), Abwehrvorgangen..."

[13] ibid., p. 127. My translation. In the original: "Der in Klammer gesetzte Anteil ist dynamisch dominant, der andere ist bewustseinsdominant. Es gelten aber beide zusammen..."

> and of affective vitality in the process of intellectualization and isolation appears as an increasing dissolution of their relational character.[14]

While Lorenzer's introduction of the "sign" concept correctly identifies some of the transformations undergone by the representation as it is caught up in dynamic processes, it is important not to overemphasize the purely denotative aspect. Instead, it would seem more appropriate to speak of a defensively determined one-sidednes as accruing to the representation. We can make this point with reference to Lorenzer's discussion of Freud's case of Little Hans.[15] He states that when Hans excommunicates (represses) his anger toward his father for interfering in Hans' relationship with his mother, the fantasied aggressive relationship to the Oedipal father becomes a stereotype.[16] In this repressive movement, the metaphoric displacement of the stereotypically-bound aggressive impulse to a falling horse transfers to that animal Hans' unconscious rage and the unconscious fantasy of paternal retribution as well. Following Lorenzer's analysis, this would suggest that the consciously held representation of the father becomes a

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[14] Lorenzer, ibid., p. 127. My translation. In the original: "Das ist eine anstiegende Entleerung der Bedeutung, die als eine Abschwachung von >>emotionaler Bedeutung fur das Subjekt<< zu verstehen ist... die Verwandlung der Symbole in Zeichen gleichbedeutend mit einer zunehmenden Vergegenstandlichung; die Zeichen unterscheiden sich von den Symbolen durch eine one-to-one-Beziehung, d.h. eine Perfektion der Denotation mit Verringerund der Konnotationsbreite. Bei dieser Verwandlung wird das Bezeichnete herausisoliert und als Gegenstand abgegrenzt...die Objektreprasentanzen verlieren mehr und mehr ihren Beziehungscharakter. In einer formalen Analyse der Zeichen erscheint die psychologische Erfahrung der fehlenden Warme und affektiven Lebendigkeit bei Intellektualisierung und Isolierung als zunehmende Auflosung des Beziehungscharakters..."

[15] Sigmund Freud, "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy," pp. 47-184 in Philip Rieff ed. The Sexual Enlightenment of Children (New York: Collier, 1963).

[16] Lorenzer, ibid., pp. 131-2.

sign. The point of our criticism is that the resulting defensive constitution of the positive relationship with the father implies that the representation "father" has not become only a sign in the sense that it only refers denotatively to an object. Even if the neurosis were to proceed to the point at which the representation "father" were to not, in itself, immediately evoke any relational schemas bearing a manifest affective "charge," the representation would not be purely denotative. Rather, the representation might be what we can call, somewhat prosaically, abstracted, with a varying range of affectively-charged representations undergoing suppression and repression.

The need to be precise in our analysis of this process of denotative representation can be seen if we contrast it with a denotative representation consciously established within discourse. Consider the following example. During a plant meeting discussants are comparing different employee medical plans. Suppose that, to resolve "complexity," they choose to evaluate the plans in cost-benefit terms, and choose to value the health of particular employees on the basis of the dollar value of their contribution to the firm's output. In this situation, then, the representations of the employees would, through agreement among the discussants, be drained of any other meaning than that derived through some productivity measure, e.g. their salary. Conventional injunctions attributing equivalent value to the life of individual's would thus be suppressed; the representations would be "more" denotative relative to their customary content.

Suppose now that the discussants take a coffee break, during which one of them speaks with distaste of the terms of the cost-benefit

analysis and begins to talk with great feeling about the difficulties faced by the employees in maintaining adequate health care. Should one of his listeners' have a personality characterized by narcissistic patterns, he would find such a conversation difficult, whether because he himself is incapable of sympathy, he is angered by the generosity shown for third parties, he would prefer to gain admiration by talking about his new car, etc. The denotative moment of his representations of the employees corresponds to a defensively determined stance in which "genuine" affect is fended off.

In short, the concept of a denotative sign seems most useful when talking about the confluence of psychological and social discourses that interprets objects within systems of abstract signification. This is especially apposite to our discussion of ideology, though, for ideology is intended, in part, to achieve a "pseudoresolution," within a system of abstract intended to defuse suffering within contradictory discourses.

To conclude this section, it will be helpful to redistinguish and clarify the concepts we are using to describe the subject's representations. The terms "self-other representation" or "systems of self-other representations" and their equivalents are the most inclusive in that they refer to the subject's general understanding of themselves in relation to others, an understanding that accounts for the subject's needs and expectations that are integral to the relationship. I would stress that the hyphenation is not arbitrary, but is intended to connote the mutual implication of self and other when either is referred to. Self is always at least implicitly understood in relation to other, and vice versa. The term "stereotype" refers to an unconscious self-other

representation. Again, in contrast to conscious self-other representations, the three elements that are represented, subject, object, and need/affect, are interrelated in a manner that is not amenable to symbolic mediation. The term "object relation" is, strictly speaking, equivalent to the term self-other representation. I chose not to make it a focal concept because it does not immediately connote the subject's side of the relationship. Thus I felt it might confuse the reader. This reason overrode a competing rationale, that "self-other representation" might connote the subject's representation of a "fused" or merged relationship with the object, a form of representation characteristic of infants and psychotic and borderline patients. I will occasionally use the term, however, both in connection with references to psychoanalytic literature employing the term, to emphasize in some places that we are not referring to the subject's consciously apprehended self, and also to avoid the monotony of the awkward construction "self-other."

Ideology, Role Identity, and Stereotypes

By "pseudoresolution within a system of abstract signification" I am not referring to the assumption of an institutionalized role identity on the part of the subject, wherein the subject holds a role-appropriate understanding. The deficiency of that standpoint lies not so much in its absolute inapplicability, but rather in its misinterpretation of the resolution as culminating in a noncontradictory identification on the part of the subject. Instead, role identity appears more as a regulatory self-other representation in which significant relational elements are both suppressed and repressed in return for "compensations" gained by adequate performances. Thus,

role identities function as part of a consciously and unconsciously circumscribed discourse based upon institutionally defined social relations. Within the terms of the discourse abstracted, role-appropriate repesentations of social relations are in a constant dialectic with inappropriate representations that is tilted in favor of the former. Through a combination of generalized necessity, force, and agreement the institution typically triumphs, at least at the behavioral level. But, especially within a contradictory social order, the incorporation of this behavioral, and perhaps, attitudinal triumph, into role analysis as a presumed noncontradictory state of the individual, instead of as a temporarily hypostatized contradiction, fails in important respects to elucidate the structure and dynamics of ideology.

First, the assumption of a role identity framework specifies an approach to critical interpretation within which ideology is understood as essentially derivative of the subject's role, or ensemble of roles. This does not exclude a critical analysis of ideology, an analysis which may unfold as an interrogation of ideology's empirical propositions and also and examination of the communicative conditions supporting adherence to it. In other words, interpretation may presuppose the possibility that consensus on the desirability of a system of social relations may rest upon systematically limited information regarding social options and/or limitations upon collective reflection regarding interpersonal relationships. But elaboration of these presuppostions as a critical discourse upon an ideological metadiscourse (thus, somewhat awkwardly, a "meta-metadiscourse") based upon role identity theory will continually ensure the conditions of its own subversion: the critique will ratify the content of, as Lorenzer

puts it, a "pseudo-communicative private language," especially to the extent that the critique purports to thoroughly disclose constraints on reflection, decision, and action.[17]

Critique addressing the likelihood of systematic distortion in communication will be attentive to both external and internalized limitation upon reflection. Critique based on role identity theory, only in conjunction with a theory of social institutions, may reconstruct, in manner recalling G.H. Mead, the series of presuppositions underlying interpretations of self and other, and the institutional context supporting them, as a potentially dissolvable matrix of self- and other- representations.[18] This is the terminus of the initial presuppositions mentioned above: under certain institutional cnditions, and if the Other supports it, the "me" may become an "I" who may then posit a new "me" as part of a consensus with the Other. This approach to ideology, in which the constitutive character of communication is at least implicitly admitted, lies at the heart of the Marxist tradition. But in an ideological discourse riddled with the effects of unconsciously transformed and transferred stereotypes, the reflective dissolution of the "me" (and concomitant "you"s and "we"s) as part of the constitive activity of the ego (the I) is circumscribed internally in a manner that restores, in an unrecognized form, the coercive power of the external.

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[17] Lorenzer, ibid., p. 126. In the original, "pseudo-kommunikativen Privatsprache."

[18] G.H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: Universtiy of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 173-8, 317-9. I should point out that terminus of Mead's theorizing lay not in the notion of subjectivity, but in a "universality" wherein individuals could "take the attitude," or appreciate the standpoint, of others.

Recognition of this "contribution" of the unconscious can, irregardless of the multiplicity of unconsciously grounded stereotypes and the infinite shades of feeling associated with them, be understood as essentially complementing Adorno's remarks, quoted above, regarding the relationship between fear and rationality. The coercive character of the social order, real enough when we consider the individual as a rational actor whose fear is based on the probability of failure or marginalization, is greatly intensified when the principal representations through which it is understood by the individual are infiltrated by stereotypes in which the self is represented as a relatively powerless child. Whether the distorted representations require substantial mediation in order to evoke a relationship to a collective artifact, e.g. "the Market" or "the Society," or whether they refer directly to key positions of the social order, and thus individuals who may be more readily engaged, stereotypical distortion will establish a thematic of relatively infantile representations of social relations within the logic of the situation, a logic consciously conceived in terms of institutional discourses. Thus not only will the individual's reflection be undermined by the automatic intrusion of particular themes, but the nature of these themes will often tend to undercut the critical, aggressive reflective impulse. Rationality thereby increasingly becomes rationalization, and the dualism of the observed rights of civil society and those of the political sphere, hitherto apparently resolvable through an unwieldy integration via the manifest levels of ideological discourse, is caught up in conflicts from the subject's childhood.

Lorenzer's passing mention of "the employer play[ing] the game by letting the authoritarian father be evoked" deserves further comment. The employer-employee dyad represents the intersection of at least two socialization tracks that anticipate each other (and not simply in a Weberian sense, as preparation to give and obey commands relevant to role duties). As socialization proceeds, as culturally shared and class, sex, and race specific understandings of interpersonal relations are learned and/or internalized, the public language of social relations is continually infused with a more or less tacit language of social relations. Social relational forms thereby become "understood" by all participants as incorporating more than just an institutional rationale, as positions within which occupants may or must acquire "collateral" meanings derived from "external" settings. From the standpoint we are concerned with here, the most significant external setting, or institution, would be the family. The sense of right, obligation, the boundaries of legitimate dispute, and the feeling of a "natural" order to things, a sense that is peculiar, and in a sense original, to kinship systems, and which prior to industrialization and the development of capitalism were some of the most profound thematics of social integration, continues to be partially constitutive of the principal relations of capitalist society, albeit often in an unrecognized fashion, especially when such a thematic is considered illegitimate.

To discuss the impetus behind the interworking of such a thematic, an interworking constituted in the <u>transference</u> of the relations of early life onto contemporary social relations, we can conceive of our options as lying on a continuum, with one end representing a <u>personalized transference model</u> and the other a <u>cultural</u>

transference model. Within the terms of the former, stereotypical transference occurs when A, experiencing a stereotypically-defined need, imposes upon B a representational construct of the early significant other, most likely a parent or sibling. In the model B is portrayed as a tabula rasa, and the model interprets the impact of the culture solely as a stimulus of the need that A arbitrarily transfers onto B. Public communication of any aspect of the privatized object relation would be considered "out of place."

The cultural transference model, on the other hand, regards A's transferences as taking shape within a culturally grounded framework in which the roles taken up by A and B, as well as particular related practices associated with the roles, are consensually recognized as more or less meaningfully analogous to the other relationships from which object-relational components are transferred. B is no longer tabula rasa, but rather enacts the transference along lines specified within the culture. Public communication of the privatized object relation would, at least to the extent that it evokes the general terms of the relationship nd not impulses seen as contradictory to it, would not be seen as out of place.

A model comprehending the actual process as it occurs in the United States would need to account for regional variation in the thematic specificity of political and economic institutions of capitalist society vis-a-vis kinship systems. Social relations within the two spheres are formally conceptualized in terms exclusive of those constitutive of kinship systems. But this formal conceptualization is, as we have noted, only regulatory; it is determinative "in the last instance." Prior to that instance, which we may conceive of as a

dialogue in which participants only regard statements (or what can be reconstructed as statements) expressive of formal role dimensions as having persuasive power, the terms through which positions are meaningfully constituted form a multiplicity of discourses.

An Heuristic "Case"

These discourses are varyingly explicit, depending on a variety of factors. To illustrate, let us take the not so hypothetical case of a newly unionized textile mill in North Carolina. The company owning the mill, J.P. Stevens, has fought a long battle against the union, during the course of which some activists have been fired, some have left the plant, but still others have seen the drive through, and have recruited new workers to the union cause. We can assume that all pro-union employees based their vote upon a desire to get higher wages, etc., but additional reasons also loom large for certain workers: friends were fired, supervisors are resented, trusted friends voted for the union. Among anti-union employees there is less of a consensuss on the rationale for voting no. Some employees find the prospect of increased, albeit legitimate, conflict with the employer unthinkable, and would have preferred the explicitly paternalistic of the pre-union days. Others have thought they had an "in" with the supervisor, either because they work harder or because they had somehow become friendly. They view the union as disrupting this special relationship, as well as preventing them from realizing advantages they believe they had thus acquired. Stilly others regard the union as "anti-individualistic," and conceive of a unionized work force as promoting a bureaucratic tyrrany in which they will gain wages and benefits they haven't really earned, but simply have the force to win. In short, among

the work force the union question brings out and highlights the whole gamut of themes and rationales through which employees comprehend their work and their work relations.

For management, the surprising union victory has also been varyingly received. While all levels, from the chairperson to the supervisors, regard the victory as disastrous, some have decided to accomodate themselves while others are already planning the union's downfall. At the supervisor level, where, in keeping with the paternalistic format, relationships with the employees are "friendly," the degree of personal feeling is generally greater. Some supervisors view the election as an expression of the popular will and have decided to try to adapt, within guidelines set by the company. Others feel personally affronted and, planning for a counteroffensive, have resolved to make "having a union" as unpleasant as possible.

Management levels responsible for plant policy are taking a more strategic view; in this sense they are the reciprocal of the "trade-union conscious" worker activists. They realize they will have to go along with the formal aspects of the new state of affairs: maintaining at least the appearance of bargaining, observing contract provisions when pressed, not firing activists, negotiating with stewards, etc. But they believe they can, in the long run, undermine the union in a variety of ways. They can continue to harp on its "outsider" status, how it is influenced by leftists and liberals. They can prohibit granting of any non-rule-specified favors to employees, claiming they are bound by the contract not to do so. They can talk about investing overseas, pointing out how Korean workers "need" less pay. They can establish "worker participation" programs, offering workers a revised

paternalism that will be extended should the union be voted out. And so on.

Thus the various groups within the work force, and each individual within those groups, stands in a relationship to a management that is thematizing the social relations of the workplace in a complex fashion. Nominally they are operating within a new framework in which their representatives negotiate and formalize the structure of social relations of the plant, establish rights and responsbilities for every significant area of work life. In other words, they operated within the local variant of the interclass accord. Through this relationship they have gained a much broader recognition as a contracting party than they had before, a recognition reinforced in everyday life by discussion of grievances, invocation of contract provisions with the supervisor, etc.

But the contractualized relation between unionized worker and employer, which both constitutes and is constituted by a "metadiscourse regulating the invocation of discourses," is continually subverted. Speaking from a standpoint informed by a class analysis, the general terms of the class struggle, reflected in a mediated, particular form at the level of the plant, constitute the broadest determinants of both the contractual relations, the forces subverting it, and the thematizations of those determinants and forces. Thus J.P. Stevens does need to maximize profits in order to maintain and expand its market position, workers do find inflation cutting into living standards, etc. In this light the contractualized relation is a partial and temporary suspension of certain dimensions of class conflict.

Introduction of the concept of class struggle here is not intended to arrogate every particular act of members of either class to,

following Kosik, a totalizing metaphysic that dedifferentiates the meaning of each particular act. "Class struggle" is foremost an analytic term: a class analysis can be argued to be appropriate for understanding primary determinants of the formation of social actors, the conditions they experience, and the rationales underlying conflicts they enter into. It is also a critical hermeneutic term, in the sense it is an element of a critical metadiscourse which, when employed as a standpoint of critical reflection, can be employed by participants to reinterpret their situation, and to reformulate their stance toward management. As we consider the J.P. Stevens work force, the concept will be appropriate as an analytic term in the case of every action in so far as it is a concept that plausibly grasps encompassing aspects of the relationship between management and labor. But, as a critical hermeneutic term, the appropriateness of the term depends upon an explicit distinction between the critical hermeneutic intentions of the analytic text, which itself seeks to encourage a reinterpretation of experience along lines that seem more appropriate than others, and the extent to which the concept, or some rough equivalent, an "anticipation," is employed by actors themselves.

Thus as we consider the particular thematizations of the employer-employee relationship, the concept of class struggle will inform our analysis of the systemic forces destabilizing the accord in a manner different from the way it informs our assessment of its critical hermeneutic relevance. As an analytic tool, class is essential for understanding both the structure and the socially determined dynamic of the relationship. As we examine the way participants thematize their

social relations, class struggle will, in a mediated form, be manifested as a "pressure" to transcend the relationship.

For J.P. Stevens, then, a kinship thematization of the wage relation is deliberately employed as a way of transcending (or rescinding) an employer-union member accord, as part of its struggle to maximize "productivity." Yet within the terms of the accord kinship discourse can no longer be asserted as the principal form or model of command and obedience. Instead, it must be unevenly promulgated within the company as a tacit or occasional discourse, as an aura or implication of company pronouncements (talk of "loyal workers," the "J.P. Stevens family"), as a part of the style of particular supervisors, as part of the authority relation itself, etc.

Thus, in part, the transference object of the employee is deliberately self-constituted, and seeks to maximize the likelihood that the employee will represent their relationship to the employer in terms imbued with kinship relations. The transference object is also, in part, unconsciously constituted, and unconsciously constituting. Paternalism is, despite its strategic formulatin, not simply a sham set up by a role-taking and breaking management. The tacit discourse allows the unconscious needs to find expression. That management speaks with power and authority can only encourage the mobilization of early identifications with powerful figures. The "complementarity" (to use Parsons term) of the employer-employee role relation is reinforced by a complementary transference and countertransference; each, by speaking,

both turns the other into the Other of their own stereotype, as well as transforming themselves into the Other of the other's stereotype.[19]

In short, the cultural transference model, while taking the onus of transference off the pathologized employee or employer, underestimates the degree to which the "familialization" of the social relations of a plant in this country must be surreptitiously promoted, precisely because the dominant discourse of the wage relation systematically excludes it.[20] Further, by displacing active agency to the culture, the cultural transference model ignores the way in which the transference unfolds through a dialectic of system requirements, formal institutionalize discourse, tacit or subsidiary kinship discourse, and the personality of the people involved. This suggests that the regulatory function of ideology is not simply a process of the exclusion of alternative discourses and the suppression of experiences that might prompt their invocation. In addition, the ideological process also entails the mobilization of subsidiary discourses and stereotyped representations. In this fashion experience within the firm is constituted, understood, and "handled" via a complex of discourses, facilitating the disjuncture of experiences from the relations of the plant as such, the supplementary disempowering of subordinates relative to their status in the accord, and the inaccessibility of the process to reflection.

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[19] Maud Mannoni, The Backward Child and His Mother: A Psychoanalytic Study (New York: Pantheon, 1972), ch.4.

[20] An appreciation of the extent to which this was a self-conscious achievement by the bourgeoisie can be gained from reading Locke's criticism of Filmer in the Second Treatise. Filmer, writing during feudalism's decline, tried to revert to prefeudal forms of legitimation and argued for an explicitly paternalistic model of

Stereotypes and Compensatory Mechanisms

So far our concern has been to supplement a simple analysis of transference by indicating how certain repressed stereotypess are mobilized by the employer, via a complex of unconscious and consciously informed representations. We have pointed to the way this mobilization serves to interwork suppression and repression of suffering. Here it is appropriate to speculate upon the full ramifications of this process, and to suggest ways in which the mobilization of stereotyped representations may aid in the success of compensatory mechanisms.

This is recommended by the general observation that work is typically understood to be a sphere of sacrifice, within which the worker is expected to put up with unpleasant conditions in order to gain an income they may dispose of in their leisure hours. In terms of our analysis, ideological metadiscourse supplements a logic of constraint and exclusion (e.g. capitalists own the means of production and have a right to command people whom they employ) with what we might call a logic of adjustment, a claim regarding the appropriate channeling of strivings. At one level, such a logic is so evident that any reference to unconscious mechanisms seems unnecessary. Thus the logic may be represented in very explicit terms; for example, the aggravation of work is soothed afterwards by peer group drinking at the bar, during which supervisors may be damned, followed by the return to loving and grateful family, etc. The logic of adjustment, rooted in the system of exchange and fear of being fired, thereby acquires a transparently social quality, a quality which seems to argue against reference to

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authority. Locke's refutation was based on a straightforward denial of an validity to the father-son/king-subject analogy.

stereotypically defined mechanisms. Thus the experience of contradictory relations appears not to be subject to repression or some other form of unconsciously grounded distortion, but also to a powerful reevaluation in light of socially established compensations.

Nonetheless, we can argue this shift in strivings follows unconscious patterns, established in childhood, of the modification and alteration of drives. Thus the logic of adjustment, while apparently comprehensible (both logically and empathically) as a particular, historically contingent formulation of the relationship between the spheres of production and "private" life, partialy derives its compelling quality through the interworking of stereotyped representations. This is not to say that the particular scenically defined terms through which the subject represents fantasy-mediated threats of withdrawal of love, humiliation, bodily harm, etc., are not mediated, in turn, by conscious injunctions. Rather, the unconscious formulations enter into the discourse of the logic of adaptation in a mediated form, a form originally established in the conscious and preconscious discourse of the child as they begin to work out the modification.

The complexity of this process can be easily underestimated by misconstruing adjustment as the development of patterns for avoiding pain or discomfort. While all defenses serve this function, the child's capacity for identifying with constraining and frustrating figures recasts the significance of adjustment. To see this we can selectively quote Schafer's definition of identification:

> In its fullest sense, the process of identifying with an object is unconscious, though it may also have prominent and significant preconscious and conscious components; in this process the subject modifies his motives and behavior patterns,

> and the self representation corresponding to them, in such a way as to experience being like, the same as, and merged with one or more representations of that object; through identification, the subject both represents as his own one or more regulatory influences or characteristics of the object that have become important to him and continues his tie to the object...[21]

Identification is often immediately related to the instantiation of a defensive process, as when a little boy begins to want to take care of his younger sibling after being scolded by his mother for fighting with him. Despite the continuing implication of defenses in the process of identification, the process typically culminates in the form of an interest in being like the object, an interest that may be consciously recognized as in, for example, the explicit "wanting to be like father." Thus the process of identification produces an organization of unconscious and conscious conduct and strivings that, in a significant sense, anticipates the gratifications associated with the rights and status of the other identified with. Over the course of the subject's life, these patterns of defense and identification are played out in specific situations (e.g. school, jobs, etc.) as the subject matures. Within these situations, these patterns, qua observance of role requirements in exchange for approved satisfactions, are invoked by authoritative others. In this way continuity between the discourse of the child and that of the adult is maintained, both in the sense that institutionally appropriate "translations" of the child's adjustment are accomplished and in the sense that the figures originally requiring the adjustment, the father and the mother, are re-presented again and again,

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[21] Roy Schafer, Aspects of Internalization (New York: International Universities Press, 1968), p. 140. Here we are not concerned with the experience of merger which, as noted above, figures prominently in the representational processes of early infancy and psychosis. Rather, our emphasis is on representation that retains a sense of the object as external to the subject.

albeit within social relations that are "underdetermined" by institutional imperatives and rationales.

We can now see that particular insitutional contexts are always significantly anticipated by the family, and not simply in the sense that within the family forms of defensive functioning are established that may be played out in particular relationships in institutions, relationships that may give the ideologically integrated institutional discourses more power. As well, institutional contexts are assumed by the individual to presuppose some form of impulse control and channeling of gratification, an assumption that establishes the institution as a context in which thematics evocative of childhood forms of conflict resolution will manifest themselves. The general patterns of transference and countertransference thus are not only facilitated by earlier adjustment, they are also legitimated by it as part of an atmosphere of "necessary sacrifice" that, in a manner recalling Freud's sweepingly reductionist argument in Civilization and Its Discontents, reifies institutionally inconsistent impulses within, to put it crudely, a "parent-bad/obedient child" framework.

The conscious moment of ideological metadiscourse we have emphasized is that which takes the form of a metadiscourse of institutions, an explanation of the specific function of each institution, the interrelationship of institutions, the asserted "functional" and otherwise appropriated character of roles, etc. This moment, in which problematic role identities are reinforced through the rationalized assertion of the reasonableness of the social order, is also supported and elaborated by a "common sense" metadiscourse of interpersonal relations. This latter metadiscourse, accepting the

ideological metadiscourse as a parameter, is framed in categories that are "intended" to become the horizon of the individual's everyday understanding of themeselves and of their social relations. It allows the institutional metadiscourse, the stuff of formal political theory, to more readily blend with culturally established patterns of conflict management, even as it promotes the obfuscation of suffering and a corresponding opacity of forces, and categories through which they may be conceptualized, constitutive of it. All of these metadiscourses are available to and, indeed, imposed upon the subject, who comprehends them in a varyingly disjointed fashion. That is, the terms of handling interpersonal relationships will be played out by the subject without reference to objectively determining institutional parameters. A suffering constituted at the institutional level is thus tacitly and falsely "resolved" at that level via institutional metadiscourse, only to be lived out at the interpersonal level as "coping" and failing to cope.

