Translation as Narrative and Translator as Active Guide: Rufinus’ Process of Translating Origen’s Narrative of the Soul’s Descent

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Classical Studies) In the University of Michigan 2018

Doctoral Committee:

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Professor Arthur Verhoogt
DEDICATION

To everyone who believed in me even in the moments I didn’t believe in myself: my parents, my constant and steady partner, Mikes, Adrienne, Emese, and Maria.
Translation pervades every aspect of a Classical scholar's work. We are actively engaged in translating and interpreting texts at every stage of research. The ancient Greeks and Romans themselves were often reading and writing in at least two languages (occasionally at the same time). Cicero's remark to L. Papirius Paetus that a particular expression works better in Greek, and that Paetus should simply translate it himself is a clear testament to the embedded bilingualism of the ancient world: “habeo,” inquit, “non habeo a Laide” (Graece hoc melius; tu, si voles, interpretabere). With this in mind, it is surprising that there has been relatively little communication between scholars of Classics and Translation Studies. The benefits of establishing contact between the fields have not gone entirely unnoticed, however, and recent attempts have been made at opening a dialogue. Siobhán McElduff and Enrica Sciarrino's 2011 collection of essays, *Complicating the History of Western Translation: The Ancient Mediterranean in Perspective* is a welcome attempt at fostering interdisciplinary collaboration, aiming to “point out to scholars the value of translation as a category to be taken seriously” and “encourage a dialogue between the discipline of Translation Studies and the fields of research represented by this collection”. Moreover, several manuscripts cover the history of translation, spanning from antiquity to modern day.

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1 “I possess her,” he said, “I am not possessed by Laide” (this is better in Greek; you can translate it if you want). Cic. *Ad. Fam.* 9.26.2, ed. Shackleton Bailey.
3 For an overview of translation from antiquity to modern times, see Kelly (1979), Rener (1989), Robinson (2002), Rousseau (1995). There are two important texts which emphasize the importance of translation. One, Naomi Seidman’s 2006 *Faithful Renderings: Jewish-Christian Difference and*
This dissertation aims to address the current approach to Rufinus’ translations in a way that can also be applied to other translated works in antiquity. Studies of translation in the Christian period become even more relevant due to the decline in the use of Greek as an intellectual language in the Western Empire. Thus, even highly educated individuals became wholly reliant on the Latin renditions of essential works. Additionally, since many of the original Greek texts were lost or no longer widely circulated, even those who could read the Greek no longer had access to it. The above linguistic phenomena granted unprecedented power to translators such as Rufinus. In the spirit of keeping the translation processes transparent, all English translations made in this dissertation, unless otherwise noted, are my own.

_the Politics of Translation_, presents the practice of translation as part of the history of conflict between Jews and Christians. She argues that translation is a crucial part of the conflict, and in fact is so powerful a phenomenon that it even intensified the tension between the two religious groups. The other is Lawrence Venuti’s 1995 _The Translator's Invisibility_. Venuti, though concentrating specifically on the modern Western English-language translation, discusses the emphasis on the invisibility of the translator and how this illusion gives rise to the idea that a translation can be seen as having the same force and effect as the original. Not strictly dealing with translation theory, but still insightful for the purposes of thinking about translation are Derrida’s 1998 book _Monolingualism of the Other_, which deals with the negotiations between languages and the idea of the “possession” of a language by its native speakers, and Abdelfattah Kilito’s 2002 book, _Thou Shalt Not Speak My Language_, which discusses translation as an interpretive process. The works of Naomi Seidman and Lawerence Venuti will be discussed at length in Chapter One.

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<td><em>Peri Arkhôn</em> De Prin.</td>
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<td>In Rufinus’ Latin Translation: <em>De Prin.</em></td>
<td>Philokalia PG 11</td>
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<td>SC 253, 268, 269, 312</td>
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<td><em>Contra Cel.</em></td>
<td><em>Contra Celsum</em></td>
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<td><em>Mart.</em></td>
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<td><em>Pasch.</em></td>
<td><em>On the Pascha</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Disp. Hera.</em></td>
<td><em>Disputation with Heraclides</em></td>
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<td>ACW 54</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SC 67</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Afr.</em></td>
<td><em>Letter to Africanus</em></td>
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<td>PG 11</td>
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<td><em>Greg.</em></td>
<td><em>Letter to Gregory</em></td>
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<td><em>Phil.</em></td>
<td>Philokalia</td>
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<td><em>Cat.</em></td>
<td>Catenae</td>
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<td><em>Frag.</em></td>
<td>Fragments</td>
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<td><em>Comm. Mat.</em></td>
<td>Commentary on Matthew</td>
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<td>SC 162</td>
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<td>SC 87</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Comm. Jo.</em></td>
<td>Commentary on John</td>
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<td>FC 80</td>
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<td>SC 120, 157, 222, 290, 385</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm. Rom.</td>
<td>Commentary on Romans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm. Gen.</td>
<td>Commentary on Genesis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm. Songs</td>
<td>Commentary on Song of Songs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hom. Gen.</td>
<td>Homilies on Genesis</td>
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<td>Hom. Ex.</td>
<td>Homilies on Exodus</td>
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<td>Hom. Lev.</td>
<td>Homilies on Leviticus</td>
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<td>Hom. Num.</td>
<td>Homilies on Numbers</td>
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<td>Hom. Josh.</td>
<td>Homilies on Joshua</td>
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<td>Hom. Sam.</td>
<td>Homilies on 1 Samuel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hom. Ps.</td>
<td>Homilies on Psalms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hom. Songs</td>
<td>Homilies on Song of Songs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Hom. Is. | Homilies on Isaiah  
| PG 13 |
| Hom. Jer. | Homilies on Jeremiah  
| PG 13  
SC 232, 238 |
| Hom. Ez. | Homilies on Ezekiel  
| PG 13  
SC 352 |

### Works of Evagrius

| Eight Thoughts | On the Eight Thoughts  
| PG 79 |
| Eulogios | To Eulogios: On the Confession of Thoughts and Counsel in their Regard  
| PG 79 |
| Gnostikos | Gnostikos SC 356 |

| KG | Kephalaia Gnostika  
| CPG 2432  
PO 28.1 |
| Praktikos | Praktikos  
| SC 170-1 |
| Prayer | Chapters on Prayer  
| PG 79 |
| Thoughts | On Thoughts  
| SC 438 |
| Vices | To Eulogios  
| PG 79 |

### Other Works

| Phaedr. | Plato, Phaedrus |

### Series and Anthologies

| ACT | Ancient Christian Texts  


**ACW**  
*Ancient Christian Writers*

**FC**  
*Fathers of the Church*


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Name</th>
<th>Work Title</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<td>Origen</td>
<td>Homilies on Jeremiah and I Kings 28</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>James Clark Smith</td>
<td>Catholic University of America Press</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Origen</td>
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<td>103</td>
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<td>104</td>
<td>Thomas P. Scheck</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>Origen</td>
<td>Homilies on Joshua</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Barbara J. Bruce</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>Origen</td>
<td>Homilies on Judges</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>Elizabeth Ann Dively Lauro</td>
<td>Catholic University of America Press</td>
<td>2010</td>
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**LS**


**SC**

Sources Chrétiennes
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<tr>
<td>GCS</td>
<td>Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte</td>
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<td>GCS 6. <em>Origenes Werke III. Homiliae in Ieremiam, Fragmenta in Lamentationes</em></td>
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<td>GCS 33. <em>Origenes Werke VIII. Homiliae in Regn., Ez. et al.</em> (1. Aufl. 1925: W. A. Baehrens)</td>
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<td>GCS 40. <em>Origenes Werke X. Commentarius in Matthaeum I</em> (1. Aufl. 1935: Erich Klostermann/Ernst Benz)</td>
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| *PG* | *Migne Patrologie Gracae - Documenta Opera Catholica* |
### Glossary

**Translation Theory**

<table>
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<th><strong>Domesticizing Translation</strong></th>
<th>As outlined by Lawrence Venuti (1995), a domesticizing translation is one that prefers the target text to feel as natural as possible.</th>
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<td><strong>Foreignizing Translation</strong></td>
<td>In contrast to a domesticizing translation, a foreignizing translation gives priority to the source text, endeavoring to follow it as closely as possible in translation, often at the expense of readability in the target language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accessory Text</strong></td>
<td>An outside text used by a translator to inform or corroborate her own translation. Mentioned by Lawrence Venuti (1995), though not by this name, with the example of lexica or reference texts. In this dissertation, I expand Venuti’s conception to include any outside text that the translator consults, including other similar works in either the source or target language.</td>
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**Philosophy**

<p>| <strong>logismos</strong> | Stoic: a thought that has been assented to and for which we are responsible. Origen: thoughts we have accepted and for which we are responsible. <em>Logismoi</em> in Origen are judgments, and are indicative of real emotion. Evagrius: a temptation to fight off, often implanted into humans by demons (though these types of thoughts can also be implanted by angels, or arise within ourselves.) |
| <strong>noēsis</strong> | Stoic: a type of thought for which we are not responsible. Occurs before assent. Origen: a type of thought that signifies comprehension, as with an understanding of scripture. |
| <strong>phantasia</strong> | Stoic: Used by Chrysippus to mean a representation, something that strikes our senses. As Cicero states in his discussion of sense perception, the <em>phantasia</em> is “sort of like a blow inflicted from the outside” (<em>quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus</em>). The <em>phantasia</em>, then, is the strike given to our minds and bodies when we are affected by the appearance of the outside world. Origen: Like the Stoics, Origen is careful to separate <em>phantasia</em> (which we are not responsible for) from those things that we are. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Stoic</th>
<th>Origen</th>
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<tr>
<td>sunkatathesis</td>
<td>the act of accepting a representation (whether it be sensory or emotional), and thereby taking responsibility for it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>hormê</td>
<td>An impulse which the act of assent triggers and necessarily results in action.</td>
<td>an emotional impulse that provokes action, requiring assent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cogitatio</td>
<td>Rufinus’ translation of both noësis and logismos.</td>
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is invested in an interdisciplinary approach to the study of translation in the antique world. From this perspective, the project demonstrates how the study of the translator Rufinus of Aquileia can be informed by relevant modern translation theories. Rufinus’ project of translating the works of Origen takes place in a time when charges of “Origenism” were synonymous with charges of heresy, and thus Rufinus was engaging in a very sensitive endeavor. Informed by modern translation theorists such as Lawrence Venuti, Roger Bell, Tejaswini Niranjana, and Eugene Nida, the dissertation studies translation as a process and highlights the role of the translator as interpreter and active agent. The emphasis is on uncovering the overall narrative of the translation process, viewing translations as rewritings, and recommending a more mindful approach to using translations in research today. Rufinus’ translations have been subject to a substantial amount of critical work, and many scholars use his Latin texts in place of Origen’s lost Greek versions. I argue that this approach to Rufinus’ Latin texts has resulted in a misconception about how Origen viewed thought formation, and that a fresh look at Rufinus’ translation process reveals that he has undermined Origen’s moral psychology. Due in part to Rufinus’ reliance on the philosophy of thinking developed by his contemporary Evagrius Ponticus, the line between thoughts and emotions is blurred in translation, and so thoughts, conflated with passions, themselves become sinful. Rufinus’ translation resulted in a radical shift in the history of consciousness and the concept of thoughts as constituting sinful states, in and of themselves.
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is motivated by a desire to apply interdisciplinary methods to the study of ancient translations. More specifically, the following chapters aim to uncover forgotten or overlooked elements of Rufinus of Aquileia’s translation of Origen of Alexandria. Although it focuses on Rufinus’ process of translation, it does not claim to be a complete survey of Rufinus’ translations of Origen. I will work within the framework of the narrative of the Origen’s moral psychology, following the soul’s descent to embodiment, and focusing on Rufinus’ transformation of the philosophical themes and terminology drawn from Stoic and Platonic sources. The evaluation of Rufinus’ translations is not meant to uncover a degree of “reliability” or “faithfulness.” Instead, the emphasis is on uncovering the narrative of a translation, illustrating translations as rewritings, and recommending a more mindful approach to using translations in research today. Therefore, it does not attempt to rate the quality of Rufinus’ translation, preferring to situate his work and its effects in the historical context and to create awareness of the process of his translation. I will incorporate applicable translation theories and methodology along the course, but I am not attempting to address the entire field of translation studies. As an emerging and growing field, mainly focused on modern translations, not everything in it is useful for my investigation. I have drawn out a number of relevant and useful themes of translation theory to apply to this work and will cover their applicability at length in Chapter One. Each of the subsequent chapters will treat relevant aspects of those themes — audience, capability, history, and politics, and accessory texts — in order to highlight each step in the narrative of Rufinus’ translation. In Chapter Two, I will show that Rufinus’ translation choices make thoughts, rather than emotions, sinful in the works of Origen. This radical shift in the history of consciousness,
created through the process of translation, can be explained through the study of the above translation themes. Rufinus’ considerations of his Latin-speaking audience play a role in his translation choices, as does the social and political climate in which he operates. Rufinus’ capabilities as a translator and interpreter of non-Christian philosophy will also affect his translation choices. Finally, in Chapter Three I will argue that the emergence of sinful thoughts in Rufinus’ Latin can also be explained by the interpolation of the discussion of thoughts in Evagrius Ponticus. I will present evidence that Rufinus used Evagrius as an “accessory text” in his translation process. Rufinus’ reliance on the texts of Evagrius can help to clarify the shift from sinful emotions to sinful thoughts.

Some, such as Richard Sorabji, have identified Origen as the initiator of the shift towards sinful thoughts. The idea of sinful thoughts can be found in later Christian writers, such as Evagrius, who will be the focus of Chapter Three. The evidence for the transformation of thoughts in Origen comes from Rufinus’ translations. Several of the arguments laid out by scholars based on Rufinus’ translations will be discussed over the course of the dissertation. But, as I will show, the contention that it was Origen himself who made this shift from sinful actions to sinful thoughts is tenuous because it relies on Rufinus’ own interpretation of his work.

Thus, the focus of this dissertation is an investigation of the moral psychology of Origen through the narrative of the descent of the soul into embodiment and its struggles with emotion and thought formation there. I intend to illustrate how this narrative changes in Rufinus’ translation, as well as provide the background for these changes. To do this, I have borrowed methodology from the field of translations studies, which I believe provides a productive access point for discussing Rufinus’ translation. The translation theory that I outline in Chapter One is a crucial part of understanding how thoughts become sinful. It is only through applying the translation methodology I discuss in Chapter One that we can truly see the extent to which Rufinus altered Origen’s moral
psychology.

Viewing translation as a narrative and the translator Rufinus as an active agent and interpreter in the process also helps to fill out potential reasons for why these alterations were made in translation. I conclude that Rufinus’ alterations can be explained in part by his agenda of creating a complete and harmonious Christian corpus,⁵ his concerns of saving Origen from the Origenist controversy,⁶ and also by his use of what I have referred to in the dissertation as accessory texts, in this case, the texts of Evagrius. Instead of viewing Origen as the originator of sinful thoughts, instead the texts of Evagrius become interlopers on Origen’s texts through the translation of Rufinus.

The narrative of the soul’s descent is covered in Books 3 and 4 of Origen’s *Peri Arkhōn*. This specific narrative provides a particularly clear example of Rufinus’ translation practices because much of Books 3 and 4 are also extant in Greek. Many of the themes presented therein can also be verified by Greek texts of Origen’s commentaries on various Homilies.

**Rufinus: Life and Works**

Rufinus was born in Julia Concordia in 345.⁷ He studied for eight years in Alexandria under Didymus the Blind, and, after exploring Egypt in search of ascetic teachers, founded a monastic

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⁷ All biographical data are taken from F.X. Murphy (1945) *Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411) His Life and Works*. 3
community in Jerusalem. He was friends with many ascetics, including Macarius the Elder, Melania the Elder, and Evagrius. He eventually settled in Rome. During his life, he wrote a number of original works and commentaries, including a *Church History* and an *Historia Eremitica*, detailing the lives of monks in the Nitrian desert. Besides producing his own writings, he is known for engaging in a substantial project of translation. His most contested translation was perhaps Origen’s *Peri Arkhōn* in 398, but he also translated his *Homilies* and his *Commentaries on the Heptateuch, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, and Homiles on the Book of Numbers.* He also translated the works of Basil of Caesarea, Eusebius and Evagrius.

The German scholar Heinrich Marti situates Rufinus’ translations in two traditions: in the world of the testaments (the Psalms, Gospels and Pauline letters), and in the world of pagan antiquity. Rufinus spent his life expanding an impressive library, a fact that is attested in a letter written by Jerome to Florentinus in which he requests a number of books from Rufinus’ library be copied. Caroline P. Hammond speculates that Rufinus’ library was initially stocked with primarily Latin works because the books requested by Jerome are all written in Latin. By the end of the 390s, however, as Rufinus’ translations of Greek texts were being published, it seems he was expanding his library to include Greek texts as well, given his project of translating a number of Greek texts into Latin.

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8 Although Murphy (1945: 158) points out that although his translation of the *Peri Arkhōn* and the general Origenist controversy he was pulled into dominate discussions of Rufinus (both in antiquity and today), it does not seem to have consumed too much of Rufinus’ life. He continued to write his own works, as well as create further translations.
9 See Murphy (1945).
11 Jerome *Letter 5* 2.1-5 (PG vol. 22).
One year after Rufinus’ translated Origen’s *Peri Arkhôn*, Jerome made his own translation of the work in an attempt to correct what he perceived to be critical problems with Rufinus’ rendition.\(^\text{13}\) Although Rufinus and Jerome had once been friends and admirers of Origen,\(^\text{14}\) disagreements over Origen’s place in their faith seem to have strained and finally broken their friendship. The first of their quarrels over Origen began in 393\(^\text{15}\) and coincided with condemnations of Origen. Rufinus and Jerome found themselves on opposite sides of the Origenist debate. Although they seem to reach peace on the matter in 397, their disagreements re-surged after Rufinus’ translation of *Peri Arkhôn*.\(^\text{16}\)

**Translation in the Time of Rufinus: Audience and his Status as Author**

Studying Rufinus as a translator is particularly important because of the increasingly monolingual audience for whom he was writing. Carla Lo Cicero argues that the audience in the Western Empire by the time of Rufinus’ translation project was becoming increasingly monolingual and therefore relied on Rufinus’ translations. This is supported in part by Jerome’s Letter 133, in which he laments that so many texts have become more widely read in the west due to Rufinus’ translations. Rufinus himself claims in his preface to Book 1 of the *Peri Arkhôn* that he was asked to translate Origen into Latin so that Roman readers could enjoy his texts as well.\(^\text{17}\) He also attributes the interest in reading Origen in Latin to Jerome’s earlier translations of Origen’s texts.

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\(^{13}\) Murphy (1945: 234).

\(^{14}\) See Jerome *Liber tertius adversus libros Rufini* (PL: 23, 464), III, 9, where he states that both he and Rufinus were once praising Origen, but should now stand together and condemn him.

\(^{15}\) See Murphy (1945: 59–81).

\(^{16}\) Murphy (1945: 138–157).

\(^{17}\) See Rufinus, *De Principiis epil.* 1 (ed. Koetschau, GCS 22, 3–6).
Homilies. The fact that Rufinus’ translations of great works of Christian literature encouraged his audience to read in Latin instead of Greek made him that much more powerful as a translator. The power he wields is also why we should analyze his work more carefully.

I contend that Rufinus certainly imagined his audience as primarily monolingual and Latin-reading given that he undertook the project of translating so much of Origen’s corpus. Even if he had readers who could also read Origen in the original Greek, Rufinus encouraged these readers to prefer his Latin translation by claiming that the Greek was subject to textual corruption. Further, the fact that Jerome published a competing translation of Origen’s *Peri Arkhōn* points to the fact that Rufinus’ translation was indeed being read and that the target audience would need a more accurate (according to Jerome) translation in place of Rufinus’.

When studying Rufinus as a translator, it is necessary to understand the concept and practice of translation in Rufinus’ time. As Carla Lo Cicero clarifies in her 2008 book, *Tradurre I Greci Nel IV Secolo: Rufino Di Aquileia E Le Omelie Di Basilio*, there are key differences between Classic and Christian translations. The Christian translations were more creative interpretations, and the Christian translators acted as mediators between the original text and their audience. What is quite remarkable is that many of these texts, Rufinus’ included, were meant for people who were not “in grado di leggere gli originali.” Since most of Rufinus’ readers were only reading Latin, they were not able to take advantage of texts co-circulating in both Greek and Latin. In fact, because of the declining number of Christians reading Greek and the dominance of Latin education in the west, Latin translations such as Rufinus’ became more popular and influential than the original.

18 Ibid.


20 Ibid, p. 4-7.
That the audience in the time of Rufinus was becoming increasingly monolingual has practical consequences for translators. When translating for a bilingual audience, it is possible to retain some original text even in the translation. We still do it today in modern scholarship, including in this dissertation, often using phrases from French, German, or Italian under the assumption that our target audience would be familiar with these phrases. This practice thrived in antiquity as well, in periods where the audience was expected to have knowledge of both Greek and Latin. Cicero, for example, has a habit of retaining original Greek terms when discussing philosophy in Latin. In his discussion of Zeno, he retains the Greek word πάθος to make clear what he is referring to in his Latin description:

\[\text{Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discellerit a naturae constancia.}\]

Cicero *tusc. disp.* 4.11\(^2\)

“This is Zeno’s definition: a perturbatio, which he calls *pathos*, is a movement of the mind turning away from reason and contrary to nature. Certain [Stoics] more briefly state that a perturbatio is an excessive impulse, but by excessive they mean one which deviates from the constancy of nature.”\(^2\)

This makes it clear that when Cicero refers to a *pertubatio*, he means the Greek *pathos*.

To a bilingual reader, this would be a most helpful custom, as it can ground her knowledge base and provide concrete connections between the Greek and Latin texts. To a reader who studied only Latin, however, it can be confusing.

We find that Christian translators also retain Greek words in a similar way. Jerome, for example, retains Greek terms in his Latin descriptions of Greek philosophy. In the same context as


Cicero above, Jerome makes clear that the Greek pathos corresponds to the Latin perturbatio: *Illi enim quae Graeci appellant πάθη, nos perturbationes possumus dicere.*23 “Indeed, those things which the Greeks call πάθη, we can call *perturbationes.*” As we will see in the following chapters, Rufinus does not follow this practice and does not indicate Greek original terms in his translations.

Because of the precise vocabulary often needed to lay out philosophical theories in Greek, combined with a relative lack of corresponding terms in Latin, translators have several choices. They can either leave the problematic term in Greek, or at least transliterate the Greek term into Latin letters (thereby committing to a foreignizing method of translation, to be discussed in detail in Chapter One), or use a Latin term that may or may not have the same precise connotations as the original Greek. Additionally, they could combine the latter with a precise explication of the meaning in a particular context (the domesticating method, to be discussed at length in Chapter One). Where Cicero and Jerome have taken to bringing the reader closer to the foreign language by retaining Greek words, they manage both to make their philosophical summaries more precise, but also potentially less accessible to their target language readers.

Rufinus himself did not view his work as an interpretive process. On the subject of whether he was in any way an author of his translated works, he was steadfast in saying that he did not believe his name should be attached to the work of translation:

\[ Aiunt enim mihi: In his quae scribes, quoniam plurima in eis tui operis habentur, da titulum nominis tui, et scribe: Rufini—uerbi gratia—in epistulam ad Romanos explanationun libri, sicut apud auctores—inquiunt—saeculares, non illius qui ex Graeco translatus est, sed illius qui transtulit nomen titulus tenet. [. . .] Verum ego, qui plus conscientiae meae quam nomini defero, etiam si addere aliqua uideor et explere quae desunt, aut breviare quae longa sunt, furari tamen titulum eius qui fundamenta operis iecit et construendi aedificii materiam praebuit, rectum non puto. \]

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Rufinus. *Comm. Rom. epilogue*, 49–58\(^{24}\)

“[My detractors] say to me: Since, in what you write, there is quite a lot of your own in his [Origen’s] works, give it a title with your name, and write: ‘Rufinus’ Commentary on the letter to the Romans’, just like amongst the secular authors, the title does not bear the name of the one who was translated from Greek, but rather the name of the one who translated it [. . .] I, however, give more weight to my conscience than to my name; and even if I seem to have added some things and left other things out, or to have stated briefly things that were long, nevertheless I do not think it is right that the title be stolen from the person who laid the foundation for the work, and provided the material for the construction of the building.”

On the one hand, Rufinus’ mention of the opposite practice of “secular” authors further serves to distance him from earlier traditions and emphasizes his practice as uniquely Christian. On the other, Rufinus’ refusal to be considered an active agent or author of his translations gives us important preliminary insight into how wide he sets the boundaries of a translator.

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**Rufinus as Translator**

*The Scholarly Debate*

The status of Rufinus as a translator is ever-changing. Although there is no doubt that Rufinus omitted what he considered problematic passages and altered others, scholars either only briefly reflect on this fact, or some, like Nicola Pace in his extensive study on Rufinus’ translations of Origen,\(^{25}\) conclude that the translation does not alter the original in a significant way. Pace offers an in-depth analysis of Rufinus’ translation and concludes that although Rufinus brazenly omits whole sections of the original Greek, the only substantial change he makes is stylistic. Pace argues

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\(^{24}\) CSEA 5.1:254

these stylistic changes reflect Rufinus’ wish to make the work more didactic and accessible to his Roman readers, rather than sanitize or gain control of the messages in the text. Pace does provide an impressive study of Rufinus’ translation of De Principiis, on which I rely over the course of this dissertation. Pace acknowledges that investigations of Rufinus’ translations have either been incomplete or not deep or investigative enough.26 Following the methodology of J.M. Rist, he also grounds his investigation in an analysis of the technical aspects of translation, and in considerations of the different time periods in which Origen and Rufinus were living.

Pace’s method of incorporating historical perspective into the study of translation was inspired by J.M. Rist, who describes the aim for his article in Origeniana as follows: “The aim of this paper, if expressed in inflated terms, would be to identify and distinguish the worlds of thought in which Origen and Rufinus lived, and to isolate substantial divergences between them”.27 Like Pace, I am similarly inclined throughout this dissertation to follow in the footsteps of Rist in this regard, and the considerations of politics and history in the translation process that I cover in Chapter One have also been inspired in part by Rist.

Classics scholars are not the only ones weighing in on Rufinus’ translations. In a variety of fields, the overarching view is that although it is clear that Rufinus made alterations to the Greek text, the liberty with which he conducted his efforts did not result in many significant changes to the overall meaning of Origen’s work. Overall, scholars refer to Rufinus’ work with similar attributives: “faithful,” “accurate,” or “reliable,” with little attention to or description of what the criteria behind these evaluations are. As Mark Edwards puts it, “those who have studied the question know, however, that while the translations of Rufinus may be free, they have not proved

26 Ibid, p. 2.
to be mendacious…”28 Barbara Bruce begins her translation of Origen’s *Homilies* by confirming the “general reliability” of Rufinus’ translations.29 She goes on to say:

Other studies have confirmed the paraphrastic nature of his [Rufinus’] work, but have judged the changes to make for clarity and the thought to remain faithful to the Greek…. After explaining how he had expended much labor on changing the hortatory manner of the homilies on Leviticus into the form of an exposition and supplying what was wanting in the homilies on Genesis and Exodus, he said he translated the homilies on Joshua and a few others ‘just as we found them, literally and without great effort.’ Annie Jaubert, in her French translation of the Homilies, supported Rufinus’s statement. She noted constructions that were more dependent on Greek than on Latin syntax and a curtness of speech and density of expression that gave the feel of unpolished notes from which he may have been working.30

Gustave Bardy regards Rufinus’ translation of *De Principiis* as a paraphrase, but one that renders the general sense of the text correctly.31 Bardy’s investigation points out interesting alterations in the Rufinus’ texts, but in many cases simply indicates the discrepancy without

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30 Ibid. p. 16-18. See also Mark Humphries (2008: 143-64), who agrees with Barbara Bruce on the reliability of Rufinus’ Latin translation of Eusebius’ *Ecclesiastical History*, where he concludes:

Rufinus’s Latin translation of Eusebius’s *Ecclesiastical History* is customarily regarded as an inferior creature to the Greek original. By examining Rufinus’s complete translation and continuation together, however, a more sympathetic understanding of his Latin version can be reached. This shows that Rufinus’s version was by no means a clumsy version of the Greek followed by a mediocre continuation, but was conceived of as a unified whole. Hence Rufinus revised Eusebius’s text not only where he found it to be deficient, but also to make it fit with a new vision of Christian history that took account of events after the age of Constantine. Viewed in this light, Rufinus’s version emerges as a more original contribution to ecclesiastical historiography than has been acknowledged hitherto.

commenting on or discussing it. That is not to say that Bardy’s work is not of merit. It will be used at length in this study.

