Contingent Homes, Contingent Nation: Rwandan Settlers in Uganda, 1911-64

by

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Dedication

For Ananda, of course.

For Linda and Ron Rockenbach.

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And finally, to Ananda. Because of all the things.

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List of Abbreviations

APROMOSA	A*ssociation pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse*
CARA	Control of Alien Refugees Act
CMS	Church Missionary Society
CO	British Colonial Office
CSO	Chief Secretariat's Office
CSP	*Conseil Supérieur du Pays*
CUA	Church of Uganda Archives
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
DC	District Commissioner
DP	Displaced person
EAISR	East African Institute of Social Research
FCO	British Foreign and Colonial Office
KigDA	Kigezi District Archives, Kabale
LegCo	Legislative Council
LSE	London School of Economics
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PARMEHUTU	*Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu*
RADER	*Rassamblement Démocratique Rwandais*
TNA	British National Archives, Kew, London
UNA	Uganda National Archives, Entebbe
UNAR	*Union Nationale Rwandaise*
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Glossary

Unless otherwise noted, the following terms are in Luganda:

Abalokole	Christian revivalists; literally, the born-agains
Abakonde	Patrons from wealthy Hutu lineages (Kinyarwanda)
Abannamawanga	Foreigners
Abatorokyi	Migrants (Rukiga-Runyankore)
Amahéga	Cooking fire, hearth (Rukiga-Runyankore)
Bahungyi (sing., empungyi)	People who fled, refugees (Rukiga-Runyankore)
Bakopi	Peasants
Bataka	Traditional clan elders
Bustowa	Store house
Busulu	Leasing rates, rent
Empisa	Ganda behavioral norms
Envujo	A fixed percentage that landlords could receive from a sharecropper's profits
Gombolola	A sub-county
Inyenzi	Lit., "cockroach." Used in early 1960s to describe refugee raiders; used as derogatory term for Tutsis during 1994 genocide (Kinyarwanda)
Kabaka	Ganda king
Kansu	White cotton tunic
Kibanja	Land lease
Kasanvu	Compulsory labor requisition in colonial Buganda
Katikiro	Prime Minister of Buganda Kingdom
Kipande	In Kenya, an identity document that all men and teenage boys

	were required to carry in a metal container around their necks
Lukiko	Council
Luwalo	Older practice of unpaid labor in Buganda, predating *kasanvu*
Mailo	Privately owned land, originally distributed in square mile units
Matooke	Green banana
Mtwale (umutware)	Chief (Kinyarwanda)
Muruka	A parish
Mwamba	A house with a four-sided roof
Mwami	King
Omugabe	King (Runyankore-Rukiga)
Saza	A county, the largest administrative unit under a district
Ubureetwa	Clientship institution in which Hutu clients perform labor for chiefs (Kinyarwanda)
Ubuhake	Cattle clientship (Kinyarwanda)

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between displacement and state-formation in Uganda, a country that has hosted some of the largest refugee populations on the African continent since the late 1950s. Specifically, it explores the place-making work of Rwandan migrants and refugees who came to Uganda during the momentous middle decades of the twentieth century seeking work, relief, and political refuge. Rejecting neat chronologies and categories of the state, I trace continuities of mobility and governance to demonstrate connections between colonial state formation and postcolonial refugee management. Colonial authorities, I argue, possessed neither the capacity nor the political will to make migrant populations "legible." In the absence of central oversight and support, administrative responsibilities for migrants fell to low-level chiefs, employers, and landlords, who became the country's de facto gatekeepers. Decentralized governance facilitated migration and encouraged many Rwandans to resettle permanently in Uganda, but it also blurred the boundaries between "natives" and "settlers." When Rwanda erupted in revolutionary war in 1959, driving nearly 70,000 people to seek asylum in Uganda, the Uganda government responded by introducing laws and building camps to separate "refugees" from "citizens." New administrative techniques, however, could not undo decades of unregulated Rwandan migration and settlement. This dissertation explores how members of the Rwandan diaspora navigated these shifting lines of political exclusion over time, moving in and out of bureaucratic categories as they sought to make their homes in Uganda.

Introduction

I am sitting in the compound of an elderly Munyarwanda man named Yonah Kahima, who has lived in southwestern Uganda since 1959.[1] "I was chased," he says, "by the Hutu." He and his parents were living in northern Rwanda at the start of the Revolution, a conflict that brought about the end of Belgian colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi and drove over 150,000 people—predominantly Tutsi—into neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Congo. Yet when I ask Yonah to describe his life as a "refugee," he is quick to dismiss the label: "I told you I was *chased*—my neighbors know that. That doesn't make me *empungye* [refugee]." Gesturing to his wife, who is bouncing their grandchild on her knee, he exclaims, "My life is here!"[2]

Yonah's refusal of the refugee label complicates the premise, foundational to international law, that refugees constitute problems to be first identified (through the standardized collection of reliable population data) and then solved (through the reestablishment of the citizen-state bond).[3] Violently displaced at the age of ten, he and his family sought asylum in Uganda three years before national independence, when domestic refugee and citizenship laws

[1] "Yonah," whose real name I have withheld for privacy concerns, self-identifies as "Munyarwanda." Munyarwanda (*pl*., Banyarwanda) is a complicated ethnic label typically used in Uganda to indicate a person of Rwandan origins. I unpack this term in the pages that follow.

[2] Yonah Kahima, Kabale, March 28, 2013.

[3] Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (eds), *Refugees in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, *The Refugee in International Law,* Third Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); James C. Hathaway, *The Rights of Refugees under International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Kennedy, "International Refugee Protection," *Human Rights Quarterly* 8 (1986): 1-69; A. Grahl-Madsen, *The Status of Refugees in International Law*, vol. 2 (Leyden: AW Sijthoff, 1972).

did not yet exist. The British Protectorate government, responding to wars in both Rwanda and Congo, passed the *Control of Alien Refugees Act* (CARA) the following year, in 1960, at which point local authorities reclassified Yonah and his parents as "refugees." Despite this relabeling, the family did not go to live in a refugee settlement (as it had not been built), but remained in southwestern Uganda as tenant farmers on rented land. Fifty-five years later, Yonah no longer considers himself "displaced," having spent his entire adolescence and adult life in "exile." Nonetheless, he is also not a citizen—CARA, which remained on the books until 2006, expressly withheld from refugees the right to naturalize.[4] Yonah's lack of legal recognition as either citizen or refugee leaves him vulnerable to harassment, even deportation, yet he remains in Uganda for reasons both simple and profound: his life is now *here*—it is no longer *there*.

This dissertation is about the contingency of home and nation in East Africa, told at the crossroads of displacement and state formation. Specifically, it follows the experiences of a large and diverse diaspora known in Uganda as the "Banyarwanda," a capacious ethnonym of colonial vintage meaning literally, "people of Rwanda." Made up of migrants, refugees, and persons of Rwandan descent, this diaspora comprises multiple histories of displacement and relocation going back to the foundations of the colonial state. Indeed, when the British acquired the Uganda Protectorate in 1900, Kinyarwanda-speaking people were already an important part of the southern border region.[5] After World War I, Uganda emerged as a regional hub for seasonal labor migrants, who traveled from all corners of east Africa to find work in the Protectorate's cotton, coffee, and sugar plantations. Rwandans formed the largest of these migrant groups, for reasons that had as much to do with ecological crises and poor governance in Belgian Ruanda as

[4] Uganda Control of Alien Refugees Act, Laws of Uganda, Chapter 62, 1960 (1964).

[5] Donald Denoon, ed., *A History of Kigezi in Southwestern Uganda* (Kampala: Uganda Press Trust, 1977).

they did with economic opportunities in British Uganda.[6] Over the next forty years, hundreds of thousands of Rwandan men and women would journey to Uganda to escape famine, forced labor, and high taxes in Belgian territory. Annual migration rates are difficult to calculate, but colonial sources suggest that on average more than 75,000 found their way to Uganda every year during the 1940s and 1950s, with dramatic spikes in times of famine (1928-30, 1942-44) and war (1959-64). While many repatriated, others remained, forming new attachments to people and place. They took up land and learned language; they built houses and reputations; they found partners and had children. They negotiated new networks of patronage and enmeshed themselves in new social worlds. And in so doing, they transformed Uganda.

In the chapters that follow, I treat the social history of Rwandan displacement as a lens through which to explore the makings of the Ugandan state in the twentieth century.[7] Migrant and refugee journeys serve as guides, directing us through the social, political, and administrative processes that structure the possibilities for "belonging" in (post)colonial contexts. They help us push beyond state categories like "citizen" and "refugee" to discern, in the words of Clare Anderson, "the way in which the lines of inclusion and exclusion shifted across time and space."[8] Yonah's indeterminate legal status is neither unique nor surprising when understood within a longer history of migration and state formation. While international organizations have long lamented the postcolonial state's "failure" to identify refugees and provide them with legal

[6] G. Powesland, "The History of the Migration in Uganda," in *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, ed. Audrey Richards (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd, 1954).

[7] As Peter Gatrell observes in his global history of refugees, "states make refugees, but…refugees also make states." Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press): vii. For a parallel argument on the relationship between mobility and state-formation in Africa, see Darshan Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk, eds, *Mobility Makes States: Migration and Power in Africa* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

[8] Clare Anderson, *Subaltern Lives: Biographies of Colonialism in the Indian Ocean World, 1790-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 8.

protections, I argue that such indeterminacy is a product of colonial governance. As many historians of Africa have shown, the colonial state was never designed to know its subjects. Operating "on a shoestring," colonial officials possessed neither the infrastructure nor the manpower needed to fix individuals into permanent political categories.[9] Yet the relative blindness of the colonial state had as much to do with desire as it did with capacity, at least when in it came to managing African migration. The state was not simply *unable* to distinguish "native" from "settler": I argue that it actively chose *not* to for most of its history. The Protectorate economy turned on peasant production, specifically on the work of private African farmers growing small plots of inexpensive cotton for sale on the world market. Rwandan migrants, for reasons that will be explored in Chapters Two and Three, provided the manual labor needed to run the larger farms, while migrants-turned-settlers grew their own cash crops for export. In neighboring Kenya, powerful European planters worked in tense cooperation with government to exploit African land and labor.[10] In sharp contrast, Protectorate officials were convinced that their financial success depended on Africans having access to land and enjoying relative freedom of mobility. They were therefore reticent to impose restrictions on African migrants, fearing that the introduction of pass systems, identity cards, migrant quotas, and registries would threaten the country's primary labor source.

Migrant *illegibility*, in other words, served the economic interests of the colonial state, even as it undermined the state's capacity to organize populations. Indeed, the colonial administration evinced little interest in "seeing like a state," as James Scott dubs it, when it came

[9] Sara Berry, *No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 24.

[10] Anthony Clayton and Donald C. Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963* (London: F. Cass, 1974).

to African immigration. Instead, they pursued the more modest aim of "channeling" migrants towards centers of agricultural production in central Uganda.[11] Leveling roads, constructing transit camps, and providing basic healthcare, the British sought to facilitate Rwandan mobility along preferred highways. These activities enabled a certain degree of surveillance over routes, but they did not ultimately make migrants more legible in the eyes of state actors. Upon leaving the road, most migrants sought employment with private African farmers, where they disappeared from government oversight.

The Uganda state's open-door approach to Rwandan migration had profound consequences for the country's bureaucratic infrastructure and the distribution of political authority at the local level. As Fred Cooper argues, the colonial state in Africa was a "gate-keeping" state. Its primary source of power was its ability to control the intersection between the colony and the outside world. Although rarely able to organize the "social and cultural realm" of its subjects, colonial states could collect customs duties, oversee the export of valuable resources, and reinforce their political claims through recourse to metropolitan armies. In the case of Uganda, Protectorate officials effectively handed this gate-keeping function over to chiefs, landlords, and employers when they refused to intervene on questions of migrant settlement.[12] With no centralized means of recognizing migrants, the government became dependent on low-level chiefs to take on the added administrative responsibilities of identifying, taxing, and

[11] James Scott has famously argued that the modern state does violence to local communities in its efforts to simplify and "make legible" complex social realities. See James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Historians of Africa, however, counter that colonial and postcolonial states in Africa were (and are) extremely limited in their ability to "see" populations. See for example Erik Bähre and Baz Lecocq, "The Drama of Development: The Skirmishes Behind High Modernist Schemes in Africa," *African Studies* 66, no. 1 (2007): 1-8.

[12] Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 156-190.

policing new arrivals. And because the Protectorate's unique land tenure system afforded migrant tenants with remarkable protections against eviction (Chapter Two), landlords became the *de facto* arbiters of legal residence for Rwandans. Rwandan migrants, unsurprisingly, quickly overwhelmed this decentralized system of control, resulting in the further obfuscation of individuals in the eyes of the state.

The introduction of CARA in 1960, then, initiated what would become a dramatic reversal of statecraft. For the first time, the government proposed to document a large subset of cross-border African migrants, despite the fact that they lacked the bureaucratic machinery necessary for such a colossal task and had no intention of investing in it. But in the minds of British officials, long-term investment would not be necessary, because they assumed that the refugee crisis was temporary. They had, after all, closed their borders for brief periods of time in the past, either to prevent the spread of disease (Chapter One) or to deter famine victims from seeking aid in the Protectorate (Chapter Three). The 1960 law was a similar stop-gap measure, designed to address an emergency situation.[13] In 1961, to assist with the distribution of aid, the Protectorate began construction on refugee settlements in remote corners across the Western and Northern Provinces. The settlements proved flimsy shelters, built as they were on marginal, tsetse-fly infested land, but the government, again, believed that they would not be needed for more than a couple of years. However, as weeks turned into months, and months into years, the

[13] The Protectorate attempted, in 1945, to impose a temporary blockade on half-starved Rwandans who were seeking famine relief in southern Uganda. The British justified the decision on the grounds that these "famine refugees," as they were then called, could threaten the country's own limited food supply. The blockade was eventually lifted, not on humanitarian grounds, but because European and Asian businesses had complained so vociferously about their loss of migrant labor (see Chapter Three). Fifteen years later, Protectorate authorities again tried to block Rwandans from entering Uganda, this time on the grounds that these "refugees" might draw Uganda into the Rwandan revolution. However, their early attempts at repatriating '59ers resulted in significant public outcry in a way that the 1940s famine never had. Many Ugandan politicians, with their eyes on independence, used the refugee crisis as an opportunity to critique British colonial rule. What had been politically possible for the colonial state in 1945 was no longer possible in 1960. Chapter Four traces this transformation in greater detail.

decolonizing government slowly realized that their refugee situation had no obvious horizon. After a particularly violent episode in late 1963, in which an armed militia of Rwandan refugees in Uganda invaded Rwanda, state authorities decided that all refugees, regardless of need, must be moved to the settlements indefinitely (Chapter Five).

The government's attempt to exclude refugees through mandatory encampment was an improbable solution given the history of the Ugandan state. Authorities had no means of systematically registering refugees or tracking them over time. Most people who went to the settlements eventually left on their own accord, choosing instead to live as private residents across southwestern and central Uganda, just as generations of migrants before them had done. This was not a symptom of the postcolonial state's ineptitude, I argue, but was rather a logical outcome of colonial state formation. The state was not designed to know its subjects, and new political circumstances did little to change this. By the late 1960s, officials estimated that perhaps as many as two-thirds of all refugees in Uganda were "self-settled," meaning that they lived privately as undocumented migrants.[14] Like those who had come before them, they found employment, rented land, paid their taxes, and sent their children to school. Without government protection, their ability to remain in Uganda depended on their relationships with other migrants, with Ugandan family and friends, and with local authorities, landlords, and employers. The key difference now was that the state had created a new category of exclusion, one that many people managed to evade, but that still changed the tenor of political debate about belonging in Uganda.

[14] L.W. Holborn, *Refugees: A Problem of Our Time—The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972*, v. 2 (Meutchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Ltd, 1975), 1212.

Contingency of "Home"

Stephen Lubkemann has observed that, in many instances of war-time displacement in Africa, areas that produce refugees often have longer histories of labor migration. Scholars rarely interrogate this history, however, and this prevents us from "consider[ing] whether or how social processes or patterns of migrancy that *predate* conflict might bear on war-time behavior and movement."[15] Indeed, during my own fieldwork in southwestern and central Uganda, people I spoke with often felt compelled to preface their discussion of refugees with comments about earlier migrations and the artificiality of colonial borders. These introductory notes, meant for my edification, were generally trite, but their repetition was significant: My interlocutors, regardless of nationality or legal status, connected older histories of migration to more recent war-time displacement, using the former to help explain the reception and distribution of the latter. This may seem like an obvious point, but it is one that has received far too little analytical attention from scholars and policy makers.

Lubkemann suggests that part of the reason for this disconnect may have to do with the way scholars historicize mobility. "[L]abor migration," he writes, "tends to be studied as a deeply historical process that develops and changes over time," while "the movement of refugees in war-time is almost invariably described in ahistorical terms."[16] The denial of history to refugees may also be tied to the way we attribute agency to mobile subjects: Migrants, framed as individuals who choose to travel in search of economic opportunities, are understood to be historical actors, while refugees are depicted as unthinking victims of emergency situations. Both

[15] Stephen C. Lubkemann, *Culture in chaos: an anthropology of the social condition in war* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 45. See also Cecilia Ruthstrom-Ruin, *Beyond Europe: the globalization of refugee aid* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1993). Ruthstrom-Ruin noted the connection between Algerian displacement during the war (1954-1962) and earlier histories of labor migration to Tunisia, Morocco, and France—see especially pp. 80-84.

[16] Lubkemann, *Culture in Chaos*, 45.

tropes—the intrepid migrant, the terrified refugee—depict figures who are socially disembedded, unmoored from the very relations that constitute them as actors. As Harri Englund argues, "actors…are neither 'individuals' nor 'communities' but *relations* of varying scale, from personal relationships to transnational relations of power."[17] Situating migrants in social time and space was important to the people I interviewed, and so it became important to me.

Rejecting neat divisions between colonialism and independence, war and peace, migrant and refugee, and native and foreigner, this dissertation explores the messy and non-contiguous transition between colonial and postcolonial state through a social history of displacement. Framing migrant illegibility as a product of colonial state formation, I write a history of displacement that spans the colonial/postcolonial divide and connects earlier generations of Rwandan migrants to those who fled the revolution in 1959 (the so-called "'59ers"). Bridging these temporal (colonial/postcolonial) and conceptual (migrant/refugee) divides is necessary if we are to understand twentieth century displacement in Africa in its proper historical context. How have multiple generations of Rwandans managed to build homes for themselves in Uganda, and how have they navigated shifting borders of political, social, and material exclusion over time? How and why did certain migrants become saddled with the refugee label? How and why did others appropriate this label voluntarily, and to what end? Similarly, how did people like Yonah manage to shed their refugee status, and with what success? In raising these questions, my primary aim is to move beyond the legal and administrative categories that have, to date, truncated the study of forced migration in central Africa and instead follow the lives of migrants themselves.

[17] Harri Englund, *From War to Peace on the Mozambique-Malawi Borderland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 27.

This shift in perspective—from the study of state categories to the social histories of people on the move—troubles the conclusions reached by Mahmood Mamdani and Liisa Malkki, two scholars who have written influential studies of Rwandan and Burundian displacement in central Africa. Mamdani, writing in a constructivist vein, traces the history of the 1994 Rwandan genocide to the colonial state's imposition of new categorical orders. First, he argues, European administrations divided their government into two separate spheres: civic and customary. White and Asian settlers were subject to civil laws, while Africans were governed by state-appointed "customary" authorities. Customary authorities, most often glossed as "chiefs," were charged with collecting taxes, allocating putatively "communal" land, organizing household petty commodity production for colonial markets, and conscripting labor for the colonial state (including soldiers for World War I and II). This policy of "indirect" rule produced a bifurcated state in which racial membership determined citizenship status. With few exceptions, only Europeans were accorded full citizenship rights, while Africans were ruled as colonial subjects, according to 'customary laws' and other exceptional legal instruments.[18] At independence, African governments removed the racial barriers to citizenship, but did not disassemble colonial constructions of ethnicity. Ethnicity continued to structure people's relationship to the state, preventing the creation of "an undivided civic authority" or a "single and unified citizenship."[19]

To these two axes of political membership, Mamdani adds a third: that of indigeneity. The colonial state divided Africans into "native" and "foreign" ethnic groups according to

[18] An exception to this bifurcation existed in colonial Senegal, where a small number of permanent residents of Senegal's coastal cities were considered colonial citizens. M. Diouf, 'Assimilation colonial et identité religieuses de la civilité des originaires des Quatre Communes (Sénégal)', *Canadian Journal of African Studies,* 34 (1999), 565-87. As Gregory Mann argues, not all laws that applied exclusively to African subjects were cloaked in the guise of custom. G. Mann, '"What was the *indigénat*? The "empire of law" in French West Africa', *Journal of African History,* 50 (2009), 331-53.

[19] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 30.

arbitrary colonial timelines: "those who were present on native soil at the time of colonization" were considered indigenous, "while all others considered nonindigenous."[20] It is this third axis, he claims, that lies at the heart of autochthonous violence in the postcolonial state today. The colonial state, by fixing populations into political categories determined by dates of colonial conquest, lay the groundwork for postcolonial struggles over the meaning and distribution of citizenship.

Importantly, Mamdani's argument is an attempt to make sense of the Rwandan genocide without resorting to primordial explanations of ethnicity. However, he mistakes the political categories produced by the colonial and post-colonial state for social reality. The colonial state did not have the power to categorize populations in the way that he claims it did. Mamdani assumes that "[i]f the law recognizes you as member of an ethnicity…then you become an ethnic being legally and institutionally," but it is precisely the work of recognition that he leaves unexplored.[21] The ability of the state to recognize an individual as a legal entity depends first on its ability to locate, identify, and register that individual into a reliable database. Yet registration, or the systematic recording of vital events (births, deaths, marriages), is a difficult, expensive, and time-consuming process, one that few colonial states were willing or able to carry out. Furthermore, political anthropologists and historians of demography have shown registration to be a highly subjective process that is anything but automatic. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter observe that even today, despite the seeming centrality of registration to the modern state project, "perhaps as many as half of the global population…live out their lives unrecorded by

[20] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 30.

[21] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 22.

any state system of civil registration."[22] This glaring deficit, they argue, owes much to the legacy of the colonial state in Africa and South Asia, where European authorities, governing on the cheap, failed to invest in the administrative infrastructure that registration work requires.[23] Civic registration in the Uganda Protectorate was comparatively better than it was in other African colonies, but higher registration rates did not translate into permanent civic identities. Shane Doyle has shown that Africans in Uganda regularly changed their names to reflect new and evolving forms of identification. His analysis of thousands of Catholic baptismal records reveals that immigrant parents, in particular, frequently sought to re-assign their children's ethnic and national identities through flexible naming practices.[24] A baby born to Rwandan parents, for example, might be given a Ganda name; other times, an immigrant parent might adopt a local clan name first before passing it on to their child (see also Paulo Kabano's story, Chapter Two). The "mutability and multiplicity of names" in Uganda undermined the state's limited administrative infrastructure and prevented government authorities from tracking an individual beyond an initial registration event.[25]

If Uganda officials were unable to fix individuals to state categories of ethnicity, they were even less capable of determining indigeneity. The question was particularly complicated in border regions, where centuries of migration tied people to regional networks of trade, culture,

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[22] Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter (eds), *Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1.

[23] Breckenride and Szreter, *Registration*, 2.

[24] On name conversions in post-slavery West Africa, see Gregory Mann, "What's in an Alias: Family Names, Individual Histories, and Historical Method in the Western Sudan," History of Africa, Vol. 29 (2005): 309-320; see also Mike McGovern, *Unmasking the State: Making Guinea Modern* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012).

[25] Shane Doyle, "Parish Baptism Registers, Vital Registration and Fixing Identities in Uganda," in *Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History*, ed. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 278.

and social exchange. Kinyarwanda-speaking people, as noted earlier, were part of territorial Uganda from the very beginning. The precolonial Rwandan kingdom had, during the late 1800s, extended its imperial reach into what is today Bufumbira, in southwestern Uganda. Tutsi nobles and their followers, sent to govern these remote borders of the kingdom, took up permanent residence in Uganda following the demarcation of the border in 1911. The kingdom's violent expansion, meanwhile, had also forced other Kinyarwanda-speakers to flee northwards. This latter group, frequently referred to as "Hutu" or "Kiga" in European sources but who often identified according to their clan, was fiercely independent and resented the political ambitions of the Rwandan (Tutsi) king. They found asylum in the Kigezi region of southern Uganda, or what is today Kabale District. There they settled alongside Bakiga, many of whom spoke the related language of Rukiga-Runyankole. Consequently, the line between "settler" and "native" was already blurred by the outbreak of WWI (Chapter One).

Over the next half-century, the Uganda-Rwanda border remained open to cross-border migration and settlement, and the colonial administration never attempted to distinguish new arrivals from the general populace. The government initially tried to regulate the movement of livestock during the 1920s and '30s, but apart from this it made no concerted effort to check human mobility. In the mid- to late-1920s, a series of regional famines beset Ruanda-Urundi and encouraged an increase in migration to Uganda; after the famines, the Belgians introduced new forced labor quotas under the guise of preventing future famines.[26] It was also at this time that the Belgians, in an attempt to coopt the Tutsi royal court, sought to institutionalize ethnic divisions between Hutu and Tutsi through the distribution of identity cards. With these cards

[26] Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); David Newbury, "The *Rwakayihura* famine of 1928-29: A nexus of colonial rule in Rwanda," in *Histoire sociale de l'Afrique de l'Est*, 269-277 (Paris: Karthala, 1991).

came new requisitions: Those identified as "Hutu" were obliged to give additional days of unpaid manual labor to government projects, under a forced labor scheme known as *ubureetwa*. It was during this time that migration from Ruanda-Urundi began in earnest.

Before proceeding, it is important to pause here and offer some clarifications on the history of ethnicity in Ruanda-Urundi. Mamdani locates the origins of Hutu/Tutsi animosity in the Belgian colonial state, but this reading ignores a much deeper history of social and political organization. The Belgians, it is true, helped cement long-standing divisions between Hutu and Tutsi when they recognized these identities as political categories. Colonial authorities further enhanced notions of racial difference through their elaboration of the Hamitic Thesis, which supported the idea that Tutsi constituted a superior alien "race" that had conquered the inferior Hutu centuries earlier. The Belgians, however, did not invent these categories or the power relations that underlay them. The ethnonyms "Tutsi" and "Hutu" had existed for centuries prior to the arrival of the Belgians.[27] The Belgians revived and reinforced the practice of *ubureetwa*, but it, too, had existed before; King Rwabugiri (r. 1867-1896) had been the first to institutionalize it in the 1870s. The Belgians reinforced these divisions and lent tremendous political power to the Tutsi nobility, who were the benefactors of this forced labor system. They denied Hutu children opportunities for social advancement through education, ensuring that the socio-economic gap between Hutu and Tutsi would only grow wider over the course of the twentieth century. Even so, it would be erroneous to think that the Belgians invented the Hutu/Tutsi division, or that the precolonial period was one of social harmony and cohesion.[28] It

[27] Jan Vansina, *Antecedents to modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).

[28] Catharine Newbury, *The cohesion of oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Claudine Vidal, "Le Rwanda des anthropologues ou le fétichisme de la vache," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 9:3 (1969): 384-401.

would likewise be wrong to imagine that Hutu/Tutsi divisions were contiguous with the colonial territory of Rwanda. The heart of the Rwandan kingdom lay in Nduga, in what is now south-central Rwanda. Its expansion northwards during the nineteenth century was met with tremendous opposition from northern "Hutu," many of whom rejected the Hutu label as an epithet. Political labels, in other words, were historically contingent and open to contestation. And for many Rwandans, migrating to Uganda became a primary means of challenging abusive categories and the structural violence they referenced.

If Mamdani overestimates the power of the state to organize populations, refugee studies scholars have made parallel moves in their analyses of the nation-state and the refugee category. In her classic ethnographic study of Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Liisa Malkki argues that refugees constitute a problem for the modern state because they subvert an assumed "national order of things."[29] They thus become the subjects of state and humanitarian interventions designed to return displaced people to their essentialized "homelands." Malkki's major contribution to refugee studies literature is to show how refugees both inhabit these imposed categories while simultaneously contesting them. Comparing the experiences of two different groups—refugees who resided in the government camp of Mishamo, and those who had self-settled in nearby Kigoma township—she found that only the former expressed a pronounced sense of Burundian identity. "Camp refugees," as she called them, "were continually engaged in an impassioned construction and reconstruction of their history as 'a people'," while "town refugees" tried to assimilate into the life of Kigoma.[30] Camp refugees insisted that they were the

[29] Liisa Malkki, "Refugees and exile: from 'refugee studies' to the national order of things," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995b): 495-523.

[30] Liisa Malkki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995): 3.

true natives (autochthones) and rightful inhabitants of Burundi, and that they had been expelled from their homeland by foreign Tutsi interlopers. Town refugees, meanwhile, inhabited "multiple, shifting identities…derived or 'borrowed' from the social context of the township."

Malkki's research stresses the agency of displaced persons in the discursive production of "nationness," yet her overall analysis remains focused on the power of categories, narratives, and "mythico-histories."[31] In so doing, her work often loses sight of the ways that individuals regularly moved between camp and town and across conceptual barriers. While acknowledging camp and town refugees were "routinely" in touch through "kin ties and trade networks," she downplays the importance of these connections on the grounds that they "did not appear in the imagery that either locale wove of the other."[32] These practical linkages, however, point to the limitations of categorical orders—whether those orders are imposed by colonial states, humanitarian agents or refugees themselves. Mundane social histories can illuminate the tension between imagined purity and lived experience, and are therefore worth exploring. Importantly, a turn to social history subverts the patriarchal assumptions embedded in state categories by showing how displaced women and girls, for the sake of survival, reordered their relationships to people across space.[33] If Malkki was concerned with the difference between "camp" and "town," this dissertation focuses on the relationship between the two and the colonial histories of both.

[31] For a more recent study on the relationship between refugees, international aid, and the formation of imagined national identities, see Jill Rosenthal, "From 'Migrants' to 'Refugees': Identity, Aid, and Decolonization in Ngara District, Tanzania," *Journal of African History* 56, no. 2 (2015): 261-279.

[32] Malkki, *Purity and Exile*, 198, 199.

[33] Andrew Apter, "Matrilineal Motives: Kinship, Witchcraft, and Repatriation among Congolese Refugees," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 18, no. 1 (2012): 22-44; Mike McGovern, "Life during wartime: aspirational kinship and the management of insecurity," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,* 18:4 (2012): 735-752.

In summary, both Mamdani and Malkki fail to account for the ways that people move in and out of state categories over time, categories that are themselves historical and unstable. Allowing these categories to frame the terms of inquiry only results in their further reification.[34] Recent scholars, fortunately, have demonstrated alternative approaches to the history of the state, often by shifting the focus of analysis to the perspectives of those who find themselves at the margins of classificatory regimes.[35] Dorothy Hodgson and Jan Bender Shetler, for example, have called attention to the androcentric assumptions embedded in much of the literature on ethnicity in Africa—assumptions that render women as "passive victims of an absence."[36] Viewing gender and ethnicity, not as natural categories but as questions to be explored, they seek to understand the ways in which both are mutually constituted over time.[37] In a similar vein, Derek Peterson, following John Lonsdale, treats ethnicity as "a forum for argument, not an invented tradition to which people were obliged to conform."[38] Colonial East Africa, he shows, was awash in conservative ethnic movements in which patriarchal men, in the name of personal and collective honor, sought to canonize their collective histories, preserve their vernacular languages, and police the reproductive labors of "their" women. These "patriots" sought to stir a renewed sense of loyalty, pride, and devotion amongst their ethnic compatriots, but as Peterson shows, not

[34] On "identity" as "category of analysis," see Frederick Cooper with Rogers Brubaker, "Identity," in *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005): 59-90.

[35] Aidan Stonehouse, "*Peripheral Identities in an African State: A History of Ethnicity in the Kingdom of Buganda Since 1884*" (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 2012), 15.

[36] Jan Bender Shetler, "Introduction: Women's Alternative Practices of Ethnicity in Africa," in *Gendering Ethnicity in African Women's Lives*, eds. Jan Bender Shetler and Dorothy Hodgson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015): 4.

[37] Shetler, "Introduction," 5.

[38] Derek Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, c. 1935-1972* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3.

everyone was prepared to comply. Cosmopolitan Christian revivalists, believing the end was near, rejected the inward-looking conservatism of their peers, and instead sought to reimagine themselves and their community as part of a global Christian witness. By paying attention to dissent, Peterson is able to rethink the boundaries and practices of ethnic belonging.

Given the fraught, sometimes explosive history of identification and identity politics in central Africa, I turn to the work of Hodgson, Shetler, and Peterson, as well as the deep regional histories of Jan Vansina and David and Catharine Newbury as I attempt to make sense of how Rwandan women, men, and children moved across borders, navigated ethnicity, and established new homes in the flux of colonial state-formation. Contrary to Mamdani's account, the Belgian colonial state in Ruanda-Urundi could not force people into Hutu/Tutsi and native/settler binaries, nor could the British organize African populations into groups of "ethnic natives" and "ethnic strangers." Women migrants, already accustomed to a life of mobility given the expectations of patriarchal and patrilocal society, were the first to tell me about their strategies of social survival when famine, war, or male volition forced them from their natal homes. For them, displacement across borders—whether by marriage or violence (or, in the case of one woman, both—see Chapter Three)—did not amount to irretrievable identity loss. It was, instead, a rupture that forced the reconfiguration of her relationship to social space.[39] I have included some of their stories in Chapters Three and Five.

In a similar vein, centering the lives of migrants reveals that, even in times of heightened ethnic consciousness and dangerously brittle identity politics, people still did not experience boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in precisely the same way—as Mamdani's administrative

[39] I draw my understanding of social space from Doreen Massey, who conceptualizes social space "in terms of the articulation of social relations which necessarily have a spatial form in their interactions with one another." Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994): 120.

categories would suggest. Chapter Two explores how Rwandan labor migrants struggled to relocate to Buganda Kingdom in central Uganda during the 1940s and '50s, a period of rising xenophobia against persons deemed "non-Ganda." Their ability to access material and social resources often depended on how well they managed relationships with landlords, chiefs, and employers. While some scholars have concluded that Rwandan migrants resettled in Buganda with remarkable ease, thanks to the lack of central government oversight, my analysis calls attention to both the opportunities and vulnerabilities that migrants faced in the absence of state protections.

While the colonial state was largely uninterested in registering "migrants," it did try to identify "refugees" from 1960 onwards. Central Protectorate authorities were resolute that African refugees in Uganda be barred from pathways to citizenship, but their exclusionary aims depended on their ability to systematically determine the refugee status of individuals. Archival records from the 1960s in London and Uganda are replete with frustrated messages between central and local authorities and the Colonial Office over refugee identification and documentation. CARA provided no detailed criteria for evaluating individual asylum claims, since refugee status was assigned to select groups by ministerial decree. The central government would declare that a certain group qualified for asylum, and then local authorities would be expected to distribute permits to all individuals who could demonstrate membership to that group. Chapters Four and Five explore this bureaucratic work in detail, but for the moment it is useful to return to Yonah's story as an example of how this process worked (or failed to work).

Yonah's father, Alonso, claimed to be a Munyarwanda of Ugandan origin when he first arrived in Kabale in 1959, on the grounds that he had been born in the Ugandan *saza* (county) of Bufumbira. Bufumbira, located on the border of Rwanda and Congo, had historically high

populations of Kinyarwanda-speaking residents who identified as "Banyarwanda" but understood their home to be Uganda. Alonso had left Uganda as a young man to take a job with the Ruanda Mission, where he and his wife made their home for many years; all of their children were born in Rwanda. The Revolution forced the family to evacuate in November 1959, at which point they returned to southern Uganda. Neither Alonso nor his wife had birth certificates to prove their Ugandan origins, however, and so relied on chiefs and clergy to vouch for their identity. Initially, the testament of an elderly chief and pastor had been sufficient evidence for local government officials, but within two years Alonso and his family appeared in the District Office's refugee registries. Still, they remained in Kabale on land they had acquired through their Anglican church connections, and Alonso sent Yonah to school. After living as documented refugees in Kabale for two years, however, the central government in Entebbe decided that the Kahima family needed to be relocated to the new refugee settlement that the government had just installed in the neighboring district of Ankole. It is difficult to know how long the family remained in Oruchinga, as I only have records of the bus manifest that supposedly carried the family to Ankole, but I do know that their stay was temporary. The Kahimas eventually returned to Kabale and resumed their lives as subsistence farmers. Yonah today remains on the rented land that his late father left him, and he does not consider himself to be a refugee any longer. It was a temporary period of his life, not a permanent identity.

Method

This dissertation is the culmination of eighteen months of archival and oral history research that I conducted primarily in Uganda (June-August 2011, January-November 2013, July 2015), the U.K. (July 2012, December 2015), and Geneva (February 2015). I originally proposed to study the history of the post-1959 Rwandan refugee diaspora in Uganda, building on earlier

case studies by Mahmood Mamdani, Ogenga Otunnu, and Liisa Malkki. I thought I would devote only one chapter to the colonial period, offering a brief history of the border and Rwandan labor migration. This chapter would provide the historical background for my primary chapters, which would focus on the experiences of displaced Rwandans who settled in Uganda between the 1959 Revolution and the 1990 RPF invasion. What I have produced, instead, is a history of Rwandan mobility and migration governance during the colonial period and the first years of independence. My focus is therefore not on the '59ers *per se*, but on the relationships between, and continuities of, migration, settlement practices, and state-formation in Uganda both before and after independence.

Oral History

I decided to focus my life history collection in two areas known to have historically high rates of Rwandan migration and settlement: Kabale District, in southwestern Uganda, and Mukono District, in eastern Buganda. I then identified twenty long-term residents from each District who could talk about the history of settlement in their community. I organized my questions around the *work* of building and maintaining a home: How did people come to settle in this place? How did one go about accessing land and work? How did people in this area build their houses, and how did occupants distribute chores? When it came time to marry, who did one marry? Had marriage practices changed over the years? What did it mean to be a good or honorable person? These questions allowed me to ask questions about the work of settling in a new place without ever asking my interlocutor about their origins or identity. Oftentimes, however, people would freely volunteer this information after several meetings with me. I have featured some of these life histories in the chapters that follow.

This approach to oral history, while time-consuming, facilitated my research in important ways.[40] It allowed me to learn about migration and settlement without putting individuals in compromising positions, and this removed the pressure from our conversations and allowed us to build trust slowly, over the course of multiple interviews. Also significant, it opened up conversations with elderly women. As Jan Shetler has noted, conducting oral histories with women in East Africa can be difficult, because "history" is widely believed to be the purview of men.[41] This is not because women do not know history, but because their knowledge of the past is often very different from men's by virtue of their social and spatial positions.[42] Women often tried to redirect me to men when I asked them to tell me the history of their village, but were quite pleased to talk about the differences between their childhood homes and current households. Because of this, I was able to interview roughly the same number of men and women in both locations.[43]

Refocusing my research around earlier histories of migration allowed me to make better use of Uganda's rich archival landscape, which provided some of my most illuminating sources. The Uganda National Archives, newly catalogued during my graduate years, shed light on the

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[40] Each interview consisted of an initial visit to discuss the topic and explain the interviewee's rights, followed by one, two, and sometimes three return visits, each of which might last an hour to a half-day. Kabale and Mukono are large districts, and most of the people I interviewed lived in rural areas far from one another, which added to the amount of time I spent on interviews.

[41] Liisa Malkki was largely frustrated in her attempts to interview women: "...women seemed to be less accustomed, and to feel less of an entitlement, to assume authorship of narrative expression—perhaps particularly in the presence of an outsider like myself. Women were visibly frightened by my presence...and even when more familiar with me, they readily referred me to their husbands, fathers, brothers, or other men." Malkki, *Purity and Exile*, 50.

[42] Jan Bender Shetler, "The gendered spaces of historical knowledge: women's knowledge and extraordinary women in the Serengeti District, Tanzania," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36:2 (2003), 283-307.

[43] In addition to these forty life-histories, I also conducted thirty interviews with retired chiefs, camp commandants, lawyers, police officers, aid workers, and clergy who could tell me about their work with Rwandan migrants during the 1950s and early '60s. These interviews were particularly important for my research on refugee settlements, since most refugees and staff who reside in the settlements today are fairly recent (post-1994) arrivals.

central administration's changing views on migration, particularly for the period between 1958 and 1962, when the decolonizing administration was constructing camps and drafting legislation. These files, read in conjunction with the recently released FCO papers at the British National Archives (the infamous "Hanslope Park" files), reveal a government with no long-term objectives when it came to border management and African migration. For decades, colonial and postcolonial administrations addressed border crises as they arose. Scholars have called attention to the ad-hoc nature of postcolonial refugee governance, but it is important to realize that the Uganda state had a longer history of operating in crisis-mode when it came to border management. *CARA* was short-sighted and ill-conceived in part because its authors operated within institutional frameworks that encouraged adhocracy and quick fixes.

For a detailed view of the border, however, I had to travel to the provincial districts of Kabale and Kabarole in southwestern Uganda. Here, local government archives document nearly a century of border management, providing unparalleled insights into the everyday work of the chiefs, clerks, and District officers who manned the upcountry provinces. These collections allowed me to examine how "the state"—embodied in low-level bureaucrats—interpreted Rwandan migrants and their connection to Uganda over time. They allowed me to identify and trace what Ann Stoler calls "social etymologies," or "the career of words and the political practices that new categories mark or that new membership in old categories signals," which in turn allow us to "index how social kinds were produced and what kinds of social relations were construed as plausible evidence of membership."[44]

[44] Ann Stoler, *Along the archival grain: epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 35.

The national and district archives were also the best resource for the history of refugee settlements. The government has, over the past sixty years, shifted responsibility for refugee affairs between numerous ministries, rendering archival research particularly challenging. During my fieldwork, I made repeated visits to the UNHCR and several government ministries in Kampala, hoping that someone might be able to tell me whether a separate repository existed for refugee issues, but these trips proved exhausting and circuitous.[45] Visits to the settlements themselves, meanwhile, proved interesting but not particularly fruitful. During my visits to the settlements, which were admittedly brief, I was struck by the seeming amnesia of the place. Indeed, the regular flow of people, paper, policies, and funding through Uganda's refugee regime works against memory, and the capacity to forget seemed to be built into the settlement's administrative structures and material landscape. For starters, nearly all government and international staff are relative newcomers to the settlements. To prevent corruption, the government forbids the settlement's head officer, the camp commandant, to serve for more than three years at any one settlement. This may have been helpful in preventing graft and the creation of personality cults, but it also meant that few officers I met could remember anything that happened before the early 2000s. The rapid cycle of government staff paralleled the cycle of non-government implementing partners, which provided financial and logistical assistance to the Uganda Government. Apart from the administrative offices located at the settlement's "base camp," most of the structures in Nakivale are made of temporary materials—mud brick, plastic tarps, and thatch. I was told by numerous administrators that refugees were "not allowed" to

[45] More than one person suggested that the Ministry of Local Government, which formerly oversaw refugee matters, might have pertinent files, but I was never able to gain access during my visits.

build permanent houses, since they were not (in theory) supposed to remain in Uganda long-term.

This does not mean, of course, that a history of a place like Oruchinga or Nakivale is impossible, or that sources do not exist inside the settlement—they do—but a focused biography of the settlements would require time, access, and relationships that I simply did not have during my year of dedicated fieldwork. An ethnographic history of the settlements would be a real asset to the history of displacement in Africa, since Oruchinga and Nakivale are the oldest refugee settlements on the continent to still be in operation today. My fifth chapter offers a starting point for this history, and I hope that, in the future, either I or someone else has a chance to take up this challenge. At the time of my fieldwork, however, this was simply not possible.

Biography as method

Finally, I turn to biography as a *method* for illuminating the many different kinds of relational pathways that span Uganda and Rwanda. In the pages that follow, I offer biographical accounts of men and women not because I believe they are representative of common migrant experiences, but because they highlight, like dye through a vein, the diverse relationships and spatial connections that tie the region together. Biography, in short, helps me to illuminate the border-as-process. People move in and out of marginal spaces, making their marginal status contingent on historical context.

Adopting biography as method was also a way for me to sift through the endless stacks of archival materials, what Jake Hodder calls the "disorienting, overwhelming, bewildering volume of presence."[46] Biography, writes Hodder, "acts as a connective device, allowing one to plot a path through abundant archives without compromising on conceptual or theoretical

[46] Jake Hodder, "On absence and abundance: biography as method in archival research," *Area* 49, no. 4 (2017), 453.

ambition…"[47] Without claiming to be representative of common migrant experiences, then, the biographies included here illuminate different cross-border networks. The story of a disgraced Tutsi noble named Nyirimbirima, in Chapter One, for example, highlights the delicate political relations between Tutsi nobles who lived on either side of the Uganda-Rwanda border in the early twentieth century. Chapter Two, meanwhile, features the journey of fifteen-year-old boy who first left Rwanda in 1945 to seek his fortunes in Uganda; he eventually married a Ugandan woman, adopted a Ganda clan, and settled down in Buganda kingdom. Chapters Three and Five feature multiple biographies of women migrants, whose passage across geopolitical borders often required creative negotiations of male expectations and patriarchal norms. Women found pathways to permanent residency in Uganda via marriage, or through diffuse networks of female relatives who traveled to Uganda for marriage before them.

Chapter Summaries

My history of the Uganda-Rwanda border begins with early contests between Rwandan nobles, colonial veterinarians, and political rebels over the movement of cattle across the Uganda-Rwanda frontier during the first thirty years of the twentieth century. The power to distribute and confiscate cattle underwrote Rwandan political authority, and the networks of cattle and clients structured the kingdom's political territory. The Rwandan *mwami* exercised authority across the space of his kingdom through the distribution of cattle to his nobles, who in turn used their wealth in livestock to accrue loyal clients. Conversely, Rwandan nobles who fell out of favor with the royal court, the colonial administration, or both, sought to leverage what remaining political power they had by relocating their herds beyond the effective reach of the kingdom. Notables who left with their cattle did not travel alone, but were followed by their

[47] Ibid. 456-457.

clients, whose dependency was tied to their patron's cattle. In these struggles between king and client, the boundaries of the kingdom contracted and expanded over time.

Chapter One, "Building a Border," analyzes two key developments that confounded the play of Rwandan frontier politics during the early colonial period. The first was the proliferation of rebel movements in the uncertain decades following the death of King Rwabugiri (1895) and the violent succession dispute that ultimately brought his infant son to power. The most famous of these rebel movements—that of Muhumusa, a revered medium of the Nyabingi cult—sought to undermine the power of the Rwandan court, not only through violent intervention, but also by disrupting and redirecting the flow of cattle tributes. The second development was the colonial imposition of new veterinary measures designed to prevent the spread of rinderpest, a terrifying epizootic that had the potential to decimate cattle populations. These measures took the form of militarized border control between Uganda and Rwanda, disrupting the political maneuverings of both exiled nobles and rebel leaders who organized their followers through the distribution of cattle across space. The political saliency of the border initially emerged through this many-sided contest between people, cattle, and viruses.

At the same time that Ugandan government officials were struggling to restrict the flow of cattle across their borders, they were also becoming aware of the country's need for an extra-territorial labor source. Their efforts to create a domestic labor market had largely failed by the end of WWI, due to the fact that African farmers could earn more money by growing cotton on their own land than they could working for government or commercial planters. Unable to craft a reliable workforce at home, either through coercion or incentives, the Uganda Protectorate became increasingly dependent on African labor from Belgian territory. Chapters Two and Three explore the rise of a new and unprecedented migrant circuit in central Africa, one that was

propelled by the dynamic tension between Protectorate labor needs, deteriorating conditions in Ruanda-Urundi, and the desires of Rwandan migrants to find (or forge) better alternatives in Uganda.

Chapter Two, "Migrant Nation," explores the settlement work of Rwandan migrants in Buganda Kingdom, Uganda's economic and political heartland, during the 1940s and '50s. This was a time of heightened nativist anxieties amongst Ganda residents, who had watched their Kingdom's population expand by nearly fifty percent in less than a generation.[48] Chapter Two first considers the efforts of British officials, local government, and private interests to harness Rwandan labor power for their respective ends. It then turns to the everyday work of settling in Buganda, and the strategies that migrants employed to secure work, housing, spouses, and patrons. They were aided in their resettlement efforts by the changing sexual mores and social liberties of young Baganda men and women, who demonstrated an increasing willingness to partner and raise children with migrants. Yet, while numerous scholars have lauded the ability of Rwandans to assimilate into Ganda society despite mounting xenophobia, I argue that we must not go too far in celebrating the fluidity of migrant identities. Migrants made life work in Uganda because they felt they had to: life in Belgian Ruanda was getting worse, politically and materially, and migration offered one of the only escapes for most peasant families. Intermarriage, land, and clan adoption provided anchors of asylum in uncertain times, a point that can be lost in colonial narratives of "labor migration." Rwandans were rejecting their natal homes long before the outbreak of revolutionary violence.

[48] J.M. Fortt, "Distribution of the Immigrant and Ganda Population," in *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, ed. Audrey Richards (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons Ltd., 1954), 77, 116.

A fascinating if widely ignored characteristic of this new migrant circuit was the high number of women and girls who made the journey. While a sizeable literature exists on the history of male Banyarwanda labor migrants (Ellis 1938, Uganda 1942, Ross and Sofer 1950, Richards 1952, Powesland 1957, Mamdani 2001, Mushemeza 2007), this work has virtually ignored the experiences and contributions of migrant women, despite the fact that women and girls accounted for nearly half of the diaspora population. Chapter Three, "Women's Work," traces the journeys of three migrant women who made their way from Ruanda-Urundi to Uganda between 1928 and 1945. During this period, cyclical famine and repressive colonial policies in Belgian Ruanda-Urundi forced hundreds of thousands of people to seek food, asylum, and cash wages in the more prosperous British Protectorate to the north. By centering women's stories and perspectives, this chapter serves as an important corrective to androcentric histories of ethnicity and migration in East and Central Africa. It challenges the assumption, proffered by colonial sources and contemporary scholars alike, that women were simply the objects of men's ethnicity projects. Instead, I argue that women migrants were active participants in the work of imagining Banyarwanda identities in diaspora. Given their comparatively weaker social position, their approach to ethnicity was generally more flexible than that of their male counterparts—a flexibility that is too often read as passive resignation, rather than creative adaptation.

By the late Protectorate period, Uganda was home to hundreds of thousands of African settlers from east and central Africa, many of whom had left their homelands under duress. Migration to Uganda continued throughout the independence period, spurred in part by anticolonial violence and civil war in Ruanda, Congo, and the Sudan. Many scholars and policymakers have framed this as a new moment in Uganda's demographic and political history, in which forced migrants ceased to be a desirable resource and instead become a humanitarian

burden. This dissertation takes a different view: Uganda was already, by the late 1950s, an important host state for the region's displaced. What changed at independence was not the numbers of people crossing the borders, but the state's valuation of migrants' productive capacity and assimilability. In 1960, the late Protectorate government introduced one of the first pieces of refugee legislation in Africa: The *Control of Alien Refugees Act.* The new law represented the government's first concerted effort to filter human migration into Uganda and identify migrants on an individual or family basis. Successful implementation, however, proved elusive, because the Protectorate lacked the bureaucratic infrastructure to enforce registration. Chiefs and District administrations, acting with minimal guidance and material support from central authorities, bore the overwhelming responsibility for identifying, documenting, and assisting a new category of cross-border migrant: the "refugee." This new category, critically, did not reflect an essentialized identity or experience, but instead signaled the state's changing view of mobility and borders.

Chapters Four and Five examine the process and consequences of applying this new label to individuals, families, and populations during the 1960s. The postcolonial refugee was not a fixed identity, but a category that had to be produced over time. Chapter Four, "The Making of a Refugee Family," investigates this refugeeing process by tracing the histories of two Tutsi families who fled to Uganda during the 1959 Rwandan Revolution. The Kahima and Sabune families had straddled the Uganda-Rwanda border for generations, employing migration as a strategy to navigate the region's shifting political, ecological, and spiritual landscape. The Revolution in Rwanda and new refugee laws in Uganda disrupted how these families could relate to the border, but only one family—the Kahima family—became saddled with the refugee label. This chapter demonstrates the ways in which class and gender guided colonial officials'

application of the refugee label. My interest here is the selective mutability of the border and the economic and gendered implications of Uganda's nascent refugee regime.

Finally, Chapter Five, "Biography of a Camp," traces the conceptual, physical, and social evolution of Oruchinga Refugee Settlement in southern Uganda, the first African refugee camp in sub-Saharan Africa. Established in 1961 under the auspices of an exiting British Protectorate administration, Oruchinga was originally intended to provide humanitarian aid to persons displaced by the Rwandan Revolution and to ensure that refugees were neither harmed by, nor participants in, cross-border violence with their home state. Framing African displacement as a "problem" to be "solved," national and international agents devised the camp as a suitable—and presumably temporary—solution. Yet the decision to build Oruchinga was neither easy nor obvious, for any of the parties involved. Questioning the naturalization of camps as a solution to refugee 'problems,' this chapter asks: Why did the Ugandan government, the British Colonial Office, and the United Nations decide to construct refugee settlements in response to Rwandan displacement? What determined the settlements' physical location, material composition, and social membership? Why, and in what ways, did refugees participate in the construction process? In Refugee Studies, camps are heavily theorized, yet rarely historicized. This is a problem, because all camps are the products of particular power relations with specific histories. Locating the camp in time and space—an approach I term "camp biography"—is crucial to our understanding of what it means to be a refugee in a given place, because it illuminates how the boundaries of inclusion within the settlement change over time. This chapter traces the first decade of Oruchinga's existence (1961-71), and is divided into three parts. In part one, I highlight three principal histories that informed the Ugandan state's approach to refugee settlement: the history of Polish refugee settlements in Uganda; the Bakiga Resettlement project;

and Europe's own post-war refugee crisis. Weaving these strands together, I show how different actors brought competing expectations to the table concerning what the settlement was and what purpose it should serve. Was it a development project? A humanitarian intervention? A carceral device? A place for political organizing, a welcomed refuge, or a place to be avoided? Part two turns to the actual work of constructing the physical site, and here I foreground the experiences and contributions of refugees themselves, who played a central role in the creation of Oruchinga. Finally, in part three, I highlight the "usefulness" of the settlement, demonstrating how different people—government officials, aid workers, local residents, and refugees—sought to utilize Oruchinga for their own ends.[49]

[49] On the usefulness of camps, see Bram J. Jansen, "'Digging Aid,': The Camp as an Option in East and the Horn of Africa," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 29, no. 2 (2016): 149-165.


