Reinventing Mastery: Training and Mutuality on the Early Modern English Stage

by

Elizabeth Mathie

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Douglas Trevor, Chair
Professor Peggy S. McCracken
Professor Catherine Sanok
Professor Valerie J. Traub
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Abstract

“Reinventing Mastery: Training and Mutuality on the Early Modern English Stage” pairs early modern English prescriptive literature with drama to argue that the works of William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, and John Lyly take part in a broader cultural project of reinventing mastery. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a growing body of printed texts about the management of subordinates circulated widely in England. Interested in making training processes less burdensome for their audiences, these household manuals, humanist pedagogical treatises, and animal training manuals introduce mutuality and love overtly into descriptions of effective rule. They promote the cultivation of reciprocity between masters and subordinates as a practical means by which to ensure obedience. However, the works of Shakespeare, Jonson, and Lyly confound the pragmatic optimism of prescriptive texts, showing how mutuality can also work against masterly ends.

Situating drama within the discourse of household conduct literature, the first chapter argues that Shakespeare’s *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and Jonson’s *Every Man in His Humour* show masters who identify with their servants – and in this sense perform affective labor assigned to their inferiors in prescriptive texts – to be lacking in authority because of their desire for reciprocal affection. The second chapter reads Shakespeare’s *The Taming of the Shrew* in the context of period horse-training manuals to argue that Shakespeare’s references to horsemanship in the play call Katharina’s performance of loving submission into question. Shakespeare conflates Petruchio’s success with that of a trickster horse-courser, asking the audience to be skeptical of subordinate performances, which are central to claims of mutuality.
among successful gentlemen masters. The third chapter uses pedagogical treatises to argue that John Lyly’s 1584 pedagogical drama, *Galatea*, depicts humanist methods of mastery as effective for cultivating love and inspiring labor in trainees, but imagines how this effectiveness can also work against normative social order. The two main lovers in the play, Galatea and Phillida, while engaging with one another properly and successfully according to the precepts of pedagogical treatises, inadvertently work against their society’s hierarchies by selecting one another, rather than a suitable male master, as their tutor. In this sense, they use subordinate love to affirm their own systems of value.

Using the discourse of benevolent rule established in the previous chapters, the fourth chapter reads *The Tempest* for how it condenses the training discourses of the previous chapters in the character of Caliban, grafting early colonial ideology onto the logic of training. It critiques Prospero’s mastery while simultaneously eliding the injustice of Caliban’s initial subordination to him. This chapter turns back to the ways in which mutuality, despite its difficulties, nonetheless works hard to secure hierarchical systems and masterly authority. Largely cynical about the functions of love and reciprocity across differences in social status, these plays encourage readers to view with skepticism the claims of prescriptive texts. This project intervenes in animal studies by cautioning against seeing all blurriness across species boundaries as indicative of progressive thinking in the period. Finally, it argues that mutuality’s integral role in the establishment of mastery, made apparent in references to training on the early modern English stage, demands that we resist any easy conflation of mutuality with equality, love with friendship, and submission with conformity in the past as well as the present.
Introduction

In the opening speech of As You Like It, an orphaned Orlando – subordinated by inheritance to his older brother Oliver – mourns his position to a household servant, Adam.¹

Orlando complains not because of his position below his brother, but because Oliver allows Orlando to gain nothing through that subjection. He explains,

As I remember, Adam, it was upon this fashion bequeathed me by will but poor a thousand crowns, and, as thou sayst, charged my brother on his blessing to breed me well—and there begins my sadness. My brother Jaques he keeps at school, and report speaks goldenly of his profit. For my part, he keeps me rustically at home—or, to speak more properly, he stays me here at home unkempt; for call you that keeping for a gentleman of my birth, that differs not from the stalling of an ox? His horses are bred better, for besides that they are fair with their feeding, they are taught their manège, and to that end riders dearly hired. But I, his brother, gain nothing under him but growth, for the which his animals on dunghills are as much bound to him as I…. This is it, Adam, that grieves me; and the spirit of my father; which I think is within me, begins to mutiny against this servitude.²

Orlando claims that he “begins to mutiny against this servitude” because it places him socially below his birthright. His subordination to his brother would not be unusual in England, where primogeniture was widely practiced and many younger brothers could have found themselves in

¹ As Louis Montrose points out in “‘The Place of a Brother’ in As You Like It: Social Process and Comic Form,” Shakespeare Quarterly 32, no. 1 (Spring, 1981): 28-54, esp. 31-33, primogeniture was “widely and rigorously practiced in England – by the gentry and lesser landowners.” The eldest son in the instance of his father’s death would take a fatherly position relative to his younger siblings, and he would also inherit his father’s wealth. Such practices meant that younger sons were effectively subordinated to their elders, sometimes at the expense of their social status if family resources were limited or elder brothers were ungenerous. In part because of this, literary representations of younger sons complaining about their subjection to their brothers was common in the period.

Orlando’s predicament. Though Orlando would not be the first to complain about the subordination that results from primogeniture, his misery in this passage is more nuanced than a simple protest against subjection. He accuses Oliver of treating him below his birthright not because he makes him inferior, but because Oliver fails to meet Orlando’s expectation that his brother will “breed” him properly in that position. What such breeding would entail is detailed in Orlando’s envy of his brother Jaques – who was sent to school – and by comparison even to Oliver’s horses. Orlando envies the horses “taught their manège” while he, in contrast, “gain[s] nothing under [his brother] but growth.” The horses, because they have access to a costly training (riders are “dearly hired” for it), belong to a different category in Orlando’s estimation than both Orlando himself and the “animals on dunghills” whose bond to Oliver is considerably less than that of the well-bred horses or, presumably, of Orlando’s other brother, Jaques.

This dissatisfied brother’s desire draws attention to the way in which training makes possible a notion of reciprocity within hierarchical systems. Training, for Orlando, provides a benefit for the instructed as well as the instructor. The horses he mentions cannot confirm that they appreciate the guidance they receive, but he nonetheless claims their boundedness to Oliver on the basis of the labor and resources that instruction requires. In other words, Orlando interprets Oliver’s commandment of his horses as an indication that Oliver values them and is thoughtful of their future. He implies that he could embrace his own position if Oliver would show a similar level of care for him. If what he feels he has missed out on is a meeting of masterly investment and care implicit in training, his view of the topic would be familiar to his audience, especially if they had encountered any number of prescriptions about training processes in the instructional manuals of the time. Whether everyone would feel confident that

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domestic instruction necessarily involves a superior’s genuine investment of and care for his subject is less certain, though. Similarly, whether such care would ingratiate all servants to obedience is, as we will see in what follows, similarly questionable.

Training, and the extent to which it could constitute a mutual exchange between tutor and tutee, was a topic about which the early modern English had quite a bit to say. As other critics have noted, advice books on topics as diverse as household management, pedagogy, and horsemanship reveal how readers struggled to make such interactions function – and even function lovingly – in their everyday lives. Considering their prescriptions alongside the drama that stages the frustrations they address, I treat training as an occasion for elucidating the ways in which agency, affection, desire, and collaboration can work against the highly stratified social order of domestic spaces such as the classroom and the household. I do so while showing at the same time how reciprocal affection and understanding were theorized by early modern experts as useful tools for supporting those same differentiating systems. Training is in some ways the glue of hierarchy, as we can see in Orlando’s theory that he could be contented with his lowly position if he only received useful instruction. It also, and simultaneously, exposes the weaknesses, the illogics, and the limits of the systems it is used to support. This dissertation explores dramatists’ frequent staging of that contradiction.

The subject of an increasing number of printed prescriptive texts during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century in England, training is a useful lens through which to examine the workings of hierarchical order in the period because it rests conceptually at a point of contact between the labor of masters and the efforts of their subordinates. In order for training to

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succeed, instructor and student must enjoy a certain kind of common ground. They must have a shared language according to which they can understand one another (bodily or verbally), and both parties must actively participate in the collaborative process. As a matter of practicality, then, training requires some degree of reciprocity. Authors writing about instructional interactions across both status and species categories readily acknowledge this necessity. As is evident in Orlando’s complaint, forms of pedagogy might be owed to horses as well as to brothers and servants; and its processes, as we will see, were accordingly imagined to require similar expressions of love and patience, along with efforts at communication, regardless of whether trainees were human or not.

Though in modern usage we might be tempted to associate mutuality with equality, the concept is in fact integral to the maintenance of differentiation in early modern England. Authors of conduct literature, animal training manuals, and pedagogical treatises state that reciprocity is made possible through the cultivation (by authorities) of subordinate love. They promise that affection will, in turn, ensure obedience and easy consent. The requirements of the collaborative work of building a mutual relationship, however, also complicate the necessarily unequal interactions it can make possible. While prescriptive texts portray love across hierarchy optimistically as a tool of enforcing and harmonizing social order, representations of domestic rule on the stage are more often complicated by affection than they are secured by it. William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, and John Lyly each grapple with the function of mutuality, depicting characters whose authority is both secured by and undermined through attempts to cultivate the kind of reciprocity that printed manuals insist is vital to success. In the plays examined here – Shakespeare’s *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Jonson’s *Every Man in His Humour*, Shakespeare’s *The Taming of the Shrew*, John Lyly’s *Galatea*, and Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* – masterly
efforts to form bonds of affection with inferiors reveal the shared investment of superior and inferior, undermining the power of the former and dangerously asserting the agential authority of the later. These plays open up the possibility for equality and exchangeability where didactic texts attempt to secure the opposite.

Reconceptualizing Mastery

Examining a trend towards mutuality that spans a variety of advice literatures, I posit that these texts and their ideas are indicative of a broader cultural project of reconceptualizing mastery. Their cultural work is to remake rule in part by civilizing its reputation – by emphasizing the ways in which processes of securing authority at all levels can be gentle in physical practice and genteel in social status, as well as by disclaiming past methods as comparably violent, unskilled, and ineffective. Though broad-reaching in its aims, the “civilizing” performed by such a cultural reconceptualization does not necessarily indicate actual changes in social practice. Though similar to Norbert Elias’ notion of “civilizing” processes in that this reconceptualization was, as I argue in the last chapter, a significant aspect of England’s emerging national identity, I refer to the “civilization” of rule as a conceptualization here because the work of instructional texts is to rhetorically reframe rather than necessarily to alter actual practices. I posit that the “reinvention” of mastery celebrated in prescriptions and

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elsewhere is aspirational rather than descriptive and, as such, as much imaginary as it is actual.

As several scholars have suggested, the relationship between prescription and actual lived experience in the period is complicated. My focus is not on establishing whether tutors were in fact more gentle over time, nor is it on determining whether readers applied the advice of didactic works to their everyday habits. Rather, I examine the advice given in treatises and commented on in drama as evidence of a cultural value that would have been familiar to many coming to the theater (if not fully embraced by them all), and that therefore shapes the way authority is both questioned and established on the stage – even if real practices remain somewhat stagnant as they are understood and depicted anew. Essentially, advice manuals assert that a harmonious continuation of an old social order is possible through the efforts of masters.

Early modern English drama fills in some of the gaps left out of this rather simple equation, showing how messy love can be for hierarchy and highlighting (advertently or not) the manipulations and elisions that undergird a discourse of loving rule when it “works.”

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6 For example, Glaisyer and Pennell note in their Introduction to Didactic Literature in England, 1500-1800: Expertise Constructed (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003): 1-18, 14-15, that advice manuals could be read constructively, for interest, or contemplatively, explaining that while some readers clearly “might follow their didactic text almost to the letter,” others read for the “sheer pleasure they experienced from reading.” They conclude that “didactic ‘experience’ could [therefore] diverge significantly from the received formulae and formats” evidenced in didactic texts. Likewise, Juanita Feros Ruys, “Introduction: Approaches to Didactic Literature—Meaning Intent, Audience, Social Effect,” Introduction to What Nature Does Not Teach: Didactic Literature in the Medieval and Early Modern Periods (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2008): 1-38, 7, 18, points out that “the creation of didactic meaning” from any given text can be located “with the reader/listener who is required to absorb, make sense of, and perhaps resolve contradictory advice.” Ruys writes that “locating the didactic intent in medieval and early-modern literature is certainly difficult, but locating the didactic effect of such literature in the lives of premodern people is far more so.” Frank Whigham, Ambition and Privilege: The Social Tropes of Elizabethan Courtesy Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) argues that advice books were written intentionally to be flexible to readerly interpretation, potentially useful to audiences of varying views and interpretable depending on what a reader sought. Whigham therefore does not imagine these books intend to alter practice, but rather to justify it. Frances Dolan, “The Rule of Relation: Domestic Advice Literature and Its Readers,” True Relations: Reading, Literature, and Evidence in Seventeenth-Century England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013): 154-201; 170-171, by contrast, draws our attention to the way in which advice literature is not only potentially a product of reality, but also “productive of reality” in that “discourses of domestic advice were intrinsic indeed constitutive parts of men’s lived experiences.” She therefore points to the way in which advice books could also be integral to everyday practices.
In this project, English dramas from the late sixteenth into the early seventeenth century function as cultural sites at which to investigate how the early modern English queried the possibility of mutual subordinate-master relationships. Dramatists are particularly well-suited to considering the complexities of unequal collaboration because theater companies were reliant on royal or noble affiliation for their functioning and position in English society (despite the lowly status anti-theatrical Puritans and other moralists would have assigned them). Dramatists were quite clearly positioned as servants of at least part of their presumed audience. Within a given theater company there were also important status distinctions between the young actors who would play women’s roles, the hired men, and the “sharers” who would often play the central male roles. Though there was not an official theater guild, limiting the sense in which young actors could be officially apprenticed to a company, boy actors served in what was effectively an apprenticeship role relative to the sharers, learning the “craft” of acting from those more experienced counterparts. Dramatists, then, were constantly witnessing and negotiating within collaborations across social distinctions.

In addition to the reality of trainer-trainee relationships among their performers and the patronage undergirding theater companies, dramatists also frequently portray themselves as subjects eager to please their audiences in prologues and epilogues. Think, for example, of Robin Goodfellow’s nervous plea at the end of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* that the audience not take offence at the play they have witnessed, or Rosalind’s admission by negation that she desires the audience’s approval when she says she will not beg for applause in the Epilogue of *As You Like*

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8 Bentley, *The Profession of Player*, 119-120; for a full description of these apprenticeships and some historical examples, see esp. chapter 5, “Apprentices,” 113-146.
It only because she is “not furnished like a beggar, therefore to beg will not become [her].”

Seeking to satisfy their masters – be those patrons, an audience, or a superior company member – through performances which were also simultaneously imitations, sometimes of their social betters, dramatists and players are well positioned to be aware of how pleasing a superior, performing for them, and even becoming like them can be overlapping or even simultaneous projects. These overlaps in turn reflect the realities of the subordinate work involved in many forms of training outside of the theater. Instructional processes like the ones I examine here, many of which eventually prepare tutees to become people of power in their own right in order to perpetuate a stratified social system, implicitly include the possibility of similitude between teacher and taught. Despite this, or quite possibly because of it, period experts on the topic work to partially elide that future potential when they seek to stabilize the instructor’s authority, focusing on the present reality of distinction and necessary obedience rather than on the likeness and equality toward which training interactions so often tend. Dramatists, frequently skirting the line between obedient service, pleasing performance, and imitation, have good reason to be aware of those contradictions and elisions.

Though training might be particularly relevant to the interactions of actors on the stage, the limits these dramas outline of the usefulness of love for ensuring harmonious interactions across hierarchical difference have implications for the broader social functioning of English society as well as for the more immediate surroundings of the theater company. As I have already suggested, the usefulness of mutuality for instructors was already being taken up in

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didactic texts addressed to a variety of domestic trainers beyond the theater. In addition, the stakes of loving rule in the household are high because the rhetoric in which they partake is also political. Elizabeth I famously used a language of love to assert her authority over the English people and her many male courtly subjects. After her, James I continued to draw on a loving courtly rhetoric even as he emphasized the authoritarian power of his position. The ambitions of prescriptive authors who hope to make securing subordinate obedience a less fraught process, then, in some respect reflect the ambitions of their own political leaders to represent governance as a loving exchange between sovereign and subject. In turn, the problems with loving rule represented on the stage question the efficacy and validity not only of the work of schoolmasters and householders, but also, more subtly, of their sovereigns.

Thinking Across Subordinate Categories

11 As Susan Dwyer Amussen, “Gender, Family, and the Social Order, 1560-1725,” in Order and Disorder in Early Modern England, Anthony Fletcher and John Stevenson, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 196-217, 196, puts it, “The parallel between order inside and outside the family was obvious to writers in late Elizabethan and early Stuart England.” I extend Amussen’s point slightly here, since the theorizations of order within the family overlap a good deal with those of order in other settings, such as the schoolhouse. Many domestic realms beyond the family household would, I think, have similarly obvious parallels to political order for the early modern English.


13 Melissa Sanchez, “Erotic Subjects in English History,” chap. 1 in Erotic Subjects: The Sexuality of Politics in Early Modern English Literature (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011): 11-29, 21-22, notes the similarities and the differences in Elizabethan and Jacobean policies, writing that though both used “love” to characterize a subject’s devotion to the sovereign, Elizabethan political rhetoric “had left the precise locus of political power ambiguous” while James I emphasized the unquestionable location of absolute authority in the sovereign. So, while James I continued to use a rhetoric of love, he used it primarily to insist that his subjects had no right to rebel, having consented to a master, where Elizabeth had tended to express her own authority in large part by emphasizing her mutual dependence on her subjects’ loyalty and love. Sanchez’s chapter contains a useful overview of erotic and loving language in political discourse in early modern England.
In viewing several of modes of subordination alongside one another, this project builds on while connecting the work of other scholars focused on particular trainee categories in order to highlight a shared trend toward reciprocity across all of these categories. Literary scholars focusing on specific instructional systems such as pedagogy, the ordering of household servants and apprentices, falconry, and horsemanship have variously noted the apparent importance of shared affection and participation to these disparate relational pairs. Those examining household service, for example, have viewed servants as characters who choose their subordinate roles and actively engage in them, therefore realizing service as a position contingent on reciprocal participation. Similarly, scholars of humanist education have long noted pedagogical treatises’ emphasis on gentle methods and the value of love and pleasure for encouraging students to learn and obey. In animal studies, Laurie Shannon has traced a pre-Descartesian understanding of animals as political stakeholders with rights which thus makes human domination over them subject to accusations of tyranny – a matter of considerable cultural angst – rather than assumed

14 David Schalkwyk, *Shakespeare, Love and Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), sees Shakespearean servants and masters alike mourning the loss of affective bonds of love between master and servant in an age when such relationships were becoming (he argues) increasingly transactional. David Evett, *The Discourses of Service in Shakespeare’s England* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 15, 2, notes how the love and will of the subordinate played a central role in the idealization of service as something mutual and desirable rather than as an enforced position of submission. He looks closely at ideals of early modern service, particularly the idea of “freedom in service,” and argues that “the idea and the praxis of service invoked and enacted the motives of love and sacrifice that make social life not only possible but also desirable.” Judith Weil, *Service and Dependency in Shakespeare’s Plays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), examines how many forms of service are structured around reciprocal needs for mutual support and argues that whether service can align with freedom depends in large part on individual interactions between dependents that render service either reciprocal or dominating.

15 See Rebecca Bushnell, *A Culture of Teaching: Early Modern Humanism in Theory and Practice* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), esp. 29, 31. Bushnell writes that “Early humanist arguments against pedagogical flogging… argue that, rather than encouraging children to learn through pleasure and love, flogging turns them away from books, creating… hatred.” She also explains how excessive cruelty was seen to lead to “slavish” servility, which was unreliable and demeaning compared to “an absolute mastery of love.” See also, Jeff Dolven, *Scenes of Instruction in Renaissance Romance* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 7, who argues that early modern English Humanism is preoccupied with understanding – both with ensuring that it was effectively achieved in the classroom and with the difficulty of ensuring the same – and that such concern for effective learning is “a special mark of the later sixteenth century.” Such concerns are, I argue, paired with concerns for luring students to learning through pleasure since theorists believe that excessive fear and resentment prevents the kind of true engagement required for understanding.
Karen Raber, also considering mutuality from an animal studies perspective, has noted that, by the late sixteenth century, many horsemanship manuals are “far more concerned with gentle methods for coercion than with spectacular displays of cruelty.” In all these recent cases, critics have observed that domestic rule of various sorts was participatory, even negotiable.

Though scholars have, in these examples, been interested in complicating how we see the establishment of authority, there has not yet been much work on how the goals of authors writing about these various instances of small-scale governance overlap, nor on the social conservatism that they share. Synthesizing these scholars’ observations about the pervasiveness of mutuality, gentleness, and care in depictions of master-subordinate pairings ultimately allows me to draw attention to what conditions and limits are shared across categories and to highlight the pragmatism, but also the conservatism, that they have in common from a masterly perspective. I show that this trend toward gentleness does not correspond with an embrace of a new social order by demonstrating how mutuality, though it in many ways resists and undermines hegemonic order, is ultimately an effective tool of continued subjection in early modern drama.

The broadened view of this project shows that masterly texts address different subordinate figures similarly in one key way: Instructional literature encourages the importance of affection in their interactions with their superiors, but does so frequently to secure their inferiority rather than to push against it. The early modern English posit domestic rule of all sorts as more

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18 Work has, however, been done on the pragmatism of prescriptive writing in the sense that scholars have commented on the way in which authors of advice manuals write carefully to accommodate multiple readerly responses and interpretations. See, for example, Dolan, “The Rule of Relation,” and Whigham, Ambition and Privilege. The pragmatism I address here, however, is one of theoretical practice rather than of readerly appeal. Whether or not their prescriptions were followed, these authors make a pragmatic case for gentle training practices in the hopes of more effective and less arduously gotten results on the parts of trainers.
complicated than an assumed power which forces obedience, even while stratification remains central to their society’s organization. Together, these trends in training reveal England as a nation uncomfortable with embracing domination as a central feature of its societal order – depicting relationships founded on hierarchical difference as mutually loving instead – but largely resisting the efficacy or even the possibility of upsetting hierarchical distinctions.

In thinking across subordinate types, this project often also thinks across species categories. In this it is indebted to scholars of animal studies who have challenged human exceptionalism by querying the human/animal binary, pointing out how blurry the line between some kinds of humans and some kinds of animals could be in the period.19 These scholars’ insistence on the overlap between how animals and humans of varying social status were conceptualized in pre-Descartesian England paved the way for much of my thinking here. I further the work of animal studies by methodologically incorporating animal-focused research with human-centered research, implicitly making a case for understanding species difference in the period as an aspect of status difference. Especially in discussions of training, the early modern English frequently make comparisons across species, highlighting the conceptual affinities between domesticated animals and human subordinates in the period. In what follows, I model my own reading practices after the often (from a modern perspective) uncomfortable comparisons the English use to make sense of complex collaborative interactions across difference, occasionally using one form of subordination to clarify or draw attention to

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19 Especially Erica Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006). Also, Susan Crane, *Animal Encounters: Contacts and Concepts in Medieval Britain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012) 4, 6. Crane explores how “the founding human/animal dichotomy is so unstable that it has migrated all too easily within the human” and argues that medieval texts (bestiaries, in particular) “situate humans among the other animals, not only as their master but also as their similar.” Similarly, Shannon, *Accommodated Animal*, 228-239, shows how animals could be conceptualized as political stakeholders in a human-animal cosmopolity, an understanding that allows them to claim rights alongside and sometimes even over and above the similar political claims of humans in the period.
conditions of apparent mutuality which are more overt in the first form than in another. So, for example, references to animals in the plays I examine (specifically to horses and dogs) tend to highlight both the bodily intimacy of command and the slipperiness of the distinction between civil rule and cruelty when the handled cannot effectively speak for him or herself. Those issues pertain importantly to humans as well, but become more visible with references to animal training as a lens. Likewise, while instructional texts about cultivating love between masters and servants address servants and command them to labor – likely because they might actually have access to those texts – horsemanship treatises do not acknowledge or discuss the expectations of trainees as explicitly.20 While horsemanship treatises address primarily the labor of the instructors who will be reading the manuals, the horses being taught are also implicitly expected to conform their bodies and wills to the bodies and wills of their riders. The work of horses is less frequently discussed in scholarship on mastery, because they are only rarely depicted as speaking subjects in dramas, pamphlets, and treatises.21 The affective work demanded of humans, then, has encouraged me also to look more carefully for the labor of trainees whose labor is unmarked.

In looking across species boundaries to reveal shared methods of subordination and (often) oppression, this project cautions against seeing blurriness across species in the period – often celebrated in animal studies as indicative of a forward-thinking past – as inherently progressive. The alignment of these differing figures in dramas could theoretically allow us to imagine new avenues for possible identification across difference. Despite this, the texts I

examine offer few possibilities for positive transformation based on such affinity. The mobility of many subordinate positions during the period, combined with masters’ aims to use mutual love not to equalize but to cement structural order despite that changeability, means that moments of recognition across status are fleeting and often problematic. In chapter one, a servant’s alliance with his dog becomes evidence of his clownish status and leads to physical punishment. In chapter two, affinity between a new wife and a horse serves to undermine the woman’s agency, suggesting her performance is a product purely of her husband’s training. In chapter three, affinity between two students is necessarily interrupted by the insertion of hierarchical difference as one of them moves up in society after successful imitation. And in the last chapter, parallels between early Americans and English subordinates limit the political claims imagined as possible for the former.

Though several historians have asserted the prevalence of stratification in early modern English culture, and much excellent work has been done taking into account the social mobility of various subordinates, my interest in how advice manuals seek to stabilize social systems means that I am concerned with the ways in which such movement is set aside or undermined. All of the masters I examine in this dissertation are also subject in one way or another to a higher power, and many current inferiors are being trained to become leaders themselves. My interest, however, is less in the reality of that possible advancement than in how reciprocity is carefully cultivated from the perspective of power to preserve authoritative difference within systems of

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22 For example, Laura Gowing, “The Manner of Submission” Cultural and Social History 10, no. 1 (2013): 25-45, 31. Gowing explains the social mobility of early modern English servitude, using the term “lifecycle service” to describe its generally temporary nature. P. J. Goldberg, Women, Work, and Life Cycle in a Medieval Economy: Women in York and Yorkshire C.1300-1520 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), although addressing an earlier era, also suggests that service in England “may more usefully be described in life-cycle terms” than in terms of “class.” Ann Kussmaul, Servants in Husbandry in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), also notes that “most youths in early modern England were servants” and that most servants were therefore servants as part of a life stage.
mobility. A focus on training can paradoxically elide questions about who ought to be subjugated by focusing attention instead on the codependence between teacher and taught, encouraging us to read subjects as the products of their masters’ methods, as always already in relation and overdetermined by it. This training-centered logic treats the ruled as autonomous only insomuch as that subject’s autonomy must be acknowledged and responded to by a good master to make governing successful. One of the paradoxes of training, in other words, is that, though it often occurs with an implicit promise of changing the trainee’s status in some way, the necessity of a clear hierarchy during the training process means that to dwell on the process of instruction is to dwell on the maintenance of difference rather than to look forward to the promise of transformation. Calls to reform practices of establishing command can shift attention away from the question of subordination itself and focus instead on a more limited critique of its methods and techniques.

I consider mutual love from the perspective of power in this way in part because that perspective is the most accessible in the literature I examine. Instructional texts were written by men who wrote about securing loving obedience from their households, their horses, and their students. These texts therefore represent a view of the ideal conditions of subordination which, though in conversation with the desires of subjects, ultimately concerns itself with ensuring its own masterly position. Valuable work has been done to better understand how inferiors might carve out spaces of power and resistance within hierarchical order, even while they technically obey the strictures and live up to the ideals of that order. Such resistance, however, is not the

23 For a thorough examination of how conduct literature positioned itself in conversation with its audience, including wives (who wield authority but were also importantly subordinate to their husbands), see Dolan, “The Rule of Relation.”

24 One striking example is Kathryn Schwarz, What You Will: Gender, Contract, and Shakespearean Social Space (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). Schwarz argues that literary representations of early modern women who embrace their subordinate roles show this form of active submission to be dangerous. She explains that obedience can be threatening to patriarchal order in such cases because it highlights the necessity of willing female
focus of this project. Rather, this dissertation maintains that it is valuable to understand the workings and efforts towards legitimization of power from the position of power as well as from below. The views of civil governance being developed and interrogated in this period, moreover, are surely precursors to the rhetoric of care and benevolence which would permeate England’s domination of other nations and cultures in later centuries.  

Scholarship has also shown how apparently didactic literature either misrepresents a reality of negotiation across hierarchical difference or encourages (inadvertently or actively) multiple interpretations which can in turn be used by those in inferior positions to argue against their own mistreatment as much as by masters to enforce their authority. While the usefulness of such projects should not be understated, focusing too wholly on subjects’ resistant or empowering interpretations of such works at the expense of considering how the position of the powerful is also strategically negotiated and nuanced within these texts risks missing the often coercive ways in which instructional works seek to limit such forms of subordinate empowerment. Frances Dolan has already begun to call our attention to how household manuals can be understood as collaborative documents which teach readers how to balance the ideals of prescription with the realities of everyday life, “focus[ing] not on force but on persuasion, submission for the stability and continuity of order. Female characters who embrace their role in establishing and maintaining social order therefore make use of – and insist upon the power of – their position as agential, integral, and therefore necessary participants in the social contract. I identify a similar perceived danger in the need for subordinate participation, and my project complements Schwarz’s by outlining how discourses of training battle for the usefulness and manageability of subordinate will, attempting to elide (or frame as unthreatening) this form of danger.

25 For a discussion of how English advice books were transported to the early American colonies and helped to shape and preserve an English identity among colonists, see Jennifer Mylander, “Early Modern ‘How-To’ Books: Impractical Manuals and the Construction of Englishness in the Atlantic World,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 9, no. 1 (Spring - Summer, 2009): 123-146.

26 Schwarz, What You Will, 82, for example, refers to the idea that prescriptions come out of compromises necessitated for the social contract between men and women to function, calling them “negotiations that masquerade as prescriptions.” Frances Dolan writes in “The Rule of Relation,” 179-201, 194, about how William Gouge encourages his readers to interpret his advice according to their needs, recounting one particular instance in which a wife (Sarah Cowper) uses Gouge’s text “to take her husband to task for failing to fulfill his obligations and for encroaching on or disrupting her ability to fulfill hers.”
enjoining subordinates and superiors alike to understand why they must perform the duties… so that they can put their hearts in their practice.” Building on arguments like Dolan’s, I consider how a variety of other instructional texts, particularly those concerned with the everyday work of training, similarly view the establishment of rule as a project of compromise and persuasion. I push Dolan’s point further, and away from the subordinate perspective, though, by considering the way in which these authors pitch mutuality explicitly to a masterly audience. Certainly, these documents, implicitly and explicitly, acknowledge the agency of all parties involved, impressing on their readership the need for collaborative understanding – even when those asked to obey are horses and falcons. However, they do so at least in part to outline terms for negotiation which secure the negotiating master’s position as such.

Chapter Outlines

For this project, I have selected dramas that are exceptionally direct in their interrogation of particular aspects of training relationships. So, for the first chapter I focus on Shakespeare’s *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and Jonson’s *Every Man in His Humour* because these dramas overtly query the role of love in master-servant interactions. In the second chapter, I have chosen to read Shakespeare’s *The Taming of the Shrew* for its unusual attention to the expectations of horse-training and for what it demonstrates about how those social rules translate across species into skepticism about the apparent mutuality of human-human relations. The third chapter centers around John Lyly’s *Galatea* because its status as a pedagogical play which also takes love and training as its central themes makes it unusually well-suited to considering the role of affection in the early modern English classroom. And finally, I use *The Tempest* as my main text

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in the final chapter for the unique way that it represents the overlaps between types of mastery examined in the previous chapters, mapping the nation’s early colonial ventures onto an English domestic discourse of training.

This dissertation explicates several central and related ways in which early modern drama complicates the usefulness of seeking after reciprocity throughout the period. The first three chapters parallel one another in structure. Each focuses on a specific relation, the prescriptive literature produced about benevolent mastery within it, and dramatic representations of that pairing. Each of the plays selected for the first three chapters poses a different challenge to the viability of the pragmatic use of mutuality represented in the prescriptive literature. In these chapters, I demonstrate how the drama at hand illuminates a particular danger for the social order or unspoken (in the prescriptive literature) limit of the reciprocity envisioned there. The final chapter looks back to the limits of the resistances and problems posed in these first three, and uses the terms established there to argue that Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* demonstrates how a rhetoric of training can be wielded to forgive and reinforce bad mastery, despite prescriptive authors’ ostensible goal of reforming it. It therefore presents rhetorics of everyday training as coercive tools for securing rule regardless of its legitimacy and justice from a modern perspective.

The first chapter draws attention to how a householder’s investment in the establishment of mutuality (especially when expressed in terms of love, as it often was) risks identification and the discovery of similitude across status and therefore highlights a disparity in the process of establishing such relationships: it is not the labor of the master, but the labor of the subordinate which becomes most central to the establishment of reciprocity. Since the superior’s work is treated as something to be hidden and not dwelled upon on the stage, the subordinated party
becomes central to establishing the gentleness of the former. Householders who invest too much in their relationship with their social inferiors are derided as lacking authority, and subordinates are accordingly expected to solve the problems that prohibition poses by doing most of the work, allowing mutuality to be established without an excessive show of care from their betters. Chapter one explores this aspect of mutual rule through the lens of prescriptions about governing household servants.

Using the Puritan William Gouge’s 1622 *Domestical Duties* as a late but indicative example of conduct literature which promotes the cultivation of collaborative governance, I read this advice book for how it makes clear that, despite its insistence that masters should behave civilly and reasonably towards their servants, the burden of cultivating a mutual and loving relationship falls primarily on the shoulders of those servants. Gouge demands of servants an affective labor whereby they achieve oneness and a shared will with their superiors. Turning to William Shakespeare’s *Two Gentlemen of Verona* and Ben Jonson’s *Every Man in His Humour*, I show how they expose these uneven expectations of affective labor: by revealing how masters who perform the affective labor assigned to servants in Gouge’s manual – identifying with their servants – are depicted as unfit for their position.

Relatedly, drama confounds the promises of a useful benevolent domestic rule by demonstrating how trainers might cultivate the *appearance* of reciprocal government without actually practicing the gentleness, reasonableness, and self-discipline that treatises insist are key to securing obedience. They are able to get away with false pretense because the limits on masterly displays of affection mean that characters often look to subordinate performances, rather than methods of enforcement, to determine the gentleness of the master. Thus, as long as a subject effectively performs a loving relationship with her master, that show will be read as
evidence of mutuality. Taking horsemanship treatises as its main prescriptive literature context, Chapter 2 takes up this issue of false appearances. Horsemanship treatises in the period often seek to distinguish between civil, rational methods of securing obedience and violent, ineffectual ones. The stated difference between one sort of method for mastery and the other, though, is inconsistent across and even within treatises. This ambiguity about what constitutes necessary versus cruel violence undermines any avowed difference between brutal domination and civil rule in training processes.

Turning to Shakespeare’s *The Taming of the Shrew* with horsemanship treatises and a figure of the ruthless trainer – the horse-courser – as a lens, I demonstrate how Shakespeare aligns Petruchio’s establishment of rule over his new wife, Katharina, with the methods of a cruel horse-courser. This alignment renders Petruchio’s final victory at the play’s conclusion problematic for the project of reconceptualizing mastery in that his success – through Katharina’s complex show of submission – demonstrates how purportedly “uncivil” methods can be passed off as gentle. That Shakespeare cues us to read Petruchio’s marriage through a lens of horsemanship, moreover, asks us to assume that we can only guess at the experience of the performing subject (as we would be forced to do in the case of the voiceless horse of a training manual), encouraging us to be skeptical of Katharina’s performed loving obedience. The play thus calls into question a project of reforming mastery which distinguishes between civil rule and uncivil domination mainly through a subordinate performance of willing submission that both the example of horse-coursers and *The Taming of the Shrew* suggest can be secured by questionable methods.

Another problem that drama presents, addressed in Chapter 3, is the possibility that subordinate love can remake hierarchical structures by authorizing unconventional masters. The
third chapter turns its focus away from those in power, considering when affective labor might impede authoritative goals. Using humanist pedagogical treatises as its main instructional literature, this chapter reads a pedagogical play, John Lyly’s 1584 drama, *Galatea*, for how it engages the issue of subordinate affective labor with reference to humanist pedagogical practices of *imitatio* and *actio*. I argue that *Galatea* depicts humanist methods of mastery as superior for cultivating love and inspiring action in students, but that the results of this effectiveness are problematic for social order. The play suggests that these strategies are more effective by aligning the two lovers, Galatea and Phillida, with schoolboys and contrasting their successful training (each by the other) with the failures of other subordinate characters in the play. Though Galatea and Phillida engage with their tutors appropriately according to humanist prescription, they each select as their “master” a model that the other characters consider unfit – because not male. Venus resolved this problem by promising to make one of the girls into a man, simultaneously confirming and licensing the girls’ selection and assuaging the concerns of the other characters. However, the goddess’s action suggests that subordinate love has the potential to create new authorities and to raise new models up to the status of authority. Lyly’s play points out the potential dangers that love poses to hegemonic order, even as he claims that Humanist education is well-positioned to encourage the same.

Lastly, drama demonstrates how mutuality in the period operates to preserve hierarchy, using training-focused critiques of mastery to encourage the audience to have patience with bad leaders. These conceptions therefore offer ways to view the current social stratification conservatively as emendable, despite its faults, rather than as an unjust system demanding reform or revolution. The fourth chapter, examining how the reformative prescriptive efforts of training experts works in the favor power, takes a step back to consider a larger discourse of benevolent
rule that emerges out of all the situations described in the previous chapters. Reading this larger discourse of benevolent rule as a con-text for *The Tempest*, I argue that this training-centered discourse allows Shakespeare to comment on and critique the problems of English mastery without ultimately suggesting that it ought to be resisted or questioned as such.

By weaving together in Caliban the features of multiple English subordinates as well as features of early Americans from accounts that made their way back to England, Shakespeare asks his audience to consider Prospero’s tyranny on the island as a domestic disagreement – an indication that Prospero needs to emend his modes of enforcement, but not an indication that he is in fact unjust in assuming a position of power over Caliban (and the other characters). Shakespeare calls our attention to how Prospero has struggled (and continues to struggle) to train his servant by likening Caliban to a series of potentially-frustrating trainees in everyday English life: a student, a child, a servant, a domesticated animal. Shakespeare thus presents *The Tempest* as a story of redemption whereby a bad master (Prospero) learns to claim the results of his own problematic methods, leading him to forgive his subordinate and to take on a role as a more patient and pragmatic ruler at the end of the play. Arguing that the drama’s conservative message supports an emerging colonial discourse that saw Europeans as superior to the Americans, even when the Europeans’ actions were clearly cruel and tyrannical, *The Tempest* offers a case study for how a discourse of benevolent power, even as it seems to critique mastery, might in fact support conformity rather than encourage rebellion. Adding nuance to the notion that colonial

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28 I use “con-text,” here and in the chapter, in the sense of Francis Barker and Peter Hulme, “Nymphs and Reapers Heavily Vanish: The discursive con-texts of *The Tempest*” in John Drakakis, ed. *Alternative Shakespeares* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002, 2nd ed.): 195-209, 35-37: Barker and Hulme define “con-texts” as “the precondition of [a] play’s historical and political signification” made up of texts that are congruent to (in this case) Shakespeare’s works “irrespective of Shakespeare’s putative knowledge of them.” That is, performing a con-textual reading means tracing “discursive networks” that can be traced through a given text because of their historical and political situation and regardless of authorial intent.
discourse co-opts a benevolent familial discourse to disguise its coercive operations, I show how domestic discourses of benevolent governance do not become coercive when applied to a colonial context, but rather include coercion within themselves already. Applying theories of loving rule to a colonial context, then, does not mask the coercion of that project, but rather presents its coercion as a form of compromising pragmatism, making it socially familiar and thus more acceptable – but making few claims about what a modern audience would consider genuinely reciprocal or loving relations.

Together, the advice manual and dramas I examine reveal an era struggling with an emerging ideal of gentle domestic rule that partially problematizes and partially shores up existing social stratification. Though prescriptive literature frequently makes efforts to depict mutuality as unproblematically effective, the mere fact that so much instructional literature about securing obedience was produced speaks to how often it failed to deliver on those promises.29

The dream of horse and rider united as one body with one will expressing the best of their natures more often than not goes awry because reciprocity does not inherently enforce difference and so must be limited in order for it be wielded for power’s preservation. It goes awry because what constitutes mutual love as opposed to violence and error is unclear and frequently debated in the period, but ultimately distinguished by the performance of subordinates rather than the conditions of mastery. It goes awry because it can be wielded to remake the face of authority. And finally, it goes awry because, from a modern perspective, it allows the English to skirt around the real questions of injustice and inequality that trouble so many stratified interactions in

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29 For work on the disparity between domestic advice, in particular, and the realities of early modern English domestic practices, see David Capp, *When Gossips Meet: Women, Family, and Neighbourhood in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Amussen, “Gender, Family, and the Social Order,” has also argued that the increased production of conduct literature in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England correlates with significant changes in how households operated vis a vis public life. Thus, prescriptions increase as they diverge from practice, rather than the reverse.
the period. Early modern drama, staging as it does so many fraught cross-status interactions, needs to be plumbed for the details of those failures.

