

**Japanese Colonial Policy Studies, 1909-1945:
Nitobe Inazō, Yanaihara Tadao, and Tōbata Seiichi**

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(History)
in The University of Michigan
2017

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To my parents

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation explores the historical origins, development, and transformations of Colonial Policy Studies, an academic discipline in Japan in the era of imperialism, through the writings of its three leading scholars, Nitobe Inazō, Yanaihara Tadao, and Tōbata Seiichi. Founded at Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido, this new, academic discipline took a more systematized form when Nitobe established it at Tokyo Imperial University in 1909. Until 1945, when the Japanese empire collapsed, the discipline provided Japanese society with a basic framework through which they defined colony, colonization, and colonial policy, and legitimized Japanese colonization as a universal phenomenon of the time.

Previous studies have dealt with the three economists within a binary framework of ethical judgment, namely, whether they were internationalists believing in benefits of empire or imperialists advocating exploitation. By placing the colonial policy scholars in the discursive context of their times, my dissertation demonstrates how these opposing terms were, in fact, mutually implicated in their attempts to explain, legitimate, and sometimes criticize Japan's expanding colonial enterprise. Moreover, my study elucidates the continuities that link the conceptual assumptions and theoretical foundations of the three scholars and lend the discipline an internal coherence.

Each of the three scholars represents a distinctive phase in modern Japanese history: Nitobe representing the “nationalist” 1910's, Yanaihara, the “internationalist” 1920's and 1930's,

and Tōbata, the “militarist” late 1930’s and the early 1940’s. This discursive analysis of their lecture notes, monographs, scholarly pieces, and policy papers for the Japanese government demonstrates that they all advocated colonization in some form as an engine of development leading to a greater good, and all believed that empire could be disentangled from imperialism as exploitation, whether in the present or in an imagined future. All three saw colonization as an encounter between different societies with different stages of economic development and as the collective efforts of these societies to utilize all available resources to the maximum to increase human wealth, freedom, and equality for the benefit of all. Ultimately, I show that they served to legitimate and veil Japan’s actual exploitative colonial policies by claiming colonization to be development without exploitation.

INTRODUCTION

Colonial Policy Studies (*Shokuminseisakugaku* or *Shokumin'gaku*) is a modern Japanese academic discipline, which was established at the beginning of the Japanese empire in the late 19th century¹ and abolished with the collapse of the empire in 1945. In the beginning, the discipline started as a class in the Faculty of Agriculture at Sapporo Agricultural College (Sapporo nōgakō) in Hokkaido. The class was called Agricultural Policy and Colonial Policy (*nōseigaku oyobi shokuminsaku*) in 1887 and Colonial History (*shokuminshi*) in 1890. Later, in 1907, it grew to the status of an independent expanded curriculum, titled Colonial Studies (*shokumin-gaku*). The main subject of the discipline in this period was “internal” colonization focusing on the agricultural development of Hokkaido, the northern periphery of Japan.

The discipline made a big stride forward in 1909, when its center moved from Hokkaido to Tokyo. Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933), a graduate of Sapporo Agricultural College, founded Colonial Policy Studies in the Faculty of Law at Tokyo Imperial University, with the help of Gōtō Shinpei, the then head of civilian affairs in the colonial government of Taiwan, and other political and business leaders of Japan. By that time, Nitobe already had established himself as a well-known pacifist and internationalist scholar and had once served as a government bureaucrat in the Meiji period. It was at this juncture that Colonial Policy Studies emerged as a powerful discourse set and institution in imperial Japan. Under the leadership of Yanaihara in the 1920s,

¹ See the Appendix for a chronology of Japanese colonialism.

the new academic discipline was systemized; its textbooks were published, the curriculum was solidified, and the programs were funded by the Japanese government. In this period, the discipline became even more closely related to economics, particularly, studies on the international economy.

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the discipline made another transformation; it developed into a part of area studies departments focusing on Asian countries. As Japan occupied a portion of China, including Manchuria, and later some South East Asian countries through war with Western imperial powers, Colonial Policy Studies became integrated with several disciplines in the human and social sciences, such as history, linguistics, ethnography, anthropology, and medicine, under the name of Colonial Studies (*shokumin-gaku*). Colonial Studies, once an academic field primarily addressing the agricultural economy of colonies, was expanded into interdisciplinary area studies on Asia at that time.

After 1945, Colonial Policy Studies was abolished along with the demise of the Japanese empire, but the academic tradition managed to continue, as some of its classes were taught under the name of International Economy (*kokusai keizaigaku*). Eventually, in 1952, the old discipline was reconstructed as International Relations studies at Tokyo University by combining International Economy and International Politics (*kokusai seijigaku*), which became the theoretical foundation for Japan's foreign development assistance programs.

Colonial Policy Studies has wielded a significant discursive power in Japanese society throughout the modern era until the present day. In pre-1945, it provided Japanese people with terms and a framework to theorize and define colonial relations between Japan and its colonial and occupied territories as well as to enact and to legitimize the Japanese imperial project. After 1945, this system of colonial knowledge continued to provide the intellectual and ideological

ground on which Japanese people characterized the relationship between Japan and its neighboring developing countries; this system also became the basis for establishing international organizations to manage relationships in the region.

As historian Alexis Dudden shows in her book, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power*,² the history of Japanese imperialism was not only about colonial politics and ruling institutions, but also about the discursive legitimization of empire. Japanese aggrandizers in the transformative Meiji era (1868-1912), the period of Japan's modern nation-building, realized the necessity of defining their colonial policies in mutually referential terms of law, that is, international law, if they were to gain full legitimacy for Japan as a colonizing nation in the international politics of imperialism: "Colonizing politics were above all a reflexive process," as Dudden states. Therefore, the Japanese leaders expended a great deal of effort to make their territorial expansion through colonization, as in the annexation of Korea, *legal* in the eyes of the international community. This discursive project of the Meiji leaders, demonstrating Japanese colonization as a recognized practice of the day, was an important factor in the making of modern imperial Japan.

This dissertation explores the history of Colonial Policy Studies, which, as an academic project of Japanese political and intellectual leaders, had as much discursive power as the language of international law. The leaders attempted to legitimate Japan's imperialist claims within Japan and abroad with this new discipline – a discipline that "confirmed by its logic that the Japanese knowledgeably controlled their colonies." In other words, Colonial Policy Studies explained to both the Japanese and the world, "how Japan's empire engaged with and also was

² Alexis Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005).

upheld by the prevailing international political science of the day.”³

The founder of Colonial Policy Studies, Nitobe Inazō, was well aware of this legitimating effect of the new discipline. As will be seen in Chapter 1 in this dissertation, he expected the system of knowledge to “create a foundation for disseminating colonial knowledge to the Japanese people”⁴ for the benefit of the Japanese nation. In 1910, when Nitobe witnessed the official annexation of Korea by Japan,⁵ a “historic” event signaling the rise of Japan as one of the legitimate imperial world powers, he pronounced his view that the most urgent priority was to standardize Japanese colonial knowledge with a “scientific and practical approach, reflecting the contemporary trends of colonization.” Lamenting the fact that even the term, colony, had not been interpreted in Japan according to the “international standard” of the field, Nitobe, as the first chair of the new department at the most prestigious university in Japan, presented a universal definition of colony and explained Japanese colonization as one instance of internationally accepted practices at that time. In his colonial theory, Japanese control of Korea was legitimated as a commonly shared set of colonial practices, comparable to the British colonization of India and colonial activities of other imperialist powers.

From the beginning, Colonial Policy Studies placed great emphasis on acquainting the Japanese people with the “international trends” of colonialism and demonstrating the universality and contemporaneity of their colonial project by employing international terms. The discipline aimed to offer the Japanese people a standardized vocabulary of colonization with which they could communicate with each other and with the people of other countries, including those living

³ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁴ Kaneko Fumio, “Nihon no Shokumin Seisakugaku no Seiritsu to Tenkai,” *Kikan Sanzenri*, no. 41 (February, 1985): 73.

⁵ The Japanese colonization of Korea was possible through an over-a-decade-long process of legitimization, from 1895, by which the Japanese political leaders strove to gain approval for their colonization in the international society of Western imperial counterparts. Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea*.

in the lands that they colonized. The new academic discipline helped to make these terms a part of public discourse in Japanese society, and it also presented Japanese colonization to international society as part of a broader world political field in which all the Western Powers operated at that time.

The colonial policy scholars addressed in this dissertation, Nitobe Inazō, Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961), and Tōbata Seiichi (1899-1983),⁶ each of whom filled the chair of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University in succession (Nitobe, from 1909-1918, Yanaihara, from 1921-1937, and Tōbata, from 1939-1945), all intended to describe the Japanese empire as part of the larger current of world empires. First, they endeavored to define colonization in general as a universal project with a mission to benefit all of humanity, and then argued that the Japanese project could make a contribution to this larger mission of colonization. More specifically, they characterized the ultimate purpose of colonization as “development” (*hatten*, or betterment) for all humanity and, to fulfill this purpose, they identified inter- and transnational cooperative economic development (*kaihatsu*, or the utilization of all resources) under the principle of mutual aid as most critical. They promoted the idea of forging cooperative economic relationships among colonizing countries or between colonizing and colonized countries. Although their specific discussions about the extent and range of such development and the mechanism by which such development would happen varied depending on the historical contexts and theoretical frameworks in which each scholar operated, they all converged along

⁶ In academia, his last name, 東畑, has been read in two ways, Tōbata and Tōhata. The National Diet Library in Japan uses Tōbata, while the Library of Congress in U.S. uses both Tōhata and Tōbata. Because he lived in Japan and all his published books are from Japan, I use Tōbata, following the National Diet Library authorities. Refer to Web NDL Authorities, <http://id.ndl.go.jp/auth/ndla/?qw=%E6%9D%B1%E7%95%91%E7%B2%BE%E4%B8%80&g=all> and Library of Congress' filing, which goes, 100 1_ |a Tōhata, Seiichi, |d 1899-1983; 400 1_ |a Tōbata, Seiichi, |d 1899-1983; 400 1_ |a 東畑精一, |d 1899-1983.

parallel lines to inscribe Japanese colonization as a universal practice of humanity historically verified and commonly understood – that is to say, a cooperative human activity for the betterment of all.

Such an idealist and internationalist idea in the sense of emphasizing cooperation of international communities resulted in a very interesting consequence for the theory and practice of these colonial studies scholars: the producers of the language of colonization legitimizing Japanese empire often became critics of its specific policies in certain contexts. Any colonial project prioritizing the benefit of the metropole to the detriment of the colony was met with criticism by these scholars as an “imperialist” or “exploitative” policy which, according to them, would damage international cooperation. This seemingly contradictory position taken by the Colonial Policy Studies scholars ultimately produced two opposing images of them: as imperialists (*teikokushugisha*) who actually served as propagandists for the Japanese empire, or as internationalists (*kokusaishugisha*) who genuinely disapproved of unfair colonial policies.

This is the main reason why the previous scholarship on the discipline has confined these protagonists within a restrictive binary division, in which it has attempted to define them exclusively as either imperialist or internationalist.⁷ Therefore, the fact that these two contradictory ideas are theoretically linked and logically coexist in their texts has been

⁷ Asada Kyōji, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron* (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1990); Tanaka Shin'ichi, “Shokumin Seisaku to Nitobe,” in Sapporoshi Kyōiku Inkaikai Bunka Shiryōshitsu, eds., *Nitobe Inazō* (Hokkaido Shinbunsha, 1985); Sharlie C. Ushioda, “Man of Two Worlds: An Inquiry into the Value System of Inazō Nitobe (1862-1933),” in Hilary Conroy and T. Scott Miyakawa, eds., *East Across the Pacific* (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio Press, 1972); Thomas Burkman, “Nitobe Inazō: From World Order to Regional Order,” in J. Thomas Rimer, ed., *Culture and Identity: Japanese Intellectuals during the Interwar Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990); Miwa Kimitada, “Crossroads of Patriotism in Imperial Japan: Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), and Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933),” Ph. D. diss., Princeton University (1967); George Masaaki Oshiro, “Internationalist in Prewar Japan: Nitobe Inazō, 1862-1933,” Ph. D. diss. University of British Columbia (Canada, 1985); Ōta Yūzō, “*Taiheiyō no Hashi*” *toshite no Nitobe Inazō* (Misuzu Shobo, 1986); Kang Sang-Jung, “Shakai Kagakusha no Shokumin Ninshiki: Shokumin Seisaku to Orientalism,” in Sakai Naoki, Yamanouchi Yasushi et al., eds., *Nihon Shakai Kagaku no Shisō* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993); Yi Gyu Soo, “Kūndae Ilbon ūi Sikmin Chūngch’ae k e nat’anan Chosūn Insik,” *Asia Munhwa Yōngu*, vol. 26 (2012).

overlooked, or simply forgotten by previous scholars. The existing literature often resolved the alleged ambiguity in Nitobe Inazō's and Yanaihara Tadao's discourses by deeming their internationalist dimension as a product not of their theoretical logic but of their practical strategy. In the previous scholarship on Colonial Studies, the critical positions that these two took toward some colonial policies were just seen as an anomaly, an exception, or an intentional/unintentional rupture with their own theory. More specifically, in the face of the coexistence of imperialism and internationalism within the discourse of Colonial Policy scholars, previous studies have concluded that it was a “theoretical retreat forced by the militarist social atmosphere” (Nitobe)⁸ and a “theoretical error” (Yanaihara).⁹ In the case of Tōbata Seiichi, who played a crucial role in articulating the economic aspects of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere policy during wartime Japan in the late 1930s and early 1940s, only his postwar internationalist thought and activities have been highlighted, while his earlier experience as a colonial scholar has been largely forgotten.

In fact, a few recent studies take a less binary approach to the discourse of Colonial Policy Studies.¹⁰ By historicizing its internationalist rhetoric – “colonization as an international economic community for development of all” – in the context of the Japanese empire, they actually identify the Janus-faced co-existence of internationalism and imperialism at its foundations, and show the ambiguity of the academic discipline that supported “liberalist transnationalism” in the 1920s while endorsing colonization. But in this new trend of critical

⁸ Asada, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron*, 181.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 371.

¹⁰ Sakai Tetsuya, *Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007); “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868-1945,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9:2 (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Michael Schneider, “The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 1914-1931,” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago (1996); Nakano Ryōko, *Beyond the Western Liberal Order: Yanaihara Tadao and Empire as Society* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Morita Ryōji, “Nihon Shakai Kagaku to Shokuminchi Ajia,” Ph. D diss., Osaka University (Osaka, 2000); “Tōbata Seiichi no Philippine: ‘Shokumin Seisakugaku’ kara ‘Chiiki Kenkyū’ e no Tenkai,” *Shakai Shisōshi Kenkyū*, no. 21 (1997).

studies, mainly originating from the field of International Relations studies, Colonial Policy Studies has been examined only as part of the genealogy for their own field of International Relations. As a result, rather than studying the entire period of Japanese empire, these studies concentrate on a specific time frame, particularly, on Yanaihara in the 1920s, to show the “unfortunate” transition from “liberalist transnationalism” to “hegemonic regionalism.” More importantly, they tend to idealize Yanaihara’s conceptualization of the liberalist development of Japanese empire, which, as they suggest, could have been realized without political disruptions like the Manchurian Incident. They even directly link Yanaihara’s liberalist transnationalism in the 1920s to today’s democratic globalism. In doing so, they turn a blind eye to the instrumental role of his theory, which served as a bridge between the theories of Nitobe and Tōbata justifying Japanese imperialism. Consequently, their studies actually end up largely staying within the binary framework of the previous studies.

My dissertation argues that if we explore theoretical linkages among the three protagonists of Colonial Policy Studies, whose academic careers spanned more than three decades, and look into the discursive structure that they “collectively” built, we can overcome the binary “either/or” approach that has divided commentators on whether each of these colonial policy scholars was internationalist or imperialist, an approach that has hindered a comprehensive and systematic understanding of their theory. Rather, a close analysis of core assumptions, main categories, theoretical breakdowns, and key concepts extensively employed in their texts (such as lecture notes, monographs, scholarly pieces in academic journals, and policy papers for Japanese government), as well as a clear revelation of their organizational configurations and discursive strategies will show that, in the work of these colonial scholars, the two ideas, imperialist and internationalist, were never placed in opposition to one another;

instead they were actually integrated in their discursive world.

Moreover, this more discursive analysis helps to capture the theoretical consistency and coherence among the three scholars in a clear way. While what these three had to say here and there about specific colonial policies varied, mostly due to the fact that they were situated in different political contexts – that is, Nitobe in the era of “nationalism” in the 1910’s, Yanaihara in the era of “liberalist internationalism” in the 1920s and early 1930s, and Tōbata in the era of “wartime hegemonic regionalism” in the late 1930s and early 1940s – they shared a common discursive structure in which they used the language of Smithian modern economics, theorized colonization through universal terminology as a vehicle to the progress of humanity, and compared and contrasted the Japanese imperial project with contemporary Western practices.

Both Nitobe and Yanaihara were critics of Japanese assimilation policy, which prioritized the benefit of the metropole and would possibly sacrifice that of the colonies, because it politically undermined the Smithian ideal of international economic cooperation. While their criticism would seem at first sight to claim Japanese empire to be illegitimate, in reality, the opposite was true; at the core of their discursive world, Japanese colonialism was fundamentally described as a universal project in which all humankind should participate – and as an internationally validated practice of the times that was carried out by other imperial powers as well. The specific colonial problems that Japan faced were often depicted as comparable to those that other imperialists also encountered. Regardless of the fact that Nitobe and Yanaihara criticized Japanese assimilation policy, or Tōbata advocated it in a different political atmosphere, namely, the wartime period of total mobilization, their theories were all consistent and comparable in their entanglement of internationalist and imperialist perspectives.

My approach, revealing the theoretical foundations of Colonial Policy Studies through a

discursive analysis, aims to overcome another binary that pervades the discourse of and about Japanese imperialism – a binary that can be regarded as even more significant in light of its lingering effect on today’s international relations between Japan and the countries that were liberated from its colonial rule in 1945, most notably, Korea: whether Japanese colonization was developmental or exploitative. Put differently, the existing studies on Japanese imperialism have asked whether the countries colonized by Japan benefitted from, more specifically, were modernized by, Japanese rule or were so exploited that their path to modernity was derailed.¹¹ This question has arisen frequently in both political and public spheres, creating heated controversies in academic circles as well as causing unceasing political and diplomatic conflict between the two sides.

Such a question, sometimes expressed in a broader form of discussion about the nature of Japanese colonialism, became a major academic topic in the 1960s and 1970s, in the midst of the Cold War, when modernization theory was imported from the U.S to the Asian countries in

¹¹ According to a Korean historian, Lee Süng Ryul, there are three types in the studies on the nature of Japanese colonialism: (1) Perspective of Exploitation (*Sut'alron* 収奪論) focusing on exploitation of Japan’s rule, some of which are, Cho Kijun, *Han'guk Chabonjuüi Söngnipsaron* (Seoul: Taewangsa, 1973); *Han'guk Kiupgasa* (Pak'yöngsa: 1973); “Ilche Singminji T'ongch'ihauü Minjokjabon,” *Hanguk Kündaesaron* 1 (Chisiksanüpsa: 1977); Kang Man'gil, *Chosön Hugi Sangöp Chabon üi Paltal* (Seoul: Koryö Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 1974); Kim Yongsöp, *Chosön Hugi Nongöpsa Yön'gu*, 2 vols. (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1974); Hö Su-yöl, *Kaebal üpnün Kaebal* (Seoul: Ünhaeng Namu, 2005). (2) Perspective of Colonial Modernization (*Singminji Kündaehtarwon* 植民地近代化論) focusing on the colony’s development under Japan’s rule, some of which are, Nakamura Satoru, An Pyüng-Jik, et. al. eds., *Chosen Kindai no Rekishi Zö* (Nihon Hyöronsha, 1988); An Pyüng-Jik, Lee Dae-Gün, Nakamura Satoru, et. al. eds., *Kündae Josün üi Kyüngje Kujo* (Seoul: Pibong Ch'ulpansa, 1989); An Pyüng-Jik and Nakamura Satoru, eds., *Kündae Josün Kongüphwa üi Yüngu: 1930-1945 Nyün* (Seoul: Iljo'gak, 1993); Lee Yöng-Hun, Matsumoto Takenori, et. al. eds., *Kündae Chosün üi Suri Chohap üi Suri Chohap Yüngu* (Seoul: Iljo'gak, 1992); Lee Yöng-Hun, “Oe Tasi Haebang Chönhusa in'ga,” *Haebang Chönhusa üi Chaeinsik 1* (Seoul: Ch'aek Sesang, 2006); James Palais, “Nationalism: Good or Bad?” Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherlini eds., *Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Carter J. Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991). (3) Perspective of Colonial Modernity (*Shingminji Kündaehtarwon* 植民地近代性論) focusing on the coexistence of development and exploitation, some of which are, Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Yun Hae-Dong, *Singminji üi Hoesaek Chidae: Han'guk üi Kündaesöng kwa Singminjuüi Pip'an* (Seoul: Yöksa Pip'yöngsa, 2003); Yun Hae-Dong, et. al. eds., *Kündae rül Tasi Ingnünda: Han'guk Kündae Insik üi Saeroun p'aerödaim ül wihayö* (Seoul: Yöksa Pip'yöngsa, 2006). For the details, see Lee Süng Ryul, “‘Singminji Kündae'ron kwa Minjokchuüi,” *Yöksa Pip'yöng*, no. 80 (Yöksa Munje Yönguso, 2007).

the “free” world. In modernization theory, which played a propagandistic role in articulating the superiority of the capitalist “free” world to the communist bloc, capitalist economic development and Western-styled industrialization were described as the norm and even as the final destination of human development. Thus, under the rubric of the intellectual scheme that elevates the status of capitalist development as universal progress, its historical origins in the then developing countries came under scholarly scrutiny. Some claimed that the countries that had been Japan’s colonies owed their contemporary capitalist development to the period of Japanese colonial rule. Opposing this claim, scholars in the countries that had been Japan’s colonies, particularly in Korea, many of whom were motivated by nationalist sentiment, argued that Japan’s rule had actually prevented Korean capitalism from developing an autonomous path. During the colonial period, they maintained, the Korean economy was subordinated to the Japanese economy for Japan’s benefit, and the indigenously driven development of Korean capitalism was distorted due to this exploitative economic structure.

I do not intend to deeply engage with this debate, nor position myself on either side. Rather than determining which side in the debate is closer to historical reality, instead, I would like to focus on the form the debate has taken – the binary discursive framework of “development *or* exploitation” itself, within which the nature of Japanese colonialism has been discussed. In Chapter 2 and 3 in this dissertation, I will show that the framework was created during the Japanese colonial period by colonial policy scholars. Nitobe, Yanaihara, and Tōbata all emphasized the developmental dimension of colonization first by providing a general definition of colonization as the cooperative efforts of humanity for the development of all. However, they also noted that this general nature of colonization could be expressed differently, namely, taking a more exploitative form, in certain specific historical contexts or cases. Of

course, they all attempted to deemphasize its exploitative dimension by imagining the possibility of colonization as development without exploitation. Such imaginary colonization, based on the affirmation that “colonization is development for all,” became the very ground on which the binary framework of “development or exploitation” was built.

The framework was firstly created by Nitobe. Trained at Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido and inspired by its frontier mentality, he basically defined colonization as a matter between humans and nature, not between two groups of human beings. For him, colonization was a natural phenomenon in which all humanity cooperated in developing nature and, in due course, would reach the ultimate state of human development. In addition to this internationalist view of colonization, however, the founder of Colonial Policy Studies had a “nationalist” view of colonization as well, defining colonization as the territorial expansion of a nation. Living in the early era of nation and empire building of Japan, Nitobe theorized the political exploitation of the colonized and the subsequent conflicts between the colonizer and the colonized in the actual process of colonization as “disturbances,” which inevitably happened on the road to the final stage of human development but would eventually disappear following the law of nature. In this way, he linked colonization as a national phenomenon with colonization as a natural phenomenon that would, he believed, create international development in an organic and harmonious relationship.

It was Yanaihara who inherited Nitobe’s dualistic view of colonization, but made a critical revision of it by establishing an opposing relationship between colonization as an international phenomenon and colonization as a national phenomenon, arguing that the former was for development and the latter for exploitation. In the 1920s, the so-called era of Taisho democracy, Yanaihara, who genuinely aspired to the political emancipation of the colonized and

disapproved of the contemporary trends of colonization caused by imperialism, vividly imagined colonization as development without exploitation. Believing that global modernization resulting from colonization had an emancipatory effect of promoting the freedom of ordinary people and nations, he sought to achieve this ideal status by dividing colonization into two opposing kinds. The first type, colonization as development, occurred as a result of the socio-economic transnational movements of people, without generating any political dominant-subordinate relationship between the metropole and the colony. The second, colonization as exploitation, was conducted for nationalist and imperialist motives to expand the territory of the metropole. He then attempted a theoretical strategy to separate the former from the latter. He conceived of a binary framework of development *or* exploitation as a way to criticize the contemporary trends of colonization, which, he believed, were the fusion of development *and* exploitation. Observing the contemporary trends of colonization in which colonization as development and colonization as exploitation were intricately entangled, Yanaihara dreamt of vitalizing the former and eliminating the latter.

However, once such a binary framework contrasting colonization as development with colonization as exploitation was created, Yanaihara's original critical intent toward the actually existing imperialism was buried under the weight of history. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, in wartime Japan, Tōbata began to assign geographical attributes to this binary framework as a way of justifying Japan's wartime total mobilization in the colonies. He claimed that the Japanese Empire was the model of colonization as development while the British Empire, representing Japan's wartime enemy, adhered to the model of colonization as exploitation. This was the moment when Yanaihara's criticism of "colonization as development *and* exploitation" was transformed into a politically-loaded discourse set and wartime propaganda, "colonization as

development *or* exploitation,” where the Japanese project was legitimized as a developmental one but the case of British colonization was condemned as exploitative. From this moment, the binary framework was employed to disguise the fact that Japan needed to develop and exploit its colonies to fully mobilize their resources in order to expand its sphere of influence during the war.

In this sense, if we discuss the nature of Japanese colonialism within the binary “development *or* exploitation” framework, which was the historical creature of the wartime mobilization period, we remain locked in the very logic manufactured to disguise the nature of colonialism in the era of imperialism. My dissertation seeks to contribute to the scholarship of Japanese imperialism, which is still confined in the binary framework, by revealing a genealogy of how the framework was created, established, and transformed in the texts of Colonial Policy Studies in the era of Japanese empire.

The colonial discourse of “development” has survived in the post-colonial period in the name of “science.” This is mainly because the belief is still widespread that the discourse is based on “scientific,” “objective,” and “practical” research and facts, such as statistics of the growth of schools, literacy rates, population, hospitals, and factories. But this “scientific” methodology has a colonial origin. It was originally created in the colonial and imperial structure in which the rhetoric, “colonization is development for all,” was widely produced and reproduced to become a foundational assumption sustaining the structure. The objectivity of the scientific method itself needs to be reexamined. In fact, when colonial policy scholars actually legitimated the exploitative system of imperialism with the internationalist claim of colonization as development, they did so based on a belief in the validity of “scientific,” “objective,” and “practical” research, which was another universal practice of the day. Nitobe, as mentioned

above, in his project to standardize Japanese colonial knowledge, emphasized that Japanese colonial policy studies must follow the international standards of the field by taking a scientific and practical approach. He then listed modern benefits as the signs of development that colonization brought to humanity, such as medicine and public hygiene, claiming that “colonization is the spread of civilization.” Even Yanaihara, who was a persistent humanist critic of Japanese colonial policy, under the rubric of scientific “objectivity,” praised the spread of modern civilization in the colony – such as public health, education, railways and other transportation, water control and reforestation, political reforms to extinguish evil customs, and nationalism – as having an emancipatory function for ordinary people and nations.

Regarding this question of the objectivity of the scientific methods that originated in the colonial period, very suggestive is Tomiyama Ichirō’s critical review of Japanese intellectuals’ “scientific” works published in the 1930s and 1940s on other cultures. In his article, “Colonialism and the Sciences of the Tropical Zone: The Academic Analysis of Difference in ‘the Island Peoples’,” Tomiyama questions the “objectivity and neutrality” claimed by the human and social sciences of the colonial period in his analysis of the so-called tropical sciences on the Southern Islands during wartime Japan.¹² According to him, “human [and social] sciences such as anthropology, ethnography, geography, and medicine” were produced throughout the entire period of Japanese colonization to examine the subordinated peoples in the colonies, one after the other. These sciences created a relativistic epistemology of unique “traditions” of the colonized by classifying and treating them as the “Other” with uniquely different cultures from “Us,” the Japanese. In his view, that makes this discursive framework of relativism significant – even though it was constructed by “scientific research” and sounded neutral with no political

¹² Tomiyama Ichirō, “Colonialism and the Sciences of the Tropical Zone: The Academic Analysis of Difference in ‘The Island Peoples’,” *Positions* 3:2 (1995).

orientation – is that it became an essential discursive basis for Japanese political and regional domination in the form of the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” which envisioned an international organic community for economic development under the hegemony of the leading country, Japan. He emphasizes the fact that the wartime propaganda claiming “cooperative development” within the Japanese empire was based on the “affirmation of a [scientific] practice, born in the midst of classifying and reforming the Other, not a naked racism or nationalism.”¹³

Tomiyama’s observation of the human sciences is highly suggestive for Colonial Policy Studies as well. Searching for scientific foundations, Nitobe, Yanaihara, and Tōbata, who were all economists, paid close attention to the difference between the colonies as pre-capitalist societies and the metropole as a capitalist society. They then classified the attributes of pre-capitalism and those of capitalism in economics terms and discussed how to reform the pre-capitalist societies to become as modernized as the metropole, the capitalist society, and how the latter could be even more developed. This academic practice was based on their Smithian belief that both the colonies and the metropole developed by forming an international economic system that operated through an international division of labor. They defined colonization as the meeting of different societies with different stages of economic development and as the collective efforts of these societies to utilize all available resources, such as lands and raw materials, to the maximum. Such cooperative efforts were described as a mechanism for increasing human wealth, freedom, and equality. In this way, the scientific methodology of Colonial Policy Studies was conducted under a grand discursive schema: A colonial empire is an international economic community in which the international division of labor enables all its members, including the colonies, to develop. This theoretical setting blurred the fact that colonization was the forceful

¹³ *Ibid.*, 387.

subjugation and exploitation of another country by a capitalist imperialist country that sought new sources of raw materials and markets to solve its domestic problems of overproduction and overcapitalization, but highlighted the alleged benefits that colonization could bring to all, even the forcefully colonized country. The objective and scientific methodology that Colonial Policy Studies claimed for itself was, in fact, created and formulated within this broader discursive field.

By positing Colonial Policy Studies in Japan as an academic discipline and public discourse legitimating Japanese empire in internationalist terms in the period of Japanese imperialism, this dissertation examines the origin, development, and transformation of the new and modern academic discipline. My main interest resides in an exploration of the discursive process by which colonization was inscribed as a universal given of the times. I focus on the process by which the internationalist notion of colonization – “colonization is development for all, including the colonized” – was collectively formulated by these three colonial policy scholars. Using various intellectual sources to claim scientific and practical validation for their discipline, these scholars legitimated this internationalist definition of colonization. While such a definition actually allowed them to criticize specific Japanese colonial policies that, they believed, would damage international cooperation in pursuit of development through colonization, this critical stance did not mean that they opposed colonization itself. By examining the genealogy of the conceptualization of colonization without exploitation in these three scholars, my dissertation will elucidate the fact that internationalism and imperialism were always mutually implicated in Japanese colonial theory.

Although Nitobe, Yanaihara, and Tōbata collectively created the internationalist definition of colonization, their motives, goals, and ideas were not completely identical. As the historical contexts in which they acted as colonial policy scholars varied, so too did the concrete

content of their thought. I will show how their different ideas converged in the coherent and systematic discourse set of colonization and development in the shared theoretical space in which they rejected, revised, appropriated, and embraced others' ideas. My genealogy starts from the creation of Colonial Policy Studies. In Chapter 1, I examine Nitobe's colonial thought and activity as the origin of the academic discipline. First, I describe the relocation of the center of colonial studies from Hokkaido to Tokyo with Nitobe's establishment of the new academic discipline at Tokyo Imperial University and address the historical significance of this move in terms of Japanese political and intellectual leaders' discursive project to legitimate Japanese empire as a universal colonial practice. I then explore the significance of Nitobe's double definition of colonization as both a natural phenomenon *and* a national phenomenon. Chapter 2 deals with Yanaihara's revision of Nitobe's colonial thought. In the liberalist mood after WWI, he endeavored to introduce radical reform into mainstream academic thought in the field of colonial studies. As a passionate sympathizer with the colonized, he conceived a colonial theory for all, including the colonized and the colonizer; this theoretical vision provided a logical foundation for his successor, Tōbata, who was able to make an economic policy theory to support a more militarist Japanese colonial policy. In Chapter 3, I analyze Tōbata's colonial thought by putting special emphasis on its legacy in post-colonial Japanese international relations. I reveal colonial origins in the post-1945 activity of Tōbata as an advisor of the Japanese foreign assistance program (ODA, the Official Development Assistance).

Colonial Policy Studies claimed to be a science. By using internationally circulated terms of human and social sciences of the day, the new academic discipline defined and legitimated colonization as an international, cooperative human effort to bring development to all, including the colonized. This discursive framework of colonization and development was widely

disseminated and circulated as the universal understanding of the day in Japan and in the empire as a whole. The chapters that follow explore the formation of this powerful discursive set in Japan.

Chapter 1:

Nitobe Inazō: The Founder of Japanese Colonial Policy Studies

Introduction

Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933) was the original “pioneer of Japanese Colonial Policy Studies” (*Shokumingaku* or *Shokumin seisakugaku*)¹⁴ and one of the most influential public figures in Japan in his time. His theory of colonization provided the basic framework, throughout the entire period of Japanese imperialism, for later Japanese colonial policy scholars who relied on him to craft their own theories. Many of his ideas persisted in the work of Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) and Tōbata Seiichi (1899-1983), who will be the subjects of later chapters in my dissertation. As Nitobe was the thinker who provided the coherence of Japanese colonial theory throughout the entire imperial era, it would be most relevant to begin my discussion with a close analysis of his theory. In particular, I will attempt to show that the two strands of his theory, his definitions of the colony as a natural phenomenon and as a national one, are not separate as usually understood by previous scholars, but are in fact deeply and inextricably intertwined.

To best understand Nitobe’s thinking, I will draw on details of his life as well as his

¹⁴ Ōuchi Hyōe, “Kaisetsu,” in Nitobe Inazō Zenshū Henshū Iinkai, eds., *Nitobe Inazō Zenshū* [NIZ afterwards], vol. 4 (1969), 645. This famous Marxist economist calls Nitobe the “pioneer of the colonial policy studies” arguing that “colony” (*shokumin*) had not been considered as an academic theme until Nitobe. He was one of Nitobe’s students at the Tokyo Imperial University, and took his colonial policy classes in 1912 and 1913.

works. Therefore, this chapter will start with the facts of Nitobe's biography that significantly affected and directed his thinking about the subject of colonization. I will then focus on the two main threads of his theory noted above and explore how these two seemingly contradictory concepts actually align with each other. The result will be an understanding of Nitobe's thought that emphasizes the continuity of colonial theory throughout the Japanese colonial period.

Nitobe was a famous public writer, educator, diplomat, administrator and scholar. His fame began with his book, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, which he wrote in English and published in the U.S. in 1900.¹⁵ Soon it was published in Japan too, in its original form without being translated into Japanese, and over the next three years it ran through nine printings.¹⁶ Particularly after 1905, when Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, the international interest in Japanese culture surged, and the book was newly published in a revised and expanded edition and widely distributed to the world by a major American publisher. In the preface of this new edition, Nitobe referred to Theodore Roosevelt's appreciation of his book, which further enhanced sales.¹⁷ On April 12, 1905, he and his wife were even invited to the Imperial palace for an audience with Emperor Meiji.¹⁸ By the age of forty three, he had become internationally well-known as one of the most prestigious Japanese scholars and educators, versed in both Japanese and Western cultures.¹⁹

¹⁵ Nitobe Inazō, *Bushido: the Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought* (Philadelphia: Leeds & Biddle, 1900). In this book, Nitobe analyzes the moral codes of the Japanese medieval warrior class, samurai, associating them with the modern bourgeois values of western Europe and the U.S. See Michael Schneider, "The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 1914-1931," 52.