UGANDA
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
National capital
Town, village
Airport
International boundary
District boundary
Main road
Secondary road
Railroad
SUDAN
KENYA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
RWANDA
Kigali
Lake Victoria
Lake Albert
Lake Kyoga
Lake Kwania
L. George
Lake Edward
L. Bisina
Kazinga Channel
Bahr el Jebel (White Nile)
Albert Nile
Victoria Nile
Kibali
Ora
Shari
Ituri
Semliki
Nkusi
Kafu
Lugo
Katonga
Kagera
Aswa
Pager
Dopeth
Agago
Acuwa (Moroto)
Okok
Oker
Nzoia
Winam Gulf
Speke Gulf
Sese Is.
Nimule
Lopodi
Kitgum
Kotido
Arua
Gulu
Moroto
Lira
Lothaa
Katakwi
Namalu
Soroti
Masindi
Bunia
Hoima
Kumi
Kapchorwa
Kamuli
Mbale
Kitale
Iganga
Tororo
Bombo
Mubende
Fort Portal
Jinja
Bungoma
Kampala
Kasese
Entebbe
Buvuma
Damba
Sigulu
Lolui
Kome
Ibanda
Kalangala
Bugala
Masaka
Mbarara
Mfangano
Kabale
Kyaka
Bumbire
Ukara
Ukerewe
YUMBE
MOYO
ADJUMANI
KITGUM
KOTIDO
ARUA
GULU
PADER
NEBBI
MOROTO
APAC
LIRA
KATAKWI
MASINDI
KABERAMAIDO
SOROTI
NAKAPIRIPIRIT
NAKASONGOLA
HOIMA
KUMI
SIRONKO
KAPCHORWA
KAYUNGA
KAMULI
PALLISA
KIBOGA
KIBAALE
MBALE
BUNDIBUGYO
LUWERO
TORORO
IGANGA
KABAROLE
KYENJOJO
MUBENDE
JINJA
BUSIA
KAMPALA
KASESE
KAMWENGE
MPIGI
SEMBABULE
WAKISO
MAYUGE
BUGIRI
MASAKA
BUSHENYI
MBARARA
MUKONO
RUKUNGIRI
KANUNGU
RAKAI
KALANGALA
NTUNGAMO
KISORO
KABALE
UGANDA
0 25 50 75 100 km
0 25 50 75 mi
30°
32°
34°
4°
2°
0°

Map 1: Uganda


RWANDA
National capital
Prefecture capital
Town, village
Airport, airstrip
International boundary
Prefecture boundary
Road
Track
UGANDA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
BURUNDI
Kigali
Gisenyi
Ruhengeri
Byumba
Cyangugu
Kibuye
Gitarama
Butare
Gikongoro
Kibungo
GISENYI
RUHENGERI
BYUMBA
KIGALI
GITARAMA
KIBUYE
CYANGUGU
GIKONGORO
KIBUNGO
BUTARE
KAGERA NATIONAL PARK
BIRUNGA NAT'L PARK
Lac Kivu
Lake Mutanda
Lake Bunyonyi
Lac Burera
Lac Ruhondo
Lac Rwanyakizinga
Lac Mikindi
Lac Hago
Lac Kivumba
Lac Ihema
Lac Muhazi
Lac Nasho
Lac Mugesera
Lac Mpanga
Lac Cyambwe
Lac Cyohoha Sud
Lac Rweru
Lake Mujunju
Lake Bisongou
Ile Bugarura
Ile Wahu
Ile Idjwi
Ile Gombo
Lowa
Nyabarongo
Akanyaru
Kagera
Kagitumba
Merama
Kafunzo
Rwemhasha
Lubirizi
Nyagatare
Kabale
Muvumba
Gatunda
Gabiro
Ngarama
Rutshuru
Kisoro
Cyanika
Kidaho
Butaro
Katuna
Mulindi
Kirambo
Cyamba
Ruhengeri
Busogo
Kora
Mutura
Kagali
Goma
Gisenyi
Nyundo
Kabaya
Ngaru
Nemba
Rushashi
Kinihira
Kinyami
Muhura
Rutare
Murambi
Mbogo
Shyorongi
Rukara
Ngororero
Kiyumba
Kinyinya
Gikoro
Rwamagana
Kayonza
Bulinga
Runda
Kicukiro
Bicumbi
Butamwa
Gitarama
Mabanza
Kibuye
Birambo
Gishyita
Bwakira
Rwamatamu
Masango
Ruhango
Gatagara
Kaduha
Nyabisindu
Karaba
Rusatira
Gikongoro
Karama
Rwesero
Kamembe
Gisakura
Cyangugu
Rwumba
Kitabi
Bukavu
Cyimbogo
Karengera
Nyakabuye
Bugumya
Ruramba
Butare
Gisagara
Busoro
Bugarama
Munini
Runyombyi
Bugesera
Rilima
Gashora
Nemba
Ngenda
Kigarama
Kibungo
Rukira
Sake
Bare
Kirehe
Rusumo
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
29°00'
29°30'
30°00'
30°30'
31°00'
1°00'
1°30'
2°00'
2°30'
0 10 20 30 40 50 km
0 10 20 30 mi

Map 2: Rwanda

Chapter 1: Building a Border: Prophets, Pathogens, and Run-Aways in Southwest Uganda

In March 1920, the Chief Veterinary Surgeon for Belgian Ruanda-Urundi confirmed that cattle from southern Uganda had introduced Rinderpest, the dreaded "cattle plague," to herds in northern Rwanda.[1] The animals shared a common watering hole on the banks of the Kakitumba river, which runs along the Uganda-Rwanda frontier. It was through this daily contact that herds belonging to two Bahima pastoralists came into contact with healthy cattle on the Rwandan side of the border. Within six days, nearly three thousand cattle had been exposed to the virus, with many showing signs of infection: excessive salivation and mucus production, elevated temperatures, acute gastrointestinal distress, and severe dehydration. By early April, the outbreak had engulfed the Belgian veterinarian research station in Mutara, eastern Rwanda, and from there continued its southward course towards Kigali.[2] The outbreak was so severe that the *mwami* (king), whose sacred obligation it was to protect the kingdom's herds, took the extraordinary step of allowing Belgian veterinarians to initiate a mandatory inoculation campaign. Despite these interventions, the virus killed on average sixty percent of all Rwandan cattle it infected.[3]

The introduction of Rinderpest to Belgian territory had significant ramifications for Uganda, as well. For nearly a decade, the British administration in Uganda had worked diligently

[1] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B. "Veterinary," 1919-1920.

[2] M. Carlier, "La Lutte contre la Peste bovine au Ruanda," *Bulletin Agricole du Congo Belge* 11:3 (1920), 191-93.

[3] Alison des Forges and David S. Newbury, *Defeat Is the Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896 -1931* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011 [1972]), 171-72.

to contain the epizootic, employing quarantines, permit systems, mandatory inoculation programs, and stiff penalties for non-compliance, but to no avail. Between 1912 and 1920, the Protectorate lost an estimated 320,000 cattle across Buganda Kingdom and Western Province, out of a total of 541,000 animals.[4] The spread of the virus into Rwanda magnified the crisis, not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of governance. Now two colonial governments—one British, one Belgian—were responsible for managing it, with two different veterinary departments, in two different imperial languages, across two different territories united by one common border. Even if Protectorate authorities succeeded in eradicating the disease from their territory, their Belgian colleagues (with their assumed inferior veterinary skills) might not, and the cycle of infection would continue. To guard against the possibility of future cross-border contamination, Uganda officials devised a host of new technologies to help them manage their 170-kilometer frontier with Rwanda. Between 1920 and 1931, they introduced veterinary ordinances, cattle brands, permit systems, quarantine camps, armed border patrols, frontier tribunals, and extradition agreements, all of which aimed at wresting control over the movement of livestock and the diseases they carried.

The movement of cattle, however, could not be disentangled from the movements and motivations of their human caretakers. Livestock were central to the colonial vision of economic development, leading Protectorate agents to value animals only in terms of their monetary worth. Yet cattle represented something far more important than money in the eyes of most borderland residents: they were a medium of social and political exchange. In Rwanda especially, the

[4] These figures are based on Blue Book estimates quoted in the Veterinary Report for 1921. They are not adjusted for losses and gains arising from immigration and natural population growth, nor do they differentiate on the basis of cause of death. However, they do point to significant losses across much of the Protectorate for this period, and corroborate eyewitness accounts.

transfer of cattle was central to patron-client relationships and marriages. It was also central to state-society relations. The Rwandan *Mwami* (King), who was said to own all of the cattle in his kingdom, loaned cattle to his chiefs and notables as a way of securing loyalty—particularly from those in the distant provinces. Disrupting the flow of cattle across borders therefore constituted a disruption of people's social and political lives.

Colonial responses to the 1919-20 Rinderpest epizootic signaled a watershed in the history of border management between Uganda and Rwanda. Before state administrators sought to regulate the movement of *people* across borders, they created laws, infrastructure, and practices to control the passage of livestock. Anti-Rinderpest measures obliged the colonial state to strive for a level of territorial control that had hitherto been unimaginable, but this does not mean that the results were linear. This chapter weaves together a multi-species history of disease and mobility to craft a "border biography" of the Uganda-Rwanda frontier, a historical study exploring "how specific boundaries materialize, rematerialize, and dematerialize in different ways, in different contexts, at different scales and at different times."[5]

This chapter is divided into five parts. Part one provides a brief overview of the history of cattle-keeping and its relevance to conceptions of political space and identity in the Great Lakes region. Part two turns to the construction of colonial borders during the first decade of the twentieth century, emphasizing the continued importance of political allegiances over and above careful observance of political territory. A narrative of the 1919-20 Rinderpest outbreak in southern Uganda and northern Rwanda forms the basis of part three, in which I demonstrate how the introduction of new laws, practices, and infrastructure—all introduced in the interest of

[5] Nick Megoran, "'B/ordering' and Biopolitics in Central Asia," in *A Companion to Border Studies*, edited by Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, (Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 492.

controlling a deadly epizootic outbreak—had significant consequences for human mobility at the border. The (veterinary) medicalization of the border was inherently political, because it disrupted how borderland residents conducted and conceived of their political lives. Part four examines the afterlives of the 1919-20 epizootic and how its spread into Rwanda served as a catalyst for a new and unprecedented focus on border control. Part five, finally, documents the ways that the evolving cattle migration controls worked to prevent patrons and peasants alike from crossing the border.

Part I: Cattle, Territory, Identity

A history of colonial borders in interlacustrine Africa must begin with a discussion about cattle, for cattle have long played a critical role in defining the contours and relational content of social and political space. Archaeological evidence dates the domestication of cattle in the region to the third century CE, with some findings suggesting the presence of cattle as early as the first millennium BCE.[6] Changing climate and falling water tables, phenomena likely spurred by widespread forest-clearing that accompanied the rise in iron-smelting, transformed the tropical woodland into drier savannah, creating conditions that favored the expansion of pastoral society.[7] The proliferation of terms describing the shape and size of cattle horns and the color of their hides points to the growing political and social currency of cattle from 500 CE onwards, despite the continued primacy of grain crops to basic survival.[8]

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[6] Jean-Pierre Chrétien, *The great lakes of Africa: two thousand years of history* (New York: Zone Books, 2003), 68-77.

[7] David S. Newbury, *The land beyond the mists essays on identity and authority in precolonial Congo and Rwanda* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 295.

[8] David Lee Schoenbrun, *A green place, a good place: agrarian change, gender, and social identity in the Great Lakes region to the 15th century* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1998), 74.

Cattle played a critical role in the emergence of central African kingdoms in the seventeenth century, most notably Rwanda. While the region's impressive population growth from the fifteenth century onwards must be attributed to the development of banana cultivation, cattle took on social and political significance in ways that agricultural produce did not. The first Rwandan monarch, Ruganzu Ndori, was likely a Muhima cattle-keeper from Nkore (present-day Ankole, Uganda) who migrated south with his herds to what is now central Rwanda, sometime around the middle of the seventeenth century. There, he managed to gain authority over other powerful herders by using his superior wealth in cattle to turn his would-be competitors into clients.[9] Following Ndori's death, his descendants pursued a course of consolidation and expansion, using cattle as a means of incorporating potential rivals into the fold.

As the kingdom expanded, the court sought to exercise control over distant provinces through the development of permanent armies and the manipulation of its intricate patronage networks. Armies were particularly useful for managing the noble ranks, not only because they held the monopoly over violence, but also because their work as professional cattle raiders ensured a regular supply of new herds that the *mwami* could then use to reward his favorites. Nobles wanted cattle, in turn, because with cattle they could acquire their own clients; the more cattle they controlled, the greater their power base. The creation of permanent armies and the multiplication of dependent nobility allowed the royal court to begin seizing the herds of individual lords during the early-mid eighteenth century, making them ever more dependent on

[9] Jan Vansina, *Antecedents to modern Rwanda the Nyiginya Kingdom* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 47.

the king for their wealth.[10] By the end of the eighteenth century, the court commanded all of the major herds in the kingdom.

By the opening of the nineteenth century, the steady growth in human and cattle populations was beginning to limit the availability of arable land. Without land, nobles could not sustain their herds; without land, the majority of the kingdom's subjects could not feed themselves. The court, however, took this burgeoning crisis as an opportunity to centralize control. In a move designed to protect his chief political resource—cattle—the *mwami* Rwogera (c. 1845-67) ordered the creation of royal pasture reserves, which he then placed under the control of a favorite client. The hiving-off of precious land for royal use accelerated under the reign of Rwogera's son, Rwabugiri (c. 1867-95), who intensified the practice in the central region and extended it outwards into the kingdom's periphery. The development of royal pastures exacerbated the land shortage at the same time that it displaced former provincial authorities, replacing them with clients who were responsible to no one but the *mwami.* The centralization of command further heightened competition among the noble families, who jockeyed to secure coveted positions for their sons. In the process, many found themselves on the losing end of the struggle.

Intense political competition quickened painful processes of social stratification in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.[11] It was at this time that the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi"—ethnonyms that had been in circulation for centuries—took on new socio-political meaning. Now that a personal connection to the court was of paramount importance in determining access to cattle and land, "Tutsi"—a term long associated with pastoralism—became the label for wealthy,

[10] Ibid. 68.

[11] Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda*, 134-36.

cattle-owning lineages, while "Hutu" came to mean, among other things, a lack of influential connections.[12]

Yet in recognizing the social and political significance of the structural changes introduced under Rwabugiri, one must be careful to view these developments as on-going, historical trends, not fait accompli. This was the mistake of colonial administrators and certain academics who, in an effort to explain (or justify) how a Tutsi minority maintained such extensive command over people, land, and cattle, adopted a functionalist view of Rwandan society. This position originated in the works of Jacques Maquet, who hypothesized that the kingdom's "coherence" stemmed from the symbiotic relationship between cattle-owning patrons and cattle-leasing clients, and that this give-and-take allowed for an integrated if grossly unequal society.[13] Maquet's "Premise of Inequality," while popular among colonial officials, Tutsi monarchists and certain western academics, soon came under criticism from other scholars who pointed to the pervasiveness of violence that made such coercive relationships possible.[14] Historians have further endeavored to situate these relationships in time, demonstrating, in contrast to Maquet's timeless functionalism, the significant variations in Rwandan political space and time. The *Mwami's* command over territory and people was dependent on his ability and the ability of his chiefs to assert the court's authority over disparate provinces of unwilling clients, often through violent means.

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[12] Catharine Newbury, *The cohesion of oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 11.

[13] Jacques Maquet, *The premise of inequality in Ruanda: a study of political relations in a central African kingdom* (London: Published for the International African Institute by the Oxford University Press, 1961).

[14] See for example Marcel d' Hertefelt, *Les clans du Rwanda ancien. Éléments d'ethnosociologie et d'ethnohistoire* (Tervuren: Musée royal de l'Afrique central, 1971).

It is also important to clarify that in highlighting the political significance of cattle and their relationship to political space, I am not suggesting that cattle clientage was universally important to all Rwandan subjects. As other scholars have shown, only a minority of Rwandans participated in cattle clientship (*ubuhake*) during the late 1800s through to 1954, the year the institution was formally abolished.[15] Instead, my purpose in sketching the political history of cattle in Rwanda is to lay the groundwork for an investigation of changing border regimes in the twentieth century. When colonial veterinarians began to impose barriers against the movement of animals across the Uganda-Rwanda frontier, they did so in the interest of preventing the spread of disease and protecting what they considered to be a valuable economic asset. But their work was inherently political, whether they realized it or not, because the ability to control the distribution of cattle across space was central to how politics was done in Rwanda.

The movement of cattle was also important for a host of other reasons that had little to do with *ubuhake* clientage. In this chapter, I follow Danielle de Lame in conceptualizing cattle as "ambiguous capital," the value of which varies across time, space, and circumstance. Indeed, it is the slipperiness of the sign that make cattle such excellent things (beasts) to think with. Cattle may be bought, leased, given, received, swapped or stolen. A cow might embody the alliance of two families through marriage, or it might be sold at market price. A bull could be slaughtered in service of the sacred, or it could be castrated and raised for meat as part of a government-run development scheme. A herd still communicates one's attainment of the 'good life,' while the careful distribution of animals among friends and relatives is thought a prudent way to hide

[15] Claudine Vidal, "Le Rwanda des anthropologues ou le fétichisme de la vache," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 9:3 (1969): 384-401; Francois Saucier, "The Patron-Client Relationship in Traditional and Contemporary Southern Rwanda" (PhD Diss., Columbia University, 1974).

accumulation.[16] Adding to these examples, this chapter also shows that cattle could signify biological danger, which might in turn be attributed to the animal's "foreignness" or history of "illicit" mobility. Cattle, in other words, came to embody the ambiguity of the bordering process.

Cattle and twentieth century borders

The colonial imposition of the Uganda-Rwanda border in 1911 did not initially do much to disrupt the ebb and flow of Rwandan political territory, but that is not the same as saying that the border was inconsequential. The arrival of new political actors (e.g., the British and Germans, and after 1916, the Belgians) introduced new possibilities for strategic alliance-building.

Take, for example, the story of Nyindo, a Tutsi noble who oversaw the northern province of Bufumbira. Bufumbira, the land beyond the Mfumbiro volcanic chain, had long been an independent territory just beyond the northern marches of the Rwandan kingdom. Rwabugiri finally conquered it sometime during the 1880s, after which he built a royal compound there and left it in charge of one his wives, Kumukera, and a favorite client. Nyindo was Kumukera's and Rwabugiri's son, and when he had grown his father installed him as the provincial chief of Bufumbira. From 1890 to 1911, Nyindo ruled the province at the pleasure of the *Mwami*, sending regular tribute to the court in exchange for his continued access to royal herds.

When the British annexed Bufumbira as their own, they kept the preexisting political structures in place. Nyindo retained his position—now retitled *Saza* [County] Chief—but with the provision that he would accept the oversight of an agent selected by the British to tutor Nyindo in the ways of government.[17] Nyindo agreed to this arrangement, likely because he saw

[16] Danielle de Lame and Helen Arnold, *A Hill Among a Thousand: Transformations and Ruptures in Rural Rwanda* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 370.

[17] For the first twenty (and in some places, like Bufumbira, thirty) years of Protectorate rule, the British employed Ganda agents—trusted African conscripts from the Buganda kingdom in central Uganda—to help them establish a

it as the best possible option in a time of political uncertainty. Yet he continued to collect and send tribute to the Rwandan court, despite his new status as a British subject. The British, furthermore, were fully aware of his continued relationship with the *Mwami*, but their presence on the ground was weak, and they knew that the success or failure of their political project depended on the cooperation of local authorities. They were therefore willing to turn a blind eye to the steady movement of cattle, agricultural prestations, and laborers across their border with what was now German Ruanda, requesting only that Nyindo agree to share administrative power with one of their agents, and that he swear his ultimate allegiance to the British Crown, never allowing his loyalties to the *Mwami* trump his commitments to the Protectorate.[18]

Nyindo's reluctant cooperation with the new European interlopers, of course, was instrumental only, something to be discarded when a better opportunity arose. This opportunity came in the form of World War I. *Mwami* Musinga—Rwabugiri's heir and Nyindo's half-brother—sent word to Nyindo instructing him to ally with the Germans, who promised to return Bufumbira to the kingdom if they won.[19] The Germans, however, were quickly routed in Rwanda following a joint invasion of British and Belgian forces in 1916. Bufumbira was permanently lost to Rwanda, and Nyindo's rebellion ended in failure. He surrendered himself to the British in 1916, who deported him and his family to the neighboring District of Ankole, just east of Kigezi.

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colonial administration. See A.D. Roberts, "The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda," *Journal of African History* 3:3 (1962): 435-50.

[18] Elizabeth Hopkins, "The Nyabingi Cult of Southwestern Uganda," in *Protest and Power in Black Africa*, edited by R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970): 308-9; Benoni Turyahikayo-Rugyema, "The History of the Bakiga in Southwestern Uganda and Northern Rwanda ca. 1500-1930" (PhD Diss., University of Michigan, 1974): 538.

[19] Paul Ngologoza, *Kigezi and its People* (Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1969), 60; Des Forges 1972 [2011], *Defeat is the Only Bad News*, 130

Nyindo's dismissal and exile were consequences of the new border, but the fact that he was allowed to maintain connections with the *Mwami* for as long as he did highlights the border-as-process, over and above the border as political artifact or physical line. Moreover, his continued commitment to the Rwandan court, expressed through the ongoing traffic in cattle, people, and goods, demonstrated the extra-territorial reach of the *Mwami*, whose domain did not map neatly onto contiguous political space. Nyindo's Bufumbiro chieftaincy had, like many other northern provinces, been created during the expansionist wars of his father, Rwabugiri. When the king died unexpectedly in 1895, the royal court descended into a violent succession struggle, and in the chaos that followed many of the northern clans had opportunity to reassert their independence. Rwabugiri's son and successor, Musinga, was only an infant when the king died, and when he came of age in the 1910s, he found that he had lost most of the territories that his father had seized.[20] Yet the contraction of the kingdom was not linear: Pockets of loyal clients remained behind the receding frontier, satellites that continued to send tribute despite being territorially remote. Bufumbiro was one such satellite, and would continue to be long after the establishment of colonial borders. Nyindo's deposition was neither a consequence of his repeated border transgressions nor his continued relationship with the Rwandan court. Rather, the British removed him from power when his political commitments to the *Mwami* drove him to take the extraordinary act of siding with the Germans. The "border," then, was about political alliances, not territorial sovereignty *per se*, and Nyindo's case showed that even this boundary could accommodate considerable ambiguity.

[20] The fact that Nyindo was Musinga's half-brother meant relatively little when it came to the question of loyalty. Given the scarcity of land and political resources, family life in the growing noble class could be acrimonious, even violent. Relationships between brothers, half-brothers, and male cousins (i.e., between young men who were competing for a share of their father's inheritance) could be especially fraught, and instances of fratricide were not uncommon.

While Nyindo was collecting cattle tributes in Uganda to send to the Rwandan court, his teenage nephew, Nyirimbirima, was preparing for life as a Tutsi noble. The son of a wealthy land chief, Nshozamihigo, with direct family ties to *Mwami* Musinga,[21] Nyirimbirima was positioned to inherit extensive territory in the northern province of Mulera. But something happened between 1914 and 1917 that soured his relationship with the court. It began with the whisperings of the king's most trusted advisor, Bandora, who warned the embattled monarch that Nyirimbirima was going to make a bid for the throne. Bandora's motivations were obvious—he was also from Mulera, and he was envious of Nyirimbirima's inheritance—but Musinga was clearly prepared to listen. Perhaps it was the fact that Nyirimbirima's father had grown too powerful for comfort. Or maybe the king was suspicious of the young man's dealings with the meddlesome Catholic missionaries, who had a station in Mulera and who were drawing so many young nobles away from the court. Then again, the *Mwami* might just have been paranoid, for these were anxious times: His bid to help the Germans had failed, he was under the surveillance of a new European power, many of the northern provinces were in open rebellion, and the Christian missions were becoming powerful patrons in their own right.[22]

Whatever the reason, Musinga turned on Nyirimbirima shortly after Nshozamihigo's death. In August 1917, the *Mwami* ordered the young noble to appear before the court, where he was placed in confinement for four months and subjected to repeated floggings and abuse.[23]

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[21] Nshozamihigo, Nyindo, and Musinga were all half-brothers, sons of the late Rwabugiri. Nyirimbirima was Rwabugiri's grandson.

[22] The 1910s had been a tumultuous decade for Musinga, marked by a series of rebellions across his kingdom's northern periphery, many of which were led by mysterious and charismatic leaders who claimed to be the rightful heirs to the Rwandan throne. Nyirimbirima, then, as a grandson of the infamous Rwabugiri (Musinga's father) and the son of the powerful notable, Nshozamihigo, (Musinga's half-brother), might feasibly position himself as a contender to the throne.

[23] Des Forges 1972 [2011], *Defeat is the Only Bad News*, 148-50.

Nyirimbirima was finally released in November, but this was only the beginning of his punishment: He was to be sent back to Mulera, where news of his humiliating ordeal was already well known. Musinga had feared that Nyirimbirima might instigate a rebellion in Mulera, but the truth was that the people of Mulera hated the son as much as they had hated the father. Mulera was only incorporated into Rwanda during Rwabugiri's reign, and the local residents resented the Tutsi nobles who collected tribute on behalf of the court. Nyirimbirima consequently would have had no chance of leading a popular revolt, even before his imprisonment. Now that everyone knew he had fallen out of favor with the court, he was an open target. He therefore made a logical decision upon reaching Mulera: he organized his household and closest followers, selected several hundred of his favorite cattle, and set out from his natal home in the direction of Bufumbira.

Nyirimbirima's decision to bring his cattle might be interpreted as an attempt to safeguard his inheritance and personal wealth, but it was much more than this. His cattle tied him into a complex web of patron-client relationships, making any major movement inherently political. He had likely acquired many cattle from his father as well as the *Mwami*, making him a client of the court. In Mulera, he had used these cattle and their offspring to gain his own following. In selecting his favorite cattle to bring with him to Bufumbira, he was simultaneously choosing which clients should follow him into exile. He was not simply protecting his material wealth: he was fashioning a political constituency.

The British administration in Bufumbira, however, failed to recognize the political import of Nyirimbirima's herds or the complex obligations they represented. Instead, the colonial government welcomed the young lord with open arms, believing they could use him, a Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi noble from Mulera, to govern the difficult borderland residents of

Bufumbira, whom the British regarded as "Banyaruanda," or Hutu. Indeed, Nyirimbirima's Tutsi identity was, in the eyes of the British, central to his legitimacy. Heavily informed by scientific racism, colonial administrators, most notably the DC Kigezi, believed Tutsi constituted a superior race that had conquered the Hutu cultivators of Rwanda centuries before. Therefore, the logic went, if a predominantly Hutu constituency was to be part of the British Protectorate, then it must be governed by a Tutsi chief, their presumed natural leader. Nyindo's act of treason had turned the British against the local Tutsi population, but Nyirimbirima came from outside and could thus be seen as separate from local intrigues and cliques. In his annual report for 1921, the DC Kigezi even described him as an "indigenous chief," despite the fact that he was neither born in Uganda nor "from" Bufumbiro in any sense of the word.[24] His indigeneity was defined by his presumed racial identity—an identity symbolized in his wealth in cattle—at the same time that his trustworthiness depended on his separateness from Bufumbiro Tutsi politics. While it was true that Nyindo had betrayed them, the British believed the nephew would prove faithful: He was, after all, a refugee of the court.

The stories of Nyindo and Nyirimbirima illustrate the kinds of social and political networks that animated the Uganda-Rwanda frontier during the first two decades of the twentieth century. This section has further emphasized the significance of mobile cattle to changing constellations of patrons and clients at the border. Appreciating the political possibilities of this earlier moment is crucial for understanding how Rinderpest (and, more importantly, anti-Rinderpest campaigns) impacted the transborder mobility of both people and cattle. Here, it is important to state that my argument is not that the border went from being more permeable to less permeable, or less real to more real, but rather that changes to veterinary laws and

[24] Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report for Kigezi District, 1921* (Entebbe: Government Printer): 6.

infrastructure, combined with colonial conceptions of a particular animal disease, had lasting consequences for how and where the border materialized.

Part II: Creating a Colonial Veterinary Service

For the first decade of the twentieth century, the Protectorate government operated without a resident veterinarian. Sick and injured animals used for government transport would be sent to the veterinary service in Kenya,[25] where a white settler population ensured the presence of adequate care for their imported herds.[26] Costly and inconvenient—the journey took three days by rail and lake steamer, meaning that most injured animals did not survive the crossing, while many contagious animals were simply not sent—this was the system for the first decade of British rule.

The driving impetus behind the formation of a Protectorate veterinary department arose not from an internal demand for better services but from growing international investment in the treatment and prevention of epizootics, particularly Rinderpest. While European governments had largely managed to control the spread of Rinderpest within Europe by the turn of the century, they still did not have a safe vaccination. Moreover, the expansion of the global livestock trade and of European empires had opened up new potential circuits for the spread of disease, and few colonial governments had the veterinary infrastructure thought necessary to combat a serious epizootic episode. Finally, changing professional standards in the fields of human and veterinary medicine had given rise to a new class of certified physicians, who, in the

[25] Unlike Kenya, which had been established as a settler colony, Uganda was a protectorate, and was not intended for white settlement. Kenya's white settler community had ensured the availability of adequate veterinary services, at least in the highlands. See Waller 2004.

[26] J. Carmichael, "Uganda" in *A History of the Overseas Veterinary Services, Part II*, ed. DHL Rollinson and JFF Callear (London: British Veterinary Association, 1973), 341.

wake of the germ theory revolution, were committed to a brand of science that valued transparency, communication, and standardized methods.[27] Gathering at conferences held across Europe and Africa, an international community of veterinary experts slowly coalesced around mutual concerns regarding disease, veterinary sanitation, animal husbandry, and policy. At the ninth meeting of the International Veterinary Congress, held in The Hague in 1909, government physicians and agricultural ministers representing nineteen countries across Europe and North America, as well as European colonial interests in Africa and the Pacific, passed a resolution urging "the various [colonial] Governments which have not yet organized a veterinary supervision…[to] do so as expediently as possible." All "colonizing States" were furthermore encouraged to finance veterinary research in "the tropics," on the grounds that "etiology forms the base of all veterinary sanitary administration."[28] Colonial veterinary surgeons operating in British East Africa (Kenya), German East Africa (Tanganyika, Ruanda, Urundi), and the South African colonies were all present at The Hague and endorsed these resolutions.[29]

The British Colonial Office response to the Hague resolutions, and to the burgeoning international interest in veterinary science more generally, was to first augment the small veterinary department in Kenya with a bacteriologist, and to formalize plans for the construction of a laboratory dedicated to the study of animal diseases.[30] That same year, the Colonial Office

[27] On global networks of medical expertise, see Deborah Joy Neill, *Networks in tropical medicine internationalism, colonialism, and the rise of a medical specialty, 1890-1930* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012).

[28] Ninth International Veterinary Congress at The Hague, 13-19 September 1909. Vol. III, "Organization, Opening and Closing meetings, General Meetings," 244. FIX

[29] Ninth International Veterinary Congress at The Hague, 13-19 September 1909. National committees, subjects to be treated, etc.

[30] A. Theiler, "Notes on Stock Diseases of German and British East Africa and Uganda, and the Resolutions of the International Veterinary Congress at The Hague, Holland, 1909," In *Agricultural Journal of British East Africa*, 3:1 (April 1910), 41.

sent E.E. Hutchins, a young Dublin graduate and Member of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, to Uganda to serve as the Protectorate's first resident veterinarian.[31] He initially had only one staff member, an older clerk named H. Rahmtullah who had worked for the British in Uganda since 1898.[32] The veterinary service gradually expanded over the next decade, adding veterinary officers, Indian veterinary assistants, stock inspectors, and clerks.[33]

Hutchins and his staff, while initially brought in to oversee the health of the Protectorate's transport animals,[34] were soon overwhelmed with managing disease outbreaks, the most terrifying of which was Rinderpest. Rinderpest was, until its final eradication in 2010, one of the deadliest animal diseases on Earth. In immunologically naive populations, it was not uncommon to witness mortality rates exceeding ninety-five percent. An animal typically contracted the disease by inhaling the mucosa of an infected herdmate. Entering through the upper-respiratory tract, the virus quickly destroyed the linings of the alimentary tract as well as lymphoid tissue, suppressing the animal's immune system and rendering the animal vulnerable to other infections. Acute infection was characterized by the rapid onset of symptoms, typically manifesting within three to five days (but sometimes taking as long as seven to nine days). Within six to twelve days of the appearance of symptoms, the host either recovered or succumbed. [35]

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[31] Carmichael, "Uganda," 341.

[32] Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year ended 31st March, 1918* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1918), 5.

[33] Uganda Protectorate. *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year Ended 31st March, 1915* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1915), 3.

[34] Carmichael, "Uganda," 341.

[35] C.A. Spinage, *Cattle plague: a history* (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003), 5-7.

The disease, which likely originated on the steppes of central Asia, had terrorized Eurasia for millennia, but was virtually unknown in sub-Saharan Africa prior to its introduction to Ethiopia by Italian soldiers in 1870. Within seven short years, Rinderpest had, with the help of its mobile hosts, traveled as far as the Atlantic Ocean to the west and Cape of Good Hope to the south. It reached northeastern Uganda by late 1890, moving rapidly with the herds of the Masaai, Karamojong, and Turkana communities into western Kenya and central and southwestern Uganda. Emin Pasha reported its arrival along the Kagera River in April 1891, less than four months after its first appearance in northern Uganda. Oral histories and traveler accounts of this period speak of unprecedented devastation; of mile after mile of dead and bloated cattle filling the air with choking stench; of subsequent famine and small pox epidemics; of buzzards too heavy to fly and lions that developed a taste for human prey; and of losses that drove some men to suicide, and others to barter their children for food.[36]

The end of the African Rinderpest pandemic (1889-96) was brought about, not by human intervention, but by the contagion itself. Because the morbillivirus that caused Rinderpest could not survive outside of its host for more than a few hours, its survival in any given region depended on the uninterrupted availability of a susceptible population. In centers of endemic infection like western Europe, where experienced herds had acquired some level of resistance to through the disease, mortality rates were relatively low (0-30%), thus enabling the virus' survival. Naïve hosts, on the other hand, had almost no immunological defenses and therefore succumbed in overwhelming numbers.[37] This meant that the inexperienced herd, in order to

[36] Charles H. Ambler, *Kenyan Communities in the Age of Imperialism: The Central Region in the Late Nineteenth Century* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988).

[37] Gordon R. Scott, "Pan-African Rinderpest Campaigns," in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities,* edited by Paul Nugent and A.I. Aswiju (New York and London: Pinter, 1996), 147.

survive, had to be very large and capable of reproducing at a rate that outpaced the ravages of the disease. In most instances involving naïve hosts, the virus simply killed its host population and thus burned itself out.

This was the case across much of eastern and central Africa in the 1890s: So complete was the devastation that in many places, the virus was left without a host and thus ceased to be a threat. Cattle and bison herds slowly recovered their numbers, and for the first decade of the twentieth century, Rinderpest outbreaks in Uganda were relatively rare. When Rinderpest did reappear, it was generally confined to the northeast and east where cross-border trade and cattle-raids reintroduced the disease from Kenya and the Sudan.[38] By the time Hutchins arrived in 1909, most of major pastoral communities had rebuilt their herds.

Hutchins and his staff had worked diligently to contain these minor foci, employing the weapons they knew from anti-Rinderpest campaigns in Europe—quarantines, movement permits, and veterinary sanitation ordinances—together with new inoculation technologies developed in South Africa. Hutchins' staff devoted most of their time and energies to addressing outbreak, inoculating over 38,000 cattle in 1912 alone. The Protectorate placed a moratorium on the small cattle export business, with the Nile as an imagined boundary against the unfolding epidemic, but in August 1913 Hutchins' staff confirmed Rinderpest cases in Buganda Kingdom (Map 1).[39]

These methods worked with limited success for several years, but Hutchins knew that a serious episode would quickly overwhelm his limited staff and resources.[40] Controlling

[38] Spinage, *Cattle Plague*, 578.

[39] Spinage, *Cattle Plague*, 578.

[40] Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year Ended 31st March*, 1913, p. 24.

Rinderpest was demanding work, even when an outbreak was small and localized. Simply getting to the site of a suspected outbreak could require a one-two day journey on foot, by which point the disease might already have claimed a whole herd and moved on to new hosts. One veterinary officer recalled the dismal scene of an infected herd. Alerted to a possible outbreak by "the usual tattered note from some little sub-chief," the officer would:

> "rush out on foot or by cycle to the area concerned and then, as we neared the boma, there, swinging lazily overhead, would be the inevitable vultures. As we approached still nearer we would be greeted by the unmistakable and overpowering smell of a Rinderpest *kraal* [paddock]—there was seldom any need for a closer diagnosis..."[41]

In the absence of any laboratory test that might confirm the presence of Rinderpest (the virus could not be seen under light microscopes), the colonial veterinarian based his diagnosis on clinical observation alone. Armed with only a thermometer and stethoscope, the officer would check for the telltale symptoms: elevated temperature, excessive salivation, mucus discharge, oral lesions, and dehydration resulting from profuse diarrhea. Most often, however, it was the smell emanating from the animal's stall that clenched the diagnosis.[42]

In the event of an outbreak, sick animals were either quarantined or slaughtered, as there was no other treatment available at that time. For healthy animals, Hutchins' team had the option of administering a primitive inoculation using what was known as the "serum-simultaneous" or "mixed" method, which two European bacteriologists had developed at a veterinary research station in South Africa. This method involved injecting a healthy animal with serum and an attenuated form of the virus at the same time. In the best-case scenario, eighty-eight to ninety

[41] R.J. Simmons, "In Retrospect," *Bulletin of Epizootic Diseases in Africa* 5:5 (1957): 361.

[42] Scott, "Pan-African Rinderpest Campaigns," 146.

percent of treated cattle received life-long immunity, with only a 1.5% mortality rate.[43] However, the success of the inoculation depended on many factors, many of which were outside of the veterinarian's control. The serum might be contaminated with another pathogen, for example, or the attenuated virus might be too potent for the animal to combat. Moreover, since both the serum and the attenuated virus were produced out of a lab in Nairobi until the Protectorate established its own research center, entire batches of inoculation expired while en route.[44]

Consequently, early vaccination campaigns in Uganda witnessed very high mortality rates, and this contributed to widespread distrust and even open hostility towards colonial veterinarians. Protectorate officials predictably blamed "native superstition" for local aversion to veterinary practices, but herders had good reason to question the intentions of colonial surgeons. For starters, herders knew that inoculation was dangerous. By the CVO's own admission, a "highly satisfactory" survival rate was 88 percent, meaning that in a district with a population of 200,000 cattle, over 24,000 would be expected to die of complications.[45] Cattle owners were furthermore expected to pay a fee for every inoculated animal that survived—a policy that ultimately backfired when people failed to pay their taxes, having spent all available cash on vaccinations. Even more troubling, Article V of the 1918 *Animal Diseases Ordinance* allowed any veterinary officer to order the immediate slaughter of any animal or animals infected or suspected of being infected with Rinderpest.[46]

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[43] Spinage, *Cattle Plague*, 433.

[44] Simmons, "In retrospect," 359.

[45] H.B. Thomas and Robert Scott, *Uganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 203.

[46] Uganda Protectorate, *Diseases of Animals Ordinance* No. 13 of 1917.

The work took a serious toll on veterinary staff. Spending weeks at a time on safari, sleeping in tents near infected herds, and subsisting on a limited and largely vegetarian diet, staff were constantly falling ill. Two European stock inspectors died of Blackwater fever,[47] two others were forced into early retirement by unremitting illnesses, and still another officer committed suicide.[48]

Despite these hardships, Hutchins' team appeared to be remarkably successful in containing the spread of Rinderpest for the first five years of operation. In his annual report for 1915, the CVO even boasted that his staff had finally succeeded in bringing the disease to heel through a combination of effective quarantine practices and expert administration of the serum-simultaneous inoculation method. It now only existed "in remote districts bordering the Sudan and British East Africa [Kenya]," he wrote, "and thus all danger of the epidemic extending through Uganda to Southern Africa has for the time being been removed."[49] Hutchins' premature declaration of victory is perhaps understandable in view of the great personal costs entailed in early veterinary work, but much of his team's apparent success had as much to do with luck as it did with scientific expertise. A bad batch of serum could kill an entire herd and poison local opinion; one infected goat could slip across a militarized quarantine zone, obviating the purpose of harsh sanitation measures. In the end, colonial veterinarians simply did not understand the ecology of the virus, and were consequently unable to prepare for all eventualities. Hutchins, for example, was unaware that pigs could swim.

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[47] Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year ended 31st March, 1921* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1923), 4.

[48] R.J. Simmons, "In Retrospect," *Bulletin of Epizootic Diseases in Africa* 5:5 (1957), 362-63.

[49] *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year Ended 31st March, 1917*, in *Tropical Veterinary Bulletin* 6, no. 1 (1918): 53-55.

In July 1917, the District Commissioner of Lango in Northern Province cabled Hutchins to inform him that the Rinderpest outbreak in his district had spilled over into neighboring Bunyoro, in Western Province. An Indian trader had allegedly been responsible for reintroducing the disease to Lango the month before by importing raw cattle hides from Gulu, where "Rinderpest was rampant." The hapless suspect was convicted under the *Animal Diseases Ordinance* and sentenced with the maximum fine, but the damage was already done. By early July, chiefs were reporting multiple outbreaks along the Victoria Nile that formed the District's western border with Bunyoro.

The outbreak in Lango was lamentable, but district administrators and veterinary staff had been hopeful that the river would help contain the epizootic and prevent it from spreading further west. This approach of using so-called natural barriers to curb and channel epizootics was a common practice in Europe and especially Africa, where colonial administrations lacked the means and manpower to enforce sanitary corridors. But rivers are not simply barriers: they are part of complex ecosystems and geographical landscapes, and can just as easily act as conduits, filters, and sanctuaries. The river (and the crocodiles and hippopotami that swam beneath its surface) did indeed prevent many animals from crossing, but this did not make it a "natural" barrier against Rinderpest—this quality was ascribed to it in the imaginations of colonial scientists.

In all likelihood, the Rinderpest virus forded the Nile's treacherous waters in the bloodstreams of wild pigs. "Of its ability to swim the Nile I have ample proof," the DC argued in his report to the CVO,

> "as its numbers have been increasing rapidly on the East bank of the Nile and they have been swimming across from Bunyoro. In the event of their becoming infected with

> Rinderpest, nothing seems more likely than that they should try to avoid the scourge by returning to the West bank, thus carrying the disease to the buffalo."[50]

Pigs, goats, and antelope, while rarely exhibiting symptoms, could facilitate epidemics by acting as carriers of the virus. The invisibility of their infection, combined with their wide-ranging mobility and (in the case of wild boar and antelope) relative independence of human caretakers, made them key actors in Rinderpest epizootics. Even if colonial governments had possessed the resources and human agents needed to control the movements of people and domestic cattle across borders, the ability of antelope to jump fences, of pigs to ford rivers, and of goats to trek mountains meant that all human efforts to contain the spread of Rinderpest could be undone by one intrepid swine.

As predicted, Rinderpest, once introduced to Western Province in July 1917, spread rapidly southwards, crossing into Rwanda by March of the following year. As the next section will demonstrate, colonial responses to this phase of the epizootic signaled a marked shift in the history of border management between Uganda and Rwanda. Veterinary laws, practices, and infrastructure designed to respond to a deadly disease were slowly, over the period of fifteen years, incorporated into a more generalized mobility regime that structured how animals *and* people could move across international boundaries.

Part III: The view from the border: Anti-Rinderpest Work in Kigezi, 1919-20

British officials stationed in southwestern Uganda watched the unfolding epizootic with increasing trepidation. The Western Province was important cattle country, with an estimated

[50] Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture,* 1918 (Entebbe: Government Printer), 37.

cattle population of 350,000 in 1917.[51] Protectorate officials hoped to develop the pastures and herds into a lucrative livestock industry,[52] but the region had suffered tremendous losses during the 1890s pandemic and was still in the process of recovery. Twenty years without Rinderpest had given the herds opportunity to rebuild their numbers,[53] but it also meant that they had no immunological memory of the disease, and would therefore be highly susceptible in the event of a fresh outbreak.

A second source of concern had to do with the lack of manpower, resources, and infrastructure needed to fight an epizootic in an area as rural and remote as Western Province. In 1919, the Veterinary Division had a staff of thirteen people, four of whom were office clerks, fully occupied in fighting Rinderpest in Eastern Province and Buganda.[54] A substantial grant from the Colonial Office enabled the Protectorate to elevate the veterinary service to department status in 1920 and to add thirty-five people to its pay roster,[55] but they were still faced with

[51] Summary of the *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year Ended 31st March, 1917*, in *Tropical Veterinary Bulletin* 6:1 (1918), 53.

[52] Eustace Montgomery, "The Stock Industry in Uganda," in *The Annual Report on the Veterinary Department, 1921*, 19-24 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1921), 19-20.

[53] Recovery levels are based on guesswork, as exact numbers of pre-pandemic cattle are unknown for most places. A 1924 colonial survey conducted with herders in two districts of northern Tanganyika, which borders Ankole (Uganda) to the north and Rwanda to the west, estimated that the two districts had lost a combined total of 380,000 out of 400,000 cattle during the 1890s pandemic. Similarly, we know that Emin Pasha lost 565 out of 600 head cattle, or a little over ninety-four percent, when Rinderpest passed through his northern Tanganyikan paddock in 1891. See John Ford, *The Role of the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A Study of the Tsetse Fly Problem* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971): 141. The head of the Anglo-German-Belgian border commission reported seeing thousands of head of cattle paraded in Ankole in 1908, but it is possible that the royal court was putting on a performance for the European travelers. See Evan Maclean Jack, *On the Congo Frontier: Exploration and sport* (London: T.F. Unwin, 1914). Nevertheless, if Protectorate officials were estimating Western Province at 350,000 head in 1917, this suggests that the region had made a substantial (if not full) recovery.

[54] Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture for the Year Ended 31st March, 1919* (London: HM Stationary Office): 2.

[55] Uganda Protectorate, *Colonial Reports - Annual: Uganda, Report for 1920, April-December. No. 1112* (London: HM Stationary Office), 6.

monitoring the health of over 1.5 million cattle, sheep, and goats across 91,100 square miles of Protectorate territory.[56] And because the Protectorate had concentrated its veterinary efforts on Buganda and Eastern Province throughout the 1910s, it had no infrastructural capacity in the western districts at the beginning of 1919. Quarantine camps and veterinary offices[57] had to be constructed on the fly, often in isolated reaches far from auto-accessible roads. Perishable serum and delicate glass syringes for inoculations had to be imported from Nairobi, which had the only veterinary research laboratory in East Africa at that time. Most importantly, the lack of a veterinary presence in Western Province before 1919 meant that staff had little knowledge of vernacular languages or even basic geography.[58] Lacking the means to communicate directly with African livestock owners, veterinary officers opened the door to widespread misunderstandings about the aims of their department.

The greatest cause for concern for Uganda administrators, however, was that in the absence of effective controls, the virus would cross into Belgian territory. The British viewed Rinderpest management primarily through the lens of territorial control. When the virus crossed borders, it multiplied the number of administrators involved. In Eastern Province, the British could at least count on the cooperation and shared colonial policies of their compatriots in (British) Kenya. Similarly, southwestern Buganda abutted northern Tanganyika, which was also British territory. Cooperating with Rwanda and Congo, on the other hand, would require

[56] Uganda Protectorate, *Blue Book for the Year ended 31st March 1920* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1920), 63.

[57] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B. Ag. CVO Richardson to DCs Kigezi and Ankole, April 12, 1920.

[58] Veterinary correspondence from this period have frequent requests for maps. See for example KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920. Vet. Officer R.H.H. Hart to D.C. Kigezi, January 14, 1920.

extensive cross-border communication[59] and mutual trust in each other's administrative capacity and scientific competency.

When Rinderpest did finally appear in Rwanda in early 1920, British veterinary correspondence reflected deep levels of distrust in the reliability of their Belgian counterparts. For example, when the Director of Veterinary Services for Rwanda, M. Carlier, offered to assist in the emergency inoculation of Kigezi cattle, the Veterinary Officer newly assigned to the Western Province expressed strong reservations in a private memo to district administration, stating that he did not want "inoculations being carried out in British territory by anybody other than British, except in the most desperate condition."[60] The officer's underlying fear, of course, was that inoculation campaigns would result in the same mortality rates as his department had witnessed in Buganda and Eastern Province, and that Belgian veterinarians, having little experience with inoculation techniques,[61] would have even worse results.[62] Should this happen in Kigezi, cattle owners could easily flee across the border, spreading the contagion to Belgian territory. The DC Kigezi, however, had little patience for these excuses, responding to the VO in a letter stripped of the usual decorum of colonial correspondence: "If Rinderpest, which now

[59] One might expect that British colonial officials would be fluent, or at least conversant, in French, but this was not always the case, at least in Kigezi District. Inter-territorial communications between the District Office and Rwanda administrators are littered with poor translations of Belgian correspondence, and on at least one occasion, an Assistant DC had to bring his wife to a major border meeting to act as translator between both sides.

[60] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920. V.O. R.H.H. Hart to DC Kigezi, January 25, 1920.

[61] While Belgian veterinarians would be very knowledgeable of anti-Rinderpest methods used in Europe, it is important to remember that inoculations had been developed in South Africa, and were still not widely used in Europe at this time.

[62] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920. CVO Kampala (Richardson) to DC Kigezi, February 7, 920.

closely threatens British Ruanda, gains an entry, which is most probable, in the near future, both political and Rinderpest conditions will be 'desperate'."[63]

The shrillness of the DC's response must also be understood in the context of recent history of violence in the borderland. Since the reign of Rwabugiri, the region had served as a place of asylum for persons seeking refuge from the imperial designs of the Rwandan kingdom. Kigezi's secluded swamps, valleys, and caves offered shelter to those wishing to hide; they also provided ideal headquarters for refugees seeking to launch a rebellion, either against the Rwandan court, European colonials, or both. European boundary missions, meanwhile, engaged one another in minor skirmishes prior to the region's incorporation into the British Protectorate in 1911, and these confrontations drew Africans into the struggle at the same time that they introduced new weaponry to the borderland.[64] World War I commenced three years later, at which point Kigezi served as the Allied frontier against the Germans until 1916, when British and Belgian forces invaded German Rwanda via Lutobo.

Throughout this period, rebellion against Rwanda and colonial powers continued to rage. Indeed, just a few months before the Rinderpest outbreak crossed the Victoria Nile, the District had broken up what they described as a "rebel base" of three hundred people on the slopes of Muhavura. Five months later, a man named Ntokibiiri, who was wanted by the colonial government for leading 1,400 combatants in a raid on a Kigezi administrator's headquarters in 1917, was finally apprehended by British forces in Kayonza forest, northern Kigezi.[65] Ntokibiiri

[63] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920. DC Kigezi Philipps to Veterinary Officer Ankole, January 27, 1920. Emphasis in the original.

[64] Minor in terms of how they played out on the ground. Among officials in the metropole, the skirmishes triggered a significant legal battle. See Wm. Roger Louis, *Ruanda-Urundi* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).

[65] Hopkins, "The Nyabingi Cult of Southwestern Uganda," 291.

was killed in the confrontation, and the District brought his body back to their headquarters in Kabale to be put on public display.[66]

Into this dynamic frontier came the 1919 Rinderpest epizootic, a contagion that Kigezi officials seemed to fear almost as much as they feared rebellion. This was evidenced in the way that the line between viral pathogens and human rebels often blurred, both rhetorically and in practice. In a telegram to the CVO, for example, the DC reported on both the state of the Rinderpest epidemic and his cooperation with Belgian officials concerning rebel activities:

> "Regret inform you buffaloe reported dying CONGO…thus British Ruanda now also threatened…[Kigezi] District now island closely surrounded Rinderpest East, North and West; and Resident Rwanda asking co-operation against southern frontier rebels mount Muhavura whither I proceed tomorrow…can manage quite well but ask instant dispatch of the twenty extra police to Kigezi"[67]

At first glance, it would appear that the district official was requesting police reinforcements to assist with the "frontier rebels," but his message was addressed to the Chief Veterinary Officer, whose department was financing the special dispatch. The purpose of this newly assembled force, which increased the existing police force in Kigezi by nearly 50 percent, was to guard the Protectorate's frontiers against the spread of Rinderpest. The DC had already received a commission of 6,000 rounds of .303 M.K. VI bullets from the Veterinary Department the month before, and these were to be distributed to the police constables when they arrived.[68] The introduction of new weaponry and the augmentation of security personnel, however, also served to curb rebellion.

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[66] Hopkins, "The Nyabingi Cult of Southwestern Uganda," 302.

[67] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B. Telegram, D.C. Kigezi to C.V.O. Kampala, n.d. (but 1920).

[68] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-20; Notice, Capt. Greenwood (Quartermaster) to Chief Veterinary Officer, c/o DC Kigezi, December 22, 1919. Emphasis in the original.

Political borders, both internal and international, emerged as critical sites in the fight against Rinderpest. In early 1920, for example, Ankole and Kigezi administrators had ordered that a six-mile-wide, cattle-free zone be created between their two districts for the purposes of halting the internal circulation of Rinderpest. Armed askaris (guards) were positioned strategically along this line of quarantine,[69] and were given authorization to slaughter all cattle found within the free zone.[70] The free zone ran perpendicular to the Uganda-Rwanda border, and was delimited by what the government understood to be "natural" boundaries: the foothills of eastern Kigezi, and the forests that fringed western Ankole. The British hoped that by identifying and clearly marking the area of quarantine, they would be better able to manage the movement of animals across their territory.

Two critical factors, however, undermined this early attempt at border control. First, anti-Rinderpest measures brought to light the government's spectacular lack of basic geographical knowledge. While district administrators were often familiar with the terrain of their jurisdictions, their familiarity was obtained on the job through regular safaris and interactions with local chiefs. Veterinary staff from Kampala and Kigali, on the other hand, were forced to rely on maps that were generally incorrect and incomplete. Correspondence between the DC Kigezi and the Veterinary Officer assigned to Western Province are replete with questions about place names, rivers, and roads, with frequent complaints about the poor quality of available maps.[71] To assist his Kampala colleagues, the DC Kigezi included map citations in all of his

[69] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-20; Veterinary Officer to Commissioner of Police re: Anti-Rinderpest Measures, January 7, 1920.

[70] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-20; DC Kigezi to the Chief of Belgian Veterinarian Services, March 5, 1920.

[71] See for example KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920. Vet. Officer R.H.H. Hart to D.C. Kigezi, January 14, 1920.

communications concerning the location of outbreaks in his district.[72] Following announcements of a positive Rinderpest diagnosis in Rwanda in March 1920, he issued an urgent appeal to Belgian and British officers, requesting that only "one map should be used by all concerned, and map names adhered to in correspondence. The only clear and reliable map is German East Africa Section A 2, Karagwe, 1:300,000, with additions July 1917. This I think you have."[73]

Anti-Rinderpest efforts obliged colonial agents to familiarize themselves with Ugandan territory in a way that previous boundary commissions and military engagements had not. European investments in seizing natural resources had largely informed the original cartographic expeditions of the early 1900s.[74] While some attention was paid to linguistic and political divisions on the ground,[75] such considerations were always made in the interest of creating a profitable colonial territory. Similarly, military strategists had concerned themselves with local topography inasmuch as it allowed for better defensive positioning and offensive maneuvering. Disrupting the spread of Rinderpest, on the other hand, required an understanding of how cattle

[72] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920. DC to CVO Kampala, February 1, 1920.

[73] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B. DC Kigezi to Chef de Service Vétérinaire belge, BUKETETE, Anglo-Belgian (Ruanda) Frontier, March 5, 1920.

[74] Rogers, *Ruanda-Urundi*, 1963. A counter-argument can be made that because imperial boundary commissions depended on African guides and local authorities to carry out their work on the ground, colonial borders were therefore products of both European and African interests. See for example S. Touval, "Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa," *The Journal of African History* 7, no. 2 (1966): 279-293. While Africans certainly had some influence over the physical lie of colonial borders, and while borderland residents played central roles in work of making borders meaningful over time, it does not follow that the European imposition of borders reflected local *interests*. Colonial borders served European interests, even if certain African individuals had opportunity to strategically influence certain points on the new political map. See Paul Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Toga Frontier: the lie of the borderlands since 1914* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002).

[75] UNA C.756B: Uganda-Kigezi-Ruanda, 1911-36.

moved, which was a reflection of people's workaday lives and their social and political relationships.[76]

Map 3: Map drawn by Veterinary Officer Hart, showing free-zone, askari positions, and his inoculation camp (KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920. VO Hart to DC Kigezi, 30th March 1920).

As colonial veterinarians struggled to get their bearings in new and often-uncharted territory, local cattle-keepers used their intimate knowledge of the countryside and their social networks to circumvent quarantines and border askaris.[77] The free zone, despite being easily identified by geographic features like foothills and forests, was not indicative of any meaningful

[76] Danielle de Lame and Helen Arnold, *A hill among a thousand: transformations and ruptures in rural Rwanda* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 370.

[77] The CVO had sent special veterinary police from Kampala, meaning that they were not local recruits. See KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920.

social division. Instead, it cut across territory historically associated with Bahororo pastoralists, who had long occupied the gentle, rolling grasslands situated between the Kigezi hills to the west, Ankole plains to the east, and Rwanda to the south. Residents of this area were highly mobile, their social networks and transhumant routes spanning either side of the frontier.[78] Unsurprisingly, the DC Kigezi acknowledged defeat shortly after the creation of the quarantine zone, observing that local residents were "nightly taking cattle back into [the] mountains which constitute [the] free zone," where they concealed their herds in the forests, "as anticipated."[79]

By late 1920, the worst of the Rinderpest epizootic in western Uganda and Rwanda had largely passed. The CVO credited this development to the department's successful enforcement of strict quarantine measures and mass inoculation,[80] and while this no doubt contributed to herd immunity and increasing rates of survival, veterinary science was not the only factor at play. As mentioned earlier, luck was often as important as skill, and an animal's chances of surviving exposure to the attenuated virus administered during inoculation could depend on its health as well as the purity of the serum, the availability of clean drinking water and fodder, or even a break in the weather.[81] The department's use of coercive violence (armed border patrols, mandatory slaughter), moreover, had done much to encourage widespread resistance—resistance that often took the form of cross-border movement.