Finally, by viewing prescriptive texts and early modern dramas through the lens of training, this dissertation demonstrates the flexibility of hierarchical social systems in early modern England, showing how they are both more pragmatic and more sinisterly effective in accommodating the agency of the subjected than scholars have previously acknowledged. While in one respect this project explores the many ways in which mutuality problematizes the power of masters, it ultimately outlines how acknowledging the agency and the rights of a subordinate – even with all the pitfalls such an acknowledgement can include – was often a route to perpetuating and reifying subordination within an early modern English social system rather than a sign of approaching reformation.
CHAPTER 1
Identification and Desire for Mutuality in Master-Servant Relations

In 1965, Peter Laslett famously described early modern English patriarchal society as one in which “every relationship could be seen as a love-relationship,” even as oppression, exploitation, and inequality were central features of its operation.¹ This chapter begins to consider the details of how some of these “love-relationships” worked by looking closely at relations between master and servants in instructional texts and on the stage. In the case of householders and their servants, the labor involved in building and maintaining affection was significant, not in the least because population growth was changing the ways that their interactions functioned.² Population growth meant increasing mobility among wage-laborers, particularly among agricultural workers and live-in domestic servants, so that discontented workers could often leave to find a better master.³ Despite the difficulty of establishing “a beneficial and rewarding relationship” between employer and servant, then, it was in many

³ Scholars who note the movement of servants and other workers frequently from one master to the next during this period include Wrightson, Earthly Necessities, 32; Beier, Masterless Men, 23; Ben-Amos, Adolescence and Youth, 71-72.
masters’ interest to seek after such mutuality, and servants and apprentices often describe successful relation to their superior in terms of reciprocity and even friendship.⁴

Scholars of English literature, and particularly of Shakespearean drama, have only recently begun to investigate the implications of affective ties between the two.⁵ Building on that work in this chapter, I explore dramatic depictions of master-servant interactions with an eye to how control, affection, dependency, and contingency are balanced within them. I argue that training in William Shakespeare’s *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and in Ben Jonson’s *Every Man in His Humour* is treated as a flashpoint for signaling the reality of shared labor and affection between ruler and ruled. Because of this, the boundary between trainer and trainee becomes unstable when training is recalled. Occurring at a point of negotiation between mutual obligation, desire, and hierarchical reinforcement, training is at the unacknowledged heart of how authority gets established and maintained. It is also, and at the same time, representative of a mutuality that can undermine hierarchical categories. When masters reflect upon the labor they put into training, they overtly reflect on the labor they have put into their relations with subordinates. They also reflect, whether consciously or not, on their need and desire for their trainee’s response. In speaking about the mutuality of training, then, masters recall a feature that is both integral to and problematic for the preservation of rule.

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⁴ See Ben-Amos, *Adolescence and Youth*, 156, 174, on the difficulty of establishing these relationships and on how servants characterized their relationship with their masters in terms of “reciprocity” and even friendship.

⁵ See Elizabeth Rivlin, *The Aesthetics of Service in Early Modern England* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2012), explores the implications for what she calls an “aesthetic of service” in drama that aligns service with mimesis, suggesting that those who serve well in some sense become their masters. Rivlin points out an overlap in superior and subordinate identity what produces a similar possibility for parity; See also Judith Weil, *Service and Dependency in Shakespeare’s Plays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and David Evett, *The Discourses of Service in Shakespeare’s England* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); David Schalkwyk, *Shakespeare, Love and Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Though I am skeptical of the direct link Schalkwyk draws between the relatively slow introduction of a new market economy over several centuries and nostalgia about lost affection in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, his general point that the affective dimensions of master-servant relations were of notable interest to early modern English dramatists is apt. DiGangi, “The homoerotics of mastery in satiric comedy,” also argues for drama’s interest in the affective (and also erotic) dimensions of these relations.
The Necessity of Affective Labor in Household Service

The Puritan William Gouge’s 1622 treatise, *Domestical Duties*, is a detailed example of how mutuality between superiors and inferiors was valued by instructional texts in the period: it was encouraged as a tool for securing obedience and ensuring harmonious rule. In professing the value of making mastery reciprocal, though, Gouge makes clear that servants should be doing most of the affective work. Not unusual among treatise authors, he argues that service can in fact be a form of freedom, if servants approach it the right way.⁶ He writes in a section on the “Duties of Servants,”

> Let there be cheerfulness in a servant’s [sic] mind, and he is as free as his master: for such a servant is the Lords freeman (1 Cor. 7. 22.) and when he cannot be made free of his master, he doth after a manner make his service free.⁷

Citing the argument in Corinthians that God calls those who are slaves as free men and those who are free men as slaves, Gouge presents a form of equality between master and servant by balancing their respective positions from a heavenly perspective. He makes the argument that if one commits oneself inwardly and outwardly to cheerful and sincere service “Great is the benefit that by servants faithfulness will redound both to master and servant.”⁸ Gouge often makes use of biblical references which allow him to place the servant’s part of his equal reward beyond the frame of earthly life.⁹ The servant’s affective labor – cultivating a cheerfulness in his mind,

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⁶ This was not an unusual concept in the period. *The Book of Common Prayer* characterizes service to God as “perfect freedome,” making that approach to obedience available in conduct literature as something for everyone, but particularly servants, to aspire to.


⁸ Ibid., doc image 322, p. 622.

⁹ Ibid., doc image 322, p. 622-623.
willingly embracing his subordinate role – is said to benefit both parties. In this way, Gouge promises shared benefit without asking for shared labor.

The equivalence of the promised benefits is therefore rather questionable. Masters who have sincere and obedient servants can “take no more care than… [to] put all that they haue into their servants hands” while servants’ corresponding reward is to be “comfortable to themselues” and to have “peace of conscience.”  

The head of household’s benefit is one of trust and faith in his subject, which in turn ensures the security of his material possessions and promotes his own personal success. His assistant’s reward, however, is something the employee effectively bestows upon himself. Any external, present, and earthly gain for the servant depends on the honesty and gratitude of the master. Gouge assures faithful workers that profit will come when they are called by God to account for their lives after death, “if not by his master on earth.”  

In doing so, he anticipates that some householders will fail to be particularly good or thankful, but insists that their inferiors have reason to be dutiful nonetheless. The only real way for servants to improve their chances of earthly recompense, then, is to commit themselves to making their labor its own reward.

Gouge details how household inferiors ought to go about finding this inner benefit, urging them to cultivate a specific sort of self, disciplining their identity, will, and desires to suit those of their commanders. He says they must “endeauour to make their judgment agree with their masters,” elaborating,

For this end let servants note these two rules.
That they labour to bring their judgment to the bent of their masters judgement, and to thinke that meet and good which he doth.
The second rule which servants must observe is this, that

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10 Ibid., doc image 319, p. 616-617.
11 Ibid., doc image 322, p. 623.
Though they cannot in their judgement thinke that fit to be done which their master will haue done, yet vpon his peremptorie command they must yeeld [sic] to the doing of it.\textsuperscript{12}

Gouge does not suggest that all servants will easily agree with their employee’s desires, characterizing the process of taking on his judgment as “labour.” He allows that sometimes it will even be beyond a worker’s capacity to find good in what his master demands, but even in this case notes that his demands must be fulfilled. Before that reluctant form of obedience is allowed, though, Gouge makes clear that subordinates should bring their judgements into accord – that they should not only agree, but should endeavor to find their employer’s actions “fit and good.”

Likewise, Gouge advises servants to play a role in the creation of their superior’s authority by actively cultivating an appropriate level of “fear and trembling.”\textsuperscript{13} Where one might expect the maintenance of authority to be a ruler’s work, Gouge urges that “seruants must labour to nourish it [respectful fear], as a meanes to keepe them from ouer-much boldnesse”\textsuperscript{14} – the “them” here referring, oddly, to themselves. \textit{Of Domestical Duties} assigns much less space for the necessary affective efforts of masters, leaving out in his descriptions of servant labor how masters might be expected to instruct and guide their inferiors, and therefore to put in significant efforts themselves toward the relationship. This cultivation of one’s own judgement to align with the judgement of a master (or another exterior figure) is a term of identification. By asking servants to labor to make their individual will similar to or, ideally, one with their master’s, Gouge asks them to identify with their superiors in an intimate and interior way.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., doc image 328-329, p. 635-636. Italics in original.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., doc image 318, p. 615.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., doc image 319, p. 616.
The absence in Gouge’s treatise of demands that household heads put significant affective labor, time, and other work into making their relationships with their inferiors harmonious does not mean that they were not in fact making such efforts and investments. The very existence of *Of Domestical Duties*, which one historian described as “a catalogue of discord,” indicates that the peaceful reciprocity to which Gouge aspires was of interest to a wide audience and not necessarily a reality for many of them. And though Frances Dolan has recently argued that such manuals addressed themselves to servants and wives as well as to heads of household, the latter constituted a significant aspect of their audience. Whether or not massive population growth and the increasing mobility of young workers put a new strain on superior-subordinate relationships, it remains the case that young domestic workers and their employers depended on one another in various ways – the employer for assistance and respect, and employees often for food and board as well as wage. As a part of the family unit, servants had relationships with their masters that were in some ways intimate and formative and in others contingent and temporary. It is quite possible, then, that the increasing circulation of household manuals advising families how best to achieve harmony across hierarchical difference responded in part to the difficulties of achieving affection and love where it was often longed for, but remained elusive, for masters and subjects alike.

Like the affective labor of masters, however, the reality that desire for mutual attachment could also be felt by, and even felt *primarily* by, employers, goes largely unaddressed in *Of*

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16 For a full discussion of access to conduct literature, see Frances Dolan, “The Rule of Relation: Domestic Advice Literature and its Readers” in *True Relations: Reading, Literature, and Evidence in Seventeenth-Century England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013): 154-201, esp 156-160. Dolan explains that illiterate persons could access such literature through having it read to them by their masters, spouses, etc. as well as through sermons at their local parish (much of this instructional literature was based on sermons).
17 For the social dangers of having indiscrete, gossipy servants, for example, see Richardson, *Household Servants*, esp. 160.
Domestic Duties. To understand why this might be the case, we can turn to the stage. Both Jonson and Shakespeare are aware of the efforts masters put into their subjects and the affective ties that can result from that laborious investment. By relegating the expression of those experiences to clowns, servants, and undisciplined gentlemen, though, they communicate the problems those experiences pose for social order, even as they make light of the men who fall into their affective trap.

The Two Gentlemen of Verona: Friends, Lovers, and Servants

The plot of The Two Gentlemen of Verona centers around two friends, Proteus and Valentine. Their union is complicated when Proteus abandons his love, Julia, to court Valentine’s love, Silvia. Shakespeare manages to resolve these events with the usual comedic promise of marriage, but only after Proteus has first threatened to rape his friend’s love, Silvia, and then Valentine has offered Silvia to Proteus as a reward for his subsequent contrition. The offer of Silvia to her attempted-rapist is interrupted by Julia, who has disguised herself as a pageboy but now reveals her true identity. In the end, Valentine and Silvia are wed and Proteus regains his love for the once-scorned Julia. For a modern audience, the possibility of both rape and the exchange of a woman as a gift might taint this resolution. As William C. Carroll notes in his introduction to the 2004 Arden edition, scholars have questioned whether the play’s uncomfortable ending (along with some of its other perplexing or seemingly inconsistent features) is the result of a novice playwright’s shortcomings or a conscious commentary on the problems of a classical friendship discourse. Among the other features of the play that scholars

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consider when they debate its status as the work of a novice or a clever critique is the 

prominence of two servants whose presence some have argued is distracting to the main plot. Both Valentine and Proteus bring their servants along with them to Milan – Valentine takes a servingman named Speed and Proteus a man named Lance.

Lance’s interactions with his unruly dog, Crab, have received most of its scholarly attention from the perspective of animal studies. Readings of Crab have therefore been particularly interested in his status as animal. Some of these have argued that his interactions (or lack thereof) with his master highlight the artifice of human interactions, either on the stage or in civil society. Lesley Kordecki has argued that the combination of Crab’s impassivity and Lance’s devotion to and deference to Crab makes their interactions a “mirthful discrediting of the human superiority over the animal.” Considering Lance alongside Gouge’s precepts for affective engagement, however, I argue that the species divide between Lance and Crab is less important to the play than the divide between servant and master. Their species difference serves, through the lens of these precepts, primarily to emphasize the status distinction between trainer

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20 English Literary Renaissance 12, no. 2 (1982): 210-219. For a reading of the play’s ending as more than the result of a novice hand, see Jeffrey Masten, Textual Intercourse: Collaboration, Authorship, and Sexualities in Renaissance Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. 45-48. Masten argues that the attempted rape and offer of Silvia at the end of The Two Gentlemen of Verona through Valentine (and male friendship) serves to “re-instate” Proteus as a gentleman and reassert male homosocial order in the text partially through the traffic in women.

21 On the drama’s general disconnectedness and arguable lack of coherence, Marjorie Garber, “The Two Gentlemen of Verona,” in Shakespeare After All (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004): 43-56, 43, calls it “an anthology of bits and pieces waiting to be crafted into more compelling drama.” Elizabeth Rivlin, “Mimetic Service in The Two Gentlemen of Verona,” ELH 72, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 105-28, 107, contends that that servants are intentionally prominent, since the whole play explores the distinction between “elite service” and a domestic one, the first of which Julia expands to include women and people of lower social status and the second of which serves mostly to parody masters and to manipulate the notion of taking their masters will by exploiting the interpretive “space between their masters’ will and its replication.”


23 Boehrer, Shakespeare Among the Animals, 164; Fudge, “Humans, Animals, and Self-Control,” 199.

and trainee. If we consider Crab’s species difference from Lance also as a difference in social status, we can see how Shakespeare uses these characters to reflect on the implications of friendship and love between superior and subordinate. That Lance performs an unequal friendship with a dog renders the scene of their interaction comic for various reasons, but an early modern audience would also have reason to sympathize with and not simply discredit the possibility of Lance’s desire.

Recent studies have revealed that the early modern English were interrogating classical ideals about friendship “in the context of a highly stratified, changing world in which equality, sameness, and the closeness they could engender—the sine qua non of traditional friendship—were as a rule merely illusory.”24 The notion of friendship between equals was especially complicated in the context of marriage, where humanists tried to argue for a unique form of friendship that would allow for subordination without disavowing the shared purpose between husband and wife.25 But friendship was difficult to achieve outside of this particularly vexed unit as well. In The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Shakespeare explores how the desire for friendship

24 Daniel T. Lochman and Maritere López, “The Emergence of Discourses: Early Modern Friendship,” Introduction to Discourses and Representations of Friendship in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700, Maritere López, Daniel T. Lochman, and Lorna Hutson, eds. (Surrey, England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011), 1, argue that early moderns were exploring the limits of friendship in cases where subordination is often involved and similitude is unlikely or impossible. In that collection, see esp. Donald Gilbert-Santamaría, “Guzmán de Alfrache’s ‘Other Self’: The Limits of Friendship in Spanish Picaresque Fiction,” 83-98, on the fragility of friendship between unequals. Also prominent among literary scholarship exploring the incongruity of classical models of similitude in perfect friendship and the hierarchical nature of most relationships during the English renaissance are Laurie Shannon, Sovereign Amity: Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002) and Lorna Hutson, The Usurer’s Daughter: Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth-Century England (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). Looking slightly after my historical period in this chapter, Tim Hitchcock, “Tricksters, Lords and Servants: Begging, Friendship and Masculinity in Eighteenth-Century England” in Love, Friendship and Faith in Europe, 1300-1800, Laura Gowing, Michael Hunter, and Miri Rubin, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 177-96, 179, 192-93, argues that a language of Christian charity, combined with languages of friendship and obligation partially inherited from the structure of the household (including live-in servants) lead to confusions about class distinctions that “occasionally overcame the apparently straightforward condescension of the gentleman for the beggar on the street corner.” He argues that the very poor wielded this language sometimes to suggest friendship (and thus an equality of sorts) between themselves and the gentlemen who gave them charity.

asserts also a desire for parity between equals and unequals alike. Though similitude proves beneficial for Proteus in his friendship with Valentine, who offers him forgiveness and calls him to virtue after his ungentlemanly pursuit of Silvia, a similar kind of identification does not prove so rewarding for his servingman Lance, whose pursuit of friendship with an inferior hurts his social standing. Lance and Speed’s commentary throughout, far from being unrelated or distracting to the main plot, sets the stage for the central plot’s examination of love – friendly or romantic – by disavowing the possibility or prudence of open love in which subordination is an integral feature, therefore reaffirming the idea that friendship can only successfully and beneficially occur between equals. Along similar lines, Lance’s inappropriate affective investment in his trainee Crab demonstrates how friendly love moves relationships away from utility and subordination, and is therefore a dangerous affect for masters to embrace relative to those beneath them.

**Service, Intimacy, and Utility**

Mid-way through the play, Lance, who is both a servingman and a clown, suggests that love can spring from utility, but that a wise master will not openly declare that love. After calling his master Proteus a fool for being in love and loud about it, Lance admits he has a mistress himself, but promises that “he lives not now that knows me to be in love, yet I am in love, but a team of horse shall not pluck that from me.”

26 His opening declaration insists on his love, but also states doubly the fact that he does not openly declare that love, but keeps it wisely (unlike his foolish master) to himself. He proceeds to read off to the audience a list of skills his

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27 3.1.259-260: “I am but a fool, look you, and yet I have the wit to think my master is a kind of knave.”
beloved (a milkmaid) possesses which demonstrate both his love’s inferiority to him in status (she is a milkmaid who “serves for wages”), and her usefulness to him.28

I am in love… ‘tis a milkmaid; yet ‘tis not a maid, for she hath had gossips; yet ‘tis a maid, for she is her master’s maid and serves for wages. She hath more qualities than a water-spaniel, which is much in a bare Christian. [Pulls out a paper.] Here is the cate-log of her condition. [Reads] Inprimis, she can fetch and carry. Why, a horse can do no more; nay, a horse cannot fetch but only carry, therefore is she better than a jade. Item, she can milk. Look you, a sweet virtue in a maid with clean hands.29

Lance amusingly lists among his lady’s attributes menial skills which could be partially fulfilled by domesticated animals. He praises the maid by pointing out how her ability to perform tasks like fetching makes her more useful than a water-spaniel or a horse. He also labels a simple physical ability (and the ability to masturbate) a “sweet” moral virtue.30 In all these cases, he playfully conflates the useful and the erotic, the loving and the pragmatic. While he is reading, Valentine’s servant Speed enters the scene and expresses curiosity about Lance’s paper. After a brief exchange, Lance allows Speed to take over reading, and the maid’s traits expand to include a copious number of abilities equally mundane and made intimate via sexual innuendo. In just the first half of Speed’s portion, he repeats that the milkmaid “can milk” and goes on to announce that she “brews good ale… can sew… can knit… can wash and scour… can spin… (and) hath many nameless virtues.”31 Of those examples, “to milk,” “sew,” “knit,” and “spin” all could have sexual connotations. Further on in the document, we discover that the maid also “hath a sweet mouth” and is “too liberal.”32 These descriptions demonstrate that the maid might be said to be serving Lance (in both a servant’s and a wife’s capacity), suggesting by their

28 3.1.264-267.
29 3.1.262, 265-74.
32 3.1.319, 337.
framing as things Lance is clever to be discrete about that love which combines utility and affect in this way is simultaneously something Lance can celebrate and something he knows better than to talk about out loud.  

By permitting his fellow to read, Lance affords himself the opportunity to respond to the items as they are named. For example, when Speed says she “is not to be kiss’d fasting, in respect of her breath,” Lance jokes, “that fault may be mended with a breakfast”; and when Speed explains that she is “too liberal,” Lance announces that he will “keep shut” her purse if she proves too liberal there, but that he does not really care if she is too liberal sexually. He continues like this, evaluating each detail’s bearing on the maid’s suitability for her position as his useful lover. In so doing, Lance performs the gathering of intimate physical knowledge of the maid while simultaneously parodying a concern for her morality and measuring her worth through individualized tasks. In this, he positions himself as an employer as well as a lover.

Since many servants and apprentices took their positions at a young age, their masters were often expected to give them moral guidance while teaching them various skills. In addition, masters were expected to care for servants or apprentices who fell ill or were injured, taking the place of

33 Garber, *Shakespeare After All*, 52-53, notes how this list undermines Lance’s claim of love. I resist the implication that the maid’s utility (sexual and otherwise) makes it impossible to take Lance’s claims of love seriously by focusing instead how the maid’s utility might make Lance’s caution in socially expressing that love necessary, since he must preserve a hierarchically superior position relative to be maid even as he admits to himself that he loves and pragmatically depends on her.

34 3.1.315-318, 337-341.

35 Susan Dwyer Amussen, *An Ordered Society: Gender and Class in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 40, while explaining how the early modern household was integral to conceptions of political order (thus revealing the lack of distinction between public and private order in the period), has explained that “The responsibilities of masters and mistresses to their servants were parallel to those of parents to children. Both servants and children should have a moral and practical education…. Mistresses and masters were to keep servants from idleness, teach them good manners, make sure they attended church…. See also Mark Thornton Burnett, *Masters and Servants in English Renaissance Drama and Culture: Authority and Obedience* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997 and New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997). Burnett explains masters’ responsibilities to their apprentices’ similarly. See especially chap. 1 “Apprenticeship and Society,” 14-53.
a parent in that respect, unless the youth’s parents had insufficient funds to provide such care. While the kind of bodily intimacy at issue in Lance’s note is not necessarily the same as that which would result from sharing a household, overseeing physical labor, and caring for the body of a servant, the ownership he is able to claim over the milkmaid by asserting that knowledge and judgement, paired with his parsing of those abilities according to their practical utility (in both sexual and non-sexual terms), encourages us to notice the possibility of a parallel.

When Lance compares his milkmaid to both a hunting dog and a horse, too, he brings to mind domestic servants by parodying the sometimes animalistic functions assigned to these figures. For example, in a 1589 book of witticisms, *A display of dutie dect with sage sayings, pythie sentences, and proper similies*, Leonard Wright makes an apparently commonplace link between a good servant and domesticated animals. At the beginning of a section on “certain prety notes, and pleasant conceits, delightfull to many and hurtfull to none,” Wright gives his thoughts on “The property of a good Servant.”

IT is required in a good servant to have the backe of an Asse, to beare all things patiently: the tongue of a shéepe, to kéépe silence gently: and the snout of a swine, to féede on all thinges heartily; large eares: light féet: & a trustie right hand: loth to offend: diligent to please: willing to amende, and sufferance disease.

Wright uses the features of a donkey, a sheep, and a pig to encourage separate good behaviors. He portrays animal traits positively by using them to demonstrate how each feature of the servant’s body can be useful to his master. Moreover, he places this saying after a brief description of “The natural inclination of an English man,” and of “The natural disposition of

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36 Ben-Amos, *Adolescence and Youth*, 170-172; Gouge, *Of Domestical Duties*, p. 677, admonishes masters who fail to care for sick servants, pointing out that such masters “In this kinde … shew more kindnesse to a dogge, or other beast that is not well, then [sic] to a servant.”

most women” in his book of witticisms. In doing so, he implicitly separates the category of “servant” from those of “English man” and “most women.” Though not a criticism of servants, then, his description suggests a distinct and potentially non-human social status for them.

Animal comparisons are also used to degrade bad servants in the period. Gouge, for instance, compares a servant who will not improve even after being whipped many times to “a rusty jade” and quotes Proverbs to compare such “a scornful, blockish servant” to “an horse” and “an ass,” saying that such servants must eventually be given up on and “put… out of doores.”

Here, a servant’s lack of skills justifies his being thrown out of the house, even though doing so might well force him into a life of poverty and vagrancy. Implicit in Gouge’s comparison and the justification it provides is the assumption that servants and animals alike are given human care and attention on a conditional basis. If these figures are not practically useful, their master’s obligation to them can be, and even should be, rescinded. By comparing his milkmaid to a water-spaniel and a horse, especially with respect to her utility, then, Lance keeps to a logic whereby her skills as a servant connect her to non-human animals and govern the terms of his engagement with her. Despite his insertion of overt love and sexuality, Lance’s itemization preserves what Wright’s passage shows to be a masterly interest in subordinates’ potential uses. And by providing the audience with the pragmatic view of an employer when we expect to hear the milkmaid described through the eyes of a lover, Lace highlights how these affects and dependencies can go together, despite how the drama’s central love story would seem to pit them against one another. By proudly declaring that he keeps this love to himself, however, Lance also makes clear that such a love is wisest when not socially performed or acknowledged.

38 Gouge, Of Domestical Duties, doc image 318, p. 614-615.
39 Beier, Masterless Men, 22-28, and Ben-Amos, Adolescence and Youth, 156-157.
This moment in the play has been read as a mock-blazon.\textsuperscript{40} Though that interpretation accurately portrays the expectation Lance sets up for his audience when he first produces his paper about his milkmaid, it does not fully account for the number of traits Lance lists which are, in fact, practically desirable in a good milkmaid. Nor does it account for the bizarre language of “Inprimis” and “Item” that frames his description. “Inprimis,” likely a malapropism or a misspelling of the Latin “imprimis” for “firstly,” can be found along with the subsequent instances of “item” in a variety of legal documents at the time – proclamations of law or injunctions given by the queen or other authorities to their subordinates (such as an archbishop’s injunction to a parish), orders taken by officials and clergymen, formal confessions and reports, and contentions regarding illegal actions. Thus, this language presents Lance’s love in legal and contractual terms, wedding love and function and subordination in a potent combination that Lance thinks he would be foolish to admit he recognizes in his relationship with the milkmaid. If his depiction of loving service or loving employment here is kept carefully controlled and hidden, though, in the following act, Lance fails to follow his own advice and demonstrates the consequences of such masterly love existing in the open.

**Lance and Servant-Love**

In 4.4, Lance goes on to demonstrate the destabilizing possibilities for masterly love. He performs the kind of affective labor expected of servants while he attempts to occupy a position of authority relative to his dog, inadvertently portraying the pitfalls of that affective labor: he identifies with his trainee and loses social status in the process. His identification occurs in part because of a physical intimacy with Crab, evidenced by his knowledge of Crab’s body. While in

\textsuperscript{40} Carroll, “Introduction,” 41; Garber, *Shakespeare After All*, 52.
\textsuperscript{41} Carroll, ed., *Two Gentlemen*, p. 221, n. 270.
his dealings with the milkmaid Lance used such knowledge to take a position of judgment and
ownership, when it comes to Crab a similar familiarity leads him to conflate the dog’s body with
his own. Having brought Crab as a gift to Silvia (failing his master Proteus’s orders to bring a
different, smaller dog), Lance is ultimately subjected to a beating for Crab’s ungentlemanly
behavior. At the beginning 4.4, both parties enter and Lance addresses the audience about the
ordeal,

> When a man’s servant shall play the cur with him, look you, it
goes hard. One that I brought up of a puppy, one that I saved from
drowning when three or four of his blind brothers and sisters went
to it. I have taught him, even as one would say precisely, ‘Thus I
would teach a dog’…. O, ’tis a foul thing when a cur cannot keep
himself in all companies. I would have, as one should say, one that
takes upon him to be a dog indeed, to be, as it were, a dog at all
things.”

Lance’s first line, “When a man’s servant shall play the cur with him, look you, it goes hard,”
has several possible meanings. If the “servant” in question is Crab, he says that Crab acts like “a
worthless, low-bred, or snappish dog.”

This expression could also apply to Lance, however, since “cur” can be “a term of contempt” for “a surly, ill-bred, low, or cowardly fellow.” Lance himself has “played the cur” by playfully substituting his own dog for Proteus’s better-bred one, to comical and disastrous effect. As for to whom this cur-like behavior “goes hard,” the phrase could technically refer to either Proteus, whose suit to Silvia is rejected because of his servant’s unwieldly failure, or to Lance, who has been beaten. If it goes hard for Lance, though, it can do so in two senses. First, it goes hard for him as Proteus’s disobedient servant who is beaten because of his currish behavior. Second, though, it does so in that Lance is beaten as Crab’s

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42 The Two Gentlemen of Verona, 4.4.1-6, 9-13.
44 Ibid., s.v. “cur,” n. 1b.
45 Ibid., s.v. “to come (also go, etc.) through the hard (also hard),” adj. and n. P2. d., “to experience hardship or
difficulty.”
master. In that case, the currish behavior of a servant – Crab – results in hardship and difficulty for his master – Lance. Launching into a complaint about all the effort he has invested in Crab immediately after this declaration, Lance at least asks the audience to consider taking this second possibility seriously.

The clownish servingman calls our attention explicitly to training when he announces, “I have taught him, even as one would say precisely, ‘Thus I would teach a dog.’” To my knowledge, there are no extant printed texts in English explicitly describing the training of dogs, although texts like Abraham Fleming’s 1576 translation of John Caius’s *Of Englishe dogges* describe which dogs can be “trained up” to perform certain tasks and inform readers about how dogs will respond to their master’s voice or motions.\(^{46}\) In other contexts, though, such as household management, falconry, and horsemanship, many instructional texts were being produced to inform masters (and sometimes, as in Gouge’s treatise, their subjects) on how best to lead their inferiors (or themselves) to willing obedience. Lance’s protest that he has an unwieldy subordinate in Crab despite training him exactly as one might say he ought to could well reflect frustrations these prescriptive texts sought (and likely often failed) to resolve. His reference to the process of training is an implicit acknowledgement of his laborious investment in initiating his relationship with this domesticated creature. Lance argues that he did his part in training Crab, but Crab’s refusal to respond appropriately to his tutelage has rendered those efforts ineffectual. Gouge encouraged servants to put their own mental effort into securing their master’s position by cultivating fear and reverence within themselves. The impassive Crab puts in no such effort here, leaving Lance to attempt to be the source of his own authority. Lance’s

complaint reveals that without his trainee’s support, and even despite following the appropriate steps of training, the trainer’s efforts are fruitless.

Lance’s frustration is made comical by the absurdity of his expectations. He bemoans Crab’s social rudeness at Silvia’s house: “O, ’tis a foul thing when a cur cannot keep himself in all companies. I would have, as one should say, one that takes upon him to be a dog indeed, to be, as it were, a dog at all things.” One joke in that assertion is, of course, a dog cannot be expected to “keep himself in all companies” precisely because he is literally, and not by choice, “a dog at all things.” If Crab is unresponsive and unchanging in the face of his trainer’s efforts, though, Lance seems to have responded not by disengaging, but by becoming even more responsive himself. Early in the play, when he first took leave of his family to follow Proteus to Milan, Lance demonstrated that his attention to Crab and Crab’s cold demeanor sometimes slips into identification with him. When he begins to narrate the story of his departure in 2.3, he inadvertently conflates himself with his dog. First, he explains how difficult it was for him to follow his master to Milan, announcing that his dog Crab is “sour-natured” for his failure to cry on the occasion (Lance tells us that everyone else did cry, even the cat). He notes here, too, Crab’s notorious disinterestedness, calling him “a stone, a very pebblestone” who “has no more pity in him than a dog” (with again a joke about how Crab’s supposed shortcomings ought to be expected). Endeavoring to convey the coldness of Crab during the off-stage event by acting it out for the audience, Lance goes about setting the scene by assigning the role of the parties involved to various articles of clothing. As he reaches the end of the character list he gets

47 Fudge, “Animals, Humans, and Self-Control,” 192, has also noted this conflation, as has Garber, Shakespeare After All, 54.
48 2.3.4-9.
49 2.3.9-10. Garber, Shakespeare After All, 54, points out that Crab’s shortcomings in this case might actually be perceived as “unnatural” since “the dog was the most proverbial loyal and faithful of companions.”
confused: “The hat is Nan our maid. I am the dog. No, the dog is himself, and I am the dog. O, the dog is me, and I am myself. Ay, so, so.”50 Amid dwelling on his creature’s irritating lack of response, then, Lance declares first that he is the dog and then that the dog is him. Lance’s admission that he cares about Crab’s indifference – that he desires an emotional investment from him – in this scene of departure becomes the occasion for his first conflation of himself with that inferior.

Returning to the mishap at Silvia’s, we see Lance emphasize his identification with his still uncooperative dog, again framing it with a complaint about Crab’s lack of caring. He describes Crab’s main transgression,

If I had not had more wit than he, to take a fault upon me that he did, I think verily he had been hanged for’t. Sure as I live, he had suffered for’t. You shall judge. He thrusts me himself into the company of three gentlemen-like dogs under the Duke’s table. He had not been there – bless the mark—a pissing-while but all the chamber smelled him. “Out with the dog,” says one. “What cur is that?” says another. “Whip him out,” says the third. “Hang him up,” says the Duke.51

Erica Fudge has argued that Crab, and in particular his unsocialized practice of misplaced urination, demonstrates the fragility of the animal-human distinction in this scene: it marks Carb as an animal and, via analogy, calls attention to the uncivil actions of the human protagonists in the drama.52 Thus, for Fudge, Crab points out the “the very real danger of incivility that hangs over the play.”53 Lance himself, though, has framed this story with a complaint about a failure in the trainer-trainee relationship, a dangerous decision that comes to bear on himself rather than on

50 2.3.19-20.
51 The Two Gentlemen of Verona, 4.4.13-22.
52 Garber, Shakespeare After All, 55, also reads this scene as questioning “the nature of ‘natural’ behavior, for men and for dogs” while considering “which of these various creatures—noblemen, clowns and servants, dogs—are the most admirable, or the least culpable.”
53 Fudge, “Humans, Animals, and Self-Control,” 199.
his uncivil underling. He has shared his labor in attempting to train Crab with the audience and now, while he continues to tell the story of the dog’s disobedience, he also reveals an un-self-conscious but also unquestioned and unflagging care for his four-legged servant.

Rather than throwing up his hands and casting Crab “out of doors” as Gouge suggested was necessary with untrainable servants, Lance steps in to take the blame and save Crab from hanging. Even at the beginning of his description his wording – “he thrusts me himself into the company of three gentlemen-like dogs under the Duke’s table” – jumbles pronouns so that it is difficult to determine who is under the table and who is among the gentleman-like dogs. It is equally syntactically ambiguous who is thrusting whom to what location. It is possible that the “he” who “thrusts” Lance or Crab into the company of “gentleman-like dogs” is Proteus, who did, after all, order Lance into this situation. It is also possible that Lance blames Crab for thrusting him into a shameful position. According to that available meaning, Lance affords his stone-like subject more agency than he assigns to himself, who is passively forced into embarrassment by the more powerful dog. If Lance has already begun to switch places with Crab by acting as his subordinate rather than vice versa, his identification with what ought to be the dog’s role only intensifies as he goes about saving Crab from punishment:

I, having been acquainted with the smell before, knew it was Crab, and goes me to the fellow that whips the dogs: “Friend,” quoth I, “you mean to whip the dog?” “Ay, marry, do I,” quoth he. “You do him the more wrong,” quoth I, “twas I did the thing you wot of.” He makes me no more ado, but whips me out of the chamber. How many masters would do this for his servant? Nay, I’ll be sworn I have sat in the stocks for puddings he hath stolen, otherwise he had

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55 Boehrer, “Animal Fun for Everyone,” 161-62, 164-66, also notes the similarity between Crab and Lance’s position in this respect, arguing that their similarity invites a metadramatic parallel between them which the dog repeatedly ruins by failing to act. My own concern here is not only the similarities between the two, but the direction of action and power between them, which is why I spend time here thinking about which party is the actor and which the passive receiver of that action.
been executed. I have stood on the pillory for geese he hath killed, otherwise he had suffered for’t.  

Lance announces his knowledge of Crab’s body, declaring himself acquainted with even the smell of Crab’s urine (which he claims to be able to distinguish even from that of other dogs), before submitting his own body to a whipping to protect Crab from harm. Lance’s sacrifice of his own body to the “fellow that whips the dogs,” which is also a substitution of his body for the dog’s, undermines his mastery over Crab in two ways.

First, his sacrifice admits to an affective connection with the dog which has been implied by his initial tale of saving and raising him. Lance’s lack of self-interest in this moment and his thoughtless sacrifice for Crab suggests friendship more closely than it suggests mastery.  

Second, Lance’s offer of his own body as Crab’s and his claim of Crab’s actions as his own resembles the affective labor of identification Gouge asks of servants in Of Domestical Duties – a form of identification that leads Lance to consider Crab’s priorities over-and-above his own. The result of both is the easy acceptance of his body in place of Crab’s by, apparently, everyone in Silvia’s dining hall. In the process of maintaining his commitment to a cold subordinate, in other words, Lance seems to have effectively expressed an unreciprocated friendship towards him and, resultantly, has become Crab’s disciplined servant rather than his master or companion. Kordecki describes this shift in authority as a disavowal of human superiority. Although it might read that way to a modern audience, Lance’s lost authority does not in my view primarily

56 4.4.22-32.
57 Again, Boehrer, “Animal Fun for Everyone,” 166 notes this substitution and the parallels it highlights between man and dog, but he does so to argue that Lance must fill in for Crab as his acting double because of the animal’s failure (because of his animality) to perform.
58 Kordecki, “True Love and the Nonhuman,” argues that Lance’s love for Crab is superior to other loves in the play and serves to undermine the inherent superiority of humans over animals. Garber, 52-53, also notes Lance’s friendship for Crab, calling him Lance’s “best friend” and noting that his love for Crab is stronger than his love for his milkmaid.
deconstruct a hierarchical animal/human binary since, as has been established, such a clean binary did not yet exist at this time. Shannon has demonstrated how human interactions with non-human creatures were important sites for interrogating the difference between just and tyrannical rule in multi-species terms. In this scene, we can see how they are also important sites for exploring the conditions of a domestic authority that operates across both species and social status boundaries.

Apparently blissfully unaware of his social degradation, Lance asks the audience, “How many masters would do this for his servant?” The answer is quite simple for an early modern English audience: none that are successful. None, because to continuously engage with an uninterested servant is to seek to establish mutuality from the wrong direction. As an inferior, Lance could certainly devote himself to his better and, if his lord did not reciprocate, he could nonetheless expect praise for his actions according to Gouge’s household prescriptions. As a superior, though, we see in this scene that Lance’s persistent affective bond with Crab does not make Crab a better subordinate, but rather brings his trainer down to his own social status, whipped for peeing under the dinner table. Rather than making it clear to the audience that Lance is in fact the best and most generous of all masters, Lance’s speech here (appropriate for his clown designation) is ironically unconscious of his failure as such. If we reexamine Lance’s first line – “When a man’s servant shall play the cur with him, look you, it goes hard” – we find that Lance has indeed “played the cur,” not only in the sense of having been disobedient or difficult, but also in the sense of having literally taken the brunt of Crab’s punishments.

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Continuing to appeal to Crab’s non-existent affection for him, Lance makes clear that moments of instruction and command – moments which unavoidably require Crab’s response – have opened Lance up to this transformation into his servant’s servant. He addresses the dog directly,

(To Crab) Thou think’st not of this now. Nay, I remember the trick you served me when I took my leave of Madam Silvia. Did not I bid thee still mark me, and do as I do? When didst thou see me heave up my leg and make water against a gentlewoman’s farthingale? Didst thou ever see me do such a trick?62

Lance’s question “Didst thou ever see me do such a trick?” assumes that Crab has been learning from his master, admiring his actions as good and seeking to imitate them. Clearly, Crab has not been doing this. The role Crab’s agency has played in negating Lance’s status as trainer is encapsulated in his master’s repetition of the word “mark” as he rants about his subject’s disobedience: “Did not I bid thee mark me, and do as I do?” Earlier, Lance referred to Lance’s urination under Silvia’s table as a “mark” (“bles... the mark”). In the passage above, he uses it instead to indicate a careful attention he has apparently assumed Crab would pay him. “Bless the mark” is a common period expression used to acknowledge and ask for excuse for something unpleasant or shocking;63 but “mark” can also refer to the boundary of a territory – and as a verb, “marking” can refer to listening as well as to claiming property or territory.64 Lance asks Crab to “mark” in one way but finds that Crab marks in the other way instead, asserting his territory. The dog claims dominance rather than proving himself properly teachable and submissive. The dual possibilities for what it means for Crab to “mark” Lance highlight Crab’s power as Lance’s

62 4.4.32-38.
64 Ibid., v.I 2c 2d 2g, v. III.
inferior. Either Crab listens and learns from Lance, or Crab inverts their roles and effectively claims ownership of his carefully attending master.

In contrast to the threat posed by the unreciprocated care of a trainer for his trainee, the play depicts the same unequal affective engagement among servants as a matter of course. For example, after Speed expresses surprise at how his master Valentine has suddenly become “a notable lover” in 2.5 (the intimacy of which observation also demonstrates the closeness of master and servant), Lance responds cheekily that he has always known Speed’s master to be “A notable lubber, as thou reportest him to be.”65 When Speed snaps back in irritation, “Why, thou whoreson ass, thou mistak’st me,” Lance seizes the opportunity and retorts, “Why, fool, I meant not thee, I meant thy master.”66 Though Speed means that Lance has misheard him, Lance’s comment points the audience to a secondary meaning, whereby Speed has taken a criticism of Valentine as a criticism of himself. His snappish retort leaves open the possibility that he does in fact take insult at a comment directed at his master, however, revealing a kind of truth in Lance’s quip that Speed has conflated his master for himself.

Similarly, in the very first scene of the play, Speed conflates his own bodily identity with Valentine’s. Speed is running late behind the gentleman, who is about to depart for Milan, and he stops to ask Proteus for help catching him. When Speed says of himself that he has “played the sheep in losing [Valentine],” Proteus responds by saying “Indeed a sheep doth very often stray./ An if the shepherd be awhile away.”67 The servingman retorts, “You conclude that my master is a shepherd then, and I a sheep…. Why then, my horns are his horns, whether I wake or sleep.”68 With this joke, Speed unites his own sexual status with that of his love-struck master, calling

65 2.5.36-37, 40.
66 2.5.41-42.
67 1.1.73-75.
68 1.1.76, 78.
attention to the way in which both Speed’s physical body and his moral reputation are yoked with those of Valentine. Proteus’s suggestion, using the shepherd analogy, that an absent master leads to his servant’s moral misdeeds, would be a commonplace in a society where masters were indeed considered responsible for the moral actions of their servants.\textsuperscript{69} But Speed challenges that, replying, “The shepherd seeks the sheep, and not the sheep the shepherd… therefore I am no sheep.”\textsuperscript{70} Speed resists the passivity Proteus assigns to his role, and appropriately so. His subjection to Valentine, much like Lance’s inadvertent subordination to the non-reciprocating Crab, is marked by a committed pursuit of and loyalty to that master. While Speed follows his master literally here, Lance pursued Crab affectively despite Crab’s disinterest. In both cases, the figure who labors most overtly in the hierarchical pair is either actually or effectively the servant.

Shortly afterwards, Speed makes a similar point. When he has difficulty getting Proteus to pay him for his service, Speed says, “Well, I perceive I must be fain to bear with you.”\textsuperscript{71} Like his first joke, this one belies an assumed master-servant dynamic. Speed’s use of “bearing” refers to common early modern jokes about servants’ ability to bear, like asses, whatever load they must carry for their masters. But in this case, Speed’s bearing comments on his master’s position more than it animalizes his own, suggesting that the servant must bear \textit{with} his superior rather than bearing \textit{for} him. Speed suggests that he must be patient with Proteus who therefore looks childish (or at least complaining and stubborn) by comparison.\textsuperscript{72} All of this is said as part of a playful exchange, but Speed’s jokes nonetheless comment on a real gap between both the servant’s dependence on and animality relative to his master, and his continual efforts chasing

\textsuperscript{69} Amussen, \textit{An Ordered Society}, 40. See also Burnett, \textit{Masters and Servants in English Renaissance Drama and Culture}, see esp. chap. 1, “Apprenticeship and Society,” 14-53.
\textsuperscript{70} 1.1.84-86
\textsuperscript{71} 1.1.113.
after his master and waiting patiently to engage. The subordinate’s efforts, from Speed’s perspective, are perhaps just as important to the harmony between the pair as is the devotion or care of his employer.

