

ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: Inspired Lone Wolves: A threat of their own
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This thesis examines Inspired Lone Wolves, or individuals who pledge their violent attacks or allegiance to a particular terrorist group. In the past, lone wolves have been characterized as crazy or subscribing to an ideology outside of mainstream terrorism groups. Recent Inspired Lone Wolves have dispelled this notion and call for This thesis continuously begs the question of “Why”, quantitatively analyzing lone wolves and their attacks over the past 26 years and asking the crucial question of “why do they attack alone instead of joining a group”. In doing so, their motivations are revealed to be much similar to that of individuals who join terrorist organizations, simply transposed onto the internet. These Inspired Lone Wolves mark a new phase in terrorist organization evolution, and effectively mark the entrance into the fifth wave of terrorism.

Inspired Lone Wolves: A threat of their own; A Quantitative Analysis of How and Why do Lone
Wolves Attack

By

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Dedication

This thesis would never have been conceptualized if not for the two most incredible women in my life. To my grandmother, Rita Simon, who always taught me to ask “Why?” and continuously pushed and emboldened my curiosity; I would not be the student, researcher or person I am today if not for you and your teachings. And to my mother, Judith Simon Garrett, who has always served as my biggest motivator and inspiration. If I am able to be half of the mother, and career woman as you, I will consider myself a success. Thank you for always believing in me and pushing me to do even better. Most importantly, thank you for serving as my role model in all things.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"The most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone-wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack."

President Obama, August 16, 2011

The summer of 2016 brought the world some of the most high profile lone wolf attacks in history, all of them in rapid succession. A lone wolf attack in Orlando, Florida, followed by one in Nice, France, followed by one in Wurzburg, Germany; this form of terrorism seemed everywhere. What was additionally unique, was that all of these lone wolves pledged their allegiance to a particular terrorist group when perpetrating their attack. The lone wolf phenomenon is not new. Since 1998, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation has considered lone wolves to be the most serious and lethal domestic terrorists (Suro 1998). Within the United States, lone wolf terrorists have conducted the majority of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil from 1978 to 2001 (Eby 2012). However, this phenomenon has become increasingly internationalized with terrorist groups from overseas inspiring attacks on foreign soil. Numerous security officials have made statements about the danger of lone wolf terrorists and their increasing threat to livelihoods everywhere. Former Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson told the Senate Homeland Security and Government Committee last year that the world has since evolved from September 11, 2001 to a world where terrorist- inspired attacks perpetrated by an individual who is self radicalized, pose a huge danger (Johnson 2016). He also highlighted intelligence and law enforcement agencies' difficulties in detecting these terrorist inspired attacks because the lack of planning necessary to perpetrate the attack. Within this group of lone wolf terrorists, there has emerged a group unique to themselves. In the year 2016 alone, thirteen

lone wolf attacks were committed by individuals who were directly inspired by a particular terrorist organization and/or pledged their attacks in the name of a group. Unlike several notable lone wolves such as Anders Brevik, Timothy Metzger and Micah Johnson, these inspired lone wolves are not in possession of proprietary ideology and attack methods but rather draw motivation from terrorist organizations. The Inspired Lone Wolf is truly a threat of his/ her own. They have different motivations for enacting their violence (which offer unique opportunities for preventing the success of their attacks), their attack methodology is different from other lone wolves and terrorist group members, and their recent rise in frequency speaks to the changing terrorist landscape, as well as the future of terrorism. Additionally, a concerning trend has emerged that these Inspired Lone Wolf terrorists, that perpetrate their attacks without outside guidance or operational assistance, have been innovating and improving. The United States and Europe saw twice as many successful lone wolf attacks in 2015-2016 than they did from 2011-2014 (Johnson 2016). Current counterterrorism efforts seem to be ill-equipped to effectively manage these new violent offenders as lone wolf attacks are getting more frequent and increasingly deadly. As such, these individuals pose both unique challenges and threats but also opportunities to thwart their violent aspirations.

This thesis will examine lone wolf attackers who are inspired by and/or pledge their attacks to a single terrorist group. There are many lone wolves who commit acts of terrorism for their own ideals, without any affiliation or inspiration from a group. The same summer of 2016 also brought attacks by Micah Johnson, Gavin Long (both were angered by police brutality against African Americans) and Dylan Roof in 2015, who attacked a church full of black worshipers. These individuals, while also lone wolves (for they were expressing a form of political ideology through violence) are the sort of lone wolves that will not to be studied

because they were exercising their own grievances outside of a terrorist organization and representative of a different phenomenon.

This thesis will attempt to unpack and understand how these particular Inspired Lone Wolf terrorists attack and why they choose to do so, particularly in comparison to joining a terrorist group in a physical space. Inspired Lone Wolf attacks have been examined from the years of 1990 to 2016 in order to analyze trends and quantitatively examine how these lone wolves attack. In this thesis I argue that these Inspired Lone Wolves attack for the same reasons that individuals join terrorist groups, in addition to the fact that the world is entering the fifth wave of terrorism, which is marked not by large scale operations committed by terrorist organizations but instead perpetrated by individual attackers on behalf of a larger, virtual group. It additionally seeks to analyze trends in recent years and posit questions for the future and what steps law enforcement and policy makers alike must take in order to build a safer tomorrow. I have examined these Inspired Lone Wolves across nine countries: United States, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, South Africa, France, Italy, Austria and Canada. All of these countries are considered “The West” with high functioning counter terrorism apparatuses. I wished to examine across several countries, in different regions of the world so that this is evidenced as a truly global phenomenon, and not just unique to one country.

A Discourse on Definitions

Before any analysis on Inspired Lone Wolf Terrorism can begin, a discussion on what the term “lone wolf” must be expanded upon. What makes lone wolf a difficult term to use is that it has numerous definitions in the scholarly context as well as online through media and journalism and has been additionally in non-accurate contexts with differing associations. It has also been

sensationalized within the media. First, to define terrorism. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the “unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Hoffman 1993). This is the definition that has been used to analyze data and determine which events were appropriate to include within the dataset composed by the author.

Within research circles and academia, there is often a “high brow” snub of using the term “lone wolf terrorism”, scorning the term that has often been loosely thrown around and sensationalized by the media. Those scholars who do choose to use the definition, define it in a multitude of ways. Ramon Spaaij, one of the most prominent lone wolf terrorist researchers defines a lone wolf as someone who “operates individually, does not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, and their modus operandi are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy” (Spaaij 2012). I chose not to use this definition because such a definition does not allow for the study of thwarted plots, as often these would be terrorists are stopped by telling an informant of their plans. Comparatively, Author Mark Pitcavage defines a lone wolf as people who have had some level of contact with operational extremists (Pitcavage 2015). Other researchers use the term “lone offender terrorist” or lone actor terrorism. While the legitimacy or validity of the term may be debated (perhaps there are better options or more academic sounding terminology), I will use this term when referring to the attackers as defined below and their perpetrated or attempted acts of terrorism. Regardless of whether or not there is a more eloquent term, this is the term that has been adopted by terrorist organizations and widely recognized with the phenomenon being studied. For this thesis, a lone wolf has been defined as someone who commits violent acts in support of some

group, movement or ideology, but does so alone, outside of any command structure (Weimann 2012). Their acts are terrorist attacks that are carried out by individuals who operate individually. An additional set of criteria was added in that there had to be concrete evidence that the individual was inspired by one terrorist group in particular, not several, so that they adhered to only that group's ideology, and were inspired by one group only.

In this thesis, inspired has been conceptualized as two possible forms. The first, is that the individual writes or professes their allegiance to the particular terrorist organization and that the attack is committed in their name. Alternatively, if the individual has propaganda or writings that clearly connected the individual to the group ideology, that was also constituted enough to be an "Inspired Lone Wolf".

Finally, there has been controversy on the appropriateness of using the term "Radical Islam" or "Islamic Terrorist". In the current political climate, this choice can often be seen as a partisan decision. President Obama and other high profile security officials have made numerous statements that the use of the term not only further justifies these terrible acts of violence by granting them legitimacy through the association with the word of religion but also has the potential to give the impression that the West views itself as at war with Islam. To avoid any partisan politics, this thesis will use the term "jihadist" in order to refer to terrorist organizations that perpetrate violence in the name of Islam.

Literature Review

Ever since the attacks of September 11 in the United States, the study of terrorism has burst into the forefront of the global agenda in both public policy and academic spheres. While there is an almost certainly endless supply of topics to study within terrorism, since 2012, the

study of lone wolf terrorism has grown considerably, due to government emphasis on the potential danger posed by lone wolves. However, the study of lone wolf terrorism remains fairly underdeveloped relative to other facets of terrorism. There is widespread recognition of the fact that lone actor terrorism currently has many holes which need to be filled (Nesser 2012).

The body of research has been largely segregated into various topic areas with few studies attempting to study the global phenomenon writ large. Many researchers analyze the radicalization process of lone wolves or attempt a construction of a lone wolf profile, often times for the use of law enforcement. There is general consensus within research, academia and policy spheres that the establishment of a lone wolf profile is a largely pointless endeavor (Worth 2016). Most analysis however, analyzes lone wolf terrorists within their ideological sphere such as right wing lone wolves or jihadist etc. Charles Eby for example, analyzed lone wolves who committed attacks on U.S. soil since September 11 2001. While this study provides a great quantitative analysis and looking at a trend within this certain ideology, it does have a blind spot in examining how the method is used outside of Jihadism and the United States and the global trends. Additionally, much of current lone wolf research has been directed toward Jihadist attackers, even though since September 11, right wing terrorists have killed more Americans than Jihadists by a ratio of 2:1. Many researchers over the past two years have noted that there is a severe deficiency within current body of research on far right lone wolves (Koehler 2016, Ellis, Pantucci, Zuijdewijn, Bakker, Gomis, Palombi & Smith 2016). These studies have generated incredibly useful data, nonetheless there has been almost no research that has attempted to study the same group of perpetrators as this thesis will examine. It is for this reason I attempted to look at the use of lone wolf terrorism across the ideological spectrum to see if it was truly a global and terrorist organization wide strategy and not just an ideological affiliation.