Heinrich Marti also acknowledges the difficulties inherent in philology and ancient translation. He states that the reconstitution of the original text is the goal and concludes by saying that Rufinus translated everything for the most part exactly.  

Others have been slightly more critical. Annie Jaubert’s writes in her work on the Homilies on Joshua that although Rufinus’ work remains true to Origen’s thought, we should not consider it a translation, but rather an adaptation. J. E. L. Oulton agrees with this, saying, 

But even when no temptation lay upon him, Rufinus transgressed the bounds of freedom which every translator must be expected to observe. It is not merely that he eschews the bad literalism of Aquila or the Latin translator of Irenaeus: he is continually taking unjustifiable liberties with his original. He omits, abbreviates, transposes, expands according to taste: and perhaps his favorite method is to produce a kind of paraphrase which gives the general sense. 

As I will demonstrate over the course of the three chapters of this dissertation, Rufinus did indeed step well outside the boundaries of translation, as Oulton states. He added and subtracted to the original text, made paraphrases (some of which, we will see, misconstrued and confused parts of Origen’s text), and also injected Origen’s text with influence from other Christian authors contemporary to Rufinus, such as Evagrius of Pontus (to be discussed in Chapter Three).

There is also the consideration that in many cases Rufinus’ translations offer us one of the

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32 Marti, H. (2008: 36): “Die Aufgaben der Philologie sind im Falle antiker Übersetzungen von besonderer Art: Für die Textkonstitution ist ja das Ziel, sofern das Original recht ediert ist, klar festgelegt; zwar gibt es gegen 100 lateinische Hss (s. CLC 2, Appendice 3), aber die Stemma-Analyse ist einfach, da Rufin meist genau übersetzt, der Archetyp also vom Original nur wenig abweicht.”


oldest manuscripts with which to work. Speaking of Rufinus’ translations of Gregory, Marti points out that original source texts are no longer extant, and the earliest Greek manuscripts we have are dated to around the 9th century. Rufinus’ Latin translations of Gregory, on the other hand, are available dating to the 6th century:


However, if Rufinus’ translations are not reliable replacements for Origen’s thought, as I will show, then their earlier date is less significant.

Translation Practices According to Rufinus

While scholars debate the extent to which Rufinus’ translations alter Origen’s original text, Rufinus himself details how he engaged with and manipulated the text of Origen in his translations. In the preface to Book 1 of De Principiis, Rufinus reveals his preference for using the translation process to make edits to the original text. When discussing Damasus’ translations of Origen’s Homilies and the Commentaries on St. Paul, Rufinus says:

In quibus cum aliquanta offendicula inveniantur in graeco, ita eliminavit omnia interpretando atque purgavit, ut nihil in illis quod a fide nostra discrepet latinus lector inveniat. Hunc ergo etiam nos, licet non eloquentiae viribus, disciplinae temen regulis in quantum possumus sequimur, observantes scilicet ne ea, quae in libris Origenis a se ipso discrepantia inveniuntur atque contraria, proferamus.

Rufinus, De Principiis, epilogue 1.34-4136

“Since in these there can be found quite a few things in the Greek likely to be offensive, he smoothed these over and emended them in translation, so that the Latin readers would find nothing in them out of step with their faith. I also emulate his example; therefore, perhaps not with the strengths of his eloquence, but nevertheless following the same rules as much

as I can, I am careful not to cite those things in Origen’s books that are found to be inconsistent with and contrary to his own teachings.”

Thus Rufinus, like his model, Damasus, considered first what might be offensive to his readers, and altered these things through the process of translation. He brings Origen closer to his audience and providing them a more comfortable reading experience.

We also find that Rufinus likewise makes edits to Origen’s Greek when he believes it does not reflect Origen’s “true” beliefs. In the preface to his translation of Book 3 in particular, Rufinus writes:

quod sicut in prioribus libris fecimus, etiam in istis observavimus, ne ea quae reliquis eius sententiis et nostrae fidei contraria videbantur, interpretarer, sed velut inserta ea ab aliis et adulterata praeterirem.\(^{37}\)

Rufinus, *De Principiis*, epilogue 3.23-27

“… just as I did in the former books, likewise in these I will be careful not to translate those things that seem to contradict the rest of Origen’s teaching and our faith; I rather omit them, treating them as signs of insertion or corruption by others.”

Rufinus is using his powers as translator to control his audience’s access to information. He simply omits anything in his translation that he deems contrary to *relinquis eius sententii*, the rest of Origen’s corpus as understood by Rufinus (whose understanding, as we will see, was colored by many outside factors). He also omits anything he finds that is contrary to *nostrae fidei*, the Christian faith itself, as it was outlined in the time of Rufinus. Rufinus, in his attempt to “save” Origen from fading out of the Christian corpus (a motive that will be further extrapolated in the following section), blamed any such inconsistencies on textual corruption. He thus gave himself free reign to omit any problematic passages he encountered in the text.

In terms of what Rufinus was specifically referring to when he refers to things that are *nostrae fidei contraria*, he further makes it clear that the works of “pagan philosophers” most certainly

would fall under this purview, as he singles them out by name along with the more general category of “heretics”:

Absurdum namque est poetarum ficta carmina et comoediarum ridiculas fabulas a grammaticis exponi, et ea quae vel de deo vel de caelestibus virtutibus ac de omni universitate dicuntur, in quibus omnis vel paganorum philosophorum vel haereticorum pravus error arguitur, sine magistro et explanatore putare aliquem posse se discere; Rufinus, De Principiis, epilogue 3.36-42

“For it is absurd for the made up songs of poets and ridiculous tales found in comedies to be explained by grammarians, and to think that anyone can learn on his own, without a teacher or interpreter, about those things said about God or about the heavenly powers, and about the whole universe, in which every depraved error, committed either by the pagan philosophers or the heretics, is refuted.”

In this case, because Rufinus has very explicitly lays forth his bias against “pagan philosophers” in his translation process, it is quite important to consider Rufinus’ translations very carefully before using them in the context of tracing the philosophical roots of Origen.

Rufinus and the Establishment of a Christian Corpus

Rufinus may have had a larger goal in mind during his translation process. That he was developing a project to consolidate, standardize, and make widely available a solid Christian corpus of texts that could replace the standard classical corpus of educational texts (such as Homer, Plato, Aristotle, and other non-Christian authors), can explain in part why he would want to cut away any influence from these traditions.

Catherine Chin provides an excellent explanation of Rufinus’ attempt to displace classical literary culture with a body of Christian literature.\(^{38}\) Her main goal is to contrast Rufinus’ agenda, namely seeing Christian literature as an aggregate corpus, with Jerome’s, who prefers to focus on

authors individually. She concludes:

What we see in Rufinus, then, is an attempt to use Origen’s theology of the movement of the souls through life, and into the afterlife, as a way of understanding the life and afterlife of texts in a newly Christian world. In the work of Rufinus, textual lives and afterlives are filtered through an adaptation of the idea of a library, both as a place of text collection and as a place of textual assimilation — that is, the figure of the library as established preeminently in Alexandria.  

While her conclusion does not specifically take into account Rufinus’ editing of outside influences in his translation, the motive for the editing is likely informed in part by Rufinus’ project of creating a Christian corpus. In an age where Christianity was breaking free from its past oppression, Rufinus may very well have been trying to breathe new life into the works of Origen. Extracting any undue influences from non-Christian, non orthodox sources was part of the process of tearing down and rebuilding the new purely Christian corpus.

However, the idea of Rufinus not as author further emphasizes here his project of creating a library of aggregate works for Christian readers. It also serves to explain why he might want to standardize the overall textual corpus so that the authors do not state contradictory theories.

The question then remains: how should we treat Rufinus’ translation of Origen? If he made changes, elaborations, personal interpretations, and has had his own agenda in the process, then it is necessary to examine the translations to determine what changes they have suffered before using them as stand-ins for Origen’s thought. As I will show in Chapter One, reliability is not a simple measure, and it cannot be achieved simply by comparing the linguistic details of one text to those of another. Taking a holistic approach to the translated texts breathes a new life into the text and informs us how we can use these texts in studies of Origen, Rufinus, and the time periods in which they lived. As I will argue in detail in Chapter Two, Rufinus’ translations should not be used as a substitute for Origen’s original Greek. These translations can easily be treated as separate texts,

39 Ibid. p. 165.
ones which comment on Origen’s writings, but do not replace them.

**Origen: Life and Works**

We learn a considerable amount about Origen’s life through the 4th-century historian Eusebius, who writes extensively about Origen in his *Ecclesiastical History*.\(^{40}\) Pamphilus, a disciple of Origen contemporary with Eusebius (who was Pamphilus’ successor, in fact, and thus had first-hand access to Origen’s texts\(^{41}\)) wrote a defense entitled *Apology for Origen*,\(^{42}\) where we can also garner some biographical details.

Born in Alexandria, according to Eusebius *HE 6.2.12*, Origen was around seventeen when Emperor Septimus Severus’ Christian persecution began, meaning he was born around 185. His father was imprisoned and executed for his Christian faith, and although Origen wanted to join his father in death, according to Eusebius’ account, his mother prevented him from doing so by hiding all his clothes.\(^{43}\) He does ultimately die at the hands of Christian persecutors in 255.

*The Texts of Origen*

This investigation will rely primarily on Origen’s systematic theological treatise, *Peri Arkkōn*. This text is important to the discussion of translation precisely because so much of it

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\(^{42}\) Text in Migne, PG 17.521-616

\(^{43}\) Eusebius *H.E.* 6.2.12
survives only in Rufinus’ Latin. We also have substantial Greek extracts from Books 3 and 4 preserved in the *Philokalia* of Basil of Caesarea and Gregory Nazianzen as well as quotations in Jerome’s *Letter to Avitus* and the *Letter of the Emperor Justinian to Menas*. The Greek fragments have been compiled by Paul Koetschau. Although Koetschau’s edition of the *Peri Arkhōn* remains the standard text, it is not without potential hazards. Mark Edwards’ distrust of Koetschau’s Greek fragments is not entirely unfounded, as they do come from potentially biased sources. However, his argument against them is often based on the fact that no parallel can be found in Rufinus’ Latin. Because of the problems inherent in relying on Rufinus’ translation to confirm the Greek, and the similar difficulties with verifying the Greek fragments of Koetschau, I contend that a study based only to Origen’s *Peri Arkhōn* is too limited. Therefore, I have expanded the study to include Origen’s biblical commentaries. As much as possible throughout, I will include evidence from other texts of Origen in order to confirm his doctrine. Much evidence of Origen’s background in philosophy will also be drawn from his response to the philosopher Celsus’ attack on Christianity, *Contra Celsum*.

**Origen the Christian Philosopher**

Origen openly admits to reading philosophical texts, and his teachers included the

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44 Rufinus’ Latin translation can be found in Henri Crouzel’s 1978 critical ediction of *De Principiis* and shall be cited in this dissertation using the Latin title *De Principiis*.


47 The text of which can be found in Found in Origen. (1899). *Origenes Werke*. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs.

Platonist Ammonius Saccas, who also became the teacher of Plotinus. Not only that, but his teaching material even included philosophical texts, and as Peter Martens writes, “Many of his writings reflect a profound integration of philosophical themes into his own reflections on God, the cosmos, and humanity.” However, Origen’s relationship with Greek philosophy still remains a contested topic. Although there is little doubt that Origen was well-versed in the works of Plato, the Stoics, and the Neoplatonists, the extent to which he relied on these philosophical foundations in his own interpretations of scripture and in formulating his own philosophy is still debated.

Throughout this dissertation, I will present the competing views on Origen’s relationship to

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49 For more on teaching philosophical texts, see Martens (2015: 599). See also Eusebius H.E. 6.3.9, 6.3.13, 6.8.6, 6.17.2-3, 6.18.2-4, 6.19.12-14.
50 See Ramelli, I. (2009) Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism Re-Thinking the Christianisation of Hellenism, where she argues that Origen was a Christian Platonist, and that Origen the Neoplatonist is one and the same person as Origen the Christian philosopher. She points out that one of the main reasons he was so heavily contested and criticized is exactly because he exhibited these Platonic leanings. She further argues that his Peri Arkhōn was composed in the style of a pagan philosophical work, and not inspired by earlier Christian works. She is not the only one who thinks this; Robert Berchman also sees the structure of the Peri Arkhōn as inspired by both the Neoplatonic argument of the relationship of the rest of the world to the One, and Aristotle’s Categories. On the other side of the argument, there is Mark Edwards, who titled his book Origen Against Plato, as a deliberative method to invoke surprise in his readers. He argues that Origen’s works were deliberately constructed as an attack on Plato. He underlines that one should not argue for any sort of philosophical ‘influence’ from Plato at all, and that simply using what he sees as general philosophical language should not be misread as a ‘contamination’ of Origen’s work with Platonism. Schibili, Herman S. (1992) ‘Origen, Didymus, and the Vehicle of the Soul’ in Origeniana Quinta ed. Robert J. Daly. Leuven, Leuven University Press, who traces the connection between the Neoplatonic conception of the Vehicle of the Soul and Origen’s idea of the light and luminous body (augoeides soma, which he also sometimes refers to as the vehicle, ochema). Schibili thinks that Origen has taken the idea specifically from Iamblichus, who believes there is only one vehicle, which is immortal, as opposed to Proclus’ assertion that there are two, one mortal and one immortal. Origen also seems to adopt the Proclus’ hierarchy of One, mind, soul, and body, which I will point out in more detail in this chapter. See also Finamore, J. F. (1985). Iamblichus and the theory of the vehicle of the soul. Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press.
philosophy and will argue for my own view that Origen was borrowing and adapting competing philosophical doctrines and weaving them together in a unique and fruitful way.

I align myself with a view that posits Origen neither as a philosopher per se nor as an opponent of philosophy. Instead, I will consider him as opining a form of “Christianized Philosophy,” a term borrowed and adapted from Peter W. Martens’ assessment of Origen as practicing a kind of “Christianized Platonism.” Martens challenges Adolf von Harnack’s Hellenization of Christianity construct,\(^\text{51}\) which posits that Greek philosophy infiltrated and damaged early Christianity and still lies in the background of many investigations into Origen today.

Although Martens rightfully admits that if the vocabulary and conclusions in Plato and Origen overlap, this does not necessarily mean “the former was the ‘ancestor’ of the latter,”\(^\text{52}\) he still views Origen as borrowing and adapting from Platonism, but only within the framework of his Christian roots. He notes “… a number of passages where he [Origen] frames heresy as the adoption of philosophical teachings that conflict with otherwise clear scriptural testimonies, especially those incorporated into the church’s rules of faith.”\(^\text{53}\) Thus, Origen only believes in adapting and incorporating philosophical ideas that are not in conflict with existing church wisdom.

On the specific topic of Origen’s theory of the pre-existence of souls (discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two), Martens notes that “… it is erroneous to present this teaching within a dichotomous Hellenistic/philosophical-versus-Jewish/scriptural framework as if pre-existence were


\(^{52}\) Martens (2015:613).

\(^{53}\) Martens (2015: 598) See also *Hom. Gen.* 16.3; *Princ.* 2.3.4; *Cels.* 3.47, 4.67-8, 4.54, 5.6-13, 6.1-4, 7.42, 7.44. As Marten also draws attention to, however, Origen is not always critical of philosophy, even saying that Christianity has some ideas in common with them in *Cels.* 3.81. For more positive comments, see *Hom. Gen.* 13.3; *Cels.* 1.4, 6.3, 6.13-14, 7.6, 7.45-47, 7.71; *Princ.* 1.3.1; *Ep. Ad Greg.* 2.
simultaneously philosophical and anti-biblical, and the competing views on embodiment were biblical and not philosophical.”

Martens concludes that “From his perspective, this doctrine with undeniable Greek roots did not corrode orthodox Christianity as the proponents of this thesis have contended, but rather precisely the opposite: it was deployed to help defend it.” In Chapter Two, I will provide examples of how Origen has defended his Christian faith using philosophical doctrines from Platonism to the Stoa.

The Origenist Controversy

The most intense controversy surrounding Origen, although it was not the first and would not be the last, is also the one most relevant to Rufinus’ translation process. In 553, the Fifth Ecumenical Council, wrote a series of fifteen anathemas against Origen. As Elizabeth Clark explains in her 1992 book, The Origenist Controversy, the charge of “Origenism” became a way of attacking the orthodoxy of Christians at the turn of the 5th century. The main weaknesses of Origen’s theology that came under attack concerned the Trinity, pre-existence of souls, and eschatology, and apokatastasis.

Clarks’s book investigates the controversy by deconstructing the debate between Jerome

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She views their discord through the lens of their divergent methods of translating Origen’s works from Greek to Latin, and thus Rufinus’ translations of Origen are also important in the controversy. Based on early letters written to Rufinus by his fellow writer-translator Jerome, the two were on good terms for some time. Unfortunately, at a certain point this friendship deteriorated somewhat, as evidenced by Jerome’s sharp criticisms of Rufinus’ work. Clark sees the controversy of Origen as mainly a social one, and one which was brought into sharp focus because the Origenist framework for investigation, which included the origin of the soul and free will (both relevant to this study), was no longer tenable in later Christian society. She states:

By the first quarter of the fifth century, it struck many Christians as bizarre and unwelcome teaching for human intelligence to be thought akin to that of the sun, moon, and stars; for all rational beings including the devil to be deemed capable of sloughing off not just sin, but bodilessness itself, and of regaining their primordial contemplative ecstasy; for the justice of God to be confessed as the singular divine attribute that must be upheld at all costs.

Some of Rufinus’ translation choices may have been informed by the Origenist controversy. Since Rufinus’ project took place in a time when the Christian corpus was being solidified, and, perhaps more importantly, standardized, the alterations to Origen’s text as rendered by Rufinus can illuminate the particular qualities of the original that later became problematic. As we will examine in more detail in Chapter Two, Origen did not seem to have any problem mixing his Christian devotion and philosophical inclinations. Later, however, these two identities came into conflict, and Origen’s philosophical identification with texts outside the Christian corpus had to be muted in order for his text to live on.

Ibid p. 245
Overview of Dissertation

This dissertation complements existing works on Rufinus’ translations of Origen, as well as those discussing Origen’s relationship to philosophy and his narrative of the soul’s descent. I make several important contributions in the following chapters. First, in Chapter One, I develop a methodological approach to working with ancient translation, one that treats the translation process as an overall narrative, providing a theoretical framework on which to ground the investigation of Rufinus as translator. In Chapter Two, I demonstrate what Rufinus left out during his process of translation, motivated in large part by a will to extract certain types of Hellenistic philosophy from Origen’s work. I use this knowledge to rethink the overall conception of Origen’s moral psychology as it is presented in Rufinus’ Latin texts. As Mark M.S. Scott states:

Origen remains a polarizing figure, however, partly because of his willingness to venture into unexplored theological territory and partly because of his ability to keep seemingly opposite positions in productive tension… His detractors failed to see the experimental and exploratory nature of his theology and were unable to grasp his synthetic genius and the apologetic motivation behind his integration of philosophy and theology… As only great minds can, he finds harmony where others see only antitheses. Part of his genius, then, is his ability to find truth in paradoxes.59

Rufinus, I will argue, has failed to capture Origen’s skill at weaving seemingly incompatible doctrines (both from Christian theology and competing philosophical schools) into the harmonious and intricate web of his thought. Much like in an intricately woven tapestry, pulling just one thread can quickly and easily unravel the whole piece. I will argue that Rufinus has done just that. In his attempt to blur certain philosophical allusions in Origen’s text, he has subverted Origen’s doctrine on free will and has created a new type of sinful thought. Last, in Chapter Three,

I propose another consequence of Rufinus’ process of translation: the interpolation of the works of Evagrius Ponticus into Origen.
Chapter Summaries

Chapter One: Translation as a Journey: Methodology for assessing Rufinus as a translator and his process of translation

Chapter One outlines the methodology for the dissertation. It provides an introduction to the translation theories used throughout, as well as outlines the specific tools with which I will analyze Rufinus’ work on Origen. First, it provides a holistic definition of translation, including both the final product and the process of translating. This definition then underpins the assessment of translation as a form of rewriting. The key elements in a theory of translation are laid out thereafter. The bulk of the chapter is concerned with detailing a specific methodology for approaching ancient translations. By combining modern theories of translation with arguments from Classics scholars, four categories of consideration will be presented: the expertise of the translator, considerations of audience, historical and political environment, and use of accessory texts. Finally, I will outline how to apply this methodology to the translations of Rufinus.

Chapter Two: Crossing the Border: Rufinus’ translation choices and their consequences for Origen’s doctrine on the soul’s journey to embodiment and the psychological processes of embodied thought

Chapter Two provides the necessary background for an engagement with the translations of Origen's works by tracing his theory of the soul as we find it in the extant Greek corpus. Special attention is paid to the terminology he uses to describe the soul's faculties, in particular with regard to human emotion, decision-making, and thought. Consideration is then given to exploring the
above topics in Platonic and Stoic sources. I intend to illuminate the influence of Platonism and Stoicism on Origen and Origen's appropriation of Platonic and Stoic terminology in his works. Attention is paid to the overarching historical and cultural context that allowed Origen readily to adopt philosophical terms in his writings. Once the similarities to Stoic and Platonic sources have been identified, it will thereby be easier to discover and assess the deviations found in Rufinus' translations. I will provide an overview of Rufinus’ process of translation of Origen’s moral psychology. Each section of this chapter presents each of the first three categories of analyzing translation covered in Chapter One: Rufinus’ expertise, his considerations of audience, and the effects of his historical and political environment. Each category will include an examination of Rufinus' process, relying on both his own commentaries as well as historical analysis and a close reading of the Greek and Latin texts relevant to each case. The two main purposes of this chapter are to establish that Rufinus made significant alterations to Origen's works in his translation project, and to illustrate the consequences of those alterations.

Chapter 3: In Foreign Lands: Evagrius’ works as accessory texts and their infiltration into Origen through Rufinus

This final chapter is focused on the analysis of a set of accessory texts used by Rufinus: the works of Evagrius. I will first explore the connection between Rufinus and Evagrius. Next, I will present close readings and examples of alterations to Origen's text that closely mirror the works of Evagrius. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the power that an intervening text can have. The works of Evagrius, emerging from a different time and perspective, have come to retroactively alter the translations of Origen in the process of translation. Finally, I will examine a consequence that Rufinus as rewriter, active agent, and author in his own right has enacted on Origen's text
through his translation: by cross-breeding Origen with Evagrius, Rufinus has created a new relationship between thought and sin.

Conclusions

Where Mark S.M. Scott’s task was the retrieval of Origen's thought, to “recover his neglected theological legacy”,60 mine is similarly to uncover Origen’s thought by shedding light on Rufinus as translator and active agent in the rewriting of Origen. To understand Rufinus as translator, we must begin with a method of analyzing translation and understanding the role of the translator. Chapter One begins with this task.

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60 Scott (2012: 7).
CHAPTER I

Translation as Journey

Methodology for assessing Rufinus as Translator and his process of translation

Translation Theory and its Application

Translation theory, although a relatively new field itself, has obvious interdisciplinary benefits and has developed to work seamlessly with other disciplines, including linguistics, philosophy, cultural studies, language engineering, and literary studies.\(^6\) Due to the relative lack of comprehensive studies of translation in antiquity in the field of Classical Studies, I have combined the approaches used by modern translation theorists with already established principles and methodologies in the field. In pursuit of this goal, I am greatly indebted to the works of modern Anglo-Saxon and post colonial translation theorists. Lawrence Venuti’s work on “invisible” translators has been especially helpful in directing my methodology in analyzing Rufinus’ translations. The works of Roger Bell and Jacques Derrida have also provided a stable base for discussion of translation as an intellectual implement. Amongst Classical, Byzantine, and Near Eastern scholars focusing on ancient translations, I will rely in particular on the work of Naomi Seidman, Marianne Pade, and Catherine Chin.

The main aim of this chapter is to lay down the framework for an analysis of translation. I will argue that translation is fundamentally a form of rewriting, and in some cases even closer to a

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commentary on the original text. I will first present a definition for translation that encompasses not only the product of translation but also the process. Next, the relevant theories from both modern translation theorists and scholars in Classics and related fields will be laid out. Following will be a discussion of the difficulties in producing a “transparent” translation, which is an impossible goal propagated by the current ideal of creating a translated text that can stand in place of the original. I will present a basic formula for a useful translation theory and within the framework of the former, I will proceed to outline the methodology used in this dissertation will be outlined. Using a modified version of Lawrence Venuti’s approach to modern Anglo-Saxon translations, I will conduct investigations in four categories which serve to reveal the entire process of translation: audience, politics and history, accessory texts, and the translator’s expertise. Examples will be provided on how each of these categories uncovers a piece of the story of a translation. Finally, I will provide a brief overview of how the above will be applied in the case of Origen, Rufinus, and Evagrius. Overall, this chapter endeavors to highlight the translator as an active and effective agent in the process of translation and not simply a conduit through which a text travels unaltered from one language to another. Furthermore, revealing the translator as agent will underline the importance of studying translation not only from the standpoint of the final product (the target language text), but also the utility of approaching the process of translation itself as a sort of history of the text; the journey the text takes is a story in itself, full of contact points at which it is vulnerable to outside influence on its way to being formed into the final translation.
A Complete Definition of Translation

The process of translation can appear to some as a task similar to mathematics: simply substituting one word in the source text for the equivalent one in the target language. This sort of concept of translation as a calculable formula is evidenced by the fact that modern technology is now used in foreign language learning to create word-for-word and line-by-line translations to aid in the mastery of a new language. The advent and ubiquitous use of online programs such as Google Translate also point to the idea that translation is somehow programmable. There is also an expectation that translated works are readily available, whether in print or digital format, in particular in dominant world languages (such as English). In a globalized world, most anyone can pick up a new book written across the world but conveniently available in her own tongue. Although it can appear to be an exact science, it is undeniable that a translated text cannot be viewed as equivalent in all senses to the original. Translators require more than to be simply trained to use a dictionary, and despite Google Translate’s popularity, it is far from capable of replacing a human translator. In the case of translation, then, what does a human have that a machine does not? She has the ability to understand the underlying context of a foreign text, which is colored not only by the plurality and varying shades of meaning inherent in each word and phrase, but also the underlying cultural environment\(^62\) in which the text was produced. She can then reproduce that context in another language, using a set of cultural norms inherent in the target language’s users.

\(^{62}\) According to Miller et al. (2010: 12), culture can be defined as “the social process whereby people communicate meanings, make sense of their world, construct their identities, and define their beliefs and values.” Seen from another perspective, as quoted in Levine, Donald, ed. (1971: 6) Simmel: On individuality and social forms. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Georg Simmel defines it as “the cultivation of individuals through the agency of external forms which have been objectified in the course of history”. Thus, culture can be viewed both on an individual level and on the level of broad scale societal organization and interaction.
Even if two translators approach the same text, they will necessarily produce different outputs precisely because they are not machines computing inputs and producing outputs based on one-to-one correspondence. Every word or phrase, every idiom used by a translator is the result of a choice. The powerful influence of the translator on her text cannot be emphasized enough.

Roger Bell (1991: 13) defines translation as an amalgam of three different subsections: translating (the process), a translation (the product) and translation (the abstract concept that includes both the process of translating and the outcome of translating: a translation). A proper discussion of translation in general necessarily includes all three parts making up the whole.

I will use Lawerence Venuti’s definition of the process of translating (inspired by Jacques Derrida) in this dissertation:

Translation is a process by which the chain of signifiers that constitutes the source-language text is replaced by a chain of signifiers in the target language which the translator provides on the strength of an interpretation. Because meaning is an effect of relations and differences among signifiers along a potentially endless chain (polysemous, intertextual, subject to infinite linkages), it is always differential and deferred, never present as an original unity.63

Although translation may appear as a creative form of mathematics, it is impossible to simply “replace” signifiers from one language to the next. It is, indeed, the overall goal in translation as specified by Venuti’s opening statement. However, the step is untenable without the addition of a translator’s interpretation. Meaning is relational, and the translator must interpret the context of a passage in order to translate even one word. This is of course the root of reason that computers today overwhelmingly fail at creating translations, in particular in the case of literary texts. The complexity of meaning as contextual prevents a simple substitution of one set of signifiers in one language to another set in another. As Venuti expresses in a different way,

“Meaning is a plural and contingent relation, not an unchanging unified essence, and therefore a translation cannot be judged according to mathematics-based concepts of semantic equivalence or one-to-one correspondence.”  

