Nature and Ecologies of Kind in Early Modern England

By

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"This monstrous world that monsters bredes / As men tofore it bred by native kinde"
DEDICATION

For Katherine Sarah Willenson Linwick, Marianne Margo Willenson, and Claudette Casey Linwick
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INTRODUCTION

William Shakespeare, *The Winter's Tale* (4.4.89-97)\(^1\)

The polysemic “kind” evinced especial dynamism in early modern England.\(^2\) In the culture’s literature and lexicons, the noun “kind” claims a diversity of meanings, including form, sort, breed, gender, sex, rank, race, genus, and species. As an adjective, “kind” has at least two meanings: natural and gentle. Although these multiple senses of the word were interrelated in the period, many existed in tension with each other. A genus, for instance, was recognized as a more capacious taxonomic category than a species.\(^3\) Species and sex were understood to distinguish between inherently different qualities.\(^4\) Individuals and things could be designated as “kind” to convey that they were natural or gentle, but not always both.\(^5\) When, for instance, the titular character of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* (c. 1600) tells his mother, Gertrude, that he “must be cruel only to be kind,” he means not that he must be cruel to be nice but rather that, to honor his nature as his father’s son—that is, to be natural—he must punish those responsible for his father’s death (3.4.162).\(^6\) Whether kinds should be understood as categories of art or nature was also a point of contention, as Polixenes’s argument—quoted in the epigraph—suggests.

According to certain dominant paradigms of the period, nature partitioned the world into kinds; it was, in effect, a system of kinds, some of which took tangible form in the physical world.
For example, in *A Treatise of the bulk and selvedge of the world* (1674), the physician Nathaniel Fairfax writes that, in nature, “thing[s] stirr’d or quickned…advance up to those bounds that Dame Kind had before pitcht upon.” An egg, he explains, is “in motion” to become a chicken “as fast as it can.” Under “a bare warmth or brooding shrowd,” a “spring” within the egg vaults forward, and “the makings toward animality” continue “to that bulk and quickness, which Dame Nature had cast with her self to bring about.” Fairfax’s narrative of the chicken’s becoming suggests that Dame Nature’s “self” is Dame Kind; it is Dame Kind he first describes casting “stirred” substances into “bounds” or molds. Fairfax also refers to nature’s casts as kinds. He understands these kinds to correspond to God’s will: “God holds us by laws of kind.” As a system of kinds, then, nature effectively plays the part of God’s proxy; whatever authority it holds derives from God. This logic, which assumes that to deviate from kind is both to undermine natural order and to defy divine will, appears in texts published throughout the period. Consider, for example, the exegesis of Psalm 128’s third verse in Martin Luther’s *Commentary upon the Fifteen Psalms* (1577), translated into English by Henry Bull and printed in London by Thomas Vatroullier. The verse describes a god-fearing man’s wife as a “fruitful vine” and his children as “olive plants.” If his offspring “degenerate” and “grow out of kind,” the *Commentary* explains, they “become evil plants.” Entries in various early modern English lexicons define “nature” and “kind” in a manner consistent with this idea, construing kinds as categories of divinely sanctioned nature. Because nature was also thought to cleave out and rank kinds according to their presumed virtue, ideologies of kind could be invoked to reinforce customs believed to correspond to a hierarchical natural order and to justify the marginalization of “lesser” kinds.

Despite the hegemony of such ideologies, the impulse to classify kinds within early modern England prompted some writers to reflect critically on the processes by which kinds could come into existence. Attending to drama, poetry, and prose primarily from a period that extends from the
early seventeenth century to 1674—when the second edition of *Paradise Lost* was published—I submit that many of these texts depict such processes as simultaneously, and contradictorily, natural, artificial, and social. Often, they do so by naming various kinds or engaging the polyvalence of kind and the polysemy of “kind.” Such work evinces that early moderns could imagine alternative “orders of nature” or what I will be calling “ecologies of kind” while (re-)evaluating the basis of their culture’s naturalized identity categories. The word “ecologies” is somewhat anachronistic in this context, but I prefer “ecologies” to other words such as “networks” because it has a strong association with what most people today would feel comfortable calling “nature.” Just as critically, “ecology” may be used to describe a system with parts that many would not consider natural. In *The Ecological Thought* (2010), Timothy Morton writes that “Ecology can do without a concept of something…called Nature.” He describes “ecological thinking” as a mode of thought that “might be quite different from our assumptions about it. It isn’t just to do with the sciences of ecology. Ecological thinking is to do with art, philosophy, literature, music, and culture….Ecology includes all the ways we imagine how we live together.” The productive affiliation and tension between “nature” and “ecology” are similar, although not identical, to those between “nature” and “kind” in early modern discourse. What many today would regard as social roles, early moderns frequently viewed as natural kinds. In other words, social kinds—in contrast to artificial kinds—were generally conflated with natural kinds. Yet as early moderns experimented with the polyvalence of kind, I argue, they were able to imagine these kinds “without nature”—or, at least, as categories that might not derive directly and completely from nature. Consequently, they were able to reimagine their relationships with themselves and each other—that is, to conceive of alternative ecologies of kind.

“Nature and Ecologies of Kind in Early Modern England” focuses on how literary experiments with various senses of “kind” concerned a particular nexus of naturalized identity categories: rank, race, sex, gender, and species. Moving among early modern dictionaries, treatises,
William Shakespeare and John Fletcher’s *The Two Noble Kinsmen* (c. 1613), Lady Mary Wroth’s *The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania* (1621–c. 1626), John Fletcher’s *The Island Princess* (c. 1619–1621), and John Milton’s *Comus* (or *A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle*, 1634), “Epitaphium Damonis” (c. 1639), *Tetrachordon* (1645) and *Paradise Lost* (1674), I show how these categories were bound up with ideologies of kind. Each of the following chapters inquires into how the naming of kinds or wordplay with “kind” in a given text or set of texts assays the presumed lines that separate nature, art, and society, thereby inviting the reassessment of the kinds that make up traditional, hierarchical orders of nature and the practices of cultural reproduction that sustain them. Additionally, each chapter considers how such work would have allowed early moderns to envision naming, reproducing, and embodying different kinds of kinds. At the same time that this study examines articulations of nature, then, it provides ways to explore how ideologies of kind informed the identities accessible to early modern individuals. In doing so, my study provides a framework grounded in early modern English culture that illuminates what these identity categories had in common and the dynamics that developed among them.

Today, the seemingly unambiguous taxonomical function of “kind” might obscure the word’s rich semantic history, yet the adjectival form—synonymous with “nice,” “friendly,” “gentle,” or “considerate”—hints at the word’s layered past. The adjective’s capacity for the work of valuation is in fact a vestige of the noun’s early modern associations with a metaphysically weighty nature—a nature that acts as a proxy for God. I argue that the collection of ideas that the concept of kind pulled together and the various senses the word “kind” carried distinguished it from the period’s other classifying terms—such as “breed,” “degree,” and “form”—and enabled it to perform important cultural work that inflected early modern identities in diversely distinct ways.

The cultural work that the concept of kind and the word “kind” performed in early modern England has attracted relatively little attention. In “The Practice of Kindness” (2011), an article on
how notions of kindness “melded good-will, material aid, and courtesy into a practical template” that significantly informed “the landed ranks’ understanding” of their relationships with each other, Linda Pollock writes that, in general, the concept of “kindness has been remarkably understudied.”

Laurie Shannon’s extensive consideration of what she calls early modern “kind-ness” has elucidated certain broader political dimensions of it. In Sovereign Amity (2002), she suggests that the “heteronormative logic of affectionate kinds” that emerges in early modern notions of friendship provides opportunities to resist “the difference between rulers and the ruled, which in friendship becomes a difference of ‘kind.’” Friendship privileges the relationships between individuals of the same sexual and social kinds. In the Renaissance, Shannon maintains, “likeness in both sex and status is (the only) political equality.” According to Shannon, the “homonormative logic of affectionate” kinds runs counter to the early modern institution of marriage, an institution predicated on a hierarchical system of “natural” kinds in which the males of each species “master” their female counterparts. In The Accommodated Animal (2013), Shannon’s attention dilates to the political relations that obtained within a larger body of kinds as she explores how early modern writers invoked Genesis and certain classical sources to acknowledge the “legitimated capacities, authorities, and rights”—or political entitlement—of nonhuman animal kinds.

Long before Shannon analyzed the political dimensions of kind, Rosalie L. Colie’s The Resources of Kind: Genre-Theory in the Renaissance (1973) shed critical light on how early moderns conceptualized literary kinds. It is now common to classify works of literature according to their “genre,” but in early modern England, literature was instead separated into “kinds.” Colie explains that literary kinds offered early modern writers particular “frames” or “fixes” that contributed to “literary change” and “imaginative experiment.” While some individuals insisted on defending the purity of distinct literary kinds, others readily combined them. In the last pages of her book, Colie vividly describes literary kinds as “tiny subcultures with their own habits, habitats, and structures of
ideas as well as their own forms.” These subcultures “melt[ed] into one another—often to enrich the possibilities of literature taken as a system.” Frequently, such “melting” happened in ways that corresponded to “actual historical events.”

I take a different but complementary approach to the study of early modern kinds. Whereas Pollock sheds light on the extent to which the landed ranks defined their interrelationships in terms of kindness, Shannon focuses on the relationships between kinds in sociopolitical contexts, and Colie examines how writers produced material that engaged systems of literary kind, I explore how the proliferation of kinds and ideas associated with the concept of kind made it possible for the use of “kind” to interrupt and even modify established hierarchies of nature, art, and society. It was precisely because “kind” was affiliated with each of these ontological categories, I propose, that it could perform such diverse and important cultural work. Ultimately, this work allowed early moderns to rethink the terms that defined their relationships with themselves and each other. In other words, it enabled them participate in remaking the elaborate ecologies of kind they inhabited. To understand why, however, it is necessary to look further into the various senses “kind” had in early modern England.

I. Natural, Artificial, and Social Kinds

Most early modern English lexicons define “kind” far less frequently than they employ it in other entries. These lexicons regularly use the partitive construction “kind of” to express taxonomical relationships that, in some cases, might seem to exclude nature. John Florio’s World of Words (1598), for instance, defines “Asclopiadi” (or Asclepiad) as “a kind of verse or meter.” Here “kind of” conveys that Asclepiad is a subcategory of verse. Although the World of Words designates Asclepiad as a kind, many early moderns would not have considered Asclepiad a kind of nature. Instead, they would have considered it a kind of art. “Art,” in the period, denoted craft, science, skill, trade, and human “occupations” in general or the products of them. It could also be used
pejoratively as a synonym for “deceit” or “guile.” Significantly, “art” was frequently defined in complementary opposition to nature.

In William Shakespeare’s *The Winter’s Tale* (c. 1609 – 1611), for example, Perdita explains that she will not include “our carnations and streaked gillyvors” in her garden because some refer to them as “nature’s bastards” (4.4.82-83). Perdita deems the flowers a lesser “kind” because she has heard “There is an art which in their piedness shares / With great creating nature” (4.4.83-87). That is, she believes that art accounts for the striped appearance of carnations and gillyvors and, therefore, the flowers are not fully “natural” kinds. Perdita’s concern rests on two assumptions: 1) art may contribute to the production of kinds, and 2) artistically produced kinds are different from and inferior to purely natural kinds. Her observation that some call carnations and gillyvors “nature’s bastards”—as opposed to “half-bloods” or “mongrels,” common insults that would be just as germane given the context—is revealing in light of her assumptions. By acknowledging this aspersion, Perdita insinuates that carnations and gillyvors are illegitimate because they are mixed kinds. From Perdita’s perspective, the essential ontological difference of nature and art means that they should remain separate.

Philip Sidney also uses kind to distinguish between the products of art and nature in *A Defence of Poetry* (1595). Yet unlike Perdita, Sidney elevates certain artworks (or types of art) above nature. Dividing poetry into “three general kinds,” Sidney not only details the particular merits of each but also insists, “Nature never set forth the earth in so rich a tapestry as divers poets have done. …Her world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden.” Poets, he reasons, “doth grow in effect another nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature.” Perdita and Sidney, then, may disagree on the merits of artificial or artistic kinds, but they concur that such kinds are—ontologically speaking—different from natural kinds.
Although the belief that nature and art were essentially different was widespread during the period, it was certainly not uncontested. Importantly, *The Winter’s Tale* leaves Perdita’s argument in doubt, staging a debate between Perdita and Polixenes, the King of Bohemia. Polixenes maintains that nature encompasses art. Art may alter nature and thereby produce new kinds, but because “art itself is nature,” its kinds are no less legitimate than other natural kinds. “Make your garden rich in gillyvors, / And do not call them bastards,” Polixenes urges Perdita (4.4.98-99). Gillyvors, Polixenes insists, derive legitimacy from an art ultimately indistinguishable from nature itself.

A few lines earlier, Perdita seems to have conceded Polixenes’s point that art is nature, but their agreement is short-lived. When Polixenes urges Perdita to plant gillyvors, her response suggests not only that she still assumes nature and art are inherently different but also that she believes art is inferior to nature because it elicits illegitimate desire: “I’ll not put / The dibble in the earth to set one slip of them, / No more than, were I painted, I would wish / This youth should say ’twere well, and only therefore / Desire to breed by me” (4.4.99-103). Perdita’s tacit analogy between planting gillyvors and relying on “paint” to excite Florizel’s interest in “breeding” implies that her purity or virtue—her kindness—depends on her uncompromised deference to nature’s system of kinds.

For early modern audiences of *The Winter’s Tale*, Perdita’s kindness might well have seemed to depend on her deference to nature’s system of kinds. Whereas those who conformed to their supposed kind and respected nature’s system of kinds were praised for being “kind,” those who appeared to “degenerate” from their kind and degrade nature were often labeled “unkind.” Hamlet, for instance, famously denounces his uncle and new stepfather Claudius as “A Little more than kin and less than kind” (1.2.65). Hamlet believes Claudius has married the widow of his brother, Hamlet’s father, to become king of Denmark (although Hamlet has not yet met his father’s ghost, he already suspects Claudius of murdering his father), thereby assuming the roles of both father and uncle to Hamlet. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)*, “king” may be a “direct
derivative” of “kin,” “in the sense either of ‘scion of the kin, race, or tribe,’ or ‘scion of a (or the) noble kind.’” Thus, “king” may be similar to “father” and “uncle” in that it is used to specify the particular relationship that an individual has to another member or set of members of the same kin. What Hamlet effectively asserts when he punningly condemns Claudius as “more than kin and less than kind” is that Claudius has tangled up the established pattern of kinship by claiming more titles for himself—king of Denmark, uncle to Hamlet, and father to Hamlet—than natural order would seem to allow. Complicating his relationships with Denmark and Hamlet, Claudius has violated natural order or deviated from kind, thereby revealing his unkindness.

While Hamlet’s epithet differentiates kin from kind, the success of the pun speaks to a profound interrelationship between the two concepts. “Kin” and “kind” could even be used synonymously in the period—a fact that helps illustrate early modern England’s tendency to conflate prescribed social roles and relationships (e.g., “king,” “uncle,” “father”) with “natural” kinds. In contrast to artificial kinds, social kinds often appeared indistinguishable from natural kinds; they seemed to derive directly from nature itself. Early modern discourse recurrently naturalizes kinds demarcated by systems of kinship, including those of rank. From at least 1000 CE through the late seventeenth century, one’s “kind” could be construed as the position or rank one seemed to possess by right of birth. Those considered “well-born,” “well-bred,” or of “gentle birth” were often thought to exhibit the greatest kindness—as long, that is, as their behavior corresponded with the expectations of their social kind. As Andy Wood writes, “Conduct manuals stressed how speech denoted rank and hierarchy, simultaneously embedding and naturalizing social distinctions”; drawing from Stefan Guazzo’s *Civile Conversation*, translated from French into English by George Pettie and printed by Richard Watkins in 1581, Wood notes that, whereas a country clown’s “natural” speech was “rude,” a citizen or gentleman’s was “fine and polished.” A gentleman whose speech was “fine and polished” could, therefore, claim to be kind. Thus another, related sense of the
adjective “kind” emerged; it could function as a synonym of “gentle,” a word that also conflates status with behavior in the period’s discourse. Claudius is more than family and—paradoxically—less than family because he does not demonstrate gentleness or courteousness, the defining qualities of his family’s naturalized rank or kind.

Although early moderns did at times distinguish between nature, art, and society—especially between nature and art—as I have begun to show, they also frequently collapsed these categories, referring to all three as “kinds,” a fact that would suggest that whatever divisions had been established between nature, art, and society were porous. Over the past four hundred years or so, the previous meanings of kind have been definitively sundered, and categories of nature, art, and society have acquired their own distinct names. A “species” is a category of nature, a “genre” a category of literature or art, and a “role” a category of society. In effect, these names and others like them help to uphold the assumption that nature, art, and society are essentially different: they require different nomenclature because their different ontologies necessitate different methods of study. In today’s parlance, “kind” often denotes a nonspecific, ostensibly neutral classifying unit. Thus, “kind” may operate as a less precise word for “species,” “genre,” or “role,” and consequently, it would still be fair to say that categories of nature, art, and society are “kinds.” But they are not kinds in quite the same sense that they were in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, when “kind” was neither a nonspecific substitute for more precise taxonomical terms nor a neutral term.

In the period’s discourse, the attempt to name various kinds and wordplay with “kind” could effectively reconstitute the parameters of nature, art, and society—remapping the sites where they overlapped and diverged. Indeed, the naming of kinds and wordplay with “kind” became heuristics for rethinking not only what was natural but also what was divinely sanctioned, lawful, and intrinsically or culturally valuable. Polixenes, for example, figures the “bark of baser kind” as a kind that partakes of nature, art, and society. “The bark of baser kind” is the product of a social
practice—grafting, a process Polixenes equates with marriage—that is also an art, which “itself is nature” (4.4.89-97). That Polixenes implies the three may be ontologically intertwined in a given kind is not in itself extraordinary; earlier in the scene, Perdita maintains that carnations and gillyvors belong to “that kind” in which art and nature mix—the flowers’ variegated complexions reflect this mixture (4.4.83 and 4.4.86-88). Unlike Perdita, however, Polixenes denies that mixed kinds are illegitimate. Tellingly—and perhaps counterintuitively—he also ultimately resists suggesting that the “bark of baser kind” is inherently inferior to “the bud of nobler race” (4.4.94-95). Although Polixenes intimates that social and artistic practices derive legitimacy from nature, he contends that they possess authority over nature to the extent that they may modify it. In doing so, he hints that they may have a hand in authorizing their own legitimacy: if their legitimacy derives from nature but they have the power to rewrite nature, they affect nature’s order, its “law.” Those who take part in social and artistic practices, then, may participate in the reconception of “legitimate” kinds. And whether carnations and gillyvors are “bastards” or “base” may depend as much on how Perdita construes their (re)production as it does on nature itself. By calling attention to the roles that social and artistic practices play in authorizing nature, Polixenes raises a number of questions: What are the consequences of imagining nature in one way or another? What are the consequences of demarcating kinds in one way or another? What justification is there for defining nature or kind in a particular way, and what are the sources of such justifications? Early modern literary and dramatic experiments with “kind” posed questions such as these, I argue, and they were especially significant insofar as they invited early moderns to (re)evaluate the basis of their culture’s often-naturalized identity categories, categories the period’s discourse registered as kinds. “Bastard,” “gentle,” “base,” and “noble” account for only a fraction of them.
II. Kinds by Other Names

Throughout “Nature and Ecologies of Kind,” I focus on how conceptual experiments with kind contribute to theorizations that concern a specific nexus of identity categories: rank, race, sex, gender, and species. Numerous texts illustrate that these categories were intimately bound up with ideologies of kind; exploring the relationship “kind” had to such identity categories provides the means to understand the complex and dynamic ways in which kind functioned. Attending to how concepts of kind were embedded in notions of rank, race, sex, gender, and species may, in turn, illuminate the dynamic interrelationships and similarities between these identity categories. For example, the link between religious thought and kind sheds light on why kind could so easily be deployed as device for dressing up arbitrary value judgments about people’s identities to look more metaphysically consequential. Questions of virtue are rarely far behind when questions of kind arise.

Notably, although discourse on kind does not always explicitly engage the subject of religion, its almost invariable concern with questions of virtue (or right and wrong) speaks to how swiftly kind could be deployed as a mechanism for reinforcing or contesting religious doctrine without overtly championing or condemning Catholic and Protestant positions—a point upon which I elaborate in my third chapter.

As I have noted, in certain contexts “kind” signified rank, which was often construed as the social status or estate and attendant privileges one claimed by right of birth. In De Republica Anglorum: A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England (1583), Sir Thomas Smith explains, “Gentlemen be those” whose “blood and race doth make noble and known.” Gentlemen’s descendants, because they are of the same “race”—which is itself a remarkably capacious and mobile term—may obtain virtue more easily than others; in addition, their progenitors’ examples, their readiness for education, and the “enraced love of tenants and neighbors” encourage them to “ensue in their fathers’ steps.” If “all this doe[s] fail” to make them virtuous—“the world is subject to mutability”
and therefore “many times fail[es],” concedes Smith—just “as the husbandman has to plant a new tree where the old fails,” the prince has to make “gentlemen, esquires, knights, barons, earls, marquises, and dukes” of those “able to bear that honor.” Smith also begrudgingly admits that one’s rank may primarily reflect one’s relationship to manual labor. In England, whoever studies law, studies at a university, “professes liberal sciences,” “can live idly and without manual labor,” and “will bear the port, charge and countenance of a gentleman” may “be called master.” But rank could be naturalized even when it was chiefly defined in terms of one’s relationship to manual labor. Pinheiro, a character in John Fletcher’s *The Island Princess* (c. 1619-1621), insinuates that one’s lineage determines one’s proclivity for manual labor. Recounting how the Governor of Ternate captured the King of Tidore while he was rowing a boat for exercise, Pinheiro avers, “Base breedings love base pleasure”—evidently, “base pleasure” includes “dull labor” like rowing (1.1.18-23). My analysis of kind, then, engages with rank as a category of social privilege that may sometimes be understood in terms of one’s relationship to leisure or labor yet still corresponds in some respect to one’s birth, estate, and blood—that is, one’s pedigree.

Polixenes’s disquisition on grafting demonstrates that “kind” could also be interchanged with “race,” a word that was strongly affiliated, if not always wholly synonymous, with “blood” and “kin.” Notably, early modern dictionary entries on a variety of words treat “race” and “kind” as roughly equivalent. Abundant scholarship has demonstrated that early moderns indexed race and ethnicity in diverse ways. What was meant by “race” and what distinguished it were not always clear. Some regarded geohumoral composition as the best indicator of a person’s race. Others relied on a language of color—“dark” and “light,” “black” and “white”—to delineate race. Still others interpreted the physical marks and trappings associated with a given rank as evidence of one’s race. As Ania Loomba has so compellingly demonstrated, however race was marked, it was almost invariably understood to have some relationship to religion. Works such as *De Republica Anglorum*
and the period’s dictionaries suggest that although early moderns may have relied on different signs to read race, what they generally sought to establish was the family, lineage, pedigree, or stock that might account for one’s defining qualities (which might include one’s spiritual disposition). I use this general sense of “race” when I argue that questions of kind had the potential to inform early modern conceptions of race.

Whereas early modern dictionary entries on “kind” often list “sex” as one of the word’s multiple meanings, entries on “sex” tend to be brief. Most simply define “sex” as “kind.” Do these entries indicate that one’s sex is one’s defining quality, one’s essence or nature? The case could certainly be made for such an interpretation. The entry on “woman” in Thomas Wilson’s *A Christian Dictionary* (1612), for instance, indicates that a person’s sex marks what one was “made by God” to do. Richard Huloet’s *ABCedarium Anglico Latinum* (1552) provides a slightly longer definition, characterizing “sex” as a “kind of male or female...as in Sexus virilus, mankind, or malekind, Sexus foemineus, womankind, or the female kind.” Several dictionaries also construe “gender” in terms of “kind,” although—to my knowledge—no dictionaries explicitly mention “gender” in their entries on “kind.” Recent scholarly and popular discourses that distinguish between the concepts of sex and gender generally agree: “Sex” refers to categories that classify organisms according to their physiological reproductive systems and the physical traits that typically accompany those systems. “Gender” refers to socially constructed roles associated with “sex.” For analytical purposes, I rely on these current senses of the words when I say that particular experiments with “kind” prompted early moderns to rethink prevailing notions of sex and gender, even if early modern discourses evince little interest in distinguishing between them.

“Species” is similar to “sex” in that it frequently appears in early modern dictionary entries on “kind,” and nearly all entries on “species” mention “kind.” Many early modern dictionaries use “species”—although more use “kind”—to designate particular categories of living organisms. I
employ this narrow sense of “species”—now the word’s dominant sense—when discussing how experiments with kind bore on early modern relations among creatures.  

Several words, including “species,” accomplish taxonomical work similar to that of “kind.” Species was a versatile classifying unit in early modern England. Like “kind,” “species” could designate categories of nature, art, and society. Nevertheless, a number of early modern dictionaries illustrate that “kind” performed far more taxonomical work. “Species,” moreover, was only rarely used to signify rank and race. Unlike “kind,” “species” did not function as a synonym of “sex” or “gender.” And while species could be construed, among other things, as a category of nature, it would not necessarily have been associated with merit or divine will. Perhaps because “species” did not evoke the divinely sanctioned, lawful, or ontologically or culturally valuable with the same force that “kind” did, dictionaries from the period define the morally charged “degenerate” in terms of “nature” and “kind” rather than “nature” and “species.” In short, “kind” had a greater taxonomical impulse and carried more moral weight.

“Sort” was also a partial synonym of “kind,” and it performed a great deal of classifying work. In this respect, “sort” was almost comparable to “kind.” Like “species,” however, it lacked both the moral weight and range of meanings that “kind” claimed. “Sort” designates a “cut” or “lot” in dictionaries from the early sixteenth century. It takes on the additional senses of “manner” and “fashion” in dictionaries from the late sixteenth century. Timothy Bright’s *Charactery: An Art of Short, Swift, and Secret Writing by Character* (1558) may be the first lexicon to define “sort” as “kind,” although the *OED* illustrates that this sense of “sort” had been in use since at least the late thirteenth century. As early modern dictionaries increasingly associate “sort” and “kind,” they also increasingly rely on “sort” to explain categories of identity. According to John Rider’s *Biblioteca Scholastica* (1589), a “female” is “of the feminine sort.” Claude Hollyband’s *A Dictionary French and English* (1593) and Cotgrave’s *Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611) describe “race,” among
other things, as a “sort.” To the extent that “sort” functioned as a marker of quality or value, it differed from “species.” Yet “sort” never acquired quite the same moral charge that “kind” possessed. That one may praise another for “kindness” or for being “kind” but not for “sortness” or for being “sort”—or that “sort” never assumed an adjectival form—may reflect the weaker charge that “sort” carried. Its relative weakness might be explained by its lack of a direct affiliation with nature—much less a divinely sanctioned nature. Like kind, sort has now largely ceased to function as a marker of quality and is instead considered a blandly neutral term.

“Breed,” “degree,” and “form” also indicated classification and valuation in the period. “Breed,” however, did not encompass the range of meanings of “kind,” and early modern English lexicons suggest that it did far less conceptual work than “kind.” As early modern discourse attests, there could be differences of degree within a kind, but a difference of degree was not comparable to a difference of kind. It is unlikely that a difference in degree would have been interpreted as a difference in nature. “Degree,” moreover, accomplished only a fraction of the work that “kind” did. Like “kind,” “form” could refer to an entity’s “nature.” In The Mysterie of Rhetorique Unvail’d (1657), John Sergeant writes that “the form is that inward principle, by which any thing hath its being, or is what it is; as the Soul, whereby a man is a man.” Although the OED illustrates that this particular sense of “form” had been in use since at least the fourteenth century, early modern English lexicons do not clearly register it until the late sixteenth century; it seems to have become more common in the late seventeenth century. Yet even in the seventeenth century, the dominant sense of “form” may have been “shape”—the first sense of “form” that Elisha Coles records in An English Dictionary (1676). Perhaps because the relationship between form and nature was more tenuous than the relationship between kind and nature, “form,” like “sort,” lacked the moral charge “kind” exhibited. (While early moderns did not praise each other for being “form,” they did employ “deformed” as a derogatory term. Indeed, in contrast to “form,” “deformed” quite clearly carried a
moral charge: it was associated with the foul, the defiled. Additionally, early moderns seem to have enlisted “form” much less than “kind” to develop taxonomies.

What ultimately sets “kind” apart from other words that might be said to accomplish similar taxonomical work in early modern English discourse, then, is not only the sheer amount of conceptual labor that it performs and the particular set of concepts that it encompasses but also its frequent yet contestable affiliation with nature and divine authority. This latter aspect of “kind” substantially contributes to the word’s tendency to be invoked when early moderns analyzed and contested often-naturalized, value-laden identity categories. If “kind” does not obviously recommend itself for such analyses today, perhaps that is because, as the meaning of nature has changed, so has kind’s relationship to nature. By the late eighteenth century, a nature suffused with divine authority had begun to give way to what Lorraine Daston refers to as “an ostensibly amoral nature.” Since then, the concept of species—which notably lacked the moral valence of the kind in early modern England—has assumed a greater purchase on nature. The *Oxford Dictionary of English* (2010) even defines “species” as “the principal natural taxonomic unit.” Over the course of the past several centuries, kind’s claim on nature, evaluative capacity, and metaphysical import have greatly diminished. But relics of them remain, even if they seem rather antiquated. The same dictionary’s entry on the noun “kind,” for instance, lists the word’s second meaning as “character; nature.” And its note on the phrase “someone’s kind” reads, “used to express disapproval of a certain type of person.”

The *Oxford Dictionary of English*’s first entry on “kind”—“a group of people or things having similar characteristics”—is now the word’s dominant meaning: kind has effectively become a nonspecific, ostensibly impartial classifying unit. As such, kind is similar to category, type, and sort, each of which may define any group of entities or things that appear both to belong to a larger group and to have at least one other trait in common: lamps designed to rest on tables, chefs...
responsible for sautéing, roses that climb, rocks composed of solidified lava, and domestic cats with stripes. Category, sort, type, and kind acknowledge the existence of the entities and things they delineate. In this respect, the classifying units may not be entirely neutral, but they tend not to confer additional value (positive or negative) on the entities and things they delineate.

III. The Cultural Reproduction of Kinds

If kind’s journey from the early modern period to the present has left it a husk of its former self, its role in cultural reproduction has also drastically diminished. Perdita’s exchange with Polixenes helps illustrate that the issue of how to adhere to a system of kinds was once profoundly interrelated with the issue of how to reproduce kinds that social and religious authorities recognized as legitimate—or, to borrow the words of a character from another of Shakespeare’s plays, how to do “the deed of kind.” Those considered illegitimate—including “bastards,” the “deformed,” and even “lesser” plants—were often deemed unworthy of reproduction or unfit for existence. The dedication to Henry Wriothesley that precedes Shakespeare’s “Venus and Adonis” (1593) expresses anxiety over the possibility that the poem will prove “deformed”; if it does, Shakespeare vows, he will never again cultivate “so barren a land for fear it yield me still so bad a harvest.” Those who participated in the reproduction of illegitimate kinds, as Perdita hints, might become subjects of condemnation. In 1562, Thomas Marshe printed a sensational pamphlet announcing the birth of a “monstrous child” in Much Horkesley. The pamphlet explains the etiology of the child’s unusual “form and shape” with a rhyme. A monster’s shape, the rhyme maintains, evinces the particular sins its parents have imagined or committed to the extent that it diverges from “native kind” (emphasis mine). A block of prose beneath the rhyme explains that the “deformed” child of Much Horkesley’s parents were “married to others before,” and although their child was “born in matrimony,” they begot it “out of matrimony.” Because their “sin” disrupted nature’s order, nature cropped their
child’s limbs “with maiming knife” (lines 36-37). “Better far better ungiven were his life / Than
given so” (lines 34-35), the rhyme asserts.

Whereas those who purportedly propagated “illegitimate” kinds might experience shame and condemnation, those capable of reproducing “legitimate” kinds supposedly had a responsibility to do so. Those who did not reproduce at all might experience or elicit anxiety. The speaker in Shakespeare’s sonnet 10 insists that the subject of his verse should “For shame deny that thou bearest love to any, / Who for thyself art so improvident” (lines 1-2). By loving anyone beneath himself, the subject “conspires” against himself, “Seeking that beauteous roof to ruinate” (lines 5-7). Instead, the speaker urges the subject to

Be as thy presence is, gracious and kind,
Or to thyself at least kind-hearted prove.
Make thee another self for love of me,
That beauty still may live in thine or thee.

(lines 11-14)

The “beauteous roof” may be a metonym for the subject’s estate—that is, the rank and fortune that presumably correspond to the subject’s “condition” or “nature.” By consorting with someone unworthy of his love, the subject has already compromised his estate; the speaker implies it requires “repair.” When the speaker exhorts the subject to be “as [his] presence is,” he essentially urges the subject to behave in a way that coheres with his self. If the subject conforms to his nature, he will embody his kind (likely a kind of “gentle birth,” since it is a kind known for “gentle love” and “graciousness”) and therefore he will be kind (lines10-11). The least the subject can do to “repair” his “roof,” according to the speaker, is to “kind-hearted prove” by demonstrating his love for his kind—that is, his family and estate (as opposed to someone “improvident”)—and reproducing his kind. In sonnet 11, the speaker continues his plea, contending that not just anyone should reproduce: “Let those whom nature hath not made for store, / Harsh, featureless, and rude, barrenly perish” (lines 9-10). But nature has “best endowed” the subject: “She carved thee for her seal, and
meant thereby / Thou shouldst print more, not let that copy die” (lines 12-14). As these lines suggest, the ability to reproduce “legitimate” kinds carried with it not only responsibility but also authority and prestige.

While those who participated in the reproduction of “legitimate” kinds might accrue respect and authority, then, those who could not or chose not to might face marginalization. As Kathryn Will writes, even Queen Elizabeth I and King James I “faced public criticism for allowing scores (and in James’ case, hundreds) of men to be knighted simultaneously and under questionable circumstances.”¹⁰⁸ That England’s monarchs met with disapproval for permitting growing numbers to acquire titles without verifiable claims to noble or gentle blood attests to the prevalence of the assumption that estate—or what Will wryly terms “fortunate birth”¹⁰⁹—corresponded to blood, to nature, in an essential way that the monarchs failed to respect. At the same time, this “inflation of honors” suggests the culture’s awareness (however repressed) that such honors derived less from natural order than from human preference and privilege.¹¹⁰

What counted as a legitimate kind and how much variation could exist among kinds of a given set of kinds also became important considerations for those concerned with the reproduction of kinds that had a more ambiguous relationship to nature, like poetic kinds. Although Sidney extols poets’ inventive power,¹¹¹ he discourages playwrights from ignoring the “laws of poesy” by creating material that does not conform to its kind.¹¹² Thomas Norton and Thomas Sackville’s *Tragedy of Gorbuduc* (1561), Sidney charges, contains speeches, phrases, and “notable morality” that “obtain the very end of poesy,” but the play is “very defectuous in the circumstances, which grieveth [Sidney], because it might not remain as an exact model of all tragedies.”¹¹³

What counted as a legitimate kind and what degree of variation was permissible within a set of kinds could become even weightier issues when the reproduction of “natural” or naturalized kinds was concerned precisely because many believed these to manifest divine will. After describing
how “Dame Nature” stirs up “things” and casts them into kinds in *A Treatise of the bulk and selvedge of the world*, the theologically inclined Fairfax elaborates on the relationship between God and kind: \[114\]

If you ask me then, What 'tis that keeps the soul so fast within the quickened body? I answer, Because the great law of kind has set it no business to do any where else in the world; and for the soul to be and be for nothing, or be against the law of its kind, which is as bad, would too ill tax, and too much shame the wisdom of its maker…[E]verything in the world is as much staked down to its work (freedoms in free beings set aside) by the law of its maker, as the ground sill of St. Paul’s was by the tools of the workmen. \[115\]

Briefly and parenthetically, Fairfax acknowledges that certain beings—“free” ones—possess free will and, therefore, may not always behave in ways that are predetermined. But he stresses that only God, through nature, determines what counts as a kind and to which kind “everything in the world” belongs. God—to quote Fairfax again—dictates whether a given kind is one of the highest or the “the lowest things.” \[116\]

It would seem to follow from Fairfax’s point of view that whatever or whoever is not reproduced in adherence with the law of kind is necessarily illegitimate, and whatever or whoever the law deems “base” is incontrovertibly so.

But this logic was obviously open to contestation in the period. In Shakespeare’s *King Lear* (c. 1603 – 1606), \[117\] the Earl of Gloucester’s “bastard” son Edmund rails against it. Naming nature his “goddess,” he denies that laws of kind or custom correspond to nature. \[118\] Although nature, kind, and kin tend to converge conceptually in early modern discourse, Edmund exposes key fault lines among them. Those who begot him, not nature, he asserts, have “branded” him with “base,” “baseness,” and “bastardy” (1.2.9-10). Gloucester recognizes Edmund as his son, his kin, yet he also identifies Edmund as an illegitimate kind, recounting to the Earl of Kent how he has “often blushed” to acknowledge his role in Edmund’s “breeding” (1.1.8-9). When Kent praises Edmund, Gloucester responds, “But I have, sir, a son by order of law, some year / elder than this, who yet is no dearer in my account” (1.1.18-19). Despite admitting his love for Edmund, Gloucester repeatedly identifies Edmund as inferior to Edgar and other members of the nobility. Fondly recalling the “good sport” he had with Edmund’s “mother fair,” Gloucester concludes, “the whoreson must be
acknowledged”; then, promptly turning to Edmund, Gloucester asks, “Do you / know this noble gentleman [Kent], Edmund?” (1.1.21-23).

“Bastards” in early modern England were, like Edmund, certainly subject to marginalization. In A World of Words (1598), Florio defines “natural” as someone or something “of or according to nature, lawful. Also, a man’s privities. Also, a base born, or bastard.”119 In A Christian Dictionary, however, Wilson defines “bastard” as a person who “is no natural child, but begotten beside and against the ordinary course of Nature, in fornication or adultery” or as a person who “is not the child of God by grace of adoption, but is either a wicked person, or an hypocrite.”120 Given the social marginalization that bastards usually faced, Edmund’s evident frustration with the designation “bastard” might well have resonated with individuals living in early modern England. According to Edmund, it is only the “excellent foppery of the world” that assumes that “if we were villains by necessity; fools by heavenly com- / pulsion; knaves, thieves, and treachers, by spherical predomi- / nance; drunkards, liars, and adulterers, by an enforced /obedience of planetary influence” and that attributes “all that we are evil in” to “a divine thrusting on” (1.2.109-116). Spitefully, Edmund resolves to usurp the estate of Edgar, his father’s first, “legitimate” son: “Edmund the base / Shall top the legit- / imate” (1.2.20-21). What appears to rankle Edmund is that, while certain members of society presume a “divine thrusting on”—a pun that refers to the heavenly Father’s will while alluding to Gloucester’s “good sport” out of wedlock with Edmund’s mother—indelibly marks him as a bastard, they ignore the extent to which they are themselves responsible for deciding what counts as legitimate reproduction, and in turn, what counts as a legitimate kind. In a sense, they ignore the role they have played in authoring Edmund’s “bastardy,” and thus the role they have played in depriving him of the privileges he feels are due to him.

