Europe: Requiem for an Idea?

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation connects an idea of Europe, the Kantian idea of Europe, with public opinion data measuring support for the EU. By the Kantian idea of Europe, I refer to the idea of the EU as a federation of independent republics. I look at multiple dimensions of support for the EU. The first dimension is utilitarian. As the initial promise of the EU and its predecessor institutions was largely economic, I check if public support for the EU is contingent on economic performance and find mixed support for my hypotheses. The dimension I consider comes from revised modernization theory. I check and see if education, interest in politics and postmaterialist values play a role in determining support for the EU. Postmaterialists do support the EU more than materialists do, but stagnant levels of materialism over the last three decades means that we cannot rely on value change to provide support for the EU in the future. Next, I consider the minority nationalisms in European nation-states which have long sought greater autonomy vis-à-vis the nation-state. The EU was considered a vehicle for achieving this autonomy but its impact has been limited at best. I also check if people who are from these regions seeking greater autonomy are more supportive of the EU than others in their state. I find that support for this hypothesis is limited at best. Finally, I turn my attention to the creation of a European identity in opposition to an ‘other’, namely the Muslim immigrant. The question animating my analysis here is whether there is a nascent European nationalism which sees itself in opposition to the Muslim ‘other’. My analysis shows that those who are generally biased against immigrants do not support the EU. However, if we differentiate between immigrants from within the EU and those from outside the EU, there is much more support for the former. This doesn’t necessarily mean that there will be an affective
European identity, but does lead me to conclude that there exists a base for one. All my analyses are conducted using data from the Eurobarometer and European Social Survey. Both the surveys provide a long time-series and ask questions which measure support for the EU.
CHAPTER I

Introduction

...what is true about today’s Europe may not be very new, and what is proclaimed as new not perhaps wholly true.

Tony Judt
A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe

This dissertation concerns itself with the multiple dimensions of public support for the European Union (EU). The EU itself exists because a collective idea of Europe as “a political and cultural domain” exists (Pagden, 2002, p. 1). It is such an idea, one based on peace and commerce, which I wish to explore further in this introduction. This is not to say that other ideas of Europe don’t exist. They do, and one can convincingly argue that the cultural unity of Europe comes from Christendom (Hay, 1968) or from war and conquest (Pagden, 2002, p. 13) or as a product of the Cold War and in response to the Soviet ‘other’ (Neumann, 1999). The idea which I examine here comes from an enlightenment narrative. It is the Kantian idea of Europe as a federation of republics and it has become a normative standard—an ideal by which to judge forms of political association in Europe and the world (Tully, 2002, p. 333).

1.1 The Kantian Idea of Europe

As Tully (2002, p. 333) mentions, the idea of Europe as a federation of independent nations has functioned as a Kantian “regulative ideal” since the publication of Perpetual
Peace in 1795. Kant, in his essay, outlines six preliminary articles (which lead to the conditions for a perpetual peace among nations) and three definitive articles (which lead to perpetual peace, formally instituted). It can be argued that the EU has fulfilled many of the conditions laid out in Kant’s essay. The EU is a (con)federation of liberal democratic states, thus fulfilling the requirements of the first and second definitive articles. The third definitive article, that of the cosmopolitan right of universal hospitality, is arguably fulfilled by the free movement of people within the EU. Moreover, EU itself is brought together by commerce and trade with a single market and single currency. For Kant, this ‘spirit of commerce’ is necessary because he saw it as antithetical to war (Kant, 1991, p. 114). And importantly, this reliance on commerce provides a means to ensure compliance within the federation without a resort to war.

There are three additional features of this idea of Europe which bear further discussion. The first is that Europe and the EU serve as models for the political organization of all the nations of the world (Tully, 2002, p. 332). This idea of perpetual peace is not limited to Europe but aims to encompass the whole world (Kant, 1991, p. 104). Yet again Europe is seen to be on the forefront of development; it is forging a path which the rest of the world will follow. Second, the spread of this form of political organization across the world is understood “as the consequence of a set of historical processes and ‘stages’ of world development, including the spread of commerce and the rule of law by European wars of imperial expansion” (Tully, 2002, p. 332). The idea of the ‘stages’ of world development is present in Kant’s essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent. For Kant, history itself works towards nature’s highest purpose, namely a universal cosmopolitan existence for all mankind (Kant, 1991, p. 51). Finally, for Pagden (1995), the publication of Perpetual Peace marks the transition from the idea of Europe as ‘empire’ to the idea of Europe as ‘federation’.

This Kantian idea of Europe remains relevant to this day (Pagden, 2002; Tully, 2002; All references to Perpetual Peace are from Kant’s Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss (1991).
Fontana, 2002). The EU and its predecessor institutions were created with the aim of preventing another war between the European states, particularly France and Germany. By this measure alone, the EU has been a spectacular success. Trade and commerce were the tools used to achieve this aim and the EU has successfully created a common European market which allows the free movement of goods and people. Hence, Kant’s ‘spirit of commerce’ has achieved the desired result: the prevention of war. The EU members are all liberal democratic states; indeed it is a requirement for gaining membership to the union. For Kant, it was important that the nations in this federation retain their national character; Kant opposed the idea of an international state (Kant, 1991, p. 102). As of now, the EU does fulfill this requirement though many see it as being well on its way to a supranational state. It is for these reasons I argue that the idea animating the EU is the Kantian Idea outlined in Perpetual Peace.

This dissertation is not a theoretical inquiry into the Kantian Idea of Europe. Rather, this idea serves as the premise for an empirical inquiry into public support for the EU. As I have mentioned above, all the member states of the EU are liberal democracies; that is the basis for their legitimacy. By extension, the EU itself derives its legitimacy from the citizens of its member states. If this was not previously obvious, it has been made so by Brexit. The very survival of the union—and by extension the Kantian Idea of Europe—is contingent on public support for it.

Throughout this dissertation I aim to show that the Kantian idea is not a useful frame of reference for analyzing Europe. That it has been used in the past is not reason to use it going forward. For Kant, the federation of republics was to be a rather loose institutional arrangement without strong enforcement powers. This is clearly not the case of the EU now. My argument is that the EU is trending towards a supranational state, a European nation-state if you will, and that a Burkean framework is much more useful in order to analyze this kind of political structure.

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2Hence the title of this dissertation: Requiem for an Idea.
1.2 Plan for the Dissertation

I analyze public support for the EU using publicly available survey data. I limit my inquiry to the EU15 countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. I choose the EU15 states for two reasons. First, there is an extensive time-series survey data available for these countries since at least 1995. And second, including these countries increases the differences between countries in the analysis. The EU15 countries show a number of differences and with the addition of the Eastern European member states, the amount of heterogeneity increases, thus making interpretation of the statistical analysis harder. The Eurobarometer surveys have been conducted bi-annually in member countries since 1973 and they form the basis of my inquiry. Chapter two develops measures of public support based on questions asked in the Eurobarometer surveys. I start the chapter by developing a theoretical framework for the analysis of public support for the EU. This is largely based on the frameworks developed by David Easton (1965) and Fritz Scharpf (1999). I differentiate between two dimensions of public support (specific and diffuse) and then go on to apply them to the measures of public support for the EU. The chapter concludes with a graphical description of these measures. I present and discuss the time-series of these variables which is separated by country. This allows us to see the different dynamics of support in each of the EU15 states.

Chapter three connects instrumental public support with economic indicators. The argument here is that the initial promise of the EU was largely economic and so public support for the EU should vary with economic outcomes. I start the chapter with a discussion of the neofunctionalist theory of integration and from this derive my basic hypothesis that stronger GDP growth, lower unemployment and inflation, and more trade with EU countries will lead to more support for the EU. After this, I turn to a discussion of the post-functionalist theory of Hooghe and Marks (2008) which contends we cannot take public support for granted following the post-Maastricht politicization of the inte-
gration process. From this theory I derive the hypothesis that the explanatory power of economic indicators in predicting public support has decreased following the Maastricht Treaty. These hypotheses are tested using fixed-effects regression on panel data. I also conduct individual country regressions to test these hypotheses in each country. The results show mixed support for the hypotheses.

The next chapter focuses on revised modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997) in the context of European integration. Modernization theory fits in quite well with the idea of ‘stages’ of world development. The main idea behind it is that economic development leads to political change and, theoretically, a move towards democracy. For the revised version of modernization theory, this relationship is mediated by a change in values at the individual and societal levels. I relate this revised version of modernization theory to European integration and derive two main hypotheses from this discussion. The first is related to cognitive mobilization, namely that rising levels of education will allow more people to identify with a larger political community (the EU). I test if those with higher educational levels and a higher interest in political issues are more supportive of the EU. The second hypothesis is related to value change. Individuals with postmaterialist values (those prioritizing freedom and autonomy) are hypothesized to be more supportive of the EU. I test both hypotheses using mixed-effects logistic regression analysis, the first with Eurobarometer data and the second with data from the World Values Survey / European Values Survey. The results confirm both the hypotheses, though the lack of an increase in the relative number of postmaterialists in the last thirty years leads me to the conclusion that we must look to other sources of support for the EU.

The next two chapters look at nationalism and its role in affecting public opinion about the EU. Chapter five discusses minority nationalist movements in the age of the union. If the EU is to be a federation of peoples, support for the EU must come from all these nationalities within the EU. The great promise of the EU for minority nations (periphery) within existing European nation-states (center) is that it provides a path by which they
can achieve increasing autonomy. Hence, we would expect those living in the periphery to be more supportive of the EU as compared to those living in the center. We would also expect regionalist parties, as a party family, to be more supportive of the EU. In order to test these hypotheses, I discuss the response of regionalist parties towards the EU in three countries: Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom. I then analyze public opinion data from these three countries and compare levels of different measures of public support in the center and periphery. The results show that with the exception of the United Kingdom, there is no pattern of significantly higher public support in the periphery as opposed to the center. Hence, we cannot expect the center-periphery conflict to provide significant support to the EU. I discuss the analysis of the United Kingdom in the context of Brexit and ask if the center-periphery conflict could have actually provided the last few votes that were needed to get the UK out of the EU.

Chapter six discusses the formation of a nascent European nationalism and the construction of a European identity. My discussion of this revolves around the construction of ‘self’ as opposed to an ‘other’. In the European context, I identify and discuss two of the latter: the American ‘other’ and the Muslim immigrant ‘other’. While there is a long history of analyzing the creation of a European ‘self’ in opposition to America (which I discuss in the chapter) the lack of survey data makes it hard to empirically connect the two. Hence, my empirical analysis is limited to the opposition to the immigrant. Using European Social Survey data, I show that those with negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration say that European integration should not go further. This is not really surprising and is in line with past research on the topic. However, this analysis (and most past research on this subject) does not differentiate between immigrants from within the EU and those from outside (Muslims). The next part of my analysis in this chapter is a first step in doing that. As the EU has opened up borders and allowed the free movement of people, the EU15 countries have seen a significant increase in immigration from other EU countries. Hence, most immigration is from within the EU, even if the perception
remains of the quintessential immigrant being Muslim. I show that there are significant differences in if people view immigrants favorably depending on if the immigrants are from the EU or from outside. This difference holds regardless of whether respondents identify as exclusively European, exclusively national, or say that they identify with both Europe and the nation.

Finally, the conclusion discusses the results of my empirical analyses and relates them back to the Kantian idea of Europe I have discussed in this introduction. The big question driving my empirical analyses has been whether European public opinion can lend support to this Kantian idea of Europe. If it cannot, my contention is not that the EU will (completely) disintegrate. Rather that we might then be moving towards a more Burkean idea of Europe, the idea that the EU is becoming a nation-state. I end my dissertation with a discussion of its limitations and avenues for further research.
CHAPTER II

The Data

This chapter describes the measures of public support used in the analyses that follow. However, before describing the data and the measures I have chosen, I describe the theoretical reasoning behind this choice. Towards this end, the next section lays out the theoretical framework of public support which was first outlined by David Easton and then relates it to the measures of support for the EU. In the following section, I explore the data graphically so that we can get a good sense of how support has changed over time for a given country in the EU15.

2.1 A Theoretical Framework

The analysis in this dissertation follows a long line of previous research in adopting David Easton’s theoretical framework for the analysis of public support for European integration (Niedermayer and Westle, 1995; Reif, Inglehart and Rabier, 1991; Gabel, 1998; Shepherd, 1975). One reason that they use the Eastonian model is that it allows them to specify various dimensions of public support. According to Easton (1965), both demands and support serve as inputs to a political system. Support serves as the input to three objects in this system: a) the political community where the members of the system are seen as a group of people bound together (1965, p. 177), b) the regime, which is the set of institutions (values, norms, and structure of authority) which comprises the system (1965,
p. 193), and c) those who occupy the authority roles in the system (1965, p. 212). Support itself is divided into specific and diffuse. Specific support is a consequence of the fulfillment of demands that members make on a political system (1965, p. 268). While this kind of support is most easily measured by looking at approval levels and economic outcomes, it is not necessarily limited to this. Specific support could also be generated due to specific policies on environmental issues, democratic performance, and disarmament. However specific support by itself is insufficient because no political system could withstand long periods where the demands of members were not satisfied (Easton, 1965, p. 269). Hence the need for diffuse support which forms a ‘reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will’ that helps members cope with adverse outcomes (Easton, 1965, p. 273). A large amount of diffuse support is necessary during trying political and economic conditions: members are happy to support a political system which satisfies their wants but are considerably less likely to support a system which does not do so. Diffuse support becomes necessary during such times as it signifies an ‘attachment to a political object for its own sake’ (Easton, 1965, p. 274). As such, it goes beyond economic rationality and is associated with legitimacy towards a particular regime or authority, a ‘dedication to a common interest, or identification with a political community’ (Easton, 1965, p. 343). As Easton makes clear in a later re-assessment of the two kinds of support, specific support is ‘directed towards political authorities and authoritative institutions’ (1975, p. 439). This assumes that the members of the political system can connect outputs to the performance of authorities. Also, it assumes a political culture exists where members can hold authorities accountable for their performance. If these assumptions are met, then specific support will vary with perceived benefits gained from the system (1975, p. 439).

A similar concern with these two types of public support is present in the work of Fritz Scharpf. According to Scharpf, the issues of democracy and legitimacy involves two perspectives: an input-oriented democracy where political decisions are legitimate if ‘they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community,’ and an
output perspective where political choice are legitimate if they ‘effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question’ (1999, p. 6).

This latter perspective is interest-based rather than identity-based and is derived from the ‘capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions because they could not be solved through individual actions, through market exchanges, or through voluntary cooperation in society’ (1999, p. 11). In other words, the output perspective points us towards the view that support for institutions comes from their ability to solve collective problems and thus corresponds nicely with specific support. The input perspective, where political decisions are an expression of the preferences of community members, requires the existence of a “thick” collective identity among its constituents. According to Scharpf, this is necessary in order to prevent the tyranny of the majority; it is when belief in a “thick” collective identity is taken for granted that majority rule loses its threatening character (1999, p. 8). In Estonian terms, the argument that Scharpf is making here is that the presence of diffuse support is necessary in the absence of specific support (even if it is to prevent the tyranny of the majority).

### 2.1.1 Measures of EU Support

Segatti and Westle (2016) take the Eastonian model of support for a political system and apply it to the European context. They divide diffuse support into the three subdimensions of legitimacy, mutuality (belonging together) and identification (belonging to). In their framework, the subdimension of legitimacy captures evaluative attitudes towards the present and future existence of the political community (Segatti and Westle, 2016, p. 23). The measures which capture this subdimension are a) membership: do you think that our country’s membership in the EU is a good thing or a bad thing; b) deepening: do you think that integration had already gone too far or not far enough, and; c) widen-

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1 I should mention here that both these perspectives can, and often do, work simultaneously in a democracy. It is also helpful to think of the input-oriented democracy as a Rousseauian vision of a republic animated by a general will. Output-oriented democracy is much closer to the Madisonian ideal type.
ing: are you in favor or against the widening of the EU. The subdimension of mutuality looks at trust towards others within the community and the definition of outsiders and insiders. The subdimension of identification is divided into a cognitive identification with the community along with the knowledge and salience of the EU in people’s lives. This subdimension also includes an affective component. This is operationalized as a question which asks respondents if they see themselves belonging the the nation-state only, to the nation-state and Europe, to Europe and the nation-state, or to Europe only (Segatti and Westle, 2016, p.24). Another subdimension of diffuse support not discussed by Segatti and Westle (2016) is that of trust in the EU institutions. I add this dimension to capture how much respondents trust the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB). For specific support, Segatti and Westle (2016, p. 24) suggest the use of the variable which asks respondents if their country has, on balance, befitted from being a member of the EU.

