Latinos Rising to the Challenge: Political Responses to Threat and Opportunity Messages

by

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DEDICATION

I dedicate my dissertation to my husband, son and parents. Thank you for helping me perseveare. Micah, thank you for carrying me across the finish line.

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Finally, I would like to close these acknowledgements with the following quote from an enviromental scholar activist. “Optimism is a political act. Those who benefit from the status quo are perfectly happy for us to think nothing is going to get any better. In fact, these days, cynicism is obedience” (Alex Steffen, *The Bright Green City*).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii

LIST OF TABLES xi

LIST OF FIGURES xiv

LIST OF APPENDICES xv

ABSTRACT xvi

CHAPTER 1: Revisiting Threat as the Dominant Catalyst 1
- Introduction 1
- Why the Focus on Latino Political Behavior? 5
- Addressing Existing Shortcomings 11
- Chapter Overview 16

CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework for Pairing Threat and Opportunity 21
- Background 21
- General Experimental Research on Threat and Opportunity 24
- Measuring Immigration Policy Threat in Political Science 30
- Threat and Opportunity Signals in Policy Landscape and Mobilization Messages 33
- Theoretical Framework 39
- Gender and Political Participation 45
- Summary 47

CHAPTER 3: A Matter of Causality? Testing the Causal Impact of Threat-and-Opportunity on Intended and Observed Forms of Political Participation 49
- Hypotheses 50
- Methods and Procedure 51
- Results 65
- Discussion 72
- Summary 74

CHAPTER 4: Who is More Mobilized? Explaining Conditional Effects by Gender 77
- Methods and Procedure: 78
- Results: 79
- Discussion 88
- Summary 96

CHAPTER 5: Fear and Hope: Motivating Effects of Emotions in ANES 2008 and 2012 101
- Emotions in Politics 102
- Standard Models of Participation 105

Hypotheses 107
Methods and Procedure 107
Results 120
Discussion 140
Summary 144

CHAPTER 6: Conclusion: Implications for Contemporary Politics and Democratic Governance 147
Summary 147
Latinos in the 2016 Election 149
Limitations and Future Inquiries 152

APPENDICES 159
A. Chapter 3 Appendices, Part One 159
B. Chapter 3 Appendices, Part Two 163
C. Chapter 4 Appendices 171
D. Chapter 5 Appendices 177
E. Survey Experiment Questionnaire 197

REFERENCES 205

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Regional Distribution of Immigrant Ordinances in U.S. Muncipalities, by Ordinance Type 36
Table 3.1: Experiment Sample Distribution and National Demographic Benchmarks 54
Table 3.2: Description of Survey Experiment Randomized Action Alerts 57
Table 3.3: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms of Political Participation……67
Table 3.4: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Electoral Form of Political Participation – Intent to Vote in Upcoming General Election……69
Table 3.5: Logit Models, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Sent Postcard……70
Table 4.1: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender 80
Table 4.2: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines 86
Table 4.3: Estimating Postcard Sent Logit Models by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines 87
Table 5.1: The Distribution of Outcome Measures among Latinos 109
Table 5.2: Bivariates Between Outcomes and Emotions Variables of Fear and Hope……115
Table 5.3: Distribution of Key Control Variables (weighted) ……118
Table 5.4: Models Estimating Talking, Participating and Voting with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation with No Controls and with Limited Control Variables……123
Table 5.5: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women ……126
Table 5.6: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women……129
Table 5.7: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women……132
Table 5.8: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women……134
Table 5.9: OLS Models Estimating Voting Intentionality with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women……137
Table 5.10: OLS Models Estimating Voting Intentionality with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women……139
Table A.1: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms of Political Participation with Added Demographic Controls 167
Table A.2: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Intent to Vote with Added Demographic Controls 168
Table A.3: Logit Models, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Sent Postcard with Added Demographic Controls 169

Table A.4: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms of Political Participation with Opportunity Message as the Baseline 170
Table B.1: OLS Models Estimating Cognitive Perceptions of Threat (1) and Opportunity (0) by Treatments 163
Table B.2: Estimating Models of Participation Scale and Sent Postcard, Controlling for Cognitive Manipulation Check 164
Table B.3: OLS Models, Emotion Manipulation Check of Threat (Fear) and Opportunity (Hope) 165
Table B.4: Estimating Participation Scale and Sent Postcard Models with Demographic Controls and Manipulation Checks... 166
Table B.5: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms of Political Participation with Added Demographic Controls…………..167
Table B.6: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Intent to Vote with Added Demographic Controls……..………..………..………..………..……. 168
Table B.7: Logit Models, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Sent Postcard with Added Demographic Controls ………..………..………..………..………..…….169
Table B.8: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms of Political Participation with Opportunity Message as the Baseline….. 170
Table C.1: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines and Added Controls 172
Table C.2: Estimating Sent Postcard Logit Models by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines and Added Controls 173
Table C.3: OLS Models Estimating Vote Intent by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines and Added Controls 174
Table C.4: OLS Estimates for Emotion Manipulation Check with Moderating Gender Effects by Treatment.. 175
Table C.5: Estimating Participation Models by Treatment Among Women................. 176
Table D.1: Distribution of Partisanship Identification in ANES 2008 and 2012 Latino Samples 177
Table D.2: Distribution of Partisan Strength in ANES 2008 and 2012 Latino Samples 178
Table D.3: Logit Models Estimating Talking About Politics, Participating in Politics, Vote Intentionality with ANES Latino Subpopulations in 2008, including no controls and limited controls.. 179
Table D.4: Logit Models Estimating Talking About Politics, Participating in Politics, Vote Intentionality with ANES Latino Subpopulations in 2012, including no controls and limited controls 181
Table D.5: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation, fully specified 183
Table D.6: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation 185
Table D.7: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation 187
Table D.8: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation 189
Table D.9: OLS Models Estimating Voting Intent with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation 191

Table D.10: OLS Models Estimating Voting Intent with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation 193

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Local immigration policies in the United States between 2005-2009 34
Figure 3.1: Predicted Probabilities of the Perception that Policy Proposal Will Make Lives of Unauthorized Immigrants Easier or Harder by Treatments........................ 62
Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of Sending a Postcard by Treatment........................... 71
Figure 4.1: Participation Scale by Gender and Across the Control Condition and Coupled Treatment 82
Figure 4.2: Intent to Vote by Gender and Across the Control Condition and Coupled Treatment 83
Figure 4.3: Sent Postcards by Gender and Across the Control Condition and Coupled Treatment 85
Figure A.1: Experiment Threat Condition 159
Figure A.2: Experiment Opportunity Condition 160
Figure A.3: Experiment Combined Threat-and-Opportunity Condition 161
Figure A.4: Experiment Control Condition 162
Figure C.1: Sent Postcards by Treatment and Gender 171

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A: Chapter 3 Appendices, Part One: Screenshots of Treatment Conditions and Control Condition…....….....….....….....….....….....….....….....….....….....….....….....….....……..159
Appendix B: Chapter 3 Appendices, Part Two: Experiment Manipulation Checks…......163
Appendix C: Chapter 4 Appendices with Additional Gender Moderating Effects……...171
Appendix D: Chapter 5 Appendices : ANES Results Fully Specified…....…....…....…....…....………....………....………....………....………....………....…....……177
Appendix E: Survey Experiment Questionnaire…………....……....……....……..........…………197

ABSTRACT

Interest groups and campaigns intent on spurring political participation often focus on highlighting potential threats in order to engage their target audiences. However, the use of threat in this approach is at times immobilizing because it diminishes the extent to which people feel equipped to respond. In this study, I re-assess the hypothesis that exposure to threatening political messages is a necessary and sufficient condition to encourage one's political activism among Latinos. I focus on Latinos in particular because the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of restrictive immigration environments as the primary catalyst driving political participation within the Latino electorate, suggesting that threat best stirs the Latino "sleeping giant." Political elites seeking to increase civic participation may be more likely to engage individuals if they couple threat with an opportunity frame that emphasizes policy initiatives a group can aspire to accomplish. My findings are based on an original online survey experiment of 1,015 Latino adults in the United States and secondary analyses of Latinos in the American National Election Study (2008, 2012). I find that a message combining elements of threat and opportunity is a significant catalyst of various forms of participation, including intended and observed forms of civic engagement. These effects are moderated by gender, with women being especially receptive to the coupled threat-and-opportunity message. In sum, there is room to delve more deeply into the motivating effects behind paired messaging alternatives within the field of political science where social

movements, like that of immigration, give rise to a dynamic set of policy options, some of which may be more desirable and provide hope for the Latino electorate.

CHAPTER 1:

Revisiting Threat as the Dominant Catalyst

Introduction

Edmund Burke asserts in *The Sublime and The Beautiful*, "No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear" (as cited in Altheide and Michalowski, 1999). Yet, political mobilizers often seek to garner support and encourage participation by pointing to the looming catastrophe at hand, often triggering a sense of urgency (Alinsky 1971). Interest groups and campaigns intent on encouraging participation believe that appeals to threat represent an effective means of capturing their audience's attention and potential political activism. However, threatening appeals may be a double-edged sword that triggers action among some even as it immobilizes others because it diminishes the extent to which people feel equipped to respond to the crisis (Vasi and Macy 2003; Soroka and McAdams 2015). Is it possible that threat cues do not spark action among certain segments of the populace? Instead of only relying on a threatening message, mobilizers seeking to spur greater levels of political participation may be more effective if they *couple* this approach with an opportunity message that emphasizes the possibility of more desirable policy goals (Alinsky 1971).

In this study, I re-assess the hypothesis that exposure to threatening political messages is a necessary and sufficient condition to encourage political activism among Latinos. I focus on Latinos in particular because the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of restrictive immigration environments as the primary catalyst driving political participation within

the Latino electorate, suggesting that threat best stirs the Latino "sleeping giant." For instance, a dominant thread in the extant Latino politics literature focuses heavily on the role of threatening immigration policies that were widely perceived as undermining the interests of this community in the late 1990s in California and nationwide in the spring of 2006 (Ramakrishnan 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). From February to May of 2006, an estimated 3.5 to 5.1 million Latinos protested in more than 350 demonstrations held in over 160 cities in the United States (Bada, Fox and Selee 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014; Zepeda-Millán 2014a). The unprecedented activism seen in 2006 has been characterized as a direct response to concerns surrounding a punitive immigration bill—House Bill 4437 (H.R. 4437) (Barreto, Manzano and Ramirez 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2008; Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 2008). If passed, H.R. 4437 would have increased penalties on undocumented immigrants by criminalizing their status in the U.S. as well as penalizing those who employed and provided them shelter (Bada et al. 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014). Some of the punitive ramifications of H.R. 4437 included criminal penalties up to 5 years in prison for knowingly assisting any undocumented immigrant "to reside in or remain" in the U.S., which affected assistance provided by educators, hospitals, clergies, families, etc. (Bada et al. 2006; Wallace et al. 2014).

Previously, scholars found that similar propositions, such as those seen in California in the 1990s, spurred record naturalization rates and voter turnout among Latinos across the state (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; Ramakrishnan 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Ramirez 2013; Wallace et al. 2014). For example, amid a statewide recession and growing political rhetoric against immigrants in California, Proposition 187 in 1994 was aimed at denying public services to undocumented immigrants, including prohibiting access to non-emergency health care, public education and other public services. This proposition also

required public officials, including doctors and schoolteachers, to report immigrants suspected of being undocumented to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Pantoja et al. 2001). Aside from the more restrictive efforts of Proposition 187, there were additional propositions that contributed to the racially divisive and threatening environment in California (Bowler et al. 2006). For instance Proposition 209 in 1996 outlawed affirmative action in public domains and Proposition 227 in 1998 outlawed bilingual education in California. These 3 statewide ballot initiatives were seen as examples of racial/ethnic animus toward Latinos and other minority groups (Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006). The majority of Latino voters in California saw Proposition 187, which received support from Republican Governor Pete Wilson, as an attack by Republicans on all Latinos (Michelson 2003a). In fact, these restrictive propositions are thought to have been the largest contributors to the dramatic reversal in the state's political landscape from Republican to Democratic, particularly as the share of Latino voters grew from 8 to 13 percent between 1988 and 1998 (Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006; Johnson, Reyes, Mameesh, and Barbour 1999; Scott 2000). Furthermore, the California Field Poll concluded that, of the 1.15 million new voters added to California's electorate in the 1990s, 87 percent were Latinos (Marinucci 2000).

Thus, the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the role of restrictive immigration environments as the primary contributor to political participation within the Latino electorate, a group that has largely felt "under attack" by such policies (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto et al. 2009; Ramirez 2013; Wallace et al. 2014; Ybarra and Sanchez 2015; Michelson 2003a; Rodriguez 1999; Michelson 2005; Michelson 2006). Does the reliance on threatening cues to spur activism remove the role of other stimuli? The dominant narrative in Latino politics may lead us to believe that policy-oriented threats are the primary ingredient driving Latino political engagement. Furthermore, the focus in the Latino politics literature on crisis and threat, and the

limited attention devoted to opportunity appeals, is not simply an academic issue. By focusing on negative cues, scholars may have unwittingly encouraged political activists to adopt one strategy for mobilization to the exclusion of other strategies. Threats often paint a grim political outlook, and may stall efforts to create a more engaged citizenry in the polity, leading more people to be too scared, or too despaired, to partake in other forms of civic engagement as well.

There are at least three limitations in the existing literature. First, there is the failure to grapple with alternative explanations for Latino political participation—such as exposure to messages designed to advance the status quo rather than to derail it. In fact, legislative proposals aimed at expanding immigrants' rights (e.g. sanctuary cities and access to driver's licenses), may also engage and motivate people to take action. Given that some could be exposed to simultaneously threatening and appealing messages, this raises a number of interesting questions. Are threat appeals more likely to motivate people to take action when coupled with more appealing opportunity appeals? My research questions aim to re-evaluate and expand the hypothesis that threat incites Latino political participation. I do not dispute that threat can play an important role in one's political motivation.[1] However, I argue that this characterization is, at best, a partial story. That is, threat appraisals do not only consist of one's careful thought-processing of the risk or danger posed by a threat, but they may also involve an appraisal of the opportunity messages, and the potential promises, surrounding this particular debate.

A second, and equally important, limitation in the extant literature is the overreliance on aggregate measures to assess threatening contexts. That is, threat is often measured by objective measures at the aggregate level (e.g. based on living in a state or city with punitive immigration politics) rather than relying on individual level measures (Zepeda-Millán 2014a). For example,

[1] In fact, threat may also be a catalyst for opportunity appeals from the opposing side of an issue, as seen with a social movement and its countermovement (Tilly 1979), as has been seen with controversial immigration debates surrounding restrictive legislation (Barreto et al. 2009).

Pantoja and his colleagues (2001) assess threat by simply determining if Latinos lived in one of three states (California versus Florida and Texas)." Although existing observational studies have allowed us to account for the interplay of state political contexts and individuals, (Ramakrishnan 2005; Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003), there are still a lack of measures accounting for the simultaneous policy goals in one's political environment. Thus, by focusing solely on threat or the absence of threat, it is difficult to conclude that threat alone motivates previously observed peaks in political activism (Ramakrishnan 2005; Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003; but see Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Barreto et al. 2009; Zepeda-Millán 2014a; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013; Garcia Bedolla 2005). Finally, though untested, there is a presumed link between the policy environment and the levels of political participation among Latinos. My experiment design will allow me to test the causal inference behind this expectation in the existing literature.

In departure from previous efforts, this dissertation will build on, as well as challenge, the literature on political context by exploring the influence of multi-faceted political cues in encouraging heightened levels of political participation among Latinos (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto et al. 2009; Felix, Gonzalez and Ramirez 2008; Benjamin-Alvarado et al. 2009; Pantoja and Segura 2003). I rely on general principles of collective action, persuasive communication and the study of fear appeals in social psychology to expand upon recent theoretical and empirical research on the motivating effects of a coupled message approach involving threat and opportunity cues.

Why the Focus on Latino Political Behavior?

Latinos serve as an ideal population to test the coupled threat and opportunity messaging strategy on first, not because they are more susceptible to this coupled strategy, but because the Latino

"sleeping giant" has been predominantly construed as an electorate particularly stirred by restrictive or threatening immigration policy shocks. It is implied that a casual relationship exists between a restrictive immigration environment and Latino political behavior, particularly as seen in terms of expressing a need to protect their resources, perhaps out of fear of losing to certain services or status, through naturalization, voter turnout and protest participation (Pantoja et al. 2001, 731; Scott 2000). This causal relationship has not been tested thus far. Thus, it is important that the social movement literature account for the mixed signals people receive regarding immigration policy. It is also important that we re-examine the positive and negative effects of exposure to appeals designed to elicit fear. Furthermore, this rapidly growing electorate is heavily sought after by Republican and Democratic campaigns (File 2013), but also continually excluded and included, being repeatedly exposed to numerous threat and opportunity messages. Finally, Latinos represent a large immigrant-based community, a community that has felt especially targeted by immigrant legislation and the immigration policy rhetoric in the U.S. at the federal and state level (Huntington 2004; Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Ramírez 2013; Latino Decisions 2015; Vargas, Sanchez and Valdez 2017). Because Latino immigrants make up the largest portion of undocumented immigrant populations in the U.S., Latinos experience the largest impact from the nation's contentious immigration policy discourse (Chavez 2001, 2013; Garcia 2011; Latino Decisions 2013a, b; 2014; 2015).[2] Finally, if a more representative democracy consists of more equal participation from all groups, and not just the few or most affluent (Hansen 1985; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), grasping a better stronghold on the motivating effects of one's political context is essential to our democracy. Understanding what better drives political activism among Latinos, one of the largest growing populations and most low

[2] Although Mexican and Central American immigrants make up two-thirds the share of all unauthorized persons, 94 percent of those deported since 2005 have been almost exclusively Latino (Rugh and Hall 2013; Passel and Cohn 2014).

participating groups in the U.S. (File 2013), would make great strides in creating a more representative democracy.

Along with the economy and jobs, immigration policy has ranked as a top five issue of concern to the Latino population for the past decade (Latino Decisions, June 2013). In an "entrance poll" for the 2016 election, a poll co-led by the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), Noticias Telemundo and Latino Decisions, found that immigration emerged as the top policy issue for Latino voters in the first five weeks of the poll, although creating more jobs later tied with passing comprehensive immigration reform as the top issue (Pantoja, 2016). When asked to state what are the most important issues facing the Hispanic/Latino community they think Congress and the President should address, immigration—particularly passing comprehensive immigration reform—rises to the top in large part because this issue personally affects a large proportion of Hispanic voters (though they are by definition U.S. citizens) (Pantoja, 2016). In fact, according to a Latino Decisions June 2013, 67 percent of Latinos report knowing someone that is an undocumented immigrant. Among the 67 percent in the June 2013 poll, half said this connection was someone in their family.

Due to all these connections within their social networks, scholars explain that Latino constituencies that protested, voted, sought naturalization and resisted the passage of restrictive immigration bills in the 1990s and 2006 took action against the anti-immigrant threats in their environments (Ong 2011; Ramirez 2013; Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto, Ramirez and Woods 2005; Wong 2006; Scott 2000; Bada et al. 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014; Barreto et al. 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado et al. 2008).[3] It is implied that a casual relationship exists between a

[3] In terms of perceptions of feeling targeted by such restrictive immigrant legislation (Vargas, Sanchez and Valdez 2017), polls administered through Latino Decisions in June 2011 and March 2015 reveal that Latino voters are conscious of a tense, and broader anti-Latino, political context surrounding anti-immigrant policy concerns. In

restrictive immigration environment and Latino political behavior; however, “correlation is not causation” (Barnard 1982, 387). Thus far, Latino politics scholars have not precisely identified whether threat messages, or (simultaneous) alternative messages, spark Latino activism. Instead, researchers have made numerous assumptions about the perceptions and subsequent behaviors generated by one’s political context without directly assessing whether Latinos are motivated by threat or opportunity messages, or a combination of the two working hand in hand. Furthermore, by ignoring opportunity appeals, previous Latino politics studies have also suffered from omitted variable bias and thus offered partial depictions of the kinds of political cues that are more likely to spur political action among individuals more broadly.

One could argue that the 2006 protests were not just a series of demonstrations against restrictive immigration legislation proposed in Congress but also an effort to mobilize in support of more desirable policies (Johnson and Hing 2006; Gorman, Miller and Landsberg 2006; Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 2008). While engaging with the grievances posed by the anti-immigrant movement, the pro-immigrant countermovement advocated for different policy goals and issues, a trend that is characteristic of social movements and countermovements more broadly (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). As opposed to simply protesting a punitive bill, H.R. 4437, Johnson and Hing (2006) explain “the protesters sought nothing less than justice for immigrants and supported legislation allowing undocumented immigrants the opportunity to regularize their immigration status” (100). This quote is indicative of overlooked opportunity policy appeals motivating Latino political behavior more broadly.

The contested politics surrounding the immigration policy movement serves as a helpful domain for which to test the simultaneous effect of policies signaling threat and opportunity.

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fact, approximately 75 percent of respondents perceive the political rhetoric in recent years as being anti-immigrant and anti-Latino more broadly (Latino Decisions, March 2015).

Furthermore, immigration policy is central to the nation's identity, especially as the United States is seen as a "nation of immigrants and a gatekeeping nation" (Lee 2004, 121)(as seen in Steil and Vasi 2014). Additionally, "immigration is a prominent issue from the culture wars (Hetherington and Weiler 2009)" (as seen in Nicholson 2011), especially as native-born residents attempt to protect their political dominance through more restrictive or gatekeeping immigration policies (Steil and Vasi 2014). However, according to the Pew Research Center (2012), the American general electorate is almost evenly split when asked whether "the growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values"—46 percent agree and 48 percent disagree with this statement. This divide in the public creates a research opportunity to study the simultaneous effect of restrictive and expansive immigration policy cues in one's environment. Ramirez (2013) and Barreto et al. (2009) explain that constituencies that protested, voted, sought naturalization and resisted the passage of restrictive immigration bills, in effect, took action against these perceived threats (Ong 2011; Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto, Ramirez and Woods 2005; Wong 2006). In addition to the motivating effects of resisting threatening immigration policies, the pro-immigrant movement has also pushed for gaining access to rights not previously enjoyed by immigrants (e.g., the right to vote in school board or other local elections, the right to drive with a valid driver's license, a pathway to citizenship, etc.) (Tilly 1979; Steil and Vasi 2014). Thus, the nativist movement fighting against immigrants and the countermovement attempting to create a more integrative environment have been working hand-in-hand (Tilly 1979; Steil and Vasi 2014).

There has not been enough emphasis on the efforts devoted to signaling the public's attention to policy alternatives during these threatening political environments. Because there were restrictive and expansive policies proposed during the time of these protests, I focus on the influence of both pro

and anti-immigration messages. For example, the immigrant countermovement in 2006 used mobilizing messages that combined an awareness of threat (e.g., exposure to H.R. 4437) as well as the need to push for policy alternatives using opportunity appeals (e.g. "Legalization Now", "Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote," etc.) (Ramirez 2013; Hin 2008). More specifically, other policy alternatives being proposed around 2006 included sanctuary city ordinances, amnesty, paths to earned sentiments, scholars have not taken into account the effects citizenship, and other conditional forms of citizenship (Walker and Leitner 2011). Although there were several signals regarding alternative policy opportunities amidst the threat of restrictive immigration policies, previous studies have not accounted for these different policy goals.

The existence of oppositional movements associated within the immigration debate creates a research opportunity to address the dynamic effects of restrictive and expansive policy cues on the political behavior of the targeted immigrant community of these pieces of legislation. Although much research focusing on immigration legislation has analyzed policy making at the congressional (Freeman 1995; Jacobson 2000; King 2000; Tichenor 2002; Ngai 2004; Wong 2006; Newton 2008; Zolberg 2008) and state and local levels (Varsanyi 2010), the focus has often been on the importance of local political partisanship and framing of demographic changes as significant factors explaining the passage of these laws and their influence on public opinion (Hopkins 2010; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011; Valentino et al. 2008), especially focusing on the policy attitudes of the white U.S. electorate. Comparatively, few studies have considered the effect of these contested and simultaneous policy alternatives on Latino political activism beyond naturalization, voting and protests (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; Bada, Fox and Selee 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014; Zepeda-Millán 2014a).

Addressing Existing Shortcomings

Instead of only analyzing the isolated effect of threat appeals alone, I explore the influence of both threat and opportunity appeals as well as that of being *jointly* exposed to threat and opportunity messages. By *policy threat messages*, I mean messages that emphasize proposed policies that are perceived to undermine a group's interests—highlighting how the status quo may worsen. By *policy opportunity messages*, I refer to messages that point to proposed policies perceived to offer potential gains to one's group—highlighting how the status quo may improve.[4] Previous work has not explored the coupled approach, or joint impact, of these two types of appeals.[5] Second, as opposed to relying on aggregate measures of threat and opportunity, I rely on individual level self-reports. Since these subjective assessments are the presumed link between the policy environment and the levels of political participation, this is the more appropriate indicator of threat or opportunity. Lastly, in the experiment described in chapters 3 and 4, I randomly assign subjects to receive either threatening or opportunity immigration messages, or both. This design allows me to rule out any other explanation for differential responses to theses appeals. As a result, I will be able to draw more confident inferences than previous scholarship about the causal effects of different types of appeals.

Overwhelmingly, *threat* appeals have often been operationalized as cues that undermine a group's perceived interests (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Marcus et al. 2000). The literature

[4] Admittedly, a few studies have focused on the effects of policy opportunities (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Albertson and Gadarian 2015), but they have not addressed the coupled message approach where respondents are exposed to both threat and opportunity messages. Threat appeals run contrary to one's preferences—or that of a salient group they belong to—as they are undesirable and potentially jeopardize the existing or future economic, social, broader values or their political circumstances (Gusfield 1963; Hansen 1985; Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Loomis and Cigler 1995; Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004; Miller et al. 2002; Marcus et al. 2000; Wallace et al. 2014; Sanchez 2006; Schildkraut 2005; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Tajfel 1982; Dawson 1994). Opportunity appeals consist of policy changes that align with one's desired interests.

[5] I refer to the coupled threat-and-opportunity approach or coupled approach or paired messages interchangeably throughout the paper.

typically operationalizes threat with the presence of negative valence emotions, such as anger, fear and anxiety (Brader 2002, 2005; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings 2011; Folkman and Lazarus 1980; Marcus et al., 2000). Typically, the expectation is that threat cues will shake individuals out of their usual ambivalence to politics and motivate them to become politically active (Hansen 1985; Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004). However, a few studies have found threat to be immobilizing (Miller 2005; Henik 2008), suggesting that of fear has an unreliable effect on political action (Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings, 2011). The coupled threat-and-opportunity message approach is especially critical because individuals who are exposed to a policy that they wish to see passed may be more task-focused and less distracted by negative emotions stirred by the threat message (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, Gruen 1986; Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leitten 1993; Henik 2008).

The delicate balance between alerting an individual to take action against a threat and not allowing them to be "scared stiff" can be alleviated through persuasive communication techniques (Vasi and Macy 2003; Henik 2008; Klandermans 1992; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Van Vught 1999; Miller 2005; Hutchings 2001; Valentino et al. 2011). Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that mobilizers can better spur participation, and consequently alleviate the "mobilizer's dilemma" by issuing empowering messages in conjunction with crisis-oriented threat messages. By adding this empowering message, Vasi and Macy (2003) highlight the possibilities of collective action and affirm the importance of coordinated efforts (Klandermans 1992). Thus, an ideal form of political communication will alert an audience to potential threats without demobilizing them. For example, Kern (1989) describes how producers create emotional news sequences known as "get them sick, then get them well" ads. The first portion of the segment is

used to establish a negative emotion associated with some threat to the viewer. In the second portion of the segment, the problem is resolved with a positive emotion associated with a story coming to the rescue. Without this promise of a resolution, people could very easily be "scared stiff" (Kern 1989; Henik 2008). Essentially, the threat captures the audience's attention, and the resolution points to a positive and attainable objective to counter the threat (Tomaka et al. 1993). In the same spirit, the coupled threat-and-opportunity approach I propose has the potential to "get them sick" and then "get them well." Thus, for these aforementioned reasons, we would not want to rely on a mobilizing strategy that only emphasizes fear, especially if we want people to feel that they have the ability to ward off the danger and to avoid making them feel overwhelmed by their vulnerability. As political elites define what the public is supposed to fear (Robin, 2006), politicians and whistle-blowers often overlook offering policy alternatives to provide relief from the provoked threat. This latter portion of the threat appraisal narrative and the political communication tactics surrounding it, which provides hope and relief, is missing in the existing scholarship on what spurs political behavior under contentious environments.

A related line of research in psychology provides additional reasons to expect that the joint effect of threat and opportunity appraisals will enhance participation (Dienstbier 1989; Blascovich and Tomaka 1996; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leitten 1993). Tomaka and colleagues (1993) and several other scholars (Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Lazarus and Folkman 1984) argue that threatened individuals perceive the potential for loss, with little, if anything, to be gained in the situation; contrastingly, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as well as loss. Threats occur when the decision-maker experiences insufficient resources to meet situational demands (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leitten 1993). When such resources are present (perceived or real), it becomes a challenge (Pang, Jin and Cameron 2007). Thus far, this

distinction in the threat appraisal process, and its complexity, has been notably absent from the existing political science literature. Those who may have more of the resources and civic skills to perceive the possibility of gains and losses while being simultaneously exposed to threat and opportunity messages may be heavily influenced by demographic factors related to their gender.

I find that women are more responsive to the threat and opportunity condition. To make better sense of this, I turn to the existing gender and Latina politics literature. In fact, Latinas have spearheaded community organizing efforts, naturalization rates and record voter turnout in the Latino community (Lien 1998; Bejarano 2014a, 2014b). Thus, in subsequent analyses, I interact the treatment conditions by gender, allowing me to determine whether men and women respond differently to various messaging strategies. It is also worth noting psychologists have found people cope with contentious environments differently, particularly along gender lines (Ptacek, Smith and Zanas 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Folkman et al. 1986). Interestingly, men tend to be more problem-focused and try to find direct solutions to the problems they face, whereas women tend to employ more emotion-focused methods, including seeking social support (Brems and Johnson 1989; Ptacek, Smith and Zanas 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Folkman et al. 1986; Carver, Scheier and Weintraub 1989; Heppner, Reeder and Larson 1983).

For instance, threat appraisal responses likely differ among men and women in my study, particularly as women might be more willing to engage in political acts that leverage their social networks (Taylor, Klein, Lewis, Gruenewald, Gurung and Updegraff 2000). In fact, sociologists have found that during stressful times of financial hardship and unemployment, women fare better than men partially due to access to social support (Russell 1999). This is in line with previous findings on gendered political participation patterns in the U.S. For example, there are strong historical roots of women being involved in broad social networks and more community-

oriented activities (Baker 1984). Finally, according to analyses of voter turnout between 2006-2012, Bejarano (2014a) generally finds that Latina females vote at higher rates than their male counterparts. Increased levels of political participation and familiarity with navigating the political system, in part through exposure to their children's schools, can also provide women with stronger ties to their community and political institutions (Bejarano 2014a). This literature is relevant as we consider the more social or expressive activities captured in my study.

To test my theoretical framework of the mobilizing effects of both threat and opportunity, I rely on a survey-experiment and two nationally representative surveys. In the experiment, I focus on the effect of threat and opportunity on various forms of political participation, including the intent to join a protest, volunteer time with an immigrant organization, talk about politics with friends and family, and the intent to vote. It is important to consider outcome measures aside from the intent to vote, especially because a large portion of the Latino population is ineligible to vote, because of high rates of non-citizenship (Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Garcia 2011; Schildkraut 2005). In the original survey experiment, I also have the ability to test whether the hypothesized effects of coupled threat and opportunity message impact observable forms of political activism. The observed behavior involves sending an electronic postcard to their U.S. Senators. This form of participation is arguably a much tougher test of my theory because it moves beyond the intended forms of political behavior, which are more speculative.

The novel combination of being exposed to both policy threat and policy opportunities cues is distinct from the presence or absence of threatening policies seen in previous threat appraisal studies. Also, by including separate conditions for threat and opportunity cues as single cues, this provides more baseline comparisons previous studies have been unable to leverage. Finally, the use of a survey experiment approach with a Latino population provides a unique test of previous threat appraisal

studies that have largely relied on experiments with predominantly white samples (see Albertson and Gadarian 2015). My experiment's findings expand the realm of possibilities of mobilizing messages, and point to the notion that threat is not the only external catalyst for Latinos.

Finally, I compliment the experiment treatment conditions by analyzing the effects of hope and fear in the American National Election Study (ANES). The representative sample surveys in the 2008 and 2012 ANES contain oversamples of Latinos in both years. Fear and hope are often triggered by political threats and political opportunities (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Miller 2005; Kim and Cameron 2011). I rely on fearful feelings towards the Republican candidates (McCain and Romney) to represent a perceived political threat, and hopeful feelings towards the Democratic candidate (Obama) to represent a perceived political opportunity for the Latino electorate. These partisan perceptions of threat and opportunity are measured as such because of the overwhelming partisan support Obama received among Latinos in 2008 (66 percent of Latino vote) and 2012 (71 percent of Latino vote) (Pew Hispanic Center, 2012). I test whether perceived threat and opportunity toward the presidential candidates influence Latinos' intent to talk about politics with their friends or family.

Chapter Overview

In Chapter 2, I review and critique the literature on threat and participation among Latinos. Additionally, I summarize the threat appraisal and political psychology research most central to the focus of my research question. I argue that threat cues alone are probably insufficient to mobilize the Latino population. For example, although there have been repeated attempts to create more punitive policies targeting undocumented immigrants nationally and state-by-state (Steil and Vasi 2014; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Hopkins 2010), these policy

threats have not provoked the mobilization response seen in 2006. In this chapter, I also focus more squarely on the theoretical underpinnings of my argument for the coupled threat-and-opportunity approach, drawing from persuasive communication and social psychology research to illustrate reasons to revisit the dominant consensus that threat motivates political action. This literature points us to the logic behind my hypotheses for the motivating effects of the simultaneous exposure to threat and opportunity to overcome collective action problems.

As indicated above, researchers have traditionally focused on the mobilizing effects of threat cues, and somewhat less frequently opportunity cues (Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004; Marcus, et al. 2000; Meyer and Staggenborg 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Groenendyk and Banks 2014), but not the two at the same time—which is more likely to reflect one's political reality (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Furthermore, within studies focused on Latino participation and activism, threat is often assessed by objective measures at the aggregate level (e.g. based on living in a state or city with punitive immigration politics) rather than testing the casual effect of threat and the additional signals that may be present in a contentious political environment (although see Zepeda-Millán 2014a; Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Barreto et al. 2009; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013; Garcia Bedolla 2005).