Because of the plurality of meaning and the unavoidable addition of the translator’s interpretation, analyzing the process of translation necessitates a more thorough analysis with a wide set of considerations.

Working under the above parameters, analysis of a translation should examine the mirror reflection of the translator in her text and the process of translation to reach the target language. It must treat the translator not as a mere conduit through which a text has the potential to be seamlessly transformed, but rather as an interpreter of the original text. I shall argue that dealing with a translation from the standpoint of the process requires one part paleography (dealing with possible manuscript errors, created by the translator, as one normally would working with potentially corrupt or incomplete manuscripts), and one part commentary analysis (considering a translation as a commentary on the original text rather than a replacement of it.), in order to fully understand the translation process.

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64 p. 18
The Invisible Translator: Translation as a Rewriting

A drawback to the overwhelming modern criteria for analyzing a translation, one which inevitably asserts its influence to a certain extent on the field of Classics (and other disciplines dealing with multi-lingual texts), is that rather than taking a holistic view, the emphasis often rests almost entirely on the readability of the target text instead:

A translated text, whether prose or poetry, fiction or nonfiction, is judged acceptable by most publishers, reviewers, and readers when it reads fluently, when the absence of any linguistic or stylistic peculiarities makes it seem transparent, giving the appearance that it reflects the foreign writer’s personality or intention or the essential meaning of the foreign text—the appearance, in other words, that the translation is not in fact a translation, but the “original.”

The result of this approach to textual analysis is that a text that reads fluently and adheres to the translator’s and target audience’s expectation and sense of taste is more likely to be considered a reliable translation; however, readability in the target language is far from a guarantee of faithfulness to the source.

There is still a great deal of emphasis on preserving the meaning and force of the original text. But in modern translation, and even in the translations that classicists themselves produce, readability often is also thought to be synonymous with faithfulness. The translator Norman Shapiro boldly claims:

I see translation as the attempt to produce a text so transparent that it does not seem to be translated. A good translation is like a pane of glass. You only notice that it's there when there are little imperfections—scratches, bubbles. Ideally, there shouldn't be any. It should never call attention to itself.

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65 Venuti (1999: 1)
66 Quoted by Venuti (1999: 1).
While this is a worthy goal for a translator, it underestimates the profound influence that she has on the text with which she engages.\(^{67}\) A pane of glass allows a clear view of what is behind it without distortion. However, the very act of translation is a distortion, and thus can never function in the way Shapiro describes. In fact, there are countless other variables at play even in the original text, and these variables are only compounded when rendered in a new language. Both the translator and the original author are under the influence of forces both internal and external.

Venuti summarizes:

Both foreign text and translation are derivative: both consist of diverse linguistic and cultural materials that neither the foreign writer nor the translator originates, and that destabilize the work of signification, inevitably exceeding and possibly conflicting with their intentions. As a result, a foreign text is the site of many different semantic possibilities that are fixed only provisionally in any one translation, on the basis of varying cultural assumptions and interpretive choices, in specific social situations, in different historical periods.\(^{68}\)

The interpretation of non-translated texts has become standard and obvious to scholars. Uncovering what is “derivative” in a text and under what variety of influences the author composed it is an established part of modern scholarly work. But, this “derivativeness” is compounded in translation, depending entirely on the “cultural assumptions” and “interpretive choices” of the individual translator in his own time and environment. Uncovering these factors is crucial to understanding the translation process.

If we cannot view translation as transparent and ineffective, the question that must be considered is how one can judge a “good” translation. Furthermore, what does it mean for a

\(^{67}\) See Venuti (1999; 1-2): “The illusion of transparency is an effect of fluent discourse, of the translator’s effort to insure easy readability by adhering to current usage, maintaining continuous syntax, fixing a precise meaning. What is so remarkable here is that this illusory effect conceals the numerous conditions under which the translation is made, starting with the translator’s crucial intervention in the foreign text The more fluent the translation, the more invisible the translator, and, presumably, the more visible the writer or meaning of the foreign text.”

\(^{68}\) p. 4
translation to go unnoticed, and what can this say about the process of translation? Ultimately, what constitutes a good translation involves a complex number of factors and relative calculations. “Good” is judged differently depending on whether one considers it form the point of view of the original author or its new readers, and a translation that does not draw attention to itself may very well be quite pleasing to readers in the target language but may nevertheless have travelled a long way from the source text.

Unfortunately, considering a translation as something that can be transparent (or should be) is rather misleading. More than just a conduit or a pane of glass, as Lawrence Venuti emphasizes, translation is a process of “rewriting”.69 More specifically, it is a “manipulation, undertaken in the service of power”.70 The transfer from one language to the next entails alteration, no matter the diligence or skill of the translator. The translator has complete power over the text, as well as power over what and how he transmits it to his target audience. No matter the process, a translation is committing some violence to the original text. This is not meant to disparage translation as a practice. Indeed, it has many positive effects. For one, Venuti writes that these rewritings “can help in the evolution of a literature and a society. Rewritings can introduce new concepts, new genres, new devices, and the history of translation is the history also of literary innovation, of the shaping power of one culture upon another”.71 As we will see in the following sections, rewritings and alterations made through translation can bring foreign and seemingly inexplicable concepts to new audiences, or can make cultural, scientific, or historical concepts clear to non-expert readers. It can create connections that were not previously tenable and enhances the flow of knowledge across languages and cultures. On the negative side, rewriting “can also repress innovation, distort and

69 See Venuti (1999; 8).
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid
contain.” The original text is completely at the mercy of the translator. She is able to impart a version of the text to her target community in the way she deems most suitable. It may be in accordance to her own personal tastes, or perhaps simply in line with her current cultural environment. She is colored by her own experiences, culture, morals and values. Ultimately, the translator is exercising absolute power over the text: “All rewritings, whatever their intention, reflect a certain ideology and a poetics and as such manipulate literature to function in a given society in a given way.” Unveiling the manipulative power of translation is one of the main aims of this dissertation.

Whether the manipulation of texts is positive or negative, or whether the translator’s intention has a role to play, in the end it is important to simply be aware that these influences exist. “The violence wreaked by translation is partly inevitable, inherent in the translation process, partly potential, emerging at any point in the production and reception of the translated text, varying with specific cultural and social formations at different historical moments.” The assumption of translation as rewriting and the inevitability of violence on a translated text can help scholars study and better situate these special texts in their own time and socio-political environment, and contributes to a better overall understanding of their place in history.

Naturally, scholars who work with texts across various languages have more sophisticated techniques for analyzing translations than mass market publishers and their readers (from where many of the above expectations for translated texts come). However, some of the overall mentality from these contemporary sources still bleeds into scholarship analyzing translation as well. There is

72 Ibid
73 Venuti (1999: 8).
no doubt that current trends in translation have an effect on the discipline of Classics, in particular for those who are not themselves involved with the methods of translation theory.75

The most recent translations of the Odyssey and the Aeneid are two good examples of the juggling act inherent in translating ancient texts, as well as how these translations are evaluated by modern scholars and publishers.

A principal challenge inherent in both aforementioned texts is rendering Greek and Latin metered poetry into English. Even a very simple example from antiquity can suffice to illustrate the point. The first line of the Iliad, in Greek, μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος is enough to elicit a necessary compromise. Peter Green’s translation (“Wrath, goddess, sing of Achilles Peleus's son's”), and Robert Fagles’ (“Rage--Goddess sing the rage of Peleus's son Achilles”) both retain μῆνιν as the first word. Richmond Lattimore renders it “Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son Achilleus”. On the one hand, Green and Fagles keep the emphasis in the correct place. It is a poetic work, and in poetry (but also to a greater or lesser degree in prose), the word order makes up part of the artistic portrayal as well. We are meant to see the word μῆνιν first in this poem. On the other hand, retaining this word order is a stretch for the English language.

Some translators (such as Robert Fagles), chose to simply to bypass this issue by writing in free verse and sticking to the content rather than the composition. Others have crafted English versions in meter but prefer iambic pentameter (such as Richmond Lattimore) because it is more fitting to the English language than the original dactylic hexameter.

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75 On the current status of modern translations, Venuti (1995; 2) states: “On those rare occasions when reviewers address the translation at all, their brief comments usually focus on its style, neglecting such other possible questions as its accuracy, its intended audience, its economic value in the current book market, its relation to literary trends in English, its place in the translator’s career.“ Much of this general conception of translation is also prevalent in commentaries on ancient translations, as we saw in the case of Graves, and will encounter again in the case of Rufinus.
Gregory Hays, in his review of Emily Wilson’s new 2018 translation of the Odyssey, underscores a strength of her translation is that it attempts to stay as true to the original poetic feel and structure as possible. Wilson adheres to a strict iambic pentameter, and even commits to maintaining the same number of lines in the English version as there are in the original. This does illustrate a growing preference in the field for maintaining as much of the feel of the original as possible. Retaining the meter as strictly as possible certainly reaches for Schleiermacher’s ideal of creating an equivalent relationship between audience and text in translation.

Ultimately, there are still signs of modern translation’s preference for the readability of the target text. The publisher’s blurb of Wilson’s translation praises it as “A lean, fleet-footed translation”, refers to it as “fresh” and “authoritative”, “Written in iambic pentameter verse and a vivid, contemporary idiom”. The reviews similarly use key terms pointing to fluency and readability in English, lauding it as “fluent”, “elegant”, “irresistibly readable”, and “the most accessible, yet accurate translation of Homer’s masterwork that I have ever read”.

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78 Ibid. “A masterpiece of translation—fluent, elegant, vigorous.” — Rowan Williams, Master of Magdalene College, University of Cambridge

“Irresistibly readable…turns Homeric epic into a poetic feast.” — Froma Zeitlin, Princeton University

“A staggeringly superior translation—true, poetic, lively and readable, and always closely engaged with the original Greek—that brings to life the fascinating variety of voices in Homer’s great epic.” — Richard F. Thomas, Harvard University

“This will surely be the Odyssey of choice for a generation.” — Lorna Hardwick, The Open University, London
There is also evidence that evaluators of new Greek and Latin translations admit the translator’s inherent powerful agency over the text, although they at times do so obliquely. When commenting on David Ferry’s translation of Vergil’s eighth Eclogue, April Bernard remarks:

Here Virgil (or is it Ferry?) hangs perfectly poised between the personal and the general, between private suffering and the public good made from it—the public good that, in an ocean of lies, continues to survive in poetry’s truth.

She is admitting here the extent to which Ferry has control over the text he has translated. Whose verse are we really reading, Vergil’s or Ferry’s? To be an excellent translator of poetry, one must also be an excellent poet.

That even translation of classical works has been colored by modern sentiment (driven mainly by the fluency and readability of the target language text) on what constitutes a praiseworthy translation is not to say that there has been no thorough or thoughtful analysis of Rufinus. In the specific case of Rufinus, many scholars have voiced their opinions on the quality of his translations (to be discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections), but we lack a specific system of analysis, and thus it is difficult to draw convincing conclusions. In the following section, I will outline a series of themes to consider in the analysis of a translation. The application and analysis of these themes should aid in tracing the influences the translator has on the process of creating a text. As Venuti concludes, “the study of the manipulative processes of literature as exemplified by translation can help us toward a greater awareness of the world in which we live.”

The following section will outline how we can uncover the rewritings in Rufinus’ translations and

“Emily Wilson has produced a clear, vigorous, sensitive Odyssey that conveys both the grand scale and the individual pathos of this foundational story. This is the most accessible, and yet accurate, translation of Homer’s masterwork that I have ever read.” — Susan Wise Bauer, author of The History of the Ancient World

thus gain a more acute awareness of the history of his translated text, and the specific process undergone through translation.

**Building a theory of translation**

It is possible to build a theory of translation that focuses on the product of the translation or the process itself. But developing a comprehensive theory of translation requires not only a careful examination of the end product of translation, but also an intimate awareness and understanding of how a translation is produced, thereby combining the analysis of process and product. Roger Bell\(^{80}\) delineates these three potential translation theories in the following way:

1. “A theory of translation as process. This would require a study of information processing and would draw heavily on psychology and on psycholinguistics.”
2. “A theory of translation as product. This would require a study of texts not merely by means of the traditional levels of linguistic analysis (syntax and semantics) but also making use of stylistics and recent advances in text-linguistics and discourse analysis.”
3. “A theory of translation as both process and product. This would require the integrated study of both and such a general theory is, presumably, the long-term goal for translation studies.”

According to Eddie Ronowicz\(^{81}\) (2006:2), an ideal theory must possess five characteristics:

1. Consistent with other knowledge
2. Consistent within itself

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(3) Consistent in the use of terminology

(4) “Elegant”

(5) Empirically verifiable

Finally, Ronowicz states that a theory of translation consists of five components: assumptions or axioms, methodology, language, descriptions and explanations.\(^82\)

In addition to Ronowicz’s criterion, Bell adds the following necessary characteristics of a good translation theory\(^83\):

(1) “determinism: it must be able to predict”

(2) “parsimony: it must be simple”

(3) “generality: it must be comprehensive.”

This dissertation attempts to create a workable and comprehensive translation theory for application in the case of Rufinus and Origen that in line with Bell above: incorporating an analysis of both the process of translation and the product. That it is consistent with other knowledge, within itself, in its use of terminology, elegant, and empirically verifiable, as well as embodying Bell’s three necessary characteristics shall be demonstrated in due course.

The incorporation of a study of both the process and product can be accomplished in two phases: first, analyzing the translator and his influences (to unfold the process of translation), and second, engaging in a detailed linguistic and stylistic analysis of the translation itself in the context of the procedural findings (to reveal the product of the translation). I will assume the basic structure of Venuti’s model for analyzing a translator and his translation, adding two critical aspects necessary for the examination of Rufinus’ translations.

\(^82\) Ibid
\(^83\) Bell (1991: 27).
Venuti’s terms his own method for analyzing a translation “symptomatic reading”, a process in which he endeavors to ground a reading of translated texts on a “foreignizing method of translation that assumes a determinate concept of subjectivity.”[^84] A symptomatic reading treats a translated text as an amalgam of influences, each word, phrase, sentence, idiom, or passage as a whole as a symptom of the translation process. This method ensures that the translator does not remain “invisible”, but he and his process of translation rather become part of the narrative of a translated text. The end goal of this kind of reading is the following:

To combat the translator’s invisibility with a history of—and in opposition to—contemporary English-language translation. Insofar as it is a cultural history with a professed political agenda, it follows the genealogical method developed by Nietzsche and Foucault and abandons the two principles that govern much conventional historiography: teleology and objectivity.[^85]

Venuti’s use of the genealogical method is helpful because it helps us to view translation as a part of the history of the text. The translator has connections and is under various influences that naturally become part of the translation itself. Although Venuti’s material is contemporary English language translations, the basic tenets of his theory can be applied in the case of ancient translations as well. Viewing a translated text as a part of the socio-political history rather than a stand-in for the original texts can prove very fruitful no matter the date of the text, or the language pair. Venuti in theory assumes a “foreignizing method of translation” which is a key matter of consideration in analyzing translated texts. A translator can approach the text to be translated in a foreignizing or domesticating way. A translator who creates the target text while prioritizing the source text is engaging in a foreignizing method of translation. Domesticizing is the opposite: prioritizing the needs of the target language in creating the translation. The latter results in a translation that sounds very “natural” in the target language. As we will see, the general preference

in modern translation is the domesticating method (although a curious example of success of a foreignizing method, in the case of Haruki Murakami, will be presented). In addition to outlining Venuti’s own symptomatic reading as a method for approaching translation, leading domesticating and foreignizing theories will be examined.

Venuti’s examination of foreignizing and domesticating translations is conducted through two main channels: an analysis of how the translator interacts with his potential audience, and the consideration of potential political and cultural influences. Naomi Seidman, as we will see, also adapts Venuti’s method and brings the politics and history in Jewish and Christian translations in sharper focus.

I will add to this investigation two more categories of consideration: accessory texts and the capability of the translator. An accessory text is one which is used to triangulate a proper translation into the target language. While using a third text to verify a translation can on the one hand add strength and legitimacy to a translation, it can equally cause harm if the accessory text is poorly chosen. While Venuti does touch briefly on the general concept of accessory text (which will be discussed in greater detail below), I believe for the purposes of translations in Classics, and particular in the case of ancient Christian and philosophical texts, a consideration of accessory texts is crucial. Arguments from scholars who have put the study of accessory texts to use will also be presented.

The consideration of the capability of the translator is one which is already being exercised in the field. Research into translators such as Rufinus typically include a summary and analysis of the life, experiences, and expertise of the translator. My aim in including it as an “addition” to Venuti’s method is only to give this set of data a more central role: no longer simply a part of the “background”, but rather a vital piece of the analysis of a translated text.
The Translator’s Audience

The target audience of a translation can have a considerable impact on how the translator works. The target language also plays a role. What may be natural and comprehensible in one language may not translate well into another. We can take an example from modern marketing translation to illustrate this. Braniff International Airways’ slogan “Fly in leather”, a phrase that brings to mind images of luxury and class to English-speakers, was unfortunately translated quite literally into Spanish as “Vuela en cuero”, an idiom meaning “fly naked”. This is a case of translator error due to apparent unfamiliarity with the target language. A translator who could recognize that a literal translation would not suffice would have to make a choice about whether to keep something that may be sound awkward to her target readers, or rather make adjustments so that the text has a natural feeling in the target language. Similarly, readers of the target language may have certain expectations or preferences when it comes to the text being translated. The translator may try to fulfill these expectations. In general, a translator can consider what would be the most digestible to her target audience (domesticizing the text), or she can endeavor to retain the foreign elements of a text in the target language (foreignizing). In the following, I will first set up Schleiermacher’s Dichotomy: the choice between domesticating and foreignizing translation. A domesticating translation is created with the target audience in mind and is exemplified by the current dominant conception of a good translation, as discussed above. A foreignizing translation prefers to stay as close to the source text as possible, even if it means at times sacrificing the comfort of the target audience. Next, I will present two examples: one of the result of a foreignizing translation (Haruki Murakami), and the other of a domesticating one (Leo Tolstoy).

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These examples will be followed by an examination of two translation theories, one from Eugene Nida and the other from Philip Lewis. Finally, I will look more in-depth at Venuti’s symptomatic reading method and present two examples of its application (analyzing translations of Sigmund Freud and Robert Graves).

Schleiermacher’s Dichotomy

Friedrich Schleiermacher maintained that there are two options when a translator considers the interaction between the text and the reader: “Either the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as possible, and moves the reader towards him; or he leaves the reader in peace, as much as possible, and moves the author towards him” (as quoted by Lefevere 1977:74).87 By moving the reader towards the author, the translator retains the foreign aspects of the text, perhaps rendering some of the phrases and sentences in unnatural ways in the target language. Venuti summarizes that a translation such as this “signifies the difference of the foreign text, yet only by disrupting the cultural codes that prevail in the target language.”88 It is likely that some readers may find the text uncomfortable to read, as they are being transported abroad to the world of the source text. Although they recognize the language of the text, they cannot find their culture in it. Venuti summarizes this effect, writing that “In its effort to do right abroad, this translation method must do wrong at home, deviating enough from native norms to stage an alien reading experience” 89 In a contemporary Anglo-American culture that values fluency and readability in translated texts, a text

87 See also Venuti (1995: 20): “Schleiermacher allowed the translator to choose between a domesticating method, an ethnocentric reduction of the foreign text to target-language cultural values, bringing the author back home, and a foreignizing method, an ethnodeviant pressure on those values to register the linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text, sending the reader abroad.”
89 Ibid.
that has been translated in this way could be accused of being written in “translationese”. Naturally, even a text translated using a foreignizing method cannot be said to be without alterations. Although, according to Venuti:

Schleiermacher made clear that his choice was foreignizing translation, and this led the French translator and translation theorist Antoine Berman to treat Schleiermacher’s argument as an ethics of translation, concerned with making the translated text a place where a cultural other is manifested—although, of course, an otherness that can never be manifested in its own terms, only in those of the target language, and hence always already encoded.90

Considering the foreignizing method an “ethics” of translation creates the illusion that this method is doing less violence to the text by retaining its otherness. However, since the dramatic transformation of rendering the text into another language is still necessary, and because language translation isn’t as simple as plugging in new words with a one-to-one correspondence, the foreignness is still only accessible through a distorted picture. Thus, though it may have some advantages over the domesticizing translation, the first and foremost being that it endeavors to retain as many original features of the text as possible, a foreignizing translator cannot be considered invisible, nor her text without its own part in the historical narrative.

Schleiermacher’s other option, to move the author closer to the reader, is domesticizing the text. The reader feels as though they are in a comfortable space, accessing a foreign text from the comfort of their own home. The vocabulary used in the translation is up to date and relevant in the target language and culture. Subtle, or sometimes quite overt choices may be taken to align the translated text to current social and cultural norms in the target language society. Further, there are often short elaborations and explanations added by the translator that help to orient the reader in this foreign world. As we will see, Rufinus engages in this kind of translation. He does not leave

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Origen alone in the 3rd century, rather he brings Origen closer to 5th century Latin-speaking Christian readers. He both adds to the text to bring context to the reader and makes alterations and extractions that bring the text in line with the contemporary Christian norms.

Foreignizing Translation: Haruki Murakami

An example of a foreignizing translation can be found amongst the translated works of Haruki Murakami, a Japanese author of bestselling books both in Japan and abroad. His works have been translated into 50 languages, including English. Murakami chose Jay Rubin as his official translator for his 1997 collection of stories, *The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle*, and this propelled his novel to the mainstream in the English-speaking world. However, another translation, made by Alfred Birnbaum in a collection of Murakami’s stories that included the same story Rubin translated, became a fan favorite and has since become the voice of Murakami in English today.

The introductory passage of book will be compared below:

When the phone rang I was in the kitchen, boiling a potful of spaghetti and whistling along with an FM broadcast of the overture to Rossini’s *The Thieving Magpie*, which has to be the perfect music for cooking pasta.


I’m in the kitchen cooking spaghetti when the woman calls. Another moment until the spaghetti is done; there I am, whistling the prelude to Rossini’s *La Gazza Ladra* along with the FM radio. Perfect spaghetti-cooking music.

*The Elephant vanishes*, trans. Alfred Birnbaum

Although a thorough evaluation of the above translations should include an analysis of Murakami’s original Japanese text, I believe there is still much to be learned about the process of translation and the intention of the translator simply by comparing the two English versions. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, Venuti’s method of analyzing translations can be applied only

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to the target text (in cases where either the scholar does not know the source language, or the original is not available). This can also prove fruitful in cases where an original text is lost, as often happens in the case of Rufinus.

The first example, written by Murakami’s chosen translator, has a smooth and comfortable style. It combines the entire scene into one grammatically correct and complete sentence. The dependent clauses flow naturally from one to the next, and the relative clause leads clearly from its antecedent. The tense choices are natural for the context. The simple past “rang” and past continuous “was boiling” and “[was] whistling” are used to indicate an interrupted action in the past. Furthermore, the title of the opera piece is given in English. These all serve to bring the text closer to the English-speaking audience. It is easy and clear to read. There are no foreign elements, let alone words, for the reader to grapple with.

On the other hand, the second version has an entirely different tone and flow. Birnbaum chose to break the scene into four sentences, creating a more disjointed sequence of events. The use of narrative present tense throughout, although not at all incorrect usage, lends an urgency to the events and even adds a bit of foreignness to the text in comparison to the more flowing and natural sounding tense changes used by Rubin. Birnbaum also chose to leave Rossini’s opera in Italian, further adding a foreign feeling to the text, as well as making the narrator seem more educated and pretentious. Of course, the foreignness in this case does not stems from the original language, but nevertheless represents a decision not to bring the text fully to the reader by rendering the title in English. In Birnbaum’s translation, the final sentence is not properly a full sentence. While sentence fragments can also be found in original English language literature, it still draws attention to itself, especially when compared to Rubin’s translation. Birnbaum also chose to render the more forced and awkward “spaghetti-cooking music”, which requires that he create a new complex noun in English, rather than Rubin’s solution of expanding the idea into a phrase “the perfect music for
cooking pasta”. In addition, Birnbaum repeats the word “spaghetti” at both the beginning and the end, rather than the perhaps stylistically more elegant solution of first specifying that he is cooking spaghetti and later simply referring to pasta. Thus, it appears that Rubin was concerned with making the target audience comfortable, whereas Birnbaum created a text that could at times leave the audience feeling the opposite.

Domesticating Translation: Leo Tolstoy

Two interesting examples of domesticizing translations can be found in two translations of War and Peace. A hefty and dense novel, full of culturally and historically specific details about nineteenth-century Russia, it is no doubt a difficult text to translate into English, and two translators took the liberty of domesticizing their translations in order to better appeal to their target audiences. First, British translator Andrew Bromfield received mixed reviews in 2006 when he took the liberty of creating Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace in English as a shorter, happier novel. The Russian publisher of the Bromfield War and Peace stated that this version of the novel is “twice as short, four times as interesting … more peace, less war.” This was seen as major violence against the original text and is an extreme example of a type of domesticizing a translation. Finally, the publisher defended its choice by pointing out that the text was translated using an older manuscript written by Tolstoy that he later expanded. Although this means that the choices the translator made were not as violent to the text as it originally seemed (he did not arbitrarily choose which sections to cut, nor did he write a happy ending himself), it still is an excellent example of domesticizing translation. Bromfield and the publishers deliberately chose a version of the text (arguably an unfinished one) because they anticipated that it would be more pleasing to their target audience.

The “more peace” text, complete with a happy ending fits nicely into the twenty first-century English-speaking world, certainly more so than a long, complex, depressing novel.

Similarly, Constance Garnett came under fire for her translations of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. She translated large volumes of text in an incredibly short amount of time (creating 70 translations of Russian literature throughout her lifetime) and was known to skip over awkward passages. D.H. Lawrence, who knew Garnett, wrote that she was often sitting out in the garden turning out reams of her marvelous translations from the Russian. She would finish a page, and throw it off on a pile on the floor without looking up, and start a new page. The pile would be this high…really almost up to her knees, and all magical.\(^94\)

She received a great deal of criticism from Russian speakers, who accused her of making the translations too British. In a review of her translation of Dostoyevsky’s *Notes from Underground*, Kornei Chukovsky wrote:

> In reading the original, who does not feel the convulsions, the nervous trembling of Dostoevsky’s style? It is expressed in convulsions of syntax, in a frenzied and somehow piercing diction where malicious irony is mixed with sorrow and despair. But with Constance Garnett it becomes a safe blandscript: not a volcano, but a smooth lawn mowed in the English manner—which is to say a complete distortion of the original.\(^95\)

With similar sentiments, Joseph Brodsky theorized that “The reason English-speaking readers can barely tell the difference between Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky is that they aren’t reading the prose of either one. They’re reading Constance Garnett.”\(^96\) Garnett is obviously being accused of translation in a domesticating manner. While her texts might read quite smoothly and easily in English, her Russian critics uncover that this resulted in a “distortion” of the original. The remark that readers of her translations are not actually reading the original Russian authors, but they are


rather “reading Constance Garnett” illustrates quite clearly the translator’s powerful agency in the process, and the potential for rewriting and enacting violence on the source text through the process of translation.

While the above examples involve conscious efforts to appease a particular audience, a translator can also unconsciously make adjustments to the texts they are working on based on audience expectation.97

In the end, knowing the audience of the translated work can have a marked effect on the translator. Whether a translator makes purposeful moves to render the text more digestible to their target audience, as in the case with the War and Peace translation, or if it is simply a consideration of time and practicality, as with Constance Garnett, it is important to take note of any audience-based influence on the translated text. It is worth noting that although overt displays of domesticizing or altering a text in any way is received with skepticism, these practices often happen in a more subtle way. As we will see in the following, those who engage in domesticizing translation are often regarded as the most faithful and impartial.

