Lost in Transplantation: Knowledge Production and Memory at U.S. Land Grant Colleges in Colonial and Cold War Japan

by

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Japanese names in the main text of this dissertation are written family name followed by given name, with exceptions for persons who refer to themselves as given name followed by family name in their own writings.
ABSTRACT

Lost in Transplantation: Knowledge Production and Memory at U.S. Land Gant Colleges in Colonial and Cold War Japan

The U.S. land grant college model was transplanted to the northern and southern islands of the Japanese archipelago in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, respectively. My dissertation investigates exactly what was transplanted and what was left behind in the history-making process of U.S.-Japan relations. While these historical events are conventionally studied in different fields, this dissertation bridges Indigenous Studies and U.S. and Japanese histories to provide transnational perspectives in its examination of the roles of U.S. land grant colleges in late nineteenth century Japanese settler colonialism and U.S. imperialism and post-1945 Cold War politics in East Asia. Drawing on multi-sited archival research in both countries and critically engaging with national and university archives, “Lost in Transplantation: Knowledge Production and Memory at U.S. Land Grant Colleges in Colonial and Cold War Japan” reveals the intimate connections between U.S. imperialism and Japanese settler colonialism via agricultural colleges that were previously obscured or lost in their different and nationally bounded ways of remembering and forgetting.

My dissertation discusses how the U.S. land grant college system, which was invented as a legal device for the distribution of land in the public domain of the United States in 1862, along with land laws enacted for the purpose of U.S. settler colonialism,
informed the Japanese during their colonizing projects in Hokkaido. It reveals that agricultural colleges promoted Japanese settler colonialism through land cultivation that relied on U.S. technology, ignored indigenous knowledge production, and transformed native ecology. By extending its temporal scope from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, it further examines how the United States again deployed the U.S. land grant model during its occupation of Japan and Okinawa amidst rising Cold War tension in East Asia. In this global Cold War context, this dissertation further reveals that U.S. officials, U.S. and Japanese university administrators, and Japanese student activists partially and differently invoked historical memories of U.S.-assisted Japanese colonialism, while engaging in critical acts of forgetting their shared pasts. The significance of this project lies in its use of global and transnational perspectives to unveil the material and discursive structures of U.S. and Japanese dual imperialisms and their problematic impacts on indigenous populations.
Introduction

“A Colony of Americans” in Hokkaido, Japan, September 1876: Historical Memory of U.S.-Japan Dual Imperialism

[A] colony of Americans would be a most desirable addition to the population of Hokkaido.1

Kuroda Kiyotaka, expressed in his conversation with William Smith Clark.

The individual and collective example of such persons would be of inestimable service to the Japanese settlers, and they would be certain to make their influence felt in many ways in various parts of the Empire. They would introduce the agricultural practices of America, and by their general business capacity do much to develop the resources of Hokkaido.2

William Smith Clark, in his letter to Kuroda Kiyotaka.

“A Colony of Americans” in Hokkaido, Japan, September, 1876

In September 1876, halfway through the global recession that followed the panic of 1873, Kuroda Kiyotaka, Japanese director of the Colonization Commission (kaitakushi) suggested establishing “a colony of Americans” to “introduce the agricultural practices of America” during his conversations with William Smith Clark, U.S. professor employed by the Japanese government to help develop Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido.3 This proposed U.S. American colony in the northernmost island of the Japanese archipelago was ultimately never realized. As U.S. imperial desire in Hokkaido was not achieved in a concrete way, it remained invisible,

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1 Letter from William Smith Clark to Kuroda Kiyotaka, September 12, 1876, Box No.4, Folder No. 9, William Smith Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
2 Letter from William Smith Clark to Kuroda Kiyotaka, September 12, 1876, William Smith Clark Papers.
3 Letter from William Smith Clark to Kuroda Kiyotaka, September 12, 1876, William Smith Clark Papers.
and the mechanism of the conjuncture of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms and settler colonialism has largely remained unknown.

Clark’s 1876 letter to Kuroda reveals his assumptions about a mutually beneficial collaboration between U.S. and Japanese empires, yet also hints at competition between the two imperial powers as Clark tries to secure special protections for U.S. American immigrants along with the full benefits of imperial citizenship. Clark began his letter by reminding Kuroda of their conversation about the proposed U.S. American colony in Hokkaido during their recent excursion to the Sorachi coal beds: “Your Excellency having expressed the opinion that a colony of Americans would be a most desirable addition to the population of Hokkaido, I beg permission to make a few inquiries and suggestions concerning the matter.” Clark emphasized that U.S. colonists would contribute to the Japanese colonization of Hokkaido by providing a model of what he viewed as superior U.S. agricultural practices. Furthermore, Clark, like Kuroda, presumed that U.S. American and Japanese settlers would cooperate in the shared colonization of Hokkaido.

Despite the assumption of this shared endeavor, however, a degree of friction between U.S. Americans and the Japanese over the territoriality of Hokkaido is also evident in the letter. Clark and Kuroda’s discussion of the U.S. American colony in Hokkaido centers on the question of who and in what capacity owns and controls the island, which the Japanese nation-state had just recently claimed sovereignty over based

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4 Letter from William Smith Clark to Kuroda Kiyotaka, September 12, 1876, William Smith Clark Papers.
5 Here, I borrow historian Charles S. Maier’s definition of territoriality, “the properties of exclusivity and control that territory confers.” He defines “territory” as “global space that has been partitioned for the sake of political authority, space in effect empowered by borders.” This conceptualization of territoriality that distinguishes it from the concept of “territory” is useful when one examines overlapping empires and/or competition for resources within a territory. Charles S. Maier, _Once Within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500_ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 1, 7-8.
on the logic of *terra nullius*, or empty (and uncultivated) land in 1868. Clark sought to clarify several points, starting with the citizenship status of the immigrants from the United States. Clark asked if the immigrants should “adjure their American citizenship and become subjects of the Imperial government?” Next, Clark sought special legal capacity for the colonists: “Would the government grant such persons exemptions from taxation and military service for a term of years, and allow them to constitute a self-governing municipality without annoyance from Japanese officers?” Finally, he tried to secure their rights to economic and commercial activities: “Would such persons be permitted to engage in trade, manufactures, fishing and mining, & with all the rights and privileges of other Japanese citizens in all parts of the Empire?”6 The fact that Clark asked such questions regarding U.S. American settlers’ economic privileges, citizenship, and jurisdiction signifies Clark’s internalization of U.S. territorial desires. It was also highly ironic, given that Clark was hired by the Japanese government to assist with the establishment of Sapporo Agricultural College, which was at the center of Japanese colonizing projects in Hokkaido that sought to modernize Japan and strengthen its sovereignty in the face of encroachment by Western imperialisms. At this time, Japan was subject to treaties with Western countries that restricted its sovereignty, including the United States-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1858, 7 and similar treaties between Japan and the Netherlands, Britain, Russia, and France. This series of treaties were called the “unequal treaties” by the Japanese because they stipulated that Japan establish enclaves for foreigners, accept the loss of tariff autonomy, and allow Western

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6 Letter from William Smith Clark to Kuroda Kiyotaka, September 12, 1876, William Smith Clark Papers.
7 This treaty was based on the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1854, which was led by the Commodore Matthew C. Perry and opened Japan.
powers “extraterritoriality” in Japan. After the Meiji restoration and the foundation of the nation-state of Japan in 1868, the Meiji officials urgently sought to establish sovereignty over the archipelago, modernize the country, and abolish the “unequal treaties.” The Japanese government encroached upon and institutionally incorporated the northern and southern islands of the Japanese archipelago into its sovereignty in 1868 and 1872 respectively, and renamed these islands as “Hokkaido” and “Okinawa.” The 1876 discussion between Clark and Kuroda took place just four years after the representatives of the Meiji government toured the United States and Europe (1871-73) to request deferral of the renewal of the unequal treaties.

Clark’s plan for a U.S. American colony in Hokkaido was based on the premise that the Japanese confiscation of land from the indigenous Ainu was already essentially completed. Clark asked whether the Japanese government would grant travel expenses, housing, and land for cultivation to the settlers (the proposed number of settlers was sixty people, including thirty adult males and their families). The costs for the Japanese government, Clark calculated, would “not exceed $10,000. The land would cost nothing, and houses would prove a good investment of money, which would ultimately be refunded by their rent or sale.” Clark finished the letter by forecasting the success of his plan: “[t]he universal depression of business in the United States renders the present an

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8 Kiyoshi Inoue, Jōyaku kaisei [Treaty revision] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1955), 2-5; Historian Daniel V. Botsman provides the meaning and historical reality of “extraterritoriality” in the 1850s: “extraterritoriality meant in practice that Westerners accused of committing crimes or violating contracts in Japan would be judged in consular courts presided over by other members of the local foreign community. Initially the Tokugawa authorities may have seen little reason to object to these arrangements. […] It was not long, however, before the Japanese began to realize that in reality extraterritoriality was more likely to provide European traders and adventurers with de facto immunity from prosecution than to serve as an expedient measure for controlling them.” Daniel V. Botsman, Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan (Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 2013), 132-133.

exceedingly favorable time for attempting such an enterprise, and I am confident it could be accomplished with the most satisfactory results.” Clark’s expectation that the Japanese government would be able to grant land for free clearly shows that he assumed the Japanese government, not the indigenous inhabitants, owned the land of Hokkaido. Indeed, Clark’s letter never even mentions the existence of the indigenous Ainu in Hokkaido. Thus, this letter exemplifies the central topic I explore in my dissertation: how the collaborative and competitive relationship between U.S. imperialism and Japanese settler colonialism that operated in the Japanese archipelago was premised upon complete ignorance of the epistemology of indigenous peoples.

A similar overlapping of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms in the Japanese archipelago occurred once more after World War II. This time, the United States exerted its power over the archipelago in more concrete and formal ways as a residual power following the clash between the two empires. The United States occupied Okinawa from 1945-72 and the rest of Japan, including Hokkaido, from 1945-1952. Hence, both the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries were critical moments of the reconfiguration of

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10 Letter from William Smith Clark to Kuroda Kiyotaka, September 12, 1876, William Smith Clark Papers.
territory and territoriality over the Japanese archipelago, in which the United States intervened more than any other historical period.

During these two historical periods, agricultural educational institutions—Sapporo Agricultural College (est. 1876) and the University of the Ryukyus (est. 1950)—were established based on the U.S. land grant college system crucially situated at the intersection of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms in the Japanese archipelago. Agricultural education provided Japanese settler colonial and U.S. imperial powers with a rationale to control land and served to institutionalize U.S. American-style agriculture that transformed the political economy and local ecology in late-nineteenth century Hokkaido. Furthermore, as I will discuss in this thesis, during the post-1945 Cold War era, the concept and creation story of the U.S. land grant colleges also contributed to the formation of U.S. exceptionalism that denied U.S. imperialism in the Japanese archipelago. Historian Paul Kramer explains that U.S. politicians and academics have considered imperial acts to be fundamentally incompatible with U.S. national identity, given the origins of the United States in its independence from the British Empire. Since Thomas Jefferson coined the phrase “empire of liberty” and especially during the post-1945 Cold War era, U.S. intellectuals formulated and have depended on the concept of U.S. exceptionalism, which they believed reconciled this contradiction and blurred U.S. imperial past, desires, and actions.12

Therefore, this study interrogates the influence of U.S. agricultural educational institutions within U.S. and Japanese empires, with a focus on the history of the import and export of U.S. agricultural science and the land grant college system to and from

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Japanese colonies in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. By taking a transnational and interdisciplinary approach, incorporating Indigenous Studies with U.S. and Japanese histories, I reveal how the U.S. land-grant college system provided fundamental discursive and material justifications for Japanese colonialism in late-nineteenth century Hokkaido. I argue that the U.S. land-grant college model was used to sever indigenous peoples from their means of production by institutionalizing Western agriculture, ignoring indigenous knowledge, and transforming the ecological landscape. Furthermore, I reveal that the historical memory of the late-nineteenth century U.S.-Japan agricultural college exchange was later utilized during the Cold War, serving to obscure ongoing Japanese colonialism and U.S. imperialism. The formation of dual imperialisms was not brought about by direct confrontation or reciprocal cooperation, but reflects the contingent complicity resulting from each power differently remembering and interpreting their shared past. Not only does this transnational study uniquely expose the discursive, material, and ecological structures of U.S and Japanese dual imperialisms, but it also reveals the erasure of indigenous epistemology and experiences from this history, thereby opening up a space for knowledge production that includes indigenous perspectives.

I focus in particular on the relationship between Sapporo Agricultural College (presently Hokkaido University) and Massachusetts Agricultural College (presently the University of Massachusetts, Amherst). In 1876, Sapporo Agricultural College was established in Hokkaido, where the indigenous Ainu had resided prior to Japanese settlement in the late nineteenth century. This college was modeled after the U.S. land-grant college system; from 1876 to 1893 eight professors came from Massachusetts
Agricultural College to help develop its agricultural science program. In the second half of this dissertation, I examine additional, similar university partnerships produced during the post-1945 period: the relationships between the University of the Ryukyus and Michigan State College established in 1951, as well as that between Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, revived in 1958. The higher education institutions in Hokkaido and Okinawa both entered into contracts with U.S. land grant colleges in Michigan and Massachusetts sponsored by U.S. federal agencies in the context of U.S. Cold War geopolitics.

The history of this educational exchange has been predominantly studied from either a U.S. or a Japanese historical perspective, both of which not only celebrated U.S. professors’ benevolence and contributions to Japanese agricultural science, but also often ignored their more problematic impacts on indigenous populations. To interrogate the invisibility of Japanese settler colonialism and U.S. imperialism in the Japanese archipelago, one needs to examine the processes of rewriting historical memory of late-nineteenth century colonialism at this specific moment during the post-1945 Cold War era.

**Invisible Japanese Settler Colonialism and U.S. Imperialism in the Japanese Archipelago**

The Ainu and Okinawans have resided in the northern and southern islands of the Japanese archipelago, respectively, long before the establishment of the Japanese modern nation-state in 1868. The newly established Japanese government created the colonization commission to dispossess the indigenous Ainu of their lands in the northern islands in 1868 with the assistance of the U.S. government. The northern islands are now
called “Hokkaido,” and are a prefecture of Japan. At the same time, the Japanese government also encroached upon the southern islands, where Okinawans previously had a sovereign kingdom, establishing the Ryukyu Domain in 1872 and “Okinawa” Prefecture in 1879. Later, the United States would occupy Okinawa from 1945 to 1972, and it still possesses extensive U.S. military bases in Okinawa based on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Indeed, the Ainu and Okinawans have been under the direct influences of Japanese and U.S. imperialisms.

However, Japanese studies scholars have pointed out a historiographical bias of Japanese imperialism that either ignores or glosses over issues of Japanese colonization of the Ainu and Okinawans. The dominant view of Japanese imperialism considers imperialism to start with the Japanese possession of Taiwan in 1895, a periodization that excludes the colonization of Hokkaido and Okinawa. Robert Eskildsen states, “[t]he establishment of Japan’s formal colonial empire has served as an influential historiographical guidepost, but it also encourages the view that Japanese colonialism happened after Japan had accomplished its own modernization, rather than that colonialism and modernization happened concurrently.”13 Even though scholars acknowledge that the Japanese government treated the Ainu and Okinawans cruelly and engaged in colonial acts against them, they define Hokkaido and Okinawa as “informal” and/or “internal” colonies at best. However, Michele Mason points out that this historiographical trend in Asian studies reflects the assumption of the fixed notion of Japanese sovereign territory:

Although the phrase “internal colony” includes the word “colony,” it typically functions to attenuate colonial legitimacy through a distinction between external and internal territories. This a priori assumption, however, presupposes an internal status before the actual process of internalization and sanctions the unilateral claims of rule over another group of people.  

Accordingly, Mason intervenes in this historiography by calling attention to the ways in which Japanese imperial ideology and imagination shaped and blurred the status of the northern islands, and how Japanese modern territoriality eventually included and naturalized the northern islands and the Ainu into the status of “internal.” Indeed, the prefix, in-, is the source of the problematic claim. In addition to Mason’s argument, which signifies the ambiguity of the territoriality of the northern islands, the discussion of whether to consider Hokkaido and Okinawa as informal or formal colonies reflects the questions of whether the Ainu and Okinawans were colonized or not, and whether they are Japanese or not.

The case of the post-war history of Okinawa also demonstrates such methodological occlusions. After the battle of Okinawa and near the end of World War II, the U.S. military occupied Okinawa and remained as an occupying power until 1972. During this time, the U.S. military decided to re-build former Japanese military bases in Okinawa for their own use. The U.S. bases and their surrounding communities in Okinawa became the final suppliers for the U.S. military and personnel before they took off for battlefields in Korea and Viet Nam during the Cold War. This militarization under the Cold War reconfiguration of international politics in East Asia rendered the status of Okinawans ambiguous. Yuichiro Onishi addresses the limitations of studying and

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15 Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan*. 
framing U.S.-occupied Okinawa in Asian studies and Japanese studies, and utilizes the methodologies of Asian American studies and American studies for his study of the court case *United States v. Ushi Shiroma* (1954). This case, Onishi posits, “exposes the inner workings of constituting ‘occupied Okinawa’ as an epistemological object and placing it on the edge of U.S. imperial sovereignty.” While Onishi’s project reveals “occupied Okinawa” as a doubly colonized figure, it also implicitly suggests the ways in which the indigeneity of the people of Okinawa had slipped from the discussion of the sovereignty over Okinawa between Japan and the United States.

**Problems of Priorness and Race**

As shown above, the temporality and territoriality of the northern islands and southern islands of the Japanese archipelago are ambiguous in contemporary scholarship. Critical indigenous theory provides a tool to help clarify this structure. Elizabeth A. Povinelli introduces the idea of “the governance of the prior as a mode of political imaginary and manoeuvre in which priorness is not a problem but a problematic that implicates settler and indigenous subjects.” This idea demonstrates that the claims of indigeneity and the authority of settler sovereignty over territory essentially overlap with each other. Povinelli states:

Both are caught in strategic manoeuvres of temporalization and territorialization around this problematic because the nation-state and the indigenous share a set of vital organs originating in a history that pre-dates their emergence even as this history of the present, and in the present, continually foregrounds that these organic transplants are subject to an intense and complex immunity crisis.

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Thus, the settler state and the indigene share sources (i.e., priorness) of authority over sovereignty and indigeneity. Settler powers have governed the prior by utilizing multiple means of legitimation:

The seizure of persons (habeas corpus), property (as an intra-territorial relationship between the sovereign and citizen) and territory (as an inter-territorial relations between two sovereigns) were all articulated through the still emergent notion that what held must hold until it is purchased (or gotten by treaty), forced to give way (through conquest or genocide) or characterized as never having actually existed (such as in the concept of terra nullius).¹⁹

In the case of the northern islands, the Japanese government claimed terra nullius, even though they knew that this area was already inhabited by the Ainu. Furthermore, in both the case of the Ainu and Okinawans, the Japanese government and intellectuals invented an effective tool to govern “the priors,” namely the (re)invention of Japanese-ness, which was first applied to the Ainu and Okinawans in the late nineteenth century. Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues that after the Meiji restoration in 1868, Japanese government officials and intellectuals started to claim that the Ainu and Okinawans were “underdeveloped Japanese.” Although they were considered to be “foreign” before the colonization of the northern and southern islands, in order to claim the legitimacy of Japanese territorialities in these two locales, the Japanese needed to incorporate the Ainu and Okinawans into the category of Japanese.²⁰ This ideological shift is evident in the change of the northern islands’ name from “Ezochi” to “Hokkaido.” Richard Siddle points out, “[t]his naming was in itself a symbolic Japanisation of the island: whereas previously it had been known by the simple description ‘Ainu-land’ (Ezochi), that is, as a foreign region, the legalistic and cultural symbolism of the new name contributed

towards the legitimisation of Japanese rule.” By incorporating the Ainu and Okinawans into the category of Japanese, the Japanese government became able to claim priorness over the northern and southern islands of the archipelago. This problematic structure continued with U.S. imperialism in the northern and southern islands, because at the point when the United States intervened in these territories in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, “Japanese” became the prior. From the points of view of the Ainu and Okinawans, their status as “Japanese” towards outside powers (e.g., the United States) as the prior interfered in their claims of indigeneity.

Similarly, the role of outside powers is often unclear in critical Japanese studies and indigenous studies, since they assume a binary relationship between indigene and colonizer. While the proposed U.S. American colony in Hokkaido was not necessarily a “formal” entity, as Clark’s questions indicate, late nineteenth century U.S. imperial actors desired to profit from or even acquire territory in Hokkaido. As Onishi suggests, the U.S. occupation of Okinawa is certainly a manifestation of U.S. imperialism. To interrogate the problem of the invisibility of Japanese colonialism and U.S. imperialism in the northern and southern islands requires multiple and transnational perspectives.

**Triangulating (or Multiplying) Frameworks and Transnational Feminism**

To challenge such binary frameworks, some scholars have developed alternative frameworks that focus on a third country or group in U.S. and Japanese imperial relations. For example, Yujin Yaguchi investigates how U.S. Americans contributed to the Japanese colonization of the indigenous Ainu in Hokkaido, calling for “more multi-layered and multicultural points of view to enrich our knowledge of the terrain of

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international history.” Keith Camacho examines the ways in which Chamorros in the Mariana Islands experienced and remembered U.S. and Japanese colonialism as well as the Asia-Pacific war. This triangulation drawing on archives and oral histories of Chamorros, Japanese, and Americans, enables him to narrate different histories of World War II and colonialism in the Pacific from conventional historiographies. He points out that previous literature on the Asia-Pacific war tends to describe this history as a clash between two countries, the United States and Japan, and to marginalize the experiences and voices of people of the Pacific Islands. In addition, the historiography of colonization of the Pacific Islands fails to mention of Japanese involvement. Takashi Fujitani, in his comparative research on racism with particular focuses on the military policies of ethnic and colonial minority populations in the United States and Japan before and after the war, combines two different historiographies: the history of Japanese Americans in the United States and Korean history in Japanese colonization. He investigates how the Japanese American soldiers and Korean colonial subjects experienced racism in the United States and Japan, respectively.

By triangulating or multiplying their frameworks, these scholars avoid describing the history of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms in the Asia-Pacific region as a binary opposition, and rather reveal the similarity, complicity, and complexity of the two empires. Although Japan and the United States were key actors in Asia and the Pacific throughout the twentieth century, focusing on the history of the two nation-states separately cannot provide insights into multiplicity of histories in the regions. Therefore,

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23 Keith L. Camacho, Cultures of Commemoration: the Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands (Honolulu: Center for Pacific Islands Studies, School of Pacific and Asian Studies, University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa, 2011).
one needs to incorporate multiple perspectives that have been erased by conventional
historiography.

The insights of transnational feminist studies have also influenced the framework
of this dissertation. Transnational feminist scholars, including Ella Shohat, Inderpal
Grewal, Caren Kaplan, Chandra Talpade Mohanty among others, have developed
theoretical tools to make critiques on the formation of the nation-state from outside
arbitrarily drawn national boundaries. By “transnational,” they do not necessarily mean
cross-, inter-, or multi-national, but they aim to move beyond nation-based thinking and
to articulate social and historical conditions beyond the material and discursive
constraints of the nation-state.25 Similarly, for Chicana feminists, questions of the
national boundary and borderland between the United States and Mexico add an
important perspective because the border between nation-states has forcefully divided
their culture, families, and identities. Aida Hurtado writes, “[t]he exposure to multiple
borders allows many Chicanas to ‘see’ the arbitrary nature of all categories and therefore
the necessity nonetheless to take a stand.”26 Indigenous feminist scholars have also made
important interventions in the understanding of “nation-state.” For example, Audra
Simpson challenges the “colonial logics of the state to critically examine the ways in
which Native women are dispossessed and detribalized within their own respective
indigenous nations, wherein Native male leadership draws on the power of the settler

Museum of Contemporary Art, 1998); Caren Kaplan and Inderpal Grewal, “Transnational Feminist
Cultural Studies: Beyond the Marxism/Poststructuralism/Feminism Divides,” *Positions* 2, no. 2 (September
21, 1994), doi:10.1215/10679847-2-2-430 (accessed February 21, 2017); and Chandra Talpade Mohanty,
Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. (Durham: Duke University Press,
2003).

state to authorize its newfound patriarchal power.”

Similar to Chicana feminists, indigenous feminist consciousness and critical works have a strong power to destabilize and deconstruct the category of the “nation-state.” As Andrea Smith points out, “even scholars critical of the nation-state often tend to presume that the United States will always exist, and thus they overlook indigenous feminist articulations of alternative forms of governance beyond the United States in particular, and the nation-state in general.”

As I described above, my project focuses on two critical periods of reconfiguration of the territory and territoriality of the Japanese archipelago—the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. The insights from transnational feminism allow me to interrogate the assumption of such border-making as natural, to critique these processes as well as to imagine groups who have never been considered in the narratives of these border negotiations.

In this dissertation, I am not in a position to reconstruct an indigenous narrative, but to use its “absent presence” from the U.S. and Japanese national and university archives to clarify the formation of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms over the Japanese archipelago. Transnational feminist scholars have problematized First World feminism’s complicity in imperialism by universalizing the category of women and homogenizing the feminist political agenda; these transnational scholars have developed theoretical tools to articulate the ways in which disparities and diverse experiences are continuously produced in transnational movements of capitals, meanings, and people.

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acknowledge the scholarly misunderstanding of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s article, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Kaplan and Grewal point out that U.S. feminists misread Spivak’s argument and aroused a “desire to extract authentic information and testimony from what is perceived to be peripheral or ‘Other.’” However, Kaplan and Grewal point out, “[w]hile Spivak asks us to analyze this desire and its linkages to first world consolidations of power, this misreading refuses such a linkage in favor of narrowly conceived metropolitan feminist concerns.”

Building upon Spivak, Kaplan and Grewal proposed “transnational feminist practices—that is, an attention to the linkages and travels of forms of representation as they intersect with movements of labor and capital in a multinational world.” My task here is therefore not to tell the story of indigenes per se, but to delineate the structures and links between U.S. and Japanese imperialisms in the Japanese archipelago.

**Defining U.S. Empire**

Studies of U.S. imperialism have contested the definition of national identity in the United States. In contrast to the understanding of European imperialism, the notion of U.S. empire has not been fixed; rather, it has been denied, challenged, and re-articulated by intellectuals and academics in the United States. The historiography of U.S. imperialism shows the ways in which historians and American studies scholars have invented critical methodologies to make the contours of U.S. empire visible, to mirror

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unconscious imperial desires, and to challenge the spatial and temporal dimensions of conventional understandings of U.S. empire.

One key moment in the historiography of U.S. imperialism is the emergence of the “New Left” school in the history of foreign relations in the United States in the late 1950s. William Appleman Williams and his students and colleagues, also called the “Madison School,” emphasized on the logic of economics for their analyses of U.S. empire with a focus on economic aspects of foreign policy as well as the roles of corporations and industry, and explained the ways in which the United States expanded its territory while seeking new markets abroad. Although studies that incorporated political ideology into the economic aspects of foreign relations were developed in the 1980s, such as those of Emily S. Rosenberg and Michael Hunt, it was not until the early 1990s that cultural aspects of U.S. empire gained special attention.32

Amy Kaplan, along with other scholars of American studies and literature, prompted a paradigm shift in the study of U.S. imperialism in *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (co-edited with Donald E. Pease, 1993).33 Utilizing discursive and cultural analyses, they attempted to deconstruct U.S. exceptionalism as well as U.S. imperial formations of knowledge, meanings, and categories. Kaplan’s introductory article to this anthology, “‘Left Alone with America:’ The Absence of Empire in the study of American Culture,” shows the ways in which the discursive powers that shape American national identity on the one hand negate the history of imperialism on the other. By closely reading the preface of Perry Miller’s *Errand into the Wilderness*, Kaplan shows that

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“Miller represents a coherent America by constructing Africa as an imperial unconscious of national identity.” Furthermore, Kaplan uses Miller’s discursive formation as an entry point to challenge three key absences in historiographies of U.S. history and American studies: “the absence of culture from the history of U.S. imperialism; the absence of empire from the study of American culture; and the absence of the United States from the postcolonial study of imperialism.” Kaplan’s piece suggests that historians and American studies scholars must challenge themselves to view the United States in the broader context of imperialism. In particular, it is significant that Kaplan calls for an expansion of the scale of study of the United States not only spatially but also temporally:

The absence of the United States in the postcolonial study of culture and imperialism curiously reproduces American exceptionalism from without. The United States either is absorbed into a general notion of “the West,” represented by Europe, or it stands for a monolithic West. United States continental expansion is often treated as an entirely separate phenomenon from European colonialism of the nineteenth century, rather than as an interrelated form of imperial expansion. The divorce between these two histories mirrors the American historiographical tradition of viewing empire as a twentieth-century aberration, rather than a part of an expansionist continuum.

Kaplan’s literary intervention in the studies of U.S. imperialism has been very influential. Since the publication of *Cultures of United States Imperialism* in 1993, historians and American studies scholars have critiqued U.S. imperialism as well as exceptionalism by echoing Kaplan’s call.

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35 Kaplan, “‘Left Alone with America,’” 11.
36 Kaplan, “‘Left Alone with America,’” 17.
In addition to the logic of capitalism and culture, historians and American studies scholars have paid attention to the logic of the “military-industrial complex” in order to explain U.S. imperialism. Bruce Cumings, a preeminent scholar of Korea, provided a framework for understanding the ways in which the United States expanded its influence using military logic particularly after World War II and during the Cold War era. In *Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power* (2009), Cumings discusses the ways in which the “military-industrial complex” and U.S. military strategy after World War II, rather than economic and market-driven expansion, determined the basic structure of U.S. empire. By describing major industries and their relations with the military in cities and states on the Pacific coast of the United States, including Texas, Washington, Alaska, Hawai‘i, and California, Cumings argues that the development and expansion of the U.S. military industry has shaped the economy and cultures of the United States. For instance, Cumings posits that, although the proliferation and concentration of technological industry in Silicon Valley is often associated with entrepreneurial success, this could not have been achieved without financial support from Washington based on U.S. military strategies towards Asia and the Pacific.³⁷

This logic of the military industrial complex enables Cumings to understand the spatiality of U.S. empire differently than previous scholarship. First, Cumings intervenes in the history of U.S. imperialism by shedding light on what the United States does beyond the Pacific coastline. Because most U.S. American intellectuals and policy makers are alumni of schools in New England, he points out, the history of United States has been asymmetrically focused on the Atlantic. The other side of the history of the

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³⁷ Bruce Cumings, *Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 469.
United States in the Pacific has not been given adequate attention due to this geopolitical structure of knowledge production. However, Cumings argues, Pacific relations have “come to rival and perhaps surpass our Atlantic relations, giving us a new way to make sense of the American position in the world.” In this sense, Cumings intervenes in the framework of the study of U.S. imperialism by shifting its focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Second, this work provides a different view on the territoriality of the empire. The United States has developed a number of military bases on the lands of its allied countries, and spread and maintained its military networks over the globe, which Cumings calls the “archipelago of empire.” This archipelago of empire was driven by the logic of the military industrial complex. He argues, “[s]ince 1950, […] the American realm in the world has been guaranteed by military forces who relate much more easily to the expansionist tendency. Empires need territory, and these folks live and work on an archipelago that is the clearest expression of the American empire.” However, the ontology of this empire is distinct from other empires in terms of the understandings of territoriality amongst people in the metropole, according to Cumings. For most U.S. Americans, it is not acceptable that the United States owns a “territorial empire” like former British or Japanese empires; its preferable form is “nonterritorial.” Cumings contends:

But we do run a territorial empire—the archipelago of somewhere between 737 and 860 overseas military installations around the world, with American personnel operating in 153 countries, which most Americans know little if anything about—a kind of stealth empire, “hidden in plain sight” as Kathy

38 Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea, vi.
39 Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea, 393.
40 Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea, 391, 393.
Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull put it, one part of which can occasionally be closed down (like U.S. bases in the Philippines in 1992) but which persists because it is politically and culturally invisible, at least to Americans.\footnote{Cumings, \textit{Dominion from Sea to Sea}, 393.}

Here, Cumings clearly shows that the archipelago of empire exists, but is not connected to the popular imagination of empire or acknowledged by the politics and culture of the United States. This intervention is important in that it provides a perspective to see the gap between the actual presence of U.S. empire and people’s understandings.

**Appropriation, Imposition, and “Transpacific Displacement”**

As literally incarnated by Clark, the United States served as an instructor—a teacher—in the Japanese colonization of Hokkaido, and the Japanese settlers were students of U.S. modernization in the late nineteenth century. This schema of U.S.-Japan (teacher-students, big sister/brother-little sister/brother, etc.) relations re-appeared in the post-1945 era, as represented by the iconic picture of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur and Japanese emperor Hirohito. Morio Watanabe suggests that in this photograph, taken on September 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1945, MacArthur and Hirohito are represented and understood as guardian and innocent boy/girl respectively. Although Japanese masculinity and femininity were defined based on military systems until just after the Asia-Pacific War, the Japanese emasculated themselves and represented their identity as adolescent girls and boys by internalizing their relationship with the United States as conqueror and conquered.\footnote{Morio Watanabe, “Imagery and War in Japan: 1995,” in \textit{Perilous Memories: the Asia-Pacific War(s)}, eds. Fujitani Takashi, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 148.} In such uneven relations in the late-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, what exactly did the Japanese settlers learn, copy, adopt and adapt from their U.S. American teachers?
Erez Manela’s work on colonized people that appropriated U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s concept of “self-determination” helps to understand the dynamics of Japanese adaptation of the concept of U.S. land grant colleges. With particular focuses on India, Egypt, China, and Korea, he argues that, although Wilson and other European people did not predict such an outcome, people in the colonial world supported and utilized the concept of self-determination for their own sake. Manela reveals that “[i]n the campaigns that they launched to claim the right to self-determination for their own peoples, anticolonial nationalists appropriated Wilsonian language to articulate their goals and mobilize support for them both at home and abroad.”