¹⁶ Nitobe Inazō, *Bushido: the Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought* (Tokyo: Shōkwabō, 1900). George Masaaki Oshiro, "Internationalist in Prewar Japan: Nitobe Inazō, 1862-1933," 100.

¹⁷ Nitobe Inazō, *Bushido, The Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought*. 10th rev. and enl. ed. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905). Most libraries have this tenth and revised edition. See Alexis Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea*, 180.

¹⁸ Oshiro, *Internationalist in Prewar Japan*, 107-109.

¹⁹ Unlike this popular acclaim, the established Japanese scholars in these areas were critical of the academic quality of *Bushido*. For example, Inoue Tetsujiro dismissed it as an "amateur's work trespassing the turf." This philosopher

Nitobe was a recognized “internationalist,” frequently called by his self-made epithet, “bridge across the Pacific.” That lifelong motto describes not just his literary and academic works emphasizing international cooperation, but also his actual life. A faithful Christian, in 1891, he married an American woman from a distinguished Quaker missionary family from Philadelphia. And in 1911, he was selected as the first exchange professor from Japan to work in America under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. For nine months, he gave 166 lectures at a variety of universities and academic institutions including Brown University, Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Minnesota, and others. When the League of Nations was established in 1920, he was appointed as an Under Secretary-General and worked there until 1927, after which he worked for the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) as the Japanese chairman.²⁰

But as Oshiro Masaaki pointed out, though he was a famed and revered public figure in his time, many Japanese people nowadays, in contrast to his contemporaries such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Natsume Sōseki, have not remembered him as such.²¹ It has been the case since 1945 and the end of Japanese empire. This sudden forgetting of Nitobe among the Japanese public, in my view, is most likely related to his “ambiguous” position in the prewar era, somewhere between internationalist and imperialist. In 1932, less than a year after the Manchurian Incident, Nitobe set off on a lecture tour to the U.S. and Canada to defend the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Through nationwide radio broadcasts across the U.S. and public lectures at major universities, he defended the legitimacy of his nation’s military and political actions in Manchuria, which had cold the responses there. He died of an illness the following

of Japan and others chastised him for carelessly identifying Japanese medieval values with Western modern values particularly related to Quakerism. *Ibid.*, 100-101.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 51-56, 135-147, 181-219.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

year in Canada.²² In the Japanese public view, Nitobe has been regarded as a man of contrasts. On the one hand, he is seen as a Taisho-liberal who promoted democracy and social justice to the extent that he highly praised the Japanese socialist movement in 1902, for he viewed socialism as a means of social reform for struggling common people.²³ On the other hand, he has been looked upon as a “successful” colonial bureaucrat who worked for the colonial government in Taiwan, as well as a prominent colonial policy scholar who espoused colonial domination and oppression of other nations.²⁴ The difficulty with reconciling these two aspects has made postwar Japanese society reluctant to revere Nitobe.

In fact, when the issue of whether to print Nitobe’s portrait on the 5,000 yen Japanese banknote arose in 1981, a controversy ensued, unlike the uncontested processes of printing Fukuzawa Yukichi on the 10,000 yen note and Natsume Sōseki on the 1,000 yen note. Inuma Jirō and Satō Masahiro had heated debates in *the Mainichi* and *the Asahi* newspapers. Inuma opposed the idea, arguing that Nitobe was a “pure imperialist” throughout his life, even before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, which was conventionally identified as the turning point when Nitobe suddenly changed his position from anti-imperialism to pro-imperialism. Satō held, by contrast, that Nitobe was a genuine Christian, liberal, humanist and pacifist, who dreamt of the cooperation of the entire human race, as exemplified in his idea of “the internationalization of lands.”²⁵

Nitobe has left a legacy of dual images: One is as a humanist and internationalist, the

²² Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea*, 140-141; Oshiro, *Internationalist in Prewar Japan*, 235-261.

²³ Oshiro, *Internationalist in Prewar Japan*, 171.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 91-97, 148-156. Oshiro shows his own difficulties with handling the aspect of Nitobe as a colonial policy scholar as well as bureaucrat. Compared to the internationalist and liberalist aspect of Nitobe, this facet is covered much less significantly.

²⁵ Sakai Tetsuya, “Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo,” *Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron* (Tokyo: Iwanami Koza, 2007): 196-197. For Inuma’s argument, see *The Mainichi*, 26 August 1981 and *The Asahi*, 27 November 1984 and 1 February 1985. For Sato’s argument, see *The Mainichi*, 4 September 1981 and *The Asahi*, 25 December 1984 and 1 March 1985.

more familiar image to the external world, as captured in the epithet, “bridge across the Pacific”²⁶; the other is as an ardent imperialist, as seen in his speech during his trip to America in 1932 defending the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.²⁷ Most of the existing studies on Nitobe’s thoughts have explored him within the framework of this dichotomy, choosing sides on the question of whether Nitobe was a liberal humanist and a pacifist internationalist or a racist imperialist.²⁸ And, as in the case of its pioneer, Colonial Policy Studies in Japan has also received these dual responses from the public who have judged the academic discipline within the framework of whether it was “internationalist” or “imperialist” system of knowledge and educational program.

Given the context of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, however, this categorical dichotomy between “internationalist” and “imperialist” may fail to effectively capture the position of Nitobe and other colonial policy scholars. At that time, the two concepts were closely interrelated to the extent that they sustained each other. On a broad level, some scholars have already addressed this point.²⁹ Sakai Tetsuya, an international relations sociologist, attempts to

²⁶ Most biographies of Nitobe have focused on this aspect of him as “internationalist.” Kitazawa Sukeo, *The Life of Dr. Nitobe* (Tokyo: Hokuseidō, 1953); Isonokami Gen’ichiro, *Taiheiyo no Hashi* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1971); Satō Masahiro, *Nitobe Inazō: Shōgai to Shisō* (Tokyo: Kirisutokyō Tosho Shuppansha, 1980); Uchikawa Eiichirō, *Nitobe Inazō: The Twilight Years [Bannen no Inazō]*, Trans. Michael Newton (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1985); Sasaki Takamura, *Amerika no Nitobe Inazō* (Morioka: Iwate Broadcasting Company, 1985); Oshiro, *Internationalist in Prewar Japan*; Ōta Yūzō, “*Taiheiyo no Hashi*” *toshite no Nitobe Inazō*; John F. Howes ed, *Nitobe Inazō: Japan’s Bridge across the Pacific* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). Oshiro provides an annotated bibliography of the Nitobe biographies that had been written by 1985. See Oshiro, *Ibid.*, 348.

²⁷ Nitobe, “The Manchurian Question and Sino-Japanese Relations” (Lecture delivered on 21 September 1932), in Takagi Yasaka et. al. ed., *The Works of Inazo Nitobe*, vol. 4 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1972): 221-233.

²⁸ Tanaka Shinichi, “Nitobe Inazō to Chosen,” *Kikan Sanzenri*, vol. 34 (1983); “Shokumin Seisaku to Nitobe”; Hirase Tetsuya, “Nitobe Inazō no Shokumin Shisō,” *Tōkyō Joshi Daigaku Fusoku Hikaku Bunka Kenkyū Kiyō* 47 (1986); Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “Nitobe Inazō ni okeru Teikokushugi to Kokusaishugi,” in Ōe Shinobu, et. al. eds., *Kindai Nihon to Shokuminchi*, vol. 4 (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1993); Kang Sang-Jung, “Shakai Kagakusha no Shokuminchi Ninshiki.”

²⁹ Mrinalini Sinha, *Specters of Mother India: the Global Restructuring of an Empire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); John Fabian Witt, *Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of American Law* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); David Long and Peter Wilson eds., *Thinkers of the Twenty Year’s Crisis: Interwar Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); David Long and Brian Schmidt eds., *Imperialism*

explain the interrelation through his analysis of “civilization.” In his view, the modern concept of “civilization” was so double-edged that it contained the elements of both internationalism and imperialism within itself without any contradiction. It was a concept infused with social Darwinism, which identified the difference among societies as based on the level of civilization, and functioned as a justification for imperialist rule over the lower by the higher in the name of “survival of the fittest.” Under the rubric of the “standard of civilization,” internationalism, which espoused international cooperation among “legally equal” sovereign states, coexisted with imperialism advocating the aggressive expansion into non-Western regions, which were not recognized as fully civilized nations and thus were unqualified to be members of the international society yet.³⁰

My analysis of Nitobe’s idea of colonialism will show that he was simultaneously both an internationalist *and* an imperialist. The two categories were so intermixed in his scholarship throughout his life that any attempt to sharply divide the two cannot give a holistic picture of his colonial thought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Noting this point, previous scholars have attempted to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory images of Nitobe, but their efforts have not been fully successful. For example, Asada Kyōji, a preeminent post-war scholar of Japanese colonialism and colonial policy, attempts to do so by limiting the definition of “imperialist” (*teikokushugisha*). He defines the “imperialist” as an “advocate of political reaction and dictatorship domestically and, at the same time, an advocate of colonization internationally.” With this narrow definition, he tries to exempt Nitobe from the category of imperialist by highlighting Nitobe’s sympathy for “exploited” social classes in Japan. Asada calls him instead a

and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

³⁰ Sakai Tetsuya, “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868-1945,” 234; “Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo,” 199.

“humanist colonial policy scholar who approved of colonialism in a formal sense” (*shokumin teisai yōnin suru jindōshugiteki shokuminseisakugakusha*).³¹ By deliberately using the term “colonialism in a formal sense” (*shokumin teisai*) to soften “colonial” (*shokumin*), Asada implies that Nitobe, who espoused colonial expansion in a humanist and internationalist guise, should not be labeled an imperialist. Nevertheless, Asada’s division of humanism/internationalism and imperialism into two separate domains renders him unable to reconcile Nitobe’s defense of the “Manchurian Incident” in 1931 with his entire theoretical itinerary from the 1890s through the 1930s.³² Instead, Asada ends up claiming that Nitobe’s imperialist justification of the Japanese advance into China was a strategic “retreat” which the internationalist humanist was forced to make in the midst of the militaristic social atmosphere of the time.³³

In his study of ideas of the future of the Japanese empire among Japanese colonial policy scholars in the years from 1914 to 1931, Michael Schneider, a historian of Japanese international relations, attempts to show the coexistence of internationalism and imperialism within Nitobe by exploring “cultural internationalism” in his colonial theory.³⁴ Schneider argues that Japanese imperialism was not conceptualized in the 1920s based on “exceptionalism,” emphasizing Japanese particular nationalist interests,³⁵ but on universalism. Schneider places great

³¹ Asada Kyōji, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron*, 181-182.

³² Other scholars have shared this problem. For example, Tanaka Shin’ichi, “Shokumin Seisaku to Nitobe”; Sharlie C. Ushioda, “Man of Two Worlds: An Inquiry into the Value System of Inazo Nitobe (1862-1933)”; Thomas Burkman, “Nitobe Inazō: From World Order to Regional Order”; Miwa Kimitada, “Crossroads of Patriotism in Imperial Japan: Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), and Nitobe Inazō (1962-1933)”; Oshiro, *Internationalist in Prewar Japan*; Ōta Yūzō, “*Taiheiyō no hashi*” *toshite no Nitobe Inazō*.

³³ However, Mary P. Elkinton, Nitobe’s wife, clarified that Nitobe had not been compelled by any authority to go to America and defend the Japanese military attack of Manchuria. She said that he had done so of his own will. Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea*, 141; Along with the Showa militarism, for the factors of the “retreat,” Asada blames Nitobe’s neglect of the ethnic problem in the colonial problem. He states, “Nitobe’s humanism, which did not include the fact that the colonial problem was essentially an ethnic problem, gave its way to the social pressure in the authoritarian state.” Asada, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron*, 181.

³⁴ Michael Schneider, *The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire*, 46-50.

³⁵ Schneider means by this term the “exceptional” view of Japanese imperialism, which emphasizes the “special rule of the Emperor system, the special needs of national defense and regional stability in East Asia, the special

importance on Nitobe's reconceptualization of the Japanese empire as an international movement for the cultural and economic development of the entire human race, not as a national one for the political and military growth solely of the colonizing nation. In order to highlight the link between Nitobe's internationalist and imperialist ideas, however, Schneider completely leaves out Nitobe's nationalist view of colonization, which was another key strand of his colonial thought. Overlooking the fact that Nitobe led the trend in the 1910s toward defining colonialism as a national and political matter, Schneider assumes that Nitobe only emphasized the internationalist and cultural/economic aspect of colonization.³⁶ Summarizing his view of Nitobe, Schneider asserts, "cultural universalism thus took Nitobe *away from*³⁷ the particularistic aspects of colonialism (race, ethnicity/*minzoku*, nationality/*kokuminsei*) to the universal (economic development, moral valuation, culture, civilization (*bunmei*))."³⁸

Similarly, in his study on the Japanese social and cultural transition from internationalism in the 1920s to imperialism in the 1930s, Sakai Tetsuya attempts to understand Nitobe's thought by concentrating on his internationalism, without seriously considering its interconnectedness with his nationalism which was already apparent in the 1910s. According to Sakai, the internationalist colonial thought of Nitobe developed after WWI following the contemporary cultural phenomenon known as the "Discovery of Society" (*shakai no hakken*):³⁹ After the destructive world war broke out among states, the supremacy of state sovereignty became subject to question, and thus the concept of "society (*shakai*)" as autonomous from "state" (*kokka*) arose

cultural unity of Asians, and the special geographical proximity of Japan's empire." *Ibid.*, 5; Michael Schneider, "The Intellectual Origins of Colonial Trusteeship in East Asia: Nitobe Inazō, Paul Reinsch and the End of Empire," *American Asian Review* 17. 1 (Spring 1999): 14.

³⁶ Schneider, *The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire*, 50-54.

³⁷ This is my emphasis.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 54.

³⁹ Carol Gluck and Douglas Howland have located the "Discovery of Society" earlier around the turn-of-the-20th century. Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myth* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985); Douglas Howland, *Translating the West* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai'i Press).

as an alternative concept for building a peaceful world.⁴⁰ In colonial studies as well, Sakai argues, scholars including Nitobe began to view the Japanese empire as a reciprocal and cooperative socio-economic community of autonomous social groups, that is, Japan and its colonies.⁴¹

In fact, these analyses by Sakai and Schneider are more appropriate to the ideas of Yanaihara Tadao, which will be discussed in the next chapter, rather than to those of Nitobe. I argue that it was Yanaihara who used the idea of society to redefine colonization and empire in order to overcome the limitations of a national and political conceptualization that had caused conflicts among nations. By contrast, Nitobe constructed his internationalist view of colonization on the basis of his nationalist understanding of it; the interconnectedness of these two in his theory ultimately left a lasting legacy for later generations. In this chapter, I will tackle the question about how Nitobe's seemingly contradictory ideas of colonization—on the one hand, an internationalist view considering it as a universal value for all humanity and, on the other, a nationalist one as a particular value only for the colonizing country—could coexist and sustain each other in his theoretical logic. The answer will be given when I explore his concept of colonization as a *natural* phenomenon.

The main body of this chapter will consist of four parts. In the first section, I will deal with aspects of Nitobe's biography that had a significant influence on his colonial theory. In addition, I will examine his leading role in establishing colonial policy studies at Tokyo Imperial University. By doing so, I will shed light on the early institutionalization of Colonial Policy Studies in Japan, as well as on why and in what context the studies became established in Japan as an academic discipline.

⁴⁰ Sakai Tetsuya, "Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo," 199-200.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 206-214.

In the following three sections, I will give a detailed analysis of Nitobe's colonial theory through his main works. First, I will introduce Nitobe's view of colonization as a natural phenomenon. He saw colonization as something natural and morally good because it is subject to God's or natural law. To him, colonization was originally a matter between humans and nature, not between humans. He defined colonization as an international cooperative activity in which all humans make relations with nature and God. Nitobe's deliberate selection of a proper Japanese translation for *colony* will be discussed as evidence to prove this point.

Then, I will examine Nitobe's conceptualization of colony, colonization, and colonial policy as national phenomena. Rejecting an existing view of colonization as the social relations among private social groups, he attempted to theorize colonization as a function of national policy to emphasize the public and political relations between colonizer and colonized. I will explore the reason why he adhered to this nationalist concept of colonization in relation to the historical context of Japan at that time. In addition, I will reinterpret his idea of "colonial policy prioritizing the benefits of the colonized" (*shokuminchi hon'i shugi seisaku*)—which has been invoked to show his genuine internationalist aspirations⁴²—in the light of his nationalist orientation.

Lastly, I will reveal the theoretical logic by which the two strands of Nitobe's colonial theory that are seemingly opposite to each other, colonization as a natural and a national phenomenon, are integrated into one. Focusing on his argument regarding the ultimate goal of colonization, influenced by 1) August Comte's philosophy, 2) theories of social evolution drawn from Charles Darwin, Henri Bergson, and Herbert Spencer, and 3) Adam Smith's view of the colony, I will show how Nitobe subsumed colonization as a national project with a particularistic

⁴² Kawata Tadashi, "Kokusai Keizai," Tokyo Daigaku Keizaigakubu, eds., *Tokyo Daigaku Keizaigakubu 50nen Shi* (1976): 459.

value under colonization with an internationalist value. Nitobe found a way to dismiss the national conflicts caused by colonization as a temporal “disturbance” that would inevitably occur as a historical necessity but would be resolved eventually by human efforts at pacification. Nitobe theorized the national aspect of colonization as a constituent of the natural dimension of colonization; as a result, the particularistic form of colonization was idealized as the one with a universal value—to lead all nations to the final stage of human development, the perfect harmony among humans, nature, and God.

In the conclusion, I will discuss the limitations and significance of Nitobe’s colonial theory, which affected Japanese intellectual circle and society throughout the entire period of Japanese colonialism. In doing so, I provide an idea based on which the development of Japanese colonial thinking can be comprehensively understood as a continuous and consistent process, even with the existence of notable historical ruptures during the period.

Nitobe and Colonial Policy Studies

In 1909, Nitobe became the first chair of the Colonial Policy Studies Department, newly established at Tokyo Imperial University. By that time, he was an established colonial policy expert, not only as a scholar but also as a colonial bureaucrat. He had been trained in Japan, America, and Germany, and had worked in Taiwan for the Japanese colonial government. Born in Morioka in 1862 to a high-ranking samurai family of the Nanbu domain,⁴³ Nitobe graduated from the elite Tokyo English School (*Tokyo Eigo Gakkō*) in 1876 and entered Sapporo Agricultural College in 1877 as part of the second class, where he majored in agricultural policy

⁴³ Oshiro, *Internationalist in Prewar Japan*, 13.

(*nōseigaku*). Sapporo Agricultural College (*Sapporo Nōgakō*) had been newly established in 1876 by the Hokkaido Colonization Office (*kaitakushi*) of the Meiji government to support its colonizing project on the northern frontier, which had just started in 1875.⁴⁴ At the college, which was staffed with American teachers who were Christian, Nitobe received his baptism and became Christian in 1878 with some of his classmates, including Uchimura Kanzō.⁴⁵

After his graduation in 1881, he worked for about two years at the Hokkaido Colonization Office and then at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, to which the Office's functions were transferred. In 1884, he went to the U.S. to study at Johns Hopkins University. He spent three years there studying economics and politics under the guidance of his advisor, Richard T. Ely, an ethical economist and reformist who interpreted American politics from perspectives borrowed from the German social policy school.⁴⁶ Along with Ely, Nitobe was influenced by Herbert Baxter Adams, among the best-known historians in early twentieth-century America, from whom he learned history, literature, and international politics.⁴⁷ Under Adams' guidance, Nitobe changed his field of interest from agricultural economics to US-Japan relations and published a book on the topic.⁴⁸ In 1887, he went to Germany with the sponsorship of the Sapporo Agricultural College, which had just appointed him as an assistant professor of Agricultural Economics. He studied economics and agricultural economics at the University of Bonn, the University of Berlin, and University of Halle, where he received his first doctoral

⁴⁴ Tanaka Shin'ichi, "Shokumingaku no Seiritsu," in Hokkaido daigaku eds., *Hokudai Hyakunenshi Tsuusetsu*, 1982; "Nitobe Inazō to Chosen," 90; Michele Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan: Envisioning the Periphery and the Modern Nation-State* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 35-36.

⁴⁵ Oshiro, *Ibid.*, 21-23.

⁴⁶ Sakai, "Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo," 213.

⁴⁷ Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*, 133; Tōbata, "Nitobe Inazō," *Keizaigaku Daijiten*, vol. 3 (Tōyō Keizai Dhinpōsha, 1959): 311.

⁴⁸ Nitobe Inazō, *The Intercourse between the U.S. and Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1891). This is a series of the Studies of Historical and Political Science that Adams edited for Johns Hopkins Press. Oshiro, *Internationalist in Prewar Japan*, 39.

degree. After finishing his studies in Germany, he came back with his new wife, Mary P. Elkinton, to Japan in 1891 and taught colonial history (*shokuminshi*) at Sapporo Agricultural College until 1897,⁴⁹ when he had to stop teaching to receive medical treatment in the U.S. During his stay in the U.S., he published *Bushido* in 1900.

After recovering, Nitobe was appointed to be the head of the Sugar Industry Bureau of the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan (Taiwan *Sōtokufu*) in 1901. From that time until 1903, he worked in Taiwan under the patronage of Gotō Shinpei (1857-1929), the head of civilian affairs in the colonial government of Taiwan. Upon Gotō's request, he drew up plans for the reform of the Taiwanese sugar industry in 1901 based on his three-month inspection tour, and made a great success in the industry.⁵⁰

From 1903 to 1905, Nitobe taught colonial theory at Kyoto Imperial University in Japan while still being associated with the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan.⁵¹ During that time, he saw the victory of his home country in the Russo-Japanese War and its subsequent feat of making Korea a protectorate. His own success followed too, as *Bushido* became a bestseller in Japan and abroad. Then, in 1906, he was able to move to Tokyo because he had been offered the position of headmaster at the elite First Higher School. The well-known public figure accepted

⁴⁹ Kaneko Fumio, "Nihon niokeru Shokuminchi Kenkyū no Seiritsu Jijō," 72; Tanaka Shin'ichi, "Nitobe Inazō to Chosen," 90; Satō Shōsuke, who had graduated one year before Nitobe from Sapporo Agricultural College and had studied with him at Johns Hopkins University, helped Nitobe get a professorship at Sapporo Agricultural College. Satō taught Colonial History (Shokuminshi) at Sapporo Agricultural College in 1891, which was the first lecture on colonial studies at the college level in Japan. Tanaka Shin'ichi, an economics professor at Hokkaido University, argues that Nitobe taught Colonial History from 1894 to 1895, not to 1897. After 1895, he argues, Satō taught the class again, and after Satō, Takaoka Kumaō, who had been one of Nitobe's students from the college, took charge of it. The Colonial History class was expanded to a course, Colonial Studies (Shokumin'gaku) in 1907, when Sapporo Agricultural College grew to Tohoku Imperial University. For the genealogy of Shokumingaku at Sapporo Agricultural College, see Tanaka Shin'ichi, "Shokumingaku no Seiritsu." For Satō Shōsuke, see Inoue Katsuo, "Satō Shōsuke 'Shokuminron' Kōgi Nōto," *Hokkaido Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō*, no. 93 (1998).

⁵⁰ Nitobe, "Tōgyō Kairyō Ikensho" (1901), *NIZ*, vol. 4, 169-226. In Taiwan, Nitobe is known as the "father of the sugar industry." Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*, 133.

⁵¹ Tanaka, "Nitobe Inazō to Chosen," 89; Kaneko, "Nihon niokeru Shokuminchi Kenkyū no Seiritsu Jijō," 73. Kaneko mentions that Nitobe was able to get this Kyoto professorship through Gotō's recommendation.

this offer on the condition that he would also be appointed as a professor in the Department of Agriculture at Tokyo Imperial University. He taught colonial policy studies there.

In 1909, Nitobe moved again to the Faculty of Law at the same university, where he took the initiative to establish Colonial Policy Studies as a sub-division of the Law Faculty. His initiative was supported financially by Gotō as well as several businessmen and colonial bureaucrats who had made a success in Taiwan and Korea. He stressed to them the importance of establishing colonial studies as an independent academic discipline. “In light of the colonial governance of Taiwan,” he said, “it has become an urgent priority to create a foundation for disseminating colonial knowledge to the Japanese people.”⁵² As a public educator, he no doubt believed that his nation should be more prepared before the imminent expansion of territory that would come with the annexation of Korea. He began the task to standardize and systematize Japanese colonial knowledge in emulation of the examples set by Western counterparts.

In 1910, the year of the official colonization of Korea, Nitobe established the Association of Colonial Studies (*shokumingakkai*) with Takekoshi Yosaburō (1865-1950), a historian and politician. Since Colonial Studies was just emerging in Japan and scholars specializing in the new field were few, the members of the association, numbering approximately 150 in total, were mostly politicians, businessmen, and men of letters who had been engaged primarily in Taiwan. In fact, they regarded themselves as an “academic association of colonization” (*shokumin no gakkai*) rather than as an “association of colonial studies” (*shokumingaku no kai*). At the inaugural meeting of the association in Tokyo, Terauchi Masatake (1852-1919), Governor General of Korea, and Uchida Kakichi (1866-1933), Chief of Home Affairs of Taiwan, who later became Governor General of Taiwan in 1923, were present and listened to the public lectures on

⁵² Kaneko, *Ibid.*

various contemporary colonial issues such as British colonial policy in India, the nature of Japanese imperialism, the national motives for colonization, and economic policy in the colony.⁵³

Japanese businessmen and bureaucrats were eager to understand the meaning of what they were doing and the best policy options that they should adopt in the light of world trends. They believed that colonization was an important project, not only at the national level, but also at a more individual level, as an opportunity for personal profit.⁵⁴ Especially because they had already observed the rapid growth of the sugar industry in Taiwan, they were eager to know what they could expect from Korea. Thus, the establishment of colonial policy studies as a scholarly discipline was the creation of a kind of consortium of bureaucrats, businessmen, and scholars, who aimed to educate the public as well as themselves in the most up-to-date trends of colonialism for national and personal benefit.

Nitobe taught colonial policy studies during the critical period between the Russo-Japanese War and the end of WWI, when Japan rose as an imperialist power. As Ōuchi Hyōe summarizes, from his Kyoto period (1903-1905) to his Tokyo period (1906-1919), Nitobe made Japanese society acknowledge the theme of colony (*shokumin*) as academic. “Nitobe was indeed the pioneer of Colonial Policy Studies,” Ōuchi comments, “who started his career as an agricultural economist in Hokkaido, but later became a colonial policy scholar in Tokyo.”⁵⁵

Nitobe’s main works on colonization and colonial policy were written mostly in the Tokyo years, 1906-1919,⁵⁶ when he taught the subject at Tokyo Imperial University. At this time,

⁵³ Takaoka Kumao, “Kaichō Aisatsu,” in Kaneda Kinji ed., “Dainippon Takushokugakkai Sōritsu Taikaiki,” *Kokumin Keizai Zasshi* (1942): 378-379.

⁵⁴ Uchida Jun, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).

⁵⁵ Ōuchi, “Kaisetsu,” 646.

⁵⁶ Tanaka Shin’ichi states that his lectures during the Kyoto years (1903-1905) have not remained for some reason, except what Ishii Mitsuru briefly mentioned them in his biography of Nitobe, *Nitobe Inazō Den* (Tokyo: Sekitani

his colonial thought was broadened and systematized. I will analyze in this chapter Nitobe's public lectures, published articles, and essays in academic journals during the Tokyo era which ended by 1920, when Nitobe resigned his post of head of the Colonial Policy Studies and began to serve as undersecretary to the League of Nations.⁵⁷ His works have two main themes on the subject of colonization—colonization as a natural phenomenon and a national phenomenon. In the following three sections, I will examine the two concepts one by one and then consider the internal logic by which the two seemingly contradictory concepts become closely interconnected.

Colonization as a Natural Phenomenon

This past August was full of things that will be difficult for me to forget.... for example, the terrible floods throughout the country causing damage exceeding 30 million yen.... Another unforgettable event was the annexation of Korea. Such an occurrence takes place only once in a lifetime. Our country became bigger than Germany, France, and Spain overnight. Many people will comment and give speeches, [but no matter how you look at it] all of a sudden we grew by ten million people.⁵⁸

At the opening assembly of the 1910 fall term of the First Higher School in Tokyo, Nitobe, the principle, gave a speech commemorating Japan's annexation of Korea, which had occurred just a month earlier. In his speech, he juxtaposed the recent, tremendously damaging floods with the immense territorial expansion resulting from the colonization of Korea. Nitobe

bookstore, 1934). Tanaka argues that his Tokyo lectures would cover most of his Kyoto lectures. Tanaka, "Nitobe Inazō to Chosen," 90.

⁵⁷ Nitobe Inazō's written materials are catalogued in a work of twenty-two volumes: Nitobe Inazō Zenshū Henshū Iinkai, eds., *Nitobe Inazō Zenshū* [NIZ afterwards] (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1960-1982). In addition, there is a five-volume set of his English writings and select translations of his famous Japanese pieces in Nambara Shigeru, ed., *The Works of Inazō Nitobe* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1972). His lectures from 1912 to 1917 were reconstructed and published by Yanaihara Tadao in 1942, titled *Nitobe Inazō Hakase Shokuminseisaku Kōgi oyobi Ronbunshū*, as a collection of class notes by his famed students, the notes by Ōuchi Hyōe from 1912 to 1913, by Takagi Yasaki from 1914 to 1915, and by Yanaihara Tadao from 1916 to 1917. This collection has been included in *NIZ*, vol. 4.

⁵⁸ Nitobe, "Kōchō Ensetsu," 13 September 1910, quoted in Tanaka, "Nitobe Inazō to Chosen," 93 and re-quoted in Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea*, 135.

argued that the two events shared one thing in common: Both are natural phenomena which come like destiny; rare, unexpected, and irresistible. And, as will become clear below, for the Christian Nitobe, nature is suffused with divine power.

This analogy with nature was later made concrete and detailed in a lecture Nitobe gave to Japanese businessmen in England on the rise of nationalism and colonialism in the 19th century. Here Nitobe clearly explains colonization as a natural phenomenon using a juxtaposition of the Darwinist rhetoric of natural selection and the Christian biblical rhetoric of God's judgment.

The 19th century was an era of national consciousness and national expansion. As all the nations have a strong sense of themselves, less powerful nations have grown concerned about it. Nations who successfully adapted their nationalism to the law of organic growth have become conquerors or colonizers. Just like the foolish virgins in the Bible,⁵⁹ however, nations who did not immediately act upon the call of the era lost their independence. The law of survival of the fittest, declared beginning in the 19th century, proves the legitimacy of the expansion of strong nations.⁶⁰

Here, Nitobe argues that there are two kinds of nations, colonizer and colonized.

Colonized nations were weeded out, according to him, not only by natural selection but also by God's selection, because they had been too lazy to make themselves grow strong and healthy. By contrast, colonizing nations were selected by nature and God because they had "immediately

⁵⁹ This phrase, "the foolish virgins," is from the Christian biblical story of the "Analogy of Ten Virgins." The Analogy goes, there were ten virgins who were eagerly waiting for their bridegrooms' arrival. As they could not know when the man would arrive, they needed to be constantly alert. The most important preparation they were supposed to make was to fill up their lamps with oil for the first night of their wedding. When they were finally called on at midnight unexpectedly to welcome their bridegroom, only five brides had lamps full of oil. These could greet and marry him. However, the other five brides who had empty lamps could not marry. The storyteller praised the first five for being wise, while admonishing the latter five for being foolish, slumberous and idle: "Watch, therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of man [Jesus, God, or the redeemer] come." This analogy is read by today's Christian believers as a warning for the day of judgement when God will judge the good and the evil. They try to live by God's teaching, "love God and love others," not to be one of the foolish virgins who have not been faithful during their earthly lives, so will not be redeemed. See, "The Book of Matthew," *Holy bible*, Ch. 25, 1-13.

⁶⁰ Nitobe, "Nihon no Shokumin" (1919), *NIZ*, vol. 21, 483.

acted upon” the call. When the rare, unexpected, irresistible law of nature and God arrived, they successfully responded to it because they had prepared themselves well to do so, enabling “organic growth.” Likewise, for Nitobe, the primary relationship of colonization is between humans and nature or God, not between colonizer and colonized. Thus colonization is not a matter of history guided by human initiative but a matter of providence decided by natural law and God’s law. In this way, colonization, and the colonizer, can be justified as morally good.

This understanding of Nitobe’s basic tenet of colonization is specified in his Japanese translation of the European word, *colony*. In 1911, less than a year after Japan colonized Korea, he wrote an article dedicated to the question of what the most appropriate Japanese translation for colony was. He thought that it was a critical moment when Japan needed to claim colonization as a “legitimate” imperial power, just as its European counterparts had, and the first step was to standardize the translation of *colony* in accordance with its internationally circulated meaning.⁶¹ Nitobe begins by pointing out that there have been two translations for “colony” in Japanese—“as the increasing people” (*shokumin* 殖民) and “as the planting people” (*shokumin* 植民)—that Japanese people have commonly used without any serious consideration of their fundamental difference.⁶² He strongly argues that the latter should be standardized as the official translation because it evokes the original meaning of colony, expressed in the Dutch “*zie Volkplanting*.”⁶³ What makes him think “to plant people” is the right choice but “to increase

⁶¹ Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea*, 137-138.

⁶² In Japanese, *colonization* can be translated into *shokumin* which is a combination of two Chinese characters, *shoku* and *min*. According to which Chinese letter is used for *shoku*, between 殖 and 植, however, two translations can exist for *shokumin* with different meanings. Nitobe’s preference of “to plant people” compared to “to increase people” will be discussed in more detail later in section V of this chapter.

⁶³ Nitobe, “Shokumin naru Meishi ni tsuite” (1911), *NIZ*, vol. 4, 346-349. It seems that it is not until Nitobe that *shokuminchi* (植民地) became a standardized official translation for colonized territories. In the article, he additionally argues that using the right translation for *shokumin* (植民), the Japanese recent colonies such as Korea,

people” is not?

Quoting Brückner, Nitobe reasons as follows: “Colonization is controlled by an irresistible natural force.....People have left their birth places and moved to unknown, undeveloped, and different places. This is because they have been compelled by an irresistible force they must follow.”⁶⁴ “The entire earth is a field,” he continues, “and what plants human seeds in the field is the likes of a force beyond mankind. The bible says ‘God is a farmer.’”⁶⁵ In Nitobe’s view “to plant people” best conveys the meaning of people’s migration from one place to another, new, and unfamiliar place. Furthermore, using an agronomical metaphor, he elevates colonization to a Christian god’s plan for the human race. In this way, colonial policy becomes the most precious human task, which puts the divine plan into practice. He concludes, “it is the greatest policy for all humanity to plant human seeds from a land with rich people but poor soil to a land with rich soil but poor people.”⁶⁶ In sum, in Nitobe’s view, colonization becomes all humanity’s task for the fulfillment of God’s plan. It is a part of God’s plan for the benefit of humankind; thus all nations have to respond to it with “faithfulness.” These universal benefits of colonization, which Nitobe asserts to be advantageous to both colonizer and colonized, will be more closely examined in the section below entitled Colonization as the Utmost Development of Humanity.

Taiwan and Karafuto should be called colonies (*shokuminchi* 植民地), not “new additions” (*shinpu no chi* 新附の地) or “new territories” (*shin ryōdo* 新領土, or *shin hanto* 新版図) as had been widely used before.

⁶⁴ Nitobe, “Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki” (1913), *NIZ*, vol. 4, 354.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 358.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 357-358. So much of this argument derives from Nitobe’s experience in Hokkaido, where the development of Japanese and North American forms of agriculture was seen as “civilizing” an uncivilized northern island and making it habitable for “wajin” as well as Japanese people. See, Michele Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan*.

Colonization as a National Phenomenon

Nitobe defined colonization as something subject to natural law or God's law that would bring general benefits to all nations. As for the specific way that such colonization as a natural phenomenon was put into practice, however, he paid attention to the role of each nation-state with its own particular national interests. In other words, he defined colonization as a national phenomenon as well: a nation-state's political activity of planting its people in a new land to expand its own national territory.