2.2 Operationalizing the Measures

The analyses in the dissertation primarily use the Eurobarometer surveys in order to measure public support for the EU. The Eurobarometer surveys are public opinion surveys conducted semi-annually in the EU (and more recently the EU candidate countries) in order to measure public opinion on a wide range of issues. The surveys started in 1973 and continue until the present day and are conducted on behalf of the European Commission. As the EU expanded to include more member countries, these countries were subsequently included in the survey. Hence this survey provides the largest time-series for conducting any analyses on public opinion in Europe. The data from 1973 to 2002 were combined in the Mannheim trend file (Schmitt and Scholz, 2005). For the purposes of this dissertation, I have extended the Mannheim Trend file to include the surveys conducted between 2002 and 2016. That is I have added the individual Eurobarometer files from EB 58 to EB 86 to the Mannheim trend file. In this dissertation I analyze public opinion in the fifteen Western
European countries of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and Austria. The graphs below show how each variable under consideration has changed over time in each of these fifteen countries.

Figure 2.1 shows how the measure of specific support (has your country benefited from being a member of the EU) has changed over time in each of the fifteen countries under consideration. The graph is constructed using weighted Eurobarometer data and shows the percentage of respondents who say their country has benefited from being a member of the EU. An cursory glance at the graph tells us that the levels of support and the trend over times varies considerably by country. This level of specific support for the EU in Ireland is, and has been, very high while it has declined in Greece since the introduction of the Euro. In Italy it has been declining since the early 1990s while Spain and Portugal have experienced some sharp declines in the late 2000s due to the financial crisis. In Sweden and Finland the level has been increasing since the late 1990s while it has stayed constant in Austria.

The next graph shows what Segatti and Westle (2016) considers a measure of diffuse support. Figure 2.2 gives the percentage of respondents who say that their country’s membership in the EU is a good thing. As a measure of diffuse support, it should theoretically be more stable than measures of specific support. However, we see that the trend mirrors figure 2.1 which shows the percentage who say that their country has benefited from the EU. This brings into question if this indeed is a measure of diffuse support. It isn’t as stable as a measure of diffuse support should theoretically be and as is seen in the chart, the countries hardest hit by the financial crisis have seen the largest declines in this measure. Given this, it makes sense to treat this measure as an indicator of specific support.

The next trend I consider is a newer one which started in 2002. It asks respondents about their image of the EU. Responses are recorded on a five point scale going from ‘Very Positive’ to ‘Neutral’ to ‘Very Negative’. Figure 2.3 shows the percentage of respondents
Figure 2.1: Percentage who say that their country has on balance benefited from being a member of the EU.

who have a positive image of the EU. The time-series goes from 2002 to 2016 and shows a declining trends across all countries besides Finland and Sweden. Since the introduction of
the Euro and especially since the global financial crisis, the percentage of those who view the EU positively has been declining. In the United Kingdom, less than 40% of respondents...
Figure 2.3: Percentage who have a positive image of the EU.

have a positive image of the EU.

The next three figures show the levels of trust in EU institutions. Figures 2.5, 2.4
Figure 2.4: Percentage who say that they tend to trust the European Parliament.

and 2.6 show the level of trust in the European Commission, European Parliament and the European Central Bank. The figures show that in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal
trust in EU institutions is at very low levels. Trust has also been declining in Germany and France and to a lesser extent in Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria. In the United Kingdom, trust in EU institutions has always been at quite a low level.

Finally, figure 2.7 shows responses to the question about national versus European identity. The Eurobarometer question asks respondents if they identify with the nation only, the nation and Europe, Europe and then the nation or Europe only. The figure shows the percentage of respondents who have a mixed or European identity. We see that the trends are more stable and don’t change as much with changes in economic conditions such as the recent economic and migrant crises. This is a more stable measure of support and of identification with Europe as opposed to the EU. Hence it makes sense to consider this a measure of diffuse support. In many countries the trend is increasing as more people come to see themselves as European rather than as exclusively national.

These trends present a troubling picture for the EU as an institution. We see that since 2000, trust in key EU institutions has been declining across most countries. As the EU institutions have come to have a larger presence in the daily lives of EU residents, the institutions themselves are losing legitimacy. However, while this is happening, identification with Europe, as opposed to the EU, is rising in most countries. There is certainly a strong cohort effect here as more and more people come of age in a post Cold War Europe where the free movement of goods and people is the norm. This points to the creation of a nascent affective European identity which, as I contend in this dissertation, will be necessary if the project of European integration is to prosper. The UK remains an exception in this trend as around 60% of residents see themselves as exclusively national and there has been virtually no trend towards a growing European identity. This goes a long way in explaining why the Brexit vote succeeded.
Figure 2.5: Percentage who say that they tend to trust the European Commission.
Figure 2.6: Percentage who say that they tend to trust the European Central Bank.
Figure 2.7: Percentage who do not exclusively identify with their country, that is, they identify as “European”.
CHAPTER III

Utilitarian Support for the EU

This chapter looks at the relationship between changes in public support for the EU and changes with economic conditions. A cursory examination of the data in the previous chapter showed that support did indeed decrease in the countries worst affected by the economic crisis in the late 2000s.

3.1 Connecting the dots: The contribution of Neofunctionalism

The work of Ernst B. Haas, the founder of neofunctionalism, links the concepts of specific and diffuse support to the case of European integration. Neofunctionalist theories trace their lineage to the economic integration theories of Bela Balassa (1961) and Jan Tinbergen (1954). Balassa’s model is one of economic determinism: once member states choose the path of economic integration there is, as such, no going back and economic dependence in one area triggers integration in another. In this model, the first phase would involve ‘negative integration’, namely the removal of internal tariffs, the establishment of a common external tariff and the removal of barriers to the free movement of capital and labor. The next phase, that of ‘positive integration’, would lead to the harmonization of social and economic policies, a monetary and fiscal union, and finally, political integration (Buonanno and Nugent, 2011, pp. 15–17). Neofunctionalism shares the economic determinism of Balassa’s integration theory; both predict that integration in one area will
'spill over' into other areas and will eventually lead to political spillover.

Yet, for Haas, the move towards a political union was mediated by more than just economic spillover. Haas defined political integration as ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’ (1958, p. 16). It is the part about ‘shifting loyalties’ which has been interpreted by Thomas Risse (2005, p. 292) to be a statement about collective identity formation. Following this line of reasoning, for Haas public identification with EU institutions is an integral part of the process of political integration. But how will this occur? By what mechanism will the public be “persuaded” to identify with the new institutions? To this, Haas gives us three answers (1958, p. 14). First, the new loyalties may be valued as ends in themselves. Second, they may develop due to pressure of conformity. Finally, and most importantly for integration theorists, new loyalties can come about if groups and individuals cannot realize their goals within a national framework and so must turn to the supranational institutions. Elaborating on this last mechanism, Haas states that political loyalties are a function of an individual’s satisfaction with the institution’s performance of crucial functions. And as international organizations will be performing these crucial functions, a transfer of personal loyalty to these institutions is likely (1964, pp. 49–50).

In this chapter, my focus is not so much on the mechanism by which specific support leads to diffuse support. Rather, I am concerned about the existence of specific support for the European integration project itself. This brings about the question of how we measure the EU’s performance. On one level, the EU has been spectacularly successful—as the founders of the EU intended, it (and its predecessor institutions) have eliminated the possibility of war between member states. The way in which this goal was achieved was through the creation of economic institutions which bound these countries together.

\footnote{Crucially, these shifting loyalties need not mean the end of national loyalties as Haas (1958, p. 14) mentions that multiple loyalties can exist for an individual.}
In large part, the promise of the EU has been an improvement in domestic economic and trade outcomes (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998). Hence, neofunctionalist assumptions can be tested by looking at the relationship between public support for the EU and national economic and trade performance. According to neofunctionalism, better economic performance should translate to greater public support for the EU. This leads to my first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** Public support for the integration project, in the EU as a whole, will vary with domestic economic and trade performance.

Neofunctionalist theory does not account for important national differences. For example, we know that support for integration has traditionally been low in the United Kingdom and much higher in Germany. These differences are treated as exogenous for the purposes of neofunctionalist theory. Instead, the theory predicts that regardless of the base level of support in each country, changes in support should reflect the performance of European institutions. Thus, the prediction is that economic performance can account for some of the variation in public support for integration and that the logic of this relationship remains the same across all countries. This leads me to two related hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 2a:** Domestic economic and trade performance will explain some of the variance in public support in all countries.

**Hypothesis 2b:** The trend that better domestic economic and trade performance will lead to greater support will remain the same in all countries.

### 3.2 The Postfunctionalist Challenge

As we have seen, Haas’ economic determinism was tempered somewhat by his attention to identity. Yet, this aspect of the theory was largely ignored by the neofunctionalist

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2 Whether or not this support translates to a ‘shift in loyalties’ from the nation to the EU is an empirical question which I will not explore in this paper.
and intergovernmentalist debates in the following three decades (Risse, 2005, p. 294). It is only since the 1990s that issues related to a European identity have become the focus of sustained academic debate. It is within this debate that Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2008) have proposed a postfunctionalist theory of European integration. The functionalism in ‘postfunctionalism’ corresponds to the view ‘that regional integration is triggered by a mismatch between efficiency and the existing structure of authority’. The ‘post’ comes from the fact that the outcome of the integration process will be contingent on political conflict which engages communal identities (2008, p. 2). Economic interests alone do not underly preferences over Europe; rather it is identity and economic interests together. Hence, postfunctionalist theory aims to shed the economic determinism of neofunctionalism and tries to explain the structure of political conflict surrounding European integration.

It is significant that this postfunctionalist theory marks the time of the Maastricht Treaty as a break from the past. Using Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1970) concept of ‘permissive consensus’, Hooghe and Marks (2008, p. 5) argue that the years leading up to the Maastricht Treaty were ones characterized by this consensus as most of the public was agnostic towards the integration process; European integration simply did not affect their lives much. On the other hand, the period since the Maastricht Treaty has been described by them as one of ‘constraining dissensus’ as European issues began to engage the mass public. By ‘constraining dissensus’, Hooghe and Marks refer to politicization of the integration process—this issue is no longer one of low salience for the public. It does not necessarily mean the rise of a Eurosceptic public; rather, it simply refers to the notion that European elites will no longer be able to ignore public opinion on this issue as they had done in the past. Increased salience does not automatically lead to the politicization of an issue. For that to occur, the presence of political entrepreneurs who can construct the issue in the political sphere is necessary (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p. 13).

In Hooghe and Marks’ model, the issue of European integration can be constructed in
the domestic politics of a country on an economic or non-economic left/right dimension (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, pp. 14–17). The economic left/right dimension would consist of two broad coalitions, one supporting ‘social market capitalism’ and pushing for market correcting measures at the European level, while the other would have a ‘Europe-wide deregulated market’ as its goal. Yet, this Europe-wide economic left/right debate is different from the national left/right debate in that redistribution from rich to poor would mean large amounts of inter-country fiscal transfers from the richer north to the poorer south and east. This debate also brings up a non-economic left/right dimension which, according to Hooghe and Marks (2008, p. 16) ranges from green/alternative/libertarian (gal) to traditionalism/authority/nationalism (tan) parties. On one side of the spectrum, there is a weaker association between the gal parties and support for European integration because this goes along with market liberalization. Notwithstanding this, Green parties have come around to supporting the idea of a multi-cultural European society (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p. 17). This was exemplified by the German Green party’s support for the expansion of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a bail-out mechanism for the Euro. The same issue also brought out the dilemma facing moderate tan parties such as the ruling German coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) as the main opposition to the expansion of the EFSF came from the CDU’s coalition partners. These parties oppose European integration because it erodes national sovereignty and yet this opposition is tempered by a commitment to liberal economic policies espoused by the EU. However, for the more radical tan parties, also known as populist radical right parties, no such conflicts exist. These parties, such as the Austrian Freedom Party and the French National Front, are anti-system parties (Ignazi, 2003, p. 212) which, while not overtly calling for an end to democracy, do actively espouse an anti-liberal democratic agenda (Mudde, 2007, p. 155). They are extremely nationalistic in their worldview and their discourse is highly anti-immigrant and xenophobic, yet, they have made a clean break from the fascist past and now most of
the new radical right parties actively dissociate themselves from fascism (Ignazi, 2003, p. 195). That they are a product of the postindustrial revolution should not be in question as economics is no longer the primary issue of the party family (Mudde, 2007, p. 136).

Postfunctionalist theory posits that the process of integration will be increasingly mediated by public opinion on this issue. But how does postfunctionalist theory fit into the Eastonian framework I have developed above? According to postfunctionalism, during the phase of ‘negative integration’ (the removal of internal tariffs, the creation of a common external tariff, and the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, labor, and capital) specific support would depend on the benefit community members were able to derive from the EU institutions. After the Maastricht Treaty, the phase of ‘positive integration’ begins and there is a transfer of competencies from the nation to the EU. It is during this phase that diffuse support for the national political community will begin to impinge on the specific support derived from better economic outcomes. Hence, postfunctionalist theory predicts that domestic economic and trade outcomes will explain less of the variance in public support for the EU after the Maastricht Treaty. However, in order to become politically salient, opposition to integration needs the presence of political entrepreneurs. Here, the radical right parties serve this purpose and so we would expect that in countries with strong radical right parties, the utilitarian relationship between the economy and public support will be even more tenuous. This leads me to the next two hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 3a:** The post-Maastricht period (post-1992) shows a decline in the change in public support explained by domestic economic and trade indicators.

**Hypothesis 3b:** In the post-Maastricht period, economic and trade factors explain public support less in countries with strong radical right parties than in countries without these parties.

Now that I have a good set of hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework, I would like to lay out the plan for the rest of the chapter. In the next section I review
some past analyses of utilitarian support for European integration, outlining along way the similarities and differences these analyses share with my own. After that, I take a first look at the data with which I will test out the hypotheses given above. Finally, I go right into the actual analysis itself, accompanied by a discussion of the results.

3.3 On Specific Support: A literature review

My study is hardly the first to analyze the utilitarian basis for EU support. However, in spite of the many similarities that my analysis shares with those reviewed below, there are two differences which stand out. First, all these studies (including mine) use data from the Eurobarometer surveys but given the bi-annual nature of the surveys, I have a much larger dataset to work with. This leads to the second difference: the data allows me to conduct separate regression analyses for each EU member state. Having said that, the studies my own analysis is most indebted to are those conducted by Richard Eichenberg and Russel Dalton (1993; 2007). In their first analysis, they investigate the relationship between economic factors (GDP growth, inflation, unemployment, trade, and EU transfers) and public support for the EU. In addition to economic factors, they also investigate the relationship between various political factors and public support for the EU. Their conclusion is that both of these factors are important in explaining public support—specifically, good economic conditions lead to greater public support for the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). Revisiting their analysis a decade and a half later, Eichenberg and Dalton find that while economic factors continue to influence public support, this influence is much weaker in the post-1992 time period. In their study, the move towards a monetary union triggered a public concern with the transfer of resources between member countries. Hence, they find that even though economic variables continue to matter, they do so at a lower intensity (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007).

