

Working Paper

Shades of Green

Andrew J. Hoffman
Stephen M. Ross School of Business
University of Michigan

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Dissecting the Environmental Movement

Andrew J. Hoffman¹
University of Michigan
701 Tappan Street, R4390
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
734-763-9455
ajhoff@umich.edu

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On April 22, 1990, an estimated 200 million people from 140 nations participated in the reenactment of Earth Day on its twentieth anniversary. While the day's events once again focused on "corporate destruction of the environment"², its tone was markedly different from that of the original event. Where the first Earth Day angrily denounced corporations as unwelcome villains, the 1990 Earth Day fully embraced them as invited partners. Through funding of the day's events and staging of special demonstrations of their green activities, corporations were prominent participants and organizing supporters of the largely peaceful event. This led *The New York Times* to observe that "this multi-million dollar orchestration of the event bore little resemblance to the grass roots movement driving the event twenty years before."³ *Time* called the event "a commercial mugging."⁴

Explicit in these observations is the sentiment that corporations had co-opted Earth Day and, by inference, the environmental movement as a whole. Implicit in these observations is a statement that corporations are not a legitimate member of the environmental movement. Indeed, there is a great deal of tension in today's environmental movement about the relationship between environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and corporations. A recent book by Christine MacDonald, the former media manager at Conservation International, expresses outrage at ENGOs accepting donations from oil, lumber and mining industries without holding them accountable for ongoing pollution practices. In her book, *Green Inc. An Environmental Insider Reveals How a Good Cause Has Gone Bad*, MacDonald charges that the association between ENGOs and corporations has led to a system of co-optation, where the outcome is assisted greenwashing. This is but the tip of an iceberg of concern over the growing connections between the corporate and non-profit sectors on the environment. Even long-time environmentalist, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies' Dean James Gustave Speth, criticizes today's environmental movement for its willingness to work "within the system" through "pragmatic and incremental" actions rather than "deeper approaches to change." "What is needed," he states, "is transformative change in the system itself."⁵

A schism seems to be emerging between two camps: the **dark greens** and the **bright greens**. The dark green ENGOs seek radical social change to solve environmental problems, often by confronting corporations.⁶ The bright green ENGOs work within the present system, often in close alliance with corporations, to solve environmental problems.⁷ The article "Harnessing Purity and Pragmatism" in the fall 2007 issue of the *Stanford Social Innovation Review* describes the core of this schism as the tension between purity and pragmatism and suggests that gulf between them is widening. But in the end, the authors conclude, both camps are needed for the environmental movement to achieve its objectives. The authors argue that the ability of more moderate, consensus-oriented ENGOs to operate as change agents is influenced by the presence of more radical, conflict-oriented ENGOs through what is called the "radical

flank effect.”⁸ The radicals, in effect, make it possible for the moderates to effect change. And yet, few ENGOs seem to recognize this fact.

What many in the movement, and society as whole, fail to fully grasp is the extent to which the environmental movement is a complex and interconnected network, one that includes corporations as an integral part. In fact, most ENGOs define themselves either in opposition or engagement with that element of the movement. This yields criticisms and acrimony from dark greens that the bright greens are “selling out”⁹ and accusations from bright greens that dark greens are irrelevant or unproductive distractions to substantive change. The reality is that the network of the environmental movement in its relationship with corporations has formed in an organic and uncoordinated way, with many ENGOs challenging and competing with each other rather than working in a more concerted fashion. This dynamics seems particularly acute in Washington. But if we can look at this movement through a new lens – a network lens¹⁰ – we can begin to see ways in which to understand the diversity of ways in which corporations and ENGOs engage. By developing a clear “map” of the composite landscape of the environmental movement, NGO managers will be better able to consider their role and place within the overall network. And the corporate manager can better understand where and how they can access it. With this kind of imagery developed, more structured and effective coordination and collaboration becomes possible.