Nitobe's emphasis on the political dimension of colonization is clearly revealed in his definition of "colony," which he thought was the most basic term for any colonial theory. Listing the three constituent components of the colony—people, land, and political relations with the motherland—he explains, "the colony is a new land (*shokuminchi towa shinryōdō*) to which people migrate from their motherland and settle in."⁶⁷ Here, "people" means the citizens of the colonizing state who migrate from their motherland (*bokoku* 母国) to the colony and come to interact with the colonized who live there. "Land" means "new land," he argues, in the sense that it is "different" from the motherland in terms of language, customs, socio-cultural system, and ways of thought. He adds that it is "newly acquired" land in a political sense, rather than a scientifically created or geographically discovered land.⁶⁸ Lastly, he explains that "political relations with the motherland" means that the colony must be politically subject to its motherland. Colonization is a nation-state's activity of establishing a colony, and colonial policy is the policy

⁶⁷ *NIZ*, vol. 4, 61.

⁶⁸ *NIZ*, vol. 4, 56-57.

that the nation-state plans and executes to establish a colony.

Nitobe was concerned that his contemporaries were not receptive to political characterization of the colony. Just as he criticized his contemporaries' ignorance of the most appropriate translation of colony in Japanese, Nitobe criticized a broadly shared concept of colony as "settlement" or *kyojyūchi* (居住地). Defining settlement as the "land among new lands where people from the motherland live and settle," Nitobe argues that the understanding of colony as settlement cannot capture "recent currents" in the realities of colonization.⁶⁹ In his view, the term "settlement" is not the same as "colony" because it carries no implication of the "political relations between the colony and its motherland." Invoking the "Anglo-Saxon colonies" such as North America, Australia, and New Zealand as examples of settlement, he observes that "although they have been regarded as prototypical colonies, they are not colonies in a modern sense because they have been established at the level of individual people as private and personal initiatives."⁷⁰ Instead, he presents the political nature of a colony as the most essential element of a modern colony.

[Modern] colonization is generally an activity of a nation-state and starts from the concept of state (*kokka kannen*) or national consciousness (*kokumin no jikaku*) ... And colonization is the expansion of national strength beyond its national borders... Colonization and the concept of state (*kokka to iu kannen*) or the concept of nation (*minzoku to iu kannen*) cannot be separated.⁷¹

Compared to settlements, or settler colonies, which result from the initiative of private social groups, Nitobe highlights that the modern colony is the political achievement of a nation-state that aims to expand its national territory as a matter of national pride. From the side of the

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, He called *kyojyūchi* (居住地, "settlement") the "original term for colony" (*honrai no shokumin* or "colonization proper" [according to his own translation]), which shows the popularity of the term among his contemporaries.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 59-60.

⁷¹ Nitobe, "Igaku no shinpo to shokumin hatten" (1918), *NIZ*, vol. 4, 327.

colonized, he suggests, it entails the loss of their own national sovereignty and political subjugation to the colonizing state. Placing the utmost value of colonization on its political purpose, Nitobe regards commercial, agricultural, and industrial motives for colonization as being subordinate to the political objective of expanding national prestige and strength. The merchants and businessmen who are actively engaged in colonization to improve their own economic status are merely an arm of the state or its subordinate partner at best.

Likewise, Nitobe argues that the “modern” colony is not characterized by its social and economic nature but by its military and political nature. With this argument, Nitobe hopes to bring about a shift in public understanding of the colony in alignment with a new trend in colonization in the early 1900s. Before the 1900s, Japanese colonial policy studies had focused on the settler colony as the primary form of colony. The so-called Hokkaido group, who were from the Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido, led the old understanding. Their main interest was in colonizing Hokkaido, a “virgin land” (*shojochi*) that needed modern technologies from the mainland for its economic development, particularly in agriculture. As the Japanese government intensively implemented an agricultural settlement program in Hokkaido from 1875 to 1904,⁷² in fact, public interest in colonization of Hokkaido grew significantly. Hokkaido was described by Japanese society as an “uninhabited land” (*mujinchi, mujin no sakai*), “primeval forest” (*genshirin, gnseirin*), or “virgin land” (*shojochi*), and colonization meant the economic exploitation of nature and the subsequent increase of people. Indeed, the most popular translation for colony at this time was “increasing people” (殖民), shortened from *takuchishokumin* (拓地殖民)—“to open up lands and increase people on them.”⁷³ Nitobe, who was a Sapporo

⁷² Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan*, 35-36.

⁷³ Nitobe, “Shokumin naru Meishi ni Tsuite” (1911), *NIZ*, vol. 4, 346.

Agricultural College graduate as well, regarded colonization as a matter between humans and nature, with economic and social implications. As Michele Mason argues, he “emptied Hokkaido entirely of Ainu [the native inhabitants who had already lived in Hokkaido before the Japanese colonization] existence and history and described the island in terms of its ‘natural resources yet untouched by human hand.’”⁷⁴ To him, the colony, as represented by Hokkaido, was close in meaning to a settler colony such as Australia and New Zealand of Britain. For Japan, it meant new lands *of their own* where their people migrated and settled. In other words, in the Hokkaido settlement era, Nitobe and his contemporaries formulated the idea of colonization solely in terms of a natural phenomenon with economic benefits.

As Japan went through a new phase of colonization in the 1900s, however, the idea of colonization originally based on the Hokkaido experience was rejected and reformulated by Nitobe. The cautious but persistent efforts to colonize Korea brought about this change. To colonize Korea, Japan fought against two world powers, both allies of Korea, China in 1895 and Russia in 1904-1905. And it was not an easy task to colonize Korea, which had its own long dynastic history and a strong collective identity; Japan had to suppress the fierce resistance of Koreans that erupted first when Japan claimed Korea as a protectorate in 1905 and then in the wake of formal annexation in 1910.⁷⁵ Of course, Korea was not the only colony Japan had

⁷⁴ Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan*, 59-60.

⁷⁵ Andre Schmid and others have shown that at the time of the Japan-Korea “Treaty” of 1905, by which Japan deprived Korea of the rights of diplomacy and military control, Korean nationalist intellectuals attempted to save their nation by imbuing ordinary Koreans with nationalism, publicizing the issues of national survival through literary as well as verbal tools. See, Andre Schmid, *Korea between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York : Columbia University Press, c2002); Henry Em, “Minjok as a Modern and Democratic Construct: Sin Ch’aeo’s Historiography,” in Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Sin Yongha, *Han’guk Kunda Minjok Jui ūi Hyōngsong kwa Chōn’gae* (Seoul: Univ. of Seoul Press, 1987); Pak Sōngsu, *Han’guk Tongnip Undongsa Ron* (Sōngnam: Han’guk Chōngsin Munhwa Yōn’guwōn, 1996). In addition to this, Dudden has showed that Korean men and women formed resistance troops, the so-called “Righteous Army” (Ūibyōng), to fight the Japanese troops throughout the hills of central and southern Korea between 1906 and 1914. Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea*, 74-99.

established by that time; Japan obtained Taiwan from China in 1895 and Karafuto (or the southern half of Sahalin) from Russia in 1905. These early colonies were, however, war booty they could take without the many difficulties that the colonization of Korea posed. Under the weight of defeat, the belligerents were willing to give up these territories, and those who lived there did not mount the same kind of strong opposition as Korea. But Korea was an independent nation-state in itself with a significant population.

As Dudden points out, Japan now came to need a new framework of colonial theory to legitimize the colonization of Korea. They needed a new definition of the colony.⁷⁶ Colonization could no longer mean “peaceful” cultivation of virgin lands.⁷⁷ Now the colony had to be redefined in terms of the military and political activity of a nation-state. Nitobe argued that Japan had to expand its national territory to increase its national strength by occupying another country, regardless of international and national conflicts. For this reason, the definition of colony focusing on internal colony (*naichi shokumin*), formulated by the Hokkaido group, began to be sharply excluded from mainstream colonial theory. Nitobe, who, by that time, had become the head of colonial policy studies at Tokyo Imperial University, put himself at the center of this conceptual shift by standardizing the concept of “modern colony” in light of the Japanese colonization of Korea.

As a result of the colonization of Korea, Nitobe articulated his colonial theory within a context of international confrontation. In his opening lecture on colonial policy studies at Tokyo Imperial University, he employed the “Wave Theory” (*hadōsetsu*) to explain the historical

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 133-135.

⁷⁷ For example, Satō Shōsuke who led the Colonial Studies at Sapporo Agricultural College, was a typical advocate for this view. He identified the modern colony with the ancient colony that had no political relationship with its motherland. Inoue Katsuo, “Satō Shōsuke; Shokuminron Kōgi Nōto,” *Hokkaido Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 93 (1998).

development of the world in terms of the contact between two waves, eastern and western civilizations. With this visual description, he described how the two civilizational waves rose and declined in such a way that when one was at its highest, the other was at its lowest.⁷⁸ In the 1920s, this inverse relationship found expression as the confrontation between the yellow and white races.⁷⁹ The heightened rhetoric of conflict occurred particularly after the passage of the American immigration law restricting Japanese immigration, as a result of the perceived “Yellow Peril” that swept the Western coast of the U.S.⁸⁰ Nitobe strongly criticized this law, consolidating the confrontational rhetoric.⁸¹

In tandem with the rhetoric of international confrontation, the theme of colonization for national survival was widely circulated as well in Japan throughout the early 1900s. After the colonization of Korea, colonization became conceptualized as a necessity for maintaining national security in the arena of international struggle. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, Korea was regarded as the line of national defense for Japan against China and Russia. After Korea was colonized and became a Japanese territory, the line was drawn north of Korea, that is, at the southern border of Manchuria. After a part of Manchuria was colonized, the line was redrawn at China.⁸² The rhetoric of colonization for national survival, likewise, contributed to justifying the ceaseless expansion of the Japanese empire.

⁷⁸ *NIZ*, vol. 4., 17-18.

⁷⁹ George Akita and Ito Takashi, “Yamagata Aritomo to ‘Jinshū Kyōsō’ ron,” *Nenhō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū 7: Nihon Gaikō no Kiki Ninshiki* (Yamagata shuppansha, 1985), cited in Sakai, “Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo,” 205.

⁸⁰ As Japanese migrants to Hawaii and the American mainland reached one hundred thousand in number by the early 1900s, the anti-immigrant rhetoric about the threat of this so-called Yellow Peril was virulent on the West Coast, to the extent that local laws mandated that schools be segregated. In 1908, the so-called Gentleman’s Agreement was concluded between President Theodore Roosevelt and Prime Minister Saionji. This nonlegislative measure committed the Japanese government to limit drastically the flow of emigrants to the United States. See Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 176.

⁸¹ Nitobe, “Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki” (1913), *NIZ*, vol. 4, 368-370.

⁸² Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea*, 135-136.

This nationalist conceptualization of colonization shaped Nitobe's ideas on colonial policy. To make an effective colonial policy, he underlined the "abnormal" characteristics of the colony, influenced by Theodore Roosevelt, who had said "the colony is an abnormal state" (植民地は変態国家).⁸³ Nitobe gave three reasons for characterizing the colony as an "abnormal state." First, the colony is located far away from the home country, as exemplified by Europe's overseas colonies, so it is hard for its "motherland" to control it. Secondly, it has its own socio-cultural system different from that of the home country because its people are different from those in the home country in terms of ethnicity or race. Thus, it has its own history, language, religion, customs, and practices, which are different from those of the home country. Finally, it is difficult for the colony and the home country to communicate without conflict, because there is a tendency of the colonized to see their colonizer with suspicion, while the colonizer despises the colonized, treating them as subordinate.⁸⁴ In sum, the colony is a place where national conflicts between the colonized and the colonizer occur presumably as a result of the abnormality (*hentaisei*) of the colony.

If political tensions in colonial settings are inevitable, it is logical to ask what kinds of colonial policies would be best to deal with these conflicts. To meet this challenge, Nitobe proposed the so-called "colonial policy prioritizing the benefit of the colonized" (*shokuminchi hon'i shugi seisaku*). He argued that, in the colony, such policies implemented different systems from those of the motherland in accordance with the colony's own history and culture, not the same political, social, economic, and cultural systems as the motherland's. Rather than "forcing" the colonizer's systems on the colony, the colonizer must "respect" the colony's own systems. In

⁸³ *NIZ*, vol. 4, 101.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 101-103.

this vein, he criticized the colonial government's attempts to abolish "harmful" [emphasis in original] practices of the colonized, such as the Taiwanese queue or Korean white work clothes, which the colonial government viewed as less productive and hygienic. In addition, after the March First Independence Movement in Korea in 1919, which gave voice to the Wilsonian principle of self-determination after WWI in the colonies, Nitobe, in a public lecture, made the argument that colonial policy had to pursue the principle of mutual benefit for both the colony and the motherland to prevent national conflicts between them.

It is natural that a colony does not like to be governed by a foreign power. The colonial government did not gain approval from the colonized to govern them. Also whether the colonizer is white or brown, there is little reason that the colonized believe that it would be willing to sacrifice itself for them and carry heavy burdens in order to improve the destiny of those who it takes care of. The history of colonization is that of the nation-state's self-assertion (*kokka no jiko shuchō*). And this self-assertion can be achieved through the simple principle of human relationships, "give and take." The principle of mutual benefit should be the principle [of the colonial relationship].⁸⁵

Based on Nitobe's advocacy of a colonial policy "prioritizing the benefits of the colonized" (*shokuminchi hon'i shugi seisaku*) based on a principle of mutual benefit, some scholars have argued that Nitobe was a humanist who supported equal rights in the colony.⁸⁶ Other scholars have interpreted Nitobe's views as an expression of the post-WWI trend toward the reconstruction of empire as an economic entity among autonomous nations, similar to the British Commonwealth, which Nitobe directly witnessed as undersecretary of the League of Nations in 1919.⁸⁷ I will reinterpret it, however, based on his view of the colony as abnormal, fundamentally different from the motherland, and impossible to change autonomously without the help of colonizers.

⁸⁵ Nitobe, "Nihon no Shokumin" (1919), *NIZ*, vol. 21, 492.

⁸⁶ Kawata Tadashi, "Kokusai Keizai," 459.

⁸⁷ Sakai, "Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo," 206-207.

In “Thoughts on a Dying Country” and “Withering Korea,” his journal entries from October and November 1906 during his inspection tour of Cheolla province, the southwest rural area of Korea, Nitobe, the humanist, expresses his belief in the racial difference between Koreans and the Japanese and the impossibility for Koreans to overcome their dismal fate.⁸⁸ Viewing Korean peasants and laborers as emblematic of the Korean national character, he states, “they have absolutely no will to work. The men squat in their white clothes smoking on their long pipes and dream of the past, never thinking of the present nor hoping for the future.”⁸⁹ Korean people are characterized as “so arcadian” that “they do not look like those of the twentieth century, nor of the tenth nor even the first. They are a people who predate history.”⁹⁰ Such images as “squatting” and “smoking with long pipes” show Nitobe judging Koreans as being uninterested in politics as well as being so “slothful” that they have no zeal for national survival. He concludes that “Korean traditions are dead traditions. . . Korea is soon to be governed by death.”⁹¹ He can find no potential for Koreans to progress on their own.⁹²

Nitobe is convinced that the colony’s social ills prove the inability of Koreans to exercise the same political rights as Japanese people. Opposing giving the colony the same political rights

⁸⁸ *NIZ*, vol. 5, 78-82.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁹² Contrary to Nitobe’s judgment, the political aspiration of Koreans for their national survival and independence was high, and, when such aspirations were expressed in Korea, he misrepresented them. For example, in 1919, when a nationwide anti-Japanese movement arose in which Koreans rallied hurraing and shouting for their national independence, or when the March First Independence Movement broke out in Korea, he denounced the peaceful marches as “riots.” He even legitimized the Japanese atrocity committed against Korean people at the “Cheamri Church” in the aftermath of the movement, commenting that “it was a lawful suppression of the instigators of the riots.” But as discovered by later scholars, in reality, the Japanese policemen killed about 30 people at the Cheam village in Suwon near Kyungseong (today’s Seoul) by carrying out an arson attack on the church where the village people had gathered for their worship service. Nitobe was in the middle of a trip to Europe and the U.S. at the time he delivered his lecture, to Japanese businessmen in England (December 1919). See Nitobe, “Nihon no Shokumin” (1919), *NIZ*, vol. 21, 491.

as Japan, he asserts that Koreans' level of culture (*mindō*) is not yet "mature."⁹³ In fact, he is utterly pessimistic about the prospects for the Korean people to ever attain maturity; "It will take 800 years for the colony to become fully assimilated to the motherland [to the point where they could be treated just as the motherland under the same institutional systems]."⁹⁴ Because he thinks that it is impossible for Japanese colonies to reach the same level of civilization as Japan, he instead prevails upon the Japanese to accept the "abnormality" of the colony and to exercise patience in educating the indigenous inhabitants.⁹⁵ He did not believe that the colonized could make independent progress, instead maintaining the notorious rhetoric of the "white man's burden," that is, the "colonizer's mission to enlighten the colonized."⁹⁶

Nitobe's colonial policy "prioritizing the benefits of the colonized" should be understood in this vein of "abnormality." The policy was neither a manifestation of humanism nor egalitarianism as these terms might be defined today.⁹⁷ Rather, it was a representation of his theorization of a prejudice regarding the aptitude of a colonized people. Oguma Eiiji reveals such colonialist prejudice during Nitobe's time through the case of Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931), the pioneer of crowd psychology who had a strong influence on Japanese intellectuals including Nitobe.⁹⁸ In his examination of Le Bon's criticism of French assimilation policy (*dōka shugi*

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 489.

⁹⁴ Nitobe, *NIZ*, vol. 4, 163; This kind of expression was prevalent at that time as seen in Gōtō Shinpei's "90 years" or Kodama Kentarō's "two centuries." See Oguma Eiiji, *Nihonjin no Kyōkai: Okinawa Ainu Taiwan Chōsen Shokuminchi Shihai Kara Fukki Undō Made* (Tōkyō: Shin'yōsha, 1998): 182; Interestingly enough, in 1933, this view changed. In his short essay on "Assimilation of Koreans" in the *Osaka Mainichi* written in English on July 1st, Nitobe stated that "although there might be a biological difference between the Japanese and Koreans, it is only insignificant (*sasai*)." Nitobe "Henshū Iroku," *NIZ*, vol., 20, cited in Asada, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron*, 123.

⁹⁵ *NIZ*, vol.4, 163.

⁹⁶ James L. Hevia, *English Lessons: the Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-century China* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

⁹⁷ According to the online Merriam-Webster dictionary circulated in 2016, the legal definition of "equality" is "the quality or state of being equal as sameness or equivalence in number, quantity, or measure" or "as likeness or sameness in quality, power, status, or degree." <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/equality>.

⁹⁸ According to Oguma, Le Bon had a great influence on contemporary intellectuals such as Bergson, Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Japanese colonial theorists like Nitobe. Le Bon's two books were published in Japan in 1910, with

seisaku), Oguma sheds light on Japanese intellectuals' understanding of equality in their own colonial context. According to Oguma, Le Bon argued that French assimilation policy was a failed policy, criticizing the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of its bureaucratic and institutional colonial apparatus including the military, police, and educational systems. Le Bon particularly rejected the concept of equality that French assimilationists based on three assumptions: 1) the colonized people have the same human reason as the French people; 2) the principles of the French Revolution such as liberty, equality and fraternity are pursued as eagerly by the colonized as by the French; 3) the colonized can enjoy those principles by being reformed through education, which would lead them to the universal civilization. Le Bon held none of these assertions to be true.

In opposition to the French assimilationists, Le Bon—a staunch believer in scientific race theory based on modern biology—claimed that “human beings are not equal or homogeneous but are determined by race (*jinsu*) and genetic transmission.” Sorting humanity into four levels—primitive race, inferior race [*rettō*], middle race [*chūtō*], and superior race [*yūtō*—he claimed that the racial boundaries could never be crossed. The social system, custom, law, and culture of each race, he believed, were an inevitable consequence of the race’s genetic attributes that could not be changed or acquired through education. Although the superior race’s knowledge or language could be inculcated in the inferior race, the effect, he believed, was too superficial to make a significant change in the fundamental psychology of the race.⁹⁹ Rather, he maintained

titles translated as *Minzoku Hatten no Shinri* in August, one week before the Japanese colonization of Korea in 1910, and *Gunshū Shinri* in December, by the Great Japanese Civilization Association [Dainichi Bunmei Kyōkai]. This association was a membership association which published in Japanese European masterworks “that are so wholesome as to be worthy of recommending to Japanese people.” It had 5,000 members or so in 1908 from the outset, from which it can be inferred that its publications were distributed widely among Japanese intellectuals of that time. Oguma, *Nihonjin no Kyōkai*, 172, 175.

⁹⁹ Based on this phrase from Le Bon’s *Minzoku Hatten no Shinri*, Nitobe asserted, “Intelligence (*chishiki*) can be educated but never can national character (*seikaku*).” *NIZ*, vol. 4, 138.

that bestowing a high level of education on the colonized would arouse dissatisfaction by spurring their desire for success and by creating discontent with their current situation; moreover, it would incite disturbances and rebellion.¹⁰⁰

The Haitian rebellion was the evidence Le Bon and his followers often invoked to show the failure of French assimilation policy and its assumptions about human nature. In fact, they argued that the assimilationists' belief that universal reason could be realized equally in the colony could only lead to increased hardship for the colonized. Nitobe makes this same point very clearly. "What does it mean to protect the indigenous people (*genjūmin*)? They cannot have the same rights as the people in the motherland. In other words, they must be ruled by laws made especially for them. We have reached this conclusion from bitter experience: because France applied the French Revolution's slogan—liberty, equality, and fraternity—to its colony without any modifications, treating the indigenous peoples in the same way as the metropolitans, the Haitian rebellion broke out and atrocities committed by the French against the Haitians ensued."¹⁰¹

In sum, Nitobe's idea of sound colonial policy based on the principle of "prioritizing the benefits of the colonized" (*shokuminchi hon'i shugi*)—a policy that seemingly emphasized the equal treatment of the colony—was, in fact, a discriminatory ideal, influenced by Le Bon's crowd psychology based on scientific race theory. The "abnormality" of the colony was another word for the racial or ethnic inferiority of the colony. This is why Nitobe claimed that the colonizer must not treat the colony equally under a commonly shared set of institutions. Only a discriminatory policy that denied the colony the same political rights as its motherland, on the basis of the inferiority of its national or racial character, could protect the lives and dignity of the

¹⁰⁰ Oguma, *Nihonjin no Kyōkai*, 172-175.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 144.

colonized.¹⁰² For Nitobe, it seems, the term “equality” meant the discriminatory treatment of people corresponding to their racial character or their level of civilization. Borrowing from Oguma’s argument, we can say that many Japanese believed that “discrimination” assured “equality” in the colonial context.¹⁰³

Colonization as the Utmost Development of Humanity

While the two preceding sections have shown that colonization was both a natural phenomenon and a national project for Nitobe, the question remains: How are the two axes of Nitobe’s colonial ideas related to each other? While his internationalist view claims the colony’s universal value for all humanity, his nationalist view emphasizes its particular value solely for the colonizing country. How can these seemingly contradictory concepts be interconnected in Nitobe’s colonial theory? What theoretical logic can we find to understand the interconnectedness? The key to answering these questions lies in Nitobe’s concept of colonization as a natural phenomenon.

In his article, “The Ultimate Purpose of Colonization,” published in 1913, Nitobe elaborates his basic tenet that colonization is a natural phenomenon, based on his reinterpretation of Auguste Comte’s (1798-1857) concept, “biocracy” (*biocratie*).¹⁰⁴ This concept originally

¹⁰² Nitobe advocated the U.S. segregation policy in 1913 with the same rhetoric. *NIZ*, vol. 4, 154-155.

¹⁰³ Chapter seven of Oguma’s book, *Nihonjin no kyōkai*, to which I owe much for writing this section, is titled “Discrimination, that is, Equality” [*Sabetsu Sunawachi Byōdō*].

¹⁰⁴ Auguste Comte, *Comte, Auguste, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte* [Cours de philosophie positive, 6 vols., 1830-1842], Eng. Trans. and Condensed., Harriet Martineau (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1893); *System of Positive Polity, or Treatise on Sociology, Instituting the Religion of Humanity* [Système de politique positive, ou Traité de sociologie instituant la religion de l’humanité, 4 vols., 1851-1854], Eng. Trans., Edward Spencer Beesly (New York: Lenox Hill, Burt Franklin, 1973). Citing Antonella Cutro, Claudio Minca summarizes, “Biocracy, for Comte, was the form of government and self-discipline of individuals necessary to realize a sociocracy; that is, a society in which a purely biological understanding of life would coincide, perfectly,

meant the form of government in which all organic substances associated with one another subjugate (*seifuku*) the inorganic substances and make them suitable for the human world.¹⁰⁵ But Nitobe inflects it with colonialism at its center and argues, “colonization is the process in which the “biocratic league” (*yusei dōmei*), the organic entity, which consists of God the general, people the captain, and plants and animals, the sergeant, dominates nature, the inorganic entity, to expand their habitable lands (*Oikumene* in Greek).”¹⁰⁶ In sum, Nitobe defines colonization as the subjugation of nature by humans who act upon God’s command. This idea is also expressed in another phrase he coined, the humanization of nature or the “humanization of the earth” (*chikyū no jin’ka* 地球の人化).¹⁰⁷ With this term, he presents colonization as a mission to transform primitive nature into a suitable place for human habitation. By doing so, he defines colonization as a battle between humans and nature, instead of one between humans. In this logic, all nations are regarded as one unified group—regardless of whether they are colonizer or colonized—which cooperatively participates in the process of expanding habitable lands. Nitobe asserts that colonization is a natural phenomenon beneficial to all humanity that proceeds with God’s blessing.

Nitobe’s favorite epigram, “colonization is the expansion of civilization” (*bunmei no kakuchō*),¹⁰⁸ or “colonization is the spread of civilization (*bunmei no denpa*),” which he borrowed from Paul S. Reinsch, an American colonial policy theorist and diplomat,¹⁰⁹ represents

with modes of life, the social and the cultural.” In John A. Agnew, et. al. eds., *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Geography*, 2nd edition (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 169.

¹⁰⁵ Nitobe, “Shokumin no shūkyoku mokuteki,” *NIZ*, vol. 4, 358.

¹⁰⁶ Nitobe, “Igaku shinpo to shokumin hatten” (1918), *NIZ*, vol. 4, 329.

¹⁰⁷ Nitobe, “Shokumin no shūkyoku mokuteki,” *NIZ*, vol. 4, 358.

¹⁰⁸ Nitobe, “Igaku shinpo to shokumin hatten,” *NIZ*, vol. 4, 328-329. According to his disciples’ recollection, Nitobe began each of his lectures by writing this epigram on the blackboard. *NIZ*, vol. 4, 7-10; Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea*, 134.

¹⁰⁹ Paul S. Reinsch, *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century, as influenced by the Oriental Situation* (New York: Macmillan & co., 1900); *Colonial Administration* (New York: Macmillan & co., 1905); *Colonial*

this essential idea of colonization. Nitobe invoked this epigram in his public lecture on the role of public hygiene in colonization, “The Medical Advance and Colonial Development” (*Igaku shinpo to shokumin hatten*), which he delivered in memory of Robert Koch (1843-1910), the German physician and bacteriologist who was famous in Japan especially for his anti-malaria methods that Japanese people found useful in Taiwan.¹¹⁰ In this lecture, he describes civilization (or culture) as the tangible modern benefits, such as medicine and public hygiene, that can help the biocratic league subjugate nature and make it habitable.¹¹¹ He states, “like the law of osmosis, colonization is the natural flow of culture, from a country with a high density of culture to a country with a low density of culture.”¹¹² In this statement, he is arguing that colonization is the spread of modern science and technology to conquer nature within the biocratic league. This technological transfer is claimed to be as natural as the law of osmosis since it follows the law of God, the commander of the league. Nitobe thus characterizes colonization as the bestowal of blessings (*ontaku*) from the motherland to the colony as a way of helping the colony conquer their untamed nature. After all, to him, colonization was the subjugation of nature by humans,

Government (New York: Macmillan & co., 1902). For a comparative study of Nitobe and Reinsch, see Schneider, “The Intellectual Origins of Colonial Trusteeship in East Asia: Nitobe Inazō, Paul Reinsch and the End of Empire,” *American Asian Review* 17. 1 (Spring 1999).

¹¹⁰ Nitobe, “Igaku shinpo to shokumin hatten” (1918), *NIZ*, vol. 4. Koch’s method of controlling malaria was applied to the Japanese colonial government’s anti-malaria project in Taiwan in 1910. Gotō Shinpei, the colonial governor of Taiwan at that time, who had been the head of the Public Health Bureau at the Home Ministry in 1883, had a close relationship with Kitasato Shibasaburo, who joined the bureau in 1883 when he graduated from Tokyo Imperial University. Kitasato, who became the most important scholar in establishing infectious disease studies in Japan, had been a student of Koch in Germany. As malaria had become one of the top three causes of death in Taiwan by 1910, the Japanese colonial government started its anti-malaria project in Taiwan in 1918. Lin Yi-ping and Liu Shiyung, “A Forgotten War: Malaria Eradication in Taiwan, 1905-65,” in Angela Ki Che Leung and Charlotte Furth eds., *Health and Hygiene in Chinese East Asia: Policies and Publics in the Long Twentieth Century* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010):186; Iijima Wataru, “Colonial Medicine and Malaria Eradication in Okinawa in the Twentieth Century: From the Colonial Model to the United States Model,” in Yip Ka-che ed., *Disease, Colonialism, and the State: Malaria in Modern East Asian History* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 63.

¹¹¹ At the very beginning of the 1900s, Comte’s concept of biocracy was reintroduced in the areas of medicine and public hygiene by a French hygienist Edward Toulouse. In John A. Agnew, et. al. eds., *The Wiley Blackwell companion to political geography*, 169.

¹¹² Nitobe, “Igaku Shinpo to Shokumin Hatten,” *NIZ*, vol. 4, 329.

not that of the colony by the motherland.

The question still remains why it was so important in Nitobe's view that humans subjugate nature. It may be that Nitobe needed the mandate that humans subjugate nature in order to justify his claim that colonies should be thankful for being colonized and for receiving the benefits of modern technology and knowledge with which they could transform nature. To him it is so because he believes that humans will be able to reach the highest status of development through their encounter with an immense nature. By "development" here, he means not just economic development, but a fundamental level of human development encompassing the natural, human, and spiritual worlds.

In fact, when he defines colonization as a matter between nature and humans, he assumes that humans can be changed by nature just as much as they can change nature. Citing Henri Bergson's argument, "Human affairs (*hito no nasu koto*) are not simply ruled by natural selection but delicately operate within the circle of all living beings (*raifu naru mono*), Nitobe argues that, in response (*kannō*) to their surroundings, humans change in accordance with the changes in their surroundings."¹¹³ Here, he emphasizes that people are influenced (*kanka*) by their external surroundings in a significant way as they progress. In other words, he is anticipating that humans can change by way of adapting to their surroundings, not just dying out or becoming extinct. But the change goes beyond mere survival for Nitobe. Intentionally using the Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist concept *kanka* (meaning "to be cultivated or spiritually influenced") rather than *henka* (to change), he implies that the change by nature will lead people to a high spiritual stage in which they can realize the Way, the Truth, or the essence of the Universe. In the same manner, he uses *kannō*, highlighting "to feel sympathy" toward the object, not *hannō* which means "to react"

¹¹³ Nitobe, "Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki," *NIZ*, vol. 4, 360.

without such connotation of sympathy. By doing so, he is asserting that humans can be united with nature and, going further, with God, through colonization.

In his reading of Darwin's theory of natural selection, Nitobe highlights the grave influence of environment on human evolution rather than emphasizing the survival of the fittest in natural selection.¹¹⁴ Agreeing with Franz Uri Boas (1858-1942), a German-American physical anthropologist and advocate of scientific race theory, for example, he claims that European colonizers in America, after two generations of migration, developed a long-head shape in contrast to their original broad-head shape.¹¹⁵ In addition, he maintains that environment affects the transition of human social character, claiming that once the British colonizers migrated to America, their national character was transformed into a more plebeian disposition (*heimin no kishitsu*), but when they migrated to Australia, they became more socialistic in character.

Moreover, Nitobe claims that some people, less competitive in their home country, could have a chance to develop themselves through colonization by finding the "right" conditions. Thus, he states, "The colony is a place where natural selection operates at its best... It is not a refuge for losers or the settlement of an inferior race. People who have experienced a failure in their regular society merely because they are 'weaker' will rise again in the colony because the encounter with a new land fills them with a new vigor. While they may have ranked in the middle in their home country, they will survive and be competitive in the colony."¹¹⁶ In other words, he is arguing that "the broader an environment is given, the more a person can progress."

This idea of the relationship among nature, humans, and God seems to be shared by some of Nitobe's contemporaries. For example, as Julia Thomas points out, Spencer had already

¹¹⁴ This is the same as Uchimura Kanzō's understanding in his *Chijinron*. Sakai, "Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo," 203-204.

¹¹⁵ "Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki," vol. 4, 359-360.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 388-389.

discussed this point in his early work, *First Principles*, published in 1863.¹¹⁷ Thomas argues that Spencer comprehended the whole world—material, political, and spiritual—as one moral system. Using an oxymoronic concept of “evolutionary equilibration” based on Catholic understanding, Spencer argues, according to Thomas, that although all things are now continually in process, one day all processes will cease in a perfection, the absolutely stable balance among all entities, organic and non-organic, and their environment. On the way to reaching this perfect stasis, he continues, each entity reacts to “disturbances” in its surroundings by better adapting itself to them. He states, “The adaptation of man’s nature to the conditions of his existence cannot cease until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter. And the establishment of this equilibrium is the arrival at a state of human nature and social organization, such that the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which the individual voluntarily respects.” As Thomas aptly summarizes, Spencer imagines that all things—human and non-human—are engaged in “fine-tuning their increasing harmony until the moment when perfection or equilibration is achieved.”¹¹⁸

The status of evolutionary equilibration is what Nitobe conceives as the highest status of human development that people can reach through colonization. The ultimate purpose of colonization is to realize “Infinite Perfection” (*mugen no kanzen*),¹¹⁹ the “status in which people

¹¹⁷ Julia Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Political Ideology* (Univ. of California Press, 2001): 59, 117. The evolutionary theory that had started from Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) biology was so popular in Japan at that time that at least thirty-two translations of Herbert Spencer’s (1820-1903) work were published between 1877 and 1890; Nitobe cited Spencer in his inaugural lecture of the colonial policy studies at the Imperial University of Tokyo. *NIZ*, vol. 4, 17.

¹¹⁸ This summary of Spencer’s argument is excerpted from Julia Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity*, 118.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 362. Nitobe borrowed this term from European philosophers in the late 18th century, Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794) and Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829). His own translation of the term is “Endless perfectibility.”

can become perfect and have power to communicate with God” through encountering nature.¹²⁰ Just as Spencer views the whole world, material, political, and spiritual, in one moral system, Nitobe interprets colonization within the triple relationship among nature, humans, and God as seen from his concept of colonization based on biocracy. He argues that “heaven (*ten, sora* 天), earth (*chi, tsuchi* 地) and people (*jin, hito* 人) will be integrated into one” through the humanization of the earth, the process where the biocratic league between humans and God subjugates nature. He also expresses this ideal status using Ernest Seillière’s concept of “ethical imperialism,” with an analogy to the Confucian idea of “the mean” (*chūyō* 中庸, *Doctrine of the Mean*): “the wise cultivates heaven and earth through ethics, knowledge and wisdom with all their humanity.”¹²¹ In other words, Nitobe is arguing that through colonization people can achieve “the mean,” or equilibration.

Likewise, empire and colonization are elevated to the lofty human efforts to reach the perfect ethical harmony among nature, humanity and heaven in Nitobe’s colonial theory. Referring to both classical as well as modern scientific teachings from both Eastern and Western civilizations, such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, and theories of social evolution,¹²² he attempts to show that colonization is a universally ethical enterprise that will realize the ultimate development of humanity. He attempts to claim colonization not as the economic exploitation of a colony by its colonizers, but as an economic, social, cultural, political, and even spiritual achievement for the benefit of all humanity.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 362. As Tanaka Kotarō(1890-1974), a Catholic expert of natural law, has commented, in a sense, Nitobe seems rather “materialistic.” See, Sakai, “Teikoku chitsujo to kokusai chitsujo,” 204-205.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 358.