Another study of utilitarian support comes from Matthew Gabel (1998). Gabel develops an Eastonian model with which he links utilitarian and affective support. The conclusion
of his study on utilitarian support is that this support varies systematically with the economic benefits individuals obtain from the liberalization of the capital, goods, and labor markets (Gabel, 1998, p. 55). The level of intra-EU trade remains a strong predictor of public support in Gabel’s model. Related to this, Anderson and Reichert (1995) conduct a cross-national analysis of public support for integration and find that support also varies with how much benefit people can derive from unification. Citizens of countries which benefit more from EU trade and budget transfer show higher levels of support, as do citizens who would individually benefit from market liberalization. Similarly, Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) find that favorable domestic economic conditions and length of membership in the union all lead to greater public support. Finally, a more recent study by Isernia et al. (2012) looks at both utilitarian and identity-based determinants of support for integration. Surprisingly, they find that public support is greater in countries where the economy is more developed, during poor economic times, when governance is poor, and when immigration is low (2012, p. 129). They also find that the salience of economic variables in explaining public support has not decreased over time.

As this short review of the existing literature has shown, there is no broad agreement in how economic variables influence public support. It is keeping these studies in mind that I now begin my own analyses.

3.4 The Data

As stated above, my main aim in this paper is to look at the relationship between economic outcomes and public support for the EU. As a measure of utilitarian (specific) support, I take responses to the following question from the Eurobarometer surveys: “Generally speaking, do you think (your country’s) membership in the Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?” Following Eichenberg and Dalton (1993; 2007), I construct the net support of a given country at a given time by subtracting the percentage those who answered ‘a bad thing’ from the percentage of those who answered ‘a good
thing’. One advantage of using this question is that with a couple of exceptions, it has been asked bi-annually from 1973 to 2011. Hence, I get a large time-series with 74 data points for each country where all the data is available. The entire series (from 1973 to 2011) is available for Belgium, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the UK. It is available from 1980 for Greece, from 1985 for Spain and Portugal, from 1993 for Finland and from 1994 for Austria and Sweden.

In order to capture domestic economic and trade performance, I have used the common metrics of GDP, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and the export ratio of a country’s exports to the EU countries to its exports to the world. Quarterly economic data is used (specifically, the second and fourth quarters) in order match the timing of the Eurobarometer surveys.

Looking at the evolution of aggregate net support from 1973 to 2011 as shown in figure 3.1, there are two things which stand out. First, that the increase in net support in the 1980’s was followed by a large drop in the 1990’s. At first glance this lends some support to the postfunctionalist thesis. Secondly, the start of the eurozone crisis in the late 2000’s has seen a large drop in net support. After a quick look at figure 3.2, we see a more nuanced picture emerging. This figure shows net support by ascension group. Looking at this, we can see that the large drop in the 1990’s was caused in large part due to the inclusion of Austria, Finland, and Sweden which have a lower level of base support. However, a downward trend in net support amongst the EU5 countries is also noticeable after 1990. Does this mean that the postfunctionalist thesis is correct? I use regression analyses in order to test this and the other hypotheses in the next section.

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3I have taken the GDP Index with 2010 as the base year. In all the regressions, I use the first-difference of this variable in order to reduce problems associated with stationarity. Source: OECD (N.d.) Main Economic Indicators.

4Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators and Eurostat, European Commission (N.d.).

5Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators.

6Source: IMF (N.d.), Direction of Trade Statistics.
Figure 3.1: Aggregate Net Support for the EU (EU15 countries)

Figure 3.2: Aggregate Net Support for the EU (EU15 countries)
3.5 Analyses & Discussion

For analyzing this data, I have used multivariate regression on unbalanced panel data for analyses which require pooling of countries. The fixed-effects models correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. For the individual country analyses, I have used ordinary least-squares regression.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Panel Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Pre 1993 Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Post 1992 Estimate (S.E.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>1.202 (0.775)</td>
<td>0.5332 (0.538)</td>
<td>0.175 (0.535)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.0093* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.0052 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.0133* (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.0099 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Ratio</td>
<td>0.3775 (0.418)</td>
<td>1.1944* (0.341)</td>
<td>0.7909* (0.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.0704</td>
<td>0.3123</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p \leq 0.05$

A quick look at table 3.1 shows poor support for my first hypothesis. The panel regression using all the data shows that economic factors explain very little variance in public support. Except for the export ratio, none of the factors are significant. Breaking up the data into two sets (pre 1993 and post 1992) paints a slightly different picture. The pre-1993 data shows strong support for the neofunctionalist thesis with economic factors explaining 31% of the variance. However, post 1992 data does not show the same relationship. In fact, this table suggests a preliminary support for the post-functionalist thesis (hypothesis three). However, besides the change in politicization which occurred post 1992 (as post-functionalism posits), the other big change in the data was the addition of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the mid-1990s. Prior to this, there was the addition of Spain and Portugal in the mid-80s. Hence it might be that the addition of these countries is changing the
relationship between economic outcomes and public support. It could be possible that in countries for which we have the full series (from 1973 to 2011), economic variables could still explain public support well. In order to test this, I repeated the above analysis for the eight countries for which I have a complete series (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and, UK). The results of this analysis are presented in table 3.2. The results are quite similar to table one. A balanced panel regression on all the data shows no significant relationship between the economic variables and public support. A strong relationship exists between the two prior to 1993 but disappears after that. All of this lends support to the postfunctionalist thesis.

Table 3.2: EU8 Panel Regressions (includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Panel Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Pre 1993 Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Post 1992 Estimate (S.E.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>1.654 (1.089)</td>
<td>0.4155 (0.598)</td>
<td>0.2787 (0.721)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.0052 (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.0114* (0.005)</td>
<td>0.0176 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.0119 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.0088* (0.003)</td>
<td>0.0063 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Ratio</td>
<td>0.0669 (0.541)</td>
<td>0.9822* (0.434)</td>
<td>0.8041* (0.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AdjustedR²</td>
<td>0.0659</td>
<td>0.2838</td>
<td>0.0685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ 0.05

Moving on to individual country analyses, the results of the regressions are presented in tables 3.3 and 3.4. A quick look at the results shows that the neofunctionalist thesis does not bear fruit. Economic outcomes do not explain public support in all countries; notably the regression is not significant for Austria and Luxembourg. Moreover, the logic of neofunctionalism does not work the same across all countries. In my regression analysis, neofunctionalist theory would predict that higher unemployment, higher inflation, lower
GDP growth, and lower trade would all lead to a decline in support. Importantly, while this logic works in most cases, it is not true of all the countries. For example, for Italy, this logic is reversed as higher inflation and higher unemployment suggest higher public support for the EU. For Denmark, lower GDP growth is associated with higher support for the EU. In the Netherlands, it is unemployment which doesn’t fit the mold. Hence the analyses show little to no support for my first two hypotheses.
### Table 3.3: Individual Country Regressions I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Belgium Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Denmark Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Finland Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>France Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Germany Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Greece Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Ireland Estimate (S.E.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>1.0944</td>
<td>-0.4096</td>
<td>-0.6142</td>
<td>-0.1775</td>
<td>0.6357</td>
<td>0.5421</td>
<td>-0.5476*</td>
<td>0.3968*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(0.884)</td>
<td>(0.556)</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.549)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>-0.8736</td>
<td>-0.2839</td>
<td>-1.6252*</td>
<td>-1.2577*</td>
<td>2.6129</td>
<td>0.2503</td>
<td>3.7627*</td>
<td>2.2267*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(1.591)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>(0.811)</td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td>(2.346)</td>
<td>(1.223)</td>
<td>(1.637)</td>
<td>(0.765)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.0468</td>
<td>0.0091*</td>
<td>-0.0296*</td>
<td>-0.0264*</td>
<td>0.0131</td>
<td>0.0054</td>
<td>-0.0026</td>
<td>-0.0283*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.0674</td>
<td>-0.0051</td>
<td>-0.0115</td>
<td>-0.0086</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>-0.0291*</td>
<td>0.0085</td>
<td>-0.0219*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Ratio</td>
<td>-0.7758</td>
<td>1.2997</td>
<td>1.6304*</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>-0.4197</td>
<td>0.2281</td>
<td>1.4889*</td>
<td>0.7806*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(1.018)</td>
<td>(0.674)</td>
<td>(0.449)</td>
<td>(0.442)</td>
<td>(0.727)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSE</td>
<td>0.0962</td>
<td>0.1024</td>
<td>0.0906</td>
<td>0.0659</td>
<td>0.1298</td>
<td>0.1066</td>
<td>0.1248</td>
<td>0.1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AdjustedR²</td>
<td>0.0348</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.7349</td>
<td>0.1749</td>
<td>0.1705</td>
<td>0.2789</td>
<td>0.4902</td>
<td>0.7129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ 0.05
Table 3.4: Individual Country Regressions II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Luxembourg Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Netherlands Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Portugal Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Spain Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>Sweden Estimate (S.E.)</th>
<th>UK Estimate (S.E.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>-0.9959*</td>
<td>0.8865*</td>
<td>-1.257</td>
<td>0.7115</td>
<td>1.2423*</td>
<td>-2.7955</td>
<td>-0.9675*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.701)</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.298)</td>
<td>(1.654)</td>
<td>(0.294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>1.2248</td>
<td>0.1502</td>
<td>-1.5577</td>
<td>0.9912</td>
<td>0.2543</td>
<td>-3.9645</td>
<td>1.8352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(1.077)</td>
<td>(0.503)</td>
<td>(1.233)</td>
<td>(1.212)</td>
<td>(1.417)</td>
<td>(2.152)</td>
<td>(1.742)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>0.0244*</td>
<td>-0.0043</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>0.0156*</td>
<td>0.0212*</td>
<td>3e-04</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.0536*</td>
<td>-0.0143*</td>
<td>0.0419*</td>
<td>-0.0476*</td>
<td>-0.017*</td>
<td>-0.0294</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Ratio</td>
<td>1.6021*</td>
<td>-0.1237</td>
<td>2.2453*</td>
<td>0.0522</td>
<td>-0.7194</td>
<td>5.3871</td>
<td>1.9637*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S.E.)</td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.862)</td>
<td>(0.615)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(2.776)</td>
<td>(0.512)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSE</td>
<td>0.0961</td>
<td>0.0656</td>
<td>0.0817</td>
<td>0.0873</td>
<td>0.0908</td>
<td>0.1575</td>
<td>0.1467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.6888</td>
<td>0.0426</td>
<td>0.2697</td>
<td>0.7316</td>
<td>0.4122</td>
<td>0.1801</td>
<td>0.2427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p \leq 0.05$
Moving on to my third hypothesis, postfunctionalism would predict that countries with strong radical right parties experience greater politicization of European integration and hence, economic variables should explain public support to a lesser extent. Within the EU15 countries that I analyze, the ones with the strongest radical right parties are as follows: Austria (Austrian Freedom Party), Denmark (Progress Party, People’s Party), Belgium (Vlaams Blok), Netherlands (Freedom Party), Italy (Lega Nord, MSI/AN), Greece (Golden Dawn).\(^7\) So, do we see economic variables explaining less variance in public support in these countries? Unfortunately, the results are quite mixed. While in the case of Austria and Sweden it is clear that economic variables do not explain public support but this is not the case for other countries. However, in Italy, Denmark, and Greece, economic variables explain a large amount of the variation in public support. Hence, the evidence in favor of my third hypothesis is, at best, mixed. So where does that leave us?

3.6 Towards alternative indicators

The Maastricht Treaty not only signaled the start of positive integration in the social sphere, it also setup a monetary union with the eventual creation of the ECB and the adoption of the Euro. In order to achieve this goal, monetary convergence criteria were agreed upon in 1992 which every country had to abide by. These criteria sought to lower the interest rate and inflation differentials across the member states along with reigning in government budget deficits. In the case of inflation, these criteria were quite successful as they managed to bring down the quite vast differentials in inflation across the member states (Lane, 2006). Even though the inflation differentials rose a little after the adoption of the Euro, in general, they remained much smaller than prior to 1992. Indeed, inflation in the Eurozone as a whole was lowered considerably. However, public perception of inflation increased after the adoption of the Euro (Eichengreen, 2010). Hence there exists a clear disconnect between the actual inflation numbers and the its perception by the

\(^7\)The list of parties is partly from Norris (2005).
public. The point of this discussion is two-fold. First, I am making the argument that
the move towards creating a monetary union has altered the relationship which existed
between economic variables and public support prior to the Maastricht Treaty. Hence, it
should come as no surprise that inflation (and, possibly, the other variables) do not explain
public support in the post-Maastricht era. My second claim that the adoption of the Euro
has skewed the publics perception of the economic indicators themselves. If all of this is
ture, not all the economic variables which predicted public support prior to 1992 would
work the same way.

The last four decades have also seen declining, or at best stagnant, real incomes in most
developed countries. According to recent work by Inglehart and Norris (2017, p. 448), this,
combined with rising income and wealth inequality, has led to rising levels of existential
insecurity and hence the rising popularity of radical right parties in Europe and the US.
The EU, with its neoliberal economic agenda and its commitment to the free movement
of capital, goods and people, makes an easy target for the radical right in Europe. The
EU can be (and is) readily blamed by these parties for depressing wages that labor can
command. Hence, any future research into whether economics drives support for the EU
must necessarily take into account factors such as the level of inequality (Gini coefficient)
and the perceived economic threat posed by immigrants. European integration, as Judt
(1996, p. 23) mentions, was “made necessary by circumstance and rendered possible by
prosperity.” It now has to survive in an era of austerity.

The next chapter only indirectly looks at the role of economics in driving support for
the EU or, more specifically, Europe. I look at how revised modernization theory, with its
focus on cognitive mobilization and postmaterialist values, drives support for Europe as
a supra-national entity.
CHAPTER IV

Cognitive Mobilization and Postmaterialism

This chapter looks at European integration in the context of modernization theory and changing values in the Western Europe. Modernization theory, in general, looks at the changes in society wrought by a move from an agricultural to industrial society (and beyond) and its impact on the political order (Deutsch, 1961; Lerner and Pevsner, 1958; Lipset, 1960; Inglehart, 1997). The process of modernization has been defined by Karl Deutsch as one where “advanced, non-traditional practices in culture, technology and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale” (Deutsch, 1961, p. 493). As such, the process is closely linked with industrial development and the changes that come along with it. These changes include “urbanization, mass education, occupational specialization, bureaucratization, and communications development” and lead to cultural, social, and political transformations (Inglehart, 1997, p. 8). For Deutsch, all these changes lead to social mobilization, which is a part of modernization. Deutsch defined social mobilization as the process by which “old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior” (Deutsch, 1961, p. 494). The social and political implications of this process of social mobilization include: a) an expansion of the politically relevant strata of the population, b) the transformation of social and political practices and institutions, c) the provision of government services in education, health care, law & order, d) a shift in political leadership,
and e) a focus on and consolidation of the nation state (Deutsch, 1961).

In the decades following the 1950’s and 60’s, modernization theory came to be increasingly criticized for being linear, deterministic, and ethnocentric. The early versions of modernization theory assumed that social and cultural change, along with economic development, moves in one direction until the end of history, namely the achievement of a liberal democratic world order. This was problematic because it became increasingly clear that all newly industrialized societies with increasing educational levels and per capita GDP did not tend towards higher levels of democracy. Many modernization theorists also emphasized that a society’s economic system determines its politics and culture or vice versa. However, neither economics, nor culture complete accounts for political outcomes and political scientists looked at including institutions as mediating the effects of economics and culture. Finally, modernization theorists drew upon the experiences of Western societies and assumed that all societies would follow this path, thus equating modernization with Westernization. These shortcomings were addressed by Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators with a revised version of modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). This revised version is based on the theory of intergenerational value change which, in turn, is based on two key hypotheses. The first is the scarcity hypothesis which states that socioeconomic conditions effect an individual’s priorities in that we put the greatest value on that which is in short supply. The second, namely the socialization hypothesis, says that an individual’s value priorities, to a large extent, reflect the socioeconomic conditions prevalent during their preadult years (Inglehart, 1997, p. 33). According to this theory, value change in society depends on a couple of factors: socioeconomic development and the transition from one generation to another. The theory also emphasizes that this value change is not linear. As an industrial society transitions to a postindustrial, services-oriented society, value orientations of individuals in these societies also change in a non-linear fashion. According to the re-

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1This is based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943).
vised modernization theory, the origins of these postmodern values lies in the fact that economic development had allowed individuals (at least in industrial societies) the luxury of existential security; people were growing up with the awareness that their survival could be taken for granted (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 30–3). This new value orientation has been called postmaterialist, and it signifies a shift away from materialist goals like economic and physical security with an emphasis on the nation-state towards goals such as self-expression and a declining emphasis on authority (Inglehart, 1997, pp. 35–9).

