Jewish *Paideia* in the Hellenistic Diaspora: 
Discussing Education, Shaping Identity

by

Jason M. Zurawski

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Near Eastern Studies) 
in the University of Michigan
2016

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Gabriele Boccaccini, Chair  
Professor Sara Ahbel-Rappe  
Associate Professor Brian B. Schmidt  
Professor Raymond H. Van Dam  
Professor Benjamin G. Wright III, Lehigh University
For my parents,

who taught me the value of *paideia* and encouraged me to peak my head out of the cave
Acknowledgements

This project owes a great debt to many people, no one more so than my advisor, Gabriele Boccaccini, who has been a constant presence and guide in my development as a scholar and a teacher and has shown me the benefits of collegiality and academic collaboration. I am also grateful to the other members of my dissertation committee: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Brian Schmidt, Ray Van Dam, and Benjamin Wright. They have challenged me with their sage counsel and provided encouragement through their steadfast belief in this project. The idea to explore Jewish *paideia* would likely have never arisen had it not been for my early obsession with the Greek language, and I would like to thank those teachers who first helped to foster this fascination, in particular Ben Acosta-Hughes, Netta Berlin, and Traianos Gagos. Traianos was a teacher, a friend, and a mentor, and I learned as much from him over pints at Ashley’s as I ever did in the classroom. He taught me not only about Greek and papyrology, but about being a teacher and an academic, valued guidance I still strive to follow today. I think he would have liked this project. He is sorely missed.

I would like to thank the Wisdom and Apocalypticism group at the Society of Biblical Literature, particularly Matthew Goff and Karina Martin Hogan, for allowing me opportunities to present some of this research at an early stage. The participants of the Nangeroni Meeting I organized last summer in Naples, Italy, “Second Temple Jewish *Paideia* in Its Ancient Near Eastern and Hellenistic Contexts,” taught me that a true, comprehensive picture of Second Temple education necessitates interdisciplinary collaboration. Fellowships from the Rackham
Graduate School and the Department of Near Eastern Studies provided the time and space necessary for research and writing, and financial support from the Frankel Center for Judaic Studies, the Enoch Seminar, the Alessandro Nangeroni Foundation, and the Michigan Center for Early Christian Studies allowed me ample opportunity to travel throughout Europe, Israel, and the United States over the past several years for conferences and research.

I am fortunate to have had a wonderful group of colleagues over the years at the University of Michigan, including but not limited to Stephanie Bolz, Rodney Caruthers, Helen Dixon, Harold Ellens, Deborah Forger, Noah Gardiner, Anne Kreps, Isaac Oliver, Ron Ruark, Joshua Scott, Adrianne Spunaugle, Jason Von Ehrenkrook, and James Waddell. I would like to express my eternal gratitude for the continual and much-needed friendship of Yale Cunningham, Andy Green, Brandi Green, and Jun Park. This project would never have been completed without my dissertation accountability buddy, Nancy Linthicum, and our weekly Thursday meetings at Vinology. She has been a source of unwavering support, motivation, and friendship.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents Dean and Barbara and my brother Nick, who have always encouraged me without question over the years to pursue my goals and my passions, no matter the seemingly odd directions they may have taken.
Table of Contents

Dedication ii
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract vi
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Part I. From *Musar* to *Paideia* 19
   Chapter 2. *Musar* and *Paideia*: Semantic Distinctions 23
   Chapter 3. *Musar to Paideia* in the Septuagint 59
Part II. Thinking about *Paideia* in the Hellenistic Diaspora 93
   Chapter 4. Philo of Alexandria 96
   Chapter 5. The *Wisdom of Solomon* 173
   Chapter 6. Paul’s *Letter to the Galatians* 215
Summary and Conclusions 259
Bibliography 265
Abstract

While the integral role of paideia in Greek, Roman, and early Christian history has been widely recognized, the place of paideia in Jewish thought and the resultant influence on late antique Christianity, and thus on Western education as a whole, has been largely neglected. This study examines the theories of ideal Jewish education from three contemporaneous, but unique Diaspora Jews—Philo of Alexandria, the pseudonymous author of the Wisdom of Solomon, and Paul of Tarsus—particularly in light of the role of the Greek Septuagint translations. The purpose is not to locate a unified concept of Jewish Hellenistic paideia, but to allow the views of each author to stand on their own. The diverse educational theories all developed out of a complex amalgam of Jewish and Greco-Roman influences, brought together and reimagined thanks to the Septuagint and the consistent use of paideia as a translation for the Hebrew musar. The translators of the ancient Hebrew scriptures handed down to future generations a textbook and a teacher, a lens through which later Jewish thinkers could merge and morph ancestral traditions with contemporary Platonic and Stoic philosophy in the creation of new and innovative paideutic concepts. With their textbook in hand, these authors would deploy their ideal notions of paideia as a means of contemplating on and shaping the self and Jewish identity. Paideia, then, becomes the mechanism by which the most highly valued constituents of Jewish ethics and culture are formed and employed. The diverse developments in Jewish education explored reveal the varied dynamics both within the Jewish community and between the Jews and the wider cultural world.
*Paideia* became the perfect surrogate, a common, universal good which could touch on every facet determinative in the construction of the self.
Chapter 1. Introduction

*Paideia* has long been marked as a defining concept in the intellectual, cultural, and social histories of ancient Greece and Rome. The Greek term, notoriously difficult to translate, can refer at once to education, culture, and enculturation through education, and classicists have highlighted the centrality of *paideia* through to the Hellenistic and Roman periods, both as an idealized concept and in all the ways it would surface on the ground. Scholars of early Christianity too have pointed to the integral role of Greek *paideia* in the development and history of the early Church. In addition, Greek encyclical *paideia*, which would come to be known as the *artes liberales*, is commonly understood as the basis of modern, Western education, the influence of Greek *paideia* being mediated through late antique and medieval Christianity. However, the place of *paideia* in early Jewish thought and the influence it had on late antique Christianity, and thus on Western education as a whole, has been largely neglected.

The following study considers three unique views of idealized *paideia* from contemporaneous, Greek-speaking, Diaspora Jews: Philo of Alexandria, the pseudonymous author of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, and Paul of Tarsus. These conceptions of model education for the Jewish people all evince a creative amalgam of ancestral tradition and contemporary Greco-Roman philosophical theory. This conceptual hybridity was facilitated by the revered scriptures of the Diaspora communities, the Greek Septuagint, and, in particular, the consistent rendering of the Hebrew *musar* with the Greek *paideia* throughout the translations. Therefore, this study of Jewish *paideia* appropriately begins with the Septuagint itself, examining in detail the effect the
musar to paideia transition had on how these texts came to be read and understood in the centuries following the initial translations.

The Septuagint was received and utilized as a textbook and a teacher, a singular educational resource for the Greek-speaking Jews of the Second Temple period. Perhaps even more importantly, the Septuagint would serve as a lens, through which later Jewish thinkers could reimagine, merge, and morph both their ancient received traditions and contemporary Platonic and Stoic philosophy in the creation of new and innovative paideutic concepts. With their textbook in hand, these authors could discuss and debate the proper means of Jewish education in major Hellenistic cities and its value and role within the life of the individual and the community at large. But, the discussions on paideia we find extend beyond issues of pedagogy or curricula, well beyond what one might reasonably expect to surface on the ground. The supremely elevated nature of and deference to paideia made it the perfect surrogate which could reach any and all facets determinative in the construction of the self. Paideia, then, becomes the mechanism by which the most highly valued constituents of Jewish ethics, culture, and identity are formed and employed.

1. STATE OF THE QUESTION

Scholarship on the Second Temple period has progressed considerably in the past century, both in terms of method and approach, and yet, despite the far greater historical understanding of the era as a result, knowledge of Jewish education during this time has been nominal, and there has been a lack of critical research conducted on the topic. Early studies on the subject often assumed an educational system based on either ancient Israelite or rabbinic models, a problematic basis from which to begin for several reasons, including the fact that many of these
studies took place at a time when, one, few scholars distinguished the diversity of the Second Temple period from later late antique forms of Judaism, and, two, critical research into early Israelite and Judahite education was still in its infancy.

Compared to the extensive history of research on education in ancient Israel and Judah, scholarship on Second Temple education appears quite meager. Swift highlights this embarrassing oversight in the preface to his 1919 monograph, bemoaning the lack of proper studies on “Hebrew education,” and the disregard of the Jewish contribution to larger histories of

---

education, \(^2\) a dissatisfaction echoed at the start of Drazin’s work from twenty years later. \(^3\) However, these and other studies from this period \(^4\) suffer from major methodological problems, most seriously the uncritical use of rabbinic literature to describe the educational situation of the Jews centuries earlier. Rabbinic sources are cited far more than materials from the period, including the texts from the Hebrew Bible and New Testament. These early forays into the subject are little to be blamed, as the field at that time did not yet have the benefits that came from the Dead Sea Scrolls, greater critical study of the pseudepigrapha, and the generally more sophisticated methods developed in the past decades. Nevertheless, the inherent deficiencies in these studies make them of little use today.

For example, studies from this period routinely assume, based on later rabbinic literature, that the Jewish people of the Second Temple period developed a universally mandated education for all its people and that this education took place in established schools of different levels, from elementary to more advanced. We find claims such as, “The Jewish people almost alone, of all the ancient nations, provided for the universal schooling of its children. The earliest historical evidence to support this contention as of the first century B.C.E. can be found in the Palestinian Talmud (ca. 400 C.E.).” \(^5\) Note that this uncritical use of rabbinic materials is not confined to the first part of the twentieth century. Safrai’s study from 1976 is based nearly entirely on later rabbinic texts, and he takes depictions of pre-70 Jerusalem from the Talmuds almost without

\(^2\) Fletcher Harper Swift, *Education in Ancient Israel from Earliest Times to 70 A.D.* (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1919). Swift argues that his will be the first broad treatment of the subject in English (v).
\(^3\) Nathan Drazin, *History of Jewish Education from 515 B.C.E. to 220 C.E. (During the Periods of the Second Commonwealth and the Tannaim)* (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Education 29; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940), vii, 1-2.
\(^4\) See also Eliezer Ebner, *Elementary Education in Ancient Israel during the Tannaitic Period (10-220 CE)* (New York: Bloch, 1956).
question, as when he uses the view from the Palestinian Talmud that pre-70 Jerusalem had 480 synagogues, each with its own “house of reading” and “house of learning,” the former for study of the written law, the latter for the oral law, as evidence for the ubiquity of Jewish education during the period.⁶

As we move into more recent scholarship, we find very few extensive, detailed studies on the topic. Instead, we see a number of authors take up the issue very briefly and superficially in broader surveys⁷ as well as several more focused studies. There have been a number of critically sophisticated works on, for example, the role of the Greek preliminary studies in the thought of Philo of Alexandria in light of related discussions in Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman sources, and views on Jewish education as related to Ben Sira or the Dead Sea Scrolls have long been a standard aspect of the respective research fields.⁸ Studies on the texts of the New Testament in

---

⁶ Shmuel Safrai, “Education and the Study of the Torah,” in The Jewish People in the First Century (ed. S. Safrai and M. Stern; CRINT ½; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1976), 2:945-70 (2:947). See y. Meg. 73d; y. Ketub. 35c. Around the same time as Safrai’s study, Hengel, in his brief overview of Jewish education, notes the obvious exaggerated nature of the account. See Martin Hengel, Judentum und Hellenismus, Studien zu ihrer Begegnung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Palästinas bis zur Mitte des 2 Jh.s v.Chr. (2nd rev. ed.; WUNT 10; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973), translated by John Bowden as Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period (2 vols.; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1974), 1:82. As to the universality of Jewish education and schools during the Second Temple period so prevalent in the earlier sources, Catherine Hezser’s monograph, Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine (TSAJ 81; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), though focused primarily on the later period, has proven extremely influential and effective in providing the necessary corrective to this widespread view.


light of Greco-Roman education have also become popular in recent years. In addition, we find
regular discussions of Jewish education in the Hellenistic Diaspora, at least in the narrow sense,
where it relates to Jewish access to the gymnasium and to citizenship in cities like Alexandria.

David Carr, in his 2005 monograph, has most closely attempted to approach some of the
larger questions I will pursue here, though the focus of his work is decidedly different. As he
states from the onset: “I ask: what can we plausibly suppose about how texts—particularly texts
used over long periods of time—were produced, collected, revised, and used? How might we
avoid imposing anachronistic models of textual production and reception on ancient texts? The
alternative picture developed here not only illuminates the formation of the Bible but also
provides insight into the nature of education in general and the use of writing as a major cultural-
religious medium.” Carr’s project is, first and foremost, a sort of book history of the Bible. The
nature of Jewish education is of secondary concern, though it is often a major focal point

9 See the recent studies of Samuel Byrskog, Jesus the Only Teacher: Didactic Authority and Transmission, in
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1994); Robert S. Dutch, The Education Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and
Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context (London: T&T Clark, 2005); Adam G. White, Where is the Wise
Man? Graeco-Roman Education as a Background to the Divisions in 1 Corinthians 1-4 (London: T&T Clark,
2010); and Matthew Ryan Hauge and Andrew W. Pitts, eds., Ancient Education and Early Christianity (London:
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016).

10 Victor Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of
America, 1959); E. M. Smallwood, The Jews Under Roman Rule: From Pompey to Diocletian (SJLA 20; Leiden:
553; A. Kashe, The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (TSAJ 7, Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1985);
Society, 1995); and J. M. G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE –

11 Carr, Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 4.
throughout the book, yet always approached via his book history and his view of the “Bible” as an enculturating, subverting force.

Carr’s study is impressive in its goals and breadth of material concisely covered—from the dawn of writing in ancient Mesopotamia to the end of the Second Temple period in under 300 pages—and he does a fine job in highlighting the role of ancient Hebrew literature in the education of Jews during the Second Temple period, particularly in Palestine. There are, however, two serious problems with his approach. First, his focus on the textuality of the “Bible” alone leaves a distorted image of the overall education of the Jews, especially in the Diaspora. In his discussion on Philo’s views on education, for instance, Carr draws a picture of Philo entirely fixated on “Hebrew” texts over and against Greek ones in the education of the Jews of Alexandria. Yet, he does this by completely ignoring Philo’s views on the necessity of encyclical—i.e. Greek—paideia and the actual way in which the Jewish law is utilized in education and to what ends. He portrays Philo as concerned solely with the Torah as the central educational element, but without mentioning that this education could come through Greek methods of exegesis—allegory—or that education via the Mosaic law inculcates (the Greek concept of) virtue and centers on (Greek) notions of the soul. His focus on biblical textuality might excuse these major oversights, but not when he extends this focus to include universal statements on Jewish education in general.12

The other serious point of concern is Carr’s assumed, universally applied postcolonial model of the education of marginalized peoples, where native Jewish education—for Carr, the Bible—is initially intended and then serves as a subversive counter-curriculum designed to

12 To be fair, Carr does mention the objection that could be raised based on Philo’s views on the encyclia in such treatises as De congressu in a footnote, but dismisses it by simply stating that “such texts are not under discussion here” (Writing on the Tablet of the Heart, 245 note 14).
contrast and undermine Hellenistic education. Why he begins and ends from this assumed model is unclear and actually unnecessary in his study. And, the vast majority of his own examples actually do not support this model and show, instead, much greater “cultural hybridity,” as he calls it. Only when we arrive at the end of his study and his discussion of the Hasmoneans and the Maccabean literature do we actually find direct evidence for his overarching claim. Yet, why we must take the view of (some of) the Hasmoneans as normative for the Jews of the Second Temple period, whether on notions of education or any other topic? The evidence he finds throughout the various sources to support his postcolonial model is, primarily, the centrality of the Torah, that a focus on one set of texts equates to a denigration of all other literature and even the cultures from which that literature sprang. This assumption is clearly not supported by the evidence we have. If Carr had not set out this specious presumption from the beginning and instead allowed the diversity of the materials and views to stand on their own, his study would have been much more effective.

Despite these critiques, Carr should be credited for his attempt to understand more fully Second Temple education in a broad, comprehensive manner. No other recent scholar has done so. However, though the field of Second Temple Judaism has been slow to fill this major gap in our historical understanding of the period, we are now beginning to see a shift and a recognition of the importance and necessity of thorough, critical study on the topic of Second Temple Jewish

---

13 Carr, *Writing on the Tablet of the Heart*, 238-239.
14 In a recent study, Royce Victor picks up Carr’s intuitive postcolonial reading, and supplies it with actual models from postcolonial theorists and a comparison between Hellenistic Judea and colonial India. Victor should be credited with his open, theoretical approach, but, in the end, his study suffers from the same flaws as Carr’s, namely taking one example from the period as the exemplar for the entire period. Royce M. Victor, *Colonial Education and Class Formation in Early Judaism: A Postcolonial Reading* (LSTS 72; London: T&T Clark, 2010). I do not dismiss the postcolonial model outright, but it should not be used indiscriminately and without testing it in each case.
paideia, with a number of doctoral projects devoted to various aspects of the subject\textsuperscript{15} and two recent conferences centered on these very issues.\textsuperscript{16}

2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE

This meager research history is deeply problematic, as the study of education can tell us far more about a group of people than issues pertaining solely to their schooling. Concepts or theories of education reveal comprehensive value systems which influence and illuminate a shared view of the self and the world. By studying education, we study those things most highly prized in a community and the way in which that community views itself with respect to the surrounding world. Educational theory, in particular, is uniquely illuminative, and though there is a clear dichotomy between idealized theory and way in which education actually surfaced on the ground, the former can be far more instructive in understanding these larger questions.

We find several examples of how views on education can be used as windows into more expansive issues of worldview and identity formation in the literature of the Second Temple period, particularly in that of the Greek-speaking Diaspora communities, in Hellenistic cities where paideia was a topic of continual and central importance. In what follows, I will explore

\textsuperscript{15} See, e.g., the recently published dissertation of Patrick Pouchelle, \textit{Dieu éducateur: Une nouvelle approche d'un concept de la théologie biblique entre Bible Hébraïque, Septante et littérature grecque classique} (FAT II/77; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015).

\textsuperscript{16} At the 2012 and 2013 Society of Biblical Literature annual meetings in Chicago and Baltimore, the Wisdom and Apocalypticism in Early Judaism and Early Christianity group offered several sessions on various aspects of early Jewish and Christian paideia, the results of which—including two papers of my own—will be published later this year as \textit{From Musar to Paideia: Education in Early Judaism and Christianity} (ed. Matthew Goff, Karina Martin Hogan, and Emma Wasserman; Atlanta: SBL, forthcoming). This past summer, together with Gabriele Boccaccini and Luca Arcari, I organized and chaired a conference on “Second Temple Jewish Paideia within Its Ancient Near Eastern and Hellenistic Backgrounds” at the University of Naples, Federico II, with over thirty international, interdisciplinary scholars. We will be publishing the volume of proceedings in late 2016. Additionally, a recent research group has been formed within the Courant Research Centre “Education and Religion” at the University of Göttingen, led by Tobias Georges and titled “Piety and Paideia. Religious Traditions and Intellectual Culture in the World of the Roman Empire.” However, the focus is on the second and third centuries CE, not on the Second Temple period.
how idealized discussions of proper Jewish paideia reflect not only the actual educational systems from which these conversations sprang, but, more importantly, the process of contemplating on and shaping the self and Jewish identity within the wider Greco-Roman world. I have chosen three authors for this survey who share much in common but also possess distinctive views of Jewish ethics, culture, community, and identity, which result in unique depictions of ideal education, both in the forms it should take and the benefits it offers. Philo, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, and Paul are all roughly contemporary to one another. The first two both lived in the major Jewish community of Alexandria and all three received an elite Hellenistic education. And, they all utilized and revered the Greek Septuagint as the sacred, received scriptures. Yet, despite these superficial commonalities, these Jewish thinkers develop their own unique notions of education, some irreconcilable with the others. Therefore, these three authors are an ideal group from which to begin to understand the diversity of educational concepts of the time and the ways in which paideia could be deployed as a means of contemplating Jewish identity.

As the three authors under discussion all utilized the Greek Septuagint translations as the basis from which to build their unique concepts of Jewish paideia, I will begin the study from Septuagint itself, in particular the decisive, fortuitous translation of the Hebrew musar with Greek paideia. Jewish thinkers in the Hellenistic Diaspora would come to conceive of ideal educational programs in ways absent from and even irreconcilable with ideas found in the ancient Hebrew texts themselves, developing them neither from their ancestral traditions alone nor solely from their Greco-Roman cultural milieux. Instead, these authors, writing with unique audiences and aims in mind, merged and morphed choice aspects of both in order to create theories or at least aspects of educational knowledge production, which could incorporate the
best of both Greek and Jewish notions of education, and which were ideally suited to their own particular purposes. This amalgamation of two, at times seemingly incompatible, circles of thought was made possible by our first known examples of Jewish Hellenistic literature, the Greek translations of the Hebrew scriptures. The Septuagint would serve as a textbook and a lens, through which later Jewish thinkers would view and reimagine both their ancestral customs and contemporary philosophical theories in the creation of innovative notions of Jewish paideia, which they would employ in their shaping of concepts of the self and of Jewish collective identity in the first-century Diaspora.

In order to understand and read the Septuagint as Philo or Paul would have read it and the impact of the translation of paideia for musar, Part I begins from a detailed examination of the respective semantic ranges of the Hebrew and Greek terminology. In Chapter Two, I compare the usage of musar / y-s-r with paideia / paideuō, noting the many points of overlap but also the significant differences, such as the standard use of the Hebrew terminology to describe a pedagogical process based on verbal rebuke and physical punishment, a notion not inherent to the Greek terms. The Greek paideia, instead, is often idealized and connected to lofty notions such as virtue, citizenship, and the fate of the immortal soul. And paideia, particularly in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, came to take on a universalizing function, whereby proper education was determinative in one’s membership in a politeia rather than one’s family or even ethnos.

Given the unique semantic ranges of the terms, the choice of paideia as a translation for musar had the potential to significantly impact the understanding of the texts as they came to be utilized in those very environments which held such lofty, idealized visions of paideia. This impact is explored in Chapter Three, where I compare the Septuagint translations with the
Hebrew vorlage. The ways in which scholars have read and understood the Septuagint has often been based, directly or indirectly, on the perceived origins of the Greek texts and the translators’ initial intended purpose for those texts. As opposed to basing my understanding of the Greek texts on the translators’ purposes, I will focus on the texts themselves and, in the analyses to follow, examine the Hebrew and Greek texts individually as if separate, autonomous documents in order to best understand how the Greek text would have been read in the Hellenistic settings where it came to be studied. The intention of the actual translators is of secondary importance, as conclusions related to the motivations of the individual translators are necessarily speculative, though researchers interested in this line of inquiry may often find light shed on this topic, so popular in Septuagint research, through my reading of the texts. Yet, the primary purpose here will be to attempt to read the Greek texts as a Jew in the Hellenistic Diaspora would have read them, as a Jew like Philo would have read them, not as “translation texts,” but simply as texts, sacred and worthy of study on their own.

In the Greek translations, I have identified two very different ways of handling the translation from musar to paideia. In the texts of Proverbs and Job, the Greek terminology maintains its traditional range of meaning, to the point of distancing the term from notions of violent punishment at times inherent in the Hebrew texts. The Greek Pentateuch and prophetic

---

17 Recent reviews of the material may be found in Gilles Dorival, “La traduction de la Torah en grec,” in La Bible des Septante: Le Pentateuque d’Alexandrie: Texte grec et traduction (ouvrage collectif sous la direction de Cécile Dogniez et Marguerite Harl; Paris: Cerf, 2001), 31-41; Dorival, “De nouvelles donées sur l’origine de la Septante?” Semitica et Classica 2 (2009): 73-79; Dorival, “New light about the origin of the Septuagint,” in Die Septuaginta – Texte, Theologien, Einflusse. 2. Internationale Fachtagung veranstaltet von Septuaginta Deutsch (LXX.D), Wuppertal 23. – 27.7.2008 (ed. Wolfgang Kraus, Martin Karrer; WUNT 252; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 36-47; Jan Joosten, “Reflections on the ‘Interlinear Paradigm’ in Septuagintal Studies,” in Scripture in Transition. Essays on Septuagint, Hebrew Bible, and Dead Sea Scrolls in Honour of Raija Sollamo (ed. A. Voitila and J. Jokiranta; JSJS 126; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 163-178; and Benjamin G. Wright III, “The Letter of Aristeas and the Question of Septuagint Origins Redux,” JAJ 2 (2011): 305-325. Joosten sees four major “paradigms” in the history of research: (1) the Letter of Aristeas; (2) official endorsement, but to provide the Jewish community of Egypt with a code of law, not to satisfy the curiosity of the Greeks; (3) liturgical, religious, and educational setting; and (4) the interlinear paradigm. Wright, instead, offers three major divisions prior to discussing his preference for the interlinear paradigm: (1) liturgical origin; (2) legal origin; and (3) Ptolemaic initiative connected to the library.
literature, however, follow the Hebrew *urtext* so closely that the Greek *paideia* / *paideuō* must take on the disciplinary, punishing aspects of the Hebrew *musar* / *y-s-r*, expanding the potential semantic range of the Greek terminology. This expanded range of meaning would have a definitive impact on the *Wisdom of Solomon*, which, with firm textual support, would develop a theory of *paideia* based on divine testing and punishing discipline.

Beyond this particular case, however, this initial and then consistent move to translate *musar* with *paideia* would have a profound impact in the centuries to follow, as the Greek-speaking Jews would be handed a textbook of their own imbued with notions of *paideia*, just as the Greeks and Romans had in their own texts. Had the translators chosen a term with a closer range of meaning but less cultural significance—such as *noutheteia* or *elegchos*—Jews like Philo would not have had the tangible means necessary to reshape and merge their ancestral customs with contemporary paideutic theory in the creation of new conceptions of education.

Once having established a chronologically situated and culturally concordant reading of the relevant Septuagint texts, Part II then explores the three unique concepts of *paideia*, highlighting the role of the Septuagint as both the textbook / teacher and the tool which facilitated the incorporation of Greek philosophy and educational ideals with Jewish traditions and law in the total education of the individual. Chapter Four explores the extensive views on *paideia* found in Philo of Alexandria’s corpus, including the various forms of education and the essential value of *paideia* in the life and development of the individual. In Philo’s overall educational theory, we find Greek encyclical *paideia*—what will come to be known as the *artes liberals*—, the study of native and foreign philosophy, and the use of the laws of Moses as trainers or teachers, educating the individual in the unwritten law of the nature and combating the irrational passions of the soul, as all crucially vital for each individual. Philo symbolizes *paideia*
in several ways to make explicit its necessity and value, including *paideia* as the “rod,” not the stick the pedagogue uses to beat misbehaving children, but the tool which quells the passions and desires of the soul. Philo also discusses the academic family, where *orthos logos* is the father and encyclical *paideia* is the mother, and the best children obey both parents, the divine education of the father and the worldly teachings of the mother, an idea which highlights Philo’s insistence on balance between the active and contemplative lives. Philo, throughout his work, is often consumed with issues of *paideia*, the component essential for keeping bodily desire at bay, the attainment of virtue and wisdom, and the realization of the immortal life of the soul.

In Chapter Five I move on to an Alexandrian text roughly contemporaneous to Philo: the *Wisdom of Solomon*. As with Philo’s writings, we find here a text permeated with the language and thought of *paideia* and a worldview which considered *paideia* the essential ingredient in attaining the true immortal life of the soul in nearness to the divine. However, the means of education, the pedagogy, envisioned in the *Wisdom of Solomon* is, at times, drastically different from Philo’s. While the pseudonymous author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* likely would have viewed the *propaideumata* and the Jewish law as beneficial educational resources, he also understood God’s violent testing as necessary *paideia* and determinative in the fate of the soul, divine, pedagogical discipline that could include even corporal death. The world, from the author’s perspective, is an *agōn*, a divine contest set up to determine those worthy of the true life of the soul, separated from the somatic prison, an idea made possible by the author’s Platonic influences and the extended range of meaning attached to *paideia* found in the Septuagint prophetic literature, particularly *Isaiah*. This rather harsh view of the world is, nevertheless, decidedly inclusive in scope, where this testing is applied to all of humankind universally and
where all are encouraged to be educated and gain immortality. Philo would agree with the inclusivity, but certainly not with the pedagogy.

The final view of Diaspora Jewish education explored is that of Paul in Chapter Six, in particular looking at his view of the Jewish law as propaedeutic in his *Letter to the Galatians*. Paul uses a number of metaphors to describe the law in the central argumentative portion of the letter, all of which point to the once necessary preliminary function of the law, but a role temporary and no longer needed now that Christ has brought the wisdom to which the law was preparatory. This preliminary, temporary view of the law culminates in Paul’s allegorical reading of the Hagar and Sarah narrative, much like Philo’s allegorical reading where Hagar represents the encyclical, preliminary *paideia*, both necessary for Abraham to attain Sarah—the symbol of virtue and wisdom—and dangerous once having moved on to the loftier goal. Paul’s reading, however, differs in two significant ways: one, Hagar represents not Greek encyclical *paideia*, but the Jewish law; and two, with the advent of Christ, wisdom is freely given to the community of believers. While Philo and other Hellenistic philosophers would argue that the encyclical studies must be abandoned after attaining wisdom, Paul argues the same for the Jewish law.

In all this, my aim is not to locate a unified theory or depiction of a normative, universal Jewish education during the Second Temple period. Instead, in order to comprehend and elucidate the complexity of views on Jewish education and identity formation within the multiform Jewish communities of the period, the diversity of Jewish *paideia*, in all its articulations, must be allowed to stand, without flattening it into a simplified, yet historically untenable concept. This type of teleological conceptualization has been one of the primary problems at the heart of scholarship on Jewish education during the period since its inception. Most specialists in Second Temple Judaism have long come to realize that the idea of a
normative Judaism at this time is a fallacy and that insisting on this notion is counter-productive and inimical to a genuine understanding of the period. My research on Jewish *paideia* begins and ends with this plurality firmly entrenched, and by avoiding preconceived, anachronistic models of education and by not transposing one theory over the others, we are able to see just how powerful the concept of *paideia* could be as a means of shaping ethics, culture, and identity.

3. **Implications**

A critical study of education is necessary in order to understand better not only the social and cultural lives of the Jewish people during the Second Temple period but also the complex relationships between Jews and non-Jews. Telling of the unique, developing, and at times divisive worldviews of the particular Second Temple writers or communities is the means proposed for the education of the Jewish people, the pedagogical tools and methods, whether the curricula of Greek preliminary education, philosophy, and/or the Jewish laws, customs, and traditions properly interpreted. But, the way in which a particular community or author imagined the ideal education of the Jews speaks to historical questions far larger than details of curricula or pedagogy. It can tell us how the author or community envisioned the Jewish people—or their own small part of it—within the world and their role in that world. Are the Jews to be part of the world or separate from it? Can they partake in the cultural and intellectual offerings of the time while still maintaining their own unique identity? These are the types of questions Christians would ask centuries later, and they are questions that still resonate today within many traditional religious communities. And they are questions that can be best understood through a programmatic study of education.
From the examples here explored, we will find, through the critical analysis of each author’s views on paideia, an inclusive approach to education that would have been undermined had we begun from an assumed Judaism/Hellenism opposition. Philo of course has a special place for the law of Moses within the education of the people, but this neither undermines Greek education nor excludes non-Jews from achieving those goals to which the law, as paideia, led. Unlike Philo, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon is not overtly concerned with the Jewish law and, instead, focuses on the instruction of Wisdom, available to all of humankind, and the divine discipline that God uses to test humanity. And with Paul, though we do not know his broader views on education, we similarly find that wisdom, to which the Jewish law was preliminary, is now available to all who believe, whether Jew or Greek. In the views here examined, we have failed to locate Carr’s subversive Jewish curriculum.

Beyond the goal of a greater understanding of the Jews of this period, this research will also help to situate Jewish education within the overall history of Western education, a place that has long been denied it. The standard histories of Western education from the past century have either neglected completely the role of the Jewish people or have relegated Jewish education—actually rabbinic forms of education—to a footnote in the history as a whole. According to most historians of education, our modern educational system begins, principally, in Greece. Greek education travels via Rome to Christendom, which incorporates it into traditional religious education and thereby fills the long gap between antiquity and the Renaissance.\(^{18}\) This secular-religious synthesis may seem antithetical to modern Western education, but without it, the secular side, i.e. the liberal arts, would likely have been undermined and lost in the West. This

synthesis took the basis for modern education and carried it nearly 1500 years. And, it is this synthesis that historians of education have assigned to the early Church. The fact that we find this very fusion in Philo’s overall educational theory, where Greek and Jewish education are both essential in the development of the individual, and that it was Philo who influenced those early Christians who would incorporate Greek *paideia* with Christian education is in no way acknowledged. This research will help to correct this troubling oversight.

In seeking to clarify systematically the nature and diversity of ancient Jewish education, this project will help to fill a significant lacuna in the scholarly understanding of the Second Temple period. The dearth of critical inquiry on the subject has led to, at best, a professed ignorance, and, at worst, a gross misunderstanding of Jewish education based on unfounded, anachronistic preconceptions and assumptions. The result is an opaque slice of the cultural history of the period and a perpetuation of histories of Western education absent contributions of the Jewish people. This research has far-reaching implications in what it illumines not only concerning the adoption of Greek and Roman curricula into the wider education of the Jews but also how this adoption could co-exist alongside ancestral traditions, native customs, and the Mosaic law, all reworked and reinterpreted in light of a real or imagined pedagogic intention. And the study of these unique educational theories reveals how ancient Jewish authors could utilize *paideia* as an ideal means of contemplating on larger issues of Jewish communal and individual identity.
Part I. From *Musar* to *Paideia*

The Septuagint translations of the Hebrew scriptures would prove the perfect lens through which later Jewish intellectuals living and working in major Hellenistic cities could interpret their ancient, ancestral customs in light of their current surroundings and the Platonic and Stoic philosophical milieux so prevalent, and thereby move beyond the largely utilitarian basis of elite scribal education found in ancient Israel and Judah to a point where idealized education, including now exegesis of the Mosaic law, could be an equalizing force and one determinative in the soul’s fate in this world and the next. Within the overall project of the Septuagint translations, two primary loci have proven decisive in this shift in idealized education: the translation of the Greek *paideia* for Hebrew *musar* and the Greek *nomos* for Hebrew *torah*. More than any other translation choices, whether in individual terminology or wider ideological motivations, these two consistent moves by the translators would prove highly influential in the direction Jewish education would take in the centuries to follow. While the *torah* to *nomos* translation has long been a topic of scholarly discussion, the *musar* to *paideia* shift has gone largely unnoticed. Therefore, the focus in the following two chapters will be on *musar* and *paideia*, first examining their traditional semantic ranges, then looking at the effect of the translation in the Septuagint.

For the purposes of this project the intentions of the Septuagint translators are of no consequence and have no bearing on our reading of the Greek. For our purposes, these are not translation texts. They are simply texts. If we are to understand how a Jew like Philo read the Septuagint, we simply cannot begin from any other premise. We know how the Septuagint texts
came to be utilized in the Diaspora, and we must, therefore, try to understand them as their ancient readers did, and not as we typically use them today, as text-critical tools for attempting to better grasp their source materials. Philo did not have both a Greek Pentateuch and a Hebrew Torah at his desk, and so we too cannot use the Hebrew to help explicate the Greek. The Greek should be allowed to stand on its own, and we must try to make sense of it on its own terms.

In looking at this transition and the differences between the Hebrew vorlage and the Greek, it is important that we keep in mind the work of James Barr. Barr’s sights were set squarely on the imprecise and haphazard use of linguistic arguments within biblical theology, especially as expressed is texts like Boman’s *Die hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem Griechischen* and Kittel’s *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum neuen Testament*. In particular, Barr had issue with the way many scholars used this sort of piecemeal linguistics in order to demonstrate a simple correlation between the structure of a language—or language group—and the worldview and value system of that language’s culture. So, from a sporadic and contextually- and historically-isolated treatment of the Hebrew and Greek languages, there developed the notion of an inherent, sharp contrast between the Hebrew and Greek mentalities. From here it is easy to see how one would naturally argue, then, that a translation from Hebrew into Greek reflects not only a shift in language but also a fundamental shift in outlook. Barr’s argument is that these types of assumptions are based entirely on an unsystematic, parochial use of linguistic evidence. When the languages are examined in their entirety and according to the methods of general linguistics, these supposed distinctions are proven fallacious.

---

20 Barr, *Semantics*, 33 cites Pedersen, “The Semitic languages are as perfect expressions of Semitic thinking as the European languages of European thinking,” and Boman, “The unique character (Eigenart) of a people or of a family of peoples, a race, finds its expression in its own language.”
Another point of contention, which surfaces primarily in his criticism of the *TWNT*, is the lack of distinction between a term and a concept and the resultant treatment of a term as if a concept, applying the full complex of meaning inherent in the concept to every use of the term, regardless of context, a move especially problematic when the “Bible” is taken as a unified whole. The issue becomes even more complex in the context of translations, as Boyd-Taylor has pointed out in his recent study on ἐλπίζω in the Greek Psalter in light of Barr’s approach. According to Boyd-Taylor, when working with the Septuagint, “there is a temptation to assume that through the process of Hebrew-Greek translation *concepts* expressed in the source language somehow passed over into *lexical meanings* within the target language.”

The dangers here are clear, particularly in the realm of biblical theology. However, the following is not a theological study, and the examination of *musar* and *paideia* avoids the types of issues with which Barr had a problem. The readings that follow are, one, fully situated within the broader contexts of the passages, two, not based on an assumed inherent difference between the Hebrew and Greek mentalities, and three, never applied universally. The diversity of the texts and the meanings of the terms are allowed to stand firmly on their own, without falling back on a supposed universal concept. Nowhere do I suggest that *musar* in the Hebrew texts or *paideia* in the Septuagint are technical, global concepts. Instead, I will argue that the translation led to a possibility of new meanings, an expanded range of meaning, not “a semantic revolution,” not a sort of universal conceptual shift. This expanded range of meaning will prove critical in the

---

development, not of a unified concept of *paideia* in the Hellenistic Diaspora, but of a multiplicity of diverse educational theories.
Chapter 2. Musar and Paideia: Semantic Distinctions

The translations of *paideia* for *musar* and *nomos* for *torah* were progressive, bold choices, not because the Greek and Hebrew terms are in no way related. There is a great deal of overlap in their respective ranges of meaning. The differences, however, are significant, and both *paideia* for *musar* and *nomos* for *torah* would not have been the most natural, instinctive translation moves. While both refer to some type of instruction or education, *musar* most often designates the pedagogy, the means of instilling said instruction, typically via some sort of reproof, reproach, or punishment; *paideia*, instead, more often denotes the content or the result of the educational process, not necessarily dependent on any sort of corrective punishment. In much of the ancient Hebrew literature, *torah* has more in common with the Greek *paideia* than *musar*, having the common notion of instruction, most often as the content, distinguishing it from—and helping us to understand the connection to—*musar*, as the pedagogy, as the means to instilling *torah*. *Nomos*, on the other hand, came to be more commonly understood as some sort of solidified law code, whether of the state or of the cosmos, that thing which holds a city, society, or the universe together and keeps it from falling into chaos.

Perhaps more important than the actual discrepancies in meaning between the Greek and Hebrew terminology, both Greek terms held a vital place in the Hellenistic world of thought. The role of *paideia* in the development of the cultured citizen and, then, that citizen’s adherence to the *nomoi* of the state and of nature would have been topics regularly discussed in philosophical circles and even among the common citizenry of cities like Alexandria. Therefore, not only did these translation choices introduce new ideas into the texts, at times significantly diverging from
the Hebrew Urtext, but they also allowed those later Jewish intellectuals to enter fully into the meaningful discussions taking place in the Diaspora as to the role of law, philosophy, and education in the life of the citizenry. They would afford these Jewish thinkers a means of becoming part of the wider Greco-Roman dialogue and world.

While scholars have long studied the respective distinctiveness of torah and nomos and the shift between the two in the Septuagint, the differences between musar and paideia have gone largely without comment. Scholars have failed to realize the importance of the shift from Hebrew musar to Greek paideia, not only in Second Temple Judaism, but to the history of Western education as a whole. A close examination of the semantic range of meanings of the terms in their native settings and then of the sources themselves will reveal a potential impact on later Jewish thought equal to or greater than that between torah and nomos.

1. **TORAH AND NOMOS**

Only a very brief comment on the semantic differences between torah and nomos is required prior to moving on to the analyses of musar and paideia, as the differences and the resultant shift in meaning to the Septuagint texts have been discussed extensively. Several early scholars argued that the Greek translators had either completely misunderstood the Hebrew or purposefully misrepresented the text when they translated torah with nomos.23 Others, instead,

---

have given a more thorough, nuanced reading of the translations and have pointed out both the differences and those places where the Hebrew concept fit well with the Greek.24

There are, at times, clear points of contact between torah and nomos. In Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomistic History, the references to the דברי התורה or the ספר התורה or the ספר תורה שלוש seem often to look very much like a written code or collection of laws, much like a nomos. But, the more common understanding of torah in the Hebrew Bible, especially in prophetic or wisdom literature, relates to teaching or instruction generally, often coming from the deity via prophets or priests, but just as often coming from parents or received tradition.25 In this educational understanding, torah differs from the Greek nomos. Nomos has the more general sense of custom or tradition, which later could be solidified as law, whether of the state or the cosmos.26

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the concept of nomos in the Hellenistic world. Two aspects in particular would suit well those Jewish writers influenced by Greek philosophy. First, the idea that law was of divine origin obviously fit well with the divinely given Mosaic law. For Aristotle, allowing nomos to rule was the equivalent of allowing God and nous to rule. Nomos, according to Aristotle, was nous without desire (διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν), and it was nomos which educated (παιδεύσας) the leaders (Pol. 3.1287a). Plato too

---

25 E.g., “Hear, my child, your father's instruction, and do not reject your mother's teaching / שמע בני מוסר אביך ואל תטש תורת אמך (Prov. 1:8); “Receive instruction from his mouth, and lay up his words in your heart / קח נא מפיו תורה ושׂים אמריו בלבבך (Job 22:22); or “For they are a rebellious people, faithless children, children who will not hear the instruction of the Lord / מוסר אביך ואל תטש תורת אמך ו裨 ימי רבעים (Isa. 30:9).
26 The literature on the concept in the Greek world is extensive. See H. Kleinknecht’s entry in the TDNT (4:1022-1035) for much of the early bibliography.
believed in this connection to God and to the divine *nous*, and his ideal law code was an image of the divine form.\textsuperscript{27}

These types of ideas coincided with concepts such as ideal, universal, or cosmic laws. Already in Heraclitus we find a kernel of the concept: “Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, as a city must rely on its law, and with much great reliance: for all the laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left over” (DK 114; trans. Kirk). While it is true that Philo is the first author we have in Greek to use the phrase *nomos phuseos* consistently,\textsuperscript{28} the idea of an intrinsic, unwritten order that supersedes all individual, written law codes finds probably its greatest expression in Stoic thought, from Zeno and Chryssipus on, whether they called it *nomos phuseos*, *orthos logos*, or something else.\textsuperscript{29} While the claim for the divine origin of Mosaic law would not have occasioned any serious objections from the Jews’ Greek and Roman neighbors, the insistence that this written law could in fact faithfully render the law of nature would have been a much tougher sell, but the connection would be possible through the use of *nomos* to translate *torah* consistently in the Septuagint.

2. **Musar**/\(y\)-\(s\)-\(r\)

The most natural, common context for the Hebrew *musar* is within the sphere of instructional or pedagogical discipline. Its verbal root, \(y\)-\(s\)-\(r\) (יסר) means to “discipline,” “instruct,” “chasten,” or “admonish,” often with a view towards correcting the recipient’s wayward behavior, constructive

\textsuperscript{27} See, e.g., *Laws* 701b-c; 890d; and 892aff.  
\textsuperscript{28} See discussion in Chapter 4.  
\textsuperscript{29} See Diog. Laert. VII, 87-88.
not destructive punishment.\textsuperscript{30} This corrective discipline is commonly given from a parent to child:

**Prov. 19:18**

יָסֵר בִּנְךָ כִּי־יֵּשׁ תִּקְוָה וְאֶל־הֲמִּיתוֹ אַל־תִּשָּׁא נַפְשֶׁךָ

*Discipline* your son, for there is hope,
and do not set your heart on killing him.

**Prov. 29:17**

יָסֵר בִּנְךָ וִיָּנִיחֶךָ וְיִּתֵּן מַעֲדַנִּים לְנַפְשֶׁךָ

*Discipline* your son, and he will comfort you,
and he will bring delight to your soul.

As a father disciplines his son, so Yahweh disciplines his people and all humankind:

**Ps. 94:10,12**

בֹּאֶר מִגְוָיִם נִיטַח יָהָה בִּלְקַע

אַשְׁרֵי הַגֶּבֶר אֲשֶׁר־תְיַסְרֶנוּ יָהָה וְמִתְרָתְךָ תְלַמְדֶנוּ

He who *disciplines* the nations and teaches humanity knowledge, does he not rebuke?

Happy is the man whom you *discipline*, O Lord, and whom you teach from your *torah*.

\textsuperscript{30} R. D. Branson, “\textit{yāsar, mūsār}” *TDOT* (ed. G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren; Vol. VI; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 127-134 (129). Branson points out that the association between *y*-\textit{s-r} and *y*-\textit{k-h} (הKick), “rebuke,” can put *y*-\textit{s-r} in the realm of destructive chastening, it is also often limited by *mispär* and, therefore, a controlled punishment, with an eye towards justice. See also R. B. Zuck, “Hebrew Words for ‘Teach,’” *BS* 121 (1964): 228-335 (231).
For the children who do not learn from their parents’ corrective discipline, or the people who disregard Yahweh’s instructive chastening, worse punishments are in store, including public humiliation, exile, incestuous cannibalism, and death:

Deut. 21:18-21

If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son who will not obey the voice of his father or his mother, and, when they discipline him, he will not listen to them, then his father and his mother shall take hold of him and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of his place. And, they shall say to the elders of his city, “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious. He will not obey our voice. He is a glutton and a drunk.” Then all of the men of his city shall stone him to death. And so you shall purge the evil from your midst, and all Israel shall hear of it and be afraid.

Lev. 26:18

And if in spite of this you will not obey me, I will continue to punish you sevenfold for your sins.
Yahweh’s “education” of the people here in the Holiness Code involves terror, consumption, and fear (26:16), wild animals which will kill their children and livestock (26:22), and, finally, a hunger so great they must eat their own children (26:29). While the correction often goes unheeded and appears futile in these cases, there is often an intended, underlying lesson. Here, Yahweh is attempting to correct the people’s behavior, force them to learn from this instruction, and, therefore, stop them from breaking the covenant and, instead, return to obeying the commandments previously set forth.

In some cases, the verb seems to have lost entirely the instructional or remedial context and refers only to the punishment, without the possibility or goal of correcting the recipient’s behavior:

1 Kgs. 12:11 / 2 Chr. 10:11

וְעַתָּה אָבִי הֶעְמִּיס עֲלֵּיכֶם עֹל כָּבֵּד וַאֲנִּי אוֹסִּיף עַל־עֻלְכֶם אָבִּי יִּסַּר אֶתְכֶם בַשּׁוֹטִּים וַאֲנִּי אֹיֵסֵר אֶתְכֶם בָעַקְרַבִּים

Now, whereas my father laid upon you a heavy yoke, I will add to your yoke. My father disciplined you with whips, but I will discipline you with scorpions.31

The noun form largely falls in line with its verbal root’s range of meaning. Musar, most often, is connected to the process through which instruction is given, but it can refer to the educational content or to a body of knowledge which is to be received:

31 Cf. Deut. 22:18; 1 Kgs. 12:14 / 2 Chr. 10:14; Hos. 7:12; 10:10. Because of this complete lack of intended correction or remediation, I must disagree with Lane’s assertion that y-s-r always presupposes an educational purpose. See W. E. Lane, “Discipline,” in ISBE (1979): 1:948-950. According to Branson, “The use of yāsar in the sense of ‘punish,’ with no suggestion of remediation, could derive from the concept of corporal punishment of students (cf. māṣār below). In this case it refers more to the act of discipline than to its result, namely instruction. The next step was the loss of any pedagogical connotations” (TDOT 6:130).
Listen, children, to a father’s musar,
and pay attention that you may gain understanding;
for I give you good teaching;
do not abandon my torah.\(^{32}\)

However, even when musar seemingly refers directly to the educational content,\(^{33}\) the process of acquiring that content is always lurking in the background, as this instruction is experiential, based either on the combined, empirical knowledge of one’s ancestors or on the lessons learned through corrective punishment.\(^{34}\) As Fox has it, “The core notion conveyed by musar is the teaching of the avoidance of faults. In line with its root-meaning, y-s-r ‘punish,’ ‘inflict,’ musar is originally, and usually, a lesson intended to correct a moral fault.”\(^{35}\) The close connection between musar and tochahath, verbal or physical reprimand, is telling in the understanding of musar as corrective discipline.\(^{36}\) In the book of Proverbs, musar and tochahath are closely related, often put in parallel to one another or placed in a genitive relationship (3:11, 5:12, 6:23, 10:17, 12:1, 13:18, 15:5, 15:10, 15:32, 22:15), making the two terms inextricably linked, the former dependent on the latter. For example:

---

\(^{32}\) Cf. Prov. 1:8.

\(^{33}\) Several scholars have pointed out this dual meaning of the term, as both process and content. See Richard J. Clifford, Proverbs (OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), 35 and Branson, “yāsar, mūsār” TDOT 6:131-132.

\(^{34}\) This latter sense led Waltke to define musar as a “chastening lesson.” See Bruce K. Waltke, The Book of Proverbs: Chapters 1-15 (NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 175.

\(^{35}\) Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 1-9 (AB 18a; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 34.

\(^{36}\) See the excursus in the following chapter on the comparison between the Hebrew tochahath and the Greek elegchos.
Prov. 6:23

כִּי נֵר מִצְוָה וְתוֹרָה אוֹר וְדֶרֶךְ חַיִּים תוֹכְחוֹת מוסר
For the commandment is a lamp and the torah a light, 
and reproofs of musar are the way of life.

Prov. 12:1

אֹהֵּב מוסר אֹהֵּב דָעַת וְשֹׂנֵא תוֹכַחַת בָעַר
Whoever loves musar loves knowledge, 
but the one who hates rebuke is stupid.

The education of children apparently required more than verbal reprimands. Physical punishment was seen as necessary to a child’s upbringing, and, therefore, another tool often essential to musar was the rod.37

Prov. 22:15

פָּעַר מוסר יַרְחִיקֶנָה מִמֶנוּ
Foolishness is bound up in the heart of a child, 
but the rod of musar drives it far from him.

Prov. 23:13-14

It is this connection to the rod that led Nili Shupak to argue that musar and y-s-r have the double meaning of “instruct-reprove” and “chastise-beat.” See N. Shupak, “Egyptian Terms and Features in Biblical Hebrew,” Tar 54/4 (1985): 475-483.
Do not withhold *musar* from your child,
if you beat him with a rod, he will not die.
If you beat him with a rod,
you will deliver his soul from Sheol.

Yahweh’s education of his people or of humankind in general also necessarily includes strict discipline, though Yahweh’s version of the rod is often a bit more severe, including corrective punishments such as illness, violent physical punishment, exile, and even death.

*Job 5:17*

> How happy is the one whom God reproves;
therefore do not despise the *musar* of the Almighty.

*Jer. 30:14*

> All of your lovers have forgotten you; they do not seek you out;
for I have struck you with the blow of an enemy, the *musar* of a cruel foe,
because your iniquity is great, and your sins are numerous.
**Isa. 26:16**

O Lord, in distress they sought you, they poured out a prayer when your *musar* was on them.

**Isa. 53:5**

But he was wounded for our transgressions, crushed for our iniquities; upon him was the *musar* that made us whole, and by his bruises we are healed.

In *Job* 5:17, Eliphaz is arguing with Job, that Job must welcome the afflictions and illness that God has brought upon him, as God does not allow suffering for no reason. In the end, so says Eliphaz, Job will be healed and he will have learned from this instructional punishment.

*Jeremiah* 30:14 describes Yahweh’s discipline of his people as “an enemy’s wound,” and it is difficult to determine here whether this *musar* refers to corrective punishment or simply destructive punishment in response to the people’s sins. Though Branson argues that this is one of two examples in the texts of the Hebrew Bible where *musar* refers to Yahweh’s punishment of the people without any clear redemptive purpose (the other being *Hos.* 5:2), there is an eventual end to this punishment and a restoration of the people is assured. Therefore, there is likely some instructional notion lurking behind the usage of *musar* even here.

---

38 *TDOT* 6:133.
The *musar* in both passages from *Isaiah* refers to a multiplicity of unpleasantness. While there has been extensive discussion over the actual time of composition and historical background of the so-called “Isaiah-Apocalypse” (*Isa.* 24-27), whether exilic, early Hellenistic, or Maccabean,\(^39\) in 26:16, Yahweh’s *musar* of the people includes the destruction of Jerusalem, the exile, and all of the horrors that go along with it. Despite the severity, this punishment is, again, meant to be instructive and redemptive: “Therefore, through this the guilt of Jacob will be expiated” (*Isa.* 27:9a).

We find a different sort of redemptive *musar* in *Deutero-Isaiah*’s fourth servant song (*Isa.* 52:13-53:12). Here, the redemption of the people comes through another’s *musar*, Yahweh’s punishment of the innocent, righteous servant. The servant bears the full brunt of the suffering on account of the people’s collective guilt: born ill and disfigured (52:14; 53:2), despised and rejected (53:3), the servant dies an ignominious, painful death (53:9-10, 12). As with the previous passage from *Isaiah*, it is not readily clear how this, seemingly senseless, prolonged torture of an innocent can be termed *musar* and what is the pedagogical angle. It is certainly redemptive, if not for the servant, at least for the people around him. Sanders could be correct in his understanding of the usage of *musar* here as having a double purpose and intent: “(1) it expresses purposeful suffering as we have seen in earlier prophets and is clear here from the context; but (2) it is a suffering which is observed by kings, though experienced by the servant, that the kings ‘understand’ and learn therefore,”\(^40\) drawing on the idea in 52:15: “So he will startle many nations; kings will shut their mouths because of him; for that which had not been told to them, they will see, and that which they had not heard, they will understand.”

---


One must welcome or “take” (l-q-h) musar gladly, whether from one’s parent or from Yahweh, or more severe punishment is in order, moving beyond corrective to destructive discipline. God’s discipline of Israel is meant to correct its past sinful behavior and bring it back into the covenantal relationship. A continual theme through the book of Jeremiah is the people’s continual rejection of God’s musar, as punishment for past sins and discipline to curtail future sins. The end result of the continual dismissal of their instruction is the Babylonian exile.

*Jer. 2:30*

לַשָּׁוְא הִּכֵּיתִי אֶת־בְנֵיכֶם מוּסָר לֹא לָקָחוּ אָכְלָה חַרְבכֶּם נְבִּיאֵּיכֶם כְּאַרְיֵּה מַשְׁחִּית

In vain I have struck down your children; they accepted no musar. Your own sword devoured your prophets like a ravening lion.

*Jer. 5:3*

יְהֹוָה עֵינֶיךָ הֲלוֹא לֶאֱמוּנָה
הִּכִּיתָה אֹתָם וְלֹא־חָלוּ כִּלִּיתָם מֵּאֲנוּ קַחַת מוּסָר
חִּזְקוּ פְנֵיהֶם מִּסֶלַע מֵּאֲנוּ לָשׁוּב

O Lord, do your eyes not look for truth?

You have struck them, but they felt no anguish; you have consumed them, but they refused to accept musar.