The United States also played roles in the reception and adaptation of the concept of self-determination among anti-colonial nationalists. Manela points out that Chinese perceived the United States ambivalently. In other words, although some colonial nationalists were aware of how the United States acted as an imperial power internationally and cruelly treated Chinese immigrants domestically, according to Manela, many of them nevertheless idealized the United States because it achieved independence from the British Empire. Paul Kramer also points out, “many nationalist movements in the pre-1945 period looked to the United States as the model of a successful non-imperial nation, minimizing its colonialism, which raised the specter of ‘empire.’” As I will discuss mainly in Chapter 4, this ambiguity of U.S. history as both revolutionary and imperial agent continued to cast a shadow in Cold War Japan.

Imposing the concept of the U.S. higher education system and agrarian ideal on the Japanese also had an effect on U.S. national identity. In his literary study, Yunte

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Huang reveals that “transpacific displacement” of Chinese literature was actually an integral part of the formation of U.S. American national literature, which was often considered to evolve within the national boundary in the twentieth century. Huang defines “transpacific displacement” as “a historical process of textual migration of cultural meanings, meanings that include linguistic traits, poetics, philosophical ideas, myths, stories, and so on. And such displacement is driven in particular by the writers’ desire to appropriate, capture, mimic, parody, or revise the Other’s signifying practices in an effort to describe the Other.” This “transnational migration of cultural meanings by way of ethnography, translation, and intertextual travel is intrinsic and vital to the formation (and possibly, deformation or destabilization) of any national literature,” Huang argues. While Huang’s and my subjects and approaches differ, Huang’s work helps me to imagine the history of “transpacific displacement” of the U.S. land grant college system in the Japanese archipelago as a part of the formation of U.S. national identity.

**Remembering and Forgetting Colonial Pasts during the Cold War**

To delineate colonialism and imperialism, scholars from history, anthropology, and geography interrogate the politics of history making and knowledge production. One question they share in common is to ask how history is produced. The premise behind this question is that history making cannot be objective or indifferent to colonial, imperial, and global politics, and that history is a product of processes of continuous retrieving and erasing “facts” from the past.

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While archives are a place where historians find evidence, the objectivity of the archive has long been questioned. Building on the insights of Michel Foucault, for instance, Ann Stoler and Antoinette Burton destabilize the objectivity of archives by historicizing them as institutions and contextualizing them in particular power dynamics. Burton collects articles on “archive stories,” which are “narratives about how archives are created, drawn upon, and experienced by those who use them to write history.” Burton argues against the presumption that the archive is objective and exists freely from politics and socioeconomic situations; rather, she suggests that what is to be collected and found in archives is conditioned by political, cultural, and economic pressures.

Furthermore, archives are also not the only place from which people make history. In her synthesis of the works of memory studies scholars, Penny Von Eschen points out that these scholars call for a more inclusive understanding of history making. Taking insights from critiques on the limited nature of archives and the notion of “official” history retrieved from them, they argue that the binary notion of official and non-official history, which often corresponds to the dichotomy of history and memory, is no longer useful. For example, Emily Rosenberg argues, “the distinction between ‘memory’ and ‘history’ is highly contingent upon time, place, and project.” Therefore,

Von Eschen states, memory studies scholars rather suggest interrogating the intersection of history and memory. “[W]hile all historians grapple with the limitations of the historical archive, for scholars of memory, an interrogation of the constructed nature of the archive becomes paramount. To undertake a study of memory is to put such questions front and center.”

Forgetting and silencing are equally important actions as remembering for memory studies scholars and others critically interrogating history-making processes. Emily Rosenberg summarizes, “[w]hat becomes preserved as memory of the past cannot replicate the past but can only select and structure its remains by the simultaneity of remembering and forgetting. Silences are as important as inclusions in historical production.” Michel-Rolph Trouillot discusses how history writing involves silence. According to Trouillot, historians are not necessarily the first agents who write history. That is, there are people who witness events, collect information, and narrate the events based on information. These agents do not necessarily act objectively. During the processes, he points out that certain groups of people’s voices are also “silenced.”

Ann Stoler and Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar further provide nuanced ways of understanding and interrogating the question of silence. They illustrate the various natures of silence: when something cannot be articulated; something should not be talked about; or something is not necessarily raised in interviews and/or historical archives because it is thought of as common sense.

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52 Emily S. Rosenberg, A Date Which Will Live, 4.
Nevertheless, the memory of the past is one of the most influential pieces of rhetoric that is frequently utilized in international politics. Two collections, *Perilous Memories*, edited by T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama, and *The Unpredictability of the Past*, edited by Marc Gallicchio, include articles that deal with the memory politics of the Asia-Pacific War in transpacific relations. Although the subjects of the papers in these collections are various, there is a common understanding that the memory of the past is not stable but is distorted, remembered, forgotten, and reconstructed in response to shifting political, economic, and social conditions.55

Gallicchio argues, the mutual operation of present politics and past memory formed transpacific relations and will continue to do so. “The dynamism inherent in that process is what makes the future of the past unpredictable.”56

A significant shift in remembering colonial and imperial past and present occurred both in the United States and Japan in the post-1945 Cold War era. On the one hand, according to Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama, the Japanese have developed the notion of “national victimology” following the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. They posit, “the most conventional mode of remembering the Asia-Pacific War has been to see it as a moment of historical aberration along the path of an otherwise successful modernization process.”57 In this national victimology, the histories of Japanese colonialism and

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imperialism in and beyond the Japanese archipelago were overshadowed by the supposed takeover of Japanese rule by the military elite from the 1930s to 1945.58

In the United States, the denial of U.S. imperialism proliferated during the Cold War era as a form of “exceptionalism.” Donald E. Pease states, “[t]hroughout the Cold War era, American studies research, teaching, and publication proved themselves indispensable to the state by constructing a nationalist and, ultimately an imperialist discourse out of the exceptionalist norms that they propagated throughout Europe and the so-called Third World.” “The exceptionalist paradigm,” defines Pease, “described U.S. uniqueness in terms of what the nation lacked—a landed aristocracy, a feudal monarchy, a territorial empire, a society hierarchize by class, a deeply anchored socialist tradition.”59

While my multi-sited archival research in the United States and Japan suggests important gaps in ways of knowing and remembering between U.S. and Japanese histories, archives in both countries reflect a biased perspective in relation to indigenous populations during the colonization of Hokkaido. In this dissertation, I also try to take into account what is absent from the archives, and the ways in which the mode of knowledge production of multiple imperialisms acted to further obscure the epistemology of indigenous populations.

Decolonizing the Land Grant University

This university is neither Japanese nor American; it is a university which, its founders hope, will grow into an institution satisfying the needs of the students and serving the people of the Ryukyu Islands. 60

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60 “University of the Ryukyus Catalog, 1951-1952,” Box 283, Folder 1, University of the Ryukyus Project Records, Michigan State University, University Archives and Historical Collections.
In his monograph on the University of the Ryukyus, established in then-U.S. occupied Okinawa in 1950, scholar of American literature Yamazato Katsunori demonstrates two ways of understanding the sentence “[t]his university is neither Japanese nor American.” If one reads “Japanese” and “American” as possessive terms, these words bear political and national meanings, and suggest that the university is for peoples of the Ryukyus. On the other hand, these words could be read as adjectives; he suggests that this reading connotes the university as a unique hybrid of Japanese and American higher education institutions as represented in the curricula and architectural design of the campus.61 Yamazato prefers to take the latter reading, based on his close reading of rich archival materials both in the United States and Okinawa as well as the testimonies of Okinawan academic administrators of the University of the Ryukyus.

Yamazato’s monograph is a history of Okinawan struggles to foster a higher education institution from its start under U.S. occupation through its incorporation into the Japanese national university system after 1972. He challenges the title of “colonial university” that the University of the Ryukyus traditionally bears because it was established by the U.S. occupation authority with colonial intention. Even though the U.S. military established the University of the Ryukyus ostensibly to liberate Okinawans from Japanese imperialism and teach them U.S. democracy, ultimately the U.S. occupation authority undemocratically forced its Cold War political ideology on the university and suppressed academic freedom. The U.S. occupation authority had the University of the Ryukyus expel six student activists for their anti-U.S. demonstration in

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1956. Yamazato points out the limitation of framing the University of the Ryukyus as a “colonial university.” “Even if there was a colonial intention to establish the university in Okinawa,” Yamazato states, “the history of the University of the Ryukyus was Okinawan people’s struggles to overcome colonialism and to foster an ideal higher education institution.”

He ends the monograph just before the Japanese ministry of education merged the University of the Ryukyus into the Japanese national university system in 1972. Here, Yamazato introduces what Okinawan faculty envisioned in their discussions for the future of the University of the Ryukyus during multiple and lengthy meetings in 1970. Yamazato points out that their vision contained progressive ideas and “reflected their enthusiasm to exceed the traditional model of a Japanese higher education institution.”

Yamazato’s perspective is invaluable in that it tells the story of the University of the Ryukyus without relying on U.S. or Japanese historical narratives. This is significant because not only did the U.S. and Japanese imperialisms exert overwhelming powers over people in Okinawa, but also because the structure of the two empires that appeared in the transplantations of U.S. land grant colleges in Hokkaido and Okinawa was not straightforward or unilateral, as the following chapters reveal. My dissertation is an attempt to clarify the structure of such U.S. and Japanese imperialisms that operated simultaneously in the Japanese archipelago.

**Chapter Outline**

Chapter One considers the role of the U.S. land-grant college system in Japanese settler colonialism. The U.S. land-grant college system, established by the Morrill Act of

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1862, was a unique U.S. product often treasured as exemplifying American democracy and the agrarian ideal. However, it actually contributed to the confiscation of land from indigenous populations in the North American continent and abroad. The creation story of this higher education system was traditionally narrated as providing commoners with a democratic education in opposition to the European establishment, and was used to obscure its function in U.S. settler colonialism during the U.S. territorial seizure of the North American continent. Furthermore, the system and philosophy of the U.S. land-grant college were exported abroad in the context of the development of U.S. overseas colonialism at the turn of century, and U.S. imperialism during post-1945 Cold War. In this context of U.S. settler colonialism and overseas imperialism, Sapporo Agricultural College also contributed to Japanese colonialism in Hokkaido with U.S. assistance.

Although the concept of the U.S. land grant college system is often strongly associated with democracy and the agrarian ideal, this chapter also reveals that the Japanese rather adopted the land grant college system to establish sharecropping farms in Hokkaido starting in the late nineteenth century.

Chapter Two examines how teachings on scientific agriculture and the agrarian ideal by professors from Massachusetts contributed to Japanese settler colonialism in late-nineteenth century Hokkaido. It demonstrates that ignoring the indigenous perspective was actually fundamental to legitimizing this colonizing project. Sapporo Agricultural College functioned as an apparatus to justify Japanese colonialism in Hokkaido based on the concept of terra nullius, or empty (and uncultivated) land. To prove terra nullius, it was necessary for the U.S.-assisted Japanese colonizing project not to recognize the indigenous Ainu’s means of production or treat them as capable of
cultivating the land. Professors from Massachusetts at Sapporo Agricultural College imported cattle and plants from the United States to promote Western agriculture in Hokkaido, thereby drastically transforming the native ecology of Hokkaido. This led to tremendous change in the ways of life of the indigenous Ainu, who strongly depended on the natural environment and had different relations to the land from either the American professors or the Japanese students who made Hokkaido their base of operations. Furthermore, the Ainu were systematically excluded from the development of modern agriculture initiated by the agricultural college. Professors from Massachusetts also worked in an imperial context; they not only provided Japanese students with agricultural knowledge, but also fulfilled U.S. imperial curiosity about other cultures and desires for economic success by bringing back agricultural specimens, such as soybeans, to utilize for agricultural development in the United States.

The denial and remembrance of colonial pasts, especially those of colonized islands under contemporary Japanese jurisdiction (i.e., Hokkaido and Okinawa), were significant issues after World War II in the context of Cold War politics in Asia, and continue to be sites of political contestation today. Therefore, the third and fourth chapters investigate how the historical memory of the U.S.-Japan college exchange as well as the philosophy of the U.S. land-grant college system supported the continuity of Japanese colonialism after World War II.

The historical memory of the U.S. land-grant college in Hokkaido was also utilized for U.S. militarization of Okinawa during the Cold War era. The U.S. military implemented another U.S. land-grant college exchange project from 1951 to 1968 between Michigan State University and the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa as part
of U.S. occupation policy in Okinawa. During this project, professors from Michigan State College visited Hokkaido University as a successful model of the U.S. land-grant college system in Japan. The third chapter asks how the philosophy of the U.S. land-grant college system was circulated and translated between these three campuses in response to broader U.S. Cold War strategies in Asia. By utilizing the concept of U.S. land grant colleges, Michigan State College’s officials also planned to operate the University of the Ryukyus as a tool of U.S. suppression. Furthermore, this chapter sheds light on Okinawan perspectives on this history, and asks how these philosophical and practical aspects of the U.S. land-grant college system were adopted, adapted, and re-articulated by Okinawan faculty at the University of the Ryukyus. For example, during his inauguration speech in 1952, Goya Chōshō, the second president of the University of the Ryukyus described his version of the history of higher education in Okinawa, stating that there had been an institution of higher education in Okinawa before Japanese colonization, and that it shared the philosophy of democratic education with the U.S. land-grant college system. This narrative is significant in that, by analogy with the U.S. land-grant college system, it destabilizes historical narratives that deny the existence of such other institutions.

In Chapter Four, I argue that the historical memory of U.S. assistance to Sapporo Agricultural College (1876-1893) was partially utilized as rationale for the revival of Hokkaido-Massachusetts college relations during the Cold War era (1957-1961). In the 1950s, U.S. foreign officers and Japanese elites re-established U.S.-Japan relations with the goal of making Japan a major economic power and anti-communist ally under U.S. tutelage. As a part of this strategy, the U.S. State Department planned a college exchange program between Hokkaido University and a U.S. counterpart university to improve
agricultural productivity and thereby prevent communist development in Hokkaido. To mitigate anti-American sentiment on campus and to implement this ideological and agricultural plan, administrators at Hokkaido University invoked the historical memory of the nineteenth century relations between Massachusetts Agricultural College and Sapporo Agricultural College. They idolized nineteenth century professors from Massachusetts, and emphasized the philosophy of the U.S. land-grant college system and the self-sufficient farmer ideal as representative of U.S. democracy, while obscuring the complicity of the American agricultural education system and ideology in settler colonialism both in the United States and Japan.

By mapping out the multiple levels of understandings, usages, and historical memories of the U.S. land-grant college system, I argue that the U.S. land grant college system and its history in Hokkaido was interpreted in various ways so as to render the history of dual imperialism in the Japanese archipelago invisible.
Chapter One

The Circuit of Teachers in U.S. Empire and Beyond: U.S. Land-Grant College System and Agricultural Education as Tools of Settler Colonialism, Imperialism, and Anti-Communism

Since its advent through the legislation of the Morrill Act of 1862, the U.S. land grant college system has been celebrated for opening the doors of higher education to common people through teaching applied science for immediate needs in the United States, and is often considered revolutionary for challenging the Old World academic model based on teaching Classics to the elite. The conditions that “gave rise to the ideal of democratized education in the United States, that led to the founding of the land-grant institutions” were described clearly by W.J. Kerr, president of Oregon State Agricultural College, in his speech given in 1931. First, Kerr pointed out the general lack of scientific knowledge and broad skepticism towards applying science, citing examples of people’s fear of artificial lights in New England in 1816 and railroads in Ohio in 1826. At the same time, he said, manufacturing industries and agriculture had rapidly grown in the United States, requiring domestically trained engineers and agricultural workers. “Manufactories, established to meet the necessities of the colonies while they were at war with Great Britain, managed to survive and finally to expand. Skilled operators to conduct them, however, had to be imported from abroad.” Finally, the United States still depended on Europe for its higher education model. Kerr stated, “higher education was strictly traditional and classical. It had no relation to the resources of the country or to the
occupations and objectives of the great mass of the people.” Accordingly, these three interrelated situations demanded a new higher education model. Kerr summarized:

Here and there voices were raised against the ineptitude of the old world, aristocratic type of education for a democratic, pioneer community. The vision of intellectual leaders, from Franklin to Horace Greeley, had outlined a more adaptable and practical educational program. But little or nothing came of these proposals. Gradually, however, public sentiment among the agricultural and industrial classes began to crystalize about the leadership of such men as had definite programs for educating the common people according to the needs of their everyday life.\(^6^4\)

Kerr’s U.S. land grant college system creation story—based on democratizing higher education—invoked the supposedly unique needs and circumstances of the United States. However the influence of the U.S. land grant college system was not limited to the domestic sphere; it was also utilized abroad. One such example is the establishment of Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido in 1876, modeled after Massachusetts Agricultural College. This use of the U.S. land grant college system in the context of Japanese settler colonialism of Hokkaido was just the beginning of the history of the U.S. land grant institutions beyond the continental United States. About half a century after Sapporo Agricultural College stopped employing U.S. professors from Massachusetts, Hokkaido University (successor of Sapporo Agricultural College) revived its relationship with the University of Massachusetts Amherst (successor of Massachusetts Agricultural College) in 1958, and the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa was founded with assistance of Michigan State College in 1950. In all three historical events, the structure and discourse of U.S. land grant colleges played important roles in establishing the

Japanese colleges and relationships with their counterpart U.S. land grant colleges in Massachusetts and Michigan.

These cases were not peculiar to Japan; the system and philosophy of U.S. land grant colleges were exported to multiple U.S. territories and non-territorial lands in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. This chapter is an attempt to understand the circulation of the ideas of and professors from the U.S. land grant colleges as a global phenomenon.

By tracing how the concepts and systems of U.S. land grant colleges were translated and transplanted over the Pacific in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, this study reveals the connections, contestations, and complicity between U.S. and Japanese imperialisms, which were informed by U.S. settler colonialism. This chapter sets the stage to interrogate these connections, which until now have not been examined systematically. Alyosha Goldstein argues that settler colonialism has been and still is fundamental to both the “domestic” history of the United States and all aspects of its political domination over foreign soils, including imperialism, militarism, and occupation. More importantly, building upon the work of critical indigenous studies scholar Jodi Byrd, he argues that, even though critical investigations of U.S. imperialism have proliferated, they tend to place issues of settler colonialism and the claims by indigenous peoples in the past, as resolved issues. Accordingly, Goldstein calls for works that “place U.S. overseas empire and settler colonialism into the same analytic frame—not only as a means of comparison, but as sometimes mutually constitutive and sometimes conspicuously disjointed formations.”65 My study echoes this call.

Lisa Lowe’s *The Intimacies of Four Continents* further advances research questions allowing me to tease out the intertwined and often entangled historical events on both sides of the Pacific. Lowe makes visible the connections between the rise of liberalism in Europe, importing slaves from Africa and immigrants from India and China, and the colonization of the Americas. “Historians, philosophers, and sociologists have written quite a lot about the origins of liberalism in modern Europe,” Lowe points out, “[y]et these discussions have more often treated liberalism’s abstract promises of human freedom, rational progress, and social equality apart from the global conditions on which they depended.” She argues, “liberal philosophy, culture, economics, and government have been commensurate with, and deeply implicated in, colonialism, slavery, capitalism, and empire.”

Similarly, the system and philosophy of the U.S. land grant college emerged and developed on a global scale. The concept of the U.S. land grant college has been overwhelmingly narrated in the context of U.S. American articulation of liberalism. The U.S. land grant college system has been rationalized as opening educational opportunities to common people, pursuing rational science, and liberating academics from European tradition. However, this dominant narrative is myopic in its ignorance of the history of U.S. land seizure from indigenous peoples, whose land was granted to each state to build agricultural colleges. Furthermore, the history of U.S. land grant colleges is not contained within the contours of U.S. settler colonialism. Rather, it was applied during U.S. imperial expansion in the late nineteenth century and through U.S. post-1945 Cold War politics. My study examines a part of this global phenomenon of the circulation of the concept and system of U.S. land grant colleges. I suggest that the transplantation and

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adaptation of the U.S. land grant college system in Japanese colonies is connected to and even dependent on the sacrifice of indigenous peoples, not only in the Japanese archipelago, but also on the other shore of the Pacific.

Each case of overseas use of the U.S. land-grant model I examine is located in a distinct historical moment (i.e., the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries) and in multiple geopolitical contexts (i.e., U.S. overseas imperialism, Japanese settler colonialism, and U.S. occupation). These historical moments and events are conventionally studied in unrelated fields. However, the establishment of colleges in Hokkaido in 1876 and Okinawa in 1950 and the revival of the relationship between Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst in 1958 all depended on the concept of U.S. land grant colleges. The U.S. land grant college model was originally applied to Sapporo Agricultural College in the context of Japanese settler colonialism in Hokkaido; it was once again utilized in U.S.-occupied Okinawa. As I will show in later chapters, furthermore, the system and philosophy of U.S. land grant colleges and historical memory of U.S. assistance in the establishment of Japanese agricultural colleges played key roles in connecting U.S. settler colonialism, U.S. overseas imperialism, and Japanese settler colonialism. The historical memory of the Japanese adaptation of the U.S. land grant college system was summoned again both in post-1945 Hokkaido and Okinawa. Furthermore, in each case the U.S. land grant college model was invoked in different ways; in other words, the concept and system were contingently interpreted for various purposes.

To provide historical context for each case, this chapter describes the contexts of these historical events and shows why each power needed agricultural colleges and chose
to use the U.S. land grant model for their particular political situations. It shows how this U.S. higher education model was created and adapted in relation to U.S. and Japanese settler colonialism, and how it was propagated at two salient moments in the history of U.S. imperialism—in the late nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. The first section focuses on the origin of the U.S. land grant college system by examining U.S. federal and Japanese colonial policies on land reform and agricultural schools. It places the Morrill Act of 1862 in the context of a series of U.S. federal land laws that dispossessed indigenous peoples of their lands, and Japanese adaptation of these legal practices in its settler colonial projects in Hokkaido. It reveals that land laws and agricultural schools served both U.S. and Japanese settler colonialism based on the logic of agriculture, while ignoring indigenous epistemology or capability for cultivation. The second section examines the ways in which the United States and U.S. Americans were involved in the exportation of the U.S. land grant college system to newly acquired U.S. territories and beyond during the rise of U.S. imperialism. This section particularly explores U.S. American perspectives on the establishment of Sapporo Agricultural College through the botanical research of William Smith Clark, who was then president of Massachusetts Agricultural College, and took a leave of absence to serve as president of Sapporo Agricultural College from 1876 to 1877. For U.S. academics, I will demonstrate, Sapporo Agricultural College was a bridgehead of imperial activities to collect agricultural materials. Thirdly, I will investigate the ways in which the U.S. land grant college system was adopted by Sapporo Agricultural College. I focus on a report written by Satō Shōsuke, former president of Sapporo Agricultural College (1894-1907) and its successor institutions Tohoku Imperial University Agricultural College (1907-
1918) and Hokkaido Imperial University (1918–30). Satō’s report on the U.S. land grant college system provided a model for the financial management of Sapporo Agricultural College. It especially gave support to the officials of the college to establish school farms to stabilize school finances. Far from the democratic ideal of the U.S. land grant college system, these school farms were actually cultivated through the exploitation of sharecropper labor. Finally, it describes the revitalization of the relationship between Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst and the establishment of the University of the Ryukyus with assistance of Michigan State College in the context of post-1945 Cold War politics in East Asia. It shows that the U.S. government developed the U.S. land grant colleges and agricultural development for the U.S. geopolitical strategy of containing communism. In this chapter, I will argue that the U.S. land grant college system, invented during the course of U.S. settler colonialism, was used for Japanese settler colonialism, U.S. imperialism, and U.S. anti-communism in the late-nineteenth and mid-twentieth century Japanese archipelago.

1. The U.S. Land Grant College System in U.S. and Japanese Settler Colonialism

The Morrill Act of 1862 as a Continuum of U.S. Land Reform Laws

To make visible the connection between U.S. and Japanese settler colonialism, one needs to clarify the role of the U.S. land grant college system in the context of U.S. land reforms and Westward expansion. W.O. Thompson, president emeritus of Ohio State University, in his address of 1931, whose theme was “The Spirit of the Land-Grant Institutions,” suggested that “the disposition of public lands” was a fundamentally

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unique context during the establishment of U.S. land grant colleges. Thompson praised the efforts of legislation of the Morrill Act of 1862:

Few people in a great expanse of territory like the United States, with three-fourths or more of it unoccupied, and most of it unknown to the majority of the people, would have occasion to think at all seriously or persistently on the constitutional and proper use of the public lands as an endowment for the nation. The ordinary view was that the public lands were sort of a reserve asset to be called on in cases of war or any great emergency contemplated at the time the government was organized. This proposal by Mr. Morrill set aside the public lands as a national asset to the people of the several states as an endowment in each state of a college to be operated within the law as the people through their legislature should determine.

As words like “unoccupied” and “unknown” territories suggest, this address obviously did not take into account indigenous peoples’ perspectives, and furthermore clearly shows the role of U.S. land grant colleges in the context of U.S. westward expansion and settler colonialism. Thompson continued, “the spirit of this Act was not to make any grant or assistance to states as states, but rather to use the states as agencies that could assemble and redistribute in the interest of the whole people the national asset of the public domain.”

The ways in which the lands that the United States acquired should be distributed was one of the fundamental issues to be solved by the legislation of the Morrill Act. I draw on the work of two historians concerning land reforms as well as U.S. Indian policies to describe further the contexts of the legislation of the Morrill Act of 1862 and the direct and indirect consequences of this act on indigenous people in the North American continent.

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Historian Paul Wallace Gates argues that the Morrill Act of 1862 was a product of the conflict over the use of the “public domain” of the United States, mainly between the original thirteen northeastern states and the new western states. The former group insisted that profit from the public domain should be equally shared by all of the states as a part of the federal revenue, and they were not concerned about the monopoly of land by speculators.69 This claim was based on the Virginia Act of cession (completed in 1784),70 which set the condition that “the public lands were the sole property of the United States, that any income derived therefrom was to be shared by all the states in proportion to their representation in Congress, and that the new states were to have the same rights as the original states.”71 However, the Land Ordinance of 1785 made land grants solely for new western states to establish educational and social infrastructural institutions; this contradicted the claim made in the Virginia Act of cession.72 Furthermore, since 1800, the federal government promoted settlements in the West by increasing accessibility to lands and admitting pre-emption rights that protected settlers from speculators.73 Accordingly, the discontent of Easterners about federal land policies increased. They felt that Congress had violated the promise that all states should share the profits from the public domain. They also feared “their farmers and their labor [would be drawn] away to the cheaper and more fertile lands of the West.”74 In order to gain profit from the public domain, this group supported the Morrill Act, named for Vermont representative Justin Smith Morrill,
who was the leading advocate of the law. President Lincoln signed the Morrill Act in 1862, which established endowments for agricultural and mechanic art colleges by allowing each representative and senator to gain 30,000 acres of federal lands within the states; or, for the states for which public domain was not available, to receive scrip to buy lands from other states.

The latter group, consisting of “the landless poor in the East and of the small farmers in the West and South,” on the other hand, claimed that the public domain of the United States should be distributed to settlers, and opposed federal land policies that served land speculators. They considered the Morrill Act of 1862 to be one such policy. “[Western critics] pointed out that the proposed bill continued the old paradox of liberalizing the land laws without terminating policies which produced land monopoly.”

Therefore, they made an effort to realize the Homestead Act, which was passed by Congress and signed by President Lincoln the same year as the Morrill Act. Even though they understood the importance of agricultural education, they were afraid that enactment of the Morrill Act would accelerate land monopoly by speculators. Gates points out, “[m]any westerners, […] were torn between their desire to support a democratic system of higher education for the farmers and workers and their fears that the measure would contribute further to land speculation and land engrossment.”

Southerners also strongly opposed the idea of the land-grant college bill. They were afraid that education would undermine the system of slavery. Democratic President James Buchanan from Pennsylvania vetoed the Morrill bill of 1858, believing that “the

75 Gates, The Wisconsin Pine Lands of Cornell University, 8.
agricultural-college bill would destroy the old balance of power between the states and the Federal Government.”

Although the Homestead Act of 1862 was supposed to contribute to egalitarian land distribution for settlers, it failed to realize such an agrarian ideal. Like other former legal attempts for settlers, this act was also taken advantage of by speculators and capitalists. For example, the preemption laws of 1828, 1830, and 1832, which allowed poor settlers to squat and cultivate land and to have one year to buy the land cheaply, were intended to realize the Jeffersonian yeoman ideal. However, capitalists rapidly increased the value of the land, and yeoman farmers couldn't afford to purchase it. Similarly, the Homestead Act of 1862 couldn’t prevent capitalists from participating in the competition of acquiring newly opened public lands. Even though the Homestead Act assured settlers 160 acres for free, which enabled poor settlers to establish their farms, the flow of capitalism that concentrated massive amounts of lands in the hands of a few could not be stopped. This capitalist accumulation of lands was achieved by “the use of dummy entry men, the continuation of the cash-sale system and the extraordinarily generous sharing of the public lands with railroads and the states which did not allow free homesteads on their part.

Whether or not land policies attempted democratic land distribution, these acts worked to further deprive indigenous populations of their lands. Historian Francis Paul Prucha states that both U.S. policy makers and Christian reformers considered the privatization of indigenous lands to be a top priority after the Civil War. They shared the

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common goal of individualization of Native Americans to disrupt “tribalism.” Legislation of a series of land allotment laws was attempted starting from extending the Homestead Act of 1862 to the Native Americans in 1875. Finally a general allotment law, the so-called Dawes General Allotment Act, was signed by president Grover Cleveland on February 8, 1887. This act provided each Native American family with 160 acres, and each Native American individual with 80 acres on a reservation, with the condition that the U.S. government would be able to buy the surplus after the lands were distributed to Native Americans, and to redistribute them to homesteaders if the lands could be used for agriculture. The supporters of land allotment laws, including Richard Coke, senator from Texas, and Carl Schurz, secretary of Interior, envisioned that these laws would promote individualization of Native Americans by allowing them to become self-sufficient farmers on allocated lands. 82 Even though these were the dominant views on the land allotment and indigenous peoples at that time, Prucha found opposition to the land allotment laws in the House Report. According to Prucha, the opponents argued that policy makers imposed their own values and assumptions about land usage on the indigenous peoples, ignoring their cultural and economic backgrounds as well as epistemologies. “An Indian could not be changed into a farmer, these congressmen argued, merely by giving him a quarter-section of land.” Prucha summarizes the House Report, claiming “[m]ost basic of all, the report charged that the main purpose of the bill was not to help the Indians at all, but to get at the valuable Indian lands and open them up to white settlement.” 83

As this report warned, it turned out that the Dawes Act did not succeed in making Native Americans farmers. In particular, Prucha points out, “[t]he provisions of the act that prohibited the leasing or other such conveyance of the allotments—wisely intended to protect the Indian holdings for an extended period—actually seemed to work a hardship on many Indians.” The provisions turned out to be full of loopholes allowing for the confiscation of lands from Native Americans. The law did not allow those who could not farm the allotted lands, including women, children, and students, to make a profit from them. In some cases, white settlers illegally utilized lands allotted to Native American students who were absent for their education. Even if Native Americans were physically able to farm the lands, they rarely succeeded in cultivation due to lack of adequate agricultural equipment and livestock. Neither could they lease the allotted lands, which also prevented them from gaining income to make their living and/or to obtain agricultural tools and animals to effectively cultivate the lands. Accordingly, the Dawes Act of 1887 rather accelerated the alienation of Native Americans from their own lands due to a lack of consideration for the realities of their lives.

Whether or not the land laws were based on agricultural, egalitarian, or humanitarian motivations, they ultimately contributed to the confiscation of indigenous lands. The Morrill Act and the Homestead Act of 1862 were justified by the discourse of agriculture. The Homestead Act was based on Jeffersonian yeoman ideology, and the Morrill Act was supposed to not only provide the eastern states with shares from the lands, but also to allow them to establish institutions of agricultural education. More importantly, while at least the Homestead Act intended to promote egalitarian land distribution, and promoters of the Dawes Act had humanitarian intentions in their own

84 Prucha, The Great Father, 671.
ways, the two different land laws of 1862 resulted in the acceleration of land dispossession from indigenous peoples.

Adoption of U.S. Land Laws and Land Grant College System in Colonial Hokkaido, Japan

The idea and system of land-grant colleges were transplanted outside of U.S. national borders as early as 1876, just fourteen years after the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862. A year after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Meiji government of Japan established the Hokkaido Colonization Commission (*Kaitakushi*), which the government created for the purposes of colonizing the northern islands of the Japanese archipelago. For the newly established modern nation-state, the colonization of the northern islands, which the Japanese named Hokkaido, was considered an urgent necessity to help develop Japanese capitalism and relieve overpopulation in the rest of Japan. During the process of the modernization of the Japanese state, the new Meiji government also needed to suppress the resentment of former *samurai* who had lost their status and means of livelihood. Furthermore, the administrators had anxiety about Russian territorial expansion towards the southeast since before the Meiji era. Therefore, Meiji officials decided to transplant former *samurai* as well as commoners to Hokkaido to develop agricultural colonies to claim its territoriality and to boost the Japanese economy. In order to justify its colonization internationally, Meiji officials claimed the northern island as *terra nullius*, or “ownerless land,” even though they knew that indigenous people, the Ainu, already inhabited the area.