The Environmental Movement

The term “environmental movement” is a misnomer, lumping together many organizations with varied interests into one category. The 6,493 organizations that filed 501(c)(3) forms with the Internal Revenue Service calling themselves environmental groups in 2005¹¹ cannot be clustered into one or two distinct categories. Some ENGOs are staffed with lawyers and scientists and work within existing institutions to bring about corporate and social change in a collaborative style (such as the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense Fund¹²). Others prefer to remain outside those institutions, relying on less professionally oriented staffs and working in a more confrontational style (such as the Public Interest Research Groups and Rainforest Action Network). Still others prefer to engage in acts of sabotage and deliberate violation of the law, leading the FBI to consider them terrorist groups (such as Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front). Some seek to protect nature for its innate value (such as The Nature Conservancy and the World Wildlife Fund). Others seek to protect nature for the purposes of hunting and fishing within it (such as Ducks Unlimited and Whitetails Forever). Some are explicitly organized to engage corporations (such as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies) and others avoid such engagement by explicit mission (such as the League of Conservation

Voters). Overall, the dimensions on which ENGOs differ are many. And as a result, these differences manifest themselves in a diversity within what we monolithically call the environmental movement.

This diversity is an historical product of a steadily widening range of constituents, resulting in the continuing redefinition of its form and focus over the past century. For example, when conservation groups and a wilderness ideology prevailed in the early part of the 20th century, environmental policy issues were cast primarily in terms of managing natural resources for social benefit. As modern environmental activists entered the movement in the 1960s, the ideologies shifted, and the agenda priorities became the protection of natural ecosystems. With the entry of employee groups and community groups in the mid-1970s, the issues focused on work-place safety and community right-to-know. Then, with insurers in the mid 1980s came an integration of environmental concerns into standard risk management practices such as waste management and vulnerabilities to pollution liabilities. In the early 1990s, investor groups pressured corporate boards directly through proxy resolutions related to such issues as: the establishment of an environmental policy committee, revised health and safety policies, toxic wastes in ethnic/minority communities, controlling carbon dioxide emissions, and eliminating the use of specific compounds. And more recently, the emergence of customer demographics (such as LOHAS) has created a shift in the marketplace and the products that companies provide to serve it.¹³

Most notable in this evolving collective is the increasing engagement between ENGOs and corporations, beginning in the 1990s. The earliest alliance was perhaps the National Wildlife Federation's Corporate Conservation Council in 1982; while the most prominent example was the alliance between McDonald's and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) in 1990 to target waste reduction opportunities across the business. As part of this 42 part comprehensive action plan, the alliance gained most visibility for facilitating the shift from polystyrene clamshell containers to paper wraps. As of today, many other companies, including Exxon Mobil Corp., The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Eastman Kodak Co., AT&T Inc., Monsanto Co., The Dow Chemical Co, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Coca-Cola Co. and General Electric Co. have engaged with ENGOs in a variety of formats and issues ranging from packaging to climate change. And yet, some ENGOs eschew such activity and view it with suspicion at best and derision at worst. Herein lies the provocative tension over the dark green/bright green ideologies. How can we make sense of it?

Beyond Dark Green and Bright Green

To understand the complex and varied ways that ENGOs engage with corporations it helps to use social networking tools to draw a visual map of the movement. We can then look more deeply at the implications for how the movement operates and the various roles that ENGOs play within it. To begin

our network map I narrowed my view to the 70 largest ENGOs by budget. These range in size from 100 members to 1.2 million (average 136,000); in budget from \$1 million to \$245 billion (average \$18.5 million) and; in date of formation from 1875 to 1995 (average 1958). Overall, while the sample is biased towards large national and international groups, it is a useful sample for developing a picture of the complexity of an influential segment of the environmental movement.

Then, I analyzed the web pages for each ENGO to identify relationships with companies in the form of project partnerships, alliances, financial support or other mention of a joint relationship. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of this network, and it immediately makes clear the dark green and bright green clusters. This is a “two-mode” network where the ENGOs are depicted as red circles while the corporations with which they are tied are depicted as black squares. In such a map, we can see certain populations or clusters of ENGOs that might not be otherwise visible. For example, we can see graphically that 25 groups on the right have no business relations and form the dark green cluster. Further, we can see that 45 ENGOs within the network have relations with 664 Corporations through 869 ties (with a range of 1 to 102 business ties per ENGO). These are the bright green cluster.