Chapter 3 tackles these setbacks directly. This chapter tests my causal hypotheses with an original Internet survey experiment with a sample of 1,015 Latino adults (including U.S.-born and foreign-born participants). One goal of the experiment is to test whether there is a causal link between being simultaneously exposed to threatening- and opportunity-based messaging environments and one's political participation, including intended and observed forms of participation. A second goal of the experiment is to test whether the simultaneous threat-and-opportunity message spurs greater rates of political engagement relative to the single cue

conditions of threat alone and opportunity alone. Previous scholars have argued that threat alone will activate greater levels of political activism (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto et al. 2009), some research points to the need to account for the potential motivating effects of opportunity appeals (Brader 2005; Marcus et al. 2000; Groenendyk and Banks 2014) and the important consideration of accounting for messaging environments that are simultaneously threatening and signaling more opportunities (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Vasi and Macy 2003). Furthermore, the comparison in previous research has not been made to a messaging environment that involves signals of both peril and promise. We know the role of threat is complex, but what this project shows is that it is not the only way to shake the masses out of their political apathy. Instead, we see that coupling a sense of peril with promise evokes a greater likelihood to take political action.

To what extent are the results uncovered in Chapter 3 driven by a subset of my sample? In Chapter 4, I examine potential moderating effects of the coupled strategy, with a particular focus on gender because the acculturation literature largely expects women to integrate and navigate American culture and political systems at a faster rate than men, especially among immigrant women (Berry 2001; Jones-Correa 1998; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Bejarano 2014a). Interestingly, my findings affirm that gender structures how one views the political world (Hutchings, Walton and Benjamin 2010; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Garcia Bedolla 2005). Given additional differences in the socialization process by gender, women may be more mobilized than men when faced with exogenous policy signals centered on the plight of one's community (Hutchings, Walton and Benjamin 2010; Hardy-Fanta 1993).

In Chapter 5, I turn to observational analyses through the American National Elections Studies (2008, 2012) to compliment my experimental findings and to be able to draw more

generalizable claims behind the coupled effect of threat and opportunity. In this chapter, I begin to delve into the potential causal mechanisms behind the motivating effects of a coupled threat and opportunity environment. As proxy measures of threat and opportunity, I rely on the mediating effects of fear and hope towards the presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012. I rely on fearful feelings about the candidates to represent a perceived political threat and hopeful feelings about the candidates to represent a perceived political opportunity. As seen with the experiment, I test whether perceived threat and opportunity toward the presidential candidates have a catalyzing or demobilizing effect on Latinos' intent to talk about politics with their friends or family, as well as other political participation measures and vote intionality.

The concluding chapter summarizes my findings and considers the implications of a coupled messaging strategy. Thus, the work here revises our existing understanding of the catalyzing effect of threat, and provides important evidence of effective messaging strategies that are more likely to spur various forms of political activism. In this chapter, I also speculate on the potential insights that might be drawn from my work to our understanding of the constituents mobilized, and those who abstained, from voting in the 2016 election. For some voters, this past election may have been perceived as one full of threat and opportunity cues, while for others they may have experienced an overwhelming sense of despair and "battle fatigue," leading to their abstention. Generally speaking, a democracy that consists of more effective mobilizing strategies will provide people with the means and motivation to participate more fully (Schattschneider 1975). Those means involve creating a more informed and engaged citizenry, indicators of a healthy democracy and more representative government (Dahl 1998; Fishkin 1991; Habermas 1989). Without properly motivating the masses, we may fail to create a more engaged citizenry to keep our elected officials more accountable (Hutchings 2003). Instead of

potentially exacerbating feelings of helplessness while only emphasizing a sense of urgency (or policy threat), combining these messages with more opportunity-based policy alternatives may be an improved strategy to catalyze a group to rise, and not succumb, to the challenge before them.

CHAPTER 2:

Theoretical Framework for Pairing Threat and Opportunity

Background

In the spring of 2006, the Latino "sleeping giant" was stirred by the so-called Sensenbrenner Bill, or H.R. 4437.[6] This awakening was similar in many ways to what transpired in the 1990's in California, when many Latinos were mobilized by what was perceived as anti-immigrant and anti-Latino state ballot initiatives. The unprecedented activism seen in 2006 has been characterized as a direct response to the threat of this punitive immigration bill (H.R. 4437), which would have made it a felony to be an undocumented immigrant and would have added more fencing along the Mexican-U.S. border (Barreto, Manzano and Ramirez 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2008; Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 2008). This bill also carried criminal penalties against persons or groups assisting undocumented immigrants (Merolla et al. 2012). In the spring of 2006, millions of immigrants and immigrant rights advocates took to the streets across the nation to demonstrate against H.R. 4437, making this the single largest civil rights action in American history (Merolla et al. 2012). Based on the large-scale political responses of the Latino electorate in the 1990s and in 2006, in the

[6] The Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act, or H.R. 4437, passed in the House of Representatives in December of 2005 (Merolla et al. 2012). For more details on H.R. 4437 and California's propositions 187, 209 and 220 in the 1990s, see Chapter 1 footnotes 2 and 3. Overall, H.R. 4437 and the 3 statewide ballot initiatives in California were seen as examples of racial/ethnic animus toward Latinos (Barreto et al. 2009; Pantoja et al. 2001; Garcia Bedolla 2005). In terms of perceptions of feeling targeted by such restrictive immigrant legislation (Vargas, Sanchez and Valdez 2017), polls administered through Latino Decisions in June 2011 and March 2015 reveal that Latino voters are conscious of a tense, and broader anti-Latino, political context surrounding anti-immigrant policy concerns. In fact, approximately 75 percent of respondents perceive the political rhetoric in recent years as being anti-immigrant and anti-Latino more broadly (Latino Decisions, March 2015).

form of naturalization rates, voter turnout and protests, it is implied that a casual relationship exists between a restrictive immigration environment and Latino political behavior (Pantoja et al. 2001; Scott 2000; Bada et al. 2006; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa 2014; Barreto, Manzano and Ramirez 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2008).[7] Focusing more specifically on the unprecedented activism of 2006, though immigrant advocacy networks brought attention to stopping anti-immigrant policy proposals, they also pushed for proposals that were viewed as more promising, including a path to legalization through comprehensive immigration reform similar to that of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of the 1980s (Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 2008).

Thus, the 2006 protests were not just a series of demonstrations against restrictive immigration legislation proposed in Congress, but may have also been an effort to mobilize support for more desirable policy opportunities (Johnson and Hing 2006; Gorman, Miller and Landsberg 2006; Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 2008). In fact, while engaging the grievances raised by the threats to immigrant rights, immigrant advocates have pushed forth a countermovement with different policy goals, a trend that is characteristic of social movements and counter-movements more broadly (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). In sum, Latino politics scholars have not precisely identified whether threat messages, more desirable appeals, or some combination of the two, spark Latino activism. Instead, researchers have made numerous assumptions about the perceptions and subsequent behaviors generated by one's political context without directly assessing whether Latinos were motivated by threat or opportunity messages, or both. By ignoring opportunity appeals, previous Latino politics studies have suffered from omitted variable bias and thus offered a threat-centered narrative of the kinds of political cues that may be more likely to spur political action. I rely on general principles of collective action, persuasive communication and the study of fear appeals in social psychology to

[7] Scholars have tried to explain the size and extent of the protests (Jones-Correa and De Graauw 2013). With the exception of Merolla et al. (2012), the most popular, though untested, explanation is that the media played a critical role in spurring immigrants and immigrant advocates to action (Barreto et al. 2009).

develop my hypotheses regarding the mobilizing effects of a coupled message approach involving threat and opportunity cues. We do not know which types of messaging strategies, involving threat and/or opportunity, play a more dominant role or if the interaction of the two is more likely to mobilize individuals.[8]

Speaking in general terms, *threat* appeals have been construed as future-oriented policy cues that, if implemented, would run counter to one's—or one's group—interests (Miller and Krosnick 2004). Ignoring the more complex nature of one's political messaging environment, particularly in a contentious policy debate, does not further our understanding of the external motivators driving one's political participation. Furthermore, this one-sided focus on threat has depicted the nature of a policy debate operating within a simple dichotomy of threat or no threat. E.E. Schattschneider recognized the need to consider policy alternatives that are more competitive than this simple dichotomy. He concluded his classic book, *The Semisovereign People,* by defining democracy as "a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process" (1960, 138). Therefore, rather than only analyzing the isolated effect of one policy cue (Chong and Druckman 2007, 2010; Druckman 2010; Druckman and Leeper 2012), it is important to capture the competitive nature of policy cues when participants are *simultaneously* exposed to both threat and opportunity appeals.

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[8] Although, it is worth noting that Merolla et al. (2012) find that upon portraying immigrants in a disparaging light, such as either social burdens or as threats to our national security, the focus of their study is to distinguish between racial group participation differences after being exposed to various depictions of Latino immigrants. Their treatment conditions randomize participants to different tones and issues related to the rationale behind federal immigration policies, though their treatments do not provide calls to action or specific attempts to create more expansive or restrictive legislation. Latino respondents in their sample are more likely to want to become more politically engaged. This line of inquiry raises important questions about the effects of being exposed to denigrating or exalting media frames about immigration policy. Though this work is related to the nature of my project and broader focus on political participation, my research more specifically considers whether the motivating effects posed by policy threats or policy opportunities that attempt to derail or improve the state of affairs for Latino immigrants could spur differences in Latino political participation. Thus, I am not manipulating whether immigrants are seen as drains or assets to society.

To better understand varying levels of political engagement among Latinos, I focus on the underpinnings of the threat narrative in political science. This first section includes a critical assessment of the existing literature on experimental work centered on the presence or absence of threat and highlights mixed findings from political psychology research on emotions associated with threat appraisals. Secondly, I take a closer lens to the existing measurement concerns and model misspecifications most relevant to my project, especially as it relates to immigration policy environments that have been linked to greater levels of political engagement among Latinos. In the third section I move on to provide more details on the threat and opportunity signals present within the immigration policy landscape across the U.S. and in the mobilizing messages used by immigrant movement organizers. Then, gleaning from the "mobilizer's dilemma," explained below, and fear appraisal literature in social psychology and persuasive communication, this section lays the theoretical foundation behind the pairing of threat and opportunity messages. Finally, in last portion of the chapter, I turn our attention to how coping strategies surrounding threat appraisals vary, based on socialization patterns observed among men and women more broadly and particularly based on levels of political engagement among Latinas.

General Experimental Research on Threat and Opportunity

The rationale behind threat appeals in politics is based on the human desire to survive and protect one's self-interests (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lazarus, 1991; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Miller and Krosnick 1994); in fact, threat appeals often signal danger or fear and induce a fight or flight response in the decision-maker (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Darwin 1864). In psychological terms, we expect threat to be especially motivating because in the presence of threatening stimuli, people's brains are more alert and in an anxious state of mind (Lazarus 1991;

Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Miller and Krosnick 1994). While not as heavily studied as the concept of threat, reactions to potential opportunities have most typically been correlated with people devoting less energy toward collective action efforts (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Marcus et al. 2000). The predominant perspective in this literature understands opportunity messages through the lens of free-riding or "social loafing" effect, as in prospect theory and social impact theory (Miller, Krosnick, Lowe and Holbrook 2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Latané 1981). According to prospect theory, and from a basic evolutionary standpoint, people are more motivated by losses than gains; people are driven to protect themselves (or their group), and their resources or status from anything threatening to derail them (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). On the other hand, people are deterred from taking action towards a common goal, which offers potential gains, if they believe others are already working towards it (Latané 1981), similar to Mancur Olson's (1965) free-riding expectations.

Along with what we might expect from prospect theory, Miller (2000) and Miller and Krosnick (2004) find that threat has a mobilizing effect on various forms of political activism—including financial contributions and volunteering time for a political interest group. They employ a field experiment in collaboration with the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League of Ohio (NARAL Ohio).[9] The letters were intended to fundraise and recruit new members for NARAL. Although a cursory view of this literature might suggest the unambiguous influence of threat appeals, a closer examination of the messages reveals that they include mixed signals of threat as well as positive cues. Thus, given the confounding nature of the opportunity signals across their treatments, the support they find for the motivating effects behind the threat condition are actually not solely driven by threat cues. The experimental

[9] Given the focus of abortion issues and the demographic group NARAL-Ohio targets for its membership, the letter recipients in Miller and Krosnick's (2004) field experiment were exclusively women registered as Democrats in Franklin County, Ohio. This is the county where the greatest numbers of NARAL members resided.

treatments were largely informed by a content analysis that consisted of 100 fundraising letters distributed by interest groups over a seven-year period.[10] Again, similar to the letters in their field experiment, no letter across the nineteen organizations in their content analysis contained one single cue alone.

More specifically, the control version of the letter included elements seen in typical fundraising letters: a discussion of the organization's goals, evidence of past victories, attempts to increase efficacy, statements of urgency to take action and selective incentives to join NARAL's attempts to facilitate access to abortions in Ohio. The threat letter highlighted an undesirable policy change that was intended to induce threat among those who favored legalized abortion. This threat letter contained all the information seen in the control letter, but it specifically focused on legislative attempts aimed at making abortions more difficult to obtain. The opportunity letter emphasized desirable policy changes among people who favored legalized abortion, and it addressed the ways in which members of Congress were working hard to make abortions easier to obtain. In addition to the policy opportunity seen in this letter, this condition also included the same information seen in the control letter. The threat and opportunity letters each contained a discussion of the organization's goals, evidence of past victories, attempts to increase efficacy and statements of urgency. Based on the content analysis portion of Miller's work (2000), all the letters discussed more than the organization's goals. Instead, thirteen out of the nineteen (or 68 percent) contained both signals of alternative future changes (goals/opportunities) as well as a sense of urgency (threat)(e.g., "there's not a moment to lose"). These patterns, which involve mixed signals of both threat and appeasing policy goals, confirm

[10] These patterns involving aspects of both a political dilemma and hints of future policy goals (and empowering messages of efficacy) across the letters are consistent with patterns revealed in Godwin's (1988) content analysis of 150 direct political mailings from liberal and conservative organizations. For more on Miller's content analysis, refer to discussion sections in Miller (2000) and Miller and Krosnick (2004) publications.

the implications drawn from Albertson and Gadarian (2015), who focus on the use of fear in contemporary politics and the ways in which anxiety affects how citizens engage in politics.[11] They conclude that policy scenarios provoking anxiety alone are not realistic as people are exposed to more complex political messages than those seen in their randomized treatment conditions in their experiments.

Overwhelmingly, threat appeals have often been operationalized as cues that are aversive to one's interests. The existing public opinion literature typically correlates and operationalizes an indication of threat with the presence of negative valence emotions, such as anger, fear and anxiety (Brader 2002, 2005; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings 2011; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Fischer, Shaver and Carnochan 1990). Marcus et al. (2000) also find that people who feel threatened by a political stimulus (i.e. an opposing candidate in an election) are more likely to become politically active than those who do not feel threatened. They present the theory of affective intelligence, which explains that anxiety provoked by the novel danger behind threatening stimuli triggers more vigilant attention and a disruption to one's typical patterns of behavior (Marcus et al. 2000). Thus, when assessing the literature on threat and its effects on motivating political action, this conversation cannot be devoid of the study of fear appeals and the ways that both negative and positive emotions serve as feedback to inform people's decision-making behaviors (Vasi and Macy 2003, p. 982; Leventhal 1970; Mewborn and Rogers 1979; Rogers and Mewborn 1976). Behind the "mobilizer's dilemma," Vasi and Macy (2003) also rely on a literature of "fear appeals" and the importance of pairing them with an alternative so as to avoid making subjects

[11] More specifically, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) use experiments on immigration, public health, climate change and terrorism to assess the impact of anxiety-provoking threat messages on outcomes such as political learning, attributing trust to political actors as well as people's policy support for more protective policies.

feel unable to respond to the danger (Vasi and Macy 2003; Leventhal 1970; Mewborn and Roger 1979; Rogers and Mewborn 1976).

Though some might assume we have arrived at a consensus about the way these emotions help people contend with their political environments (Gray 1990; Marcus et al. 2000), a few studies have found threat to be immobilizing (Miller 2005). In fact, Valentino et al. (2011) find that fear has quite a sporadic effect on political action, sometimes deterring participation from a large battery of campaign-related political activities and it is not mobilizing for the 5-point political participation scale.[12] To the degree fear *is* associated with participation, Valentino and colleagues' (2011) separate analyses of the ANES from 1980-2004 reveal that these effects tend to be confined to more conservative actions, such as information-gathering, displaying a button or bumper sticker and talking to friends and family about politics. Thus, we cannot expect political threats alone to be the dominant drivers of other forms of political action, including attending a rally, donating money to a campaign and working for a party or candidate. Even within Miller's work (2000, 2004), we see that there are mixed results on the effect of threat. Threat mobilized people to donate more money, but it inhibited one from contacting an elected official about their opinion (Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004). In fact, Hobbes suggests that political elites are entrusted to define what the public is supposed to fear (Robin 2006). In this capacity, politicians and whistle-blowers often offer policy alternatives to provide relief from the provoked threat. This latter portion of the policy narrative, one that provides hope and relief, is missing in our current understanding of what spurs political behavior under contentious environments. It is worth mentioning that it is potentially concerning to allow political elites to craft a political environment that only heightens the "politics of fear," leaving society and the government more willing to enlarge its surveillance state (Robin 2006). This

[12] These results included activities such as wearing a button, volunteering for a campaign, attending a rally, talking to others and donating money.

heightened state of survey and anxiety creates a citizenry that stops paying attention to new threats posed before them.

A related problem in the literature is that scholars have uncovered inconsistent results regarding the motivating effects of opportunity cues. On the one hand, we know that opportunity appeals have been found to encourage "free riding" (Meyer and Staggenborg 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and that positive emotions reinforce existing behaviors and attitudes (Marcus et al. 2000); however, others argue that opportunity appeals tend to have a mobilizing effect (albeit smaller than the effect of threat) on political participation depending on the political outcome of interest (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Miller 2000; Hardin 1968; Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). In fact, they find opportunity messages increase the rate of people sending postcards (Miller and Krosnick 2004). Additional studies also raise more questions about the expected "free riding" effects of opportunity appeals. Through the use of a randomized lab experiment and analyses of a 2008 national survey, Valentino et al. (2011) repeatedly find that the motivating effects of enthusiasm on various forms of electoral campaign participation are positive—though not statistically significant. Though, upon controlling for skills and resources across pooled analyses of ANES surveys from 1980-2004, Valentino et al. (2011) later find that enthusiasm significantly boosts participation for various campaign and non-campaign related forms of political participation. Thus, we should not overlook the potential mobilizing effect the positive emotions (particularly hope) that opportunity appeals might provide for individuals, especially when paired with the urgency of a threatening message. Furthermore, those experiencing enthusiasm have a higher predicted probability of engaging in more involved forms of participation, including joining a rally, working for a campaign and donating money (Valentino et al. 2011).[13]

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[13] Interestingly, Valentino et al. (2011) find that anger is not politically mobilizing in the absence of skills and resources. Those that are angry can "put to use" the skills to organize and take political action. However,

When accounting for the moderating effect of skills and resources, enthusiasm still boosts participation, though not as much as anger (Valentino et al. 2011). My argument is not that enthusiasm or hope stirred by opportunity appeals is more catalyzing for individual political action, but rather that the combination of hope and fear (or opportunity and threat) is most effective. After all, upon drawing heavily from the neuroscience and automatic processing of emotions, there is reason to expect that the combination of the hope and fear may be especially motivating, especially as both positive and negative emotions might lead to action (Gray 1990) and boost political participation (Marcus et al. 2000).

Measuring Immigration Policy Threat in Political Science

Instead of oversimplifying the environmental cues people are exposed to, I suggest that the opposite of threat does not merely imply the absence of threat as characterized in previous research (Lupia and Menning 2005; Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004; Pantoja et al. 2001; Felix, Gonzalez and Ramírez 2008). Alternatively, one must also incorporate the presence of opportunities in the political environment. Thus, I want to examine variations in responses to one's political context by considering a coupled threat and opportunity approach and not simply account for the presence of threatening stimuli. For example, previous observational survey analyses have only factored in the presence or absence of threat in their models when predicting Latino political engagement patterns. More specifically, when analyzing exogenous immigration policy shocks perceived as posing a threat to Latinos, previous studies aggregate rather than rely on individual level measures to assess threat in the local environment (Pantoja et al. 2001). For example,

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without such access, anger can have a deterring effect on participation. In this study, I focus on the effect of fear and hope, and not on anger because action followed by anger requires a sense of entitlement and indignation (Planas 2016), which may be largely fueled by one's place in society and access to resources. Being in an alerted state of anxiety does not require a sense of entitlement. Finally, I also focus on fear posed by threats because this emotion has had theoretical underpinnings in motivating political action for a long time. In fact, Thucydides finds that fear has played a large role in motivating political action (aside from honor and interest)(Robin 2006).

respondents living in California from 1994-1996 are coded as 1, indicating the presence of a threatening environment as this was a time period when restrictive immigration propositions were on the state ballot. Conversely, not living in California is coded as 0 to represent a non-threatening political context in states without such restrictive immigration proposals (Pantoja et al., 2001). The authors also include a measure of living in California during this threatening time period (1994-1996) compared to Latinos living in Florida and Texas. Florida and Texas are intended as comparison states that represent "no threat," and they do not find Latino immigrants naturalizing or turning out at the same rate there as they do in California at the time.

Similarly, Bowler et al. (2006) focus on a slightly later time period to account for the passage of Propositions 187, 209 and 227 in California, and their effects on participants' partisan identification. To account for the cumulative effect of passing these 3 alienating propositions, they create a categorical variable that accounts for the time before the passage of Proposition 187 ("0"), the time period between the passage of 187 in 1994 to the passage of 209 in 1996 ("1"), the passage of 209 to until the passage of 227 in 1998 ("2"), and thereafter the measures takes the value of ("3"). In a separate model, Bowler et al. (2006) also code dummy variables for each proposition so as to better "assess whether specific propositions had greater or lesser effects among specific populations" (351). Again, the variables specified in this study do not account for the persuasive effects of perceiving the legislation passed during this time as either threats or opportunities for minority interests in California.[14] Thus, we do not know if the cumulative effect they are capturing in their categorical time variable is also conflating efforts led by

[14] For more on the perceived partisan and racialized nature of these ballot initiatives in California in the 1990s, see discussions in Bowler et al. (2006) and in Tolbert and Hero (2001). The authors expect that the highly partisan nature of these racialized initiatives help explain the substantial shift of partisan loyalties observed in California's political landscape after the mid 1990s. After the passage of Propositions 187, 209 and 227, Latino and white respondents identified more closely with the Democratic Party. To explain why white respondents became more closely identified with the Democratic Party, they explain that white voters were uncomfortable with the explicitly racialized nature of this legislation, which was seen as a violation of the norm of racial equality (Mendelberg 2001).

immigrant advocates attempting to provide more desirable policy goals amidst the political threats being passed.

In addition to elite interviews, Barreto et al. (2009) analyze two national surveys collected during the immigration protests of 2006. The surveys, conducted by the Latino Policy Coalition, were fielded two weeks after the April 10th immigration rallies and also one month after the second wave of immigration rallies and May 1st boycott. To account for motivators of a threatening political environment, the authors rely on more negative approval ratings of Congress and the president. They find that those who are more disapproving of Congress are more likely to have participated in the rallies. Barreto et al. (2009) also include a control measure for the participant's level of support for a pathway to citizenship, though this measure does not reach statistical significance and seems to be negatively correlated with participating in the rallies.[15]

Moving beyond cross-sectional studies (Pantoja and Segura 2003; Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006), more qualitative studies have found a positive relationship between restrictive immigrant legislation and increases in Latino mobilization efforts (Barreto et al. 2009; Zepeda-Millán 2014; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013). The qualitative data provides further insight into the mechanisms motivating organizers of local 2006 marches, especially those in non-traditional gateway cities. While this scholarship explores the role grievances or threatening immigration policies play in mobilizing the Latino community, previous work does not broaden

[15] The LPC surveys asked Latino registered voters whether or not they agreed with the principles, objectives and themes of the 2006 immigration rallies. This is more so tapping one's ideology policy support of how to deal with undocumented immigrants and not necessarily the motivating effects of being exposed to messages of future policy goals. In terms of predicting support of the objectives behind the rallies, the effect of disapproving of the President and Congress has a positive and significant effect. Given the conceptually distant nature of these variables (involving evaluations of two branches of government and the extent to which one supports more expansive immigration policy reform), it would not make sense to collapse the disapproval ratings and policy stance measures into a single measure to account for both potential threats and potential policy opportunities. Thus, the simultaneously motivating effects of the threat and opportunity signals remain untapped and untested in the literature.

the narrative to make room for the motivating role of more promising or desirable policy goals in these contexts.[16]

Threat and Opportunity Signals in Policy Landscape and Mobilization Messages

While state governments have acted on immigration issues throughout US history (Skerry 1995; Filindra 2009; Okamoto and Ebert 2010), data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) highlights the dramatic increase in state action on immigration in the past decade (Jones-Correa and DeGraauw 2013). In 2005, legislatures in 25 states considered approximately 300 immigration-related bills and resolutions; by the end of 2007, after the failure to pass immigration reform at the federal level, this legislative activity increased five-fold—amounting to a total of 1,562 bills and resolutions being introduced, and 290 were enacted in 46 states (NCSL 2012; Jones-Correa and De Graauw 2013). There is also legislative activity at the municipal level, which includes 180 cities, towns and counties across the country enacting approximately 120 ordinances by the end of 2007 (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). Thus, the existence of oppositional movements associated with the immigration debate creates a research opportunity to address the dynamic effects of threatening and appealing policy cues (Tilly 1979; Steil and Vasi 2014).

[16] Interestingly, interviews by Garcia Bedolla (2005) reveal that threat leads to more disengagement among some Latinos, largely based on whether they have a positive sense of Latino identity. For instance, among Latinos with a positive Latino identity and sense of group worth, they are more mobilized to take action in the hostile immigrant environment of California in the 1990s. However, for those who do not have a positive Latino identity, the threatening environment leads to further inaction.

Figure 2.1: Local immigration policies in the United States between 2005-2009



Source: Map illustrates the distribution of local immigration policies in the United States between 2005 to 2009 as assembled by Walker and Leitner (2011). The authors created this map from an original database of publicly available data in 369 U.S. localities (including 281 municipalities and 88 counties), focusing on those locales that had proposed or created an immigration or immigration-related policy.

To illustrate that immigration policies have not been exclusively restrictive, and instead that there have been several legislative examples of perceived policy threats and policy opportunities for Latino constituents, Figure 2.1 depicts a visual representation of restrictive and integrationist immigration policies between 2005 and 2009.[17] Across the U.S., nearly 370 local

[17] The map in Figure 2.1 does not include the expansion of Secure Communities program implementation past February of 2009, at which point was still considered voluntary (Walker and Leitner 2011). Thus, their map underestimates the expansion of Secure Communities by the Obama Administration. The data ranges back to 2005 because a plethora of these local and county-level policies were passed between 2005-2007 (Walker and Leitner 2007; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). The passage of local ordinances, including those that are restrictive or pro-immigrant, are primarily based on partisan politics, immigrant protest activity and salience of immigration stirred by the Sensenbrenner Bill of 2005, and not due to demographic pressures faced by immigrant-receiving localities

governments have proposed or implemented policies aimed at addressing issues of undocumented immigration in their communities (Walker and Leitner 2011). The increased policymaking taking place in states and municipalities is part of a broader trend of the devolution of immigration responsibilities to local levels, including coordinating with federal immigration authorities on matters of immigration control and immigrant policing (Ellis 2006; Coleman 2007a, 2007b; Varsanyi 2008). For example, through the 287(g) Program and Secure Communities, local police authorities are deputized to check the immigration status of detainees and initiate deportation proceedings (Walker and Leitner 2011). However, as seen in Figure 2.1, there is a mix of both inclusive and exclusionary immigration policies in the U.S. across cities and county-level governments, which are arguably perceived as attempts to challenge, maintain and/or improve the status quo of immigrants (Walker and Leitner 2011; Ybarra and Sanchez 2015; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015). Walker and Leitner (2011) constructed a dataset of proposed immigration policies within 269 localities (including 281 cities and 88 counties) between 2005 through February 2009.[18] Inclusive or integrationist policies are sanctuary ordinances, policies granting local rights to undocumented residents (such as local voting rights to noncitizens, valid identification cards, and the acceptance of Mexican *matricula consular* ID cards as valid forms of identification), and resolutions in support of paths to legalization for undocumented immigrants (Walker and Leitner 2011; Wells 2004; Varsanyi 2006; Ridgley 2008). Exclusionary or punitive policies involve examples aside from 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities Program, these policies also consist of English-only ordinances, and

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(Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005; Ramakrishnan and Wong 2007, 2010; Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram 2013; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015).

[18] It is worth noting that this list is not exhaustive. The authors gathered this information from databases on local immigration policies produced by Fair Immigration Reform Movement, The Mexican American and Puerto Rican Legal Defense Funds, and the National Immigration Law Center. The authors also cross-checked and supplemented information from a collection of national and local media documents. For a study that considers policies that actually passed between 2001 and 2011, see Steil and Vasi (2014).

penalties to employers and landlords who knowingly hire or rent to undocumented immigrants (Walker and Leitner 2011).

Table 2.1: Regional Distribution of Immigrant Ordinances in U.S. Municipalities, by Ordinance Type

U.S. Region	Percent "Pro"	Percent "Anti"	Total
West	52.2 (36)	47.8 (33)	69
Midwest	43.2 (19)	56.8 (25)	44
South	11.5 (9)	88.5 (69)	78
Northeast	25.6 (23)	74.4 (67)	90
All Ordinance Municipalities	31.0 (87)	69.0 (194)	281

Notes: This table was compiled by Walker and Leitner (2011). The quantity of ordinance municipalities in the region is indicated in parentheses. This table includes the full sample of ordinance municipalities, n = 281. Census region definitions are based on the U.S. Census Bureau. Chi-square test: $p < .001$.

As Walker and Leitner (2011) point out, Figure 2.1 reveals a plethora of both inclusive and exclusionary local ordinances—although they are more heavily skewed towards restrictive policies overall, though Ramakrishnan and Wong (2007, 2010), and Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015), find there is a shift towards more integrationist policies in the 2000s as well, particularly with the presence of pro-immigrant protest activities. This fragmentation and variation in policy proposals is in part due to the stagnation of federal immigration policy and the failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform (Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013), but it also involves grassroots responses to the presence (or potential presence) of undocumented immigrants. Some grassroots responses have led to policies that exclude immigrants or penalize employers who hire undocumented immigrants, while others have pursued integrative strategies (Walker and Leitner 2011; Ybarra and Sanchez 2015; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). As portrayed in Figure 2.1, and with percentage details in Table 2.1, over half of the Midwestern municipalities (57 percent) introduced local immigration ordinances designed to deter the settlement of immigrants. In the Northeast, 74 percent of the municipalities

also introduced more exclusionary policies rather than those designed to incorporate immigrants. The South stands out as a region with nearly 90 percent of municipalities in the sample introducing restrictive immigration policies. Whereas the West is the only region where a slight majority of the municipalities adopted pro-immigration policies (52 percent).

Despite the proliferation, and potential exposure, of both expansive and restrictive immigration policy changes, the extant literature has focused almost exclusively on the latter as the primary catalyst driving political participation within the Latino electorate, particularly their voter turnout, naturalization rates and 2006 protest participation (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto et al. 2009; Ramírez 2013; Wallace et al. 2014; Ybarra and Sanchez 2015). This is, at best, one portion of the story and may lead us to believe that threatening immigration contexts are the dominant external motivators spurring Latino activism. I do not discount that threat can play a catalyzing role in one's political motivation.[19] I aim to pinpoint the causal impact of threat appraisals, which may not only consist of careful thought-processing of the risk or danger posed by a threat, but it may also involve an appraisal of the opportunity messages, and the potential promises, surrounding a particular debate.

Aside from the proliferation of immigration policy changes at the local and municipal level, cues of peril and promise are also evident in various organizations' political communication: fundraising letters, memoranda, press releases and email action alerts (Miller 2000, p. 75; Daniels, 2010; NCLR, 2007; LULAC, 2007; NALEO, 2007; NPNA, 2015). For instance, the National Partnerships for New Americans (NPNA) emphasized the concerning threat of Texas Supreme Court Rulings interfering with then-President Obama's second Deferred

[19] In fact, threat may also be a catalyst for opportunity appeals from the opposing side of an issue, as seen with a social movement and its countermovement (Tilly 1979). With the social movement surrounding immigration, scholars have found very strong proponents and opponents of the most heavily protested punitive immigration policies in the past decade (Barreto et al. 2009; Steil and Vasi 2014).

Action program. Referring to the first paragraph below, the Deferred Action of Parents of American and Lawfully Permanent Residents (DAPA) was aimed at providing deportation relief for 5 million undocumented immigrants parents who have U.S.-born children was seen as a policy opportunity among immigrant advocates. Instead of only emphasizing the stalling effect these rulings could pose (threat), the NPNA's second paragraph also reminds the public of policies pushing forth benefits (opportunities) for undocumented immigrants. From an action alert publicized on their website in September 2015, the NPNA highlights the following policy threats and policy opportunities:

> "Last week, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the Obama administration's executive actions on immigration which were announced one year ago this week and would grant 5 million people temporary work authorization and relief from deportation.
>
> We will not be deterred by the delays. National Partnership for New Americans (NPNA) organizations and partners are commemorating this anniversary by hosting 49 naturalization, DACA, and document preparation workshops to continue building power and preparing for eventual implementation across the country. […] These workshops are a part of the NPNA's "Full Citizenship Campaign" which aims to assist the nearly 9 million green card holders who are eligible to become U.S. Citizens, to find pathways to citizenship for the 11 million undocumented immigrants across the nation, and to fight for a more vibrant, just, and welcoming democracy for all."

The NPNA does not overwhelm its audience with the alarming problem of the court stalling President Obama's administrative relief program. They move beyond the first paragraph and also emphasize naturalization drives and the need to push for reform with a path to citizenship. This strategy embodies the coupled threat-and-opportunity approach proposed in this dissertation. Similarly, the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) used a coupled threat-and-opportunity approach to try to spur action in a 2007 memo release in response to the Senate failing to move a comprehensive immigration bill forward:

> "'It is utterly unacceptable for the Senate to fail to address the issue of comprehensive immigration reform,' said Janet Murguía, NCLR President and CEO. 'The country demands and deserves a solution to our broken immigration system, and it is unthinkable that the Senate would fail to move the debate forward.' Murguía asserted that while much of the bill needs improvement, it also offers a great deal of hope. She highlighted the pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, the 'DREAM Act,' the reduction of backlogs for immigrant families, and the 'AgJOBS' proposal. 'Our opportunity to improve this bill and to enact the best possible reform rests with the United States Senate.'"

Some of the hopeful policy opportunities the NCLR press release includes are the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act and the Agricultural Job Opportunities, Benefits and Security Act (AgJOBS)—two policy proposals that would provide protection and a safety net for undocumented immigrant students and farmworkers. First introduced in the U.S. Senate in 2000, the DREAM Act is aimed at providing a pathway to citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants who were brought to this country under the age of 5 and have sought higher education (or served in the military) and have not committed any crimes. AgJOBS was also first introduced in the U.S. Senate in 2000, is aimed at providing H-2A visas to the large number of farmworkers without existing access to legal protections from abuse and wage theft. The DREAM Act and AgJOBS policies are examples of policies that may provide the reward-seeking behavior, or gains, triggered by enthusiasm or hope as people process this message, helping them overcome the potential distraction or despair caused by the threat of legal action to stall deportation relief efforts.