They have made their faces harder than rock; they have refused to turn back.\(^41\)

Ultimately, rejection of instruction leads to death:

---

**Prov. 5:23**

He will die for lack of *musar*,
and in the greatness of his folly, he will go astray.\(^{42}\)

While there are a few examples in the texts of the Hebrew Bible where *musar* and *y-s-r* do not have any clear pedagogical purpose, the most typical understanding of the terminology is discipline, instruction, or punishment designed to teach and to correct behavior. This pedagogy is largely experiential and is tied to some form of reproof, whether verbal chastisement or physical violence, which the recipient must eagerly accept from the parent or the deity. Education is achieved through the acknowledgment of past mistakes, repentance, and a commitment not to continue in one’s past sinful ways.

3. **PAIDEIA / PAIDEUŌ**

Scholars have long pointed out both the pivotal importance of *paideia* in ancient Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman societies and the notorious difficulty in defining the term and translating it into English (or German, French, etc.), and, though we have seen a flourishing of capable studies on the Greek and Roman educational processes and institutions in the past thirty years, no scholar has attempted to define the term in all its complexity holistically since Werner Jaeger and

---

\(^{42}\) Cf. *Prov. 5:12* and *15:10*. 

36
Henri Irénée Marrou, whose seminal works are not, however, without their own problems.\textsuperscript{43}

Elsner sums up nicely the current state of the scholarly understanding of \textit{paideia}:

First, I am not at all sure that even now we really know what \textit{paideia} meant in antiquity or, rather, at different times in a changing antiquity. There is a unitary, holistic and arguably monolithic idealism at constant play in both Jaeger and Marrou, which remains the case whenever \textit{paideia} is invoked by modern scholarship as an explanation of cultural background, which is its most common function in its current use. That strategic and rhetorical employment of the concept as a \textit{deus ex machina} to justify a broader set of generalizations and historical, sociological or institutional claims about antiquity, is worrying because it functions (as indeed the concept was meant to function in both Jaeger and Marrou) as an unquestioned good and as a canonical justification for whatever claim is being made. Effectively the concept of \textit{paideia} has no defined propositional meaning in its usual usage save as the ideal goal of an educational process and the description of that process as a good in itself: this is precisely the continuing legacy of the approaches of both Jaeger and Marrou, and a result of the power of their accounts, despite the profound differences between them about what the ideal might be.\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{44} Elsner, “Paideia: Ancient Concept and Modern Reception,” 151. See also Jaeger’s opening to the second volume of \textit{Paideia}, given prior to title page: \textit{Paideia}, the title of this work, is not merely a symbolic name, but the only exact designation of the actual historical, subject presented in it. Indeed it is a difficult thing to define; like other broad comprehensive concepts (\textit{philosophy}, for instance, or \textit{culture}) it refuses to be confined within an abstract formula. Its full content and meaning become clear to us only when we read its history and follow its attempts to realize
It is not surprising that modern scholars idealize *paideia*, as the concept was already idealized by ancient Greek philosophers, orators, and sophists. In fact, though ancient and modern authors can talk at length on the specifics of *paideia* on the ground and how it actually functioned in the lives of students and the community as a whole, it is precisely the idealization of the concept that has given it such power for 2500 years, allowing the unalterably positive term to be exactly what one needed it to be at a given time and place, allowing it to take on whatever aspirations one viewed as possible or necessary during periods of growth, stagnation, or even horror.

Though Elsner expresses his cynicism about ever truly being able to grasp what *paideia* meant throughout antiquity, his final comment above, “Effectively the concept of *paideia* has no defined propositional meaning in its usual usage save as the ideal goal of an educational process and the description of that process as a good in itself,” provides a solid foundation on which we can begin to understand this elusive, complex idea. And, of immediate relevance, it gives us insight into the underlying difference between *paideia* and *musar*.

Attempting a holistic definition of such a complex, ancient concept that was utilized and constantly reinterpreted over centuries is, of course, fraught with problems, and though the attempt at this sort of endeavor may bear fruit, it is, in the end, likely to reveal more about the author’s own personal motivations, interests, and social, cultural, and political settings than anything firmly based in the past. Therefore, instead of attempting this futile exercise, I will itself. By using a Greek word for a Greek thing, I intend to imply that it is seen with the eyes, not of modern men, but of the Greeks. It is impossible to avoid bringing in modern expressions like *civilization*, *culture*, *tradition*, *literature*, or *education*. But none of them really covers what the Greeks meant by *paideia*. Each of them is confined to one aspect of it: they cannot take in the same field as the Greek concept unless we employ them all together. Yet the very essence of scholarship and scholarly activity is based on the original unity of all these aspects—the unity which is expressed in the Greek word, not the diversity emphasized and completed by modern developments. The ancients were persuaded that education and culture are not a formal art or an abstract theory, distinct from the objective historical structure of a nation’s spiritual life. They held them to be embodied in literature, which is the real expression of all higher culture. That is how we must interpret the definition of the cultured man given by Phrynichus (s.v. *φιλόλογος*, p. 483 Rutherford): *Φιλόλογος ὁ φιλῶν λόγους καὶ σπουδάζων περὶ παιδείαν.* (2:ii)
simply look at some representative examples of the term’s use and attempt to read them without, as far as is possible, the baggage typically attached to such an important, weighty concept, all in service of the goal of contemplating the differences between the Greek and Hebrew terminology and how the shift in languages could have affected the later reading of the texts in the Hellenistic Diaspora.

Both the noun *paideia* and the verb *paideuō* derive from the substantive *pais*, “child,” with the -euō verb denoting a condition or activity related to the substantive, and the -eia, for e(u)-ia, showing the abstraction of that condition or activity.45 In this sense, there would seem to be little to distinguish the meanings of the terms from *trophē* / *trephō*, “nurturing,” “nourishing,” or “rearing” of children / to “bring up,” “rear,” or “raise,” children, and, in the earliest usage of our terminology, there is little difference between *paideia* and *trophē*:

Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* 16-20

tέκνοις τε, Γῆ τε μητρί, φιλτάτη τροφῷ:

ή γάρ νέους ἔρποντας εὐμενεῖ πέδῳ,

ἲπαντα πανδοκούσα παιδείας ὀτλον,

ἐθρέψατ᾽ οἰκητήρας ἀσπιδηφόρους

πιστοὺς ὅπως γένοισθε πρὸς χρέος τόδε.

You must aid both your children and Mother Earth, your beloved nurse.

For when you were young, creeping upon her kind soil,

---

welcoming all the distress of your paideia,
she raised you as shield-bearing inhabitants
and faithful in this time of need.\textsuperscript{46}

Yet, even at a very early stage, a focus on one particular aspect of child-rearing is emphasized,
teaching: “οὗτοι με ξένον οὐδ’ ἄδαήμονα Μοισάν ἐπαίδευσαν κλυταί Θῆβαι” (Pindar, fr. 198a).
Though the terminology, particularly the verb, could, at times, continue to be used nearly
interchangeably for or in parallel with trophē / trephō,\textsuperscript{47} it is in this one aspect of the raising of
children—education—which will come to dominate the extensive usage of the terms.

One of the earliest defining qualities of paideia was that, through it, anyone could acquire
not only knowledge but virtue itself. Education, culture, and virtue, which in the past were tied
directly to one’s noble, aristocratic lineage, became something attainable for everyone through a
systematic and sustained training.\textsuperscript{48} This true education was not, however, to be confused with
simple occupational training:

Plato, \textit{Laws} 1.643d-644b

\begin{quote}

μή τοίνυν μηδ’ ὁ λέγομεν εἶναι παιδείαν ἀδόριστον γένηται. νῦν γὰρ ὅνειδίζοντες
ἐπαινοῦντες θ’ ἐκάστων τὰς τροφάς, λέγομεν ὡς τὸν μὲν πεπαιδευμένον ἡμῶν ὄντα τινά,
[643ε] τὸν δὲ ἀπαίδευτον ἐνίοτε εἴς τε καπηλείας καὶ ναυκληρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Plato, \textit{Crito} 54a: “αὔλλα δ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν παιδῶν ἔνεκα βούλευε ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτούς ἐκθέτω χρήσει καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δὲ; εἰς Ὑπποταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαθῶν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τότε ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τούτο μὲν οὔ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τριφώμενοι σοὶ φοιτόντες θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται μὴ συνόντος σοὶ αὐτοῖς;”

\textsuperscript{48} As Jaeger notes: “Its aim was to transcend the aristocratic principle of privileged education, which made it
impossible for anyone to acquire aretē unless he already possessed it by inheritance from his divine ancestors. It
seemed east to transcend it by the application of logical reasoning, the new instrument whose power was constantly
growing. There was only one method—to apply a deliberate system of education to the mind” (\textit{Paideia} 2:287).

But we must not allow our description of *paideia* to remain indefinite. For at present, when censuring or commending a man's upbringing (*trophē*), we describe one man [643e] as *educated* and another as *uneducated*, though the latter may often be uncommonly well *educated* in the trade of a pedlar or a skipper, or some other similar occupation. But we, naturally, in our present discourse are not taking the view that such things as these make up *paideia*: the *paideia* we speak of is training from childhood in goodness (*aretē*), which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously. This is the special form of nurture (*trophē*) [644a] to which, as I suppose, our present argument would confine the term “*paideia*” whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical
strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name “paideia.” Let us not, however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide by the statement we agreed upon just now, that those who are rightly educated become, as a rule, good, [644b] and that one should in no case disparage paideia, since it stands first among the finest gifts that are given to the best men; and if ever it errs from the right path, but can be put straight again, to this task every man, so long as he lives, must address himself with all his might. (LCL trans.)

Plato here gives us his understanding of the ideal of paideia and its shift away from both trophē and vocational training. During one’s childhood development (trophē), an individual may be extremely well educated or trained in a trade, but could still be considered “ignorant,” “uneducated,” or “uncultured,” apaideutos. This is because, for Plato, paideia is not simply training in a skill, but rather “training from childhood in virtue (τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετήν ἐκ παιδοῦν παιδείαν),” a training for something loftier than one’s future profession, bodily perfection, or even art, though Plato makes clear elsewhere that physical education and music are integral in this lofty ideal of paideia. 49 This exalted paideia, a special sort of trophē, has the goal of aretē, which is directly tied, in Plato’s ideal state, to becoming an ideal citizen, “knowing both how to rule and to be ruled with justice (ἀρχεῖν τε καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης).”50

These two connections, between paideia and aretē on the one hand and paideia and politeia on the other, become central to the Greek ideal of paideia. We find an elucidation of the

49 See, e.g., Rep. 2.376e-377a, where Plato explains that gymnastics is education for the body and music education for the soul, or Tim. 87c-88c, where we find that there must be a symmetry between the training of the soul and of the body. See also Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.39.1, where he explains that the Athenians’ military prowess is due to their superior paideia as youths, which makes them prepared at all times for any possible danger.
former in book eight of Aristotle’s Politics, showing that the goal of paideia is not simple utility, but rather a desire for further, superior forms of knowledge:

Aristotle, Politics 8.1338a30-1338b9

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἣν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς νιεῖς οὐδ’ ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερὸν ἐστίν: πότερον δὲ μία τὸν ἁριθμὸν ἢ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὐταί καὶ πῶς, ὑστέρουν λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὀδὸν γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τὸν ἁρχαίων ἔχομέν τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων: ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δήλον. έτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι δεῖ τινα παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, οἶνον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰς ἐνδέχεσθαι γένεσθαι δι᾽ αὐτῶν μαθήσεις ἐτέρας, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὑδίοις μὴ διαμαρτάμεσιν ἀλλ’ ὅσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν ὑπὸν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, [1338β] ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοπύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθερίοις.

It is clear therefore that there is a form of paideia in which boys should be trained not because it is useful or necessary but as being liberal and noble; though whether there is one such subject of education or several, and what these are and how they are to be pursued, must be discussed later, but as it is we have made this much progress on the way, that we have some testimony even from the ancients, derived from the courses of education which they founded—for the point is proved by music. And it is also clear that some of the useful subjects as well ought to be studied by the young not only because of
their utility, like the study of reading and writing, but also because they may lead on to many other branches of knowledge; and similarly they should study drawing not in order that they may not go wrong in their private purchases and may avoid being cheated in buying and selling furniture, [1338b] but rather because this study makes a man observant of bodily beauty; and to seek for utility everywhere is entirely unsuited to men that are great-souled and free. (LCL trans.)

Aristotle echoes Plato’s belief that paideia should be concerned not only with the useful and necessary, but with the free (eleutherios) and the noble. Aristotle, however, makes clear that one is not to avoid those subjects which seem, on the surface, merely utilitarian—e.g. reading and writing—but to pursue them because of what these then lead to. The ends of basic skills such as reading, writing, music, and drawing are not trades or talents but the desire to seek and the ability to obtain more considerate, elevated forms of knowledge. This distinction between basic lessons or skills and higher education and virtue reminds one of a distinction which became ubiquitous in the later Hellenistic and Roman periods, between what was called encyclical (egkuklios) or mesē or preliminary paideia and wisdom, virtue, or philosophy. For example, the Stoic Aristo of Chios argued that “those who labor with the preliminary studies but neglect philosophy are like the suitors of Penelope, who, when they failed to win her over, took up with her maid servants instead.”51 Philo would make the same distinction between Hagar and Sarah.

51 Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος τοὺς περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα πονομένους, ἀμελεύοντας δὲ φιλοσοφίας, ἔλεγεν ὁμοίως εἶναι τοὺς μηνιστήριος τῆς Πηνελόπης, οἱ ἀποτυγχάνοντες ἔκεινης περὶ τὰς θεραπαίνας ἑγίγνοντο (SVF 1:350). Stobaeus preserves the fragment. Elsewhere the comment is credited to Gorgias (Gnomol. Vatic. 166). See Albert Henrichs, “Philosophy, the Handmaiden of Theology,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 9:4 (1968): 437-450 (444); and K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 139. According to Pseudo-Plutarch, the statement is the philosopher Bion’s: “ἀστείως δὲ καὶ Βίων ἔλεγεν ὁ φιλόσοφος ὅτι ἀσπέρ οἱ μηνιστήρις τῆς Πηνελόπης πλησίαζέν τι μὴ δυνάμενοι ταῖς ταῦταις ἐμφανίσεις θεραπαίνας, οὕτω καὶ οἱ φιλοσοφικαὶ μὴ δυνάμενοι κατατυμεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις παιδεύμασι τοῖς οὕτως αὐτοὺς κατασκευείνῳ” (Lib. Ed. 7d). See also Yehoshua Amir, “The Transference of Greek Allegories to Biblical Motifs in Philo,” in Nourished with Peace:
Like Plato, Aristotle also envisioned an ideal connection between *paideia* and *politeia*:

Aristotle, *Politics* 1.1260b

ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δ' οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἰπέρ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τὸ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν: αἱ μὲν γὰρ γυναῖκες ἡμισὺ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων οἱ κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας.

For since every household is part of a state, and these relationships are part of the household, and the excellence (*aretē*) of the part must have regard to that of the whole, it is necessary that the *paideia* both of the children and of the women should be carried on with a regard to the form of the constitution (*politeian*), if it makes any difference as regards the goodness of the state for the children and the women to be good. And it must necessarily make a difference; for the women are a half of the free population, and the children grow up to be the partners in the government of the state. (LCL trans.)

Aristotle too is describing his ideal state, yet his understanding of the education of women and children and its connection to the state is more solidified here than in Plato’s description above. Aristotle takes for granted the unbreakable and necessary connection between the state and its...
citizens, and therefore, he understands the state’s decisive role in their education. Education and citizenship are inseparable.

This ideal connection between the state and the education of its citizens was not only a topic of great import to philosophers. The sophist and rhetor Isocrates, whose views on education were often at diametric odds with Plato’s, nevertheless envisioned a necessary connection between paideia and politeia.

Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 12.138

tοῦ μὲν οὖν διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἰκεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν κατ’ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον δικαίως ἄν ἐπενέγκομεν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῖς βασιλεύσασιν αὐτῆς, περὶ ἃν ὅλιγῳ πρότερον διελέχθην. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἠσαν οἱ παιδεύσαντες τὸ πλῆθος ἐν ἀρετῇ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ πολλῇ σωφροσύνῃ, καὶ διδάξαντες ἐξ ὧν διώκουν, ἀπερ ἐγὼ φανεῖν ἃν ὑστερφν εἰρηκὼς ἦ κεῖνοι πράξαντες, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία ψυχή πόλεως ἐστι, τοσαύτην ἐξούσια δύναμιν ὅσην περ ἐν σώματι φρόνησις: αὕτη γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ βουλευομένη περὶ ἄπαντων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ διαφυλάττουσα, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς διαφεύγουσα, καὶ πάντων αἰτία τῶν ταῖς πόλεσι συμβαινόντων.

The fact, then, that our city was governed in those times better than the rest of the world I would justly credit to her kings, of whom I spoke a moment ago. For it was they who educated the multitude in the ways of virtue and justice and great sobriety and who taught through the manner of their rule the very truth which I shall be seen to have expressed in words after they had expressed it in their deeds, namely, that every polity is the soul of the state, having as much power over it as the mind over the body. For it is
this which deliberates on all questions, seeking to preserve what is good and to avoid what is disastrous, and is the cause of all the things which transpire in states. (LCL trans.)

Despite the Platonic opposition to sophistic or rhetorical education, Isocrates’ Hellenic universalizing of paideia would form the basis for the Hellenistic model of determining one’s ‘Greekness,’ not through birth and lineage, but through education and culture.

Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 50

τοσοῦτον δ’ ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὡσ’ οἱ ταύτης μαθηται τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασι, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκε μηκέτι τοῦ γένους ἄλλα τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἑλλήνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ή τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας.

And so far has our city distanced the rest of humankind in thought and in speech that her pupils have become the teachers of the rest of the world; and she has brought it about that the name Hellenes suggests no longer a race but an intelligence, and that the title Hellenes is applied rather to those who share our culture than to those who share a common blood.

On this, Jaeger noted, “Without the idea he here expresses for the first time, the idea that Greek paideia was something universally valuable, there would have been no Macedonian Greek
world-empire, and the universal culture which we call Hellenistic would never have existed.”

Though the Jewish authors to be discussed will follow, either directly or indirectly, Plato’s views on *paideia* and its instrumentality in the fate of the soul, they, like the entire history of education, are deeply indebted to Isocrates for this fundamental idea which rooted membership not in ethnicity, family, or heritage, but in education and culture.

Despite the great importance of Isocrates and the sophists in the development of Greek education outside the hands of the nobility, the connection between *paideia* and the fate of the soul we find in Plato will have a tremendous impact on the Hellenistic ideals of *paideia*, both within Jewish circles and without.

Plato, *Phaedo* 107c-d

> νῦν δ’ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν [107δ] εἰ οὐτῆς ἄλλη ἀποφυγῇ κακὸν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἀιών ή ψυχῆ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἢ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὦφελείν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας.

But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape [107d] from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its *paideia* and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither. (LCL trans.)

Jaeger, *Paideia* 3:80-81. On the importance of Isocrates’ model of education, see chapters 2-6 in volume 3 of Jaeger’s *Paideia*.
We have already seen that Plato understood true *paideia* as education in virtue and the good. In *Laws*, this training was seen as the necessary requirement in making one a true citizen of the *politeia*. In the *Phaedo*, however, Plato goes further in positing a connection between *paideia* and the fate of the immortal soul, since the soul only leaves this world with the *paideia* and *trophē* it acquired during its short stay here within the mortal shell. One’s duty, then, is to spend a life devoted to nurturing and education of the soul. The consequences of ignorance now take on an entirely new dimension.

It is with this sense in mind that we can begin to understand the Hellenistic ideal of *paideia*, as expressed in a classic Roman-period treatise on education, Pseudo-Plutarch’s *De liberis educandis*.

Pseudo-Plutarch, *De liberis educandis* 5c-e

συνελών τοίνυν ἐγώ φημι καὶ χρησμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἕ παρανεῖν δόξαιμ’ ἂν εἰκότως ὅτι ἐν πρῶτον καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευταῖον ἐν τούτοις κεφάλαιοιν ἀγωγή σπουδαία καὶ παιδεία νόμιμός ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα φορὰ καὶ συνεργᾶ πρὸς ἀρετήν καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φημί. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μικρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοσπούδαστα καθέστηκεν. εὐγένεια καλὸν μὲν, ἄλλα προγόνων ἀγαθόν. πλοῦτος δὲ τίμιον μὲν, ἄλλα τύχης κτήμα, ἐπείδη τῶν μὲν ἔχοντων πολλάκις ἀφείλετο, τοῖς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐλπίσασι φέρουσα προσήνεγκε. . . παιδεία δὲ τῶν ἐν ἴμην μόνον ἐστίν ἀθάνατον καὶ θείον.

Briefly, then, I say (an oracle one might properly call it, rather than advice) that, to sum up, the beginning, the middle, and end in all these matters is good education and proper *paideia*; and it is this, I say, which leads on and helps towards virtue and towards
happiness. And, in comparison with this, all other advantages are human, and trivial, and not worth our serious concern. Good birth is a fine thing, but it is an advantage which must be credited to one's ancestors. Wealth is held in esteem, but it is a chattel of fortune, since oftentimes she takes it away from those who possess it, and brings and presents it to those who do not expect it. . . . But paideia, of all things in this world, is alone immortal and divine.

In this text, roughly contemporaneous with Philo of Alexandria’s works, we see centuries of ruminating on an ideal paideia taken to a logical conclusion: there is nothing in this world more important than paideia, which alone is athanaton kai theion, and which eradicates (in this ideal view) the benefits of nobility, family, and wealth, all of which are insignificant (mikra) by comparison.53

In understanding the similarities and differences between the Hebrew and Greek terminology, it is also important to note that nowhere in De liberis educandis is paideia associated with the chastisement or punishment of free children for the purpose of their education. Better, we see a shift from education via the rod to education via the book: “For the corresponding tool of paideia is the use of books, and by their means it has come to pass that we are able to study knowledge at its source (τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁργανον τῆς παιδείας ἤ χρήσις τῶν βιβλίων ἐστί, καὶ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τὴν ἑπιστήμην τηρεῖν συμβέβηκεν)” (8b); and further: “This also I assert, that children ought to be led to honourable practices by means of encouragement and reasoning, and most certainly not by blows or ill-treatment, for it surely is agreed that these

53 For Marrou, it is from the Hellenistic era, that we find the principle of paideia pushed to the limit, where paideia is no longer the means of equipping a pais for his future career, but comes to signify “culture,” “of something perfect: a mind fully developed, the mind of a man who has become truly man.” (A History of Education in Antiquity, 98-99).
are fitting rather for slaves than for the free-born; for so they grow numb and shudder at their
tasks, partly from the pain of the blows, partly from the degradation. Praise and reproof are more
helpful for the free-born than any sort of ill-usage, since the praise incites them toward what is
honourable, and reproof keeps them from what is disgraceful” (8f-9a).

The fact that this author must forcibly argue against the use of corporal punishment in the
education of children would suggest that physical chastisement had long been a popular
pedagogical tool. We find confirmation of this as far back as Aristophanes and his particular
brand of biting satire in *Clouds*:

Aristophanes, *Clouds* 962-976

λέξω τοίνυν τήν ἀρχαίαν παιδείαν ὡς διέκειτο,

ὅτ’ ἐγὼ τά δίκαια λέγων ἦνθουν καὶ σωφροσύνη 'νενόμιστο.

πρῶτον μὲν ἐδει παιδὸς φονήν γρύζαντος μηδὲν ἄκούσαι:

εἶτα βαδίζειν ἐν ταΐσιν ὁδοῖς εὑτάκτως ἐς κιθαριστοῦ
tοὺς κομήτας γυμνοὺς ἀθρόους, κεί κριμνώδη κατανείφοι.

εἶτ’ αὖ προμαθεῖν ἄσμι’ ἐδίδασκεν τῷ μηρῷ μὴ ἔσχοντας,

ἡ ‘Παλλάδα περσέπολιν δειν’ ἢ ἴηλέπορον τι βόσμα,‘

ἐντειναμένους τὴν ἀρμονίαν, ἢν οἱ πατέρες παρέδωκαν.

εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῶν βιομολογεύσαιτ’ ἢ κάμψειέν τινα καμπήν,

οίας οἱ νῦν τὰς κατὰ Φρύνιν ταῦτας τὰς ὑσκολοκάμπτους,

ἐπετρίβητο τυπτόμενος πολλὰς ὡς τὰς Μοῦσας ἀφανίζων.

ἐν παιδοτρίβου δὲ καθίζοντας τὸν μηρὸν ἐδεὶ προβαλέσθαι
tοὺς παιδας, ὅπως τοῖς ἔξωθεν μηδὲν δείξειαι ἀπηνές:
I will, therefore, describe the ancient system of *paideia*, how it was ordered, when I flourished in the advocacy of justice, and temperance was the fashion.

In the first place it was incumbent that no one should hear the voice of a boy uttering a syllable;

and next, that those from the same quarter of the town should march in good order through the streets to the school of the harp-master, naked, and in a body, even if it were to snow as thick as meal.

Then again, their master would teach them, not sitting cross-legged, to learn by rote a song,

either “*Pallada persepolin deinain*” or “*teleporon ti boama*”

raising to a higher pitch the harmony which our fathers transmitted to us.

But if any of them were to play the buffoon, or to turn any quavers, like these difficult turns the present artists make after the manner of Phrynis, he used to be thrashed, being beaten with many blows, as banishing the Muses.

And it behooved the boys, while sitting in the school of the Gymnastic-master, to cover the thigh, so that they might exhibit nothing indecent to those outside;

then again, after rising from the ground, to sweep the sand together, and to take care not to leave an impression of the person for their lovers. (LCL trans.)
Corporal punishment at the hands of parents or pedagogues was ubiquitous in Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman education.\textsuperscript{54} According to Plato,

With the return of daylight the children should go to their teachers (διδασκάλους); for just as no sheep or other witless creature ought to exist without a herdsman, so children cannot live without a tutor (παιδαγωγόν), nor slaves without a master. And, of all wild creatures, the child is the most intractable; for in so far as it, above all others, possesses a fount of reason that is as yet uncurbed, it is a treacherous, sly and most insolent creature. Wherefore the child must be strapped up, as it were, with many bridles—first, when he leaves the care of nurse and mother, with tutors, to guide his childish ignorance, and after that with teachers of all sorts of subjects and lessons, treating him as becomes a freeborn child. On the other hand, he must be treated as a slave; and any free man that meets him shall punish both the child himself and his tutor or teacher, if any of them does wrong (πᾶς ὁ προστυγχάνων τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν κολαζέτω τὸν τε παῖδα αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν παιδαγωγὸν καὶ διδάσκαλον, ἔαν ἐξαμαρτήσῃ τὶς τι τοῦτον). (\textit{Laws} 808c-e; LCL trans.)\textsuperscript{55}

We also find the idea of remedial suffering, even that at the hands of the gods, an idea expressed most memorably by Aeschylus:

\begin{quote}
Aeschylus, \textit{Agamemnon} 176-183
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὀδό-
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{55} Cf. Plato, \textit{Protag}. 325c-d.
Zeus, who sets mortals on the path to understanding, Zeus, who has established as a fixed law that “wisdom comes by suffering.” But even as trouble, bringing memory of pain, drips over the mind in sleep, so wisdom comes to men, whether they want it or not. Harsh, it seems to me, is the grace of gods enthroned upon their awful seats. (Smyth trans.)

The comical image from Aristophanes, the strong opposition to corporal punishment in schools from Ps.-Plutarch,\(^56\) and the idea of teaching through divine suffering in Aeschylus\(^57\) might suggest a similarity to the disciplinary, chastising nature inherent in the Hebrew musar, which, as we saw, most typically involved some form of verbal rebuke or physical violence. However, as opposed to the use of musar, never is this, often assumed violence, termed paideia or paideuō. Bertram has noted that never is paideuein used in non-biblical Greek to refer to corporal punishment until, perhaps, the second century CE, well after the translation of the Hebrew texts

---

\(^{56}\) Ps.-Plutarch was not alone. See Quintilian, 1.3.14-17; Plutarch, Marcus Cato 20.4; and the discussion in Marrou, History of Education, 272-273.

into Greek, and that this disciplinary notion of *paideia* was the result of the Greek terms taking on “a new and originally almost alien significance,” from the Hebrew *musar* / *y-s-r*. Though discipline and rebuke would have, at times, been a part of *paideia*—primarily for children only—it was never the defining element, as it was with the Hebrew *musar*.

4. **Conclusions**

From the earliest understanding of *paideia*, related generally to the upbringing of children, to the specification of the term to describe solely one aspect of child-rearing, education, to the further particularization of the terminology, now referring not to simple occupational training, but rather education in virtue and the good, which was connected to one’s role in the *politeia* and to the ultimate fate of one’s soul, there is much the Greek terms *paideia* and *paideuō* have in common with the Hebrew *musar* and *y-s-r*. We found that the primary locus for *musar* / *y-s-r* was in the realm of instruction and pedagogical discipline. *Musar*, like *paideia*, seemed to be geared toward a higher purpose than simple career training; it prepared an individual for life itself, and it was necessary to insure a productive, successful life. Yahweh’s *musar* was often collectively distributed to the people, who were meant to welcome it as a group in order to show their adherence to the covenant, and who, more often than not, collectively failed to properly absorb

---

58 *TDNT* 5:600, 608. Elsewhere Bertram has argued that rendering *musar* with *paideia* led to a psychologizing of the punishing aspect inherent in *musar*. See “Der Begriff der Erziehung in der griechischen Bibel,” in *Imago Dei. Beiträge zur theologischen Anthropologie* (Gustav Krüger festschrift; ed. H. Bornkamm; Giessen 1932), 33-51. Indicative of our Greek terminology not having this disciplinary notion in non-biblical Greek usage, *LSJ* lists the following definitions for *paideia*: “rearing of a child,” “training and teaching, education,” “its result, mental culture, learning, education,” “culture of trees,” “handiwork,” “anything taught or learned, art, science,” and “chastisement.” However, for this last definition, the only examples listed are LXX *Proverbs* 22:15 and *Hebrews* 12:5. Similarly, for *paideuō*, *LSJ* gives us: “bring up or rear a child,” “train and teach, educate,” “give instruction, teach,” “correct, discipline,” and “chastise, punish.” While for the definition of “correct, discipline,” *LSJ* gives Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.3.5 as an example, which talks about the self-discipline of the body and soul, for the final definition of “chastise, punish,” we find only the examples of LXX *Hosea* 7:12 and *Luke* 23:16.
and learn from this divine instruction, which then lead to collective punishment, including the Babylonian exile.

Despite the similarities, however, there are significant points of semantic discrepancy between how the terms were natively understood and used. The most prominent distinction between the Hebrew and the Greek is the standard sense of *musar* as the pedagogical process through which knowledge should be obtained and the form this pedagogy often took. We saw that it was very uncommon for the Hebrew terminology to be used to describe instructional content; instead, in nearly every case found, *musar* / *y-s-r* denotes the means of instilling instruction. This alone distinguishes it from *paideia* / *paideuō*, which more commonly refers to the content of instruction and to the result, a use never found with the Hebrew. More importantly, the form *musar* pedagogy typically takes—verbal rebuke and physical punishment—sharply distinguishes it from *paideia*. Though it was assumed that the education of children often involved beatings at the hand of the teacher or the pedagogue, this punishment was never actually referred to as *paideia* and it was never an inherent part of it, especially when it came to adult education.

The idealization and general importance of *paideia* in the Greek conscience also leads to important distinctions from the Hebrew notion, primarily in the connection between the individual’s *paideia*, virtue, and citizenship, together with the understood universalizing nature of *paideia*, through which anyone could gain in virtue and become part of Greek culture. While *musar* was often divinely distributed to the people collectively and it had collective consequences, the focus on the individual and the individual’s attainment of virtue to become part of the collective *politeia* is unique to the Greek term. Further, the idea first seen in Isocrates, but later taken up vigorously in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, that it was *paideia not ethnōs*
that made one “Greek,” also finds no direct parallel in the Hebrew *musar*. This confluence of ideas surrounding the ideal of *paideia* will become one of the defining characteristics of Hellenism, and it will play a fundamental role in the Jewish intellectuals’ ability to enter into conversation with and utilize the wider Greek and Roman philosophical world of thought in the creation of their own unique notions of education, enculturation, and knowledge production.

Finally, the explicit Platonic connection between the *paideia* received during one’s corporeal existence and the fate of the immortal soul after somatic death will profoundly influence Jewish Hellenistic thinkers like Philo or the authors of the *Wisdom of Solomon* and 4 *Maccabees*. *Musar*, of course, could play a determinative role in the outcome of one’s life, but the lack of a sustained afterlife or immortality concept in the texts discussed necessarily relegated the consequences of one’s *musar* to the mortal world and kept its influence earthborn. The immortality of the soul allowed *paideia* to have much loftier aspirations and a far longer reach. The Jewish authors in the Hellenistic Diaspora, with the immortal soul—at least in one direction—fully entrenched in their worldview, would pick up on this connection to *paideia* and develop new and unique conclusions based also on the expanded semantic range of the term drawn from the Hebrew *musar*, the notion of divine discipline.

Though the Hebrew and Greek terms are not diametrically opposed and, in fact, have very much in common, the differences between them are, at times, vast. And, while the motivations of the original translators for choosing *paideia / paideuō* as a nearly consistent translation for *musar / y-s-r* are close to impossible to comprehend with any certainty, the fact remains that they left for their later readers texts that, one, would have been read and understood in a way far differently from the Hebrew *vorlage* and, two, could actually mold the understanding of the Greek terminology itself, expanding the Greek term’s range of meaning
beyond its classical sense. Both of these scenarios will prove determinative in the understanding of Jewish *paideia* during the Second Temple period, and the way in which the diverse conceptions would be deployed in the complex process of shaping individual and collective identity.
Chapter 3. Musar to Paideia in the Septuagint

1. Introduction

With the nuanced, diverse understanding of the terms in mind, we can now turn to reading the texts of the Septuagint alongside the Hebrew texts, not in order to utilize the Hebrew to explicate the Greek or to use the Greek to help better understand the Hebrew, but rather to see how each would likely have been read on their own terms.

In the following analyses, we shall see two primary and divergent ways of understanding paideia in the Greek translations. The Pentateuch, likely the earliest Septuagint translation, and the prophetic literature display a startling use of the Greek terminology, which comes to take on the violent disciplinary aspects inherent in the Hebrew texts but foreign to the Greek term’s range of meaning. The Hebrew essentially overwrites the Greek understanding of the terms. On the other hand, in the wisdom texts of Proverbs and Job, likely inheriting the translation choices from the Pentateuch translators, we find an understanding of paideia in no way at odds with the classical Greek semantic range. In fact, when a more literal translation of the Hebrew could result in an association between paideia and disciplinary violence, the translators subtly break this association in the resultant Greek text, making sure that paideia is not, as in the Pentateuch and the prophetic literature, understood in any way other than the classical sense. These two divergent notions of paideia found in the Septuagint translations will be partially but directly responsible for the various ways paideia would later be understood and used in the Hellenistic Diaspora, with Jewish thinkers incorporating Hebrew notions of musar or divine discipline and
Greek and Hellenistic ideas of *paideia*, especially the connection to virtue, the *politeia*, the immortality of the soul, and the universality that it brings, surpassing one's birthright or even upbringing.

2. **Musar to Paideia in the Septuagint**

**Musar to Paideia in the Pentateuch**

Septuagint specialists have long agreed that the Torah was the first of the Hebrew texts to be translated into Greek, likely in the early- to mid-third century BCE, with the later translators following several of the precedents set by this initial group over the next couple of centuries, including the literal quality of the translation, the style of the Greek, and the Greek vocabulary used.59 Though not overly prevalent in the Torah, the language of *musar* / *y-s-r* is here first translated with the Greek *paideia* / *paideuō*.

Extant examples of *musar* / *y-s-r* and *paideia* / *paideuō* in the Torah / Pentateuch are limited to the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy. *Y-s-r* occurs three times in Leviticus, all in the concluding section of the Holiness Code, where the text discusses the penalties for Israel’s disobedience to the covenant. Each occurrence is translated with the Greek verb *paideuō*:

Lev. 26:18

And if in spite of this you will not obey me, I will continue to punish you sevenfold for your sins.

καὶ ἐὰν ἐως τοῦτο μὴ ὑπακούσητέ μου, καὶ προσθήσω τοῦ παιδεύσαι ύμᾶς ἐπτάκις ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀμαρτίαις ύμῶν

And if you still do not obey me, I will continue to punish you sevenfold for your sins.

Lev. 26:23-24

καὶ ἐὰν ἐως τοῦτο μὴ παιδευθῆτε ἀλλὰ πορεύσθητε πρὸς με πλάγιοι, πορεύσομαι κἀγὼ μεθ’ ύμῶν θυμὸ πλαγίῳ, καὶ πατάξω ύμᾶς κἀγὼ ἐπτάκις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ύμῶν.

And if you are not corrected by me by these things, but continue hostile to me, then I too will continue hostile to you; and I myself will smite you sevenfold for your sins.

καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐὰν μὴ παιδευθῆτε ἀλλὰ πορεύσθητε πρὸς με πλάγιοι, πορεύσομαι κἀγὼ μεθ’ ύμῶν θυμὸ πλαγίῳ, καὶ πατάξω ύμᾶς κἀγὼ ἐπτάκις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ύμῶν.

And if you are not yet corrected, but walk askew to me, then I too will walk with skewed wrath with you, and I myself will smite you sevenfold for your sins.

Lev. 26:28

καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐὰν μὴ παιδευθῆτε ἀλλὰ πορεύσθητε πρὸς με πλάγιοι, πορεύσομαι κἀγὼ μεθ’ ύμῶν θυμὸ πλαγίῳ, καὶ πατάξω ύμᾶς κἀγὼ ἐπτάκις ἀντὶ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ύμῶν.

I will continue hostile to you in fury, and I myself will punish you sevenfold for your sins.
καὶ αὐτὸς πορεύσομαι μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐν θυμῷ πλαγίῳ, καὶ παιδεύσω ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ ἐπτάκις κατὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ὑμῶν·

And I myself will walk with you with skewed wrath, and I myself will punish you sevenfold according to your sins.

Though not in the foreground, *y-s-r* does have an educational implication in these passages; Yahweh is attempting to correct the people’s behavior, force them to learn from this instruction, and, therefore, stop them from breaking the covenant and, instead, return to obeying the commandments previously set forth. So, it would not be completely inconceivable to describe this activity with the pedagogical verb *paideuō*. However, when we consider that Yahweh’s “education” of the people here involves terror, consumption, and fear (26:16), wild animals which will kill their children and livestock (26:22), and, finally, a hunger so great they must eat their own children (26:29), we are unlikely to find a Greek precedent for this type of pedagogy. Whether we understand this as “correction,” “education,” or “punishment,” *paideia* here takes on a connotation entirely foreign to its traditional range of meaning.

There are six instances of *musar* / *y-s-r* in the book of *Deuteronomy*, one of the noun, five of the verb, all of which are translated with *paideia* / *paideuō*. The Greek verb occurs one other time in the text, translating the *polel* of the verb *bîn* in 32:10, which *HALOT* takes to mean “to take care of” and *BDB* “to attentively consider,” though the precise meaning is uncertain, as this is the sole example in the HB of *bîn* in this stem. In most cases, the use of the verb *paideuō* in LXX *Deuteronomy* does not necessarily stray too far from the classical Greek sense (4:36; 8:5 [twice]; 21:8; 32:10), but, in two passages, the translator clearly stretches the meaning of the Greek terminology further than the classical sense would allow:
Deut. 11:2

Remember today that it was not your children, who have neither known nor seen the 
*musar* of the Lord your God, but it is you who must acknowledge his greatness, his mighty hand and his outstretched arm,

And you will know today that it was not your children, who have neither known nor seen the *paideia* of the Lord, your God, and his great works, powerful hand, and lofty arm,

Deut. 22:18

The elders of that town shall take the man and punish him.

And the elders of that city shall take that man and punish him.
In 11:2, it is impossible to read *paideia* in the classical Greek sense, since, from the context of the passage (11:1-7), this *paideia* points to Yahweh’s punishments against Egypt and the sons of Eliab, which the people had witnessed, and their own hardships wandering in the wilderness. There is educational value for the people, but this is a form of education previously foreign to the Greek term, and it would be impossible to read into the Greek text the common understanding of *paideia*.\(^{60}\) In 22:18, which discusses the punishment of a man who falsely accuses his new bride of not being a virgin, there is no educational value tied to the verb at all. It simply refers to the financial restitution which he must pay to his wife’s father (22:19). Here *paideuō* is stripped of any pedagogical footing, unthinkable in a Greek setting.

The evidence from the Pentateuch is limited, but from the usage in both *Leviticus* and *Deuteronomy*, *paideia* looks very different from what we see in classical Greek literature, with the term taking on notions of divine violence and punishment with the ultimate purpose of instructing the people through example and fear. The terminology is, in these texts, unable to maintain the traditional Greek sense and, instead, adopts completely the full range of meaning of the Hebrew terms. This “*paideia as musar*” is a concept that the Greek Pentateuch and, as we shall see, the Greek prophetic texts, will endow to later Jewish authors, who will then selectively draw upon these texts in order to incorporate notions of divine discipline into their overall conceptions of the ideal Jewish education and enculturation curriculum.

---

**Musar to Paideia in Prophetic Texts**

---

\(^{60}\) Learning by *positive* example was certainly a proper and necessary means of *paideia*. See Lysias, *Funeral Oration* 2.3: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς παλαιοὺς κινδύνους τῶν προγόνων δίειμι, μνήμην παρὰ τῆς φήμης λαβών: ἄξιον γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπων κάκεινον μεμνήσθαι, ὑμνώντας μὲν ἐν ταῖς ὀμοίας, λέγοντας δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν γνώμαις, τιμώντας δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς καιροῖς τοῖς τοιούτοις, παιδεύοντας δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἔργοις τοὺς ζώντας.
We find the use of our terminology throughout the prophetic literature, though sparingly save for Isaiah and Jeremiah, both of which, like the Pentateuch translations, will prove influential in the later understanding of paideia as musar or God’s disciplinary violence. All instances of musar and y-s-r in Isaiah are translated with paideia and paideuō, except for 8:11, which has in the MT וְיִּסְרֵּני. It seems that both the Greek and the Syriac understood the form as coming from the root $w-r, “to turn aside, leave, desert,” instead of y-s-r, translating the verb with ἀπειθοῦσι and $ܢܣ طبيعي respectively. In LXX 50:4-5, where paideia does not translate musar (v. 4 has παιδείας for לִּמוּדִים, and ἡ παιδεία κυρίου is the subject that opens the ear instead of אֲדֹנָי יְהוִּה in v. 5), the traditional educational aspect of the noun is evident, but in all other cases, paideia takes on musar’s notion of divine chastening:

Isa. 26:16

וְיִּסְרֵּני בְּשֵׁר פְּקוּדָךָ צָקוּן לַחַשׁ מַוּסָרְךָ לָמ
O Lord, in distress they sought you, they poured out a prayer when your musar was on them.

κύριε, ἐν θλίψει ἐμνήσθην σου, ἐν θλίψει μικρά ἡ παιδεία σου ἡμῖν.
O Lord, in affliction I remembered you; your paideia was on us with small affliction.

Isa. 28:26

וְיִּסְרֵּני בְּשֵׁר פְּקוּדָךָ צָקוּן לַחַשׁ מַוּסָרְךָ לָמ

---

61 The Vulgate seems to have understood the form as the MT did, translating with erudivit me.
62 On the phenomenon of paideia becoming the active subject of verbs in the Septuagint translations, see below in the section on the book of Proverbs.
For his God instructs him for judgment and teaches him.

καὶ παιδευθήσῃ κρίματι θεοῦ σου καὶ εὐφρανθήσῃ.

And you will be instructed by the judgment of your God, and you will rejoice.

*Isa. 53:5*

But he was wounded for our transgressions, crushed for our iniquities; upon him was the *musar* that made us whole, and by his bruises we are healed.

But he was wounded because of our lawless transgressions and harmed because of our sins; the *paideia* of our peace was upon him; by his bruises we were healed.

In 26:16, God’s *paideia* is understood as but a small affliction (θλίψει μικρῇ) compared to the great benefit conferred, similar to the birth pangs of a woman in labor (26:17). 27:7-9 reveals that this divine *paideia* includes even the exile, which at the same time expiates the guilt of the nation and forces them to remember the Lord and return to righteousness. The “instruction” in 28:26 refers to the preparation of the people before they can be restored, God as the farmer who must plow the land and thresh the cumin with a rod (ῥάβδῳ 28:27). Finally, in 53:5 we have the servant who takes upon himself the *paideia* that makes the people whole, healthy, and at peace.

---

63 Cf. LXX Jer. 46:28 for a similar idea of the exile as part of God’s *paideia*.

66
This *paideia* which this innocent man must accept on behalf of an iniquitous people includes being beaten to death. This is the furthest we have seen the Greek terminology stretched thus far, and these passages will have a direct impact on the *Wisdom of Solomon*’s understanding of the divine *paideia* which the righteous man must accept, including even his brutal, bodily death.

According to Sanders, “the clearest expose in the Bible of the doctrine of divine discipline is found in Jeremiah.”64 Although beyond the scope of Sanders’ monograph, we could say that the Septuagint version of *Jeremiah*, too, gives one of the clearest, most consistent pictures of the concept of *paideia* as *musar*. LXX *Jeremiah* consistently and extensively uses *paideia* / *paideuō* to translate the Hebrew *musar* / *y-s-r* and to refer to God’s divine punishment of the people. Of the thirteen instances of the Greek terms, there is only one example where the term has not taken on the transformed significance of the Hebrew, 17:23, which refers to Jeremiah’s failed attempt to instruct the people about Sabbath observance. In every other case, *paideia* has a clear and vivid chastening edge, which is the sole purview of God. A common theme developed throughout the text is the people’s continual rejection of God’s *paideia*, which, then, is their principal source of wickedness and sin and leads to the Babylonian exile.

*Jer. 2:30*

לָשָׁוְא הִכֵּיתִי אֶת־בְּנֵיכֶם מוּסָר לֹא לָקָחוּ אָכְלָה חַרְבכֶם נְבִּֽיֶּֽיכֶם כְאַרְיֵּֽה מַשְׁחִּֽית

In vain I have struck down your children; they accepted no *musar*. Your own sword devoured your prophets like a ravening lion.

---

μάθην ἐπάταξα τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν, παιδειαν οὐκ ἐδέξασθε: μάχαιρα κατέφαγεν τοὺς προφήτας ὑμῶν ὡς λέων ὀλεθρεύον, καὶ οὐκ ἐφοβήθητε.

In vain I have smitten your children; you65 did not accept paideia; a sword has devoured your prophets like a destroying lion, and you did not fear.

Jer. 5:3

O Lord, do your eyes not look for truth? You have struck them, but they felt no anguish; you have consumed them, but they refused to take musar. They have made their faces harder than rock; they have refused to turn back.

κύριε, οἱ ὀφθαλμοί σου <οὐχί> εἰς πίστιν; ἐμαστιγώσας αὐτοὺς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπόνεσαν· συνετέλεσας αὐτοὺς, καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν δέξασθαι παιδειαν· ἐστερέωσαν τὰ πρόσωπα αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ πέτραν καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν ἐπιστραφῆναι.

O Lord, do your eyes not look for faith? You have scourged them, and they did not suffer; you consumed them, and they refused to receive paideia; they have made their faces harder than rock and they refuse to return.

These examples make clear the notion of musar and paideia in the texts.66 The Hebrew text consistently refers to God’s punishment of the people for their wickedness as musar, and the Greek faithfully renders it with the standard translation of paideia, despite the fact that the Greek

---

65 The switch in subject in the Septuagint version seems to make the paideia here even more vivid and cruel, including the smiting of their children, than the musar in the MT version.

66 Cf. Jer. 7:28; 10:24; 30:14; 31:18; 32:33; and 35:13. This is also what we find in Hosea’s conception of musar and paideia. See Hos. 5:2; 7:12, 15; and 10:10.
term simply could not encompass this range of meaning in its classical setting. While God’s violent *paideia* could afflict the innocent in *Isaiah* for a greater purpose, in *Jeremiah*, the *paideia* is always in response to wickedness and sin, as both punishment and instruction. In both texts, though, this punishment, no matter the severity, is seen as but a small affliction relative to the people’s sin and their future redemption. This is an idea that will be picked up by later authors in describing the chastening *paideia*, not of the wicked but of the righteous, yet miniscule torment in light of the future redemption in the form of the immortality of the soul in nearness to the divine.

**Musar to Paideia in Proverbs**

As we move to the use of *paideia* in the wisdom literature, we find a strikingly different take on how the Greek terminology is understood and utilized. While in the Pentateuch and the prophetic literature, the Greek terms come to adopt wholly the full range of meaning of the Hebrew *musar*, to the point where they cannot, at times, continue to maintain the Greek sense found in non-Jewish Greek literature, the books of *Proverbs* and *Job* consistently affirm the traditional Greek understanding of *paideia* and distance the term from overt forms of physical discipline and violence inherent in the Hebrew text. While other, more suitable terms could have been chosen for the Hebrew *musar / y-s-r*, it is likely that the translators of the wisdom literature inherited the translation choices from the earlier translation of the Torah and were left with the task of trying to rework the text to suit better the Greek term’s semantic range.
The greatest number of instances of the Hebrew musar / y-s-r and the Greek paideia / paideuō in the HB and LXX occur in the book of Proverbs.\(^{67}\) Nearly every instance of musar is translated with the Greek paideia. Possible exceptions are 7:22, 8:33, 13:1, and 23:23. For unknown reasons, 8:33 and 23:23 are not extant in the Greek,\(^{68}\) and מוסר in 7:22 is probably best vocalized as mösér, “bond,” from sr, rather than músr. Therefore, we are left with only one instance where musar was not translated with paideia, 13:1:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{בֵּן חָכָם מוּסַר אָב וְלֵּץ לֹא־שָׁמַע גְּعָרָה}
\end{align*}
\]

A wise son, the musar of a father,

but a scoffer does not listen to rebuke.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{υἱὸς πανοῦργος ὑπήκοος πατρί,}
\end{align*}
\]

A clever son is obedient to his father,

But a disobedient son goes to destruction.

The Hebrew of 13:1a is a bit odd, with the second half the predicate of the first, literally “a wise son, musar of a father,” or “a wise son is the musar of a father,” which makes little sense. There have been several proposals made to clear up the meaning. For example, BHS, followed by NRSV, emends 'b to ṣ̄hēb, “a wise son loves musar.” Others gap šama` from 13:1b, take the

\(^{67}\) 29 or 30 instances of musar (depending on whether you understand musar or moser in 7:22); 25 of paideia; 5 of ysr; and 12 of paideuō.

\(^{68}\) Cook argues that the omission of 8:33 in the Greek was due to haplography. See Johannes Cook, The Septuagint of Proverbs-Jewish and/or Hellenistic Proverbs? Concerning the Hellenistic Colouring of LXX Proverbs (VTSup 69; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 245.
notion of “obeys” from the Greek and the Syriac, or assume a qbl, “receives.” Fox, however, does not see a problem with the Hebrew, seeing the sentence as an example of “blunt juxtaposition, in which two nouns are set side-by-side without an obvious or usual semantic connection, leaving the reader to tease out the connection.” Both the Greek and the Syriac texts exhibit some confusion with the Hebrew and the intention to make the meaning more explicit. We can read nothing more into the Greek text and the lack of paideia in this circumstance.

In LXX Proverbs, the Greek paideia is always translating the Hebrew musar, but for three exceptions. In 16:17, paideia occurs in a couplet not extant in the MT, and LXX 17:8 appears to take an apparently distasteful proverb concerning the profitability of bribes and replace it with something more fully in line with Hellenistic sensibilities, the benefits of paideia. Finally, in 25:1 we find a unique translation move, emblematic of LXX Proverbs’ overall view of paideia and prescient of how Greek Proverbs will later come to be utilized: the mishley of Solomon become, not the paroimiae or the parabolai, but the paideiai of Solomon, the translator making explicit the educational value of the text and the sayings.

The Hebrew verbal root y-s-r is always translated with the verb paideuō, in 9:7, 19:18, 29:17, 29:19, and 31:1. In just as many cases the Greek verb does not translate y-s-r. In 3:12 we

---

69 The Peshitto, similar to the Greek, has μακάριος ἀληθεύων εἰς τήν ἁπάντησιν.
70 Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 10-31 (AB 18b; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 561. Fox argues against the retrograde gapping of šama’, as this should only occur if the gapped verb is in final position (561 note 271).
71 The Vulgate too seems to try to help better explicate the Hebrew: filius sapiens doctrina patris qui autem inlusor est audit cum arguitur.
72 Compare: וֹמֵּר שֹׁמֵּר נַפְשּׁוֹ נֹצֵּר דַרְכּוֹ מְסִלַת יְשָׁרִים סוּרֵּר versus τρίβει ζωῆς ἐκκλίνουσιν ἀπὸ κακῶν, μήκος δὲ βίου ὁδοί δικαίωσιν. ὁ δεχόμενος παιδείαν ἐν ἀγαθῷ ἔσται, ὁ δὲ φυλάσσων ἐλέγχους σωφροσύνην ἔσται τὰς ἐκαυτὸν ὁδοὺς τηρήσει τὴν ἑαυτῷ ψυχήν, ἄγατον δὲ ζωὴν αὐτὸν φειδεῖται στόματος αὐτοῦ.
73 Compare אֶבֶן־חֵּן הַשֹּׁחַד בְּעֵינֵּי בְּעָלָיו אֶל־כָּל־אֲשֶׁר יִפְנֶה יַשְׂכִּיל to μισθὸς χαρίτων ἡ παιδεία τῆς χρομένως, οὗ δὲ ἂν ἐπιστρέψῃ, εὐδοκιμήσεται. Note the Syriac too removes the praise of bribery in the proverb. See Fox, Proverbs 10-31, 1015. According to McKane, “LXX has apparently reacted against the opportunism of MT. What is achieved by bribery according to MT is, according to LXX, the product of παιδεία (mūsār), ‘discipline.’” See William McKane, Proverbs: A New Approach (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1970), 502.
74 A and S do have παροιμίαι instead of παιδεία, but paideiai seems like the clear lectio difficilior here, with paroimiae probably coming from a scribe(s) influenced by Prov. 1:1.
find the verb translating the Hebrew יְכִיחַ, from י-ק-ח, the root typically associated with י-ס-ר and almost always translated with the Greek elegchō. In fact, several good manuscripts have ἐλέγχει instead of παίδευε, though it is difficult to say which is the best reading. On the one hand, paideuei would seem to be the lectio difficilior, as the verb י-ק-ח is nearly universally translated with elegchō in LXX Proverbs. On the other hand, the idea in 3:12b, where the Lord “scourges (μαστιγῶ) every son whom he receives,” would introduce an association between paideia / paideuô and physical violence which is unique in LXX Proverbs and in contrast to the understanding of paideia we find throughout the rest of the text.

The participle paideuontos translates the Hebrew mōrāy, “teachers,” in 5:13, and 10:4, a stich not extant in the Hebrew, reads, “An educated (πεπαιδευμένος) son will be wise, and will use the fool as a servant.” LXX 28:17c-d, “educate (παιδεύει) your son and he will love you and give honor to your soul,” seems to be a translation of MT 29:17. The reason for the placement in 28:17 is unclear. Finally, the Greek translator of 22:3 took a rather mundane proverb found elsewhere in the text (27:12) and used it as an opportunity to introduce a unique educational concept, the idea of learning through witnessing the punishment of others:

A clever one sees evil and hides,
but the simple go on and are punished.