The Regulation of Reflection

At this point we should reemphasize that the dialectical evocation of the various levels of conscious, preconscious, and unconscious discourses simultaneously evokes understandings of the extent and manner of the appropriate reflection upon them. This statement suggests a further elaboration of previous remarks regarding the distinction between the hermeneutics of normal speech and the depth hermeneutics of systematically distorted communication. That is, while the hermeneutics of normal speech may be conceived of as having a standard form, i.e. misunderstandings arising from apparent violations of the system of norms and rules are addressed through the participants'

reflection upon the system's prescriptions for the situation in which the misunderstanding occurred, at the same time the rules governing the process of arriving at renewed cooperation may vary. For example, one of the participants may be given the status of a final authority, or both participants may have equal status; misunderstandings may be viewed as requiring resolution at the time of their occurence, or they may be allowed to continue for some period while the discourse itself is subjected to review, etc. With regard to our concerns, the point is that the evocation of stereotypes is not only disadvantageous to employees in the sense that they are relatively disempowered compared to their status under the accord and the specific contractual arrangement within it. In addition, the developing violations of the accord potentially does not evoke the reparative hermeneutic arrangements specified in the accord, but the arrangements particular to those of the relations embodied in the stereotype. Thus for employees the notion of invoking rights spedified in the contract may not only entail a realistic anticipation of sanctions, but also they subtly appear as a more frightening violation of the kinship relation.

In this light, a defense of the accord and the contract on the part of the union does not only entail the mobilization of the resources at its disposal, e.g. active policing of the contract, maintaining employee unity for collective defense, building a strike fund, etc. It also entails an effort to maintain the discourse of the accord as that which regulated the relations of the plant.[22] In doing so the union not

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[22] For our purposes this aspect of the union's discourse-regulating activity is most significant. A more complete analysis would need to consider ways in which the union might seek to mobilize stereotypes to support its position. In such an analysis we could point to the fraternal thematic often adopted by unions, e.g. Brotherhood of

only seeks to maintain role identities consistent with the notion of collective bargaining process, but also to regularize a process of dispute settlement in which, though highly circumscribed and often subverted, participants are nominally regarded as equals empowered to fully voice their position.

Of course, suffering issuing from problematic situations excluded from direct regulation in the accord, e.g. the suffering associated with hierarchical control patterns which are accepted by the union under the concept of "rights" ceded to management, is treated entirely differently. In the review of American labor history in the fifth chapter we shall see how the insitutionalization of the currently enforced accord placed such suffering outside the parameters of a "dialogue of partners to the wage contract" and made accord-recognizing unions partners with management in the suppressive managing of this experience. By not availing employees of a formal status as a communicant of this grievance, and instead authoritatively demanding silence, displacement, and renunciation, the accord increases the likelihood that representation of such suffering is significantly overdetermined by stereotyped discourses.[23]

Steelhaulers," "brothers and sisters of the union movement," as part of an effort to supersede the abstract character lent to the organization by the nature of the wage relation and to strengthen ties among employees. Generally, it seems that unions, necessarily interested in limiting property rights, must in the relationship with the employer innovate away from kinship thematics.

[23] The chapter's discussion has largely focused on the context in which the accord is most immediately effective, the social relations of the workplace, and has only generally indicated the implications of the general social context of interclass relations. The review of labor history in chapter five will supplement sections of chapter two in filling out this context. However, with regard to the question of the transference of stereotyped representations, in order to limit the

Summary

The discussion in this chapter was primarily devoted to elaborating the concept of systematically distorted communication by way of a critical revision of Fromm's program for an "analytic social psychology." The core of this revision lies in our intention not to reinforce a perspective in which the subject is viewed as a set of dynamic patterns understood in relation to inner and outer nature and the social order. Instead, to put it simply, we wish to regard subjects as agents capable of reflection upon their characteristic patterns of representing themselves and the world, and of engaging in a dialogue with others that can conclude in new forms of sociality.

In adopting this position we are not merely opting for the "free subject" as opposed to a determined one. Such a characterization would be as unfair to our analysis as it would be to Fromm's. We have emphasized ego-capacities not for the purpose of resurrecting a Fichtean subject capable of constructing a new world of representations,[24] but to better understand a situation in which subjects are dissuaded from relatively modest innovation in the institutions in which they suffer. If Fromm and others lapsed into a form of functionalism, it was largely because they downplayed or ignored contradictions in the social orders they studied, contradictions concealed by ideology.

Using rudimentary psychoanalytic concepts and a model case of industrial relations we have argued that in ideological metadiscourse, a logic of the integration of formal institutional categories and projects

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complexity of the analysis I have decided to focus on industrial relations, even though political relations would figure importantly.

[24] Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 207-8.

- hierarchy, work, democracy, equal representation - blends with a logic of interpersonal relations and concomitant attitudes towards the self. In contrast to a role identity model, which would only acknowledge the possibility of contradictory institutional discourses in recognizing the necessity of ideology, we have suggested that the process of struggle in the plant also mobilizes unconscious representational motifs, and have pointed to conditions in which they could become most significant in regulating employer understandings and attitudes.

CHAPTER IV

CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS AND INTERVIEWING

Introduction

In this chapter we will more explicitly discuss the process of critical hermeneutics as such, a process unfolding within the patterns of distorted communication outlined in the previous chapter. The focus will therefore be upon the dialogue beteen "researcher" and subject, and will adress the following questions:

- What are the interests motivating the dialogue?

- What are the categories characterizing the movement of the dialogue, and how do they serve to inform both the conduct of the dialogue and the nature of reflection within it?

- How does the notion of a "research project" mesh with the ideal of a fully developed critical hermeneutic project? How does the presentation of the interviews in the following chapter help elucidate such a project?

Motivating Interests: The Possibility and Limits of Immanent Critique

Out of an analysis of a process of distorted representation, which we have broadly characterized as unfolding through the interweaving of unconscious and conscious discourses, we can derive the idea of true representation or, as Habermas puts it, an "appropriate" language:

> We call appropriate that language of morals which permits determinate persons and groups, in given circumstances, a truthful interpretation both of their own particular needs and more importantly of their common needs capable of consensus. The chosen language system must permit those and only those interpretations of needs in which the participants in the discourse can make their inner natures transparent and know what they really want...By virtue of its formal properties, practical discourse must guarantee that the participants can at any time alter the level of discourse and become aware of the inappropriateness of traditional [and ideological] need interpretations; they must be in a position to develop that language system which permits them to say what they want under given conditions with a view to the possibility of changing conditions...[1]

Commitment to the concept of true representation does not presuppose a commitment to timeless standards by which the falsity of representations is to be assessed. Instead, it assumes that under certain conditions representations become reified, i.e. their constitutive matrix, the fact of their genesis in human practice, is obscured. That is, their constitution as part of the linguistic mediation of the exhange between the individual, society, and nature is suppressed in the sense that what can be reconstructed and reestablished as a decision instead presents itself as a given. The concept of true representation thus derives its formal power from the insight into the nature of human agency and the "nature of nature" as the sociolinguistically mediated substratum of life instead of an unmediated factor that may be known in order to derive binding representations of needs.

But from this formal insight cannot be drawn the substantive motivation to engage in critique. Adorno wrote:

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[1] Jurgen Habermas,"Wahrheitstheorien," pps. 211-265 in Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Walter Schutz zum 60. Geburtstag (Pfulligen: Neske, 1973), cited by Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Boston: MIT Press, 1978), p. 316.

> The supposed basic facts of consciousness are something other than mere facts of consciousness. In the dimensions of pleasure and displeasure they are invaded by a physical moment. All pain and all negativity, the moving forces of dialectical thinking, assume the variously conveyed, sometimes unrecognizable form of physical things, just as all happiness aims at sensual fulfillment and obtains its objectivity in that fulfillment...This doctrine is easy to criticize as secretly expressing a naive naturalism. In fact it is a last epistemological quiver of the somatic element, before that element is totally expelled. It is the somatic element's survival...[2]

Critical hermeneutics seeks to not only to articulate displeasure, but to articulate it as a movement against systems of representation that needlessly routinize displeasure. It is in this sense that ideology may be said to strive to alienate the suject from itself, to urge them to "escape" from the need constellations that are potentially hostile to core social relations. In offering to the subject what appears to be the only way s/he can manage him/herself and survive socially, ideology develops a commitment to itself and against a "bad subject" that ideology constructs to haunt the publicly acceptable remains. Ideology seeks to have an allied subject consistently draw upon ideology to reinterpret, or shout down, the coarsely articulate suffering welling up within. In this way ideology is the social twin of idealism, without its intention to truth: it allows a social order to assume the role of a collective Other, reifying each particular subject under system-functional concepts. To the extent the particular subject knows him/herself through these concepts, which we have discussed in terms of integrated role identities, s/he adopts the same hostile and arbitrary

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[2] T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (Boston: Seabury Press, 1973), pp. 202-3.

stance to what would defy these concepts, just as idealism did towards the elements of the object it could not encompass.[3]

By seeking to give unhappiness a voice that is directed at its social determinants, critical hermeneutics seeks to restore to the subject a content and form that changes its relation to the social order. No longer a mere "particular" that is subsumed under general categories that seek to channel its strivings, the restored subject can engage those general objectifications as formulations of needs that must be accepted or rejected in a dialogue with others. In this way institutionalized approaches to "species necessities" are consistently understood as provisional arrangements, and the force lying behind objectifications becomes that of open consensus. The open character of this consensus is mirrored in a less phobic stance on the part of the subject to formulations of needs that are excluded from consensus. The terminus of critical hermeneutics is the precarious preservation of

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[3] To quote Adorno:

> Whenever something that is to be conceived flees from identity with the concept, the concept will be forced to take exaggerated steps to prevent any doubts of the anassailable validity, solidity, and acribia of the thought product from stirring. Great philosophy was accompanied by a paranoid zeal to tolerate nothing else, and to pursue everything with all the cunning of reason...(ibid., p. 22)

> Identity is the primal form of ideology. We relish it as adequacy to the thing it suppresses; adequacy has always been subjection to dominant purposes and, in that sense, its own contradiction. After the unspeakable effort it must have cost our species to produce the primacy of identity even against itself, man rejoices and basks in his conquest by turning it *into the definition of the conquered thing*: what has happened to it must be presented, by the thing, as its "in-itself" [its pregiven essence]. Identity's power of resistance to enlightenment is owed to its complicity with identifying thought [exemplified in idealism]. (ibid., p. 148.)

subjectivity within an intersubjectivity that makes the former possible and refrains from dominating it.

At this point we cannot state whether such a negative utopia (not dystopia) can be rendered plausible only on the basis of the extensive program outlined by Habermas,[4] or whether such a critical dialectic might find a basis in a relatively more mundane synthesis of insights into the causes of suffering, guided by a critical theory relying upon Marx, Freud, and others. In this thesis I have taken the latter course, and chosen to avoid pinning the emancipatory movement critical hermeneutics seeks to instigate upon the success of Habermas' formulation of knowledge-constitutive interests and a universal pragmatics. Instead, I have sought to restore that role to the notion of immanent contradiction. Indeed, within the Frankfurt School the validity of such a theoretical restoration was held in doubt. In their analyses, capitalism was regarded as having developed techniques of social

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[4] Treating this program at the length it deserves would take us far afield. Following McCarthy, we can summarize that facet of most immediate interest. Habermas argues that it is not only possible to reconstruct the foundations of a speaker's linguistic competence which, follwing Chomsky, entails an analysis of phonetic, syntactic, and semantic features of comprehensible sentences, but also the subject's communicative competence. This analysis involves reconstruction of the universal validity claims implicit in the practical employment of language, i.e. within an intersubjective relationship. Critically taking up the work of Searle, Austin, and others, Habermas concludes that the pragmatic employment of speech entails the claim that 1) the utterance is comprehensible, 2) "true" with regard to the world of objects and events, 3) truthful and sincere with regard to the speaker's own intention, and 4) right or appropriate in relation to a normative context that is provisionally accepted as legitimate. Of course, these presuppositions may be violated, but their plausible, binding character suggests that one may derive from them the idea of an "ideal-speech situation" within which subjects may freely consider the extent to which utterances meet these claims. In other words, by analyzing speech acts Habermas seeks to draw out latent, compelling intentions held universally by subjects that may be used to justify patterns of intra and intersubjective relations. See Jurgen Habermas, Communication and

management capable of both controlling the principal contradictions in the economy and deflecting associated social tensions into other institutions, e.g. the family and the political sphere.[5] Thus the target of critique is obscured and its motivation dampened. In addition, critical thematics are progressively integrated and rendered non-antaonistic through their assimilation into the commodity based system of cultural production (e.g. "revolutionary breakthroughs in car design"), incorporation into the framework of interest group liberalism, etc.[6] Further, the very notion of the subject, here used as a locus of the experience and abolition of contradiction, was cast into doubt as part of an analysis of changes in family structure.[7] Drawing upon this theoretical heritage, it is easy to understand why Habermas believes that the critique of capitalism cannot be immanent in the sense that it draws upon immediately available, consensually recognized standards and principles of social organization and interpersonal relations. With reference to the specific concerns of Habermas' recent work, the commonly shared, enforcible understanding of the processes of democratic will formation in the "public sphere" appears inadequate to the tasks of critique, and can only serve as a general commitment that requires extensive elaboration in a dialogue informed by his theory of communicative competence. Thus the theory is not intended to simply

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the Evolution of Society, translated and with an introduction by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), pps. vii-65.

[5] Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 107-9.

[6] Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

[7] Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason (Boston: Seabury Press, 1972).

ground critique, but to make it possible by restoring the vitality and power of the traditions embodied in the public sphere.[8]

For us this point is moot. Even if the ideological suppression of contradiction can only be fully addressed or worked out through an institutionalized dialogue informed by the theory of communicative competence, from the standpoint of the critical hermeneutic process the full argument of the theory need only be available in the ancillary stages of the process. It is only after displeasure is first recognized and brought in some relation to the social order objectively constituting it that, for the subject, the theory begins to bear any relation to their situation. Until that point the critical hermeneutic process derives its impetus from the suffering accompanying dialectically interrelated conflicts experienced intra- and interpersonally.[9] Persuasive arguments intended to <u>proleptically</u>

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[8] One might argue that Habermas' effort to acheive a convincing theory of communicative competence presupposes the tradition of critical discourse he is trying to define and defend. If so, one might question whether his effort is necessary. But this rejoinder ignores the pessimistic analysis of the preconditions of critical discourse and the necessity of formulating arguments to support and maintain those preconditions.

[9] Aside from the arguments noted above, perhaps one of the most crucial employed to define the limits of the critical contribution of suffering is made by Habermas to set up a justification for the "emancipatory interest." He quotes Freud as the latter argues for the therapeutic benefits of privation:

> It is possible to observe during treatment that every improvement in [the patient's] condition reduces the rate at which he recovers and diminishes the instinctual force impelling him toward recovery. But this instinctual force is indispensable...we must see to it that the patient's suffering, to a degree that is in some way or another effective, does not come to an end prematurely. If, owing to the symptoms having been taken apart and having lost their value, his suffering becomes mitigated, we must re-instate it elsewhere in the form of some appreciable privation; otherwise we run the danger of never acheiving any improvements except quite insignificant and

establish the desirability of critical hermeneutic discourse require no such theoretical justification, only a plausible linkage of such metadiscourse to an improvement in the subject's situation.

Similarly, because of its immanent relation to suffering the critique of ideology does not at its outset necessarily require a theory vindicating the superiority of theoretical and practical judgments based upon unconstrained consensus. Instead, such a theory would seem to draw its force from the subject's experience of the partial benefits attained by a critical hermeneutics lacking full justification. In short, the metatheory of systematically distorted communication, referring to psychoanalytic object relations theory and a revised Marxist analysis of social forces underlying reification, provides sufficient underpinning for the negative critique we propose.

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transitory ones. (Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 234)

From this quotation, which clearly affirms the impetus of suffering in the subject's reflection, Habermas draws the unwarranted implication that the subject proceeds "only as long as analytic knowledge is impelled onward against motivational resistances by the interest in self-knowledge."(ibid., p. 235) The only grounds for such an abstraction might seem to lie in accounting for the therapist choosing to deprive the subject. But surely we might discuss this in terms of the therapist's understanding of the full extent of the distortion in communication and thus the necessity of suffering to relieve suffering. If these arguments are plausible, we can question whether this movement of critical reflection must be theoretically represented as the movement of an emancipatory interest that, in turn, must be vindicated in a theory of communicative competence. This is clearly Lorenzer's position: "The motor of psychoanalytic enlightenment is thus not the interest in self-reflection, but [the interest] in achieving the abolition of physically experienced suffering." My translation. In the original: "Motor des psychoanalytischen Erkenntnis prozesses ist daher nicht das Interesse an Selbstreflexion, sondern sinnlich erfahrbares Leiden, das nach Aufhebung verlangt." (Alfred Lorenzer, Uber den Gegenstand der Psychoanalyse oder: Sprache und Interaktion (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), p. 142)

Critical Hermeneutics as Mediation

How does the researcher facilitate the mediation of the subject's representations by the categories of a critical social theory? Again, we can generally characterize the task of a critical hermeneutics to be the interrelating of contradictory social relations, and associated role identities, to systemic processes. This entails the elucidation of the categories of the subject's experience, both in terms of role identities and of the object-relational stereotypes infiltrating them, within a framework of a critical social theory. More concretely, we can anticipate these stages:

1) The recognition of dimensions of conscious and preconscious experience that are antagonistic to the experiential categories mandated by role identities. For example, through discussion the subject recognizes they are upset about "having to take orders all the time."

2) Elaboration of the exclusionary chatacter of role identity, and examination of the institutional rationales compelling the exclusion of possible alternatives. This process simultaneously entails the theoretical elaboration of antagonistic experiences. For example, through discussion the subject grasps the systemic significance of profit maximization and the manner in which the hierarchical structure of the firm facilitates that project.

3) The elaboration of antagonistic experience will be accompaned by increasingly manifest resistance and defensive processing. The relationship of the increased intrapsychic conflict to the discussion of antagonistic experience within contradictory roles can be pointed out. This serves as an occasion for an extension of the subject's grasp of the idea of systematically distorted communication,

to include rudimentary psychoanalytic concepts, e.g. the unconscious, repression, as well as an extension of reflection beyond suppressed experience, formulated in terms of contemporary discourse, to unconscious stereotypes, formulated in the language of childhood scenes.

Ensuing processes of reflection must continually steer between psychological and sociological reduction. This is not simply a theoretical and methodological pitfall, in that representations of the experience of contradictory social reations may be "mistakenly" formulated in one-sided terms. It also records the effects of established patterns of need satisfaction, as well as social pressures flowing from group and institutional life. For example, a subject's desire to immediately express aggression may dovetail with the demands of union participation to prompt expressions of anger towards supervisors in which the institutinalized character of the supervisor's role performances is not recognized. Reflection upon this tendency may lead to an improved appreciation of the tactical considerations appropriate to regulating the expression of aggression. But it may also lead only to its rationalization; the subject may argue that they should actively expose institutionalized contradictions whenever possible. Further attempts to encourage reflection upon possible object-relational antecedents may themselves be regarded as suppressive.

In other words, the inculcation of a critical "psychological-mindedness" may lead to the objective matrix of experience being dragged into subjective categories, or the suppression of reflection on subjective categories in the name of objective appropriateness. This unavoidable problem, already anticipated under the conventional rubric of "tensions between the interests of individuals and institutions," is

the "material" problematic within which regulatory concepts such as Habermas' "ideal speech situation" may become important. In order to avoid reductionism and conflation, it is necessary to considerably revise the traditional conceptions of freedom, equality, and rationality in order to ensure that the scope of reflection and concomitant praxis is sufficiently broad to cover the dimensions of social and individual dynamics relevant to the situation.

Reflection and Practice: Social and Psychoanalytic Theory

The mediating performances sketched out above are deliberately arrayed to suggest stages in a process. This conforms to the general notion that the motivational ground of reflection is suffering, a suffering which is understood within an expanding and deepening categorial field. But this formal reconstruction, accurate enough in specifying the principal forms of reification within a dynamic broadly consistent with the likely path of the subject's reflection, can serve as only a general sketch.

To see this, we can begin by briefly examining the two areas of praxis-oriented reflection, social transformative activity and psychoanalysis, that we are attempting to interwork here under the rubric of critical hermeneutics. Regarding the former, we can point to an extensive literature noting the dynamic between transformative consciousness and action. Some examples: Luxemburg's writings on the emergence among Russian workers of a political consciousness growing out of a narrower conception of economic interests,[10] the rich interviews obtained by Ronald Fraser that tell of the development of a class

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[10] Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, The Political Party, and the Trade Unions (New York: Harper Row, 1971).

politics among various sectors of the Spanish population during the Spanish Civil War,[11] and so on. The practical lessons from these movements have, in turn, often been worked into guidelines for social education and mobilization. Alinsky's Reveille for Radicals, one of the best known such texts in this country, is exemplary for its description of the growth of a practical understanding of the prerequisites of successful social action through a graduated series of change attempts.[12] Through initial small scale successes, participants overcome their inculcated "sense" of the horizons of appropriate reflection and action to reflect upon their condition as well as their constrained expectations. In a manner recalling Sartre's description of "groups-in-fusion," the significance of group-mediated self-understandings increases - aggregates of individuals are now collaborators - and new self-understandings emerge in which collective identity plays a larger role.[13] Such observations suggest the circumscribed validity of Lukacs formulation.

The nature of reflection-oriented praxis in psychoanalysis has not, despite its recognized importance, been defined to a satisfactory degree. In Freud's writings the nature of the analytic process remains only broadly specified in sets of terms alternately reflecting descriptive, topographic, and dynamic conceptions. Thus at times Freud stresses remembering, the coming to consciousness, of repressed ideas as

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[11] Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

[12] Saul Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

[13] Jean- Paul Sartre, The Critique of Dialectical Reason (London: New Left Review, 1975).

the hallmark of analysis: "We do not regard an analysis as at an end until all the obscurities of the case are cleared up, the gaps in the patient's memory filled in, the precipitating causes of the repressions discovered."[14] Here the goal of analysis appears to be the dissolution of patterns of deception and the knowing of the hitherto unconscious object relations. Through analysis an object is uncovered and made known to the subject.[15] This tendency in characterization is partially superseded, however, when Freud formulates analysis as a dynamic process resulting in the recognition of conflicts:

> The therapeutic task consists, therefore, in freeing the libido from its present attachments, which are withdrawn from the ego, and in making it once more servicable to the ego...In order to resolve the symptom we must go back as far as their origin, we must renew the conflict from which they arise and with the help of motive forces which were not at the patient's disposal in the past, we must guide it to a different outcome. This revision of the process of repression can be accomplished only in part in connection with the memory traces of the processes which led to repression, The decisive part of the work is acheived by creating in the patient's relation to the doctor - in the transference - new editions of the old conflicts; in these the patient would like to behave in the same way as he did in the past, while we, summoning up every available mental force [in the patient] compel him to come to a fresh decision...by the help of the doctor's suggestion, the new struggle around this object is lifted to the highest psychical level: it takes place as a normal mental conflict.[16]

In this account the moment of remembering is part of a process conceived in terms oscillating between structural and "personological" concepts: stereotyped object relations are brought to play in the contemporary relationship with the analyst so that the latter, by

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[14] Sigmund Freud, "Analytic Therapy," in Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1957), pp. 452-3

[15] Barnaby Barratt, "Freud's Psychology as Philosophical Discourse," paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, 28 August 1978: 5.

[16] Freud, ibid., p. 454.

simultaneously bringing to bear the patient's interest in freeing him/herself from conflict, enables the patient to redecide the nature of their strivings. But it is still a question as to whether this expanded account is intended by Freud to amount to anything more than saying "analytic cure= remembering + redecision."

In assessing this issue, our understanding of the transference process is decisive. At first Freud viewed the transference of "repressed infantile wishes" onto the analyst as an obstacle to treatment, in that the patient's unconscious construal of the analytic relationship as an encounter between parent and child thwarted the work of remembering.[17] But the infiltration of stereotyped object relations into the analytic relationship also made their contours, as the above quotation suggests, more immediately evident; instead of recalling scenes the patient could recognize them. However, the possibility that other therapeutically significant processes might transpire within the transference was obscured through Freud's prioritization of remembering; if the patient was not remembering through recognizing he would be neurotically repeating, "acting out."[18]

LaPlanche and Pontalis question this view:

> It may legitimately be asked whether such a contrast really helps us get a clearer picture of the transference in its two dimensions - actualization of the past and displacement on to the person of the analyst.
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> Indeed, it is hard to see why the analyst should be any less implicated when the subject is recounting some event of his past

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[17] Sigmund Freud and Josef Breuer, Studies on Hysteria, S.E. 2, p. 303.

[18] Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, S.E. 18, pp. 18-20.