Theoretical Framework

I argue that the pairing of threat and opportunity work together so that threat arouses attention and opportunity directs specific actions towards policies that are more appeasing. The promise of hope and viable alternatives are crucial in one's responses to threatening situations. In fact, in the field of persuasive communication and psychology, "fear appeals" were found to be

unsuccessful if unaccompanied with an alternative (Vasi and Macy 2003, 982; Leventhal 1970; Mewborn and Roger 1979; Rogers and Mewborn 1976). As opposed to participants who did not have any sense of reassurance, Rogers and Mewborn's (1979) findings reveal that respondents were more likely to alter their behavior in their best interest if they knew they could take a course of action to avert the threat. Similarly, Vasi and Macy (2003) find that participants were more likely to take action when encountering a threat if and only if they had an empowering message that reinforced the utility of their collective action. Thus, there is room to delve more deeply into these motivating (or reassuring) alternatives within the field of political science where social movements give rise to a more complex set of policy options beyond threat and putting a halt to aversive policies.

I rely on general principles of collective action, persuasive communication and the study of fear appeals in social psychology to elaborate the logic behind the motivating effects of a coupled message approach. For example, Vasi and Macy (2003) explain that collective action is difficult to initiate and sustain, posing a substantial social dilemma on participants and mobilizers (Olson 1965). Aside from competing with the busy lives among the inattentive masses (Olson 1965; Marcus et al. 2000), Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that potential participants are faced with two challenges in the mobilizer's dilemma. First, one might not receive a greater portion of the benefits if they put forth their own effort (the "efficacy problem") (Marwell and Oliver 1993). Second, participants also face the temptation to free ride or enjoy the benefits others worked toward to achieve the desired goal (the "free-riding problem") (Hardin 1968; Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). For participants, the dilemma involves being successfully persuaded of the importance of their individual contribution; for mobilizers, the dilemma involves not overwhelming people with the dire nature of a call to action (Olson 1965; Vasi and Macy 2003). Thus, the mobilizer's task is to

create a call to action that alerts them to pay attention to politics, but one that does not backfire by undermining the belief in the ability for individuals to make a difference (Vasi and Macy 2003). It might seem intuitive to emphasize urgency or attention to a threatening policy change in the early stages of mobilization, perhaps to shake people of out of their habitual inattentiveness. Yet, "this risks creating a sense of despair at precisely the worst possible time—when the obstacle to participation is more likely to be the problem of efficacy, not free riding" (Vasi and Macy 2003). While they assign participants to a control condition with no message, a crisis message condition, and a coupled condition combining a crisis and empowerment messages, they do not test the tendency to free-ride when the messages are empowerment-only.

Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that mobilizers can better spur participation, and consequently alleviate the "efficacy problem," by issuing empowering messages that highlight the possibilities, accomplishments, and victories of collective action and affirm the importance of individual efforts when coordinated with others (Klandermans 1992). The strains between individual and collective interest in social dilemmas can be alleviated through persuasive communication techniques (Klandermans 1992; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Van Vught 1999). Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that mobilizers can better spur participation, and consequently alleviate these two dilemmas by issuing empowering messages in conjunction with crisis-oriented messages. By adding this empowering message, it highlights the possibilities, accomplishments, and victories of collective action and affirms the importance of individual efforts when coordinated with others (Klandermans 1992). Relatedly, Leventhal (1970) finds that if people feel vulnerable to a threat, they tend to show more resistance to attitudinal and behavioral change. If crisis communication and calls of collective action are only based on making fear appeals (or threat appeals) salient, the general public can experience "battle fatigue"

from the volume and oversaturation of such urgent appeals (Smith, Allen and Danley 2007).[20] Furthermore, they do not test a combination approach where people are exposed to threat and opportunity appeals in their mailers (Smith et al. 2007). Thus, for these aforementioned reasons, we would not want to rely on a mobilizing strategy that mainly emphasizes fear, especially if we want people to feel that they have the ability to ward off the danger and to avoid making them feel overwhelmed by their vulnerability. Borrowing from basic principles of peril and promising messages, I apply this to mobilizing messages that are policy-specific.

Vasi and Macy (2003) test this messaging strategy with two experiments based on resource-management games. More specifically, they tested the effects of crisis and empowerment messages on conservation efforts in laboratory experiments. Members of a large group faced a resource-depletion problem with "declining" conditions, and the investigators manipulated the presence of persuasive empowerment messages to suggest conditions were "improving." Vasi and Macy (2003) measured the extent to which people practiced self-restraint in harvesting the commons, or protecting the group's resources in these laboratory experiments. The rules of the game were such that it was in each individual's best interest to collect as many resources as possible to earn more redeemable points; however, if the community chest depleted, the game would automatically end, and everyone would lose all their points (Vasi and Macy 2003, 985). They found that those who received a paired empowerment message, reassuring them that their efforts were "improving" the group's resources, were more willing to cooperate

[20] For example, in response to hostile social and academic campus environments, black male students reported psychological responses symptomatic of racial battle fatigue (e.g., frustration, shock, anger, disappointment, resentment, anxiety, helplessness, hopelessness and fear)(Smith, Allen and Danley, 2007). In their discussion section, Miller and Krosnick (2004) refer to the potential desensitization or underestimation of threat mailers in their experiment as a "threat fatigue." To explain the underestimated effects of threat in their experiments, the investigators suggest that respondents may have already received countless mailers and solicitations regarding the same issue and this may have already made the threat very salient in their minds. However, the authors are unable to test this alternative explanation as they do not consider the timing of their mailers in the experiment.

with other group members and conserve more resources for their community chest. Those who received the crisis-only message, which emphasized the “slippery slope” and declining conditions they were in, conserved far fewer resources than the paired crisis-empowerment group. The paired crisis-empowerment group received identical crisis messages as those in the crisis-only group, but also received empowerment messages when conditions were improving (Vasi and Macy 2003, 988).

When one faces an inability to ward off the danger confronting them in their environments, individuals do not have the means to change their behavior and respond accordingly (Rogers and Mewborn 1976). Rogers and Mewborn (1976) focused on people’s health behavior responses to health threats. Although Rogers and Mewborn (1976) focus on an alternative operationalized as a recommended health change (e.g. recommending subjects stop smoking to prevent bodily harm), I focus on alternatives in a goal-oriented policy context that go beyond a call to stop the threat or instructions on how to cope with the threat (Mewborn and Rogers 1979). Relatedly, scholars find that if people feel vulnerable to a threat, or particularly targeted, they tend to show more resistance or defiance, making it more difficult to facilitate attitude change (Leventhal 1970). As mobilizers try to design their calls to action, it may be detrimental and counterproductive to follow suit and only emphasize the crisis at hand. Instead, it is important to couple their sense of urgency with affirmative messages pointing to progress and more hopeful policy alternatives (Vasi and Macy, 2003).

We can apply additional lessons from public health studies in this case. People’s acceptance of a health recommendation depended not only on the likelihood of the harmful effects and extent of urgency in their prognosis, but also on the change in probability if the recommendation were followed (Rogers and Mewborn 1976). “When perceived efficacy is low,

people tend to do the opposite of what is advocated, and fear appeals may boomerang (Rogers and Mewborn, 1976; Witte, 1992)" (Vasi and Macy, 2003). Through psychophysiological experiments, this line of work finds people were more likely to comply with the recommended practices when those recommendations were paired with coping responses (Leventhal, 1970; Rogers and Mewborn, 1976; Mewborn and Rogers, 1979; Rogers, Cacioppo and Petty, 1983; Witte, 1992). "The data indicated that the efficacy component acted upon intentions, not by making the threat seem less severe or less likely to occur but by directly strengthening beliefs in the ability to cope with danger when it is confronted " (Rogers and Mewborn, 1976). This two-pronged strategy guards against feelings of hopelessness or feeling overwhelmed by the prognosis or recommendations.

The logic behind the importance of providing people with a reassuring message is heavily supported in psychology work on fear appraisals. To hone in on the process by which people weigh the risks involved in taking action or doing nothing when confronting a stressor in their environment, I turn to work by Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey and Leitten (1993). These authors clarify that threatened individuals perceive the potential for loss, with little, if anything, to be gained in the situation whereas challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as well as loss in the situation. Thus, I suggest we apply this to our understanding of threat and opportunity appraisals in a political context, as the combined effect of threat-and-opportunity cues may lead to heightened political participation. The coupled threat-and-opportunity approach is intended to challenge individuals to take action by conveying the possibility of gain and loss, a perspective Tomaka et al. (1993) find most helpful as people encounter a threat or stressor in their environment. Threatened individuals, who only perceive the potential for loss, may think it is not worth exerting their efforts; *contrastingly*, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of

gain as well as loss, and are more eager to accomplish the goal at hand (Tomaka et al. 1993). As such, there is room to delve more deeply into these motivating, or reassuring, paired messaging alternatives within the field of political science and the topic of immigration lends itself squarely to provide a sense of loss and gain for some.

Theoretically, I assert that threat evokes a sense of loss for one or one's group, whereas an opportunity evokes a sense of benefit and greater access to privileges for one's group (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Soss and Schram 2007; Campbell 2003; Schneider and Ingram 1993; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). Combining the effects of these two distinct signals may generate the necessary motivation to take political action against any attempts to derail a group's progress and provide the reassurance that their efforts will improve the state of affairs for the collective group.

Gender and Political Participation

To my surprise, I found that women were the most responsive to the coupled threat-and-opportunity strategy. To explain these findings, I turn to new findings on gender as it relates to political participation, threat appraisal and the immigrant acculturation literature. Focusing on immigrants and their intent to become more politically engaged in the U.S., women tend to be at more of a political advantage than men. For instance, women account for 55 percent of all persons seeking naturalization (Office of Immigration Statistics 2013; Bejarano 2014a). Among Latino communities, scholars have found that various forms of political incorporation, such as naturalization rates and voter turnout, are dominated by Latina women (Bejarano 2014a). Within our understanding of Latino immigrants and their political incorporation, women tend to spearhead community organizing efforts as well as more formal electoral forms of participation

(Jones-Correa 1998; Bejarano 2014a). In terms of where they are paying political attention, male immigrants are more willing to pay more attention to politics of their countries of origin than female counterparts. While examining the political socialization of Latin American immigrants in New York City, Jones-Correa (1998) finds that men express greater desires to return to their native country, and they send remittances back home at higher rates than immigrant women. These gendered pathways are, in part, due to Latino male immigrants experiencing a more elevated political status in their home countries, where a patriarchal system is more predominant; in the U.S., immigrant men experience a demotion in status as they navigate their place in the host country's economic market. Though immigrant men may have been considered middle class and well educated in their countries of origin, their newfound jobs in the U.S. are well below their previous socioeconomic class positions. Conversely, immigrant women experience less of a decline in their status as they enter the labor market with less previous work experience (Jones-Correa 1998). Additionally, women come in contact with more American civic institutions, especially through their children, than their male counterparts. Thus, "the structuring of social and economic experiences in the U.S. leads to very different kinds of organizational incentives for immigrant women and men,'' and this illustrates why women would be more efficacious and responsive to the coupled threat-and-opportunity strategy (Jones-Correa 1998).

According to analyses of voter turnout between 2006-2012, Bejarano (2014a) generally finds that Latina females vote at higher rates than their male counterparts. Increased levels of political participation and familiarity with navigating the political system can also provide women with stronger ties to their community and political institutions, making them the most likely to encourage other family members to become more involved in American politics (Bejarano 2014). In terms of immigration policy enforcement and work in more economically

vulnerable spaces, it is no secret that Latino immigrant men have been more heavily targeted, and deported, at higher rates than female immigrants (Golash-Boza Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Rugh and Hall 2016). In fact, 85 percent of deportees are estimated to be male immigrants from Latin America (Golash-Boza Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Rugh and Hall 2016). Thus, this leaves Latina women in the household to take on a heavier burden in navigating U.S. political institutions.

Though scholars have explained differences in political activity based on the amounts of time and money devoted to these forms of engagement (Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995), there is also an aspect of expressiveness and social venues that political activities provide participants, especially for women. "Recent sociological research argues that women are more strongly connected to neighborhood networks than men, whilst mothers of young children enjoy particularly robust patterns of social exchange" (Lowndes 2008). Similarly, Taylor et al. (2000) suggest that the female stress response of "tending" to offspring and affiliating with a social group ("befriending") provides resources and protection for the female and her offspring under conditions of stress. Thus, threat appraisal responses are likely to differ among men and women in my study, particularly as women might be more willing to engage in activities as a group and in political acts that leverage their social networks.

Summary

To reiterate, the "mobilizer's dilemma" is a theory of collective action which holds that efforts to galvanize a response with crisis messages only make matters worse by undermining the belief in one's ability to "make a difference"(Vasi and Macy 2003). Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that efforts intended to overcome free-riding and override feelings of low efficacy are best tackled through a two-pronged message approach: a coupling of crisis and empowerment

message frames. In other words, “a one-sided emphasis on the need for action can be counterproductive unless coupled with messages that call attention to occasional progress” (Vasi and Macy 2003). These findings suggest that threats alone may not be an effective strategy for mobilizing some populations. Because at least some researchers have found that there are motivating effects behind a two-pronged approach in a few domains of participation and collective action (Vasi and Macy 2003; Rogers and Mewborn 1976), I propose that we test the dynamic effects of simultaneously threatening and opportunity appeals on one’s political behavior.

In the pages that follow, I test empirically the theoretical framework presented here, and demonstrate some of the ways in which a combined threat and opportunity message approach may lead to greater likelihoods in spurring political activism among Latinos. Aside from not accounting for alternative explanations that would be part of a threatening political environment, including exposure to opportunity messages, previous studies concluding that Latinos have felt “under attack” have not included measures at the individual level. Thus, without measuring threat at the individual level, it is difficult to conclude that threat alone motivates peaks in political activism. My project expands the range of potentially mobilizing messages, and challenges the idea that threat is the most successful way to encourage participation among Latinos. My findings also point to the ways in which women cope with threat and stressors in their environments through the more expressive and social forms of political engagement captured in this study. The coupled strategy equips, or motivates, some to join in collective action efforts more easily.

CHAPTER 3:

A Matter of Causality? Testing the Causal Impact of Threat-and-Opportunity on Intended and Observed Forms of Political Participation

In this chapter, I present details regarding the design and administration of a survey experiment conducted with an Internet sample of Latino adults living in the U.S. I focus on the general findings that emerge from the entire sample from this experiment. In Chapter 1, we saw that there are at least three limitations in the extant literature on threat appraisals as they relate to mobilization. Briefly, I argued that there is the failure to consider alternative explanations for heightened political participation among Latinos, including exposure to a combination of policy messages designed to both alert Latinos to impending threats and to encourage them to seek. Second, the existing scholarship on Latino political behavior in response to threat has relied on objective measures at the aggregate level (e.g. one's state or city of residence) rather than relying on measures assessed at the individual level. Lastly, by relying on observational data alone the Latino politics literature on participation has been vulnerable to the charge of omitted variable bias. An experimental design provides a straightforward way of addressing these concerns. In sum, without testing the causal impact of threat, and randomly assigning subjects to alternative appeals, we do not know if threat alone motivates political activism (Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006; Barreto and Ramirez 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).

In Chapter 2, I presented a theoretical framework to account for the simultaneous effects of threat and opportunity cues, and why they may be more mobilizing than alternative approaches focusing on threat alone or opportunity alone. Instead of analyzing the isolated effect of one type of

policy appeal, I explore the effects of an opportunity-based appeal as well as a more competitive policy environment in which participants are *jointly* exposed to threat and opportunity messages. Second, as opposed to relying on aggregate measures of threat and opportunity, I randomly assign subjects to either threat, opportunity, or both threat and opportunity appeals in my experiment so as to more precisely measure their causal effects. In this chapter and the following chapter, I provide results from my survey experiment. As indicated in chapter 2, I expect the combined effect of threat-and-opportunity cues to lead to heightened political participation.

Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical groundwork I have laid out for the mobilizing effects of a coupled threat-and-opportunity approach in Chapter 2, I have developed four testable hypotheses. My primary hypothesis involves the combined effects of the threat and opportunity cues. This coupled threat-and-opportunity approach is especially important because individuals who feel challenged (as opposed to only threatened) may be more task-focused and less distracted by the negativity stirred by the crisis-only message (Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Tomaka et al. 1993).

> *H1: The coupled threat-and-opportunity cues will encourage respondents to participate in politics at a greater rate, relative to the non-political appeals condition.*

To test whether to the motivating effects of the coupled approach are consistent when comparing the results to a policy environment that only focuses on threat or opportunity signals, I generate a second hypothesis with different baseline comparisons from that seen in hypothesis 1.

> *H2: The coupled threat-and-opportunity cues will catalyze respondents to participate in politics at a greater rate, relative to threat or opportunity appeals alone.*

Vasi and Macy (2003) find that participants did not partake in greater collective action efforts when they were only alerted to the crisis without an empowering message. Furthermore, Valentino et al. (2011) and Brader (2005) find that the motivating effect of fear on political action is sporadic, and often limited to more conservative and less time-consuming forms of political participation (such as talking about politics and wearing a political button). Thus, I reconsider the mobilizing effects of threat alone in the following hypotheses.

> *H3: The threat condition alone will either be ineffective or discourage respondents from participating in political acts such as participating in protests, volunteering time with an organizing, the intent to vote and sending an electronic postcard, relative to the non-political appeals condition.*
>
> *H4: The threat condition alone will spur participants into taking political action, such as talking about politics, relative to the non-political appeals condition.*

Moreover, the dominant narrative of opportunity messages expects people to engage in "social loafing" tendencies (Latané 1981), similar to Mancur Olson's (1965) free-riding expectations. According to social impact theory, learning about a potential policy opportunity should inhibit respondents from participating in collective action efforts because it demonstrates that others are already working towards a common goal, making their individual contribution appear to be less critical (Latané 1981).

> *H5: The opportunity condition alone will either be ineffective or discourage respondents from participating in political acts such as participating in protests, the intent to vote and sending an electronic postcard, relative to the non-political appeals condition.*

Methods and Procedure

In order to address the hypotheses described above, an experimental design will allow me to isolate the effects of coupled threat-and-opportunity appeals on one's political behavior relative to singular appeals and those who received a non-political message. By using data from

a randomized experiment, I can pinpoint the causality of the observed outcome differences (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski and Lupia 2006; Huddy, Sears and Levy 2013). Experiments facilitate causal inference through the randomization of experimental treatment conditions. Campbell (1957) explained internal validity as the ability of the investigator to be able to find a significant difference between the treatment and control condition. As indicated previously, I do not expect a single policy cue, whether it be threat or opportunity alone, to be a realistic representation of one's policy environment (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). I view threat as most effective when it is tempered with opportunity appeals, and vice versa. Thus, I focus on the important effect of coupling threat and opportunity appeals on one's political behavior.

In this experiment, I focus on policy appeals, although one could easily imagine threat and opportunity cues outside the realm of proposed policies. More specifically, subjects are presented with an appeal designed to threaten, an optimistic appeal, as well as *simultaneously* exposed to both threat and opportunity appeals. As such, *opportunity* appeals consist of future policy goals consistent with one's interests. Instead of potentially exacerbating feelings of helplessness while only emphasizing a sense of urgency (or policy threat), combining these messages with more opportunity-based policy alternatives may represent an improved strategy to mobilize, rather than demoralize, politically salient groups.

This study relies on a convenience sample collected on the Internet by the polling firm, *Latino Decisions*. The field date of the survey was May 21, 2016 through June 1, 2016. The sample consists of 1,015 Latino adults in the U.S., including 511 women and 504 men.[21] Sixty-three percent of the sample was born in the U.S. Sample quotas were collected based on loose

[21] The overall survey length averaged nineteen minutes. Fourteen outliers were dropped based on spending less than four minutes on the overall survey, as well as based on spending over ten times the average length on either the overall survey or experimental treatment screens. These outliers may have consisted of those who were distracted and spent lots of time away from the survey screen. Thus, the analyses are restricted to 1,001 cases, including 496 women and 505 men.

benchmarks of nativity, generation status, Latino subgroup ethnic origin, age, gender, income and census region from the U.S. Census 2010 and American Community Survey (2014).

Before delving into additional details, I compare my sample's demographics to that of known national markers for Latino adults in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Experiment Sample Distribution and National Demographic Benchmarks

	Latino Decisions Sample (%)	American Community Survey 2014 (%)
Gender		
Female	50	49
Male	50	51
Median Age	32	28
Immigrant Generation		
First Generation	36	37
Second Generation	36	30
Third Generation+	28	33
Educational Attainment		
Less than a high school diploma	8	20
High school diploma or equivalent	24	15
Some College	40	12
Bachelor's degree or more	29	7
Household Income (ACS categories in parentheses)		
under $16,999 (ACS: under $14,999)	15	17
$17,000-$34,999 (ACS: $15,000-$34,999)	26	30
$35,000-$69,000 (ACS: $35,000-$74,999)	34	33
$70,000-$119,000 (ACS: $75,000-$99,000)	18	9
$120,000 or more (ACS: $100,000 or more)	7	12
Census Region		
Northeast	17	3
Midwest	8	9
South	36	36
West	39	52
National Group Origins		
Mexican	44	63
Puerto Rican	11	9
Cuban	6	4
Other	39	24
Partisanship (with leaners being probed)		
Democrats	57	52
Independents	12	20
Republicans	27	23

Notes: With the exception of age being reported as a median, the figures above are based on percentages. The sample demographics from my original experiment are based on 1,015 Latino adult respondents gathered through Latino Decisions. The final column includes figures from the

American Community Survey 2014, though the national partisanship figures are based on a recent USA Today/Gallup (from April 16-May 31, 2016), and they are not excluded to those who are registered to vote.

To highlight a few of the differences, the American Community Survey in 2014 provides the following demographic benchmarks for Latinos: 49 percent female and median age of 28. My sample of 1,015 Latino adults consisted of similar gender and age breakdowns. My sample contained 50 percent female and an overall median age of 32. It is also worth noting I had a more highly educated sample. In terms of national group origins, my sample underrepresents Latinos of Mexican origin. My sample had slightly fewer independents and non-partisans than known estimates provided in Table 3.1.

If an experimental subject did not meet the age and Latino ethnic origin screener requirements on the first two questions of the survey, they were sent to a closing message and were not allowed to complete the entire survey. The survey firm compensated respondents with redeemable points, or the equivalent of one movie ticket or a $10 iTunes gift card. Participants took the survey in the privacy of their own home at their leisure. The survey length in English is approximately sixteen minutes long, while in Spanish it is approximately seventeen minutes long (Spanish language surveys traditionally take longer to read than English translations).

Treatments:

My experimental treatments consist of three versions of an online action alert from the same immigrant advocacy organization. The reputed source of the action alert is from Reform Immigration for America. According to their website, this organization is "the online component of a united national coalition that brings together individuals and grassroots organizations with the mission to build widespread support for workable, humane and comprehensive immigration reform" (Reform

Immigration for America 2016). Participants were randomized to a Control Condition, a Threat Condition, an Opportunity Condition, and a fourth condition that includes both threat and opportunity-based cues, referred to as the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition. Subjects assigned to the non-political Control Condition read an article about smartphone messaging applications that was the same length as the single cue messages. All three experimental treatments consist of a realistic action alert regarding a U.S. Senate immigration proposal that participants are told will be voted on within the week. By manipulating the content of the proposed Senate bill(s) and its corresponding photograph, the treatments will consist of a call to action that has either 1) threat-only, 2) opportunity-only, or 3) a combination of the threat-and-opportunity cues. Screenshots of the treatment messages, including the Control Condition, are available in Appendix A.[22] The Threat condition refers to a policy proposal that suggests eliminating the birthright citizenship of children born to undocumented immigrant parents. The Opportunity Condition references a policy proposal that would provide a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants in the U.S. A detailed description of each of the conditions can be found in Table 3.2, with differences across the 3 action alert treatments highlighted in bold text.

[22] The juxtaposed use of photographs and verbal text can enhance the memory and comprehension of the verbal information to achieve the message's effect (Abraham and Appiah 2006; Abraham 2003; Paivio 1986; Burgoon 1985; Hutchings, Walton, Mickey and Jardina, 2011). I conducted intercoder reliability tests with seven adult respondents from Amazon's Mechanical Turk from October 15 through October 18 of 2015. They coded eight different photographs I found through Google images search. Coders described the photographs in an open-ended question, as well as six measures regarding their affective responses, the subjects', race, ages, gender and social groupings. Coders also provided their affective responses and described the threat/opportunity policy content without accompanying images. Finally, the policy content reading ease for each of the experimental vignettes is accessible at a 6th grade reading level, according to readability software online (https://readability-score.com/). More extensive pre-testing of the treatments were gathered with a snowball sample of 221 respondents in February of 2016.

Table 3.2: Description of Survey Experiment Randomized Action Alerts

Description	Threat	Opportunity	Coupled Message
Headline	**"Warning! Ending birthright citizenship** is the **wrong** move!"	**"Our time is now! A pathway to citizenship** is the **best** move!"	"Warning! Ending birthright citizenship is the wrong move!"
First Paragraph	"This week the Senate is going to vote on a bill to **end the U.S.-citizenship for children born of immigrant parents who do not have legal U.S. status.** Before it is too late, let your Senators know that **ending birthright citizenship** would be an **attack for American and immigrant families everywhere!"**	"This week the Senate is going to vote on a bill to **provide a pathway to citizenship for immigrants living in the U.S. without legal status**. Before it is too late, let your Senators know that **providing a pathway to citizenship** would be a **win for American and immigrant families everywhere!"**	"This week the Senate is going to vote on a bill to end the U.S.-citizenship for children born of immigrant parents who do not have legal U.S. status. Let your Senators know that ending birthright citizenship would be an attack for American and immigrant families everywhere!"
Second Paragraph			**"…Meanwhile, another bill in the Senate** provides a pathway to citizenship for immigrants who are living in the U.S. without legal status. Before it is too late, let your Senators know that providing a pathway to citizenship for these immigrants would be a win for American and immigrant families everywhere!"
Closing Caption	"Let's take action today!"	"Let's take action today!"	"Our time is now! Providing a pathway to citizenship is the best move! Let's take action on both of these bills today!"
Photograph Descriptions	*Two identical images of a scared and crying little girl. She is standing in the middle of a line in a detention center with her mother. There is a small American flag hanging out of mother's backpack.*	*Two identical images of a happy and smiling little girl. She is standing in a naturalization ceremony celebration with mother. Mother and daughter are holding a small American flag.*	*Two images: One copy of the frightened girl and one copy of the happy little girl from the "Threat" and "Opportunity" conditions.*

The differences across the three treatments begin with the headlines, as shown in the first row of Table 3.2. In the Threat Condition, people are alerted to the urgency of the proposal attempting to revoke the birthright citizenship status of children born to undocumented immigrant parents. This policy proposal is not far from reality as there have been such bills introduced to every U.S. Congress since 1993 and there have already been attempts to revoke birthright citizenship in Arizona and Texas through legislation or administrative rulings (Van Susteren 2011; Jacobson 2010; Feere 2010); furthermore, then-candidate Donald Trump had been very vocal about revoking birthright citizenship on the campaign trail (Connelly 2015). By and large, the organization behind the action alert is acting as a whistleblower in this scenario, pointing to a policy most Latino communities would perceive as unfavorable to immigrants.

The Opportunity Condition also refers to matters of citizenship. The Opportunity Condition is centered on passing reform that includes a pathway to citizenship, an issue immigrant advocates and the Latino community have favored for the last decade, ranging from 86 percent approval in 2006 to 77 percent among Latino voters in 2015 (Jones 2015). The Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity approach provides language from the single-cue Threat and Opportunity conditions so that respondents learn about the attempt to revoke birthright citizenship and the bill aimed at providing a pathway to citizenship. Each of the treatments ended with a general call to action.

Dependent Variables:

Political participation was measured with three items: the likelihood of participating in a march, talking about politics with friends or family, and volunteering time with a political interest group. These outcomes are 5-level categorical variables ranging from 0 (“not at all likely”) to 1 (“extremely

likely"). Respondents were asked "If given the opportunity to do so, we would like to know whether you are extremely likely, very likely, moderately likely, slightly likely or not at all likely to take part in any of the following three activities to express your opinion about immigration policies." Because the march, talk and volunteer items were on the same question prompt, I combined these into an overall participation scale ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning they were "extremely likely" to take part in all three non-electoral forms of political behavior. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Cronbach's alpha was .85 for all three items. Thus, I combined all three behaviors into a 3-item participation scale, resulting in a mean of .387. The distribution of these individual measures include 21 percent saying they are "extremely likely" or "very likely" to join a protest, 36 percent expressing they are "extremely likely" or "very likely" to talk about politics with their friends or family, and 22 percent suggesting they are "extremely likely" or "very likely" to volunteer for an interest group. The intent to march variable had a mean of .324, the talking about politics measure had a mean of .481, and the volunteering with an interest group measure had a mean of .355.

Furthermore, I also provide analyses for intended electoral political behavior. Among respondents who said they were registered to vote or planned on registering to vote (n=789), they were then asked about how likely they were to vote in the general election in November. This 5-level categorical variable was recoded from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning "extremely likely" and 0 meaning "not at all likely." The distribution of my vote variable consists of 62 percent of the sample saying they are "extremely likely" to vote in the November election, while nearly 17 percent reported being "somewhat" or "not at all likely" to vote. This outcome measure had a mean of .84, admittedly quite high.

Finally, instead of only relying on intended forms of political participation, I incorporate an observed measure of behavior, including sending an anonymous electronic postcard to the U.S.

Senators of their state (1 meaning they "sent any postcard message," 0 meaning they "did not send any postcard message"). This measure was asked after the intent to participate items. All respondents had the option to urge their U.S. Senators to cast an affirmative or opposing vote on either or both of the following immigration proposals: 1.) ending birthright citizenship for children born of immigrant parents who do not have legal U.S. status, and/or 2.) providing a pathway to citizenship for immigrants living in the U.S. without legal status. Subjects also had the option to write their own message about immigration reform. Lastly, subjects were also given the option to select "I do not want to send any message." Unless respondents chose to send no message, they could select up to two preset message options (and/or write their own). Sixty-four percent of the sample opted to send a postcard, while nearly 36 percent chose not to send any message.

As opposed to my analyses of the intended forms of political participation, the observed postcard measure is potentially less vulnerable to one overestimating how willing they are to engage in politics. Furthermore, given that this was an Internet survey experiment, there is much less social pressure on this platform than there would be with a classroom laboratory experiment where the investigators are present (Merolla et al. 2012; see discussion of this difference in social pressures in Morton and Williams 2010). When it comes to analyzing actual forms of political engagement, this postcard measure is part of a broader and newer range of online political behaviors (Valentino et al. 2011; Merolla, Pantoja, Cargile and Mora 2012), particularly one moving beyond more conservative forms of behavior (e.g. information gathering seen in previous studies)(Gibson, Lusoli and Ward, 2005; Brader 2005, 2011; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks and Davis 2008; Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot and White 2006). This actual form of participation allowed participants to send either an anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant message (or both) to their U.S. senators, which is an improvement from previous studies that have only

captured one-sided forms of political activism (Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004). Finally, participants were able to write their own message if they wanted to go into more detail about their views. Again, the survey was available in English and Spanish, so my sample was able to write their messages in their preferred language.[23]

Manipulation Checks:

Finally, though I did not rely on treatment messages that were self-generated among my participants, I protect the internal validity of my treatment randomization through the use of a manipulation check measure. I include a cognitive manipulation check of the treatment messages. Figure 3.1 below provides the predicted probabilities of perceiving threat and opportunity estimated by the treatment messages (for the model's full results, refer to Appendix B Table B-1). The manipulation check measure asks the following question immediately after the randomized treatments: "Do you think current immigration proposals will make the lives for unauthorized immigrants currently living in the U.S. easier or harder?" The 6-category options range from 0 meaning the current immigration proposals would make life a "great deal easier" for unauthorized immigrants, and "1" meaning current immigration proposals would make life "a great deal harder" for unauthorized immigrants. To avoid acquiescence bias in the responses, the response options randomly appeared in forward- and reverse-ordering. In fact, this was the case for all the variables in the survey. The results are consistent whether this measure is recoded as the original 7-category measure, including those in the middle of the scale who reported "neither

[23] So as to manage the scope of the project, the 96 open-ended postcard messages are currently not included in the empirical chapters of this dissertation. As part of an extension of this dissertation manuscript, I plan on hiring bilingual research assistants to generate intercoder reliability of the postcard messages and delve into deeper analyses for my book project.

harder nor easier." This middle category was dropped as ambivalent cases.[24] The aim of the manipulation check is to determine whether participants in fact perceived a policy threat to undocumented immigrants in the "Threatening Condition" and if they perceived a policy goal aimed at improving the state of affairs for undocumented immigrants in the "Opportunity Message." Finally, the Coupled Condition contains signals of both threat and opportunity elements, and as such, we see that the participants perceived this message to be somewhere in between the scale range. It is also important to note that based on additional robustness checks, the participation and postcard model results reported in this chapter and in the next chapter still hold when accounting for this cognitive manipulation check (Appendix Table B-2).

Figure 3.1: Predicted Probabilities of the Perception that Policy Proposal Will Make Lives of Unauthorized Immigrants Easier or Harder by Treatments



Notes: Predicted probabilities are derived from OLS regression estimates from Model 2 of Appendix Table B-1 (n=1,001). Predicted Probabilities based on the 6-category measure of the cognitive perception of threat and opportunity, ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning current

[24] Those in the middle of the scale ("neither") of the 7-category measure could be considered cognitively ambivalent (Model 1). Thus, the outcome measure in Model 2 (and 3) of Appendix Table B-1 excludes these cases from the ambivalent category and results in a sample size of 756. The predicted probabilities are not substantively different whether based on the 7-category (Model 1, n=1,001) or the 6-category cognitive perception measure (Models 2 or 3, n=765).

proposals will make life a great harder for undocumented immigrants and 0 meaning currents proposals will make life a great deal easier for undocumented immigrants. Relative to the non-political control condition, all probabilities are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. $^{+}$Signifies the predicted probabilities that are statistically distinguishable from the threat condition at the $p<.01$ level (Model 3).

Based on the predicted probabilities in Figure 3.1, the intended policy signals associated with each treatment message were consistent with what participants reported. Relative to those in the non-political Control Condition, those in the Threat Condition reported that the lives of undocumented immigrants would be made harder (by 12 percentage points) with the current immigration proposals. As suspected, those in the Opportunity Condition reported lower probabilities of seeing things get worse for undocumented immigrants (by 22 percentage points). Finally, those in the Coupled Condition said that life would fare somewhere in the middle, neither entirely making life harder, nor making life entirely easier.

As expected, and relative to those in the Control Condition, subjects in the Threat Condition reported greater rates of perceived threat levels (Appendix Table B-1, Model 1, b = .092, p-value = 0.000) and those in the Opportunity Condition were substantially less likely to report perceived threat levels (Appendix Table B-1, Model 1, b = -.172, p-value = 0.000) and more likely to report greater opportunities for undocumented immigrants. Those in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition landed in the middle on this spectrum (Appendix Table B-1, Model 1, b = -.003, p-value = .912), though indicating perceptions of threat and opportunity for those in this combined approach were not statistically distinguishable from those in the Control Condition. Because I know that the treatment messages triggered the policy signal they were intended for, I am confident that the coupled threat-and-opportunity, in effect signals of peril and promise, catalyzed greater rates of political engagement among my participants.