_Nida’s Dynamic Equivalence_

Eugene Nida’s theory of translation was first developed in 1964, and later expanded and developed in numerous books and articles. Inspired by his work as a bible translator, his theory focuses on translating as a process, and considers how the audience interacts with the target text. A

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97 See Venuti (1995; 18-19): “The aim of translation is to bring back a cultural other as the same, the recognizable, even the familiar; and this aim always risks a wholesale domestication of the foreign text, often in highly self-conscious projects, where translation serves an appropriation of foreign cultures for domestic agendas, cultural, economic, political. Translation can be considered the communication of a foreign text, but it is always a communication limited by its address to a specific reading audience.”
consideration of this method reveals that it rests on a mixture of domesticizing and foreignizing translation. Nida describes “A translation of dynamic equivalence aims at complete naturalness of expression, and tries to relate the receptor to modes of behavior relevant within the context of his own culture.”\(^98\) He prioritized the rendering of the source language text “first in terms of meaning and secondly in terms of style”.\(^99\) His shift towards considering the target language text and how to most effectively reproduce the text with a “naturalness of expression” effectively domesticizes the foreign text\(^100\) and has exerted considerable influence worldwide in translation theory and practice, particularly in Germany, the United States, England and China. On the other hand, it also has been criticized by some scholars as too narrow (focusing only on Biblical texts) and ultimately unattainable, since the translator cannot know for sure what the effect on each reader will be.\(^101\)

According to Nida, achieving “dynamic equivalence” requires a consideration not of one-to-one translation or emphasis on structure or grammar. Rather, it involves identifying the relationship of the text to the reader and the experience transmitted through their interaction. Thus,

one is not so concerned with matching the receptor-language message with the source-language message, but with the dynamic relationship, that the relationship between the receptor and the message should be substantially the same as that which existed between the original receptors and the message.”\(^102\)

Furthermore,

Dynamic equivalence is therefore to be defined in terms of the degree to which the receptors of the message in the receptor language respond to it in substantially the same manner as the receptors in the source language.”\(^103\)

\(^{98}\) Nida (1964:159).
\(^{99}\) Nida and Taber (1969: 12).
\(^{100}\) See also Venuti (1995; 39): “The phrase ‘naturalness of expression’ signals the importance of a fluent strategy to this theory of translation, and in Nida’s work it is obvious that fluency involves domestication.”
\(^{102}\) Nida (1964: 159).
\(^{103}\) Nida and Taber, (1969:24).
Achieving dynamic equivalence in translating involves two further priorities:

1) The devaluation of exact and literal translations. According to Nida, “strict verbal consistency may result in serious distortion of the meaning.” 104 Thus, relying on an interpretation of individual meanings of words, or attempting to follow the structure or linguistic style of the source text may ultimately change the meaning in the translation because the readers will interact with it differently from the readers of the original text. A strange or foreign translation will produce a different result in the readers than one that focuses on creating fluent prose.

2) The prioritization of the needs of the audience. Nida maintains that “the translator must be a person who can draw aside the curtains of linguistic and cultural differences so that people may see clearly the relevance of the original message”. 105 Here, the goal is to render the text with the audience in mind. The text must be readable and understandable in the target language, as well as relay the original message.

Although Nida prioritizes the target language and the needs of his audience, he does place emphasis on accurately rendering the foreign text (and the inherent difficulties therein), admitting that “an easy and natural style in translating, despite the extreme difficulty of producing it […] is nevertheless essential to producing in the ultimate receptors a response similar to that of the original receptors”. 106 In this way, the target language readers should relate to the text in the same way that the source language readers do. 107 Indeed this is a monumental task for the translator, who

105 Nida and de Waard (1986:14).
107 See Venuti (1995; 40) on this point: “he is in fact imposing the English-language valorization of transparent discourse on every foreign culture, masking a basic disjunction between the source-and target-language texts which puts into question the possibility of eliciting a “similar” response.”
should be able to create the effect that “the receptors of a translation should comprehend the translated text to such an extent that they can understand how the original receptors must have understood the original text”. Ultimately, this method still produces a domesticated text, since it prioritizes the needs of the target language audience and emphasizes fluency and readability. The relevance of the text is specific to the reader and her cultural norms.

Lewis’ Abusive Fidelity

On the opposite end of the spectrum to Nida, we find Philip Lewis. His concept of “abusive fidelity” rests on the assumption that one must resist domestication of a text. He endeavors to resist the temptation of achieving fluency in the target language, and rather prefers a “translation that values experimentation, tampers with usage, seeks to match the polyvalencies or plurivocities or expressive stresses of the original by producing its own” (Lewis 1985:41). This method actively resists conforming to the expectations of the target language and culture. It is self-conscious of the potential damage that a domesticizing translation can enact on a text. Even so, it cannot avoid altering the text. As Venuti puts it, “Such a translation strategy can best be called resistancy, not merely because it avoids fluency, but because it challenges the target-language culture even as it enacts its own ethnocentric violence on the foreign text”.

108 Ibid. p. 36.
109 See Venuti (1995: 32) on the relevance of the translation: “This is of course a relevance to the target-language culture, something with which foreign writers are usually not concerned when they write their texts, so that relevance can be established in the translation process only by replacing source- language features that are not recognizable with target-language ones that are… Communication here is initiated and controlled by the target- language culture, it is in fact an interested interpretation, and therefore it seems less an exchange of information than an appropriation of a foreign text for domestic purposes.”
110 Venuti (199: 22).
Venuti’s Symptomatic Reading

Venuti describes the preferred method used in *Translator’s Invisibility* as his “own attempt to ground a symptomatic reading of translated texts on a foreignizing method of translation that assumes a determinate concept of subjectivity.” 111 This method recognizes the inevitable effect that a translation has on the text and attempts to be aware of this both when translating and when working with translations. This method of reading also is cognizant of how to recognize these alternations and thereby combat the idea of transparency in translation:

In some translations, the discontinuities are readily apparent, unintentionally disturbing the fluency of the language, revealing the inscription of the domestic culture; other translations bear prefaces that announce the translator’s strategy and alert the reader to the presence of noticeable stylistic peculiarities. 112

As we will see, Venuti’s methodology can also be applied first by looking only at the translated texts alone without the source text. Besides shining light on the translator as visible and effective, Venuti’s symptomatic reading also acknowledges the historical environment surrounding even the process of uncovering the translation process:

A symptomatic reading, in contrast, is historicizing: it assumes a concept of determinate subjectivity that exposes both the ethnocentric violence of translating and the interested nature of its own historicist approach. 113

The historical environment, as we will see in the examples below, of the readers of the text is another crucial element to consider. A translation (or any text) will be read and interpreted differently depending on the present historical, societal, and cultural circumstances. What follows are two examples of a symptomatic reading of two translations: Freud and Suetonius.

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111 Venuti (199: 29).
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
Example One: A Symptomatic Reading of Freud

Venuti demonstrates his method of symptomatic reading in the case of the translation of Freud’s texts for the Standard Edition. Although the Standard Edition was nearly unequivocally lauded as the most relevant and faithful translation of Freud, it was not until the criticism of Bruno Bettelheim that potential issues arose. Bettelheim concluded that the English translation can make Freud’s writings “appear to readers of English as abstract, depersonalized, highly theoretical, erudite, and mechanized—in short, “scientific”—statements about the strange and very complex workings of our mind”.\footnote{Bettelheim (1988:5).} He argues that this is, in fact, in contradiction to Freud’s simpler and more comprehensible German text. In one example, he points out that the translation uses the term “parapraxis”. While this is a very scientific term in English, it is in fact a translation of the much simpler German word 

\textit{Fehlleistungen}, which Bettelheim would have rendered as “faulty achievement”.\footnote{Ibid. (1983: 87).}

In this instance, as well as others, Venuti argues that a close reading of the German text is not even necessary to realize the stylistic inconsistencies in the translation. For example, they can be garnered even from the following passage in English:

I now return to the forgetting of names. So far we have not exhaustively considered either the case-material or the motives behind it. As this is exactly the kind of parapraxis that I can from time to time observe abundantly in myself, I am at no loss for examples. The mild attacks of migraine from which I still suffer usually announce themselves hours in advance by my forgetting names, and at the height of these attacks, during which I am not forced to abandon my work, it frequently happens that all proper names go out of my head.\footnote{Freud (1960: 21).}

As Venuti points out, the diction of the passage is on the whole “so simple and common (‘forgetting’), even colloquial (‘go out of my head’), that ‘parapraxis’ represents a conspicuous
difference, an inconsistency in word choice which exposes the translation process.”

In addition to the strange juxtaposition of personal “everyday” examples that Freud uses, he himself underscores the non-specialized nature of his work in a footnote:

“This book is of an entirely popular character; it merely aims, by an accumulation of examples, at paving the way for the necessary assumption of unconscious yet operative mental processes, and it avoids all theoretical considerations on the nature of the unconscious.”

In light of the above, the Standard Edition of Freud’s writings have certain domesticating and misleading elements that have gone almost entirely unnoticed until recently. Freud’s texts can seem unapproachable to the average English reader, and perhaps the translator rendered them in this way because of a contemporary prevailing culture of psychology as an “expert” and theoretical discipline, and not one that is regularly accessed by laymen. Whatever the reasons behind it, this anecdotal example illustrates that even in the case of translations that are generally accepted as standard, closer examinations may reveal inconsistencies. The field of Classics is not exempt from this anomaly, as the following example will show.

Example Two: A Symptomatic Reading of Graves

Robert Graves, widely known as the author of the novel I, Claudius, can be thanked for a number of translations, including Suetonius’s Twelve Caesars. This particular translation, published as a Penguin Classics text, was for many years considered an “accurate” translation. Despite its wide success and praise as a transparent translation, Graves himself admitted quite directly in his preface that he used a domesticating approach to the translation:

For more detailed and extensive examples, see Venuti (1995: 38): “a comparison between the English versions of key Freudian terms easily demonstrates the inconsistency in kinds of diction I have located in the translated passage: ‘id’ vs. ‘unconscious’; ‘cathexis’ vs. ‘charge,’ or ‘energy’; ‘libidinal’ vs. ‘sexual.’”

Freud (1960: 272n.).
For English readers Suetonius’s sentences, and sometimes even groups of sentences, must often be turned inside-out. Wherever his references are incomprehensible to anyone not closely familiar with the Roman scene, I have also brought up into the text a few words of explanation that would normally have appeared in a footnote. Dates have been everywhere changed from the pagan to the Christian era; modern names of cities used whenever they are more familiar to the common reader than the classical ones; and sums in sesterces reduced to gold pieces, at 100 to a gold piece (of twenty denarii), which resembled a British sovereign.\footnote{Graves (1957:8).}

Although some of these changes may seem harmless, such as using familiar city names and currencies, and others purely educational, such as explaining potential unfamiliar concepts to inexpert readers, they nonetheless cause changes to the text and bring the author closer to his foreign readership. The explanations provided in the course of the text (as opposed to in a footnote or comment, making it clear that it is the addition of the translator \footnote{For more on the use of adding comments into the stream of the narrative rather than using footnotes, see Cohen (1962: 33), who states that “The translator […] aims to make everything plain, though without the use of footnotes since the conditions of reading have radically changed and the young person of today is generally reading in far less comfortable surroundings than his father or grandfather. He has therefore to carry forward on an irresistible stream of narrative. Little can be demanded of him except his attention. Knowledge, standards of comparison, Classical background: all must be supplied by the translator in his choice of words or in the briefest of introductions.”}, requires a significant level of trust in the translator that the reader may not even be aware she is granting.

Furthermore, in his essay \textit{Moral Principles in Translation}, Graves further clarifies his prioritization of the potential audience, saying that the average reader of a classical text (in this case Diodorus) “wants mere factual information, laid out in good order for his hasty eye to catch”.\footnote{Graves (1965: 51).} He comments similarly on the prose of Apuleius, saying that although he “wrote a very ornate North African Latin,” Graves translated it “for the general public in the plainest possible prose.” Thus, there is no doubt that he engaged in large-scale domesticization of the texts he was translating.
Interestingly, despite Graves’ frank admission that he has made both small alterations and added explanatory sections in text, his translation has still been regarded as “accurate” (if not “precise”). Even the scholar tasked to edit Graves’ translation in 1979 proclaimed its accuracy and “inimitable” nature:

[It] conveys the peculiarities of Suetonius’s methods and character better than any other translation. Why, then, have I been asked to “edit” it? Because Robert Graves (who explicitly refrained from catering for students) did not aim at producing a precise translation—introducing, as he himself points out, sentences of explanation, omitting passages which do not seem to help the sense, and “turning sentences, and sometimes even groups of sentences, inside-out.” […] What I have tried to do, therefore, is to make such adjustments as will bring his version inside the range of what is now generally regarded by readers of the Penguin Classics as a “translation”—without, I hope, detracting from his excellent and inimitable manner.122

Grant thus acknowledges Graves’ domesticizing strategies and praises the accuracy of his translation in the same breath. Unfortunately, besides the obvious manipulation that Graves openly admits, a closer examination of the text reveals many potential biases and drastic changes to the meaning and understanding of the original text.123

Although Graves’ translations are meant for students with little or no background in ancient history and would therefore not be used by scholars in their investigations of the ancient world, his translations nevertheless have imbedded biases and distortions which are passed on through the dissemination of his works. Venuti points to the following passage as a prime example of how much influence a translator can have on a text. In the following passage on Caesar’s military campaigns, Venuti sees Graves’ additions to the text as rendering it more conclusive and biased against Caesar, rather than open-ended and contemplative. Further, Venuti points out phrases used

122 Grant (1980: 8–9).
123 For a complete analysis of these changes, see Venuti (1995: 22-39).
by Graves which embeds homophobic bias in the English not present in the Latin. The passage reads as follows:

Stipendia prima in Asia fecit Marci Thermi praetoris contubernio; a quo ad accersendam classem in Bithyniam missus desedit apud Nicomeden, non sine rumorem prostratae regi pudicitiae; quern rumorem auxit intra paucos rursus dies repetita Bithynia per causam exigendae pecuniae, quae deberetur cuidam libertino clienti suo. reliqua militia secundiorum fama est et a Thermo in expugnatione Mytilenarum corona civica donatus est.
Suetonius, Divus Julius 2

“Caesar first saw military service in Asia, where he went as aide-de-camp to Marcus Thermus, the provincial governor. When Thermus sent Caesar to raise a fleet in Bithynia, he wasted so much time at King Nicomedes’ court that a homosexual relationship between them was suspected, and suspicion gave place to scandal when, soon after his return to headquarters, he revisited Bithynia: ostensibly collecting a debt incurred there by one of his freedmen. However, Caesar’s reputation improved later in the campaign, when Thermus awarded him the civic crown of oak leaves, at the storming of Mytilene, for saving a fellow soldier’s life.”

As Venuti illustrates, although both texts are based on second-hand stories and not hard evidence (“rumorem”, and “suspicion”), Graves makes additions to the text that lend more certainty to these stories about Caesar, and more bias against him. First, the use of “homosexual relationship” for prostratae regi pudicitiae (“surrendered his modesty to the king”) is “an anachronism, a late nineteenth-century scientific term that diagnoses same-sex sexual activity as pathological and is therefore inappropriate for an ancient culture in which sexual acts were not categorized according to the participants’ sex.” Graves’ further makes the story more a certainty than simply heresay by translating rumorem auxit (“the rumor spread”) as “suspicion gave place to scandal,” and has inserted “ostensibly” into the translation, when it was not present in the Latin

124 Butler and Cary (1927:1–2).
text. Read in this way, it is possible to see how a translator’s own milieu and view of a text can alter the translation.

The case of Graves, however, is not unlike that of Rufinus. As we will see in the following chapters, Rufinus’ translations were also meant as an educational tool, and he likewise frankly admitted to changing and omitting sections of Origen’s text, as well as adding explanatory notes into the body of his translations. Furthermore, just as Graves, despite evidence to the contrary and his own admission, Rufinus has often been praised as providing a faithful and accurate translation, one which scholars can consider representative of Origen’s original thought.

The History and Politics of Translation

In the discussion of the politics of translation, I rely heavily on Naomi Seidman’s book Faithful Renderings. In it, she highlights how politics and age can influence translations on multiple levels. When introducing her book, she provides a telling example of political translation in action. It is a story of her father, who was living in post-liberation Paris. Both a Yiddish and French speaker, he once came to the aid of a group of Jewish refugees being questioned by the police. He reassured the refugees, promising them that he would help and that no one would be hurt. The police officers were naturally interested in what he said:

One of the police officers, curious about my father’s rapid-fire Yiddish exchange with the crowd, asked him what he had said to calm them. Thinking fast, and thinking in French, my father ‘translated’ his Yiddish words for the policemen: ‘I quoted to them the words of the great Frenchman: ‘Every free man has two homelands — his own, and France.’ I assured them that they, who had suffered so much, had arrived at a safe haven, the birthplace of human liberty.’ As my father told it, the gendarmes wiped away patriotic tears at his speech.127

127 Seidman (2006: 2).
Her father’s rather stylized translation of what he had said is, of course, colored by the contemporary political age he lived in, as well as the specific circumstances he found himself in. That he was able to calm the refugees as well as provide a rendition that pleased the guards shows his understanding of both languages, and indeed of both cultures too. Although this is an extreme, clear example of politics influencing a translation, the same thing happens in almost every translated text to varying degrees. The translator is a prisoner of the age and culture she lives in. Every word she uses in the target language has shades and colors that may or may not be present in the source text. Or perhaps she chooses to portray her translation in a certain light in order to appease the current socio-political system she lives in. Or it may not be a conscious choice at all. The social, cultural, and political strata around her may be having an effect on her and her translation whether she chooses her words with them in mind, as with Seidman’s father, or not.

Seidman’s book, relying on the work of translation studies, brings up the particular interesting case of Tejaswini Niranjana’s conception of translation. Niranjana sees translation not as solely the final product that is created, but rather as a “border zone” or “transit station”, “in which what does not succeed in crossing the border is at least as interesting as what makes it across.” Thus, the process of translation is just as important to consider as the product itself. These bits that are lost in translation, that do not make it past the border control, can tell us much more than a simple investigation of the translated text.

128 “In focusing on translation performances that demonstrate the asymmetrical relations between cultures rather than essentially symmetrical relations between languages, I am indebted to the work of postcolonial translation studies. This subfield is often said to begin with the groundbreaking publication of Tejaswini Niranjana’s Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context (1992).” (2006: 16).
One of the elements standing at the border crossing is politics, and this is exactly the focus of Seidman’s book. She concentrates on the translation between Jewish and Christian texts and languages, with particular emphasis on the “contingent political situations in which translation and, inevitably, mistranslation arise”\(^{130}\) She argues that we have often subserved narrative as history or literature to theory, and that not much investigation into the historical or political influences on translation has been conducted. Like Venuti, she notes that too much emphasis is placed on translations simply sounding fluid and recreating the original:

As banal as this insistence might seem, the historical and political dimensions of translation have often remained unacknowledged. In Western translation discourse, narrative as history or as literature has taken a secondary role to theory. There may be reasons for this that inhere in the conceptualization of translation in Western thought. Because translation is conceived as the production of a linguistic equivalent that will substitute for an "original" text, and because the dominant method for rendering such apparent equivalents has been the production of a fluent text that "reads like the original!" the very figure of the translator, as a historical figure exercising creative agency, has been an encumbrance. As Lawrence Venuti argues in *The Translator's Invisibility*, the figure of the translator has been elided by the normative logic of translation. And it is not only the translator who has been forgotten in Western translation. History, too, as the temporal horizon within which translations emerge and acquire their meaning, is collapsed and neutralized in a discourse that imagines translation as the "recovery" of the original meaning...\(^{131}\)

Seidman agrees that more focus should be placed on the role of the translator, who is “exercising creative agency” and has been mostly forgotten. But even further, she believes that history, too, has been ignored in the study of translation. Historical considerations on both sides of the translation process (those which are pertinent to the original text, as well as to the translator and her readers) should be considered. Situating the original text in its historical context can help illuminate potential conflicting factors between that text and the target language and culture. The

\(^{130}\) Seidman, N. (2006: 18): “This book situates translation between Jewish and non-Jewish languages (and particularly between Jews and Christians) not in the abstractions of linguistic theory but squarely in the contingent political situations in which translation and, inevitably, mistranslation arise.”

\(^{131}\) Ibid.
historical factors affecting the translator and his audience can explain why certain discrepancies between source and target text are found.

Naturally, not every discrepancy in translation is intentional. In this case, the meaningful transformation often takes place on the product side of the process. On the subject of simple translation errors, Seidman notes their significance not only in terms of linguistics, but also within the context of culture and society:

Even the notion of “linguistic error” is subject to variation, since mistranslations, especially in literary texts, can be not merely intelligible but significant in the target-language culture. The viability of a translation is established by its relationship to the cultural and social conditions under which it is produced and read.\textsuperscript{132}

Thus, errors themselves not only have consequence in the target text, but also can be influenced and read differently depending on the current “cultural and social conditions”. This historical and cultural reading can happen on both sides of the translation process: either the translator makes a linguistic mistake due to the influence of current societal factors or her position in the present socio-political context. On the other hand, it can simply be a linguistic error which is then interpreted in a new and profound way in the target text, due to the current influencing socio-political environment. Regardless, errors can also tell stories of the history of a translation.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
Accessory Texts

In the discussion to follow, I describe as an “accessory text” a third text used by the translator with the purpose of strengthening or supplementing the target language text, or simply as an aid in the translation process. This can be as basic as a lexicon, or as complex as a text covering the same or a similar topic. Using the lexicon to render difficult vocabulary seems quite natural, but even this can produce a misleading translation unless the specific context of the word being looked up is considered. How can I choose between a lexicon entry that includes “likelihood”, “probability”, and “chance”, for example? This requires not only a keen sense of the target language, but also an understanding of the source language terminology and context, more broadly within the field and specifically within the particular passage. The translator’s capability doubtless plays a role here, as will be discussed in the following section. On a more complex level, the use of accessory texts can be for the purpose of triangulating the writings of the source text in the target language or confirming terminology or style. For example, if a translator is rendering a mathematical text on Einstein’s general theory of relativity in English from a German source, he might consult existing English sources discussing the theory of relativity in order to familiarize himself with what type of mathematical and physics terms are commonly used in English to describe Einstein’s theory. This might be an excellent triangulation strategy, especially if he is not

133 viz. Venuti (1995: 24): “Thus, the translator consults many different target-language cultural materials, ranging from dictionaries and grammars to texts, discursive strategies, and translations, to values, paradigms, and ideologies, both canonical and marginal. Although intended to reproduce the source-language text, the translator’s consultation of these materials inevitably reduces and supplements it, even when source-language cultural materials are also consulted.” This is an overall negative view of using outside materials, in that they tend to “reduce” a text. Although it is possible that they can also strengthen and legitimize a translated text, it is undeniable they are still outside influences working on the text.
well versed in the theory in English. It can also add credibility to a translation because he has consulted an outside source and because it is then likely that the text will read in a manner that English speakers are already used to when reading about Einstein’s theories. Any time he uses an outside text, however, it is influencing his translation, and causing alternations to the text itself (just as he himself is also influencing the text based on his translation choices). At the very worst the influence of accessory texts can dramatically alter the resulting translation depending on the accessory texts used. An accessory text in a similar field but with a slightly (or even dramatically) different perspective on the subject matter can result in alternations made to the translation via the outside influence of the accessory.

Another way accessory texts can cause damage, as Venuti notes, is that: “Their sheer heterogeneity leads to discontinuities—between the source-language text and the translation and within the translation itself—that are symptomatic of its ethnocentric violence.”\(^{134}\) Using a variety of accessory texts in the process of translation equates to adding a variety of small outside influences on the text. The text thus has many authors and many sources acting on it. This is, of course, also the case with the original text. Although it has one author, every author is under his own influences. He takes inspiration from his environment and education. Thus, although the added influence of accessory texts is inevitable, it need not be detrimental. However, ignoring the influence of potential accessory texts can be a problem. Much as the influences on an original author are analyzed as a matter of course, the influences on a translator and the effects on the translated text should similarly be critiqued.

Guarino Guarini’s Accessory Text Usage

An interesting example of undue influence of an accessory text in translation is pointed out by Danish scholar Marianne Pade. Aptly titling her article: *For ikke at kede læseren* (So as not to bore the readers), she examines Guarino Guarini’s fifteenth-century translation method in the case of a Hymn of Homer. He was asked to render the Homeric Greek into Latin by a close friend of his, Girolamo Gualdo. The translation itself is unfortunately lost, however there is a letter Guarini wrote to Gualdo which describes his translation method:

Guarinus Veronensis Hieronymo suo sal. pl. d.

[…] Curavi ut versus illos Homeri tibi traducerem in linguam latinam. Eos tibi transmitto, in quibus nonnulla ex verbo ferme converti, quaedam summatis exposui, quod a Virgilio nostro factitatum animadverti, nam cum plura particularim intelligenda sint, ut in pane faciundo, satis habuit dicere ‘Cerealiaque arma’ (Aen. 1,177), ne pistoria enumerans instrumenta fastido afficeret auditorem vel ad infima et vulgaria descendens, carmini dignitatem auferret. Homerus contra in omnibus exponendis rebus poeta diligentissimus et usque ad minutissima accuratissimus cum lecti ab Ulixe facti mentionem faceret, cuiusdam oleagini trunci delationem descripsit, deinde ad rubricam directum, tum perforatum pedibus impositis expressit; quae singula paucis dixisse contentus particularia tacui, quocirca eos versus (Od. 23,190-204) tibi latine <o>missos, graece scribere neglexi. Illud autem in primis annotare debes, quod post annos viginti rediens in patriam Ulixes ‘multum terris iactatus et alto’ (Verg. Aen. 1,3), domi procos inventis, petulantissimos et clarissimos Ithacae et adiacentium insularum primum; mendici vero habitu simulatus erat. Eis interfectis sese uxori cognoscendum offert, at Penelope non facilis ad credendum, cum non plane virum nosciaret, ei lectum extra Ulixis cubile parari ab ancillis iubet, ut sic de Ulixe periculum faceret: tanta non modo pudicitia sed et gravitate pollet. Habes velut ipsorum versus argumentum, qui in libro Odysseae XXIII sunt; is autem ab litterarum ordine Ψ inscribitur.

Nuper alios quoque converti latine claro iurisconsulto Madio nostro de Dolone (II. 10),

quos si voles, eos autem velle debes, ipsos ex Madio petes […] Vale.

<Verona settembre 1427>.7

“Guarino from Verona greets his Hieronymos cordially.

[…] I managed to translate that verse of Homer you asked me into Latin. I translated some of it mostly word for word, but other parts I produced in summary, as I noticed Vergil often did. For when a multitude of things can be expressed simply, as in the case of making bread, it’s enough to say ‘weapons of Ceres’ (Aen. 1,177), so as not to bore the readers by enumerating the tools nor, reducing it to the low or normal, take away from the dignity of the verse. In contrast, Homer, on the other hand, was very diligent as a poet when it came to descriptions, and he is extremely accurate even down to the most minute detail: when he
mentions the bed Odysseus made, he describes how the trunk of the olive tree was cut, and next how it was made up with red, and perforated when the legs were put in. I left out the particular details and was satisfied with just a few words. Therefore, I did not transcribe the Greek verses (Od. 23, 190-204) which I skipped in Latin for you. You should first and foremost feel that when Odysseus turned home ‘greatly tossed about on land and in sea’ after 20 years, then finds suitors in his house, the basest and most well-known great men of Ithaca and the surrounding islands. However, he disguised himself as a beggar. After they were killed, he reveals himself to his wife, but it was not easy for Penelope to believe it, and since she really didn’t recognize her husband, she orders a servant girl to make his bed outside Odysseus’ bedchamber to test him. She was marked not only by chasteness, but also by gravitas. You have herewith a summary of those verses, which are in the Odyssey 23; and it is marked by the letter Ψ in the alphabetical order.

By the way, I also translated the verses on Dolon into Latin for the brilliant lawyer, Maggio. If you would like them, and you should, ask Maggio about them. [...] Goodbye.

<Verona September 1427> 7.”

As Pade herself notes, Guarino chose to translate Homer to Latin with Vergil as the model. She argues that Guarino is imitating a classic Roman author in his translation of a Greek epic. Of course, Vergil was himself a writer of epic and was in part bringing a Homeric world to a Roman audience in his Aeneid. Thus Guarino is using an accessory text in his translation: creating Homer in Latin through the lens of Vergil. Not only this, but Guarino’s own conception of Vergil is colored by his reading of Servius’ late antique commentary of Vergil, adding a further distortion to the text. Pade points out that Guarino, for certain in this instance if not others, is

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136 Pade (2013: 6): “Som jeg beskrev ovenfor, imiterer Guarino i sin latinske oversættelse af et græsk epos en klassisk romersk forfatter der på sin side er kendt for at have imiteret det pågældende epos. Og Vergil var naturligvis den romerske Homerimitator par excellence. Ikke alene var han den største romerske episke digter, han havde også i sin Æneide så at sige importeret det homeriske univers ind i en romersk kontekst, samtidig med at han på utallige måder alluderede til sin store forgænger, i de første seks sange mest til Odysseen og i de sidste mest til Iliaden.”
following the “vergilistic” poetics found in Servius’ late antique commentaries. This is not the only instance of a particular commentary coloring the reading of a text. Pade points to Kirsten Friis-Jensen showing how Petrach’s reading and use of Horace was majorly influenced by the commentary he used. Furthermore, Trine Arlund Hass has worked on translations of Vergil’s Ecologues that were created by leaning heavily on certain commentaries. She has also demonstrated the Vergilian influence on later Latin translations of Theocritus’ Idylls. All of the above point towards a trend of reading one text through the lens of a familiar (if also similar) text at hand. The levels of influences can even build from there, depending also on the commentaries used. As Pade concludes:

Selv i Guarinos afsluttende resume af 23. sang får Odysseus en lille vergiliansk beskrivelse med, han er “multum terris iactatus et alto” (Verg. Aen. 1.3). Homer bliver ikke bare oversat, han bliver ’romanificeret’, gjort romersk, synes det. Men når Guarino i brevet til Gualdo beskriver en masse detaljer ved sengebyggeriet som han sprang over i oversættelsen, så kan man alligevel ikke lade være med at tænke over om det er en elegant pointe, en hilsen til en mere homerisk poetik.