¹²² This ecumenical approach can be understood in that Nitobe dreamt of the harmony of civilization between the East and the West. For the theory of civilizational harmony between the East and the West which was widely circulated at his time in Japan, see Sakai, *Ibid.*, 203-204. Or, to follow Dudden’s argument, it can be read as evidence of his efforts to prove that Japanese colonization has as much universal value as Western colonization. Dudden, *The Japanese Colonization of Korea*, 5.

His Japanese translation of *colony* as “to plant people” (*shokumin* 植民) can be fully understood in this context. As seen in the section above, Colonization as a Natural Phenomenon, he chose this translation in preference to “to increase people” (*shokumin* 殖民). I would like to argue that this is because he thought “to increase people” (*shokumin* 殖民), originally from *takuchishokumin* (拓地殖民), which means “to open up lands and increase people on them,”¹²³ could not stand for his ideal of colonization. The main focus of this term is the economic value of colonization, the increase of new and arable lands. By contrast, “to plant people” (*shokumin* 植民) suggests a broader meaning. Nitobe took issue with the economic approach toward colonization of some Western colonial policy scholars as well as his Japanese contemporaries, like the Hokkaido group, who argued that the main purpose of colonization is “to open up lands or to enhance agriculture.”¹²⁴ Choosing instead to highlight “planting people in new lands” as the essence of colonization, he highlights people’s migration to new lands and the subsequent results: the development (or civilization) of the land in a broad sense and the achievement of infinite perfection through the interaction between people and the land. By doing so, he elevates colonization to a historical mission for all humanity in order to reach the highest stage of human civilization, not a mere economic task to increase human wealth.¹²⁵

This high purpose notwithstanding, we still face the task of understanding his other definition of colony as a national phenomenon in this framework where its universal value seems exclusively highlighted. After all, an integrated view of his theory must account for the grave colonial problems such as national conflicts that Nitobe was so concerned about when he

¹²³ Nitobe, “Shokumin naru Meishi ni tsuite,” *NIZ*, vol. 4, 346.

¹²⁴ Nitobe, *NIZ*, vol. 4, 59.

¹²⁵ This could be related to the shift of his academic interest from agricultural economy to history and international relations under the influence of Herbert Adams at Johns Hopkins.

proposed a “colonial policy prioritizing the benefits of the colonized.” It may be difficult to see how these colonial tensions can be addressed in the basic framework of his colonial theory based on biocracy.

To answer these questions, we need to go back to Spencer’s concept of evolutionary equilibration. Addressing the perfect harmony among the material, political, and spiritual worlds, Spencer mentions that, on the road to this state of perfection, there will inevitably be disturbances in nature that humans will have to address. Until the disturbance is settled and perfection is achieved, humans must engage in a constant fine-tuning process where they try earnestly to adapt themselves to the disturbed nature. In Nitobe’s terms, political problems in the colony can be an example of disturbance. And colonial policymaking can stand for the fine-tuning process.

Therefore, it can be said that, although Nitobe basically comprehends colonization as a natural phenomenon in which humans encounter nature according to God’s law, he thinks that the specific form it takes in practice is a nationalist political movement. And because of its nationalist character, he acknowledges that colonization inevitably causes colonial problems; he nevertheless, anticipates that these disturbances will ultimately be quelled because the colonizers address them with colonial policies. This continuous process of recognizing problems and solving them with effective policymaking is a part of the process of fine-tuning. Nitobe believes, without any solid evidence, that this constant process of adaptation will cease at some point when the perfect harmony between a colony and its motherland is realized.

But just as his students complained that he was too “genuinely scholarly,” Nitobe’s view of the ultimate resolution of all colonial problems does not offer any executable solutions. There are visions and ideals but no specific policies that can create the harmony. Ōuchi Hyōe recalled

that Nitobe's lectures on colonial policies were disappointing. As he said, "what we learned from him was a variety of anecdotes about peoples, natural wonders, and various policies in the colonies, not so-called national policy.... In another sense, I learned about society and his ideal of society."¹²⁶

As a colonial policy to accomplish the ultimate goal of colonization, in fact, Nitobe advanced too idealistic an idea of "Internationalization of Land" [*sekai tochi kyōyū ron*]. With this international socialist phrase by Henry George, he asserts that any person or any nation should have a legitimate chance to develop any land anywhere in the world. In other words, he claims that the colonized should allow people with different nationalities to use their lands.¹²⁷ For this reason, he argues, "while one is good at handwork, another is at music. While one is talented at drawing, another is at cultivating the fields. In accordance with their own different national abilities endowed from God (*tenpu no minzokuteki nōroku*), all nations can plan the utilization of resources as they respect and interact with each other."¹²⁸ In this statement, influenced by the Smithian idea of the division of labor, Nitobe makes two arguments. First, all nations can develop their own talents if they find their own rightful place to do so. Colonization, the expansion of human development, helps each nation find that rightful place. Secondly, just as no country can develop unless its people, who all have different talents, cooperate with each other, the colonized and the colonizer should cooperate for their own respective development. In sum, he declares to the colonized that colonization is beneficial to them as well, because it will help them develop their own national abilities. He concludes that "each land should be given to

¹²⁶ See Ōuchi Hyōe, "Yanaihara Kyōju no Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku," *Keizaigaku Roshū* 5 (1927), 536-537.

¹²⁷ Nitobe, "Shokumin no Shūkyoku Mokuteki," *NIZ*, vol. 4, 371.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 370. Katō Hiroyuki (1836-1916), Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), and Tōgō Minoru (1881-1959) also attempted to extract from evolutionary theory the possibility of realizing organic harmony among the nations, not just the struggle for survival among nations. Sakai, "Teikoku Chitsujo to Kokusai Chitsujo," 226, n. 31.

the fittest who can utilize it best and contribute the most to humanity. . . Land is a gift from the Heavens and it should go to the people who can use it best. . . Leaving a vast land unutilized is akin to a sin against the Heavens as well as against the entire human race.”¹²⁹ However, it is hard to imagine that this policy would sound persuasive to the colonized, those deprived of their national independence and politically suppressed by their colonizers. Nitobe’s nationalistic internationalism does not seem to have been so effective at toning down the political aspirations of the colonized, who aspired to their own autonomy and national independence.

Conclusion

Nitobe Inazō has traditionally been studied within a binary framework in which most scholars choose sides on the question of whether he was an internationalist or an imperialist. Although some scholars have made efforts to overcome such a dichotomy, they have not been fully successful in revealing the internal logic of his colonial theory in which the two categories—internationalism and imperialism—became intertwined and intermixed.

In this chapter, I have attempted to show the interconnectedness between the two categories. First I have isolated his two entangled definitions of colony, as a natural phenomenon and a national phenomenon, and then examined the way in which these two seemingly contradictory concepts were able to coexist and sustain each other. Nitobe defined colonization as an irresistible moral force which was subject to the law of nature and God. Particularly

¹²⁹ Nitobe, *Ibid.*, 371. This kind of view is also seen among Puritan colonial settlers in North America. In 1653, the Puritan colonial historian Edward Johnson wrote that colonial changes in New England were “one of God’s providences,” that a “‘remote, rocky, barren, bushy, wild-woody wilderness’ had been transformed in a ‘generation into a second England for fertility.’” For Johnson, colonization was “divinely ordained and wholly positive.” See, William Cronon, *Changes in the Land* (NY: Hill and Wang, 2003), 3.

influenced by biological thinking, evolutionary theory and Christianity, he comprehended colonization within the threefold relationship among nature, humans and God, and concluded that it would lead all humanity to the state of utmost development by integrating the three parties into one entity. For Nitobe, this was the destiny of humankind ultimately mandated by the law of nature or God. For this reason, he emphasized the importance of international cooperation and concessions in the course of colonization for the achievement of this ultimate goal of humanity.

As for the specific ways in which colonization was practiced, he claimed that all nations should necessarily go through a nationalist political stage of colonization, the result of the world historical trends in the late 19th and 20th centuries. As I have shown, this was also what he had learned from his first-hand experience of the Japanese colonization of Korea from 1895 to 1910. He regarded the international as well as national conflicts caused by colonization as disturbances, which inevitable occurred on the path toward perfect union among nature, humans and God. He believed that these colonial problems could be solved through the fine-tuning process in colonial policy.

So, can we actually ask a question about if Nitobe was an imperialist or an internationalist? In my view, this type of question is closer to being meaningless because his internationalism necessitated imperialism. His internationalist vision of colonization must be fulfilled through the nationalist practice of colonization. Nitobe's logic does not differentiate imperialism from nationalism, because what Nitobe meant by nationalism was the self-consciousness of nations that they could construct through their empire building. In his thought, nationalism could not stand without empire, and imperialism could not stand without nationalism.

Here I have to point out a couple of problems in Nitobe's colonial theory. First of all, though he claimed the internationalist ideal of colonization could be achieved through the

nationalistic practice of colonization, he did not pay keen attention to serious problems and conflicts that the practice had been producing in the real world. What he suggested was that since colonization is a natural phenomenon, namely, a matter between humans and nature, the ideal of colonization should ultimately be attained at some point according to the law of nature or God. His colonial ideal was an ill-founded and teleological argument.

Secondly, though he argued that colonial problems can be settled through specific policies, Nitobe never presented realistic methods that could be effective. His proposed policy of “prioritizing the benefits of the colonized first,” as already revealed in this chapter, turned out to be ineffective in reducing the national conflicts within empire since it did not allow what the colonized people most wanted, that is, political autonomy. The policy, in fact, prioritized the benefits of the “motherland,” in the sense that it was primarily for the security of the empire by not provoking colonial revolts. Nitobe’s policy was a defensive one, aimed at preventing the rise of political aspirations among the colonized in advance, who, he thought, were a fundamentally inferior race incapable of political maturity.

Regardless of these shortcomings, Nitobe’s colonial theory is highly significant mainly because it provided the basic framework throughout the entire era of Japanese imperialism—a framework upon which later Japanese colonial policy scholars constructed their own theories. His belief that colonization brings development to all humanity was widely shared by them, as will be seen in the later chapters on Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) and Tōbata Seiichi (1899-1983), the second and third chairs of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University. The specific ways in which they defined the scope of development varied, but the basic tenet, that colonization is development for all, remained intact in their texts to the end of the empire. In particular, Nitobe’s ideas about the two kinds of advantages of colonization, international and

national became the fundamental ground to his successors. How to conceptualize the relationship between the two was the main theoretical task for Yanaihara in the 1920s and Tōbata in the 1930s and 1940s, when they drew a master plan for the future of the Japanese empire.

I will demonstrate in the later chapters that the idea of “the East Asian Community” (*Tōa kyōdōtai ron* 東亜協同体論) and “the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (*Daitōa kyōeiken* 大東亜共榮圈) in the late 1930s and 1940s owed their intellectual roots to Nitobe’s colonial thinking elaborated in the 1910s, in which internationalism/imperialism and internationalism/nationalism were locked in a tight embrace. Nitobe’s colonial ideas paved an ideological path that led from the liberalism of the 1920s to the imperialism of the 1930s. He laid foundation of the Japanese colonial discursive field which was partially modified and reformed but eventually shared by intellectuals from the 1920s to the 1940s. Japanese colonial history, which has been narrated in many cases as if it were a history of three disparate stories under the rubric of 1910’s nationalism, 1920’s internationalism and 1930’s imperialism, will be understood as an interconnected history.

Chapter 2

Yanaihara Tadao: The Reformer of Colonial Policy Studies

Introduction

This chapter discusses the characteristics of Japanese Colonial Policy Studies in the 1920s through the 1930s by examining Yanaihara Tadao's colonial theory. Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) was the second chair of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University, from 1923 to 1937, succeeding Nitobe Inazō. In the post-WWI era when colonies' demands for the rights of self-determination intensified and their challenges against the existing order of empire with its dominant-subordinate relationship arose, Yanaihara was among the most important critics of Japan's imperialist colonial policies. In this chapter, I attempt to explore this humanist reformist's concepts of colonization, colony and empire, particularly by placing them within the entire stream of Japanese Colonial Policy Studies. A close exploration of them will reveal the continuity and discontinuity among the theories of the three scholars—Nitobe Inazō in the 1910s, Yanaihara Tadao in the 1920s, and Tōbata Seiichi from the late 1930s to 1945. In particular, my analysis will show that, indeed, while Yanaihara, inspired by Nitobe, attempted to break with exploitation as an inherent element of colonialism, he actually provided a set of ideas which was later manipulated by Tōbata to endorse the imperialist wartime propaganda.

A brief biography of Yanaihara will help us understand the basic tenets of his colonial theory. After graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University Faculty of Law in 1917, and

working for two years at a mining company, Yanaihara became an assistant professor in 1920 in the Faculty of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University, which was newly established that year as separate from the Faculty of Law.¹³⁰ To study the contemporary Western colonial affairs, he spent two years in England, France and the U.S. In 1923, he returned to Japan and became a full professor in the field of colonial policy theory. From that time, he began to publish critical essays against the contemporary imperialist colonial policies, which he deemed exploitative and oppressive. In particular, he opposed the tendency of Japanese academe to dismiss (or use) Adam Smith's theory to support exploitative imperialist colonial policies. Yanaihara actively disseminated his reinterpretation of the Scottish economist in whose work he found the possibility of an alternative colonial policy.¹³¹ As a crystallization of these efforts, in 1926 he published a 600-page long monograph, *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku* (Colonization and Colonial Policies), which he wrote as a textbook for college students.¹³² And the following year, he edited his articles written from 1923 to 1926 and published them as a collection, titled

¹³⁰ Schneider, "The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 1914-1931," 122.

¹³¹ From 1925 to 1926, Yanaihara had heated debates with Yamamoto Miono, an established colonial policy studies professor at Kyoto Imperial University, and his followers, on Adam Smith's colonial theory and economics. For some details on the debates, see Yanaihara Tadao's review of his own article, "Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi ron" (1924) in *Shokumin Seisaku no Shin Kichō* (Kyoto: Kōbundō Shobō, 1927), which is compiled in Nambara Shigeru et al. eds., *Yanaihara Tadao Zenshu* [YTZ afterwards] I (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1963): 535-538.

¹³² Ōuchi Hyōe, a famous Marxist economist and Yanaihara's close friend at Tokyo Imperial University, highly praised this book as "a phenomenal and exceptional work (kinrai no taicho, kinrai shusshoku no chosho)." Ōuchi Hyōe, "Yanaihara kyōjyu no 'shokumin oyobi shokumin seisaku'," *Keizai Ronshū*, vol. 5 issue (1926) in Nambara Shigeru eds., *Yanaihara Tadao: Shinkō, gakumon, shōgai* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968). Both Ōuchi and Yanaihara had taken Nitobe's colonial policy studies class when they were students at Tokyo Imperial University. When they were in Europe to study after graduation, they once traveled to Germany together. They became colleagues in the department of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University, having their offices near each other on the same floor. In 1948, after WWII, as they returned to the university from their respective expulsions, Yanaihara organized a seminar group of professors and graduate students to study Adam Smith, which was called the "Adam Smith Reading Group (Adamu Sumisu no kai)" and Ōuchi joined the group. In addition, in the same year when the Peace Issues Discussion Group (Heiwa Mondai Danwakai) was organized by Japanese intellectuals who were concerned over the strained international relations at the dawn of the Cold War, Yanaihara and Ōuchi joined the group together, representing the "Labor Farmer School (Rōnōha)" of economists at Tokyo University. For more details, see Ōuchi Hyōei, "Nihon shokumingaku no keifu," and Ōkōchi Kazuo, "Yanaihara sensei to 'Adamu sumisu no kai'," in Nambara Shigeru eds., *Yanaihara Tadao: Shinkō, gakumon, shōgai*; Igarashi Takeshi, "Peace-Making and Party Politics: the Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 11:2 (Summer, 1985): 343.

Shokumin seisaku no shin kichō (The New Foundation of Colonial Policy). Including his review of Adam Smith's colonial theory, an essay on the Zionist movement as colonization, and some critical essays on the colonial and immigrant policies of Japan, the U.S. and England, this supplement to his monumental textbook aimed at clarifying his criticism of various serious problems that imperialist colonial policy had caused.¹³³

Yanaihara's works produced an immense sensation among his contemporaries in the academia. This was particularly because of his unique definition of colonization as "a social phenomenon in which a social group migrates to a new region and conducts social and economic activities with the natives there" (*shokumin towa shakaigun ga aratanaru chiiki ni ijūshite shakai teki keizai teki ni katsudōsuru genshō*). By the 1920s when Yanaihara's academic career just began, colonization had come to be regarded as a political and cultural project of a superior state under the rubric of "the white man's burden"; but Yanaihara opposed the existing view, arguing that political and cultural factors should be excluded from the definition of colonization. Instead, he included such forms of migration that had previously been left out from the category of colonization, as the Jewish settlement in Palestine through the Zionist movement, the movement of Koreans to Manchuria and Siberia, internal colonization (*naichi shokumin*), the Japanese movement to Hokkaido, the northern part of Japan, and even their emigration to Hawaii in the category of colonization. Of course, colonization with a political dominant-subordinate relationship between the metropole and the colony, the prevailing type of colonization at that time, was also colonization in this view, in the sense that it involved with human migration.

¹³³ Yanaihara Tadao, *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1926); *Shokumin Seisaku no Shin Kichō*. These books are compiled in *Yanaihara Tadao Zenshu* [YTZ] I. After its first publication in 1926, *Shokumin oyobi shokumin seisaku* went through five editions, the second in 1929, the third in 1930, the fourth in 1933, and the fifth in 1934. For a list of his other major works on colonial policy studies, see Nakano, *Beyond the Western Liberal Order*, 157-158. On his personal history, see Asada, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron*, 316-317; Kamoshita Shigehiko, Kibata Yoichi, and Ikeda Nobuo, *Yanaihara Tadao* (Tokyo: Tokyodaigakushuppankai, 2011): 2-88.

Not only liberals but also conservatives in Japan criticized Yanaihara's definition of colonization. They called him an advocate of colonization, an imperialist, a fool or an idealist ignorant of the realities of colonization. They particularly problematized his unique methodology of dividing colonization into two types: actual colonization (*jisshitsuteki shokumin*) and formal colonization (*keishikiteki shokumin*). The former, which Yanaihara advocated, stood for colonization in which two different social groups, settlers and natives, formed a community of international division of labor, and as a result, both groups (and by extension, all humanity) could enjoy economic prosperities. By contrast, the latter, which he criticized, represented colonization in which a settler group and native people were placed in a politically dominant-subordinate relationship, not a socio-economically cooperative one among equally independent groups, which frequently spawned national conflicts and ultimately diminished chances for prosperity. This argument, advocating and criticizing colonization at the same time, was interpreted by some of his critics as the advocacy of imperialism; it assumed the existence of colonization with no political implication or conflict even in the era of imperialism. They saw this as impossible on the ground that actual colonization and formal one could not be separated in reality.¹³⁴

However, such criticism by his contemporaries failed to account for the actual life that Yanaihara led during the era of Japanese imperialism. He was a humanist activist against Japanese imperialist colonial policies. To draw on his engagement in the colonial problems of

¹³⁴ A Marxist critic, Hosokawa Kaoru, called Yanaihara a "bourgeois spokesman," who could be identified with other "aggressive expansionists, war mongers, and paternalistic oppressors of the lesser races." A conservative critic, Nagao Sakuro, opposed Yanaihara for including immigration and stateless ethnic group migration to a new land in colonization, and pejoratively dismissed him by saying, "That rabble is just the refuse of the world." Kanaji Ichirō, an economist and a colonial theorist, condemning Yanaihara's rejection of the state's role as the essential force of colonization, characterized his ideas as "utterly vague and formless hopes through religious idealism." Ōuchi also questioned Yanaihara's exclusion of the political dimension from colonization. See Asada, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron*, 317-319 and Schneider, "The Future of the Japanese Colonial Empire, 1914-1931," 146-148.

Korea, he criticized Japan's cruel suppression of the Korean independence movement on March 1st 1919 and opposed Japanese assimilation policy that subjugated the Korean industries and resources to the needs of the Japanese economy. He argued for offering the Koreans suffrage and allowing them to make autonomous assemblies or a cabinet government where they could decide their own foreign and military affairs.¹³⁵ In fact, he personally interacted with Korean people and supported them, often expressing his sympathy with their aspirations for national independence.¹³⁶ His anti-imperialist attitude was epitomized by his opposition to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Soon after the outbreak of the war in 1937, he wrote an essay condemning Japan's invasion of China in which he stated, "Bury Japan for a while so that her ideals may live." As a result, he was forced by his university to resign, just three months after the publication of the essay.¹³⁷ In light of his consistent critical posture against Japanese colonial policies, the judgment of his contemporary critics—that he was an imperialist who took no account of the real problems of colonization and ignored the political nature of colonization—can hardly stand.

Then, how should his colonial theory, which appears so "non-political as to advocate for imperialism" and therefore seems to contradict his actual commitment to anti-imperialist activism, be reinterpreted? In other words, in what ways should the coexistence of advocacy for colonization and criticism against colonization in his theory be explained? Regarding this

¹³⁵ Yanaihara, "Chosen tōchi no hōshin," *Chūō kōron* (June 1926), *Shokumin seisaku no shinkichō*, *YTZ* I, 725-744; "Chosen sanmai zōshoku keikaku ni tsuite," *Nōgyō keizai kenkyū* 2(1) (Feb., 1926), *YTZ* I, 692-724; "Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea," *Pacific Affairs*, 11(2) (1938), *YTZ* 23, 558-568.

¹³⁶ Yi Gyu Soo, "Yanaihara Tadao ūi sikmin chōng ch'aekron kwa chosūn insik," *Daedong Munhwa Yōngu*, 46 (2004): 184; Cho In Je, "Na ūi abōji hwoi sōng Cho Yong Hak yōngsu," *Pu Kyōng Kyohwoisa Yōn'gu*, vol. 35 (January 2012): 127-148.

¹³⁷ Yanaihara, "Kokka no risō," *Chūō Kōron* (September 1937). On the details of this so-called *Yanaihara Incident*, see Susan C. Townsend, *Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy: Redeeming Empire* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), Ch. 9; Shogimen Takashi, "Censorship, Academic Factionalism, and University Autonomy in Wartime Japan: The Yanaihara Incident Reconsidered," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 40:1 (2014).

question, the existing studies have simply viewed the coexistence as a “theoretical error,” instead of examining his theoretical logic on which such coexistence might be possible. For example, Asada Kyōji, a prominent historian of Japanese colonial policy, concluded that “Yanaihara made a contradictory error in that he strongly advocates the autonomy of colonies (*jishushugi seisaku*) while praising the enormous contribution of colonization to all humanity.”¹³⁸ Kang Sang-jung found the reason for such error in Japanese orientalism, by which Yanaihara viewed the colonized as uncivilized “them” outside, compared to Japan, namely, the civilized “us” inside.¹³⁹ Ubukata Naokichi and Lee Gyu-soo argued that Yanaihara’s error was a product of “modern rationalism,” that is, the colonizers’ calculative thinking through self-reflection that the Japanese empire must make rational changes to its colonial policy in order to maintain the Japanese empire.¹⁴⁰ All of these scholars concluded that Yanaihara’s colonial theory was not so anti-imperialist as to advocate for national independence of the colonized people.

In this chapter, I would like to challenge these existing views of Yanaihara’s colonial theory by illuminating the theoretical coherence between his advocacy *and* his criticism of colonization. I will take a couple of strategies to do that. First of all, I reconsider his argument concerning colonization that “modernization through colonization brings welfare and economic prosperity to all humanity.” While this statement has been regarded as proof of his pro-imperialist position, I will argue that it should be interpreted as evidence of his advocacy of modernization. For Yanaihara, colonization was a diachronic concept meaning actual

¹³⁸ Asada, *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū Shiron*, 371.

¹³⁹ Kang Sang-Jung, “Shakai Kagakusha no Shokumin Ninshiki: Shokumin Seisaku to Orientalism.”

¹⁴⁰ Ubukata Naokichi, “Shinkō no ronri to seiji no ronri – Kim Kyo-sin to Yanaihara Tadao no baai,” in Niida Noboru and Masao Fukushima, Niida Noboru Hakushi tsuitō ronbunshū: Vol. 3, *Nihonhō to Ajia* (Japan and Asia) (Tōkyō: Keisō Shobō, 1970): 90-96; cited in Yi Gyu Soo, “Kūndae Ilbon ūi Sikmin Chūngch’ae e nat’anan Chosūn Insik” (The Japanese Perception of Korea represented in the Modern Colonial Policy Theory), *Asia Munhwa Yōngu* (Journal of Eastern studies Academy of East Asian Studies) vol. 26 (2012):76-77, 85.

colonization without political dominance, a human activity that had existed throughout history. To him, it did not indicate just the form of political dominance (“formal colonization” in his own terms) that became prevalent in the specific moment of history, namely, the era of imperialism. As he defined colonization or, more precisely, actual colonization, Yanaihara imagined the establishment of an economic community among politically independent and equal nations based on the principle of mutual aids in their international division of labor. Through such international economic unity, he believed that all people in the world, regardless of their class and social status, could equally enjoy modern benefits and bring about the end of the era of imperialism.

Secondly, I will illuminate the theoretical process by which the coexistence between pro-modernization and anti-imperialism could take place in Yanaihara’s theory. I will explore two theoretical sources that he relied on—Adam Smith’s international economics and Marxist studies of imperialism. In the course of these analyses, I will demonstrate that Yanaihara, inspired by Smith’s colonial theory, conceived of the two types of colonization—colonization based on political and military domination (formal colonization) and colonization as a socio-economic phenomenon without political implications (actual colonization)—as a methodological principle to criticize Japanese imperialist colonial policies that denied the colonies’ political autonomy. Employing Smith’s logic, Yanaihara disapproved of “formal colonization” for its economic inefficiency in terms of national interest, while he praised “actual colonization” for its potentials to achieve human equality and prosperity. The latter, he believed, would transform an immense uncivilized nature into inhabitable spaces and expand the international division of labor to make the world better. As a result, it would enable even ordinary people and nations in the world to get access to resources and goods, which had been limited previously to a small number of people in the high-status and wealthy nations.

Yanaihara's own critical arguments against formal colonization was strengthened when he added the Marxist critique of imperialism to this Smithian colonial theory. Influenced by Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding and Vladimir Lenin, the Smithian colonial theorist emphasized how the exploitative structure of imperialism in the era of high capitalism reinforced the political and dominant-subordinate relationship between the metropole and the colony through the movement of capital, and he displayed how severely it damaged world peace, causing conflicts and inequalities among nations. Based on these two theoretical sources, Yanaihara demanded that colonial policy offer colonies political autonomy (*jishushugi seisaku*), by which colonies could have political, economic, social and cultural independence for their own benefit. In this vein, he strongly rejected assimilation policy (*dōkashugi seisaku*), which subordinated all aspects of life in the colonies to Japanese interests.

No matter how seriously the humanist reformist contrasted actual colonization with formal one and pursued an end to imperialism, however, he failed to recognize fully some theoretical "potentials" of his "internationalist" or "anti-imperialist" perspective for abuse and misuse. His advocacy for modernization in the 1920s came to be co-opted and appropriated during the Japanese wartime period from the late 1930s to 1945. In this period, Tōbata Seiichi, Yanaihara's successor as the third chair of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University, adapted Yanaihara's colonial theory, particularly, its clear-cut divisions between actual colonization and formal colonization, development and exploitation, and internationalism and imperialism, and utilized it as a theoretical basis for imperialist wartime propaganda claiming that the Japanese empire promoted international cooperation and mutual development for all its member nations, that is to say, a Greater East Asian Co-prosperity sphere.

Such "unexpected" transformation of Yanaihara's theory by Tōbata points to the

limitations of Yanaihara's views. I will argue that his ideas of modernization as development for all humanity served as the crucial link that made such a transformation possible. These pro-modernization ideas, which he shared with Nitobe as well as Smith, led Yanaihara to imagine the possibility of actual colonization—colonization as development without exploitation—even in the era of imperialism when such possibility could not be fulfilled. This imagined possibility, which was originally intended to bring an end to imperialism, was ultimately appropriated by Tōbata to prove that colonization as development and colonization as exploitation could exist separately. In fact, during the Pacific War, Tōbata claimed that the Japanese empire was an international economic community for development without exploitation, while the British Empire was an exploitative model of empire. In this way, Yanaihara's colonial theory had grave, if unintended, consequences, providing his contemporaries and later generations with a theoretical tool to evade responsibility for colonization in the era of imperialism. Contrary to the creator's intention, the theory established a theoretical framework through which they evaluated Japanese imperialism in a clear-cut binary division between development and exploitation without a serious historical examination of the specific colonial realities, imperial exploitative systems and distorted capitalist economic development.

Taking all the issues mentioned above into consideration, the main body of this chapter comprises four parts. The first section introduces the general structure of Yanaihara's colonial theory by illuminating the relationship between his goal of study and his new approach to colonization. Yanaihara framed his theory as an anti-imperialist pursuit and consequently defined colonization as a social phenomenon as a way to oppose the political definition of colonization on which the imperialist colonial policies were based. In next two sections, I explore the two bodies of theory that Yanaihara relied on to construct such reformist ideas—Adam Smith's

colonial theory and Marxist studies of imperialism. By integrating these two sources, Yanaihara attempted to criticize imperialist colonial practice characterized by economic exploitation of colonies, while promoting an ideal form of colonization without political dominance aiming at economic development for all humanity. In the fourth section, I describe the ideal colonial policy that Yanaihara dreamt of. Lastly, in conclusion, I reflect on the historical significance and limitations of Yanaihara's colonial theory in terms of the continuities and discontinuities that it had with his predecessor, Nitobe and his successor, Tōbata. My criticism centers on his dual approach to colonization, colonization as development and colonization as exploitation.

While Yanaihara's works are various and voluminous, as seen in the twenty-nine volume collection of his writings, in this chapter, I mainly deal with his books, *Colonization and Colonial Policy* and *The New Foundation of Colonial Policy*, as well as his articles and critical essays on contemporary colonial policies. In addition to these, some sources, such as recollections of Yanaihara written by his son and students, are used to show how his life experience gave reality to his colonial theory.¹⁴¹ With these sources, I reconstruct Yanaihara's colonial theory in the context of his life. In doing so, I elucidate the complexities and contradictions inherent in his arguments, which will be helpful to understand the characteristics of democracy, liberalism, and internationalism in imperial Japan in the 1920s.

¹⁴¹ In particular, I was able to obtain unpublished postcards that he exchanged with Cho Yong-hak, an elder at a Korean Presbyterian church in Pusan, Korea, who died a martyr in 1941 for his resistance against the Japanese assimilation policy that enforced Japanese Shintō shrine worship. I encountered with the elder Cho's son, Cho In-Je, in early 2017 in Kwangju, Korea, and he gave me all the materials he had collected and written about the relationship of his father and Yanaihara. I wish to express my special gratitude to Mr. Cho In-Je.

Colonization as a Social Phenomenon

In the very beginning of *Colonization and Colonial Policy*, Yanaihara introduces the academic significance and purpose of his book. In contrast to the existing Japanese colonial studies, he explains, his is a “practical study (*jisshitsuteki kenkyū*) of colonization and colonial policy,” or at least the efforts toward such a study; it was written to illuminate “the significance of colonization and colonial policy as a social fact (*shakaiteki jijitsu*)” and “the effects of colonization on humanity (*jinrui*),” particularly on those with a vested interest (*rigai kankeisha*) such as the colonizing country (*shokuminkoku*) and the colony (*shokuminchi*), or the colonizer (*shokuminsha*) and the natives (*genjūsha*), and “the characteristics of the various colonial social relationships (*shokuminteki shakai sho kankei*).” And therefore, he expects, his “objective study based on facts (*kyakkan teki bunseki ni motozuku jijitsu kankei no haaku*) could appeal to all ranges of groups without prejudice,” for example, “to the colonizing people as well as the colonized people, to the capitalist class as well as the working class, and to the imperialist as well as the non-imperialist.” By doing so, he hopes his study will become the grounds on which “practically effective (*jissai teki*) colonial policies” can be made and implemented.¹⁴²

In other words, he is arguing that his colonial theory is an alternative to the existing Japanese colonial policy studies by being a “social, practical, factual, objective, effective, and reconciling” theory that will be acceptable to all nations and classes. To understand this statement, it is helpful to look at his specific assessment of the problems of traditional colonial policy studies, an assessment that can be summarized in two points.

First of all, according to Yanaihara, the existing colonial policy studies do not stand on

¹⁴² Yanaihara, *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, YTZ I, 5.

practical facts (*jissai teki chi'i*). That is, they do not constitute a social science. To borrow an expression from his reviewer, Ōuchi Hyōe, they are theories “standing on prospects” (*tenbō teki chi'i*), or “ideologies based on the self-consciousness of a world-class great empire (*sekai teki daiteikoku*).” Without considering a social history of actual life in a colony, the existing studies are simply based on the ideologies of Japan’s superiority (*sokoku yūetsu*), civilizational guidance (*bunmei shidō*), and racism (*jinshu sabetsu*). They are a “pseudo-theory (*ese gakumon*)” that disguises the colonizing countries’ administrative techniques for pillage and exploitation as a magnificent spectacle in front of the colonized people.¹⁴³

Secondly, Yanaihara regards them as “ruling policies (*tōchi saku*)” sustaining imperialist colonial policy (*teikoku teki shokumin seisaku*), which cannot solve the contemporary colonial problems prevailing all over the world. In *Colonization and Colonial Policy*, he enumerates such colonial problems experienced by the early half of 1920s, centering on three issues: 1) conflicts and wars among colonizing powers; 2) national conflicts between the colonizing country and the colony; and 3) resistance from ordinary people or the working class in colonizing countries. As illustrative examples of these conflicts, he invokes WWI, the Opium War, the independence movements in Ireland, Egypt, India, China (*kokken kaifuku undō*), and Korea, Russian Communism (*sekka undō*), Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine of the right of self-determination, and the mandate system after WWI. In Yanaihara’s view, current colonial policy studies could not provide any solution to these grave problems because they had a tendency to serve imperialist colonial policies, contributing only to the benefit of a small number of colonizing powers and capitalists.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Yanaihara, “Ronbun kaidai,” *YTZ* I, 536-537. Ōuchi, “Yanaihara kyōjyū no ‘shokumin oyobi shokumin seisaku’,” 236.

¹⁴⁴ Yanaihara, *Ibid.*, 521-524; Ōuchi, *Ibid.*, 234.

Yanaihara constructed his own colonial policy theory with the clear intention of reforming “impractical” and “imperialist” colonial theories. He attempted to construct an anti-imperialist, humanist, and reconciling colonial theory, and to do so, he concentrated on redefining the essential terms of the field—colonization, colony, and colonial policy. Following the structure of his book, *Colonization and Colonial policy*, I analyze Yanaihara’s understanding of colonization—the definition, motives, and ends of colonization; its specific historical phases; and the value and ideal of colonization.

Colonization and Colonial Policy begins with Yanaihara’s urge that colonial policy studies should start from the examination of the nature of “colonization,” not from that of “colony” as was a customary practice:

Colonization [shokumin], Colony [shokuminchi], and Colonial Policy [shokumin seisaku]. Among these three interrelated concepts, the most fundamental one is colonization. The land where colonization is conducted is the colony; the policy related to colonization is colonial policy. In the study of the various colonial relationships of humankind, therefore, the first thing that should be determined is the substance of colonization. We should no longer simply assume the concept of colony as the starting point of our study, as has been repeatedly attempted so far.¹⁴⁵

As seen in the previous chapter on Nitobe Inazō, the most foundational concept in mainstream colonial policy studies was indeed the “colony,” standing for a “new territory” (*shin ryōdō*, or “new land” in Nitobe’s translation), or a “newly acquired land,” which was different from “new soil” (*shin chi*) suggesting “nearly or wholly uninhabited by man.” In conventional understanding, a modern colony was predicated on the existence of a political relationship between the metropole and the colony. The U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were considered settlements, not colonies, in these studies, since they were established by individual

¹⁴⁵ Yanianhara, *Shokumin Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, YTZ I, 13.

initiatives, not by a state at the prompting of nationalism.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the existing concept of colony emphasized the legal element as well. Yamamoto Miono, an established colonial theorist at Kyoto Imperial University, captures this definition of a colony precisely as a “new territory that is not considered a part of the homeland (*honkoku*) according to the national constitution and therefore is ruled by a separate system of laws.”¹⁴⁷

Based on this political and legal understanding of colony, mainstream colonial theory defined colonization as a “political phenomenon in which a part of a nation migrates from its motherland (*bokoku*) to a new territory, and thereby a political relationship is generated between the motherland and the new land, or the colony.” In other words, colonization had been understood as human migration along with the extension of political sovereignty from motherland to colony.