Another weakness within the current literature is many of these papers are heavily case study based or examine only a few perpetrators. These in-depth case studies offer much in terms of insight and individual cases but it difficult to extrapolate across the entire spectrum of the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism. This offers a great space to look at the trends of lone wolf terrorism, across the ideological spectrum across several decades, to see how lone wolves have evolved and the future of lone wolf terrorism. Finally, many studies are country specific. While this offers clues to how domestic actors act within the country, the increasing globalization of the world and terrorism makes the lack of globally focused literature concerning. Furthermore, the central role of the internet in lone wolf terrorism. The internet has no sovereign boundaries, no nationalistic affliction and the spread of propaganda and information allows terrorists and would be terrorists to communicate across the world. The role of disseminating propaganda and information makes these inspired lone wolves a threat that spans across the world. It is for this reason that I examined attacks in nine countries, specifically that of the United States, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, South Africa, France, Italy and Canada.

A Brief History of Terrorism

Throughout the thesis, and most emphatically in the conclusion of this thesis, I will argue that while modern day lone wolf terrorism is unique enough and the techniques different enough from the previous wave of terrorism to constitute a fifth wave of terrorism, and to say that this is on the rise and will most likely only increase in the number of attacks over the next 5-10 years. Before doing so, it is important to establish what the previous waves were and how researchers conceptualize the various phases. While this is not a comprehensive examination on the history of terrorism throughout history, this section seeks to provide a brief overview to establish context

for the next, fifth wave. Waves of terrorism are thought of as periods of time which are marked by a particular attack methods or domination by a particular ideology and marks new evolution in terrorist strategy.

The first recorded use of terror and terrorist was in 1795 and it referred to the Reign of Terror, perpetrated by the French Government (Whitaker 2001). Almost exactly a century later, the first terror rebel movement emerged in Russia, Narodnaya Volya (the People's Will). The group emerged in 1879 and successive movements terrorized Russia for almost 40 years. Narodnaya was one of the first groups in modern history to generate a culture of terror and use innocent civilians and victims as ways to obtain emotional and political responses. This group was hailed as unique, in comparison to other similar groups such as the Sons of Liberty (who tarred loyalists and caused them to leave) and the KKK which caused federal troops to withdraw from the South during Reconstruction. The group distinguished themselves from guerilla's, specifically to emphasize the point that they were targeting civilians and not military targets. (Rapoport, 2001) Since Narodnaya, the terror methods and appearance of terrorism is often broken into four "waves".

In the years before the outbreak of World War I, state-sponsored terrorism was abundant. One of the most infamous incidents of early 20th century terrorism was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914; an incident that is often directly cited as a cause for the outbreak of World War I. Continuing through to World War I, terrorism was continuously associated with anti-colonial and independence movements. This is often referred to as the first wave, stemming from the 1880's until the 1920's. It is important to note, while not often used in today, in the past states were often referred to with the definition of terrorism as well (Nazi Germany was often referred to as a terror state for example). During the second wave, from the

1920's to the 1960's, terrorism largely focused on national self determination. In this phase, political assassinations, like that of the archduke, fell to the wayside as martyrdom became less symbolic. Terror efforts were instead focused on attacking the police forces of the state.

The third wave of terrorism was largely defined as the third wave. Revolutionary ideology and motivations spanned national borders and groups such as the PLO (the Palestinian Liberation Organization), were often more active in foreign lands such as Europe than the subject of their motivation, Palestine. This wave was plagued and made infamous by the number of high profile airline hijackings; more than 100 occurred during each year of the 1970's decade (Rapaport 2001). This wave was largely dependent on the revolutionary bond of brotherhood and alienated everyone who did not fit that ideology, limiting their recruitment pool severely and not allowing the group to sustain themselves. The 1980's, embroiled in the ideological and proxy wars of the Cold War, saw an immense increase in state sponsored terror groups as an extension of existing proxy wars. One of the most successful of these was Lebanon's state sponsored terrorism, specifically Hezbollah, and the advent and adoption and wide spread populization of Suicide Bombing. This wave was also markedly unique as terrorist organizations began to train and coordinate other terrorist groups.

The fourth wave has a more contested definition than the preceding waves. Rapaport and those who agree with him, largely mark this era by religiously affiliated violence. This wave was largely motivated and started by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Weingberg & Eubank 2009). Measured in terms of lethality and the longevity of the terrorist groups involved, the fourth wave appears to both policy makers and researchers alike as much more severe than the previous waves. However, we have now reached about 30 years since the beginning of this wave, which

has historically signaled the end of an era and the beginning of another which lends to the argument that this is the beginning of a new wave.

Findings

In order to analyze the trends of inspired lone wolf terrorism, I looked at terrorist incidents from 1990 to 2016. I selected these two years as bookends in order to be able to analyze the trends over a long enough period of time to account for various short phenomenon and spikes and truly examine the developments. I sought to understand why these inspired lone wolves, who adhere to the same ideology as these terrorist groups and perpetrate violence in their name, chose to attack alone rather than the more “traditional” route of joining a terrorist group. I found that these attackers carried out violent attacks for the same reasons that individuals most commonly attribute to their motivation for joining terrorist groups. The development and advancement of the internet has allowed for the fulfillment of these desires online. These types of inspired lone wolf attacks are on the rise and becoming increasingly deadly as they begin to learn and study each other and they have more and more material available. As the world continues to effectively crack down on terrorist groups, even large threatening organizations such as the Islamic State, terrorist groups will need to innovate to find new ways to carry out their violence and message while not being able to physically operate in large groups. Just because the world is ridding itself of terrorist safe havens does not mean that terrorists will cease to operate; rather they will innovate and find a new way which they have already begun to do. This fifth wave of terrorism will be marked by more inspired lone wolf attacks, as terrorist groups innovate and evolve to encourage more and more attacks.

Chapter 2: How do Lone Wolves Attack? A Quantitative Analysis

Introduction

In this chapter, I analyze a comprehensive data set to attempt to analyze who becomes a lone wolf terrorist when inspired by a particular group. There is an ongoing debate within the policy and research circles around whether it is possible to establish a profile of a lone wolf terrorist. Part of what makes lone wolf terrorists so difficult to identify is that they do not communicate with other individuals and their plans can stay completely silent until they are enacted. The terminology, “lone wolf” simply refers to the way in which an act of terrorism is carried out (alone or in a very small group and not connected to an organization) but has no relation to the motivation behind the terrorism, such as Jihadist terrorism or Environmental terrorism. The general consensus of late has been that there is little use in attempting to profile what is a lone wolf (Worth 2016). This thesis does not attempt to necessarily establish a profile or ‘stereotype’ of what an Inspired Lone Wolf terrorist is. Rather, it attempts to analyze the characteristics and factors of those who have become Inspired Lone Wolf Terrorists, in hopes of understanding how these attackers execute their attacks and what are markers of the attack. By examining the comprehensive data set compiled by the author, specifically analyzing the attacker and the modus operandi, or certain trends and patterns do emerge which allow scholars and policy makers alike to see trends in who is committing acts of lone wolf terrorism and attempt to create measures to prevent or lessen the effects of lone wolf terrorism.

There have been relatively few research projects or scholarly articles that have attempted to qualitatively analyze lone wolf terrorism (Eby). Many researches who study Lone Wolf

Terrorism attempt to do so by doing in depth case study analysis, such as that conducted by Hemmingby concerning Anders Brevik. Conducting such an in depth, case by case, investigation does offer many benefits; it attempts to understand one specific instance which can then be extrapolated to apply to other potential lone wolf terrorists who have similar markers or characteristics. Yet, it does have many shortcomings as well, as each individual lone wolf attacker has different lives and factors that led them to commit or attempt to commit such heinous acts. These types of case studies offer more to fellow researchers as sources of information than they can to the policy world (the benefit of which is not to be understated). Additionally, the few studies that have attempted to quantitatively analyze Lone Wolf Terrorism often segregate attackers by ideology. The study conducted by Charles Eby quantitatively does an impressive and deep analysis of Jihadist Lone Wolf Attacks since September 11th, 2001 and Jacob Ravndal created an impeccable database and analysis of Right Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe from 1970 until 2005. However, while both studies are able to analyze lone wolf terrorism in the context of the specific or category of ideological motives, they fail to analyze lone wolf terrorism as a phenomenon as a result of society and as a particular method of carrying out terrorist actions, spanning the ideological spectrum. However, the value of case studies is not to be underestimated. They offer in depth perspectives, the ability to test and examine theories, as well as examining cases that have larger and far reaching implications (Van Evera 1999).

Methods

In order to conduct such a quantitative analysis, I created a dataset of inspired lone wolf terror attacks that fit the definition of lone wolf terrorist and being inspired by or possessing allegiance to a particular terrorist group. To create the comprehensive dataset, the author used

many databases, news articles and reports, as well as think tanks and consortium resources. Specifically, the Global Terrorism Database and Profiles of Individual Radicalization (PIRUS) from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) which covered terrorist events from 1970 to 2010, RTV (Right Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe) created by Jacob Aasland Ravndal, the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge base. Access was provided through the Terrorism Research Initiative via the University of Michigan. This dataset also includes those attacks that were prevented from occurring due to the excellent work of law enforcement in the various countries but were far along in the planning stages that the would be attacker had a plan in place and had acquired at least some of the materials or weapons to execute the plan. Information for such was found via various FBI press releases.