“Even in Guarinos’ final resume of the 23th stanza, Odysseus gets in a little Vergilian description: he is “multum terris iactatus et alto” (Verg. Aen. 1.3). Homer was not only translated, he was ‘romanified’, made Roman, it seems. But when Guarino describes the many details he skipped in the bed building in the letter to Gualdo, then in any case can we not help but think over whether it is an elegant point, a greeting to a more Homeric poetic.”

139 Pade (2013: 8).
Thus, Guarino both uses Vergilian sentiments (as transmitted through the commentary of Servius) in his translation and even quotes Vergil himself in the Latin Homeric verse translation. He succeeded in making Homer Roman through the use of an accessory text, that is, Vergil (also colored even further by the commentary on Vergil that Guarino consulted). The process of translation illuminates the transformation of the product itself.

**The Translator’s Capability**

The capability of the translator herself, of course, cannot be ignored. There are several aspects to consider in this regard. First, one should examine the amount of experience she has in translation in general, as well as her level of expertise in the relevant language pair. Second, the expert field of the translator has an effect on the quality of the translation. If an ancient historian were to translate a modern text detailing current unsolved mathematical problems, he would likely not have as many relevant skills as a translator with a background in mathematical research.
Applying Translation Theory to the Translation of Origen

In the study of Origen there is also remarkably little conversation about translation. Although there has been some background debate on whether Rufinus is a reliable translator, as detailed in the introduction, an investigation into Rufinus’ translations can and should consider many key factors. My aim moving forward is to apply a systematic method for evaluating Rufinus’ translations of Origen. This will entail a focus not only on the final product of the translation, but also on the process itself, in line with Bell’s method for studying translation. The investigation will be carried out in three phases: 1) discovering Rufinus as a translator and the influences under which he worked (the process of translation), 2) engaging in a close reading and analysis of the resulting translation (the product of translation), and 3) analyzing how the first two phases relate to each other (a holistic view of Rufinus’ translations). The application of the above theory will first analyze Rufinus as a translator and his process of translation. Each translation process examination will be followed by linguistic analysis of the final product of translation, thereby considering the visible results that the process of translation has on the product. In this way, the criterion of a translation theory that encompasses both process and product will be satisfied. Furthermore, a more holistic and penetrative view on Rufinus’ translation will be compiled.

The background for all phases of investigation will be Venuti’s symptomatic reading: assuming a foreignizing translation and the inherent subjectivity of the text. Translation will be regarded as a form of rewriting, and Rufinus’ agency as translator will be highlighted.

The above will be accomplished through a discussion in different categories of investigation. I will first examine Rufinus as a translator. His experience, background, motivation for creating his translations, and his potential for linguistic error or mistranslation will be covered.
Next, I will uncover the influence of Rufinus’ audience, referring to the foreignizing and domesticating models laid out by Nida. Next, I will go over the history and politics of Rufinus’ translation, keeping in mind Niranjana’s concept of translation as a “border zone”, and attempt to discover what may have been lost while crossing the border from one language to another. Each category of investigation will be paired with deep textual analysis in order to illustrate the effects of Rufinus’ various influences.

The preservation of both the original Greek and the Latin translations of much of Origen’s *First Principles* and *Commentary on the Gospels* gives us a unique opportunity to study the journey of a philosophical idea as it goes through the process of translation. In some cases, we are left only with the Latin translation. In such instances, the establishment of crucial accessory texts, such as the writings of Evagrius, can provide valuable insights into potential alterations to the text and thereby present a clearer picture of the story of Rufinus’ translation.
Conclusions

In conclusion, we need a translation theory that combines both the process of translation and the product. The obstacle for the current approaches to translations is that they tend to favor an investigation only of the product — its readability, its relation to the source text on the linguistic, semantic, and stylistic levels. As I have demonstrated above, with the help of scholars of history and translation theory, there is a method for examining the process of translation as well. This involves addressing how the translator is affected by his capability and experience, the audience of the target text, contemporary history and politics, and finally potential accessory texts used to create the translation. My aim is to combine a research into the above factors with a close examination of the product of translation. In this way, the translations studied in this dissertation can be laid out in their entirety. The story of the text will unfold, and the translator will be given his rightful place as active agent in its production.
CHAPTER II
Crossing the Border

Rufinus’ translation choices and their consequences for Origen’s doctrine on the soul’s journey to
embodiment and the psychological processes of embodied thought

Translation is a complex process, a journey not unlike a physical crossing from one country to another. Viewing the translation process as similar to a physical journey, the foundational question driving this chapter is: what was present in Origen’s original Greek, at the beginning of the journey that may have been subject to “border control” measures in Rufinus’ translation process, and what consequences does their absence have for the Latin text? Framing the investigation using Tejaswini Niranjana’s translation border zones will aid in answering this question. A secondary aim for this chapter is to illustrate the importance of analyzing the whole process of Rufinus’ translation of Origen: viewing translation as a narrative can reveal previously undiscovered realities.

Discovering what was lost requires more than just a simple investigation of the translated text. A thorough understanding of the source text is an essential part of discovering the elements lost in the translation process, and consequently the study of the translation process should not begin with the product itself, as is often done. Nor is it sufficient to simply compare the product with the original. To have comprehensive understanding of the entire translation process, one must begin with a thorough examination of the source text. Further, pointing out the parts of the text that were lost in the translation is not the final aim. An analysis of why these elements were left out and
what the consequences for a reading of the target text are is also a crucial part of the translation analysis.

In pursuit of the above, Chapter Two first provides the necessary background for an engagement with the translations of Origen's works by exploring his descriptions of the journey of the soul in its descent into embodiment and struggle with thought and emotion as we find it in the extant Greek corpus, in addition to detailing how it adapts Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Stoic doctrines in various ways. The descent of the soul uncovers issues of theodicy and the pre-existence of souls, as well as important questions of free will. The purpose of this chapter is to establish a baseline and then use it to measure the effects of the translation process on Origen's philosophy. Once the similarities to Stoic and Platonic sources have been identified, it will clear the path towards uncovering and properly assessing the deviations found in Rufinus' translations. Special attention is paid to the terminology Origen uses to describe the soul's faculties, in particular with regard to human emotion and thought. I intend to illuminate Origen’s appropriation of Platonic images and Stoic terminology to complete his narrative of the soul’s journey. These “philosophical markers”, as I refer to them, have been extracted in the process of translation.

Completing the Narrative

To accomplish the above goals, I will begin the chapter by demonstrating the presence of certain philosophical images and terms that have their roots in Platonism and Stoicism. I will emphasize the philosophical markers present in Origen’s text that point back to Platonic and Stoic sources. I will then demonstrate that many of the philosophical markers in Origen’s Greek have been subject to strict “border controls” in Rufinus’ translation process. The analysis of both Origen’s works and Rufinus’ translations of them will include both “big picture” considerations,
such as concept and style, as well as more specific details, such as grammar and the use of individual terms. Next, I will develop the reasons behind Rufinus’ abandonment of certain elements of Origen’s Greek text. Rufinus’ social and political motivations, and his considerations of audience, discussed in the previous chapter, will be emphasized, and how these may have affected his choice to leave certain traces of Platonism and Stoicism behind in the original Greek. Finally, I will rethink the resulting narrative of the Latin translation and how it differs from the original in key ways.

Narrating the Steps in the Soul’s Journey

The journey of the soul in Origen from its place with God down to its embodied trials on earth mirrors the journey of the text through the process of translation. Origen’s doctrines on evil, the pre-existence of souls, free will, emotion, and the role of thought and sinfulness are all stops along the journey, and all crucial aspects of Origen’s theology. In this chapter, I will show the processes of embodiment in Origen in terms of their cosmic structure and relationship to Platonism, and subsequently the psychological processes of embodied thought and their relationship to Stoicism. I will demonstrate that in the process of translation, Rufinus makes alterations that may seem innocuous seen individually, but when viewed from the prospective of the overall journey of the soul, it becomes clear that they have serious consequences for the reading of Origen’s theory of free will.

The four steps of the soul’s journey are:

1) Descent. The soul first descends from God into its embodied state on earth. The stages it goes through on the way are strikingly similar to the Neoplatonic description of the descent of the intellect and its transformation into an embodied soul. It also borrows elements from Plato’s *Phaedrus*. The description of descent and embodiment also points to the pre-existence of souls, a
concept that similarly has Platonic undertones. That the soul first existed as intellect and then transitioned into the body seems to indicate that the soul existed before the body;

2) Free will. The second stop in the journey of the soul is existence in an embodied state, when it is faced with many challenges to overcome in order to avoid sin. The soul’s ability to make its own decision about avoiding and succumbing to sin is due to its free will, a topic that Origen will discuss in terms of the ‘self-moving mover’ of Plato’s *Phaedrus*;

3) Emotion. Step three, avoidance of emotion, presents another challenge to the embodied soul. Here Origen leans heavily on Stoic terminology and framework. He also incorporates the concept of *propatheia*, or pre-emotions, as outlined in Seneca.

4) Thoughts. Origen stresses the proper assessment of thoughts and their relationship with sin. He borrows two different types of thought used in the Stoa: *noēsis* and *logismos* to differentiate thoughts that are implanted in us and those to which we have assented and for which we are therefore responsible.

After a brief investigation into the relationship between the above steps in Origen and the philosophical concepts he borrowed and adapted for his work, I will turn to uncovering the differences in Rufinus’ translations.

In step one, Rufinus’ translation suppresses the suggestion of pre-existence of the soul by changing the verb forms in the Latin text. Instead of the intellect becoming a soul, and afterwards becoming embodied, Rufinus renders the process simply a question of nomenclature, and not a change of state. The soul is only called by different names during its descent, which makes it less clear whether it existed before it became embodied.

Step two also shows signs of Rufinus’ agency as translator. Rufinus is careful with how much he allows Origen’s explanation of free will to resemble the Platonic self-moving mover in the *Phaedrus*. 
Next, in the third step, Rufinus’ discussion of emotions in translation conflates key emotional terms. He blurs the strict line between pre-emotions (for which we are not responsible), and true emotions (for which we are). Further, he equates a phantasia, something which is presented to our senses or mind, with a hormê, or emotional impulse that provokes action. He thus creates an inconsistent picture of Origen’s precise formulation of the formation of and consequences for emotions.

Finally, in step 4, Rufinus makes the most significant alteration to the text, resulting in a profound downgrading of the previous steps. He collapses an important distinction between two different types of thought: noësis and logismos. In doing so, he takes away the power of free will when he renders a person responsible for implanted thoughts. This subverts the strong emphasis Origen places on free will, a key component in his explanation of evil, and his narrative of the soul’s descent.

**Consequences for Rufinus’ Translation Choices**

The obvious outcome of the translation is that the Latin texts no longer exhibit the symptoms of philosophical influence. In the process of translation, the elements of revised and adapted Platonic and Stoic narratives are left behind at the border crossing, resulting in a discontinuity between the emphasis on the importance of free will and the weakened agency a person has over her thoughts. By blurring the line between thoughts that are up to us and those that are implanted, and further collapsing two Greek terms (noësis and logismos) into one in Latin (cogitatio), Rufinus fundamentally changes Origen’s psychological processes of embodied thought. This change also has a profound impact on Origen’s doctrine of free will. Thus, Rufinus’ translation limits the agency a person has over his thought, and thereby downgrades her free will as
well. But there is a further consequence: the philosophical purging of the texts disrupts the delicate balance and artistry of Origen’s original Greek, thus conflating Origen’s own doctrine.

Origen and Philosophy

Origen’s conception of the pre-existence of souls, the process of embodiment, and the psychological processes of embodied thought are informed by Platonic and Stoic thinking. Indeed, as Peter W. Martens argues, the “Christianized Platonism” present in Origen’s work describes exactly how he interacted both with the Platonic and Stoic sources. Origen believed he was improving upon their doctrines by utilizing them to explain and enrich his own Christian philosophy and scriptural commentary. I will thus not treat the traces of philosophical doctrines that I demonstrate in this chapter are present in Origen’s work as infiltrations on his work. Nor do I mean to argue that Origen was a “Platonist” or a “Stoic” based on the fact that he saw utility in some of their thoughts. Instead, I will treat Origen as a “man of the Church”, as he himself professes to be. 140 Most importantly, I will treat him as an independent thinker who makes sense of scripture, his faith, and the world around him, by weaving together diverse methods of critical thinking.

140 “But I hope to be a man of the Church. I hope to be addressed not by the name of some heresiarch, but by the name of Christ. I hope to have his name, which is blessed upon earth. I desire, both in deed and in thought, both to be and to be called a Christian” (HomLc 16.6). For the critical edition, see Origène: Homélies sur s. Luc, trans., Henri Crouzel, François Fournier, and Pierre Périchon, Sources Chrétiennes 87 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1998). For the English, see Origen: Homilies on Luke, Fragments on Luke, FOC 94, trans., Joseph T. Lienhard (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996).


Step 1: The Descent of the Soul

In his treatise *Peri Arkhôn*, Origen describes the descent of the intellect from God, thereafter becoming a soul and further entering into a body on earth. At a certain point, the soul has the possibility to become an intellect again and rise up once more. As Mark M.S. Scott unpacks in his book *Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil*, Origen’s narrative of the soul’s descent is the starting point for his explanation of evil, which relies on the fact that the soul is given free will to choose its path. That the soul has free will to choose explains how there can be inequity in the world, despite the fact that God created everything to be equal. Scott summarizes:

Origen construes the problem of evil as the problem of failed providence: on the surface, it seems that God does not govern creation equitably. Appearances, however, are often deceiving in Origen’s theological landscape. As he searches for meanings “worthy of God” beneath the problematic surface narratives of the Bible, so he searches for meanings worthy of God beneath the inequities of the world. In an effort to preserve cosmic coherence, he unveils a striking vision of creation and restoration that explains evil and orients the soul in its journey back to God. His theodicy, then, functions both as a defense of providence and as a map for the questing soul in its journey from sin and suffering to purification and, ultimately, eternal beatitude.

In addition, Rowan Greer similarly emphasizes the importance of the fall of the soul for Origen’s discussion of evil, saying “His theological story is a kind of theodicy and has the function

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of explaining why evil has arisen; the precosmic minds misused their freedom and brought into existence this fallen order.”\textsuperscript{142}

Another question that often arises when considering Origen’s narrative of the soul’s descent is: does he subscribe to the theory of the pre-existence of souls? This became a problematic question by the time of the emperor Justinian’s anathemas in 533.\textsuperscript{143} It was an established fact in the Christian faith by the time of Rufinus’ translations of Origen that souls were not pre-existent before their entry into bodies. The church was adamant about the soul being created together with the body, not before. Justinian wrote in 553 on this topic, and singles out Origen:

\begin{quote}
Πυθαγόρας τοίνυν καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πλωτῖνος καὶ οἱ τῆς ἕκειν συμμορίας ἀνθρωπότως εἶναι τὰς ψυχὰς συνομολογήσαντες προσπάρχειν ταύτας ἔφησαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ δὴμον εἶναι ψυχῶν, καὶ τὰς πλημμελούσας εἰς σώματα καταπήπτειν, ὡς ἔφη, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πικροὺς καὶ πονηροὺς εἰς παράδαλεις, τοὺς δὲ ἀρπακτικοὺς εἰς λύκους, τοὺς δὲ δολεροὺς εἰς ἀλωνικας, τοὺς δὲ Θηλυμαινεῖς εἰς ἱππους. ἢ δὲ ἐκκλησία τοῖς Θείοις ἐπιμένει λόγοις φάσκει τὴν ψυχήν συνδημιουργηθῆναι τῷ σώματι καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὅστερον, κατὰ τὴν Ὡριγένους φρενοβλάβιαν.

Justinian, quoted in Georgius Monachus, \textit{Chronicon}\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

“So Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, and their followers, who agree that souls are immortal, declared that they exist prior to bodies and that there is a great company of souls, of which those that transgress descend into bodies … But the

\textsuperscript{142} Rowan A. Greer (1979), \textit{Introduction, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, On Prayer, First Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers}, trans., Rowan A. Greer New York: Paulist, 1979. For more on the importance of the soul’s descent in Origen’s explanation of evil, see Adolf Harnack (1976: 343–344, ft. 2), \textit{History of Dogma}, Volumes II and III, trans., Neil Buchanan Gloucester, MA:“To Origen the problem of evil was one the most important [theological problems]” (343), and Hal Koch (1932: 96-62), \textit{Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus}, AKG 22 Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.


\textsuperscript{144} DeBoor: 2: 630-33
church, following the divine scriptures, affirms that the soul is created together with the body, not first one and the other later, according to the insanity of Origen.”

Thus, the fact that Origen was contemplating the existence of souls before bodies, as I will argue in this chapter (in line with other scholars who have similarly attested this), was problematic for a Christian text in the time of Rufinus. It is no surprise, then that Rufinus’ translation attempted to leave this question a little more open, thereby removing the Platonic influence from the text and simultaneously aligning Origen with the orthodoxy of the Church in the time of Rufinus.

Descent: The Philosophical Background

Plotinus describes a very similar paradigm to the one we will see in Origen. He envisions a hierarchy that emanates from the One: first the intellect, then the soul, and finally corporeal matter:

καὶ πρώτη ὁδὸν γέννησις αὐτή· ὃ γὰρ τέλειον τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν μηδὲ ἐχειν μηδὲ δείσθαι ὁδὸν προερρήσῃ δαῖ τὸ ὑπερπλήρες αὐτῶν πεποίηκεν ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὗτος. Καὶ ἢ μὲν πρὸς ἐκείνον στάσις αὐτῶν τὸ δὲ ἐποίησεν, ἢ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ, ἰνα ἔχειν ἐκεῖνον καί οὐδὲν. Οὗτος οὖν ὁ ὁδὸς ἐκείνος τὰ δόμια ποιεῖ δύναμιν προχέας πολλὴν — εἰδος δὲ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῶ — ὅσπερ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτῶν πρότερον προέχει· καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκ τῆς ὁσίας ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς τοῦτο μένοντος ἐκείνου γενομένη· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς μένοντος τοῦ πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐγένετο. Ἡ δὲ οὐ μένουσα ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινηθείσα ἐγέννα εἰδώλον. Ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν Βλέπουσα, ὄθεν ἐγένετο, πληροῦται, προσθέσαν δὲ εἰς κίνησιν ἄλλην καὶ ἐναντίαν γενναὶ εἰδώλον αὐτῆς αἰσθήσιν καὶ φύσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. Plotinus, Enn. V 2, 1.7-21

“This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows, as it were, and its superabundance makes something other than itself. This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is fill, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. It’s halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it


becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces in the same way, pouring forth a multiple potency—this is a likeness of it—just as that which was before it poured it forth. This activity sprinting from the essence of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while that which is before it abides unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and so brings forth an image. It looks to its source, and is filled, and going forth to another opposed movement generates its own image, which is sensation and the principle of growth in plants.**147

Plotinus describes the generation of the soul through the various steps leading from the One. The One creates Intellect, and from the Intellect comes the Soul. As we will see when examining Origen’s text, this procession from One (in Origen’s case, God), to Intellect and finally Soul bears the most striking resemblance to the style and concept of Origen’s description of the soul’s descent in style and formulation. The sense of becoming something new in each phase of the descent will be mirrored in Origen’s Greek. The narrative of the soul’s descent has even older precursors than Plotinus, however.

Plotinus bases his explanation of the soul’s creation on Plato’s description of the soul’s descent in the *Phaedrus*. Indeed, the overall narrative in Plato shares many similarities with Origen’s. This has not gone unnoticed in scholarship; scholars such as Mark Edwards and Panayiotis Tzamalikos both contend that Origen did not take any inspiration from Plato, and even further that Origen did not argue that souls were pre-existent before their bodies. As Tzamalikos writes, “to ascribe to Origen a Platonic notion about pre-existing personal incorporeal rational creatures, which received a body, is just a simplistic and misleading solution, which garbles his real doctrine.”**148 As I will demonstrate, the claim that Origen did not believe in the pre-existence of

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148 Panayiotis Tzamalikos, *Origen: Cosmology And Ontology of Time* ( Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 77; Leiden, Brill, 2006) 80-81. See also *Ibid.* 4-5; 25; 28-29; 36-38; 41-42; 61; 68-79; 87; 88n 146; 93-95.
souls is difficult to prove. On this topic, Peter W. Martens similarly agrees that Origen clearly wrote on the pre-existence of souls. He also presents a convincing argument that Origen did in fact take his inspiration from Plato and adapted (or rather, from Origen’s perspective, improved on) Plato’s narrative of the descent. This is the viewpoint that I fall in step with.149

Besides highlighting that Origen’s view on the pre-existence of souls was in fact widespread in his day,150 Martens also makes an important contribution when he emphasizes the fact that Origen himself refers to Plato’s version of the descent and even states that his own version is “superior” to it:

καὶ ὁ ἐκβαλλόμενος δὲ ἐχ τοῦ παραδείσου ἄνθωπος μετὰ τῆς γυναικὸς, τοὺς δερματίνους ἁμφιεσμένους χιτόνας σὺς διὰ τὴν παράβασιν τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐποίησε τοῖς ἀμαρτήσασιν ὁ θεὸς, ἀπὸ τῆς ρητὸν τινα καὶ μυστικὸν ἔχει λόγον ὑπὲρ τὸν κατὰ Πλάτωνα, τῆς ψυχῆς πετροφούσης καὶ δεύρο φερμομένης, ἕως ἕν στερεοῦ τινος λάβηται. Cels. 4.40151

“And the statement that the man who was cast out of the garden with the woman was clothed with the “coats of skins” (Gen 3:21), which God made for those who had sinned on account of the transgression of mankind, has a certain secret and mysterious meaning, superior to the Platonic doctrine of the descent of the soul which loses its wings and is carried hither “unto it finds some firm resting-place.”

Origen is engaging in a practice of assuming and then improving upon Plato’s narrative of the soul’s descent. Having established this, I will now move on to examining the narrative of descent in Origen’s works in order to highlight specific signs that he did prescribe to the notion of the pre-existence of souls, and that he drew inspiration from Plato and Plotinus in his formulations.

149 See Martens (2015).
Origen makes the pre-existence of the soul quite clear in his *Commentary on John*:

"He who sedulously guards himself in his dealings with Scripture against forced, or casual, or capricious procedure must assume that John’s soul, being older than his body and subsisting prior to it, was sent to the ministry of testimony concerning the light … now if the general theory concerning the soul prevails, that is, that it has not been sown with the body but exists before it and for various reasons is clothed with flesh and blood, the expression “sent by God” will no longer seem to be exceptional when it is used of John.”

In contemplating the salvation of the soul, Origen describes a very similar hierarchy to the Plotinean one. When souls reside with God, they are in fact not souls but minds. Origen contemplates whether a soul that has been saved is still a soul. His conclusion is that it is no longer a soul but changes back to an intellect when it reunites with God:

"Just as the savior came to save what was lost, when that which was lost was saved, it was no longer lost. Thus, he came to save the soul, to save what was lost. And thus, the saved soul was no longer a soul... the intellect, when falling, became the soul and the soul, when formed again in virtues, will become the intellect again.”

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152 GCS 4, 87.6-15 PG v. 14, 2.24.
154 Frag 21, Koetschau, from *Justinian Ep. ad Menam.*
Once again, this passage emphasizes the change of state that occurs when the intellect
becomes a soul during the descent, and vice versa. Origen’s Greek is quite clear, succinct, and
precise. There is no speculation or qualification in his language. As we will now see, Rufinus’
translation not only changes the language from becoming (a state change), to being named (a
semantic question of nomenclature), but also introduces more tentative expressions, thereby
rendering Origen’s clear and precise claims more speculative.

Descent: Rufinus’ Translation

Rufinus’ De Principiis 2.8.3 is as follows:

aut si cum ad beatitudinem venerit, iam anima non dicetur? Sed videamus ne
forte potest hoc modo responderi, quia sicut salvator venit salvare quod perierat,
et iam cum salvatur, non est perditum quod prius perditum dicebatur: ita
fortassis etiam hoc quod salvatur anima dicitur; cum autem iam salva facta
fuerit, ex perfectioris partis suae vocabulo nuncupabitur. Sed et illud adici posse
videbatur quibusdam, quia sicut hoc, quod perditum est, erat sine dubio
antequam periret, cum alius nescio quid erat quam perditum, sicut et erit utique
cum iam non est perditum: ita etiam anima, quae perisse dicitur, videbitur fuisset
quia aliquando, cum nondum perisset et propter hoc anima diceretur, quae
rursum ex perdite liberta potest iterum illud esse quod fuit, antequam
periret et anima diceretur.
Rufinus, De Principiis, 2.8.3155

“or when it attains blessedness, should it be no longer called a soul? Let us see if
perhaps an answer may be given in this way, that as the Saviour came to save
what was lost, that which formerly was said to be lost is not lost when it is saved;
so also, perhaps, this which is saved is called a soul, and when it has been placed
in a state of salvation will receive a name from the Word that denotes its more
perfect condition. But it appears to some that this also may be added, that as the
thing which was lost undoubtedly existed before it was lost, at which time it was
something else than destroyed, so also will be the case when it is no longer in a
ruined condition. In like manner also, the soul which is said to have perished will
appear to have been something at one time, when as yet it had not perished, and
on that account would be termed soul, and being again freed from destruction, it
may become a second time what it was before it perished and be called a soul.”

155 GCS v. 5, 95.
There is no doubt that the two passages have the same general message. However, in this case, the particular word choices that Rufinus makes are quite striking. In Origen's account, when the soul is saved and brought up to God, it actually becomes something else (namely, mind). When the soul is ‘saved,’ it ascends towards God and actually changes into intellect, mimicking the Plotinan hierarchy. Origen chose to use forms of εἰναι to describe the process. Rufinus, on the other hand, translates these forms of “to be” with the much softer terms such as dicetur or videbatur, nuncupabitur, as I have highlighted in the above Latin. Where Origen’s Greek actually takes the soul from one level to the next, Rufinus’ translation keeps intellect and soul on the same equal level. This renders the changes undergone in descent as simply a difference of how we talk about them at each stage.

Besides the verb changes, Rufinus also adds speculative vocabulary to the narrative, such as “perhaps” or “it appears to some”, as I have underlined in his Latin rendition. This serves to distance Origen from these arguments and gives the impression that he is speaking more hesitantly. Even if a reader were to recognize any philosophical adaptation of Plotinus’ hierarchy or Plato’s Phaedrus, it could easily be dismissed as not representative of Origen’s thought because of the speculative language Rufinus uses.

Conclusions on Descent

While Origen’s descent of the soul makes it clear that the soul existed before entering into its embodied state, Rufinus makes significant changes when he translates. The differences may seem fairly benign, but when read in the greater context of Origen’s doctrine of pre-existence and his adaptation of the Plotinus, the changes become more significant. I have demonstrated that
Rufinus’ Latin obstructs the reader’s view of the aforementioned concepts by changing the verb forms in the Latin text. Instead of the intellect becoming a soul, and afterwards becoming embodied, Rufinus renders the process simply a question of nomenclature, and not a change of state. The soul is only called by different names during its descent, which makes it less clear whether it existed before it became embodied.

**Step Two: Free Will**

The soul exercises its free will when it descends to earth in its embodied state, and thus it is responsible for its own decisions. That our embodied souls have the power of free will is a crucial tenet in Origen’s doctrine. Indeed, his explanation of evil hinges on our soul’s power to choose. The following analysis will concentrate on Origen’s description of the soul as a “self-moving mover” and its similarity to Plato’s description of the soul in the *Phaedrus*. I will then move on to demonstrate how Rufinus’ translation makes the passage more hesitant and speculative. In particular, Rufinus’ Latin, in contrast to Origen’s Greek, does not offer a definitive answer for whether non-animate objects such as plants are ensouled. We will see in the description of the soul as self-moving mover that although Rufinus does not make significant alterations directly to Origen’s doctrine of the soul’s free will, further alterations made in steps three and four result in an undermining of the free will established in the first two steps.