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[78] The area was so mobile that the DC Kigezi, after years of trying to control cross-border cattle migrations, offered to cede the territory– including all of its cattle wealth, mining claims, and taxpayers—to Ankole District. The DC Ankole declined the offer. See UNA Provincial Papers, Western Province Box 2, File LAN 4i: Boundaries: Interritorial [sic]: Ruanda, 1926-1961.

[79] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 10B: "Veterinary," 1919-1920; State Telegram, Ag. D.C. Kigezi to C.V.O. Kampala, N.D. Handwritten Note: "Copy V.O. Ankole by Special Runner 19/1"

[80] Uganda Protectorate. *Annual Report of the Veterinary Department, 1921* (Entebbe: Government Printer), 6.

[81] Simmons, "In retrospect," 359.

Part IV: After the Outbreak: Building borders, criminalizing cattle

The passage of Rinderpest into Rwanda brought about a shift in the way that Protectorate officials framed the disease. While Uganda remained a center of endemic infection after 1920, veterinary authorities and district administrators increasingly framed Rinderpest outbreaks as consequences of "illicit cattle running" across the border with Belgian territory. "To provide against such movements is difficult," wrote the CVO in his 1921 annual report,

> "the more especially as the territorial boundary is ill-defined, and whilst the patrolling of the boundary by armed guards did much to check the practice of 'running' cattle across the border, it was impossible to stop entirely."[82]

In the aftermath of the 1919-20 epizootic, Kigezi officials worked hand in hand with local chiefs and veterinary agents to erect border quarantine camps, identify Belgian cattle, and establish uniform protocols governing how people could move livestock across borders. In the process, they contributed to the Protectorate's growing investment in territorial control.

The work of categorizing livestock into stark dichotomies—healthy/sick, immune/susceptible, Ugandan/Rwandan, licit/illicit—placed an unprecedented imperative on adherence to territorial borders. Because the virus was highly mobile, traveling in the bodies of animals that could move up to thirty miles a day, colonial authorities believed that centralized oversight was necessary in the struggle against the disease. If an infected cow crossed from one jurisprudence to another, officials in the first jurisprudence would then have to rely on the cooperation and competency of their neighbors if they hoped to stamp out the infection.

Colonial authorities experimented with a variety of methods to help identify animals that had been brought legally across the border. The Belgian authorities first tried to use metal rings

[82] Uganda Protectorate. *Annual Report of the Veterinary Department, 1921* (Entebbe: Government Printer): 6.

to identify animals that had been successfully immunized.[83] In 1922, Kigezi officials declared that all persons entering the District with cattle from the Congo, Rwanda or Tanganyika must report immediately to the *Gombolola* (sub-county) Chief in charge of the territory into which they had crossed.

In this way, cows became mobile embodiments of the international border, their branding scars and ear tags serving as visible markers of their new imperial "identities." Yet such markers could be readily forged, as Kigezi officials quickly learned. Within months of introducing a policy of branding inoculated cattle, the District Commissioner was already predicting that his government would have to place a moratorium on livestock imports due to the widespread use of counterfeit brands.[84] Residents of the important cattle-keeping county of Rujumbura had, by early 1923, illegally branded so many of their animals that the DC gave up trying to prosecute every case, hoping instead to make examples out of a few hapless convicts.[85]

Frontier Tribunals

The challenge of enforcing adherence to veterinary measures was compounded by what ostensibly amounted to local conflicts over cattle, but ones that had been internationalized with the creation of new borders. In response to a particularly severe altercation between residents living on either side of the Uganda-Congo border in 1923, Belgian and British administrators instituted frontier "barazas" in hopes of managing these cross-border conflicts. While frequently

[83] KigDA Agriculture Box 62, File 70: Veterinary - Relations with Belgian Territory, 1921-1928. Resident du Rwanda to DCs Kigezi and Mbarara, Political Officers Bukoba and Biaramule, and to the Chefs de Poste Rukira, Mukalange, and Gatsibu. 28th April 1922.

[84] Kigezi District Annual Report, 1922.

[85] KigDA Agriculture Box 7, File 130, "Veterinary—Rinderpest," 1922-25; DC Kigezi to PC Western Province, "Curious branding of stock," 31st January 1923.

acknowledging the questionable legal status of these tribunals, colonial officials maintained that they helped to ameliorate border conflicts while also ensuring that the subjects of one territory could not escape justice by fleeing to the neighboring state.[86] Yet almost all cases litigated by the frontier courts revolved around questions of cattle.[87]

Over the next ten years, European and African agents maintained four separate frontier tribunals, three along the Uganda-Rwanda border and one between Uganda and Congo. Each tribunal was expected to meet twice yearly, but actual court schedules tended to vary depending on the commitment of district administrators and the interest of local residents. Plaintiffs interested in having their case tried were required to submit their complaints to their most immediate chief—the *muruka* or parish chief in Uganda, and the sous-chef in Rwanda—who kept a running list over the course of each six-month cycle. Approximately six weeks before the scheduled tribunal, the *miruka* and sub-chiefs would pass these lists on to their superiors—the *gombolola* and *saza* chiefs in Uganda, the chiefs in Rwanda—who would then create a final list for submission to the European administrator. The administrator would then send a formal communication to his counterpart on the other side of the frontier, requesting assistance in distributing the list to the appropriate African authorities, who would then be responsible for locating and informing the accused persons. If the accused refused to comply with this "subpoena," or if he or she could not be found, the case would still proceed to trial. If the judges decided in favor of the plaintiff, the accused person would be expected to comply with the sentencing, regardless of whether he or she had been present at the trial.

[86] Gouvernment Belge, Ministère des Colonies, *Rapport sur l'administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi*, 1926.

[87] Gouvernment Belge, Ministère des Colonies, *Rapport sur l'administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi*, 1928.

Each tribunal sat for several days, sometimes as long as a week, during which the African justices would hear scores of cases, sometimes hundreds. European administrators were notably absent during the hearings, but would arrive on the last day to offer litigants a chance of appeal; it appears that the initial rulings were rarely overturned, however.[88]

European administrators generally praised the tribunal system, describing it as "a distinct step forward in Administration of the two territories."[89] Indeed, the frontier courts offered colonial officers a relatively convenient (for them) means of governing their hard-to-reach subjects living in the outer peripheries of their already-rural domains. They were a kind of safety valve for local conflicts, an alternative to vigilante justice for those who would put their trust in the system. Cross-border raids, often carried out as acts of retribution or to recover stolen property, were not only destabilizing, but they could also act as conduits for disease.

But most importantly, tribunals provided mutually-agreed upon means for colonial governments to quietly manage their extra-territorial subjects. As the Resident for Rwanda noted in his 1925 annual report, the new court system promised to stop Rwandan subjects from escaping justice by fleeing the country.[90] Framing their operations as "extradition," British and Belgian authorities sought to deny their subjects the option of voting with their feet by criminalizing certain forms of movement. Colonial governments worked to control cattle movement, initially in the interest of curtailing disease and protecting valuable livestock, but increasingly as a means of controlling political territory. Whereas Rwandan elites had previously been able to relocate their power base to British territory as recently as 1918 (as Nyirimbirima

[88] Gouvernment Belge, Ministère des Colonies, *Rapport sur l'administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi*, 1927, 10.

[89] Uganda Protectorate. *Annual Report for Kigezi District, 1923* (Entebbe: Government Printer), 13.

[90] Gouvernment Belge, Ministère des Colonies, *Rapport sur l'administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi*, 1925, 8.

had), by the mid-1920s this was no longer an option—at least not a legal one. Anti-Rinderpest measures had led to the further militarization of the physical border, while frontier tribunals and colonial commitments to extradition extended the reach of the border inland, into the parishes, villages, and compounds that sheltered Rwanda's runaways.

The control of cattle could also be used to keep undesirable persons out of Rwanda. Here, we return to Nyirimbirima, the Tutsi noble who fled Rwanda in 1917. The British had welcomed him, installing him as the *Saza* chief of Bufumbira ("British Ruanda") in 1921, apparently believing that his tense relationship with the *Mwami* would ensure his loyalty to the Protectorate. But it seems Nyirimbirima maintained his connections with his natal home, and throughout the latter half of the 1920s, his compound in Bufumbira became a refuge for other exiled Mulera patrons.[91]

In 1930, he submitted a formal request to British authorities, asking that he be allowed to return to Mulera. The message was subsequently passed to the Resident of Rwanda and the Territorial Administrator for Gatsibu, both of whom rejected the request, believing that Nyirimbirima was hoping to exploit the current instability in northern Rwanda and reinstall himself as chief, or worse, launch a rebellion of his own.[92] Adding to these concerns, the Resident of Rwanda also noted that,

> "In addition to political considerations, there is also the reason that the British authorities in recent months returned several hundred head of cattle to Gatsibu territory that Rwandan herders had taken to Uganda. Will they not ask us to do the same if Nyirimbirima carries out his plan?"[93]

[91] KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, "Rwanda," 1929-32. Resident of Rwanda to Delegate at Gatsibu, re: Nyirimbilima, 26th January 1931.

[92] KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, "Rwanda," 1929-32. Pr. le Resident du Rwanda en route, Le Resident - Adjoint R. Bonjean, to the Delegate du Resident pres Musinga-Nyanza, 24 December 1930.

[93] KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, "Rwanda," 1929-32. Resident of Rwanda to Delegate at Gatsibu, re: Nyirimbilima, 26th January 1931. My translation.

Recall that Nyirimbirima fled to Uganda with several hundred head of cattle. Presumably he used this wealth to rebuild his political base in Bufumbira, accruing clients and increasing his herds. While the archives available to me do not indicate what his actual intentions were, it is significant that less than a year after submitting his request for repatriation, he was dismissed from his Ugandan post on charges of "nepotism." The DC angrily reported that Nyirimbirima's administration saw "the undeserved ousting of many Batongole and Muruka Chiefs, and their substitution by others with little or no claim to advancement beyond the payment of a fee to the Mtwale [Nyirimbirima]."[94] The subtext of the DC's report gives the idea of political laziness mixed with corruption, but a more likely scenario was that Nyirimbirima had been busily building a political base. The Belgians were obviously concerned that if he returned to Mulera, he would try to bring his cattle—which represented his political capital and human followers—with him. Should the British request the return of Nyirimbirima's cattle and dependents, the Belgian authorities would have to expend tremendous resources in finding, identifying and extraditing the persons and beasts concerned. And, if they failed to do this, they would not be able to count on British assistance with similar cases in the future.

Cattle played a determining factor in the Belgians' decision about how and where Nyirimbirima would be allowed legal passage across the border. In the end, the Belgians permitted him to return to Rwanda, but not to Mulera. Perhaps if he had been willing to go alone, without his cattle and followers, they might have let him resettle in Mulera, where anti-Tutsi sentiment was high and likely to keep his political aspirations in check. But, in the company of

[94] Kigezi District. Report for the quarter ending 30th June, 1931. 5th July 1931, 5.

his entourage, he was too powerful to risk sending him back to home territory, where he might prove strong enough to launch a successful revolt—or at least a disruptive and costly one.

Part V: Permits against Patrons: The 1931 Lutobo Agreement

Controlling the movement of cattle across borders had, at the beginning of the 1920s, been seen as important for the prevention of disease. By the end of the decade, Belgian officials were attempting control cattle mobility as a way of 1) preventing emigration from Rwanda and 2) cudgeling non-compliant chiefs into obedience. The reasons for this were multiple, and some context is here necessary.

In brief, all was not well in Rwanda. Failed rains, faulty agricultural policies, exploitative labor practices, and a deepening land crisis had culminated in a severe famine in the northeast. Between 1928 and 1930, an estimated 35,000-40,000 people perished in the political and ecological disaster known as *Rwakayihura*, while another 100,000 sought refuge elsewhere in Rwanda or left the country entirely. The Belgians fumbled their response, first by waiting too long to initiate emergency food provisions, and then by using punitive action against those who failed or refused to comply with desperate eleventh-hour policies. As the crisis mounted, they ordered the northeastern marshes to be drained and prepared for cultivation in 1928. The chiefs and Tutsi elite were bitterly opposed to this plan, for the marshes provided the only source of water and grass in the dry season; without the wetlands, the herds would not be able to survive if the drought continued. The Belgians responded with threats, stating that chiefs who failed to enforce emergency famine cultivation would be stripped of their position and herds, and the

animals would be slaughtered to feed their people. Some chiefs capitulated, but others gathered up their cattle and followers and left.[95]

The issue of immigration between Uganda and Rwanda was therefore a sensitive one for colonial officials. The Belgians were anxious to salvage their reputation before the League of Nations, which had entrusted them with the Mandated Territory of Ruanda-Urundi following the defeat of the Germans in World War I. Their British neighbors, meanwhile, were put in the awkward position of receiving tens of thousands of Rwandan famine victims who constituted the human cost of colonial failure (see Chapter Three). Emigration from Rwanda was so pronounced, in fact, that the Chief Secretariat's Office in Entebbe was actually concerned that Belgium might accuse the Protectorate of using emergency food aid "as bait to tempt natives from them to us, to settle, for our labor purposes." In case this happened, the CSO requested the DC Kigezi to report on the number of Banyarwanda refugees who remained in the District in early 1931.[96]

While famine victims made up the largest proportion of emigrants from Rwanda at the end of the 1920s, the Belgians were also concerned about the departure of chiefs who left either in protest of colonial policies or because of a local political conflict. In late 1930, for example, a man named Kabengo, a sub-chief in the northern Rwandan district of Rukiga, absconded across the border with 500 head of cattle and seventy followers. Kabengo's dramatic departure undermined the legitimacy of the principal Chief, Rukeratabaro, and the Belgian Territorial

[95] Des Forges and Newbury, *Defeat is the Only Bad News*, 233-34.

[96] KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112: "Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc.," 1930-1949. Memo from the Secretariat to "Adams", 13 Feb. 1931.

Administrator. Accordingly, the latter wrote to the DC Kigezi with an urgent request for assistance in returning the fugitive:

> "You will realize that it would be impossible for me to go on governing the district if these cattle do not return. Every time I make the slightest remark to a chief, he will go off to your side, whereas if you take him back, the whole country will know about it, and people will think twice before they go across. As I have shown on several occasions, I am ready to restore any of your people you wish, complete with cattle. I hope, and in fact I am sure, that you will reciprocate."[97]

Considering the political significance of mass departures like Kabengo's, British and Belgian authorities worked hard to honor what one official referred to as "an exchange of good neighborly courtesy," which was a euphemism for the work of extraditing cattle and people with few questions asked. The British apprehended Kabengo and returned him to Gabiro under escort in January 1931.[98]

Despite these efforts, however, emigration from Rwanda continued unabated, and in March 1931, Belgian and British officials gathered at Lutobo in eastern Kigezi to discuss ways of reducing the flow of people across their border.[99] The primary focus of the meeting, however, was not on immigration in general, but on the movement of livestock. The conference resolved, specifically, to institute a permit system that would henceforth require persons interested in conducting cattle across borders to apply for a permit with their respective government. This permit, however, would only be granted for "good reason being shown, e.g., dowries, debts, joining relations, etc." This was a vague guideline that gave considerable discretion to local

[97] KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, "Rwanda," 1929-32. Delegue Verhulst to DC Kigezi Rogers, 7 January 1931.

[98] KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, "Rwanda," 1929-32: DC Kigezi (ROGERS) to Resident at Gatsibu, 11 Jan. 1931.

[99] Kigezi District. Report for the quarter ending 31st March, 1931. 11 April 1931.

administrators at the same time that it restricted the scope for what would be considered "reasonable" movements.[100]

Rinderpest, unsurprisingly, provided a key justification for instituting a permit system,[101] but this stated reason requires careful scrutiny. Rinderpest was still a concern for both colonial governments, and western Uganda did experienced a resurgence in Rinderpest cases in 1929 and 1930, after five years of being essentially free of the disease.[102] The outbreak had been relatively severe, but mortality rates never approached those witnessed in 1919-20, because of the improvement in inoculation technology and the growing resistance of Ugandan herds. The reemergence of the virus in Western Province, moreover, was the result of infected game from northern Uganda crossing the Victoria Nile into Bunyoro—i.e., the 1929-30 outbreak was not introduced from Belgian territory, but had followed the same internal path as the 1919-20 epizootic. So, while the disease still posed a danger to Ugandan and Rwandan herds, officials were far more moderate in their risk assessments.

Anti-Rinderpest rhetoric arguably allowed government officials to downplay more pressing reasons for instituting a permit system. By limiting the distribution of permits to applicants who wanted to move livestock for reasons of kinship and debt repayment, for example, colonial agents would have an easier way of justifying extradition requests in cases like that of Kabengo. A restrictive permit system could also be used against Rwandan cattle owners

[100] KigDA Justice, Law, and Order (JLOS) Box 6, File 52: International Tribunals: Belgian Rwanda Native Frontiers, 1930-37. DC Kigezi to Delegate for the Resident, Gatsibu, 10 March 1931.

[101] See for example KigDA Justice, Law, and Order (JLOS) Box 6, File 52: International Tribunals: Belgian Rwanda Native Frontiers, 1930-37. Resident du Rwanda to PC Western Province, 2 May 1931.

[102] Uganda Protectorate. *Annual Report of the Veterinary Department, 1929* (Entebbe: Government Printer), 4.

who, in the face of rising taxes on livestock and polygyny,[103] tried to dodge the system by moving their animals across the border temporarily—an action which then obliged the Uganda authorities to intervene.[104]

A test case for the Lutobo agreement presented itself in September of that year. The Territorial Administrator for Gabiro Province wrote to the DC Kigezi requesting assistance in the return of 131 Rwandan families who had fled to Uganda with 347 head of cattle. To assist the Uganda authorities in locating the families concerned, Verhulst attached a list providing the name of the (assumed) family head, their racial identity (Tutsi/Hutu), their identity card number, and the number of cattle they were believed to have taken with them. The list also gave details regarding their possible whereabouts: the hill on which they are staying, the gombolola chief who was believed to be providing them sanctuary, and the district.

While Belgian authorities did not provide details as to the origins of the runaways, we do know that they were from the eastern province of Mutara, a region that had suffered substantially during the famine. Many people who had strength to flee had already done so, leaving Verhulst to complain that he did not have the labor he needed to complete the public works projects assigned to him.[105] Several of the chieftaincies under his watch were so turbulent that he failed to requisition any laborers from them at all. Writing to the DC Kigezi in September, he worried that

[103] C. Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 172-73.

[104] Uganda Protectorate. *Annual Report for Kigezi District, 1931* (Entebbe: Government Printer), 6.

[105] KigDA Administration Box 4, File ADM 006, "Rwanda," 1929-32. Delegue de Resident Rwanda to DC Kigezi, 11th December 1930.

if Uganda failed to uphold its end of the Lutobo agreement and "return those natives who escaped with their cattle," he was convinced that many more would soon follow.[106]

Verhulst justified his extradition request on the grounds that "ces fuites"—these run-aways, or literally, "these leaks"—had brought their cattle to Uganda in violation of the permit regulations formalized under the Lutobo agreement, and in so doing had placed all Ugandan livestock at risk of infection. Yet even a cursory review of the document reveals that of the persons listed, fifty-five families (41%) crossed the border without cattle. Verhulst himself admitted that many of the so-called "fugitives" were simply "Banyarwanda" who did not wish to submit themselves to new cultivation ordinances, which the government maintained were intended for their own benefit. Obviously, then, the Belgian administrator was not just worried about Rinderpest, or even cattle—he was desperate to prevent the complete implosion of his territory.

The Rwanda Resident, in his annual report, noted that the British had graciously returned 300 cattle to Rwanda that had been brought across the border "in violation of statutory measures."[107] Such "valuable aid," he added, was critical to the struggle against Rinderpest.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced colonial efforts to control the movements of cattle, initially in the interest of curtailing disease and protecting valuable livestock, but increasingly as a means of controlling political territory. Whereas Rwandan elites had previously been able to relocate their power base

[106] KigDA Administration *Box 4, File ADM 006, "Rwanda," 1929-32*: IMG 7745: CHEF DE POSTE GABIRO, VERHULST, TO DC KIGEZI, CC AGENT TERRITORIAL FREMANS (NYAKATARE) RE: FUYARDS A RENVOYER, 11 SEPTEMBER 1931.

[107] KigDA Administration *Box 4, File ADM 006, "Rwanda," 1929-32*; CHEF DE POSTE GABIRO, VERHULST, TO DC KIGEZI, CC AGENT TERRITORIAL FREMANS (NYAKATARE) RE: FUYARDS A RENVOYER, 11 SEPTEMBER 1931.

to British territory as recently as 1918 (e.g., Nyirimbirima), by the late-1920s this was no longer an option—at least not a legal one. Anti-Rinderpest measures had led to the further militarization of the physical border, while frontier tribunals and colonial commitments to extraditing each other's "fugitives" extended the reach of the border inland, into the parishes, villages, and compounds that sheltered Rwanda's runaways.

Chapter 2: Migrant Nation: Rwandans making themselves at home in Buganda

The previous chapter explored the British Protectorate's effort to use its southern border as a barrier against epizootic disease and political unrest, and the consequences that this had for human migration and the ways in which people could relate to one another across political territory. Specifically, it demonstrated how colonial interventions into the movement of cattle ultimately had ramifications for the play of Rwandan politics, which were largely organized around the distribution of cattle across space. Although the British and Belgians had originally been concerned about disease, their investment in controlling animal mobility became, by the late 1920s, a convenient reason to go after the movement of people. Under the pretext of Rinderpest prevention, British authorities could extradite fugitive Tutsi cattle-owners back to Rwanda and deny movement permits to suspicious figures like Nyirimbirima. What began as a concern about veterinary policy had morphed into a set of border-control practices that helped both colonial governments consolidate their control over territory.

Yet, at the same time that the British sought to close their border to destabilizing politics, they were growing increasingly aware of their need for Rwandan labor. The young Protectorate needed a reliable workforce to build roads, plant cash-crops, and transport goods to market. Early efforts to create a domestic labor pool, however, had largely failed by the end of World War I. Uganda residents, particularly those living in Buganda, the Protectorate's economic heartland, were highly reticent to sell their labor to public works projects and European plantations. They preferred instead to support themselves on subsistence agriculture

supplemented by small-scale cotton production. Government officials, unable to conjure the necessary manpower by coercive means, felt compelled to look for labor elsewhere, first in the Protectorate's supposedly less-productive peripheries, and then across borders into Ruanda-Urundi, Congo, Tanganyika, Kenya, and the Sudan. Of these extraterritorial sources, Ruanda-Urundi would prove the most vital. Where colonial officials had once been preoccupied with keeping certain people out, they were now anxious to bring people in.

The border, in other words, had always been porous, but the colonial justifications for population control were changing. This chapter investigates the Protectorate's evolving gatekeeping strategies and the political and social consequences of its nascent dependency on foreign labor. Between the early 1920s and late 1950s, Protectorate labor demands and border practices helped set in motion a new and unprecedented circuit of regional mobility. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans and Burundians would make their way to Uganda over the course of three decades, with many choosing to settle permanently in Buganda, Ankole, and Kigezi. By the mid-1930s, the government estimated that migrant laborers were responsible for growing half of Buganda's cotton, the country's most lucrative cash crop.[1] By the end of World War II, approximately one in five Buganda residents were of foreign origin, with Rwandan and Burundian settlers accounting for nearly 5.9 percent of the Kingdom's population.[2]

British observers interpreted this stunning demographic shift as a function of the Protectorate's economic prosperity, but it arguably had as much, if not more, to do with deteriorating conditions in Ruanda-Urundi. Life in Belgian territory, as noted in the previous

[1] Maryinez Lyons, "Foreign Bodies: The History of Labour Migration as a Threat to Public Health in Uganda," in *African Boundaries: barriers, conduits, and opportunities*, eds. Paul Nugent and A.I. Asiwaju (London: Pinter, 1996), 135.

[2] O. Dak, *A Geographical Analysis of the Distribution of Migrants in Uganda* (Kampala: Dept. of Geography, Makerere University College, 1968), 6.

chapter, was in a state of precipitous decline for the majority of the population. From 1929 onwards, on the pretext of famine prevention, Belgian authorities built roads, drained marshlands, and established new regional headquarters. In 1931, they instituted new cotton and coffee quotas for chiefs and sub-chiefs. This work was accomplished on the backs of Hutu peasants, who were required to provide free labor to their chiefs under a clientship institution known as *ubureetwa*.[3] In addition to cash-crop production and public works projects, peasants were also expected to grow food for government famine reserves and, from 1937 onwards, participate in anti-erosion terracing efforts. By the outbreak of World War II, Hutu residents were devoting as many as three days out of six to chiefs, Belgian officials, and even private European planters. Traveling to Uganda was thus a way for people to escape the drudgery of Rwandan peasant life while searching for new economic and social resources that might alleviate some of the more difficult aspects of life back home. For an increasing number of people in Rwanda, Uganda offered a political alternative to the twinned oppressions of Tutsi vassalage and Belgian governance.[4]

[3] *Ubureetwa* was the most humiliating of labor prestations, initially introduced by King Rwabugiri in the late 19th century as a means of bringing the unruly provinces to heel. In representations to the League of Nations and the ILO, Belgian Mandate officials framed their interventions as good faith efforts to: 1) prevent future famines and to 2) cooperate with African political authority. They acknowledged that *ubureetwa* was a form of forced labor, but they claimed to have softened and rationalized the more onerous aspects of the "traditional" practice. Prior to Belgian reforms, family lineages could collectively fulfill their *ubureetwa* obligations by sending a single representative to work for the state. Moreover, *ubureetwa* was only practiced in those regions under firm control of Nyanza; in the more distant marches of the north and northwest, *ubureetwa* was virtually unknown. In reality, these interventions played on the very worst political legacies laid down by Rwabugiri a half-century before, at the same time that their streamlining of chiefly governance meant that people were increasingly subject to the whims of a single sub-chief; where clients once had some ability to navigate power relations by playing one patron off of another, Belgian reforms removed even this possibility. See C. Newbury, *Cohesion*, 140-142; Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 122; and Pottier, *Re-Imagining Rwanda*, 13.

[4] Regarding Rwandans in Uganda, see Richards, *Economic Development*, 29. Regarding the famine, see Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 153 and Singa, *La Famine Ruzagayura*, 30; for an account of a Hutu man who left Rwanda in 1925, likely in response to the Gakwege famine, see Codere, *Biography of an African People*, 197-201.

Protectorate administrators adopted a laissez-faire approach to African immigration from the early 1930s onwards, initially because of the Depression but later out of concern for expediency. Uganda needed foreign labor, and officials feared that overt forms of surveillance would "frighten" migrants away and encourage non-compliance. For this reason, Protectorate administrators consistently refused to implement pass systems, labor registries, and medical screenings, even though other British colonies in Africa readily employed such measures.[5] In 1942, for example, after an alarming number of Rwandan migrants had been found dead along the highway, a special committee of labor experts urged the Protectorate government to establish screening posts at various points along the border to weed out the medically unfit. This would spare the administration from potential scandal and help prevent the spread of communicable diseases. Central authorities, however, rejected the proposal on the grounds that too many migrants would be turned away if subjected to medical inspection.[6] "It is not really satisfactory that these large bodies of men should be roaming about the country without coming under the cognizance of any public authority," another labor official conceded, "[but] [a]ny general registration or pass system may be dismissed at once as both impracticable and undesirable."[7] This stance invited widespread criticism from business leaders, Baganda authorities, and even some British officials, who feared that uncontrolled migration would have deleterious consequences for business, public health, and security. Yet the Protectorate refused to reconsider,

[5] Uganda Protectorate, *Second Report of the Labour Advisory Committee: Organisation of the South-West Labour Migration Routes* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1943), 6.

[6] Lyons, "Foreign Bodies," 139.

[7] Uganda Protectorate, *Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Labour Situation in the Uganda Protectorate, 1938* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1938), 50. The author of this report did go on to recommend that the Protectorate provide migrants with identification documents, but even this measure was ultimately rejected on the grounds that it was too expensive and impractical.

and labor migration to Uganda continued unabated with almost no central oversight. Instead, the work of identifying cross-border migrants—a task that was necessary for reliable tax assessments and social planning—fell to local chiefs at the village and parish levels. The government's lowest-paid "man on the ground," in other words, became responsible for managing what would become one of the largest population transfers in twentieth century central African history. This was a remarkable cession of colonial authority to local power brokers.

The Protectorate claimed that it lacked the technological capacity to identify and track cross-border migrants, but this chapter suggests that at an even more fundamental level, the Protectorate refused to document migrants because such interventions undermined their economic imperatives. Unlike neighboring Kenya, where European planters formed the basis of the colonial economy—and where planter success depended on easy access to alienated land and labor—Uganda's relative wealth derived almost entirely from peasant production. African farmers in Uganda growing small plots of cotton on their own land brought in tenfold what the European and Asian plantations did. As early as early as 1914, peasant farmers exported over £500,000 in agricultural goods, while European planters raised only £26,000.[8] The meteoric rise of the small-scale farmer, however, meant that the Protectorate administration could not depend on the local populace for its labor supply, and had to attract adequate numbers of workers from abroad. European planters in Kenya, by contrast, were far more numerous and influential than their counterparts in Uganda, and they used their economic and political power to secure greater access to native land and labor. In 1915, the colonial administration in Kenya, at the urging of white settlers, introduced the notorious *kipande* system, which required all Kenyan men and boys

[8] Cyril Ehrlich, "The Uganda Economy," in *History of East Africa*, vol. 2, eds. Vincent Harlow and E.M. Chilver (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 414.

over the age of fifteen to submit their information to a centralized labor registry and carry identification papers on their person at all times.[9] Such explicit checks on African mobility would have hindered the Ugandan economy if applied to Ugandan farmers or migrant laborers, and they were therefore never introduced.

Few historians have looked at the mechanisms of documentation and recognition for migrants in colonial Buganda. The laxity of state supervision over movement and documentation can be read as giving migrants a much greater ability to move and assimilate. Shane Doyle, for instance, has argued that the Protectorate's lax policies contributed to and even facilitated flexible identification practices, granting migrants wide berth to reinvent themselves abroad. Buganda Kingdom was able, he claims, to absorb and integrate large numbers of foreigners between 1920 and 1960 *because* the state gave low priority to registration. In this way, the lack of official recognition benefitted vulnerable migrants because it allowed them to carve out new places for themselves in Uganda.

This chapter argues that, while this was certainly true for the Rwandans who made their homes in Buganda at mid-century, the lack of official recognition was also always a double-edged sword. In the interest of short-term economic growth, the Protectorate government facilitated a demographic trend that their bureaucratic infrastructure ultimately could not handle. Migrants helped build the Ugandan state, but the state's failure to recognize and secure political rights for them set up a political problem that the country has yet to resolve. And, when the

[9] The colonial government issued specially-designed metal cases to all men and boys over the age of sixteen, and these cases held their documents. The case was called a *kipande* (hence the *kipande* system) and was supposed to be worn around the neck. Critics compared it to a dog-collar. There is a vast literature on *kipande.* See for example Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, "Crises of Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State: The Development of the Labour Control System, 1919-29," in *Unhappy Valley, Bk. 1: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, ed. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), 101-26. See also Anthony Clayton and Donald Savage, *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963* (London: Frank Cass, 1974).

Uganda authorities imposed a new documentary regime requiring certain groups of migrants ("refugees") to submit to individual identification in 1959, the central government had no reliable means of distinguishing one migrant from another, resulting in heightened insecurity for all persons of Rwandan origin, both real and suspected. The lack of individual recognition, while a momentary convenience for the state and a possible boon for migrants, became a source of significant long-term anxiety.

This chapter proceeds in two parts. Part I, "Illegible Migrants," analyzes the efforts of state and private interests to control and organize foreign labor power for their respective ends. It demonstrates how Protectorate fears about labor shortages and their dependency on Rwandan labor led officials to adopt a relaxed policy towards immigration control, one that ultimately undermined their capacity and political will to know their subjects. Migrant illegibility served the interests of the state and facilitated African mobility, but it also burdened local administrative structures and opened up space for abuse. Part II, "Studying Migrants," turns from this larger structural analysis to the everyday work of Rwandan settlement. It emphasizes how migrants, however successful they were at "fitting in," still tested the boundaries of Ganda society—often at great personal risk. For this reason, scholars should be wary of celebrating the apparent flexibility of migrant identities. Migrants remained vulnerable to the whims of chiefs, landlords, and neighbors who, unchecked by central oversight, could make their lives in Uganda miserable, even unsustainable. Dispensing with apolitical narratives of assimilation, this chapter therefore calls attention to the rough edges of resettlement, the inflexibility of identities, and the limits of personal reinvention.

Part I: Illegible Migrants

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Protectorate sought to develop the Ugandan economy along two broad lines. First, they encouraged commercial planters and Ganda chiefs to experiment with cash crop production. Uganda, as far as the administration knew, was poor in mineral resources but rich in agricultural potential. Fertile soils along the shores of Lake Victoria had sustained impressive populations for centuries, leading colonial authorities to believe that they might also support more lucrative crops like rubber, sugar, coffee, and cotton. They were not entirely wrong in this. Early attempts in cash-crop production were largely successful in terms of actual yield. The problem, however, was that each crop, in order to be produced in large scale, required tremendous labor inputs that outstripped planter budgets. The Belgian Congo had grown rich off of rubber only by enslaving the Congolese population.[10] The same had been true for sugar in the Caribbean, cotton in the United States, and coffee in Kenya. Without access to a continuous supply of free or nearly-free labor, planters in Uganda could not produce yields that encouraged their long-term commitment to the Protectorate. Moreover, without a steady supply of workers, the government could not build the roads, bridges, and ports that it needed to transport these potential goods to market.

The Protectorate's second aim was therefore to develop a domestic labor market. This was not an easy task, however, and it ran into conflict, ironically, with the government's first development goal. Few Ugandans were willing to sell their labor in the years leading up to World War I because they found they could raise whatever cash they needed for taxes by growing small plots of cotton alongside their *matooke* trees and vegetable gardens. Cotton, while

[10] C.C. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda: A Short Agrarian History* (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1959), 13.

attracting little interest from European planters, had quickly become a popular crop among peasant farmers after missionaries introduced it to the Protectorate in 1904. Unlike coffee, which required considerable up-front expenditures in time and money, cotton generated a harvest within a single season. Cheap to plant and quick to grow, peasant farmers could easily add a small batch to their regular rotations without incurring much risk to themselves (for a gender analysis of cotton production, see Chapter Three).

The unexpected success of peasant production came at the expense of the Protectorate's labor needs, and in response, the British turned to coercive measures to draw people into the market. They first imposed new taxes in 1904 and 1905, and when these failed to produce the desired results, they introduced a compulsory labor requisition known as *kasanvu*. *Kasanvu* played on an older practice of unpaid labor in Buganda known as *luwalo*, in which subjects of the *Kabaka* contributed one month to the construction and maintenance of local public works. Unlike *luwalo*, the *kasanvu* system was paid (three rupees per month) but still compulsory, and laborers were often forced to work on dangerous government projects located far from their homes. People could claim exemption from *kasanvu* if they could demonstrate employment with a private employer, but others chose to emigrate rather than cooperate. Premised on the faulty assumption that colonial subjects in Uganda shared a common patriotic loyalty to the imperial state (and would therefore see the value of contributing towards public works projects in distant counties), the *kasanvu* system quickly became an object of widespread resentment.[11] Chiefs, who had the unpopular job of enlisting their own people, watched their parishes shrink as people chose to seek alternative employment or even emigrate rather than submit to government labor

[11] P.G. Powesland, *Economic Policy and Labour: A Study in Uganda's Economic History*, ed. W. Elkan (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1957), 18-34.

demands.[12] *Kasanvu* also depressed wages and discouraged private European estates from improving labor conditions, since they knew that many people would prefer to work for an abusive planter locally than for a public works project that was far from home.[13]

Uganda residents became so successful in avoiding compulsory service that by 1918, the government was once again facing acute labor shortages. Certain voices, namely European planters, insisted that the state needed to adopt more punitive measures if they were ever going to overcome the African's inherent laziness.[14] But by then the tide was beginning to turn against *kasanvu*, and fewer government officials were willing to come out in support of compulsory labor.[15] Coercion had failed to drum up adequate numbers, and the unpopularity of the program had led the Buganda kingdom to denounce it in 1921. Protectorate authorities were also under mounting pressure from the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, who announced that forced labor would no longer be tolerated anywhere in the empire following scandalous revelations about African labor conditions in Kenya.[16] Thus, despite vociferous objections from the white planting community, the Protectorate phased out *kasanvu* between 1922 and 1923. Forcing Ugandans to sell their labor had disrupted and displaced productive peasant farmers, and in so

[12] Holly Hanson, *Landed obligation: the practice of power in Buganda* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), 176-77.

[13] Powesland, *Economic Policy*, 21-22.

[14] Uganda Development Commission, *Report of the Uganda Development Commission, 1920* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1920), 13.

[15] Powesland, *Economic Policy*, 24.

[16] Winston Churchill, Despatch to the Officer Administering the Government of the Kenya Colony and Protectorate relating to Native Labour (London: HMS Office, 1921). See also Berman and Lonsdale, "Crisis of Accumulation," 111-112.

doing undermined the country's profit aims.[17] Yet Uganda's labor question remained, and the abolition of *kasanvu* did little to address it.

Rwandans in Uganda

The Protectorate's response to the first noticeable movements of Rwandans to Uganda in the early 1920s was therefore one of cautious optimism. Here was a potential short-term solution to their post-*kasanvu* labor shortage.[18] Viewing Rwandan migration as a temporary phenomenon, they gave little thought to possible long-term political consequences. Instead, officials were primarily concerned with improving migrant health and facilitating their passage along the main highways that connected Ruanda-Urundi with Buganda.[19]

Even with these modest aims, however, the Protectorate soon ran into trouble. The late 1920s revealed how little control the British had over migrant labor. From year to year, their numbers could fluctuate wildly, for reasons that the government scarcely understood. Migrant trends appeared to have little to do with demand on the Uganda side, resulting in alternating seasons of widespread unemployment and labor shortages. Public health authorities and security officials complained that these unpredictable changes could leave people stranded in urban centers with neither work nor food nor the means to return home. Still others made their way to

[17] European planters in Uganda, while relatively few in number compared to Kenya, formed a relatively powerful political bloc during the 1910s, when the direction of the country's economic development was still unclear. Yet by the early 1920s Protectorate authorities believed that peasants, rather than planters, were the key to Uganda's economic prosperity. The planters subsequently lost the political platform they had enjoyed momentarily during the war years. See Ehrlich, Wrigley, and Powesland for detailed histories of the planter class in Uganda; see also the Uganda Development Commission's 1920 report.

[18] G. Powesland, "The History of the Migration in Uganda," in *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, ed. Audrey Richards (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd, 1954), 30.

[19] Uganda Protectorate, *Medical and Sanitary Department: Annual Report for the Year ended 31st December 1928* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1929), 28. See also Uganda Labour Department, *The Housing and Hygiene of African Natives on Plantations, Estates and at Ginneries* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1928), 8.

Buganda under extreme duress, setting out from Rwanda when they were already half-starved. It was not uncommon during the interwar years to find Rwandan migrants either dead along the road or bed-ridden in Ugandan hospitals. Medical officers began to identify Rwandan communities as centers of epidemic disease, a perception that Maryinez Lyons has shown spread quickly to the Ganda populace.[20]

Government intervention during the late 1920s was limited to sporadic health screenings and the occasional provision of food aid, but by the mid-1930s, officials were beginning to consider more ambitious programs. The economy was slowly recovering from the 1929 crash, and the Colonial Office in London was under increasing pressure from trade unions and the International Labor Organization to implement much-needed labor reforms across the empire.[21] Many of these reforms would have little impact on Rwandan migrants, however, because they targeted formal industry, not private Ganda farmers (who employed the majority of foreign laborers in Uganda). Even so, Protectorate attempts to "stabilize" labor relations by raising wages, improving living quarters, and replacing Master and Servants ordinances with employment law had indirect consequences for migrant workers.[22] For starters, they put the Protectorate's industrial leaders on the defensive, encouraging some to take drastic action to secure access to low-cost workers. Migrants entering Buganda from the southwest routes often spoke of illicit labor recruiters who lay in wait along the road, kidnapping unsuspecting travelers and spiriting them away to Ganda farms and commercial plantations (see Paulo's story, below).

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[20] Lyons, "Foreign Bodies," 131-44.

[21] M.K. Banton, "The Colonial Office, 1820-1955: constantly the subject of small struggles," in *Masters, servants, and magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955*, ed. P. Craven and D. Hay (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 295.

[22] On the history of stabilization and British colonial labor policy, see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

British officials regarded recruiter scares as evidence of migrant irrationality, rather than systemic exploitation. The Protectorate Labor Inspector, writing at the end of World War II, downplayed the rumors, suggesting that most stories were the result of migrants who either misunderstood the terms of their contract or who were trying to cheat their employers out of a free ride. This argument continued to circulate among British observers for the next decade. Even Audrey Richards was quick to dismiss migrant recruiter stories as either ghost stories or convenient half-truths. "Recruiting stories are common on the road and many of them are probably a survival of the terror of old days, and not of actual conditions at the moment," she wrote, adding that,

> "it must also be said that those who are most vehement in their indignation against the recruiting companies do not consider that they have done any injury to the company by accepting free motor transport from the borders to the sugar estates in East Uganda and then deserting on arrival, and it is estimated that 40 to 60 per cent of those transported by the Lugazi factory do so desert."[23]

Despite such skepticism, however, the Labor Inspector still admitted that "sufficient evidence" indicated that some recruiters did use "undesirable methods" "at times."[24] In a different section of the same report, he even noted that one Asian and four African recruiters had been convicted of "conspiracy to recruit labour by unlawful means and of wrongful confinement" and had been sentenced to three to nine months' imprisonment with hard labor.[25] Two years later, when licensed recruiting firms reported that migrants were openly hostile to

[23] Richards, *Economic Development,* 60.

[24] Uganda Protectorate, *Labour Department Annual Report for the Year Ended 31st December 1946* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1947), 6.

[25] Ibid., 10.

their agents at Masaka, the Labor Department urged "patience," admitting that migrant attitudes were understandable in light of "incorrect methods used in the past."[26]

It is impossible to know the extent to which migrants were subjected to forcible recruitment and kidnapping en route, but the stories speak to the predations of an unregulated labor market. Fresh reports of forcible recruitment drove migrants to abandon highways, avoid government labor camps, and refuse free rations. They profoundly impacted people's sense of security, convincing travelers to take the "jungle route" at the expense of their physical health.[27] Migrants at Lugazi told Richards that they had been kidnapped at a camp called Mutukula on the border with Tanzania.[28] Still others spoke of an "Indian lady who built a camp for migrants, and when they sleep in it [she] catches them and takes them to the plantations."[29] The "Indian lady" in question was actually an Italian woman named Toni Nuti, who kept a whites-only guesthouse on an island in the middle of Kagera River. Her role in labor recruiting is unclear from available evidence, but her name came up often in Richards' research. The DC Masaka knew her but refused to comment when pressed for information, saying only, "Well she is a foreigner after all, and they are always highly emotional. That is all you can say."[30] Indeed, the mystery that surrounded recruitment only exacerbated migrant fears.

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[26] Uganda Protectorate, *Labour Department Annual Report for 1948* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1949), 5.

[27] On the "jungle route" expression, see Richards, *Economic Development*, 60. On the relationship between perceived insecurity and migrant health, see the Labour Department's Annual Reports for 1946-1948.

[28] LSE Richards, 7/11, *Estates and Co-operatives*; "Field-notes, visit to Lugazi Sugar Factory, Kyagwe," 6 April 1951.

[29] LSE Richards, 7/19, *Kyagwe Survey, 1951*; "Lukiko meeting, Ssabagabo muruka [Kyagwe]," 28 February 1951.

[30] LSE Richards 7/3, *Modern Political Organization*; "Interview with Graham Moss, DC Masaka," 5 May 1951.

Yet sometimes the evidence of forcible recruitment was incontrovertible, at which point the British were quick to place the blame at the feet of Asian businessmen, African headmen, and the occasional non-British European. Sir Granville Orde-Browne, then the Labor Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, reported that the demands of wartime production had had a "retrograde influence" on certain businesses in Uganda, namely the two Asian firms: "[T]wo managers of important Indian concerns," he wrote in 1946, "approached me for support for measures on compulsion, penal sanctions, and corporal punishment of a preposterous nature."[31] This was implicit in the larger mantra about the importance of employers taking over primary responsibility for labor health. Either way, the problem was racialized, stereotyping irrational natives who told wild tales of kidnappers along the road, and unscrupulous Asians who abused their workers.

The story of Paulo Kabano offers insight into the possibilities and perils that Uganda's immigration practices created during the interwar years.[32] Originally from Mukonya in Ruhengeri Province, northwestern Rwanda, Paulo first came to Uganda in January 1944, when he was only fifteen years old. On the cusp of adulthood, he knew what awaited him if he remained in Ruhengeri for much longer: The average Rwandan farmer no longer worked for himself, but for the state, and the demands of the state were always growing. Born in the wake of the *Rwakayihura* famine (1928-30), Paulo had grown up during a period of unprecedented state expansion, and had watched his parents struggle to keep their household afloat amid ever-increasing demands on their time, energy, and labor. Forced labor was accompanied by the constant threat of corporal punishment. "Sometimes," Paulo said, "without luck on his side, [my

[31] TNA CO 536/213/4, *East Africa: Uganda: Labour Conditions, 1943*; Orde-Browne, Notes, 21 May 1946.

[32] Interview: P.K., Mukono District, 11 September and 8 November 2013.

father] would come back [at the end of the day] when he had gotten eight strokes of the cane." Paulo himself worked as an unpaid domestic servant in the home of the local sub-chief. It is little wonder, then, that he started looking for an escape.

The opportunity came in December 1943, when six of his neighbors—all members of his clan—returned to Mukonya on holiday. They had been in Uganda, working on private farms in Buganda, and had only come back to bring money to their families and to check on their homesteads. It was during their visit that Paulo hatched a plan: he would ask his master for a chance to visit his parents, but instead of going home, he would run away with his clan mates. "I told [my master], 'Let me go see my parents at home for only two Sundays, two Sundays,'" he recalls. "The days I would have spent [at home] were used to walk to Uganda...He was [later] just told that I left."

The timing of his departure was significant, because in theory, he should not have been able to leave Rwanda when he did. That was the year when the British and Belgians decided to close their mutual border in order to prevent Rwandan victims of the *Ruzagayura* famine (1942-44) from seeking asylum in Uganda. The closure lasted for several months, during which time many unfortunate travelers were apprehended at the major border stations at Kisoro and Kabale (see Nyirambonwa's story, Chapter Three). Paulo's ability to escape depended in large part on the travel expertise of his companions. They knew the main route, but more importantly, they knew the back roads. Warned ahead of time by fellow travelers about the border closure, the party diverted from the main road as they approached Kisoro, crossing the border at night by way of a hidden footpath. Having made the journey many times before, they were able to evade

new obstructions such as border closures, while less-experienced migrants were apprehended and deported.[33]

The party's successful passage at Kisoro, however, was only the first challenge they would face during their long walk to Buganda, and Paulo's travel companions, no matter how experienced or knowledgeable, could not be prepared for all situations. They did not know, for example, that the border closure had caused an uproar among the Protectorate's plantation owners, who viewed the government's actions as a direct assault on their labor supply and thus their bottom line.[34] Stories of forced labor recruitment multiplied during the border closure, and Paulo was an unhappy recipient of the industry's wrath. As the group approached Masaka, Paulo remembered, they came across a set of three waiting lorries. "We were walking and when we got to the road with the six people I came with, we joined others—Banyankole, Barundi... we were many," he said. "We were found and kidnapped in the area in Masaka called Mbirizi, somewhere before you reach Masaka, we were kidnapped and put on the side, they brought three lorries and we were put in and locked in." When asked how the Kakira employees managed to capture such a large group, Paulo laughed. "We could not fight them. They were more than us." The men who captured them were neither Asian nor Baganda, he said, but "blacks" from northern Uganda and Congo. "The Lugbara were very tough!" he exclaimed, adding that some of his kidnappers had also been Congolese. "Do you think you can call a Congolese a person?" he asked rhetorically, using racial stereotypes about the militancy of northerners to explain his inability to escape.

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[33] The border closure was short-lived and attracted considerable grief from the business community. See Chapter Three for a more detailed analysis of the closure. For more on the Protectorate's efforts to deport sick and injured migrants, including those deemed "mentally unfit," see KigDA Immigration Box 1, File MIG.2/1, *Repatriation of Africans (Destitutes), 1935-43*; KigDA Immigration Box 6, File MIG 004, *All Districts: Inquiries Concerning Surrounding Refugees, 1945-73.*

[34] D.P.S. Ahluwalia, *Plantation and the Politics of Sugar in Uganda* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995) 121.

The lorries transported Paulo to Kakira Sugar Works in eastern Buganda, where he worked for six months, supposedly as a contract laborer (though he does not recall ever signing an agreement). Uncertain of where they were and unfamiliar with eastern Buganda, he and his relatives decided to remain at Kakira, having been promised room and board and a decent wage. Paulo's own memories of life at the plantation are mixed. On the one hand, he consistently referred to his time there as "*kasanvu*," suggesting that, although the Protectorate had abolished forced labor in the 1920s, the word lived on as a reference to other forms of coerced labor. Work in the cane fields was difficult, and Paulo was only paid half of what his older relatives received, on the grounds that he was a "child" and therefore incapable of doing a full day's work. Meals consisted of stale posho served with beans or groundnuts, the latter of which was an unfamiliar and acquired taste for most Rwandan migrants. Workers were not allowed to leave the plantation, nor did they receive their wages until six months had passed. On the other hand, Paulo also had favorable memories of Kakira. "We were treated well," he said. "There was no one to beat you and we changed shifts on time." While it seems unlikely that Paulo was treated "well"—even ignoring his forcible conscription, cane cutters at Kakira suffered an appallingly high death rate, which had contributed to riots in 1942—his emphasis on the regularity of hours and meals and the absence of corporal punishment suggests his life of *kasanvu* was better than what he experienced at home.

At the end of six months, a Kakira lorry returned Paulo to Masaka, from where he walked the rest of the way to Ruhengeri. He returned home with only thirty-six shillings in his pocket, the sum total of his wages; what a grown man working for a private farmer might earn in a month, Paulo had earned in half a year. He remained in his parents' home for another two years, turning down invitations from his relatives to go back to Buganda. But he did eventually go

back, only this time he paid fifteen shillings to ride the bus from Kisoro to Kampala in order to avoid the labor recruiters in Masaka. That he would purchase a ticket that cost two-and-a-half times his previous monthly salary at Kakira was evidence of his fear of the recruiter lorries, but it also reflected his determination to return to Uganda.

His second journey was far more rewarding. He traveled alone this time, if traveling in an over-crowded bus with other Banyarwanda, Congolese, and western Ugandans could be called traveling alone. He knew that some of his more distant relations had found work in eastern Buganda, and he hoped to find them by talking to other migrants he met en route. In this hope he was not disappointed, as there were people on the bus who knew his relatives and were able to direct him to where they stayed in Mukono. Arriving in Mukono, he stayed with his relatives for two weeks, during which time he looked for work.

Paulo eventually found secure employment as a domestic in the household of a wealthy chief.[35] How he landed this position is a bit unclear, but he was likely put in contact with the chief through other Banyarwanda laborers who worked in his fields. Paulo described the chance opportunity as a gift from God, but one also gathers that he knew how to play the part of the "house boy," a title heavy with gendered connotations. He had already learned, from his prior experience in Rwanda, that he could win the favor of a patron by being "humble and obedient," carrying out household chores normally reserved for women. When asked why he thought he was chosen over other applicants, he even likened his good fortune to a marriage proposal in which he was the lucky bride: "Amongst many people, many women, wouldn't you pick just one [to marry]?" Perceiving an opportunity to get ahead by taking on the role of the deferential household help, he performed his daily tasks with diligence and attention to detail.

[35] For the sake of Paulo's anonymity, I have decided to omit the name of the chief.

Paulo remained with his employer for the next twenty years, living in a grass hut behind the main house. In contrast to his time at Kakira, where he spent most of his work and leisure time with other Kinyarwanda-speaking migrants, his position as a houseboy brought him into the more intimate spaces of Ganda life, where he had to communicate in Luganda and organize his days around the itineraries of his master's children.[36] In our interviews, Paulo was reticent to share details about his previous employer, even though he boasted that he knew "a lot [of] very private and important" information. Whatever he knew about the inner world of Ganda politics, he was evidently keen to demonstrate his mastery of Ganda history and culture, even lecturing my research partner, Rebecca—a young Muganda woman belonging to the royal clan, *Bambejja*—on the importance of being able to count back the generations of Ganda kings. He later became exasperated when Rebecca didn't seem to know the biography of his former employer or how he came to reside in Mukono. "What got him from Kampala to Mukono?" he asked incredulously, repeating Rebecca's question:

> PK: I think that you are not getting these things properly.
> R: We will get them.
> PK: You ought to understand.
> R: I have gotten them.
> PK: You ought to understand, you know, *Kabaka* Mutesa, the *Kabaka* who gave [my boss] the chief's title.
> R: (*conceding defeat*) Yes, sir.

Later, while discussing the affairs of Mutesa, Rebecca made the mistake of asking which Mutesa Paulo was referring to. "The one who produced Mutebi, the current king." Glancing at

[36] Richards, *Economic Development*, 134.

his wife, he shook his head. "Mutesa the First, can you know? Can you count [the kings]? You can't."[37]

Paulo took great pride in his social connections and cultural literacy, but neither of these provided sufficient security in late colonial Buganda. Paulo knew he was *like* a member of his employer's household, but he was still only a domestic servant and his status was subject to change. And so, after spending several years in Mukono, he set about securing a more reliable attachment to Buganda: He acquired land.

From Migrants to Settlers

Buganda's unique land practices enabled migrants like Paulo to relocate permanently to Uganda. Xenophobic politics would rear their ugly head in the 1950s, but ethnic identity was never a prerequisite for access to land. Buganda political authority during the mid-late nineteenth century was based on land tenure and, more specifically, the power of the chief to distribute that land—which he received from the Ganda king, the *kabaka*—to his followers in exchange for their loyalty and labor. In turn, his followers had the power to leave and find new patrons if he proved to be a harsh, incompetent, or lazy administrator. This relationship of reciprocal obligation kept Buganda's political order in balance.[38] Social membership, then, was primarily tied to relationships and land, and only secondarily to territorial origins.

Colonialism profoundly altered the politics and practices of land tenure, which in turn altered the terms of client-patron relationships and political membership in Buganda. Under the 1900 Buganda Agreement, which provided the legal platform for colonial rule in Uganda, British

[37] In fairness to Rebecca, herself a schoolteacher, Paulo was discussing Muteesa II, who reigned from 1939-69. Muteesa I reigned from c. 1856-1884. She was not about to challenge him during our conversation, however.

[38] Hanson, *Landed obligation*, 240.

agents and powerful Ganda chiefs negotiated a new system of land tenure that came to replace earlier landholding practices with a rationalized grid of individual freehold plots. This new system, known as *mailo*, turned chiefs into landowners where previously they had functioned more like stewards of the *kabaka,* who had in principle owned all of the land. Individual freehold broke the cycle of reciprocal obligation, for it ensured that landowning chiefs were no longer dependent on the *kabaka* for their source of power and authority. Instead of pandering to a centralized monarch, chiefs could use their property to accrue wealth-in-rent through private leasing.[39] Baganda clients-*cum*-tenants lost much of their sole bargaining power (i.e., their ability to leave patrons) when they became tied to the land through leases, and were furthermore subject to the whims of their new landlord-chiefs, who could evict tenants at will and without reason.

Changes to the Buganda land market added to the labor vacuum created by the abolition of *kasanvu.* The 1900 Buganda Agreement had enabled land-owning chiefs to lease small plots to whomever they chose, but this new tenure system offered few protections to tenants and was weighted heavily in favor of landlords. By the mid-1920s, public resentment of abusive Ganda landlords boiled over into a vigorous populist movement known as the *Bataka* Association,[40] which united a broad spectrum of peasants and clan heads against the landed chiefly class. The critical aspect of this collaboration was that it sought to unify *bakopi* (peasants) and *bataka* (traditional clan elders) regardless of nationality or birthplace against the landlords. Banyarwanda immigrants and settlers, then, were welcomed members of the class-based coalition. In the end, the Protectorate determined that it could not overturn the 1900 Agreement,

[39] Richards, *Economic Development and Tribal Change*, 173. Elsewhere in colonial Africa, native councils controlled access to land, and it was much more difficult and politically sensitive for a governing body to collectively decide to grant tenancy to outsiders.