75 According to Fox (Proverbs 10-31, 982): “The couplet is Gk in origin, since the Heb would have used ‘ebed for ‘servant’ in this context, but ‘ebed is never rendered by Gk διακόνος.”
κραταιός αὐτὸς παιδεύεται,
οἱ δὲ ἀφρονεὶς παρελθόντες ἐξημώθησαν.

When a clever man sees an evil man being punished severely, he is educated,
but fools go on and are punished.

This idea of intelligent people learning through the suffering of the wicked is similar to what we saw already in Deut. 11:2, though without the explicit violence, and it is a concept that will be picked up in later texts such as the Wisdom of Solomon.

In several of the instances where paideia / paideuō translates musar / y-s-r, the Greek and Hebrew wholly overlap, and the Greek meaning fits well with the Hebrew range. Both musar and paideia come from Solomon’s proverbs themselves, parents, God, teachers or instructors, Lady Wisdom, and observation of the world. Both are closely connected with the “fear of Yahweh/God.” Both are received aurally and visually, are intimately connected to wisdom, and lead to insight and understanding, which thereby makes them necessary for a good life and for children. The rejection of musar and paideia is the trait of the foolish and leads to poverty, disgrace, and death. In all this, where paideia correlates well to musar in Proverbs, the understanding of the term in no way deviates from the classical Greek sense. For example:

---

77 From the proverbs (1:2-3; 5:1-12; 25:1); one’s parents (1:8; 4:1-11; 15:5; 19:20, 27; 31:1); God (3:11); teachers or instructors (5:13); Lady Wisdom (8:10); observation of the world (24:32).
78 15:33.
79 Aurally (1:8; 4:1; 5:13; 19:20, 27; 23:12); visually (22:3; 24:32).
80 1:7; 8:10; 15:33.
82 4:13; 10:17; 16:17, 22.
Prov. 19:20

Hear counsel and accept *musar*,
that you may be wise in your later years.

ἄκουε, υἱέ, παιδείαν πατρός σου

ἵνα σοφὸς γένῃ ἐπ’ ἐσχάτων σου.

Hear, son, your father’s *paideia,*
that you may be wise in your later years.

Greek *paideia* here shows its affinity to the Sapiential worldview, and the Greek and Hebrew terms can both be read without compromise in their own native senses. When, however, the Hebrew text of *Proverbs* seems to head in a direction not compatible with the Greek terminology, the Greek text begins to diverge from its source and distance itself from apparently problematic ideas related to notions of education, resulting in a text that could later be read in ways wholly congruous to Hellenistic pedagogical notions.

In three cases, the Greek translator took a Hebrew text where *musar* was the object of a verb or a predicate nominative and made *paideia* the subject of the verb, transforming it into an active force.

Prov. 10:17

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and a good understanding.

Prov. 10:17

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and a good understanding.
Whoever heeds *musar* is on the path to life,
but one who rejects rebuke goes astray.

ο碹ς δικαις ζωης φυλασσει παιδεια,
παιδεια δε ἀνεξέλεγκτος πλαναται.
*Paideia* protects the righteous paths of life,
but *paideia* without refutation goes astray.

*Prov. 13:18*

רֵישׁ וְקָלוֹן פוֹרֵעַ מוּסָר וְשׁוֹמֵּר תוֹכַחַת יְכֻבָד
Poverty and disgrace are for the one who ignores *musar*,
but one who heeds reproof is honored.

πενιαν και ἀτιμιαν ἀφαιρεται παιδεια,
ὁ δε φυλασσων ἐλέγχους δοξασθησεται.
*Paideia* removes poverty and disgrace,
but the one who minds refutations will be honored.

*Prov. 15:10*

מדך רע ל甗ב ארא שונא תנכםת נمى
There is severe *musar* for the one who forsakes the way,
but one who hates reproof will die.
The paideia of the simple\textsuperscript{86} is known by those passing by, but those who hate refutations will die shamefully.

In all three verses, the move to make paideia the subject results in two separate but related outcomes. First, the notion of paideia is elevated, becoming an active force working in the universe, much like sophia, though not nearly as lofty.\textsuperscript{87} As an active subject, the Greek term takes on an almost abstract, independent, universal dimension not found in the Hebrew, where musar is typically the object of an action, something instilled by someone else, something to be heeded, accepted, or abandoned at the particular moment in time when it is offered. Though at times also a predicate nominative, nowhere in the texts of the Hebrew Bible is musar ever the subject of a verb, a force acting upon someone or something else. Making paideia an active subject exalts the concept to a level unknown with the Hebrew musar.\textsuperscript{88}

The second result of this change in subject is that it helps to distance the Greek term from the notion of punishment or correction found more clearly with the strict Hebrew parallelism. Throughout the book of Proverbs, musar and paideia are linked in some fashion to tochahath and elegchos.\textsuperscript{89} The Hebrew parallelism clearly shows that musar and tochahath are interwoven ideas, the former dependent on the latter. The Greek, however, subtly weakens this inseparable

\textsuperscript{86} Fox understands akakou as an error of for what should be kakou (Proverbs 10-31, 1007). This conjecture seems unnecessary.

\textsuperscript{87} Cf. 4:13 in both the Hebrew and the Greek: “Take hold of musar / my paideia; do not let go; guard her, for she is your life.”

\textsuperscript{88} While Cook and others have urged caution when interpreting the change in subjects or objects in the Septuagint translations, the important point here is how the Greek text would have later been read and interpreted, not the ideological or theological motivations of the translator. See Cook, The Septuagint of Proverbs, 226.

connection. In the three cases above, the translator has broken the strict parallelism of the Hebrew text, which is not uncommon in LXX Proverbs, but, nevertheless, results in a greater distance between paideia and elegchos, where elegchos may be an aspect of paideia but not the defining aspect.

Excursus: רוחח and ἔλεγχος

As to the exact notions of tochahath and elegchos, the terms have much in common. The verbal forms y-k-h and elegchō both have a similar range of meaning, to decide, judge, prove, rebuke, reprove, refute, correct, reprimand, censure, blame, etc., in essence, to set to right, with the nouns being the blame, censure, reprimand, etc., the thing which will set to right. The Hebrew terminology is common in a juridical setting, with the lemma found prominently in the context of the covenant lawsuit: “Come now, let us argue it out (נִוָּכְחָה), says the Lord: though your sins are like scarlet, they will be like snow; though they are red like crimson, they will be like wool” (Isa. 1:18).

While tochahath is often under Yahweh’s purview, the book of Job turns this notion on its head, with Job wanting, instead, to bring God to trial for the unfair treatment he has received. In many ways, the entire text of Job revolves around the concept of tochahath, when and by

---

91 On the Septuagint usage, Büchsel notes that, in distinction from paideuein and y-s-r, “behind which there is always the idea of paternal chastisement, it [elegchō and y-k-h] denotes the disciplining and educating of man by God as a result of His judicial activity. This embraces all aspects of education from the conviction of the sinner to chastisement and punishment, from the instruction of the righteous by severe tests to his direction by teaching and admonition” (“ἔλεγχο,” TDNT 473). We shall see that both of these comments are patently false. On the Greek terminology generally, see Friedrich Büchsel, “ἔλεγχο,” TDNT 2:473-476; LSJ 531; and T. Muraoka, A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint (Louvain: Peeters, 2009), 222.
whom it is appropriate and necessary. Job’s companions understand his great sufferings as part of God’s divine *tochahath* (5:17; 19:5; 22:4), designed to correct some unknown but certain fault on Job’s part. Job, instead, responds by wondering why they are putting him on trial, knowing that he is truly innocent and blameless (6:25-26). Yet, Job refuses to reprove his friends, instead making clear that he will only argue his case with God (13:3, 5; 16:21), even though he knows that any trial between a mortal and an immortal is *a priori* unfair, as there is no one able to adjudicate between them (9:32-35). Nevertheless, in his despair, Job’s only desires the possibility:

*Job* 23:3-7

Oh, that I knew where I might find him,
that I might come even to his dwelling!
I would lay my case before him,
and fill my mouth with *tochahoth*.
I would learn the words with which he would answer me, and understand what he would say to me.
Would he contend with me in the greatness of his power?
No, surely he would give heed to me.

There an upright person could **put him to trial**, and I should be acquitted forever by my judge.

In the end, Job, the “reprover of God (מוכיח אלוהים)” (40:2), gets his chance, but as he expected, it is not a fair trial. Yahweh simply belittles Job, bragging about all of the great things of which he, and no one else, is capable, and Job, too awestruck to continue his plea, gives in (38:1-42:6).

The Greek too is often used in the context of trials and lawsuits: “And all those who persuaded you by means of envy and slander—and some also persuaded others because they had been themselves persuaded—all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question (ἐλέγξαι) him, but I am compelled in making my defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross-question (ἐλέγχειν) when nobody answers” (Plato, *Apol.* 18d; LCL trans.).

Unique to the Hebrew terms, God’s discipline, education, and reproof can take the form of severe punishment and violence:

*Ezekiel 5:15*

וְהָיְתָה חֶרְפָה וּגְדוּפָה מְשַׁמָה לַגּוֹיִּים אֲשֶׁר סְבִּיבָהָּ לָךְ הָעָשִּׂיתָ בַּעֲשׂוֹתִּּי בָּךְ שְׁפָטִּּי בְאַף וּבְחֵּמָּּה וּבְתֹכְחוֹת חֵּּמָה אֲנִּי יְהוָה דִּבַּרְתִּי

And it will be a reproach, a taunt, a *musar*, and a horror to the nations around you, when I execute judgments upon you in anger, wrath, and furious *tochehoth*. I the Lord, have spoken.

---

93 There are many examples of the juridical usage of *elegchos*. See also Thucydides, *History of Peloponnesian War* 3.53; Antiphon, *Against the Stepmother for Poisoning* 1.12; and Plato, *Phaedrus* 273b-c.
καὶ ἐσῃ στενακτῇ καὶ δηλαίστῃ ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν τοῖς κύκλῳ σου ἐν τῷ ποιῆσαι με ἐν σοὶ κρίματα ἐν ἐκδίκησις θυμοῦ μου ἐγὼ κύριος λελάληκα

And you will be mourned over and wretched among the nations around you, when I execute judgments upon you in the vengeance of my wrath. I, the Lord, have spoken.

Note the difference in the LXX translation, where neither musar nor tochahath are translated with the typical paideia and elegchos. The translator here chose to simply ignore musar and tochahath, as opposed to instilling upon the typical Greek terminology aspects outside their semantic range. Greek elegchos / elegchō does not have the strong sense of punishment and physical threat or violence, which is often integral to the Hebrew concept of tochahath.⁹⁴

An important aspect of the Greek terminology which has no parallel in the Hebrew, is found in the philosophical sphere, where elegchō / elegchos represents the philosopher’s controverting of propositions as an integral aspect of paideia. We find an excellent discussion of this ideal educational tool in the dialogue between Theaetetus and the visiting philosopher in Plato’s Sophist. Coming to the conclusion that paideia is that part of teaching that gets rid of a lack of learning (ἀμαθίαν) in the soul (229c), the philosopher argues that paideia must be divided into two unique aspects, νουθετητικός and ἔλεγχος, “admonition” and “refutation.” The first, νουθετητικός or “admonition,” is the “rough road,” “our forefathers’ time-honored method of scolding or gently encouraging. They used to employ it especially on their sons, and many still

---

⁹⁴ See also 2 Sam. 7:14: “I will be a father to him, and he shall be a son to me. When he commits iniquity, I will punish him with a rod such as mortals use, with blows inflicted by human beings (גכת וַחַתֶּה יָשֶׂם לְנַכֵּנֶנָּה בֵּינֵי אָדָם),” and the connection between י-כ-ח and נ-כ-ח, “smite” in Prov. 19:25 and Ps. 141:5. Note that LSJ offers several examples of elegchos / elegchō, meaning “(to) reproach, disgrace, dishonor,” and other unpleasantness, but always with the understanding that the rebuke is verbal and does not include any overt physical violence.
use it on them nowadays when they do something wrong” (229e-230a). The second, and clearly superior form of *paideia*, ἔλεγχος or “refutation,” the “smooth way,” is the means by which the belief in one’s own wisdom is called into question:

They cross-examine someone when he thinks he’s saying something though he’s saying nothing. Then, since his opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize them. They collect his opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The people who are being examined see this, get angry at themselves, and become calmer toward others. They lose their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has a more lasting effect on them. Doctors who work on the body think it can’t benefit from any food that’s offered to it until what’s interfering with it from inside is removed. The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the soul, too, won’t get any advantage from any learning that’s offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it (πρὶν ἂν ἔλεγχον τις τὸν ἔλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας), removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things that it does know, and nothing more. (230b-d)

*Elegchos*, then, is a fundamental aspect of *paideia* which helps to cleanse the soul of ignorance and hubris by removing from it unfounded assumptions and presuppositions, leaving the individual in possession only of that which one truly does know and understand. In this sense, “refutation is the principal and most important kind of cleansing / τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστι,” (230d) and without it one is “uneducated and ugly

---

(ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν), in just the ways that anyone who is going to be really happy has to be completely clean and beautiful” (230e).

Socratic dialectic makes consistent use of, and is based on, this type of elegchos throughout Plato’s dialogues. A particularly nice example of not only the proper use of elegchos but also the difference between sophistical, rhetorical, or juridical elegchos and true philosophical elegchos is found in Socrates’ exchange with Polus in Plato’s Gorgias. Polus, encouraged by his rhetorical training and believing that he has caught Socrates in an obvious blunder, claims that even a child could refute him: “So hard to refute (ἐλέγξαι) you, Socrates! Nay, a mere child could refute you (ἐλέγξειεν), could he not, and prove your words are untrue?” (470c). Socrates draws Polus in and quickly turns the tables on him, pointing out the flaws of rhetorical refutation: “My gifted friend, that is because you attempt to refute me in rhetorical fashion (ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν), as they understand refuting (ἐλέγχειν) in the law courts. For there, one party is supposed to refute (ἐλέγχεις) the other when they bring forward a number of reputable witnesses to any statements they may make, whilst their opponent produces only one, or none. But this sort of refutation is quite worthless for getting at the truth (οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἐλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν)” (470e-471a). While Polus may bring forward any number of false witnesses in an attempt sway favor, Socrates makes clear that the only witness that counts is the person sitting across the table, getting your opponent to bear witness for your side (472b-c). This speaks to the fundamental difference between rhetorical or juridical elegchos and philosophical, dialectic elegchos; the one seeks to win the favor of the crowd by any means necessary, the other seeks only the truth: “for the truth is never refuted (τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται)” (473b). In the end, of course, the master takes Polus systematically through

---

96 Note the association between a lack of elegchos and dying aischrōs in Proverbs 15:10 above.
his elegchos and brings him over to his side of thinking, removing the error of hubris and ignorance from his soul, as is the purpose of elegchos.\textsuperscript{97}

Despite the similarity in the Hebrew and Greek terminology, read on their own, those texts which put musar and paideia into close association with tochahath and elegchos would have been understood very differently. The readers of the LXX in their Hellenistic setting would not have the insinuation of divine punishment typically associated with tochahath, but instead would read into the texts a natural and fundamental aspect of paideia, philosophical cross-examining and dialogue versus violent rebuke. The choice of elegchos to translate the Hebrew tochahath introduced a different nuance of meaning. While tochahath was often connected to severe, perhaps physical, chastisement and punishment, the Greek term had a more natural setting in the educational sphere, as verbal refutation or cross-examination, either at court or in the philosophical circle. The relationship, therefore, between paideia and elegchos need not insinuate any form of disciplinary chastisement. The typical translation of tochahath / y-k-h with elegchos / elegchō further affirmed the texts of the Septuagint and the Jews as part of the important discussions taking place on the nature of paideia within a wider philosophical perspective.

Where musar is inseparably linked to the notion of chastisement or punishment, it is not uncommon for the Greek text to break subtly the strict identification. For example, in 6:23 and

\textsuperscript{97} We might see here a foreshadowing or a germ of the much more thorough and sophisticated system Aristotle will present in his \textit{De sophisticis elenchis}, where he systematically goes through the various fallacies brought forth in sophistical or rhetorical arguments, how to spot them in others’ arguments and your own, and how to defend against them: “Let us now discuss sophistical refutations, that is, arguments which appear to be refutations but are really fallacies and not refutations (Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων, ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἄλλ’ οὐκ ἐλέγχων, λέγομεν)” (164a).
22:15, *musar* is placed in a genitive/construct relationship with *tochahath* and *shevet*, the rod, respectively.

*Prov. 6:23*

כִּי נֵּר מִּצְוָה וְתוֹרָה אָוֵר וְדֶרֶךְ חַיִּים תֹּכְחוֹת מַעַר

For the commandment is a lamp and the *torah* a light, and reproofs of *musar* are the way of life.

ὁτί λόχνος ἐντολὴ νόμου καὶ φῶς,\(^{98}\)
καὶ ὀδὸς ζωῆς ἔλεγχος καὶ παιδεία,

For the commandment of the law is a lamp and a light, and refutation is the way of life and *paideia*.\(^{99}\)

*Prov. 22:15*

אָטָלָה קַשּׁוֹרָה בְּלַעֲבֵר יַרְחִיקֶנָה מִמֶּנ

Foolishness is bound up in the heart of a child, but the rod of *musar* drives it far from him.

---

\(^{98}\)Editors punctuate the verse differently. Rahlfs places the comma after φῶς, Swete after νόμου, though the ambiguity is noted in his apparatus. My translation makes clear where I suspect the comma should be placed.

\(^{99}\)My translation of LXX 6:23 here differs from both the Brenton and NETS translations, which respectively have, “For the commandment of the law is a lamp and a light; a way of life; reproof also and correction,” and “for the law’s commandment is a lamp and a light and a way of life, reproof and discipline.” These translations, however, do not properly reflect the parallelism in the stich (6:23a: predicate, subject, predicate; 6:23b: predicate, subject, predicate).
In both cases above, the Greek breaks the construct chain, which puts more distance between the pedagogy and the punishment, allowing the Septuagint text to be read in a way more consistent with the classical usage of *paideia* and, in 6:23, *elegchos*. Granted, there is still the association in 22:15 between *paideia* and the rod. This is even clearer in 13:24 and 23:13-14, the only cases in LXX *Proverbs* where *paideia* is linked to some form of physical violence, but these, like 22:15, are very specific cases where the *paideia* is meant for a young child. The harsh treatment of children in their education and upbringing was not uncommon, but rather often seen as necessary in the ancient Greek context.100

Only in the case of children was physical punishment seen as a necessary part of the educational process. Therefore, the connection between *paideia* and the *rabdos* in LXX *Proverbs* is neither surprising nor exceptional, and a text like 23:13-14 is perfectly understood in a Greek context: “Do not refrain from educating (παιδεύειν) a child; for if you beat him with a rod, he will not die. For if you beat him with a rod, you will deliver his soul from death.” Yet, it is important to note that never is this physical punishment of students referred to by the term *paideia*, and, by the time of Philo, we do find a number of Greek or Roman authors speaking out against the corporal punishment of children.101

---

100 See the discussion in Chap. 2.
101 See the discussion in Chap. 2.
If we are attempting to read the Greek text on its own terms, as a Jew in the Hellenistic Diaspora would have read it, and not in light of the Hebrew, we come to the conclusion that nowhere in Greek *Proverbs* does *paideia* mean anything different from the classical Greek understanding of the term. The verb, *paideuō*, too, maintains the Greek sense over the Hebrew *y-s-r*. There is clearly a great deal of overlap between the Hebrew *musar* and the Greek *paideia*, making them often quite compatible in *Proverbs*. But, the Hebrew term and the related *tochaḥath / y-k-h* have more naturally inherent the notion of physical discipline, rebuke, chastening, chastisement, punishment, etc., which is foreign to the Greek terminology, outside of the specific instance of disciplining children. Therefore, reading each text on its own terms would bring to mind a unique distinction of meaning based on the particular milieu. The notions of physical discipline, rebuke, and chastisement implicit in the Hebrew *musar* are largely absent from the Greek text and without the Hebrew text open beside the Greek, one would not be led to this understanding. What the translator has left us is a text which is able to be read in its entirety in easily understood Hellenistic terms and concepts.

**Musar to Paideia in Job**

*Musar / y-s-r* occurs five or six times in the book of *Job*. Paideia occurs only twice in the text, once as a translation of *musar* (20:3) and once as a translation of the Hebrew *shevet*, “rod” (37:13). The verb *paideuō* is not found in LXX *Job*. In 4:3 *y-s-r* is translated with the verb *noutheteō*, and in 5:17 *musar* is translated with noun *nouthetēma*. These Greek cognates are

---

102 As in *Prov. 7:22*, *mwsr* is probably best vocalized as *môsēr* in *Job 12:18* instead of *mûsār*, “bond” as opposed to “discipline.”
terms probably better suited to *musar* / *y-s-r* and the notions of chastisement, rebuke, and admonition, often in the context of correcting behavior for instructional purposes, latent in them.

In every instance where our terminology is found in *Job*, the Greek translator distances the text from the idea that Job’s afflictions are somehow meant to be God’s divine education. This coheres well with the overall view of the text: the blameless Job is in no way in need of correction or instruction, and the afflictions are not meant as such; it is only Job’s friends who believe them to be, and they are consistently proven misguided. Even though coming from the mouth of Job’s ignorant companions, the following Greek texts suggest an uneasiness with utilizing the term *paideia* to Job’s great suffering.

*Job 5:17*

> נַעַהַ אַשְׁרֵי אֱנוֹשׁ יְכִיחֶנוּ אֱלוֹהַּ וּמוּסַר שַׁדַּי אֲלָלֶּהוּ שֶׁדַי אֱלוֹהַּ

How happy is the one whom God reproves; therefore do not despise the *musar* of the Almighty.

> μακάριος δὲ ἄνθρωπος, ὃν ἠλέγξεν ὁ κύριος·
> νοοθέτημα δὲ παντοκράτορος μὴ ἀπαναίνου

Happy is the man whom the Lord has reproved; so, do not reject the *chastisement* of the Almighty.

*Job 33:16*
Then he opens their ears,
and he seals / frightens them with musar.

Then he opens the mind of men;
he frightens them with such fearful visions.

Job 36:10

He opens their ears to musar,
and commands that they return from iniquity.

But he will listen to the righteous;
and he said that they will return from unrighteousness.

Job 5:17 is part of Eliphaz’s first speech against Job (4:1-5:27), where he argues that Job must welcome the afflictions that God has brought against him, as the innocent will not suffer in the

---

103 Most scholars agree that this is best pointed as ἀνακαλύπτει νοῦν ἀνθρώπων.
end. Here, God’s *musar* may be the infliction of pain or wounds, but in the end God ultimately heals (5:18). The Greek translates *musar* with *nouthetēma*, a term that can carry the disciplinary aspects of *musar* but without the inherent pedagogical force found in *paideia*. *Job* 33:16 is from Elihu’s first speech (32:1-33:33), where he contends that God always answers mortals but in ways they may not understand, such as in dreams or visions. Here God is meant to frighten people in their dreams in order to correct their sinful behavior (33:17-18). The *musar* can include pain (v. 19), lack of appetite (v. 20), a wasting away of one’s flesh (v. 21), and a near-death experience (v. 22). The Greek translator clearly had a problem associating these awful punishments with God’s *paideia* and instead chose to label them more obviously as “fearful visions.” *Job* 36:10 is again Elihu speaking, maintaining God’s ultimate goodness and justice. While *musar* here is not directly associated with violent discipline, as in the previous two verses, Elihu’s point in his speech is that Job’s afflictions are part of God’s *musar*, and he must be willing to listen to and learn from God’s instruction or else die (36:11-15). As in the other examples, the Greek text shows no connection whatsoever between Job’s suffering and divine *paideia*.

Only twice in LXX *Job* do we find the term *paideia*, 20:3 and 37:13:

*Job* 20:3

I have heard *musar* which shames me,

and my discerning spirit compels me to answer.

*παιδείαν ἐντροπῆς μου ἀκούσομαι,*
καὶ πνεῦμα ἑκ τῆς συνέσεως ἀποκρίνεται μοι

I will hear *paideia* of my shame,

and the spirit of understanding answers me.

*Job 37:13*

אִם־לְשֵׁבֶט אִם־לְאַרְצָה אִם־לְחֶסֶד יַמְצִּּ֑יָהוּ

Whether for chastisement, or for his land,

or for love, he causes it to happen.

※ ἐὰν εἰς παιδείαν, ἐὰν εἰς τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ,

※ ἐὰν εἰς ἔλεος εὑρήσει αὐτόν.

Whether for *paideia*, or for his land,

or for mercy, he will find him.

The only time the translator used *paideia* for *musar* is in 20:3, where Zophar, angrily, refers not to God’s *musar* but to Job’s, to Job’s attempts to educate and correct his friends’ misguided ideas, that they themselves will be punished for persecuting Job without cause (19:28-29). *Job 37:13* is interesting, in that the translator chose to use *paideia* for the Hebrew *shevet*, “rod,” as opposed to the typical *rabdos*, where Elihu is discussing God’s workings in nature, which are inscrutable to humankind (36:24-37:12), replacing a disciplinary point with a pedagogical one: nature does not punish; it instructs.
The Greek text of Job consistently reveals an unwillingness to refer to Job’s afflictions as part of God’s discipline, which, in the Hebrew, is said to either punish Job for his sins or instruct him to be faithful to the divine. These assertions from Job’s companions are obviously erroneous and counter to the entire worldview espoused through the book of Job, where Job is wholly blameless and has done nothing wrong to deserve punishment or reproach. Unlike Deuteronomistic / covenantal theology or traditional Sapiential thinking, reward and punishment are not necessarily the result of piety and wickedness. In Job, God is mysterious and incomprehensible to humans and is above mortal concepts such as covenant or justice. The preceding Greek texts, then, can be read more closely in line with the overall thrust of the narrative, and one reading only the Greek version of the text would never associate physical violence with the lofty notion of paideia. There is no hint in Greek Job that paideia should refer to some kind of divine punishment or chastening rebuke.105

3. CONCLUSIONS

This study into the use of paideia in the Septuagint translations has yielded clearly defined results and a pattern of usage which would prove highly influential among the Greek speaking Jews in the Hellenistic Diaspora. The sense of paideia we often find in the Pentateuch and prophetic literature is largely foreign to the classical Greek range of meaning. Paideia in these texts could take on notions of divine disciplinary action, including physical and mental violence.

105 This point would be strengthened if the translator or Job was the same as that of Proverbs, as several scholars have argued. See Gerleman, Studies in the Septuagint. III. Proverbs, 59-60; Gerleman, Studies in the Septuagint. I. Book of Job (Acta Universitatis Lundensis Nova Series; Lunds Universitets Årskrift Ny Följd Första Avedelningen 1 Band 43 Number 2; Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1946); and Emanuel Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research (Revised and enlarged second edition; Jerusalem Biblical Studies 8; Jerusalem: Simor Ltd., 1997), 16.
designed to either punish the people for their sins, instruct the people to uphold their covenant promises, or both. In these texts, we might say that Hebrew notions of *musar* have been overlaid onto the Greek term, and this usage of *paideia*, connected to divine violence, will later be found only in those texts influenced by the Septuagint translation itself, Jewish Hellenistic literature and early Christian authors. The Greek translation of the Pentateuch and the prophetic literature expanded *paideia*’s possible range of meaning for the Jews and Christians who held these texts as sacred and foundational.

In the wisdom literature, we find a very different approach to the translation of the Hebrew and the understanding of *paideia* within the Greek text: it does not encompass notions of punishment and physical rebuke but always has a clear educational emphasis. We never find in these texts a modification of the Greek term’s semantic range which, then, better reflects the Hebrew understanding of *musar*. Instead, the terminology in the texts maintain the classical Greek range of meaning. This differs fundamentally with the meaning overlaid onto the Greek *paideia* in the Pentateuch and prophetic literature. If the later Jewish translators of *Proverbs* and *Job* were in some measure bound to the use of *paideia* / *paideuō*, even in circumstances that directly conflicted with their innate meaning, they went to great lengths to distance the Greek notion from any hint of violence or physical rebuke. It is these two disparate and, at times, opposed views that will have such a tremendous impact on the understanding of *paideia* in later Jewish thinking, with authors able to utilize both concepts, the one more congruous to their ancestral customs, the other to their current Hellenistic *Sitz im Leben*, in order to develop ideas related to the education and enculturation of their fellow Jews encompassing, but unique from, both.
Part II. Thinking about *Paideia* in the Hellenistic Diaspora

As we move from the production of the Septuagint to its reception in the first century CE, the impact of the translation choice of *paideia* for *musar* on the development of new and innovative educational theories is felt in a variety of ways. At the most discernible level, the two patterns of translation I have identified would have the more obvious repercussions. With the translators of *Proverbs* and *Job* unwilling to compromise the classical semantic range of the *paideia* terminology, we are left with Greek texts which diverge from the Hebrew at those points which would have associated *paideia* with overt violence and disciplinary rebuke. Choosing to remain consistent with their translation of *musar*, the translators produced texts now distinct in their views on the role of corporal punishment and divine discipline within the realm of education. In the Greek Pentateuch and prophetic literature, however, later readers would find an impression of *paideia* distinctive from that found in any other Greek literature to that point. This *paideia* could refer directly to horrible violence and punishment. With God as the agent, this discipline was still viewed as educational, and, no matter the gravity of the suffering, it could be considered as but a slight and temporary discomfort compared to the rewards that came with the training. This view of *paideia* had a clear and direct result on at least two of the following authors. The author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* would take up this view with great fervency in developing his theory of education, but in a way altogether disparate from that found in the Septuagint texts themselves. The author would pick up the divine educational discipline from the prophets, but combine it with the Platonic view of *paideia* as determinative to the future life of the soul. God’s rebuke is still a minor affliction compared to its benefits, but the principle benefit is now
immortality free from the corporeal shell. This expanded view of paideia from the Septuagint would influence Philo as well, who would turn the notion on its head by symbolizing paideia as the disciplinary rod. Education does not require corporal punishment; instead, education is required to combat and beat back the desires of the flesh. Both of these authors would combine and reshape the traditions of Moses and the prophets together with that of Plato and the philosophers in the formulation of new, yet distinctive views on the role of punishment in education, and in this methodology we see another impact of the translation choice, less pronounced but far more consequential.

The very move of inserting paideia into the revered, received Jewish scriptures would provide the necessary link which allowed later thinkers like the author of the Wisdom of Solomon or Philo to freely merge Jewish traditions with Greek philosophical and rhetorical theories of education. Whether or not this was the outcome intended by the initial translators, later Jews were given their own texts devoted to paideia which could then be used in conjunction with the extensive reflections on paideia of Greek authors like Plato or Isocrates. The impact is felt throughout the discussions to follow, even if it is not immediately apparent. We can see the influence in Philo’s view of the necessity of encyclical paideia for most of humanity, in the Wisdom of Solomon’s call to follow the paideia of Sophia, and in Paul’s insistence on the propaedeutic function of the Jewish law. We see the influence everywhere, and the educational theories of our three authors would have developed far differently—if at all—had the initial translators chosen terms perhaps more semantically commensurate to the Hebrew musar. Instead, by imbedding terminology which had such a profound cultural significance in the Hellenistic world, the translators left to later generations the means of engaging the wider world on an equal, if not superior, level. In the following three chapters, we will see the result of this
initial translation move as found in three contemporary Jewish thinkers, each of whom developed their own distinctive views of the ideal *paideia* of the Jews and humankind generally. And we will see how the distinctive characteristics of each reflected not only their own unique views on education proper, but also the differing ways in which the authors would conceive of the self and of Jewish identity.
Chapter 4. Philo of Alexandria

1. INTRODUCTION

Philo of Alexandria is a crucial figure in our attempt to understand how Greek-speaking Jews could utilize the Septuagint in the creation of innovative notions and ideals of Jewish *paideia* in the Mediterranean Diaspora of the Second Temple period, and how these views of ideal *paideia* were employed as a means of contemplating on and shaping individual and collective identity. He is important, first, because we know who he is. We know when he lived and worked. We know about his family and his elite socio-economic status in the central Hellenistic city of the Roman world. We know of his elevated, respected role within the Jewish community of Alexandria, nearly one-third the total population of the city and the largest Jewish community in the world at the time. And, we know about his own education, at least from the viewpoint of personal reflections, interspersed sparingly throughout his writings. Philo’s corpus is another reason he is important in this understanding. His body of work is the largest we have from any Second Temple Jew and one of the largest from antiquity generally. And, much of this work is devoted precisely to the question of *paideia*.106

---

106 The statistics for the usage of *paideia* and cognates are impressive. The terminology set includes the terms *paideia*, *paideuō*, *apaideusia*, *paideuōma*, *propaideuma*, *paideusis*, *paidagōgos*, *apaiddagōgētos*, *paideutikōs*, *apaideutos*, *eupaideutos*, *paidagōgeō*, *propaideuō*, and *paideuttēs*, and occurs in around 3.5% of all verses in Philo’s corpus, compared to 3% for *sophia*, 5.87% for *nomos*, and 10% for *aretē*. The most common of the set is *paideia*, 152 instances in 146 verses, followed by the verb *paideuō* with 75 instances in 72 verses, *apaideusia* at 33 instances in 33 verses, and the rest of the terms following. The treatises with the highest percentage of usage per verse are *De congressu eruditionis gratia* (13.9% of verses), *De ebrietate* (12.5%), and *De fuga et inventione* (8.9%).
These preceding points do not mean, however, that we can or should take Philo as representative of all Diaspora Jewish views on education, or that the various types of education he postulates, even those which he himself likely received, would have been desirable or even available to all Jews in Alexandria, not to mention those in smaller villages or in the countryside. What we have in Philo is a Jew from the very highest social and economic rung. He had the wealth and opportunities available to him to allow for the best possible education, and then the time necessary for research, study, and writing. As we discuss the various ideals Philo sets forth as the proper education for the Jewish people, and indeed for all humankind, we must keep this dichotomy in mind.

Despite this caveat, Philo remains deeply important to the project of understanding Jewish education, enculturation, and knowledge production during this period, not only because of his known biography or the size of his corpus, but also because of the way in which he makes use of his sources. In Philo, we find an ideal case of how a Second Temple Jewish thinker could utilize the Septuagint as a lens through which to view ancestral traditions, native customs, and the contemporary Greek philosophical milieu, and then to reimagine, reinterpret, combine, and morph foundational elements from each in the creation of a complex set of new and innovative paideutic concepts. And, in Philo, we see clearly that concern for the education of the Jewish people was not a question existing in isolation, but was part of a larger discussion taking place throughout the Hellenistic and Roman Mediterranean. Philo shares many of the same concerns as Quintilian, Plutarch, Cicero, and, perhaps closest of all, Plato himself, as to the ideal nature of education, the role of it in the life of the individual and the state, and its effect on the soul and the mind. Yet, while he addresses many of the same issues, his situation is unique among most writers on the subject at this time, in that he had one, additional concern that was of paramount
importance, namely how to welcome a foreign educational curriculum based on literature which would be construed as antithetical to Jewish monotheism and then include or even necessitate this instruction within the wider educational program of the Jewish people. How can the Jewish people embrace this education and receive all of the benefits which come with it without losing their own customs, traditions, and identity? If this “secular” curriculum is beneficial and even necessary, what role does the divinely received tradition play in the education of the people?

These are the types of concerns which Philo addresses in his development of distinctive conceptions of Jewish paideia. And, these are the very same questions on which Christians will later ponder in the hard-fought but eventual adoption of Greek paideia in the early Church. Thus, Philo, in his efforts to include both Jewish and Greek, religious and secular, native and foreign, within the ideal education of the individual, is important in situating ancient Jewish education within the history of Western education, a place which has long been denied it.

State of Research on Philo and Paideia

The best study to date on Philo’s views on paideia is a ten-page article in a little-known journal from 1971.107 This is because Walter Wagner, who worked primarily on late antique Christianity and notions of paideia therein, is the only person to at least hint at the complexity of Philo’s thought on paideia. Most scholarship on Philo and paideia has focused almost exclusively on Philo and encyclical paideia, the preliminary studies. Wagner, instead, outlines “four manners” of paideia in Philo, based on the differing relationships between the individual and God, the self, and the world: 1) divine discipline, whereby powers, such as the logos, correct improprieties; 2)

encyclical *paideia*; 3) *paideia* as the mother of the soul and wife of the *logos*; and 4) the coming together of the other forms as God’s actions towards and within the individual. Unfortunately, the nature and scope of the article does not allow Wagner to deeply or systematically elucidate these different views of *paideia*, and, while he intimated the necessity of a broader perspective on Philonic *paideia*, neither he nor any scholar since has adequately pursued such an approach.

Though most scholarship on the topic has simplified the concept and focused exclusively on Philo and Greek preliminary studies, there have been several helpful studies which have read Philo’s take on the encyclia in light of Greek and Roman views of the same, beginning, primarily from Colson’s 1917 *JTS* article.  

108 Colson identifies the Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah allegory as crucial to Philo’s view of the encyclia, reading it in light of the pervasive suitors of Penelope adage and, more generally, with an eye to wider discussions of encyclical curricula in, for example, Quintilian. Importantly, at the end of his article, Colson also acknowledges the influence of Philo’s views concerning the adoption of pagan learning on Clement and Origen and, thus, on early Christian views of education.  

109 This narrow take on Philo and *paideia*, where Philo’s *paideia* is taken solely as Greek preliminary education, has been followed by most scholars since, most thoroughly by Alan Mendelson in his short 1982 monograph, *Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria*, though it must be noted that Mendelson introduces the unique idea that Philo viewed the encyclia as

---


109 This last point has been explored most recently in Edgar Früchtel, “Philon und die Vorbereitung der christlichen Paideia und Seelenleitung,” in *Frühchristentum und Kultur* (ed. Ferdinand R. Prostmeier; Vienna: Herder Verlag GmbH, 2007), 19-33.
having inherent spiritual value, that they are beneficial beyond being preliminary to philosophy, and thus reflects a shift in the history of liberal education.¹¹⁰

Thanks to scholars such as Raffaella Cribiore and Teresa Morgan, our understanding of Hellenistic and Roman education has increased significantly in the past twenty years.¹¹¹ In fact, in her Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, Morgan makes prominent use of Philo’s depictions of the encyclia alongside those of Quintilian or Plutarch in her overall research, an inclusion rare for classicists, who tend to dismiss or ignore Philo more often than not. The most recent studies on Philo and the encyclia have incorporated the advances on the Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman sides.¹¹²

The above studies have gone a long way in detailing Philo’s views on traditional Greek preliminary instruction, including details on the curriculum, the benefits of this “foreign” education to the Jewish people, and the relative importance of Greek paideia within the wider cultural values of the Jews. Yet, the fact that scholars have consistently focused solely on this


¹¹² Tae Won Kang, “Wisdom Mythology and Hellenistic Paideia in Philo: A Case Study of De Congressu Quaerendae Eruditionis Grattia,” (Dissertation; Claremont Graduate University; Chair Karen Jo Torjesen, 1999); and Karl Olav Sandnes, Challenge of Homer: School, Pagan Poets and Early Christianity (LNTS 400; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 68-78. To be fair, in Sandnes’ chapter on Philo, he does include the Jewish law within the wider program of Jewish education. He outlines a sequential, hierarchical system, with the encyclia first, followed by philosophy or wisdom, and ending with “Torah (supreme virtue or paideia)” (73). However, this third step, Jewish law as paideia, is never supported by the sources on which he is drawing, and he never sufficiently describes how this actually works. He even has a section entitled, “Real Paideia: The Law of Moses,” which sounds quite promising. Yet, this view of Jewish law as the pinnacle of paideia is based largely on preconceptions not confirmed by Philo’s own materials. I will discuss Sandnes’ work in more detail below.
one, narrow piece of the educational program, we are left with a distorted or, at least, hazy picture of Philo’s ideal conception of Jewish paideia, which included much more than the preliminary studies.113

Aims, Organization, and Questions to be Addressed

In light of the current state of research, my principal goal here is to understand and elucidate the concept of paideia in Philo’s works and thought, in all its various forms, within the realm of Jewish education, enculturation, and the production of knowledge. This clarification will begin from a detailed examination of the different types of paideia Philo discusses throughout his works, including encyclical, preliminary paideia, native and foreign philosophy, internal reason and paideia quelling the passions within the soul, the law of nature, and Jewish law, customs, and traditions. Throughout, we will look at Philo’s various ideal examples of paideia and the role they play as paideia themselves, as models to be emulated and imitated. These include the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Moses, the Essenes, the Therapeutae, various Greeks and

113 Here it is necessary to mention the work that Greg Sterling has done on Philo and his own exegetical school since the late 1990s. While the reconstruction of Philo’s school is necessarily speculative, Sterling draws on his decades of research and experience as one of the foremost scholars of Philo in the world. See Gregory E. Sterling, “‘The School of Sacred Laws’: the Social Setting of Philo’s Treatises,” *VC* 53 (1999): 148-164; “Was there a Common Ethic in Second Temple Judaism?,” in J. J. Collins, G. E. Sterling and R. A. Clements (edd.), *Sapiential Perspectives: Wisdom Literature in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium of the Orion Center, 20-22 May 2001* (Leiden 2004) 171-194; and, most recently, “The School of Moses in Alexandria: An Attempt to Reconstruct the School of Philo,” the paper he offered at a conference on “Second Temple Jewish Paideia in Its Ancient Near Eastern and Hellenistic Contexts,” the Fifth Nangeroni Meeting, which was held in Naples, Italy (June 30 – July 4, 2015). Any comments on this final piece are based on the conference draft. An edited version of the paper will be published with the proceedings in late 2016. Related to Sterling’s work, see also P. Borgen, “Greek Encyclical Education, Philosophy and the Synagogue. Observations from Philo of Alexandria’s Writings,” in O. Mattsson (edd.), * Libens Merito. Festskrift til Stig Stromholm på sjuttioårsdagen 16 sept. 2001*, Acta Academiae Regiae Scientiarum Upsaliensis. Kungl. Vetenskapssamhällets Uppsala Handlingar 21 (Uppsala 2001) 61-71; and the contribution of Sean Adams to the Fifth Nangeroni Meeting, “Philo’s Questions and the Adaptation of Greek Philosophical Curriculum.”
barbarians, and Philo himself. Though still within the realm of the ideal, these depictions should help us move closer to how Philo’s theories of *paideia* could have surfaced in reality.

Moving beyond the means of education, we will explore the value of *paideia*, both within the life of the individual and for the community at large. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of *paideia* in Philo’s thought. It is pervasive and built into Philo’s overarching concern for the life of the soul and the mind. This is because the gifts *paideia* offers are of the highest kind: virtue, world citizenship, immortality. The righteous life of the soul begins and ends with *paideia*. Without it, comes death. Not the hoped for, intended death of the body which allows the immortal soul to return home, but the death of the soul itself, an unthinkable evil. *Paideia* is everything for Philo. And, in this, it figures prominently in the major dualistic dichotomies Philo outlines throughout his work, that of the body/soul, sense perception/*nous*, and the active/contemplative life, where the ideal life involves not only attention and devotion to the noetic elements, but a cooperation of the heavenly with the worldly, a compromise between the two. This is Philo’s view of *paideia* as well. Balance is the goal, always. We see this prominently in the children of (earthly) *paideia* and (heavenly) *logos*, where the best kids are those who diligently attend to both parents, not the ones who follow the father alone.

From all the detail and diversity, we finally must see if we can extrapolate an overarching concept of Philonic *paideia*. Did Philo himself envision a grand view which encompassed all of the various aspects he discusses throughout his works, a system of *paideia* which could include encyclical preliminary studies, the Mosaic law and its allegorical reading, philosophy, mental discipline, and the imitation of nature (perhaps through the examples of special individuals from the past)? Can this all fit into an ideal view of individual education? How? And, grand view of *paideia* or not, what can all this tell us about Philo’s view of the Jewish people within the larger
world community? My stated purpose here is to see how Philo envisioned the education of the Jewish people, but is this Philo’s own intended concern? It’s rare that he draws a divide between foreign and native \textit{paideia}. Was the education of the Jews to be different than that of the Greeks? Should it be? Are the Jews to act as exemplars for the world in their education? These are all questions which the followed detailed study of Philo and \textit{paideia} should help to answer.

2. \textit{Encyclical Studies}

Philo’s perspective on encyclical or preliminary \textit{paideia} is the natural place to begin our comprehensive exploration of Philonic \textit{paideia}. Not only has this been the one aspect of \textit{paideia} on which the vast majority of scholarship has been focused and is the form of \textit{paideia} which Philo himself most regularly discusses throughout his work, but the very nature of the encyclia as preliminary necessitates that we discuss this type of \textit{paideia} before moving on to higher forms of education. Philo is horrified of those who would attempt to begin their educational ascent without first preparing themselves with the encyclia. Therefore, we must do the same.

Philo’s terminology for this form of education, consistent with contemporary Greek usage, centers on the substantives \textit{paideia}, \textit{paideuma}, \textit{propaideuma}, \textit{mathèma}, \textit{didaskaleion}, and \textit{mousikē} together with the adjectives \textit{egkuklios} and/or \textit{mesos}. So, we find examples such as τὴν \textit{ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν} (\textit{Cong. 73}), ἡ \textit{ἐγκύκλιος μουσική} (\textit{Cong. 79}), ἡ διὰ τῶν προπαιδευμάτων \textit{ἐγκύκλιος μουσική} (\textit{Cong. 9}), or simply τὰ \textit{ἐγκύκλια} (\textit{Cong. 10}). Why this type of \textit{paideia} is \textit{egkuklios} has been much discussed, but, by this period, the term likely had the force of either “circular” or “general.” So, we would have something like “the circuit of education,” or “all-around education,” which is how Quintilian seems to have taken the Greek, referring to it as \textit{orbis doctrinae} (\textit{Inst. 1.10.1}) and would explain well Philo’s use of \textit{choreia} and cognates in close
connection or as apparent synonyms for *egkuklios*, or “general, normal, ordinary education,” as opposed to specialized or more advanced education. Philo uses the adjective *mesos* interchangeably for *egkuklios*, as in τὴν μέσην παιδείαν (*Cher.* 3), ἡ μέση καὶ ἐγκυκλίος παιδεία (*Cher.* 6), τὴν μέσην καὶ ἐγκύκλιον χορείαν τε καὶ παιδείαν (*Ebr.* 33), or τὴν τῶν μέσων καὶ ἐγκυκλίων ἐπιστημῶν μέσην παιδείαν (*Cong.* 14), though it is not always clear if, with the term, Philo intended a different nuance in meaning, such as “intermediate education,” e.g. between elementary and philosophy, or “middling education,” i.e. between wholly good and wholly bad. Despite this uncertainty, it is clear that this type of education was intended as preliminary to something else, as Philo’s other favorite term to describe the encyclia makes abundantly clear, τὰ προπαιδεύματα (*Leg.* 3:167).

The disciplines of Philo’s encyclia are comparable to what we find in gentile sources, including the subjects of grammar, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, dialectic, and rhetoric (*Cong.* 11, 15-18, 74-76; *Mos.* 1:23; *Cher.* 105; *Agr.* 18; *Somn.* 1:205; *QG* 3:21). Philo differs from his Greek and Roman neighbors only in his inclusion of rhetoric as one of the encyclical disciplines, as rhetoric is often understood as the result of encyclical education or a

---

114 On the term, see L. M. de Rijk, “ἐγκυκλίος παιδεία: A Study of its Original Meaning,” *Vivarium* 3 (1965): 24-93, for an extensive discussion of the history of research. De Rijk understand the term *egkuklios* initially referring to general choric education, “training to make man ‘harmonious’” (86). Then, from the middle of the fifth century BCE, this choric *paideia* split into two “sister arts,” *mousikē* for the soul and *gumnastikē* for the body, with the encyclia coming to refer only to the *mousikē* (87-88). Finally, from the first century BCE on, the term encyclical *paideia* was used to denote a new ideal of all-round education, preparatory to specialist training (91-92).

115 Morgan understands Philo’s use of *mesos* as intending those subjects more advanced than elementary reading and writing but preliminary to philosophy. See *Literate Education*, 34 note 113. For Júnior, it is because they are “a reality halfway to perfection.” Manuel Alexandre Júnior, “Philo of Alexandria and Hellenic Paideia,” *Euphrosyne* 37 (2009): 121-130 (125). The use of *mesos* for the encyclia is common among the Stoics. See Colson, “Philo on Education,” 153.

more advanced stage. While many understood encyclical *paideia* as preliminary to philosophy,¹¹⁷ some took it as preparation for advanced rhetorical training.¹¹⁸ For Philo, instruction in the encyclia was meant to provide more than technical proficiency or knowledge of the various subjects. Grammar, for example, through the study of history and literature, leads to a healthy skepticism of polytheistic myths and fables (*Cong.* 15). Geometry, by instilling a sense of equality and proportion, sows a zeal for justice (*Cong.* 16). Rhetoric and dialectic teach the means and power of persuasion, but, more importantly, provide the student with a rational mind and the ability to refute sophistical argumentation and deceit (*Cong.* 17-18). In this way, encyclical *paideia* is understood as preparatory, not only to more advanced disciplines, but also to the attainment of wisdom and virtue.

Philo repeatedly places the encyclical studies at a level inferior to other forms of *paideia*, philosophy, virtue, or wisdom. In language crucial to his allegorical understanding of the Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah narratives, Philo could delineate a three-step progression:

καὶ μὴν ὃσπερ τὰ ἐγκύκλια συμβάλλεται πρὸς φιλοσοφίας ἀνάληψιν, οὔτω καὶ φιλοσοφία πρὸς σοφίας κτῆσιν. ἦστι γὰρ φιλοσοφία ἑπιτήδευσις σοφίας, σοφία δὲ ἑπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων. γένοιτ’ ἂν ὦν ὢσπερ ἢ ἐγκύκλιος μουσική φιλοσοφίας, οὔτω καὶ φιλοσοφία δούλη σοφίας.

And just as the encyclia contribute to one’s ascension to philosophy, so too does philosophy contribute to the acquisition of wisdom. For philosophy is the devoted attention to wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and their

¹¹⁷ Seneca *Ep.* 88; Ps.-Plutarch *Lib Ed.* 7c-d.
¹¹⁸ Quintilian *Inst.* 1.10.1; Cicero *De or.* 1.73-77. See Morgan, *Literate Education* 35, 190-198; Sandnes, *Challenge of Homer*, 24.
causes. Therefore, just as encyclical scholarship is the handmaiden of philosophy, so 
philosophy is the handmaiden of wisdom. (Cong. 79)

He tells us that those who attend solely to the encyclia, dwell near but not with wisdom (Sacr. 44). At his most pejorative, Philo can claim that devotion to the preliminary studies alone, with no thought to move beyond them, is nothing but sophistry (Cher. 9-10; Mut. 260). More typical is the association he makes between encyclical paideia and imperfect souls, moving towards perfection but not yet reaching it (Det. 64-66). We find this idea in his depictions of Abraham (Leg. 3:244-245), Joseph (Det. 6-10), and Aaron, who is compared to his brother Moses, the already perfected individual (Leg. 3:128, 140, 159).

Philo offers several metaphors to help explain the relationship between the preliminary studies and loftier philosophy, wisdom, or virtue. He likens the encyclia to the gates of a house: “For just as gates are the beginning of a house, so the encyclical preliminary studies are the beginning of virtue / ὥσπερ γὰρ οίκια ἀρχαὶ πυλῶνες, καὶ ἀρετῆς τὰ ἐγκύκλια προπαιδεύματα” (Fug. 183). These are the “fountains of intermediate paideia / αἱ παιδείας τῆς μέσης πηγαί,” as they irrigate and prepare those souls thirsty for learning (Fug. 187-188). The encyclical studies decorate the entrance to the house of the soul, built of virtue on a foundation of a well-mannered disposition and didaskalia (Cher. 101-105). The encyclia are the necessary path which leads to virtue: “For just as vestibules are placed before the gates of a house, and just as in cities there are suburbs, through which one must pass in order to enter the cities, so too do the encyclia lay before virtue. For the encyclia are the road which conducts to virtue. / ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν μὲν οἰκίαις αὐλειοι πρόκειται κλισιάδων, ἐν δὲ πόλεσι τὰ προάστεια, δι᾽ ὅν εἶσον βαδίζειν ἐνεστίν, οὕτως καὶ ἀρετῆς πρόκειται τὰ ἐγκύκλια· ταύτα γὰρ ὀδὸς ἐστιν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνην φέρουσα” (Cong. 10).
Food is another common metaphor Philo uses to explain the role of encyclical *paideia*. While the virtues are the proper food for fully-grown adults, the encyclia nourish the soul like milk does infants:

ἐπεὶ δὲ νηπίως μὲν ἐστι γάλα τροφῆ, τελείως δὲ τὰ ἐκ πυρῶν πέμματα, καὶ ψυχῆς γαλακτώδεις μὲν ἄν εἶν τροφαὶ κατὰ τὴν παιδικὴν ἡλικίαν τὰ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου μουσικῆς προπαιδεύματα, τέλειαι δὲ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἐμπρεπεῖς αἱ διὰ φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀπάσης ἀρετῆς ψυχῆς ταῦτα γὰρ σπαρέντα καὶ φυτευθέντα ἐν διανοίᾳ καρποὺς ὑφελιμωτάτους οἰσει, καλὰς καὶ ἐπαινετὰς πράξεις

Since milk is the food of infants, but wheat cakes are the food for mature adults, so must the soul in childhood have milk-like food, which are the preliminary studies of encyclical scholarship. But the adult food, fit for men, are the guidelines set forth via prudence, temperance, and every virtue. For these things, sown and implanted in the mind will bear the most advantageous fruit, noble and praiseworthy actions. (*Agr.* 9; cf. *Cong.* 19; *Prob.* 160)

In this same vein, Philo likens the encyclia to seedlings, implanted in immature souls, on whose fruit the souls will feed. Once the souls have reached adulthood, the mature trees of the virtues will take root instead (*Agr.* 18).

These metaphors, most not unique to Philo, all clearly indicate the preliminary and preparatory nature of encyclical *paideia*, which is not meant to be an end in itself, but instead is designed to help the individual progress to things far loftier, namely philosophy, virtue, and

---

wisdom. Philo explores this relationship most explicitly and forcefully in his allegorical reading of the Hagar, Sarah, and Abraham narratives, where we find Philo’s detailed understanding of the necessity of the encyclopaedia within one’s wider educational, and in fact spiritual, development, but also the dangers of this type of education and thus their essential impermanence.

**The Allegory of Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah**

Philo discusses his allegorical understanding of the Abraham, Hagar, and Sarah accounts in a surprisingly consistent, coherent manner throughout his body of work, a fact which speaks to the place this reading held for him throughout his career. Whether Philo was following the lead of other Jewish exegetes before him in this novel reading of the *Genesis* story or was the creator of the interpretation can only be guessed, though his is the earliest known example we have. What is certain, is that allegorical interpretation of the narrative as intending to describe the proper path from preliminary instruction to loftier philosophy, virtue, or wisdom, is akin to the common philosophical adage concerning Penelope, her maid servants, and her suitors. The Stoic Ariston of Chios argued that “those who labor with the preliminary studies but neglect philosophy are like the suitors of Penelope, who, when they failed to win her over, took up with

---

120 See *Cher.* 3-10; *Leg.* 3:244-245; *Sacr.* 43; *Post.* 130-132, 137; *Agr.* 9-19; *Her.* 274; *Mut.* 255; *Somn.* 1:240; *QG* 3:18ff.; and most of *Cong.*

121 See the discussion of the allegory of Sarah in, Maren R. Niehoff, “Mother and Maiden, Sister and Spouse: Sarah in Philonic Midrash,” HTR 97.4 (2004): 413-44 (430-433), who attempts to show through internal evidence that Philo is familiar with and following an existing Jewish exegetical tradition, but that he also contributes to that tradition. Cf. Kang, “Wisdom Mythology and Hellenistic Paideia in Philo,” 60.