It is unlikely that Edmund would find a sympathizer even in Polixenes of The Winter’s Tale. As I have argued, Polixenes’s strategic use of “kind” in the debate over whether a garden should
exclude “bastard” flowers exerts critical pressure on the distinctions between nature, art, and society that might otherwise seem to justify the marginalization of “lesser” kinds such as “bastards.”

Polixenes here implies that if individuals and groups invested in the reproduction of kinds may alter nature and other systems of kind through their social and artistic practices, those individuals and groups bear some degree of responsibility when the systems that inform their worldviews marginalize members of a specific kind. But Polixenes holds inconsistent, even contradictory, views on kind which exert pressure on any analogies between plants and people that his speech on gillyvors might seem to invite. When Polixenes learns that his son Florizel plans to marry Perdita—whom he believes was born to a shepherd—he threatens to disown him. Polixenes cannot conceive of a “sceptre’s heir” affecting a “sheep’s hook” (4.4.407-08). If Florizel pursues Perdita, Polixenes will deem him “too base / To be acknowledged” and “bar [him] from succession, / Not hold thee of our blood, no, not of our kin” (4.4.407-18). Polixenes’s critique of naturalized hierarchies that would discourage the union of a “bud of nobler race” with a “bark of baser kind” does not extend to those that would allow a prince to marry a shepherd’s daughter. Whereas Polixenes condones mixing different kinds of plants, he condemns any such mixing of “noble” and “base” humans. As the figure of Polixenes attests, individuals, institutions, and texts might reconceive some kinds of kinds while preserving and perpetuating others.

IV. Nature and the Stakes of Kind

Each of my chapters shows that engagements with kind were especially significant insofar as they prompted early moderns to evaluate the notions of rank, race, sex, gender, and species. Literary and dramatic experiments with “kind” could undermine the basis of these identity categories by emphasizing the hand early moderns had in constructing them. At the same time, such experiments provided a stage on which early moderns could imagine naming, reproducing, and inhabiting alternative kinds. In what follows, I ask: Whom does kindness benefit? Whom does it hinder—or,
even, harm? Who may participate in the reproduction of kinds? When does reproduction sustain or subvert kinds? When do kinds stimulate or stifle reproduction? How do the different forms of kind interact and play off of one another? How might the deconstruction of certain kinds reinforce other kinds? Who has the authority to revise the “law” of kinds, and why? How does the value of kindness within a given system depend on the kinds of kinds that constitute that system and their relationships to one another? That is, how do different ecologies of kind determine the value of kindness?

In asking these questions, I aim to recuperate some of the articulations of nature that early moderns formulated as they imagined new ways of being and being with each other. Such articulations of nature are in danger of becoming, as Donna Haraway has warned, “lost in doctrines of…scientific objectivity.” Various historicists, new historicists, and cultural materialists have argued that early modern texts and performances either buttress or undermine dominant schematics of nature like the Great Chain of Being. Because “Nature and Ecologies of Kind” considers how texts and performances articulate nature in terms of kind, it calls attention to less discussed, potentially surprising notions of nature or aspects of them.

For example, if contemporary discourse does not always draw hard and fast distinctions between nature and culture, it does frequently seem to place wilderness and culture on opposite ends of a “nature spectrum”; on this spectrum, wilderness represents nature in its purest form. “Wilderness” had different meanings and connotations in early modern England than it does today. Citing the King James Bible (1611) and John Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667, 1674), the environmental historian William Cronon explains that “wilderness” not only connoted desolation and waste but also elicited “bewilderment’ or terror.” One came to wilderness “only against one’s will, and always in fear and trembling. Whatever value it might have arose solely from the possibility that it might be ‘reclaimed’ and turned toward human ends—planted as a garden, say, or a city upon
a hill. Careful attention to Milton’s use of “wilderness” throughout *Paradise Lost* suggests that Cronon overstates his point, and characters throughout Shakespeare’s oeuvre portray wilderness in both negative and positive terms. But the use of “wild” to characterize supposedly less valuable kinds lends credence to Cronon’s argument. When Polixenes describes marrying a “gentler scion” to the “wildest stock” to make the wild or “baser kind” conceive with the “nobler,” he initially suggests that this process “mends” nature (4.4.92-96). Although Polixenes emends his statement, substituting “change” for “mend,” the slip nevertheless attests to a certain bias against the wild. Unfavorable impressions of the wild—as opposed to the natural—may also elucidate why “wild” or “rude” kinds—e.g., the “wild Irish”—were regularly regarded as less inherently valuable and more dubious than “cultivated,” “gentle,” or “refined” kinds.

In attending to early modern discourse’s proclivity for naturalizing social roles and relationships, this study corroborates the premise that hard divides between nature and culture had yet to materialize in the period. As Daston remarks, even those who are “professionally alert to the plasticity to cognitive and moral categories” tend to “divide up the world into nature and culture,” in part because these categories, “conceived in yin-yang complementarity, are of relatively recent provenance.” Instead, Daston asserts, early moderns defined the natural against the “supernatural, preternatural, artificial, and unnatural.” Although Daston acknowledges that “the art/nature opposition was attacked on several fronts” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, she brackets these disputes, instead underscoring that “the intellectual reflex of classifying objects as one or the other [natural or artificial] persisted.”

Yet early modern articulations of nature that resist the “art/nature opposition” constitute an important chapter in the history of nature and warrant further analysis. They shed light on how alternative conceptions of nature allowed early moderns to experience themselves and others on different terms or as alternative kinds of kinds. By examining how texts and performances
separate, collapse, and reconstitute natural, artificial, and social kinds, my project emphasizes a crucial link between ideologies of nature and cultural identity in early modern England. This dissertation thus offers a primarily synchronic analysis of nature and ecologies of kind, focusing on drama, poetry, and prose from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the second edition of *Paradise Lost* (1674). During this time, an array of factors—evolving structures and mechanisms of power, technological innovation, artistic experimentation, domestic and global travel, religious reformation(s), an incipient capitalist economy, emerging disciplines such as anatomy and cartography, and conspicuous environmental change—stimulated the generation of novel kinds.

A variety of theorists—in addition to those cited above—have informed my analysis of kinds. Raymond Williams’s *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1976) has been especially influential because of its argument that some important social and historical processes occur within language, in ways that indicate how integral the problems of meanings and of relationships really are. New kinds of relationships, but also new ways of seeing existing relationships, appear in language in a variety of ways: in the invention of new terms…; in the adaptation and alteration (indeed at times reversal) of older terms…; in extension or transfer.

This insight suggests that the dynamics between early modern England’s different senses of “kind” have the potential to illuminate how concepts of kind structured early moderns’ views of themselves and each other.

Foucault’s discussion of order in *The Order of Things* (published in French in 1966 and in English in 1970) invites reflection on the extent to which kind as a classifying unit might have functioned as the foundation of what I would call a “system of systems”—that is, a system that allows for the very possibility of order(s)—in early modern thought. For Foucault, order is “that which is given in things as their inner law, a hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language.” Such order depends on the “definition of the segments by which the
resemblances and differences can be shown, the types of variation by which those segments can be
affected, and, lastly, the threshold above which there is a difference and below which there is a
similitude.” In Fairfax’s *Treatise of the bulk and selvedge of the world*, kind quite clearly operates as the
necessary “segment” of the law that dictates how “everything in the world is…staked down” or
ordered. In this respect, kind does seem to constitute the principal condition of a system of systems.
The methodological impact of Foucault’s project involves his recognizing the processes by which a
culture becomes increasingly cognizant of the orders that govern “its language, its schemas of
perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, [and] the hierarchy of its practices.” As a
culture “imperceptibly” strays from “the empirical orders prescribed for it…, instituting an initial
separation from them,” those orders “lose their original transparency,” and the culture “frees itself
sufficiently to discover that these orders are not the only possible ones or the best ones.” Various
uses of “kind” in early modern drama, poetry, and prose appear to unsettle established systems of
kind, suggesting that certain uses of “kind” might in fact have contributed to the sort of “initial
separation” Foucault details, permitting early moderns to begin to question the previously invisible
systems of kind that structured their lives. Jacques Derrida’s insight that the policing of genre
paradoxically entails the corruption or contamination of genre elucidates why the naming of kinds
and regulation of kindness in early modern England could in fact compromise the very systems
from which the impulses to name and regulate stemmed.

Kind is a historically fascinating concept not only because of the integral part it played in
structuring early modern England’s cultural landscape—that is, in determining what was possible to
apprehend, accomplish, and imagine. What makes kind especially deserving of critical attention is
how it wound or spooled together so many identity categories. The feminist theoretical concept that
Kimberlé Crenshaw named “intersectionality” maintains the necessity of recognizing that identity
categories such as class, gender, sexuality, race, and ability are inextricably interrelated. Whose
identity is not determined by the convergence of more than one such category? A woman of lower socioeconomic status, for instance, is likely to experience her gender differently than a woman who belongs to the upper class. Women of different ethnicities and socioeconomic statuses are even more likely to have different experiences of gender. This theory has informed the particular set of issues that I consider in this dissertation and, in fact, motivated my initial decision to undertake an analysis of kind. In early modern discourse, systems of gender, race, and species, for example, privilege and marginalize individuals according to different principles. But because these systems are predicated on concepts of kind, an analysis of kind may shed light on the interrelationships between them or on how the negotiation of one identity category may implicate or complicate others.

Attention to kind may also elucidate how early modern identities were understood in relation to nature, art, and society. Early modern England’s kinds tend to straddle the domains of the natural, artificial, and social. Somewhat polemically, Bruno Latour argues that “critics” today assume only one of three approaches to analyzing the world: they collect and interpret data on nature and nonhuman things, they observe and theorize processes of socialization, or they analyze discourse. He insists that the disciplinary divides that distinguish these approaches deter us from recognizing the extent to which natural, social, and discursive problems are often intricately intertwined. But given that early modern kinds partake of nature, art, and society, an analysis of kind may elucidate how the problems that we classify as natural, social, or discursive may simultaneously be all three. Such an analysis may also clarify why whether a problem is natural, social, or discursive is sometimes beside the point.

V. An Itinerary of Kinds

The works of drama, poetry, and prose that I examine in the following chapters evince an acute interest in delineating the interrelationships among different kinds of kind. My examination of these interrelationships illustrates the various directions in which analyses of kind might unfurl and
elucidates the diverse ways in which systems of kind and principles of kindness mattered—either to those living in early modern England or those who had some form of contact with its culture. Each chapter is consistent with the others insofar as it inquires into how a particular work that asserts, qualifies, and tests ideological distinctions between nature, art, and society—by naming kinds or engaging the polyvalence of kind and polysemy of “kind”—occasions both the reconsideration of kinds and the practices of cultural reproduction that inform arrangements of kinds within traditional hierarchies. Simultaneously, each chapter inquires into how the text it examines might have allowed early moderns to imagine naming, reproducing, and inhabiting alternative kinds of kinds.

My first chapter analyzes how a crisis of cultural reproduction sparks a competitive dance between two systems of kind in John Fletcher and William Shakespeare’s _The Two Noble Kinsmen_ (c. 1613). The dominant system—which I call the “naturalizing hierarchy of kinds”—naturalizes sex, gender, and species, and appears to uphold moral order by reinforcing “natural” order. To ensure the futurity of humankind within this system—an ostensible moral imperative—one must embody the gender that supposedly corresponds to one’s sex. In the early modern period, human males claim ascendancy over all other forms of earthly life as husbands and as guarantors of cultural reproduction. But to perform the role of husband successfully, a human male must subdue a human, female wife. His wife, in turn, must affirm his standing as a guarantor of cultural reproduction—in other words, his “kindness”—by obediently taking part in biological reproduction. There is nothing surprising here; the ideology is consistent with ideas articulated in many early modern texts. In the _Two Noble Kinsmen_, however, this way of thinking precipitates a crisis of cultural reproduction for the eponymous kinsmen, Arcite and Palamon, when it necessitates their participation in a battle that leads to their imprisonment. In prison, the kinsmen lament their inability to reproduce their kind—until, that is, they begin to reconceptualize kinds. Although the kinsmen quickly return to their former way of thinking, their brief moment of inspiration provides an impetus for considering the
alternative system of kinds articulated by their love interest, Emilia. According to Emilia, one need not conform to one’s natural(ized) kind to engage in cultural reproduction or even to sustain life. Emilia’s notion of cultural reproduction not only avoids privileging natural(ized) kinds; it suggests that we cannot assess the value of kinds, kindness, or life in unspecific terms. Instead, we must consider the dynamics among kinds fostered by the cultural reproduction of particular kinds, patterns of kindness, and forms of life. The naturalizing hierarchy of kinds appears to prevail in the last act of the play, but the Epilogue reminds its audience that whether a system’s kinds are natural(ized) may matter less than how they construe and sustain life. In doing so, the Epilogue urges the audience to participate in the collaborative re-imagination of kinds, kindness, and life itself.

Chapter 2 explores the attempt to contest notions of cultural and creative reproductive authority that undergird naturalizing hierarchies of gender, rank, and skin color in Lady Mary Wroth’s *The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania* (1621-c. 1626). *Urania* contradicts early modern truisms about women and redefines the nature of womankind by depicting women who are willing to suffer constantly for love. As these women channel their psychic pain into composing poetry and forging unconventional relationships through sympathetic exchange, they undercut two specific truisms: first, womankind is naturally less capable of enduring pain than mankind, and second, womankind is therefore naturally less deserving of cultural and creative reproductive authority than mankind.144 While *Urania* reconstitutes womankind, however, both its persistent emphasis on virtue and the language of difference it employs to mark virtue undermine its project of recalibrating naturalized kinds of rank and skin color. Nevertheless, the priority that Wroth’s romance affords sympathetic exchange effectively endows readers with the authority not only to work through these contradictions but also to envision better ends for *Urania*.

My third chapter on John Fletcher’s *The Island Princess* (c. 1619-1621) proposes that the story the play tells about wonder and the use of gunpowder prompts the audience to reconsider the
narratives of kind that Christian Europeans relied upon to justify their programs of international conquest and trade. Treatises contemporaneous with the play frequently insinuate that individuals cognitively process wonder in ways that correspond to their “kind.” Those who convert wonder into knowledge evince their natural authority over those who remain absorbed by wonder, thereby demonstrating their superior kind. Such treatises may index kind according to religious belief, skin color, or some combination of them. The technology of the Portuguese in the play might seem to suggest that their capacity for knowledge exceeds the Malukans’; the explosions they create with gunpowder leave the Malukans wonderstruck. Consequently, it could be argued that the play identifies the Portuguese—and, by extension, other Christian Europeans—as natural rulers. But the same gunpowder that Armusia and his countrymen ignite in Maluku to subdue the Malukans shakes the foundation of this claim. Armusia’s reliance on gunpowder would have prompted some early moderns to question his chivalric heroism. His protracted state of wonder also would have invited questions about his natural authority. When Armusia has opportunities to demonstrate his transcendent knowledge, he instead appears overly confident in himself, his religion, and his culture. These missed opportunities, I submit, contribute to the conversion of gunpowder from a technology that illustrates the natural authority of those deploying it into an overdetermined symbol that compromises the basis of distinctions between wonder and knowledge. Questioning ideological distinctions that reinforce naturalized hierarchies of kind—hierarchies in which kinds are indexed according to their knowledge, religious belief and skin color—The Island Princess simultaneously challenges the basis of Christian Europeans’ geopolitical authority and directs attention toward alternative ecologies of kind.145

Chapter 4 argues that John Milton construes kinds as the consequence of Satan’s rebellion and the increased “bounds” of kind as punishment for Adam and Eve’s consumption of the forbidden fruit. Although Milton’s conception of kind may appear more traditional than
Shakespeare’s, Wroth’s, or Fletcher’s, Milton thinks about kinds as temporary but necessary conditions of the postlapsarian world and kindness as a means to an end. For Milton, kindness is both a work of faith and a socioeconomic ordering mechanism that allows for the more equitable distribution of resources among human and nonhuman kinds—that is, a more balanced ecology of kinds. Reading *Comus* (or *A Mask Presented at Ludlow Castle*, 1634), “Epitaphium Damonis” (c. 1639), *Tetrachordon* (1645), and *Paradise Lost* (1667, 1674) together, I argue that in Milton’s corpus, kindness offers a path to a life after death that throws Milton’s views on temperance and sexuality into surprising relief. In the life after death, the bounds of kind dissolve: former members of humankind may assume the proportions and cominglings of genders and species that the earthly bounds of kind would not previously permit as they as they “commingle.” Despite Milton’s position(s) on the necessity of kind and kindness, to some extent, he suggests that they constitute a form of punishment and looks forward to a point at which they will cease to exist.

As these literary works attest, the concept of kind—embedded in discourses of combat, husbandry, life, cultural and creative reproductive authority, constancy, suffering, sympathetic exchange, enterprise, wonder, technology, and temperance or self-discipline, to name a few—helped determine the contours of an array of patterns that converged and diverged in the fabric of early modern English culture. Kind’s affiliation with nature and divine authority meant that it could easily be invoked to champion traditionally accepted hierarchies as natural and right. But as the chapters that follow illustrate, early moderns could also alter these hierarchies through the strategic use of “kind.” The polysemy of “kind” and kind’s conceptual reach as a classifying unit as well the naming of kinds and wordplay with “kind” allowed early moderns to explore the interstices of the seams that gathered nature, art, and society together while defining them as ontologically separate. This naming and wordplay, in turn, allowed early moderns to question assumptions about the inherent virtue of
conventionally privileged, naturalized kinds delineated within hierarchies of rank, race, sex, gender, and species.
Notes


2. When I place quotation marks around “kind,” I am referring specifically to the word. When quotation marks do not appear around the word, I am using it to designate a concept or category.

3. See, for example, “a Kynde” in Catholicon Anglicum (1475) Lexicons of Early Modern English (LEME), Ed. Ian Lancashire. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Library and University of Toronto Press, 2015), accessed March 13, 2015. Every subsequent early modern lexicon cited was also accessed through LEME between March 13, 2015 and September 27, 2015 unless otherwise noted. The entry reads: “genus geneus fisis grecce natura est species sed defferunt genus & species quia omnia animalia sunt eiusdem generis sed non eiusdem specie quia different in specie nam alia est species humana alia leonine alia equina.” That is, genus and species are different; all animals are of the same genus but not the same species. Many thanks to Clara Bosak-Schroeder for assistance with the translation.

4. See the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), Online ed., “species,” n., I.9.e. A reference to Joseph Addison appears under this entry on “species”: “Their amusements seem contrived for them rather as they are women…; and are more adapted to the Sex than the Species.” The line suggests that species and sex were taken to be two essentially different taxonomical units.

5. See, for example, Thomas Blount, “Chaos (Gr.)” in Glossographia: Or A Dictionary, Interpreting all such Hard Words, whether Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, French, Teutonick, Belgick, British or Saxon; as are now used in our refined English Tongue. Also the Terms of Divinity, Law, Physick, Mathematicks, Heraldry, Anatomy, War, Musick, Architecture; and of several other Arts and Sciences Explicated. With Etymologies, Definitions, and Historical Observations on the same. Very useful for all such as desire to understand what they read (London: published by Humphrey Moseley and George Sawbridge, 1656). The entry describes chaos as “the rude and undigested first heap of natural elements.”


9. See “The Heads or Contents” in Fairfax, A Treatise of the bulk and selvedge of the world, image 19 of 124.


12. See, for example, Geoffrey the Grammarian, “kende of that god coursly hath in set” in *Promptorium Parvulorum* (Published by Fredrici Egmondt and Petre Post Pascha, 5 May 1499), STC / 40234; “Natura” in *Medulla Grammatice* (Pepys Library MS 2002, 1480); and Guy Miège, “nature” in *A New Dictionary French and English, With Another English and French; According to the Present Use and Modern Orthography of the French. Inrich’d With New Words, Choice Phrases, and Apposite Proverbs; Digested Into a most accurate Method; And Contrieved For the Use both of English and Forreiners* (London: published by Thomas Basset, 1677).


14. The *OED* traces the first use of “ecology” only back to 1875 (*OED*, s.v. “ecology,” n., 1).

15. In contrast, the *OED* traces the first use of “network” back to the sixteenth century (*OED*, s.v. “network,” n.A.1-2).


19. Linda Pollock, “The Practice of Kindness in Early Modern Elite Society,” *Past & Present*, no. 211 (May 2011): 121-58, esp. 122-24. See also William S. Hamrick, *Kindness and the Good Society: Connections of the Heart* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), esp. xiii. Hammrick’s monograph examines how western philosophical texts throughout history have treated kindness as it is almost exclusively thought of today—that is, as consideration or niceness. His study is both engaging and philosophically rigorous. The *OED*’s entry on the adjective “kind,” however, suggests that Hamrick’s etymological claim that “the use of the word ‘kind,’ as indicating something morally praiseworthy, emerged since the Renaissance, at least in English” would benefit from revision.


30. As the results of a search for “kind of” in the database *LEME* demonstrates, the construction “kind of” was particularly prevalent in dictionary entries published from 1538 through 1702. See esp. Randle Cotgrave, *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (London: published by A. Islip, 1611); Thomas Elyot, *The Dictionary of Syr Thomas Eliot Knight* (London: published by Thomae Bertheleti, 1538); John Florio, *A Worlde of Wordes, Or Most copious, and exact Dictionarie in Italian and English* (London: published by Edward Blount, 1598); Claude Hollyband, *A Dictionarie French and English: Published for the benefite of the studious in that language: Gathered and set forth by Claudius Hollyband. For the better understanding of the order of this Dictionarie, peruse the Preface to the Reader* (London: published by Thomas Woodcock, 1593); John Kersey the Younger, *A New English Dictionary: Or, a Compleat: Collection Of the Most Proper and Significant Words, Commonly used in the Language; With a Short and Clear Exposition of Difficult Words and Terms of Art. The whole digested into Alphabetical Order; and chiefly designed for the benefit of Young Scholars, Tradesmen, Artificers, and the Female Sex, who would learn to spell truly; being so fitted to every Capacity, that it may be a continual help to all that want an Instructer* (London: published by Henry Bonwicke and Robert Knaplock, 1702); Edward Phillips, *The New World of English Words: Or, a Generall Dictionary: Containing the Interpretations of such hard words as are derived from other Languages; whether Hebrew, Arabick, Syriack, Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, British, Dutch, Saxon, &c. their Etymologies and perfect Definitions* (London: published by Nath. Brooke, 1658); John Rider, *Biblibeca Scholastica. A Double Dictionarie, Penned for all those that would have within short space the use of the Latin tongue, either to speake, or write. Verie profitable and necessarie for Scholers, Courtiers, Lawyers and their Clarkes, Apprentices of London, Travellers, Factors for Marchants, and briefly for all Discontinuers within her Majesties realmes of England and Ireland* (Oxford, imprinted by Joseph Barnes, 1589); and Thomas Thomas, *Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicanae. In hoc Opere Quid Sit Praestitum, & ad superiores λέξικογραφοντις adiectum, ducet epistola ad Lectorem* (Cantrbridgic: published by Richardum Boyle, 1587). Whereas a search in *LEME* for “kind of” returns 7,706 results, searches for “sort of,” species of,” and “degree of”—similar early modern partitive constructions—return only 1,204 results.
combined. (LEME returned these results and any discussed below after searching the headwords, explanations, full entries, and notes of 206 lexicons.)


34. See OED, s.v. “mongrel, adj., B. I. 1.” and “half-blooded, adj.” Perdita does not necessarily imply that carnations and gillyvors are the products of an adulterous union; first and foremost, she is emphasizing that they are somehow false (and therefore illegitimate). As early modern dictionaries demonstrate, “bastard” could be substituted “spurious” or “counterfeit.” See, for example, John Withals, “bastard” in *A short Dictionarie For Yonge Beginners. Gathered of good authors, specially of Columell, Grapald, and Plini* (London: published by John Waley and Abraham Vele, 1556); see also Cotgrave, “bastard” in *A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611). LEME, accessed May 30, 2015.


38. For both Perdita and Sidney, art seems to function as a category that encompasses the objects that humans produce—by non-procreative means—to elicit aesthetic pleasure.

39. Interestingly, in *ABCedarium Anglico Latinum, Pro Tyrunculis* (London, published Gul. Riddel, 1552), Richard Huloet defines a bastard as one “begotten between base and gentle.” That Polixenes explains the grafting process to Perdita with these very terms just before enjoining Perdita not to call gillyvors bastards suggests that *The Winter’s Tale* engages this sense of bastard precisely in order to repudiate it. Polixenes emphatically denies that the product of a union between base and gentle kinds is necessarily degenerate or “false.” See note 20 above.

40. The “paint” on the face of the actor who played Perdita would have imbued these lines with humor and possibly motivated some to consider how free of paint—figuratively speaking—any one person might actually be. It is also noteworthy that Polixenes, who—as King of Bohemia—enjoys a great deal more authority than Perdita, undermines the naturalized hierarchies of nature and rank that Perdita endeavors to uphold. Polixenes may remain relatively secure while expressing unorthodox ideas. In contrast, the few claims Perdita has to authority or status may depend on her ability to demonstrate her virtue through her fierce adherence to the very systems of kind that marginalize her (because according to these systems, kindness is virtue).

42. *OED*, s.v. “unkind, adj., 4.” accessed September 12, 2014. Several lexicons from the period define “degenerate” as “unnatural,” “churlish,” “unkind.” See Blount, “degenerate” in *Glossographia: Or A Dictionary*; John Bullokar “degenerate” in *An English Expositor: teaching the interpretation of the hardest words in our language* (London: published by John Legatt, 1616); Robert Cawdrey, “degenerate” in *A Table Alphabeticall, containing and teaching the true writing, and understanding of hard usuall English words, borrowed from the Hebrew, Greeke, Latine, or French, &c. With the interpretation thereof by plaine English words, gathered for the benefit & helpe of Ladies, Gentlewomen, or any other vsukilfull persons. Whereby they may the more easiely and better understand many hard English worthes, which they shal or read in Scriptures, Sermons, or elsewhere, and also be made able to use the same aptly themselves* (London: published by Edmund Weaver, 1604); Henry Cockeram, “degenerate” in *The English Dictionarie: Or, An Interpreter of hard English Words. Enabling as well Ladies and Gentlewomen, young Schollers, Clarkes, Merchants, as also Strangers of any Nation, to the understanding of the more difficult Authors already printed in our Language, and the more speedy attaining of an elegant perfection of the English tongue, both in reading, speaking and writing. Being a Collection of the choise words contained in the Table Alphabeticall and English Expositor, and of some thousands of words never published by any heretofore* (London: published by N. Butter, 1623); and Phillips, “degenerate” in *The New World of English Words* (1658). See also Cotgrave, “desnaturé” and “degenerer” in *A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611).

43. *OED*, s.v. “king, n. etymology.”

44. Interestingly, Henry VIII had to obtain a dispensation from Rome to marry his brother’s widow. See G. W. Bernard, *The King’s Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the English Church* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 9. That Claudius’s marriage to Gertrude was unlawful and unnatural might therefore have been more palpable for early audiences of *Hamlet*.

45. See *OED*, s.v. “kin, n.1” and s.v. “kind, n. 11-12.”

46. As Lorraine Daston has demonstrated, early moderns did not necessarily cleave human society (or culture) and nature into separate ontological categories. See Daston, “Nature of Nature,” 154.


48. The extent to which the concept of kindness concerned the landed ranks in early modern England speaks to a general anxiety over establishing kindness as an elite quality. See See, Pollock, “The Practice of Kindness,” 144-46. As Pollock writes, “That elite correspondence was so copiously sprinkled with the term shows that kindness was the norm, something to be expected”; in contrast, “Those with less status and wealth seem to have used the word ‘kindness’ less often than the phrase ‘living in charity with neighbors.’”


51. The *OED* suggests that this particular sense—that is, “gentle”—of the adjective “kind” emerged in the late Middle Ages. The other sense of the adjective—that of adhering to nature’s law—appeared four hundred or more years earlier. Compare *OED*, s.v. “kind, adj. I.1.a-c” and ““kind, adj. II.4-5.”

52. “Art” also seems to have taken on a more specific meaning over the course of the past several centuries; it now primarily refers to select products of human occupation.

53. Perhaps the early modern “general kind” would be the closest analog to today’s “kind” purely in terms of its sense. See John Florio, “genere,” and “ingenere” in *Queen Anna’s New World of Words, Or Dictionarie of the Italian and English tongues, Collected, and newly much augmented by John Florio, Reader of the Italian vnto the Soueraigne Maiestie of Anna, crowned Queene of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, &c. And one of the Gentlemen of hir Royall Privie Chamber. Whereto are added certaine necessarie rules and short obseruations for the Italian tongue*, 2nd ed. (London: published by Edward Blount and Willaim Barret, 1611), STC 11099.

54. This particular passage has inspired scholars to interpret the notions of art and nature that Polixenes and Perdita articulate in a number of different ways. See esp. Jennifer Munroe, “It’s all about the gillyvors: Engendering Art and Nature in *The Winter’s Tale*” in *Literary and Scientific Cultures of Early Modernity: Ecocritical Shakespeare*, eds. Lynne Bruckner and Dan Brayton (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011), esp. 143. Monroe asserts that “the play ultimately reinforces Perdita’s argument,” which she takes to be that “human artifice and labor may change nature,” but humans are not superior to nature. At the same times, she argues, the play “questions the ability (let alone right) of men to control women. Likened throughout the play as they are in the early modern period to Nature, women are here associated with an artful utilitarianism that aligns rather than competes with the things nature creates. Restoring a sense of balance in the kingdom is possible, therefore, not by imposing authoritative control but by men becoming subject both to the things of Nature and to women in the play.” I would instead argue that Perdita’s concern with legitimate birth (or “bastards”) and condemnation of makeup as deceitful to men demonstrate that her understanding of natural order is deeply misogynistic; indeed, her speech anticipates Polixenes’s subsequent condemnation of her and insistence that Florizel not marry her because she is not of their “kin” and could only have attracted him with witchcraft (4.4). See also Mary Livingston, “The Natural Art of The Winter’s Tale,” *Modern Language Quarterly* 30 (1969) 340-55; Charles Forker, “Negotiating the Paradoxes of Art and Nature in The Winter’s Tale,” in *Approaches to Teaching Shakespeare’s The Tempest and Other Late Romances*, ed. Marice Hunt (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1992), 94-102.

55. “Gentle” could be used as a noun and as a form of address. *OED*, s.v. “gentle, adj. and noun, B.1.b-c.”

56. See *OED*, s.v. “kind, n., I. 1.b-2.a.,” and “kind, n., II.12,” accessed September 12, 2014. Dictionary definitions of “kind” in *LEME* do not list “rank” or “class” as one of the word’s meanings. Here my argument is based on the *OED*’s historically grounded definitions of “kind” and on what I have read in the period’s literature. See, for example, Fairfax, *The Bulk and Selvedge of the World*, image 7 of 24: “The kindness and good greeting that is of one sort, is wont to be enfolded mainly within the rank or stock Guild or kindred of the same.”

58. Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*, 38.


61. OED, s.v. “race, n., 6.” See also Cotgrave, “Race: f,” in *A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611); Hollyband, “Vne race,” in *A Dictionary French and English* (1593); Richard Hogarth, “Race” in *Gazophylacium Anglicanum: Containing The Derivation Of English Words, Proper and Common, Each in an Alphabet distinct: Proving the Dutch and Saxon to be the prime Fountains. And likewise giving the Similar Words in most European Languages, whereby any of them may be indifferently well Learned, and Understood. Fitted to the Capacity of the English Reader, that may be curious to know the Original of his Mother-tongue* (London: published by Randall Taylor, 1689); Miège, “Race, (f)” in *A New Dictionary French and English* (1677). Interestingly, entries on “race” often list “kind” as one of the word’s meanings. Dictionary definitions of “kind,” however, tend not to include “race.”

62. See, for example, Cotgrave, “Couvé,” “Estoc,” “Geanterie,” “Genereux,” “Genereuse,” “Gent,” “Germain, m. ine, f.,” and “Mulataille, f.” in *A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues* (1611); Florio, “Razza, Raza” in *A World of Words* (1598); Florio, “Rázza” in *Queen Anna’s New World of Words* (1611); Hogarth, “Gennet” in *Gazophylacium Anglicanum* (1689); Hollyband, “Vne race,” in *A Dictionary French and English* (1593); Florio, “Razza, Raza” in *A World of Words* (1598); James Moxon, “Heterogenial,” in *Mathematicks made Easie: Or, a Mathematical Dictionary, Explaining The Terms of Art, and Difficult Phrases used in Arithmetick, Geometry, Astronomy, Astrology, and other Mathematical Sciences. Wherein the true Meaning of the Word is Rendred, the Nature of Things signified Discussed, and (where Need requires) Illustrated with apt Figures and Diagrams. With an Appendice, exactly containing the Quantities of all sorts of Weights and Measures: The Characters and Meaning of the Marks, Symbols, or Abbreviations commonly used in Algebra. And sundry other Observables. By Joseph Moxon, a Member of the Royal Society, and Hydrographer to the King’s most Excellent Majesty* (London: published by Joseph Moxon, 1679); John Wilkins, “Breed” in *An Essay Towards a Real Character, And a Philosophical Language* (London: published by Samuel Gellibrand and John Martyn, 1668).


68. Even those who looked to one’s geohumoral composition to decipher one’s race would have been concerned with one’s lineage. As Floyd-Wilson writes in *English Ethnicity and Race*, “Climate determines the color and temperament of general populations, but the transmission of traits also depends on the parents…[O]nce the environment has produced certain ingrained characteristics, generations of descendants are able to maintain and transmit these same traits even when residing outside their ancestral region”; ibid., 9. I do not discuss the category genus in this introduction although early modern dictionaries frequently list it as a synonym of “kind.” I have chosen not to explore its relationship to kind because “genus” appears less often than “race” in early modern discourse but, I think, has roughly the same meaning as the most vague sense of “race.”


71. Huloet, “Kynde of male or female” in *ABCedarium Anglico Latinum* (1552). See also Florio’s entries on “sesso” in *A World of Words* (1598) and Queen Anna’s *New World of Words* (1611); and Kersey’s entry on “sex” in *A New English Dictionary* (1702). Kersey describes “sex” as a “mark of distinction between male and female.”

72. See Florio “Feminéo” in *A World of Words* (1598): “of the feminine kind or gender. Womanish, feminine”; Richard Perceval, “Femineo” in *A Dictionarie in Spanish and English, first published into the English tongue by Ric. Percinale Gent. Now enlarged and amplified with many thousand words, as by this marke *to each of them prefixed may appeare; together with the accenting of every word throughout the whole Dictionarie, for the true pronunciation of the language, as also for the divers signification of one and the selfsame word: And for the learners ease and furtherance, the declining of all hard and irregular verbs; and for the same cause the former order of the Alphabet is altered, divers hard and uncoutant phrases and speeches out of sundry of the best Authors explained, with divers necessary notes and especiall directions for all such as shall be desirous to attaine the perfection of the Spanish tongue. All done by Iohn Minshew Professor of Languages in London. Hereunto for the further profite and pleasure of the learner or delighted in this tongue, is annexed an ample English Dictionarie, Alphabetically set downe with the Spanish words thereunto adjoynd, as also an Alphabeticall Table of the Arabick and Moorish words, now commonly received and used in the Spanish tongue, which being dispersed in their seuerall due
places throughout the whole Dictionarie are marked thus: by the same Iohn Minsheu. For the right use of this worke, I referre you to the directions before the Dictionarie, contriued in diuers points differing from other Dictionaries heretofore set foorth (London: published by Edm. Bollifant (1599): “womanlike, soft and tender, female like, pertaining to a woman. Also of the feminine kind or gender”; Elisha Coles, “gender” in An English Dictionary: Explaining The difficult Terms that are used in Divinity, Husbandry, Physick, Philosopy, Law, Navigation, Mathematicks, and other Arts and Sciences. Containing Many Thousands of Hard Words (and proper names of Places) more than are in any other English Dictionary or Expositor. Together With The Etymological Derivation of them from their proper Fountains, whether Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, or any other Language. In a Method more comprehensive, than any that is extant (London: published by Samuel Crouch, 1676): “difference of sex or kind.” In the early modern period, of course, “gender” could also refer to one of three noun classes: feminine, masculine, or “common.” See Miège, “gender” in A New Dictionary French and English (1677). It is not always clear whether entries on gender refer to noun classes or attributes of living organisms. See also OED, s.v. “gender, n. 3b.”

73. In early modern England, “sex” classified individuals not only according to their physiological reproductive systems and the physical traits that typically accompanied those systems; it also classified individuals according to their presumably correlative roles and qualities—e.g., man, woman, masculine, and feminine. See OED, s.v. “sex, n.1, 1a and 2a.” See also, for example, Miège, “sexe (m.)” in A New Dictionary French and English (1677). Still, the use of “masculine” and “feminine” in some early modern lexicons suggests that early moderns recognized distinctions between physiological reproductive systems (and the physical traits that tended to accompany them) and the roles and qualities that supposedly corresponded to those systems. See, for instance, Blount, “Masculine” in Glossographia (1656): “of the male kind, manly”; and Phillips, “Masculine” in The New World of English Words (1658): “manly, or of the male kinde.” See also Moxon, “Masculine Planets or Signs” in Mathematical Dictionary (1679): “This term is used by astrologers, not to denote any real distinction of Sex in the Celestial Bodies, but only analogically serves to signify the qualities they are principally endowed with…” Intriguingly, a particular text on which the OED bases its entry on “gender, n., 2.a.” indicates that “kind” and “gender” may sometimes have been distinguished from each other. See the OED’s reference to Thomas Usk’s Testament of Love (c. 1385) under “gender, n., 2.a.”: “after this manner manifold good is said; that is to say, good in kind and good in gender.” It would be worth considering the range of semantic relationships that exist between “kind,” “sex,” and “gender” in early modern English at greater length in an additional study.

74. See, for example, “kynde” in Catholicon Anglicum (British Library MS, c. 1475); Hogarth, “kind” in Gazophylacium Anglicanum (1689); Huloet, “kynde” in ABCedarium Anglicanum (1552); Miège, “Kind, subst.” in A New Dictionary French and English, (1677); and Rider, “A kinde, or sorte” in Bibliotheca Scholastica (1589).