Hence we see that the revised version of modernization theory is a story of value change in society caused by changing socioeconomic conditions. The changes in the values held by individuals lead to profound changes in social and political institutions. For example, the move towards postmaterialist and self-expression values has been associated with democratization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and a reorientations of views towards gender and sexuality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). In this chapter I will look at if and how this change in values has affected the process of identification with a supra-national body, namely the European Union. The next section looks at our theoretical understandings of how value change might impact the European integration process. Based on these theories, I propose some hypotheses and proceed to test them using data from the Eurobarometer and World Values Survey.

4.1 In the context of European Integration

In the period after World War II, the six western European countries which initially came to form European Coal and Steel Community experienced high levels of economic growth and prosperity. During this period, the population of these countries enjoyed unprecedented levels of existential security while at the same time the “ever-closer union” of the six Western European countries proceeded apace. It was in this context that modernization theory, based on the theory of intergenerational value change, was applied to the societies of the European Community. The theorizing took two distinct but complemen-
tary paths. The first was a continuation of Deutsch’s theory of ‘social mobilization’ and looked at citizen’s shifting loyalties to a supra-national body. This was called cognitive mobilization. The second path looked at the change in the value orientation of individual’s in these societies (from material to postmaterial values) and its impact on public support for the European integration project. Both these strands were explored by Ronald Inglehart in the 1970’s and I take a closer look at each in the sections below (Inglehart, 1970, 1971).

4.1.1 Cognitive Mobilization

As Deutsch (1961) surmised, the process of social mobilization expanded the politically relevant strata of society. As more and more people were brought into the political process, power was consolidated in the nation-state. However, in the early stages of European integration, some decision making power went from the nation-state to a supra-national entity. This shift in power also went along with higher levels of education and greater media use. Hence, Inglehart defined the process of cognitive mobilization as a continuation of social mobilization which leads to the ‘increasingly wide distribution of political skills necessary to cope with an extensive political community’ (Inglehart, 1970, p. 47). The increasing cognitive capabilities of the Western European publics does not automatically lead to growing support for integration project. These skills are a necessary but not sufficient condition for identification with the European Union. The relationship between the two is mediated by messages from the mass media. Hence it was hypothesized that predominantly positive media messages about European integrations would lead to a generally favorable opinion towards integration in those individuals with higher levels of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970, p. 48). As we have seen in the previous chapter, the subject European integration was not very politicized during much of its history. It was an elite project without much mass involvement. Hence, for a long while in the study of European integration, it was safe to assume that the mass media portrayed integration
in a positive light but with the recent financial and refugee crises this assumption is no longer valid (Statham and Trenz, 2015). In fact, a recent study of the media discourse about the EU in the United Kingdom shows a strong anti-European bias (Shaw, 2016). However, without adequate time-series data on the nature of media coverage in the EU15 countries, it is not possible to test the exact role of media coverage in shaping opinion about the integration project. A further impediment to gauging the use of media is the changing nature of mass media itself, with the advent of the internet and the numerous ways in which people get their news.

While the effect of the media on individuals is hard to measure, there have been a number of proposed measures of cognitive mobilization itself. The first measure is formal education, with higher levels of education leading to higher levels of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970, p. 47). This indicator comes from the definition of the process itself and has been used by a number of researchers over the years (Duchesne and Frognier, 1995; Wessels, 1995; Luhmann, 2017). Another indicator of cognitive mobilization is the knowledge of EU institutions where those with greater awareness of EU institutions having said to have more cognitive skills. This indicator was used by Inglehart (1970, p. 54) and the results of that analysis show it to be a much more powerful predictor of pro-European attitudes than education. However, the changed wording of questions related to the knowledge of EU institutions in the Eurobarometer make it unsuitable for time-series analysis (Nissen, 2014, p. 721). Another measure of cognitive mobilization used by researchers focuses on how frequently individuals discuss politics and how often they try and persuade others of their own political opinions. Duchesne and Frognier (1995, p. 214) combines both these variables into an ‘opinion leadership index’ and finds that higher levels of this index indicate greater support for integration. Luhmann (2017) similarly operationalized cognitive mobilization, keeping separate variables for frequency of political discussion and persuading others. Following these researchers, I operationalize cognitive mobilization using the level of education, frequency of political discussion, and
persuading others of one’s own political views. This leads to the following hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1:** Higher levels of education are associated with greater identification with Europe. This relationship holds across the EU15 countries and over time.

**Hypothesis 2:** Controlling for the level of education, individuals who discuss politics and persuade others of their political views more frequently have greater identification with Europe. This relationship holds across the EU15 countries and over time.

### 4.1.2 The shift towards Postmaterialist Values

As mentioned above, the shift towards postmaterialist values is based on the theory of intergenerational value change. But, what exactly comprises postmaterialist values and what does this shift signify for European integration? In survey data, the postmaterialist value orientation is most commonly measured by asking respondents of their value priorities. The respondents are asked to list their top two value priorities from a choice of a) maintaining order in the nation, b) fighting rising prices, c) giving people more say in political decisions, and d) protecting freedom of speech (Inglehart, 1971, p. 5). The first two choices signify a materialist value orientation (the focus is on material security) while the last two signify a postmaterialist orientation. Respondents who choose one from the first two and one from the last two are classified as having a ‘mixed’ orientation. It has been posited that postmaterialists are expected to have a more cosmopolitan outlook than materialists. This is because they are less focused on immediate needs and because the nation-state has traditionally derived most of its legitimacy from providing security (Inglehart, 1977, p. 151). If a process of intergenerational value change is indeed taking place, we would expect the younger, postmaterialist cohorts to gradually increase support for

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2 This reasoning is open to the objection that European integration itself started due to the very material concerns of preventing war in Europe and securing trade between the participating countries. However, as European integration has proceeded, the EU has aligned itself with ideas such as human rights, equality and democracy, such that many observers explicitly link the EU with cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2005).
the EU. However, it is not clear that this is taking place. An analysis of combined Eurobarometer and World Values Survey data by Inglehart has shown that the birth cohorts born in 1976–85 and 1966–75 are not more postmaterialist that the previous cohort born in 1956–65. Prior to this, the theory held and previous birth cohorts were significantly less postmaterialist (Inglehart, 2008, p. 136). This has been attributed to slower levels of economic growth and rising income inequality.

Over the last four decades, this theory of intergenerational values change has been extensively debated. Shively (1991) contends that it is not possible to distinguish between generational, life-cycle (value change over an individual’s life), and period effects (changes due to short term socioeconomic conditions). A critique by Clarke and Dutt (1991) has argued that measure materialist / postmaterialist values does not take unemployment into account. The reasoning is that an individual concerned about unemployment would be likely to choose that its important to have more say in political decisions. Duch and Taylor (1993), Davis (1996) and Warwick (1998) argue that rather than socialization, it is education that most affects levels of postmaterialism. Similarly, Janssen (1991) argues that it is the indicators of cognitive mobilization, rather than levels of postmaterialism, which explain support for European integration. Sacchi (1998) raises concerns about the dimensionality of the postmaterialism value construct, arguing that the items tap into multiple value dimensions. Davis and Davenport (1999) criticize the construction of the index, arguing that if we know the respondent’s first goal, we cannot predict the second and hence the responses are random. These critiques, along with others, have been addressed by Inglehart and his collaborators over the years. These exchanges have been well summarized by Abramson (2011) and are too numerous to detail here.

Based on this discussion of postmaterialist values, I expect those classified as postmaterialists identify with a supranational body such as the EU more than materialists or those with a ‘mixed’ value orientation. This is because they would likely have a more cosmopolitan orientation. I also expect that this relationship holds over time.
Hypothesis 3: Postmaterialists identify with a supranational body with more probability than materialists so. This relationship holds over time.

4.2 Measures and Method

To test the hypotheses regarding cognitive mobilization, I use data from the Eurobarometer surveys from 1992 to 2016. The data was collected from the Mannheim Trend file (Schmitt and Scholz, 2005) and individual Eurobarometer files from EB 58 to EB 86 and analyzed for the countries which comprise the EU-15. The choice of the time period under consideration (1992–2006) is dictated by the availability of the dependent variable used in the analysis. This is the 'Moreno’ question which asks respondents if they, in the near future, see themselves as a) <nationality> only, b) <nationality> and European, c) European and <nationality>, or d) European only. The question was originally developed by Luis Moreno in the context of national and sub-national attachments in Scotland and Catalonia (Moreno, 2006). It has been described as a measure of “affective identification of self with the political community” by Segatti and Westle (2016, p. 23). Importantly, this is a measure of identification with Europe as opposed to a measure of specific support for the EU. The question itself allows for dual identification with country and Europe and is also a measure of the intensity of that identification (Segatti and Westle, 2016, p. 26). It has been criticized for forcing the respondent to choose one identity over another as it competitively activates both (Caporaso and Kim, 2009, p. 23). However, the advantages of using this measure, namely allowing dual-identification and its availability as a long time-series for all fifteen countries, far outweigh the disadvantages. The question has been asked in at least one Eurobarometer survey every year from 1992 to 2016, except in 1996, 2006, 2008 and 2009. Hence, we have data for twenty years within this time period.

The independent variables used in this analysis are the indicators for cognitive mo-

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These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
bilitation. The education variable in the Eurobarometer surveys asks the respondent’s age when they completed their full-time education. I have recoded this variable into the following categories: a) Incomplete Secondary, b) Completed Secondary, c) Incomplete College / Vocational, and d) Completed College. For the measure of frequency of political discussion, the Eurobarometer survey asks respondents to choose between ‘frequently’, ‘occasionally’ or ‘never’. The measure of persuasion asks respondents how often they persuade others if they have a strong opinion. Respondents choose between ‘often’, ‘from time to time’, ‘rarely’, or ‘never’. Both of these questions have a long history in the Eurobarometer surveys and have been asked in most years between 1975 and 2016. However, they were not always asked in the same survey as our dependent variable. Hence, the inclusion of these two variables shortens the time series to between 1992 and 2012, minus 1994, 1996 and 2006–09, for a total of sixteen years.

In order to test the postmaterialism hypothesis, I use combined data from the World Values Survey and European Values Survey. The Eurobarometer surveys are unsuitable for use here because the value priorities questions have only been asked as a continuous time series until 1994. While they have been asked in four years since (1997, 1999, 2005 and 2008), there is not enough recent time series data and it doesn’t include all the EU-15 countries I analyze. The WVS/EVS data presents the most complete time series and was conducted in six waves spanning the time period 1981–2014. Figure 4.1 shows a preliminary cohort analysis of the weighted WVS/EVS data. We see the percentage of postmaterialists minus the percentage of materialists separated by their birth cohort. The graph largely corroborates the results of the analysis in Inglehart (2008) by showing that levels of postmaterialism have largely stagnated in cohorts who were socialized in the 1970’s and beyond.

For the dependent variable in this analysis, the combined WVS/EVS has a question in which respondents were asked which geographical group the belonged to first. Respondents had to choose between locality, region, country, Europe, and the world. This is the
same variable used in the analysis of regional belonging in Inglehart (1977). The variable has been asked in all waves of the WVS/EVS, except the last wave, hence my analysis includes the first five waves of the combined WVS/EVS, covering the years between 1980 and 2010.

4.3 Analysis

The hypotheses are tested using mixed effects logistic regression. The use of logistic regression allows us to keep the dependent variable as having its original levels. Mixed effects regression is used as the individual responses are clustered by country and by year. Using a cross-classified model, we can allow the intercept to vary by country and year in the model, hence making it suitable for the time-series cross-sectional data we have here (Gelman and Hill, 2006). The estimated model is given in equation 4.1. In this equation, \( i \) indexes all observations and \( j \) indexes the response categories. The country and year
effects are taken to be random and assumed to be normally distributed. The model was fit using the R statistical computing environment and using the lme4 package for mixed model analysis (Bates et al., 2015). The results of the analysis are given in table 4.1. The first model is a regression of the identity variables against level of education. The second model adds the variables for frequency of political discussion and persuading others.

\[
\text{logit}(P(Y_i \leq j)) = \theta_j - \beta_1(\text{education}_i) - \beta_2(\text{discuss}_i) - \beta_3(\text{persuade}_i) - u(\text{country}_i) - v(\text{year}_i)
\]

\[i = 1, \ldots, n\]
\[j = 1, 2, 3\]
\[u(\text{country}_i) \sim N(0, \sigma_u^2)\]
\[v(\text{year}_i) \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)\]

The results in table 4.1 largely support hypotheses one and two as all the coefficients are positive and significant. We see that those with higher levels of education are more likely to identify as European. The effect stays positive and significant even with the introduction of the other measure of cognitive mobilization. From the second model, we see that those who discuss politics frequently are more likely identify as European than those who never discuss politics. Similarly, those who persuade others of their political views often tend identify as European more than those who never persuade others. However, the effect size of this variable peaks at those who persuade others from time to time. In other words, the probability of identifying as European is highest for those who persuade others from time to time, all other variable being equal. The effect size, along with 95% confidence intervals is shown figure 4.2. The effect size for a particular variable is calculated by keeping the other two variables at their mean. On all the graphs, the y-axis is the effect size on the dependent variable. As we can see, in the case of education, the effect size increases almost linearly as the level of education rises. It is also the case that edu-
cation has a larger effect than the other two variables in the model. This analysis largely confirms that the cognitive mobilization hypothesis is still valid.

While the mixed model analysis tells us of the effect of cognitive mobilization on identification with Europe, it doesn’t clearly tell us if and how this has changed over time. In

Table 4.1: Mixed effects logistic regression with Eurobarometer data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feel National / European</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete Secondary (Ref)</td>
<td>0.475***</td>
<td>0.380***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Secondary School</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College / Vocational</td>
<td>0.849***</td>
<td>0.750***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed College</td>
<td>1.335***</td>
<td>1.122***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Discussion</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never (Ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>0.471***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>0.658***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persuade Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Never (Ref)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>0.246***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>0.390***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often</td>
<td>0.362***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.231***</td>
<td>−0.809***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Std Dev of Random Effects</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0.44704</td>
<td>0.48296</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.13133</td>
<td>0.10971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N / Country / Year</td>
<td>466,143 / 15 / 21</td>
<td>269,534 / 15 / 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−297,267,500</td>
<td>−170,474,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>594,547.100</td>
<td>340,971.300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
order to get a good sense of change over time I ran the regression model specified above for each year. There were twenty-one regressions for the first model and fourteen for the second. The results are given in figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. In figure 4.3 we see the results of a yearly regression on the identity variable on educational level from 1992 to 2016. The probability of choosing a national or European identity given the level of education hasn't changed much over this time period. We can see that almost 60% of respondents who haven't completed school choose an exclusively national identification, while only 25% of respondents who have completed college choose that. The probability of exclusive identification with Europe is quite low at less than ten percent for the entire time series and has been decreasing. However, given its low levels throughout, the change is not very much. For all the identifications which involve Europe (mixed national or European and exclusively European), we see that educational levels follow a predictable pattern where a respondent who has completed college has the highest probability while a respondent who hasn't complete secondary school has the lowest probability. Hence, we can conclusively
say that the probability of choosing a mixed or exclusively European identification increases the level of education.

![Figure 4.3: Time series probability of identification by educational level](image)

**Figure 4.3:** Time series probability of identification by educational level

Figures 4.4 and 4.5 shows the results of a yearly regression of model 2. The independent variables are the level of education, frequency of political discussion and persuading others and the regression was conducted for fourteen years between 1992 and 2012. From figure 4.4 we see that those who discuss politics often tend to have a higher probability of identifying as exclusively European and mixed European and national (and vice versa). Again, the probability of exclusively identifying with Europe is very low and doesn’t increase over time and in fact, there is a slight decrease. The probability trends do support the cognitive mobilization hypothesis, with those who are more engaged with politics tending to have a more identification with Europe.