122 Nearly all scholars see a correspondence between Philo’s allegorical reading of the Hagar/Sarah narrative and the Penelope allegory. The only author I know of who argues adamantly against a connection, due to the discrepancies between the two allegories, is Thomas Conley, “‘General Education’ in Philo,” 6-8. In their responses to his paper, both John Dillon and Alan Mendelson take Conley to task on this point.
her maid servants instead.”123 Philo, having no desire to allegorically read Homer, applies a similar principle to his reading of the Genesis narrative.

A succinct account of Philo’s reading is found in the third book of the Allegorical Laws:

But it’s necessary to consider another woman, of what sort Sarah happened to be, the governing virtue (τὴν ἀρχοσαν ἀρετήν); and the wise Abraham was guided by her, when she recommended him such actions as were good. For before this time, when he was not yet perfect, but even before his name was changed, he gave his attention to subjects of lofty philosophical speculation; and she, knowing that he could not produce anything out of perfect virtue (ἐπισταμένη ὅτι οὐκ ἔν δύνατο γεννάν ἐξ ἀρετῆς τελείας), counseled him to raise children out of her handmaid, that is to say out of encyclical education (ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης τουτέστι παιδείας τῆς ἐγκυκλίου), out of Agar, which name being interpreted means a dwelling near; for he who meditates dwelling in perfect virtue, before his name is enrolled among the citizens of that state, dwells among the encyclical studies (τῶν ἐγκυκλίων μαθήματος), in order that through their instrumentality he may make his approaches at liberty towards perfect virtue. After that, when he saw that he had become perfect, and was now able to become a father, although he himself was full of gratitude towards those studies (τὰ παιδεύματα), by means of which he had been recommended to virtue, and thought it hard to renounce them; he was well inclined to be appeased by an

---

oracle from God which laid this command on him. “In everything which Sarah says, obey her voice.” (Leg. 3.244-245)

We find here all of the primary elements of the allegory. Sarah is the representative of virtue; Hagar that of the preliminary studies. Encyclical paideia / Hagar was absolutely necessary in Abraham’s desire to attain to virtue / Sarah, who encouraged his intimate relationship with Hagar / the encyclia, as he was not yet prepared for virtue / Sarah. Abraham was very fond of his studies / Hagar and was reluctant to give them up, but he submitted to God’s will, and understood that once having reached his goal of virtue / Sarah, his precious studies / Hagar would have to be abandoned.

Philo devotes an entire treatise to his understanding of encyclical paideia and the allegory, On Mating with the Preliminary Studies (Cong.), which allows him ample room to explore this aspect of education in detail. Philo saw this paideia as necessary for most people who desire true wisdom: “For we are not as yet capable of becoming the fathers of the offspring of virtue, unless we first of all have a connection with her handmaiden; and the handmaiden of wisdom is the encyclical scholarship of the preliminary studies. . . . So the encyclia are placed in front of virtue, for they are the road which conducts to her” (Cong. 9-10). While Philo continually points out the importance of this encyclical paideia for most people, the exemplar being Abraham who is the type of one who acquires wisdom through instruction, there are

---

124 The Latin title is De congressu eruditionis gratia, the Greek ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΟΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΑΤΑ ΣΥΝΟΔΟΥ.
125 See Migr. 88; Praem. 24-51; Jos. 1. Abraham is the exemplar of one who acquires virtue through instruction (διδακτική), Jacob through practice (ἀσκητική), while Isaac is a rare member of the self-taught race (αὐτομαθής γένος). This threefold typology of learners—through instruction, nature, or practice—is common and goes back at least to Aristotle, thought Billings has shown that Philo’s depictions of the triad are also deeply influenced by Plato. See Thomas H. Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus (Dissertation, University of Chicago; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919), 82ff.. Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. Educ. 2a-c, understands the triad as nature, reason/learning, and custom/training (φύσιν, λόγον/μάθησιν, ἕθος/ἀσκησιν), perfection coming from a combination of all three. His models are Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. See also Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I.9.1099b; X.9.1179b.
some who do not need this paideia in their attainment of virtue, such as Isaac: “But the self-taught race (αὐτομαθὲς γένος), of which Isaac was a partaker, the greatest joy of good things, has received as its share a nature simple, unmixed, and pure, standing in need of neither training nor instruction (ἀσκήσεως μήτε διδασκαλίας), in which there is need of the concubine sciences (παλλακίδων ἐπιστημῶν)” (Cong. 36).

The benefits of the preliminary studies are, then, for the majority of people, clear and profound. But, this is not the end of the narrative. Philo must explain why Sarah banishes Hagar and forces Abraham to abandon this paideia, of which he was so fond. Could they not co-exist? In beginning to understand Philo’s reading of this important piece of the Genesis narrative, we must remember that Philo, often forcefully, makes clear that the handmaiden is in no way to be confused with the true mistress, wisdom. First of all, as opposed to one’s connection with wisdom which is noetic (i.e. via the mind or νοῦς), the connection to encyclical paideia is somatic and aesthetic (i.e. via the body or σῶμα and the senses or αἰσθήσεις):

For it follows of necessity that the man who delights in the encyclical contemplations, and who joins himself as a companion to varied learning, is as such enrolled under the banners of the earthly and Egyptian body (ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐγχορεύοντα ταῖς ἐγκυκλίοις θεωρίαις καὶ πολυμαθείας ἑταίρων ὄντα τῷ γεώδει καὶ Αἰγυπτίῳ προσκεκληρόσθαι σώματι); and that he stands in need of eyes in order to see and to read, and of ears in order to attend and to hear, and of his other external senses, in such a manner as to be able to unfold each of the objects of the external sense (τῶν αἰσθητῶν). (Cong. 20). Because of this bodily connection, the sarkic desires tend to want to weigh down and oppress the soul. Herein lies the potential danger of Greek paideia, becoming too infatuated with the handmaiden to the detriment of the mistress: “For some men, being attracted by the charms of
handmaidens, have neglected their true mistress, philosophy, and have grown old, some in poetry, and others in the study of painting, and others in the mixture of colors, and others in ten thousand other pursuits, without ever being able to return to the proper mistress” (Cong. 77). The neglected mistress will not just sit idly by, but convict the guilty party to his face: “I am treated unjustly, and in utter violation of our agreement, as far as depends on you who transgress the covenants entered into between us; for from the time that you first took to your bosom the preliminary studies, you have honored above measure the offspring of my handmaiden, and have respected her as your wife, and you have so completely repudiated me that you never by any chance came to the same place with me” (Cong. 151-152; cf. 158-159). Because of this danger, this pull to infatuation with the preliminary studies, they must be given up entirely if one is to fully embrace the true wife of virtue or wisdom.

Another area where we see the marked difference between encyclical paideia and wisdom is in Philo’s depictions of Ishmael and Isaac. While Isaac, the child of Sarah, represents a sophos, a wise man, Ishmael, Hagar’s son, represents a sophist: “For Isaac received wisdom for his inheritance, and Ishmael sophistry (σοφίαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰσαὰκ, σοφιστεῖαν δὲ Ἰσμαήλ. κεκλήρωται). . . . For the same relation which a completely infant child bears to a full-grown man, the same does a sophist bear to a wise man, and the encyclical branches of learning (τὰ ἑγκύκλια τῶν μαθημάτων) to real knowledge in virtue” (Sobr. 9). With this strong dichotomy between encyclical paideia and wisdom explicitly made, we now can understand why Sarah had to banish Hagar and why Abraham had to give up his precious studies:

But when Abram, instead of an inquirer into natural philosophy, became a wise man and a lover of God . . . then too those preliminary studies which bear the name of Agar, will be cast out, and their sophistical child will also be cast out, who is named Ishmael. And
they shall undergo eternal banishment, God himself confirming their expulsion, when he bids the wise man obey the word spoken by Sarah, and she urges him expressly to cast out the serving woman and her son; and it is good to be guided by virtue, and especially so when it teaches such lessons as this, that the most perfect natures are very greatly different from the mediocre habits, and that wisdom is a wholly different thing from sophistry (σοφία σοφιστείας ἄλλοτριος); for the one labors to devise what is persuasive for the establishment of a false opinion, which is pernicious to the soul, but wisdom, with long meditation on the truth by the knowledge of right reason (ὁρθοῦ λόγου), brings real advantage to the intellect. (Cher. 7-9)

Sarah’s banishing of Hagar and Ishmael is meant to demonstrate to the reader the vast difference between encyclical paideia and wisdom and the need to dispose of preliminary education, once having attained virtue, lest one is tempted by her (bodily) charms and begins to mistake the handmaiden for the mistress.

Philo’s allegorical interpretation of the Hagar/Sarah narrative is extremely well developed and consistently applied throughout several treatises of his corpus. The topic was obviously an extremely important one for Philo, living in the most Hellenistic of cities, and his allegorical understanding of the Genesis story is an attempt to reconcile the obvious benefits he perceived in a traditional Greek education and the possibly disastrous influences it could play in the Jewish community if not undertaken with proper care. For Philo, this paideia was a means to an end, but once the end is achieved—the attainment of wisdom or virtue—this paideia must be thrown out. The temptations of the handmaiden are just too great to allow her to live in the same house as the mistress.
An Indispensable Yet Treacherous *Paideia*: Concluding Remarks on the Preliminary Studies

Mendelson has argued that past scholarship had too readily seen a disparaging view of the encyclia in Philo’s thought, having a strictly subordinate, preliminary value, a means to an end only. Against this, Mendelson maintains that encyclical *paideia* could be an end in themselves, in their role in the ascent of the sage, where the encyclia produce the skepticism necessary to begin the ascent from the world. As it was not uncommon to find stern critiques of encyclical *paideia*, Mendelson presents Philo’s view as a shift in perspective.

On the role of encyclical *paideia* in the ascent or return of the *nous* to heaven, Mendelson is certainly correct. In describing the descent of the *nous* and its necessary entanglement in the body, Philo contends that only the *nous* which is able resist and discard sense perception and the evils of the body is able to return upwards, by first “being trained in all forms of encyclical scholarship, from which it derives a desire for contemplation and acquires temperance and patience, formidable virtues, leaving its former home, and finding a means of return back to its native country, and it brings with it those things of *paideia*, which are called ‘substance’ [cf. Gen. 15:14] / τοῖς τής ἐγκυκλίου μουσικῆς ἐντραφεῖς ἄπασιν, ἐξ ὧν θεωρίας λαβόν ἴμερον ἐγκράτειαν καὶ καρτερίαν, ἐρρωμένας ἀρετάς, ἐκτήσατο, μεταισινάμενος καὶ κάθοδον τὴν εἰς τὴν πατρίδα ἐυρισκόμενος πάντ’ ἐπάγεται τὰ παίδεια, ἀπερ ἀποσκευὴ καλεῖει” (Her. 274; cf. Spec. 3:187ff.).


127 *Secular Education*, 70.

128 See, e.g., Seneca *Ep*. 6.56; 108.23-26; Diog. Laert. 7.32; 129; Ps.-Plutarch *Lib. Ed.* 7c-e.
Additionally, the encyclia play a role in the mind’s rejection of pleasure and the taming of the irrational faculties of the soul in its attachment to virtue (Sacr. 44-45, et al.), a laudable function, suggesting something beyond simply preliminary. However, the connection between encyclical *paideia* and such mundane notions as sense perception (Post. 137; Her. 315), practicality (Agr. 12-13; Leg. 3:167), local customs and laws (Ebr. 34, 63, 68), and the body (Cong. 20), make the *propaideumata* desirous, dangerous, and thus necessarily temporary. Philo himself testifies to his own problems with attending to the illegitimate children of the encyclia to the neglect of the legitimate children (Cong. 6). Given their transitory nature, we must view the encyclia as the lowest rung on Philo’s educational ladder, even while they are necessary for the vast majority of humanity.

3. **Philosophy as *Paideia***

Philo’s metaphorical imagery most commonly depicts encyclical *paideia* as preliminary to and necessary for virtue and wisdom, but, like many of his contemporaries, he understood the encyclia as subordinate also to philosophy on this upward path.\(^{129}\) *Mesē paideia* is the handmaiden to philosophy (Cong. 145), and the lovers of *kalokagathia* know that it is impossible to approach philosophy without first becoming acquainted with the entire range of encyclical learning (Ebr. 49). Once one has progressed to the study of philosophy, a reversion to the lesser branches of *paideia* is not advisable (Ebr. 51).

Philo’s adamancy on the necessity of approaching true philosophy only after being prepared with the encyclical studies derives from philosophy’s relationship to and origin from

---

\(^{129}\) See Seneca *Ep.* 88; Ps.-Plutarch *Lib. Educ.* 7c-d.
the lower branches of education. Closely following Plato, Philo argues that contemplation of the universe is ultimately responsible for the development of philosophy. In *Opif.* 53-54, Philo, drawing on *Tim.* 47a-c, describes the ascent to philosophy, beginning from observation of the stars and planets, making use of the sense of sight, whose instrument is light. The mind ponders the harmony of the heavenly bodies, which move in accordance with the laws of music. This leads to the soul contemplating the substance of the stars, their existence, their origin, and the causes of their movements. Finally, “it is from inquiry into these things that the genus of philosophy has arisen; no more perfect good has ever entered into human life. / ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ζητήσεως τὸ φιλοσοφίας συνέστη γένος, οὐ τελειότερον ἁγαθὸν οὐκ ἠλθεν εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον” (*Opif.* 54; cf. 77).

Though not explicit in this passage, this type of speculation and contemplation is due to one’s training in the preliminary studies (*Her.* 274; *Spec.* 3:187ff.), an idea hinted at in *Opif.* 53 and the focus on the instrumentality of the light of the soul, which Philo elsewhere claims is nothing else than paideia (*Leg.* 3:167).

In *De congressu* Philo delves deeper into this connection between philosophy and preliminary paideia. Here, it seems that philosophy did not so much originate as was inherent and waiting to be discovered. It is philosophy that provided the first principles and seeds to the particular branches of instruction, from which, then, speculation arises (*Cong.* 146). While the particular branches occupy themselves with the invention of a multiplicity of complications, philosophy is concerned with the fundamental nature of things. Geometry may focus on triangles

---


131 Philo is not unaware of the circularity of his argument; instead, it appears to be a fundamental part of his larger argument on the cyclic origin and destiny of the *nous*. 
and circles and all sorts of other figures, but the exact nature of a point or a line is the
provenance of philosophy (Cong. 146-147). Reading and writing are fundamental to the study of
grammar, but it is philosophy which contemplates the nature and elements of language (Cong.
148-150). This is why Philo can, disparagingly, refer to the encyclia as technai, but philosophy
as epistēmē (Cong. 142).

This distinction between encyclical paideia and philosophy is based on Philo’s
understanding of the core of philosophy. The branches of paideia, though they may hint at
nature, are above all concerned with particulars. Philosophy, instead, is entirely focused on the
nature and essence of existing things; “the world is its subject matter / ὥλη γὰρ ἐστιν αὐτῆς ὁ κόσμος”
(Cong. 144). Encyclical education is akin to following good and noble law codes of
particular cities (Ebr. 34, 63, 68), but philosophy is paideia in the universal and in nature, and
devotion to philosophy is to live according to natural law (Prob. 160).

Philo, at times, draws a distinction, seemingly Stoic in origin, between the natural,
logical, and moral principles of philosophy. Philo, openly following ancient tradition,
compares the three with the image of the field or garden of philosophy, where physical or natural
philosophy is represented by the trees and plants which produce the fruit of moral philosophy, all
of which is protected and hemmed in by the fence of logical philosophy (Agr. 14ff.; Mut. 75).133
All three are necessary and mutually beneficial: “through the logical comes infallible
interpretation, through the moral comes the correction of manners, and through the physical

132 On the Stoic division, see Catherine Atherton, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 40ff.
133 The garden imagery also appears Stoic in origin. See John M. Dillon, “The Pleasures and Perils of Soul-
E. Sterling; SPhA 9; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 190-197.
comes knowledge of heaven and the world” (*Spec.* 1:336), though the moral portion is typically understood as the pinnacle, which utilizes the other two in its search for virtue (*Mut.* 75).

We saw that, in Philo’s allegorical interpretation, Abraham’s transition from Hagar to Sarah represents the ascent from encyclical *paideia* to virtue or wisdom. Elsewhere, Philo describes another transition for Abraham, that from natural to moral philosophy. Prior to becoming Abraham, Abram “delighted in the lofty philosophy which investigates those things which take place in the air, and the sublime nature of those things which exist in heaven, which mathematics has appropriated as the most excellent part of natural philosophy. . . . But, when Abram, instead of an inquirer into natural philosophy, became a wise man a lover of God, had his name changed to Abraham” (*Cher.* 4, 7). The *Genesis* narrative literally describes the changing of his name, but the true allegorical understanding describes how “he migrated from natural to moral philosophy, from contemplation of the world to knowledge of the creator, from which he acquired piety, the most excellent of possessions” (*Mut.* 76). From the larger allegorical reading, Philo suggests that Abram’s interest in natural philosophy alone was unable to bear the fruit of moral philosophy. It was only after his acquisition of the encyclical studies that Abraham was then able to advance to moral philosophy and virtue. (*Leg.* 3:244).

**Jewish Philosophy**

In all this discussion on philosophy and *paideia* to this point, there has been nothing to suggest the provenance of this philosophy which is subsequent to preliminary education and necessary for the attainment of virtue. We are not told whether this is Greek or barbarian or Jewish philosophy. Philosophy, so far, appears universal, transnational. And, this should not be surprising, as Philo never highlights the fact that encyclical *paideia* was, in fact, Greek; instead,
he seems to go out of his way to omit it. However, at several points Philo does refer to the Jews’ *patria philosophia*, their ancestral philosophy. According to Philo, the emperor Tiberius was well aware that Jewish people practiced their ancestral philosophy in the synagogues on the Sabbath (*Legat. 156*), and that the legate Petronius himself, because of his zeal for *paideia*, had learned something of “Jewish philosophy (Ἰουδαϊκῆς φιλοσοφίας)” (*Legat. 245*). But, what exactly is this ancestral or Jewish philosophy?

In book two of the *Life of Moses*, Philo claims that the lawgiver, whose own education included the full curriculum of encyclical *paideia* and philosophy (*Mos. 1:23*), intended the seventh day to be devoted to meeting together and public training in philosophy, through which the populace would advance in *kalokagathia* and improve their moral characters and lives (*Mos. 2:215*), a custom which continues to Philo’s own day:

> ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ εἰσεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦσι ταῖς ἐβδόμαις Ἰουδαϊῶν πάτριον φιλοσοφίαν τὸν χρόνον ἐκεῖνον ἀναθέντες ἐπιστήμη καὶ θεωρία τῶν περὶ φύσιν· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεις προσευκτήρια τι ἐτερόν ἐστίν ἡ διδασκαλεῖα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης εὐσεβείας τε καὶ ὀσιότητος καὶ συμπάσχος ἀρετῆς, ἡ κατανοεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται τὰ τέ άνθρώπεια καὶ θεία;

According to this custom, even to this day the Jews pursue philosophy on the seventh day, dedicating this time to their ancestral philosophy and to the knowledge and contemplation of nature. For what are the prayer houses in each city but schools of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice, and of piety, holiness, and every virtue, by which things human and divine are understood and set right? (*Mos. 2:216*)

Though the description here of the *proseuchai* as Greek philosophical schools may have been influenced by Philo’s audience and purpose of this particular text, it is clear thus far that Jewish
philosophy, as it is devoted to nature and the attainment of virtue, cannot be distinguished from any other sort. However, when Philo describes the philosophical education of the Essenes and the Therapeutae and its connection to Jewish law, we can begin to see the distinctive character of the Jews’ ancestral philosophy.

Essene education is devoted entirely to the moral aspect of philosophy, as the logical part is unnecessary for the acquisition of virtue and the natural part is only beneficial for the contemplation of the existence of God and the creation of the universe. In their education in moral philosophy, “they utilize their ancestral laws as trainers, laws which would have been impossible for the human soul to devise without divine inspiration. ἀλείπταις χρώμενοι τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις, οὕς ἀμήχανον ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπινοῆσαι ψυχήν ἄνευ κατοκοχῆς ἐνθέου” (Prob. 80). They are instructed with these laws throughout the week, but especially on the Sabbath, when they gather together in the synagogues. There, one member reads the books and another, one of the most experienced elders, teaches, explaining the philosophical, symbolic meaning of the text (Prob. 81-82). In this way, the members of the community “are educated in piety, holiness, justice, economy, politics, and the knowledge of those things which are truly good, bad, or indifferent, and to choose what is beneficial and to avoid the opposite, making use of three established criteria, the love of God, the love of virtue, and the love of man” (Prob. 83).

Philo’s description of the education of the Therapeutae is similar. During the week, they study their ancestral philosophy in complete solitude, utilizing their holy texts, reading them allegorically in order to uncover the secret meaning lying beneath the literal expressions (Cont. 28). They also study ancient allegorical treatises and attempt to imitate their systems and explanations in the creation of new written works (Cont. 29). Then, like the Essenes, they meet
together on the Sabbath, and one of the elder members instructs the others, allegorically exegeting the precise meaning of the laws (Cont. 30-31).\textsuperscript{134}

As with the Essenes, the Jewish law is instrumental in the education and philosophy of the Therapeutae. In fact, Philo knows of a tradition that claims that they are called “Therapeutae” or “Therapeutrides” because “they are educated by nature and the sacred laws to serve God / ἐκ φύσεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν νόμων ἑπαξεύθησαν θεραπεύειν τὸ ὄν” (Cont. 2). While I will focus on the role of Jewish law in education more broadly in the following section, it is important here to see how and why the Jewish law is involved in this educational philosophy.

Nikiprowetzky has argued that, for Philo, this ancestral philosophy was, above all, the study and practice of the Jewish law.\textsuperscript{135} Philo describes the Jewish laws themselves as “philosophical” (Mos. 2:36), and argues that “whatever benefits are derived from the most esteemed philosophy for its students are derived for the Jews through their laws and customs / ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας τῆς δοκιμωτάτης περιγίνεται τοῖς ὁμιληταῖς αὐτῆς, τοῦτο διὰ νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν Ἰουδαίων” (Virt. 65). We have seen that the philosophical study of the laws requires proper interpretation through allegorical exegesis that the literal text might reveal its true teaching and lead, ultimately, to the acquisition of virtue. This goal of the study of Jewish philosophy is no different than that of Greek philosophy. Yet, the Jewish laws serve as the best possible teachers, as they were set down by the greatest student, teacher, and philosopher in history, Moses (Mos. 2:2), who understood that the study of philosophy must begin with the contemplation of nature and be in line with order of the universe (Mos. 2:211). The exact relationship between the law of Moses and the universal law of nature and the connection to Jewish paideia will be discussed.

\textsuperscript{134} For more on the study of philosophy on the Sabbath, cf. Mos. 2:211-212; Dec. 98-101; Spec. 2:62-64; Hyp.7:10-14; and Opif. 128.
\textsuperscript{135} Nikiprowetzky, \textit{Le commentaire de l’Écriture chez Philon d’Alexandrie}, 97-116.
below, but it is important to point out now that both philosophy—whether foreign or native—and the laws of Moses could serve as paideia in the law of nature.

**Philosophy as Another Step on the Upward Ascent**

Philo makes it clear time and again that the study of philosophy is necessarily subsequent to encyclical paideia and that to approach philosophy prior to completing the preliminary studies is dangerous and ill-advised. But, philosophy is not the end; it is another means to an end, another step towards the attainment of loftier goals. It would be wrong, therefore, to see in Philo’s thought a too elevated veneration of philosophy, even Jewish philosophy. Philosophy, in the end, is another tool, an excellent tool, but a tool nonetheless, which is utilized towards greater objectives. Philo makes this perfectly clear: “Just as the encyclia contribute to one’s ascension to philosophy, so philosophy contributes to the acquisition of wisdom. . . . Therefore, just as encyclical scholarship is the handmaid of philosophy, so philosophy is the handmaid of wisdom (γένοιτ’ ἂν οὖν ὁσπερ ἡ ἐγκύκλιος μουσικῆ φιλοσοφίας, ὡτω καὶ φιλοσοφία δούλη σοφίας)” (Cong. 79).

Philo described the encyclia as a road which leads to virtue, but he also describes philosophy as the road to virtue, though a better road, a “royal road” (Post. 101-102).

Philosophy, also like the preliminary studies, is crucial for the ascent of the nous, out of the body and back to heaven (Spec. 2:230). And the study of philosophy is “that which man, though

---

136 It is not uncommon to find scholars who argue that Philo is here subordinating Greek philosophy to Jewish law, an idea based on the deeply problematic notion that the identification between Jewish law and wisdom was ubiquitous at this time. See, e.g., Wolfson, *Philo*, 1:149-150; or M. Pohlenz, *Kleine Schriften* (2 vols.; Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1965), 1:324-330. Dillon, though unfortunately maintaining the assumed identity between wisdom and law, nuances the argument and arrives at a concept perhaps more in line with Philo’s thought. Seeing that Philo’s subordination of philosophy to wisdom is completely in accord with Stoic thought, Winston argues, “Far from subordinating philosophy to Scripture, Philo is rather identifying the summit of philosophical achievement with the Mosaic Law” (“Response” to Thomas Conley’s “‘General Education’ in Philo,” 19).
mortal, is made immortal” (Opif. 77). Philosophy is preliminary and preparatory like the encyclical studies, but, unlike the encyclia, it is a lifelong pursuit, not a source of simple lessons, which, upon grasping, can be discarded. The knowledge gained through the study of philosophy connects to the soul rather than the body, the noetic rather than the sense-perceptible. Philosophy thus poses no danger to those infatuated with it.

4. THE JEWISH LAW AS PAIDEIA

Like any good Greek or Roman philosopher of his time, Philo envisioned the study of philosophy as a, if not the, essential step on the upward path to the attainment of wisdom and virtue. But, according to Philo, Jewish ancestral philosophy was distinct from any other in that the Jewish people had in their laws incomparable teachers, which would guide the student of philosophy more surely on the path towards virtue. The Jews have a great advantage over all other peoples, not in the ends they are able to attain, but in the means which allow them to more easily reach those ends. Philo discusses the educational value of the Jewish law throughout his work, in great detail and in ways which are not tied explicitly to the study of Jewish ancestral philosophy.

Moses, Student and Teacher

Philo regularly portrays Moses as a teacher of the Jewish people, his laws serving as the people’s textbook, as they were intended. However, in order to contemplate Moses the teacher, we must first understand Moses the student. In his biography of the lawgiver, Philo describes in some detail the education of the young Moses, growing up in the royal palace with all the attendant
advantages. Naturally, Philo’s description of Moses’ education is based on the practices of Roman Egypt rather than pharaonic, Moses having the educational opportunities of the most elite members of society, even those of the royal family.

Even within the realm of the elite, Moses was special. Philo foreshadows his future intellectual prowess in describing his being weaned off milk at an unusually early age (Mos. 1:18), a subtle reference to the typical depiction of the encycelia as milk suitable for infants prior to the solid food of philosophy. Indeed, even at the start of his education, Moses appears to require more than “milk.” Moses was a serious student, diligent in all those lessons which would benefit the soul (Mos. 1:20). He had a truly international education, with private teachers from all over Egypt and Greece, and, because of his innate intellectual gifts, he quickly surpassed their lessons and was able to comprehend difficult subjects on his own, without his teachers. His genius was due to the fact that, instead of learning anew, he was able to access memories of innate knowledge (ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι δοκεῖν, οὐ μάθησιν) (Mos. 1:21). Therefore, Moses was able to speed through his studies in all the encyclical subjects and in Egyptian philosophy (Mos. 1:23), and become an expert in philosophical—as opposed to sophistical—rhetoric and dialectic (Mos. 1:24).

As he grew older, Moses continued his education, now focused on the taming of the passions, impulses, and violent affections of the soul (Mos. 1:25-26). His asceticism was renowned, and, through his actions every day, he exhibited the doctrines of philosophy, living for the soul alone and not for the body (Mos. 1:27-29). This particular aspect of paideia will be

---

137 Cf. Mos. 1:22: “The well-disposed soul anticipating its lessons, is improved by itself rather than by its teachers, taking hold of some sort of primordial knowledge.” On innate knowledge, implanted within the soul, see below.
138 Cf. Leg. 3:128, where Philo distinguishes Aaron, as the model of one moving towards perfection, who restrains, guides, and subdues the passions, from Moses, the model of the already perfected soul, who prefers, instead, to completely and permanently eradicate the passions.
discussed further below, but it is important here to show how Philo sets up Moses as the ultimate, perfect model of the learning soul, displaying a mastery of all three models of attaining virtue, through teaching, the self, and training. Yet, despite the amazing opportunities he had as Pharaoh’s grandson and his vast intellectual talents, Moses longed for the *paideia* of his kin and ancestors (πὴν συγγενικὴν καὶ προγονικὴν ἔξηλοσε παϊδείαν), considering the *paideia* of his adopted home as ultimately illegitimate (νόθα), though quite brilliant for a time (Mos. 1:32).

In his longing to seek a better education, Moses found a new *paideia* and a new teacher, with God himself educating his pupil Moses (Mos. 1:80), first through signs (Mos. 1:77-80), and later through the laws, on the mountain when Moses was initiated in the divine will (Mos. 2:71). Moses’ initiation, Philo tells us elsewhere, involved not only his own education, but it also led to his, then, becoming a hierophant and a teacher of divine things (Gig. 54), who would initiate others into these divine mysteries (Virt. 178). In the generations to come, Moses would continue this “initiation,” through the education he passed on in the Jewish law, particularly in its proper interpretation.

Philo often refers to the text of the Pentateuch as Moses’ education of the people, with such phrases as “as Moses often teaches, saying… / ὡς καὶ Μωυσῆς πολλαχοῦ διδάσκει λέγων…” (Migr. 8; cf. Mut. 220, 236) or “Moses speaks here very instructively (παιδευτικῶς)” (Virt. 165) or “Moses is here philosophizing and teaching us / φιλοσοφῶν καὶ διδάσκων ἡμᾶς” (Her. 291). Moses “trains (συνασκήσας)” and “educates” those “living under his constitution (πολιτεουμένους)” with his “laws as trainers (τοὺς ἀλείπτας νόμους)” (Praem. 4-5). The soul is “taught by the hierophant and prophet Moses” (Leg. 3:173). This type of language is common in

---

139 Cf. Mos. 1:95, where God attempts to instruct the Egyptians through signs and wonders, though to no avail, leading to further afflictions and admonitions. This is an idea that will be fully taken up by the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, though it is important to note that Philo is careful to not refer to the plagues as *paideia*. 

---

125
Philo’s work, however, when he describes Moses as an educator via the law or the law as having a specifically educational function, it is nearly always in reference to the non-literal meaning of the text.

*Paideia through Allegorical Interpretation of Jewish Law*

It is often pointed out that Philo considered both the literal and allegorical meanings of the Pentateuch necessary for the Jewish people, and this idea is, at least partially, correct, the clearest support of which is found in Philo’s *De migratione Abrahami*, where he derides those Jews who disregard the literal meaning of the text upon discovering the allegorical:

> εἰςι γὰρ τινες οἱ τοὺς ἤρητος νόμους σύμβολα νοητῶν πραγμάτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὰ μὲν ἀγαν ἤκριβωσαν, τὸν δὲ ραθύμως ὀλγιώρησαν· οὑς μεμισαίμην ἃν ἐγογε τῆς εὐχερείας· ἐδει γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ζητήσεως τε τὸν ἀφανὸν ἀκριβεστέρας καὶ ταμείας τὸν φανερὸν ἀνεπιλήπτου. ⁹⁰ νυνὶ δ᾽ ὀσπερ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ καθ᾽ ἐαυτοὺς μόνοι ζῶντες ἢ ἀσώματοι ψυχαὶ γεγονότες καὶ μήτε πόλιν μήτε κόμην μήτ᾽ οἰκίαν μήτε συνύλως θίασον ἀνθρώπων εἰδότες, τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπερκύψαντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν γυμνὴν αὐτὴν ἐφ᾽ ἐαυτής ἐρευνῶσιν· οὑς ὁ ἑρῶς λόγος διδάσκει χρηστῆς ὑπολήψεως πεφροντικέναι καὶ μηδὲν τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἔθεσι λύειν, ἢ θεσπέσιοι καὶ μείζους ἄνδρες ἢ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὄρισαν. ⁹¹ μὴ γὰρ ὅτι ἢ ἐβδόμη δυνάμεως μὲν τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγένητον, ἀπραξίας δὲ τῆς περὶ τὸ γενητὸν διδαγμά ἑστί, τὰ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ νομοθετηθέντα λύωμεν. . . ⁹² μηδ᾽ ὅτι ἢ ἐορτῆ σύμβολον ψυχικῆς εὑφροσύνης ἑστὶ καὶ τῆς πρὸς θεῶν εὐχαριστίας,

---

ἀποταξόμεθα ταῖς κατὰ τὰς ἐτησίους ὡρας πανηγύρωσι· μηδ’ ὅτι τὸ περιτέμνεσθαι ἢδονής καὶ παθὸν πάντων ἐκτομὴν καὶ δόξης ἀναίρεσιν ἁσβετοὺς ἐμφαίνει, καθ’ ἦν ύπέλαβεν ὁ νοῦς ικανός εἰναι γεννῶν δι’ ἐαυτοῦ, ἀνέλωμεν τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ περιτομῇ τεθέντα νόμον· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀγιστείας καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων ἀμελήσομεν, εἰ μόνοις προσέζομεν τοῖς δι’ ὑπονοιῶν δηλουμένοις.  ἀλλὰ χρή ταῦτα μὲν σώματι ἐοικέναι νομίζειν, ψυχῇ δὲ ἐκεῖνα· ὅσπερ οὖν σώματος, ἐπειδὴ ψυχῆς ἐστὶν οἶκος, προνοητέον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ῥητῶν νόμον ἐπιμελητέον· φυλαττομένων γὰρ τούτων ἁγίων ἀριστοτερῶν κάκεινα γνωρισθῆσεται, ὃν εἰσὶν οὗτοι σύμβολα, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέμψεις καὶ κατηγορίας ἀποδιδράσκειν.

For there are some who, looking upon the literal laws as symbols of noetic things, have studied some things with great accuracy, and have disregarded with indifference other things. These men I should blame for their recklessness, for they should attend to both classes of things, a precise inquiry into hidden things and a blameless stewardship of the obvious things.  ἀλλὰ χρή ταῦτα μὲν σώματι ἐοικέναι νομίζειν, ψυχῇ δὲ ἐκεῖνα· ὅσπερ οὖν σώματος, ἐπειδὴ ψυχῆς ἐστὶν οἶκος, προνοητέον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ῥητῶν νόμον ἐπιμελητέον· φυλαττομένων γὰρ τούτων ἁγίων ἀριστοτερῶν κάκεινα γνωρισθῆσεται, ὃν εἰσὶν οὗτοι σύμβολα, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέμψεις καὶ κατηγορίας ἀποδιδράσκειν.
of pleasures and all passions and of the destruction of impious opinion, according to which the mind has imagined itself to beget on its own, does it follow that we are to annul the established law concerning circumcision. Since we shall neglect the laws concerning temple worship and many other things, if we attend only to those things which are made clear via their deeper intention. 93 But, it is necessary to think that one class of things resembles the body, and the other the soul; therefore, just as one must care for the body because it houses the soul, so too must one care for the written, literal laws. For, when these laws are kept, the other things will be more clearly understood, of which these laws are symbols, and, in so doing, one will escape blame and censure from the majority. (Migr. 89-93)

Philo here argues that one must continue to follow the literal observances of the law even after coming to understand the true allegorical meanings behind the individual enactments, as the praxis is meant to remind and further instill the deeper teaching of the text. However, this is not to say that Philo put the literal and allegorical interpretations of the Pentateuch on an equal level, especially in understanding the intended lessons of the text, and Philo often condemns those ignore the true allegorical meaning in favor of the plain, surface reading (Somn. 1:102). 141 While the individual ordinances must continue to be observed, Philo clearly argues that the educational value of the Mosaic law comes via a deeper, non-literal exegesis.

The value of an allegorical, symbolic, or figurative reading over the literal is particularly highlighted when the plain meaning of the written text is problematic and seemingly contrary to Philo’s particular understanding of an ultimately transcendent, uncreated, incorporeal deity. 142

---


142 See Wolfson, Philo, 1:116; and Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 91.
The ancient Hebrew scriptures and their Greek translations are rife with anthropomorphic and angelomorphic language describing the God of Israel communicating and interacting directly with humans in human or angelic form, an image preposterous and even blasphemous for Philo. However, knowing that Moses would never have added anything unnecessary or blatantly false in his text, Philo must explain these problematic passages.

On the passage “the Lord went down to see the city and the tower,” from the Tower of Babel narrative in the book of Genesis (Gen. 11:5), Philo comments that the statement “must be heard in a wholly figurative sense. For to imagine that the divinity can go towards, or go from, or go down, or go to meet, or, in short, that it has the same qualities and movements as particular animals, or to move at all, is, as they say, a monstrous and other-worldly impiety. / τὸ δὲ, "κατέβη κύριος ἵδειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸν πύργον" τροπικῶτερον πάντως ἄκουστέον· προσιέναι γὰρ ἢ ἀπείναι ἢ κατιέναι ἢ τούναντιον ἀνέρχεσθαι ἢ συνόλως τὰς αὐτὰς τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ζῷοις σχέσεις καὶ κινήσεις ἵσχεσθαι καὶ κινέσθαι τὸ θεῖον ύπολαμβάνειν ύπερωκεάνιος καὶ μετακόσμιος, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, ἐστίν ἀσέβεια” (Ling. 135). Moses, of course, could never be charged with such an impiety, therefore, “these things are spoken of anthropomorphically by the lawgiver of God, who is not in the form of a man, for the benefit of our education, as I have often said before in reference to other passages. / ταῦτα δὲ ἀνθρωπολογεῖται παρὰ τῷ νομοθέτῃ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀνθρωπομόρφου θεοῦ διὰ τὰς τῶν παιδευομένων ἡμῶν, ὡς πολλάκις ἐν ἑτέροις εἰπον, ὑφελείας” (Ling. 135).

This type of base anthropomorphic language Philo argues was intended to be beneficial for the education of the foolish, who are incapable of conceiving of a deity without form or speech or emotion. God is described in the holy literature as a man

143 See, e.g., Fug. 54.
in order to educate the life of the foolish (τὸν τῶν ἀφρόνων βίον παιδεύσαι) . . .

attributing to God a face, hands, feet, a mouth, voice, anger, passions . . . he offers these expressions not with an eye towards truth, but for the benefit of those who might learn from them, for some are very dull in their natures, so as to be completely unable to imagine God without a body. . . . For we must be content if such people are able to be corrected through the fear hanging over them through such descriptions. And these are the only two paths in the entirely of the law, the one leading towards the truth, by which we have assertions such as “God is not like a man” [Num. 23:19], the other, that which has an eye towards the opinions of the stupid, to whom it is said, “The Lord God shall educate you as a man educates his son” [Deut. 1:31]. (Somn. 1:234-237)

Elsewhere, Philo argues that Moses used this type of language “as a sort of introduction, for the sake of correcting those people who could not be corrected otherwise” (Deus 52). These are people who are more attached to the body and sense perception than those attached to the soul and incorporeal things, those who are able to have a proper comprehension of an incorporeal deity in need of nothing (Deus 55-56). Anthropomorphism as literary device, then, serves a very elementary educational purpose, necessary for children or the child-like who have not advanced to a higher intellectual or philosophical level. The educational value of the law, however, goes far beyond this introductory level, especially when we move into Philo’s allegorical reading of the text.

Allegory is both the primary literary device Moses used in crafting his law code, and the exegetical tool necessary to delve below the surface meaning of the text and understand the true

---

144 In Deus 51-54 Philo makes the very same argument and comparison between Num. 23:19 and Deut. 1:31 when exegeting Gen. 6:7. Cf. QG 1:55; 2:54. Philo also understands Moses using such anthropomorphisms as “I am your God” (Gen. 17:1) as a form of catachresis (Mut. 27).
meaning, the lesson Moses intended. Philo can refer to this underlying view of the text explicitly as *paideia* for the people, but even when he does not, this is always the assumption: the allegory of the Mosaic law uncovers the lawgiver’s originally intended *paideia*, lessons concerning the nature of and relationship between the body and the soul or mind and their attendant sense perceptible and noetic properties. For example, it was his desire to educate (παιδευτικός) that led Moses to include in his law an entire “holy book” allegorically describing the exodus of the soul out of the body (*Migr.* 14). The historical narratives of particular individuals and peoples contained in the law are, in reality, *paideumata* about more universal truths about the nature of the cosmos and the soul’s path to virtue (*Her.* 267-268; *Agr.* 68, 122). This dichotomy between the literal text and the underlying allegorical *paideia* led the philosophically-minded Therapeutae to envision the Jewish law itself in terms of the Mosaic allegory, viewing the plain words to be the body and the invisible meaning beneath these words the soul (*Cont.* 78). Philo, it seems, would agree. However, this view of the law does not mean that the literal commandments—i.e. the body—can be or must be thrown off in favor of the allegorical reading—the soul—alone. First, there is the wider issue of balance in Philo’s overall worldview, balance between the active and contemplative and between the body and soul, an absolute necessity for Philo and an issue which will be discussed further below. Second, there is the educational benefit of the plain commandments, a *paideia* which, unlike the encyclia, cannot be abandoned.

Philo’s entire exegetical project to reveal the underlying, intended lessons hidden beneath the surface of the literal text clearly highlights the educational quality of those aspects of the Mosaic law which are not legislative at all, that is the creation narrative and histories. Understanding the history of Abraham as a symbol of the soul migrating away from the passions and moving up through the ranks of necessary *paideia* to loftier virtue and wisdom, turns a
particular, individual drama into a universally applicable lesson. And yet, while some thought it eminently reasonable to assume that observance of the literal legislative aspects of the law were irrelevant after determining and following the universal lessons gained through allegorical interpretation—such as those Philo derides in *Migr.* 89-93 and later Christians beginning from the *Epistle of Barnabas*—Philo insists that the literal, particular commandments remain in effect for all, regardless of their own intellectual advancement. This is due, in part, to the educational force Moses intended, not only with the narrative, but also with the praxis itself, where practice of the literal laws could forcefully instill elements of the broader allegorical program and its lessons.

Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Jewish law as justification for its observance is part of a long line of tradition in Greek-speaking Jewish communities of the Second Temple period, going back to the pseudonymous author of the *Letter of Aristeas* and the roughly contemporaneous Aristobulus. While much has been discussed on the motivations for allegorizing the Jewish laws, whether tending towards particularism or universalism, those laws which most clearly served to differentiate the Jews from their Gentile neighbors and those which would have been most distasteful or unusual to Gentile ears, those laws which then become synonymous with Gentile views of Jewish practice, would have provided fertile ground for allegorical interpretation. Thus, we find allegorical explanations of Jewish dietary laws (*Aris.* 144-171) and the Sabbath (Aristobulus *frag.* 5), both of which take what was

---


particular and, to outsiders, peculiar, and endow them with philosophical and universal meaning. Philo is no different in this regard, but the overall, ever-present aim of his allegorical exegesis, focused continually on all things psychic, results in unique explanations.

The Jewish dietary restrictions become, for Philo, literal, daily expressions of their deeper, symbolic significance, that is the soul’s need to excise the passions and devote itself, instead, to education. Certain types of animals are forbidden, not because they are inherently unclean, but because of what they represent and what they teach those following the food laws. In fact, Philo openly admits that there is no logic to the literal meaning of some of the food laws, and only through allegorical interpretation (δι᾽ ὑπονοοῖν) does the logic become evident (Agr. 131). We learn that clean animals must, first, chew the cud, which is meant to remind one of the necessity of the soul to ruminate over and again on its paideia, contemplating the lessons received until they are firmly implanted within the soul (Spec. 4:107; Agr. 132). Next, the animal must have cloven hooves, the hoof parted as life itself is parted, one road leading to wickedness, the other to virtue. The cloven hoof represents the necessity of distinguishing between the two, choosing and remembering what is right, and avoiding and forgetting the opposite (Spec. 4:108; Agr. 133-134). Animals with solid hooves imply that the nature of good and evil is one and the same, while those with many toes show that there are many roads which lead to deceit (Spec. 4:109). As far as water-dwelling creatures are concerned, only those which have both fins and scales are permissible, as they represent a patient and temperate soul, while those without symbolize a soul devoted entirely to pleasure (Spec. 4:110-112). Likewise, reptiles which crawl upon their bellies are symbolic of souls devoted to pleasure and insatiable appetite and those which are four-legged and many-footed (τετρασκελῆ καὶ πολύποδα) are akin to souls enslaved to all the passions (Spec. 4:113). But, reptiles which jump and leap off of the ground are clean, as
they represent the rational soul which, through its devotion to orthē paideia, is able to resist the weight of the body and the passions and spring up from the earth to the heavens (Spec. 4:113-115). In all these dietary restrictions and the distinctions made between clean and unclean animals, Moses “causes the extinction of appetite” (Spec. 4:118).

Circumcision was another defining marker of Jewish particularism and separateness, though the Jews, of course, were not the only ones to practice it. Nevertheless, circumcision became a source of continual fodder in Greek and Roman anti-Jewish polemics,147 as Philo himself makes clear at the opening of his multi-volume De specialibus legibus: “We will begin from that law which is an object of ridicule by the majority of people” (Spec. 1:1). Philo then goes on to give multiple reasons for the continuation of a painful and mutilating (Spec. 1:3) ancestral custom, beginning from those of exegetes before him, explanations both medical—preventative, cleanliness, prolificness—and anatomical, the resemblance of the circumcised portion to the heart, making what is invisible visible (Spec. 1:4-7). Philo proceeds to give his own interpretation of the practice, seeing it as symbolic of two larger, more universal lessons: the excision of the pleasures which delude the mind and the soul, and self-knowledge and the destruction of vain opinion from the soul (Spec. 1:8-10; Migr. 92).

Sabbath practice, too, had an allegorical meaning underlying Moses’ literal proscriptions, which was bound up together with the creation account itself. The idea that God required a certain number of days to create the world and then needed a period of rest is, to Philo, nonsense (Dec. 99). This division, then, must have an intended educational purpose, a lesson for those who keep the Sabbath day holy, a commandment through which Moses tells the people to “always imitate God” (Dec. 100). With God as the paradigm, the six days of creation represent to

---

humanity mortal needs, the “unavoidable necessities of life,” while the seventh day is devoted to
the contemplation of nature, the period serving as both model for all human actions and for the
perfect way of life, the balance between the active and contemplative lives (Dec. 99-101). God’s
immortal, uncreated, wholly perfect nature did not require such a division of time, but humanity,
composed of both body and soul, requires those things beneficial to both, the active life in
service to the body and the contemplative life devoted to the perfection of the intellect (Spec.
2:64).

It must be made clear that Philo does not apply this method only to those laws which
most obviously distinguished Jews from Gentiles. For example, Philo can take a rather obscure
law concerning the purification of the homes of lepers and allegorically make it applicable even
to those who are not priests charged with such cleansing:

Therefore, in the law concerning leprosy, “when in a house hollows appear of a greenish
or fiery red color, then the inhabitants shall take out the stones in which such hollows
appear, and put in other stones in their places” [Lev. 14:36-42], that is to say, whenever
diverging qualities, which the pleasures and the appetites, and the passions akin to them,
have created, weighing down and oppressing the whole soul, have made it more hollow
and more lowly than its natural condition would be, it is necessary to remove the reasons
which are the causes of this weakness, and to introduce instead reasons made healthy by a
lawful training and correct education (ἀγωγῆς νομίμου ἢ καὶ παιδεύσεως ὀρθῆς). (Det.
16)

All commandments proscribed by Moses are to Philo customs which must be followed and,
through their practice, lessons designed to educate the Jews about the life and educational
journey of the soul.
The Jewish people have in the law of Moses a powerful educational tool, which teaches on different levels, depending on the intellectual prowess of the individual, in both its narratives and its legislation. But, the question remains as to why is the law is so pedagogically valuable. The simplest answers would point to the divine origin of the law or the intellectually and philosophically perfect lawgiver. However, the validity of the law as an educational tool is due not only to its origins, but also to its nature, specifically its relationship to the unwritten order of the universe.

The Law of Moses and the Law of Nature

Philonic scholarship has long and extensively explored the concept of natural law in Philo’s works and thought and the connection he makes between the written law of Moses and the unwritten law of nature, discussing Philo’s originality—or lack thereof—in the development of the concept of natural law, the connections between his concept and similar ideas in Stoic philosophy, the bold and problematic move of equating a written law code with the unwritten order of the universe, and the reasons behind Philo’s insistence on such a connection. However, in all this discussion, the correlation between the Mosaic/natural law link and Philo’s insistence on the educative role of the Jewish law has gone largely unnoticed.

The fact that Philo is the first Greek writer we have who extensively and technically utilized the term “law of nature” or νόμος φύσεως, led Helmut Koester to claim that Philo himself was the originator of the concept, an idea which could only have sprung from the unique amalgamation of Jewish and Greek thought and within a philosophical framework where Stoic
elements are regularly subsumed beneath a broader Platonic framework.\textsuperscript{148} This is not to say that Philo developed the theory in a vacuum. Koester makes clear the background Heraclitean, Platonic, and Stoic elements, but he also allows for originality on Philo’s part, against the then common trend of viewing Philo’s thought, particularly his philosophy, as utterly derivative.\textsuperscript{149}

Scholars immediately recognized the value of Koester’s work, though they pointed out one major problem with his study and his claim for Philo’s contribution: his only passing reference to and ultimate dismissal of similar concepts and terminology in Stoic-influenced Latin literature, particularly that of Cicero. Richard Horsley argued extensively and, for most, conclusively that Philo and Cicero were both deeply influenced by earlier Stoic thought on the concept,\textsuperscript{150} and this indebtedness to Stoic philosophy has been assumed in all studies on natural law in Philo since.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{148} Helmut Koester, “Nomos Phuseos: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought,” in Religions in Antiquity. Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough (ed. Jacob Neusner; Studies in the History of Religions XIV; Leiden: Brill, 1968), 521-541. See Koester’s conclusion: “It seems that there can be little doubt that Philo has to be considered as the crucial and most important contributor to the development of the theory of natural law. Most probably, Philo was its creator, at least insofar as the evidence from the Greek literature is in question. Only a philosophical and theological setting in which the Greek concept of nature was fused with the belief in a divine legislator and with a doctrine of the most perfect (written!) law could produce such a theory, and only here could the Greek dichotomy of the two realms of law and nature be overcome. All these conditions are fulfilled in Philo, and the evidence for the development of this theory of the law of nature in Philo is impressive” (540).

\textsuperscript{149} See, e.g., Wilfred L. Knox, Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity (London: Oxford University Press 1944), 34.


\textsuperscript{151} Markus Bockmuehl, “Natural Law in Second Temple Judaism,” VT 45.1 (Jan., 1995) 17-44, agrees in part with Horsley’s critique of Koester, but adds that Philo’s development of the theory was also indebted to a long line of tradition within Second Temple Judaism itself. John W. Martens, One God, One Law: Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law (Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 2; Leiden: Brill, 2003), acknowledges the Stoic influence, but allows for some philonic originality and creativity: “Philo follows the Stoics in his formulations, especially in adopting the description of the order of nature as the ὀρθὸς λόγος. Reason guides nature. Philo gives us more: he is the first writer in Greek, whose work is extant, to speak so clearly and often of the νόμος φύσεως. While Philo has clearly adopted Stoic terminology, he provides the missing link: the term itself. To follow the λόγος of nature is to follow the νόμος φύσεως. It is Philo who first gives us the formulation on a consistent basis” (75-76).
While Philo’s level of originality in developing the Stoic concept of natural law continues to be debated, Philo’s connection between the unwritten, perfect law of nature with a written law code does not have an immediate locus in Greek philosophical thought, and, as many have pointed out, would have been viewed by non-Jewish philosophers as deeply problematic. And though we find earlier Alexandrian Jews who implicitly drew a connection between the Jewish law and the order of nature, Philo is the first known author who consistently and systematically binds the two together and makes the relationship a foundational aspect of his broader worldview.

Philo opens his treatise on the Genesis creation narrative by explaining the curiosity of Moses beginning his law code with an account of the creation of the world. Moses surpassed all other lawgivers before and after him, including those who simply and straightforwardly set forth their regulations and those who shroud their laws with deceptive fables and myths (Opif. 1-2). Moses, instead, begins with creation, because, unlike all other written law codes, Moses’ law was in consort with the order of the universe:

"ἡ δ᾿ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἔφην, ἐστὶ θαυμασιώτατη κοσμοποιίαν περιέχουσα, ὡς καὶ τοῦ κόσμου τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῦ νόμου τῷ κόσμῳ συνάψωντος καὶ τοῦ νομίμου ἀνδρὸς εὐθὺς"

---


154 See Let. Aris. 161: “For our laws have not been drawn up at random or in accordance with the first casual thought that occurred to the mind, but with a view to truth and the indication of orthos logos.” In the small number of fragments we have of Aristobulus, there are hints that he too connected the Mosaic law with the orthos logos of nature. See Frags. 2.2-3; 5.9-10, 12.
His opening is, as I have said, most amazing, in that it contains an account of the creation of the cosmos, and the reason for this is that the cosmos is in harmony with the law and the law with the cosmos, and the man who observes the law is at once a citizen of the cosmos, governing his actions according to the intention of nature, according to which the entire cosmos is regulated. (Opif. 3)

This connection is quite remarkable, as Philo understood the sense-perceptible cosmos being governed by a perfect, universal law, a “politeia by which the cosmos is administered” (Abr. 61), which he contrasts specifically with the plurality of law codes of the individual cities: “For this cosmos is a great city (μεγαλόπολις), and it has one politeia and one law; and this logos of nature enjoins what one ought to do and forbids what one ought not to do. But, the individual cities are unlimited in number and make use of differing politeiai and laws; for there are different customs and regulations found and established in different places” (Jos. 29). There is discord among the various peoples because of this plurality, because “they were not satisfied with the laws of nature (τοῖς τῆς φύσεως θεσμοῖς)” (Jos. 30). The particular law codes were, thus, added to the perfect politeia of nature, “for the laws of individual cities are additions to the orthos logos of nature / προσθήκαι μὲν γὰρ οἱ κατὰ πόλεις νόμοι τοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθοῦ λόγου” (Jos. 31).155

155 While the Greek term “law of nature” may be lacking in earlier philosophical literature, the idea is clearly present in early Stoicism, often connected to or equated with orthos logos. For example, according to Chrysippus, “And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the common law, that is to say, the orthos logos (ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, δόσεως εστίν ὁ ὀρθῶς λόγος) which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is” (Diog. Laert. VII. i. 88). On the Stoics and orthos logos, see A. A. Long, “The harmonics of Stoic virtue,” in Stoic Studies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 202-223; and Brian E. Johnson, The Role Ethics of Epictetus: Stoicism in Ordinary Life (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2014), 72-76.
The goal of humanity should be to live in harmony with the order of the universe, to be citizens of the great city by living according to the law of nature. A life in accord with law is a life of freedom (Prob. 45), but “but the unerring law is orthos logos, not some perishable, mortal law, not some soulless law written on soulless papyrus or stelae, but the imperishable law stamped by an immortal nature on an immortal mind (ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἀφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοι ὑποθεῖς)” (Prob. 46). Total obedience to particular law codes, even those of great men like Solon or Lycurgus, is not sufficient to ensure the life of freedom, because they are simply additions to the universal law, “orthos logos, which is the fountain from which all other laws spring” (Prob. 47). Particular law codes may spring from the unwritten law of nature, the great importance of following natural law is that orthos logos is the “never-ending fountain of virtues” (Plant. 121).