75. See, for instance, William Bagwell, “species” in The Mystery of Astronomy Made plain To the meanest Capacity, By An Arithmetical Description of the Terrestrial and Celestial globes. Briefly shewing (by way of Question and Answer) the wonderful works of God, from the earth his Footstool, to his Throne of heaven. With Divine Observations upon every part thereof. Also, Two Tables: the one, for Contents; the other, for Explanation of Hard words (London: published by William Larnar, 1655); Blount, “Species” in Glossographia (1656); Bullokar, “Species” in An English Expositor (1616); Cockeram, “Species” in English Dictionary (1623); Coles, “Species” in An English Dictionary (1676); Elyot, “Species” in The Dictionary of Sir Thomas Elyot (1538); Florio, “Spécie” in A World of Words (1598); Florio, “Specie” in Queen Anna’s
World of Words (1611); Hogarth, “Spice” in Gazophylacium Anglicanum (1689); Kersey, “A species” in A New English Dictionary (1702); William Lily, “Species” in A Shorte Introduction of Grammar generally to be used: compiled and set forth, for the bringing up of all those that intend to attain the knowledge of the Latine tongue (London: published by Reginaldum Vuolfium, 1567); Phillips, “Species” in The New World of English Words (1658); and Thomas Willis, “Species” in Dr Willis’s Practice of Physick, Being the whole Works Of That Renowned and Famous Physician: Containing These Eleven Several Treatises, viz. I. Of Fermentation. II. Of Feavres. III. Of Urines. IV. Of the Ascension of the Blood. V. Of Musculary Motion. VI. Of the Anatomy of the Brain. VII. Of The Description and Use of the Nerves. VIII. Of Convulsive Diseases. IX. Pharmaceutice Rationalis, the First and Second Part. X. Of the Scurvy. XI. Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes. Wherein most of the Diseases belonging to the Body of Man are Treated of, with excellent Methods and Receipts for the Cure of the same. Fitted to the meanest Capacity by an Index for the Explaining of all the hard and unusual Words and Terms of Art derived from the Greek, Latine, or other Languages, for the Benefit of the English Reader (London: published by T. Dring. C. Harper, and J. Leigh, 1684).

76. For examples of entries classify living organisms according to “species,” see Steven Blankaart “Generatio” in A Physical Dictionary; In which, all the Terms Relating either to Anatomy, Chirurgery, Pharmacy, or Chymistry, are very accurately explain'd (London: published by J. Gellibrand, 1684); Thomas Cooper, ‘Brontia’ and ‘Buglossos’ and ‘Calamintha’ and ‘Centifolia’ and ‘Cerrus’ and ‘Clematis’ Thesaurus linguae Romanae & Britannicae tam accurate congostus, vt nihil penè in eo desiderari possit, quod vel Latinè completatur amplissimus Stephani Thesaurus, vel Anglicè, toties aucta Elianea Bibliotheca: opera & industria Thomae Cooper Magdalenensis. ... Accessit dictionarium historicum & poëticum propria vocabula virorum, mulierum, sectarum, populorum, urbium, montium, & c. aeternorum locorum complectens, & in his iucundissimas & omnium cognitione dignissimas historias (London: Henrici Bynnemani, 1584); Lily, “Ostreum” and “Robur” A Short Introduction of Grammar (1567); Thomas, “Acrocorium,” “Betonica,” “Capnitis,” and “Verticilla” in Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicaee (1587); and Willis, “Species,” in Dr. Willis’s Practice of Physic (1684). “Kind” is more often used to designate categories of living organisms in early modern lexicons. Because they rely on “kind” so frequently to perform this function, I have not cited individual dictionary entries that employ “kind” to classify living organisms; there are too many to list. See esp. Coles, An English Dictionary (1676); Cooper, Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et Britannicae (1584); Coote, The English Schoolmaster (1596); Cotgrave, A Dicconarie of the French and English Tonges (1611); Elyot, The Dictionary of Sir Thomas Elyot (1538); Florio, A Worlde of Worde (1598); Florio, Queen Anna’s New Worlde of Worde (1611); Hogarth, Gazophylacium Anglicanum (1689); Hollyband, A Dicconarie French and English (1593); Huloet, ABCadarium Anglico Latinum (1552); Kersey, A New English Dictionary (1702); Mige, A New Dictionary French and English (1677); Perceval, A Dicconarie in Spanish and English (1599); Phillips, The New Worlde of English Worde (1658); Rider, Bibliotheca Scholastica (1589); and Thomas, Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicaee (1587).

77. See, for example, Florio, “Specie” in Queen Anna’s New Worlde of Worde (1611). See also OED, s.v. “species, n., I.1.” and “species, n., II.7.”

78. In purely quantitative terms, whereas a search for “kind of” in LEME generates 7,706 results, a search for “species of” generates only 24 results. See also note 17.

79. OED, s.v. “species, n., I.8.a..”
80. And see the OED’s reference to Joseph Addison under “species, n., I.9.e.”: “Their amusements seem contrived for them rather as they are women…; and are more adapted to the Sex than the Species.” The passage suggests species and sex were understood as inherently different taxonomical units.

81. Species was not entirely unassociated with divine will or religious ritual. See OED, s.v. “species, n., I.2.” Under this particular entry, the OED quotes William Fulke’s Dr. Thomas Heskins Overtrown (1579): “They cease to be the body & bloud of Christ, when the species or kinds of bread and wine, are putrefied and rotten.” It is interesting, however, that here Fulke relies on “kind” to clarify the metaphysical significance of “species.”

82. See note 29 above.

83. A search for “sort of” in LEME generates 1,029 results. Eight lexicons in particular employ “sort” to perform significant classifying work. These lexicons were all published in the later half of the 17th-century or the beginning of the 18th-century. See, B. E. A New Dictionary Of The Terms Ancient and Modern Of The Canting Crew, In its several Tribes of Gypses, Beggars, Thieves, Cheats, &c. With An Addition of some Proverbs, Phrases, Figurative Speeches, &c. Useful for all sorts of People, (especially Foreigners) to secure their Money and preserve their Lives; besides very Diverting and Entertaining, being wholly New (London: published by W. Hayes, P. Gilbourne, W. Davis, (1699); Blankaart, A Physical Dictionary (1684); Edmund Bohun and John Augustine Barnard, A GEOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY Representing the Present and Antient NAMES and STATES OF ALL THE Countries, Kingdoms, Provinces, Remarkable Cities, Universities, Ports, Towns, Mountains, Seas, Straights, Fountains, and Rivers of the whole WORLD; THEIR Distances, Longitudes, and Latitudes, WITH A short HISTORICAL ACCOUNT of the same, and a general INDEX of the Antient and Latin Names (London: published by Charles Brome, 1693); Coles, An English Dictionary (1676); Kersey, A New English Dictionary (1702); Miège, A New Dictionary French and English (1677); Phillips, The New World of English Words (1658); and Jean de La Quintinie, The Compleat Gard’ner; Or, Directions for Cultivating And Right Ordering Of Fruit-Gardens And Kitchen-Gardens; With Divers Reflections On several Parts of Husbandry. In Six Books. By the Famous Monsieur De La Quinintye, Chief director of all the Gardens of the French-King. To which is added His Treatise of Orange-Trees, with the Raising of Melons, omitted in the French Editions, trans. John Evelyn (London: published by M. Gillyflower, 1693).

84. Perhaps the “sort” could confer value only because of its close association with “kind”; thus, when “kind” lost its charge, so too did “sort.” See the Oxford Dictionary of English, s.v. “sort.”


86. See OED, s.v. “sort, n.2.III.” Cotgrave’s Dictionary of the French and English Tongues (1611) appears to be one of the first English lexicons to define “sort” as something more than a “cut” or “lot.” Cotgrave defines “Sorte: f.” thusly: “sort, manner, form, fashion, kind, quality, condition, calling. De sorte que. So that. Chascun demnde sa sorte: Prov. Each to his kind, as words to wind.” Compare this definition to Cotgrave’s “Sort: m.”: “A lot, or lottery; also fate, luck, hazard, fortune,
chance, casualty; also, a charm, incantation, or spell; also, the stock, or principal money in bank, or at use.”


88. Rider, “The Female” in Bibliotecha Scholastica (1589). Rider also uses “sort” as others use “kind” in his entry on “Rascal:...rude sort of men.” Here “sort” seems to refer to a group of men whose nature it is to be rude. For similar uses of “sort,” see Cotgrave, “Castagnole: f.” and “Mise: f.” in A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (1611); Florio, “Volgo” in A Worlde of Wordes (1598); Perceval, “Génére, vide Genéro” in A Dictionary in Spanish and English (1599); and Wilson, “Lord. sig.” in A Christian Dictionary (1612).

89. Cotgrave, “Ra...ce: f.” A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (1611); Hollyband, “Vne Race” in A Dictionary French and English (1593). See also OED, “sort, n.2.I.2.”

90. A search for “kind of” in LEME generates 7,706 results; a search for “breed of” generates 14 results. According to several dictionary entries on “breed,” the noun form of “breed” was often employed as a synonym specifically of “race” and “kind.” See B. E. “Mongrel” in A New Dictionary Of The Terms Ancient and Modern (1699); Cotgrave, “Engeance: f.” in A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (1611); Hogarth, “Gennet” in Gazophylacium Anglicanum (1689); Kersey, “A Breed” in A New English Dictionary (1702); Perceval, “Raléa, f.” and “Yeguáda” in A Dictionarie in Spanish and English (1599); and Wilkins, “Breed,” in An Essay Towards a Real Character (1668).

91. A search for “degree of” generates 151 results. Nothing I have read indicates that a difference in degree would have been interpreted as a difference in nature. See John Milton, Paradise Lost, new ed., ed. Meritt Y. Hughes (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., [1997] 2003): “Differing but in degree, of kind the same” (V.490). See also Blount, “Collateral,” “Proximity,” and “Quater cousins” in Glossographia (1656); Bullokar, “Collateral” in An English Expositor (1616); Cockeram, “Collateral” in An English Dictionary (1623); Cooper, “Linea” and “Proximitas” in Thesaurus linguarum Romanarum & Britannicae (1584); Cotgrave, “Ligne” and “Proximité” in A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (1611); Florio, “Lincéa” and “Prossimità” in A Worlde of Wordes (1598); Florio, “Catedra,” “Linea,” and “Prossimità” in Queen Anna’s New World of Words (1611); Hollyband, “Proximité” in A Dictionarie French and English (1593); Huloet, “Degree of blood,” “Kynswoman,” and “Parent” in A BCDarium Anglico Latimum (1552); Miège, “Branch,” “Ligne,” “Proche” in A New Dictionary French and English (1677); Phillips, “Gradual,” “Proximity,” and “Quater cousins” in The New World of English Words (1658); John Rastell, “Gavelkind” in The exposicions of the termys of the lawe of england & the nature of the wrytts wth dyuers rules and pryncyples of the law aswell out of the bokys of master lyttelton as of other bokys of the law gadered & breuely compiled for yong men very necessary (London: printed by John Rastell, 1525); Rider, “A Degree” in Bibliotheca Scholastica (1589); and Wilson, “Woman” in A Christian Dictionary (1612).

“Degree” could be used to denote rank, but again, it was not strongly associated with nature. See OED, s.v. “degree, n., 4.” See also Cotgrave, “Formarier” in A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (1611); John Cowell, “Nobility” in The Interpreter: or Booke Containing the Signification of Words: Wherin is set forth the true meaning of all, or the most part of such Words and Terms, as are mentioned in the
Lawe Writers, or Statutes of this victorious and renowned Kingdom, requiring any Exposition or Interpretation (Cambridge: published by John Legate, 1607); Kersey, “Co-ordinate” and “Nobility” in A New English Dictionary (1702); Palsgrave, “Degree” in Lesclarissement de la Langue Francoyse (1530); Perceval, “Estádo” in A Dictionary in Spanish and English (1599); Phillips, “Classe” in The New World of English Words (1658); Rider, “A Degree” in Bibliotheca Scholastica (1589); and Thomas, “Classis” in Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicanae (1587).

92. John Sergeant, “Forma” in The Mysterie of Rhetorique Unvail’d, Wherein above 130 The Tropes and Figures are severally derived from the Greek into English, together with lively Definitions (London: published by George Eversden, 1657). See also Cooper “form” in Thesaurus linguae Romanae & Britannicae (1584); Wilkons, “Form” in An Essay Towards a Real Character (1668); and Wilson, “Forme” in A Christian Dictionary (1612).


94. Coles, “form,” An English Dictionary (1676). Coles notes that “form” refers to “outward show or appearance, shape or beauty, also the inward essence of a thing.” See also See Geoffrey the Grammarian, “Schap or forme” in Promptorium Parvulorum (1499); Hollyband, “La forme” in A Dictionary French and English (1593); Huloet, “Fourme” in ABCedarium Anglico Latinum (1552); “fformo” in Medulla Grammatice (1480); Kerese, “A Form” in A New English Dictionary (1702); Miège, “Form” in A New Dictionary French and English (1677).

95. Interestingly, the deformed was also often assumed to be unkind, which would suggest that “deformed” carried a greater charge than “form.” See John Baret, “Dishonor” in An Alvearie Or Triple Dictionarie, in Englishe, Latin, and French: Very profitable for all such as be desirous of any of those three Languages. Also by the two Tables in the ende of this booke, they may contrariwise, finde the most necessary Latin or French wordes, placed after the order of an Alphabet, whatsoever are to be founde in any other Dictionarie: and so to turne them backwardes againe into Englishe when they reade any Latin or French Aucthors, & doubt of any harde worde therein (London: published by Henry Denham, 1574); Cawdrey, “deformed” in A Table Alphabetical (1604); Cawdrey, “deformed” in A Table Alphabetical (1617); Cooper, “deformis,” in Thesaurus linguae Romanae & Britannicae (1584); Coote, “deformed” in The English School-maister (1596); Cotgrave, “Deforme” in A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues (1611); Elyot, “Deformis,” in The Dictionary of Sir Thomas Elyot (1538); Huloet, “Deformed or defiled” and “Deformed or ill favored woman” in ABCedarium Anglico Latinum (1552); Miège, “Difforme” in A New Dictionary French and English (1677); Perceval, “desFórme” in A Dictionary Spanish and English (1599); Thomas, “Deformatus” in Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicanae (1587).

96. A search for “form of” in LEME generates 230 results.

97. Daston, “The Nature of Nature,” 171. To articulate Daston’s point in other words, for a growing number of people, “nature” primarily called to mind the physical world (especially the parts not constructed by humans) rather than metaphysical order. I would argue that before “nature” began to lose its moral charge, the concept of nature yoked metaphysical order and the physical world together.


100. The OED lists all four words as modern synonyms of each other. “Category” and “type,” however, do not seem to have been used very frequently in the early modern period. Fewer than 10 of 203 lexicons in LEME include entries on “category.” The first entry on “category,” which appears in Cawdrey’s A Table Alphabetical (1604), defines it as an “accusation.” Other entries add that it may signify a “predicament” or that it is a “term used in logic.” See, for instance, Blount, “category” in Glossographia (1656). No dictionaries in LEME employ the partitive construction “category of.” Fewer than 20 of 203 lexicons in LEME include entries on “type.” These entries define “type” as a “figure.” See, for example, Blount, “Type” in Glossographia (1656); Bullokar, “Type,” in An English Expositor (1616); Cawdrey, “type” in A Table Alphabetical (1604); Cockeram, “Type” in The English Dianctorie (1623); Kersey, “The Type” in A New English Dictionary (1702); Miège, “Type” in A New Dictionary French and English (1677); and Thomas, “Typus” in Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicanae (1587). When dictionaries employ the partitive construction “type of” (which they rarely do—a search for “type of” in LEME generates only 7 results), it signifies “figure of.” See Blount, “Pasche” and “Typocosmy” in Glossographia (1656); Florio, “Appamondo” and “Glóbo” in A Worlde of Wordes (1598); and Wilson, “Blood of the Covenant,” “Cleansing,” and “Holy of holies” in A Christian Dictionary (1612).


102. See 1.3.81 of William Shakespeare’s The Comical History of the Merchant of Venice, or Otherwise Called the Jew of Venice in The Norton Shakespeare ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 1090-1145.


104. The true reporte of the forme and shape of a monstrous childe, borne at Muche Horkesleye a village three myles from Colchester, in the countye of Essex, the xx. daye of Apryll in this yeare (Imprinted at London: In Fletestrete nere to S. Dunstons church by Thomas Marshe, 1562), STC 12207. Early English Books Online: Text creation Partnership, digital edition, accessed July 1, 2014. Whether someone other than Marshe participated in writing this pamphlet is unknown. The pamphlet expresses views about nature and kind that were fairly conventional yet frequently contested during the period. Pamphlets advertising “monstrous” births were also not uncommon in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. EEBO’s collection suggests that these pamphlets were especially popular in the late 1540s, for a little more than the first decade of Elizabeth I’s reign, and throughout James I’s reign. See Julie Crawford Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-Reformation England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 38. Crawford observes that other “monstrous” births—e.g., the 1562 birth of the “ruffled calf”—prompted Queen Elizabeth I and her Privy Council to issue statutes

105. Shakespeare’s sonnets do not maintain this conservative ideology; rather, the sequence proceeds to undermine it.


107. As the *OED* notes, preceded by a possessive, “presence” could denote a “person’s self.” *OED*, s.v. “presence,” n.4.a See also Cotgrave “presence, f.” in *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (1611).


118. For an explanation of how the nature to which Edmund pledges himself differs from other natures in the play, See Valerie Traub’s “The Nature of Norms in Early Modern England: Anatomy, Cartography, *King Lear*,” *South Central Review* 26, no. 1 & 2 (2009), 42-81.


130. Daston, “Nature of Nature,” 154. I would add that the lack of a divide between nature and culture or the divide’s relative incipience during this period may explain why wilderness was regarded with suspicion. The cultivated, refined, or gentle was often taken to be nature at its best.


132. Daston, “Nature of Nature,” 156. Elaborating on the dominant conceptual distinctions between nature and art in the period, Daston explains that whereas nature could “create or alter essences,” “art could never create a ‘nature’ in the sense of an inner essence that defined an authentic kind or species.”


138. Foucault, _The Order of Things_, xx.

139. Foucault, _The Order of Things_, xx.

140. Foucault, _The Order of Things_, xx.

141. Jacques Derrida, “The Law of Genre,” trans. Avital Ronell. _Critical Enquiry_ 7.1 (1980): 55-81, esp. 56-7 and 59. Derrida writes that generic systems establish limits: “Do,’ ‘Do not,’ says ‘genre,’ the word ‘genre,’ the figure, the voice, or the law of genre.” Indeed, “as soon as genre announces itself, one must respect a norm, one must not cross a line of demarcation, one must not risk impurity, anomaly, or monstrosity.” But the concept of the pure may not exist without that of the contaminated. Thus, Derrida describes the “law of genre” as “precisely a principle of contamination, a law of impurity.”


CHAPTER I

“But take heed to your kindness”: Kind Trouble and the Drama of Life in

Shakespeare and Fletcher's *The Two Noble Kinsmen*

As the editors of the New Cambridge Shakespeare edition of William Shakespeare and John Fletcher’s *The Two Noble Kinsmen* (c. 1613) write, for hundreds of years the play primarily attracted the attention of those intent upon determining who had composed which parts of it,¹ how to pin down its ambiguous genre,² and its relationship to its source texts.³ Recently, however, scholarship has increasingly attended to *The Two Noble Kinsmen*’s engagement with questions of sexuality as well as the larger cultural significance of the playwrights’ textual collaboration.⁴ In this chapter, I submit that *The Two Noble Kinsmen* invites its audience to engage in a complementary form of collaboration. Contrasting early modern ideologies of kind and approaches to cultural reproduction—by which I mean the replication, perpetuation, and general regulation of categories, identities, and standards that structure experiences of life⁵—*The Two Noble Kinsmen* calls on its audience to consider how life’s definition as natural or constructed may concern dramas unfolding in and beyond the theater.

*The Two Noble Kinsmen*’s ambiguous tone—most discernible during the Epilogue—leaves the play’s conflicts unfixed, appealing to the audience’s judgment. The initial conflict arises within a system of thought that naturalizes sex, gender, and species. Those who subscribe to this ideology—which I refer to as “the naturalizing hierarchy of kinds”—presume to uphold moral order by reinforcing natural order. To guarantee humankind’s futurity—an ostensible moral imperative—one must embody the gender that supposedly corresponds to one’s sex.⁶ Within this naturalizing
hierarchy, human males may enjoy authority in the form of natural ascendancy over all other forms of earthly life. To do so, however, they must assume the role of the husband, and in that capacity, act as a guarantor of cultural reproduction. While husbands and potential husbands may relate to each other as relative equals, to maintain their status, they must also subdue human female wives. A wife should affirm her husband’s standing as a guarantor of cultural reproduction by taking part in what is referred to today as “biological reproduction.” I call this axiom the “principle of husbandry.” The principle of husbandry coheres with ideologies articulated in many early modern texts. In the play, however, it precipitates a crisis of cultural reproduction for the titular kinsmen, Arcite and Palamon. Their adherence to it compels them to take part in a battle that eventuates in their imprisonment. In prison, the kinsmen express concern over their inability to reproduce their kind until they begin to conceive of kindness in different terms. This moment provides an impetus for considering an alternative system of kinds articulated by their love interest, Emilia. Emilia’s understanding of cultural reproduction troubles the premise that distinctions between gender, sex, and species—distinctions central to the play’s primary conflicts—must either be natural or constructed. According to Emilia, one need not—at least not in all cases—conform to or embody one’s natural(ized) kind to engage in cultural reproduction or even to sustain life.

The idea that distinctions among kinds could correspond either to natural or constructed differences is not unique to The Two Noble Kinsmen. As I described in the introduction, concepts of kind and valuations of kindness combined to form one of early modern English culture’s organizing principles—the view that the world could be understood as a system of kinds. Certain notions of kind in the period’s discourse presume that a kind’s legitimacy stems from nature. Nature partitions the world into kinds; it is, in effect, a system of kinds with tangible form in the physical world. When understood as a system of kinds, nature is also often portrayed as God’s proxy. As Nathaniel Fairfax argues in A Treatise of the bulk and selvedge of the world (1674), “God holds us by laws of kind as we do
others by those of right.” Various lexicons from the period define “nature” and “kind” in a manner consistent with this idea. But as these lexicons and other early modern texts attest, kinds could also be construed as constructed or artificial—that is, products of human occupation. Such kinds, however, were often deemed less ontologically significant or valuable. In William Shakespeare’s *The Winter’s Tale* (c. 1609–1611), for instance, Perdita identifies “our carnations and streaked gillyvors” as “nature’s bastards” because she has heard “There is an art which in their piedness shares / With great creating nature” (4.4.82-87). That is, she believes the flowers are not fully natural kinds.

In *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, Michel Foucault theorizes that the sovereign’s right over life and death assumed a new character during the seventeenth century: that “of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life.” For the social body, “sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species,” and sex “became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life”—specifically, “natural” or biological life. *The Two Noble Kinsmen* could be said to register this shift in power over life at a moment when power was increasingly congealing around discourses of nature, sex, and sexuality. Yet the play suggests that at this same moment, certain technologies of the theater and dynamics of kind were frustrating the regulation of life, in part, by figuring life’s kinds—or the kinds it animated and the kinds that reproduced it—as something in between natural and constructed.

Emphasizing the essential importance of husbandry—which in this case can be understood as the management of both creaturely kinds and wives—the naturalizing hierarchy of kinds in *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, it could be argued, serves as a conduit for the second form of power Foucault describes. In the material that follows, I elaborate on why Arcite and Palamon’s conformity to this naturalizing hierarchy occasions their defeat, and in turn, their crisis of cultural reproduction. Subsequently, I explore how the kinsmen can conceive of reproduction in new terms during their imprisonment. After reflecting on what leads Arcite and Palamon to recommit themselves to
embodying and reproducing natural(ized) kinds, I review current scholarly debates over the value of kindness qua kindness in early modern England. Finally, I inquire into how Emilia’s understanding of kindness calls attention to the potential value of kindness while challenging the impulse to distinguish between natural and constructed kinds. Emilia moves beyond the insights that the kinsmen arrive at in prison, I propose, by attending to the different forms of life to which alternative practices of kindness and kinds of kinds may contribute.

I. A Constitutional Crisis of Kinds

In *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, the forces acting on and between the tiers of the naturalizing hierarchy and its constituent kinds threaten to occasion their collapse. As Laurie Shannon writes, in early modern English discourse, “affiliation, affinity, and attraction normally proceed on a basis of likeness, a principle of resemblance strong enough to normalize relations between members of one sex above relations that cross sexual difference.” Yet “nature” also often “serves to rationalize the institutional relations of marriage…; husbandry is governance.” Man “husbands” every species or kind beneath him, including woman. One of the three Queens in *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, for instance, addresses the Amazon Hippolyta, Theseus’s captive and future wife, as a woman “near to make the male / To thy sex captive, but that this thy lord, / Born to uphold creation in that honour / First nature styled it in, shrunk thee into / The bound thou wast o’erflowing” (1.1.78-84). For the Queen, Hippolyta’s kind, defined by her sex, is indistinguishable from her nature, a nature “upheld” or reinforced by her male counterpart of the same species—namely, Theseus, Duke of Athens. The naturalizing hierarchy of kinds is enlisted both to valorize likeness in the form of same-kind—and more specifically, same-sex—relations and to (re)establish man as the sovereign husband par excellence. In other words, the naturalizing hierarchy paradoxically promotes kindness at the same time that—because it adheres to a particular ideology of husbandry—it discourages reciprocity between kinds.
According to the first chapter of Genesis, the relationship between humans and non-humans is hierarchical, but the relationship between human males and females is not (Genesis 1:26-27). As Mary Nyquist writes, however, the first chapter “has always co-existed somewhat uneasily with the…more obviously masculinist” second chapter, in which the creator makes man and then fashions a helper for him.\textsuperscript{20} In the second chapter, God produces the panoply of non-human animals and allows man to name each one. Realizing that none is an ideal helper for man, God removes a rib from him while he sleeps, fashions woman out of it, and brings her to man, who gives her the name “woman” (Genesis 2: 7-23). In The Two Noble Kinsmen, the principle of husbandry coheres with this second account insofar as it grants husbands (or potential husbands) overriding authority over their wives (or potential wives) as well as nonhuman creatures.

The principle of husbandry not only privileges men; it also places them at risk. As Theseus postulates, if men are “subdued,” they lose nothing less than their “human title” and thereby jeopardize the very futurity of humankind (1.1.232-33). The three Queens—disadvantaged by their sex as defined by the naturalizing hierarchy—must rely on a male sovereign and almost-husband (they approach Theseus in the midst of his wedding ceremony) to avenge their “sovereign” husbands, whose bodies ominously fester just outside the gates of Thebes (1.1.39). Their description of decomposing bodies strewn across the Theban fields suggests Creon’s failure as a guarantor of cultural reproduction (1.2.29); in exercising his right over life and death, Creon has failed to “ensure, maintain or develop” life.\textsuperscript{21} To confirm his right to the title of sovereign husband and human by re-establishing proper order, Theseus agrees to forestall his wedding and help the Queens.

Arcite and Palamon’s consequent fate, however, illustrates how, in some cases, the naturalizing hierarchy defeats even its most ardent champions. The cousins define themselves and their lives in terms of their kindness—that is, their devotion to embodying their kind. Throughout the play, they strive to align themselves only with kinds they deem “noble.” They have the highest
esteem for each other, and so first and foremost, they identify with each other. The play introduces them as they lament the state of moral decay into which Thebes has fallen under the reign of their uncle, Creon, a “most unbounded tyrant” (1.2.63). Like Theseus, they regard Creon’s treatment of the widowed Queens and general conduct as disgraceful (1.2.79-83). To avoid becoming too intimately aligned with Creon, his friends, and his courtiers, Arcite and Palamon plan to leave their native city (1.2.42). Before they can depart from Thebes, however, Theseus declares war on it. Whereas only a few lines earlier, the kinsmen insist that they are “not [Creon’s] kinsmen / In blood unless in quality”—here they would appear to reach a different conclusion (1.2.78-79). Palamon maintains that “to be neutral to [Creon] were dishonour, / Rebellious to oppose; therefore we must / With him stand to the mercy of our Fate” (1.2.100-03). When the kinsmen define their kindness in terms of consanguinity, they arrive at a conundrum: to align themselves with the sort of honorable figure that Theseus represents (for them), they must fight with Creon against Theseus. The kinsmen are consistent, however, on one point: to preserve their honor, they must remain loyal to their established kind. To avoid committing “crimes of nature” like those they decry earlier in the scene, then, Arcite and Palamon reluctantly take up arms against Theseus (1.2.3).

The extent to which the naturalizing hierarchy of kinds constrains the kinsmen’s lives becomes evident as their limp bodies are conveyed in hearses to Theseus shortly after he defeats Thebes in battle. Arcite and Palamon appear neither dead “nor in a state of life” (1.4.25). Recalling their admirable performances in battle, Theseus decides he would “rather have ’em / Prisoners to us than death” (1.4.36-7). When the kinsmen awake to discover that they have been conquered in battle and are being held in an Athenian prison, they initially worry that they will wither away before they can reproduce their kind, or in Arcite’s words, “figures of ourselves”:

Here age must find us
And – which is heaviest, Palamon – unmarried.
The sweet embraces of a loving wife,
Loaden with kisses, armed with a thousand Cupids,
Shall never clasp our necks; no issue know us;  
No figures of ourselves shall we e’er see  
To glad our age, and, like young eagles, teach ’em  
Boldly to gaze against bright arms, and say  
‘Remember what your fathers were, and conquer!’

(2.2.28-36)

The passage throws the contradictory tenets of the naturalizing hierarchy of kinds into sharp relief. The first tenet, as I noted above, promotes parity, privileging relations between those of the same kind; it motivates the cousins’ ambition to reproduce their own kind. The second discourages parity, requiring the cousins to couple with differently gendered and sexed kinds and inspiring their desire to taste the “sweet embraces of a loving wife.” Yet the kinsmen’s adherence to the first principle precludes their realization of the second. Arcite’s complaint that he and Palamon will never have an opportunity to teach their offspring how to conquer exposes the limits of their ideology (2.2.28-36). In a sense, the naturalizing hierarchy of kinds has conquered—both literally and metaphorically—the kinsmen. Their allegiance to it has eventuated in their imprisonment and, they complain, consequent inability to reproduce their kind.

II. Prison Intercourse

Yet the prison becomes a potential locus of critical synergy for the kinsmen. As they attempt to redefine themselves and their lives in relation to each other and society, they also begin to reconsider what it means to reproduce their kind and sustain life. One purpose of the early modern English prison was to protect society in general from its deviants. Dosia Reichardt, however, explains that, “For some groups—women, millenarian sects, even debtors and merchants from a putative bourgeoisie—prison provided an opportunity to be heard in print for the first time.”

Scholars such as Reichardt, Molly Murray, and Adam Smyth have convincingly illustrated that when early modern individuals found their physical and political freedom constrained by prison walls, they simultaneously found ways to overcome other limitations. Murray’s study of prison writing details the “numerous petitions and certificates conveying specific grievances” of prisoners,
revealing that prisoners of the period established diverse communities; grievances and petitions “often had multiple signatories, and explicitly claim to express group sentiments, suggesting that writing in prison could be done collectively by men and women, poor prisoners and gentlemen.” A great deal of early modern prison writing seeks to illuminate the writer’s life within the context of a collective that exceeds carceral limits. Many scholars have approached these texts as life writing. Shackled within the Athenian prison, Arcite and Palamon see their “life problems” come to a head, but they are subsequently inspired to engage in what I would as well consider a form of life writing.

In a moment of inspiration, Arcite proposes, “Let’s think this prison holy sanctuary” (2.2.70). Suddenly, the kinsmen see their prison transformed from a place where “dead-cold winter” drains “youth and nature” into a productive haven (2.2.40-45). Arcite waxes:

What worthy blessing
Can be, but our imaginations
May make it ours? And here being thus together
We are an endless mine to one another.
We are one another’s wife, ever begetting
New births of love; we are father, friends, acquaintance;
We are, in one another, families—
I am your heir, and you are mine; this place
Is our inheritance. No hard oppressor
Dare take this from us. Here with a little patience
We shall live long and loving.

(2.2.76-86)

Sequestered from the world beyond the prison’s walls, Arcite and Palamon can conceive of themselves in new terms: wives “ever begetting / New births of love.”

As the imprisoned cousins allow themselves to acknowledge that their gender need not be grounded in their sex—and perhaps as they begin to think of their sex in more capacious and transitive terms—they find pleasure in the freedom to play roles they previously could not or would not outside their cell. Palamon rapturously exclaims that he has become “almost wanton / With [his] captivity” (2.2.95-97). Notably, neither cousin imagines himself as a husband while practicing this alternative kind of kindness. Because the husband’s authority derives from his role as the guarantor
of biological and, in turn, cultural reproduction, the principle of husbandry holds less sway once cultural reproduction is construed as a process that does not in all cases rely on biological reproduction or heterosexual intercourse. While the kinsmen deliberately begin to inhabit new kinds in prison, they come to understand their innovative collaboration as a form of cultural reproduction—“ever begetting”—that also contributes to the maintenance and development of life.

This scene builds upon a key theme in Shakespeare’s sonnets. The poet-speaker may initially enjoin the young man to “get a sonne” (Sonnet 7.14), but shortly thereafter he realizes his own reproductive powers as an artist. In Sonnet 55, he nearly claims the power to grant his beloved immortal life with his verse:

Not marble, nor the gilded monument
Of princes shall out-live this powrefull rime,
But you shall shine more bright in these contents
Then unswept stone, besmeer’d with sluttish time.

(lines 1-4)

Throughout the sonnets, the poet-speaker continues to emphasize his reproductive power. Noting the “specific anxiety about reproduction” that appears in comedies such as Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night (c. 1602), Valerie Traub writes that, in the sonnets, “anxiety regarding women’s necessary role in reproduction is displaced…as the poet appropriates for himself reproductive powers.” Not all forms of cultural reproduction, the sonnets insist, depend upon biological reproduction. Both Shakespeare’s sonnets and The Two Noble Kinsmen provide critical distance from modern paradigms of cultural reproduction in which textual reproduction or creative collaboration may only contribute to cultural reproduction insofar as they function as metaphors for biological reproduction. But by taking such metaphors seriously, as the early moderns seemed to do, we attain a literal interpretation of Arcite’s claim that, with Palamon, he is “ever begetting / New births of love” (2.2.80-81).

Construing cultural reproduction as a process that may take place independently of heterosexual intercourse not only allows us to think of gender and sex in more capacious terms; it
also affords the lives of novel species, like the human actor-dramatic character, greater significance. Henry Turner contends that “one of the largest questions raised by Shakespeare’s” *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (c. 1600) “concerns…the concept of ‘life.’” Countering the argument that “dramatic characters imitate or simulate life but are not themselves living,” Turner observes that the argument assumes an absolute separation between actor and character—life and simulated life—that drama complicates. In short, Turner challenges the premise that dramatic characters cannot possess real life simply because they imitate life. The “concept of imitation” is key, he adds, “not merely in sociological or anthropological accounts of life but in the ‘hard’ sciences of biology and genetics.”

Noting the “good deal of evidence” that would suggest that “early modern period theaters were understood to be a kind of machine,” Turner submits that the lives they generated exemplify what some posthumanists “have described as a posthuman condition, one in which the long-standing integrity of the category of the ‘human’ has been variously compromised, both at the level of practice…and at the level of concept.” Turner’s point illuminates the interrelationship between concepts of life and concepts of speciation. When we acknowledge that life exceeds the realm of the biological, we acquire greater insight into the diverse intra- and inter-kind relations involved in fostering various modes of life. In turn, we may gain a deeper appreciation for relations that do not capitulate to perceived natural imperatives.

In certain important respects, the prison in which Arcite and Palamon beget “new births of love” resembles the early modern theater. As Turner notes, “the topographic location of the theaters within the liberties in and around London granted them a certain ‘exceptional’ status; the mimetic conventions that made [the] theater possible in the first place allow us to project a notion of state exception…a world of immense potential that was simultaneously everything and nothing at once.” Within the Athenian prison, Arcite and Palamon find themselves in a similar “state of exception” that inspires them to conceive of life in new terms.
III. A Window into More Kind Trouble

Yet the “holy sanctuary” of the prison cell loses its exceptional status when Palamon spies Emilia through a “kind window” (2.2.275). The pun here is significant. Presumably, Palamon describes the window as “kind” because it provides him with a view of the beautiful Emilia. But this view leads Palamon and then Arcite to reassume their previous ideology of kindness. The last lines Palamon speaks as he gazes out the window carry more than one meaning: “O my lady, / If ever thou hast felt what sorrow was, / Dream how I suffer. Come, now bury me” (2.2.276-78.) Simultaneously melodramatic and risqué, Palamon’s words are also prophetic, for the kinsmen’s re-endorsement of the naturalizing hierarchy and ensuing attempts to husband Emilia engender a devastating conflict.

Extolling Emilia’s beauty, Palamon insists that Arcite follows suit: “Do reverence; / She is a goddess, Arcite” (2.2.134-35). Predictably, Arcite’s injunction precipitates a rift between the kinsmen.

ARCITE. I cannot tell what you have done; I have, Beshrew mine eyes for’t. Now I feel my shackles. PALAMON. You love her then? ARCITE. Who would not? PALAMON. And desire her? ARCITE. Before my liberty. PALAMON. I saw her first. ARCITE. That’s nothing. PALAMON. But it shall be. ARCITE. I saw her too. PALAMON. Yes, but you must not love her. (2.2.157-62)

Palamon maintains that he “took possession” of Emilia “first” and, given Arcite’s professed love for Emilia, questions his cousin’s loyalty (2.2.168-74). Arcite rejoins, “Am not I / Part of your blood, part of your soul? You have told me / That I was Palamon and you were Arcite…Why then would you deal so cunningly, / So strangely, so unlike a noble kinsmen, / To love alone?” (2.2.189-95). Arcite’s attempt to heed Palamon’s order to venerate Emilia and, more generally, align himself with
Palamon leads Palamon to reject Arcite as a “traitor” (2.2.172). Once again, kindness appears to entail defeat.

Kindness not only foments a hostile competition between the kinsmen; it also denies Emilia the right to act according to her preference. Notably, the cousins first spy Emilia while she is in the midst of a sexually suggestive conversation with her handmaid. After Emilia rearticulates her partiality for “maids” (2.2.137), she and her handmaid agree to “lie down” together (2.2.151-53). Apparently unconcerned with what Emilia might desire, Palamon asserts his claim to her. Arcite, of course, reacts in kind: as her potential husband, he has “as just a title to her beauty / As any Palamon” (2.2.68-82).

Drawing from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s work on homosociality, Richard Mallette contends that in the play, “heterosexual marriage values” motivate a homosocial rivalry that precipitates this homosocial violence: “the ‘new births of love’ [Palamon and Arcite] generate in prison will not be fulfilled until they exchange their amity for another bond, in another all-male arena, the field of chivalric competition. In that domain (another ‘holy sanctuary’), births of love become something more sinister: erotic desire grows into homosocial violence.” According to Mallette, “marriage prevails over same-sex friendship,” but it does so at a high “cost,” simultaneously sacrificing same-sex desire and friendship. Compelling as Mallette’s argument is, his discussion of why “erotic friendship converges with male rivalry for the beloved” to uphold the regime of heterosexual marriage in The Two Noble Kinsmen requires further explication.