It was the United States that Meiji officials turned to when they sought a model of settler society and land reform policies to pursue in their colonization of Hokkaido.

Although the Meiji government hired not only U.S. Americans, but also other foreigners to support the colonization of Hokkaido, the number of U.S. advisors was remarkably large. It is highly likely that this emphasis on hiring U.S. Americans reflected the fact that Meiji officials considered the United States and its colonization of Native Americans to be a role model of Japanese colonization of the Ainu. Beginning with Horace Capron, former U.S. secretary of agriculture, “who had played an important role in suppressing Native American resistance during the conquest of the American West,” and agreed to be an advisor for the colonization project of Hokkaido at the request of Kuroda Kiyotaka, Deputy Commissioner of the Colonization Commission in 1871, forty-eight U.S. Americans were involved in the project until 1882. In comparison, the Colonization Commission hired only seventeen Europeans and thirteen Chinese. In addition, the United States was chosen as the main destination for students of exchange programs from Hokkaido mainly in agriculture, mining, engineering, and women’s education supported by the Colonization Commission. In 1871 and ’72, fifty-five such students were sent to the United States. This number is particularly prominent compared to the number of students who were sent to other countries, for example, three students who studied in France.

88 Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan, 25.
90 Akira Tanaka, “Hokudai hyakunen no shomondai: Sapporo nōgakkō to ôbei bunka” [Topics in the hundred-year history of Hokkaido University: Sapporo Agricultural College and Western culture], in
Based on consultation with Capron, the Colonization Commission officials decided to adopt “American-style farming” in Hokkaido. In order to achieve this goal, the Colonization Commission established Sapporo Agricultural College in 1876, which was “modeled after the Massachusetts Agricultural College.” Massachusetts Agricultural College was established in 1863 as a land-grant institution, which received public land to establish agricultural colleges under the Morrill Act of 1862. Professors from Massachusetts Agricultural College were hired to start “an American-style agricultural school […], and to train its students in the latest scientific agricultural techniques” at Sapporo Agricultural College.

The Japanese officials in colonial Hokkaido also adopted U.S. land-reform policies, which were implemented in the course of U.S. westward expansion in the nineteenth century. Since 1872, the Colonization Commission and Japanese government enacted a series of land laws in Hokkaido based on the suggestions of U.S. advisors. Beginning in 1872, Horace Capron introduced three U.S. land allotment laws to the Colonization Commission: the Homestead Law, the Act of Preemption, and land auctions. The Homestead Law allowed settlers to purchase 160 acres of land for ten dollars to be an owner of the land, if the purchaser fulfilled several requirements, including settling within six months, living on the land for five years, building a house, and improving the property. The preemption acts authorized settlers, who fulfilled the requirements of the


92 Oshiro, “Nitobe Inazō and the Sapporo Band,” 103.
Homestead Law but had not registered the land in the government, to purchase public land at 1.25 or 2.5 dollars per acre depending on the conditions.93

The land reform laws categorically favored the Japanese and were created based on racist ideology and lack of knowledge of the Ainu. Since 1886, in particular, the agricultural policy in Hokkaido changed from fostering small farmers to promoting large-scale plantations. The new land reform law was enacted in the same year to allow Japanese capitalists and landlords as well as Kazoku (the nobility class) to own large-scale agricultural farms in Hokkaido.94 Furthermore, while the land law of 1898 allowed the Japanese to purchase approximately 500 acres or even more, the Former Natives Protection Law of 1899 allowed the Ainu to receive approximately only 5 acres of land. In addition, Article 2 of the Former Native Protection Law stated that the Ainu were required to obtain permission from the governor to receive or take out a mortgage on land, even land owned by the Ainu before the enactment of the law in 1899. To rationalize this law, the Japanese government stated that the Ainu were not capable of protecting themselves due to their lack of knowledge. This law was passed in the Diet based on a completely racially biased view against the Ainu and a belief in Japanese superiority, and the ignorance of the Ainu’s creative capacity to live in colonial modernity in Hokkaido.95

While the economy of Hokkaido and Japan had already been in a gradual process of incorporation into global capitalism before the Meiji period, late-nineteenth century modernization projects led by the Colonization Commission with practitioners and

95 Inoue, Meiji Nihon no shokuminchi shihai, 172-180.
professors from the United States rapidly changed the environment of the northern islands. Before this time, the Ainu, whose economy was mainly based on fishing and hunting, although they used subsistence agriculture on a relatively small scale, had used the land in Hokkaido communally. Before the Meiji restoration of 1868, the Tokugawa shogunate and the Matsumae domain had control over the northern islands; however, the Japanese residence was limited to the southwestern part of the main island. Although the Tokugawa shogunate promoted agriculture among the Ainu as an assimilation policy, and the Matsumae domain exploited Ainu labor and sexuality through a system called basho ukeoi (subcontracted trading post), the Ainu still maintained their own cultural identities based on their indigenous way of life within a sphere into which the Japanese did not enter. The Colonization Commission’s efforts to promote Western-style agriculture and private land-ownership brought almost immediate results in settler population and agricultural development. In 1873, the total population in Hokkaido was 168,000; by 1898 it had increased to 853,239, whereas the Ainu population was 16,272 in 1873 and slightly increased to 17,573 in 1898. Agriculture accounted for only 7.4% of the economic yield of Hokkaido in 1881, compared to 91% from seafood products; by 1899, it became 36% tied with seafood products. The total population of cattle in Hokkaido increased from 921 in 1886 to 18,348 in 1931. Within only three decades, the landscape and ecology of Hokkaido had drastically changed.

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100 Takakura. *Ainu seisaku shi*, 402.
The indigenous Ainu, whose livelihoods depended on the environment of Hokkaido, were forced to change their lifestyles. For instance, although deer were an indispensable source of food as well as clothing for the Ainu, by 1880, the population of deer had rapidly declined due to modernization projects in Hokkaido, including the construction of highways and excessive hunting of deer for trading both by the Japanese settlers and the Ainu.\(^{102}\) Salmon and trout fishing were also significant means of production for the Ainu; yet under the names of “protection” and “modernization” of the Ainu, the government interfered in fishing rights and management. In reality, the government aimed to deny the autonomy of the Ainu and utilize production for their own purposes and for Japanese capitalism to take over the fishing industry.\(^{103}\)

In the end, teaching the indigenous Ainu agriculture was the ostensible reason for the Japanese to deprive them of their lands. Following the policy of the Tokugawa shogunate, the Colonization Commission tried to transform the Ainu into modern farmers by granting them agricultural tools and seeds.\(^{104}\) The Former Natives Protection Law of 1899 was supposed to help the indigenous Ainu become farmers through land allotment. Ironically, through the enactment of the law, the indigenous Ainu were often given inadequate and infertile parcels of land that proved impossible to cultivate. Article 3 of the Former Native Protection Law states, nevertheless, “[a]ny part of the land granted under Article 1 shall be confiscated if it has not been cultivated within 15 years from the date of the grant.”\(^{105}\) Just as the Dawes Act of 1887 did not help indigenous peoples


\(^{103}\) Takakura, Ainu seisaku shi, 425; Katsuya Hirano, “The Politics of Colonial Translation: On the Narrative of the Ainu as a ‘Vanishing Ethnicity.’”

\(^{104}\) Takakura, Ainu seisaku shi, 428.

\(^{105}\) Masahito Ogawa and Shin’ichi Yamada, Ainu minzoku kindai no kiroku [Record of modern Ainu history] (Tokyo: Sōfūkan, 1997), 601-602; “Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Law,” March 1, 1899,
become farmers but rather accelerated land deprivation, the Former Native Protection Law of 1899 had similar effects that functioned in favor of the Japanese settlers and capitalists.

While the similarities between the Dawes Act of 1887 and the Former Native Protection Law of 1899 have been pointed out by many scholars, American Studies scholar Yujin Yaguchi states that the Former Native Protection Law of 1899 further reinforced the stereotypical image of “uncivilized” Ainu in an international context. He suggests that several Japanese, including Nitobe Inazō, who was a graduate of Sapporo Agricultural College and studied at Johns Hopkins University, and Oyabe Jen-ichirō, who studied at Hampton Institute, knew of the Dawes Act of 1887. Ostensibly, Nitobe and Oyabe studied the U.S. law from humanitarian motives to “save” the indigenous Ainu, but the Former Native Protection Law of 1899 meant much more to them. Yaguchi argues that the Former Native Protection Law allowed the Japanese to claim their nation-state as a “civilized nation” which saved “savages.” “Japanese men like Oyabe and Nitobe were profoundly dependent upon the Ainu for establishing their relationship with western nations. They needed the Ainu in order to claim their civilized status.”

Furthermore, emeritus professor of history at Hokkaido University (formerly Sapporo Agricultural College) Inoue Katsuo reveals that the Former Natives Protection Law of 1899 deprived the indigenous Ainu of their communal funds, and destroyed the movement of self-governance and the adaptation of Western agriculture. More importantly, he points out, the fourth president of Sapporo Agricultural College was

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involved in the preventing the indigenous Ainu supporting themselves by farming. Even though they faced the above-mentioned structural and environmental discrimination in the late nineteenth century, there was an indigenous Ainu community seeking self-governance by owning land and adopting Western agriculture in the Tokachi region, located in the southeastern part of Hokkaido and far from Sapporo. According to Inoue, due to the delay of the Japanese settlements in the Tokachi region, the indigenous Ainu in that particular area were able to sustain their independence, even in the face of oppression by the Japanese, until they completely lost their own lands (*Ainu Moshir* in their words, meaning “the quiet land of humans”). Because of the autonomy that the Tokachi Ainu secured, they were able to obtain a large amount of community funds through communal fishing. However, the Ainu communal funds had often been abused by the government, in particular by the Hokkaidōchō (1886-1947); some Ainu communities’ communal funds were completely lost, which forced them into further difficult situations. As Inoue reveals, it was the fourth president of Sapporo Agricultural College, Hashiguchi Bunzo, who transferred communal funds of some Ainu communities into stock investments in hemp and sugar mill companies when the government officials established those companies in 1887 and 1888. However, the stocks became valueless due to the poor performance of these companies. Nevertheless, in 1894, 135 Ainu households in the Nakagawa area in the Tokachi region created partnership assets to seek self-governance by retrieving their communal property from the government. Furthermore, in 1896, all of the Ainu households in the Nakagawa area filed claims for land allocations, by which they aimed to own their lands permanently and to adapt modern farming. While Japanese settlers still found the purchase of Western agricultural tools such as plows to be
expensive, a government report observed that the indigenous Ainu in the Nakagawa area were able to obtain them to cultivate their lands in 1898. However, a year after the government-operated sugar mill company finally went bankrupt in 1901, the communal property of the indigenous Ainu in the Nakagawa area was confiscated by the government under the Former Natives Protection Law of 1899, and the self governance movement was dissolved.\footnote{Inoue, Meiji Nihon no shokuminchi shihai, 166-177.} This was possible because, as Article 10 of the Law stated, “The Governor of Hokkaido will manage the communal funds of the Hokkaido Former Natives.”\footnote{It continues, “The Governor of Hokkaido, subject to the approval of the Home Minister, may dispose of the communal funds in the interests of the owners of the communal funds or may refuse to expend them if he deems it necessary. The communal funds managed by the Governor of Hokkaido shall be designated by the Governor of Hokkaido.” “Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Law,” March 1, 1899, trans. Siddle.}

This story is significant not only because it reveals the culpability of Sapporo Agricultural College and the Hokkaido government in stealing the property of the Ainu, but also, more importantly, it sheds light on the existence of indigenous Ainu who tried to create their own modernity even under severe oppression and racial discrimination. Unlike the stereotypical view of Japanese colonizers towards the Ainu (e.g., “uncivilized people who needed protection from the government”), their attempts to secure autonomy and to modernize their livelihood seemed even more progressive than the Japanese settlers at that time. This indigenous Ainu version of modern living—self-governance and cultivating lands through the use of Western agricultural tools—in Hokkaido, however, was destroyed and denied by the Japanese government. In addition, Sapporo Agricultural College played further roles as a knowledge-producing institution in forgetting this incident and the indigenous Ainu’s movement for self-governance.\footnote{Inoue, Meiji Nihon no shokuminchi shihai, 169-170, 182-183.}
Both the U.S. land grant colleges and Sapporo Agricultural College were established in the contexts of U.S. and Japanese settler colonialism in the North American continent and the northern islands of the Japanese archipelago. The scale and legal basis differed: The U.S. land grant colleges contributed to nation-wide land-dispossession of indigenous populations and was realized by the federal Morrill Act of 1862; on the other hand, Sapporo Agricultural College was the only case of such an agricultural college in Japan at the time, and it was established under the Colonization Commission, the governmental agency for colonizing Hokkaido. However, the land laws and land grant college system that Japan adopted from the United States made it possible for Japanese settlers to obtain lands in Hokkaido, just as their teacher, the United States, did in its Westward expansion. From the perspectives of indigenous peoples in North America and Hokkaido, both the establishment of land grant colleges and enactment of land laws worked to detach them from their own lands. These historical processes of “divorcing the producer from the means of production” were similar to what Karl Marx and E.G. Wakefield observed in “primitive accumulation” in Britain and “systematic colonization” in British colonies.\textsuperscript{111} However, they also differed from these models, in that both the legislation of the Dawes Act in the United States and the policies towards the indigenous Ainu in Hokkaido, in particular the Former Native Protection Law of 1899, failed to transform indigenous peoples into an agricultural labor force. Rather, both the United States and Japan had created and enacted laws that were unfavorable to the indigenous peoples becoming farmers and included loopholes to confiscate indigenous lands. In settler colonialism, Patrick Wolfe argues, “[a]s opposed to enslaved people, whose

reproduction augmented their owners’ wealth, Indigenous people obstructed settlers’ access to land, so their increase was counterproductive.” In the Japanese colonization of Hokkaido, settlers from other parts of the Japanese empire supplied the agricultural labor force. The indigenous Ainu were not considered to be a priority as a source of labor; rather, they were “obstacles” to Japanese settler colonialism. As Wolfe posits, settler colonialism is achieved based on the “logic of elimination.” “Whatever settlers may say,” states Wolfe, “and they generally have a lot to say—the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element.”

The discourse of agriculture was repeatedly utilized to justify U.S. and Japanese settler colonialism. Nevertheless, the practice of Western agriculture was not necessarily compatible with the livelihood of Native Americans and the indigenous Ainu; rather it denied and, more problematically, physically destroyed their livelihoods. As Yaguchi argues, the Former Native Protection Law of 1899 functioned as a marker of civilization for Japan, which purported to save “uncivilized” indigenous Ainu by granting them farmland, thereby elevating the Japanese empire to equal status with the United States and European imperialisms. Furthermore, as Inoue discovers, even when an indigenous Ainu group who were financially and technically capable of cultivating their own land made its appearance, the Former Native Protection Law did not protect, but rather demolished, their modern lifestyle. The discourse and practice of agriculture were used to serve settler colonialism and against the indigenous peoples by denying indigenous ways of thinking and living, regardless of the agricultural ability of the indigenes. Indeed, as

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warned by a few congressmen in the *House Report* that Prucha introduces: as a “scheme for his improvement, devised by those who judge him exclusively from *their* standpoint instead of from *his*,” the Dawes Act of 1887 and its counterpart law in Hokkaido were created based on ignorance of indigenous epistemology. Building upon Inoue’s study which points out the involvement of professors and graduates of Sapporo Agricultural College in the colonization of Hokkaido and beyond, in Chapter Two, I further explore the ways in which Sapporo Agricultural College, as a major site of knowledge production in Hokkaido, discursively, materially, and ecologically supported the seizure of Ainu land by Japanese settlers. Furthermore, I examine how the knowledge of Western agriculture and agrarian ideal continued to rationalize Japanese settler colonialism while ignoring indigenous epistemology. This enterprise was not achieved only by Japanese imperialism, however. Although Sapporo Agricultural College was established by the Japanese colonizing agency in Hokkaido, this school was also expected to function as a tool of U.S. imperialism, as U.S. professors and schools significantly invested their resources in its development. In the next section, therefore, I will analyze the U.S. American motives and perspectives on their involvement in institutionalizing a school modeled after the U.S. land grant college in a Japanese colony.

2. Sapporo Agricultural College as a Bridgehead for U.S. Imperial Agents

After returning to Amherst, Massachusetts, from Sapporo, Hokkaido, on August 2, 1877, William Smith Clark wrote to a former student, “I suppose you are all enthusiastically engaged in collecting plants and specimens in Natural History somewhere among the woods and mountains of Yesso. Your interesting adventure will

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furnish abundant material for very many letters which I hope to receive in the months to come.”114 The recipient of the letter was Satō Shōsuke, Clark’s favorite Japanese student among the first class of sixteen Japanese students at Sapporo Agricultural College. After Clark completed his mission at Sapporo Agricultural College, he received many letters from his former Japanese students. They were not, however, as enthusiastic about collecting plants as Clark had expected.

The Japanese students wrote to Clark to tell how much they missed him and wished that he could stay, and most frequently mentioned their gratitude for his teaching Christianity. On the day of Clark’s departure from Sapporo, April 16, 1877, Tanouchi S. wrote that all of the members had devoted themselves to Christian religious practices, including abstaining from any alcohol and drugs and reading the Bible. “This was by your kind invitation,” Tanouchi continued, “and not only that, but by manifestation of that great and glorious God through you.”115 Another student, Ōshima M. also thanked Clark: “When I recollect that I was once living in darkness, and ignorant of Christianity, to which you were a light to me, I cannot help thanking you for your kindness.”116 Satō Shōsuke also wrote an eloquent letter describing how grateful he was for Clark’s teaching Christianity and how his religious mission was successful in Japan. While Satō admitted there were “scarcely any [Japanese] who know and believe the true doctrine of Christianity” and he felt like he and his colleagues were “helpless soldiers amidst the

114 Letter from William Smith Clark to Satō Shōsuke, August 2, 1877, Box No. 4, Folder No. 15a, William Smith Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
115 Letter from Tanouchi S. to William Smith Clark, April 16, 1877, Box No. 4, Folder No. 15a, William Smith Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
116 Letter from Ōshima M. to William Smith Clark, July 7, 1877, Box No. 4, Folder No. 15a, William Smith Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
army of the Heathen,” his spirit was lifted by recalling Clark’s instruction that “we should never give any offense to the people on account of our belief in the true religion.” “In this respect we are all the same—all lead a quiet and peaceful life and set forth the example of good morals.” Satō confirmed the success of Clark’s academic mission but with particular emphasis on his teaching of Christianity. “Thus you see that the seeds which you have sown here have started up pretty well. There is no doubt that they will bring forth good fruits when a proper season comes.” Finally, Satō closed his letter with a plea for Clark to return to Sapporo:

I sincerely wish that you will give us the honor of seeing you soon again at Sapporo. Japan has but few wise, intelligent and useful men, and so needs them more than other counties. For this purpose therefore she wants to educate her sons under the direction of great and honorable persons. So we all hope for your return.117

To this letter from Satō and the other students whose letters were also filled with feverish appreciation for Clark and Christianity, William Smith Clark replied politely, but could not help reminding his students that they should keep collecting plant specimens. Indeed, besides “saving” the young Japanese spirits by religious teaching, collecting exotic and useful plants as well as creating local collectors were also important missions for Clark.

At the time Clark was helping with the establishment of Sapporo Agricultural College, Massachusetts Agricultural College was also a young institution, having been established in 1863. The college was just 14 years old when it agreed to lend its active president to the Japanese government to help establish Sapporo Agricultural College. The

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117 Letter from Satō S. to William Smith Clark, June 4, 1877, Box No. 4, Folder No. 15a, William Smith Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
Fifteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, published in January 1878, provided the rationale behind their decision:

At the beginning of the year 1876 the Trustees were called to perform a most unexpected, but most important duty in connection with agricultural education. The Japanese Government having determined to establish an agricultural college, and having selected the Massachusetts College as a model, very naturally looked to its faculty and graduates for advice and assistance. His Excellency Yoshida Kiyonari, Japanese minister at Washington, was especially serious of procuring the services of President Clark, if only for a single year, to aid in locating, organizing, and starting the new institution. Accordingly, the Trustees, by a unanimous vote, granted him leave of absence from May 15, 1876, to Sept. 1, 1877; at which time he resumed his duties at Amherst.

What was the “most important duty in connection with agricultural education” for Massachusetts Agricultural College? The Fifteenth Annual Report disclosed in a latter part of the report:

Among the many interesting and valuable results to be achieved by Massachusetts professors at Hokkaido is the discovery of new and useful plants, and their introduction into the United States. Seeds of about thirty species of desirable trees, shrubs, woody climbers, and herbaceous plants, were collected in the autumn of 1877, and forwarded by President Clark to the Arnold Arboretum in Boston, where they are now growing.

For the stakeholders of Massachusetts Agricultural College, obtaining useful plants could be an important justification for providing support for the president of the college to be on leave abroad. Indeed, William Smith Clark and his U.S. American colleagues were keenly engaged in collecting specimens and seeds and sending them to Massachusetts while they were in Sapporo.

“Despite his other activities, Clark was able to send seeds of trees, shrubs, and vines from Sapporo to Amherst and to the Arnold Arboretum within the first months of

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118 Fifteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, January 1878, Box No. 14, Folder No. 70, William S. Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
his arrival,” according to biologist Karen B. Searcy, who studied the specimens and seeds that Clark and his U.S. American colleagues David P. Penhallow and William Penn Brooks sent from Hokkaido. According to her study, at least seven Japanese plant species arrived at the Arnold Arboretum from Clark on December 20, 1876. The year following Clark’s return to Massachusetts, seeds of approximately 30 species were sent by Penhallow.119 Furthermore, they collected 166 vascular plant and 43 lichen specimens while Clark was in Sapporo from July 31, 1876 to April 16, 1877. The specimens of vascular plants were sent to Harvard University and the lichens were delivered to Amherst College. At each institution, well-known botanists Asa Grey and Edward Tuckerman studied and identified Clark’s plant samples from Sapporo.120 Even after Clark left Sapporo Agricultural College, his colleagues and Japanese students under the instruction of Brooks and Penhallow, who followed Clark, continued to send specimens and seeds to Massachusetts until around the time Brooks returned to the United States in 1888.121

The practice of collecting plants in foreign soils is a classical imperial activity, and as a young aspiring empire, the United States had also engaged in such activities in the course of Westward expansion and beyond. For example, David Mackay investigates the works of 126 collectors who sent plant seeds and specimens to British botanist Sir Joseph Banks (1743-1820) or to Kew Gardens in London from overseas during the period of 1770 to 1820. He reveals that these collectors contributed to the British Empire by discovering “new tropical foodstuffs” to strengthen and rationalize the economic

120 Karen B. Searcy, “The Plant Collections of William S. Clark,” in Dr. W.S. Clark and His Plants at Sapporo, ed. Hideki Takahashi (Sapporo: The Hokkaido University Museum, 2012), 11.
resources of the empire, evaluating foreign lands on the basis of their productivity, environment, flora, and fauna for possible settlement by Europeans, and incorporating knowledge of “new lands and colonies into a British scientific and industrial hegemony.” Similarly, in the United States, starting from the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and Lewis and Clark’s expedition, plant collectors and botanists were actively involved in exploration of newly acquired lands by the United States. Similarly, in the United States, starting from the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and Lewis and Clark’s expedition, plant collectors and botanists were actively involved in exploration of newly acquired lands by the United States.123

The U.S. American botanist, Asa Gray, to whom William Smith Clark and his colleagues sent their seeds and plant specimens, also benefited from the activities of U.S. empire. From his analysis of plant specimens brought back by other botanists of the U.S. Japan Expedition of 1852-1854 and the North Pacific Exploring Expedition of 1853-1856, Asa Gray presented his theory on the “similarities between the flora of Japan and that of eastern North America” at Harvard University in 1858.124 Even though the two regions are geographically widely separated, or “disjunct,” “the flora of eastern North American (ENA) had more in common with eastern Asia (EA) than it did with western North American.”125 Inspired by the encouragement of Charles Darwin to “study the global distribution of North American flora,” Gray analyzed plant specimens collected and sent from Japan.126 This theory still has strong support among biologists today, and

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124 While this was a year before the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, Darwin and his lesser-known colleague Alfred Russel Wallace had already published about the “variability and origin of species.” Kuang-Chi Hung, “Finding Patterns in Nature: Asa Gray’s Plant Geography and Collecting Networks (1830s-1860s)” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2013), 3–4.
the followers of Gray continue to conduct research based on his thesis.\textsuperscript{127} As science historian Kuang-Chi Hung argues, however, this theory could not have been possible without U.S. imperialism, which brought back plant specimens back to Gray so he could study such floristic similarities.\textsuperscript{128}

Thus, from the perspective of U.S. American professors and administrators at Massachusetts Agricultural College, Sapporo Agricultural College served as a bridgehead for imperial activities. As an agricultural educational institution, Sapporo Agricultural College furnished Clark with human resources (professors and students) and infrastructure (school farms and laboratories) to collect plants and seeds to make specimens to send to Massachusetts and to conduct experiments to grow them in Sapporo. As I will further discuss in Chapter 2, moreover, the Japanese students and officials were not necessarily aware of the system to which they were contributing. Even after U.S. professors left the school, they established a system to continue supplying knowledge about and materials of useful plants, since they taught the Japanese students how to conduct fieldwork to collect plants and make dried specimens in the “proper” way and ship them to Massachusetts. In this sense, while Sapporo Agricultural College was not technically or legally a U.S. land grant college, it should be understood in the context of U.S. imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that shaped and was shaped by that system.

3. Satō Shōsuke’s Report on the U.S. Land Grant Colleges and Development of Sharecropping Farms in Hokkaido


\textsuperscript{128} Hung, “Finding Patterns in Nature.”
While the activities of Clark and other U.S. professors in Hokkaido clearly reflected U.S. imperialist interests, Satō Shōsuke and other Japanese college officials eagerly adopted the U.S. land grant college system for use in establishing Sapporo Agricultural College. Satō wrote a report on the U.S. land grant college system to argue for establishing school farms in 1886. Based on and justified by this report, Sapporo Agricultural College established school sharecropping farms, which became a model for the expansion of sharecropping farms in Hokkaido. In this section, therefore, I will discuss the context of introducing sharecropping farms and the content of Satō’s report of 1886.

Satō Shōsuke (1856-1939) is known for having “saved” Sapporo Agricultural College from abolishment, instead developing it into Hokkaido Imperial University.\(^{129}\) Satō was born in Hanamaki, Iwate, the northern part of the Honshu island, in 1856. He entered the first class at the Sapporo Agricultural College in 1876 and studied under William Smith Clark. He further pursued a doctorate degree at Johns Hopkins University in the United States from 1883 to 1886. After he came back to Japan, Satō served as the director of Sapporo Agricultural College starting in 1894. “[U]nder his able leadership of over forty years,” the writer of his obituary praised, Sapporo Agricultural College was “developed into Hokkaido Imperial University, with Colleges of Agriculture, Medicine, Engineering and Pure Science.” Satō retired from the presidency of the university in 1929.\(^{130}\)


\(^{130}\) Hokkaido Daigaku, “Enkaku”; Members of the American community in Sapporo and Harold M. Lane, “Biographical sketch and notice of death of Baron Shosuke Sato,” June 1939, Box 2; Folder 4, William
When Satō returned from the United States in 1886, Sapporo Agricultural College was facing the possibility of closing. The officials of the college had not yet found a way to maintain the school after the abolishment of the Colonization Commission, which oversaw the college but was established for only a limited time (until 1882). In 1878, Zusho Hirotake, then-president of Sapporo Agricultural College, made a proposition that the school receive 150,000 yen from the government and use its interest for the revenue. Professors from Massachusetts Agricultural College, who knew the system of U.S. land grant colleges, helped provide the idea to establish an endowment. In 1882, the second president of Sapporo Agricultural College, Mori Genzō, also made a request to the Colonial Commission that Sapporo Agricultural College be allowed to acquire ranches in Makomanai and Niikappu. However, the Colonization Commission did not accept these requests from either Zusho or Mori. After the abolishment of the Colonization Commission, the authority that controlled Sapporo Agricultural College changed several times: first the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (1882), then the Hokkaidōchō (the government of Hokkaido established in 1886), and finally, the Ministry of Education (1895). Each time, Sapporo Agricultural College was pressured to downsize its budget and even faced the possibility of closing. For this reason, the officials of Sapporo Agricultural College hoped to establish an endowment so that the school would be financially independent and would not be affected by the budgetary vicissitudes of its authorities.\footnote{Hokkaido Daigaku, \textit{Hokudai hyakunenshi}, 104.} It is in this context that Satō Shōsuke wrote a report on the Morrill Act of 1862 and the U.S. land grant college system in 1886. His report provided strong support and further rationale for establishing an endowment.

\footnote{Penn Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.}
Satō Shōsuke submitted his report on the U.S. land grant college system with recommendations for Sapporo Agricultural College to Iwamura Michitoshi, the first director of the Hokkaidōchō (1886-1947) in November 1886. This document was written based on his research on U.S. land grant colleges while he studied in the United States from 1883 to 1886. The report had two major parts: the former mainly described the historical background and current situations of the U.S. land grant colleges, and the latter contained his recommendations to restructure the curriculum and management system of Sapporo Agricultural College.

In his study on U.S. land grant colleges, Satō Shōsuke primarily examined school management systems, especially their finances, curricula, and role in the U.S. society. Satō began by introducing the law and system of U.S. land grant colleges. Although Satō did not use the word “land grant” to describe the U.S. Agricultural college systems in his report (he called them “U.S. agricultural schools”), his “U.S. agricultural college” is interchangeable with “U.S. land grant college.” He defined agricultural schools in the United States as “not just agricultural schools but agricultural engineering schools. They originated in the law enacted on July 2, 1862.” The law Satō mentioned here is the Morrill Act of 1862. “The United States government granted public lands,” he continued, “to promote agricultural and engineering education.” Satō further explained the details of the Morrill Act of 1862: the federal government of the United States granted each state thirty thousand acres of public land per member of Congress. While the federal government granted public land to each state, the state government was not allowed to use the money from the granted public land to establish schools. Rather, the agricultural schools used the interest from this endowment for its school management.
Satō Shōsuke continued to further explain the details of the financial system of U.S. land grant colleges. He analyzed the budget and income of several U.S. land grant colleges, and paid special attention to the income from school farms at the agricultural schools. Satō explained that half of the revenue of the U.S. agricultural schools came from interest on their endowment, and the other half came from each state.\textsuperscript{132} While the areas of school farms at the U.S. land grant colleges varied from 200 acres to 6,700 acres, Satō further wrote, most of the school farms managed to make a profit to contribute to school finances. In 1885, for example, the total revenue of Massachusetts Agricultural College was $34,000: $10,000 from its endowment, $10,000 from the state, and the rest the from the school farm and miscellaneous income.\textsuperscript{133}

For Satō, it was equally important to describe the relationship between the state and federal government. Since this related to the financial system and independence of U.S. land grant colleges, Satō described it in the beginning of the section on financial management of U.S. land grant colleges. Satō argued, even though U.S. land grant colleges were established based on federal law, the actual management of colleges was independent from the federal government because the decentralization of governing power was the basis of the U.S. nation-state since its foundation. While the United States granted each state lands to establish endowments to maintain the agricultural colleges, each state prepared their own funds for the foundation of the colleges and supervised


\textsuperscript{133} Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,” 32.
them, Satō explained. Because each state took responsibility for the establishment and management of its land grant college, they were able to respond to local needs.

Therefore, Satō observed, there were regional differences in the curricula and management systems of U.S. land grant colleges. He compared the curricula, the composition of faculty and students, and the occupations of graduates of “leading” U.S. land grant colleges. He mainly discussed the Maine College of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts (the University of Maine), Massachusetts Agricultural School (the University of Massachusetts Amherst), the Agricultural College of Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania State University), and State Agricultural College (Michigan State University). Besides these agricultural colleges in the eastern states, Satō explained about other cases of U.S. land grant colleges in the South and West. For instance, he wrote, “since there was larger black population in the South, many Southern states divided the funds” from the land grant by the Morrill Act. “The state of Virginia gained 285,000 dollars from the sale of granted land, and allocated 90,000 dollars for agricultural school for white people and 95,000 dollars for the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute (Hampton University), which mainly provides vocational education for black people.” “Most Western states such as Nebraska and Minnesota,” Satō pointed out, “established universities that included a department of agriculture based on the funds gained through the Morrill Act.” He stated that each state developed its land grant college based on their interpretation of the Morrill Act. Furthermore, the management systems and curricula of each agricultural college varied depending on the needs and situations of each state. However, Satō concluded, the law was the basis of the development of agricultural and

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134 Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,” 31-32.
engineering schools in the United States. Accordingly, Satō praised this law as an important piece of legislation in the history of agricultural science in the United States.\textsuperscript{135}

In response to criticism of U.S. agricultural colleges, Satō Shōsuke discussed the ways in which agricultural colleges played important roles in the historical and social contexts of the United States. He argued that northeastern states, particularly those in New England, urgently needed agricultural education. The local governments, manufacturing industry, and educational institutions had rapidly developed since Europeans settled in the North American continent. Since European immigrants who had settled in the Northeast, he further explained, cultivated limited land, while the population rapidly grew, “it is difficult [for those immigrants and their descendants] to make a livelihood without expanding their ability in accordance with social development.” “It is also true in farming,” Satō posited. Although farmers tended to be conservative and reluctant to change old customs, he admitted, farmers in the United States, however, realized that they needed to improve their farming by incorporating commercialism. Therefore, Satō argued, U.S. farmers finally recognized the significance of science, and the value and usefulness of agricultural schools and their experimental stations in the United States.\textsuperscript{136}

In the second part of the report, Satō Shōsuke made various recommendations to improve the organization of Sapporo Agricultural College based on his study of U.S. land grant colleges. In this section, he argued that the college should be more closely tied to the Japanese colonization of Hokkaido. First, he reminded the reader of the purpose of establishing Sapporo Agricultural College, not only for teaching academic theories, but

\textsuperscript{135} Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,”27-35.
\textsuperscript{136} Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,”34.
also for accumulating practical knowledge to support settlers’ livelihoods in Hokkaido.