> to him, or telling him some dream, than he is when the patient involves him in his actions.[19]

We can follow up their doubts by putting the issue more pointedly: the work of remembering via recognition of elements of the transference entails a reappropriation by the subject's ego that is not only guided by the analyst's interpretations but encouraged by the presence of the neutral analyst. It is within a regulatory discourse of neutrality, or "sympathetic understanding," that the repressed wish can become a moment of desire that can be consciously reappropriated. Within the discourse, which not only establishes a "reality" of relative freedom from sanctions, but also mobilizes positive transferences, impulses gradually are no longer regarded as dangerous and disruptive. Because, following Lorenzer and Beres, to be conscious of a wish is to entertain it as a prospective form of relationship between self and object, the analyst must adopt their characteristic stance; the greater inhibitory and transformative capacities of the adult ego can only be experienced in relation to the wish once the repessions framed in childhood are understood to be unnecessary in the presence of a tolerant other.[20] Thus remembering in analysis is a form of praxis in which potential forms of intra- and interpersonal relationships are anticipated and discovered.[21]

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[19] J. LaPlanche and J.B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), pp. 460-1. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974), pp. 460-1.

[20] Lorenzer, Sprachzerstorung und Rekonstruktion, pp. 139-43.

[21] In M. Mannoni's The Child, His "Illness," and the Others, the equivalent of Lorenzer's process of resymbolization is discussed as the restoration of a "true word," or true representation of the object relation, to the child within the discourse with the parent or with the analyst. This highlights what the term "remembering" allows to remain latent, the simultaneity of the representative moment (the true naming) and the orientation to action within relationship (the word is given and expressed within the transference/analytic relationship). See Maud

To sum up, let us interwork these two forms of praxis to clinch our point about the inadequacy of a schematic that supports an objectivistic, contemplative view of reflection, i.e. one in which the subject comes to "see" an object-like memory, and the notion of practice is completely absent. In both social theoretical and psychoanalytic reflection the moment of critique is bound up with the evocation of a practically oriented stance toward either an internal object or an external object, or both. With regard to the critique of ideology, the elucidation and legitimation of those aspects of the subject's experience that are both suppressed by institutional discourses and ideology and repressed via stereotypic mobilization clearly requires, as I have tried to demonstrate, a dialogic setting that allows a practice informed by reflection to unfold. Both because of the nature of the discourse embodied in the analytic interview and because of the anticipatory potential inherent in the ego's capacity for trial action, the dialogic setting itself can become a relatively free sphere within which the practice-reflection dialectic can begin. But the limitations of this sphere are readily apparent. The confused reservation "That sounds good in theory, but it won't work in practice" attests to the way in which a privately held truth about a situation can be surrendered for the sake of social survival. Its logic argues for the unreality of what is assumed to be unattainable, but still possible, at the outset of the critical dialogue; it belatedly demands of itself the "realism" it sought to temper with critique.

Mannoni, The Child, His Illness, and the Others (Middlesex: Penguin, 1970), pp. 23-7.

As a characteristic form of the denial of the outcome of critical reflection, the phrase attests to the necessity for the critical hermeneutic process to conceive of itself as culminating in reflection in the midst of social practice. That the negative truth developed in critical hermeneutic dialogue continually presses the subject up against internal and external constraints both drives the process forward by identifying new constraints on critique and threatens to silence it when its claims seem to invite sanctions. Ultimately, the plausibility of a critical process of the unbounded form we are suggesting rests upon the nature of the political situation, particularly to the extent some form of radical politics begins to appear to the subject as viable, or at least worth trying to develop. Even with regard to the relatively "traditional" question of the ideological circumscription of democracy, we would expect that the conduct of critical dialogue would generate substantial fear and anxiety. Within the context of the narrowly defined research I carried out, substantially aimed at studying the subject's management of this anxiety, this was not a limitation. But to the extent that within the overall process, the critique of forms of social relations passes into a search for alternatives, the failure of the anxious subject to be able to identify any organized groups with whom s/he can work to develop and realize his/her conclusions, let alone to simply validate them, may threaten the critical process with turning into its opposite: their grasp of what they must exclude in the face of real constraints may simply be improved.

Tensions in the "Working Alliance"

What is the relationship between the "working alliance" formulated here in light of our understanding of the psychoanalytic dimension of critical hermeneutics, and that aspect of the dialogue geared to the critique of explicitly "social" reifications? One point of view, set out by Freud in 1912 paper "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis," wold seem to suggest that the relationship can only be contradictory; the introduction of the political and social views of the analyst can only interfere with the development of the transference.[22] But there are several aspects to the issue that need to be clarified. First, it would appear that Freud is here referring to outright advocacy, the taking of an affirmative stand that, ipso facto, would entail introducing partisan conflicts (in the mundane sense) into the analysis. In such an instance, a tendency for the subject to view the analyst as a mere proselytizer would likely develop. The consequent effects would be manifold, and determined in part by the personalities of both analyst and subject. In general, it is likely that the necessary regressive movement in the analysis would be continually subverted, with the subject resisting recognizing more infantile forms of relations with their political opponent, or agreeing with the analysts's views to secretly placate the transferred parental imago, etc.

But what if instead of taking a "political" stand, the analyst restricts their communication to the extension of the interpretive approach employed in analysis, such that it is only the contradictory character of the subject's social relations that are brought

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[22] Sigmund Freud, "Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis," S.E. 12, pp. 109-20.

out? Menninger's model of the analytic process can help define the question more sharply. He describes optimal therapy as revolving around a triangular sequence of reflection in which childhood scenes, situations from the subject's contemporary life, and the analytic setting are continually interrelated via thematic similarities.[23] In terms of this schema, is it not possible to simply estalish the reflection on the subject's contemporary life as the point at which the analytic process, as it is commonly understood, may link up with the process of identifying suffering within social contradictions? More specifically, can we make that field a moment in the elucidation of both intra- and interpersonal reifications, maintaining a distinction sufficient to allow stereotype-oriented reflection to proceed in the midst of role-oriented reflection and critique?

A primary issue here is the relation of these processes to the patient's experience of suffering. In considering this we cannot help but be struck by the tension between them. In the case of psychoanalysis, it would appear that the triangular process of insight simultaneously results in a shift of the locus of suffering to the scenic components that are being put back into increasingly explicit communication. The scenic components are immanent to and constitutive of the subject's suffering as they accept the analytic insight (or preconsciously work with it after nominally rejecting it). On the other hand, the process of social theoretically-oriented reflection seems to be <u>anchored</u> in the experience of social contradictions. Thus, in terms of our concerns, the locus of the experience of humiliation of work is

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[23] Karl Menninger, <u>The Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique</u> (New York: Basic Books, 1958), pp. 147-53.

brought into sharp relief and used to motivate the elaboration of a more or less detailed analysis of the social formation, within which the experience is constituted. In contrast to analytic reflection, each new insight does not result in an ever-widening understanding of suffering in terms of the specific repressed conflicts actually constitutive of suffering, but an appreciation of how newly defined institutions and processes causally frame the contradiction.

This is not to underestimate the extent to which previously unknown or distant objects, e.g. the capitalist mode of production or the Chrysler corporation, may be established as responsible for the subject's suffering, thereby ensuring motivation for critical action. It is possible to transfer animosity toward the supervisor to capitalism. But such a transfer follows a causally framed mode of reflection, and would appear to be dependent upon factors noted above, e.g. a supportive group capable of meaningful action, etc. Thus, it would appear that in addition to the problem of avoiding either psychological or sociological reductionism, mentioned above, we must consider the possibility of confusion arising from the divergent modes of reflection appropriate to the two forms of analysis.

This can be illustrated with reference to one of my clients, a young man. He frequently employs interpretations to develop a causally framed understanding of the formation of his personality, a mode of appropriation of his "past" that allows him to view the interpreted scene as if from a distance, thereby avoiding a more direct experience of the emotions implicated in the pivotal scenes. While this tendency to isolate affect is clearly expressive of his obsessive dynamics, I would argue that his having learned causally framed theories of personality

formation figure importantly in setting up a relatively autonomous intellectual dimension to the defense. Conflation of these two forms of reflection, and the associated tendency to short-circuit the recognition of repressed wishes by blaming the causally interpreted actions of significant others of childhood, would be a persistent difficulty in critical hermeneutics.

Life-Practical Presppositions: The Interview as an Intersection of Hermeneutic Fields

Reference to Cicourel's analysis of the process of interviewing will help us to further develop our discussion of the interview in critical hermeneutics generally, and also with respect to the specific goals of this study. After an extended review of literature arguing that the social character of the interview situation must be recognized, both in the sense that interviewer and interviewee seek to manage each other's perception of themselves and that both employ potentially incongruent frameworks for interpreting each other's communications, Cicourel draws upon Kahn and Cannell for a summary injunction:

> If the interview is a product of interaction, what becomes of the conveniently simple notion that the ideal interview is something that springs from the soul of the respondent to the notebook of the interviewer without encountering any contaminating influences en route? And what becomes of the corollary notion that any vestige of interviewer influence in the interviewer process constitutes bias and must be avoided at all costs? The answer to these questions is that they represent a concept of the interview and the respondent and interviewer roles that is rejected by the interactional analysis we have just made. That concept places primary emphasis on the interviewer's negative function, that of not influencing what the respondent says. What we propose to emphasize in the interviewer's role is the importance of controlling and directing the process of interaction between himself and his

> respondent in such a way that the basic objectives of the interview are met.[24]

Cicourel goes on to reassert the interest of the interviewer who, seeking to "achieve an understanding of the nature of stable social relationships and thereby stable order," requires more developed "theoretical insights and practical recipes for establishing a successful relationship with a respondent, maintaining it so as to sustain communications and obtain particular kinds of information, and finally leaving the scene intact so as to allow for the possibility of return."[25] He concludes by suggesting an experimental procedure in which, by monitoring an interview and breaking in at preestablished points, the experimenter can develop a better understanding of the dynamics of the interview process, and better anticipate sources of distortion in the subject's response.[26] This would allow a better appreciation of the nature of the specific forms of interaction that might transpire within interviews on particular questions, allowing interviewers to improve the arrangement of questions, prepare themselves for problems, and so on.

This analysis and proposal for research holds some merit, especially to the extent it dispels the notion that the researcher can interact with the subject as a geologist might interact with a rock stratum, and argues for greater sensitivity to the interaction through deliberate study. Thus the following discussion will at times seem to

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[24] R.L. Kahn and C.F. Cannell, The Dynamics of Interviewing (New York: Wiley, 1957). pp. 34-8. Cited in Aaron Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 98.

[25] ibid., p. 99.

[26] ibid., pp. 103-4.

stand in general agreement. Yet, from the standpoint of critical hermeneutic research, the analysis and proposal hold a major deficiency: it maintains that, just as the geologist leaves the earth essentially unchanged, so will the researcher leave the subject. Such a conception, stemming both from the overall understanding of social research as in principle disjoined from ensuing research-informed practice and from the methodological interest in maintaining replicability to assure a check on the validity of findings, tends to suppress systematically an interest in the nature of the subject's reflection upon their understandings, especially to the extent that process of reflection is conceived of as mutative.

Our objection can be understood in two senses. On the one hand, we would argue that the interview process may often be inevitably mutative of the subject's understandings. Especially to the extent that research seeks to identify ways in which suffering is "handled" so that core social relations escape criticism, it is likely that the interview will prompt, at least for a short period, a greater awareness of suffering and the measures taken to control it. Even though the problems faced by the subject remain, e.g. they need to "get along" at work, and as such are likely to return to their general patterns of thought and action, some change will occur. These considerations, significant in the case of the present study because of its truncated nature, are inverted when we consider the critical hermeneutic project as a whole. Research becomes deliberately mutative as the process more and more becomes an expression of an emancipatory interest based on a shared

desire to alleviate suffering.[27] Within such a project it is still possible to generate the sort of "status reports," relevant to theoretical and methodological questions, to which Cicourel harnesses the interview process. But such reports will bear a different relation to the goal of prediction. Broadly, they will refer to the development of a capacity for subjects reflecting upon and changing the systems of representation mediating the "objective" conditions comprehended in the social laws which empirical-analytic social science aims. In effect, the "contaminative" influence of the social researcher, which methodologies typically seek to purge, will be deliberately cultivated.

We can turn to Lorenzer's discussion of the psychoanalytic interview as a source of categories more appropriate to out interests. Lorenzer takes up the problem of how the "life-practical presuppositions" of the analyst, i.e. their preconceptions of typical significant patterns of interaction, preconceptions which are necessarily abstract in relation to the actual thematizations of the subject, are gradually refined to the point when the analyst's interpretations begin to successfully approximate the subject's own language, thereby facilitating the coming to consciousness of the subject's stereotyped object relations.[28] He argues that analysis presupposes two hermeneutic fields, that between analyst and subject, and that between analysts. Here I will merge Lorenzer's treatment of

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[27] The importance of the commonality of such a desire is great. This issue will be treated throughout the rest of the dissertation.

[28] Alfred Lorenzer, Die Wahrheit der Psychoanalytischen Erkenntnis (Frankurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), p. 203.

the latter field with a discussion of the process as it transpired in our informal research group.

Our preliminary conversations aimed at outlining likely themes and theme interrelations that we expected to characterize the subjects' standpoints. Because the actual interviews, conducted for the most part at weekly interviews over the course of ten weeks, would provide us with ample time for considering our developing understanding of our subjects, our preinterview work remained at a fairly general level.

This general task passed over into, but did not fully entail a second, the anticipation of what may be described as countertransference phenomena. For me, Kernberg's discussion, in which he distinguishes between two contrasting views of countertransference, was most helpful. One approach, which he terms the "classical," and which he attributes to Freud, defines countertransference as the "unconscious reaction of the psychoanalyst to the patient's transference."[29] The second approach he terms "totalistic;" it conceives of countertransference as "the analyst's conscious and unconscious reactions to the patient in the treatment situation, reactions to the patient's reality as well as to his transference, and also to the analyst's own reality needs as well as to his neurotic needs."[30] Aside from a more extensive understanding, the totalistic perspective maintains that the analyst's countertransference should not be understood simply as unwanted departures from the position of

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[29] Otto Kernberg, Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism (New York: Aronson, 1975), p. 49.

[30] ibid.

neutrality; while they should be resolved, they may be useful in getting an understanding of the patient.[31]

A variety of insights into the interview process can be drawn from this statement. First, the concept of countertransference (as well as transference) demands recognition in the interview situation of the same unconscious communications we have discussed in conjunction with the textile firm model. What is only tangentially treated by Cicourel as a question of interrole dynamics (e.g. the researcher as intrusive authority and the respondent as an uninformed citizen striving to appear "in the know") is actually a much more complicated relationship in which the same regulatory discourse/unconscious discourse dynamic characteristic of psychoanalysis is played out. Of course, the parallel with the psychoanalytic situation may be carried too far: the subject's primary motivation for participation was not to gain relief from suffering as such, but to be able to tell their friends they are being interviewed, to satisfy their curiosity, to talk with someone about their lives, and so on. Thus the subject's dependence upon the analyst, a dependence established their hope that they will relieve them of their neurosis, which is a factor crucial in the constitution of the transference, was not a major presupposition of the <u>research</u> encounter. Yet, generally, we would argue that in an intensive interview format, in which discussions are essentially a reflection upon social relations that are unconsciously determined in important ways, transference and countertransference phenomena are likely to be significant.

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[31] ibid., p. 54.

This leads to a crucial reinterpretation of the interview situation. In line with Kernberg, who espouses a version of the "totalistic" orientation, we would argue that transference-countertransference dynamics constitute a significant source of information about general dimensions of the subject's pattern of transference and displacement. Instead of being simply an encounter in which we may find out about the way a subject understands social relations "external" to the interview, the interview inevitably stimulates and brings into play that understanding.

This is not to argue that the interview be turned into an experiment or therapy. Rather, it is to argue for maintaining an important distinction as we consider our countertransference. On the one hand, research group and/or individual reflection should seek to identify neurotic - i.e. unconsciously determined, compulsively repetitive - stances which the researcher is prone to adopt, expecially in discussing the particular topics in question. Countertransference of this type ideally can then be taken up in psychoanalysis or psychotherapy; if that is not an option, other forms of reflection will help to attenuate its intensity and clarify its impact upon the researcher's stance. On the other hand, the researcher should not adopt, as Kernberg puts it, a "phobic attitude" towards his/her own emotional reactions, but should try to understand them in light of his/her emerging understanding of the patient's stance. Racker has distinguished between two tupes of countertransference useful to us here: "concordant identification" and "complementary identification." To quote Kernberg's explication:

> "Concordant identification."..is an identification of the analyst with the corresponding part of the patient's psychic

> apparatus: ego with ego, superego with superego. Under the influence of concordant identification, the analyst experiences in himself the central emotion that the patient is experiencing at the same time...one might consider empathy as a direct expression of concordant identification...Complementary identification refers to identification of the analyst with the transference objects of the patient. In that position, the analyst experiences the emotion that the patient is putting into his transference object, while the patient himself is experienceng the emotion which he had experienced in the past in his interaction with that particular parental image. For instance, the analyst the analyst may identify with a superego function connected with a stern prohibitive father image, feeling critical and tempted to control the patient...while the patient may be experiencing fear, submission, or rebelliousness connected with his relationship to his father. Racker states that the analyst fluctuates fetween these two kinds of countertransference identifications.[32]

The overall nature of the study predisposed me to the former type of countertransference; I regarded the people I interviewed as subjected to systematic coercion and viewed the thesis as hopefully making some contribution to changing these conditions. Further, the study clearly represents an expression of my own critical attitude towards arbitrary and unnecessary control, and thus is informed by my own experience of the primary contradiction in question. It is easy to see how, without exercising appropriate care in maintaining a neutral, major problems could develop, taking the form of an "alliance" in which, by picking up on an amplifying the subject's resentment I might encourage him to take a more combative stance than he might "normally," i.e. in the absence of support.[33]

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[32] Otto Kernberg, ibid., p. 59. See H. Racker, "The Meaning and Uses of Countertransference," Psychoanalytic Quarterly 26 (1957): 303-57.

[33] It is not entirely clear how we should regard such "distortion." Especially if we consider the practical concern of the study, to develop a better understanding of the ideological circumscription of democracy, the fact that potentially counterinstitutional stances might be so readily elicited in a context distantly analogous to an everyday political discussion is important to

It is important to distinguish between this tendency, in which the dynamics of identification are significant, from another that might be readily confused with it, stereotyping (the conventional connotation is intended). In the stereotype-dominated interview the researcher plays a role in the reduction of the field of communication. By assuming that the subject will hold certain attitudes, an assumption derived in part from the researcher's own needs, but also from the stereotyping mechanisms of the social order, the researcher not only does not recognize extra- or contra-stereotypical qualities of the subject, but also, by restricting communication to themes presupposed by the stereotype, may dispose the subject to conform to their expectations, thereby enhancing the tendency to "response set bias." In an important sense, at its extreme this process accomplishes a reversal of the source of the transference-countertransference dynamic: the expectations, conscious and unconscious, that the researcher brings into the interview promote a countertransferential response from the subject.[34]

This was, I believe, at least not a persistent problem. Regarding the specific issue of attitudes towards democracy in

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recognize. On the other hand, it is "only an interview," and the alliance with the researcher in such a "safe" situation may provoke expressions of criticism completely unlikely in a social setting where the consequences will be significant.

[34] In the psychoanalytic literature it is assumed that through extensive training the analyst can adopt a stance that is largely undetermined by their personal needs, especially as compared with that of the person seeking help. Thus with regard to the reciprocal concepts transference and countertransference, it is assumed that the client takes up the role of initiator. Hence the appropriateness of assigning to them the former term. In interview research the relatively less extensive training of the interviewer, the fact that it is their interest prompting the research, and the likelihood that the subject's interest in participating is not as pressing as the prospective therapy client all argue for suspending this assumption.

the workplace, recent debates over the nature of working class consciousness also substantively contributed to this process of assumption clarification and attenuation. Generally speaking, potential stereotypes, such as the immiserated proletarian of orthodox Marxism or leisure-oriented worker of Marxism's critics have been weakened through mutual criticism, and virtually dissolved in succeeding corrective analyses. It was out of this milieu of theoretical and empirical research, along with my own contact with workers while employed in retail and assembly-line jobs, that the plausibility and necessity of a more subtle analysis, sensitive to contradictory trends in the subject's consciousness grew. In short, the theoretical and methodological orientation of this study both reflects a thorough critique of stereotypes of the conventional sort, and incorporates a bias against them as a fundamental set of presuppositions.

To anticipate the discussions of the interviews, using countertransference phenomena in the interviews seemed to involve not simply the recognition of stable identifications, but also occasional transitions from one type to the other. Most often these transitions involved a shift from concordant to complementary forms. The characteristic sequence entailed, first, the recognition that discussion of the topic was becoming more difficult for the subject. At times, reflection on the source of this difficulty led me to recognize that a diffuse sense of cooperation had passed, and that discussion of the material had evoked conflicts in the subject that were transferred to the interview. In particular, questions about forms of resistance to work discipline led not only to uneasiness on the part of the subject, but also evasion and condemnation of others. This strongly suggested

feelings of anxiety and an attempt to appear willing to cooperate with condemning figures, a trend in the dialogue that was heralded in its onset by a "change of atmosphere" picked up in a complementary identification.

In a therapeutic setting this sort of shift in the relationship might prompt the analyst to make an interpretation of the patient's assumption that the therapist was judging him, or to wait as potentially mutually recognizable "evidence" builds up along with the strength of the transference so that the interpretation will be effective. In this study the recognition and dissolution of such transferences was not part of the agreement between myself and the subject. Instead, I would encourage the subject to elaborate on the terms of the conflict (i.e. the motives held by the parties to the conflict, the subject's conscious self-understanding of the choice of action patterns available, etc) so that the terms of the conflict might be related to other areas of the subject's life.

Our discussion has passed into a consideration of the second hermeneutic field between analyst and subject. Already the dialectical character of the relationship between the two fields is evident, with an emphasis having been placed on the research group as a context within which likely thematic configurations are formulated, then played off against the dialogue between researcher and subject as their particular standpoints become apparent. If we turn our attention to the forms of inference employed by the reasercher, what is meant by "playing off" will be clarified.

Three Forms of Interpretation

Working within Lorenzer's discussion we can distinguish between three forms of interpretive understanding employed by the researcher:

a) Logical verstehen: Lorenzer incorrectly applies this term to what I will call, borrowing from him, "interactionform" recognition (see below). Here "logical verstehen" will refer to Weber's discussion of the interpretation of particular expressions or actions of a subject through conventional interpretive categories. Ideally interpretations of this type may be checked by asking questions of the subject that simply presuppose the subject formulates motives by referring to standard conceptions of appropriate behavior. Should subjects not be available for dialogue, interpretations can be made based upon the assumption of ideal-typical logics, formulated in practical syllogisms.

b) Interactionform recognition and c) scenic understanding are distinguishable yet mutually implicated interpretive operations. Interactionform recognition entails the identification of patterns in the subject's interaction with others, and their management of impulses.[35] Thus, the researcher scans the subject's communications for persistent contents, sequences, forms of expression, etc. For example, the researcher might notice that each account of a dispute is immediately followed by a self-effacing statement, and then silence. The pattern might be evident to the extent that a person merely socialized to the language, without any knowledge of the subject using it, could recognize the pattern. Such an operation might be conceived of in entirely formal terms. Thus, it might be hoped that an objectivistic

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[35] Lorenzer, Sprachzerstorung und Rekonstruktion, p. 138.

psychoanalysis could be established. But, irregardless of the undeniable transparency of certain unconsciously constituted and compulsively expressed motifs, such a project is only of a certain limited value. To be sure, for our purposes it is useful in arguing for the interworking of certain gross dimensions of personality and ideology. But, within the context of the critical hermeneutic project, such a procedure by itself is as useful as the observation that the hand-washing gestures of an hospitalized schizophrenic represent an attempt at absolution. The interpretation may be true, but the partial recommunication is only "for us," entirely abstracted from the patient's privatized system of representations.

When linked with scenic understanding and interpretation, however, interactionform recognition acquires a new value, becoming an integral part of both the successive approximation of excommunicated scenes and the working through of the conflict as the subject recognizes the various forms it takes. In a case report Greenson provides us with a good example of this process:

> Another scientist patient used to describe all this experiences in a very matter-of-fact tone and in technical terms...He was never hesitant or eager, but mechanical and thorough in his reporting...For a long time the patient justified himself by stating that the facts were the important thing, not the emotions. Then I was able to show him that emotions are also "facts" but that he had an aversion to acknowledge those "facts" about himself. The patient then realized he left out emotions in reporting to me because he felt it was shameful for an adult scientist to have feelings. Furthermore, he also recognized he hid his emotions from others as well, even from his wife in his sexual relations. This behavior he then traced to his childhood, when his engineer father showed contempt for emotional people, considering them weak and unreliable. Eventually, the patient recognized that he considered shhowing emotions as equivalent to becoming incontinent and uncontrolled. He equated coldness with

> cleanliness, and emotional warmth with dirtiness and loss of control.[36]

Thus it is through scenic understanding (within the transference conceived in "total" terms, a dimension not drawn out in Greenson's report) that the researcher is able to link their growing appreciation of patterns in the subject's present life to the constitutive scenes in the subject's past and to identify them as the subject takes up positions within them during the session.