Finally, in figure 4.5 we see that support for the cognitive mobilization hypothesis is
less clear. Those who more frequently persuade others of politics do not always have a greater identification with Europe. However, there is a clear difference between those who never persuade others and those who persuade others often, from time to time, or rarely. Hence, it might make more sense to analyze this variable as binary, given the nature of the predicted probability. We see that those who never persuade others are more likely to identify as exclusively national. Those who persuade others (frequently or not) are more likely to identify as mixed national / European than those who never persuade others. Both these relationships hold for the time period under consideration. For the other two identity categories (mixed European / national and exclusively European) we see that the probability of choosing either is very low and that there is not much difference in the levels of persuading others.

Turning now to the analysis on value orientation, I use combined WVS/EVS data to
Figure 4.5: Time series probability of identification by frequency of persuading others
test if higher levels of postmaterialism are associated with a more cosmopolitan identifi-
cation. The dependent variable in this analysis asks respondents which geographical
ty they identify with first. The choices are locality, region, country, Europe, and the
world. The results of the regression analysis are shown in table 4.2. We see that the value
orientation coefficients positive and significant, thus indicating identification with larger,
more extensive, geographical entities is associated with postmaterialist values.

According to the time series in figure 4.6, we see that overall, identification with Eu-
rope or the world is quite low, even among postmaterialists. However, of those who iden-
tify as such, they are more likely to be postmaterialists. Interestingly, we also see that
the probability of identification with country is 35 to 40% for postmaterialists and 25 to
30% for materialists. The reverse is true for identification with locality. And so, this leads
to the result that while postmaterialists, in general, identify with a more extensive politi-
Table 4.2: Mixed effects logistic regression to test the postmaterialism hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Orientation</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Regional Identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materialist (Ref)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>0.261***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmaterialist</td>
<td>0.590***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Std Dev of Random Effects</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>0.2976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wave</td>
<td>0.1212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N / Country / Wave       | 75,428 / 15 / 4 |
| Log Likelihood          | −50,580.850     |
| Akaike Inf. Crit.       | 101,171.700     |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

...cal community, this political community is not necessarily supra-national. While around 20% of postmaterialists identify with either Europe or the world, 40% of postmaterialists identify with their country. Hence we can say that while it not true that the majority of postmaterialists primarily identify with a supra-national entity, those who do are likely to be postmaterialists.
Discussion

The results of the analysis in the previous section clearly show that identification with Europe increases with levels of cognitive mobilization, thus showing support for previous studies by Inglehart (1970), Duchesne and Frognier (1995) and Luhmann (2017). It is interesting to look at this in the context of rising educational levels. When the Eurobarometer surveys started, six to seven percent of all respondents had completed college. This rose to thirteen percent by 1992 and almost thirty percent by 2016. Given this trend in rising educational levels we can expect overall identification with Europe to go up. However, what we are seeing is that there is less exclusive identification with the nation. As educational levels rise and Europe come to play a larger role in peoples’ consciousness, we see rising levels of simultaneous identification with Europe and the nation. And we also see that those who discuss politics frequently tend to identify less exclusively with the
nation.

When we look at exclusive identification with Europe, the picture is a little troubling. Absolute levels of respondents who identify exclusively with Europe has stayed much the same in the last twenty-five years. And this is true even with rising levels of education. Of course, one can make the argument that I am asking Europe to do in fifty years what the nation-state accomplished in a few hundred. This is undoubtedly true, as is the fact that exclusive identification with the nation-state is decreasing. However, Europe has not yet captured the public imagination in the way that the nation state has; it has not yet led to an affective European identity. My sixth chapter looks at whether it could do so, especially by the construction of an ‘other’. Before that I turn to a discussion of how nationalism can play an instrumental role in generating support. The next chapter discusses how, and if, minority nationalism can lead to support for the EU.
CHAPTER V

Minority Nationalism

The founders of the project of European integration have long predicted that national identity would diminish over time. For the founders of the ECSC one of the primary goals was to reorient identification away from the nation, thus leading to a more peaceful Europe. For Jean Monnet, “Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of centuries of feud and war” in order to establish peace and so “one had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national interest as an end in itself” (Monnet, 1963, p. 205). Integration theorists have long maintained that as functional integration proceeds apace, the citizens of the European countries would shift their loyalties to European institutions (Haas, 1958). They also hypothesized that as loyalties shifted towards Europe, this would weaken national and sub-national identities. Some observers went on to associate a nascent European identity as being postnational and cosmopolitan, one which would take us away from the trappings of the nation-state (Delanty, 2005; Delanty and Rumford, 2005).

However, as is clear from the various measures of European identity studied in the previous chapters, identification with Europe (and especially with the EU) is much lower than identification with the nation. And more recently, the deepening and widening of EU integration, Brexit notwithstanding, has been accompanied by a resurgence of right-wing nationalist parties. The recent financial and immigrant crises have had the unintended consequence of highlighting the democratic deficit of the EU. In many European countries,
and especially Greece and Portugal, “electoral democracy, a crucial institutional embodiment of national consciousness, is [thought to be] under threat from the EU” (Hosking, 2016, p. 219). This has lead to increasing support for radical right parties which have a strong anti-immigrant and anti-EU agenda (Eger and Valdez, 2015). In this chapter, it is not these radical right parties which are under investigation. Rather I consider how, and if, integration affects regionalist parties. It has long been hypothesized that regionalist parties would be pro-EU because the EU makes smaller, more homogeneous state more viable. Hence, the EU could well provide a viable means for a region to secede. In this chapter, I consider the stance of regionalist parties towards the EU and the attitudes of people living in these regions towards the EU.

Here, regional integration refers to the process of “political and economic integration by European states, formalized in the European Union” (Jolly, 2015, p. 2). Regional integration is most advanced in the EU, but has parallels in integration projects such as the African Union, ASEAN in Asia and Mercosur in South America. Regionalism, on the other hand, refers to minority nationalism in established states (Jolly, 2015, p. 2). Regionalist parties typically aim for greater autonomy and ethnic or linguistic rights within the state, while sometimes seeking independence as their end goal. For regionalist parties, competition is framed around the center-periphery cleavage, one of the four cleavages which, for Lipset and Rokkan (1967, p. 123), structure party competition in Western Europe. The cleavage was formed due to nation building in some states given that regional populations were either linguistically, ethnically or religiously different from the central elites (Jolly, 2015, p. 15). In this chapter I consider regionalist movements in Spain, Belgium and the United Kingdom. I chose these three Western European countries due to the prominence of their historical and/or active secessionist movements (Coppieters, 2010, p. 237).
5.1 The Viability of States

In the last few decades, a number of economists have turned their attention to optimal state size. According to this literature, the optimal size of a state depends on a trade-off between efficiency and heterogeneity (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2000). Larger states have many economic advantages over smaller ones, namely a) the cost of nonrival public goods decreases as the costs are spread over a larger population, b) an increase in the size of the market where the costs of international trade are absent and c) the cost of uninsurable shocks is greater for smaller states (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, p. 1029). These advantages are tempered by the fact that larger countries usually have a more diverse population and the state needs to provide public goods to satisfy diverse preferences (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, p. 1029). Using a formal model, Alesina and Spolaore make a two-fold argument: on the one hand democracy leads to secession and an inefficiently large number of states while on the other hand economic integration increases the equilibrium number of countries (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, p. 1028). For European integration, this implies that deepening economic integration should make smaller states more viable (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2000; Wittman, 2000).

This argument is carried forward by Jolly (2015) who contends that European integration diminishes the advantages of larger states and so makes smaller homogeneous states more appealing to regional elites and citizens. His argument is that the EU provides many public goods, in the form of monetary, regulatory, environmental and trade policy. The EU also provides a disaster relief fund to help with uninsurable shocks. Financial crises and other asymmetrical shocks can be somewhat mitigated by the EU with the provision of structural funds. The single market removes trade barriers and gives all member countries equal access to a large single market. The European Defense Agency, along with NATO, removes the fears of a foreign invasion, thus allowing countries to reduce defense expenditure. Finally, independence from larger EU nation-states would allow smaller states to
have greater cultural autonomy and thus protect the regions language and culture. It is for all these reasons that Jolly (2015, pp. 41–47) hypothesizes that both regional elites as well as citizens would favor the EU and would like deeper integration.

However, this argument seems a little too simplistic to me. While viability theory does correctly predict that the equilibrium number of states would be larger given deeper regional integration, there are certain costs of integration to a smaller state which are overlooked here. For example, the elites and citizens of Catalonia would appreciate the fact that the EU provides a bargaining chip in their demands for greater autonomy from Spain, the EU also allows free movement of people which leads to greater migration within Europe. Hence, any perceived gains from regional integration have to be tempered with the fact that the EU can lead to increased heterogeneity within the region with greater amounts of migration from Eastern Europe as well as the settlement of refugees from outside Europe. This threatens the very purpose of regional parties, namely the protection of their language and culture. Another point which bears discussion is that the EU could very well be seen as the replacement of the nation-state by regionalist parties. Given that power has been transferred from the nation-state to the EU, independence from the nation-state might not amount to much in the long run. Finally, if it is control of national governments which is needed in order to influence policy-making at the EU, regionalist parties would find it more profitable to fight for control at the national level rather than looking to break away. It is for these reasons I argue that attitudes of regionalist parties as well as citizens in those regions would not necessarily be positive towards the EU. This chapter, like this dissertation, is focused on public attitudes towards the EU but in the next section I briefly speak about regionalist party positions.

5.2 Regionalist Party Attitudes towards Europe

Much of the academic discussion on regionalist parties has focused on the concept of ‘Europe of the Regions’. This was the slogan adopted by regionalist parties with the hope
that the EU would give legal and institutional recognition to minority nations within the existing European nation-states (Elias, 2008b, p. 484). This went along with academic work which showed the growing empowerment of the sub-state level where decision-making power and implementation of policies gradually shifted away from the nation-state and was diffused to multiple levels (Marks, 1993; Hooghe and Marks, 2001). As political power moved away from the nation-state and went above (to the EU) and below (to sub-state actors), it was thought that this would lead to the empowerment of regionalist parties and progress would be made towards a ‘Europe of the Regions’. However, it soon became clear that decision-making power was moving to the supranational level and sub-state actors were benefiting little from this redistribution of power (Elias, 2008b, p. 486). While in the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty a Committee of the Regions was setup in 1994, it led to a certain demobilization and the regional dimension was largely ignored in Amsterdam and Nice (Loughlin, 2005, p. 162). And while the principle of subsidiarity—which in theory would define competencies for the regions—was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, there is little evidence that it took decision making power away from EU institutions (Weatherill, 2005, pp. 136–7).

Even though the EU institutional framework has not included regions in a meaningful way, the EU itself has grown in importance for regional parties. This is because decentralization has proceeded apace in many European countries and this has given regional governments the responsibility of implementing and enforcing EU legislation (Elias, 2008b, p. 487). Moreover, European integration has provided a platform for regionalist parties in many different member states to come together and collectively bargain for greater competencies. This may be through the Committee of the Regions or a coalition in the European Parliament such as the European Free Alliance (De Winter and Cachafeiro, 2002, p. 485). In addition to this, many regional actors have increased their presence in Brussels with the hope of influencing policy (Elias, 2008b, p. 487). And finally, Europe provides an important symbolic space where regional parties can push for self-determination (Hep-
Notwithstanding the growing importance of the EU for regional actors, there is a certain frustration creeping in with the lack of transfer of competencies to regions. Hepburn (2008) conducts an analysis of the positions of regionalist parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia towards Europe from the 1970’s to the 2000’s and finds that party positions exhibit a cyclical nature, shifting from pro-integration stances to stances opposed to the EU and then back again. There have also been a variety of responses to European integration, from demands of greater recognition to protests against any threats to their competencies (Hepburn, 2008, p. 549). While there was growing convergence in the 1990’s as regionalist parties came together around the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, the lack of any meaningful progress in the transfer of competencies to regional actors has left many parties disillusioned (Hepburn, 2008; Elias, 2008a).

![Figure 5.1: EU Position by Party Family](image)

**Figure 5.1: EU Position by Party Family**
This change in regionalist party position towards the EU is seen in 5.1. Here we see the change in party position by party family in Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The data comes from the Chappel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) which surveys experts on party positions on (amongst other issues) European integration in a number of different European countries (Polk et al., 2017; Bakker et al., 2015). The first waves of the survey was conducted in 1999 with subsequent waves in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. This dataset was combined with a previous set of expert surveys conducted by Leonard Ray in 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Ray, 1999). The graph shows that over time, regionalist parties have consistently positive views on the EU. Amongst the regionalist parties there exist some ideologically extreme ones such as the Vlaams Blok or Vlaams Belang in Belgium. These are right-wing parties which are anti-EU but since they are also regionalist parties, they are classified as such. And as figure 5.1 averages the EU position by party families, the trend for regionalist parties would have been higher had these parties not been considered. Figure 5.1 also confirms the analysis on regionalist party position in Jolly (2015, p. 96–8). We see that regionalist party attitudes towards the EU decline in the mid-1990’s until the mid-2000s and then increase. This is in line with the reasoning that regionalist parties became disenchanted with the lack of progress towards a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in the mid-1990s. Figure 5.2 breaks down the data by country. We see that except for the UK, the regionalist party position on the EU is quite similar to the aggregate of other parties. In the UK, we see that regionalist parties view the EU quite a bit more favorably than other parties do.

In this section we have seen the positions of regionalist parties towards the EU. While it can be argued that regionalist parties are, in general, more positive towards the EU than other party families, they are still not the most Europhilic except in the case of the UK. This tells us that the concept of ‘Europe of the Regions’ has not played out as hoped by regionalist parties and this has led to changing levels of support for the EU. Also, as regionalist parties have come to realize that the way of influencing policy at the EU level
is through control of national politics, their focus has, in some cases, shifted towards the
The next section looks at public opinion towards the EU by region in order to understand
the stance of those who these parties are appealing to. Further, this is in order to check if
support for the EU comes from the regions which are looking for further autonomy from
the nation-state.

5.3 Public Attitude from the Periphery

The attitudes of regionalist political parties towards European integration is much
easier to measure than public attitude. This is because there has been no satisfactory an-
swer for how to operationalize regionalist attachment amongst the public. In this section
I look at two approaches to this problem, the solutions they have proposed, and discuss
their analyses. Then, I outline my own, admittedly more modest approach towards un-
derstanding differences in public opinion between the center and periphery and present
In his work on regionalist mobilization in Western Europe, Jolly (2015, p. 123) frames the issue as such: why is it that as the European integration deepens, the UK seems more likely to fragment? Framed in such a way, the question makes an assumption that there is a causal relationship between further integration and the UK’s fragmentation. Necessarily, this is an assumption which will need to be proven, and Jolly sets out to do just that in his chapter on regionalism and public support for the EU. His analysis proceeds in two complementary tracks. On the one hand he shows that regionalist parties, as a party family, are more supportive of the EU than other and so these parties and elites cue their supporters with favorable attitudes towards integration. On the other hand, he demonstrates that voters of these parties do indeed hold more favorable views towards the EU (Jolly, 2015, p. 124). He operationalizes regionalist support by using the Eurobarometer surveys and looking at the respondents vote intention. Voters who intend to vote for regionalist parties are shown to be more supportive of the EU (Jolly, 2015, pp. 129–132). The analysis is conducted for the years between 1984 and 2000, the years for which data is available from the Mannheim trend file (Schmitt and Scholz, 2005). This support is instrumental in nature in that respondents support the EU in order to get greater regional autonomy. The reasoning goes back the discussion of viability theory. One drawback of this study is that in any given year, the number of regionalist party supporters is small. In order to address this defect and strengthen the causal nature of this theory, Jolly examines Scotland as a detailed case study and and shows the evolution of support for the EU over time.