Then he recommended that Sapporo Agricultural College should more directly contribute to the colonization of Hokkaido by deploying the graduates of the college as the officials of the local government (Hokkaidōchō), developing agricultural and engineering knowledge for practical purposes, and encouraging the students and faculty of Sapporo Agricultural College to become entrepreneurs in Hokkaido. Through the enhancement of the practical contribution of Sapporo Agricultural College to the colonization of Hokkaido, Satō argued, the college could more effectively serve settlers.137 Therefore, Satō also recommended that the curriculum of the college should focus on agriculture and engineering, which were urgently needed in the cultivation of land and development of social infrastructure in Hokkaido.138

Two of Satō’s other recommendations were particularly informed by his study on U.S. land grant colleges. “Based on my observation on Western education policies,” Satō posited, “there were numerous examples of colleges that not only educated college students, but also contributed to the society.” He stated that colleges should disseminate knowledge through public lectures, publications, and libraries. “It is urgent to enhance practical knowledge among settlers in Hokkaido. Now, we should utilize our own Sapporo Agricultural College to support settlers in Hokkaido,” Satō advocated.139

Satō’s study on U.S. land grant colleges clearly informed his recommendations for school farms and the management of the school. As many U.S. land grant colleges raised profit from their own school farms, he argued that the school farm at Sapporo Agricultural College should also seek profit. “I learned that the school farms at U.S.

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137 Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,” 37-38.
138 Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,” 38.
139 Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,” 42.
agricultural colleges were profit seeking organizations,” he stated in the section on school farms. In his view Sapporo Agricultural College should have supported the maintenance of the school by incorporating income from the school farm into its revenue. Satō further justified this stance, writing “the benefit of practical science lies in its contribution to this mundane economy…The reason why we have been making efforts to transplant U.S. agriculture is because we expect economic benefits.” Furthermore, he claimed that school farms in Hokkaido could serve as a model to prove that Western agriculture was economically beneficial by turning a profit. This recommendation informed by the U.S. land grant college system—to gain profits from school farms—and intertwined with the local situation—the necessity to prove the profitability of Western agriculture—became the basis of the development of sharecropping farms in Hokkaido.

A year after Satō Shōsuke submitted his report on U.S. land grant colleges, his recommendation was accepted by Iwamura Michitoshi, the director of the Hokkaidōchō, and Sapporo Agricultural College received approximately 1,797 acres of land for the establishment of the school farm in 1887. The school further gained about 856 acres of land in 1889. The lands for the school farms were temporarily transferred to the Sapporo alumni association (whose representative was Satō Shōsuke) in 1890, due to changes in laws regarding school property. In 1895, Sapporo Agricultural College was once again able to obtain property, and the total area of farmland including eight school farms owned by the school grew to approximately 14,401 acres the following year. The university

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140 Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,” 42.
141 Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,” 42.
142 Satō, “Beikoku nōgakkō no keikyō oyobi sapporo nōgakkō soshiki kaisei no iken,” 39, 43.
143 Hokkaido Daigaku, Hokudai hyakumenshi, 101-102.
144 Hokkaido Daigaku, Hokudai hyakumenshi, 114.
possessed eight school farms in 1896 in Hokkaido, and it also had experimental forests in Japanese colonies including Sakhalin, Korea, and Taiwan. The university directly operated two of the farms as well as an orchard to conduct research on crop cultivation and animal husbandry and economy of farm management. The other five farms were designated for sharecropping. The officials expected to produce surplus by the sales of crops and the rental fees from sharecroppers in order to increase the endowment.

According to the business report of school farms at the university (1937), the purpose of these farms was to “collect rent from sharecroppers to incorporate it into the revenue of Hokkaido Imperial University [the name of Sapporo Agricultural College from 1918 to 1946].” Their population stayed above 5,100 from 1908 to 1934, and peaked at 6,003 in 1914. Since the first sharecropping school farm was established in 1895, these school farms produced surplus from the labor of sharecroppers, which they contributed to the school’s financial management. The school farms at Sapporo Agricultural College continued to be cultivated by sharecroppers even after the U.S. occupation era of Japan from 1945 to 1952 until they were abolished in 1964.

As advocated by Satō in his 1886 report, the sharecropping system of the school farms became a model for farm management across Hokkaido, as the owners of

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147 Hokkaido Teikoku Daigaku Nōgakubu Fuzoku Nōjō, *Hokkaido Teikoku Daigaku Nōgakubu Fuzoku Nōjō jigyō hōkoku gaiyō* [Hokkaido Imperial University Agricultural School Farm business report summary] (February 1937), 1.
149 Hokkaido Teikoku Daigaku Nōgakubu Fuzoku Nōjo, *Hokkaido Teikoku Daigaku Nōgakubu Fuzoku Nōjō jigyō hōkoku gaiyō* [Hokkaido Imperial University Agricultural School Farm business report summary] (February 1937), 1.
152 On December 15, 1964, after multiple attempts, the last sharecroppers of the school farms at Hokkaido University were finally liberated. Hokkaidō Daigaku, *Hokudai hyakunenshi*, 427-428.
sharecropping farms came to depend on the labor of sharecroppers. In 1886, when the Hokkaido government was established, government officials invited successful capitalists from the main island of Japan and former nobles, or kazoku, to develop large plantations by relaxing the regulations on the acreage that the settlers were able to obtain. In officials’ calculations, such plantations should have been successful by utilizing Western agricultural tools and cattle; in reality, however, these owners were unable to successfully use such new technologies and faced a lack of laborers. This failure led to a dependency on tenant farmers. In 1887, about one sixth of the farmers were tenant farmers (4,950 tenant farmers out of 32,675 farmers), and over a decade later, the number of tenant farmers increased to 106,824 (total 270,663) in 1898.

The U.S. land grant college system as interpreted by Satō Shōsuke became the basis for the development of sharecropping farms in Hokkaido. His report on the U.S. land grant college system justified the establishment of Sapporo Agricultural College’s endowment and its profits from school farms. This took place in the context of Japanese colonization policy promoting Western agriculture in Hokkaido, which was not necessarily easily accepted by Japanese settlers. In order to persuade them to adopt the new ways of agriculture, Satō advocated that the school farms should make a profit to prove that Western agriculture would be beneficial for farmers.

For one who claimed to believe the democratic and anti-establishment philosophy of U.S. land grant colleges, Satō’s interpretation of the Morrill Act of 1862 and agricultural schools in the United States and the resulting development of sharecropping

154 Hokkaido, Shin Hokkaido shi 9, 798.
farms in Hokkaido based on his recommendations is ironic. However, as I will discuss in Chapter 2, the Jeffersonian agrarian ideal was also not realized in the post-Civil War era in the United States. In that case as well, even the limited number of yeoman farmers eventually fell into sharecropping. In that sense, farmers in Hokkaido followed the similar history to their counterparts in the United States.

4. Establishment and Revival of U.S. Land-Grant College Technical Assistance in Cold War Okinawa and Hokkaido

After Sapporo Agricultural College was successfully established on foreign soil in 1876, additional U.S. land-grant colleges were further implemented in continental and overseas territories of the United States. The United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines as colonies and controlled Cuba after the Spanish-American War of 1898. It further annexed Hawai‘i as its territory in 1898. In the wake of acquisition, the United States sought to establish colleges on these island colonies as it did in Hawai‘i in 1907 through the Second Morrill Act of 1890; the University of Puerto Rico was established in 1903 and given land-grant status to found the schools of Agriculture, Science and Engineering under the Morrill-Nelson Act of 1908; the University of the Philippines was founded in 1908 by Act No. 1870 of the Philippine Assembly; the University of Guam was established in 1952 and began to receive federal funds as an 1890-land grant institution in 1972.

These universities reflected, however, the ambivalent identity of the United States as a newly emerging imperial power. Three universities founded just after the turn of the

century, namely the University of Puerto Rico, the University of Hawai‘i, and the
University of the Philippines, literary scholar Victor Bascara argues, share remarkably
similar discursive and material structures despite the geographical and historical
uniqueness of each. Each university equivocally embraced the dual natures of “liberal
education” and “imperial control,” which mirrored the new formation of U.S. imperial
discourse that represented the United States both as liberator from Spanish imperialism
and as a new imperial practitioner.\footnote{Victor Bascara, “New Empire, Same University? Education in the American Tropics after 1898,” in The
Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent, eds. Piya Chatterjee and Maira Sunaina (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).} This self-contradiction similarly appeared when the
successor universities of Massachusetts Agricultural College and Sapporo Agricultural
College revived their relations in the Cold War era, as I will discuss in Chapter 4.

In addition to the establishment of land grant colleges by the government of the
United States, U.S. professors from U.S. land grant colleges actively went on missions to
propagate the philosophy of the U.S. land grant colleges abroad. They helped establish
agricultural colleges not only in newly acquired territories, such as Hawai‘i and the
Philippines, but also on non-territorial lands, including China, India, and Japan. For
example, John Washington Gilmore also taught scientific agriculture at multiple
educational institutions overseas. After graduating from Cornell University, a land-grant
college, in 1898, Gilmore’s career followed the trajectory of U.S. imperialism in Asia and
the Pacific at the turn of the century. Gilmore first established agricultural colleges in
China in 1898 and India in 1900. Gilmore served as Education Commissioner of the
Philippines in 1901. After returning to Cornell in 1902 and earning his Masters’ degree in
1906, he joined Pennsylvania State College in 1907. From 1908 to 1913, Gilmore was the
president of the College of Hawai‘i (presently, the University of Hawai‘i), which was
established as a 1890 Second Morrill Act land-grant institution in 1907.\textsuperscript{158} Gilmore became an agronomy professor of the University of California, Berkley and taught mainly at the then University Farm at Davis (presently, University of California Davis) starting in 1913 until his death in 1942.\textsuperscript{159} While he was serving as a professor in California, he also took short-term positions as an agricultural advisor to Chile in 1921, the Dominican Republic in 1925, and Mexico in 1931 and 1936.\textsuperscript{160}

The overseas missions of U.S. professors from land-grant universities came to bear new meanings in the Post-World War II era. By this time, exchange programs and land-grant university professors’ careers themselves had become directly involved in U.S. post-1945 Cold War strategies on a global level. The U.S. land-grant college system and agricultural education were not only reinforced in the Pacific, but also were expected to contribute to indoctrination into U.S. democracy as an anti-communist strategy in emerging global Cold War tensions. Higher education systems, particularly in West Coast states of the United States and Hawai‘i, were formed and developed uniquely tied to U.S. defense strategy due to their proximity to the U.S.S.R.\textsuperscript{161} Then-U.S. occupied Japan including Hokkaido (1945-1952), and also U.S.-occupied Okinawa (1945-1972) were important parts of this regional strategy in the Pacific.

On September 8, 1952, R.A. Spruance, the ambassador to the Philippines, wrote a letter to the Secretary of State from his post in Manila:

\textsuperscript{158} John S. Gilmore, “John Washington Gilmore: A Journey Well Travelled” (2009), California Collection, Shields Special Collections, the University of California, Davis, 9–13.
To be kept out of the Communist camp, Japan must be able to trade with the free nations and obtain the materials and the markets needed to support her ever increasing population. Agriculturally, except possibly for Hokkaido, Japan has expanded to the limit of her capabilities. She can produce no more food, but must depend on imports of food and raw materials. She is an industrial nation and must manufacture the raw materials she imports, export and sell them abroad. If all of the free countries of the Far East industrialized to the limit of their capacities and failed to increase their capacity for production of food and raw materials, the result might be the forcing of Japan into the arms of the Communists.\(^\text{162}\)

In arguing the importance of Japan’s capacity to import agricultural and raw materials in their fight against Communists, this letter exemplifies the logic of U.S. foreign officials and their strategy of agricultural development throughout Asia.

Immediately following the end of World War II, Japan was supposed to become a democratic and demilitarized country; instead, however, it took, with U.S. support, what is known as the “reverse course” to become a major economic power supporting U.S. wars in Asia. Under the tutelage of the United States, Japan became an economic and industrial hub that depended on raw materials from Southeast Asia to develop an Asian anti-communist bloc.\(^\text{163}\)

The logical connection made by the United States between agriculture and their strategy of Communist containment can be observed as early as January 1948. A memorandum dated January 29, 1948 circulated within the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee for the Far East:

Although at the moment, the subject of Japanese Agriculture (and Land Reform) is not of direct military concern, certain long-range U.S. military views now being considered envision a Japan economically self-supporting and of potential value as a deterrent to further Soviet expansion in Eastern Asia. A program of socialization of Japanese agriculture, as complete as that proposed in this paper,


even though already initiated by the SCAP, would tend to weaken the overall recovery of Japan, a recovery which would be essential at an early date should there be adopted by the U.S. Government the strategic concept of building Japan, to extent practicable, into a bulwark against further Soviet expansion.\textsuperscript{164}

This connection was made between agriculture and anti-Communist strategy just about the time when, as historian John Dower suggests, U.S. officials shifted their policy towards East Asia to one that “incorporated Japan in a positive manner in the U.S. Cold war strategy” starting from June 1949.\textsuperscript{165}

As indicated by Spruance’s letter of 1952, Hokkaido would be prioritized for improving agricultural productivity to compete against communist development. Moreover, Hokkaido occupied a geopolitically important position. Stalin once expressed his desire for the Soviet Union to occupy the island, and Truman rejected this idea.\textsuperscript{166}

This context prompted the initiation in 1958 of an exchange program was initiated between Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Hokkaido was the focus of an effort by the United States to serve as a stronghold against communism because of its agricultural potential and its location directly south of Sakhalin. This strategic purpose for the exchange program was clearly stated by Dale H. Sieling, former dean of the University of Massachusetts Amherst, on October 21, 1958:

In 1955, an agricultural officer of the overseas missions in Tokyo proposed that ICA [International Cooperation Administration] sponsor a University contract with the University of Hokkaido and an American institution, for the purpose of developing advanced agricultural technology as a bulwark against the pressure of Communism from Russia which, incidentally, is closer to the island of Hokkaido than Hokkaido is to Tokyo. As a result of lengthy discussions with the officials of the University of Hokkaido, it was decided to invite the University of

\textsuperscript{165} Dower, \textit{Japan in War and Peace}, 179.
\textsuperscript{166} Dower, \textit{Japan in War and Peace}, 163.
Massachusetts to resume its historical relationship with the University of Hokkaido to aid in the development of an integrated program of research, teaching and extension at that now famous University of Hokkaido campus.\textsuperscript{167} [emphasis added]

However, the rhetoric of “resuming [the] historical relationship” between the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Hokkaido University needs careful attention. The formal relationship between Massachusetts and Hokkaido lasted only for eighteen years (it started in 1876 and ceased in 1893 when the last professor ended his contract).\textsuperscript{168} As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the historical memory of the relationship between the two colleges was arbitrarily used to support initiating the exchange program and even suppress an anti-American movement on campus.

Furthermore, in alignment with the core educational missions of U.S. land grant colleges, developing an “integrated program of research, teaching and extension,” was the main purpose of the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s technical assistance according to Sieling’s narrative. The International Cooperation Administration (ICA), an agency of the U.S. State Department from 1955 to 1961, had a close relation with the technical assistance programs of U.S. land grant colleges. These technical assistance programs, which included university contracts, proliferated under the ICA. By 1956, 38 countries and 54 U.S. American universities had entered into ICA-sponsored technical assistance contracts. The total numbers of such contracts eventually reached 84. Before

\textsuperscript{167} Dale H. Sieling, “Eight Years of Technical Exchange: Massachusetts and Hokkaido,” October 21, 1958, Box 19, Folder 17, William Smith Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst; The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) was established by State Department Delegation of Authority 85 on June 30, 1955. This organization aimed to “coordinate foreign assistance operations and conducted all military security programs. The functions of the ICA were transferred to Agency for International Development in 1961. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961,” http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/469.html (accessed August 30, 2013).

the ICA launched, there were already several university contract projects variously
sponsored by the Economic Cooperation Administration, which was established under the
European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) from 1948 to 1951; the Technical
Cooperation Administration, under Harry S. Truman’s so-called Point IV foreign policy
program from 1951 to 1953; and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs established in
1942. All of them were incorporated and administered by the ICA. Among U.S.
American universities, land grant institutions were deployed in U.S. technical assistance
especially in the fields of agriculture and engineering. The University of Kansas even had
a one-week course on land grant college organization for exchange scholars from Ankara
University and Ataturk University in Turkey. Besides specific academic fields such as
home economics and agriculture, the course included discussion of the philosophy of
land grant colleges. Indeed, the U.S. land grant college concept was a significant
element in the revival of the relationship between the University of Massachusetts
Amherst and Hokkaido University, as well as other U.S. technical assistance programs in
the world.

Unlike many technical assistance programs sponsored by the U.S. Department of
State, the program between Michigan State University and the University of the Ryukyus
was started by the U.S. Army in 1951. This was due largely to the position of the Ryukyu
islands in the U.S. Cold War strategy. The United States developed its global network of
military bases, referred to by historian Bruce Cumings as the “archipelago of empire”

169 The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Records of the Technical Cooperation
Administration (TCA) 1946-54,” Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961,
170 International Cooperation Administration, Technical Cooperation through American Universities,
171 International Cooperation Administration, Technical Cooperation through American Universities, 33-34.
starting in 1950. Cumings points out that, in contrast to British and Japanese empires that possessed colonies, post-World War II United States preferred “nonterritorial” status; that is, it exerted an informal system of control over foreign countries through military force. Especially among the “frontline cold war semi-sovereign states like Japan, West Germany, and South Korea,” the experience of U.S. militarization was a “mundane, benign, and mostly unremarked daily life of subtle constraint, in which the United States kept allied nations on defense, resource, and, for many years, financial dependencies.” He asserts, however, the possession of military bases overseas is a genuine expression of empire. Among these overseas bases, the U.S. militarization of Okinawa that developed during the occupation era from 1945 to 1972 has been a particularly significant presence in the Asia-Pacific area.

To make Okinawa a host of this enormous U.S. military base, the United States took advantage of the fact that the identity of Okinawans was ambiguous as people of the “informal” colony of Japan. The United States aimed to rule Okinawa separately from Japan, on one hand; however, on the other, the U.S. government did not plan to territorialize the Ryukyu Archipelago or grant Okinawans U.S. citizenship. Therefore, the U.S. government tried to educate Okinawans to encourage them cooperate with U.S. foreign policy and foster a distinct “Ryukyuan” identity. They were forced to be neither American nor Japanese; rather, they were supposed to be Ryukyuans who were obedient to the United States. U.S. government efforts to contribute to this Ryukyuan identity

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172 Cumings, *Dominion from Sea to Sea*, 392-394.
formation included media propaganda, establishment of a university, and promotion of traditional performing arts and music that were banned under Japanese colonization.  

The University of the Ryukyus was considered to be particularly significant in the subject formation process of Okinawans under this strategy. The process of decision-making in the establishment of the University of the Ryukyus reflects this fact. American literature studies scholar Yamazato Katsunori points out that local grassroots organizations in Okinawa and a group of Okinawan descendants in Hawai‘i had both lobbied for the establishment of a university in Okinawa. Although the plan that the Okinawan group in Hawai‘i proposed was similar to the U.S. occupation government’s plan, the diasporic group was not allowed to participate in the development of the University of the Ryukyus.  

Rather, the U.S. occupation government excluded participation of grassroots and diasporic groups and established the University of the Ryukyus on their own in 1950. The U.S. Department of the Army entered into a contract with Michigan State University to develop the University of the Ryukyus with “U.S. Civil Administrators and Ryukyuan educators […] in Ryukyus based on U.S. Land Grant models” from 1951 to 1968. As a land-grant institution, Michigan State University accepted “the request of the American Council on Education, which was the channel for the new university sponsor, the U.S. Army.”

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the system and philosophy of U.S. land grant colleges appeared in various historical settings. The contingent purposes and contexts were completely different in each implementation of this U.S. higher education institution concept. Originally, the U.S. land grant college system was created as a legal tool to redistribute the public domains of the United States during its Westward expansion. It was then adopted during Japanese settler colonialism in Hokkaido, and at the same time, served a U.S. imperial desire to discover useful plants and to explore new lands. Furthermore, far from the democratic agrarian ideal that the traditional discourse of U.S. land grant college system stood for, Satō Shōsuke justified the establishment of a large-scale sharecropping system in Hokkaido from his analysis of the Morrill Act of 1862 and U.S. land grant school farms. During another peak of U.S. imperial activity in the Pacific in the post-1945 Cold War era, U.S. land grant colleges were again mobilized to serve U.S. anti-communism strategy by increasing agricultural productivity in Hokkaido and supporting the U.S. militarization of Okinawa.

Furthermore, each case, especially during the post-1945 era, referenced other cases. For example, Hokkaido University served as a model of a successfully adopted land grant college for U.S. American professors from Michigan State University in their development of the University of the Ryukyus (as I will demonstrate in Chapter 3), and the historical memory of late nineteenth century U.S. American assistance to Sapporo Agricultural College played an important role in reviving the connection between Massachusetts and Hokkaido (as I will analyze in Chapter 4). To acquire more historically situated understandings, it is necessary to tease out the ways in which the U.S. land grant college concept was utilized by each historical agent and in each distinct
time period. Accordingly, I will further discuss how the U.S. land grant college system and philosophy were adopted and translated in Chapter 3.
Chapter Two

Soybeans, Cattle, and Yeoman: Agricultural Knowledge Exchanges between U.S. and Japanese Empires in Late-Nineteenth Century Colonial Hokkaido

About 75 years ago, Japan gave this country the soybean.\textsuperscript{177}

Radie Bunn

While in Japan, one of Dr. Brooks’ numerous enterprises was to introduce the Ayrshire breed of dairy cattle, and without much difficulty he developed a herd at the Sapporo Agricultural College.\textsuperscript{178}

A.S. Alexander

We know that the spirit of self-sufficient farmer that Brooks advocated would have sprouted out all over by breaking the bedrock of nationalism and totalitarianism which had covered the entire academia of social science in Japan.\textsuperscript{179}

Ōtahara Taka’aki

“Japanese Gift of Soybean to U.S. Still Has Effect 75 Years Later,” claimed Radie Bunn in an essay written for Agricultural Communications at the University of Massachusetts Amherst in the mid-1960s. Bunn extolled the virtues of the longstanding relationship between the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Hokkaido

\textsuperscript{177} Radie Bunn, “Japanese Gift of Soybean to U.S. Still Has Effect 75 Years Later,” circa 1964, William S. Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst.


\textsuperscript{179} Taka’aki Ōtahara, “Nōgyō keiei gaku” [Agricultural management studies], in \textit{Lectures on agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture} ed. Munehiro Takai (Sapporo: Hokkaido Daigaku Tosyo Kankōkai, 2004), 238.
Bunn began his essay by stating that soybeans not only provide material benefits to the United States but also “a reason for continued cooperation between Japanese and University of Massachusetts scientists.” A former faculty member of his school, William Penn Brooks, initiated the soybean exchange between the United States and Japan. “It was [Brooks],” continued Bunn, “who introduced the soybean from Japan to the United States.”

In 1877, William Penn Brooks, a recent graduate of Massachusetts Agricultural College, became a professor at the newly founded Japanese “land-grant” college, Sapporo Agricultural College, in the also recently colonized northern island of the Japanese archipelago, Hokkaido. William Penn Brooks was born in South Scituate, Massachusetts in 1851 and studied plant physiology under William Smith Clark at Massachusetts Agricultural College from 1871 to 1875. When Clark, his teacher returned from Sapporo Agricultural College, Brooks traveled to Hokkaido to replace him in January 1877, remaining in his post until October 1888. The length of Brooks’ stay in Hokkaido was the longest amongst foreign professors at Sapporo Agricultural College; although much better remembered among the Japanese, Clark was there for only eight months. After Brooks completed his contract with the Colonization Commission, he became a professor of agriculture at Massachusetts Agricultural College and worked as an agriculturalist at the Hatch Experiment Station of Massachusetts Agricultural College.

180 The position of Radie Bunn at the University of Massachusetts Amherst at the time he wrote this piece is not clear from archival materials. Radie Harold Bunn, who is highly likely the same person, was working as an “Extension Communications Specialist” at the University of Massachusetts Amherst in 1957. University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Index (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1957), https://archive.org/details/index1957univ (accessed May 10, 2017).
181 Radie Bunn, “Japanese Gift of Soybean to U.S. Still Has Effect 75 Years Later,” circa 1964, William S. Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
in 1889. In 1906, he became the director of the Experiment Station while remaining at the college as a lecturer.182

During his twelve-year stay in Hokkaido, Brooks taught the Japanese students at Sapporo Agricultural College about Western crop cultivation and cattle husbandry as well as Jeffersonian yeoman ideology. Brooks’ teachings contributed to the Westernization of Japanese agriculture, which ultimately led to drastic changes in the environment of Hokkaido. Brooks brought back soybeans as well as other exotic crops from Japan, and made efforts during his later career as an agriculturalist at Massachusetts Agricultural College to adapt these crops to the U.S. agricultural industry. Brooks played a crucial part in the history of the development of non-native monoculture both in the northern island of the Japanese archipelago and the North American continent.

When Brooks came to the northern islands of the Japanese archipelago in 1877, the Japanese government had just redefined its national borders at the height of imperial contestations in the Pacific. The Japanese government claimed territorial sovereignty over the northern islands based on the logic of *terra nullius*, and changed the area’s name from “Ezochi” to “Hokkaido” after the Meiji Restoration of 1868.183 Russia and Japan signed the Sakhalin-Kuril Exchange Treaty in 1875. Under this treaty, the two nation-states “unilaterally divided up the territory of Ainu Moshir and drew the countries’ borders in such a fashion that people of the same ethnic group were made to hold differing citizenship.”184 To protect its newly defined national border, the Japanese

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government enacted several colonizing projects, including the establishment of Sapporo Agricultural College. Brooks lived in the islands now called Hokkaido under his contract with the Japanese government. However, as revealed through Brooks’ letters, the border and names of the northern islands were still not fixed at that time.

Brooks’ work in Japan has been differently, but positively remembered on both sides of the Pacific. Brooks is remembered in the United States for making an important contribution to U.S. agricultural industry by bringing soybeans from Japan while introducing a herd of Ayrshire cattle to Hokkaido; in Hokkaido he is considered to be a great teacher of Western agriculture and agrarian ideals, which became the basis for an idealized liberal, pastoral society. Bunn’s narrative celebrated the relationship between the United States and Japan and proudly described how Brooks’ Japanese soybeans contributed to U.S. agricultural industry: “Today its production represents an annual $2 billion industry – our fourth largest grain crop. And, of the 16-1/2 million tons of soybeans produced in the U.S. last year, about 1 million tons were exported to Japan for oil extraction and industrial use.” He even told of a Japanese scientist who visited the University of Massachusetts Amherst to study how “to grow better quality soybeans and boost yields of this important Japanese protein food.”185 A. S. Alexander at the University of Wisconsin claimed, “one of Dr. Brooks’ numerous enterprises was to introduce the Ayrshire breed of dairy cattle,” in a 1931-32 publication of Better Crops with Plant Food.186 Like Bunn, Alexander painted a portrait of Brooks mainly as a bringer of soybeans and Japanese millet to the United States. Alexander wrote: “[h]is sojourn and investigations in the Orient gave him experience and information which later proved

185 Bunn, “Japanese Gift of Soybean to U.S. Still Has Effect 75 Years Later.”
useful in his native land. He brought back with him certain agricultural plants which have succeeded and become highly profitable here.”¹⁸⁷ He further stated that Brooks introduced a herd of dairy cattle to Hokkaido “without much difficulty.”¹⁸⁸ The last epigraph at the beginning of this chapter by Ōtahara Taka’aki comes from Lectures on Agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture, which was edited and published with annotations by contemporary agricultural scientists in 2004. Here, Ōtahara pointed out that Brooks’ self-sufficient farmer ideal became the basis of counter-ideology against the nationalism and totalitariansm that dominated Japanese society and academia before World War II, and also inspired criticism of tenant farming.¹⁸⁹ While both U.S. and Japanese narratives represent different aspects of Brooks’ work, they similarly celebrated his history and legacy in the development of modern agriculture in the U.S. and Japan.

However, contrary to these celebratory accounts, the plants, animals, and ideology that were exchanged between the United States and Japan via agricultural scientists like William Penn Brooks had significant and often deleterious impacts on the indigenous peoples and ecology on both sides of the Pacific. The introduction of cattle and yeoman ideology facilitated land reform in Hokkaido along with other measures of modernization. These processes, including the influx of settlers, transformation of natural landscapes into farmland, construction of highways, and overhunting, changed the native ecology of Hokkaido, displacing both indigenous Ainu and non-human species from their land. Furthermore, soybeans became one of the foremost agricultural products in the United States and beyond, creating a monoculture that ravaged indigenous species. While

¹⁸⁹ Ōtahara, “Nōgyō keiei gaku,” 239.
William Penn Brooks was not the first or only person who brought soybeans to the United States or brought cattle to Hokkaido, he did both, literally “exchanging” soybeans and cattle as an agricultural professor. Indeed, William Penn Brooks served as the link between New England and the modernization/colonization of Hokkaido.

How, then, did William Penn Brooks participate in the layered acts of imperialism by both the United States and Japan? How was Brooks able to bring these agricultural materials and ideology into Hokkaido and New England? What kind of logic undergirded this exchange? By answering these questions, this chapter examines how U.S. and Japanese dual imperialisms were experienced and enacted by one agricultural scientist in the late nineteenth century.

The first section examines U.S. perspectives to explain why U.S professors came to Hokkaido, and argues that contrary to the dominant Japanese narrative, they came to teach and practice modern agricultural science not merely for goodwill, but for their own economic and scientific benefit in the context of U.S. imperialism. The second section reveals what Brooks envisioned for his work on agricultural education by describing what he taught and brought into Hokkaido. In the final section, I will show that Brooks’ teaching of yeoman ideology in Hokkaido, which was not achievable for most Japanese settlers who, on the contrary, became sharecroppers in Hokkaido, was based on the conquest of indigenous populations. I will argue that the exchange between Massachusetts and Hokkaido of plants, animals, and the agrarian ideal, mediated by Brooks, promoted and justified the displacement of Ainu from their native lands, and contributed to the development of global modern capitalism. This chapter also suggests the material and discursive connection between U.S. and Japanese colonial modernities in
the North American continent and the northernmost island of the Japanese archipelago. 

By problematizing the U.S. and Japanese historical memory of U.S. professors and advisors in Hokkaido, this chapter aims to open spaces in order to imagine different colonial modernities in the northern islands of the Japanese archipelago.

1. Botanizing “Yezzo”

“How many are the cases,” Brooks lamented during his speech after he returned to the United States in 1888, “I can recall when my hopes of having found something new have been shattered by the discovery that it had been previously collected in some mountain region of the South [in Japan].” This passage demonstrates Brooks’ competitive desire to “discover” new species in Hokkaido. Brooks’ motivation to collect Japanese plants and seeds can be traced to U.S. imperial interest in biological specimens and commercial materials in East Asia since the 1850s. Such botanical collecting activities started with the U.S. Japan Expedition of 1852-1854 and the North Pacific Exploring Expedition of 1853-1856. While the first expedition led by Commodore Matthew C. Perry is famous for its opening of Japan to international trade, botanists were closely involved in both. Although Brooks is considered to be one of the first scientists to successfully adapt Japanese soybeans in Massachusetts in the late nineteenth century, he probably knew of soybeans before he traveled to Japan due to these previous

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190 “Ezochi” is an old Japanese name for the northern islands, meaning “Ainu-land.” Richard Siddle, Race, Resistance, and the Ainu of Japan. Brooks called the northern islands “Yezzo.” Letter from William Penn Brooks to Rebecca Brooks, October 7, 1883, William Penn Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

191 William P. Brooks, “Fruits and Flowers of Northern Japan,” Transaction of the Massachusetts Horticultural Society, (1890), William Penn Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 40.

192 R.H. Bunn, “Documentation of W. P. Brooks’ Role in Introducing the Soybean to the United States,” March 1967, William P. Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
expeditions. Two kinds of “soja bean” were brought back to the United States from Japan by Perry’s expedition in 1854. Since then, “frequent references to the plant occur in agricultural literature under such names as Japan pea, Japan bean, and Japanese fodder plant.” However, “the soybean was regarded more as a botanical curiosity than as a plant of much economic importance.” It had been already two decades since soybeans became known in the United States, but the commercial use of soybeans had not been well investigated when Brooks left for Japan.

Collecting plants and seeds for commercial purposes in the northern islands of Japan was not actually the main task of Brooks expected by the Japanese Colonization Commission officials. On the contrary, the Japanese officials apparently prohibited Brooks from such trading and commercial activities. His contract with the Japanese government as a professor of agriculture and superintendent of the school farm at Sapporo Agricultural College, signed by both Yoshida Kiyonari, a Japanese official, and William Penn Brooks, on December 14, 1876, restricted the capacity of his activities in Japan, stipulating that “Brooks further agrees and covenants that, during his employment by the Japanese government, he will not engage in any commercial activity either directly or indirectly.”