As the window scene shows, the naturalizing hierarchy engenders violence that exhausts same-sex desire because it rests on the principle of husbandry and not necessarily because it celebrates “heterosexual marriage.” Several critics have argued that the institution of heterosexual marriage need not preclude the expression of homoerotic desire. Yet as Jeffrey Masten writes, “we are in the modern scheme accustomed to polar and mutually exclusive hetero-
homosexualities.” Citing Shakespeare’s *Two Gentlemen of Verona* (c. 1590-c. 1591) as an example, Masten contends that early modern English drama stages “a sex/gender system in which marriage (a version of marriage that subordinates and silences women) and the homoeroticism of male friendship co-exist.” In “The Homoerotics of Shakespeare’s Elizabethan Comedies,” Julie Crawford demonstrates that marriage and homoerotic desire did not always operate in opposition to one another for women, either. Despite the ideology of coverture, in which a woman’s legal identity was “covered” by that over her husband, marriage did not necessarily entail erotic exclusivity. But according to the principle of husbandry, one kind—noblest man—necessarily assumes the right (or, depending on the perspective, the obligation) to exercise dominion over other kinds. Typically, husbandry and marriage coincide. Yet by staging what the principle of husbandry entails when two men of the same kind find themselves in (virtually) the same physical place and must vie for the position of noblest kind, *The Two Noble Kinsmen* calls attention to this principle’s inherent violence in both abstract and practical terms.

Yet as Arcite and Palamon’s inspired prison intercourse—which diverges from the principle of husbandry—intimates, not all forms of kindness need eventuate in violence. In *Sovereign Amity: Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts*—a cogent analysis of early modern friendship doctrine—Shannon advances an apology for kindness, which she equates with likeness and sameness. According to Shannon, some critics portray sameness as meaningless, reactionary, or unattainable. But Shannon asserts that social and sexual kindness were exceptional in that they were the only form of political equality that subjects and selves experienced in early modern England. Friendship doctrine’s “insistent emphasis on sexual and social sameness,” Shannon posits, systematically resists “that most acute form of early modern difference: the hierarchical difference of degree, especially the categorical difference between rulers and the ruled (which in friendship becomes a difference in ‘kind’).” To summarize Shannon’s analysis of what is at stake in the critical debate over kindness:
those who privilege kindness may indulge in a form of narcissism by prioritizing relationships with those who resemble them; consequently, they may risk “the disenfranchisement of others”—that is, they may deny those they perceive as dissimilar a voice. If kindness allows for political equality and undermines hierarchical differences enforced by authoritarian regimes, however, to eschew kindness may be to abrogate significant strategies of resistance.

*The Two Noble Kinsmen’s* engagement with questions of kindness, cultural reproduction, and life may cast this problem in even more complex terms. In Act I, Arcite and Palamon practice kindness to participate in the cultural reproduction of what they regard as society’s most valuable kind—a noble kinsman. But the kinsmen’s particular form of kindness, which is informed by the principle of husbandry, not only leads to their imprisonment; it also threatens to preclude them from reproducing their kind. And although the alternative kindness that Arcite and Palamon practice in prison may yield “new births of love,” the cousins quickly slip back into their former practice of an entitled form of kindness when they glimpse Emilia and are struck with desire for her. This practice not only deprives Emilia of the right to refuse to be husbanded and disregards same-sex desire; it also endangers the kinsmen’s lives.

Each kinsman finds a way out of prison. As they duel later in the forest, they realize that Theseus, Hippolyta, and Emilia are nearby, and they decide to face Theseus. Infuriated by their disregard for his disciplinary authority, Theseus decrees that both kinsmen must die. Hippolyta, however, urges her sister to intercede on the kinsmen’s behalf, so Emilia entreats Theseus simply to banish Arcite and Palamon from Athens forever. Yet both kinsmen refuse to leave Emilia. Impressed by their resolve, Theseus orders Emilia to choose Arcite or Palamon as her husband; the other must die. When Emilia demurs—she would prefer to marry neither—Theseus declares that the two men will fight atop a pyramid; whichever cousin forces the other to “touch the pillar” will “enjoy [Emilia], the other lose his head” (3.6.297-98). Wracked with grief and guilt, Emilia cannot
help but “cry for both” (4.2.54). At the end of the play, the kinsmen wage a death-dealing duel for the hand of Emilia according to Theseus’s terms. Arcite wins, but he subsequently falls off a horse Emilia has given him, incurring a fatal wound before he can marry her (5.4.49-83). After the dying Arcite insists that Palamon marry Emilia, Palamon laments: “O cousin, / That we should things desire which do cost us / The loss of our desire! That naught could buy / Dear love but loss of dear love!” (5.4.108-11). Arcite and Palamon seek to engage in cultural reproduction as it is defined within the naturalizing hierarchy of kinds, but in order to do so, Palamon realizes, they have forfeited their relationship—a relationship they desired so intensely that it defined their lives. Does The Two Noble Kinsmen, therefore, corroborate critical arguments against kindness and undercut Shannon’s claim that kindness allows for “political equality”? Does The Two Noble Kinsmen render kindness as “empty, inevitable, reactionary, or impossible” after all?

IV. Emilia’s Rehearsal

With the figure of Emilia, The Two Noble Kinsmen stages an intervention between those who would decry and those who would acclaim the power of kindness. Presciently anticipating the stakes of current critical debates that concern kindness, cultural reproduction, and life, the characterization of Emilia insinuates that we cannot evaluate the merits of kindness until we consider the dynamics that persist between a given system’s particular kinds of kinds. If the system aims to reproduce life, how does the regulation of its kinds achieve that ambition? And to what extent does it foster inclusivity or entail exclusivity among those who embody its kinds in the process of reproducing life? By raising these questions, Emilia shifts the focus from the naturalness of kinds to interchanges among kinds.

Emilia’s exchange with her handmaid helps clarify her nuanced understanding of kindness. Discussing Narcissus, Emilia claims he was “a fool / To love himself” (2.2.120-1). “Were [the maids] all heard-hearted?” she asks (2.2.123).
WOMAN. They could not be to one so fair.
EMILIA. Thou wouldst not.
WOMAN. I think I should not, madam.
EMILIA. That’s a good wench, But take heed to your kindness though.
WOMAN. Why, madam?
EMILIA. Men are mad things.

(2.2.122-26)

In this passage, Emilia simultaneously praises her handmaid for her kindness—i.e., her benevolence—and enjoins her to perform kindness with discretion. Emilia realizes her handmaid’s kindness might, in some cases, endanger her, as her play of the double entendre embedded in kindness shows. As I mentioned above, one was thought to exhibit kindness by behaving in a manner consistent with one’s naturalized kind. Within the context of the naturalizing hierarchy, Emilia’s handmaid would have to demonstrate her kindness, in part, by deferring to supposedly superior kinds and, presumably, engaging in intimacy with them. Emilia’s warning, “Men are mad things,” hints at the potential risk of deferring to them simply because the naturalizing hierarchy affords them greater status.

Emilia’s warning also foreshadows the fate of the Jailer’s Daughter, for the kindness she shows Palamon leads to her miserable madness. The Jailer’s Daughter admires Palamon for his “noble body” and “fair” language (2.4.20-25). Acknowledging that Palamon “will never affect” her because she is “base,” she nevertheless seeks to “make him know [she] love[s] him” (2.4.2-29). When she frees him, she adheres to the naturalizing hierarchy of kinds and the principle of husbandry by paying homage to a presumably nobler kind. At the same time, however, she betrays the Jailer, her father—her own kin(d). To some extent, she, too, registers the contradictory forces at play in the naturalizing hierarchy at the moment she decides to free Palamon: “Say I ventured / To set him free. What says the law then? Thus much / For law or kindred! I will do it” (2.4.31-32). These lines invite two interpretations. Perhaps the more obvious is that she does not care whether she must defy law or kind to free Palamon. But one might also argue that she adheres to the “laws
of kind” when she frees Palamon; by doing so, she honors and serves a higher-ranking kind. The logic of the naturalizing hierarchy in *The Two Noble Kinsmen* supports both interpretations. Once freed, Palamon predictably and justifiably—according to the naturalizing hierarchy—leaves his love-struck liberator behind to pursue Emilia, a woman whose social status is closer to his. 49 Alone and hungry, the Jailer’s Daughter wishes only for her “end, and that is all” (3.3.38).

The madness the Jailer’s Daughter experiences after releasing Palamon could be regarded as a symptom of the naturalizing hierarchy’s tendency to overpower those who embody its kinds. The Countrymen’s insistence that the Jailer’s Daughter is a “madwoman” prompts the Schoolmaster to inquire, “And are you mad, good woman?” (3.5.67-71). Tellingly, she replies, “I would be sorry else” (3.5.71). Attempting to cure the Jailer’s Daughter, the Doctor advises the Jailer and the Wooer to trick her into believing the Wooer is Palamon (4.3.61-7). After the Wooer seems to succeed in convincing her, the Doctor urges the Wooer to “lie with her if she ask you” regardless of whether she realizes he is not Palamon (5.2.18). Essentially, the Doctor proposes to “cure” the Jailer’s Daughter by “husbanding” her with the Wooer (5.2.22). 50 The play concludes without revealing whether the Doctor’s prescription relieves the miserable madness of the Jailer’s Daughter or further perpetuates it.

To a certain degree, the kindness that Emilia values (in contrast to that the Jailer’s Daughter performs) resembles the kindness practiced by Palamon and Arcite in prison just before they mark Emilia outside their window. Remembering the “time when [she] enjoyed a playfellow” (1.3.50)—her beloved companion Flavina—Emilia recalls:

> And she I sigh and spoke of were things innocent,  
> Loved for we did, and like the elements  
> That know not what nor why yet do effect  
> Rare issues by their operance, our souls  
> Did so to one another. What she liked  
> Was then of me approved, what not, condemned—  
> No more arraignment.

(1.3.60-61)
According to Emilia, she and Flavina collaboratively decided what to approve and what to condemn as they patterned themselves after one another (1.3.72). By likening Flavina and herself to nonhuman “elements” that produce “rare issues,” Emilia associates the collaborative compositions she and Flavina constructed together with what many early moderns would have understood to be natural material. In other words, Emilia suggests that the issues she begot with Flavina were neither solely natural nor solely artificial.

Although Emilia and Flavina did not pursue or privilege kindness as defined by the naturalizing hierarchy of kinds, Emilia suggests they nevertheless practiced a form of kindness that contributed to cultural reproduction as she describes to Hippolyta how their souls begot “rare issues”:

Her affections – pretty,  
Though happily her careless wear – I followed  
For my most serious decking. Had mine ear  
Stolen some new air or at adventure hummed one  
From musical coinage, why, it was a note  
Whereon her spirits would sojourn – rather dwell on –  
And sing it in her slumbers. This rehearsal  
(Which, ev’ry innocent wots well, comes in  
Like old importment’s bastard) has this end,  
That the true love ’tween maid and maid may be  
More than in sex dividual.

(1.3.72-82)

Discussing this moment of the play, Shannon notes that Emilia’s “narrative does not suggest that likeness was the source of friendship. Instead, sameness seems to have been, in a way, its goal.” This cogent observation helps elucidate how Emilia and Flavina’s kindness differed even from the kindness that the kinsmen practice in prison. In prison, the kinsmen may momentarily forget the principle of husbandry, but they still seek to reproduce kinds that derive their legitimacy from the naturalizing hierarchy: “wife,” “father,” and “heir” (2.2.76-86). Perhaps their re-adoption of the
principle of husbandry is therefore almost inevitable. Contrastingly, for Emilia, the naturalness or legitimacy of the issues that she begot with Flavina is not a concern. Emilia happily likens her rehearsal with Flavina to a “bastard.”

The “rehearsal” that Emilia describes underscores the importance of both reciprocity and motion in more than one way; the “rare issues” they generated were essentially composites of their conjoined selves, which were constantly and reciprocally in motion (1.3.71-72). As Masten observes, there is a key difference between this rehearsal in the 1634 quarto and the rehearsal in modern editions of the play: “Emilia’s ‘individual’ is in all modern editions emended to ‘dividual,’ a change that stabilizes the meaning of the sentence, making it a comparison of love between women and love between men and women—the ‘dividual’ sexes.” The 1634 quarto records Emilia’s “rehearsal” thusly:

This reheatsall [sic]
(Which fury-innocent wots well) comes in
Like old importments bastard, has this end,
That the true love tweene Mayde, and mayde, may be
More then in sex individuall.

Of course this rehearsal—or “reheatsall,” as the case may be—is probably not without its typos. But replacing “individuall” with “dividual” does more to alter the effect of Emilia’s rehearsal than replacing “reheatsall” with “rehearsal.” Masten explains that in early modern England, “individual” could mean “indivisible.” He, therefore, posits that Emilia’s disquisition “suggests two historically viable readings of the line.” Emilia might be arguing that “that the love between two maids is more than the love between the individual (“indivisible”) sexes.” Alternatively, Emilia might be asserting that “true love between two maids is in more than simply sex.” I would argue that Masten’s second reading is particularly compelling in light of Emilia’s preceding line. This line contains a heretofore neglected pun on “mayde,” a pun that suggests the following reading: love made or being made between two maids may be greater than love primarily predicated on one’s ready-made, naturalized
kind—defined in this particular instance as one’s “sex.” The pun on “mayde” also recalls Emilia’s account of the “operance” or operation by which she and Flavina “made” each other, improvising out of various patterns, perfumes, garments, and musical “coinage[s]” (1.3.66-76).

Emilia’s use of “fury-innocent” in the 1634 quarto is also noteworthy. Recent editions of The Two Noble Kinsmen replace it with various alternatives. But in 1634, “fury” was synonymous with both “passionate” and “mad,” which would imply that Emilia regards the kindness that she experienced with Flavina as a form of madness. Kindness may perpetuate madness—or an ecstatic departure from traditional order—yet Emilia insinuates that it need not entail crisis. By declaring her erotic preference for maids and describing the mad kindness she knew with Flavina, Emilia disputes the principle of husbandry: maids do not require a husband’s regulation to produce “rare issues” or “exceptional” lives with each other.

Emilia and The Two Noble Kinsmen, however, do not necessarily defy all hierarchical differences of degree simply because they challenge the principle of husbandry. Hierarchies depend just as much upon the signification and cultivation and privileging of sameness as they do upon that of difference. To pursue some kinds—e.g., maids—rather than other kinds—e.g., men—moreover, is to prioritize and therefore hierarchize these relations. In the end, there can be no sameness without difference and no difference without sameness, no inclusion without exclusion. This deconstructive and feminist insight suggests that even a hierarchy of non-naturalized kinds may foster heteromorphic impulses, homomorphic impulses, and tensions between those impulses. So if Shakespeare and Fletcher seem to endorse heteronormative or homonormative logics in The Two Noble Kinsmen, that does not guarantee that they either capitulate to or resist hierarchy qua hierarchy. The Two Noble Kinsmen and Emilia effectively challenge certain hierarchical differences of degree, but they also construct or maintain others.
Can Emilia, then, still be celebrated as the “great figure” of resistance to tyrannical power that Shannon suggests she is? In *The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England*, Traub observes: “the unity, mutuality and affection of Emilia and Flavina are idealized and portrayed as a foil to male-female antagonism; at the same time, these bonds are represented as temporary, firmly located in childhood or adolescence, and necessarily giving way to patriarchal marriage.” The ending of *The Two Noble Kinsmen* is profoundly disappointing. Arcite and Palamon are sundered. Emilia is forced into a marriage she never desired. And what becomes of the Jailer’s Daughter? Patriarchal marriage and Theseus seem to triumph as the only real winners in *The Two Noble Kinsmen*.

Or do they? As the Epilogue steps out onto the stage and addresses the audience, it affords the audience critical authority:

> I would now ask ye how ye like the play,  
> But, as it is with schoolboys, cannot say.  
> I am cruel fearful. Pray yet stay a while,  
> And let me look upon ye. No man smile?  
> Then it goes hard, I see.  

*(lines 1-5)*

As if intentionally seeking to remind the audience of *The Two Noble Kinsmen*’s constructedness, the Epilogue continues, “If the tale we have told— / For ‘tis no other—any way content ye / (For to that honest purpose it was meant ye) / We have our end” (lines 12-4). The subdued tone of the Epilogue hints—almost insists—that the audience has found the play a disappointment. Apologetically, the Epilogue hastens to add, “and ye shall have ere long, / I dare say, many a better to prolong / Your old loves to us” (lines 15-18). In couching its last lines in the subjunctive rather than the indicative mood, the Epilogue prompts audience members to ask themselves whether they wish the play ended differently—whether the play could have a better ending. If you are satisfied, “We have our end”; if not, the Epilogue insinuates, perhaps we should stage another rehearsal.

The Epilogue speaks not to the play’s indeterminacy but rather to its irresolution. Even if kinds are to some degree constructed, *The Two Noble Kinsmen*’s Epilogue emphasizes that they
precipitate issues that are collective and substantial. For example, the kinsmen’s reproductive angst, the Jailer’s Daughter’s miserable madness, and Emilia’s desire not to be husbanded may be narrated issues, but they also deserve to be treated as social and material issues. In a sense, the Epilogue’s tone intimates that issues as devastating as these call for cultural reproduction—they call for a re-envisioning or a re-figuring of the cosmos, its kinds, and life itself that would leave fewer individuals definitively delimited and defeated. The process of reproduction illustrated by Emilia and Flavina would direct less attention to natural or constructed kinds as ends in and of themselves than it would to practices of kindness—specifically, the consequences they entail and the pleasures they foster. Thus, the Epilogue offers the stage as a place to explore different concepts of life while experiencing the consequences and pleasures of experimenting with different resources of kindness.65

The concepts of life and kindness that The Two Noble Kinsmen entertains pertain to those that thinkers in various disciplines are currently exploring from what might be considered a posthumanist perspective.66 Recent work in sexuality studies, for example, demonstrates the need to jettison modern disciplinary schematics that insist on studying sexuality and textuality as separate modes of cultural reproduction; this work illuminates important interrelationships between early modern “forms of eroticism” that extended beyond the human, methods of textual practice, and theories of cultural reproduction.67 Scholars in life sciences are increasingly attending to how myriad species produce life as well as the forms that life may take as genetic engineering evolves.68 Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists’ research on and conversations about “artificial” intelligence and brain-computer interfaces may also require us to reassess how we construe relationships not only between life and consciousness but also between natural and artificial life.69 As such work illustrates, when we acknowledge that life exceeds the realm of the biological, we may acquire greater insight into the diverse intra- and inter-kind relations involved in fostering life. In turn, we may gain a deeper
appreciation for relations that do not necessarily capitulate to “natural” imperatives. By raising the questions that it does about life, then, *The Two Noble Kinsmen* sets the stage for those with diverse backgrounds to reflect collaboratively on how to (re)define life, its kinds, and their interrelationships.
Notes


2. See Hallet Smith, introduction to *The Two Noble Kinsmen* in *The Riverside Shakespeare*, 2nd ed., eds. Herschel Baker, et al. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 1689. When the play was recorded in the Stationer’s Register on April 8, 1634, it was classified as a “Tragi Comedy.” See also, *The two noble kinsmen presented at the Blackfriers by the Kings Majesties servants, with great applause: written by Mr. John Fletcher, and Mr. William Shakespeare. Gent.* (London: Printed by Tho. Cotes, for John Waterson, 1634). The title page of the 1634 quarto, however, nowhere identifies the play as a “Tragi Comedy.” Any foul papers or promptbooks that were used to prepare this quarto have been lost. Neither the 1623 First Folio of *Mr. William Shakespeares Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies* nor the 1647 Folio of *Comedies and Tragedies written by Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher* includes the *Two Noble Kinsmen* in its contents. But the play is one of the 53 works in the 1679 Folio of *Fifty Comedies and Tragedies written by Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher, Gentlemen; All in one Volume, Published by the Authors Original Copies, the Songs to each Play being added* (London: Printed by J. Macock, for John Martyn, Henry Harringman, Richard Marriot, 1679). On the title page of only nine plays in this volume, no descriptive “kind” or genre appears. This group includes *The Two Noble Kinsmen*. To this day, *The Two Noble Kinsmen’s* genre remains decidedly undecided. See “Contents” in *The Riverside Shakespeare*, 2nd ed., eds. Herschel Baker et al. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), x. *The Riverside Shakespeare* groups the play with Shakespeare’s other “Romances.” See “Table of Contents by Genre” in *The Norton Shakespeare*, eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), ix. *The Norton Shakespeare* lists *The Two Noble Kinsmen* under “Comedies.” Yet Walter Cohen, introduction to *The Two Noble Kinsmen* in *The Norton Shakespeare* eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 3195, troubles this classification too by calling attention to the “misery and destruction” that haunt the end of the play and contribute to the “problem of determining [its] tone.” This problem, Cohen suggests, “parallels the question of authorship.”

3. See Turner and Tatspaugh, introduction to *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, 1. Scholars have been especially intrigued by *The Two Noble Kinsmen’s* relationship to Geoffrey Chaucer’s *The Knight’s Tale*. For an example of recent scholarship on this subject, see Misha Teramura, “The Anxiety of *Auctoritas*: Chaucer and *The Two Noble Kinsmen*” in *Shakespeare Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (Winter 2012), 544-576.

4. See esp. Jeffrey Masten, *Textual Intercourse: Collaboration, Authorship, and Sexualities in Renaissance Drama* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 58. Masten argues that, although “collaboration as practice (Shakespeare and Fletcher writing *The Two Noble Kinsmen*) does not necessarily result in collaboration as theme,” the title page of the 1634 quarto—which names both playwrights—“creates the possibility of reading [the playwrights] into the play” as collaborators. For an account of scholarship more concerned with authorship attribution, see Turner and Tatspaugh, introduction to *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, 16-17. After Charles Lamb attempted to explain how the writing styles of Fletcher and Shakespeare differed, other critics began to debate which parts of the play to attribute to Fletcher and which to attribute to Shakespeare. See also Robert A. J. Matthews and Thomas V. N. Merriam, “Neural Computation in Stylometry I: An Application to the Works of
5. For a rigorous examination of cultural reproduction in early modern England, see David Glimp, Increase and Multiply: Governing Cultural Reproduction in Early Modern England (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). See also Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron. Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture. Translated by Richard Nice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1990. See Babara Hodgdon, The Shakespeare Trade: Performances and Appropriations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 2. Hodgdon writes that the “tension between textual and social subjects” in The Taming of the Shrew’s history demonstrates that “the text called The Taming of the Shrew is not the same as that produced and activated by its readers and spectators.” In this chapter, I argue that The Two Noble Kinsmen ultimately reminds its readers and spectators that its text need not be “that produced by its readers and spectators.” As what Turner and Tatspaugh, introduction to The Two Noble Kinsmen, 31, describe as the play’s “more than three-hundred-year absence from the stage” might suggest, readers and spectators have not always been receptive to this message. See also, Steven Mullaney, The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power in Renaissance England (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, [1988] 1995), x. Mullaney writes that the early modern “popular stage” may be viewed “not merely or primarily as a literary phenomenon but as one of a diverse body of cultural practices whose relation to the larger social formation was at once culture-specific and provisional.” I keep this view of the stage in mind throughout the chapter.

6. “Kind” and “sex” were strongly associated in the period’s discourse. The case could certainly be made that these entries indicate that one’s sex is one’s defining quality. Early modern dictionary entries on “kind” often list “sex” as one of the word’s multiple meanings. Entries on “sex” tend to be briefer. Most simply define “sex” as “kind.” See, for example, Oxford English Dictionary (OED), Online ed., s.v. “kind,” n. II.10.c. See also Robert Cawdrey, “sex” in A Table Alphabetical (1604 and 1617); Edmund Coote, “sexe” in The English School-master (1596); Randle Cotgrave, “sexe” and “féemelle” in A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues (1611); John Florio, “sesso” in A World of Words (1598); Florio, “sexe” in Queen Anna’s World of Words (1611); Claude Hollyband, “sexe” in A Dictionary French and English (1593); John Kersey, “kind” in A New English Dictionary (1702); Guy Miège, “sexe (m.)” in A New Dictionary French and English (1677); and Thomas Thomas, “sexus” in Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicaee (1587) in Lexicons of Early Modern English (LEME), ed. Ian Lancashire. (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Library and University of Toronto Press, 2015), accessed March 13, 2015. Every subsequent early modern lexicon cited was also accessed through LEME between March 13, 2015 and September 27, 2015 unless otherwise noted. Because certain lexicographers published more than one dictionary, I have listed the publication date of each.


8. See Nathaniel Fairfax’s “The Heads or Contents” in A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World Wherein the Greatness, Littleness, and Lastingness of Bodies are Freely Handled: with an Answer to
9. See, for example, Geoffrey the Grammarian, “kende of that god coursly hath in set” in *Promptorium Parvulorum* (1499); “Natura” in *Medulla Grammatice* (1480); Miège, “nature” in *A New Dictionary French and English* (1677) in LEME.


11. See William Shakespeare, *The Winter’s Tale* in *The Norton Shakespeare* ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 2883-2953. See also Lorraine Daston, “The Nature of Nature in Early Modern Europe,” *Configurations* 6.2 (1998): 149-172, esp. 156. Daston writes that, in the early modern period, “the artificial was an ontological category: in Aristotle’s formulation, still cited well into the seventeenth century, only natural objects have ‘an innate impulse to change,’ in the extended Aristotelian sense of achieving a telos. Artifacts lack ontological identity, the ‘nature’ that would stamp them as one of a kind of thing rather than another. Art might imitate, perfect, help, or even improve nature, as the medieval and early modern commonplaces had it, but art could never create a ‘nature,’ in the sense of an inner essence that defined an authentic kind or species.” As the epigraph to my introduction suggests, not everyone in early modern England agreed with these “commonplaces.”


14. Ibid., 147.


16. Ibid., 188.


19. It is perhaps significant that Theseus has not yet assumed the title of “husband.” See William Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, ed. Gail Kern Paster and Skiles Howard (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999), 814-863. Since Shakespeare’s *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (c. 1590 – c. 1596), Hippolyta’s sister Emilia has arrived in Athens, but Theseus and Hippolyta remain unmarried. Has the fortnight of “nightly revels and new jollity” (5.1.346-7) that Theseus announced would precede their wedding in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* only just elapsed, or have other events forestalled the marriage?


27. Since the mid-1990s, many critics concerned with the semiotics of sexuality have illuminated a troubling trend in contemporary scholarship: when sex seems not to result in reproduction, it is often cast in unfavorable terms. See esp. Stephen Guy-Bray, *Against Reproduction: Where Renaissance Texts Come From* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), xiv. Guy-Bray not only argues “against” reproductive sex; he also takes issue with the celebration of texts as instruments for “reproducing a particular vision of society”; ibid., 15. Given that people in early modern England did not always assume that heterosexual intercourse was a condition of conception, birth, or reproduction in general, however, it seems a mistake to conclude that discussions of textual reproduction inexorably reinforce a teleological, heterosexual narrative.


29. Ibid., 203.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid. Some might demur that the lives of these chimeric human-machine hybrids, instead exemplify a “prehuman” condition that anticipates the posthuman.

32. Ibid., 201.


36. Ibid., 29.

37. Ibid., 48.

38. Masten, Textual Intercourse, 48.


41. Ibid., 20.

42. Ibid., 3.

43. Ibid., 2.

44. Ibid., 21.

45. Ibid., 2-3.

46. Ibid., 20.

47. OED, s.v. “kind,” adj., II.4.a., accessed September 12, 2014.

48. Interestingly, Shannon writes that “it is in connection with the kinsmen’s yielding to passion that the Jailer’s Daughter must be considered; her madness literalizes the state in which the kinsmen place themselves.” Shannon, Sovereign Amity, 106.

49. Later, Palamon contributes “a sum of money to her marriage”—a marriage, the play implies, to which she may not be able to consent in her state of mind (4.1.23).

51. OED, s.v. “elements,” n., II.9-12.

52. Shannon, Sovereign Amity, 116.

53. Masten, Tectual Intercourse, 51.

54. John Fletcher and William Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen Presented at the Blackfriers (1634), 14. Any foul papers or promptbooks that were used to prepare this quarto have been lost.

55. It is tempting to consider how the meaning of this passage might change if “reheatsall” were interpreted as “reheats all” rather than “rehearsal.” The OED records the first use of the verb “reheat” in 1649. OED Online, s.v. “reheats,” v., 1., accessed September 12, 2014.


57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.


60. See The Norton Shakespeare, 3277. The Norton’s substitute is “seeley innocence.” See also The Riverside Shakespeare, 1729. The Riverside prefers “ev’ry innocent.”


62. Shannon, Sovereign Amity, 121.


64. In the theater, a play’s ending is also largely contingent on the performance of the acting troupe. See Simon Palfrey and Tiffany Stern, Shakespeare in Parts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4. Palfrey and Stern “identify the actor and his part as crucial contributors, both as catalyst and vehicle, to whatever Shakespeare’s theatre became.” See also James J. Marino, Owning William Shakespeare: The King’s Men and Their Intellectual Property (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 73. Marino similarly stresses the frequency with which playing companies like The King’s Men revised the texts in their repertoires. Significantly, this scholarship illustrates the trouble with assuming that either a play’s credited writers or its ending must determine its primary message or moral. A play’s ending would have been more or less unstable—depending on how often it was revised. But The Two Noble Kinsmen’s Epilogue does not appear to have undergone much revision since the 1634 quarto. This does not mean, of course, that the Epilogue necessarily would have been part of the play’s first performance (probably in 1613) at Blackfriars. Perhaps the Epilogue was actually the contribution of The Two Noble Kinsmen’s first publisher, John Waterston. In ways both ironic and fitting, the Epilogue corroborates scholarship that—to use Palfrey and Stern’s
words—challenges “the playwright and/or the finished play” as the “primal font of meaning and direction”; Shakespeare in Parts, 4.


CHAPTER II

“Worke in new kinds”: Suffering and Sympathetic Authorship in Wroth’s *Urania*

Like an overdetermined dreamscape, Lady Mary Wroth’s *The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania* (1621 - c. 1626) consists of a surging succession of stories that replicate, reinforce, and challenge one another.¹ Each story, I suggest, approaches questions concerning cultural and creative reproductive authority from a distinct angle. By “cultural and creative reproductive authority,” I mean the authority to regulate, reproduce, and adapt the kinds that determine various dimensions of social and aesthetic order (e.g., king and cleric, lyric and romance).² What does it take for different writers or speakers to become authors—that is, to become recognized as authorities on the matters about which they write or speak? Under what conditions may the text of either an individual or a collective redefine the conditions of authorship and, in turn, cultural change? Wroth’s engagement with the concept of authorship has proven a fruitful source of inquiry for decades.³ A few scholars, however, have expressed metacritical concern over the extent to which this line of inquiry may have “magnified” Wroth’s marginalization as a female author “to show how she resisted it,” and in doing so, diminished the significance of “her voice in the larger political debates of early seventeenth-century England.”⁴ But I propose that the connection *Urania* interrogates between authorship and kind offers crucial insight into how Wroth’s effort to negotiate the authorial status accessible to members of “womankind” simultaneously contributes to the more extensive but less stable project of reimagining the interrelationships among a larger network of social kinds.⁵ As *Urania* underscores women’s capacity to endure suffering and thereby invests womankind with alternative signifying
power and greater authority, the sympathetic exchanges that it depicts among various kinds also counter—at least fragmentarily—some of the period’s truisms about the nature of rank and skin color.

As a genre—or, in the period’s parlance, kind—romance recommends itself for such a project, in part, because it affords suffering priority. In romance, suffering functions as an organizing principle—that is, an interpretive lens that may bring complex and craggy narrative domains into focus. What so often precipitates suffering in romance is delay—for example, delayed recognition or delayed consummation—where amorous love is concerned. In general, those who exhibit the greatest capacity for suffering in *Urania* are female. Pamphilia assumes the role of the romance’s sufferer par excellence by choosing to remain “constant to inconstancy”—or, in other words, faithful to Amphilanthus, someone notoriously unfaithful to her and his many other lovers (2:23). Her incomparable will to suffer—or, more exactly, her constant suffering—for love undercuts one of the period’s misogynistic strains of discourse, which characterizes womankind as inconstant and therefore iniquitous. Indeed, Pamphilia’s commitment to amorous suffering indexes her exemplary constancy and therefore virtue; at the same time, it establishes her political and poetic authority. Seeking out the companionship of other sufferers, Pamphilia forges relationships that undermine naturalizing hierarchies of gender, rank and skin color as she undertakes what might be considered a form of collaborative authorship. She does not, of course, constitute the only or even the chief model of female authority in *Urania*. Pamphilia’s cousin, the romance’s titular character (also Amphilanthus’s sister), acquires authority through her less zealous commitments to suffering and constancy as well as her deliberate acceptance of change. Although Urania consolidates her position of female authority effectively, in contrast to Pamphilia, she does not develop relationships that assay naturalizing hierarchies of rank or skin color in particularly notable ways. The most politically and poetically productive relationship to emerge in *Urania* might be the enduring one
between Pamphilia and amorous suffering itself. In Wroth’s romance, deliberate if not constant
suffering provides those who experience it with not only the impetus but also the authority to
recalibrate the kinds that demarcate their social environs.\footnote{7}

The genre of romance may facilitate the project of reimagining the interrelationships among
diverse social kinds in *Urania*, but it also seems to limit that project. In the well-known essay,
“Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre,” Frederic Jameson argues that romance establishes various
“organizational categories”; the “most important…is the conceptual opposition between good and
evil, under which all the other types of attributes and images (light and darkness, high and low, etc.)
are clearly subsumed.”\footnote{8} Jameson’s account of romance may be reductive, essentially designating the
genre as a lengthy fable and discounting both its self-reflexivity and messiness.\footnote{9} Nevertheless, *Urania*
relies on the conceptual opposition between virtuousness and baseness—which it often codes as
noble and low-ranking, light and dark, respectively—to define its amorous sufferers as virtuous and,
in turn, grant them authority. Notably, *Urania* tends to enlist the noble-lowly and light-dark binaries
simultaneously to mark the nobility of those with darker skin.\footnote{10} While the narrative of amorous
suffering in Wroth’s romance negotiates the authorial status accessible to those traditionally
marginalized in terms of gender, rank, and skin color, I argue, the language of difference it draws
upon ultimately reinforces some of the very same ideologies it contests.

I. “Actions to their kinde”

That “womankind” did not enjoy the same cultural and creative reproductive authority that
“mankind” did in seventeenth-century England is hardly a matter of contention among scholars of
the period. As I discuss in the previous chapter on William Shakespeare and John Fletcher’s *The Two
Noble Kinsmen* (C. 1613), when the imprisoned Arcite and Palamon realize that they may engage in
cultural reproduction without participating in biological reproduction, they are instantly inspired by
their newfound sense of reproductive power.\footnote{11} Together, Arcite declares, he and Palamon may
constantly beget “New births of love” (2.2.81). The kinsmen’s love interest, Emilia, describes a time when she practiced similar forms of cultural and creative collaboration with her dear friend Flavina. But the Duke of Athens, Theseus (also Emilia’s brother-in-law), effectively discourages Emilia both from pursuing such collaboration in Athens and from claiming much (if any) authority over herself when he orders her to marry one of the two kinsmen against her will. In a sense, this aspect of the play’s narrative is consonant with the general lack of cultural and creative reproductive authority afforded to actual women in early modern England.

As a number of Wroth scholars have illustrated, Wroth was acutely conscious of the limited authorial status that her culture permitted women to assume.\textsuperscript{12} Josephine Roberts, for instance, writes that Wroth was “very much aware of how little voice women had in determining their own destinies or even choosing their life partners.”\textsuperscript{13} Although women could compose translations and religious meditations without “transgressing the traditional boundaries that restricted” them,\textsuperscript{14} they could not always do so without feeling compelled to explain why their gender should not preclude them from undertaking such projects. As Nandini Das notes, the Englishwoman Margaret Tyler understood the need to clarify why her gender had not prevented her justifiable translation of Diego Ortúñez de Calahorra’s Spanish romance \textit{Espejo de príncipes y caballeros} for publication in 1578.\textsuperscript{15} Naomi J. Miller observes that the letters conveying “the court furoir” over \textit{Urania}’s publication “indicate that Wroth’s gender, her choice of genres, and her social position outside the inner circle of power whose vagaries she was exposing rendered her authorship unacceptable.”\textsuperscript{16} I submit, however, that by redefining kinds—especially the nature of womankind—in \textit{Urania}, Wroth simultaneously redefines the terms according to which one may claim authorial status. By calling attention to the discursivity of naturalized social kinds and the orders they comprise, moreover, Wroth intimates that members of traditionally marginalized kinds are limited not by their natures but rather by the discursive structures that define them—structures that may be challenged and adapted.
Notably, Edward Denny, Baron of Waltham’s poem “To Pamphilia from the father-in-law of Seralinus”—an invective-filled response to the first part of Urania—suggests that Wroth’s sex denies her any legitimate claim to authorship. Evidently, Denny believed that he had provided the inspiration for the father-in-law of Sirelius in Urania. When Sirelius suspects his wife of infidelity, her father becomes enraged on Sirelius’s behalf, deciding to kill his daughter “and so cut off the blame, or spot, this her offence might lay upon his noble bloud” (1:516). As his father-in-law attempts to stab his daughter’s heart with a dagger, Sirelius stays his hand and then catches her before she falls “under the weight of unkindnes” (1:516). Here “unkindness” carries two senses: cruelty and disloyalty to one’s kin. In his poem, Denny attempts to deflect the (perceived) accusation of unkindness from himself to Wroth. Wroth should “leave idle books alone / For wise and worthyer women have writte none” (ll.25-26). Indeed, he charges, by writing Urania, Wroth has shown herself to be a “Hermophrodite” (l. 1)—neither a member of womankind nor of mankind. Kind members of womankind do not write romances. Paradoxically, Urania’s resemblance to its creator or its kindness is also its unkindness, for it “doth look” like its monstrous “damme” (ll. 1-4). What makes Wroth monstrous or unkind is not only her authorship of an “idle book” but also her apparent disregard for another member of a high-ranking kind represented by the father-in-law of Sirelius in the romance. In Urania, Wroth “strikes at some mans noble blood / Of kinne to thine if thine be counted good” (ll. 5-6). In other words, if Wroth can even be considered a member of the same rank as Denny, she is unkind, but the very fact that she (supposedly) expresses criticism of Denny’s character calls her blood or rank into question.

An anonymous writer’s acrostic addressed “To the ho[norable Lady the Lady Mary Wroth” contradicts Denny’s claim:18

L    ove, Birth, State, Bounty and a Noble mynde
a    ssume you in a happie residence
d    isposinge all your Actions to their kinde
y    nspr’d to you by Vertues influence
As I say in the introduction, “kind” may refer to one’s (e)state in seventeenth-century discourse. In the acrostic above, “state” and “residence” function as synonyms of “estate.” According to the anonymous writer of the acrostic, Wroth’s kind inclines her to behave in a manner that befits her kind—that is, to perform her kindness. That Wroth exhibits kindness confirms that she is inspired by virtue, especially because she is a member of the gentry. As Linda Pollock writes, the concept of kindness “played a significant role in the landed ranks’ understanding” of themselves and their lives. For them, “kindness was a norm, something to be expected.” The frequency with which the word “kind” and its variants appear in Urania provides support for Pollock’s claim. While the acrostic indicates that Wroth’s kindness depends on, to some extent, her actions, it strongly implies that her naturalized social status virtually guarantees her kindness. Although the acrostic’s logic of kindness establishes Wroth as kind and virtuous, it also effectively diminishes the importance of her actions in relation to her social status.