**Self-Moved Mover: The Philosophical Background**

In the *Phaedrus* 245c5 and following, Plato explains the soul’s immortality based on the fact that it is a self-mover (τὸ ἀὐτὸ κινοῦν). It is moved by itself, as opposed to something that is
moved by something else (ὡπ’ ἄλλου κινούμενον). He goes on to say that this self-mover is also the source and origin of movement in other things (ἄλλα καὶ τῶι ἄλλως ὃσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχή κινήσεως):

Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἄθανατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἄθανατον· τὸ δ’ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὡπ’ ἄλλου κινούμενον, παύλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παύλαν ἔχει ζωῆς, μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἀτε οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἑαυτό, οὕτως λήγει κινούμενον, ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὃσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγή καὶ ἀρχή κινήσεως.

Plato, Phaed, 245c5-9

“Every soul is immortal, for what is ever-moving is immortal; but what moves something else and is moved by another, since it has an end to its movement, it has an end to its life. Only that which moves itself, since it does not abandon itself, never stops moving, but this is also the source and origin of movement for other things that are moved.”

Plato recognizes that something which is the sole cause of motion in itself never has to stop, and thus never dies. Something that requires an outside influence to move, however, runs the risk of being abandoned by its mover and thus is subject to death if it stops being moved by the outside influence.

The Self-Moved Mover in Origen

We similarly find that Origen, when he begins his discussion on fate, feels he must first establish the characteristics of the soul, specifically that it is an entity which serves as the cause of its own movement (τὰ μὲν τινα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχει τὴν τῆς κινήσεως αἰτίαν), and is moved from inside, as opposed to something that is moved from the outside (ἑτέρα δὲ ἔξωθεν μόνον κινεῖται). He further refers to fire, which he states is moved from the outside, as a self-mover (καὶ τὸ πῦρ

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He establishes the soul as a self-mover in order to show that the soul has control over its own will and thus also its fate:

“Of things that move, some have the cause of their movement outside of themselves, yet others are moved only externally. Those which are moved only from externally are lifeless, such as wood and stones and all things which are held together by the constitution of their matter alone. That view must indeed be dismissed which would regard the dissolution of bodies by corruption as motion, for it has no bearing upon our present purpose. Other things have the cause of their motion in themselves, such as animals, or trees, and all things held together by natural life or a soul, among which some think veins of metal belong. Fire is also supposed to be the cause of its own motion, and perhaps also springs of water. And of those things which have the causes of their motion in themselves, some are said to be moved out of themselves, others by themselves. Those things moved out of themselves are without a soul, whereas those things which are moved by themselves have a soul. And those ensouled entities move by themselves when a representation calls forth an impulse.”

Because the soul has control over its own movement, this grants it free will. If it were moved from the outside, then it would not have to take responsibility for its actions. Although

Origen uses the image of the self-moved mover for a different purpose, the connection to the

Phaedrus both in the terminology and conceptualization of the soul as an entity moved from within

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and thus in some way responsible for its actions makes it difficult to doubt that Origen did not have
the *Phaedrus* in mind when composing this passage. It also serves as a fitting illustration of how
Origen extracted certain philosophical tenets or themes and adapted them to advance his own
theological narratives. This particular narrative is altered through the process of translation, as we
shall now see.

*Rufinus’ Self-Moved Mover*

Compare Rufinus’ translation of the same passage above:

> Omnium quae moventur alia in semet ipsis causas motuum suorum gerunt, alia extrinsecus accipiunt: ut puta extrinsecus tantummodo moventur omnia, quae sine vita sunt, ut lapides vel ligna et quaecumque huiusmodi sunt, quae solo habitu materiae suae vel corporum constant ... Alia vero in semet ipsis habent movendi causam, ut animalia vel arbores et omnia, quae vel per naturalem vitam vel per animam constant; inter quae etiam metallorum venas deputari aliquibus visum est, sed et ignis sui motus esse putandum est, fortassis autem etiam et fontes aquarum. Haec autem, quae in semet ipsis causam suorum motuum habent, quaedam dicunt ex se, quaedam ab se moveri; et ita dividunt quod ex se moveantur ea, quae vivunt quidem non tamen animantia sunt;

Rufinus, *De Principiis*, 3.1.2-3

“Of things that are moved, some have the cause of their motion within themselves, others receive it from without: the result is that all things which are only moved by an external force are things without life, like rocks or wood or other things of this type, which consist only in a state of material or bodies. That view must indeed be dismissed which would regard the dissolution of bodies by corruption as motion, for it has no bearing upon our present purpose. Others, again, have the cause of motion in themselves, such as animals, or trees, and all things which are held together through having a natural life or a soul; among these some think it is clear that veins of metals belong, fire is also thought to be its own mover, perhaps even fountains of water. These things, however, which have the cause of their motion in themselves, they say some move out of themselves, others by themselves, and thus they separate things which move by themselves because they live but are nevertheless do not have a soul.”

159 *GCS* v. 5, 95.
On the whole, it may appear that Rufinus has translated this passage accurately. The fact that it is considerably longer than the original Greek has much to do with the explanatory comments interwoven in the text, something which Rufinus himself admits that he has done in his prefaces. There are, however, some very clear instances where one can point to Rufinus’ translation losing its relationship to previous philosophical traditions through small but significant changes to the meaning of Origen’s Greek text. The exclusionary notion of vel ... vel in the categorization of animals and plants that are moved from within themselves tends towards a completely different conclusion than the simple καὶ from the original Greek. Origen’s point is considerably vaguer: both animals and plants have in themselves the cause of motion, as well as all those things which are held together by nature and soul (ἐν ἑαυτοῖς δὲ ἔχει τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ζῶα καὶ φυτᾶ καὶ ἀναξαπλῶς ὃσα ὑπὸ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς συνέχεται). Here, it is not completely clear whether we should read this “and” as exclusive or inclusive. These self-movers are held together both by the fact that they have a soul and that they have some sort of nature that allows them to move themselves. It is possible they have only one of the two elements, but it is likewise possible that they have both. If we were to read the explanation in this way, it would allow the possibility that both animals and plants (and other things which are self-movers) have souls.

The omissions made in the process of translation show a great deal about what Rufinus’ motivations were. Several lines describing the effect of a representation on ensouled beings are simply missing from the Latin translation. The concept of a representation striking the being from without and bringing forth an impulse is entirely missing, and thus we also miss a great deal of Stoic influence in the Latin text.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{160} For more on the Origen’s adaptation of the Stoic doctrines, see Steps Three and Four in this dissertation.
Ultimately, Rufinus translated Origen in a vague way, and his rendering of the passage makes it more speculative and hypothetical. It leaves it up to the reader to decide: animals and trees have the cause of their motion within themselves, as do all things which exist either because they have a soul or because they have a natural life. Rufinus not only precludes the possibility that something like a plant would have a soul, but he likewise cuts off the interaction this passage could have with other philosophical passages. According to Rufinus, self-moved things either have some natural life (presumably this would include things such as plants), or they have souls (like us), and certainly not both as the idea of ensouled plants would not please Rufinus' Christian readers. It might also remind the readers of the forbidden pagan philosophical doctrines.

Conclusions on Free Will

Rufinus is careful with how much he allows Origen’s self-moved mover to borrow from the *Phaedrus*. He translated the passage on the self-moved mover in such a way that some clear conclusions Origen made were rendered more speculative or hypothetical, a method of rewriting through translation he also employed in the passage describing the soul’s descent in Step One. In Step Two, Rufinus makes small, yet significant, alterations to Origen’s discussion of the soul. As we move forward to consider the psychological processes of embodied emotion and thought, we will see that the changes made in those additional steps of the soul’s journey further undermine the crucial establishment of free will.
Step 3: The Psychological Processes of Embodied Emotion

Once the soul has descended to its embodied state, it must use its ability to choose to combat the temptations of sin. One of the methods of avoiding sin is avoiding bad emotions. Origen expresses doubt about the value of emotions. As we shall see, he is careful not to ascribe real emotion to God or Christ, but he does admit to a type of pre-emotion that does not count as a full emotion. He further cautions mortals to steer clear of emotions, which he describes as winds that wreak havoc on the soul. The descriptions of the psychological processes of emotion and pre-emotion draw heavily from Stoic sources, as shall be demonstrated.

When we turn to Rufinus’ translation, we find that his discussion of emotions conflates key emotional terms. He blurs the strict line between pre-emotions (for which we are not responsible), and true emotions (for which we are). Further, he equates a phantasia, something which is presented to our senses or mind, with a hormē, or emotional impulse that provokes action. He thus creates an inconsistent picture of Origen’s precise formulation of the formation of and consequences for emotions.

Emotions: The Philosophical Background

In his investigations on emotion, Origen makes use of terms borrowed from Stoic writers. Richard Sorabji\textsuperscript{161} sees in particular the way Origen and other Christian writers adapted the Stoic conception of withholding assent to emotions to their own doctrines of withholding assent to temptation. Despite the general consensus that Origen relied on the Stoic doctrine, it is not clear to what extent he adapted or even misinterpreted the teachings of the Stoa. Sorabji believes that

\textsuperscript{161} Sorabji (1999).
Origen conflated the distinction between feeling and emotion. As I will reveal, however, this conflation happened in the translation process.

We must first understand the complex system of emotion formation in the Stoic sources before we turn a comparison of Origen’s own account. There has been considerable attention given to the study of Stoic *pathē* in recent scholarship. Although the term in its most basic translation would be “something suffered or undergone” (from the Greek verb *paschein*: to suffer or endure), scholars use various translations in order to try to capture the specific meaning of the term in Stoic thought, including “emotion” or “passion”. Whatever translation is used, the Stoic term *pathē* should not be understood as having the same meaning as emotions or passions in the modern sense. While there are many examples of Stoic *pathē* that could be easily classified as “emotions” in the modern sense, there are just as many reactions which we would put in the same category, but that the Stoics could not accept as emotions, such as crying over a tragic story or trembling before having to give a public speech. We typically treat “emotion” as a state which is not within our control (hence we are overwhelmed by anger or drowned in sorrow). Although “passion” is etymologically closer to the Greek and Latin terms *pathē* and *passio*, the English cognate “passion” is associated with a state of excessive emotion. The Stoic *pathē* are neither simply exaggerated emotional states, nor are they states which affect us as passive object. For the sake of consistency, I will use the translation “emotion” for *pathos*. I will also follow Margaret Graver in describing anything which does not constitute an emotion (but at times may be so-identified in common parlance) as a “feeling”. Having a feeling in modern English is usually a passive sensation that we do not control. In this way we can preserve in English the specific delineation in the Stoic doctrine between emotions, which are active and in our control, and feelings, which are passive and not in our control.
The Greek term *pathos* is rendered into Latin either as *perturbatio* (Cicero, Jerome) or *adfectus* (Seneca). The emotions are described by various sources as “judgments” and “opinions”.

We find this in Cicero:

> sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione. Itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate.
> Cicero *tusc. disp.* 4.14

> “But they think that all emotions come about through judgment and opinion, and thus they define them more narrowly, so that it is not only understood how destructive they are, but also how much they are in our power.”

That the emotions are judgments and opinions puts the responsibility for them in our hands, and further, it allows for them to be controlled by our reason, and so it is equally within our power to refuse to experience them. Cicero cautions that emotions are destructive; this is the reason that wise men must not be affected by them:

> Perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis. Itaque his sapiens semper vacabit.
> Cicero *de fin.* 3.35

> “Emotions, however, are not moved by any power of nature, and all of them are opinions and judgments made out of inconstancy. And it is for this reason that the wise man will always be free from them.”

The reason that a wise man avoids emotions is not because he does not have opinions or make judgements. Emotions are *faulty* opinions and improper judgements. Once this bad opinions or judgements are assented to, they become more difficul to control, and this is the reason they must be avoided.

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162 SVF 3.380.
164 SVF 381.
Stoic phantasia

We encounter many circumstances as we move through our lives, things whose effect on us is not in our control. Within the Stoic framework, our reaction to these circumstances, however, is what we do have control over. Sometimes our bodies may react, as when something comes near our face and we flinch. Other times, our mental state may be affected, as when we feel moved by a tragic fresco. Both of these types of reactions, as we shall see, are described by Seneca as pre-emotions, things to which we have not agreed voluntarily. Having an emotion, however, is described in both earlier and later Stoic sources as something to which we actively assent, and once we have assented to an emotion, we can end up doing something contrary to our normal reasoning.

One form of event over which we do not have control is what Chrysippus terms a phantasia, or representation. As Cicero states in his discussion of sense perception, the phantasia is “sort of like a blow inflicted from the outside” (quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus). The phantasia, then, is the strike given to our minds and bodies when we are affected by the appearance of the outside world:

plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. in qua primum de sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi to impulsione oblata extrinsecus quam ille φαντασίαν, nos visum appellemus licet...
Cicero, Acad. 1.40

“He [Zeno] changed many things however in that third part of the philosophy, in which he first said certain new things concerning the senses themselves, which he believed are compounded from a sort of blow inflicted from the outside, and he termed that blow representation, what we call ‘visum’...”

Representations are thus passively received, and they affect how the world appears to us. The standard translation of phantasia as “impression” comes from the analogy of an imprint (τύπωσις) on the soul. The problem with thinking of the representation as an impression, like that of a signet ring into wax, is, as Diogenes Laertius points out in the same passage, you cannot imprint many

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166 SVF 1.55, 61, 60, LS 40D.
different things on a strip of wax at the same time. The representation has some sort of effect on our minds and/or bodies, and we are passive recipients of it. That the representation inflicts some sort of involuntary change on us will become very important when we examine the properties of pre-emotions.

**Stoic sunkatathēsis**

Once a representation imprints on or reveals itself and its object to us, how we react is up to us. Our reaction involves giving, rejecting, or withholding our assent (*sunkatathēsis*). Here we are exercising some control. Cicero reports that representations are ‘received as it were, by the mind’s assent, which he takes to be inside of us and voluntary’:

\[
\textit{sed ad haec quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adiungit animorum, quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntarium.}
\]

Cicero, *Acad.* 1.40\(^{168}\)

“... but he added to these representations received as it were by the senses the assent of the mind, which he wants to be within us and voluntary.”

If assent is up to us and voluntary, then there must be a choice made as to whether to assent to something. Indeed, it turns out that the Stoic sage must know when to assent and when to withhold assent, since assenting to the wrong thing amounts to erring and living unworthily:

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Anon. Stoic. (*P. Herc.* 1020), col. 4, col. 1\(^{169}\)

“... wise men cannot be deceived nor make mistakes, and they live according to merit and do all things well. Therefore, in the case of assent more attention is paid, so that they do not do it otherwise but only with cognition.”

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\(^{168}\) SVF 1.55, 61, 60 part; LS 40B.

\(^{169}\) SVF 2.131, LS 41D.
An assent made μετὰ καταλήψεως is an informed one that the Stoic sage knows is correct. Assent to an emotion, as we shall see below, is one which is always deceptive and incorrect, and this is precisely because emotions can quickly slip out of our control.

Assent is an integral part of the formation of emotions, as it is this voluntary action of assent that results in a state for which we must take responsibility. An emotion, it turns out, is a particular type of assent—an impulse, and this impulse is one that drives us into action. The proof of this lies in Stobaeus: Πάσας δὲ τὰς ὀρμᾶς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν περιέχειν. (Stobaeus 2.88, 2 (SVF 3.171, LS 33I): “They say that all impulses are assents, and that the practical impulses also contain the power of movement.”). Thus, an impulse cannot arise without assent, as it is by definition a type of assent. We find a similar attestation of the relationship between assent and impulse in Plutarch:

καὶ μὴν ἐν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαῖκους ἁγώσιν ὁ πλείστος λόγος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ περὶ τίνος γέγονε; περὶ τοῦ ‘μήτε πράττειν μήθ’ ὀρμᾶν ἁσυγκαταθέτος, ἄλλα πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κενὰς; υποθέσεις τοὺς ἁξιοῦντας, οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης, εὐθὺς ὀρμᾶν μὴ εἰξαντάς μηδὲ συγκαταθεμένους.’
Plutarch St. rep. 1057A

“In their arguments against the Academics, what was most argued about by Chrysippus himself and Antipater? The fact that without assent there is neither action nor impulse, and that they are talking nonsense and empty assumptions if they approve the proposition that when an appropriate impression occurs, there is an impulse immediately if they haven’t yielded or given their assent.”

In addition, an impulse arises only when an ‘appropriate’ (oikeias) representation arises.

This indicates that there are certain representations which are not appropriate, and therefore would not result in an impulse to take action. Stobaeus, too, further elaborates this point when speaking of “What moves an impulse, they say, is nothing other than a representation that immediately stimulates a particular function.” (τὸ δὲ κινοῦν τὴν ὀρμὴν οὐδὲν ἔτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ ἢ

170 SVF 3.177; LS 53S.
φαντασίαν ὀρμητικήν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν). Thus, we need an impulsive representation to arise in order to have an impulsive assent to create the action specified by our assent.

Stoic hormê

The formation of emotions involves a number of factors. Chrysippus links emotions explicitly with conscious decisions, even though once these decisions are made, they can spiral out of our control. Stobaeus summarizes this view, saying:

πάθος δ’ εἶναι φασιν ὀρμήν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῇ τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ ή κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἤγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς)... πάν γὰρ πάθος βιαστικὸν ἐστί, ώς πολλάκις ὀρθῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὀντας ὅτι συμφέρει τὸδε οὗ ποιεῖν, ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τῖνος ἀπειθοῦς ὕππου, ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτό ...

Stobaeus 2.88.6; 89, 4

“They say that emotion is an impulse that is excessive and disobedient to the determination of reason, or an irrational movement of the soul contrary to nature; (but that all emotions are of the soul’s commanding faculty)... For every emotion is unbridled, since people often, because they are in states of emotion, although they see that it would be fitting not to do something, get carried away by the intensity, just like by some disobedient horse, and are led along to do it.”

Emotions are impulses which we can no longer control with our power of reason. This underlies the fundamental principle that emotions should be avoided, since they ultimately go against what we really would want. Nevertheless, a disobedient horse is only disobedient if we allow it to be; if we train a horse well, he will not throw us off, or run at full speed to the left when we’ve asked him to walk calmly to the right. We can learn to resist emotional impulses in the same way by withholding assent. Galen likewise describes impulses over which we lose control with similar terminology and metaphor:

171 SVF 3.378, 389; LS 65A.
“For example, in the case of walking in accordance with impulse, the movement of one’s legs is not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that one can stop or change direction whenever she wishes. But in the case of running in accordance with impulse, this sort of thing no longer happens. The movement of her legs surpasses the impulse, so that it [the motion] is carried away and does not change obediently, as soon as her legs have begun.”

Here he describes a different species of impulse, exemplified by walking, which you can easily stop or change. This is not an emotional impulse, but rather a type of impulse that is appropriate rather than excessive. An emotion, however, according to Stobaeus, is by definition an excessive impulse. We see in Galen the same descriptions: once the impulse becomes excessive (πλεονάζει, as in the case of the ὁρμήν πλεονάζουσαν in Stobaeus above), it becomes disobedient (μὴ εὐπειθῶς, compare to Stobaeus’ horse, which is ἄπειθῶς), and this leads to the movement of the legs being carried away (ἐκφέρεσθαι, just as people under the influence of emotion are ἐκφερομένους in Stobaeus’ account). On the one hand, we can assent to reasonable impulses; this would be the equivalent of walking in Galen’s metaphor. As all impulses, they produce an action, such as walking, but the reasonable impulse is one that does not overrun reason, hence we are able to stop walking, or change the direction we are going. An emotion, however, is a type of impulse that disregards our reason. Although we hold the power of creating to the impulse, it then becomes uncontrollable, as when our legs get carried away when running and we are no longer able to stop or change when we wish to.

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172 SVF 3.462; LS 65D.
Both Stobaeus and Galen identify the same three characteristics of an emotional impulse: it is excessive, disobedient, and irrational. Being excessive (*pleonazein*), is illustrated by the example of running. Even if the running begins in accordance with impulse, it soon gathers momentum, increases, and becomes extremely difficult to control. Long and Sedley’s example of a speedometer “which marks all speeds beyond 70mph in red—someone who drives beyond that speed is driving excessively ...” (p. 420) is an apt metaphor, in particular if we imagine driving a large truck which become more difficult to maneuver and brake when it passes 70 mph. Disobedient (*ἀπειθος*), if we follow the examples above, is something that happens contrary to our reason. Just as the disobedient horse stops listening to its rider, the emotions are no longer under the control of our reason. The disobedient horse in Plato’s *Phaedrus* is quite similar to the disobedient Stoic horse: βρίθει γάρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ὄπος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γὴν ῥέσων τε καὶ βαρύσων ὃ μὴ καλῶς ἦν τεθραμμένος τῶν ἱμάχων. (Plato *Phaed*. 247b (Yunis)): "For the horse from bad stock proceeds heavily, sinking to the earth and weighs down on his charioteer if the horse has not been well trained."). This horse also causes trouble for the charioteer in the *Phaedrus* because it has been poorly trained. The implication that the horse is poorly trained leaves open the possibility that with proper effort it is possible to have an obedient horse. The main difference between the Stoic account and the Plato’s however, is that Plato posits two horses: one good and one bad.

The different number of horses in the Platonic and Stoic accounts only serves to highlight the differences in their philosophies. The Platonic soul consists of both a rational and irrational part, which compete with each other. The Stoic soul, however, is entirely rational and every aspect of the process of forming an emotion (representation, assent, impulse, and reason) is under the authority of the commanding faculty.
How, then, can emotion, which arises from a rational judgment of the soul, be called irrational? Plutarch’s account illustrates that we may distinguish between the state of being irrational and simply using the term irrational:

καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικόν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορὰί τινα καὶ φύσει ψυχής τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἄλλα τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἤγεμονικόν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ έξιν ή διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς, κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ: λέγεσθαι δὲ ἄλογον, ὅταν τοῦ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὀρμής, ἴσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι, πρὸς τὸν ἀπόποιν παρὰ τὸν αἴροντα λόγον εκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ἐκφαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρήτερα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβοῦσιν.

Plutarch de virt. mor. cp. 3, p. 441c

“And they think that the feeling and the illogical parts are not distinguished by any difference or nature of the soul; but it is all the same part of the soul, what they call the intellect and ruling faculty, which is totally turned and changed in both experiencing emotions and changes arising according to habit or disposition, and thus evil and virtue arise. And the soul does not have anything irrational in it. But it is called irrational whenever it is carried away to something unnatural because of an excess of impulse, which becomes strong and overpowering. Emotion is bad and undisciplined reason, formed from a base and flawed judgment which gains strength and violence.”

G.E.R. Lloyd sees in Zeno that “contrary to nature” and “contrary to reason” seem to be interchangeable (SVF 1.205) and thus also in the case of emotions, we can substitute “contrary to nature”, in the sense that it goes against our natural tendencies to do healthy things for ourselves (and having emotions is not healthy). The problem with reading “irrational” as “contrary to nature” is that Stobaeus points out that irrational and contrary to nature are in fact two different things each with a specific meaning:

̄λλὰ τὸ μὲν “ἄλογον” ἵσον τοῦ “ἀπειθὲς τω λόγῳ.” ... καὶ τὸ “παρὰ φύσιν” δ’ εἰληφται ἐν τῇ τοῦ πάθους ὑπογραφή, ὡς συμβαίνοντος παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν λόγον. πάντες δ’ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὤντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον ...
Stobaeus 2.89, 4

“‘Irrational’ is equivalent to ‘disobedient to reason’... the sense of ‘contrary to nature’, in the outline account of passion, is of something that happens contrary to the right and natural reason. Everyone in states of passion turns aside from reason...”

So instead of reading “irrational” and “contrary to nature” as equivalent and interchangeable, we should instead see ‘disobedient to reason’ as ‘irrational’ behavior. It is here that the metaphor of the disobedient horse fits in: a horse disobedient to its master exhibits irrational behavior, just as emotions which become disobedient to reason are irrational. We may also want to keep in mind Plutarch’s distinction between being irrational and simply being called irrational, in which he also points toward a reading of irrational as tied to the disobedient nature of an excessive impulse.

propathēia

That the Stoics advocated apathēia, the absence of emotion, is a common conception treated in recent philosophical scholarship. It is also readily found in common parlance amongst the general public, as evidenced by the fact that in modern English, the term “stoic” is virtually synonymous with emotionless. Our ancient sources also tell a similar story. Seneca draws a specific distinction between the Stoics and the Peripatetics in this regard: utrum satius sit modicos habere affectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est: nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant. (Seneca ep. 116, 1 (SVF 443) “It is often asked whether it is better to have moderate emotions or no emotions: we get rid of them, the Peripatetics temper them.”). Although on the face of it, Stoic apathēia seems to be an eradication of all emotion, the specifics are more complex. Not only is the

176 SVF 3.389; LS 65A.
Stoic sage allowed *eupathēia*, or “good” emotions, but according to some later sources, he is also allowed to exhibit some *propathēia*, “pre-emotions”, referred to in Latin as *primi motus animi*, “first movements of the mind”. The introduction of first movements solves a potential problem of a Stoic sage seemingly exhibiting signs of emotions, but in fact upholding the tenets of *apathēia*. *primus motus animi*.

Seneca, writing his Stoic treatise *De Ira*, is our earliest extensive source for the pre-emotions. In addition to the strict definition of *pathē*, there are also *pathē*-like states that are not within our control, or, perhaps more importantly, are not indicative of true emotion. He describes certain human experiences that may look like emotions, but in fact are nothing more than *proludentia*, a *prima agitatio animi*, or *primus motus*. These are not emotions, but rather feelings in that they resemble emotions but do not involve an act of assent and thus are not up to us. This appears then to be an invention of Seneca’s, as we do not find any sources who summarize Chrysippus outlining this kind of idea. Although he does not use the specific terminology present in Seneca, Aulus Gellius describes certain reactions such as jumping at a loud noise as a state occurring before assent. The later attestation of these feelings which are not true emotions would point to the *primi motus* being a later development; their addition may have been in response to criticisms launched against the long-standing ideas of Chrysippus. We see, for example, one such development in Galen’s summary of Stoic views on emotion: he remarks that you can be rationally persuaded not to be afraid, but nevertheless if you encounter representations yourself, you may feel afraid in any case. He then asks:

πῶς γὰρ ἂν τις λόγῳ κινήσει τὸ ἀλογον, ἐὰν μὴ τινα ἀναξωγράφησιν προσβάληται αἰσθητῆ παραπλησίαν; οὕτως γοῦν ἐκ διηγήσεως τινες εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκπίπτουσιν καὶ ἐναργῆς ἐγκελευσαμένου φεύγειν τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον λέοντα οὐκ ἰδόντες φοβούνται. Galen *plac.* 5.6.25-31 Posidonious fr. 162\(^{177}\)

\(^{177}\) LS 65Q.
“How could anyone initiate the irrational with reason, unless he set some picture in front of it like a perceptual impression? Thus, some people’s appetites are roused by a description, and when someone tells them to flee an approaching lion using vivid descriptions, they are frightened without having seen it.”

As we will see shortly, Seneca would not accept reactions to descriptions, either oral or visual, as inciting real emotion. That this is summarizing Posidonius is significant. Sorabji (1999) has pointed out that Seneca’s account may be a defense of Chrysippus’ doctrine against the criticisms of both Posidonius and Aristotle. Questions such as Galen's, summarizing Posidonius a century after Seneca’s explanation of first movements, exemplify the sort of interaction others had with Stoic explanations of emotion. However, the difference between feelings and emotions in the Stoic framework may extend further back than Seneca. Cicero speaks of “bites” that afflict us before the act of assent in his *Tusculan Disputations*:

*aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod inanis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed opinione, sed quadam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa maerens, morsus tamen et contractiuncula quaedam animi relinquetur. hanc dicant sane naturallem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit.*

Cicero tusc. disp. 3.82

“All grief is far removed from the wise person, because it is useless, because it is taken up in vain, because it arises not from nature but judgment, opinion, from a certain invitation for grieving, we decided that it is thus appropriate come about. When this judgment is withheld, because it is completely voluntary, that mournful grief will be eliminated, although there will nevertheless still remain a bite and a kind of little depression of the mind. The latter they could reasonably say is natural, as long as they do not use the troublesome name ‘grief’, horrid and dreadful as it is, because grief cannot in any way exist, or live, as it were, along with wisdom”.