The appraisal process of threat and opportunity has often involved various reactions, including cognitive and affective stages of processing (Folkman and Lazarus 1980; Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Folkman et al. 1986; Lazarus 1991). People respond with fear when they confront threats that are either difficult to control or it is not clear how to address them. In this study, hope is the desire and expectation for a promising or appeasing policy goal to materialize in the future (Phoenix 2015; Just, Crigler and Belt 2007). Thus, it is also worth pointing to an additional manipulation check I added to the survey instrument. Immediately after being randomized the experimental treatment screen (just before the cognitive perception item), subjects were asked about their affective responses to the treatments.[25] Perhaps due to not having a larger sample, and the fact that the treatment screens were not designed to tap the emotional causal mechanism of one's responses to the treatments, there is only one statistically distinguishable result that emerged from the analyses of the emotion manipulation check: the threat condition was negatively correlated with feeling hopeful (Appendix Table B-3, b = -.068, p = .035).[26] The emotions were coded from 0 to 1 (1 = a great deal, .5 = a moderate amount, 0 = not at all). There are ways to design a randomized treatment so as to trigger the intended emotions. This separate treatment design is being implemented in a current extension of the project in a new survey experiment with YouGov (funded by the National Science Foundation). Again, the aim in this survey experiment was to first establish the causal effect between policy messages (involving threat and opportunities) and one's motivation to take political action.

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[25] The exact question read: "What kind of emotional response did you have, if any, based on what you read or saw in the previous screen? For each of the 10 emotions shown below, do you feel that emotion a great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little or not at all?" The 10 emotions included were: anxious, proud, angry, hopeful, afraid, excited, happy, sad, uneasy and hopeless. The order of the emotions was randomized and the participants saw one emotion at a time.

[26] When it comes to the potential mediating effects of fear and hope in the appraisal process of threat and opportunity, I included these measures in Appendix Table B-4 to test whether my participation outcomes still remained significant. In fact, I find the results remain consistent upon controlling for both cognitive and affective manipulation checks.

Results

My primary hypothesis involves the variation in participatory behavior across experimental conditions, relative to non-political appeals. Thus, my primary independent variables are the three experimental treatment conditions. Given the continuous nature of my dependent variables of political behavior, I rely on ordinary least squares regression models. The observable sent postcard outcome a dichotomous measure, so I rely on logistic regression analyses for this behavior. Specifically, I explore the following question in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5: does the combination of policy threat and policy opportunity lead to greater mobilization rates than being exposed to non-political appeals? Secondly, I determine whether the combination of threat and opportunity cues would yield greater observed participation rates relative to the single-cue conditions for the postcard outcome (seen in additional models of Table 3.5). This approach allows me to discern with greater precision whether any observed effects are as a result of the combination of threat and opportunity or simply any appeal other than the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity approach. To dispel beliefs that the differences in the distribution of sociopolitical variables across the cells might account for the results, I also estimate my models with controls for education, income, age, immigrant generation status and partisanship, which yield slightly stronger results for the main effects models. All these control variables were coded from 0 to 1.[27]

[27] Results with the control variables are available in Appendix Tables B-5 through B-7.

Table 3.3: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms of Political Participation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Join a March (Baseline = Control)	Talk About Politics (Baseline = Control)	Volunteer for an Organization (Baseline = Control)	Participation Scale (Baseline = Control)
Threat Condition	0.046	0.037	0.030	0.038
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.026)
Opportunity Condition	0.011	0.018	0.001	0.010
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Coupled Condition	0.051*	0.068**	0.027	0.049*
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.026)
Constant	0.297***	0.449***	0.340***	0.362***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Observations	1,001	1,001	1,001	1,001
R-squared	0.004	0.006	0.002	0.002

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables gender, education, income, age, immigrant generation status and partisanship measures as controls. These additional models are available upon request.

As anticipated in Hypothesis 1, Table 3.3's results suggest the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition mobilizes participants at greater rates than the non-political Control Condition. This is the only treatment with an effect that is statistically distinguishable from the baseline. The mobilizing effect of the Coupled Condition is particularly apparent for the intent to join a march and talk about politics with friends or family. The Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition's coefficient translates to a 5 percent increase for joining a march relative to those exposed to the Control message (p = .100). Moreover, in terms of talking about politics with friends or family, the Coupled Condition's coefficient translates to a 7 percent increase (p =

.050) compared to those in the Control Condition. These results are modest, but significant. There are no reliable mobilizing effects that emerge when predicting one's intent to volunteer for an organization, as the treatment estimates fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In the final column (Model 4), I present results for the participation scale (which combines the marching, talking and volunteering outcomes), and here we see the positive effect of the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition still holds. Thus, relative to the Control Condition, the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition yields greater participation rates among subjects. While we also see that the effects of the single cue treatments of Threat and Opportunity alone are substantively positive in Table 3.3, these results do not reach statistical significance. I thought the effect of the Threat Condition would have been positively correlated with at least talking about politics (Hypothesis 4), but Model 2 indicates this effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Results in Table 3.3 provide the first direct evidence that highlighting both the threat and opportunity cues can foster greater levels of political participation relative to those in the non-political Control Condition, supporting Hypothesis 1. Expanding on findings from sociology and psychology work, this conclusion is consistent with the implications of Vasi and Macy (2003) and Rogers and Mewborn (1976) and suggests that providing a promising goal with the urgent threat of a potential loss motivates respondents to take action. Although not shown in Table 3.3, the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition also appears to have a positive effect on talking about politics when the referent category is the single-cue Opportunity Condition ($b = .049$, $p = .100$).[28] This finding partially supports Hypothesis 2, where I expected the Coupled Condition to be more mobilizing than the single cue conditions.

[28] Results available in Appendix Table B-8.

Table 3.4: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Electoral Form of Political Participation – Intent to Vote in Upcoming General Election

	Model 1
	Intent to Vote (Baseline = Control)
Threat Condition	-0.028
	(0.025)
Opportunity Condition	-0.052**
	(0.025)
Coupled Condition	-0.020
	(0.025)
Constant	0.868***
	(0.018)
Observations	789
R-squared	0.006

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. The Intent to Vote outcome was limited to those who reported being registered vote or intending to register, and it did not include those who said they were ineligible to register to vote or who said they did not plan to register. Results do not vary when controlling for gender, education, income, age, immigrant generation status and partisanship measures as controls.

In Table 3.4, I focus on electoral political behavior, specifically the likelihood of turning out to vote. Much like conventional wisdom might expect (Miller et al. 2002), the negative and statistically significant coefficient for the Opportunity Condition suggests that cues of this sort actually inhibit political action (Kahneman and Tversky 1976; Latané 1981). People in the Opportunity Condition indicate an intention to vote in the upcoming general election at about 5 percent lower rates than comparable study participants in the Control Condition. This finding supports Hypothesis 5, where I expected lone opportunity cues to discourage participation. This is the only treatment with an effect that is statistically distinguishable from zero. I expected the

Coupled Condition to have a positive effect on the likelihood to vote, but results reported in Table 3.4 do not support this hypothesis.

Table 3.5: Logit Models, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Sent Postcard

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Sent Postcard (Baseline = Control)	Sent Postcard (Baseline = Threat)	Sent Postcard (Baseline = Opportunity)
Threat Condition	0.041	-	0.072
	(0.185)	-	(0.184)
Opportunity Condition	-0.031	-0.072	-
	(0.184)	(0.184)	-
Coupled Condition	0.442**	0.401**	0.473**
	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.191)
Control Condition	-	-0.041	0.031
	-	(0.185)	(0.184)
Constant	0.483***	0.52***	0.452***
	(0.130)	(0.13)	(0.129)
Observations	1,001	1,001	1,001

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables gender, education, income, age, immigrant generation status and partisanship measures as controls.

Finally, instead of only relying on intended measures of political participation as seen in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, I turn to an observed measure of political behavior in Table 3.5. In some respects, this is the toughest test for my argument as an intention to participate might represent "cheap talk," but an actual measure of participation might represent a more genuine indicator of the concept I have chosen to study. Whether I compare the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition to the non-political Control Condition or to the Threat Condition, we see that the combined approach has a positive effect on one's willingness to send a postcard to their U.S.

Senators. Model 1 is consistent with my expectations in Hypothesis 1, and so far provides the strongest support that the coupled approach is yielding greater rates of observed political action. Most interestingly, that the effect of this condition is also decidedly different from either the Threat (Model 2) or Opportunity Conditions (Model 3), as expected in Hypothesis 2. Upon computing the odds-ratio of the reported logistic coefficients in Table 3.5, I find that the odds of sending a postcard are 1.555 times greater for those in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition relative to those in the Control Condition. The substantive impact of this condition is of comparable size when the Threat Condition is the baseline. In Model 3, I find consistent results when the Opportunity Condition is the baseline. The Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition generates 1.604 times greater odds of sending a postcard relative to those in the Opportunity Condition. This is consistent with my expectations in Hypotheses 1 and 2, the Coupled Condition was more mobilizing relative to the control or single-cue messaging strategies.

To more easily interpret the results from Table 3.5, Figure 3.2 provides the predicted probabilities based on the logit coefficient estimates. As we can see, relative to the control (or other single cue conditions), the coupled threat-and-opportunity messages boost the probability of having sent a postcard by approximately 10 percentage points. This effect is significant at the .05 level, a pattern that was consistent whether the referent category was the non-political control condition or if it was either of the single cue conditions. In fact, we see that the threat and opportunity conditions on their own are not statistically distinguishable from the non-political control conditions. Thus, the effect of the single message approach is flat and neither mobilizing or demobilizing for participants when it comes to sending a postcard. The single cue messages of

threat and opportunity alone are ineffective in spurring this form of political participation (Hypothesis 3).

Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of Sending a Postcard by Treatment



Notes: Predicted probabilities are derived from logit estimates from Table 3.5 (n=1,001). The referent category is the non-political control condition. Relative to the non-political control condition, all probabilities are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$. $^{+}$Signifies that the predicted probabilities are statistically distinguishable from the threat condition (Model 3).

When it comes to understanding those who sent a postcard, we recall that participants also had the option to write their own message. In fact, 96 participants wrote their own message (nearly 15 percent of those who sent a message). Some of the messages people wrote on their own emphasized the importance of embracing America's diversity and highlight the deservingness of immigrants and their children. For instance, one participant's comments summarize this best.

> *"This country is the great melting pot, where for centuries folks have come to work hard, raise their families, and live a better life with endless opportunities. Let us always remember the words of MLK.....if one of us is oppressed, then we are [all oppressed]."*

This participant was exposed to the threat message, which focused on revoking the birthright citizenship of children of undocumented immigrant parents. Thus, reading about this policy proposal invoked feelings of righteousness and social justice in them. Instead of feeling solely disillusioned or fearful, the participant focused on the diversity behind the American “melting pot” and how through hard work, folks have the chance to raise their families in a better life. To emphasize that there is injustice or a wrong that needs to be rectified, the participant goes so far as to share a quote from Martin Luther King, Jr. Other participants provide shorter messages that speak to the deservingness and warmth with which immigrants should experience in the U.S.: “Children have the right to have the American citizenship” and “immigrants need some help to stay in [the] USA.” So, by emphasizing a paired policy message, one with hope and threat, we are harnessing the potential for all participations to feel empowered or as though there will be some relief for the situation of undocumented immigrants. This is critical, especially as threatened individuals who only perceive the potential for loss, may think they have very little to gain from their efforts; contrastingly, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as well as loss, and are more eager to accomplish the task in front of them.

Discussion

Overall, my findings provide strong support for my argument regarding the mobilizing effects of the combined threat and opportunity appeals among Latinos. Unlike the threat or opportunity strategies alone, when both approaches are adopted I found that Latinos in my sample were more likely to engage in non-electoral forms of participation and were more likely to contact their elected representatives through the use of a postcard. With respect to sending a postcard to one’s senators, I found that the coupled strategy was effective relative to a non-political control group and relative to the threat and opportunity appeals alone. I suspect that my

mobilizing messages had the strongest effects in the intent to participate and postcard models because the treatment messages ended with an immediate call to action. These participation measures allow respondents to express more immediate action, whereas the intent to vote in the general election measure consisted of a type of activity that was still about five months away at that point (data was collected in June of 2016). Furthermore, people may not have been inclined to express a desire to vote because they realize that a president cannot create immigration reform, it has to be handled legislatively through Congress and state politics (Planas 2016).

The Coupled Condition is intended to challenge individuals to take action by conveying the possibility of gain and loss, a perspective Tomaka et al. (1993) find most helpful as people encounter a threat or stressor in their environment. Threatened individuals who only perceive the potential for loss, may think they have very little to gain for their efforts; contrastingly, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as well as loss, and are more eager to accomplish the goal at hand. When sufficient resources are present (perceived or real), the stressor in one's environment becomes a challenge with the possibility of gains and benefits, instead of solely a danger or risk confronting them as seen in the threat-only condition (Tomaka et al. 1993; Pang et al. 2007).

A potential alternative explanation of my findings is that the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition might be more mobilizing because it is providing more information for participants to learn from. However, we know through Lupia's (1994) work that more information is more cognitively taxing for individuals. As busy as people are, more information should turn them away from politics, and not towards it (Lupia 1994). The Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition has approximately 60 more words than those seen in the single-cue treatments. As such, the time spent reading the Coupled Condition was only approximately nine

seconds longer than the time it took to read the other two single cue treatments. It is also worth mentioning the Control Condition consisted of 66 words, while the Threat condition had sixty-three and the Opportunity Condition had 67 (as seen in the transcript provided Table 3.1). Upon analyzing whether differences in time carry weight, I found the time spent on each treatment screen does not have a statistically significant effect on one's overall survey length. Finally, another potential alternative explanation is that the Coupled Condition provided people with two issues to become impassioned about, and it may not necessarily be a sense of threat and opportunity working hand-in-hand. As an extension of the current project, I am currently designing a separate survey experiment to test this alternative hypothesis. In this extension project, the threat-only and opportunity-only messages would have two immigration policy issues in each, which would then match the length and number of issues presented in the coupled treatment message.

Summary

In this chapter, I questioned the causal link between threat and individual mobilization, and whether threat is the only catalyst Latinos respond to. Again, the policy threat mentions a proposal that wants to revoke the birthright citizenship of undocumented immigrants, while the policy opportunity refers to providing a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. The coupled approach refers to both proposal initiatives, which both involve the topic of citizenship. The motivating effects behind a coupled threat and opportunity approach center on the expectation the urgency provoked by the political threat to boost greater attentiveness, and yet this anxiety does not veer into despair because the promising signals of a political opportunity provide encouragement and hope. This is captured through the cognitive manipulation check, which accounts for the risks posed by the policy threat as well as the glimmer of improving conditions posed by the policy opportunity.

My results shed further light into the nuance of policy threat and policy opportunity messages and the ways in which they work hand in hand in people's environments. Specifically, previous work has not directly examined whether threatening anti-immigrant appeals lead to greater levels of political participation among Latino participants. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find messages focusing solely on such threats do not always mobilize Latinos into action. This narrow focus on threat has also prevented scholars from delving into the more complex messaging environment people are exposed to when facing threats in their environment, especially for a highly contested topic area like immigration policy. As is, researchers have not explored whether additional messages, such as competing policy opportunities, might provide alternative explanations for observed levels of activism. In part, previous scholars have largely expected competing messages (such as gains and policy opportunities) tend to foster free-riding behavior among the masses (Latané 1981; Olson 1965; Miller and Krosnick 2004). The focus on the catalyzing effect of threat, particularly dominant in the Latino "sleeping giant" narrative in the 1990s and 2006, has been one-sided—often ignoring the demobilizing or ineffective mobilizing effect of this appeal. We know the role of threat is complex, but what this project shows is that it is not the only way to bolster political participation. Instead, we see that coupling a sense of peril with promise evokes a more participatory public, at least among Latinos regarding the immigration policy debate.

Consistent with the work of Vasi and Macy (2003) and Rogers and Mewborn (1976), simply exposing Latinos to a looming crisis without a reassuring policy alternative can be counterproductive. The coupled threat-and-opportunity approach is more mobilizing because I argue that individuals who feel challenged, and not only threatened, are less distracted by the negativity stirred by the threat message (Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Lazarus and Folkman 1984;

Tomaka et al. 1993). I have some indirect evidence for this, as the cognitive manipulation check demonstrates that subjects are less pessimistic about the future well-being of unauthorized immigrants in the Coupled Condition – even though they receive the identical message as in the Threatened Condition. That is, without an incentive such as the benefits posed by a policy opportunity, threatened individuals who only perceive danger have little, if anything, to gain from their efforts (Tomaka et al. 1993). The experiment results point to a positive association between the Coupled Condition and the intent to participate in various non-electoral forms of participation (march, talk and volunteer). I find the coupled strategy of threat and opportunity encourages people to send a postcard at higher rates than simply using lone messages emphasizing threat or opportunity appeals. This observed political behavior provides the most striking results, as it moves away from speculating about potential or intended behavior.

Finding ways to promote political participation is very important in the health of a democracy. Political participation is central to healthy democracies because it is indicative of an engaged citizenry (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). The less that people are involved, the less likely they are to hold favorable evaluations of the responsiveness of the political process (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Finkel 1985 1987; Madsen 1987).

CHAPTER 4:

Who is More Mobilized? Explaining Conditional Effects by Gender

In Chapter 3, my survey experiment allowed me to test hypotheses on the main effects for each of my treatment groups. One of my major findings is that, relative to a non-political appeal, a message combining elements of threat and opportunity is most effective at encouraging various forms of reported political participation, such as the intent to participate in protest marches and talk about politics with their friends or family. This finding expands the realm of possibilities of mobilizing messages, and points to the notion that threat appeals are not the only factors motivating one's political behavior. Another major finding in my experiment is that the coupled message spurred greater levels of observed political behavior—sending a postcard with their immigration opinion to their U.S. Senators—, arguably a much tougher test of my hypotheses as it moves beyond the intended, or speculative, forms of political behavior. For this observed measure of participation, I found the coupled threat-and-opportunity message to be more mobilizing than the single-cue threat or single-cue opportunity conditions. This set of findings for the coupled approach challenges previous scholars who have relied on the threat as the most effective external motivator to explain heightened levels of political participation in a contentious political environment. What has yet to be explored is for whom the coupled message is most effective? Upon subsequent analyses of the experimental data, I found these mobilizing effects are moderated by gender, with women driving the results behind the coupled message. In this chapter, I explore this surprising finding and explain the moderated effects for gender. Some

of the questions guiding this chapter are: why would we expect women to respond differently to the coupled threat-and-opportunity message? Do women assess risks and opportunities differently and, therefore, turn to alternative coping strategies than their male counterparts? What would lead us to believe that women respond differently to various messaging strategies? Given differences in the rate at which Latino men and women acculturate in the U.S., are Latino women generally advantaged or disadvantaged when it comes to navigating the U.S. political system?

The chapter is organized into three sections. The first section provides my experiment's results and discussion of the analyses. I then proceed to a theoretical background to grasp a better understanding of the ways in which gender shapes one's stress appraisal and coping strategies. Lastly, I provide an overview of the socialization and acculturation differences that explain varying levels in political engagement patterns among Latinos more broadly.

Methods and Procedure:

As described in the previous chapter, this study relies on a convenience sample collected on the Internet by the polling firm, *Latino Decisions*. The sample consists of 1,015 Latino adults in the U.S., including 511 women and 504 men. To test the moderating effect of gender across my treatment conditions, I create an interaction term between gender and the experimental treatments. Again, gender is coded as a dummy variable with "1" representing females and "0" representing males. Each treatment condition is coded as a dummy variable, with "1" being those who saw that specified treatment and "0" being "all else." Due to this interaction term, the analyses are conducted with the pooled sample and not in a split-sample design where men and women are analyzed separately.

Treatments:

To reiterate, my experimental treatments consist of three versions of an online action alert from the same immigrant advocacy organization. Participants were randomized to 1 of 4 screens: a Control Condition, a Threat Condition, an Opportunity Condition, or a fourth condition referred to as the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition. Subjects assigned to the non-political Control Condition read a non-political summary about Smartphone messaging apps. All three experimental treatments consist of a realistic action alert regarding a U.S. Senate immigration proposal that participants are told will be voted on within the week. By manipulating the content of the proposed Senate bill(s) and its corresponding photograph, the treatments will consist of a call to action that has either 1) threat-only, 2) opportunity-only, or 3) a combination of the threat-and-opportunity based cues. The Threat condition refers to a policy proposal that suggests eliminating the birthright citizenship of children born to undocumented immigrant parents. The Opportunity Condition references a policy proposal that would provide a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants in the U.S. A detailed description of each of the conditions can be found in Table 3.2, with differences across the action alerts highlighted in bold text.

Results:

Political Appeals and Gender

To better identify the mobilizing effect of the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity message, I explore whether single cue and coupled approaches of threat and opportunity messages motivate some and not others. In Table 4.1, the treatments are interacted by gender, allowing me to determine whether men and women respond differently to various messaging strategies.

Table 4.1: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Participate Scale (Baseline = Control)	Intent to Vote (Baseline = Control)	Sent Postcard (Baseline = Control)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.076**	-0.097***	-0.871***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.267)
Threat Condition	0.015	-0.064*	-0.398
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.266)
Threat X Gender	0.047	0.079	0.872**
	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.374)
Opportunity Condition	-0.018	-0.099***	-0.388
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.272)
Opportunity X Gender	0.060	0.100**	0.718*
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.372)
Coupled Condition	-0.010	-0.061*	0.200
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.289)
Coupled X Gender	0.117**	0.091*	0.512
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.389)
Constant	0.399***	0.913***	0.922***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.194)
Observations	1,001	789	1,001
R-squared	0.011	0.016	

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for two-tailed test. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. There were 119 women in the Control, 121 in the Coupled Condition, 133 in the Threat Condition and 132 in the Coupled Condition. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables including gender, education, income, age, immigrant generation status and partisanship measures as controls. It is worth noting that postcard outcome findings for the coupled condition lose their statistical significance in the fully specified model. These additional models are available in Appendix C.

We see that the gender coefficient is negative and statistically significant, meaning that in the Control Condition, women are less likely to participate across all 3 models relative to their male counterparts. Focusing on Model 1, while estimating one's intent to participate in various forms of non-electoral political behavior, the Coupled Condition's combined interactive effect is statistically significant and remains positive. Women in the Coupled Condition express greater

rates of political participation than men exposed to the same condition. This message helps women minimize the wide gender gap between their rates of participation and that of their male counterparts (refer to first two columns of Figure 4.1). When predicting people's likelihood to vote (see Model 2, Figure 4.2), I find that men are less likely to indicate they will vote. Gender does make a difference, but mostly by allowing women to resist the negative effects that men experience in the Coupled Condition. Interestingly, the gender-by-treatment interaction term for the Threat Condition remains positive, but does not reach statistical significance. The interactive effect of the single cue Opportunity Condition cancels out. Some of the findings in Table 4.1 suggest that the mobilizing effects of this message are driven by women being more motivated to participate in social forms of political behavior (Model 1). As seen with the case of intending to vote, women are not being demobilized in the Coupled Condition, as with the case of men (Model 2).

When estimating the sent postcard outcome (Model 3), these analyses reveal the single cue treatment messages do not have the same mobilizing effect for men and women. Contrary to free-riding and "social loafing" expectations of opportunity messages in the extant literature (Miller et al. 2002; Olson 1965; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Latané 1981), the gender-by-opportunity treatment interaction indicates that the opportunity message is motivating women to send a postcard. Women in the Opportunity Condition have expressed greater predicted likelihoods in sending a postcard, at least relative to men in the same condition. The interactive effect of the Opportunity treatment by gender is statistically significant. The interactive effect also appears to be positive for the Threat Condition, meaning that for women threat is mobilizing them to send a postcard relative to men in the Threat Condition. Though the single-cue conditions appear to be having a substantively demobilizing effect for men, these coefficients are

not distinguishable from zero. Furthermore, the interactive effect of gender by the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition does not appear to have a statistically distinguishable effect among men and women. Thus, the effects are in the anticipated direction but they fall short of statistical significance.

To ease interpretation of the moderating effects of gender in my experiment, the results in Table 4.1 were converted into predicted probabilities in Figures 4.1-4.3. The first figure depicts the predicted probabilities of the participation scale estimates.

Figure 4.1: Participation Scale by Gender and Across the Control Condition and Coupled Treatment



Notes: Predicted probabilities derived from the participation scale regression found in Model 1 of Table 4.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables including gender, education, income and age as controls.

As we examine Figure 4.1, the first pair of bars columns represents the probability of expressing greater participation scale rates among men and women in the Control Condition and

the second set of columns are from subjects in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition. In the Control Condition, I find that women are significantly disadvantaged relative to men when it comes to non-electoral forms of participation. This disadvantage amounts to about 8 percentage points, so it is not trivial (p = .05). However, as seen in the highlighted Coupled Condition in this figure, we find this gender imbalance is not only eliminated, but women are slightly more likely (4 percentage points) than men to participate politically. Interestingly, men remain essentially unmoved by the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition. Thus, the positive interactive effect of gender and the Coupled Condition is being driven almost entirely by the 9-point increase in participation among women.

Figure 4.2: Intent to Vote by Gender and Across the Control Condition and Coupled Treatment



Notes: Predicted probabilities derived from the intent to vote estimates presented in Model 2 of Table 4.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables education, income and age as controls.

In Figure 4.2, we see there is an obvious gender gap in likelihood to vote in the non-political Control Condition (p = .01), but this is quickly eliminated in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition. The combined approach is static for women and deters men from the intent to vote. In fact, women experience a mild, albeit statistically insignificant, 2-point increase in voting, men encounter a 6-point decrease in voting between the Control and Coupled Conditions. This may be due to the difference in coping styles men and women rely on under threat and opportunity appraisals (Ptacek et al. 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1980). Because voting is more of an expressive form of political participation and women tend to be more expressive when coping with a stressor in their environment (Ptacek et al. 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1980), Latino men might not see voting as a solution to their concerns or as a means to deal with the stress they encounter in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition. Expression and seeking social support are more so the types of coping styles women engage in (Ptacek et al. 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1980). Men might turn to other forms of political behavior, such as lobbying or running for office to resolve the issue at hand, but those outcomes were not part of the scope of this study. The socialization literature on Latinos would suggest that men might be deterred from participating because the positive message embedded in the Coupled Condition is not enough to dissuade the triggered "oppositional" response associated with the threat message in this same condition (Foner 2000; Waters 1999; Lopez 2003).

Figure 4.3: Sent Postcards by Gender and Across the Control Condition and Coupled Treatment



Notes: Predicted probabilities derived from the postcard estimates provided in Model 3 of Table 4.1. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables education, income and age as controls. For the predicted probabilities of all the treatments, see Appendix Figure C.1.

Finally, we see in Figure 4.3 that the interactive effect fell short of statistical significance in the Coupled Condition for women relative to men, meaning there is no substantial gender difference in this treatment—neither men and women experience a mobilizing effect when plotting one's probability of sending a postcard.

To test whether the gendered findings hold relative to the single cue conditions, I assign threat or opportunity alone as the referent category conditions in Table 4.2 (participation scale) and Table 4.3 (postcard) below. Table 4.2 focuses on the participation scale measure. The models were also estimated after accounting for demographic control variables for educational

attainment, income, age, generation status, and partisanship (for full results, refer to Appendix C). The tables in this chapter are estimated without the control variables.

Table 4.2: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines

	Model 1	Model 2
	Participation Scale (Baseline = Threat)	Participation Scale (Baseline = Opportunity)
Gender, 1= Female	-0.029	-0.016
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Control Condition	-0.015	0.018
	(0.036)	(0.037)
Control X Gender	-0.047	-0.060
	(0.052)	(0.052)
Opportunity Condition	-0.033	-
	(0.037)	-
Opportunity X Gender	0.013	-
	(0.052)	-
Coupled Condition	-0.025	0.008
	(0.037)	(0.038)
Coupled X Gender	0.071	0.057
	(0.052)	(0.052)
Threat Condition	-	0.033
	-	(0.037)
Threat X Gender	-	-0.013
	-	(0.052)
Constant	0.414***	0.381***
	(0.026)	(0.027)
Observations	1,001	1,001
R-squared	0.011	0.011

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

As seen in Table 4.2, we do not find evidence of a moderating gender effect in the Coupled Condition relative to the single cue treatment conditions. Thus, the gendered effect found in Model 1 of Table 4.1 only holds when the omitted category is the non-political Control Condition.

Table 4.3: Estimating Postcard Sent Logit Models by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines

	Model 1	Model 2
	Sent Postcard Gender Interactions	Sent Postcard Gender Interactions
Gender, 1= Female	0.00	-0.15
	(0.26)	(0.26)
Control Condition	0.40	0.39
	(0.27)	(0.27)
Control X Gender	-0.87**	-0.72*
	(0.37)	(0.37)
Opportunity Condition	0.01	-
	(0.26)	-
Opportunity X Gender	-0.15	-
	(0.37)	-
Coupled Condition	0.60**	0.59**
	(0.28)	(0.29)
Coupled X Gender	-0.36	-0.21
	(0.39)	(0.38)
Threat Condition		-0.01
		(0.26)
Threat X Gender		0.15
		(0.37)
Constant	0.52***	0.53***
	(0.18)	(0.19)
Observations	1,001	1,001

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In Table 4.3 above, we see the logit coefficient estimates for sending a postcard relative to the single cue baseline conditions of Threat (Model 1) and Opportunity (Model 2). We see that with either of the single cue conditions set as the baselines, the control message has a dampening effect on the observed participation rates of sending a postcard among women compared to men in the control message. As we can see, the coupled condition still results in a positive effect on the reported likelihood at which both men and send an electronic postcard.

Interestingly, I find that the effect of the coupled treatment makes women feel significantly less afraid, at least relative to men (Appendix Table C.4, Model 2). In that same Appendix table, I also find that women are less likely to report they are hopeful (Model 1), but this effect is not as significant or as large as that seen when estimating fear. Perhaps women report being less fearful because they rely more on their social networks to confront the scenario before them (Carver, Scheier and Weintraub 1989; Stone and Neal 1984; Rosario et al. 1988; Ptacek et al. 1992), and they have the positive opportunity cue in the coupled message that points to promise and is more aligned with wishful thinking (Ptacek et al. 1992). Furthermore, because men are disproportionately targeted by immigration police enforcement (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Rugh and Hall 2016), men are perhaps more anxious and vigilant to have additional emotions triggered by the policy messages. This nuance in the extent to which men and women are reporting varying levels of fear (and hope) is worth exploring further. I plan to explore this more closely in the emotion-induction experiment design immediately following this dissertation project.

Discussion

The Role of Gender in Stress Appraisal and Coping Strategies

A gendered approach to the threat appraisal process and its impact on one's political participation would help us better understand participatory differences among Latinos, particularly as Latinas are naturalizing and voting at higher rates than their male counterparts (Lien 1998; Bejarano 2014a).[29] Because men and women are socialized differently (Choderow

[29] Though the experiments analyzed by Miller and Krosnick (2004) most closely relate to the design and political participation outcomes in my study, their sample is limited to female Democrats and thus they could not

1978; Gilligan 1982; Lang-Takac and Osterweil 1992; Ptacek et al. 1992), they may also be mobilized differently. In fact, “women are raised to internalize a great sense of responsibility for the most vulnerable in society, whereas men are encouraged to focus on self-fulfillment (Choderow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Lang-Takac and Osterweil 1992)” (as in Hutchings, Walton and Benjamin 2010). Women tend to display public opinions inclined to show concern for the disadvantaged and endorse social group equality (Pratto, Stallworth and Sidandius 1997; Schuman et al. 1997; Sidanius and Ekkehammar 1980). Thus, calls to action that emphasize the needs of a marginalized community, like those seen across the treatment messages in my experiment, would likely stir more political engagement among women. Furthermore, in the U.S., there are strong historical roots of women being involved in broad social networks and more community-oriented activities. Historically, from the time of the American Revolution, women have used methods for influencing policies from outside electoral channels (which they were excluded from) in their efforts to address concerns of the well-being of women, children, the home, and the community (Baker 1984). Some of those activities included crowd actions, circulating and presenting petitions. Throughout the nineteenth century, the charitable work of women addressed societal problems revolving around poverty and disease (Baker 1984). In the early twentieth century, after a period of discouragement in the late nineteenth century, a surge of renewed energy centered on the women’s suffrage campaign.

Ptacek et al. (1992) explain that because of widely held sex role stereotypes and gender role expectations, men are socialized to a greater extent to deal instrumentally with stress, whereas women tend to be socialized to express emotion, to employ emotion-focused coping

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test a gendered divide in the threat and opportunity appraisal process. Other scholars have focused on group differences among racial groups (Phoenix 2015) and along partisan lines or partisan strength (Valentino et al. 2011; Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Heurberger et al. 2016; Marcus et al. 2000), but there has not been a concerted focus on gender differences when it comes to assessing threats.

methods, and to seek the support of others (Mainiero 1986; Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Rosario, Shinn, Morch and Huckabee 1988). Given differences in the socialization process by gender, women may be more mobilized than men when faced with exogenous policy signals centered on the plight of one's community. Thus, women may be more likely to seek expressive forms of participation under stress, including more expressive and social forms of political behavior—for example, intending to march, talking about politics and sending a postcard fulfill this form of social or more expressive coping behavior.

Several studies have revealed that men use more problem-focused coping than women (Brems and Johnson 1989; Folkman and Lazarus 1980; Stone and Neal 1984; Ptack et al. 1992). Folkman and Lazarus (1980, 1986) focus on three broad classes of coping responses: problem-focused coping, emotion-focused coping and the seeking and utilization of social support. Several scholars have found the preferred response options at times vary by gender (Ptackek et al. 1992).[30] And although both men and women employ emotion-focused methods, women do so with greater frequency (Fondacoro and Moos 1987; Stone and Neal 1984). Many studies have found that women are more likely to seek social support than men when responding to stress in their environments (Carver, Scheier and Weintraub 1989; Stone and Neal 1984; Rosario et al. 1988; Ptacek et al. 1992).

The tendency for women to seek social support in response to a threat in their environment is supported in newer studies of the human stress response as well (Taylor, Klein, Lewis, Gruenewald, Gurung and Updegraff 2000; Ptacek et al. 1992). Taylor et al. (2000) challenge the well-known human stress response known as "fight-or-flight" (Cannon 1932) with findings that women tend to respond in a pattern they characterize as "tend and befriend." Given

[30] According to Folkman and colleagues (1980, 1986), problem-focused coping includes cognitive and behavioral attempts to change the stressful situation. Emotion-focused coping involves attempts to control emotional responses elicited by the situation. Finally, the third class of strategies involves attempts to secure social support.

the constraints females face in taking on the role as primary caregivers for offspring, the authors describe the need for women to have evolved with these alternative behavioral responses to threats (Taylor et al. 2000). "Tending" refers to the quieting and caring for offspring and reducing the neuroendocrine responses that may compromise offspring health. On the other hand, fighting would jeopardize the safety and wellbeing of the mother and offspring, and flight behavior is not a viable option with the need to take care of young offspring. The "befriending" pattern involves affiliating with social groups to reduce risk and increase the likelihood that multiple group members will protect both them and their immature offspring. Thus, threat appraisal responses are likely to differ among men and women in my study, particularly as women might be more willing to engage in activities as a group and in political acts that leverage their social networks.