Insert Figure 1 about here

As we look deeper within the networked clusters, we also find that the ENGOs that defined their focus as “conservation” in the *Encyclopedia of Associations*¹⁴ were more central to the network than those that defined their focus as “environmental protection” or “pollution control.” Seventy-three percent of the conservation ENGOs had ties with business (total of 52, with an average of 13.3 ties per ENGO) compared with only 33 percent of the environmental protection ENGOs (total of 21, with an average of 4.8 ties per ENGO), and 18 percent of the pollution control ENGOs (total of 11, with an average of 2.3 ties per ENGO). The term “conservation” refers to groups that seek the preservation and protection of the environment and the natural things within it, some for its own sake, others for the benefit of human beings. “Environmental protection” is a broader term, addressing actions at international, national and local levels to prevent and, where possible, reverse environmental degradation of ecosystems. This term often has a legislative component to it. “Pollution control” refers to the direct control of emissions and effluents into air, water or soil from consumption, heating, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transportation and other human activities that, left unchecked, will degrade the environment. These clusters represent three overlapping but distinct movements within what we call the environmental movement, with the former geared more towards protection of nature and the latter two focused more on challenging corporate activities.

But looking further, the organization and details of the network map tell us much more. For example, by looking at the structure of the network, we can begin to see a diversity of positions. First, we can distinguish ENGOs between those in the *core* of the network and those on the *periphery*. ENGOs in the core of the map have extensive ties to the network. This is measured not just in number of ties, but more importantly in the interconnectedness of those ties. Think of a popularity contest or Google's Page Rank when you think of centrality in a network map. It's not just the number of connections you have, but also how connected those connections are. So, ENGOs like Conservation International, World Resources Institute and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) are highly central to the network and closely linked with much of its members. Second, moving to the periphery, we can see multiple positions as well. There are ENGOs that have many direct ties, but few link to the core of the network (such as Fish America Foundation and Rainforest Action Network), ENGOs with few direct ties and few links to the core (such as the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund and the International Wildlife Coalition) and then there are some ENGOs with their own discrete networks with no ties to the core (such as The Wilderness Society and the Land Trust Alliance). Corporations most central to the network map included: BP, Home Depot, Anheuser Busch, Bank of America, Citigroup, Coca-Cola, Consolidated Edison, Ford, General Motors and MBNA America Bank

But this map looks only at the connections among ENGOs and specific corporations. Is that the only lens to use to analyze this network? If we categorize the companies by sector and redraw the network map using sectoral ties, new insights emerge regarding the types of corporate engagement employed by ENGOs. Figure 2 depicts the ENGOs as red circles and the industry sectors with which they are tied as black squares. The first consideration in such a map is the clusters of commonality among ENGOs that share common sectoral ties. Through such ties, we would expect ENGOs to share common types of information and common channels of influence. We can see clustering along sectoral lines that have more clear delineations than the network based on specific company ties. For example, some ENGOs cluster in the northeast area of the map through their ties with sporting goods companies like those in firearms, outfitters and marine equipment sectors. Another cluster of ENGOs forms on the west side of the map through their ties with resources extraction companies like those in the mining & metals, oil & gas and forestry & paper sectors. And we can see that ENGOs like Conservation International, World Resources Institute and The Nature Conservancy again remain in the center while other, less connected ENGOs congregate around the periphery.

Insert Figure 2 here

A second consideration with regards to sectoral ties is the diversity that each ENGO possesses. A *lack of diversity* suggests a more narrow set of interests being engaged between individual ENGOs and their corporate partners. Those with a narrow set of sectoral ties may be captive to the interests or influence of their network of corporate engagement, while those with a broader set may be independent in their ability to manage information flows. In short, those with greater diversity may be free to be selective about the types of information and influence they both project and receive.

Finally, it worth noting that some distinctions emerge in terms of strategies as evidenced by network positioning. For example, only 29 percent of ENGOs that identified their focus as “forestry” (in the *Encyclopedia*) had ties with “forest & paper” companies. This could be a deliberate attempt to avoid cooptation by the industries with which they target their activities or it could suggest a different definition of certain topics by ENGOs and corporations. Additionally, linkages among various sectors and topics can help understand the agendas at play and the constituencies that engage them. For example, on a humorous note, 100 percent of firearms companies have ties with ENGOs that also have ties with beer and alcohol companies; suggesting that it may be wise to stay out of the woods during hunting season!

Differentiating Roles

As discussed, two key ENGO distinctions emerged within our two network maps. The first is the positioning on the corporate map between the core and the periphery. The second is the diversity of sectoral ties that an ENGO possesses. These dual distinctions create a matrix of five possible strategies that ENGOs employ to engage with corporations, shown in Figure 3.