In the actual process of understanding these three approaches are tightly intertwined. As noted, the process of interactionform recognition is integral not only to the researcher or analyst's conjectures regarding pivotal scenes, but also to the subject's recognition of the scene and their recasting their contemporary relationships. The immediacy of the researcher's experience, which we have conceptualized in terms of the countertransference, is thus opposed by a "distancing" in the sense that the experience is mediated by psychoanalytic theory and knowledge of the particular subject selectively brought to bear by the researcher. It is precisely through this distancing that the analyst seeks to pose, following Mannoni, the "true word" to the subject via their interpretation. The researcher will also resort to logical verstehen to inductively or deductively elaborate confirmed scenic interpretations. To take Greenson's case again, one might establish as a tentative working hypothesis that the father also discouraged emotionality on the part of the mother, which she may have focused on the child. Such an hypothesis might prove useful if the subject should allude to his mother as "frustrated" by the father

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[36] Greenson, The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis, pp. 120-1.

and/or complains about the mother having "meddled" in his life. Similarly, if the subject were to characterize his mother as inconsistent in her love for him, one might surmise that the inconsistency may partially be attributed to the father's stance. Such hypotheses might find some degree of confirmation in further analyses of interactionforms and scenes, which could then allow further elaboration through logical verstehen.

In the study both the elaborative and validative phases of the interviews were drastically curtailed. Again, because I wished to encourage renewed interest in this area of research and to set out some axial concepts, "following through," which in critical hermeneutics refers to the transformation of a subject's self-understanding through a critique encompassing an expanded conception of ideology, was not possible. Because they were truncated in this way, the interviews were conceived as basically akin to diagnostic work, but with the object being not an understanding of the subject's neuroses as such, but the interlock of reifying processes.

Summary

Within a critical hermeneutic process carried out in the context of a capitalist democracy, the researcher would encourage a reflection upon suffering that strives to accomplish a unification of the "self-observing ego" of psychoanalysis with a generic democratic-egalitarian self-understanding on the part of the subject. In doing this the researcher can rely upon the latent homology between the two stances. That is, on the one hand the researcher encourages the subject to take up a regulatory "meta-self-representation" through which the subject can reflect upon aspects of their relations with others and work

to alter their automatic, hypostatized character. On the other hand, the researcher encourages the subject to adopt a regulatory meta-self- representation through which role identities hypostatized in ideological metadiscourse can be called into question in collective dialogue and action. Both regulatory meta-self-representations converge in an antagonism towards internalized and external forms of domination, and as such acquire a certain positive content that regulates both the formal procedures entailed in collective will-formation as well as its substantive conclusions regarding optimal forms of social relations.

The illustrative case of the next chapter abstracts from this process. In only the most limited sense did the subject's suffering seem to briefly escape the everyday process of routinized management that places the subject squarely within the field of identifications and defensive impulse control represented in ideological metadiscourse and embodied in the institutions of the current accord. The concepts and categories of the critical hermeneutic project remain only latently for-the-subject. Further, as I have stated, I decided to minimize my interpretations of the subject's articulations, both because of limitations imposed by the research project (its relatively short length and my reservations regarding disturbing the subject's pattern of adjustment) and because I felt that a "minimalist" approach would be more persuasive at this stage. The prolegomenal nature of the research reported cannot be overemphasized.

CHAPTER V

INTERVIEW PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION

Introduction: The Current Accord

As was argued in chapter two, the primary determinant of the thematics of the ideological circumscription of democracy is the way in which class relations, and class struggle, are institutionalized. That a variety of discourses infiltrate a discourse of class relations and figure importantly in the "success" of ideology does not challenge the primacy of that discourse of class relations. This discourse, including a range of moments from the strategic to the ritualized, reflects the history of class relations and their present dynamics. As a subject talks about class relations, their discourse ebbs and flows through a framework more or less deliberately established to regulate class relations, a framework of laws, rules, and norms that the subject must recognize and observe, at least in part, on a daily basis.

This basic proposition justifies what I think will strike the reader as a rather traditional rendering of the social and historical context within which the interviews were conducted, and within which our understanding of the ideological circumscription of democracy took shape. Thus I will sketch the evolution in the United States of forms of capitalist production, the state, working class culture, and labor-management relations not because they solely explain the ideological

discourse of the interviews, but because they constitute the historically contingent complex whose constitutent relations are reified within the circumscription, and which at the same time constitute it. They are the sociohistorical matrix within which is constituted the ideological metadiscourse relevant to the contradiction in which we are interested.

It is important to recognize that to speak of "coordinates" in this way, to grant them a certain objectivity, is to refer to a specific phase and type of class relations, and their associated mediations. At a general theoretical level this point is intended to remind the reader that the notion of coordinates correlating with "persona" represents a form of supersedable domination. More specifically, it refers to a period in which the nature of the "accord," to use Bowles and Gintis' term, between classes is generally not regarded, either by individual workers or within the tactical and strategic programs of their major representative institutions, as a contingent state of affairs. Instead, the accord becomes hypostasized, regarded as an immutable fact of social life.

That this is not a necessary outcome is obvious.[1] As two counterexamples, we can refer to the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the period prior to World War I, and the recent history of the Swedish Social Democratic Workers Party (SAP). While the SPD was certainly not a unified revolutionary party - substantial segments of

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[1] We should note that Bowles and Gintis do not expressly distinguish between ways the accord may be regarded by those who participate in it. That the accord is artifactual and contingent and can be correctly appreciated as such is the social-theoretical justification for a limited notion of "false consciousness," a concept that Gintis, at least, takes pains to reject along the lines taken by Thompson. See Gintis, "Communication and Politics," p. 191.

the party and its allied trade unions followed a reformist strategy aimed at gradually attaining political hegemony - the consensus within the SPD viewed the institutionalized forms of class relations as reflective of a transient phase of social development.[2] Concerning the SAP, Katznelson reports these results of a study by Richard Scase:

> ...the Swedish case belies the common thesis that deradicalization is a conventional feature of workers parties in advanced capitalism. Rather, as a result of SAP's decades long objective of a more egalitarian, if still capitalist, society, Swedish workers "were more aware of inequality" and resented the differentials between capital and labor more than their English counterparts, who tend to stress intraclass differentials. The very success of the SAP [in winning social democratic reforms] has heightened workers' awareness that there are contradictions between further substantial gains in the direction of equality and a capitalist political economy dominated by the profit-seeking imperatives of private capital.[3]

"Legitimacy," whether derived from a commitment to the legal system or authoritative commands (Weber) or from an unconstrained consensus (Habermas), could never accrue to institutionalized forms of class relations in such a context; outputs of authorities and of the legal system were critically mediated by a class analysis that rendered the observances essentially strategic, or critically correctable to that status.

It is really only within certain late capitalist societies, and most explicitly American capitalism, that we find metainstitutional and institutional levels of the ideological circumscription of democracy thoroughly informing the views of the mass working class

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[2] Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

[3] Richard Scase, Social Democracy in Capitalist Society (London, 1977). Cited in Ira Katznelson, "Considerations on Social Democracy in the United States," Comparative Politics 11 (October 1978): p. 84.

organizations. Here it will be useful to discuss briefly some of the most important determinants of this "exceptional" quality of the American working class. In an outstanding essay published in 1980, Michael Davis offers these introductory reflections:

> On the one hand we must discard the idea that the fate of the American working class has been shaped by any overarching telos (liberal democracy, interacting causes (upward mobility plus ethnicity plus...). All plausible explanatory variables must be concretized within the historically specific contexts of class struggle and collective practice which, after all, are their only real mode of existence. Against such positivist conceptions of a working class permanently shipwrecked on 'reefs of roast beef' (Sombart) or shoals of universal suffrage (Hartz), Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky were absolutely correct to affirm the central role of class struggle...On the other hand, the Marxist classics tended to underestimate the role of the sedimented historical experiences of the working class as they influenced and circumscribed its capacities for development in succeeding periods. Each major cycle of class struggle, economic crisis, and social restructuring history has finally been resolved through epochal tests of strength between capital and labor...[Within the Marxist classics] What the emphasis on the 'temporary' character of obstacles to political class consciousness tended to obscure was precisely the cumulative impact of the series of historic defeats suffered by the American working class.[4]

What Davis refers to as the "qualitatively different level of class consciousness and intraclass cohesion" of the American working class, a consciousness he terms "corporatist," reflects a particular series of accords that, relative to the experience of European working classes, can be termed defeats.[5] It is this within this comparison that we can speak of the failed initiatives, disorganization, and

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[4] Michael Davis, "Why the U.S. Working Class is Different," New Left Review 123 (September 1980): 6-7.

[5] Davis, ibid., p.7. This is not to establish the organizations and strategies of the European working classes as an ideal-typical standard. Rather, to the extent that it is impossible to argue for the absolutely exceptional quality f the American working class, the reference to European working classes legitimately suggests, albeit only generally, the system-transcendent potential of the American working class.

depoliticization of the American working class and, within this study, to establish an "horizon" against which the ideological hypostatization of the social relations of the firm may be assessed.

Here we will not review the entire history of American labor. Instead, following the indications of Bowles, Gintis, Davis, and other writers such as Montgomery and Zerzan, the period of the formation of the currently effective accord, the years between World War I and the Korean War, will be our focus.

The differentiation of the working class into the mostly skilled workers of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), concentrated in the building trades, and the nonunionized, unskilled or semiskilled workers of the manufacturing and extractive industries, was reciprocally linked to ethno-religious distinctions that solidified divisions stemming from occupational stratifiction through communal isolation. Waves of immigration throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries not only maintained an "industrial reserve army" but also constituted it as an ethnically and/or religiously distinct group that was often forced to develop communal organizations capable of competing with other groups.[6] Political and economic achievements, such as gaining control of city government or breaking open a particular trade to members of the group, would maintain a cycle of political and economic fragmentation opposing the development of institutions expressive of class interests. Organizations that were able to forge interethnic alliances, such as the Knights of Labor or the Populist party, would find their success to be short-lived. The increased levels of repression and cooptative efforts they were subjected to as a result

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[6] ibid., p. 35.

of their enhanced offensive capabilities would always partially rely upon mobilizing the organizationally superseded distinctions. The fate of the southern Farmer's Alliance in the 1880's and 1890's illustrates this pattern well. A racially heterogenous coalition of landless laborers and sharecroppers, the Alliance met fierce resistance from a merchant-planter elite fully conscious of the threat posed by interracial organization. Militant blacks were lynched by the Klan, subjected to increased state repression, and disenfranchised. Their white allies were attacked on the economic front and simultaneously offered the dubious benefits of racial discrimination, benefits that gained appeal after the defeat of the associated New Orleans General Strike of 1892. The prevailing pattern of competition among poor blacks and whites was restored, and the organization embodying new forms of inter- and intraclass relations was destroyed.[7]

Racial and ethnic identifications enhanced intraclass divisions stemming from the division of labor; as an ensemble, these divisions attained in the AFL a remarkably regressive expression at the level of class politics. Initially receptive to socialism at its inception in the 1880's, by its 1894 convention the AFL under Gompers had adopted an explicitly anti-socialist stance, repudiating the Debsian wing of the labor movement. The organization thus evolved, albeit unevenly, as an agency of class integration. David Montgomery's study of the International Association of Machinists (IAM) illustrates how the aim of leadership of the IAM to allay the hostility of employers to unionism led to the emergence of a"proto-business union" strategy among the leadership that was often sharply at odds with the perspective of the

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[7] ibid., p. 33.

rank and file machinist. For the rank and file of 1900, who might be fined 25 cents a day for six months for the offense of looking out the factory window or would suffer discrimination in pay raises for becoming a union officer, the daily experience of class relations demanded militancy and, eventually, an aggressive class politics.[8] While the union leadership typically believed steady increases in wages, improvements in working conditions and shortening of the work day were legitimate demands, they would attempt to control rank and file activity to fit the cadence of contract negotiations and, ultimately, a new pattern of reliable unionism. Thus it was in fact standard practice for the union's officials to traverse the country during times of labor unrest, seeking to suppress independent militancy and centralize organizational initiative.[9]

The transition in the approach of capital to the union movement developed in the same fitful manner. Tolerance of unions was part of a second best strategy urged by both the militancy of American workers and by an assessment of the growth of socialist movements in Europe, especially in Germany and England. Depending upon domestic conditions - economic climate, strike activity, etc. - different groups of employers would be varyingly committed to supporting and encouraging "responsible unionism." Thus, to return to Montgomery's example, it was in the economic upswing of 1898-1902, when demand for products and, therefore, labor was high that an employers group, the National Metal Trades Association, was established to bargain on a national basis with

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[8] David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America (New York: Cambridge, 1979), p. 69.

[9] ibid., pps. 52-54.

machinists. Tenuous from the outset, cooperation among employers to encourage business unionism collapsed by 1903 as a depression weakened the machinists' bargaining position and made an open shop offensive by empoyers feasible. The mediating agency of the National Civic Federation (NCF), an organization dominated by larger units of capital that sought to advance enlightened models of labor relations within a frankly monopolistic industry structure, was thereby weakened and discredited. Just as the union could not control its members, neither could the NCF theirs. As Montgomery states, it was in the period following its victories of 1910-1912 that the Democratic Party (DP), promising state enforced mediation and legislated guarantees for working conditions, that actually lay the groundwork for corporate liberalism's model of labor relations.[10]

The decimation of the Socialist Pary and IWW in the nativist backlash following World War I, together with the relative prosperity of the 1920's and an extremely offensive stance on the part of capital, led to a decline in union strength over the period: in 1920 19.4 percent of non-agricultural workers were unionized, in 1930 only 10.2 percent.[11] Further, unionized workers were increasingly represented by unions designed to stabilize labor relations and prevent the direct expression of rank and file discontent. The AFL seemed to compete with the popular, at least among employers, "American Plan" company unions in guaranteeing steady work for low wages. These examples, cited by Zerzan,

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[10] ibid., pps. 82-83.

[11] John Zerzan, "Unionization in America," Telos 27 (Spring 1976): p. 147.

of business' appreciation of the principal union federation testify to its collaborationist stance:

> In 1925 Arthur Nash of the Golden Rule Clothing Company invited Sidney Hillman's Amalgamated Clothing Workers to organize his employees. Mr. Nash explained it this way:"I had a job that I could not do, and I just passed the buck to Mr.Hillman." Gerald Swope, president of General Electric, tried as early as 1926 to persuade the AFL to organize a nation-wide union of electrical workers on an industrial basis. Swope believed that having an industrial union might well mean "the difference between an organization with which we could work on a business-like basis and one that would be a source of endless difficulties.."..in 1928 Secretary of Labor Davis asked that year's AFL convention to eliminate jurisdictional squabbling and get on with the kind of mass organizing that business desired.[12]

Having met defeat in its more militant attempts to prevent the imposition of forms of technical control over the skilled trades in various industries, the AFL had compounded the weakness of its position with a "we'll take anything" attitude that discredited it in the eyes of workers. Thus, when the wildcat strikes and small-scale sabotage of unorganized industrial workers erupted into a massive strike wave following the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933,[13] the surge in organizing effort sprang largely from independent rank and file groups and activists of the left. It was this autonomy that provided the basis for a new union grouping, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), in 1935.

The 1933-37 upsurge owed little if anything to Lewis or the other official leaders of the union movement. Observers concur in attributing the worker upsurge to organizational strength built up by workers themselves, often helped and led by members of left

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[12] ibid.

[13] Section 7a established the right of labor to "representatives of its own choosing."

organizations.[14] With some latitude, we can say that during the upsurge period worker militancy and thus worker gains stemmed from their relative independence from their labor leaders and their concomitant ability to force that leadership to support and legitimize their militancy.[15] Lewis' famous fight with the AFL's Hutcheson at the AFL convention of 1935, a fight that heralded the founding of the CIO, was essentially a successful symbolic expression of the impatience and frustration of workers by a man who was regarded as an autocrat in his own union and who intended to extend that autocracy throughout the ranks of the unorganized. A Republican up to and through the presidential election of 1932, Lewis organized the CIO as a highly centralized, "feudal" structure, replicating the United Mine Workers (UMW) framework that allowed UMW representatives to bargain over the heads of workers. Thus organizing drives led by the CIO performed the function of rooting out indigenous leadership.[16] Intent upon circumscribing a broad range of "management prerogatives" as beyond worker control, the hierarchy of the CIO was especially interested in refocusing worker interest away from the salient control issues, especially when they were broadly framed to challenge management authority. In representing a work force angered over the petty despotism of foremen and aasembly line pressures, the CIO limited shop floor reform to regulations restricting foremen and sought to change strike tactics so that the employee's

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[14] Micahel Davis, "The Barren Marriage of American Labor and the Democratic Party," New Left Review 124 (November 1980): 48.

[15] Zerzan, ibid., p. 152.

[16] Davis, ibid., p. 62-6.

strongest weapon, the sitdown strike with its direct chanlenge to employer control, would be dropped in favor of refusal to work.[17]

Crucial to the effectiveness of the efforts of the labor hierarchy in suppressing insurrectionary tendencies among workers were the efforts by the Democratic party (DP) to cement labor's participation in the electoral alliance first established in 1932. This was carried out by both direct negotiation between DP leaders and labor chiefs, through occassional pro-labor tilts that were intended to forestall third party tendencies, and by the failure of more base-oriented organizations, especially the Communist Party (CP) under Browder, to resist cooptive moves and cleave to an independent line.[18] (Of course, the entire process of integration was only possible within a climate of actual or threatened state repression and remarkably fratricidal sabotage of "leftish" strikes by AFL unions.)[19] The following letter from Roosevelt to Lewis and William Green, head of the AFL, accurately illustrates the mediating role the DP was trying to establish for itself:

> The American people sincerely hope that a constructive negotiated peace with honor may come about between the A.F. of L. and the CIO...The National Manufacturers Association express now a better understanding of the problems of labor relationships and greater willingness to work with labor in a realistic effort to improve their mutual relations and to better general working conditions.[20]

During World War II the organizational and ideological rationalization of American corporatism, which had been developed in

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[17] Zerzan, ibid., p. 152.

[18] Davis, ibid., p. 55.

[19] New Essays 3:1 (January 1937): p. 18.

[20] Living Marxism 4:6 (January 1938): p. 166.

sections and maintained only with difficulty during the first two Roosevelt administrations, began to achieve some degree of consolidation. Davis describes the situation:

> The previous estrangement of the dominant fractions of corporate capital from the New Deal was superseded by the intimacy of collaboration as the flower of Wall Street became the economic warlords of Washington while leading reformers were being exiled to minor administrative posts. The reigning congressional alliance of Republicans and right-wing Democrats was reinforced by the rise of a bureaucratic cabal of "dollar-a-year" corporate executives and...Southern Democrats in command of the war economy...generals and admirals now entered into a new and permanent collusion with war contractors and their political agents. This emergent "military-industrial complex" succeeded where the NRA had failed in melding the political and economic ingredients for state monopoly capitalism.[21]

The form of "partnership" implied in Roosevelt's letter acquired an air of necessity in the war against fascism. Although the partnership was blatantly unequal and operated to the detriment of organized labor, which had formally agreed to a no-strike pledge and had been seriously weakened by CIO-AFL conflict, it was accepted without significant protest in the upper union echelons. Predictably, the concomitants of this weakness, a fall in real wages over the course of the war and repeated violations of the Wagner Act, led to waves of unauthorized strikes beginning in 1943. The labor bureaucracy, now having achieved a greater legitimacy within the state apparatus as "labor commanders," once again sought to suppress strike action, this time with the support of the CP, which insisted upon maximizing production to take pressure off the Soviet Union. The CP thereby isolated itself from its "base," leaving it, and thus the left generally, in a weak position when the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviets formally disintegrated.

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[21] Davis, ibid., p. 63.

The years 1946-49 brought the resolution of the "left-labor problem." Backed up by a center-right Congress that eventually passed the Taft-Hartley Act, and gaining some support among a substantially ethnic blue collar constituency grown suspicious or hostile towards the Soviet Union,[22] conservatives in the labor movement, in conjunction with employers, mounted an outright purge of the left. In 1949 eleven allegedly Communist controlled union were expelled from the CIO, to be replaced by anticommunist unions that began to organize workers in the expelled unions. The case of the United Electrical Workers (UE) illustrates some of the worst results of the state-sponsored interunion conflict that followed:

> In 1948 the UE had been able to negotiate from a position of strength, representing all the workers in the electrical manufacturing industry; by 1953, after five years of raids and the chartering of a rival international, some eighty different unions had pacellized the UE's jurisdiction and were bargaining for a membership only one-half the size of the 1948 UE rank and file. While raiding was in progress, employers were given a free hand to conduct long-sought purges of the militant local and secondary leaderships. On one day in Chicago alone, for example, three electrical companies fired more than five hundred UE officials and stewards (and were later upheld by the NLRB [National Labor Relations Board] under provisions of Taft-Hartley).[23]

Aftermath: Theoretical Reconciliation

Theoretical expressions of this defeat of labor can be tracked in a variety of directions. In them can be read a theoretically formalized account of inter and intraclass relations of the American variant of social democracy, welfare capitalism. "Pluralist" theories of democracy, expounded by writers such as Lipset and the early Galbraith

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[22] Workers of Slavic and Hungarian descent composed approximately one-half of the CIO membership.

[23] Davis, ibid., p. 77.

and Dahl, provide the best examples. Lipset, writing in 1960, proclaimed the Final Equilibrium: "the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state."[24] Now labor and capital possessed, according to Galbraith, "countervailing power," and had become "corespective," each recognizing the legitimate interests of the other.[25] To Dahl, a sufficiently fair distribution of the fruits of production would be achieved through negotiations carried out by elites representing various competing mass followings, negotiations guaranteed by an "arena" maintaining state.[26]

In their 1962 article,"The Two Faces of Power," Bachrach and Baratz argued that such "theories" of power failed to achnowledge a significant form of its exercise:

> Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of desisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.[27]

As an innocuous example, Bachrach and Baratz offer the case of a faculty member who, though wishing to change a longstanding departmental policy, does not raise his objections because he is afraid

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[24] Seymour Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1963), pp. 442-3.

[25] John Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 137-9.

[26] Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicage Press, 1956), pp. 145-51.

[27] P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz,"The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56 (December 1962): 948.

of the consequences for his career or because he believes he is insufficiently powerful.[28] According to the form of empiricism Barach and Baratz wish to criticize, there has been no empirically definable contention and thus there has been no failure to have a system-relevant grievance addressed and/or satisfied. To refute this view the authors quote Schattschneider:

> All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.[29]

The concept of "mobilization of bias" was at least latent in the writing of those pluralists who were most explict in defining pluralist democracy in contrast to less desirable social froms. To Kornhauser, "mass society" provided a summary characterization of such forms: "a social system in which elites are readily accessible to influence by non-elites and non-elites are readily available for mobilization by elites."[30] To prevent mass input from putting too much pressure on elites, or becoming available to counterelites disrespectful of the rules of the game, Kornhauser declared that mass absorption in depoliticized activities was essential.[31] Broadly anticipating a focus of Marcuse, Kornhauser argued that the sublimation of potentially national level interests into interests capable of realization at the "intermediate group" level would allow elites their necessary insulation

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[28] ibid., p. 949.

[29] E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960), p. 71.

[30] William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Free Press, 1959), p. 39.

[31] ibid., p. 59-60.

from mass pressure, and at the same time make the masses unavailable for mobilization. Thus Kornhauser, by introducing the Freudian concept that epitomizes the uncertain fusion of objectively necessitated and socially compelled redefinitions of interest, offered ideological "insulation" for both the process and consequences of the mobilization of bias. At the same time, of course, he pointed to the manner in which psychological mechanisms can be enlisted to accomodate and to an extent promote identification with the interests of elites.[32]

Overall, the pluralist account provides a superficial rendering of the more explicitly political resource allocation mechanisms of "interest group liberalism," while at the same time it conceals crucial repressive and suppressive elements of inter- and intraclass relations, elements that would contradict pluralism's affirmative intentions. From the standpoint of our concerns, the combination of economic and legal repression that was aimed at anti-corporatist elements both within and without the labor movement seriously weakened the organizational and critical resources of the opposition. Thus although the terms of capitalist hegemony had been altered through the partial success of

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[32] Of course, this purported sublimatory moment of the mobilization of bias can most readily be comprehended if we conceive of the sublimated need as an abstract "drive" that can be satisfied once another setting for its realization is found. If, however, as we have argued in the second chapter, the need or interest that is being frustrated is not conceived of as in abstract terms, e.g. desire for an unspecified object, but instead as a form of social relation within which an entire panoply of socially elaborated needs may be met, e.g. democratic-egalitarian relations, we would anticipate sublimation to be more difficult, if possible at all. In such instances it thus becomes appropriate to conceive of the application of power to achieve a suppressive or repressive mobilization of bias as remaining just that, without applying concepts that suggest "reconciliation."

initiatives within both the political and economic spheres,[33] the more general question of class power in the social order was submerged under the concept of management prerogatives and the welfare state.

While, I would argue, such power does not allow an "hegemony without contradiction," it does inform an outlook entailing habits of resignation, deference, and withdrawal, that is in a basic sense unleavened by any hope of altering the social relations of production. This is both conducive to and realized within a pattern of pursuits called by Habermas "civil privatism:" "political abstinence combined with an orientation to career, leisure, and consumption."[34] But this syndrome, grounded in the frustration, disenchantment, and self-protective cynicism stemming from the continuing failure of distinguishable, but essentially bourgeois parties to address social contradictions, has not developed into a complete indifference to public life. Thus the abstinence referred to by Habermas involves not so much a complete withdrawal, but:

a)vis-a-vis formal government institutions, the limitation of participation to the correction of political tendencies threatening liveing standards and the quality of life, defined in the consumption oriented terms of the civil privatism model.

b) An insistnece that patterns of voluntary or peer group decision-making conform generally to democratic-egalitarian models,

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[33] For example, along with formal recognition of the right to union representation and the attendant possibility of gaining higher wages, job security, etc., the working class secured other state-provided reforms such as unemployment compensationk social security, and government job programs to counteract the effects of business cycles.