Opposing this common view of colonization, Yanaihara claimed that colonization must be interpreted as the socioeconomic activities of social groups.

Shokumin is a social phenomenon. In order to study the substance of *shokumin*, the character of this social phenomenon needs to be clarified. The study of the substance of a social phenomenon should not be restricted by formal conditions (*keishiki teki jōken*). The right approach is to explore the actual characteristics (*jishitsu teki tokushusei*) associated with that phenomenon. Human society is composed of the interactions and the existence of *shakaigun* or social groups that are distinguished as tribe (*shūzoku*), ethnos (*minzoku*), and nation (*kokumin*). Each group occupies and dominates its own region; and yet, it also moves from one place to another when necessity arises. The new residence may not have a previous owner, or may be occupied by other social groups. In either case, the collective way of life of the migrating social group (*ijū suru shakaigun no shūdan*) may have a set of particular attributes. [To include this breadth of meaning,] I call *shokumin* a phenomenon produced by a social group that migrates to a region (*chi'iki*), perceived as new by the migrants, in which it acts socially and economically.

Here, Yanaihara claims that political interpretation had limited the scope of the studies of colonization. Urging that the “concept of colonization should be emancipated from national

¹⁴⁶ Nitobe Inazo, *NIZ*, vol. 4, 56-61.

¹⁴⁷ Yanaihara, *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, *YTZI*, 26.

constraints,”¹⁴⁸ Yanaihara suggests a new idea of colonization, that is, “colonization as a social phenomenon in which a social group migrates to a new region and conducts social and economic activities with the natives there.” Therefore, a colony is “the region where a migrating settler social group conducts their social and economic activities with the native social group” without having a national, political, territorial, dominant-subordinate relationship itself as its substance.¹⁴⁹

According to Yanaihara, this conceptual shift is necessary for two reasons. First, through his new definition, he was able to claim that some key forms of colonization that had been neglected in the more politicized definition could be revived. For example, stateless ethnic migration, such as Jews to Palestine and Koreans to Manchuria and Siberia, domestic migration or internal colonization (*kokunai tenjyū, naichi shokumin*), such as Japanese migration to Hokkaido, and the migration of an entire social group (*zenbuteki ijjū*), could be regarded as colonization.¹⁵⁰ Agreeing with George Cornwall Lewis (1806-1863) and Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1796-1862), whose non-political concept of colonization had been rejected by most Japanese colonial theorists for the reason that it was not adaptable to the “modern” colony, the reformist colonial theorist argued that the major feature of colony was migration of people, not political dependence on the motherland. In this sense, he claimed that even immigration (*imin*), such as Japanese people’s migration to Hawaii, and the white settlements, such as North America, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, were a kind of colonization. In his view, the U.S., even after political independence, could still be called a colony since it continued to receive English

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 14-16.

immigrants.¹⁵¹

Secondly, Yanaihara claimed that his new concept of colonization could explain actual characteristics of colonization that could not be explored in the political interpretation of colonization: the effects of colonization on humanity, including colonizer and colonized, for example, or the characteristics of various social relationships in the colony. Colonial Policy Studies, which had belonged squarely in the discipline of political science, he maintained, should be a part of a comprehensive academic system encompassing economics, sociology, and political science.¹⁵²

In addition to these two reasons that the author clearly lays out, one more reason can be inferred for his emphasis on the social definition of colonization. It seems that Yanaihara thought that such conceptual reorientation would allow scholars to imagine a peaceful end to colonization in the era of imperialism. Criticizing Otto Köbner (1869 - 1934), a German colonial law scholar, who argued for the continuation of the political and legal relationship between the motherland (*bokoku*) and the colony and at the same time the extinction of the motherland, Yanaihara dismissed his argument as a “theoretically careless one”¹⁵³ which neglected the basic fact that the extinction of the “motherland” should also mean the extinction of the political relationship with the colony. Since it presupposed the perpetual existence of “motherland” in its definition, “A colony is a new land to which people from the motherland migrate, and thereby comes to be placed under a dominant-subordinate relationship to the motherland,” the political

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 23-25.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 16. Otto Max Köbner’s book, *Einführung in die Kolonialpolitik* (1908) was translated in Japanese in 1913 by Shiozawa Masasada, entitled *Shokumin seisaku*. In the preface, Köbner was introduced as an expert German colonial policy thinker who had been engaged in actual policy making for the German navy, particularly as the policy maker for the German occupation of the Jiaozhou Bay concession in China (or Kiautschou Bay concession, 1898-1914).

and national definition of colonization could not assume the natural end (*shokuminchi shūshi*) of the colonial relationship between the motherland and the colony.

In this context, Yanaihara apparently believed that the redefinition of colonization as a social phenomenon, in which the agent of colonization became a “social group” (*shakaigun*) rather than a nation (*kokumin*) or a representative of a motherland, a natural end to the colonial relationship could be imagined. Declaring that “[n]o permanent colony can exist,” the reformist colonial theorist argued that a “colony can be a colony only when it looks new to the migrant group’s eyes; but as time passes by, the moment comes when the colonial society no longer looks strange or foreign (*fremd* in German) to them.” In other words, he anticipated a time when the migrants would see the colonial society as their own society, as they accumulate various kinds of relationships with the local society. “At this very moment,” he concluded, “the phenomenon of colonization ends.”¹⁵⁴ In sum, he endeavored to reconceptualize colonization in order to address the possibility of a “peaceful” separation of the colony, which could never be imagined in existing colonial studies under “national constraints.”

It is clear that Yanaihara’s redefinition of colonization with a focus on its social aspects had its roots in the anti-imperialist consciousness of his time. But for the theoretical inspiration for his redefinition, we must look to Adam Smith. In the next section, I will explore this major theoretical source for Yanaihara’s colonial theory more closely.

Smithian Theory

Before Yanaihara, Adam Smith had been assumed in Japanese academia to be an

¹⁵⁴ Yanaihara, *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, YZ I, 16.

economist, whose theory of free trade supported an imperialist economic system.¹⁵⁵ Strongly opposing such a perspective, however, Yanaihara rather praised Smith as a great colonial policy scholar whom every Japanese colonial policy scholar in his time must know. In his view, Smith was a powerful critic at the end of mercantilism who attacked the harmful effects of the exclusively monopolistic colonial policy on British society as well as on the world in general. In particular, Yanaihara extolled his practical and scientific research as an effective tool for criticism, because it analyzed the way in which the monopolistic colonial policy, prioritizing the interest of a small number of “merchants and master manufacturers” (*shōnin oyobi daiseizōka*, Yanaihara’s own translation), affected the interest of ordinary people and the development of human productivity.¹⁵⁶

For Yanaihara, Smith was an “advocate of a new colonial policy who prioritized the benefits of ordinary people and human peace and development in a difficult historical situation”;¹⁵⁷ moreover, Smith’s theory of free trade and noninterference policy (*jiyūhōnin setsu*) was a kind of “emancipation movement for ordinary people” (*ippan minshū wo kaihō sentosuru no kaihōundō*).¹⁵⁸ Thus, Yanaihara emulated Smith in his aim to become a humanist reformist in the field of Japanese colonial policy studies. In this section, I will elucidate Smith’s influence on Yanaihara’s colonial theory. First I will introduce Smith’s views of colonization and unique methodology of dividing the advantages of colonization into two kinds. And then, I will examine the way in which Yanaihara directly adapted Smith’s ideas to his own colonial theory,

¹⁵⁵ Yanaihara, “Ronbun kaidai,” *YTZ* I, 536. In Europe and the U.S. in the 1800s, Smith’s economic theory was widely and wrongly understood as defending the interests of emerging capitalists. While Smith, living in the late 1700s, reprimanded capitalists for their “mean greed” and obviously stated that “they neither were the leaders for all human societies nor must not be so,” the emerging capitalists in the West ignored his criticism, reserving all their praise for his great message, “Let the market alone.” Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers: the Lives, Times, And Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers*, 5th ed., (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); 66.

¹⁵⁶ Yanaihara, *Ibid.*, 537.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 537-538.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 537; Yanaihara, “Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi ron,” *YTZ* I, 684-685.

particularly focusing on his argument of the value of the colony.

In his phenomenal book, *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith included a chapter titled “Of Colonies.”¹⁵⁹ According to an American historian of economic thought, Robert L. Heilbroner, Smith regarded “wealth” as the “goods and services that all the people of society consume”¹⁶⁰ and colonization as contributing to the increase of nations’ wealth. He argued that the international trade system formed through colonization increased the general consumption of goods among common people in the metropole as well as in the colony. And the increased consumption brought a general increase in production too, he thought, because “consumption” was “the sole end of purpose of all production.”

Adam Smith’s “democratic” idea of colonization, which “was neither anti-labor nor anti-capital, but pro-consumer,”¹⁶¹ seems to have attracted Yanaihara, who wanted to construct a colonial policy theory without any partiality. In his article, “Adam Smith’s Colonial Theory,”¹⁶² the humanist colonial policy scholar introduces Smith’s idea of the positive effects of colonization—the increase of human consumption and productivity. Yanaihara explains how Smith addressed the “general advantages of colonization” (*ippanteki rieki*) by drawing on the example of the British colonization of America and the East Indies. As he summarizes Smith’s argument, British colonization provided not only Britain, but also Europe with a broader market for their overproduction in general, which resulted in an increase in their production of goods. Moreover, the exchange between European goods and American goods brought advantages to all the common people on both sides of the Atlantic, giving them more opportunities to enjoy novel

¹⁵⁹ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 1st ed., (London: W. Strahan, 1776).

¹⁶⁰ Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers*, 51.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 66.

¹⁶² Yanaihara, “Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi ron,” YZ I, 659-691.

goods that had previously been monopolized by nobles or great merchants. In other words, Smith believed that as long as the free market mechanism without any government intervention or monopoly of great merchants was working, the kinds and quantities of commodities would expand and, as a result, the wealth of all nations would rapidly increase, including colonizing, colonized, and even neighboring nations.¹⁶³

Likewise, Smith's concept of "general advantages of colonization" was strictly based on the social interpretation of colonization, excluding any political aspects. For him, colonization stood for the expansion of international free trade without political oppression. However, most of Smith's contemporaries regarded the colony as a national matter directly related to their national pride, supporting colonization with monopoly policies based on mercantilism. Lamenting this stance, Smith harshly criticized the prevailing view of colonization for its "economic ineffectiveness." In fact, he blamed it for harming the economic interests of England itself.

Yanaihara goes on to show how Smith criticized the negative effects of the nationalist colonization on the societies of both metropole and colony under the name of "the particular profits of colonization" (*tokushu rieki*). He argued that if colonial trade was governed not by the free market mechanism, but by government intervention, as in British mercantilist policy prioritizing the "particular" profits of a small number of great British merchants, bureaucrats, and politicians, they could not increase the wealth of nations; the level of human consumption and production would drop.¹⁶⁴ Smith's reasoning goes as follows: mercantilist policy increases the price of goods, which then decreases consumption in Britain and subsequently, production as well. The decrease of production limits the demand for goods, causing less production and less

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 670.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 672-673.

consumption, as a result of which a market with cheap and abundant goods will disappear. In other words, a trade monopoly produces relative profits for a small group, not absolute profits for all people in the metropole. In Smith's view, British mercantilist policy was designed to maintain the superiority of Britain by preventing other nations from producing goods. Therefore, it could not increase the profits for Britain beyond what could have been attained naturally through the free market mechanism.¹⁶⁵ Smith also argued that mercantilist trade policies made it more difficult for ordinary people living in Britain and the colonies to buy cheap products from other nations. And, finally, he argued that even the great merchants were prevented from running their business on a stable basis, because the pace of the capital turnover was too slow in the colonial trade, where commodities were shunted over a long distance between the metropole and the colonies.¹⁶⁶

In addition to these anti-consumer effects, according to Yanaihara, Smith drew on a dark side of the particular advantages of colonization—the increase of the costs for wars and national defense, which was harmful to the metropolitan economy itself. Smith argued that the British attempts at the political domination of colonies to secure a trade monopoly caused international conflicts with their colonies as well as with neighboring countries. As a result, Britain could get no financial and military support from the American colonies, which resisted the policy that imposed taxes without allowing political autonomy. Britain had to pay enormous military and administrative expenses even in times of peace, thus reducing the British national treasury rather

¹⁶⁵ Heilbroner astutely summarizes Smith's laws of market in a simple manner: "The drive of individual self-interests in an environment of similarly motivated individuals will result in competition; and they further demonstrate how competition will result in the provision of those goods that society wants, in the quantities that society desires, and at the prices society is prepared to pay." Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers*, 53.

¹⁶⁶ Yanaihara, "Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi ron," *YTZ I*, 673-674.

than increasing its revenue.¹⁶⁷

Smith's advocacy of the "general advantages" of colonization and his criticism against the "particular advantages" of colonization were the very grounds on which Yanaihara constructed his colonial theory. Relying heavily on Smith's methodological division between socio-economic colonization and political-military colonization, Yanaihara, as previously mentioned, divided colonization into two kinds—actual colonization (*jisshitsuteki shokumin*) and formal colonization (*keishikiteki shokumin*).¹⁶⁸ Actual colonization stands for his definition of colonization itself, "a social phenomenon in which a social group migrates to a new region and conducts social and economic activities with the natives there." Or, in Smith's terms, it can also stand for "the expansion of international free trade without political intervention." By contrast, formal colonization stands for "the political and military occupation of the colony (*shokuminchi ryōyū*) generating a dominant-subordinate relationship between the motherland and the colony."

Yanaihara argues, just as Smith does, that actual colonization produces general advantages (*ippan teki rieki*) beneficial to all human societies, while formal colonization generates the particular advantages (*tokushu teki rieki*) beneficial only to the colonizing country, failing to serve the interests of ordinary people in the metropole, the colony, and even in other states.¹⁶⁹ This view is clearly demonstrated in Yanaihara's argument on the value of colonization.

Yanaihara examines the value of colonization in four directions: the general advantages

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 677-679.

¹⁶⁸ In accordance with two types of colonization, Yanaihara interprets the Japanese translation of colonization, *shokumin*, in two ways. While *shokumin* has been conventionally regarded with one meaning as "planting people," Yanaihara uniquely suggests the meaning of "*shoku*" in two ways, "to plant" or "to be planted." As a result, he interprets colony (*shokuminchi*) both as a place in which something plants people (*tami o ūuru chi*) and as a place in which settlers are planted (*ūuru tami no chi*). While the first interpretation stands for formal colonization, the second interpretation represents actual colonization because it can highlight the movement of the people itself rather than who sends the people to the colony. For more details, see Nakano, *Beyond the Western Liberal Order: Yanaihara Tadao and Empire as Society*, 192.

¹⁶⁹ Yanaihara Tadao, *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, YZ I, 196-197.

of actual colonization for humanity, the advantages of actual colonization for the settler group, and the values of formal colonization, that is, the political domination of the colony, for the settler group, and for the native group. The first two categories address the general advantages (*rieki*) of actual colonization while the last two concern the value (*kachi*) of formal colonization.

As the first part of the general advantage of actual colonization, Yanaihara starts with the expansion of human habitable lands [*Oikume*, in Greek] through colonization and the subsequent development of humankind in both quantity and quality.¹⁷⁰ He argues that colonization causes an increase in human population and their economic development. Actual colonization produces an international economy, which then brings economic prosperity to all humanity. For this reason, he emphasizes the Smithian idea of the international division of labor. That is, he maintains that colonization encourages the movement of goods, people, and capital between the metropole and the colony, particularly the movement of raw materials and labor from the colony to the metropole and the movement of capital from the metropole to the colony. This so-called “expansion of international division of labor,” he continues, increases the total sum and kinds of production; as a result, human wealth increases, enabling ordinary people and ordinary nations in the world to consume goods that were previously limited to an elite minority in wealthy nations. In this respect, he concludes, the effects of colonization are so positive as “to make the economic development of the entire humanity possible in terms of both quantity and quality.”¹⁷¹

As for the social and economic advantages that the settler group can receive from actual colonization, Yanaihara argues that they can acquire some emergency methods for addressing the problems of overpopulation, unemployment, and rural areas at home. In addition, they can

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 197-198, 466. Like his mentor, Nitobe, Yanaihara calls this phenomenon the “expansion of *Oikume* (Habitable world in Greek).” Nitobe, “Igaku shinpo to shokumin hatten” (1918), *NIZ*, vol. 4, 329.

¹⁷¹ Yanaihara, *Shokumin Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, in *YTZ I*, 198.

increase their wealth by increasing trade with their colonies and by investing their capital in them.¹⁷²

Yet, in reality, it was commonly regarded that such advantages of actual colonization could be protected more effectively by the political occupation of the colony and the subsequent exploitation of the colony's economy. Therefore, formal colonization became the main trend of colonization. Yanaihara acknowledges that these common views are right in a sense. He draws on some examples of the values of formal colonization for the settler group: besides advantages through migration, investment, and trade, through the monopolistic domination of an international economic region (*ichidai keizai chiiki tokusen teki shihai*), they can acquire some financial and military support from the colonies. But Yanaihara points out that compared to these supports from the colonies, the financial burdens that the settler group must carry to maintain the exclusive domination of colonies are much greater. That is, they have to pay enormous financial and military expenses to resolve conflicts with the colonies as well as with other colonizing countries. By suggesting a kind of comparative profit and loss statement of Japan's formal colonization, the Smithian Japanese colonial policy scholar underlines the ineffectiveness of the political occupation of colonies. Going further, he argues that people support formal colonization regardless of such economic ineffectiveness for reasons that are emotional rather than economic, such as the private interests of the ruling classes, a sense of cultural superiority, a desire for national prestige, and a sense of national rivalry.¹⁷³

Lastly, Yanaihara discusses the value of colonization for the natives (*genjūsha*). This part of his argument is very interesting in that Yanaihara shifts the way in which he uses the term colonization. Here, without clarifying which of the two meanings of colonization he is invoking,

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 202-206.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 207-222.

he states, “Colonization is inevitably a misfortune to the natives (*genjūsha no fukō wa shokumin ni hitsuzen teki nariya*).” In other words, whether it is actual or formal, he aptly points out, colonization is a misfortune for the natives, because they have no choice but to encounter new migrants who intrude into their lands and occupy them without their permission. He states, although colonization is valuable to the settler group because it brings them various advantages, it is not to the native group because of the forceful and exploitative methods (*kyōatsu sakushu*) of its implementation. Employing the example of the Western colonization of the East and West Indies (*tōzai indo*), he states that historically colonization was conducted through “accidents” (*guzen*) such as the “farmers’ ignorance” (*nōmin teki muchi*); that is, the settlers oppressed and eradicated (*zetsumetsu*) the natives.¹⁷⁴ He emphasizes that it should be remembered that the advantages of colonization for humanity were in fact established on the basis of the sacrifice of the natives.¹⁷⁵

In other words, as Ōuchi aptly comments, Yanaihara suggests that actual colonization and formal colonization are continuously entangled with each other (*kōsaku*) during the course of colonization, which generates positive and negative value (*kachi / fukachi*), depending on the perspective. For example, Yanaihara argued that the contemporary colonization after the Industrial Revolution had a value for the settler group because it brought them capitalist development; at the same time it had no value for the native group because it prevented the natural development of their economy by making them proletariats (*musansha*) as well as destroying their indigenous culture, customs, and social order.¹⁷⁶

Nevertheless, Yanaihara claims that if the general advantages of actual colonization

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 222.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 223.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 225. Ōuchi, “Yanaihara kyōjyu no ‘shokumin oyobi shokumin seisaku’,” 244.

beneficial both to the settlers and the natives are considered, colonization is still a valuable pursuit. Therefore, he demands that each of the settlers and the natives reconsider their current attitude toward colonization. He asks them to cooperate to base their relationship on the principle of mutual benefits, not of oppression and exploitation. To the settlers, he states, to achieve the goal of “coexistence and co-prosperity (*kyōson kyōei*)” as they advocate facing the colonies’ demands for self-determination rights after WWI, they must grant them independent status and allow them to participate in determining colonial policies for their own societies. Without giving them this kind of freedom (*jiyū*), the advocacy of “coexistence and co-prosperity” becomes mere deception.

In the same way, Yanaihara tries to appeal to the natives by emphasizing the modern products generated in the course of colonization: infrastructure such as railway and other transportation and projects for water control or reforestation, the distribution of education and hygiene and the maintenance of public health, the political reforms to extinguish evil customs, the establishment of a constitutional system, and the guarantee of safety for life and property.¹⁷⁷ Although colonization entails injustice and misfortune, he attempts to rally the discouraged colonized to strengthen their nation by employing modern development generated by the expansion of international trade. “Because the natives were economically, socially, and politically weak, he concludes, the colony was established. However, through colonization, the natives also can develop (*kanyō*) their ability to resist the colonizers’ exploitation.”¹⁷⁸

Yanaihara’s argument on the value of colony, as laid out above, has become the target of criticism for scholars who judge him as a defender of empire or an imperialist. But Yanaihara insisted that he was not an imperialist. Rather, he aspired to be an “internationalist,” according to

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 226-228.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 228.

his own definition, who advocated a free market mechanism in an international economic system without political intervention.¹⁷⁹ In a sense, it can be said that he was an advocate of modernization. Just as Smith saw the possibility of democracy in the expansion of international free trade through colonization without monopoly, Yanaihara also dreamt of emancipatory effects of modernization through actual colonization.

However, this pro-modernization stance produced contradictions in Yanaihara's colonial theory. As already seen in his argument on the value of colony, Yanaihara acknowledges that colonization which generates positive value for the settler group can generate negative value for the native group. One wonders, then, how Yanaihara was able to argue for the general advantages of colonization. Can his so-called "actual colonization" exist? What kind of colonial policy could create such an ideal form of colonization?

To address these questions, I would like to redirect the discussion from the question of whether Yanaihara was an imperialist or not, to the questions of how he juxtaposed pro-modernization ideas and anti-imperialist criticism. I ask how this juxtaposition produced theoretical complexities and contradictions and explore the impact of these contradictions on his contemporaries. Smith's advocacy of the general advantages of the socio-economic interactions among free nations through international free trade, and his criticism against the particular advantages of the exclusive possession of colonies through political and military occupation, became the basic framework for Yanaihara's colonial theory with its binary division between pro-modernization and anti-imperialism. In the next sections, I will examine in what ways Yanaihara consolidated the binary framework by focusing on another of his theoretical sources, Marxist imperialism studies of imperialism. In the conclusion of this chapter, I will then address

¹⁷⁹ Yanaihara, "Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi ron", *YTZ* I, 686-687.

the limitations of his binary framework of pro-modernization and anti-imperialism.

Marxist Imperialism Studies

Although Smith's theory provided Yanaihara with the basic structure of his colonial theory, it could not explain the new trend of colonization since the development of monopoly capital in the 19th century.¹⁸⁰ Now, colonizing countries, or the monopoly capitalists, competed with one another to expand their exclusive sphere of influence over colonies. These so-called imperialists put the top priority on the expansion of empire through the political occupation of colonies to maximize their economic profits. However, Smith, who lived before the Industrial Revolution, argued in 1776 that long-distance trade and monopolistic trade could not be profitable to the economy of the metropole. Before the era of overcapitalization, he could not even envision the possibility that a colony could become a market for capital investment.¹⁸¹

Therefore, to examine colonization in the post-industrial revolution era, particularly after the 1870s, Yanaihara turned to Marxist critics, such as Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding, and Vladimir Lenin.¹⁸² In a sense, these Marxist thinkers' methodology was similar to Smith's methodology. They took a "practical" (*jisshitsuteki*) approach, or a socioeconomic approach, which posited the colony in the midst of the world economy, to examine its social and economic characteristics and the development of social relations in it, just as Smith did. However, they were interested in focusing on the metropole's exploitation of the colony, while Smith was

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 670-671.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 671.

¹⁸² Yanaihara, "Ronbun kaidai," *YTZ I*, 536-537. On the development of Marxism in Japan, see Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions* (CA: University of California Press, 2004), 54.

interested only in the effects of colonization on the settler economy. In this regard, the Marxist theorists appeared to be even more effective critics against imperialism in Yanaihara's eyes.¹⁸³

In his chapter on the motives of colonization, Yanaihara analyzes the origin of imperialism by fully employing the Marxist methodology. Positing imperialism as a later form of colonization, the so-called "investing colony" (*tōshi shokuminchi*), he first explains the motives of colonization in a way that can include even the earliest form of colonization in history, the so-called "settlement colony" (*ijū shokuminchi*). As he sees it, colonization occurs due to the "social group's ability to maintain their livelihood" (*seikatsuryoku*). In this way, Yanaihara emphasized the socio-economic elements in his explanation of the motives of colonization in accordance with his definition of colonization as the movement of a social group and the interactions between social groups. He divides the motives of colonization into two kinds, the passive motives (*shōkyoku teki dōin*) and the active motives (*sekkyoku teki dōin*): The former represent the social group's efforts to avoid unhappiness (*fukō no kaihi*) and the latter comprises the social group's efforts to pursue happiness (*kōfuku no tsuikyū*). In other words, a social group moves to a new land because they want to escape from disadvantageous living conditions such as overpopulation. In the capitalist society, he maintains, overproduction and overcapitalization become disadvantageous conditions because they cause the situation of overpopulation. Moreover, religious and political oppression also operate as passive motives. By contrast, he argues that the active motives stand for the manifestation of human vitality, such as a social group's migration to use labor and capital in a more productive way to improve their living conditions. The search for commercial profits, the import of food and raw materials on the capitalist demands, and the acquisition of a new market or of a new place for capital investment

¹⁸³ Yanaihara, "Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi ron," *YTZ* I, 676.

all belong to the active motives. A political will to control, religious evangelism, and cultural chauvinism or cultural “humanitarianism” are also active motives.¹⁸⁴

Positing imperialism as one of the active motives, Yanaihara identifies the origin of imperialism in the development of monopoly capitalism. Drawing on Rosa Luxemburg, he maintains that the structure of expanded reproduction of capitalism through primitive accumulation of capital itself ceaselessly generates colonization. Luxemburg’s concept of “outside” (*gaibu*), which means the “perfect outside of the capitalist economy,” or “non-capitalist conditions,” such as non-capitalist social classes and states, is identical to his concept of an actual colony. He mentions that this does not necessarily mean foreign countries in terms of international law. Rather, the “outside” stands for the internal or external regions of a state which are not yet capitalized. He argues that expanded reproduction of capital constantly makes people migrate to the outside, a new non-capitalized region, in search of social and economic profits.¹⁸⁵

In other words, capitalism originates from primitive capital accumulation, which necessitates colonizing non-capitalist countries. They become the market as well as the source of raw materials and food for the metropole. However, since the 1870s when the competition between Britain and Germany to expand their own exclusive sphere of domination over non-capitalist countries intensified, modern imperialism had made its appearance. Now, the economic will to control a great economic region through cartel or monopoly capital combined with the political will to control the region. Regarding this rise of imperialism, influenced by Hilferding, Luxemburg, and Lenin, Yanaihara concludes: “The substance of imperialism is the expansion of political domination. Here, political domination does not necessarily mean the expansion of

¹⁸⁴ Yanaihara, *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, YTZI, 75-77.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 71-73.

territories (*ryōdōken*). It stands for interference in the affairs of other countries through political power (*seiji teki kenryoku niyoru kanshō*). The capitalist economy's expansion or maintenance of a sphere of monopolistic domination constitutes the inevitable contents or purpose of modern imperialism. In other words, modern imperialism is the political and economic domination by monopoly capitalism of other countries.”¹⁸⁶

Yanaihara criticizes the exploitation of the colony as an effect of imperialism. Pointing out that the colony became a market as well as a source of raw materials and food, he states, “While the metropole (*honkoku*) became increasingly capitalized with expanded reproduction of capital, the colony experienced the proletarianization (*musanka*) of the natives: their loss of lands, the commercialization of their labor, the increase of production for foreign trade, the import of international goods, and subsequent extravagance (*shashi*).” In sum, due to the capitalization of the colony, the colonial capitalists became wealthier while the natives became poorer.¹⁸⁷

Yanaihara's critical insight into the exploitative nature of colonization in the era of imperialism is clearly expressed in his report to the Institute of Pacific Relations, “Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea,”¹⁸⁸ published in 1938. In this report, drawing on Korea as a typical example, he criticizes the problems of the Japanese assimilationist colonial policy in the 1920s and the 1930s.¹⁸⁹ After WWI, Wilsonian principles had fostered an international mood in

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 82, 85.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 186-195.

¹⁸⁸ Yanaihara, “Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea,” *YTZ* 23, 558-568. On the Japanese administration in Korea, he had consistently taken a critical stance. Yanaihara, “Chosen sanmai zōshoku keikaku ni tsuite” (Feb., 1926), *YTZ* I, 692-724; “Chosen tōchi no hōshin” (May, 1926), *YTZ* I, 725-744.

¹⁸⁹ In the international mood in which colonies demanded the right of self-determination after WWI, as the Korean independence movement broke out in 1919, the Japanese government revised the colonial policy, which was called assimilation policy (*dōkashugi*) or cultural policy (*bunka seiji*), under the principles of “extending domestic rule to colonies” (*naichi enchō shugi*), “impartiality and equal favor” (*isshi dōjin*) and “co-existence and co-prosperity” (*kyōson kyōei*). Through the new policy, it aimed at assimilating the colonies into the organic structure of the Japanese empire. More emphasis was put on cultural measures such as the promotion of industry and encouragement of education. The policy was interpreted as furthering the Japanization of Korea, designed to transform the Koreans

which colonies demanded the right of self-determination. Korea's independence movement broke out in 1919, as part of this international trend. In response, the Japanese government adopted a revised colonial policy in Korea with two principles, promoting industry and encouraging education to Japanize the Koreans by appeasing them on the one hand, the so-called "paternalistic protection and encouragement," while, on the other hand, reinforcing the police force to suppress Communism and the Nationalist movement in Korea, "bureaucratic oppression."¹⁹⁰

Yanaihara argues that these two principles make the Korean colonial government significantly financially dependent on the Imperial Treasury of Japan proper. In particular, he harshly criticizes the policy for aggravating this financial dependency, noting that the Japanese government does not encourage Korea to be financially independent from Japan, but focuses on keeping Korea's economy dependent or subordinate to Japan's economy. For instance, he draws on the example of the development of rice production in Korea with Japanese support beginning in 1920. The goal was to solve the food problem in Japan proper rather than to help the growth of the Korean economy. As the fear of shortages in Japan was eliminated, the Chosen Government-General was compelled, in May, 1934, to curtail its extensive rice production program and to control and limit rice exports. In addition, stimulated by the trade boom during WWI, in 1917, the Japanese colonial government initiated several new industries – cotton spinning and the manufacture of sugar, cement, and iron – in Korea. However, as the trade boom ebbed away, those industries were no longer encouraged. Mining enterprises were undertaken during the same period, but their backers withdrew in the depression that followed the war. "Consequently,"

into Japanese in every phase of their life and to absorb them into the Japanese national consciousness. See Yanaihara, "Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea," *YTZ* 23: 560, 566, 568.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 559.

Yanaihara concludes, “the relations of Korea with Japan proper were on a typical colonial footing, Korea supplying the home country with agricultural products and depending on Japan for its industrial requirements, a situation characteristic of the relationship prevailing between home countries and colonies in the present industrial age.”¹⁹¹

Yanaihara’s use of a pejorative term, “paternalistic,” to characterize the Japanese colonial policy reveals his intention to criticize the exploitative characteristic of the Japanese colonial policy. He put the most emphasis on the fact that the policy of protection and encouragement did not give economic and political autonomy to Korea. In this sense, he thought that it affected the benefit that could accrue to the Korean people, which in the end would have an impact on Japan too. He praised the policy for bringing Korea “gradual modernization and capitalist advancement” through colonization, such as the emancipation of Koreans from the “corrupt and unscrupulous government of the old Korean dynasty” and their transformation from “victims of inertia and reclusive hermits” to “hard and diligent workers with ambitions.” Nevertheless, the Smithian colonial policy scholar pointed out that Japan would inevitably experience serious difficulties from refusing to “confer on the Koreans such political rights and privileges as the franchise and participation in defense services.” As he saw it, by prohibiting Koreans from having political autonomy, Japan precluded Korean people from planning the independent development of their own economy, and, as a result, Korean financial dependency on Japan proper continued, causing Japan to bear heavy financial burdens and incur conflicts with Koreans, whose political aspirations for independence only grew stronger as they modernized. He calls

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 564. By contrast, Yanaihara regards the sugar industry in Formosa [Taiwan, in present] and the Mandated South Sea Islands as a good example of Japanese colonial policy. While the industries developed in Korea compete with those of Japan proper, the sugar industry of Formosa has no rivals and practically monopolizes the markets of the Japanese empire so that the Formosa Colonial Government has an independent economic system with enough revenue to meet its expenditure. He thinks that it is good for the ordinary people in Japan proper as well as Formosa. *Ibid.*, 565, 562.

this the limitations of an “undemocratic” and “despotic” colonial policy.¹⁹²

In sum, Yanaihara claims that actual colonization has the democratic effects of modernization contributing to the benefits of ordinary people in the metropole and the colony. But as the Japanese assimilation policy shows, he maintains, formal colonization monopolizing and politically controlling the colony creates significant colonial problems; Japan has to withstand enormous financial burdens to support the colonial government and to suppress the natives’ aspiration for national independence naturally resulting from modernization through colonization. Likewise, out of the mixture of Smithian and Marxist criticisms, Yanaihara advocates actual colonization, colonization of development, while criticizing formal colonization, colonization of exploitation.

The Ideal of Colonial Policy: Development Without Exploitation

Yanaihara himself finds a contradiction between actual colonization and formal colonization, that is, the problem that colonization is actually necessary but begs the question of how people can eliminate “colonization as subjugation and occupation with irrationalism (*fugōrisei*).”¹⁹³ As a result, he dreams of a sort of international economic community of development without exploitation.

As Yanaihara sees it, colonization as the settler group’s socio-economic activities in a new land for their own survival has existed throughout history and will exist as long as human

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 559-560. Yanaihara supported the Korean nationalists who aspired to national independence. He supported a Korean nationalist, Kim Cheong-sik, who was imprisoned in Korea for three years for participating in an independent movement in 1916. He encouraged another Korean nationalist, Cho Yong-hak, who was tortured to death by the Japanese police in 1941 for resisting the Japanese policy that enforced Japanese Shintō shrine worship. Yi Gyu Soo, “Yanaihara Tadao ūi sikmin chōng ch’ækron kwa chosūn insik,” 184; Cho In-je, 142-144.

¹⁹³ Yanaihara, *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, YTZ I, 468.

beings live on earth. Like his mentor, Nitobe, he regards the ideal of colonization is “the economic utilization of all parts of the earth with no part remaining unutilized.” He states, the size of the economy of a social group has expanded from a local economy, to a national, imperial, and ultimately an international economy. The establishment of an international economy like this, he argues, strengthens the foundation of the social groups’ economic lives by maximizing their production in both quality and quantity through international cooperation and the division of labor.¹⁹⁴

To realize the ideal of colonization, he lists three conditions that must be satisfied: the utilization of lands, the freedom of the movement of people and goods, and the solution of the conflicts between the settlers and the natives. First, people need to develop the wastelands into *oikumene* (habitable lands) in which people can live through actual colonization. Secondly, people and goods must be able to move freely internationally. The overproduced capital or labor must be able to circulate freely. He claims the perfect establishment of an international economy through the joint use of lands, agreeing with Nitobe, who argued for international socialism only in terms of lands for the humanization of the earth (the international expansion of *oikumene*) and the utmost development of humanity. And lastly, expanding Kant’s idea of international citizenship (*sekaiteki kōminken*) based on the principle of “hospitality (*kantai*),” the right of people being welcomed by the natives when they visit their lands, Yanaihara dreams of the “right to abode (*taizaiken*),” the right of the settler freely residing in the new lands permitted by the natives.¹⁹⁵ Here, he asserts that just as formal colonization (occupation of lands by forcefully suppressing the natives) is an injustice (*fugi*), it is also a social injustice (*shakaiteki fugi*) that the

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 465.