The two dominant explanations behind the gender differences that emerge in the appraisal process and coping strategy patterns have fallen into either the socialization hypothesis or structural hypothesis (Ptacek et al. 1992). The socialization hypothesis holds that men and women are socialized to deal with stressful events in different ways, with men being expected to deal with stress more instrumentally, whereas women are socialized to be more expressive and seek the support of others (Mainiero 1986; Shinn, Morch and Huckabee 1988). The structural hypothesis contends that specific classes of situations demand particular methods of coping, and so because men and women experience dissimilar types of events, they appear to have different coping preferences. For instance, women experience more stresses associated with health and family concerns, and men report more stresses related to work and finances (Billings and Moos 1981; Folkman and Lazarus 1980). Mainiero (1986) finds empirical support for both

socialization influences and structural factors that reinforce coping strategy differences among men and women.

Ptacek et al. (1992) find that men and women did not differ significantly in the frequency with which they appraised events as threats, but they differ in the proportion of challenge appraisals they reported. Women appraised more events as threatening, whereas men appraised more events as challenging. In terms of additional coping strategies that are used frequently, women were also found to engage in more wishful thinking and avoidance. The appraisal differences and tendencies to engage in more wishful thinking and avoidance among women is critical as we assess the relative ease at which people feel they can cope with the threat and opportunities presented in the treatment messages (Ptacek et al. 1992). Again, threats consist of events that could have negative or undesirable consequences, whereas challenges are events that could have the potential of negative and more desirable consequences (Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Tomaka et al. 1983). Tomaka and colleagues (1993) clarify that threatened individuals perceive the potential for loss, with little, if anything, to be gained in the situation; contrastingly, challenged individuals perceive the possibility of gain as well as loss (Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Folkman and Lazarus 1985). By painting the potential for losses and positive consequences more clearly in the coupled threat-and-opportunity message, women are more readily able to channel their empathetic concerns and wishful thinking into more political engagement. Given the social and expressive nature of the political outcomes following the treatment messages, women are turning to these forms of political action, especially since they are already more apt to seek social support under stress. They do not seek this same political action in the threat alone condition, and instead operate under the expected avoidant behavior previous scholars have found when subjects are overwhelmed with the potential of negative

consequences provoked by the event (Ptacek et al. 1992; Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Tomaka et al. 1992).

Socialization Differences among Latinos

Gender has also been a critical construct of the political paths and acculturation patterns for men and women from largely Latino immigrant backgrounds. Acculturation is the process by which people adjust to contact with a culture other than their own and the extent to which they maintain their cultural identity (Berry 1994, 2001). The acculturation literature largely expects immigrant women to integrate and navigate American culture and political systems at a faster rate in the U.S. than men (Berry 2001; Jones-Correa 1998; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2003; Hardy-Fanta 1993). For instance, as seen with the gender gap in U.S. education overall, and across various racial and ethnic groups, immigrant girls are obtaining higher levels of education than their male counterparts, producing outcomes that indicate "gendered pathways" (Waldinger and Perlmann 1998; Portes and Zhou 1993). This gender gap coincides with the patriarchal norms of femininity that girls need more protection and stricter curfews in order to maintain important values of virtue. These social restrictions fit well with education systems that reward those who comply, obey and do not challenge authority figures (Waldinger and Perlmann 1998; Lopez 2003). On the other hand, immigrant parents treat their sons with more freedom, allowing more opportunities for immigrant boys and second-generation male youth to channel negative experiences with authority and experiences of racism into a masculinist "oppositional culture." This "oppositional culture" involves more questioning of authority figures as they navigate various institutions in their daily lives. As a result, these aversive interactions contribute to the gender gap observed between men and women, especially as it relates to their educational

attainment and political participation (Foner 2000; Waters 1999). Thus, to avoid another stressful encounter, men might be more willing to disengage ("flight" response) from politics when exposed to a call to action that also includes a threatening message.

Bejarano (2014a) also finds that Latino youth are socialized differently growing up in the U.S. As a function of traditional gender roles, young Latinas are expected to take on more community involvement and increased responsibilities with their families compared to young Latino males (Lopez, 2003). These experiences can lead Latinas to gain more civic skills than Latino males. In fact, over the last decade Latinas have had higher voter turnout rates in presidential elections than Latino males (NALEO; U.S. Census Bureau; Bejarano 2014a; Lien 1998). Increased levels of political participation and familiarity with navigating the political system can also provide women with stronger ties to their community and political institutions, making them the most likely to encourage other family members to become more involved in American politics (Bejarano 2014a, 2014b).

Additionally, scholars find that men and women in the Latino immigrant community engage in different kinds of political behavior (Hardy-Fanta 1990; Uni 1991; Jones-Correa 1998). For instance, while Latino women are more absent in political office, they are more involved in community-organizing efforts than their male counterparts. Jones-Correa (1998) provides more insight into the gendered pathways of the Latino community with interviews of recent immigrants in New York. Because women experience a greater boost in their social mobility status in the U.S. than in their home country, they tend to be more active in American politics than their male counterparts, who are still more valued in their native countries' social hierarchies than those in their host country (Jones-Correa 1998). As a result, Latinas tend to maintain fewer close ties with their country of origin than Latino immigrant males, including

sending remittances and expressing a desire to return to their home country (Bejarano 2014a). In fact, Latinas have spearheaded community organizing efforts and voter turnout in the Latino community (Lien 1998; Bejarano 2014a).

In sum, and in the case of the Latino population in my study, I imagine the gender differences that emerge are due to both socialization and structural pattern explanations. In part, women are more encouraged to care for the marginalized and seek social support when confronted with stress, but women are also building their ability to navigate politics with the advent of interacting more with their children's educational institutions (Jones-Correa 1998). Mothers also face less of a language barrier with their children than male immigrant fathers, whose work demands often keep them away from the home more often (Mahalingam 2013; Berry 1997). Finally, in terms of an additional structural factor that could be affecting the gendered differences that emerge in my study, immigrant men are disproportionately deported at higher rates than their immigrant female counterparts (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Rugh and Hall 2016). In fact, 85 percent of deportees are estimated to be male immigrants from Latin America (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013; Rugh and Hall 2016). Thus, women are left behind to address the emotional, political, social and economic consequences of more punitive immigration policies.

As we recall, without an incentive such as a policy opportunity, threatened individuals who only perceive danger or the potential of a loss have little, if anything, to gain from their efforts (Tomaka et al. 1993). We also know that women seek more expressive and social-oriented forms of coping when dealing with stressors in their environments (Ptacek et al. 1992; Taylor et al. 2000). Finally, due to additional socialization and acculturation differences among Latina women and Latino men (Jones-Correa 1998; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Lien 1998; Bejarano

2014a; Waters 1999), these studies help gain a bearing on the gendered patters that emerged in this project.

Summary

This chapter sought to shed light on who was driving the results of the coupled threat-and-opportunity message. After initial analyses, I found that the results were heightened among a subset of my sample, specifically along gender lines. I find the messaging cues work differently for men and women, with women being especially receptive to the coupled message when asked about intending to participate in politics. Perhaps because men and women cope with environmental stressors differently (Ptacek et al. 1992), signals of hope along with those of threat in the Coupled Treatment-and-Opportunity Condition may have helped women feel more able to confront the stressor through expressive and group-oriented political activities. Ptacek et al. (1992) explain that because of widely held sex role stereotypes and gender role expectations, men are socialized to a greater extent to deal instrumentally with stress, whereas women tend to be socialized to express emotion, to employ emotion-focused coping methods, and to seek the support of others (Mainiero 1986; Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Rosario, Shinn, Morch and Huckabee 1988). Furthermore, given differences in the socialization process by gender, women may be more mobilized than men when faced with exogenous policy signals centered on the plight of one’s community. I suspect my results are driven among women for the participation scale model because they potentially have more advantageous civic skills available at their disposable, especially based on greater exposure to the civic skills and social capital they encounter in their children’s schools (Bejarano 2014a; Berry 1997; Jones-Correa 1998; Bloemraad, Voss and Lee 2011). Perhaps these additional civic skills are why we see women

driving the mobilizing effect behind the Coupled Treatment-and-Opportunity Condition for these intended forms of participation.

Second, threatening messages are ineffective and even discouraging for some in my sample. As it turns out, the importance of understanding the intersection of gender and stress appraisals should not be overlooked when considering the effect of threat (Ptacek et al. 1992), even when it is paired with an opportunity message. Men in my sample are discouraged from the intent to vote in the Coupled Condition. When estimating the intent to vote, men experienced a demobilizing effect in the Coupled Treatment-and-Opportunity Condition, whereas women are not deterred from voting. Part of what may be going on is that this types of political outcomes measured in this survey experiment do not capture the types of political behaviors men might be more inclined to participate in. Additionally, the men in my sample might have felt more willing to disengage when exposed to the Coupled Condition because their assessment of the threat may have clouded their willingness to strive for the policy opportunity offered in the same message. Their socialization experiences and potential for an "oppositional" response may have made them default to abstention more readily than for women (Lopez 2003; Foner 2000; Waters 1999), who are more highly educated and involved in navigating U.S. political institutions.

A possible alternative explanation for the moderating gender effects, particularly among women in the intend participation scale findings, is that the treatment designs included female images that felt more relevant for women in my sample. If this were driving the results, we would expect to see the girls in the images also have a positive effect for women in the vote intentionality and postcard models, but we do not find this to be the case. This is not to say that if the treatment designs included images of boys, then maybe we would not see the demobilizing effect that we observe for men in the

vote intentionality model. A future iteration of this experiment will randomize the gender of the photographed subjects in the action alerts.

This chapter is not an exhaustive exploration of the role of gender in processing threat and opportunity mobilizing messages. In fact, Garcia Bedolla, Lavariega-Monforti and Pantoja (2007) point to differences in the gender gap across national group origins indicating that gender has a differential impact on the political attitudes of men and women in Mexican, Cuban and Puerto Rican communities. In future studies, scholars should explore various policy priorities and political leanings by gender across Latino national group origins.

Previous studies have found that participation in collective action more likely occurs when members of a group identify with one another (Brewer and Kramer 1986; Kollock 1998; Kramer and Brewer 1984). Given the emphasis on solidarity messages and mobilization efforts spearheaded by Latino organizations, media, political elites, and activists that all aimed to make one's panethnic Latino identity salient in more politicized environments (Ramirez 2013; Barreto et al. 2009; Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2011; Perez 2015), future studies should include the role of group identity in perceiving threat and opportunity appeals. Several organizations also managed to expand the plight of immigration reform across multiple constituencies, regardless of nativity, citizenship status, and Latino origin group (Olesen 2006; Barreto et al. 2009). By activating a broader pan-ethnic identity, along with a sense of group solidarity (Bloemraad and Trost 2008), this widened the participation and support of the immigration marches. This helps to explain why a diverse coalition of Latinos in the U.S. are willing to endorse expansive immigration policies and participate in immigration marches even when they themselves are not undocumented immigrants or foreign-born (Barreto et al. 2009; Pantoja et al. 2001; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013).

Interestingly, the idea of striving toward the same common goal is thought to disincentivize or inhibit people's activism (Kahneman and Tversky 1979); in fact, this free rider problem is particularly the case because participants can enjoy the benefits without having shouldered the burden of collective action. However, for an individual with a strong sense of group consciousness, working together toward collective action is inherent to its definition (Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980; Garcia 2003). Thus, perhaps policy opportunities will not have the free-rider effect as so many have previously expected (Miller 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004), particularly among Latinos with higher levels of group identification. I would expect this free-riding effect to be diminished among Latinos with a high sense of panethnic identification.[31] As opposed to a one-sided emphasis on either urgency or opportunity, coupling attention to an impending threat as well as empowering messages regarding policy opportunity alternatives, mobilizers can better communicate crisis messages and improve efforts for collective action. I expect these effects to be particularly amplified when the group's pan-ethnic Latino identity is made salient. Due to potential ceiling effects of heightened Latino identification in a 2016 election that largely alienated Latino voters, the role of Latino group identity and linked fate were not significant moderators of my treatment effects. This not to say there may not be a stronger mobilization response to coupled threat-and-opportunity messages among those who more strongly identify with Latinos, but this particular study did not capture this effect.

[31] Vasi and Macy (2003) and Rogers and Mewborn (1976) rely on the moderating effect of efficacy to explain people's responses to communication strategies involving threatening stimuli posing a danger. Efficacy does not lessen the severity of the threat but it strengthens people's belief in the ability to cope with danger when they confront it (Rogers and Mewborn 1976; Vasi and Macy 2003). Subsequent analyses revealed that the gendered findings are partially explained by women who follow immigration more closely, as well as women who are more efficacious. However, salience and efficacy are not conditioning the treatment's effects for the sample as a whole. This may be because the timing of this study was in the middle of a presidential election season, at a time people when may have been particularly attentive to topics and group appeals being discussed by the candidates. Also, remarks made by then-candidate Donald Trump may have made it so that immigration issues and racial group attacks were chronically salient among Latino communities.

Together, the findings in this chapter underscore an important point: The gendered aspect of threat- and opportunity-appraisal processes yields unexpected results in a terrain that has gone largely unexplored in the study of mobilizing messages and their effects on one's political behavior. The coupled threat and opportunity approach may be especially critical to effectively mobilize Latinas (Bejarano 2014a).

CHAPTER 5:

Fear and Hope: Motivating Effects of Emotions in ANES 2008 and 2012

The motivation to participate in politics that I posit is derived from exposure to a coupled threat and opportunity message centers on the expectation that the urgency and anxiety stirred by the political threat is tempered by the promise associated with the opportunity appeal thereby elevating a sense of excitement and thus encouraging political engagement. The previous chapter provided direct evidence of the influence of the coupled approach but little attention was devoted to the mechanism for these results. Thus, in this chapter, I more explicitly address the role of emotions in processing a risk and opportunity appraisal process, and their impact on one's political behavior. Though there is still debate about how emotional appeals in campaign ads work and lead to both persuasive effects among the public (Brader 2005; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Witte and Allen 2000; Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Banks 2016) and motivate individuals to take political action (Valentino et al. 2011; Gray 1990; Groenendyk and Banks 2014), there is more consensus about the causes and consequences of the two emotions political ads commonly appeal—enthusiasm and fear (Damasio 1994; Lazarus 1991; LeDoux 1996; Gray 1987).[32] Building upon the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, the analyses in this chapter involve examining the combination of fear and hope emotion measures and their impact on non-

[32] Given their high correlation rate, scholars have often combined hope and pride to measure enthusiasm (Brader 2005; Valentino et al. 2011; Marcus et al. 2000; Groenendyk and Banks 2014). For theoretical reasons and to avoid having the paired version of pride and hope skew too positively, I limit my analyses to hope. It is worth noting I also conduct robustness checks when using a combined measure of hope and pride (tables available upon request).

electoral political participation among Latinos. I find that feeling both fear and hope towards the presidential candidates encourages one to talk about politics, relative to those who did not feel the combination of both fear and hope.

This chapter is organized into four sections. First, I provide a literature review of the role of emotions and their impact on one's motivation to take political action. This first section draws our attention to existing emotion measures of fear and hope, which the existing literature has previously used as proxies for threat and opportunity. This first section ends on an overview of how the short-term motivational effects derived from one's emotions fits into the standard resource model of political participation. Secondly, I introduce the hypotheses section, where I focus on the simultaneous effect of fear and hope on one's political engagement. In the third section, I describe the methods and procedures that will allow me to test my hypotheses. The analyses are drawn from the Latino samples in the 2008 and 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). Finally, I conclude with the results and discussion section based on my three outcome measures: including talking about politics, participating in politics and vote intentionality.

Emotions in Politics

Gray (1990) and Valentino et al. (2011) contend that either hope or fear might lead to action, either in the form of reward-seeking behavior or danger-averting behavior. In fact, the following synopsis of the types of signals that stir feelings of hope and fear encapsulates this best:

> "Enthusiasm is a reaction to signals that have positive implications for a person's goals (i.e. things are going well). It reinforces commitment to those goals and strengthens the motivation to act or stay involved. If goals are not met, the result is disappointment and a diminished drive for pursuits. Anxiety or fear is a reaction to threat. Fear breaks a person out of routines, directs attention to relevant portions of the environment, and activates thinking about alternative courses of action. The motivational impact of fear is less

certain, as it can stimulate constructive action to deal with a threat, withdrawal, or immobility, depending on the person and situation (Gray 1987; LeDoux 1996)" (as seen in Brader (2005)).

While a few strands of this line of research have focused on the role of emotions in resolving collective action problems (Groenendyk 2011; Lupia and Menning 2009), voting behavior (Wang 2013; Hueberger, Jorgeson and Leighley 2016), and non-electoral political participation (Valentino et al. 2011), the dominant focus of the role of emotions in political life have been limited to more information-seeking, political efficacy, candidate preferences or policy preferences (Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk 2009; Valentino et al. 2011; Petersen, 2010; Civettini and Redlawsk 2009; Albertson and Gadarian 2015).

Additionally, scholars have found that negative emotions like fear can have dampening effects on concentration, learning and problem solving (Valentino et al. 2008; Ashcraft and Kirk 2001), particularly because fear can be highly distracting (Calvo and Carreiras 1992; Tohill and Holyoak 2000). Based on the fact that the motivational impact of fear is less certain (Gray 1987; LeDoux 1996; Miller 2005; Valentino et al. 2011), I focus on fear with regard to threats. Fear is triggered when an individual is less certain about the cause and does not feel in control (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Smith and Kirby, 2004; Tiedens and Linton 2001).[33] Brader (2005, 2006) finds that participants exposed to an enthusiasm-evoking political ad specifically reported higher levels of campaign interest, intention to register, intention to vote, and a greater willingness to work for a campaign relative to those exposed to a control ad without music or imagery. However, Brader (2005, 2006) finds fear ads to have a more limited impact, with participants only expressing a greater willingness to work for the campaign and a stronger belief in the importance of voting.

[33] New research has uncovered that one's sense of control can help explain why anger and fear operate differently (and for different people)(Valentino et al. 2011; Banks 2009, 2016; Phoenix 2015).

Drawing on insights from circumplex models of emotional responses (Plutchik 1980; Russell 1980; Zevon and Tellegen 1982), Marcus and his colleagues offer the most prominent theory of the effect of emotions on individual political engagement. In fact, according to the theory of *affective intelligence* (Marcus et al. 2000), emotions may help citizens use political heuristics more efficiently, particularly as emotions complement reason by signaling to the brain when to rely on heuristic processes and when to expend greater cognitive effort (Gray 1987a, 1987b, 1990). A threatening political signal triggers a high-level of arousal (Lupia and Menning 2009; Witt 1992; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000), particularly as one instinctually wants to protect oneself or those in their group from the potential losses it poses. Thus, I use fear towards a candidate as a proxy for threat, while hope towards a candidate as a proxy for opportunity. Some might feel more enthusiasm, or hope, when exposed to a candidate with policies they favor. Damasio (1994) finds that both positive and negative emotions can improve decision-making behaviors. Positive and negative emotions serve as feedback from brain systems that encourage reward-seeking and danger-averting behavior, respectively (Gray 1990).

A candidate might pose a threat or opportunity through "proposing particular policies that visibly favor some groups at the expense of others; by emphasizing or neglecting problems that are of special concern to a particular group; by keeping certain company, spending time in the public eye with iconic representatives of one group or another; and more" (Kam and Kinder 2012, p. 338)(Hutchings, Cruz Nichols, Gause and Piston, 2015). In my analysis of the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES), 62 percent of respondents identify somewhat strongly or strongly with the Democratic Party. Thus, most Latinos have more overlapping interests with the Democratic candidate, in this case Barack Obama, and might perceive more political threats from the Republican candidates, John McCain (2008) and Mitt Romney

(2012)—two candidates often characterized in the press as embracing more restrictive policies on immigration. Then-candidate John McCain emphasized building a larger wall and a more secured border between the U.S. and Mexico in 2008, while then-candidate Mitt Romney upheld Arizona's SB 1070 bill as a prime example that the rest of the country should follow in 2012.[34] As such, Romney supported the idea of undocumented immigrants engaging in "self-deportation" in the face of worsening living conditions.

Standard Models of Participation

The prevailing explanation of political participation is often hinged upon access to stable and long-term resources, skills, interests and mobilization strategies. This explanation stems from the Basic Resource Model (BRM) and Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) proposed a basic resource model of participation that includes education, income, age and other demographics. To explain the substantial variation in the public's participation patterns, they find that those lacking resources are less likely to participate. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) confirm the earlier findings on the role of socioeconomic status, but they also move beyond the individual resources one possesses and turn our attention to the role of engagement and recruitment. They add that that based on basic life circumstances and exposure to different institutions (like families, school, work, non-political associations and religious organizations), some people are not predisposed to participate in various forms of political activity. Following their theory, more money, more spare time and more skills will increase political participation. By engagement, Verba et al. (1995) are referring to the

[34] For more on the overwhelming support Obama received over McCain and Romney, refer to Latino Decisions (June 2008) http://www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2008/06/16/national-poll-shows-that-latino-voters-favor-obama-over-mccain/ and the Pew Hispanic Center (2012) http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election/. For more on the candidate's views on immigration in 2008 and 2012, refer to http://www.npr.org/news/specials/election2008/issues/immigration.html and http://www.npr.org/2012/07/06/156381703/where-they-stand-obama-romney-on-immigration.

motivation stemming from political interest, political efficacy, political information, and partisanship. These measures provide the "desire, knowledge, and self-assurance that impel people to be engaged by politics" (Verba et al. 1995, p. 354). Finally, and most central to this study, recruitment consists of being asked to participate. Thus, individuals who are both motivated and capable of participating in politics are more likely to become more active if they are part of recruitment networks where requests for their participation take place. In fact, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. (1995) find that people do not participate because they are not tapped or mobilized by political elites (e.g. campaigns, candidates, political parties, interest groups, etc.).

There are a several possible explanations why people who possess the resources (time, money and skills), engagement and recruitment, still do not participate. "Political scientists have begun to investigate the short-term forces that affect one's decision to take political action. The majority of this work has focused on 'threat,' generally defined as any risk of future harm either material or symbolic" (Valentino et al. 2011, p. 157). The kind of message they are being exposed to when being recruited to participate in politics may not effectively communicate the stakes involved in their political action. By drawing from Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) (Marcus et al.) and cognitive appraisal theory (Folkman et al. 1986; Lazarus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001), we gain a better understanding of the emotional processing of the risks and gains involved in prompting one's political mobilization. This chapter builds on the previous observations by exploring the specific role of combined emotions, triggered by political threats and political opportunities, and their role in motivating one's political mobilization. As such, depending on the substance of the recruitment message, people may have a different understanding of the policy goals they are trying to achieve. Are they trying to stop a threat

posed by their political opponent? Are they trying to advance a policy opportunity posed by their favored candidate? Are they potentially motivated by both?

Hypotheses

H1: Feeling a combination of both hope and fear will have a stronger positive association with political participation relative to those who feel other emotions.

H2: Feeling only fear will not be associated with political participation relative to those who feel other emotions.

H3: Feeling only hope will not be associated with political participation relative to those who feel other emotions.

H4: Women who feel a combination of both hope and fear will have a stronger positive association with political participation relative to men who feel both hope and fear.

H5: Feelings of fear towards the Republican candidate and hope towards the Democratic candidate will be especially catalyzing among Democrats.

Methods and Procedure

In order to test whether threat and opportunity are more catalyzing when paired together than alone, I draw on existing survey data from two years of the American National Election Study (ANES). The two years consist of nationally representative samples of Latino adults, included the 2008 and 2012 ANES. The 2008 and 2012 ANES allow me to replicate the results provided by the experiment fielded with Latino Decisions in the previous two chapters. Although the ANES provides data among a nationally representative probability sample of American citizens, I focus my analyses on Latinos. The inclusion of ANES survey measures aimed at capturing the public's emotions toward the major political parties and candidates date back to 1980, which have asked participants to recall whether "a candidate has ever made you feel (angry, afraid, proud, hopeful)?" The coupled threat and opportunity message approach provides a sense of loss and gain for participants. I argue that the pairing of the opportunity signals

prevents the participant from veering too far into despair. Based on the theoretical underpinnings of the study of fear appeals, which is often provoked by threat, and the hope an underlying promise of positive change, which is often evoked by an opportunity appeal, fear and hope serve as imperfect proxy measures for signals of threat and opportunity. I begin my analyses with the 2008 ANES in this dissertation because this was the first year the survey included a nationally representative Latino oversample. The pre- and post-election interviews were offered in Spanish as well, thus not limiting the sample to the most acculturated and English-speaking Latinos. In the 2012 ANES, the Latino sample was supplemented with an additional web-based survey sample. In an effort to make comparable analyses between the 2008 and 2012 datasets, I rely only rely on the face-to-face samples.

The results in this chapter provide some support for the coupled threat and opportunity strategy, demonstrating that this strategy at times catalyzes political participation among Latino respondents. I present these results with the caveat that individual demographics, socioeconomic effects (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995), a heightened sense of racial group identity (Sanchez 2006b; Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980; Schildkraut 2005; Stoke 2003) and broader measures of political engagement (including party mobilization)(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1995; Liu 2001) play important roles in understanding who is motivated to take political action. I provide additional robustness checks including these measures in my models in Appendix D. Before delving into the details of the distribution of these key control variables and addressing any differences that may artificially skew relationships, I proceed by considering the distribution of my main outcome measure: talking with anyone about political candidates or political parties they should support or vote against.

Table 5.1: The Distribution of Outcome Measures among Latinos

	ANES FTF Sample	ANES 2012 FTF Sample
Talking About Politics		
Yes	66%	65%
No	34%	35%
Participation Scale (Talk, Rally, Sign)		
Yes	43%	44%
No	57%	56%
Vote Intent		
Extremely/Somewhat Likely	48%	63%
Not at all/Somewhat Likely	12%	24%

Notes: The data are weighted. Percentages based on 2008 and 2012 ANES Latino samples.

Talking about Politics

Table 5.1 shows the distribution of responses when asked whether they talked about election politics with anyone across the 2008 and 2012 ANES. As part of the post-election interview, the ANES interviewer asks respondents to recall whether they spoke with anyone to try to convince them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates. More specifically, the question wording goes as follows: “We would like to find out about some of the things people do to help a party or a candidate win an election. During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?” The response options were “Yes” or “No.” Along the two Latino samples in 2008 and 2012, nearly 35 percent of the sample is expressing that they talked to someone they knew about the most recent election, especially to persuade them on which particular candidate or party to vote for. Though this measure may suffer from social desirability bias because people may want to appear to be more politically engaged and more politically influential than the average person, the proportion of Latino respondents reporting that they engaged in this form of

political participation is lower than that among non-Latino participants (43 percent).[35] Given the dichotomous nature of the talking measure, I used logit model estimates with the 2008 and 2012 ANES models in this chapter.

Political Participation Scale

The preponderance of other social activities, including joining a political rally during the past election season, only consisted of 4 percent of the sample, and less than 1.5 percent upon limiting the sample to those in the face-to-face mode.[36] Furthermore, while wearing a political campaign button or displaying a campaign bumper sticker are expressive forms of political behavior, only 13 percent of the Latino sample participated in this form of political engagement (and only 7 percent in the face-to-face sample). The talking about politics, joining a rally, and wearing a political button were each dichotomous variables. As such, I combined the following 3 political participation measures into 4-category participation scale (coded from 0 to 1), including talking about politics, joining a political rally, and those wearing a political campaign button or campaign bumper sticker. Those coded as "0" did not participate in any activities, those who said they participated in at least one of the activities were coded as ".33," and those who participated in two activities were coded at ".66," and those who participated in 3 activities are coded as "1." Based on the dichotomous coding scheme I created, the logit statistical model analyses in the results section below uses the 4-category measure including those who participated in no activities (0) to any of the 3 activities (1). All 3 measures had a cronbach's alpha of .48.

[35] The difference-in-means for the talking outcome measures is statistically significant different across Latino and non-Latino samples ($p<.01$, based on two-tailed test).

[36] Though the ANES includes additional measures on the extent to which participants have been civically engaged, they ask about the last 4 years. Perhaps as a result of an inability to recall information in the last year, let alone the past 4 years, the proportion of respondents saying that they engage in these civic forms of participation is low, ranging from 6 to 22 percent preponderance levels, among Latino respondents and the general sample (without limiting to the face-to-face sample). These behaviors include contacting an elected official, posting a message on social media, writing a letter to a newspaper and signing either an electronic or paper petition.

Vote Intentionality Certainty

Aside from talking about politics with friends or family and other measures of non-electoral political participation, I tested my theory with vote intentionality. The 2008 ANES measure was based on the certainty for one's intent to vote or not to vote. Recoded from 0 to 1, this was a 10-category measure, with "1" meaning "definitely will vote" and "0" meaning "definitely will not vote." Estimates in the 2008 ANES are based on OLS regression models. In the 2012 dataset, the vote intentionality measure I rely on was based on an open-ended measure where respondents could report how likely they were to vote (ranging from 0 to 100). I recoded this measure into a 5 quantiles, with those closer to "1" meaning they were "absolutely certain they would vote" and those closer to "0" meaning "there is no chance they would vote." The distribution table above is based on the two lowest and two highest categories combined together. The OLS statistical models are based on the full range of these categorical variables.[37] As seen with the 2008 ANES, the vote intentionality models in the 2012 dataset were estimated with OLS models as well.

Threat and Opportunity Emotion Proxies

To capture threat and opportunity in the ANES surveys, I turn to emotions of fear and hope. Table 5.2 provides the means and observations for the emotion measures serving as proxies of threat and opportunity. The single cue and paired conditions are each coded as dichotomous measures. The ANES uses the following question to capture multiple emotions a general election candidate might stir. The question reads: "Has (Democratic or Republican

[37] The 2012 ANES also had an additional measure for the certainty of one's vote intent, but this was based on 5-categories and only half the sample was randomized to this version of the survey question. Future iterations of the ANES analyses will combine both versions of these vote intentionality measures.

candidate)—because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done—ever made you feel (angry, afraid, proud, hopeful)?" These questions are asked in the pre-election questionnaires of the ANES waves. I have coded the emotions such that the "Only Fear" measure involves respondents who reported being fearful of the Republican candidate that election season, while the "Only Hope" condition represents those who reported feeling hopeful towards the Democratic candidate.

Though the ANES follows up with a question about the amount of said emotion the candidate made them feel, these follow-up measures contain too much missing data for the Latino sample (particularly among those in the face-to-face mode). Thus, my analyses are restricted to the initial question about whether they felt said emotion—"yes" or "no." I focus specifically on fear and hope. For the combined fear-and-hope variable, I only include those who felt the two emotions. This provides a conservative test of my theory because only participants who feel a combination of these two emotions, and only these two emotions (fear and hope), are expected to be catalyzed to more action than those in the single emotion conditions.[38]

Given the relevance of one's party identification when assessing their emotions towards a candidate, I also control for party identification and partisan strength. Party identification involves group-level emotions that stimulate participation (Groenendyk and Banks 2010; E. R. Smith et al. 2007; Groenendyk 2011). Based on this existing literature on the persuasive and motivating effects of emotions, scholars have found that emotions trigger political interest (Brader 2005, 2006; Marcus et al. 2000). According to intergroup emotions theory, when social identity is salient, those who identify with the group will consider the stimuli in the group

[38] The ANES randomizes the order in which people receive the four emotion questions. The ANES also randomizes whether they ask the emotions battery about the Republican or Democratic candidate first. In a future project, this could allow me to test whether the ordering of threat and opportunity appraisals matter for the coupled threat and opportunity approach to catalyze people to take action.

context as opposed to the individual context (Mackie, Devos and Smith 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993; E. R. Smith, Seger and Mackie, 2007). As such, individuals experience emotions on behalf of their group, including that of their partisan identity. Furthermore, to test whether the outcome measure of participation is explained away by one's substantive political views or partisan leanings, I also account for partisan strength (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; Rudolph et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2011). For a distribution of these party identification and partisan strength variables, refer to Appendix D (Table D.1 and Table D.2).

More specifically, respondents who said they felt afraid about something to do with the Republican candidate as a person or what the Republican candidate did, were coded as 1 for experiencing "only fear" and 0 for all else. I used this coding scheme for the single emotion dummy variables. Those who reported the Democratic candidate made them feel hopeful were coded as 1 for experiencing "only hope" and 0 for all else. By coding these emotion variables as dichotomous independent variables, I mimic the mutually exclusive nature of being exposed to one condition as seen in the survey experiment. Finally, to capture the coupled effect of threat and opportunity, I combined those in the "only fear" and "only hope" conditions as 1, and "all else" as 0. I combined these variables by interacting the two single emotion variables. Thus, those in the coupled threat and opportunity condition ("fear and hope") are based on those who only felt fear towards the Republican candidate as well as those who only felt hope towards the Democratic candidate. It is worth noting that the overwhelming majority of Latino voters supported Obama in 2008 (66 percent) and 2012 (71 percent) (Pew Hispanic Center 2012). Table 5.2 provides the bivariates of the combined fear and hope measures with that of the outcomes of interest. The proportions provided are weighted. Admittedly, as each of the lower right-hand quadrants demonstrates, there is not an apparent association between the outcome

measures and the combined fear and hope emotion strategies. However, when focusing on the bivariates among Democrats alone (see italics in Table 5.2), the associations give way for a possible correlation between the coupled Republican fear and Democratic hope strategy.

Table 5.2: Bivariates Between Outcomes and Emotions Variables of Fear and Hope

	ANES 2008 Sample		ANES 2012 FTF Sample	
	Combined Republican Fear and Democratic Hope			
	0	1	0	1
Talk				
No (0)	52%	14%	49%	16%
Yes (1)	22%	12%	22%	13%
Talk (Among Democrats)				
No (0)	*43%*	*20%*	*48%*	*20%*
Yes (1)	*18%*	*18%*	*16%*	*16%*
Participate				
No (0)	45%	12%	42%	13%
Yes (1)	29%	14%	30%	16%
Participate (Among Democrats)				
No (0)	*38%*	*16%*	*41%*	*17%*
Yes (1)	*24%*	*22%*	*22%*	*21%*
Vote Intent				
No (0)	10%	10%	18%	15%
Yes (1)	32%	15%	44%	19%
Vote Intent (Among Democrats)				
No (0)	*4%*	*10%*	*12%*	*5%*
Yes (1)	*31%*	*24%*	*33%*	*26%*
	Combined Fear and Hope towards Either Candidate			
	0	1	0	1
Talk				
No (0)	46%	20%	45%	20%
Yes (1)	18%	16%	15%	20%
Participate				
No (0)	41%	16%	38%	16%
Yes (1)	24%	19%	22%	24%
Vote Intent				
No (0)	9%	2%	17%	6%
Yes (1)	27%	20%	32%	28%

Notes: The percentages are weighted. Table entries are based on Latino respondents in the 2008 and 2012 ANES. The analyses are limited to the face-to-face samples.