Insert Figure 3 here

The choices that an ENGO makes on where to position itself within the matrix has important implications for the degree of *autonomy* and *influence* they wish to have.¹⁵ Think of ties as channels of information and resources. They allow ENGOs to influence the members of the network through the spread of ideas, but they are also channels that work in reverse. ENGOs may gain resources, like financial contributions, because of network linkages, and they may be susceptible to cooptive influence by the corporations with which they connect. Therefore, the ties in the network represent the dual (and at times competing) goals of gaining influence and remaining autonomous with corporations. The choice to integrate, with how many and with what kinds of corporations, then, becomes a strategic consideration for each ENGO. This strategy has both actual and perceptual considerations. Some ENGOs have a very clear motivation to remain autonomous by staying disconnected from the network, free to pursue and realize

interests without constraint from other actors in the system. But other ENGOs wish to influence change more directly with corporations by developing deeper ties with the network. This influence is a dyadic relationship. ENGOs influence the corporate sector through pressures for change, but corporations influence ENGOs as well. One measure of that influence may simply be that of money. And our data proves that out. In the sample of ENGOs, those with business ties had, on average, larger budgets (\$24.3 million versus \$7.6 million).¹⁶

So, in breaking out the roles that ENGOs choose to engage, the critical questions surround the extent to which they wish to remain autonomous and the extent to which they wish to have influence by integrating themselves to varying degrees within the network. Each position carries with it a different role. Below we can classify five roles based on the centrality they have within the corporate network and the diversity of those ties based on the sector network.

The most obvious type of ENGO is that which is disconnected to the network, what we call *isolates*. Twenty-five of the 70 ENGOs in the sample (36 percent) fell into this category. These ENGOs are the most autonomous from corporate influence; maintaining a sense of purity through that autonomy but wielding little power in influencing corporate activity directly. But this position also limits the ENGOs access to resources, such as large pools of funding from corporations. The motivations for this role can emerge in two ways. For example, while Greenpeace and the League of Conservation Voters both make it clear that they do not work with corporations on their web page, their motivation is different. Greenpeace is more oppositional in its posture, choosing to avoid direct ties with businesses because their mission is defined around terms of conflict, particularly around issues of nanotechnology and genetically modified organisms. But the League of Conservation Voters is more ambivalent, avoiding direct ties as a form of disengagement necessary to maintain its impartiality and objectivity around issues related to the environment. Regardless of the motivations, isolates form an ideological core that is divorced from concerns from the corporate sector. They can be seen as ENGOs from which the strongest statements and ideas about environmental protection can emerge, but also ENGOs that must rely on others to bring them into practice. These ENGOs likely see themselves as the “true” supporters of the environmental cause. They are the most dark green environmentalists in the network.

At the opposite extreme are the *mediators*, ENGOs which maintain a high number of corporate ties and a diversity of sectoral ties. This role is embodied by some of the larger and more notable ENGOs in the movement, such as Conservation International, EDF, and TNC, with the highest annual budgets (average \$56 million)¹⁷ and the highest membership (average 493,000) among the role types in the network (see figure 4). These organizations operate with a more pragmatic strategy than the others, fully engaging the corporate community through tight connections in the network. They have tremendous

convening power for promoting change, and are best positioned to drive discussion and debate over particular issues. They maintain greater autonomy through their limited dependence on one sector while also maximizing their ability to influence change through their large number of corporate ties. As such, these ENGOs are the most instrumental in diffusing new ideas and practices within the corporate sector. But, these ENGOs also run risks from such tight connections to the corporate network. These risks include concerns for cooptation and mission deflection as they seek to satisfy the interests of key benefactors. These are the brightest of the bright greens.

Insert Figure 4 here

In between these two extremes lie three hybrid roles that ENGOs can employ. The first is that of the *independents*, ENGOs located at the periphery of the corporate network, but maintaining a variety of sectoral ties through which to engage the network. This role includes ENGOs like Land Trust Alliances, the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society as well as many of the hunting and fishing organizations, all of which can be seen on the periphery of Figure 1 with discernable clusters of corporate ties. These ENGOs have more autonomy than many of the other roles in the network, shielding themselves from specific corporate interests by diversifying their channels of information. But their level of influence is equally limited because of their peripheral position. These ENGOs are entrepreneurs, and have increased latitude for generating innovative notions of change within the corporate sector that will be less influenced by the mass of corporate interests that engage with ENGOs. They can test new ideas in their proximity of the network, but they need engagement with mediators to fully diffuse them through the network. Think of them as incubators for change upon which the mediators can draw ideas and energy.