**Love and Not Love**

The sections above have established that affective labor is required from the lesser of a hierarchical pair and that the revelation of the similar work of the superior risks encouraging and exposing a desire for mutual response that can destabilize authority. This lack of parity in expectations for commitment is part of what ultimately distinguishes the love available in friendships and romantic pairs from the love available among masters and servants in the play. Julia, who loves Proteus, disguises herself as a servant so she can follow him to Milan. Because Julia is actually in love with her “master,” their interactions literalize and take to the furthest degree the possibility of a loving employer-employee relationship. Since Julia presumably aspires to act as a loyal lover to Proteus while also being his servant, we might expect her engagement to meet and even surpass the affective commitment displayed in the drama’s other pairs. Julia distinguishes herself from these others differently, though, when she receives her first order from Proteus – to give a ring he received from Julia to his new love interest, Silvia. She complains,

Alas, poor Proteus, thou hast entertained
A fox to be the shepherd of thy lambs….  
I am my masters true-confirméd love,  
But cannot be true servant to my master
Unless I prove false traitor to myself.  
Yet will I woo for him, but yet so coldly  
As, heaven know, I would not have him speed.\(^{73}\)

\(^{73}\) *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, 4.4.89-90, 101-05.
Julia’s dilemma – that she cannot be a true servant to Proteus without betraying herself – is strikingly unlike the identity slippages expressed by Speed and Proteus. Her speech suggests that her individual identity and will are not as easily conflated with her “master’s” person as these others’ have been. In fact, Julia’s complaint is in direct opposition to Lance’s report that he has left a weeping family to follow the same Proteus that Julia follows now. In that earlier scene, Lance says nothing of an internal debate. He weeps and chastises Crab for failing to acknowledge a similar sadness, but does not seem to question that he will follow his superior. Julia’s shepherd metaphor, too, harkens back to the opening scene of the play when Proteus and Speed debated who could correctly be called a sheep and who a shepherd. As she contemplates her duty to her master, Julia calls herself a bad shepherd, assigning herself a position of power over her supposed superior. Her dilemma implicitly points out the lord’s dependency on his servant and again calls attention to the way in which a servant’s response to his or her master counter-intuitively makes the latter’s control possible.

The similarity here to earlier scenes draws our attention to an important difference between how Julia imagines her own subordinate position and how she depicts the position of other subordinates. Her superior is vulnerable because Julia, unlike the other menial figures, considers and expresses her own needs and wants rather than parroting his, despite the fact that her gender certainly renders her societally subordinate to him. As it turns out, it might well be the case that Speed and Lance, indeed no sheep, are successful shepherds of their masters. Their success depends not necessarily on an abandonment or disavowal of their own agency, but on their active directing of their will towards the will of their masters – even when their own individual goals or desires might conflict with it. Julia expresses in her distraught words an inability to redirect her own desires in such a fashion in part because she is not (as she describes
it) Proteus’s subject in the same way his servants are, but is instead his “true-confirmé love.” That her loyalty to one form of love negatively affects her ability to act out the other demonstrates the differences between them. No matter what path she takes after this speech, she will be in one sense both loving and loyal, and in another sense a traitor. In ultimately failing to deliver Proteus’s ring to Silvia, Julia opts to remain true to her own desires and to her love to Proteus, failing to make her master’s current will her own, as he expects her to do. Her case suggests that “true confirmé” love and service, despite the hierarchical distinction that will dictate her interactions with Proteus in marriage, do not mix.

Expected to honor and obey Proteus, Julia’s love is only subtly different from the affective commitment of servants in the play, and the nuances of the distinction between them are further parsed in the final scene. After Julia reveals her identity to Proteus, she scolds him,

O Proteus, let this habit make thee blush.  
Be thou ashamed that I have took upon me  
Such an immodest raiment, if shame live  
In a disguise of love.  
It is the lesser blot, modesty finds,  
Women to change their shapes than men their minds.  

Julia’s clothes are “immodest” in part because they are not societally suitable for her gender. Other cross-dressed female characters express similar reservations about their manly costumes. However, this particular maiden has already considered and then brushed aside the shame that weighs heavily on her now. Much earlier, Julia discussed her planned disguise with her waiting-woman, Lucetta:

*Julia.* But tell me, wench, how will the world repute me  
For undertaking so unstaid a journey?

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74 5.4.104-08.  
I fear me it will make me scandalized.

Lucetta. If you think so, then stay home and go not.
Julia. Nay, that I will not.

Lucetta. Then never dream on infamy, but go.
If Proteus like your journey when you come,
No matter who’s displeased when you are gone.
I fear me he will scarce be pleased withal.
Julia. That is the least, Lucetta, of my fear.
A thousand oaths, an ocean of his tears,
And instances of infinite love
Warrant me welcome to my Proteus.

Lucetta. All these are servants to deceitful men.
Julia. Base men, that use them to so base effect!
But truer stars did govern Proteus’ birth.76

Lucetta assures Julia that she should not concern herself with the potential embarrassment of her disguise as long as she can be certain Proteus will welcome her arrival in Milan (although she is skeptical that such welcome is likely). Julia is certain she will be received warmly, and so goes on to disguise herself, innerly assured of that response. When her expectations are not met, she is forced to maintain her disguise after reaching her destination and ends up serving in Lance’s place as Proteus’s servingman. Initially wearing only the outer trappings of a page, she is now made to take on Lance’s role as a direct result of Proteus’s failure to reciprocate her love. Her lover turns to her directly after sending Lance away to ask her to take his place precisely because he wants to send a ring to his new love.77

When Julia allows that there is “shame” in “a disguise of love,” then, she could refer simultaneously to her own physical disguise and to Proteus’s insincere love for her, which he disguised as a faithful one. In another, sense, though, recalling her earlier dilemma of true love’s conflict with true service, her response points to how her love has been disguised as a servant’s through her transformation. Part of Julia’s shame, available within this sense of her words, is a fall in status which has been effectively caused by Proteus’s

76 2.7.59-74.
77 4.4.59-64.
coldness towards her – from future wife to menial servant. In replacing Lance with Julia, Proteus has inadvertently drawn an apt parallel between them. Not unlike the shameful treatment Lance receives as a result of his over-investment in the unresponsive Crab, Julia experiences a shame unfitting her social status when her lover refuses to reciprocate as she expects he will. Both Lance and Julia lose social status because of another’s impassivity. It is only after Proteus’s love and commitment have been restored that Julia can marry him and become a part of the “one mutual happiness” that Valentine promises at the end of the play, however colored by inequality their marriage might be expected to be.  

Despite Julia’s subordination to Proteus as his wife, then, her transformation into and out of servitude draws a clear distinction between the love that might exist between servant and master and the love that can be expected between husband and wife. Though Julia will hold a position inferior to her husband, the play sets the form of loving subordination Julia is about to enter into in marriage against the servitude she has been attempting to perform while disguised. The difference is highlighted shortly after Julia and Proteus are reunited. Valentine offers to fight Silvia’s remaining counter-suitor, Turio, but Turio instead relinquishes his claim on her, saying, “I hold him but a fool that will endanger/ His body for a girl that loves him not.” The Duke derides Turio for this sentiment, “The more degenerate and base art thou/ To make such means for her as thou hast done,/ And leave her on such slight conditions.” The Duke suggests that Turio is shameful for his relinquishment not because he is wrong that Silvia does not love him nor because he is being untrue to his own desires in not further pursuing her, but because he “makes such means for her” only to give up that claim too easily. He says that Turio has put

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78 5.4.171.
79 5.4.131-32.
80 5.4.134-36.
effort into establishing ownership of her and, he implies, should therefore be willing to “endanger his body” to keep her, whether or not she is interested in being kept. We might be reminded here of Julia’s exposure of herself to shame in pursuit of Proteus, which according to the Duke’s logic here might be construed as courageous. We might also be reminded of Lance, who put considerable means into his ownership of Crab – he saved him as a puppy, he raised him, he trained him just as one ought to train a dog. Lance’s similar endangerment of his body is portrayed only as confirming his status as a clownish servant, though, because his love of his servant threatens to undermine the social hierarchy that separate master and servant – a threat that is nonetheless habitually made possible by the necessity of a certain form of mutual engagement between trainer and trainee.

It might be tempting to dismiss the applicability of Lance’s degradation with Crab to most masters’ experiences. Perhaps part of Lance’s problem is that he has an affinity with a non-human animal. Erica Fudge has noted the possibility of humans slipping into animality according to theory of the period; and as the comparisons in domestic treatises and common expressions in the period make clear, audiences would likely be well acquainted with thinking about servants in relation to animal counterparts. The domestic worker’s capacity to slip into an animal state might be said to be higher than the capacity of the average gentleman in that sense. It is possible, in other words, that Lance encounters a problem with Crab in part because there are significant sources of similitude between him and the dog that make identification possible. The potential points of likeness exist across Lance and Crab’s hierarchical difference, however, do not necessarily differentiate them from other master-servant pairs. Heads of household and those

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82 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, esp. chap. 3 “Becoming Animal,” 59-83.
who worked for them could sometimes be quite close in age, and masters and servants often did refer to one another with terms of friendship and endearment.\(^3\) Hiding behind the comedy of Lance’s predicament, then, is the serious suggestion that a servant who withholds affective engagement and apparent friendship might expose his master’s desire for both. Unlike in matters of romantic love, where that revelation can indicate an honorable loyalty in a masculine pursuer, the exposure of a masterly longing for friendship with his inferior highlights an affinity between the two that belies the hierarchical difference between them.

As long as mutuality looks like it is coming from the subservient trainee who can acceptably aspire to imitate his master, it can create a rewarding harmony in the household. Once it becomes clear that the master desires mutual affection, though, his dependency on his inferior is exposed and the boundary between them becomes negotiable. Lance, to act as a master to Crab, must certainly cast the stone-like Crab away rather than desiring his engagement. This is, after all, what Proteus does to Lance in 4.4, quickly replacing him with Julia.\(^4\) What remains unsaid in Gouge’s treatise, but is evidenced in Lance’s commitment to Crab, is how difficult that abandonment might be for masters who have invested labor and time in intimate relationships – relationships in which identification and affection coming from both directions, in spite of distinctions in social status, are quite possible.

*Every Man in His Humour* and “Love” in Service

*The Two Gentlemen of Verona* suggests that servants are expected to labor to take on the wills of their masters. It also shows how a similar identification from masters, if servants fail to reciprocate affection, risks exposing the superior’s desire for response and the potential

\(^3\) See Ben-Amos, *Adolescence and Youth*, 174-175.

\(^4\) 4.4.57-60.
similarities between himself and his subject. Ben Jonson’s *Every Man in His Humour* clarifies the difficulties of these conditions in two ways. First, it acknowledges the significance of training in the establishment of masterly authority. Jonson distinguishes between true masters and aspirational ones in part by making fun of novices who will attempt rule without first putting in the effort to gather the necessary knowledge and physical skill. He makes this point in relation to animal subjects in particular, but, I argue, also connects the ability to command animals to the same skill in relation to other humans. Secondly, even after establishing that training subordinates is vital a master’s social position, Jonson depicts the potential dangers of a trainer’s investment in his subject. He suggests that these dangers are present, moreover, even in cases when a trainee *does* respond adequately. In *Every Man in His Humour*, training again brings to the fore how the desire for affective connection can turn master-servant interactions into risky negotiations of power. Jonson’s play also adds nuance to the role of love in master-servant pairs, suggesting that their expressed love can be genuine despite its transactional nature. However, it also shows that to misunderstand the value of that more regulated love is to misunderstand the master’s need for affective distance. This drama, therefore, offers a nuanced view of affection across status difference, allowing for the contractual nature of hierarchical interactions without diminishing the value of their affective dimensions.

While older scholarship on *Every Man in His Humour* engaged with humoral theory and on how it might encourage an audience both to sympathize with and judge its characters’ many follies, Matthew Kendrick has recently situated the drama’s humoralism within the context of the social changes at issue in service and other aspects of stratified English society in the period.85

85 A. Richard Dutton, in “The Significance of Jonson’s Revision of ‘Every Man in His Humour’”, MLA 69, no. 2 (April, 1974): 241-49, argues that Jonson is thinking consciously about making the follies of his characters relatable to his audience in his revisions of *Every Man in His Humour*. He claims that Jonson’s revision aims at a psychological realism present in his later plays. This realism results in more audience identification with the
Kendrick makes clear how the play’s participation in discourses of humoral theory reveal its interest in interrogating and managing social order. Friendship has also been an important context for this play. Mario DiGangi includes it among a set of satires that reflect a destabilization and rethinking of service because of “the social and economic transformations in the institution” during the period. Though DiGangi explores representations of homoerotics within service relations which are beyond the reach of this project, his focus on “uncertainties about the shifting boundaries of power and propriety between master and servant” is relevant to a discussion of all affective bonds. Lorna Hutson, in arguing for the significance of friendship in the play, demonstrates that Jonson disassociates overt expressions of affection from genuine affection. She explains that Lorenzo Jr. and Prospero’s friendship is characterized by a “lack of emotional explicitness” which results from “a displacement of intimacy itself into men’s tacit appreciation of one another’s judgment, discretion, and allusive ingenuity.” In other words, exchanges of wit stand in for the emotional articulation of personal bonds. Hutson argues that this kind of speaking in “plain style” renders “the homoerotics of a literary friendship between men… ideally virile” in the world of the play. Jonson’s attention to the interactions of friends

characters and complicates the condemnation of those characters for their humoral deficiencies. Matthew Kendrick argues in “Humoralism and Poverty in Jonson’s Every Man in His Humour,” South Central Review 30, no. 2 (Summer, 2013): 73-90, 74, 87, that the play responds to social disorder in London by “translating poverty into humoral discourse,” rendering humoral categories also economic. This translation allows poverty to become an economic status within the social order, making the “trickery” associated with the impoverished under humoralism into a form of labor available to be acknowledged by the social order (in his reading of the play, Doctor/Justice Clement’s “acknowledge[ment of] the central importance of Brainworm’s/Musco’s labor to the events of the play” proves this point).


DiGangi, “The homoerotics of mastery,” 65, 66. Specifically, DiGangi studies scatological and other “ass”-related language in several satires he groups with Every Man in His Humour, among others of Jonson’s works (including Every Man Out of His Humour), to “remark how the ass becomes an especially potent signifier for the relation between social power and eroticism in early seventeenth-century comedy.”

Hutson, “Liking Men.”


draws comparative attention to rhetorical exchanges between masters and servants. By looking at servants and friendships together, I argue that *Every Man in His Humour* insists the while equal affection between friends is to be expected, a desire for the same level of shared love in master-servant relations is inappropriate.

In keeping with its implicit affirmation of “plain-style,” *Every Man in His Humour* contains numerous overt expressions of love across hierarchical difference. Since these direct claims to affective ties are numerous, they carry less weight than the more subtle communications between friends. Relationships which rely on verbal expressions of mutual affection are not necessarily empty of attachment, but they primarily communicate a practical exchange – a functional and reciprocal dependency that unties a pair temporarily, to the benefit of both. Expressions of “love” in this case communicate an expectation of instruction-and-response across social categories. Servant-master pairs, though intimate, are depicted through conventional verbal pronouncements as importantly pragmatic in their relation to one another.

For example, Lorenzo Jr. says of the service done him by his father’s servant Musco, “I’ll not forget this thy respective love,” conflating “love” with Musco’s dutiful report about an intercepted letter. He then says to Musco later, “perform this business happily and thou makest a conquest of my love for ever,” depicting “love” as something Musco can earn conditionally from him as one might earn a wage. The performance of one successful task leads to a second instruction. Out of this arrangement, the subordinate Musco receives payment and care from his master, and Lorenzo Jr. receives dutiful service. When Lorenzo Jr. calls his servant’s obedience “love” and promises his own “love” in return, he does so to remind Musco of their mutual obligations, not necessarily to express a genuine affection or to demand the same. With no real

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92 1.2.15.  
93 3.6.1-2.
affection between the two, their “loves” communicate instead a functional reciprocity between a gentleman and his capable subject.

In contrast to the conventional pronouncements of “love” above, the gentleman Thorello’s expressions of affection for his servant, Piso, are emotionally charged. Where Lorenzo Jr. asks for the performance of tasks, Thorello asks for confessions of affective attachment. Jonson depicts Thorello’s mistake of his conditional bond for a more mutually loving and unconditional union as a feature of his jealous humor. His desire is therefore mocked in the drama as indicative of his unregulated self, and must be done away with before the plot can conclude. Thorello and Piso stand out from other pairs in the play beginning with the former’s introduction of the latter. Thorello announces to his brother-in-law Guilliano, “[Piso] is e’en the honestest faithful servant that is this day in Florence—I speak a proud word now—and one that I durst trust my life into his hands, I have so strong opinion of his love, if need were.”94 His unabashed and unsolicited praise of his subordinate draws only a surprised and slightly dismissive reaction from Guilliano, who replies, “God send me never such need! But you said you had somewhat to tell me…” and moves on to another subject.95 Thorello’s eager endorsement is noteworthy for its contrast with his unfailing suspicion of his wife. He himself encourages comparison between his wife and servant when he worries aloud about Bianca’s supposed tendency to stray:

Well, to be plain, if I had but thought the time
Had answered their affections, all the world
Should not persuade me but I were a cuckold.
Marry, I hope they have not got that start.
For opportunity hath balked them yet,
And shall do still, while I have eyes and ears
To attend the imposition of my heart.

95 1.4.16-17.
My presence shall be as an iron bar
‘Twixt the conspiring motions of desire;
Yea, every look or glance mine eyes objects
Shall check occasion, as one doth his slave
When he forgets the limits of prescription.\textsuperscript{96}

Claiming that his glances will check any flirtatious behavior in Bianca “as one doth his slave/
When he forgets the limits of prescription,” Thorello makes clear that, though he assumes his
servant to be loving, he considers his wife as he would a slave likely to disobey.\textsuperscript{97} While he
states that he would never be persuaded Bianca had not cuckolded him, he later entrusts Piso to
do just such persuading. He asks him first to watch Bianca in his absence and report back if any
strange men enter the house, then to follow her, elaborating, “Mark their looks; note if she offer
but to see his band, or any other amorous toy about him… note me all this, sweet Piso; mark
their sighs, and if they do but whisper, break them off. I’ll bear thee out in it… wilt thou be true,
sweet Piso?”\textsuperscript{98} Thorello’s endearments throughout this scene, and his longing request for
reassurance (“wilt thou be true, sweet Piso?”), give an emotional charge to his command that
contrasts with the business-like declarations of other masters in the drama. As he asks for
reassurance, Piso responds with a litany of contrastingly contained statements of obedience: “At
your pleasure, sir… I will, sir… Very well, sir… I will not, sir… Yes, sir…. I warrant you, sir…
(etc.).”\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{96} 1.4.174-185.
\textsuperscript{97} “Slavery” is the period was only ambiguously distinguished from service, sometimes considered justified as a
punishment for bad behavior but also viewed skeptically as a potentially unjust practice (especially when used for
reasons other than just punishment) that took freedom from people who were, according to England’s emerging
national sensibility, rightfully free on English soil. See Michael Guasco, \textit{Slaves and Englishmen: Human Bondage in
the Early Modern Atlantic World}, The Early Modern Americas Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2014). See esp, the Introduction, “The Problem of Slavery in Pre-Plantation America,” 1-10, and chap. 1,
\textsuperscript{98} 3.1.99-101; 4.3.75-77, 81-84.
\textsuperscript{99} 3.1.95, 98, 102, 104, 107, 109.
After this exchange, Thorello adds to the passionate features of the scene by characterizing his intention to share a secret with Piso later in intimate emotional terms. He says, “By heaven… that’s enough… Piso, conceive thus much:/ No ordinary person could have drawn/ So deep a secret from me.” After Thorello leaves the room, the servingman expresses shock, asking,

Whence should this flow of passion, trow, take head? Ha? 
Faith, I’ll dream no longer of this running humour 
For fear I sink. The violence of the stream 
Already hath transported me so far 
That I can feel no ground at all.

The influence Piso fears his master’s unruly passion has already had on his own state (that he has been physically moved toward ill humor by it) could indicate that he is in fact quite affectively invested in his master, but he nonetheless shies away from the pronouncements of closeness Thorello has made. He attributes this intimacy to Thorello’s unregulated passion – to a lack of control – rather than to his “strong opinion of [Piso’s] love.”

As with Lance in *Two Gentlemen*, Thorello’s excessive affective bond is signaled in part by his dwelling on the efforts he put forth to train Piso. But Jonson makes clear that despite the pitfalls of putting too much affective significance into the training process, training itself is a central and laborious feature of establishing and maintaining authority. Also made fun of for his ineptitude at mastery, the character Stephano is similarly dependent on his inferiors (although less passionately so). His reliance on the servant Musco is comically opposed to his ambitions of control, which he expresses through a baseless assumption that he can easily make use of animals. In the very first scene of *Every Man in His Humour*, Stephano has arrived early in the morning to ask if his cousin has a falconry manual he can borrow:

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100 3.1.114, 117-119. 
101 3.1.124-128.
Stephano. Uncle, afore I go in, can you tell me an he have e’er a book of the sciences of hawking and hunting? I would fain borrow it.

Lorenzo Senior. Why, I hope you not a-hawking now, will you?

Stephano. No, wusse, but I’ll practice against next year, I have bought me a hawk and bells and all; I lack nothing but a book to keep it by.

Lorenzo Senior. Oh, most ridiculous!

Stephano. Nay, look you now, you are angry, uncle. Why, you know an a man have not skill in hawking and hunting nowadays, I’ll not give a rush for him. He is for no gentleman’s company and, by God’s will, I scorn it, ay, so I do, to be a consort for every humdrum.... What do you talk on? A gentleman must show himself like a gentleman. Uncle, I pray you, be not angry; I know what I have to do, I trow, I am no novice.102

On the contrary, Stephano shows himself to be a perfect novice. Lorenzo Senior goes on to deride his nephew, “What, have you not means enough to waste… but you must/ Go cast away your money on a buzzard,/ And know not how to keep it when you have done?”103 Although training and negotiating the terms of communication and obedience would doubtless be necessary in most contexts of domestic subordination, the need for a specialized knowledge and labor is especially pronounced in the instruction of a hawk. Avowedly in response to inept masters like Stephano, an increasing number of printed instructional manuals on falconry (of the type Stephano requests here) circulated during the period. In Latham’s Falconry, for example, Simon Latham explains the purpose of his treatise,

102 1.1.28-41, 42-45.
103 1.1.49, 50-52.
Stephano sees his purchase of a hawk as a logical step towards asserting his social status as a gentleman, but he fails to understand the labor that must go into the establishment of his rule over such a creature.

Hawking proves a suitable introduction to his general lack of effort in mastery as the play moves forward. In a later scene, the issue is raised again with respect to horsemanship. In this case, Stephano’s admission of a lack of experience (and presumably also knowledge) in the realm of animal mastery leads into a comical affective and physical reliance on a human servant.

In 1.2, Musco helps to dress the young lord. As he clothes Stephano, Musco comforts Stephano’s anger over having failed to intercept a messenger carrying an incriminating letter to his father – a problem Stephano cannot now fix because he cannot ride a horse.

*Stephano.* …Oh, that I had a horse! By God’s id, I’d fetch him back again, with heave and ho.
*Musco.* Why, you may have my master’s bay gelding an you will.
*Stephano.* But I have no boots, that’s the spite on it.
*Musco.* Then it’s no boot to follow him. Let him go and hang, sir.
*Stephano.* Ay, by my troth. Musco, I pray thee, help to truss me a little. Nothing angers me but I have waited such a while for him, all unlaced and untrussed yonder, and now to see he is gone the other way.
*Stephano.* I will, I will. Oh, how it vexes me!
*Musco.* Tut, never vex yourself with the thoughts of such a base fellow as he…. I mar’l, sir, you wear such ill-favoured coarse stockings, having so good a leg as you have.
*Stephano.* … but I’ll have a pair of silk ere it be long. I think my leg would show well in a silk hose.
*Musco.* Ay, afore God would it, rarely well.
*Stephano.* In sadness, I think it would. I have a reasonable good leg.
*Musco.* You have an excellent good leg, sir. I pray you, pardon me, I have a little haste, sir.105

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105 1.2.24-39, 45-46, 48-54.
Much like when he conflated the ownership of a hawk with the ability to train and command one, when Stephano says he cannot use the horse because he “[has] no boots,” he inserts the possession of riding boots for the ability to make use of a horse. If he does not own riding boots, purchasing them would hardly make up for what the audience can only assume, based on his general inexperience, is his complete lack of experience in the art of riding. Since Musco mentions that the horse is his master’s (Lorenzo Senior’s), Stephano also literally states that he cannot take the position of Musco’s master (on his horse) while he admits to his inability.

As he does this, Stephano relies on Musco for even such an intimate task as dressing. That would be common in the period, but directly after mourning that he cannot ride the horse, his neediness begins to take on a new comical dimension. Stephano asks that Musco “help to truss” him. “Truss” can mean “to tie the ‘points’ of laces which fasten the hose to the doublet,” but it can also mean “To charge or burden with a bundle or pack, or a number of such; to load” as one would a pack-horse or another animal of burden. The word makes available an image of horse and keeper in the pair as Stephano wiggles impatiently and Musco soothes and trusses him. The servant’s comments about his young master’s legs increase his effective position as keeper in the scene. Musco might even have his hands on his superior’s leg as he comforts him, adjusts his clothes, and takes note of how “excellent good” that leg is. Stephano’s confession that he cannot direct a horse, lacking the proper boots, then, ushers in a scene in which the helpless gentleman’s dependence becomes like that of a horse cared for by a superior.

These two demonstrate how the commonplace intimacy of a master and his servant can slip into dependence on the part of the master, especially when a young gentleman lacks experience in instructing and commanding. Thorello’s reliance cannot be explained by a similar

lack of experience. In fact, reading two early editions of the play alongside one another, we can see how Thorello’s excessive love is in part founded on his memory of his past efforts with Piso. After his earlier profession of faith, Thorello asks for confirmation of his servingman’s love:

“thou mayst deceive me, but I think thou lov’st me, Piso.”\(^{107}\) Piso replies conditionally to Thorello’s passive-aggressive demand by saying only “Sir, if a servant’s zeal and humble duty may be termed love, you are possessed of it.”\(^ {108}\) His apparent conviction that he needs to clarify what he means by “love” reveals the limits of the play’s comfort with love and service by acknowledging the possibility that master and servant might have different definitions in mind.

The 1616 edition of *Every Man in His Humour* offers another related way that Thorello can communicate his overinvestment in his servant, though. In a revision of the same introduction scene, Thorello (Kitely, in this version), again introduces Piso (in this case, Cash Thomas) to his brother-in-law (here called Down-right):

KIT. Doe you see that fellow, brother DOWNE-RIGHT?
DOW. I, what of him?
KIT. He is a iewell, brother. I tooke him of a child, vp, at my dore, And christned him, gaue him mine owne name, THOMAS,
Since bred him at the Hospital; where prouing A toward impe, I call’d him home, and taught him So much, as I haue made him my Cashier,
And giu’n him, who had none, a surname, CASH:
And find him, in his place so full of faith,
That, I durst trust my life into his hands.\(^ {109}\)

Thorello’s explanation of his affection for Piso as a servant in this edition is strikingly similar to Lance’s expression of his commitment to Crab in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*. Like Crab, who was “one who [Lance] brought up of a puppy, one that [he] saved from drowning” and who

\(^{107}\) 3.1.58-59.
\(^{108}\) 3.1.60-61.
he “taught…even as one would say precisely, ‘Thus I would teach a dog,’” Piso was taken in by Thorello when he was a poor child at his door. Thorello “taught him/So much” and so well that he boasts Piso is now his cashier and, “so full of faith” that Thorello claims to trust him with his life. Both Lance’s and Thorello’s commitments to their subordinates depend in part upon a claim to have taken that subordinate from a disadvantaged youthful position and taught him properly. Lance protests that he is owed genteel behavior and perfect imitation from Crab because he has taught him. Thorello, in mentioning that Piso initially “prou[ed]/A toward impe,” and has now become the perfect servant, emphasizes the role his own instruction has played in making Piso the “iewell” he is today.

Both editions of Every Man in His Humour similarly represent Thorello’s intimate connection to Piso. One version uses “love” to describe the relationship which, in the 1616 version, is parsed out to include raising, teaching, and then valuing as a product of labor and as an item of present value (a “jewel” crafted by years of careful instruction). It is not unusual that Thorello educated his servant; but by dwelling on that process, he makes his own investment more visible than the other masters around him have done. His anxious desire for an overt rhetorical expression of love acknowledges that he also desires an affective commitment from his inferior that the other masters either do not care much about or simply assume is there. In the earlier exchanges of love between Lorenzo Jr. and his servant, love was something Lorenzo Jr. assigned to his servant’s actions – effectively telling Musco that his action counted as love – or that he promised in return for a favor. Thorello gives Piso more power by acknowledging that he wants an expression of affective connection, setting himself up for a problem should Piso fail to respond.
Not only Piso, but the resolution of the drama itself, makes sure to clarify the terms of Thorello’s engagement with his inferior. In the final scenes, Lorenzo Jr. and Prospero prey on Thorello’s jealousy by convincing him that Bianca has cuckolded him in the laborer Cob’s house with the aid of his wife Tib. Thorello confronts Bianca,

_Thorello. [To Bianca]_ Out on thee, more than strumpet’s impudency! Stealst thou thus to thy haunts? And have I taken thy bawd and thee and thy companion, [Pointing to Lorenzo Sr.] This hoary-headed lecher, this old goat. Close at your villainy?...

_Bianca._ Out, I defy thee, ay, dissembling wretch!

_Thorello. [Standing by Piso]_ Defy me, strumpet? Ask thy pander here, Can he deny it? Or that wicked elder?¹¹⁰

Despite what initially appears to be a contrast between Thorello’s trust for Piso and his distrust of his wife, he is quick to abandon his affinity with his servant once he believes his suspicions about Bianca are confirmed, calling Piso her “pander.”¹¹¹ Many broken relationships are mended in the play’s conclusion when Doctor Clement steps in to cool tempers and restore order. While Thorello’s paranoia is resolved, his love for Piso is never restored. This makes sense, considering Piso’s characterization of Thorello’s passionate interactions as a feature of his “running humour.” If this master is to be less jealous and better controlled in the future, as he ultimately suggests he will be, presumably his interactions with Piso will never again reach such emotional heights.¹¹²

Despite its prohibition of Thorello’s desire for affective attachment from his servant, _Every Man in His Humour_ does not foreclose the possibility of genuine affection and even love between household heads and their subjects. Doctor Clement expresses great admiration for Musco as he dispenses justice. In response to the servant’s relation of his many tricks, he says to

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¹¹⁰ 5.2.44-48, 54-56.
¹¹¹ 5.2.73.
¹¹² 5.3.428-430.
him, “I admire thee, I honour thee, and if thy master or any man here be angry with thee, I shall suspect his wit while I know him for it.” As DiGangi notes, the Doctor even describes Musco as his “mistress” in one folio.\(^\text{113}\) So, while affection, even with an implication of eroticism, is certainly expressed across potential trainer-trainee boundaries in this play, it remains the case that Thorello’s explicit dwelling on his effortful training of Piso signals too much investment in the securing of mutually loving bonds.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have begun an exploration of mutuality in subordinate-superior relationships by considering how conduct literature and drama differently depict the means by which such reciprocity is established. Gouge places emphasis on the affective efforts of servants, asking them to shape their wills and judgements around their masters’. Though this affective dimension of service is certainly present in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and *Every Man in His Humour*, these plays also indicate that the desire for mutuality, in the form of feelings of friendship and requests for love, can emerge from the master as well as from his subordinate, and that such affection on the master’s part can be problematic. Gouge’s treatise leaves out mention of all the hours, all the patience, and all the affective labor heads of household might also be expected to contribute towards the harmonizing of domestic service. In wedding masterly descriptions of training to incidents of a master’s inappropriate or excessive desire, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and *Every Man in His Humour* give us some sense of why that omission might occur. In a society where masters and servants are often of similar age, and in relationships which are temporary and full of conflict, processes of training highlight the fact that power is

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negotiable even when social status would seem to suggest otherwise. To acknowledge, through training, the necessity of negotiation is simultaneously to acknowledge the fragility of a social order that is constructed and collaborative, reliant on the willing service of others, rather than stable and inherent.
CHAPTER 2
Petruchio the Horse-Courser: The Appearance of Mutuality in *The Taming of the Shrew*

In the previous chapter, I explored dramatic moments in which the mention of training highlighted the master’s role in establishing mutuality and thus signaled excessive desire for affective connection. In this chapter, I examine cases in which that laborious but caring masterly training does not occur. Like in the drama of the previous chapter, the establishment of rule between superior and subordinate in Shakespeare’s *The Taming of the Shrew* is mostly kept out of public view. Unlike in those examples, however, the central master in this drama, Petruchio, resists ascribing to the gentler practices of instructional manuals, making use of subordinate performances of affection to claim mutuality where there is none. Trainers like Petruchio seek only the *appearance* of a reciprocal bond where gentle society ostensibly values its actual presence. This focus on appearance problematizes that society’s reliance on trainee performances in asserting benevolent rule. We can better understand the social status of Petruchio, and the meaning of Katharina’s ultimate show of submission, within this broader context.

Modern scholarship of Shakespeare’s *The Taming of the Shrew* has long debated what we can or should make of Katharina and Petruchio’s marriage. Lynda E. Boose observed in 1991 that scholars had so frequently sought to read the play against the patriarchal dominance it appears to celebrate, “reimagining an ending that will at once liberate Kate from meaning what she says and simultaneously reconstruct the social space into a vision of so-called ‘mutuality,’” that “such revisionism [had] become a kind of orthodoxy.” While scholars have since fruitfully

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1 Lynda E. Boose, “Scolding Brides and Bridling Scolds: Taming the Woman’s Unruly Member,” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 179-213; 180; 181.
explored contextualizations of the play that resist such revisionism by revealing how domination and violence underpin the events of the drama or by offering Katharina only qualified, contextualized resistance to a still dominating Petruchio, several have also read Petruchio as a trainer providing Katharina with a desirable performative ability. In doing so, scholars have carved out an exceptional equitable and loving space for the couple within an otherwise tyrannical, patriarchal world. Remaining skeptical of the possibility of affection and parity between Petruchio and his bride, I examine how references to horsemanship in The Taming suggest that this tamer is not the gentle and considerate instructor that other contexts might suggest he is. I articulate the case for Petruchio’s cruelty by reading him as a particular type of deceptive figure in the era: a horse-courser. Although critics have considered references to horsemanship and other forms of animal-training in the play before, none have fully explored

2 On violence underpinning the drama, see Frances Dolan, “Household Chastisements: Gender, Authority, and ‘Domestic Violence,’” in Renaissance Culture and the Everyday, Patricia Fumerton and Simon Hunt, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999): 204-225, in which Dolan explores authority, rather than only gender, as the source of violence in households, drawing attention to Katharina’s position as aggressor and enactor of violence. Dolan expands on these ideas in Frances Dolan, Marriage and Violence: The Early Modern Legacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), complicating the notion that wives (including Katharina) are only either “victims” or “aggressors,” and pushing against the idea that the primary question of the play concerns Katharina’s status as either one or the other. See also on the implicit violence of the play, Emily Detmer, “Civilizing Subordination: Domestic Violence and The Taming of the Shrew,” Shakespeare Quarterly 48, no. 3 (Autumn, 1997): 273-294, 293. Detmer argues that Katharina’s submission is forced by non-physical violence, but violence nonetheless. She argues that, though Petruchio does not physically harm Katharina, “the result” of his adjusted violent methods “is not less domination but less unseemly domination.” For readings that strongly qualify their claims for Katharina’s resistance, see Holly A. Crocker, “Affective Resistance: Performing Passivity and Playing A-Part in The Taming of the Shrew,” Shakespeare Quarterly 54, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 142-159; Wayne A. Rebhorn, “Petruchio’s ‘Rope Tricks’: The Taming of the Shrew and the Renaissance Discourse of Rhetoric,” Modern Philology 92, no. 3 (Feb 1995): 294-327; and Juliet Dusinberre, “The Taming of the Shrew: Women, Acting, and Power,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 26, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 67-84.

3 Helga Ramsey-Kurz, “Rising Above the Bait: Kate’s Transformation from Bear to Falcon,” English Studies 88, no. 3 (June 2007): 262-281. Ramsey-Kurz reads references to falconry alongside the play’s meta-theatrical context to suggest that Petruchio acts as a falconer towards Katharina and therefore (she argues) works to preserve a form of freedom for her within her captivity. Elizabeth Hutcheon, “From Shrew to Subject: Petruchio’s Humanist Education of Katherine in The Taming of the Shrew” Comparative Drama 45, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 315-337, Hutcheon argues that Petruchio models humanist training with Katharina, affording her a non-gendered (she argues) discursive power. Corinne S. Abate, “Neither a Tamer Nor a Shrew Be: A Defense of Petruchio and Katherine,” in Privacy, Domesticity, and Women in Early Modern England ed. Corinne S. Abate (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003): 31-44; 31, 38, argues that Petruchio models for Katharina how public performance can be viewed as "inessential,” training Katharina to abandon her regard for public appearances so that at the end of the play she “possesses agency and can do or say whatever she wants to an outside audience because the consequences of such behavior are meaningless.”
how codes of gentleness and cruelty within the context of animal training itself can inform our reading of Petruchio’s techniques for securing obedience.4

The mastery of animals, and particularly the art of horsemanship, is a helpful context for *The Taming of the Shrew* in part because animal training has a particular salience for questions of reciprocity between superior and subordinate in the period. Laurie Shannon has persuasively argued that the pre-Descartesian English understood man’s rule over non-human creatures in a theological and natural scientific context whereby interactions across species were understood as indicative of a history begun in Genesis. Within this framework “living creatures… were held to be related within a shared regime of order or laws that governed them commonly.”5 It was therefore possible for people to view human rule over animals as “tyranny,” which she describes as “the most abiding concern across sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century political thought.”6 As Shannon mentions briefly, horsemanship treatises are among the many early modern English texts that express concerns about human domination over animals.7 In aiming to avoid claims of unjust rule, these manuals seek to encourage methods of reciprocal governance as much for the benefit of the social reputation of trainers as for the benefit of their horses. These treatises, not unlike instructional literature on household management, humanist pedagogy, and also on other

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7 Ibid, 34. Shannon quotes from Michael Baret’s 1618 *An Hipponomie or The Vineyard of Horsemanship*, which blames man’s original fall in the Garden for all creatures’ present “rebellion” against their rule.
forms of animal training at the time, encourage readers to avoid unnecessary violence by suggesting that excessively cruel masters are unsuccessful, encouraging only rebellion, resistance, and sometimes ill-health in their subjects.8

I examine horsemanship in this chapter rather than falconry, hunting, or some other related animal sport for several reasons. Treatises on animal sport were immensely popular in early modern England, and continued to be reprinted and rewritten and copied well into the eighteenth century. However, the content of these publications varies somewhat by subject: hunting manuals often include indications that hunting hounds were trained, but few (if any) English texts remain now that detail the process of domestication; hawking and horsemanship treatises, in contrast, tend to include detailed descriptions of both the training process and the medical care required to keep the creature in question. Because of their immense detail, the remaining archive of hawking and horsemanship manuals provide more insight into early modern thinking about the investments, intimacies, and violences of taming processes than do other instructional texts about animals.

Setting themselves apart from falconry manuals,9 horsemanship treatises are persistently concerned with cultivating a particular image of the horseman as an intelligent gentleman who

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9 Hawking treatises similarly represent their methods of taming and training as gentle and not unnecessarily violent, cautioning that the use of excessive violence will never successfully tame a hawk. They make fewer comparisons to past violent methods or to divergent methods of other respected authors and practitioners than do horsemanship treatises, though. This is likely because, unlike horsemanship, falconry was a sport relegated almost exclusively to those of high social standing. While certain sports involving horsemanship, such as manège, were similarly class-restricted, other more basic aspects of horse riding and taming were widely practiced and common across social spheres.
was both knowledgeable and civil in his methods. While authors discussing falconry assume high status based on their expertise, they do so less frequently, suggesting they are less concerned with securing the validity of the sport and the techniques they describe. To some extent, we can only guess why this might be the case. It seems likely that it has to do in part with the social exclusivity of hawking compared to horsemanship. Whereas many households without noble status would have owned a horse, falconry (like hunting) is more strictly relegated to the upper echelons of the population. Accordingly, hawking and hunting manuals seem to assume their art and its methods will be relegated primarily to the nobility, even as they market their manuals to a wider audience. This is part of the reason that Ben Jonson’s most foolishly pretentious and flighty character in *Every Man in His Humour*, Stephano, is mocked for fancying himself a falconer. Authors of horsemanship treatises, in contrast, work actively to demonstrate why their own methods should not be collapsed into those of plentiful and less gentlemanly types of trainer by actively arguing for their advice over the suggestions of other horsemen and by anticipating disapproval among their readers. As is apparent in this presentation of their subject, the mere fact of their knowledge about horse-training does not in and of itself disassociate them from the violence, cruelty, and deceit they attempt to relegate to more common men.

**Gentlemen and Horsemen**

As was the case with household manuals explored in the previous chapter, the sheer number of horsemanship treatises published in English in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century suggests that the mutuality promised between horse and man in these treatises was perhaps easier to imagine than it was to achieve. John Astley markets his well-known 1584

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publication, *The Art of Riding*, as most horsemanship experts did – by promising to show riders how to successfully and peacefully tame their horses, avoiding a cycle of increasing violence (on the part of the tamer) and bad behavior (on the part of the horse) which led to frustrated men that “thereby deserve the name of Butchers rather than of Riders.”¹¹ Some physical discipline of the horse is always allowed in these texts, but much of that violence – such as striking the horse with a rod – is only permitted when more gentle methods do not succeed. *A discourse of horsmanship*, a 1593 horse manual by Gervase Markham (one the most recognizable names in horsemanship in the era, and a prolific author of treatises on household governance), delivers a common caution that although too much “lenity” achieves nothing with a horse, “cruelty… is the hie way not onely to marre him, but also to kill him.”¹²

Resisting that ineffective brutality, the language used in horsemanship treatises even sometimes describes the ideal interactions between horse and trainer as exchanges of mutual love. Markham writes in a 1607 treatise, *Cavelarice*, for example, that “as the keepers greatest labour is but to procure loue from the Horse, so the onelie thing that is pleasant to the Horse, is loue from the keeper; insomuch that there must be a sincere and incorporated friendship betwixt them or else they cannot delight or profit each other.”¹³ Here, Markham assumes love to be a matter of reciprocity between horse and keeper: the latter procures love from his horse in part by showing the love he hopes to win. Markham appropriately terms that parity “friendship.”