This is not to suggest that the law codes of individual cities were inherently bad. They are simply insufficient. Philo actually has kind things to say about other laws and encourages obedience to the laws of the state. In Abr. 16, Philo argues that lawgivers strive to fill the souls with good hope, but the virtuous man, instead, has within him an “unwritten, self-taught law, which nature has implanted.” There are certain individual, therefore, who have been able to live, inherently, according to the law of nature, without the help of any written law code, including that of Moses.

Adam was the first human citizen of the cosmos, and the first human to adopt the politeia of the world, “the orthos logos of nature, which more properly is designated ‘ordinance,’ being a

---

156 On the connect between orthos logos and virtue, see also Leg. 3:150; Gig. 17, 48; Migr. 128; Spec. 2:29; Virt. 127; and Prob. 62.
157 Pace Martens, One God, One Law, 99-100, who argues that Philo only accepts other law codes where they were drew on the law of Moses. See below on the extended discussion of mother paideia and father orthos logos in Ebr., where observance of the laws of the state is part of one’s obedience to mother paideia and part of the perfect, balanced life.
divine law in accordance with which things suitable and appropriate are assigned to each person / αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὸς λόγος, ὁς κυριωτέρα κλήσει προσονομάζεται θεσμός, νόμος θείος ὁν, καθ’ ὃν τὰ προσήκοντα καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἐκάστοις ἀπενεμήθη” (Opif. 143). Adam shared this constitution with those citizens who came before him, the “rational and divine natures, both those incorporeal and noetic and those not without bodies, such as the stars” (Opif. 144). This natural law existed prior to the creation of the first human, who would follow it, living in as close to a divine state as was possible for a mortal creature, at least until the arrival of woman, allegorically interpreted as sense perception, which would give rise to desire, bodily pleasures, a breaking of the law of nature, and forfeiture of immortality (Opif. 151-152).

The arrival of sense perception into the universe did not prevent all of humankind after Adam from living according to this same natural law, but it did become much more difficult. Certain extraordinary individuals throughout history have been able to follow the original, unchanged law of nature, imprinted upon their minds, without the help of written instructions or guidance and, in so doing, have become models for others to follow, living laws to emulate. It is for precisely this reason that Moses decided to follow his account of creation with the lives of such extraordinary individuals, “the more general laws, which are archetypes, as it were, of the particular laws, which are copies” (Abr. 3). Moses permanently enshrined the lives of these individuals in his writings not only to praise their actions, but also to encourage others to emulate their conduct (Abr. 4), to show that particular laws which would follow were in accord with the universal law of nature, and, finally, to demonstrate that it is not difficult to adhere to the particular laws, as these men were able to obey the law of nature without any outside, written help:
These men have become living and rational laws (ἔμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι), whom Moses extolled for two reasons: first, because he wanted to show that the injunctions laid down are not out of sync with nature; and second, to demonstrate that it is not overly difficult for those who wish to live according to these established laws, when these first men readily and easily obeyed the unwritten legislation (ἀγράφῳ τῇ νομοθεσίᾳ) before any of the particular laws were written down. So that one may properly say that the written laws are nothing more than memorials of the life of the ancients, discussions of the ancient deeds and words which they had adopted. (Abr. 5)

These individuals, without the benefit of instructors or teachers, were able to conduct their lives according to the unchanging ancient law of nature (Abr. 6). Abraham did not have the benefit of the law of Moses, but was nevertheless able to fulfill completely “the divine law and all the divine commandments, not having been taught to do so by written texts, but by unwritten nature, he was eager to follow all healthy and salutary impulses” (Abr. 275). In the hands of Moses, Abraham is thus not only law-abiding (νόμιμος), but he himself becomes “an unwritten law and ordinance (νόμος αὐτὸς ὁν καὶ θεσμὸς ἀγράφος)” (Abr. 276). Abraham’s life is set up as a paradigm to follow, a model for those who wish to live in accordance with the divine law. We have discussed in detail one of the ways Abraham served as a model, as an allegorical representation of the soul on the path from preliminary paideia to wisdom, ironically as the model of the soul which requires teaching to acquire virtue.

Philo understands the role of those wise individuals who could live in perfect harmony with the law of nature as paradigmatic, whether the lives of ancient patriarchs like Abraham or Moses himself (Dec. 1), set down as permanent models in the law of Moses, or the actions of contemporary individuals, both Jewish and Gentile, who serve as imminent sparks of virtue and
wisdom wherever they go: “In the past, there were some people who surpassed their contemporaries in virtue, taking God alone as their guide and living according to the law, that is the orthos logos of nature, who were not only free themselves, but also filled all who came near them with the spirit of freedom. And now too, in our own time, there are some who are, as it were, images of the kalokagathia of wise men, modeled from the archetypal representation” (Prob. 62). Elsewhere, Philo makes clear that these contemporary models can be found among all nations. In a present-day world filled with covetousness and mutual hostility (Spec. 2:43), there exist certain special individuals, “whether Greek or barbarians, who are practicers of wisdom, living a life blameless and beyond reproach,” who avoid associations with injustice and corrupt public institutions (Spec. 2:44) and, instead, live peaceful lives devoted to the contemplation of nature and the ascent of the mind (Spec. 2:45). These people, through their devotion to the order of nature and paideia, are full of kalokagathia and able to rise above all the bodily pleasures and appetites which weigh down the soul (Spec. 2:46). Though few in number, they serve as “a smoldering coal of wisdom in their various cities, on account of which virtue may not become entirely extinguished and thus destroyed from our race” (Spec. 2:47). Philo laments the fact that this number is so small and argues that if all men lived in accordance with nature’s designs, the world would be free of pain and fear and, instead, be filled with eternal joy and happiness (Spec. 2:48). It is in this, the difficulty of innately following the law of nature and the very few able to do so, where we begin to see the purpose and role of the law of Moses and the special place it holds for the Jewish people.

In the discussion of the role of the Jewish law in the study of ancestral philosophy, we saw that Moses intended his citizens to live according to the laws of nature (Mos. 2:211), and we have seen that the seemingly odd inclusion of both a creation narrative and historical accounts at
the start of his law code were meant to demonstrate this possibility of achieving this goal through adherence to the particular laws he would then set forth. The particular injunctions of the law would allow the normal person who followed them closely to achieve what only a small handful of extraordinary individuals had been able to accomplish on their own. The laws had this power because, one, they were modeled on the living laws as archetypes, those who innately followed the law of nature, and, two, they were set down by the most perfect intellect the world has seen. Moses was such an exceptional student, who was able to quickly master and then surpass the lessons of his teachers, because he had complete access to and total recall of the knowledge latent within him. This knowledge was nothing but the orthos logos of nature, imprinted upon the mind or soul, and the attendant virtues (Mos. 1:48). And it is this which Moses would set down as written copies, as only he could:

Therefore, it is a great thing if it has fallen to the lot of one person to arrive at any one of the qualities before mentioned, and it is an amazing thing, as it seems, for one to have been able to grasp them all, which Moses alone appears to have done, having given a very clear description of the aforesaid virtues in the commandments which he established. ¹¹ And those who are well versed in the sacred books know this, for if he had not had these principles innate within him, he would never have compiled those scriptures at the promptings of God. And he gave to those who were worthy to use them the most admirable of all possessions, likenesses and copies of the paradigms which were impressed upon his soul (τῶν ἄγαλματοφορουμένων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παραδειγμάτων ἀπεικονίσματα καὶ μιμήματα), which became the laws which most clearly and plainly revealed the aforementioned virtues. (Mos. 2:10-11)
With fewer and fewer people in the world able to live by the innate law of nature, God, through Moses, gave the Jewish people some assistance, a written guide which would allow those who followed its ordinances and studied its deeper meanings to live as humanity was initially intended, to overcome the passions and appetites within the soul and elevate the noetic over the sense-perceptible. The law of Moses was given so that “the one who followed the laws and welcomed the concomitant conformity to nature would live in accordance with the arrangement of the universe with perfect harmony and concord between his deeds and his actions” (Mos. 2:48). Because the written laws of Moses were “the most closely resembling image of the politeia of the cosmos” (Mos. 2:51), and each of the particular, individual laws “aim at the harmony of the universe and are in agreement with the logos of eternal nature (τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἀιδίου φύσεως)” (Mos. 2:52).\(^{158}\)

**Mosaic Paideia, Concluding Comments**

In Philo’s understanding, the connection between the written law code of the Jews and the unwritten, universal law of nature is determinative in the educational value of the Mosaic law, the entirety of which becomes, in Philo’s hands, paideia, a textbook whose purpose is to instruct the student to live according to orthos logos and, thereby, attain the sought-after goals of all

---

\(^{158}\) Scholars have long argued that Philo, in drawing this connection, equates the law of Moses with the law of nature. See Koester, “Nomos Phuseos,” 533; John W. Martens, “Philo and the ‘Higher’ Law,” Society of Biblical Literature 1991 Seminar Papers (ed. E. H. Lovering; SBLSPS 30; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 309-322 (317); and Hindy Najman, “The Law of Nature and the Authority of Mosaic Law,” *SPhA* 11 (1999): 55-73 (60, 64). However, Philo’s argument that the laws of Moses are the best possible representations of the laws of nature is not an argument for identical similitude, the limiter, “best possible,” being crucial here. This is further confirmed by Philo’s standard view of copies as necessarily imperfect and degenerative (Opif. 140-141). There is a definite hierarchy, the law of nature being superior to the law of Moses, but one that makes little difference, as the law of Moses remains the best possible representation on earth. A hierarchy, however, does not equate to a disparagement or subversion of the Jewish law or Judaism itself, an assumption often lurking behind the motivation of some scholars to prove an equality between the law of nature and the law of Moses in Philo’s thought.
forms of *paideia*, wisdom, virtue, and, ultimately, the immortal life of the soul. The written law of Moses is a unique educational resource, not only due to its connection to the unwritten order of nature, but also because it is capable of different levels of instruction, from the most elementary to highly advanced, depending on the level and capacity of the individual student, and we can distinguish an internal hierarchy of Mosaic *paideia*. Moses could use figurative, anthropomorphic language to instruct the most elementary students to come to proper conception about God. Practice of the literal Jewish ordinances would educate at different levels, from the beginning student who is not yet able to conceive of the deeper allegorical meaning of the laws to those more fully cognizant of the intended lessons underlying Jewish praxis, and literal observance as a whole, with its intended target of the earthly mind (γῆ ὦν ὦν), is at an intermediate level of instruction (*Leg*. 1:93-95). Finally, deep allegorical study of the Jewish law, in service to ancestral philosophy, appears to be the loftiest form of *paideia* for the most advanced students, highly educated thinkers like Philo himself. In fact, Philo’s entire allegorical project is the product of this loftiest level of education.

While an internal hierarchy is clear, caution is required in attempting to discern the relationship between this Mosaic *paideia* and other forms of education Philo insists are necessary, such as the encyclical studies and philosophy. It is not uncommon for scholars to assume an overall hierarchy of educational forms that places the Jewish law on top, but they do so without firm Philonic support. Philo can repeatedly and consistently argue for the preliminary nature of the encyclica prior to philosophy or philosophy prior to virtue and wisdom.

159 It should be noted that several scholars have argued that Philo equates the laws of Moses with the Greek virtues. See, e.g., Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:200; and Naomi G. Cohen, “The Greek Virtues and the Mosaic Laws in Philo: An Elucidation of *De Specialibus Legibus* IV 133-135,” *SPhA* 5 (1993): 9-23. Yet, the relationship Philo consistently draws between the two—that the laws are training towards virtue—is so closely paralleled to that between the encyclica or philosophy and the virtues that one must conclude that, for Philo, the Mosaic laws were not themselves the virtues, but *paideia* which leads to the attainment of the virtues.

but he never openly draws these comparisons between Mosaic \textit{paideia} and other forms. His silence on this is likely intentional, as is his near absence of ethnic markers for the various forms of education. The curriculum of encyclical studies Philo discusses is undoubtedly Greek, but one would never know this from Philo himself. Only in his discussion of Moses’ education, do we see a distinction along ethnic lines. Philo goes out of his way to not distinguish between Greek and Jewish \textit{paideia}.

One of the clearest examples of this is Philo’s discussion of mother \textit{paideia} and father \textit{orthos logos} as the parents of learning souls in \textit{De ebrietate} 33ff., which I will examine in detail below. The best students—the perfect learning souls—are those who attend to both parents, not just one or the other. Philo could have easily made a distinction here between the necessity of both \textit{Greek} encyclical \textit{paideia} and \textit{Jewish} Mosaic \textit{paideia}, but he does not. The father is \textit{orthos logos}, not \textit{orthos logos} obtained through a study of the law of Moses. Philo’s scenario is decidedly inclusive.

It would be easy to claim superiority for the \textit{paideia} of Moses, and it may seem self-evident, but, with Philo himself not doing so, it is best to view Mosaic \textit{paideia} as existing alongside other forms. Encyclical \textit{paideia} or the study of Greek philosophy were not preliminary to education via the Jewish law. Mosaic \textit{paideia} took place continually throughout one’s life and existed, at different levels, at every stage of the individual’s educational development. This conclusion not only makes the best sense of Philo’s thought, but also likely best reflects the education of elite Alexandrian Jews of Philo’s own time.

5. \textbf{THE ROD OF PAIDEIA}
One of primary results of the examination on the transition from *musar* to *paideia* in the Septuagint translations was the observation that, while certain of the translations held strictly to the understanding of *paideia* found within the ancient and contemporary Greek contexts, to the point of altering the underlying Hebrew so as to distance *paideia* from notions of violence and disciplinary punishment more inherent in the Hebrew *musar*, others followed the Hebrew text so closely that there was no choice but to imbue the Greek *paideia* with those violent connotations. This decision, to consistently utilize *paideia* as a translation for *musar* even in those cases which would stretch the meaning of the Greek term beyond its traditional usage, would have far-reaching implications in the development of paideutic notions in later Jewish and Christian settings. In the following chapter we will see just how far the idea of *paideia* as *musar* or divine, violent discipline could be taken, in a text roughly contemporary to the writings of Philo, the *Wisdom of Solomon*, where a fundamental and necessary form of *paideia* is the testing of humanity by God or Wisdom, educative tests which could include great violence, torture, and even death.

Disciplinary, chastising forms of *paideia*, whether the agent was human or divine, were linked to the *rhabdos*, the rod or cane used to beat misbehaving children. Note that this connection was fundamental in both Jewish and Greco-Roman traditions, where the rod of the pedagogue was ubiquitous in literature and vase paintings. The term *paideia* may have not traditionally meant violent discipline, but there is little doubt that beatings were a regular part of the instruction of children in ancient Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman education.¹⁶¹

Philo too makes the connection between *paideia* and the rod, though in a manner quite unexpected, allegorically reading the rod of Jacob and the rod of Moses as *paideia*, the weapon

---

necessary for combating the passions, desires, and appetites within the soul. Instead of beating children, the rod of *paideia* would beat the passions into submission. The rod, then, for Philo, was purely symbolic and metaphorical. With the connect to the rod, Philo is neither suggesting the necessity of divine disciplinary violence, as the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* does, nor even condoning the corporal punishment of children. The training of the soul via the rod does not require physical abuse, but rather the application of *paideia* and *orthos logos* to combat those things detrimental to the life of the soul and the individual. In linking *paideia* with the rod of Jacob and Moses, Philo internalizes the understanding of *paideia as musar* and reevaluates and restructures it in the development of, what was to him, a more acceptable image of *paideia*. At the same time, Philo also subtly undermines the connection between corporal punishment and the instruction of children inherent in Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman education, and, in so doing, he participates in a philosophical debate current among several of Philo’s near contemporaries, such as Quintilian and Ps.-Plutarch.\(^\text{162}\)

**The Allegory of the Rods of Moses and Jacob**

The fullest allegorical exegesis which will serve as foundational for Philo’s understanding of *paideia* as the rod which helps to supplant the irrational passions of the soul is found in book two of *Legum allegoriae*. Philo begins from an allegorical reading of *Exod.* 4:1-5, which he then links, through a sort of pre-rabbinic *gezerah shevah*, to *Gen.* 32:10, from Moses to Jacob and back, connected together via each man’s respective *rhabdos*. Having just established the serpent

---

as the symbol of pleasure (*Leg*. 2:84), Philo sets out his base proof text for establishing the role of *paideia* in combating the passions:

And serpentine pleasure (ἡ ὀφιώδης ἠδονή) does not even abstain from attacking that most God-loving Moses, for we read as follows: “‘If, therefore, they will not obey me, nor listen to my voice—for they will say, “God has not been seen by you”—what shall I say to them?’ And the Lord said to Moses, ‘What is that which is in your hand?’ And he said, ‘A rod (ῥάβδος).’ And God said, ‘Cast it onto the ground.’ And he cast it onto the ground, and it became a serpent (ὄφις), and Moses fled from it. And the Lord said to Moses, ‘Stretch out your hand, and take hold of it by the tail.’ And having stretched out his hand, he took hold of it by the tail, and it became a rod (ῥάβδος) in his hand, ‘That they may believe you.’” (*Leg*. 2:88)

We next learn that the story is not actually about God inquiring about Moses’ stick. The question “What is that which is in your hand?” is to be understood as “What is in the practical life of the soul (τῷ πρακτικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ βίῳ)? For the hand is a symbol of action (πράξεως)” (*Leg*. 2:89). Moses’ reply of “a rod,” should actually be read as *paideia*: “And he answers, ‘*paideia,*’ which he calls a rod” (*Leg*. 2:89). *Paideia* is fundamental to the practical—or active—life.

Before completing his allegorical exegesis of the *Exodus* passage, Philo then takes the mention of the *rhabdos* as an opportunity to connect this account to the *Genesis* passage and to Jacob, the symbol of the soul which ascends to virtue through training (ἀσκησις): “On which account, Jacob, the supplanter of the passions, says, ‘For with my rod (ῥάβδῳ), I passed over this Jordan.’ But, Jordan is to be interpreted as ‘descent.’ And those things of a lower and earthly and perishable nature exist in wickedness and passion; but the athlete\(^\text{163}\) mind (ὁ ἀσκητής νοῦς)

---

\(^{163}\) My translation of the Greek *askētēs* as “athlete,” I feel best represents Philo’s imagery of Jacob as the model of the one who achieves virtue through training (ἀσκησις). “Trainer” is acceptable, though ambiguous, having both an
passes over these things with *paideia*” (*Leg. 2:89*). Using his allegorical interpretation of the encounter between God and Moses, Philo takes the “lowly” notion of a man crossing over a river with a cane (βακτηρίαν) and observes a lofty, universal truth, that the rod of *paideia* is necessary to overcome the corruptible passions.

With the link to Jacob, the athlete mind, established and at the fore, Philo then returns to complete his exegesis of the *Exodus* passage:

Well, therefore, does the God-loving Moses answer. For truly the actions of the virtuous man are supported by *paideia* as by a rod, quelling the agitation and restlessness of the soul. This rod, when cast away, becomes a serpent. And very appropriately. For if the soul casts away *paideia*, it becomes fond of pleasure instead of being fond of virtue. On which account Moses fled from it, for one who is fond of virtue does flee from passion and from pleasure. (*Leg. 2:90*)

A soul without *paideia* becomes susceptible to the influence of the irrational passions. And the first instinct of Moses, being the God-loving, virtue-loving man he is, is to flee from such passions, to avoid them and keep them at bay. However, Moses’ instinct here is wrong. Escape from the passions is the action fit for a mind not yet made perfect, but Moses, who represents the mind already perfected, must instead endure in his war with the passions and fight against them in order to keep them from wholly taking over and despoiling the soul (*Leg. 2:91*). The rod of *paideia* is both necessary to supplant the passions and the result of successfully conquering them:

---

objective and subjective meaning. “Ascetic,” though obviously matching the Greek closely, should be avoided as the term conjures too easily notions of Christian monasticism and hermetism, which are not suitable here.

164 Cf. *Leg. 3:18*, where Jacob subdues forcefully low-hanging, less powerful passions, but flees from the loftier passions on his way to perfect virtue.

165 We saw earlier that Aaron is the paradigm of one on the path towards perfection and, thus, one who flees the passions instead of fighting them directly. See *Leg. 3:128, 140, 159*.  

151
On which account God commanded Moses “to take hold of it by the tail,” that is to say, let not the hostile and untamable spirit of pleasure terrify you, but with all your power take hold of it, and seize it firmly, and master it. For it will again become a rod instead of a serpent, that is to say, instead of pleasure it will become paideia in your hand. (Leg. 2:92)

Several other occurrences of a rhabdos in the books of Moses Philo likewise interprets as referring to paideia: Mut. 135 on Gen. 38:25 and Judah’s rod; Cong. 94 on Lev. 27:32 and the tenth portion of cattle “under the rod” holy to the Lord;¹⁶⁶ and Sacr. 63 on Exod. 12:11 and the Passover meal understood as the passing over from the created to the uncreated through the help of paideia. While the imagery of being “under the rod” could easily, in the literal sense, suggest physical chastisement and discipline, and indeed this is how scholars have often viewed these passages in Philo,¹⁶⁷ Philo makes perfectly clear that the rod is but a symbol of the working of paideia within the soul or mind, mental discipline not actual corporal punishment. We see this explicitly in part of Philo’s allegorical reading of the Hagar/Sarah narrative, in his explanation of Gen. 16:6 and the idea that Sarah “afflicted (ἐκάκωσεν)” Hagar.

Philo’s understanding of passage centers on the notion of affliction, and he begins from the comment in Deut. 8:2 that God “afflicted (κακόση)” and “tested (ἐκπειράση),” the people in the wilderness through, among other things, starvation (Cong. 170). While such passages would provide the author of the Wisdom of Solomon the basis for his understanding of paideia as necessary, divine discipline and testing, the idea that God was doing something so vulgar (Cong.

¹⁶⁶ Philo often associates the number ten with paideia. See Post. 97; Sacr. 122; Cong. 88, 111; Mut. 228.
171) gives Philo the ammunition he needs in order to argue that Moses had intended a different, true meaning. The words “he afflicted,” in reality, “are equivalent to ‘he educated and admonished and corrected (ἐπαιδευσε καὶ ἐνουθήτησε καὶ ἐσωφρόνισε),’” and this starvation is not about a deficiency of food, but rather of “pleasures, desires, fears, pain, injustices, and all things which are the works of wickedness or of the passions” (Cong. 172). Applying this idea to his reading of the Hagar/Sarah passage, Philo finally argues: “When, then, you hear that Hagar was afflicted by Sarah, you must not imagine any of those things which customarily arise out of feminine jealously; for the passage is not about women but about minds (οὐ γὰρ περὶ γυναικῶν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διανοιῶν), the one being trained in the preliminary studies, the other struggling through the contests of virtue” (Cong. 180). This type of allegorical reworking is indicative of Philo’s overall view of paideia as the rod and any seemingly disciplinary aspects associated with it.

Aids in the Fight against the Passions: Model Athletes, Mosaic Law, Orthos Logos,

Conscience

The connection between the rod of paideia and Jacob is not a coincidence. For Jacob, the symbol of the mind which improves to virtue through training, the rod of paideia was the natural ally against the irrational and earthly impulses. Jacob is the “athlete of knowledge (ὁ ἀσκητής ἐπιστήμης) warring against the opposite disposition, ignorance, in a way shepherding the irrational powers in the soul by admonishing and correcting (νουθετῶν καὶ σωφρονίζων) them” (Det. 3). In fact, this is the reason Jacob is portrayed by Moses as a shepherd in Gen. 30:36 (Agr. 42). Moses gives the title of “shepherd” only to the wise, the true kings, as they rule over irrational impulses like a flock (Agr. 41). Moses himself is portrayed as such (Exod. 3:1), as he is
“the shepherd of that mind which embraces delusion over truth and welcomes appearance over reality” (Agr. 43). The athlete is able to corral that which has gone astray.

The shepherd of the unruly passions and those guided by them, the athlete of virtue should serve as a model for others: “For we look upon the athlete of insight (φρονήσεως ὀσκητήν) as the sun, since the one gives light to our bodies, and the other to the things of the soul, and the paideia which such a person makes use of, we look upon as the moon at night, for the use of each is the purest and most useful” (Somn. 2:134). We have seen that Moses was such a model student and the very paradigm of the already perfected individual because he had mastered all three paths to wisdom and virtue, including the training of the passions (Mos. 1:25-26, 28-29), and, as a help for those not so gifted, he left behind “trainer laws (τοὺς ἄλειπτας νόμους)” to help chasten those passions (Praem. 5).168 We saw earlier how the dietary laws could allegorically symbolize the extinction of appetite, the destruction of the passions, and the literal practice of the ordinances helped to forcefully instill this paideia.

The laws of Moses, as paideia, then, could provide help and guidance in chastening the irrationality of the soul, and models like Jacob or Moses served as paradigms for the use of the rod of paideia. But humankind also has internal helpers, most notably orthos logos and conscience, which work in concert with the various forms of paideia to control the passions within the soul. We saw earlier how special individuals throughout history were able to completely adhere to the unwritten law of the universe, the orthos logos of nature, without any external help, solely by following the copy of the universal law which was imprinted in their minds. While this perfect correspondence is rare, the way in which God created the sense-perceptible world and the composite nature of humanity mean that every individual has a stamp

---

168 The Essenes, who utilized such “trainer laws” (Prob. 80), were also known as “athletes of virtue (ἄθλητας ὑπετής)” (Prob. 88).
of the divine law within their soul or mind,\textsuperscript{169} and this image aids in the fight against the irrational.

Philo often describes this internal orthos logos as that which, together with paideia, helps to subdue the passions and properly guide the mind. In this way, orthos logos can be portrayed, like Jacob or Moses above, as the shepherd of our internal flock, which, without orthos logos to “correct and educate it (νουθετήσοντός τε καὶ παιδεύσοντος), strays a great distance from the rational and immortal life” (Post. 68). Philo also envisions this function of orthos logos as the charioteer, holding the reins of the passions (Leg. 3:118, 222), or the pilot, steering rightly the mind or soul (Sacr. 51). Yet, orthos logos is not able to guide on its own; it must work together with the mind.\textsuperscript{170} While a tyrannical nous can cause suffering in both the body and soul and an indulging in passions and pleasure, the kingly nous insures that the composite individual “will, like a ship, enjoy a fair voyage through life, being guided on its course by the good and skillful pilot, that is orthos logos (κυβερνώμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τεχνίτου κυβερνήτου, οὗτος δὲ ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος)” (Leg. 3:80). Philo sets Aaron apart as one who attended to orthos logos and bridled the soul with orthos logos as its charioteer instead of allowing the passions to become too wild and trample the whole soul (Leg. 3:128). Instead, Adam is the example of a mind moved contrary to orthos logos, swayed by Eve, that is sense perception, letting the horses

\textsuperscript{169} God thought about the plans for his great cosmic city, from which was ordered the intelligible world (Opif. 19). The intelligible cosmos “is nothing else than the Logos of God as he is actually engaged in creating the cosmos” (Opif. 24). The human nous was then modeled on the divine logos or nous (Opif. 69, 146; Spec. 3:207; QG 2:62). Because of this, the human nous contains, in essence, the outlines of the noetic cosmos, the entire world of ideas. It is this nous which God breathes into man’s face via pneuma (Opif. 135). God “inspired (ἐνέπνευσε) that crafted thing from above with something of his own divinity. And this invisible divine nature stamped upon (ἐνεσφράγισε) the invisible soul its own impressions, in order that even the ground of the earth might have a share in the image of God” (Det. 86). Commenting on Gen 2:8, Philo says, “It was proper, after the creation of the world, to establish a contemplative system of life, in order that man, by the sight of the world and of the things which are contained in it, might be able to attain to a correct notion of the praise due to the Father. And since it was not possible for him to behold nature herself, nor properly to praise the Creator of the universe without wisdom, therefore the Creator planted the outline of it in the rational soul of the principal guide of man, namely the mind” (QG 1:6).

\textsuperscript{170} Note that nous too is also described as the charioteer or pilot of the soul. See Sacr. 45; Leg. 3:224. Philo seems to shift these roles back and forth with no hesitation or contradiction.
get the better of the charioteer, the ship get tossed upon the waves despite the pilot’s efforts (Leg. 3:222-223).

Conscience (συνειδός) is another internal aid in the individual’s fight against the passions, using elegchos to correct and subdue those unruly psychic components.¹⁷¹ Like the rod of paideia and orthos logos, conscience rebukes and chastens from within, though the particular purview of conscience often appears aimed at sins committed intentionally. Thus, conscience is not imagined as a shepherd or charioteer or pilot, but as the judge within the soul: “unintentional misdeeds, even if they are extremely extensive, are not worthy of blame and are pure, in that they do not have conscience, that burdensome accuser; but intentional offenses, even if they don’t extend a great deal, being convicted before the judge within the soul, are considered unholy, polluted, and impure” (Imm. 128). Conscience effectively restrains the voluntary impulse of the offender until the soul is set right (Imm. 100). This means putting it back under the reigns of orthos logos (Imm. 126).

Much like he did in his conceptualization of the rod of paideia, Philo, in his understanding of conscience, takes an idea most commonly associated with corporal punishment and internalizes the violence. Earlier we discussed the transition of tōkāhath to elegchos in the

---

Septuagint translations, where, along the same lines as the transition from *musar* to *paideia*, several texts appear to maintain the classical usage of the Greek *elegchos*, while others transfer the idea of *tōkatha* as violent correction onto the Greek term. The result of this is that the notion of *elegchos*, which is so closely connected to *paideia* in the Septuagint texts, would come to be understood as a natural component of pedagogical discipline, whether human or divine. The rod and *elegchos* would pair well. We will see this explicitly in the *Wisdom of Solomon*, where *elegchos* is a fundamental aspect of the text’s insistence on the necessity of divine, violent testing for all of humankind in the overall goal of earning the immortal life of the soul after corporeal death. However, just as with the rod, Philo does not accept this easy connection, and, instead, transfers the chastening aspect of *elegchos* to the soul. The author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* will view the sense perceptible world and corporeal life as an *agōn*, a contest to be overcome and won in pursuit of the true life of the soul. Philo thrusts the *agōn* into the soul, an internal struggle for the life of the soul, contested by the individual with the help of *paideia, nous, orthos logos*, the laws of Moses, and conscience.172

The Rod of Paideia Concluding Thoughts

All of the various concepts examined here—*rhabdos, askētēs, orthos logos, suneidos, elegchos*—find commonality in the internalized struggle of the soul, in the fight against the irrational impulses which can lead it astray. Philo’s concept of the rod of *paideia*, then, is not so much a unique type of *paideia* or a pedagogical method as it is a symbol of how *paideia* works to bring about necessary change and correction. It symbolizes one of the many essential benefits

172 See *Det.* 23-24; *Praem.* 52 for the internal *agōn* of the soul.
of paideia in the life of the individual. But, this symbol can possibly tell us more. The conception of the rod of paideia is an ideal place to attempt to see how Philo’s writings might speak to a broader social reality.

What was Philo’s view on corporal punishment in the educational process? This is a question most would expect addressed in a section on the rod and paideia. Like most questions which attempt to move from Philo’s theory or philosophy to an actual social setting, the answer is not readily found in his corpus. Most have assumed that Philo, like the majority of his Jewish and Gentile contemporaries, would have found corporal punishment as a necessary tool in early childhood education. In fact, Philo discusses the rights of parents with respect to their children, that the parents are permitted to beat, imprison, and even kill their children over the course of their upbringing (Spec. 2:232-239). However, he never describes this punishment as paideia and he does not connect it to the children’s education. I think this omission is telling. Add to this the fact that Philo goes to great lengths to take the tool of corporal punishment, the rod, and reinterpret it as a means of supplanting desire and passion instead of one’s children or students, and it would not be too bold of a claim to argue that Philo was among those began to call into question the necessity of physical punishment in the educational process.173 It would appear that Philo understood one’s lessons, philosophical training, and the laws of Moses, working in consort with divinely-received innate powers and conscience, as a far more effective tool in the fight against irrationality and bodily desire than a simple stick and a beating.

6. The Academic Family and a Life of Balance

173 See Quintilian, 1.3.14-17; Ps.-Plutarch, Lib. Educ. 9a.
We find one of Philo’s most fascinating discussions on paideia in his treatise De ebrietate or On Drunkenness, where encyclical paideia is said to be the mother of learning souls. As with his concept of the rod of paideia, the imagery of mother paideia suggests not so much a distinct form of education or pedagogy, but rather a symbol of how education benefits the individual, specifically the necessity of paideia in maintaining a perfectly balanced life, a life both active and contemplative.

At the end of his preceding treatise (Plant. 140ff.), Philo explored what other philosophers have said concerning drunkenness (μέθης), and now, in De ebrietate, he will go on to consider the views of Moses on the subject (Ebr. 1). According to Philo, drunkenness, as depicted throughout the law of Moses, is not the condition of the body upon drinking too much wine, but rather the state of the soul which lacks education. Drunken foolishness, insensibility, and insatiability are the result of apaideusia, a lack of education due “not to simple ignorance, but to a purposeful aversion to paideia / ὁ τὴν παίδειας ἀνεπιστήμοσύνην ἄλλα τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀλλοτρίωσιν” (Ebr. 6). As unmixed wine is to the drunkard, so apaideusia is to the soul (Ebr. 11). Apaideusia is the greatest of all the errors of the soul (Ebr. 12, 15, 27).

The drunken soul is in need of parents to save it through admonitions and chastisement (Ebr. 29). It would be reasonable to take the parents of the soul as God and Wisdom, the parents of the entire universe (Ebr. 30-31), but no one would be able to suffer even the mildest of threats or censure from these parents (Ebr. 32). Therefore, these parents are to be removed from the discussion and others must be considered, that is their pupils, those who are assigned to care for those souls not wholly untrained or uneducated, orthos logos and paideia: “Therefore we say that the father is masculine and perfect orthos logos, and the mother is the middle, encyclical course of paideia, and it is good and advantageous to obey them, as a child obeys his parents” (Ebr. 33).
The parents each have their own unique skillset which they are able to pass on to their children. The father, orthos logos, teaches the children to follow and obey nature, to pursue naked, bare truth, while the mother, paideia, teaches the children to attend to the just customs established in cities, nations, and countries (Ebr. 34). The purview of the mother includes the particular customs, traditions, and laws of the state, while the father is concerned, instead, with the laws of nature (Ebr. 64, 68). Mom’s lessons apply to the created world, while dad’s concern the divine (Ebr. 77).

Paideia and orthos logos have four classes of children (Ebr. 35). The worst are those children who ignore both parents, who contribute nothing to society or to piety and are a burden on their cities and all those around them (Ebr. 77-79). These are children so thoroughly drunk on the unmixed wine of apaideusia that their destruction is all but assured. The next two classes are each half-perfected (ἡ μιτελῆς), the one attending only to the mother (Ebr. 36-64), the other attached solely to the father (Ebr. 65-76), the latter being the clear superior class. Those children who only pay attention to the mother can become “conquered by the unmanly and womanly association with sense perception, the passions, and the senses,” so that they are dragged about by anything that passes by (Ebr. 63). However, they still have their mother as their ally and are thus far better off than those who have ignored both parents (Ebr. 64). The second best class are the children who neglect their mother’s lessons and adhere fully to their father. They are represented by the priesthood (Ebr. 65). One could imagine that this group would be considered the top class, focused solely on things divine, the true order of nature, and neglecting those things which are but a shadow. But, for Philo, this was not the ultimate goal. The priesthood is necessary and to be greatly admired, but the greatest of all the learning souls is that which
attends to both parents; these children “will carry off the prize of victory as superior to all the others” (Ebr. 35; cf. 80-92).

That Philo considered the best student that soul which adhered to the lessons of both parents speaks to his overall concern for a properly balanced life. A cursory reading of Philo might lead one to assume that an ideal life would be devoted solely to the mind over the body, or to the noetic over the sense-perceptible, or to the contemplative over the active. After all, things corporeal and sarkic and political are the constant source of problems through Philo’s works. These are the things which lead to an unhealthy devotion to pleasures and desire, and they disrupt the natural function of the soul and prevent the mind from ascending back upwards. But, Philo’s overall viewpoint is that the solution to these problems is not wholesale rejection, but a proper balance between the mind and the body, but with the mind firmly in control of the reins. A look again at Migr. 93 is instructive here: “But, it is necessary to think that one class of things resembles the body, and the other the soul; therefore, just as one must care for the body because it houses the soul, so too must one care for the written, literal laws. For, when these laws are kept, the other things will be more clearly understood, of which these laws are symbols, and, in so doing, one will escape blame and censure from the majority.” The intended active and contemplative balance is built into Moses’ creation narrative, the six days of the active life and the seventh day devoted to contemplation (Dec. 99-101). His metaphorical family makes perfectly clear the necessity of all forms of paideia in achieving this properly balanced life. Encyclical paideia on the mother’s side and philosophy and the study of the laws of Moses, both of which are an education in orthos logos, on the father’s side.

7. THE DEATH OF THE SOUL DRUNK ON APAIDEUSIA
After Philo discusses the family of mother *paideia*, father *orthos logos*, and their four orders of children, he picks up again the larger theme of the treatise, drunkenness and the dangers of *apaideusia*. We have seen again and again that *paideia*, in all its forms, leads to the acquisition of virtue and wisdom and, ultimately, the immortality of the soul. Here, Philo affirms that the opposite is also true, that a lack or rejection of *paideia* leads to death, not the natural death of the body, but the unimaginable death of the soul: “ignorance brings death, but *paideia* brings immortality. For just as in our own bodies, disease is the cause of dissolution and health the cause of preservation, so in like manner in our souls, that which saves is prudence—for this is the health of the mind—and that which destroys is foolishness, which inflicts an incurable disease” (*Ebr*. 140). Given Philo’s Platonic affinities, the idea of the soul’s death, during, as we shall see, corporeal existence, would appear a bizarre and seemingly impossible phenomenon. However, he discusses it often and extensively, finding evidence of it throughout the law of Moses. We must conclude, then, that psychic death as punishment, particularly for *apaideusia*, was a vital and thoroughly established part of Philo’s worldview.

---

174 Plato often and blatantly argues for the soul’s inherent immortality. In his *Phaedo* Socrates refutes those who claim that the soul is, in fact, mortal and simply dissolves upon the death of the body: “Consider then, Cebes, whether it follows from all that has been said that the soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble, and never consistently the same” (*Phaed. 80a*-b), and Will the soul, the invisible part which makes its way to a region of the same kind, noble and pure and invisible, to Hades in fact, to the good and wise god whither, god willing, my soul must soon be going—will the soul, being of this kind and nature, be scattered and destroyed on leaving the body, as the majority of men say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias, but what happens is much more like this: if it is pure when it leaves the body and drags nothing bodily with it, as it had no willing association with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself together by itself and always practiced this, which is no other than practicing philosophy in the right way, in fact, training to die easily. Or is this not training for death? (*Phaed. 80d*-81a; cf. 105d-106b) Philo could find in this passage, especially in the idea of “training for death,” a perfect argument for the righteous, whose souls are, indeed, immortal. But, this also directly refutes the idea of the soul’s death, even for the wicked. Plato makes no distinction in this case. For Plato, a polluted soul will have to undergo purification and a series of transmigrations into other, non-human bodies, but the soul is nevertheless immortal (cf. *Phaed. 81c*-e; 83d-e).

In his treatise *On Flight and Finding*, Philo has the perfect occasion to delve into the concept of psychic death when explaining Moses’ true allegorical meaning behind the punishments decreed for homicides, specifically when Moses claims that, “If anyone should strike another and he dies, let the striker die by death (ἐὰν πατάξῃ τίς τινα καὶ ἀποθάνῃ, θανάτῳ θανατοῦσθω)” (*Fug.* 53; cf. *Exod.* 21:12). The fastidiousness of the translator—translating the common Hebrew technique of strengthening the meaning of a verb (infinitive absolute plus finite verb,¹⁷⁶ here מות יומת, “let him surely die”), with the awkward Greek θανάτῳ θανατοῦσθω (literally, “let him die by death”)—sets Philo up with an ideal opportunity for a bit of creative exegesis. For Philo, the Greek translation of the Torah was as divine and infallible as the Hebrew, so he must explain the odd phrase: “Knowing clearly that Moses adds no superfluous word . . . I was at a loss as to why he did not simply say that the one who kills intentionally shall die, but instead that he shall die by death. For how else does anyone who dies die but by death?” (*Fug.* 54-55). In his confusion, Philo consults with “a wise woman, by the name of *Skepsis* (σκέψις).” This “woman,” likely representing his own philosophical inquiry,¹⁷⁷ teaches Philo that some people who are living are dead and some who are dead are alive (ζῶντες ἐνιοτετεθνήκασι καὶ τεθνήκότες τεθνήκασι). She said that the wicked, even though they should continue to a long, old age, are dead, deprived of a life of virtue, but that the good, even if

---


¹⁷⁷ According to Jaap Mansfeld, “Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of Alexandria,” *VC* 39.2 (June 1985): 131-156 (142), when Philo turns to “Skepsis,” he is saying that in times of perplexity, you may turn to the philosophers.
they are separated from communion with the body, live forever, having received an immortal portion. (Fug. 55)\(^{178}\)

Later, Philo uses the example of Cain and the fact that Moses makes no mention of his death to explain that “impiety is an unending evil, once kindled never able to be extinguished. . . . [Impiety] is immortal as to the life among us [on earth], since as to the existence with God it is without soul and dead, and, as someone has said, ‘more worthless than dung’ ” (Fug. 61; quoting Heraclitus 76 M). While heaven is the region for good things, evil is assigned to earth, “living at the greatest distance from the divine choir, wandering about mortal life, unable to die from the human race” (Fug. 62). Therefore, “Cain, the symbol of wickedness, will not die, for it is necessary that wickedness always live in the mortal race among humankind” (Fug. 64).\(^{179}\) Cain, appropriately, becomes Philo’s epitome of the psychic suicide.

\(^{178}\) The most notorious use of the phrase, “to die by death” comes not, however, from the injunctions against homicide, but in God’s command to the first parents not to eat of the tree of knowledge (Gen 2:17). In Philo’s exegesis of this passage in Leg. 1:105-107 he describes the death of the soul, in contrast to the natural, intended death, in detail:

> Accordingly, therefore, he says, “On the day in which you shall eat of it, you shall die by death (θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖτε).” And yet, though they do eat of the tree, not only do they not die, but they even beget children and become the causes of life for others. What, then, should we say? Namely, that death is of two kinds; the one being the death of the man, the other the particular death of the soul. Now, the death of the man is the separation of the soul from the body, while the death of the soul is the destruction of virtue and the entrance of wickedness. For which reason, God says that they will not merely “die (ἀποθανεῖν)” but that they will “die by death (θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖν),” clearly indicating that he is discussing not the common variety of death but the peculiar and extraordinary death, that is of the soul, entombed in passions and all sorts of wickedness (ἐντυμβευομένη πάθης καὶ κακίας ἀπάσας). That one sort of death almost does battle with the other variety; for the one is the separation of those things which were previously combined, body and soul, but the other, on the contrary, is the union of both, the inferior portion, the body, having control, while the superior portion, the soul, is put in subjugation. Therefore, wherever he says, “to die by death,” observe closely that he is discussing that death which is inflicted for punishment, not that which exists according to nature. The natural death is the one according to which the soul is separated from the body, while the death which is for punishment is when the soul dies according to the life of virtue and lives solely to the life of wickedness.

\(^{179}\) On Fug. 53-64, Mansfeld notes that, “what we have here is a little Middle Platonist treatise (or a treatise in the Middle Platonist manner) concerned with the vicissitudes of the soul as illustrated by a plurality of related ideas ultimately deriving from (‘Pythagoras’, the ‘Orphics’,) Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Homer, which have been reinterpreted in order to serve a common purpose. Philo has merely applied this cento to the exegesis of Scripture, bringing out his proof-expression and listing scriptural passages that can be integrated in the cento” (“Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of Alexandria,” 145).
Philo regularly assigns the sins of blasphemy, devotion to pleasure, and especially lack or neglect of education as the causes of the soul’s death. Lack of paideia is particularly problematic as it is the cause and source of so many other sins (Fug. 198-201). Ultimately, the death knell of the soul comes from allowing the body to imprison, engulf, and effectively smother the soul. During its corporeal existence, the soul is essentially carrying around a corpse (νεκροφορεῖν; Leg. 3:69; cf. 3:74; Somn. 2:237; Migr. 21). At the end of one’s “life” the soul simply leaves this corpse, i.e. the body, behind (Leg. 3:70). This is the way it is supposed to work, when the mind occupies itself with heavenly contemplations. But, “whenever it abandons its inquiry into divine things, it then regards the body as a friend, a kinsman, and brother, and therefore it takes refuge with those things dear to the body” (Leg. 3:72). By allowing the body to dominate what should be dominant, the wicked individual commits suicide by killing one’s own soul.180

What is Psychic Death?

Psychic death entails the destruction of virtue, making the soul entirely subject to the body and living only for vice. The complete loss of virtue can actually prevent the natural death of the body181 which leads to the immortal life of the soul.182

The most powerful result of the soul’s death during corporeal existence is the knowing eternal separation from God (Post. 69; Fug. 80-81), where God deserts and despises the

---

180 Philo clearly states that Cain committed psychic suicide: “Therefore we read in the subsequent passage, ‘Cain rose up against Abel his brother and murdered him.’ Now, according to the obvious interpretation, he suggests that Abel has been killed. But, according to the more accurate examination, it becomes clear that Cain himself was killed by himself so that we should read the passage as, ‘Cain rose up and killed himself,’ and not the other” (Det. 47).

181 See again Leg. 1:105-107.

182 The distinction between the two deaths is a favorite of Philo’s. See also, for example, QG 1:16, 76 and Post. 39. Often the distinction is drawn between Abel and Cain, Abel being the one who, though dead, is truly alive, and Cain, though living, is actually dead. See Det. 49, 70.
psychically dead (QG 1:70, 73). This deserted individual, Philo at times can even describe as being transformed from a rational creature into a brute, irrational beast (QG 1:50, 76; Abr. 33).\footnote{John Conroy has argued extensively that Philo’s concept of the death of the soul goes beyond mere metaphor and that it actually involves an ontological change in the person, reducing the wicked individual to the level of a beast. He notes, “... for Philo, the hierarchy is metaphysical, and individual human beings have the opportunity of motion up or down the scale of being. For instance, a righteous person, when she or he dies, moves up the scale from being “mortal, rational, animate” to the state of an ‘immortal.’ Further, when an unrighteous person refuses to live by the dictates of reason, s/he moves down the scale of being to that of an ἄλογος.” John T. Conroy, Jr., “The Wages of Sin is Death:’ The Death of the Soul in Greek, Second Temple Jewish, and Early Christian Authors,” (Ph.D. dissertation; University of Notre Dame; Gregory E. Sterling, Director; April 2008), 83. See also Conroy, “Philo’s ‘Death of the Soul’: Is This Only a Metaphor?” SPhA 23 (2011): 23-40.}

The destiny of the psychically dead is telling. While the immortal soul’s destiny is in heaven or the noetic world in nearness to the divine, those who have destroyed their own souls can only look forward to the ground:

What is the meaning of the phrase, “Until you return to the earth from which you were taken” [Gen 3:18]? For humankind was not formed from earth alone, but also from the divine spirit. First, it is evident that the earth-born creature was compounded out of earth and heaven. And because he did not remain uncorrupted but made light of the commands of God, turning away from the best and most excellent part, namely heaven, he gave himself wholly over to the earth, the denser and heavier element. Second, if he had been desirous of virtue, which makes the soul immortal, he would certainly have obtained heaven as his lot. Since he was zealous for pleasure, through which psychic death (ψυχικὸς θάνατος) is brought about, he again gives himself back to the earth; accordingly Scripture says, “Dust thou are, wherefore to dust shalt though return.” Thus earth is the beginning and end of the evil and vile man, but heaven of the virtuous man. (QG 1:51)
Instead of positing a theory of transmigrations—which Philo seems to reject\(^\text{184}\)—the best explanation for the idea that the wicked man “gives himself to the earth,” is that Philo is here talking simply about burial. The soul is trapped on earth in the corporeal vessel during one’s lifetime, and at death, while the righteous leave their bodies behind to enjoy a blessed immortality, the wicked are simply buried in the ground. The earth, then, becomes the permanent home for the wicked who have destroyed their own souls.

This earthly existence, devoid of God’s presence, is Philo’s idea of hell: “And banishing the unjust and atheistic soul, he disperses it far from himself to the region of the pleasures and desires and injustice. And this region is called most suitably the region of the impious, not that which is fabled to exist in Hades. For the real Hades (ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν Ἀτόμης) is the life of the wretch, who is vengeful and a miscreant, and guilty of all sorts of curses” (Cong. 57). There is no “afterlife” punishment, because this “life” is not really life. This (corporeal) life is, rather, death. So, it would be more appropriate to actually speak of an “afterdeath” reward, the immortal life of the soul. Punishment simply consists in continuing in death. This horrifying, unimaginable fate,

\[^{184}\text{Pace Winston, who suggests that, “Since Philo further indicates that the earth is the beginning and end of the evil and vile man (QG 1:51), we may conclude that in his view the destruction of the wicked very likely consists in an endless series of reincarnations. This would fit precisely his definition of folly as ‘a deathless evil, never experiencing the end that consists in having died, but subject to all eternity to that which consists in ever dying’ (Det. 178). It is apparent, however, that such is the fate only of those who have become incurably wicked and thus resemble the class of the incorruptible which appears in the Platonic myths of the Phaedo (113E), Gorgias (525-26) and Republic (615E), who are doomed never to emerge from Tartarus” (David Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria [Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985], 39). Winston admits that Philo rarely, if ever, refers to the reincarnation of the soul, but nevertheless maintains the idea: “What, then, will be the final destiny of those progressing toward but never fully attaining perfect wisdom? It is quite likely that Philo thought they needed to undergo further transmigrations to purge them before they could escape the wheel of rebirth and enter the disembodied state of eternal bliss. Philo’s sparse references to reincarnation reveal a reluctance on his part to give undue prominence to a Platonic conception which was essentially alien to Jewish tradition” (42). Burnett, instead, seems correct in saying, “Although both Philo and Plato emphasize the connection between the soul’s conduct and its fate, Philo posits no successive incarnations of the soul according to fate in which the wicked soul will ultimately be purified and freed from the body” (Fred W. Burnett, “Philo on Immortality: A Thematic Study of Philo’s Concept of Palingenesia,” CBQ 46 [1984]: 447-470 [466 n. 83]). For a similar view, see also Erwin R. Goodenough, “Philo on Immortality,” HTR 39.2 (April, 1946): 85-108 (106). A new monograph on the subject has just been published, which appears to argue alongside Winston, that Philo did accept the tenet of reincarnation, though not openly. Sami Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo of Alexandria (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015). I have not yet been able to consult this volume.\]
beyond reprieve or correction, is the result, ultimately, of a rejection of *paideia*. Instead, a
diligent adherence to one’s *paideia* leads to virtue and wisdom, guaranteeing the soul’s immortal
existence. It would be hard to make a more important argument as to the necessity of education
in the life of the individual.

8. **Conclusions**

The evidence set forth above provides a strong foundation from which to determine Philo’s
overarching view of *paideia*. Education begins with the preliminary studies. Encyclical *paideia*
is preparatory to philosophy, virtue, and wisdom, and it is absolutely essential for nearly every
individual. Study of the encyclia leads to speculation, necessary for the ascent of the mind, it
helps to fight off the passions of the soul, and provides the necessary balance between the active
and contemplative lives. But, because the encyclia are so enticing, they can trap students and
keep them from moving on to more advanced education and the acquisition of virtue. Therefore,
encyclical *paideia* is necessarily temporary and must be abandoned once moving on to
philosophy. The knowledge and experience gained through these studies, however, remains valid
and essential as the student moves upward to more advanced studies.

Encyclical *paideia* is prerequisite to the study of philosophy, as the encyclia prepare the
student to properly speculate on nature, and philosophy is, in essence, *paideia* in the workings of
the universe and the true *orthos logos* of nature. Unlike the preliminary studies, philosophy is a
lifelong education. Yet is it still preparatory. Education in philosophy leads to the acquisition of
virtue and wisdom, the ascent of the mind, and the immortality of the soul. Jewish ancestral
philosophy too is devoted to the contemplation of nature, yet it is unique from all other forms of
philosophy in that the Jews utilize the laws of Moses in support of their philosophical education,
as the Mosaic laws are also *paideia* in the law of nature, and the study and performance of the laws allows one to live according to nature’s intention. The goal of all philosophy is the same. Jewish philosophy is exceptional only in that they have the best possible teachers in the laws of Moses.

Mosaic law is a unique and exceptional form of *paideia* in many respects. Study of the laws of Moses is preparatory, like the encyclia or philosophy, to virtue, wisdom, and immortality. But, unlike the encyclia, it is eternally valid; no aspect of the law is to be abandoned no matter the intellectual progress of the individual. The continued validity of the law is due to the nature of the law as *paideia*. While there is an internal hierarchy in the educational value of the law, from the very basic to the most advanced and sophisticated, all aspects of the law as *paideia* point to truth and the order of nature. Slavish devotion to the encyclia could lead to sophistry and vain opinion, but adherence even to the literal practice of the individual ordinances of Moses lead to a life aligned with *orthos logos*, a life balanced between the active and contemplative. The law of Moses, as the best possible copy of the law of nature, is the ideal *paideia* to allow the average individual to live as God and nature intended. Yet, Mosaic *paideia* does not supersede the other forms of education; it exists alongside it. All *paideia* is valuable in the individual’s path upwards and everyone has a responsibility to take advantage of all available educational opportunities.

After discussing the varieties of *paideia*, we looked at three vivid symbols Philo utilized in order to illustrate the great benefits *paideia* could provide. With the rod of *paideia*, Philo takes the symbol of corporal punishment, the cane of the pedagogue, and reimagines it as the symbol of *paideia* combating desire and irrational impulse within the soul. All *paideia*, whether the preliminary studies, native or foreign philosophy, or the laws of Moses, had the power to the
help the individual combat those things which lead to ruin and destruction. Philo’s academic family, with encyclical paideia as the mother and orthos logos as the father of learning souls, points to the necessity of all aspects of paideia in a properly balanced life. Perfection requires the education of both parents, the mother’s lessons focused on the worldly and particular and the father’s focused on the order of the universe and the divine. For this, both the preliminary studies and philosophy are required. Finally, Philo’s depiction of the soul drunk on the unmixed wine of ignorance or apaideusia reveals the great value of paideia by illustrating the opposite’s results. Rejection of paideia leads to a multitude of sins and the destruction of virtue from the soul, the result of which is the suffocation of the soul and its death, trapped forever in the tomb of the body and the earth, never able to escape and return home. The most horrific fate imaginable awaits those who do not heed their paideia.

In attempting to determine an overall, grand view of paideia within Philo’s thought, we must recognize that all forms of paideia are preparatory, as they are meant to lead to greater things such as virtue and immortality. Paideia is always a means, not an end in itself. This recognition, however, does not insinuate any disparagement on Philo’s part, for paideia generally or any form of paideia in particular. Following the above study, we would have a difficult time finding an author, ancient or modern, more enamored with education than Philo of Alexandria. But, by recognizing the preparatory nature of paideia, we are made immediately aware of an essential hierarchy, not that of the forms of paideia itself, but the hierarchy between the means and the end. The goal of all paideia is virtue and wisdom and the immortal life of the soul that follows.