Emphasizing the extent to which one’s kindness and virtue depend on one’s actions, Urania grants individuals more power both to determine their authorial status and to demonstrate the unreliability of truisms regarding naturalized social kinds. In Urania, the King of Morea, Pamphilia’s father, expresses admiration for the Princess of Stalamine, Nereana, when she appears at his court in search of the Prince of Albania, Steriamus. She recounts how Steriamus rejected her amorous overtures because he loved another—namely, Pamphilia. Pamphilia’s father responds: “for your love, it is so rare a thing to bee found in one of your sexe in such constant fury, as to procure, and continue such a journey, as that of it selfe (without the mixture of such perfections as you see in your selfe) were enough to conquer one that could be overcome” (1:194). After a brief exchange between Nereana and Pamphilia (during which Pamphilia assures Nereana that she has no romantic interest in Steriamus), the King of Morea reiterates his admiration for her “since for a woman it was
unusuall to love much, but more strange to be constant” (1:195). His remarks critically illuminate the instrumental value that constancy holds for Pamphilia. Although Pamphilia may not fully “conquer” Amphilanthus’s heart by proving her constancy, she may nevertheless reveal the tenuousness of her father’s misogynistic beliefs about the nature of her sex and assert her authority over herself. Rather than solely allowing others to classify her nature, Pamphilia participates in determining the meaning of her kind through her performance of constancy. Miller suggests that, “in historicist terms,” Wroth’s engagement with the concept of constancy may be interpreted “less as a self-destructive idealization of a dominant masculinist ideology…than as a manifestation of women’s potential to transform strictures upon their actions into enabling grounds for discourse.” Indeed, Pamphilia’s repurposing of this ideology both evinces her capacity for creativity and helps to establish conditions in which she may exercise that capacity.

While Pamphilia performs her constancy, she also performs her virtue because—as the King of Morea’s appraisal of Nereana assists in elucidating—the members of her coterie generally concur that constancy is virtuous. In addition to the King of Morea, Amphilanthus (however hypocritically) assigns constancy especial value, contending that “In woeman [change] is nott onely ill butt unseemly, wher virtuous and chast Modesty ought whooly to rule and governe” (2:37). The conversation that the King of Morea, Amphilanthus, Urania, and Pamphilia have about constancy, however, sheds light on why constancy alone may not endue Pamphilia with as much authority as constant amorous suffering. Relating how the young Prince of Corinth became infatuated with an execrable “peece of woeman kinde,” the King of Morea maintains that she is “a rapsidie of all untowardnesses and deepe follys together” (2:27). Intrigued by the King’s disdain, Amphilanthus wishes to see her for himself. The King responds that Amphilanthus “may chance for varitie sake to finde som what in her to like” (2:27). When Amphilanthus objects that, since reuniting with Pamphilia, he has become more “stay’d,” the King rejoins that his “very staydnes is a change”
Urania agrees: “I thinke you are the Constantest man breathing, for you have nott so much altered from your first maner of loving as to change one Jott from change” (2:28). As this exchange suggests, even consistently frequent change—which *Urania* treats as dubious—may qualify as a form of constancy.

Pamphilia’s thorough embrace of amorous suffering indicates that her constancy is neither dubious nor trivial: her will to endure pain attests to the strength of her character and power over herself. Consequently, as Miller maintains, her “discourse acquires authority from her suffering.”

Her resolute acceptance of suffering also distinguishes her from amorously afflicted characters such as Nereana and Antissia, who seek out various remedies to alleviate their pain. On one occasion, for example, Antissia coerces an admirer (whom she eventually marries) into making an attempt on Amphilanthus’s life (1:357-58). Nereana retreats to live “in a Cave alone” (1:334). Contrastingly, while Pamphilia stoically endures her pain, she also channels it into sympathetic exchanges with other sufferers. These exchanges allow Pamphilia and her fellow sufferers to forge what Miller describes as “alternative network[s] of affection, connection, and communication.” Those who participate in the construction of such alternative networks may consolidate different forms of individual and collective authority as they explore different relations of kind.

Deliberate amorous suffering and sympathetic exchange provide Pamphilia with opportunities not just to establish her authority and negotiate the constraints of kind; they also seem to enable her to acquire the experience necessary to communicate effectively in lyric. The narrator of *Urania* explicitly states that Pamphilia is “excellent in writing” (1:62). Her reputation for being “excellent in Poetry” prompts the Queen of Macedon, Meriana, to entreat Pamphilia to share her work (1:460). Initially, Pamphilia worries that her poetry is too sad for others to enjoy, but Meriana insists that “the saddest verses will please [her] best” (1:460). Pamphilia’s mastery over herself and care for others translates into compelling, creative expression: Meriana derives so much satisfaction
from the sonnet Pamphilia recites that she asks for a copy of it (1:461). Pamphilia agrees to give it and “many more” to Meriana (1:461). In contrast to Pamphilia’s compositions, the narrator depicts Antissia’s as derivative and convoluted (1:114). Her “unfashionably framed” verses correspond to her “unfram’d and unfashioned thoughts” (1:147). Antissius, Antissia’s nephew, characterizes her poetry in harsher terms: “my Aunts raging, raving, extravagant discursive language is most apparently and understandably flatt madnes; if you did, Madame [Pamphilia], but see her speake, you would say you never saw soe direct a mad woeman” (2:41). A “weake woeman” incapable of self-control, Antissia is also vain (2:41). Her vanity prevents her from experiencing lasting sympathy for others—as her attempt on Amphilanthus’s life might suggest—and therefore her poetry does not resonate with others; instead it elicits their derision. Significantly, Wroth’s romance does not intimate that deliberate suffering and sympathetic exchange must be experienced or executed in a single way to possess cultural and creative reproductive value or that they must always lead to the same cultural and creative ends. Pamphilia and Urania suffer and sympathize differently, and although Urania never becomes poetically prolific like Pamphilia, both Pamphilia and Urania are able to assert their authorial status as they engage in distinct forms of community building.

II. After “cherish’d torment”

Wroth’s romance introduces the sixteen-year-old Urania in a state of anguish over the uncertainty of her naturalized social kind, which she refers to as her “estate.” Having just discovered she is not the daughter of a shepherd as she thought, she maintains that she is less afflicted by the “povertie of my estate” than the ignorance “of my selfe” (1:16). She soliloquizes: “of any miserie that can befall a woman, is not this the most and greatest which thou art falne into…Can there be any neare the unhappinesse of being ignorant, and that in the highest kind, not being certaine of mine owne estate or birth?” (1.1). In the absence of this knowledge, her “sorrowing thoughts” are her “choicest companie” (1:1). She may not know her status in relation to other social kinds, but by
nurturing her sorrow, she establishes her identity as someone who is miserable in the “highest kind” (1:1). Indeed, the narrator relates, Urania does not seek “to find least respite from her sorrow, which so dearly she [does] value” (1:2).

Although Urania initially wishes to remain alone with her sorrow, she finds herself drawn to other sufferers; her exchanges with them both enhance her authority over herself and (eventually) lead her to the knowledge of her naturalized social kind—specifically, her nobility. When she stumbles upon Perissus, “the most exact piece of miserie,” languishing in a cave, she asks him to “favour [her] with the knowledge of [his] greife” (1:3-4). While the more obvious interpretation of Urania’s request would be that she wants to know the source of his grief, it could also be argued that she asks Perissus to impart affective knowledge and, in turn, authority to her. According to the narrator, her encounter with Perissus has in fact been affectively instructive: his amorous suffering for a woman he believes to be dead prompts Urania to give “leave for love to make a breach into her heart” (1:21). Wroth’s language here implies that Urania has once again chosen to endure pain—specifically, the pain of love’s violence—as does Urania’s description of this violence as “cherish’d torment” (1:25). By continuing to define herself in terms of her capacity to suffer, Urania is effectively authoring her kind—a point Wroth emphasizes in the account of Urania’s subsequent meeting with the Prince of Morea, Parselius (also Pamphilia’s brother). As Urania and Parselius gaze at each other, they resemble “two Master-pieces, framed to demonstrate the best, and choicest skill of art” (1:21). Urania’s resolute embrace of suffering has allowed her to become her own masterpiece. Intriguingly, Wroth insinuates that naturalized social kinds may only become perceptible within a particular structure or “frame.” The admiration that Urania’s “frame” inspires in Parselius motivates him to conclude that she is the lost Princess of Naples who was kidnapped less than a week after her birth. He, of course, is correct (1:23-26).
Urania’s “cherish’d torment” defines her only for a portion of Wroth’s romance. After an enchantment at the Throne of Love in Cyprus sunders Parselius and Urania, Parselius loses his faith in her fidelity. Consequently, he allows himself to court and marry the wise and beautiful Dalinea. Later, on the island of Delos, the sage Melissea counsels the distraught Urania: “you shall be happy, and enjoy, but first, death in apparence must possesse your dainty bodie, when you shall revive with him you now love, to another love, and yet as good, and great as hee” (1:190). Anticipating that Urania will object to the prospect of her change, Melissea assures her, “Bee not offended for this is your fate, nor be displeased, since though that must change, it is but just change, bringing it from him [Parselius] alike disquieted (1:190). Importantly, just as Urania deliberately chooses to experience the pain of amorous love, she deliberately chooses to relinquish it. Atop the rocks of St. Maura—the sea into which Melissea advises Amphilanthus to throw Urania so that she may be cleansed of her amorous love for Parselius—Amphilanthus apologizes to his sister: “dearest Urania, I must throw thee into the Sea; pardon me, Heaven appoints it so” (1:230). Directing her brother to follow Melissea’s instructions, Urania reminds her brother of her agency: “You wrong me much to thinke that I feare death, being your sister, or cheerish life, if not to joy my parents; fulfill your command, and be assured it is doubly welcome, comming to free me from much sorrow” (1:230).

Not only does Urania experience relief from her amorous suffering; she decides to pursue another romantic relationship after she is recovered from St. Maura. Parselius—who sorely regrets marrying Dalinea when Urania appears to him in a dream—happens to be lying in a rocky crevice that overlooks St. Maura as her body surfaces on its waves. He dives in to rescue her and almost drowns, but two nearby men in a boat jump into the sea and save him and Urania (1:230). Upon the shore, Urania, Parselius, and the two men, Steriamus and Dolorindus, discover that St. Maura has “soundly washed” them of their amorous afflictions (1:230-31). Urania is “delivered from such a hell, as loving [Parselius], who had (although so neere to her) been so farre from truth to her”
(1:231). Parselius knows “nothing of his former love” for Urania, only “being assured” that she is his cousin (1:230). Steriamus—a longtime friend to both Urania and Parselius—finds himself “released of his unfortunate love” for Pamphilia (1:231). Dolorindus—who has been scorned by a woman and therefore vowed “never to love, or chuse a Creature of so light a kinde, as generally all women be” (1:189)—discovers that the sea has dissolved his hatred for womankind (1:231). “Love was pleased,” writes Wroth, “because now he might have new worke in new kinds” (1.231:4-7). As Urania and Steriamus learn to redefine themselves after the St. Maura episode, they also negotiate a romantic relationship with each other. Their relationality and their kinds are mutually constitutive; love may assume new forms or kinds as it is cultivated by new kinds.

In contrast to characters like Pamphilia who insist that constant love is the “worthiest” kind of love even if it is not reciprocated, Urania and Steriamus regard love as a sequential, collaborative venture. Steriamus proposes to collaborate with Urania to produce a “new” and “perfect” love born “unto” and “with” her (1:265). Although Urania initially worries that she cannot offer Steriamus her “first affection,” she goes on to muse, “truly may I in a kind; for I liked [Steriamus] before I loved the other” (1:265). Redefining love’s kinds, Urania authorizes new forms of relationality and, in turn, new social kinds. Steriamus readily accepts this alternative kind of “first” love from Urania. “Give me this second,” he replies, “which as the first I will esteeme and cherish it; for a new created one it is, and so shall live in me” (1:265.32-35). His use of “cherish” recalls Urania’s soliloquy on love as “cherish’d torment” after she meets Parselius. Whereas numerous characters in Urania cherish a love personified as a sovereign tormentor, Steriamus and Urania cherish a love they nurture together.

Languages of love, in seventeenth-century England, could be deployed to naturalize relationships between sovereigns and their subjects. As Melissa Sanchez illustrates, Stuart absolutists spoke about love in terms that reinforced naturalizing gender hierarchies and then invoked them to naturalize “the domination of the ruler over implicitly feminized subjects.” The more reciprocal,
collaborative love and ensuing marriage between equals modeled by Urania and Steriamus counters theories of sovereignty predicated on naturalizing gender hierarchies championed by Stuart absolutists. Miller maintains that Urania and Steriamus’s relationship “represents one of the most stable unions in the romance” and that it even “underscores the terms of male dependence upon women as mothers not only as a past connection, but also as a present and future one.” In the figure of Urania, “Wroth shifts the focus from the mother’s body as a fortuitous conjunction of womb and breasts to the mother’s role as the author of posterity.” Unlike the subservient wife idealized in King James I’s first speech to Parliament, Urania assumes the role of a mother-author of the kingdom she rules with Steriamus—a role that affords her a degree of preeminence in her relationship with Steriamus. Eventually becoming the queen of Albania and counselor to Albanians, her family, and her friends, Urania determines her society’s ordinances and customs. In doing so, she does not simply sustain social reproduction as mothers in general might through pedagogy, the enforcement of norms, and discipline; rather, Urania plays a crucial role in authorizing the very terms of social reproduction.

III. Pamphilia’s Composition

Not in entirely dissimilar ways, Pamphilia also plays an important role in authorizing the terms of social reproduction in Urania. Given that Wroth published the first part of Urania when, as Sanchez notes, “James ruled substantially alone” and wrote the second, unpublished part “during increasingly contentious debates over the source and extent of parliamentary authority,” her exploration of authority and effort to envision “a viable alternative to” the prevalent “idolatry of absolutist rhetorics” would have spoken to the struggles and desires of her contemporaries, and not just those of her sex. Sanchez’s claim that Wroth portrays Pamphilia as an example of inappropriate submission and debased servitude “embodying the consequences of Stuart narratives of asymmetrical obligation,” however, deserves further scrutiny. Pamphilia’s deliberate amorous
suffering challenges equations of love, naturalizing gender hierarchies, and absolutist rhetorics that implicitly and sometimes explicitly sanction the sovereign’s total control over “feminized subjects.” Just as significantly, her mode of engaging with other sufferers creates privileged spaces in which members of often-marginalized kinds may speak with authority.

In a key scene in the first part of Urania that further elucidates Pamphilia’s relationship to constancy and amorous suffering, Urania advises her grief-stricken cousin after Amphilanthus reunites with his childhood sweetheart Musalina and subsequently “forgets” his feelings for Pamphilia. Pamphilia has just addressed the absent Amphilanthus: “what have I deserved to be thus tormented, and forsaken? Tell me, and use mee crueler if that may be, so you then make an ende, and againe receive me into favour” (1:458). When Urania discovers her cousin in her “sorrowes,” she asks Pamphilia to confess the identity of her tormentor (1:458). Pamphilia assures Urania that she would if “we were gone from hence. I hate this Corinth, and long to see Arcadia againe” (1:458). “[W]ill your sadnesse end then?” queries Urania (1.459:1-2). Pamphilia’s reply suggests that she is just as committed to suffering as she is to Amphilanthus (who is also in Corinth). “No,” she says, “I should hate my selfe as ill as I doe this place, if I should doe so, change cannot nor must not aspire to worke such effect in mee” (1:459). She even chides Urania, who seeks to remedy her anguish: “doe not prove an enemy to mee, though mine own eyes and heart have turned to my destruction, bee still a noble friend…not by striving to make mee more unhappy, which I shall bee, if I let in that worthlesse humour change” (1:459). Pamphilia would sooner languish in her “most wretched” state, preferring constancy over change, than attempt to find “favour” with Amphilanthus again, or for that matter, question him about his amorous amnesia (1:458). This constancy to her vow translates not into a debased servitude to Amphilanthus but rather a fidelity to constant suffering and sovereignty over herself: she will not permit change to work “effect” in her because she believes that doing so may undermine her authorial status.
Yet Pamphilia’s insistence on defining herself in opposition to less constant kinds threatens to preclude her—in contrast to Urania—from authorizing new forms of relationality and, in turn, new social kinds. After Pamphilia’s anguish leads her to faint, Urania urges, “Preserve your health…you have grieved enough for men everlastingly to curse themselves, that one of their kind should give occasion of sorrow to the most deserving woman” (1:469). Urania maintains that her inconstant brother does not deserve Pamphilia’s love. She adds that the vow Pamphilia made to him has not been socially ratified through a formal ceremony and therefore need not continue to constrain Pamphilia: “let him goe and rejoice, you see his imperfections before you were tyed to them” (1:469). Pamphilia, however, diverts the subject of their conversation from Amphilanthus and men, in general, to love as an abstraction. “What hath love done to you, to make you thus bitter against him? do you not happily enjoy what you desire? are you ambitious to any thing within his authority,” she demands (1:469). Although Pamphilia suggests that Urania unjustly seeks to arrogate love’s authority, when she explains why she will not treat love like a “good child” as Urania and Steriamus do, she marks the power that she herself possesses over her “tormenter”: “Pamphilia must be of a new composition before she can let such thoughts fall into her constant breast, which is a Sanctuary of zealous affection, and so well hath love instructed me, as I can never leave my master nor his precepts, but still maintaine a virtuous constancy” (1:470). Pamphilia’s embodied self or “composition” is her sanctuary, and she chooses not to “let” inconstant thoughts unseat the “master” who presides there. As the author of her “composition,” however, Pamphilia is, in a sense, the sovereign of her master. Nonetheless, Urania thinks it unfortunate that Pamphilia loves constancy as much “as having true possession of [her] soule,” concluding that it is a “pittie…that ever that fruitlesse thing Constancy was taught you as a virtue” (1:470). Constancy is “fruitlesse,” according to Urania, insofar as it deters Pamphilia from experiencing “new kinds” of love and ways of being.
But to dismiss Pamphilia’s constant amorous suffering completely would be to discount the significance of the sympathetic relationships it allows her to forge. Pamphilia and several other women such as Alarina and Dorolina—who are of lower social statuses than Pamphilia—develop enduring relationships as they share their pain in affairs of the heart. Pamphilia seeks out Alarina, a hermetic shepherdess, after hearing her sing as she prepares to bathe in the river. When Pamphilia learns that Alarina is “married” to despair, Pamphilia entreats her, “tell me all your story, and this night will be more pleasing to me, if so spent, then any that my fortunes have yet knowne” (1:216-17). Alarina explains that she fell in love with a herdsman who reciprocated her affection, but she would not participate in a sexual relationship with him because he was married. Falling in love with another shepherdess who was “faire above the common beautyes” (1:120), the herdsman scorned Alarina. Languishing for some time, she eventually drank from a magical spring and “grew free, and free from love, to which I late was slave. Then finding this true virtue in my selfe, and my poore selfe to me returnd to me againe, I did embrace it” (1:224). Impressed by Alarina’s account of how she discovered “true virtue” in herself, Pamphilia returns to her bedroom to reconsider her own relationships with both love in the abstract and herself (1:225). Like Alarina, Dolorina is also of a lower social status or rank than Pamphilia. Although she is Pamphilia’s servant, the servant and mistress find comfort in each other’s company (1:498-505)—not an unusual situation in the early modern period. Having been rejected by the gentleman she loves, Dolorina returns to serve Pamphilia, who receives her “with all kindness…the better being joined…because nearest agreeing with her passions, and miseries (1:495). “Kindness,” here, means not only gentleness but also likeness. For Pamphilia, the value of sympathetic exchange with other amorous sufferers exceeds the importance of rank. Dolorinda’s particular appreciation for Pamphilia’s poetry further attests to the affinity between the women.
Pamphilia’s relationships with both Alarina and Dolorinda are mutually instructive and rewarding because—despite their different social statuses—they sympathize with each other’s pain. By comparison, Urania devotes little attention to those who are not members of the nobility. After Parselius identifies Urania as the lost Princess of Naples, she is content to treat the young, unnamed woman she was raised to believe was her sister—the daughter of those Urania “tooke for [her] Father and Mother”—as her “maide” (1:16, 28, 49, 170). As I have noted, the way “kind” functions as a synonym of “estate” and “rank” effectively naturalizes rank. Pamphilia’s reciprocal relationships with Alarina and Dorolina could, therefore, be understood to compromise an ideology of rank in which rank corresponds to natural virtue (the same ideology discernable in the acrostic dedicated to Wroth) at the same time that they facilitate the construction of alternative kinds.

The relationship that Pamphilia and Leutissia develop in the second part of elucidates how Pamphilia’s deliberate suffering allows for the consolidation of female authority and the construction of new kinds while establishing privileged spaces in which those marginalized by misogynistic absolutism may speak with authority. In the midst of a morning walk through the grounds of Urania and Steriamus’s estate in Albania, the Marquise of Gargardia and Pamphilia rest by a fountain. As Pamphilia reclines “in her olde passionate manner, sighing and lamenting,” the Marquise whittles a hazel stick, attaches a silk thread to it, and begins to fish in the fountain (2:308). Her “dashing and fooling with the water” prompts the nymph Leutissia, who is hiding in the fountain, to wail, “What fury is come hether purposely to torture mee? I have laine her thes many yeeres in quiet rest till now” (2:309). The frightened Marquise scampers away, but Pamphilia convinces Leutissia to speak with her, who does so gladly upon realizing that she can best serve Pamphilia “in that kinde” of conversation she prefers—that is, conversation about suffering (2:309). She recounts for Pamphilia the horrific fate she suffered at the hands of Demonarus, a “great lord” in Albania after she fell in love with his son, Amarintus (2:310). Demonarus destroyed the couple’s
happiness when he sought to have intercourse with his daughter, Lydia (Amarintus’s sister), who refused her father (2:310). Lydia’s mother attempted to convey her away from their estate (2:311). Unfortunately, Demonarus followed them (2.311). As he tried to rape Lydia in the woods, Amarintus and Leutissia intervened. Enraged by Amarintus’s opposition, Demonarus tried to slay his son (2:311). Rushing to Amarintus’s defense, however, Lydia caught the blow intended for her brother and died (2:312). Now completely consumed with fury, Demonarus slaughtered both his wife and son as he swore to “wreake all his revenge” on Leutissia (3:12). But the goddess Diana and water nymphs saved Leutissia as she leapt into the fountain to escape Demonarus; he—seeing his “desires crost”—impaled himself on his sword (2:312). Leutissia’s story attests to the problem with the belief that, as Sanchez puts it, “the king-husband-father must command absolute obedience” from his subjects. Because Pamphilia understands that Leutissia’s suffering surpasses her own, she grants Leutissia greater authority. In fact, Leutissia’s criticism of the “fruictles business” of Pamphilia’s “wailings” compels Pamphilia to entertain the possibility of becoming a “new woeman” (2:379). Leutissia also decides the terms on which they will meet. That their meetings take place in a cave or a secluded cypress grove at some remove from the Albanian court suggests that Leutissia’s authority exceeds the strictures even of Urania and Steriamus’s collaborative monarchy (2:351-52).

Pamphilia’s relationship with Leutissia—predicated on their common valuation of suffering—could therefore be considered an alternative form of government that also facilitates the construction of alternative social kinds.

IV. White Hands

In *Urania*, Pamphilia’s deliberate amorous suffering also becomes a mechanism for contesting a hierarchy of skin color that may have been less clearly coterminous with hierarchies of kind than were hierarchies of rank in early modern England. The extent to which skin color indexed kind or race in the period remains a matter of debate—although critics are increasingly providing a
tighter link than had heretofore been observed. (As I observe in the introduction, “race” was often interchanged with “kind,” and race was considered a category of nature in early modern English discourse, but it had yet to acquire the strong association with skin color it has today.) The emphasis on the dichotomy between virtuousness and baseness in *Urania*, however, ultimately works against the project of discounting the congealing correlation between skin color and kind precisely because of the terms in which the romance establishes this dichotomy.

As is the case in many early modern texts, dark skin is frequently associated with baseness and undesirability in the first part of *Urania*. Wroth describes the Lord of the Islands of Cerigo and Dragonero, for example, as one “who for countenance seem’d no lover; his colour like a Moore; his fashion rude and proud,” his person “ugly” (1:97). In a particularly arresting passage that reinforces the association between dark skin and undesirability, Pamphilia is filled with remorse after momentarily questioning the virtue of her love for Amphilanthus. She addresses her absent beloved:

> I will truly and religiously confesse, I am not worthy of you; but it is not my fault, I wish I were fit, as you might ever love, and such an one as all the world might thinke fit for you, then I know you would be just: nor wish I this for any benefit, but for your love; for else in the comparison of other gaine unto my selfe, or any other then your loved selfe, I rather would wish to be a Black-moore, or any thing more dreadfull, then allure affection to me, if not from you; thus would I be to merit your loved favour, the other to shew my selfe purer, then either purest White or Black: but faith will not prevaile, I am forsaken and despised, why dye I not? It is not fit, I still must live, and feele more cause of woe, or better to say, to see my cause of woe. (1:465)

Pamphilia imagines herself in a state that potential admirers would find undesirable—nay, “dreadfull”—but she would find preferable to winning the affection of anyone other than Amphilanthus. Given the choice between being a “Black-moore” and “alluring affection” from anybody who is not Amphilanthus, Pamphilia would choose to “be a “Black-moore.” By constructing a counterfactual scenario in which she could wish herself into being a “Black-moore” rather than attract the attention of other admirers, she testifies simultaneously to the prejudices that she and her culture harbor about blackness while articulating her purity of heart and virtue.
That Pamphilia can imagine wishing herself into being a “Black-moore” and thereby demonstrating her virtue, however, reveals that she does not view “Black-moores” as inherently or naturally base. From her perspective, the “Black-moore” is not a base kind. In other words, Pamphilia discounts the possibility that the association between baseness and a darker skin color in her culture stems from a naturally causal relationship between them. At the same time that Pamphilia’s address to the absent Amphilanthus registers what Kim Hall describes as the “hegemony of male favor and color” in Pamphilia’s culture, it attests to her awareness of the hegemony’s discursive construction and therefore the potential of its deconstruction.

Notably, Wroth undermines the correlation not only between darkness and baseness but also between lightness and virtue in Urania. She writes, for example, that Antissius’s wife, Lucenia was “not the fairest, yet truly was she beautifull, and as faire as any in goodnesse” (1:33). Positing a distinction between fair skin and fairness “in goodness,” Wroth disarticulates the seamless conflation between fair skin and virtue. Pamphilia’s appraisal of Antissia’s whiteness, however, compromises the equivalence between light skin and fairness so that “fairness” may be used to signify physical beauty without light skin. When Amphilanthus praises Antissia’s “fairness,” Pamphilia rejoins, “me thinks there is not that beautie in her as you speake of, but I have seene, as faire and delicate as shee; yet in truth shee’s very white, but that extreame whitenesse I like not so well” (1:61-62). Hall maintains that “the issue” for Pamphilia here is Amphilanthus’s “authority in granting [Antissia] ‘whiteness’ rather than her actual beauty”; Pamphilia dislikes “Amphilanthus’s admiration for [Antissia]” more than Antissia’s whiteness, and she consequently exposes his “masculine right to make women fair or black as he desires.” I propose that this passage allows for an alternative interpretation that is consistent with the less specific sense of “fair” in Urania—that is, “beautiful.” Pamphilia may dislike Amophilanthus’s praise of Antissia, but what she objects to is his aesthetic valuation whiteness, which automatically squares whiteness with beauty. Pamphilia’s point
seems to be that she has encountered those who are just as fair but not as extremely white as Antissia. In denying that whiteness is necessarily commensurate with fairness, she disputes Amphilanthus’s aesthetic judgment. Her disagreement with him over the fairness of whiteness serves as another example of her interest in establishing her cultural reproductive authority.

Wroth’s description of the islanders on Robollo whom Steriamus and his companions encounter in the second part of *Urania* distinguishes between whiteness and fairness perhaps even more clearly:

They encountered a company of Forest creatures (men and woemen) sufficiently handsome and faire, for soe are most Islanders; and thos that were nott white were lovely browne, the most lovely couler, and the sweetest, lovliest beautie. Amongst thes ther was one who seemed the chiefe, and som thing fairer, hansomer, or som thing better seeming then the rest, and to whom the rest shewed a pretty kinde of neglective respect. (2:147)

Given Wroth’s definitive statement on the uncommon beauty of the islanders’ brown skin, and given her description of the chief as “hansommer” than the other islanders, it would be reasonable to assume that the chief has brown skin. Together, then, the supplemental appositive synonyms in the second sentence, “fairer” and “hansommer,” indicate that handsome brown skin may be fairer than white skin. As Elizabeth Spiller remarks, Wroth also “attributes a darker complexion to Pamphilia.” That Wroth describes Pamphilia as incomparably fair constitutes further evidence of the association between darkness and physical beauty in *Urania* (1:37). Unlike Pamphilia, however, most of the islanders on Robollo exhibit “rudenes” and “incivilitie,” which the chief attributes to their “nature” and “ther breeding” (2:148). Just as Wroth avoids unequivocally confirming a correlation between whiteness or lightness and natural virtue, she troubles the easy correlation between brownness or darkness and natural virtue.

But without taking recourse to language that simultaneously naturalizes distinctions of rank and skin color, Wroth has difficulty signifying that those with skin considerably darker than Pamphilia’s are capable of the stoical amorous suffering, and in turn, the virtue necessary to engage
in sympathetic exchange. In the second part of *Urania*, a messenger arrives at the court of Morea with the news that his “master, the great King of Tartaria,” Rodomondro,” has just arrived in the country: “itt was his hard fortune to suffer shipwrack upon a rock nott farr hence” (1:42).

Immediately, Wroth emphasizes Rodomondro’s authority and ability to endure hardship. Yet the ensuing description of his person conveys that his skin color might call these attributes into question:

A brave and Comly Gentleman, shaped of body soe curiously as noe art cowld counterfett soe rare a proportion, of an excellent stature neither to high nor of the meanest stature, his hands soe white as would have become a great Lady, his face of curious and exact features, butt for the couler of itt, itt plainly shewed the sunn had either liked itt to much, and soe had too hard kissed itt, ore in fury of his delicacy, had made his beams to strongly to burne him, yett cowld nott take away the perfect sweetnes of his lovelines. His diamond eyes (though attired in black) did soe sparcle gaist his rays as made them in ther owne hardenes knowe strength against his beams, and power to resist strongest burning heat; and soe certainly had the conquest, for though black, yett he had the true perfection of lovelines, and in lovelines the purest beauty. For what is fairnes without feature, even as a picture is with out the life peece itt self. (2:42)

Whereas other characters are lovely because of their brownness, Rodomondro is lovely in spite of his blackness. Whether Wroth implies either that Rodomondro is fair despite his blackness or that “fairnes without feature” cannot compare to his blackness with “exact features” is open to interpretation. By comparison, the King of Candia’s brown skin, which Wroth insinuates makes him more beautiful even than Amphilanthus, does not require defense: “Onely being nearer the sunn, hee had more hardly used him in roughly kissing then hee had Amphilanthus, whos excellency was never Ambitious of such curtisies, to cross to greater beautie” (2:58). Although Wroth says nothing about the color of the King of Candia’s hands, she highlights Rodomondro’s white hands before describing his black skin as if to preempt objections to it. Hall speculates that Rodomandro’s white hands “function as a sign of rank” that “mitigates his race/color status.” Indeed, to confirm Rodomondro’s virtue and thereby his power both to suffer in love and participate in a sympathetic exchange, Wroth underscores his nobility by portraying his hands as unblemished by manual labor,
unburned by the sun. Equating one’s lack of need to participate in manual labor with one’s innate virtue, Wroth makes distinctions of rank into distinctions of kind.

As Wroth highlights Rodomondro’s unburned hands to signal his virtue, however, she does not only make distinctions of rank into distinctions of kind. If the degree to which one’s hands remain unblemished by the exigencies of labor and the sun’s rays corresponds to the degree of one’s innate virtue or potential for virtue, it is reasonable to infer that skin that (supposedly) has been burned, like that on Rodomondro’s face, corresponds to the opposite—that is, an inherent defect. The special attention Wroth devotes to Rodomondro’s white hands has the effect of transforming the trope of skin “too hard kissed” by the sun into an index of natural insufficiency. In isolation from Rodomondro’s white hands, the trope of sunburned skin could simply be a trope. Together, the focus on Rodomondro’s white hands and the trope of sunburned skin make differences of rank and skin color into those of kind so that Rodomondro’s hands simultaneously point to his natural nobility and its natural precariousness. Ironically, Rodomondro’s white hands necessitate the very supplement they are intended to constitute.46

Wroth’s account of the knight Folietto also manifests this irony. Folietto attributes his failed courtship of the sage Melissea’s niece, Denia, to his “tanned, scorched face” (2:60). Believing that he has had his “hansomnes disgraced” by her, he is filled with “rage and distraction” (2:61). Wroth’s evaluation of his physique consists of yet another apology for black skin:

Yett hee was, to speake truthe, tollerable and soe enough to bee commended for a Very hansom black man, well-shaped for strength, well-featured of face, but ill-complexioned; yett had hee exceeding white hands, and they showed a hope his skinn was answerable. For the rest, his minde was only to haughty; els indeed hee was a gallant man. (2:61)

Spiller argues that the “two parts of Wroth’s Urania are written across the shift from pre-racial to racial bodies.”47 While the “humoral model of the body” predominates in the first part, “proto-racial” characters become more pronounced in the second.48 Spiller may be overly eager to read skin color as a symptom of humoral composition in the first part of Urania, but her observation that
Wroth describes characters in both humoral and proto-racial terms within the romance is astute. In the passage above, for example, Wroth marks Folietto in terms of skin color, humoral complexion, and rank. The use of the sunburned-skin trope signals that Folietto’s skin color does not correspond to his humoral complexion. In other words, his blackness is not a symptom of black melancholy. Furthermore, if Folietto were a black melancholic, he would be constant, which he is not. When Denia chooses his cousin, Clavarindo, over him and tells him to “follow [his] owne adventures,” he responds that now he is “in some sort better, for I love noe fetters, nor ever could love binde mee” (2:60). Thus, Folietto is “ill-complexioned” not because he has black skin but rather because his humoral state disposes him to rage, distraction, and haughtiness. His white hands, however, signal the possibility that the natural virtue to which his high rank corresponds will permit him to prevail over his humoral complexion. Yet in juxtaposition with the “burned” skin on the rest of his body, Folietto’s white hands also hint at his defectiveness.

Although Rodomondro’s white hands may call his nature into some question, they do seem to correlate with his capacity for amorous suffering, suffering more generally speaking, and sympathetic exchange. The exceptional abilities that Pamphilia and Rodomandro demonstrate to suffer and sympathize motivate their personal and political alliance. Rodomandro’s reserve of sympathy far exceeds even Amphilanthus’s. For instance, Pamphilia’s brother Philarchos, Rodomondro, and Amphilanthus all take part in a battle with the King of Lydia that leaves Philarchos dead and Rodomandro and Amphilanthus seriously injured. Contrasting the men’s emotional depth, Wroth writes:

The Tartarian was les hurt, and had lost much less blood, yet the Tartarian was wounded deeper with a hidden wound for his freind [Philarchos] which indeed hee never perfectly recovered. The Emperour [Amphilanthus] quickly recovered health, and strength came prettily to him, and sooner than would have binn expected. (2:268)

Pamphilia and those in the country she governs (which shares her name) are deeply affected by Philarchos’s death just as Rodomandro is. For them, the victory over the King of Lydia is “noe thing
to the sorrow” of the loss of Philarchos, “yett they must bear itt” (2:269). Significantly, Rodomandro’s courtship of Pamphilia intensifies precisely at this point in the narrative, and Pamphila grows increasingly receptive to him.

That Rodomondro proposes to Pamphilia in terms that acknowledge her authority may increase her interest in him. He swears he does not seek “soverainitie over love, as that way to master, butt to bee a meanes for mee, poore mee, to bee accepted and receaved by you” (2:271). Although Pamphilia effectively rejects his first proposal, she praises him in terms that recall her earlier regard for Amphilanthus; besides Amphilanthus, Rodomandro is the only suitor whose “worth” Pamphilia claims to esteem above her own (1:465). When Rodomondro persists, “Love your booke, butt love mee soe farr as that I may hold itt,” she rejects not him but rather the subservient language he uses to style himself (2:272). Convinced that he does not seek to compromise her sovereign authority, however, she begins to consider his proposal seriously. The relationship that grows between Pamphilia and Rodomandro over the course of *Urania* is rooted in sympathetic reciprocity and a mutual recognition of each other’s authority. Yet to the extent that *Urania* implies that Rodomondro’s white hands constitute the condition of their relationship, it renders Pamphilia and Rodomandro as unequal kinds.  

V. The “sympathetic internal experience”

In *Urania*, the conceptual oppositions reinforced between virtuousness and baseness, nobleness and lowliness, and lightness and darkness work at cross purposes with the project of investing those who are marginalized by naturalizing hierarchies of gender, rank, and skin color with greater authority. Yet the priority that Wroth’s romance grants to sympathetic exchange suggests that the project may nevertheless evolve. In *Marxism and Form*, Jameson maintains that affect plays an integral role in the dialectical process, reflecting, “I have felt that the dialectical method can be acquired only by a concrete working through of detail, by a sympathetic internal experience of the
gradual construction of a system according to its inner necessity.” Amorous suffering prompts numerous characters in *Urania* to seek out what might be considered the collaborative “sympathetic internal experience” of their social environs and the kinds that constitute those environs while they share their affairs of the heart with each other. *Urania*, I therefore suggest, depicts a form of what Jameson calls the “dialectical method.”

Dialectics may deconstruct the premises from which they begin as they facilitate the reconstruction of the systems in which they unfold and the adaptation of the ideologies they engage. Although *Urania* takes the conceptual opposition between virtuousness and baseness for granted and, in doing so, reinforces oppositions between nobility and lowliness and lightness and darkness, its narrative form allows for the undoing of these oppositions. In other words, Jameson’s critique of romance as a genre might apply to Wroth’s romance in certain respects, but *Urania*’s narrative form demonstrates that romance may be less unitary than he acknowledges. Indeed, *Urania* evinces Wroth’s acute interest in engaging diverse perspectives and experiences, including those of her readers. At the same time that *Urania* portrays the sympathetic internal experience, it invites its readers to participate in that experience. As Susan Light’s study of marginalia and autographs in extant copies of the first part of *Urania* shows, “the collaborative idea of authorship, associated with manuscript circulation, was relevant to the circulation of printed texts” in seventeenth-century England. While *Urania* negotiates the authorial status accessible to those marginalized by naturalizing hierarchies of rank and skin color less effectively than it redefines the nature of womankind, it entrusts its readers with the authority to work through its contradictions and to arrive at more satisfactory ends.
Notes


2. See David Glimp, esp. xii.


5. My argument in this chapter frames *Urania* primarily as a project of cultural reconstruction rather than autobiography. The practice of reading *Urania* as Wroth’s autobiography is relatively common among scholars of her work. See Mary Ellen Lamb, “The Biopolitics of Romance in Mary Wroth’s *The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania,*” in *Ashgate Critical Essays on Women Writers in England, 1550-1700: Volume 4: Mary Wroth*, ed. Clare R. Kinney (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 165-188, esp. 130. Lamb, for instance, interprets the incomplete last sentence of the second part of *Urania*—“Amphilanthus wa[s] extremly” (2:418)—as a reflection of Wroth’s authorial debilitation. Because William Herbert, 3rd Earl of Pembroke was not “receptive” to Wroth’s romance, Lamb speculates, Wroth found that “there was no place further that Urania could go.” See also Jennifer Carrell, “A Pack of Lies in a Looking Glass: Lady Mary Wroth’s *Urania* and the Magic Mirror of Romance” in *Ashgate Critical Essays on Women Writers in England, 1550 - 1700: Volume 4: Mary Wroth*, ed. Clare Kinney (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 117. Carrell admits, however, we know little about the “relationship between Wroth and her cousin Pembroke except that they seem to have spent a great deal of time together when they were young” and that “Wroth was not Pembroke’s first paramour.” The dearth of verifiable information that survives about Wroth’s relationship with Pembroke leads to my skepticism regarding the tendencies, first, to draw conclusions about the nature of Wroth’s relationship with Pembroke based on the events that transpire in *Urania*, and second, to use those conclusions to justify arguments about the romance’s meaning. My intention is not to suggest that reading *Urania* as Wroth’s autobiography necessarily leads to this circular form of argumentation. Many of the characters in *Urania* can be read to reflect aspects of the author’s life. Considered alone, however, this legitimate social and historical approach to *Urania* can obscure its engagement with issues less obviously relevant to Wroth’s personal romantic attachments.