First, the criteria for creating the data set. The database was filtered through the time period of incidents from 1990 until 2016. By choosing to start the data at 1990, the data is not just examining a recent trend but contextualized within years preceding and following arguably the most famous terrorist incident in modern day history, September 11th. The span of 26 years allows for the clustering of various different terrorist attack styles and phenomenon, such as the Oklahoma City truck bombing of 1995, the plane attacks of September 11, 2011, and the recent phenomenon of truck attacks of 2016, as seen in the Nice attack of the summer of 2016¹ as well as the Berlin Christmas Market attack of that winter.² Such a time frame allows for the analysis of trends of inspired lone wolf terrorism over the spread of many years. While this topic will be

¹ In July 2016, a man drove a truck through the Bastille celebration in Nice, France killing 84 people, wounding over 200. His attack was pledged to the Islamic State or ISIS.

² Anis Amri, a man of Tunisian origin, drove a truck through the Berlin Christmas market on December 2016

discussed more fully in Chapter 4, there is ample evidence of clustering and contagion of the style of terrorist attacks, meaning that terrorist groups and individuals often copy the style and method of attack of other terrorist, especially those which are highlighted and exulted in the media. The countries of focus were narrowed to the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Australia, Denmark, Canada and Austria. These countries were chosen due to the fact that they all have high functioning security apparatuses and attacks of lone wolf terrorism, wherever and throughout the country, is widely reported. They additionally all have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force throughout their country and are able to exercise control throughout the country. By ensuring that all of the countries have similar scope conditions, allowing for the examination of the variable and looking at similarities across cases. The more similar the cases, the increased availability to isolate variables that this thesis is attempting to analyze (Van Evera 1999).

The data was then filtered through the size of the attack group (or lack thereof in this case). For the purpose of the data set, the attacker could either act alone or with the aid of one accomplice. Mark Potok, a senior fellow at the Southern Poverty Law Center found that when lone wolves do not act solely individually, they are usually in tightly knit, often kin, pairs; brother and sister, father and son, boyfriend and girlfriend (Reveal News). This size selection serves two purposes: one for the individuals, which the study attempts to look at and the other for practicality. The purpose of this thesis is to examine individuals who choose to attack by themselves rather than join a particular group and whatever factors go into that decision, as well as the overall trends that span ideological and national boundaries. It is not unreasonable to assume that some individuals who want to commit an attack by themselves realize that they may not possess the necessary skills or need assistance in some way. Additionally, a key distinguishing

factor from true inspired lone wolves and those attacks which might appear to be lone wolves, or are terrorist operatives, given directions from the terrorist group is that these individuals designed the attack without outside assistance, in hopes of furthering the message of their alleged group. So they seek out a partner. This is different from establishing a group, or mini cell to attempt to carry out an attack, so groups of three or more attackers are excluded. At the threshold of three, it becomes a group attack. Additionally, the allowance of a pair of lone wolf attackers allows for the examination of foiled terror plots that were thwarted via FBI informant. These thwarted attacks provide crucial insight into the minds and plans of lone wolves. Finally, this thesis is not an outlier in using the allowance of two attackers to still qualify as a lone wolf, as other notable institutions utilize this definition as well, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center.

To qualify for this specific dataset, 'inspired by' a particular terrorist organization must be defined. To qualify for this data set, the perpetrator or attempted attacker had to have made it known via recording, note, post online, exultation to friends or family, etc. Another possibility, which was popularized in 2015 and 2016 in particular, were video recordings explicitly stating that the purpose of the attack was in support of or in the name of a certain group. Additionally, if the FBI or law enforcement found propaganda or materials that would suggest an allegiance or inspiration to one particular terrorist group, and none others, than that has also been constituted as being inspired by. They were consuming the message of a particular group and not seeking out the ideologies and influences of others to shape their terrorist aspirations. A disqualifying factor was if the individual was previously a part of a terrorist or extremist organization.

Finally, it is important to define what qualifies as an act of terrorism and what differentiates a terrorist attack from an act of random violence or hate. Terrorism is defined as

the “violence or the threat of violence against noncombatants or property to gain a political, ideological, or religious goal through fear and intimidation (Meloy and Yakely 2015). This definition provided by Reid Meloy most accurately captures all of the essential components of various definitions used by law enforcement such as the FBI (which defines terrorism as “unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof in furtherance of political and social objectives”) and the academic definitions of violence for political means.

After all the conditions were met and examined 56 cases emerged. For each case, the following questions were asked: Age, Country of Origin, Date of Attack, Modus Operandi, existence of previously diagnosed mental health conditions, and leakage (whether or not they had made statements to individuals around them or online about their intentions or allegiance) and the terrorist group to which the attack was pledged.

The Attacker

An essential question to be addressed and analyzed is who becomes a terrorist? While that is a very broad question that cannot possibly be answered or predicted with generalized certainty, the purpose of this portion of the study is to look at who *has* become a terrorist, specifically a lone wolf terrorist, and any factors they might have in common. First, is to analyze gender. While it is widely known that females are less likely to become terrorists, there are still female lone wolves, and female terrorists. From 1990 to 2016, only 4 out of the 56 incidents in the data set were perpetrated wholly or in part by women, or around seven percent. All four occurred within the past 15 years, which may suggest an uptick and future increase in female perpetrated

lone wolf terrorism. This reflects the general terrorism trend that female involvement in terrorism is generally low, however it has been on the rise in recent years. However, the ideological affiliation regarding the female inspired lone wolves does not follow the trend of terrorist group operatives worldwide. There has been a higher increase in female lone wolves in right wing and left wing extremist groups and less so in Jihadist organizations. This too might be soon changing as those groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda are increasingly directing their recruiting efforts towards women, particularly young women around ages 14-18. All four women pledged their attacks or were inspired by a Jihadist group (Al Qaeda and the Islamic State specifically) women are often suicide bombers but do not participate as warriors or dominant members (Jacques and Taylor 2010). In right wing groups and left wing groups, female membership is much higher than in that of jihadist(Jacques and Taylor 2010). Within the United States for example, female membership is around 25% for Right Wing affiliated terrorist groups and compose 50% of new recruits, which exemplifies the growing trend (Cunningham). Additionally, the trend of female participation in terrorist attacks and groups has resulted in groups directing their message and actively recruiting women (Jacques and Taylor 2010). Women are typically not thought of as terrorists or active participants, rather only as serving in a support capacity for the group, if any. It is crucial to dispel notions and falsities in order to appropriately asses the terrain of potential terrorists and engage in meaningful prevention. It is important for researchers and policy makers alike to begin dedicating more resources to the study of and prevention of these individuals.

Another key unit of analysis is the attackers country of origin. The attacks of September 11 created a paranoia in the American psyche of foreign born terrorists coming into the United States in order to execute a large scale attack. However, the data does not support this notion. Only 5 of the 56 cases involved a foreign born attacker, or around nine percent. All of the others

were native and citizens of the country where the attack took place. It is important to dispel these notions of foreign citizens traveling from another country in order to enact a terrorist attack. As will be further discussed in Chapter 4, is it tactically disadvantageous for a terrorist group to send (or in this case encourage) an attacker to travel to another country. It has been well established that transnational terrorism (or groups that operate in one country and perpetrate attacks in another) reveals little about terrorism trends in general (Nemeth 2014). Rather to commit an attack in the countries of these studies, popularly dubbed 'The West'. Furthermore, it makes little sense for a lone wolf, who often has fewer resources than a terrorist organization, and likely does not possess the ability to travel to another country to execute an attack. Charles Eby found that, in his study of lone wolves since September 11th in the United States, "not one international lone actor entered the country to enact an immediate attack" (Eby 2012).

The individuals included in the dataset were also analyzed via age. Within terrorism research circles, there is a common idea and theme (that has been largely supported with research that most Jihadist and Left Wing terrorist participants are younger while Right Wing terrorists and extremists are in their 30s to 40s. Researches Russell and Miller found that the average age, across the entire ideological spectrum, of an active terrorist member was between 22 and 25 (Library of Congress). Disproportionally, most of the attackers were aged between the ages of 20 and 30. Notably, there was also no direct correlation between attack style and age. The four attackers over the age of forty planned and executed attacks that ranged from shooting rampages to letter bombing campaigns to explosives. While nearly all of the lone wolf attackers of the data set had completed high school (except for those underage such as Charles Bishop, who was 15 at the time of his attack), not many had completed college or attended some form of higher education. This partly revolves around the fact that the average age of these inspired lone wolves

were around 20-23 but it does offer some other clues, particularly that of an inspired lone wolf's social skills. Lone wolves are often thought of to be "crazy" and while this is not actually usually the case (as discussed further in the following paragraph), it does suggest that many lone wolves do not do well in many social circumstances or struggle with many social institutions, leading to the desire for acceptance or glory which is more easily attainable virtually. However, many inspired lone wolves, particularly increasing in recent years, were active members of their community as well as social and cultural groups (Eby 2012). Nevertheless, these inspired lone wolf attackers tend to be less educated than their terrorist member peers.

A common narrative when discussing Lone Wolf attacks in the media and in notable research as well, is the notion that Lone Wolves are not representative of a larger trend of methodical attackers but simply products of poor mental health; saying almost that they are simply "crazy" and commit attacks as a result of their unstable mental status. To say that however, would be remiss. Paul Gill, one of the leading scholars on lone wolf terrorism, found that lone wolf terrorist events were "rarely sudden and impulsive" (Gill 2013). In a study conducted by the European Union, analyzing from the years 2000-2014, the committee found there was only a slightly higher rate of mental illness among lone wolf terrorists than terrorist groups in general, 35% versus 27% respectively (GTI 2016). In fact, within the dataset, only three cases involved a perpetrator where there was an existing awareness of a mental health condition or assessed as one before standing trial. This is not to rule out the possibility of perhaps underlying mental health issues that perhaps went undiagnosed, however it would be foolish to label these lethal individuals as simply crazies. Those who perpetrate Lone Wolf attacks are individuals who have planned out and with increasing complexity these attacks. They must be analyzed, by in large, as rational actors and not as "one-offs". Similar to their terrorist counterparts, many academics

have found that there is no “larger percentage of mental illness among terrorists than there is the rest of the population” (Kings College London).