Before moving on, it is important to highlight that there tend to be fewer cases for those reporting fear than any of the other emotions available in the ANES. This is consistent with what previous scholars have found (Valentino et al. 2011; Huerberger et al. 2016), and is more than likely due to social desirability bias in people wanting to appear that they are in control. In the 2008 and 2012 data, fear is reported nearly 30 to 40 percent lower than those reporting hope, which is closer to 70 and 80 percent. The percentage point difference is the nearly the same when combining fear towards either candidate.[39] The combined approach in the ANES is only an imperfect proxy of the randomized survey experiment conditions, particularly because I am combining discrete emotions that were asked separately. For instance, there is not a question in the ANES that asks if the subject felt two simultaneous emotions about the candidates. Additionally, the emotion variables in the ANES are based on evaluations of the candidate, or something the candidate did or said. This is tough to separate from partisan politics, especially when asked so close to the general election. This partisan component was not part of the survey experiment; in other words, there is no mention of partisan cues in the treatment designs. To account for the partisan bias to favor one's in-party candidate in the ANES, I focus some of my analyses on Democrats alone.[40] As seen in Table 5.2, the bivariates demonstrate the importance of partisan considerations when asking participants about their feelings towards the leading general election candidates. Furthermore, as a result of the relatively lower levels of those reporting one emotion over the other, future steps involve using an emotion-induction

[39] I have also estimated the models with a combination of fear towards the Republican candidate or fear towards the Democratic candidate. I have also created a general hope dummy variable that includes hope towards either the Republican candidate or hope towards the Democratic candidate. This technique of combining emotional reactions to both candidates, and not simply evaluations of the in-party or out-party candidate, is common the existing scholarship of the role of emotions in political life (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 2000; Rudolph et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2011).

[40] When I focus on Democrats alone, this includes those that are strong/moderate/leaning. This is only relevant for the models with the Republican fear and Democratic hope measures. Focusing on Democrats alone does not apply for the models in which I have combined measures of fear and hope towards either candidate.

experiment where people are asked to reflect and write about feeling a particular emotion, including fear. By using this approach, the intensity of the given emotions will be equally strong, especially since it will be based on what that particular respondent felt and not based on an external stimulus (e.g. policy vignette). The emotion-induction experiment is an extension of this dissertation project, and is being fielded by YouGov in August of 2017. By using an emotion induction experiment, in which respondents are asked to write about aspects of a policy domain that make them feel a particular emotion, we run into less of this social desirability problem to underreport. As we will later see in the results section, even with the low number of cases of people reporting fear, some of my findings still reach statistical significance and allow us to reject the null hypothesis of the mobilizing effect behind the coupled strategy.

To account for the role of key demographic and socioeconomic factors playing a role in predicting whether someone is motivated to take political action, Table 5.3 provides the means for the key control variables in my statistical analyses.

Table 5.3: Distribution of Key Control Variables (weighted)

	2008 Mean	2012 Mean
Resources		
Income	.326	.372
Unemployed	.063	.071
Education Indicator (1=College)	.154	.199
Female	.568	.524
Age	41.034	39.473
U.S. Born Nativity	.744	.643
English Speaker	.828	.848
Internal Efficacy Scale	.527	.487
External Efficacy Scale	.405	.409
Political Interest		
Attention to Politics	.566	.463
Party Identification (Democrats =1)	.696	.740
Strong Partisans	.576	.615
Social Involvement		
Church Attendance	.694	.629
Household Member Labor Union	.123	.134
Number of Memberships	.590	.716
Home Ownership	.604	.544
Length of Residence (Years)	9.846	11.935
Mobilization		
Mobilized by Political Party	.321	.286
Cares Who Wins Election	.733	.778
Linked Fate	.580	.594

Notes: Table entries are based on Latino respondents in the 2008 and 2012 ANES. With the exception of age, all variables are coded from 0 to 1. Missing data are not included by default when using Stata13 survey estimations with subpopulation weights.

The demographic control variables and standard participation model predictors are provided in Table 5.3. To account for resources, I use a couple of different variables. The family income measure includes 28 income categories ranging from "0" to "1," with "1" being the highest ($250,000 or more). The unemployment status indicator is based on whether respondents reported they were unemployed ("1"), with all other categories (including looking for a job, student, homemaker, etc.) being coded as "0." The education indicator is a dichotomous measure based on those who have a college degree ("1") and those who have less than a college degree

("0").[41] Gender is coded "1" for females and "0" for males. The continuous age variable ranges from 18 to 90. The nativity indicator is a dichotomous variable that involves those who are U.S.-born ("1") and those who are foreign-born ("0"). The English variable is based on whether the respondent took the survey in English in the 2008 ANES. Due to the fact that this language of interview question was not available in the 2012 ANES, I relied on whether they watched the news in Spanish or English. For both measures, there were 3 categories, and I collapsed them into 2. For the English measure, "1" means "English" or "both English and Spanish" and "0" means "Spanish." The internal efficacy and external efficacy scales each contain two 5-category variables. For internal efficacy measures, I rely on measures that tap asked about how strongly they agree with having a good understanding of politics as well as how strongly they disagree with politics being too complicated to understand.[42] For the external efficacy measures, I coded those who said they strongly disagreed with having little say in the government and those who strongly disagree with elites having little care about people like them into one scaled efficacy measure. The scaled internal and external efficacy measures range from 0 to 1 (9 categories), with 1 meaning they have higher levels of efficacy.

The party identification variable involves 3 categories, with "1" meaning they are "strong Democrats, not very strong Democrats, and independent leaning Democrats," ".5" meaning they are "independents," and "0" meaning they are "strong Republicans, not very strong Republicans, and independent leaning Republicans." If a respondent has a stronger sense of partisan identity, they are more interested in politics and more invested in participating (and this is especially

[41] The analyses are also consistent when the education variable when coded as a categorical variable including 8 different levels of education, with the highest level (graduate school) being "1."

[42] These measures were asked in a split-sample ballot format. The other portion of the sample had response category options regarding how frequently they felt the statement was true. The category options included: "All the time, most of the time, about half the time, some of the time and never." I did not rely on respondents with this newer format of the question. As a result, there are a lot of missing observations when I include this measure in the models. In future iterations of the project, I will include these newer measures as well. As is, I cannot combine these measures (doing so results in 0 observations).

heightened among those participating in electoral behaviors) (Heurberger, Jorgeson and Leighley 2016; Hamill, Lodge and Blake 1985; Lupia 1994; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). The emotion variables ask about emotions towards political candidates, which may be heavily influenced by one's party identification leanings. The partisan strength measure also involves 2 categories, with "1" being strong and not very strong party identifiers and "0" being those who are independent and those independents who are leaners. For those who mentioned they liked and disliked aspects of the Democratic and Republican parties, I combined these "Yes" responses to these 4 questions equal to "1." Those who said they had no dislikes towards the parties equal "0." In addition to one's party identification, a sense of racial and ethnic group identification has been linked to greater levels of political engagement among racial minority groups (Schildkraut 2005; Garcia 2003; Sanchez 2006b; Stokes 2003; Miller et al. 1981). I rely on the dichotomous variable available in the ANES that asks whether the respondents feels their life is affected by what happens to Hispanics/Latinos in the U.S.

To measure social involvement, I have included union membership, organization memberships and church attendance. Those who said they had someone in their household that belonged to a labor union were coded as "1." I also included a continuous measure for the number of organizations for which the respondent belonged to as a formal member. The religious identity indicator involves those who attend church outside of weddings, baptisms and funerals ("1").

Results

Talking about Politics, Participation Scale and Vote Intentionality

In Table 5.4, I provide the most basic models estimating the key outcome variables in this chapter. The first 3 models do not include any control measures, but demonstrate the effect of the

main emotion variables of fear and hope on talking about politics, participating in politics and vote intentionality. The last 3 models include more demographic control variables. These models are useful before moving on to the more fully specified models that follow in this chapter, which include more standard participation controls and emotional engagement variables.

The first covariates are emotions based on feelings of fear towards the Republican candidate—McCain in 2008, Romney in 2012—and feelings of hope towards the Democratic candidate (Obama).[43] These two single emotion variables are dichotomous dummy variables. To test whether the combination of fear and hope is more mobilizing than either of these feelings alone, I have created an interaction term between these two emotion variables. Thus, the interactive term across the models specified in this chapter are based on those who *simultaneously* feel fear towards the Republican candidate (Republican fear = 1) and hope towards the Democratic candidate (Democratic hope = 1). As such, the constituent terms of the interaction variable cannot be interpreted as if they stood alone.

In the first model of Table 5.4, we see the results for talking about politics. The outcome measure for talking about politics is a dichotomous measure, so I rely on logistic regression models to estimate the predicted likelihoods of engaging in this form of political action. We see that the interactive effect of experiencing hope towards the Democratic candidate and fear towards the Republican candidate is positive, though not statistically significant. These patterns are in the same substantive direction throughout the table, with the exception of the vote intentionality model (Model 3). The interaction term does not reach statistical significance at any point throughout the first 3 non-fully specified models or in the latter 3 models with additional

[43] As main independent variables, I also test the collapse fear towards the Republican candidate and fear towards the Democratic candidate into one overall fear dummy variable. This involves testing hope towards the Democratic candidate and hope towards the Republican candidate into a separate dummy variable as well. These results are available in Appendix D and among the final tables of Chapter 5.

demographic and socioeconomic control factors. Interestingly, only feeling hope towards the democratic candidate has a positive effect on the predicted likelihood one's vote certainty (Model 3, p<.10 level), but it has a negative effect on the overall participation scale, which includes talking about politics, joining a rally and wearing a political button (Model 5, p<.10 level). Models 4 through 6 include controls for family income, unemployment status, education, gender, party identification, age, nativity, political interest, owning a home, union membership and a sense of Latino linked fate. I rely on these more simplified models in Table 5.4 to paint a general sense of the associative effects of our key emotion variables (or proxies for threat and opportunity). The table below is an abbreviated version for readability purposes. These models also provide larger samples than those in the more fully specified models to follow. It is also worth noting that the interaction term of fear and hope is actually in a negative direction (though it predominantly fails to reach statistical significance) when using the same models seen in Table 5.4 with the 2012 ANES (available in Appendix D). I anticipated the simultaneous effect of feeling hope towards the Democratic candidate and fear towards the Republican candidate to boost one's political participation. As seen in Table 5.4, there is no definitive evidence supporting such an expectation.

Table 5.4: Models Estimating Talking, Participating and Voting with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation with No Controls and with Limited Control Variables

	Model 1 Talking Politics No Controls 2008	Model 2 Participating No Controls 2008	Model 3 Voting No Controls 2008	Model 4 Talking Politics Limited Controls 2008	Model 5 Participating Limited Controls 2008	Model 6 Voting Limited Controls 2008
Main Independent Variables						
Fear- Rep	0.228	0.035	0.132	-0.074	0.005	0.048
	(0.670)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.780)	(0.101)	(0.072)
Hope- Dem	0.058	0.010	0.088*	-0.391	-0.046*	0.016
	(0.272)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.319)	(0.024)	(0.042)
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):	0.431	0.046	-0.035	0.877	0.074	0.001
	(0.739)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.823)	(0.108)	(0.089)
Demographic Controls						
Family Income				0.409	0.028	-0.037
				(0.453)	(0.042)	(0.083)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)				0.295	0.027	0.148***
				(0.404)	(0.044)	(0.034)
Gender (Female=1)				-0.236	-0.027	0.090***
				(0.282)	(0.027)	(0.033)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)				-0.145	0.010	0.097**
				(0.352)	(0.031)	(0.047)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)				-0.060	0.012	-0.058
				(0.355)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Interest in Campaign Politics				0.730	0.139***	0.384***
				(0.475)	(0.051)	(0.047)
Own a Home				0.143	-0.009	0.020
				(0.291)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Constant	-0.897***	0.165***	0.623***	-1.585***	0.045	0.249***
	(0.206)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.546)	(0.059)	(0.089)
Observations	440	440	438	355	355	353
R-squared		0.021	0.043		0.103	0.306

Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents in the 2008 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey estimates of the Latino subpopulation. These models were also replicated with the 2012 data (see Appendix D).

Talking About Politics – Among Democrats and Women

Moving on to Table 5.5, I demonstrate the results for a more conservative model, including more important controls for traditional models of political participation, but also includes additional emotional engagement variables. For this table, I focus on predicting talking about politics. The talking measure in the ANES is a social behavior that consists of trying to influence one's friends or family into supporting a candidate of their choice (or on behalf of one's community). Though the results are fully specified, they are abbreviated in this table for readability purposes. For results with the full demographic, standard participation and emotional engagement control variables provided in the list of variables in Table 5.3, refer to Appendix D. The first model is based on the entire Latino subsample in the 2008 ANES. However, one cannot overlook the entangling effects of partisanship when asked to evaluate their feelings towards the leading general election candidates (Valentino et al. 2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014). To account for the partisan nature of feeling fear towards the Republican candidate and hope towards the Democratic candidate, the second model is focused solely on Democrats in my sample (strong/moderate/leaning). This group would see any message of opportunity and threat provided by the candidate through the lens of their party or partisan group. I focus on the subset of respondents who identified as either strong, moderate or leaning Democrats because those who consider themselves Democrats would be expected to feel more strongly about their hope towards the Democratic candidate and feel more strongly about their fear towards the Republican

candidate. Due to the gendered findings that emerged in the survey experiment (Chapter 4), the third model focuses on female respondents. In the previous chapter, I found that women were driving the results behind the coupled threat-and-opportunity strategy's mobilizing effects. By the same logic, to test whether women in the ANES data are particularly susceptible to the mobilizing effects of the coupled fear-and-hope strategy, I focus on the subset of women in my sample in Model 3.

Again, in an effort to test whether the combination of fear and hope is more mobilizing than either of these feelings alone, I have created an interaction term between the first two single emotion dummy variables. The first covariate represents those who only feel fear towards the Republican candidate (Republican fear=1) and those who do not feel hope towards the Democratic candidate (Democratic hope = 0). The second logit coefficient in Table 5.5, or the additional constituent term, represents having hope towards the Democratic candidate (Democratic hope = 1) and not having any fear towards the Republican candidate (Republican fear =1).

Table 5.5: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women

	Model 1 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls	Model 2 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems	Model 3 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women
Main Independent Variables			
Fear- Rep	1.618	1.768	0.755
	(1.904)	(1.963)	(5.347)
Hope- Dem	-0.606	-1.552	-2.440
	(1.338)	(1.070)	(1.668)
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):	1.590	2.632*	4.440*
	(1.235)	(1.371)	(2.343)
Additional Emotional Engagement Variables			
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-1.644	-1.729	0.994
	(1.431)	(1.112)	(2.391)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-1.118	-0.991	-1.030
	(1.713)	(0.925)	(2.167)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.187	-0.343	1.671
	(0.539)	(0.540)	(1.029)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	2.736**	4.405**	
	(1.175)	(1.010)	
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	-1.030		-0.949
	(0.761)		(2.422)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.189	-0.451	-
	(0.517)	(0.565)	
Constant	-2.687*	-3.713	-6.976
	(1.459)	(2.313)	(6.150)
Observations	165	117	88

Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents in the 2008 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey

estimates of the Latino subpopulation. For the full results with all the demographic and standard participation controls, see Appendix D.

As seen in Model 1 of Table 5.5, the interactive effect of fear and hope is positive among the Latino sample, but the results do not reach statistical significance. The results are in the expected substantive direction, though. Moving on to subsample results among Democrats (Model 2), results from the logit estimates indicate that feeling a coupled sense of fear and hope is in fact significantly associated with talking about politics at the .10 level of significance for both outcomes in the 2008 ANES. These results hold upon controlling for various socioeconomic and standard participation predictors. Furthermore, as seen in Chapter 4, where the coupled effects of threat and opportunity in my experiment's findings were heightened among women, I also find that the simultaneous effect of feeling fear and hope is driven among women (Model 3). Previous research has found that women seek more expressive and social-oriented forms of coping when dealing with stressors and threat appraisals in their environments, and often relying on wishful thinking strategies (Ptacek et al. 1992; Taylor et al. 2000). Finally, due to additional socialization and acculturation differences among Latina women and Latino men, where women have been found to be more engaged in various forms of political behavior (Jones-Correa 1998; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Lien 1998; Bejarano 2014a; Waters 1999), I expected to find that women would be more willing to deal with both fear and hope by talking about politics with people they know.

My findings provide additional support for the catalyzing effect of coupled threat and opportunity messages seen in Chapters 3 and 4. The effect of "only fear" towards the Republican candidate (or threat alone), is positive; as such, this provides some support for threat being a catalyst of political action, but it does not reach statistical significance. It is also worth mentioning that although the effect of "only hope" towards the Democratic candidate (or

opportunity alone) is not statistically significant, it is overwhelmingly negative (except for Model 3). Overall, based on Table 5.5's 2008 results, we can reject the null that the coupled effect of fear and hope is not associated with talking about politics, even after controlling for important predictors of political participation.

As demonstrated in Table 5.5, I have also included additional emotional engagement controls, and even still my results remain significant among Democrats and women. Overall, Democrats and women are more susceptible to the mobilizing effect of the combined feelings of fear (Republican) and hope (Democratic). The additional emotional engagement variables are accounting for a couple of different forms of being more emotionally engaged so as to explain away the simple combination of two emotions—fear and hope—seen in the interaction term I have created. Presumably, those who feel any of these feelings towards either candidate are more emotionally engaged in this election and perhaps this will explain away my results. As we see in Table 5.5, my main independent variable of the combination of fear towards the Republican and hope towards the Democrat is still positive and statistically significant among Democrats and among women. It is also worth noting that the angry feelings towards either candidate are also positive and statistically significant ($p<.01$ among Democrats). In the past, scholars have found anger to be positively associated with political participation (Valentino et al. 2011).

Table 5.6: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women

	Model 1 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls	Model 2 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems	Model 3 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women
Main Independent Variables			
Fear- Rep	2.534	32.055	-3.740
	(2.836)	(0.000)	(3.094)
Hope- Dem	-0.479	15.060	1.857
	(1.035)	(0.000)	(2.961)
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):	-3.931	-27.714	-7.829
	(3.028)	(0.000)	(5.017)
Additional Emotional Engagement Variables			
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	2.969*	-2.151	7.981*
	(1.577)	(0.000)	(4.103)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	2.792	-11.537	6.784*
	(1.686)	(0.000)	(3.959)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-1.414	-1.498	-6.621**
	(1.482)	(0.000)	(2.968)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.449	0.294	4.123**
	(0.656)	(0.000)	(1.882)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	-1.284		-0.762
	(1.066)		(1.657)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.128	-0.133	
	(0.491)	(0.000)	
Constant	-9.361***	-10.673	-20.353*
	(2.842)	(0.000)	(11.729)
Observations	160	112	88

Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents in the 2012 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey

estimates of the Latino subpopulation. For the full results with all the demographic and standard participation controls, see Appendix D.

In Table 5.6, we have the same model specification, but we move on to the Latino sample found in the 2012 ANES. As we see in this table, the coupled feelings of fear and hope do not reach statistical significance and cannot reject the null hypothesis. Furthermore, the results are not in the expected direction (substantively positive). The coupled feelings of fear and hope are negatively correlated with talking about politics in 2012. The single emotion variables of feeling fear towards the Republican and hope towards the Democrat candidate are not statistically significant and the effect is not in one consistent direction. These results are consistently insignificant when focused only on Democrats (Model 2) and on women (Model 3). Thus, in 2012, feeling both fear towards Romney and hope towards Obama did not have a positive effect on people's willingness to talk about politics with friends and family to try to influence their decision in the election. As seen in the last table in 2008, feeling angry towards either candidate is positive and statistically significant (among women only). In fact, among women, most of the additional emotional engagement variable controls boost one's willingness to talk about politics. Admittedly, we see the total observations deplete considerably in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, especially as these models include a more complete list of control variables. Some of these control measures have a large number of missings (i.e. including the additional emotional engagement variables), some in large part because respondents were asked about the items in a split-sample format (i.e. internal and external efficacy measures). Furthermore, due to the split-sample nature of focusing either solely on Democrats or solely on women, the total observations shrink even more.

Participation Scale – Among Democrats and Women

As we move on to Table 5.7, we move on to estimating people's willingness to engage in more forms of political participation. The participation scale outcome measure includes talking about politics, joining a political protest, and wearing a campaign button or displaying a campaign bumper sticker. This 4-category outcome measure ranged from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning the participant engaged in all 3 activities and 0 meaning they had not participated in any of these activities. Thus, given the categorical nature of the variable, I rely on OLS models in Table 5.7. In Table 5.7, we see the overall sample results available in Model 1. Due to the partisan nature of feeling fear towards the Republican candidate, and hope towards the Democratic candidate, I move on to assessing the results among Democrats in Model 2. Finally, Model 3 demonstrates the results in a split-sample model focusing only on women.

Table 5.7: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women

	Model 1 Participation Scale Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2008	Model 2 Participation Scale Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2008	Model 3 Participation Scale Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2008
Main Independent Variables			
Fear- Rep	0.106	0.071	-0.019
	(0.097)	(0.109)	(0.153)
Hope- Dem	-0.081	-0.041	-0.095*
	(0.056)	(0.070)	(0.048)
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):	0.131*	0.132	0.235*
	(0.076)	(0.108)	(0.124)
Additional Emotional Engagement Variables			
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.153**	-0.085	-0.064
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.050)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.041	0.036	0.081
	(0.058)	(0.079)	(0.055)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.068	-0.100**	-0.009
	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.075)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.152*	0.139*	0.189*
	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.098)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	0.004		-0.068
	(0.034)		(0.052)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.053*	-0.073*	
	(0.029)	(0.037)	
Constant	-0.072	-0.186	-0.150
	(0.100)	(0.157)	(0.152)
Observations	165	117	93
R-squared	0.381	0.426	0.452

Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents

in the 2008 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey estimates of the Latino subpopulation. For the full results with all the demographic and standard participation controls, see Appendix D.

In Table 5.7, I find that the coupled strategy of feeling fear towards the Republican candidate and hope towards the Democratic candidate is positive in predicting more political participation. I find this effect to be positive and statistically significant at the .10 level. Although the effect remains positive when focusing solely among Democrats, the combined effect loses significance (Model 2). To test whether the results were driven by women in my sample, Model 3 presents these results. Among women, the coupled effect of feeling both fear and hope is positive and statistically significant ($p<.10$ level). Each of these models includes additional controls for robustness, though they are not presented here. We can see that the results hold after controlling for important demographic and standard participation controls (outlined in Table 5.3). The full table of results is available in Appendix D. It is also worth noting that the angry feelings towards either candidate are also positive and statistically significant across all three models in Table 5.7. Again, this confirms the motivating effects found behind anger among Valentino et al. (2011).

Table 5.8: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women

	Model 1 Participation Scale Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2012	Model 2 Participation Scale Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2012	Model 3 Participation Scale Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2012
Main Independent Variables			
Fear- Rep	0.265**	0.351**	0.293
	(0.107)	(0.145)	(0.240)
Hope- Dem	-0.105	-0.129	-0.060
	(0.071)	(0.150)	(0.073)
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):	-0.318***	-0.151	-0.506**
	(0.115)	(0.174)	(0.245)
Additional Emotional Engagement Variables			
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.107**	-0.124**	0.166**
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.081)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.130	0.223	0.213**
	(0.082)	(0.150)	(0.090)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.061	-0.074	-0.038
	(0.068)	(0.087)	(0.099)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.031	-0.003	0.118
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.071)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	-0.032		-0.002
	(0.059)		(0.075)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.028	-0.069*	
	(0.034)	(0.040)	
Constant	-0.161*	-0.089	-0.295**
	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.148)
Observations	160	112	88
R-squared	0.373	0.424	0.463

Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-

tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with face-to-face Latino respondents in the 2012 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey estimates of the Latino subpopulation. For the full results with all the demographic and standard participation controls, see Appendix D.

The 2012 results for the participation scale outcome are available in Table 5.8. Interestingly, the 2012 results for this outcome raised mixed results. As it turns out, the coupled effect of fear and hope is not positively correlated with various measures on the participation scale in 2012. In fact, the coupled effect is negative and statistically significant in the entire sample (p<.01), among Democrats (not significant), and among women (p<.05). Feeling fear towards the Republican candidate and feeling hope towards the Democratic candidate does not have a boosting effect on the extent of one's participation. Among those in the pooled sample (Model 1), the composite deterring effect of feeling both fear and hope is small (-.053 times). Among women, those who felt both fear and hope, are .213 times less likely to participate in all 3 political activities. This is the first table for which we have seen the threat alone, or fear alone, effect is positive and reaches statistical significance. Given that Obama was an incumbent president, the amount of hope associated with him may have been lower than that seen in 2008. As such, it may be threat alone, or fear towards Romney, that is driving the deterring results observed in the coupled effect of fear and hope.[44] Moving on to the additional emotional

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[44] In an effort to test if the combination of fear and hope reactions to both candidates would still support the coupled approach of threat-and-opportunity, the final results in Appendix D account for one's emotional responses to either candidate. By combining responses towards either candidate for the corresponding emotion, I boost the number of cases for each measure. More specifically, "Only Fear" is based on fear posed by either candidate—the Republican or Democrat. The "Only Hope" variable includes respondents who said they felt hopeful towards either the Democrat candidate or the Republican candidate. Finally, the combined effect of "Both Fear and Hope" involves those who feel both hope and fear posed by either candidate. Combining the emotion variables for either the Republican or Democratic candidate has been a standard technique in previous research on the effect of emotions in politics (Valentino et al. 2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Groenendyk 2011; Marcus et al. 2000). Though the combined hope and fear interaction term is positive and statistically significant focusing solely among female participants for either talking about politics or predicting the participation scale, the results are not positive or statistically significant for the overall Latino sample. These results are available in Appendix D.

engagement variables, we see that hope towards either candidate has a positive effect, but only among women this time (Model 3).

Vote Intentionality – Among Democrats and Women

In terms of predicting vote intentionality, I rely on OLS models for the categorical measure of one's intent vote in the general election. The 2008 ANES measure is based on a follow-up question regarding the respondents' certainty to vote or not to vote. Recoded from 0 to 1, this was a 10-category measure, with "1" meaning "definitely will vote" and "0" meaning "definitely will not vote."

Table 5.9: OLS Models Estimating Voting Intentionality with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women

	Model 1 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls	Model 2 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems	Model 3 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women
Main Independent Variables			
Fear- Rep	-0.019	-0.093	-0.332*
	(0.206)	(0.180)	(0.179)
Hope- Dem	-0.172*	-0.223**	-0.072
	(0.090)	(0.103)	(0.120)
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):	0.169	0.295*	0.246
	(0.215)	(0.155)	(0.189)
Additional Emotional Engagement Variables			
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.137	-0.134	0.169
	(0.090)	(0.116)	(0.114)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.185**	0.132	0.000
	(0.088)	(0.119)	(0.102)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.073	0.082**	0.148**
	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.060)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.138	-0.016	0.073
	(0.099)	(0.067)	(0.076)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	0.080		0.058
	(0.064)		(0.124)
Gender (Female=1)	0.153***	0.107*	-
	(0.057)	(0.062)	-
Constant	0.066	0.240	0.517**
	(0.148)	(0.162)	(0.250)
Observations	163	115	92
R-squared	0.453	0.440	0.437

Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: ANES 2008 Latino sample.

Among those in the pooled sample (Model 1), experiencing both fear towards the Republican candidate and hope towards the Democratic candidate in 2008 appears to suggest a positive effect on one's likelihood to vote in the general election. This is not a very strong finding, as the standard errors indicate it is not statistically distinguishable from zero. However, it is in the expected positive direction. As we move on to Model 2, focusing solely on the Democratic subset of Latinos, we see that the results become discernable from zero. The boosting effect holds and is statistically significant at the .10 level. The composite effect of those who experience fear towards the Republican candidate and hope towards Democratic candidate are .202 times more likely to say they are extremely likely to vote.

Table 5.10: OLS Models Estimating Voting Intentionality with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation, Among Democrats and Among Women

	Model 1 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2012	Model 2 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2012	Model 3 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2012
Main Independent Variables			
Fear- Rep	0.167	0.189	0.383**
	(0.260)	(0.485)	(0.166)
Hope- Dem	0.232	0.164	-0.060
	(0.222)	(0.336)	(0.215)
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):	-0.525**	-0.345	-
	(0.221)	(0.442)	-
Additional Emotional Engagement Variables			
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.346**	0.129	-0.095
	(0.143)	(0.334)	(0.122)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.076		0.126
	(0.306)		(0.210)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.002	-0.035	-0.529***
	(0.145)	(0.190)	(0.162)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.215*	-0.251**	-0.445***
	(0.114)	(0.098)	(0.093)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	0.060	-	-0.312
	(0.148)	-	(0.200)
Gender (Female=1)	0.175*	0.045	-
	(0.095)	(0.097)	-
Constant	-0.005	0.368	0.190
	(0.207)	(0.383)	(0.198)
Observations	71	51	37
R-squared	0.696	0.668	0.871

Notes: The dependent variable contains 5 categories, ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 being "Extremely Likely." Entries are OLS coefficients. This vote intentionality outcome measure is based on one of the split-ballot measures available in the 2012 ANES. This measure asks about

the likelihood one will vote in the November election and provides a 5-point Likert scale. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In the 2012 dataset, the vote intentionality measure I rely on was based on an open-ended measure where respondents could report how likely they were to vote (ranging from 0 to 100). I recoded this measure into quantiles, with those closer to 1 representing those reporting higher percentages about their certainty to vote in the general election. As seen previously with the 2012 results, the coupled results of fear and hope have a deterring effect on one's likelihood to vote. The results reach statistical significance at the .10 level. In fact, accounting for the composite effect of the interaction term and one of its constituent terms (-0.525+0.167 = 0.358), they are .358 times less likely to report they are likely to vote. In Model 3, among women, the estimates for the interaction term are missing because there were not enough cases for the coupled feelings of fear and hope.

Discussion

I use data from the ANES 2008 and 2012 to test my hypothesis that, among Latino respondents, the coupled message of threat and opportunity is more mobilizing than threat alone. The benefit of using the ANES to analyze secondary data to test my theory is that it allows me to draw more generalizeable claims, which I could not do with the convenience sample in the survey experiment in Chapters 3 and 4. Thus, the nationally representative sample of Latinos available in the ANES provides me with claims of external validity as I replicate my survey experiment. The use of face-to-face interviews and probability-based geographic sampling is the same gold-standard approach used by the U.S. Census Bureau (Maholtra and Krosnick 2007). The ANES Time Series studies started collecting survey data during the years of Presidential

elections since 1948 including interviewing respondents during the two months prior to the November election, and then re-interviewing during the two months after the election.[45] Despite its longstanding history collecting public opinion of American voters, the ANES only recently began collecting comparable representative data of ethnic and racial minorities, including Hispanics (and Blacks) in 2008. More specifically, the ANES gathered a Latino oversample in the 2008 Time Series oversample design. In the 2012 ANES, the ANES included a nationally representative main sample (including people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds) as well as an oversample of black and Hispanic respondents. The 2012 ANES also contains a self-administered portion of the interview, which is intended to minimize the social desirability pressures or privacy concerns one might face in front of an interviewer. The participant can answer some of the questions privately on a tablet computer.

Skeptics might wonder how the role of partisanship might be driving the results. In fact, one's partisanship identity has often been found as an important political identity, and one that is based on group considerations. Thus, threats to policies one holds as important are not just a threat to the individual, but they threaten the individual's group (Groenendyk 2011). Processing these threats in terms of a group lens allows the individual to have a greater sense of control over the situation (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). In terms of predicting voter turnout, having a strong partisan group identification has been found to be a strong predictor of political participation (Groenendyk and Banks 2014) and trust in government sources (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), particularly as people navigate their complex political environment by following political cues from parties and interest groups (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Kam 2005; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991). Emotion scholars have controlled for partisan strength by

[45] The ANES also collects Pilot Studies testing content and methodology in 'between' most of the Time Series studies since 1979.

combining emotional reactions to either Republican or Democratic candidates (Valentino et al. 2011; Groenendyk 2011). Nicholson (2011) finds that party leaders are particularly more effective in polarizing opinions, more so than generic political party signals. This raises concerns about the particular candidates running in the 2008 and 2012 elections, and the unique effect they might have had in mobilizing political action. Petty and Cacioppo (1996, Ch. 3), in their studies on persuasive source characteristics, also suggest that people's opinions are shaped by their perceptions of the source's credibility, trustworthiness and similarity with the recipient's views. Perhaps this could also be applied to a focus on political behavior.

Furthermore, the Latino samples are collected at a time during the historical presidential election of the first black president, Barack Obama. The mobilizing effect of hope and fear may have been especially driven by hope, particularly as Obama's 2008 campaign ran on a promise of "hope" and "change." Perhaps there was less room for fear of political threat to catalyze people to take action; thus, my analyses might be understating the effect of fear than what we might have seen in previous elections. However, I am not too worried about this concern because if fear and hope were not working hand-in-hand in a unique way, we would see that experiencing fear alone or hope alone would be sufficient to catalyze a significant effect in talking about politics, and this is not the case.

As seen with the talking outcome in the independently designed survey experiment in Chapters 3 and 4, my experiment and the ANES contain similar outcome measures to capture whether a participant is engaged in talking about politics with friends and/or family. Though the subtle differences involve engaging in conversation about immigration politics versus talking with someone about why they should vote for a particular candidate or party, the two capture a social form of political participation. The two measures are expressive and involve a political

dialogue with someone they know. Overall, when predicting whether people will talk about politics, the logit models presented in this chapter reveal that the behavior of Latino samples in the 2008 and 2012 ANES does at times support the simultaneously motivating effects of coupling fear and hope. The participation scale models demonstrated substantive positive results for the 2008 ANES (in the overall sample and among women) and statistically significant and boosting effects in the models estimating vote intentionality (particularly among Democrats) in the same dataset. Interestingly, the 2012 ANES models tended to result in a dampening effect across all 3 political participation outcomes. The only time the 2012 ANES results indicated a possible positive direction for talking about politics was when combining fear towards either candidate and hope towards either candidate, though the result did not reach statistical significance (seen in Appendix D).

The results presented in this chapter are not conclusive and still raise more questions. Overwhelmingly, we see that the results do not reach statistical significance. The existing proxy measures I relied on for threat and opportunity were very narrow and based on a comment(s) the presidential candidates had said or what they had done in the past. This question does not ask about something the candidate intends to do in the future, particularly as part of their campaign goals. The nature of a looming threat or potential opportunity, as presented in the survey experiment vignettes in Chapter 3, are that they are based on the future. Additionally, the current ANES affect measures relies on a question that is not devoid of political partisanship. The survey experiment vignettes did not cue a specific political party reference. Thus, the respondents' fears and hopes may be driven from their overall loyalty or opposition for the long-standing 2-party system in U.S. politics. Furthermore, respondents may be underreporting the extent to which they felt fear towards the candidate(s). If there is a reluctance to report fear, I suspect there may

also be a reluctance to report a strong sense of hope. Appearing to be as unbothered or as realistic as possible about the candidates at hand could be driving the dull “treatment” effects captured in people’s self-reported feelings of fear and hope.

Summary

As with most studies, while the current analyses answer a few immediate questions about the role of fear and hope in motivating political engagement, this study also raises new points to consider for future research. In support of previous scholarship that have shown fear and hope can motivate political action, I also find that these two emotions, particularly in combination, are associated with greater levels of political engagement. For example, in support of this claim, Marcus et al.’s (2000) survey analyses demonstrate that anxiety and enthusiasm are associated with campaign interest and participation. Brader (2005, 2006), through the use of campaign experiment ads, which contained varying emotional components (music and imagery), finds that fear has a narrow catalyzing effect, particularly on behaviors such as the participants’ willingness to work for a campaign and a stronger belief in the importance of voting. He finds that enthusiasm evokes higher levels of campaign interest, intent to register, intent to vote and a greater willingness to work for a campaign. In an attempt to reconcile some of the ways in which scholars factor the role of emotions in predicting political participation, some methodologies involve manipulating emotions through an experiment, while others have used correlations from survey data, or a mix of both approaches (Brader 2005, 2006; Marcus et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Groenendyk 2011).