In order to attain virtue, one must strive to live according to the law of nature, to abide by orthos logos, and to control the irrational aspects of the soul which will ultimately destroy it.
Education is what is necessary to achieve this, not Greek education or Jewish education, but education. The starting point is encyclical *paideia*, as it is a prerequisite to the study of philosophy. The Mosaic law was a great advantage to the Jews in their education towards virtue, but it did not replace other forms of education and it was not a required form of study for non-Jews. Because of this ideal educational resource, the Jews were like the priests of the world (*Spec. 2:163*), but this did not mean that Gentiles who did not study the laws of Moses could not acquire virtue, wisdom, and immortality, and we have observed that some Gentiles could serve as living laws, models of a life in accord with nature.

We do not find a progression from the encyclopaedia to foreign philosophy to Mosaic *paideia*. In Philo’s writings, education in the laws of Moses existed, for the Jews, alongside the other *paideia*. The way in which Philo conceived of this synthesis between Greek and Jewish education, between the secular and the religious, would have a significant impact on those earliest Christians who also had to decide how best to incorporate Greek *paideia* into overall Christian education. This influence extends to the history of modern Western education as a whole, as it was late antique and medieval Christians who were responsible for bringing Greek *paideia* into the Renaissance and modernity.

This synthesis also likely reflected the social reality for Philo and his contemporaries. Elite Alexandrian Jews would have had access to Greek education either in small school circles or through private tutors, from the most elementary literate education to advanced rhetorical and philosophical studies, if we are allowed to judge from Philo’s own command of these subjects. Education in and via the laws of Moses would have occurred elsewhere, likely at the synagogue or at home, if we are to extrapolate from Philo’s depictions of Essene and Therapeutae education. This Mosaic education of the synagogue would have ranged from elementary to
intermediate, as the most advanced level of education in the laws through the study and use of allegory, would not have been accessible to most members of the community. For this level, we should look for a school of Jewish philosophy, perhaps the school of Philo himself, as Sterling has reconstructed it, where varying levels of exegesis would have been taught alongside Greek philosophy. 185

While it would have been commonplace to find the texts of Homer in elementary schools or the treatises of Plato in philosophical circles, the textbook of the synagogue and of Philo’s school would have been the Septuagint, the Greek law of Moses as well as texts like Proverbs. Segal argued that Philo’s equation of the law of Moses with the law of nature was his way of correcting what he saw as a mistranslation of nomos for torah, but I would argue the exact opposite. Philo was not trying to correct a perceived misunderstanding on the part of the translators. It was precisely the fact that torah became nomos that allowed for the opportunity of connecting the written nomos of Moses with the unwritten nomos of the universe. And this connection, in the hands of Philo, centered on his view of the laws of Moses as the paideia which would help guide the Jewish people to live according to nature, an idea made possible by the other essential translation choice, paideia for musar. In the following chapters, we will see the effects of this translation choice on other authors, with the Wisdom of Solomon fully committing to the view of paideia as musar or divine discipline and Paul taking the notion of the Mosaic law as paideia to a conclusion Philo would not, that it, like the encyclical, was preliminary and necessarily temporary.

185 See note 9 above.
Chapter 5. The *Wisdom of Solomon*

1. **Introduction**

The *Wisdom of Solomon* is an ideal model of a Jewish text from the Hellenistic Diaspora that seamlessly incorporates the idea of *paideia* as *musar* or divine discipline found in the Pentateuch and the LXX prophetic literature with the ideals of classical Greek and Hellenistic *paideia*. This text, roughly contemporaneous to the writings of Philo of Alexandria, with its complex structure, seemingly ambiguous intended audience, and amalgam of influences and referents, has often eluded readers as to its precise aims and message, apart from the clear goal for the reader to attain wisdom. However, through systematically focusing on the concept(s) of *paideia*, we...
find a text which revolves around the goal of gaining wisdom as well as the means to do so, a text at once thoroughly permeated by a Hellenistic, sapiential perspective, and yet creatively developed out of its unique combination of sources, all in service to the goal of developing a new theory of paideia.

In the earliest critical study of the Wisdom of Solomon, it was standard opinion that the text was a composite of three or more individual authors, writing at different times for different purposes. However, since Carl Grimm’s monumental commentary from 1860, the text’s unity has no longer been seriously called into question. The work of scholars such as Wright, Reese, Bizzeti, and Gilbert, begun primarily in the 1960s, on the structure and genre of the text, have sufficiently confirmed the unity of the composition and the tripartite structure. Yet, the purpose of the structure has remained an elusive question. The continued division of the text into three “books,”—usually along the lines of “Book of Eschatology,” “Book of Wisdom,” and “Book of History”—which began with Weber in 1904, has not always aided the understanding of the text but has, at times, hindered a more thorough, nuanced appreciation of the author’s motivations and overall message.

One consistent theme that appears throughout the text and its unique parts is the detailed understanding of God’s and Wisdom’s education, discipline, and pedagogical testing of

Collins and Daniel C. Harlow; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 1242-1244, who rightly notes, however, that the precise purpose of the text is tied directly to the question of the intended audience, which is an issue that has also eluded scholarly consensus.


C. L. W. Grimm, Das Buch der Weisheit (Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apocryphen des Alten Testamentes VI; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1860).


humanity. This is a text that is, throughout, colored with the language and ideals of a new *paideia*, and it is the text’s focus on *paideia*, as both content and pedagogy, which unites the seemingly divergent sections into a coherent whole. However, the way in which the author makes use of radically different conceptions of *paideia* in service to his overall project is wholly unique and would have been unthinkable without the intermediary help he received from the Septuagint translations, which handed down to him the acceptable tools necessary to create a bold theory of *paideia*.

Interpreting the Greek texts of the Pentateuch and the prophetic literature in light of a worldview imbued throughout with Greek philosophical thought, most predominantly the idea of the immortality of the soul—or at least the soul’s potential immortality—yields fascinating results, likely never considered by either the authors of the original Hebrew texts or their Greek translators. The notion of *paideia as musar* is taken to the extreme in the text, where God’s disciplinary violence takes on new dimensions, where one’s entire corporeal existence becomes nothing but an *agon* of divine discipline which can include even bodily death. Yet, drawing on LXX *Isaiah*, this death becomes but a trifle and a test in comparison to its reward, the true immortal life of the soul in nearness to the divine.

However, our author was not reading the Pentateuch and prophetic literature alone. From LXX *Proverbs*, which focuses not on disciplinary violence but on the dire necessity of *paideia*, its universality, and the strong connection between *paideia* and *sophia*, the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* could envision his project on a grander and more inclusive scale. *Proverbs* provided the paradigm necessary to develop Wisdom as the educator of humankind, to include Wisdom’s teachings and the text itself as part of a new *paideia*, and to make this *paideia* truly global and free from partiality and exclusivity. Therefore, through devotion to Wisdom and her instruction,
the gift of immortality and nearness to the divine is available to all humankind. This *paideia* is truly universalizing, though the process by which it equalizes would seem entirely foreign and odd to Plato or Isocrates.

What seem like incompatible notions related to *paideia*, however, come together and work in concert in the text, and this melding perfectly exemplifies how Jewish authors writing in Greek would come to use the Septuagint as a lens through which to read and interpret both their received ancestral traditions and the intellectual culture of their Hellenistic milieu in the creation of new and innovative paideutic concepts. While, in the details, the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* gives us several different aspects of his understanding of *paideia*, viewed holistically, *paideia* comes to represent complete and universal education, both the content and the processes by which it is attained. This *paideia* has no ethnic or restrictive significance or determination, but instead is the definitive factor of righteousness and the means by which the individual gains the true immortal life of the soul.

2. **Conceptions of Paideia in the Wisdom of Solomon**

Throughout this complex text, we find a number of distinct views of *paideia*, not all of them obviously related. The first hint we have of the concept comes in the author’s opening address, pointing to the central importance of the idea and its connection to the predominant player in his drama, the figure of Wisdom or *Sophia*. In 1:4-5, we see that Wisdom will not be involved in deceit, transgression, or wickedness of any kind, because she is the *hagion pneuma paideias*, the “Holy Spirit of *paideia.*”¹⁹³ The very first description of Wisdom in the text is as the source of

---
¹⁹³ For the originality of *paideias* over the minority readings of *paideiou* or *sophias* see C. Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse ou la Sagesse de Salomon* (3 vols.; EBNS 1,3,5; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1983-1985), 1:174-175; J. Ziegler, *Sapientia Salomonis (Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum. Auctoritate Societatis Litterarum Gottingensis*
paideia, humanity’s educator, the one who will allow them to understand all things on earth and in heaven. 194

**Paideia as the Educational Content**

While this opening highlights the importance of the concept in the author’s program, it tells us little about to what exactly paideia refers in the text. The term, together with the cognate verbal form, paideuō, is used by the author variously to denote both the pedagogy and the educational content. We shall see later that as the means by which individuals are educated and thereby made righteous, the author’s portrayal of paideia often aligns more closely with the Hebrew concept of musar, which it inherited from the Greek translations of the Pentateuch and prophetic literature, than with the Hellenistic ideals of paideia proper. But, when paideia in the Wisdom of Solomon refers to the content of education, the concept is fully compatible with Hellenistic sensibilities.

In the author’s second direct address to the kings and judges of the earth (6:1-21), the expressed purpose of the text is made clear, to correct the behavior of the rulers before it is too late, before they are beyond repentance. In this second address, we learn that the author viewed his own teachings as paideia, as education meant to guide one on the path to wisdom and immortality. The addressees have already gone astray: they are unjust rulers, who have neither

---

kept the law nor lived according to God’s purposes (6:4). Therefore, before God’s full disciplinary wrath comes upon them the author attempts to help:

Wisd. 6:9-11

9 πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὖν, ὦ τύραννοι, οἱ λόγοι μου,
ἵνα μάθητε σοφίαν καὶ μὴ παραπέσητε:
10 οἱ γὰρ φυλάξαντες ὁσίως τὰ ὅσια ὀσιωθήσονται,
καὶ οἱ διδαχθέντες αὐτὰ εὑρήσουσιν ἀπολογίαν.
11 ἐπιθυμήσατε οὖν τῶν λόγων μου,
ποθήσατε καὶ παιδευθῆσεσθε.

9 To you, then, O rulers, my words are directed,
in order that you may learn wisdom and not transgress.
10 For whoever piously observes holy things will be made holy,
and those who have been taught them will find a defense.
11 Therefore, desire my words,
long for them, and you will be educated.\textsuperscript{195}

The author’s own words, and thus the entire text, then become a pedagogical tool, a textbook for righteous living. This reminds us of the claim that Jesus ben Sira’s grandson and posthumous translator claimed about his grandfather’s work:

\textsuperscript{195} Cf. 6:1: ἀκούσατε οὖν, βασιλεῖς, καὶ σῶντε: μάθετε, δικασταὶ περάτων γῆς, and 6:25: ὥστε παιδεύεσθε τοῖς ῥήμασιν μου, καὶ ὁφεληθήσεσθε.
Ben Sira prologue 7-14

My grandfather, Jesus, who had devoted himself extensively to the study of the law, the prophets, and the other books of our ancestors, and had acquired considerable proficiency in them, was himself led to write something on paideia and wisdom, so that those who love learning might, by also becoming acquainted with what he had written, make even greater progress in living according to the law.

The author of the Wisdom of Solomon’s assertion is even greater. His intention is not to teach his readers simply to live according to the Jewish law. He intends, through the teachings he claims to have received from Wisdom herself, to educate humankind on the proper, and only, way to achieve the true immortal life of the soul. This is an extraordinary claim for this textbook, this new paideia.

While the author, in the guise of the righteous king, plays the role of teacher, the constant figure of Wisdom—and thus God, Wisdom’s own guide—is the ultimate source of educational
content, and a devotion to her *paideia* is the ultimate prerequisite to acquiring Wisdom. Much like the figure of *Sophia* in LXX *Proverbs*, Wisdom, the holy spirit of *paideia*, in our text is available to all who desire her; there is no hint of esotericism or ethnic partiality here (6:12-16). For those committed to her *paideia*, the educational and spiritual value is without end: “For she is an unfailing treasure for mortals; those who acquire it attain friendship with God, commended for the gifts that come from *paideia* (διὰ τὰς ἐκ παιδείας δωρεὰς συσταθέντες)” (7:14). The content of Wisdom’s teachings is complete, universal knowledge:

*Wisd.* 7:15-22

15 έμοι δὲ δόθη ὁ θεός εἰπεῖν κατὰ γνώμην
καὶ ἐνθυμηθῆναι ἀξίως τῶν δεδομένων,
ὅτι αὐτός καὶ τῆς σοφίας ὁδηγός ἔστιν
καὶ τῶν σοφῶν διορθωτής.

16 ἐν γὰρ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἡμῶν
πᾶσα τε φρόνησις καὶ ἐργατειῶν ἐπιστήμη.

17 αὐτός γὰρ μοι ἔδωκεν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν ἀγεωδῆ
εἰδέναι σύστασιν κόσμου καὶ ἐνέργειαν στοιχείων,

18 ἀρχήν καὶ τέλος καὶ μεσότητα χρόνων,
τροπῶν ἀλλαγάς καὶ μεταβολάς καιρῶν,

19 ἐνιαυτοῦ κύκλους καὶ ἀστρῶν θέσεις,

20 φύσεις ζῶων καὶ θημοὺς θηρίων,
πνευμάτων βίας καὶ διαλογισμοῦς ἀνθρώπων,
διαφοράς φυτῶν καὶ δυνάμεις ρίζῶν,
May God grant that I speak with judgment,
and to have thoughts worthy of his gifts,
because he himself is both the guide of Wisdom
and the corrector of the wise.

For both we and our words are in his hand,
as are all understanding and skill in crafts.

For it was he who gave me unerring knowledge of existence,
to know the structure of the universe and the operative power of the elements;
the beginning and end and middle of times,
the alternations of the solstices and the changes of the seasons;
the cycles of the year and the positions of the stars;
the natures of animals and the tempers of beasts,
the force of spirits and the reasonings of mortals,
the varieties of plants and the powers of roots.

I learned both what is hidden and what is manifest;
for Wisdom, the fashioner of all things, taught me.
This totality of knowledge reminds us of the famous Stoic definition of wisdom as “knowledge of matters human and divine,” which is also found in 4 Maccabees and throughout Philo’s corpus.\footnote{See Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita 874e: οὖν Στοικοὶ ἔφασαν τήν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναί θείον τε καὶ ἄνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην. The attribution and transmission of the definition is quite complex. See René Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 8-40.}

*The Wisdom of Solomon and Gentiles: Global or Nationalist Paideia?*

If this *paideia* can include the educational curriculum as laid out in the text itself and the “full range of human science and philosophy,”\footnote{Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 172, remarking on 7:15-22.} as taught by Wisdom, should we associate it with known curricula of the Jewish Hellenistic world? Should we equate *paideia* in this text either with the encyclical educational system so well developed by this time in Alexandria, as it often does in his contemporary Philo’s writings, or with the Mosaic *nomos*, as it does in the Greek translation of Ben Sira or in 4 Maccabees?

While it has long been observed that the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* shows little overt interest in the Jewish law, especially in the particularistic aspects of it, many scholars have assumed its importance in the mind of the author.\footnote{See, e.g., Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 42-43; John J. Collins, Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age, 192; Leo G. Perdue, Wisdom Literature: A Theological History (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 308; or Lester Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 92.} *Wisd.* 2:12, where the impious are accused of sins against the law and against *paideia*, has been one of the decisive verses in the discussion of the author’s view of the Mosaic law, the intended audience of the text, and the entire tone set forth in the book.

*Wisd.* 2:12
Let us lie in wait for the righteous man, because he is inconvenient to us, and he opposes our actions; he reproaches us for sins against the law and charges us with sins against our paideia.

What exactly did the author intend by the terms nomos and paideia here?

The genitive pronoun hēmōn in 2:12d has been singled out by scholars in their understanding of these terms. As Larcher, following Fichtner and others, pointed out, the pronoun could modify either hamartēmata or paideias. “Sins against our paideia” would refer to transgressions against the education that the impious had personally received. “Our sins against paideia” would instead refer to transgressions “against an objective reality, a body of doctrine or standard practice.” Scarpat has argued extensively that nomos and paideia here should refer exclusively to the Mosaic Law, in part because the pronoun, hēmōn, according to Scarpat, is inclusive of the righteous man and the author. Against those who want to see instead a reference to natural law and Greek education, Scarpat argues that the inclusive aspect of the

---

199 See Ziegler, Sapientia Salomonis, 100, for the variant readings for paideias (paidiás, paidiās, and apaideias).
201 Scarpat, Libro della Sapienza, 1:187.
pronoun means that the righteous man and the impious who torment him must have had the same nomos and paideia, which could only have been the Mosaic Torah.202

The pronoun, however, should not cause any problems. First, this is a direct quote from the group of wicked men, who are speaking to one another. This is their paideia (or their sins against paideia). There is no reason to posit that the pronoun should include the righteous man or the author and his audience. The referent of the pronoun hēmōn, then, makes little difference in our understanding of the verse. Only if paideia is ever associated specifically with the Mosaic Torah, with a specific set of laws and/or customs, would it be significant. But, this is never the case in our text. Paideia is never equated with the written law or specific ancestral customs, and we cannot assume this was the case based on other Jewish sources like Ben Sira. This author makes no distinction between “Jewish paideia” and “Greek paideia.” There is one paideia for all of humankind, and the impious in 2:12 are accused of sins against it.

There is also no reason to assume the righteous man must be Jewish, as the author goes to great lengths to avoid just such an identification. The righteous man’s ethnicity is never made explicit, because not only would this idea fall outside of the author’s purpose, but making the righteous man specifically Jewish would actually defeat one of his primary goals, to show that ethnicity has no part to play in the acquisition of wisdom and immortality.

A continuous point of debate among scholars has been the author of the Wisdom of Solomon’s views towards gentiles and Hellenistic culture in general. While the influence of that

---

202 Scarpat argues that nomos and paideia elsewhere in the text should also refer specifically to the Jewish law. For example, on 6:17-19, he argues, “La stretta connessione e interdipendenza di questi termini o meglio di questa realtà religiosa è descritta nel passo di Sap. 6,17-19 costruito forse in base alle forme della logica corrente, con un sillogismo detto sorite o forse con un procedimento più semplice detto della «catena» (vedi avanti, p. 368): la paideia è l'unico modo per essere fedeli al patto nell'osservanza delle leggi, la quale porta all'incorruttibilità, cioè alla vicinanza con Dio e fa raggiungere all'uomo l'unico regno degno di questo nome: la Sapienza” (Libro della Sapienza, 1:77). Bertram, instead, argued that the author of Wisdom accepted the pedagogical ideal of the Hellenistic world but inserted the foreign concept of divine punishment (Bertram, “παιδεύω,” TDNT, 5:610).
culture on the author is no longer contended, scholars remain divided over whether the text displays a more inclusive view and rapprochement with Hellenism, as in the Letter of Aristeas, or whether it uses the language of Hellenism in order to undermine it, as in 4 Maccabees.

Three main issues in the text are typically brought forward in this discussion: the audience of the text, the general nature of the first two parts versus the apparent nationalism of the third, and the lack of proper names in the so-called “Book of History.” The language used throughout the text is actually not ambiguous. The question is whether we are to take the author seriously or not. Was he being genuine with his words or deceptive?

The text is addressed, from the first, to the “rulers of the earth (οἱ κρινοντες τὴν γῆν)” (Wisd. 1:1), and later the second address is directed specifically at the “kings (βασιλεῖς)” and “judges of the ends of the earth (δικασταὶ περὰτων γῆς)” (6:1). These rulers, kings, and judges are the ones who are to “love righteousness” (1:1), not “invite death” (1:12), “learn wisdom and not transgress” (6:9), and be “educated (παιδευθεσθε)” (6:11), in order to gain an immortal kingdom: “Therefore if you delight in thrones and scepters, O monarchs of the peoples (τύραννοι


204 See Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 3: “In contrast to Pseudo-Aristeas’ mild criticisms of heathen cults, the author of Wisd’s wrathful exhibition of the innumerable crimes and corruptions connected with pagan idolatry and his unrestrained attack on Egyptian theriolatry (worship of animals), is an unmistakable sign of the complete rupture which had in his time sundered the Jewish community from the native Egyptians and Greeks.” See Scarpat, Libro della Sapienza, 1:28: “Anci se troviamo l’eco di queste correnti culturali e religiose, il nostro autore va messo fra coloro che non condividevano, come altri e come Filone, il filoellenismo fra i Giudei d’Alessandria; egli appartiene alla schiera di coloro che sostenevano che l’idolatria, sotto le sue varie sembianze, era assolutamente inconciliabile con la fedeltà al patto, inconciliabile con l’osservanza stretta di quella Legge che, unica, assicurava la vita eterna. Del resto, secondo qualche commentatore della Sapienza, l’autore ebbe solo un contatto superficiale con l’ellenismo; secondo noi la sua cultura pagana va poco oltre le letture che la scuola esigeva o praticava. Le sue conoscenze filosofiche sono quelle correnti, con i termini correnti, nelle interpretazioni della divulgazione scolastica. Le influenze registrate, su cui qualche studioso insiste, secondo noi non rivelano assolutamente una particolare e approfondita cultura greca. La sua cultura è giudaica, i suoi libri sono la legge e i profeti, i salmi e i libri sapienziali.”

185
λαοῦ), honor wisdom, so that you may reign forever (ἐἰς τὸν αἰῶνα βασιλεύσητε)” (6:21).

Clearly, the fictive addressees could not be thought of as Jews. They must be gentile rulers. Gentile rulers who are told to learn, gain wisdom, and gain immortality! This is astonishing language used to address gentile rulers, especially those who have not, as of yet, ruled rightly (6:4). But, are we to take the language at face value? Are we to take the audience seriously?

Nearly all modern scholars agree that the author could not possibly have envisioned gentile leaders in Egypt reading his text, or even a widespread pagan audience. However, many have gone further in positing that, because the actual audience could not have been primarily gentiles, these addressees must naturally be disguised Jews, and that the impious described in chapter two are not simply exemplars of impiety, but are specifically wayward Jews who have found themselves astray from proper Jewish worship, enticed by the charms of Hellenistic culture. The idea that the author could have intended an actual (or real) primarily

---

205 E.g., Enns, on *Wisd*. 1:1, explains, “Although the book is addressed to the pagan rulers, I do not think that these rulers were the actual, intended audience, but merely provided the literary context in which Ps-Solomon could address his beleaguered countrymen. Could we really expect the rulers of Ps-Solomon’s day to have been moved by his warnings to follow[sic] the way of wisdom? It seems more likely that even these opening chapters are addressed to Jews. Ps-Solomon is telling his audience, ‘See, these pagan rulers are doomed to certain judgment and destruction. They mean you no good and their end is certain. Do not be like them or the people they rule. They do not follow wisdom’s path, but you should.’” See Peter Enns, *Exodus Retold: Ancient Exegesis of the Departure from Egypt in Wis 10:15-21 and 19:1-9* (Harvard Semitic Museum Monographs 57; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 140. While I, like nearly all *Wisdom of Solomon* scholars, agree that actual gentile rulers were not the intended audience here, I could not disagree more with Enns’ understanding of the author’s purpose. Reese likens these figurative addressees to those of the Hellenistic kingship tracts. See *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences*, 146-151, followed by Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 63-63, 101. See also Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse*, 1:164-165.

206 J. P. Weisengoff, “The Impious of Wisdom 2,” *CBQ* 11.1 (Jan., 1949): 40-65, argued that “The author wrote the book primarily for faithful Jews, to encourage them in their trials and to warn them against the materialism to which many of their compatriots had fallen victims” (64), and that “The "impious" are thus to be regarded as Jewish contemporaries of the author of Wisdom, who, under the stress of the constant threat of pogroms, or because of the mockery of pagans, or because of their pagan environment and their love of sense pleasure, surrendered their faith in Yahweh and in the Torah, banded with pagan sensualists to enjoy the present life to the full, and were, therefore, a source of sorrow and scandal to the faithful” (65). For Winston, the text “was probably designed as a broadside against assimilated Alexandrian Jews who had turned their backs on their spiritual heritage (cf. Philo *Mos*. 1.31), some ultimately resorting to apostasy, and those pagans (either Alexandrian or Romans or both) who were hostile to Judaism” (*The Wisdom of Solomon*, 14). Larcher argued that the impious in chap. 2 were meant to be apostate Jews, but part III was aimed at the gentile persecutors of the Jews (*Le Livre de la Sagesse*, 1:114-115). Scarpat’s is a dissenting voice: “Il libro della Sapientia non ha intenti missionari o apologetici ma, certamente, l'autore si sarà
Hellenistic Jewish readership, but a fictive royal gentile audience, with the actual Jewish audience meant to read the text as if it were written for pagan rulers, the audience the readers would imply from the text itself, has never been seriously considered. The use of a fictive audience—together with a fictive author—is not an unfamiliar rhetorical device in either Jewish Hellenistic literature—see the Letter of Aristeas—or in ancient protreptic discourse.

This assumed dichotomy between proper Jewish service and apostate Hellenism is, then, carried over into an ethnocentric reading of the third section of the text. The author’s description of Israelite history, from Adam to the Exodus, is, no doubt, unique, in that, as with the rest of the text, there is a complete lack of proper names. The stories are, in broad strokes, the same as we find them in the Septuagint, and we see the same invective against Israel’s historical enemies, especially the Canaanites and the Egyptians. Idolatry, particularly that of the Egyptian sort, is attacked without mercy. The question then becomes, why. Why go to such lengths to remove the identities in the narrative?

Most scholars who presume a restrictive message have assumed that there was no need for the proper names because the stories would have been so well known to the text’s Jewish

---

207 Scholars of modern rhetorical studies and audience theory have long discussed the differences between real, ideal, and implied, invoked, or fictional audiences and their relationship. The “real” audience or readers are the actual humans who end up reading (or hearing) the text. An “ideal” audience is a creation of the author at the time of writing, who imagines a future actual readership, though there is much discussion as to whether or not this ever truly exists. The “fictive” audience is a creation of the author, often designed as a rhetorical device in service to the narrative or purpose. An “implied” audience, is the understanding of the audience the actual reader would come to understand through the reading of the text. If properly executed, the fictive audience and the implied audience should be identical, and this is what, I believe, we find in the Wisdom of Solomon, a fictional audience of pagan rulers crafted by the author in service to the overall purpose of the text and an audience of pagan rulers implied by the real readers of the text. See Edwin Black, “The Second Persona,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 56.2 (1970): 109-119; Walter Ong, “The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction,” PMLA 90.1 (Jan.,1975): 9-21; Helen Rothschild Ewald, “The Implied Reader in Persuasive Discourse,” Journal of Advanced Composition 8.1 (1988): 167-178; and James E. Porter, Audience and Rhetoric: An Archaeological Composition of the Discourse Community (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992).

audience. A few, however, have taken the typology of the third section of the text seriously. For example, in attempting to determine whether the righteous of the text are only meant to represent Jews and the unrighteous, non-Jews, Goering has come to the conclusion that the lack of proper names is purposefully designed to highlight the contrast between, not Jews and non-Jews, but between the righteous and the impious:

A more perfect wisdom is available to all who seek it, regardless of ethnic identity or religious affiliation. While the experiences of Solomon and the ancient Israelites are paradigmatic, the author’s vision, like that of Philo, is nonetheless potentially universal, in that any human may seek the specialized wisdom that will permit her or him to know more sufficiently the deity and his cosmos.210

209 Reese argues that “only a group of Hellenistic Jewish students, trained not only in their own religious traditions but also in Greek literature and philosophy, in rhetoric and science could have been capable of appreciating the Sage’s artistry and allusions. And only members of a group actually occupied in scholarly pursuits would have been disposed to follow such an artificial presentation” (Hellenistic Influence, 146). Mazzingi argues for a Jewish readership because a pagan reader could not have understood these stories (“Wis 19:13-17,” 79). Cheon, who situates the text during the time of the pogrom in Alexandria and sees its purpose as meant to comfort an oppressed people, makes the claim that the author “identifies himself and his community as Israelites, the righteous people (18.6, 8). . . . He does this through his interpretation of Scripture with which both he and his audience were familiar. By interpreting their shared traditions in light of persecution, he intends to persuade them to strengthen their adherence to that tradition.” See Samuel Cheon, The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon: A Study in Biblical Interpretation (JSPS 23; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), here 24-25. Cheon postulates three reasons for the lack of proper names in the pseudo-historical section: (1) the author’s intention was not to write an historical account of the Exodus; (2) the author may have been trying to typologically describe the differences between the good and bad in order to make his text more coherent and meaningful to his generation; and (3) the author assumed an audience familiar with the scriptural content. According to Cheon, “If they were not familiar with Scripture, they could not understand Pseudo-Solomon’s discourse, which subtly avoids the proper names” (110-111). This assumption by many scholars is simply false. The narrative would have been (and is) perfectly understandable without knowing the referents; it would have just been understood in a different way.

210 Gregory Schmidt Goering, “Electio n and Knowledge in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Studies in the Book of Wisdom (ed. Géza G. Xeravits and József Zsengellér; JSJSup 142; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 163-182 (182). See also W. Vogels, “The God Who Creates Is the God Who Saves,” Église et Théologie 22 (1991): 315-335 and Michael Kolarcik, “Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in Treasures of Wisdom: Studies in Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom (Festschrift M. Gilbert; ed. N. Calduch-Benages, J. Vermeylen; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 289-301. Kolarcik notes that the problem is to reconcile the universalistic outlook found in the first two parts of the text with the particularistic outlook in the third. He claims that the author was carried away in the third section by his rhetoric, but that justice remains the guiding principle of his argumentation. “It is equally clear that the author could have recoiled from universalistic language and embraced unbridled nationalism. But this is not
If we understand the so-called “Book of History” as a typology between the impious and the righteous and not as a dichotomy between Jew and Gentile, the apparent nationalism of the third section vanishes. Even the strong polemic against idolatry does not prove an anti-Gentile bias, as we find similar arguments from Greek and Roman philosophers, including the euhemeristic explanation for the origins of idolatry (14:12-21) and the disdain for Egyptian animal worship (11:15; 15:18-19).211 We shall see that, in this distinction between the righteous and the impious, the author continually makes clear that the righteous are the ones who learn from God’s divine paideia, and the impious are those who do not. In this way, the third section of the text fits perfectly with the first two. The early classification of the last section as the “Book of History” cemented an incorrect or at least incomplete idea in the minds of later scholars who inherited the case. The author maintains a universalistic spirit sympathetic to what is eminently reasonable in Hellenism” (301). Reese also saw the author as attempting universalizing through typology (Hellenistic Influence, 71, 160).

211 As Collins has noted, “This critique of idolatry has been described as ‘one of the most sustained attacks on Gentile religiosity that we have from the pen of a Diaspora Jew’ and has been taken as evidence that the predominant theme in the Wisdom of Solomon is ‘the social conflict and cultural antagonism between Jews and non-Jews.’ But this conclusion overlooks the fact that much of this polemic can be paralleled in the writings of Stoic and Cynic philosophers. Many Greeks could be expected to share the contempt for Egyptian animal worship and other crass forms of superstition.” John J. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 200-201, quoting J. M. G. Barclay, Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora from Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE) (Edinburgh: Clark, 1996), 186, 184. For recent discussions of euhemerism and Greek philosophy, see Albert I. Baumgarten, “Euhemerus’ Eternal Gods: or, How Not To Be Embarrassed by Greek Mythology,” in Classical Studies in Honor of David Sohlier (ed. Ronan Katzoff with Yaakov Poreff and David Schaps; Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1996), 91-103; Jacob Stern, “Heraclitus the Paradoxographer: Περί Ἀρίστων, ‘On Unbelievable Tales,’ Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-) 133.1 (Spring 2003): 51-97; and Sylvie Honigman, “Euhemerus of Messene and Plato’s Atlantis,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 58.1 (2009): 1-35. On euhemerism and the Wisdom of Solomon, see Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 270-271. On Euhemerus himself, see now Franco De Angelis and Benjamin Garstad, “Euhemerus in Context,” Classical Antiquity 25.2 (October 2006): 211-242. Greek and Roman abhorrence of Egyptian religiosity, especially animal worship, is well known. See Juvenal, Satire 15, which begins, Quis nescit, Volusi Bithynice, qualia demens Aegyptos portenta colat? or Cicero, Tusc. 5.78: “Who does not know of the custom of the Egyptians? Their minds are infected with degraded superstitions and they would sooner submit to any torment than injure an ibis or asp or dog or crocodile, and even if they have unwittingly done anything of the kind there is no penalty from which they would recoil.” Cf. De natura deorum 1.16.43; 1.29.81; and 1.36.101. See Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 232, who mentions the story found in Cassius Dio 51.16.5, that Octavian, when asked if he would like to visit Apis, declared that he was “accustomed to worship gods, not cattle.” On a comparison between the critiques of idol worship in the Letter of Aristea and the Wisdom of Solomon, see Benjamin G. Wright III, The Letter of Aristaeas: ‘Aristeas to Philocrates,’ or ‘On the Translation of the Law of the Jews’ (CEJL; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015).
terminology and the preconceptions that came with it. If a label is required, “Typological History” would be more accurate terminology for the section and a better representation of the text’s motivations.

Nationalist, ethnic, or exclusive language of any sort has absolutely no place in the *Wisdom of Solomon*, in any of the traditionally structured “Books,” and it would be a mistake to read an ethnocentrism into the text without adequate cause. Instead, every indication in the text points to inclusivity, *paideia* and *sophia* available to all, and, through them, the ultimate reward of immortality. Therefore, it would be misguided to equate the content of *paideia* in the text with the Mosaic law. Likewise, we cannot identify it with any other exclusive curriculum. The educational content of Wisdom’s teachings was universal knowledge, and the language used to describe it could fit well with the various subjects taught in the gymnasium as the *propaideumata*. But, *paideia* clearly goes beyond these preliminary studies, including, among other things, the very lessons taught in the text itself. Therefore, *paideia* in the text should not be identified with a particular Greek curriculum, whether preliminary, secondary, or tertiary, or with Mosaic law. It could likely include both—just as it could include the author’s own book and his typological reading of Israelite history—, but it could never be one or the other exclusively.

**Paideia as Musar: Divine Discipline and the Testing of Humanity**

As the pedagogy or the means by which humanity is educated in the text, *paideia / paideuō* takes on a meaning radically different from anything found in classical Greek or contemporary Hellenistic sources, including notions of divine, disciplinary violence and physical punishment. In this, the term has taken on elements from the Hebrew *musar / y-s-r* foreign to the traditional
semantic range and facilitated by the Septuagint translations of the Pentateuch and the prophetic
texts, which the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* was reading and exegeting.

While in the Greek translations of the wisdom books of *Proverbs* and *Job*, the use of
*paiđeia / paideuō* is fully compatible with the traditional Greek understanding of the concept and
the translations are often seen distancing the concept of *paideia* from overt forms of physical
discipline and violence inherent in the Hebrew text, the use of *paideia / paideuō* in the
Pentateuch and prophetic literature is strikingly different, with the Greek terms wholly adopting
the full range of meaning of the Hebrew concept of *musar*. In the Greek Pentateuch and
prophetic literature, it is often impossible to read the Greek *paideia / paideuō* in a manner
consistent with its classic semantic range.

Especially important is the Greek translation of *Isaiah*, a text with which our author was
well aware,²¹² where God’s violent, chastening *paideia* is understood as but a small affliction
(θλίψει μικρά) compared to the great benefit conferred (26:16). This divine *paideia* can include
exile, which at the same time expiates the guilt of the nation and forces it to remember the Lord
and return to righteousness (27:7-9), and even the torture and death of the righteous (53:5). As
we shall see, the connection between the servant’s *paideia* in LXX *Isaiah* and the righteous
man’s *paideia* in *Wisdom of Solomon 2-3* is striking.²¹³

This notion of *paideia* as *musar* or divine discipline is an idea elaborated upon
throughout the text, often portrayed as God’s testing of humanity, and the author uses an
amazing variety of clear juridical terminology to describe God’s (or Wisdom’s) pedagogical
testing of the righteous, the impious, or humanity universally: πειράζω, ἐτάζω, ἐξετάζω,

²¹³ See George W. E. Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism*
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 58-92, on the connection between *Wisdom of Solomon 2-5* and
the fourth servant song in *Second Isaiah.*
καταδικάζω, νουθετέω, δοκιμάζω, κρίνω, ἐλέγχω, ἔξελέγχο, κολάζω, βασανίζω, τιμωρέω, μαστιγώ. In the final third section of the text, the typological history, the author transforms the unique history of the Israelites and the Exodus into a universal didactic tale, designed to highlight the differences, not among particular ethnic or cultural groups, but between the righteous and the impious or ungodly. We see here a clear dichotomy between the righteous who learn from God’s pedagogy and the impious who do not through a continuous series of divine tests which God (or Sophia) uses to instruct humankind, give them a chance to repent for past transgressions, and learn to not repeat past mistakes. Winston has described these comparisons as the seven “antitheses,” which illustrate what he argues is the author’s theme, “that Egypt was punished measure for measure, whereas Israel was benefited by those very things whereby Egypt was punished.” But, by focusing on this ethnic dichotomy, Winston and others have missed the larger issue. These “antitheses” are not meant to draw attention to some unspoken divine protection of the Israelites. Instead, they are designed to portray divine instruction through testing and the results of passing and failing the tests.

In chapter eleven, the author makes clear reference to the story of Moses striking the rock at Horeb, providing miraculous water for the people to drink (Ex. 17:6; Deut. 8:15). Here it is God or Sophia who provides the righteous with water from the flinty rock (11:4). The impious, however, receive a river defiled with blood (11:6). There are two intended lessons in

---

214 Testing of the righteous: πειράζω (2:17; 3:5; 11:9); ἐτάζω (2:19); καταδικάζω (2:20); κολάζω (3:4); παιδεύω (3:5; 11:9; 12:22); νουθετέω (11:10; 16:6); δοκιμάζω (2:19; 3:6; 11:10); κρίνω (12:21); διαφθείρω (16:5); ἀνάμνησις (ἐντολῆς νόμος σου) (16:6). Testing of the impious: ἔλεγχος / ἔλεγχος (1:3, 5, 8, 9; 2:11, 14; 4:20; 11:7; 17:7; 18:5); κολάζω (11:5, 8, 16; 16:1, 9); κρίνω (11:9; 12:10); βασανίζω (11:9; 12:23; 16:1, 4); καταδικάζω (11:10; 17:11); ἐτάζω (6:6); ἔξελέγχο (11:10); τιμωρέω (12:20; 18:8); μαστιγώ (12:22). Universal testing: πειράζω (2:24); κολάζω (12:14, 15); ἔλεγχος (12:2); ὑπομνήσκω (12:2); νουθετέω (12:2); κρίνω (12:13, 18); καταδικάζω (12:15); ἔξελέγχο (12:17); διοικέω (12:18).


216 Interestingly, Philo, in his allegorical understanding of the passage, says that the rock was divine Wisdom herself (Leg. 2.86). Paul, perhaps knowing the tradition, instead argues that Jesus was the rock (1 Cor. 10:4).
these divine actions. First, the righteous learn the consequences of impiety and the rewards for enduring God’s trials:

Wisd. 11:8-10

8 δείξας διὰ τοῦ τότε δίψους
πῶς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἐκόλασας.

9 ὅτε γὰρ ἐπειράσθησαν, καίπερ ἐν ἐλέει παιδευόμενοι,
ἔγνωσαν πῶς μετ᾽ ὀργής κρινόμενοι ἁσβεῖς ἐβασανίζοντο·

10 τούτους μὲν γὰρ ὡς πατήρ νοωθετῶν ἐδοκίμασας,
ἐκείνους δὲ ὡς ἀπότομος βασιλεὺς καταδικάζον ἐξήτασας.

8 You revealed, by the thirst [of the righteous],
how you punished their antagonists.

9 For when the righteous were tested, though disciplined in mercy,
they came to know how the impious were tormented when judged with anger.217

10 For you tested them like a reproving father,
but the others you examined like a condemning king.

The righteous are those who endured God’s test in the wilderness and were rewarded with miraculous water from a rock. They learned how, one, God’s pedagogical discipline leads to reward, and, two, a failure to learn leads to even greater testing.

---

217 The author is likely taking the idea of paideia via the discipline of others from texts like Deut. 11:2; Isa. 53:5; Jer. 2:30; and Prov. 22:3.
If this were the end of the lesson, I could perhaps agree with the argument for the ethnic disparity, but we see that these two miracles were also meant to further instruct the already impious:

*Wisd.* 11:12-14

12 διπλὴ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἔλαβεν λύπη
καὶ στεναγμὸς μνημῶν τῶν παρελθόντων·
13 ὅτε γὰρ ἦκουσαν διὰ τῶν ἰδίων κολάσεων
εὐεργετημένους αὐτοὺς, ἠσθοντο τοῦ κυρίου.
14 τὸν γὰρ ἐν ἐκθέσει πάλαι ἡρέντα ἀπείπον χλευάζοντες,
ἐπὶ τέλει τῶν ἐκβάσεων ἐθαύμασαν
οὐχ ὤμοια δικαίοις δυσῆσαντες.

12 For a twofold grief overtook [the impious]
and a groaning over the memories of what had happened.
13 For when they heard that through their own punishments,
the righteous had benefited, they took note of the Lord.
14 For though they had mockingly rejected the one who had formerly been cast out and exposed,
at the end of the events, they came to admire,
having thirsted in a manner unlike the righteous.

---

218 Cheon, who largely follows the idea of Winston’s “antitheses,” notes that in *Wisd.* 11:1-14, “Pseudo-Solomon interprets this temporary thirst as God’s testing of Israel and further as God’s educational opportunity for the righteous people to understand how the Lord punished their enemies,” without, however, making mention of the second didactic test of the impious. See Cheon, *The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon*, 33.
The impious also come to learn the rewards for endurance and the punishments for a rejection of the divine instruction. Of course, the impious will just as soon forget their lessons and continue in their iniquity and ignorance, while the righteous will heed their teachings. Note that nowhere in this historical review does the author of the Wisdom of Solomon make mention of the Lord hardening the heart of the Egyptian pharaoh, as we find in both MT and LXX Exodus.

An externally hardened heart suggests a predestination or preordained punishment, an inability to learn from one’s mistakes and then correct them, an idea that directly conflicts with one of the messages of the text: even the wicked and those who have gone astray have the ability to be educated, disciplined, and turned onto the path of immortal righteousness. The impious are not tormented and destroyed solely because of their past sins, but because they continue in sin and ignorance, refusing to learn from God’s divine discipline.

This language of divine discipline and testing pervades the entirety of the Wisdom of Solomon, and, even when the Greek terms paideia or paideuō are not immediately present, it is always attached to the author’s idealized concept of divine, disciplinary paideia. Time and again we see that these tests, no matter how harsh, are meant to instruct and to correct behavior. In 11:15, God (or Sophia) sends a multitude of irrational creatures against the impious in response to their ignorant worship of like creatures, “in order that they might come to know that one will be punished through those very things by which he sins” (11:16). This is a learning opportunity designed to allow the impious to repent from their past transgressions: “Therefore, you correct little by little those who trespass, and you remind them of the things through which they sin, in order that they may be delivered from their wickedness and come to believe in you, Lord” (12:2).

Cf. 12:18-27 and 16:4-9 for similar depictions of a twofold didactic test of the righteous and the impious.

Exod. 4:21; 7:3, 13, 14, 22; 8:15, 19, 32; 9:7, 12, 34, 35; 10:1, 20, 27; 11:10; 14:4, 8.
As in LXX Isa. 26:16, this disciplinary action is a small affliction compared to the rewards gained from the education.

Paideia as Somatic Death (Extreme Musar) Resulting in Psychic Immortality

The concept of paideia as musar or divine discipline and testing, together with the juridical terminology set, is found not only in the final section of the text, the typological history, but also in the opening chapters, where it takes on a greater, cosmic dimension and where the education and disciplinary test can include even bodily death.

The scenario outlined in the first five chapters of the Wisdom of Solomon, depicting the struggle between the anonymous righteous man and the wicked ungodly parallels that between the righteous and the impious just examined. Here, we learn about a group of individuals who bring on their own destruction through their ignorance and their rejection of paideia, which leads them to torment, torture, and eventually murder a righteous individual, because “he reproaches us for sins against the law and charges us with sins against our paideia” (2:12), thinking that they will test the righteous man’s claims about God and true life and death (2:16-20). Yet, precisely because of their continual ignorance, they do not realize that they were not actually the ones putting the righteous man to the test. God was the one doing the testing, both of the righteous man and the impious.

At the start of chapter three, we see that this torment, torture, and murder of the righteous man was part of God’s divine, educative test. While, to the ignorant, the righteous appear to die, we find out that this was not actually the case:

Wisd. 3:1-6
1 The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and no torment will ever touch them.

2 In the eyes of the foolish they seem to have died, and their departure was considered a misfortune,

3 and their going away from us their destruction, but they are at peace.

4 For though in the sight of mortals they were punished, their hope is full of immortality.

5 And, having been disciplined a little, they will receive great good,
because God has tested them
and found them worthy of himself.

Like gold in a furnace, he tried them,
and like a sacrificial burnt offering, he accepted them.

Just like the righteous of the typological history, who had to endure the desert and thirst before receiving their reward, the righteous here must endure mockery, persecution, suffering, and, finally, death itself before receiving the ultimate reward. The stakes are clearly higher here than in the typological history; the righteous must have total faith in God and total faith that the life of the body is not the true life and that the death of the body will release the soul and allow it to live the immortal life in nearness to the divine. But, refocusing the salvific suffering and death of the {pays} of LXX Isa. 53:5, if one is able to brave this ignominious and violent test, the reward will far outweigh the brutal ordeal.

The *Wisdom of Solomon* is perfectly clear on what exactly is required in order to survive such a test and achieve the true immortal life of the soul. Those who take advantage of and fully embrace the *paideia* of Sophia and as outlined in the text will earn the reward of immortality in nearness to the divine and, especially relevant to the author’s fictive addressees, an eternal kingdom:

*Wisd.* 6:17-21

17 ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὐτῆς ἢ ἀληθεστάτη παιδείας ἐπιθυμία,  
18 φροντὶς δὲ παιδείας ἀγάπη,  
ἀγάπη δὲ τήρησις νόμων αὐτῆς,
προσοχή δὲ νόμων βεβαιώσις ἀφθαρσίας,

19 ἀφθαρσία δὲ ἔγγυς εἶναι ποιεῖ θεοῦ.

20 ἐπιθυμία ἀρα σοφίας ἀνάγει ἐπὶ βασιλείαν.

21 εἰ οὖν ἤδεσθε ἐπὶ θρόνοις καὶ σκήπτροις, τύραννοι λαῶν,

τιμήσατε σοφίαν, ἵνα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα βασιλεύσητε.

17 The beginning of Wisdom is the truest desire for paideia,

18 and concern for paideia is love for her;

and love for her is the keeping of her laws,

and attention to her laws is a guarantee of immortality;

19 and immortality makes one near to God;

20 so, the desire for Wisdom leads to a kingdom.

21 If, then, you delight in thrones and scepters, you rulers of the nations,

honor Wisdom that you may rule forever.

While the text shows clear influence of Platonic ideas concerning the role of paideia in the future life of the soul, it does not maintain the notion of the unconditional immortality of the soul. Immortality and the true life of the soul is one’s reward for enduring God’s disciplinary paideia during the mortal life, while the soul is confined to the corporeal shell. No higher reward could be imagined. Yet, the rejection of one’s paideia and a continued life in ignorance leads to the worst possible fate imaginable, the death of the soul even during corporeal existence and an eternal separation from the divine.
Apaideusia and the Death of the Soul

The concept of death in the 
*Wisdom of Solomon* has been extensively studied. Most scholarship has focused on what sort of death the author references in the first part of the text, that death which “God does not create” (*Wisd.* 1:13), whether it is supposed to be bodily, spiritual, “ultimate,” “second,” or some combination thereof.221 Yet, the idea that the souls of the wicked could die prior to their somatic death has gone largely unnoticed.222 A focus on the text’s supposed eschatology has not helped.223 Given some of the apocalyptically-tinged language used by the author, scholars have assumed apocalyptic and eschatological motifs when, instead, much

---


222 For example, John R. Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: From Sirach to 2 Baruch* (JSPS 1; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988), 52, nicely describes the contrast between the “eternal peace” of the righteous and the “eternal death” of the impious, but he suggests that his eternal death begins only with their physical death. Beverly Gaventa (“The Rhetoric of Death,” 135) notes, “the author does not treat death as a crisis that impends in the present. Death, instead, is a future point at which God will accomplish justice for the faithful.” See also William J. Deane, *The Book of Wisdom: The Greek Text, the Latin Vulgate and the Authorised English Version with an Introduction, Critical Apparatus and a Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1881), 117; and Weisengoff, “Death and Immortality,” 127, for similar views. One of the rare exceptions is Samuel Holmes, who states correctly that “Physical death, however, is practically disregarded by our author: he fixes his attention upon spiritual death, and this can take place even on earth. The wicked are made to say, ‘as soon as we were born we ceased to be’ (v. 13). According to this statement spiritual death does not mean annihilation; the wicked are spiritually dead even on earth” (*APOT* 1:530).

223 See, for example, John J. Collins, “Apocalyptic Eschatology as the Transcendence of Death,” *CBQ* 36.1 (1974): 21-43 (esp. 39); and Shannon Burkes, “Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Wisdom of Solomon,” *HTR* 95.1 (Jan., 2002): 21-44, who argues that the book is sapiential in form, “but bridges the sapiential and apocalyptic worldviews” (40). I tend to agree, instead, with Kolarcik’s recent comment, “The tenor of work’s sapiential values carries the argument of the author from beginning to the end. Though it is likely that the author made reference to and employed motifs from current apocalyptic literature, such motifs as the mysteries of God, wisdom sitting by the throne of God, and apocalyptic judgments unfolding in the cosmos, these motifs are employed within the context of a convincing and entertaining argument which are characteristic features of the sapiential worldview” (Michael Kolarcik, “Sapiential Values and Apocalyptic Imagery in the Wisdom of Solomon,” in *Studies in the Book of Wisdom* [ed. G. G. Xeravits and J. Zsengeller; Leiden: Brill, 2010], 23-36 [36]).
of the punishment of the wicked better fits their fate on earth in the corporeal shell and their learning of the ultimate fate of the righteous.  

In the opening chapter, the author exhorts the Gentile rulers of the earth to pursue righteousness and abstain from impiety. He tells them, “Do not be zealous for death by the error of your life, and do not bring on destruction by the works of your hands; because God does not make death nor does he delight in the destruction of the living” (Wisd. 1:12-13). Instead of death, God intends humanity for immortality: “For he creates all things to exist and the creations of the cosmos are salvific and there is no destructive poison in them, nor is a kingdom of Hades on earth. For righteousness is immortal” (1:14-15). The immortality intended for humankind is the immortality of the soul, and the uninvited death that God does not create is clearly the death of the soul: “Be on guard against useless grumbling, and keep your tongue from slander; for clandestine speech will not travel without effect, and a lying mouth kills [or takes away] the soul (ἀναιρεῖ ψυχήν)” (1:11).

---


225 The careful reader will note that I am taking the aorist tense verbs in 1:13-14, 16, and 23-24 as gnomic aorists and therefore translating them with a proverbial present tense. I do so according to the argument that the aorists are found in close parallel with present tense verbs and that the author is here not referencing one particular moment in the past, but a continual state. He is claiming that God never creates death, but always creates things to exist. For a full discussion see Jason M. Zurawski, “Separating the Devil from the Diabolos: A Fresh Reading of Wisdom of Solomon 2:24,” JSP 21.4 (2012): 366-399 (387-388). Several commentators have argued for a gnomic understanding of the aorists in 1:16. See Scarpat, Libro della Sapienza, 1:132; and Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon, 113.

226 Later, the text makes clear that humanity was born mortal with respect to the body: “I too am mortal like all of humanity, descended from the earthborn protoplast, and in a mother’s womb I was sculpted into flesh” (7:1). Here the author draws on the language of Genesis’ second human creation narrative in order to reference humanity’s bodily mortality, just as he seems to recall the first human creation narrative in 2:23 in order to affirm humanity’s psychic immortality. This idea along with the clearly platonic (or orphic) comment in 9:15, “For a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthly tent burdens a thoughtful mind (νοῦν),” suggests that the author of the Wisdom of Solomon envisioned a dualistic body-soul dichotomy, and he distinguishes between the natural death of the individual—the separation of the soul from the body, allowing the soul to return home to enjoy its immortal life—and the punishment death—the death of the soul even during corporeal life. Collins sees in 9:15 a tendency by the author of Wisdom to possibly devalue “the particular instances and experiences which make up the immediate substance of life. . . . This tendency is not only contrary to the wisdom tradition expressed in Proverbs and Sirach
Setting out immediately the intended destiny of humanity—immortal with respect to the soul—the author goes on to depict the impious as those who do not understand this. Their ignorance, which will result in the deaths of their own souls, centers on precisely their mistaken ideas about life and death, assuming that there is but one life and one death, that of the body:

_Wisd. 2:1-5_

1 εἶπον γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς

όλίγος ἐστὶν καὶ λυπηρὸς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν,

καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἱσις ἐν τελευτῇ ἀνθρώπου,

καὶ οὐκ ἐγνώσθη ὁ ἀναλύσας ἐξ ἀδου.

2 ὦτι αὐτοσχεδίως ἐγενήθημεν

καὶ μετὰ τούτο ἐσόμεθα ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρξαντες·

ὁτι καπνὸς ἡ πνεύ ἐν ῥισίν ἡμῶν,

καὶ ὁ λόγος σπινθήρ ἐν κινήσει καρδίας ἡμῶν,

3 οὐ σβεσθέντος τέφρα ἀποβήσεται τὸ σῶμα

καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα διαχυθῆσεται ὡς χαῦνος ἀήρ.

4 καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἡμῶν ἐπιλησθῆσεται ἐν χρόνῳ,

καὶ οὐθεὶς μνημονεύσει τῶν ἐργῶν ἡμῶν·

καὶ παρελεύσεται ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ὡς ἤχη νεφέλης

καὶ ὡς ὀμίχλη διασκεδασθῆσεται

διωχθεῖσα ὑπὸ ἀκτίνων ἠλίου

but is also in tension with the basic thrust of the Wisdom of Solomon itself. We are assured at the beginning of the book that God created all things that they might exist, and “the generative forces of the world are conducive to salvation” (“The Root of Immortality,” 191). But when we see that the existence which God intended is the immortal existence of the soul, there is no longer any contradiction.
καὶ ὑπὸ θερμότητος αὐτοῦ βαρυνθείσα.

5 σκίᾶς γὰρ πάροδος ὁ καιρὸς ἡμῶν,
καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναποδισμὸς τῆς τελευτῆς ἡμῶν,
ὅτι κατεσφραγίσθη καὶ οὐδεὶς ἀναστρέφει.

1 For they reasoned unsoundly, saying to themselves,
“short and sorrowful is our life
and there is no remedy at the end of man
and no one has been known to return from Hades.

2 Because we were born by mere chance,
and after this we shall be as though we had never existed,
for the breath in our nostrils is but smoke
and the logos is but a spark in the beating of our hearts;

3 when it is extinguished, the body will turn to ashes
and the spirit will dissolve like empty air.

4 Our name will be forgotten in time,
and no one will remember our works,
and our life will pass away like the traces of a cloud
and be scattered like mist chased by the rays of the sun
and overcome by its heat.

5 For our allotted time is but a passing shadow,
and there is no return from our death,
because it’s been sealed up and no one returns.”
This ignorant attitude leads the impious eventually to torture and murder the righteous man, thinking that if they inflict their idea of death, they will forever destroy him (2:17-20). But, in so doing, they simply reveal the difference between the two deaths and their own lack of comprehension, because, as previously discussed, their actions actually lead to the righteous man’s immortality.