Friends and family, as well as communities, are consistently hailed as the key to stopping lone wolf attacks before they can take place. Yet, it is necessary of what exactly the likelihood of the family having tangible information in order to be aware enough to take action. The existing literature has found that 79% of lone wolf cases, others, including family and friends, were aware of the individuals following of a particular extremist ideology (Gill 2013). In another study, 59% of cases, the offender published or made public statements prior to the attack to outline their beliefs. The San Bernadino offenders, Tashfeen Malik and Syed Farook exchanged numerous messages on Facebook about their jihadist leanings and even make posts that were visible to certain friends of couple, as far back as two years prior to their December 2015 attack (Rayman & Schapiro 2015). The data would suggest that it is likely to be able to intervene, one just needs to be observant. One such example is the attack of December 2014, where a Frenchman attempted to stab French police officers with a knife before being shot dead. He made numerous Islamic State propaganda posts of support and allegiance. This highlights the essential role that internet monitoring, social media in particular, will play in determining an individual’s extremist sympathies or ‘likelihood’ of becoming a lone wolf attacker. In another example, Tafsheen Malik, one of the San Bernadino shooters³, messaged friends of hers on Facebook in 2012 and 2014, stating her support for the Islamic State and desire to join their holy war (LA Times). Neil Lewington, the British man who was found to have bomb making materials and two homemade IEDs in 2009, lived in a room extensively decorated with posters of a neo Nazi group titled

³ Number 13 in Case Study List

Combat 18 (Dodd 2009). He made numerous statements to women he had met online about his hatred for Blacks and Asian ethnic groups and even stated his fantasies of their murders. This leakage runs counter to the prevailing narrative that it is impossible to know if these individuals attack or who or where lone wolves exist. Additionally, these inspired lone wolves do not simply make statements about their hatred for a particular group or desire for violence. They discuss or admire or exult groups whose ideology is made known. This association should make it additionally clear to friends and family of their potential and willingness to commit violence. It also gives an idea of who they may attack and how they may do so.

Target Selection

Target Selection of Lone Wolf actors is a crucial aspect to study and understand as it is a complex and dynamic process. Additionally, understanding the probabilities of attacks and the operational procedures can allow us and law enforcement where to allocate resources in the immense amount of possibly targets of terrorism. Within the data set, only six lone wolves chose “hard targets” or structures; a Dallas Skyscraper, an Illinois military base and a Florida building as some of them. By in large, 90% of the time in fact, inspired lone wolves have chosen to target soft targets, such as humans and maximize casualties. Eleven of the attacks targeted military or law enforcement personnel. Studies have found that lone offender terrorists plan or attack military targets much less than terrorist groups (Gill 2013). It makes sense as the planning and capability required to attack a military target is much higher and more difficult for one individual compared to an operation where there are five or six roles to play. In a case study of Anders Brevik (who was not used in the dataset as he did not fit the criteria to be studied) researchers Cato Hemmingby and Tore Bjorgo, through extensive police interviews, found that Brevik considered several targets including UN and EU buildings and assassinating President Obama

when he was in Oslo to give his Nobel peace prize. However, he decided that such attacks were beyond his capabilities (Hemmingby). There is also the factor that attacking hard targets requires surveillance and awareness of the place you are going to attack and the security apparatus that exists there. Additionally, attacks on soft targets are more difficult to prevent, due to the wide range of targets and the inability of law enforcement to protect everywhere (Gass 2016).

Terrorists, both lone and groups, choose soft targets because they maximize the goals of communication and inspiration of fear (Drake 1998). Often, media reports and images and videos of civilians dying are much more powerful than images of attacks on soldiers or law enforcement because risk of death or violence is considered “part of the job” (Hoffman 2006). This is reflective of an overall trend within terrorist groups as well. Terrorists are increasingly favoring confined areas with civilians, such as the prolific Paris attack of November 2015.

Ideology is also central to the target selection as the belief system decides what is a legitimate versus illegitimate target (Drake 1998). In the instance of these Lone Wolves, they choose targets which they believe the organization would want them to target and therefore proving their loyalty and adhering to the message of their inspired group. Terrorism, committed by individuals and groups alike, have a dual goal: inspiring of fear and communication of political messages (Drake 1998). In many of these cases, almost all on both sides of the ideological spectrum, civilians or groups of civilians fall within the acceptable target or on the receiving end of the ire of the terrorist group.

The Attack

By far the most common weapon of attack used by Inspired Lone Wolf Terrorists is guns. In the United States, guns are much easier to obtain than in the rest of the other countries studied. Some studies postulate that guns are so highly prevalent in Lone Actor terrorism because little

training or expertise is required to use a firearm. The next most commonly used weapon is bombs. Additionally, lone actors overall make use of low-skilled or ordinary weapons in contrast to bombs or kidnappings (Gill 2013). By contrast, in 1993, prominent terrorism research and professor Bruce Hoffman found in a study that “Bombing continues to account for the majority of terrorist operations” including lone wolf terror operations. This represents a crucial change in the shift of conceptualizing terrorist, particularly lone wolf, operations. Additionally, post September 11th and increased government repression (which will be discussed further in a terrorist groups ability to act and conduct terror operations in Chapter 4) a pattern has emerged of frequent yet less complex attacks (Michael 2012). This serves a dual purpose for Lone Wolf terrorists and terror organizations alike. The lone wolves are able to execute attacks easier and there is the effect of contagion, or that it “serves as a catalyst spurring others to move from thought to action, in effect inspiring copycats” (Michael 2012). Terrorist organizations are therefore incentivized to encourage lone wolf attacks via their propaganda because these attacks allow their group to remain relevant within the media and global politics as well as inspiring others to attack, and furthers the cycle.

Within the case studies of this data set, unsurprisingly, there is a direct correlation with the type of attacks committed and those advocated by the terrorist group the person is inspired by. This reflects a desire to please or follow the word for word of the group. In the year 2016, there were five truck attacks, which will be analyzed in the next chapter if they in fact inspired each other. Another factor which discourages the manufacture of bomb and the use of more “ordinary” weapons, is that most of the materials that are used to make bombs are monitored by the government and it is much easier to identify and disrupt a plot that involves a bomb compared to a truck or a gun (Achenbach 2015). Even terrorist organizations, which possess a

higher amount of resources and opportunities, are foregoing large scale operations in favor of these smaller and more frequent attacks. Charles Eby found that “lone wolf and group terrorist planning and attacks tend to occur in proximity to their residences (Eby 2012). For example, most lone wolf attackers in the dataset committed their attack within the same state as they lived in. One notable exception was Franz Fuchs, who sent letter bombs all around Austria, but the mode of attack allowed for increased mobility and distance reaching. Sandler found that in across all types of terrorism, domestic terrorism is the most common and perpetrated by those lacking access to resources and publicity (Nemeth 2014).

Deadliness

A crucial, albeit uncouth, metric of analysis of terrorist groups and operatives. Regardless of the chosen method and strategy of conveying the message, a central part to terrorism is the pursuit of spreading *terror*. Whether this be through a large single event, such as 9/11, or the successive smaller attacks, the end goal is inspiring fear within a targeted population so it is necessary to examine the repercussions and the human cost of these attacks. By in large, lone wolf attacks do not result in nearly as many deaths as terrorist organizations. This however is not the case in countries with high functioning and effective counter-terrorism apparatus’. In these cases, which is all of these countries included in the scope of analysis, lone wolf terrorists are more deadly than terrorist organizations. This is due to the fact that organizations face such high operational hurdles that the individual becomes more deadly than the group (Findley 2014). This is highlighted by the fact that since 2006, 98% of all deaths from terrorism have been perpetrated by lone wolves, with 156 deaths in total (GTI 2016). According to the Global Terrorism Index, in 2015, lone wolf terrorists were responsible for 22% of OECD countries (GTI 2016). Within

the data set, an inspired lone wolf attacker killed an average of 1.5 persons per attack. These can be actively compared to ISIS terrorist attack of November 2015, which killed around 130 people, which was much more deadly. Lone Wolf attacks are often less deadly than group attacks not only because of tactical limitation but because the attacker is often untrained in violence.

Terrorism researcher Thomas Hegghammer found that the involvement of someone with prior combat experience or terrorist history dramatically improves the odds of the attack succeeding and makes the attack much more deadly. These statistics also reveal a disturbing trend that is reflected by lone wolves in general, which is that they are becoming more and more deadly. As will be further discussed in the next chapter, Lone Wolves study each other and successful attacks breed imitation (which has been particularly evidenced by recent use of trucks and cars in perpetrating attacks).

The Terrorist Organization

A stark trend within the data was the much higher percentage of jihadist or left wing inspired lone wolf terrorism contrasted with the amount of attacks perpetrated in the name of right wing terrorist groups. Out of 56 incidents, only seven attacks were inspired by right wing groups. The 1990's and early 2000's saw all of the right wing inspired attacks, which was also the height of right wing extremist prominence of the media. Upon initial examination of the data, this was seen as very curious because that is not representative of the ideological breakdown of terrorist activity within the studied countries nor of lone wolves that adhere to the ideology in justifying their attacks. In the United States, Right wing lone wolves have perpetrated more attacks on US soil than any other ideological affiliation and in Europe and right wing lone wolves kill more than Jihadist Islamic terrorist. This is of additional curiosity as lone wolves tend

to be more deadly in countries with high functioning security apparatuses, such as these countries in this study, where these right-wing groups are much more active. It is important then to investigate why this trend exists. It will be investigated in the next chapter.

Conclusion

All of this data provides evidence that these inspired Lone Wolf attacks are occurring and increasing in frequency. Over half of the attacks looked at occurred within the past two years and demonstrates a trend of increasing lethality. While it is not of use to create a “stereotypical inspired lone wolf”, it is of use to examine the trends quantitatively, stemming over the past 26 years. Inspired Lone Wolves are usually of younger age, use guns to carry out attacks against soft targets and should not be presumed to be mentally ill. Law enforcement and policy officials need to examine how to better conceptualize security in taking into account the shift in targets, more civilians and less structures, and the new, more mundane weapons which are being used in order to perpetrate this horrific violence.