[34] Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, p. 37.

e.g. all can voice their opinion, elected representatives are expected to follow policies that reflect the majority will, etc.

The formation of elite consensus and its promulgation as policy is bounded in its content by the consumptionist themes of civil privatism and in its form by an open-ended, unevenly realized insistence upon democratic-egalitarian relations. In part, this open, uneven quality stems precisely from the confluence of communicative context and discourse we have earlier remarked on and which we have now more concretely specified.

The Interviews: Preliminary Comments

In reporting the interviews I will introduce them by first providing further details regarding the sociohistorical setting. In doing this, I will anticipate the actual interview material by paying more attention to those aspects that seemed salient to the subject, thereby beginning to draw attention to broad features of the subject's selective attention and thematizations. Here the intent is not to link objective and subjective fields in a manner recalling the identification of principal "causes" in nomothetic research. To recall earlier points, all to frequently this results in trapping and containing the subject in a grid of determining factors, a model of explanation suppressive of the reflective capacity of the subject. Rather, the aim is to play off the preceding section so as to suggest the manner in which ideological processes and attitudes, unfolding within a subject-society dialectic, both depend upon and support a one-sided appropriation of the social order by the subject.

Interwoven in this introduction will be fragments of a "portrait" of the subject. This part of the presentation is more

problematic than it may seem. The study's focus on social and psychological dynamics, fissures, and opacities, and the interest in exposing the continuous effort to patch them together ideologically demands a critical approach to the presentation of the subject as a person. To present an image of the subject composed of physical description, accounts of behavior, general insights derived from talking with them, etc. can contribute to the ideological process I wish to clarify. Two lines of consideration seem significant here:

a) An insistence on presenting the "whole subject" is often justified as a way of avoiding their reification in theory (as well as the reification of the researcher in theorizing). This point, paralleling Adorno's critique of idealism we have referred to, is well taken. Yet this insistence may also contain a demand for narcissistic compensation that obscures, through the benevolent restoration of personal and interpersonal qualities that are valued but cannot actually be attained in the existing order, the effects of social processes. At bottom, having to recast experience so that one's behavior meet role requirements is humiliating and does constitute a loss of dignity and integrity. Even if the interviewer is able to establish a relatively unpressured, restorative context in which the integrity and humanity of the subject manifests itself, the constitutive relationship of the particular communicative context to those qualities, and the uniqueness of that context suggest they largely exist as potentiality. The more the integrity of the individual is lauded in the midst of a powerfully effective domination, the more the notion of integrity is adjusted to fit conditions that would extinguish it.

b) Perhaps the most important interpretive technique employed in the analysis of the interviews is the sentence by sentence tracing of shifts in the subject's stance as they discuss contradictory relations. These shifts mark the subject's ongoing attempt to adjust their needs to a contradictory reality. In the midst of these contradictions the "whole" subject becomes a procession of contradictory images held together by an ego that resorts to ideology to hold things together. In relation to the "results" of this form of dialog analysis, in which the subject is regarded frame by frame, the portrait is the projected image of the "film," run at regular speed. All the dissonant frames are thereby blended together, their specific outline lost behind an integrative movement carried out by both the subject and the researcher.[35]

In some sense what I am arguing is that while one is justified in referring to an integrative self, this self, just as in the case of the transcendental ego in Kant's system, is manifested only through the particular way it carries out its integrative function and can, therefore, only be understood in relation to those elements. To continue the parallel, just as Kant introduces tne transcendental ego after the

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[35] Such an integrative movement is characteristic of a suppressive activity of social groups. In my work at a mental health center I talked with a woman who was struggling to maintain her "model mother" image, despite the fact that family problems were creating such stress for her that she had begun to drink heavily, was experiencing great rage towards her children, and was having thoughts of suicide. Within the family, rewards of love and esteem were given in return for her "performance," which the family charitably assessed in terms of her role observances and not her increasing debility. She was "living a lie" in which her husband, children, and relatives collaborated to preserve themselves from her anger and criticism. I would argue that this is simply an extreme case of a ubiquitous phenomenon. While the interests of the audience vary, the identity they bestow bears the same occlusive relationship to the reality of the subject's life.

transcendental deduction of a priori categories, so does the self emerge ontogenetically as "the overall organization of identifications and introjections under the guiding principle of the synthetic function of the ego."[36] Because in a fundamental sense it is the particular identifications and introjections that must be called into question, the self, which exerts such a strong pull on our attention in ideological discourse, must be continually "passed through" in our analysis. Our goal corresponds to something akin to what Sartre termed an "authentic" self, here freed of his illusions, characteristic of that period of his work, of facile self-transparency and ahistoricity. At bottom, then, I want to encourage the reader to refrain from composing either a stable image, subsisting apart from the analytically defined contents, nor an image struggling with "conflicts." Instead, what I want to emerge is a sense of the subject in a set of changing, dynamic relations, conceived of both intra- and interpersonally.

Pat

When I interviewed him in the summer of 1978, Pat was 19, a white male from a rural, essentially working class community within Washtenaw county.[37] He worked as an assembler in a Chrysler plant,

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[36] Otto Kernberg, Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis (New York: Aronson, 1976), p. 24.

[37] My decision to present Pat's interviews was rather fortuitous. Originally the other memberso of my informal research group, Gary Gregg and Tod Sloan, and I had decided to each interview six or seven subjects and to pool the interviews so that we could together draw on twenty interview sets. Pat was the first subject I interviewed. In order to facilitate discussion among us, his interviews were immediately transcribed and copied. As it became clear just how lengthy a satisfactory interview presentation would be, and as the general phenomenon I wished to elucidate reappeared across our subjects, I decided to do fewer interviews. Eventually I elected to present only one subject as an illustration and chose Pat because his interviews were transcribed, I was familiar with them, and because I believe the nature

putting together sections of an instrument panel and he was required to do 3189 parts per day, about one every ten seconds. In its deskilled simplicity and pace Pat's job was typical of assembly work, and its effects were evident during our interviews, which always took place after he got off work in the afternoon. The tone of our conversations was generally subdued, Pat rarely becoming animated and tending to avoid eye contact. It seemed as though Pat would be only gradually leaving the plant as we talked in his apartment.

In the summer of 1978 auto workers were in a defensive position, facing layoffs as a result of a general decline in domestic demand due to "stagflation," rising fuel costs, and the tardiness of the auto company response to the shift in car size preference.[38] In this context the regular pressure exerted by management for greater "productivity" and work discipline was intensified, both in the sense that management sought to take up "organizational slack" and in that management demands now appeared justified by expanding inventories, and the overall insecure position of the company. Having been only marginally profitable even in the sixties, and consequently never subjected to a strike, Chrysler's traditional status as the most endangered of the Big

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of the project warrants the use of a single case as an "archetype." In the concluding chapter I discuss criteria for selecting further cases.

[38] Serrin attributes this tardiness to poor judgment regarding demand patterns, and a reluctance to give up the greater profits afforded by larger cars (rougly directly proportional to unit cost). Thus, to use the 1970 figures cited by Serrin, a large car selling for $4000 would bring roughly $250 to $300 in after-tax profits, while a small car selling for half that price would bring half the profit. In addition, a small car ethos would have encouraged the purchase of fewer high profit accessories. The greatest "irony" is that the United Auto Workers had been encouraging the auto companies to build a small car since the early sixties. The standard response was that production decisions were none of the union's business. See William Serrin, The Company and the Union (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 30.

Three further enhanced its ability to make demands from weakness.[39] Yet, even though an appreciation of Chrysler's position was substantially shared by the rank and file and the union leadership, a considerable divergence in the experienced consequences opened up a gap between them. Thus, while the union leadership was preparing to establish a political working alliance with the corporation to appeal for federal loan guarantees, some Chrysler workers, as Pat recounted, had begun to look to their informal organizational capacity and were talking vaguely of possible wildcat strikes to relieve the pressure.

As we shall see, Pat, in his general approach to work and its encompassing social relations, tended to frown upon tactics of this sort. While he offered explicit rationales for his dissent, rationales that we will address below, at the very outset of the interviews his formulation of his dissatisfaction with the position of assemblyman indicated he had found a basis for rapprochment:

> Pat: I don't plan on staying with Chrysler or staying an assemblyperson [his usage] for more than four years or something like that. Yeah.
>
> Interviewer: Do you have any ideas about what you'd like to do?
>
> P: I'm thinking about going into drafting, something like that, 'cause Chrysler will hire me, they'll pay for all the schooling too, and for anything I put into it.

Already Pat had pointed to a dimension of the relationship with Chrysler, couched in terms of an opportunity to enhance his job, that existed apart from his immediate relationship to the process of production and, yet, for its possibility depended upon Pat carrying out his immediate production tasks. These structured incentives, part of the "bureaucratic" control pattern outlined by Edwards, established a real

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[39] ibid., p. 33-34.

ground for an orientation to the future relationship with the company, and presented Pat with a way of escaping his present situation.[40] Confronting a contracting job market, itself certain to heighten the fabled job security consciousness of American workers overstressed by writers like Perlman,[41] Pat's orientation is also urged into the future by the prospect of white collar work if he "suffices."

I then asked him about his working conditions, specifically how his rate of work, which I anticipated would be a conflicted issue, was determined.

> P: Uh, they have a rate set up...[denotes pause and roughly indicates length] you know, for normal production and how many parts a person can run an hour and if you run over that..like the rate on my machine is 3189. if I hit 3189 two hours early I don't have to work anymore and if they make me work they have to pay me time and a half for any hours worked...so I just quit when I hit production.
>
> I: So you can work a varying number of hours per day?

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[40] Edwards distinguishes three types of cntrol systems used in capitalist enterprises: simple, technical, and bureaucratic. Simple control involves direct supervision by the owner and a coterie of supervisors, who exericse personal power in rewarding and punishing workers. Most characteristic of small firms, it clearly persists as a feature of capitalist enterprises generally. Technical control is made possible when the size of the firm allows the production process to be structured as an integrated sequence, the pace of which can be determined by management. The car assembly line is the best example of such routinization and standardization. Bureaucratic control "rests on the principle of embedding dontrol in the social structure or social relations of the workplace." (p. 21) Rules are formalized and hence impersonalized; optimally, promotion opportunities are used to encourage compliance and, we might add, to undercut identification with any particular position. Obviously, the overall control system in a large firm contains elements of each of these: e.g. winning favor with the supervisor for producing above "the rate" will increase the likelihood of promotion. See Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 18-22.

[41] Cited by Sidney Peck, "Fifty Years After A Theory of the Labor Movement: Class Conflict in the United States," Insurgent Sociologist 8 (Fall 1978): 4-5.

P: Yeah, there's a lot of people who work like five hours a day, every day.

I: You mean you can go in there and work hard for five hours...

P: Yeah, and then you go sit in an air-conditioned cafeteria, or out in the sun.

I was surprised that people had to remain at the plant after they fulfilled their production quota, which was supposed to represent, according to the union contract, a full day's labor. I conveyed that surprise, and Pat replied:

P: Yeah...it strikes me as funny but, I don't know, I suppose it's to keep down cheating and things like that 'cause a lot of people would like to leave early.

I: Let me follow this up some...How would you cheat if they know you've done 3189?

P: They really can't tell because the parts I make don't really go directly to somebody. They sit in a bin and some one else puts parts on top of those so they couldn't tell if it was mine or theirs or somebody else's. My counter, I push the counter by hand, so...there's lots of jobs like that.

I asked if he minded hanging around the plant after he's done his quota.

P: Not really, I'm not getting paid for it. You know, there's people always saying "Boy, I wish we could leave after we got done," but they really can't bitch because they get paid for doing nothing...you know... I mean the work isn't really that hard for what you do. I mean, most places, if you hit the...like Ford's, if you hit the production you're on call even if you're done.

I decided to see how he would assess a justification for leaving the plant upon attaining the quota. I referred to the idea that Pat's output is determined by time and motion studies intended to establish production rates that make the most of a worker's time.

P: Yeah, well it's supposed to be no more than a normal pace, is how it reads, the contract.....Yeah, it does sound reasonable, but...uh, yeah...I don't see why they don't work it that way...It's just the way it's been since I've been there.

I: I see.

P: Sounds, yeah, they're just confining people.

I: Hmmm.

P: That's what they're doing...I don't think they like the system they have there, really.

We talked briefly about Chrysler having previously had a system that encouraged production over the quota with monetary incentives, but which was dropped when demand fell. I then asked if people planned to finish early so they might talk or play cards.

P: People do that with the remainder of their time...there's always a card game you can get into...I use to get done everyday but they raised my rate and I won't...I won't run it. I mean, you know, its inhumanly possible do I start slowing down.

Recapitulation: The Pull of Management's Standpoint

In this section of the first interview we see an overall shift in Pat's references to his experiences at Chrysler, a shift accompanied by manifestations of conflict. As we move into the question of production rates, one of the principal objective determinants of the quality of life at the plant, Pat focuses in on the possibility of getting off as much as two hours early - he can "just quit when he hits production" and then "go and sit in an air-conditioned cafeteria, or out in the sun." When I wonder why people are kept at the plant, Pat momentarily questions the policy, then takes up the standpoint of management, speculating about the cheating that would occur if people were allowed to leave, further stating that a lot of them would.

Here we should pause to consider my grounds for referring to Pat as "taking up the standpoint of management," as opposed to simply hypothesizing about their rationale. First, it is undeniable that Pat has interrupted a self-expressive account - "it strikes me as funny" -

that conveys some doubt about the justifiability of the rule, to articulate a hypothetical management rationale. Now, it could be argued that this is simply an objectively oriented report based upon the experience of an "average informed participant." But seeing Pat's reference to management's rationale as a simple act of logical verstehen, an imputation of a motive to another actor, is inadequate. Most clearly, Pat regularly interacts with management and in that interaction necessarily tries to understand management by drawing upon foreknowledge and implicit and explicit communications as well as inferences based upon those sources. But we can infer that Pat attempts to arrive at this understanding to come to terms with coercion by management. Our inference is based upon 1) our knowing that a "fair day's work" has been specified by time and motion study, and that fulfillment of that contractually legitimized work quota represents an end to the individual's obligation to the company, a notion partially recognized by the company when they allow employees to sit in the cafeteria and fully recognized by other workers, who complain, 2) the ease with which Pat sees the warrant of my critical suggestion and elaborates it, 3) my own sense of what the range of legitimate wage-based obligations are, a sense derived from personal experience, my knowledge of law and custom, etc., 4) later expressions by Pat of objections to this scheme.

Recognizing the prohibitionary and antagonistic quality of the rationale and the context in which it is "learned" brings us to question the wisdom of seeing Pat's statement as a simple report, and of understanding its "valence" in his train of thought as essentially

neutral. Let us look at the key statement again, this time analyzing it into three sections:

> P: Yeah...[1]it strikes me as funny,
> [2]but, I don't know,
> [3]I suppose it's to keep down cheating
> and things like that 'cause a lot of
> people would
> like to leave early.

In the first segment, Pat equivocally picks up on my doubts, doubts which are more strongly articulated at the end of the dialogue I have reported. However, in the second segment, the objecting "but," followed by the self-effacing "I don't know," signifies the suppression of his doubt, and sets the dialogic and psychological stage for the third segment, wherein management's rationale is both articulated and affirmed with reference to the likelihood of cheating.

Although this shift may be partially constituted by Pat's "own" ambivalence, it is also expressive of a social contradiction. The prohibition flows out of management's hierarchically enacted strategy to maximize productivity, and Pat's continuing experience of the prohibition as antagonistic is maintained by the grounding of his interests in legitimized sociocultural themes. Pat may be able to supress his awareness of his suffering attendant to this contradiction. But the shift we see in the dialogue suggests that the management of the conflict is an ongoing task for Pat, and requires persistent processing.

Returning to the interview, after Pat explains how cheating is possible, I ask him how he feels about staying after he's fulfilled his quota. His response, "Not really, I'm not getting paid for it," doesn't quite make sense - why shouldn't he leave if he isn't getting paid? The inadequacy of the statement as a reference to consensually valid norms

intended to justify management policy should not be taken as a simple error, but instead as indicative of the power of the internalized representation of management. This expanded sense of his statement is reinforced by his reworking of the phrase in a more appropriate context a few seconds later. The standpoint favorable to management espoused by Pat involves conceiving of wages as determined by time spent in the plant, rather than work done, even though the latter standard is recognized by management in a number of ways: via time and motion study determined output goals and the fact that they have, in boom times, paid people more when they produce over quota. At the same time, of course, the work done rationale retains its moral force - "they get paid for doing nothing." Here Pat's reference to management power within the interview involves less illogic than a shifting, selective deployment of elements of two rationales which has the effect of putting workers in a worst-off position with regard to justifying their compensation. At the same time, within the frame of reference momentarily established - Pat assessing other workers - management is absent, yet possibly all the more effective in that its standpoint is not manifestly connected in Pat's utterances with an explicit attribution of the rationale to management, a representation that might provoke resistance to it. Instead, Pat seems to speak for management, at least in the articulation of the worst-off rationale, which then passes over into a reference to the relatively better conditions. This reference, as we shall see, links up with Pat's job history, and the relative superiority of work within the oligopolized auto industry, and encourages, to use his phrasing, a "loyalist" orientation.

The standpoint shifts in Pat's justification unfold within what appears to be a steady reference to the other workers. They are said to only complain, and thus do not form arguments which require serious consideration. Again, instead of being prospective partners in serious dialogue, Pat invokes a connventional form of denigration and characterizes them as simply "bitching." In contrast to Pat, they are unappreciative of the benefits they receive for doing work that "isn't really all that hard," an absolute argument which is then relativized through reference to conditions at Ford. However, when I try to set up the likely standpoint of the bitching workers, Pat quickly refers to the notion of contractual legitimacy and begins to wonder whether management is actually just "confining people." He decides they are...but then immediately separates act and actor by claiming management doesn't like their own system. I would argue that Pat thereby sets up the possibility of criticizing work without really confronting management. This allows him to begin to articulate an ongoing problem: that the production rate, which he had earlier suggested was low enough for him to quit early, is actually so high that it cannot be met, that it is, in an ironic and contradictory slip, "inhumanly possible."

In this sequence we have seen how the eventual articulation of suffering is not allowed to gain a status that makes it relevant to the overall characterization of the social relations of the workplace. Initially, this experience, constituted in the clash of systems of representation at the locus of the individual, is suppressed. The onset of a critical attitude, enabled by the relatively open character of the interview situation, at first sets off a process of self-disqualification in Pat that reflects, on one level, a difficult

confrontation with management. Ultimately, after first surfacing in the voice of other workers whom Pat criticizes and defines himself in opposition to, suppressed/repressed conceptualizations do attain a certain focus, but essentially in a manner that is abstracted from the very social relations within which they are constituted in the first place - after all, management doesn't like their own system.

One way of characterizing what was taking place in our dialogue is to see it as an aborted movement on the part of the subject to a clearer definition and articulation of their social existence in the midst of contradictory systems of representation. In our dialogue a process of reflection was initiated that tentatively developed as the neutrality of the interview situation was explored by Pat. To an extent, the trajectory of reflection in psychoanalysis, passing through resistance and defense to the wish, provides a useful analogy.[42] Here the suffering, and the desire to somehow end it, is obscured by a series of defensive moves. As the dialogue proceeds we pass through something akin to what Greenson would call a "hierarchy of resistance and defense," a series of characteristic maneuvers unfolding at conscious, preconscious, and unconscious levels that prevent the threat to the relationship with management from surfacing. In the dialogue we go through a series of representational frameworks in which Pat identifies with management, acknowledges his gratitude, condemns the idea of criticism, denies his discontent, etc. Finally, after I provide him with the "space" and an echo of his own resentment, the dangerous

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[42] Ralph Greenson, The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis (New York: International Universtities Press, 1967), pp. 137-145.

criticisms are voiced, but only after he absolves the management of responsibility. The correct attribution does not transpire.

The scattered, at times illogical, self-disqualifying defensive maneuvering is undoubtedly characteristic of Pat's everyday consciousness. This is not to say that Pat is simply muddled and unable to recognize his "true" interests, that his consciousness is "false" in that he does not recognize an objective truth. Rather, it is to say that characteristically Pat does not think within a communicative context in which the constraints we have "seen" at work here are suspended. In a manner that recalls the conflation of thought and action in the stereotyped object relations of the unconscious and, as we shall argue, is partially constituted by them, Pat's thinking about problematic consequences of social relations appears to be constrained by the immediate, unrecognized evocation of the undesirable consequences of his criticism. To see this let us recall the discussion of Lorenzer's concept of the stereotype in the third chapter, wherein one of the most signnficant consequences of stereotypic infiltration was the difficulty experienced by the subject in considering an object without immediately acting out behavior that is informed by a scene, a fixed constellation of self, object, and impulse. Here I am suggesting that in Pat's discussion of management, the fate of criticism is governed by the immediate evocation of unrecognized rationales that "dictate," as it were, suppression of criticism, and thus disrupt the articulation of his grievance. In thinking about management, his appreciation of the negative consequences of criticism is effectively simultaneous with the evocation of his grievance. Thus the increase in conflict with management that would follow from his criticism, conflicts which may

always be consciously considered and accounted for as part of a "coping strategy" and hence avoided, are evoked at the preliminary stage of his reflection, his intrasubjective communication, on his own frustration. Consequently, he does not "hear himself out." He preempts the eventual critical attitude with one-sided identifications - the loyal, grateful critic of bitching - that contain both positive and negative elements - he can ally with management at the same time as he denies his suffering, all in a movement that, to him, corresponds to the voicing of an opinion that is freely arrived at.

After Pat speaks of the rate being "inhumanly possible," he quietly hoped that no one would run the rate, thus making it likely that it would be lowered again. I began to silently wonder if Pat and the four other workers performing the same task would collaborate to ensure the lowering of the rate. But as he talked about their collective discontent, he told of how the rate had been set to <u>his pace</u>. I asked him if the other workers had said anything:

> P: No. It wasn't my choice. I could have gone really slow and they might have passed me by, but I doubt it, 'cause the last time I went slow they just passed me by and came back again.

I wasn't clear as to what he meant. From my own experience, time and motion studies were done to both identify inefficiencies and establish ideal rates on the basis of an analysis of the job down into basic movements that could be given standard times.[43] The approach he had described seemed to rely upon the worker to validate the rate, instead of the job analysis. I asked for a clarification:

> P: Let's see, They were gonna raise the rate on my job and they came down and timed me and I didn't run the rate they wanted so they went and changed it back to the old way and came back a

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[43] Braverman, <u>Labor and Monopoly Capital</u>, pp. 173-83.

couple of month's later and changed it again and I was going faster. They happened to catch me on a day after a day off in the middle of the week so I was pretty energetic.

I asked if the "old way" was the same job with a slightly slower rate. His response is unclear, but from reading over the transcripts, the difference between old and new refers to a minor change in the machine that was said to justify raising the rate by approximately 40 percent.

P: Yeah, the old way was a slower rate but, yeah, they had to change it [the machine] because they wanted to raise the rate. The rate on the old one wasn't really as high as it should've been but the rate on the new one was too high. From one extreme to another.

I: Why do you say it want't as high as it should have been?

P: Because it was fairly simple to get done on. I could get done pretty close to just the same on the new way and the old one. It didn't really make much of a difference, to justify the rate raise, especially. But the change isn't...Like I got done earlier with the old way than the new way but I never worked as hard as I could with the new way.

Picking up on his use of the term "should" in his previous statement, I sought to find out what he considered when assessing whether a rate was appropriate or not. My phrasing was vague, so it took a while for him to understand what I was asking:

I: How do you tell when you're working fast or when you're working at the right speed, let's put it that way.

P: Usually I have to time myself on a job with a high rate.

I: Well, I mean...

P: I have to figure out how many parts I have to run per minute or sometimes even per second or, you know, how many seconds per part.

I: When you're trying...It seems like other people might have said that the slower rate's all right, and I'm just trying to figure out why it is that you thought that a little bit faster rate was a better rate.

P: I didn't say it was better...

I: That you felt more, that you..

P: I just don't think it was as high as it could have been. They want it to be just as high as they can get it. Uh...

I: Well, did you have some sense that the old one, the real slow one, that the old rate was not fair?

P: No, nothing like that. You know, I don't think it was unfair to anybody really. I just think that the person that ran it the first time was going a little slower or, you know, he was going slower than my normal pace.

I: OK, so when you say that the rate "should" have been faster, what do you mean by that?

P: If the company would have done it the way they wanted to it could easily have been faster.

I: I'm just focusing on your use of the term "should," like "should" in light of what? Because it's more fair, because it makes more sense to use the machines better that way?...

P: You know, it would have cost them less per part if they could make more parts per hour, so...they were just losing money because they didn't set the rate higher in the first place.

I made several mistakes in this section. My first error was to translate "should" into another term, "better," that obviously had unacceptable implications for Pat. I made this translation with reference to the other workers in a way that may well have implied that I thought he was "brown nosing" the supervisor. This may have prompted him to refer to the objective possibility of a higher rate - "as high as it could have been." Then, when I translated <u>again</u>, and introduce the term "fair," it might have seemed to him as though I was trying to coax him into criticizing the company. Underlying all of this was my sense that when he told of how the company set the rate, by catching him when he was feeling refreshed, he was criticizing the company, and by introducing normative concerns, was miving into a potential condemnation.