7. See Steven Mullaney, *The Reformation of Emotions in the Age of Shakespeare*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 19: “Emotions apprehend aspects of our lives that are ‘hard to think’ in disciplinary and theoretical discourses, which suggests that emotions are themselves a form of lived theory, a way of seeing or understanding the world around us that can’t necessarily be accomplished by other means.”


14. Ibid., xvi.


18. Qtd. in Roberts, “The Life of Lady Mary Wroth,” 19. Roberts notes that this poem is in the Muniment Room of the Duke of Rutland at Belvoir’s Castle. She speculates that Wroth’s cousin, Elizabeth, Countess of Rutland, wrote the poem; observing that Rutland’s died in 1612, Roberts strongly implies that the poem was written during or before 1612.


21. Ibid., 144.

22. While the title page to the first part of *Urania* (1621) acknowledges Wroth’s gender, it simultaneously attempts to justify her authorship by emphasizing the nobility of her kind and her kinship with other esteemed writers. The title page of Sir Philip Sidney’s *The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia* (1590) lacks such supplemental information. Must the social standing or kind of Wroth’s family be invoked to augment her authorial status because she is a woman? See Wroth, *The First Part of the Countess of Montgomery’s Urania*, civ. The title page reads: “the right honorable the Lady / MARY WROATH / Daughter to the right Noble Robert / Earle of Leicester / And Neece to the ever famous, and re- / nowned Sir Phillips Sidney knight. And to / the most excellent Lady Mary Countesse of / Pembroke late deceased” (civ).

23. Miller, *Changing the Subject*, 40.


25. Miller, *Changing the Subject*, 123.

26. John Kucich, “Psychoanalytic Historicism: Shadow Discourse and the Gender Politics of Masochism in Ellis, Shreiner, and Haggard,” *PMLA* 126, no. 1 (January 2011): 88-106, esp. 97-99. In a comparative analysis of the works of Havelock Ellis, Olive Shreiner, and H. Rider Haggard, John Kucich argues that masochism became a progressive mode of thinking within the fiction of the late nineteenth century. Although his study concerns literature from another period, it illuminates the role that willful suffering plays in *Urania*. From writers who championed eugenics and social Darwinism, Shreiner incorporated into her work “the self-aggrandizing notion that female self-denial was crucial to the survival of not just middle-class women but the entire human race” (98). In doing so, Schreiner motivated first-wave feminism’s “linkage of limitless idealism to acts of suffering sustained grandiose self-images of quasi-religious character, individual and collective” (99). “Narcissistic fantasy,” Kucich therefore posits, “can play as important a role in revolutionary movements” and “produce solidarity” (97). Whether Pamphilia indulges in “narcissistic fantasy” when she aggrandizes her amorous suffering is debatable, but her idealization of this suffering does permit her to solidify individual and collective authority.

27. Miller, *Changing the Subject*, 233.


29. Miller, *Changing the Subject*, 100.

30. Ibid., 100.

32. Ibid., 464.

33. After Parselius decides that Urania must be the lost Princess of Naples, he goes to meet her “with equall love and kindnesse” not only because they reciprocate each other’s love but also because they belong to the same rank or kind (1:27).


35. See esp., Ania Loomba and Jonathan Burton, “Introduction” to Race in Early Modern England: A Documentary Companion, eds. Ania Loomba and Jonathan Burton (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). See also, Peter Erickson, “Representations of Blacks and Blackness in Renaissance England,” Criticism 35, no. 4 (1993): 499-528, esp. 503: “The absence of the modern understanding of the word ‘race’ in the Renaissance does not mean that a racially inflected discourse about color was nonexistent or that perceptions of racial color unmediated by the vocabularies of exoticism and theology were impossible.”

36. See Hall, Things of Darkness, 204-05. See also Elizabeth Spiller, Reading and the History of Race in the Renaissance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 163-64. Both Hall and Spiller argue that Pamphilia maintain that Pamphilia straightforwardly wishes to be black in this passage. As my reading of the passage might suggest, I would argue both Hall and Spiller give Pamphilia too much credit.

37. Hall, Things of Darkness, 204

38. See Hall, Things of Darkness, 203. See also Spiller, Reading and the History of Race, 177. Spiller reads this passage through a geohumoral lens: “Antissia functions within Part I of Wroth’s narrative as a counterpoint to Pamphilia in that she represents a different model of passion (both amorous and humoral) and, with those, a different kind of writing (good and constant writing which emerges out of melancholy as opposed to the jealousy-driven writing that emerges out of Antissia’s dominant choler and which ultimately leads to her madness).”


40. OED, “fair,” adj.

41. The chief is also clothed in an “ash-colored” or brown dress. OED, “ash-color,” compound., 1b. adj. In general, Wroth or the narrator of Urania expresses a particular appreciation for brown. Spiller, Reading and the History of Race, 179-80, writes that “The most historically and iconographically distinctive color for the knights and ladies in Urania is tawny. Although a number of characters wear it, it is Pamphilia’s color” (179). She speculates that “Wroth wants to associate tawny with the heraldic meanings that it had in an earlier age. In the early sixteenth century, tawny is a cloth color and, through such usage, enters into heraldic and aristocratic registers. In the Elizabethan romances of the 1570s–1590s, for instance, writers…use tawny to express forsakenness, abjection, and steadfastness in love. Even during the Elizabethan period, though, the term and color
'tawny' begins to drop out of heraldry and subsequently out of romance because it becomes associated with kinds and populations of people (Indians, Abyssians, Tartars, mulattoes)” (180).

42. Spiller, Reading and the History of Race, 157-58 and 178. Spiller writes that “the two parts of Wroth’s Urania are written across the shift from pre-racial to racial bodies….The Pamphilia of the print Urania is imagined in the context of a humoral model of the body and, by extension, of the acts of reading that were implied by the body. The Pamphilia of the manuscript continuation, by contrast, exists as a proto-racial character” (157-8). She also argues that Pamphilia’s “dark complexion…is what enables Wroth to attribute to Pamphilia the humor of melancholy.” (178).

43. Wroth writes, “Pamphilia had the fame of the onely princess living, yet she was not so white in the face as Philitella” (1:263).

44. The island chief Robollo is in fact the daughter of a Morean Knight. Like Pamphilia, the princess of Morea, she has darker skin. What seems to differentiate the chief from the other islanders is her naturalized rank.


46. Hall, Things of Darkness, 210. Hall contends that “The inclusion of a figure such as Rodomondro, who has to be made to fit into the culture through strategies of color, clearly demonstrates how a social order seemingly based solely on class is profoundly—if invisibly—racialized.” Although I agree, I would also argue that the extent to which Wroth relies on a language of rank to invest skin color with significance might be just as notable. Loomba and Burton, “Introduction” to Race in Early Modern England, 14, explain that in early modern England, the concept of race as a “bloodline or heredity, and that of a moral hierarchy between different bloodlines” was “already attached to class”; indeed, “race” was “most widely used in this period…as a synonym for class. At this time, class was seen as an attribute rooted in the blood, or inherited, rather than a changeable socioeconomic positioning.”

47. Spiller, Reading and the History of Race, 157.

48. Ibid., 157-58.

49. Ibid., 163.

50. What makes this passage particularly noteworthy is that it implies that rank may be more crucial in determining one’s disposition than complexion.

51. In an early scene in the first part of Urania, I suggest, the figure of the “Black-moore” registers a maid’s anxiety over the possibility that distinctions of rank may be reified into distinctions of kind and, as such, limit in essential ways both the relationships she may have and the trajectory her life may take. In Cyprus, Urania and her companions discover a three-towered palace tended to
by Venus’s priest (1:47-48). As he explains, Venus built the tower to test “false or faithfull Lovers” (1:48). When thirst drives Urania and those with her to drink from a river that runs past the Tower of Desire, each of them becomes delusional. “Urania’s maide” sees “Allimarlus in the second Towre, kissing and embracing a Black-moore,” which upsets her so much, “being passionately in love with him,” that she determines “to revenge herself of that injurie” (1:49). For the maid, the “Black-moore” elicits anxiety and envy because who the “Black-moore” is, what social status the “Black-moore” might claim, and whether that claim has the potential to place the maid at an even greater disadvantage within the rigid hierarchical society she inhabits remains unclear. Her concern with social status does not seem unwarranted. This is the woman who called Urania “sister” until her identity was reduced to that of a maid—a nameless one at that—upon the discovery of Urania’s nobility. From the maid’s perspective, the “Black-moore” threatens to diminish her chances of assuming the position she covets beside Allimarlus. Rodomondro’s white hands may further elucidate her anxiety. If in the maid’s culture naturalized nobility becomes the condition of acceptance for those with dark skin, distinctions of rank (as well as distinctions of skin color) may very well become distinctions of kind, constraining the maid according to her nature as a maid.


CHAPTER III
"The Wealthy Magazine of Nature": Knowledge, Wonder, and Gunpowder
in Fletcher's *The Island Princess*

When Armusia—a Portuguese venturer in John Fletcher’s *The Island Princess* (c. 1618-1621)—arrives on the island of Tidore, he marvels at its perfumed wind and rare spices (1.3.17-22). His attention to Tidore’s spices would have reminded early modern audiences that Tidore was one of the “Spice Islands,” an archipelago in North Maluku. At the time of the play’s first recorded performance—26 December 1621—the clove grew only in Maluku. Because the spice was prized for its ability to preserve and season meat as well as for its supposed aphrodisiacal and medicinal properties, Maluku became a destination for many merchants. With a bundle of cloves light enough to carry, a merchant could quickly make a considerable profit in European ports. Characterizing the clove as a “Wonder of Nature” in *Conquista de las Islas Molucas* (1609)—one of Fletcher’s source texts—the Spanish priest and poet Bartholomew Leonardo de Argensola laments that “the precious Commodity, which gives Power and Wealth to those Kings…causes their Wars.” Yet Armusia exhibits a relative lack of interest in trade. He appears only to have followed his desire to behold “new worlds” to the balmy isle of Tidore (1.3.6-14).

Shortly after Armusia’s arrival, Quisara, the eponymous “island princess,” promises to marry whoever recovers the King of Tidore, her brother, from the neighboring island of Ternate, where the Governor of Ternate has imprisoned him. Although Quisara hopes the Portuguese captain Rui Dias, her lover, will meet the challenge, he is slow to act. Disguised as merchants, Armusia and his
companions quickly embark for Ternate. On Ternate, Armusia creates an explosion with gunpowder that sets much of the town ablaze, calling attention away from the prison. Facing little resistance there, he rescues the King. While the King and most Tidoreans are overjoyed, Quisara is reluctant to marry Armusia. Rui Dias sends his nephew, Pinheiro, to her to volunteer to murder Armusia. (Secretly, Pinheiro has no intention of harming him.) She accepts the offer. But to remind Quisara of her promise “without presuming to ask anything” (3.3.103), Armusia finds a way into her chamber. When Rui Dias barges in on them, Quisara rebukes him. To prove his honor, Rui Dias challenges Armusia to a duel. Meanwhile, the Governor has returned to Tidore disguised as a “Moor priest” (4.1). He enjoins the King and Quisara to become more devout and beware of the Portuguese. Armusia defeats Rui Dias in the duel. Inspired by the “priest,” Quisara insinuates that she will marry Armusia if he converts to her religion. Heretofore, Armusia has sung his only orisons to Fortune, but suddenly remembering he is Christian, he launches into an impassioned verbal attack against her. The King imprisons him. Impressed by Armusia’s performance, Quisara decides she loves him and will convert to Christianity. Rui Dias and Pinheiro plot to avenge Armusia by roasting Tidore with gunpowder (5.1.76). After they set fire to Tidore, Pinheiro rips off the Governor’s disguise in front of everyone. Overwhelmed by “wonder,” the King frees Armusia, gives Quisara to him, and announces he is “half persuaded” to become Christian (5.5.65-66). Armusia thanks Rui Dias for “my life, my wife and honour,” and the King rejoices that the “gods give peace at last” (5.5.88-94).

In recapitulating The Island Princess’s plot in such detail, I seek quickly to highlight aspects of the play that seem incompatible with the common argument that it is essentially involved in the business of colonial myth-making. Several scholars have observed that Armusia’s apparent indifference toward commerce allows him to assume the role of a chivalric hero in the play; as the hero, it could be said, Armusia contributes to a myth that romanticizes Christian Europeans’ global
ascendancy and commercial success. In other words, Armusia’s courtship of Quisara, and her conversion to Christianity amount to propaganda in the form of political allegory. Ania Loomba writes that Fletcher calls to mind a “chivalric ideal...to feature colonial mastery as international romance.” Michael Neill reads the play as an “anticolonial document,” but one that develops a “fable of mercantile chivalry”: the play imagines the British Empire as both “purely mercantile” and a victorious hero. Both scholars, however, briefly acknowledge the difficulty with which The Island Princess sustains a narrative of either colonial or mercantile triumph. As Neill remarks, at times “Fletcher’s language” contradicts “the play’s official ideology.” Loomba considers the play’s vision of “mercantile and English success...fragile at best.”

In this chapter, I submit that the story The Island Princess tells about wonder and the use of gunpowder actually encourages its audience to rethink the narratives of kind that Christian Europeans marshaled to justify their agendas of international conquest and trade. Contemporaneous treatises and travel narratives often portray wonder—often attributed to racialized others—as ancillary to and lesser than knowledge—particularly, European knowledge. Many imply that individuals cognitively process wonder in ways that correspond to their ‘kind’ or status within a hierarchical natural order: those who convert wonder into knowledge demonstrate their superior kind and natural authority over those who continue to dwell in wonder. In the play, the technology of the Portuguese might suggest their capacity for knowledge exceeds the Malukans’; their munitions leave the Malukans wonderstruck. The play could, therefore, be interpreted as figuring the Portuguese—and, by extension, other Christian Europeans—as natural rulers. As Ania Loomba and Jonathan Burton write, early modern discourse reinforces the idea that “cultural superiority” is a correlative of natural superiority. Those who read Armusia simply as a victorious chivalric hero effectively assert that he performs complementary work: his putative integrity and shrewd use of gunpowder contribute to a “theatrical emblem” that signifies the “moral and technological
superiority” of Christian Europeans, and in turn, their rightful geopolitical authority. The same gunpowder that Armusia and his countrymen ignite to amaze and subdue the Malukans, I suggest, explodes this emblem. Armusia’s reliance on gunpowder in Maluku would have prompted early modern audiences to question his chivalric heroism. His protracted state of wonder also would have invited skepticism. At crucial moments—especially when Armusia has opportunities to demonstrate his transcendent knowledge—he appears little more than fatuous. These moments help transform gunpowder from a technology that evinces the geopolitical and natural superiority of those deploying it to an overdetermined symbol that compromises distinctions between wonder and knowledge.

In challenging the divide between wonder and knowledge, The Island Princess anticipates and—to some extent—counters the disenchantment narrative of the modern world associated especially with Max Weber. The play registers two ostensibly different modes of apprehending the world. The first—modeled by the Malukans—might be said to correspond with an ‘enchanted’ worldview, the second—modeled by the Portuguese—with a ‘disenchanted,’ (proto-) ‘modern’ one. Whereas the Malukans evidently attribute causation to the “bright influences” of the sun and moon (4.5.71-72), the Portuguese seem to assume that, because they understand causation more rationally, they can—in Weber’s terms—“master all things by calculation.” Weber offers a rational, some would say, cynical account of disenchantment, which leaves the world increasingly denuded of the wondrous and numinous. Querying the wonder-knowledge opposition, The Island Princess instead cues its audience to ask whether Portuguese disenchantment might, in fact, be another form of enchantment.

Pyrotechnic displays that represented the gunpowder explosions in the early modern theater would have produced The Island Princess’s most spectacular moments, which would have played a crucial role in further compromising distinctions between wonder and knowledge, enchantment and
disenchantment. In turn, these displays also would have contributed to the play’s broader work of destabilizing kinds—or naturalized identity categories—defined by hierarchical schematics of natural order. It was not uncommon for Christian Europeans to predicate their claims to international preeminence on such schematics. However, by questioning ideological distinctions between wonder and knowledge that reinforce hierarchies of kind, The Island Princess both challenges the basis of Christian Europeans’ geopolitical authority and directs attention toward alternative ecologies of kind.

I. Wonder: a “seed of knowledge” and “broken knowledge”

Many medieval and early modern Europeans believed that wonders and experiences of wonder were valuable insofar as they prompted individuals to acquire knowledge about nature, yet there was also considerable ambivalence about where such experiences might lead. In The Passions of the Soul (1649), René Descartes writes that an encounter with a wonder may beget the “passion” or emotion of wonder, which will, in turn, inspire inquiry. Nevertheless, he maintains, wonder is only beneficial to the extent that it leads to knowledge; an overabundance of wonder “can never be anything but bad,” for it discourages the pursuit of knowledge. Francis Bacon advocates the collection of wonders or marvels as part of the study of nature. In The Advancement of Learning (1605), Bacon suggests that, as the “seed of knowledge,” wonder may prompt inquiries that engender knowledge. Stressing that wonder is always subsidiary to knowledge, however, Bacon also refers to it as “broken knowledge.” While Bacon finds wondrous objects worthy of study, he is wary of wonder as an emotion that may not always lead to knowledge. According to Bacon, whereas wonder is suspect, knowledge is the “light of nature.” Bacon’s address to King James I in the Advancement of Learning implies a correlation between a person’s knowledge and natural virtue. James’s speech reflects his vast knowledge of “nature’s order,” and his perfect acquisition of knowledge matches his virtue or “gifts of nature.”
Although Bacon’s praise for James suggests that the distinction between wonder and knowledge could be used to make privileged social kinds like king appear even more natural, even more justified, these distinctions could also destabilize the authority of privileged kinds. In *The Island Princess*, for example, the king of Bacan asserts that the Governor of Ternate should not presume to occupy the same space as members of the nobility: “Away, thing, / And keep your rank with those fit for your royalty” (1.3.66-67). The Governor returns the insult by suggesting that Bacan’s critical lack of knowledge calls any authority he might claim as a king into question: “Art thou acquainted with my nature, baby?” (1.3.70). Perhaps part of the appeal of the distinction between wonder and knowledge inhered in its potential to redefine and redistribute authority among kinds, but as Thomas Harriot’s *A Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia* (1588) suggests, it rarely did so without reinforcing other naturalizing social hierarchies.

Harriot’s *A Brief and True Report* both depicts wonder as subsidiary to knowledge and posits a relationship between knowledge and kind. Harriot assures readers that the “natures and manners” of the Carolina Algonquians—whom he designates the “natural inhabitants”—confirm that they, “in respect of troubling our inhabiting and planting, are not to be feared, but that they shall have cause both to fear and love us.” To support his case, Harriot recalls how the wonder that English technology and learning inspired in the “natural inhabitants” affirmed the “greater credit” of the English. The Algonquians are supposedly simple and unlearned; they “esteem our trifles before things of greater value.” Tools and practices the English deploy to catalog nature leave the Algonquians in awe because they lack the “capacities” to understand English technology and learning. Without the help of those “whom God so specially loved”—that is, the English—the Algonquians are incapable of fully discerning truth.

In Harriot’s view, the English evince their superior kind by converting their own wonder into knowledge. “This was an age of discovery, invention, venture capital, conquest,” writes Mary Baine
Campbell: “the active, not the contemplative virtues were in ascendance. Increasingly, wonder was suspect, inconvenient.” The English may have regarded their own wonder with ambivalence, but they recognized the apparent wonder of the inhabitants they encountered in foreign lands as an excuse to assume control over both. As the bedazzled Algonquians marvel at English instruments and tools, Harriot implies, they justify the English colonial enterprise: the active, technologically savvy, knowledgeable, and therefore virtuous English must be fitter to manage the “new found land.”

While Harriot interprets the presumable cultural superiority and knowledge of the English as a sign of their natural authority, he also attributes their knowledge to their religion. Acknowledging the difficulty of determining exactly why “Europeans felt powerfully superior to virtually all of the peoples they encountered,” Stephen Greenblatt writes that “the Christians’ conviction that they possessed an absolute and exclusive religious truth must have played a major part in virtually all of their encounters.” Harriot’s faith in the knowledge of the English stems from his faith in their religion and vice versa.

The Portuguese are ostensibly the most active, technologically advanced, and knowledgeable characters in *The Island Princess*. Pinheiro contends that their manners and customs distinguish them from the “base” Malukans (1.1.18). Notably, he does not elevate the Portuguese above other Europeans. While the Portuguese and Spaniards demonstrate their superior natures by “managing” horses, the French evince theirs “in courtship” (1.1.24-26). The “dancing English” confirm theirs by “carrying a fair presence” (1.1.26-27). Pinheiro’s commentary suggests that—contrary to his intention, it seems—the difference between those whose “natures are gross” and those whose natures are “noble” is a matter of cultural bias (1.1.42 and 4.2.29). Armusia’s undaunted fanaticism allows the play’s audience to entertain the possibility that the difference between “gross” and “noble” natures may not always be a matter of cultural bias; instead, the difference may map directly
onto essential differences between Christians and non-Christians. Ultimately, however, *The Island Princess* also challenges the foundation of this presumably fundamental religious distinction.

II. Armusia’s “perfect knowledge”

Fletcher’s choice to depict Armusia as Portuguese—a departure from his source texts—is noteworthy. In the *Conquista*, Argensola describes the Spanish campaign to capture Ternate after Dutch merchants ousted the Portuguese from Tidore in 1605. As Carmen Nocentelli writes, the “longest and best known” narrative in the *Conquista* provides much of the material for *The Island Princess*. But in Argensola’s *Conquista*, a Tidorean native, Cachil Salama, rescues the King of Tidore before the Portuguese captain Ruy Diaz d’ Acunha can. Because the actual Portuguese captain Ruy Diaz “arrived at Tidore well over a decade after the capture and eventual rescue of the king,” Nocentelli speculates that Argensola developed the tale “to disappoint all expectations of Portuguese chivalry.” In contrast, she maintains, “*The Island Princess* appropriates Salama’s chivalry, projecting it onto the young Portuguese Armusia” to undermine Spain. Noting that Armusia’s “status as ‘a gentleman scarce landed’ mirrors England’s belated entry into the early modern spice race,” Nocentelli concludes that *The Island Princess* relies on the figure of Armusia to forecast “England’s fortunes in Asia.” Relations between England and Portugal, however, were often strained in the early seventeenth century, and it would have been historically accurate to depict English merchants in Maluku. It is, therefore, worth asking why Armusia is not an English merchant if his purpose in the play truly is to emblematize England’s commercial success in Asia.

It is also worth attending to the difficulty with which Armusia embodies a victorious chivalric hero. When Fletcher wrote *The Island Princess*, the trope of the chivalric hero was itself unstable. As Michael Murrin writes, commerce was placing a “strain” on the “epic genre” of romance. Although “romancers in western Europe continued to portray knights as heroes in their tales, and merchants saw in these tales reflections of what they knew or experienced firsthand,” in
general, trade was not regarded as “a heroic activity.” While Portuguese “monarchs and nobles also engaged in trade,” Portuguese playwrights and poets deemed Portuguese enterprises in India and Southeast Asia corrupt. Portraying Armusia as Portuguese and repeatedly associating him with trade, *The Island Princess* invites its audience to question the very possibility of his chivalric heroism. Armusia’s precarious status as the chivalric hero severely compromises the ability of the play’s “international romance” to function as an allegory of Christian Europe’s just international conquest and trade. According to Gordon McMullan, Fletcher was generally “uneasy” with celebrations of Jacobean discovery and conquest. Relying on the figure of Armusia—as opposed to that of an Englishman—to critique colonial and mercantile enterprises would have been less risky for an early modern English playwright and acting company. Armusia’s dubious heroism both limits his ability to contribute to an allegory of Christian Europe’s righteous geopolitical ascendancy and casts doubt on his natural virtue—most especially, his superior capacity to convert wonder into knowledge.

The centrality of wonder in *The Island Princess* may in part be what prompts so many to identify it as a (chivalric) romance in the first place. Objects and experiences of wonder figure prominently in early modern romance. In some cases, wonder leads characters astray. In others, wonder affords characters greater insight into themselves and their worlds. One need not convert wonder into knowledge to qualify as a chivalric hero in romance. Given the discourse on wonder in treatises and travel narratives contemporaneous with *The Island Princess*, however, if Armusia is to function as an emblem of Christian Europeans’ geopolitical and natural superiority at all, his capacity to convert his wonder into knowledge would seem to be crucial.

Introducing Armusia in a state of wonder, *The Island Princess* prepares its audience for such a conversion. He marvels at its fragrant flora, “civil-mannered” people, and beautiful women (1.3.32-34). The disillusioned Pinheiro serves as his foil. Pinheiro deprecates both Tidorean practices and Quisara’s beauty (1.1.19-44). While Armusia prepares to detail “The women, which I wonder at,”
Pinheiro cuts him off with a cynical, “Ye speak well” (1.3.34). His point may be that, despite Armusia’s skill for stringing words together, there is little substance to what he says.47

It is in this state of desirous wonder that Armusia resolves to recover the King of Tidore from Ternate. “How do you like her spirit?” Armusia asks his companions, Sousa and Emanuel, after Quisara promises to marry whoever retrieves her brother (1.3.22). Instantly reassured by Sousa’s judgment that her spirit is “clear,” Armusia pushes “forward on!” to rescue the King (1.3.226-27). He returns to his men with a promising report after a solo excursion into the town on Ternate:

I have begun the game—fair Fortune guide it.  
Suspectless have I travelled all the town through  
And in this merchant’s shape won much acquaintance;  
Surveyed each strength and place that may befriend us;  
Viewed all his magazines; got perfect knowledge  
Of where the prison is and what power guards it.  

(2.2.9-14)

Recounting his ability to hoodwink the inhabitants of Ternate in a “merchant’s shape” while acquiring “perfect knowledge” of the Governor’s “magazines,” Armusia begins to establish a hierarchical distinction between the enchanted Malukans and the “disenchanted” Portuguese, who assume they can acquire mastery over their environment by meticulous calculation.

The distinction between the wonderstruck Malukans and the knowledgeable Portuguese, however, remains inchoate and uncertain, in part, because the manner in which Armusia relies on gunpowder calls his moral knowledge into question.48 Gunpowder and guns were common in early modern warfare,49 but many writers denounced their use. As Murrin observes, the technology “posed a problem for the writers of romance and epic that had no parallels in tradition.”50 In Orlando furioso (1516), Ludovico Ariosto develops what Murrin calls “the negative critique.”51 Summarizing Ariosto’s position, Murrin writes, “No mastery in arms, no courage or strength avails now, since the worse can win by the gun.”52 Subsequent iterations of this critique appear in various works including Samuel Daniel’s Civile Wars (1595 and 1609), Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s Don Quijote de la Mancha
(1605 and 1615), and John Milton’s *Paradise Lost* (1667 and 1674). Cervantes and others working in the romance tradition “assimilated firearms to a standard medieval category. Guns were held to exemplify fraud, the vice traditionally opposed to chivalry.”

Armusia’s chivalric heroism cannot hold up under such a negative critique. His discourse with Sousa and Emanuel suggests that he realizes his gunpowder affords him an advantage over the Ternateans; he insinuates that they are unfamiliar with his explosive technology, predicting that when they see the “material flames” it sparks, they will be paralyzed by wonder (2.2.38-47). One premise of the critique is that a person with guns or gunpowder might enjoy an unfair advantage over another person with greater skill and fortitude but without the same technology. Armusia is aware that he has the upper hand over the Ternateans; he is also willing to inflict indiscriminate violence on Ternateans who may not support the Governor. Contrastingly, the Keeper of the Jail and two Moors who attend to the imprisoned King express their concern for his well-being, lamenting that they are bound by the Governor’s command (2.1.37). Their compassion distinguishes them from Armusia as well as the Ternateans in both Argensola’s *Conquista* and Lois Gédoyn, Sieur de Bellan’s “L’Histoire Mémorable de Dias Espagnol, et de Quixaire Princesse des Moluques” (1614)—a French adaptation of Argensola’s *Conquista* and another of Fletcher’s source texts. In the *Conquista* and “Histoire,” Ternateans affix the limbs of slain Tidoreans to their masts and spears. As the Ternateans engulfed in fire cry out in *The Island Princess*, Armusia disregards their distress, instead delighting in the “comely light [the fire] gives up / To our discovery” (2.3.54-55). According to those sympathetic to the negative critique of gunpowder, Armusia’s willingness to rely on his technological advantage over the Ternateans and subject them to indiscriminate violence would prevent him from readily assuming the part of the chivalric hero. He may call the chivalric hero to mind, but his use of gunpowder on Ternate suggests that he lacks the moral knowledge necessary to play the part convincingly.
Key moments in which Armusia has the opportunity to demonstrate his transcendent religious knowledge and general perspicacity also leave such virtues in doubt, further undercutting his supposedly superior status—his kindness—in the play. That Armusia cares so deeply about religion comes as a surprise in act 4, scene 5 after Quisara enjoins him to renounce his religion. When she explains how she will teach him to worship her gods “humbly on [his] knees” (4.5.37-38), he interrupts, launching into a rant that McMullan describes as “hysterical and hyperbolic even in the context of the times.” Armusia, however, is less concerned with enumerating the important differences between their religions than with the dominance his religion affords him. His “maker” teaches the sun and moon, Quisara’s deities, that “they are not so great as we: they are our servants” (4.5.78). Quisara, he insists, should have “wept and kneeled to beg” to become Christian (4.5.89). Armusia’s language transforms Quisara from an instructor to a supplicant and Armusia from a supplicant to someone capable of kicking the heads of Quisara’s deities “into puddles” (4.5.117). Impressed by Armusia’s tirade and suddenly smitten by his masculine forcefulness, Quisara decides to convert to his religion. “Your faith and your religion must be like ye,” she reasons (5.2.118). Unconcerned by her tendency to vacillate, Armusia finds her grounds for conversion compelling. Significantly, he does not thank his God for her new insight; he declares his own “triumph” (5.2.128). The King’s announcement that he is “half persuaded…to be a Christian” and his gift of Quisara to the Portuguese venturer placate him (5.5.67), and he seems entirely to forget about his fidelity to God with his turn of good fortune. It is Rui Dias he thanks for his “life, [his] wife and honor” (5.5.88). Yet the King’s invocation of plural deities in the last line of the play underscores that Armusia’s religious and epistemic triumphs are less decisive than he imagines: “the gods give peace at last” (5.5.94).

Although *The Island Princess* prepares its audience for Armusia’s conversion of wonder into knowledge, it does not confirm that he completes such a process or that any knowledge he
possesses is superior to wonder. Highlighting similarities between Armusia’s wonder and supposed knowledge, the play instead establishes parallels between experiences of wondering and knowing. Does Armusia’s use of gunpowder and fervid profession of faith demonstrate his superior knowledge or, rather, attest to his entitled sense of authority? Does his confidence correspond to knowledge or reveal his uncritical infatuation with himself and his culture? His questionable moral and religious knowledge, I suggest, undercut his heroic status and natural authority. Symbolically, Armusia casts doubt on the foundation of Christian Europeans’ colonial and mercantile success.

III. “Shame o’their guns!”

From an early modern audience’s perspective, the fetid smoke unfurling throughout the theater would have further obscured Armusia’s status or kind. Early productions of *The Island Princess* likely would have relied on two fireworks, rosin powder and squibs, to simulate both gunpowder blitzes in Maluku. As Jonathan Gil Harris describes these fireworks,

> They packed an explosive theatrical punch. Rosin powder was thrown at candle flames to produce flares; squibs...were employed to produce flashes and loud bangs. Because of their visual and acoustic impact, it is easy to overlook how both effects also stank—especially the squib, which became a virtual synonym for bad odor.\(^6\)

Squibs were usually prepared from a concoction of “sulfurous brimstone, coal, and saltpeter” held together with eggs that had spent about a month ripening under dung.\(^6\) *The Island Princess* alludes to both fireworks. After the explosion on Ternate, Citizen 2 exclaims, “I have been burnt at both ends like a squib. / I lived two hours in the fire—’twas a hideous matter” (2.4.4-5). A few lines later he declares, “I stink abominably” (2.4.19). In the midst of Portuguese gunfire on Tidore, Townsman 2 refers to rosin powder flares: “Shame o’their guns! I thought they had been bird-pots / or great candle-cases” (5.3.5-6). The pyrotechnics used in performances of the play would have prompted early modern audience members enveloped in stinking smoke to identify with the Malukans. Might it not then be probable that they would call Armusia, the Portuguese, and their explosive technology into question. In what Clare McManus speculates is a “metatheatrical nod to the groundlings,”
Citizen 2 insists that “men of understanding” will condemn the “hideous matter[s]” ignited by the Portuguese (2.4.5-7).

At a level that is also metatheatrical, The Island Princess implies that audience members who marvel at the technology and feats of Armusia and his countrymen may not be capable of definitively evaluating their own knowledge or natural authority. Such audience members, after all, resemble the Malukans whom Armusia imagines standing paralyzed in awe of his explosive technology (2.2.40). In other words, those who suppose that the Portuguese triumph in Maluku confirms Portugal’s—or, by extension, England’s or Christian Europe’s—triumph have fallen captive to the spell of the theater’s explosive technology. Can an audience enthralled by a staged narrative and special effects accurately assess the knowledge and natural authority of the Portuguese? At this metatheatrical level, The Island Princess further obscures the line between wonder and knowledge.

As The Island Princess challenges distinctions between wonder and knowledge, enchantment and disenchantment, it not only fuses the categories of English audience member and Malukan but also destabilizes the categories of Christian and non-Christian. One of Fletcher’s most obvious adaptations to the “island princess story” is to develop it into an exploration of religious conflict. Argensola and Bellan do not dwell on religion in their versions of the story. McManus posits that the successful gunpowder plots in The Island Princess “raise the ghost of an alternative English history under a second Queen Elizabeth.” If the 1605 “Gunpowder Treason” had succeeded in killing King James, his daughter Princess Elizabeth, “another island princess,” might have ruled England instead. Guy Fawkes and his co-conspirators intended to establish her as the queen of England. Many in England, writes David Cressy, interpreted the plot’s failure both as “proof of the relentless evil of Roman Catholicism” and of England’s superior status as a Protestant nation. At the same time that the play prompts its audience to reflect critically on the dynamics between Christians and
non-Christians, then, it reminds the audience of the religious schisms that extended across
seventeenth-century Christian Europe and how contested the meaning of ‘Christian’ could be. If
Harriot’s confidence in English knowledge derives from his conviction that, as Christians, the
English enjoy exclusive access to definitive religious truth, *The Island Princess* instead emphasizes that
such truth is uncertain. That is, Christian Europeans’ favorable assessment of their own knowledge
may be based not on rational calculation but rather on faith in their cultural superiority. In this
respect, they would be less disenchanted than they might appear.

Although the anniversary of the Gunpowder Treason was observed every year after 1605 in
England with services and festivities, when the religious war eventually known as the “Thirty Years’
War” began raging on the Continent in 1618, the Gunpowder Treason acquired additional
relevance.\(^68\) King James’s daughter Elizabeth and her husband Elector Frederick of Palatine were
embroiled in the war, fighting with Protestant states against Catholic ones.\(^69\) McManus suggests that
*The Island Princess*—by imagining an English history that might have been had the plot succeeded—
“offers advice” to James, who saw the play’s debut at Whitehall.\(^70\) While McManus does not specify
what that advice is, her discussion of the “convergence of Islam and Catholicism” in the play and
the resemblance between the Ternatean Governor—an “Islamic Machiavel”—and a “Catholic
persecutor” implies the advice is “beware of Catholics!”\(^71\) Here McManus seems to align the King
of Tidore with King James: this reading of the play also collapses the categories of Malukan and
English audience member, enchanted and disenchanted.

It is also possible to interpret the play as establishing a parallel between the Portuguese and
English Catholics; Portugal was a Catholic country, and the Portuguese bear the gunpowder in the
play. Such a parallel would have made Protestant audience members more inclined to view the
Portuguese “triumph” in Maluku uneasily, skeptically. This critical distance would, in turn, have
allowed the disguised Governor’s characterization of the Portuguese—which McMullan deems a “deconstruction of colonial motivation”—to resonate more fully in the early modern theater: 72

These men came hither, as my vision tells me,  
Poor, weather-beaten, almost lost, starved, feebled;  
Their vessels, like themselves, most miserable;  
Made a long suit for traffic and for comfort,  
To vend their children’s toys, cure their diseases.  
They had their suit, they landed, and to th’rate  
Grew rich and powerful, sucked the fat and freedom  
Of this most blessed isle, taught her to tremble.  

(4.1.44-51)

In other words, The Island Princess’s evocation of the Gunpowder Treason would have permitted audience members to dissociate themselves from characters that emblematize Christian Europe’s colonial and commercial programs and to reconsider whether such programs could be justified with any form of absolute religious truth or ‘disenchanted’ knowledge.

In The Island Princess, of course, the Portuguese do not present the sole danger to the King of Tidore. The Governor threatens the King when he kidnaps him and, later, appears on Tidore in the guise of a “holy man” come to share the truths of “our religion” (4.1.31-81). 73 If the play aligns the King of Tidore with King James, it warns James to approach zealous champions of his own religion with cynicism. The play might have served as a powerful reminder to James that England’s purported Protestant allies could be untrustworthy, even malevolent. In the Banda islands—which are part of Maluku—the Dutch regularly conducted ruthless attacks on the English. 74 As the play highlights religious schisms among Christian denominations, then, it also hints at the malice Christians visited even upon those who professed their own creed. In doing so, the play challenges the nature of and rationale behind oppositions among denominations. Perhaps James felt that the King of Tidore’s experience with the Governor affirmed his inclination not to support the Protestant cause in the war on the Continent. Three days after The Island Princess debuted, he disbanded Parliament, which had been attempting to finance a military intervention on behalf of
Elizabeth and Frederick. Recalling conflicts that divided Protestants from their fellow Protestants, the play casts doubt on the notion that Protestants possess definitive religious truth and may consequently pursue their colonial and commercial agendas with enlightened, disenchanted knowledge.