Chapter 3: Media and Terrorism

Introduction

After examining the dataset and seeing a deficiency of right wing inspired lone wolves, I immediately began questioning why this was. In all the studied countries, right wing and white supremacy ideology is the most common inspiration for lone wolves across the ideological spectrum, but that was not the case with Inspired Lone Wolves (Worth 2016). Additionally, in the United States, many studies have shown that lone wolf terrorism is the most commonly used strategy or method of attack for the American extreme right. When examining 198 lone actor attacks, Ramon Spaaij found that right wing actors perpetrated 17% of total attacks. Likewise, a study of 111 European lone wolf actors found that 39% had an extreme right wing background, more so than al-Qaeda inspired individuals, which stood at 34% (Koehler 2016). When I examined why there was such a large discrepancy within the data, two tandem explanations emerged. In order for a terrorist organization to inspire individuals, they need to rely on contagion and the role of copycat phenomenon in part. To spark this raging wildfire, they require a physical haven in order for them to still perpetrate attacks and create propaganda.

Contagion

A crucial part of terrorism is the expression of ideology. Terrorism can essentially be analyzed or understood as a form of communication; using violence to send a certain type of message. Contagion is a well-documented phenomenon within terrorism, which can be defined as a form of copycat crime where violence prone individuals and groups imitate forms of

political violence in order to attract them. There is also evidence that contagion between terrorists and terrorist organization takes place without direct contact in adopting motivations and strategies (Nacos 2009). However, the likelihood of contagion depends on the availability of coverage, detail of the methods and the portrayals of those who have been affected (Nacos 2009). Violent Acts spread like a contagious disease which then increase other forms of violence as well. Contagion of violence is also easier and expands the potential geographic distribution of copycat violence due to the internet. Media coverage of terrorist attacks may encourage by contagion imitation or otherwise other individuals to engage in such a conduct (Bassouni). There is clear evidence that Inspired Lone Wolves study each other. Mohamed Lahouaïj Bouhlel, the Nice attacker, researched previous attacks committed by ISIS supporters, including Omar Mateen and his mentions in ISIS propaganda. Likewise, Omar Mateen examined the methodology of the San Bernadino attackers and their mentions in propaganda (Carey 2016). This in part might be due to the publication of the attack by the terrorist organization in praise.

Media coverage has been shown to help extremist organizations in recruiting and mobilizing terrorists (Drake 1998). The media devotes much of their coverage to rise in threat levels relating to threat of Jihadist violence but rarely for that of far-right violence (Smith, Barton & Birdwell 2016). This can be used to explain why so many ISIS inspired lone wolves there are in contrast to right wing. As ISIS has been so extensively covered by the media, individuals looking for a cause or way in which to gain more prominence in their attack, latch onto the group but actually have been barely radicalized or exposed. They are what I consider to be “fangirls”; not true adherents or even loyalists to the group, only inspired by very brief contagion and exposure. Nonetheless, these individuals, for however little time they were exposed, choose to perpetrate violence, same as those who have been thinking about it for years.

The more things change, the more they stay the same

The right-wing in both the United States and Europe is having a bit of a legitimacy problem. A terrorist's group ability to attract attention and encourage other attacks is predicated on the success of their attacks. Only after a successful attack can they encourage another attack to occur. Additionally, the prominence or success for the terrorist organization rests on the visibility of their attacks. In that vein, terrorist groups must focus constantly on carrying out attacks in order to stay relevant and keep supporters motivated. The right wing is unable to do so (Hoffman 2006). A study by Mark Fisher found that white racist groups are less capable of producing organized and lone actor violence (Fisher 2015). Leading researchers have two theories as to why this is; 1) years of infiltration by the FBI (which is able to more effectively infiltrate groups on its own soil) and monitoring by private groups have made almost the entire operation move online, in a largely anonymous fashion, as individuals risk jail or repression in their real lives from their extremist ideology. Both make it increasingly difficult to bring people from behind the laptops into the streets. In order to inspire new attacks, a terrorist group must maintain a minimum violent presence to remain effective (Drake 1998). Dissemination of violent imagery and combative messages is an extremely important way to incite action. This is used to inspire new attacks and generate fear (Bates & Mooney 2014). The right wing is currently unable to produce such propaganda. For Jihadist groups, they still have a physical safe haven where they are able to make propaganda and perpetrate attacks, allowing them to be a true terrorist group with credibility. It is in this sense that the copycat phenomenon plays a large role in inspired lone wolf terrorism and the imitability of lone wolf attacks and the ability for them to take hold and inspire others. Another constraint on the actions of right wing terrorist groups is lack of public communication referencing the attacks. In Germany, only 24% of right wing

terrorist perpetrators send out any form of claim or note (Koehler 2016). There is the possibility that many Inspired Lone Wolves perpetrate violence anonymously do so while being inspired by the group but are too worried about the groups infiltration or the authorities tracing it back to the individual so that they leave no note claiming allegiance or responsibility. This is seen as a possible risk for detection. This lack of visibility provided by the media keeps right-wing extremism from creating and inspiring Inspired Lone Wolves and permeating the public consciousness, which often leads to individuals looking up the organization and learning about the ideology and then consuming the propaganda. This offers words of encouragement for law enforcement that their efforts are being effective in strangling many efforts of terrorist organizations.

Chapter 4: A Virtual Family

Introduction

While the previous chapter has shown that Lone Wolves have many attributes and characteristics in common with terrorist organization members, they are a “species” of their own to speak; they did not join a terrorist organization and work in a group but rather they chose to go on their own and commit the attack in solitude. This chapter will seek to understand *why* lone wolves attack alone. While motivation is very complicated and not easily pinpointed, in addition to there being an infinite number of reasons why something *could be*, examining the data set quantitatively and looking at a large number of offenders offers a unique perspective that simply analyzing case studies does not. Through analyzing terrorist messaging about lone wolf attacks, the text of the public pledge expressed by the attacker, and the ways in which the attack is viewed and celebrated by the terrorist organization, we can begin to analyze and see some of the motivations and common threads across individuals. In this chapter, I make the argument that lone wolf terrorists who are inspired by one particular terrorist organization, attack for the same reasons that individuals join terrorists groups, most notably desire for family/social inclusion (notably the exact opposite of the prevailing narrative of lone wolves being deranged loners) and desire for fame or widespread recognition. I assert that these motivations and cravings are now satisfied via the internet through online communities and the feedback and reward mechanism, which was once satiated by being in the physical proximity of the group, likewise is online. No longer do individuals need to be in each other’s physical presence to feel united or reveled but instead feel satiated virtually.

Disproving the Loner Theory

Within the current Lone Wolf terrorism body of research that exists today, there is a certain affinity for “The Loner” argument in attempt to explain why lone wolves choose to attack by themselves. Ramon Spaaij, for instance, claims lone wolves are withdrawn from society and prefer to lead their lives in solitude, which leads them to commit attacks by themselves. Another researcher Christopher Jaspardo confirms this theory, by analyzing 10 cases, “nine have been described...as loners. Seven had criminal records and at least six appear to have suffered from mental illness” (Eby 2012). However the cases that these researchers are looking at are much too small and specific to be extrapolated to lone wolves in general. Rather than saying this is the profile or typical lone wolves, Jaspardo and Spaaij are examining one motivation or explanation for why lone wolves choose to attack alone. One study by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization postulated that lone wolves can be characterized as isolated individuals who seek to perpetrate violence and use an extremist ideology as justification for their violence and that these individuals often struggle to function in society and are failures. This should not be the prevailing narrative encompassing or seeking to explain most lone wolves. This explanation holds little merit in light of recent lone wolves and in the case of these lone wolves specifically. First, there are no higher prevalence of mental illness within lone wolves than within the general population. Within the dataset, only 3 out of 53 attackers were found to be or had a previous diagnosis of a form of mental illness and all were members of groups or organizations. Many were married, such as the case of Tafsheen Malik and Syed Rizwan Farook, the married San Bernadino Attackers, and others Anis Amri⁴, encourage others to join in in violence, albeit not the plot itself.

⁴ The Berlin Christmas Market Attacker in December 2016; #9 in Case Studies

Amri, before the attack itself, attempted to convince his nephew to kill his uncle in order to prove himself worthy to the Islamic State. Farook was said to be well liked by his co-workers at his place of employment, the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health, throwing him a baby shower before his daughter was born (San Bernardino Shooting: Who Were the Attackers). Similarly, Roshonora Choudhry thwarts the stereotype of being unhinged. At the time of her radicalization, she was on her way to a successful university and worked as a part time teacher at a local Muslim School (Pantucci 2012).

All of this is not to say that lone wolves that fit this description do not exist nor to say that they should not be studied. Neil Lewington fit this particular profile. His brother described the chronic terrorist as a “loner who largely avoided contact with other people, including his family” (RFERL). In another report, he was described as an “intelligent loner” by friends and family. However, it is important not to pigeon hole all lone wolves into this category, and as the number of lone wolves increase, less and less are fitting this category and more for the following reasons. In 2005, the Committee on the Psychology of Terrorism at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in Madrid in 2005 established consensus among terrorism researchers and scholars that for terrorism and lone wolf terrorism in particular, explanations at the individual level are insufficient and it is far better to study and group psychology of terrorism is the much more improved scope with which to analyze terrorism (Post 2015).