Pat takes up a position that presupposes and alludes to the fact of *opposing* interests. When he states "I just don't think it was as high as it could have been. They want it to be just as high as they can get it," my request for him to discuss the basis of his own standards is not really addressed before he passes on to the company's motives. His earlier statement that the old rate "was fairly simple to get done on," which seems to imply a personal judgment, is thereby revealed as an expression of "the union of internal autonomy and external heteronomy, [a] disintegration of freedom in the direction of its opposite," a characteristic form of coerced accomodation noted by Marcuse.[44]

We can explore this confusing dialectic of autonomy and domination further by looking at a section of the second interview, which I start off with another question about Pat's conception of "fair play" at the plant. When the general question didn't seem to be meaningful, I asked Pat whether he bargained with his supervisor over aspects of his job, trying to see to what extent rules could become personalized via negotiation and informal agreement. He explained that the supervisor would only tell him to speed up if he fell below 80 percent of the rate, a figure apparently specified in the contract. He went on to say that a worker who had applied for foreman had attained the rate the Friday after our first interview, making it likely that the new rate would be kept.

> P: If someone makes it they can't change it...it can't be argued that it's too high...er...it can be argued but nothing can be done about it.

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[44] Herbert Marcuse, Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 51.

He wasn't entirely sure that the new rate would be formalized, though. I asked him what he would do if the foreman told him the new rate was to be kept.

P: Uh, I don't know...I don't think I'd do it if he came up and told me to. I'd tend to do it more if he didn't tell me to.

I: Why is that?

P: I don't really trust my foreman, you know, that much.

I: What do you mean, you don't trust him?

P: I mean I don't trust what he says at all. He says one thing but he does the opposite so that tends to make me not believe what he says. On my rate he said that if it was too high he said he'd change it, and when he brought it down [from management] he said he couldn't change it.

I asked him whether he had ever said anything about that to the foreman.

P: I talked with him about the rate...I talked with him about it when he first brought it down but he said there was nothing he could do about it and from then on he didn't seem to care.

I: Did you tell him he had broken his promise?

P: No, I didn't mention that...uh...let's see...Had something to say...What was...I can't remember now.

I: Do you want to sit for a minute and try to think of it?

P: I'll probably...I don't think I can remember it right now.

Pat then recalled that he had told the supervisor that he would be "very tired" at the end of the day. I then asked about his saying he wouldn't run it if the foreman told him to.

P: I don't know. It's probably because I have to decide for myself if I'm gonna run it or not, is what it is. It doesn't really matter ifhe tells me or not, 'cause I still have to do the work, whereas he doesn't have to. It's easy to come up and tell someone to do something if you don't have to do it yourself.

For Pat, direct commands that disregard the real difficulties entailed by a job seem to engender an immediate resistance, whereas he

can eventually come to accept the production rate if he is allowed to develop his own sense of the target's legitimacy. This dimension of Pat's criteria of legitimacy coincides with Kantian doctrine which, baldly put, defines the subject's freedom as the right to rationalize the various forms of coercion associated with the social relations of capitalist democracy.[45] In this manner Pat "resolves" the contradiction beteeen citizen and worker: rejecting the commands of the untrustworthy and unempathic foreman, Pat simultaneously looks past the foreman to the basic principles guiding the plant's operation. These principles tend to acquire naturalized power - one can argue about the rate, but if someone makes it, the rate "can't be changed." That offers Pat few options if he is interested in keeping his job, and resonates powerfully with capital's continuing appeals to the laws of the impersonal, uncontrollable market to justify its labor policy.

Forced Consent and the Limits of the Accord

As I have argued at the beginning of the chapter, the terms of the accord between labor and capital establish a framework of guidelines (laws, regulations, associated ideology) for class relations that are consonant with and select from among the stock of interpersonal relations. This formally recognized "agreement" is both supported and subverted by understandings of class relations that are cognizant of interclass power realtions, which ebb and flow around the formal constraints upon the exercise of power. The almost ceremonial, formal aspects of the accord is revealed by the extent to which its breach, and the conduct of interclass relations on the basis of the less regulated use of force, is a possibility that must be anticipated. To understand

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[45] Marcuse, ibid., pp. 90-1.

the Kantian dimension of Pat's conception of assent, his vulnerability to coercion must be recognized. We can see this in his discussion, later in the second interview, of the supervisor's overdiligent enforcement of what he termed "crazy rules:"

P: Like when you're absent...Most supervisors will ask you if you have a note. If you don't they just unexcuse, while he'll give you a lecture. They're...the first time I was absent without a note he said we'd talk about it later and he came back six hours later and then we discussed a little, but after that he ended up saying it was unexcused. You know, he just dwells on little things that other foremen didn't, I should say. Like he would make you, if you didn't get done he wouldn't let you wash your hands before you left until the buzzer went off. Or, you couldn't get your coat until you got done...He's brought up rules I've never heard of, like washing your hands before you leave...or not being able to. In fact, he's made up rules, I think.

I: Did you ever check?

P: No.

I: How would you check if you wanted to?

P: I'd probably ask the union. They should be able to tell me.

I: Why didn't you ask the union steward?

P: I just never got around to it...I figured if I got, if I...At that point I was getting done and I sloughed it off. You know, what's the difference. After they changed the rate I stopped listening to what he said. I wash if I feel like it, you know, and get my coat before I leave, before the buzzer goes off.

I: It sounds like he's...Well, what would happen if you got the union to step in?

P: They'd probably just tell him he was full of crap and leave it at that, or tell him you can't tell that to employees anymore.

I: Wouldn't that put you in a better position, the fact that he had been grieved against? Why don't you file one?

P: Too much of a hassle, really.

I: What do you mean?

P: You gotta go and file a grievance with the committee and then they have to wait and put it through meetings. And it puts you on a bad footing with the supervisor.

I: Can't the union protect you once you're in a bad position?

P: Yeah, to a certain extent. But...well, I got...a friend of mine was fired because they set him up.

I: Set him up?

P: He had a certain amount of rejects he made in comparison with the parts he made. The rejects would have showed [that] he made the rest of parts for his production and they took all of his rejects and took them apart, put 'em back in the bins and fired him for cheating.

I: Has that happened before?

P: I've never heard of it, I'm not sure...His wife worked for Chrysler and they wanted to fire one of them because they were taking too much time off...They'd figure they'd have them over a barrel, that they'd [one of them] have to work constantly.

I: And that's what you fear happening to you?

P: Somewhat, yeah.

I: What do you mean, somewhat?

P: I wouldn't put it past my foreman to do something like that. I don't think he's plotting, but I wouldn't put it past him. But there are other things they can do. They can put me on worse jobs.

In Pat's case, the ability of the foreman to exact reprisals argues for a strategy of indirect opposition and noncompliance. Within the range of "management prerogatives" the foreman possesses an armory of powers that the union can, at best, defend Pat against only well after their employment and which, at worst, the union is helpless to counter. The foreman, who in all likelihood is simply enforcing the rules, is thereby able to undo the various customary <u>quid pro quos</u> other foremen have accepted to encourage production. Assuming his account of his own actions is correct, Pat's attempt to reestablish those customs is successful only in so far as he is willing to open himself to

discipline, something he may be forestalling by arriving "independently" at his decision to produce.

The story of the "setup" is not completely implausible, but as an account of a real occurence it may be a mixture of fabrication and imputation. Yet, as an illustration and reminder of management's offensive power, the story expresses the belief held by workers that management can do what it wishes. As it is told and believed, the "accord" is revealed as a farce, and the nominal strength of workers' organizations becomes ephemeral at the individual level. Within our dialogue, the story functions as a rational justification for the nonunion-oriented strategy for coping with management; the associated shift in the tendency of the dialogue that it accomplishes recalls the implicitly power oriented shifts of the first interview. Prior to his account of the setup, Pat has reported that he "sloughed off" the problem of rule fabrication after the foreman has shown he "doesn't care" about the new rate. Pat responds in a passive-aggressive fashion, "ignoring" the foreman and at the same time avoiding the confrontation that would follow from taking the matter up through the union. This interpersonal strategy, in which his good behavior protects him from reprisal, fits into a more general framework wherein Pat, while having to contend with a management, or perhaps sections of management, that can plot against workers, still can establish a relationship in which "company loyalty" is possible. To Pat, this was both a vague, ill-defined dimension of his job, and yet one that is almost automatically established. After he refers to the possibility he might be punished by having his job changed, I take up a question from the preceding

interview, that of compensation, and ask him about how he feels towards Chrysler, specifically if he feels any sense of obligation.

P: Somewhat. Feel a certain amount of company loyalty for any company you work for. It's not just because of the money... It's probably just because I work there...I don't know...I...

I: Why is that?

P: I don't know. I suppose it would break down to them paying me every week, I'm not really sure.

I: How would you describe your feeling of loyalty?

P: Ummm...I don't know...I just feel...They pay me to go in everyday so I go in everyday I can.

Although I have erred in leading him somewhat with the abstract notion of "obligation," I believe that a concept like "company loyalty" is appropriate for describing some strong, and clearly minimally elaborated, feelings Pat has towards the company. As can be seen from this section of dialogue, the vague feelings elicited by my question are intellectually reduced by Pat to a conventional affective correlate of the exchange of equivalents. When I asked him how he expresses this loyalty, he speaks of trying not to make bad parts, unlike the roughly 50 percent of the workers who don't care. To follow up on this, I asked whether his supervisor, who was surprised at how few bad parts he made, had somehow complimented him. After another of the long pauses that occurred frequently in this part of the interview, Pat said he had.

I: And what did you say?

P: Probably just shrugged my shoulders or something.

I: Is that all it meant, a shrug of the shoulders?

P: I don't know [a little impatiently], it's always good to get compliments, some kind of recognition; meant more than that of course, [mumbles] probably make me work harder.

Undoubtedly, Pat is probably seeking to abide by customs, standard among organized workers, discouraging positive feelings for the employer: not only do they threaten the solidarity of the workers, but, as Pat implies, one thereby allows one self to be manipulated. But even though Pat is aware of these problems, at another level a positive relationship has been constituted, expressed in these manifest rationales that are developed elsewhere in the discussion:

> a) a sense that he is getting paid too much for the unskilled labor he performs
>
> b) the superiority, relative to prior jobs, of the wages and benefits he receives from Chrysler.
>
> c) Pat's conception of honesty, or his sense of "appropriate" equivalents.

That the positive relationship is essentially experienced in relationship to the amorphously defined company, existing apart from untrustworthy foremen, is probably most clearly revealed when I ask him if he sees himself in conflict with Chrysler:

> P: To a certain extent. I mean, I try to get along with the company, to go by their rules, as much as I can. I suppose...Yeah, there's a few things I don't agree with the company on, but that generally I say I'd agree mostly, like 60/40.

When I ask him about the 40, he refers to his "outside interests," including his oppostion to nuclear power, a stand I will refer to below.

To the extent that they achieve expression, Pat's conflicts at the plant seem to be consistently reduced down to interpersonal terms, the relationship with "Chrysler" being understood independently of them. Thus it is through the interpersonal terms that the most severe effects of the accumulation drive are felt; for the foreman to not be lenient, to "go by the book," brings about his transformation into a

disciplinarian who is contrasted to the other foremen and the company. This is the "soulful corporation" approach of Elton Mayo, with a twist. Instead of Pat developing a positive rapport with the company through the experience of corespectivity in the work group, the foreman serves as a focus of frustration, the capriciousness of his discipline paradoxically finding expression in rule-enforcemnt.

Guilt and Good Wages

Unionized "subordinated" workers in the primary sector of the economy, dominated by the mass production industries, earn on the average 1/3 to 1/5 more than workers in the secondary sector.[46] Pat, who had traversed a typical series of secondary sector jobs - cook, clerk, metalcutter in a nonunion plant - was working for $7.69 an hour at Chrysler, approximately 40 percent more than at his previous job. Bills were now paid easily, money was actually saved, and both he and his wife had medical coverage. But as we talked about his contribution to Chrysler[47] it seemed that the security he had gained outside of the job was complimented by a sense of embarrassment and some shame over the relatively high level of pay. After characterizing his job as "work a 3-year old could do," he said he didn't feel like he really deserved that much money, and that his friends at the plant agreed. As we continued, he modified his position by saying it was "just a matter of opinion" how much he got. When I followed up by asking if he should earn less, say $4 per hour, he began to defend his wage, pointing to the

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[46] The range of job categories is broader in the secondary sector, including lowskill jobs in small, nonunion manufacturing, service employment, lower level retail and clerical jobs, agricultural, and varieties of part-time work. See Edwards, ibid., pp. 167-73.

[47] This dialogue was not recorded. I failed to notice the tape had run out.

"pressure" involved. He then returned to criticizing the "free money" obtained for "sitting around" after reaching production, also implying some workers shouldn't be paid the same rate as himself because they did not work as hard.

To account for this vulnerability of primary sector workers we would need to refer to a broad range of relationships and traditions of their interpretation. Since Ford's much publicized (but unevenly enacted) introduction of the $5 a day plan in 1915, workers in the auto industry have had to face the envy and criticism of workers outside of the industry. Management complaints over lack of appropriate prductivity, recently rising to an organized, droning chorus, can thereby acquire greater plausibility, especially when coupled with implicit reference to to the deskilled jobs management itself has created. Of course, these themes derive their potency within a communicative context in which organized labor, far from having established a genuine "counter-hegemonic" culture in a Gramscian sense, both is viewed and views itself as an "interest group" competing with others. Thus to the extent that organized labor is successful in improving the material conditions of its members, it is viewed simply as a "winner," successfully taking resources from others. Organized labor thereby becomes a victim of the very doctrine of interest group liberalism that marks the high tide of its struggle to date; having established the idea of a right to a decent life for all, attained through wages and state expenditures, it can then be accused of taking more than its share within that framework. In the primary sector, where benefits are the greatest, a sense of privledge, and associated guilt, easily develop.

In the following long excerpt from the seventh interview, the metainstitutional level of Pat's thinking appears as substantially geared to the logic of interest group liberalism. We can see that his concern with ensuring that demands be kept within vaguely defined limits of appropriateness, which above I have linked in part to processes of identification with management, is also informed by the moral vacuity of group conflict that has no goal other than the satisfaction of particular, not common, needs.

P: Seems like a constant battle between company and worker...

I: What do you think about that constant battle?

P: I don't really think it is too good.

I: Why is that?

P: Well, because of apathy the company is gaining. The union's not as strong as it used to be, so you don't have as much control over the company...Kind of like a game of tug of war, like the company tries to pull as much as it thinks it can get away with, and then finally the union gets sick of it and pulls back, just a problem of a lot of people complaining a lot, doing a lot of talking but taking no action.

I: Well, what do you think should be done?

P: Not really sure, what should be done...how do you mean?

I: You've said that management has been taking a lot and the union's been apathetic. What do you think people in the union ought to do?

P: Suppose they ought to petition a little more and get organized a little more. The union I'm in now, I went to the last meeting and there was 19 people there, including all the union officers, out of 1500 people...Could you repeat the question?

I: I asked what the people in the union should do since management is moving in on them and pulling the rope too far in the other direction.

P: They should fight back and take affirmative action, basically is what it boils down to. Like the new attendance policy. There's been talk about wildcat strikes and everything,

but they're not really talking seriously, they are just complaining.

I: How do you yourself feel?

P: I don't really have any opinions on the attendance policy. From what I've seen of it, it sounds pretty good. I mean it rewards good employees, and it would also stop their attendance problem. I don't know, I suppose petitioning the company would be a good way to start.

I: Would you agree with their petitioning the company on that?

P: Probably. If the union backs it I'm sure I probably would. I mean, it's not all good. I haven't read all the way through it and there are points where I'm kind of skeptical...I suppose they ought to take action if they are upset about it

He went on to his views on the background of the problem.

P: I mean, the reason the company is the way it is, is because a couple of years ago the union had total control over the company, you know, and they would get anything they wanted, seemed like just about anything. I don't know, I probably wouldn't agree with [them] if [their demands] started getting ridiculous.

I: What is the worry?

P: It seems like if you keep paying a certain amount of people more and more money its just gonna raise the prices. Then people will have to get more money to get by on the same amount, get by at the same standard of living they are at.

Within this section of dialogue the confluence of dynamics and themes constituted at the socio-historical level with personal dynamics and themes is noteworthy. At the formal level, the confusing strategic situation of the union "objectively" established the potential for a vacillating perspective. Thus the restrained combative profile of a successful business union was challenged by an even more corporatist approach recommended by Chrysler's weakness. This corporatism extends beyond union-management relations, of course. The Carter administration's efforts to jawbone major economic actors into wage and

price restraint is clearly reflected in Pat's statement closing this section.

Once again, these themes seem to crop up to perform a restraining function in the dialogue. We have started off from a general characterization of company-worker relations. His reference to the "company-worker" battle seems significant here; taken together with his reference to the union's declining strength, it suggests he may here be referring more to his experience of management's control over the work process. The game of "tug of war" is thus a concept immediately summarizing the nature of management-worker conflict during the contract, when the union often, as we have seen, supports management's control, or else cannot help the worker. Most important, through this reference Pat seems to be willing to take a more combative stance. But this quickly erodes. After his reference to people talking but not taking action, suggesting a sense of futility and disgust but also recalling the "Pat/bitchers" opposition of an earlier interview, I ask him what he thinks should be done. This was a poor choice of wording, possibly recalling the foreclosing rejoinder "Well, what do you think we should do?" that is often used to turn the tables on a critic; it certainly, in light of the hierarchical structure of the union and its suppressive stance towards rank and file action, was asking a lot of him. Even so, the position that Pat takes up, that of commenting on what the union should do, seems more informed by his unwillingness to project his own concerns about work into the public arena, and to instead criticize, as a "good worker," what other workers are angry about.

The synthesis of socioeconomic pressures, the confused response of the union, and Pat's personality trends is most evident in this passage:

> P: I don't really have any opinions on the attendance policy. From what I've seen of it, it sounds pretty good. I mean it rewards good employees, and it would also stop their attendance problem. I don't know, I suppose petitioning the company would be a good way to start.
>
> I: Would you agree with their petitioning the company?
>
> P: Probably. If the union backs it I'm sure I probably would. I mean, it's not all good. I haven't read all the way through it and there are points where I'm kind of skeptical... I suppose they ought to take action if they are upset about it.

Here the impact of Pat's conflicts is not quite so evident as in the earlier section. This is because the suppressed elements of experience are not directly brought to the fore, the focus being more upon appropriate levels of demand rather than "human rights violations." Consequently the marked vacillations that follow Pat's denial - "I don't really have any opinions" - do not so explicitly bear the stamp of suppression and repression, but appear more as attempts to reconcile bonds to the union, his work group, and the company. The denial of suffering and aggression seen earlier thus sets up this attempt to take all sides, to avoid partisan conflict by emptying himself of needs.

Limitless Desire and Limits on Democracy

Pat's attendance at the union meeting and his notion of "petitioning" the company are better understood if we relate them to his orientation to democracy. I posed that question at the beginning of the fourth interview, by asking Pat what he thought was most important about it:

P: I think the freedom to do anything you want. That's about it, or the most important.

I: Could you expand on that?

P: It's just that, you know, in nondemocratic countries people are oppressed and aren't able to say what they feel, whereas in this country you can. We can also go just about anywhere we want at any time, or just about anywhere, more places than any nondemocratic country. That's about all.

I asked him to talk about how the freedom to say what you feel is important.

P: Uh, I don't know. Speak out against the government without being ridiculed or put in jail or something. And also change things supposedly. Seems a little hard, but you can still change government. Supposedly majority rules, you know.

I followed up by asking him of his doubts concerning majority rule, and then moved on to ask in what situations in his daily life he believed the ability to say what you feel, or the right of free speech, would be especially important*

P: Well I suppose when I want my opinions heard, you know, like at work or something. I mean, if I wasn't free to speak the way I wanted to, I suppose I could never voice or, you know, couldn't voice them as much.

We talked about how he had come to place importance on "voicing his opinion." Here he referred to both school and his home life in a way that indicated resentment over not being able to state his side of things, with an emphasis on the right to free expression per se as opposed to practice based on free expression. I then asked about national politics once more. He said he had voted for Carter and explained it this way:

P: I'd say Carter had a lot of issues that I liked. That's why I voted for him. But, I don't know, I can agree with him and I can't agree with him. That's kino of how I feel, I mean, Carter acted like he was for the people and ended up not being for them...

I: How do you feel about that, that he turned out not to be for the people?

P: It kind of seems like he went against all his campaign promises...but...that's about it.

He then talked about how it is hard to get anything done in Washington, that maybe Carter hadn't been thinking realistically when he made his promises. This ambivalent attitude towards Carter stands in sharp contrast to his anger over more anonymous politicians "who line their pockets instead of working for the people."

I then tried to slowly shift into a discussion of workplace democracy by asking him how he would characterize the way things were run at the plant. He said it wasn't a democracy:

P: Far from it, I think. At Chrysler you mean? No, I mean you can voice your opinion to the union but the company can only hear so much. I mean if all the employees were for something and the company were against it the company would win unless everyone went out on strike for it. It seems close to the way democracy is running right now, you know, where people have to go to extremes to get their way, but I really don't think it's run as a democracy, the company has the final say, really the major say. Employees can only gripe to a certain extent. Suppressed...

I: How do you feel about that?

P: Seems like that's the only way they could run the company and still make any money. I mean, if they let the employees decide everything they wanted to do they would probably decide not to work or work two days a week or something, so they have to...Company prides itself, well, it doesn't pride itself but their way of getting things done is to be strict on the rules. That's the only way the company could run smoothly, because if a democracy was used in the company the employees would be voting on everything, bringing up their proposals on the way they want the company run.

To prompt him to continue, I asked him why he thought the employees would only want to work two days a week.

P: 'cause it seems like everyone there gets everything they want and still doesn't have enough...Bad example...People are never satisfied with what they have, they always want more. That's just the general consensus of the people I work

with. Seems like they just take everything to the limit, 'cause they do at this place. But I suppose if you took the rules away you'd knock out that certain percentage of people who took it to the limits because the rules were there. Yeah...

I: What would people do then?

P: I'm not really sure. Probably take advantage of as much as they could . Something on that order.

I: What would you think of those people?

P: Never really thought about that. I suppose if that's what they want to do, I mean...Fighting something just because it's there, or climbing a wall because it's there is kind of a crazy thing to do, it seems like. About the only opinion on that I have.

I asked him if he ever took things to the limit.

P: I've taken certain things to the limit, like running a certain amount above production, not running a certain amount below it. Can't think of anything...Oh, attendance. I used to take off one day every, or you know, once a month because they allowed that. That's about the only example I can think of.

I: When did you see that there are people who run things to the limit?

P: I suppose when I started working for Chrysler, you know, that's the first place I really noticed it workwise, you know, union companies in general. Chrysler was the first place I ever worked where they kind of pushed things to the limit.

I: And that struck you as crazy. Were there any other feellings that you had towards them at the time?

P: Yeah, well I first noticed it when they were voting on a new contract and everyone seemed dissatisfied with what they had, you know to me it sounded like a really good, a great contract. And, uh, I thought they were all crazy, that they were pretty greedy at that point.

We might, following analyses such as that of Goldthorpe's in The Affluent Worker, characterize Pat's stance as that of an "instrumentally oriented worker," content with his relatively high pay

and opposed to conflict in the plant.[48] But to do so would be to reduce Pat's consciousness to a stabilized collection of attitudes. The conflicted, dynamic aspect of his stance, the particular nature of which is achieved through the personal appropriation ("personalization") of the metainstitutional moment of ideology, is not resolved, but only suppressed through ideology.

At the outset of this interview section Pat defines democracy in a manner recalling Sennet and Cobb's discussion of the concept of "opportunity" in The Hidden Injuries of Class.[49] For their interviewees the idea that America is a land of opportunity is a crucial moment in a misconceived attribution process, the outcome of which is self-blame and hatred. For Pat, entering early adulthood, the emphasis in his definition is on impulse release - democracy is the "freedom to do anything you want." It is quickly toned down to the freedom to move anywhere you want, an negative "freedom from" formulation predominant in the culture. Even within this view of freedom a "devolution of falling expectations" is strikingly manifested:

> P: [1]We can also go just about anywhere we want at any time,
> [2]or just about anywhere,
> [3]more places than any nondemocratic country.

Freedom of speech is similarly defined in a passive, symbolic way, with an emphasis placed upon being allowed to say something without being ridiculed or jailed. In referring to nondemocratic countries, Pat has relativized the initial absolute "do anything" to a vague "do more than

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[48] John Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (New York: Cambridge, 1969), pp. 5-8.

[49] Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Vintage, 1973), pp. 96-98, 180-3.

someone else," which serves to distance himself from the impulses initially seeking release, as well as to situate himself within the system of laws and custom.

Nonetheless, Pat's initial statement suggests he preserves a fantasy of impulse release that, as a wish, informs his appropriation of the myth of opportunity noted by Sennet and Cobb. We can speculate that in his future reflection on his life, in which he may well take seriously the cant of unlimited opportunity, Pat will misrecognize the earlier fantasy of unlimited impulse release as the cause of his failure to fulfill his hopes. The myth will thus both maintain the fantasy in an active form as one of the nominally superseded, yet dialectically preserved moments of the myth, and at the same time will provide a standpoint of self-condemnation that will intensify as Pat grows old and discovers he has not attained what was supposedly possible.[50]

I did not ask for elaboration of Pat's reference to the possibility of changing government and the rule of the majority, but my sense is that the availability of the concept of change, and of "petitioning" mentioned earlier, is at least encouraged by his participation in an anti-nuclear group. Here we should indicate that Pat frames that issue in the extreme terms it merits, i.e. the unnecessary possibility of nuclear catastrophe. Thus his justification for participation in a more confrontative politics is framed in an emergency motif. This contrasts sharply with his interpretation of work-related issues. As he talks about wanting his opinions heard in response to a question phrased to elicit a concrete reference, the lack

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[50] Arnold Kornhauser, Mental Health of the Industrial Worker (New York: John Wiley, 1965), p. 328.

of such a reference give his reasoning a circular, floating quality. This, I would argue, follows from the relative marginalization of his real concerns at work through an ideological process of suppression. He can voice his opinion when he wants to, as long as he seriously intends no action. He intends nothing because the existing work process is contractually sanctioned, and the existing work process is contractually sanctioned because the communicative context is framed by power relations that suppress his concerns. It is only when the issue is of the life or death variety that he seems to be able to feel justified in demanding policy change.