This shared affective engagement allows for horse and man to gain “delight” and “profit” from one another, a goal Markham assumes his readers will desire. He posits, then, a view of training as a process that can be pleasurable for both parties even while it is masterful. Markham’s use of the language of love, friendship, and delight is not unusual in the genre. As Karen Raber points out, many contemporaneous experts in the field were likewise interested in depicting training as a reciprocally participatory relationship rather than one of domination.¹⁴

Aside from using a language of love, horsemanship experts describe their own methods favorably in part by placing them alongside traditional practices or the advice of other horsemen. Within those comparisons, authors frequently label their counterparts “tyrans,” depicting themselves by contrast as simultaneously more knowledgeable and gentle.¹⁵ Despite relatively frequent explicit statements of differentiation, though, it is not always evident which disciplinary methods will be labeled cruel and which deemed necessary means to good ends. For example, though Markham often protests against the painful techniques of other horsemen in his multiple manuals, he also complains about “some horsemen who haue been of more temperate & milde dispositions” who incorrectly see the “tyranie of the man in tormenting a beaste that is created for his vse, seruice and familiaritie” in his own preferred methods.¹⁶ These apparently excessively mild masters see tyranny where Markham sees only practicality and wisdom.¹⁷

Defending against claims of tyranny with one hand and pointing accusatorially towards their fellows with the other, these public figures fought to establish their position as gentle leaders despite the ever present possibility that an outside viewer might see something more sinister. The

¹⁴ Raber, Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture, 86.
¹⁵ Markham, Cavelarice, “The second Booke,” 58.
¹⁷ Ibid., 25-30. Though Markham does describe a gentler method of teaching a horse to amble (“by hand” rather than while riding), he goes on to say that this method is ineffiectual, requires “the losse of your time,” and, even if it works initially, will not work for long with any horse.
stakes of the debate about what is and is not cruel, then, are high for experts concerned with their social perception, whether or not they are truly invested in the well-being of their horses.

As part of the balancing act of this positioning, treatise writers sometimes call on the “horse-courser” as a particularly bad example relative to which they can elevate their own prescriptions. The horse-courser is a trainer and seller of horses who fools men into buying bad horses. He makes sales by creating the appearance of willingness and gentleness in his charges where those features do not in fact exist. Thinking they see an obedient horse with a loving keeper, unsuspecting victims place a high value on his horses, only to realize upon purchasing one that those appearances were an illusion. The horse-courser’s faults as a practitioner, then, are distinct from those of the impatient or frustrated novice who turns to violence out of weakness or lack of knowledge. Though similarly derided for his cruelty and violence, the horse-courser’s execution of that cruelty is more strategic than the ineffectually brutal (and ignorant) trainer. The horse-courser is pragmatic, using improper methods to make a profit from an otherwise worthless, or at least less valuable, horse.

So, for example, in Christopher Clifford’s 1585 horsemanship treatise *The schoole of horsemanship* – written as a dialogue between himself and the Kingdom (England), whose questions he answers – Clifford chastises “the Kingdom” for valuing self-profit over the well-being of its creatures. When his interlocutor asks if it might be acceptable to “raise my horses roome a foote higher than the grounde behind, to make my horses shew the better,” Clifford responds with reference to the horse-courser, writing, “It were good for an horse courser to make his horses shew higher than they be indeed, but for [the] ease of [the] horse, it is stark naught, or [*sic*] if your horse chance at any time to treade behind his plancks he shal most cruelly strike his
leg.” Here, the evil-minded swindler is imagined to seek only his own profit, a profit that often occurs to the detriment of his trainees. We can also see a common sub-motivation of this notorious figure via the raised floor which makes the horse look taller than he is: to make money off his horse, the horse-courser must trick other men into believing his creature to be a different sort of horse than he actually is.

This common villain might have been familiar to some of Shakespeare’s audience through printed manuals, but they could also have encountered him in books of witticisms and characters, where he frequently makes an appearance. In George Gascoigne’s 1576 satire, The Steele Glas, the speaker lists among the corruptions revealed in his glass “horsecorsers” who trick their friends with disguised jades – an ill-conditioned or otherwise worthless horse. In Nicholas Breton’s 1607 Wits Private Wealth Stored, Breton includes among the recorded witticisms, “If you see an offenders punishment, pray for amendment: but if a horse-courser be hanged it is happie for Trauailers.” While the punishment of most criminals calls for self-reflection, this expression suggests, the horse-courser’s death can be celebrated by “trauaillers” (the phrase seems to refer to honest laborers) who might lose their wealth buying a badly-trained horse.

or ill horse from this lazy trickster.\textsuperscript{21} In the above and other character books, the horse-courser is listed among other common pranksters who practice their arts at fairs and in the cities. Thus, for example, Ben Jonson’s Scrivener promises the audience a horse-courser (Knockem) among other stereotypical figures of the fair such as “a leer Drunkard,” “a fine oily Pig-woman with her Tapster,” and “a consort of Roarers,” in the Induction of \textit{Bartholomew Fair}.\textsuperscript{22} Through such representations (if not through lived experience), the audience for \textit{The Taming of the Shrew} would have been familiar with the horse-courser as a typical trickster trainer. They would have been familiar as well with his low social status and with his ability to fool others into believing both that he is gentle and that his horse is well-kept.

\textit{The Taming of the Shrew}

Taking discourses of appropriate and inappropriate techniques from horsemanship treatises as a context for Shakespeare’s play, I argue that Katharina’s performance in the final act of \textit{The Taming of the Shrew} is ironic not only in that she says what she might not believe, but in that her speech reminds the audience that Petruchio is not the gentlemanly master he will receive credit (and profit) for being. Through reference to the horse-courser, Shakespeare suggests that Petruchio’s “politic” rule over Katharina is both deceptive to his fellows and cruel to his subject.\textsuperscript{23} He simultaneously demonstrates how excessive dominance can be disguised as right rule in human and in human-animal relations. This drama, then, plays out an early modern

English concern about how a brutal tyrant might pass for a gentle ruler in the context of both horse- and wife-taming, illuminating the difficulty of distinguishing one type of governor from the other in the various subsidiary hierarchical relationships of human society. Such a difficulty was not taken lightly in an era when, especially in the realm of prescriptive literature, various forms of masterly violence were no longer overtly endorsed.24

Reading Petruchio alongside the horse-courser not only makes sense of the abundance of horsemanship references in *The Taming of the Shrew*, but also allows interpretation of the final scene in a manner that does not rely on knowing with any certainty what is or is not going on in the performing Katharina’s head. As much as we might want to know whether Katharina considers herself better off with Petruchio than she was with her father, as much as we might want to know whether she and her husband have reached an agreement about an in-joke that they now perform for his peers, we do not have adequate information about her thought process or her private interactions with Petruchio to know if such willing concessions or in-jokes exist. Dealing, then, with a lack of full access to the tamed subject, I turn instead to the tamer and his methods – and to how a period audience might read them. Horsemanship, from this view, becomes one context whereby Shakespeare cues his audience to be skeptical of Petruchio’s gentlemanly status and to laugh at the men of high status who are hood-winked by him.

Scholars have taken up the presence of horse-training as a corollary to wife-taming in *The Taming* before, and they have sometimes done so towards oppositional argumentative ends. Lynda Boose draws on horse-taming (particularly bridling) to clarify how Petruchio’s ostensibly

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24 Detmer, “Civilizing Subordination,” 273-274. Of wife-beating, Detmer writes, “it is clear that prescriptive literature ceased to authorize the specific violence of wife-beating. The vigor of public discourse on wife-beating exemplifies a culture at work reformulating permissible and impermissible means for husbands to maintain control over the politics of the family.” A similar trend towards deemphasizing overt violence, I argue, is visible in other (and overlapping) realms of male rule, including humanist pedagogy and horsemanship treatises.
gentler taming techniques draw on and share a history with physically punishing practices. She notes that his methods – relying, as the bridling of women did, on the effects of public shaming – desire and achieve a similar silencing to that accomplished by more overtly violent disciplining strategies. Before Boose, Joan Hartwig had read horse-taming references metaphorically as a signal that Petruchio’s interactions with his wife are not about patriarchal domination but mutual benefit. She considers horsemanship a reference to reciprocity because “When the rider is able to keep his mount under his control, both the horse and rider are figures of nobility.” This interpretation of man and horse leads her to conclude that “The complementary relationship that accrues honor to both is what Petruchio and Kate have achieved at the end of the play.” Her reading, then, views horse-training as a realm of animal sport which particularly emphasizes the shared advantages of caring rule.

Depending on the context of their reference, and depending on how literally those references are applied in a human relational context, these two scholars forward horse-taming as an analogue for both cruelty and reciprocity among master and subject. Whereas Boose draws attention to the real application of horse-taming practices to early modern women, a practice that overtly demonstrates the violence of patriarchal domination, Hartwig reads horse-taming metaphors as indicative of the willing participation of husband and wife in their marriage. Hartwig, in other words, sees horsemanship as a means by which to affirm the very mutuality that Boose resists as simply a form of “benevolent patriarchy.” Such contradiction is possible in part because Hartwig’s metaphorical reading leaves unexamined an assumption that an early modern English audience would instinctively read horse-training as a gentle and equitable

26 Ibid.
process – a “complementary” one which “accrues honor to both” parties. While scholarship has considered whether Petruchio’s methods for taming Katharina would be considered kind or severe, domineering or sensitive, relative to a variety of training and taming contexts, they have not considered the similar debate about what constituted those categories in the context of horsemanship at the same time. Images of keeper and creature might well serve as allusions to the communicative closeness between tamer and tamed, but they can also serve as references to brutal “instructional” practices and to the manipulation of the appearance of mutuality and obedience.

Several readings of Katharina and Petruchio’s marriage as an advantageous and even loving one rely on a comparison between Petruchio and the other men in the play. Katharina’s father, most notably, treats his daughter as something of which he must rid himself. Scholars have described Baptista as a “self-serving, adversarial” man who is on a “quest to sell both of his daughters to the highest bidder.” They have remarked that Baptista quickly establishes Katharina as something undesirable which needs to be sold despite its lack of appeal. In noting Baptista’s attitude toward marrying off Katharina – making her, “a stale… among these mates” – critics have considered the disadvantage of Katharina’s situation even before Petruchio arrives in Padua. Less considered, though, has been the influence this stage-setting has on how we might read the man who eventually comes to take Katharina off Baptista’s hands. If Katharina as a “stale” fails to attract any suitors, what kind of man might we anticipate entering the marketplace to purchase her nonetheless? Baptista’s desperate desire to get rid of Katharina, and every

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28 Abate, “Neither a Tamer Nor a Shrew Be,” 31, 32; Detmer, “Civilizing Subordination,” 287, observes, similarly, that “Her father, traditionally the person who would protect her, has established that he wished to be rid of her; she feels as if she has been put up for sale.”
29 1.1.58.
potential husband’s lack of interest, sets the stage for a rather horse-courser-minded suitor. And Petruchio, upon his first appearance, meets that expectation.

A characteristic complaint about horse-coursers, as I have mentioned above, is their focus on personal profit above all else. This motivation leads the horse-courser to occupy a notably unscrupulous position in his marketplace. In Thomas Dekker’s *Lanthorne and candle-light* (the sequel to his 1608 *The bellman of London*), a bellman, having listed “horse-coursing” among the “Fiue lumpes of Leape-frog” whereby men profit from other men’s misfortune,\(^30\) describes the “horse-courser” to his readers in more depth:

> whereas in buying all other commodities, men striue to haue the best, how great so euer the price be, onely the Horse-courser is of a baser minde, for the woorst hors-flesh (so it be cheape) does best goe downe with him. He cares for nothing but a fayre out-side, and a hansome shape (like those that hyre whores, though there be a hundred diseases within: he (as the other) ventures vpon them all.\(^31\)

Here we see how the horse-courser is imagined not only to have unusual values when purchasing commodities, but how those values might be aligned with someone who hires diseased whores. The alignment of a man who purchases horse flesh and one who purchases whore’s flesh in this passage is a link the audience could also make with the difficult Katharina’s complaint that her father makes her into a “stale,” or a particularly derided form of prostitute.\(^32\)

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When Petruchio first presents himself as a suitor for Katharina he is blunt about what he seeks to gain from the marriage.

_Petruchio._ Signor Hortensio, twixt such friends as we
Few words suffice. And therefore, if thou know
One rich enough to be Petruchio’s wife—
As wealth is burden of my wooing dance—
Be she as foul as was Florentius’s love,
As old as Sibyl, and as curst and shrewd
As Socrates’ Xanthippe, or a worse,
She moves me not, or not removes, at least,
Affection’s edge in me, were she as rough
As are the swelling Adriatic seas.
I come to wive it wealthily in Padua;
If wealthily, then happily in Padua.³³

As Hortensio will later confirm when he indicates that Katharina is “young and beauteous,” the woman in question is neither “foul” in a physical sense nor is she “old.”³⁴ But Petruchio is unconcerned with whether she is either. He straight-forwardly admits that he seeks wealth above everything. He does not care if Katharina is “foul” and “old,” “curst” and “shrewd,” as long as she is “rich enough” for him to “wive wealthily.” He makes this proclamation without directly calling himself a horse-courser, flowering his speech instead with classical allusions – including one to a classical “shrew.”³⁵ Much in the way that Dekker’s horse-courser prioritizes his own ability to profit over the actual value of the horse he seeks, though, Petruchio explains his own motivation as monetary profit.

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³³ 1.2.60-71.
³⁴ 1.2.80. Bevington also notes Hortensio’s confirmation of Katharina’s beauty in Bevington, _The Taming_, footnote for 1.2.55, p. 63. He posits that when Hortensio calls Katharina “ill-favored” (“Petruchio, shall I then come roundly to thee/And wish thee to a shrewd, ill-favored wife?”) he might mean “ill-natured,” because of his earlier assertion that Katharina is “beauteous” and therefore not “ill-favored” in appearance.
³⁵ Ibid., footnote for 1.2.66, p. 64. “Xanthippe: the philosopher’s notoriously shrewish wife.”
Undercutting Petruchio’s flowery allusions, his servingman Grumio makes the horse-courser connection more explicit. He interjects before Hortensio can respond to Petruchio’s lines above,

Nay, look you, sir, he tells you flatly what his mind is. Why, give him gold enough and marry him to a puppet or an aglet-baby, or an old trot with ne’er a tooth in her head, though she have as many diseases as two-and-fifty horses. Why, nothing comes amiss, so money comes withal.36

In one sense Grumio only doubles his lord’s declaration here, but in another he contextualizes and comments on it by bringing horsemanship overtly into the conversation. “Old trot,” a slang term for an old woman, also brings with it an association with trotting horses. Common knowledge in early modern England was that the quality of a horse’s teeth and mouth were accurate indicators of age.37 Finally, Grumio closes by asserting quite literally that Petruchio’s future wife can “have as many diseases as two-and-fifty horses… so money comes withal.” In bringing these elements to Petruchio’s characterization of himself, Grumio winkingly aligns his master’s position with that of a notorious trickster, pointing out that Petruchio’s lack of regard

36 1.2.72-76.
37 Many horsemanship treatises advise men to look in the mouths of horses, and often at their teeth, to determine a horse’s age. Thomas Blundeville, *The fower chiefyst offices belonging to horsemanshipe…* (London: 1566) *Early English Books Online*, accessed May 18, 2016, http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rfid=xri:eebo:citation:99840344, doc image 19, p. 15. In a section on “howe to know [horses’] ages aswell by their teth as other wise,” Blundeville explains that “moste men vse to judge a Horses age by his teeth, taking y’ to be the most certaine way of knowledge.” He notes that “after the Horse beginneth to enter into olde age, his temples will waxe hollowe, and the heare of browes hoare and whyte, his teeth also wilbe greater and thicker in substaunce, fowler in colour, and one standing further out, or higher then another, which they do not so longe as the horse is yong.” See also, Gervase Markham, *Markhams maister-peece, or What doth a horse-man lacke…* (London: 1610) *Early English Books Online*, accessed May 18, 2016, http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rfid=xri:eebo:citation:23877159, p. 477-478. Markham says that you may determine the age of a horse “by his teeth” as well as “but his hoofes, or by his taile, or by the barres in the roofe of his mouth.” He goes on to elaborate that “his teeth will bee exceeding long, very yellow, blacke, and foule” and “at thirteen yeares, his tushes will be wore close to his chappe, if he bee a much ridden horse, otherwise they will bee blake, and foule, and long like the fanges of a boar.” Likewise, in Markham, *Cavelarice*, “The eight Booke,” 11, Markham explains how a horse-courser will seek to prevent men from looking in his horses’ mouths because any “man that hath not other skill shall knowe his [the horse’s] age by his mouth, for the countenance of the horse, or the holownes of his eies, or gray haires about the Temples of the head are no true signes.”
fits nicely within the realm of horse-coursing. His superior, he reasserts, cares nothing for
Katharina’s true value as long as he can somehow turn possessing her into an advantage.

When Petruchio arrives for his marriage, the horse upon which he is mounted points
again to his connection to that despised swindler. His horse’s diseases, as David Bevington has
noted, are almost all available in Markham’s 1593 *How to chuse, ride, traine, and diet, both
Hunting-horses and running Horses*,³⁸ and the horse also has some embarrassingly overdone and
shabby clothes of its own, including a “woman’s crupper of velour, which hath two letters for her
name fairly set down in studs, and here and there pierced with packthread.”³⁹ It is unlikely that
any gentleman would own a horse as diseased as Petruchio’s, but it would be unremarkable for a
horse-courser to have such a creature. That Petruchio has dressed it overtly in female trappings
and thus has marked it for Katharina only increases the alliance between his willingness to marry
her and his willingness to buy an apparently worthless horse. As one of his companions for the
wedding, the horse serves to humiliate Katharina. It simultaneously associates Petruchio with the
sort of horse only a horse-courser would try to pretend was a gentlemanly mode of transportation
and Katharina with such a horse. Not just the horse’s dressings, but Petruchio’s own clothing
suggests a complete lack of shame.⁴⁰ Biondello describes,

Why, Petruchio is coming in a new hat and an old jerkin; a pair of
old breeches thrice turned; a pair of boots that have been candle-
cases, one buckled, another laced; an old rusty sword ta’en out of
the town armory, with a broken hilt, and chapeless; with two
broken points…⁴¹

This, too makes sense for Petruchio because, aside from the distracting clothing of his horse, the
clothing of a horse-courser was a part of his stereotypical character. Much as the horse-courser is

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³⁸ Ibid., footnote for 3.2.45, p. 93.
³⁹ 3.2.53-55.
⁴⁰ 3.2.57-61.
⁴¹ 3.2.41-45.
said to dress his worst horses in the best trappings in an effort to disguise their illnesses, and his best in the worst (perhaps to prevent its purchase at the expense of his lesser horses), his own style often disguises his person or adapts it to suit advantageous occasions.

In *Micrologia*, one of several early seventeenth century books published on “persons, trades, and places, offered to the city and country,” an author identified as R.M. describes the typical horse-courser,\(^{42}\)

\[
\text{He keeps his best horses in the worst clothes, and his worst lades bee richest on weeke-dayes.... Hee is a man not much affected with Pride, but makes commonly his prauncing serue as a Prologue to his profit He trots, ambles, gallops, rebounds and treads the Measures in all varietie of Paces: hee circumuents Smithfield with curuets, and leaps madly through thicke and thinne, seeming in his full careere, ready to outstrip Pegasus. He keeps at all Faires in Country habits, and the change of his clothes is as frequent as the Moones.}\(^ {43}\)
\]

Here, the horse-courser behaves like the apparently lively horses he hopes to sell. He is boisterous, “prauncing” and altering his pace dramatically as he makes his way through Smithfield. Such behavior evinces R.M.’s assertion that the man is “not much affected with Pride” because he is unconcerned with how his behavior, his “country habits,” or the frequent changes in his pace and clothes will affect his appearance. His changeability and capacity to shape himself to resemble his creaturely companions might also remind us of Petruchio’s imitation of Katharina. Petruchio tames her in part by mimicking her behavior, as a servant

\(^{42}\) Samuel Halkett and John Laing, *A Dictionary of Anonymous and Pseudonymous Publications in the English Language 1475-1640*, John Horden, ed., et al., rev. 3rd ed. (Harlow and London: Longman Group Limited, 1980), 126. In the most recent edition, Halkett and Laing suggest that R.M. may be the author’s initials reversed, referring to someone with the last name “Rhodes,” since *Micrologia* was apparently also called “Rodes Characters” in a 1628 folio. They conclude, however that “the book cannot be reasonably attributed to any known author of this name.”

suggests at 4.1.149 when she says that Petruchio “kills her in her own humour,” and as Petruchio reiterates when he explains that his method is “a way to kill a wife with kindness.” In the context of horse-coursing, we can see Petruchio’s imitation as deceptive and unembarrassed, performed as part of a strategy to tame an unruly subject and to fool his fellows into dismissing his marriage so that he can convince them to bet against its hierarchical functionality in the last scene. As with everything the horse-courser does, Petruchio is concerned primarily with “his profit,” not his pride.

Petruchio’s outfit confirms not only his lack of shame and his willingness to portray himself in whatever light necessary to make his marriage profitable, but also an inconsistency reminiscent of the disguisable horse-courser. Petruchio’s outfit when he arrives for his wedding is dazzlingly incoherent, as is the fact that he apparently has an embarrassment of a horse. He wears miss-matched shoes and too many layers of pants; his servant wears miss-matched socks and, it seems, everything but a feather in his cap. The inconsistent Petruchio and his outlandishly arrayed horse and servant are not unlike the horse-courser in Micrologia who changes his clothing “as frequent as the Moones.” In fact, Petruchio loudly notes the easy changeability of his clothes when others protest at his ridiculous attire, saying,

ha’ done with words.  
To me she’s married, not unto my clothes.  
Could I repair what she will wear in me  
As I can change these poor accoutrements,  
‘Twere well for Kate and better for myself. 

Because dramas about shrew-taming are conventional in the period, the audience is likely well-prepared for Petruchio to succeed in taming Katharina. His claim that his new wife will “wear” down anything significant in him, considering the success guaranteed to him by the genre, is not

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44 4.1.177.  
45 3.2.106-110.
likely one his audience would take seriously. In fact, dressed as he is, with his horse-courser horse waiting for him outside, this lie about how concerned he is that Katharina will wear him down (he never expresses such a concern when they are out of the company of the other citizens of Padua) is even made darkly comical by the fact that the audience can assume Petruchio has some scheme up his sleeve to make this marriage a guaranteed gain.

Throughout *The Taming of the Shrew*, horse-taming and horses make appearances in the language of the characters and occasionally in the content of the action. Despite this, Petruchio most overtly describes his establishment of rule over Katharina through hawking metaphors. I argue that Shakespeare means us to understand such contextualizing on Petruchio’s part as deliberate. Falconry is an appealing reference point for Petruchio because the methods he will apply to tame Katharina are broadly accepted in the context of early modern English falconry in a way that they are not in the context of horse training. In presenting himself as a falconer rather than the tamer of a particularly wild horse Petruchio uses the kind of comparative logic that many English horsemen used in their treatises to justify their strategies. That is, he finds a comparative context according to which his actions will appear civil and uses that context to his advantage. He describes his treatment of Katharina,

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Thus have I politicly begun my reign,
And ’tis my hope to end successfully.
My falcon now is sharp and passing empty,
And till she stoop she must not be full-gorged,
For then she never looks upon her lure.
Another way I have to man my haggard,
That is, to watch her, as we watch these kites
That bate and beat and will not be obedient.
She ate no meat today, nor none shall eat.
Last night she slept not, nor tonight she shall not.
… amid this hurly I intend
That all is done in reverent care of her.
And in conclusion she shall watch all night,
And if she chance to nod I’ll rail and brawl,
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And with the clamor keep her still awake…
And thus I’ll curb her mad and headstrong humor.\textsuperscript{46}

It is undoubtedly the case that Petruchio is referencing the initial taming of a hawk in much of this speech. He refers to his wife as a “falcon” and a “haggard;” and his techniques – making sure that she is not “full-gorged” (or, starving until she will do as he pleases), and watching her “as we watch these kites” – all point the listener to falconry. But, as Joan Hartwig has observed, his explanation nonetheless ends by referencing horsemanship when he slips and says, “thus I’ll curb her mad and headstrong humor.”\textsuperscript{47}

His slip is significant because Petruchio’s methods read very differently in this alternative context. While the starving and watching that Petruchio describes are assumed to be acceptable in hawking treatises, they are sometimes suggested but notably contested, or endorsed only with qualification, in horsemanship treatises.\textsuperscript{48} Despite Petruchio’s obvious application of a hawking metaphor to his training of his wife, then, his actual techniques do not limit the context in which one can read them, and according to which one can evaluate their acceptability, to falconry. Allusions to hawking in \textit{The Taming of the Shrew} make possible the argument that Petruchio’s strategies are appropriate to Katharina’s wild nature. Helga Ramsey-Kurz, for example, considers how critics often “ignore that the manning methods applied in falconry were devised in the interest of the bird, to reduce the stress of captivity, protect the raptor from self-injury, and, most importantly, to preserve its predatory instincts.”\textsuperscript{49} She argues that falconry and meta-references to theatricality in the play together allow us to read Katharina’s submission as a

\textsuperscript{46} 4.1.157-166, 172-176, 178.
\textsuperscript{47} Hartwig, “Horses and Women,” 287.
\textsuperscript{48} For a quick overview of hawking practices and excerpts from two representative treatises see Dolan, “Analogues to Shrew Taming,” 304-312. Hawking Treatises treat both the practice of “watching” (keeping up through the night with light and noise) and starving (while feeding the hawk small stones) as commonplace and not ungentle methods for taming (“making”) a wild hawk.
\textsuperscript{49} Ramsey-Kurz, “Rising Above the Bait,” 278.
shared performance on the part of herself and her new husband. Falconry is especially important for this reading because it “makes conceivable” for the early modern English “a completely voluntary dependency built on the dependent’s sense that a return to freedom is always possible.”

Putting aside any skepticism we might bring to Ramsey-Kurz’s assertion of the sincerity of the mutual benefit and maintained freedom implicit in hawk-manning methods, there are limits to reading the goals and concerns of Petruchio’s methods so fully according to his own terms. Such an allowance affords Petruchio and his practices all the kindness and reciprocity he himself would ascribe to them. It takes him at his word both that his reign is “politically” begun and that all the torments he puts Katharina through are done “in reverent care of her.” Those tortures – keeping her awake all night, starving her – are not exclusive to the hawk. Both “watching” – keeping an animal up all night, often with noise – and starvation appear in horsemanship treatises. In Cavelarice, for instance, Markham writes that it is acceptable to watch a horse as one would a hawk, by light or, if necessary, by “extraordinary noise,” but only in the extraordinary case in which the trainer “knowes not well” how to keep his horse from risking hurt to his rider and himself by “plunging,” or diving downwards. Moreover, Markham only

50 Ibid., 279.
51 Dolan, “Analogues to Shrew Taming,” 306-308. Dolan expresses such skepticism eloquently in relation to Margaret Loftus Ranald’s similar argument in Shakespeare and His Social Context (New York: AMS P, 1987) for the reciprocity between falconer and falcon as a model for reciprocity between Petruchio and his wife. Dolan writes, “This positive evaluation of falconry as a model for marriage downplays the significant disparities between the two parties: one is human, endowed with reason and free will, the other an animal; one controls access to food, sleep, and flight, the other can choose only to resist or submit to circumstances she cannot control. The bond that results—reinforced as it is with leather restraints—is hardly between equals.”
52 In Leah Marcus, “The Editor as Tamer: A Shrew and The Shrew,” chap. 4 in Unediting the Renaissance: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Milton (London and New York: Routledge, 1996): 101-131, 120, Marcus notes Petruchio’s metaphor might even demonstrate some lack of knowledge about falconry (although she also notes that “the issue could be argued either way”), since “Petruchio seems to advocate watching a ‘bating’ falcon – that is, one who flaps its wings violently and risks injury during its confinement” while “The best authorities of the period held that such birds, if unhooded, should not be approached at all.”
53 Markham, Cavelarice, “The second booke,” 94-95.
gives this advice immediately following the story of a man who allowed his horse to dive in resistance all night until she could do so no longer and died from the exertion.⁵⁴ In doing so, Markham makes watching a horse acceptable by opposing it to aggravating a horse to death. Similarly, starvation as a method of training only emerges in Markham’s nervously defended description of how it might be possible to make a horse do something extraordinary, such as fetching a glove – something Markham approves of in an effort to defend William Bankes, the owner of the famous horse Morocco, from accusations of unnaturalness, trickery, and even witchcraft.⁵⁵ The methods Petruchio ascribes to falconry, then, only belong to falconry insomuch as they are more whole-heartedly endorsed in that context. Petruchio’s slip into horsemanship at the conclusion of his speech therefore repositions his opening line (“thus have I politicly begun my reign”) into the ironic boast of a horseman overly confident in his use of questionable techniques rather than the celebratory exclamation of a gentle ruler.

Perhaps the most vicious scene of Petruchio’s taming occurs offstage, on the road from Padua to his home. The location of this violence, too, makes considerable sense within the context of horse-coursing. Grumio returns home ahead of his master and mistress and describes the chaos of the offstage scene,

But hadst thou not crossed me, thou shouldest have heard how her horse fell and she under her horse; thou should have heard in how miry a place, how she was bemoiled, how he left her with the horse upon her, how he beat me because her horse stumbled, how she waded through the dirt to pluck him off me, how he swore, how she prayed that never prayed before, how I cried, how the horses ran away, how her bridle was burst, how I lost my crupper, with

⁵⁴ Ibid., 94.
many things of worthy memory, which now shall die in oblivion and thou return unexperienced to thy grave.\textsuperscript{56}

Grumio’s description suggests injury to almost all parties. The horses are frightened away, Grumio is beaten, and Katharina is intimidated. Though Katharina is not necessarily physically harmed in this interaction, Boose has pointed out that Grumio inadvertently or intentionally suggests the horse’s bridle might be Katharina’s by leaving out the possessive clarifier “horse’s” before “bridle.”\textsuperscript{57} Linguistically placing the bridle on Katharina, Grumio also once again associates – even substitutes – Katharina for Petruchio’s struggling horse. This physical scene is only given to us second-hand through Grumio’s testimony. The distance the audience experiences from the action of Petruchio’s taming in these moments before the wedding party arrives home (Grumio assures Curtis that the house will soon discover first-hand the truth of Petruchio’s behavior) mimics the distance that is necessarily experienced by the citizens of Padua.\textsuperscript{58} Petruchio’s distance from them both in his house and on the road keeps the most significant parts of his training strategy far from those in Padua who will eventually see – and pay for – its performative results.

In another book of characters from the early seventeenth century, Sir Thomas Overbury complains about the traveling “arrant horse-courser”: “The Trade of Spurre-making had decayed long since, but for this vngodly tyre-man. He is curst all ouer the foure ancient High-wayes of England; none but the blind men that sel switches i’th Road are beholding to him.”\textsuperscript{59} Here,
Overbury suggests that the horse-courser is cursed all along the highways and only appreciated by those vendors on the road who sell him the outdated and cruel tools he uses—so roughly that he must replace them often. His continued success despite his identifiability on the highway relies on the fact that his notoriety will not reach the fairs where he performs his tricks. Overbury locates those who know the horse-courser as himself in the in-between space of the road, outside the sight of the city. In this same space, Petruchio beats his servant, scares away his horse, and intimidates his wife with his potential for violence. To the absent gentlemen who will watch Katharina perform her obedience later in Padua, this raging episode cannot be a factor. To the audience who hears of his behavior from Grumio, however, it certainly can be.

In another part of the description of “A cunning Horse-Courser” in Micrologia, R.M. likewise locates the horse-courser’s worst treachery on the road, emphasizing his travel back and forth along the highway as central to his trade.

Of his bastard sort the Sire and Damme hee keepes an exact Catalogue, and freely offers to let you haue the triall of him any morning to Hye-gate; and ten to one hee will spend so much time to ride with you himselfe, where haply his Copers bee before to carry him backe vpon some new bargaine; but ere you get to London you are catcht in his fet-locks, and he fastens on you a Iade that dare not clim.⁶⁰

The horse-courser succeeds in R.M.’s example because he fools his target into buying a jade and is conveniently out of sight, whisked off by his fellow dealers (“Copers”), before the trick is revealed. Returning to Grumio’s teasing statement to Curtis that Grumio’s story of the incident on the road is “of worthy memory,” we can see how the context of the horse-courser indeed makes this off-stage information quite important. If Curtis risks that he will “return unexperienced” to his grave without Grumio’s story, that threat also applies to the similarly

⁶⁰ R.M., Micrologia, doc image 22.
unknowledgeable men of Padua who will be tricked by Petruchio without informative contexts like Grumio’s. If the gentlemen of Padua heard about Petruchio’s outlandish violence on the road, in other words, they might not bet against his ability to make Katharina obey in the final scene. Petruchio’s status as a brief visitor in Padua, then, suggests that Katharina’s later performance of her tameness might be a trick played on the gentlemen for whom it is performed. It also suggests that her apparent complicity in that performance is simply a feature of the illusion.

It is appropriate that Petruchio is never overtly labeled as a horse-courser, for a significant part of the horse-courser’s success hinges on the difficulty of labeling him as such. Another feature of his ambiguity is the contested nature of horse-taming methods more generally. Which methods are excessive and which are necessary is inconsistent across treatises and even across situations described within individual manuals. An author’s endorsement of a given practice usually relies on its comparison to an avowedly crueler technique that is overtly being avoided. When Petruchio describes his taming of Katharina in 4.1, he challenges the audience “He that knows better how to tame a shrew,/ Now let him speak,” assuming that the audience will think only of something worse and accept his actions on those grounds.61 He renders his own practices acceptable primarily by suggesting that they could be much worse. Despite the insistence of horsemanship treatise authors, it is not always clear what makes a horseman a “horse-courser” or a respectable horseman in their own terms. That the violence of the horse-courser was, despite the ostensive efforts of these experts, difficult to parse from the

61 4.1.179-180. Boose, “Scolding Brides,” 200, points out that “curb” in Petruchio’s speech could be a direct reference to the method of bridling headstrong women – a violent method Petruchio names but overtly excludes from his own taming of Katharina. I think this reading can co-exist with my own in that Petruchio’s reference to bridling women argues for his own gentleness comparatively, much as does his alignment of himself with a falconer rather than with a horseman.
“necessary” violence of the gentle trainer is even partially reflected in the term “horse-courser” itself. This ambiguity is worth exploring for what it demonstrates about how Petruchio riskily walks the line between credibility and suspicion with his new wife.

The term “horse-courser” in early modern English can be used to describe more than one horse-related profession, and not all associations with those professions are bad. Sometimes, “horse-courser” can refer to an expert and honest horse breeder or tamer. Several usage examples from the *Oxford English Dictionary* demonstrate this, despite the fact that the given definition speaks more to the term’s association with a deceitful, greedy, or cruel horseman (“A jobbing dealer in horses”).

For example, in a corrected 1572 version of Richard Huloet’s Latin dictionary, *Abcedarium Anglico Latinum* (originally published in 1552), “horsecorser” is recorded to mean simply “[he] which letteth horses to hyre.” Similarly, the *OED* records that William Thomas’s 1567 *Italian Grammar and Dictionary* describes “an horsecorser” simply as “the rider that tameth wilde horses.”

Although “horse-courser” often appears in a derogatory sense in books of witticisms or character descriptions, even Anthony Copley’s 1595 book of the same provides an example of a horse-courser who is an authority on training particularly wild horses rather than a deceitful trickster. In the section “of gentlemen,” Copley writes,

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A Gentleman put out his mule to a Horse-courser to break and bid him make it a widow-mule: The Horse-courser marvelling at such a tearme, demanded his meaning therein. Mary (sayd the Gentleman) a widow hath these three good properties: she is fat, she feeds well, and she goes well, such a one would I haue you make my mule.\(^65\)

The horse-courser here provides a straight-forward service for the gentleman, his profession beside the point of the witticism. While demonstrating a commonplace association between horses and women, Copley’s brief story demonstrates how a “horse-courser” can also be interpreted simply as an expert trainer, to whom one might turn if training a horse (or mule, in this case) proves difficult. In these more benign instances, a horse-courser might earn his title from the wildness of the horse he tames rather than from his own methods. So, for example, Abraham Ortelius explains in his 1608 *Theatrum orbis terrarium* that the docile horses of Iceland are “such as amble by nature without the teaching and breaking of any horse courser,” again envisioning the horse-courser only as a useful resource for training especially difficult creatures.\(^66\)

As much as horse-coursers could be difficult to distinguish from skilled trainers, though, Petruchio’s characteristics align specifically with those negative traits that are often highlighted to illuminate the difference between the two. For Markham, “horse-courser” refers not to the


profession of selling horses in general, but to a form of greedy, money-focused horse merchant who does not care for the actual quality of his horse. In Markham’s account, the horse-courser’s love of profit is wedded to both his desire to make the horse appear differently than it is and, relatedly, to the cruelty of the methods that make such a transformation possible.

when the Horse courser hath bought his Horse according to his fancy, and learnt as much as he can… touching his inward disposition… presently hee begins to plot stratagems in his head, how hee may cloake and couer those falts, and make the Horse seeme in euerie Mans judgment _mearely contrary to that to which he is naturally adicted_, as thus; If he find the Horse that he hath bought to be a dull, heavy, sad lade, and that a Man can with no reasonable compulsion make him goe faster than an Asse; then the Horsecorser will not misse, but duly euery Morning, Noone, and Night, with big long rypling slaues bestow at least an houre and more in beating his Horse, both vpon the body, sides, and Buttocks, till he make his flesh so extreame tender and sore, that euem the very shake and lifting vp of a sticke, is enough to make the Horse mad and desperate… he will not at any time passe by the Horse but he shall haue a stroak… til he haue made the Horse so fearefull and desperate, that the very bitternesse of a mans voyce shall bee able to make him leape against the Walles.67

This is just one instance of the horse-courser’s violence, always performed in the interest of making the horse appear in men’s judgement “_mearely_ contrary to that to which he is naturally inclined.” “Mearely” is worth parsing here for how it can connect the tricks of the horse-courser to Petruchio’s performance with Katharina. The _OED_ reports “merely” to mean “Absolutely, entirely; quite, altogether” in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century English. However, the word might also retain some sense of its older meaning, “Magnificently, excellently, splendidly, wonderfully,” since this sense of the word appears in the period in a few manuscript copies of texts composed in old English.68 This second meaning articulates an element of marvel that

67 Markham, _Cavelarice_, “the eight Booke,” 5-6. Italics added.
might be attached to the horse-courser’s transformative achievement with his worthless horse. He uses violence to create an unexpected alteration in the horse from its natural character into “mearely” – and wonderfully – its opposite. The *OED* explains a “wonder” broadly as that which “causes astonishment” and the experience of wonder as “to be struck with surprise or astonishment.” In making his horse *completely* its opposite, the horse-courser also astonishes buyers with his ability to disguise the real quality of his horse, making it impossible for the ill-informed to avoid being caught by surprise when the horse’s true quality is eventually revealed.

The horse-courser’s ability to achieve this type of wonder with a horse does not distinguish him from other horse trainers. In fact, it blurs the boundary between the trickster and the honestly artful horseman, whose accomplishments might similarly provoke awe. The word “wonder” appears in horse treatises not just in the undertones of the horse-courser’s deception, but also as a feeling inspired by the skilled performances of their counterparts. In these cases, as would also be the case when a horse-courser’s deception created astonishment, wonder can emerge from the ignorance of the observer who witnesses the horseman’s performance. Thus, in his 1609 horsemanship treatise, *The perfection of horse-manship*, Nicholas Morgan asserts that a good horseman,

> by often making much of him [the horse] when he doth well, taking leasure, &giuing breath… shal vndoubtedly… make him [the horse] do swiftly, loftily, and iustly, & with such grace as shall bring to the vnlearned beholder wonder, and to the skillful admirable delight.

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70 Ibid.; s.v., “wonder” *v*. 1., accessed June 2, 2016, http://oed.com; “*infr*. To feel or be affected with wonder; to be struck with surprise or astonishment, to marvel. Also *occas.* to express wonder in speech.”

The only beholder who experiences wonder in Morgan’s description is “the vnlearned beholder,” whose wonder contrasts to the “admirable delight” of the “skillful” onlooker. Morgan asserts that “simpathy of obedience & reciprocal loue… in all motions” between man and horse “may seeme more then wonderfull” to some, but only to those who do not know that “wonders are no wonders in such wonderfull creatures” as horses.\(^2\) For Morgan, then, as for other thinkers of the period, “wonder is the daughter of ignorance.”\(^3\)

Even as it might be dismissed as a result of ignorance, or perhaps because the ignorance it indicated meant that observers would struggle to make sense of rider and subject’s achievements, wonder could expose horsemen to skepticism among their viewers (or, in the case of treatises, among their readers). This is why Markham worries that “Some will wonder, and happilie out of that wonder mightly condemne [him]” when he introduces methods “different from all those showed by former authors.”\(^4\) Markham’s efforts to differentiate himself and other gentle horsemen from the horse-courser are necessary – as they were in other authors’ treatises – because the distinction is not self-evident. Markham worries that wonder might aggravate the problem, leading to condemnation from baffled witnesses who do not recognize his techniques.

\(^2\) Morgan, The perfection of horse-manship, 15.
\(^3\) Morgan, The perfection of horse-manship, 15. On wonder’s correlation with ignorance, see Lorraine Datson and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: Zone Books, 1998), 14, 110. Datson and Park explore how “wonder” marks the boundary between ignorance and knowledge, along with other boundaries, in late medieval and early modern Europe. In particular, they assert that “After the mid-fifteenth century natural philosophers started to focus on wonder as something that emerged out of ‘considering effects in ignorance of their natural causes.’” This particular conceptualization of wonder applies here, rather than the conceptualization explored in Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 19, in which wonder is necessarily a precursor to conceptualization and, relatedly, a justification for conquest. Greenblatt’s “wonder,” however, is related despite its distinct context and differing cultural uses in that it “provokes… conceptualization” in part because “philosophy (as Socrates had already formulated it) begins in wonder,” or, that is: wonder emerges out of ignorance and in so doing calls for further investigation, thus giving cause for philosophy.