In *Wisd.* 2:21-24 the author directly refutes the unsound reasoning of the impious concerning life and death:

*Wisd.* 2:21-24

21 Ταῦτα ἔλογίσαντο, καὶ ἐπλανήθησαν·

ἀπετύφλωσεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἡ κακία αὐτῶν,

22 καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωσαν μυστήρια θεοῦ

οὐδὲ μισθὸν ἠλπίσαν ὁσιότητος

οὐδὲ ἔκριναν γέρας ψυχῶν ἀμώμων.

23 ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπ’ ἀφθαρσίᾳ

καὶ εἰκόνα τῆς ἱδίας ἀδιότητος ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν·

24 φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον,

πειράζουσιν δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος οὐντες.

21 Thus they reasoned, but they were led astray,

for their wickedness blinded them,

22 and they did not know the mysteries of God,
nor hoped for the reward for holiness,
nor discerned the prize for blameless souls.

23 For God creates humanity for incorruption
and makes it in the image of his own eternity;
24 but through an adversary’s envy death enters into the world,
and those who belong to death’s party put humanity to the test.227

The impious did not realize that God intends the human soul
for immortality and that through their own wicked actions they have at the same time destroyed their own souls and made
possible the psychic immortality of the righteous:

Rejection of paideia → Actions of the impious
                → Death of the body for the righteous / Death of the soul for the impious
                → Immortal life of the soul for the righteous / Only the life of the body for the impious

Psychic immortality is conditional, and the text is clear on the causes for the loss of that immortality and the soul’s eternal death: blasphemy (1:2), slander (1:11; 2:24228), and especially lack or disregard of education. In 1:3, σκολιοὶ λογισμοὶ, crooked or perverse or unsound reasoning, is targeted as the cause of psychic death. Wisd. 2:1-5 shows that the unsound reasoning of the ungodly was specifically related to their fundamental misunderstanding when it

227 My translation of 2:24 is obviously quite different from the typical reading of the verse, “But through the devil’s envy death entered the world, and those who belong to his company experience it” (NRSV). In a recent article I discuss the problems of the traditional interpretations at length and focus on reconstructing a translation and interpretation more in line with both the Greek text and the context of the passage in the author’s argument. See Zurawski, “Separating the Devil from the Diabolos.”
228 The choice of the term diabolos in 2:24 is telling. The term points to an adversary, inimical precisely due one’s slanderous nature. See Zurawski, “Separating the Devil from the Diabolos,” 390-391.
came to the meanings of true life and death. This blindness, ignorance, or lack of discernment (cf. 2:21-22) is the root cause of further transgression, such as leading an anarchic life of debauchery (2:6-9), violence against the weak (2:10-16), and, ultimately, the torture and murder of the righteous innocent (2:17-20). These impious individuals had previously received a proper education, but they disregarded it: “[the righteous man] reproaches us for sins against the law and accuses us of sins against our paideia ( ámbartήματα παιδείας ἡμῶν)” (2:12; cf. 17:1 where it is the “ἀπαίδευτοι ψυχαὶ” which go astray).

No matter the particular transgression, throughout the text the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, perhaps against those who want this text to be more apocalyptically-oriented than it is, reinforces the idea that the individual is entirely responsible for his or her own soul. There is nothing in this world (or out) that can kill the soul except one’s own actions: “Do not be zealous for death by the error of your life and do not bring on destruction by the works of your hands” (1:12), and “But the impious by their hands and their words summon death, considering it a friend, they pine for it and make a covenant with it. For they are worthy to be of death’s party” (1:16). Unlike so many apocalyptic texts, there is no hint of superhuman evil in the Wisdom of Solomon. There are no demonic forces in the world that tempt humanity or try to prevent its righteousness. All the creatures or causes in the world are salutary (1:14). One of the overarching purposes of the text is to make known that everyone is capable of obtaining wisdom and living by the order of the universe (cf. 6:12-16). If the soul dies it is because its owner killed it. There is no psychic murder, only psychic suicide.229

The author of the Wisdom of Solomon enjoys taking traditional values and beliefs—as in the understanding of life and death—and turning them completely on their heads, all in service to

---

his belief in the fundamental role of paideia in the life of the individual. Chapters three and four describe the differences between the life of the soul and the life of the body, and here we find a dichotomy between the educated righteous and the ignorant impious, exemplified through human traits which have, in the past, had clear deuteronomistic or traditional sapiential implications. Problems such as childlessness (3:13-14) or dying young (4:7-15), which historically marked disgrace or just punishment for sins committed, now become aspects of divine paideia. The barren woman, the eunuch, and the man who dies early are not being punished through their afflictions but instead will be rewarded in the future for enduring them, because they know, like the righteous man, that the bodily life is not the true life. The wicked, instead, may have a brood of children and live to a long, old age, but all of this will account for nothing (3:16-17), because “those who reject wisdom and paideia are miserable (σοφίαν γὰρ καὶ παιδείαν ὁ ἐξουθενών ταλαίπωρος), and their hope is vain, their labors without profit, and their works useless” (3:11). The wicked may live long without their souls, but their lives will turn out horrible, and, at death, instead of enjoying that nearness to the divinity, they will simply become “corpses without honor and an outrage among the dead forever” (4:19). Like Philo, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon seems to suggest that earth is the ultimate destiny of the wicked, in the body during life and in the ground at death. But, the Wisdom of Solomon diverges from Philo on one key point, an afterlife existence, however brief, for the wicked.

After the bodies of the impious die, buried in their eternal home of earth, we see the final conviction of the wicked, with the righteous and their blessed immortality serving as the ultimate nail in their coffin: “They will come with dread at the calculation of their sins, and their lawless

231 See, e.g., Philo, Fug. 55-64; Ebr. 140-141; Leg. 1.105-107; QG 1.51; Cong. 56-57. For more, see Zurawski, “Hell on Earth,” 194-207.
deeds will convict them to their face. Then the righteous man will stand with great confidence in the presence of those who afflicted him and those who rejected his labors. When they see him they will be shaken with dreadful fear and be amazed at the righteous man’s unexpected salvation” (4:20-5:2). It is only at this point that the impious fully realize what a grave error they had made. They see the man whom they tortured and killed and realize that his God did protect him, that he actually passed the test. And they realize that they failed the test, that their miserable earthly existence is all they will ever have:

Wisd. 5:1-6a

1 Τότε στήσεται ἐν παρρησίᾳ πολλῇ ὁ δίκαιος
κατὰ πρόσωπον τῶν θλιψάντων αὐτῶν
καὶ τῶν ἀθετοῦντων τοὺς πόνους αὐτοῦ.

2 ἰδόντες ταραχθῆσονται φόβῳ δεινῷ
καὶ ἐκστάσονται ἐπὶ τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς σωτηρίας.

3 ἔρουσιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μετανοοῦντες
καὶ διὰ στενοχωρίαν πνεύματος στενάζονται καὶ ἔρουσιν

4 Οὕτως ἦν, ὅν ἐσχομέν ποτε εἰς γέλωτα
καὶ εἰς παραβολὴν ὁνειδίσμοι οἱ ἄφρονες;
τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ ἐλογισάμεθα μανίαν
καὶ τὴν τελευτήν αὐτοῦ ἀτιμον.

5 πῶς κατελογίσθη ἐν υἱοίς θεοῦ
καὶ ἐν ἀγίοις ὁ κλῆρος αὐτοῦ ἔστιν;

6 ἡρα ἐπλανήθημεν ἀπὸ ὀδοῦ ἀληθείας,
1 Then the righteous man will stand with great confidence
in the presence of his tormentors
and those who had disdain for his labors.
2 And when they see him, they will tremble with dreadful fear
and marvel at the miracle of his salvation.
3 They will speak to one another in repentance,
and, in anguish of spirit, they will groan:
4 “This is the man whom we once held in derision,
and as a by-word of reproach, fools that we are!
We considered his life as madness
and his end as being without honor.
5 How was he reckoned among the sons of God,
and how is his lot among the holy ones?
6 But it was we who strayed from the path of truth.”

In the typological history, the wicked in the desert were educated not only through their own punishments but also through the miraculous rewards of the righteous, when they would come to see and understand God as the author of all; so here too do the impious learn through their observance of the righteous man’s reward of immortal life, when they understand how horribly ignorant they were about the nature of life and death.

Just as the impious in the desert received a river of gore in return for their decree to kill the innocent and a plague of irrational animals in exchange for their worship of the creatures, the
impious here are punished according to their ignorant reasoning (3:10). They believed that this life was the only life and that death meant extinction. They assumed that their names and their works would be forgotten, that their lives, like their deeds, would simply “pass away like the traces of a cloud, be scattered like mist chased by the rays of the sun” (2:4). In 5:9-12, after the ungodly realize their grave error, they find that they ironically foretold their own punishment. All their accumulated wealth and prestige vanish like a shadow. Just as a bird’s or an arrow’s flight path immediately disappears without a trace, so too do their lives. Yet their punishment is even more severe. They assumed this would happen and that all these things would dissolve upon death. This is what led them to their libertine enjoyment of life. But, as we’ve seen, their punishment, their death, actually begins already during their corporeal existence, when they are not even able to enjoy the pleasures of the flesh. They expected nothingness upon death, but now they realize that their actions led to nothingness during life: “As soon as we were born, we ceased to be, and we had no sign of virtue to show, but were entirely consumed in our wickedness” (5:13). They realize that their psychic death means an eternal separation from the divine (cf. 1:2-3). Though they have come to recognize that their views on life and death were mistaken and their actions wicked, it is too late. They have had their opportunities for learning and repentance. They have been educated. But they rejected their education and the wisdom that comes with it. The immortality and all the gifts that come with the paideia of Wisdom are forever lost to those who denounce their education. The wicked had failed the great cosmic test, the agōn,232 which is the mortal life of the body, the proving ground designed to determine who is worthy of the immortal psychic life.

Like his Alexandrian compatriot Philo, the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon* rejected the notion of a fiery hell where the souls of the wicked would be eternally tormented in the afterlife. It would not be incorrect to say that he also rejected the notion of an afterlife reward for the righteous. Instead, the *Wisdom of Solomon* completely redefines the concepts of “life” and “death.” “Life,” according to any true and meaningful definition, is the life of the soul, which it can only fully and permanently experience once it is released from within the confines of the body. Its time on earth is merely prologue, a time of education and testing, preparation for its true destiny. Death, the one according to nature, actually leads to life. That death is really not even the death of the body, since the body is already dead, a corpse which the soul must carry around. The soul leaves the corpse behind in the ground. The new concept of “Death” is much worse, the imprisonment of the soul within this corpse, so entwined with the body and sense-perception that upon that natural death, it cannot be released. The soul becomes so attracted to its dead shell that it too dies and is simply buried in the ground along with the flesh. In the *Wisdom of Solomon*, Wisdom and her *paideia* allow the soul’s immortality and release from the corporeal prison. Wisdom “will neither enter a deceitful soul nor dwell in a body involved in sin” (1:4). Without Wisdom, therefore, the soul will be imprisoned in the body. Immortality is impossible without Wisdom and *paideia*.


In a text devoted to the divine figure of Wisdom, whom the author depicts in the loftiest possible terms, her first and principle function is as the educator of all humankind, the holy spirit of *paideia*, and it is the steadfast focus on the nature and necessity of *paideia* that unites the
seemingly disparate sections of the *Wisdom of Solomon* into a unified whole with a clear, consistent message and purpose. The opening third of the text is designed to startle and perhaps frighten the audience, with revolutionary propositions as to the true nature of life and death and the cosmic import of *paideia* and *sophia*, the means necessary to enjoy the intended psychic immortality. The properly educated know that this corporeal life of the body is fleeting and nothing more than a test to determine the worthiness of the true, immortal life of the soul. Those who have rejected their *paideia* believe, instead, that the life of the body is all there is. This *apaideusia* leads to nothing less than the death of the soul and knowledge that the righteous, who took heed of their *paideia*, will live an immortal life in the presence of the divine while they will be forever separated, their future consisting of nothing more than a corpse and the cold earth. After this opening barrage, the middle portion of the text goes on to describe the gifts that come from *paideia* and *sophia* in a loving, sensual manner. Instead of the unimaginable fate that awaits those who refuse to learn, here Wisdom’s education leads to total knowledge of the universe and immortality. From the initial shock of the opening, the middle section, beginning from the second direct address to the world rulers, reinforces the idea that it is not too late to learn, repent of past misdeeds, and choose a new path, one devoted to Wisdom and her *paideia*. Lastly, the final section of the text brings in proof of this dichotomy in a global drama, which highlights the historical results of the acceptance and disregard of God’s and Wisdom’s divine, disciplinary *paideia*. The unique history of Israel becomes here a universal typology between the righteous who learn from their education and the impious who do not and eventually suffer the ultimate fate. This section is the mundane reflection of the first. The structure is bold and effective, and it makes little sense until we understand the primacy of *paideia* in the author’s purpose as the total education of all of humankind.
The different perspectives on *paideia* seem, on the surface, to be incompatible and perhaps even contrary. And, within the text’s Greco-Roman milieu, the different views espoused in the text likely would have been considered divergent and nonsensical. Certain of the text’s paideutic concepts would have fit naturally within a Hellenistic philosophical context, such as the strong ties to wisdom, the educational content as complete knowledge of all things human and divine, the direct correlation between the *paideia* received during one’s corporeal existence and the fate of the soul after it is released from the body, and the equalizing nature of *paideia* which eradicates differences based on ethnicity and socio-economic status. However, the way in which the *Wisdom of Solomon* understands *paideia* as pedagogy would likely have been foreign to the author’s (non-Jewish) Alexandrian neighbors. *Paideia* as divine discipline, which could include physical, mental, and emotional violence and even death, does not have a parallel in Greco-Roman thought. The author was able to incorporate this type of pedagogy into his overall project based on his reading of the Septuagint prophetic literature, where *paideia* came to take on the expanded semantic range.

Despite the seemingly contrarian ideas related to *paideia*, the *Wisdom of Solomon* does exhibit an overall, all-encompassing view of *paideia*, which accounts for this plurality in meaning and the unique confluence of both educational content and pedagogy. Taken as a whole, *paideia* comes to represent an ideal, global educational system, whose goal is the immortality of the soul. It includes the content of education—the author’s own words of *paideia* in the text and Wisdom’s gift of complete knowledge—, and it incorporates the means of distilling that education—*musar*, divine testing, even corporeal death. This *paideia* does not refer solely to a particular law code or ancestral tradition; it is not meant to express exclusively the curriculum of Hellenistic education. It may include both of these, but it is more. It includes the process by
which God and Wisdom educate humanity, the divine test that is this sense-perceptible world and the somatic death that is a natural part of it. And it is the text of the *Wisdom of Solomon* itself, the author’s textbook or pedagogical manual, which, he argues, came not from apocalyptic revelation but from the experience of this world and God’s gift of divine instruction. Ethnic partiality has no place in this text, where everything is reworked into a universal drama between the righteous and the impious, where the first step on the path to gaining Wisdom is total adherence to *paideia*. The righteous are the beneficiaries of *paideia* and the ones who learn from it; the impious are those who do not, ultimately bringing on the death of their own souls. This big view of *paideia* in the *Wisdom of Solomon* is not the result of either ancestral traditions or contemporary Greco-Roman ideas alone. Using the Septuagint translations as a lens through which to read, interpret, and modify both ancient Jewish traditions and contemporary philosophy, the author was able to craft a completely new and unique *paideia*. In the *Wisdom of Solomon* we find the creation of an innovative *paideia* in process.
Chapter 6. Paul’s Letter to the Galatians

1. INTRODUCTION

Philo of Alexandria envisioned a number of unique forms of *paideia* as necessary in the total education of the individual. These included the Greek encyclical curricula, the study of philosophy, and the laws of Moses, both as practiced on a daily basis and as understood through deeper allegorical exegesis. In common to all forms of *paideia* was their preliminary nature. *Paideia*, for Philo, was always the means not the end. *Paideia* was the means to the loftier goals of virtue, wisdom, and the immortal soul. The preliminary nature of *paideia*, however, did not necessarily indicate its temporary nature. The study of both philosophy and the Mosaic law was a lifelong pursuit, never to be abandoned despite the achievement of greater strides upward. Encyclical *paideia*, however, was necessarily impermanent, to be abandoned due to the dangerous pull towards the body and the sense-perceptible. Philo’s allegorical reading of the Hagar, Sarah, and Abraham narrative was focused on exactly this issue, the value and necessity of the encyclia as a means to wisdom, but the dangers of their continued study and the need to abandon them.

Although Paul’s allegorical reading of the *Genesis* narrative seems, superficially, to be quite different from Philo’s, there is good reason for attempting to read Paul’s exegesis in light of Philo’s and strong evidence from within the letter itself that Paul had this type of reading in mind when crafting his argument. This is not to suggest that Paul was actually reading Philo—though I do not roundly dismiss the possibility—, but simply that he may have been aware of
this, perhaps popular, way of reading the *Genesis* account in the Diaspora, as Paul and Philo were both part of the same universe of discourse.²³³ Given his activities in major Hellenistic cities, it is plausible that Paul would have been conscious of two likely popular topics of conversation among the cities’ Jewish populations, the Mosaic law, as *paideia*, as a means to attaining wisdom, and Greek *paideia* as a more cautious means to attaining wisdom. Paul’s allegorical reading in *Galatians*, then, becomes part of these same conversations, though not without some fairly drastic innovation.

In his allegorical reading, Paul conflates the two paths to wisdom: Mosaic law and Greek *propaideumata*, the law itself becoming Philo’s encyclical *paideia* or Hagar, having, at one time, an educational purpose but no longer needed or desired once the end goal of wisdom has been attained. This is a concept that most of Paul’s fellow Jews would not have agreed with,²³⁴ but it is a move that Paul makes due to his conviction of wisdom being freely given to those who believe. Just as Philo sternly warned his readers of the dangers of turning back to preliminary *paideia* once having attained true wisdom, Paul warns the Galatians of the dangers of turning back to the law once having attained true wisdom via Christ. The allegory, instead of being cut off from the rest of Paul’s argument—as many scholarly interpretations would have it—is a continuation and expansion of Paul’s argument of the law as pedagogue, a tool that served a vital, pedagogic, though temporary, purpose. This concept of the Jewish law as pedagogue or preliminary *paideia* is not confined to these few verses (*Gal. 3:24-25; 4:21-5:1*), but forms the core of Paul’s main argument in his letter, which begins at 3:1. This reading of the allegory

---


²³⁴ See Philo’s arguments against the “extreme allegorizers,” who thought that they could dismiss the literal precepts of the Law because they had learned the true, allegorical interpretations of the Law (*Migr*. 89-94). That Philo is arguing against these Jews testifies to the fact that Paul was neither the first nor the only Jew to make this move.
shows a consistency in Paul’s argumentation through this central section of the letter, which has often been overlooked or misjudged due to other interpretations of the allegory.

2. PAUL’S ALLEGORICAL READING OF THE HAGAR, SARAH, AND ABRAHAM NARRATIVE

Gal. 4:21-5:1

4:21 Λέγετε μοι, οἱ ὑπὸ νόμον θέλοντες εἶναι, τὸν νόμον ὅπως ἀκούετε, ἡ γέραπται γὰρ ὅτι Αβραὰμ δύο υἱοὺς ἔσχεν, ἕνα ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης καὶ ἕνα ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας. ἡ γάρ ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης κατὰ σάρκα γεγέννηται, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας ὁ ἐπαγγελίας. ἀπινὰ ἐστὶν ἀλληγορούμενα· αὕτα γὰρ εἰσὶν δύο διαθήκαι, μία μὲν ἀπὸ ὄρους Σινᾶ εἰς δουλείαν γεννῶσα, ἦτις ἐστὶν Ἁγάρ. τὸ δὲ Ἁγάρ Σινᾶ ὅρος ἐστίν ἐν τῇ Ἄραβίᾳ· συστοιχεῖ δὲ τῇ νῦν Ἰερουσαλήμ, δουλεύει γὰρ μετὰ τῶν τέκνων αὐτῆς. ἡ δὲ ἁνω Ἰερουσαλήμ ἐλευθέρα ἐστίν, ἦτις ἐστὶν μήτηρ ἡμῶν· γέραπται γὰρ· εὐφράνθητι, στείρα ἡ οὐ στικουσα, ῥηξὼν καὶ βόησον, ἡ οὐκ ἀδίνουσα· ὅτι πολλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐρήμου μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἔχουσις τὸν ἄνδρα. ὑμεῖς δὲ, ἀδελφοί, κατὰ Ἰσαὰκ ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα ἔστε. ἡ γάρ τοῖς τοῖς μὴ κληρονομηθέντοις τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς ἐλευθέρας. διό, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἐσμέν παιδίσκης τέκνα ἄλλα τῆς ἐλευθέρας. Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν· στήκετε οὖν καὶ μὴ πάλιν ζυγὸ δουλεῖας ἐνέχεσθε.
21 Tell me, you who wish to be under the law, will you not listen to the law? 22 For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by the maidservant, the other by the free woman. 23 One, the son of the maidservant, was born according to the flesh; the other, the son of the free woman, was born through a promise. 24 Now these things should be understood in an allegorical manner: these women are two covenants. One woman, bearing children for slavery, is Hagar. 25 Now Hagar is Mount Sinai in Arabia, and she corresponds to the present Jerusalem, for she is in slavery together with her children. 26 But the other, the free woman, corresponds to the Jerusalem above, and she is our mother. 27 For it is written,

Rejoice, barren woman, you who has borne no child;
cry aloud, you who have not endured birth pangs;
for the children of the desolate woman are more numerous
than the children of the one who has a husband.

28 Now you, brothers, are children of the promise, like Isaac. 29 But just as at that time the child who was born according to the flesh persecuted the child who was born according to the spirit, so it is now also. 30 But what does the scripture say? “Throw out the maidservant and her son; for the son of the maidservant will not share in the inheritance with the son of the free woman.” 31 So then, brothers, we are children, not of the maidservant but of the free woman. 5:1 For freedom Christ has set us free. Stand firm, therefore, and do not be bound again to a yoke of slavery.

Paul’s allegorical reading of the Genesis narrative in Galatians has been extensively discussed, as it speaks to such themes continuously at the forefront of Pauline studies as Paul’s relationship
with and understanding of the Jewish law and his overall conception of the nature of the
Christian community. Recent studies, beginning from Barrett’s 1976 article, have largely
moved away from the traditional understanding of the allegory as simple anti-Jewish rhetoric and
have, instead, given more complex, compelling readings, often in light of recent depictions of
Paul associated with the New Perspective or Radical New Perspective on Paul. However,

235 Charles Kingsley Barrett, “The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians,” in Rechtfertigung: Festschrift für Ernst Käsemann zum 70. Geburtstag (ed. J. Friedrich, W. Pöhlmann, and P. Stuhlmacher; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1976), 1-16. Barrett notes the two main problems with which commentators have struggled in dealing with the allegory: the interpretation of its details and the reason Paul included it in his letter. With a few exceptions, Barrett dismisses most previous scholarship on the topic due to the fact that most scholars had either ignored the allegory altogether, or they simply dismissed its importance and place within the letter, relegating it to minor (and not very convincing) support to Paul’s larger argument. Barrett attempts to rectify this situation and, in so doing, begins a new history of interpretation followed by many modern Pauline scholars. He argues that Paul’s use of scripture in Galatians 3 and 4 is directly due to the fact that his opponents in Galatia used those same passages to their own ends, and Paul, then, tries to turn the tables on them. In the case of the allegory, Paul’s opponents used the Sarah/Hagar story, interpreting the Genesis passages literally, in support of their own argument: they are the true descendants of Abraham through the covenant made with God through circumcision; the Gentiles are descendants of Hagar; if they want to be a part of Abraham’s seed, they must be circumcised; if not, they must be cast out like Hagar and Ishmael. This move by his opponents gives Paul the impetus to take up these passages from Genesis, passages which he would not have used otherwise (due to this literal interpretation). While his opponents interpret literally, Paul asserts that the matters are to be spoken of or interpreted allegorically. When they are, the opponents’ position is reversed: the physical descendants of Sarah become the spiritual descendants of Hagar, whereas the physical descendants of Hagar (i.e., Gentiles) become the spiritual descendants of Sarah, the inheritors of the promise.

236 Unlike more traditional interpretations of Paul’s allegory as representing “two diametrically opposed covenants,” i.e., an old covenant and a new covenant (see, e.g., H. D. Betz, Galatians, [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979], 243), James Dunn, Galatians [Black’s New Testament Commentaries; London: A & C Black, 1993], 256-257) does not see in the allegory a contrast between the Jews and the Christians, but instead between those of the spirit versus those who rely on circumcision as a marker of covenant: “The child of Hagar is the child ‘born according to the flesh’; but that corresponds, not to the descendants of Ishmael, but to the Jews, or at least those of them who relied on their physical (‘according to the flesh’) descent from Abraham.” So, for example, in Galatians 4:28, “But you, brothers, are children of the promise like Isaac,” Dunn emphasizes that Paul is saying, “not ‘you’ Gentiles over against or excluding Jews in whole or part, but ‘you’ Gentile believers in particular, ‘you too.’” Dunn does not see Paul conceiving of two separate covenants here, only one, with Hagar and her offspring representing the covenant wrongly perceived. Elsewhere, Dunn makes clear that Paul’s purpose is not to distinguish between two separate covenants: “Only one covenant is at issue here—the promise to Abraham of seed. Hagar represents the covenant misconceived” (The Theology of Paul the Apostle [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998], 146 note 94.

237 Mark Nanos, “What Does ‘Present Jerusalem’ (Gal 4:25) in Paul’s Allegory Have to Do with the Jerusalem of Paul’s Time, or the Concerns of the Galatians?” presented at Central States SBL, St. Louis, March 28-29, 2004; available online, as of 2/23/2015, at: http://www.marknanos.com/Allegory-Web-Temp-5-2-04.pdf. Nanos does not see a dichotomy between Jew and Christian or between Gentile Christian and Jewish Christian in Paul’s allegory. Paul instead uses the allegory in support of his argument against proselyte conversion for Gentiles. The Sarah covenant represents the birth of free sons, “Israelites and those from the nations who join them through faith in Christ,” while Hagar represents the birth of slave sons, or Jewish proselytes (4). Gentiles have no need to become full proselytes; in fact, they must not, as it directly opposes Paul’s view of monotheism. Jews must remain Jews, and Gentiles must remain Gentiles. See also his The Irony of Galatians: Paul’s Letter in First-Century Context (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), 65-69, 156-158.
Pauline scholars continue to dismiss the possible connections between Paul’s allegory and Philo’s and the light that Philo’s reading may shed on Paul’s.\(^ {238}\) Paul uses the allegorical reading at the concluding point of his main argument in the letter, which is focused, as we shall see, on the once necessary, though no longer needed, educational value of the Mosaic law in the lives of the Jews, a context parallel to that which compelled Philo to utilize the allegory. Though the Pauline allegory looks, on the surface, unlike the extensive Philonic version, the similarities between the two are striking once we recognize the unique elements in Paul’s version.

**The Allegory within the Argumentative Structure of the Letter**

The prominent use of rhetorical analysis in determining the structure of Paul’s letters, particularly *Galatians*, can be traced, in large part, to an article of Hans Dieter Betz from 1975, based on a paper read at the previous year’s SNTS meeting in Sweden.\(^ {239}\) Though many would come to disagree with him in the details, especially his assertion that the letter was designed according to judicial oration and rhetoric, Betz’s impact on the structural understanding of the letter is without question, and most scholars of the letter today begin their structural analyses from the Greco-Roman handbooks on rhetoric and epistolography because of the foundational

\(^ {238}\) Peder Borgen (“Some Hebrew and Pagan Features in Philo’s and Paul’s Interpretation of Hagar and Ishmael,” in *The New Testament and Hellenistic Judaism* [ed. P. Borgen and S. Giversen; Oxford: Aarhus University Press, 1995], 151-164.) is the only recent scholar who has attempted to read the allegory of Paul in light of Philo of Alexandria in order to see what light may be thrown upon Paul’s interpretation of the *Genesis* passage. Although he discusses Philo’s allegorical interpretation briefly, it is chiefly in his more literal exegesis of the *Genesis* narrative where Borgen finds possible background to Paul’s allegory. In *Abr.* 247-251, Philo portrays Hagar as a sort of “borderline” figure. She is “an Egyptian by birth, but a Hebrew by choice” (*Abr.* 251), so, for Borgen, a Jewish proselyte. It is against this type of exegetical background that Paul, then, makes his chief argument in the allegory: Hagar and Ishmael represent the model for Jewish proselytes and those Judaizers in Galatia who want to make slaves out of the Christian gentiles.

work set by Betz in the 1970s. While a number of recent commentators have expressed their reservations about the benefit and applicability of ancient rhetorical criticism to assess Paul’s letters, the majority of Pauline scholars today acknowledge that there is something to be gained from a comparison with ancient rhetorical methods.

Given the widespread disagreement as to the type(s) of rhetorical situations and models Paul may have been addressing and utilizing and because of the inconsistencies in the Greco-Roman source materials themselves, we would expect a great deal of dissent in modern structural analyses. However, despite some minor terminological contention and variation, Betz’s structure has held up quite well, particularly in his outline of the primary argumentative section of the letter:

1:1-5  epistolary prescript

1:6-11  *exordium* (also known as the *prooemium* or *principium*)

---


For Betz, as for many commentators, the most decisive section of Paul’s argument in the letter is 3:1-4:31, what Betz and others have labeled the _probatio_, or the “proof.”\(^{243}\) This is the letter’s central element, whose purpose is to demonstrate to the audience the reasons why they should accept the author’s proposition, which Betz sees in 2:15-21, namely that justification or righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) comes not through the law but through faith in Christ.\(^{244}\)

Even if one is hesitant concerning the value and applicability of ancient rhetoric and epistolography to Paul’s unique circumstances and purposes, non-rhetorically-oriented structural analyses often place 3:1-4:31 as the central piece in Paul’s argument as well. For example, Lightfoot identified three main sections of the letter:

1:1-2:21 personal or narrative portion
3:1-4:31 argumentative or doctrinal portion

---

\(^{243}\) Betz is drawing on Quintilian 5; Cicero, _De inv._ 1.24.34; and _Rhet. ad Her._ 1.10.18. See “The Literary Composition and Function of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” 368-375. Some argue that Betz’s insistence that Paul is here following the model of a judicial speech has led to a rhetorical structure too complex. Both Russell and Hall argue, instead, that 3:1-4:31 is a central element in the larger _probatio_, which runs from 1:10 or 1:11 to 6:10. See Russell, “Rhetorical Analysis of the Book of Galatians, Part 2,” 421; and Hall, “The Rhetorical Outline for Galatians,” 284-286.

\(^{244}\) See also Richard N. Longenecker, _Galatians_ (Word Biblical Commentary 41; Dallas: Word Books, 1990), 80-81. Not everyone agrees that this is Paul’s proposition in the letter. Hall, for example, places it at 1:6-9, namely that the Galatians should stick to Paul’s gospel alone and reject all others. See “The Rhetorical Outline for Galatians,” 283-284.
Most important to our concern here is that Paul’s allegorical reading of the Hagar, Sarah, and Abraham narrative is included within Paul’s central argument. Betz, seemingly anticipating the objection that allegory was often considered a fairly weak argument in ancient rhetoric, and, therefore, that its place at the decisive conclusion of the probatio would make little sense, draws on Pseudo-Demetrius, who believed that simple, direct arguments were not the most effective:

In the light of the foregoing rhetorical considerations the place and function of the allegory iv. 21-31 becomes explainable. Paul had concluded the previous section in iv. 20 with a confession of perplexity (... ὁτι ἀποροῦμαι ἐν ὑμῖν). Such a confession was a rhetorical device, seemingly admitting that all previous arguments have failed to convince. Then, in iv. 21 he starts again by asking the Galatians to tell the answer themselves: Λέγετέ μοι ... τὸν νόμον ὥσκ ἀκούετε; In other words, the allegory allows Paul to return to the interrogatio method used in iii. 1-5 by another route. There this method was employed to force the Galatians to admit as eye-witnesses that the evidence

---


246 There is disagreement here. Some, like Hansen and Longenecker, prefer to situate the allegory more closely with what follows than with what precedes, in what both refer to as the “request section.” See Longenecker, *Galatians*, 197-200; and Hansen, *Abraham in Galatians*, 141-154. Much of the disagreement over the placement of the allegory is due to the digressive nature of 4:12-20, where Paul interrupts his argument with a personal, direct plea to the community. Betz has explained the difficult section, as usual, in light of ancient rhetorical exempla: “The section becomes understandable when interpreted in the light of epistolography: iv. 12-20 contains a string of topoi belonging to the theme of friendship, a theme which was famous in ancient literature. More importantly, it was customary to use material from the topos περὶ φιλίας in the probatio section of speeches as well as in letters. Quintilian includes the material among the various types of exempla,” citing Quintilian 5.11.41 (“The Literary Composition and Function of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” 372).

speaks for Paul, an admission that leaves them in the situation of ‘simpletons’ (ἀνόητοι). However, people who are to be persuaded should not be left in a situation of such low regard. By his confession of perplexity in iv. 20 Paul removes himself from the haughty position of one who has the total command of the arguments. Through the allegory he lets the Galatians find the ‘truth’ for themselves, thus convincing themselves, and at the same time clearing themselves from the blame of being ἀνόητοι Γαλάται. The conclusion (iv. 31), now stated in the first person plural, includes the readers among those who render judgement. Moreover, the conclusion of iv. 31 is not only the resume of the meaning of the allegory iv. 21-31, but of the entire probatio section, thus anticipating that the whole argument has convinced the audience. 248

Betz’s argument on the place of the allegory within the proof section and within the letter itself is admirable and works very well with Barrett’s hypothesis of Paul using an allegorical reading of the narrative in order to combat his opponents’ use of the literal reading, 249 as it becomes the culminating scriptural proof for his overall argument in the letter, as outlined in the propositio (2:15-21), that the arrival and salvific death of the messiah has fundamentally nullified the present usefulness of the law.

If the allegory in 4:21-5:1 250 is the fundamental and concluding element of Paul’s central argument in the letter that begins at 3:1, it must be interpreted in light of that argument. Interpretations of the allegory which do not cohere with this central section and with the message of the letter as whole must be dismissed. Unfortunately, Betz’s own interpretation of the

249 “The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians.”
250 As I will demonstrate, I take Gal. 5:1 as a part of the allegory’s conclusion in 4:31-5:1.
allegory, which he explains more fully in his 1979 commentary, does not, itself, accord with the meticulously crafted argument he has envisioned Paul having developed. By putting the emphasis in the allegory on “two diametrically opposed systems: an ‘old covenant’ . . . and a ‘new covenant,’” Betz essentially ignores Paul’s focus in the rest of the probatio and in the preceding propositio, both of which, as we shall soon see, are almost entirely focused on the changing role of the Jewish law in light of Jesus Christ. And, by missing or ignoring the fact that the allegory continues and concludes Paul’s previous arguments concerning the essential, though temporary, nature of the law, Betz et al. have failed to make use of a clear, contemporary parallel usage of the Genesis narrative, Philo’s allegorical reading.

We can further distinguish the following sections within the argumentative center, or probatio, of the letter:

3:1-12 What the law cannot and was not intended to accomplish
3:13-18 I.e. those things faith in Jesus Christ was intended to provide
3:19-24 The divinely intended purpose of the law
3:25-29 The situation post-Christ
4:1-10 Dangers of turning back to the law, post-Christ
4:11-20 Rhetorical digression, personal plea

---

251 Galatians, 243.
252 Others, too, have understood the central place of the allegory, yet have downplayed this connect to the law. Troy Martin, “Apostasy to Paganism: The Rhetorical Stasis of the Galatian Controversy,” JBL 114.3 (Autumn, 1995): 437-461, understands the allegory’s primary emphasis being on those who are in versus those who are out: “Paul designs this allegory to prove that those who desire to be under law and practice the distinctions of circumcision are not the elected offspring of Abraham even though they are circumcised” (457). Clearly, the fate of the two types of individuals is an integrated, important part of Paul’s argument with the allegory. Yet, by solely focusing on this aspect, Martin and others have overlooked the true purpose of Paul’s bringing this allegory into the equation, namely as final scriptural proof of the analogical argument he had been making through the rest of the proof section, that the law once had a necessary function that is now no longer needed due to the arrival and death of the messiah.
In the arguments leading up to the allegory, we find Paul setting up a comparison much akin to Philo’s between the encyclical or preliminary studies and loftier wisdom, though with two significant differences: one, the Mosaic nomos fills the role of Philo’s encyclical paideia as the necessary preliminary education, and two, the loftier goal of wisdom has been freely given to the community of believers. Once we understand these two dramatic shifts, the comparison to Philo’s allegorical reading becomes clear.

The Jewish Law as Pedagogue or Preliminary Paideia

The first discrepancy from the Philonic allegory, Jewish law as the preliminary paideia, was a hugely consequential and highly controversial move, as putting the law of Moses in the place of Philo’s encyclia meant that the law had a necessary, yet temporary role in the lives of the Jewish people. Paul was not the only second temple Jew to argue this point, but many or even most of his contemporaries would have viewed this assertion as deeply problematic.253

At the very start of the probatio, Paul follows up on the letter’s proposition he laid out in 2:15-21. Gal. 3:3 vividly expresses Paul’s primary problem with the community and serves as the jumping-off point for his arguments regarding the actual purpose of the law: “Are you so foolish that, having begun in the spirit you will now finish in the flesh?” In 3:1-12, he explains to the Galatians what the law cannot and, importantly, was never intended to accomplish. These

---

253 See note 3 on Philo’s extreme allegorizers in Migr. 89-94.
were likely points of contention with Paul’s adversaries and those in Galatia who had been convinced by them. According to Paul, the law was not designed to provide the spirit (3:2, 5), to permit the doing and witnessing of miracles (3:5), to provide the blessing of Abraham (3:7-9), to provide justification (3:11, 21), or to make alive (3:21). These things were, instead, provided by faith and belief in God. Thus was the purpose of Christ, to fulfill the promise to Abraham. Therefore, Jesus Christ replaced the law (3:13), so that all could receive those things that the law could not provide: the spirit, justification, and Abraham’s blessing (3:14).

Dunn and others from the New Perspective have argued that Paul’s references here and elsewhere to not being justified “by the works of the law (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου)” (3:2, 5, 10), though referring generally to all that the law requires, should, in this particular case, refer instead to those specific aspects of the law that serve to mark Jew from Gentile, laws pertaining to circumcision, Sabbath observance, and dietary regulations.254 The assertion, however, that ἔργοι νόμου was, in essence, a terminus technicus is tenuous, as there are no known examples of this type of usage prior to Paul, despite attempts to see something similar in 4QMMT. The notion that the various congregations in Galatia would have immediately understood the phrase as a metonym for only those aspects of the Jewish law that functioned to keep the Jews separated from the Gentiles is difficult to believe. As we shall see in the discussion of the stoicheia below, if Paul intended the phrase to have more than its superficial meaning, it was likely within the realm of a particular attitude towards the following the law, a slavish devotion. Furthermore, as Paul continues his arguments, he stops speaking of the “works of the law” in favor of simply “the law.”

If justification of sins was not the purpose of the law, “why then the law?” (3:19). Paul tells us exactly why in *Gal. 3:19-24*. The law “was given for the sake of transgressions, until the seed to whom it was promised should come” (3:19). Despite what some commentators suggest, this verse does not have any negative connotation in regards the law.\(^{255}\) If we follow Paul’s logic, what he suggests is that the promise was given to Abraham because of his faith, but yet transgressions continued to increase. Therefore, the law was given in order to help, to educate the Jews and to inform them of their sins. As opposed to those not under the law, who might transgress without knowing it, the Jews have been given a great gift and a great help. The educational role of the law was a common theme with Paul, and in this he was not alone.\(^{256}\) We have seen in previous chapters numerous examples of Jews, Greeks, and Romans who understood the law as having a fundamental role in the education of the individual.\(^{257}\) Paul’s more controversial move, at least within the realm of Second Temple Judaism, was the necessary impermanence of this educational tool.

*Gal. 3:23* is another verse that many scholars use to affirm Paul’s negative portrait of the law: “Before the faith came, we were protected under the law, contained until the faith would be revealed (Πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἐλθεῖν τὴν πίστιν ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρονοῦμεθα συγκλειόμενοι εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι).” The primary point of contention here is the understanding of the phrase ἐφρονοῦμεθα συγκλειόμενοι, which most modern English translations take as...

\(^{255}\) Traditional interpretation of 3:19a has long seen this (and cf. Rom 5:20) as Paul arguing that the law was given to actually produce sin and increase wickedness, with 3:19b referring to the inferiority of the law due to angelic or even demonic mediation. See the discussion and bibliography in Dunn, *The Theology of Paul*, 139-140, as well as Dunn’s refutation of this line of interpretation. For a more recent understanding of 3:19 along traditional lines, see Chris VanLandingham, *Judgment & Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2006), 207.


assigning the role of jailor to the law as opposed to guard or protector, as my translation attempts to make clear. See, e.g., the NRSV translation: “Now before faith came, we were imprisoned and guarded under the law until faith would be revealed.” The Greek terms themselves are ambiguous and context-dependent, and, therefore, the verse must be read in light of the Paul’s other arguments regarding the law at this point in the letter. As with 3:19, I argue that Paul is suggesting the law’s preparatory, custodial purpose, an idea continued in his depiction of the law as the child’s pedagogue in the following verses.

*Gal. 3:24-25*

24 ὡστε ὁ νόμος παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν γέγονεν εἰς Χριστὸν, ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶμεν. 25 ἐλθούσῃ δὲ τῆς πίστεως οὐκέτι ὑπὸ παιδαγωγὸν ἔσμεν.

24 So then the law was our pedagogue until Christ, in order that we might be justified by faith. 25 But now that the faith has come, we are no longer under a pedagogue.

Paul’s analogy here between the Jewish law and the (Greco-Roman) pedagogue is indeed unique, as, outside of his comment in *1 Cor.* 4:15, which does not provide much help here, the Greek παιδαγωγὸς occurs nowhere else in the New Testament or the Septuagint. Most scholars have explained Paul’s use of the concept in the comparison as coming from two motivations. First, and most clearly, Paul wants to highlight the temporary nature of the Jewish law. The Greco-Roman sources, while depicting the pedagogue in varying terms, from loving family member and mentor to evil, sadistic terror, all agree that the pedagogue’s role in the life of the

---

258 For the various scholarly views, see David J. Lull, “‘The Law as Our Pedagogue’: A Study in Galatians 3:19-25,” *JBL* 105.3 (Sep., 1986): 481-498 (486-487).
child was temporary.\textsuperscript{259} This first point, then, is conclusive. The second, however, is more problematic.

Often through superficial or carefully selective readings of the Greco-Roman sources, many have chosen to highlight the more negative portrayals of the pedagogue and, from that, the law.\textsuperscript{260} Some, following the lead of Dunn and others that Paul’s main problem with the law in \textit{Galatians} is in its particularistic aspects, focus on the pedagogue’s protective role as the guardian of a child. In this way, Paul argues that the law was meant to keep the Jewish people separated from Gentiles, but only for a time.\textsuperscript{261} The view of the law here is not so much negative as neutral.\textsuperscript{262} Others, instead, have sought a more nuanced understanding of Paul’s motivations through both a thorough examination of the sources and a reading better contextualized within

\textsuperscript{259} There have been several nice reviews of the relevant literature. See Lull, “‘The Law as Our Pedagogue’: A Study in Galatians 3:19-25”; Norman H. Young, “\textit{Paidagogos}: The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor,” \textit{NT} 29.2 (1987): 150-176; and Young, “The Figure of the \textit{Paidagōgos} in Art and Literature,” \textit{The Biblical Archaeologist} 53.2 (Jun., 1990): 80-86.

\textsuperscript{260} Older, more traditional scholarship has, not surprisingly, only seen a negative association here. Yet, even more recent studies have focused on the negative. See for example, Richard N. Longenecker, “The Pedagogical Nature of the Law in Galatians 3:19-4:7,” \textit{JETS} 25/1 (March 1982): 53-61. Longenecker, based on his examination of the pedagogue in Greek and Hebrew sources, asserts that “It is not possible to interpret Gal 3:24-25 as assigning a positive preliminary or preparatory role to the Law. The point of the analogy for Paul is not that the Law was a preparation for Christ. Rather, the focus is on the inferior status of one who is under a pedagogue and the temporary nature of such a situation” (55-56). According to E. P. Sanders, \textit{Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People} (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 66-67, “The law as pedagogue, then, is more an enslaver than a protector. Thus it is understandable that many scholars view the phrase ‘on account of transgressions’ in 3:19 as meaning ‘for the sake of producing transgressions.’ This reading . . . can be derived from the enslaving character of the pedagogue (as interpreted by Gal. 4:2) and from the phrase ‘imprisoned under sin’ in 3:22.” D. F. Tolmie, “Ὁ \textit{ΝΟΜΟΣ ΠΑΙΔΑΓΩΓΟΣ ΗΜΩΝ ΓΕΓΟΝΕΝ ΕΙΣ ΞΡΙΣΤΟΝ} [sic]: The Persuasive Force of a Pauline Metaphor (GL 3:23-26),” \textit{Neotestamentica} 26.2 (1992): 407-416, argues that the inferiority of the law with respect to faith means that there cannot be a positive interpretation of the pedagogue. Instead, the point of the metaphor is to point out the temporary nature of the law and notion of confinement and slavery to it (412-413).


\textsuperscript{262} As Esler remarks, “Paul is not suggesting that there is anything particularly negative about the law in the use of this analogy, only that it is by definition, and of necessity, restrictive in its operation and limited as to its time of application. . . . The law has passed its use-by date.” See Philip F. Esler, \textit{Galatians} (New Testament Readings; London: Routledge, 1998), 202.
the letter. Most notably, David Lull, refuting the principally negative view of the law in the metaphor found in earlier scholarship, argues for a more complex set of associations imposed upon the law through the analogy with the pedagogue, which include the temporal limitations, the function of the law to prevent transgressions and bridle the passions, and the experience of those under the law as one of slavery, though with the enslavement meant to protect and govern action rather than induce to sin.²⁶³

There is much to agree with in Lull’s reasoned arguments. However, he and most other commentators on the passage, have too easily dismissed the educational, preparatory intent inherent in Paul’s analogy.²⁶⁴ The view of the pedagogue in the ancient sources is highly varied and ambiguous. Yes, the pedagogue could be described as a very strict disciplinarian whose most conspicuous accessory was the stick, good both for walking and for beating misbehaving children. But, he also served a necessary purpose in a child’s upbringing. The pedagogue was responsible for protecting the children under his care on their way to and from school, both from

²⁶³ Lull, “‘The Law as Our Pedagogue’: A Study in Galatians 3:19-25.”
²⁶⁴ For example, Gordon argues, “Although it is adequately established, for instance, that the παιδαγωγός fulfilled a tutorial or academic function in some households, that understanding does not make sense in this pauline context” (“A Note on ΠΑΙΔΑΓΩΓΟΣ in Galatians 3.24-25,” 152). It is unclear to me why an educational function should not fit the context. According to Young, “The presence of φρουρέω and συγκλείω in close conjunction makes it clear that Paul’s main point—if not his only point—in the metaphor is not a matter of discipline, education, instruction or punishment, but of restriction. That is, that under the law Israel experienced a curtailment of freedom akin to the limitations imposed on a child by a pedagogue” (“Paidagogos: The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor,” 171). Young, whose article has much to offer, places a too restrictive view here, picking and choosing which associations with which to limit the Greek term. There are a number of problems here. First, if a term was commonly understood as x, y, and z together, the modern scholar cannot choose to simply dismiss those aspects which do not suit one’s argument. Second, the combination of φρουρέω and συγκλείω in the previous verse is not decisive; the connection to guardianship and confinement would well include matters of discipline, education, instruction, and punishment. And lastly, the idea that Paul’s explanation of the past relevance of the law in Gal. 3:1-5:1 should be restricted to only one, narrow contention is naïve and overly simplistic. Paul uses five unique metaphors in order to make his point: law as guard (3:23); law as pedagogue (3:24-25); law as steward and manager (4:1-2); law as stoicheia (4:3, 8-9); and law as Hagar (4:21-5:1). There are commonalities among them all, but there are also unique elements in each. Paul is not just simply repeating the same argument over and again. Finally, see Karl Olav Sandnes, Challenge of Homer: School, Pagan Poets and Early Christianity (LNTS 400; London: T&T Clark, 2009), chapter 17, “The New Testament and Encyclical Studies,” 248-277 (esp. 259-262), who argues that, in general, there is no propaedeutic view of the law in Galatians. Sandnes’ argument, however, is primarily against some common traditional scholarship/theology which claimed that Paul’s view of the law here was as preparation for the Jews for Jesus and the Christian faith, which I, of course, am not arguing.

231
outside dangers and the inner impulses of the passions. Depending on the slave’s own literate education, he would also tutor the children in their lessons and sometimes even give primary instruction himself. However, even if the pedagogue did not actively take part in his ward’s literate education, he was typically the one in charge of the moral education of the child—“paideia which leads one towards virtue (ἡ εἰς ἀρετὴν παιδεία)—and the child’s character development. It is no surprise, then, that those same slaves described as vicious tyrants were also remembered fondly, with deep affection, and were often manumitted.

This type of ambiguity in description can often be found within the oeuvre of a single author, including Philo of Alexandria. Philo, likely drawing on his favorite philosophers, both past and contemporary, and his own personal experience, had mixed feelings about the pedagogue. In the same treatise, Philo can at once argue that nurses and pedagogues (τιτθαὶ καὶ παιδαγωγοὶ) help to foster “foolishness, intemperance, injustice, fear, cowardice, and the other ruinous things which are inborn (ἀφροσύνην ἀκολασίαν ἀδικίαν φόβον δειλίαν, τὰς ἄλλας συγγενεῖς κήρας)” (Sacr. 15; cf. Her. 295), and later compare those who love the passions and hate right reason (ὁρθὸν λόγον) to foolish children who hate their “pedagogues and teachers, and every reproving and chastising word (τοὺς διδασκαλοὺς καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς καὶ πάντα νουθετητῆς καὶ σωφρονιστῆν λόγον)” (Sacr. 51). Elsewhere, Philo claimed that anyone who lives their life without a pedagogue and teaching (ἀπαιδαγώγητον καὶ ἀδίδακτον) will be a slave forever to self-conceit, appetites, pleasures, injustice, foolishness, and erroneous conceptions (Cher. 71).

---

265 See Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 34-46.

266 In Plutarch’s discussion of whether virtue can be taught, he says of pedagogues: “For these are the first to receive the child once it has been weaned, and, just as nurses form its body with their hands, so the pedagogues, by the habits they instill, lead the child’s character towards the first step on the path to virtue (πρῶτοι γὰρ οὗτοι παραλαμβάνοντες ἕκαστος, ὅπερ αἱ τίθαι ταῖς χερσὶ τὸ σῶμα πλάττουσιν, οὕτω τὸ ἢμος ῥυθμίζουσι τοῖς ἔθεσιν, εἰς ἐγνώς τι πρῶτον ἁρετῆς καθιστάντες)” (An virtus doceri possit 439f). See H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1956), 144; Lull, “‘The Law as Our Pedagogue’: A Study in Galatians 3:19-25,” 491.

267 Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome, 41.
understood the necessity of pedagogues (παιδαγωγῶν), teachers (διδασκάλων), parents (γεννήσαντες), or guardians (ἐπιτρόπους), who would reprove and correct the errors of children, and that children who had pedagogues were better off than those who did not (ἀπαιδαγωγήτων) (Det. 145). Here we see that, in addition to teachers, nurses, and parents, Philo, like Paul, saw a connection between the pedagogue and the “guardian/steward” or ἐπιτρόπος (Gal. 4:1-2; cf. Legat. 26). And, like Paul, Philo saw a connection between the pedagogue and the law:

Philo, Migr. 116

σωφρονιστῶν ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἔθος, παιδαγωγῶν, διδασκάλων, γονέων, πρεσβυτέρων, ἀρχόντων, νόμων· ὀνειδίζοντες γάρ, ἐστι δ` ὑποῦ καὶ κολάζοντες ἐκαστοι τούτων ἀμείνους τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπεργάζονται τῶν παιδευομένων.

This, as it would seem, is the custom of superintendents, and of pedagogues, and of teachers, and of parents, and of elders, and of rulers, and of laws; for they, at times, do each of them reprove and punish and render the souls of those being educated better.

Philo, Legat. 115

μόνους γὰρ Ἰουδαίους ὑπεβλέπετο, ὡς δὴ μόνους τάναντα προηρημένους καὶ δεδιδαγμένους ἐξ αὐτῶν τρόπων τινά σπαργάνων ὑπὸ γονέων καὶ παιδαγωγῶν καὶ ψηφηγητῶν καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τῶν ἱερῶν νόμων καὶ ἐτι τῶν ἀγράφων ἑθῶν ἕνα νομίζειν τῶν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ κόσμου θεόν.
For he was suspicious of the Jews, as they alone cherished wishes opposed to his and had been taught from their very swaddling-clothes by their parents, and pedagogues, and instructors, and even before that by their holy laws, and also by their unwritten customs, to believe that there was but one God, the father and the creator of the world.

Although Philo did not make a direct analogy between the law and the pedagogue, as Paul did, these examples do show that Paul was not alone in associating the Jewish law with the pedagogue, in a positive, educational context. In both of these passages, the pedagogue is connected to the law by the very fact that they both serve to educate children in virtue.

The evidence, from both Greco-Roman and Jewish sources, no matter how ambiguous they may be in their attitudes towards the pedagogue, is clear in the integral connection between the pedagogue and education. To dismiss this fundamental aspect of the pedagogue’s function in favor of solely highlighting other possible attributes, such as the slave’s oppression or protection of his charge, is to miss entirely Paul’s motivations for the analogy. In reality, we should try to understand the term, and from that the metaphor, as his original audience, many of whom no doubt having first-hand, daily interactions with pedagogues of various sorts, would have.

Therefore, we must say that the pedagogue was a slave entrusted with a child’s protection and education; he could often seem quite oppressive, especially through the eyes of a child, though, in the end, he was often remembered with great fondness; and, he was a necessary, yet temporary, component of a child’s moral development into adulthood. This, all of this, is what Paul wanted his audience to understand about the role of the law for the Jewish people, and why he chose the pedagogue specifically in the metaphor as opposed to a didaskalos. In making the comparison, Paul asserts that the law had a necessary pedagogical and protective purpose at one
time for the Jews. Being under the law could be oppressive, but it was necessary for their security and development on the path towards wisdom and virtue. In this way it was an amazing gift that God gave to the Jewish people and no one else, but it had a shelf-life; it was never designed to be permanent.

Paul’s message has been consistent throughout the *probatio* section of the letter thus far: the law did have a positive, intended purpose for the Jewish people, but its purpose was not to provide justification of sins or Abraham’s inheritance. Like Philo’s encyclical *paideia*, Paul’s law had a necessary, educational role in the lives of the Jewish people. And, also like Philo’s encycelia, Paul’s law was necessarily temporary, thus the analogy to childhood, expressed poignantly by Philo who claimed that as an infant relates to an adult, so the preliminary studies relate to knowledge in virtue (τὰ ἐγκύκλια τῶν μαθημάτων πρὸς τὰς ἐν ἀρεταῖς ἐπιστήμας) (*Sobr. 9*), and by Paul’s argument of the law as pedagogue that leads to Christ and thus virtue (ὁ νόμος παιδαγωγὸς ἤμων γέγονεν εἰς Χριστόν). The glaring difference between Philo’s preliminary studies and Paul’s is that Philo gives the clear subordinate position to Greek *paideia*, which must, at some point, be abandoned; Paul gives the same place to Jewish *paideia*.