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Here we can see that Cicero makes a clear distinction between the emotional state of grief and a “bite” or “contraction” that should not be called grief. Grief, he points out, is a result of judgment (*iudicio*) and thus is completely voluntary (*totum est voluntarium*). This underlines the fact that emotional states are completely up to us; they involve assent. On the other hand, even the wise man cannot escape the bites and contractions that happen without assent. Indeed, the vocabulary used — *morsus* — emphasizes that something is happening to us. We are being bitten by something, but we should not call it grief because we haven’t given assent to these attacks on our mind. Even the diminutive *contractioncula* underlines the difference between grief and involuntary feelings. These are tiny depressions and are qualified even more by *quaedam*; this is a particular type of tiny depression which is not grief. Given that there would be no reason for Cicero, who is summarizing the views of many different philosophical schools, to innovate or develop the Stoic doctrine, we can assume that Cicero is drawing upon already established Stoic frameworks on what constitutes an emotion and what does not. In this case, we can assume that the distinction between emotions and feelings extends back to earlier Stoic authors, although given Cicero’s less-detailed explanation, it may have been Seneca who first gave feelings a more specific and in-depth analysis.

Seneca’s detailed discussion of feelings and emotions comes roughly a century after Cicero. The “first movements” that he discusses in *De Ira* are not emotions, although they do resemble what we would commonly consider indicative of feeling an emotion, such as growing red when angry. Seneca mentions other uncontrollable effects on the human body: shivering when cold, shrinking back from a touch, hair standing on end, blushing when hearing profane language, or dizziness in confrontation with a precipice. He points out that these reactions cannot be controlled by reason: “Because none of these are in our control, no reason can persuade them (*quorum quia nihil in nostra potestate est, nulla quo minus fiant ratio persuadet*, 2.2.1).” But, if we closely
analyze Seneca’s further examples of instances not under the control of reason, we see that the
category expands considerably to include not only effects which act exclusively on the body, but
also things which affect both the body and the mind simultaneously. After citing examples of
changes in the body which are not voluntary, and thus not indicative of a true emotion, Seneca goes
on to explain that there also exists a sort of blow to the mind (ictus animi) which even wise people
suffer. The shock is one qui nos post opinionem iniuriae movet, (‘which moves us after (we have)
the impression of an injury’). The examples he cites to illustrate this phenomenon include seeing
plays, reading stories, listening to music, and enjoying other sorts of art. We seem to grow angry
when we read about Antony ordering the death of Cicero, and likewise when we see a painting our
minds can be moved:

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preliminaries which are pretending to be emotions”). When Seneca describes the reactions to stories as *proludentia*, although this can also have the meaning of a prelude or practice beforehand, I believe Seneca is getting at more precise point. The prefix *pro*, although often meaning “before”, can also have the sense of “instead of”. If we see *pathē*-like reactions in this way, then Seneca means to say that there are some reactions that simply masquerade as emotions that occur in the place of emotions but aren’t actually emotions themselves. This reading makes better sense of the examples Seneca uses as well. Nowhere does he indicate that feelings that arise at seeing a sad play occur in temporal relation to real emotions. The feelings one experiences in response to various forms of art are not said to occur before real emotion. Instead, with a clever word play in the choice of *proludentia*, aptly used in the context of performance, the feelings are just simulating real emotion. What action could possibly follow a reading of Cicero's murder? What impulse would arise to create real emotion? There doesn't seem to be a next step in this type of feeling, nor does Seneca mention one explicitly.

The key to real emotion in Seneca is neither involuntary changes in the body nor even particular types of movements of the mind. Real emotion necessarily is a type of impulse, one that urges action. Seneca too, enforces this idea on *De Ira* 2.3.1. Here he cautions that not everything which moves the mind ought to be called an emotion: *Nihil ex his, quae animum fortuito impellunt, affectus vocari debet* (“None of these things, which strike the mind by chance, ought to be called emotions”). Indeed, he goes on to say that being moved is not enough, as we must follow up on the movement: *Ergo affectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permettere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi.* (“Therefore, emotion is not being moved to the exhibited appearances of circumstances but allowing them and following this chance movement”). He reiterates this sentiment in 2.3.3: *Ira non moveri tantum debet sed excurrere.* (“Anger ought not only to be moved, but to rush out.”). To rush out would be to say that it needs to be channeled somewhere,
namely, into action. In 2.3.5, he says: Numquam dubium est quin timor fugam habeat, ira impetum. (“There is no doubt that fear entails flight, anger entails assault”). This underlines Seneca's strong position on action being a necessary component of emotion and illustrates the difference between “being moved” and “following”. The former refers to the primary movements: we are their passive recipients and have no control over their effects on us. What we do have control over, however, is the latter, namely, our assent to the movements. In 2.4.1, Seneca describes three movements. The first (primus) is involuntary (non voluntarius), the second (alter) arises along with a desire which is not yet unruly (cum voluntate non contumaci), and finally the third (tertius) one is already out of control (iam impatiens). The progression from entirely involuntary to voluntary but commiserate with intent, and finally to completely out of control is similar to the metaphor of running or sitting atop an unruly horse which appear in Stobaeus and Galen.

Thus, we have seen the Stoics distinguish true emotional states from pre-emotions, which are simply a form of phantasia and are not within our control. The formation of a true emotion involves first the arrival of a representation (phantasia), then assent (sunkatathēis) to the representation, thereby creating an emotional impulse (hormê), ultimately resulting in an emotion-driven action. We will next examine how Origen adapted and incorporated the Stoa’s general mistrust for emotion, the pre-emotion, and the process of emotion formation into his work.

**Origen and Emotion**

Origen’s discomfort with emotions is apparent when reading his work. He often interprets emotional vocabulary in scripture in a highly specific and qualified way that does not assign any
true emotion to a wise man, to Jesus, or to God himself.\textsuperscript{181} Although he does not fully explain why emotions should be avoided, he does equate them with powerful storms that agitate the soul, and he often cites reason as a preventative measure to protect against their turmoil. As I will demonstrate, his treatment of emotion is heavily influenced by the Stoic emotional framework. In warning against potential troubles for the soul, Origen posits four ‘winds’: “But there are four wind types, troubling the soul of man: desire, fear, pleasure, and grief. (ἀνεμοι δὲ τέσσαρες γενικοὶ, ταράσοντες τὴν ἄνθρωπον ψυχήν, ἐπιθυμία, φόβος, ἡδονή, λύπη)”\textsuperscript{181}. These are also the four categories of emotion according to the Stoic doctrine: “An emotion is an illogical movement of the soul and is contrary to nature, or it is an excessive impulse. But the emotions are, more generally, divided in four types: pain, fear, desire, pleasure.” (πάθος ἐστὶν ἀλογὸς ψυχῆς κίνησις καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἢ ὀρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. τὰ δὲ γενιδότερα πάθη τέσσαρα: λυπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή.)

Origen’s terminology mirrors the categories of emotion and his description of these categories as disturbances of weather that should thus be avoided also mimics the Stoic mistrust of tumultuous and excessive emotions. In his \textit{Commentary on John}, Origen is quite careful to interpret scripture in such a way that it does not assign any sort of emotion to God, despite the fact that in the original scriptural passage it would be much easier to see God as an emotional figure. For example, he is quite preoccupied with the notion that the “anger of God”, which shows up often in scripture, should not be read to mean that God is angry, or even \textit{can} be angry, as he is completely emotionless:

\textit{exaspēstēlας τὴν ὀργὴν σου, καὶ κατέφαγεν αὐτὸς ὡς καταφρονοῦντα τῆς χρηστότητος καὶ άλλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν καταφρονοῦντα τῆς χρηστότητος καὶ οὗτος ἰδιότητος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος θεοῦτος τιμωρίας. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν καταφρονοῦντα τῆς χρηστότητος καὶ οὗτος ἰδιότητος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος θεοῦτος τιμωρίας.}

\textsuperscript{181} See \textit{frag. comm. in Joann. iii.36} (Brooke 51), \textit{in Jer. 5.9}. Detailed analysis of these passages will follow below.
μακροθυμίας φησί· "Κατὰ δὲ τὴν σκληρότητά σου καὶ ἀμετανόητον καρδίαν θησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ ὀργήν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς"; > οὐ γὰρ νομιστέον πάθος εἶναι θεοῦ τὴν ὑνομαζομένην αὐτοῦ ὀργήν. πῶς γὰρ δυνατὸν πάθος εἶναι περὶ τὸν ἄπαθη; ἀλλ᾿ ἐπεὶ μὴ πάσχει θεὸς ἀναλλοίωτος ὄν, ἐρμηνευτέον τὴν λεγομένην αὐτοῦ ὀργήν καθ᾿ ἐξήται.

Origen frag. comm. in Joann. iii.36

“Often in scripture the punishments of the evildoers are said to be ‘the anger of God’, as, for example, in what Moses says about the Egyptians: ‘You dispatched your anger and it consumed them just like straw.’ and Paul when he writes the following about the Jews: ‘And the anger overtook them in the end.’ says that the god sent punishments coming upon them were anger. But to those who look down upon goodness and patience, he says ‘Because of your hardness and unrepentant heart, you will store up anger in yourself until the day of anger.’ But we should not think that what is called an emotion of God is his anger. For how can there be emotion in the case of one that is emotionless? Instead, since God is immutable and does not suffer emotions, we must not say that it is his anger that is being spoken about.”

Although ὀργή θεοῦ could be quite simply understood as God’s anger, his attempt to avoid assigning emotion to God indicates that he has a commitment to avoiding it entirely. What is inappropriate for God, however, need not necessarily be a problem for a mere mortal. But we see a similar exhortation from Origen that prohibition of emotion does not just apply to God:

καὶ ποιήσωμεν τὸ ἀποστολικὸν ἐκεῖνο τὸ «βούλομαι οὖν προσεύχεσθαι τοὺς ἅγιον ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ ἐπάροντας οἷος χείρας χωρίς ὀργῆς καὶ διαλογισμῶν». Ἐὰν περιέλωμεν τὴν ὀργήν, περιέλωμεν τὸ κάλυμμα, ἐὰν τὰ πάθη πάντα· ὅσον δὲ ταῦτα ἐστιν ἐν τῷ νῷ ἡμῶν, ἐν τῷ λογισμῷ ἡμῶν, ἐπίκειται τῷ ἐνδον προσώπῳ, «τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ ἡμῶν, τὸ κάλυμμα καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία, τὸ μῆ βλέπειν ἡμᾶς τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ λάμπουσαν. Ὅρις ἐστιν ὁ θεός ὁ ἀποκρύπτων αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν ἀφ᾿ ἡμῶν, ἀλλ᾿ ἡμεῖς τὸ κάλυμμα ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας ἐπιπλεόντες τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ».

Origen Hom. Jer. 5.9

“And let us consider that saying that ‘I want therefore to pray for the men in every place who raise up their sinless hands without anger and calculations’. If we remove anger, we remove the veil which allows all the emotions to happen.

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184 SC 232, 302
As long as these emotions exist in our mind, in our thought, they lie in our countenance, in our commanding faculty, the veil and the disgrace, they do not see the shining glory of God. God is not hiding his glory from us, but we place the veil of evil on our commanding faculty.”

Here, not only anger but all other emotions are depicted as a veil which obscures our access to God. Although the specific image of a veil is not present in the Stoic sources examined, the Stoic ideals are similarly obscured and unattainable if assent is given to emotions.

Propathēia in Origen

There is likewise evidence that Origen considered pre-emotional states, just as Seneca. In his Commentary on John, Origen speaks again on Jesus' apparent displays of emotion:

Πᾶσαι αἱ τοῦ Σατανᾶ δυνάμεις ἀμα τοῦ αυτῆς ἡγεμόνος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ σωτηρίου πάθους ἐπεστράτευσε τῷ σωτῆρι· ἦς ὡς ἡγεμόνος των ἀνθρωπίνως ἐπαράτετο, οὐ τὸν θάνατον δειλίζετο, ἐι καὶ τούτῳ ἀνθρώπινον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔτητηθήναι...διὰ τούτο περὶ τούτων ἐλπεῖτο αὐτοῦ ἡ ψυχή καὶ ἐπαράτετο, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τις νομίσεισθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ταραχῆς κατακρατούμενος ἀλλ’ ἀκαριαίως· τούτῳ γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ νῦν· ἠμα γὰρ τὸ ἀρξασθαι καὶ ἐπάυσατο, καὶ ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν σημείων ἦν χρόνου.

Origen frag. in Joann. xii. 27

“All of the powers of Satan, together with their leader, turned against the savior in due proportion with the emotions of the savior. And upon seeing them, the soul of the savior was stirred as humans are, But he did not fear death, even though this is a human condition, but he was afraid of being overcome. For Christ allowed his soul to suffer so long as they were his own, and since he was about to become the cause of eternal salvation to those who were below him, his soul was sad and worried at the sight of them. But he was not completely dominated by his concern, as someone might think, but only briefly. This is what

Again, the prevalence of passive verb forms in Origen's descriptions of Jesus' emotional stirrings (ἐταράττετο, ἐλυπεῖτο, κατακρατούμενος) indicates that he is not the initiator of these 'stirrings'; he simply suffers them. We also find again that his emotion never gets past a mere beginning (τῷ ἄρξασθαι). That he has not been an active participant in the feelings he starts to experience, and that they never get past the initial stages is a reading of John that falls in line with Seneca's description of pre-emotions. It is also consistent with how Origen has interpreted emotional vocabulary in other contexts.

**Phantasia and Hormê in Rufinus**

Rufinus' translation collapses strict distinctions between borrowed Stoic terms. In his translation of Book 3, on the arbitration and assent of the souls, he makes the decision to use the Latin transliteration _fantasia_, a word that is quite full of connections to both Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy:

\[
A se autem moventur animantia, cum eis fantasia, id est voluntas quaedam vel incitamentum, adfuerit, quae e amoveri ad aliquid vel incitari provocaverit. Denique etiam in quibusdam animalibus inest talis fantasia, id est voluntas vel sensus, qui ea naturali quodam instinctu provocet et concitet ad ordinatos et compositos motus ...
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Rufinus, _De Principiis_ 3.1.2

“Ensouled beings move by themselves when a representation, i.e. a will or impulse, hits them, which then provokes or incites them to move towards something. There is also a type of a representation, i.e. a will or inclination, in

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every animal, that calls them forth as if through some kind of natural instinct and incites them to regular and fixed movements …”

He qualifies the term *fantasia* first with the phrase *id est voluntas quaedam vel incitamentum*, and then later *id est voluntas vel sensus*. By doing this, he presents two partially overlapping definitions of *fantasia*. He also collapses the traditionally Stoic distinction between phantasia and horme, and thus cuts a tie between Origen and the Stoics. In *De Principiis*, 3.1.2, he states: *fantasia, id est voluntas quaedam vel incitamentum, adfuerit…* (“a representation, a particular will or impulse, arises, which arouses them to move towards something or arouses them …”).

Rufinus conflates Origen’s originally sharp distinction between representation and impulse, explaining that by a "representation" (*phantasia*) he means "a particular will or impulse" (*id est voluntas quaedam vel incitamentum*). We have seen a clear distinction in Stoic sources between a representation and impulse; the representation arises on its own, and our assent to it constitutes an impulse. We see in the original Greek that Origen writes something quite different: "when the representation arises and brings forth an impulse" (*φαντασίας ἐγγινομένης ὁρμήν προκαλομένης*). Representation and impulse are never used synonymously as Rufinus explains them in his translation. Thus, it is in translation that the conformation to Stoic terminology is lost.

**Conclusion on Emotions**

Origen’s doctrine on the psychological processes of emotions is informed by the Stoic doctrine of emotions, as I have shown. Origen is quite careful about ascribing real emotion to God, and similarly advises all wise men to avoid succumbing to emotion. He likewise leans on Seneca’s conception of pre-emotion. When we turn to Rufinus’ discussion of emotions in translation, however, we find that the Latin text conflates key emotional terms. Rufinus blurs the strict line...
between pre-emotions (for which we are not responsible), and true emotions (for which we are).

Further, he equates a *fantasia*, something which is presented to our senses or mind, with a *voluntas*, or emotional impulse that provokes action. He thus creates an inconsistent picture of Origen’s precise formulation of the formation of and consequences for emotions. As we will see in the next section, the process of embodied thought is tightly connected to the formation of emotions, and in this step Rufinus makes the most significant alteration, one which has far-reaching consequence.
Step Four: The Psychological Processes of Embodied Thought

The fourth and final step is the soul’s encounter with thoughts. I will demonstrate that Origen borrows Stoic terminology when discussing different types of thoughts: the *noēsis*, a type of thought for which we are not ourselves responsible, and *logismos*, a thought that we have accepted and for which we must take responsibility. In Latin, both of these terms are translated as *cogitatio*. This dramatically changes the meaning of the translated text. In his book, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, Richard Sorabji identifies the seemingly inconsistent use of *cogitatio* in *Peri Arkhōn*. He points out that: "Origen, if we can trust Rufinus’ Latin paraphrase, makes a decisive change. In mentioning first movements, he connects them with the idea of bad thoughts (*logismoi*, Latin *cogitationes*)... Origen’s shift is a major one."\(^{189}\) He further argues that the result of this shift can be made "... more intelligible by thinking of it as a change of focus from Seneca's first movement, the shock, to its cause, the appearance."\(^{190}\) That thoughts are appearances need not be a shift, as Origen, in particular in the original Greek, describes thoughts as having an effect on us and thus causing pre-emotions, as we shall see. However, we shall also see that Origen does not explicitly connect his discussion of thoughts as representations and pre-emotions. There still does seem to be inconsistency in the Latin use of *cogitationes*. I will demonstrate that these misinterpretations or modifications were in fact no more than a symptom of the process of translation that the text underwent at the hands of Rufinus.

In conflating thoughts that are our responsibility and those that are not, Rufinus not only makes a big change in Origen’s doctrine on thought, but also weakens Origen’s emphasis on free will. As I will demonstrate, Rufinus’ Latin allows for thoughts to be implanted into our head for

\(^{190}\) Ibid.
which we must be responsible. However, this circumvents our free will to choose and decide which thoughts to accept, thereby undermining the strong emphasis on free will as an explanation for evil in steps two and three.

Thoughts: The Philosophical Background

There are a number of terms in Greek that could be rendered with the English word “thought,” although they each have a different semantic range within the Stoic philosophy. Of particular interest to this study are the terms noēsis and logismos. According to Diogenes Laertius, a noēsis is a type of representation:

\[ \text{"According to the Stoics, some representations are sensory, others are not. The sensory ones are experienced through the faculty of sense perception, and the non-sensory ones through the faculty of mental comprehension, such as the comprehensions of incorporeals or other things understood through reason... Some representations are rational, others irrational. The logical ones belong to rational animals, the irrational to irrational animals. The logical representations are thoughts (νοήσεις), whereas the illogical ones do not have a name."} \]

Here he explicitly compares sensory perception and non-sensory, which is experienced through thoughts in the same way that our sense organs experience the blow of a representation.

Although the term dianoia is used to indicate all forms of non-sensory experiences, the noēsis is the particular type of thought that rational animals (such as we humans) have, through which we experience non-sensory information. If we follow the parallelism of the passage, both experiences

\[ SVF 2.52, 55, 61; LS 39A \]
(sensory and non-sensory) here are passive. The topic of discussion is representation, which is something that acts upon us. Diogenes Laertius shows us that we can be acted upon both by sensory objects, such as an image acting upon our eyes, as well as non-sensory objects, such as an incorporeal concept acting upon our minds. Plutarch similarly corroborates this definition of a *noēsis*:

φαντασία γάρ τις ἡ ἐννοιά ἐστι, φαντασία δὲ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ... τὰς ἐννοίας <ἐν> ἀποκειμένας τινάς ὁριζόμενοι νοήσεις, μνήμας δὲ μονίμους καὶ σχετικὰς τυπώσεις.

Plutarch *comm. not.* 1084F-1085A

“For a conception is a certain type of representation, and a representation is an imprint on the soul... they define some conceptions as underlying thoughts (νοήσεις), but memories as permanent and fixed imprints.”

Although he uses *ennoia* instead of *dianoia* as the more generic category of non-sensory representation, he states that a *noēsis* is a particular type of *ennoia*. This amounts to a particular type of thought, which is nothing other than a type of representation, and thus would not be something that is up to us. This further suggests that impressions can contain a propositional aspect, in the form of a thought, but it is not until we assent to the thought that we have accepted the content therein.

We will see that there do seem to be certain thoughts or mental events which do in fact involve assent. *Dianoiai*, however, as well as the *noeseis* which rational animals experience, are simply a type of representation and thus having a thought does not always constitute having an emotion.

Another type of thought exists, however, which is treated differently from *noēsis*. This type of thought has already been assented to and has a particular place in the discussion of emotion.

Plutarch reports on the relationship between *logismoi* and emotions:

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192 SVF 2.847; LS 39F.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ Ἀνομολογίας ὁ Χρύσιππος εἰπών "ὅτι τυφλὸν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ πολλὰκις μὲν οὐκ ἐά ὡς τὰ ἐκφανῆ, πολλὰκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβονομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ" μικρὸν προελθὼν "Τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγιγνόμενα," φησὶ "πάθη ἐκκρούει τοὺς λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ ὡς ἐτέρως φαινόμενα, βιαίως προωθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις.

Plutarch de virt. mor. cp 10 p. 450c

“In his ‘On Disagreements’ Chrysippus says: ‘Anger is something blind, and often it both does not allow you to see things clearly and comes before circumstances have been grasped. A little earlier, he said ‘For emotions, when they are present, drive out reasoned thoughts (λογίσμους) and things that appear differently, forcefully urging one towards contrary acts.’”

Here, the sense of what may be translated simply as ‘thoughts’ (logismoi) is different. The thoughts that emotions drive away are not the same types of thoughts that are representations (noēsis). The noēsis is passively received, and here Chrysippus specifically discusses an emotion, which must involve active assent. However, the “opposite acts” (ἐναντίας πράξεις) seem to be opposite to what our chased away logismoi would proscribe. These reasoned thoughts would normally, if we make correct judgments, lead us towards correct actions. Emotions, however, no matter whether one has assented to good judgments, can overturn these judgments and make us act in the exact opposite way we normally would.

Thought Processes in Origen

In the original Greek, we will see that Origen draws a distinction between noēsis, which are representations, and logismoi, which are involved in the case of true emotions.

To demonstrate this, I will closely examine examples in his corpus of the use of two different terms for “thought” in Greek: noēsis and logismos. Finally, a close reading of the

193 SVF 3.390.
problematic sections of *Peri Arkhôn* 3.1-2 in light of Origen’s other works will illuminate whether there is in fact conflation between first movements and emotions.

As we saw, the distinction between different types of thought or mental processes (*noēsis* vs. *logismos*) is an important one in the Stoic framework, in particular when dealing with the line between pre-emotion and true emotion. The status of *noēsis* as a representation renders a thought not up to us. It would be prudent, then, to determine whether Origen’s thoughts similarly can be deemed representations, or whether thought has somehow blurred the boundary between pre-emotion and emotion itself.

The noun *noēsis* shows up relatively infrequently in Origen’s works. The main meaning it seems to have is “comprehension” or “understanding”, and Origen usually uses it to describe knowledge of particular passages of scripture that could properly be understood as comprehension. He also distinguishes between utterance and *noēsis*: "Not because of the utterance but rather because of the force of the meaning.” (Οὐ κατὰ τὴν προφορὰν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς νοῆσεως ἐπιτεταμένον).194

This usage parallels the Stoic usage of *noēsis*. Much like a representation imprints its object onto us through our sense perception, reading a passage of scripture can imprint its meaning onto us through the conceptions of our mind. Indeed, Origen himself makes the comparison between sense perception and perception through thought, *noēsis*, which is quite similar to Diogenes Laertius 7.49-51:

> διὸ οὐ καθάπαξ εἰρήκεν· «Θεόν οὐδεὶς εὕρακεν», ἀλλὰ μετὰ προσθήκης τῆς «Πώποτε», σημαίνοισις χρονικόν τι, ἵν’ ἦ τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον· ὡς θεόν τὸ «Πώποτε» δύναται λέγεσθαι, ώς σημαίνοιν τι ὑποκείμενον, ὁ νοῦς ἐμπέραται τῇ ἐνύλῳ ζωῆ. διὸ ιδεῖν τὸν θεόν οὐ δύναται κατὰ προσβολὴν νοῆσεως.  

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“Therefore each time he said: ‘No one has seen God’, but with the addition of ‘ever’ as a temporal marker, then the meaning is the following: in as much as the word ‘ever’ can be said to be something assumed, the mind holds sway in material animals. Therefore not being able to see God is not being able to see him with a striking of a thought.”

He draws a comparison between sight perception and perception facilitated through one’s mind, which he calls ‘the striking of a thought’ (προσβολὴν νοήσεως). To see someone is not to assent to any proposition about him; your sight is a product of the representation hitting you with an image of its object. In a like manner, perceiving someone through a noēsis does not require assent, since it is simply your mind being struck by a representation coded in thought. Indeed the language of striking (προσβολὴν) brings to mind the action of a representation striking the senses from the Stoic sources.

Noēseis, though appearing rather rarely in Origen, do appear to have the same semantic force in both Stoic sources and Origen. However, Origen uses another word that appears to undermine his strict adherence to the emotional framework laid out by the Stoics: logismos. Appearing much more often in Origen’s corpus, logismoi, although they can also be translated as “thoughts” in English (and, as we shall see, both noēsis and logismos are translated as cogitatio in Latin), should be distinguished from noēseis. We have seen above the relation of the word logismos and emotion in Origen’s Commentary on Jeremiah 5.9. There, emotions are said to lie “in our thoughts” (ἐν τῷ λογισμῷ ήμῶν). If logismoi were thoughts in the same sense as noeseis, in that they happen to us and are thoughts which may not have been assented to, this would cause a bit of

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confusion indeed, as the Stoic emotions are necessarily the result of an assent. In an interpretation of a line of scripture, however, Origen explicitly states that logismoi are judgments (κρίματά): "He loves the judgment of just men, whose thoughts are the judgments about which it is said: 'give a just judgment'." (Ἀγαπᾷ δὲ κρίσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαιῶν, ὅν οἱ λογισμοὶ κρίματά εἰσί, περὶ ὅν λέγεται· “Κρίμα δίκαιων κρίνατε.”) If we then read logismos as a judgment, a reading of Jer. 5.9 on Stoic lines makes sense. Emotions do consist of judgments, as we have already seen concisely put by Diogenes Laertius: “But it seems to them that the emotions are judgments” (δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι). We may be better off thinking of logismoi as judgments than simply thoughts.

Another indication of Origen’s consideration of logismoi is that he describes God as hearing our prayers and overlooking our judgments (ἐφορᾶν τοὺς πάντων λογισμοὺς). He also mentions in this context that God hears our prayers. Origen seems to be making the point that in the same way that we direct prayers towards God, and hope for a positive result, we should similarly keep in mind that he also is aware of our judgments. We may similarly expect something in response to our judgments, perhaps positive or negative, depending on the correctness of these judgments. Without relying too heavily on an argument ex silentio, he does not indicate that God keeps track of our noēseis, which reinforces the notion that we cannot be held responsible for them.

Origen also makes a similar delineation between rational and irrational animals. He says of ants and bees that although they may seem to be acting rationally or thoughtfully (ἐπὶ λογικῶν τεταγμένων), are not, as they “do not act with judgment” (οὐ γὰρ σὺν λογισμῷ ποιοῦσι). This falls in line with the Stoic argument that non-rational animals react simply based on impulse and not with judgment.

Finally, in his Commentary on John 6.2.9 (PG v. 14), Origen presents a personal anecdote in which he uses his reason as the first line of defense against bad judgments: "... reason called me to stand up to the fight and to guard my commanding faculty, lest evil judgments be able to let
loose a storm in my soul ..." (...)στήναι μᾶλλον με πρὸς τὸν ἀγώνα παρεκάλει ὁ λόγος καὶ τηρῆσαι τὸ ἕγεμονικόν, μήποτε μοχθηροί λογισμοὶ ἐξισχύσωσι τὸν χειμῶνα καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μου ἐπεισαγαγεῖν...) The metaphorical use of unfavorable weather is reminiscent of his description of the emotions as ‘winds’. It is then likely that these bad judgments will stir up emotions if the mind is not protected from them. Once again the choice of the term logismos in this situation is telling. If left unchecked, noēseis pose no threat, any more than another type of representation is not up to us until there is an act of assent. Bad judgments, on the other hand, as we saw in Galen and Stobaeus examples of the disobedient horse and running downhill, though they may initially be obedient to reason, soon gain momentum and strength and are quite difficult, if not impossible, to stop. It is thus incorrect judgments, or assents to incorrect stimuli that must be guarded against. In Origen’s Greek, the various terms for thought demonstrate a consciousness about two different types of mental events.