¹⁹⁵ This concept of “hospitality” originated from Kant, who claimed the “right of visit” (*hōmonken*) for facilitating trade and commerce among states. Going further than Kant, however, Yanaihara even claims the “right of abode.” *Ibid.*, 466.

natives, who do not have an ability to develop their broad wastelands, do not permit other social groups to come to their lands to develop them. It is a “selfish desire” (*gayoku*) standing comparison with the “violence” (*hōryoku*) of formal colonization.¹⁹⁶

In other words, Yanaihara is arguing for the reconstruction of empire and the liberalist development of internationalism for the idealistic realization of colonization. He claims “an organic unity between the settlers and the natives” (*yūkiteki ketsugō*) and “a unification of international social groups” (*sekai shakaigun no tōitsu teki ketsugō*) as the ideal state of colonization or actual colonization.¹⁹⁷ As he sees it, such an international community can be established only on the principle of autonomy (*jishushugi shokuminseisaku*), which he explains as follows.

Every social group that possesses an independent “group personality”¹⁹⁸ (*shūdan teki jinkaku*) can achieve maximum development under its own historical constraints and circumstances, and promote the unification of human society worldwide through mutual cooperation. The principle of autonomy means neither the imposition of the average nor the elimination of the distinct characteristics of a social group. It aims primarily at creating a state of mutual help, instead of a state of war, among social groups. Should this ideal be achieved, a colony would become a place where the people suffered no oppression or enforcement; the need of social groups for survival would be satisfied; and people successfully could migrate without any territorial occupation.¹⁹⁹

Unlike assimilation policy that imposes the average, that is, the systems and values in the metropole, and eliminates the distinct customs and culture of the colony, Yanaihara argues that autonomy policy creates a state of mutual help by respecting the native group’s aspiration for individuality or national independence. Emphasizing that the native’s zeal for independence is “a social fact,” when it is ignored or violated by the settler, no colonial policy can succeed. In the same vein, when the native acts exclude the settler (*haitateki*), the result is devastating. He

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 466-468.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 468.

¹⁹⁸ This is Yanaihara’s own translation of *shūdan teki jinkaku*.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 470. I owe the whole translation of this excerpt to Nakano. Nakano, 195.

argues that “just as an individual person can live as belonging to a society, a social group can live and develop as belonging to a society of social groups.”²⁰⁰

This idea of empire as an organic unification among autonomous social groups resulted from the theory of plural states emphasizing the personality of social groups, which was prevalent in the 1920s in Japan. Based on 19th century liberal democracy, which focused on the balance between individual personality and political unity, the theory claimed unification through alliance (*rengō teki tōitsu riron*) among states as social groups.²⁰¹ In addition, the establishment of the British Commonwealth after WWI became a great inspiration to Yanaihara. Depicting it as a “League of Nations within the League of Nations and a more solid unity of nations than the League of Nations,” he highly praised the British Commonwealth, claiming that “each dominion in it has autonomy as a nation and is not supposed to have a colonial rule by the Empire.” For him, it appeared to be “a great community via solidarity of autonomous nations, which would be effective not only from the utilitarian point of view but also from that of social justice within which group personality is respected.”²⁰²

However, even the British Commonwealth did not seem like a permanently sustainable system of unification. Yanaihara mentions that at the first British Commonwealth Labour Conference in summer, 1925, where the members of the Labor Party and the labor union of the British Empire gathered, issues surfaced, such as that Indian laborers were being discriminated against in the South Africa Union and that British migrant applicants were being rejected in

²⁰⁰ Under a belief in the principle of autonomy, Yanaihara advocated the establishment of autonomous assemblies and the responsible cabinet government in Korea and Taiwan. He thought that if autonomy policies were implemented, the metropole and the colony would separate naturally while being “bound together by the ties of mutual benefits and friendship.” Yanaihara, “Chōsen Tōchi no Hōshin,” *YTZ I*, 742-743.

²⁰¹ Sakai, *Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron*, 135.

²⁰² Yanaihara, *Shokumin Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, *YTZ I*, 478-483; Sakai, “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan,” 239.

Canada and Australia. In these cases, it was argued that the white laborers worked better than the Indian laborers, or that there were not enough jobs even for the Canadians and the Australians.²⁰³ Disappointed by the fact that even the British Commonwealth, seemingly observing the principle of autonomy, was likely to be threatened because of people's search for self-interest,²⁰⁴ Yanaihara concluded his masterpiece with a utopian message.

“Scientifically or historically, nothing can guarantee the realization of the ideal of autonomy policy,” he states, “[therefore], hope! And religion! I believe. Peace will be achieved in the eternal love of the strong Son of God.”²⁰⁵ Ironically enough, the colonial policy scholar, who aspired above all to be practical and scientific, found the most effective way of solving the colonial problems in, seemingly, the most unpractical methods, “sacrifice” and “love.”

Conclusion

Out of a deep sympathy toward people suffering in the colony and the metropole in the era of imperialism, Yanaihara conscientiously searched for an alternative form of empire. Influenced by Smithian economics and Marxist critical theories against imperialism, in the democratic atmosphere in the 1920s after WWI, Yanaihara argued for reconstructing the empire as an organic international economic entity among autonomous nations, which would co-operate with each other under the principle of mutual aids. This argument expressed the Smithian

²⁰³ Yanaihara, *Ibid.*, 479.

²⁰⁴ Yanaihara showed this kind of pessimistic opinion about other political-economic systems too. In his eyes, neither capitalism (whether it is laissez-faire capitalism or monopoly capitalism) nor socialism, which necessitated an international economic system, could suggest a sustainable way of making the empire or the economic union an organic and amicable (*yūkiteki yūgiteki*) entity. Both systems seemed likely to be easily dissolved due to people's self-interest. *Ibid.*, 480-481.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 483.

advocate's dream of the eventual end of "empire," operating under the principle of subjugation and suppression.

Yanaihara's unique definition of colonization, the socio-economic movement of a social group and the socio-economic encounter between different social groups, came out of his wish to end the current form of "empire." He divided colonization into two kinds, actual and formal, and put value and no-value on each respectively. Actual colonization represented the formation of an organic international economic community for the development for all humanity, while formal colonization stood for "empire," that is, the imperialist monopoly of the colony through political occupation and suppression, which was harmful for the benefit of humanity. Helpful to that, according to him, was actual colonization without formal colonization, that is, an international economic entity for development without exploitation. In his eyes, this idea, inspired by Smith's argument for the general and particular advantages of colonization, was an "internationalist" idea, not an "imperialist" one. He even acknowledged as the given "social facts" "the human demands for survival, migration, and colonization resulting from the development of economic exchanges (*keizai kōtsū no hatten*) [necessitating an international economic system], and the national aspiration of independence of all social groups" (*kaku shakaigun no dokuritsu teki shūdan ishiki*).²⁰⁶ Therefore, to him, internationalist colonization could be a solution for "eternal world peace" (*eikyūteki heiwa jitsugen*) without violent conflicts involved.

In fact, Yanaihara's binary concept of colonization, propelled by his pro-modernization advocacy, produced a critical historical legacy in the later decades. Tōbata Seiichi, after succeeding Yanaihara in 1939, the middle of wartime, as the chair of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University, greatly relied on Yanaihara's colonial theory to make his own. As one

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 467-468, 470.

of the main architects for theorizing the Japanese imperialist propaganda, the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere Policy, he reformulated Yanaihara's theory to support Japan's wartime mobilization.

In particular, the two intellectual sources in Yanaihara's theory were significantly re-conceptualized by Tōbata. First, Yanaihara's advocacy of Smith's idea of general advantages of colonization was reread to beautify the Japanese Empire as the "sphere of co-prosperity" in which all "independent" members constructed "an organic international economic community for the economic development of all in it." Secondly, Yanaihara's reliance on the Marxist criticism of imperialism was employed to criticize the British Empire representing all the Western enemies fighting against Japan and its allies during WWII. The division between development and exploitation under the binary framework of actual colonization and formal colonization was transformed by Tōbata into a division with a geographic difference; the Japanese Empire was depicted as a sphere of development without exploitation, while the British Empire was characterized as a sphere of exploitation.

In sum, the liberalist transnationalism in the 1920s shown in Yanaihara contained a logical linkage to be transformed into hegemonic regionalism in the 1930s. The thread of continuity was the discursive framework of pro-modernization ideas that had been constructed by the Smithian tradition of Colonial Policy Studies since Nitobe. In next chapter, by investigating Tōbata's colonial theory, I will reveal the continuity of the discursive framework reproduced with a new title of "development" in the 1930s and 1940s and its lasting effects on post-1945 Japan and its neighboring countries in the postcolonial period.

Chapter 3

Tōbata Seiichi: The Adapter of Colonial Policy Studies

Introduction

This chapter examines the continuing development of Japanese colonial discourse under Tōbata Seiichi (1899-1983). He had served as the chair of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University from 1939 when Yanaihara Tadao left the position to 1945 when the Japanese empire collapsed. This chapter analyzes Tōbata's concepts of colony, colonization and empire and displays how he conceived the relationship between the colony and the metropole during the so-called Fifteen Years War from 1931 to 1945.²⁰⁷ In doing so, it argues for the continuity of Japanese colonial thought from the 1920s to 1945, and shows how this thinking persisted in Japanese international relations in the postwar era after 1945. In other words, in this chapter, I explore the transition of Japanese colonial discourse from liberalist transnationalism in the 1920s established by Nitobe and Yanaihara to hegemonic regionalism in the 1930s theorized

²⁰⁷ The term, "the Fifteen Years War (15 *nen sensō*)," indicates the historical period of fifteen years from the Manchurian Incident in 1931 through the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to the end of the Pacific War in 1945 in modern Japanese history. In contrast to the attitude of his contemporaries, who limited the Japanese wartime period to the Pacific War, 1941-1945, Ienaga Saburō, who first used the term in Japanese history in 1956, insisted the Pacific War be understood in the context of a longer process of Japanese imperialism. By using the term, he intended to clarify Japan's war responsibility. Another historian, Tsurumi Shunsuke also shared a similar idea with Ienaga by coincidentally inventing the same term himself in 1956. See, Ienaga Saburō, "chishikijin no sensōsekinin," *Chūō kōron*, January, 1956; "Nihon chishikijin no amerika zō," *Chūō kōron*, July, 1956; *Taiheiyō Sensō* (Iwanami Shoten, 1968); Tsurumi Shunsuke, *Senjiki Nihon no Seishin Shi, 1931-1945* (Iwanami Shoten, 1982).

by Tōbata. Also, I deal with the subsequent transition from hegemonic regionalism in the 1930s and the 1940s to democratic transnationalism in the post-1945 era, which was exemplified by the academic and bureaucratic career of Tōbata.²⁰⁸

Tōbata, born in 1899 in Mie prefecture in Japan as the first son of a landowning farmer, became an assistant professor in the Faculty of Agriculture at Tokyo Imperial University in 1924. After studying in America and Germany from 1926 to 1929, primarily under the guidance of Schumpeter, he returned to Japan, to the same department and the same university, and established his fame as an agricultural economic policy expert and an importer of Schumpeter's economics to Japan. In the 1930s, he was actively engaged in various research committees for planning national policy, such as the Showa Research Association (*Showa Kenkyūkai*),²⁰⁹ the think tank of the Prime Minister, Konoe Fumimaro. After assuming the chair of Colonial Policy Studies in the Faculty of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University in 1939, while continuing to hold his professorship in the Faculty of Agriculture, he participated in making colonial policy as well in the Showa Research Association and other government-led research committees such as the Philippines Research Committee (*Hitō Chōsa Inikai*).²¹⁰ In these institutions, notably, he theorized the economy section of the “East Asia Cooperative Community (*Tōa Kyōdōtai*)” policy, which was the Japanese government's official colonial policy beginning with the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and continuing through the end of the Japanese empire. His theory went by the name of the “Grand Regional Economy” (*kōiki keizai ken*)²¹¹.

²⁰⁸ Here I adapted the terms, “liberalist transnationalism” and “hegemonic regionalism,” from Sakai Tetsuya's study, “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868-1945,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9(2) (Cambridge University Press, 2008): 234. In original, “liberalist transnationalism” is termed by Sakai as “liberalist-oriented transnationalism.”

²⁰⁹ Sakai Saburō, *Showa Kenkyūkai: Aru chishikijin shūdan no kiseki* (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1992).

²¹⁰ Morita Ryōji, “Nihon Shakai Kagaku to Shokuminchi Ajia.”

²¹¹ “Regional Sphere” can be an alternative translation. “Grand Regional Economy” is Tōbata's own translation of his term, “*kōiki keizai ken*.”

Although Tōbata was one of the main figures who laid the theoretical foundations for colonial policy during the Pacific War, his colonial ideas have rarely been examined by scholars.²¹² Instead, what attracted the attention of academia was his postwar economic thought and activities.²¹³ This focus on Tōbata's later career occurred because he was regarded as a key figure in the process of Japan's economic reconstruction in the postwar. In particular, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's offer to him for the Minister of Agriculture in 1946²¹⁴ and his major role in drafting the Basic Law of Agriculture of 1961²¹⁵ assured his place in the postwar economic history. Tōbata's modernist and developmentalist ideas, largely derived from Schumpeter, have been assessed as a theoretical basis underlying the economic miracle of the postwar Japan. Yet, the scholars who make these claims strictly limit his academic influence exclusively to the agricultural economy, as if his scholarly interests had always been confined to Japan's domestic economy.

As the brief overview of Tōbata's career shows, however, he was a colonial policy expert as well as an agricultural economist. During the colonial period, he interpreted the domestic economic problems of Japan in the larger context of empire, relating them to the situation of the colonies. His modernist and developmentalist stance was formulated in this

²¹² The exceptions are Morita Ryōji's Ph. D dissertation and article, in which Tōbata's colonial theory is examined in relation to his activity in the Philippines Research Committee. See, Morita Ryōji, "Nihon Shakai Kagaku to Shokuminchi Ajia"; "Tōbata Seiichi no Philippine: 'Shokumin seisaku gaku' kara 'chiiki kenkyū' e no tenkai," *Shakai Shisōshi kenkyū*, no. 21 (1997). Other than Morita, Sakai Tetsuya briefly mentions the theoretical relationship between Tōbata and Yanaihara in his analysis of Yanaihara's colonial theory. Sakai Tetsuy *Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron* (Tokyo: Iwanami Koza, 2007).

²¹³ Shinozaki Takao, *Tōbata Seiichi no Keizai shishō: kyōdōkumiai, kigyōsha, soshite chiiki* (Nihon Keizai Hyōron sha, 2008); Minoguchi Takeo, "Tōbata Seiichi and Japanese Agriculture," *Ikeo* 1999; Yagi Kiichirō, "Japanese Theory of Industrialization/Modernization between Liberalism and Developmentalism," in Werner Pascha ed., *Systematic Change in the Japanese and German Economies: Convergence and Differentiation as a Dual Challenge* (NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Mark Metzler, *Capital as will and imagination: Schumpeter's Guide to the Postwar Japanese Miracle* (Cornell, 2013); Andrew E. Barshay, *The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: The Marxian and Modernist Traditions*, (Univ. of California, 2004).

²¹⁴ Yoshida Shigeru, *Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man*, translated and edited by Hiroshi Nara (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007): 63.

²¹⁵ Yagi, "Japanese Theory," 23.

process, as he sought to nurture the economic development of Japan within broader transnational boundaries. In light of this history, his economic thought cannot be examined without seriously considering his ideas constructed during the imperial period.

Tōbata's postwar activities further illustrate why studying his colonial theory is important. After rejecting Yoshida's offer to be the Minister of Agriculture, Tōbata became the director of the National Research Institute of Agricultural Economics newly established by the Ministry of Agriculture and, at the same time, the director of the Institute of Developing Economies, a support institution for the Official Development Assistance (ODA) which was Japan's overseas developmental funding program.²¹⁶ This is a close reenactment of what Tōbata did during the wartime, when he held a joint professorship in the department of Agriculture and Colonial Policy Studies. Tōbata's academic journey from agricultural economy to colonial policy and his subsequent attempt to integrate the two fields strongly suggest that his ideas of Japanese domestic economic development were formulated based on his theory about broader regional economic system.

It should be mentioned that I am not trying to explain Tōbata's whole economic theory in the postwar period through his colonial ideas. Rather, my aim here is to criticize the tendency of the previous studies on Tōbata to overlook the continuities in his thought from the wartime to the postwar era. In my view, this tendency to deny the theoretical link across 1945 is related to the sharp division that these scholars have maintained between internationalism and imperialism, which I pointed out in the introduction of this dissertation. The previous scholars seemed to think that Tōbata's wartime discourse was too imperialist to be incorporated into his postwar democratic thought, which took an internationalist stance on regional economic development

²¹⁶ Yagi, *Ibid.*, 23.

through mutual aids and cooperation. For them, the East Asia Cooperative Community policy had nothing to do with the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the sense that the former was exploitative while the latter was supportive and developmental.

My study of Tōbata's colonial theory, by contrast, will show the continuity between wartime Japanese empire and democratic postwar Japan. I argue that the Grand Regional Economy policy, a theoretical tool for wartime mobilization, was in fact the one presenting a strategy and "model of economic development for late developing countries." By exploring this logical basis of the policy—on which the fully exposed wartime propaganda had relied—and by noting its survival even after the war and its role in Japan's foreign economic support system in the postwar era, I offer critical insight into Japan's postwar economic history and policy.

Many believe that the Grand Regional Economy policy, which was an exploitative ideological tool for Japanese imperialism, relied on Japan's sense of superiority and the justification of its colonial hegemony. In fact, however, this policy was based on an appeal for "equality" between Japan and its colonies and for their "right of self-determination" as independent countries. It actually identified Japan with its colonies as a late developing country and depicted the national independence of Japan *and* its colonies as being threatened by the more developed Western countries. Its message was that the Japanese empire must be reconstructed into a regional economic community in which all countries could develop their own national economies for their own national survival by following a unified economic policy directed by Japan, the leading country of the region. Consequently, Tōbata called it a model of "regional economic development without exploitation." Interestingly enough, he again used the exact phrase, "regional economic development without exploitation," in the postwar era as the motto of the ODA plan for the Japanese foreign support system. It is a historical irony that the

exploitative wartime mobilization and the democratic economic support plan shared the same logical underpinnings.

My observations on this foundational logic for wartime Japanese imperialism would contribute in a couple of ways to the field of modern Japanese history. Firstly, they call for a reconsideration of the prevailing view of the discourse on the East Asia Cooperative Community. This discourse has been regarded as the “criticism of nationalism and the right of self-determination.” For example, Sakai Tetsuya argued in his work on the political discourse of international order in Japan that the discourse of Japan’s hegemonic regionalism was destined to be “not national self-determination but rather ‘cooperation among nations.’”²¹⁷ In other words, he contrasted the logic of national self-determination, the cornerstone of Wilsonian ideals, with the logic of communal social construction. My research on Tōbata, however, presents a different idea that in the discourse on the East Asia Cooperative Community the two logics were not contradictory but complementary. In its attempts to colonize the Manchukuo (the Japanese puppet state in Northeast China), China (a semi-colony), and the Southeast Asian colonies of Western colonizers, Japan adopted a strategy of first claiming the national independence of these “countries,” in order to eliminate the claims of other imperial powers to them. It then deployed the logic of a regional economic community of independent nations to give the characteristic of the Japanese empire. In presenting the expansionist discourse of hegemonic regionalism in the 1930s through 1945, Tōbata used the very discursive ground that Yanaihara had built in the 1920s; a logic of integration between national self-determination *and* transnationalism. My finding provides a clearer explanation of the logical linkage between the liberalist internationalism in the 1920s and the expansionist imperialism in the 1930s and the 1940s. It also

²¹⁷ Sakai Tetsuya, “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan” 242.

helps explain in what ways the Japanese wartime colonial discourse was transformed in the postwar era, particularly, in the process of decolonization, that is, in the national reconstruction of Japan as well as of its former colonies.

Secondly, my understanding of the logical basis of wartime Japanese imperialism calls for a critical revision of the binary way of thinking that has consistently dominated the postwar studies of Japanese colonialism. The question that structures these studies is whether Japanese colonization was for “the development of the colony or the exploitation of the colony.”²¹⁸ By illuminating the origin of this binary way of thinking, my study blurs the clear line of demarcation between development and exploitation. I argue that the binary framework in fact originated from Japanese colonial policy scholars’ imagination of “regional economic development without exploitation.” This concept, which Yanaihara Tadao, influenced by Smith, originally posited as a critique against imperialism, was appropriated by Tōbata, who used it to advocate the superiority of Japanese colonialism over Western case. By examining the process in which the idea was transformed from Yanaihara to Tōbata, I will show the historical process by which development and exploitation, inseparably intertwined in the nature of colonization, were imagined as two separable things. In other words, by historicizing the binary framework itself, I will point out its limitation. As seen in Tōbata’s case, the binary was employed to disguise the fact that Japan needed to develop and exploit its colonies to expand its sphere of power and influence.

In this chapter, I will explore the theoretical basis of wartime Japanese imperialism by tracing the logical process by which Tōbata theorized the Grand Regional Economy. I will argue that it was constructed on the theoretical three-fold basis of Schumpeter-Smith-List to claim the

²¹⁸ See the footnote 11 for an overview of these studies.

Japanese empire as a model of regional economic development for late developing countries.

Following the order of these theoretical roots, this chapter will consist of four sections.

The first and second sections will examine Tōbata's ideas of colonization and colony, tracing how they were influenced by Schumpeter's economics. Tōbata viewed colonization as the movement of capital, not people, and the colony as a place where "creation," a Schumpeterian term standing for "economic development," takes place. Here, through a comparison with Nitobe and Yanaihara, I will argue that Tōbata advanced such a modernist and developmentalist view in order to display the possibility of Japan's economic development in the midst of the economic crisis during the Fifteen Years War. In the third section, I examine the process by which his idea of colony was expanded to that of empire. Focusing on Tōbata's new coinage, "Counter-Colonization," I will show that Tōbata incorporated Smith's view of the British Commonwealth into his Schumpeterian concept of colony to claim that the empire was a sphere of mutual economic development between the metropole and the colony. This will illuminate the process in which Yanaihara's interpretation of Smith on transnationalism in the 1920s was adapted into Tōbata's colonial ideas in the 1930s. Lastly, in the fourth section dealing with the Grand Regional Economy, I will discuss how Tōbata's view of empire was reified in the late 1930s while Japan was conducting the two major wars. Responding to the increasing need for total mobilization, the Japanese empire became redefined as an organic regional economic community among independent developing countries in which they worked together in unison for their national survival under the guidance of one leading country, Japan. Tōbata completed his theory by adding List's economics to his Schumpeter-Smith combination. I will examine the process in which the contradiction between the equality of Japan and its colonies and the hierarchy acknowledging Japan's dictatorship was resolved by Tōbata's effective deployment of

Schumpeter's concept of "entrepreneur," Smith's idea of "international division of labor," and List's category of "national system." In the conclusion, I will discuss the historical legacy of Tōbata's colonial ideas on Japan and its neighboring countries in the postwar era of decolonization. During the colonial period before 1945, Tōbata's colonial theory, emphasizing an entrepreneur's leading role for the rapid and effective economic development of all, justified Japan's dictatorship as necessary for other developing countries to reach the same economic level as Japan. And the political tensions, such as social unrest or ethnic conflicts within the empire, were regarded as problems that must be managed through governmental controls to allow rapid economic development. I will argue that these colonial ideas evolved into modernization theory and developmental dictatorship theory (*kaihatsu dokusai ron*)²¹⁹ in Japan and its neighboring countries in the postwar era when the world was reconstructed into Cold War camps.

Reflecting his dual professorship, Tōbata left two groups of works: on agricultural economics and on colonial policy theory. In this study, I will mainly analyze his works on colonial policy theory, including academic essays, newspaper articles, encyclopedia entries, and reports to the *Takumushō*, which were published between 1940 and 1944 while he was the chair of the Colonial Policy Studies. In addition to these, I will also examine some of his works on economics as far as they are relevant to colonial problems, such as his analysis of the Korean agricultural economy. In the list of primary sources, I include his autobiography and his disciples' memoirs of him. Lastly, some unpublished documents—for example, reports and minutes of *Showa Kenkyukai* meetings stored in Tōbata's personal collection at the Mie

²¹⁹ A J. Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); Kim Eungsoo and Byeong-cheon Yi, *Developmental Dictatorship and the Park Chung-Hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea* (Paramus, NJ: Homa & Sekey Books, 2006).

Prefectural Library in Japan, and photos, certificates of commendation and letters of appreciation that he received from the Japanese government preserved at the Tōhata Memorial Museum at the Mie Agricultural College—have an influence on this study; they demonstrate the continuity in Tōbata’s career, that is, as a bureaucrat who was engaged in international economic policy from wartime to postwar Japan.

Colonization: The Movement of Capital

In August 1940, Tōbata published his first paper on colonial theory, titled “The Substance of Colonization.”²²⁰ Heralding his new start as a colonial policy theorist with an agricultural economy background, this article introduced the main concepts and structure of his colonial theory, which would lay a foundation for his later works. In this section, I will start with his concept, the “transplantation of capital” (*shokkin*), to examine the basic feature of his colonial theory. I will examine this concept in comparison with the views of his predecessors in Colonial Studies—Nitobe and Yanaihara. Tōbata himself makes this comparison when he says:

The word, “colonization,” originally meant movement of people. Our translation of the word, “shokumin” [植民 literally means “transplantation of people”] particularly well proves it. A recent trend shows, however, that the priority in colonization is shifting to the movement of capital rather than that of mere labor (*rōdōjinko*). There is no need to remain loyal to the original setting in which the word was created. What is important is to see the changes that have happened subsequently in the setting. We must not adhere to “people.” The word “transplantation of capital” (植金 *shokukin*) also stands for colonization.²²¹

In this statement, Tōbata attempts to intervene in the existing tradition of Colonial Policy Studies. Criticizing his predecessors, Nitobe and Yanaihara, who regarded the movement of

²²⁰ Tōbata Seiichi, “Shokumin Genshō no Honshitsu,” *Keizai-gaku ronshū*, vol. 10: 8 (1940).

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 18 (fn. 3).

people as the most important element of colonization, he argues that the movement of capital rather than people encapsulates the nature of the colonization of his time. Using his own word, “shokukin” (transplantation of capital), he emphasizes that colonization is an economic activity after all. Politics and culture can be adjusted according to the economy in his view.

He explains this trend toward the transplantation of capital as a historical transition in the form of colonization. Although colonization has existed throughout history, he states, it was not until the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century that it was conducted mainly through economic factors, relatively independent from social, political, or other factors. In his view, the early form of modern colonization, such as the British colonization of America and Australia, took place in “uninhabited lands” mainly to alleviate the problem of overpopulation in Britain. That is, in this period, a multitude of British people moved to the New World, and the colony existed as an extension of the motherland (*bokoku no enchō*). But in the 19th century, as seen from the European colonization of Asia, he argues, colonization began to occur through the movement of excess capital to an “existing society,” resulting from the problem of overcapitalization in colonizing countries.²²² Arguing that colonization can be explained more accurately with the term “migration of capital” than of people, in this period, Tōbata points out that mass migration disappears as the movement of people becomes a mere by-product of the movement of capital.²²³

As the best example of this contemporary trend in colonization, Tōbata draws on the phenomenon of the “semi-colony” (*han shokuminchi*)—for example, China and some countries in the Balkans and South America, which were not politically subsumed under any single colonizer, but were economically dominated by several colonizing countries. Characterizing the

²²² *Ibid.*, 14-16.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 16.

20th century as “the era of international conflict to maintain semi-colonies, not to acquire colonies,”²²⁴ he argues that the colonial relationship has now changed from a one-to-one relationship between colonizer and colony to a one-to-many, that is, between one colony (or one country that will likely be colonized) and many imperialist colonizers. He explains this trend as follows, relating it to the change in the nature of capital that had occurred since the late 19th century.

[Since the late 19th century, the age of imperialism] a national category has been added to capital, which was originally an economic category, and therefore nationality becomes attached to capital. At this time, a nation-state exports capital [to other countries] as a means of its national expansion..... In order to export capital, first of all, the state provides guarantees and guidance. Then, the state exports capital for itself. In this case, however, we never see a simple commercial transaction. The state pushes the export of capital forward to promote national interest (*keneiki*), not profits (*lijun*). Thus, general security (*ippanteki tanppo*) is put in place in the country where the capital is exported, and therefore the state, obtaining the right to do business (*jigyō sankaken*), dispatches technical advisers and makes directs investments. Likewise, there emerges a relationship of domination (*shihai*) or compulsion (*kyōryoku*), which clearly shows the nature of colony (*shokuminsei*).²²⁵

Here, Tōbata points out as the main feature of capitalist development in the late 19th century that capital began to be associated with nationality and became a means of domination. In this era of imperialism, as he sees it, imperialist powers started to export their capital to other countries for their national interests, not for profits. And as a result, he argues that the so-called semi-colony emerges, that is, a “region (*chiiki*) surrounded by *several* colonizing motherlands, not a single motherland.”²²⁶ He explains, since no power wants the semi-colony to become another power’s exclusive political colony, the imperialist powers manage to keep a balance of power among themselves. They leave the semi-colony as a politically independent country in a formal sense, but in actuality they colonize it collectively by expanding their own respective national interest in the region through capital investment. Tōbata argues that this semi-colony,

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 28-30.

the most contemporary form of colony, can be explained only through an economic approach focusing on the migration of capital.

In sum, Tōbata's colonial theory is characterized by his unique definition of colonization as occurring in two stages, that is, first the transplantation of people (*shokumin*) and, second, the transplantation of capital (*shokukin*). By defining colonization since the 19th century as the transplantation of capital, he attempts to revise the tradition of Colonial Policy Studies that had earlier defined colonization as transplantation of people. What remains to be seen, then, is what theoretical differences can be found between him and Nitobe or Yanaihara, and where these differences originate.

First of all, unlike Nitobe, Tōbata views colonization as an economic activity. By contrast, Nitobe regards colonization as a political activity of the state. Nitobe emphasized people's movement in his view of colonization because he thought that the people stood for nationality. In his definition, colonization meant the movement of people from the motherland to the new land and the subsequent result of the movement—the political relationship between the motherland and the new land. Therefore, he did not consider the British people's movement to the New World as modern colonization because it was motivated by private groups with private goals. However, Tōbata takes this case into account. He calls this movement of a number of British people the first form of colonization in the modern era, which was motivated by the problem of overpopulation in Britain.

In this regard, Tōbata seems to have something in common with Yanaihara. For Yanaihara, who defined colonization as a socio-economic activity by social groups, the British colonization of America and Australia was a clear example of colonization. Yanaihara and Tōbata have a more comprehensive definition of the colony than Nitobe did, so that their definitions can

encompass all cases of colonies throughout human history.²²⁷ In fact, based on his own comments on his predecessor, Tōbata seems to acknowledge his theoretical debts to Yanaihara. Tōbata has given him high praise for the comprehensiveness and precision of his colonial theory.²²⁸

Tōbata, unlike Yanaihara, attempts to examine the phenomenon of colonization as an exclusively economic activity, disregarding its social nature. While Yanaihara took the socio-economic approach in order to address both the benefits and the negative impact of colonization, that is, the economic development for humanity as well as the economic exploitation of the colony and subsequent colonial problems such as national conflicts, Tōbata focuses only on the economic effects of colonization. This difference is clearly found in their views of the rise of monopoly capital in the late 19th century. While Yanaihara harshly criticized it as the main reason for the rise of exploitative (or “formal”) colonization, Tōbata, without any value judgment, plainly describes it as one of the phenomena seen in capitalist development in the modern era.

More specifically speaking, Tōbata makes a positive assessment of the movement of capital, whether it is monopoly capital or not, stating that it brings about economic development in the colony. He believes that the colonizing country’s investment and trading activity in the colony facilitate the modernization of the colony, as did Rōyama Masamichi, the founder of Japanese international politics. Rōyama, an old brother of Tōbata’s close friend, was his admiring mentor from his adolescence.²²⁹ Tōbata followed Rōyama, who had a functionalist

²²⁷ Nonetheless, Yanaihara’s concept is more comprehensive than Tōbata’s since it includes immigration and internal colonization in the category of colonization. Tōbata argues that these cannot be called colonization because no creation, or no economic development initiated by the colonizer’s economic system, takes place in them. For more detail, see the next section in this chapter, “Colony as Creation.”

²²⁸ Tōbata Seiichi, “Shokumingaku no taikan,” *Tōkyō teikoku daikaku gakujuutsu taikan hōgakubu keizaigakubu* (Tōkyō teikoku daigaku, 1942): 652-653.

²²⁹ Tōbata Seiichi, *Watashi no Rirekisho* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1979): 208. After growing up, they worked together in the Showa Research Association [Showa kenkyūkai] and on the Philippines Research Committee

understanding of international relations. Both of them expected that American capital that penetrated into China would promote the modernization of China to increase the mutual dependence among the states and to facilitate the establishment of a regional order for peace in the Pacific Rim.²³⁰

Colony as Creation

Finding the main essence of colonization in the movement of capital, Tōbata argued that the reason he took an economic approach was because it could best capture the most contemporary trend of colonization of his time, that is, the emergence of the semi-colony. But I would argue that another reason why he took this approach was because of his firm belief that colonization necessarily brought economic development to the colony. And I would like to highlight the fact that he owed such a belief to his mentor, Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950), an Austrian-born economist who was one of the most influential economists in the 20th century. In this section, I will show how Tōbata framed his colonial theory with the basic concepts of Schumpeter's economics, particularly the concept of "creation."

Tōbata met Schumpeter in 1929 when he studied in Germany at the University of Bonn. With Nakayama Ichirō,²³¹ Tōbata became an ardent student of Schumpeter. Returning home to Japan, they translated their mentor's book into Japanese and published it in 1937, titled *Theory of*

[hitō chōsa iinkai]. For the activities of the Philippines Research Committee, see Morita Ryōji, "Nihon Shakai Kagaku to Shokuminchi Ajia," 72-79.

²³⁰ Sakai Tetsuya, "'Tōa Kyōdōtai ron' kara 'Kindaika ron' e,'" *Kindai Nihon no Kokusai Chitsujoron* (Tokyo: Iwanami Koza, 2007):

²³¹ Nakayama Ichirō (1898-1981) was a professor of Economics at Tokyo Commercial University (Hitotsubashi University at present). He contributed to industrialization and labor relations in postwar Japan.

Economic Development (Keizai Hatten no Riron).²³² Employing Schumpeter's ideas on profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle, they also published their own analyses of the Japanese economy.²³³ After becoming the head of Colonial Policy Studies, Tōbata used his expertise in Schumpeter's economics to create his own colonial theory. Therefore, I will first introduce Schumpeter's economic theory before examining Tōbata's colonial theory.

In the preface to the 1937 Japanese edition of his book, *Theory of Economic Development*, Schumpeter clarified his intellectual debts to Léon Walras (1834-1910) and Karl Marx (1818-1883). According to Hungarian historical economist, Aladár Madarász, Schumpeter thought that the equilibrium theory of Walras was theoretically important in that it provided a precise foundation for the theory of exchange, prices, and money, as well as an explanation of distribution. On the other hand, Walrus' theory could not explain the dynamics of the economy, or economic development, as Marx did, because it preferred a stationary process in which the economic system reproduced itself unchanged over a period of time.²³⁴ Thus, Schumpeter attempted to explain the process of economic development and in the end concluded that economic growth took place in the conditions where the status of equilibrium was broken, such as in economic crises.

On economic crises, Schumpeter stated as follows:

It is the essence of economic development that the means of production, which, up to then, have been employed in a defined static manner, are withdrawn and put in the service of new

²³² Joseph Schumpeter, Tōbata Seiichi and Nakamura Ichirō trans, *Keizai hatten no riron* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1937); The Deutsch original, *Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1912); The English translation, *Theory of Economic Development* (Cambridge, Mass. 1934).