Nevertheless, Brooks made an effort to find “new” species and introduce them to the United States for both commercial and scientific purposes. He followed his teacher

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195 Yoshida Kiyonari, “Sapporo nōgakkōcho ken nōjōcho toshite sannen kōyō keiyakusho” [Three year contract to hire William Penn Brooks as the president and director of school farm of Sapporo Agricultural School] December 14, 1876, Northern Studies Collection, Hokkaido University Library http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0C006380000000000 (accessed February 23, 2017).
William Smith Clark who pursued the discovery of valuable plants from the beginning of his eight-month stay in Hokkaido. It is not surprising then that Brooks sought an opportunity to contribute to economic and scientific “discovery” in return for his twelve-year long stay in Japan.

Commercializing Japanese Plants in the United States

Brooks actively tried to cultivate a variety of plants he collected and researched while he was in Hokkaido for the use of farmers and agricultural development in the United States. Furthermore, not only did he transplant these foreign species to North American soil, but also he made cultural efforts to introduce the new plants. Just four years after he returned from Japan and three years after he started to work as an agriculturalist at the Experiment Station of Massachusetts Agricultural College, Brooks published a report on his work at the Station in 1892. Beside his report on “Soil Tests with Fertilizers,” Brooks spent eight out of sixteen pages on a “Report on Trial of Miscellaneous Crops.” Most of the seeds Brooks tried originally came from Japan; some of them are specifically mentioned as from northern Japan or near Sapporo, Hokkaido. The rest of the crops he tried at the Experiment Station were based on requests from the United States Department of Agriculture. The Japanese crops tested at the farm in the Experiment Station in the early 1890s reflect upon the experiences and interests of Brooks.

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196 William P. Brooks, “Hatch Experiment Station of the Massachusetts Agricultural College. Bulletin No. 18,” (Press of Carpenter & Morehouse, 1892), William P. Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst, 97.

197 These include three kinds of oats (two kinds from Japan), two kinds of millet (both from Japan), two varieties of hemp (both from Japan), flax, several varieties of wheat, and eight kinds of beans (all of them originated in Japan).
Among this variety of plants, Brooks considered soybean and millet to be the most useful and profitable products in the United States. He conducted research on the adaptability, productivity, and nutritional content of soybeans at the Experiment Station. In the same report published in 1892, Brooks argued for the usefulness of the soybeans he cultivated:

Several of the varieties which I have had under cultivation, having been taken from northern Japan [Sapporo], ripen seed here with as great certainly as the kinds of corn under common cultivation. It is believed that some of these varieties will prove valuable grain crops. The yield, it is true, cannot be expected to equal that of corn; but the grain is far richer, and because of the high percentage of protein it contains it is fitted to take the place of bran, cotton-seed meal and linseed meal for which our dairymen yearly pay out so much money.\(^{198}\)

In addition to scientific agricultural experiments, Brooks made cultural efforts to adapt Japanese soybeans to the United States, and explained the cultural history of soybeans in Japan. For example:

[The Japanese] have developed methods of preparation which make it of great importance in the dietary of the country. A delicious cheese known to the Japanese as “tofu” is made from it. […] “Tofu” is used in many Japanese families daily but they buy it of manufacturers or purveyors whose relation to it is similar to that of the baker in this country to bread, cake etc. It is quite possible that “tofu” might in time become a valuable addition to our dietary but those who have not forgotten the popularity of “Mother’s cooking” will I think agree with me that a long time would probably be required for it to make a place for itself in such quantity as to render its production commercially profitable. The Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station, however, has under way the experimental production of “tofu” which we hope later to introduce to the nearby public.\(^{199}\)

In this piece titled “The Soy Bean as a Food Crop for Massachusetts,” Brooks not only explained the Japanese cultural context of tofu, but he also described the ways in which this bean could be adapted for use by people in Massachusetts. He ambitiously

\(^{199}\) William P. Brooks, “The Soy Bean as a Food Crop for Massachusetts,” 1917, William P. Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
presented ideas for developing the commercial production of tofu in the context of current food practices in Massachusetts. In addition to tofu, he tried to bake soybeans, and even tried to use them as substitute for coffee beans.\textsuperscript{200}

Furthermore, Brooks was actively involved in marketing new plants in the United States by giving them English common names. Brooks brought back seeds of Japanese millet from Northern Japan and tested its adaptability to New England climate at the Experiment Station. He named Japanese millet accordingly:

Prof. Brooks adopted the name Barnyard Millet on account of the fact that this millet belongs to the same species as the common barnyard grass, which is so common a weed in cultivated fields in many parts of the United States. The Japanese Barnyard Millet, however, although belonging to the same species, is quite different from the common barnyard grass, having been selected and improved for centuries in the Orient for seed production.\textsuperscript{201}

Once he realized it could be used for forage, Brooks gave the seeds to farmers in Massachusetts to try. It soon became commercially distributed. The advertisement for “Japanese Barnyard Millet” describes its qualities: “[t]he capacity of this millet for seed production is very great. It has sometimes yielded in Amherst at the rate of nearly 100 bushes of 35 pounds each per acre.”\textsuperscript{202} Thus, it was supposed to be a highly profitable crop and was even named “Billion Dollar Grass.”\textsuperscript{203}

Brooks’ search for new, useful species continued even after he returned from Hokkaido through his connections to Japanese scientists. On June 1, 1904, William Penn Brooks wrote a letter to Miyabe Kingo, a graduate of Sapporo Agricultural College and professor of botany at his alma mater, about seeds that Miyabe had sent to Brooks. In this

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\textsuperscript{200} William P. Brooks, “The Soy Bean as a Food Crop for Massachusetts.”
\textsuperscript{201} William P. Brooks, “Japanese Barnyard Millet,” circa 1889, William P. Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
\textsuperscript{202} Brooks, “Japanese Barnyard Millet.”
\textsuperscript{203} Alexander, “The Inquiring Mind and the Seeing Eye.”
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letter, Brooks complained that he was struggling to introduce a Japanese plant, called “Matatabi” in Japanese, to his neighborhood in Massachusetts. This plant has a similar effect on cats as catnip. Brooks gave the plant the English name “Silver Sweet Vine,” which he thought “suits it very well,” and tried to propagate it as an ornamental. Although Brooks knew that Matatabi attracted cats based on his observations in Japan, this made it difficult for him to cultivate, as it was completely unknown to his neighbors in Massachusetts. “I cautioned the man who propagated it for me against cats,” explained Brooks. However, the nurseryman did not realize just how much cats like Matatabi; therefore, he did not make a “cat-proof fence” to protect the plants. It turned out, “the cats of the whole neighborhood congregated in his little nursery and destroyed almost all the plants.” Brooks continued, “[f]riends and acquaintances of mine have again and again experienced the greatest difficulty in getting the Matatabi plant established on account of the injury from cats which seem to come from long distances and which seem to be fairly crazy over the vine.”

While it was not easy to succeed in propagating Matatabi in Massachusetts, Brooks continued to exchange agricultural knowledge and materials including seeds, plants, and specimens with his former students at Sapporo Agricultural College. Utilizing connections that he fostered in Sapporo, Brooks continued to seek out valuable plants throughout his career.

Collecting Indigenous Species

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204 Letter from William Penn Brooks to Miyabe Kingo, February 20, 1900, Miyabe Kingo Papers, Hokkaido University Archives, Hokkaido University Library.
“I am exceptionally busy as I am making a collection of the indigenous flora,” wrote Brooks in the margin of his letter to his sister Rebecca on May 27, 1883. Likewise, he often reported to her that he went on excursions to botanize native species while he was in Sapporo. The above-mentioned plants, soybeans, millets, and silver vine, are not peculiar to Hokkaido. However, Brooks had a clear sense of difference between the plants that were endemic to the northern islands and those that occurred throughout the rest of Japan. He was also anxious to collect indigenous plants in Hokkaido in response to U.S. academic as well as commercial interests. On October 7, 1883, Brooks wrote to Rebecca:

I am collecting seeds of a number of trees and plants peculiar to Hokkaido for Mr Boehmur, Horticulturalist, now in Yokohama this autumn. He volunteers in return to give me a quantity of Japanese trees, shrubs, and seeds. I shall be very glad to have them for many are very beautiful. I shall send to Edward or Milton and get them to plant somewhere on my land. I have made party by proxy; but mostly in person a very large collection of plants this season. In another year I shall be all to make it tolerably complete that is including nearly all the phanerograms and ferns of Yezzo. I propose taking the plants home in duplicate so that I shall be able to make exchange with American collectors. In that way with my present home herbarium, I shall be all to make up quite an extensive collection.

At the Massachusetts Horticultural Society, Brooks gave a speech titled “Fruits and Flowers of Northern Japan,” published in Boston in 1890, two years after he returned to the United States. Brooks introduced about seventy fruit and flower plants from Hokkaido as well as other parts of Japan. These included berries, nuts, hops, asparagus, fruits, and flowers. In the introduction of each species, Brooks explained the biological and environmental contexts of how these plants were grown; his experiments on

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205 Letter from William Penn Brooks to Rebecca Brooks, May 27, 1883, William Penn Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
206 Letter from William Penn Brooks to Rebecca Brooks, October 7, 1883, William Penn Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
transplanting them in Massachusetts; and their commercial values. Although he admitted
that “[n]ot by any means all of those of which I shall speak are peculiar to this island
[Hokkaido],” his desire to introduce native species from Hokkaido can be seen in several
places. Brooks was indeed well aware of what the Boston academia at that time expected
to hear from an agricultural scholar who spent twelve years in a botanically “unknown”
foreign land. Here, he described what famous botanist Asa Gray at Harvard University
would have wanted:

Little has been written in English on the flora of Yesso [Hokkaido]- almost
nothing if we expect what our lamented Dr. Gray wrote after examination of the
collection of the Perry Expedition, a considerable part of which came from the
vicinity of Hakodate in Southern Yesso.207

Brooks wanted to present a comprehensive collection of plants from the entire
island of Hokkaido at that time, because Gray needed such thorough collections in order
to prove his disjunction theory on the similarities of the floras of Japan and North Eastern
America. This theory suggested some kinds of former connection, perhaps geological or
meteorological, between East Asia including the Japanese archipelago and the
northeastern region of American continent despite the current geographical separation
between them. According to biologist David E. Boufford, while Gray was not the first
scientist to notice this biological phenomenon, since he had a close relation with Charles
Darwin and supported his evolutionary theory, Gray’s paper on the disjunction theory,
“Diagnostic Characters of New Species of Phanerogamous Plants Collected In Japan by
Charles Wright, Botanist of the U.S. North Pacific Exploring Expedition” (1859), also
became famous. As Boufford explains, “[w]hile Gray’s knowledge of the flora of Japan
came primarily from the publications of others and, at that time, a limited number of

herbarium specimens that were sent to him for study, his writings and addresses led to a lasting interest in the flora and vegetation of Asia and that has continued to the present.208 Indeed, it was in this context that Brooks endeavored to collect as many specimens and seeds of indigenous species as possible from Hokkaido to bring back to Massachusetts. Brooks’ works also show that not only did he contribute to the commercialization of plants from Hokkaido but also to the development of Western scientific knowledge during the rise of evolutionary theory.

William Penn Brooks contributed to U.S. imperial knowledge production and profit making by bringing useful plants back to the United States. However, such acts of transplanting plants for the sake of agricultural and scientific development deserve careful attention. As David Mackay points out in the case of botanists in the British Empire, “[t]he transfer of useful plants for acclimatization in England or the colonies represented a reordering of the world.” Mackay posits that the practice of collecting and transplanting “new” species in accordance to the benefits of the British Empire resulted in symbolic, material, and ecological reformulation of the natural order.209 Similarly, Brooks’ acclimatization of Japanese plants to New England not only contributed to the development of scientific knowledge, but also disturbed the local ecology. Amongst the plants Brooks introduced at the Massachusetts Horticultural Society, he mentioned several species as “successfully imported.” However, unbeknownst to Brooks, some of these would go on to cause serious problems: they became so-called “invasive” species, escaping from human control and displacing native vegetation. Brooks described his apparent success with a species of raspberry (*Rubus phoenicosius* Maxim.), which is

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commonly known as wineberry or wine raspberry: “I successfully imported plants of this species last year; and I may remark that I have been informed that at least one nurseryman advised it for sale last season.” Unfortunately, this species is now considered to be “invasive” by U.S. scientists due to its vigorous growth that displaces indigenous species as well as agricultural crops in the East Coast of the United States. Furthermore, the disturbance of native ecology by Brook’s works was not limited to the North American continent; it had a similar effect in the northern island of the Japanese archipelago.

However, Brooks was not the only agent nor was the United States the sole imperial power engaging in this kind of knowledge production and ecological transformation. In opposition to the mythology of the “triumphant westward expansion of European civilization,” Susan Scott Parrish argues that various people both in the metropoles and colonies actively participated in knowledge production about the natural world in the Americas. Likewise, the collaboration between U.S. and Japanese empires as well as U.S. Americans and Japanese were indispensable for Brooks’ practices of collecting seeds and plant specimens. In this case, the land grant colleges in Massachusetts and Sapporo provided significant space to conduct experiments on the productivity and adaptability of the plants that Brooks collected. Furthermore, the college trained local collectors, such as Miyabe Kingo. Brooks’ intimate relationship with Miyabe allowed Brooks to continue receiving seeds and specimens from Hokkaido even

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after he returned to the United States. Nonetheless, the U.S. Americans and Japanese did
not always collaborate in scientific knowledge production, nor did their collaboration
necessarily homogenize agricultural knowledge, as I will discuss in the next section.

2. Importing New England Cattle and Plants to Hokkaido

“I shall make it as much like a New England Cattle show as possible” wrote
William Penn Brooks to his sister Rebecca on August 11, 1878, referring to his plan for
an “agricultural fair” at Sapporo Agricultural College. One and a half years after his
arrival to Hokkaido, Brooks delightfully reported to his sister about his achievements in
his new position. In the first part of the letter, Brooks described his adventure into the
wilderness with his five students to Mt. Tiene [Teine?], describing “the highest mountain
in the immediate vicinity about three thousand feet height.” He continued, “[t]he great
part of the way there is no path and a very dense undergrowth of bamboo.” Further,
Brooks told his sister that he was content with his progress at the school farm, despite
some challenges in introducing new crops; “[a]lmost all my farm crops are looking
splendidly. Turnips and cabbage have been very badly damaged by insects, and one field
of the former is not a very fine one.” Finally, Brooks wrote about his upcoming meeting
with Kuroda Kiyotaka, the chief of the Colonization Commission, in which Brooks
would talk about his plan for the “agricultural cultural fair.”

While Brooks’ letter shows his excitement about his new work, it also reveals the
contrast between the wilderness of the northern island and what he envisioned for the
future of Hokkaido through his works at Sapporo Agricultural College. This wilderness,
covered by dense thickets of bamboo impassable to humans, was waiting for him to be

213 Letter from William Penn Brooks to Rebecca Brooks, August 11, 1878, William Penn Brooks Papers,
Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

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opened like the Western “frontier” of North America. As his attempt to enact a New England-style agricultural fair demonstrates, his frame of reference for introducing agriculture to the Japanese was distinctly U.S. American. Brooks imported animals, plants, and land reform philosophy from New England, all of which were quite foreign to the Japanese, the indigenous Ainu, and other inhabitants in the northern island.

**Animal Husbandry**

In 1877, Brooks requested the Colonization Commission to import six Ayrshire cows and one bull for teaching animal husbandry at Sapporo Agricultural College.\(^{214}\) In his lecture on stock-farming,\(^{215}\) Brooks introduced a wide range of cattle breeds, including Devon, Hereford, West Highland Cattle or Kyloes, Ayshire Cattle, Jersey Cattle, Dutch or Holstein Cattle, Galloways, Longhorn Cattle, and Shorthorn or Durham. All of these species originated in Europe. Sapporo Agricultural College imported Shorthorn in 1877, Ayrshire in 1878, and Holstein and Guernsey Cattle in 1889.\(^{216}\) This act of importing a herd of cattle itself constituted brutal violence against the animals as well as the ecology of the northern island. These animals were sent all the way from

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\(^{214}\) Hokkaido Daigaku, *Hokudai hyakunenshi* [Hundred-Year History of Hokkaido University], 312-317, 573-574.

\(^{215}\) The lecture notes of Brooks while at Sapporo Agricultural College, *Lectures on Agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture*, were published in 2004 from Hokkaido University Press. The collection is edited by Munehiro Takai, a former agricultural professor at Hokkaido University with researchers and professors from the same university. The notes are based on lectures on agriculture given by William P. Brooks from 1877 to 1880, which were recorded by Nitobe Inazō and others of the second cohort of Sapporo Agricultural College. Since the lectures were given in English, the notes were also taken in English. In the 2004 edition each chapter was accompanied by an explanation in Japanese by a specialist in that field. Therefore, this book is not only helpful to know about the actual lectures by Brooks at Sapporo Agricultural College, but also how contemporary Japanese researchers evaluate and acknowledge what Brooks taught the Japanese students in the late nineteenth century. The Brooks lectures are divided into eight chapters, and topics are mostly on practical agriculture. These include: Agriculture, Soil, Farm Drainage and Irrigation, Pulverization of Soils (Tillage), Manures (and Fertilizer), Farm Economy (Management), Crop Cultivation, and Stock-Farming. In the introduction, however, the editor Takai admits that some of Brooks’ lectures were somewhat out-of-date and narrowly focused since Brooks was the only agricultural professor, and that he taught biology and chemistry by utilizing agricultural crops available at the school farm. Brooks, *Lectures on agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture*.

\(^{216}\) Brooks, *Lectures on agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture*, 400.
Massachusetts to Hokkaido, which was no easy trip in those days. According to the report by the Colonization Commission, during the voyage across the Pacific, one cow gave birth on the ship, and died after that because she could not tolerate the conditions at sea. The other five cows, one bull, and the newborn calf safely arrived at Sapporo Agricultural College.217

Over time, the rapacious appetite of these seemingly gentle animals for grasses non-native to Hokkaido would accelerate the destruction of the indigenous ecosystem. In his lecture on “Pasture Land and its Management,” Brooks explained the importance of “foreign grasses” for raising dairy cattle and sheep. Based on his observation, “[m]ost of the natural grasses of Hokkaido [...] are coarse and rank in their growth,” and therefore not suitable for milking purposes. The grasses should be “sweet and succulent.” Brooks stated, “to the attainment of the highest success, therefore, in the production of butter, cheese, milk, wool or mutton, it will be necessary in most cases to introduce foreign grasses.”218

Although large-scale dairy farming, which was promoted by Brooks as well as the government, did not succeed immediately, Brooks’ teachings as well as those of another Ohio rancher, Edwin Dun, who was also hired by the Colonization Commission, established the basis of today’s dairy farming in Hokkaido.219

Similarities in Plants and Climate between Hokkaido and Massachusetts

Brooks also introduced Western vegetables during his lecture on “Crop Cultivation” as well as agricultural experiments at the school farm at Sapporo Agricultural College. In his lecture, Brooks introduced thirty-four crops and techniques for their cultivation. Many plants he introduced in his lectures at Sapporo Agricultural College originated outside of Japan, and were mostly Western crops, including wheat, rye, oats, barley, Indian corn, buckwheat, millet, Hungarian grass, potato, beans, peas, turnip, cabbage, carrot, parsnip, and onion. His lectures on each crop start with a definition and cultural background, and continue on to varieties, soil adaptation, cultivation, diseases, insects.\textsuperscript{220}

Brooks introduced the onion as “an important article of human food, being extremely wholesome. It is especially prized aboard ship or in the army, or indeed anywhere where men are obliged to live largely upon salted or preserved food. In such situations, onions prevent a disease caused under the conditions mentioned.”\textsuperscript{221} Based on this belief, Brooks also made an effort to introduce onions to local farmers in Okadama, Sapporo and to teach them how to cultivate onions. Starting from Okadama, Hokkaido produces half of all onions in Japan today, and Brooks’ contributions to the onion industry are still highly regarded there.\textsuperscript{222}

Interestingly, Brooks didn’t mention Japanese plants, either rice or soybean, in his lecture on crop cultivation. However, this doesn’t mean Brooks didn’t know about these crops; rather, he came to know both crops well while he was in Hokkaido. At the school farm of Sapporo Agricultural College, where he was actively involved as the director,

\textsuperscript{220} Brooks, “Crop Cultivation,” in Lectures on agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture.
\textsuperscript{221} Brooks, Lectures on agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture, 294.
\textsuperscript{222} Takashi Harada, “Kaju oyobi yasai ni tsuite” [On orchards and vegetables] in Lectures on agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture, 331.
soybeans were one of the most profitable crops. As I discussed in the previous section, Brooks brought back soybeans and made efforts to adapt the plants to the soil of North Eastern America. For him, at least during his first three years, soybeans were not considered appropriate subjects to teach to Japanese students, but rather an object to collect for academic and economic success in his country.

Furthermore, Brooks held the strong conviction that rice was not suitable to the cold climate of Hokkaido. Other professors and practitioners from the United States shared this belief. Their basic advice was to adopt Western-style farming, which included cultivating wheat and raising cattle. Therefore, they tried to change the eating habits of the Japanese students at Sapporo Agricultural College. Some Japanese students such as Kanzo Uchimura, who later became a Christian philosopher and intellectual, followed this policy and advocated eating wheat products, praising the virtues of wheat over rice. Not all of the students converted to eating bread, however.

As a matter of fact, the Japanese did not necessarily accept all of Brooks’ teachings and Western scientific agriculture. Most notably, the Japanese students and graduates of Sapporo Agricultural College were eager to learn about rice. Graduates from Sapporo Agricultural College complained that they couldn’t compete with graduates from Komaba Agricultural College (presently the University of Tokyo) who learned how to cultivate rice. At the insistence of the Japanese students, therefore, Sapporo Agricultural College offered a Japanese agriculture class taught by a Japanese professor, Minami Takajiro, who was also a graduate of Sapporo Agricultural College.

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223 Hokkaido Daigaku, *Hokudai hyakunenshi* [Hundred-Year History of Hokkaido University], 324.
Although, as Brooks argued, rice cultivation in Hokkaido was more difficult than in warmer climate, the yield of rice produced by Japanese settlers in Hokkaido gradually increased over time. In 1888, when Brooks returned to the United States, the gross area of rice paddies was approximately 2,195 ha., compared to total field area of 32,466 ha. (6.7%); rice paddies increased to approx. 12,588 ha., and the total field area was approx. 253,197 ha. (5.0%) in 1901.\footnote{Hokkaido, *Shin Hokkaido shi* 3 [New Hokkaido history], 785–6.} By 1937, as a result of land and breed improvements, it became possible to grow rice throughout almost the entire island, and Hokkaido became one of the top producers of rice in Japan in the mid-1960s.\footnote{Nakaseko, “Shokuyō sakumotsu ni kansuru kōgi no tokuchō” [Characteristics of the lecture on food crops], 326-7.} Whether cultivating rice or wheat, however, this means that Western and Japanese agriculturalists contributed to the alteration of the landscape and environment of Hokkaido.

Brooks’ introduction of Western animal husbandry and crops as well as Japanese settlers’ equivocal response to his teachings demonstrate the competition for knowledge production over Hokkaido. As critics of colonialism and imperialism point out, knowledge production is highly conditioned by the prevailing power structure. In other words, indigenous knowledge was ignored, disproportionally objectified, and understood within the framework of Western epistemology.\footnote{For example, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (London: Zed Books, 2012).} Unlike the conventional binary model i.e., colonizer and colonized, however, this story also exemplifies a more complicated nature of knowledge production under dual imperialisms. Brooks completely ignored the agricultural knowledge of the Japanese as well as the indigenous Ainu. However, in the cultivation of rice of the Japanese colonials in Sapporo competed with Brooks’ Western
agricultural knowledge, and in addition to Western agriculture, the Japanese pursuit of rice cultivation further contributed to the transformation of land use in Hokkaido.

Agricultural systems as well as human relations to nature and land in Hokkaido drastically changed during the late nineteenth century, led by professors and practitioners from the United States, who were hired by the Colonization Commission. As environmental historians and indigenous studies scholars reveal,\textsuperscript{229} the introduction of both Western and Japanese agriculture and land use in Hokkaido caused drastic changes in ecology and the displacement of the Ainu from their lands. Fearing the southward expansion of the Russian Empire, the Meiji government urged enactment of the modern idea of land-ownership and agricultural development throughout the entire island in order to claim its territoriality over Hokkaido. The significance of this shift to the Ainu can hardly be overstated. They were not only displaced from the land, but also deprived of their means of production, including fishing and hunting, due to both direct and indirect interventions into natural resources and ecology by the Japanese settlers with American assistance, and eventually forced to fundamentally change their ways of life.

3. Yeoman Ideology and Settler Colonialism in Ainu Moshir\textsuperscript{230}

Yeoman Ideology

In addition to introduction of cattle to Hokkaido, William Penn Brooks is also remembered by the Japanese for his teaching of the ideology of self-sufficiency to farmers at Sapporo Agricultural College. In his lecture on “Farm Economy,” Brooks


promoted the virtues of the “yeoman” amongst Japanese students. He advocated that young farmers should own land even if they have to borrow money to obtain it, as long as they possess knowledge and the management skills of farming. He stated:

The influence on a man personally of owning a farm, is very great. It [...] makes him independent, self-reliant and manly. It gives him a home and an object and incentive to labor. The power and productive capacity of a country, the land of which is divided among many of its inhabitants will be greater than the power and productive capacity of a country otherwise similarly situated but the land of which is owned by a few individuals. For this reason, it is good policy for nations to give public lands to industrious men who will settle on them. If an immigrant comes to Hokkaido to commence farming and has enough money to start in that business, the government is really a gainer if it gives him land to settle on.

Further, Brooks confidently taught the Japanese students the ways in which self-sufficient farmers contribute to the prosperity of nation-states. He believed that agricultural colleges like Sapporo Agricultural College could play an important role in teaching its settler-students to avoid the abuses of new-world agriculture by using Hokkaido’s “late development” to its advantage:

Now, although the soil of Hokkaido is still fertile and may produce large crops for many years without the exercise of much knowledge, yet it should be the aim of the inhabitants to so conduct their agricultural operations as to keep it in this condition and not to exhaust its fertility, as is almost invariably done in newly settled countries. Though the eastern parts of the United States were settled early in the seventeenth century, no agricultural schools were established for more than two hundred years. Japan has begun more wisely than this in Hokkaido, and has thus, early in its settlement, founded an agricultural college from which will go forth men who can do much to prevent her from following the ruinous policy of other nations in their history.²³¹

²³¹ Brooks, Lectures on agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture, 41.

Brooks’ lament of the lack of agricultural colleges in the eastern United States and his celebration of Sapporo Agricultural College in the early settlement of the “virgin” land of Hokkaido reflect his confidence in agricultural colleges and scientific agriculture.
He tried to convince the Japanese students (and probably himself) that if farmers had proper agricultural skills and technology including soil fertilizers, animal husbandry, and crop cultivation, the land of Hokkaido or anywhere else would not be exhausted, and eventually contribute to the development of the nation-state. For him, scientific agriculture could solve the various problems confronting farmers and had the potential to make the Jeffersonian agrarian ideal succeed.

Brooks’ imperial ambitions and confidence in the superiority of Western science are clearly reflected in his lecture notes. He believed that Jeffersonian ideology would be successful in the northern island of the Japanese archipelago, if agricultural colleges were established. While he was aware of the damage to the environment in the eastern United States caused by Western agriculture, he wanted to prove that scientific agriculture could solve the problems in his country and in Hokkaido. What he did and did not teach reflects his confidence in scientific agriculture; he promoted Western crops that he believed to be valuable, such as onions, but he was stubborn in not teaching about the cultivation of rice because he believed it was not suited to the climate of Hokkaido. For Brooks, Sapporo Agricultural College on the northern island of the Japanese archipelago was one huge experimental station.

The ideology that Brooks taught can be traced back to “yeoman republicanism,” which Thomas Jefferson envisioned when he purchased Louisiana from Napoleon in 1803. Jefferson considered that the Mississippi Valley would provide the United States enormous areas of land with which to achieve an “empire for liberty.” According to Jefferson’s plan, the “agricultural heartland of the United States” would be insulated from the mercantile district of the East Coast and the manufacturing industries of Europe.
Historian Walter Johnson writes, “[e]mpire—the expansion of the United States and the distribution of its population over space—was, thought Jefferson, essential to producing the specific form of agricultural economic development that he associated so strongly with liberty.” Although this expansion of U.S. Empire was accomplished by the conquest of indigenous populations and the labor of slaves, women, and children, Jefferson’s vision of “liberty” only applied to white men; women, children, and slaves were excluded from the benefits of yeoman republicanism, despite the fact that they were indispensable to its execution. In order to achieve this yeoman republicanism, the United States implemented preemption laws, which allowed poor white men to squat, cultivate, and purchase the land at $1.25 per acre. Nevertheless, far from Jefferson’s agrarian ideal, not poor whites but rich capitalists took advantage of the preemption laws, and cotton plantations became dominant in the Mississippi Valley.232 Even in the few cases of successful yeoman communities, the development of capitalism and transportation systems made it difficult for them to maintain their lifestyles by the mid-nineteenth century. Historian Steven Hahn points out, while Southern yeomen in Georgia Upcountry were independent, self-sufficient farmers before 1865, due to changes in social structures that made subsistence farming impossible, yeoman in this area were incorporated into the market economy as producers of the major cash crop, i.e., cotton, and poor yeomen eventually became sharecroppers.233 Despite these failures, over a decade later, at the end of Civil War, William Penn Brooks from Massachusetts taught the Japanese yeoman ideology in colonial Hokkaido.

232 Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom, 24 and Chapter 1.
Immediately after Brooks left Sapporo, however, Japanese professors at Sapporo Agricultural College shifted their policies towards the system of sharecropping starting around 1890. Even though the sharecropping system was based on the exploitation of laborers and the division of classes, which was far from the yeoman ideal of self-sufficient farmers and agrarian democracy, professors and graduates of Sapporo Agricultural College took advantage of the cheap labor of poor settlers to raise money for their school. Satō Shōsuke, former president of Sapporo Agricultural College, supported the system of sharecropping, and even he himself as well as Sapporo Agricultural College under his presidency owned sharecropping farms. In 1890, Satō opened “Satō Nōjō (Satō Farm),” where 26 households lived as tenant farmers on approximately 206 acres. Many graduates followed the president of the school in obtaining lands and practicing sharecropping. Satō even posited that the key to success for the owners of sharecropping farms was to secure enough sharecroppers, and to prevent them from becoming independent yeoman farmers. Satō, in his lecture on colonial policy, further taught that in order to secure sharecroppers it was necessary to keep the price of the land high. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Satō developed the idea and system of managing school sharecropping farms to maintain the college’s revenue stream from his study of U.S. land grant colleges. Sapporo Agricultural College started to manage the sharecropping school farms starting in 1895, and finally abolished them in 1964. In that sense, Satō and other Japanese professors indeed put into practice what they learned

234 Inoue, Meiji Nihon no shokuminchi shihai [Colonial control by Meiji Japan], 165.
235 Inoue, Meiji Nihon no shokuminchi shihai [Colonial control by Meiji Japan], 197.
236 Inoue, Meiji Nihon no shokuminchi shihai [Colonial control by Meiji Japan], 204.
237 Hokkaido Daigaku, Hokudai hyakumenshi [Hundred-Year History of Hokkaido University], 427-428.
from the United States, which was to praise the Jeffersonian yeoman agrarian ideal but not rely on it to turn a profit.

A “Vanishing” Race

As Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman ideology depended on the conquest of Native Americans, Brooks’ and Japanese settlers’ dreams of self-sufficient farmers could not be realized without repossessing the lands of indigenous Ainu. Whom did Brooks consider to be the indigenous populations in the northern island? And how did he justify his teaching of yeoman ideology, which depended on the dispossession of the land from the Ainu?

On a pleasant day in the summer of 1880, Brooks visited Tsuishikari, about ten miles north-east of Sapporo, with two other English professors from Tokyo. The 854 indigenous Ainu of Sakhalin had been forced to relocate to Tsuishikari due to the Sakhalin-Kuril Exchange Treaty signed between Russia and Japan in 1875. Brooks described his encounter with the Ainu of Tsuishikari in his letter to his sister Rebecca:

“[w]e went into the hut of the chief and there partook of some of the worst tea I ever tasted. I slyly poured mine out into a crack between the slabs on the flour and [the] old fellow soon observing that my cup was empty tried to persuade me to take more. I declined with thanks.”

As this Aino [sic], quite an old man, knew Japanese I was able to talk directly with him. He said in answer to my question that he did not like this country nearly as well as Saghalien [Sakhalin] the place from which his tribe emigrated when that country was ceded by the Japanese to Russia in exchange for the Kurile islands. He said that here there was not so good fishing and hunting and that the country was inferior in every way. He also said in answering to my inquiry that

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239 Komori, “Rule in the Name of ‘Protection,’” 67-68.
the deaths in his tribe now outnumber the births. His race will probably become extinct at no very distant day. ⁴⁰

Brooks, like Japanese and European intellectuals, perceived the Ainu as a “vanishing race.” For Japanese linguist Kindaichi Kyosuke, Hirano Katsuya argues, collecting and preserving the Ainu language was a central necessity for modern nation-state building for Meiji Japan. The Japanese desired to include the peripheries of the nation-state into the purview of the Japanese regime in order to rationalize its expansion. Meiji intellectuals considered the Ainu culture to be a “primitive” version of the Japanese “frozen in time.”⁴¹ Therefore, scholars like Kindaichi desired to record the cultural practices of this “vanishing ethnicity,” “not because they were concerned with the actual causes of Ainu’s tribulations but because they wished to uncover a ‘primordial’ cultural form that might offer clues to the cultural origins of the Japanese ethnos.”⁴²

However, Brooks’ view on the Ainu stemmed from a different belief on colonialism. Taking a position apart from both the Russians and the Japanese, Brooks listened to the voice of the chief lamenting their treatment by both countries. Brooks further joined the chief in criticizing Japanese policies towards the Ainu: “I saw the school and the manufactory of fishing nets under Japanese charge but could judge little of their usefulness though the Ainu seemed pleased with both.”⁴³ Brooks was not necessarily sympathizing with the Ainu under Japanese colonialism; he rather cared about the “usefulness” of these institutions, and apparently felt he could do better in modernizing and colonizing the Ainu than the Japanese.