[40] Not to be confused with the *Bataka* Union of the 1940s.

but it did pass the *Envujo* and *Busulu* laws. These laws codified leasing rates (*busulu*) and the percentage that landlords could receive from a sharecropper's profits (*envujo*), and made it nearly impossible to evict tenants from their rented plots.[41] Perhaps most importantly, the laws made *ebibanja* a heritable asset: upon his death, a tenant's land would pass to his heir—it would not revert back to his landlord. *Busulu* and *Envujo* laws revolutionized Buganda's land market by providing previously unheard-of protections to tenants. Moreover, the guarantee of heritability allowed peasant families to accrue wealth across generations independent of patron-client networks.

The new law also did not discriminate on the basis of tribe or origin. Migrants could claim the same legal protections as native tenants, thus challenging earlier notions of belonging and social order. This was to have a profound and lasting impact on immigration to the Protectorate, for it provided migrants with the option of settling in Buganda without fear of arbitrary eviction. Migrants who chose not to permanently relocate could still take advantage of the new tenancy laws by supplementing their incomes with money earned from planting fast-growing cotton on rented land. This latter option proved extremely profitable for Banyarwanda accustomed to low wages, so much so that many were able to abandon manual labor on Ganda farms altogether and begin growing cash crops instead. In his 1949 report, the Labour Director lamented that the availability of land, and its accessibility to migrants, meant that industrial concerns could no longer attract sufficient numbers of laborers. Given the option of working for an employer or himself, a migrant usually chose the latter. "Until such time as the land available

[41] Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 163-164; M. Louise Pirouet, *Historical Dictionary of Uganda* (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1995), 74-76; Richards, *Economic Development*, 127-128.

for cultivation throughout the country can no longer meet the needs of an increasing population," he wrote, "the labour shortage is likely to continue."[42]

The EAISR Study

Buganda was, by the early 1950s, grappling with the effects of an incredible population boom, one that owed as much to immigration as it did to natural reproduction. Protectorate efforts to manage immigration through halfway measures like transit camps and road construction had failed to check immigration rate. This was shockingly clear in the 1948 census data, which found that the kingdom's African population had grown by 49.6 percent since 1931.[43] The census findings, combined with a conservative swing in Ganda politics, gave rise to nativist fears that Buganda was being invaded by foreigners.[44] Ganda editorialists warned their compatriots that they were rapidly becoming a minority in their own land, while landlords and chiefs called for greater government surveillance of migrants.[45]

Uganda's administrative hierarchy, however, was not set up to "know" individual subjects. In theory, the *muruka* chief was supposed to serve as the eyes and ears of the government, providing invaluable information about the comings and goings of his people. In

[42] Uganda, *Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1949* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1950), 5.

[43] J.W. Fortt, "The Distribution of the Immigrant and Ganda Population within Buganda," in *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda*, ed. Audrey Richard (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1954), 77.

[44] On Ganda politics in the 1940s and 1950s, see D.A. Low, *Buganda in Modern History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971); Carol Summers, "Grandfathers, grandsons, morality, and radical politics in late colonial Buganda," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 38:3 (2005), 427-447.

[45] On Ganda editorialists and nativist scares, see Peterson, *Ethnic Patriots*, 80. For the attitudes of chiefs and landlords towards migrants, see Audrey Richards' papers. For example, one landowner told Richards that foreign workers should be outfitted with "identity discs" and "distinctive uniforms" for easier identification—a clear reference to identification practices under Kenya's *kipande* system. LSE, Richards' Papers, 7/19, *Kyagwe Survey, 1951*; "Gombolola Lukiko Meeting, Kyagwe, Mutuba VII," 23 February 1951.

practice, however, chiefly ability varied tremendously across time and space. In more urban areas like Kampala, or rural areas with high resident turnover like Kyagwe, *miruka* chiefs were hard-pressed to keep up with the constant flow of people in and out of their jurisdictions.[46] This was reflected in the parish tax registries. A *muruka* chief's primary responsibility was to collect taxes, a job that presumably required him to keep a registry of revenues collected and owed. Yet, as Southall and Gutkind found in their two-year study of local governance in Kampala, *muruka* tax registries bore little resemblance to demographic realities. Chiefs were required to collect a fixed amount for their parish as a whole; they did not need to ensure that each taxpayer contributed their share. This allowed for widespread tax evasion, particularly by migrants who could claim that they had paid taxes elsewhere.[47]

Growing concerns about migrants prompted the Protectorate government, in 1950, to commission Audrey Richards, then Director of the Kampala-based East African Institute of Social Research (EAISR), to conduct a preliminary study of the situation in Buganda Kingdom. Over the next three years, Richards and her team of anthropologists fanned out across Buganda, conducting interviews, village surveys, and intensive archival research; checking government census data; visiting labor camps; and traveling up and down the main migration routes that led to Buganda. Focusing on three *amassaza* or counties—Buddu (West), Busiro (Central), and Kyagwe (East)—the EAISR team was able to chart the distribution of migrants across the Protectorate and note differences in settlement patterns. Despite government fears of detribalization, Richards found that many Banyarwanda migrants were able to successfully

[46] Southall and Gutkind, *Townsmen*, 191-92; Richards, *Economic Development*, 235-40.

[47] Under Protectorate law, an African who lived in one parish but owned property in different parish could pay his taxes in the latter one. Non-Ugandan migrants like Banyarwanda, moreover, did not have to pay taxes until they had lived in the Protectorate for a full calendar year. Those who came for seasonal work, returning to their homes for several months out of the year, could claim that they had paid their taxes back in Ruanda-Urundi.

assimilate into Buganda society: they secured local patrons, adopted local names and dress, learned the Luganda language, and sent their children to local mission schools. While Baganda interviewees often spoke disparagingly of the *abannamawanga* (foreigners), denying that a Munyarwanda could ever pass as a Muganda native, the Province's diverse African populace seemed to be getting along peaceably in practice.

Nevertheless, even as Richards demonstrated the tremendous capacity of Ganda society to incorporate foreigners, she still concluded her study with an ominous warning: if the Protectorate did not find a way to incorporate Rwandan migrants into the political state, then the coming of independence "may quite possibly cause a recrudescence of 'tribalism'." Buganda's population problem, she argued, was not about resource scarcity or ethnic tension *per se*, but rather the government's reluctance to ensure the equitable incorporation of settlers. Summarizing her major findings, she stated that, "Buganda has assimilated an enormous influx of foreigners in the past twenty-five years and has done so in an unexpectedly peaceful manner." But, she added, "in the future its government will have to decide whether it wants to encourage or discourage colonising [settler] migration; and whether it wants to facilitate the complete social absorption of migrants already settled on the land or to continue to treat them as people of inferior social status."[48] The Protectorate, in other words, had a difficult choice to make. It could either accept the permanency of Rwandan settlement and work toward greater social cohesion and political inclusion, or refuse to accept this demographic shift and instead pursue segregation and mobility control.

In the end, however, it chose neither. Believing foreign migrants to be too critical to the country's bottom line, the Protectorate continued to encourage Rwandan migration at the same

[48] Richards, *Economic Development*, 223.

time that it refused to invest in the administrative infrastructure necessary for their incorporation. The consequence of this refusal was that chiefs—especially the lowest-paid *miruka* chiefs and their unpaid headmen—found themselves in charge of rapidly expanding jurisdictions which they possessed neither the resources nor personnel they needed to administer effectively. Private landlords, meanwhile, granted access to land and the coveted *kibanja* title, which gave migrants the closest thing approaching legal residency. Low-level bureaucrats and landed interests, in short, became the face of "the state" for Rwandan settlers, determining who belonged and who did not.

Part II: Studying Migrants

The *lukiko* (council) meeting at Sabawali parish had taken an uncomfortable turn. Ganda landlords, decked in impeccable white *kanzu* (tunics), shifted in their seats while tenant farmers and ragged field-hands, uninvited but curious, leaned into the crowded hall through open windows. Richards and her EASIR colleague, A.B. Mukwaya, sat at the front of the room, waiting. Their research assistant, Mr. Kabubi, poised with pencil to paper, was ready to record the room's answer to Richards' question: "Is it a good thing that the Ganda should live together with other people?" The Baganda had always lived together with other people, of course—pre-colonial Buganda had been, like any empire, heterogeneous—but that was not the gist of the inquiry.[49] Richards and Mukwaya were not asking about the potential assimilability of abstract 'others.' Theirs was a specific question about contemporary Buganda's rise as a major destination for migrant workers from Ruanda-Urundi, a phenomenon driven in large part by the landed aristocracy's demands for cheap labor and paying tenants. Ganda landlords and the

[49] On the heterogeneity of the pre-colonial kingdom, see Aidan Stonehouse, "Peripheral Identities in an African State: A History of Ethnicity in the Kingdom of Buganda since 1884" (PhD diss., University of Leeds, 2012).

colonial state had made a killing off of Rwandan migration during the 1940s and '50s, yet their profits came at a price: The cost of land was rising, as was the number of non-Ganda tenants. People told Richards they feared foreigners would one day take over the kingdom from within. "Buganda will lose her empire just as Rome did when they kept slaves and forgot how to work," one chief told her.[50] For many Baganda, the question of Rwandan settlement was believed to be an existential one.[51]

Several awkward moments passed as meeting participants waited for someone else to answer. Finally, after much "embarrassment and shrugging of shoulders," one elderly landlord stood up and said that migrants were welcome as seasonal workers, but they should not be settling in Buganda. "They are eating our land," another concurred. The uneasy silence gave way to a buzz of angry murmurs. "Where will our children live?!" someone demanded from the back row. At this point, another man, "wall-eyed" and "blunt," attempted to intervene. Standing up before the council, he informed his neighbors what they no doubt already knew: he was "a Munyarwanda," he "suppose[d]," but he was "born here." His parents were dead, and he had nowhere else to go. "[I] never even went as far as Mbarara," he said humbly, attempting to cut the tension of the room with gentle self-deprecation. The audience rewarded his performance of obliging dependency with "good-humored laughter," but it was not enough to turn the collective mood. The EAISR team had struck a nerve.

As the laughter fizzled, another man, described in Kabubi's notes as "old," "mild," and dressed in a "dirty coat and dirty kansu [sic]," rose and stated that he, too, was a Munyarwanda.

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[50] LSE Richards, 7/16, *Attitudes and Values*: "Banyaruanda," 14 September 1950. The chief in question was Mumyuka, the *Gombolola* chief for Mityana, Buganda.

[51] Shane Doyle, "Immigrants and Indigenes: the Lost Counties Dispute and the evolution of ethnic identity in colonial Buganda," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3:2 (2009), 289.

But unlike his compatriot, he was not prepared to cater to Ganda egos. "I have planted trees here and have cows…I don't want to go. Besides, the foreigners are married to Ganda and have children by them. Do you want to lose these?" Rumblings from the audience, but the man pressed on: "I have paid my *busulu* [rent] and have done everything I ought to do." Pausing briefly, he then posed a question of his own: "Is there anything wrong that I have done? I have been here six years. Have I done anything wrong during that time?" Turning to sit back down, he again challenged his infuriated listeners to "tell me if I have done anything wrong."

Have I done anything wrong? In highlighting his investments in land, trees, cows, and family, the second Rwandan speaker was challenging the boundaries of Ganda society. He made no attempt to fool his neighbors about his identity—they knew where he came from—but he also refused their efforts to consign him to a second-class status.[52] For starters, he had paid *busulu*, thus establishing his legal right to residency. Beyond this, he claimed to have "done everything" that he "ought to do" as a responsible member of the community. He communicated in Luganda and wore Ganda dress, however imperfectly. He grew cash crops and contributed to the local economy, and he had evidently figured out the delicate balance of gift-giving that underwrote landlord-tenant and local government relations. He knew, furthermore, that he was part of a demographic shift that neither the Baganda nor the British could stop: Rwandans were settling down permanently in the hundreds of thousands across the Buganda kingdom. Protectorate authorities, believing that the country's economic success hinged on the ready availability of migrant workers, did little to hinder their movement, preferring instead to allow Rwandans to

[52] Scholarship on Rwandan assimilation sometimes slips between macro- and micro-phenomenon. While many Rwandans during this period were beginning to "pass" as Baganda and thus allude detection from demographers, census-takers, and strangers, available evidence also suggests that *individuals* were often known to neighbors and friends: "As the Ganda himself remembers his centre of clan origin, so the Buganda-born foreigner who may perhaps now speak no language but Luganda, calls himself still a Rundi or Ruanda, and is described as such by his neighbours" (Richards, *Economic Development*, 222).

integrate freely with the local population. Unimpeded by onerous pass systems, native reserve schemes or immigration controls like those found in neighboring Kenya, Rwandan migrants were living side-by-side with Ganda residents. They were adopting Ganda names, renting Ganda land, and finding Ganda partners. The man's question about children (*did the Ganda want to lose these?*) was thus a pointed rebuke of Ganda chauvinism and their hypocritical treatment of Rwandan settlers. He knew, as did his neighbors, that the Ganda did not have the power to dictate Rwandan migration as a phenomenon.

As an individual, however, the man in the dirty *kansu* was taking a serious risk in publicly challenging the *lukiko* and the parish's land-owning class. He claimed that he deserved to live in Buganda because he paid *busulu* and observed local norms, but his presumptiveness was precisely the problem. Wealthy Ganda were not interested in civilizing Banyarwanda, but in domesticating them. They wanted docile, disease-free workers who would show up in season and depart after the harvest. Rwandan migrants who tried to adopt local dress, manners, and language were not appeasing Ganda chauvinists, but threatening the social hierarchy that supported Ganda prosperity. And so, while the landlords in Sabawali could do little to stop the general flow of migrants into Buganda, they could certainly make life difficult for one uppity tenant.

The nerve of the man to challenge his own exclusion at the Sabawali *lukiko* was enough to excite the first Rwandan man—the deferential "wall-eyed" chap—into emergency action. Raising his voice above the angry din of the meeting hall, he tried desperately to calm the audience by cutting his compatriot down to size. "Those children aren't his," he said, "They are his brother's. And the cows aren't his, they are his brother's." "Brother" was an honorific that Rwandan migrants used to refer to Baganda, and the man's statement was an attempt to assure the *lukiko* that no one was threatening to take away children or cows from the Kingdom; no one

was threatening the social order. "The Baganda are our friends and we depend on them. We must live together." His anxious pleas, however, fell on deaf ears. The meeting ended abruptly, without the usual ceremony. Outside the hall, landowners refused to pose for Richards' group photograph if foreigners were to be included. Kabubi recorded that even after the meeting disbanded, people remained in the hall to continue their "angry discussion" for another half-hour.[53]

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The literature on Banyarwanda settlement in Uganda has emphasized the ability of migrants to assimilate into Ganda culture. Highlighting the generosity of the Protectorate's tenancy laws, the relative accessibility of Buganda's native court system, and the flexibility of east African identities, scholars have argued that Rwandan migrants enjoyed unique opportunities to both assert and reinvent themselves in late colonial Uganda. Images in Richards' study present a gendered, teleological narrative of Rwandan assimilation, in which ragged bachelors living in grass-huts slowly morph into respectable Ganda peasants with wives and children.[54] Yet it would be wrong to assume that all Banyarwanda could assimilate, or that they wanted to. Even as they took up land, adopted Ganda names and sent their children to Ugandan schools, Rwandan migrants still found themselves on the short end of local power inequalities. The British had opened the country's gates to foreign workers, but landlords, chiefs, and employers still possessed considerable means to make life difficult for them, especially those who struggled to speak Luganda or who were naive of local laws. Even the *Busulu* and *Envujo*

[53] LSE Richards 7/3, *Modern Political Organization*; "Lukiko meeting in Buddu, *Gombolola* Musale, *Muruka* Sabawali," 4 May 1950 [correction: 1951].

[54] Richards, *Economic Development*, Plates XII and XIII.

laws, which were intended to protect the most vulnerable tenants against abuse, were not enough to mitigate the power differential between Ganda landlord and foreign settler. A landlord, for instance, could refuse to issue a *busulu* ticket to an immigrant *kibanja* holder, meaning that the tenant lacked proof of legal occupancy.[55] The tenant could haul his or her landlord to court, but always at the risk of retaliation. A *gombolola* chief in Buddu informed Richards in 1950 that landlords were beginning to chase foreign tenants off their *ebibanja* plots. Tenants could contest their eviction in the courts—and when they did, they often won—but the landlord would find other ways to make life difficult for them. The *gombolola* chief gave as an example the story of a landlord in Kayonde who informed his unwanted tenants that he was reducing their monthly wages by nearly half, from 25/- per month to 15/-; four tenants abandoned their claims as a result.[56]

Rwandan migrants therefore had compelling reasons to try and become Ganda, or at least to study them closely. "Assimilation" was neither automatic nor easy, and certainly not a process to romanticize. A migrant's education in Ganda ways generally began on the road, in the company of more experienced travelers who knew the way and could already speak broken Luganda. Reaching Buganda, many found accommodation, not in migrant hostels, neighborhoods or camps, but with Ganda farmers who allowed them to sleep in their kitchens or build temporary huts on their land in exchange for menial labor. Here, in the domestic spaces of Ganda kitchens and compounds, migrants gained some of their first critical insights into their hosts' everyday routines, personal hygiene practices, and family life. They came to know the

[55] LSE Richards 7/18, *Immigrant Labour Survey*: "Notes on visit to Mutuba II, Mumyuka Gombolola, Busiro," 26 January 1951.

[56] Richards papers, LSE, 7/16, *Attitudes and Values*, Notes on Buddu, Kasujju, 26 May 1951.

parish chief and received visits from his headmen. Migrants would have opportunity to witness and perhaps even attend the monthly parish *lukiko* (council) meetings where the chief and his men announced new government policies and arbitrated local disputes.

Learning how to comport oneself, however, required significant trial-and-error. Richards' field journals document fascinating confrontations between Ganda landlords and migrant settlers that illustrate the rough edges of assimilation. At a meeting of landowners in Buddu, for example, Richards' interview was cut short by a young Rwandan man who loudly demanded to be let in to the hall. Dressed in a *kansu*, he informed the meeting attendees that he had "been here many years" farming his own *kibanja*, and had no intention of either returning to Rwanda or working for the Ganda. When several landowners began to mock him angrily, saying "He can't even talk Luganda!," another Rwandan man who had been watching the confrontation from the back row quickly stood up and came to his compatriot's defense. "Can we be sent back?" he asked. "If so, will [you] pay us for our land and houses?"[57] While many migrants tried to keep a low profile, others challenged Ganda condescension by highlighting their accomplishments, family ties, and tenure claims. An anonymous editorialist wrote to the *Uganda Herald* to say that he "protested against the common statement by Ganda that the Government was taking the money 'earned' by the sweat of their brows and pointed out that it was, after all, the sweat of Ruanda brows that was in question!"[58] Bursting into *lukiko* meetings uninvited, shouting pointed questions from the sidelines, and hauling abusive landlords to court, migrants openly challenged

[57] LSE Richards 7/10, *Land Tenure*: "Buddu, G. Musale, M. Sabagabo," n.d. May 1951.

[58] Richards, *Economic Development*, 200.

the boundaries of moral community in mid-century Buganda, employing their knowledge of Ganda society to make arguments about their place within it.

The Public Square

The *muruka lukiko*, or parish council, was a critical site for both migrant education and self-assertion. Its weekly meetings provided a public venue where African residents might bring their disputes, both large and small, to the attention of their local administrators. Doyle has argued that low-level chiefs used the council as a space for disciplining foreigners and inculcating them with an appreciation for *empisa*, or Ganda behavioral norms.[59] Indeed, Aidan Southall and Peter Gutkind, in their 1957 ethnography of urban governance in Kampala, found that *miruka* chiefs often believed that they bore some responsibility for "civilizing" migrants.[60] According to one chief they interviewed, practicing good *empisa* involved, among other things,

> "the paying of poll-tax, raising an alarm when someone was attacked, bringing a culprit to the chief, asking for permits and not doing anything without permission, eating only Ganda foods, being clean in the use of latrines and bathrooms, speaking Luganda, greeting people and respecting those in authority."[61]

The *lukiko* held significant political and economic sway over residents, most especially in the rural areas where most chiefs and headmen were powerful landlords, but it was not a one-way street. It was not simply a place where Ganda imparted their values onto presumed foreigners. Migrants could also use the courts to assert themselves and protect their interests in an increasingly heterogeneous society. *Muruka* jurisprudence, in other words, was not only a site of discipline, but of negotiation as well.

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[59] Shane Doyle, "Immigrants and indigenes: the Lost Counties Dispute and the evolution of ethnic identity in colonial Buganda," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3:2 (2009), 289.

[60] Southall and Gutkind, *Townsmen*, 210.

[61] Ibid., 201 ff 2.

The council was made up of the *muruka* chief, his appointed headmen, and a clerk who (in theory) recorded the assembly's proceedings. While the *muruka* chief had historically served both administrative and judicial functions, his role had since changed under the Protectorate state. Under Protectorate law, the council was an executive body whose primary responsibility was to collect taxes and implement government policy. Legally, it did not have constitutional authority to preside over court cases, but in practice, *muruka* council meetings frequently doubled as hearings for local disputes. These disputes covered a wide range of questions, from land tenure to child custody to witchcraft accusations. However, the chief was limited in what he could do, because he could not enforce a judgment. In the case of civil disputes, if he failed to bring about a resolution through arbitration, he would have to refer it to the *gombolola* court, the lowest-level native court recognized under Protectorate law; all criminal disputes had to be referred immediately to the police. Despite the chief's dubious judicial authority, local residents nevertheless brought their cases to the *lukiko* for arbitration. Southall and Gutkind found that in Mengo parish, the council heard sixty cases over the course of the year, of which only eleven were referred to the *gombolola* court. The parish court, then, served a practical if poorly recognized and legally questionable role in the Buganda Native Court system.

The relative informality and dubious legal authority of the *muruka* court arguably contributed to its accessibility for migrants. For example, Gutkind recorded an incident in Mulago in which a Rwandan woman "in great agitation" stormed into the *lukiko* meeting and demanded that her case be heard immediately. That the plaintiff was both female and Rwandan was not in itself unusual, at least in this part of Buganda: over 40% of cases recorded in the Mulago council diary during the 1950s were brought by non-Ganda.[62] What was unusual was the

[62] Southall and Gutkind, *Townsmen*, 201.

woman's boldness. Instead of politely kneeling and waiting for the council to recognize her (as was custom), she marched up to the council's table and interrupted the chief who was in the middle of other *lukiko* business. Before the chief could even respond, another man—the woman's husband—came charging into the hall and attempted to drag his wife away bodily; she responded to his assault by hitting him repeatedly until he let her go. The court, rather than arresting or dismissing the couple, agreed to hear their case there and then.[63]

Indeed, the *muruka* council meetings provided a source of entertainment and information for local residents, and even those who did not bring a case themselves could still attend and enjoy the show. Richards and Southall and Gutkind all noted the frequent presence of bystanders at council gatherings, who came either because they were interested in a specific case, or because they wanted to "simply sit and listen and watch life pass along the street."[64] The court was in many ways a stage where jealous lovers, conniving neighbors, and abused tenants could voice grievances against local residents known to the community. In Mulago, general attendance at *lukiko* meetings appears to have been relatively low most weeks, but a spectacular case might draw a crowd of several hundred people. Over 150 people showed up to witness the hearing of a man accused of bewitching his neighbor, for example, and raised a protest when the council refused to hear the case.[65]

Many middle-class and wealthy Baganda viewed the *muruka* court and its raucous hearings with disdain, but this did not prevent tenants from using it to hold landlords accountable

[63] Southall and Gutkind, 209.

[64] Southall and Gutkind, 199.

[65] Southall and Gutkind, 204-05.

to the law.[66] Two Barundi approached Richards and Mukwaya while they are conducting fieldwork in Sabawali *muruka*, Buddu, asking for advice about their landlord. The men owned contiguous *bibanja*, which they had occupied for six years, and they had *busulu* and *nvujju* tickets to prove their tenancy. However, their landlord sold the land to another Muganda, who was now trying to force the men out without proper compensation. Mukwaya and Richards urged them to take their case to the *muruka* chief, reminding them that under the law, a landlord can only evict a *kibanja* tenant if the tenant has failed to develop the land or had nowhere else to live. "Mukwaya reminds me afterwards that the compensation price is fixed now. It is a shilling a tree. He thinks the muruka would have to award them at least this sum in court."[67]

The court was not accessible to everyone, however. All official business had to be carried out in Luganda without the aid of translators. This could cause some difficulty for non-Ganda settlers who spoke a different Bantu language like Runyankole or Kinyarwanda, especially if they were new to the area. For many northern Ugandans, however, who spoke non-Bantu languages, the Luganda requirement was a far more formidable deterrent. Gutkind and his research team attended nearly a hundred *lukiko* meetings over the course of two years, and in all that time they only witnessed one non-Bantu-speaking plaintiff, a Luo man complaining of missing property, bring his case to court. Despite living in a diverse neighborhood where

[66] Southall and Gutkind recorded that "skilled artisans and independent retailers" never brought a case against their perceived peers to the parish chief, but they would bring a case if it was against someone of lower standing, like an immigrant. "On these occasions, the plaintiffs often take a high moral line, pointing out…that the defendant was not a resident of Mulago, but an immigrant who had settled in Buganda, because of the goodwill and graciousness of the Ganda people" (Southall and Gutkind*, Townsmen*, 201).

[67] LSE Richards 7/10, *Land Tenure*: "Land Tenure: Buddu, Musale M.," 13 May 1951.

someone might surely have served as translator, the court nevertheless "forced [the plaintiff] to communicate...in Luganda."[68]

The parish council and court provided a potential avenue for asserting oneself in Buganda, but migrants who wished to remain on good terms with local Ganda authorities also needed to learn how to navigate complicated expectations about gift-giving and patronage. Kawalya Kagwa, the retired *Katikiro* and son of Apollo Kagwa, told Richards that

> "in my father's day…peasants used to bring him presents of their crops; beans and bananas and beer. Everything! A man would be ashamed not to bring some of his food to the omwami. He would not like to go a month without bringing anything.
>
> R: What did they get in return?
>
> KK: They got their land. And of course their chief gave them things like bark-cloth and so on."

When Richards pressed him on contemporary "gifts" expected by landlords, suggesting that landlords with valuable land would not be happy with their 8/50 a year in rent plus *envujo*, he replied, "Well that is what they got by the case taken to London. You may have heard of it? The *bataka* were angry because the land had been given out by the Europeans with 'individual land tenure.'"[69]

British researchers found little consensus on the subject of gift-giving. This was unsurprising, of course, given that the practice was technically illegal. Interlocutors who had something to gain from gift-giving would therefore have ample reason to dismiss its importance, while tenants might be more inclined to exaggeration.[70] That the practice continued to be an

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[68] Southall and Gutkind, 201.

[69] Kagwa here is referring to the 1920s Bataka movement. The Kagwa family, as major landowners in Buganda, lost significant power with the passage of the *busulu* and *envujo* laws (hence his sarcastic reply to the British anthropologist). LSE Richards 7/10, *Land Tenure*: Land tenure, interview with Kawalya Kagwa, 30 January 1951.

[70] LSE Richards 7/10, *Land Tenure*: Land tenure, 14 November 1950; Forms of land-holding, 27 November 1950.

important facet of Ganda life, however, there was little doubt. Newly-arrived migrants had to find their place quickly in the moral economy of gift-giving if they hoped to find a place to stay. Low-paid chiefs and their unpaid headmen, who bore the brunt of a parish's administrative labor, supplemented their incomes with bribes from squatters, sex workers, and unlicensed brewers. Landlords, meanwhile, consolidated their power through these exchanges.[71]

Marriage and Clan

The public square was not the only venue for Rwandan self-making and integration. They also negotiated identity in their changing domestic worlds. Relationships of clan and kin, and love and lust, offered hidden pathways into 1950s Buganda life. Even as the public square became increasingly hostile, Rwandans were making themselves at home with Ganda lovers, spouses, friends, and employers. While Richards' interlocutors, both Ganda and foreign, frequently disparaged intermarriage as untenable, substantial evidence suggests that the social reality was far more complex. Much of this complexity had to do with the fact that Ganda women enjoyed considerable economic freedom in comparison to their counterparts elsewhere in East Africa. If Buganda's unique land-market did not discriminate on the basis of origins, it also did not discriminate on the basis of gender. Women could inherit land from their late husbands and fathers, and could then use this land to grow profitable crops. As Doyle has argued, women's relative access to productive resources granted them greater independence from family and clan, and this had important ramifications for Buganda's sexual economy and social networks.[72] Paulo

[71] Southall and Gutkind, *Townsmen*, 192.

[72] Shane Doyle, *Before HIV: Sexuality, Fertility and Mortality in East Africa, 1900-1980* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 155-57.

Kabano, for example, lived with his Ganda partner for many years before they married.[73] This would not have been surprising to Richards, who found that "co-habitation" between Ganda and non-Ganda partners was relatively common.[74] These relationships were typically long-term and exclusive, and could be found in both urban and rural areas. Many of these relationships produced children, who were often given Ganda names even if the father was a foreigner.[75]

Richards believed that genuine integration into a local clan was rare, perhaps even impossible. A man might memorize clan lineages, adopt a clan name and observe certain avoidances, but Ganda interviewees insisted that they always saw through such performances. Indeed, Richards' notebooks are replete with references to "incredulous sniggers" when migrants attempted to lay claim to local clan identities.[76] "Their biggest vice was adopting the ways of the Baganda and naming their children with the same names as Baganda," one elderly woman told me, adding that many migrants simply took the name of their employers:

> "Some used to take the names of their masters' children and called their children those names, so that they may be counted as Ugandans or be 'born' into that clan. For example if there master's name was Nsubuga, they named their female child Nansubuga, etc. They wanted to adopt the ways of their masters."[77]

While some migrants built kinship ties with their employers through the adoption of their clan, this was not the only means of re-identification. Paulo did not adopt the clan of his employer even though he worked as a houseboy for over two decades. Born a member of the

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[73] Interview: P.K., Mukono District, September 11, 2013.

[74] Richards, *Economic Development*, 178.

[75] Shane Doyle, "Parish Baptism Registers, Vital Registration and Fixing Identities in Uganda," in *Registration and Recognition: documenting the person in world history*, eds. Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter (Oxford: Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 2012), 283-90.

[76] Richards, *Economic Development*, 176.

[77] Interview: N.F., Mukono District, September 12, 2013.

Abasinga clan in Ruanda, he later reassigned himself to the Ganda *Ab'yente* clan. Yet Paulo insisted that his change in name was superficial, not substantive: *Ab'yente*, he said, was the Luganda translation for *Abasinga*. Both names referred to members of the "cow clan," which could be found (he claimed) in Uganda and Rwanda. "It wasn't copying. It wasn't copying because a cow is called a cow like how you hear *ab'ente* in Buganda, some of the people of the *nte* clan do not like cows." Paulo's wife, Nalongo, concurred that the two were "similar." The two clans, however, have little historical relationship to one another. They share similar totemic avoidances—the *Ab'yente* refrain from eating certain kinds of beef, as do *Abasinga*—but here the similarities end. Paulo offered no evidence for his claims. Richards found that many migrants tried to "pass" as members of a Ganda clan by memorizing complex genealogies and referencing clan lands (*butaka*), but Paulo did neither. His was not a "clever ruse," but a statement of what was, for him, a simple social fact: He was *Abasinga* from Rwanda, which was the same as *Ab'yente* in Buganda. The effort at translation, however, was a source of amusement for his wife, who was herself Muganda. "*Nte*!" she exclaimed during our interview while laughing good-humoredly. "He is Kakooza!" Kakooza is a name given to male members of the *Nte* clan, and Paulo had evidently taken the name for himself. "Even [our] child here is Kakooza," Nalongo explained. Paulo, in other words, insisted he was both Rwandan and a member of a Ganda clan, but had passed the latter identity on to his child.

Paulo was not unique in his naming practices. Shane Doyle has found, in a review of thousands of entries in baptismal registries in the Catholic Church archives, that parents with non-Ganda-sounding names apparently adopted new names over time. Richards might have dismissed such naming practices with skepticism, but she also found cases of self-identifying migrants who claimed a Ganda clan on the grounds that it was the same as their own back home.

In Busiro, for example, she and her EASIR colleague Mukwaya visited a man whom they knew to be a Tanganyikan settler, and saw that he had a picture of a lion with a Ganda proverb hanging on his wall. Her journal records the conversation that ensued: "Mukwaya asks him if he honours the lion [is a member of the Ganda *Mpologoma* clan]. He says, Yes. I, knowing him to be a Munyamwesi [from Tanganyika], ask if the clans are the same. He looks annoyed and says that they are the same everywhere all over Africa."[78]

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Paulo visited his parents' farm in Ruhengeri for the last time in January 1957, but by that point, Rwanda was no longer home. He had acquired a *kibanja* in Mukono, and was making a decent salary working for a powerful patron. And, he said, "there were no disturbances" in Buganda as there were in Rwanda. Indeed, 1957 was a difficult year for Belgian Ruanda, and Paulo was not the only person to pull up stakes (see Chapter Four).[79] Paulo was proud of his connections and accomplishments in Buganda. Yet, for all of his work of reinvention, he never denied where he came from: he was from Ruhengeri, he spoke Luganda with an unmistakable Rwandan accent, and he grinned when his wife laughed openly at his claims to be a member of the Ganda *nte* clan.

[78] LSE Richards 7/18, *Immigrant Labour Survey:* Interview with Musigiri for Musisi mutala, Sabagabo muruka, Mumyuka Gombolola, Busiro, 26-27 November, 1950.

[79] Colonial authorities confirm at annual labor conventions that the number of people leaving Rwanda for Uganda was increasing. See TNA CO 822/1131: Uganda: Labour Agreement with Ruanda-Urundi, 1956; Minutes of a Meeting between a Mission from the Government of Ruanda-Urundi, and representatives of the Governments of Tanganyika Territory and Uganda Protectorate regarding Migrant Labour, November 30-December 3, 1954.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced the efforts of Banyarwanda migrants to settle in Buganda. Buganda represented a political alternative to life in Ruanda-Urundi, an imagined refuge from famine, coerced labor, and state-sponsored violence at the hands of Tutsi chiefs. Two critical factors—a generous land tenure system, on the one hand, and the government's lax approach to population management, on the other—facilitated Rwandan settlement, but these were insufficient protections against the tide of Ganda nativism. Buganda had its possibilities, but also its hierarchies. Landlords, chiefs, and employers possessed considerable means to make life difficult for migrants, especially those who struggled to speak Luganda or who were naive of local laws. Newcomers had to study their hosts carefully if they were to navigate social norms and the everyday politics of gift-giving, dispute settlement, and civic engagement.

British and Baganda officials downplayed these political dimensions of Rwandan migration, choosing instead to frame Banyarwanda as "labor migrants" (or "wives of laborers"—Chapter Three), but the reality was that Uganda was a refuge for Rwandans long before the outbreak of the 1959 revolution. Much of the literature on the Rwandan diaspora has emphasized the success of migrant integration in colonial Buganda. In this way, scholars have used pre-1959 "migrants" as a foil to post-1959 "refugees," contrasting the assimilability of the former with the political incongruity of the latter. This framework depoliticizes colonial migrants and their motivations for relocating to Uganda, at the same time that it flattens what was in fact a highly uneven and irregular process of settlement and integration. Uganda's Rwandan refugee problem cannot be divorced from longer histories of politicized migration and population management. This elision also minimizes the role of the state in shaping regional mobility patterns over time.

The Protectorate, while not actively recruiting within Ruanda-Urundi, went to great lengths to clear the roads of physical and legal obstacles.

Chapter 3: Women's Work: Gendering the Banyarwanda Diaspora

Not all migrant women were prostitutes. This was one of the conclusions drawn by anthropologist Audrey Richards during her 1950-1 study of Banyarwanda[1] labor migration to the Uganda Protectorate. Richards' research team, commissioned by the Protectorate administration and financed by the Colonial Office, based their findings on 200 interviews that they conducted with migrant women from Ruanda-Urundi at government transit camps along the highway connecting central Uganda to the Rwanda border. When asked why they traveled, the majority of respondents replied that they were going to visit family, or to find husbands. Still others said that they were in the process of permanently relocating to Uganda, often (but not always) to join spouses, siblings, parents, and adult children who had gone before them.[2] These answers, combined with overwhelming statistical evidence and two years of ethnographic observation, pointed to a demographic phenomenon of which the colonial authorities had long been aware but only faintly understood: migrants from Ruanda-Urundi were putting down permanent roots in Uganda, and an observable increase in women's mobility was symptomatic of this trend.

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[1] During most of the colonial period, the British typically referred to all Kinyarwanda-speaking migrants from the Mandated Territory of Ruanda-Urundi (present-day Rwanda and Burundi) as "Banyarwanda," an ethnic neologism that masked more than it revealed. Distinguishing between Rwandans and Burundians in the historical record is therefore not always possible. For this reason, I use the label of "Banyarwanda" to refer to migrants from the Belgian Territory, unless my source directs me to a more suitable alternative (See Mukamusana's story, for example). That said, all available sources—colonial demographers, anthropologists, and church records—indicate that more Rwandans than Burundians settled in Uganda, with the 1959 Uganda census recording 350,000 permanently-settled Rwandan migrants in Buganda, against 150,000 Burundians. See J-P Chrétien, "Des Sedentaires Devenus Migrants: Les Motifs des départs des Burundais et des Rwandais vers l'Uganda (1920-1960)," *Cultures et développement: Revue internationale des sciences du développement*, 10:1 (1978): 71-101.

[2] Audrey Richards, ed., *Economic Development and Tribal Change: A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda* (Cambridge, U.K.: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1954), 72-74.

Government officials knew that the Protectorate's lucrative cash-crop economy had depended on Banyarwanda labor since the mid-1920s, but until World War II they had assumed that the annual circuit of seasonal workers was predominantly male and temporary. New census data published in 1948, however, found that Uganda was home to over 289,000 Banyarwanda residents, of whom 122,000 (42.3%) were women and girls.[3]

Women and girls played important roles in Banyarwanda migrant communities in Uganda, even if colonial authorities initially failed to register their presence. This chapter documents the poorly understood history of Banyarwanda women's migration and their contributions to an imagined diaspora community in Uganda. I argue that women's labor—paid and unpaid, licit and illicit, formal and informal, public and private—not only contributed to household wealth and the colonial economy, it made a Banyarwanda diaspora possible, *thinkable.* Women were the key alliance builders between families and clans in societies that practiced patriarchal (and often virilocal) marriage. Famine, economic deprivation, and political oppression in Ruanda-Urundi prompted significant emigration of Banyarwanda men from the 1920s onwards, and women's mobility linked the disparate parts of this diffuse diaspora together.

Yet it would be wrong to assume—as colonial authorities often did—that women only moved at the behest of brothers, husbands, uncles, and sons. As this chapter reveals, many women left home as a means of survival, when life in Ruanda-Urundi was no longer tenable. Still others took to the road to create, manage, and maintain their invaluable social networks—networks that gave them access to land, social security, and affective support in uncertain

[3] East Africa High Commission, "African population of Uganda Protectorate; geographical and tribal studies," in *East African population census, 1948* (Nairobi: East African Statistical Department, 1953).

times—as well as to take advantage of the unique economic opportunities that Uganda offered. In the process, they made critical decisions about family, property, language, and comportment that would leave a lasting imprint on what it meant to be Banyarwanda, both abroad and in Ruanda-Urundi.

An emphasis on women's mobility and identification work complicates male-centered histories of migration and ethnicity in East and Central Africa.[4] Recent scholarship on migrant welfare associations and ethnic societies has done much to illuminate the ways in which migrant men, displaced from their natal homes, sought to control women's mobility and reproductive labor as a means of preserving collective identity and honor.[5] While this scholarship has pluralized our understanding of masculinity and migration, it remains preoccupied with male agency. An overemphasis on men's work as ethnic entrepreneurs in diasporas caricaturizes women's contributions by forcing them into an artificial binary of complicity or resistance. Women feature as either the silent damsels in distress, left to fend for themselves on the family homestead, or as the rebellious, promiscuous urbanites who refused to accommodate patriarchal demands. By centering women's stories and demonstrating how women often operated *within* the bounds of social expectations, this chapter moves beyond the resistance paradigm towards a more nuanced understanding of gender, mobility, and ethnicity in the colonial period.

[4] For a useful comparative case in West Africa, see Marie Rodet, *Les migrantes ignorees du Haut-Senegal (1900-1946)* (Paris: Karthala, 2009).

[5] See for example Derek R. Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: a History of Dissent, C. 1935-1972* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); John Lonsdale, "KAU's Cultures: Imaginations of Community and Constructions of Leadership in Kenya after the Second World War," *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 13:1 (2000), 107-124; Luise White, *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). White's well-known work did much to illuminate women's mobility and labor in colonial East Africa, but her focus was on sex work (and the reactions of cultural associations).

Building on the work of Jan Shetler,[6] I argue that women—imagined by contemporaries and scholars alike as objects of control in men's ethnicity projects—actively participated in the reconfiguration of Banyarwanda identities and gender relations in colonial Uganda. In contrast to their male counterparts, women proved far more flexible in their identification work. Because marriage was often vital to their economic survival, women had to adapt themselves to new cultural and linguistic settings. The three biographies highlighted in this chapter show women as adept language learners and cultural intermediaries, appropriating the ways of their matrimonial household in order to gain social currency. This process has wrongly been described as one of erasure and loss,[7] rather than adaptation and convergence. Without ignoring the power inequalities that structured women's lives and options, this chapter calls attention to women's creative labor, and the ways in which they navigated new milieux without abandoning the languages, practices, and relationships that helped to define them.

Three lines of historical inquiry animate this chapter. The first examines how gendered assumptions about labor and Protectorate interpretations of Banyarwanda migration worked in tandem to make women's mobility seem exceptional. The second draws on oral histories to consider how, through their language acquisition, relationship decisions, long-distance travel, and everyday labor, women helped reimagine Banyarwanda identity in diaspora. The third and final line of inquiry considers how changing economic trends and new land tenure practices in Uganda intersected with Rwandan migration patterns to alter gender relations and gendered notions of respectability.

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[6] Jan Bender Shetler, ed., *Gendering Ethnicity in African Women's Lives* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015).

[7] See for example Leroy Vail, *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

This chapter proceeds in four sections. Part one traces broad trends in the history of women's labor and migration in Uganda and their impact on gender relations. Part two, organized around the story of Mukamusana, examines how women rebuilt their lives in Uganda after fleeing horrific famine in Rwanda. British and Belgian responses to cyclical famine form the basis of part three, and colonial correspondence about the case of one widowed mother, Nyirambonwa, demonstrates the intimate social consequences that attended the state's exceptionalizing discourse around women's mobility. Finally, part four highlights, through Dorcas's journey, the unexpected ways in which women could carve out places for themselves in post-World War II Buganda.

Broad Trends

The abolition of *kasanvu*, combined with cash-crop production and Buganda's changing land market, altered the role and value of women's work. Women historically shouldered the responsibility of subsistence farming across much of Uganda and eastern Africa, growing food on land provided to them by their husbands and fathers. Women typically retained control over the fruit of their labor, storing their produce in their own granaries and portioning out food to their own children as they saw fit. When the Protectorate distributed cottonseed to African chiefs on an experimental basis in the first decade of the twentieth century, African women provided most of the labor needed to prepare the soil, plant the seed, weed the fields, and harvest the bolls. Women continued to play this essential role in cotton production throughout the 1910s, but in so doing, they compromised their ability to produce food for their families. Meanwhile, chiefs, husbands, and fathers assumed control of the final product, selling cotton grown by their wives and pocketing the profits.[8] European and African men therefore benefitted enormously from

[8] Carol Summers, "Force and Colonial Development in Eastern Uganda," in *East Africa in Transition: Communities,*

women's labor. Cotton provided individual African farmers with an unprecedented source of wealth, and the cumulative prosperity of Baganda cultivators in turn provided for the Protectorate's financial success.[9]

Ironically, most colonial observers coded cash crop production as a fundamentally male enterprise, despite its reliance on women's labor. In an important government report produced in 1938, the Uganda Labour Commission observed, "The consensus of opinion…is that, in the present state of social development and taking the Protectorate as a whole, about two-thirds of all agricultural work—that is in both subsistence and economic crop production—is performed by the women and children."[10] Having acknowledged the centrality of women's labor to agricultural production, the authors nevertheless maintained a strange commitment to upholding cash-cropping as a male project: "In general terms, it is held to be a fair presentation of the division of labour to attribute to the men all work upon the cash crops…and to the women and children all work on the food crops; since it is thought that the help undoubtedly given by the men with the food crops is approximately equivalent to that undoubtedly given by the rest of the family with the cash crops."[11]

Despite official dismissals of their contributions, the Protectorate's dependency on female labor was evident in the ways that British and Baganda men sought to discipline women workers. Carol Summers has documented the rise of court-ordered corporal punishments meted

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Cultures, and Change, ed. J.M. Bahemuka and J.L. Brockington (Nairobi, Kenya: Acton Publishers, 2002), 186-87.

[9] C.C. Wrigley, *Crops and Wealth in Uganda: A Short Agrarian History* (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1959), 20-22.

[10] Uganda, *Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Labour Situation in the Uganda Protectorate, 1938* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1938), 32.

[11] Ibid., 33.

out to "disobedient women" in Eastern Province during the 1920s, a trend that corresponded with the abolition of *kasanvu*. This was not a colonial translation of precolonial practice, she argues, but a colonial solution to a modern problem: the need for labor to drive capitalist enterprise. British officials were not allowed to flog women, per orders of the Colonial Office, nor were they permitted to force African farmers to grow cotton. Many Uganda authorities, however, were willing to turn a blind eye to the actions of the semi-autonomous Native Courts, which doled out lashes to women defendants with increasing regularity from 1923 onwards. In Teso District alone, the Governor of Uganda reported that over 920 women had received court-ordered floggings over a period of two years; in the neighboring district of Bugwere, almost 300 women were whipped during a thirteen-month period.[12] Without recourse to forcible conscription of male labor, African chiefs depended on private African growers to develop the cotton industry, and women's unpaid "domestic" work was critical to its success. In the eyes of Protectorate officials, Christian missionaries, and their menfolk, women who refused to grow cash crops constituted a threat to the Protectorate's economic progress.

Growing numbers of migrant men from Ankole, Kigezi, and Ruanda-Urundi provided a solution to tense gender relations in central Uganda from the mid-1920s onwards. Even modest Baganda farmers could afford to hire Banyarwanda laborers to tend their fields and herds, which eased women's workloads.[13] Now, instead of going to the fields before sunrise to dig, Baganda women could take on the managerial role of field supervisor, overseeing the household's hired

[12] Summers, "Force," 184.

[13] A. Mafeje and A.I. Richards, "The Commercial Farmer and His Labour Supply," in *Subsistence to Commercial Farming in Present-Day Buganda: An Economic and Anthropological Survey*, ed. A.I. Richards, Ford Sturrock, and Jean M. Fortt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 179.

help.[14] Migrant men, meanwhile, assumed a lower status in this shifting social hierarchy, taking on the jobs that no self-respecting Muganda man (or woman) would want to do.[15] "They even worked in toilets," one elderly woman recalled of laborers who worked for her husband, grimacing. "It was their job, even emptying latrines and doing that sort of work...[everyone] knew that kind of work was meant for Banyarwanda."[16] Migrant men, particularly those associated with "non-martial" groups like Banyarwanda, were targets of an emasculating discourse that associated their low socio-economic status with an assumed sexual meekness, even impotency. British officials regularly compared the "docility" of Banyarwanda men to the "virility" of migrants from the Sudan and northern Uganda.[17] This attitude was also apparent in Baganda employers. As one private employer told Richards in 1951: "He [my hired worker] is a very good man. When he has done his garden work, he washes up our teacups like a woman. He does not want a wife and he hasn't been home for a holiday in eight years."[18]

The feminization and de-sexualization of migrant men paralleled a seemingly contradictory development: the emergence of labor migration as a means of men's self-actualization. Contrast the emasculating discourse of Buganda employers with the triumphant

[14] Ibid., 187-88.

[15] Richards, *Economic Development*, 161-67.

[16] Interview: N.F., Mukono District, September 12, 2013.

[17] See for example, Uganda, *Report of Committee of Enquiry, 1938,* 22: "The Banyaruanda are not, as a whole, so well-equipped to look after themselves. They are strangers in a strange land and have not in general the same virile character as the Nilotics. Thus they are much more open to exploitation and victimization in the course of their long tramp into Uganda and their search for work."

[18] Richards, *Economic Development*, 162.

ways in which one retired labor migrant, "Semana,"[19] recounted his life history to American anthropologist Helen Codere:

> "...I decided to go to Uganda [at the age of 12] because I did not like the life of a [Hutu] cultivator. But I went without saying goodbye to my papa. He had 400 francs in a box in a suitcase and I decided to steal it. On my *colline* [hill] there were some other young men and we had promised one another that we would go away together...It was two o'clock in the morning and I went to my friends. They got their baggage in order and we smoked and then we left."[20]

Semana framed his story about leaving home as a rite of passage in which he defied his father's wishes, stole his father's money, and set out on a journey that would turn him and his fellow age-mates into men. One can imagine the youthful, male space of that early morning gathering, in which the boys passed around a pipe to quiet their stomachs and steady their nerves for the long road ahead. Semana made it to Buganda after four days of difficult travel, where he found work with a Ganda shopkeeper. He remained in Uganda with this same employer for three years, during which time he managed to save 5,000 francs. He describes his return to his father's house in triumphant terms:

> "My parents were very happy to see me. At the moment I had gone away it had been with much fear. My parents gave me beer and a lot of food...After I had rested I told my parents what my trip had been like and about everything I had seen over there...I gave my mother 200 francs and two robes to help her out. I gave my papa 500 francs and a khaki shirt. My parents were very pleased with me and thanked me joyfully."[21]

Semana, returning home to play the part of the dutiful and successful son, concludes his autobiography by explaining how he was able, with the money he had saved, to build his own house, get married, and open his own shop. His father, meanwhile, whose 400 francs had

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[19] Interview with "Semana," full text published in Helen Codere, *The Biography of an African Society, Rwanda, 1900-60: Based on forty-eight Rwandan autobiographies* (Tervuren: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1973), 240-42.

[20] Codere, *Biography*, 240.

[21] Ibid., 241.

financed Semana's journey, is now cast in the role of dependent—an old man who benefits from his grown son's hard work and prosperity. Likewise, Semana does so well with his shop that he is able to hire day laborers to tend his fields, relieving his wife of her hard agricultural labor. He is the hero of his own story, overcoming difficult odds to achieve the life he wants. His exposure to new places and ideas enables him to chart a different course for his life: he will not be a farmer like his father, but a shopkeeper. One also detects in his story, recounted in the momentous years of the Rwanda revolution, a rejection of the emasculating, racialized categories ascribed to him since birth: He refuses to be the subservient Hutu client. His father will rest contented in his retirement. His wife will be a woman of means, who manages her fields and her workers. Labor migration had given him the ultimate bootstrap.

Semana's story is a clear example of the kinds of socio-economic possibilities that drew Banyarwanda migrants to Buganda. Yet unlike Semana, many migrants could not use the wealth they accumulated abroad to build the lives they wanted at home. Given the option of remaining in Ruanda-Urundi or taking up rented plots in Uganda, many would ultimately choose the latter. Between 1939 and 1959, the number of settled and long-term Banyarwanda migrants in Buganda would increase five-fold, with Uganda census takers counting 216,896 individuals in 1959.[22] Buganda's gravitational pull had consequences for Banyarwanda settlement patterns in the border districts as well. An unpublished migrant population study, written by Rhona Ross and Cyril Sofer and commissioned by the Uganda Government, found that the greatest concentrations of Banyarwanda-identifying women resided in Kigezi and Ankole, where long histories of cross-border marriage and migration had led to the formation of substantial

[22] Uganda, *Uganda Census 1959: African Population* (Nairobi: Statistics Branch, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1961), 36.

Kinyarwanda-speaking communities. In both districts, in fact, Banyarwanda women outnumbered their male counterparts: in Kigezi, the study counted 43,453 men against 52,699 women (1:1.212). Many of those in Kigezi were likely part of an older settled community that predated the Uganda-Rwanda border (although this was certainly not the case for everyone—see Mukamusana's story). The farther one moved from the border, however, the larger the concentrations of *first-generation* migrants became. In Ankole, for example, the ratio of men to women was smaller than it was in Kigezi (16,954 men to 17,887 women, or 1:1.055), but the number of first-generation migrant women was larger. Ross and Sofer found that nearly two-thirds of all Banyarwanda in Ankole had been born in Ruanda-Urundi, indicating much more recent settlement. This trend persisted as one moved in a north-eastward arc around Lake Victoria, cresting in Buganda before tapering off in Busoga District, in the Eastern Province. Table 1 provides a summary of the study's major statistical findings.

Ross and Sofer's study contributed to a growing colonial consensus at mid-century around the numerical significance of women's migration. Their calculations mirrored the findings of the most recent government census, conducted two years prior. They also formed the basis for Audrey Richards' subsequent study, which in turn supported Ross and Sofer's claims about Banyarwanda settlement being a recent demographic phenomenon. While these figures are imperfect,[23] as ballpark metrics they raise an important question: How had so many women travelled to Uganda undetected?

[23] See Richards 1954, Appendix A for critical evaluation of the 1948 census data; see also C.J. Martin, "The East African Population Census, 1948: Planning and Enumeration," *Population Studies* 3:3 (1949), 303-320; and R.R. Kuczynski, *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire*, vol. 1, *East Africa*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1948).

	Banyarwanda				**Barundi**			
	Male	Female		Total	Male	Female		Total
Kigezi	43,453	52,699	(54%)	96,152	13	10	(43%)	23
Ankole	16,954	17,887	(51%)	34,841	42	40	(49%)	82
Masaka *Buganda*	38,776	24,696	(38%)	63,472	9,241	3,607	(28%)	12,848
Mengo *Buganda*	61,684	24,446	(28%)	86,130	31,716	9,660	(23%)	41,376
Busoga	2,774	711	(20%)	3,485	987	48	(4%)	1,035
Total	163,641	120,439	(42%)	284,080	41,999	13,365	(24%)	55,364

Table 1: Summary of statistical data collected by Ross and Sofer in 1950.[24]

Part of the answer to this question had to do with the limits of colonial demography (see Chapter Two). Protectorate authorities did not even attempt to disaggregate their statistics by sex until 1951, thus adding to government uncertainty about women's migration.[25] Before this, official reports and internal correspondence make only passing reference to women's mobility. In 1943, for example, during the *Ruzagayura* famine in Rwanda, the Director of Labor wrote that the Protectorate had received an "influx of many women and children and infirm men," but he did not provide an actual figure. British officials, when they did acknowledge the presence of women among migrant populations, almost always referred to them as the wives and dependents

[24] KigDA Immigration Box 4, File LAB.1/10i, *Survey of Banyaruanda Complex*; Rhona Ross and Cyril Sofer, "Survey of the Banyaruanda Complex," 18-21.

[25] Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1951* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1952), 26.

of "labor migrants" (who were assumed to be male). In 1947, for instance, the Labour Commissioner wrongly concluded that, although "accurate figures of wives and children who accompany seasonal workers to their employment would be very difficult to obtain…[i]t is clear that the proportion is very small." He expressed equal doubt about the contributions of women to the workforce, assuring his colleagues that "[t]he aspect of women workers, whether the wives of migratory employees or not, does not arise to any appreciable extent."[26] In light of these persistent dismissals issued by the Labor Department, the findings of the 1948 census, which reported large numbers of Banyarwanda women living across western and central Uganda, likely shocked the Labour Commissioner's office.

But another key reason for colonial ignorance had arguably to do with the ways that Protectorate officials framed women's mobility as an exceptional phenomenon. Casting men as "migrant laborers," they relegated women to the role of auxiliaries and dependents, no matter their material contributions. In so doing, British officials failed to integrate women's mobility into a more comprehensive understanding of Banyarwanda migration. Women responded to the same factors that drove men's migration. Men might enjoy the ease of mobility that the labor migrant label afforded, but their turn to seasonal wage work was a consequence of material and political hardship at home. Both men and women moved to survive, in other words, but British and Belgian authorities only recognized the former as legitimate laborers. In times of relative plenty, the British took little notice of women's mobility, tolerating it so as not to discourage the continued flow of male labor. In times of famine, however, they interpreted women migrants as signs that all was not well in Belgian territory.