A second hybrid strategy for ENGOs lies in a similar peripheral position as the independents, but restrict their engagement to a select cluster of sectors. These are the *captives*, ENGOs that maintain a low level of engagement with a more restricted set of corporate sectors. As they choose not to be central to the network, their information channels are constrained to a narrow set of interests and influence, which also helps to maintain a greater degree of autonomy. And yet, they enjoy greater certainty in their scope of control given the clarity and simplicity of their network linkages. Those hunting and fishing groups that are not found in the independents are found here, as are some ENGOs with more specific mandates such as the African Wildlife Foundation and American Rivers. These organizations may become vulnerable to the biased influence of one set of corporate interests and therefore limited in their autonomy to act independently. But they may be incubators for ideas and influence that remain localized and of interest to a specific cluster of the network and not the entire mass.

As we move to the core of the corporate network, we find our third and final hybrid role type, that of the *bridge*. These ENGOs are central to the network, such that they can exert influence on the other ENGOs in the network, but they maintain a narrow spectrum of sectoral ties. As such, they act as bridges, channeling between a specific set of corporate sector concerns and the rest of the network. ENGOs such as Flora and Fauna International, Soil and Water Conservancy and the Center for Clean Air Policy fall into this category. We can expect them to inject specific ideas and interests into the network and, through their central position, help to gain greater engagement among the other ENGOs within the network for their acceptance. But they are constrained in their autonomy from this narrow set of interests as well.

Balancing Roles

Regardless of which role an ENGO chooses to play, it must continually balance the tension between exerting influence over the corporate sector while maintaining autonomy from it. And this tension plays out in the actions and behaviors of ENGOs on the ground. For example, many hunting groups have struggled with this tension, recognizing the benefits of funding and influence that come from corporate partnerships, but fear the influence such engagement on the agenda and culture of their organizations. Trout Unlimited and Ducks Unlimited, for example, have engaged in delicate negotiations to bring their organizations into more close contact with corporations through their boards. On the one level, they see a benefit in gaining influence in protecting hunting and fishing grounds through the contacts and financial support that corporate board members can provide. On the other hand, they do not wish that influence to alter the historically grass roots and local character of their autonomous state and regional chapters. The issues that they most often engage center around the protection of valuable ecosystems that are spawning or nesting grounds for the animals they hunt. So, the resources and influence that corporations provide helps in that agenda. But they wish to remain focused at the local level in their agenda setting. To try to balance those competing interests, Trout Unlimited has created a two-tier board that skirts the edges of the corporate network. One tier is that of the “grass-roots trustees” that are elected from the ranks of the volunteers. The second tier is that of “at-large trustees” that are officially nominated by the board for their philanthropic history and the social ties they have to other wealthy donors.

This delicate balancing act can be seen by some as a slippery slope towards getting pulled into the gravitational pull of the powerful corporate network with which NGOs are engaging. One ENGO, TNC, found itself embroiled in controversy when that pull was seen as too strong by others outside the ENGO. In 2003, the world’s wealthiest ENGO with over \$3 billion in assets found itself the subject of a *Washington Post* exposé suggesting that, in the pursuit of influence, it had given up too much of its autonomy.¹⁸ While

TNC would be considered a part of the bright green movement and a mediator in its diversity of sectoral ties, critics charged that the organization had become too close to the corporate sector and that this was leading to questionable deals with private members. In the wake of this scandal, TNC was the subject of a federal inquiry and an independent audit, and was forced to distance itself from many of its corporate board members. This event highlights the concerns that many have with environmentalists becoming too close to corporations in general and the criticisms of bright greens in particular.

One way in which ENGOs can address these competing tensions returns us to consideration of the network of organizations, and the opportunities created by coordination among role types. Groups in the periphery of the network can play roles that those in the center cannot. And if coordinated properly, they can create a change within the system through coordinated agenda. For example, a peripheral ENGO such as Rainforest Action Network may threaten to protest a paper supplier such as Staples Inc. for the company's limited offerings of recycled paper, while a mediator ENGO such as EDF may be able to work with the company to develop solutions. Exemplifying the positive radical flank effect, Russell Train, second administrator of the EPA once quipped, "Thank God for the David Brower's of the world. They make the rest of us seem reasonable."¹⁹ [David Brower was a prominent environmentalist in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, and the founder of many environmental organizations, including the Sierra Club Foundation, Friends of the Earth, the League of Conservation Voters, and the Earth Island Institute who used aggressive and confrontational tactics to oppose dams in the Grand Canyon, the Alaska pipeline, the SST and nuclear power.] So, peripheral ENGOs can help mediator ENGOs stay clear on the environmental ideology and assist them in promoting it.