A second approach to analyzing public support from the regions has been presented by Chacha (2013). The paper aims to fill a gap in the literature on public support for EU integration, namely the “role that subnational attachment sentiments play in influencing public opinion towards European integration” (Chacha, 2013, pp. 206–7). Regional attachment is operationalized in two distinct ways using the Eurobarometer surveys. Inclusive
regional attachment is measured by a variable which asks respondents, on a four point scale, to what extent they are attached to the regions they inhabit. Exclusive regional attachment is operationalized as a binary variable that measures whether the respondent has a higher level of regional or national attachment (Chacha, 2013, p. 214). These variables, along with a slew of sociodemographic controls, are run through a multi-level analysis with the dependent variable measuring EU support. The results show that inclusive regional attachment is positively associated with EU support but there is no statistically significant relationship between exclusive regional attachment and EU support (Chacha, 2013, p. 216). Hence, those individuals who exclusively identify with their region are not more likely to support integration as they would see it as diluting their regional identity. One major flaw with this study (for my purposes) is that it doesn’t differentiate between the center and periphery. Region here could refer to either the center or the periphery and so we cannot say if there is greater support for integration from the periphery. This, no doubt, is built into the design of the study and so it is strange that the article itself speaks of regionalist parties and ‘Europe of the Regions’ and aims to add to the literature on regionalist support for European integration (Chacha, 2013, p. 208–9).

My own analysis checks if there are differences in support for European integration between people living in the periphery versus those living in the center. I take the regions of the periphery to be those that have or have had separatist movements or where regionalist parties have demanded high levels of autonomy. For the UK, this means Scotland and Northern Ireland, for Spain it is Catalonia and the Basque Community, and for Belgium it is Flanders. The variables I analyze are amongst those which were discussed in chapter two. In particular, I look at EU benefit, if membership is a good thing, positive or negative image of the EU, if respondents tend to trust the European parliament, and if respondents have an exclusively national identity or not. In the graphs below, higher levels always mean more support (specific or diffuse) for the EU. The data for each of these variables comes from the Eurobarometer from the years 1975 to 2016. Each variable is graphed sep-
arately for each country. In addition, I conducted a chi-square test of difference on the weighted data in each year to statistically test if there were significant differences between the regions. If a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level was found, this is denoted with an asterisk in the graph. In other words, an asterisk denotes that for that particular year, for that particular variable, there was a statistically significant difference between the levels in the regions under consideration.

Figure 5.3 shows the level of EU support in Wallonia and Flanders on five different indicators. On most of the indicators there is little to separate public support from either of the regions. However, if viability theory is correct, we would expect more support for the EU from Flanders. This is the case in only one of the indicators (the one which
asks if EU membership is a good thing). The other indicator which shows a consistent difference is the one which asks if the respondent feels identification with the nation, with Europe, or a mixed identification. For that variable, we see that respondents in Flanders feel more exclusively national than those in Wallonia. This goes against the prediction of viability theory that respondents in Flanders should support the EU more strongly. Hence, in Belgium, we can see that support for viability theory is weak, at best.

![Figure 5.4: Regional differences in EU support in Spain](image)

In the case of Spain, shown in figure 5.4, we see that there is little to differentiate Catalonia and the Basque community from the rest of Spain in the case of public support for the EU. In this case, levels of support tend to move in unison, falling or rising together as the case may be. The only indicator where there is a clear difference between the re-
gions and the rest of Spain is the one which asks about national versus European identity. In both Catalonia and the Basque community, we see that respondents tend to identify with Europe more, either having an exclusively European identity or a mixed national and European identity. In contrast, respondents in the rest of Spain are much more likely to identify as exclusively Spanish. This difference is not hard to explain given the history of separatism in these two regions. It is understandable that respondents would not identify as Spanish, and since the question only gives the choice of national or European, many would see themselves as exclusively European or as having a mixed national and European identity.

Figure 5.5: Regional differences in EU support in the United Kingdom

The clearest regional differences in support for the EU are seen in the UK. As seen in
Figure 5.5, respondents in both Scotland and Northern Ireland are more supportive of the EU than those in England and Wales. There are a couple of interesting trends to note. The first is that Northern Ireland is, in general, more supportive of the EU. While Scotland is significantly more europhilic than England and Wales, it is closer to the levels of support seen in the latter than it is to Northern Ireland. This indicates that the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) enthusiasm for the EU is not shared by the Scottish population. The second trend which is seen across all indicators is that support levels across the regions under consideration are, over the last five years, coming closer together. The trend lines for the regions are converging and we also see fewer years in the last five where there are statistically significant differences between the regions. Throughout the UK, we see that in 2016 just a little less than 50% of respondents thought that EU membership was a good thing. Of course, this mirrors the eventual vote tally of the Brexit referendum, where 52% voted to leave the EU (Telegraph, 2016). However, while the Eurobarometer survey data indicates that attitudes about EU membership were the same across all regions in the UK (at a little less than 50% saying the EU membership is a good thing), the actual Brexit vote didn’t mirror this. In Scotland, 62% of voters wanted the UK to remain in the EU while the corresponding figure for Northern Ireland was 56% (Telegraph, 2016). The Scottish case, at least, is complicated by the SNP’s calls for the independence of Scotland from the UK. This, combined with the Brexit vote, leads to a strange set of incentives for the Scottish voter. A Scottish nationalist who wants independence from the UK would have an incentive to vote for Brexit in the hope that it would lead to a vote for Scottish independence. On the other hand, a Scottish unionist would have the opposite incentive, preferring to remain in the EU because the chances of keeping Scotland in the UK would then be higher. Hence, the Scottish vote on Brexit, rather than being seen as a straight referendum on the EU, needs to be considered in the context of the SNP’s push for Scottish independence from the UK. If my reasoning is correct, it would mean that independence from the UK is less popular than the SNP’s platform would suggest. Indeed, we can see this play out in the
general election in the UK. As the British government went to invoke article 50 which would begin the formal process for Brexit, the SNP renewed calls for holding a second Scottish independence referendum within a year or two (Washington Post, 2017). Such an aggressive move for Scottish independence didn’t play well with voters as the SNP lost 19 seats in Scotland in the British general election held in June, 2017.

5.4 Discussion

My analysis of center-periphery differences in public support for the EU gives some interesting results. First, it shows that there are important differences between countries in how regionalist parties and the residents of these separatist regions perceive and support the EU. While there are very few differences in public support for the EU between the center and periphery in Spain and Belgium, we see greater and statistically significant differences in the UK where the Scottish and Northern Irish publics support the EU more than those of England and Wales. Other researchers have also shown that regionalist party responses to Europe are varied and have changed over time. Hence, combining and analyzing all regionalist parties and partisans in Western Europe, as Jolly (2015) and Chacha (2013) do, leads to a significant loss of precision. What might be important for Catalonia is lost in the general analysis of all regionalist movements in Western Europe.

It is the use of viability theory which leads social scientists to look at regionalist movements in Europe as a whole. At its heart, viability theory is a purely economic theory. It only says that the EU, as an economic entity, leads to an increase in the equilibrium number of states by reducing the costs for smaller states. However, the EU is not only an economic entity, it is also a political one. Just because the economic costs to independence have been lowered, it doesn’t mean that the political costs have also been lowered. And, if we combine this with the fact that different countries have different political responses to regionalist movements, it makes a lot of sense to look at these movements in each country separately rather than generalize for all of Western Europe.
Viability theory, as applied to the EU by Jolly (2015), would predict that the public in separatist regions would show more instrumental support for the EU. However, my analysis shows that this is only true for the UK. In the case of Spain, when we consider the indicators for instrumental support, we find that there is not clear difference between levels of support in Catalonia, the Basque community and the rest of Spain. For Belgium, we see where there are significant differences, the relationship as to whether the center or periphery support the EU more changes over time. Hence, we cannot say that Flanders is, over time, shows more instrumental support for the EU than Wallonia. There are strong differences in the more affective measure of support for the EU, the one which asks about national versus European identity. However, even there, there is no consistent finding across the three countries. In Belgium, residents of Flanders have a more exclusively national identity than those of Wallonia. However, this is reversed in Spain where residents of Catalonia and the Basque community have a more European identity than the rest of Spain.

My analysis shows that while viability theory is fine as a purely economic theory, it cannot be applied indiscriminately to all regionalist movements in Western Europe. There are important historical and political differences between European countries which need to be taken into account when speaking of regionalism in the context the European integration. In the larger context of public support for European integration, we can say that the regional dimension of politics is dependent on the context. It could provide increased support from the periphery for European integration on an instrumental basis. However, in certain countries, we could just as easily see no increased support.
CHAPTER VI

Europe’s Others

No European can be a complete exile in any part of Europe.

   Edmund Burke
   *Letters on a Regicide Peace*

In the chapters so far, I have looked at instrumental support for Europe based on economic and regional factors as well as support due to growing cognitive mobilization and postmaterialism. In this chapter, we take a look at a possible national identification and an emerging European nationalism. Towards this end, I discuss issues of national identity and take a look at Europe’s ‘others’, specifically the American other and the (Muslim) immigrant other. While many scholars have pointed out that a growing European nation would (and does) see the United States as its other, a lack of survey data on this issue makes it difficult to connect it with a European identity. The second theme, that of Muslim immigrants in Europe, lends itself more easily to the kind of analysis I conduct in this dissertation. Thus far, my research has pointed to the necessity of the legitimization of EU institutions in the wake of the economic crisis. It is in this context that political mobilization against integration invoke national identity and the loss of national sovereignty. To combat this, further integration would require the legitimization of current EU institutions and the integration process. In other words, it would require a kind of ‘thick’ identity or a sense of community.
6.1 A Question of Identity

Thus far, I have used the term ‘identity’ without giving it much thought. I would like to step back for just a minute now and analyze this concept further and specify what I mean by it before continuing. As any casual observer of political science knows, the use of the term ‘identity’ and the field of ‘identity studies’ has grown rapidly in the last few decades. However, even with this rapid growth, there is little agreement about what the term ‘identity’ actually means and how it should be used (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Fearon, 1999). This follows from the constructivist turn in political science. The old essentialist conceptions of identity, which Brubaker and Cooper refer to as ‘strong’ understandings of identity (2000, p. 10), speaks of identity in the context of bounded homogeneous groups wherein group membership is not easily changed. Identity is usually decided at birth and there is little individual choice in the matter. Following the constructivist turn, identity has come to be seen as much more fluid and contingent, with individuals seen as having multiple identities. However, for Brubaker and Cooper, this represents somewhat of a problem because identity, as an analytical concept, then ceases to have any power; by attempting to say too much, identity says nothing at all. Hence, they recommend thinking beyond ‘identity’ and taking up new analytical terms (commonality, connectedness, affect, and so on). James Fearon speaks of much the same fragmentation which has occurred concerning the concept of identity. However, he sees some commonality in the usage of the term ‘identity’ in the social sciences. According to him, when authors speak of this term, they are speaking of one of two general meanings (1999, p. 36):

(a) a social category defined by membership rules and allegedly characteristic attributes or expected behaviors, or (b) a socially distinguishing feature a person takes special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential (or, of course, both (a) and (b) at once).

For my purposes, I will agree with the rather broad definition provided by Fearon. Specif-
ically, I am interested in political identities, and this refers largely to part (a) of the above definition. As such, my work looks to a ‘we’ rather than an ‘I’ and looks at group membership and attributes, symbols, and values shared by members of the group, all in the context of Europe. And yet, as Sophie Duchesne (2008) points out, all this talk of a European identity presupposes the existence of a stable polity that people could identify with or the existence of a European identity as such. Mostly, this is not the case. In the case of Europe, we are dealing with how people come to identify with an emerging polity. And at this time, it is not really clear what sort of identification this is (or will be). For Duchesne, shelving identity in favor of identification can help shed light on the process rather than encourage debates about what has not yet come to pass. In this spirit, I propose to study collective identification with Europe. In her analysis, Duchesne identifies three processes and uses the works of Norbert Elias, Ronald Inglehart, and Benedict Anderson in order to develop three alternative, yet complementary, processes by which to think about changes in identification.¹ In his chapter, I take up the national question which is based on Benedict Anderson’s work. For Anderson (2006), the nation is an entity which is at once imagined, limited, and sovereign. Hence, there can be no two sovereign nations within the same territory. This model, as Duchesne rightly points out, implies a competition between Europe and its member states for the loyalty of its citizens and this suggests a tension between national and European identification (Duchesne, 2008, p. 405). As my analysis in this chapter shows, this tension does exist and provides opposition to further integration. However, my larger concern here is not so much the competition between a national and European identification. Rather, it is the creation of a European sense of self in opposition to the American and immigrant other.

¹My own work is related to this in many ways. For her project, an important aspect is the transition from national to European identification. Hence, she looks at an emerging European identification in the context of established national identities. For my purposes, this inter-play between national and European identification is of lesser importance.
6.2 Europe’s Others

Much of the work on nationalism and national identity focuses on the necessity of the other by which the sense of self is created (Hobsbawm, 1992; Colley, 1992; Smith, 1992; Sahlins, 1991). In saying this, I do not wish to fall into the trap of essentialism wherein there are some immutable differences between self and other. Indeed, there need not even be any objective linguistic or cultural differences. What is necessary, however, is the “subjective experience of difference” (Sahlins, 1991, pp. 270–1). In the case of Europe as a whole, there are two significant others: the American other and the (Muslim) immigrant other. In this section, I provide a theoretical basis for why these could lead to a European identity.

6.2.1 The American Other

Starting with anti-Americanism, two questions come immediately to mind: what is it? and how can it contribute to an emerging identification with Europe? To answer the first question, a short review of the literature on this subject makes it clear that anti-Americanism is not a rational disagreement with the policies of the United States. Rather, as Paul Hollander mentions, is is a “deep-seated, emotional predisposition” to negatively perceive the United States (Hollander, 2004, 12). In this way, it is a prejudice that often lacks “distinct reasons or concrete causes” (Markovits, 2009, 17). This narrative is not limited to any one side of the political spectrum but exists from the left to the right (Markovits, 2009, 28). And it is not a new phenomenon; as many observers have noted, there is a long tradition of European Anti-Americanism, starting from images of the New World until the present (Markovits, 2009; Ceaser, 2004). But what exactly does this have to do with identification with Europe? Back in 1954, Hannah Arendt worried that a growing anti-Americanism might become the beginning of a European nationalism.\(^2\). For Arendt,\(^2\)

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\(^2\)These lectures and essays have been subsequently published in Essays in Understanding 1930–1954 (1994). For Arendt’s views on anti-Americanism and a European identity, see pages 409–427
Europe projected on to the United States its fears of technology and modernity (especially the evils of technology, such as the nuclear bomb) and a growing consumer culture (signifying a lack of ‘real’ culture based on a long historical tradition). This, coupled with the growing wealth of the United States and its far-reaching foreign policy, became a focal point around which European anti-Americanism was based.\(^3\) As Arendt saw it, anti-Americanism holds such a potential to become the focal point of a European identity because the Europeanism it would produce would closely resemble the Americanism it sought to confront. Hence, Americanism and Europeanism would become two competing ideologies because of the fact that they resembled each other.\(^4\) It is striking, then, to see that the protests of February 15, 2003—protests against the US-led war on Iraq and, ostensibly, against the United States itself—signaled to many observers the birth of the European nation (Markovits, 2009, ch. 6).