²³³ Nakayama Ichirō, *Junsui Keizaigaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1933); Tōbata Seiichi, *Nihon Nōgyō no Tenkai Katei* (Tokyo: Tōyō shuppansha, January 1936). Tōbata's book was expanded and published by Iwanami Shoten in June, 1936.

²³⁴ Aladár Madarász, "Economists and Economic Thought: Schumpeter's Theory of Economic Development," *Acta Oeconomica* 25, no. 3/4 (Budapest Hungary, 1981): 343. This article is a separate publication of the author's introduction to the Hungarian version of Schumpeter's book. To write this section, I owe a great deal to Madarász's summary of Schumpeter's economic theory.

ends. Here this is called the process of carrying out new combinations. These are not realized, as it were, automatically, as the customary combinations of statics, but they demand the sort of intelligence and energy over which only a minority of economic subjects dispose. The carrying out of such new combinations is the specific function of entrepreneurs.²³⁵

For Schumpeter, economic crises were the time when the static status of general equilibrium was disturbed by some factors and the time precisely when economic development occurred through entrepreneurship, which carried out new combinations of means of production, or innovation, to bring a new level of equilibrium. As Madarász summed up, the essence of Schumpeter's theory of business cycles—economic fluctuations in his terminology—remained “entrepreneurial activity, its appearance in swarms, disturbances in the equilibrium resulting from innovations, the spread and reception of the innovation, and the achievement of a new state of equilibrium.”²³⁶ Rejecting the presumption of continuous and automatic development in the neo-classical theory of circular flow, he emphasized discontinuous change due to the economic disturbances resulting from factors that were intrinsic to the capitalist system; and he viewed the entrepreneur as innovator in times of disturbance and crisis. For Schumpeter, in this sense, the Great Depressions in 1929 were “far from being unmitigated social evils but actually in the nature of ‘a good cold douche’ for the capitalist system.”²³⁷

Schumpeter's theory had a great influence on Tōbata, especially when he tried to find a solution to the economic crisis, from which his home country suffered severely. In 1930, when he came back to Japan from Germany having finished his study under Schumpeter, he observed his home country experiencing crucial damage caused by the Great Depression. During this so-

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 344.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 352.

²³⁷ Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers*, 311.

called Showa Agricultural Shock²³⁸, the half-agricultural country was suffering a sharp decline of silk and rice prices, aggravated by the massive import of rice from its colonies such as Korea and Taiwan.²³⁹ In the midst of the economic depression, Japan also saw political turmoil, for example the assassinations of major political figures by young right-wing officials after the Manchurian Incident. At this time, Tōbata felt urgently that he had to make economic plans to resolve the crisis.²⁴⁰ Therefore, he published two books, one about the structure and the development of the agricultural economy of Japan and the other about the structure of the agricultural economy of its colony, Korea.²⁴¹ In these books, Tōbata insisted that Japan must reform its systems with an entrepreneurial approach, and argued that the economic crises caused by the international economy, including a competitive colonial economy, offered a perfect opportunity to make such domestic reforms.²⁴² Here, in all likelihood, he was influenced by the Schumpeterian idea that “business fluctuation is the essence of the capitalist economy.”²⁴³

Meanwhile, after taking charge of Colonial Policy Studies at Tokyo Imperial University in 1939, Tōbata needed to re-conceptualize the colony and the colonial relationship between the colony and the motherland. Before 1939, he believed that the colony was just one of the external factors that had an influence on the Japanese agricultural economy. But after 1939, he felt the need to focus on the colony as much as on Japan. And to create his own colonial theory, the newly-appointed colonial policy theorist began to reconstruct Schumpeter’s economic theory.

²³⁸ A part of the Showa Depression of 1930-1931. The lifting of the gold embargo in 1930 worsened the situation.

²³⁹ After the 1918 rice riot in Japan, to prevent any similar future problem of rice shortage in Japan, the Japanese colonial government in Korea established and executed plans for increasing rice production in Korea in 1920, 1926, and 1940, regarding Korea as the rice resource for Japan.

²⁴⁰ Tōbata, *Watashi no Rirekisho*, 229.

²⁴¹ Tōbata, *Nihon nōgyō no tenkai katei* (Tōyō shuppansha, 1936); Tōbata and Ōkawa Kazushi, *Chosen beikoku keizairon* (Nihon gakujutsu shikōkai, 1935/Revised edition 1937). Ōkawa Kazushi was Tōbata’s student who had expertise in statistical agricultural economics.

²⁴² Morita Ryōji, “Tōbata Seiichi no Philippine: ‘Shokumin seisaku gaku’ kara ‘chiiki kenkyū’e no tenkai,” 87.

²⁴³ Tōbata Seiichi, “Shokumin Seisaku no Dankai,” *Keizai gaku Ronshū*, vol. 13:1 (1943): 8 (fn.2).

“[To define it simply], colonization is the process in which a new society is created or an existing society is forcefully transformed by the movement of the means of production (which are labor and capital) in the arena of conflict among colonial powers.” (*shokumin genshō wo kantan ni teigishite, rekkyō sōtō no jinchū nioite seisan shūdan (sōryoku to shihon) no idō niyotte zakki sareru shinshakai no sōzō katei moshiku wa kison shakai no kyōryoku teki henkaku katei dearu*).²⁴⁴

As seen from this statement, Tōbata defines colonization by highlighting its effect. He declares it the “creation of a new society” (*shin shakai no sōzō*), or the “forceful transformation of an existing society” (*kison shakai no kyōryoku teki henkaku*). Using Schumpeter’s vocabulary, “creation,” he asserts that colonization gives birth to a new society in the colony, which has been seen neither in the motherland nor in the colony before colonization. In particular, the colony is depicted as a place where a new mode of economic development is achieved in a sudden and innovative way that has not existed in these previous societies. “Forceful transformation,” another term used by Tōbata for “creation,” also represents this feature of the colony—economic development in a new way, not in a traditional way.

Before examining the relationship between creation and economic development, I would first like to clarify the relationship between creation and forceful transformation. As already mentioned in the previous section, Tōbata constructed his colonial theory with two categories of modern colonization in mind: colonization of an “uninhabited” land, like the New World in the 19th century; and that of an existing society in the 20th century, where a number of people already lived. In these two different categories of colonization, the motives for colonization also differ. He argues that the 19th century type was motivated by overpopulation, and the 20th century type was motivated by overcapitalization. Thus, in the earlier type the main content of colonization

²⁴⁴ Tōbata, “Shokumin Genjō no Honshitsu” (1940): 38.

was the movement of labor (people); in the latter type, it is the movement of capital.

For Tōbata, it is this particular feature of modern colonization that calls for the term “forceful transformation.” As he sees it, this term characterizes the colonization in the 20th century, in which capital moves from a colonizing nation or nations to an existing nation with a significant population, by which the colony is forcefully transformed to become a new society despite their reluctance to be changed. By contrast, “creation” refers to 19th century colonization which, he claims, had no possibility of causing national conflicts because the colony was an “uninhabited” land.²⁴⁵

In a word, Tōbata used the term, “forceful transformation,” without any intent to critique modern colonialism for its reliance on force or violence. It was a substitute for “creation” for him. In fact, the word “forceful” (*kyōryoku*) was used in Japan with a positive meaning similar to “bringing about significant change and development in the society.” For example, in 1872, when a compulsory elementary education system was about to be established for the first time regardless of strong resistance from all levels of people in the country, the Meiji government’s official title of the system was “coercive education” (*kyōhaku kyōiku*).²⁴⁶ In this case the Meiji government regarded coercion as necessary to make their people faithful citizens and furthermore to ensure national progress. In 1883, Fukuzawa Yukichi passionately argued in his bestseller, *The Encouragement of Learning*, “We support the coercive system (*kyōhaku hō*), because it is very important for Japan at present.” In particular, Fukuzawa believed that the coercive educational system was essential for national survival because it could make a strong army and a wealthy country, and later his belief was proven true in Japan’s victory in the Sino-

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 22-23.

²⁴⁶ The term, “kyōhaku,” can be translated into “compulsory.” It literally means “to press something or someone with force.”

Japanese War in 1895.²⁴⁷ Likewise, the word “forceful” or “coercive” was favorably used, or propagandized, in Japanese society to mean “intensive and extensive change and development for individuals as well as for the nation as a whole.” Thus, Tōbata adopts this term without implying criticism of the concept of modern colonization.

Regardless of the differentiation just described, Tōbata views any type of modern colony as a “creation.” And this means that he regards the colony as a place where “economic development” takes place. The relationship between creation and economic development is clearly displayed in the following chart of “economic process” that Tōbata presents based on Schumpeter’s economic theory.

Table 3.1: The Stages of the Economic Process (*sho tankai no taiō*)²⁴⁸

Consciousness of Subject: (<i>shutai ishiki</i>)	Wandering (<i>hōkō</i>)	→Peace (<i>heian</i>)	→Creation (<i>sōzō</i>)
Objective System: (<i>kyakutai taisei</i>)	Disorder (<i>ranzatsu</i>)	→Stability (<i>antei</i>)	→Instability/Disturbance (<i>fuantei</i>)
Whole System: (<i>sōtai</i>)	Murkiness (<i>kondatsu</i>)	→Order (<i>chitsujo</i>)	→Development (<i>hatten</i>)

As can be seen in this table, Tōbata explains the economic process focusing on three different stages of the mentality of an economic actor and his relationship with the economic environment. Tōbata argues that the economic actor has no economic rationality in a primitive state. In this initial stage, he quenches his thirst by eating fruits and satisfies his hunger by eating food he finds as he wanders in mountains and fields. At this time, the economic environment is in a state of disorder. As time passes, however, the economic actor comes to have a sense of

²⁴⁷ Oguma Eiji, *Nihon to Iu Kuni*, [3rd ed.] (Tokyo: Īsuto Puresu, 2013): 15-31.

²⁴⁸ Tōbata Seiichi, “Shokumin Seisaku no Dankai” (1943): 9.

rationality and thus he begins to calculate and measure his surroundings with a peaceful mind. He can adapt to his surroundings through trial and error, and these repetitive efforts produce habits and customs, that is, an order or an orientation (*Orientierung*). At this time, the economic surroundings are placed in a state of stability. But when this static state continues for a long time, the economic actor feels weariness and wants to break through the status-quo by taking dynamic and energetic action. He takes an irrational and creative action that cannot be calculated or imagined in the static state of peace and repetition. This “reorientation (*Umorientierung*),” exemplified by the change from handicraft manufacturing to mass production or by the shift from individual enterprise to company enterprise, throws the economic environment into a state of instability. Traditional methods of production that have been regarded as the best and the most appropriate become disturbed by innovative new methods of production. Tōbata argues that economic development takes place in this state of instability or disturbance.²⁴⁹ Invoking Schumpeter’s notion that “business fluctuation is the essence of the capitalist economy,”²⁵⁰ he implicitly argues that the capitalist economy is destined to develop continuously because of its intrinsic nature of instability.

Likewise, Tōbata argues that the economy develops when the creative actor (or entrepreneur) takes irrational and creative action (or innovation) that cannot be imagined by the static actor, who tends to remain in a stable economic mode.²⁵¹ In short, in an unstable state such as an economic crisis, the economy develops through the entrepreneur’s creation of new

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-9.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 8 (fn.2).

²⁵¹ Dahms summarizes Schumpeter as dividing the economic actor into two kinds, rational individual economic (or static) actor and creative (or dynamic-energetic) actor. Harry F. Dahms, “From Creative Action to the Social Rationalization of the Economy: Joseph A. Schumpeter's Social Theory,” *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1995): 4.

combinations.²⁵²

Therefore, his definition of colonization—the creation of a new society—can be rephrased as “the creation of new combinations” and as “a space where new combinations take place and thus the economy develops.” It is noteworthy that Tōbata is asserting here that the colony, by its very nature, is a place where economic development is inevitable. To support this assertion, in fact, he emphasizes that the colony, from the very moment of being colonized, has the nature of “instability,” the main condition in which entrepreneurs make innovations.

Deploying social analyses of the South-East Asian colonies which were influential at that time, John Sydenham Furnivall’s (1878-1960) theory of plural society (*fukugō shakairon*) and Julius Herman Boeke’s (1884-1956) theory of dual economy (*nijyū keizairon*), alongside

Schumpeterian economic theory,²⁵³ Tōbata explains this “inherent” process of economic development in a colony as follows:

[Before being colonized], an existing society has a low level of economy and its own social structure. Tentatively, I call this the unitary society (*ichigen teki shakai*). This society has its own distinctive customs, order, structure, and culture, and is ruled by a value system of its own. To speak about economy only, the society has a demand-supply curve that corresponds to its given social structure and value system. Its economy has an ability to achieve equilibrium as well as economic development for itself.

As capital is invested from outside [through colonization], however, the society is suddenly

²⁵² According to Dahms’ summary, Schumpeter identifies five types of new combinations. 1) the production of a new good, 2) the introduction of a new quality of a good, or the new use of a product that already exists, 3) a new method of production, 4) the opening up of a new market, or 5) a change in the economic organization, as in the creation of a trust or the establishment of a corporation. The ideal typical introduction of a new combination is the establishment of a new enterprise. Schumpeter, *Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung* (1912):159—cited in Dahms, *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁵³ J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 1939). This book was widely read in Japan as it was translated into Japanese and published in three different titles by two different publishers in 1942. Its typical title was *Ran’in keizaishi*. In addition to *Netherlands India*, Furnivall’s other books also gained popularity in Japan in the 1940s. *An introduction to the political economy of Burma and Progress and welfare in Southeast Asia* were translated into Japanese and published, respectively titled *Biruma no keizai* in 1942 and *Nanbō tōchi seisaku shiron* in 1943. Less widely read than Furnivall in Japan but still important for Tōbata’s colonial theory, in comparison, J. H. Boeke had just one Japanese translation of his books in the 1940s. His Dutch book, *Dorp en desa* (Leiden, 1934), was published in 1943 with the title of *Jawa sonrakuron*. His most influential book, *The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy*, was released in 1942 by the Institute of Pacific Relations and had a great influence on Tōbata, but could not be translated into Japanese during the 1940s, as the Pacific War intensified.

put into a capitalist relationship [with the motherland], and new capitalist companies are established that make the natives (*dochakujin*) into laborers. Until yesterday, the natives have been subordinates or serfs and have had fruits and wild animals in nature for food. Working individually, they had weak consciousness of labor and no sense of saving. They had a supply curve of labor different from a capitalist society. But as they become laborers in a capitalist company [after being colonized], they serve the so-called plantation agriculture and industry in colony. The relationship between labor and capital in the motherland and that between the so-called black labor and white capital in the colony are different. In the colony, to facilitate collective labor and factory labor, it is necessary to implement forced labor and contract labor that often correspond to whipping. Although the capital has come from the motherland due to overproduction, it has a totally different world to work in in the colony and precisely at this point the secret of “colonial profits (*shokuminchi rijun*)” is discovered. Somehow, this kind of company is established next to the obsolete form of native capital. Likewise, when the old economy and the new economy exist in parallel, the plural economy of the colony (*shokuminchi keizai no nigen teki seishitsu*) emerges.²⁵⁴

In this statement, Tōbata clearly shows that he understands colonization as the movement of capital from the motherland to the colony, or capital investment. He considers the colony as the meeting place of an old economy and a new economy, or in other words, pre-capitalism and capitalism. To use Schumpeterian terminology, he suggests that this meeting of the economy in “murkiness” and the economy in “stability” generates the plural economy in a state of “instability,” which becomes the source of “creation.” He concludes that the “plural economy” creates colonial profits which can be obtained neither in the old economy in the colony nor the new economy in the motherland. In sum, in Tōbata’s colonial theory, the colony becomes a new place where a new way of economic growth is created because of the fact that the new migrated capital from the motherland coexists with the old native capital. The colony becomes the space of “creation” out of the inherent structure of instability of the plural economy.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Tōbata, “Shokumin Genjō no Honshitsu” (1940): 35-36. The plural economy is the author’s own translation of “shokuminchi keizai no nigenteki seishitsu.” Here, it seems that he understands Furnivall’s plural society and Boeke’s dual (*nigenteki*) economy as an identical concept.

²⁵⁵ In this sense of creation of a new society, Tōbata clearly differentiates immigration from colonization. While immigration means the “perfect absorption of the migrants by the existing society,” he argues, colonization stands

Interestingly, in Tōbata's theory, no matter how much the instability in colony is emphasized, it has no negative effects on the possibility of economic development in the colony. Unlike Nitobe and Yanaihara, who separated the social problems in the colony, such as ethnic problems, from the economic development in the colony, and even characterized the two as conflicting, Tōbata bridges the separation, insisting that the former is the very condition in which the latter can take place through the innovative achievements of some individuals.

In fact, Tōbata mentions that the state of instability in a colony tends to be aggravated by social and political factors. "The new colonizers with a different value system and social knowledge come in with capital and take the dominant position in the colony. And they live in parallel with the natives with their own old value system. The two groups have no sense of commonality or connectedness. In the colony, there can be 'will of all' but no 'general [shared] will.' The society can be called the 'mixed residence of plurality' (*nigensei no zakkyo*)."²⁵⁶ He also comments that the fragile balance of power among colonizing countries as well as the nationalism of colonized countries intensifies the instability in the colony.²⁵⁷ Under the Schumpeterian framework, however, Tōbata argues that it is precisely this unstable nature of the colony that provides the very ground on which the economy can develop and progress to the next level.²⁵⁸

In addition, he believes that such instability or disturbance can be calmed through an

for the "creation of a new society by the migrants [to speak more precisely, the capital they bring to the colony]." He regards the inner colonization (*naichi shokumin*) also as a part of immigration on the grounds that it is a perfect inclusion in the home country. *Ibid.*, 22-23.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 37-38.

²⁵⁸ This perspective of Tōbata resembles that of Schumpeter, who regards the Great Depressions as "far from being unmitigated social evils but actually in the nature of 'a good cold douche' for the capitalist system." Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers*, 311.

able government's policies. Calling them *Datenpolitik* (与件政策 *yoken seisaku*),²⁵⁹ he draws on extraordinary police and military systems for examples of such policies and argues that they will facilitate economic development by effectively managing the economic conditions of the colony. Dividing economic policy into two categories in general—the policy for economic order and the policy for economic development (*sei chō seisaku*), he maintains that *Datenpolitik* of the former constitutes the main part of the economic policy for societies in the beginning stage of a capitalist economy. A colony, one of these societies, needs *Datenpolitik* to make its economic development continue for a long duration.²⁶⁰ In short, Tōbata considers colonial problems such as national conflicts and social distress in the colony to be manageable, similar to the natural conditions of a disobedient nature in tropical regions full of epidemics, where public health and hygiene policies produce a more tractable natural order (*shizen chian*). For him, the establishment of public order (*chian*) in terms of the human world as well as the natural world through *Datenpolitik* is the basic principle for wealth and economic development. Citing Adam Smith, Tōbata argues that, even in liberal societies with advanced capitalism, the role of government is crucial for establishing the conditions for economic development.²⁶¹ This idea of the necessity of a strong and able government for economic development, when it is applied to the relationship between the colony and the metropole, provides a justification for Japan's dictatorship in the service of colonial economic development.

If it is the colonial government that creates the foundations for economic development

²⁵⁹ According to Tōbata's definition, *Datenpolitik* stands for the policy to promote the growth of the economy by stabilizing the relationship between economic conditions and the economy (*yoken to keizai no kankei wo antei*), and, going further, processing (*kakō*) actively the conditions. Processing the nature (*shizen ni kansuru kakō*), the establishment of social peace (*shakai heiwa*), and the maintenance of various systems are examples. See, Tōbata Seiichi, "Shokumin Seisaku no Dankai" (1943):11

²⁶⁰ Tōbata Seiichi, *Ibid.*, 11, 15-17.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

through policy, then who are the entrepreneurs who will push economic development forward through innovation? For Tōbata, it is clearly the colonizers who become the entrepreneurs. They have vitality, determination, and leadership, and most are from the upper strata of their society. Calling them an “unstable population with determination (*kakugo*) and drive to push outward [into the colony] (*Drang nach aussen*),”²⁶² he argues that they bring to the colony the advanced level of technology of their home country, and thereby create something that has never been seen either in their home country or in the colony.

In addition to the colonizers, Tōbata includes the colonial authorities in the category of the entrepreneur. While the concept of entrepreneur in Schumpeter’s theory connotes the “function of fulfilling innovation” without being associated with any specific “class” or “occupation,” Tōbata specifies it as a “mover with a specific form to lead Japanese economy or agriculture.” And thus, industrial associations or government can also qualify as entrepreneurs.²⁶³ In his lectures in the 1930s, for example, he often explained that, “government is a risk avoiding entrepreneur.”²⁶⁴ The Japanese colonial authority in Choson, he maintained, was an entrepreneur, which played an entrepreneurial role in facilitating the Japanese colonizers’ migration to Choson and in providing them with such supports as subsidies or low-interest funds.²⁶⁵

By contrast, he sees no possibility of entrepreneurship in the colonized people. For him, they are people with no vitality and a very low level of civilization (*mindō*), who have no ability to develop by themselves. In his description of Choson agriculture written in 1934, for instance, he states that Choson landlords, the leaders in the society, have no entrepreneurial talent, desire,

²⁶² Tōbata, “Shokumin Genjō no Honshitsu” (1940): 21.

²⁶³ Yasuhiro Ōtomo, “Bukuribū 2: Shinozaki Takao cho, Tōbata Seiichi no Keizai no Shisō,” *Kanau*, October 2008. <http://ha1.seikyō.ne.jp/home/kki/kanau/kanau109/109bookreview2.html>.

²⁶⁴ Yoshio Abe, *Sensibility and Management*, translated by Robert McIlroy (Tokyo: Diamond Inc., 1990): 176.

²⁶⁵ Tōbata Seiichi, “Chosen no Nogyō to Nōmin” (1934), 57-58.

or ability. He argues that they are interested neither in capitalizing their farm rents nor in investing in their agriculture. Moreover, Choson peasants have no consciousness of saving, mainly due to the lack of food. In his eyes, the Choson agricultural economy looks stagnant, with no possibility of creating modern capitalism on its own. In the end, he concludes that Choson necessarily has to be led by Japanese colonizers to develop their economy. Characterizing Japanese colonizers as profit-seekers who are willing to take risks in Choson—a “virgin soil” or an “unexplored area” or a “new enterprise,” he argues that these colonizers produce economic development by combining capital and labor with new methods. They are effective “technicians,” he states, who can manage technologies and organizations with scientific knowledge to create agricultural development.²⁶⁶

As an agricultural economist, Tōbata conceptualized colonial theory based on his Schumpeterian understanding of economic development. In his view, just as the Showa Agricultural Shock was an opportunity for Japan to enhance its economic systems through reconstruction, the colony was a site where economic development naturally would occur through innovations, precisely out of the state of instability produced by the encounter of two different economic and social systems. Furthermore, this concept of the colony as creation was expandable to a larger context, empire. Tōbata went on to construct the concept of empire as creation, which became the theoretical foundation for the economic component of the Japanese wartime policy throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War and the following Pacific War. In the next section, I will discuss the process of this transition and expansion of the concept of creation in Tōbata’s colonial theory.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

Empire as Creation: Counter-Colonization

Tōbata emphasized the role of Japanese colonizers in creating the economic development of the colony. But he did not see this role as the “white man’s burden.” Rather, he defined colonization as a two-way process mutually beneficial to both the metropole and the colony. He argued this point with his new coinage, “counter-colonization” (*gyaku shokumin*).

The New World was able to create different things, [that is,] a different civilization from Europe’s, even though it came out of Europe. We can call this colonization. The statement, “Civilization is the result of colonization rather than the cause of colonization” (S. de Sismondi), does not fit in this case. In addition, it goes without saying that the different civilization in the New World had influences back on its motherland even before it became independent. It did so, not through the travels of people or capital, but through ideological and institutional products. We can call this “counter-colonization.” In the beginning, people established a colony due to domestic problems of overpopulation and overcapitalization. However, not only did they alleviate these problems, they also transformed themselves in the process of encountering life in the colony, due to the effect that the colony had on them in reverse. At this stage, the phenomenon of “counter-colonization” must be recognized.²⁶⁷

Drawing an example from the relationship between the New World and Britain, Tōbata argues in this explanation that the colony also has creative effects on the metropole, just as the metropole does on the colony. In other words, just as a new society is created in the colony by the impact from the metropole, so a new society emerges in the metropole as a result of the impact from the colony. To illustrate this process, he cites Frederick Jackson Turner’s (1861-1932) frontier thesis, which insisted that the formation of American exceptionalism was based on the frontier movement. Turner claimed that the so-called “American” traits such as democracy were formed during the Westward movement throughout two centuries and that these traits in

²⁶⁷ Tōbata, “Shokumin Genjō no Honshitsu” (1940): 33-34.

turn influenced British society.²⁶⁸ For Tōbata, the metropole was a creation as well as the colony was.

This view has its theoretical roots in Schumpeterian ideas of crisis. Even before becoming a colonial theorist, Tōbata insisted in his books, *The Rice Economy in Choson* (1935/1937) and *The Process of Development of the Japanese Agriculture* (1936), that even though Japanese society had suffered serious economic problems like the Showa Agricultural Shock since the Great Depression and the Manchurian Incident due to the inflow of cheap rice from the colonies,²⁶⁹ it could take advantage of this crisis to spur economic development at home. Through the transition to the wartime economy (*senji keizai*), he argued, Japan could make an opportunity out of the crisis to take reformative action to transform its agricultural structure.²⁷⁰ For Tōbata, armed with Schumpeter's economic theory, even the competitive or substitutional function (*daitaiteki, kyōsōteki yakuwari*) of a colony that disturbed the Japanese domestic market provided a helpful stimulus for the metropole to develop its economy, beyond the complementary function (*hosokuteki yakuwari*) of the colony in providing Japan with the resources it lacked.²⁷¹ Based on this positive understanding of the “counter-effects” of colonization, the term “counter-colonization” was conceptualized to have the meaning of the “colony’s economic transformative effects on the motherland (*bokoku e no keizai henkaku sayō*).”²⁷² And as a result, the empire was seen as a space of “mutual creation,” or “mutual economic development” between the metropole and the colony.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

²⁶⁹ Since 1932, due to the rice problem in Japan, the regulation of rice imports from the colonies such as Korea had been the main issue in the Japanese government's rice policy. “Chosen no Nogyō to Nōmin” (1934): 53.

²⁷⁰ Tōbata Seiichi, “Tōa shin chitsujo no kensetsu niokeru nihon nōgyō,” *Nihon Nōgyō Nenkan*, November, 1939 (Tokyo: Fumin Kyōkai)—Cited in Morita, “Tōbata Seiichi no Philippine: ‘Shokumin seisaku gaku’ kara ‘chiiki kenkyū’e no tenkai,” 88.

²⁷¹ Tōbata Seiichi, “Gyaku Shokumin,” *Ueda Teijirō hakase kanreki kinen ronbunshū*, vol. 4 (1943): 291-294.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 291.

Later, Tōbata incorporated this initial view of counter-colonization into the wartime discourses of Japan in the 1930s and the 1940s when Japan fought two major wars, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Pacific War against the U.S.A. and its allies. During wartime, the so-called discourse of the “East Asian Cooperative Community” and its later form, the discourse of the “Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,” developed in a way that emphasized the Japanese empire as an organic community of Japan and its colonies, to justify Japan’s wartime mobilization of its colonies. And Tōbata’s concept of counter-colonization contributed to those discourses as it provided the economic rationale. He expanded the meaning of counter-colonization to stand for the “Grand Regional Economy,” which conceptualized the Japanese empire as an economic entity of mutual cooperation between Japan and the colonies, achieving economic development through the “autonomous” development of each state (*kokka*) within it. In this conceptualization, the empire itself became a regional “community” of creation through economic development.

Tōbata arrived at this conceptual transformation of counter-colonization emphasizing the communal construction of the empire by revisiting Adam Smith’s colonial thought on the British Commonwealth through the mediation of Yanaihara Tadao, who had elaborated on the subject a decade earlier. As seen in the previous chapter, Yanaihara interpreted the British Commonwealth after WWI as a model for the Japanese empire: a great community via solidarity of politically and economically autonomous nations based on common economic interest shared by the metropole and the colonies. Yanaihara regarded it as a rational community, not only from the point of view of utilitarianism but also from that of social justice, because it demanded recognition of each group’s respective personality. Tōbata modifies Yanaihara’s evaluation of Smith to emphasize economic unity, only without serious consideration of the political autonomy

of the colonies. In this light, he argues that the Japanese empire must establish its economic policy by learning from Smith, the best model for understanding the effect of counter-colonization.

Tōbata states, “It is important that while people paid attention to only the one-way relationship from the metropole to the colony before Smith, Smith, who recognized the effect of ‘counter-colonization,’ *presented a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the metropole and the colony by addressing the problem of the metropole as a problem that included the colony*” (The emphasis is in the original. *shokuminchi o fukumete no honkoku no mondai ga mondai to serareta zentaikan ga teiji serareta ten ni aru*).²⁷³ In his view, Smith was a pioneer who viewed the metropole and the colony as one community of mutual economic development, going beyond the existing view of colony as merely the object of depredation (*ryakudatsu*). He argues that the economic success of the Imperial Unity (a pejorative term used by the Japanese side to designate the British Commonwealth), exemplified by the enormous extension of the market of Great Britain, was the result of the Smithian view of colony, which recognized the economic development of the metropole through developing the economy of the colony. Praising the astonishing level of productive power resulting from the international division of labor within the empire, he declares that the Industrial Revolution, the economic transformation in Great Britain, was the “best example of taking advantage of the counter-colonization.”²⁷⁴

By adding Yanaihara’s interpretation of Smith on the relationship between the colony and the metropole to his Schumpeterian view of the creative effect of the colony on the metropole, Tōbata constructed a vision of empire as an organic community for mutual economic development based on the principle of mutual cooperation. As for the reason for creating this

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 295.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 293-295.

organic unity, however, Tōbata differed from his predecessors, Yanaihara and Smith. He located that reason in politics rather than the economy.

The Grand Regional Economy

In the early 1940s, in the specific context of the war against the U.S. and its allies, including Great Britain, Tōbata could not agree with Yanaihara, who had viewed the British Commonwealth as an ideal to be pursued by the Japanese empire. Instead, arguing that Japan as a “Late Power” should find an alternative way of establishing such an economic community, he theorized the concept of the “Grand Regional Economy.” In an article written in 1943, in the midst of the Pacific War, he explained the concept, which he had once described as “Late Power’s version of the Imperial Unity of Great Britain,”²⁷⁵ as follows:

The Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere aims to establish *Grossraumwirtschaft* (*kōiki keizai*, Grand Regional Economy). This term is not exactly from pure economics. The most notable situation in the world economy today—particularly since the Ottawa Conference in 1932 and the Nazi’s principle of reconstruction of Germany—is that unlike in the past, *the regional boundaries* within which the world economy, or international trade, and the movement of capital take place *have become narrower* (*kyōiki ka*, the emphasis is in the original). WWII and the Great East Asian War have forced the national economy of every state (*kakkoku no kokumin keizai*) to narrow such regional boundaries in the context of war, and it is clear that the Ottawa Conference was the major reason for this trend of narrowing the sphere of the economy (*keizai kyōiki ka*). The essence of the concept, Grand Regional Economy, lies not in problematizing this narrowing of the “Economic Cosmos” (*keizai kūkan*, the author’s original translation) but in attempting to achieve economic development based on this recent trend, or even regardless of it. *Broadening* (*kōiki ka*) the boundary where a unified economic *policy* is set up and implemented, in other words, is the kernel of the concept (the emphases are original).²⁷⁶

According to this statement, the Grand Regional Economy has three general characteristics. First, it is necessary for Japan, due to the change in the international political

²⁷⁵ Tōbata Seiichi, “Shokumin gainen no yōin,” *Kokka gakkai zasshi*, vol. 57:7 (1942): 17. Late powers were, he meant, the nations that succeeded in modernization in the 19th century, such as Japan, Germany, and Russia.

²⁷⁶ These emphases are original. Tōbata, “Gyaku Shokumin” (1943): 284.

economy caused by the Ottawa Conference in 1932. The change refers to the establishment of the bloc economy system initiated by the British Empire. The British Empire announced its decision at that the Conference to build the British Commonwealth, affirming the protection of free trade within the empire and the vested interest of the existing industries of the empire, particularly of the motherland, against other countries outside the empire. This current initiated by “an advanced imperial power” brought economic hardship to Japan, a Late Power, particularly when, after the Manchurian Incident and the subsequent establishment of Manchukuo, its puppet state, it opted for an isolationist policy by withdrawing from the League of Nations in 1932. As a result, Japan needed to strive to establish its own Block Economy within its empire in order to be independent from the existing international economic system led by hostile Western powers. The search became even more desperate after 1937 with the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the ensuing economic sanctions imposed against Japan by Western powers. Japan’s “East Asian Cooperative Community” policy emerged out of this desperation and lasted until after the start of the Pacific War in 1941, when it was renamed the “Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere” policy. The policy’s economic piece, the “Grand Regional Economy,” aimed at Japan’s economic development by making its own economic block to survive a multi-front war.

Secondly, Tohata’s statement, quoted above, claims that the Grand Regional Economy is necessary not only for Japan but also for its colonies. Referring to the metropole as well as the colonies with the term, “every state” (*kakkoku*), Tōbata implies that Japan and its colonies share the same fate; their national independence is in danger in the war, threatened by the exclusive economic system of enemy countries. He regards Japan *and* its colonies as “the have-nots.” Invoking the history of colonization of the Asian countries by the Western powers, he

emphasizes a shared regional fate in which Japan and its colonies are all at risk of being colonized by or becoming semi-colonies of “the haves.”²⁷⁷ Yet, he is effectively silent about Japan’s own colonization of Asian countries. By this silence, he asserts the necessity of transforming the Japanese empire into an organic regional community that works together to develop the economy of all of the member states so that they can survive the war and avoid being colonized.

In other words, the principle of mutual cooperation in the Grand Regional Economy is different from the ideal Commonwealth that Smith and Yanaihara imagined. While Smith and Yanaihara located that principle in an economic or social tendency of social groups to work together for fear that social disruption will affect their self-interest, Tōbata located it in a political cause, the sense of a common regional fate.

This point is developed further in the third characteristic of the Grand Regional Economy. Tōbata argues that the Grand Regional Economy is a policy “broadening the boundary where a unified economic policy is set up and implemented.” This characteristic of political unification of the Grand Regional Economy is reinforced by the concept of the “Leading Country” [*chūshin kokka* 中心国家, *chūkaku koku* 中核国].²⁷⁸ According to Tōbata, the leading country is a developed country which is “energetic but poor” because it has to find the materials necessary for becoming a “national defense state” (*kokubō kokka*) in the world market. As war breaks out, it needs to build a regional economy where the division of international labor occurs under its own economic policy, so it can acquire all the materials for maintaining its heavy industry to win the war. Other countries in the region are in a situation similar to that of the leading country, in that they also need a broader economic boundary where they can get all the

²⁷⁷ Tōbata, “Shokumin gainen no yōin” (1942): 16.

²⁷⁸ Tōbata, “Gyaku Shokumin” (1943): 288.

materials they need to build their own national defense state in wartime. But since they are severely weak in terms of population, technology, and organization, they do not have an ability to create and strengthen such a regional economy. Instead, they need to follow one stronger country that is able to lead them in the creation of a developed economy. Likewise, Tōbata conceptualized the Grand Regional Economy as the sphere of national defense for all the countries in it, including Japan and its colonies, and theorized Japan's leading role through the appeal to regional fate or crisis.²⁷⁹

Given these three characteristics of the Grand Regional Economy, there is a certain irony in the fact that all countries, which seek their own national political independence, nevertheless co-operate with one another under one policy planned by one leading country. Tōbata repeatedly refers to every colony in the Grand Regional Economy as a “country” (*kuni, kokka*), each its own political entity, not a “nation” (*minzoku*). It is difficult to imagine how such a communal international entity could exist in which all countries have their own political autonomy but also have to follow one country's economic policy.