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⁴⁰ Letter from William Penn Brooks to Rebecca Brooks, August 8, 1880, William Penn Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/murg003_1_b76-f08-i18800808 (accessed February 24, 2017).
⁴³ Letter from William Penn Brooks to Rebecca Brooks, August 8, 1880, William Penn Brooks Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
In his lecture at Sapporo Agricultural College, Brooks claimed indigenous peoples should adapt to Western modern agriculture based upon his experiences in the United States. In the context of explaining the development of modern Western agriculture during one of his lectures, Brooks posits, “[Native Americans’] houses were very rude; their clothing, so far as they wore any, as the skins of wild beasts.” Furthermore, from Brooks’ view, Native Americans’ means of production had to inevitably shift from hunting and gathering to “modern agriculture.” He states, “when the number [of population] increases, they must either cultivate the soil or raise flocks and herds of sheep and cattle.”244 For him, the transformation of the ways of production to modern agriculture was an inevitable path for any population. Even though he clearly heard and understood the chief’s description of the importance of fishing and hunting, these integral means of production of the Ainu did not register with Brooks. In his mind, there was no space to imagine indigenous modernity or to let indigenous peoples decide how to live on their own land or to recognize prior cultural practices the predated either the Japanese or the American.

*Terra Nullius*

Cultivation was indeed central to Brooks’ agricultural philosophy, and justified settler colonialism in North America. Carole Pateman discusses the legitimacies of the doctrine of *terra nullius* that was claimed in settler colonialism, and points out two notions behind the concept: “first, [defenders of colonization in North America] claimed that the lands were uncultivated wilderness, and thus were open to appropriation by virtue of what I shall call the right of husbandry; second, they argued that the inhabitants had no

244 Brooks, *Lectures on agriculture by William P. Brooks, Professor of Agriculture*, 41.
recognizable form of sovereign government.”

Brooks apparently perceived Hokkaido using the same logic; particularly “the right of husbandry.” “[T]he greater portion of these soils are still virgin,” Brooks said, in his explanation of the current status of agriculture and its soils in Hokkaido at a meeting of the Massachusetts Horticultural Society in Boston. It wasn’t “virgin,” of course, for the Ainu; they did not cultivate the land in European or American ways, but they made their livelihoods upon the soil. However, the indigenous way of living was ignored in Brooks’ epistemology. Brooks continued:

Until within the last fifteen or twenty years the Japanese people had made no effort to occupy this territory. To them it was a terra incognita; to the minds of a race of tropical origin it was a dreadful, frigid wilderness, peopled with ferocious wild beasts and hairy men scarcely less wild. The Japanese fished upon its shores in summer, and a few dwelt there; but no attempt was made to settle in the interior. The virgin soil is in many places of considerable fertility.

Introducing Japanese perspective on the northern islands as “terra incognita,” Brooks further criticized the Japanese for not making an effort to cultivate the inland of Hokkaido which still remained in a “virgin” state.

Conclusion

The famous exhortation, “Boys, be ambitious!” uttered by his teacher William S. Clark to Japanese students in Sapporo could also apply to Brooks: he certainly had economic and scientific ambition. He went to northern Japan full of hope; for him the opportunity to stay for an extended period in Japan would enable him to contribute to the development of the U.S. agricultural industry as well as the production of scientific

knowledge during the rise of Darwinian evolutionary biology. His twelve-year stay in northern Japan was ultimately “successful” in terms of bringing back useful plants and knowledge to the United States. Furthermore, he also contributed agricultural knowledge and cattle to the Japanese. Indeed, he fulfilled a role as an important imperial agent for both the U.S. and Japan.

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the U.S. land grant colleges in Sapporo and Amherst both provided spaces to facilitate the exchanges that simultaneously contributed to U.S. imperialism and Japanese settler colonialism. In the exchange of plants, animals, and the agrarian ideal, U.S. American professors and Japanese students did not consider the impact of Western plants and cattle on the land of the Ainu, nor the harm wrought by mass production of non-native species on the lands of Native Americans. Moreover, they collaboratively and competitively ignored indigenous knowledge and changed local ecology, and the U.S. and Japanese relations at the U.S. land grant colleges discursively and ecologically created the state of “uncultivated land” to justify *terra nullius* while contributing to the development of large-scale sharecropping farms in Hokkaido.

As shown by the post-World War II historical memories of William Penn Brooks’ actions, national and disciplinary epistemological boundaries have overshadowed the true nature of the exchange and the link between U.S.-Japan dual colonialisms in Hokkaido and the North American continent.
Chapter Three

“Transpacific Displacement”: Hokkaido University as a Model of the U.S. Land Grant College System in Japan

In 1956, Milton E. Muelder and his colleague Clifford E. Erickson, deans at Michigan State University, toured universities in Hokkaido, Okinawa, and Vietnam. Upon their return to the United States, they reported that “[T]he University of Hokkaido[…], more than any other in Japan, understood and appreciated the functions and purposes of a land-grant institution in America.”

In the early 1950s, Michigan State College, itself a land-grant university established in 1855, entered into a contract with the U.S. Military and the State Department to help establish colleges in Okinawa and Vietnam, respectively, based on the U.S. land-grant college system. In 1956, Muelder and Erickson conducted their trip to review progress of the program. While in Japan, Muelder and Erickson visited Hokkaido University to see a successful example of a foreign university based on a U.S. land grant college for their reference in establishing the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa. Hokkaido University (1947- ), originally Sapporo Agricultural College, was established by the Japanese Colonization Commission of Hokkaido with assistance of professors from Massachusetts Agricultural College, also a land-grant university, in 1876. While they were in Tokyo, U.S. foreign officials told Muelder and Ericson about the reputation

of Hokkaido University as a successful case of transplantation of the U.S. land grant college system to Japan. Two days after their arrival to Japan, on January 12, 1956, Muelder and Erickson took a flight from Tokyo to Sapporo.\textsuperscript{248} During their visit to Hokkaido University, they confirmed the reputation of the university, writing in their report: “We found that the concept of service, in addition to research and teaching, was present particularly in the faculties of agriculture and education (emphasis added).”\textsuperscript{249} These three elements—extension service, research, and teaching—consistently appeared in the discourses of U.S. American administrators at Michigan State College in the 1950s. As I illustrated in Chapter 1, these were integral parts of the creation story of the U.S. land grant college system, and they were frequently narrated as proof of the democratic nature of the U.S. higher education system, which was revolutionary in its departure from the European elitist academic model.

Muelder and Erickson apparently expected some form of collaboration or support from the Japanese educators at the University of Hokkaido, in accordance with their belief that educators at the University of Hokkaido understood the concept of U.S. land grant colleges better than any others in Japan. At Hokkaido University, they met with members of the faculty, including those in science and literature. They excitedly wrote in their report that professors of science were “very sympathetic to our program at the University of the Ryukyus,” which had just started with help from Michigan State College in 1951 under contract with the U.S. military. They even suggested the idea of

\textsuperscript{248} C.E. Erickson, “Trip Report, Far East, January 7 - February 23, 1956” 1956, Folder 50: Vietnam and Okinawa Tour for Michigan State University Operations 1956; Box 1821; Clifford and Mildred Erickson Papers, Michigan State University Archives & Historical Collections, East Lansing, Michigan, 2.

\textsuperscript{249} “Report of Trip of Deans C.E. Erickson and Milton E. Muelder to Japan and Okinawa. 10 January to 27 January 1956,” 1956, Folder 50: Vietnam and Okinawa Tour of Michigan State University Operations 1956; Box 1821; Clifford and Mildred Erickson Papers, Michigan State University Archives & Historical Collections, East Lansing, Michigan.
“an exchange of professorships with the University of the Ryukyus. Professor Makino, a world authority in genetics, was particularly helpful on this point.” Nevertheless, Muelder and Erickson observed, literature professors did not express interest in extending their services to the University of the Ryukyus, but were merely interested in “immediate problems of research and teaching.” Muelder and Erickson also met with a professor at the Hokkaido University of Education who was involved in “one of the education workshops in Okinawa” held by the Japanese educators. Despite meetings with the presidents of the two Japanese leading universities in Tokyo, Yanaihara Tadao and Ohama Nobumoto, they did not mention any conversations about possible collaborations between the University of the Ryukyus and the University of Tokyo or Waseda University. From the detailed description of the meetings with the Japanese educators in Hokkaido, it can be inferred their expectation to gain support from them was much higher than for any other institution in Japan.

It is clear then, that Erickson and Muelder felt that Hokkaido University most successfully exemplified the U.S. land grant college system and philosophy abroad, but it is difficult to tell exactly how they came to this conclusion from the report on their trip. They didn’t elaborate further on their exact definition of the concept of the U.S. land grant colleges, or specifically what they found that exemplified the concept at Hokkaido University. Moreover, during the eighty-year history of Hokkaido University, the period that professors from Massachusetts Agricultural College taught there lasted only

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18 years, from 1876 to 1893. After the U.S. professors left, the college started to seek new teachers from Germany in the late 1880s. Furthermore, and more problematically, the liberation of the school sharecropping farm came 18 years after the first agricultural reform instigated by the U.S. occupation authority in Japan (the General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power) in 1946. The GHQ/SCAP deemed the land reform necessary for the establishment of democracy and the development of capitalism in post-1945 Japan. When Muelder and Erickson visited Hokkaido University in 1956, the sharecropping farms were still operating. The institution of sharecropping contradicts the democratizing education that is often identified as an important mission of the U.S. land grant college system. Despite the fact that Hokkaido University had possessed sharecropping farms for 70 years, the concept of the U.S. land grant colleges firmly connected Hokkaido University and the University of the Ryukyus in the minds of U.S. foreign officials and U.S. American professors from Michigan.

The concept of U.S. land grant colleges has been utilized for drastically different purposes under different historical contexts in Japan. This chapter begins from the link between Hokkaido and Okinawa via the concept of U.S. land grant colleges to examine the translation of the concept of U.S. land grant colleges in the Japanese archipelago. The system and philosophy of U.S. land grant colleges, which were formulated in the context of U.S. westward expansion, migrated over the Pacific to contribute to Japanese settler colonialism in late-nineteenth century Hokkaido and U.S. militarization in post-1945 Okinawa. In these distinct historical moments, U.S., Japanese, and Okinawan professors all actively utilized the concept of the U.S. land grant college system. In addition to

Muelder and Erickson, Goya Chōshō, Okinawan president of the University of the Ryukyus in post-1945 Okinawa, also actively adopted and articulated the concept of U.S. land grant colleges. However, while they all adhered to the concept of the U.S. land grant college in their discourses, each used it differently for their own purposes, and oftentimes their usages contradicted the traditional narrative of the U.S. land grant college system.

As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the historical memory of late nineteenth century U.S. American aid to Sapporo Agricultural College was selectively and arbitrarily utilized as an anti-communist tool in the revitalization of the relationship between University of Massachusetts Amherst and Hokkaido University. Similarly, the ways in which the concept of the U.S. land grant college system was used by each professor in the University of the Ryukyus deserves careful scrutiny.

My theoretical interests lie in the questions of imposition, appropriation, mimicry, and contradiction in the concept and practices of U.S. land grant colleges in colonial settings under dual imperialisms. Various material structures (e.g., agricultural education, experimental stations, and financial sources and management systems) and ideological meanings (e.g., democratizing higher education, anti-establishmentism, anti-imperialism, and anti-feudalism) of U.S. land grant colleges were arbitrarily and oftentimes in combination selected and exploited by these differently positioned administrators. Especially for Muelder and other administrators from Michigan State University, the concept of the U.S. land grant college system was an important reference point in their development of the University of the Ryukyus. Each time they imposed and interpreted the concept in Okinawa and other parts of the world, they referred to their definition of the U.S. land grant college system. In this sense, although the history of the U.S. land
grant college is often narrated in a trans-Atlantic context in opposition to the European model of elite education, this chapter reveals the trans-Pacific side of the creation and reinforcement of the concept of the U.S. land grant college system. At the same time, the interpretation and adaptation of the U.S. land grant college system by Goya were not necessarily consistent with what Muelder and other administrators (at least superficially) believed. Yunte Huang conceptualizes “transpacific displacement” as “a historical process of textual migration of cultural meanings,” and he observed that it “is driven in particular by the writer’s desire to appropriate, capture, mimic, parody or revise the Other’s signifying practices in an effort to describe the Other.”253 Likewise, the academics examined in this chapter trans-pacifically conveyed the meanings of the U.S. land grant college, with interpretations that served their specific situations in-between the United States and Japan. However, it is this broader room for interpretation that rendered not only the history of “transpacific displacement” of the U.S. land grant college system unclear, but also the formation of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms invisible.

In this chapter, therefore, I first examine how and for what purposes M.E. Muelder at Michigan State College deployed the concept of the U.S. land grant college for the establishment of the University of the Ryukyus under the U.S. occupation of Okinawa. Mobilizing his experience as a U.S. American official in Allied-occupied Germany after World War II, Muelder wrote a proposal for the competitive bidding to enter into the contract with the U.S. Military to “adopt” the University of the Ryukyus project. From my analysis of Muelder’s article based on this proposal, I argue that he utilized the system of U.S. land grant colleges as a tool of reorientation of Okinawans in the transformation from Japanese to U.S. regimes. The second Okinawan president of the

253 Huang, Transpacific Displacement, 3.
University of the Ryukyus, Goya Chōshō, grasped and utilized the concept of U.S. land grant colleges differently, however. I discuss the ways in which Goya utilized the concept of U.S. land grant colleges to articulate his version of the history of higher education in Okinawa. The concept of the U.S. land grant college gave him a discursive device to rearticulate Okinawan history, which departed from both Japanese and U.S. versions. Through my analyses of these professors’ interpretations of the U.S. land grant college system, I argue that the ambiguity of the concept obscured the history of collaboration, competition, and complexity of U.S. and Japanese imperialisms within and among the Japanese archipelago.

1. The Role of International Programs in Identity Formation of the U.S. Land Grant College System and the United States

As described in the introduction, Hokkaido University (successor of Sapporo Agricultural College) was supposed to be the best example of the U.S. land grant college system in Japan, which is why administrators Milton E. Muelder and Clifford E. Erickson from Michigan State College visited there in 1956 as reference for their development program at the University of the Ryukyus. However, although Sapporo Agricultural College established school farms to propagate knowledge of Western agriculture, the farms were cultivated by sharecroppers, a situation far from the democratic and yeoman agrarian ideals supposedly at the heart of the land grant college system. What then did Muelder and Erickson expect to see and learn from their visit in Hokkaido in 1956? Unfortunately, there were no direct answers to these questions in the archives. In this section, therefore, I would like to explore what Muelder envisioned when he wrote the proposal for the University of the Ryukyus project and the ways in which Michigan State
College’s international project allowed U.S. academics to reinforce the identity of the U.S. land grant college system and the United States as a new imperial power in the world.

Milton E. Muelder was one of the professors who planned Michigan State College’s University of the Ryukyus project, informed by his experience as a military officer in allied-occupied Germany. He worked in highly significant places for U.S. Cold War strategies in the world, including, Germany, Okinawa, Vietnam, and Columbia. After he obtained his M.A. in 1932 and Ph.D. in 1937 from the University of Michigan, Muelder taught at Michigan State College while serving as lieutenant of the United States Naval Reserves from 1935 to 1943. After he earned his M.A. in public administration and international law at Columbia University in 1943, he served in the Navy until the end of World War II, and worked for the U.S. Military Government in Germany from 1945 to 1948.254

John A. Hannah, then-president of Michigan State College, visited Berlin to persuade Muelder to come back to East Lansing to help develop its international programs. According to Muelder, Hannah at the time was committed to developing programs at the college to provide students with opportunities to “become responsible citizens of the world.” Muelder understood that the reason he was recruited was because of his experience in the U.S. military and abroad. He recalled:

The pink slip appointing me in the fall of 1949 as head of the newly created department of political science and public administration carried an interesting addendum: “It is understood that additional responsibilities may be assigned to

you by the President.” I’ll confine myself to those which impinge upon international programs and their administration.\textsuperscript{255}

Muelder played a key role in Hannah’s vision to expand the university programs internationally. In particular, Muelder himself stated, his war experiences were “invaluable later in representing MSU in numerous negotiations with the army whether in Washington DC or abroad, as well as with numerous U.S. Government agencies and with major foundation representatives.” For instance, Muelder was involved in the U.S. Military’s post-war exchange programs between U.S. Americans and Germans after he returned to the university. As a part of this program, the Police Administration Department at Michigan State College hosted a German police group.\textsuperscript{256}

Among Muelder’s international activities at Michigan State, helping the University of the Ryukyus was a major endeavor. In 1950, U.S. land grant colleges and universities were invited to apply for a U.S. Army-sponsored project to “adopt” the University of the Ryukyus, the so-called “University of the Ryukyus Project.” This invitation came by way of a letter sent by the president of the American Council of Education, Arthur S. Adams. John A. Hannah as the then-president of Michigan State University received the letter and consulted with Muelder as to whether they should apply. Muelder recalled:

I simply stated that if he wanted the project I would draft a proposal employing the military staff format - a one page presentation, succinct and clear, supported by tabs of supporting documentation. I had drafted many such presentations and


had critiqued many more for the Chief of Staff in Berlin. Briefly, MSU’s proposal was the one that was accepted. Responsibility for handling the Okinawa project fell on my shoulders.\footnote{257}

Muelder’s rationale for Michigan State College’s intervention in the development of the University of the Ryukyus was to foster the U.S. land grant college system and philosophy and thereby instill “obedience” in local Okinawans during the regime transition from Japan to the United States. This thinking was revealed in his report titled “The University of the Ryukyus” (1951), which was written based on his proposal to the American Council on Education: “The most important program for the M.S.C. Teachers,” stated Muedler, “will be to help develop an organization pattern and the philosophy of education which will reflect that of the land-grant institution.”\footnote{258} Muelder made two further points supporting the involvement of Michigan State College in the development of the University of the Ryukyus project. First, since the local people and even U.S. officials stationed in the Ryukyu islands did not have adequate understanding of the U.S. land grant college system, it was important that Michigan State College, as one of the leading U.S. land grant colleges, be included as a model. In his report, Muelder provided an episode of one attempt to incorporate agricultural experiment stations into the University of the Ryukyus. Against the skepticism of Okinawans and the plans of a U.S. official in Okinawa, Muelder and his colleague took action to take “over all of the existing experiment stations.” They believed, “[i]t would be a boon to bring these stations under the wing of the university as soon as there is valid and proper staff in the university


\footnote{258}Milton E. Muelder, “The University of the Ryukyus” Reprinted from “The Educational Record” for October 1951, Folder 4: “The University of the Ryukyus” by Milton Muelder, 1951; Box F.D.; Milton E. Muelder Collection, Michigan State University Archives & Historical Collections, East Lansing, Michigan, 357.
to direct, guide, and integrate their work and services.” However, this plan was not well supported by Okinawans inside or outside the University of the Ryukyus because, Muelder believed, they couldn’t imagine universities serving the community and its everyday problems. “The local organization model for a university is that of the University of Tokyo which, like the German university and even some American schools, is inclined to be an ‘ivory tower’ institution which does not relate its programs of research and teaching to the needs and problems of the surrounding society.” However, Muelder believed it was crucial that Michigan State College provide the Okinawan people with a model of a U.S. land grant college. Muelder insisted:

A real contribution can be made by the University of the Ryukyus to the future development of Okinawa and the surrounding islands. If the Ryukyuans are given reason to expect that such a contribution will be made, because the whole purpose and orientation of the university is one of service to the community, then future support to sustain and develop the institution will undoubtedly be found. Thus, in the over-all, it would appear that the most challenging task of the Michigan State College staff this year is to help to provide a basic organization pattern, both as to general administrative arrangements and as to purpose and philosophy, similar to the pattern and goals of a land-grant institution such as Michigan State College.259

Furthermore, Muelder claimed that Michigan State College could serve as a mediator to “reorient” Okinawans to the U.S. occupation administration. In the transition between U.S. and Japanese regimes, Muelder observed that Okinawan public sentiments inclined towards reversion to Japan. He predicted “a clash between the older and newer generations,” who had acquired elements of the American way of life through their encounters with U.S. Americans in various settings including both public and private spheres under the U.S. occupation. Facing these economic and cultural challenges, the

University of the Ryukyus, with support from Michigan State College, needed to show “new ways of strengthening the native economy and of helping people.” Muelder further revealed:

If the United States is to remain for many years on the island, it is imperative that we gain the respect of the natives as well as their obedience. For this a great deal more is demanded than importation of food or the mere dissemination of information. A real challenge exists for the Michigan State College staff to play its part in the reorientation program. That part is an integral and important aspect of our policy in the Ryukyus.²⁶⁰

It was clear then that Muelder expected Michigan State College to guide local Okinawans to respectfully follow the new American regime, and the concept of the U.S. land grant college provided an important discursive device here. As the original U.S. land grant college system was established in opposition to the European academic model, Michigan State College’s University of the Ryukyus project was proposed as an alternative to the Japanese academic model—the University of Tokyo. In order to instill “obedience” in local Okinawans, the United States utilized the U.S. land grant college model to present themselves as an anti-imperialist force and liberator from Japanese imperialism. Even though this identity and the United States occupation of Okinawa existed in contradiction, the concept of the U.S. land grant college system was utilized to deny the real, imperialist nature of the relationship. In this sense, the U.S. land grant college system was utilized to reinforce U.S. exceptionalism. Furthermore, this post-1945 interpretation of the concept of the U.S. land grant colleges by U.S. Americans is not limited to Okinawa, but was similarly enacted on a global scale.

Muelder and Erickson’s errand to East Asia in 1956 and Michigan State University’s other overseas missions helped them discover the “uniqueness” of their education system and reinforce U.S. national identity. After completing their business in Okinawa and Vietnam, they made a circuit of the globe, visiting India, Pakistan, Italy and the U.K. After their 26,000 mile world tour, what impressed Erickson most was the superiority of the U.S. land grant college system. “The university of the United States and particularly the land grant universities, have devoted themselves to the solutions of the vital problems facing our people,” Erickson stated in his trip report. Erickson found this educational system and philosophy peculiar to the U.S. land grant colleges. He elaborated on its uniqueness:

In no other country does such a large proportion of the youth have the advantages of provided educational opportunities. In no other place is such great social fluidity commonly found. In no other place does such a large proportion of the people have an opportunity to contribute their ideas and have these ideas implemented into everyday practices.

Erickson observed, while people around the world were “friendly, helpful, and intelligent,” they were not in a position to enjoy freedom, self-determination, or education. “The unique educational forces of the United States,” he believed, “can surely make a great contribution all over the world.”

According to his fellow traveler Muelder, Erickson was not initially enthusiastic about the university’s international engagement; rather “he began the trip reluctantly and skeptically.” However, after he

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completed his trip around the world, he became a huge supporter of the international programs of Michigan State college.\textsuperscript{262}

Likewise, the concept of the U.S. land grant college was rediscovered and reinforced through Michigan State University’s other international programs. Michigan State University simultaneously carried out international missions in other foreign countries; for instance, Columbia starting in 1951, and Vietnam and Brazil starting in 1954.\textsuperscript{263} The president of Michigan State University established a coordinating committee for overseas projects (later it became the office of international programs), and Muelder served as a chairperson.\textsuperscript{264} Muelder received a report from John T. Stone, professor of the College of Agriculture that was involved in Michigan State University’s mission to agricultural colleges in Palmira and Medellin in Columbia. Stone’s report revealed that, even though the Colombian people were at first skeptical about Michigan State University’s mission, which had been identified with “Yankee imperialism and dollar diplomacy,” it was eventually accepted. Muelder quoted Stone:

Students are now learning to apply science to practical problems. They are getting laboratory experience by doing rather than just memorizing textbook material. The staff has a new interest in extending agricultural knowledge to all the people as evidenced by the introduction of an active short course and farm demonstration program. A few years ago, practical instruction to farmers by faculty would just not have been considered, and in fact, is encouraged considerable opposition. In


other words, the land-grant philosophy of education, which has been so important in the development of agriculture, is gradually taking root in Colombian soil.

Through intervention by Michigan State University, higher education in Colombia changed its model from “classic European philosophy for the intellectual few” to “extending agricultural knowledge to all the people.” The components of the U.S. land grant college system and philosophy present in this narrative were: 1) a focus on applied science for everyday life, 2) opening knowledge to a wider audience, and 3) a strong contrast with classic European education. At the height of the Cold War, what Muelder affirmed from the Michigan State University mission in Columbia and his world tour resonated well with the discourse of U.S. exceptionalism, which often claimed the unique identity of the United States that separated it from European imperialism while denying its imperial acts. For university administrators at Michigan State College who were involved in its overseas missions in the 1950s, the concept of the U.S. land grant college was thus highly significant in that it provided them a rationale for their international missions whilst denying their involvements in U.S. imperial acts.

2. U.S. Land Grant College Concept in Contestation in post-1945 Okinawa

In contrast to Muelder’s expectations, local Okinawans did not obediently accept the transplantation of the U.S. land grant college to Okinawa. Rather, Goya Chōshō, the second president of the University of Ryukyu, offered a new articulation of the concept of the U.S. land grant college system during his inauguration address in 1952. The correspondence that followed regarding Goya’s address in 1952 shows clearly the

266 Pease, “Exceptionalism.”
differences in how Goya, the mission members actually enforcing the system in Okinawa, and academic administrators in East Lansing understood the concept of the U.S. land grant college.

Russell E. Horwood, one of the heads of the Michigan State College mission to Okinawa, was critical of Goya Chōshō in his letter dated October 20, 1952 to Milton Muelder, the Dean of the School of Science and Arts of Michigan State College, and sent a carbon copy to the president of Michigan State University, John A. Hannah, both in East Lansing, Michigan. What irritated Horwood was Goya’s plans for developing the University of the Ryukyus that included establishing a biological research center. From Horwood’s point of view, Goya did not understand the concept of the U.S. land grant college, which the University of the Ryukyus was supposed to imitate:

You will find a copy of President Goya's inaugural address. You will note he talked about establishing “research in biology.” He has not grasped the idea of dealing in practical research and extension to help people now in their everyday problems. I have a further meeting with the University Administration and Board today to emphasize the importance of developing a three-fold University that will provide information and service to meet the needs of people.267

For Horwood, Goya’s plans to establish a biological research center deviated from the “three-fold University” model, which was based on “teaching, research, and extension.” These three aspects were identified as the “fundamental features” of U.S. land grant institutions by Hannah in a letter he sent to Horwood. In this letter, Hannah claimed that Michigan State College was chosen “in view of its outstanding reputation among the land-grant institutions in the United States,” and stated that the goals of the Michigan State College mission were to “help formulate a basic organization pattern and

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267 Letter from Russell E. Horwood to Milton E. Muelder, October 20, 1952, University of the Ryukyus Project Records, Michigan State University, University Archives and Historical Collections.
determination of fundamental goals” at the University of the Ryukyus. Hannah then reiterated the “fundamental features of [a] land-grant institution” as guidance for Horwood, who led the mission in Okinawa: “Land-grant institutions were established on the premise of rendering service to people—all the people.” Furthermore, Hannah described the role of U.S. land grant institutions as “the agent to carry out for the government certain basic tasks in the field of extension services.” While Michigan State College received financial support both from state and federal governments and functioned as “an important instrument for the government in providing much needed services directly to the people,” it was administratively independent from these governments. This institutional structure was key in serving the local farmers, Hannah believed.

The extension service, along with teaching and research, was a crucial part of Michigan State College and other U.S. land grant colleges. Hannah understood the extension program as a mediator between governments and farmers. By providing a direct connection between these two groups, faculty of the U.S. land grant institutions who were engaged in extension programs, were able to bring “the problems of the people” back “to the university and the resources of the university be applied intelligently to serve the people’s needs.” It was practical education, Hannah conceived, that U.S. land grant colleges would demonstrate and transplant to the newly established University of the Ryukyus.

Horwood himself was deeply involved with U.S. land grant colleges. He had devoted himself to developing experimental stations in Michigan and Japan before he

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went on the mission to Okinawa. Horwood, who specialized in dairy research, had previously served as the director of an experimental station in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan for two years, and had worked for the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers to study and give advice on extension programs in Japan in 1946 and 1947. He then headed the first five faculty members who went on their mission to the University of the Ryukyus from Michigan States College in 1951.

In contrast to Horwood’s concern about Goya’s inauguration address, however, Hannah and Muelder did not find anything alarming about it. Muelder replied to Horwood: “Incidentally, President Hannah also feels that President Goya's inaugural address was a very excellent one. He was puzzled at your criticism of it.” Muelder and Hannah, who were situated in Michigan and did not have direct contact with Goya or the other Okinawan staff, found Goya’s address to be acceptable. However, Horwood insisted that the inaugural address did not represent the actual politics of the Okinawan faculty members at the University of Ryukyus. As the chief of the Michigan State College advisory group situated in Okinawa, Horwood observed:

My statements regarding it reflects [sic] my knowledge and that of some of our Mission members of President Goya's thinking and that of his staff, gained through many contacts rather than just what his speech states. There is the general talk constantly of having a highly specialized staff that wishes to carry on very basic research. Actually they do not have, to any extent, either the trained

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270 The five faculty members included “E. Eleanor Densmore, home demonstration agent in Kent County; Guy H. Fox, associate professor of political science and public administration; Edward Pfau, Jr., assistant professor of education; and Horace C. King, instructor, department of business education.” Milton E. Muelder, “The University of the Ryukyus” Reprinted from “The Educational Record” for October 1951, Folder 4: “The University of the Ryukyus” by Milton Muelder, 1951; Box F.D.; Milton E. Muelder Collection, Michigan State University Archives & Historical Collections, East Lansing, Michigan, 357.

271 Letter from Milton E. Muelder to Russell E. Horwood, November, 6, 1952, University of the Ryukyus Project Records, Michigan State University, University Archives and Historical Collections.
personnel or equipment for such at this time. They do have, on the other hand, an opportunity to deal in a practical type of research and extension to aid the people in their everyday problems. Our mission has tried to make this point.\textsuperscript{272}

This correspondence reveals not only the contestation in regards to the ideals of the University of the Ryukyus between Okinawan and U.S. faculty members in Okinawa, but also differences in opinion between U.S. faculty members in Okinawa and Michigan. This fact suggests that the concept of the U.S. land grant college was not imposed by a single power or coherent actors.

However, despite Horwood’s accusation of Goya Chōshō’s “misunderstanding” of the U.S. land grant college system and philosophy, Goya’s inaugural address actually demonstrated his comprehension and strategic usage of the concept. By denying Goya’s capacity to grasp the concept of the U.S. land grant college, Horwood ironically revealed his own inability to understand it. In his inaugural address, Goya praised and even boasted of the extension program that the University of Ryukyus offered to the general public in Okinawa. In comparison with other Japanese universities, he stated, the University of the Ryukyus basically provided the same quality of higher education. However, one point, Goya emphasized, where his university gained an advantage over its Japanese counterparts was its extension program. He continued:

\begin{quote}
In order to elevate the general living standard of the people of the Ryukyus, I think it necessary to develop strongly our plan of the improvement of our agriculture and home management through our extension activities. We are endeavouring to realize our ideal of educational trinity of research, teaching, and extension.

Goya indeed shared an appreciation of the importance of the three major components of the U.S. land grant college system that Hannah and Horwood so strongly
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{272} Letter from Russell E. Horwood to Milton E. Muelder, November, 20, 1952, University of the Ryukyus Project Records, Michigan State University, University Archives and Historical Collections.
desired to transplant to Okinawa. After describing the three-fold approach of the U.S.
land grant college system, Goya revealed his hope to establish the biological research
center. This idea became the target of insistent criticism by Horwood.

Goya’s argument for the establishment of the biological research center stemmed
from his belief in the importance of allowing professors to devote themselves to their
research as vital for the development of the university. As Horwood pointed out, Goya
understood that the University of the Ryukyus was not equipped with adequate research
facilities and human resources. Yet, Goya believed that it was also crucial to raise morale
among researchers at the university. He pleaded for both “financial and spiritual help” to
make the University of the Ryukyus “the true center of the culture of the Ryukyus.”

Goya advocated establishing a biological research center that would specialize in
subtropical biology:

The Ryukyu Islands belong to the subtropical zone[,] and we are told that the
lands and the surrounding seas of the archipelago are abundant in many rare
species of life and plants [sic], but the scientific research has not yet been applied
to them in full measure, and the secret of nature lies undiscovered. We must open
these long-closed doors of truth.

Goya believed that by making use of its unique geographical location, his
university would “be able to contribute to the cause of [the] scientific world.” It is
important to note that Goya’s way of articulating the need for a biological research center
was conditioned by the colonial discourse that positioned Okinawa as a “secret” place to
be discovered. On the other hand, he had little choice but to express the desire to
contribute to the “scientific world” by using colonial discourse, such as the “long-closed
doors of truth.”