**Jesus Christ as Wisdom**

Paul’s first divergence from the Philonic interpretation of the Hagar/Sarah allegory concerned the Hagar side of the allegory—Jewish law as preliminary *paideia* as Hagar—, the second relates to Sarah. In Philo, Sarah represented loftier virtue and wisdom, the goal that the student Abraham sought and that necessitated the abandonment of the preliminary studies, Hagar, once attained. For Paul, this loftier virtue or wisdom has been found with the arrival and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Christ has provided the goal for which the Mosaic law served as preparation for the
Jews. The law did have an essential purpose at one time, but that time has since passed. Those of faith are no longer infants but full-grown adults, and to go backwards is not an option. This move that Paul makes is seen repeatedly throughout his letters (e.g. Rom. 7:4; 10:4), and it is explicitly made in the argument leading up to the allegory. A key passage is 3:13-14: “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, becoming a curse for us . . . in order that the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, in order that we might receive the promise of the spirit through our faith.” Christ has released humanity from the need of preliminary education via the *nomos*. The goal to which the law was preparatory has now been freely given: “But when the fullness of time had come, God sent forth his son, born from woman, born under the law, in order that he might redeem those under the law, in order that we might receive adoption as sons. And because you are sons, God sent forth the spirit of his son into your hearts, crying out, ‘Abba! Father!’ So that you are no longer a slave but a son, and an heir through God” (4:4-7). Note that Paul is not arguing that Christ himself was the goal of the law, but that Christ has provided that to which the law was always meant to be preparatory, wisdom. This goal has now been freely given to those who have faith, both Jews and Gentiles; therefore, the law is no longer needed and, as we shall see, actually dangerous.

An association between wisdom and Jesus Christ from Paul is not surprising. Scholarly discussion on the topic has always centered on Paul’s christology and whether or not he had a “Wisdom christology.” However, these studies have often suffered from two major problems, the first methodological, the second conceptual. First, the assessment of Paul’s possible Wisdom christology has been based on insufficient and/or overly reductive views of the figure of Wisdom in Jewish sources, the development and diversity of which is extremely complex.\(^\text{268}\) The larger

\(^{268}\) For example, Dunn, like many others, tries to simplify this complex situation into a unified Jewish view on the figure of Wisdom: “In short, the Wisdom of God is not something other than God, but God’s wisdom, God in his
problem, however, lies with the question itself, which is anachronistic and assumes that Paul was a sort of systematic theologian. Modern scholars and theologians can argue about whether Paul had a Wisdom christology, or a Son of God christology, or an Adam christology, or a Kyrios christology. Paul would likely not have not understood the question. It would be most accurate to say that Paul did not have a christology at all, at least in our understanding of the concept. He had certain ideas about Jesus Christ as the messiah, ideas that varied and were not always consistent in terms of modern theological standards. But this, of course, is irrelevant to Paul’s actual world of thought. To argue that Paul had this or that type of christology is to distill down a complex set of ideas, each of which worked in different ways and towards different ends for Paul, into a simple concept, which obscures Paul’s actual understanding of Jesus Christ and the purpose of his letters.

While I will not argue that Paul had—or did not have—a Wisdom christology, it is clear that he often associated Jesus with Wisdom and described Jesus in ways that other Jews in the past had described Wisdom. The best evidence for this is found in his letters to the Corinthians. In 2 Cor. 4:4, 6, Paul describes Christ as being the “image of God (εἰκόν τοῦ θεου)” and his face as shining with the “light of the knowledge of the glory of God (φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ),” both of which recall the beautiful poem praising Wisdom in Wisd. 7, especially 7:25-26:

Wisdom was universally understood within early Judaism as God’s wisdom, as the immanent God in his wise engagement with his creation and his people” (Theology of Paul, 271-272) See also his Christology in the Making (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 163ff. While Dunn does believe that Paul had a wisdom christology, Gordon Fee disagrees. His disagreement is based, in part, on a problematic and limited understanding of the figure of Wisdom in the ancient Jewish literature, which, for Fee, does not include Philo of Alexandria! See Gordon D. Fee, “Wisdom Christology in Paul: A Dissenting View,” in The Way of Wisdom: Essays in Honor of Bruce K. Waltke (ed. J. I. Packer and Sven K. Soderlund; Grand Rapids; MI: Zondervan, 2000), 251-279. See also A. Van Roon, “The Relation between Christ and the Wisdom of God According to Paul,” NT 16.3 (Jul., 1974): 207-239. For a brief history of research, see Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 118-126.
For she is a breath of the power of God
and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty;
therefore, nothing defiled gains entrance into her.

For she is a reflection of eternal light,
a spotless mirror of the working of God,
and an image of his goodness.\(^{269}\)

In 1 Cor. 10:4, Paul refers to the story of Moses striking the rock at Horeb, providing miraculous water for the people to drink (Ex. 17:6; Deut. 8:15), though in Paul’s version, the rock was Christ: “and everyone drank the same spiritual drink. For they drank from the spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock was Christ (καὶ πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ πνευματικὸν ἔπιον πόμα· ἔπινον γὰρ ἐκ πνευματικῆς ἀκολουθοῦσης πέτρας, ἣ πέτρα δὲ ἦν ὁ Χριστός.).” The connection here to Wisdom is obscured until we see that Philo, in his allegorical reading of the account, claims that

the rock was divine Wisdom herself: “for the abrupt rock is the Wisdom of God (ἡ γὰρ ἀκρότομος πέτρα ἡ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστίν), which being both sublime and the first of things he quarried out of his own powers, and from which he gives drink to the souls that love God” (Leg. 2:86). 1 Cor. 8:6 is one of the primary places where scholars have claimed Paul exhibits a preexistent Wisdom christology: “yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist (ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν εἰς θεός ὁ πατήρ ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἰς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς δι᾽ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι᾽ αὐτοῦ).” The verse recalls the role Wisdom had in creating the world found in Proverbs, Ben Sira, the Wisdom of Solomon, and throughout Philo’s corpus.²⁷₀

Elsewhere, Paul is even more explicit. In the first part of 1 Corinthians, he distinguishes worldly wisdom—which God actually made foolish (ἐμώρανεν)—with the wisdom of God: “My speech and my proclamation were not in persuasive words of wisdom, but in a demonstration of the spirit and of power, in order that your faith might not rest on human wisdom but on the power of God (δύναμει θεοῦ)” (1 Cor. 2:4-5). This dunamis is God’s wisdom which is Christ, as Paul had just made clear:

1 Cor. 1:24

αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς κλητοῖς, Ἰουδαίοις τε καὶ Ἑλλησίων, Χριστὸν θεοῦ δύναμιν καὶ θεοῦ σοφίαν·

²⁷₀ See even the similar language in Philo, Det. 54: πατέρα μὲν τὸν γεννήσαντα τὸν κόσμον, μητέρα δὲ τὴν σοφίαν, δι᾽ ἡς ἀπετελέσθη τὸ πάν.
But to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God.

1 Cor. 1:30

ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ύμεῖς ἔστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, δός ἐγενήθη σοφία ἡμῖν ἀπὸ θεοῦ, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἁγιασμὸς καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις,

But from him you exist in Christ Jesus, who became for us wisdom from God, and righteousness and holiness and redemption.

Paul was clearly not averse to associating Christ with the figure of Wisdom when the comparison suited his needs. In 1 Corinthians, Paul sought to differentiate the wisdom of this world—which is not wisdom at all—with God’s wisdom, represented by Christ. In Galatians, we find a similar strategy: the Jewish law belongs to the wisdom of this world—along with the pedagogue, guardians/administrators, and the stoicheia—, but with Christ comes the wisdom of God. These mundane things are, thus, represented by Hagar in the allegory; the divine, by Sarah, just as Philo’s mundane encyclical paideia found representation in Hagar and loftier wisdom in Sarah. This does not mean that Paul was disparaging the law or Philo the preliminary studies. It simply shows that the law and the encyclia were subordinate to that goal of all philosophically oriented Jews, Greeks, and Romans: wisdom.

4. THE DANGERS OF THE LAW
Philo repeatedly emphasized the inherent dangers of the encyclical studies, the pull they had on the student, and, therefore, the desperate need to abandon them once having risen to the higher level of wisdom. To remain in or return to the encyclical was to be mired in the sense-perceptible, the somatic, and the mundane. In *Galatians*, Paul similarly argues that an attachment to the Jewish law was critically dangerous once the goal of wisdom via Christ has been reached.

**Situation Post-Christ (*Galatians* 3:25-29)**

To this point, Paul has spent much of the *probatio* arguing against, what was to him, a mistaken understanding of the Jewish law and its purpose. In 3:1-12, he describes those things that the law cannot and, more importantly, was never intended to do, such as provide justification and the inheritance of Abraham. These gifts, so Paul tells us (3:13-18), were to be provided by the arrival and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Instead, Paul explains that the true, divinely intended purpose of the law was for the protection and education of the Jewish people (3:19-24). In this line of argumentation, 3:25-29 then serves as a major transition:

*Gal. 3:25-29*

25 ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς πίστεως οὐκέτι ὑπὸ παιδαγωγῶν ἐσμέν. 26 Πάντες γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστε διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ· 27 οὐσοὶ γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστόν ἐνεδύσασθε· 28 οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαίος οὐδὲ Ἑλλήν, οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θήλε. πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἰς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. 29 εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ, ἀρα τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα ἐστέ, κατ᾽ ἐπαγγελίαν κληρονόμοι.
25 But now that the faith has come, we are no longer under a pedagogue; 
26 for you are all sons of God through the faith in Christ Jesus.  
27 For, as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. 
28 There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is not male and female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus. 
29 And if you are Christ’s, then you are the offspring of Abraham, heirs according to a promise.

Prior to this, when Paul discussed the intended educational purpose of the law, he referred to the situation of the Jews prior to Jesus Christ (the first-person plurals in 3:23-24). With the arrival of Christ (3:25), Paul’s language shifts in order to reflect his overtly stated belief that the situation of the world has shifted. He no longer refers solely to the condition of the Jews; his concern now is for the baptized community as a whole, Jews and Gentiles together, and his personal addresses—both first- and second-person plurals—throughout the remainder of the letter should be taken as such, beginning from 3:25 itself: “But now that the faith has come, our entire baptized community is no longer under a pedagogue.”

Paul, continuing his metaphor, claims that baptism in Christ and the entering of the community is akin to the transition of a child into adulthood. The adults—i.e. those of the community—have no need of the law and no need of distinctions. They are all now heirs of Abraham.

Τὰ Στοιχεῖα τοῦ Κόσμου and the Danger of the Law Post-Christ (Galatians 4:1-10)

271 See J. Albert Harrill, “Coming of Age and Putting on Christ: The Toga Virilis Ceremony, Its Paraenesis, and Paul’s Interpretation of Baptism in Galatians,” NT 44.3 (Jul., 2002): 252-277. Harrill convincingly explains the curious idea in Gal. 3:27 that those have you have been baptized have “put on Christ” or “clothed themselves in Christ” in light of the Roman toga virilis ceremony, which marked the child’s transition into manhood and freedom from the pedagogue (see especially Plutarch, Mor. 37c-e and Suetonius, Divus Claudius 2.2).
Gal. 4:1-2 appears, at first glance, to be an aside, a simple parenthetical throwaway designed to explain his comment about the community being the heirs of Abraham in 3:29. However, Paul utilizes this small section of text to string together earlier elements of his argument with the important points to come:

Gal. 4:1-2

1 Λέγω δέ, ὃς ὁ δὲ σὸν χρόνον ὁ κληρονόμος νήπιος ἔστιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου κύριος πάντων ὃν, 2 ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπου ἔστιν καὶ οἰκονόμους ἄχρι τῆς προθεσμίας τοῦ πατρός.

1 Now what I’m saying is this: as long as an heir is a child, he is no different from a slave, though he may be lord of everything, 2 but he is under guardians and administrators until the time set by his father.

The allusions to his argument concerning the law as the Jews’ pedagogue in 3:24 are clear. Like the pedagogue, the guardians and administrators serve a necessary, preparative function for the child heir, but they too are temporary and are no longer needed once the child reaches maturity. The hupo clause in 4:2 (ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους . . . καὶ οἰκονόμους) recalls the hupo clauses in 3:23 (ὑπὸ νόμου) and 3:25 (ὑπὸ παιδαγωγόν). It is not surprising, then, that many scholars argue that, as with 3:23-24, the child heir must represent the Jews and the guardians/administrators the Jewish law. But, this is only partially correct.

As with the pedagogue analogy, scholars have often argued that with Gal. 4:1-2, Paul is arguing that the Jewish people were enslaved to the law. See, e.g., Betz, Galatians, 244; Esler, Galatians, 180; and Sanders, Paul, the Law, 66. For a more positive view, see Dunn, The Theology of Paul, 142; and Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 149.
We saw that, in 3:25-29, Paul transitions from his discussion concerning the intended educational purpose of the law for the Jews prior to Christ to the situation post-Christ. His focus shifts from the Jews alone to all those part of the baptized community, Jews and Gentiles together. He does not return now to the discussion of the Jews alone but continues his concern for the community in toto. Yes, these lines should remind us of the Jews and the law prior to Christ, but they also foreshadow Paul’s wider concern for the community post-Christ. The first clue is the reference to the “heir” or κληρονόμος in 4:1, a term Paul had just used to describe the baptized community in 3:29. Second, the idea of the child heir as slave is telling, as Paul has not yet raised the issue of slavery, an issue that becomes crucial in verses to come. Despite attempts to prove otherwise, Paul’s pedagogue metaphor was in no way meant to depict the Jews as slaves to the law. Unlike the pedagogue metaphor, the child heir refers to the community as a whole. It was not the Jewish people alone who were to be the heirs of Abraham but all his offspring, all of humanity. The guardians/administrators would have intentionally conjured up different notions to the different members of the community; to the Jews surely they were understood as the Mosaic law. To what exactly they referred for the Gentile members is more difficult to say, but the next portion of text, which follows this same pattern, should help.

Gal. 4:3-10

3 οὗτος καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅτε ἦμεν νήπιοι, ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ἣμεθα δεδουλωμένοι· 4 ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικός, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον, 5 ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ, ἵνα τὴν υἱοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν. 6 Ὅτι δὲ ἔστε υἱοί, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν κραξον· αββα ὁ πατήρ. 7 ὡστε οὐκέτι εἰ δοῦλος ἀλλὰ υἱός· εἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ
κληρονόμος διὰ θεοῦ. 8 Ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν οὐκ εἰδότες θεὸν ἐδουλεύσατε τοῖς φύσει μὴ ὁδυσθεὶς θεοῖς. 9 νῦν δὲ γνώντες θεὸν, μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ, πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἁσθένη καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεία οἷς πάλιν ἄνωθεν δουλεύειν θέλετε; 10 ἡμέρας παρατηρεῖσθε καὶ μὴν καὶ καιροὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦς.

3 So too with us; while we were children, we were enslaved under the stoicheia of the world. 4 But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, 5 in order to redeem those under the law, so that we might receive adoption as children. 6 And because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his son into our hearts, crying, “Abba! Father!” 7 So that you are no longer a slave but a son, and if a son then also an heir through God. 8 Formerly, when you did not know God, you were enslaved to things which by nature are not gods. 9 Now, however, that you have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to the weak and beggarly stoicheia? How can you want to be enslaved to them again? 10 You are observing special days, and months, and seasons, and years!

This passage and to what specifically these stoicheia tou kosmou should refer has long been the topic of extensive scholarly discussion.273 The Greek term stoicheion has the basic meaning of a part of a larger whole or series and, in classical Greek literature, commonly refers to an element of language or music—e.g. a syllable, the initial sound of a word, a letter, a part of

273 For reviews of the pertinent secondary literature, see Gerhard Delling, “στοιχεῖον,” TDNT 7:670-687; David R. Bundrick, “Ta Stoicheia Tou Kosmou (Gal 4:3),” JETS 34/3 (September 1991): 353-364; and Martinus C. de Boer, “The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” NTS 53 (2007): 204-224. Bundrick sees three typical interpretations of the stoicheia in the scholarly literature: principal (i.e. rudimentary principles), cosmological (i.e. components of the cosmos), and personalized-cosmological (i.e. personalized powers or spiritual beings).
speech, a note, etc.—, an elementary or foundational principle, or one of the four basic elements that make up the universe and everything in it—earth, water, air, and fire. Wink argues that the Greek stoicheia was used in essentially the same way that we use the English “elements,” as referring to irreducible components, of what exactly being deduced from the specific context. In order to understand Paul’s meaning here, four primary questions must be addressed: (1) To whom does ἡμεῖς refer in 4:3? (2) To what exactly should the stoicheia refer? (3) What is the significance that these stoicheia are tou kosmou? (4) Are the referents in 4:3—both the stoicheia and those enslaved to them—the same as those in 4:8-9?

Clearly, how one answers the first question directly affects the answer to the second. Most scholars now take the ἡμεῖς in 4:3 as referring solely to the Gentile members of the community, who, prior to their entry into the community, were enslaved to their pagan “gods,” the stoicheia taken to mean the four basic elements of the universe—i.e. tou kosmou—which had been elevated to divine status. Those who argue that 4:3 refers to the Gentiles, then argue the same for 4:8-9. Some have argued instead that the “we” of 4:3 should refer solely to the Jewish members of the community. Linda Belleville, for example, contends that the stoicheia in both 4:3 and 4:9 must refer to “elementary or rudimentary principles” or “the regulatory principles of the world,” as they more certainly do in Col. 2:8, 20, where, importantly, they are also tou kosmou. However, she sees the first reference pertaining to pre-Christian Jewish life under the

275 See Dunn, The Theology of Paul, 108, who notes, “The long debate about the reference of stoicheia should almost certainly be regarded as settled in favour of the elemental substances of which the cosmos was usually thought to be composed (earth, water, air, and fire). The point here is that these substances were also commonly divinized (mythologized or personified) as divine spirits or deities.” Cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 554; and Betz, Galatians, 205. Note that though we do not have clear evidence of this meaning of stoicheia in classical Greek literature, we do find that both Philo (Vit. Cont. 3-5) and the author of the Wisdom of Solomon (7:17-19; 13:1-3) assumed worship or deification of the cosmic elements. This has been a favored understanding of the phrase in Galatians 4 since the early patristic period.
Mosaic law and the second to Gentile life under some other, unspecified set of regulatory rules.

Burton too had argued for a principal reading of the *stoicheia*, but that, in both 4:3 and 4:8-9, they should be applicable to both Jewish and Gentile Christians, the ἡμεῖς being inclusive of both. More specifically, following Tertullian’s interpretation, he claimed that these *stoicheia* are “the rudimentary religious teachings possessed by the race.” They are *tou kosmou* in order to signify that they belong to the world of humanity or, as Bundrick has it, “the *stoicheia* possessed by the peoples of the world.”

Recently, Martinus de Boer has sought a solution to the quandary that allows for both the inclusiveness found in Burton or Bundrick but with an understanding of the Greek terminology more consistent with contemporary usage. Following the work of Blinzler, Schweizer, and Rusam, de Boer confidently begins from the assumption that “the phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου

276 Linda L. Belleville, “‘Under Law’: Structural Analysis and the Pauline Concept of Law in Galatians 3.21-4.11,” *JSNT* 26 (1986): 53-78 (esp. 68-69). Cf. Sigurd Grindheim, “Not Salvation History, but Salvation Territory: The Main Subject Matter of Galatians,” *NTS* 59 (2013): 91-108. Gindheim, though differentiating the referents in 4:3 and 4:8-9, sees a sort of conflation between the two: “Paul’s use of this phrase is the clearest example of his tendency to confl ate the history of Israel and the history of the Galatians. In 4.3, he and his fellow Jews are enslaved under the elements, and in 4.9 he associates these same elements with the Galatians’ former life in idolatry. If the Galatians were to embrace circumcision, it would constitute a return to the very same elements to which they had been enslaved when they were pagans.” (99) As will be discussed next, this is an idea more fully developed by De Boer and Woyke.

277 E. D. Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (New York: Scribner's, 1928), 510-518 (518). Burton, however, qualified the comment with the following note: “If the fact that στοιχεῖα is rather infrequently used in the sense of elementary teachings while, the physical sense is very common, seems to necessitate understanding τὰ στ., τ. κ. as in some sense physical or related to the physical sense, the interpretation most consonant with the evidence would be to understand τ. in that loose and inclusive sense in which it is employed in Orac. Sib. as including both the physical constituents of the world, and the sky and stars. To the στοιχεῖα in this sense, the Jews might be said to be enslaved in the ordinances pertaining to physical matters, such as food and circumcision, and also as the context suggests in the observance of days fixed by the motions of the heavenly bodies, while the bondage of the Gentiles to them would be in their worship of material images and heavenly bodies. See also D. A. Black, “Weakness Language in Galatians,” *GTJ* 4 (Spring 1983): 15-36, who similarly claimed that the *stoicheia* are “the rudimentary teaching regarding rules, regulations, laws, and religious ordinances by means of which both Jews and Gentiles, each in their own way, tried to earn their salvation” (19). They are followed by Bundrick, “Ta Stoicheia Tou Kosmou,” 362.


279 Bundrick, “Ta Stoicheia Tou Kosmou,” 362.
is a technical expression referring in the first instance to the four elements of the physical universe: earth, water, air, fire,” and that the Galatians would have understood the phrase immediately in this sense.\footnote{“The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 207-208.} These stoicheia were, additionally, the weak, impotent things, which are not gods by nature (4:8-9) but which the Galatians had at one point apparently worshiped as such. Using texts from Philo and the \textit{Wisdom of Solomon} as support for the idea that at least some Jews conceived of Gentiles worshiping the elements of the universe, de Boer takes Paul’s use of the phrase \textit{ta stoicheia tou kosmou} as a metonym for a wider complex of Galatian religious beliefs and practices centered on the four constituent elements.\footnote{“The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 220.}

Despite what is, to his mind, a clear referent, de Boer is not convinced that this meaning is adequate to Paul’s argument at this point in the text and that the phrase must have had some additional intended meaning. Pointing out that the phrase \textit{hupo nomon} in 4:4-5 serves as an “apparent synonym” for the phrase \textit{hupo ta stoicheia tou kosmou} and is meant to echo 3:25, where Paul argues that, with the arrival of Christ, the people are no longer \textit{hupo paidagōgon}, de Boer understands Paul establishing a parallel between existence \textit{hupo stoicheia} to that \textit{hupo nomon} where a return to observance of the Jewish law is equivalent to a return to the worship of the \textit{stoicheia}.\footnote{“The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 213-216.} This is the reason Paul decided to bring the \textit{stoicheia tou kosmou} into the discussion at this point in his argument: “in Paul’s mind the observance of the Law and the veneration of the στοιχεῖα were in some sense functionally and thus also conceptually equivalent.”\footnote{“The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians,” 215.} Paul, then, reinforces this equivalence in his deprecation of calendrical observances, using terminology that would apply to both Jewish and pagan festivals (4:10). In the end, according to de Boer, Paul argues that, with the coming of Christ and the gift of
redemption through faith, enslavement to the *stoicheia tou kosmou* is no different from enslavement to the Jewish law, and that to turn to the Jewish law now would, in effect, return the Galatians to a time when they still worshipped the *stoicheia*.284

Following the argument on the transitional nature of *Gal. 3:25-29*, where distinctions are now abolished, both within the baptized community and with regard to Paul’s personal addresses in the remainder of the letter, I agree with those who support an inclusive reading 4:3, with the ημείς referring to the community as a whole, Jews and Gentiles alike. Paul’s use of third-person plural when describing the Jews relationship to the law (3:13, 23-24), substantiates this interpretation. The *hupo* preposition, as with 4:2, should recall the *hupo* clauses of 3:23 and 3:25, but it is not directly parallel. The people “under the *stoicheia*” need not be the Jewish people alone, and the *stoicheia* need not refer to the Jewish law alone. Paul’s rhetoric is more complex and nuanced; he not only permits the ambiguity of the Greek terminology to stand on its own, not providing any definitive qualifiers, but he actually uses the ambiguity to his advantage,

---

284 Johannes Woyke, “Nochmals zu den ‘schwachen und unfähigen Elementen’ (Gal 4.9): Paulus, Philo und die *stoicheia τοῦ κόσμου*,” *NTS* 54 (2008): 221-234, in this article from a year later, Woyke takes up de Boer’s work, attempting to better understand how Paul could conceptually equate observance of the Jewish law with pagan worship of the *stoicheia*. In this, Woyke sees the depiction of the *stoicheia* in *Gal. 4:9* as “weak and impotent” particularly enlightening and comes to understand this impotence as the inability of the *stoicheia* to overcome the passions and desires of the flesh. Woyke finds help in Philo’s allegorical reading of *Gen. 15*, found primarily in his treatise *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* (*Her.*), where Philo asks whether an individual who is dependent on the body and the sense-perceptible is capable of inheriting incorporeal and divine things (*Her.* 63). In order to become heir of the spiritual, Abraham had to abandon his ties to the earthly and to the flesh, symbolized by his former Chaldean home and his former gods, and instead focus on the noetic and incorporeal. While in *Her.* 274, Philo makes clear that the mind, which must reside in the body, requires encyclical education in order to return back to its original, desired state as pure soul or mind, Woyke here assumes that this “Tugenbildung” is exemplified in the Mosaic law (229), setting up a clear distinction between, on the one hand, Philo’s dichotomy between the *stoicheia* of Abraham’s Chaldean past and the *nomos* which allows Abraham to become the true heir and, on the other, Paul’s equivalence between the Jewish *nomos* and the pagan *stoicheia*. Paul, for Woyke, understands both the *nomos* and the *stoicheia* as relegated to the earthly and fleshly and imbued, therefore, in sin. Philo’s reading of *Gen. 15:15* in *Her.* 277-279, Woyke finds so analogous in Paul’s argument of returning to the *stoicheia*, that he posits the possibility that Paul was facing opponents in Galatia with knowledge of this Jewish-Hellenistic interpretation (233).
intending a dual referent for his mixed audience of believers, a notion most closely hinted at in de Boer’s article.

While de Boer makes the case that only with the calendrical observances does Paul’s reference to the veneration of the *stoicheia* serve fully as an actual equivalent to the observance of the law,²⁸⁵ I would argue that Paul’s reference to the *stoicheia* itself was intended to be simultaneously understood as both the elements that comprise the universe and the elements that comprise the Torah. Paul is purposefully drawing on the ambiguous understanding of the Greek term *stoicheion*, which, as we saw, could regularly refer to either an element of the cosmos or to an element of language, most telling in the case of Paul, to a letter or γράμμα. While technically the *stoicheia* were to be distinguished from the *grammati*, in many classical authors, they appear as virtual synonyms.²⁸⁶ It is this common usage of *stoicheia* as *grammati* that Paul expects his readers to understand as the second referent in Gal. 4:3 and 4:9, and, in this way, we are reminded of Paul’s typical antithesis between the letter of the law and the spirit, particularly after the death of Christ: “For, while we were in the flesh, the sinful desires, which come via the law, were at work in our limbs to bear fruit for death. But now we have been released from the law, having died to that which we were bound, so that we are slaves (δουλεύειν ἠμᾶς) in the newness of the spirit, not in the oldness of the letter (γράμματος)” (Rom. 7:5-6; cf. Rom. 2:27-29; 2 Cor. 3:5-8). Just as the people were enslaved to the *stoicheia tou kosmou* prior to Christ, so too were they enslaved to the letter of the law. In *Gal*. 4:3, Paul chose the term *stoicheia* over the near equivalent *grammati*, so that he could make the passage relevant to the Gentiles as well as the Jews: as the Gentiles were enslaved to their elemental deities, the Jews were enslaved to the

²⁸⁶ See, e.g., Plato, *Theaetetus* 202e-203a. Philo often uses the term to refer either to individual vowels or to letters in general (*Opif.* 126; *Sacr.* 74; *Agr.* 136; *Her.* 282; *Cong.* 150; *Leg.* 1.14; 3.121.). See the discussion in LSJ, στοιχεῖον, II.1.

250
precepts of the Torah. The conceptual equivalence, as argued by de Boer, between the pagan religiosity and Jewish Torah practice becomes even clearer if we read the *stoicheia* as referring to religious and/or cultural foundations fundamental to both Gentiles and Jews, especially after the arrival of Christ. His addition of *tou kosmou* serves to highlight the human, created, and temporary nature of the *stoicheia* in opposition to the divine and eternal nature of the spirit now possessed by the members of the community.

Paul continues the imagery of slavery to the *stoicheia* in *Gal. 4:8-9*: “Formerly, when you did not know God, you were enslaved to things which by nature are not gods. Now, however, that you have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to the weak and beggarly *stoicheia*? How can you want to be enslaved to them again?” While this language may seem excessive to describe the Mosaic law, it comes to make sense in the context of the law originally intended as *paideia* preliminary to wisdom and unnecessary or even dangerous once that wisdom is achieved. Just as the Gentiles served the elements as if they were actually deities, the Jews served the elements of the law as if they were themselves gods, and now that Christ has come and, with him, the desired goal of wisdom, the elements of the law are just as weak and ineffectual for the believers as the cosmic elements were to the Gentiles. Just as Abraham had to abandon his beloved Hagar—and encyclical studies—so those who have been baptized into Christ must leave the law behind.

Paul’s purpose in 4:1-10 and the complicated yet effective rhetorical structure he developed is directly tied to that crucial line from the start of his argument, “Are you so foolish, that, having begun in the spirit, you now would finish in the flesh?!” This same incredulity is found in 4:9-10, with Paul amazed at the illogicality of the Galatians, and it leads to his personal plea in 4:11-20, a digression before he completes his argument with the allegory of Hagar and
Sarah. The rhetorical nature of the digression is signaled immediately with the first-person verbs φοβοῦμαι and κεκοπίακα: “I fear for you, that I may have labored for you in vain” (4:11). These verbs are echoed at the conclusion of the digression: “My children, for whom I am again in the pain of childbirth (ὠδίνω) until Christ is formed in you, I wish I could be with you now and that I could change my tone, for I am perplexed by you / for I have a difficult question for you (ἀποροῦμαι)” (4:19-20). While both of these meanings are possible for the verb ἀπορέω, with the first translation the more common and the one universally used by commentators, the second fits well within the context of the passage and leads more naturally to the question Paul immediately raises.\(^\text{287}\) Regardless of the meaning intended, the language of the verses clearly signals that he is going to take up his argument anew, this time utilizing a different tactic.

5. THE ALLEGORY AND ITS PURPOSE

With the allegorical reading of the Hagar and Sarah narrative, Paul makes his final defense, concisely highlighting the major pieces of his argument to this point: the intended purpose of the law, the need to abandon the law post-Christ, and the dangers of not doing so. When we arrive at the allegory and the closing of the letter’s argumentative center, we sense Paul’s desperation in the face of what must have been a persuasive counter-argument. He immediately alerts his readers that he will take on the problem of adherence to the law within the community from a new angle, as if sensing that his previous metaphors and analogies had not quite landed. He tells his readers that if they are apparently so desirous of being under the law (ὑπὸ νόμον), they must understand what the law itself actually says (about being under it) (4:21). But, he is not going to

\(^{287}\) See LSJ, ἀπορ-έω, (B) 1., for the first meaning, and (B) 2., for the second, where it is used prominently in dialectic.
simply use the Mosaic law as a source of proof texts, as is his wont. Instead, he informs his readers that he will exegate the law in a non-literal manner, explicitly stating that the referenced passages from Genesis (Gal. 4:22-23) were originally spoken of or written allegorically (4:24), something that he does nowhere else. Paul’s final argument for abandoning the law will come via the law itself, but he makes clear that it is through the properly understood meaning of the law, not the plain, literal meaning. The unequivocal reference to Moses’ intended allegorical meaning of the text alerts his audience to, one, the mistaken understanding of the text espoused by the trouble-makers who have attempted to distort the gospel of Christ (1:7), and, two, an allegorical understanding of the narrative of which they may have already been aware, namely, an exegetical tradition akin to Philo’s reading, the only other allegorical interpretation of Hagar and Sarah we know of to this point.

One could imagine a scenario in which Paul’s opponents in Galatia used the story of Abraham, Hagar, Sarah, and their children in support of their own agenda. They hoped to

---

288 I prefer to understand Paul’s phrase ἅτιν ἐστι προφήτης ἀλληγορούμενος as meaning “these things are spoken of allegorically,” as opposed to “interpreted allegorically,” as many commentators have it. While the difference may seem slight—for if something is spoken of allegorically then it must, out of necessity, be interpreted that way—there is a crucial nuance missed if this participle is not properly understood. Paul is not simply saying that he plans on giving his own, allegorical, interpretation of the Genesis passages. He is affirming that when Moses wrote these passages, he specifically wrote them allegorically, with the intended meaning which Paul wants to explain. The difference lies in the authority given to the interpretation. One is your own; the other is Moses’ original meaning that you are bringing to light.


290 I am following Barrett’s lead here. See note 3.
convince the community that it was necessary to hold to the Mosaic law in its entirety. They used, therefore, a more literal exegesis of the narrative to support their argument: they are the ethnic heirs to the covenant made with Abraham by means of circumcision; if anyone hopes to be heirs as well, they must be circumcised and follow the precepts of the Torah. Given Paul’s vehement stance in the letter, this argument was obviously quite persuasive to some of the Galatians. Paul then responds to this move by telling his audience that the text is not meant to be taken literally but allegorically, as Moses intended. Hagar does not represent the uncircumcised, but preliminary *paideia* in the form of the Jewish law; Sarah does not represent followers of the law but wisdom and virtue through faith in Jesus Christ, which provided justification and the true inheritance of Abraham.

Paul’s discrepancies from the allegorical tradition—Mosaic law as preliminary studies and wisdom via Christ freely given to those of faith—are reinforced with a contrast between the “slave woman” and the “free woman,” a point that Philo did not exploit in his exegesis. While, in Paul’s reading, Sarah represents the heavenly Jerusalem, the mother of the true heirs, the promise made to Abraham, the spirit, and freedom (4:26, 28-29, 31), Hagar symbolizes Mt. Sinai—a not opaque reference to the law—, the mundane Jerusalem, the flesh, and the mother of slaves who will not inherit (4:25, 29-31). Paul emphasizes Hagar’s connection to slavery in order to demonstrate to the Galatians the mistake of becoming again enslaved to the *stoicheia* of the Jewish *paideia* now that the goal of Sarah, freedom, has been attained.

This dichotomy is extended to the contrast between Ishmael and Isaac. For Philo, Ishmael, as the offspring of the somatic connection between Abraham and Hagar, was the heir and representative of sophistry, while Isaac, the offspring of the noetic union between Abraham and Sarah, was heir to wisdom. Paul draws a similar contrast, using his typical language of flesh
and spirit compared to Philo’s normal opposition of body and soul/mind. Ishmael, “born according to flesh” (4:23), was born into slavery to the Mosaic *paideia*, being, in essence, a sophist, slavishly devoted to the letter—or *stoicheion*—of the law. Isaac was born “through a promise” (4:23), that is, through Sarah, and therefore born into freedom and wisdom and as Abraham’s true heir. As we saw, God did not give the inheritance through the law (i.e. Hagar), “but God freely gave it to Abraham *through a promise*” (3:18).

Philo tells us that one reason Ishmael was banished with his mother was “because he, being illegitimate, was mocking the legitimate son, as though he were on terms of equality with him” (*Sobr.* 8). For Paul, Ishmael was banished because “the one born according to the flesh persecuted the one born according to the spirit” (4:29). Paul’s opponents in Galatia—the children of Hagar, the devotees of the law—are persecuting Paul and the Galatian communities—“the children of the promise like Isaac” (4:28). The connection between the baptized and Isaac is telling. Not only was Isaac Sarah’s son and Abraham’s heir and thus represented the pneumatic union between Abraham and Sarah, while Ishmael represented the dangers of the sarkic desires of preliminary *paideia*, but Paul may also be betraying knowledge of Philo’s view of Isaac as the representative of the “self-taught race (αὐτομαθὲς γένος),” those who have no need of preliminary instruction in order to attain wisdom:

But these men were husbands of many wives and concubines, not only those who were citizens, as the sacred scriptures tell us. But Isaac had neither many wives nor any concubine at all, but only his first and wedded wife, who lived with him all his life. Why was this? Because the virtue which is acquired by teaching (ἡ διδακτικὴ ἀρετή), which Abraham pursues, requires many things, both contemplations legitimate according to
prudence and those which are illegitimate according to the encyclical, preliminary studies 
(τὰ ἐγκόκλα προπαιδεύματα). . . . But the self-taught race (αὐτομαθῆς γένος), of which 
Isaac was a partaker, the greatest joy of good things, has received as its share a nature 
simple, unmixed, and pure, standing in need of neither training nor instruction, in which 
there is need of the concubine sciences and not only of the citizen wives. For, when God 
had showered down from above the noble self-learned and self-taught, it would have 
been impossible to continue to live with the slavish and concubine arts, desiring 
illegitimate doctrines as if children. (Cong. 34-36)

Here we find both Abraham as an example of one who needed paideia to attain loftier wisdom 
and Isaac as one who is freely given wisdom, with no need of external instruction or training. 
Paul is, in essence, telling the community that they are like Isaac because they no longer need 
preparatory instruction in order to attain the promise. They’ve already received it because of 
their faith. The ends to which the law was the divinely intended means have been achieved, 
making the law now unnecessary.

Paul ends his allegorical interpretation and the central argumentative section of the letter 
in the very same way he began the probatio, “For freedom Christ has set us free. Therefore, 
stand firm and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery” (5:1), echoing, once again, that key 
verse, 3:3, “Are you so foolish that, having begun in the spirit you will now finish in the flesh?” 
Philo would have made the same argument with respect to Greek paideia. For the self-taught 
Isaac, who begins with wisdom, to become enamored of the encyclical studies and move 
backwards to a time of childhood is an absurd and contrary notion.
6. CONCLUSION

By viewing Paul’s chief argument in his letter as a whole, of which the allegory is an essential part, and not looking at 4:21-5:1 in isolation from what surrounds it, we see that Paul is consistent and coherent in his message, and he displays a level of rhetorical sophistication not typically associated with the apostle to the Gentiles. Philo made the connection between Hagar and Greek *paideia* in order to both encourage his audience to take up the encyclical studies and to warn them of their dangers. Paul makes the connection between Hagar and Jewish *paideia* in order to explain the role the law had played for the Jews and to warn his audience of the danger of taking it up post-Christ. Unlike Philo, Paul does not encourage those in the community to take up the Mosaic law as *paideia*, because a new means of attaining Abraham’s inheritance has been found in the messiah’s justifying death and the baptized believer’s faith.

The implications of Paul’s allegorical reading in *Galatians* are clearly widespread, especially in what it may add to the scholarly discussion of Paul and the Jewish law, the makeup of the communities he founded, and the place of Paul within the wider realm of Second Temple Judaism. While the more modern schools of Pauline studies are to be credited with having a better, though by no means full, understanding of Judaism at the time of Paul, despite those scholars who maintain, rightly, that Judaism was not some form of stringent legalism, almost every scholar, when attempting to understand Paul’s place within that Judaism, nevertheless relies solely on Paul’s view of the Jewish law. Depending on the particular author’s interpretation of Paul’s view of the law, Paul either was divorced from Judaism (i.e. no longer saw the law as necessary for Christ believers) or was fully part of Judaism (i.e. he was Torah observant). Given our modern understanding of Second Temple Judaism, with its almost endless
diversity, it’s regrettable that the discussion of Paul within Judaism takes place exclusively over how he related to the law.

While Paul does make the rather drastic move of equating the Mosaic law with Philo’s preliminary *paideia*, something that should be discarded once the goal of wisdom is attained, this does not mean that Paul thought of the law in essentially negative terms. Paul never, here or elsewhere, tells us that the law itself is bad or opposed to human will. It’s one’s overzealous devotion to the letter of the law, mistaking the created for the creator, which becomes problematic, especially given Paul’s addition of Christ into the equation. For Paul, as for Philo, the Mosaic Torah was a means to an end. Paul’s divergence comes when he suggests that the means are no longer needed once the end is achieved.

This reading, then, of the allegory and the *Letter to the Galatians* as a whole, understands a Paul who called for the abandonment of the Jewish law within the baptized community, for both Jews and Gentiles. Note that Paul’s focus here is *within* the community. He is not arguing, at least not here, for the abrogation of the law for all Jews, only for those who have been baptized into Christ. Now, whether or not he believed that all of humanity—Jews included—were guilty of sin and therefore needed the justification that only faith in Christ could provide, is another question and one not raised here. Paul’s focus in *Galatians* is on the community of believers, who, seemingly inclusive of himself, must no longer strictly hold to the precepts of the Torah.
Summary and Conclusions

As Plato in his Republic or Aristotle in his Politics well knew, education is a key component in the complex, multi-faceted formation of identity, both of the self and of the collective. Isocrates’ assertion that it was paideia which actually made one Greek rather than a shared genetics or ethnicity (Panegyricus 50) would serve as the basis for the spread of Greek education in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Plato’s understanding of paideia as conversion in this respect is telling. Education has the power to convert the soul, to direct one to see that which truly exists rather than mere shadows dancing on the walls of a cave (Republic 514-518). The reorientation of the soul reflects the reshaping of the self.

According to Erich Gruen, “The fashioning and refashioning of identity constitutes a staple item in Jewish history. The matter took on particular urgency in an age when Hellenic power and Greek culture held sway in the Near East.” The process of identity formation is complex and often amorphous, and it occurs on a multitude of levels, involving every aspect of ethics, culture, and overall worldview. Discussions of education can provide the ideal vantage points from which to observe this process in action, as ideal education reflects those values most highly prized and necessary for the individual and within a community. As with Plato or Aristotle or Isocrates, discussions of paideia provided Philo, the author of the Wisdom of

---

292 Erich S. Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism: The Reinvention of Jewish Tradition” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 292. Gruen demonstrates how this identity fashioning could occur through creative retellings of such integral stories as the Exodus or the Joseph narratives.
Solomon, and Paul a means to contemplate the individual and the individual’s place within the collective, and these discussions allow the modern reader unique insight into the shaping of identity in process.

Our three authors all used and revered the Greek Septuagint texts as the holy, received traditions of Moses and the prophets. The Septuagint and its translation of *paideia* for the Hebrew *musar* fostered the development of their unique educational theories. The Septuagint came to serve as a lens through which later authors could reimagine and merge their ancestral traditions together with Greek philosophical influences and thereby construct images of *paideia* ideally suited to their own specific aims and audiences, images which reflect their individual shaping of the self and collective Jewish identity. The very inclusion of *paideia* in the Greek translations provided these Jewish thinkers with their own internal, historical discussions of the fundamental concept, allowing them to enter into wider Greek and Roman conversations concerning the ideal nature, role, and significance of *paideia*. And the expanded semantic range of the Greek terminology found in the Pentateuch and prophetic literature opened up new possibilities for integrating the Jewish God and questions of theodicy into the overall education of the individual. With the Septuagint, *paideia* became both Greek and Jewish.

We find the incorporation of *paideia* into the Jewish ancestral traditions nowhere more important and central than in the writings of Philo of Alexandria. Questions of *paideia* are found throughout his work, whether explicitly or lurking in the background, and Philo’s overall conception of *paideia* is foundational in determining the complexities of his worldview. Philo’s idealized educational program includes the curricula of Greek encyclical *paideia*, training in philosophy, and both the practice and study of the laws of Moses. The value of education is beyond compare. Education provides the means to combat the irrational passions, a life properly
balanced between the active and the contemplative, access to virtue and wisdom, and the preparation of the soul for its future immortal life. These benefits are available to all of humanity through education; Philo’s outlook here is decidedly global. Philo never sets up any sort of Greek education versus Jewish education antagonism. It is rare that he even designates encyclical paideia as specifically Greek, though it assuredly was. Instead of being at odds, Greek and Jewish forms of education appear to work together, and both were required for the vast majority of people. Philo’s example here of a true Jewish/Greek, religious/secular, native/foreign educational system would prove critical in the history of modern Western education, influencing heavily the early Christians, to whom credit is typically given for developing this synthesis and thereby carrying Greek education into modernity. It is true that Philo urged caution when it came to the preliminary studies and argued that they must be abandoned at a certain point, but in this he was no different from contemporary non-Jewish philosophers. And it is true that the Mosaic law held a unique and prominent place within Philo’s ideal education, but in the law’s true educational content and aims, there is a decidedly cosmic perspective. The Jews are unique in possessing an incomparable teacher in Moses and the best possible textbook in his law. The Mosaic law, in Philo’s hands, is not a particular, ethnocentric code of conduct, but rather the guide to becoming a true citizen of the world, living according to the universal cosmic law, of which the Jewish law is a reflection. Mosaic paideia aims at the same truths as Greek philosophy; it just does it better. Because followers of the innate natural law serve as exemplars of wisdom and virtue throughout history and throughout the world, those who follow the Mosaic law too must serve as models or, in Philo’s terms, priests for the rest of humankind.

We find a similar universalist view of paideia in the Wisdom of Solomon. This text, contemporary to Philo, is addressed to the kings of the earth, who are called upon to take up the
author’s *paideia*, gain wisdom, and attain immortality, and the author goes out of his way to erase the distinctions between Jews and Gentiles, even in the particular history of the Jewish people, which the author reshapes in order to illustrate the division not between Jews and Gentiles, but between the righteous and the impious, the educated and the ignorant. As in Philo, education is responsible for the greatest possible goods. However, the necessary pedagogy described in the *Wisdom of Solomon* is in stark contrast to Philo’s forms. While Philo would argue that the rod is better viewed as a symbol of *paideia*, which is able to beat back desire and irrational passion, rather than a cane used to beat children at their lessons, the author of the *Wisdom of Solomon*, utilizing the extended meaning of *paideia* found in the Greek prophetic literature, would make violent punishment an integral part of humanity’s education. All manner of suffering in this world is reimagined as divine discipline and testing, including even the death of the body. Corporeal existence is portrayed as nothing more than an *agôn*, a testing ground where God determines who is worthy of the only life that truly matters, the immortal life of the soul. This more pessimistic view of the world seems to reflect the author’s contemplations on theodicy and his solution to, perhaps very real, experiences of suffering. And all of this is played out in his discussion of ideal education.

Paul offers us a unique view in his *Letter to the Galatians*, as, unlike the other two authors, Paul espouses a messianic, apocalyptic worldview and a firm belief in the immediacy of the eschaton, and these core values are reflected in his view of the temporary educational value of the Jewish law. Paul’s view of the law prior to the arrival of Christ would have matched well Philo’s: the law of Moses was the preeminent educational resource of the Jews which allowed them to combat sin and desire and was preparatory to wisdom. But, with Christ came this wisdom, now freely given to those in the community, relegating the law to the past. The series of
metaphors Paul uses throughout the central argumentative portion of the letter, culminating in his allegorical reading of the Sarah/Hagar narrative, highlight the once necessary but ultimately temporary role of the law for the community of believers. Philo would argue that with Hagar and Sarah, Moses intended to teach about the difference between encyclical *paideia* and wisdom or virtue and the need to abandon the preliminary studies once moving on to wisdom. Paul, instead, places the Jewish law in the preliminary and temporary role. With the removal of the law comes the eradication of distinctions in the community, where issues of race or ethnicity have no bearing in the preparation of the soul for the coming end of the world.

This study on the conceptions of *paideia* from Philo, the *Wisdom of Solomon*, and Paul makes clear just how problematic the lack of critical study to date on education and educational theory in the Second Temple period has been, as a study of education and the ways in which authors discussed education provides insight into far more than details of curriculum or pedagogy. Through discussions of an idealized education—including such questions as the forms it should take, the value it offered, who had access, etc.—ancient thinkers were able to contemplate on those aspects most fundamental to the shaping of individual and collective identity.

While there are many facets of Second Temple education that remain to be explored, the example I have set forth here forms a solid basis on which to build not only a comprehensive portrayal of Jewish education during the period, but also one that is critically situated and driven by the extant sources rather than anachronistic or unnecessary models. One of the principal results of the epic strides made in Second Temple research of the last century is the acknowledgment of the vast diversity of thought and practice during the period and, with that, the scholarly acquiescence to foregoing the search for a type of “common” or “normative”
Judaism. We must now accept the idea that Jewish education too was incredibly diverse and the goal of finding a common form of Jewish education is ultimately fruitless. A clear, unbiased examination of the sources, as demonstrated here, reveals the multiplicity of unique conceptions and theories of ideal Jewish *paideia*, which reflect an equally diverse range of views on Jewish identity.
Bibliography

Adam, James, “Ancient Greek Views of Suffering and Evil,” in The Vitality of Platonism (ed. A. M. Adam; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 190-212


Alexandre, M., De congressu eruditionis gratia (Les oeuvres de Philon d’Alexandrie vol. 16; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1967)


Amir, Yehoshua, “The Figure of Death in the ‘Book of Wisdom’,” JJS 30 (1979): 154-178


Anderson Jr., R. Dean, Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul (Contributions to Biblical Exegesis & Theology 18; Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996)

Atherton, Catherine, The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)


Bertram, Georg, “παιδεύω,” TDNT 5:596-625

_____，“Der Begriff der Erziehung in der griechischen Bibel,” in Imago Dei. Beiträge zur theologischen Anthropologie (Gustav Krüger festschrift; ed. H. Bornkamm; Giessen 1932), 33-51


_____., Galatians, (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979)


Billings, Thomas H., The Platonism of Philo Judaeus (Dissertation, University of Chicago; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919)

Bizzeti, Paolo, Il Libro della Sapienza: Struttura e genere letterario (Brescia: Paideia, 1984)


Boccaccini, Gabriele, Middle Judaism: Jewish Thought 300 B.C.E. to 200 C.E. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991)


Bonner, Stanley F., Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)


Bretscheider, C. G., “De Libri Sapientiae parte priore Cab. I-XI, e duobus libellis diversis conflata” (Dissertation; Wittenburg, 1804)


______, “To Revise or Not to Revise: Attitudes to Jewish Biblical Translation,” in *Septuagint, Scrolls and Cognate Studes* (ed. G. J. Brooke and B. Lindars; SCS 33; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 301-338


Büchsel, Friedrich, “ἐλέγχω,” *TDNT* 2:473-476

Bundrick, David R., “Ta Stoicheia Tou Kosmou (Gal 4:3),” *JETS* 34/3 (September 1991): 353-364


____, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1997)


Collins, Nina, *The Library in Alexandria and the Bible in Greek* (VTSup 82; Leiden: Brill, 2000)


Conroy, Jr., John T., “‘The Wages of Sin is Death:’ The Death of the Soul in Greek, Second Temple Jewish, and Early Christian Authors,” (Ph.D. dissertation; University of Notre Dame; Gregory E. Sterling, Director; April 2008)

_____，“Philo’s ‘Death of the Soul’: Is This Only a Metaphor?” SPhA 23 (2011): 23-40

Cook, Johannes, The Septuagint of Proverbs-Jewish and/or Hellenistic Proverbs? Concerning the Hellenistic Colouring of LXX Proverbs (VTSup 69; Leiden: Brill, 1997)


Cribiore, Raffaella, Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996)

_____，Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)


Delling, Gerhard, “στοιχεῖον,” TDNT 7:670-687


_____，“De nouvelles données sur l’origine de la Septante?” Semitica et Classica 2 (2009): 73-79


Dunn, James, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998)

Dürr, Lorenz, *Das Erziehungswesen* (Mitteilungen der Vorasiatesägyptischen Gesellschaft 36/2; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1932)


Ebner, Eliezer, *Elementary Education in Ancient Israel during the Tannaitic Period (10-220 CE)* (New York: Bloch, 1956)


Focke, Friedrich, *Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913)


Fox, Michael V., *Proverbs 1-9* (AB 18a; New York: Doubleday, 2000)

_____, *Proverbs 10-31* (AB 18b; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009)


Fraenkel, Ernst, *Griechische Denominativa in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und Verbreitung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1906)

Freeman, K., *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957)


Gilbert, Maurice, “La structure de la prière de Salomon (Sg 9),” *Bib* 51 (1970): 301-331


271


Grant, R. M., *Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought* (1952): 19-28

Grimm, C. L. W., *Das Buch der Weisheit (Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apocryphen des Alten Testamentes VI)*; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1860


Hauge, Matthew Ryan and Pitts, Andrew W., eds., *Ancient Education and Early Christianity* (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016)


Hezser, Catherine, *Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine* (TSAJ 81; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001)

Hirzel, Rudolf, *Agraphos Nomos* (Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaft 20; Leipzig: Teubner, 1900)


Kang, Tae Won, “Wisdom Mythology and Hellenistic Paideia in Philo: A Case Study of *De Congressu Quaerendae Eruditionis Gratia*,” (Dissertation; Claremont Graduate University; Chair Karen Jo Torjesen, 1999)


274


Lang, Bernhard, “Schute und Unterricht im Alten Israel,” *La Sagesse de l'Ancien Testament* (ed. Maurice Gilbert; BETL 51; Gembloux: Duculot, 1979), 186-201


Leisegang, Hans, *Der heilige Geist* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1919)


Lindez, José Vílchez, *Sabiduría* (Sapiencialies V; Nueva Biblia Espanola; Estella: Editorial Verbo Divino, 1990)


Mansfeld, Jaap, “Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of Alexandria,” *VC* 39.2 (June 1985): 131-156


McGlynn, Moyna, *Divine Judgement and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom* (WUNT2 139; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001)


Mendelson, Alan, *Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria* (Monographs of the Hebrew Union College 7; Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982)


Montefiore, Claude G., “Florilegium Philonis,” *JQR* 7.3 (Apr. 1895), 481-545


Morris, Nathan and Drazin, Nathan, *The Jewish School from the Earliest Times to the Year 500 of the Present Era* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1937)


Nachtigal, J. C. C., *Die Versammlungen der Weisen. 2 Teil. Das Buch der Weisheit* (Halle: J.J. Gebauer, 1799)


277


Pietersma, Albert, and Wright III, Benjamin G., eds., *A New English Translation of the Septuagint and Other Greek Translations Traditionally Included under that Title* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)


Pouchelle, Patrick, *Dieu éducateur: Une nouvelle approche d’un concept de la théologie biblique entre Bible Hébraïque, Septante et littérature grecque classique* (FAT II/77; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015)


278


_____, *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences* (AnBib 14; Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1971)


Sandnes, Karl Olav, Challenge of Homer: School, Pagan Poets and Early Christianity (LNTS 400; London: T&T Clark, 2009)


Scarpat, Giuseppe, Libro della Sapienza: Testo, traduzione, introduzione e commento (3 vols.; Biblica Testi e studi 1, 3, 6; Brescia: Paideia, 1989-1999)


_____ , Where Can Wisdom Be Found? (OBO 130; Freiburg-Göttingen, 1993)


Sterling, Gregory E., “‘The School of Sacred Laws’: the social Setting of Philo’s Treatises,” *VC* 53 (1999): 148-164


Stricker, B. H., *De Brief van Aristeas. De hellenistische codificaties der praeheleense godsdiensten*, Amsterdam, 1956

Swift, Fletcher H., *Education in Ancient Israel from the Earliest Times to 70 A.D.* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1919)


_____, ed., *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden: Brill, 2001)


Wendland, Paul, *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1907)

282

White, Adam G., *Where is the Wise Man? Graeco-Roman Education as a Background to the Divisions in 1 Corinthians 1-4* (London: T&T Clark, 2010)


_____*, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria* (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985)

Wischmeyer, Oda, *Die Kultur des Buches Jesus Sirach* (BZNW 77; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995)


_____*, “The Figure of the Paidagōgos in Art and Literature,” *The Biblical Archaeologist* 53.2 (Jun., 1990): 80-86

Zuck, R. B., “Hebrew Words for ‘Teach,’” *BS* 121 (1964): 228-335