For this reason, in fact, the concept has been interpreted as mere war-propaganda, as have the East Asia Cooperative Community and the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.²⁸⁰ Indeed, there is a grain of truth in this view. During the period of the Fifteen Years War (1931-1945), Japan needed to make its new colonies such as Manchukuo and some South East Asian countries nominally independent countries in order to colonize them. This was because Northern Manchuria, where they established Manchukuo, had been a part of China, and the South East Asian countries had been colonies of the Western powers. Therefore, Japan strategically called

²⁷⁹ Tōbata, “Shokumin gainen no yōin” (1942): 16.

²⁸⁰ Ienaga Saburō, *The Pacific War: World War II And the Japanese, 1931-1945*, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

them “independent countries, which were members of the Grand Regional Economy.” In reality, in the Greater East Asia Conference (*Dai tō-a kaigi*) held in Tokyo for two days from the 5th to the 6th of November, 1943, the countries that had recently become Japanese colonies were called independent countries with their own political sovereignty: Manchukuo, the Nationalist Government of Republic of China in Nanjing, the State of Burma, the Provisional Government of Free India, the Second Philippine Republic, and the Kingdom of Thailand.²⁸¹

However, I would like to argue that the Grand Regional Economy, beyond mere propaganda or even political necessity, was also the result of the logical reasoning of Tōbata regarding the economic development of the Late Power’s empire. The Schumpeterian economist saw no contradiction in the association between politically independent countries with one leading country. Instead, for him, the existence of one leading country, Japan, and a unified economic policy designed by it, was a necessity for the economic development of each country within the empire. This is because he regarded Japan as an “entrepreneur” and its dictatorship as *Datenpolitik*, the two important preconditions for economic development out of crisis, which he extracted from Schumpeter’s economics.

The war situation in the 1940s brought severe economic hardship to Japan and its colonies. Japan, which had depended on the Anglo-American sphere for more than 80% of its total oil supply, could not sustain its economy when the United States imposed an oil embargo against it in response to the 1941 invasion of southern Indochina. Very soon afterwards, Japan instigated the Pacific War and continued its invasion of the Southeast Asian colonies of the Western powers, hoping to obtain oil, rubber, and other crucial resources through colonization.

²⁸¹ Tōbata Seiichi, “Dai tōa keizai kensetsu no kōsō,” *Chūō Kōron*, vol. 59:2 (1944): 5.

This “sudden, massive, and discontinuous”²⁸² expansion of the empire aggravated the economic crisis in the empire. Yet, for Tōbata, armed with a Schumpeterian viewpoint, this crisis still seemed manageable as an opportunity for Japan to create rapid economic development.

In Tōbata’s view, the sudden expansion of the empire looked like a scene where “oil and water were suddenly poured into one jar.” This wartime situation of “heterogeneity” where the advanced capitalist system of Japan suddenly met with the pre-capitalist system of the Southeast Asian colonies, however, could be the very source of economic development in his Schumpeterian theory, only if two preconditions were fulfilled. First, Japanese colonizers needed to play the role of entrepreneur, and, second, the Japanese government had to fulfill the entrepreneurial function of *Datenpolitik* for them. The *Datenpolitik* was, according to him, a device to bring a state of order to the colonies, so that the Japanese entrepreneurs could innovate. Tōbata’s examples of *Datenpolitik* ranged from public health policy and hygiene policy to military policy (*gunji kōsaku*), cultural policy (*bunka kōsaku*), and thought control.

In this sense, the leading country with one unified economic policy could become the essential component of the Grand Regional Economy, causing no contradiction with the claim that it was a regional economic community for mutual economic development among politically independent countries. And the Japanese dictatorship, intolerant of any opposition against it in the colony, could be justified as *Datenpolitik* for the rapid economic development required for all to survive. The colonies’ national aspirations for self-determination were of no concern in this logic. They were regarded as just one among many factors causing the state of crisis, which could be managed by effective economic policies.

There was, however, one problem to be solved in the Grand Regional Economy in order

²⁸² Tōbata, “Gyaku Shokumin” (1943): 285.

for the Schumpeterian logic of economic development to work. It was that the entrepreneurs, the Japanese colonizers, had no capital to invest in the new colonies for innovation during the Pacific War. The Japanese government could not perform an entrepreneurial function, such as subsidizing them, because of the lack of capital.

Facing this reality, Tōbata found another theoretical source to supplement his Schumpeterian model of economic development for the Japanese empire. This was Friedrich List's (1789-1846) concept, "National System," with which he argued that each country in the Grand Regional Economy had to establish its own self-sufficient national economy, developing all areas of industry from light industry to heavy industry, step by step, with balance. List was a protectionist against free trade, who argued that a late industrialized country like Germany must protect its own infant industries through artificial trade barriers, or otherwise be dominated by the early industrialized countries like Britain and France.²⁸³ Tōbata, under List's influence, identified the Japanese empire in the 20th century with Germany in the 19th century, regarding both of them as late developing countries or "have-nots." He argued that the Grand Regional Economy needed to encourage each country in it to protect its infant industry to construct a national system for its own survival.

This claim of the "National System" in the Grand Regional Economy became a mere excuse for the unfair exploitation by Japan of all the resources from its colonies without providing them with even daily necessities. This theory, as policy, was implemented as the Japanese military moved toward a defensive war in 1943 against rapidly expanding U.S. military might and a naval blockade. It was disastrous both for local populations that were cut off from

²⁸³ Tōbata, "Shokumin gainen no yōin" (1942): 17.

preexisting regional trade and for Japanese soldiers fighting in these places.²⁸⁴

Tōbata, however, insisted that the National System referred to an alternative model of economic development for the sake of each country's national independence. For example, he asserts that while the Imperial Unity subjugates the colony's economy to the metropole's economy by imposing a "monocultural economy" (*tansaku keizai*)²⁸⁵, suppressing the production of general consumer goods and basic commodities, the Grand Regional Economy helps each country build a so-called "self-support" (*jikatsu*) system, where a comprehensive polycultural economy (*tasaku keizai*) is established.²⁸⁶ Using an analogy, he enlarges upon this point.²⁸⁷

In the Anglo style [Imperial Unity], it is not asked whether a student is in elementary school, middle school or college. With all students being put on the same plane, the division of labor in studying is established; an elementary school student learns math only, a middle school student learns history only, and a college student learns physics only. In contrast, we provide our students with a perfect education by teaching them all subjects by level, so that all students can learn math, history and physics, corresponding to their own respective stages of development. The division of labor is established by [the level of difficulty of] content here. In the steel industry, for example, there is the division of labor from bicycle manufacturing to car manufacturing. The former is done by people in the lower level and the latter is done by people in the higher level. We do not use the division of labor as a specific tool to "divide and rule" (*bunkatsu tōchi*). We provide each country and each region (*kakuchi kakuiki*) with guidance to help all of them make gradual improvement through a poly-cultural and comprehensive economy (*tasakuteki sōgōteki keizai*). In other words, our economic structure must be "guidance by location" (*tokoro o eta shidō*), not "divide and rule."²⁸⁸

²⁸⁴ Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle against the Sun: the American War With Japan* (New York: Free Press, 1985); Ienaga Saburō, *Ibid.*; Oguma Eiji, *Nihon to Iu Kuni*, [3rd ed.] (Tokyo: Isuto Puresu, 2013).

²⁸⁵ Malay for tin and rubber; the Philippines for sugar, for example. Although they were agricultural countries, they had to import numerous food products from outside. And they had never been trained for light industry. Tōbata, "Dai tōa keizai kensetsu no kōsō" (1944): 2-3, 9.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 9. He admitted, however, that this assertion could easily be misinterpreted as a Japanese countermeasure for the shortage of the supply of materials that prevented it from backing up the mono-cultural economy.

²⁸⁷ Interestingly, Tōbata highlights the superiority of the Grand Regional Economy over the Imperial Unity, employing different languages for them: grand regional sphere (*kōiki ken*) versus the colonial empire (*shokumin teikoku*); countries (*kuni*) or guided nations (*hi shidōkoku*) versus colonies (*shokuminchi*); region (*chiiki*) versus colonies (*shokuminchi*) or empire (*teikoku*). See Tōbata, "Shokumin gainen no yōin" (1942): 15-16.

²⁸⁸ Tōbata, "Dai tōa keizai kensetsu no kōsō" (1944): 10.

Here, Tōbata makes a clear division between (Anglo) Imperial Unity and the Grand Regional Economy. While the former is the perpetuation of a dependency system through forcing a monocultural colonial economy, he explains, the latter is the establishment of an independent self-support system through building a polycultural economy in the colony. He characterizes the former as “exploitation” through the system of “divide and rule;” in contrast, he sees the latter as “development” through the system of “guidance by location,” which helps each colony according to the level and stage of its economy. He asserts that Japan, the leading country, gives customized guidance for all members in the community to create balanced development in all areas of industry, by which they can develop their own national economy without being dependent on the metropole’s economy.

Here, it becomes clear that the binary rhetoric of colonization, whether colonization was “exploitation” of the colony or “development” of the colony, already existed in the 1930s through 1945. In fact, it was originally Yanaihara who made this distinction between development and exploitation in the nature of colonization, before Tōbata. But unlike Tōbata, Yanaihara did so in order to criticize the very nature of colonization, asserting that economic development of the colony was inseparably intertwined with exploitation of the colony. Yanaihara dreamt of an ideal situation where the metropole and the colony could undergo mutual economic development without the former’s exploitation of the latter; in fact, this is the reason why he made a binary division between development and exploitation. But he knew that it was impossible indeed for the ideal to become a reality; in the end, he appealed to his religious faith to envision the realization of his ideal.²⁸⁹

By contrast, Tōbata was convinced that the ideal of mutual economic development could

²⁸⁹ Yanaihara, *Shokumin Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku*, YTZ I, 483.

be realized in the present. Appropriating Yanaihara's separation of development from exploitation in the nature of colonization, Tōbata superimposed that binary over a distinction between Japan and the West: Japanese colonialism existed for the development of the colony while Western colonialism existed for exploitation of the colony. During the Fifteen Years War era, to take a stand against the Western powers after the Manchurian Incident, Japan needed to distinguish the nature of their own colonization from that of Western colonization. As a result, Tōbata reconceptualized Japanese colonization as mutual development while criticizing Western colonization as development of the metropole only. In this way, Yanaihara's original Smithian vision of "colonization as regional economic development without exploitation" was reinterpreted by Tōbata as exclusively Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s wartime Japan. While Yanaihara conceived the binary framework of development *or* exploitation for criticizing the contemporary trend of colonization, which was the fusion of development *and* exploitation, Tōbata used it for supporting wartime propaganda, which claimed the Japanese empire as serving development for the colonized and the British empire as creating exploitation of the colonized. Now, the binary framework was employed to disguise the fact that Japan needed to develop and exploit its colonies to mobilize every resource from them to expand its sphere of power and influence during the war.

In sum, it can be said that Tōbata's advocacy for a "Grand Regional Economy" based on a self-supporting national system became mere war propaganda. In other words, Tōbata created a discursive rationale for extracting maximal resources from Japan's colonies and occupied areas while investing nothing in the basic commodities necessary to sustain the lives of the people living there. This exploitation was pursued on the basis of Tōbata's theory of economic development for the late developing country, which aimed at "economic development without

exploitation.” After the Japanese empire ended, his theory became the logical foundation for Japan’s economic support project for the developing countries of Asia. In the final section of this chapter, I would like to address the postwar legacy of Tōbata’s colonial theory.

Conclusion

After 1945, when the Japanese empire collapsed, Colonial Policy Studies was abolished. But beginning in 1952, the academic tradition could continue, as Yanaihara became the first chair of the Department of International Relations at the University of Tokyo.²⁹⁰ Tōbata as well, after retiring from the Department of Agriculture at Tokyo University in 1959, actively engaged with the Japanese government’s foreign development assistance program, taking charge as the first director of the Institute of Developing Economies (*Ajia keizai kenkyūjo*), part of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan.²⁹¹

Regarding the aim of the Japanese government’s foreign development assistance, he expressed his idea in 1963 in “Various Issues Facing Asian Countries” (*Ajia shokoku no sho mondai*). Pointing out that there had been two characteristics of colonial management (*shokuminchi keiei*), “exploitation” (*sakushu*) and “development” (*kaitaku or kaihatsu*), he stated that Japan’s contemporary economic assistance for developing countries in Asia was aiming at “development,” unlike colonialism which was “exploitative” in nature. In other words, Tōbata seems to believe that his ideal of a “regional community for economic development without exploitation”—an ideal impossible to realize under wartime conditions—could now be achieved

²⁹⁰ Sakai Tetsuya, “The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan: 1868-1945,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9(2) (Cambridge University Press, 2008): 247.

²⁹¹ The ODA, starting in 1954, has its goal to help developing nations with supplies, civil engineering, and other assistance.

in the post-1945 era of decolonization. In all likelihood, he envisioned Japan's postwar foreign assistance program as another version of the Grand Regional Economy system, this time without exploitation.

Before discussing the legacy of the Grand Regional Economy in postwar Japan's foreign economic assistance program for the Asia-Pacific region, I would like briefly to explain the origins of the program. After the Japanese empire collapsed in 1945, mostly due to the defeat in the Pacific War, Japan went through democratization and demilitarization mandated by the American occupation. But after the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were announced in 1947, the Cold War intensified in the Asia-Pacific region; the so-called "reverse course," which firstly took shape in 1948, was enacted more extensively in occupation policy toward Japan. Now the U.S. focused its efforts on making Japan its major ally in East Asia to contain communist China and the U.S.S.R., by reviving Japan's military and economic powers. The first step in these containment efforts was to make Japan an "independent" state in international politics. At the San Francisco Peace Conference of September 1951, the end of the American occupation of Japan was declared. Also, in the conference, a question of reparations by Japan to its former colonies were discussed. Since the U.S. wanted the rapid recovery of its new ally, whose economy had been devastated by the wars, they limited reparations to the export of Japanese manufactured products using the resources of the Asian recipients of compensation (*ekimu hoshō*), which was also helpful to Japan's economic recovery.²⁹² In this way, Japanese economic assistance to developing nations in the Asia-Pacific region was actively conducted in the postwar era as a part of the U.S. plan to consolidate the "free" world in that region in the

²⁹² Tōbata returned to the Philippines as a member of the Reparations Committee of Japan (*baishō zenkendan*) in 1953. His first visit to the country was in 1943, when he went there as a member of the Philippines Investigation Committee (*hitō chōsa iinkai*) to write a report for the Japanese Ministry of Colonization (*Takumusho*).

midst of the Cold War.

Then, what legacies of the Grand Regional Economy can we find in postwar Japan's foreign economic assistance program? I would like to address two aspects of this question. First, in the postwar period, the Grand Regional Economy evolved into what is commonly referred to as modernization theory.²⁹³ As seen in this chapter, the Grand Regional Economy was constructed as a model of regional community among developing countries for economic development, which was claimed to be necessary for their national survival in the arena of imperial powers' struggle to acquire more colonies. This rhetoric of imminent danger to their independence continued to exist in the postwar, but at this time the visible enemy was a different one. While the Grand Regional Economy had claimed that nations must make rapid economic development to deal with the imperialist enemy, the postwar assistance program did so by emphasizing the threat from the Communist enemy. According to the rhetoric, the threat could be prevented by reaching the "norm" of economic development.²⁹⁴

In this view, the norm meant the American style of capitalist development, and Japan was accepted as the best example of achieving that norm for the first time in Asia, as evidenced at the three-day Hakone Conference in 1960 in which thirty-one eminent Japanese Studies scholars, including John W. Hall and Edwin O. Reischauer, discussed the modernization of Japan.²⁹⁵ Just as the Grand Regional Economy advocated Japan's leadership for developing countries in the regional economic bloc to reach the desirable level of economic development,

²⁹³ The most recent central works on modernization theory are; Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Sebastian Conrad "'The Colonial Ties aer Liquidated': Modernization Theory, Post-war Japan and the Global Cold War," *Past and Present* (2012), 216(1):181-214.

the level achieved by Japan, the postwar economic assistance program aimed at the developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region reaching the norm of economic development with Japan's help.

In the Grand Regional Economy policy, however, Japan's leadership turned out to be another name for Japan's dictatorship, a dictatorship justified as necessary for rapid economic development. As seen in this chapter, Tōbata argued that the so-called *Datenpolitik* (*yoken seisaku*)—policies aimed at installing a new economic order by effectively controlling any instability in society by recourse to extraordinary policing and military measures—was required to facilitate the policy of economic development. For him, *Datenpolitik* was a necessity to enable Japanese colonizers to make innovations in the colony, and the Japanese government with an entrepreneurial function needed to implement it in order to encourage the entrepreneurial creation.

This point leads to the second legacy of the Grand Regional Economy policy. I argue that it evolved into a developmental dictatorship policy (*kaihatsu dokusai seisaku*)²⁹⁶ in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region in the postwar era, where the idea of rapid economic development through *Datenpolitik* was reproduced. For instance, during the Park Chung-hee regime in the 1960s and 1970s, Korea achieved rapid economic development through harsh political, socio-economic and cultural oppression. Japan and the U.S., the most favorable allies of the Park regime, ignored its anti-democratic policies. Rather, it seems that they regarded Park's dictatorship as useful for establishing a relationship of peace and cooperation in the "free" world and, in particular, in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, in the midst of nation-wide anti-

²⁹⁶ James A. Gregor. *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979); Kim Eungsoo, and Byeong-cheon Yi, *Developmental dictatorship and the Park Chung-hee era: the shaping of modernity in the Republic of Korea* (Paramus, NJ: Homa & Sekey Books, 2006).

Japanese protests in Korea in 1964, when the issue of Japanese reparations to Korea for its colonial occupation was hastily closed on condition that Japan give Korea economic assistance through supplies, civil engineering and funds, Park's regime quelled the protests with police and military power.²⁹⁷ That is, in the postwar democratic era, the responsibility for carrying out *Datenpolitik* seemed to be transferred from the Japanese government in the Grand Regional Economy to each nation's government. Therefore, it can be argued that an idea of the regional community for rapid economic development for developing countries, relying on a leading nation and *Datenpolitik*, continued into the postcolonial period.

In sum, Tōbata's colonial theory of the Grand Regional Economy was reproduced in the postwar era through Japan's foreign economic assistance program. Although Tōbata claimed to aspire the "establishment of regional community for economic development without exploitation," his developmentalist vision could not reach this goal because he had never given an adequate consideration to the inseparability of development and exploitation.

²⁹⁷ Oguma Eiji, *Nihon to Iu Kuni*, 102-104.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters, I have explored Japanese Colonial Policy Studies, focusing on the theories and ideas of its three theoretical protagonists. It was an academic discipline as well as an influential discursive set whose primary objective and function were to legitimate Japanese Empire in the early half of the 20th century. It created the image of colonization as development without exploitation for the benefits of all humanity, under the internationalist and “modernist” belief that the spread of modernization through colonization would bring every nation in the empire freedom, equality, and prosperity. From the beginning of the Japanese empire to its end in 1945, this discourse set was formed, developed, and spread in the name of “science.” Starting from the science of agriculture at Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido, Colonial Policy Studies was soon integrated into economics centering on the international economy, and then evolved to a sort of area studies on Asia. Using “scientific and practical” research relying on various international systems of knowledge in the human and social sciences, including Social Darwinism, Comtian biology, and the economic ideas of Smith, Marx, Schumpeter, and List, Nitobe Inazo, Yanaihara Tadao, and Tōbata Seiichi defined colonialism as an encounter between different national, social, or economic groups, and claimed it would bring development to all the interested sides. In the 1910s, the founder, Nitobe Inazo, theorized colonization, mostly expressed in the form of national territorial expansion, as a natural phenomenon in which all humanity would cooperate with each other to reach the status of the utmost human

development—a perfect harmony among nature, humans, and God. To him, colonization was a natural stream conveying civilization from the metropole to the colonies. Yanaihara Tadao, who was active in the liberalist mood of the 1920s, largely adopted his mentor’s pro-modernization perspective. Criticizing the national aspects of colonization, however, he redefined the concept. To Yanaihara, such aspects as the metropole’s territorial expansion, its economic exploitation, and the consequent political conflicts did not represent the “natural” elements of colonization; they were distorted expressions of colonization in the age of imperialism. Taking a stance against such imperialism, a fusion of development and exploitation, he dreamt of colonization as development without exploitation. In this vein, he defined colonization as a social phenomenon in which different social groups interacted, and he imagined the ideal of empire as an economic cooperative community among independent nations with the principle of mutual aid. In Yanaihara’s view, colonization could serve as a tool for worldwide modernization through international division of labor, which would create emancipatory effects for ordinary people and nations.

Even though it was true that Yanaihara was a genuine “anti-imperialist” humanist, his theory nevertheless played a critical instrumental role in supporting Japanese militarist imperialism in the later years because of its main pro-modernization tenet. During the wartime in the late 1930s and early 1940s, employing Yanaihara’s Smithian colonial theory, Tōbata was able to theorize the Japanese empire as a cooperative organic community among late developing independent nations for the purpose of rapid economic development. He defined colonization as an economic phenomenon in which different economic systems, particularly, pre-capitalist and capitalist ones, met and fostered entrepreneurial innovations. National conflicts within the empire, according to this Schumpeterian, represented a crucial part of economic development;

they created a state of “disorder” where innovations took place. The theorist of the economic policy of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity utilized Yanaihara’s two key concepts in an interesting way; he characterized Japanese empire as an entity where development happened, while the British Empire was a space of colonial exploitation.

Colonial Policy Studies’ imagination of colonization as development without exploitation based on pro-modernization ideas has left imprints on postwar Japan and its neighboring countries in Asia, its former colonies. To close this examination of its development in the hands of its three main protagonists, I would like to address the three legacies of the discipline. First, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, it became a theoretical basis of Japanese international relations in the post-WWII era. Colonial Policy Studies, already abolished in 1945 at the demise of the Japanese empire, actually revived in 1952 with the new name of International Relations Studies. At this time, the academic tradition of Colonial Policy Studies based on international economics became a platform on which the Japanese government’s foreign development assistance program was conceived and implemented. The key rhetoric of Colonial Policy Studies, “colonization is development for all,” continued to be influential in Japanese foreign policy making, as seen in the reenactment of Tōbata’s theoretical formulation in the period of the Cold War, when modernization theory wielded its power to claim the Japanese model of economic development as the norm for other Asian countries in the “free” world. This usage was a discursive strategy to consolidate the “security” and “solidarity” within that camp. The economic policy of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere evolved into a developmental dictatorship policy (*kaihatsu dokusai seisaku* 開発独裁政策) in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region in the postwar era, where the idea of rapid economic development through *Datenpolitik* was extensively reproduced. The Park regime’s model of economic development in

the 1960s and 1970s in South Korea, which achieved rapid economic development through hard line policies and Japanese aid, was a typical example showing the legacy of Colonial Policy Studies in Japanese international relations.

Secondly, in a broader sense, Colonial Policy Studies has had an impact on the development of area studies as an academic field. As mentioned above, during the wartime period in the 1930s and early 1940s, Colonial Policy Studies was enlarged to become an interdisciplinary area studies program on Asian countries, which incorporated ethnography, anthropology, history, linguistics, and medicine. Not only formal colonies such as Korea and Taiwan, but regions within the Japanese sphere of interest including Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asian countries became the objects of its “scientific” research. As Yanaihara pointed out in a survey he wrote in 1951 of the genealogy of international economics (which later became International Relations Studies), area studies around the time of the Second Sino-Japanese War presented a “magnificent sight” (*ikan*), in which various universities and research institutions, such as the South Manchurian Railway Research Department (*Mantetsu chōsabu*), the East Asia Research Institute (*Tōa kenkyūjo*), and the Pacific Association (*Taiheiyō kyōkai*) produced a great number of systematic studies on the Asian region.²⁹⁸ Colonial Policy Studies played a key role in creating the boom of Asian area studies in the interwar period which later contributed a great deal to shaping Japan’s ideas of international relations and foreign countries in Asia in the second half of the twentieth century and after.

Lastly, Colonial Policy Studies has a postwar legacy in that it has shaped one of the most important postwar academic debates in Asian countries, especially in the former Japanese colonies: an argument on the nature of Japanese colonial rule and its impact on their

²⁹⁸ Yanaihara, “Wagakuni kokusai keizairon no kaiko to tenbō,” *YTZ*, vol. 5: 378-379, 382.

modernization. It has done so by providing main terms and frameworks within which the debate has been conducted. The discursive set of colonialism based on internationalist pro-modernization ideas produced a binary imagination of colonization as “either development or exploitation,” during wartime Japan. In the postcolonial period, “development” and “exploitation” respectively became the key words for each side of the debate, as was witnessed, particularly, in Korean scholarly circles in the late twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries. Discussions between the so-called perspective of exploitation (*sut'alron* 収奪論) and the perspective of colonial modernization (*singminji kŭndaehwaron* 植民地近代化論) have often escalated into very heated and even political exchanges in which each “camp” has been supported by contending political groups in Korea. However heated their debate has been, both sides are locked in the framework created in the colonial period by a discourse set whose primary goal was to legitimize the Japanese colonial rule, namely, Colonial Policy Studies. In actual fact, some participants in the debate suggested deconstructing the framework of “development or exploitation,”²⁹⁹ but they simply presupposed that this binary scheme had largely originated in modernization theory in the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, their specific strategy tended to come down to critically rethinking the Cold War “modernist” perspective. However, in the context of East Asian history, such “modernist” ideas could be traced back to the Japanese colonial period, as my dissertation has showed. The binary framework that still exists is, indeed, a colonial product, creature, and vestige of the theories and discourse of the three principle architects of Japanese Colonial Policy Studies, Nitobe Inazō, Yanaihara Tadao, and Tōbata Seiichi.

²⁹⁹ See the footnote 11 for a brief overview of these three perspectives.

APPENDIX:

A Chronology of Japanese colonialism

Year	Lives of Nitobe, Yanaihara, and Tobata	Events in Japan and the World
1862	Nitobe was born in Morioka, Nanbu domain.	
1868		Meiji Restoration
1875		Agricultural settlement programs (1875-1904) were implemented by Japanese government in Hokkaido.
1876		Sapporo Agricultural College (Sapporo Nōgakō) was established in Hokkaido by the Hokkaido Colonization Office of the Meiji government.
1877	Nitobe entered Sapporo Agricultural College.	
1878	Nitobe was baptized to become Christian.	
1879		Ryūkyū Islands were annexed by Japan.
1881	Nitobe graduated from Sapporo Agricultural College and worked at the Hokkaido Colonization Office and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.	
1882		Hokkaidō was officially incorporated into Japan proper.
1884	Nitobe went to the U.S. and studied economics and politics at Johns Hopkins University.	
1887	-Nitobe was appointed as an assistant professor of Agriculture in Sapporo Agricultural College. -Nitobe went to Germany and studied economics and agricultural economics at the Univ. of Bonn, Univ. of	A class, "Agricultural Policy and Colonial Policy (nōseigaku oyobi shokuminsaku)" began to be listed on the curriculum of

	Berlin, Univ. of Halle.	Sapporo Agricultural College but could not be taught because of the lack of lecturer.
1890		"Agricultural Policy and Colonial Policy" began to be taught for the first time by Satō Shōsuke, who changed its name into "Colonial History (shokuminshi)."
1891	-Nitobe married Mary P. Elkinton and returned to Japan. -Nitobe began teaching colonial history at Sapporo Agricultural College.	
1893	Yanaihara was born in Ehime prefecture.	
1895		-First Sino-Japanese War broke out, and China defeated. -Japan acquired Taiwan from China.
1897	Nitobe stopped teaching and went to the U.S. to receive medical treatment.	
1899	Tobata was born in Mie prefecture.	
1900	Nitobe's Bushido was published in America and Japan.	
1901	Nitobe was appointed to be the head of the Sugar Industry Bureau of the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan.	
1903	-Nitobe was appointed as an affiliated professor to teach colonial policy studies at Kyoto Imperial University. -Nitobe stopped working at the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan and returned to Japan.	
1904	Nitobe became a professor at Kyoto Imperial University.	Russo-Japanese War broke out.
1905	-Bushido, 10 th revised and enlarged edition was published in New York and London. -Nitobe was invited to the Imperial Palace and met Emperor Meiji. -Nitobe stopped working at Kyoto Imperial University.	-Japan won the Russo-Japanese War and acquired Karafuto and the Kwangtung Leased Territory. -Japan made Korea a protectorate.
1906	-Nitobe became headmaster at the First Higher School (Tokyo Dai'ichi Gakkō) in Tokyo. -Nitobe was appointed as a professor to teach colonial	

	<p>policy studies in the Faculty of Agriculture at Tokyo Imperial University.</p> <p>-Nitobe had an inspection tour of Korea.</p>	
1907		Colonial Studies (Shokumin'gaku) was established in the Faculty of Agriculture at Hokkaido Imperial University.
1908		Gentleman's Agreement was concluded between President Theodore Roosevelt and Prime Minister Saionji, by which the Japanese government to limit drastically the flow of emigrants to the United States.
1909	Nitobe became the first chair of the Colonial Policy Studies, Tokyo Imperial University.	Colonial Policy Studies was established in the Faculty of Law at Tokyo Imperial University.
1910	<p>-Yanaihara entered the First Higher School and met the principal Nitobe.</p> <p>-Nitobe established the Association of Colonial Studies (shokumin'gakkai).</p>	Japan officially annexed Korea.
1911	Nitobe went to America as the first exchange professor of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.	
1913	Yanaihara entered the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Imperial University.	
1914		<p>-WWI broke out.</p> <p>-Japan occupied the South Sea Islands as a member of League of Nations.</p>
1917	Yanaihara entered the Sumitomo business conglomerate and worked for the copper mining sector at Besshi, Ehime prefecture.	Russian Revolution broke out.
1918		WWI ended.
1919		-Peace Conference was held in Versailles, and President Woodrow Wilson presented

		<p>Fourteen Points with the principle of self-determination of colonies.</p> <p>-Anti-Japanese Korean Independence movement, the March First Movement, broke out.</p> <p>-Anti-imperialist May Fourth movement in China broke out.</p>
1920	<p>-Nitobe was appointed as an Under Secretary-General at the League of Nations.</p> <p>-Yanaihara was appointed as an assistant professor at the Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Imperial University and started research abroad (mainly England, France and the U.S).</p>	
1923	Yanaihara returned to Japan and was appointed as the chair of Colonial Policy Studies, Tokyo Imperial University.	
1924	Tobata was appointed as an assistant professor at the Faculty of Agriculture, Tokyo Imperial University.	Immigration Act was promulgated in the U.S. to prohibit Japanese immigration entirely.
1925	Yanaihara published "Adamu Sumisu no shokuminchi ron" and had debates with Yamamoto Miono about Adam Smith's economics and colonial theory.	
1926	<p>-Yanaihara published <i>Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku</i> (Colonization and Colonial Policy).</p> <p>-Tobata studied abroad (mainly Germany and America).</p>	
1927	<p>-Yanaihara had a research trip to Taiwan.</p> <p>-Yanaihara published <i>Shokumin Seisaku no Shinkichō</i> (The New Foundations of Colonial Policy).</p> <p>-Nitobe stopped working at the League of Nations and began working for the Institute of Pacific Relations as the Japanese chairman.</p>	
1928	Yanaihara published <i>Jinkō Mondai</i> (Questions on Population).	

1929	-Tobata returned to Japan. -Yanaihara published <i>Teikokushugi-ka no Taiwan</i> (Taiwan under Imperialism).	Great Depression began in the U.S.
1930		Show Agricultural Shock began in Japan.
1931		Manchurian Incident broke out.
1932	-Yanaihara had a research trip to Manchuria. -Nitobe defended the Manchurian Incident during the lecture tour in the U.S. and Canada.	Japan established Manchukuo, a puppet state in Manchuria.
1933	-Nitobe died in Canada. -Yanaihara published <i>Marukusshugi to Kirisutokyō</i> (Marxism and Christianity). -Yanaihara had his 1 st research trip to the South Pacific islands.	
1934	-Tobata had an inspection trip to Korea and published his report "Chosen no Nogyō to Nōmin" (The Agriculture and Farmers in Choson). -Yanaihara published <i>Manshū Mondai</i> (The Manchurian Question). -Yanaihara had his 2 nd research trip to the South Pacific islands.	
1935	-Tobata published <i>Chosen beikoku keizairon</i> (The Rice Economy in Choson). -Yanaihara published <i>Nan'yō Guntō no Kenkyū</i> (Research in South Pacific Islands).	
1936	-Tōbata published <i>Nihon nōgyō no tenkai katei</i> (The Process of Development of the Japanese Agriculture). -Tobata became a member of <i>Showa Kenkyūkai</i> (Showa Research Association).	
1937	-Tōbata Seiichi and Nakamura Ichirō published <i>Keizai hatten no riron</i> (The Theory of Economic Development), a translation of Joseph Schumpeter's <i>Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung</i> Development. -Yanaihara published <i>Teikokushugi-ka no Indo</i> (India under Imperialism). -Yanaihara left Tokyo Imperial University.	-Second Sino-Japanese War broke out. -Japan colonized Timor and Thailand.

1938		Japan colonized French Indochina.
1939	Tobata was appointed as the chair of Colonial Policy Studies while continuing to hold his professorship in the Faculty of Agriculture.	Japan colonized Borneo, Malaya the Dutch East Indies and Burma.
1940	Tobata published "Shokumin Genjō no Honshitsu" (The Substance of Colonization).	Japan colonized Manchukuo and the Philippines.
1941		Pacific War broke out.
1942	Tōbata published "Shokumin gainen no yōin" (The Elements of the Concept of Colonization).	
1943	-Tobata went to the Philippines as a member of the Philippines Investigation Committee (hitō chōsa iinkai). -Tōbata published "Shokumin Seisaku no Dankai" (The Stages of the Colonial Policy) and "Gyaku Shokumin" (Counter-Colonization). -Yanaihara published <i>Nitobe Inazō Hakase Shokuminseisaku Kōgi oyobi Ronbunshū</i> , a collection of Nitobe's lectures from 1912 to 1917, reconstructed based on the class notes by Nitobe's students—Ōuchi Hyōe (1912-1913), Takagi Yasaki (1914-1915), and Yanaihara Tadao (1916-1917).	Greater East Asia Conference (Dai tō-a kaigi) was held in Tokyo.
1944	Tōbata published "Dai tōa keizai kensetsu no kōsō" (A Plan for the Construction of the Great East Asian Economy), "Hitōjin no Keizai ishiki (1) and (2)" (Economic Consciousness of the Philippines).	
1945	Yanaihara returned to Tokyo University.	-WWII ended as Japan defeated the Pacific War, and the Japanese empire collapsed. -The U.S. occupation of Japan began. -Colonial Policy Studies was abolished.
1946	-Yanaihara was appointed as the dean of the Social Science Institute, Tokyo University. -Tobata refused Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's offer to be the Minister of Agriculture.	Yoshida Shigeru's cabinet was established.

1948		Cold War began in Europe.
1949	Yanaihara was appointed as the dean of the College of Arts and Science, Tokyo University.	
1950		Korean War broke out.
1951	-Yanaihara was appointed as the president of Tokyo University. -Yanaihara published a translation of J. A. Hobson's <i>Imperialism</i> .	-San Francisco Peace Conference was held. -U.S. occupation of Japan ended. -Japan's reparations to Asian countries for its colonial occupation began.
1952	Yanaihara established International Relations Studies in the Social Science Institute, Tokyo University.	
1953	Tobata went to the Philippines as a member of the Reparations Committee of Japan (baishō zenkendan).	
1959	-Tobata retired from Tokyo University. -Tobata became the first director of the National Research Institute of Agricultural Economics (Nōgyō sōgō kenkyūjo) established by the Ministry of Agriculture, and the first director of the Institute of Developing Economies (Ajia keizai kenkyūjo), a support institution for the Official Development Assistance (ODA).	
1961	-Tobata drafted the Basic Law of Agriculture. -Yanaihara died of stomach cancer.	Park Chung-hee rose to power through a military coup in Korea.
1963	<i>Yanaihara Tadao Zenshū</i> began to be published.	Park Chung-hee officially became president of Korea.
1964		-Treaty on Basic Relations was signed between Japan and Korea to close the issue of Japanese reparations to Korea -Nation-wide student protests against the treaty were quelled by Park regime.
1983	Tobata died, aged 84.	

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