\(^4\) Markham, Cavelarice, “The second Booke,” 141. Markham is describing how to train a horse to run in ring patterns and maintains that a pattern with fewer sharp turns is better for a horse than the customary pattern described in other treatises.
Markham’s efforts to legitimize a particularly marvelous horseman – William Bankes – and his famous horse Morocco also demonstrates how wonder could expose horsemen to suspicion about their honesty, their methods, and their motives. Bankes and his horse were popular in England from at least 1590, around when Shakespeare likely composed *The Taming of the Shrew*, until after 1610. In their shows, Morocco, at the direction of Bankes, performed many feats that seemed to suggest his ability to reason and problem-solve, including identifying people in the audience, fetching purses and counting money, and apparently distinguishing honest women from whores. However, the wonders Morocco and Bankes performed were not always received as affirmation of Bankes’ skill in proper horse-training. As Markham explains, some horsemen said that Morocco’s tasks “more properly do be long to Dogges, Apes, Munkies, and Baboones.” This incongruity lead to suspicion that Bankes and his methods were unnatural or assisted by the devil.

Against accusations of witchcraft, Markham writes that an expert who properly understands his horse’s abilities and who uses the proper techniques can achieve Bankes’s wonders with any horse. Any good horseman, he insists, can “[make] the Worlde wonder at that which is neyther wonderfull, nor scarce artificiall.” In detailing this point, however, Markham demonstrates how difficult such apparent wonders are to achieve with a horse without also

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77 Markham, *Cavelarice*, “the eight Booke,” 27.


79 Markham, *Cavelarice*, “The eight Booke,” 35.
applying inordinate and cruel techniques, thus affirming some of the condemnation that wonder might inspire. Most markedly, teaching a horse to perform the task of fetching – normally performed by a hawk or a hound – requires starving the horse. Markham advises,

you shal neuer at any time giue him [the horse] any food, but when he doth something to deserue food, that knowing alwaies the cause why hee hath foode, hee may with more diligence regard and obserue you in whatsoeuer you do.  

And he says that you can teach your horse to fetch your glove only when you haue brought him to an empty body & an hungry appetite, so that euen for his belly sake he wil dubble his diligence, for it is a general rule that neither flying Hawke, nor setting Spanyel must bee kept more empty then a horse in this case, then you may begin to teach him to fetch your gloue.

There is very little in the extreme measures described here to distinguish Markham’s recommended course from the harsh practices of a horse-courser. A horse, he advises, must be starved more decisively than either hawk or spaniel to achieve Bankes’s trick. Only through the starvation of an animal whose diet is central to its care can the feat of having a horse fetch be made theoretically possible.

That Markham himself knows this method is extreme is indicated by his placement of this section in the treatise directly below his section deriding horse-coursers. By placing the starvation method only after vivid descriptions of the trickster’s cruelty, he must hope to make his instructions for achieving apparent wonders with a horse at least gentler than the techniques

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80 Ibid., 30.
81 Ibid.
82 Fudge, “A Reasonable Animal?” 134. Quoting from the same section of the treatise, but for the method by which a horse can be taught to count, Fudge also notes “the cruelty to the horse,” arguing that the violence is allowed because of “the crucial difference between them [horse and man], by which the right of violence is given to the trainer.” She marks the cruelty to the horse from a modern perspective, then, suggesting it is allowable from an early modern English perspective. I am arguing, however, that an early modern English audience would not necessarily assume the trainer was correct in wielding such a “right of violence.” Rather, such violence was allowed conditionally and could have a negative impact on the authority and respectability of a trainer who wielded it in the wrong context or to achieve the wrong results.
the horse-courser uses to achieve a similarly unexpected transformation. However, Markham’s comparative efforts in this case also unavoidably draw attention to their similarities, both using violence to train the horse to act entirely outside of men’s expectations of its nature. The author of Micrologia perhaps jokes about the resemblance between these contested figures and their wondrous work when he adds to his description of “A Cunning horse-courser” that “Hee reads Markhams Method, and Banks is his old acquaintance.” The marvelous tricks performed by all of these parties, moreover, bear a certain resemblance to those performed by Petruchio and Katharina at the end of The Taming of the Shrew.

**Wondrously False Mutuality**

If Shakespeare’s drama challenges Petruchio’s position as a gentle tamer while it simultaneously sets the stage for his performance of having successfully tamed Katharina, we ought to read Katharina’s final speech for what it indicates about Petruchio and his training practices as much as for what it indicates about the sincerity or irony of her submission. Some critics have argued that the new bride’s performance at the play’s conclusion sets her apart from someone simply subjected to and tamed by another. This argument satisfies because Katharina is allowed such a lengthy speech, because her speech demonstrates great rhetorical skill, and

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83 R.M., Micrologia, doc image 21.
84 Holly A. Crocker, “Affective Resistance,” esp. 156; Hutcheon, “From Shrew to Subject,” 333, argues that “Katherine’s rhetorical tour de force [which] emphasizes her connection to the young men produced by the humanist educational system,” signals that she has become “a fully realized, nongendered subject,” rather than a subjected woman; Valerie Wayne, “Refashioning the Shrew,” Shakespeare Studies (January 1985): 159-187, 172, argues, “if we attend only to the words Kate uses in her last speech, we will find here an argument for female subservience. If we consider her dramatic situation as she gives the speech and Petruchio’s reaction to it, we will see a woman dominating a scene by giving advice to other women.” Dusinberre, “Women, Acting, and Power,” also notes the powerful position Katharina has on stage, from a theatrical perspective, during her final speech. Abate, “Neither a Tamer Nor a Shrew Be,” 38, goes so far as to read the speech “not merely as ironic… but more importantly as an empowering final act that showcases the deft gaming abilities she has acquired through Petruchio’s positive compliments.”
because she has *nearly* the last word of the play – she thus can be read as performing an in-joke or subtle resistance. Others, however, have maintained that Katharina’s speech has been more significantly coerced or forced. My own reading allows little room for Katharina’s willing participation, considering the methods by which it was achieved. However, it does illuminate ways in which her speech comments on the conditions by which her submission has been achieved in Petruchio’s “taming school.”

Katharina’s recommendation of obedience calls attention to the rhetorical tricks whereby masters like Petruchio depict themselves as gentle:

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Fie, fie! Unknit that threatening, unkind brow,
And dart not scornful glances from those eyes
To wound thy lord, thy king, thy governor.
… [who] for thy maintenance commits his body
To painful labor both by sea and land,
To watch the night in storms, the day in cold,
Whilst thou liest warm at home, secure and safe;
And craves no other tribute at thy hands
But love, fair looks, and true obedience –
…My mind hath been as big as one of yours,
My heart as great, my reason haply more,
To bandy word for word and frown for frown;
But now I see our lances are but straws,
Our strength as weak, our weakness past compare,
That seeming to be most which we indeed least are.
Then vail your stomachs, for it is no boot,
And place your hands below your husband’s foot,
In token of which duty, if he please,
My hand is ready; may it do him ease.
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Several words in Katharina’s speech refer back to the animal-training methods alluded to throughout the drama. She describes how Petruchio “watches” storms and cold days, but that verb “watch” also recalls how he “watched” the stormy Katharina as one would watch a hawk or horse. She also calls on the Widow and Bianca to submit to their husbands by advising them to “vail” their “stomachs.” Frances Dolan glosses this phrase to mean “lower your pride,” where “vail” means “To lower (a weapon, banner, etc.); to cause or allow to descend or sink,” “To lower in sign of submission or respect,” or “To lower or cast down (the eyes)” or bow one’s head or hang one’s tail, as a dog might. In this meaning of the phrase “stomach” stands in for courage or pride; Katharina asks the other women to submit or “lower” their pride and courage to their husbands, submitting themselves to their husbands’ rule.

Another definition of “vail,” however, is “To be of use or service; to avail or profit,” which can be used with a subject as in Katharina’s construction – “vail your stomachs” – to mean, essentially, “make use of your stomachs” or “allow your stomachs to be useful to you.” This alternate definition allows Katharina to advise the women to submit at the same time that she tells them to allow for conditions in which their stomachs might avail them. Thus, Katharina’s wording gestures back to Petruchio’s starving of her. Before she submitted to Petruchio in their marriage, after all, what vailed her stomach with no food for it to digest? As Valerie Wayne observes, Katharina also inserts the word “keeper” into the terms used to describe her husband, again reasserting the connection between her relationship with her husband and that of a horse or hawk and its human keeper. Wayne correctly points out that Katharina’s language

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88 The Oxford Dictionary Online, 2nd ed., s.v. “vail” v.2, 1a, 1b, and 1c. (also “to bend, bow down (the head, etc.); to hang (the tail)”), accessed May 5, 2016, http://oed.com. The other definitions of v.2 similarly suggest submission and/or surrender.
90 Wayne, “Refashioning the Shrew,” 173.
here exceeds period expectations for a wife’s inferiority and dependence. While Wayne interprets Katharina’s exaggeration of her dependence as an effort on her part to “prove herself [Petruchio’s] equal in parodic performance,”91 I interpret it as a commentary directed at the other gentlemen in the room, meant to benefit the real audience watching the play. Katharina’s performance makes clear that the “obedience” Petruchio has demanded and apparently achieved is one based on excessive dependence and thus force, not the willing submission for which he will nonetheless receive credit. Her language, in all its excesses, reminds the audience how her new husband’s techniques have been generated out of animal-training practices throughout the play. And the acceptability of the methods reasserted here – watching and starving – among gentle horsemen was, as we have seen, uncertain at best.

The trick Katharina has just performed before she gives this speech similarly leaves open both falconry- and horsemanship-based readings. In “fetching” the other women, Katharina might be imagined to be capturing prey and returning it to her husband. She might also be imagined to be fetching the women as the Intelligent Horse Morocco could fetch a purse, or as Markham insists any horse can fetch a glove. Of these two options, the hawking metaphor, though it offers a gentlemanly way to read Petruchio’s methods, fails to account for the reaction of the audience on stage. Hawks were considered wild, yet were tamed nonetheless by gentlemen in a sport indicative of gentlemanly skill, but hardly a wonder to behold. After Petruchio and Katharina exit the stage for the last time, however, the final lines of the drama go to the gentlemen Hortensio and Lucentio. Lucentio makes a final evaluation of Katharina’s performance with her husband.

_Hortensio._ Now go thy ways. Thou hast tamed a curst shrew.
_Lucentio._ ‘Tis a wonder, by your leave, she will be tamed so.92

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91 Ibid.
92 5.2.192-193.
These final lines equivocally insist upon the impressive skill of Petruchio’s taming and cast doubt upon it. If Katharina’s performance has been “a wonder,” it is a feat more extraordinary than the successful training of a hawk. Lorraine Datson and Katharine Park have argued that wonders operated as a means by which the medieval and early modern elite sought to “[separate] themselves from the vulgar… in their ability to distinguish things that were truly wonderful from things that were not.”

Lucentio’s wonder reminds the audience of the gentlemen’s lack of knowledge in this final scene. Lucentio and Hortensio wonder at Katharina’s performance in part because they are ignorant of the methods used to achieve it. Their amazement casts doubt not only on the performance’s status and, accordingly, on the quality of the training process that made it possible.

Petruchio’s success in The Taming of the Shrew ultimately hinges on the performance of Katharina’s apparent loving obedience. Coded as a brash, greedy and ungentlemanly trainer, his ability to pass as gentlemanly (and to win the approval, or at least the money, of other respected men in the play) by limiting the visibility of his taming methods is a central feature of the play’s dark comedy. If accomplished through societally sanctioned means, Katharina’s submission could be a wonder to the other men simply because Petruchio is genuinely a more skilled domestic ruler than any Padua has seen. But Petruchio’s trick with Katharina deliberately and deceptively takes advantage of his on-stage audience’s ignorance, creating the appearance of a wonderful mutuality where that has never been his aim. His frequent alignment with horses, his trickster ways, and his unrelenting focus on (and achievement of) profit taint his ability to make the woman who would never have fetched or preached on obedience do both.

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In the end, though, Petruchio cannot be distinguished from a gentleman who uses less extreme measures because we have no real access to Katharina’s experience. We have only her performance and her husband’s claims of gentleness. And the terms of Petruchio’s own identity are similarly uncertain. He cannot be definitively labeled either a marvelously skilled gentleman trainer or a jobbing horse-courser by those who rely on Katharina’s show of loyalty. By performing obedience so well after a dubious process of taming, Katharina’s over-and-above success as a subordinate wife demonstrates to its early modern audience that any distinction between affluent domestic rule and the tyranny of those of low social status which depends upon such performances is unreliable. It also, from a modern critical perspective, calls attention to the difficulty of identifying when training is “mutual” and when it is cruel and domineering, especially when we access such apparent reciprocity only after the taming process is complete. Without the opportunity to ask Katharina her thoughts, we can not know whether she is in on the joke any more than we can know for certain when we watch a horse and rider perform together whether that presentation is meaningfully collaborative from the horse’s perspective.

That Katharina’s performance allows a man who employs the techniques of a horse-courser to pass as a gentleman is particularly problematic for the world of The Taming of the Shrew because the characters duped by Petruchio use similar performances to assert their own positions of power. The actions of a subordinate, the play suggests, credit the master, even when these marginal figures seem to be (or in fact are) improvising and acting independently of instruction. For example, the Induction that frames the main action connects this delegating version of rule to true nobility. As Frances Dolan has observed, when the Lord and his servants trick the drunkard Sly into thinking he is a lord, they use hunting, along with other similar
sporting activities, to fool him into the illusion.\textsuperscript{94} Planning his deception of Sly, the lord suggests that his servants “tell him of his hounds and horse” among other trappings of his status.\textsuperscript{95} He himself asks the poor man “wilt thou ride?... Dost thou love hawking?... Or wilt thou hunt?”\textsuperscript{96} and one servant encourages the tinker further, urging, “Say thou wilt course, thy greyhounds are as swift/As breathèd stags.”\textsuperscript{97} Even before Petruchio’s story has begun, the audience is alerted to the way that well-trained subordinates signal noble superiors.

Another potential trainee in the play, Lucentio’s servant, Tranio, characterizes his own actions (charming Bianca’s father whilst pretending to be his superior) in terms of the by-proxy achievement of gentlemanly sport. In the final scene of the play, Petruchio toasts to “all that shot and missed,” referring to the unsuccessful suitors of Bianca who have lost her to the disguised Lucentio and his servingman. Bianca has, in keeping with Petruchio’s hunting joke, just been called a bird.\textsuperscript{98} Tranio responds, “O, sir, Lucentio slipped me like a greyhound, /Which runs himself and catches for his master.”\textsuperscript{99} Tranio’s simile insists that his task for Lucentio is quite similar to the task performed by the Lord’s hounds, despite the fact that he performs an elaborate scheme without any direct guidance from his master. His simplification is rather incredible, but easily accepted by the rest of the room. If the play calls Katharina’s performance into question based on its failure to indicate Petruchio’s ungentlemanly ways, it also makes clear the artificiality of the authority-making process from which many of the ostensibly genuine gentlemen in the play have benefitted.

\textsuperscript{94} Dolan in \textit{The Taming of the Shrew: Texts and Contexts}, “Analogue to Shrew Taming,” 304-305.
\textsuperscript{95} Induction, Scene I, 57.
\textsuperscript{96} Frances Dolan calls attention to these lines and their significance for social status in the analogue to her edition of \textit{The Taming of the Shrew} (Boston and New York: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 305.
\textsuperscript{97} Dolan, ed. \textit{The Taming of the Shrew}. Induction, Scene II, 36, 38, 39; 42-43.
\textsuperscript{98} Bianca refers to herself as a bird escaping hunters to start off this string of metaphors at 5.2.46-47.
\textsuperscript{99} 5.2.51-53.
In an era when instructional literature for masters sought to encourage gentleness as the best route to benevolent rule, Petruchio’s successful pretense of gentility belies the ideal touted by those authors who depicted authority as something most successfully wielded by the most self-possessed, knowledgeable, and gentle of trainers. Much in the way that the horse-courser’s success belies the horsemanship treatise ideal of the gentle and understanding horseman as also the most successful, Petruchio’s success with Katharina negates the idea that obedient wives always point back to gentlemanly husbands. If we are skeptical of Petruchio’s kindness, of course, that does not mean the play resists patriarchal domination or even that it resists the “benevolent patriarchy” identified by Boose. If Petruchio’s ability to pass himself off as a gentleman is unsettling within the world of the play, it is so primarily because it suggests that social hierarchy can be transgressed through deception and performance, not because the play questions the value of that hierarchy. Petruchio’s success is an embarrassment for a benevolent patriarchy that imagines itself to be wholly different, but finds itself unable to distinguish itself, from the brutality of the wife-beating it imaginatively relegates to incapable male authorities of low social status.

While my contextual reading of the play offers little in terms of revising the ugliness of the comedy from a modern perspective, it demonstrates how the specificities of the animal practices referenced in early modern English drama can complicate, rather than simply justify or gloss over, the relative meaning and acceptability of cruelty on the part of human figures of authority. In response to animal studies’ call for greater attention to the specificity, embodiedness and embeddedness of animals in the world and in human experience, Karen Raber has asserted the importance of the creation of “historical and literary traditions that privilege

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such attention.” She argues that “continued study of the history and literature of animal bodies” should always be a part of answering such a call. This chapter has, I hope, taken a step towards such specificity by demonstrating how continued attention to horse manuals and early modern English horse-training practices might inform references to those practices on the stage. Such attention reveals that a straight-forward view of horsemanship as mutually beneficial would not always have been intuitive to Shakespeare’s audience. Without investigating the nuances of human practices regarding non-human animals, we might miss the questions of ethics and social status that references to those practices bring to bear on Renaissance drama. We might miss, in this case, how a non-revisionist reading of The Taming the Shrew can still leave room for the early modern English to look askance at Petruchio and his methods.

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101 Raber, Animal Bodies, Renaissance Culture, 187. Raber refers to Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 120: “posthumanism… requires us to attend to that thing called ‘the human’ with greater specificity, greater attention to its embodiment, embeddedness, and materiality, and how these in turn shape and are shaped by consciousness, mind, and so on.” Raber writes, quoting Wolfe, “Philosophers and critics interested in the ‘question of the animal,’ and the related, but not more pressing, question of the human, invite us to attend with ‘greater specificity, greater attention to [their] embodiment, embeddedness, and materiality, and how these in turn shape and are shaped by consciousness, mind, and so on.’"
CHAPTER 3
The Problem with Love: Subordinate Affective Engagement and Humanist Pedagogy in John Lyly’s *Galatea*

As the last chapters have shown, instructional literature of several types in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England deliberately acknowledges that mutuality is a central component of mastery. These texts encourage affective engagement with and from subordinates. Prescriptive texts such as conduct literature and animal-training manuals assure readers, especially masters, that the cultivation of affectionate bonds will allow training in particular to be a reciprocal and even loving process. Masters of all sorts, according to didactic authors, do not (or should not) need to use domineering physical force to achieve control. Instead, they can cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship between themselves and those beneath them. In fact, the persuasion or coercion made possible through affective engagement are expected to be even more effective in preserving hierarchical order than direct force would be. Gentle methods of mastery thus come to be touted as the quickest route to a superior kind of rule – a benevolent one. This rule, in turn, is presented as the gentleman’s rational and civil way of ruling.

Building on those contexts, this chapter examines John Lyly’s 1584 play, *Galatea*, for how it both represents and then questions the validity (from a masterly perspective) of emotional affect – and particularly love – as a useful tool of mastery. It does so by exploring another important training context: the schoolroom. Written to be performed by a schoolboy troupe for Queen Elizabeth I and her court, *Galatea* is ostensibly a love story about two shepherdesses – Galatea and Phillida – who grow to love one another while they are both disguised as boys. When it is revealed to the gods, goddesses, and citizens of the play that the girls are in fact girls,
Galatea and Phillida remain committed to their love. Despite the disapproval of the other gods and goddesses, Venus, the goddess of love, intervenes to help the young lovers. She promises to transform one of them (she does not specify which) into a boy at the church door so that they may be married.

_Galatea_ has been fruitfully read for what it reveals about the radical potential and the conservative limits of early modern English conceptions of sexuality and sexual difference.\(^1\) By turning attention to the pedagogical and hierarchical setting in which it would have been performed, I shift attention to an important element of the play which, though integrally intertwined with issues of sexuality, has been less explored. While scholars of sexuality have persuasively shown that Lyly’s play is unique in representing homoerotic love as both possible and even, according to a few scholars, preferable to patriarchal heterosocial institutions like marriage,\(^2\) viewing the play alongside the concerns of education reveals that the similitude that characterizes homoerotic love in the drama serves also to critique the usefulness of love for maintaining hierarchical structures. The represented coequality of homoerotic love that threatens patriarchal claims for the necessity of difference in marriage and sexual consummation also threatens, in this case, to undo the categories of master and subordinate that training processes

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seek in part to maintain. *Galatea’s* celebration of gender sameness, then, is a problem for trainers who hope love will operate as a means to secure trainee obedience.

Love is relevant to the pedagogical context because the language of love used in *Galatea*, especially as it appears between the central romantic pair, does not hold meaning only in a sexual or romantic sense. “Love,” as this chapter shows, also operates significantly in a humanist pedagogical context, as it did in other hierarchical contexts during the period. When associated with training processes, languages of love often describe the affective engagement masters seek to cultivate in trainees. This is especially the case in pedagogical treatises. Resisting long-standing stereotypes of schoolmasterly cruelty, humanists work actively to impress upon their audiences that gentleness is central to effective teaching. This emphasis replaces domination with care, expressed in part through authors’ concern about establishing mutual understanding between instructor and pupil.

To encourage students to eagerly communicate with their tutors treatise authors recommend that instructors cultivate a love for the training process in their pupils. The classroom was well positioned as a site at which to test the viability of a cultural trend towards mutuality. Some of humanism’s central educational methods are centered around and require willing engagement from subordinate students. The practices of *actio* and *imitatio*, in particular, require

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4 For a discussion of the decreasing emphasis on domination in humanist pedagogy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries see Rebecca W. Bushnell, *A Culture of Teaching: Early Modern Humanism in Theory and Practice* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press), 1996. She writes, for example, “Early humanist arguments against pedagogical flogging… argue that, rather than encouraging children to learn through pleasure and love, flogging turns them away from books, creating… hatred.” She also explains how excessive cruelty was seen to lead to “slavish” servility, which was unreliable and demeaning compared to “an absolute mastery of love” (29, 31). See also, Stewart, *Close Readers*, 108, on Ascham’s gentle tone in *The Scholemaster*.

pupils to gain rhetorical prowess not only by learning the texts and languages they are assigned, but also by imitating their master and his methods and behavior. Thus, training in the classroom involves imitative performance on the part of students as much as it involves commandment by teachers. Not unlike the servants who adopted their masters’ judgement, students were implicitly asked to identify with their superiors, in this case by imitating them and their rhetorical skills.

Although identification does not necessarily always follow from imitation, Lynn Enterline has explored how one can slip into the other, especially for students in the English Renaissance. She has outlined some of the complications that arise from the humanist use of imitation as “a method for obtaining compliance with the school’s linguistic and social regime.” Enterline contends that practices of *imitatio* and *actio* encourage students to embody both male and female classical models, ultimately allowing male students to identify with modes of expression coded feminine as well as those coded masculine, resistant as well as civically dutiful. She points out that the according identification made possible between imitator (student) and model (text) makes it conceivable for schoolboys to express passions ostensibly contrary to – and even resistant to – the schoolroom’s ostensible goal of producing “rhetorically capable ‘gentlemen’ with univocally ‘male’ egos.” In other words, schoolboys could affectively engage with rhetorical models that would allow them to subvert masculinity and

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6 Lynn Enterline, *Shakespeare’s Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 12-13, 34: Masters were instructed to perform translations in front of their students and “More important, the ‘childe’ is to follow his teacher’s footsteps exactly…. Even the act of rote memory at the basis of a grammar lesson requires a relationship of imitation, both textual and personal…. In Ascham’s ideal humanist lesson, a student follows first his schoolmaster and then a personified classical authority.”

7 Enterline, *Shakespeare’s Schoolroom*, 4, 12-13, 34, 35-36 for an explanation of how imitation functioned in the early modern English classroom and involved the imitation of both texts, schoolmasters, and sometimes fellow students who were playing the master’s role in his absence.

8 Enterline, *Shakespeare’s Schoolroom*.

9 Ibid., 120.

10 Ibid., 131-132, 152.

11 Ibid., 152.
gentlemanly performance. Scholars have recently disagreed about whether this possibility was inadvertent or actively embraced by pedagogues pursuing Quintilian’s actor-based prescriptions for educating young boys. Whether or not instructors intended for their trainees to have affective access to both ideal civic male models and more divergent forms, however, it is well-established that the affective engagement encouraged in particular through imitation and performance encouraged schoolboys of all types to go beyond mere mimicry and to engage deeply with their models – dutifully male or otherwise.

Resistance to an ideal male model is especially conceivable via the texts of Ovid. Though part of the standard curriculum, Ovid’s prose and poetry often stray from the masculine expressions of “epic duty” found in other humanist standards, such as Vergil. As such, they present boys with the opportunity to identify with erotic and feminine figures “at some distance from their masters’ declared purpose.” Already built into the institution’s values, then, is an

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12 Also on how humanist practices allowed for the subversion of masculinity and its performance, see Elizabeth Hutcheon, *Imitating Women: Rhetoric, Gender, and Humanist Pedagogy in English Renaissance Drama*, dissertation, University of Chicago, 2011, and Barbara Correll, “Malleable Material, Models of Power: Woman in Erasmus’s ‘Marriage Group’ and Civility in Boys” *ELH* 57, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 241-262; 243-44. Correll examines Erasmus’s inclusion of “women or a version of woman… in the construction of the young male students” while his pedagogical works seek to manage “two important issues… the dangerous problems of women’s power and the instability of adolescence as the treacherous, liminal period when the boy appropriates his sexual identity as the prerequisite for entering the civic realm.” Jeanne H. McCarthy has recently resisted Enterline’s argument that such possibilities for imitation were inadvertent, however, by showing how dramatic performance and inventive improvisation among students was a conscious and integral part of the humanist educational regime in *The Children’s Troupes and the Transformation of English Theater 1509-1608: Pedagogue Playwrights, Playbooks, and Play-boys*, Studies in Performance and Early Modern Drama Series (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 106-108.

13 Most markedly, since she departs from more common readings of humanist pedagogy (and the troupes it produced) as stiff, stuffy, and repressed compared to the art of acting practiced in adult troupes, McCarthy, *The Children’s Troupes*, esp. 106-115. McCarthy in part credits Quintilian’s influence with pedagogue’s commitment to producing creative and passionate, not mindlessly mimicking, students.


15 Enterline, *Shakespeare’s Schoolroom*, 87: “the unintended effect of the school’s rhetorical trainings was to shift poetic invention away from Vergilian epic duty toward Ovidian eroticism…. Despite the didactic models offered by masters and theorists of education, former students either passed over Vergil entirely in favor of Ovid or, on the rare occasions they took on a Vergilian voice, did so in one heavily inflected by Ovid’s penchant for female monologues. Such a literary history suggests to me that school training in imitation may well have released identifications and emotions in its *pueri* that were at some distance from their masters’ declared purpose.”
uneasy relationship between Ovidian tales of love and the goals of a normalizing training program. Reliant as they are on their trainees’ willingness to identify with the models they approved of, it is practical for early modern educators to acknowledge that student pleasure and desire to learn are integral to their success. However, that same reliance means that student desire can work against the conservative intentions of the institution, should it direct itself towards available and opposing systems of value. The identificatory bonds students form with their masters and their materials, then, are both vital to the institution and potentially threatening for its goals. Because of this, if for no other reason, the affect of these students had to be handled with conscious care, wielded to spur their labor in the classroom. Despite the perils of love and Ovid, pedagogues were overtly dependent on the amenability of both to the maintenance of social order in the classroom.

Affective Engagement, or the Encouragement of Love, in Humanist Pedagogy

For pedagogical theorists like Roger Ascham and Richard Mulcaster, love for one’s tutor and for the process of learning is valuable in part for staving off the negative effects of intimidation and fear. Though it is clear that fear has a place in the early modern classroom, these pedagogues caution that too much fear will discourage students from asking questions and will ultimately dampen their ability to consume information, imperiling a schoolmaster’s chance of success. Along with this practical consideration, schoolmasters who themselves often occupy lower social positions than those to which their trainees might aspire have plenty of reason to be particularly cautious about how they wield control. The schoolmaster Richard Mulcaster

16 See Stewart, Close Readers, 86 on the “openly anxious relationship” between student and tutor. On the low social status of schoolmasters relative to their students, see also Bushnell, A Culture of Teaching, 31.
complains in his 1581 treatise, *Positions*, about the power of displeased parents, devoting an entire chapter to “friendlinesse between parentes and maisters,” in which he feels the need to defend the use of schoolroom punishment. He notes with frustration that “if parentes were as carefull to examine the casuses of beating, as they are nothing curious to be offended without cause for beating, themselues might gaine a great deale more to their childrens good.” That such a defense is necessary speaks to the ambivalence that plagues teacherly authority in the period. It also highlights schoolmasters’ dependence on outside approval for their success.

Describing the caution schoolmaster needed to use, Rebecca Bushnell points out that a tutor might be seen to “overcome his betters” when disciplining noble students. She also describes fear that schoolroom beating “might turn one who was noble into a slave.” Emphasizing the role of love and pleasure in the classroom, then, could help counter concerns about a master’s potentially inappropriate form of rule over his young subjects.

The practical utility of students’ pleasure in the classroom is also central to pedagogues’ promotion of love in the learning process. In his authoritative 1570 treatise on education, *The Scholemaster*, Roger Ascham argues that a positive affective experience is central to students’ obedience and, accordingly, to their eventual success as scholars and citizens. He writes that “from seauen yeare olde, to seauentene, loue is the best allurement to learning,” stressing that love does not just ease master-student relations but also leads students to desire and pursue

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18 Ibid., 277.
20 Ibid.
In other words, “love” is appealing for Ascham primarily because it motivates students to work. He describes why he expects his methods of instruction to be pleasurable for the student and why that pleasure will help the student to learn more effectively:

> Whan by this way prescribed in this booke, being streight, plaine, & easie, the scholer is alwayes laboring with pleasure, and euer going right on forward with profit… Which, because he shall do alwayes in order, he shall do it alwayes with pleasure: And pleasure allureth loue: loue hath lust to labor: labor alwayes obteineth his purpose.  

In Ascham’s equation (“pleasure allureth loue: loue hath lust to labor: labor alwayes obteineth his purpose”), pleasure, love, labor, and the achievement of any purpose are integrally, indeed, causally, entwined. Ascham supports clear methods of teaching because such methods encourage the student to labor in pleasure, and that pleasure, in turn, leads him to love and desire that labor.

Although Ascham is consistent in stressing that love should be part of the pedagogical equation, love’s object within the process is somewhat flexible. Schoolboys can come to love the process of learning or they can love performing a specific exercise itself. They can also love simply to be rewarded for their success. In fact, Ascham suggests that a student’s love of his master’s praise is perhaps as important as his love of learning more generally. He writes “He, that loueth to be praised for well doing, at his father, or masters hand. A childe of this nature, will earnestlie loue learnyng, gladlie labor for learning, willinglie learne of other, boldlie aske any doute.”

And unlike natural wit and aptitude for learning, “love, labor, gladness to learn of others… and will to win praise” are not inherent in the student but “won and maintained by

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23 Ibid., 9.
the… wisdom and discretion of the schoolmaster.”24 Although discipline is necessary, the main way a master can fail to maintain these aptitudes is through excessive beating and overly harsh chastisement.25 In so much as love emerges from the natural inclinations of the pupil, Ascham describes the ideal trainee. In so much as he qualifies that description with the importance of the role of the master who “wins” and “maintains” the fruits of those inclinations, he describes the ideal trainer.

Ascham was not alone among pedagogical authorities in his attempt to redirect emphasis away from masterly cruelty and towards affection and care, nor was he alone in supporting such a shift on pragmatic rather than moralistic grounds.26 During the late sixteenth century, humanists “moved explicit attention from the mastery of mind and body to the ‘allurement’ to learning…. structuring the relationship of student and teacher as one of love.”27 So, for example, the Puritan schoolmaster John Brinsley writes in his 1612 publication, Ludus literarius: or, the grammar schoole, that a good school requires “ Constancy in good order… with continual demonstration of loue in the Master towards the Schollars, & a desire to do them the vtermost good” because “This shall ouercome the most froward in time; and vsed with the rest, shal undoubtedly bring forth the fruit of their desires.”28 Here, importantly, the master gives love as well as (or as a precondition of) receiving it. Mulcaster cautions against sending children to school too early because frustration may cause their schoolmasters to beat them “Whom if we

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 For example, John Brinsley, Ludus literarius: or, the grammar schoole… (London: 1612), Early English Books Online, accessed June 26, 2016. http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&rfr_id=xri:eebo&res_id=xri:eebo:collection:99842309, 173, 209, 49. Brinsley cautions that to “deale ouer rigorously with the poor boies” in a school risks making them “so feareful, that they would rather desire to go to any base trade or drudgery, then to the Schollars.” He also notes that excessive rigor in general works “a maruellous distast in the scholar” according to which they “distast good learning before they haue felt the sweetnesse of it.” See also Mulcaster, Positions, 260.
27 Bushnell, A Culture of Teaching, 29-30.
28 Brinsley, Ludus literarius, 51-52.
beat we do the children wrong in those tender yeares to plant any hatred, when loue should take roote, & learning grow by liking,” again pointing out the counter-productive nature of excessive force.29

This is not to say, of course, that early modern pedagogues forbid masters from beating their students any more than other texts prevented the beating of wives, servants, or domesticated animals. Nor, for that matter, do I mean to suggest that any of the instructional literature which sought to deemphasize fear and pain as adequate motivators sought to do so primarily (or at all) for ethical reasons. Rather, humanist scholars sought to encourage the cultivation of gentler practices only where possible and effective, simultaneously resisting stereotypes of schoolmasters as brutal, and of learning as painful, to the benefit of their own institution. It is also not the case that theorists imagined love would emerge from just any schoolboy given the proper gentle conditions.30 Rather, love could emerge from and work in students as long as they were properly “toward,” laboring within themselves to affectively engage with and enjoy the material given them by their master.31 All a master can really do, according to these manuals, is be careful to encourage and reward such engagement. As was the case with masters and servants in Chapter 1 here we find subordinate agency at the heart of processes that make mutuality possible across hierarchical difference. In the case of love among the subordinates in Lyly’s play, that agency both does and does not work the way pedagogues hope it will.

Galatea

29 Mulcaster, Positions, 24.
30 Mulcaster, Positions, esp. 154, 165-166, in particular, has an entire section in his treatise on identifying which children ought to be educated and which sent to apprenticeships instead.
31 Ibid., 27.
Written to be performed by a schoolboy troupe – the Boys of St. Paul’s – *Galatea* was first performed in 1588 before Elizabeth I and her court. Appropriately for a schoolboy troupe, it represents humanist educational methods as particularly effective in encouraging subordinate affective engagement. This endorsement is significant in a society increasingly invested in the possibility of mutuality as a component of mastery. In the process of so representing education, however, *Galatea* also demonstrates the predicament that a dependence on subordinate love can pose for hierarchy. It shows how the affective engagement of subordinates can work against rather than for stratified order by leading trainees to take too much agency in their own subordination, selecting and creating masters of their own choosing and thus training themselves with little regard for the values of the system that is authorizing them. More importantly, though, *Galatea* also shows how love can usher in realizations of similarity, blurring rather than reasserting difference between instructor and student.

This reading of *Galatea* follows in the footsteps of critical readings that have focused on Venus’s promised transformation of Galatea or Phillida in part by considering how transformation pervades the play beyond that single moment. While the transformation offered by Venus is arguably the most literal of the drama, the subplots contain subordinate figures who seek similar transformations. Aside from the shepherdesses, *Galatea* contains a side plot about the apprentice Rafe, who is in search of a master, and the maiden Hebe, who is expected to serve as a sacrifice for her nation. Both Rafe and Hebe pose the benefits they seek from submitting to masters in terms of transformation. The play might be expected to tolerate an unusual amount of shape-shifting, since it is written in an Ovidian vein. While the central plot is an adaption of Ovid’s *Iphis and Ianthe*, the maiden Hebe’s sacrifice to Neptune’s sea monster (part of the country’s punishment for disobedience to the gods) mirrors the fate of Hesion in Book Eleven of
The Metamorphoses. In Ovid’s tale, Hesion is tied to a rock and offered to a sea monster as part of her father Laomedon’s punishment for failing to pay a debt to Phoebus and Neptune, much like Hebe’s offer to a similar monster as payment for her nation’s past lack of piety. Galatea’s name also comes from The Metamorphoses. In Book Thirteen the sea nymph Galatea is courted by the Cyclops, who kills her contrastingly boyish lover, Acis. Reeds and finally a river spring from Acis’s crushed body, bringing Galatea’s tale to a typically body-warping Ovidian close. These references serve to set Galatea firmly in the humanist tradition, referencing one of its central authors. They also simultaneously signal Galatea’s position on the fault-line of the humanist social program. The eroticism, transformability, and love rampant in Ovid are (as we have seen above) somewhat problematic for inspiring social conformity in early modern England. These aspects of Ovid frequently overspill expectations about bodily form, identity, and authority which are integral to the social order humanism avowedly seeks to perpetuate. The love plot, which will structure the play’s representation of humanist training, moreover, is enabled by one of these Ovidian references, further marking affection as a potentially destabilizing force in the play.

Though some aspects of Ovidian transformation as adapted in Lyly’s drama will problematize categories of master and subordinate the transformations Hebe and Rafe hope for are actually relatively normalizing. Especially in the case of education, but also in the case of apprenticeship and household service, many subjects who were trained to be obedient and loyal to their superiors could expect to eventually serve as domestic governors in their own right, even if not surpassing the status of their initial master. This mobility allows subordinate experiences, insomuch as they train non-masters to be more masterly, to offer a “transformation” of sorts to their participants. This appealing (but by no means revolutionary) mobility is certainly present in
Galatea’s transformations. While from a modern perspective it might seem necessary to separate Venus’s offered gender transformation from the social mobility associated with certain forms of instruction, the distinction between the two would not necessarily be as stark for an early modern English audience. In particular, there are salient similarities between Venus’s promise and the promise of education in the period. Young girls and young boys in England were imagined to have much in common and, in fact, were dressed in similar clothing until boys underwent “breeching” around the age of seven. Though the schoolroom was not the only place where boys were taught to perform a distinct masculinity, it was a central site of their transition into manhood.

Alan Stewart explains how the passage into masculinity was tied to the passage into education for boys: “The ‘breeching’ of a boy at around the age of seven was a major event: Thomas Elyot links the age to the ideal age for the starting of an education. The ‘breeching’ of a boy was not only the entry into his education, but also his institution as a man, now visually distinct from his female companions.” A boy’s “entry into education” was nearly coterminous with his “institution as a man.” Having been visually separated from girls and women, schoolboys entered a classroom where much of their work would involve imitating their male instructor and the rhetoric of male authors. This is not to say that the schoolmaster or humanist education could serve as an entirely uncomplicated model of performative masculinity. As has been fruitfully explored, humanism’s position within a patriarchal society held together in part by heterosocial marriage was in some ways quite precarious. Nonetheless, as humanism came to shape intellectual bonds in court and beyond, humanist institutions were very much integral to

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33 Stewart, Close Readers, 102.
34 See esp. Stewart, Close Readers.
the English social order. Accordingly, the classroom, whatever its gender-based anxieties, played a central role in the production of performatively masculine subjects.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, when schoolboys learned how to perform according to humanist values, they learned simultaneously how to take a masculine place in society as “rhetorically capable gentlemen.”\textsuperscript{36} In this sense, the transition from boyhood to adulthood in school is not unlike the one Venus offers Galatea and Phillida – characters who would themselves have been played by schoolboys. So, while transformation in once sense suggests that Lyly’s setting is “a never-never land where Greek gods can appear on the banks of the Humber,”\textsuperscript{37} it also allows that fantasy world a palpable connection to Lyly’s lived social reality.

Although I argue that Galatea’s love story speaks directly to the concerns of humanist pedagogues, the fact that it therefore addresses subordinate love’s function within training processes also makes it relevant for other contexts. A more complete summary of the play demonstrates how subordination of all kinds pervade the plot. Galatea follows the story of two girls who are disguised as boys by their fathers in an effort to spare them from becoming sacrifices to an angry Neptune. While the girls are disguised, they encounter Diana and her train of devotee-nymphs, who are invaded by, and then capture and punish, a troublesome Cupid. The play charts these adventures along with those of Hebe who is selected to serve as a sacrifice for Neptune’s monster Agar and a band of apprentices – Rafe and his brothers – who are searching for masters after abandoning a life at sea. The story, then, is rife with asymmetrical relationships, among gods and mortals, and made possible by both willing and unwilling subordination.

\textsuperscript{35} See Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom, for a full discussion of the goal of producing masculine subjects and of its complications within a humanist program.

\textsuperscript{36} Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom, 152.