[26] Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1947* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1949), 12.

The following biographies explore the lives of women who settled (or tried to settle) across southwestern and central Uganda between 1928 and 1945. They call attention to the ways in which women maneuvered their complex social worlds to maximize their advantages in difficult times. Because they often depended on men for access to land, relationships figure prominently in their stories, but one should not interpret these relationships as prefixed givens: women had to choose which relationships they prioritized, and these choices had significant implications for the changing social landscape of the Banyarwanda diaspora.

"She was pure Mukiga": Mukamusana's Journey

Surviving the Rwakayihura Famine, 1927-29

In the latter half of the 1920s, eastern Rwanda suffered a devastating famine known as *Rwakayihura*.[27] An estimated 35,000 to 40,000 people perished over a period of eighteen months between 1927 and 1929, while as many as 100,000 people fled to neighboring British territories.[28] While men were more likely to flee than women,[29] the *Rwakayihura* famine was the first time that European authorities and missionaries observed the mass movement of women and children out of Rwanda.[30] The following biography traces the journey of a young Munyarwanda[31] woman named Mukamusana, who left her home in Rukira, eastern Rwanda,

[27] According to Anne Cornet (1996:2 ff 5), who is in turn interpreting a line from the anonymously penned *Histoire et chronologie du Ruanda* (1956:12), *Rwakayihura* ("of Kayihura") appears to have been named after a chief, Kayihura, whose hill was allegedly the first to be impacted by the famine. See Cornet, *Histoire d'une famine: Rwanda 1927-30: Crise alimentaire entre tradition et modernité* (Enquêtes et documents d'histoire africain 13, Louvain-la-Neuve: Centre d'histoire de l'Afrique, Université catholique de Louvain, 1996).

[28] Cornet, *D'une Famine Rwanda*, 39.

[29] Ibid., 10.

[30] *Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année 1928* (Brussels: Établissements Émile Bruylant, 1929), 72.

[31] This was the term that her daughter used to describe her, in contradistinction to "Tutsi" and "Rwandese."

during the height of the famine. Her story, which is based primarily on the memories of her surviving daughter, Doreen, shines light on the gendered possibilities and vulnerabilities that shaped the lives of these "famine refugees."[32] Her successful resettlement in Uganda also points to the creative means by which migrant women reimagined their communities and repositioned their social worlds in geo-political space. Doreen insisted that her mother ultimately shed her "Rwanda-ness" and became "pure Mukiga," an assimilation process that included learning Rukiga, acquiring a Mukiga husband, and adopting Kiga manners and work habits. Yet life is never so compartmentalized, and this emerges in the messy details that frame Doreen's account of her mother's life.[33]

Leaving Rwanda

The decision to leave home could not have been easy. Mukamusana, a new mother, was still breastfeeding, and the route to Uganda was long. Actually, no roads existed in eastern Rwanda, as the Belgians had not seen any use for them in this part of the Territory.[34] The only way out was to travel on foot through waterless hill country, with the occasional help of a worn cattle track or footpath. Worse, the journey would force Mukamusana's body to divert precious

[32] The British used this term frequently in their correspondence during the period. Legally, the term was meaningless.

[33] Mukamusana's biography is based on a series of interviews that I held with her 75 year old daughter, "Doreen," between August 1 and September 24, 2013. All interviews took place in Doreen's home in Bukinda County, Kabale District (formerly Kigezi District). I have changed the names of private individuals to protect anonymity. Doreen reports that her mother died in the late 1980s.

[34] The Belgians had constructed over 1,000 kilometers of roads in western Rwanda, because they wanted to draw labor from the Mandated Territories to their plantations and mines in Congo. Eastern Rwanda was entirely excluded from this infrastructural development, and the lack of roads had dire consequences for famine victims, preventing early escape and delaying the delivery of life-saving food aid. See Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 244-50.

calories away from the work of producing the milk her baby needed to survive. We can assume that she decided to leave when she saw no other option.[35]

Mukamusana traveled with her sister and several other women, without male companions. She had brothers, but they remained in Rwanda, most likely because they had land and families in their home province of Rukira; they would not want to risk the journey—or their homesteads—if they had any chance of surviving where they were. As for the father of Mukamusana's child, it is possible that she had the baby out of wedlock and was leaving to escape stigma. It is more probable that she had been married, and her husband either died in the famine or abandoned the family when he could no longer care for them. As a young widow or divorcée,[36] Mukamusana would have had the option of returning to her father's house if he was still alive, but remaining in Rukira during the crisis would severely limit her chances of finding a new husband (and thus renewed access to her own land).[37] So many people had left after the rains failed three seasons in a row that by 1928 only the very young and the very old remained.[38] Mukamusana's group likely had little to keep them at home.

Indeed, missionary accounts paint a grim picture of eastern Rwanda in 1928. A Protestant missionary doctor named Joe Church, based in Gahini, reported to the London *Times* that "an average of about 1,000 a week" passed by his hospital "en route for Uganda," and that "day after

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[35] For a comparative example, see Jeanne Penvenne, *Women, migration & the cashew economy in Southern Mozambique: 1945-1975* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2015), 121-54.

[36] It is perhaps relevant that in our first interview, Doreen stated that her mother came from Rwamagana, and in our second interview, that she came from Kiramuruzi. Kiramuruzi is north of Lake Muhazi, while Rwamagana is just to the south. Mukamusana may have been born in one place, and married in the second—this would account for the small discrepancy.

[37] Jennie Burnet, *Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 42-43.

[38] *Rapport sur l'Administration Belge du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année 1928* (Brussels: Établissements Émile Bruylant, 1929), 72.

day one sees them staggering out of the country, with all their goods and chattels, and with scarcely sufficient strength to carry their loads."[39] Scenes from the mission hospital, which served as a feeding station at the epicenter of the famine, were truly horrifying, with people dying daily from organ failure and disease. "Needless to say it is impossible to keep the place clean," the distressed doctor wrote during an outbreak of dysentery in February 1929, "and people, especially children, are actually *dying* from jiggers. They burrow into their fingers, toes, elbows, knees and buttocks, until the children are absolutely helpless and unable to walk or feed themselves properly."[40] The movement of women out of their homes in search of food and assistance indicated the degree of social disruption caused by famine. As the missionary observed, "A few months ago it was a rare thing for a woman to leave the seclusion of her hut and come work for us, but now we have about one hundred every day."[41]

Mukamusana and her party headed north because one of the women had a grandmother in Kandago parish, Kigezi District. Doreen does not know how long her mother's journey took, or whether the other women travelers had children with them as well, but the going would have been slow without adequate food and water supplies, and slower still if young children were present. That the entire group survived the journey is remarkable. As the women made their way out of the famine's radius, they eventually found accommodation with Bakiga families in southern Uganda who had food to spare, and who were willing to give the travelers a place to stay in exchange for domestic labor. The party made their way from homestead to homestead, exchanging household chores for food and a bed for the night. Eventually, they reached

[39] Joe Church, "A Stricken Land," *Times*, April 16, 1929, accessed 19 May 2016, *The Times Digital Archive*.

[40] Joe Church, "News from Gahini and Belgian Ruanda from Dr. Church," *Ruanda Notes* 28 (April 22, 1929), 24.

[41] Ibid.

Kandago, where they stayed for some time. Their presence was conspicuous, however, for grown women were, in Doreen's colorful phrase, "like food ready for eating" (*ebykurya bihire*).[42] Local men took notice, and began to approach the women's hosts with marriage propositions. Soon, Mukamusana's host family arranged for her to become the third wife of a Mukiga farmer named Rugwisa.

Mukamusana's marriage highlights an important way in which women's mobility could complicate processes of social reproduction in patriarchal communities. The exchange of women in marriage between families mediated alliances between men and structured the distribution of land across clans.[43] A girl who left her father's homestead, or a woman who left her husband's, for the sake of survival, forced the reconfiguration of her social field. Journeys undertaken for food and shelter brought women into contact with new potential families and new potential suitors, who in turn stood to benefit from migrant women's vulnerability as well as their productive and reproductive labor. Thus Mukamusana's displacement resulted, not only in her own relocation, but in the removal of her male kin from key decisions about her marriage. A prime example: Rugwisa did not have to provide bridewealth. When asked why this was the case, Doreen replied, "Can you pay for something you have found by the roadside?" When Mukamusana's brothers came to visit her several years later, they had no power to demand payment, because they had not been present to negotiate the engagement. Even if they had been, the famine had been so catastrophic that women's families were poorly positioned to demand a

[42] Doreen may have been paraphrasing a Rukiga proverb: "When ripe, a banana is eaten and a girl is married" (*Enyamwonyo ku ekura eriibwa, omwishiki ku akura ashwerwa*). Marius Cisternino, *The Proverbs of Kigezi and Ankole* (Kampala: Comboni Missionaries, 1987), 348.

[43] Danielle de Lame, *A hill among a thousand: transformations and ruptures in rural Rwanda*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005); Christopher C. Taylor, *Milk, honey, and money: changing concepts in Rwandan healing* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992).

sizeable bridewealth. Not only had the famine weakened them economically, but the presence of a colonial border further disrupted their bargaining power. Kigezi authorities responded to the famine in Rwanda by restricting food exports, and this in turn impacted currency rates and other forms of cross-border exchange. During the 1943-44 famine colonial officers in Kigezi observed that, "the severity of the famine in Belgian Rwanda and the magnitude of the temptation to export foodstuffs to that country may be assessed by the fact that a wife could be bought for a basket of maize."[44]

Mukamusana's union with Rugwisa granted her access to his land, which in turn allowed her to remain in Uganda long after male famine refugees had returned home.[45] Doreen, however, insists that her mother's successful integration had more to do with her ability to cultivate that land, rather than with the gift of land itself. In Doreen's eyes, Mukamusana negotiated her place of belonging among Bakiga farmers because she knew how to work hard in the fields and she had a taste for local food. This differentiated her from Rwandan pastoralists[46] who sought refuge in southern Uganda, both in the late 1920s and after. This latter group, according to Doreen, were "Rwandese" who "depended on milk," and who ultimately failed to acclimate to life in Kigezi because they "did not like digging" or "eating sweet potatoes." Kigezi, she said, became a place of asylum for "Banyarwanda"—people who, in Doreen's vocabulary, knew how to cultivate land and lived on agricultural produce—while the neighboring Uganda district of Ankole attracted

[44] Uganda Protectorate, *Special report—"Western Province (including Northern Province): Survey of the War Years 1939-1946"* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1948), 83.

[45] KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112: "Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc.," 1930-1949. Memo from the Secretariat to "Adams", 13 Feb. 1931.

[46] See Introduction for an explanation of my use of ethnic and national categories. Here, I use "Rwandans" because that was the word Doreen repeatedly used.

milk-drinking "Rwandese," because it was a "place with many cows."[47] Thus, while Rugwisa's marriage proposal and land offer was critical to Mukamusana's survival in southern Uganda, her cultivating skills, comportment, and taste were equally important. Intermarriage, in other words, was not an automatic guarantee of belonging and acceptance.

Intermarriage also did not signal the loss of a woman's previous identity. Mukamusana continued to speak Kinyarwanda with her sister and her children, and she made regular visits to her family in Rwanda. Her brothers, likewise, would visit her in Kigezi, bringing her news from home. Doreen recalled many nights gathered around the fire with her uncles, who would swap jokes, stories, and gossip with her mother and her aunt. Her father was always absent from these gatherings, for as the dignified head of household, he was expected to take his meals alone in the courtyard.[48] Mukamusana's cooking fire (*amahéga*) thus became an important place where she renewed her ties to Rwanda and where her children had opportunity to practice their Kinyarwanda and hear about their mother's natal home. Moreover, the regular traffic of Kinyarwanda-speaking visitors to Rugwisa's homestead meant that neighbors were continually reminded of the family's Rwandan connections. Doreen was vague on whether her mother ever faced discrimination on account of her language and identity, but she did acknowledge that migrant wives were sometimes abused by their husbands and by members of the community. "Abusive husbands would get drunk," she recalled, "And they would say [to their Rwandan wives], 'Ah, no wonder you made this mistake! You are a traveler!'" Mukamusana's reputation

[47] Here, one easily reads the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" into Doreen's narrative, but it is important to note that Doreen herself never used these terms, even when they were suggested. All people who came from Rwanda were, in Doreen's vocabulary, "Banyarwanda," but those who were rich, owned cattle, and subsisted on a diet of milk were further differentiated by the label "Rwandese."

[48] May Edel confirms this practice in her study of 1930s Kigezi. See M.M. Edel, *The Chiga of Uganda* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 59.

also meant that her home became a stop-over for later groups of Banyarwanda migrants and refugees, who were directed to Rugwisa's courtyard by locals who knew about the family. Through language and a careful cultivation of multiple relationships, Mukamusana managed a life that was complicated, but not severed by, the border.

Mukamusana's journey, together with her daughter's memory and self-identification work, raises important questions about the ways in which ethnicity and belonging constitute historical, gendered processes. Doreen argued that her mother was a fully-integrated member of her father's household, that she *became* "Mukiga" (even if she maintained links to Rwanda). This narrative framing, however, may have more to do with Doreen's own self-identification than her mother's. Doreen's self-fashioning rested heavily on the identity of her father, Rugwisa, and her association to his clan, the *Abasiga*. She is Ugandan, she claimed, because her father was Ugandan, and "children always take the father's clan." Doreen could have easily established her Ugandan-ness on legal grounds, because the constitution only requires that an individual have one Ugandan parent or grandparent in order to claim Ugandan citizenship.[49] Yet for Doreen and many of the second-generation migrants with whom I spoke, the litmus test for nationality was paternal descent.

As for Mukamusana, it is impossible to know for certain how she self-identified, but the fact that she came from a predominantly agricultural family suggests that she may, possibly, have understood herself to be Hutu. But here a word of caution is necessary: Mukamusana left Rwanda three years before the Belgian government started to systematically assign Hutu and Tutsi identities. Furthermore, she came from a region, Rukira, that had long been on the fringes

[49] See Ch. 10, Art. 2 of Uganda, *Constitution of the Republic of Uganda* (Entebbe: Uganda Print. And Pub. Corp., 1995): "…every person born in Uganda one of whose parents or grandparents is or was a member of any of the indigenous communities existing and residing with the borders of Uganda as at the first day of February, 1926..."

of empire, both Rwandan and European, meaning that local affinity to either the Rwandan court or the Belgian government was weak.[50] Most likely, Doreen's choice of terminology reflected her own history with charged labels: born and raised on the Rwanda border, Doreen witnessed multiple episodes of violent displacement over the course of her life. Rwanda's political troubles often drew southern Ugandans into the fray (Chapter Four), with Ugandan chiefs sometimes joining sides with either Hutu or Tutsi. It is therefore conceivable that Doreen would want to remove her mother's memory from this violent past by refusing labels that were otherwise available to her.

Regardless of what she intended or how she actually felt, Mukamusana's life was fundamentally structured by the border. Doreen claimed her mother became Mukiga—a statement suggesting an erasure of prior identifications—but Mukamusana maintained key practices that continued to connect her to Rwanda. She visited her brothers in Rukira, and they in turn visited her. The family hearth, where women and their children and their relatives gathered, was an especially important space for remembering the past, gossiping about the present, and planning for the future. Out of the embers, families recreated kinship after dislocation. Whenever troubles came to Rwanda, refugees found their way to Mukamusana's home, either because neighbors directed them there, or because they knew about Mukamusana's home through connections in Rwanda. Through these exchanges, Doreen acquired a working knowledge of her mother's language, even if she herself did not self-identify as anything other than Ugandan. The mother's line is obfuscated, but it is not erased, and this distinction is important: Mukamusana

[50] The British had actually acquired this territory from the Belgians for a brief period after the First World War—that was how the Uganda-based Church Missionary Society was able to plant a mission station in Gahini. See David S Newbury, "The *Rwakayihura* famine of 1928-29: A nexus of colonial rule in Rwanda," in *Histoire sociale de l'Afrique de l'Est (XIX-XX siècle): Actes du Colloque de Bujumbura (17-24 Octobre 1989)* (Paris: Karthala, 1991), 269-85.

did not shed her ethnic identity, but reconfigured it in the service of her own survival. Her flexible identification also opened up spaces for other Banyarwanda to follow—her language skills and her reputation as a Munyarwanda served as signposts that guided others to places of asylum in times of famine and war.

Closing the Border to "Labor migrants and their families": Nyirambonwa's Story

Escaping the Ruzagayura Famine, 1942-44

The 1927-29 *Rwakayihura* famine that drove Mukamusana from her home was a watershed moment in Ruanda-Urundi's history, one that brought many of Belgium's failings as a colonial power to light. It took both the British and the Belgians by surprise, and was a source of international embarrassment for the latter. Feeling alienated before the League of Nations and rebuked by the world press, the Mandate authorities moved quickly to salvage their reputation, instituting a raft of far-reaching measures aimed at preventing future famines (see Chapter One). Yet these reforms, which included local government restructuring, infrastructure development, and public health improvement, were couched in the racist, civilizing logics of the empire. According to this framework, African laziness and irrationality, rather than extractive colonial practices, had brought about the food crisis. If only the native could be taught to work hard, save for the future, and contribute to the material development of the territory, then Ruanda-Urundi would not suffer such severe famines.[51] The government's anti-famine measures, unsurprisingly, translated into ever-increasing demands on African time, money, and labor, wringing the peasant classes for what remaining resources they had. Adding insult to injury, the reforms proved ineffective in actually preventing famine.

[51] Pedersen, *The Guardians*, 250-53.

This became clear twelve years later, in mid-1942, when Rwanda was beset by an even worse crisis than *Rwakayihura*: the *Ruzagayura* famine. Over 300,000 people died within a period of two years, primarily in Rwanda's northeastern territories, making *Ruzagayura* ten times deadlier than *Rwakayihura*.[52] The Belgian response was slow and fumbling, only bringing in emergency food relief in late 1943, by which point many people had either died or fled the country.[53] Of those who fled, many headed to Uganda, where they hoped to find shelter with family and friends who had migrated earlier.

The resultant exodus was a source of grave concern for the British and the Belgians, albeit for different reasons. Noting an "unusual" increase in the number of "women and children and infirm men" on the road from Rwanda to Buganda, the British feared that they would be forced to provide humanitarian care to these "famine refugees" at a time when their own food sources and cash reserves were running low.[54] They were also worried that any humanitarian service, such as emergency medical care or food relief, might be interpreted by the Belgians as a ruse designed to lure precious male labor over the border. As the Chief Secretary had warned in 1931, "we have always been a bit nervous that our actions in feeding those Belgian refugees [in 1928 and 1929]…might be construed as a bait to tempt natives from them to us, to settler, for our labor purposes…"[55] The Protectorate's desire to prevent the immigration of "ineffectuals" thus coincided, perversely, with their wish to maintain good diplomatic relations with the Belgians.

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[52] Dantès Singiza, "La Famine Ruzagayura, Rwanda 1943-44: Causes, consequences, et reactions des autorites" (MA Thesis, Univerité de Liège, 2011), 94.

[53] Catharine Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 158.

[54] Uganda, *Annual Report of the Inspectorate of Labour, 1943* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1944), 5.

[55] KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112, *Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc*., 1930-1949. Memo from the Secretariat to "Adams", 13 Feb. 1931.

The Belgians, meanwhile, were far less worried about the departure of starving women and children, but they did resent the loss of male labor. These concerns led the two colonial powers to take the extraordinary step of closing the Uganda-Rwanda border for the first quarter of 1944. The Governor of Uganda, Charles Dundas, initiated the closure in December 1943, informing the Belgian authorities that as of January 1, "women and children [will] no longer [be] acceptable as immigrants into Uganda."[56] The Belgians agreed to the closure, and added that labor migrants (men) should also be prevented from traveling to Uganda until the crisis had passed.[57]

The British recognized that many people they turned away at the border were, in colonial parlance, "refugees." This was the actual term that officials on the ground and in London used to describe famine victims. In September 1942, for example, when rumors of a mounting food crisis in Rwanda first began to circulate through colonial channels in Uganda, the Colonial Office reached out to Sir Granville Orde-Browne, the empire's leading authority on labor migration, for advice. He responded by urging the Uganda authorities to take the rumors "of refugees from famine" seriously, in light of the region's perennial food shortages. "The Banyaruanda are very liable to famine," he conceded, "and they flock over to Tanganyika and Uganda in search of work, or really, food...We had immense difficulties with them in Tanganyika in 1930, when they flooded over uncontrolled, and died in numbers."[58] Britain's recognition of the life-threatening conditions that prompted people to leave Rwanda, however,

[56] TNA CO 536/213/4, *Uganda: Labour Conditions, 1943*; Decode of telegram to British Consul General [from Governor of Uganda], Leopoldville, 5 December, 1943.

[57] Uganda, *Annual Report of the Inspectorate of Labour, 1944* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1945), 3-4.

[58] TNA CO 536/209/6, *Labour Conditions,* 1942-43; Orde-Brown to E.L. Scott, Notes section to file, 30 September 1942.

resulted in very few humanitarian ends. To be called a "refugee," in this circumstance, was to be identified as a candidate for deportation, not protection. "Unaccompanied" women and children were particularly vulnerable to this kind of negative labeling, because officials assumed that they could not possibly be anything other than victims.

The story of Nyirambonwa, a widowed mother of three who was intercepted by District officials in Kabale in February 1944, highlights the gendered consequences of this border closure. Colonial authorities did not actually have the power to systematically seal their mutual boundary, but they could at various moments use force to exclude those deemed undesirable. Women migrants, already disregarded in colonial labor policy as mere auxiliaries to male workers, were particularly undesirable in times of famine because they were not valued as a potential labor source. This helps to explain why Protectorate officials ultimately chose to deport Nyirambonwa in May, *after* she had recovered from malnutrition in Kabale Hospital and *after* Uganda had lifted their side of the border closure. While the government welcomed the swift resumption of male labor from April 1944 onwards,[59] women like Nyirambonwa were classed as "undesirables" and returned to Rwanda.

Nyirambonwa and her three small children were admitted to Kabale Hospital in a "starving state" in late February 1944.[60] According to the hospital administrator's report, the woman's husband had died two years prior. The deceased was originally from Astrida (Butare) in southern Rwanda, but had moved his family to the northern territory of Byumba sometime

[59] UNA C.3360, *Labour: Proposed Conference with Belgian Authorities re: Banyarwanda Migration*, 1948; Memorandum on Proposed Discussions in Immigrant Labour from Ruanda-Urundi, based on discussions between authorities for Uganda and Tanganyika Territory in January 1947.

[60] KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112: "Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc.," 1930-1949; N.S. (but from a medical worker or administrator at Kabale Hospital), "Nyirambonwa, Rwanda Immigrant, Widow" (n.d., first half of 1944).

around 1941 or 1942. The report does not say why the family relocated, but one possible reason was that they had fallen out of favor with the local chief. The United Council of Protestant Churches in Ruanda-Urundi, writing in 1944, observed "widespread" abuses on the part of native authorities towards their subjects, including everything from,

> "excessive forced labour, to constant beatings for minor offences, to demands for cows, etc.…so that their lives become unbearable. These are not matters of offences against the law, but of personal vendettas. Against this the native has usually no effective court of appeal, and his only refuge is to leave his home for another s/chefferie or Province."[61]

Whatever the case, Nyirambonwa's husband died before he had succeeded in establishing a new home in Byumba, leaving his wife and children stranded and without means of support. Nyirambonwa's own parents had died many years before, and she did not have any close relatives remaining in Rwanda. She therefore decided to return to Astrida, "the original home of [her] husband," possibly in hopes of finding support from her in-laws. On reaching Astrida, however, she failed to find anyone who was willing or able to take her in: her late husband's parents were dead, and no other close relative remained. As a landless widow in those desperate circumstances, Nyirambonwa may have turned to sex work in Astrida town, or she may have hired her labor to a European or Asian family.[62] Whatever her choice, life in the town soon became "impossible" according to her hospital discharge papers, and she decided to leave Rwanda for good. She had a brother, she said, who had migrated to Uganda years before, taking two of her own children with him.[63] She believed that they were living in a place called

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[61] Archives of the Church of Uganda Online, Ruanda Mission 1944, "Memorandum by The United Council of Protestant Churches Ruanda-Urundi," n.d. [but 1944]. http://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/archives-of-the-church-of-uganda/archives-of-the-bishop-of-uganda/regional-activitiesassociated-regions/ruanda-mission-1944;cuacua1cua1260484

[62] Helen Codere, *Biography*, 144-47 and 299.

[63] If the family was poor, it is entirely possible that Nyirambonwa's brother offered to adopt two of her children, thus distributing the burden of care more evenly across the family; it is also probable that these two children were the result of a previous marriage, and were sent away when Nyirambonwa remarried (ensuring that they did not

Kyamaganda, in Masaka District, Buganda.[64] With this destination in mind, she set out for the border.

How the family managed to reach Kabale is a mystery. They would have had to travel over 200 kilometers on foot during the height of *Ruzagayura*, passing through the northeast, where the famine was most severe. They reached the Ugandan border in February 1944, only to find that the border was closed. It is possible that Nyirambonwa circumvented the customs post and border guards who stood watch at Katuna, the main port of entry between Kabale and northern Rwanda, but this would have required her to pass through steep hill country—a daunting challenge for an adult suffering from extreme malnutrition, and likely impossible for her three small children. More likely, the border guards, who had seen many famine refugees cross through Katuna, took pity on the family and brought them to the hospital.[65]

Regardless of how they made it to Kabale, Nyirambonwa and her children spent the next ten weeks convalescing at the District Hospital. By May, they had regained some of their body weight and were well enough to travel. Nyirambonwa's desire to continue on to Masaka seems quite clear in the archival record, rising from the details of the hospital administrator's report in the names of her brother, Furasisco Nyakabwa, and her older children, Mbuguje and Musaniwabo. Indeed, the detail of the hospital report suggests that the administrator was also

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inherit their step-father's property). Other research participants told similar stories of fosterage. See for example Théress' story, Chapter Five.

[64] It is difficult to say why she returned to Astrida when she had close relatives in Buganda. It is possible that she was unaware of the fact that her in-laws were dead before going to Astrida. Likewise, she may not have known her brother's precise whereabouts when she was in Byumba.

[65] In early December 1943, shortly after the Governor of Uganda had announced the border closure (but before it went into effect), the Governor General for Ruanda-Urundi requested that during the first 2-3 weeks of the closure, "necessitous cases will be allowed to enter Uganda when they are not in fit condition to make the return journey." TNA CO 536/213/4, *Uganda: Labour Conditions, 1943*; British Consul General, Leopoldville to Governor of Uganda, December 6, 1943.

operating on the assumption—or perhaps the hope—that the District Office would send word to officials at Kyamaganda, asking whether they knew the whereabouts of Nyirambonwa's family.

The District Commissioner (DC) for Kigezi, however, was not interested in facilitating Nyirambonwa's onward journey. Despite the fact that the Protectorate had reopened the border to migrants a month earlier—and despite the fact that Nyirambonwa had recovered much of her physical strength—the DC still viewed her as "destitute" and "ineffectual," someone who would likely become a burden on state resources if allowed to stay in Uganda. He therefore responded to the hospital report by ordering the family's immediate removal to Rwanda. In a formal letter to the Belgian Administrateur du Territoire (AT), Ruhengeri, dated 3 May 1944, the DC announced that he was returning "a Munyaruanda vagrant widow with 3 small children," to Astrida. In contrast to the hospital report, which was careful to state that Astrida had been the home of Nyirambonwa's *husband* (not necessarily hers), and which gave the names of her next of kin in Masaka, the DC's letter simply requested the Belgian official to make arrangements for the family's repatriation.[66]

Why did the colonial authorities choose repatriation over settlement? Some additional context here is helpful. To begin, the war years witnessed a renewed commitment to anti-vagrancy measures on the part of East African governments. The Buganda kingdom, in fact, passed its own ant-vagrancy legislation in 1940, aimed at checking the population of "unemployed and destitute natives…collecting at various big centres, particularly Mengo, Mpigi, and Masaka, where they prey upon the local inhabitants and give considerable trouble to the

[66] KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112, *Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc*., 1930-1949; Letter from the DC Kigezi (D.K. Burner) to Monsieur L'Administrateur Territorial, Ruhengeri, 3 May 1944.

authorities."[67] Kigezi District, moreover, had played a key role in the Protectorate's evolving deportation process. Sharing borders with Congo and Rwanda, it was the port of entry for the majority of Uganda's migrant workers. As such, Kigezi officials were responsible not only for enforcing Protectorate policy (such as the border closure), but also for providing operational support for other districts' deportation cases. If a magistrate in Buganda convicted a Munyarwanda migrant of vagrancy, for example, he would forward the guilty party to the Kigezi District offices in Kabale, where the DC would be responsible for arranging their transport back to Ruanda-Urundi.[68] This process was expensive, time-consuming, and involved, requiring close coordination between many local government workers operating on slender budgets and spread across wide swathes of rural countryside. Buses did not exist in western Uganda until the mid-1940s, meaning that the DC had to negotiate rides and itineraries for deportees with commercial lorry drivers.[69] Sometimes, officials in the central and eastern Districts sent deportation candidates to Kabale in error because they were ignorant of the country's basic geography (see Chapter One). "There is no means of transport between Kabale and Kigali," wrote the obviously tired DC Kigezi to the DC Busoga in June 1937, in a letter begging his colleague not to send a Kigali-bound amputee to his office. "[And i]t is doubtful if he could walk [there] with only one leg."[70] Through the DC's correspondence with other Protectorate agents throughout the late

[67] TNA CO 859/79/8, Memo by Attorney-General, Uganda, 4 January, 1941, quoted in A. Burton and P. Ocobock, "The 'Traveling Native': Vagrancy and Colonial Control in British East Africa," in *Cast Out: Vagrancy and Homelessness in Global and Historical Perspective*, ed. by A.L. Beier and Paul Ocobock (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 294.

[68] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File MIG.2/1, "Repatriation of Africans (Destitutes)," 1935-43; Commissioner of Police, Kampala to DC Kigezi, "Edward Awago-Jaluo - Your 393/189 d/d 28.4.37," 30 April 1937.

[69] See for example KigDA Immigration Box 8, File 112, "Native Affairs: Repatriation of Banyarwanda, etc., etc.," 1930-1949; DC Ankole to Labour Officer, Masaka, Repatriation of Incurables, 23 January 1946.

[70] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File MIG.2/1, "Repatriation of Africans (Destitutes)," 1935-43; DC Kigezi to DC Busoga, 19 June 1937.

1930s and early '40s, Kigezi emerges as a kind of receptacle for wasted and wasting human bodies—"a dumping ground for undesirables,"[71] in the DC's words. In his mind, Nyirambonwa and her children represented more disposal[72] work for his office.

Nyirambonwa's story reveals the intimate human costs of the Protectorate's labor market and colonial officials' gendered valuations of productive work. Had she been permitted to continue on to Masaka, she could have contributed to her brother's household income through farming and domestic labor. The DC Kigezi, however, framing Nyirambonwa as a helpless victim, ordered the family to board a lorry bound for Ruhengeri, the nearest Rwanda town, sometime in late May. Once in Ruhengeri, the Belgian Territorial Administrator would be responsible for arranging for her onward journey to Astrida. Yet without access to land, the family's survival would depend on Nyirambonwa's ability to earn cash wages in a town that was still reeling from the effects of famine.

This micro-history also points to the difficult social choices that women had to make for the sake of their survival and the survival of their children. As Rwandan families spread out across eastern Africa in search of food, land, and jobs, women had to choose which relationships to prioritize, for reasons both affective and material. Nyirambonwa was unsuccessful in her attempt to reach Masaka, but details of her long and circuitous journey suggest important relational work. When her husband died in 1942, she did not go to Masaka where her brother and older children lived, but to Astrida. What prompted this decision? Perhaps she hoped to find a relative of her late husband who would be willing to take care of her three young children, giving

[71] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File MIG.2/1, "Repatriation of Africans (Destitutes)," 1935-43; DC Kigezi to Registrar, H.M. High Court, Kampala, 15 November 1939.

[72] Ibid.

them a brighter future than the one she could provide. Perhaps she feared that her brother would not share his land with her, given that he was already supporting her older two children. Then again, maybe Nyirambonwa did not want to leave the country of her birth. It is also possible that the man she named as her "brother" was not an actual kin relation, but an acquaintance or fellow clan member whom she hoped might be willing to take her in. It is impossible to know the reason, but what the sources do show is that she had options, meager though they were. Her winding path across Rwanda and Uganda implies a careful calculation of risk and prioritization of relationships. Women did not simply follow their men. They made strategic choices about when to leave and with whom, where to go and which relationships to pursue. These choices not only had profound consequences for their families and social networks, but for the widening geography of the diaspora as well.

"Mine was *bustowa*": Dorcas's Journey

Settling in Buganda after World War II

In times of scarcity and war, colonial authorities interpreted the actions of migrant women through the lens of dependency and victimhood, but a closer analysis of individual journeys highlights women's resourcefulness. Their creativity and strategic social maneuverings, however, had limits, as witnessed in Nyirambonwa's cruel deportation. Indeed, women faced many gendered constraints on their mobility. At the same time they chose to migrate, they could also, by virtue of their marginalized position, be forced to move against their will. "Dorcas" was kidnapped by her husband and brought to Uganda in 1945. Her story, like Nyirambonwa's, underscores the particular vulnerability and limited agency of women migrants. Yet, her ability to remain in Uganda after her husband's death in 1955 demonstrates how changing land and migration policies opened up new, unexpected spaces for women settlers.

Dorcas[73] came to Uganda at the end of World War II, soon after colonial officials reopened the border to migration. She was fifteen years old, an orphan, and newly married to a man named Karwemera. Dorcas and Karwemera both hailed from the same hill in Gitarama province, central Rwanda, but Karwemera was older and had spent much of his youth in Uganda as a migrant worker. He had spent so much time abroad that his childhood friends and family members had taken to calling him "Muganda," in recognition of his social and physical relocation.

The couple married quickly and without ceremony. "It was not a wedding," Dorcas says. "He and my brothers just agreed on the bride price, and that was it. I went with him." Dorcas knew that her new husband was preparing to return to Uganda shortly, but she assumed that she would remain in Gitarama like many migrants' wives did. What she did not know was that her brothers had agreed to send her away with Karwemera when he left, and that they had devised a plan to trick her into going. "They said to me, 'Let us escort this Muganda [to Kigali],'" Dorcas recalls of the day she left home.

> "So they lied to me until we reached Kigali, and then they got out [of the lorry]…I thought they were coming back, but then the car [we were in] started to leave. I started crying…I wanted them to open and let me pass. 'Where have my brothers gone?' I asked. 'We will go together,' Karwemera told me. 'Where is my oldest brother?!' 'We will go together, dear.' I cried all the way here. One month passed and I was still crying" (*laughs*).

Karwemera brought Dorcas to the sub-county of Kyagwe, in eastern Buganda kingdom, where he had his own plot of land and a house. There was little Dorcas could do to resist her own kidnapping. Her parents and her aunts were dead, leaving her at the mercy of her older brothers

[73] This story is based on a series of interviews that I held with "Dorcas" in September 2013, at her home in Mukono District. As with Doreen's story of Mukamusana, I have changed the names of private individuals to protect anonymity.

who controlled access to the family land. If she refused the marriage, she would have few respectable options. If she tried to escape from Karwemera, she had no money to pay for her journey back home and, in any case, her childhood home no longer welcomed her. Her location in the network of familial power relations had shifted irrevocably with Karwemera's marriage proposal, foreclosing the possibility of remaining in Gitarama. She knew that she could not go back.

On her arrival in Kyagwe, Dorcas faced another startling revelation: Karwemera already had a Munyarwanda wife and two children. They lived in a beautiful house that he had built for them, with a four-sided roof made of thatch. "It was a *mwamba* house," Dorcas recalls with evident admiration. Owning a *mwamba* was a sign of one's prosperity and social rank, as only chiefs and wealthier peasants could afford to build one. The wealthier one was, the better materials they could use. Karwemera had built his out of mud and thatch, but the size of the house and the shape of the roof was what set his homestead apart from those of his poorer neighbors. "It was a proper house," Dorcas says, nodding. "But mine was *bustowa [bu-store]*," a Luganda neologism likely drawn from the English word for "store house": a small hut with a single-sided roof. As Karwemera's wife, Dorcas was entitled to her own hut and garden, but she could not expect to have a better home than her rival co-wife. The hierarchy of her new matrimonial family could not have been more obvious.

Kyagwe was home to the Asian-owned Lugazi Sugar Plantation, which was the second largest employer in the Protectorate, employing 8,500-9,000 workers by 1950. The Protectorate's largest employer and Lugazi's rival, Kakira Sugar Works, was only fifty kilometers down the road, and together the two companies attracted tens of thousands of seasonal labor migrants to the area every year. While Karwemera may have reached Kyagwe on foot, he more likely arrived

via recruiters seeking laborers for Kakira or Lugazi. The sugar companies kept recruiting agents permanently stationed at Mbarara and Masaka towns, where they worked diligently to intercept migrants en route to Buganda. In exchange for free transportation, a blanket, and guaranteed employment with daily meal rations, recruited workers signed a contract pledging two years of service. That was how most Banyarwanda ended up in Kyagwe, rather than Mengo or Masaka, which were closer to the Rwanda border. Once in Kyagwe, however, most contracted laborers abandoned their posts before their two year commitments were up, because they found that they could make better money doing much lighter work for private Baganda farmers in the area.

Dorcas represented Karwemera's crowning success as an industrious migrant. Few men in Rwanda, whether Hutu or Tutsi, could afford to have multiple wives. But his good fortune in Buganda had afforded him, like Semana (pp. 13-14), an escape from the drudgery of peasant life in Belgian Rwanda. By the time he married Dorcas, Karwemera had already saved enough money to establish himself as a well-to-do peasant farmer in Kyagwe. He had rented his own land (*kibanja*) and purchased several head of cattle, and he had paid the bride price and built a *mwamba* house for his first wife. The couple had two children, who Karwemera sent to school with money he earned raising cotton. The addition of a second wife to his household was a symbol of his wealth, but also a reason for his continued prosperity: With two wives, he could devote all of his time to growing cash crops, while the women grew food. The diversification of household labor promoted the family's further accumulation of wealth and served as a stabilizing force against crop failure, inflation, and the changing price of cotton on the world market.

Dorcas' introduction to life in Kyagwe was difficult. She was the second wife living in a visibly inferior house, in the middle of a predominantly Baganda village, with no support except her husband. Her co-wife actively disliked her, and went out of her way to remind Dorcas of her

place in the household hierarchy. She did not speak a word of Luganda or English, making her all the more dependent on Karwemera, who spent most of his days in his cotton fields, away from the house. That first year was isolating and lonely, an emotional pain made worse by the physical exhaustion of her first pregnancy and by the expectation that she would cultivate her own garden without any help or guidance. "I knew how to dig from growing up in Rwanda," she said, "But not seriously. That was when I learned to dig seriously." Dorcas stated that her life began to improve as she came to accept that Kyagwe was her new home. Her co-wife hated her, but she did not have to share a home with her. She could work hard in her garden, practice her Luganda, and show respect to other people in her village.

Dorcas's biography shows how women could negotiate new places for themselves in Buganda within the parameters of significant power inequalities. Structurally, she had very little control over her life. Brought to Uganda against her will, her experiences in many ways reflected colonial assumptions about female dependency and male initiative: she came to Uganda because her husband willed it. She made it work because she had to, focusing her energies on the few things over which she had control: raising children, tending gardens, practicing Luganda, and visiting neighbors. When Karwemera died in 1955, however, her position changed. Because his first wife had passed away several years earlier, and because all of his children were small, Karwemera left Dorcas all of his property when he died. And so, despite the fact that she was a woman and a foreigner, Dorcas inherited her husband's wealth, thanks to Buganda property laws that protected all *kibanja* tenants, regardless of gender, ethnicity or birthplace.

Those first few years after Karwemera's passing were exceptionally difficult, because she was left to look after four small children alone. She eventually did remarry, but not until her two oldest children were grown. Her second husband, Alain, was a Kinyarwanda-speaking migrant

from Burundi, who had moved to Kyagwe in the late 1950s. Their union produced no children, but Alain's companionship made her happy, and her land was sufficient for the two of them and her two youngest children. As the years progressed and illness and arthritis began to limit Dorcas's mobility, Alain took over all cultivation duties. The two of them continue to live in Kyagwe, on Dorcas's land.

Conclusion

Between 1928 and 1945, Rwandan women moved to Uganda in incredible numbers. Their departure from Ruanda-Urundi was symptomatic of mounting economic and political tensions in the Belgian Territory, tensions that would eventually erupt in the revolution of 1959 (see Chapter Four). In leaving home, however, women were doing more than escaping hardship or following husbands: they were forcing the reconfiguration of their social networks. This was rarely their *intent*, of course, but it was a consequence of decisions they made. Dislocated from familiar patriarchal geographies, they had to negotiate new pathways to land and livelihood, and this required careful relational work, not only with their menfolk, but also with the new communities in which they found themselves. In so doing, women were not shedding their old identities, but repositioning themselves in social space. They maintained their Kinyarwanda and taught it to their children while diligently learning new languages. They contributed to their husbands' household wealth while remaining in contact with family back home. Their resettlement in Uganda can therefore hardly be described as a process of erasure, but of creativity and pragmatic flexibility.

Their capacity for creative adaptation, however, had painful limits. In particular, structural forces exposed women to violence and deprivation that men could avoid. Nyirambonwa's detainment and subsequent deportation at the hands of anxious British

authorities is a case in point. Women were largely invisible to Uganda officials throughout the first half of the twentieth century, but this invisibility was conditional on government assessments of scarcity. In times of relative plenty, the Protectorate rarely noticed women migrants, even though they were certainly present in seasonal migration flows; when they did notice women, they categorized them as dependents of Banyarwanda men, and as by-products of Uganda's dependency on foreign labor. In times of famine, however, the government lost faith in the ability of migrant men to look after their wives and children. Banyarwanda women, at that point, ceased to be invisible in government eyes, because they represented a potential drain on colonial resources rather than a source of valuable labor.

Chapter 4: The Making of a Refugee Family

In the pre-dawn hours of November 12, 1959, Alonso Kahima, a medical dresser with the Ruanda Mission Hospital at Shyira in northwestern Ruanda, helped his wife and children climb into the bed of a waiting lorry. Across the valley on the opposite hill, Tutsi homesteads burned, casting the nighttime landscape in a strange, flickering glow. Fighting had erupted six days prior, and seemingly without warning. Kahima wasn't sure who started it—the mission was awash in rumor—but he did know one thing: several of his neighbors, both Hutu and Tutsi, were among the bands of assailants who moved through the hills each night, hunting down Tutsi chiefs and other persons believed to be supporters of the radical monarchist party, the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR). Kahima was not UNAR, but he was Tutsi and he worked for the Anglican mission, which was widely regarded as allies of the monarchy. Consequently, after that first terrible night, he moved his family from their small farm on the side of Shyira hill to the station grounds at the 1,000-foot summit, where other families were also gathering.[1] The following day, protesters began a sustained assault on the hill, setting fire to the homes of mission workers. In an instant, the Kahimas lost the earthly treasures that had taken them decades to accumulate: their house with the good roof of corrugated iron, their coffee trees, and their cow and calf. On

[1] For a description of Shyira hill, see Rev. E.R. Langston to Rev. B.R. Isaac, "What God Has Wrought," *Ruanda Notes* v. 6, No. 131 (25 December 1955), 2. For images of Shyira Hospital, see *Ruanda Notes* Nos. 95 (February 1947) and 98 (November 1947).

November 10, the Belgian government sent in Congolese troops to guard the station.[2] The following day, the British missionaries appealed to the Belgian authorities for help in organizing an evacuation to Uganda—if not for the thousands of people now sheltering on the Mission's hill, then at least for the station's most vulnerable families.[3] Kahima, an aging father of eight with advanced rheumatoid arthritis and few material options, was among the first to leave.[4]

Overseeing the evacuation was one Rev. Andereya Sabune, an ordained pastor and a long-term missionary with the Ruanda Mission. Like Kahima, he identified as Tutsi, but the cleric enjoyed certain protections that his colleague did not. To begin with, he had been born and raised in Bufumbira, and was the son of a Ugandan chief. He was educated, able-bodied, and middle class. As the head African pastor at Shyira, he was a highly visible figure in his community and could often be seen traversing the district's steep hills either on foot or in his Volkswagen Beetle as he made his rounds to the Mission's 200 village out-stations. By all accounts it appears he was well-liked, and was known to use his position at Shyira to advocate for better pay and work conditions for African staff, both Hutu and Tutsi. He was a supporter of the monarchy, however, and this could have been a liability. In fact, he initially left with the caravan for the safety of his wife and children. Yet the family returned to Shyira within a matter of weeks, at the request of Sabune's Hutu colleagues. His popularity and perceived outsider status, it seemed, were enough to mitigate his Tutsi-ness and royalist politics—at least for a little

[2] "Trouble at Shyira," *Ruanda Notes* No. 147 (Mar-May 1960), 4.

[3] CUA-1, Series *Administrative/Governing Bodies,* Box 254, Folder 1462, "Ruanda-Urundi and Bishop Brazier, 1959"; Minutes of the Emergency Executive Committee held at Ibuye, 17th November 1959.

[4] Kahima's history is based on interviews that I conducted with a surviving relative as well as archival sources. I have changed his name and certain minor details of his story to protect his identity.

while.[5] The Sabunes were able to remain at Shyira for another three years, long after most Tutsi families had fled.

This chapter is a social history of displacement, told through the intersecting journeys of the Kahima and Sabune families during the Rwandan revolution (c. 1959-61) and its aftermath. The two families were among the estimated 50,000-70,000 people, predominantly Tutsi, who sought refuge in Uganda between 1959 and 1964.[6] Following the routes of earlier labor migrants and famine refugees—some of whom had been their kith and kin—they found their way to safer harbors in Kigezi, Ankole, and Buganda. Many would take up permanent residence in Uganda, but as we will see, their ability to recreate home after displacement was contingent on a host of different factors. Sabune, for example, was able to use his familial origins, social capital, and Anglican connections to secure citizenship for himself and his family when they eventually left Shyira in 1962. Although his wife, Ayirini, was from Congo, she was able to receive citizenship through Sabune.

The same could not be said for Kahima and his wife, Joyce. Kahima's trouble lay in his weak social position and murky personal history. He had lived in Uganda for decades prior to moving to Shyira, and evidently had the documents to prove it.[7] Yet local Ugandan officials ultimately could not determine his birthplace, either by reference to a birth certificate or an

[5] Interview, Charles Sabune, July 2015. Information on Andereya's life comes from interviews that I conducted with his surviving children (Charles, Petero, and Harriet) as well as his half-brother, Dr. Herbert Nsanzemuhire. The family has spent many years conducting an extensive oral history and genealogy of their family, and they graciously shared their findings with me. I have supplemented this oral history with insights gleaned from the Church of Uganda Archives at Mukono, the Kabale District Archives, and copies of the *Ruanda Notes*, held at the Cambridge Centre for World Christianity at Cambridge. I shared all archival documents concerning Sabune with his surviving family.

[6] Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 164.

[7] KigDA Immigration Box 3, ADM 23/1i, Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees, 1961-1962.

authoritative witness like a chief, and this contributed to his eventual reclassification as a "refugee" in 1962.[8] His wife was Ugandan, having been born and raised in Kisoro, Bufumbira, but Ugandan women could not help their foreign spouses secure citizenship—the 1962 Citizenship Act only provided a naturalization option for non-Ugandan women married to Ugandan men.[9] Kahima therefore had no options when, in a chance encounter, a Kigezi District official ordered his immediate removal to a government refugee camp in 1964.[10] In that moment, it did not matter that Kahima had spent the majority of his childhood and adult life in Kabale, or that his spouse was Ugandan. In the eyes of a swiftly evolving state, Kahima became an outsider.

The experiences of the Sabune and Kahima families open up questions about the temporality of place and the meaning of the border at independence. The attenuation of "home" was a long and alinear process, one that did not look the same for everyone. How did Shyira change for Kahima and Sabune, both before and during the war? How do we account for their diverse experiences of place? Similarly, how do we explain the unevenness of their abilities to reclaim place in Uganda? In answering these questions, I ground my analysis in Doreen Massey's assertion that place cannot be fixed. Place, like identity, is relational, contingent.[11] The state's imposition of national borders, refugee laws, and documentation regimes constituted an effort to fix people in time and space, to define "Uganda" as a place that was different from Rwanda. Yet the state could not monopolize the work of place-making, because people's lives

[8] KigDA Immigration Box 3, ADM 23, *Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees*, 1962-1964.

[9] The Uganda Citizenship Act, 1962, Section 3. See also Bronwen Manby's analysis of independence-era citizenship laws in Africa: Bronwen Manby, *Citizenship Law in Africa: A Comparative Study* (Oxford: African Book Collective, 2012), 5, *Project MUSE*.

[10] KigDA Immigration Box 9, 123, Refugees, 1964-1987.

[11] Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 168-169.

always exceeded the state. Kahima and Sabune were part of kin and religious networks that spanned the border like human bridges. New government interventions were part of place-as-process, because they effected these social relations across space, but they were not determinative. The experience of place, like the experience of displacement, never tracked perfectly with chronologies of war and state-making. People's social histories were just as important, if not more so, in the loss and reclamation of place.

Paying attention to the temporality of place allows us to identify the factors that either facilitated or hindered people's ability to relocate after the Rwandan revolution. In so doing we are able to divorce our understanding of displacement from static notions of place. Following the cross-border lives of the Kahima and Sabune families, I demonstrate how they made and remade their homes time and again. I also show how, at a particular moment in space, changing immigration and citizenship policies overwhelmed and immobilized the social resources of one family, but not the other. Dislocation was not an equalizer.

In what follows, I draw on oral histories, local government archives, missionary journals and private family papers to trace the journeys of Kahima and Sabune from Bufumbira to Shyira and back again. Part One, "Building Cross-Border Lives," tells the story of the Ruanda Mission and how Sabune and Kahima made their homes in Shyira. Part Two, "Losing Place," chronicles their respective experiences of the war and the circumstances surrounding their displacement. Part Three, "Borders," shifts to Kigezi District in Uganda and the efforts of refugees to negotiate asylum as they waited for the opportunity to return to Rwanda. The conclusion returns to Sabune and Kahima and their respective fates.

Part I: Building Cross-Border Lives

Before examining the Kahima and Sabune families' experience of the revolution, it is first important to situate their war-time migrations within longer, multi-generational histories of regional mobility. Migration was a time-honored strategy that members from both families had used at various points in their lives to evade danger and maximize opportunities. These prior experiences and shared narratives informed how each family navigated the border during the war. They also, critically, provided a fund of intellectual and emotional resources on which members might draw to help them make sense of their new circumstances. In highlighting the continuity of migration, however, it is also important to acknowledge that the *experience* of violent displacement at the end of the colonial era was anything but ordinary for those who lived through it. Fleeing the country was truly frightening, especially since the political significance of their flight was unclear. The meaning of the border was changing rapidly between 1959 and 1964, often in unpredictable ways, raising new obstacles for some while facilitating the mobility of others. Understanding prior histories of border-crossing is necessary if we are to appreciate how people's relationship to the border changed after 1959.

Recalling from Chapter One, the northern periphery of the Rwandan kingdom was, by the turn of the twentieth century, a densely populated and heterogeneous region. Older networks of clan, kin, and trade overlay more recent configurations of political territory and tribute; these lines of communication shaped how people responded to dangerous situations like war, disease, and domestic disputes. The advent of colonial borders rarely destroyed these networks but instead augmented existing linkages. In some cases, they generated new possibilities for

connection and mobility.[12] New religious circuits, for example, were particularly important for Kahima and Sabune, whose travels across central Africa coincided with the expansion of the Ruanda Mission and its parent organization, the Church Missionary Society (CMS). Both men were Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi who had grown up between southern Uganda and northern Ruanda, and both had found employment with the Ruanda Mission during the 1920s—Sabune as a teacher and Kahima as a medical orderly. Their ability to move back and forth across the border must be understood within the context of the CMS-Ruanda Mission's peculiar trans-border history and organization. A few brief words about the history of the Mission are therefore in order.

The Ruanda Mission

Despite its name, the Ruanda Mission originated in Uganda. Its founders were two British doctors named Leonard Sharp and Algernon "Algie" Stanley-Smith,[13] who first came to Uganda at the end of World War I as missionaries with the CMS, an Anglican organization with headquarters in London and stations across the Empire. Their true ambition, however, was not to remain in Uganda, a country they regarded as already "reached," but to do "pioneer" evangelism in Ruanda-Urundi, which was by then a League of Nations Trust Territory under Belgian trusteeship. The Belgian authorities denied their initial request for permission to enter Ruanda, however, leaving Sharp and Stanley-Smith to look for an alternative site on the Uganda side of the border. They found it in Kigezi, a rugged, up-country District that until 1911 had been divided between British Uganda and German Ruanda. The missionaries reasoned that, if they

[12] Jesper Bjarnesen and Henrik Vigh, "Introduction: The Dialectics of Displacement and Emplacement," *Conflict and Society* 1 (June 2016), 9.

[13] KigDA: *Annual Report for Kigezi District 1921-1923*, DC Kigezi to PC-Western Province, Fort Portal, 20 April 1921.

could not go to Ruanda immediately, then perhaps they might begin their work among the Kinyarwanda-speaking Banyarwanda who were settled just across the border in Uganda.[14] In 1921, they laid the foundations for a hospital and a boys' boarding school in the district capital of Kabale, as well as a second boarding school in Kisoro, Bufumbira *saza*.[15]

In 1923, the British Protectorate gained control of a small part of eastern Ruanda, at which point the CMS doctors seized the opportunity to plant a second mission station in what was now British territory. Joined by another CMS missionary doctor named Joe Church, they constructed a hospital at Gahini, near Lake Muhazi. In 1924, the British returned Gahini to the Belgians, but the missionaries were allowed to keep the Gahini station. In 1931, the Ruanda Mission expanded further, building hospital stations at Shyria, in northwest Ruhengeri Province, and at Kigeme, in the south near Astrida (Butare). Four years later, the Ruanda Mission expanded yet again, this time into Urundi with another three hospital stations at Ibuye, Matana, and Buhiga. By the mid-1930s, then, the Ruanda Mission comprised seven major stations spread across two empires and three territories, with African and European staff circulating regularly between them.

A driving force behind much of this circulation was a new piety movement known as *Abalokole*—literally, the born-agains—and remembered today as the East African Revival. Originating in Gahini in the mid-1930s, the *Abalokole* believed that eternal salvation rests in Christ alone, and that one must be "born again" through the acknowledgement of one's sinful nature and the acceptance of Christ as Lord and Savior. Once saved, it was incumbent upon the

[14] Kevin Ward, "Revival, Mission and Church in Kigezi, Rwanda and Burundi," in *The East African Revival: History and Legacies,* eds. Kevin Ward and Emma Wild-Wood (New York: Routledge, 2012), 14-15.

[15] Algernon Stanley-Smith, *Ruanda Notes* v. 1, no. 3 (15 September 1921).

born again to share her story with the world, in hopes that others might be saved, too. The *Abalokole* were convinced that they were living in Biblical end times, that the risen Christ would soon return to earth to judge the living and the dead, and that those who had not been saved would spend eternity in hell, a place of unending, physical torment. On the basis of these convictions, converts took to the road as missionaries, traveling extensively across eastern and central Africa to spread their message. For them, the community forged around individual commitments to a personal Christ transcended human divisions of nationality, race, and politics—or at least it was supposed to.

For all of their egalitarian rhetoric, however, white missionaries with the Ruanda Mission demonstrated an unspoken preference for Tutsi in both their missional aims and hiring practices, believing that the conversion of the aristocracy would lead to the conversion of the masses.[16] The Church Missionary Society had used this approach with great success in Uganda, but it failed to bear fruit in Ruanda, at least as far as numbers went. Most chiefs and notables instead joined the Catholic Church, with a significant rise in baptisms during the 1930s.[17] Nevertheless, the Ruanda Mission continued to pursue the aristocracy until the revolution. Whereas their Catholic rivals were beginning, after World War II, to rethink their own Tutsi-biases and reach out to the Hutu masses, the Anglicans maintained a steady faith in the Tutsi as the country's destined leaders. "They have an innate capacity to rule born of centuries of experience," wrote Stanley-Smith in 1958. "Will it be selfish, domineering, cruel and corrupt as in the past, or will it be in the highest interests of all, enlightened and pure? The answer to this will depend on whether men are found

[16] Ward, "Revival," 26. The white missionary staff came largely from England's upper crust, and their class politics informed their preference for elite Tutsi. See Timothy Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 80.