In spite of the vast amount of theoretical literature on anti-Americanism, there are surprisingly few statistical analyses of the phenomenon. Of those statistical analyses relating anti-Americanism to a European identity, I have found only one, that by David Michael Green (2012). The major reason for this lack is that there is no good survey data on the subject. Green himself tests out the thesis that European identity is based on anti-Americanism by looking at data from the International Social Survey Program and the Eurobarometer. Even with this dataset, the analyses that Green can conduct are limited. On the one hand, he tests the thesis that European identity would be stronger when more people opposed US policies, as say under George W. Bush. The other analysis looks at Eurobarometer data and at perceptions of if people see themselves as Europeans and their perceptions of the US role for peace in the world. In both these analyses, the results are, at best, inconclusive. On the one hand, the problem is theoretical. If I am correct in that anti-Americanism is based on prejudice rather than rational perceptions of US

\(^3\)For further analysis of Arendt’s thoughts on this, see Rensmann (2006)

\(^4\)On a related note, looking at the process of identity formation in Spain and France, Peter Sahlins finds something similar. He notes that the sense of difference between self and other is strongest where there is some history of cooperation and relatedness (Sahlins, 1991).
policy, it would follow that the actions of the US government would have a rather small impact in shaping this prejudice. Hence, means-testing the levels of public attachment to Europe across various US administrations would, by itself, not conclusively prove that a growing anti-Americanism leads to an identification with Europe. There have been other, more modest statistical analyses done on anti-Americanism in Europe. Of those, the one by Heiko Beyer is promising because he combines the statistical analysis of Pew survey data while also providing theoretical mechanisms (those of projection and cognitive dissonance) for anti-Americanism (2012). In his work on anti-Americanism in Germany, he also devises survey instruments designed to measure the prevalence of anti-Americanism (2013). Following this, I think a more fruitful approach is the combination of statistical analysis with a theory of the process by which anti-American sentiment could lead to growing identification with Europe.

6.2.2 The Immigrant Other

Here, it is not my aim to take a look at the historical interactions between the Islamic empires, most notably the Ottoman empire, and Christian Europe. There are a number of good accounts in international relations theory of how, through these interactions, Islam came to be seen as Europe’s other (Neumann, 1999; O’Brien, 2009). Rather, my aim is to study the current European prejudice against Muslim immigrants.\footnote{Such has been the success of the radical right that the terms Muslim and immigrant have come to be used interchangeably in almost all popular and academic discourse (Yilmaz, 2012). Indeed, as Yilmaz mentions, it is due to the efforts of the radical right that discourse on immigrants has come to be seen as a cultural issue by the left as well as the right.} A couple of common features with anti-Americanism can be observed: (a) both prejudices have little basis in reality, (b) both exist across the political spectrum, from the left to the right. The Muslim in Europe, and in much of the developed world, is caught in a good / bad binary where the good Muslim (moderate, non-violent, tolerant, plural, committed to women’s equality) is a friend while the bad Muslim (the opposite, in every respect, of the good Muslim) is the enemy, despite the fact that no Muslims actually fit these stereotypes (Mahmood, 2004;
Shryock, 2010). In Europe, it is no secret that the Muslim immigrant has become the radical right’s favorite punching bag. What is surprising is that a good number of leftist intellectuals have also fallen into this trap. Consider, for instance, public statement signed by twelve intellectuals (including Salman Rushdie, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Bernard-Henry Lévy) in the wake of the Danish cartoons controversy. In it, something called ‘Islamism’ (purportedly something to do with the religion) is equated with fascism, Stalinism and Nazism and the term ‘Islamophobia’ is disparaged as one which confuses “criticism of Islam” with the “stigmatization of those who believe in it”. Reading it, I was left to wonder how it would be possible for me to call your entire belief system totalitarian and not manage to stigmatize you.

This is but one of many instances of Islamophobia coming from leftist intellectuals. However, it is the radical right parties in Western Europe which are truly at the forefront of this phenomenon. As we have briefly seen in the section on postfunctionalism, Hooghe and Marks contend that the politicization of national identities by radical right parties constitutes a large impediment to further European integration. However, contrary to this argument, my hunch is that the success of the radical right parties in Western Europe is in large part due to anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment within the populace. Hence, the success of radical right parties in Europe signals the shared sentiment of anti-Islamism across many countries and so rise of these parties need not portend the end of further integration. While it is hard to actually prove this argument, a quick survey of the foreign and security policy of these radical right parties shows that my argument is not completely off the mark. As we have seen, most radical right parties are nativist, in that they resist the immigration of those who they suspect to be unable or unwilling to integrate. Hence their specific focus on Muslim immigrants as they are portrayed as being unable to integrate as Islam is undemocratic and anti-minority (Betz, 2007). All these parties agree that Europe is a civilization based on Greek, Roman, and Christian values.

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6The statement is titled “Together Facing the New Totalitarianism” and can be viewed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4764730.stm
and that the EU should eventually include all Christian or occidental nations of Eastern Europe (Liang, 2007, p. 17). However, their view of the EU is limited in that they don’t support a European super-state, rather a “Europe of peoples based on ethnicity” (Liang, 2007, p. 12). At the same time, most parties look to form alliances at the EU level and there are two party groups in the EU parliament with members from radical right parties (these are the ‘Identity, Tradition, and Sovereignty Group’ and the ‘Union for Europe of the Nations’). Hence, as Liang mentions, these parties subscribe to a globalized nationalist agenda. The call for a halt to European integration is going hand-in-hand with greater cooperation between such parties at the European level. This is all well and good, but does it really point to an identification with Europe as such? Couldn’t people vote for the far-right because they feared economic competition with immigrants? Or just because they had little trust in the political system?

These hypotheses were tested by Pippa Norris on her work on the radical right. She found that public support for the radical right comes from both the middle and lower classes (Norris, 2005, p. 147). Hence, the rise of the radical right cannot simply be attributed to growing unemployment. Those who vote for the radical right are indeed less trusting of political institutions and this lends some credence to the protest vote thesis (Norris, 2005, p. 164). However, the strongest support for radical right parties comes from those who have a “negative attitude toward immigration, refugees, multiculturalism, and economic equality” (Norris, 2005, p. 182). This is despite the fact that there is no relationship between ethnic diversity in a given country and the level of radical right support (Norris, 2005, p. 185). A similar conclusion was reached by Strabac and Listhaug (2008) who found that anti-Muslim sentiment in a given country has little to do with the actual percentage of Muslims living in that country.

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7One manifestation of such cooperation is the Contact Forum for European Patriotic National Parties and Movements with a permanent office in Vienna (Liang, 2007, p. 19).
6.2.2.1 Connecting Immigration and European Integration

As identified by Kentmen-Cin and Erisen (2017, p. 4), there are four main trends in research on anti-immigrant attitudes and public opinion about the EU. The first looks at cultural and identity threats posed by immigrants. The main hypothesis in this theme is that those who see immigrants as a threat would oppose further integration because of the EU’s open border policy which allows the free movement of people within the Schengen area. The second theme looks specifically at attitudes towards Muslim immigrants. The research here is split into two distinct dimensions and the first asks whether people are willing to accept predominantly Muslim countries as EU members. The second dimension looks at attitudes towards Muslim immigrants and support for European integration. This second dimension is very closely related to the first theme of immigrants posing a cultural threat, specifically because the the conflation of the terms immigrant and Muslim in the European context. The third theme focuses on perceived economic and security threats posed by immigrants while the fourth theme looks at the attitudes of immigrants towards the EU (Kentmen-Cin and Erisen, 2017, p. 4). Here, I focus on the first trend, that linking anti-immigrant attitudes and public opinion about the EU.

McLaren (2002) makes a strong argument for the primacy of perceived cultural threats while examining attitudes towards European integration. This is based two main contentions. The first is that when evaluating public policy proposals, individuals look at societal-level needs rather than performing a personal cost-benefit analysis. The second focuses on the primacy of “symbolic politics” and contends that opposition to the EU involves perceived threats to the primacy of the nation-state (McLaren, 2002, pp. 554–5). Indeed, McLaren’s own analysis of Eurobarometer data says that opposition towards the EU is based on the hostility towards other cultures. The argument here is not that factors such as economics, cognitive mobilization and postmaterialism don’t matter. Rather its that symbolic factors better explain support for European integration (McLaren, 2002, p. 564). McLaren’s analysis doesn’t focus on immigrants in particular but rather minorities
in the country. The (reasonable) assumption here is that when survey respondents speak of minorities, they are thinking of immigrants. Other studies in this vein have extended this model of perceived cultural threats to focus specifically on immigrants. Using data from their own survey, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) find that negative out-group attitudes are a very strong predictor for opposition towards the EU. As the EU is associated with open borders, those with negative attitudes about non-nationals will oppose EU integration. Their study also confirms the importance of economic factors as well as domestic politics in determining EU related attitudes.

In their study of religion, anti-immigrant attitudes and support for European integration amongst European youth, Nelsen and Guth (2003) connect a number of important strands in the literature. They find that religion, particularly Catholicism, promotes a European we-feeling which leads to support for the EU. They note that the Catholic church has long tended to “supranational solutions to political and social problems” and the EU is just the latest manifestation of this tendency (Nelsen and Guth, 2003, p. 91). They find that Catholics support the EU more than either Orthodox or Protestants. As a group, Catholics, Protestants and the Orthodox are more supportive of the EU while the secular youth were the most Eurosceptic. Amongst young people, they confirm the findings of previous research in that those who support immigration view the EU favorably. However, their findings point to an interesting tension. If we accept that religious Christians are more supportive of the EU than atheists and that this is because of Europe’s Christian heritage and the Catholic church’s supranationalism, we might reasonably expect them to be against immigration from outside Europe as this would reduce Europe’s Christian character. Yet, their findings point out that this might not be the case.

Tillman (2013) connects anti-immigrant attitudes with authoritarianism. Both the EU and immigrants represent a threat to the social cohesion of the nation-state and are thus opposed by those with authoritarian attitudes.8 In a similar vein, Luedtke (2005) finds

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8 Authoritarian attitudes are operationalized as those who have respect for authority, believe there is one true religion, who have not attended a political demonstration, and those who believe homosexuals
that those with an exclusively national identity are more likely to oppose the harmonization of a EU-wide immigration policy, preferring that immigration policy should remain under national control. In this study, attitudes about immigration were also a significant predictor with those who opposed further immigration also opposing the harmonization of immigration policy (Luedtke, 2005, p. 98). McLaren (2007) argues for the importance of the immigration population in a given country. The argument here is that in countries where there are a large number of immigrants, we would see more opposition towards integration. McLaren (2007) shows that this is the case for opposition to the inclusion of Turkey in the EU. Carrying this argument forward, I argue that in thinking about European integration more generally, perceptions of the level of immigration in a country matter. Across all countries these have consistently been higher than actual levels of immigration and we would expect that those with higher perceptions of immigration would be more opposed to further integration.

As seen in this short review, much of the research shows a tension between identification with the nation and identification with the EU. The latter is oftentimes blamed for any perceived increases in immigration and thus diluting the national character. In the following sections, my analysis of European Social Survey and Eurobarometer data shows a strong link between attitudes towards immigration and the EU.

### 6.3 Hypotheses and Method

Given the theoretical discussion and literature review above, we can postulate a few testable hypotheses. By allowing the free movement of people across within its borders, the EU is seen as leading to an increase in immigration both from within and outside Europe. Hence, we would expect those with negative attitudes about immigrants to be opposed to further integration. We would also expect that those who would prefer lower...
levels of immigration would be opposed to further integration. When we consider the perception about levels of immigration, we can expect those who perceive high levels to oppose further integration. However, it is important to note a mediating effect here. If one has negative attitudes about immigrants and perceives high levels of immigrants, one would be more opposed to EU integration. Hence, we would expect the perception of the level of immigration to works in interaction with the attitudes about immigrants. The hypotheses are more formally stated below.

**Hypothesis 1:** Individuals with negative attitudes about immigrants oppose further EU integration.

**Hypothesis 2:** Individuals who reject more immigration also oppose further EU integration.

**Hypothesis 3:** The interaction of perceptions about levels of immigration and attitudes about immigrants are a significant predictor of attitudes about EU integration.

Comparing data about immigration levels and perception of immigration, we see in table 6.1 that in every country in the EU-15, perceptions of immigration far exceed actual levels of immigration. In table 6.1, the first two columns give us levels of immigration. The first column is the percentage of the population not born in that country, the second is the percentage of population in the country which was not born in Europe. This data is for 2016 and is sourced from Eurostat. The next three columns give data of the average level of the perception of the proportion of foreigners in the country. This data is from rounds one and seven of the European Social Survey (ESS). As we can see, in every country except France, people think that the number of foreigners in the country has increased. In all countries, people think there are a lot more foreigners than there really are. Hence, the perception of immigration is much more than the actual level of immigration.

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9In the Netherlands and in Sweden, this increase is not significant.
10This is not surprising as immigrants are over-represented in urban areas and in the media.
Table 6.1: The perception and reality of immigration in the EU-15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Foreign</th>
<th>Non-EU born</th>
<th>In 2002</th>
<th>In 2014</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>18.16</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>20.26</td>
<td>26.72</td>
<td>6.46*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>16.32</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>23.11</td>
<td>29.07</td>
<td>5.96*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>11.16</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>10.14</td>
<td>13.57</td>
<td>3.42*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>27.78</td>
<td>26.04</td>
<td>-1.73*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>9.48</td>
<td>2.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>20.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>13.27</td>
<td>7.98</td>
<td>19.88</td>
<td>22.76</td>
<td>2.88*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>16.90</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>20.38</td>
<td>5.78*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>17.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>45.22</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>40.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12.11</td>
<td>8.84</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>23.83</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>20.78</td>
<td>24.79</td>
<td>4.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12.74</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>16.23</td>
<td>21.84</td>
<td>5.62*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>20.29</td>
<td>20.63</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>23.86</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>3.41*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.05. Immigration data is from Eurostat, opinion data from ESS.

Thus far, the working assumption of this chapter has been the opposition to the Muslim immigrant other. However, as table 6.1 tells us, not all immigrants are created equal. The open-borders policy of the EU has resulted in large (though smaller than hoped for) mobility within countries of the EU. Hence, a significant portion of the foreign-born population in the EU-15 countries comes from other countries within Europe. This distinction is useful for analyzing the creation of an affective European identity. If my reasoning is correct, those who identify with Europe would be more welcoming of immigrants from within Europe than from outside Europe, while those who identify only with the nation-state would not view any immigration into the country favorably. This leads me to a fourth hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 4:** Individuals who identify with Europe would be more favorable to immigration from within Europe while individuals identifying with the nation-state would not be favorable to any immigration into the country.
6.3.1 Measures and Data

In order to test the first three hypotheses, I use data from the European Social Survey. This survey has been conducted bi-annually in European countries since 2002. Hence we have a total of seven rounds of data. I limit my analysis to the EU-15 countries. All fifteen countries are present in each round of the ESS with the following exceptions: Austria is missing round six, Greece is missing in rounds three, six and seven, Italy is missing in rounds three, four, five and seven, and finally Luxembourg is missing in rounds three to seven. Compared to the Eurobarometer surveys, one of the limitations of the ESS is that we have a rather small time-series of seven rounds over twelve years. However, the advantage for using it in research about attitudes towards immigration is that the ESS has asked a battery of questions related to immigration in every round.

This group of six questions falls under two main categories: are immigrants good / bad for the country and should we allow many / few immigrants into the country. The first set consists of three questions asking if immigrants are good / bad for the country’s economy and cultural life and if immigrants make the country a better / worse place to live. Responses to these questions were recorded on an eleven point scale (0 = Bad for country, 10 = good for country). The second set of questions asks if we should allow many / few immigrants and consists of three questions which ask allow immigrants of the same ethnicity, allow immigrants of a different ethnicity, and allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe. Responses were recorded on a four point scale (1 = Allow many, 4 = Allow None). These questions relate to two distinct dimensions on immigration in the EU. This is confirmed by conducting a principal component analysis, the factor loadings of which are seen in table 6.2 and the scree plot for which is show in figure 6.1.

The two sets of questions forms two distinct dimension, one related to attitudes about the impact of immigrants and the second related to the control of immigration. These questions were combined into two indices which were then standardized on a scale of zero to one, with zero being against immigrants and immigrations while a value of one
supports immigrants. The scale related to the impact of immigrants has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85 and the scale related to allowing immigration has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.9. The scales form two of the independent variables in the analysis which follows.