Or, one ENGO may wish to attempt the challenging task of playing multiple roles within the network, such as that of both the autonomous isolate and the influential mediator. EDF, for example, has shifted its tone and posture from its original unofficial and confrontational slogan in the 1970s of "Sue the bastards," to its more collaborative official slogan of "Finding the ways that work" today. But the ENGO did not give up its activist roots entirely. In 2007, when the energy company TXU proposed a series of coal-fired power plants in Texas, EDF staged protests and filed lawsuits. Then, when invited to participate in the negotiations over the leveraged buyout of the company, they hired Perella Weinberg Partners, the boutique investment bank, to advise it on using Wall Street tactics in negotiating mergers and acquisitions. Rather than playing multiple roles within one organization, other ENGOs – such as Friends of the Earth, the League of Conservation Voters, Clean Water, the Sierra Club and TNC – choose to create multiple organizations to accomplish this task; such as a coordinated 501(c)(3) charitable organization, 501(c)(4) social welfare organization and Political Action Committee (PAC) to maximize their ability to maneuver within policy and social spheres.²⁰

As should become clear, network positioning is critical for successful advancement of an ENGOs agenda. But positioning should always be addressed with a careful eye for funding, membership, media attention, and ability to mobilize people – in short power to play the role of change agent. It is important for ENGOs to understand where their constituency lies and to position themselves in a way they are willing to support. Earth First! or the Earth Liberation Front, for example, find that culturally (and legally) illegitimate activities on the far extreme of the isolate position can further their goals and bolster their support within the narrow segment of society that endorse such controversial action.²¹ Other groups, such as TNC or EDF, prefer to work more towards the extremes of the mediator role, within the institutions of society and utilize legitimate market based activities to achieve their ends. When the position matches their constituency's expectations, resources flow. But if an ENGO drifts too far from the expectations of their constituency, they may find membership and donations impacted. For example, in the mid-1990s, Greenpeace began to shift towards the core of the network by working with corporations in a less confrontational style. But members and employees became dissatisfied by the shift and the reputation of the ENGO suffered. To correct this repositioning, the group staged an "eco-commando" action on the Brent Spar oil rig in 1995, being sure to have the media alerted and on hand. This action reestablished their more confrontational image and moved them back out of the corporate network.

Concluding Thoughts

The reality is that the general public refers to the "environmental movement" or "environmentalists" in monolithic terms, generalizing a collective of ENGOs into a cohesive whole. This perception fuels critics like MacDonald and Speth to criticize "the" movement for drifting too far towards the business and market segment. But the environmental movement is not one movement, as Neil Evernden, explains:

"The term 'environmentalist' was not chosen by the individuals so described. It was seized upon by members of the popular press as a means of labeling a newly prominent segment of society. . . In fact, the act of labeling a group may constitute an effective means of suppression, even if the label seems neutral or objective. For in giving this particular name, not only have the labelers forced an artificial association on a very diverse group of individuals, but they have also given a terse public statement of what 'those people' are presumed to want. Environmentalists want environment — obviously. But this may be entirely wrong, a possibility that few environmentalists have contemplated even though many have lamented the

term itself. For in the very real sense there can only be environment in a society that holds certain assumptions, and there can only be an environmental crisis in a society that believes in environment."²²

Network mapping is a powerful visual tool for mapping the complexities of the movement. And the usefulness of maps cannot be underestimated for understanding where you are and where you are going. This paper provides one such map based on corporate/ENGO ties as measured through web page citations. There are many other maps that can be drawn, depending on how you wish to draw the ties and nodes, each providing one more view of this complex movement into greater relief. Such maps are powerful tools for helping ENGO managers consider more coordinated action amongst each other. They can also be helpful for corporate managers to distinguish among potential ENGO partners. In either case, you cannot understand your place and role within the environmental movement without an understanding of the landscape. And with that understanding, you can more effectively achieve your goals. In the immortal words of Yogi Berra, "You got to be careful if you don't know where you're going, because you might not get there."