\textsuperscript{37} Phyllis Rackin, “Androgyne, Mimesis, and the Marriage of the Boy Heroine on the English Renaissance Stage,” PMLA 102.1 (Jan 1987): 29-41; 31. Rackin suggests that androgyne can become acceptable in such a world because the fantasy of it “transcends the social” and allows androgyne to operate as “an image of human self-completion rather than an aberrant social category.”
Galatea’s professions of love, while speaking to educational theory, would also likely resonate with its courtly audience. Just as languages of love have significance for the humanist classroom, they have purchase for Elizabeth’s humanism-influenced court, where a language of affection and romantic courtship was used to communicate obedience, service, and patronage. Considering the importance of such language in the Elizabethan court, scholars have suggested accordingly that love poetry and other literary representations of amorous conquest can be mined for its contemporary political relevance. However, there is an important difference between how love is being used in the treatises I describe above, which accords with how it is used in Galatea, and how it is used in court culture. While pedagogues rely on the possibility that a student’s love for his master and for learning could be genuine (otherwise it would hardly effect any change in a student’s willingness to labor and would therefore lose its ascribed practical value), courtly rhetoric relies at least in part on the opposite, as Catherine Bates explains the nobility’s embrace of discourses of “courtship”:

What both the Queen and her courtiers exploited was the sexual indeterminacy of the courtship-situation. Courtiers were permitted to love without loving, and to desire without desiring; the Queen, to be flattered without in any way diminishing her fame or her majesty. At the court of Elizabeth, then, courtship was frequently separated from its nuptial function and became an end in itself, a


39 See footnote 39.
convenient way of expressing political loyalty and devotion in
desexualized and depersonalized terms.\footnote{Bates, Rhetoric of Courtship, 89.}

Love-language works at court without reference to inner feelings or the active desire that its
rhetoric implies. The courtly rhetoric of love symbolically shores up and allows for the safe
negotiation of power between queen and courtier. Indeed, as Bates describes, the safety and thus
the usefulness of this language \textit{relies} on its detachment from powerful inner feeling. Were the
queen to participate in the amorous exchange implied by the language of courtship, she would
risk undercutting her authority. Were she to feel excessive attachment and passion, the result
would be the same. Though superficial rhetoric of this kind is no doubt important to power
dynamics and displays of obedience in the classroom – much as it is in all master-subordinate
relationships – the focus of Lyly’s critique in \textit{Galatea} is instead on masters’ appeals to the
affective power of an innerly located, substantial, subordinate love. Though instructors would be
unwise or unpoltic to desire any sexual or nuptial consummation from their students’ loving
engagement, that engagement necessarily required actual desire and actual pleasure, not just the
rhetorical performance of it, for it to have effects on the work students were willing undertake.

The role of rhetoric for its own sake has been the worthy topic of much scholarly work,
including Bates’. The difficulty of definitively entangling rhetorical from experienced love in the
context of training and mastery, moreover, was a central concern of the last chapter. But, it is
also important to consider the role of love as a felt passion, a source of inner pleasure and a
genuine motivation towards labor. Early modern masters were well aware of the power of
experienced love. Galatea and Phillida’s intense affection is demonstrably rhetorically expressed.
Their rhetorical expressions, in fact, are the only certain evidence we have of their feelings for
one another. Because that rhetoric is taken seriously in the play as evidence of inner feeling,
throughout this chapter I will take the girls at their word. Though Lyly’s message about love has broad implications for his society’s interest in affective engagement as an aspect of training, then, the disruptive power he associates with subordinate love operates distinct from strictly rhetorical expressions of that love.

Even allowing for these limits on the reach of Lyly’s cautionary critique of love, Galatea has broad implications for the relationship between the authorization of subordinate love and the preservation of hierarchy. In this work, Lyly speaks to an issue that directly concerns the practices of his own profession as a schoolmaster. Simultaneously, since similar practices were being encouraged elsewhere, his critique has implications for domestic pedagogies of all sorts. If we read Galatea within the context of how pedagogues use “love” to describe the ideal student’s affective engagement in his training, that context makes visible the importance of Galatea and Phillida’s interactions with one another and their promise of eventual transformation – not just for sexuality studies, but also for early modern ideas about how affective engagement could be wielded to solidify social hierarchy. The dynamic relationship between masters – be they gods, citizens, fathers, or practitioners of various arts – and their subjects in the play is expressed often in terms of transaction and transformative benefit. Only in Galatea and Phillida’s case do we see how fondness is integral to subordinate training; and only in their case do we see how it can problematize the social order that humanist training aims in part to sustain.

**Humanist Training and Successful Subordination in Galatea**

Galatea opens with separate scenes in which each girl in the central romantic pair is told by her father why she must be disguised as a boy: both girls are beautiful enough that their fathers worry they will be selected as the country’s virgin sacrifice to Agar. In both cases, the
shepherdesses are represented as obedient to their fathers’ wishes, despite expressing hesitation about the honorability of the proposed plan. Galatea promises that she attends “willingly” to her father, despite her feeling that being devoured by the monster “cannot be so hard as the disguising hateful.” 41 Phillida says to her father two scenes later, “Dear father, Nature could not make me so fair as she hath made you kind, nor you more kind than me dutiful. Whatsoever you command I will not refuse.” 42 Her comment subtly implies her father’s request is less than kind, since she suggests her duty to obey him exceeds the kindness of his command. Despite this, or rather simultaneous with it, she asserts her duty toward him and submits to his instruction. In performing compliance with their fathers’ wills, the girls perform both their gender and social positions. Phillida later associates her submissiveness with her femaleness, but the shepherdesses’ obedience is also importantly appropriate to their status as children addressing the masters of their households – their fathers. This second aspect of their submissive natures does not separate them from the ideal humanist schoolboy, who is also expected to bow to his parents’ command.

After these introductory scenes, Phillida casts her obedience as a feature of her girlishness rather than of her position as a child. Once disguised, she mourns her clothing and how she must perform boyishness with her body: “I neither like my gait nor my garments, the one untoward, the other unfit, both unseemly.” 43 By calling the gait of a boy “untoward,” Phillida opposes her womanly body to her body disguised as a man. In one sense, as Leah Scragg glosses the term, Phillida calls her gait awkward. 44 In another sense, having highlighted her own

41 Leah Scragg, ed. John Lyly, Galatea, Revels Student Editions (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2012); Citations are to act, scene, and line; 1.1.14; 93-94.
42 1.3.10-12.
44 Scragg, Galatea, p. 56, footnote 15.
obedience from the play’s beginning, Phillida refers to what her newly disguised form communicates about her tractability. People and animals labeled “untoward” in the period would be considered dispositionally “difficult to manage, restrain, or control; intractable, unruly, [or] perverse.”45 By this definition, she associates masculine performance with resistance to training. The fact that Phillida is herself played by a boy as she speaks this line makes her characterization comical not only because she insults the body of her actor, but also because the fact that she is played (presumably successfully) by a boy belies the distinction she assumes between her inherent towardness and a boy’s natural untowardness. In fact, the student who plays Phillida presumably succeeds in doing so partly because he is a successful and “toward” schoolboy who has learned his dramatic lessons.

Phillida, then, mistakes herself as inherently different in her subordination from the schoolboys who possess, according humanist pedagogical authors, a “natural towardness” rather than the reverse.46 The scene of the girls’ first encounter, as each expresses surprise at the lack of confidence they see in the “boy” before them, jokes in one sense about the characters’ failures to comfortably act out the roles newly assigned them by their fathers. But it also simultaneously jokes about the actual male actors’ indistinguishability from the characters they play – that is, their indistinguishability from girls failing to effectively perform masculinity. Galatea says in an aside upon seeing Phillida’s discomfort with herself “I perceive that boys are in as great disliking of themselves as maids.”47 Phillida echoes the joke, remarking of Galatea “It is a pretty boy and a fair. He might well have been a woman.”48 Further cementing their link to the schoolboys who play them, Galatea says upon seeing the disguised Phillida, “I will learn of him how to behave

46 Mulcaster, Positions, 27.
47 2.1.18-19.
48 2.1.21-22.
myself.” Each girl, upon encountering the other, decides that imitation of a masculine model is the best way to successfully appear masculine. In so doing, Galatea and Phillida approach their roles as would a good humanist schoolboy. They thus set themselves up for more success than do their less fortunate subordinate counterparts.

Failed Subordination

The first example of failed subordination that I will examine is the village’s sacrifice of a virgin to the monster Agar. Because the two most beautiful virgins in the land – Galatea and Phillida – are disguised as boys and hidden in the woods, the citizens select Hebe to serve as their sacrifice. Hebe (apparently accurately) expresses amazement along with her despair that she should be considered the most beautiful. She begins her speech, tied up and waiting for the monster, “Miserable and accursed Hebe, that being neither fair nor fortunate, thou shouldst be thought most happy and beautiful!” By the end of this same speech, though, Hebe seems to have accepted her role as sacrifice, crying “Come, Agar, thou unsatiable monster of maidens’ blood and devourer of beauty’s bowels. Glut thyself till thou surfeit, and let my life end thine! ...I am fair! I am a virgin! I am ready!” From initially appearing skeptical that she constitutes a fit sacrifice for Agar, Hebe comes to boldly declare that she is fair, possibly even fair enough to serve as a sufficient sacrifice for the rest of time by adequately “surfeiting” even the monster’s “insatiable” desire for maiden beauty for the foreseeable future. The monster, of course, never comes, and her newfound confidence proves unwarranted.

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49 2.1.12-13.
50 5.2.7-9.
51 5.2.50-53, 56.
Critics have read the monster Agar as an ominous metaphor for what is undesirable about marriage, from a maiden’s perspective. Hebe’s sense of loss upon not being subjected to Agar, however, draws attention to what she theoretically has to gain from acquiescing to the will of her fellow citizens, Neptune, and Agar, even if that submission will decidedly be an awful (and most likely fatal) experience. Despite the fact that her lack of beauty saves her life, Hebe claims part of the disappointment we might expect from the other citizens who realize they have angered Neptune with an inadequate offering. She says, “Fortunate Hebe, how shalt thou express thy joys! Nay, unhappy girl, thou art not the fairest…. But alas, destiny would not have it so, destiny could not, because it asketh the beautifullest. I would, Hebe, thou hadst been beautifullest.” Winding her way to the sad conclusion that she wishes she had been “beautifullest” after all, Hebe views her freedom from subjection with some disappointment. In so much as Hebe’s story would remind its audience of Ovid’s Hesion, who is rescued from her sea monster by Hercules and then married happily to Telamon, Hebe’s bittersweet response to her salvation would only be more unexpected. Nothing about Hesion’s short part in The Metamorphoses indicates that she regrets not being swept away by Neptune’s creature. Hebe, it seems, had come to anticipate a post-facto transformation from her forced submission to Agar. She expected the monster to accept her as a sacrifice, confirming a beauty she previously did not believe she possessed. This hoped-for transformation might not sound terribly appealing, resulting as it does in her probable death. But her sacrifice would confirm a clear and culturally valued position for Hebe in her


53 5.2.65-66, 70-72.
social world – maybe even one, she imagines, that will alter the country’s future sacrificial practices. When the monster fails to accept her, those hopes and expectations are dashed.

The play might not ask us to blame Hebe for what she perceives as her failure, but it does point out an important case in which a subject’s embrace of obedience fails to afford her a societally-sanctioned transformation. Hebe cannot make herself what she is not simply by placing herself (or being placed) in the position of a particular kind of subordinate (a beautiful virgin). Her sadness at her “failure” is perhaps laughable because self-destructive, but it is also so because what she hoped for was absurd. If she was not beautiful entering the sacrifice, how did she expect to become so just by virtue of being where the sacrifice usually sits? Hebe’s form of subordination fails because her affective commitment to that submission has no effect on whether she can serve the role she is assigned by her superiors. Even her capacity to affectively engage is limited by the fact that, when it actually comes down to it, Hebe has no choice in whether she is offered as sacrifice.

Hebe’s failure in this respect speaks to a distinction one humanist theorist makes between the commitment of citizens to their king and the superior commitment schoolmasters require of their students. In Positions, Mulcaster compares the two types of subjects. Describing a student’s obedience, he writes,

> Is not obedience the best sacrifice, that he can offer vp to his prince and gouernour, being directed and ruled by his countrie lawes? And in the principles of gouernment, is not his maister his monarche? & the scholelawes his countrey lawes? wherunto if he submit himselfe both orderly in perfourmance, & patiently in penaunce, doth he not shew a mynde already armed, not to start from his dutie? and so much the more, bycause his obedience to his maister is more voluntarie, then that to his prince, which is meere necessarie.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Mulcaster, Positions, 151.
Mulcaster sees the schoolroom as a microcosm of the country: a realm with laws, government, and a monarch. He reads the student, in keeping with humanist ideals of affective engagement, as “more voluntary” in his obedience to all the rules of the classroom and to his master. From this perspective, Hebe’s ultimate obedience to her country might mean less in part because her agreement can only be partial. She evidently embraces her role as sacrifice by the time it becomes clear that Agar will not arrive, but she does so only in the context of a forced submission – she is literally dragged to it by men who similarly act out of necessity to prevent the flooding of their lands. These conditions do not lead her to the transformation she hopes to achieve.

If we read the maiden’s failure alongside those of yet another apparently inadequate subordinate – Rafe, the apprentice – it starts to seem as if Galatea, despite its numerous Ovidian references, is actually quite skeptical about the possibility of transformation among these mortals. Rafe’s failure is slightly more complicated than Hebe’s forced service to her country since, on the surface, Rafe seems more willing than Hebe has opportunity to be. Rafe appears almost to be affectively engaged in the way educators argued humanist students should be. He attempts apprenticeships with two separate men who work in mystical arts that, true to the fruits Rafe will reap from his terms with them, promise unlikely transformations. The first, an alchemist, promises to reproduce valuable materials from themselves while the second, an astronomer, promises to transform Rafe’s capacity for knowledge, to change the way he understands the universe by giving him access to the mysteries of the skies. Were these training experiences successful, these masters could teach Rafe skills that would afford him an improved position in his world. Rafe himself expresses great enthusiasm for the potential of each position. When the Alchemist offers to take Rafe on as an apprentice (mostly because his last apprentice
Rafe’s enthusiasm is evident in how he begins (“I follow, I run, I fly!”) and, after joking about his father’s reputation for cheating, he looks forward to his expected reward for obedience to (and training from) the alchemist.

But he puts it oddly. He says he anticipates he will “have a golden body.” Rather than simply expressing a desire to become wealthy and to obtain gold, as the Alchemist has promised, he states his hope in terms of bodily transformation – suggesting that his body will become gold. While fixating on the prospect of such a transformation, Rafe fails to express any interest in the art itself or in the work he presumably would have to do to become skilled in any trade. Rafe does not look forward to practicing alchemy. He does not even look forward to turning things into gold or creating mounds of precious metal from less expensive stores, despite the fact that such work would indeed earn him the wealth his eager anticipation of a “golden body” implies he wants. Rafe’s rather bizarre phrasing, which makes even his hoped-for-state after the apprenticeship into a passive, unthinking, inanimate one (as a golden body) emphasizes the extent to which Rafe expects a reward and anticipates no work, no practice on his own part. His wording reveals that he is perhaps as interested in cutting corners as his gold-thumbed father. Unprepared to engage on any level with his education, it is hardly a surprise in humanist terms when Rafe fails to benefit from this first apprenticeship.

After quickly abandoning the alchemist, Rafe makes a similar mistake of will in his commitment to a new master. Rafe hopes for another transformation through this second apprenticeship:

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55 2.3.140-42.
Astronomer. I accept thee…. Therefore come in with me, and thou shall see every wrinkle of my astrological wisdom, and I will make the heavens as plain to thee as the highway. Thy cunning shall sit cheek by jowl with the sun’s chariot. Then shalt thou see what a base thing it is to have others’ thoughts creep on the ground, whenas thine shall be stitched to the stars.

Rafe. Then I shall be translated from this mortality!

Astronomer. Thy thoughts shall be metamorphosed, and made hailfellows with the gods.

Rafe. O fortune! I feel my very brains moralized, and as it were a certain contempt of earthly actions is crept into my mind by an ethereal contemplation. Come, let us in!56

Rafe’s excited response to the Astronomer, “I shall be translated from this mortality!” focuses again on a transformation he hopes will occur to his person. He, himself, will be translated through his subordination to the Astronomer. The word “translated” encourages his audience to consider Rafe’s apprenticeship and its work alongside the tasks of students who would have earned their own social transformation in part through exhaustive translating (of Ovid and others). The comparison Rafe’s language ushers in does not bode well for his prospects. Once again, other parts of his phrasing rhetorically place him in a passive position, receiving the effects of the art he hopes to learn rather than actively engaging with that art himself. He expects to be translated from this mortality, when in fact astronomy (to the extent that the Astronomer’s art is real) would only allow Rafe to do the labor of translating the world around him. Again, this student’s enthusiasm is not for the labor of training but for its anticipated results.

Both of Rafe’s apprenticeships prove to be deeply disappointing. Whereas he easily asserts “I fly!” as he enters into the Alchemist’s tutelage, he later mourns that he lacks wings to escape with the Alchemist’s former runaway apprentice (“I would I had a pair of wings, that I might fly after”57), confirming that no such transformation has taken place. Eventually, Rafe

56 3.4.63-65, 78-90.
57 3.3.3.
offers an explanation of his failures that directs readers toward his lack of self-motivation and the willingness of his subordination. Upon reuniting to his brothers, he describes his failed apprenticeships, “I have had two masters, not by art, but by nature.”\textsuperscript{58} Leah Scragg glosses this passage with two possible meanings: 1) “not because they had academic degrees, but because I was in their employ” and 2) “not by design but because that was the customary course of events.”\textsuperscript{59} In either case, Rafe’s joke points out a lack of effort on the part of his masters and himself. If this student’s instructors were such only because they had a trainee and not because they had labored to cultivate a skill in a certain art, then clearly they have not done the work required to affect the artful transformations they promise. They cannot serve as models for a skill they do not possess. Since we never see more of these masters beyond their initial call for Rafe’s apprenticeship (although we do get some hearsay from Rafe about their ineptitude in their respective arts), Lyly does not necessarily go out of his way to demonstrate that they have failed to motivate Rafe the way a schoolmaster would. That we never see any instruction between either teacher and Rafe, though, leaves only empty space where the most important aspect of the subordination (according to educational authorities) ought to be.

Though these trainers might then be charged with a portion of the responsibility for Rafe’s failure(s) of transformation, his other possible meaning (“not by design but because that was the customary course of events”) makes clear that he shares the blame. If Rafe came to have these mentors not because he intended to learn their art and not because he was carefully cultivating his identity, but only because he was thoughtlessly performing his customary role in society as an apprentice, then Rafe too has failed to do the labor that would make him suited to the transformations he desires. If Hebe’s subordination falls short in part because she has no real

\textsuperscript{58} 5.1.16.
\textsuperscript{59} Scragg, ed. p. 100, footnote 16.
choice, Rafe’s thoughtless perpetuation of a customary servitude implies a similar lack of engagement. Unlike the student who Mulcaster insists is better for submitting voluntarily to his schoolmaster’s rule, Rafe suggests he has not selected his masters out of voluntary interest or investment in their practices.

His failure is also notably one of selection. In picking first an alchemist and then an astronomer as his mentor, he selects men involved in fantastical arts that many people viewed with skepticism at the time. As we will see with Galatea and Phillida, however, his selection of an unapproved masterly figure might not have been a problem had he affectively engaged with that model nonetheless and committed himself to mimicking what he desired to become. While Hebe and Rafe’s desired transformations fail, Galatea and Phillida seem at the end of the play to have succeeded when Venus promises to transform either Galatea or Phillida into a boy. Scholars have debated whether we are meant to believe that Venus’s transformation will take place. If we consider how Hebe and Rafe’s expectations for transformation have failed, and if we consider how their roles as subject and apprentice respectively compare to the role of the humanist student in early modern English treatises, it becomes clear that humanist methods of subordinate affective engagement – and specifically the cultivation of love for master and subject are what primarily separate Galatea and Phillida from their subordinate counterparts.

60 See Katherine Eggert, Disknowledge: Literature, Alchemy, and the End of Humanism in Renaissance England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), esp. 4-6, on early modern attitudes toward alchemy as an art which was both true and false, a practiced (and practical) profession and a patently impossible pursuit. Rackin, “Androgyny,” 30, also notes that Rafe and his fellows pursue careers in “dubious trades.”
61 See Joel B. Altman, The Tudor Play of Mind: Rhetorical Inquiry and the Development of Elizabethan Drama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) and Susan C. Kemper, “Dramaturgical Design in Lyly’s Galathea,” THOTH (Fall 1976): 19-31; for two older works that argue that the transformation does occur by arguing that the play depicts Galatea as the girl who will be transformed. Shannon, “Nature’s Bias,” 206, argues that the authorization of Galatea and Phillida’s desire for one another on the basis of likeness has a firmer grasp in the play than the transformation which is deferred and “as haunted by impossibility as alchemy had been” since the play depicts love according to likeness as more “natural” than the difference-based marriage Venus promises to eventually make possible: “at the play’s end there are still only two kinds of gender-mixed bonds on the table: a predatory heterosexuality marked as inimical to female characters and a deferred sex-change within a love established clearly on the basis of ‘natural attraction,’ that is, a drawing-toward effected by a law of like natures.”
Subordinate Authorization of Masterly Models

By approaching one another with the goal of learning to be a boy through imitation, Galatea and Phillida each seek to learn according to humanist educational precepts. They bestow the authority of an expert model onto each other, while simultaneously (and without knowing it) serving as the model for the other’s behavior. Each girl occupies, then, a position of simultaneous teacher, subject, model, and student relative to her counterpart. Specifically, the method the girls use to learn how to be a boy, whereby they seek to learn about something new by imitating that something and therefore acting as if they are what they are not, enacts imitatio and actio. And despite the fact that both girls have inadvertently selected problematic models for the masculinity they hope to achieve, Venus finds their efforts worthy of approval.

Initially, it is clear that Galatea and Phillida intended to select a societally normative model of masculinity. But as they continue to identify with one another, they each begin to suspect the other might be a more problematic authority than anticipated. Following these growing suspicions, the girls simultaneously attempt to hint that they are girls and increasingly come to worry that the other might be hinting the same (since, of course, she is). Phillida says anxiously in an aside “I fear me he is as I am, a maiden,” only to dismiss her fear in her next line: “Tush, it cannot be; his voice shows the contrary.”62 Galatea considers the same possibility in her following line: “What dread riseth in my mind! I fear the boy to be as I am, a maiden,” and likewise rejects the notion, “Yet I do not think it; for he would then have blushed.”63 Both girls change their mind several times, Galatea in one moment concluding “Ay me! He is as I am, for his speeches be as mine are,” bringing to mind the role rhetorical performance played in gender

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62 3.2.32-33, 36-37.
identification in the schoolroom and beyond. Unable to definitively resolve their confusion, Phillida finally proposes to Galatea, “Come, let us into the grove, and make much of one another that cannot tell what to think of one another.”

When they return from the grove four scenes later, the girls are steadfastly in love, but seem not to have determined one another’s gender. Their evident continuing confusion about how to classify the other’s gender has inspired much scholarly discussion about what it is, exactly, that the girls might have done in the grove. Phillida’s proposal can be read as an amorous one. Theodora Jankowski argues that the girls have a sexual encounter, but that their lack of knowledge about sex according to patriarchal order (because of their virginity) allows that sexuality to occur in a realm other than that of the patriarchy. For Jankowski, then, it is important that the girls’ encounter is a sexual one which does not require the gender and sex differences patriarchal order would consider necessary for sex to occur. For Mark Dooley, the sexuality of the girls’ encounter is also important, since he sees it as an acknowledgement of the viability of female-female desire despite the anxiety expressed about the same at the end of the play.

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64 3.2.45-46.
65 3.2.64-66.
66 For example, Mark Dooley argues in “Inversion, Metamorphosis, and Sexual Difference: Female Same-Sex Desire in Ovid and Lyly” in Ovid and the Renaissance Body, Goran V. Stanivukovic, ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 61, that Galatea is a play which importantly insists upon female same-sex desire between Galatea and Phillida. He makes the case that Lyly consciously presents female-female desire as such in the play based on what he reads as Lyly’s significant decision to alter the end of the Ovidian tale (Iphis and Ianthe) on which the play is modeled. Ultimately, he argues that “[t]hrough the sex-change tantalizingly offered by Venus but deferred beyond the scope of the action in the play, Lyly is able to heighten recognition of female same-sex desire and make a case for its viability and its tenability though at the same time exposing some of the anxieties surrounding female sexuality and bodies in the period;” in “Queer(y)ing Virginity: Virgins, Lesbians, and Queers of All Types” (Pure Resistance: Queer Virginity in Early Modern English Drama. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 22. Theodora Jankowski reads Galatea and Phillida’s “virgin desire” (one according to which the girls desire one another’s “entire selves rather than that small portion located between their legs”) as a desire that can exist outside of and therefore resist patriarchy.
67 Jankowski, “Queer(y)ing Virginity.”
68 Dooley, “Inversion, Metamorphosis, and Sexuality.”
The actual phrase “to make much of,” however, introduces ambiguity into the scene not just in terms of what sort of sexual act occurred in the grove but also in terms of whether the act was sexual at all, or even primarily romantic. A close look at the meaning of the phrase “to make much of,” reveals that the girls might well enter the grove in order to continue to cultivate their studently love – to treat one another, in other words, as their model and master despite their uncertainty. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the phrase two ways:

**12c. to make much (also little, something, nothing, etc.) of (or on):** to derive advantage from or turn to account, to the degree specified.

And

**29a. to make much (also little, nothing, too much, etc.) of (or on):** to have an opinion or rate at (the degree specified); to treat with much (little, no, etc.) consideration. **to make much of:** (often) to treat with marked courtesy and show of affection.\(^{69}\)

The second definition listed (29a) is the one which has most influenced recent scholarship on *Galatea*. This version of the phrase refers essentially to shows of approval and affection, and it often is used in the context of lovers in the period. A lover, for example, might make much of his lady in a letter or in person. The last part of definition 29a bears out that common, romantic use of the phrase with its emphasis on “make much of” as a phrase used particularly to express “marked courtesy or affection.” Phillida’s remark can be read according to that definition, to suggest that the girls exchange physical and/or verbal affection without specifying how that affection might count or not count as a sexual act.

That same version of “making much of” as “displaying affection for,” however, is also used in situations when a trainer is rewarding a trainee affectionately for successfully obeying instruction or completing a task. So, for example, schoolmasters might make much of a student

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\(^{69}\) The Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “make” v. 1; *trans.* 12c “to make much (also little, nothing, too much, etc.) of (or on)”; and “To frame in thought or representation”, 29a. “to make much (also, little, nothing, too much, etc.) of (or on),” accessed December 2, 2016, http://oed.com.
who learns his lesson quickly or a horsemanship treatise author might encourage readers to “make much of” a young colt who successfully obeys his rider’s command. In this sense of the phrase, the fact that Galatea and Phillida “make much of” one another might suggest education as much as loving exchange. After all, Phillida suggests the girls go into the grove in the first place because they “cannot tell what to think of one another,” not only because they want to express affection.

On top of these two slightly different common uses of “making much” – one referring to what lovers do with one another and the other referring to how masters reward their subordinates for learning their lessons – we also have the first definition listed above (12c): “to derive advantage from or turn to account.” This definition refers less to what the object or person being made much of gets out of the process and refers more to what the person doing the action of making much gets out of that action. While definition 29a focuses on how one treats someone or something with affection, the first focuses on the fact that a person only “makes much” of something in order to derive, or as they are deriving advantage, from that something. In this sense, the phrase emphasizes more the fact that the actor who “makes much” derives some value from the object or person being made much of. The first definition also, in its emphasis on the perspective of the praiser rather than the receiver of praise, calls attention to that way in which,

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for anything or anyone to be “made much of,” someone has to decide that person or thing is *worth* it. In other words, some actor has to authorize the value of the object or person acted upon.

A helpful example of how this understanding of the phrase could be used in the period is in another of Mulcaster’s treatises on early education. In *The first part of the elementarie* (1582), Mulcaster uses “make much” in this latest sense several times. In one instance, he describes how tutor and student should approach the reading of unfamiliar words:

> if anie reader find falt with anie word, which is not sutable to his ear, bycause it is not he, for whom that word serues, let him mark his own, which he knoweth, and make much of the other, which is worthie his knowing.71

Mulcaster says that the reader should take note of the words he does know, but that he should “make much of” those that he does not know because they are “worthie his knowing.” The reader, according to this schoolmaster, should “turn to account” the words he does not know because he expects to “derive advantage” from coming to know them (in this case, he will become more knowledgeable). “To make much of” something here operates as a synonym for making something (or someone) the subject of further study, of giving it (or her) emphasis. To make much of something in this way fits clearly into an educational context, especially from the perspective of the schoolmaster who determines to what his students would be best advised to pay attention.

As I have suggested, it is in response to their unsureness about “what to think” of one another as much as in response to their obvious attraction that Phillida and Galatea decide to

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enter the grove. In “making much,” then, Galatea and Phillida affectively engage with each other in part as students engage with their models and masters. In so doing, Galatea and Phillida cultivate their love for someone they see as their superior (a boy who can serve as a model of the masculinity they each seek to learn – their schoolmaster in the rhetorical performance of masculinity) by making much of them. Their effortful engagement with their respective “superiors” sets them apart from Hebe and Rafe, one who has little agency over her decision to take on a subordinate role and the other who desires transformation but performs no affective labor to achieve it.

In keeping with the claims of pedagogues in the era, Galatea and Phillida’s affective engagement does seem to afford them success in their training. It gives them access to a transformation that allows them each a place in society. By the time they enter the grove, their subordination to their chosen model is based in their own pleasure and motivated by their own desires. This, paired with the labor those motivations lead them to undergo, is shown to be integral to their success. The love they have cultivated ultimately earns them Venus’s approval. Even the validity of their model in the eyes of the society around them ends up being less important than their motives and methods. Venus makes this clear when, as a condition of offering to transform Galatea or Phillida, she asserts that “love and faith” cannot be overthrown by “fortune and nature” and asks the girls, “Is your loves unspotted, begun with truth, continued with constancy, and not to be altered till death?” Her favoring of love and faith over fortune and nature poses her own interests as the goddess of love explicitly against those of Diana, who champions nature and chastity. It likewise gives precedent to the affective engagement that

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72 5.3.144-147.
characterizes Galatea and Phillida’s relationship rather than the pair’s social legibility or actual societal position.

Cupid has earlier articulated a similar value of genuine desire over other motivations for the forming of relational bonds. The god of love directly opposes his own authority to Diana’s by causing her nymphs to fall in love explicitly against their mistress’s command and against the chastity she values. In punishment for this transgression, Diana captures the god of love and seeks to shame him by telling her nymphs to untie his love knots. The nymphs’ efforts, however, primarily demonstrate how their sense of what constitutes love differs from Cupid’s. When the nymphs chastise Cupid about the ease with which some of the knots (which they take to all be love knots) come apart, he informs them that those knots are easily undone “because [he] never tied them.” He then identifies these un-love knots, listing motivations that differ importantly from that of love: “The one was knit by Pluto, not Cupid, by money, not love; the other by force, not faith, by appointment, not affection.” Money, force, and appointment, in Cupid’s explanation, are set against love, faith, and affection.

Cupid’s distinction between love and what looks like love, but is not, refers us back to the conditions of subordination we have seen throughout the drama. While “love,” “faith” and “affection” constitute the terms of Galatea and Phillida’s relation to one another, “force” refers more clearly to Hebe’s earlier predicament and “money” or “appointment” could easily allude to Rafe’s habitual pursuit of wealth-promising masters. Cupid’s version of love is also notably distinct from the rhetorically performed affection used to express service and patronage in Elizabeth’s court. While purely linguistic expressions might well be drawn out by (or in the interest of) money, force, or appointment, the love Galatea and Phillida have cultivated for no

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73 4.2.45-47.
audience in the grove works *against* their social advancement – at least until Venus steps in. According to Cupid’s standards, this makes the girls’ love more reliable than any courtier’s. According to Venus’s criteria, it makes that love worthy of validation. In contrast to the force and habit which has motivated other subjects in the play (and which might motivate others outside the world of the play as well), Galatea and Phillida affirm the values to which Venus and Cupid ascribe. When they respond to Venus’s inquiry by verbally exclaiming that their commitment to one another is “begun with truth,” “continued with constancy,” and “not to be altered” (Galatea says “Die, Galatea, if thy love be not so!” and Phillida responds “Accursed be thou, Phillida, if thy love be not so!”), Venus agrees to make one of them a boy, thereby making their relationship legible within a hierarchical order which requires one of them to be different from, and also superior to, the other.

The play famously ends without determining which girl will be transformed. Venus does not specify, the girls do not inquire, and the epilogue starts before the change occurs. For scholars of early modern sexuality, this ambiguity allows for an affirmation of homoerotic desire despite its simultaneous concession that gender difference is required for the consummation of the girls’ marriage.74 I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that a pedagogical reading of the play builds on the work of scholars who have read the play for its representations of homoeroticism. How the play represents education and how it represents same sex desire become especially intertwined at the drama’s conclusion. Earlier, I noted that moments of the girls’ “linguistic symmetry”75 also evince their connection to schoolboys in training. Similarly, their

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74 Jankowski, “Queer(y)ing Virginity,” 26: “the arbitrary nature of the change – no one knows who will becomes the ‘real boy’ and the women do not seem to care – serves to call attention to the nature of the marriage being made here. I would argue that Venus’ cavalier attitude toward gender – a penis may be necessary to legitimize the union, but the organ here becomes an add-on part, sort of like a better fitting dildo – trivializes the whole notion of the traditional patriarchal marriage.” Walen, “Utopian Lesbian Erotics,” 137: “Lyly does not dramatize the sex change, which suggests its insignificance.” Traub, *Renaissance of Lesbianism*, 287, 327-28.

75 Traub, *Renaissance of Lesbianism*, 328.
loving engagement with another as if the other were their trainer and superior – their subordinate participation in their own instruction, in other words – in the grove ultimately leaves them no longer seeking difference (seeking masculinity) in their “superior,” but instead reflecting similarity.

Though the girls initially approach one another as an authority based on an expectation of difference, their imitative speeches, as Valerie Traub has noted, revel in what is shared and equal between them from the beginning.\(^{76}\) It seems, in other words, that the girls’ subordinate affective labor has not secured a socially stratified difference between them, but has instead undone that distinction, revealing it to be insubstantial and insignificant to their task of pursuing pleasure, desire, and love. It is possible to interpret this result in terms commensurate with humanist goals. As I have mentioned, schoolmasters did, theoretically, eventually intend for their students to become masters themselves. So, it might be possible to understand the girls’ increasing co-identification as the intended result of all imitation, all humanist engagement of student affect. That the girls have increasingly come to discover that they are both girls, however (and thus both subordinates according to the terms of their initial training purpose), problematizes that reading. Having approached one another with the goal of learning to be different from themselves, Galatea and Phillida have come instead to identify with one another while maintaining and affirming their previous identity. Their affective engagement, then, seems to have enticed them away from humanist ideals that would usher them towards a masculine masterly rhetoric.

Offering to perform a transformation and implying that either girl will make an adequate masculine figure in a hierarchical and socially sanctioned household, Venus makes it possible to argue that the girls have, inexplicably, successfully learned to perform masculinity by imitating a

\(^{76}\) Ibid., 327.
feminine figure. This claim, too, though apparently contradictory, might make the result of the girls’ training amenable to humanist training goals. As we have seen both in the fact that humanist programs included texts by Ovid and in the arguably precarious masculinity of the figure of the schoolmaster, it is possible that the production of coherent masculinity out of a rather incoherent model reflects well (if a bit satirically) on the potentials of humanist education. The expectation that such contradictory production is possible, though, is a less than ideal one on which to found a program. Besides the fact that it seems problematically improbable, its success demonstrates the insignificance of a trainer’s inherent masculine authority. If all results are dependent on and only provided by subordinates, the master’s role can only be an arbitrary one. Perhaps the master still serves a social function in this case, but the intrinsic value of that figure is unimportant and, moreover, not affirmable by subordinate success according to the reading above.

Ultimately, the problem Galatea and Phillida pose for masterly hopes about love is the same problem they pose for a patriarchal order that insists on the need for bodily difference for marriage and sexual consummation: the shepherdesses do not seem to actually need difference at all. They do not need bodily difference to desire one another, they do not need hierarchical difference to consider one another models worth imitating, they do not need a difference in social status to successfully train one another in an engagement they find valuable. Throughout the play the girls imitate one another in one sense as part of their self-appointed training program and in another sense because they are in fact already the same. This similitude itself, then, more than the masculinity the Venus promises, is expressed simultaneously as the product of their affective labor and as the precondition of their love for one another (the motivation for that labor). In
imitating one another, the girls create and enhance similarity even as they assume difference, thus creating the co-identification that they increasingly find has always been there.

What becomes unclear as Venus affirms this relationship is what exactly led to and was made possible through the girls’ subordinate love. Is their affective labor predicated on a love to know and imitate what they do not know, as it seemed it might be when the girls entered the grove, or is it predicated on a love of similitude? At the juncture of these two possibilities lies the problem with depending on subordinate love to productively stabilize trainer-trainee relationships. This final scene asks: Does encouraging love between trainer and trainee shore up hierarchical difference by teaching the trainee to pursue with pleasure an identification with and understanding of a master categorically different from himself, or does it encourage trainer and trainee to notice increasingly what they have in common, collapsing categorical difference in favor of a destabilizing (from the perspective of societal order) similitude? In so much as Galatea and Phillida once treated one another as masters, Venus’s transformation only reminds us that neither has ever yet been that masculine master by societal standards. If anything, each girl’s affective labor has given her an opportunity to see how her master is actually like herself, clarifying that both instructors are students, even as their worthiness as a model increases in the eyes of the pupil.

In promising that love can do the “unpossible,” making the love and pleasure that Galatea and Phillida practice produce a hierarchical relationship which Nature in the guise of Diana can approve, Venus assures the audience that she can make love amenable to early modern societal order – much as did pedagogues who argued for love and pleasure as tools of conformity in the classroom. The actual events of the drama thus far, though, have demonstrated that love can approve its own masters – Venus and both of the shepherdesses have done so. Moreover,
Venus’s indifference about which girl ought to become a boy – an indifference the girls share – demonstrates how fundamentally incompatible her own order is with that of the society she promises to satisfy.

**Yielding to Love**

Having seen subordinate love both blur the boundary between trainer and trainee and authorize a model contrary to the differentiating standards of early modern English society, we can read *Galatea*’s Epilogue as an attempt to perform a transformation similar to the one Venus promises the gods and citizens who are upset by the shepherdesses’ commitment to each other. The Epilogue asks us to forget about what we have seen and to accept the drama as an affirmation of love’s power to affirm societal norms. It does so despite the fact that we have not actually seen love (in any form) really do that work. The similitude of Galatea and Phillida’s relationship, as Traub notes, has even been preserved through Venus’ unspecified promise to insert difference between them.77 In the Epilogue, Galatea speaks winkingly to her audience of aristocratic ladies, still dressed as a boy,

You ladies may see that Venus can make constancy fickleness, courage cowardice, modesty lightness, working things impossible in your sex, and tempering hardest hearts like softest wool. Yield ladies, yield to love, ladies, which lurketh under your eyelids whilst you sleep, and playeth with your heartstrings whilst you wake; whose sweetness never breedeth satiety, labour weariness, nor grief bitterness. Cupid was begotten in a mist, nursed in clouds, and sucking only upon conceits. Confess him a conqueror, whom ye ought to regard, sith it is unpossible to resist; for this is infallible, that love conquereth all things but itself, and ladies all hearts but their own.78

Mike Pincombe reads Galatea’s speech here as defiant – Lyly hinting at love’s preferability to chastity, despite Elizabeth’s demand that her ladies-in-waiting practice the latter.\footnote{Mike Pincombe, “John Lyly’s Galatea: Politics and Literary Allusion,” chap. 24 in *A Companion to Tudor Literature* ed. Kent Cartwright, Blackwell companions to literature and culture (Chichester, U.K. and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 381-394; 383-84.} Love, however, as I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, was at issue in a variety of hierarchical relationships, and it was not necessarily being discouraged. Moreover, the love Galatea describes here, apart from the fact that it seems to be moving away from a few good subordinate properties (it makes constancy fickleness, courage cowardice, and modesty lightness – possibly a joke about Galatea’s movement from womanly to manly love), sounds quite a bit like the love that masters hoped to instill in their subjects. As Galatea describes it, love motivates labor and never breeds weariness, and it leads its subjects to take chastisement as encouragement rather than as a source of bitterness and despair. Such a love could presumably spur students and servants alike to obedience and productivity. It could be infinitely useful in processes of training, when active participation is so important. Insomuch as it recommends love to an aristocratic audience that embraced a rhetoric of love in political contexts, Galatea may well be interpreted as safely advising the ladies in the audience to submit to love for their queen rather than for a lover. If we take the Epilogue on its own, then, even if we view it from a narrow royal perspective, it does not necessarily depart from Lyly’s reputation for strategic flattery and playful critique.

While Galatea’s speech itself might not be problematic for hierarchy, however, the similitude it seeks to elide with its opening list of opposites is certainly so. Despite the difference-making list of words with which Galatea begins, there has been a notable lack of differentiation in this play’s most obedient subordinate pair. Lurking under Galatea’s happy insistence that what Venus has done is work across binaries – making fickleness out of
constancy, cowardice out of courage, lightness out of modesty – is the blatant fact that all the love we have seen in the play has been persistently foundering itself in, revealing, and even creating, forms of similitude and equality. By promising that one of the girls will be the clear master of the shepherdesses’ married household, Venus does not so much make the unpossible possible as she rhetorically offers an empty promise – one which Galatea pretends we have seen fulfilled in her epilogue. Venus assures her audience unconvincingly that a love that has done nothing but level hierarchical categories throughout the play can and will now be used to reassert those categories. Well aware of the power of the affective experiences schoolmasters (and other masters) sought to use to their advantage, Lyly’s play reminds its audience that authorizing subordinate love can also authorize subordinates to pursue their own pleasures and create their own systems of value. Love may well be used to secure normative order in some cases, but Galatea reminds us playfully that love can and will also exceed those bounds.
CHAPTER 4
Loving Wrong: Tempestuous Mastery in *The Tempest*

The previous chapters have examined several dramatically staged complications to prescriptive texts’ endorsement of mutuality as a tool for establishing mastery. Chapter 1 explored the perils of masters who acknowledge too overtly their own labors in establishing reciprocal affection between themselves and their inferiors. Chapter 2 turned to the problem of masters whose cruelty can be masked by the societal mandate established in the first chapter – that masterly labor be hidden rather than expounded upon. Chapter 3 considered the threat posed by a subordinate love with the capacity to shape and affirm its own systems of value and order. In the process of viewing mutuality and its problems from these different angles, this project has detailed some of the frustrations of heads of household, of schoolmasters, of horse trainers. It has also reflected on some of the pains, resistance, and self-assertion expressed among their trainees. We have begun to see, in the power of masters’ reflective returns to their labors and in the embarrassing possibility that tyrants can pass for skilled masters, how the initial labors of training continue to inform and sometimes to vex hierarchical relations even after that work has ostensibly passed – particularly in interactions where benevolent domestic rule is required for societal success. If love and mutuality are not established early, frustration and misbehavior are amplified and prescriptive authors caution that correction becomes increasingly difficult.

Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* is preoccupied with the errors that complicate the establishment of rule and with the possibility of redeeming faulty mastery after the fact. It celebrates, ultimately, the message of forgiveness and reform implicit in prescriptive texts that insist English domestic masters can improve their methods and, in so doing, achieve harmony...
and love even in unequal households. Masters can have, according to the logic of their texts, both love and power. *The Tempest* announces itself as a participant in the cultural turn towards training-focused mutual rule first by its insistently back-ward looking structure. A story of exile and return, this drama begins by showing how the early moments of training can be contested after the fact. It ends by asking its audience to look more gently at everyone – and the hierarchical system in which they work – and to have patience with the system and its actors alike. It admits that Prospero has failed as a master, suggesting that his failings and the discontents of his subordinates are common. With a turn towards forgiveness, however, it also insists that his position and the harmony of his household can be restored and maintained. This movement toward resolution makes sense given English prescriptive efforts to reform more extreme modes of mastery. Nonetheless, it should make a modern reader suspicious of the play’s representations. Ultimately conservative in its conclusion, *The Tempest* demonstrates how a prescriptive turn towards gentleness and mutuality can make possible the continuation of a flawed and structurally unjust system. Simultaneously, and relatedly, it shows how such preservative efforts can be wielded to support a colonial discourse that assumes European superiority and takes for granted the possibility of a just and harmonious rule by Europeans over other peoples. To fully understand the colonial work done by *The Tempest*, then, we must understand how it participates in and is built within an English training-centered discourse of benevolent domestic rule.

I propose an English discourse of reciprocal mastery which I have been exploring throughout this dissertation as a larger discursive “con-text” for *The Tempest* (to use Barker and Hulme’s term)\(^1\) – a con-text which helps to shape a related discourse of English colonialism.

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situating it within the broader logic of English mastery. The formal structures encouraged by this discourse of benevolent rule, along with its assumptions about the implications of subordinate agency (that this agency must be acknowledged but does not constitute evidence that inferiors should be anything but inferior) makes possible some of the central colonial work of the drama. The discourse of mutual rule helps to explain the overwhelming presence of declarations of love and affection in a play that is ostensibly about usurpation and tyranny. It clarifies the role of Prospero’s “well-known irascibility,” which has always undermined earlier scholars’ interpretation of the sorcerer as “a self-disciplined, reconciliatory white magician” in his narrative arc toward forgiveness.² It allows for the consolidation of Caliban’s uniquely ambiguous identity, which is never cleanly assigned to one human or animal position but instead encompasses multiple species and subordinate positions, under the category of “trainee.” Lastly, it helps to explain how The Tempest makes its own participation in a discourse of colonialism legible, acceptable, and, at least formally, resolvable (if still somewhat forced or unsatisfying in its resolution) for an early modern English audience.

This discourse of mutual rule centers around the practical needs of training. The collaborative work of early training relations between domestic rulers and their trainees provides a model of mastery as both hierarchically stratified and importantly participatory. The Tempest’s inclusion in a discourse of English colonialism is made possible within, as a subpart of, its relation to this discourse of reciprocal mastery. The latter allows for, and indeed insists upon, the acknowledgement of subordinate agency without admitting to the possibility that such agency might lead to a critique of the master’s position. It is therefore quite useful for the operations of colonial conquest. That a discourse of colonialism is subsumed within a broader training

² Ibid., 199.
discourse is evident in how Shakespeare makes his American-like native of the island (Caliban) also identifiable as an English subordinate. By locating the early American within a generalized English subordinate character, Shakespeare elides the existence of alternative social structures and communities evidenced in the new world and acknowledged in his likely sources. Isolating Caliban’s American-ness from a broader non-European societal context, Shakespeare makes Caliban’s participation in his own subordination one-in-the-same with his inclusion in the social order of the play – a constraining reality for many actual English subordinates, but not initially the condition of the Americas when Amerindians first encountered Europeans. Shakespeare crafts a narrative in which both master and subject admit some wrong and commit to participating in their hierarchical relationship, thus empowering and forgiving the master while acknowledging the importance of the subject’s consent, but also while importantly reiterating the subject’s subjugation.

By viewing The Tempest through the lens of early modern English preoccupations with benevolent domestic rule, we can understand how The Tempest both admits to Prospero’s tyranny and bad mastery and insists that his unacceptable methods are forgivable and emendable – by translating Prospero’s problems into the pervasive everyday struggles of an individual household master. Reading The Tempest as part of a broader discourse of mastery can expand our understanding of what it demonstrates about the more insidious transmitters of colonial logic.

3 For example, I will go into detail about Richard Eden, trans. Pietro Martire d’Anghiera, The decades of the newe worlde or west India… (London: 1555), Early English Books Online, accessed March 1, 2017, http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99840143. Throughout this account, the narrative insists that the Spanish consistently conquer and/or earn the respect of American kings. Nonetheless, many different kings are acknowledged as such, and the Spanish earn allies among them in part by intervening in acknowledged pre-existing social interactions and conflicts between these disparate societies. I do not contest the colonial motivations and effects of these sources, but rather suggest that they acknowledge realities of alternate social structures and pre-existing kingdoms in the new world which Shakespeare’s references to the new world, in contrast, elide. That this work is being done helps to explain why The Tempest asks us to disregard as naïve characters’ expectations that the island offers the opportunity for a new social order or that it brings forth unfamiliar wonders.
One such conveyer – as practical and pragmatic as it is destructive – is a discourse of benevolent rule that allows for a critique of mastery, that emphasizes the value of love and gentleness in any process of establishing command, that acknowledges the value of securing subordinate consent, but that uses such discussions to close down or avoid addressing what might be unjust about the rule initially established. This discourse, though ostensibly criticizing social order for the injustice and cruelty it allows, can also be wielded to enforce and support a hierarchically stratified status quo rather than to undermine, critique, or reimagine it.

Training in The Tempest

From Prospero’s first entrance, The Tempest is concerned with the past and specifically with the continuing effects of earlier instances of training. Scholars have noted the contested nature of Prospero’s own narrative of his story’s beginning by focusing on Ariel and Caliban’s interventions in that story. Even before Ariel and Caliban complicate Prospero’s tale of betrayal and exile with their own complaints about his rule, though, Prospero introduces the complex negotiations involved in establishing mastery and the errors that can plague them. Having just demonstrated his own mysterious powers through the opening scene’s tempest, Prospero describes his brother Antonio’s powers of rule back in Milan with language that bizarrely likens Prospero’s sorcery to Antonio’s pragmatism, locating the beginning of Prospero’s downfall not only in his brother’s treachery but, whether or not he intends to do this, in his own methods of mastery. We might not be accustomed to thinking of Prospero as his younger brother’s master, but reading brotherly relations in such hierarchical terms would not be alien to an English

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audience – especially not to any who had seen or heard of Orlando’s opening speech in *As You Like It*, where he complains that his subordination to his brother Oliver is shameful because Oliver refuses to provide Orlando with the training he expects to accompany that subordinate role in the family.\(^5\) At the time of his rebellion, Antonio is not only Prospero’s brother, but also his subject.

While explaining how he came to be exiled from his dukedom in Milan, Prospero, after claiming that he loved his brother more than almost anyone,\(^6\) suggests that his loving “lording” of Antonio led Antonio to steal his dukedom.

\[
\begin{align*}
\ldots & \text{my trust,} \\
& \text{Like a good parent, did beget of him} \\
& \text{A falsehood in its contrary as great} \\
& \text{As my trust was, which had, indeed, not limit,} \\
& \text{A confidence sans bound. He being thus larded,} \\
& \ldots \text{did believe} \\
& \text{He was indeed the duke.} \ldots \,^7
\end{align*}
\]

Prospero then describes the actions Antonio took under the misconception that he “was indeed the duke.”

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Being once perfected how to grant suits,} \\
& \text{How to deny them, who t’advance, and who} \\
& \text{To trash for overtopping, new created} \\
& \text{The creatures that were mine, I say : or changed ‘em,} \\
& \text{Or else new formed ‘em ; having both the key} \\
& \text{Of officer and office, set all hearts i’th’ state} \\
& \text{To what tune pleased his ear.} \,^8
\end{align*}
\]

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\(^6\) 1.2.69.

\(^7\) 1.2.93-97, 102-103.

\(^8\) 1.2.79-85.
In this telling of it, Prospero presents his brother’s work as mysterious, demonstrating his own confusion about how the usurpation was possible. He struggles to describe what exactly Antonio did. He cannot be sure how Antonio “new created/ The creatures that were [his],” or whether it would be more accurate to say that his brother “changed ‘em,/ Or else new formed ‘em.” Despite this occult language, the “transformations” to which Prospero refers would likely be much less mysterious to Shakespeare’s audience than the sorcerer’s own powers. Antonio has been learning the nuance of governing subordinates and, more importantly, of persuading them to enter into a particular relationship with him as their duke. He has, in other words, been doing the work of training. Antonio learns not only the workings of the political system, but also, significantly, how to use reward and discipline to adjust his inferior’s behaviors and loyalties. The word “trash,” in particular, would help signal this to Shakespeare’s audience, since the verb refers to pulling back on the leash of a hound. Unlike Prospero’s apparently deep but disengaged affection for his brother and subject, Antonio’s interactions with his own subordinates are active, responsive, and associated with the sport of training.

Prospero’s attempt to tell an uncomplicated story of mastery and betrayal in which a good governor is unjustly overcome by his evil underling is immediately undermined by his blatant ignorance about what responsive mastery looks like. The word “creature” contains within it a sense of creation, both past and continuing into the future. Beginning the story of his brief rule on the island and eventual return to his dukedom with Antonio’s re-creation of “the creatures that were [his],” Prospero sets the stage for a drama about the dynamic exchange between teacher and taught that makes trainees into the “creatures” of their masters. Prospero’s complaint against

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9 Orgel, ed. *The Tempest*, footnote 81, p. 105: “trash ‘to check (a hound) by a cord or leash’ (OED).”
Antonio is hypocritical because “his own enterprise [on the island] is precisely the same,” as Ania Loomba asserts.\footnote{Ania Loomba, “Seizing the Book,” in \textit{New Casebooks: The Tempest}, R.S. White, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999): 135-54, 148.} That shared enterprise is one of establishing rule, and training is a central feature of that process. Prospero’s inadvertent hypocrisy is indicative precisely of his ignorance about what is properly considered to be involved in the work that he shares with his brother. After viewing Antonio’s training as witchcraft, Prospero proves equally unaware of how training might be achieved when he attempts it with his own subjects on the island. He serves as trainer for several subjects. He and his servant Ariel use the language of apprenticeship when they debate whether Prospero has broken a promise to “bate” Ariel’s service a year,\footnote{1.2.246-250; see Andrew Gurr, “Industrious Ariel and idle Caliban,” chap. 12 in \textit{Travel and Drama in Shakespeare’s Time} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 193-208, 198, who notes in this exchange “the language of indentured apprenticeship.”} and he acts more overtly as both Miranda and Caliban’s trainer. As Miranda’s “schoolmaster” he has “made [her] more profit/ Than other princes can that have more time/ For vainer hours, and tutors not so careful.”\footnote{1.2.172, 172-174.} And he was Caliban’s early instructor, too, who Caliban says cared for him and “[taught] me how/ To name the bigger light and how the less.”\footnote{1.2.332-336.}

In some regard, Prospero’s training seems to have been successful with Miranda, who Loomba calls “the most successful of his creations.”\footnote{Loomba, “Seizing the Book,” 148.} Other scholars contest this notion, however, arguing instead for Miranda’s agency as expressed through her disobedience via her desire for Ferdinand. See, for example, Melissa Sanchez, “Seduction and Service in \textit{The Tempest}” \textit{Studies in Philology} 105, no. 1 (Winter, 2008): 50-82; and Jessica Slights, “Rape and the Romanticization of Shakespeare’s Miranda” \textit{Studies in English Literature 1500-1900} 41 no. 2 (Spring 2001): 357-379. To the extent that Miranda is in fact fully obedient and well-trained by her father, though, Prospero continues to demonstrate his ignorance of how training works by consistently seeming unaware that he might have actually succeeded in the art with his daughter. After all, he stages her “disobedient” selection of Ferdinand as a
husband under the assumption that her own desire must be independent of her father’s for her to (inadvertently) obey his wish for the match. He also, in the same opening scene in which he describes Antonio’s apparently baffling powers of control, demands repeatedly and distrustfully that Miranda reassert her attentiveness, even as we are given ample evidence – through her repeated verbal assurances and her clearly comprehending follow-up questions – that she has never strayed from obedient listening. Instead of relying on what seems likely to be her available service, Prospero subjects her to the totalizing authority of his magic, under the rule of which he says he “know[s] [she] canst not choose” but obey. If his more conventional methods of teaching work with his daughter to make her a willing and consistent subject to his will, they seem to have done so without the sorcerer’s awareness.

**Prospero the Bad Trainer**

If Prospero’s command over Miranda is generally effective, his lack of skill in training and mastery proves more problematic for his rule over other beings on the island. His incompetence continuously interrupts the broader narrative of perfect control and merciful restoration he tries to tell with Miranda’s carefully orchestrated betrothal, muddying his version of events by calling attention to his own shortcomings rather than the faults of his subjects. These interruptions push him steadily toward a redemption that involves his own admission of guilt and error as much as it involves his “forgiveness” of those who have wronged him. By pointing to these faults and depicting a path to forgiveness beyond them, though, *The Tempest’s*

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16 1.2.451-453.
17 1.2.78-106.
18 1.2.186.
acknowledgement of Prospero’s bad mastery serves to strengthen and ultimately (quite literally) reinstate his social position rather than to question its validity.

The sorcerer embodies several potential mistakes of training that would be familiar to anyone who had encountered an instructional manual on the subject, and that would likely be familiar to the many discontented householders for whom such manuals were professedly produced. Despite Prospero’s claim about the effect of his goodness on Antonio, a “good parent” would not, according to household treatises like William Gouge’s *Of Domestical Duties*, beget an untrue child. And love, as we have seen throughout this study, was expected to do the opposite, assuaging the hatred and rebellion of trainees rather than encouraging overthrow. If Prospero “l lorded” Antonio such that he “did believe/ He was indeed the duke,” it seems Prospero did not “lord” him with enough discipline. Rather, he led him to believe they were exchangeable – that Antonio could take his place as Duke. Prospero’s affection, because it led to an excessive trust and passive disengagement, fostered something of an equality between the hierarchically distinct brothers.

According to his own account, love has been Prospero’s main problem as a rule. Other retrospective stories offered immediately after Prospero’s – by Ariel and then Caliban – however, complicate his depiction of himself, adding to his masterly errors by suggesting that he has swung from being excessively loving to being excessively cruel. Even before Prospero walks on stage, an early modern English audience could associate him, through his name, with tyrannous methods of enforcement. The name “Prospero” holds more than one potential reference for Shakespeare’s moment in England, but one particularly infamous association would be with an Italian horse-trainer. Appearing in horsemanship treatises published after he seems to
have left England, this Prospero represents a dark part of England’s national efforts under Elizabeth I to secure England’s place among Europe’s great nations in the art of horsemanship.

Prospero (whose surname I have been unable to locate anywhere) was an expert in horsemanship who, according to William Cavendish’s 1667 *A new method*, was brought to England by Sir Philip Sidney. Several such Italian horsemen were brought to England by Sidney, presumably to help educate Englishmen in the art of riding.¹⁹ A few of the more famous printed works on the subject that circulated with English-authored manuals during the period were penned by Italians.²⁰ So, Prospero entered England with a reputation as an artful expert of a skill which many Englishmen aspired to attain.²¹ Though initially held up as an ideal example in training, however, his reputation by the time Shakespeare was composing *The Tempest* seems to have diminished significantly.

Gervase Markham, in his 1607 treatise, *Cavelarice*, describes the Italian as a man initially welcomed in England and admired, but later understood to be “a most tyrannous and cruell ryder… out of the depth of his knowledge in hors-leach craft (in which he was most famous).”²²

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²⁰ Perhaps most prominently the Italian nobleman Federico Grisone, who wrote some of the first treatises on courtly riding in the mid-sixteenth century and who Thomas Blundeville, in one of the earliest English horsemanship treatises, references frequently throughout his own text. For a through analysis of Grisone’s influence of early modern and modern horsemanship techniques (including an argument about how Grisone introduced the gentleness that would then be echoed in later English treatises), see Elizabeth M. Tobey, “The Legacy of Federico Grisone,” in *The Horse as Cultural Icon: The Real and the Symbolic Horse in the Early Modern World* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012): 143-171.


²² Gervase Markham, *Cavelarice, or The English horseman containing all the arte of horse-manship…* (London: 1607) *Early English Books Online*, accessed May 5, 2016,
He adds that Prospero “would aduenture sundry bloodie stratagems & cruelties, beyond reason.” Nicholas Morgan follows Markham in a 1609 publication, where he similarly describes Prospero’s fall from fame: “Prosper the Italian Horse-courser flourished… [but] within few yeres hee was meritoriouslie with infamy rejected, as not worthye the vnworthiest horsemans place.” Author Michael Baret in 1618 similarly refers to the Italian trainer, saying that the English are too easily seduced by the novelty of foreigners:

Whereby, (like sheepe) we are led to the slaughter of ignorance… For, when Signior Prospero, first came into England, he flourished in fame for a time, (through that affectionated blindnes we are vailed withall, in exalting strangers for their strange fashions) and so, though hee vsed such tormenting Cauezans, as were more fit for a massacring butcher then a Horseman… as if Art had consisted in cruell torturing poore horses. And yet for all this, our eager desire did so hunt after nouelties, that we neuer regarded whither we went in following the chase, till time (the searcher of truth) gaue evidence of his knowledge, and then a definitiue sentence was giuen against him (as a iust desert) that he was not worthy to bee marched in the reare ward of the meanest professors.

The name Prospero was by the seventeenth century associated with a deceptively impressive but ultimately faulty and cruel rule over creatures. The site of Prospero’s tyranny was not strictly political, although England’s interest in horsemanship certainly was founded in a desire for state power, but also domestic – one of many examples in horsemanship treatises when tyranny becomes a serious possibility for men of varying social status.

23 Ibid.
Tyranny is a serious charge in the period, and one that Caliban aims explicitly at Prospero twice in *The Tempest*. Laurie Shannon calls tyranny “the most abiding concern across sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century political thought,” used only to name “the extremest case of justice denied.” However, the seriousness of the tyranny of *The Tempest*’s Prospero, even given this association, is also undercut by the pervasiveness of the crime within domestic settings – settings which Shakespeare makes more relevant to Prospero, despite his once broad political power, by containing Prospero during the play to a limited and intimate household rule on an isolated island. Despite his once high political position, Prospero’s status and his “realm” during the actual course of the drama is confined to a cave, filled with “brave utensils” which he plans to use to deck a house that we are reminded he does not yet possess. His servant Caliban points out to him bitingingly, and at least close to accurately, that he himself is “all the subjects” Prospero has on the island. These humble limits to the sorcerer’s realm, combined with his overt struggles with the art of training, lower the stakes of the tyranny he exhibits, making it reprehensible but common. A signal of his ineptitude and of what he has yet to learn, Prospero’s tyranny becomes a domestic shortcoming to be overcome rather than a political crime to be punished. The threat of Prospero’s tyranny throughout the action of *The Tempest* is carefully contained to a few subordinates, like the tyranny of the horse-trainer whose methods, though scandalous and embarrassing, are addressed as a signal for needed reform rather than as evidence that horsemanship itself ought to be questioned.

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26 At 2.2.162 Caliban exclaims “A plague upon the tyrant that I serve!” and at 3.2.42 Caliban tells Stephano and Trinculo, “As I told thee before, I am subject to a tyrant….”
29 1.2.341.
Adding to the limited scale of his realm in diminishing the gravity of his tyranny, Prospero is quickly established as a caring figure – not the murderous brute often associated with tyranny in the period.\(^{30}\) In the second scene, Prospero’s daughter is distressed by witnessing the tempest that he has created. When she reveals this to Prospero, he reassures her contradictorily, “No harm./ I have done nothing but in care of thee.”\(^{31}\) Even in the first instance, Prospero insists that what looks like cruelty is in fact a sign of his care. Though his reassurance might not be entirely convincing,\(^{32}\) it nonetheless introduces care as a significant feature of the character Prospero is trying to claim for himself – one that he will continue to attach to his attempts at mastery throughout the play. The sorcerer’s insistence on himself as a loving ruler allows us to understand his misrule as a shortcoming that interrupts his goals – a mistake he will eventually acknowledge and for which he will ask the whole audience’s forgiveness.

**Slave-making and Inadvertent Tyranny**

Immediately following Prospero’s tale of himself as the loving lord betrayed by a greedy subject, Ariel enters the drama and interrupts that image. His exchange with his master demonstrates that Prospero, though he attempts to depict himself as a good head of household, is susceptible to failing at that apparent goal. Despite its praise-filled beginning, Prospero’s exchange with his spirit-servant Ariel quickly becomes contentious. When Prospero makes clear that Ariel’s work is not done (“Ariel, thy charge/ Exactly is performed; but there’s more

\(^{30}\) For a description of the brutality associated with tyranny, see Shannon, *ACcommodated Animal*. The first pages of chap. 1 “The Law’s First Subjects: Animal Stakeholders, Human Tyranny, and the Political Life of Early Modern Genesis,” 29-81, discuss how tyranny was associated with murderousness and even carnivorous relation to one’s subjects.

\(^{31}\) 1.2.15-16.

\(^{32}\) Sanchez, “Seduction and Service,” 53, notes the cynicism of his claim here.
work”), the spirit complains, reminding Prospero that he has broken the terms of their agreement:

Ariel. Is there more toil? Since thou dost give me pains,
Let me remember thee what thou hast promised,
Which is not yet performed me.

Prospero. What is’t thou canst demand?

Ariel. My liberty.

Prospero. Before the time is out? No more.

Ariel. I prithee,
Remember I have done thee worthy service,
Told thee no lies, made no mistakings, served
Without or grudge or grumblings. Thou did promise
To bate me a full year.

Prospero responds angrily to this reminder, inadvertently highlighting his own cruelty. He tries to protest by describing Ariel’s previous mistress (Sycorax)’s awful treatment of Ariel. However, in recounting Sycorax’s cruelty, Prospero’s offense at Ariel’s complaint makes clear that he is aware of and uncomfortable with the possibility that he is a cruel and therefore bad master. His protest at Ariel’s complaint, as it moves forward, shows how “slavery” can be evidence of unjust mastery as much as of a servant’s evil or untrainable character. And it shows that such a masterly failing might be identified in Prospero’s case. Prospero attempts to make his case, referring to Sycorax:

This blue-eyed hag was hither brought with child
And here was left by th’ sailors. Thou, my slave,
As thou report’st thyself, was then her servant;
And for thou wast a spirit too delicate
To act her earthly and abhorred commands,
Refusing her grand hests, she did confine thee,
By help of her more potent ministers,
And in her most unmitigable rage,
Into a cloven pine; within which rift
Imprisoned thou didst painfully remain

33 1.2.237-38.
34 Sanchez, “Seduction and Service,” 60; Orgel, ed. The Tempest, 20.
A dozen years….35

Shortly after this, Prospero will undermine the contrast he seeks to make in these lines by threatening to subject Ariel to even worse punishment if he continues to remind Prospero of his broken promise, saying he will trap Ariel in the “knotty entrails” of an oak “till/ Thou hast howled away twelve winters” if he “more murmur’st.”36 Sycorax’s treatment as described above, moreover, bears a striking resemblance to the way that Prospero is currently treating his other subject, Caliban. Where Ariel once “vent[ed] [his] groans/ As fast as mill-wheels strike” for refusing to do work too “earthy” for his “delicate” nature, Caliban now does the burdensome work of fetching wood, making fires, and performing other manual labor under the threat of being subjected to tortures that would make him “roar,/ That beasts shall tremble at thy din.”37

Prospero’s line in the passage above – “Thou, my slave/ As thou report’st thyself,” has been read as the magician’s attempt to pin partial blame, mitigating his own, onto Ariel for his status as slave. According to Derek Cohen, the line “As thou report’st thyself” makes the implication (whether accurate or not) that Ariel has adopted the term “slave” for himself, and that this self-definition justifies Prospero’s treatment of him.38 However, we should note that the line continues “Thou, my slave,/ As thou report’st thyself, was then her servant.” The syntax makes it possible to understand that Ariel reported himself either to be Prospero’s “slave” or Sycorax’s “servant,” or as both. Similar to the comparative argument he pursues in the following lines, then, Prospero’s phrase does not simply assign Ariel the job of making himself the slave he has become, but also emphasizes that while Ariel reports himself to be Prospero’s slave he

35 1.2.269-79.
36 1.2.295-97.
37 1.2.280-281; 272-273; 311-314; 366-369.
reports himself to have been Sycorax’s *servant*. Much like the comparative description of Sycorax’s treatment, then, Prospero includes both terms in Ariel’s supposed self-reporting to highlight the illogic of how Ariel conceptualizes his service to Prospero, suggesting that it is unjust for Ariel to act as though his service to Prospero is “slavery” when he allowed Sycorax’s demands, apparently much crueler, to be termed simply “service.”

Prospero has reason to bristle if Ariel is characterizing himself as Prospero’s slave. Though slavery would not be legal in English law until the 1660s, the concept would have been both familiar and charged with meaning for Shakespeare’s audience. Already conceiving of their nation as one uniquely adverse to enslavement and committed to freedom, English authors told a history of England that imagined it as a nation frequently fighting off the threat of enslavement. These histories position the English to see instances of slavery as threats to their own freedom, indications of potential future risk. At the same time, the English were increasingly aware of slavery around the globe and were participating in various forms of slavery both at home and abroad. Christian law justified slavery as a product of man’s fall, and texts like Thomas More’s *Utopia* demonstrate how slavery was sometimes conceived as a useful means of punishing and reforming criminals. Writers occasionally proposed to legalize slavery for a variety of pragmatic reasons, but would sometimes suggest slaves be called “bondsmen” rather than “slaves” to avoid public resistance. The concept of slavery in early modern England

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., 4-5.
42 Ibid., 33-35.
43 Ibid., 38.
is, as Michael Guasco puts it, “both widespread and familiar,” pervasive but also inconsistent in its application and interpretation.44

Because the difference between slavery and bondage was not always clear in English texts, claims of slavery can be wielded by masters and their subordinates alike to suggest the other’s fault in household manuals.45 Calling service “slavery” can serve as a commentary on the nature of the subjection imposed on the subject, as when it refers to either “Severe toil like that of a slave; heavy labour, hard work, drudgery,”46 or, figuratively, to “The condition or fact of being entirely subject to, or under the domination of, some power or influence.”47 In this sense, slavery could be used by subjects to describe the unjust or tyrannical nature of their subjection to their master. This, for example, is how a group of English criminals sent to labor in Barbados could be said to use the term when they complained in petitions to Parliament that they were being subjected to a “most deplorable, and (as to Englishmen)… unparalleled condition” of starvation and hard labor there.48 Sent to Barbados in theory because of their crimes and as a justifiable punishment, these petitioners arguably use slavery as a “rhetorical flourish” intended to move their audience back in England to see their treatment as unjust – a strategy that produced

44 Ibid., 5.
45 Sanchez, “Seduction and Service,” 62-63 uses the ambiguity of this term to point out “the difficulty of finding a precise account of the origins and extent of authority,” but does not explore how the characters might wield this term to criticize both the nature of a master’s mastery and the nature of a subordinate’s character. William Gouge, Of Domestical Duties, doc image 145, p. 269. Gouge says that some wives will bristle at the term “subjection” because “they imagine that they are made slaves thereby.” At doc image 225, p. 428, Gouge cautions parents that they might make their children their slaves if they do not balance fear-inducing discipline with affection. At doc image 356, p. 690, he derides masters who treats their servants like slaves. Roger Ascham, The Scholemaster, (London: 1570) Early English Books Online, http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&rfr_id=xri:eebo&res_id=xri:eebo:citation:99840125, doc image 56, p. 48; addresses an anticipated complaint among his readers that making students imitate their masters is “paine slaverie” and protests instead that it is a good method of training.
47 Ibid., “slavery” n. 3b.
a debate among members of Parliament as to whether or not that characterization of their position was accurate.49

“Slavery” can also be used to describe the nature or the actions of the servant or student in question rather than to the nature of the work imposed on him. So, for instance, “slavery” can refer to “Conduct befitting a slave; ignoble, base, or unbecoming behaviour.”50 This is the sense in which slavery becomes a suitable punishment for criminals in More’s *Utopia*, and a potentially reformative way to address criminality. It is possibly because of this latter meaning that Prospero attempts to implicate Ariel in his own condition; but considering the comparative move Prospero relies on throughout this passage, it seems more likely that he means Ariel’s report of slavery to be rendered inaccurate or unjust by comparison. He refers, in other words, to the way Ariel himself has just represented his tasks – as “toil” – accusing Ariel of reporting himself to be a slave when, in Prospero’s view, his servant is in fact not being subjected to slavish conditions. His defensiveness only serves to make his mastery more suspicious, however, since Ariel has not in fact characterized himself as a slave in our hearing. Prospero, in other words, brings up the subject on his own. His quick reaction to Ariel’s complaint, paired with his cruel threat to torture Ariel if he protests again, suggests that Prospero has been waiting anxiously for the accusation of slavery that his spirit-servant does not in fact level at him in his scene – and that he has been doing so with good reason.

**Passionate Tyrants**

49 Ibid. Guasco, *Slaves and Englishmen*, 2, 3, also describes that Parliament debated whether the petitioners’ claims were valid, and some like Hugh Boscawen of Cornwall were persuaded that this enslavement of Englishmen, even for punishment, was dangerous for the precedent it set, claiming that “if Englishmen lost the right to a trial or to petition Parliament ‘our lives will be as cheap as those negroes. They look upon them as their goods, horses, &c., and rack them only to make their time out of them, and cherish them to perform their work.’”

50 Ibid., “slavery” *n*. 2.
Once too loving in his rule over Antonio, Prospero is now sensitive about the possibility that his servants might consider him a tyrant. His quick-tempered responses to any indication that his authority could be questioned, though, only encourage the audience to view him as a failing trainer and, relatedly, as unjust. Prospero’s volatile temperament, exemplified by his threatening response to Ariel’s gentle reminder about the terms of his servitude, is legible as a common fault among masters within a training-centered discourse of mastery. Within that discourse, Prospero’s temper helps to explain why the sorcerer’s apparent desire for harmonious relationships with his subordinates is frequently and overtly frustrated. Instructional manuals focusing on various domestic pedagogies use “tyranny” to describe bad masters. Not tyrants who relish their cruelty – like the Alexander of The Defense of Poesie who takes pleasure in watching the misery he causes re-enacted on the stage or Shakespeare’s openly violent-minded Richard III – the tyrants of these prescriptive texts become tyrants through passionate frustration. The violence of these domestic tyrants works against their goals as trainers, inspiring misbehavior, unproductive fear, and rebellion in their subjects. Richard Mulcaster explains at length how schoolmasters must not give in to their passions when a student proves frustratingly slow to learn:

the fault is generall, and the onely cause, which both makes children loth to learne, and the maisters seeme to be tormenters in their teaching. For the maister hasting on to the effect of his

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51 Brinsley, Ludus literarius, doc image 155, p. 279: “in this louing, equall, milde and tender gouernment, the Masters shall euer haue boldnes and comfort before the children, their parents, in their own consciences, and before God himselfe: whereas in the cruell and vnmerciful tyrannie, they shall haue nothing but feare; feare of the children, feare of their parents, feare in their owne consciences, feare for the Lord.” Markham, Cavelarice, derides those who are “tyrants ouer horses,” doc image 24, p. 58; He also exclaims in regards to other horseman’s ignorant use of a cruel mouthpiece: “I haue seen both of these porstes... which hath made me admire how men for pittie could bee so tyrannous, when the greatest fault in a horse is the soonest reclaimed with gentleness” (doc image 87, p. 64); and Gouge calls cruel householders “tyrants” over their wives and their servants (doc image 184, p. 347; doc image 186, p. 351; doc image 205, p. 389; doc image 95, p. 162).

profession, and the scholer drawing backe, as not able to beare the burden: there riseth a conflict in the maister, with passion, if it conquer him: against passion if he conquer it. If the maister be verie sharp witted in deliuering, and the boy slowheaded in receiuing, then the passion will lightly conquer. Which it cannot doe, where wisedome and consideration in the maister be armed aforehand with pacience, or where experience, and wearines of extremitie haue wrought a calmenes. And as in the maister passion breedes heat, so in the childe infirmitie breedes feare, and so much the more, if he finde his maister somewhat to fierce. Whereupon neither the one nor the other can do much good at all, and all through this hastie imperfection being the matter of heat in the one, and of feare in the other.

Mulcaster emphasizes the conflict within a master between the calm patience that comes from experience and the intemperate passion that “breedes heat” in the master and “feare” in a child. He describes a disheartening positive feedback loop where erring master and slow student react mistakenly to one another, unproductively aggravating the one’s frustration and the other’s fear. He points out that when the master loses his conflict with passion, “neither the one nor the other [schoolmaster or schoolboy] can do much good at all.”

Following this logic whereby angry masters aggravate the perceived dullness of their trainees, John Astley explains that the unresponsiveness of horses to their masters’ directions can often be traced back to their masters’ lack of restraint. He writes that some riders accuse their horses of dullness that requires violence, “As some take wine to be the cause of drunkenness, whereas (in deede) it is the untemperate desire of the drinker, & not the wine: and so is it the untemperate hand of the rider… that breedeth the dullness and hardness… of the horses.”53 In fact, the very last lines of Astley’s Art of Riding return to this point when he assures his readers, “Horsemen which neglecteth to use temperance, and to minister his correction with judgement

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and patience, or omitteth likewise to cherrish his horsse upon his weldoing, shall marre more
horses, than he shall make readie or servicable."54 Roger Ascham highlights the fact that
patience and gentleness are important across these disparate training contexts when he complains
that horsemen often make better instructors than comparatively unrestrained, violent
schoolmasters. Quoting Socrates to suggest that unwilling learning is never effective, Ascham
writes in *The Scholemaster*,

> Fonde scholemasters, neither can understand, nor will folow this
good counsell of *Socrates*, but wise ryders, in their office, can and
will do both: which is the onelie cause, that commonly, the yong
gentlemen of England, go so vnwillinglie to schole, and run so fast
to the stable: For in verie déede fond scholemasters, by feare, do
beate into them, the hatred of learning, and wise riders, by gentle
allurementes, do bréed vp in them, the loue of riding. They finde
feare, & bondage in scholes, They féele libertie and fréedome in
stables.55

Apparently not considering the possibility that horse-riding might just be more enjoyable than
sitting in a classroom, Ascham assumes that boys enjoy horse-riding because the horsemen who
teach them use gentleness to “allure” them to the art. Considering Astley’s claim that the most
successful horsemen will understand the centrality of self-control and patience to training their
horses, Ascham’s claim here might be grounded in something of a truth. In the inverse of the
success experienced by the gentle master whose methods elicit harmonious obedience in horses
and schoolboys alike, passionate trainers are unwittingly tyrannous, subjecting their subordinates
to “feare” and “bondage” that only increase the trainer’s difficulties and the subordinate’s
discontent.56

54 Ibid., 79.
55 Ibid., 10.
Throughout *The Tempest*, Prospero shows himself to be as tempestuous as the natural world he controls, lacking the restraint these prescriptive texts require of masters. His threat to encase Ariel in a tree just as Sycorax did for a fair reminder about the terms of his service and his scolding Miranda for not attending to his words when all signs point to the fact that she *is* listening both demonstrate this.\(^{57}\) In 4.1, he remembers Caliban’s plot in the midst of his masque and bursts into such a rage that both his daughter and her fiancé express alarm.\(^{58}\) It is no wonder that Prospero lectures Ferdinand so excessively on the importance of controlling himself and his passions before his wedding night, knowing how incapable he himself seems of restraint.\(^{59}\) As his explosion mid-masque indicates, Prospero’s tendency toward an unruly passion proves especially problematic in his interactions with Caliban. Prospero and Miranda both use “slave” as an epithet to denigrate Caliban’s character and justify their treatment of him.\(^{60}\) However, even a subordinate’s supposed slavish character can indicate bad mastery rather than the subject’s bad nature. Slavishness among subordinates can emerge, according to instructional manuals, from excessive cruelty on the part of authority. For example, interpreting Ephesians 6.5 (which commands servants to obey their masters with sincerity, as they would obey Christ),\(^{61}\) Gouge writes in *Of Domestical Duties* that “no slauish feare is here meant, as if seruants should liue in conintuall dread, or tremble at the sight of their masters.”\(^{62}\) He adds that “a seruant by the

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was a tyrannical horseman partially because, as the English realized after his initial ascendency, he was “out of the depth of his knowledge” when he pursued horsemanship.

\(^{57}\) 1.2.294-96; 1.2.78; 87-88; 106.

\(^{58}\) 4.1.143-45.

\(^{59}\) 4.1.51-57.

\(^{60}\) 1.2.319; 344; 351 (Prospero refers to Caliban “thou poisonous slave” and “most lying slave.” Miranda addresses him “abhorred slave”).

\(^{61}\) “Slaves, obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, and with sincerity of heart, just as you would obey Christ.”

tyrannie of some master may be brought so to doe: but to doe so is no Christian dutie.” As Gouge describes it here, extreme fear is a slavish behavior, but one that may not be natural to the inferior but rather caused by “tyrannie” on the part of the master who shapes that servant’s character and behaviors.

That a master could make his subordinates into slaves by ruling violently was a pervasive concept, understood to be a risk in situations of domestic rule beyond servitude. Authors of pedagogical treatises, like schoolmaster Henry Peacham, feared beating could transform a “noble” student into “a slave.” And John Brinsley similarly warns in his Ludus literarius: or, the grammar schoole that “extreame whipping” breeds “a slauish feare” in students that makes them wish their masters dead, working against the kind of respect and affection masters would ideally receive from their young trainees. Peacham warns schoolmasters that excessive violence not only reveals a schoolmaster to be a tyrant, but creates students who do not have the appropriate “mutual affection” with their master, who instead “trembleth at their [master’s] comming in, reiynceth at their absence, and looketh his Master (returned) in the face, as his deadly enemy.”

It is easy to see how the description of Peacham’s angry, mistreated student resembles the resentful, seditious Caliban. An emphasis in the dramatic action on Prospero’s role as Caliban’s

63 Ibid., italics mine.
64 Rebecca W. Bushnell, A Culture of Teaching: Early Modern Humanism in Theory and Practice. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996; 31. Peacham, The compleat gentleman, 23, 24; Peacham writes of the errors schoolmasters make in not accounting for the individual natures of their students. This failure leads them to instruct students often improperly according to their skills, strengths, or inclinations, and can also lead to excessive discipline. Peacham says, “indiscretion in correction, in using all Natures alike, and that with immoderation, or rather plaine crueltie” “[shows] themselfes egregious Tyrants, for, Correction without instruction is plaine tyrannis” and says that gentlemen students especially cannot be expected to bear such “barbarous” and “inhumane” treatement (italics in original).
66 Ibid. for tyranny, quotation at p. 25.
trainer, both past and present, suggests that both Prospero’s misunderstanding of the pragmatic use-value of love in training and his passionate temper have shaped Caliban in ways Prospero does not intend, leading him to a contentious, discontented, and hateful relationship with this subject who, in his own words, serves as “all [Prospero’s] subjects on th’ isle.” Continuing the trend of looking back to the co-formative moment of establishing rule, Caliban and Prospero dispute the meaning of their early encounters. Caliban characterizes it,

    When thou cam’st first
    Thou strok’st me and made much of me; wouldst give me
    Water with berries in’t; and teach me how
    To name the bigger light, and how the less
    That burn by day and night. And then I loved thee
    And showed thee all the qualities o’ th’ isle,
    The fresh springs, brine-pits, barren place and fertile.
    Cursed be I that did so!...
    For I am all the subjects that you have,
    Which first was mine own king; and here you sty me
    In this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me
    The rest o’ th’ island.

Prospero counters:

    Thou most lying slave,
    Whom stripes may move, not kindness. I have used thee
    (Filth as thou art) with humane care, and lodged thee
    In mine own cell till thou didst seek to violate
    The honor of my child.

Critics have long noted the parallels between Caliban’s early interactions with Prospero, in which he “showed [him] all the qualities o’ th’ isle,” and the early exchanges between Europeans and the people they sought to colonize. The interactions Caliban describes, though,

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67 1.2.341.
68 1.2.332-39, 341-43.
69 1.2.344-48.
simultaneously establish his position as Prospero’s trainee. Both the affectionate gestures and linguistic training Caliban describes align Prospero’s role with that of the cherishing, instructing trainer. Miranda reiterates that instruction was a significant feature of their early affectionate attempts at establishing mastery over Caliban, saying that she also “took pains to make [Caliban] speak, taught [him] each hour/ One thing or other.”\(^{71}\) Caliban spurns these interactions in hindsight, understanding his initial exchanges with master and mistress as tricks, coercions that forced him into his current state of slavery. The forms of care Caliban names – that Prospero stroked him, made much of him, provided him with sustenance, and taught him to use the English language – allow Caliban to occupy the role of domesticated animal, student, and servant, all at once. While Prospero’s physical stroking of Caliban suggests the kind of bodily interaction more relevant to animal than human training in the period, the fact that he provided Caliban with shelter and sustenance, as well as the possibility that Prospero “made much” of Caliban by praising him verbally, also allows us to imagine these early interactions as those between a schoolmaster and a pupil or a master and a young servant, since both of those relationships could involve parental-like care.\(^{72}\)

Caliban’s claim that the subordination that followed was a betrayal indicates a problem with how Prospero expressed love for his would-be subordinate. Clearly, and unlike the better-trained Miranda, Caliban did not recognize Prospero’s affection as the affection of a superior. The mutuality Prospero likely meant to establish was that of a benevolent ruler over a contented subject. But just as his affection for Antonio led Antonio to see himself in Prospero’s position, fostering an equality Prospero did not intend, Prospero’s gentleness with Caliban evidently

\(^{71}\) 1.2.352, 353-354.  
miscommunicated to the islander a sense of “kindness” and equality that Prospero, once again, did not anticipate. Caliban’s attempted rape of Miranda is, by his own description, an ambitious effort to claim the island for his own by populating it with his children.73 The presentation of Caliban’s crime in this scene is important both for how The Tempest critiques Prospero and for how it assumes Caliban’s subjection to him. Prospero’s relation to Caliban, problematically for Caliban’s political claims, encourages us to see the islander’s attack as a sign of Prospero’s failure as much as of Caliban’s viciousness.