Incentives

When asking why lone wolf terrorists attack alone, it is import to ask why do people do the alternative, i.e. why do people join terrorist groups? Outside of the general motivations of adhering to the ideological framework or wanting to commit violence, there is a general theme of motivation

across ideological lines as to why people join terrorist groups that has remained unchanged over time. These same cited reasons as individuals join terrorist groups, is why inspired lone wolves perpetrate attacks on their own. In a study analyzing Right Wing terrorist motivation for joining groups in the United States by START out of the University of Maryland, out of 60 incidences, 19 individuals, almost 30%, joined due to the desire of acceptance and belonging (START 2016). In one particularly telling personal narrative, a man named Mubin Shaikh, who was a member of a Salafi Jihadist group and later turned to be an undercover agent for the Canadian Intelligence Agency, experienced an identity crisis at the age of 18 and the Taliban offered him “acceptance by the people”, exactly what he was seeking (Bonino 2016). This messaging of the terrorist organization providing security and family has been used for decades. A study conducted by Mauricio Flores examined the motivations of individuals who had joined Guerilla fighting organizations in Colombia through interviews with disarmed fighters in the 1970’s and 1980’s. One of the most common reasons for joining was the desire for social acceptance, and furthermore, as a means of gaining social prestige (Flores-Morris 2007).

It has been clearly evidenced that the internet is a powerful tool that connects people across the world by extremely strong bonds (ASU 2012). Many individuals who fall in love online will send their partners hundreds of dollars or even move to different countries to be with them, all without ever meeting them in person. The Internet has in many respects of modern day life, replaced face-to-face and physical interaction. Preliminary research into online group dynamics found that often non violent individuals in real life, can have increasingly violent personas online, which in turn influences them in real life (Post 2015). Just as in love, these bonds of brotherhood and community that are formed online can take the place of real in person interactions, and make

an individual feel a part of a group. Numerous lone wolves outside of this study, and all of the inspired lone wolves within this data set were radicalized online, by consuming propaganda, videos or message boards. The internet has allowed for the creation of virtual communities and by in this vein, virtual mobilization which fosters a lack of accountability coupled with a cult mentality (Bates & Mooney 2014).

Terrorist organizations have seized upon this and used it to their advantage. Dutch researchers, de Koster and Houtman, recently showed that the Internet is very effectively used by right wing extremist activists to create a sense of community and generate collective identities and solidarity (Varieties of Right Wing Extremism in Europe). Researchers Caini and Parenti found that lone individual Web consumers may seek to absolve their feelings of isolation and seek out family by simply consuming the propaganda, not joining or extending contact. The individual can feel a member of the group by simply seeing comments or messages on the discussion thread, see the re-affirmation of their beliefs, and feel accepted and vilified. A researcher Thiesmeyer, in 1999 found that extreme right websites try to create a sense of community (Varieties of Right Wing Extremism). This is a technique that extends across ideological lines. Additionally, they promote mobilization outside of the web. Italian researchers found that they are able to build a coherent and unifying ideology. In examining online terrorist right wing media of German groups specifically, researcher Turner-Graham (Cyber construction of nationalist landscapes), the online community makes the visitor feel accepted and validates their views. Specifically, they call for lone wolf attacks by creating a sense of empowerment via a sense of community (Fisher 2015). For adherents and participants of the Jihadist scene, the online “Jihadisphere” gives individuals the experience of being apart of the “global ummah” has given rise to a community that spans borders and

boundaries. Researcher Janis Just found that internet forms of communication can act as a substitute for interpersonal interaction (Just 2015). The desires that would usually be satiated by being the physical presence of the group are now provided online. Similar to gangs or other extremist groups, violence is often used as a method of entry to a group. In many of these lone wolf attacks, violent attacks granted an individual entry into this community that they have developed strong bonds to. Bruce Hoffman noted that terrorist organizations can now motivate and empower individuals commit acts without a chain of command and in these, instances by only consuming propaganda or secondary sources without any human interaction or contact even online (Ibrahim 2013). In many cases, the instructions on how to perform such attacks are even posted online, making the ability to commit an attack seamless. There is evidence that terrorist organizations are aware of the power of the internet and why individuals join terrorist organization and change their message to play upon such desires. Examining a Jihadi that was captured with documents in his backpack. One of the documents said that social legitimation is one of their biggest goals and challenges. Social legitimation means to create communities and spread their story within that and accept and support each other's efforts (ASU 2012). The message from the global jihad movement is directly aimed at an individual by saying not only you, but your brothers of this community face assault from infidels and threatened by military attack and cultural corruption. Studies by Carpenter, Levitt and Jacobson, found that terrorists often send messages to stoke anger in marginalized, younger people who are impressionable, disenfranchised and often seeking a cause. Additionally, lone wolf terrorism is essentially free. They require no financial backing or planning or even time. They simply consume the propaganda already published and commit an attack in the name of the organization. It is for that reason, that groups have changed their behavior in order to encourage more and more of these attacks. In this new media age,

terrorists have adapted this strategy to use this adaptation of a cause in order to convince individuals to perpetrate the attack in the name of the group (Bates & Mooney 2014).

Blood and Glory

Another prominent motivation for individuals joining is that of glory or fame, Lone Wolf terrorism offers an even greater lure to individuals seeking this sort of affirmation because attacking as an individual allows for the person to be mentioned by name in the press and media, in addition to fulfilling their obligation or feelings of loyalty to the group. In a study run by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism analyzing recruitment by Far-Right groups within the United States a highly cited motivation for joining a far right terrorist group was acceptance from peers and the ability of the group to increase one's level of personal significance. Out of a sample of 60 participants, 13 joined in order to obtain higher significance (START 2016). The Internet is the perfect forum for lone wolves with commit to become a hero through "propaganda by deed" and leveraging on the attack (Ibrahim 2013). Bin Laden artfully manipulated the idea of suicide bombing by framing it as martyrdom and becoming one of the chosen few of god's holy warriors, a select and elite group. This plays perfectly upon many individuals desire for prominence and status; granting them the ultimate and highest form of exultation. For those who wish to be celebrated and exulted within the terrorist group, it is important to look at the language terrorist groups use to celebrate and describe lone wolf attacks, and the language they use to encourage them. Researcher David Skillicon analyzed two online magazine publications disseminated by the Islamic State; titled Inspire and Azan respectively. He found that content created for those sympathetic to Jihadist ideology was crafted in order to inspire glory and fame. Another Jihadist that was famed after his attack was Mohamed Merah of France.

In March 2012, Merah attacked a Jewish preschool killing seven children and the rabbi, all while committing the attack with a GoPro camera attached to his chest. He shouted that he was a Mujahid with links and allegiance to Al Qaeda through an apartment door in Toulouse (Chrisafis 2012).. A group of psychologists found that the Islamic State is very skilled at convincing young people that they are able to participate in a “world-history” narrative, satisfying a desire for fame and glory and prominence that will live on way beyond their own time (Worth 2016).

Pledge of allegiance

By analyzing the pledge’s of allegiance that these inspired lone wolves express in a variety of ways; whether it be on social media or written in a letter, can give us a clue as to their motivations; to why they attacked and to their allegiance to the group itself. While it would be useful to quantitatively analyze all of the pledge’s posted or expressed in order to trace and count common themes, the text of such messages are not all available to the public. Additionally, not all individuals left an explicit statement, but allegiance and inspiration was confirmed via the materials in their possession. Right Wing Inspired Lone Wolves in particular left hardly any notes of allegiance, and their inspiration was traced via the propaganda in their possession. As discussed in Chapter 3, right wing Inspired Lone Wolves are incentivized not to leave notes of allegiance as this could be trace dback to their peers and result in increased surveillance and infiltration. Omar Mateen for example, the 30 year old who opened fire at a club in Orlando in 2016, posted on Facebook, *“America and Russia, stop bombing the Islamic State. I pledge by allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. May Allah accept me.... Now taste the Islamic State*

Vengeance”⁵. In this pledge, it focuses on vengeance, suggesting his desire to do violence. Additionally, he directs his message to the enemy, American and Russia, to stop bombing the Islamic State which we can postulate he identifies as his brothers or kin. This would suggest that these are the same motivations as before; the desire to do violence, and the sense of belonging. Nicholas Roddis, the 23 year old who planted fake bombs on buses in the United Kingdom in July 2007, left this note with the fake devises “*There is no God but Allah. Mohammed is the messenger of Allah. God is great. God is great. Britain must be punished. Signed the Al Qaeda Organization of Iraq*”. Notably in this pledge, Roddis again expresses this desire for revenge against some perceived injustice of his group and enacting violence. He does not express a personal sense of aggression notably against himself and does not sign by name (this could however be due to tactical reasons as he did not want to reveal himself). While the plot of Neil Lewington was thwarted before he could enact one or pledge a formal statement, made a number of statements before the police discovered his stash.

Feedback

An important piece to the puzzle is examining how the attack is hailed by the terrorist group. Individuals who see how other lone wolf attacks are hailed and presented will influence those who perpetrate attacks in the future. After the Nice Attacks, carried out by Bouhleel in July of 2016, online the Islamic State hailed Bouhleel as a “soldier of the Islamic State”, a very high honor and status symbol to be considered part of the group. For those wishing to fulfill these

⁵ February 1, 2017 hearing of wife of Omar Mateen, Noor Salman

desires of group dynamics and inclusion, this is the ultimate form of inclusion (Fyffe 2016). Photos of Boulel's attack was also featured in the Islamic State's *Rumiyah* magazine, with instructions on how to commit a successful attack like Boulel (Friedman 2017). This is the ultimate form of exultation. In addition to the desire for belonging, a premium is placed on gaining the admiration of the radicalized community, often driving individuals to compete for the most successful or deadliest attack (Post 2015). Some lone wolves seek a "blaze of glory", just as those who join terrorist organizations do (Post 2015). After the attacks of San Bernardino, committed by the husband and wife team in December 2015, the Islamic State dedicated two full pages to their English language magazine *Dabiq*, glorifying the attack and hailing the individuals as supporters of the Caliphate (Weimann 2016). After the death of Mohammed Merah, Al-Qaeda linked websites and forums created tribute videos and posters, including one video titled "The Lone Lion" and a Facebook page called "Tribute to Mohamed Merah"; the page had over 500 visits. In one online post, the Islamic State stated "The smallest action you do in the heart of their land is dearer to us than the largest action by us" (Worth 2016). For an individual seeking glory and praise, lone wolf terrorism offers the utmost exultation. There exists the potential of imitation and infamy, and the affiliation of a group promises more and more fame which increases the likelihood of imitation, even after death. The promise is more than enough, even if the individual is not alive to experience it. The expression of allegiance allows for the group to feature the individual in the propaganda, making an example out of the attacker and thereby satisfying their ultimate desire for fame.