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273 Chosho Goya, “Inauguration address,” October 15, 1952, University of the Ryukyus Project Records,
Michigan State University, University Archives and Historical Collections.
While Goya was enthusiastic about establishing a biological research center at the University of the Ryukyus, he himself did not have a scientific background. Goya taught English literature at Shuri high school before he became president of the University of the Ryukyus in 1952. He was born in Shuri, Okinawa, in 1885, and graduated from Shuri high school. He further pursued his education at the teachers’ school in Hiroshima (Hiroshima Kōtō Shihan Gakkō). He began his teaching career in Kagoshima, and became a teacher of his alma mater, Shuri high school, in 1916, and later the president of the same school in 1932. Goya was praised for his accuracy in his English teaching, and was famous for his study on Shakespeare.274

The inaugural address by Goya and the critique of his address by Horwood reveals the contestation between Goya and Horwood over the vision for the University of the Ryukyus. It is clear that Horwood looked down upon the Okinawan president as if he considered Okinawans incapable of pursuing basic scientific research. In contrast with Horwood’s vision for the University of Ryukyus, which focused mainly on extension programs, Goya not only sought to make practical contributions to the needs of local people, but also to aspire to world-class academic achievements, which he believed would raise the faculty’s morale.

Horwood’s dismissive comment that “[Goya] has not grasped the idea of dealing in practical research…” ironically shows that Horwood denied Okinawan people’s self-determination. Even though Hannah and Howood himself repeatedly stated that the mission of the U.S. land grant college was to understand people’s needs and serve them...
by utilizing its closeness to the people, his assessment negated Goya’s and local Okianwans’ abilities and rights to decide and articulate their own needs.

3. Defying Dominant Historiography

Goya utilized the concept of the U.S. land grant college to re-articulate the historical memory about higher education in Okinawa. Goya’s speech reveals his understanding of the historical memory of higher education in Okinawa, which differed from the contemporary understanding of the University of the Ryukyu’s history. The historiography of the University of the Ryukyus and Michigan State College’s mission to Okinawa presupposes that the University of the Ryukyus is the first institution of higher education in Okinawa. For example, Paul L. Dressel states that before the establishment of the University of the Ryukyus program “Okinawa had never had any university” in College to University: The Hannah Years at Michigan State, 1935-1969.\(^275\) In contrast with this understanding, Goya claimed that there was indeed a prior university in Okinawa and, moreover, that it shared a philosophy with the newly founded University of the Ryukyus:

Just 150 years ago King Sho-on of the Ryukyus established his state university on the ground in which the old normal [s]chool once stood and which is now part of our cam[p]us. King Sho-on [presented] himself at the inauguration [ceremony] of the school and gave his famous instructions to the students saying, “If I find anyone among you who is truly able and useful for the welfare of the country, I will pick him up for an important position in my government, however low his class may be. On the contrary, I will clear my country of incompetent [sic] and good-for-nothing people, even if they are descendants of the Blood or of high social ranks. [”] Tims [sic] he put special stress upon training the then young generation of Okinawa.

Although the old "university" is not the same as the modern university, in these two paragraphs Goya clearly describes the school that King Sho-on established as a university and, more interestingly, he makes a connection between the old university and the University of the Ryukyus through the concept of the U.S. land grant college system. For Goya, it is not true that Okinawan people had never had institutions of higher education; rather, they had a civilization that could prove itself equal to U.S. civilization in that they had an institution of higher education that was open to all people regardless of class or family background. In the following paragraph, his speech further points out that the old and new universities share other similarities, particularly in that the University of the Ryukyus had extension programs that were open to everyday people and that contributed to the improvement of the lives of the Okinawans.

This historic university was, however, abolished just after [Okinawa was established as] a Japanese prefecture […] in the Ryukyus. It is said that history repeats itself. After the lapse of 70 years since then, this university of the Ryukyus was founded at the historic site of Shuri castle not far from the old university. I am often inclined [sic] to think that there is some connection between our new university and the old one. I often meditate upon king Sho-on's great achievement of running his kokugaku University with the object of cultivating men of tomorrow.  

Conclusion

The concept of the U.S. land grant college allowed Goya to rearticulate the history of higher education in the Ryukyus. Goya’s interpretation of the U.S. land grant college system differed completely from the understandings of Muelder, who used the concept to suppress local Okinawans during the regime transition from Japan to the United States, while reinforcing U.S. national identity based on U.S. exceptionalism. Indeed, Goya and

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276 Goya, “Inauguration address.”
Muelder interpreted the concept of the U.S. land grant college system differently and even contradictorily. Since the concept of the U.S. land grant college system can be thus interpreted broadly, it served variously for U.S. imperialism, Japanese settler colonialism, and doubly colonized Okinawans who sought to define their own collective subjectivity in a way that differed from either the United States or Japan.
Chapter Four

Embracing U.S. Exceptionalism: Memory Wars on Japanese University Campuses, 1950-1956

“Boys Be Revolutionary”

On May 12th, 1969, the bust of William Smith Clark on the campus of Hokkaido University was vandalized with the words “BOYS BE REVOLUTIONARY” written in white spray paint. Later, the helmet that Japanese student activists wore during their protests was placed on his head. Endowed with these words and symbolic helmet, Clark, who had long been revered as the wise and benevolent U.S. American founder of Hokkaido University, ironically appeared in solidarity with student protestors. Indeed, this episode shows that the symbol of the university, William Smith Clark, occupied an ambiguous status in the post-1945 era in Japan. He was in particular placed in a complicated position at the height of anti-Americanism amongst Japanese student activists in the mid-1950s. Immediately after the end of the Asia Pacific war in 1945, the United States as the major occupation authority prioritized democratizing Japanese society, and it even protected Japanese student movements in the early period of the U.S. occupation of Japan. However, the United States changed its policy in support of rearmament and economic development to make Japan a “bulwark” against communism in 1949. In accordance with this shift, the democratization policy was also suspended;

278 Hokkaido Daigaku Gakusei Shinbunkai, “Hokudai funsoshi” 2.
rather, the U.S. occupation authority put pressure on both public and private corporations to fire members of the Japan Communist Party and sympathizers (the so-called red purge) in the late 1940s. Japanese academia was also a target of the purge. Walter Crosby Eells, U.S. American official of the Civil Information and Education Section of the General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, toured the country to advocate anti-communism on Japanese university campuses starting with Niigata University on July 19, 1949.\textsuperscript{280} In response to this attempt at ideological suppression, anti-Americanism grew amongst Japanese students.

Such anti-American sentiment was also strong on the Hokkaido University campus. In 1950, when Eells visited Hokkaido University to give a speech on anti-communism, students and faculty of the university successfully refuted his argument and drove him away. The so-called Eells incident and anti-American feelings had lingering effects, particularly when the university sought to revive its historical relationship with University of Massachusetts Amherst. Ultimately, both U.S. foreign officials and Japanese administrators at Hokkaido University utilized Clark’s exceptional status in the minds of the Japanese to mobilize historical memories for their immediate political ends. Clark also provided an ideological source of energy for young activists; but at the same time, because he had a strong and stable popularity among the Japanese, U.S. American foreign officials invoked the historical memory of Clark to mitigate the anti-American sentiments expressed in the 1950s.

In 1956, a newly established agency, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) planned several university affiliation programs between U.S. and Japanese universities. The first was to be an affiliation project between Waseda

\textsuperscript{280} Kan, Zengakuren, 45.
University and the University of Michigan, followed by a second project between Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst. The ICA was established in 1955 by incorporating several former U.S. technical assistance programs, including the Technical Cooperation Administration, which had its origins in the “Point IV” foreign policy program.\textsuperscript{281} By the time the ICA approached Waseda University and Hokkaido University to facilitate contracts with their U.S. counterpart universities, there were already 84 such contracts in existence between the United States and overseas universities all over the world.\textsuperscript{282}

In the second week of September 1956, the U.S. Operations Mission to Japan in Tokyo and the ICA in Washington D.C. exchanged numerous telegrams to discuss how to approach the opposition of students at Waseda University, and how to move forward with a plan for an ICA-funded university affiliation program with the University of Michigan. C.E. Meyer in Tokyo requested “any WASHINGTON guidance” on the current turbulence.\textsuperscript{283} In response, Fitzgerald, a U.S. official working at the Department of State in Washington D.C., suggested “widest publicity all phases Mass. educators’ visit, stressing 80 years affiliation two schools [Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst], as means counteracting Communist activity connection Waseda-Michigan affiliation.”\textsuperscript{284}

\textsuperscript{281} The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961.”
\textsuperscript{282} International Cooperation Administration, \textit{Technical Cooperation through American Universities}, 29.
\textsuperscript{283} Telegram from C.E. Meyer to SECSTATE WASHINGTON, D.C., September 8, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
\textsuperscript{284} [Fitzgerald’s first name is not written.] Telegram from FITZGERALD, DEPARTMENT to Turner, September 11, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
To conduct a survey for the second U.S.-Japan university affiliation program, the president and professors from the University of Massachusetts Amherst planned to attend the 80th anniversary of Hokkaido University on September 15, 1956 in Sapporo. Fitzgerald explained that “[William Smith] Clark First President Hokkaido University, highly revered and legendary figure, had profound influence on [the] development [of] Hokkaido [University] into one [of] Japan’s leading schools.” Fitzgerald further contextualized Clark as “originator Point IV type program,” the U.S. foreign technical assistance project started by Harry S. Truman’s administration in 1949. Thus, the telegram provided a reminder of the original relationship between Amherst and Sapporo represented by the first “legendary” president of Hokkaido University, Clark, to help establish U.S-Japan university affiliations in Tokyo and Hokkaido. It further emphasized that this strategy was advantageous because it would avoid direct U.S. involvement, at least on the surface: “This approach avoids dignifying Communists with direct or official US reply [to] their threats Waseda.”

This telegram connects the two U.S.-Japan university affiliation projects, Waseda University with the University of Michigan, and Hokkaido University with the University of Massachusetts Amherst. However, this connection was not necessarily obvious, in that this document is one of just a few in either the U.S. State Department or university archives that mentions both affiliation projects together. Moreover, this link was not visible to the Japanese students; the two ICA-funded affiliation programs were rather contextualized as totally different projects by the Japanese administrators at Hokkaido.

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University (as I discuss in a later section). For U.S. foreign officers, nevertheless, the two affiliation projects had important connections. The first affiliation project between Waseda University and the University of Michigan was needed to provide a successful role model to convince the Japanese government, academic community, and general public to launch the second affiliation project. The second project between Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst was based on the historical relationship between their respective predecessor colleges, and provided a story of U.S.-Japan friendship starting from the late-nineteenth century and continuing to the present. This story was considered by U.S. foreign officials to be a way to avoid the appearance of the U.S. fighting against “Communists” in Japan and to successfully implement U.S. missions in Japan.

To make Japan into a major economic power as a counter-communist policy in Asia during increasing the Cold War tensions of the 1950s, U.S. foreign officers and Japanese elites sought to re-establish and strengthen U.S.-Japan relations. The policies of democratization and demilitarization of Japan, which were established immediately after the end of the Asia Pacific war, were reversed for the purposes of rearmament, often referred to by historians as the “reverse course.” In a July 1954 report titled “An Economic Program for Japan,” a survey for the Foreign Operations Administration and the U.S. State Department, the importance of the “military procurement program” was discussed. It stated, “United States policy is clear as to the importance of developing a mobilization base in Japan.” Towards this goal, the report recommended “assistance in

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techniques of industrial and agricultural productivity.” The Foreign Operations Administration of the U.S. State Department was established in 1953 to “centralize operations, control, and direction of all foreign economic and technical assistance programs,” and its functions were passed on to the ICA in 1955, which sponsored the university affiliation program. Indeed, U.S. technical assistance in Japan was developed for U.S. military procurement, and to exert its military power in Asia. This U.S. militarization in post-1945 Cold War Asia was a part of the development of what historian Bruce Cumings called the “archipelago of empire.” However, the transformation of Japan into the hub of the mid-twentieth century economic development in East Asia under the tutelage of the United States was not abrupt or random. “Japan began,” Cumings points out, “its essential industrial pattern of state-guided bursts of growth in the 1880s.” William Smith Clark, William Penn Brooks, and other U.S. Americans were actively involved in the early period of the nation-state’s industrial development.

The denial of imperialism has been a project of national importance for the United States. Historian Paul Kramer states that, since becoming independent from the British Empire, the American republic has sought to ease “republican anxiety about empire” during U.S. territorial expansion, starting with Thomas Jefferson’s invention of the “Empire of Liberty.” “But fear and denials of American empire,” argues Kramer, “became more salient at the dawn of the twentieth century, as the last residues of

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289 Cumings, Dominion from Sea to Sea.
290 Cumings, Dominion from Seat to Sea, xiii.
republican society were swept aside by the industrial-capitalist order, and as the United States emerged as an extracontinental power.\textsuperscript{291} Harry S. Truman likewise denied U.S. imperialism in his inauguration speech unveiling the “Point IV program.” “The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing,” stated Truman on January 20, 1949.\textsuperscript{292} As the successor of Truman’s Point IV program,\textsuperscript{293} the ICA also needed mechanisms to deny its imperial nature.

This chapter examines the ways in which ICA-funded university affiliations programs were launched while simultaneously denying ongoing U.S. imperialism in Cold War Japan. Specifically, it asks how U.S. foreign officers utilized the historical memory of William Smith Clark and the relationship between Massachusetts Agricultural College and Sapporo Agricultural College to counteract “Communist” activities in Japan. It also investigates how and for what purposes the Japanese university administrators and student activists utilized the historical memories about the relationship with nineteenth-century educators from the United States in the midst of strong anti-American sentiment on Japanese campuses. By mapping out the different usages and understandings of the historical memories about U.S. assistance to Sapporo Agricultural College and its colonization of Hokkaido, this chapter aims to suggest a link between U.S.-assisted

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\textsuperscript{293} The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961.”
\end{flushleft}
Japanese colonialism in the nineteenth century and similar neocolonial structure that reemerged in the post-1945 Cold War era.294

Discussions of how memories of colonialism are erased and/or evoked for present colonial relations are helpful to understand the political intentions behind the use of historical memory of the U.S.-assisted Japanese colonization of Hokkaido. Derek Gregory points out the continuities of the colonial past to the present, which he refers to as postcolonialism, in The Colonial Present. Postcolonialism imposes colonial relations in the present and simultaneously critiques colonialism; both these actions rely heavily on the memory of the colonial past. Whether forgetting or remembering the past, Gregory suggests analyzing the political intentions and cultural significances of postcolonialism. He distinguishes two different usages of the colonial past, “colonial amnesia” and “colonial nostalgia.” Colonial amnesia refers to the metropolitan cultures’ acts of forgetting the Othering processes of other cultures, physical violence of colonialism, and depriving the colonized of opportunities to write their own histories. Colonial nostalgia refers to how metropolitan cultures view cultures of Others, which were destroyed by the violence of colonialism and modernity, in a static and fetishizing way. Gregory argues that both uses of the colonial past are extremely dangerous.295 Even though Hokkaido and the Ainu have been colonized, in the process of colonization, they have been naturalized as being wholly in the possession of the Japanese nation-state, and the historical past of colonization has been erased.296 In this sense, the colonial past still continues and exerts its violence in present-day Hokkaido. This chapter, therefore, interrogates the ways in

294 For the discussion of the continuities between nineteenth century U.S. imperialism and Cold War global politics, Goldstein, “Introduction: Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present.”
296 Mason, Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan.
which historical memories were remembered and/or forgotten, and the political purposes and consequences of such acts.

First, I describe the contestation over the ICA-funded contract of the university affiliation program between Waseda University and the University of Michigan. It particularly focuses on why U.S. foreign officials needed the historical memory of William Smith Clark that stressed the collaboration and friendship between the United States and Japan in the late nineteenth century. Second, I trace the history of the ICA-funded affiliation program between Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Finally, I engage the multiple understandings and usages of historical memories about Clark, including the memoir of a student activist who was expelled from Hokkaido University after the Eells incident of 1950. His narrative of his act against Eells and the U.S. anti-communist policy also summoned the historical memory of Clark as a U.S. American teacher who taught Japanese students about U.S. nineteenth-century liberalism. The multi-faceted nature of these historical memories, I will argue, served to provide an exceptional space that rendered invisible U.S. imperialism during the Cold War.

1. Waseda University and the University of Michigan Project

U.S. Foreign Officers’ Republican Anxiety: U.S. Operations Mission to Japan, Tokyo, February 1956

In his letter of February 17, 1956 to Leland A. Randall, chief of the ICA’s Japan Division in Washington, Frank L. Turner, program officer of the U.S. Operations Mission to Japan, expressed the local officers’ irritation towards the decision made by officers in Washington D.C. on the Waseda University - University of Michigan affiliation program.
“We feel disturbed about the decision because the Waseda project is predominantly engineering and will be used to improve Waseda’s contribution to Japanese industry.”

Turner complained because officers in Washington categorized the Waseda University - University of Michigan affiliation as a public administration project, ignoring the negotiation processes of the ICA-funded affiliation project with Waseda University. Turner and his colleagues wished to hide their real goal, to offer public administration programs at Waseda University, because of Japanese skepticism of the project in particular and the U.S. government in general. The U.S. foreign officials in Tokyo assumed that a project exclusively categorized as “engineering” would be acceptable to the Japanese.

The U.S. officers in Tokyo had approached Waseda University with caution during their attempts to create an affiliation contract with a U.S. university. They had already failed in the negotiation between Waseda University and the Georgia Institute of Technology. The majority of the faculty of Waseda University were opposed to their university making a contract with Georgia Institute of Technology, and their powerful distrust of the ICA-funded university affiliation project still remained from this previous

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298 Turner points out “three types of opposition to the affiliation” with Georgia Institute of Technology: “(a) One was based on the allegation that Georgia Tech was not academically proficient, (b) Another was based on the fact that Georgia Tech was a segregationist school (this latter information is very confidential and its release will embarrass me personally), (c) Finally many faculty members saw the affiliation as a threat to their job security or at least prestige.” Letter from Frank L. Turner, Program Officer, U.S. Operations Mission to Japan, to J. Russel Andrus, Deputy Chief, Education Division, International Cooperation Administration, Washington 25, D.C., January 23, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
negotiation experience.\textsuperscript{299} U.S. officers in Tokyo thought that if the affiliation project with the University of Michigan focused on engineering instead of public administration, Waseda University might be more accepting of it. Turner further envisioned that once the affiliation program started, they would be able to expand it to include public administration projects, as officers in Washington wished. He was optimistic about the negotiation between Waseda University and the University of Michigan because “[recent] President Hatcher’s visit […] served to launch the affiliation with real éclat since Hatcher is such a fine salesman for the United States as well as the University of Michigan.”\textsuperscript{300}

U.S. officers in Tokyo were anxious to pretend that non-U.S. governmental actors had initiated the affiliation project. They particularly disliked creating the impression that it was the U.S. government that had been behind the negotiation. Therefore, Turner himself, as an officer from the U.S. State Department, “didn’t participate [in the faculty meeting on the affiliation at Waseda University] personally, because it would have been imprudent for the U.S. Government to be represented at Waseda.”\textsuperscript{301} Later in the same letter to Randall in Washington, Turner explained: “Waseda is under pressure from certain groups to the effect that the U.S. Government is calling the signals and Waseda is executing them. If we go to Waseda and try to gain the acceptance of change [to public


administration projects], it will be real evidence of the fact that we are trying to force changes upon them.”

The Waseda University newspaper condemned the president of the university, Ohama Nobumoto, and his administration as “dupes of the Americans.” While Turner thought such assertions were “ridiculous,” “they are indicative of the fact that we must cooperate with President Ohama rather than make life more difficult for him than it already is,” he claimed.

Even though the ICA was an agency of the U.S. State Department, U.S. foreign officials clearly attempted to make it appear that non-governmental actors had initiated the university affiliation program. Seemingly, U.S. officers needed to reconcile their beliefs that they were acting not as imperialists, but as advocates for the interests of the free world. The “republican anxiety about empire” was deeply instilled in U.S. foreign officials in Tokyo in the mid-1950s. For the U.S. foreign officers, however, it not only came from within, but they also faced negative views and skepticism of U.S. imperialism from the Japanese.

“Remember Eells:” Japanese Students’ Resistance to U.S. Aid/Imperialism

The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, September 1956

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“Do not leave Michigan. 220,000 Japanese students reject you,” stated a telegram received by the University of Michigan from Tokyo. Other similar telegrams state: “We do not want your aid. Withhold your project. Waseda University Cell, Japan Communist Party.” “Waseda Students strongly against sending professors for Productivity Institute Waseda University Student Committee.” The anti-ICA-funded university affiliation demonstrators were aiming to prevent the visits of two professors from the University of Michigan on September 12, 1956. A student group from Waseda University that was part of the “All Japan Federation of Student Associations,” or Zengakuren, announced three action plans to intercept the professors as they left for Tokyo: sending telegrams to the University of Michigan that insisted that the two professors should remain in the United States; holding a march from Tokyo to the airport; and “picketing of University with ‘1000 students’ to throw GORGY PAGE off campus by force if necessary.” By the second week of September, the two professors, Charles Gordy and Edward Page, from the University of Michigan were in Honolulu en route from Ann Arbor to Tokyo. However, they were advised to stay there until

307 This translation is adopted from the telegram.
308 Telegram from C.E. Meyer to SECSTATE WASHINGTON, D.C., September 8, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
309 Telegram from SECSTATE WASHDC to Frank L. Turner, September 7, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park,
Waseda University provided assurance of their safety upon their arrival.\textsuperscript{310} Indeed, U.S. officers both in Tokyo and Washington took the students’ oppositional actions seriously. Student activists perceived the ICA-funded affiliation program as a “U.S. imperialist” threat that had encroached on their academic freedom and self-government over the university since the early 1950s. The University of Michigan received further messages from Japanese students at Meiji University and Hosei University in Tokyo stating “Remember EDLS.”\textsuperscript{311} U.S. foreign officials in Tokyo explained this telegram to the ICA headquarter in Washington D.C.: “‘Remember EDLS’ is believed garble for ‘Remember EELLS.’” “Dr. WALTER CROSBY EELLS was official CI. and E., GHQ SCAP who in 1949-50 surveyed practically all Japanese universities. His anti-communist views known and hence student demonstrations at HOKKAIDO and TOHOKU (SENDAI) prevented conduct of scheduled meetings.”\textsuperscript{312}

**U.S. Operations Mission to Japan and Waseda University, Tokyo, September 1956**

Facing increased opposition from students against the Waseda University - University of Michigan affiliation, U.S. officers in Tokyo and administrators of Waseda University implemented publicity campaigns to gain support from the Japanese public.

\textsuperscript{310} Telegram from C.E. Meyer to SECSTATE WASHINGTON, D.C., September 8, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.


\textsuperscript{312} CI. and E. is an acronym for the Civil Information and Education Section. CIE was an agency of General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (GHQ SCAP). Telegram from C.E. Meyer to SECSTATE, WASHDC, September 12, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
These campaigns emphasized that the affiliation program was based on the relationships between the universities and attempted to hide the participation of the U.S. government. On September 7, 1956, President Ohama of Waseda University met representatives from the All Japan Federation of Student Associations (Zengakuren), who demanded the cancellation of the ICA-funded university affiliation program with the University of Michigan. Ohama attempted to reassure the students that the U.S. government not involved, telling them “[the] agreement had no ‘strings.” He continued, “since [the] research project is outside regular University structure, [there is] no danger of undermining academic integrity.”

On September 12, 1956, Meyer sent a telegram on the student demonstration against the ICA-funded university affiliation program to the Secretary of State, Washington D.C. Meyer described the demonstrations:

[In order to prevent Professors Gordy and Page from the University of Michigan from coming to Waseda University], 15 Waseda CP [Communist Party?] cell members plus approximately equal number fellow travellers […] demonstrated at Embassy Sept. 11 then proceeded airport Sept. 12 AM to meet GORDY. Demonstrators had drawn conclusion from earlier OHAMA statement that GORDY arriving Sept. 12. On realizing GORDY not arriving, group sang songs waved banners and returned campus for further demonstration where joined by few additional agitators from SOHYO affiliated Teachers’ Union and students other campuses.

Meyer mentioned that Ohama issued a statement “identifying [the] source of trouble as [the] Communist Party and describing cordial treatment accorded Waseda professors now in U.S.” Major Japanese newspapers and TV stations publicized this statement.

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313 Telegram from C.E. Meyer to SECSTATE WASHINGTON, D.C., September 8, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
Furthermore, Meyer claimed U.S. officers “[a]re handling numerous press inquiries at USOM/Embassy generally as follows: agreement between WASEDA and UM developed by both universities not ICA. Eleven WASEDA professors already sent US. to study phases engineering under UM auspices. ICA has university affiliation program permitting about 90 foreign universities exchange faculty members with US. universities. WASEDA project is part of overall program under which ICA finances dollar costs and foreign university pays local costs.”

U.S. officials insisted that it was solely the two universities that implemented the university affiliation project without U.S. government involvement. Just as Ohama focused on U.S.-Japan friendship, and even emphasized the favor the University of Michigan had done for the Japanese faculty of Waseda University, the story of the friendship and academic bestowed by William Smith Clark during his late-nineteenth century mission to Sapporo Agricultural College was further retroactively invoked by U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.

In response to the telegram from Tokyo dated September 8, 1956 that described Zengakuren’s plans for the three demonstrations against the ICA-funded university affiliation between Waseda University and the University of Michigan, U.S. officials in Washington D.C. suggested emphasizing U.S.-Japan friendship by using the historical memory of William Smith Clark and the relationship between Massachusetts Agricultural College and Sapporo Agricultural College. On September 11, 1956, the following telegram was sent from Washington to Tokyo:

Subject: Publicity Waseda and Hokkaido.

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President Mather and Drs. Sieling and Zahradnik of University of Mass. ETA Tokyo September 13 at invitation Japanese authorities discuss prospective agricultural TC affiliation Hokkaido and Mass. Universities.

Visit coincides with 80th Anniversary Celebration Hokkaido’s founding 1876 with assistance of Dr. William S. Clark, later Third President University Mass. Clark First President Hokkaido University, highly revered and legendary figure, had profound influence on development Hokkaido into one Japan’s leading schools. Clark’s association brought to Hokkaido many noted Mass. teachers scientists.315

At the height of telegram exchanges between Tokyo and Washington concerning Waseda University’s student demonstrations against the ICA-funded university affiliation in mid-September 1956, this single telegram made a seemingly random mention of the University of Massachusetts and Hokkaido University. Indeed, it is one of a few telegrams referring to the Hokkaido University - University of Massachusetts Amherst affiliation in the entire folder of the Waseda University - University of Michigan affiliation project. However, in the minds of the U.S. officers in Washington D.C. and Tokyo, it made sense as a strategy to suppress student turbulence and achieve their goal to implement the ICA-funded university affiliation projects, which they believed would contribute to boosting the Japanese economy and containing Communism in Asia.

Fitzgerald suggested to U.S. officers in Japan:

Subject your concurrence basis knowledge present situation Japan suggest USOM conjunction USIS consider widest publicity all phases Mass. educators’ visit, stressing 80 years affiliation two schools, as means counteracting Communist activity connection Waseda-Michigan affiliation. This approach avoids dignifying Communists with direct or official US reply their threats Waseda.316

316 Telegram from FITZGERALD, DEPARTMENT to Turner, September 11, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission
The U.S.-Japan friendship narrative was useful for U.S. State Department officials because it did not directly confront Communism, yet allowed them to avoid ideological discussions and deny U.S. imperialism. By emphasizing that the U.S.-Japan friendship was over 80 years old, and attempting to suggest a continuity that did not in fact exist, they re-staged and rewrote historical memory, to rationalize and naturalize the affiliation of Waseda University and the University of Michigan.\footnote{This periodization is artificial and problematic because the original relationship between Massachusetts Agricultural College and Sapporo Agricultural College only lasted for 18 years, from 1876-1893. Hokkaido Daigaku, \textit{Hokudai hyakunenshi}, 75-96.}

Fitzgerald also made a connection between William Smith Clark and Truman’s Point IV program. “A biographer of Clark has credited him as originator Point IV type program which now widely applied between various countries throughout world,” stated Fitzgerald.\footnote{Telegram from FITZGERALD, DEPARTMENT to Turner, September 11, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.} This suggested that the U.S. aid program during the Cold War had a long history, and the United States had been liberal and benevolent towards foreign countries. This strategy was effective in a certain sense because the Japanese did indeed embrace the historical memory of William Smith Clark and the relationship between Massachusetts and Hokkaido. In the next section, I will discuss how Hokkaido University and the University Massachusetts Amherst affiliation project was negotiated and initiated from the perspectives of both U.S. American and Japanese administrators.

\textbf{2. Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst Project}

“Spontaneous Acceptance:” University of Massachusetts Amherst, January 1956

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\footnote{Telegram from FITZGERALD, DEPARTMENT to Turner, September 11, 1956, Folder: 500 USOM Prod. University Exchange; Box 1; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Executive Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.}
Provost Shannon McCune of the University of Massachusetts Amherst signed his letter to Frank L. Turner at the United State Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, on January 26, 1956. Shannon McCune, a geographer specializing in Korea, who was born to an American missionary family in Korea in 1913, and had recently worked at the University of Tokyo as a Fulbright scholar, had just become the Provost of the University of Massachusetts Amherst five months previously. Later he would become the first civilian administrator of U.S.-occupied Okinawa from 1962-64.  

The three-page long letter on the letterhead of the office of the provost at the University of Massachusetts Amherst describes the keen interest of his university in the affiliation program with Hokkaido University. Defining his new position as “sort of like an academic vice-president,” McCune stated that he had been devoting himself to program development on his own campus. He described how the possible affiliation program with Hokkaido University would contribute to the growth of the University of Massachusetts Amherst. “I think that it would be to our advantage to have foreign ties so that we could enrich our own program considerably.” McCune started his letter with the benefits to his university from the affiliation project. “We have different members of our staff go on Fulbrights or leave us for two year appointments with ICA under contracts at other institutions, and so on, but we have not done enough ourselves as an institution; yet the relationships with Hokkaido University in the past were very close and would give us...

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a natural tie for the future,” McCune posited. Then, he explained the past relationship, and expressed how remarkable it was that the legacy of William Smith Clark still remained among the Japanese:

It was a very early type of association and was very enriching and rewarding not only for Hokkaido but also for us. Unfortunately this tie was never kept up. We do get occasional visitors from Hokkaido. They are always very impressed with what we are doing and are very nostalgic when they discuss Colonel Clark and his effectiveness as a technical assistance person. I, frankly, am amazed at what this one man accomplished in eight months, for he not only developed the University and helped in many other ways out he also left a simple slogan – “Boys Be Ambitious” – which was picked up and used widely in Hokkaido.

McCune’s letter certainly reveals his interest in the affiliation program with Hokkaido University. However, it also suggests his hesitation to force the plans on the Japanese. Suggesting the affiliation program was not his original idea, but rather came from others, including U.S. officials in Washington, “I personally, have the feeling that the emphasis for this should come from Hokkaido rather than from us,” added McCune. He did not elaborate on reasons behind this statement.

While it is difficult to know why McCune preferred to avoid suggesting the affiliation project directly to the Japanese, Frank L. Turner and his colleagues working in Tokyo shared McCune’s preferred approach to implement the project. Turner replied, “I personally feel that it would be desirable to have acceptance of a second affiliation by the Japanese arise spontaneously from their side as you indicated in your letter.”

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After Turner confirmed McCune’s interests in the ICA-funded university affiliation project with Hokkaido University, the office of the U.S. Operations Mission to Japan sent a recommendation to the ICA in Washington D.C. on February 6, 1956. Quoting McCune’s letter to Turner, they recommended that the ICA and U.S. Operations Mission to Japan approach the Japanese officials with caution to gain “spontaneous acceptance” from them.

In his letter, the Provost makes the observation that many people have urged the University to seek an affiliation with Hokkaido University, but that “I personally have the feeling that the emphasis for this should come from Hokkaido – rather than from us.” The USOM shares this point of view and would suggest that a formal approach to the University of Hokkaido be deferred for the following reasons:

It continues to explain the current situation of the first affiliation contract between Waseda University and the University of Michigan. U.S. foreign officials in Tokyo were in the middle of negotiations over the first affiliation project, which was not going smoothly due to the objections and skepticism from the Japanese. “[I]t is still a fact that Japanese academic and scientific circles and left-wing-elements harbor distrust of U.S. motives,” the writer of the recommendation disclosed. In contrast to Waseda University as a private university, in the view of U.S. foreign officials in Tokyo, the fact that Hokkaido University was a national university would add more complications

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because it required the approval from the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{324} The U.S. foreign officials were well aware of how the Japanese saw them. J. Russell Andrus in Washington wrote to McCune, “Our Mission in Japan is quite sympathetic to the idea of an affiliation with Hokkaido, as is ICA/W. However, there are various problems internal to Japan, and also respecting our relationship with Japan which necessitates caution.”\textsuperscript{325}

Facing “various problems” in the processes of implementing the first ICA-funded university affiliation project between Waseda University and the University of Michigan, U.S. foreign officials tried to minimize opposition and resistance from the Japanese as much as possible. For the U.S. officers in Tokyo, therefore, it was important to create the impression that the affiliation was not forced by the United States.

It was in this context, U.S. foreign officers considered the historical relationship between the two predecessor colleges (Massachusetts Agricultural College and Sapporo Agricultural College) as a useful tool. Although the University of Massachusetts Amherst was not the ideal candidate for the affiliation, in that it lacked some programs that Hokkaido University needed to develop (i.e., fishery and forestry programs), the “historically close tie” between the two universities was prioritized during selection of the U.S. counterpart university.