The brief discussion of Carter is noteworthy for its replication of the impulse suppression dynamic. Carter's campaign marvelously synthesized the traditional campaign promise approach to winning support with an objectively dwindling resource base. The trust deficit created by the Republicans allowed Carter to generate a symbolic surplus, dispensed as guarantees of a closer "government as good as its people" and a variety of muffled populist appeals, such as tax reform and increased waste watching. When Carter refused to play the Washington game, and tried to bypass Congress and the DP with direct appeals to the electorate, he found that the game could play him. A series of stop-Carter coalitions stymied him institutionally and fuzzed out his earlier image, refocusing him as a cornball neophyte who could barely win sympathy. In this light Pat's shift from a criticism borne of disappointment to recognition of genuine obstacles is synchronized with the prevailing attitudes towards Carter. At the same time, that thematization is infiltrated and ordered by now familiar patterns, or interactionforms:

a) an authoritative person is criticized for not meeting expectations and then excuses are made for them.

b) the basic source of the problem is perceived as unrestrained acquisitions by figures who are only defined at the categorial level, e.g. "politicians" lining their pockets."

"B" emerges prominently in the ensuing discussion of workplace democracy, which we should go over in detail. At the outset the union and the company are both treated as Others, the former receptive, the latter less so. The company "can only hear so much" (my emphasis), a formulation again obscuring the company's responsibility for its own stance, and excusing the potential for losing its self-restraint. Then Pat realistically outlines the power relations between workers and the company, and in making a parallel with the way the political system works probably again draws on his experience in the anti-nuclear group ("people have to go to extremes to get their way"). He notes the one-sidedness of political dialogue, and concludes with the summary concept "suppressed" before trailing off.

The shift he makes in response to my question was surprizing, but not new. Again, the briefly recognized suppression of the employees is justified and rationalized through the imperatives of accumulation. A key phrase is the following: "I mean, if they let the employees decide everything they wanted to do, they would probably decide not to work or work two days a week or something, so they have to..." Employee decision-making, in whatever capacity and to whatever extent, is immediately linked to "everything they wanted to do." Pat "slips" - "company prides itself" - in a way that points to his conception of an emotional investment on the pat of the company in the existing state of affairs. This is the "material" of the obscured, positively emotional side of the relationship with the company, a side that Pat consciously

seeks to exclude from our discussion for reasons we will take up below. It also undoubtedly informs his understanding of what the violation of the prided social relations will involve, presumably an anger that would somehow be more heartfelt and poignant than that experienced by an objectified agent who can no longer "get things done" in the customary way. Like any excommunicated motive, it acquires greater strength in the determination of Pat's attitudes and behavior precisely because it cannot be consciously renounced. Following the approach of Adorno and Horkheimer, and to a lesser extent Habermas, this is certainly one of the crucial dimensions of the "dialectic of the Enlightment:"[51] the more the libidinal dimensions of heteronomous relationships are denied, the more the subject falls prey to the rhetoric of technique through which the relationships are publicly expressed and justified.

As Pat continues on, caught up in the jargon of efficiency, his operative sense of the workers can change without altering the basic negative judgment; the formal aspect of workplace democracy, that the "employees would be voting on everything," itself becomes problematic. I then break off this train of thought to return to the previously established problematic of unrestrained desires. At first the desires are portrayed as unbounded, continually transcending their appropriate limits. Then the emerging notion of "limit" sets up an association to rebellions directed more at the constraints of the work process, rather than on the appropriation of its products. This begins to lead to some insight into the dialectic between limits and the rules through which

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[51] Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Seabury Press, 1972), ch. 1.

they are enforced: perhaps it is the challenge to imposed rules that results in the assault on limits that may be appropriate for consensually valid reasons.

My question failed to pick up on this well; I was unable to think of a way of prompting further development of the idea without leading Pat. My "what would people do then?" was intended to mean "what would people do if the rules were somehow formulated differently," but because Pat had not explicitly raised the procedural question, he thought I was asking what would happen if the rules were eliminated. Thus workers would "probably take advantage of as much as they could." I then asked for his evaluation of workers who would behave in such a manner. His response is to first deny any criticism, and approach the question from a standpoint of general tolerance. He then returns to the ideal of taking things to the limit, which he equivocally terms "crazy," and cuts off discussion.

When, by way of establishing how he imagines himself to be either similar to or different from other workers, I ask if he takes things to the limit, he reverses the sense of the colloquialism, and tells of how he stays within the limits. This mild incoherence may have stemmed from his fatigue, but also suggested an extreme attempt to be one of the group, avoiding the emerging distinction between himself and other workers. After relating this behavior to unions, he further specifies the other workers as greedy.

The way in which institutional and interpersonal discourses and systems of action reciprocally define each other, without, or only rudimentarily, being recognized as effectively interactive, is obvious here. Pat's recognition of the formative dialectic between the

objectively constituted system of social action and the subject's participating in it, the sine qua non of an appreciation of the artifactual, historical dimensions of subject and object, is submerged under a "realism" held together, at the most manifest level, by the naturalization of the subjects. Like all classical liberal theory, the process of the formation and deformation of subjectivity within the social order is hidden; instead the social order is ideologically constituted in the subject's own image, so that it is both the best of all possible worlds and what the subject deserves.

As we have argued earlier, the "reified ontology," or fundamental categories and category relationships, of Pat's account of these social relations can be critiqued from the standpoint of a "negative ontology" that derives its basis through a recognition of the historical contingency of institutions and the manner in which objective potentialities are hidden. But within this perspective the ctitical standpoint is defined only in terms of a conventional understanding of rationality. Contrary to some of the criticisms of the concept of false consciousness, such as Thompson's, the critical thrust of this standard is not vitiated by essentially relativist counterarguments. However, the theory of symbolically distorted communication highlights a key weakness in the process of critique geared to such a conception. As argued earlier, the displeasure and suffering associated with contradictory social relations may be "excommunicated" in such a way that their worked-over conscious representation achieves the end of tying the subject more tightly to those relations. In this way they constitute the infrastructure of a reified ontology of social relations. This ontology is established at two levels. The primary level is that of the

relationship between Pat and powerful Others who articulate and enforce the social relations of the plant. In terms of their normative power, these primary relations exercise a varying influence within the overall system of meaning or, to put it another way, the system of self and other representations.[52] They are a "locus of reification."

To see this, we can envisage the reifying process at this "microlevel" as roughly analogous to the "macrolevel" process of "incorporation" outlined by Williams in his discussion of Gramsci's concept of hegemony, to which we referred in chapter two:

> ...it is a fact about the modes of domination that they select from and consequently exclude the full range of human practices. The difficulties of human practice outside or against the dominant mode are, of course, real. It depends very much whether it is in an area in which the dominant class and the dominant culture have an interest and a stake. If the interest and the stake are explicit, many new practices will be reached for, and if possible incorporated, or else extirpated with extraordinary vigour. But in certain areas, there will be in certain periods practices and meanings which are not reached for. There will be areas of practice and meaning which, almost by definition from its own limited character, or in its profound deformation, the dominant culture is unable in any real terms to recognize.[53]

Pat not only has established ways of accomodating the core relation in a direct sense - he accepts the authority of management - but other relevant relations are understood in a way complementing his accomodation to the core relation. Pat's understanding of his fellow workers, while friendly enough when considered in institutionally irrelevant interpersonal terms, shifts to criticism when the core

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[52] The individual's relationship to nature may be signified without apparent immediate reference to an Other, but I would argue that it is a serious mistake to understand this significance as unmediated by self-other references. The

[53] Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure," New Left Review 82 (November 1973): 12.

relation is immediately linked to his consideration of them. This is one way of accomplishing the reification of the core relation against which one moment of the complaints of his coworkers are addressed; the dissonanace is removed via the devaluation of the coworkers' opinion.

The coworkers themselves are simultaneously reified. Not only does the core relation, already heavily "armored" within a multi-leveled network of rationales and defensive accomodations, now acquire an aspect in which it gains its objectivity through a sort of "deduction" from the reified qualities of the coworkers. In addition, the reification of the coworkers complements Pat's own reification within the authority relationship. This is most readily evident if we conceive of this dynamic from a standpoint concerned with the capacity for critique, understood as a regulatory movement of reflection, and recognize that within this movement an appreciation of the mutability of "human nature" and its social matrix is essential. This can be thought of in two ways. To put it in logical terms, such an understanding is a "necessary postulate." To put it in psychological categories, the ego's recognition of the relative pliability of the social environment, a recognition already encouraged by its orientation to the satisfaction of needs, is a prerequisite for a controlled abatement of its defenses against needs incompatible with the social order. As we have maintained, that relaxation enables a "playing out" of object-related cathexes within a psychic representation of the environment. It is only through ego's recognition of the social environment's amenability to need-oriented change, here that the coworkers are capable of responsible decisions if circumstances change, that the subject is motivated to recognize the forms in which they themselves have internalized

constraint, and thus the "personal" categories through which they have adopted a reified understanding.

Recapitulation: the Reciprocal Syntonicity of Ideology and Defense

In Pat's discourse a decisive element in the circumscription of democracy lies in the naturalization of coworker traits, an assessment that, significantly, is developed against a thematic backdrop of the coercive power of management. I would reemphasize here that this naturalization, on one level representing a moment of a socially grounded apology, also seems to tie in with Pat's own defensively determined, or naturalized, approach to impulse regulation. What this tends to achieve is an interpenetration and mutual reinforcement of both levels. Pat's statements on institutional alternatives are thereby transformed from simple propositions about the social order to a truth that Pat "feels" and "lives out." The crucial mediating factor here lies in that institutions not only constrain the expression of aggression, but also offer forms of ideological metadiscourse that can, in effect, rationalize defenses that discount and contain experiences. Again, workplace democracy may either be unnecessary because nothing is wrong with work, or because it is contrary to management's aims, or it may be impossible because other people cannot control their impulses, or misguided because work will always be unpleasant, and so on. This array of arguments allow Pat's personal appropriation of ideology to unfold through any of an array of defenses - through this process of selection formal ideological arguments become defense syntonic (and not necessarily character syntonic). Simultaneously, the defensive nature of the subject's thinking is obscured - the defense is ideology syntonic. In the same

vein, Pat can believe that he freely believes: the constraints in communicative relationships at the social level - "the company can only hear so much" - is masked by defensively determined constraints at the personal level - he silences his discontent.

The Elaboration of "Minimal Interpretations" Through Childhood Memories

To this point we have made only minimal references to specifically psychoanalytic concepts. In a sense this practice has been disingenuous, for such concepts have certainly informed our attention to the shifts in Pat's orientation. At the same time, by not extensively deploying psychoanalytic cooncepts we have been able to demonstrate a form of "minimalist" interpretation. That is, because the text of Pat's presentation is at certain points perplexingly vacillating from the standpoint of the conventions of ordinary expressions of interest, it has been possible to characterize it as problematic without recourse to concepts which complexly resituate Pat's discourse within a dialectic of contemporary and childhood relational contexts. Instead, the implcit psychology has been one of "contemporary conflict management," in which certain defensive moves rigorously linked to unconscious processes in psychoanalytic theory, have been posed as options in a repetoire of conflict management that are employed, with institutional confirmation and encouragement, "behind the subject's back" by the subject himself. Thus, while an unconscious level of psychic activity has been asserted, it has been simply been developed as a kind of reconstructed logic to account for alterations in instinctual elements - aim, object, and drive - as the subject speaks.

Here we should consider a possible critical response. It might be argued that it is not unconscious processes that are at work, but

that we are witnessing Pat's inability to integrate various conflicting interests. Such a notion of "defective integration," and those akin to it that draw upon rational actor models for their psychology, fall behind popular understandings in terms of their willingness to accept the infiltration of unconscious processes in which the fromulation of conscious intentions. Thus, it is widely recognized that one might "blow up" at a weak person after having been affronted by a powerful one, or fall in love with a friend of someone who is truly loved, etc., all without consciously being aware of the instinctual transformations underlying the shift. True, reference to such popular understandings cannot provide theoretical justification. Ultimately we would have to enter into the controversies surrounding pyschoonalysis to address this question. But an awareness of a popular, rudimentary appreciation of distortions in communicative processes does suggest that this first, "minimal" level of interpretation is not only plausible, but could help to regulate critical dialogue.

Another line of justification for our procedure consists in pointing out that passing through a phase of minimal interpretation before systematically introducing analytic concepts would correspond to the structure of the interpretive sequence, resistance-defense-wish, we have discussed earlier. In psychoanalysis the problematization of consciousness "for-the subject" proceeds through interventions that simultaneously a) expose unconscious goals that are relatively less defended in order to b) develop the subject's appreciation of the underlying themes of their communication and of their resistance to direct expression of repressed intentions and the analyst's interpretation of them. Although the analyst, referring to his/her

prior analytic experience, general training, and discussion of the case with coworkers, may quickly establish a set of working hypotheses regarding the most central and powerful unconscious dynamics, these more profound understandings are only distantly relevant in the early work of analysis in which this "problematization" is carried out. Similarly, elaboration of a minimal interpretation serves reflection less by way of allowing the subject to consciously reconsider unconscious intentions in an effective fashion - Pat's resolutions of conflict would probably not cease if I had shared my interpretations with him - than to begin to set up a problematizing framework. It is only through the subject's grasp of general forms of systematic distortion that a collaborative relationship, a working alliance, may be established.

Practically, this problematization could be connected with a set of implied injunctions for the subject - more restraint in or suspension of their commitment to core relations, reflection on their conception of legitimate and illegitimate behaviors within those relations, etc. Such a change in Pat's approach to his representations might coincide with an appreciable increase in his ability to consider alternative conceptions. But, to the extent that we maintain an analytically framed understanding of the processes of change, we would tend to regard such a change as entailing the <u>suppressive</u> substitution of one conception for another. In all likelihood this would entail an idealization of the researcher to "override" the internalized representations recommending the now suppressed understanding. The relative shortcomings of this outcome stem from the likelihood that the "analyst," both in actual dialogue and in the form of the representation the subject gradually internalizes, backs up the subject in a struggle

with his/her patterns of censorship; rather than the patterns of censorship being worked through, they continue to be compulsively asserted. This can result in the subject becoming dependent upon the analyst to preserve the new stance, an unwillingness to innovate beyond views that would, in the estimation of the subject, be sanctioned by the analyst, and a tendency to backslide if the bonds with analyst are broken.

We have returned to the unavoidable problem we outlined in chapter four. Because we are starting out from a concern with restoring socially-constituted suffering to communication and linking communication to transformative activity, we will tend to view the transferred object-relational patterns as obstacles to the recognition of the effects of contemporary social contradictions. This sharply contrasts with a self-understanding of psychoanalysis, that reconstrues structural or topographical conceptions - "where id was, there ego shall be" - within a maturational framework, i.e. orientations to self and world constituted in early childhood are made conscious, and are renounced or sublimated into the range of socially established "adult" strivings. Thus on the one hand we are talking about a <u>reversal</u> or <u>overriding</u> of the process of infiltration so that representations of socially constituted suffering can be reappropriated as such; in particular, the locus of the hierarchy/democracy contradiction is to be "purged" of object-relational determinations rendering it opaque. On the other hand, analysis would, ideally, not rest content with what amounts to improved reality testing at the site of a social contradiction, but would place greater emphasis on the work of reappropriating the early constellations.

The above considerations bear upon other questions as well, especially the question of the contribution of particular memories to our understanding of principal object-relational schemas. To facilitate this discussion in the next section, we will first turn to the interviews in which Pat recalls his childhood.

In terms of basic structural changes, Pat's family life can be roughly divided into four periods: a) from his birth through his mother's divorce of her unfaithful husband when Pat was four years old, b) the subsequent four years during which he and his mother lived with her father, c) her remarriage to a store manager when Pat was eight, and d) Pat's departure from his family and, shortly thereafter, his marriage to his present wife. As he talked of his parents the relationship with the mother figured most prominently, as one might expect from the relatively early breakup of the original family. Thus, although within the original family the characteristic pattern of paternal dominance was played out, and there is evidence of substantial identification with the father, the combination of childhood amnesia, more specific repression of memories of the lost relationship with the father, and the emergence of his mother as the stable core of his "family" worked to prompt Pat to refer most often to her.

Of the years with his retired grandfather I have little information - Pat's reticence was a difficulty throughout all the interviews, and especially so regarding his family - but it is clear that the grandfather was marginal to Pat's development. Thus Pat refers to playing catch with his grandfather, suggesting some attempt on the latter's part to fill the gap left by the father, Sadly, in comparison with idealized father he appears to have been an abject failure: Pat

talks of his mother's disparagement of his grandfather's factory job, his heavy drinking after the death of his wife, and Pat's stepfather ordering the grandfather about and finally actually throwing him out of the house.

The years of the second marriage resolve into two phases: an initial year or two during which the situation was "pretty neat" and the remainder, marked by the rise of a largely critical and disciplinary stance on the part of his stepfather. Pat partly ascribed this to his stepfather's job: he became the manager of increasingly large stores, regularly worked twelve hour days, and was involved in persistent conflicts with both subordinates and superiors. But, irregardless of his appreciation of the stress experienced by his stepfather, Pat called the stepfather a "head case" unfit to raise children, and portrayed him as a constricted, distrusting individual who rarely spoke to his family, withheld the bulk of his salary from his wife, had few friends, if any, and was prone to displacing his aggression on to his stepchildren. Pat, counseled by his mother to "ignore" the stepfather's angry outbursts and to think about "something good," was, as he portrays it, relatively unprotected by the mother.

The predominant impression of Pat's mother gained through the interviews is of a compliant woman who was quite possessive in her relationship with Pat. Marrying Pat's father when she was seventeen and he was twenty-five, she "looked up to him," "put him on a pedestal," was "scared to talk back to him" and finally divorced him only when he refused to give up an extramarital affair. When the stepfather kicked her father out of the house she "wasn't too sure what to do" and, as noted, the stepfather's later persistent anger towards Pat only brought

from her a counsel of denial, advice which she apparently took herself even as she seemed to agree with the stepfather on questions of discipline. Her possessiveness was indicated by Pat's account of her relative indifference to his older sister's (her child by the first marriage) staying out late, in sharp contrast to her jealousy of Pat's relationship, starting in high school, with his year-older wife, Mary. His mother would reprimand him for staying out all night by saying "since she didn't do it, she expected him not to."

At the time of the interviews Pat's mother was again divorced and had moved to Texas. Pat reported that he and Mary were getting along well, he would occasionally speak of his love for her, and my impression was that they shared activities and interests.

Recurring Patterns of Defense

Within Pat's memories of his stepfather and mother a primary pattern within Pat's repertoire of conflict management again manifests itself. In the interviews Pat tells of how the stepfather would consistently come home after a long day and "bitch about things he [Pat] wasn't doing." As he recalled this Pat couldn't "really finger exactly what he was talking about 'cause I didn't really listen:"

> I: How did you feel about coming home every night and having this happen?
>
> P: Well, it upset me for a while and my mother just told me to ignore what he said, so I just started ignoring what he said. You know, going in one ear and out the other. When he's [sic] done, I'd do whatever I wanted to, going to bed or watching TV, or whatever I came in that room to do in the first place.

If we link this up with Pat's report of his mother broadly encouraging him to "try not to think about bad things and think about good things instead" as he sought to cope with his parents divorce and

the subsequent hardship, we get a fairly well-defined, if preliminary, picture of a key segment of Pat's internalized object relations and associated defenses. Simply put, frustration and associated aggressive responses are denied, and a passive stance is adopted in which whatever possibilities for satisfaction that remain are supplemented by a sense of closeness with the mother as Pat obeys her injunction and behaves as she does.

In the above account of a characteristic and, perhaps, definitive form of the relationship, Pat denies aggression by denying the significance of his stepfather. Another mechanism, identification with the aggressor, traces of which have also appeared in earlier interview sections, controls the defended impulse within a transformed relation to the object. Thus, instead of the object being "ignored" as such by Pat, he "makes himself like the object."[54] For a powerful example, we can draw upon his memories of childhood and refer to his terse account of his rare visits with his father. Just before this section he has been talking about his father seeing him only five times a year after the divorce:

> P: I didn't really think about it because I was usually pretty busy playing baseball. I didn't think about it until I got older.
>
> I: What did you think about it then?
>
> P: I don't know. I thought he was kind of a heel for not coming around too often. That's about it.
>
> I: Why do you think he didn't come around too often?
>
> P: Busy...
>
> I: Doing what?

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[54] H.P. Laughlin, The Ego and Its Defenses (New York: Aronson, 1974), p. 135.

P: I'm not really sure. If he's anything like me, he didn't do it until it crossed his mind to.

I: You say you are that way too?

P: To a certain extent. I mean I wouldn't go and visit relatives regularly. I can see if I was single, I would be busy, to a certain extent. He also had a lot of hobbies. Like he built airplanes, bought 'em and rebuilt 'em and flew 'em. And he was usually busy with other hobbies.

After first denying much concern over his father's failure to visit, Pat then expresses some anger, the use of the term "heel" possibly indicating that he is voicing his anger from his mother's standpoint. We can see how initial rationalization and denial smoothly pass over into an explicit identification with the father that accomplishes several ends. Reading the passage closely, we see uncertainty - "I'm not really sure" - that probably stems both from the essentially defensive character of the reference to his father's preoccupations and from his doubts about his father's feelings, especially why he left. These doubts are in part warranted by reality: the father's general behavior was probably contradicted by isolated expressions of love for Pat. But, further, it is also likely that the doubting works to preserve the positive aspects of the lost relationship by restraining Pat's anger towards his father. The uncertainty is then resolved with a surprising reversal of the implicit, but commonly understood lines of influence in a father-son relationship - "If he's anything like me." Reflecting his ambiguous status in the post-divorce family, within the context of the interview the identification both allows him to feel like or "one with" the admired father, and to project and transform his feelings of anger towards him into a blame from his relatives that he and his father share (his mother's complaint about his

staying out should be recalled here). The father's busy-ness is again noted, passing over into a reference to the father's hobbies Pat had to compete with. Excitement, again presumably vicarious and identification-based, over the father's interest in flying, alleviates the father's remoteness, prior to Pat's reinforcing the image of the busy father once again.

This section strikingly reveals the literal nature of the self-negating moment of identification with the aggressor. As Lagache has suggested, the adoption of the aggressor's standpoint, the fantasied participation in their power, presupposes the alienated reformulation of the subject's desire from that adopted standpoint, or the abolition, as such, of pyschic representations of the subject's original desire.[55] In this section the abolitional aspect of the defense predominates: the phrase "if he's anything like me" heralds the priority of the fantasy of identification. The "to a certain extent" suggests a reservation, a maintainance of an orientation to his frustration; Pat does not praise his father. But it seems that the ambivalent orientation, as inclusive as it is, only comes about as a final position retaining elements of the full defensive hierarchy. That is, the initial global denial - "I didn't really think about" - relaxes to admit the concept of "heel," but then seems to be reasserted with "That's about it." Then follows the higher level defense of identification with aggressor, in which the father is steadily recognized. The moment of denial persists as a subordinated instant in Pat's account, perhaps being transformed into what might be

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[55] D. Lagache, "Pouvoir et personne," L'evolution Psychiatrique 1 (1962): 111-9.

more appropriately termed repression, especially of affective components.

The Uncertain Status of the Memories

From a psychodiagnostic standpoint, our work with Pat's recollections amounts to a mere preliminary to a full assessment of Pat's "internal world." Further interviews and, perhaps, testing would be necessary to determine the specific nature and relative priority of the preoedipal and Oedipal object relations we have pointed out. These might well lead us to conclude that our implicit stress on Oedipal constellations is inappropriate, and that preoedipal, dyadic relations are more salient for Pat. This would be significant not only in light of the relatively specialized concern in learning more about Pat's personality functioning, but would also be germane to understanding the interworking of libidinal and aggressive drives in Pat's orientation to his contemporaries. For example, in reference to Pat's employment of the terms "greed," we only chose to indicate that the term functioned to characterize coworkers as incapable of properly controlling their acquisitive impulses, a problem that seemed to pose itself both because of Chrysler's situation and because of Pat's personal preoccupation with the issue. The precise meaning of this term, and thus a better appreciation of the stereotypes and defensive functioning associated with it, could only come about it we could link the term to the succession of object relations in which Pat's concern both initially arose and was reformulated as he grew up. Generally put, the semantic and dynamic nature of the term would vary depending upon whether "greed" is a label for Pat's strivings towards the mother that were inhibited by the father, or his strivings towards the mother that were frustrated or

rejected by her, or his strivings towards the absent father, or his mother's dmands on him, etc. Each constellation (and various syntheses) would recommend a different assessment of the transferences shaping Pat's understanding of his social relations, and thus Pat's handling of his frustrations.