Fangirls

Those who are not actually entrenched in the ideology. Intense media coverage has been found to give people who are thinking about committing terrorist acts direct inspiration on what and how to attack, even copying the ideology (Carey 2016). Of additional concern, are those who are so quickly radicalized and commit an attack in the name of a group, solely because of the media and it is the “trendy” thing to do. These lone wolves need to be thoroughly examined and investigated even further because they are also a part of terrorist group strategy and any attempt to thwart these attacks involve these individuals as well. To exemplify this, consider the attack by Man Haround Monis, who kept hostages in a coffee shop with guns and eventually began executing his hostages. He claimed to be carrying out the name of the Islamic State, but brought the wrong flag with him and asked the police to bring the correct flag from his home (Pantucci 2016). Another example is that of Nicholas Roddis, the 23 year old British man who left a fake bomb on a bus in London. According to a variety of friends and families who testified at his trial, while he was fascinated with Al Qaeda in Iraq, his justifications for his actions was that he was bored after having lost his job and an interest in making fireworks, combined with a curiosity with Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Byman 2017). Some research has suggested that the extensive and very detailed media coverage of terrorist attacks, by constantly reporting on lone wolf terrorism and the possibility for more, are giving people who are vulnerable to these ideas or thinking about perpetrating the attack, ideas about what to do and how to do it (Carey 2016). As Inspired Lone Wolves continue to enter the public consciousness via media reporting, these attacks and violence provide an easily accessible template to emulate for violence prone misfits who might otherwise had not acted on their impulses. Additionally, people who might not have had the opportunity or even desire to join a terrorist group have found an appealing way to express their rage and simply attribute their grievances in the name of the terrorist organization (Byman

2017). They are people who searched for meaning in their lives and found it by perpetrating violence in the name of a movement, without taking the time necessary to invest time and energy. This should concern security professionals and the news media. It is crucial to re-examine how terrorist incidents are reported, especially those of Inspired Lone Wolves, so as to mitigate the effects and potential for inspiring other individuals.

Conclusion

Many researchers believe that lone wolves are fundamentally different from individuals who join terrorist organizations (Worth 2016). While this is true on a variety of levels one thing they do share in common with traditional organization members is their main motivations. It has been well evidenced that the internet has had a direct influence and correlation to the rise in lone wolf attacks, largely due in part to the ease of spreading propaganda and communication. Through these new technologies, individuals can become not only radicalized but made to feel as if they are an actual part of the terrorist organization. It would be a mistake to profile these lone wolves as individuals whose mental state precludes them from joining the actual group. A group of psychologists argued in the magazine *The Psychiatric Times* that ISIS has had an extremely effective marketing strategy and has provided “existential fast food” to a wide variety of people including young people going through transitions and changes, those existing on the fringes of society. They provide a relief in the search for human desire for identity, social connection, meaning. The idea of being a soldier or a member has been transposed onto the internet (Byman 2017). This chapter gives us not only a crucial insight into the motivations of lone wolves but also how to combat those who might be tempted to be lone wolves in the future.

Chapter 5: The Fifth Wave

Introduction

Finally, in this conclusion, I make the argument that the world is witnessing and experiencing the fifth wave of terrorism, which is marked by online planning of lone wolf attacks and driven by these Inspired Lone Wolves. While Right Wing Groups have already had to adapt, as terrorist organizations do not survive long in highly developed states as they do in less developed states (Young and Dugan 2015, Carter 2012). It has been well established that lone wolf attacks are on the rise (Harress 2016, Worth 2016). What is crucial however, is not only a commentary on the social political climate, in that more individuals are being driven to commit acts of widespread violence, but that terrorist groups are advocating for this more and more, marking an evolution in the way terrorism is committed, making this the fifth wave of terrorism.

The Beginnings of a Shift

There has already been a large shift within the terrorism trend in how people join organizations. Due to the global security apparatus, transnational terrorism today represents little about the majority of terrorism that takes place, for several reasons (Nemeth 2014). The phenomenon of Foreign Fighters, or individuals traveling to a certain location to join the fight of a certain terrorist group, has largely died out (however the Islamic State is a notable exception; this is due to their concept of building an actual 'state' or country, which requires individuals to populate it). This is in large part due to the strengthening of international travel and no fly lists and watch lists. Additionally, those wishing to travel to join the terrorist organization have

largely been stopped, due to excellent work by local and state authorities. However, rather than let that be the end of their terrorist aspirations, these individuals instead choose to carry out an attack domestically. Such as exemplified in the case of a young teenager in Australia. In 2014, he had his passport revoked after attempting to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State. He then stabbed two police officers, choosing to commit an attack in order to join the ranks of the Islamic State Soldiers. FBI Director James Comey, in a testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee stated that “there will be a terrorist diaspora sometime in the next two to five years like we’ve never seen before” (Free Beacon 2016). Terrorist groups on all sides of the spectrum are calling for lone wolf attacks instead of directing their efforts to physical recruitment.

The Fifth Wave

Prominent lone wolf scholar Raffaello Pantucci said in an interview to Frontline that the world has effectively managed the terrorist organization problem down to a lone wolf level (Harress 2016). This is very true and shows that the global fight against terrorism has in large part been quite effective. As such, terrorist organizations have had to change and adapt. This is their new strategy. Since September 11, a new terrorist strategy has emerged which is marked by attacks that are more frequent yet less complex (Michael George). A recent report issued by the Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management on Terrorism announced that the number of lone wolf attacks have increased in recent decades and that lone wolf attacks come from all types of extremist ideological and religious groups (Weimann 2012). In the United States, since 1995, a much higher percentage of terrorist attacks in the United States have been conducted by unaffiliated individuals versus organized groups (On the fifteenth Anniversary of the Oklahoma

City Bombing 2010). Part of this goal is to spur others to move from thought to action, inspiring copycats, which was exemplified in Chapter 4. Rumbblings of this wave initially began in the 1990's with the writings of Louis Beam advocating for Leaderless resistance. Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis later popularized the term lone wolf (Anti Defamation League 2002). Their strategy was to counteract the destruction of law enforcement agencies of hierarchical militias into a vision where individuals and groups operate independently of each other (Beam 1992, Insitoot Voor 2015). In 2004, writings by Al Qaeda member "Al-Suri" that laid out his vision in a 1,600 page manifesto of leaderless jihad where individuals or small cells around the world acted independently, united only by common ideology (Worth 2016).

In 2010, al-Qaeda first began openly advocating and calling for lone wolf attacks via their online magazine, titled *Inspire*. When ISIS emerged on the terrorist scene, it actively embraced the technique. Likewise, organizations on the right side of the ideological spectrum are advocating for this vein of terrorism. The generation of white supremacists such as Louis Beam and Timothy McVeigh, are gone and in their place are groups which aim to inspire lone wolf attacks rather than orchestrating them on their own (Fisher 2015). The number of lone wolf attacks has increased each decade since the 1970's in the United States and other developed countries (Hewitt 2002). Calling for lone wolf attacks solve many infiltration problems that groups face. When recruiting online, meeting with an individual in person could be an undercover agent or pose the threat of detection. By advocating for lone wolf attacks, the integrity of the anonymity of the leaders and directors stays in tact while still communicating the violent act.

The fifth wave of terrorism will be marked by frequent yet less complex attacks. This is in part due to the media coverage of terrorism and the ability of them to broadcast the terrorist message. William Johnson, chairman of the American Freedom Party (a group that advocates

creating a white ethno state) said he agreed with the FBI in that most of the action emerging from extremist and terrorist movements in the next few decades will be lone wolves (Fisher 2015). One of the most threatening terrorist groups of today, the Islamic State are taking such heavy losses in their physical locations of Iraq and Syria, that they are decentralizing and asking people to commit attacks in their own area. They have changed their rhetoric in propaganda, not to come join the caliphate, but to commit violence in any way, even if it is amateurish (Weimann 2012).

Lone Wolves also have the potential to become increasingly more and more dangerous. Currently, lone wolf attacks are much less deadly, on average, than terrorist organizations (Worth 2016). However, there are a number of reasons why lone wolves have the potential to be more dangerous than terrorist organizations. Lone wolves could be much more likely to use weapons of mass destruction such as chemical or biological weapons. Simon 2013, argues that organizations might avoid using highly painful and widely lethal weapons in order to not alienate supporters who might have moral objections to such a use. Additionally, organizations can face serious retaliation such as an intense government crackdown. To add to that, the lack of bureaucratic and organizational hurdles, which can sometimes weed out ideas based on a variety of opinions, are not present in lone actor violence. If an actor has an idea he has no reason other than his own mind not to perpetrate the attack. There is hope however. The lack of right wing lone wolves demonstrate that there still needs to be some sort of operational capacity in order to fully take advantage of the “inspiration” faction.

Change in Target Selection

A factor which aids the use of inspired lone wolf terrorism and suggests that there is incentives for this to continue is the tactical advantage of attacking soft targets in today and age.

Due to the fact that media and news organizations provide relentless coverage of terrorist attacks on soft targets, terrorist organizations are incentivized to advocate for more of these attacks and spread their message even more. This is ideal for lone wolf attacks, for it is much easier to orchestrate an attack on individuals anywhere than it is to attempt to attack and harm any large structure in a meaningful enough way to get it reported on television or online (Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium). By targeting civilians, they are maximizing their goals of communication and inspiration of fear. This is concerning as attacks on soft targets are much more difficult to prevent than attacks on immobile structures which can have defenses surrounding them (Gass 2016). It is much easier to disrupt a bomb plot, as it involves a much higher degree of interactions and planning time, than purchasing a gun or renting a truck. As these lone wolves continue to use relatively mundane objects such as cars and knives as the modus operandi for their attack, the security defenses that have been constructed globally since September 11th such as metal detectors in the entrance of buildings will have to be re-thought.