[17] Linden, *Church and Revolution*, 208. The Catholic Church's remarkable increase during the 1930s was commonly referred to as *la tornade*.

whose first loyalty is Christ, and whose mastering motive is loving service." Reflecting the attitudes of many of his white colleagues, Stanley-Smith believed that Tutsi political dominance was inevitable, and that the Ruanda Mission therefore had a duty to convert as many Tutsi elite as they could to ensure the future peace of the country.[18]

An even greater irony of the Ruanda Mission's trickle-down evangelism was that, rather than attracting nobles and chiefs, they were actually drawing in Tutsi and Hutu peasants who, witnessing the abuses of Catholic chiefs and the seeming complicity of the Catholic Missions, turned to Protestantism as a political and spiritual alternative. Between 1936 and 1958, Protestant numbers grew by a factor of ten, from 20,600 adherents across all Protestant missions in 1936 to over 220,000 in 1958; the Ruanda Mission alone counted 100,000 converts spread across 1,700 churches in Ruanda-Urundi.[19] The station at Shyira experienced similar growth, growing from 2,000 adherents in 1941 to 10,000 in 1949.[20] While the Mission did not break down its statistics by ethnicity, it was widely regarded as a Hutu organization until the early 1950s, despite the predominance of Tutsi schoolmasters, clergy, and hospital workers.[21] In the build-up to the revolution, however, this perception would change, and the Anglicans would come to be viewed as an ally of a conservative Tutsi agenda. We will return to this point presently.

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[18] Dr. A. Stanley-Smith, "The Political Set-Up of Ruanda-Urundi," *Ruanda Notes* No. 142 (November 1958-January 1959), 6.

[19] The Ruanda Mission was not the only Protestant organization in Ruanda-Urundi. They were joined by the Seventh Day Adventists and the Belgian Protestant Mission, among several others. For general Protestant figures, see JJ Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 36, 41. For Ruanda Mission numbers, see Rev. Jim Brazier, Annual Report for 1957-58, *Ruanda Notes* No. 140 (Annual Review for 1957-58), 6.

[20] Lt. Col. G.C. Grimshaw, "Report on Ruanda," *Ruanda Notes* (February 1950), 2.

[21] Ward, "Revival," 25.

Sabune

Andereya Sabune was born in Bufumbira, at a place called Busanza, sometime during the early twentieth century. His paternal grandfather, Nyarushumba, had been a lesser chief in northern Ruanda, near what later became Gatsibo, during the reign of Rwabugiri (c. 1860-1895). As a lesser chief, he was responsible for collecting tribute for the chief above him, and that chief was Rwabugiri's son, Nyindo, who ruled over Bufumbira (see Chapter 1). It was through this political connection that Nyarushumba developed friendships with other chiefs and notables in Bufumbira. It was also how he met his first wife, a woman whose name the surviving family can no longer remember. She went back to Nyarushumba's home after they married, and she bore him a son named Karera. Karera was Sabune's father.

When Karera was about five years old, his mother took him back to her people in Busanza, Bufumbira, without Nyarushumba. Family believe that Nyarushumba may have died during a smallpox epidemic, but no one really knows for sure. A competing theory is that he had fallen out of good graces with Rwabugiri and had subsequently committed suicide. Whatever the case, sometime during the late 1880s, the young Karera came to live in Bufumbira. His mother died soon afterwards, and one of her kinsmen adopted Karera. A few years later, when Karera was a teenager, he was adopted by yet another family: the local chief of Busanza and his wife, who were childless. Karera became the chief's son, and when the chief died, Karera inherited his position. This was sometime around the year 1900, when Busanza (like all of Bufumbira) was still part of German Ruanda.

Karera ultimately married four women, who bore him many children. His firstborn son, Sehene, grew up to become the *muruka* (parish) chief of Busanza once it passed to the British Protectorate in 1911. Sabune was the second-born, and this birth-order was important: When

CMS missionaries Sharp and Stanley-Smith first came to Busanza shortly after World War I, Karera was willing to let Sabune attend their boarding school. Sehene, however, was to remain at home, where he was being groomed for the chieftaincy. This was the beginning of Sabune's religious career.

Sabune completed his primary studies and religious education in 1927, at which point he moved from southern Uganda to northern Ruanda to start working as a teacher for the Ruanda Mission station in Gahini. After two years at Gahini, he moved back to Bufumbira, where he met and married his first wife, a Hutu woman named Malisa, and began to work as a clerk for a sub-county chief.[22] Malisa, however, died soon after they settled, while she was in labor with their first child. The loss of his young wife and baby triggered a crisis of faith for Sabune, who subsequently left the church and turned to drink. He lost his job as a clerk and spent several months in prison when he was caught stealing money from the sub-county cash-box to support his habit. It was during his detention that he recommitted his life to God. Upon his release from prison, he returned to the Ruanda Mission.

The story of how Sabune met his second wife, Ayirini, offers further insight into the kinds of cross-border networks that women and men were part of during the interwar years, and bears comparison to the journeys of women discussed in Chapter Three. Ayirini was born and raised in Bwisha, a predominantly Hutu chieftaincy that had been part of the Rwandan kingdom until 1920, when the Belgians incorporated it into eastern Congo. When Ayirini reached puberty, her father arranged for her to marry the chief of Bwisha, Ndeze. Displeased with the engagement, Ayirini decided to run away. Her older sister, Dorokasi, had recently married a man

[22] Recall that 1927 marked the beginning of the *Rwakayihura* famine in eastern Ruanda, and that the Mission at Gahini distributed government relief. If family members are correct in their assertions that Sabune returned from Gahini in 1928, it may have been the famine that prompted him to relocate.

in Busanza just over the border in Uganda, and so that was where she went. What she did not know was that Dorokasi was wed to Sehene, Karera's son, and that Sabune was visiting them. Reaching Dorokasi's house, she found her brother-in-law, Sehene, sitting in the courtyard with his brother, Sabune. Sabune, smitten, then went to his father and asked him to arrange for his marriage to Ayirini.[23] The couple married shortly thereafter.

Over the next two decades, Sabune and Ayirini traveled widely across Uganda and Ruanda-Urundi in the service of the Ruanda Mission. Sabune first took a teaching position at the station at Matana,[24] and later spent time in Ibuye where he completed his religious training and received his ordination.[25] Sometime during the early 1940s, the family moved again, this time to Shyira, where they would remain until 1962.

Kahima

Kahima's early history is a bit more difficult to trace, at least as far as his birthplace is concerned. He has left a much lighter footprint in the archives, and my knowledge of his birth and childhood is based largely on the memories of his surviving son, who is now an old man himself. His son insists he came from Bufumbira, but at least one missionary source states that he was from "Ruanda" (but whether the missionary meant British Ruanda, Belgian Ruanda, or German Ruanda is impossible to tell). In any case, Kahima was born before colonial borders existed, to Kinyarwanda-speaking farmers who made their living growing sweet potatoes,

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[23.] CUA-1, *Administrative/Governing Bodies* Box 258, Folder 1477, "Ruanda Mission, 1937"; "Notes and Suggestions on the case of Andereya Sabune," n.d.

[24.] CUA-1, *Administrative/Governing Bodies* Box 258, Folder 1477, "Ruanda Mission, 1937"; "Grade 'C' Teachers working in Ruanda-Urundi," n.d.

[25.] CUA-1, *Administrative/Governing Bodies*, Box 261, Folder 1487, "Ruanda Mission, 1947"; Minutes of the Standing Committee of the Diocesan Council held at Kabale 25th-30th September, 1947.

sorghum, and pulses somewhere along the steep, lava-strewn foothills of the Virunga mountain chain. Whether his family had been in the region before the creation of the border is difficult to say. They may have been there for generations, but more likely they had been displaced from a neighboring area, either during Rwabugiri's wars of expansion or the later German pacification phase. It is also difficult to know whether Kahima grew up identifying as Tutsi, or whether this was a label he adopted later in his life. If he grew up in Bufumbira, British officers would have likely counted Kahima's father as a member of the Banyarwanda "tribe" in their tax registers. Growing up in the 1910s, Kahima would not have gone to school, since the only schools at that time were run by the Catholic and Protestant missions and were generally accessible only to the elite. Kahima came of age sometime around the end of World War I, when the Belgians took control of Ruanda-Urundi. He married a girl from a nearby village, and likely settled down to farm as his parents had done.

Kahima's son does not know how he came to be employed with the Ruanda Mission, but a likely scenario was that he was a patient at Kigezi Mission Hospital in Kabale and that during his convalescence he managed to convince the missionaries to hire him to help out around the station. As a medical assistant, Kahima would have received much of his biomedical training on the job, under the tutelage of missionary doctors and nurses and from more experienced African colleagues. He may have also been sent for further training at either Mukono, in Buganda, or Ibuye, in northern Urundi.[26] Kahima worked at Kabale throughout the interwar period, but was eventually transferred to Gahini in 1941 when the Ruanda Mission was forced to close Kigezi Mission Hospital due to financial pressures.[27] After a year in Gahini, he was transferred once

[26] *Ruanda Notes* v. 6, no. 133 (Review of 1955-56), 24.

[27] CUA-1 *Administrative/Governing Bodies* Box 84, Folder 611; Rt.-Rev. PJ Brazier to DC Kabale, 5 October 1956.

again to Shyira, where he and his wife, Joyce, would remain with their children until the outbreak of the Rwandan revolution.

Difficult Beginnings

The Kahima and Sabune families arrived in Shyira to set up their new homes in the early 1940s, during a period of tremendous social, political, and demographic change. The region was already known to be "notoriously unruly," given its long history of resistance to both the *Mwami* and the Belgian administration, but the 1940s were especially volatile due to war-time extractions and environmental disaster.[28] Between 1942 and 1944, the devastating *Ruzagayura* famine swept through much of Ruanda, killing as many as 300,000 people and displacing many more. Food shortages were not as bad in the northwest as they were elsewhere, but Ruhengeri province still witnessed widespread starvation and displacement, and Shyira was right in the thick of it. In December 1943, the Belgian administration made Shyira station a relief center, responsible for distributing government food to thousands of people in their district. Three to four times a week, lorries carrying flour, dried beans, and powdered milk would arrive from Congo and wind their way up the hairpin turns of Shyira hill. The delivery then needed to be inventoried, off-loaded, and safely stored. Each day, the Mission distributed dry food to those who were strong enough to carry it back to their homes, but prepared other food to serve people who were convalescing at the station because they were too weak to make repeated trips to and from Shyira.

The everyday work of running a relief center was all-consuming. Sabune and Kahima were kept busy from sunrise to sundown with cooking and distributing food, managing crowds, organizing stores, and making unending trips to the valley to fetch water. The station's regular

[28] Bishop Jim Brazier, "A Survey of the Situation," *Ruanda Notes* v. 7, no. 147 (Mar-May 1960), 14 [letter dated 30 December 1959].

itinerary of classes, medical rounds, and Bible study was replaced with a twice-a-day feeding schedule. The drum-beats that once announced the commencement of morning lessons and neonatal clinics and afternoon tea now alerted listeners to the arrival of a new shipment or the beginning of food distribution.[29] To accommodate the crowds, the station worked out a rotating schedule with the surrounding chiefs so that certain villages came to the station on certain days. This helped with crowd control, but it also meant that the station had to keep registers to ensure that the right people received food on the right days. The Mission's head doctor, Godfrey Hindley, supervised the distribution lines to ensure that the government's limited relief supplies went only to the neediest patients. Those he deemed "fit" would be turned away, and hospital dressers like Kahima would be on hand to enforce his decisions.[30] Sabune would have also been responsible for providing pastoral care to people as they waited in the courtyard for food or news or medical attention, or when they were gathered around their campfires in the evening. "All normal work has naturally ceased," wrote Hilda Langston, the mission's head teacher, "and we have had to call on everyone to do his bit to cook, organize everything, fetch water or firewood, and dispense the food. It is an enormous and tiring all-day job…"[31]

The Mission's relief work impacted its relationships to Ruhengeri's small and conservative Tutsi elite, who had to coordinate with Shyira staff to distribute aid. In the aftermath of the famine, these connections further led to a substantial increase in the number of

[29] Missionaries made frequent mention of the use of drums to mark out time during the day. See for example *Ruanda Notes* No. 139 (February-April 1958).

[30] The chiefs were supposed to pre-select those who were to receive government rations before sending them on to Shyira, but the missionaries reported that each day involved "…any amount of weeding out, for some would come who are not starving and though this is done in the first place by the chiefs they may miss out some" (Hilda Langston, Shyira, 23 December 1943, *Ruanda Notes* No. 85 (May 1944), 14).

[31] Hilda Langston, Shyira, 23 December 1943, in *Ruanda Notes* No. 85 (May 1944), 13.

elite Tutsi students at the mission school. Hilda Langston, writing in mid-1944, praised God for "so wonderfully open[ing] the door…to the Batutsi around us," so that "…instead of having only one or two from this ruling class, we now have over twenty out of fifty boarders, while in the boys' school nearly all are Batutsi."[32] In January 1945, when Shyira hosted a convention for the entire Ruanda Mission, many unaffiliated Batutsi from Ruhengeri also attended, some of whom "came right to the Lord, confessing their sins."[33]

In brief, Kahima and Sabune came to settle in Shyira at a time when life for the community was far from "normal." They got to know their new neighbors, supervisors, colleagues and chiefs in the midst of profound crisis, one that reconfigured social relationships and political networks across the region. They laid the foundations for their houses, collected wages from their employer, and enrolled their children in the Mission school at the same time that many people were leaving for Uganda and Congo in search of food. Finally, while all Mission staff experienced some degree of deprivation during the famine, their basic physical survival was ensured by virtue of their connection to the station. In other words, the famine created opportunities for employment and material survival for some people at the same time that it forced others to flee. Displacement and new beginnings coincided.

Over the next fifteen years, the Kahima and Sabune families became well-established at Shyira and thoroughly enmeshed in the Ruanda Mission's social and institutional networks. Kahima and Joyce had a small farm not far from the station, and their children attended the

[32] Hilda Langston, Shyira, 25 May 1944, in *Ruanda Notes* No. 86 (August 1944), 9-10. European missionaries likened *Ruzagayura* to the *Rwakayihura* famine of 1927, another disaster in which the Ruanda Mission collaborated with the Belgian authorities to distribute emergency relief, that time out of the station at Gahini. Numerous African leaders emerged out of Gahini during the 1930s and '40s, having first developed relationships with the Mission during the famine. See for example Jim Brazier, 21 October 1955, *Ruanda Notes* No. 130 (November 1955-January 1956), 6.

[33] *Ruanda Notes* No. 87 (January 1945), 5-6.

mission school. Sabune and Ayirini lived on the station itself, and their youngest children attended school with the Kahima children. Their two eldest sons, after completing their primary education at Shyira, moved on to Buganda to attend secondary school. Their linguistic proficiencies and cultural identifications deepened their connections to northern Ruanda even further, and it appears that neither family had any intention of returning to Uganda in the near future. Kahima apparently had no property in Uganda, and Sabune, in a demonstration of his renewed commitment to the faith, had sold his land inheritance in Busanza and given the money to the mission. "Home," for the moment, was in Ruanda.

Part II: Losing Place

In her ethnography of internal displacement in Columbia, Mateja Celestina asks, When does displacement 'start'? State actors and policy experts often frame forced migration as an immediate, perhaps even unthinking, reaction to life-threatening violence. Conversely, they assume that repatriation to one's former physical home is the best possible solution to displacement. Yet if place is processual—if it is, as Massey contends, "formed out of the particular set of social relations which interact at a particular location"—then this problem-solution narrative no longer holds. Shyira as a place was not the same before and after the revolution, because violence radically reconfigured its social relations and its social space. Changes in social space, however, did not have the same ramifications for the all of the actors involved. Kahima and Sabune experienced what Celestina calls "displacement before displacement" in different ways and at different rates. Furthermore, while violence played a significant role in their loss of place, it was not the only factor. To understand their individual trajectories, we must first understand their locations in social space before the outbreak of war.

In the section that follows, I trace Shyira Mission's evolution between World War II and the end of the Rwandan Revolution to illustrate this process of "displacement before displacement." I will first show how Shyira, in the decade after World War II, came to be perceived as a Tutsi establishment—a place for Tutsi—despite the fact that most of its converts, students and patients were Hutu. I will then turn to the revolution to explore how the station changed during the war, and how these changes affected the experience of place for two Tutsi families, the Sabunes and the Kahimas. Finally, pushing Celestina's discussion of displacement-as-process even further, I will highlight the alinearity of displacement: In the midst of displacement, people also experienced moments of familiarity, hope, and promise. The Sabune family was able to return to Shyira after their first departure and claim the station as their home for another three years. Paying attention to the wax and wane of "home" disrupts linear narratives of war and state-formation, and reminds us that, for those who lived this history, the end of empire was anything but certain.[34]

Shyira, 1945-56[35]

World War II was a watershed in Rwandan political history, as it was throughout Africa. Few Rwandans served in the military, but their labor fed Belgium's wartime demand for agricultural produce. The *Ruzagayura* famine was, in many ways, a consequence of western Europe's willingness to wring their colonies of food, stimulants, and textiles. Spared the violence of the warfront, the people of Ruanda confronted devastating hunger at home in addition to political

[34] On uncertainty and the end of empire, see Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

[35] This section is based on my readings of Ruanda Mission archives and their quarterly publication, *Ruanda Notes.* In future revisions of this sub-section, I will need to also consult the Rwaza Mission Diaries, the Catholic newspaper *Kinyamateka*, and Belgian colonial archives.

abuse at the hands of chiefs, who relied on corporal punishment to extract their requisite quotas. These experiences gave rise to growing rural resentment among all peasants, both Hutu and Tutsi, and this resentment provided a critical backdrop for the generation that came of age during the 1940s.

The war was also a watershed in terms of the political conversations it helped initiate. This is not to say that the war politicized Africans in Ruanda, but rather, the war put Belgium in a new position vis-à-vis its empire and its European counterparts. Before the war, Belgium could perpetually defer conversations about possible postcolonial futures; after the war, Ruanda-Urundi became a Trust Territory of the United Nations, and the Belgians, in their new role as "tutors," were charged with preparing the twinned colonies for independence. Although Belgium was predictably slow in introducing political reforms, the UN provided African activists with new forums for protest and exchange, which they could use to hold Belgium accountable. These forums included the UN offices in Geneva and New York, which received petitions and committees throughout the 1950s and '60s, as well as the UN Visiting Missions that toured the country every three years between 1947 and 1961 to ensure that the Belgians were fulfilling their obligations as a Trust Authority.

Under pressure to enact meaningful change, yet reticent to initiate political reform, the Belgians spent the latter years of the 1940s engaged in socioeconomic projects, arguing that Ruanda-Urundi needed "development" before it would be ready for democratic governance. These projects, while intended to forestall independence, were not insignificant. Building crews became a familiar sight across the country, as Belgium pumped money into new roads, schools,

and hospitals.[36] Catholic and Protestant missions, which had long provided the bulk of Ruanda's education and health services, now became virtual contractors of the state, receiving grants and subsidies from the government to expand their programs and facilities. To ensure minimum standards in education, the administration set up a Directorate of Education, which immediately began to churn out new regulations governing syllabi, academic calendars, school accreditation, teacher certification, and building codes.[37]

In addition to these government initiatives, the country was also experiencing significant changes in the private sector as European investors flocked to Ruanda-Urundi after the war. Ruhengeri was beset by mining prospectors from all over Europe, who came in search of tin ore, coltan, and wolframite.[38] Ruhengeri town (the capital of Ruhengeri province) grew rapidly after 1945, powered by new injections of capital from state and private interests. More Africans, including Christians at Shyira, acquired lorries, sewing machines, and livestock, which they used to generate income.[39] The *Ruanda Notes* reported that, across its stations, the word on everyone's tongue was *amajyambere*, "progress." Everywhere, signs of new life could be seen after years of famine and war: urban centers were growing, more towns had electricity,

[36] Jean-Paul Kimonyo, *Rwanda's Popular Genocide: A Perfect Storm*, trans. Wandia Njoya (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 22.

[37] "The Story of Our Mission Schools in Ruanda-Urundi," *Ruanda Notes* v. 6, no. 123 (February-April 1954), 3-7.

[38] Shyira Christians lived in close proximity to mining interests. "There are miners and prospectors in many parts of the territory," wrote Shyira-based missionary Godfrey Hindley. "[I]n fact, there is one camped only a few hundred yards from this hill at the moment. It could easily be that they will want to buy us out of this site." Dr. G.T. Hindley, "Only Two Alternatives," Shyira, 18 June 1953, *Ruanda Notes* No. 121 (August-October 1953).

[39] Dr. G.T. Hindley, "Weathering the Storm," Shyira, n.d., *Ruanda Notes* No. 124 "His Way in the Storm: A Review of the Year 1953-54," 11; Rev. Jim Brazier, "Yesterday, To-Day, and To-Morrow," *Ruanda Notes* No. 124, "His Way in the Storm: A Review of the Year 1953-54," 1; Rev. Jim Brazier, Annual Report for 1957-58, *Ruanda Notes* No. 140 (1957-1958), 6.

tarmacked roads, and piped water, and more children were going to school.[40] The pace of these developments was hectic, sometimes frantic. In the words of one missionary, "Developments which took fifty years in Uganda and five hundred or more in England, are being rushed through here in five years."[41]

The government's development craze had significant consequences for a place like Shyira, especially coming so soon after the *Ruzagayura* famine. Now, instead of famine relief, the Mission at Shyira was responsible for distributing education and medicine. On the station grounds itself, new grants from the government allowed the hospital to increase its number of beds and medical services. By the mid-1950s, Shyira hospital was treating 48,000 out-patients and 1,400 in-patients every year.[42] Pre- and neo-natal clinics were among the most popular hospital services during this time, in which staff examined 500 mothers and their babies every week.[43] Adding to these thousands of patients who made their way up and down the hill every week, the station's Day and Boarding school catered to 400 primary students who attended classes 221 days out of the year per government regulations.[44]

Off the station hill, the Mission's reach was also expanding. Before World War II, Shyira's entire education program consisted of a small boarding school and day school at the mission station, as well as thirty-six "out-schools" scattered across Ruhengeri. The station

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[40] "Builded Together," *Ruanda Notes* No. 108, Annual Report for 1949-1950 (May 1950), 2; Rev. Jim Brazier, "Yesterday, To-Day, and To-Morrow," *Ruanda Notes* No. 124, "His Way in the Storm: A Review of the Year 1953-54," 1.

[41] "Builded Together," *Ruanda Notes* No. 108, Annual Report for 1949-1950 (May 1950), 9.

[42] Dr. G.T. Hindley, Annual Update for Shyira, *Ruanda Notes* No. 133 (Review Number 1955-56), 19.

[43] E. Wheeler, "Hospital Joys and Problems," Shyira, 15 September 1949, *Ruanda Notes* No. 106 (November 1949), 3; Beatrice Louise, "Babies," Shyira, 28 June 1953, *Ruanda Notes* No. 121 (October 1953), 9; Dr. G.T. Hindley, "A Mission for Children," Shyira, 6 December 1955, *Ruanda Notes* No. 131 (February-April 1956), 4.

[44] Dr. G.T. Hindley, Annual Update for Shyira, *Ruanda Notes* No. 133 (Review Number 1955-56), 19.

schools catered to roughly eighty students and were staffed by European and African teachers; the out-schools, meanwhile, were run by village evangelists with little to no pedagogical training.[45] By the end of the 1950s, Shyira oversaw 230 out-schools, thirteen of which were officially recognized as schools (rather than mere catechist centers) by the government.[46]

If *Ruzagayura* had opened up new relationships between Shyira Protestants, Belgian administrators, and the Tutsi establishment, the post-war development craze served to deepen and formalize these relationships. While still dwarfed in comparison to the power and influence of the Catholic Church, the Anglicans' newfound access to state resources allowed the stations to expand their influence and increase their following.[47] The Mission's growing influence was evident in its climbing number of adherents, particularly among the elite. Before the war, only one local sub-chief identified as Protestant, against five Catholic sub-chiefs. The station counted approximately 2,000 converts and followers, who collectively tithed about 3,000 francs (£22.5) to the Mission every year. By the end of the 1940s, multiple chiefs had converted to Protestantism and the Mission counted 10,000 adherents who tithed 80,000 francs per year.[48] While these numbers weren't "spectacular" when compared to the Catholic church, missionaries

[45] Shyira, *Ruanda Notes* No. 62 (October 1937), 31; Dr. Norman Jones, *Ruanda Notes* No. 63 (January 1938), 16.

[46] Doreen Peck, Annual Report for Shyira, *Ruanda Notes* No. 140 (Review of 1957-58), 24.

[47] Issues of *Ruanda Notes* for years 1953-1956 are largely consumed with detailing how this new government funding is changing the work and daily life of the Ruanda Mission stations across Ruanda-Urundi. See for example Rev. Wilkinson, "The Chairman's Letter," 27 January 1953, *Ruanda Notes* No. 119 (February-April 1953), 16. The result of the government's partnership with the Anglican and Catholic Missions was, as far as education went, modestly impressive: In 1930, only 30,000 Rwandan children were enrolled in primary school; by 1960, that number had risen to 270,000, or roughly a quarter of all school-aged children. See Kimonyo, Rwanda's Popular Genocide, 22.

[48] Lt.-Col. G.C. Grimshaw, "Report on Ruanda," Shyira, n.d., *Ruanda Notes* No. 107 (February 1950), 1-2.

at Shyira still viewed them as evidence of "the Kingdom of God being established in this country in spite of all the growing turmoil of nationalism and social advance."[49]

European missionary writings in this period highlighted the excitement of the time, but their breathless accounts often failed to take note of the tremendous downsides that accompanied the new resource flows, consumption patterns, and public services. The construction of new schools, hospitals, roads, and mine shafts required significant inputs of manual labor, sending the missions, government, and private investors scrambling to drum up the necessary workers.[50] While this competition helped improve African wages, the Belgian administration often off-set these gains by raising taxes.[51] To this, the administration added new famine crop requirements in the wake of *Ruzagayura*, and also began to impose exceedingly strict regulations on cash crop cultivation.[52] Missionaries became fond of decrying the African's newfound "materialism" that led to constant "busyness," but this was actually a symptom of the increasing labor and taxation demands that accompanied the Belgians' post-war "progress" regime.[53]

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[49] Dr. Harold Adeney, Shyira, *Ruanda Notes* No. 83 (September 1943), 12; Dr. G.T. Hindley, Annual Report for Shyira," *Ruanda Notes* No. 140 (Review of 1957-58), 23.

[50] Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 158. The Ruanda Mission often referred to their non-stop building projects as their "Public Works Department," and complained that the Government's compulsory labor requirements made it hard for them to acquire adequate numbers of workers. See for example Reginald Webster, "In Everything give Thanks [sic]," 13 October 1947, *Ruanda Notes* No. 98 (November 1947), 2; *Ruanda Notes* No. 133 (Review of 1955-1956), 18-19.

[51] Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 166.

[52] Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 158, 205; Linden and Linden, *Church and Revolution*, 158.

[53] "If a man earns his living in some employment," wrote Shyira missionary Godfrey Hindley, "he has to work six days a week and has very little time for his own cultivations and the work demanded of him by the state, so he begins to work on Sunday and gets irregular about his attendances at Church. This is the picture throughout the district." Dr. G.T. Hindley, "Weathering the Storm," Shyira, n.d., *Ruanda Notes* No. 124 "His Way in the Storm: A Review of the Year 1953-54," 11.

In 1952, the administration announced a ten-year plan for political devolution, beginning with the creation, in 1953, of advisory councils for all levels of government. Each sub-chieftaincy was to have a consultative body consisting of five to nine members, initially selected by the government but later to be determined by democratic elections. The sub-chieftaincy councils would then select the advisory councils for the chiefdoms, and the chiefdoms would select representatives for the provincial councils. At the very top of this pyramid was the *Conseil Supérieur du Pays* (CSP), which consisted of representatives from each of the ten provincial councils as well as nineteen additional members drawn from the nobility and political elite.[54] While the reforms did make the sub-chieftaincy councils slightly more representative, the overall effect was to retrench the Tutsi establishment. The councils generally voted for Tutsi candidates from particular lineages, resulting in a CSP that was 90.6% Tutsi.[55] In this way, the introduction of advisory councils served to heighten political resentment across the country, particularly in places like Ruhengeri, where the Tutsi constituted an even smaller minority than they were elsewhere in Ruanda.

The government's next step in democratic reform was likewise disappointing. In 1956, Ruanda held its first democratic elections, in which all men had the opportunity to vote for the office of sub-chief and sub-chief councilor. In some places, the elections did, in fact, result in modestly impressive gains for Hutu candidates. In Ruhengeri, for example, Tutsi incumbents lost twenty percent of their positions to Hutu challengers.[56] But on the whole, the political privilege of the Tutsi elite remained intact. Worse, the lackluster outcome of the elections left a bitter taste

[54] Carney, *Rwanda before the Genocide*, 47.

[55] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 81.

[56] C. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 187.

in the mouths of Hutu politicians, at the same time that it put the Tutsi establishment on the defensive. The elections, rather than introducing fresh notes of representative governance, left both sides feeling betrayed.[57]

At Shyira, the stress of the times began to take its toll on African staff, whose labor underwrote the Mission's expansion. Missionary work had once allowed village evangelists to claim exemption from forced labor quotas, but now that most labor requisitions had been replaced with taxation, this was no longer the case. Bishop Brazier, writing in 1958, commented that the "evangelist [today] often works far from home, has little time to grow cash crops, and makes less money than a laborer."[58] Indeed, African teachers, nurses, evangelists, and orderlies at Shyira could expect to earn more doing comparable work for either the government or the Catholic Church.[59] Many struggled to simply feed themselves, particularly in times of food shortages,[60] while others fell into debt.[61]

These struggles were further exacerbated by the prevalence of land disputes in Ruhengeri between Tutsi and Hutu. Prior to colonial rule, the distribution of land in the northwest was controlled by wealthy Hutu lineages who were headed by patrons known as *abakonde*. At the turn of the century, incoming Tutsi chiefs, backed by German guns, wrested control of these lands, turning patrons into clients and creating a source of deep-seated anger that only grew

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[57] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 82-83.

[58] Bishop Brazier, Annual Report for 1957-1958, *Ruanda Notes* No. 140 (Review of 1957-1958), 4-5.

[59] COU Archives of the Bishop of Uganda (BP), CUA-1, *Administrative/Governing Bodies* Box 254/1458, Ruanda-Urundi and Bishop Barazier, 1955; Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Ruanda Mission held at Gahini, June 11-16, 1956. See also *Ruanda Notes* No. 106 (November 1949), 2-3.

[60] Dr. Godfrey Hindley, "New roads are opening up fast," 7 December 1947, *Ruanda Notes* No. 99 (February 1948), 8.

[61] *Ruanda Notes*, v. 6, No. 133 (Review of 1955-56), 19.

worse as time progressed and the population expanded. By the late 1950s, Ruhengeri had some of the highest population densities in the country, exceeding 200 people per square kilometer in some areas.[62] Protracted legal disputes over land, grounded in this history of disenfranchisement, became an everyday matter for Belgian officials, who often decided in favor of Tutsi litigants. In response, some of the province's more powerful *abakonde* began to organize themselves politically, often with support from the Catholic mission at Rwaza, only a few miles down the road from Shyira. Balthazar Bicamumpaka, the Hutu head of the Singa clan and a close friend of Rwaza, rose to prominence during this time and began to openly challenge the decisions of Belgian and Tutsi administrators. In 1956, when the Ruhengeri Resident attempted to replace an unpopular sub-chief with a new Tutsi candidate, 250 Singa men, likely operating under Bicamumpaka's orders, first destroyed the home of the local sub-chief and then raided the offices of the Ruhengeri Resident.[63] After 1957, the *abakonde* simply began to annex Tutsi pasture outright.[64]

While the Europeans with the Ruanda Mission rarely discussed these matters publicly, the intensity of the land issue in Ruhengeri would have affected the Christians at Shyira, especially those who lived away from the Mission hill. In 1957, for example, Hindley reported that one of their senior evangelists "had his house burned down twice in three months." He did not provide an explanation for the attack, saying only that "the trials which the evangelists on the hills contend with are very hard."[65] As a result of these privations, some left the Mission to find

[62] Linden, *Church and Revolution*, 228.

[63] Ibid. 236.

[64] Ibid. 260.

[65] *Ruanda Notes* No. 136 (Review Number 1956-1957), 12.

safer and better-paying jobs elsewhere, leaving European missionaries to lament the failure of African zeal.

The struggle for material and social survival, however, was about more than wages or spiritual commitment. European missionaries and ranking African clergy were bound up in local relations of patronage, whether they wanted to be or not. Much like their Catholic counterparts, they were expected to take care of their clients—i.e., the teachers, clergy, day laborers, evangelists and adherents upon whose labor and tithes the Mission depended.[66] The Mission's inability to pay competitive wages may have reflected hard financial realities, but this did not absolve them of their obligations. Nor could it silence the growing complaint among African workers that the Mission, for all of its rhetoric about equality, was committed to racialized pay scales. In late 1956, the Rev. Sabune found himself at the center of an explosive confrontation with European leadership over the rates of pay for African teachers. Sabune had been part of the Ruanda Mission's wages committee for over a decade, and had become increasingly critical of the disparities in pay for African and European staff. When the teachers were denied yet another pay raise in 1956, Sabune attempted to correct the matter himself, first by supplementing their wages with tithe money, and then with money out of his own pocket. In the end, the European headmistress was relocated to Uganda and six African teachers resigned in protest. Shyira's head missionary, Godfrey Hindley, framed the resignations in terms of spiritual warfare: "many in the Church have found the way of God too hard…[and have] allowed the devil to deceive them into thinking that the mission was not doing all that it should for them."[67] Sabune was nearly

[66] On the role of missionaries and clergy as patrons in the postwar period, see Linden and Linden, *Church and Revolution*, 223-224.

[67] *Ruanda Notes* No. 136 (Review Number 1956-1957), 12. See also CUA-1, Administrative/Governing Bodies, 254/1459, Ruanda-Urundi and Bishop Barazier, 1956; Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Ruanda Mission, held at Ibuye, November 10-17, 1956.

dismissed after the incident, and according to his family, was forced to publicly repent of his "sins." Indeed, Mission leadership was quick to dismiss the incident as evidence of spiritual weakness and African materialism. In the words of Bishop Brazier, the question of "pay" was becoming "a focal point of all thought and interest," and was a source of ongoing "discontent and distrust" between European and African staff. "As long as the Foreign Mission has to continue as an employer," he sighed, "there will be this tension between black and white."[68] Yet the issue was not about the wages themselves, but the Mission's refusal to address racial disparity.

Tensions between European and African staff were further complicated by the widespread perception that the Ruanda Mission, and Shyira in particular, favored the Tutsi. Their staff was overwhelmingly Tutsi. Their boarding school catered to elite Tutsi families. While the majority of their converts and hospital patients were Hutu, the Ruanda Mission reserved their most coveted positions and resources for Tutsi. Moreover, as the country's political climate grew increasingly tense in the late 1950s, the Mission remained silent on some of the most pressing questions of the day, and this silence was often interpreted as tacit support for the status quo. They refused to discuss Hutu grievances against the Tutsi political establishment. Their silence was all the more startling when compared to the Catholic Church, which became increasingly outspoken on what it referred to as "social justice" after World War II. While Catholic presses in Ruanda churned out page after page of vernacular text documenting Tutsi crimes, the Anglicans continued to insist that the *Mwami* was a unifying figure and that the Tutsi were best equipped to lead. They continued to cultivate their relationship with the royal court throughout the revolution, at one point even helping the *Mwami* smuggle the Queen Mother and the *kalinga*

[68] Bishop Jim Brazier, Annual Review for 1958-1959, *Ruanda Notes* No. 144 (Review Number 1958-1959), 4.

drums—the symbol of the monarchy—to Uganda.[69] It was therefore little surprise that many Hutu around Shyira began to believe that the Ruanda Mission had sided with the Tutsi.[70]

The Mission's treatment of the Hutu-Tutsi question became a major liability for Shyira station after 1956 as the pace of political change in Ruanda quickened and questions about Tutsi privilege took on new urgency. After the disappointment of the 1956 elections, the Hutu counter-elite, comprising Hutu seminarians and middle-class traders, began to realize that the Belgians' plan for reform was not preparing the country for true democracy, but for a continuation of minority dominance. Hutu fears about the possible machinations of Tutsi conservatives were further elevated by the release, in February 1957, of the CSP's *Mise au Point* (Statement of Views). In this document, prepared for the UN Visiting Mission, the Tutsi-dominated council urged the UN to oversee the rapid transfer of power from the Belgian authorities to the indigenous elite.[71] Their call for self-governance actively ignored the growing cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi, at the same time that it failed to address the yawning class divisions between the urban elite and the rural poor. Rather than speaking to the emerging Hutu-Tutsi question directly, the CSP adopted a universalizing rhetoric that sought to bury internal critique.[72]

A month later, in March 1957, nine Hutu intellectuals responded to the *Mise au Point* with a *Note on the social aspect of the indigenous racial problem in Rwanda*, which became known simply as the Bahutu Manifesto. In contrast to the CSP's universalism, the Manifesto decried Hutu exploitation at the hands of Tutsi, both historically and in the present. The

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[69] CCCW JEC Papers 4/7: Joe Church to Stanley-Smith, Brazier, and Barham, 13 April 1960.

[70] CUA-5, Series *Related Organizations*, Box 148, Folder 2, "CMS-Ruanda Mission, 1960-63"; "Part of a letter from Drs. Harold and Isobel Adeney," CMS Shyira, Ruhengeri, October 1961.

[71] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 150.

[72] Carney, *Rwanda before the Genocide*, 79.

country's problem was not purely Belgian rule, they argued, but the "political monopoly of one race, the Tutsi race," which had become "a social and political monopoly."[73] It is important to note here that the Manifesto was not calling for Tutsi expulsion, but for democratic governance and social justice. The danger of the statement, however, lie in its cooptation of the Hamitic thesis, or the idea that Tutsi constituted a separate, alien race from the Hutu and Twa. And so, while the Manifesto promoted numerous progressive ideals, it also contained the seeds of an irredentism that would soon take on new and terrifying dimensions as the crisis in Ruanda grew.

The *Mise au Point* and the *Bahutu Manifesto* outlined the two poles of late colonial politics in Ruanda. On the one hand was the conservative Tutsi line, which supported the rapid transfer of power to the monarchy and leading chiefs, who were (they claimed) in the best position to govern a united, independent Ruanda. These aims came to be embodied in the political ideology of the Union National Rwandaise (UNAR). On the other hand, the republican camp advocated for the end of the monarchy and the creation of a republic. Proponents of this aim called for a longer decolonization process that would allow time for Hutu subjects to acquire the training and experience they needed to play their full, representative part in democratic governance. This was the objective of the *Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu*, or Parmehutu. The UNAR framed Ruanda's troubles in terms of white colonial rule; Parmehutu emphasized the importance of Hutu-Tutsi conflict. In between these two poles, of course, was room for considerable nuance, and rival political parties formed in 1957 and 1958 to give voice to more moderate positions. The Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse, or APROMOSA, was one such organization, at least initially. Led by ex-seminarian Joseph Gitera, APROMOSA sought to unite the peasantry across ethnic lines to support republican

[73] Bahutu Manifesto, quoted in Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 149.

governance.[74] In other words, the dangerous language of racial supremacy, latent in UNAR and Parmehutu ideologies, did not represent the many moderate voices calling for reform at the end of the 1950s. Similarly, one could be a Tutsi and support the abolition of the monarchy; likewise, one could be Hutu and support the *Mwami.* As time went on, however, the UNAR and Parmehutu drowned out these more moderate positions, becoming more radical and more violent in their political outlook and strategy.

War

According to nearly every historical account, the Social Revolution "began" on November 1, 1959. The potential for violent conflict between monarchists and republicans, however, had been years in the making. In May 1958, a group of Tutsi elders representing the royal court publicly ridiculed the notion, proffered by moderates of all stripes, that the Hutu and Tutsi were one people. "Since our kings conquered the country and the Hutu and killed their petty kings," they asked rhetorically, "how can they claim to be our brothers?"[75] The Belgian administration, after decades of supporting Tutsi rule, began to make public statements suggesting that their sympathies were changing, setting the more militant monarchists on edge. Tutsi suspicions of the Belgians continued to grow until, in July 1959, *Mwami* Rudahigwa died under mysterious circumstances, leading many of his supporters to believe that the colonial administration had assassinated him. Conservatives responded by rushing through the appointment of Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa Kigeri V as the new *Mwami*, publicly declaring him king before the Belgians had

[74] That said, while APROMOSA supported a more moderate position that Parmehutu, it would be misleading to describe the outspoken, impassioned Gitera as a moderate leader. Gitera's numerous public tirades against the monarchy alienated most of the Tutsi establishment. See Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 151; Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, 192-193.

[75] Bagaragu b'ibwami bakuru, quoted in Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi,* 154.

given their consent. This made the Belgians look weak, and gave Hutu nationalists the impression that the monarchists were calling the shots.[76]

September and October were subsequently tense months filled with public meetings and demonstrations carried out by APROMOSA, UNAR, and Parmehutu. Political moderates like Chief Bwanakweri, the founder of the small Rassamblement Démocratique Rwandais (RADER) party, were sidelined as the rhetoric of the three major parties became increasingly divisive and polarizing.[77] Belgian authorities, trying desperately to stay ahead of the game, bungled their response by trying to silence popular leaders of the UNAR, a move that permanently destroyed their relationship with conservative Tutsi.

By late October, the situation in Ruanda had reached a breaking point. The final straw came on November 1, when a group of UNAR youth attacked a popular Hutu sub-chief in Gitarama province named Dominique Mbonyumutwa.[78] The chief survived the assault, but rumor quickly spread that he had died of his injuries, leading to clashes between Parmehutu and UNAR supporters the next day. From Gitarama, the violence spread north and west to Kisenyi, Ruhengeri, and Byumba—all provinces with a strong Parmehutu presence and an exceptionally small corps of Tutsi officials. By November 8, the fighting had reached Mulera, on the Ugandan border, and by the ninth it had engulfed Nyanza, the seat of the Tutsi monarchy. By the end of the month, all provinces but three (Butare, Cyangugu, and Kibungo) were reporting significant outbreaks.[79] The Belgians initially dismissed the popular uprisings as "riots" promulgated by

[76] Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, 155-57.

[77] Carney, *Rwanda before the Genocide*, 109.

[78] As we have seen, however, the building crisis had already generated violence and displacement. See the story of Bamurangirwa's brothers, Introduction.

[79] C. Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 194-195.

"incendiaries," but the situation was far graver than the colonial administration was ready to admit. The power of the revolution rested on popular resentment that was both deep-seated and widespread.[80]

Europeans at Shyira claimed that their station came under attack when they started sheltering refugees, but as we have seen, local people had reasons to distrust the mission. The catalyst appears to have been the disappearance of Yona Sekimonyo, a popular headmaster at Shyira and one of the Mission's few Hutu staff members. Sekimonyo went missing on November 6 when the fighting began, and rumors spread that "the Batutsi" at Shyira had murdered him (he would later send word to the Mission that he had gone into hiding following a credible threat to his life). On November 7, armed bands began to move up the station hill from the valley below, setting fire to the homes of African staff. As the mission's courtyard, hospital, and classroom block began to fill with frightened people, Josephine Stancliffe and Doreen Peck—the only two European missionaries then at Shyira—decided one of them should take the station's car and go for help at the next mission station at Gahini, a full day's journey to the east. Stancliffe drew the short-straw, and that afternoon she and two Hutu evangelists escaped down the hill in the Mission's Volkswagen.

Meanwhile, Peck remained at Shyira, accompanied by Edreda, the Hutu wife of the senior evangelist. That night, the local Tutsi sub-chief and his wife appeared at Peck's door, seeking shelter, and she allowed them to hide in her bedroom. The next morning, on November 8, a "very large band" of "armed raiders" entered the Mission compound and demanded that

[80] C. Newbury, *The Cohesion of Oppression*, 180. This is an important argument to underline. Since the 1994 genocide, the RPF government has sometimes tried to frame the revolution as the work of a few individual leaders, rather than the product of a mass movement. See Johann Pottier, *Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 123-126.

Peck and Edreda produce Sekimonyo "alive within two hours, [or] they would attack the Mission, get the refugees, and sack the houses and their goods." Peck did not know what had happened to Sekimonyo, but fortunately the band did not return when they said that they would; a sudden, torrential downpour seems to have disrupted their plans. In the interim, Sekimonyo sent a handwritten note to Peck, which she then used to demonstrate proof-of-life when the band came back in the late evening. With this assurance, the band dispersed, and did not return.[81]

The next three days were filled with frantic activity as mission staff struggled to find solutions for the people who were now encamped at the station. Stancliffe returned from Gahini on the 8th, together with Rev. Sabune (who had been visiting in Gahini) and another European missionary named Ted Sisley. On the 9th, missionaries Harold Adeney and Bryan Isaac, then in Burundi, received a telegram from Stancliffe informing them of the situation. They set out for Shyira, bringing with them a Hutu ordinand-in-training named Andereya Pfukuri, who hailed from Ruhengeri. Crossing into Ruanda from the south, they made their way to Butare, where they found Belgian convoys barricading the roads heading north. The country was now under martial law, and all travel between provinces needed to be cleared with the administration. Adeney managed to get a permit, and he, Isaac, and Pfukuri continued their journey north, now with an armed military escort. Arriving in Shyira late on the 10th, they found that the local Belgian administrator had sent a platoon of Congolese soldiers to guard the hill, but the fighting in Ruhengeri was so bad that they could not be spared for more than a night. The Shyira leadership, fearing what might happen once the soldiers left, decided that they would try and evacuate as many people as they could to Uganda. Adeney went to see the administrator in

[81] "Trouble at Shyira," *Ruanda Notes* v. 7, no. 147 (March-May 1960), 4-5.

Ruhengeri town the following day, who agreed to loan seven lorries with armed guards to the station, and also sent word to the Ugandan government of the plan.

The missionaries informed the refugees of the evacuation plan that very day. Leaving would not be easy: Thousands of people had sought asylum at the station, but the armed caravan only had room for several hundred. This meant that, even in the midst of a profoundly dangerous situation, careful thought had to be given to evacuation plans. According to the missionary accounts, "The night was a busy one as people decided who was to go and who was to stay," which suggests that, among other things, people's social relationships influenced collective decisions about departure. Shyira staff gave preference to individuals who were unpopular with the local community, and whose continued presence at the Mission was fast becoming a liability. The Tutsi sub-chief and his wife, for example, were granted passage to Uganda. A number of Shyira teachers and clergy who were particularly outspoken in their support of the UNAR were also included in the caravan for this reason.[82] And still others, like Kahima, who had either been caught in the wrong place at the wrong time or had been victims of personal vendettas, were allowed onto the lorries. More than half of those who were evacuated that night were children.[83]

To Kigezi

The caravan set off before dawn, arriving at the Uganda border in the late morning to find the Protectorate government on high alert. The outbreak of violence in Ruhengeri had caught them off-guard, and they were now scrambling to keep pace with the events as they unfolded. The Kigezi District Council, while receiving news updates from Entebbe about the happenings in

[82] Harold and Isobel Adeney, "The Situation in North-West Ruanda—Shyira, May 1960," *Ruanda Notes* v. 7, No. 149 (September-November 1960), 4.

[83] "Refugees Enter Uganda," *London Times*, 13 November 1959, 12.

Kigali, knew far less about what was happening just over the border. Most areas remained quiet. A senior chief reporting on his visit to the Katuna Customs Post, near Kabale township, claimed that "there is no disturbance of any kind on our boundary…[but the border guards] hear also such romous [rumors] like ourselves, that the fight is happening in Rugengere [sic]."[84] The news coming out of Bufumbira in western Kigezi, however, was disconcerting. There, *Saza* Chief Rukeribuga reported that some of his own people—"Bahutu and Batutsi from Bufumbira"—were crossing into Ruanda "to help their fellow kinsmen" on both sides of the fight.[85] At least six people from Uganda were thought to have died in these skirmishes, and authorities believed that Parmehutu agents were involved.[86] On November 10, Chief Rukeribuga issued an urgent request for police reinforcements to guard the main border station that stood between Kisoro and Ruhengeri. The District Commissioner responded by sending an entire platoon.

The Shyira caravan were thus greeted by forty-five police officers when they finally reached the border after a long and harrowing night. The police captain ordered the passengers to disembark while he radioed the Kigezi District Commissioner's office in Kabale, who then had to radio the Governor's office in Entebbe to request clearance. The hold-up was worrying, because the European staff at Shyira had worked closely with the Belgian administration to organize the evacuation and had received special permission from the DC Kigezi only the day

[84] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; Saza Chief Ndorwa to the Secretary General, Kigezi District Council, Kabale, Re: Riot in Ruanda-Urundi, 12 November 1959.

[85] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; *Saza* Chief, Bufumbira to Secretary General, Kigezi, 10 November 1959.

[86] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; DC Kigezi to Provincer Western Province, 8 November 1959.

before.[87] But this was a strange moment, and the local government's response was rather disjointed and ad hoc. And so the evacuees settled down on the side of the road to wait.

After several hours, the police captain received word from the DC: the Shyira evacuees could proceed to Kisoro town where they would be able to camp for the night at Seseme, the Anglican boarding school that Sabune had attended back in the 1920s. The next day—and for the rest of that month—the Ruanda Mission worked together with Kigezi officials, the Uganda Red Cross, and local churches to provide blankets, food, and clothing. Women connected to the local chapter of the Mother's Union, an Anglican organization, cooked comforting meals of sweet potatoes and peas for the evacuees, who were otherwise dependent on the government's stores of stale maize flour.[88] Clergy and staff attached to the Ruanda Mission's hospital and schools in Kigezi came by to visit and commiserate with their friends and colleagues. In the evenings, Rev. Sabune and Doreen Peck led prayers before bed, and the headmaster at Seseme played music on the school's gramophone. Despite the exceptional circumstances that had brought them to Kisoro, the evacuees found comfort in familiar faces, food, hymns, and prayers. Kahima's son, who was about ten at the time, actually remembers this week as a time of great fun, of riding in lorries and sleeping outside and seeing new country.[89]

Yet for the adults, the uncertainty was painful. No one knew what came next. Some thought the *Mwami* would be able to quell the attacks, but others had heard that the Belgians were now fighting on the side of Parmehutu. Others said the opposite. Chief Rukeribuga, who had been a friend of the late *Mwami* Rudahigwa, told people that the Hutu were afraid that the

[87] "Protection for the Refugees," *Ruanda Notes* No. 147 (March-May 1960), 6.

[88] Interview with G.K., Kabale, July 11, 2013.

[89] Interview with E., Kabale, 7 April 2013.

Belgians were about to turn the country over to the Tutsi for good.[90] And against these larger political questions, evacuees also worried about the more mundane problems of survival. If they stayed, how long could they rely on the Mission and the Protectorate for food and shelter? If they returned, how would they feed themselves if the bands of raiders had slashed their crops and killed their livestock? In a region of endemic food shortages, this was no small consideration.[91]

For the Rev. Sabune and Ayirini, the return to Kigezi was sobering, but not as disheartening as it was for Kahima and Joyce. The Sabunes no longer had property in Uganda, but they found ready support from Sabune's brother, who was now a parish chief who could afford to take care of them during this period of transition. Yet the Sabunes, it turned out, were not long for Uganda. At the end of November, a contingent of Hutu evangelists and teachers from Shyira came to Busanza to ask the Reverend to return to his old job. It appears that they journeyed to Uganda to ask several of the departed Tutsi clergy to come back, though others were explicitly discouraged from doing so "as they were unacceptable to the local people."[92]

Return to Shyira

The Rev. Sabune and his family came home to Shyira in early December to find that a kind of normalcy had returned to the station's everyday rhythms. Joining him was Asanasiyo Karasanyi, the station's head male nurse and a thirty-four year veteran of the Ruanda Mission. He and

[90] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; *Saza* Chief, Bufumbira to Secretary General, Kigezi, 10th November 1959. For a brief biography of Chief Rukeribuga, see Philemon Mateke, "Bufumbira in the Colonial Period," in *A History of Kigezi in Southwestern Uganda*, ed. Donald Denoon (Kampala: Uganda Press Trust, 1977), 265-66.

[91] The November uprisings happened during the short rains, when people were busily tending their fields in anticipation for a harvest in February. See Gregory Scott, *Potatoes in Central Africa: A Study of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire* (Lima, Peru: International Potato Center, 1988), 67.

[92] Harold Adeney, "The Situation in North-West Ruanda," *Ruanda Notes*, v. 7, no. 149 (September-November 1960), 4.

Sabune, along with two senior teachers at the mission school, were Tutsi. Yona Sekimonyo, the Hutu headmaster, also came out of hiding, and he and his wife were busily rebuilding their house that had been destroyed in the uprising. Stancliffe resumed her post as head nurse, and in March 1960, Harold Adeney was transferred from Ibuye to Shyira to take over the role as station physician. The hospital reopened its doors; students returned to their studies. New Hutu administrators took over the posts of vacated chiefs, but Adeney reported that many of them were "really saved people" who "used their influence to promote tolerance and... stave off violence."[93]

Sabune, in fact, counted one of the new government officials as family. His eldest daughter, Perusi, who by that point was grown and working as a nurse at Shyira, married Félix Kagaba, a Hutu and a ranking member of the Forestry Department. Ties of family and faith cut across painful histories and structural violence, offering the comforts of familiarity in the midst of uncertainty and disruption. The everyday routines of going to class, making hospital rounds, delivering babies, observing Communion, visiting neighbors, tending fields, collecting firewood, and preparing evening meals reconstituted the station as a recognizable place for those who remained, even if questions still hung in the air.

Ironically, the uprising actually reversed Sabune's material prospects at Shyira. Only a few weeks earlier, on October 14, the Bishop of Ruanda-Urundi, Jim Brazier, had written to the Bishop of Uganda, Leslie Brown, to say that Shyira had five pastors when it could only afford three.[94] Sabune had been a thorn in Brazier's side ever since the 1956 incident over teacher

[93] Mr. and Mrs. Guillebaud, "Business as Usual—as far as possible," *Ruanda Notes*, v. 7, 150 (December 1960-February 1961), 8.

[94] CUA-1 BP *Administrative/Governing Bodies*, Box 254, Folder 1462, "Ruanda-Urundi & Bishop Barazier, 1959 [sic]"; Bishop Brazier to Bishop Leslie Brown, 14 October 1959.

salary,[95] and if anyone was to be fired or demoted, Sabune was a likely candidate. The November uprisings, however, disrupted these tensions and redirected Sabune's career path. After several of his colleagues fled to Uganda, reducing the Shyira mission's staff, Sabune became the station's head African pastor.

Yet, despite the reversal of certain fortunes, the events of November had left local society upturned. Shyira was still familiar enough, but it was not the same. Many Tutsi families were gone, and those who remained felt insecure. Over time, most would leave Shyira once again, slipping away unannounced in the middle of the night. Local residents and Hutu mission staff continued to express their support of Sabune and his Tutsi colleagues, all the while making it clear that certain people would not be welcomed back. Hospital admissions went down, and rumors circulated that people were refusing to seek medical care on account of Tutsi staff.[96] Across the wider Ruanda Mission network, fissures between Tutsi and Hutu continued to grow over the coming year. In October 1960, Godfrey Hindley reported that the "divisions...created by the political parties have begun to infiltrate into the life of the Church and, as never before, we find ourselves considering whether a certain worker can be appointed to a particular job according to his race."[97]

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[95] Sabune was part of the sub-committee established by the Ruanda-Urundi Diocesan Council to investigate the pay scale. Apparently Sabune's dispute with Brazier and other Ruanda Mission leaders was so severe and drawn-out that he was, in late 1959, preparing to leave the Mission altogether, at least according to his half-brother and surviving children. His contention that African pastors deserved equal pay as European missionaries was a key motivator in his decision to send his older sons to Uganda for school, since this was what his white colleagues did for their children Petero Sabune, Interview, 10/28/15. See also Minutes of the Diocesan Council for Ruanda-Urundi, 27 May 1957, p. 3.