If comparison of Pat's available recollections with an ideal-typical "inventory" of information pertinent to his psychological profile establishes them as relatively superficial, their precise relationship to our minimal interpretation of the work-related interview material is also unclear. It would be an egregious mistake to assume that the memories are veridical, and provide an objective account of Pat's childhood that can be used to inform an understanding of his "primary socialization" experiences. This is because we would expect the subject to "work over" their recollection, both with regard to their choice of episode and their emphasis of certain characteristics, so that the recollection bears the mark of current personality trends that selectively come into play as the subject reengages the most important figures of his past. Nor would it be appropriate to evaluate them as "early memories." This is because we have not solicited an early memory as such, a procedure that increases the likelihood of the subject casting loose from the actual events of their personal history as they select and constitute what can usefully be regarded as a projective screen for their current dynamics.[56]

We can clarify the status of the recollections by considering what we are "losing" by not asking for an early memory. To put it

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[56] Martin Mayman, "Early Memories and Character Structure," Journal of Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment 32 (1968): 303-7.

roughly, I would suggest that the principal distinction lies between insight into the subject's characteristic mode of managing or handling their relationship, and insight into what the subject fundamentally senses relationships to be about. To illustrate this distinction, I will refer to the early memories of a young man I had occasion to test. Very controlled and polite, anxious to do "well," the tests indicated an ongoing, relatively manifest struggle to control his fear and anger at the possibility that he might be considered "unintellectual," a concern that reflected a deeper concern about his size. He strove to be agreeable and alertly receptive, intellectualizing and isolating affect in his struggle to contain his anger over the myriad of slights and snubs he felt he was the victim of. In his early memories the most significant material focused on his struggles with his mother: in one he "recalled" her as forcing him to eat his dinner and then becoming enraged when he spat it out at her, forcing him to leave the table while his father sat silently, "doing nothing." In the terms appropriate to early memory analysis, we could say, at the very least, that for him maternal nurturance was linked with losing his right to influence what was given and how it was received. Thus the memory suggested that one dimension of the subject's thematization of his relationship, including the prospective relationship with his therapist, would be the fear of having his self-integrity, the boundaries of the self more precisely, violated in the acceptance of "nurturant" help and, in conjunction with this, a tendency to denigrate, "spit back," that help. In other words, the early memory indicated that this specific "object relational paradigm," to use Mayman's concept, partially informed his more manifest handling of relationships.

In principle, Pat's recollections do not afford us this type of insight. However, I think there are at least two reasons why we need not conclude that they simply represent an additional example of the patterns we have already noted. First, I would tentatively claim that the change in their referential field that occurs in the process of recollection is concomitant with a partial disengagement from systems of representations of self and other as they have been shaped in the subject's present life. Tenously consistent with what I have argued above, this does not mean that in recollection the subject completely returns to past understandings of their social relations. But it would seem likely that as the subject thinks back to their situation in the family and recalls his/her needs, frustrations, and ways of coping in relation to people who were more powerfully "cathected" by the subject than contemporaries who are understood in terms of "abstract" institutional categories, patterns of handling relations will emerge in a sharper form. If this is plausible, then it would justify our elaboration of Pat's defenses in conjunction with reporting recollections.

Second, by indicating a certain continuity between childhood and adulthood in the subject's handling of relationships, in a dialogue with the subject the recollections can be used to instigate a consideration of the propriety of that continuity. They would thus allow the dialogue to move from an abstract consideration of defensive processing which, due to the reciprocal syntonicity we have noted, might not be very productive, to a recognition that a transference of stereotyped object relations is regulating the subject's thinking.

Our basic point is this: strictly speaking, as they stand Pat's recollections make only a limited contribution to a better understanding of the unconscious meaning of his contemporary relationships. In research that deliberately proscribes offering analytic interpretations to the subject, and which does not avail itself of the "validative" procedures of psychoanalysis,[57] recollections essentially foreshadow the lines of a dialogue that does not place.

Summary

Through an analysis of interviews with Pat, a Chrysler worker, we have seen how the ideological circumscription of democracy transpires through a synthesis of discourses. Two dimensions of this process stand out. First, we have emphasized how the experience of suffering within the plant is defensively dissipated so that the experience is either not given consideration or else considered in abstraction from the relationship with management that constitutes it. Second, we have shown how consciously held reservations or objections to workplace democracy, which are both available through and mandated by the social order, appear to be selectively appropriated by the subject so that they conform with basic defensive patterns. The result is the naturalization, a rendering "obvious," of both rationales and defensive processing, and the ensemble of implicated traits and qualities attributed to self, contemporaries, and institutions.

Here we would stress a subtheme of the chapter: the syntonicities of this process are of the greatest significance in supporting a self-understanding on the part of the subject that their

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[57] Here I am principally referring to the way accurate interpretatins prompt the subject to recognizing previously unconscious elements of the transference, or to elaborate childhood settings.

opinion is freely arrived at. Thus the coercion shaping the content and form of their thinking, a coercion which might be theoretically elaborated to assess the reality of the purported freedom granted to subjects in this society, is obscured in the midst of what is often facilely termed "adjustment."

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

A central thrust of the thesis has been to make a claim for the specificity of an interpretive dimension to social critique. In arguing for such a specificity I have tried to consistently keep before us the basic idea that this interpretive dimension is not intended only to give us a better record of the interaction between objectivistically conceived social forces and individuals, nor only to buttress the epistemological claim that knowledge of social processes must be grounded in a "richer" appreciation of peoples' understanding of them. Instead, I have argued that the telos of this dimension lies in an interest in alleviating suffering within a reified institutional structure and concomitant patterns of representation. Critical interpretation accordingly unfolds as a process of dialogically-based reflection mediated by social theory and a psychoanalytically informed reflection on patterns of representation, a process of reflection we can characterize as a restoration of subjectivity, and which is dialectically linked to social praxis conceptualized in "social psychoanalytic" terms.

The Organization of Reflection: Remarks on Critical Practice

The immanent relationship between the interest in the alleviation of suffering, a mediated reflection on institutions and

patterns of representation, and critical social practice sets up a complex relationship between epistemological, theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations. If the work presented here is prolegomenal, it is not only because my basic intent was to demonstrate the viability of a critical conception of ideology by pointing out the suppressive and repressive dimensions of discourse within coercive social relations. As I have suggested, the "evocation of negativity," which transpires when we link real suffering with available possibilities for a less coercive way of working and the subject's potential for working through coerced and self-deceptive ways of handling suffering, only renders critique objectively plausible, but does not guarantee that it will become a regulatory stance for the subject. This is the characteristic function of the "full" critical hermeneutic process I have pointed to.

Within such a dialogue the "evocation of negativity" necessarily implies the evocation of hope: since the dialogue is immanently related to the interest in the alleviation of suffering, within the dialogue some anticipation of a positive, alternative state of affairs is inevitable. In this study the epistemological and theoretical difficulties associated with the formulation of such an anticipation have been controlled by our focus on an active contradiction in institutional discourses. In other words, by our choice of a contradiction based on discourses embedded in ongoing social practice we have not only been able to use social theory to define a form of suffering, but also to delineate a likely form of the anticipations held by subjects when they consider how to relieve that suffering. In this way we have avoided some of the standard problems

faced by Marxist social criticism, which has, despite a withering condemnation of capitalism, often left itself in the position of having to resort to teleogically framed arguments to motivate the alternatives it poses. In large part this stems from an overemphasis on eliminating the first and second types of contradiction we have pointed out in chapter two. By seeking to coordinate organizational outputs so as to avoid economic crises, wars over markets and resources, and so on, Marxism has often become the bearer of a form of rationality that is essentially technically inspired, which can lead to as oppressive teleology of social technics in the absence of any consideration of the third type of contradiction. In this fashion the intertwined problems of the confirmation of the existence of suffering and the articulation of a plausible anticipation (for-us and for-the-subject) for its alleviation are disjoined, with the latter questin resolved via "socialist" planning carried out by a state alienated from the people it supposedly serves.[1]

That we have to a certain extent controlled this problem by our choice of contradiction does not exhaust the issues facing us. The collection of considerations which, from a formal perspective I have referred to under the domain of epistemological, theoretical, methodological, and practical concerns all come together in an imperative fashion when we take up the concrete question of how to organize and regulate interaction between critical theorists and those whom they beleve they can offer practical-theoretical insight. In

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[1] Here I am only pointing out tendencies within Marxist theory that can rationalize bureaucratic socialism. Arguments proposing to explain the historical occurence of bureaucratic socialism with reference to such theoretical tendencies are woefully indifferent to the way the theory's mediation of proctice is shaped by class structure, international relations, etc., and should be rejected.

taking up this question we can expand on our preliminary remarks by using Habermas' discussion in his essay "Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis" as a framework.[2] Habermas distinguishes between three forms of discussion within an organization seeking to accomplish radical change:

> ...the formation and extension of critical theorems, which stand up to scientific discourse; the organization of processes of enlightenment, in which such theorems are applied and can be tested in a unique manner by the initiation of processes of reflection carried on within certain groups toward which these processes have been directed; and the selection of appropriate stategies, the solution of tactical questions, and the conduct of political struggle.[3]

The first level aims at the formation of "true statements," couched in terms of social theory. The second intends the achievement of "authentic insight" for the partner in dialogue. Habermas seems to suggest that it stems from the unity of what we have in the fourth chapter called the "theoretical elaboration of antagonistic experiences," the "recognition of dimensions of conscious and preconscious experience that are antagonistic to the experiential categories mandated by role identities," and the extension of reflection to (at least) rudimentary stereotypes:

> ...the theory serves promarily to enlighten those to whom it is addressed about the position they occupy in an antagonistic social system and about the interests of which they must become conscious in this situation as being objectively theirs. Only to the degree that organized enlightenment and consulatation lead...those groups toward which this is directed to actually recognize themselves in the interpretation offered do the analytically proposed interpretations actually become consciousness, and does the objectively attributed situation of

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[2] Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 1-40.

[3] ibid., p. 32.

> interests actually become the real interest of a group capable of action...[4] [my emphasis]

The third level of discussion, aiming at "prudent decisions," is of course informed by the other two, but is not determined and justified by it in a deductive fashion:

> The sole possible justification at this level is consensus, aimed at in practical discourse among participants, who, in consciousness of their common interests and their knowledge of the circumstances, of the predictable consequences and secondary consequences, are the only ones who can know what risks they are willing to undergo, and with what expectations.[5]

Habermas seeks to clinch his argument for a disjuncture between the three levels by criticizing Lukacs' work "Toward a Methodology for the Problem of Organization," in which Lukacs outlines the operational code of the Leninist party.[6] As is well known, these norms are governed by the interest in maximizing the organizational strength of the party so that it may successfully contend in the political and social arenas with opposing forces. This is achieved by the subsumption of all three levels of discussion under a strategic orientation which, initially deriving it logic and force from the struggle with other groups, comes to dominate intraorganizational processes. Regarding the first level of discussion, Lukacs asserts that "[Every] 'theoretical' direction or divergence of views must immediately be transformed into an organizational issue if it is not to remain mere theory...if it really has the intention of showing the path to its realization."[7] Thus theoretical discussion must be curtailed so that it

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[4] ibid.

[5] ibid., p. 33.

[6] Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp. 295-342.

[7] ibid., p. 299.

does not set up dissonant tendencies in the organization. The truth that there is an immanent connection between theory and practice is used to justify the criticism of theoretical work in light of organizational consequences. Even at the formal level, critical discussions of theory come to be determined by intraorganizational politics.

Processes of enlightenment undergo a similar distortion. In our terms, the plausible claim that suffering individuals can recognize themselves and grasp important determinants of their situation in Marxist theory, a claim fostered within a process culminating in a regulatory self-identification mediated by a theoretically specified role (e.g., a "democratic socialist activist") is conflated with the demand that such an identification be given an absolute priority. As epitomized in processes of "thought reform," the subject's succeeding articulations of his/her interest are counterposed to the ramifications of the regulatory self-identification as determined by the organization, which seeks to inculcate its own stance as the subject's standpoint of critical reflection. In this manner whatever similarities that might obtain between the dialogic relationship between the party and those whose interests it would represent and the psychoanalytic dialogue are eliminated. Referring to our discussion in chapters three and four, the regulatory parameters of the analytic dialogue, which most prominently entail the suspension of social sanctions upon the subject in order to both encourage the subject to articulate and recognize what is suppressed and repressed and to allow the development of a self-observing ego capable of reformulating needs in light of chosen criteria, are replaced with an orientation that is much more coercive. The exigencies of the conflicts in which the organization is necessarily

engaged are used to rationalize and justify the bifurcation of the subject into "revolutionary" and "counter-revolutionary" tendencies. The "revolutionary" subject, "encouraged" to "struggle" with deviant orientations, thus must internalize a new suppressive orientation that will certainly enhance the infiltration of repressive mechanisms following the model we have suggested above. We would expect this to set up a tendency in which organizational rationales acquire an increasingly automatic quality and in which impulses and orientations regarded as antagonistic to the organization are processed in a manner significantly determined by defenses. The organizational fetishization of discipline, which undermines the process of "working through" the new general self-identification established via social theory, thereby set up a new, genuinely ideological process within a project that is nominally antagonistic to the reified institutional structure. The revolution, comprehended in a social theory that conceives of liberation in terms of "objective" dimensions of institutions and role identities, covertly incorporates the principal communicative forms of the society it seeks to transcend.

To avoid such an outcome, Habermas's infusion of procedural theories of democracy with a theory of systematically distorted communication is essential, as this dissertation has sought to extensively demonstrate. However, there is another level to his discussion of this issue that deserves critical comment. Habermas seeks to establish an epistemological dimension to the regulation of theoretical debate and, perforce, the regulation of intraorganizational discussion:

> While the theory legitimizes the work of enlightenment, as well as providing its own refutation when communication fails, and

> can, in any case, be corrected, it can by no means legitimize *a fortiori* the risky decisions of strategic action.[8]

It is questionable whether the distinction between refutation and correction always obtains, and thus whether the process of discussion can always avail itself of the absolute check that is implied. This is not to argue that identifications proposed to subjects as part of a critical theory may not be so divorced from their life contexts that something *akin* to the refutation of a theory in the natural sciences is possible and likely. For example, one could imagine a group of "critical theorists" proposing that workers in this country are slaves living under a despotism essentially similar to that of the Babylonian empire, and that they should revolt and form agricultural communes governed by precepts derived from Babylonian religion. On the basis of our knowledge of the culture, our study of similar messianic movements, etc., we would predict such a theory would be rejected out of hand by the majority of the population. It would simply not speak to their situation. But the epistemology of critique becomes more subtle when we consider the typical spectrum of alternatives, running from, for example, social democratic positions to the revolutionary Trotskyist left. As I have indicated in chapter five, the failure of these groups and parties to garner substantial mass support can hardly be taken to suggest that the variants of Marxism they work within have been refuted; to hold such a view would be to ignore the repression these tendencies have faced, the coercive nature of the institutions in which those whom they would address participate, etc. Because of this, failure can urge onely the necessity of "correction," the criteria for which are

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[8] Habermas, ibid., p. 33.

notoriously obscure. For example, does one need a new theory of the capitalist state, or should one try to appeal to new groups, or should one redefine norms of communication and decision-making within organizations?

When the truth of critical theory interworks with the authenticity of insight, and the latter is postulated by the theory itself as dependent upon a relatively coercion-free setting that is not immediately available, theory refutation becomes an infeasible goal of discussion. Especially when we have passed a certain vaguely defined point, after which we can say that a theory, and the identifications nested in it, are "sufficiently" adequate to the law-like quality of certain fundamental social processes and the existing self-understandings of subjects caught up in them, discussion can only hope to conclude in a shared appreciation of the need for more theoretical work. From Habermas' standpoint, this might seem to be an argument for a relativism that can support apathy, or just as easily allow leadership to entrench itself behind unassailable dogma. I think not; it can instead support a pluralism and mutual respect between disputants that recognizes the ambiguity of history, and inform a receptive attitude towards subjects the bearer of theory would address.

Some Suggestions for Research

I would like to preface some brief suggestions regarding case selction with a few general remarks intended to draw our some implications of our critical hermeneutic orientation:

The specific constellation of objective social conditions, institutional and subjective thematizations of core relations, and life history that takes shape in the presentation of a case not only

demonstrates the general nature of the ideological process, but provides a series of concrete examples of its course and dynamics. If social theory and a theory of systematically distorted communication are essential in the mediation of reified processes, exemplary cases, or exemplars,[9] are essential in mediating the abstract propostions of the theories for both theorist and audience. This is true not only because the formulations of conditions and patterns or representation must be made to speak to the particular situation of particular subjects, i.e. the general must be "operationalized" in the particular. It is also true because the suffering which the theories seek to clarify and help alleviate, the raison d'etre of the theory, must be demonstrated to be an immanent concern of the theories if they are to be taken seriously. In other words, epitemological and practical concerns are brought together in the constellation of the exemplary case.

These considerations are crucial in determining the characteristics of additional cases that would contribute to our project. We can best appreciate their implications through a contrast with research procedures in empirical-analytic social science. Along with their overwhelming interest in incorporating procedures that would assure a degree of statistical validity to research findings, standard approaches to research design typically rely upon categories specifying theoretically significant objective conditions to guide the selection of

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[9] The term is Kuhn's. I wish to restrict its meaning to connote a phenomenon or set of phenomena that exemplifies theoretical categories and relationships, and which can be used as a model to identify the elements of other phenomena which the theory may be applied. The term becomes especially significant, as I shall stress, when we wish to characterize the process of learning and applying the theory as entailing an idntification with exemplars. See Thomas Kuhn, "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," pp. 459-482 in Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories.

subject populations. Thus if a researcher is interested in studying the relationship between union structure and strike activity, they will select conceptual categories that, for a variety of reasons, seem to capture important dimensions of union structure and strike activity, and construct typologies within categories.

As we have seen, in principle the test of the validity of the conceptual categories of the empirical-analytic researcher ultimately lies in the successful prediction (or retrodiction) of events. Thus, even if the categories, following Weber's heuristic approach, are suggested by the researcher's understanding of the life world of the actors they study, the meaningful adequacy of the categories does not guarantee "good theory." Again, there are good practical reasons for this: significant "causes" may not be grasped in meaningful categories. It therefore may seem plausible to suggest that the role of empirical-analytic theory, aside from arriving at successful predictions, is to suggest extensions of actors' understandings, to bring to the subject's attention what is causally effective. From this standpoint, it could be argued that the demarcation between empirical-analytic theory and the actor's "recognition" of themselves in the social-theoretical component of critical hermeneutics is not sharp. But this argument rests upon a misconception of the latter. This is because the social-theoretical component of critical hermeneutics, by taking as its starting point a determinative set of social relations within which the actor lives (e.g. capitalist social relations), consistently seeks to maintain an internal connection between the extending field of causally significant phenomena it identifies and the historically specific social relations that constitute the actor. Within the

empirical-analytic paradigm such a connection is not maintained, or is only maintained in the sense that actors are regarded abstractly, as "someone who is interested in controlling the conditions that affect them."

This distinction becomes even sharper when we consider the extension of critical hermeneutics via psychoanalytic theory. In contrast to a psychology conceived in empirical-analytic terms, in which the meaningful categories of the subject are typically treated with indifference or, at best, with tremendous latitude,[10] psychoanalytic theory is regulated by an interest in a precise elaboration of those categories. Thus, even if the subject should approach analysis with the idea that they want to "increase their self-control," they must, in fact, accomplish this via a process that does not result in a knowledge of conditions, but in a mutative reappropriation of excommunicated object relations. The subject recognizes, or admits, what they are.

Thus in the selection of additional cases, "objective" subject characteristics - age, sex, job type - must be considered <u>primarily</u> in terms of the extent to which they facilitate the subject's self-recognition in both dimensions of theory, and not to the extent to which they allow us to relate research "findings" to existing empirical-analytic theory. Of course, such categories are likely to be significant in the subject's reception of the case qua exemplar. They are socioculturally potent elements of the subject's self-identification. But it is likely that other categories would be facilitative. This seems especially plausible when we set up a gross

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[10] For example, consider the interpretive latitude granted to the researcher in constructing categories within factor-analytic research.

distinction between a subject's initial engagement with an exemplar, in which the "profile" features of the exemplar are likely to determine whether the subject can "relate" to the case, and the categories referring to particular themes through which work is understood, or metaphors use by management to thematize work, or the subject's way of regulating frustration, etc.

What this suggests is that we might proceed with studies distinguished from each other by "profile" features, and then, as we identify categories and themes relating to other dimensions of the circumscription process, select those that seem most central for further elaboration and differentiation. Most obviously, exemplary case studies of women and minorities should be carried out. As categories of subjects that have been traditionally excluded from the range of democratic practices we specified as constituting contradictory institutional discourses, we can expect their understanding of the contradiction to be significantly different. (Of course, their exclusion, hardly total, from those practices may not result in an attenuation of their experience of the contradiction, but may in fact sharpen it; the denial, in appropriate spheres, of rights nominally guaranteed to groups may lead to the generalization of their demands across institutional spheres.) In the case of women, it would be especially important to trace the influence of family-centered orientations, in which a socialized preoccupation with "supporting" the husband and child rearing generally undercut the significance of participation in other institutions. A variety of other factors - age, union membership and involvement, skill level and job configuration, nature of local and regional politics, length of job tenure, etc. - all suggest themselves as significant

distinctions that would determine the reception of exemplars, and which thus could guide the choice of further subjects.

Within interviews thematic categories would be specified by an interplay between the categories of the theory of systematically distorted communication, the interviewers sense of the cultural themes subsumed under each of those theoretical categories, and the specific formulations of each subject. For example, the researcher knows that to secure higher profits management will try to increase cooperation from employees by thematizing work through metaphor-based discourses (we are a 'team,' or a 'family,' etc.) that invoke a cooperative orientation and which commend the suppression of discontent to preserve the idealized relationship. Whether these thematizations are elaborated in one or several standard thematic packages, comprising, for example, recurring "labels" for violators ('crazy,' 'irresponsible'), the impulses motivating violators ('greed'), all categories anticipated by the theory, could be discovered. New categories and theoretical emphases could be suggested as well. In other words, while forms of neo-Marxism and the psychoanalytic theory of personality would be generally determinative of the categories and category relationships employed by the researcher in their study of themes, the specific constellations and thus exemplary constellations could only be discovered in the interview process.

The importance of the subject's reception of exemplars suggests that interview-based studies of that process of reception would be worthwhile. For example, subjects could be first interviewed concerning their own understanding of the circumscription of democracy and then be asked to read an exemplary case. Further interviews would

then focus on how the subject understands the case, whether they believe it provides a fresh perspective on their own situation and the way they handle it, etc. It is conceivable that such a study might itself be turned into an exemplary case, in the sense that the subject's reflection on the exemplar could be presented to help other subjects reflect on their own understanding and initial reaction.

Another avenue of investigation would entail studying the circumscription relevant understandings of management, in addition to those of workers. Interviews with subjects in various levels of management would be especially significant in fleshing out the interworking of discourses nominally external to the accord. For example, general thematizations of the good employee/bad employee dichotomy could be developed to gauge the salience of the paternalistic themes that would be particularly evocative of transference. As noted, it would be especially useful to trace the manner in which those themes interwork with the common emphasis on loyalty to the work group. The results of such studes could be used to sensitize workers to management's selection of discourses that obscure the core social relation. This would better ground the idea that the worker's self-reflection on their patterns of representation is intended to facilitate their regulation of the discourse through which the core relation is interpreted. That is, because the interviews would illustrate how the "putting into play" of various discourses is regulated by the logic of accumulation, the critical movement of reflection, which would tend to "disenchant" subsidiary discourses that ameliorate the conflicts of work, would become more plausible.

Conclusion

To the social scienctist whose training is informed by the metascientific paradigm of empirical-analytic science, the critical hermeneutic research program I have proposed probably seems unscientific, a form of rhetoric dedicated to political ends. To this I can only respond that the radical break with the epistemology and methodology of empirical-analytic science is not informed by arbitrary sentiments, but by the nature of the subject and the society in which they live. That is, because subjects are capable of elaborating a systematically distorted understanding of themselves, because societies can interwork that capability with patterns of discourse that occlude the artifactual nature of society, and because this interworking maintains suffering that is objectively unnecessary, we must regard canonical adherence to that methodological paradigm as self-defeating (significant processes are obscured) and incapacitating in a practical sense.

To the social scientist who recognizes the limitations of empirical-analytic science, but who regards critical dialogic encounters with suspicion, this proposal may seem to invite bias and, much worse, oppressive arrogance. I share this concern. But, to reformulate and expand upon the previous reply, an approach that takes the notion of respect for the subject to mean that criticism is out of place, is compelled to conflate the notion of respect for the subject with an acceptance of their suffering. Most important, it assumes that the merging of arrogance and critique, in fact a product of an institutionalized form of dialogue that may be altered, is inevitable. The "empowerment" of the subject does not transpire through, following

anthropological codes, an essentially contemplative relation with the subject that leaves them in the midst of reification and unhappiness. The interest in the recording and appreciation of a "culture," and the inculcation of respect for it against forms of imperialism, is simply anachronistic in the context we have considered. In this context, empowerment unfolds through a relation that suggests the possibility of recovering the ability to rework their relations with themselves and with others. Suggesting this possibility does not necessarily entail a characterization of the subject as deficient, but instead suggests a way to resolve some dimensions of their unhappiness, a way the subject may take up if they wish. In this light, it would be fruitful to reconsider the emphasis on contemplative respect as a possible function of the researcher's own resignation, and corresponding inability to anticipate a working alliance with the subject.

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