Combatting Lone Wolves

FBI director James Comey once stated the difficulty in trying to detect lone wolves in that “we are looking for needles in a nation-wide haystack, but we are also called upon to figure out which pieces of hay might someday become needles”. However, with Inspired Lone Wolves there is somewhat of a tactical advantage. By professing sympathies or in agreement with a terrorist group ideology, this should signal to individuals around the potential perpetrator, such as friends and family, online or virtually of the intent on committing a heinous crime. The information presented within this thesis suggests that a way to lessen the threat of lone wolves is to continue to eradicate the physical spaces of terrorist activity and those inspired by such group will fall as

well. It is crucial for law enforcement to be aware that the right wing, as they feel their influence waning, wish to orchestrate a “grand event” in order to instigate more violence and more inspired attacks.

Glossary: Data Set

1. May 2010- Roshonara Choudhry- 21- stabbed British MP Stephen Timms- Ansar Al-Awlaki/Al Qaeda
2. January 2002- Charles Bishop- 15- flew plane into building- only him- HARD
3. July 2016- 31 yr old man- Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel- drove truck in Nice during Bastille- ISIS-killed 84 and injured over 200- 19 ton refrigerated truck, automatic pistol, 303 injured-history of petty crime- didn't pray or fast and often drank alcohol- mentally unstable?
4. July 2016- South Africa- two brothers planning to attack the US embassy in Pretoria and Jewish building- ISIS- weapon unknown- thwarted- HARD
5. June 13 2016- France- 25 year old killed police officer and partner in home in name of ISIS-Larossi Aballa- Magnanville (city near Paris)
6. Omar Mateen- June 12 2016- 30's- Gunfire in a club- killed 49 and injured dozens more- Orlando Florida
7. April 2016- 40 year old arrest in FL for planning explosive attack on Synagogue in name of ISIS- HARD
8. March 2016- UC-mercer student stabbed student and attacked 3 others. Inspired by ISIS and carried the flag
9. Berlin Attacker- December 2016- truck- Anis Amri
10. February 2016- Michigan Man arrested for planning to conduct mass shooting at nearby church where he wanted to kill thousands- ISIS
11. January 2016- France- Teenage ISIS supporter arrested for attacking Jewish teacher with machete
12. Jan 2016- knife wielding man charged paris police station and shot dead- ISIS
13. December 2015- San Bernadino- Husband and Wife- Killed 14- ISIS inspired- Tafsheen Malik and Syed Farook- 14 dead and 24 injured- United States- both killed
14. July 2015- Florida man arrested for plotting to kill beach goers using explosives
15. July 2015- Massachusetts man arrested for plotting to live stream an ISIS inspired terrorist rampage on college campus- Ciccolo
16. July 2015- 2 ISIS sympathizers were arrested after threatening to carry out terrorist attack on military base in Italy with US presence- Ghedi Airbase
17. July 2015- British man arrested and charged with plotting to attack US troops in UK- ISIS
18. June 2015- 19 year old NC man arrested and charged with planning assassinations in the name of IS
19. April 2015- Kansas man arrested for plotting suicide car bomb attack against Fort Riley military base in name of ISIS-HARD
20. March 2015- Former US national guardsman and cousin arrested for ISIS inspired plot to conduct terrorist attack against IL military base
21. February 2015- Denmark- gunman who pledge allegiance to ISIS opened fire at event at Copenhagen cultural center- killed 1 civilian wounded 3 officers
22. February 2015- Australia- arrest 2 men for planning public beheading in Sydney- discover ISIS propaganda

23. January 2015- Ohio man inspired by ISIS- plotting pipe bomb and shooting attack against US capitol in DC
24. December 2014- France- French police shoot and kill knife carrying suspect who made ISIS linked posts on social media- wounded 3 officers
25. October 2014- Canada- ISIS inspired- struck 2 canadian soldiers with car in Quebec, killing 2 and wounded another- Aaron Driver
26. October 2014- Denmark- Danish teen radicalized by ISIS propaganda- stabbed mother to death
27. September 2014- Australia- ISIS inspired teen stabbed 2 police officers after having his passport revoked
28. May 2014- FBI arrest upstate new York man who sought to support ISIS by shooting and killing members of US military
29. September 2007- Houssein Zorkot- arrested in Detroit carrying AK 47- inspired by Hizballah and maintained website with their messages
30. December 2016- Phoenix man 30- arrested- plotting lone wolf attack in the name of ISIS
31. January 2009- Hosam Smadi- 19 from Jordan- espoused loyalty to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda (FBI source)- Radicalized via internet- Dallas TX- trying to blow up Dallas skyscraper- THWARTED
32. June 2014- Sami Osmakac- vehicle bomb. Assault rifle- 25- Al Qaeda- THWARTED
33. April 2015, Queens residents Asia Siddiqui and Noelle Velentzas were arrested and charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction as well as other terrorism-related offenses following a joint investigation by the NYPD Intelligence Bureau and FBI. The defendants are alleged to have researched the construction of various types of explosives devices, including the car bomb used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and pressure cooker bombs such as those used in the 2013 Boston Marathon attacks; they also allegedly acquired some of the components to construct explosive devices, including propane tanks. The complaint charges that the defendants, who allegedly made statements backing violent jihad and supporting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), sought to detonate explosive devices here at home. The two pleaded not guilty in May 2015; their case is still pending.
34. January 2015- Christopher Cornell- Ohio-personality disorders- ISIS- Guns- 20 yrs old
35. April 2015- 45 year old Miguel Diaz- Miami- Sniper with ISIS on bullets
36. Philly 2016- Man attempts to kill Philly police officer and says "I pledge my allegiance to the Islamic State and that's why I did what I did"
37. August 2, 2016- Roanoke Virginia- mentally ill? Attacks 2 people with a knife
38. 2016- Police thwart plot by 38 year old muslim convert- ISIS- bombs in Arizona Prison
39. 1992- Koblenz Germany- Deutschen Front Coblenz, Smith and Wesson Gun- Killed one- Personality disorder. Emptied magazine into group of 8
40. February 1997- Lubeck Germany- Junge Nationaldemokraten- Shotgun- 1 dead 2 injured- target was leftist bookseller
41. 2003- the police searched the home of a right-wing extremist and found 11 operational improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ammunition, and weapons. Although investigators found material (T-Shirts, propaganda material) from the local 'Kameradschaft München' (Comradeship Munich), suggesting contacts with the 'Kameradschaft Süd' KS, no active connections could be proven in court.

42. July 2008- Leipzig Germany- Attended event by Freie Krafte Leipzig and attacked victim on bench via beating and kicking
43. David Folley 35- Murdered 36 year old Raj Singh Christmas day 2010- BNP propaganda
44. December 2011- Gianluca Casseri- 50 years old- 2 dead- shooting rampage- CasaPound
45. June 2015- Zack Davies- 26- Radicalised online- National Action- Tried to Decapitate man because he looked Asian with knife and hammer- only wounded\
46. June 2009- Neil Lewington: Police discovered Lewington was carrying two homemade IEDs after he was arrested on a train for smoking and being abusive. Further investigation revealed that his bedroom at his parents' house contained a wide range of bomb-making materials and evidence of his ideological sympathies- Mental Health Issues- he wanted to emulate the Oklahoma bomber, Timothy McVeigh, and the Soho nail bomber, David Copeland, and kept videos detailing their attacks at his home- The Guardian
47. July 18 2016- Afghan national age 17- uses axe and knife- train in Wurzburg germany- homemade IS flag with note in Pashto that leads them to believe he was self radicalized—texted with an IS member.
 - a. 5 days after Larossi Aballa attack—stabs and uses knife and axe. Releases selfie video
48. Canada 2014- Martin Rouleau Couture- Truck Attack- converted to Islam 1 year prior- Canadian authorities confiscated his passport but didn't have enough evidence to hold him- one soldier killed, one injured- 25- October 2014
49. October 2014- Michael Zehaf Bibeau- Convert to Islam- 32- Canada- Opast criminal history and drug addiction- asked to stop praying at mosque because too radical- connected with extremist in Canada and had interactions online including Islamic Extremist websites- no operational links- wanted to travel to Syria but not on any lists- Same week as #49- killed a soldier guarding a war memorial and then shot at parliament
50. 2016- Ansbach Germany- 27 year old refugee blew himself up outside a bar after his refugee application was rejected and pledged it in the name of the Islamic State
51. February 2016- Germany- Safia - 15- stabbed and wounded police officer- 20 year old man Mohamad Hasn knew of her plan
52. July 23, 2007- Nicholas Roddis- - United Kingdom- replica bullets and fog detectors that he said were live ammunition and mines. Arrested by Police. Had everything except for Acid for TATP- poster of Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader, Abu al-Zarqawi. Responsible for a Hoax bomb on the Rotherham bus. The note he left with his fake device : There is no g-d but allah. Mohammed is the messenger of Allah. God is great. God is great. Britain must be punished. Signed the Al Qaeda organization of Iraq
53. 2011- Jason Abdo- Thwarted- American Soldier- Inspired by Nadal Hassan and Al Qaeda- had the inspire magazine by Al Qaeda- handgun and materials for bomb making- Texas- American born- 21 at time of arrest
54. March 22 2012- Mohammed Merah- - several Jewish school children and rabbi killed in Toulouse France- allied to Al Qaeda- 23 years old- unemployed panel- shouted
55. In late 2014, Sydney came to a terrified standstill when Man Haroun Monis, a disturbed Shia convert with a record of run-ins with authorities, held up a coffee bar in the middle of the city. He claimed to be carrying out an attack on behalf of the Islamic State. But he was so underprepared that he brought the wrong flag with him and asked authorities to

bring him the flag of the Islamic State. Police eventually stormed the café once he began executing the hostages. The Islamic State later praised Monis in its publications, though no evidence emerged of any clear direction or instigation from the group.

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