Figure 1
Two-Mode Network Map: Ties between ENGOs and Corporations




Figure 2
Two-Mode Network Map: Ties between ENGOs and Sectors (OPTION 1: Without sector names)






Figure 2
Two-Mode Network Map: Ties between ENGOs and Sectors (OPTION 2: With sector names)



**Figure 3
Corporate Engagement Roles Employed by ENGOS**

		Position in the Corporate Network		
		Core	Periphery	Disconnected
Diversity of Sector Ties	high	<p align="center"><u>Mediators</u> CERES Conservation International Environmental Defense Fund National Audubon Society Natural Resources Defense Council Nature Conservancy Rainforest Alliance Wildlife Conservation Society Wildlife Habitat Council World Resources Institute World Wildlife Fund</p>	<p align="center"><u>Independents</u> Bat Conservation International Defenders of Wildlife Delta Waterfowl Foundation Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International Ducks Unlimited Environmental and Energy Study Institute Fish America Foundation International Wildlife Coalition Izaak Walton League Jane Goodall Institute Land Trust Alliances Nat. Council for Air/Stream Improvement National Wildlife Federation Quail Unlimited RARE Scenic Hudson Sierra Club The Wilderness Society Trout Unlimited Wildlife Trust Worldwatch Institute</p>	<p align="center"><u>Isolates</u> America the Beautiful Fund Center for Ecoliteracy Center for Health, Environment & Justice Clean Water Action Clean Water Fund Coastal Conservation Association Community Environmental Council Conservancy Association Earth Island Institute Ecological Society of America Environmental Action Foundation Environmental Assessment Association Forest Guild Friends of the Earth Global Warming International Center Great Lakes Fishery Commission Greater Yellowstone Coalition Greenpeace USA International Water Association League of Conservation Voters Marine and Coastal Management The Land Institute The Wildlife Society Water Environment Federation Waterfowl USA</p>
	low	<p align="center"><u>Bridges</u> Center for Clean Air Policy Fauna and Flora International Soil and Water Conservancy Society Student Conservation Association</p>	<p align="center"><u>Captives</u> African Wildlife Foundation American Forests American Rivers Pheasants Forever Rainforest Action Network River Network Whitetails Unlimited Wildlife Forever</p>	

Figure 4
Membership of ENGO Role Types (2005) (OPTION 1)



Budget of ENGO Role Types (2005)






Figure 4
Average Membership of ENGO Role Types (2005) (OPTION 2)



Average Budget of ENGO Role Types (2005)



Appendix:
Environmental NGO Sample Set (2005 Figures)

	Membership (1000s)	Budget (\$ million)
African Wildlife Foundation	65	\$8
America the Beautiful Fund	20	\$5
American Forests	117	\$3
American Rivers	32	\$5
Bat Conservation International	14	\$3
Center for Clean Air Policy	na	\$1
Center for Ecoliteracy	na	\$1
Center for Health, Environment and Justice	27.5	\$1
CERES	na	\$1
Clean Water Action	600	\$9
Clean Water Fund	700	\$2
Coastal Conservation Association	75	\$7
Community Environmental Council	0.9	\$5
Conservancy Association	0.3	\$5
Conservation International	71	\$50
Defenders of Wildlife	71	\$7
Delta Waterfowl Foundation	35	\$2
Dian Fossey Fund	5	\$1
Ducks Unlimited	733	\$128
Earth Island Institute	10	\$1
Ecological Society of America	7.4	\$3
Environmental Action Foundation	10	\$1
Environmental and Energy Study Institute	na	\$1
Environmental Assessment Association	8.2	\$4
Environmental Defense Fund	400	\$45
Fauna and Flora International	4	\$1
Fish America Foundation	na	\$1
Forest Guild	0.178	\$1
Friends of the Earth	26	\$4
Global Warming International Center	12.4	\$75
Great Lakes Fishery Commission	0.012	\$12
Greater Yellowstone Coalition	10.8	\$2
Greenpeace USA	250	\$18
International Water Association	6.85	\$1
International Wildlife Coalition	150	\$3