[96] Harold Adeney, "The Situation in North-West Ruanda," *Ruanda Notes*, v. 7, no. 149 (September-November 1960), 4.

[97] Dr. Hindley, "An Exceptional Year," *Ruanda Notes* v. 7, n. 150 (December 1960-February 1961), 2 [sent from Ibuye, 5 October 1960].

Countrywide, Rwanda underwent a series of dramatic administrative changes. "Each election, each discussion of Ruanda affairs at the United Nations Council, each suspected interference from neighboring states, produces its fresh outburst of violence." Material deprivation sharpened the edge of political antagonisms. The Ruanda franc plummeted to nearly half its pre-Revolution value in the lead up to national independence.[98] Then came news of the coup and the abolition of the monarchy, with reports that Kigeri had fled to Congo.

Even Sabune's Hutu colleagues began to complain openly that he allowed too many Tutsi relatives to visit the station. Around the same time, Sabune's younger children began to come home with stories of schoolyard bullies and ethnic taunts. Then his older son, James, who was a secondary student at Mbarara High School in Uganda, was assaulted by a Rwandan border guard when he tried to come home for the Christmas holiday. He reported to his father that the soldier had struck him across the face, demanding, "You Mututsi, what are you going to do in Rwanda?"[99]

Yet in the face of these unnerving incidents, Sabune still found reasons to hope. The Mission organized youth outings on either side of the border, with girls from the Ruanda side traveling to Kabale to join their peers for a camp-out, while a similar event for Rwandan and Ugandan boys was held at Gahini.[100] Hospital admissions for 1961 showed significant improvement over the figures for 1960, and Shyira's primary and secondary schools boasted a

[98] Bishop James Brazier, "Ruanda-Urundi: Still a sick patient," *Ruanda Notes* No. 156 (Review of year 1961-62), 5.

[99] Petero Sabune, Interview, 28 October 2015. Harold Adeney appears to be describing Sabune in his letter concerning African pastors at Shyira: "While it is gloriously the strong Christian Tutsi to be victorious over the insults and insinuations which are flung at him personally, it is very hard for his wife to accept the constant petty persecution and ill treatment their children have to put up with on account of their race." Adeney, "A Challenge to Prayer—Shyira, 26 December 1961," v. 7, No. 155 (Mar-May 1962), 4-5.

[100] Bishop James Brazier, "Ruanda-Urundi: Still a sick patient," *Ruanda Notes* No. 156 (Review of year 1961-62), 8.

population of 9,000 students.[101] Sabune reported that Protestants at Shyira continued to pool their resources to build schools, churches, and houses for teachers and pastors, often with high-quality iron-sheeting, rather than thatch. That same year, Protestant Church membership grew by 2,850 souls.[102]

Despite these promising signs, however, Sabune and Ayirini's overall sense of security at Shyira continued to deteriorate. By mid-1961, a rift developed between Sekimonyo, the Hutu headmaster, and the rest of the mission staff. Adeney explained that that the headmaster had proposed a "course of action" that, "while greatly popular with local political leaders," would have compromised the station's ability to "keep[...] the Lord's Day holy." As a result of this division, Sekimonyo stopped attending weekly staff meetings, and the rift in the Shyira leadership began to affect the relationship between school curriculum and church teaching.[103]

That same year, a few days before Christmas, unknown assailants murdered Shyira's MP, a devout Protestant who served as Director for a number of Mission schools, while he was on his way home one evening. Roadblocks, military checkpoints, and new pass requirements made travel between jurisdictions difficult; night travel was banned.[104] Sabune and his Tutsi colleagues became the targets of rumors and political intimidation, to the point that they began to fear for

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[101] Harold Adeney, "Shyira: A time of rehabilitation," *Ruanda Notes* No. 156 (Review of year 1961-62), 23.

[102] Letter from Andereya Sabune [trans. Harold Adeney], *Ruanda Notes* No. 156 (Review of year 1961-62), 24.

[103] Harold Adeney, "Shyira: A time of rehabilitation," *Ruanda Notes* No. 156 (Review of year 1961-62), 23. Sekimonyo may have part of a local council and had tried to garner Mission support for a council ruling. I do not have proof of this, but shortly after Sabune's departure, Bishop Brazier wrote to the Archbishop Leslie Brown that two Mission clergy had recently sat on local government councils in Shyira and that it had caused serious friction. "In future we shall rule out all councils for clergy because it's inevitable that they get involved in party factions. We have actually passed a minute to say that any church worker—including schools and hospitals—who wishes to take an active part in a political party should resign and do it as a church member but not as a church worker—who must be free of political strife." See CUA-5 ABP, Box 24, Folder 1, Archbishops' General File, 1962; , Rt. Rev. Brazier to Archbishop Brown, 20 June 1962.

[104] Bishop James Brazier, "Ruanda-Urundi: Still a sick patient," *Ruanda Notes* No. 156 (Review of year 1961-62), 5.

their lives. Meanwhile, European missionaries reported that many Hutu Christians felt increasing pressure to keep their distance from the mission and its Tutsi staff.[105]

The final straw, however, came in April 1962, after Tutsi refugees based in Uganda launched a series of raids into northern Rwanda (see Chapter Five). Although small in scale, the attacks came at a moment of heightened political uncertainty, when both Uganda and Rwanda were on the cusp of national independence. Popular sentiment towards the refugee diaspora, which had until then fluctuated between cautious ambivalence and a genuine desire for conciliation, hardened into outright animosity. Neighbors who had once been friendly to the Sabunes began to say things like, "These *inyenzi*, these refugee raiders, these are Sabune's sons!" It was then that the reverend and his wife knew: The home they had built over the course of twenty years was no longer theirs, because it no longer existed. Ties to family, to place, to faith, to language—these bonds were no longer sufficient in the face of malignant identity politics. Even the factors that had once set Sabune and Ayirini apart from Rwandan troubles—their identification as Ugandan and Congolese, respectively—could no longer protect them or their children from irredentist attacks. Sabune's Ugandan background, once a positive identifier, was now a liability, because his neighbors associated it with a dangerous refugee presence just across the border. It was time to go.

The Alinearity of Place

The displacement of the Sabune family was a drawn-out process, one that could be disrupted by moments of hope and encouragement. Their beginnings in Shyira, ironically, coincided with a period of widespread dislocation and upheaval. Rev. Sabune's initial job security, in fact, was

[105] Harold Adeney, "Shyira: A time of rehabilitation," *Ruanda Notes* No. 156 (Review of year 1961-62), 23.

tied to the station's desperate need for personnel to manage famine relief. His position at Shyira was again secured in 1959, when the outbreak of war forced some of his colleagues to flee, obviating the Mission's need to reduce its African staff. In the early days of the revolution, his friendships with Hutu clergy and staff made it possible for the family to remain at Shyira, despite the fact that he was Tutsi and from Uganda. His identification became a liability, however, as the geography of the conflict shifted. By 1962, the threat posed by Tutsi refugees in Uganda came to color Sabune's local reputation and friendships. His decision to flee cannot therefore be framed in simple fight-flight paradigms, but must be understood as the culmination of multiple considerations, personal and political. This multiplicity of considerations helps explain the alinear quality of home's attenuation over time.

Part III: Borders

So far, this chapter has followed the experiences of those who managed to remain in Rwanda throughout the course of the war, showing how they negotiated the spatial and existential uncertainty that accompanied what Celestina calls "displacement before displacement." But what happened to those evacuees who remained in Uganda? Part III returns to Kahima and Joyce and their escape with the Ruanda Mission's evacuation caravan in November 1959. Kahima was initially able to animate faith and kinship networks to secure asylum in Kigezi, moving between his wife's extended family and the Anglican church to access material and emotional support. Over the course of four years, he and Joyce built a new home for themselves on land loaned to them by the church. State laws governing migration and asylum changed rapidly during this time, but Kahima was able to comply with each new dictate, first registering as a "Tutsi alien" in 1960 and then as an "alien refugee" in 1962. When the Protectorate opened its first refugee camp in 1961, officials declared that displaced people like Kahima who were "living with friends and

relatives"—a ubiquitous phrase in policy discussions at this time—would be allowed to continue living as private residents. Kahima was not, in fact, living with his blood relatives, but church leaders stood in as "family" whenever government officials came around to inspect Kahima's documents. The Anglican church, in other words, mediated Kahima's relationship to the state.

Kahima's luck changed in 1964, however, when growing security concerns led the newly-independent government to reverse its policy on encampment. Certain groups of refugees had led a series of escalating attacks on Rwanda from secret bases in Uganda, culminating in a catastrophic battle between guerilla fighters and the Rwandan military in December 1963. The Rwandan military quickly defeated the invading militias and then launched a counter-assault on Tutsi citizens, killing over 8,000 people—the majority of whom were unarmed civilians. In response to the attack, Ugandan leaders decided that all refugees, regardless of circumstance, must be separated from the general public and relocated to a government settlement away from the border. Many refugees managed to evade the new order by taking advantage of the state's weak bureaucratic infrastructure, but Kahima was not so fortunate. A district official, having records of Kahima's refugee status, ordered Kahima, Joyce, and their children to board a bus bound for Oruchinga Valley Refugee Settlement. Church authorities attempted to intervene, but this time, they were not successful.

Kahima and Joyce's story is important because it demonstrates, in real time, how one family's relationship to the border evolved during decolonization. As with the Sabunes in Shyira, the Kahima family's experience of Kigezi was a mix of both possibility and precarity. Even as Ugandan laws curtailed the family's political options, government policy concerning the "rights" of refugees living with family and friends drew them closer to Anglican leaders who advocated on their behalf. Thus the family developed even stronger ties with Ugandan Christians who

helped them belong to a local community in Kigezi at the same time that their compliance with Ugandan law gradually undermined their right to legal residency. The Rwandan Revolution, in short, initiated social and political processes that reconfigured how people could relate to and move across the border.

In what follows, I call attention to the temporality of the social, political, and legal relationships that constituted the Uganda borderland as a place. Protectorate authorities, lacking the legal tools and precedent they needed to define and address Rwandan displacement, hastily crafted new laws to help them separate refugees from the rest of the general populace. The law did not have the power to completely reorganize social space—it could not fully disentangle people like Kahima from deeper histories of connection and mobility—but it could, at certain junctures, undermine one's ability to belong. This final part therefore moves between the experiences of the Kahimas and the politics of immigration control in late colonial Uganda.

From "Evacuees" to "Batutsi Aliens"

In late 1959, the Uganda government was uncertain about how to proceed. The DC Kigezi had, with the Governor's permission, allowed the evacuees to enter, but whether they would allow them to remain was an open question. Legally, the government had few means to refuse them. The Shyira evacuees were, technically speaking, no different from the tens of thousands of Rwandan migrant laborers who entered the country every year (and who continued to do so throughout the war). African labor migrants arriving in Uganda were not required to furnish identification information or register their names at border posts, nor did they need permits to stay in the country.[106] The British administration had, at various times, attempted to coordinate

[106] KigDA Immigration Box 8, File MIG 1vi, "Passports (Including Immigration Instructions)"; DC Kigezi to M. L'Administrateur de Territoire, Rutchuru, Ruhengeri, and Biumba, 23rd April 1958. KigDA Immigration Box 1, File

pass systems with the Belgian authorities in Congo and Ruanda-Urundi,[107] but had always failed to enforce them (see Chapter Two). Africans normally resident in Belgian territories were in theory supposed to carry an identity booklet and emigration papers when they traveled, and immigration officers at Ugandan customs posts were allowed to request to see them. However, immigration officers could not legally refuse entry to persons who were not in possession of such documents. The best they could do, according to a 1958 circular from the Chief Secretary's Office, was to lecture the undocumented migrant and inform him "that he will find things much easier both in Uganda and on his return to Congo [or Ruanda-Urundi] if he equips himself with the Belgian documents which he should have."[108]

The outbreak of war gave a new sense of urgency to the matter. Protectorate authorities became fearful that Kigezi might become embroiled in Ruanda's troubles, and they were not eager to have homeless evacuees ambling about trading centers and sheltering on front porches and church pews. The folks from Shyira, furthermore, were not the only people who had fled to Uganda, and the growing number of displaced people seeking asylum in Kisoro and Kabale and the parishes along the border was beginning to draw attention, both at home and abroad. Displaced Rwandans were a spectacle, visible signs that something was amiss. Older Kabale residents today recall those days with an emphasis on sight and seeing. "Now those ones [were]

LAB 1/3i, "Emigrant and Immigrant Kabale Labour Camp"; Provincial Commissioner, Western Province, to Labour Commissioner, 25 May 1949.

[107] Ibid.

[108] KigDA Immigration Box 8, File MIG 1vi, "Passports (Including Immigration Instructions)"; Paragraph 12 of Chief Secretary's Circular on Emigration and Immigration, quoted in DC Kigezi to OC Police, Kigezi; Customs Officer, Kisoro; Manager, White Horse Inn; Manager, Kigezi Recruiting Agency, Kabale President, Indian Association, Kabale, Re: Emigration of Africans from the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, 25 July 1958.

easy to differentiate and identify [as] refugees," one person told me.[109] "*That's* when I saw what a proper refugee looks like," said another.[110] Government archives reflect a similar preoccupation with visibility. Chiefs wrote of going to the border to look for signs of trouble: they scanned horizons for tell-tale smoke, and they saw houses on fire at night. Refugees were, in short, not a problem that the British felt they could ignore.

People outside Kigezi District were beginning to show interest, too, much to the central government's dismay. By early December, the story of the Shyira evacuees was being reported across Protestant missionary networks as well as in the *Uganda Argus*, the *New York Times* and the *London Times*. East African politicians called on the UN to take over Ruanda-Urundi from the Belgians,[111] while African leaders in Uganda accused the Protectorate of being more concerned about their relationship with the Belgians than they were victimized Africans. "It is plain that Belgium has abdicated her solemn trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi," wrote Julius Nyerere on behalf of the Pan-African Freedom Movement. "[T]he responsibility for protecting

[109] Interview with G.K., Kabale, 11 July 2013.

110. Interview with Godfrey Sabiti, Kinoni, Uganda, 20 February 2013. The following year, in 1960, Belgian refugees fleeing the Congo would also pass through Kigezi High School. These, however, Godfrey remembers differently: "And the following year, 1960, we saw the Belgians running away after independence of the Congo. A very pathetic situation. At that time, we could not believe that a white person could be a refugee also. But it was real! I mean, people came with their families and were ripping off their cars, beautiful cars, on the open market. Beautiful cars for practically nothing. Some were even selling clothes they were wearing to buy food. Those were taken quickly: their government came and took them. But the Rwandese had to be settled somewhere, and that took a bit of time." Upon graduation from high school, Sabiti attended Makerere University in Kampala, where he continued to volunteer time to refugee work. He became a full-time employee of the UNHCR upon graduation from college.

[111] Special to The New York Times. "Emergency is set in Ruanda strife," *New York Times (1923-Current File),* 13 November 1959. http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/114822555?accountid=14667; "Huge Watusi Tribesmen Fleeing Smaller Foes in Ruanda-Urundi," *New York Times (1923-Current File),* 14 November 1959. http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/114831414?accountid=14667;

the helpless population of that territory now rests fairly and squarely on the United Nations."[112] Grace Ibingira, one of Uganda's first African parliamentarians, agreed, asking British officials in a pointed editorial, "Where has [your] humanity fled?"[113]

Members of the Banyarwanda diaspora in Uganda also felt compelled to throw in their lot with the refugees. The president of the Banyarwanda diaspora association, the Abanyarwanda Abadahemuka, wrote to the Uganda Chief Secretary in late November to express concern about the "great number of Banyarwanda refugees in Kabale" who were now "destitutes [in] need of every kind of help," and to request permission to launch a public fundraising campaign.[114] The Protectorate, however, was less than thrilled by Abadahemuka's charity. The organization had close ties to the *Mwami* as well as the Ganda Kabaka, and many of its ranking members were also leading figures in the Church of Uganda and the Protectorate government. The Rev. Ezekiel Balaba, Frank Kalimuzo, and Festo Semagejye Higiro were only the best known. Their pro-monarchy stance had been the source of a significant split within the Uganda-based diaspora, and the Protectorate's intelligence community was now monitoring their meetings and communication, fearful that they might try to arm monarchist groups in Ruanda.[115] Chief Secretary Hartwell's response to their letter was accordingly cautious, even defensive. He claimed that he was "not aware" of any cases of "extreme hardship or suffering," but that "the Uganda Government has provided funds for the refugees." His administration could not support

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[112] "U.N. Urged to Take Over Ruanda," *Times* [London, England] 5 December 1959: 5. *The Times Digital Archive*. Web. 27 July 2017.

[113] Grace Ibingira, "Pleas Against Repatriation of Batutsi," *Uganda Argus*, 31 December 1959, 2.

[114] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; F.S.G. Higiro to Chief Secretary Hartwell, "Appeal for Banyarwanda refugees," 30 November 1959.

[115] TNA FCO 141-18430, Uganda: Developments in Ruanda-Urundi, 1960-1961; Uganda Special Branch, "Banyaruanda politics and Uganda," 22 September 1960.

Abadahemuka's appeal, moreover, because the Uganda Government was working closely with the Belgians to repatriate the refugees "as soon as possible."[116] In the eyes of senior officials like Hartwell, the refugees were a liability and source of political fodder for opportunistic organizations like Abadahemuka, and could not be swept under the rug quickly enough.

The Belgian authorities were even more eager than their British counterparts to minimize negative press. Displacement was a source of considerable political embarrassment for the Belgians, who had spent decades trying to redeem themselves on the world stage, papering over histories of red rubber and famine with a positive record of schools and public health. They consequently wanted to label the November uprisings as a "domestic" issue that they alone would manage. When the violence spread to northwestern Ruanda in early November, they began hasty construction on a refugee camp in the southeast, in a swampy hollow of wasteland called Nyamata. Of the more than 5,000 people who left Ruhengeri between late 1959 and early 1960, most went to Nyamata, transported in lorries provided by the government. Some were forcibly removed.[117]

Refugees who crossed into British territory undermined these containment efforts, and so by mid-November, Ruanda authorities enlisted the help of the Uganda government to prevent people from fleeing the country. On November 18, the DC Kigezi announced that those who could not find permanent accommodation with the Ruanda Mission in Kigezi would be sent back immediately; those who did not feel safe returning to Ruhengeri, he said, would be taken to

[116] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; Chief Secretary Hartwell to the President of the Abanyarwanda na Abarundi Abadahemuka, Kampala, 5 December 1959.

[117] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; Police Kisoro to Police Kabale, 15 December 1959.

Nyamata.[118] Returning to Shyira so soon after the uprising was, of course, out of the question for many evacuees, but the Ruanda Mission did not have the facilities to house (let alone employ) 300 additional people. Receiving the DC's announcement, Shyira missionary Doreen Peck, who had accompanied the caravan to Kigezi, telegrammed the Ruanda Mission's Executive Committee in London for help.[119] They responded by wiring the DC with an urgent appeal to delay repatriation efforts until one of their senior missionary doctors, Harold Adeney, could reach Kabale from Ruanda and discuss the matter in person.[120] The DC and his superiors in Kampala agreed to this arrangement, and called off the repatriation plans for forty-eight hours.[121]

In the meantime, the DC asked Kigezi chiefs to take down the names of the people who were seeking asylum. If he could not barricade the border, he would at least try to keep track of those coming and going. Rev. Sabune's party was first documented by Chief Rukeribuga, who labeled them as "Abavuye mu Mission Shyria," a Kinyarwanda phrase that literally means, "People who came from Shyria Mission."[122] To this list, the chief appended the names of an additional seven men, who he described as "abatware bakuru," or senior chiefs. He then attached both lists to a brief cover letter and sent them to the DC. The letter read:

Re: List yabantu bavuye mu Rwanda

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[118] Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; Adeney to DC Kigezi, 18 November 1959.

[119] CUA-1, Series *Administrative/Governing Bodies,* Box 254, Folder 1462, "Ruanda-Urundi and Bishop Brazier, 1959"; Minutes of the Emergency Executive Committee held at Ibuye, 17 November 1959.

[120] Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; Adeney to DC Kigezi, 18 November 1959; Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; DC Kigezi to Provincial Commissioner [Kampala?], 5 December 1959.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Kinyarwanda is spoken widely in Bufumbira.

> "Nkoheleleje amazina yabantu, abatwale bakulu hamwe na bashomesha bavuye mu Ruhengeri na Shyira bahunze intambara nkoko nelekanye hepfo."[123]

The letter was received by the DC's office the following day and was quickly translated by an unidentified clerk. That the clerk wrote the translation by hand in the margins of the original letter suggests the urgency with which the message was relayed. The interpretation reads: "Herewith refers names of refugees from Ruhengeri and Shyria. They include big chiefs and schoolmasters as shown." The translator has combined two phrases—"bavuye mu Ruhengeri" [those who came from Ruhengeri] and "bahunze intambara" [running away from fighting/war]—into the English word, "refugee." The chief, however, did not use the Kinyarwanda or Rukiga word for refugee (*impunzi*, *empungyi/empungi*), but instead described the circumstances that brought them to Uganda. This was the beginning of a long process of documentation and creative reclassification.

The Ruanda Mission's intervention bought the evacuees some time, but not much. Three days later, the DC was again discussing repatriation plans with his superiors in Entebbe.[124] At this point, Rev. Sabune, who was still in Uganda assisting with the relocation efforts, offered to return to Shyira on his own and bring back a report of what he found. The DC again agreed, likely realizing that forcibly rounding up 300 people who were now scattered in churches and schoolhouses and private homes across southern Kigezi would have been a tremendous chore. The situation in northern Ruanda, however, had continued to deteriorate. While I can find no record of Sabune's report, the DC Kigezi cabled L'Administrateur Ruhengeri two days later,

[123] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; Mutwale Gisoro [Kisoro], Bufumbiro to DC Kigezi, 18 November 1959.

[124] Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; Provincer Kampala to DC Kigezi, 23 November 1959.

requesting that he cancel the transportation arrangements that had been made for the refugees' return journey.[125] Evidently, the reverend's news was not good.

Thus, by the end of November, the Protectorate government found itself at a stalemate on the repatriation question. They had failed to convince the evacuees to return voluntarily, and they dared not risk the public scandal of repatriating them by force—far too many people were watching. The Governor could have decided to close the border to all future refugees—that might have at least helped the Kigezi administration get a handle on the situation—but this, too, would have been a political gamble. Their decision to close the border during the *Ruzagayura* famine had been extremely unpopular, after all, particularly with private employers in Buganda and Busoga (see Chapter Two).[126] The Protectorate needed some way to monitor and control evacuees that did not involve outright border closures or the disruption of labor migration.

They found their solution in Uganda's earlier response to political violence in Kenya and the Sudan. The Protectorate lacked the bureaucratic infrastructure it needed to screen *general* African migration, but it had in recent years attempted to control the movement of political rebels across inter-territorial borders. In 1953, the Protectorate's Attorney General called on his government to pass exclusionary legislation aimed at curbing the mobility of Mau Mau fighters. Although it had "always been, and I think always will be the policy of Government to allow Africans from the neighbouring territories to pass into our borders freely and at will," the Attorney General expressed hope that the Governor would amend the law in order to protect the "loyal" people of Uganda from the "large numbers of...Kikuyu...[who] would have no hesitation

[125] Ibid.; DC Kigezi to Administrateur-Ruhengeri, 8 December 1959.

[126] The Department of Labour estimated that one-quarter of Africans employed in Uganda were not from the Protectorate in 1959. See Uganda Protectorate, *Labour Department Annual Report for 1959* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1960), 6.

in coming to this territory in order to spread the poison which they spread throughout their own district."[127] The Governor went on to amend the 1947 *Immigration (Control) Ordinance*, a law that was originally designed to control the movement of Europeans, to include a provision allowing him to apply the law to specific groups of Africans as the need arose.[128] The amendment, when applied to Kenyan immigrants, allowed immigration officers to interrogate, detain, and search anyone they deemed suspect of contravening the law. Persons guilty or suspected of "murder...or any offence for which a sentence of imprisonment has been passed for any term" could be declared a "prohibited immigrant."[129]

The Protectorate's next step in exceptionalizing certain forms of African immigration came in August 1955, when the Governor applied the 1949 *Aliens (Registration and Control) Ordinance* to persons fleeing a military uprising in Equatorial Province in South Sudan. The Governor's ruling cast all Sudanese in Uganda who were "ordinarily resident in the Sudan" as "aliens" rather than "refugees." It allowed the Governor and those he authorized to detain and deport individuals without trial and required Sudanese migrants to apply for entrance permits upon arrival in Uganda. The Governor applied the Rules pre-emptively, as a precautionary measure in the event that violence in the Sudan resulted in mass displacement. The August military uprising did not, in fact, displace many people, and the Chief Secretary reported on September 1 that the "small numbers who have come across our border already have been capable of being dealt with." However, he and the Governor feared that "until such time as order is restored," mass displacement to Uganda remained a very real possibility. If Uganda's drought-

[127] Uganda, Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 7th Meeting, 33rd Session, 27 March 1953: Attorney General, "Second Reading of the *Immigration Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953*," p. 11.

[128] No. 8 of 1953—*Immigration (Control) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953.*

[129] Ibid., Section 9(1).

prone Northern Province was to receive large numbers of Sudanese, the Chief Secretary predicted widespread food shortages, "large scale thieving and possible disorder," and "problems of disease."[130] He therefore proposed a new bill before the Legislative Council, titled, "An Ordinance to make provision for the proper control of Refugees from the Sudan and for Regulating their return thereto, and for making provision for their residence while in the Protectorate," or *Control of Refugees from the Sudan Ordinance* for short.[131] The bill, which the Legislature enacted into law on September 2, 1955, defined a "refugee" as "any alien ordinarily resident in the Sudan who enters the Protectorate from the Equatorial Province of the Sudan after...the 18th day of August, 1955."[132] As with the 1953 amendment to the *Immigration (Control) Ordinance*, the 1955 Ordinance reflected the security concerns of the colonial state and allowed the Governor to impart far-reaching powers to appointed officers for the control of refugees.

In short, Protectorate laws concerning African immigration were piecemeal before 1960 and had no legal bearing on the first Rwandan asylum-seekers to reach Uganda in late 1959, yet they provided a precedent for British policymakers to follow. On December 22, the Governor of Uganda signed into law the *Aliens (Batutsi Immigrants) Rules*, which aimed to regulate the mobility and settlement of "African[s] of the Batutsi tribe ordinarily resident in Ruanda." The *Rules* were applied retroactively to all "Batutsi" who came to Uganda on or after November 1 of that year, meaning that the Kahima family would have theoretically been legally classified as

[130] Uganda Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Meeting, 35th Session, 1 September 1955, p. 3.

[131] Ibid., p. 2.

[132] Uganda, *An Ordinance to make Provision for the Proper Control of Refugees from the Sudan and for Regulating Their Return Thereto and for making Provision for Their Residence while in the Protectorate* (No. 35 of 1955), Sec. 2.

Batutsi immigrants.[133] As such, they would have been required to register with local government and apply for a special permit granting them permission to stay in the Protectorate. The permit did not confer rights or protections to the migrant, but was instead a list of terms to which the migrant was obliged to obey.[134]

The passage of the *Batutsi Rules* on December 24, 1959 added little clarity to the situation on the ground in Kigezi. Whereas government officials had previously described displaced persons as "refugees," they now employed additional vocabulary to refer to Ruanda asylum-seekers as "Batutsi immigrants." In an urgent memorandum titled, "Batutsi Immigrants," sent to all *Gombolola* chiefs in Kigezi, the DC announced that he would be visiting each sub-county "to explain the Government's plans for the refugees." He ordered the chiefs to "ensure that all adult immigrants, male and female, are present." The memorandum included a Rukiga translation, which, following the ambiguous language employed in the English version, referred to both "*Abatorokyi*" ("migrants") and *Bahungyi* ("those who fled").[135] The regular slippage between labels in official and informal discourse had a significant impact on documentation efforts, contributing, as we will see, to widespread confusion across all levels of government about the meaning and practical import of evolving refugee policy.

[133.] Legal Notice No. 311 of 1959: "The Aliens Registration and Control) Ordinance. (CAP. 44, Revised Edition, 1951): Rules: The Aliens (Batutsi Immigrants) Rules, 1959," in *Supplement to Uganda Gazette*, 24 December 1959, pp. 658-659.

[134] Government officials identified Batutsi immigrants following what might best be described as *prima facie* status determination, although this was not how lawmakers framed it at the time. The law applied to a circumscribed group, defined by an assumed social identity (Batutsi) and specific temporal limits (on or after November 1, 1959). Persons who might be subject to the *Batutsi Rules* were not granted individual eligibility hearings, nor did they have legal recourse to contest the decision of the government official. Instead, authorized government personnel could record any individual as a "Watutsi immigrant" who, *prima facie* ("at first appearance"), *appeared* to belong to a particular group as defined by the law.

[135] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File LAN 5i, "Boundaries - District"; DC Kigezi to Gombolola Chiefs Kamuganguzi, Rubaya, and Maziba, Re: 'Batutsi Immigrants,' 16 March 1960.

Kahima and Joyce Build a House

As the Protectorate scrambled to get ahead of the crisis at their border, evacuees with the Ruanda Mission caravan surveyed their options. The party remained at Seseme in Kisoro for a week after their arrival, at which point Mission staff decided to relocate some of the evacuees seventy-five kilometers east to the District headquarters of Kabale, where they had additional schools, churches, and people who might accommodate them. It appears that Kahima and Joyce, together with their eight children, decided to join this second group, even though Joyce had relatives near Kisoro. Why they made this decision is hard to say, but material considerations may have played a role. A family of ten would have been a considerable burden for the average subsistence farmer in Kigezi, and the Ruanda Mission had more resources. Furthermore, Kahima had lived in Kabale for almost as long as he had lived in Shyira, during his employment at the Kigezi Mission Hospital before World War II. It would be more familiar to him than Kisoro, and perhaps he might find work, either at the government hospital in Kabale or the new Anglican hospital in Kisizi.[136] The only hospital in Kisoro was run by the Catholic Church, and seeking employment with them would have jeopardized his relationship to the Ruanda Mission and his Anglican networks.[137]

Kahima's body, however, was beginning to slow down. He was nearly sixty years old, and the pace of hospital work was beginning to overtake him. For the last several years, he had

[136] The Ruanda Mission closed most of the Kigezi Mission Hospital in 1941, as noted above, but the site continued to serve as a dispensary for the next several years. In 1958, the Ruanda Mission re-opened Kigezi Mission Hospital, this time at a new location: Kisizi, thirty miles north of Kabale. See CUA-1 Bishop of Uganda (BP), *Administrative/Governing Bodies* Box 254, Folder 1461, "Ruanda-Urundi and Bishop Barazier, 1958" [sic]; Leonard Sharp, "Kigezi Mission Hospital," n.d. [but 1958].

[137] St. Francis Mutolere Hospital opened in 1959. See Uganda Protectorate, *Annual Report for Western Province, 1959* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1959), 75. Kahima may have also been wary of working with Catholics, both on religious grounds and because of their perceived support of Hutu nationalism.

woken each morning with tender swelling in his fingers and toes. It would dissipate after an hour or so, but it would always come back the next day. Over time, the swelling became more painful, and spread to his knees, elbows, and shoulders. The hike up and down Shyira hill had become more arduous, while in the hospital he struggled to make his fingers do the precision work of cleaning wounds, changing bandages, and taking blood samples. He was still a valuable employee at Shyira because of his institutional memory and language skills, but this was not the case in Kigezi. Plenty of people spoke Kinyarwanda in Kigezi, but the need for hospital staff who were native speakers was not nearly as great. Moreover, the Kigezi Mission Hospital was brand new, and unlike the old hospital, it was not located in Kabale, but in Kisizi, forty kilometers to the north. Many of the hospital dressers and nurses were young and had completed rigorous training courses in medicine. Kahima was old, and while he had received a practical education through the Mission, he had never attended formal schooling. Perhaps, after forty years of service, it was time to retire. The difficulty was determining what to do next.

It appears that the Ruanda Mission, while unable to employ Kahima in their Uganda-based ministries, found him a host near Kabale town. This was Rev. Aloys and his wife, Martha. Rev. Aloys was an Anglican deacon who had received his pastoral training with Rev. Sabune—the two men completed their course at Ibuye (Urundi) in 1948.[138] They were ordained the following year, at which time Rev. Sabune returned to Ruanda to work with Shyira Mission while Rev. Aloys continued on to Kabale. When the Ruanda Mission evacuated Shyira, they sought Anglicans in Kigezi who might take personal responsibility for one or two displaced families. Rev. Aloys and Martha took care of at least three different families over the next

[138] CUA-1, *Administrative/Governing Bodies*, Box 261, Folder 1487, "Ruanda Mission, 1947"; Minutes of the Standing Committee of the Diocesan Council held at Kabale, 25-30 September 1947.

several years, including Kahima and Joyce.[139] For the next two years, Kahima and Joyce would live in Aloys' village on a plot loaned to them by the Church of Uganda.[140] There, the family did chores for neighbors to help raise money in that first year, and by their second year they were growing their own crops.[141] The *Gombolola* chief recorded Kahima as possessing a permit under the *Batutsi Rules.*[142]

From Tutsi Alien to Alien Refugee

As Kahima and Joyce set about building their house, Protectorate authorities continued to experiment with new border control policies. The Great Lakes' political landscape was changing rapidly, and Uganda officials became increasingly worried that escalating independence crises in Congo, the Sudan, and Rwanda might spill over into the Protectorate. In June 1960, just six months after the passage of the *Batutsi Rules*, Protectorate authorities found themselves faced with the very real possibility that independence in neighboring Congo, scheduled for June 30, might result in massive refugee flows of both Belgians and Africans to Uganda. The Protectorate government responded by discarding earlier legislation and replacing it with the *Control of Alien Refugees Act* (CARA). The Governor of Uganda, Sir Frederick Crawford, operationalized the law on July 13, 1960.[143]

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[139] KigDA Immigration Box 6, File ADM 23/1A, "Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Returns," 1962-1963.

[140] Interview with E., Kabale, 7 April 2013.

[141] KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23, "Control of Alien Refugees, 1962-64."

[142] KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23ii, "Control of Entry into Uganda of Congolese and Ruanda Africans," 1960-1961.

[143] Legal Notice No. 136 of 1960, "The Control of Alien Refugees Ordinance, 1960," in *Supplement to Uganda Gazette*, 13 July 1960, 314.

The trouble with *CARA*, as with the *Batutsi Rules*, was that it provided neither specific criteria nor procedural instructions for determining refugee status. Instead, it authorized the Governor (after 1962, the Minister) to declare "any person being one of a class of aliens…to be refugees" on a case-by-case basis. He had unilateral authority to determine who was a refugee and who was not; his pronouncements, published in the *Uganda Gazette,* served as the legal instruments for determining refugee status. Unlike the 1951 Convention/Protocol or the later 1969 OAU Convention, which defined "refugee" using a combination of subjective and objective criteria, *CARA* enabled the Governor/Minister to define refugees on the basis of objective criteria alone. This meant that a person who wished to be recognized as a refugee in Uganda had to demonstrate that he or she belonged to a scheduled refugee group; individual asylum-seekers did not need to demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution" before the officer hearing their case issued a refugee permit. Group membership, not individualized fears of persecution, was what mattered.

What did this changing legal landscape mean for someone like Kahima? Initially, it meant very little. As the next chapter will demonstrate in greater detail, the Protectorate was not in a position to identify refugees under its new immigration laws; even when local officials did distribute refugee documentation, the significance of that documentation was unclear. Kahima registered as a refugee in 1961, but he continued to live on Anglican land next to Rev. Aloys for years. Rev. Aloys, moreover, provided more than material assistance: he served as a mediator between evacuees and the Ugandan government during a period of tremendous political transition. Between 1959 and 1964, changing Ugandan laws concerning migration and asylum transformed Kahima's legal status from "evacuee" to "Tutsi alien," and then from Tutsi alien to "refugee." As an evacuee, and later as a refugee, Kahima was allowed to remain in Kigezi as a

private resident provided that he was "living with friends or relatives."[144] This provision was not a part of any law, but was instead an ad hoc practice adopted by different administrators at different moments as the government struggled to get a handle on displacement. It was partly a concession to the recent creation of these political borders, but it was also a way for a limited state to govern displaced people on a shoestring, and without a plan for the political future. The government understood that people from Ruanda had networks of care and support in Uganda, and would likely not become wards of the state if they were allowed to settle privately. Yet those who "self-settled" were still denied paths to citizenship under Ugandan law. People like Kahima needed sponsors like Rev. Aloys to be able to settle in Kigezi, yet this sponsorship had no end point: It was not a means toward naturalization. And, when the government changed its mind about self-settlement and decided, in early 1964, to require all refugees to live in camps, Kahima lost whatever tenuous legal connections he had to Kigezi.

Conclusion

In early 1964, the Kahima and Sabune families were again on the move: Kahima and Joyce and their children to a refugee settlement in southern Ankole, and Sabune and Ayirini and their children to Kampala, where Sabune had a new job with the Church of Uganda. Despite their shared faith and overlapping social histories, only one displaced family was able to secure citizenship in Uganda. Ayirini received citizenship through her husband, but Joyce was unable to pass her nationality to Kahima. The Uganda-Rwanda border, once a conduit in times of want and danger, emerged in that moment and for that family as an impassable barrier—for the moment.

[144] This phrase, "living with friends and relatives," is ubiquitous in government correspondence from this period. See for example TNA FCO 141-18433, Uganda: Reports on Ruanda-Urundi, 1962; Macoun to PS/Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Inspection of Defense and Security Arrangements Ruanda Border," 2 July 1962.

In Kampala, Sabune and Ayirini built a house in the city's growing suburbs. They enrolled their children in local schools and built a hostel for refugee high school students who were also attending classes in the city. Sabune began work as a chaplain to Rwandan migrants and refugees in the city, and served as the head of the Church of Uganda's Refugee Service until the mid-1970s. While I can find no records concerning Sabune's citizenship status, it is clear from church documents and oral histories that he had no concern about being categorized as a refugee. To his dying day, Rev. Sabune identified himself as Tutsi and maintained his loyalty to the institution of the Mwami (if not the person—Kigeri became increasingly unpopular in exile). His home village in Busanza had, at the time of his birth, been part of German Ruanda, and his father had been the local chief. But the redrawing of the border had profound consequences, and this is something to note: While Ugandan nationalists liked to dismiss the Uganda-Rwanda border as an arbitrary colonial construct, it was clearly meaningful—Sabune's widespread acceptance as a "Ugandan" is evidence of this. Yet even here, identity is a funny thing. Recall that Sabune sold his land inheritance when he moved to Rwanda in 1945. The loss of family land in the father's home village, followed by the loss of their home in Shyira, meant that the Sabunes lacked a proper family burial site. When Sabune died in 1976, he was buried in Kampala. Several of his children have also died, and they are scattered in graves across East Africa. To rectify this, Sabune's surviving children have slowly reclaimed their father's land in Busanza, buying it back bit by bit. Several years ago, they began work on a house. Sabune's son, Charles, finds Busanza to be rather boring, and the house too large and echoing. But, he adds, it is a place to be buried. At the time of writing, the family is making plans to disinter the remains of Sabune and his deceased children and rebury them on the family's plot in Busanza. When I ask why, I am told that the family never felt quite at home in Uganda, even though Sabune's Ugandan-ness

had been a key factor in their original displacement. “My father was never quite Ugandan enough,” Petero tells me. “But he wasn’t Rwandan enough, either.”

By contrast, Kahima had the misfortune of being caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. His forcible relocation to Oruchinga was a double-displacement: first from Rwanda, and then from his fledgling home in Kigezi. I do not know what happened to them after 1964, or how long they remained at Oruchinga (or indeed, if they even made it as far as the Settlement). As the next chapter will demonstrate, most refugees who went to Oruchinga eventually left, either to find work or education in Kampala or to take up farms in the countryside. For the Kahima family, the most likely scenario seems to be that they interned at Oruchinga for a time, only to return to Kigezi later—likely within the same year. Whatever happened, it is a chapter that none of the surviving children wish to speak about. While the eldest son, Hezekiah, shared with me the stories of his childhood flight from Rwanda and his early days in Kigezi, he was visibly surprised when I asked him what it was like to grow up in Uganda as a refugee. Sitting up straight in his chair, he was quick to correct me. “I told you I was *chased*–my neighbors know that. That doesn’t make me *empungye* [refugee].” Gesturing to his wife, who is bouncing their grandchild on her knee, he exclaimed, “My life is here!”

Chapter 5: Biography of a Camp: Oruchinga Refugee Settlement

On May 11, 1962, the Secretary General for the Kigezi District Council received a formal letter of complaint from a group of self-settled Rwandan refugees who were then living in Kigezi, southwestern Uganda. Writing "with much sorrow," the authors expressed their dismay over the recent announcement that the government had decided to relocate all refugees to a camp in Ankole District, over 100 miles away. “We have been here since 1959 and we have never caused any trouble,” the letter begins, “[and so] we implore you to repeal or amend the order...” The authors then proceeded to list the ways in which they had already become “self-supporting.” They had found land and accommodation with “relatives,” and were growing their own food so as not “to bother the Government in giving us rations.” They had secured jobs and were earning wages, which enabled them to send their children to school with “school fees from our own pockets.” “[W]e are self-dependent,” they concluded, “[and] if we are forced to go, such [an] act will be overriding [our] fundamental human rights.”[1] At the bottom of the typewritten letter, fourteen names are listed in a steady hand, each accompanied by a corresponding signature or, for those who could not write, a thumbprint.

This extraordinary letter offers a glimpse into life on the border of the late Uganda Protectorate, just months before national independence in October 1962. Anti-Tutsi violence in the crumbling Belgian Mandate Territory of Ruanda-Urundi had, since November 1959, driven

[1] KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, *Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees*; Mushana, et al, to Secretary General for Kigezi District Council, 10 May 1962.

over 100,000 people into neighboring Congo, Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Uganda. Of these, an estimated 35,000 Rwandans were thought to be residing in the southern Ugandan districts of Kigezi and Ankole (Map 1). In response to the crisis, Ugandan authorities began construction on a formal refugee settlement in November 1961, in the Oruchinga Valley of southern Ankole. Initially, however, the government did not require refugees to settle in Oruchinga unless they needed assistance.[2] Refugees who were able to manage on their own were permitted, for the time being, to stay where they were.

The government's laissez-faire attitude towards refugee settlement began to change in early 1962,[3] when a series of border raids between Uganda-based refugees and Rwandan military forces led to accusations that the Uganda authorities were "harboring terrorists."[4] In response to these events, numerous government officials at the local and national level began to voice support for a policy of mandatory encampment, in which all refugees, regardless of material need, would be required to live in a refugee settlement as a condition of their protected status. Proponents of this policy argued that because "certain elements" among the displaced population were in favor of armed counter-revolution against the Rwandan government, all refugees should be concentrated in a single location where they could be monitored.[5] Support for mandatory encampment grew in the wake of a particularly brutal episode in March, in which PARMEHUTU forces slaughtered an estimated 2,000 Tutsi men, women, and children in the

[2] Articles 7 and 8 of the *Control of Alien Refugees Act* (1960 [1964]) state that authorized government officers *may* direct refugees to live in settlements. Mandatory encampment did not become formal policy until 1964.

[3] UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, *Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964*; Memo from Chief Minister, 18 January 1962.

[4] UNA COP Box 22, File S.07584, *Security Reports for Council of Ministers, 1961-63*; "Uganda Monthly Intelligence Report, January 1962," 1.

[5] UNA COP S.10484, *Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964*; Memo from Chief Minister, 18 January 1962.

northern Rwandan province of Mutara, in retaliation for refugee raids.[6] By early May, the Deputy Governor of Uganda capitulated to pro-encampment opinion and issued a proclamation ordering all "non-cattle owning refugees" residing in the border areas of Kigezi District to relocate to Oruchinga Settlement immediately.[7]

The Deputy Governor's announcement was met with immediate and widespread criticism from both refugees and their Ugandan kin. For refugees who had already acquired land and planted crops in Uganda, the removal to Oruchinga would leave them doubly displaced, forced to begin their recovery process from scratch. Many simply hated the idea of moving further away from Rwanda as they were convinced that they would soon be going home.[8] Local government officials and residents were also unwilling to see refugees resettled. For many supporters in the government, the reasons were personal: they had family in Rwanda, or perhaps had even come from Rwanda themselves. Local politicians operating in communities with strong cross-border links felt compelled to welcome refugees, regardless of their personal opinion, if they wished to keep their jobs. Still others saw displaced Rwandans as a potential source of revenue, either in the form rent or taxes. "Local people do not want refugees moved," reported one political leader

[6] UNA COP Box 22, File S.07584, *Security Reports for Council of Ministers, 1961-63*; "Uganda Monthly Intelligence Report, April 1962," 2.

[7] KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, *Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees*; "The Control of Alien Refugees Ordinance, 1960 (No. 19 of 1960). Order (Under Section 8 of the Ordinance)." The government had only just begun the process of clearing the land for the Nakivale camp, and so could not move cattle-owning refugees yet. Oruchinga was not suitable for large numbers of livestock.

[8] UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, *Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964*; Cabinet Minute 40 (62): Refugees from Ruanda, 13 March 1962.

to a panel of Cabinet Ministers. "Some have land from the *Muruka* [parish] Councils and the District Council is considering taxation on settled refugees."[9]

The public outcry came as no surprise to central government officials, who knew that Kigezi and Ankole voters had significant ties to Rwanda through family, business, and faith networks. Many senior ministers, in fact, had resisted calls for encampment for months, fearing punishment from their constituents at the ballot box.[10] The Deputy Governor, faced with mounting criticism, quickly suspended his relocation orders and called for the appointment of a special Ministerial committee to investigate alternatives to mandatory encampment.[11] After touring the affected Districts and meeting with security agents, District officers, local community members and refugees, the committee decided that those who had already settled privately and were able to provide for themselves should be allowed to stay; new refugee arrivals, however, were to be forwarded immediately to Ankole for resettlement.[12] The decision outraged security and intelligence agents, who believed self-settled refugees had been responsible for the recent border attacks.[13] But for most concerned officials, the Ministerial committee's compromise was

[9] KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, *Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees*; "Record of a visit by the Committee of Ministers investigating refugee problems to the Ruanda border areas from 17th to 19th May, 1962."

[10] UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, *Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964*; Cabinet Minute 40 (62): Refugees from Ruanda, 13 March 1962. In the words of one Cabinet Minister, "As the refugees did not want to move, and as they had considerable influence on voters, it would be unwise to force them to move immediately before the elections, particularly in the marginal constituency of South West Ankole. The refugees wished to remain near the border so that they could return to Ruanda if the Mwami [Rwandan king] was restored."

[11] KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, *Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees*; Extract of Kigezi District Team Meeting Minutes, 4 June 1962.

[12] UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, *Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964*; Cabinet Minute 65 (1962), Ruanda-Urundi Refugees, 29 May 1962.

[13] TNA FCO 141/18433, *Ruanda Urundi Reports*; "Inspector General of Police, Michael J. Macoun, to the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2 July 1962.

the only way forward. Life in the border was too tangled, and the fledgling state too weak, to expect anything more.

This chapter explores the unfolding relationship between refugee camps and the creation of "the refugee" as a legal and social category in Uganda during the last years of colonial rule and the first years of national independence. It is organized around two key arguments. First, I demonstrate how the creation of the camp depended on the imaginative work of many actors, including refugees**.** Following the paths of different people as they move in and out and through Oruchinga Settlement, I argue that camp was not a material expression of state sovereignty, but a rambling collection of different interests and inputs—it was, in short, many things to many people, and no one completely controlled the vision for what the camp should be or how it should function. Second, I argue that the camp both reflected and reinforced deeply entrenched disagreements about what it meant to be a citizen of the newly independent state of Uganda. Government officials had hoped that Oruchinga would help them isolate refugees from the Ugandan citizenry, but the camp's size and open design allowed for what Anna Holian calls, "spatial indeterminacy," or the interpenetration of refugee and Ugandan spaces.[14] Instead of molding "the refugee" as a recognizable, generalizable social and legal category, Oruchinga blurred the boundaries between citizen and noncitizen. The spatial indeterminacy of the settlement was only enhanced by government indecisiveness on the question of encampment, on the one hand, and the complicated social lives of refugees and Ugandans, on the other.

This chapter is organized into four parts. Part one provides an overview of the "camp" in refugee studies literature, and details my conceptual framework. The early days of Oruchinga

[14] Anna Holian, "The Ambivalent Exception: American Occupation Policy in Postwar Germany and the Formation of Jewish Refugee Spaces," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25:3 (2012), 452-73.

form the basis for part two, and here the emphasis revolves around how camp sites were selected, built and populated. Part three considers the utility of the camps, and the ways different actors—refugees, local residents, aid workers, businessmen, and politicians—used the camp for their own purposes. Finally, I conclude.

Part I: What is a camp?

Two tropes dominate refugee studies literature on the camp. The first trope, built on Foucault, frames the camp as a "vital device of power"[15] that enables the state to categorize people through spatial organization. The camp, in this framework, serves both carceral and therapeutic ends. It controls human mobility and disciplines individual subjects; it molds concentrations of individuals into identifiable "populations"; and it provides the necessary elements to keep that population alive and healthy.[16] The second trope, building on the work of Agamben, takes Foucauldian visions of the camp a step further. Here, the camp is not simply a device that the state uses to organize populations and discipline subjects: It is the ultimate material expression of sovereignty, the space in which the state is able to exclude people from the body politic through radical, carceral inclusion. The camp defines the exception, and it is against this exception—this Other—that the state defines itself.

While Foucault and Agamben provide useful ways for conceptualizing the extreme power inequalities that shape contemporary citizenship regimes, their theories on the camp are unhelpful for thinking through the history of twentieth century refugee encampment in Africa. To begin, they have not challenged scholars to push beyond Eurocentric genealogies of the

[15] Liisa H. Malkki, "Refugees and exile: from "refugee studies" to the national order of things," in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995), 498.

[16] See for example Jennifer Hyndman, *Managing displacement: refugees and the politics of humanitarianism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

camp, which trace the origins of the institution to the Nazi concentration centers and the displaced persons (DPs) camps of postwar Germany. Yet the camp as both humanitarian and carceral device was already a commonplace technology in much of the colonized world by the start of World War II. Spanish, American, and British forces all experimented with encampment as a counter-insurgency technique during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The British, in fact, had introduced the phrase "concentration camp" to the English language during the South African War (1899-1902).[17] The British incarcerated over a quarter million Afrikaner and African women, men, and children in squalid camps scattered across the Cape, Orange River, Transvaal and Natal colonies.[18] In light of such histories, Aidan Forth argues that a better genealogy of the camp might be "framed less by the exception experiences of Germany and the Soviet Union but by the recurring use of camps in liberal polities" such as the British Empire.[19]

Theoretical frameworks anchored in questions about discipline, biopower, and sovereignty have also lead some scholars to think of the camp as a closed unit of analysis, rather than an open nexus of converging relationships. Liisa Malkki, in an otherwise brilliant study of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, attributes far too much power to the space of Mishamo camp to organize human relationships and communal narratives ("mythico-histories"). She argues, specifically, that two perceived features of the settlement—its "location...in a forested

[17] Smith, Iain R., and Andreas Stucki. 2011. "The Colonial Development of Concentration Camps (1868-1902)". *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.* 39 (3): 417-437.

[18] A selective amnesia surrounds this transnational history of concentration camps. On the one hand, comparisons between concentration camps in South Africa and Nazi Germany are not new. Hannah Arendt (and later, Georgio Agamben) made this connection in 1968. On the other hand, little work has been done to illuminate "the contributions of British imperialism and of liberal empire more broadly" to the twentieth century phenomenon of the refugee camp. See Aidan Forth, "An Empire of Camps: British Imperialism and the Concentration of Civilians, 1876-1903" (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2012), 356.

[19] Forth, "An Empire of Camps," v.

nothingness, a green wilderness" and its regulated borders—had profound consequences for refugee identification work, driving "camp refugees" to imagine themselves as wholly separate from "town refugees" who had settled illegally outside Mishamo. Thus "camp" and "town" emerge as discrete rather than interpenetrating spaces.

Part II: An Unexpected Choice: The Move to Oruchinga

Assumptions about what a refugee settlement *was* and what it should *do* grew out of a global tangle of ideas about security, humanitarianism, and development. But once the British decided to build a settlement for Rwandan refugees, they still had to decide where and how to build it. Analysis of this process reveals the importance of local officials, local African governments, and refugees themselves in determining the geography of Uganda's first refugee settlement. This localized process ultimately resulted in the creation of a massive settlement in Oruchinga Valley, southern Uganda, in late 1961. This was a surprising development, given the history of the place. Oruchinga was not an ideal choice for a refugee settlement. The Protectorate had, throughout the 1950s, spent considerable time and resources trying to develop the valley into a productive agricultural settlement. The project ended in complete failure and was finally abandoned in 1958, largely because the government could not persuade African farmers to take up land in the valley. Oruchinga suffered from poor drainage, resulting in alternating periods of flooding and drought. It was heavily infested with tsetse fly and mosquitoes, making it a potentially dangerous location for both humans and their livestock. Even the Ministry of Agriculture doubted the valley's potential as a site for agricultural development, given the marginal soil quality of the area.[20]

[20] Refugee Officer to DC Kigezi, KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM.23/1i; Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees, 1961-62.

Establishing a refugee settlement in the Oruchinga Valley therefore required a radical reimagining of the landscape as a site of technocratic possibility.

Reimagining Oruchinga

Oruchinga lies in what is now Isingiro District, in a region formerly known as Ankole.[21] Roughly ten miles in length, the wide, shallow valley runs perpendicular to the Tanzania border, beginning at Lake Nakivale in the north and then sloping gently down to the Kagera River basin in the south. In the days before the Protectorate, Oruchinga was part of the heartland of the Nkore Kingdom. It served as a highway between Nkore and the rival kingdom of Karagwe during much of the nineteenth century, and was often used by raiding parties from either side. Despite the perennial cattle raid, Oruchinga nevertheless supported a settled agrarian community, at least until the 1890s. Both Emin Pasha and Henry Morton Stanley reported visiting a thriving agricultural settlement called "Mavona" at the northern end of the valley during their treks across the region in 1889 and 1891, respectively. Noting with evident admiration, Stanley wrote that "Mavona produced abundantly...peas, beans, tomatoes, potatoes, manioc, cucumbers, banigalls, bananas, and plantain."[22]

The success of Mavona was not to last, however. The last decade of the nineteenth century witnessed widespread famine that devastated Nkore, including the villages in Oruchinga

[21] "Ankole" is the Anglicized version of "Nkore," the name of the pre-colonial kingdom The Nkore kingdom likely emerged as a regional power during the sixteenth century. The British Protectorate granted semi-federal status to "Ankole" (Nkore) in 1901, from which point it was known as both Ankole kingdom and Ankole district. Here, I use Nkore when referring to the precolonial kingdom, and Ankole when discussing the twentieth century kingdom/district. Ankole has since been subdivided into several districts, but the area is still known colloquially as Ankole.

[22] Henry Morton Stanley, *In Darkest Africa, or, The Quest, Rescue and Retreat of Emin, governor of Equatoria,* v. 2 (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1890), 352.

(see Chapter 1). Many who survived the first disaster succumbed to the epidemics that followed: Smallpox, jigger fleas, and (in cattle and wild animals) Rinderpest.

The absence of settled agrarian communities in the valley opened up the land to yet another scourge, the tsetse fly, which gradually took over large cuts of Nkore (Ankole) territory in the early years of colonial rule. Tsetse flies belong to a genus of large, bloodsucking flies that serve as a vector for trypanosomes, a type of parasite that can, depending on the species, induce a deadly brain infection in both human and animal hosts. This infection is known as sleeping sickness in humans and trypanosomiasis in livestock and wildlife, and it is fatal without treatment.[23] Tsetse flies thrive in hot, subtropical climates like those found in southern Uganda, but only if they have access to shady vegetation where they can find moisture and escape the worst of the noonday heat. They are surprisingly fragile in this regard, and often cannot survive in places of permanent human settlement. Human activities like farming, grazing livestock, clearing forests, and burning grassland tend to destroy the fly's habitat, and with it, the fly. Human occupation must be continuous, however, because tsetse flies are highly opportunistic and will spread quickly into new territories as soon as conditions allow. Once land is infested with the fly, it can be very difficult to reclaim.