Table 6.2: Factor loadings for the Principal Component Analysis of attitudes about immigrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good / Bad for Economy</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermine / Enhance Cultural Life</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make Country Better / Worse</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow Same Ethnicity</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow Different Ethnicity</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow from Poorer Countries</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.1: Scree plot of Principal Component Analysis

The dependent variable in the analysis is a measure of support for further integration. The ESS questions asks respondents if European integration should go further or has gone too far. Responses are recorded on an eleven point scale (0 = unification has gone too far, 10 = Unification should go further). This question was asked in rounds two to seven of the ESS, hence my analysis is only of six rounds of ESS data from 2004 to 2014.
Hypothesis three tests if the perception of immigration is a significant predictor. The independent variable is the response to the question, “Of every 100 people in the country, how many were born outside”. Hence, this variable is the percentage of immigrants in the country as perceived by the respondent. This question was only asked in rounds one and seven of the ESS, hence in testing hypothesis three, I only use data from round seven. Finally, two other demographic controls were included in the analysis, the age and educational levels of the respondent. The educational level was measured on a seven point scale (1 = less than lower secondary, 7 = higher tertiary).

I test the fourth hypothesis, that about attitudes towards immigration from within and outside Europe, using data from the Eurobarometer surveys. Since Eurobarometer 82.3 (in 2014), there have been two question regarding this topic. The questions ask about immigration from other EU member states and of immigration of people from outside the EU. Responses are recorded on a four point scale (1 = Very Negative, 2 = Somewhat Negative, 3 = Somewhat Positive, 4 = Very positive). For these questions, we have data from three surveys between 2014 and 2016.

6.4 Analysis

Hypotheses one to three are tested using mixed effects regression as responses are clustered by country and by year. The models used are similar to those in chapter four, except for the assumption of normality for the dependent variable. The results of the analysis are shown in table 6.3. Model one is a simple mixed-effects regression of attitudes towards integration on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. The second model adds the demographic controls of age and educational level. Model three has the interaction term of the perception of the percentage of immigrants in the country with the index which measures perceptions towards immigrants. Finally, the fourth model has the interaction term as well as the demographic controls.

As we see in model 1, the attitudes towards immigrants are significant predictors of
Table 6.3: Mixed effects analysis of attitudes towards immigration and European integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: European Integration: Can go further</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allow / Reject Immigrants</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>0.107***</td>
<td>0.101***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants Good / Bad</td>
<td>0.394***</td>
<td>0.391***</td>
<td>0.466***</td>
<td>0.462***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Immigrants</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good/Bad x % of Imm.</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0004***</td>
<td>-0.0004***</td>
<td>-0.00004</td>
<td>-0.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.230***</td>
<td>0.248***</td>
<td>0.170***</td>
<td>0.190***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>110,985</td>
<td>110,985</td>
<td>20,215</td>
<td>20,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>3,939.836</td>
<td>3,986.392</td>
<td>1,298.148</td>
<td>1,296.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaike Inf. Crit.</td>
<td>-7,867.672</td>
<td>-7,956.785</td>
<td>-2,582.295</td>
<td>-2,574.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayesian Inf. Crit.</td>
<td>-7,809.969</td>
<td>-7,879.848</td>
<td>-2,526.896</td>
<td>-2,503.454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
attitudes towards European integration. Those who see immigrants as good for the country also say that integration can go further. The same is true of those who say that we should allow more immigrants into the country. This effect remains significant when we add the demographic controls. Both the age and the educational level are significant predictors as well, with support for further integration decreasing with age and increasing with the educational level. Models 3 and 4 are an analysis of the seventh round of the ESS. They add the variable about the perception of the level of immigration to models 1 and 2. The results show that while the perception of immigration levels is, by itself, not a significant predictor attitudes towards further integration, its interaction with attitudes about immigrants is. This interaction effect is shown graphically in figure 6.2. We see that the perception of immigration has a moderating effect on support for integration. When perceptions of immigration rise, we see that even those who think immigrants are good for the country will decrease their support for integration. This analysis largely confirms the first three hypotheses of this chapter and thus confirms previous research into immigration and attitudes towards integration.

For testing the fourth hypothesis, I have used pooled Eurobarometer data from 2014–2016. The differences in the percentage of respondents who view immigration from within and from outside the EU is shown graphically in figure 6.3. This is graphed by how the respondents see themselves: as European, European and national, national and European or national only. We see that less than half (46%) of those who see themselves as exclusively national view immigrants from the EU positively while only 27% view non-EU immigrants positively. Hence, more than half do not want any immigration into the country. On the other hand, 79% of those who identify exclusively as European view immigrants from EU countries positively while 59% view non-EU immigrants positively.

This analysis of EU and non-EU immigrants leads to two main results. The first is that support for all immigration increases we move from an exclusively national to a more mixed or exclusively European identity. Secondly, the percentage who view EU immi-
grants favorably is significantly larger than those who view non-EU immigration favorably. However, both these measure are highly correlated and increase almost uniformly from those with an exclusively national identification to those with a mixed national and
European identification. This analysis provides mixed support for hypothesis four. On the one hand, support for EU immigration increases as one identifies as more European. On the other hand, the difference between support for EU immigrants and non-EU immigrants stays the same across all levels of identification (at about 20%). So we see that support for non-EU immigration also increases at about the same rate as that of EU immigrants as one identifies as more European.

6.5 Discussion

The first part of my analysis largely confirms past research on attitudes towards immigration and support for European integration. Using ESS data, I have shown that individuals who are more supportive of immigrants and of accepting more immigrants into the country also tend to think that European integration should go further. This is largely in line with what previous research has shown (Kentmen-Cin and Erisen, 2017). My analysis has also shown that perceptions about immigration levels in the country also matter, though only in an interaction with attitudes about immigrants. If people perceive there to be more immigrants in the country, they tend to think that integration should slow down or stop.

In this chapter, I have also argued that the Muslim immigrant is possibly seen as an ‘other’ which could form the basis for an affective European identity, a European nationalism if you will. The fact that immigrants from EU countries are seen much more positively than immigrants from outside the EU points towards a confirmation of this hypothesis. However, support for all immigrants tends to rise as we move from a national to a European identity. Hence, one could make the argument that it is a sense of cosmopolitanism, not a nascent European identity which is driving this change. Much more research is needed to disentangle the move towards a cosmopolitan Europe versus the move towards a national Europe.
CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

At the start of this dissertation, I suggested that the Kantian idea of Europe, that of Europe as a federation of republics, is an important idea behind the EU. I now relate the results of my empirical analysis back to this idea. As I have mentioned, for Kant the ‘spirit of commerce’ played an important role in keeping the federation together as it created interdependence between members states and so ensured peace. The EU has certainly fulfilled this in creating a common market, a common currency and removing barriers to trade. Much of the promise of the EU and its predecessor institutions was economic and in the past it has mostly delivered on this promise.\(^1\) The question which needs to be asked is if the EU can survive long periods of economic crisis. It is no secret that in a lot of the EU countries real incomes for most people have remained stagnant in the the last thirty years. However, with the recent financial crisis, we have seen a fall in real incomes and a destruction of wealth as housing prices have collapsed. A few (Southern European) countries have been hardest hit by this crisis. The question then is this: does the EU, as an institution and as the manifestation of the Kantian idea of Europe, remain viable if the economic disparity between and within the EU countries doesn’t end? I argue that the answer to this question is no. The neofunctionalist response to the crisis has

\(^1\)I am not making the argument here that the EU was the cause of the high levels of economic growth in the decades after World War II. However, I am making the argument that the EU’s predecessor institutions certainly did benefit from this rapid economic growth. Indeed, many contend that were it not for these fortuitous set of economic circumstances, the European Community might not have survived its early years (Judt, 1996).
been further integration and harmonization in banking and finance. This has meant the imposition of further rules on member states as related to national debt and other facets of economic policy. As Kant rejected the move towards an international state (something that neofunctionalists tend towards), further integration in these areas might well signal an end of the Kantian idea of Europe. If the answer to any crisis is further integration, we are well on the way towards a European superstate.

The move towards an international state also leads to opposition within member states; the opposition is to what people in these states see as undue interference in matters which should be decided by the nation-state, hence a loss of state sovereignty (this forms the basis for the explanation given by post-functionalists). The relation between economic indicators and public opinion in Europe is tenuous at best because the most commonly used indicators (GDP, inflation, unemployment, trade, etc) do not accurately capture how people feel about their own economic situation. And, if integration proceeds further, the post-functionalists might well be correct in the opposition towards integration will be driven by affect rather than interest.

Revised modernization theory itself depends on economic development. If, instead of economic development we are faced with stagnation, it is unclear how values change and how it affects support for political institutions. For (Inglehart and Norris, 2017), the answer lies in declining levels of existential security. As they rightly point out, much of the developed world has seen a relative decline in its standard of living. However, except in the countries hardest hit by the financial crisis, a relative decline has not meant an absolute decline in the standard of living. Even if real incomes haven’t increased in the last thirty years, people are still not starving in say Germany or Sweden. Hence it seems a little strange to say that these countries are experiencing declining levels of existential security. It is true that within countries, the proportion of postmaterialists hasn’t risen in the last three decades. However, we have not seen a large move towards materialist values either. It is stagnation which best captures the trend of the last thirty years.
What does this mean for the Kantian idea of Europe? Rising levels of support for the EU due to cognitive mobilization and rising postmaterialism are the best way to ensure the survival of this idea. However, for reasons mentioned above, this doesn’t seem likely. Both cognitive mobilization and postmaterialism are a product of revised modernization theory. This, in turn, depends on economic development. If we are in a period of economic stagnation rather than development, this doesn’t bode well for the future of the Kantian idea.

Europe as a federation of peoples is an integral part of the Kantian idea. The EU itself made much of this idea when it signaled a move towards a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in the mid-1990s. However, the promise was proven false as there was very little autonomy gained by the regions vis-à-vis the nation-state. This explain some of the changes we have seen in regionalist party attitudes towards the EU. However, this party family, as a whole, still remains more positive towards the EU than other party families. But their support of the EU is oftentimes not shared by their constituents. As I have shown in chapter five, there is not much difference in public support for the EU between the center and periphery. The center-periphery opposition, an important cleavage in national politics, is not present when looking at support for the EU.

Finally, I have considered the possibility of the creation of a European ‘self’ as opposed to an ‘other’. The existence of such a ‘self’ is a signal of a nascent European nationalism. This, in turns, means the end of the Kantian idea of Europe. As I have argued in the introduction, a European nation-state is antithetical to the idea of Europe as a federation of peoples. However, if the EU is to survive, it might need the support of a European nationalism and this means a Burkean conception of Europe. With the recent financial crisis, further integration was portrayed as the only way forward. Politicians portrayed it as a matter of the survival of the union: Europe must integrate further or it will perish. My argument is that the institutions resulting from this kind of integration will need an affective sense of attachment if they are to be seen as legitimate by the people. In chapter
six, I try and answer if we are actually seeing a sense of this kind of affective attachment towards the EU. This sense of attachment comes in opposition to the Muslim immigrant. The nature of this question makes it hard to test using survey data. In addition to this, the question differentiating between EU and non-EU immigrants is a fairly recent addition to the Eurobarometer surveys and so a long time-series isn’t available to check for changes over time. Hence, my empirical results to this question of an affective European identity are inconclusive. There remains much work to be done in answering the questions I have posed in this dissertation.

7.1 Limitations and Directions for Future Research

One of the biggest limitations of this inquiry is the reliance on survey data. One can make the argument that the kinds of questions I have raised in this dissertation cannot effectively be answered by using survey data, that affective attachment to a political community cannot be measured using public opinion surveys. I would say that this may be party true, nationally representative surveys do give us a picture of how people feel. The big advantage of using these surveys is that they can give us a view of changes over time. And the use of these surveys can be complemented with discourse analysis. The analysis of public discourse on social media and even the news media can indeed give us a better understanding of the questions I have sought to answer. Future research into these questions must supplement survey data with the kind of discourse analysis I have suggested here.

In this inquiry, my questions are revolved around a certain idea of Europe and I have given short shrift to other ideas of Europe. A more complete discussion of the various ideas of Europe and their relation to one another is well warranted. The claims I am making about the Kantian idea of Europe are theoretical claims. However, I am using empirical analyses in order to support these claims. The link between my empirical analysis and my theoretical claims is not yet very well developed. Much work needs to be done in this
area as well.

Finally, the survey series I have analyzed in this dissertation contain many more measures related to support for the EU. They also contain many measures which could serve as independent variables in the regression analyses I have done. Of course, it is impossible for any one inquiry to analyze all the variables. However, there does need to be more work done to see if there are better measures of support for the EU and if there are other, better variables and indices which explain this support.

The field of research into public support for the EU is vast and is growing at a rapid pace. One of the reasons for this interest is that the view of the EU as *sui generis* has never truly gone away. In my dissertation I have considered this view as well. However, my conclusions lead me to say that perhaps it is time that we *also* look at the EU through the lens of the nation-state.
APPENDIX A

Survey questions used in the analysis

Question wordings for the variables from the Eurobarometer surveys, the European Social Survey and the World Values Survey have been used in the analysis.

The following questions from the Eurobarometer measure public support for the EU and are used as the dependent variable in the analysis.

**BENEFIT** Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (common market)?

- Answers recorded on a binary scale (Benefited / Not Benefited)

**EU MEMBERSHIP** Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the European Community (common market) is . . .?

- A good thing
- Neither good nor bad
- A bad thing

**IMAGE** In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?
• Very Positive
• Fairly Positive
• Fairly Negative
• Very Negative

**TRUST** For each of EU institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? (Answers are recorded on a binary scale: Tend to trust / Tend not to trust).

• European Parliament
• European Commission
• European Central Bank

**FEEL** In the near future, do you see yourself as …?

• (Nationality) only
• (Nationality) and European
• European and (Nationality)
• European only

The following question from the European Social Survey measures public support for the EU and are used as the dependent variable in the analysis.

**UNIFICATION** Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?

• Answers recorded on a 11-point scale (0 = Unification already gone too far, 10 = Unification should go further)

The following question from the WVS/EVS measures public support for the EU and are used as the dependent variable in the analysis.
BELONG  Geographical groups belonging to first

- Locality
- Region
- Country
- Europe
- The world

Moving on to the independent variables used in the analysis, the following questions from the ESS capture attitudes towards immigrants coming into the country.

SAME ETHNICITY  Now, using this card, to what extent do you think (country) should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most (country) people to come and live here?

DIFFERENT ETHNICITY  How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most (country) people?

POOR COUNTRY  How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?

- Allow many to come and live here
- Allow some
- Allow few
- Allow none

The following questions, from the ESS, look at whether the respondent views immigration positively / negatively.

ECONOMY  Would you say it is generally bad or good for (country’s) economy that people come to live here from other countries?
• Answers recorded on a 11-point scale (0 = Bad for economy, 10 = Good for economy)

CULTURE And, using this card, would you say that (country’s) cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

• Answers recorded on a 11-point scale (0 = Cultural life undermined, 10 = Cultural life enriched)

BETTER Is (country) made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

• Answers recorded on a 11-point scale (0 = Worse place to live, 10 = Better place to live)

The following question, from the ESS, looks at perception of immigration levels in the country.

NUMBER Out of every 100 people living in (country), how many do you think were born outside (country)?

The next two questions from the Eurobarometer ask about immigration from within and outside the EU.

IMMIGRATION EU Does the following statements evokes a positive or a negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from other EU Member States.

IMMIGRATION NON-EU Does the following statements evokes a positive or a negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from outside the EU.

• Very Positive

• Fairly Positive

• Fairly Negative
• Very Negative

The next three variables measure interest in politics. These are from the Eurobarometer surveys.

**INTEREST** To what extent would you say you are interested in politics?

- A great deal
- To some extent
- Not much
- Not at all

**DISCUSSION** When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters …?

- Frequently
- Occasionally
- Never

**PERSUADE** When you hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives, or fellow workers to share your views? If so, does this happen …?

- Often
- From time to time
- Rarely
- Never

The next questions is a measure of value orientation (materialist or postmaterialist). It is asked in both the Eurobarometer and the WVS / EVS.
VALUE ORIENTATION  There is a lot of talk these days about what this country’s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which of them you yourself consider to be most important in the long run? And what would be your second choice?

- Maintaining order in the nation
- Giving people more say in important government decisions
- Fighting rising prices
- Protecting freedom of speech
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