My immediate next steps are to move beyond the correlation analyses seen in this chapter, and instead extend this study with an emotion-induction experiment. It is important to

provide this form of the emotional treatment, a bottom-up approach, which allows participants to write about specific aspects of a policy debate and how they make them feel (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Scholars have found slightly diverging effects of anxiety depending on whether they rely on a combination of survey measures or if it is induced (see Groenendyk 2011; Brader 2005, 2006). I am currently fielding a survey experiment (June 2017)—through YouGov and supported by the National Science Foundation—where the emotions are independently manipulated. By replicating these results in an experiment that induces fear and hope, I will be more confident that the mechanisms (potentially emotional states) I am capturing for threat and opportunity are not based on particular evaluations of candidates in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. Admittedly, the historic election and re-election of the nation's first black president might have boosted the effect of hope, particularly as the candidate ran with a very explicit promise of "hope in his campaign." Analyses of the 2016 ANES data will provide me with more confidence that the emotional states (or mindsets) associated with threat and opportunity are not particular to the unique election of President Barack Obama. However, it is worth noting that if hope alone were driving the results, then we would find the isolated hope reaction to then-candidate Obama to be statistically significant (Table 5.5). We do not see this is the case, and instead, it is the combined effect of both fear and hope, regardless of whether it is limited to Obama (Table 5.6), to be positive and statistically significant in predicting talking about politics.

By using survey analyses with the ANES data, I am able to draw generalizeable claims of my coupled threat and opportunity theory, which I was unable to conclude from the survey experiment. As indicated by the data (and more strongly by the 2008 ANES), my findings suggest there are some boosting effects in combining a sense of urgency (or fear) with hope,

particularly among women (and at times among Democrats). These gendered results point to the gendered results seen in the survey experiment, where women were driving the catalyzing effects of the coupled threat and opportunity condition.

CHAPTER 6:

Conclusion: Implications for Contemporary Politics and Democratic Governance

Summary

To reiterate, in Chapter 2, I present the "mobilizer's dilemma," which holds that efforts to galvanize a response with crisis-oriented messages only make matters worse by undermining the belief in one's ability to "make a difference." (Vasi and Macy 2003). Vasi and Macy (2003) suggest that efforts intended to overcome free-riding and override feelings of low efficacy are best tackled through a two-pronged message approach: a coupling of crisis and empowerment message frames. Aside from not accounting for alternative explanations that would be part of a threatening political environment, including exposure to opportunity messages, previous studies concluding that Latinos have felt "under attack" have not included measures at the individual level. Thus, without measuring threat at the individual level, it is difficult to conclude that threat alone motivates previously observed peaks in political activism. My project expands the range of potentially mobilizing messages, and challenges the idea that threat is the most successful way to encourage participation among Latinos. My findings also point to the ways in which women cope with threat and stressors in their environments through more expressive and social forms of political engagement. The coupled strategy equips, or motivates, some to join in collective action efforts more easily.

Some researchers have found that there are motivating effects behind a two-pronged approach in a few domains of health behavior and collective action (Vasi and Macy 2003;

Rogers and Mewborn 1976). Borrowing from this literature, I test the dynamic effects of being simultaneously exposed to threatening- and opportunity-based appeals on Latino political behavior. The experiment results in Chapter 3 point to a positive association between the Coupled Condition and the intent to participate in various non-electoral forms of participation (e.g. march, talk and volunteer). Most importantly, I find the coupled strategy of threat-and-opportunity encourages people to send a postcard at higher rates than simply using lone messages emphasizing threat or opportunity appeals.

The coupled threat-and-opportunity approach is more mobilizing because I argue that individuals who feel challenged, and not only threatened, are less distracted by the negativity stirred by the threat message (Folkman and Lazarus 1985; Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Tomaka et al. 1993). I have some indirect evidence for this, as the cognitive manipulation check demonstrates that subjects are less pessimistic about the future well-being of unauthorized immigrants in the Coupled Condition. That is, they perceive the benefits posed by the policy opportunity, and therefore, have something to gain for their efforts as they also ward off the danger from the threat (Tomaka et al. 1993). In fact, as expected, they are most pessimistic about how well immigrants will fare if they are exposed to the Threat alone condition.

In Chapter 4, I explore the unexpected moderating effects of gender. In the Control Condition, I find that women are significantly disadvantaged relative to men when it comes to non-electoral forms of participation. However, as seen in the highlighted Coupled treatment condition in this figure, we find this gender imbalance is not only eliminated, but women are slightly more likely than men to participate politically. Interestingly, men remain essentially unmoved by the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition. Thus, the positive interactive effect of gender and the Coupled Condition is being driven almost entirely by the increase in

participation among women. Furthermore, it turns out that the Coupled Condition of Threat-and-Opportunity is static for women and deters men from the intent to vote. Thus, women are buffered from the demobilizing effect men experience in this condition. Again, this may be partly due to the "oppositional culture" men might engage in at any sign of threat. It may also be that women are buffered from the demobilizing effect because they engage in more wishful thinking, which is facilitated in the paired threat-and-opportunity condition. In terms of sending a postcard and any potential moderating effect by gender, the interactive gender effect fell short of statistical significance in the Coupled Condition for women relative to men. Thus, there is no substantial gender difference in this treatment. Neither men nor women experience a mobilizing effect when plotting one's probability of sending a postcard.

With the advent of the Latino samples available in the 2008 and 2012 ANES, I begin to scratch the surface of the causal mechanisms of a coupled threat and opportunity environment in Chapter 5. Given that the ANES does not rely on a convenience sample, I am also able to make more generalizeable claims with this dataset. I use proxy measures combining fear and hope to test the coupled threat and opportunity effect on nationally representative samples of Latino respondents. I find mixed support for the motivating effects of feeling a combination of fear and hope.

Latinos in the 2016 Election

> *"I'm worried that because Donald Trump is so visceral they'll think Latinos will turn out because of that alone. [...] Hate alone won't motivate somebody to vote…They need something to vote for." September 2, 2016. Chuck Rocha, Latino Democratic strategist from Solidarity Strategies in an interview with the Washington Post.*

In this particular case, the quote comes from a Democratic strategist concerned about the abundance of fear and perceived threat posed for the 2016 Latino electorate by then-candidate

Donald Trump (Planas 2016). Instead of presuming that the Latino 'sleeping giant' would awaken in response to then-candidate Trump's rhetoric, this quote sheds light on the need to look beyond threat if one seeks to mobilize the Latino community. Yet, campaigns and interest groups seeking to mobilize the mass public often point to an impending catastrophe or looming enemy as a means to spark a sense of urgency and alarm (Alinsky 1971). Many political elites believe that appeals to threat represent an effective means of mobilization. However, the use of threat might immobilize people because it diminishes the extent to which people feel equipped enough to respond to the crisis (Vasi and Macy 2003; Soroka and McAdams 2015). Is it possible that threat cues do not mobilize certain segments of the populace? Instead of only relying on a threatening message that emphasizes potentially aversive outcomes (Altheide and Michalowski 1999), this dissertation demonstrates that it may be more effective if such appeals are *coupled* with an opportunity message that emphasizes the possibility of more desirable policy goals. In order to explore this possibility, I focus on Latino reactions to threat and opportunity appeals on the issue of immigration.

Previous awakenings of the Latino "sleeping giant," thought to have been provoked primarily by anti-immigrant policies, led the Democratic National Convention to wrongfully err on the expectation that Latino voters would rise up in the 2016 election, to vote against Donald Trump and his draconian immigration policies (Planas 2016). Though the share of the national electorate that is Latino continues to grow in each presidential election, this is partly due to population growth (Planas 2016). Early numbers reported in the media suggest that Latinos only made up 11 percent of the 2016 electorate, which is about the same as turnout in 2012 (Suro 2016).

As I explain below, relying on negative reactions to Trump to represent a sufficient incentive for Latino voter turnout was, perhaps, a miscalculation for the Democratic National Committee and/or

Hillary Clinton campaign (Planas 2016; Suro 2016). Though some argue that a different Democratic strategy that relied on greater canvassing and outreach efforts would have increased Latino turnout in 2016 (Planas 2016; Michelson and Garcia Bedolla 2012), the message content behind these mobilizing strategies could not have been a continuation of alarming people to stop Trump's immigration policies.

Based on the lessons we can draw from the experiment and ANES findings in this dissertation, a messaging strategy pairing the threat of Trump's policies with the alternative, and more optimistic, promises of a Clinton administration would have been even more effective in driving Latinos to the polls. My results suggest that Latinos would have had a better grasp of the stakes involved in the election and a better sense that their efforts to vote were not simply to stop Trump, but to try to improve the state of affairs for the Latino community with an alternative candidate. For instance, the election of Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) and re-election of Senator Michael Bennet (D-CO) and their campaign victories are prime examples of the types of policy environments that better motivate the Latino electorate. In Nevada, it also took similar local policies that expand benefits to immigrants at the state and local level to encourage the necessary turnout from the Latino community (Summerlin 2016). In their efforts to register people to vote, Sophia Clark, a regional organizer for the Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition put it best. She describes the dissatisfaction Latino voters faced with the presidential candidates and that more voters were paying attention to state policies that could impact immigrants' lives more directly, including an expansion of authorized driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants in Colorado (Summerlin 2016). Thus, perhaps it was not simply the presence of an opposing candidate with strong restrictive immigration views or the perceived threat of Trump's immigration policies that motivated many Latinos to turnout in high rates in Colorado and Nevada.

Limitations and Future Inquiries

I focus on policy appeals and the competitive nature of policy frames when participants are *simultaneously* exposed to both threat and opportunity appeals (Chong and Druckman 2007; 2010; Druckman 2010; Druckman and Leeper 2012). In a similar vein, a critic might argue the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition is not helping people redirect their frustrations about looming threats toward more promising policy goals, but instead it is simply helping them feel there is more competition surrounding the debate and the momentum may be what is most motivating. This does not take away from my overarching argument. By providing participants with a more complete picture of the stakes involved and the efforts championed by both sides of an issue, people are then more likely to feel challenged and not overwhelmed by threat alone. Furthermore, a coupled message approach might be reframing the issue, such that the opportunity offered deflects the emphasis of threat.

As Albertson and Gadarian (2015) address in their experiments, another concern could be that there is no single set of stimuli that could trigger a perception of threat uniformly across an audience. Thus, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) argue that it is important to use multiple types of treatments to manipulate anxiety across participants. In the experiment described in chapters 3 and 4, subjects were randomized to receive a threatening appeal or a reassuring appeal, or both. Equally important, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) also advocate for the use of self-generated or bottom-up manipulations, which accomplish greater internal validity because they allow the participant to tell the researcher what makes them feel anxious or threatened. In this case, respondents in the treatment condition are asked to list their worries about a particular policy scope (immigration or public health threat) and then they compare those subjects to other respondents who simply listed their more generic thoughts about the same policy arena

(Albertson and Gadarian 2015). In a second study, funded in part by the National Science Foundation, I incorporate a self-generated manipulation of threat and opportunity cues surrounding immigration policies. This second experiment involves an emotion-induction component, allowing subjects to write about what they feel fearful and/or hopeful about when asked to reflect on the immigration debate. In the meantime, my current study design provides more realistic external political stimuli signaling threat and opportunity in the scope of immigration policy.

Interestingly, my treatment's mobilizing effects were not moderated by issue salience (Miller and Krosnick 2004; Valentino et al. 2008) or a primed racial group identification (Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980; Garcia 2003). With regards to issue salience, the literature would expect those who follow the immigration debate most closely to be the most mobilized by a call to action. Furthermore, minority group members with an elevated sense of racial group and/or panethnic identification should be especially motivated to overcome the collective action problem (Gurin, Miller and Gurin, 1980; Garcia, 2003; Garcia Bedolla 2005). Scholars have often turned to group identification as a key concept to understand how racial minorities overcome socioeconomic disadvantages and other forms of exclusion to participate in politics (Garcia 1982; Dawson 1994; Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk 1981; Omi and Winant 1993; Orum 1966; Olsen 1970; Verba and Nie 1972; Shingles 1981). For a group identity to carry political weight in an individual's political decision-making process, "individuals have to recognize themselves as members of the group and also be conscious of the political value of acting as a group" (Jones-Correa and DeGraauw 2013, p. 217). This matters because while resources tend to be stable over time, political organizations and campaigns can more easily prime a group's identity in light of one's political environment (Michelson 2001). The

mobilizing effect of threatening and hopeful policies for Latinos may be most effective among Latinos with high levels of ethnic or racial group identification. For instance, Masuoka (2008) finds that Latinos who hold racialized identities are more likely to become politically engaged than counterparts without such identities. In fact, Valdez (2011) and Stokes-Brown (2006) find that Latino group consciousness significantly and positively correlates with political participation as well as vote choice (Sanchez 2006).

However, neither of these moderating effects emerged as reliable explanations for the results presented in chapters 3 and 4. This may in part be due to the prevalence of immigration topics in this presidential campaign cycle. Thus, the lack of moderating effects for the entire sample based on issue salience and racial group identification in my study may be due to ceiling effects of both immigration issue salience and various measures of racial group consciousness.[46] On a related note, in future analyses, I plan to rely on larger sample sizes to explore differences across Latino national origin groups. Garcia Bedolla, Lavariega-Monforti and Pantoja (2007) point to differences in the gender gap across national group origins indicating that gender has a differential impact on men and women in different communities (Mexican, Cuban and Puerto Rican) when predicting their political attitudes. This intersection of gender and national origin is important to explore in subsequent analyses as some messages may be more mobilizing to some based on their policy priorities (Garcia Bedolla et al. 2007). From a political mobilization perspective, this suggests that particular policy issues may best mobilize Latinas to engage in

[46] Some of the gendered findings in chapter 4 are partially explained by women who follow immigration more closely, as well as women who are more efficacious. However, salience and efficacy are not conditioning the treatment's effects for the sample as a whole. Vasi and Macy (2003) and Rogers and Mewborn (1976) rely on the moderating effect of efficacy to explain people's responses to communication strategies involving threatening stimuli posing a danger. Efficacy does not lessen the severity of the threat but it strengthens people's belief in the ability to cope with danger when they confront it (Rogers and Mewborn 1976; Vasi and Macy 2003).

politics more than Latino men, or vice versa (Garcia Bedolla et al. 2007). In Chapter 4, I began to explore these potential differences, focusing primarily on the moderating effects of gender.

As part of my broader research agenda, I also envision a separate study that will test a less salient issue, such as environmental policies. This study will be a more conservative test of the effect of threat and opportunity cues. For instance, the effects in the current study may be due to the fact that immigration issues are highly salient as well as heavily based in Latino group cues. Testing a less salient and non group-based issue, such as one focused on local environment policy, will help me determine if salience or a sense of racial group identity are necessary ingredients behind effective coupled appeals.

Finally, I theorized but did not explicitly test the importance of the ordering of threat and opportunity appeals in the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition of my experiment. In subsequent studies, I hope to explore whether the ordering of the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity message has implications for political participation. For instance, the threat cue might have a longer lasting effect because it was the first item people read in the coupled prompt; conversely, other critics might expect the opportunity cue to have a stronger effect in people's minds because it was listed last in the coupled prompt. However, if one cue stood out more than the other, then the Coupled Condition would have looked identical to the effect of a cue on its own in the single cue treatments, but I never find this to be the case. Thus, the two policies in the coupled message are working hand-in-hand to help people see that the effort they are exerting in taking political action will not only diffuse the danger posed by the threat (revoking of birthright citizenship), but it will also lead to the possibility of gains provided by the policy opportunity (pathway to birthright citizenship). In the current survey experiment I am fielding as part of an extension of this project (through YouGov and supported by National Science Foundation), one of my conditions randomizes the ordering of threat-and-opportunity. Thus,

results from the new experiment will reveal whether the ordering of the threat-and-opportunity measure are critical in motivating people to take action.

Previous scholars have demonstrated the role of group consciousness may be leveraged as a resource for those who are appraising risk and benefits of taking political action (Sanchez, 2006a, 2006b; Garcia Bedolla 2006), and some have found that a strong sense of Latino linked fate may be particularly relevant to counteract political cynicism (Monforti and Michelson 2016, Chap. 4). In order to have more trust in government and foster greater levels of political engagement, Okamoto et al. (2010) and Monforti and Michelson (2016) also point to the important contributing (though not sufficient) factor of acculturation and integrative policies in one's environment. Those with greater group consciousness might be more optimistic as they contextualize the threat in terms of the group and not just as individual matter (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Smith et al. 2007; Groenendyk and Banks 2014). This also influences their options to take political action, which are seen as a group response signaling power with numbers. With this strength in numbers, there is a caveat: one cannot feel as though their participation is less valuable or lost in a group, also known as classic collective action dilemmas of free-riding and social loafing (Olson 1965; Vasi and Macy 2003). Although I did not find moderating effects of Latino group consciousness, Latino linked fate and heightened importance of a Latino racial identity in the survey experiment of this project, this is not to say that group identity is irrelevant in the risk and opportunity appraisal process of immigration policy.

I suspect a sense of Latino group identity was heightened and evident of ceiling effects. Furthermore, upon focusing solely on those of self-reported Mexican origin, it is important to note that the results are heightened among Mexican participants in my survey, though the results still hold upon analyzing the full Latino sample (which includes a wide array of people of

various national origins). This raises the important point of national origin and panethnic origin identification among Latinos (Monforti 2015, Chap. 2), a debate that has not reached consensus and is still changing as the diversity of Latino immigrants continues to grow beyond the larger Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban subgroups (Monforti 2015, Chap. 2.). Before delving into differences across various forms of social group identities, it was necessary to establish the causal link behind the threat-and-hope (or fear-and-hope) design of the project.

Through interviews, scholars have found that recipients, or those eligible for integrative immigration policies, are very hopeful about the future of immigration policy (Michelson, LaVariega-Monforti and Sanchez 2015; Jordan-Wallace and Zepeda-Millán 2017). Some of the recipients of integrative policies are those who were brought to the U.S. as children—including those eligible for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals or Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM). Does their protected status fuel their sense of optimism? Is this younger set of the Latino population more naïve? Is there a millennial effect? Though this is speculative, perhaps some of the optimism is grounded in the socialization experiences these young adults have gone through, including being the children of immigrant parents. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 1:4 children live in households with immigrant parents (2010). Latino Decisions found that nearly 64 percent of Latino adult citizens polled in 2014 report knowing someone who is undocumented (either a close friend or family relative). As an area for future study, it is worth exploring a potential moderating effect by immigrant generation status.

We do not have a healthy democracy when people abstain from engaging within the political system. Furthermore, this points to the need to assess whether motivators of political action, including the combined effects of threat and opportunity, differ for various groups in the U.S. While focusing on political activism among African American and White Americans,

Phoenix (2015) finds there are racial differences in the motivating effects behind anger and hope. In fact, some are led to resignation and inaction in the face of policy threats, especially if there are no signals of policy change (or policy goals) that will prevent the same misstep or crisis from happening again (Phoenix 2015). Finally, although the mass public can be persuaded to take political action and be more engaged citizens, not all forms of political behavior foster democratic outcomes. In other words, people can be manipulated to overestimate a perceived threat in their environment (Hopkins 2010; Albertson and Gadarian 2015; although see Lupia and Menning 2009) and misplace trust in more authoritarian political figures (Albertson and Gadarian 2015).

My work provides strong support for the proposition that more nuanced and balanced political appeals are at least as successful at motivating Latino political behavior as more threatening appeals. My research uncovers more effective strategies to spur more political action among Latinos in the U.S. A democracy that consists of more effective mobilizing strategies will provide people with the means and motivation to participate more fully (Schattschneider 1975), allowing them to keep our elected officials more accountable (Hutchings 2003). My dissertation project also raises questions about the health and potential challenges to our democracy. The dominant use of threat and fear tactics in politics creates a more anxious citizenry (Valentino et al. 2008; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Anxious citizens overwhelmingly "support policies that deny others' rights in times of crisis and to support leaders who may continually provoke fears to maintain power" for such policies (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). This is particularly problematic as the nation attempts to handle its increasing racial and ethnic diversity (Huntington 2004; Dahl 1973).

APPENDICES

A. Chapter 3 Appendices, Part One: Screenshots of Treatment Conditions and Control Condition

Figure A.1: Experiment Threat Condition[47]

[47] Treatments screens were also available in Spanish (available upon request). These treatment designs were extensively pretested months leading up to fielding the experiment (in October of 2015 and February 2016).

Figure A.2: Experiment Opportunity Condition

REFORM IMMIGRATION
FOR America

RELIEF RESOURCES | CAMPAIGNS | NEWS | ABOUT | DONATE

TOP PRIORITY CAMPAIGN

OUR TIME IS NOW!
A PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP IS THE BEST MOVE!

This week the Senate is going to vote on a bill to provide a pathway to citizenship for immigrants living in the U.S. without legal status. Before it is too late, let your Senators know that providing a pathway to citizenship would be a win for American and immigrant families everywhere!

LET'S TAKE ACTION TODAY!

Petition - Add your name | Donate - Give any amount | Contact - Call Congress

Figure A.3: Experiment Combined Threat-and-Opportunity Condition

REFORM IMMIGRATION FOR America

RELIEF RESOURCES CAMPAIGNS NEWS ABOUT DONATE

TOP PRIORITY CAMPAIGN

WARNING! ENDING BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP IS THE WRONG MOVE!

This week the Senate is going to vote on a bill to end the U.S.-citizenship for children born of immigrant parents who do not have legal U.S. status. Let your Senators know that ending birthright citizenship would be an attack for American and immigrant families everywhere!

...Meanwhile, another bill in the Senate provides a pathway to citizenship for immigrants who are living in the U.S. without legal status. Before it is too late, let your Senators know that providing a pathway to citizenship for these immigrants would be a win for American and immigrant families everywhere!

OUR TIME IS NOW!
PROVIDING A PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP IS THE BEST MOVE!

LET'S TAKE ACTION ON BOTH OF THESE BILLS TODAY!

Petition - Add your name | Donate - Give any amount | Contact - Call Congress

Figure A.4: Experiment Control Condition

Mobile Messaging and Social Media 2015

BY MAEVA DUGGAN

In today's world, people are adopting new ways of communicating. According to a Pew Research Center study in 2015, they asked specifically about mobile messaging apps. They found that 36% of smartphone owners report using messaging apps such as WhatsApp, Kik or iMessage, and 17% use apps that automatically delete sent messages such as Snapchat or Wickr.

B. Chapter 3 Appendices, Part Two: Experiment Manipulation Checks

Table B.1: OLS Models Estimating Cognitive Perceptions of Threat (1) and Opportunity (0) by Treatments

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Cognitive Threat Manipulation Check, 7 cat. (Base = Control)	Cognitive Threat Manipulation Check, 6 cat. (Base = Control)	Cognitive Threat Manipulation Check, 6 cat. (Base = Threat)
Threat Condition	0.092***	0.119***	-
	(0.026)	(0.032)	-
Opportunity Condition	-0.172***	-0.216***	-0.335***
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Coupled Condition	-0.003	0.003	-0.116***
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Control Condition	-	-	-0.119***
	-	-	(0.032)
Constant	0.555***	0.564***	0.683***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Observations	1,001	756	756
R-squared	0.097	0.131	0.131

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.2: Estimating Models of Participation Scale and Sent Postcard, Controlling for Cognitive Manipulation Check

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Participation Scale (OLS)	Participation Scale (OLS)	Postcard Sent (logit)	Postcard Sent (logit)
Treatment Conditions (Base = Control)				
Threat Condition	0.057*	0.043	-0.039	-0.075
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.219)	(0.223)
Opportunity Condition	0.001	0.019	-0.050	0.018
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.228)	(0.232)
Coupled Condition	0.064**	0.063**	0.439*	0.495**
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.229)	(0.233)
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1)		0.059		0.152
		(0.037)		(0.296)
Household Income level (5-cat., 0-1)		-0.028		0.418
		(0.041)		(0.327)
Age		-0.324***		-0.307
		(0.052)		(0.409)
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-1)(1=1st generation)		-0.128***		-0.639***
		(0.027)		(0.212)
Partisanship (7-cat.) (1=Strong Republicans)		0.145***		-0.012
		(0.035)		(0.276)
Gender		-0.020		-0.271
		(0.022)		(0.172)
Cognitive Threat (6-cat.)	-0.083**	-0.076**	-0.197	-0.129
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.257)	(0.262)
Constant	0.418***	0.461***	0.829***	1.048***
	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.213)	(0.367)
Observations	756	756	756	756
R-squared	0.014	0.118		

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.3: OLS Models, Emotion Manipulation Check of Threat (Fear) and Opportunity (Hope)

	Model 1	Model 2
	Hope	Fear
Threat Condition	-0.068**	0.037
	(0.032)	(0.034)
Opportunity Condition	-0.038	0.023
	(0.033)	(0.035)
Coupled Condition	-0.049	-0.023
	(0.032)	(0.034)
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1)	0.004	0.040
	(0.040)	(0.043)
Household Income level (5-cat., 0-1)	-0.007	0.004
	(0.045)	(0.048)
Age	-0.062	-0.081
	(0.058)	(0.061)
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-1)(1= 1st generation)	-0.027	-0.001
	(0.030)	(0.032)
Partisanship (7-cat.)(1= Strong Republicans)	0.002	-0.055
	(0.040)	(0.042)
Gender	0.009	0.028
	(0.024)	(0.026)
Cognitive Threat (6 cat.)	-0.088**	0.049
	(0.039)	(0.041)
Constant	0.639***	0.514***
	(0.053)	(0.057)
Observations	1,001	1,001
R-squared	0.013	0.010

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.4: Estimating Participation Scale and Sent Postcard Models with Demographic Controls and Manipulation Checks

	Model 1	Model 2
	Participation Scale (OLS)	Sent Postcard (logit)
Threat Condition	0.038	0.049
	(0.025)	(0.189)
Opportunity Condition	0.011	-0.001
	(0.025)	(0.191)
Coupled Condition	0.049**	0.482**
	(0.024)	(0.194)
Highest Educ. Degree (7 cat., 0-1)	0.061**	0.340
	(0.031)	(0.240)
Household Income level (5 cat., 0-1)	-0.032	0.185
	(0.034)	(0.269)
Age	-0.368***	-0.523
	(0.044)	(0.341)
Immigrant Generation (3 cat., 0-1)(1= 1st generation)	-0.126***	-0.502***
	(0.023)	(0.178)
Partisanship (7 cat.)(1= Strong Republicans)	0.164***	0.065
	(0.030)	(0.236)
Gender	-0.010	-0.200
	(0.018)	(0.143)
Cognitive Threat (6 cat.)	-0.070**	-0.120
	(0.030)	(0.233)
Hopeful	0.013	0.082
	(0.025)	(0.197)
Afraid	-0.029	-0.185
	(0.024)	(0.186)
Constant	0.455***	0.778**
	(0.044)	(0.344)
Observations	1,001	1,001
R-squared	0.135	

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.5: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms of Political Participation with Added Demographic Controls

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Join a March (Baseline = Control)	Talk About Politics (Baseline = Control)	Volunteer for Organization (Baseline = Control)	Participation Scale (Baseline = Control)
Threat Condition	0.039	0.029	0.021	0.029
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Opportunity Condition	0.023	0.032	0.013	0.023
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Coupled Condition	0.051*	0.069**	0.028	0.049**
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Gender	-0.036*	0.007	-0.006	-0.012
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1)	0.024	0.089**	0.072**	0.062**
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Household Income level (5-cat., 0-1)	-0.030	-0.016	-0.043	-0.030
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.035)
Age	-0.425***	-0.264***	-0.414***	-0.367***
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.044)
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-1)(1=1st gen)	-0.105***	-0.113***	-0.161***	-0.126***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Partisanship (7-cat.) (1=Strong Republicans)	0.164***	0.177***	0.150***	0.164***
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.030)
Constant	0.380***	0.423***	0.420***	0.408***
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.037)
Observations	1,001	1,001	1,001	1,001
R-squared	0.109	0.080	0.122	0.128

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.6: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Intent to Vote with Added Demographic Controls

	Model 1
	Intent to Vote (Baseline = Control)
Threat Condition	-0.027
	(0.024)
Opportunity Condition	-0.041*
	(0.024)
Coupled Condition	-0.015
	(0.024)
Gender	-0.021
	(0.018)
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1)	0.113***
	(0.031)
Household Income level (5-cat., 0-1)	0.029
	(0.034)
Age	0.208***
	(0.042)
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-1)(1= 1st gen)	0.047**
	(0.023)
Partisanship (7-cat.) (1=Strong Republicans)	0.113***
	(0.028)
Constant	0.647***
	(0.038)
Observations	789
R-squared	0.078

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.7: Logit Models, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Sent Postcard with Added Demographic Controls

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Postcard Sent (Baseline = Control)	Postcard Sent (Baseline = Threat)	Postcard Sent (Baseline = Opportunity)
Threat Condition	0.024		0.010
	(0.187)		(0.187)
Opportunity Condition	0.014	-0.010	
	(0.186)	(0.187)	
Coupled Condition	0.483**	0.459**	0.469**
	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.193)
Control Condition	-0.207	-0.207	-0.207
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Gender	0.334	0.334	0.334
	(0.240)	(0.240)	(0.240)
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1)	0.189	0.189	0.189
	(0.269)	(0.269)	(0.269)
Household Income level (5-cat., 0-1)	-0.516	-0.516	-0.516
	(0.341)	(0.341)	(0.341)
Age	-0.504***	-0.504***	-0.504***
	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-1)(1= 1st generation)	0.072	0.072	0.072
	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.235)
Partisanship (7-cat.) (1=Strong Republicans)		-0.024	-0.014
		(0.187)	(0.186)
Constant	0.660**	0.684**	0.674**
	(0.289)	(0.291)	(0.280)
Observations	1,001	1,001	1,001

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B.8: OLS Regressions, Main Effects of Treatments Estimating Non-Electoral Forms of Political Participation with Opportunity Message as the Baseline

	Model 1
	Talk about Politics (Baseline=Opportunity)
Threat Condition	0.019
	(0.030)
Opportunity Condition	-
	-
Coupled Condition	0.050*
	(0.030)
Control Condition	-0.018
	(0.030)
Constant	0.468***
	(0.021)
Observations	1,001
R-squared	0.006

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

C. Chapter 4 Appendices: Additional Gender Moderating Effects

Figure C.1: Sent Postcards by Treatment and Gender



Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for two-tailed test. Predicted probabilities derived from Model 3 of Table 5. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: Control = 249, Coupled = 250, Threat = 250, and Opportunity = 252. Results still hold after sensitivity tests with added demographic variables education, income and age as controls.

Table C.1: Estimating Political Participation by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines and Added Controls

	Model 1	Model 2
	Participation Scale Gender Interactions (Baseline = Threat)	Participation Scale Gender Interactions (Baseline = Opportunity)
Gender = 1, Female	-0.017	-0.008
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Control Condition	0.001	0.012
	(0.034)	(0.035)
Opportunity Condition	-0.011	-
	(0.035)	-
Coupled Condition	-0.018	-0.007
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Threat Condition	-	0.011
	-	(0.035)
Control Condition X Gender	-0.063	-0.072
	(0.049)	(0.049)
Opportunity Condition X Gender	0.009	-
	(0.049)	-
Coupled Condition X Gender	0.073	0.065
	(0.049)	(0.049)
Threat Condition X Gender	-	-0.009
	-	(0.049)
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1)	0.062**	0.062**
	(0.031)	(0.031)
HH Income level (5-cat., 0-1)	-0.032	-0.032
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Age	-0.370***	-0.370***
	(0.044)	(0.044)
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-1)(1= 1st generation)	-0.127***	-0.127***
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Partisanship (7-cat.) (1= Strong Republicans)	0.166***	0.166***
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Constant	0.440***	0.429***
	(0.041)	(0.039)
Observations	1,001	1,001
R-squared	0.135	0.135

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.2: Estimating Sent Postcard Logit Models by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines and Added Controls

	Model 1	Model 2
	Sent Postcard Gender Interactions (Baseline = Threat)	Sent Postcard Gender Interactions (Baseline = Opportunity)
Gender = 1, Female	0.161	-0.019
	(0.271)	(0.265)
Control Condition	0.441	0.369
	(0.269)	(0.275)
Opportunity Condition	0.072	
	(0.267)	
Coupled Condition	0.650**	0.578**
	(0.284)	(0.289)
Threat Condition	-	-0.072
	-	(0.267)
Control Condition X Gender	-0.918**	-0.738**
	(0.378)	(0.376)
Opportunity Condition X Gender	-0.181	
	(0.373)	
Coupled Condition X Gender	-0.382	-0.202
	(0.389)	(0.388)
Threat Condition X Gender	-	0.181
	-	(0.373)
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1)	0.328	0.328
	(0.241)	(0.241)
HH Income level (5-cat., 0-1)	0.181	0.181
	(0.270)	(0.270)
Age	-0.527	-0.527
	(0.343)	(0.343)
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-1)(1= 1st generation)	-0.522***	-0.522***
	(0.179)	(0.179)
Partisanship (7-cat.) (1= Strong Republicans)	0.089	0.089
	(0.237)	(0.237)
Constant	0.508	0.580*
	(0.313)	(0.302)
Observations	1,001	1,001

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.3: OLS Models Estimating Vote Intent by Treatment and Gender with Single Cue Message Baselines and Added Controls

	Model 1	Model 2
	Vote Intent Gender Interactions (Baseline = Threat)	Vote Intent Gender Interactions (Baseline = Opportunity)
Gender = 1, Female	-0.002	-0.005
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Control Condition	0.064*	0.077**
	(0.033)	(0.033)
Opportunity Condition	-0.013	-
	(0.034)	-
Coupled Condition	0.011	0.024
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Threat Condition	-	0.013
	-	(0.034)
Control Condition X Gender	-0.079*	-0.076
	(0.048)	(0.048)
Opportunity Condition X Gender	-0.003	-
	(0.048)	-
Coupled Condition X Gender	0.001	0.004
	(0.047)	(0.047)
Threat Condition X Gender	-	0.003
	-	(0.048)
Highest Educ. Degree (7-cat., 0-1)	0.111***	0.111***
	(0.031)	(0.031)
HH Income level (5-cat., 0-1)	0.028	0.028
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Age	0.207***	0.207***
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Immigrant Generation (3-cat., 0-1)(1 = 1st gen)	0.046**	0.046**
	(0.023)	(0.023)
Partisanship (7-cat.)(1= Strong Republicans)	0.112***	0.112***
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant	0.613***	0.600***
	(0.041)	(0.039)
Observations	789	789
R-squared	0.082	0.082

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.4: OLS Estimates for Emotion Manipulation Check with Moderating Gender Effects by Treatment

	Model 1	Model 2
	Hope Gender Interactions (Baseline= Control)	Fear Gender Interactions (Baseline= Control)
Gender = 1, Female	0.080*	0.076
	(0.045)	(0.048)
Threat Condition	-0.029	0.048
	(0.044)	(0.047)
Threat Condition X Gender	-0.097	-0.016
	(0.064)	(0.067)
Opportunity Condition	0.019	0.007
	(0.045)	(0.048)
Opportunity Condition X Gender	-0.089	0.011
	(0.064)	(0.067)
Coupled Condition	0.009	0.077
	(0.045)	(0.048)
Coupled Condition X Gender	-0.12*	-0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Constant	-0.116*	-0.192***
	(0.064)	(0.067)
Observations	1,001	1,001
R-squared	0.010	0.017

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C.5: Estimating Participation Models by Treatment Among Women

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Participation Scale Among Women	Vote Intent Among Women	Sent Postcard Among Women
Threat Condition	0.062*	0.015	0.474*
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.263)
Opportunity Condition	0.042	0.001	0.330
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.255)
Coupled Condition	0.108***	0.030	0.712***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.262)
Constant	0.323***	0.815***	0.050
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.183)
Observations	505	393	505
R-squared	0.018	0.002	

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

D. Chapter 5 Appendices: ANES Results Fully Specified

Table D.1: Distribution of Partisanship Identification in ANES 2008 and 2012 Latino Samples

	ANES 2008	ANES 2012
	FTF Sample	FTF Sample
	(%)	(%)
Partisan Identification		
Strong/Moderate/Leaning Democrat	62	67
Independent	15	15
Strong/Moderate/Leaning Republican	23	19
Observations	509	472

Notes: The data are weighted. Percentages based on 2008 and 2012 ANES Latino samples.