Caliban’s decided betrayal of Prospero’s rule in attempting to rape his daughter and claim the island mirrors Antonio’s earlier attempt at usurpation.74 Like Antonio’s rebellion, Caliban’s emerges, according to Prospero’s account, out of his “kindness” toward and “care” for him. Reminding us of Prospero’s original complaint and mystification about how Antonio’s skill in training led to his exile from Milan, Caliban’s discontent and rebellion alike signal that we should be skeptical of Prospero’s masterly knowledge. Just as Prospero failed to see how his passive trust of Antonio implicates him in Antonio’s usurpation, Prospero fails to see how his excessive affection and “kindness” toward Caliban might make him responsible for this subject’s differently attempted usurpation. Rather than securing obedience, Prospero’s attempt at loving rule again inspired usurpation of power, allowing his servant to blur the boundary between

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73 At 1.2.347, 1.2.349-51, in response to Prospero’s claim that Caliban attempted to “violate the honor” of Miranda, he replies, “O ho, O ho, would’t had been done!/ Thou didst prevent me; I had peopled else/ This isle with Calibans.” As feminist scholars have noted, Caliban’s attempt to use Miranda’s body to assert his own political power is both objectifying and commodifying of Miranda. Although I do not wish to diminish the extent to which we can “deplore Miranda’s attempted rape,” my focus here is on how this crime is presented as reflecting on Prospero as a master and Caliban as a subordinate (quote from Slights, “Rape and the Romanticization,” 375). For analyses that spend more time on Miranda and the implications of the attempted crime for her agency and position in the world of the play (and it postcolonial reactions to it), see Sanchez, “Seduction and Service,” 64; Slights, “Rape and the Romanticization of Shakespeare’s Miranda”; and Jyotsna G. Singh, “Caliban versus Miranda: Race and Gender Conflicts in Postcolonial Rewritings of The Tempest,” in New Casebooks: Shakespeare’s Romances, Alison Thorne, ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 205-225.

74 The parallelism between Antonio and Caliban’s rebellions is part of what allows Stephen Orgel to make his point in “Prospero’s Wife,” in The Tempest: Critical Essays, Patrick M. Murphy, ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 2001): 231-244; 241, that “Caliban is an aspect of Antonio, the evil child, the usurping brother.”
himself and his superior and to attempt to take his place as master of the household. Moreover, several historians have suggested that domestic service of some kind was a life stage for many young people in England.\textsuperscript{75} Masters were expected to be responsible for the moral behavior of their young servants and apprentices, working with them not only to make them skilled workers or obedient members of a household, but also to make them responsible members of society.\textsuperscript{76} When we consider the roles Prospero played as tutor and provider for Caliban, treating him not only as a trainee but also as a youthful subordinate who lacked language and the ability to feed and house himself, Caliban’s awful betrayal, much like his present slavery, reflects poorly on Prospero’s ability as a tutor.

In a reading that places Prospero and Caliban in a political struggle for power over the island, Melissa Sanchez argues that critics have largely ignored how the early modern English “saw rape as an analogue for political tyranny not just as isolated sexual threat or a metaphor for colonial acquisition.”\textsuperscript{77} She suggests that Prospero and Caliban both exhibit tyranny in how they go about attempting to assert political power, and that Prospero eventually “‘wins’ the political struggle not because he is ontologically, culturally, or morally superior to Caliban but because he finally acknowledges that legitimacy requires some form of consent, however deluded.”\textsuperscript{78} Such a positioning of master and servant, however, disregards the important disparity between the parties in this struggle. In so doing, it glosses over the way that Shakespeare translates Caliban into the position of a trainee and thus elides the possibility of his sovereignty. As several scholars


\textsuperscript{76} Gowing, “The Manner of Submission,” 31; Ben-Amos, \textit{Adolescence and Youth}, 171.

\textsuperscript{77} Sanchez, “Seduction and Service,” 63.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 64.
have shown, Caliban’s attempts at claiming power are never taken seriously in the drama, always relegated formally and tonally to the status of a comedic subplot in Prospero’s journey to regain his dukedom.\textsuperscript{79}

So, while the period association of rape with tyranny could be significant for readings of this scene, arguing that Shakespeare suggests tyranny as a real possibility for Caliban ignores the ways in which this scene circumvents our potential view of Caliban as a competing master. Shakespeare does not depict Caliban as a potential ruler, despite the political claims he attempts to make over the island. Presenting us with Caliban’s attempted rape only through Prospero’s words in the midst of a master-servant dispute, Shakespeare encourages us to address both the attempted rape and attempted murder as the crimes of a poorly regulated and disobedient trainee who acts out of his place, rather than those of a usurping lord or unwieldy monarch.

As evidenced in Richard Eden’s translation of \textit{The decades of the newe world}, which contains some striking parallels to \textit{The Tempest} (and in particular to Caliban), representations of the new world available to Shakespeare exhibit the connection between tyranny and rape that Sanchez highlights in her reading. Shakespeare’s translation of those sources into the character of Caliban, though, carefully erases the political power (albeit power depicted in this case as illegitimate) of the figures he references. Eden describes the king Pacra, “a cruell tyranne,”\textsuperscript{80} who is eventually fed to the Spanish explorers’ fighting dogs (the same dogs that are used to hunt down other Americans in this same narrative):

\textit{Vaschus} wrotethe that he neuer sawe a more monstrous and deformed creature: And that nature hath onely gyuen hym humane


\textsuperscript{80} Eden, \textit{decades of the newe worlde}, doc image 120, p. 96.
shape, and otherwise to bee worse then a brute beaste, with maners accordyng to the linyamentes of his bodye. He abused with moste adhominable lechery the doughters of foure kynges his brotherers frome whome hee had taken them by vyolence.\textsuperscript{81}

Punctuated in the middle with the story of a tiger hunt in which the captured and wounded tiger “rored soo terribly, that it grated the bowels of suche as harde hym, and the woooddes and montaynes neare aboute, rebounded the noyse of the horrible crye,”\textsuperscript{82} this narrative in Eden’s text is strikingly resonant with Caliban’s description in \textit{The Tempest}.

Caliban attempts, like Pacra, to take a daughter by violence. He shares both Pacra’s human form and his ugliness, and the “linyamentes of his bodye” also, according to Prospero, match his “maners” like Pacra’s.\textsuperscript{83} In referencing this new world king within the character Caliban, though, Shakespeare weaves that king’s features into an already-subordinate figure relative to a European head-of-household, Prospero. This translation simultaneously evacuates the political association of Caliban’s attempted crime and the potential seriousness of his claim to mastery, rendering both the expressions of a subordinate’s discontent and rebellion. Mention of Caliban’s attempted rape, fittingly, does not usher in accusations of tyranny like those Caliban himself directs at Prospero. Instead, Miranda responds to this memory with a complaint that training efforts are wasted on this creature “which any print of goodness wilt not take.”\textsuperscript{84} Prospero’s accusation of rape is, as Barker and Hulme characterize it, a “reticulation of denial of dispossession with retrospective justification for it.”\textsuperscript{85} Its “denial of dispossession,” however, is made possible not within the kind of colonizing narrative Eden tells, where a dispossession of sorts (and, actually, murder) is fully admitted and justified, rather than denied, through

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., doc image 121, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., doc image 120, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{83} 5.1.290-91. Prospero says of Caliban, “He is as disproportioned in his manners/ As in his shape.”
\textsuperscript{84} 1.2.350.
\textsuperscript{85} Barker and Hulme, “Nymphs and Reapers,” 204.
accusations of rape and tyranny that proceed that dispossession. Caliban frames his own complaint as one of tyrannical usurpation and unjust subjection when he says, “This island’s mine by Sycorax my mother./ Which thou tak’st from me….“ But Prospero’s response, accusing Caliban of being unresponsive to discipline and ungrateful for his initial position with the household, depicts Caliban not as an unfit ruler but as an unresponsive servant who gives him no choice except, as Gouge describes one must do with unteachable servants, to “put [him] out of doors.”

In Prospero’s response (and Miranda’s, which, as I have mentioned, dutifully copies her father’s focus on instruction), The Tempest denies Caliban’s dispossession as it justifies it by locating the justification – in this case, attempted rape – after dispossession and subordination have occurred. Prospero’s narrative distracts us from Caliban’s claim to have possessed the island before Prospero by shifting our focus to how Caliban has performed in his subordinate role since. Both initiating their statements with a chilling reminder of Caliban’s lowly status (slave), father and daughter together insist on not addressing the issue that Caliban’s initial subordination was unjust, positing instead that it was kind and humane treatment for a trainee. They effectively gloss over Caliban’s political claim to the island, characterizing his rape as indicative of an untrainable nature, even though Miranda must interrupt herself in the midst of complying with this narrative to admit that he (tellingly) did seem to learn. They do not acknowledge the attempted rape as an attempt to exercise tyrannical political power, as Sanchez asks us to read it, but present it as an indication that Caliban is ultimately unimpressionable,

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86 1.2.331-332.
87 Gouge, Of Domestical Duties, p. 614-615.
88 1.2.328.
incapable of being “imprinted” with the “goodness” his superiors sought to teach him. He is, in other words, an untoward subordinate.

Prospero finishes this manipulative narrative by commanding Caliban to perform his ordinary domestic tasks and threatening to subject him to physical torments that will “make thee roar./ That beasts shall tremble at thy din.” Returning once more to Eden’s text, this threat itself refers not back to Pacra but to the hunted tiger whose roars “grate the bowels” of those that hear him. As Prospero sends Caliban back to his domestic servitude, his allusion to The decades of the newe world collapses features of the once-powerful Pacra into those of the hunted tiger whose subjection to humanity, though potentially indicative of human tyranny, is also biblically guaranteed.89 A tyrant can be like a beast, after all, but, as Shannon has demonstrated, misrule in the period is often communicated in the image of monstrous human tyranny wielded over beasts and humans alike.90 Caliban, in this scene, is subject to tyranny perhaps as both man and beast, but certainly not treated as eligible to be an enactor of tyranny in those same terms.

Critiquing Prospero, Subordinating Caliban

The translation of scattered features of new world beings into a domestically subordinated Caliban works in two contradictory ways. In one sense, it exposes Prospero to a critique not available in Eden’s story of Spanish explorers’ supposedly just slaying of the tyrannous Pacra. Since Caliban the rebellious trainee is not a tyrant but a subordinate who does

89 Shannon, Accommodated Animal, describes how animals have rights and membership through a pre-Cartesian conception of human rule over non-human animals. Her analysis demonstrates how animal membership and claim to certain rights does not come at the exclusion of their subjection to humans. Rather, their position as subjects relative to human rulers is part of what affords them conceivable rights. Their subordination in-and-of-itself, therefore, is Biblically affirmed and not necessarily questioned, although the conditions of that subordination might be criticized. See esp. 19, 100, and chap. 1 (p. 29-81).
not “know his place,” Caliban’s Pacra-like actions instead suggest that Prospero’s affectionate early interactions might be to blame for Caliban’s power-grab. A critique of Prospero’s rule as intemperate – first in its affections and then in its anger – is only made possible, however, by the fact that Caliban has been claimed as Prospero’s trainee and subordinate, as a creature who is owed certain kinds of care in part because his actions are a reflection of Prospero’s mastery. When Shakespeare asks us to consider Prospero’s faults as a ruler he simultaneously asks us to place Caliban socially below the master whose failures foster his misbehavior. In these intimate domestic contexts, in other words, a move toward a critique of masterly failures can be simultaneously a move to reassert the subordination of that master’s subjects. Such a dual implication is particularly useful in a colonial context where erasing the question of whether masters ought to be masters in the first place is vital to the master’s enterprise.

Positioning Caliban as a bad trainee serves to deny the possibility of the tyrannical political power his attempted rape sought to exert. It does not, as Prospero seems to believe it will, foreclose the possibility that the sorcerer himself is a kind of tyrant. Rather than acknowledging that the care and trust he expressed to Caliban might have served to undermine his authority – rather than acknowledging, in other words, his own failure at establishing benevolent rule – Prospero ejects Caliban from his household. It is this that makes Prospero vulnerable to critique within a training discourse. He subjects Caliban to physical torments that make the islander terrified and resentful, and ready once again to attempt to overcome his master’s authority – this time due to his excessive cruelty rather than his excessive trust. The exiled duke exchanges an excessively gentle rule for a tyrannical one. His methods continue to shape and create Caliban as his subordinate and his lack of awareness of his noxious influence continues to cause problems for him, ruining the harmonious order he attempts to create with his
magical powers. The effects of the sorcerer’s poor mastery ruin his attempts to champion harmonious rule quite literally in 4.1. The pivotal masque in this scene presents an image of restrained, tempered love and harmonious obedience. Venus and Cupid have fled the scene, and Iris calls on “temperate nymphs” to celebrate the explicitly contracted and reserved love of Miranda and Ferdinand. In the midst of this celebration of love, obedience, and temperance, Prospero remembers Caliban’s plot and flies into a rage that both Ferdinand and Miranda note is exceptionally strong and strange. This temper causes the sorcerer to chase Caliban down with spirits appearing like hounds, one of whom he has (ironically) named “Tyrant.” Shakespeare’s insertion of the word tyrant, coming out of Prospero’s mouth, as he follows his rage and hunts his subject, asks the audience to feel discomfort about Prospero’s behavior in this sequence of scenes.

Prospero fails to see how his training methods – his rewarding and trashing – plays an instrumental role in creating his servants as they are. Distracted by the more literal transformations he can produce with his magic, he does not demonstrate much understanding of these more common shaping powers. We saw above how Prospero only partially acknowledges that his “lording” on Antonio empowered him toward usurpation. We saw, too, how his initially kind treatment of Caliban likewise enabled Caliban’s own usurpation attempt. Over the course of the drama, as we watch Caliban’s second rebellion unfold we are reminded that, despite his own claims, Prospero might well be implicated in Caliban’s current rebellions, too. Immediately after Prospero remembers Caliban’s plot during the masque, he returns – tellingly – to a complaint about all the efforts he put into training this underling:

A devil, a born devil, on whose nature

91 4.1.132.
92 4.1.143-45.
93 4.1.257.
Prospero’s masterly complaint echoes Lance’s in Shakespeare’s *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and Thorello’s dwelling on his careful training of Piso in Jonson’s *Every Man in His Humour*. In both of those cases, the master’s revelation of the labor and affective investment he put into training his subordinate and (attempting, in Lance’s case) to secure his obedience coincided with the implication that the speaking master was excessively invested in his inferior and, in fact, unmasterly for dwelling on that investment. By claiming his own efforts, Prospero exposes himself to a shared role in the problems Caliban has and continues to represent.

Prospero’s citation of the growing ugliness of Caliban’s body as he complains about his lost training labors can also reflect back on this trainer’s faults. Caliban’s body, once the hallmark for Prospero’s establishment of mutual rule when he stroked him, fed him, and made much of him, has now become the site of his master’s unrestrained enforcement. And as the one led to Caliban’s first embodied rebellion, this new method contributes to Caliban’s progressive embodiment of his now hate-filled manners toward Prospero. By selecting “pinching” as his preferred form of discipline, Prospero preserves a kind of responsibility for shaping his subordinate, even as he ostensibly has given up the possibility of such shaping.

“Pinching” has been connected to the very real tortures under which those accused of treason were placed. However, the word “pinch” is also commonly used in association with spirits, and the “pinching” committed by spirits carries a connotation not only of torture, but also

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94 4.1.188-193.
95 Breight, “Discourse of Treason,” esp. 24-27.
of transformation or reshaping. Separate from the common modern sense of “To grip or compress (something) tightly and sharply; to nip, squeeze… to grip or squeeze the skin of (a person or part of the body) sharply between the tips of a finger and thumb,” the *Oxford English Dictionary* also includes the following sense of the verb: “To bring into a specified state, condition, or position by squeezing, pushing, pressing, or nipping.” One example of Shakespeare using this latter version of the word, included in the *OED*’s glosses, comes in *The Comedy of Errors*. When Dromio of Syracuse and his master Antipholus are surprised to find the other Antipholus’s wife treating them as members of her household, Dromio exclaims that they must have entered a land of spirits who will “sucke out our breath, or pinch vs black and blew.” Patricia Akhimie has also argued of this image in the play that the bruises both Dromios acquire from their masters’ beatings mark them as inferior in ways which seem “indelible” but which the play shows is in fact manipulable and only ideologically treated as permanent features of their identities. Akhimie’s reading demonstrates how the bruising to which Dromio of Syracuse refers might be treated as socially “shaping” an individual and his status despite its limited (because temporary) effect. Central to this sense of pinching, and the only thing that seems to set it apart from the first sense of the word, is the idea that this pinching has some power to ideologically form or shape the object it is acted upon – in Dromio’s case, by changing his color and asserting his inferior status.

Prospero uses the pinching of spirits, not of hot tongs, to discipline Caliban. Caliban himself describes Prospero’s pinches as darkly transformative as well as torturous. As he

98 *The Comedy of Errors*, 2.2.188-92.
attempts to persuade Trinculo and Stephano to move on from the trap Prospero sets by his door, Caliban cautions them, “If he awake,/ From toe to crown he’ll fill our skins with pinches,/ Make us strange stuff.”

Prospero’s pinches serve as a dark sort of “training” regime. They share with the sorcerer’s initial attempts at training the fact that they “shape” Caliban in ways Prospero does not anticipate or enjoy. They make both Caliban’s body and mind take on the ugly shape of a hateful slave bent on murder. Prospero’s struggles to exert his powers effectively make Caliban his “creature,” not in the abstract sense of Julia Lupton’s human-citizen-animal, but in the sense that he is quite literally created out of Prospero’s training methods. And if Prospero is reluctant to claim his role in this transformation, he nonetheless must claim it if he is ever to become a successful master.

Forms of Power

At the heart of prescriptive texts’ endorsement of reciprocal affection is the understanding that such affection can spring only from individualized attention and communication that travels between master and subject. Though love in this discourse does not imply equality, it does imply an acknowledgement of the agency, the will, of the other in these instances of domestic training, whether that other is human or animal. Instructional manuals emphasize the importance of taking individuality into account and responding to the inclinations, strengths, and weaknesses of a given trainee. That kind of responsiveness makes it important for trainers to have the ability to apply their knowledge to specific situations and subjects. Mulcaster argues that a teacher must have the ability to apply his knowledge to specific situations.

100 Orgel, ed., The Tempest, 4.1.232-234.
Discussing the trainer who should be in charge of a young boy’s mental and physical early education, he says:

But there is a third thing yet besides these two (the master’s love of the subject in which he instructs his pupil and the master’s knowledge of that subject), which is proper to his owne person, which if he haue not, his cunning is worth nought. For though he see and embrace the worthines of his subiect, though he haue gathered in his whole haruest from out of all writers, yet if he want discretion how to apply it according vnto that, which is most fit to the verie meanest not bowghes & branches, but euen the twigges and sprigges of the petiest circumstances, he is no skillfull trayner: but so much the more daungerous, the more helpe of learning he hath, which will bolden him to much.\(^{102}\)

Prospero, who confessed to being more interested in gaining knowledge about the liberal arts than in engaging with his people as duke of Milan, lacks this kind of “discretion.” While his excessive knowledge seems to have afforded him extraordinary powers, Caliban’s rebellion demonstrates how Prospero’s exercising of those powers only exacerbates his failure as a trainer, encouraging fear and anger in Caliban where Prospero had presumably once intended to establish a harmonious rule. In everything, Prospero is excessive and commanding rather than temperate and responsive – this is what his shift to forgiveness promises to emend in him.

At the end of the play, when Prospero relinquishes his magic, he relinquishes an absolute form of enforcement that was being questioned in domestic settings in England at the time. His surrendering of this absolute power, as he turns toward forgiveness, signals his turn to that alternate, more pragmatic and negotiated form of power exercised by his brother. In contrast to Prospero’s insistence earlier that he cannot, despite all his efforts, have any effect on Caliban, he finally acknowledges Caliban as his “creature” at the end of the drama. His acknowledgement does not relinquish his power over Caliban, nor does he give any indication that Caliban will not

\(^{102}\) Mulcaster, Positions, 130.
come with him to Milan and continue to serve in his household. His last words to Caliban simply instruct him to perform another domestic task – “decking the hall” for Prospero’s guests: “Go, sirrah, to my cell;/ Take with you your companions. As you look/ To have my pardon, trim it handsomely.” And Caliban’s declaration of reform reasserts his status as Prospero’s subject. While in one sense Prospero’s claiming of Caliban acknowledges his implication in the discontent Caliban has expressed throughout the drama, that admission of fault is simultaneously an assertion of power. Stephen Greenblatt once declared that “the Caliban of Act V is in a very real sense Prospero’s creature.” For Greenblatt, Caliban’s introduction into Prospero’s language has bound them together with the kind of “deep, if entirely unsentimental bond” formed by colonialization. This bond occurs despite Caliban’s more ugly features and is shadowed over by Caliban’s early claim of injustice. It is, in some ways, the embrace of the ugly effects of colonialism ahead of its time.

For an early modern English audience, however, a familiar discourse of mutual rule in a play that has been concerned throughout with the difficulties of maintaining authority and establishing mastery allows for a more all-encompassing, and certainly a more unrepentant, claim of bondedness. I have suggested that Caliban’s attempted rape of Miranda parallels Antonio’s usurpation, both actions begot of Prospero’s excessively expressed affection that led him to be too trusting and his subordinates to be too presumptuous. Caliban’s subsequent descent into hateful enslavement and shape-warping physical torture due to Prospero’s similarly excessive rage at his disobedience can likewise be traced back to his master’s lack of

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103 5.1.290-92.

104 Caliban responds to Prospero’s command that he go and trim the cave, “Ay, that I will; and I’ll be wise hereafter./ And seek for grace. What a thrice-double ass! Was I to take this drunkard for a god,/ And worship this dull fool!” (5.1.294-97).

temperance, a fault of which Shakespeare reminds us even at the height of Prospero’s own narrative about love and temperance in the masque. If we view 5.1 through the lens of training, we can see how, claiming Caliban as his own – one whom he both “knows” and “owns” – Prospero claims Caliban’s “disproportioned” “shape” and “manners” as well, not only because he must do so “as Philoctetes might claim his own festering wound,” but also because doing so preserves and reasserts his power over Caliban.106 A critique of Prospero is therefore wielded at the expense of fully crediting Caliban with individual will and agency, since it treats his actions as the product of Prospero’s shaping of him. Within the rhetoric of training, there can be no good reading for Caliban. He is either untrainable and therefore undeserving of care, or fully created by his faulted master and “forgiven” his faults only at the expense of his full selfhood.

In the process of building a plot that arcs into an assertion of power through an admission of guilt, Shakespeare contains several references to disparate American encounters all within the solitary Caliban, dressed in a plain gabardine and tasked with carrying wood,107 with “decking” the cave, whose rebellions are confined to the role of a subplot about a discontented but ultimately unthreatening subordinate.108 What in The decades is depicted as a series of battles staged between the Spanish and powerful (though ultimately defeated) societies ruled by tyrants therefore becomes a foolish but sympathetic domestic insurrection that expresses the expected and acceptable growing pains of quotidian master-servant relationships. The narrative of The Tempest does not admit to the important distinctions we might identify between Spanish

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colonialization of America and a householder’s efforts to coerce an unruly apprentice or a rambunctious horse into behaving properly. In fact, it encourages us to view them conflated all together in the figure of Caliban.

What is particularly colonial about Prospero’s insistent insertion of Caliban into a training narrative, even one that critiques the sorcerer and admits to a need for mutual redemption, is that it helps to subsume even Caliban’s rebellions and complaints, along with all the new world signifiers attached to him, into legible features of his subordination within an English status and age hierarchy. Far from imagining him as the ultimate other, *The Tempest* instead introduces us to the islander as already a part of Prospero’s society, after the initial processes of training, however faulty, have occurred. Prospero’s declarations of forgiveness, his claiming of Caliban, afford him a second chance at both his dukedom and at his relationship with Caliban, who reciprocates his master’s forgiveness by acknowledging that Prospero is now a “fine” master and by promising to be “wise hereafter;/ and seek for grace.” Prospero’s opportunity to return to the relationships of mastery he lost is a social fantasy that undercuts the warnings of prescriptive texts about how crucial those early moments of establishing hierarchical relations are, but which also performs some of the hopeful work they do, imagining that all subordinate discontent and rebellion can be done away by gentler methods, by better knowing and responding to an inferior. Training experts imagine that the rebellion of animals emerges out of the tyranny of fallen humans, that if servants work to connect with their masters and if masters are patient with servants then those interactions will always be mutually fulfilling, that students who are shown affection along with discipline will necessarily admire their teachers and find value in the subjects they are taught. Though in some respects the move that prescriptive texts make toward critiquing masters, endorsing gentleness, and acknowledging the separate wills of
subordinates in certain ways surely improves the lives of trainees of all sorts, *The Tempest* demonstrates, it seems inadvertently, that the logic of those texts can also accommodate unjust domination.

Translating the claims of autonomy and authority of New World inhabitants to the discontents of subordinates that would be more familiar to Shakespeare’s English audience (not to mention how the play exchanges those differing English subordinates seamlessly for one another), *The Tempest* suggests that the appropriate response to their complaints is to reflect on how increased temperance on the part of the master and an abandonment of the tyranny embodied in Prospero’s magical powers can bring that conflict to a more harmonious resolution. Though it does cue us to consider how Caliban’s rebellion emerges from the violent tyranny of Prospero’s tempestuous methods, it never seriously considers that Caliban’s rebellion might be an indicator that his subordination in-and-of itself might be unjust. In considering how bad treatment inspires slavish behavior, it avoids addressing how subjection itself can do the unjust work of enslaving. I have explored throughout this dissertation how reflections on the subordination of schoolboys, horses, wives, and servants overlapped with one another in the period. Caliban, as an embodiment of several such categories – student, servant, animal, as well as New World Indian – demonstrates how rhetorics of training which seem to bring early modern mastery more in line with modern notions of agency and equality serve in other ways to keep it firmly within a strictly and hierarchically stratified system that is jarringly unjust from many modern perspectives.

When Prospero asks for forgiveness at the end of the play, his request reminds his English audience that they have seen themselves in his errors, either as the excessively affectionate master, the raging and frustrated trainer, or the resentful subordinate fashioned by
those failures. It should also remind us, though, of the limits of the kind of love and kindness across difference that Shakespeare can imagine, the limits of the mutuality claimed and celebrated in this drama’s resolution and in the discourse of benevolent rule that shapes it.

Now I want
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant;
And my ending is despair
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces so that it assaults
Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardoned be,
Let your indulgence set me free. 109

Stripped of recourse to making his absolute rule over his household succeed, Prospero is given another chance at the less magical and more compromising form of rule he once failed at in Milan. He asks his English audience to applaud this second chance and forgive the faults they’ve seen before them on the grounds that they, too, have “crimes” for which they desire pardon. That we have seen Prospero’s problems played out on such a small scale insists, like this Epilogue, that we view him as a master whose frustrations and faults speak to common household experiences and relatively benign human errors. To applaud The Tempest even in early modern England, then, is to look patiently upon the fact that discontents and bad behavior are pervasive throughout the processes of establishing rule, without refusing on those grounds to reaffirm the rightness of the status quo – without, in other words, questioning Prospero’s position as a master nonetheless.

The implications of such a request are inevitably political. Scholars have frequently read Prospero as representing both playwright and king. That he also embodies a more common household master extends the reach of the play’s conclusion. It makes use of not just the parallels between king and playwright, as Jonathan Goldberg has argued Shakespeare does in Measure for

109 5.1.331-338.
Measure, but adds to these representative possibilities (or simultaneities) the domestic household ruler.\textsuperscript{110} If it is true, as Goldberg puts it, that “by representing representation, Shakespeare contributes to the discourse of his society and to its most pressing questions about prerogative, power, and authority” and that “these questions also affect him, and his meditation on the nature of rule is inevitably self-scrutinizing as well,”\textsuperscript{111} Prospero’s epilogue asks masters of all sorts to experience that same dual experience of scrutinizing an outside authority while simultaneously scrutinizing their own authority. In some sense, we might see Duke Prospero as embodying the authority espoused by James I, who famously used Samuel I to argue that, though kings’ rule could be faulty, they deserved absolute (and patient) obedience from their subjects according to God.\textsuperscript{112} Shakespeare’s expansive representation in Prospero, though, reflects the potential errors of James I only as much as it also reflects the likely faults of many of his subjects within their own relative positions of authority. To forgive themselves their more minor domestic tyrannies, Prospero suggests, is simultaneously to make possible their patience with – even their applause of – other authorities like himself.

Early in the play, when Miranda asks why she and her father were not murdered in the midst of Antonio’s usurpation, Prospero responds with dubious claims of love,


\textsuperscript{111} Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature, 239.

\textsuperscript{112} King James I of England, King James VI and I: Political Writings, Johann P. Sommerville, ed. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 62-84; 66-68. In his The Trewe Law of Free Monarchies, James I uses the story of Samuel trying and failing to dissuade the Israelites for asking God for a king to suggest that kings are appointed by God, but also that subjects should approach their kings with patience when their human nature affects their ability to rule as God intends. He writes, “it is plaine, and euident, that this speech of Samuel to the people, was to prepare their hearts before the hand to the due obedience of that King, which God was to giue vnto them; and therefore opened vp vnto them, what might be the intolerable qualities that migth fall in some of their kings, thereby preparing them to patience, not to resist to Gods ordinance: but as he would haue said; Since God hath granted your importunate suit in giuing you a king, as yee haue else committed an errour in shaking off Gods yoke, and ouer-hasting seeking of a King; so beware yee fall not into the next, in casting off also rashly that yoke, which God at your earnes suite hath laid vpnon you, how hard that euer it seeme to be.” 66-68.
Dear, they durst not,
So dear the love my people bore me, nor set
A mark so bloody on the business; but
With colours fairer painted their foul ends.
In few, they hurried us aboard a barque,
Bore us some leagues to sea, where they prepared
A rotten carcase of a butt, not rigged,
Nor tackle, sail, nor mast—the very rats
Instinctively have quit it. There they hoist us
To cry to th’ sea that roared to us, to sigh
To th’ winds, whose pity, sighing back again,
Did us but loving wrong.  

For Prospero, “love” does not foreclose the violence and murder that his people’s “foul ends” surely included when they placed him and his daughter in a sail-less boat to drift into the open sea. “Love,” too, is ascribed to the winds so that roaring violence is translated seamlessly into the “loving wrong” of the wind’s “pity.” “Loving wrong,” in fact, might best describe how love works throughout this entire drama. Miranda expresses her love to Ferdinand in the last scene by promising she would call his falsehood fair play. Caliban forgives the “loving wrong” that Prospero once committed either by loving Caliban the wrong way as a master or by playing him false with pretended love. Prospero views his brother’s usurpation as the result of his own “loving wrong” in that he loved his brother too trustingly, undermining his ability to “lord” him. Though The Tempest is filled with expressions of love and affection, they are overwhelmingly plagued with the various failures and discontents that come with exertions of power.

Writing at a time when the usefulness of love in maintaining order was being taken seriously by masters of all sorts and at all levels of society, the ending of The Tempest asks us to

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113 1.2.140-51.
114 5.1.172-75. Gina Bloom, “Time to Cheat: Chess and The Tempest’s Performative History of Dynastic Marriage” in The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare and Embodiment: Gender, Sexuality, and Race, Valerie Traub, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 419-434, points out that Miranda’s accusation of cheating also draws attention to her own and Ferdinand’s agency and their ability to resist, change the rules of, and generally complicate Prospero’s strategic plans throughout the drama (and culminating in the expected marriage between Miranda and Ferdinand).
accept that society should remain hierarchical despite its shortcomings. Prospero asks for forgiveness for his own loving wrongs by implicating his audience in their own versions of the same crime. In doing so, he, like the training manuals that similarly coached masters to negotiate their hierarchical worlds with patience but also with unquestioned authority, asks for confirmation that a faulted order is better than a lack of order, that forgiveness and pragmatic re-approaches to the same system are better than questioning that system. Unlike the subordinate love that promised the possibility of reimagining hierarchical structures in *Galatea*, Prospero’s mastery finds hope in assuming that forgiveness is owed bad masters and second chances will be given by discontented subordinates. For all the ways in which the previous chapters have shown that mutuality might undermine an often unjust and problematic hierarchical order, then, *The Tempest* reminds us that mutuality has often worked hard to preserve it.
Coda: Training Now and Then

In *When Species Meet*, Donna Haraway quotes Belgian philosopher and animal studies scholar Vinciane Despret’s description of a successful horse-rider. She uses Despret’s words to spur a discussion of her own experience of co-formative training in agility courses with her dog, Cayenne. Despret describes how riders have been shown to move subconsciously the way they desire their horse to move – subtle movements that their horses feel and simultaneously reproduce. About this phenomenon (called “isopraxis”), Despret writes,

> talented riders behave and move like horses. They have learned to act in a horse-like fashion, which may explain how horses may be so well attuned to their humans, and how mere thought from one may simultaneously induce the other to move. Human bodies have been transformed by and into a horse’s body.¹

This description resonates for Haraway with her own experience of training “with” an animal, a process which Haraway argues requires “reciprocal induction” and “intra-action.”² Haraway theorizes that “training with” transforms both creatures involved and “makes someone out of them both who was not there before.”³ She considers the possibility of these new forms of being in terms of the Heideggerian philosophical concept of “the open.” She writes that “Training requires calculation, method, discipline, science, but training is for opening up what is not known to be possible, but might be, for all the intra-acting partners. Training is, or can be, about

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² Haraway, “Training in the Contact Zone,” 229.
³ Ibid.
difference not tamed by taxonomy." She argues that, at its best version of “natural,” training can be founded on this kind of co-participation, reciprocal response and respect, and openness to potential new being.

Though centuries away from Haraway’s terminology and, in many respects, her ethics, the early modern English clearly observed similar moments of potentially transcendent communication across species. They grapple similarly with the muddiness of differentiation, identification, and mutuality in training, but with a fundamentally different view on the ideal balance of power between the participating parties. In his *Art of Riding* (1584), John Astley sees reciprocity in the “naturalness” of training. He writes of his manual,

> Here you see now in this short discourse, how nature hath ordered this matter. First, that Art must imitate hir: next, that the horsse in teaching must be mainteined in lustiness of courage, and freshness of feeling, which is proper to him by nature: finally the Rider to make him obedient by reasonable meanes, which by nature is proper vnto men: so as these twoo seuerall bodies may seeme in all their actions and motions to be as it were but one onlie bodie. Thus if nature be obeyed, and hir order preciselie kept, it cannot be but the end will haue such successe as we doo desire.

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4 Ibid., 223.

5 Ibid., 222-223. Haraway uses “natural” deliberately as a response to radical animal studies scholars and activists who argue that all forms of training infringe on animal freedom by creating in animals behaviors which are not natural to their species. Behaviorists, in contrast, are “notoriously cavalier about what constitutes natural (biologically meaningful) behavior in an organism,” and counter radical animal studies complaints about how they “ruin” animals by pointing out how those new behaviors and learning processes can improve animal life, especially in situations were animal captivity and living amongst humans are central to species survival. Haraway, who herself discovered the usefulness of behaviorist science for engaging with Cayenne, resists behaviorism’s tendency to see all actions as subject to operant conditioning in a mechanical way, but does argue that training can indeed be “natural” in a sense, and so uses the word in a way that sits between these opposing positions. She makes the case for a natural kind of “training with” which alters behavior relationally between human and animal, allowing for “the coming into being of something unexpected, something new and free, something outside the rules of function and calculation, something not ruled by the logic of the reproduction of the same.” This is the kind of “natural” training to which she refers in the notion I paraphrase above.

Astley allows, even celebrates, how the body of horse and rider seem to become “one onlie bodie.” But he does so while simultaneously, carefully, reiterating an asymmetrical relationship of power between the two, reminding us that, though the independence of the horse (his “lustiness of courage” and “freshness of feeling”) must be maintained, the horse must also be made obedient to the man “by reasonable meanes, which by nature is proper vnto men.” Astley suggests with this phrase that the man’s ability to make a creature obedient is natural, simultaneously reminding his readers the most natural way to assert such authority is through “reasonable” (i.e. not excessive) techniques. Even as he reasserts that the rider ought to be patient, gentle, and temperate, Astley continues to make centrally important the idea that the man is the master in this almost one-bodied creature. What is both beautiful and “natural” about horse and rider to Astley is how their apparent oneness reflects the naturalness of the man’s rule over his subject. Haraway’s “training with” an animal is “natural” primarily in how it can resist the sense of completely controlled reproduction Astley celebrates here. She, a post-modern scholar of animal studies, sees hope in the fact that training can author “the coming into being of something unexpected, something new and free, something outside the rules of function and calculation, something not ruled by the logic of the reproduction of the same.” Astley, a master of early modern England, instead sees training as a process whereby, though trainer and trainee come to operate as one, the horse and man importantly maintain “natural” qualities that distinguish them from one another, artfully performing hierarchically distinct and complementary positions that imitate an implicitly stratified and unequally ordered “nature.”

Haraway cautions against dwelling too uncritically in the shared space of training and assuming equality where it cannot ultimately be claimed, since she rightly “dread[s] the consequences for significant others of pretending not to exercise power and control that shape
relationships despite any denials.” She acknowledges, with this statement, that power and control shape her interactions with others regardless of whether she thinks critically and deliberately about their role in her most intimate relationships. For early modern English masters, as I have shown throughout this dissertation, the mutual work of training could also be thought to drift dangerously toward equality. However, since they actively seek to conform training’s meanings to their embrace of asymmetrical difference, these authors remind themselves to be cognizant of power and control out of dread about what failing to do so might do to themselves and their position as master, rather than to those they govern. In other words, it is problematic for these authors that the pleasures of achieving mutuality might stray into a desire for a more powerful similitude because, as I have shown in this project, mutuality’s appeal for many trainers was based primarily in its potential to maintain a harmonious hierarchy, to make domestic rule reciprocally participatory but also, centrally, to reinforce differences of all kinds.

Haraway’s quote above refers to “significant others,” encouraging us with characteristic commitment to animal personhood to consider how both humans and non-human animals might fall into that category. It is tempting, looking back at how experts in horsemanship and falconry describe expressions of love and understanding between themselves and their animal subjects, to see an unexpected precursor to Haraway’s expansive commitment to respectful and co-transformative companionship in the rhetoric of mutual training that spans status and species categories in early modern England. In this dissertation, though, I have repeatedly shown that early moderns view training as analogous across different categories of relationship because they prioritize the maintenance of hierarchy equally in all those relations, rooting domestic pedagogy

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7 Haraway, “Training in the Contact Zone,” 236-237.
in carefully regulated subordination whether the trainee is a student, a servant, or a horse. In chapter one, Lance’s friendship with his dog in The Two Gentlemen of Verona stood in for the foolishness of masters who might befriend their social inferiors – even at a time when master and servant might be close in age, separated only by social position and not by the communicative differences that separate Lance from Crab. In chapter two, references to beaten horses in The Taming of the Shrew help the audience make sense of Katharina’s incredible transformation, even though her capacity for eloquent speech would seem to belie the usefulness of such an analogy. In chapter three’s reading of Galatea, humanist pedagogy made possible a parallel between becoming a man and becoming a teacher, highlighting the way in which the difference between woman and man might be easily aligned with the difference between child and instructor in the period. Finally, in chapter four, associations across subordinate categories in The Tempest made it possible for the English to view early Americans, servants, children, and animals all as similarly subjected to rule in the body of Caliban. Rather than drawing on alliances across difference to gesture toward an “opening up [of] what is not known to be possible, but might be, for all the interacting partners,” the shared rhetoric of training that activates all these analogies in early modern England works carefully to limit possibilities for mobility or resistance. Rather than viewing training as a process that acknowledges “difference not tamed by taxonomy,” it works consciously to maintain categorization of master and subordinate despite the collaborative interactions of partners.

At odds with Haraway’s goals, English masters go to great lengths to make a variety of disparate asymmetrical bonds mutual while resisting the tendency to produce a form of equity in the process. That doing so requires the production of so many instructional texts and proves

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8 Ibid., 223.
9 Ibid.
problematic in so many interactions on the stage demonstrates the power of training to expose the possibilities of alliance we might celebrate today, even as the early modern English struggle to resist those potentials. That mutuality is promoted in instructional texts despite the threats it can pose to order, however, also demonstrates its paradoxical usefulness for reinforcing difference even as it tends toward disrupting the same. The manual writers I read in this dissertation see how training encourages an admission of the subordinate’s agency, but they also seek through an open acknowledgement of that agency to contain the trainee’s independence and capacity for consent within their own expectations for how power will work across difference. Certainly, a good master must seek after his subject’s pleasure and free participation, but he must also make his inferior obey. Even more difficult, perhaps, he must make his student learn what he wants him to learn.

The English are able to forward both demands at once – that each party in training be accommodated and consenting, but that differentiation be maintained in their interactions – in part because hierarchy is pervasive and central to so many intimate, domestic, and loving social interactions in the period. Most masters in early modern England are simultaneously someone else’s servant, and many human subordinates will go on to master others – or are already masters of others while serving in their subordinate role. Acknowledging how power and control shape one’s interactions with significant others would be vital to the functioning of most everyday interactions. These dynamics of negotiated inequality are of course not new in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but the wealth of printed literature produced on the subject makes the role of mutuality in maintaining order strikingly visible and traceable through a number of contexts. Viewing horsemanship, pedagogy, and household management alongside one another
reveals how central both inequality and affection are to interactions that occur across what now seem like significantly distinct differences.

Because of this, training in this historical moment sits at an awkward ethical intersection between the kind of authority that we might view as acceptable and even deeply necessary – like certain forms of education – and exertions of power whose oppressive goals undermine their ostensive focus on subordinate care or advancement. If in one sense Haraway’s “training with” can open up a path to mutual transformation, to new and unanticipated ways of complementary being, its promise can also elide the fact that all training, even versions of it less complicedly imagined as “training of,” is also, as the early modern English knew, necessarily some form of a “training with.” This dissertation demonstrates that we should approach rhetorics of care and shared work in training with caution, especially when we find them situated in a distant historical and ethical moment. We should remain aware that when masterly authors focus on how to achieve the best version of togetherness across difference, they often simultaneously skim over or even actively seek to undermine the questions we might ask about the oppression that allowed for the initiation of those interactions in the first place. Rhetorics of training, even (or perhaps especially) when they carve out a space of mutuality across difference, are integral to how power is negotiated and represented in early modern prescriptive literature and on the stage. Inverting and complementing Haraway’s point that power and control, if unacknowledged, can interfere with our loving approaches to significant others, an early modern discourse of training reminds us how loving interactions have also been consciously wielded in the past to reify systems of power and control.
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