Izaak Walton League	50	\$4
Jane Goodall Institute	13	\$2
Land Trust Alliances	0.9	\$7
League of Conservation Voters	40	\$2
Marine and Coastal Management	na	\$6
National Audubon Society	600	\$44,
National Council for Air and Stream Improvement	0.1	\$10,
National Wildlife Federation	44	\$96
Natural Resources Defense Council	550	\$46
Nature Conservancy	1000	\$245
Pheasants Forever	100	\$20
Quail Unlimited	55	\$44
Rainforest Action Network	35	\$2
Rainforest Alliance	19	\$8
RARE	2.4	\$4
River Network	na	\$3
Scenic Hudson	11.4	\$3
Sierra Club	550	\$43
Soil and Water Conservancy Society	11	\$1
Student Conservation Association	38	\$20
The Land Institute	2.2	\$1,
The Wilderness Society	255	\$17
The Wildlife Society	9.2	\$2
Trout Unlimited	130	\$10
Water Environment Federation	36	\$18
Waterfowl USA	20	\$1
Whitetails Unlimited	65	\$6
Wildlife Conservation Society	105	\$95
Wildlife Forever	65	\$4
Wildlife Habitat Council	na	\$1
Wildlife Trust	3	\$3
World Resources Institute	na	\$10
World Wildlife Fund	1200	\$60
Worldwatch Institute	2.3	\$4
TOTAL	8,475	\$1,204

Endnotes:

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- ¹ The author would like to thank Gabriele Morandin, Ian Black and Niko Meissner for help in collecting data and conducting early analyses.
- ² Lorsch, D. (1990) "Protesters on the environment tie up Wall Street," *New York Times*, April, 24: B5.
- ³ Strom, S. (1990) "Earth Day extravaganza sheds its humble roots," *New York Times*, April 22: 26.
- ⁴ Painton, P. (1990) "Greening from the roots up: The fanfare masks a quiet revolution," *Time*, April 23: 76.
- ⁵ Speth, G. (2008) "Environmental failure: A case for a new green politics," *The Guardian*, October 21, 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/oct/21/network/print>.
- ⁶ Schwartz, M. and P. Shuva (1992) "Resource mobilization of people: Why consensus movements cannot be instruments of change," in A. Morris and C. McClurg Mueller (eds.) *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Chapter 9.
- ⁷ Schwartz, M. and P. Shuva (1992) "Resource mobilization of people: Why consensus movements cannot be instruments of change," in A. Morris and C. McClurg Mueller (eds.) *Frontiers of Social Movement Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Chapter 9.
- ⁸ Haines, H. (1984) "Black radicalization and the funding of civil rights: 1957-1970," *Social Problems*, 32 1: 31-43.
- ⁹ Ginn, C. (2002) "Creating demand; How corporations co-opted environmentalism," *Harvard Law Record*, April 25: <http://media.www.hlrecord.org/media/storage/paper609/news/2002/04/25/Opinion/Creating.Demand.How.Corporations.CoOpted.Environmentalism-319987.shtml>
- ¹⁰ And in particular, a network software package called UCINET. Borgatti, S., M. Everett, and L. Freeman (2002) *UCINET for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.
- ¹¹ Gale Research (2005) *Encyclopedia of Associations* Detroit: Gale Research Co.
- ¹² At the time of this study, this ENGO was called Environmental Defense. It has since renamed itself Environmental Defense Fund.
- ¹³ Hoffman, A. (2001) *From Heresy to Dogma: An Institutional History of Corporate Environmentalism* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- ¹⁴ Gale Research (2005) *Encyclopedia of Associations* Detroit: Gale Research Co.
- ¹⁵ But, R. (1982) *Toward A Structural Theory Of Action : Network Models Of Social Structure, Perception, And Action* (New York: Academic Press).
- ¹⁶ They also tended to have larger membership (171,000 versus 81,000) and older founding dates (average of 1958 versus 1971).
- ¹⁷ Even if TNC is removed from the calculation, the average annual budget is larger than the other role types (\$36 million).
- ¹⁸ Ottaway, D. and J. Stephens (2003) "Nonprofit land bank amasses billions; Charity builds assets on corporate partnerships," *Washington Post*, May 4: A1
- ¹⁹ US Environmental Protection Agency (1993) *US EPA Oral History Interview #2: Russell Train*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office).
- ²⁰ Reid, E. and J. Kerlin (2003) "Getting the biggest bang for their buck: How tax and political regulation shapes nonprofit advocacy," presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- ²¹ Elsbach, K. and R. Sutton (1992) "Acquiring organizational legitimacy through illegitimate actions: A marriage of institutional and impression management theories," *Academy of Management Journal*, 35 4: 699-738.
- ²² Evernden, N. (1985) *The Natural Alien*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Page 125.