IV. “All the windows i’th town dance a new trenchmore”

While undermining absolute religious distinctions, *The Island Princess* critically engages the color code of “swart” and “fair” that early modern Europeans often deployed to reinforce hierarchies of kind. As Loomba observes, “Religion provides the oldest vocabulary for expressing cultural and ethnic difference, and during the early modern period, this vocabulary began to acquire new quasi-biological and racial connotations as the ‘blood laws’ in Spain began to suggest a connection between one’s faith and one’s ‘blood’ or race.” As early modern Europeans increasingly referred to skin color to evaluate each other’s natural virtue or kind, the question would have arisen: If one’s skin color corresponds to one’s spiritual or religious constitution, and if one cannot convert one’s skin from one color to another, can one actually convert to another religion to attain greater truth and virtue? Loomba posits that, “as the conversion of non-Christians became increasingly important to colonial rhetoric within Europe, converts to Christianity were viewed with mounting suspicion as people who disguised their real selves with false exteriors.” Notably, the latent (il)logic of conversion that Loomba incisively articulates precludes the conversion the people supposedly most in need of it: differences of religion that seem to correspond to differences of skin color are assumed to derive from differences of kind, and therefore, one’s skin color may become a sign of one’s inconvertibility and permanent baseness. Thus, while a population’s potential conversion may ostensibly be the chief reason for undertaking a global enterprise, the pigmentation of that population’s skin may provide a convenient excuse to assume control of its resources. Those with
lighter skin and, therefore, presumably greater virtue are more qualified to determine the proper use of such resources.

Pinheiro cites the color of Quisara’s skin as evidence of her “gross” nature (1.1.42); her relative unfairness purportedly corresponds to her natural baseness. In response to Cristófero’s praise of Quisara, Pinheiro says that those who “observe her close shall find her nature / Which I doubt mainly will not prove so excellent” (1.1.43-44). Quisara is only fair because “She is a princess and she must be fair: / That’s the prerogative of being royal” (1.1.45-6). Reinforcing the association between fairness and virtue, Cristófero replies that the sun “affects her sweetness / And dares not, as he does to all else, dye it / Into his tawny livery” (1.1.61-2). This defense of Quisara’s beauty reinforces the association between darker skin and low rank that, as I argue, is particularly prevalent in Lady Mary Wroth’s Urania (1621 – c. 1626). But the ensuing exchange between Pinheiro and Cristófero also undermines that association, implying that what truly reveals a person’s nature or kind is whether her skin browns after direct exposure to the sun. According to Pinheiro, Quisara “wears her complexion in a case (1.1.65). If she did not use cosmetics that prevented her from tanning, in “A week or two, or three, she would look like a lion” (1.1.65-7). Insinuating that those with darker skin may be naturally closer to non-humans than humans, Pinheiro subsequently compares Quisara to a bat (1.1.79). While attempting to gain access to Quisara’s chamber, however, Pinheiro pays Quisara’s lady-in-waiting, Panura, a compliment that exploits the common correlation between rank and beauty: “I am guessing / By the cast of your face what the property of your / place should be: / For I presume you turn a key, sweet beauty” (3.1.137-39). Given Panura’s high social status, Pinheiro wagers that he can manipulate her with this language. Yet Quisara’s condemnation of her brother, the King of Tidore, suggests that, compared to rank, skin color is a more reliable indicator of a person’s virtue. As the King of Tidore prepares to imprison Armusia for his vitriolic outburst,
Quisara decries the King’s “foul, swart ingratitude,” which, she claims, deprives his once “noble” face of “majesty” (5.2.44-6).

The concatenating associations and disassociations among members of different religious denominations in The Island Princess jumbles the color code of “swart” and “fair.” As Daniel Vitkus writes, Protestants frequently compared Catholics to “pagans.”79 The gunpowder explosion in act 2 prompts exclamations from the Ternatean citizens that recall certain Catholic rituals.

WOMEN  Some water! Water! Water!
3 CITIZEN  Peace, ’tis but a sparkle. Raise not the town again: ’twill be a great hindrance. I’m glad ’tis out: an’t had ta’en in my hayloft—what frights are these! Marry, heaven bless thy modicum.
(2.4.31-40)

Crying for water, the women evoke the Asperges. Citizen 3 invokes Saint Mary.80 This scene may also code the citizens as black. Citizen 2, McManus maintains, makes three jokes that mark their skin as black. She interprets “We look like devils” (2.4.15), for example, as a joke that associates black skin with devils.81 As the Tidorean townspeople react to the second gunpowder explosion in act 5, however, they imply that the Portuguese—known Catholics—are devils: their guns move “devilishly,” their “horns are plaguey strong” (5.3.7-16). Townsman 2 recounts his shop’s destruction: “You would have / thought Tom Tumbler had been there and all his troop of devils” (5.3.26-30). Reading backward, if the Portuguese are devils, when Citizen 2 of Ternate claims that he and his burnt companions resemble devils, he also claims that they resemble the Portuguese. And if, as other scholars suggest, the “fair-faced” Portuguese represent Christian Europe’s colonial or mercantile agenda (4.1.48-60), the citizens and townspeople of Maluku lend support to the Governor’s contention that such commerce is devilish. Discounting the epistemic efficacy of a code that correlates lighter skin with greater virtue, The Island Princess once again denies “fair-faced” Christian Europeans a special claim to superior knowledge.
The Malukans not only evoke Catholic rituals but also reveal an intimate familiarity with English culture. When Townsman 2 cries that the Portuguese guns make “All / the windows i’th town dance a new trenchmore” (5.3.19-20), he refers to a lively English folk dance. John Selden’s posthumous Table Talk (1689) briefly discusses the dance:

At a solemn dancing, first you had the grave measures, then the corantoes, and the galliards, and all this is kept up with ceremony; at length they fall to Trench-more, and so to the cushion dance, and then all the company dance, lord and groom, lady and kitchen-maid, no distinction.  

Early productions of The Island Princess would have allowed audience members not only to empathize with the Malukans, since they too were engulfed in the smoke of the squib and rosin powder, but also to recognize themselves in the quasi-Catholic-Moorish-English Malukans—fellow dancers—with “no distinction” or, at least, with negotiable distinction.

For some characters in The Island Princess, a lack of consistent distinction or—in other words—variability becomes a source of profound anxiety and cause for condemnation. In act 4, Armusia reproaches Quisara for asking him to forsake his faith, comparing her face to “death itself” and her eyes to “pale despair: they fright me, / And in their rounds a thousand horrid ruines” (4.5.107-9). When Armusia first glimpses her, he remarks upon her “admirable form” (1.3.119). As he perceives her form changing throughout the play, her protean arts “shake” him (4.5.43 and 112). Notably, when Quisara bids Armusia to convert to her religion, the prospect of a change in position especially enrages him. The sun and moon, he rails, “are our servants, / Placed there to teach us time, to give us knowledge” (4.5.78). Without such knowledge, Armusia imagines that he would “fall” from knowledge, and form time itself (4.5.83).

In certain respects, The Island Princess establishes telling parallels between Armusia and the Governor; for each, “All goes in maintenance” of his magazine (2.3.21). Upon arriving in Maluku, Armusia and his companions wonder at the “wealthy magazine of nature” (1.3.42-4). The description of nature as a “magazine” is fitting in more than one way. First, it attests to the men’s
sense that they are entitled to whatever they happen to discover; in early modern discourse, “magazine,” may signify a storehouse of goods or a region replete with natural commodities. Second, the word hints at nature’s explosive potential; “magazine” may, in addition, signify a storehouse for arms. The Governor’s magazine literally explodes; however, the surprising concatenation of associations and disassociations among various identity categories in the play also, I submit, suggests the explosive variability of nature’s kinds. By establishing common experiences among characters and audience members, the play emphasizes that kinds are eminently convertible. Their kaleidoscopic properties challenge the stability of natural orders that definitively rank some kinds above others to justify particular social or political agendas, such as global conquest or trade. Obscuring distinctions between wonder and knowledge, enchantment and disenchantment, then, The Island Princess avoids unveiling a definitively systematized nature. In doing so, it invites its audience to imagine new ways of being and being with others. My point, however, is not that the play leads its audience to a Utopia of possibilities; by compromising the divides between wonder and knowledge and enchantment and disenchantment, The Island Princess may instead suggest the value of deliberate circumspection in the midst of nature’s “wealthy magazine.”
Notes

1. Unless otherwise noted, quotations from the play are from John Fletcher, *The Island Princess*, ed. Clare McManus (London: Arden Early Modern Drama, 2013).

   In what might be considered a nod to William Shakespeare and John Fletcher’s *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, Rui Dias attempts to convince his nephew that, if he helps defeat Armusia, he will demonstrate his natural affinity with his uncle and thereby prove himself a “noble kinsman” (3.1.56).

2. For an account of *The Island Princess’s* early performance history, see Claire McManus’s introduction to *The Island Princess*, ed. Clare McManus (London: Arden Early Modern Drama, 2013), 70.

3. Ibid., 9.

4. Ibid., 7.


7. Loomba, “‘Break her will,’” 71-72.


9. Ibid., 125.

10. Loomba, “‘Break her will,’” 101. See also Nocentelli, “Spice Race,” 584. Nocentelli articulates a perspective similar to Loomba’s.


14. See esp. Neill, “‘Material Flames, 101; see also Loomba, “‘Break her will,” 84.


17. Ibid., 13.


19. Ibid.


22. Bacon, “Advancement of Learning,” 120.

23. Ibid., 121.


25. Ibid., 141.

26. Ibid., 145.

27. Ibid., 143.

28. Ibid., 145.

29. Ibid.


35. Ibid., 575.


38. Ibid., 582.

39. Ibid., 583-84.


42. Ibid., 5 and 123. See also Loomba, “Break her will,” 101. Loomba, however, writes that comedies and city comedies could “accommodate merchants as heroes.”

43. Murrin, *Trade and Romance*, 5 and 123.


46. See, for example, William Shakespeare, *The Winter’s Tale* in *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997). Leontes marvels at the uncannily lifelike statue of Hermione that Paulina unveils and acknowledges how, once “more stone than [the statue],” he committed “evils” against his wife and their children (5.3.38-40).

47. See McMullan, *Politics of Unease*, 228. McMullan writes that Pinheiro’s interruption “provides a significant moment in the play’s conscious critique” of “colonial desire.”

48. Weber might say that a disenchanted worldview and the moral knowledge in question in the play are, to some extent, incompatible. Here ‘disenchanted’ morals may appear different from ‘enchanted’ ones, but they do not seem to be informed by greater knowledge.


51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., 130.

53. Ibid., 130 and 301n.29.

54. Ibid., 130.

55. Ibid.

56. For an English translation of Bellan’s novella, see Lois Gédoyn, sieur de Bellan, “History of Ruis Dias, A Portuguese, And Quixaire, A Princess of the Moluccas, Called the Spice or Clove Islands” in *The Exemplary Novels of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, the author of Don Quixote de la Mancha; published at Madrid, in 1618; so called because in each of them he proposed useful example to be either imitated or avoided*, (London: Printed for T. Cadell, in the Strand, 1822), 1:257-311.


59. Quisara’s religion seems to be a mix of Islam and Animism.


61. Ibid., 120.

62. Argensola shares his views on religion elsewhere in the *Discovery and Conquest*. See, for example, *Discovery and Conquest*, 156.

63. Bellan does briefly discuss religion in his “Histoire.” See, for example, “Histoire,” 258.

64. McManus, introduction to *The Island Princess*, 26.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

68. Ibid., 145.

69. Ibid., 150.

70. McManus, introduction to *The Island Princess*, 26 and 68-70.

71. Ibid., 26-28.


73. W. B. Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6. James was also kidnapped as an adolescent in 1582 by Protestant nobles who wished to prevent him from becoming too sympathetic to the views of his Catholic cousin, the Duke of Lennox.

74. See, for example, Neill, “Material Flames,” 108 and 112-16.

75. McManus, introduction to *The Island Princess*, 26. See also David Matthew, “James I: King of England and Scotland” in *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, accessed March 7, 2016. As an adolescent, James was also a victim of kidnapping. He was kidnapped by Protestants who feared that he was becoming too susceptible to the influence of a Catholic duke.

76. Loomba, “Break her will,” 84.

77. For an example of an article that takes up this question, see esp. M. Lindsay Kaplan, “Jessica’s Mother: Medieval Constructions of Jewish Race and Gender in *The Merchant of Venice*” in *Shakespeare Quarterly* 58.1 (2007), 1-30.

78. Loomba, “Break her will,” 84.


81. Fletcher, *The Island Princess*, 161n15. See also 160n4 and 164n53.


83. Somewhat unexpectedly, in Armusia’s eyes, Quisara’s skin appears to fade in color along with her virtue. Here lightness is depicted in opposition to beauty and virtue. Armusia’s description of Quisara’s conjures the image of Death and his “pale horse” in Revelations. Rev. 6: 7-8 in *The Bible: The Authorized King James Version* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) reads: “I heard the voice of the fourth beast say, Come and see. And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and Hell followed with him. And power was given unto them over the
fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword, and with hunger, and with death, and with the beasts of the earth.”


CHAPTER IV

“As Proportion’d to each kind”: Conversions of Kind in Milton

As readers have long noticed, the works of John Milton evince conflicting impulses toward egalitarianism and freedom on the one hand and hierarchy and restraint on the other. In *Paradise Lost* (1667, 1674), the archangel Raphael characterizes the “Commonality” of the “Parsimonious Emmet” in favorable terms, musing that it may even serve as the very “Pattern of just equality” (VII.485-89). When the archangel Michael reveals to Adam that Nimrod “Will arrogate Dominion undeserv’d / Over his brethren” and endeavor to construct a Tower “whose top may reach to Heav’n” (VII.27-28, 44), Adam condemns Nimrod’s “Authority usurpt, from God not giv’n”; God granted men “only over Beast, Fish, Fowl / Dominion absolute” (XII.67-69). He did not appoint any man “Lord” above men; rather, he reserved “such title to himself,” leaving “human…from human free” (XII.70-72). While Milton admires nonhuman creatures that seem to relate to members of their kind within egalitarian terms and believes humans should avoid positing hierarchical distinctions among themselves, he regards humankind’s sovereignty over other earthly kinds as God-given. Milton imagines the structure of angelic society, too, as hierarchical and divinely ordained. In this respect, he is consistent with traditional angelology. His descriptions of angelic hierarchies, however, are unusual in that they emphasize equality. “All Angelic Nature,” Abdiel reminds Satan, is “join’d in one,” equal to the “Son, by whom” God created everything, “ev’n thee, and all the Spirits of Heav’n” in their “Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Virtues, Powers” (V.834-40). Joad Raymond writes that Milton’s heavenly hierarchies are pliable and “founded upon
communication.” Their ranks correspond to duty, not prestige. Such ranks, I will argue, also predate kind—one of the primary concepts upon which liberty and constraint as well as unity and division hinge in Milton’s corpus.

In many respects, Milton’s conception of kind is ostensibly more conventional than William Shakespeare’s, Mary Wroth’s, or John Fletcher’s, who engage kind to rethink relationships among presumably different kinds of humans. Milton, instead, bears a striking resemblance to Nathaniel Fairfax’s account of kind in *A Treatise of the bulk and selvedge of the world* (1674), which I analyzed in the introduction. For Milton, like Fairfax, kinds are categories of nature, possess physical form, and reflect God’s will. In Milton’s view, humans may conform to their kind by exercising temperance, a practice comparable to certain forms of “kindness”—at least those defined in some of the period’s more conservative discourse. As I noted earlier, according to various early modern texts, individuals may exhibit kindness by embodying their supposed kinds. In other words, the performance of identity through self-restraint and conformity to the supposed natural order (by which I mean naturalized social order) is a form of kindness. Contrasting, unkindness is the performance of the corruption or degradation of oneself and, by extension, of natural order. I contend that these particular notions of kindness and unkindness—specifically, the human varieties of them—are comparable to Milton’s views on temperance and intemperance (respectively). Michael could substitute “kindness” for “temperance” when he relates to Adam how “th’ Earth shall bear / More than anough, that temperance may be tri’d: / So all shall turn degenerate, all deprav’d” (*PL* XI.804-06). I use “temperance” and “kindness” interchangeably in this chapter except when I discuss procreation as a form of kindness in early modern English culture, for while Milton lauds temperance, he assumes a more ambivalent stance on the value of procreation.

Milton primarily regards kind as a temporary yet necessary condition of the fallen world and kindness as a means to an end. That end is an eschatological state in which kind and kindness cease
to matter and may even cease to exist at all. Throughout Milton’s works, kind and kindness function chiefly as socioeconomic ordering mechanisms. They are the inevitable consequences of the discord and lack first ushered into the cosmos by Satan’s rebellion and subsequently exacerbated by Adam and Eve’s disobedient consumption of the forbidden fruit—the first human act of intemperance or, as I argue, unkindness. Kind allows for kindness, and kindness provides a path toward a society in which resources are more equitably distributed among both human and nonhuman kinds. Those who practice kindness demonstrate their deference to God’s will, and in doing so, they accomplish—albeit with greater labor—what Adam and Eve could have if they had refrained from eating the forbidden fruit and instead been content to feast on the other vegetation in the garden. Specifically, those who practice kindness prepare themselves for “One Kingdom, Joy and Union without end” (VII.161). Milton offers a surprising glimpse of this kingdom, I suggest, in a poem that has been often overlooked, “Epitaphium Damonis” (c. 1639). He wrote the poem after the death of his dear friend, Charles Diodati. That the bounds of kind dissolve in or fall short of the “One Kingdom” that Milton imagines is perhaps most strikingly evident in his vision of his friend’s life after death as well as his treatment of (in)corporeal shape, gender, and sexuality throughout Paradise Lost.

Tracking kind and kindness throughout Milton’s corpus allows a portrait of the poet and his work to emerge that coheres with what thinkers such as Will Stockton have called on readers to recognize: Milton’s Christianity is open to, nay intricately intertwined with, what Stockton designates as “queer expression.” By “queer expression,” Stockton refers to expression that does not entail “misogynistic and proprietary heterosexuality,” “sets up the possibility for counterfactual histories,” and explores “multiple forms of sexuality.” Tracking kind and kindness throughout Milton’s corpus also raises a host of questions that may require portraits of the poet and his work to be redrawn. What might the genesis and dissolution of kinds reveal about the poet’s valuation of them
in the prelapsarian world, postlapsarian world, and eternity? To what extent do they facilitate or preclude particular forms of expression? How does Milton’s eschatology account for different kinds of kinds? What might that account reveal about the poet’s understanding of their attributes and interrelationships on earth?

I. Nature’s Misery

Recounting for Adam how part of the “Angellic Host” fell to disobedience “And so from Heav’n to deepest Hell,” Raphael recapitulates an exchange between Satan and Michael that sheds light on the origin of kind in Milton’s cosmos (V.535-42). After capturing Satan during the first battle in heaven, Michael accuses him of disturbing heaven’s “blessed peace” and bringing “into Nature…/ Misery, uncreated till the crime / Of thy Rebellion” (VI.266-69). In other words, Michael charges Satan with corrupting and emiserating nature. Satan has, in effect, initiated unkindness into the cosmos. During his journey out of hell, he must face “All th’unaccomplisht works of Nature’s hand, /Abortive, monstrous, or unkindly mixt” (III.455-56). If Milton does not fully equate the “abortive,” “monstrous” and “unkindly mixt,” by categorizing all three as “th’unaccomplisht works of Nature’s hand,” he implies that they are inherently similar and interrelated (III.455-56). Unkindness, of course, cannot exist but in complementary opposition to kindness. Paradoxically, then, Satan’s rebellion might be considered the source not only of unkindness but also of kindness. While Satan’s rebellion is the condition of unkindness and kindness, Satan cannot author kinds in the same sense that God does. When Satan produces Sin and Death, for example, he does so unwittingly. And although Sin suggests that she, Death, and Satan are “of like kind,” what distinguishes their kind is their common unkindness (X.248)—their desire to “destroy, or unimmortal make / All kinds” (X.611-12).

The great wake that Satan and his company leave behind them after the Son drives them out of heaven prompts God to author kinds. He announces that he will bring “a better Race” into the
fallen angels’ “vacant room” (VII.189-90). “Race” and “kind” often function synonymously in early modern discourse in general as well as in Paradise Lost. In Book I’s Argument, for example, Milton refers to this better race as a “new kind of Creature.” Prior to this moment in Milton’s cosmos, creatures have not been divided into races or kinds. Notably, Milton does not distinguish the Son from the angels by classifying him as a member of a different kind (V.834-40). The angels become part of a kind only after God creates the new world and “Soul living in her kind, / Cattle and Creeping things, and Beast of the Earth, / Each in their kind” (VII.451-53).

Sharing his plan to populate the cosmos with a “Race / Of men,” God reveals that they will reside in a new world outside of heaven and may only ascend “Up hither” slowly “by degrees of merit” while “under long obedience tri’d” (VII.155-59). When Raphael initially imparts this information to Adam, he explains that “All things…up to [God] return / If not deprav’d from good”; creatures remain in their “active spheres assign’d, / Till body up to spirit work, in bounds / Proportion’d to each kind” (V.470-79). I will return to this last line in the pages that follow, but I quote it here because it clarifies Raphael’s subsequent conversation with Adam. According to Raphael,

flow’rs and thir fruit
Man’s nourishment, by gradual scale sublim’d
To vital spirits aspire, to animal,
To intellectual, give both life and sense,
Fancy and understanding, whence the Soul
Reason receives, and reason is her being,
Discursive, or Intuitive; discourse
Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours,
Differing but in degree, of kind the same.
Wonder not then, what God for you saw good
If I refuse not, but convert, as you
To proper substance.

(V.479-85)

In short, by nourishing man—which appears to count as a form of “obedience” in Milton’s view—flowers and fruit are converted into “intellectual” spirits. Raphael speculates that if Adam continues
to convert flowers and fruit “To proper substance” simply by eating and digesting them, he may eventually “participate” with angels and “at choice / Here or in Heav'nly Paradises dwell” (V.492-501). Indeed, notes Raphael, he himself does not abstain from “earthly fruits” because, by consuming them, he may facilitate the conversion of matter to its proper substance (V.464). “Meanwhile,” instructs Raphael, “enjoy / Your fill what happiness this happy state / Can comprehend, incapable of more” (V.503-05). Here Raphael warns Adam not to aspire to enjoy more than the bounds of his kind permit, effectively cautioning him against unkindness. These passages from Books V and VII, I suggest, critically illuminate Milton’s valuation of kind and kindness. Kind and kindness consign creatures to engage in particular forms of behavior; but as Raphael suggests, at least in the prelapsarian world, kind and kindness may simultaneously provide a path toward the reunification of “one first matter,” thereby helping to remedy the fundamental rupture and consequent lack in the cosmos precipitated by Satan’s revolt (V.472).

In the prelapsarian world, the bounds of kind consist merely of “One easy prohibition” for Adam and Eve (IV.433). Kindness entails “no other service” from them than “not to taste that only Tree / Of Knowledge” (IV.420-24). Abstaining from the Tree of Knowledge, Adam tells Eve, is

\[
\text{The only sign of our obedience left} \\
\text{Among so many signs of power and rule} \\
\text{Conferr’d upon us, and Dominion giv’n} \\
\text{Over all other Creatures that possess} \\
\text{Earth, Air, and Sea.}
\] (IV.428-32)

They enjoy “free leave so large to all things else, and choice / Unlimited of manifold delights” (IV.433-34). Their work in the garden is not required; they undertake it for aesthetic reasons and understand it to be a voluntary form of praise to God—a “delightful task” (IV.436-38). Adam adds that the “pleasant labor” of managing the garden’s abundant growth—pruning “branches overgrown” and tidying the dropped blossoms and resins that “lie bestrewn unsightly and unsmooth”—not only glorifies God but also “declares [man’s] Dignity” (IV.619-31).
Defying their single prohibition, Adam and Eve usher the discord into Eden that Satan first inflicted upon nature. When Eve tastes the fruit, Earth incurs a “wound, and Nature from her seat / Sighing through all her Works” signals that everything is “lost” (IX.782-84). Likewise, when Adam consumes the fruit, Earth shakes “from her entrails, as again / In pangs,” and Nature groans once more, weeping at the “completing of the mortal Sin / Original” (IX.1000-04). “The Law I gave to Nature,” God later explains to the Son, forbids Adam and Eve from remaining in Paradise:

> Those pure immortal Elements that know  
> No gross, no unharmonious mixture foul,  
> Eject him tainted now, and purge him off  
> As a distemper, gross to air as gross,  
> And mortal food, as may dispose him best  
> For dissolution wrought by Sin, that first  
> Distemper’d all things, and of incorrupt  
> Corrupted.

(XI.50-57)

According to God, Adam and Eve must leave Paradise because they have become distempered, corrupted—they have become unkind and, therefore, they must be “Tri’d in sharp tribulation, and refin’d / By Faith and faithful works” (XI.63-64). Humankind now shoulders more than “One easy prohibition.”

By aggravating nature’s discord, Adam and Eve also increase the bounds of kind and dictates of kindness. In the postlapsarian world, kindness or temperance entails the performance of faithful works in the face of acute adversity, which includes a scarcity of resources. Preparing Adam and Eve to depart from Paradise, Michael announces that God sent him “To show thee what shall come in future days” so that they may

> learn  
> True patience, and to temper joy with fear  
> And pious sorrow, equally inur’d  
> By moderation either state to bear,  
> Prosperous or adverse: so shalt thou lead  
> Safest thy life, and best prepar’d endure  
> Thy mortal passages when it comes.

(XI.357-66)
As this passage suggests, the meaning of kindness or temperance has changed along with natural order. In the postlapsarian world, temperance requires Adam and Eve to do more than avoid the forbidden fruit and consume whatever else they will; no longer may they count on their digestive systems to lead them to “Heav’nly Paradises” by converting food to “proper substance” (V.492-501). Instead, they must meticulously moderate every appetite, emotion, and impulse they experience. While doing so will not permit them gradually to acquire the same attributes as angels, which it would have in the garden, it will ready them for their “mortal passages.” Kindness, in effect, becomes moderation.

II. The “Holy Dictate of Spare Temperance” in the Postlapsarian World

Although Milton wrote *Comus* (or *A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634*) and *Tetrachordon* (1645) decades before *Paradise Lost*, and although it would be a mistake to claim that Milton’s thought remains entirely consistent throughout his work, his thought exhibits enough consistency for the three works to shed critical light on each, especially in terms of Milton’s general estimation of kind and kindness as temperance. *Comus* clarifies how Milton imagines the disciplinary, postlapsarian form of temperance as a “faithful work”; *Tetrachordon* throws the nuanced interrelationships between kind, temperance, and sexuality that Milton posits into relief. As Milton expounds in *De Doctrina Christiana*—a Latin manuscript emended with a heavy hand and discovered among Milton’s State Papers in 1823—it works of faith do not “deserve anything as of their own merit,” but they do possess instrumental value insofar as they “make the equity of [the Son’s] judgment manifest to all mankind” (357). In Milton’s postlapsarian universe, temperance is a work of faith because it simultaneously prepares those who practice it for a life after death and allows for a more equitable distribution of resources—including physical and intellectual strength—in a world that is plagued by scarcity and therefore necessitates diverse forms of labor.
The sociopolitical climate in which Milton composed *Comus* offers crucial insight into the masque’s treatment of temperance. *Comus* was performed for the Earl of Bridgwater on September 29, 1634 to celebrate his appointment as the Lord President of the Council of Wales and Lord Lieutenant of the Welsh and border countries. As Leah Marcus argues, the figure of Comus establishes the masque as a critique of the “stark mechanisms of power” that Milton associated with King Charles I, Archbishop William Laud, and the *Book of Sports* (1618, 1633). *Comus* distinguishes “between the images of authority presented in masques at court and Bridgewater’s goals in Wales.”

As President of the Council of Wales, Bridgewater acted as Charles I’s deputy, yet he “was in conflict with elements of the central government” and did not approve of “Laud’s plans for ordering the church.” Encouraging Bridgewater to “consolidate his position as President of Wales into an independent base of power,” *Comus* exposes the contradictions between the rhetoric of those who endorsed the *Book of Sports*—Charles I and Archbishop William Laud enthusiastically promoted it—and the social programs they supported. Although “Advocates of the *Book of Sports* liked to portray political obedience as a delightful form of political liberty,” maintains Marcus, Milton suggests that “what may appear to be liberty—a free choice of pleasure—turns out to be base submission. Indeed, through his portrayal of Comus and his retinue, Milton offers a caustic critique of the politics of survivalism.” Those who adopted this political ideology often deployed a form of *carpe diem* rhetoric, asserting that a “holiday abandonment of one’s separate identity, and of spiritual experience conceived as a personal quest for righteousness” would prompt “divine blessings upon all,” enriching and reinvigorating the community. Milton viewed the *Book of Sports*, which disseminated this idea, “as part of an insidious plot by the bishops to keep people slavishly quiescent” to their authority. His concern was that those lulled into mindless subservience could not exercise choice and therefore could not practice temperance.
The Lady’s rebuke of Comus indicates that his *carpe diem* logic undermines temperance and, in doing so, precludes the equitable distribution of resources. With his infamous charming-rod, Comus could be said to anticipate the figure of the dubious prelate symbolically represented as a shepherd in *Lycidas* (1637). The shepherd does not “know how to hold / A sheep-hook” and, piping “lean and flashy songs” to his sheep, allows them to grow hungry until, “swoll’n with wind,” their insides “rot” (ll.120-27). Comus, too, leads the members of his throng to “misery” and “foul disfigurement” (ll.73-4), although all thirsty travellers who imbibe his “pleasing poison” remain unaware of their unhappy transformations (ll.524-26). When Comus first hails the Lady, he appears to her as a “gentle shepherd” (l. 271). Eventually, she recognizes him as an imposter and dismisses his inveigling solicitations as “false rules pranked in reason’s garb” (l. 759). In response to his argument that she transgresses nature by hoarding her beauty rather than allowing others to enjoy it in “mutual and partaken bliss” (ll. 737-42), the Lady rejoins:

Imposter, do not charge most innocent Nature,
As if she would her children should be riotous
With her abundance; she good cateress
Means her provision only to the good
That live according to her sober laws,
And holy dictate of spare Temperance:
If every just man that now pines with want
Had but a moderate and beseeming share
Of that which lewdly-pampered Luxury
Now heaps upon some few with vast excess,
Nature’s full blessings would be well dispensed
In unsuperfluous even proportion.

(ll.767-73)

The Lady’s lecture is striking in that it suggests her primary objection to Comus’s defiance of the “holy dictate of spare Temperance” is the inequity or disproportionate distribution of resources it entails. Temperance is necessary to ensure that the meager resources of the postlapsarian world are allocated fairly, else “just” men be left to languish in “want” while others of “vast excess” are “lewdly pampered.”
Recurrently remarking on the “brutish” and “monstrous” visages of Comus’s companions (ll.70, 605), the Spirit and the Lady reinforce the idea that Comus’s disregard for Nature’s “sober laws” corresponds to unkindness. In *Paradise Lost*, Milton emphasizes Satan’s unkindness by repeatedly describing how he changes his “proper shape” to deceive the unfallen angels and Eve (III.634). The angel Zephon contends that Satan’s revolt has actually permanently altered his shape (IV.835). I will return to the subject of shape subsequently; for now I simply submit that what distinguishes Comus as intemperate or unkind is not so much his penchant for sensual pleasure but the form of power he exercises. “Comus is preaching his defense of holiday license,” Marcus observes, “to a public with no ability to choose.”\(^{28}\) Such a lack of freedom, according to Milton, entails a disproportionate concentration nature’s resources, symbolized, in part, by the non-normative bodies of the “Chimeras” who keep company with Comus (l.517).

As Victoria Silver’s insistence that Milton is not a “prig” intimates, his reputation might indicate otherwise.\(^{29}\) The masque’s critique of Comus’s disproportionate, intemperate, or unkind arrogation of power is more consistent with Milton’s later work than its promotion of what Melissa Sanchez calls “a normative ethics of sex.”\(^{30}\) Sanchez uses “a normative ethics of sex” to refer to sexual principles that laud “heteronormativity” by elevating “certain sexual behaviors (those that are restrained, loving, monogamous, and procreative) over others (those that are uninhibited, anonymous, promiscuous, and nonprocreative).”\(^{31}\) To support her reading of the masque’s heteronormative ethics, Sanchez draws primarily on the Spirit’s final song about the gardens to which he returns; his song forecasts Cupid and Psyche’s wedding as well as the emergence of twins from Psyche’s “unspotted side” (ll.1008-10). Yet several aspects of the masque trouble this attribution of heteronormativity: the Spirit reveals that this wedding has not transpired, and the twins have yet “to be” (l.1010). The figures already occupying the “fair” and bountiful gardens indicate that the masque’s promotion of monogamous, procreative sex is less sure than Sanchez
asserts (l.981, 987). While the Hesperides guard golden apples that proffer immortality to those who consume them, thereby obviating the need for procreation (ll.982-3), Venus sits beside Adonis as he recovers from the wound he incurred after choosing to hunt rather than entertain Venus’s affections (ll.999-1003). Unconscious, he rests on “beds of hyacinth,” a flower that recalls the handsome youth Hyacinth, who engaged the amorous attentions of both Apollo and Zephyrus. It would be nigh impossible to refute Comus’s celebration of the “sun-clad power of Chastity” (l.782), but as Silver notes, “what Milton means by chastity is…temperance—the exercise of discretion, proportion.”

Indeed, Milton exhibits acute attention to proportion—or the possibility of commensurate relationships among entities, their practices, and their environments—throughout his corpus. In The Second Defense of the English People, for example, he refutes charges that he is “A monster huge and hideous” and a “spare, shriveled, and bloodless form” so that he may instead acknowledge the gifts God has afforded him:

I do not believe that I was ever once noted for deformity by anyone who ever saw me…My stature certainly is not tall, but it rather approaches the middle than the diminutive…Nor, though very thin, was I ever deficient in courage or strength; and I was wont constantly to exercise myself in the use of the broadsword as long as it comported with my habit and my years.

Milton’s concern, here, is to establish both his proportionate shape and habits of exercise. In Comus, the Lady’s primary concern is proportionate consumption. The masque promotes a normative ethics of proportion, I would argue, far less equivocally than it advocates monogamous, procreative sex.

Milton’s most passionate arguments for the value of heterosexual marriage—typically associated with procreative sex—rest on its supposed capacity to counterbalance man’s labor. In Tetrachordon (1645), Milton considers Saint Augustine’s contention that “manly friendship in all other regards had bin a more becomming solace for Adam, then to spend so many secret years in an empty world with one woman” (TC 596). Milton does not directly disagree with Augustine. Rather,
he propounds that “our [Protestant] Writers deservedly reject” Augustine’s “crabbed opinion” (596).

Presumably addressing other men (and not women), Milton insists,

> We cannot…always be contemplative, or pragmaticall abroad, but have need of some delightful intermissions, wherein the enlarg’d soul may leav off a while her severe schooling; and like a glad youth in wandring vacancy, may keep her hollidaies to joy and harmles pastime: which as she cannot well doe without company, so in no company so well as where the different sexe in most resembling unlikenes, and most unlike resemblance cannot but please best and be pleas’d in the aptitude of that variety. Whereof lest we should be too timorous, in the aw that our flat sages would form us and dresse us, wisest Salamon among his gravest Proverbs countenances a kinde of ravishment and erring fondnes in the entertainment of wedded leisures;...By these instances, and more which might be brought, we may imagine how indulgently God provided against mans lonelines; that he approv’d it not, as by himself declar’d not good; that he approv’d the remedy thereof, as of his own ordaining, consequently good; and as he ordain’d it, so doubtles proportionably to our fal’n estate be gives it [emphasis mine]. (597)

In a woman’s company, a man may relax the “cords of intense thought and labour” because, to Milton’s mind, woman’s intellectual aptitude does not compare to man’s (596). Given that men tend to engage in profound thought without surcease while women do not, men may experience relief from their intellectual toil when they interact with women.\(^{36}\) Such relief is indispensible. When God declared that man’s solitude was “not good” in the prelapsarian world, he merely meant that it was “not pleasing,” but in the postlapsarian world, it is “plainly sinfull” (595). In *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce* (1643), Milton characterizes man’s solitude as “unkindly” (251).\(^{37}\) Emphasizing that God prescribed man’s “meet help” in different proportions in the prelapsarian and postlapsarian world, Milton at least leaves open the possibility that “manly friendship” might well have proved equally or more pleasing in the prelapsarian world (*TC* 595).\(^{38}\) In Milton’s mind, heterosexual marriage is only a virtual necessity in the postlapsarian world, where labor, without “delightful intermissions,” otherwise threatens to exhaust men.

That Milton genders man’s soul as a “she” in the passage from *Tetrachordon* quoted above is not a theologically unusual move for an early modern Christian Europeans. By referring to the soul as a “she” rather than simply “the soul,” however, Milton not only differentiates gender and sex (one’s soul is feminine regardless of one’s sex); he also complicates the normative ethics of sexuality.
he might otherwise seem to espouse. If the soul is a “she,” the “delightful intermissions” that one
soul partakes with another could be said to possess a homoerotic charge.

Adam’s extended conversation with Raphael in *Paradise Lost* doubles the homoerotic charge
that discourse between souls may assume. Comparing the attraction that both Raphael and Eve
express toward Adam’s lips (VIII.56, 218), Jonathan Goldberg adds that the “lines that Adam speaks
to Raphael can be brought into significant conjunction with those which describe Adam and Eve’s
love.” Goldberg’s point is that Eve’s love for Adam is as Adam’s love for Raphael. Linda
Gregerson recounts Adam’s appeal to God for “conversation with his like,” suggesting that either
Eve or Raphael could be “God’s answer to Adam’s request” (VIII.418). Adam explains his desire
for conversation by positing that it is “like to help, / Or Solace his defects” (VIII.418-19); he
imagines that conversation with someone similar may temper and improve him. But as Gregerson
remarks, “Loving Adam, [Eve] loves upward toward the deity. Loving her, Adam must love his
weaker self.” In a sense, Adam’s love for Eve precludes him from working “up to spirit” in
“bounds / Proportion’d to each kind” (V.478-79); by contrast, Adam’s conversation with Raphael
does not. Gregerson notes that “deliberate invocations of erotic love poetry” suffuse the
conversation between Adam and Raphael. In *Tetrachordon*, Milton underscores that when God
declared, “It is not good for man to be alone,” he did not “precisely say, I make a female to this
male”; rather, God said, “because it is not good for man to be alone, I make him therefore a meet
help” (595). Just a paragraph earlier, however, Milton opines that, by “alone,” God must have
meant “without woman” (595). “Otherwise,” reasons Milton, “Adam had the company of God
himself, and Angels to convers with; all creatures to delight him seriously, or to make him sport”
(595). Nevertheless, Milton emphasizes several times that God’s chief priority was to provide Adam
with a “help meet,” not a female. It is possible that when Milton wrote *Paradise Lost*, he had
consciously come to re-entertain the possibility that man’s “meet help” in the prelapsarian world
might not necessarily have been female. As the subsequent section demonstrates, Milton’s earlier work somewhat unexpectedly envisions what are effectively same-sex helpmates engaging in intimate conversation and providing each other with needed succor in the postlapsarian world. Regardless, Milton does not conclude that temperance necessarily precludes same-sex helpmates from partaking in “conversation” in *Comus*, *Tetrachordon*, or *Paradise Lost*.