Table D.2: Distribution of Partisan Strength in ANES 2008 and 2012 Latino Samples

	ANES 2008	ANES 2012
	FTF Sample	FTF Sample
	(%)	(%)
Partisan Strength		
Strong/Moderate Partisans	58	61
Leaners and Independents	42	39
Observations	509	472

Notes: The data are weighted. Percentages based on 2008 and 2012 ANES Latino samples.

Table D.3: Logit Models Estimating Talking About Politics, Participating in Politics, Vote Intentionality with ANES Latino Subpopulations in 2008, including no controls and limited controls

	Model 1 Talking Politics No Controls 2008	Model 2 Partici-pating No Controls 2008	Model 3 Voting No Controls 2008	Model 4 Talking Politics Limited Controls 2008	Model 5 Partici-pating Limited Controls 2008	Model 6 Voting Limited Controls 2008
Main Independent Variables						
Fear- Rep	0.228	0.035	0.132	-0.074	0.005	0.048
	(0.670)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.780)	(0.101)	(0.072)
Hope- Dem	0.058	0.010	0.088*	-0.391	-0.046*	0.016
	(0.272)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.319)	(0.024)	(0.042)
Both Hope (D) X Fear (R):	0.431	0.046	-0.035	0.877	0.074	0.001
	(0.739)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.823)	(0.108)	(0.089)
Demographic Controls						
Family Income				0.409	0.028	-0.037
				(0.453)	(0.042)	(0.083)
Unemployed				0.447	0.033	0.104
				(0.588)	(0.072)	(0.080)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)				0.295	0.027	0.148***
				(0.404)	(0.044)	(0.034)
Gender (Female=1)				-0.236	-0.027	0.090***
				(0.282)	(0.027)	(0.033)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)				-0.145	0.010	0.097**
				(0.352)	(0.031)	(0.047)
Age				-0.001	0.000	0.003***
				(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)				-0.060	0.012	-0.058
				(0.355)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Interest in Campaign Politics				0.730	0.139***	0.384***
				(0.475)	(0.051)	(0.047)
Own a Home				0.143	-0.009	0.020
				(0.291)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Union Membership				0.362	0.012	-0.005
				(0.380)	(0.042)	(0.061)
Latino Linked Fate				0.717**	0.093***	-0.003

(1=Not Very/Some/A lot)						
				(0.291)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Constant	-0.897***	0.165***	0.623***	-1.585***	0.045	0.249***
	(0.206)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.546)	(0.059)	(0.089)
Observations	440	440	438	355	355	353
R-squared		0.021	0.043		0.103	0.306

Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents in the 2008 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey estimates of the Latino subpopulation.

Table D.4: Logit Models Estimating Talking About Politics, Participating in Politics, Vote Intentionality with ANES Latino Subpopulations in 2012, including no controls and limited controls

	Model 1 Talking Politics No Controls 2012	Model 2 Partici-pating No Controls 2012	Model 3 Voting No Controls 2012	Model 4 Talking Politics Limited Controls 2012	Model 5 Partici-pating Limited Controls 2012	Model 6 Voting Limited Controls 2012
AfraidDum- Rep	0.771	0.223*	0.005	1.770**	0.328***	0.222
	(0.907)	(0.132)	(0.306)	(0.821)	(0.089)	(0.134)
HopeDum- Dem	-0.395	-0.043	0.044	0.158	-0.018	0.060
	(0.500)	(0.036)	(0.092)	(0.477)	(0.034)	(0.104)
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction Term	-0.046	-0.153	0.105	-0.921	-0.266***	-0.265
	(1.067)	(0.139)	(0.316)	(1.015)	(0.097)	(0.177)
Family Income				-0.743	-0.046	0.149
				(0.766)	(0.059)	(0.121)
Unemployed				-1.027*	-0.026	-0.201*
				(0.521)	(0.041)	(0.102)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)				0.261	0.002	0.047
				(0.567)	(0.041)	(0.082)
Gender (Female=1)				0.036	0.007	0.150**
				(0.357)	(0.029)	(0.068)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)				-1.437***	-0.072*	0.026
				(0.541)	(0.037)	(0.084)
Age				0.013	0.002**	-0.002
				(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)				0.131	0.038	-0.023
				(0.369)	(0.026)	(0.078)
Interest in Campaign Politics				1.186	0.080	0.343***
				(0.723)	(0.052)	(0.121)
Own a Home				0.757**	0.060**	0.069
				(0.347)	(0.025)	(0.070)
Union Membership				0.717	0.063	-0.020
				(0.518)	(0.043)	(0.064)
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not Very/Some/A				0.068	0.005	0.101*

lot)						
				(0.256)	(0.020)	(0.060)
Constant	-0.565	0.155***	0.712***	-1.523*	0.030	0.426**
	(0.352)	(0.026)	(0.087)	(0.791)	(0.058)	(0.177)
Observations	424	424	202	363	363	157
R-squared		0.053	0.028		0.176	0.246

Notes: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. All data are weighted. All variables are coded 0 to 1. All estimates are based on the following p-values using a two-tailed test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Source: Models estimated with Latino respondents in the 2012 ANES. The observations in the models above are based on weighted survey estimates of the Latino subpopulation.

Table D.5: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation, fully specified

	Model 1 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2008	Model 2 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2008	Model 3 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2008
AfraidDum- Rep	1.618	1.768	0.755
	(1.904)	(1.963)	(5.347)
HopeDum- Dem	-0.606	-1.552	-2.440
	(1.338)	(1.070)	(1.668)
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction Term	1.590	2.632*	4.440*
	(1.235)	(1.371)	(2.343)
Family Income	3.212***	1.552	-0.685
	(1.083)	(1.463)	(2.504)
Unemployed	0.629	0.970	2.665
	(1.482)	(1.004)	(1.791)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)	-0.431	0.133	1.572
	(0.765)	(1.040)	(1.789)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.189	-0.451	
	(0.517)	(0.565)	
Age	-0.014	-0.003	0.062
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.061)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)	-0.176	-0.168	-1.078
	(0.748)	(0.892)	(1.134)
English Interview	-0.599	-0.886	-2.863
	(0.669)	(0.946)	(1.929)
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	-0.160	-0.372	3.369
	(1.156)	(1.646)	(3.326)
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	0.303	0.676	0.848
	(0.926)	(0.936)	(1.082)
Interest in Campaign Politics	0.805	1.720**	-0.968
	(0.876)	(0.827)	(1.564)
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate)	1.013**	0.625	2.555***
	(0.455)	(0.608)	(0.959)
Church Attendance Indicator (1=Attend outside of	0.111	-0.752	-0.743

weddings/baptisms/funerals)			
	(0.578)	(0.782)	(2.329)
Union Membership	0.443	0.878	1.836
	(0.592)	(0.756)	(1.345)
Own a Home	-0.187	0.564	-0.468
	(0.415)	(0.540)	(0.939)
Length of Residence - Years	-0.003	-0.015	-0.046
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.035)
Mobilization Indicator (1=Contacted by Political Party)	1.681***	1.957***	1.084
	(0.519)	(0.621)	(1.692)
Care Who Wins Presidency	1.953**	2.104**	1.688
	(0.781)	(0.901)	(1.170)
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not Very/Some/A lot)	0.914*	1.374*	4.218**
	(0.537)	(0.708)	(2.094)
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-1.644	-1.729	0.994
	(1.431)	(1.112)	(2.391)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-1.118	-0.991	-1.030
	(1.713)	(0.925)	(2.167)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.187	-0.343	1.671
	(0.539)	(0.540)	(1.029)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	2.736**	4.405***	
	(1.175)	(1.010)	
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	-1.030		-0.949
	(0.761)		(2.422)
Gender (Female=1) = o,			-
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy = o,			-
Constant	-2.687*	-3.713	-6.976
	(1.459)	(2.313)	(6.150)
Observations	165	117	88

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D.6: Logit Models Estimating Talking about Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation

	Model 1 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2012	Model 2 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2012	Model 3 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2012
AfraidDum- Rep	2.534	32.055	-3.740
	(2.836)	(0.000)	(3.094)
HopeDum- Dem	-0.479	15.060	1.857
	(1.035)	(0.000)	(2.961)
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction Term	-3.931	-27.714	-7.829
	(3.028)	(0.000)	(5.017)
Family Income	-0.448	1.333	4.035
	(1.190)	(0.000)	(3.686)
Unemployed	-2.333**	-3.264	-0.595
	(1.080)	(0.000)	(1.767)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)	0.927	0.917	-0.518
	(0.932)	(0.000)	(1.768)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.128	-0.133	
	(0.491)	(0.000)	
Age	0.035*	0.031	-0.019
	(0.021)	(0.000)	(0.048)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)	0.764	1.559	0.135
	(0.627)	(0.000)	(1.353)
English Interview	0.615	1.065	3.808*
	(0.770)	(0.000)	(2.142)
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	-0.500	-2.109	2.119
	(1.448)	(0.000)	(3.414)
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	1.967***	3.487	-2.532
	(0.707)	(0.000)	(2.440)
Interest in Campaign Politics	2.171	4.540	4.250*
	(1.357)	(0.000)	(2.337)
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate)	-0.563	-1.702	-0.566
	(0.647)	(0.000)	(1.439)
Church Attendance Indicator (1=Attend outside of	1.201**	2.062	4.144*

weddings/baptisms/funerals)			
	(0.565)	(0.000)	(2.290)
Union Membership	0.214	-0.237	1.068
	(0.622)	(0.000)	(1.511)
Own a Home	0.875	0.897	2.948
	(0.575)	(0.000)	(2.101)
Length of Residence - Years	-0.012	-0.010	-0.149*
	(0.021)	(0.000)	(0.083)
Mobilization Indicator (1=Contacted by Political Party)	0.005	0.167	1.193
	(0.697)	(0.000)	(1.049)
Care Who Wins Presidency	2.261**	-0.898	3.462
	(1.011)	(0.000)	(2.146)
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not Very/Some/A lot)	-0.446	-1.750	-0.669
	(0.522)	(0.000)	(1.079)
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	2.969*	-2.151	7.981*
	(1.577)	(0.000)	(4.103)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	2.792	-11.537	6.784*
	(1.686)	(0.000)	(3.959)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-1.414	-1.498	-6.621**
	(1.482)	(0.000)	(2.968)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.449	0.294	4.123**
	(0.656)	(0.000)	(1.882)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	-1.284		-0.762
	(1.066)		(1.657)
Gender (Female=1) = o,			-
Constant	-9.361***	-10.673	-20.353*
	(2.842)	(0.000)	(11.729)
Observations	160	112	88

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D.7: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation

	Model 1 Participating Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2008	Model 2 Participating Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2008	Model 3 Participating Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2008
AfraidDum- Rep	0.106	0.071	-0.019
	(0.097)	(0.109)	(0.153)
HopeDum- Dem	-0.081	-0.041	-0.095*
	(0.056)	(0.070)	(0.048)
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction Term	0.131*	0.132	0.235*
	(0.076)	(0.108)	(0.124)
Family Income	0.180***	0.045	-0.124
	(0.066)	(0.106)	(0.113)
Unemployed	-0.018	0.007	0.003
	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.059)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)	-0.091**	-0.033	-0.010
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.072)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.053*	-0.073*	
	(0.029)	(0.037)	
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)	-0.067	-0.091	-0.125*
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.064)
English Interview	0.035	0.053	0.086
	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	0.099	0.163	0.209*
	(0.076)	(0.111)	(0.120)
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	0.059	0.113*	0.144*
	(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.084)
Interest in Campaign Politics	0.068	0.159**	0.050
	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.076)
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate)	0.126***	0.100**	0.110**
	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Church Attendance Indicator	0.024	-0.009	-0.028

(1=Attend outside of weddings/baptisms/funerals)			
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.056)
Union Membership	-0.035	-0.045	-0.022
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.039)
Own a Home	-0.018	0.020	0.012
	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.054)
Length of Residence - Years	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Mobilization Indicator (1=Contacted by Political Party)	0.179***	0.224***	0.094**
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Care Who Wins Presidency	0.049	0.029	0.070
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not Very/Some/A lot)	0.075**	0.094**	0.124***
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.153**	-0.085	-0.064
	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.050)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.041	0.036	0.081
	(0.058)	(0.079)	(0.055)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.068	-0.100**	-0.009
	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.075)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.152*	0.139*	0.189*
	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.098)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	0.004		-0.068
	(0.034)		(0.052)
Gender (Female=1) = o,			-
Constant	-0.072	-0.186	-0.150
	(0.100)	(0.157)	(0.152)
Observations	165	117	93
R-squared	0.381	0.426	0.452

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D.8: OLS Models Estimating Participating in Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation

	Model 1 Participating Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2012	Model 2 Participating Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2012	Model 3 Participating Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2012
AfraidDum- Rep	0.265**	0.351**	0.293
	(0.107)	(0.145)	(0.240)
HopeDum- Dem	-0.105	-0.129	-0.060
	(0.071)	(0.150)	(0.073)
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction Term	-0.318***	-0.151	-0.506**
	(0.115)	(0.174)	(0.245)
Family Income	0.054	0.119	0.055
	(0.074)	(0.099)	(0.088)
Unemployed	-0.062	-0.036	0.051
	(0.042)	(0.064)	(0.049)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)	-0.006	-0.009	-0.005
	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.074)
Gender (Female=1)	-0.028	-0.069*	
	(0.034)	(0.040)	
Age	0.002*	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)	0.040	0.079**	-0.018
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.041)
English Interview	-0.018	-0.041	0.061
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.059)
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	0.094	0.003	0.002
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.112)
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	0.067	0.168***	-0.033
	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.089)
Interest in Campaign Politics	0.080	0.167**	0.186**
	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.082)
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate)	-0.028	-0.078	0.008
	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.059)
Church Attendance Indicator	0.025	0.077**	0.019

(1=Attend outside of weddings/baptisms/funerals)			
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.043)
Union Membership	0.035	0.039	-0.005
	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.081)
Own a Home	0.024	-0.006	-0.015
	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.052)
Length of Residence - Years	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mobilization Indicator (1=Contacted by Political Party)	0.005	0.016	0.140***
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.052)
Care Who Wins Presidency	0.023	-0.102**	0.036
	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.034)
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not Very/Some/A lot)	-0.003	-0.073*	0.020
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.107**	-0.124**	0.166**
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.081)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.130	0.223	0.213**
	(0.082)	(0.150)	(0.090)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.061	-0.074	-0.038
	(0.068)	(0.087)	(0.099)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.031	-0.003	0.118
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.071)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	-0.032		-0.002
	(0.059)		(0.075)
Gender (Female=1) = o,			-
Constant	-0.161*	-0.089	-0.295**
	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.148)
Observations	160	112	88
R-squared	0.373	0.424	0.463

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D.9: OLS Models Estimating Voting about Politics with ANES 2008 Latino Subpopulation

	Model 1 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2008	Model 2 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2008	Model 3 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2008
AfraidDum- Rep	-0.019	-0.093	-0.332*
	(0.206)	(0.180)	(0.179)
HopeDum- Dem	-0.172*	-0.223**	-0.072
	(0.090)	(0.103)	(0.120)
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction Term	0.169	0.295*	0.246
	(0.215)	(0.155)	(0.189)
Family Income	0.043	-0.025	-0.280**
	(0.117)	(0.094)	(0.131)
Unemployed	0.060	0.141*	0.216**
	(0.132)	(0.082)	(0.090)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)	0.118***	0.144***	0.222**
	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.098)
Gender (Female=1)	0.153***	0.107*	
	(0.057)	(0.062)	
Age	0.003*	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)	-0.059	-0.045	-0.193**
	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.080)
English Interview	0.066	0.026	0.045
	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.083)
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	0.136	0.202*	0.223*
	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.130)
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	-0.024	-0.011	-0.022
	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.108)
Interest in Campaign Politics	0.186*	0.212**	0.021
	(0.096)	(0.087)	(0.112)
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate)	0.131***	0.050	0.148*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.081)
Church Attendance Indicator	0.039	-0.017	-0.030

(1=Attend outside of weddings/baptisms/funerals)			
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.053)
Union Membership	-0.053	-0.084	-0.072
	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.153)
Own a Home	-0.034	0.053	-0.034
	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.068)
Length of Residence - Years	-0.002	-0.001	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mobilization Indicator (1=Contacted by Political Party)	0.073*	0.086	0.028
	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.048)
Care Who Wins Presidency	0.156*	0.252**	0.203
	(0.085)	(0.118)	(0.123)
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not Very/Some/A lot)	-0.103**	-0.145**	-0.038
	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.047)
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.137	-0.134	0.169
	(0.090)	(0.116)	(0.114)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.185**	0.132	0.000
	(0.088)	(0.119)	(0.102)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.073	0.082**	0.148**
	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.060)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.138	-0.016	0.073
	(0.099)	(0.067)	(0.076)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	0.080		0.058
	(0.064)		(0.124)
Constant	0.066	0.240	0.517**
	(0.148)	(0.162)	(0.250)
Observations	163	115	92
R-squared	0.453	0.440	0.437

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D.10: OLS Models Estimating Voting about Politics with ANES 2012 Latino Subpopulation

VARIABLES	Model 1 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls 2012	Model 2 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Dems 2012	Model 3 Voting Demographic Participation Engagement Controls Women 2012
AfraidDum- Rep	0.320	0.464*	0.809
	(0.288)	(0.270)	(0.491)
HopeDum- Dem	-0.147	-0.311***	0.024
	(0.117)	(0.111)	(0.156)
BothHopeDandFearR: 1 HopeD and FearR, 0 All Else, Interaction Term	-0.232	-0.526*	-0.310
	(0.252)	(0.270)	(0.369)
Family Income	0.155	-0.601***	-0.191
	(0.139)	(0.188)	(0.265)
Unemployed	-0.034	-0.163*	-0.011
	(0.109)	(0.094)	(0.128)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)	0.202**	0.319***	0.234
	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.197)
Gender (Female=1)	0.015	0.130**	
	(0.063)	(0.059)	
Age	-0.003	-0.011**	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)	-0.041	0.026	-0.055
	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.095)
English Interview	-0.050	-0.117	-0.009
	(0.109)	(0.139)	(0.231)
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	0.154	0.030	0.705**
	(0.214)	(0.256)	(0.291)
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	-0.232**	-0.540***	-0.415**
	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.185)
Interest in Campaign Politics	-0.235	-0.146	-0.295
	(0.157)	(0.222)	(0.220)
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate)	0.066	-0.081	0.069
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.134)
Church Attendance Indicator (1=Attend outside of	-0.004	0.022	0.178**

weddings/baptisms/funerals)			
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.085)
Union Membership	0.079	0.295***	0.168
	(0.109)	(0.098)	(0.115)
Own a Home	-0.024	0.089	0.319***
	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.098)
Length of Residence - Years	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Mobilization Indicator (1=Contacted by Political Party)	0.261***	0.207***	0.194*
	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.111)
Care Who Wins Presidency	0.481***	0.559***	0.509***
	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.082)
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not Very/Some/A lot)	-0.170***	-0.125*	-0.149***
	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.042)
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.106	0.213	-0.570***
	(0.201)	(0.287)	(0.209)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.255*	0.425***	-0.051
	(0.143)	(0.153)	(0.207)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	0.058	0.283	0.448***
	(0.146)	(0.191)	(0.164)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-0.255***	-0.279***	-0.281*
	(0.084)	(0.104)	(0.160)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	-0.063		-0.153
	(0.165)		(0.134)
Constant	0.431**	0.985**	0.350
	(0.186)	(0.424)	(0.576)
Observations	71	51	37
R-squared	0.720	0.780	0.854

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D.11: OLS Models Estimating Talking and Participation Scale with ANES 2008 and 2012 Latino Respondents Focusing Exclusively on Women

	Model 1 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls **Women** 2008	Model 2 Participating Demographic Participation Engagement Controls **Women** 2008	Model 3 Talking Politics Demographic Participation Engagement Controls **Women** 2012	Model 4 Participating Demographic Participation Engagement Controls **Women** 2012
Afraid Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-3.446*	-0.299***	3.569	0.250
	(2.050)	(0.110)	(4.419)	(0.201)
Hope Towards Either Candidate_dummy	-1.030	0.081	4.163	0.187*
	(2.167)	(0.055)	(4.474)	(0.111)
Both Hope and Fear towards Either Interacted	4.440*	0.235*	0.363	-0.189
	(2.343)	(0.124)	(3.671)	(0.206)
Family Income	-0.685	-0.124	3.905*	0.089
	(2.504)	(0.113)	(2.286)	(0.089)
Unemployed	2.665	0.003	-1.542	0.037
	(1.791)	(0.059)	(1.687)	(0.054)
Education Indicator (1=College Degree)	1.572	-0.010	-0.997	-0.031
	(1.789)	(0.072)	(1.477)	(0.083)
Age	0.062	-0.000	-0.023	0.000
	(0.061)	(0.002)	(0.037)	(0.002)
Nativity Indicator (1=U.S.-born)	-1.078	-0.125*	0.255	-0.030
	(1.134)	(0.064)	(1.139)	(0.043)
English Interview	-2.863	0.086	3.658**	0.081
	(1.929)	(0.065)	(1.697)	(0.060)
Internal Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	3.369	0.209*	0.883	-0.033
	(3.326)	(0.120)	(3.488)	(0.123)
External Efficacy Scaled Measures, v1	0.848	0.144*	-4.066*	-0.111
	(1.082)	(0.084)	(2.405)	(0.104)
Interest in Campaign Politics	-0.968	0.050	4.035*	0.191**
	(1.564)	(0.076)	(2.050)	(0.090)
Partisans (1=Strong/Moderate)	2.555***	0.110**	-0.650	0.004

	(0.959)	(0.049)	(1.643)	(0.063)
Church Attendance Indicator (1=Attend outside of weddings/baptisms/funerals)	-0.743	-0.028	3.326**	0.021
	(2.329)	(0.056)	(1.429)	(0.045)
Union Membership	1.836	-0.022	-0.001	-0.016
	(1.345)	(0.039)	(1.471)	(0.083)
Own a Home	-0.468	0.012	2.084	-0.014
	(0.939)	(0.054)	(1.709)	(0.056)
Length of Residence - Years	-0.046	-0.001	-0.120*	0.001
	(0.035)	(0.001)	(0.061)	(0.002)
Mobilization Indicator (1=Contacted by Political Party)	1.084	0.094**	1.132	0.108**
	(1.692)	(0.042)	(1.140)	(0.052)
Care Who Wins Presidency	1.688	0.070	4.700*	0.055
	(1.170)	(0.048)	(2.445)	(0.036)
Latino Linked Fate (1=Not Very/Some/A lot)	4.218**	0.124***	-0.343	0.030
	(2.094)	(0.036)	(0.733)	(0.040)
AfraidDum- Rep	5.196	0.217***	-6.852**	-0.110
	(3.978)	(0.069)	(2.958)	(0.116)
HopeDum- Dem	-2.440	-0.095*	0.021	-0.071
	(1.668)	(0.048)	(2.347)	(0.075)
Pride Towards Either Candidate_dummy	1.671	-0.009	-4.819**	-0.024
	(1.029)	(0.075)	(2.235)	(0.110)
Angry Towards Either Candidate_dummy		0.189*	4.733***	0.168**
		(0.098)	(1.465)	(0.072)
Party Identification, 3 cat. (1=Strong/Mod/Lean Democrat)	-0.949	-0.068	-1.353	-0.042
	(2.422)	(0.052)	(2.092)	(0.081)
Constant	-6.976	-0.150	-14.230**	-0.210
	(6.150)	(0.152)	(6.327)	(0.162)
Observations	88	93	88	93
R-squared		0.452		0.415

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

E. Survey Experiment Questionnaire

English and Spanish Translations of Survey Instrument[48]

S2: Would you prefer to take the survey in **English** or in **Spanish**?
❍ English (1)
❍ Spanish (2)

S3 Are you 18 years of age or older? [SKIP TO END OF SURVEY IF RESPONSE TO S3=2)]
❍ Yes (1)
❍ No (2)

S4 Please indicate your gender.
❍ Male (1)
❍ Female (2)
❍ Other (3) ____________________

S5 Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? [SKIP TO END OF SURVEY IF RESPONSE TO S5=1)]
❍ No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (1)
❍ Yes, of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (2)

S6 What racial group best describes you? (select all that apply)
❑ White (1)
❑ Black or African American (2)
❑ American Indian or Alaska Native (3)
❑ Asian (4)
❑ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)
❑ Other (6) ______[force text entry]

[INSERT **Informed Consent Form** (English/Spanish options)]

Q1 [DISPLAY IF S5=1] Families of Hispanic/Latino/Spanish origin or background in the United States come from many different countries. From which country do you trace your Latino heritage? (select all that apply) [Respondents chose from a drop-down menu of response options, which listed Latin American countries in alphabetical order and provided an "other" category with a textbox option.]

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[48] This is an abbreviated version of the survey questionnaire. I did not include all the pre-test and post-test measures in this appendix, but they are available upon request. This appendix includes the items analyzed in the empirical chapters and appendices. To avoid acquiescence bias in the responses, the survey randomized reverse-ordering of the response options.

Q2 Were you born in the mainland United States, Puerto Rico, other U.S. territory or some other country?

- ❍ United States (1)
- ❍ Puerto Rico (2)
- ❍ Other U.S. Territory (3)
- ❍ Some other country (4) ____________________

Q3 [IF Q2= 4, then DISPLAY Q3. SKIP OTHERWISE.] How old were you when you **arrived to the U.S.**? _____ (open-ended)

Q5 Where were your PARENTS born, were they born in the U.S., was one born in the U.S., or were both born in another country?

- ❍ One parent born in the U.S. (1)
- ❍ Both parents born in the U.S. (2)
- ❍ Neither parent born in the U.S. (3)
- ❍ Don't know (4)

Q6 How many of your GRANDPARENTS, if any, were born **OUTSIDE** the U.S.?

- ❍ None (1)
- ❍ One (2)
- ❍ Two (3)
- ❍ Three (4)
- ❍ All (5)
- ❍ Don't Know (6)

Q7 How old were you on **your last birthday**? [Textbox]

Q11 How important is being Hispanic or Latino/a to your identity?

- ❍ Extremely important (1)
- ❍ Very important (2)
- ❍ Moderately important (3)
- ❍ A little important (4)
- ❍ Not at all important (5)

Q12 Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? Should the government…

- ❍ Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country.
- ❍ Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States in order to work, but only for a limited amount of time.
- ❍ Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, but only if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes and fines, learning English, and passing background checks.

❍ Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, without penalties.

Q13 How much attention do you pay to the following policy debates that have recently taken place in the news? Would you say NONE AT ALL, A LITTLE, A MODERATE AMOUNT, A LOT, or A GREAT DEAL?

	Campaign finance reform	Immigration	Climate change	Terrorism
None at all (1)	❍	❍	❍	❍
A little (2)	❍	❍	❍	❍
A moderate amount (3)	❍	❍	❍	❍
A lot (4)	❍	❍	❍	❍
A great deal (5)	❍	❍	❍	❍

Q13b - Do you think that what happens generally to HISPANIC/LATINO PEOPLE in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?

❍ Yes (1)
❍ No (2)

Q13c - **[DISPLAY IF Q13B=1]** Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?

❍ A lot
❍ Some
❍ Not very much

Q16 How important is your **gender** to your identity?

❍ Extremely important (1)
❍ Very important (2)
❍ Moderately important (3)
❍ A little important (4)
❍ Not at all important (5)

Q17 In what state or U.S. territory do you currently reside? (Provided drop-down menu with states)

Q17a Would you describe [**insert STATE**]'s laws as welcoming or unwelcoming towards unauthorized immigrants?
❍ Very welcoming
❍ Welcoming
❍ Somewhat welcoming
❍ Neither welcoming nor unwelcoming
❍ Somewhat unwelcoming
❍ Unwelcoming
❍ Very unwelcoming

Q24 Would you say you have been VERY MUCH interested, SOMEWHAT interested, or NOT much interested in the U.S. presidential political campaigns this year?
❍ Very much interested
❍ Somewhat interested
❍ Not much interested

Q9 About how many hours **per week** do you spend sending and answering electronic mail or e-mail?
❍ ____hour(s) per week
❍ Less than an hour per week
❍ Don't know

Q21S Now we have a set of questions concerning various public figures. We want to see how much information about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the like.

Q21 What job or political office does **Paul Ryan** now hold? ____________

Q22 What job or political office does **Joe Biden** now hold? ___________

Q23 Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the **House of Representatives** in Washington, D.C.?
❍ Democrats
❍ Republicans

Q25 In general, what language do you read and speak?
❍ Only Spanish (1)
❍ Spanish better than English (2)
❍ Both equally (3)
❍ English better than Spanish (4)
❍ Only English (5)
❍ Other (6) ____________________

Q26 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...
❍ Strong Republican (1)
❍ Moderate Republican (2)
❍ Independent, but closer to the Republican Party (3)

❍ Independent, but closer to the Democratic Party (4)
❍ Moderate Democrat (5)
❍ Strong Democrat (6)
❍ Another party, please specify: (7) ____________________
❍ No preference (8)

Q27 Was your total HOUSEHOLD income in the past 12 months...
❍ 0 - 16,999 (1)
❍ 17,000 - 34,999 (2)
❍ 35,000 - 69,000 (3)
❍ 70,000 - 119,000 (4)
❍ 120,000+ (5)

Q28 What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
❍ Did not graduate from high school (1)
❍ Graduated from high school, did not attend college at all (2)
❍ Attended college some, did not graduate (3)
❍ Still enrolled in college
❍ Graduated from college, did not attend graduate school (4)
❍ Attended graduate school (5)
❍ Other (7) ____________________

TREATMENT RANDOMIZATION
In a moment, we will show you a screenshot about a current topic. We would like you to read the information carefully and answer a few questions afterwards. Finally, if you are on a mobile device, FLIP your screen HORIZONTALLY so that you can see the text more clearly. Please click the next arrow button to continue.

[INSERT 1 OF 4 TREATMENT CONDITIONS, INCLUDING CONTROL (available in Spanish/English)]

POST-TEST QUESTIONS
Q31 What kind of emotional response did you have, if any, based on what you read or saw in the previous screen? For each of the 10 emotions shown below, do you feel that emotion A GREAT DEAL, A LOT, A MODERATE AMOUNT, A LITTLE or NOT AT ALL? (Respondents saw one emotion at a time in a carousel format and the ordering was randomized)

	A great deal (1)	A lot (2)	A moderate amount (3)	A little (4)	Not at all (5)
ANXIOUS (1)					
PROUD (2)					
ANGRY (3)					
HOPEFUL					

(4)					
AFRAID (5)					
EXCITED (6)					
HAPPY (7)					
SAD (8)					
UNEASY (9)					
HOPELESS (10)					

COGNITIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT

Q39 Do you think current immigration proposals will make the lives for unauthorized immigrants currently living in the U.S. easier or harder?

- ❍ A great deal easier
- ❍ Somewhat easier
- ❍ Slightly easier
- ❍ Neither easier nor harder
- ❍ Slightly harder
- ❍ Somewhat harder
- ❍ A great deal harder

Q32 If given the opportunity, we would like to know whether you are EXTREMELY LIKELY, VERY LIKELY, MODERATELY LIKELY, SLIGHTLY LIKELY or NOT AT ALL LIKELY to take part in any of the following 3 activities to express your opinion about immigration policies.

	Extremely likely (1)	Very likely (2)	Moderately likely (3)	Slightly likely (4)	Not at all likely (5)
JOIN a pro-immigration protest march, rally or demonstration (1)					
VOLUNTEER time for a pro-immigrant organization (3)					

TALK about pro-immigration policies with friends and family (4)					

Q33 Do you intend to register to vote before the November 6th general election, or do you NOT intend to register?
- ❍ Already registered
- ❍ Yes, intend to register
- ❍ No, do not intend to register
- ❍ No, not eligible to register

Q34 **[DISPLAY LOGIC: DO NOT DISPLAY IF REGISTRATION QUESTION Q33=3 OR 4 "NO"]** How likely is it that you will vote in the general election this November?
- ❍ Extremely likely
- ❍ Very likely
- ❍ Moderately likely
- ❍ Slightly likely
- ❍ Not at all likely

Q36 **INSTRUCTIONS**:
Now you have a chance to send an electronic postcard and express your opinion about 2 current immigration policies with [your **STATE** U.S. Senators].[49] Your name will **not be** attached to the postcard. Your postcard will be sent to **[your senators]** at the end of the survey. All electronic postcards will consist of the italicized text below.

STANDARD POSTCARD MESSAGE:

[Senator] [LAST NAME 1] [and Senator] [LAST NAME 2],
As you consider your decision on immigration policy this week,
*I ask you to [**YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT HOW THE SENATORS SHOULD VOTE WILL GO HERE**].*
Thank you for your time.

POLICY MESSAGES:
Now CLICK on the policy message you wish to send to [your senators]. You may **choose up to 2** policy messages for the postcard brackets:[50]
- ❑ **Support** the proposal PROVIDING A PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP for unauthorized immigrants. (1)

[49] For respondents living in D.C. or another U.S. territory (i.e. Puerto Rico) without U.S. Senators, the postcard option stated the postcard would be sent to the president.

[50] Due to the 2-maximum rule, I have inadvertently underestimated the number of participants who wrote a message. People wrote a message if they did not already select two preset messages. In a future iteration of the project, I would remove the 2-maximum rule.

- ❑ **Reject** the proposal PROVIDING A PATHWAY TO CITIZENSHIP for unauthorized immigrants. (2)
- ❑ **Support** the proposal that ENDS BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP for children born of unauthorized immigrants. (3)
- ❑ **Reject** the proposal that ENDS BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP for children born of unauthorized immigrants. (4)
- ❑ **Reject** the proposal that ENDS BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP for children born
- ❑ Create your own message: (5) ____________________
- ❑ Don’t want to send any postcard message.

[DEBRIEFING STATEMENT]

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