The University of Massachusetts Amherst was a familiar institution for administrators and faculty at Hokkaido University. Its name had been raised in informal conversation between Japanese university officials and U.S. foreign officers before the


\textsuperscript{325} Letter from J. Russell Andrus, University Contract Coordinator to Shannon McCune, Provost, University of Massachusetts Amherst, February 13, 1956, Folder: Education - Hokkaido University, 1954 - 1960; Box 21; Department of State. International Cooperation Administration. Mission to Japan. Program Office. 6/30/1955-11/3/1961; Record Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
official selection process. Frank L. Turner started to prepare for the second ICA-funded university affiliation program between Hokkaido University and an American institution while he was still working on negotiations for the first university affiliation project between Waseda University and the University of Michigan. U.S. foreign officers in Tokyo were planning to visit Hokkaido University and Keio University, as alternative candidates for the second affiliation project, to have “informal” conversations with university officials to see if they were interested in the ICA-funded university affiliation program. Turner wrote in his letter to J. Russell Andrus, deputy chief of the education division at the ICA in Washington D.C.: “[f]rom previous visits by members of our staff, we are sure that Hokkaido will want to revive the former relationship with the original Massachusetts institution which helped establish Hokkaido in 1876.” Then he requested Andrus to sound out the University of Massachusetts Amherst on the affiliation program.

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The University of Massachusetts Amherst was not the only candidate for the affiliation program with Hokkaido University. The University of Washington and the University of Kentucky were also interested in the ICA-funded university affiliation project with Hokkaido University. The University of Washington, in particular, was a strong rival to Massachusetts in that it had fishery and forestry programs, which Hokkaido University needed to develop but the University of Massachusetts Amherst lacked. On the other hand, the University of Washington didn’t have an agricultural college, which the University of Massachusetts Amherst did have. Furthermore, the

faculty of the University of Washington and Hokkaido University had informal correspondence about the feasibility of the ICA-funded university affiliation program. At a meeting of U.S. foreign officers and administrators of Hokkaido University in Sapporo on June 17, 1956, the names of the University of Massachusetts Amherst and the University of Washington were raised as candidates for the U.S. counterpart university. The president of Hokkaido University, Suginome Harusada, revealed that he had received letters from the University of Washington and the University of Massachusetts Amherst stating their interests in an exchange program with Hokkaido University. While Suginome preferred the University of Massachusetts Amherst to the University of Washington, core faculty at Hokkaido University raised questions on “the capacity of the University of Massachusetts to meet the requirements of the University of Hokkaido. It was pointed out that while Massachusetts had staff and facilities to meet some of Hokkaido’s requirements, it might be necessary to call on other American institutions to assist in certain fields, for example, in fisheries and forestry.”

The historical memory of the relationship between Massachusetts Agricultural College and Sapporo Agricultural College (the predecessors of the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Hokkaido University) was a decisive factor in the final selection. After the meeting about the affiliation project with officials at Hokkaido University, C.E. Meyer, director of the U.S. Operations Mission to Japan, sent U.S. officer Moyer in Washington a statement of recommendation of the University of

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Massachusetts Amherst as the U.S. partner in the affiliation program with Hokkaido University. Meyer wrote, “[w]e recognize that Massachusetts may not be as well staffed or equipped to service Hokkaido’s needs as some other American institutions such as the University of Wisconsin or the University of Washington. Nevertheless we feel that there should be no cause for concern and that the University of Massachusetts is the logical choice.” Meyer provided justifications for the recommendation, including the advantages and disadvantages of the two universities, as well as how to overcome the limitations of the University of Massachusetts Amherst — by possibly asking for assistance from the University of Washington for fisheries and forestry programs. “A major consideration in selecting Massachusetts is,” Meyer further stated:

[I]ts unique historical relationship to Hokkaido. This relationship began in 1876 when an American, Dr. [William Smith] Clark,\textsuperscript{329} was invited by the Japanese Government to help establish the University. Dr. Clark was the president of the predecessor institution of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Since that time there has been an exchange of correspondence, books, and on September 15 this coming fall the grandson of Dr. Clark will arrive under State Department sponsorship to participate as Guest of Honor in the 80\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary Celebration.[…]

I don't think we can go so far as to say that if Massachusetts were not chosen there would be no chance of an affiliation. However, it is certain that the selection of Massachusetts will go a long way towards overcoming the hesitancy and misgivings which are certain to arise in the minds of some Government officials, the faculty, and student body.\textsuperscript{330}


The “logical choice” that Meyer and his staff in Tokyo proposed was made primarily based on their consideration of the Japanese reaction to the ICA-funded university affiliation program between Hokkaido University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst, rather than the relative strengths of the current academic programs at each institution. As Meyer himself disclosed, the University of Massachusetts Amherst lacked the capacity and resources that were required for the affiliation project with Hokkaido. However, U.S. foreign officers thought that the proposal of the affiliation program with the University of Massachusetts would look a natural project because of the historical memory of the two schools. In their minds, this would allow them to gain “spontaneous acceptation” by the Japanese officials of Hokkaido University and overcome “hesitancy and misgivings” in Japan. Although the Japanese administrators at Hokkaido University also relied on the historical memory of the U.S. and Japanese relationship in the late nineteenth century to deal with anti-American sentiments on the campus, they had their own distinct goals. In what follows, I will examine materials from the University of Hokkaido to show how the Japanese administrators perceived the ICA-funded university affiliation program differently from their American counterparts, and aimed to use this opportunity to improve their university’s facilities.

**Fueling Anti-Americanism at Home and Fundraising in the United States: Hokkaido University, Sapporo, 1956**

“80th Anniversary Commemorative Events Planned,” the *Hokkaido University Newspaper (Hokkaido Daigaku Shimbun)* reported about an upcoming event on its front page on July 5th, 1956. Although Shannon McCune, provost of University of Massachusetts Amherst, expected an invitation to attend the 80th anniversary event of
Hokkaido University scheduled on September 15th, 1956, he had not yet received one in July, two months before the celebration. The newspaper article did not mention any guests from the University of Massachusetts Amherst, or the ICA-funded university affiliation project. Based on an interview with Suginome Harusada, president of Hokkaido University from 1954 to 66, the article described the main commemorative project of the 80th anniversary as the construction of a new student union. Suginome also revealed to the press that Hokkaido University had invited both domestic and foreign guests to the anniversary. The only guest who was specified in the article was the grandson of William Smith Clark from the University of Cincinnati.

At the time of publication, administrators of Hokkaido University were in the middle of negotiations with U.S. foreign officials about the ICA-funded university affiliation project. Adopting the suggestion of Shannon McCune, U.S. foreign officials in Tokyo planned to have representatives from the University of Massachusetts Amherst attend the 80th anniversary celebration of Hokkaido University. However, Suginome Harusada was reluctant to invite them. He was rather in favor of having them over to discuss the ICA-funded university affiliation program starting on September 25th, 1956, after the 80th anniversary event. “His time and energy will entirely be occupied by University Eightieth Anniversary until September 20,” Matsuda Takeo, professor of the

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332 *Hokkaido daigaku shinbun* [Hokkaido University newspaper], July 5, 1956

Department of Agricultural Economics at Hokkaido University, explained in his letter to Frank L. Turner dated on July 7th, 1956. 334

For Suginome, the main concern was how to raise funds for the construction of the student union. He needed to raise 150 million yen. Elected as the ninth president of Hokkaido University in October 1954, Suginome spoke of his plan to develop the infrastructure of the campus to provide appropriate spaces for professors and students during his inauguration speech. 335 In January 1956, at his new year’s address, Suginome announced his plan for the construction of the new student union to commemorate the school’s 80th anniversary. He planned to raise 150 million yen for its construction both domestically and internationally. 336 Accordingly, the ICA-funded university affiliation project was a secondary priority for Suginome. He and his administration rather expected the affiliation program to help them raise funds for the construction of the student union.

“[Suginome] and his office are concerned almost exclusively to collect funds for building Student Hall. You will understand this situation please, and I hope that university contract program will foster endowments of American people for the Student Hall,” Matsuda wrote in his letter to Turner. 337 Even during their business trip to visit the University of Massachusetts Amherst for a meeting on the university affiliation project in 1957, Suginome and his assistant Tsuchida Yoshikazu made an effort to raise funds for the student union in the United States. Besides Amherst, they visited San Francisco,

335 Hokkaido daigaku shinbun [Hokkaido University newspaper], October 21, 1954.
336 Hokkaido daigaku shinbun [Hokkaido University newspaper], January 30, 1956.
Cincinnati, New York, and Washington D.C. to ask foundations, media companies, and the U.S. State Department for support for their fundraising drive. In Cincinnati, they met William Smith Clark II, the grandson of the first president of the university, William Smith Clark.\(^{338}\) This fundraising drive was a great success. According to Suginome’s remarks on the opening of the student union in the *Hokkaido University Newspaper*, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation donated $50,000 each to the student union.\(^{339}\)

Despite his success in obtaining donations from U.S. sources, actually receiving funds from the United States was not an easy task for Suginome because anti-American sentiment was strong among faculty and students at Hokkaido University in 1956. When Suginome announced his plan to raise funds for the student union from the United States, the employee union opposed the idea, claiming that U.S. funds would restrict self-government and academic freedom. “The employee union argued, if we received donations from the United States, the union would have American ‘strings attached’ and self-government of the university would be constrained,” recalled Tsuchida.\(^{340}\)

Opposition to raising U.S. funds for the student union was so strong that the *Hokkaido University Newspaper* could not ignore the subject. “7,500,000 yen from the United States,” reported a headline occupying the largest space of the front page on the issue of February 15, 1956. The article explained detailed plans for the student union, and mentioned voices that were concerned about receiving funds from the United States. On the same page, there is an opinion article, which stated that students should be involved


\(^{339}\) *Hokkaido daigaku shinbun* [Hokkaido University newspaper], September 15, 1960.

\(^{340}\) Tsuchida, “Takuhatsuso,” 236.
in planning the 80th anniversary. It further criticized more directly receiving funds from
the United States.\textsuperscript{341} Similarly, the employee union was also opposed to the ICA-funded
university affiliation project between Hokkaido University and the University of
Massachusetts Amherst.\textsuperscript{342} In the processes of planning the student union and the
affiliation program, therefore, Suginome was afraid of anti-American sentiments “flaring
up” and made efforts to “work harmoniously with Americans and in particular the
University of Massachusetts.”\textsuperscript{343}

U.S. foreign officers as well as administrators of the two universities wished to
enter the contract of the ICA-funded university affiliation program, but they were each
fighting against anti-American sentiments for their own reasons. Ultimately, they all
resorted to using historical memories of late-nineteenth century U.S.-Japan relations
represented by William Smith Clark. In the next section, I will show how the multi-
faceted nature of these historical memories made it possible for them each to use the
figure of Clark for their own purposes.

3. Embracing U.S. Exceptionalism and Mobilizing Historical Memories

Anti-American sentiment on the Hokkaido University campus had been strong
ever since Walter Crosby Eells, U.S. officer of the U.S. occupation authority, came to
give an anti-Communism speech and attempted a “red purge” there in 1950. However,
this anti-Americanism also had a degree of ambivalence due to the Sapporo Agricultural

\textsuperscript{341} \textit{Hokkaido daigaku shinbun} [Hokkaido University newspaper], February 15, 1956.
\textsuperscript{342} “Hokkaido-Massachusetts Affiliation, Visa Clearance for Dr. Yajima,”
October 2, 1957, Folder: Education - Hokkaido University, 1954 - 1960; Box 21; Department of State.
Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
\textsuperscript{343} “Hokkaido-Massachusetts Affiliation, Visa Clearance for Dr. Yajima,”
October 2, 1957, Folder: Education - Hokkaido University, 1954 - 1960; Box 21; Department of State.
Group 469; National Archives at College Park, MD.
College creation story. Opposition students considered the historical memory of the relationship between Hokkaido and Massachusetts (especially William Smith Clark) to be exceptional and separate from perceived U.S. agency encroaching on the university. In his memoir, Yanada Masataka, a former student activist, describes how he was proud of the coalition between students and professors in their actions against the anti-Communism lecture by Eells. He believed that the democratic tradition they inherited from Sapporo Agricultural College (and William Smith Clark) enabled them to fight against the U.S. occupation authority. As a leader of the resistance who was expelled from the university after the Eells incident, Yanada’s memoir provides important insights into the student activism on Hokkaido University campus and the complexity of historical memories of Clark in the 1950s.

In their solidarity with besieged faculty members, what Yanada and his fellow claimed to fight for was democracy and academic freedom under the U.S. occupation. In his memoir on the Eells incident of 1950, Yanada pointed out that the depiction of the event was distorted in the Hokkaido University Newspaper. He thought of his act against the anti-Communism lecture by Eells as resistance to the absolute power of the U.S. occupation military. He was well aware that he was taking a risk, and could be accused of the violation of U.S. occupation policies towards Japan. He recalled:

The violation of the U.S. occupation policies towards Japan meant being charged in the military court, which would not guarantee the suspect’s life. [At the time, I thought I might be] “exiled to Okinawa” or “sentenced to many years at hard labor.” I also thought about my older sisters who supported me and enabled me to enter Hokkaido University.

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For Yanada, his resistance to the U.S. occupation authority required enormous courage. However, he believed he had no choice but to stand up against U.S. suppression of academic freedom. He continued:

Nevertheless, I made the decision because not only was I furious with the attitude of Eells, but also I was moved by the professors’ bravery and intelligence that refuted Eells’ arguments in the discussion session followed by his lecture. I also wanted to play an active role in the battle over the self-government of the university. \(^{345}\)

These faculty and student activists successfully forced the cancellation of the Eells lecture at Hokkaido University. Although ten students were punished, including Yanada and three others who were expelled from the university, the students and faculty who were involved in the incident were not charged in military court. \(^{346}\) Nevertheless, Yanada is clearly proud of his actions and the triumph of the opposition during the battle over protecting their campus from the U.S. occupation authority.

The historical memory of Hokkaido University’s first teacher Clark, rather than serving as a symbol of U.S. imperial power, was actually an inspiration for Yanada’s activism. In concluding his memoir on the Eells incident of 1950, he cited an article on the night school of Sapporo Agricultural College written by Matsui Masaru, former professor of Hokkaido University and peace activist (1912-1996).

I still believe that what the night school fostered in the first half of the twentieth century was the Lincoln spirit (i.e., the Pioneer spirit), which Professor Nitobe [Inazō] grasped. Furthermore, it was humanity based on human rights, progress, and democracy in the Declaration of Independence, which Clark and Capron, who fought as Union officers in the independent war \([sic]\) \(^{345}\), taught in the foundational period of Sapporo Agricultural College.

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\(^{345}\) Yanada, *Hokudai no īruzu tōsō*, 86.

\(^{346}\) *Hokkaido daigaku shinbun* [Hokkaido University newspaper], July 5, 1950.
“When I read this passage,” wrote Yanada, “I found parallels between the traditions of Sapporo Agricultural College and the democracy and energy released to protect academic freedom and self-government of the university in the Eells incident.” Yanada’s articulation of U.S. history simultaneously embraced U.S. republicanism and ignored U.S. imperialism in the works of Clark and other U.S. Americans in late nineteenth century Hokkaido. As I discussed in the previous chapters, Clark and his U.S. American students including Brooks acted in the context of U.S. imperialism. However, at the time of the Eells incident of 1950, it was not easy to articulate or even to utter the word “U.S. imperialism” for Japanese students under U.S. occupation. Daitō Osamu quotes another student activist, Takaoka Kenjirō, who was actively involved in the Eells incident at Hokkaido University: “if one used the word ‘U.S. imperialism,’ there was a possibility of being arrested for violating U.S. occupation policy.” It is difficult to tell whether or not Yanada and his fellow student activists considered Clark and Brooks as U.S. imperial agents, or how conscious they were of the Japanese settler colonialism in Hokkaido. However, the historical memory of the relationship between Sapporo Agricultural College and Massachusetts Agricultural College recalled by Yanada bore a different

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347 Yanada, *Hokudai no ēruzu tōso*, 156.
348 Daitō makes comparison of resistance against Eells between Tohoku University and Hokkaido University. He points out that students at Tohoku University articulated their action by utilizing the word “U.S. imperialism” and locating it as a part of national independent movement from U.S. occupation. Osamu Daitō, *Kenshō Ēruzu jiken: senryōka no gakumon no jiyū to daigaku jichi* [Study of the Eells incidents: academic freedom and self-governance of university under U.S. occupation] (Osaka-shi: Seibundō Shuppan, 2010) 191.
349 Later, in 1976, Student activists at Hokkaido University clearly criticized their school’s complicity in Japanese settler colonialism in Hokkaido and other parts of Asia. Two senior students started a hunger strike in front of the statue of William S. Clark in opposition to the centennial celebration in 1976. They argued: “the centennial is an attempt to continue knowledge production that serves bourgeois dictatorship without any self-reflection on the fact that Hokkaido University played an important role in the oppression of the Ainu during the development of Hokkaido as well as the invasion of Manchuria in the pre-war era.” “Kinen shikiten hantai no shūkai ya hansuto,” [Student protest and hunger strike against the centennial celebration] *Asahi shinbun*, September 9, 1976, Box 20, Folder 34, William S. Clark Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
meaning from that of U.S. officials or Japanese administrators of Hokkaido University. Instead of locating their activism against U.S. imperialism, Yanada rather utilized the historical memory of William Smith Clark and his teachings on democracy in articulating their action. On the other hand, this strategy taken under constrained situations (e.g., lacking freedom of speech) ironically functioned to gloss-over U.S. and Japanese imperialisms in late-nineteenth century Hokkaido.

While their motivations differed from the Japanese student activists, both Japanese administrators and U.S. officials also utilized the historical memory of Clark. For example, Japanese administrators at Hokkaido University seemingly celebrated Clark in response to student protests over the hiring of U.S. American professor Harold Lane. Lane used to be an English professor at Hokkaido University before World War II, and was hired again in 1951 immediately after the Eells incident of 1950. Student activists publicly questioned the capacity of Lane for this position. They criticized the American professor’s political influence on the university, in which he would probably intervene in academic freedom as a representative of the United States. In response, Hokkaido University officials strongly emphasized historical ties with the University of Massachusetts Amherst and the popularity of William Smith Clark. To mitigate students’ skepticism towards hiring Lane, then-president of the university Yoshichika Shima released a statement. “His status is merely a foreign professor; he would never be involved in the administration of the university.” On the same page of the Hokkaido University Newspaper, an article titled “The Statue of Professor Clark Completed” appeared with a photograph. Thus, it appears that William Smith Clark, was pictured

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350 *Hokkaido daigaku shinbun* [Hokkaido University newspaper], April 20, 1951.
351 *Hokkaido daigaku shinbun* [Hokkaido University newspaper], April 20, 1951.
on the same page as the statement about Lane to mitigate anti-American feelings and channel the energy of student activists into celebrating the historical memory of this legend.

Similarly, Hokkaido University officials created the impression that the contract between the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Hokkaido University differed from the University of Michigan - Waseda University affiliation project. Due to the opposition of Waseda University students, the ICA-funded university affiliation program between the University of Michigan and Waseda University was also featured in the Hokkaido University newspaper. On October 26, 1956, the article on the issue of the ICA-funded university affiliation program between the University of Michigan and Waseda University was published. Titled, “What is behind the contract?” it traced the process of negotiations between Michigan and Waseda under the ICA, as well as the student demonstrations against the project because of their concerns about U.S. encroachment on self-government and the academic freedom of Japanese universities. The article explained that the student opposition actions peaked when they demonstrated against the arrival of the two professors of the University of Michigan at the Tokyo Haneda Airport on September 12, 1956. After that day, according to the article, student activism against the affiliation program lost support and popularity. “However, the University of Michigan problem is not over. Various aspects of the contract will be revealed,” the writer concluded. Indeed, the article detailed the problems associated with, and implied further impacts of, the ICA-funded university affiliation program. On the front page of the same issue of the newspaper, it also covered its very own university’s ongoing negotiation over the ICA-funded university affiliation project with the University of Hokkaido daigaku shinbun [Hokkaido University newspaper], October 26, 1956.
Massachusetts. However, it did not mention the “ICA” or make any overt connection between the two affiliation projects. Moreover, the *Hokkaido University Newspaper* never used the term “ICA” in its articles on the university contract with the University of Massachusetts Amherst.

U.S. foreign officers in Tokyo also mobilized the relationship between the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Hokkaido University to successfully implement the second ICA-funded university affiliation plan. They made efforts to reinforce the “traditionally close tie,” and approached Japanese administrators at Hokkaido University informally. It was Provost Shannon McCune at the University of Massachusetts Amherst who described the blueprint of the reinforcement of the “traditionally close tie.” In his letter to Frank L. Turner in Tokyo on December 26, 1956, McCune stated his interests in the development of international exchange programs. McCune further inquired about the possibility to make a contract with Hokkaido University under the university affiliation program of the ICA, and he explained what he had already planned and how he expected to make the “tie” stronger. He wrote:

> One of the ways in which we can do this is on an informal basis. We are trying to put in train some simple things. For example, I am hopeful that one of our professors will be successful in his application for a Fulbright grant to teach at Hokkaido University next year. He would make an excellent emissary for us. We are expecting an invitation from Hokkaido University to send a representative to attend the celebration of the 80th year of the founding of the University on September 15. I have already tried to get things cleared away so that we could get a grant for the President, J. Paul Mather, to attend that celebration on our behalf. We are sending books and other materials to the students and staff there under the books for Asia program.

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353 *Hokkaido daigaku shinbun* [Hokkaido University newspaper], October 26, 1956.
Turner replied, “the relationship which you bear to the University of Hokkaido is a valuable asset in helping us to get started.” J. Russell Andrus, University Contract Coordinator in Washington D.C., also wrote to McCune, “[McCune’s plan] you will recognize is something that is beyond the scope of operations of ICA, but it is something which might conceivably be a prelude to a contract financed by ICA.”

Based on correspondence with McCune, U.S. Officials in Tokyo recommended actions to achieve a “spontaneous acceptance of an affiliation on the part of the University of Hokkaido.” Instead of starting formal discussions with the officials of the University of Hokkaido, they suggested, “we could bring up subject in informal talks with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Japan Productivity Center and with Ministry of Education.” As the second point of their recommended action, they stated:

Encourage the establishment of closer relationships between the University of Massachusetts and the University of Hokkaido. We should encourage the sending of a Fulbright professor which the Provost indicates in his letter of January 26 he already has in mind, encourage the sending of President J. Paul Mather of the University of Massachusetts to celebrate on September 15 in Sapporo the 80th anniversary of the founding of the University of Hokkaido, plus the sending the periodicals and books to the students and staff at Sapporo under the “books for Asia Program.”

U.S. Foreign officials basically adopted the plans stated in McCune’s letter, and supported as much as their capacity allowed sending the Fulbright scholar to Hokkaido.

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University, as well as having professors from the University of Massachusetts Amherst attend the 80th anniversary of Hokkaido University.

To further implement the plan to reinforce the tie between Hokkaido and Massachusetts, the U.S. Foreign officials sponsored the grandson of William Smith Clark to attend the 80th anniversary of Hokkaido University. Turner received an office memorandum titled “Prospective Hokkaido University Contract” on February 17, 1956. The writer, Robert S. Black, stated: “we have requested the Department to consider Dr. Clark, a grandson of the founder of the University, for a U.S. Specialist grant to come to Japan at the time of the anniversary celebration in Sapporo. The Department acknowledged our request and indicated that they will give serious consideration to the possibility.” By the early April of that year, the U.S. State Department decided to fund William Smith Clark II, grandson of the first president of Sapporo Agricultural College, William Smith Clark, to attend as a “guest of honor” the 80th Anniversary celebration of Hokkaido University on September 15, 1956.

By April of 1956, the selection of the University of Massachusetts Amherst as an American institution of the affiliation program was considered to be a “natural” one by Hokkaido University officials partly due to their efforts. On April 16, 1956, C. E. Meyer of the U.S. Operations Mission to Japan sent a report to Washington about their informal


discussion with Matsuda Takeo, professor of the Department of Agricultural Economics at Hokkaido University. Confirming Hokkaido University’s interests in the affiliation program, they further discussed how to raise the funds to cover local costs and the selection of a U.S. counterpart university. Meyer summarized the latter point:

The selection of the American institution will have to be determined upon in the light of the economic developmental needs of Hokkaido. The natural preference of the University of Hokkaido is to select the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The reason for this preference springs from the fact that an informal relationship is already in being, having commenced 80 years ago when Dr. [William Smith] Clark of Massachusetts established the predecessor of Hokkaido University, the University of Sapporo. In addition, a very cordial exchange of books has recently taken place and efforts are in process with respect to a Fulbright exchange. Moreover, the son of Dr. Joseph [sic] Clark is expected to participate in the 80th Anniversary ceremonies scheduled for September of this year in Sapporo.361

Although Suginome, president of Hokkaido University, was at first reluctant to invite professors from the University of Massachusetts Amherst to Hokkaido University’s 80th anniversary ceremony, the president and two professors from the University of Massachusetts Amherst attended the event.362 Furthermore, Dean Paul Mather, president of the University of Massachusetts gave Suginome an honorable doctorate as one of the commemorative events on September 15, 1956.363


363 *Hokkaido daigaku shinbun* [Hokkaido University newspaper], September 29, 1956.
Thus, the historical memories of William Smith Clark and U.S.-Japan relations in the late nineteenth century were actively summoned by various parties in the mid-1950s. However, as scholars on historical memory including Gregory as well as Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama argue, these historical memories were selectively recalled and simultaneously forgotten. This case ironically shows that even opposing historical actors (i.e., U.S. foreign officials and Japanese student activists) embraced U.S. exceptionalism, to which the historical memory of Clark contributed.

**Conclusion**

“If you, Hokkaido University students, were still haunted by [Clark’s] ‘ambition,’ it would rather be ridiculous,” wrote Usami Shoichirō, professor of botany in the department of science at Hokkaido University in May 1956. Such was his answer to an open letter in the *Hokkaido University Newspaper* written by student M, who lamented that it was difficult to be “ambitious” as Clark exhorted in the current depressed economic situation of Japan. The historical memory of William Smith Clark indeed haunted the Japanese faculty and students at Hokkaido University. In the 1950s, it was granted various meanings and utilized for different purposes by U.S. foreign officers, Japanese administrators and faculty, and anti-American student activists. Regardless of the positions they took, the legacy of William Smith Clark was utilized, misunderstood, criticized, and praised without critical understanding of nineteenth century U.S.-assisted Japanese colonialism in Hokkaido. Moreover, this confusing figure provided an exceptional space to conceal renewed U.S. imperialism forged during the Cold War.

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365 *Hokkaido daigaku shinbun* [Hokkaido University newspaper], April 21, 1956.
Conclusion

In July 1922, Arishima Takeo liberated 71 families who were living as sharecroppers on his farm in Karabuto, Hokkaido. Arishima, a graduate of Sapporo Agricultural College who taught at his alma mater after he studied in the United States, inherited the sharecropping farm from his father in 1908. At this time many graduates of Sapporo Agricultural College, following the president of the school, Satō Shōsuke, became owners of large-scale farms. However, with support of his colleague Morimoto Kōkichi, Arishima decided to liberate the sharecroppers by making the farm communally owned. Arishima, who was also known as a writer, explained that his motivation for the liberation of the sharecroppers of the Karabuto farm was to resolve the contradiction between his identity as an absentee owner of the sharecropping farm and his ideological beliefs as a novelist. “I could not stand,” wrote Arishima, “to exploit sharecroppers and gain profit from the farm without cultivating it myself. This economic situation disgraced my literary works, and this self-contradiction has distressed me.” Arishima stated that the liberation of the Karabuto farm was done to “satisfy his conscience” but nothing more than that. Arishima’s liberation of the sharecropping farm in 1922 not only provoked a sensation at the time, but his motivation for the liberation along with his intellectual history in the context of the modernization/colonization of Hokkaido have continued to

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366 Michel Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan*, 134.
be a subject of academic inquiry. Because of his educational background, some scholars have made a close association between Arishima’s acts against the sharecropping system and the liberal education taught during the early period of Sapporo Agricultural College represented by William Smith Clark and William Penn Brooks. However, as my dissertation has suggested, attempting to link Arishima’s act and U.S. American professors’ teachings does not provide a clear answer to why Arishima liberated the sharecroppers at his farm, but rather raises further questions. Even though the self-sufficient farmer ideal was not possible for many in the post-Civil War United States, which instead depended on the labor of sharecroppers, why were U.S. American professors’ teachings on yeoman ideology and liberalism at Sapporo Agricultural College in the late nineteenth century still closely associated with Arishima’s liberation of the tenants on his sharecropping farm in the 1920s? The influence of the U.S. occupation of Japan and U.S.-Japan relations onwards on such a historical association also needs scrutiny.

In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that Sapporo Agricultural College simultaneously served for both U.S. imperialism and Japanese settler colonialism. At the school, Japanese students learned from U.S. professors the discourse of agriculture and the mechanism of capitalism that disposed indigenes from their lands and lead to the proliferation of sharecropping farms in Hokkaido. At the same time, U.S. American professors collected and experimented with new crops in Hokkaido, and trained local collectors to send plant specimens and seeds to the United States for U.S. agricultural development. Indeed, U.S. imperialism and Japanese settler colonialism developed

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370 For instance, Taka 'aki Ōtahara, “Nōgyō keiei gaku [Agricultural management studies],” 238; Yuzawa, “Hokkaidō no kosaku mondai to Hokudai [Issues of sharecropping and Hokkaido University in Hokkaido].”
material and discursive links via U.S. land grant colleges in the late nineteenth century. However, such intimate connections were rewritten, obscured, or even lost through the dynamics of the formation of historical memories in the post-1945 Cold War period.

While U.S. imperialism and Japanese settler colonialism were discursively, materially, and ecologically connected by physical institutions, I have also found serious discontinuities in their remembering and forgetting their overlapping past. As Michel Foucault discussed historical discontinuities in the *episteme* of the West, there were different *tabula* that formed the basis of knowledge making in U.S. and Japanese empires. Because of this gap, the historical memories recovered from their shared past appeared at least slightly and sometimes completely different, and more importantly, such different U.S. and Japanese imperial *episteme* acted to cover their imperial and colonial acts and desires from each other. In this sense, the relationship between U.S. and Japanese imperialisms in the Japanese archipelago was neither one of conflict nor complicity.

In other words, my study illuminates how these two different ways of remembering the history of nineteenth century Hokkaido create deeper shadows over Japanese settler colonialism and U.S. imperialism on the islands. For example, from the U.S. American view, William Penn Brooks contributed to the development of U.S. agriculture and evolutionary biology by bringing useful and rare plants from Hokkaido to Massachusetts. This historical narrative completely ignores U.S. American complicity in Japanese settler colonialism. Specifically, it is not concerned about the fact that Brooks’ teachings on Western agriculture at Sapporo Agricultural College ecologically and

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discursively contributed to the status of Hokkaido as *terra nullius*—uncultivated land. From the perspective of the Japanese, Brooks’ works were benevolent; Brooks brought onions, cows, and yeoman ideology to the Japanese, which became the basis for agrarian democracy in Hokkaido. The Japanese version of historical memory simultaneously forgets that Brooks actually acted in the context of U.S. imperialism, and ignores what Brooks brought back to the United States.

During the Cold War, U.S. American foreign officials, Japanese university administrators, and student activists all used the historical memories of Massachusetts Agricultural College and Sapporo Agricultural College represented by William Smith Clark. However, their ways of remembering served different political agendas. U.S. American foreign officials utilized Clark as a symbol of U.S.-Japan friendship to suppress Communists while denying U.S. imperialism. Japanese university administrators were complicit in such U.S. officials’ summoning of historical memories of Clark, but used them for their own purpose—to raise funds for the student union named “Clark Hall.” For the Japanese student activists, Clark’s teachings on democracy became a philosophical basis of their protest against U.S. suppression of academic freedom. Whether Clark symbolized U.S.-Japan friendship or democracy in fights against either Communism or U.S. imperialism, these ways of remembering coincided with the amnesia of U.S.-Japan dual imperialisms and Japanese settler colonialism in the late nineteenth century Hokkaido.

The philosophy and system of U.S. land grant colleges also provided ambiguous spaces in the formation of U.S.-Japan imperialisms. While they were originally created as a legal system to redistribute the public domain of the United States, U.S. land grant
colleges became best known for teaching practical agricultural knowledge to common people, in contrast to the European model of education that was reserved for the upper class. Both Japanese settlers in the late nineteenth century and U.S. occupiers in the mid-twentieth century interpreted this philosophy for their own contingent purposes—imperialism, colonialism, and anti-communism. Contrary to the democratic ideal of the U.S. land grant colleges, they excluded and marginalized the Ainu, Okinawans, student activists, and women from their own knowledge production. As Goya Chōshō’s articulation of the history of higher education in Okinawa suggests, U.S. land grant colleges served not merely as a tool of oppressors. They were also used by marginalized people who produce knowledge with courage and wisdom under structurally constrained situations created by U.S. and Japanese imperial powers.

Indeed, U.S. settler colonialism, U.S. imperialism, and Japanese settler colonialism were intimately connected. However, the connections were not a one-way flow of knowledge or power. They became linked and disconnected multiple times during the modern history of the Japanese archipelago. These different U.S. and Japanese epistemologies did not confront each other; and yet they were not wholly complicit. In this formation of dual imperialisms, each provides a cloak to hide the other’s imperial desires, actions, and past. Their twisted and entangled relations were indifferent to and acted as obstacles against the Ainu and Okinawan’s epistemologies and knowledge production.
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