The depopulation of southern Nkore at the turn of the century set the stage for a massive tsetse infestation by the early 1910s. Without people present to clear the land, the once-manicured gardens, groves, and pastures of Mavona gave way to thick brush and tall grasses—an ideal environment for the fly. British veterinarians positively identified their first case of animal

[23] Different species of trypanosome are harmful to different hosts. *Trypanosoma duttonella vivax*, for example, can cause deadly infection in livestock and wildlife, but not people. Similarly, while *Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense* is typically fatal in human beings, it produces no symptoms in cattle. See Kirk Arden Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960* (Westport and London: Praeger, 2003).

trypanosomiasis in southern Ankole in 1909. By 1910, the disease had wiped out a large percentage of Ankole cattle, reaching 85 percent mortality rates in some kraals. People did manage to save some of their animals by relocating to hilltops, where higher elevations and cooler temperatures kept the fly at bay, but these areas could only support a small fraction of the herds.

The fly infiltrated Oruchinga Valley by the start of World War I, facilitated in its spread by the increase in military traffic between Uganda and German Tanganyika.[24] Thankfully, and for reasons still not fully understood, the Ankole infestation did not result in any sizeable outbreak of human sleeping sickness, but it did have deleterious consequences for livestock, which died in large numbers. For the next fifty years, vast areas of the kingdom were virtually off-limits to pastoralists, with the District Commissioner (DC) writing in 1949 that the infestation was "without question of doubt the most serious [problem] facing the development of the district..."[25]

District authorities, working in cooperation with the Director for Veterinary Services, pursued a host of experimental eradication methods throughout the 1930s and '40s, ranging from costly brush-clearance projects, to insecticide-spraying schemes, to prophylaxis. These efforts were moderately successful in Ankole, but significant challenges remained, with regular outbreaks in the northeast and central regions that threatened both private herds as well as the District's substantial investments in growing the cattle industry. In 1959, the District administration ordered the evacuation of cattle from Nyabushozi county while the Game

[24] Ford, *The Role of the Trypanosomiases*, 153-54.

[25] DC Ankole, quoted in Uganda, *Annual Reports on the Eastern Province, Western Province, and Northern Province for 1949* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1950), 100.

Department conducted systematized shooting campaigns to eliminate the wild animals that were capable of carrying trypanosomiasis into previously cleared areas.[26] The problem with each of these methods, however, was that without permanent human settlement, the territorial gains made against the fly were only temporary.

Government approaches to tsetse eradication shifted in the immediate post-World War II years, from an emphasis on brush-clearance to a more robust program of planned resettlement schemes. This shift corresponded with changing development concerns in neighboring Kigezi and Ruanda, which colonial demographers and agronomists described as dangerously overpopulated.[27] The *Ruzagayura* famine, a disaster that claimed the lives of 300,000 people in northern Ruanda during World War II (see Chapter 2), was, the experts warned, an example of the consequences that Belgian and British territories could expect if they did not address their overpopulation "crisis." Convinced of the science, Kigezi authorities responded by relocating 20,000 Bakiga farmers to less populated regions in the district, as well as to sites in neighboring Toro and Ankole. In 1956, the DC Kigezi requested that the Ankole government open up land in Oruchinga Valley for a new Bakiga settlement.

For the next two years, Ankole and Kigezi officials worked closely to develop Oruchinga into an attractive site for Bakiga farmers. They knew that the incentives would have to substantially outweigh the costs of relocation for prospective settlers; otherwise, the settlement would remain empty. Malaria posed the biggest health risk, but this could conceivably be addressed through quinine distribution, insecticide, and the provision of a local clinic. The

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[26] DC Ankole, quoted in Uganda, *Annual Reports on the Eastern Province, Western Province, and Northern Province for 1959* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1960), 67.

[27] For a historical critique of "over-population," see Emily Klancher Merchant, "Prediction and Control: Global Population, Population Science, and Population Politics in the Twentieth Century" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2015).

primary deterrent for Bakiga farmers, however, was Oruchinga's water. The valley's soils were relatively fertile, but they suffered from poor drainage, which in turn led to flooding and erosion—an impossible situation for subsistence cultivation. In 1958, after the settlement site had failed to attract more than sixty-three settlers, the government put a moratorium on the project pending the results of a Protectorate-sponsored irrigation trial at one end of the valley. Officials remained hopeful for a technological solution that would allow for the transformation of Oruchinga into a productive site of economic growth, but in the late 1950s, the prospects seemed dim.

The Ankole Local Government had its own complicated relationship to the land that would become Oruchinga Refugee Settlement. The kingdom recognized at least half a dozen pre-colonial sites in and around the valley as historically significant, most especially the royal burial grounds at Ishanje, on the southern shores of Lake Nakivale (see Map 2). Many of these sites were in danger of destruction, either through resettlement schemes, tsetse eradication efforts, or simple neglect owing to lacking political interest.[28] In a 1956 article for the *Uganda Journal*, H.F. Morris, the former District Commissioner for Ankole, argued that the Protectorate had a duty to preserve the remaining sites "of tribal significance," but in order to do so, the British would first have to "instill[...] into the people the need to preserve, where practicable, what remains..."[29] What Morris failed to realize was that few Ankole residents had any interest in preserving the old vestiges of the monarchy, an institution that had grown increasingly unpopular during the 1940s and '50s. The *Omugabe* (king) signified an undesirable past for many Banyankole, one in which an ethnic minority—the Bahima—had presumed to rule over the

[28] H.F. Morris, "Historic Sites in Ankole," *Uganda Journal* 20:2 (Sept. 1956), 177.

[29] Ibid. 178.

majority Bairu. As the District prepared for Ugandan independence—a process that included democratization of key leadership positions at the local level and elections for new parliamentary seats at the national level—many people in Ankole were ready to leave the kingdom and its relics behind.

Consequently, when Protectorate officials approached the Ankole Local Government in 1961 with a request for land for refugee resettlement, the latter had few attachments to sacred sites in Isingiro. The General Purposes Board, which would have overseen the negotiation with the Protectorate authorities, was made up of elected officials, most of whom would have been more interested in tsetse fly eradication and livestock development programs than historic preservation. Precise details surrounding the Protectorate's acquisition of the land for Oruchinga remain murky,[30] but according to one source, Ankole officials agreed to give up their claims to parts of the valley in exchange for better plots owned by the Protectorate government in Nyabushozi County, just north of the valley.[31] Nyabushozi was considered prize pastureland, but for the presence of tsetse fly. Having permanent human settlements in Isingiro, fully paid for by the central government, would help Ankole authorities guard Nyabushozi against further fly infestation, at least from the south. Local leaders in Isingiro would benefit directly from both tsetse eradication and (they hoped) an influx of new potential taxpayers into the sparsely

[30] I have yet to find archival record of this deal. The Ankole District Archives were largely destroyed in the Uganda-Tanzania border war of 1979.

[31] Emmanuel Bagenda, Angela Naggaga, Elliot Smith, "Land Problems in Nakivale Settlement and the Implications for Refugee Protection in Uganda" (Kampala: Refugee Law Project, 2003), 4. The article cites an interview that the authors conducted with an unnamed Mbarara District Registrar of Titles in 2002, but I have not found corroborating evidence on the matter.

populated areas of southeastern Ankole.[32] On October 3, 1961, Ankole representatives announced that Oruchinga was available for refugee settlers.[33]

The interests of local African governments had direct consequences for refugee settlement in Uganda. In the case of Oruchinga, the Protectorate authorities offered the Ankole administration a deal it couldn't refuse: free fly abatement, plus better land. Local officials were not always so accommodating, however, and their refusal to cede land for refugees had the power to redirect the entire resettlement process. This was made clear the following year, in June 1962, when the Uganda government—now less than three months from independence—approached Ankole with a request for more land. Oruchinga had already reached capacity by early 1962, sending Uganda officials on a frantic search for new sites. A particularly challenging issue was that over the past year, Rwandan refugees had brought nearly 20,000 head of cattle with them. Crowded into temporary camps along the border, refugee livestock competed with local herds for grass, water, and space, leading to violent confrontations between Ugandan and Rwandan herders. For veterinary officials who had dedicated their careers to eradicating Rinderpest, bovine pleuro-pneumonia, and trypanosomiasis from the Protectorate, the sudden, uncontrolled influx of refugee cattle threatened to undo decades of work. Ugandan refugee law (see Chapter 4) technically allowed government officers to confiscate and even destroy refugee livestock, but authorities knew from long experience that they could not wrest control of cross-

[32] It is perhaps significant that the M.P. for South East Ankole, the Hon. F. Kangwamu, was the official who moved that the Ankole General Purposes Committee should contain refugee settlement to Isingiro. As an elected officer whose constituency included Isingiro, Kangwamu stood to gain from resettlement scheme. See KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, *Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees*; Record of a visit by the Minister of Community Development to the Ruanda Refugee Camps Resettlement Area from the 13th to 16th June 1962.

[33] UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, *Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-1964*; Ruanda Refugees: Note of decisions taken at the meeting in Mbarara," 3 October 1961.

border cattle movements through blunt force (in Chapter 1). The only answer was to build a second camp for refugee cattle-owners and their stock. Informed beforehand by the *Engazi* (the Ankole Prime Minister) that Ankole Local Government was sure to look favorably on their request, Ministers from central government approached the District's General Purposes Committee with their proposal: a second refugee settlement for cattle-owners, to be located in northern Ankole, far from the Rwanda border.

In a decision that shocked the Ministerial delegation, the Ankole General Purposes Committee rejected the request, insisting that the refugees would remain in Isingiro.[34] The decision demonstrated the shift in local political authority on the eve of independence: Neither the central government nor the *Engazi* were in a position to challenge the ruling, at least not directly. The Minister for Community Development begged the Committee to reconsider, arguing that the resettlement scheme would be a boon to local development while also preventing conflicts between refugee and Banyankole pastoralists, but he ultimately had to concede defeat.[35]

Funding Oruchinga

The question of who would pay for Oruchinga was an extremely sensitive one. When anticolonial violence in neighboring Congo drove 4,000 white Belgians into western Uganda in July 1960, Brussels had immediately offered to reimburse the British Protectorate for all costs associated with housing, feeding, and transporting these white refugees. The British had therefore hoped that similar support would be forthcoming for the black refugees fleeing Belgian

[34] Ibid.

[35] KigDA Immigration Box 3, File ADM 23/1i, *Control of Entry into Uganda of Refugees—Ruanda Refugees* Record of a Meeting of the Refugee Co-Ordinating Committee," June 27, 1962.

territory. Requests for assistance with displaced Rwandans, however, met with stony refusal. The Belgians did not believe they were responsible for what happened in their former territory, nor were they willing to recognize the asylum claims of their former African subjects. The racial disparity was clear: "Belgians"—even those who were born in Congo—were to be repatriated to the metropole, while "Africans"—even those with Belgian parentage—would remain "home" in Africa.[36] The Belgians, already alienated by the international community in the wake of the Congo crisis, blamed the United Nations for their loss of Ruanda-Urundi, arguing that if the UN had not ordered the national referendum and elections in 1962, the Belgians would have been able to regain control of the Territory. Having complied with UN orders, the Belgians denied any responsibility for what happened next.

Belgium's recalcitrance posed serious questions for the exiting British administration. In less than three years (1959-62), the Protectorate had spent more than half a million dollars on Rwandan refugees,[37] at a time when the country barely had the resources to cover ordinary services like public education and road building. The Director of Refugees for Uganda, R.N. Posnett, believed it was time to appeal to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for aid, despite the fact that Uganda was not, at that time, within the scope of the High Commissioner's mandate (Chapter 4). He believed that the Uganda Council of Ministers—the advisory council to the Governor, comprised of African and European Ministers—agreed with him. The British Foreign Office, however, was loath to see the UN enter into "British business," a development that could very likely embarrass their government. Many senior officials in

[36] B.L. Jacobs, *Administrators in East Africa: Six Case Studies* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1965), 11.

[37] L.W. Holborn, *Refugees: A Problem of Our Time—The Work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972*, v. 2 (Meutchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Ltd, 1975), 1223-4.

London saw Felix Schnyder, the High Commissioner for Refugees at that time, as "something of an empire builder," who wanted nothing more than an excuse to involve his offices in the affairs of colonial Africa. As one of the UN's most important donors and most powerful members, Britain believed that the cost of Schnyder's ambition would ultimately fall on the shoulders of the British taxpayer. For Uganda-based officials, the Foreign Office's resistance to UN aid added a new layer of diplomatic complexity. In the end, the Council of Ministers opted to send one of their Ugandan members, Benedicto Kiwanuka, to the UNHCR offices in Geneva to plead their case, allowing British officials like Posnett to feign ignorance.[38]

The UNHCR made its first major donation to Uganda in May 1962, contributing $100,000 out of its emergency fund to help establish Nakivale, the country's second refugee settlement site.[39] Over the next decade, the High Commissioner would continue to funnel donations to Kampala, along with advisory staff. Humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross, USAID, and Save the Children provided operational support, along with monetary donations and gifts in kind. The bulk of refugee assistance, however, was born by the British Protectorate and, after independence, the Ugandan government.

Setting up camp

Oruchinga was not a singular "camp," but a sprawling agricultural settlement consisting of dozens of organized "villages" spread out over forty square miles of rural countryside.[40] Its size and open structure, combined with a lack of adequate staffing and the ruggedness of the local

[38] TNA FCO-141/18417, *Ruanda-Urundi Refugees*; R.N. Posnett to J.E. Huddle, 19 January 1962.

[39] Holborn, *Refugees: A Problem of Our Time*, 1224.

40. CUA-5 ABP Box 76/1, *Ankole/Kigezi Diocese: Correspondences, 1962*; World Council of Church Information Bulletin, June 5, 1962.

terrain, made it exceedingly difficult for Uganda officials to monitor and control human mobility. Buffalo, leopards, tsetse flies and mosquitos proved a far greater deterrent that security forces or refugee laws to people seeking to enter or exit the valley without permission.[41]

Initially, the government intended refugees to live on cooperative farms, with fifty or so families sharing a large communal plot between them. This plan was abandoned in late 1962, following Rwanda's first national elections that brought Michel Kayibanda's openly anti-Tutsi government into power. It was at that point that the Protectorate government realized what most refugees were refusing to accept: The crisis in Rwanda was far from over, and those displaced by the new nation's xenophobic visions would not be welcomed back anytime soon. Long-term settlement would require more space than a communal plot could provide, because families were constantly growing; the space of the camp needed to accommodate processes of social reproduction that continued even in exile. Consequently, camp authorities doled out plots to individual families from late 1962 onwards.[42] As the year of independence came to a close, Oruchinga valley was filled to capacity: 12,000 people spread across seventy-four villages, with more refugees waiting in makeshift camps at the border. [43]

Central government officials viewed Oruchinga as a means for securing the border and consolidating aid distribution, but for the District officers, Red Cross workers, and local chiefs and security personnel who managed its day-to-day operations, the camp functioned like any

41. Interview with Frank Mirenge, former camp commandant for the years 1962-65, 29 July 2013. At various points in time, camp officials and district administrators did try to control movement in and out of the valley using a permit system. These were successful in keeping certain people out (like the rule-abiding UNHCR representative), but not in controlling camp residents.

[42] KigDA Agriculture Box 9, File 2, *Agricultural Reports, Ankole District*; Ankole District Agricultural Report, June 1962.

[43] KigDA Agriculture Box 9, File 2, *Agricultural Reports, Ankole District*; Ankole District Agricultural Report for the year 1962.

other resettlement project. Government staff requisitioned for refugee work continued to operate within their bureaucratic structures, with Assistant District Commissioners, agricultural officers, health inspectors, social workers, and veterinarians all reporting to their respective offices and ministries. The Agricultural Officer for Ankole District listed "Oruchinga" as one of several "schemes" he had to monitor over the course of every month, along with Bakiga settlements, prison gardens, coffee-spraying stations, and cooperative farms. District officers, while "on loan" to Oruchinga and stationed at the reception center, could still be called in to headquarters to assist with special matters that arose, such as elections.[44] Growing organically out of Ankole's established administrative machinery, Oruchinga took on many of the traits of "ordinary" postwar development projects.

The process of establishing a new refugee village followed protocols set down for the Bakiga resettlement program. New refugees would be directed to a reception camp at the north end of the valley, where they would receive food, blankets, and first aid. During the day, all able-bodied men would be expected to leave the reception center under the supervision of a headman (often, a fellow refugee), who would lead them to the land that had been assigned to them. Each man would receive a plot of land and a set of basic tools—a shovel, a pickaxe, a saw, machete, and bucket—and would then be instructed to go collect materials in the nearby thicket such as poles, reeds and grass that they could use to construct a rudimentary hut. When the hut was finished, the man would collect his family from the reception center and move them to their new "village" home. At first, each village consisted of fifty families situated on 200 acres of land. Once the government decided to assign individual plots to each family, villages consisted of ten

[44] KigDA Immigration Box 1, File KR 1, *Correspondences with Director of Refugees*; N.P. Lister to Rubarenzia, 17 April 1962.

families settled on ten acres of land. Families would continue to receive rations during their first year, giving them time to break the soil and prepare their fields. It was hoped that, after the first harvest, refugees would be fully "self-sufficient" and no longer in need of government-issued supplies.[45]

This was the government's plan, anyway. In practice, refugees were not always so accommodating, nor were they particularly invested in helping their hosts "develop" Oruchinga. Many were keeping an eye to the south, waiting for positive news from Rwanda. Why expend energy on the backbreaking work of clearing new fields, if they were only to go home before the harvest? Still others resented the pressure to take to digging, a vocation that they felt was beneath their education and class. Government reports from those early years repeatedly bring up the difficult work of "transforming" pastoralists into cultivators, and camp officials often turned to coercive measures to get the job done. Men who refused to build their huts, and families who refused to till the soil, saw their meager rations of maize flour and dried beans reduced. In his monthly report for October 1962, the Agricultural officer wrote with satisfaction that the move to ration reductions had brought about "very good results."[46]

The civilizing aims of the Oruchinga project were perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the attitudes of government officials and humanitarian workers towards the settlement's population of young black men. In the minds of many pro-encampment parties, young men represented a double threat to the peace and prosperity of the new nation: On the one hand, they were concerned that refugee "youth," dislocated from school and family and healthy forms of leisure, could easily become "demoralized," a subjective state that could, over time, lead to

[45] KigDA 6i, *Agricultural Reports, Ankole District;* Ankole District Agricultural Report for October 1962.

[46] KigDA 6i, *Agricultural Reports, Ankole District;* Ankole District Agricultural Report for October 1962.

laziness and dependency on "hand-outs." Paradoxically, government and humanitarian agents also feared young men, left to rot in impoverished rural settlements, were easy converts for radical guerilla groups. Both fears—of the lazy, dependent "Native" and of the violent, politicized "Warrior"—turned on a pathologizing discourse surrounding black masculinity. Dependent men grew bored, and the government feared this, because they believed boredom (emasculation) was the root of political radicalization.

Government and church agents sought to prevent male boredom—and therefore radicalization and dependency—through the development of vocational training programs that were akin to those established in both Britain and Uganda to assist with other categories of welfare candidates. In the words of one CMS missionary, Stephen Carr, refugees suffered from a lack of "morale and self respect" that could be best overcome "by enabling them to become self sufficient, instead of being the passive recipients of aid."[47]

Despite the deprivations of settlement life, refugees worked hard to maintain their connections to the outside world. Young men on bicycles were the primary sources of news in a land without radios, and they were often seen traveling up and down the dirt road that led from Oruchinga to the Tanganyika border. Intelligence officers embedded in the camp were aware of these movements, but unless they suspected terrorist activity, they remained quiet.[48]

Refugees also built relationships with nearby residents. Oruchinga was sparsely populated but people still lived in the area, often on hill ridges that kept them above the valley's swampy, mosquito-ridden floor. For them, Oruchinga was, initially, a boon: It meant more roads,

[47] Church of Uganda (CUA)-5, Archbishop of Uganda Papers (ABP), Box 76/1, *Ankole/Kigezi Diocese: Correspondences, 1962*; Steven Carr, "A Short Survey of the points at which the Church could give Agricultural help in the diocese of Ankole Kigezi," n.d.

[48] KigDA Justice, Law, and Order Box 3, File S.INT.5, *Ankole District Security and Intelligence Reports, 1962-67*; "Security and Intelligence Report," October 1962.

dispensaries, and possibly even schools. From a very early date, Catholic and Protestant missionaries (both Ugandan and European) set up open-air primary schools for refugee children, and these attracted children from neighboring communities—a sign that local public service delivery was not meeting the basic needs of Ugandan residents in Isingiro.[49] Local traders and lorry drivers, contracted by the District Commissioner to transport weekly allotments of food from Mbarara town to the reception center at Oruchinga, also provided refugees with an outlet to the wider community. These regular deliveries of beans, salt, and powdered milk provided sustenance, but they also provided an opportunity for refugees to trade their ration of USAID-provided maize flour—a food they found unpalatable—for clothing, sugar, tobacco, and other more desirable items.[50] Traders, in turn, would sell the flour in town for a profit.

The boundaries of Oruchinga expanded and contracted over time, swelling to more than 12,000 residents in difficult periods and then dwindling to several thousand or less in quiet years. Refugees arrived, built huts, and grew crops before they eventually moved on, sometimes to try their luck back home, but more often because they found better accommodations elsewhere in Uganda. Refugee youth, in particular, were prone to leave when jobs, scholarships, and marriage proposals gave them a clear exit. Many who left maintained connections with those who stayed behind, however, returning to the settlements for holidays and to manage family affairs. Oruchinga was not the sole locus of refugee life, but one site in a dynamic landscape of displacement and recovery.

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[49] Church of Uganda (CUA)-5, Archbishop of Uganda Papers (ABP), *Ankole/Kigezi Diocese: Correspondences, 1966, 1967, 1969.*

[50] Michael J. Macoun, *Wrong Place, Right Time: Policing the End of Empire* (London: Radcliffe Press, 1996), 44. Macoun was the Commissioner of Police for Uganda from 1959-1964.

Part III: Oruchinga's many uses[51]

Oruchinga provided an option—rather than a predetermined destination—to people displaced by war. This is evident in the fact that, by the late 1960s, Ugandan authorities and the UNHCR believed that only a third of the country's estimated 180,000 refugees resided in camps, meaning that over 100,000 people had found alternative living arrangements to Oruchinga. The Director of the British Red Cross in Uganda reported that the camps were beset by "starving Banyaruanda" who had spent "many months" "wandering" the Ugandan countryside in search of food and work, and only reported to the official refugee reception centers when they had exhausted all other options.[52] Even those who spent time in one of the government settlements often did so on their own schedule, in response to their own needs and desires, rather than in compliance with refugee law. Families would try to maximize their options by sending some of their members to the settlement, while the rest would take their chances outside. Many who registered their presence at a camp did not stay there permanently, but left when better opportunities allowed. Often, government officials on the ground acknowledged the "slow exodus of people [from] the camps," but did little to discourage it.[53]

Getting to Oruchinga was a process, in other words, one that was critically shaped by a person's access to material resources and their position within social constellations. The stories of three girls—Amelia, Thèresse, and Mukatanzi—highlight the winding routes by which Rwandan asylum-seekers found themselves in the camp. Amelia and Thèresse were teenagers when they arrived in the settlement. They both had relatives in Uganda who could offer them

[51] For a comparative case on the camp as option, see Bram J. Jansen. ""Digging Aid": the Camp as an Option in East and the Horn of Africa," *Journal of Refugee Studies,* 29:2 (2016): 149-165.

[52] "New Homes for Ruanda Refugees," *Uganda Argus*, December 11, 1961, p. 2.

[53] KigDA 6i, *Agricultural Reports, Ankole District*; Ankole District Agricultural Report for August 1962.

refuge outside the camp, but for a variety of reasons their respective families decided to send them to Oruchinga. Amelia only stayed for a year, at which point she decided to leave the valley to go stay with an aunt in central Uganda. Thèresse, on the other hand, met and married a white aid worker, and the two of them spent the next decade working in various positions across the country's expanding camp network. In contrast to Amelia and Thèresse, Mukatanzi and her parents were brought to Oruchinga by force in 1964, during a highly controversial border sweep. Before this, however, she and her family had been staying with a Kinyarwanda-speaking migrant family in Kamwezi, some 100 miles away. Mukatanzi's story demonstrates the significance of family connections and the power of local officials to determine refugee experience.

Amelia

Amelia fled Rwanda in December 1963, when she was eighteen years old. She was from Byumba Province in the north, but had been attending a teacher training college in Kigali at the outbreak of the war. Her parents managed to remain in Byumba for a time, but a period of intense fighting in 1961 had convinced them to take their younger children to Uganda. Amelia stayed behind to complete her education, and even moved back to Byumba when the local security situation began to show signs of improvement. Her parents had made arrangements for her to stay with a Catholic mission school near the family home, believing that their eldest daughter would be safer there than in a refugee camp. For the next eighteen months, Amelia worked as a primary school teacher at the mission and lived in the school dormitory with several other young women teachers who were in similar situations.

Life outside the mission compound was uncertain and often frightening, but not yet impossible. On Saturdays, a Catholic priest would escort Amelia and her roommates to the nearby trading center to do their grocery shopping for the week, and to visit with friends and

family. Amelia had several uncles who had stayed in Byumba, and they would keep her abreast of local developments—the understanding being that she would go with them if they decided to flee the country.

Occasionally, Amelia's uncles would have a letter for her from her parents, who by then were living in Oruchinga. Such letters were difficult to procure, given the breakdown in security and most forms of public transportation, but every few months one of Amelia's uncles would brave the journey on foot. If he were lucky, he would be able to secure a ride from the border to Oruchinga on a commercial lorry that brought foodstuffs to the settlements.[54] Oruchinga, like all refugee settlements in Uganda,[55] was officially closed to non-refugees, and persons wishing to enter or exit the settlement were required by law to apply for a permit.[56] In practice, however, the Ugandan government did not have the manpower to enforce this rule, and camp commandants were aware of the fact that people came and went without much resistance from government agents.[57]

On holidays, Amelia would leave the mission to stay with relatives. She was staying with her father's oldest brother during Christmas 1963, when a joint militia of refugees from Uganda and Burundi launched a joint assault on Rwanda in yet another attempt to take back the country. The fighters were quickly routed and President Kayibanda, in turn, used the invasion as justification for a brutal crackdown on all suspected sympathizers, resulting in the death of

54. Interview with Amelia K., Mbarara District, 18 February 2013.

55. *Control of Alien Refugees Act* Article 14.

56. KigDA Immigration Box 1, File KR 1, *Correspondences with Director of Refugees, 1961-62;* Oruchinga Refugee Camp Visitor Pass (Blank Form), n.d. [created mid-1962].

57. See for example KigDA Agriculture Box 9, File *Ankole: Agricultural Officer's Monthly and Quarterly Reports, 1962-64*; Monthly Agricultural Report, June 1962. See also: KigDA File S.INT.5 *Ankole District Security Intelligence Reports, 1962-67*; Security and Intelligence Reports, September 1962 and October 1962.

thousands of Rwandan citizens—many of them Tutsi—and the displacement of many thousands more. Amelia's uncle decided it was time for the remaining family to leave when local police arrested his neighbors in early January. "He was very scared," Amelia recalls, "He was saying 'No, next it will be us!' So we had to organize and leave."

The family traveled by foot to the Kizinga border post that marked the boundary between Byumba Province and Ankole District. There, Amelia remembers waiting with her aunts and female cousins while her uncles deliberated with the Ugandan guards. After what seemed like hours, the family was allowed to cross. They remained in Kizinga for several days until the Ugandan government arranged for their transport by lorry to Oruchinga, where Amelia was reunited with her parents and younger siblings.

Amelia quickly grew restless in the settlement. As a college graduate with teaching experience, she was eager to work and to move on with her life, but employment opportunities in Oruchinga were limited. Fortunately, in mid-1964 Amelia's parents arranged for her to go to live with a distant maternal relative who had, decades earlier, migrated to Luweero, in central Uganda. When asked if she had received written permission to leave the settlement, Amelia hesitated, and then laughed. "There was a Commandant," she said, nodding. "We used to call him a commandant. I think they used to get permission from him. But for me, I left, like *that* [*Sweeps hand dismissively*]. With my Auntie, without any paper."

Amelia would not share further about the circumstance of her departure from Oruchinga, or whether her aunt had sought official permission from the Camp Commandant. What is certain is that Amelia was not alone: Between February and October 1964, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that over 1,100 people had mysteriously "escaped" from Oruchinga, and were

thought to be living in other parts of Ankole District, Kampala, and even Tanganyika.[58] The Refugees Officer for Western Region, Frank Mirenge, acknowledged in a circular to all Police Commanders and Community Development Officers that "the situation" had become increasingly complex, and that "at times one does not know what to do." The various ministries involved in providing for refugees and asylum seekers were failing to cooperate, he explained, resulting in much confusion on the ground.[59]

Amelia's story breaks the narrative of desperation and chaos that is so often attributed to refugee histories. It helps us to see displacement as a process, a series of everyday decisions and exchanges that culminate in crossing borders. This was often a collective process, as witnessed in the deliberations between Amelia, her parents, the white priests, her paternal uncles, and her mother's relatives. Her journey from Kigali to Byumba, and then from Byumba to Oruchinga to Luweero, tracked with past migrations of kith and kin. Displaced from the physical space of home, she nevertheless remained embedded in social networks.

Thèresse[60]

At the start of the Rwanda Revolution, Thèresse was fifteen years old and living with her paternal uncle, Kizito, in Butare, southern Rwanda. Her father had been dead for several years, and her mother had gone to live with her relatives in northern Rwanda, in Mutara, taking

58. UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, *Rwanda Urundi Refugees, 1961-64*; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister, and the Director of Refugees, 19 November 1964.

59. KigDA Immigration Box 9, Refugees, 1964-87; Regional Refugees Officer to the Permanent Secretary/Director of Refugees, Ministry of Planning and Community Development, "Ruanda Refugees Annual Report (Western Region), 1964," 17 February 1965.

[60] Interview with Thèresse N., Mbarara District, 2 July and 1 August 2013.

Thèresse's younger siblings with her. Kizito had insisted she stay with him when her father died, so that he could ensure that she went to school.

When the war started, Thèresse and Kizito left Rwanda almost immediately, heading north to Lubaale, southern Ankole. There they found accommodation with Kizito's elder brother, Michel, who had migrated to Uganda during the early 1930s. Thèresse's mother soon joined them, and for a time the family stayed together in Michel's village. Kizito, however, worried for Thèresse: She was "a big girl," no longer a small child, and he feared she would not complete her education if she remained in Lubaale. "He knew that staying with the Bahima, they would marry me off since I had started growing big," she explained, describing her conspicuous position in the small community. She spoke neither Runyankole nor English, meaning that local schools were not an option for her. For this reason, Kizito decided to send Thèresse to Oruchinga in 1961, where she would be able to enroll in a refugee school that offered instruction in French and Kinyarwanda. Kizito had a friend from university who had gone to the settlement, and he was sure that Thèresse would be welcome in his home.

That was how Thèresse found herself in the back of a crowded lorry, en route to Oruchinga without her family, her uncle's introductory note folded neatly in her pocket. Kizito had accompanied her as far Lubaale trading center, which at that time doubled as a refugee transit camp. There, refugees wishing to go to the settlement could board lorries contracted by the Ugandan government for free transport to the reception center at Oruchinga. As they said their goodbyes, Kizito repeated his instructions to Thèresse one final time: Immediately upon arrival at the settlement, ask for a man named Karamajyi. "That is how I was helped," she explains. "There was something special with a girl child. Finding a girl without her parents—she was handled with care. And so people had to care [for] and protect you."

One should not see in Thèresse's experience a simple story of kinship and hospitality, however. Thèresse's vulnerability as an unaccompanied teenage girl was an important part of her story. "Girl children who never had a family—life was not easy at all. That is why my father [uncle] decided to put people to look over my well-being." Throughout her interview, she made repeated reference to the father figures in her life—her uncles, her uncle's reliable friend, Karamajyi, the Catholic fathers who taught in the settlement schools. Her performance as a dutiful daughter was critical to her survival and success, and the importance of this performance is evident throughout her narrative. "If you were a girl, you would follow the upbringing that was preferred by parents. It is true that there is no girl that has a successful life living on her own without family protection."[61]

And so Thèresse went to live with Karamajyi and his family, who welcomed her "as their own daughter." She completed her primary education in Oruchinga, at which point Karamajyi found her a position as a clerk in the reception camp. It was there that she met and eventually married a white aid worker, with whom she had several children. She shares very few details about her late husband—not even his first name—but she is careful to mention that no less a figure than Kosiya Shalita, the Church of Uganda's first African bishop, gave his blessing to their relationship:

> "He would at times meet in the camp as well as outside and he would ask me how I was. That is when he one time met with my boyfriend and I never hid it from him since I had decided he was the one to be. He later advised us to handle things with care and to do it as they are supposed to be, and he even called him alone and advised him accordingly."

Bishop Shalita serves as a stand-in for Thèresse's paternal kin, who would normally have been expected to oversee her engagement and marriage. In their absence, and given the

[61] For more on kinship as aspiration, see Mike McGovern, "Life during wartime: aspirational kinship and the management of insecurity," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute,* 18:4 (2012): 735-752.

exceptional circumstances of life in exile, Thèresse finds alternative means of demonstrating her virtue and self-respect, highlighting the contributions of different father figures in her life.

Mukatanzi[62]

The stories of Amelia and Thèresse bring attention to the ways that families could use the camp advantageously, to secure access to education or to find shelter in moments of immediate danger. The camp provided a new space for reimagining kinship in the context of displacement. These histories are important, because they demonstrate the relational, everyday work of reconfiguring life in exile. It is also important, however, to understand how and when the state had the power to disrupt, dislodge, label, and confine. The following story is about a girl named Mukatanzi, who was only eight or nine when she and her parents and five siblings staggered across the Uganda-Rwanda border in early 1964. Like Amelia, Mukatanzi's family was running away from the violence sparked by the refugee invasion of late 1963.

Mukatanzi's parents spoke no Runyankole, and so they had to move from homestead to homestead in search of someone who understood Kinyarwanda. That was how they found Joy's family, and that was why Joy's family opened their home to them.

Mukatanzi and her family only stayed for a short time—Joy remembers it being only a week—before local authorities ordered their removal to Oruchinga. "I cried when they took her away," Joy recalls. "They put her on a lorry. I never saw her after that." Having grown up in Kamwezi during the late 1950s and '60s, Joy would have witnessed many thousands of people pass by her homestead as a child. In early 1960, before Oruchinga existed, refugees built a large camp in Kamwezi, where they were able to keep close eye on events in Rwanda. Joy remembers

[62] Interview with Joy K., Bukinda, September 25 and October 5, 2013.

hearing about Oruchinga from her parents, who described the settlements as "squeezed places" where people lived on "posho [maize flour] and beans alone," sometimes "d[ying] as a result of failing to cope with such food... They would die of diarrhea."

Filtered through Joy's childhood memories, there are many important details missing from Mukatanzi's story. But the memory, as delicate as it is, still points to a common feature of refugee administration in 1960s Uganda: the level of power enjoyed by the local chief in determining a person's legal status. As discussed in the previous chapter, refugee status determination procedures afforded tremendous discretion to low-ranking chiefs, who were responsible for reporting new arrivals to District authorities. In Joy's words, this system allowed chiefs to "kill an eye" when they were willing to let a refugee settle in his jurisdiction. It also could, at various moments, afford chiefs an opportunity to remove unwanted people from his area, and persons labeled as 'refugees' had no formal right to an appeal. In the aftermath of the 1964 border clearance, for instance, central government authorities received numerous complaints that police and local officials in Kigezi and Ankole had used the operation as an occasion to exact revenge on old rivals. In a particularly remarkable incident, an elderly man by the name of George Nyirimbirima—a former Kigezi chief (see Chapter 1)—was declared a refugee and forced onto the back of a lorry bound for Oruchinga. He was only returned to his home in Bufumbira when Bishop Shalita contacted the Office of the Prime Minister on his behalf.[63] The 1964 border clearance was an exceptionally aggressive intervention into the lives

[63] UNA COP Box 68, File S.10484, *Rwanda Urundi Refugees*; PS/OPM to PS/Ministry of Internal Affairs, 28 February 1964; KigDA ADM.23, *Control of Alien Refugees*; Bishop Shalita to DC Kigezi, 7 February 1964.

of borderland residents, but the ability of local chiefs to act as gatekeepers was a common feature of refugee status determination.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the genealogy, conception, and early days of the twinned camps of Oruchinga Refugee Settlement in southern Ankole, Uganda. It has shown how and why different actors responded to, participated in, and actively resisted the creation of the settlements. It has also attempted to demonstrate the permeability of the settlement's fluctuating borders by detailing the ways in which different actors moved in and out of Oruchinga at different times. The camp was a dynamic site, incorporating the imaginative labors of many people over time.

Conclusion

Uganda today is one of the most important refugee host states in the world. It has provided asylum to some of the largest, most diverse populations of displaced people on the African continent since the late colonial era. As of January 2018, it supports an estimated 1.3 million refugees.[1] The country is an imperfect refuge, certainly, but its continuous support for hundreds of thousands of refugees per annum stands in stark contrast to the dwindling refugee quotas of far wealthier nations like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In the era of Trump, Brexit, and Syria, it is critical to remember that, in between the bombastic xenophobia of American and European governments, countries like Uganda, Kenya, Palestine and Jordan remain responsible for the majority of the world's displaced and dispossessed.

This dissertation has explored the history of Rwandan migration and resettlement in Uganda and the relationship between colonial governance and post-independence refugee management. It is, in many ways, a history about a *place* of refuge as well as the people who inhabited it. As a refuge, the postcolonial state in Uganda cannot be understood apart from its colonial formation. I have argued that the Uganda Protectorate was not invested in knowing its subjects, and that the country in fact benefitted from migrant illegibility. Unwilling to jeopardize their access to Rwandan labor, colonial authorities turned away from more ambitious classificatory regimes and instead tried to channel migrants towards areas of greatest demand.

[1] UNHCR, *Global Focus: 2018 Planning Summary*, Geneva: UNHCR, accessed January 21, 2018, http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/5129#_ga=2.25652093.130244102.1516580940-716845809.1506304533.

The central administration's strategic withdrawal from immigration management facilitated Uganda's rise as a major destination for Rwandans seeking political and economic alternatives to Belgian and Tutsi governance, but it also laid the groundwork for future citizenship struggles. The work of gatekeeping fell to the lowest ranks of the customary authority, who became responsible for identifying, policing, and taxing migrants. And because control over land lay in the hands of private owners rather than state agents, landlords acquired tremendous power over migrant settlement (Chapter Two). The structure of colonial migration management allowed the Protectorate to absorb impressive numbers of foreign migrants over a brief period of time. Audrey Richards warned British officials in 1954 that their decentralized approach to Rwandan integration could lead to considerable political conflict after independence, but her words (and the results of her team's research) went largely unheeded.

In the wake of the Rwandan Revolution and Congo crisis, a panicked British administration sought to impose unprecedented restrictions on African mobility through the introduction of new laws and documentation practices. These interventions, however, did little to alter the distribution of gatekeeping power at the local level. Low-level chiefs were again called upon to do the hard work of identifying, classifying, and tracking new arrivals in their jurisdiction. The result, predictably, was a highly localized documentary regime with little to no central oversight. This meant that many Rwandans arriving in Uganda after November 1959, regardless of what motivated their departure, could still access land and wages using the same channels that migrants had been using for decades.[2]

[2] For an autobiographical account of one refugee family's self-settlement in Masaka, see Patricia Bamurangirwa, *My Mother's Dreams* (Leicestershire: Matador, 2014). The family rented land from a Muganda woman who had been renting out plots to migrant farmers for many years.

This does not mean that the development of a new refugee category was without consequence—far from it. As seen in Chapters Four and Five, the creation of laws, practices, and camps introduced new barriers for many people, particularly those who lacked the material and social resources they needed to (re)establish their bureaucratic relationship with the state. A man like Alonso Kahima, born into an ordinary peasant family in southwestern Uganda, struggled to "prove" his Ugandan origins after spending many years working in Rwanda. His wife, whose Ugandan origins were apparently never in question, could not sponsor his citizenship because of the patriarchal assumptions of Ugandan law. Kahima and his family were eventually forced to relocate to Oruchinga. Meanwhile, Andereya Sabune, a man of equally complex origins, could still use his familial connections and political resources to demonstrate his Ugandaness even as he openly identified as a Tutsi. And, because Uganda's new citizenship laws allowed Ugandan men to pass their citizenship on to their wives, Sabune's Congolese partner, Ayirini, was able to relocate, as well.

Uganda's emerging refugee regime, in short, was inherently contradictory and gave rise to contradictory outcomes. It granted decision-making power to central authorities without providing for the infrastructure that enforcement would require. Many displaced people were consequently able to evade detection, but the cost of getting caught could be steep. Those who did manage to settle privately still had to live with the uncertainty that new categories created.

These contradictions lay at the heart of Uganda's formal refugee settlement program. When the late colonial and early independent governments tried to isolate refugees into rural camps, the boundaries of these spatial orders proved impossible to govern. People might sometimes be forced to go to the camps, but the government could do little to make them stay.

Like territorial borders and state categories, the camps were porous and inextricably connected to the larger community.

The history of Uganda as a site of refuge, then, is one of many overlapping and interpolated boundaries. It cannot be understood by reference to categorical orders alone—we must also follow the journeys of those who moved across these shifting frameworks. To this end, I have adopted biography as a method for charting pathways across the confusing shuffle of a government administration in the midst of decolonization. Each chapter has highlighted the migrations of individual men and women, not because they are necessarily representative of a more generalized experience, but because they demonstrate the many different routes that people took and the kinds of connections they forged in the process.

Uganda's postcolonial refugee regime has facilitated the rapid absorption of displaced people over time, even as larger questions about citizenship remain unresolved. Mamdani and others have shown that Uganda's "citizenship question" was of paramount importance to the rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a militia of primarily second-generation refugees who invaded Rwanda in 1990.[3] Mamdani argues that the RPF invasion constituted an "armed repatriation" of refugees, one that essentially allowed the Ugandan government to "export" its "crisis of citizenship and indigeneity" to Rwanda.[4] Without question, Uganda's troubled political history

[3] On the linkages between Ugandan citizenship issues and the RPF, see Filip Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Elijah Dickens Mushemeza, *The Politics and Empowerment of Banyarwanda Refugees in Uganda, 1959-2001* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2007); Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers,* 159-184; Ogenga Otunnu, "An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)," in *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, 31-50 (London: Routledge Press, 1999); Rachel van der Meeren, "Three Decades in Exile: Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees, 1960-1990," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9, no. 3 (1996): 252-267; Catherine Watson, *Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion* (Washington DC: US Committee for Refugees, 1991).

[4] Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 160.

and exclusionary treatment of refugees contributed significantly to refugee radicalization and militarization during the 1980s. Yet, as my research suggests, radical militancy—which was essentially the reification of the native/foreign binary—was not the only viable option for Rwandan migrants. Many Rwandan refugees and migrants remained in Uganda after 1990 despite the structural hardships and social discrimination they faced.[5] They are, to borrow Malkki's term, "emplaced" in Uganda.[6] Malkki originally coined the term to reference people who remain in place while those around them are forced across borders, but it is also applicable to resettled refugees and migrants who have, over the years, transformed their exile into home. Emplacement, as the counterpart to displacement, is tied to the same historical processes that engender refugees.[7] Asking why, and how, some people leave and others remain allows us to flesh out the irregular contours and intersectional specificities of place-making and political exclusion.

Refugees in African History and African History in Refugee Studies

More than twenty years ago, Terence Ranger suggested that historians of Africa were well-suited to the study of displacement. The field, after all, was built on innovative approaches to difficult source material, and thus might have wisdom to share with refugee studies scholars who faced similar methodological challenges. For Ranger, however, the aim for Africanists

[5] For reasons explored throughout this dissertation, exact numbers are impossible to calculate, or even estimate. However, the commonplace assumption in Uganda is that Rwandans (migrants, refugees, and their descendants) continue to constitute a sizeable percentage of the population. See Lucy Hovil, *A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda* (New York: International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2010).

[6] Liisa Malkki, "Refugees and Exile: From 'Refugee Studies' to the National Order of Things," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995b): 495-523.

[7] Pamela Ballinger, "Borders and the Rhythms of Displacement, Emplacement, and Mobility," in *A Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, 389-404 (West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2012).

should not be to isolate refugees as a separate category or subfield, but instead to situate them into the flow of social history. "The refugee…situation," he wrote, "is only partly unprecedented and very largely precedented."[8] Indeed, histories of labor migration demonstrate that the social, political, and economic challenges associated with displacement and human mobility more generally are hardly new in Africa.[9] Interpreting postcolonial displacement in light of the colonial past, and incorporating refugee histories into a more general understanding of twentieth century Africa, "remind[s] us not to make too great a distinction between 'normality' and 'crisis," and to see continuities in social and political responses across the apparent ruptures of displacement.

Few scholars took up Ranger's advice initially. Until recently, in fact, few historians of any regional focus showed interest in questions about displacement, for reasons that are difficult to parse. Tony Kushner suggests that acknowledging the contributions of refugees to national pasts undermines popular conceptions of what a nation is or should be, and that this makes historians reticent to engage.[10] Peter Gatrell posits that historians are still fixated with the nation-state, despite the successes of global history.[11] Perhaps refugees, framed in terms of crisis and

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[8] Terence Ranger, "Studying Repatriation as Part of African Social History," in *When Refugees Go Home: African Experiences* (Geneva: UNRISD, 1994): 291.

[9] See for example Patrick Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c. 1860-1910* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997); Belinda Bozzoli, *Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002); Megan Vaughan, *The Story of an African Famine: Gender and Famine in Twentieth Century Malawi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Jean Penvenne, *Women, migration and the cashew economy in southern Mozambique, 1945-75* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2015); Thaddeus R. Sunseri, *Vilimani: labor migration and rural change in early colonial Tanzania* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002).

[10] Tony Kushner, *Remembering Refugees: Then and Now* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006): 18.

[11] Peter Gatrell, "What's Wrong with Refugee History?" *Journal of Refugee Studies* 30:2 (2016): 170-189. See also Roger Zetter, "Refugees and Refugee Studies—a Valedictory Editorial," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13:4 (2000): 349-355 and Claudena Skran and Carla Daughtry, "The Study of Refugees before 'Refugee Studies,'" *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 26:3 (2000): 15-35.

emergency, are not regarded as historical subjects, as Lubkemann suggests (see introduction). Then again, given the nation-state origins of the discipline and the prevalence of national archives, historians may be simply reproducing the system that forged their profession. None of these explanations is particularly convincing, however, since historians have long been interested in questions that interrogate nationalism and decenter the nation-state.[12] And, as Ranger notes, historians of Africa learned long ago about the necessity of reading against (and along) the archival grain—we have the tools to move beyond national categories.[13] But whatever the case, despite the centrality of refugees to the history of the state, they have remained minor topics in the historiography.[14]

Refugee Studies scholarship, when it has addressed historical questions, has focused almost exclusively on refugee crises in Europe and North America and the formation of the UNHCR.[15] African states, according to this narrative, only developed refugee crises after independence, prompting the UNHCR to expand its mandate to include the former colonial world. Africa thus becomes an afterthought of a Eurocentric regime, a second chapter in the history of the global refugee.[16] This literature, while aspiring to study displacement on a global

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[12] Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Immanual Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

[13] Ann Laura Stoler, "Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance," *Archival Science* 2 (2002): 87-109.

[14] On the centrality of refugees to the formation of states (and vice versa), see Nevzat Soguk, *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[15] Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide* (London: Routledge Press, 1999); Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945-Present* (New York: The Free Press, 1986); Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (London: George Allen Unwin, 1953).

[16] Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher, and James Milner, *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection* (London: Routledge Press, 2001).

scale, has failed to recognize how and in what ways "the refugee regime developing in [1940s] Europe was only one part of a larger picture." As Anna Holian and Daniel Cohen argue, historians today need to "put the early history of UNHCR…'in its place'."[17] In response to this challenge, historians have produced provocative works on displacement in the Middle East, Russia, China, South Asia, and North Africa.[18] They have called attention to the politics and ambiguities of the refugee label and the historical "multiplicity of national and regional arrangements [that] existed side-by-side" with the UNHCR.[19] Still others have moved further back in time to trace the genealogies of the UNHCR and the many false starts of global refugee protection.[20]

The history of refugees in Africa, however, remains largely unexplored.[21] This dissertation contributes to a small but growing body of literature that attempts to bring the study of African refugees back into social history. What studies do exist have gravitated toward discursive analyses of categories, which have illuminated the production of difference but often

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[17] Anna Holian and G. Daniel Cohen, "Introduction," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25, no. 3 (2012): 316.

[18] Key texts include Laura Madokoro, *Elusive Refuge: Chinese Migrants in the Cold War*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016); Janet Chen, *Guilty of Indigence: The Urban Poor in China, 1900-1953* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press., 2012); Peter Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Ilana Feldman, "Difficult Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice, and Political Identification in Gaza," *Cultural Anthropology* 22:1 (2007), 129-169; Vazira Facila-Yacoobali Zamindar, *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories* (New York: Columbia University, 2007); Andrea Smith, *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Pamela Ballinger, *History in Exile: Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

[19] Holian and Cohen, Introduction, 316.

[20] Pamela Ballinger, "History's 'Illegibles': National Indeterminacy in Istria," *Austrian History Yearbook* 43 (2012): 116-137; Jessica Reinisch, "Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA," *Past and Present* Supplement 6 (2011): 258-289.

[21] Notable exceptions include Liisa Malkki's work as well as Zolberg's classic study. See Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). See also Jill Rosenthal, *From 'Migrants' to 'Refugees': Humanitarian Aid, Development, and Nationalism in Ngara District, Tanzania, 1940-2000* (PhD diss., Emory University, 2014); and David Newbury, "Returning Refugees: Four Historical Patterns of 'Coming Home' to Rwanda," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47:2 (2005), 252-85.

ignored the more mundane bureaucratic histories that underwrite these same categories. I have shown that the postcolonial citizenship crisis in Uganda is a product of the colonial state, but not in the way that Mamdani has claimed. Instead, I have, following Breckenridge, stressed the relationship between colonial population management and the indeterminacy of citizenship categories today.[22]

Finally, by bringing refugees back into the flow of African social history, this dissertation also makes an important contribution to global histories of citizenship. If refugee indeterminacy today is a product of colonial state formation, then the prevalence of self-settlement in Africa is not an aberration of global norms or an antithesis of refugee management in Europe. It is, instead, a consequence of twentieth century global political history. Even as European governments scrambled to regroup their own scattered populations in the aftermath of world war, their colonial administrations were laying the groundwork for future displacement crises. Bringing African refugees into the analysis does more than simply diversify the field: It complicates our genealogy of the twentieth century, the Century of the Refugee.

[22] Keith Breckenridge, *The Biometric State: The Global Politics of Identification and Surveillance in South Africa, 1850 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

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The Church of Uganda Archives (CUA) are housed in Mukono, Uganda, on the campus of Uganda Christian University. In 2013, they were digitized and made available online through Brill Publishers.

The following collections were consulted electronically:

Archives of the Bishop of Uganda
Archbishop of Uganda
General Secretary

Kigezi District Archives, Kabale (KigDA)

The Kigezi District Archives, housed in the Kabale District Offices in Kabale Town, were catalogued and organized in 2013. I conducted research at KigDA in 2011, 2013, and 2015, and reference these materials using the new catalogue. I consulted the following collections:

Administration
Agriculture
Kigezi District Annual Reports
Immigration
Justice, Law, and Order
Lands
News and Communications
Resettlement
Wildlife and Forestry

Uganda National Archives, Entebbe (UNA)

The following collections were consulted:

Confidential Office of the President (UNA COP)
C Series (UNA C)

British National Archives (TNA)

The following collections were consulted:
British Council (BW)
Colonial Office (CO)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
Foreign Office (FO)
War Office (WO)

Social Science Library at the Bodleian (SSL)

The following collections were consulted:
T.F. Betts Collection
Refugee studies grey literature

London School of Economic (LSE)

The following collections were consulted:
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Cambridge Centre for Christianity Worldwide (CCCW)

The following collections were consulted:
Joe Church Papers (JEC)
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Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry
UNHCR 49, Records of the Offices in Uganda
UNHCR 6, Collection of the Documentation Centre, Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees

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Uganda Protectorate Annual Report of the Labour Department
Uganda Protectorate Annual Reports on the Kingdom of Buganda, Eastern Province, Western Province, Northern Province

Interviews

I conducted forty life histories and thirty interviews. I have limited identifying information to first names and last initials for most individuals. Upon request, I have also created pseudonyms, which I have indicated with a "(p)".

Name	**Date**	**Location**
Patricia Bamurangirwa	August 31, 2016	Birmingham, UK
Amelia K. (p)	February 18, 2013	Buhweju
John B. K.	October 15, 2013	Bukanga
Athanasio R.	June 17, 2013	Bukinda
Jennifer G.	June 17 and September 23, 2013	Bukinda
Margaret T. (p)	June 17 and September 23, 2013	Bukinda
John K.	June 17 and September 23, 2013	Bukinda
Elivasta K.	August 3, 2013	Bukinda
John W.	August 3, 2015	Bukinda
Dorcas K.	August 10 and September 25, 2013	Bukinda
Ezekiel R.	June 17 and September 23, 2013	Bukinda
Jovanu N.	June 17, 2015	Busanza
Yonah Kahima (p)	April 7, 2013	Kabale
Stephen T.	July 8, 2013	Kabale
Steven K.	July 11, 2013	Kabale
Grace K.	July 11, 2013	Kabale
Caleb R.	July 20, 2013	Kabale
Joy B.	August 7, 2013	Kabale
John B.T.	June 16 and 23, 2013	Kabale
Charles I.	August 5, 2013	Kabale
Tony M. (p)	July 15, 2013	Kabale
Nora M.	July 15, 2013	Kabale
Pius Ruhemurana	October 2, 2013	Kabale
Mbabazi W.	October 6, 2013	Kabale
Johnson K.	October 1, 2013	Kabale
Generous K.	July 20, 2013	Kabale
John B.S.	July 15, 2013	Kabale
Frank Mirenge	July 29, 2013	Kabingo
George N.	August 10 and September 25, 2013	Kahama
Higiro Semajegye	July 2, 2013	Kampala
Herbert N.	May 31, 2015	Kampala
Charles S.	May 31, 2015	Kampala
Charles K.	February 28, 2013	Kampala
Ephraim Kamuhangire	July 25, 2013	Kampala
Peter K.	July 2, 2013	Kampala
Faith K.	July 2015	Kampala
Joseph M.	February 8, 2013	Kampala
Jack Runganyangwe	June 2015	Kampala
Jack Sabiti	July 24, 2013	Kampala

Odette M.	September 2013	Kampala
Joyce K.	September 25 and October 5, 2013	Kamwezi
Frances K.	October 5, 2013	Kamwezi
Godfrey Sabiti	February 20 2013	Kinoni, Mbarara
Hezron K.	July 28, 2013	Kiruhura
Juliana M.	June 17 and 21, 2015	Kisoro
John Bitunguramye	June 17, 2015	Kisoro
Gaetano Batayenda	October 6, 2013	Kitanga
Enoch Kareba	March 18, 2013	Mbarara
Boniface B.	February 17, 2013	Mbarara
Blessing K. (p)	August 14, 2013	Mbarara
Mary N.	July 2 and August 1, 2013	Mbarara
Joshua K.	August 3, 2013	Muhanga
Doreen M (p)	August 3 and September 24, 2013	Muhanga
Paulo Kabano (p.)	September 11 and November 8, 2013	Mukono
Deborah B.	September 12, 2013	Mukono
Paul B.	September 13 and November 18, 2013; June 27, 2015	Mukono
Margaret K.	September 13, 2013	Mukono
Victor K. (p)	November 8, 2013 and June 27, 2015	Mukono
Felice N.	September 12, 2013	Mukono
Magdalena N.	September 12, 2013	Mukono
Juliana N.	September 11, 2013	Mukono
Theresa N.	September 11, 2013	Mukono
Theodora N.	September 12, 2013	Mukono
John Ssentamu		Nakivale
John Wycliffe Karazawe	February 22, 2013	Ntungamo
David Wangwe	July 30, 2013	Oruchinga
Petero S.	October 30, 2015	Richmond, VA
Evelyn B.	August 10, 2013	Rwamcucu
Alice K.	August 10, 2013	Rwamcucu
Joshua Mvumba	February 16 and July 27, 2013	Sheema
Rosette M.	April 2015	The Hague, NL

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