The importance of biological reproduction was often cited in early modern England to justify the value of heterosexual marriage. Notably, Milton avoids granting procreation qua procreation much significance in his corpus.\(^46\) To participate in procreation was, according to certain discourses of the period, to practice a form of kindness.\(^47\) When a kind produced a copy of itself by means of biological reproduction, it fostered a relation of similarity; in this respect, it performed kindness. Gregerson, however, observes that, in *Paradise Lost*, Adam interprets procreation or “the multiplying likeness of posterity as a symptom of insufficiency rather than a prospect of aggrandizement”; the reproduction of kinds creates “an excess that covers (and thus points to) a lack.”\(^48\) Commenting on the status of procreation in Milton’s corpus, Louis Schwartz writes that even the divorce tracts (e.g., *Tetrachordon*), “which, of course, have an interest in reproduction as an aspect of married life, have little to say about it beyond their emphatic and everywhere-prosecuted contention that reproduction is not the sole or central purpose of marriage as it was ordained by God for humankind.”\(^49\) Indeed, for Milton, reproduction is a tertiary concern and—in his own words—“last” consideration: “in matrimony there must be first a mutuall help to piety, next to civill fellowship of love and amity, then to generation” (*TC* 599).

If Milton is, in this source, aligned with a discourse of domestic heterosexuality, it is all the more significant that he does not recognize all forms of human biological reproduction as compatible with kindness or temperance. “Although copulation be consider’d among the ends of marriage,” if there is no sense of mutuality between those who participate in it, it is merely “an effect
of conjugal love” and “at best an animal excretion, but more truly wors and more ignoble than that
mute kindlyness among the heards and flocks” (TC 609). For Milton, the problem with both
copulation or procreation sans “mutual benevolence” and “intimat conversation” is that they
“cannot in any human fashion bee”—that is, they conflict with the dignity of humankind and are
therefore baser than the “kindlyness” of lesser kinds (TC 609). Many of Milton’s contemporaries
likely would still have counted copulation and procreation as instances of kindness in such
circumstances. Returning to William Shakespeare and John Fletcher’s The Two Noble Kinsmen (c.
1613) for a moment may elucidate why. What so acutely concerns Arcite and Palamon when they
awake to find themselves in the Athenian prison is the unlikelihood that they will be able to
undertake the biological and, in turn, cultural reproduction of their kind (2.2.28-36). That the
kinsmen understand their cultural authority to hinge on their ability to reproduce their kind explains
why they are less interested in pursuing conversation with their supposed beloved, Emilia, than in
acquiring her as a wife. If either kinsman were willing to converse with her, he would quickly realize
her desire to remain unwed. Because Arcite and Palamon assume that cultural authority and cultural
reproduction depend on biological reproduction, they prioritize it over other forms of kindness.

Milton does precisely the opposite. In the absence of intimate conversation, copulation and
procreation can be but acts of disproportion, intemperance, inequity, unkindness (TC 599). Milton’s
somewhat dismissive treatment of them need not be interpreted as a reflection of his general disdain
for sex. As Jeffrey Masten has astutely pointed out, the word “conversation” had various senses in
early modern discourse, including “sexual exchange,” and it retained this sense “into the nineteenth
century.” Keeping this sense of “conversation” in mind, we might read Milton as advocating a
form of sex that may be more intimate than copulation and valuable than procreation—namely,
conversation—because it has the potential to encourage mutuality and equity in a world replete with
adversity and scarcity.
III. The Thyrsus of Zion

Milton’s Latin dirge, “Epitaphium Damonis” spectacularly illustrates not only the utility of conversation in the postlapsarian world but also why the value of kind and kindness inhere in their capacity to negate their own necessity. The poem implies that one who heeds the bounds of kind and dictates of kindness may eventually experience a realm in which they no longer matter. In the Argument preceding the poem, Milton identifies himself as the shepherd “Thyris”—the same name that the Spirit in Comus assumes while disguised as a human shepherd—and explains that he uses the name “Damon” to refer to Charles Diodati, an unusually talented, learned, and distinguished young man. Thyris and Damon, Milton relates, were “friends from boyhood, the closest possible.” While abroad, Thyris learned of Damon’s death: “After returning home and on verifying that the report was true, he wept for himself and his loneliness.” Without Damon’s conversation, Thyris finds himself gripped by an agonizing solitude that deters him from tending to his hungry herd of lambs.

Notably, “Epitaphium Damonis” privileges same-sex conversation in the postlapsarian world. Mourning Damon, Thrysis asks, “What faithful companion will cling to my side, as you often used to do in the harsh cold?” (ll. 37-39) and recalls spending nights in “sweet conversation” with him (ll.46-47). In Paradise Lost, Adam explains his desire for a companion by pointing to the joy he observes in male-female couples of nonhuman animals: “Each with their kind, Lion with Lioness” (VIII.392-93). Contrastingly, Thyris solely uses (nominative plural) masculine nouns (“iuvenci,” “thoes,” “onagri,” respectively) to identify the kinds whose fellowship he envies. He wistfully watches the “the young bulls playing in the meadow, all comrades agreed with each other in their law,” the wolves “in packs,” and the asses “joined with their mates in turn” (ll. 94-98). (Note the possible innuendo.) Lamenting that each man “finds scarcely one partner in a thousand,” Thyris never intimates that such a partner might be a woman: “if a fortune not hostile to our prayers finally
gives us [a partner]...the hour for which you had not hoped, snatches him away, leaving eternal loss for all time” (ll.108-11). In “Epitaphium Damonis,” then, Milton depicts a postlapsarian scenario in which males provide each other with “intimate conversation” and “meet help.” Might the poem provide another clue as to why Milton repeatedly stresses that when God created Eve, his chief intention was to provide Adam with a helpmate whose sex was a secondary concern?

That the relationship between Thyrsis and Damon does not bar Damon from heaven suggests that their relationship has not transgressed the dictates of temperance or kindness—or, in the more common locution, nature. On the contrary, Thyris declares that, “Because blushing modesty and a youth without stain pleased you, because the joy of the marriage bed was never tasted, lo, virginal honors are reserved for you” (ll.212-14). “Iuventus,” translated as “youth” here may—like its English cognate—designate adolescence and young adulthood as well as a young man. These lines, then, invite at least two compatible interpretations. First, Damon led a virtuous life free of iniquity. Second, a virtuous young man—presumably Thyrsis—pleased him.

The “honors” in store for Damon cannot help but recall the figure of Comus and the sensual celebration the Lady abjures. In the midst of “heroes and eternal gods,” Damon imbibes a “heavenly liquid” redolent of Comus’s elixir (ll. 205-07). This liquid is but one of Damon’s rewards. Thyrsis waxes: “Girt about your shining head with a glowing crown, and bearing the happy shade of a leafy palm, you will partake forever in an immortal wedding, where there is singing and the lyre rages in the midst of blessed dances, and orgiastic feasts have their bacchic celebration under the thyrsus of Zion” (ll. 215-19). Although John T. Shawcross assumes that this passage “places Diodati in Heaven as the eternal bride of the Bridegroom,” he also remarks that the poem’s imagery “has allegoric kinship with the epilogue to ‘Comus.’” That kinship, I propose, helps to complicate Shawcross’s argument that Diodati or Damon has become an “eternal bride” of a single bridegroom or bride. After all, Damon is in the midst of a party that Thyrsis characterizes as both
bacchic and orgiastic. The thyrsus that Thyrsis describes mounted above the festivities in the heavenly kingdom of Zion also evokes the charming-rod Comus carries as he leads his followers “To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty” (l.77). Not only was the thyrsus traditionally thought of as Bacchus’s staff; as the Spirit in Comus explains, Comus is Bacchus’s son (ll. 46-57). In De Doctrina Christiana, Milton explicitly asserts that, as a form of marriage, polygamy may be “lawful and honorable” (DC 1228). Thyrsis never identifies a specific spouse for Damon; it would seem that the “virginal honors” he imagines his friend enjoying include a perpetual, polygamous marriage ceremony that consists of unfettered intercourse or “conversation.”

The key differences between the sensual pleasures in which Comus and his coterie indulge and those Damon experiences in heaven are where and when they are enjoyed. Unlike Comus, Damon has lived a temperate life in the fallen world. Whereas Comus gives travelers an elixir that makes them forget “all their friends and native home” and permits them to delight in “lewdly-pampered Luxury” as others suffer “with want” (ll. 76, 768-70), Damon has taught Thyrsis to “soften biting cares” by sharing his musical and medicinal knowledge with him (ll.45-6,133-38, 150-52). The instruction and intimate conversation Damon has pursued with Thyrsis constitute forms of temperance and, therefore, “faithful works” as Milton defines them. These works have refined Damon, preparing him for what Michael explains to Adam as a “mortal passage” to heaven (PL XI.366). In other words, because Damon has practiced kindness, he has been transported to a state in which the dictates of kindness cease to constrain him; the adversity and scarcity that plague the earth and consequently necessitate kindness on it are absent from heaven. Damon may freely enjoy the “immortal wedding” and “orgiastic feasts” in heaven because they do not take place at the expense of those in need. Careful attention to earthly proportion is no longer necessary.

Accounts of the shapes the angels assume in Paradise Lost reinforce the idea that proportion possesses less importance for heavenly creatures. On earth, physical proportion or shape as well as
consistent shape correlate strongly with kind and kindness. Raphael recounts that God gave Adam an “erect” and “upright” stature because he was endowed with “Sanctity of Reason,” “not prone / And Brute” like the other kinds (VII.505-08). The newly “brutish” visages of the men and women inclined to “roll” about like swine in Comus’s retinue attest to their unkindness. Angels—at least those in heaven—move unencumbered by the bounds of kind. According to Book I of Paradise Lost,

Spirits when they please
Can either Sex assume, or both; so soft
And uncompounded is thir Essence pure,
Not ti’d or manacl’d with joint or limb,
Nor founded on the brittle strength of bones,
Like cumbrous flesh; but in what shape they choose
Dilated or condens’ t, bright or obscure,
Can execute thir aery purposes.

(I.423-29)

The relationship between shape and kind does not obtain as strongly or perhaps at all in heaven—at any rate, kind does not constrain the angels’ shapes.

The shapes of the fallen angels, however, index their unkindness and constrain them. When the angels Zephon and Ithuriel search for Satan in the garden, they discover him “Squat like a Toad, close at the ear of Eve,” and Ithuriel lightly pokes him with his spear (IV.800-10). Startled, Satan resumes his “own shape” (IV.819). The transformation amazes Ithurial and Zephon, yet they still do not recognize him, asking which of the “rebel Spirits adjudg’d to Hell” he is (IV.823). Their inability to identify Satan elicits his scorn, to which Zephon responds: “Think not, revolted Spirit, thy shape the same, / Or undiminisht brightness, to be known / As when thou stood’st in Heav’n upright and pure” (IV.835-37). Satan’s altered shape signals his unkindness, as does his appropriation of other kinds’ shapes in the garden: “Of those fourfooted kinds, himself now one, / Now other, as thir shape serv’d best his end / Nearer to view his prey, and unespi’d” (IV.397-99). In contrast, the heavenly angels may “Limb themselves, and color, shape or size / Assume, as likes them best,
condense or rare” (VI.352-3). Although Satan retains some power to change his shape, as Zephon implies, that power has been severely attenuated. After convincing Eve to taste the forbidden fruit, Satan returns to hell to report his success. Anticipating “high applause,” he instead hears a “universal hiss” and feels his face become “sharp and spare, / His Arms clinging to his Ribs, his Legs entwining” (X.505-12). Against his will, he transforms into “A monstrous Serpent on his Belly prone,” ruled by a “greater power” that punishes him in the “shape he sinn’d” (X.514-16).

As sexual beings, the heavenly angels—unlike humans—need not temper their desires and may completely commingle with each other. When Adam asks Raphael how the “heav’nly Spirits” express their love, Raphael replies:

Let it suffice thee that thou know’st
Us happy, and without Love no happiness.
Whatever pure thou in body enjoy’st
(And pure thou wert created) we enjoy
In eminence, and obstacle find none
Of membrane, joint, or limb, exclusive bars:
Easier than Air with Air, if Spirits embrace,
Total they mix, Union of Pure with Pure
Desiring; nor restrain’d conveyance need
As Flesh to mix with Flesh, or Soul with Soul.

(VIII.620-29)

While angels are unfettered by kind in heaven and may enjoy total affective and pleasurable unification with each other, their prerogative to assume whatever sex, color, or shape they wish confirms that they still possess a sense of identity and agency.

In “Epitaphium Damonis,” Thyrsis invents a way to participate in Damon’s eternal nuptial celebration by transmogrifying from a shepherd into a divine staff. What is more interesting than the specific shape he takes above the “orgiastic feasts” that rage in heaven is that he assumes new proportions. Even as an object, Thyrsi(u)s remains more or less identifiable. Intriguingly, the Thyrsi(u)s of Zion mixes two presumably disproportionate figures from Comus: the Spirit and Comus himself, kind and unkind. Like Paradise Lost, then, “Epitaphium Damonis” portrays heaven as a state in which shape and identity may persist beyond the bounds of kind.
As forms of differentiation, shape and identity permit heavenly creatures to express love for each other precisely by coalescing. According to Goldberg, “in their ability to eat and make love,” the angels of *Paradise Lost* “are embodiments of Milton’s monism.”

By “Milton’s monism,” Goldberg refers to Milton’s “refusal of the ontological difference between spirit and matter.” In *Paradise Lost*, for instance, Raphael informs Adam that “Spirits that live throughout / Vital in every part” actually possess a “liquid texture” (VI.344-48). When Raphael hypothesizes that, as long as Adam continues to convert flowers and fruit to their “proper substance” by digesting them, he will eventually convert himself into his own “proper substance,” he strongly implies that Adam will then be able to participate in angelic sex (V.492-501). Such sex, remarks Goldberg, makes the “total interpenetration” of spirits possible; during angelic sex, likeness becomes sameness—“a coupling” that Goldberg deems “undeniably homo.”

What Goldberg finds especially noteworthy about Raphael’s description of angelic sex in Book VIII is how it differs from “every description of heavenly life that he has offered Adam”: angelic sex absents “the hierarchies that rank angels.” “Raphael’s offer of angelic sex, like his promise of angelic being to Adam,” opines Goldberg, “looks forward to that time when all will be all and differences will no longer obtain.” Although the “one matter” Raphael delineates constitutes a vision of sameness that Milton believes “should dispel invidious difference,” Milton insists “upon the present state as one constituted by difference”; at the same time, he commits “to making difference a matter of degree rather than kind.” I submit, however, that Milton is not committed to making difference a matter of degree in all cases. His ambivalence is evinced, for example, in his relative disdain for brute kinds and brutish humankinds whose “prone” shapes attest their lacking “Sanctity of Reason.” Goldberg may also overstate Milton’s appreciation of sameness and concern over difference. After all, the very possibility of *any* mixture, unification, interpenetration, and, therefore, angelic sex depends on some form of difference. Thus, I would qualify Goldberg’s claim: Milton values certain differences of degree, and
he is committed to making difference a matter of degree when the time and place are—in his estimation—right.

But what if, as Douglas Trevor argues, Milton’s eschatology collapses all matter into one soul at the end of time? What if the teleology that emerges in Milton’s corpus leads us from the fallen world to a place “above earth” where “nonmarital, amorous activity” in all its myriad forms may flourish during the Son’s reign—but only until “time and self-interest” dissolve into a “final, corporate, indivisible soul in which ‘God shall be all in all’”? In a meticulous study that places the theories of infinite love propounded by the Ranters and the Cambridge Platonists as well as the writings of Origen in conversation with Milton, Trevor maintains that, from Milton’s perspective on eternity, amorous love will no longer be possible and “devotional love will no longer be needed.” Does Milton’s eschatology, then, ultimately abrogate “queer expression” in his corpus insofar as it precludes opportunities to discover not just multiple, but any forms of sexuality during eternity or to entertain counterfactual histories?

His eschatology might threaten to do so if it were not inconsistent and open to various interpretations. For example, while God tells the Son that, in the last days, “Hell, her numbers full” will be sealed “forever” (PL III.332-33), Michael—God’s messenger—offers another narrative: the Son will

\[
\text{dissolve} \\
\text{Satan with this perverted World, then raise} \\
\text{From the conflagrant mass, purg’d and refin’d} \\
\text{Founded in righteous peace and love,} \\
\text{To bring forth fruits Joy and eternal bliss.} \\
\text{(XII.546-51)}
\]

Similarly, Milton’s eschatology leaves uncertain the status of individual identity. Trevor marshals support for the argument that “Milton’s dispersal of godlike powers at the end of time…dissolves the distinctions between” individual identities by turning to chapter 33 of De Doctrina Christiana, which cites Revelations 21:2. The narrator of Revelations, John, describes “the holy city, new
Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband” (CD, 1312). From this passage of *De Doctrina Christiana*, Trevor infers that, through John, Milton offers the “promise of a union of the chosen with God that dissolves any separation between the chosen God and himself.” Immediately before citing Revelations 21:2, however, Milton quotes Revelations 5:10: “you have made us kings and priests to our God, and we shall reign on the earth” (CD 1312). In this verse of Revelations, “us” and “we” refer to individuals delivered by the Son to God (5:8-10). Here Milton depicts himself in relation to God, which suggests that some separation persists between them.

Even if Milton imagines that, as God’s bride, he will become “one” with God, he does not insinuate that he and God will necessarily share the same “essence.” As Milton writes in chapter 5 of *De Doctrina Christiana*, God and the Son may be referred to as “one,” but they are not identical:

Scripture says and the Son says *I and the Father are one*. I agree. Someone or other guesses that this means one essence. I reject it as man’s invention. For whoever it was in the Church who first took it upon himself to guess about it, the Son has not left the question of how he is one with the Father to our conjecture. On the contrary, he explains the doctrine very clearly himself, insofar as it concerns us to know it. The Father and the Son are certainly not one in essence, for the Son himself asserted the contrary….How then are they one? The Son alone can tell us this, and he does. Firstly, they are one in that they speak and act as one….Secondly, he declares that he and the Father are one in the same way as we are one with him: that is, not in essence but in love, in communion, in agreement, in charity, in spirit, and finally in glory. (CD 1179)

Attending to a section of Book III in *Paradise Lost* that has occasioned some dispute over Milton’s eschatological stance on individual identity, Trevor interprets God’s declaration that, after the day of judgment, “God shall be All in All” as evidence “that Milton’s God imagines, and idealizes, the elision of individual identities in the postapocalyptic scenario” he describes (III.340). Milton repeats a version of this phrase in chapter 33 of *De Doctrina Christiana*: “And after everything has been made subject to him, then the Son himself will be made subject to him who subjected all things to him, so that God may be all in all” (1310). “All in All” is a slight adaptation of the more common phrase, “all of all,” which the *Oxford English Dictionary* traces back to John Marston’s *The
Metamorphosis of Pygmalions Image (1598) and defines as “God, viewed as the macrocosm, encompassing all of existence.” The change of prepositions here may warrant further consideration. Rather than surrounding the cosmos, Milton’s God fully intermixes with the cosmos. Yet as Milton’s reading of “I and the Father are one” illustrates, Milton might still aver that the “All” retains a separate essence from the “All” he suffuses.

Milton’s eschatological inconsistencies, I submit, allow “Epitaphium Damonis”—with its immortal nuptials, “blessed dances,” and “orgiastic feasts”—to endure as a representation of one possible eternity in the Miltonic cosmos. The “bacchic celebration” allows for the exploration of—to borrow Stockton’s phrase again—“multiple forms of sexuality.” As Thrysis’s conversion from shepherd to staff attests, while differences of degree allow those in the “pure heavens” to intermix (l.203), differences of kind do not prevent them from doing so in diverse proportions.

In its evocation of Comus, however, “Epitaphium Damonis” raises critical questions about the durability and relevance of kinds on earth. If inhabitants of Damon’s heavenly residence may, like Milton’s angels, assume whatever color, shape, or size they prefer, what becomes of non-human earthly kinds at the end of time? As I said earlier, Raphael’s account of matter implies that even “flow’rs and thir fruit” may eventually return to God (V.482). Might non-human earthly kinds, then, also intermix with the “All” in heaven? Raphael explicitly states that “All things proceed” from the “Almighty” and return to him “If not deprav’d of good” (V.470-71). What would “deprave” nonhuman, non-angelic kinds of good if they lack humankind’s agency? Could they be complicit in and therefore accountable for their corruption? (The serpent’s curse suggests they might be.) Or are they more likely to be “good” and, therefore, more likely to return to God than humans are? How do formerly human and formerly non-human, non-angelic kinds interrelate in eternity? If their relations are not more equitable than on earth, does kind still bind after judgment day? If their relations are more equitable, then how arbitrary are the distinctions among kinds on earth?
In Book V of *Paradise Lost*, Raphael attempts to distinguish between degree and kind, but the effort raises more questions than it settles. Whereas “things that live” may ascend and descend among degrees, it would seem that, as kinds, they are relatively constrained by their “bounds” (V.469-79). Yet Raphael’s account of matter’s conversion to a “proper substance” that returns to the same “first matter” compromises the basis of these bounds. If all living things derive from the same “first matter,” why are some bound by different proportions of kind than others? And, for that matter, what *is* the fundamental difference between degrees and kinds? Raphael’s conversation with Adam not only reveals that Adam may eventually “participate” with Angels if he just keeps eating (as long as he does not eat the forbidden fruit) but also implies that the division “Betwixt th’ Angelical and Human kind” will give way. Divisions of kind may be less ontological and more flexible than they seem. Milton’s corpus allows readers to entertain two possible methods of converting kinds—although one method may be less intentionally delineated by the author and less teleological than the other. On the one hand, readers may faithfully practice kindness or temperance to convert the bounds of their kind and transcend their earthly coils. On the other, they may assay the bounds of kind while engaging in intimate conversation.
Notes


8. See also PL XI.45-57, 472-78, and 515-25.


Library, 2007), 1140-1312, esp. 1173. Hereafter, Christian Doctrine will be cited in the text as CD. References to page numbers will appear as in-text citations in the body of the chapter and, unless otherwise noted, refer to this edition of Christian Doctrine. Milton claims “it is certain that the Son existed in the beginning, under the title of the Word or Logos, that he was the first of created things, and that through him all other things, both in heaven and earth, were afterwards made,” but he nowhere suggests that the Son belongs to a different “kind” than the rest of creation. Milton uses “kind” primarily when describing the fallen angels, Satan’s progeny, and earthly creatures.

15. For an example of a passage that treats angels as kinds in relation to humankind see PL. III.462. I am arguing that the angels only become a distinct kind after God creates the new world, but as my earlier point that Satan paradoxically introduces unkindness and kindness into the Miltonic cosmos might suggest, they have the ability to conform to or revolt from their natures before this moment.

16. For an account of food’s significance in Paradise Lost, see Michael C. Schoenfeldt. Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 131. Schoenfeldt writes that Milton “attempts to justify the ways of God to men and women by suggesting that humans, not God, introduce into the world through their past and present behavior toward food the contagions and impurities from which they continue to suffer. The regulation of conduct before food becomes for Milton the primary physiological and moral strategy for coping with the impurity we bring to, and confront in, every meal.”

17. See Turner, One Flesh, 175-6 for an account of Milton’s changing “sense of his own poetic mission.”


22. Marcus, Politics of Mirth, 171.


36. See Milton, *TC*, 586 for an instance in which Milton at least acknowledges that “particular exceptions may have place”: a woman may “exceed her husband in prudence and dexterity.”


38. Milton, *TC*, 595. See also 599.


42. Notably, after the fall, Adam asks: “O why did God, / Creator wise, that peopl’d highest Heav’n / With Spirits Masculine, create at last / This novelty on Earth, this fair defect / Of Nature, and not fill the World at once / With Men as Angels without Feminine, / Or find some other way to generate / Mankind?” (PL X.888-95).


44. See also Milton, TC, 599.

45. See esp., Milton, TC, 650. See also, 599-600, and 703.

46. See Goldberg, *Seeds of Things*, 195. Goldberg remarks, “Milton’s elevation of human conjugality as not simply a legitimation of reproductive sexuality enables an idealization of companionship that winds up exalting nonprocreative sex, and not just for the angels: the fact that Adam and Eve have sex and yet do not have offspring until after the fall suggest that Edenic sex also is not tied to procreation.” In CD, Milton’s position on marriage seems less nuanced than in the divorce tracts, and Milton also appears slightly less ambivalent and more sanguine about procreation. See Milton, CD, chapter 10.

47. See, for example, 1.3.81 of William Shakespeare’s *The Comical History of the Merchant of Venice, or Otherwise Called the Jew of Venice* in *The Norton Shakespeare* ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 1090-1145.


61. Clara Bosak-Schroeder, text message to author, May 28, 2016. Many thanks to her for confirming that “iuventus” may designate adolescence or a young man.

62. See “Elegia Prima Ad Carolum Diodatum,” in *The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton*, eds. William Kerrigan, John Rumrich, and Stephen M. Fallon (New York: The Modern Library, 2007), 172-75, esp. ll. 61-62. Milton compares the “enticing cheeks” (“Pallacesque genas”) of girls to the “purple hyacinth” and “the blush of your flower, Adonis!” (ll. 61-2). Here “Adonis” seems to refer to Diodati. Where on the body the “cheeks” in question are is open to interpretation. Again, the hyacinth is named after the handsome youth Apollo and Zephyrus loved. Is it worth considering the shape of the Adonis flower?


69. Milton, *ED*, (ll.45-46): “Quis me lenire docebit / Mordaces curas.”

70. Notably, Satan first experiences pain during the first battle in heaven. See *PL VI.327*.

71. Intriguingly, one line in *PL* does indicate that heavenly angels may possess “proper” shapes. See V.276.


81. This contradiction resurfaces in Milton, *CD*, 1310.

82. Trevor, “Milton and Oneness,” 84.


EPILOGUE

In “Nature and Ecologies of Kind in Early Modern England,” I argue that kind’s frequent association with nature and divine authority distinguish it from other, similar classifying words in early modern discourse, making it particularly effective as a mechanism for reinforcing naturalizing hierarchies of rank, race, sex, gender, and species. I also argue that the culture’s discourse reveals the basis of this association to be a matter of some contention. The preceding four chapters illustrate the distinct ways in which literary works by William Shakespeare, John Fletcher, Lady Mary Wroth, and John Milton name kinds or engage the polyvalence and polysemy of “kind” to rethink such naturalizing hierarchies, exploring untried affective and cognitive relationships that members of the same kind or different kinds might forge with each other in alternative ecologies. My introduction delineates the interrelationships between nature, kind, and cultural reproduction, as many early moderns generally understood them. Since my body chapters zoom into particular logics of kind that emerge in texts by Shakespeare, Fletcher, Wroth, and Milton, and my introduction primarily deals with the abstract, this epilogue returns to the questions that connect the particular to the abstract—in other words, to the questions at the heart of my project.

Although I raise each of the questions below in my introduction and at least tacitly respond to them in the ensuing chapters, I devote this space to clarifying more explicitly their relevance to the dissertation as a whole. In doing so, I aim to throw into sharper relief the common threads that fasten the various components of this project together.
I. Whom does kindness benefit? Whom does it hinder—or, even, harm?

According to early modern thinkers such as Nathaniel Fairfax and Milton, kindness—that is, the practice of conforming to one’s kind—benefits all of creation. To embody one’s kind is to maintain what Shakespeare’s Ulysses would call “peaceful commerce” by upholding the divinely decreed order of things. From the critical perspective of Laurie Shannon, social and sexual kindness permits early modern subjects and selves to experience political equality, which, in their stringently hierarchical society, would otherwise elude them. The texts Shannon examines undoubtedly support her case. Nonetheless, as my first, second, and third chapters suggest, kindness, as it is conventionally construed, often tends to benefit those who enjoy especial social privileges at the expense of those who are less fortunate.

In Lady Mary Wroth’s *Urania* (1621-c. 1626), hegemonic ideologies of kind reward males, members of the nobility, and those with light complexions, endowing them with exclusive cultural and creative authority. The ideologies of kind that John Fletcher’s *The Island Princess* (c.1619-1621) engages assume that the natural superiority Christian Europeans claim over those with different religious beliefs, bodies of knowledge, and skin colors justify their colonial and mercantile agendas. Presumably, their supposed natural superiority qualifies them to appropriate and allocate any resources they “discover” as they see fit, regardless of whether others already rely on those resources. In William Shakespeare and John Fletcher’s *The Two Noble Kinsmen* (c. 1613), the dominant ideology of kind posits a natural order that sustains Theseus’s position of authority as the Duke of Athens. This ideology also ostensibly places husbands (and potential husbands) at a social advantage, authorizing them to act as guarantors of cultural reproduction. Contrastingly, it denies women, such as the Jailer’s Daughter and Emilia, who challenge the status quo either by desiring who they should not or by not desiring who they should, a social and political voice.
At the same time, for the less privileged, kind and kindness have the potential to serve as mechanisms for social change both when kind’s relationships to nature and divine authority are not taken as givens and when kind’s social and discursive aspects are openly recognized. As Emilia recounts in *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, she and Flavina forged a relationship patterned on kindness, but because they did not construe kinds as inherently natural or understand their legitimacy to derive from nature, Emilia and Flavina could mutually determine what to count as kinds and which kinds to reproduce—or in other words, which forms of kindness they valued enough to practice. Their relationship was characterized by a dynamic motion and reciprocity.

By comparison, the ideology of kind that Theseus champions alternatingly entails stasis and violence. The Jailer’s Daughter is consigned to couple with the Wooer, someone whose social status is closer to her own, when she pines after the noble Palamon. Theseus orders Emilia to marry Arcite or Palamon when she would prefer to entertain the company of “maids.” Because Arcite and Palamon appear equally qualified to “husband” Emilia, Theseus requires them to participate in a duel that will entail one or the other’s death.

Wroth’s *Urania* and Fletcher’s *The Island Princess* also intimate that kind and kindness have the potential to counter such problematic ideologies and inaugurate social change when unfettered by natural order. While certain kinds are defined in relation to nature in Wroth’s *Urania*, others are defined in relation to constancy. Those who demonstrate their constancy through a willingness to suffer may assume social authority that their natural kind would otherwise deny them. Fletcher’s *The Island Princess* prompts members of the audience-world to identify with certain members of the play-world on the basis of their similar affective and unstable epistemological states rather than their supposed natures. Simultaneously, *The Island Princess* invites its audience members to question what they know about their own or others’ natures, a move that casts doubt on the premise that Christian Europeans’ could cite their natures to justify global conquest and trade.
The Two Noble Kinsmen, Urania, and The Island Princess, then, each hint that kind and kindness may unexpectedly be deployed to contest the naturalizing hierarchies of privilege they so often seem to sustain. That is, kind and kindness may undermine the very positions of power they typically legitimate.

II. Who may participate in the reproduction of kinds?

As I observe in my introduction, according to certain early modern English discourses, the value of a kind hinges on its perceived legitimacy. Those born or even conceived out of wedlock may assume the paradoxical status of an unkind kind. Indeed, as dictionary entries from the period attest, a bastard may be described as an unnatural “natural.” That one’s legal status could so effortlessly be conflated with one’s status in nature sheds light on the intimate interrelationship between cultural and biological reproduction in the culture’s thought. For many early moderns, cultural reproduction was effectively indistinguishable from biological reproduction. Unsurprisingly, those who were unmarried and, therefore, could not produce legitimate offspring were strongly discouraged from participating in biological reproduction.

Although husbands and wives were generally both encouraged to multiply their kind, as my first chapter notes, husbands possessed greater authority over the processes of both cultural and biological reproduction. By subduing their wives and begetting offspring with them, husbands could claim to act as guarantors of cultural reproduction, ensuring the replenishment of early modern England’s stock of constituent natural kinds. Just as men enjoyed more authority over cultural and biological reproduction, they had more freedom to pursue artistic endeavors. As I discuss in my second chapter, the period afforded women little cultural and creative authority; consequently, their opportunities to participate in artistic (re)production were limited to particular textual genres and the crafting of domestic objects such as embroideries and tapestries.
Yet as literary texts and performances tested the naturalness of England’s constituent kinds, they invited early moderns to question the extent to which a woman’s presumed nature might prohibit her from experimenting creatively with kinds. These texts and performances also called attention to possible distinctions between cultural and biological reproduction, inviting readers and audiences to imagine alternative forms of cultural reproduction, such as that which Emilia remembers pursuing with Flavina in *The Two Noble Kinsmen*. The plot of the play, however, reaffirms the limitations that such imaginative experimenters might face: unless those who undertake them already possess cultural authority, the kinds they innovate may go largely unnoticed or even be discouraged.

**III. When does reproduction sustain or subvert kinds? When do kinds stimulate or stifle reproduction?**

The conflation of cultural and biological reproduction as well as the preoccupation with legitimate reproduction would indeed have inhibited the (re)production of kinds such as the “rare issues” Emilia and Flavina begot, issues Emilia likens to a “bastard” (1.3.72-82). But Shakespeare’s sonnet 105 suggests that these forms of reproduction might not have been able to sustain even the most ideal natural kinds:

8

Kind is my love today, tomorrow kind,
Still constant in a wondrous excellence.
Therefore my verse, to constancy confined,
One thing expressing, leaves out difference.
‘Fair, kind, and true’ is all my argument,
‘Fair, kind, and true’ varying to other words,
And in this change is my invention spent.
Three themes in one, which wondrous scope affords.

(ll.5-12)

Here the beloved subject of the sonnet’s description of kindness exhausts the poet-speaker’s artistic drive and creative power. The poet-speaker’s “scope”—i.e., the subject, the object of his desire, or the end he has in view—is wondrous. But because he attempts to reproduce “One thing” or kind
over and over again with exactitude—because he practices kindness to maintain the established order of things—he finds his invention “spent,” and the sonnet never moves beyond tautology.

As I argue in my first chapter, the more prevalent practice of kindness in the *Two Noble Kinsmen* prompts Arcite and Palamon reluctantly to take part in the battle that results in their imprisonment and, much to their dismay, their inability to participate in biological reproduction. In *Tetrachordon* (1645), Milton avers that a husband and wife’s biological reproduction may compromise kindness if there is a lack of loving reciprocity between them (*TC* 609). Without such mutual love, they lose their human dignity and become baser than beastly kinds. If the purpose of reproduction is to multiply kinds, and ideally, kinds are to participate in biological reproduction, what does the tension between them in these literary and dramatic texts suggest? By foregrounding this tension, Shakespeare, Fletcher, and Milton call the mutually constitutive relationship between biological reproduction and kinds or kindness into question. Yet this tension only arises when kinds are defined strictly in terms of natural order and the purpose of reproduction is to preserve that order through biological reproduction or represent it through artistic reproduction as faithfully as possible—that is, as mimesis.

IV. How do the different forms of kind interact and play off of one another? How might the deconstruction of certain kinds reinforce other kinds?

In my second chapter, I argue that the manner in which kind draws the identity categories of gender, rank, and race together in Wroth’s *Urania* suggests that Wroth’s project of simultaneously negotiating her culture’s hegemonic hierarchies of gender, rank, and race will inevitably founder. The language Wroth relies on to assert the natural equivalence between those with light complexions and those with darker ones reinforces the naturalizing hierarchy of rank that Wroth also contests. This same language, in turn, reinforces the less stable naturalizing hierarchy of race in the romance. Fletcher’s *The Island Princess*, however, undermines the naturalized categories of religion and race by
systematically contesting the premise that Christian Europeans are naturally more knowledgeable than non-Christian, non-Europeans. Encouraging its audience to maintain a perpetual position of circumspection, the play avoids insinuating that the audience has attained any form of enlightenment over the course of watching it. These two examples illustrate how kinds may interact differently within distinct ecologies.

V. Who has the authority to revise the “law” of kinds, and why?

Within Christian cultures, ostensibly only God has the authority to write or revise the laws of kind. In practice, those at the top of hegemonic hierarchies of kind determine the “laws” or rules according to which they are maintained. For instance, in *The Two Noble Kinsmen*, Theseus is the most ardent proponent of the principle of husbandry. In *Urania*, the King of Morea, Pamphilia’s father, repeatedly and vociferously asserts the fickleness and shallowness of women. Pinheiro, the nephew of the Portuguese Captain on Tidore, insists on the natural baseness of the Islanders in the *The Island Princess*. Armusia, a Portuguese venturer and the play’s presumable protagonist, bellows that his religion is inherently superior to the Islanders’, a claim that others like Quisara consider credible.

Nonetheless, the literary texts and performances that I examine in each of the previous chapters undercut these laws, highlighting the social and discursive aspects of the supposedly natural orders upon which they are predicated. In doing so, these literary works invite readers and audience members to entertain the possibility that such laws could be rewritten. As Emilia’s unfortunate fate in *The Two Noble Kinsmen* evinces, however, implementing a revised or adapted law requires a level of cultural authority that most do not enjoy.

VII. The Roguish Dame Kind

As I discuss in the introduction, from Fairfax’s perspective, Dame Kind acts as God’s agent. In this capacity, she casts ambiguous substances into molds, which Fairfax also calls “kinds”; her kinds correspond to the divinely decreed natural order. But as the literature that I analyzed in
this dissertation shows that those in early modern England entrusted Dame Kind with a variety of occupations. These occupations were sometimes incongruous with each other and sometimes disruptive to conventional schemas of natural order. In other words, Dame Kind could and often did go rogue, forging casts that were unconventional, innovative—casts that did not clearly correspond to the established natural order and instead left its foundation in question.

In less tropological terms, what both Fairfax and Milton describe as the “bounds of kind” may constrain individuals according to their naturalized rank, race, sex, gender, or species (PL, V.479). Yet kind is an instrument not only of strict regulation but also of deconstruction and reconstruction in early modern English discourse. Precisely because it is a mobile and convertible conglomeration of concepts, kind may unsettle the very ideologies and identity categories predicated on its purported naturalness. This conglomeration changes with strategic and not-so-strategic engagements with the polysemy of “kind,” its grammatical derivatives, and its partial synonyms. In short, kind fixes, but only for as long as it remains fixed—and it tends not to. Kind may contest the conflation of nature, society, and art, but it may also resist their separation. The literary texts and performances that I analyze in this project rely on this versatility to imagine ecologies in which agents categorized by similar and diverse “kinds” may collectively negotiate how they want practices of kindness to define them and their dynamics with each other.

Attending to how nature and kind draw various identity categories into proximity, this project offers the means to undertake analyses that might otherwise prove dizzyingly unmanageable, such as those that simultaneously examine hegemonic discourses of rank, race, sex, gender, and species in relation to each other. In addition to gathering such discourses together and clarifying how individuals in this period defined themselves as similar to and different from one another, kind provides a way to think through the culture’s methods of marking the virtuous and the corrupt, the legitimate and illegitimate. My hope is that early modern scholars—especially those undertaking
studies of nature, various modes of identity, and cultural reproduction—will find kind a useful analytic with which to parse the period’s literary performances, texts, and cultural histories.
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