In his analysis of the use of ὄργίζεσθε in Psalm 4:5 (“Be angry and do not sin”), Origen explains how being angry could not be a sin in the following way:

'Ὅσον ὄργίζεσθε καὶ συμβαίνει τούτῳ υμῖν ὡς ἔχουσι πρὸς τούτῳ λογισμοὺς ἄλλα τῷ παρ' αὐτῶν μὴ προσθῆτε· ἄλλα τῷ συμβαίνοντι οὐ ψεκτῷ ψεκτόν τι μὴ ἀκολουθήσατο.
Origen sel. ps. 4:5

“‘Insofar as you are angry, and this happens to you despite the fact that you don't have any judgments to pursue anger, do not pursue that which comes out of these things. Do not allow something blameworthy to come from what has happened that is not blameworthy.”

Origen’s explanation qualifies this use of being angry with ‘insofar as’, creating a difference between the true emotion of anger and what does not yet count fully as anger. This is further strengthened by the logismoi not being present if you are angry only in this very specific

197 PG 12.1144A.
and limited way. The distinction between what is blameworthy (feeling the real emotion of anger) and what is not (feeling some sort of anger but having not yet committed to it) parallels the distinction between first movements, which may resemble emotions in one way or another, but have not been assented to, and true emotions, which involve active assent. Origen cannot ignore that the psalmist wrote ὀργίζεσθε but makes a concerted effort to explain its presence using the Stoic framework. In doing so, he highlights the narrower semantic range that an emotional verb such as “to be angry” has in philosophical texts. The Psalms use vocabulary more loosely and in more common ways, whereas Origen seeks to define more precisely by borrowing and adapting useful emotional terminology from the Stoa.

Types of Thought in Rufinus’ Translation

In Origen’s Greek, the various terms for thought demonstrate a consciousness about two different types of mental events (noësis and logismos). However, the distinction collapses in the Latin translation, as both are rendered with the Latin term cogitatio. In one particularly telling example, Origen's commentary on the same quotation of scripture remains both in the original Greek of the Contra Celsum, as well the Latin translation of the Commentary on John (for which we do not have the Greek). The Greek text makes mention of logismoi:

Οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἀνάφοροισιν οἱ δίκαιοι πάσαν τὴν τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ἀπὸ κακίας ἐρχομένων «ζωγρίαν», ὡς μηδὲ νήπιον καὶ ἄρτι ύποφύμενον κακὸν καταλείπεσθαι. Ἡμεῖς οὕτως ἀκούομεν καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἑκατοστῷ καὶ τριακοστῷ καὶ ἕκτῳ ψαλμῷ ρητοὶ, οὕτως ἔχοντος· «Θυγάτηρ Βαβυλῶνος ἡ ταλαίπωρος, μακάριος, δς ἀνταποδίσει σοι τὸ ἀνταπόδομα σου, ὁ ἀνταπέδωκας ἡμῖν μακάριος, δς κρατήσει καὶ ἐδαφεῖ τὰ νήπιά σου πρὸς τὴν πέτραν.» «Νήπια» γὰρ «Βαβυλῶνος», ἐρμηνευόμενης συγχύσεως, οἱ ἄρτι ύποφύμενοι καὶ ἀνατέλλοντες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴσιν συγχυτικοὶ λογισμοί οἱ ἀπὸ κακίας· ὁν ὁ κρατῶν, ὡς καὶ τῷ στερεῷ καὶ εὐτόνῳ τοῦ λόγου προσρήξει αὐτῶν τὰς κεφαλὰς, ἐδαφίζει «τὰ νήπια» τῆς «Βαβυλῶνος» «πρὸς τὴν πέτραν», γινόμενος διὰ τούτο
«μακάριος».
Origen Contra cels. 7.22

"Thus also just men dedicate every 'hostage' of their enemies which arise from evil so that they spare not even the children, that is the evil that is now growing. We thus understand also the meaning of the 137th Psalm: 'Daughter of Babylon, miserable one, he who gives back to you your due, what you have given to us, will be blessed, he who overpowers and dashes your little ones on the pavement.' For 'little ones of Babylon', which introduces some confusion, are the troublesome reasoned thoughts (λογισμοὶ) which grow and rise up in the soul out of sin: becoming master over them, strikes their heads with a firm and vigorous bit of reason, he beats 'the little ones of Babylon against the pavement, and it is for this reason that he is 'blessed'."199

The bad judgments are described as “growing” (ὑποφυόμενον), and “rising up” (ἀνατέλλοντες), a description that is reminiscent of growing emotional impulses which, once assented to, become excessive and uncontrollable. As we saw in Diogenes Laertius, once the horse becomes disobedient and you have assented to an unruly emotion, it becomes very difficult to stop. The violence of the reaction to these logismoi (striking, beating, a firm and vigorous reason) emphasizes the fact that they are very difficult to overcome with reason once they take hold. I do not believe these logismoi can be representations since they are said to arise from sin (ἀπὸ κακίας). Experiencing a representation cannot be sinful, nor, as we have seen, be indicative of experiencing a feeling, or the beginning of emotion. Sin occurs the moment we have assented. The λογισμοὶ οί ἀπὸ κακίας have already been assented to. Thus Origen holds fast to the distinction between noeseis, which do not involve assent, and logismoi, which do.

In the Latin translation, we find that logismoi have been rendered as cogitationes, and the terms used to describe their behavior seems to introduce some confusion about whether Origen

198 SC 150.
maintains the distinction between the different types of thought, and even more so how the philosophical terms are conflated in the Latin:

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\text{Si enim efferuescit animus et conturbatur, etiamsi non implerverit opus, ipsa tamen perturbatio indecens est ei, qui sub Iesu militat duce. Similiter et de concupiscentiae vitio et de tristitiae ceterisque omnibus sentiendum est. De quibus cunctis ita agendum est discipulo Iesu, ut nihil omnino horum in eius corde 'respiret', ne forte, si parvi alicuius viti aut consuetudo aut cogitatio 'relinquatur' in corde, processu temporis convalescat et paulatim vires latitando conquerat atque ad ultimum revocet nos 'ad vomitum nostrum' et 'fiant hominis illius' cui hoc acciderit, 'novissima peiora prioribus'. Hoc erat, quod et propheta propiciens in psalmis praemonet dicens: 'beatus, qui tenet et allidit parvulos tuos ad petram,' 'Babylonis,' scilicet 'parvulos,' qui nulli allii intelliguntur, nisi 'cognitiones malae' quae cor nostrum confundunt et conturbant. Hoc enim interpretatur Babylon. Quae cogitationes, dum adhuc parvulae sunt et initia habent, 'tenendae sunt et allidendae ad petram,' qui est 'Christus' et ipso iubente iugulandae, ut 'nil' in nobis 'resideat, quod respiret.' Sicut ergo ibi beatum est 'Babylonis parvulos tenere et allidere ad petram' et 'cognitiones malas' statim in initis necare.
\]

Rufinus comm in Jos 15.3

"If indeed the soul rages and is disturbed, even if the work is not complete, nevertheless the disturbance itself is unbecoming for the one who marches under the leadership of Jesus. We must think similarly about the vice of desire and sadness and all the others. With respect to all the others, we must act as Jesus’ follower, so that nothing of these things ever ‘breathes’ in his heart, lest by chance, if the experience or thought of a small vice ‘remains’ in his heart, through the passing of time it will grow and little by little it will grow stronger in hiding and ultimately it will recall us "to our disgust' and ‘they will become part of that man' to whom this happened: "novel things which are worse than before.' This was what the prophet was predicting when he warned [us] in the psalms, saying ‘Blessed is he who takes and dashes his little ones onto the pavement', certainly ‘little ones of Babylon', which can be understood as nothing else than ‘bad thoughts' which agitate our heart and throw it into distress. This is indeed the meaning of Babylon. Moreover, these thoughts, while they are still small and in their beginnings, ‘must be taken and dashed onto the pavement’ and they must be killed under his order, that is to say, ‘Christ,' so that ‘nothing remains which breathes’ in us. Therefore, he is happy who ‘takes the little ones of Babylon and dashes them into the pavement' and immediately kills ‘bad thoughts.'"

While the basic explanation is the same, we find instead of the \textit{cognitiones} described as growing out of control and rising up; they are instead “small and in their beginnings” (\textit{parvulae

\textsuperscript{200} GCS 30.
sunt et initia habent). This language mimics Seneca’s first movements. However, the emphasis on beginnings is not present in the Greek. Similarly, the soul and heart of the person undergoing these bad thoughts are being acted upon in the above Latin. The soul is described as “disturbed” (conturbatur) and the bad thoughts “agitare and “throw” the heart “into confusion” (confundunt et conturbant). The soul as the subject of a passive verb and the heart as the object acted upon by these thoughts again points to an interpretation in line with Seneca’s pre-emotion. The thoughts seem to have the agency here, and act upon our souls and hearts without consent. It is understandable, then, if one were to read both the Latin and the Greek descriptions of this same passage of scripture, that she would find them inconsistent. In the Greek text, the metaphorical language points towards a parallel for the Stoic emotional impulse, and thus makes it clear that these logismoi have been assented to. On the other hand, in the Latin, the vocabulary changes, bringing to mind Seneca’s first movements, and the person who must dash the Babylonian infants changes from active subject to passive object, further emphasizing that no assent has occurred.

Analysis of Target Text Only

Unfortunately, in the case of Origen, we often are left only with the Latin translation. However, given what we know about the existing Greek of Origen, we can still make some analysis of a Latin translation in order to give some indication of the process of translation. Furthermore, we can follow Venuti’s example when dealing only with the translated version of the text and examine it for internal inconsistencies or irregularities. For example, if we take the following problematic passage in Rufinus’ translation of the Peri Arkhōn, we can determine some of the factors present in Rufinus’ translation process. Rufinus’ translation begins 3.2.4 by saying:

Cogitationes quae de corde nostro procedunt, vel memoria quorumeumque gestorum, vel quarumlibet rerum causarumque contemplatio, invenimus quod
"We find that thoughts which proceed from our heart, whether they are a memory of deeds we have done or a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, sometimes proceed from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing powers, and occasionally also are implanted in us by God or by the holy angels."

The species of cogitationes being described here are ones that come from the heart. These thoughts sometimes come “from ourselves”, and other times are “aroused” or “implanted” by outside powers (whether good or evil). Already the fact that thoughts can both come from our own heart (seeming to indicate agency) and be implanted by outside powers (a description more fitting to a representation) may appear irreconcilable -- how can these types thoughts both come from inside us and be implanted? To complicate matters further, the same types of thoughts are later said to be “suggested to the heart”:

Nihil tamen aliud putandum est accidere nobis ex ipsis quae cordi nostro suggeruntur bonis vel malis, nisi commotionem solam et incitamentum provocans, nos vel ad bona vel ad mala. Possibile autem nobis est cum maligna virtus coeperit ad malum incitare, abiicere a nobis pravus suggestiones, et resistere suasionibus pessimis, et nihil prorsus culpabiliter gerere.

"Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that nothing else happens to us from these things [thoughts from 3.2.4 above] which are suggested to our heart, whether good or bad, except provoking a movement and inclination, whether it be towards good or evil. It is possible for us, however, when an evil power begins to incite us to evil, to cast away the bad suggestions from us, and to resist against the worst of persuasions, and ultimately to do nothing blameworthy."

That thoughts are said to be suggested, and that they are said to “happen to us” (accidere nobis) but not arise from our hearts is more in line with Seneca’s pre-emotion. We also see the idea of “beginning” (coeperit). Note also that the voice changes to make us the active agents when we

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202 Ibid.
cast away the bad suggestions (*abiicere a nobis pravus suggestiones*). These passages set up all types of thoughts, no matter their origin, or whether we have assented to them, as the setting of a battleground to fight off temptation. As we will see in the next chapter, this emphasis on the battling of evil thoughts is prevalent in Evagrius’ works.

Given the inconsistency between these two closely connected translations, combined with Rufinus’ other confusions (whether intentional or not), it seems that the confounding of the doctrine did not occur in Origen's Greek, but rather in the process of translation.

**Conclusions on Types of Thoughts**

Origen borrows Stoic terminology when discussing different types of thoughts: the *noēsis*, a type of thought for which we are not ourselves responsible, and *logismos*, a thought that we have accepted and must take responsibility for. In Latin, both of these terms are translated as *cogitatio*. This dramatically changes the meaning of the text. In conflating thoughts that are our responsibility and those that are not, Rufinus not only makes a big change in Origen’s doctrine on thought, but also weakens Origen’s emphasis on free will. Rufinus’ Latin allows for thoughts to be implanted into our head for which we must be responsible, and which we must battle in order to overcome. However, this circumvents our free will to choose and decide which thoughts to accept.
Conclusions

In the process of translation, the signs of revised and adapted Platonic and Stoic narratives are left behind at the border crossing and the result on the other side is that there is a discontinuity between the emphasis on the importance of free will and the weakened agency a person has over his thoughts. Thus, Rufinus’ translation limits the agency a person has over her thoughts, and thereby downgrades her free will as well.

The obvious outcome is that resulting texts no longer exhibit the symptoms of philosophical influence. But there is a further consequence as well: the philosophical purging of the texts disrupts the delicate balance and artistry of Origen’s original Greek, thus conflating Origen’s own doctrine. As we will see in the next chapter, the portrayal of battling implanted demonic thoughts comes from Evagrius’ works.
CHAPTER III
In Foreign Lands

Evagrius’ works as accessory texts and their infiltration into Origen through Rufinus

In this chapter, I will explore a model for some of Rufinus’ translation choices: Evagrius. I will use Marianne Pade’s observation that Guarino made Homer Roman through the use of an accessory text (as discussed in Chapter One) as a starting point for the investigation. Where Guarino Guarini brought Homer into Latin through the lens of Vergil, I will show that Rufinus likewise brought Origen into Latin through the lens of Evagrius. Positing the works of Evagrius as accessory texts utilized by Rufinus, this chapter will present the influence of Evagrius’ work as an important piece of Rufinus’ translation practices with respect to the psychology of “sinful” thought.

Evagrius’ Works as Accessory Texts

In Chapter One, I defined an “accessory text” as a third text used by the translator with the purpose of strengthening or supplementing the target language text, or simply as an aid in the translation process. The range of potential accessory texts is wide: from simple lexica to commentaries on the text to be translated. Each accessory text has an inevitable effect on the translation process, as using a variety of accessory texts in the process of translation equates to adding a variety of small outside influences on the text. The text thus has many authors and many sources acting on it. I also demonstrated in Chapter One an example of accessory text use as
pointed out by Danish scholar Marianne Pade. Pade examined Guarino Guarini’s fifteenth-century translation method in the case of a Hymn of Homer. She demonstrated that in his translation of the Hymn from Greek into Latin, Guarino used Vergilian sentiments and even quoted Vergil himself in the Latin Homeric verse translation. Guarino made Homer Roman through the use of an accessory text, bringing Homer into Latin through the lens of Vergil. In this chapter, I will argue that Rufinus likewise brought Origen into Latin through the lens of Evagrius.

The chapter begins with a presentation of relevant information about Evagrius and his relationship to both Rufinus and Origen, thereby providing the basis for my claim that Rufinus’ translation practices reflected the psychological theories of Evagrius. Next, I follow the journey of the soul in Rufinus' translations: its descent into body and subsequent struggles with sinful thought. I compare Rufinus' text with Evagrius' to demonstrate where Rufinus' alterations bring Origen's thoughts in line with the Evagrian model, both conceptually and stylistically. In this way, I will argue that Rufinus was standardizing the Christian corpus, and bringing two controversial figures, Origen and Evagrius, not only closer to each other but closer to the sentimentalities of his Christian readers. This will not only shed light on inconsistencies between the Greek and Latin of Origen's works but also serve to highlight Rufinus as a creator and interpreter in his own right.
Consequences of Evagrius as Accessory Text

As I will demonstrate, Evagrius is not concerned with distinguishing between different types of thoughts. For him, there is the *logismos*, and it will tempt you, both in its good and evil incarnations. He puts great emphasis on fighting the *logismos* when it arises, as well as a concern over whether one allows evil thoughts to linger and take hold in your soul. On the one hand, there are some apparent similarities to Origen's Stoic formulation, namely that one should analyze a thought, wherever it should arise, and prevent evil thoughts from taking hold by resisting them. However, the role that the *logismos* plays in Evagrius is more in line with Seneca’s *propatheia* than the reasoned *logismoi* in Origen. Origen's Greek is careful to distinguish that there are *phantasia*-type thoughts (*noēseis*), as well as thoughts that have been rationally assented to (*logismoi*). Further, Origen discusses emotions as having beginnings as well, in a state in which it is possible to reject them. Neither *logismoi* nor *noēseis* are, in Origen's model, a type of pre-emotion. Because the confusion in Origen’s doctrine arises only in the Latin translations of his work, I believe that it is more fruitful to treat these as a translator’s interpretation of Origen, one that I will demonstrate was heavily influenced by Rufinus’ personal and professional relationship with Evagrius.

Evagrius suffuses the *logismos* itself with slightly more agency, as if the presence of a thought represents the first line of battle for the integrity of the self, and the battle itself determines the whether a sin has been committed. Rufinus’ innovations are a remediation of the meaning of thinking as such in the context of Christian eschatology, contemplation, and asceticism. Both Rufinus and Evagrius emphasize battling the *logismos* in order to avoid sin.

We can see evidence of Rufinus relying on Evagrius’ psychological models throughout the journey of the soul, which I will demonstrate. However, the focus of this chapter will be on
Evagrius’ unique use of *logismos* and Rufinus’ infusion of this Evagrian *logismos* into Origen’s work.

**Evagrius’ Life, Work, and Connections**

Born in 345, Evagrius belonged to a well-connected Christian family with ties to Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and Macrina the Younger. According to a letter from Gregory of Nazianzus to Evagrius’ father, the young Evagrius was studying under Gregory in 359. At the time, Gregory was working with Basil to build an volume of excerpts from Origen, now known as the *Philokalia*. (Not to be confused with the *Philokalia* from Mt Athos in which some of Evagrius’ writings have been preserved. I will follow Casiday in referring to the former as the “Cappadocian *Philokalia*, and the latter as the Athonite *Philokalia*.”) When Basil died in 379, Evagrius left Cappadocia and went to Constantinople to join Gregory. In 382, he traveled to Palestine, where he was hosted in Jerusalem by Melania, who was supervising a monastery on the Mount of Olives along with Rufinus.

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Evagrius’ writings appear to have been quite widely known and read, thanks in part to the Latin translations that Rufinus made of his work.\footnote{See Jerome Ep. 133.3, in which he laments that Evagrius is widely read not only in the East but the West, quoted in full below.} He was not immune to charges of Origenism due to his close connections with the Cappadocian \textit{Philokalia} project, however. Much of his work ceased to be transmitted in Greek. These works survive in Syriac and Armenian versions. These translations are undoubtedly quite important in their own right. As Casiday rightfully acknowledges, they offer us an opportunity to understand more about Evagrius’ thought than we otherwise would be able to.\footnote{Casiday (2013:1).} They have also helped scholars identify some Greek texts which had previously been attributed to another author.\footnote{Some manuscripts have been attributed to Nilus of Ancyra. However, scholars have identified many of these as being authored by Evagrius. On this topic, I stand by the consensus of the Evagrian scholarship and only rely on texts which are agreed to have been authored by Evagrius himself, even if they were at erroneously attributed at one point to Nilus. For a more in-depth discussion on how and why these texts were attributed to Nilus, see Dysinger, L. (2005:22-30). \textit{Psalmody and prayer in the writings of Evagrius Ponticus}. Oxford: Oxford University Press.} Nevertheless, Casiday also admits in the same breath that the translations provide access “at a linguistic remove”. Given that the spirit of this dissertation is to shed proper light on the entire process of translation, with a focus on Rufinus as the translator, it would be disingenuous to include linguistic analysis of translated works. I caution scholars not to use Rufinus’ translations as a substitute for Origen’s thought (in particular when dealing with sensitive linguistic nuances such as those present in philosophical terminology). Therefore, a fuller analysis of the translation process of Evagrius’ texts would be necessary before they could be used to represent Evagrius’ thought in this dissertation. This sort of in-depth analysis is outside the scope of a project whose focus is on the translator Rufinus. In some limited cases,
surviving translations of Evagrius’ works will be used to represent Evagrius’ overall doctrines. However, because of the aforementioned “linguistic” remove, they will not be used in direct comparison with Rufinus’ translations.

“An Origenism of an Original Type”

Evagrius had many connections to Origenism. He traveled to Jerusalem in 382, where he spent time with Rufinus and Melania the Elder. He continued a correspondence with both of them for the duration of his life. After Jerusalem, he went on to study in Egypt under Macarius of Alexandria.²⁰⁹

Evagrius was connected to other Origen sympathizers, such as Melania, and the bishop John of Jerusalem (see his letters 2, 9, 24, 50, 51). According to Gabriel Bunge,²¹⁰ Evagrius’ Great Letter was addressed to Melania, and his On Prayer was written for Rufinus himself.²¹¹

Additionally, Jon F. Dechow links Evagrius with yet more leading Origenist figures: Tall Brothers Ammonius, Euthymius, Dioscorus, and Eusebius. Most scholars view Evagrius in the light of Origen and see him as systematizing and expanding upon Origen's thoughts.²¹² Dechow²¹³ has explicitly traced Evagrius' Origenist influence to the Cappadocians. Origen himself certainly

²⁰⁹ See Ramelli (2013:7): Macarius the Egyptian "was converted to asceticism by St. Antony (an Origeian), founded Scetis, and was, like Origen, Antony, and Evagrius himself, a supporter of the doctrine of apokatastasis, or universal restoration."

²¹⁰ Evagrios Pontikos (2013: 176-206). Briefe aus der Wüste Beuroner Kunstvlg

²¹¹ Cf. A. Guillaumont (1962: 47-77), Les ‘Kephalaia Gnostika’ d’Èvagre le Pontique, Patristica Sorbonesia, v, 1962: ‘les relations d’Èvagre avec les Origénistes de son temps,’ especially p. 69 n. 92, on the possibility that Rufinus is the addressee of Evagrius' Letter 22, and p. 71-3 on the “Evagrian” character of Rufinus' alterations to the Greek translating the Historia Monachorum.

²¹² A notable exception to this is Gabriel Bunge, who argues for distancing Evagrius from the assumption of influence from Origen. See ‘Origenismus-Gnostizimus, zum geistesgeschichtlichen Standort des Evagrios Pontikos’ 25-7.

had a direct connection with the Cappadocians, as St Gregory Thaumaturgus, one of Origen's
disciples and his close friend, was the teacher of Macrina the Elder, Basil's grandmother.\(^{214}\)

Jon F. Dechow is likely correct in his assertion that Evagrius was familiar with Origen
through the Cappadocian \textit{Philokalia}, but as Julia Konstantinovsky contends, Evagrius’ type of
Origenism was not the same as that found in the \textit{Philokalia}. Evagrius is not using material which
the Cappadocians valued and included in the \textit{Philokalia}. I assume that, as Konstantinovsky puts it,
“If Evagrius was an Origenist, his was an Origenism of an original type.”\(^{215}\) The purpose of
examining Evagrius’ texts will not be to trace the influence of Origen himself, but rather to point
out thematic and stylistic differences between Origen and Evagrius, and how Rufinus served to
smooth out these differences in translation.

\textit{Evagrius and the Origenist Controversy}

Evagrius is mentioned for the first time as a leading Origenist in Jerome’s Letter 133:

\begin{quote}
\textit{qui librum quoque scripsit quasi de monachis multosque in eo enumerat, qui
numquam fuerunt et quos fuisse describit Origenistas et ab episcopis damnatos
esse non dubium est, Ammonium videlicet et Eusebium et Euthymium et ipsum
Evagrium, Or quoque et Isidorum et multos alios... unum Iohannem in ipsius
libri posuit principio, quem et catholicum et sanctum fuisse non dubium est, ut
per illius occasionem certeros, quos posuerat hereticos, ecclesiae introduceret.}
Jerome, \textit{Letter} 133.3.6-7\(^{216}\)
\end{quote}

“He has also written a book which professes to be about monks and includes in it
many who were never monks at all whom he declares to have been Origenists,
and who have certainly been condemned by the bishops. I mean Ammonius,
Eusebius, Euthymius, Evagrius himself, Horus, Isidorus, and many others whom
it would be tedious to enumerate. the first he posits in his books was Johannes,
who was undoubtedly both a Catholic and a Saint so that on his occasion he
introduced others who had been declared heretics.”

\(^{214}\) Konstantinovsky (2009: 21).
\(^{215}\) Ibi, p. 20.
\(^{216}\) CSEL 56, p. 250-51.
Of the 15 anathemas against Origen declared at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553, 1, 2, 3, 4, on the topic of protology, and 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 on eschatology, reflect some of Evagrius’ thoughts, especially as laid out in the *Kephalaia Gnostika*. Additionally, 6, 7, 8, and 9 could be attributed to Evagrius’ Christology in the *Kephalaia Gnostika*. Evagrius’ name is not explicitly mentioned in Justinian’s 553 anti-Origenist condemnations, but according to Guillaumont, it is very likely that his works were a direct influence on the anti-Origen positions in the condemnations. In any case, at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553, Justinian condemned Evagrius individually (in addition to Origen and Didymus). On the other hand, A.M. Casiday points out:

…whether one thinks Evagrius’ theology provoked the First Origenist Controversy is in large measure a consequence of whether one thinks that his theology was exceptionally unusual in the context of late fourth-century Egypt (not to mention whether one thinks Evagrius had enough clout to stir up such an intense reaction).

Thus, it cannot be certain that Evagrius’ writings were a primary source in the writing of the condemnations. In fact, it is not necessary to approach this study of Evagrius, Rufinus, and Origen from the standpoint of dwelling on the Origenist controversy, nor from the view of the Cappadocian influence. It is beyond dispute that Evagrius drew inspiration from Origen, as well as Gregory and Basil, with whom he studied personally.

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Evagrius and Rufinus

Jerome describes Rufinus as Evagrius’ “disciple”.219 Besides being engaged in translating Evagrius’ work into Latin, Rufinus also held correspondence with him for much of their lives.220 As for Rufinus’ translations of Evagrius, there are two surviving texts: a set of maxims for monks, as well as one for a virgin. However, as Caroline Hammond (1996) points out, Jerome’s letter to Ctesiphon implies that Rufinus made many more translations of his friend Evagrius’ work:

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\begin{align*}
\text{scribit ad virgines, scribit ad monachos, scribit ad eam, cuius nomen nigredinis testatur perfidia tenebras, edidit librum et sententias } & \pi\epsilon\rho\iota \pi\acute{a}\acute{p}\alpha\theta\acute{e}i\acute{a} \varsigma \text{ huius libros } \\
\text{per orientem Graecos et interpretante discipulo eius Rufino Latinos plerique in } & \text{occidente lectitant.}
\end{align*}
\]

Jerome, Ep. 133.3221

“He writes For Virgins, he writes For Monks, and he writes to the woman whose name of darkness invokes the gloom of treachery; he produced a book and maxims On Detachment, the Greek books of which people eagerly read throughout the east, and, thanks to the translation by his disciple Rufinus, many people often read the Latin versions in the west.”

Scholars have argued that the agenda behind Rufinus' translations of Evagrius is very similar to his agenda when translating Origen: he was creating a body of Christian literature that would align with the developing orthodoxy Justinian established in 553. However, since Rufinus and Evagrius were close friends, his motivations are compounded: they become more personal. As Caroline Hammond, puts it: “No doubt Rufinus was not only satisfying contemporary interest but also aiming to win sympathy for his own particular friends.”222 Thus, Rufinus' personal connection

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219 See Jerome Ep. 133.3, quoted below.
220 See G. Bunge, Evagrios Pontikos: Briefe asunder Wüste, Sophia, 24 (Trier: Paulinus, 1986), 176-207. As Sinkewicz (2000:133) points out: ‘Unfortunately, very few of the attributions [Bunge’s] can be made with certainty.’ Nevertheless, there was at least some correspondence between the two men, in addition to the Rufinus’ extensive translation project.
221 CSEL lvi, p. 246.
222 Hammond, C. (1996: 395). She goes on to clarify: "It is likely that the translations of Evagrius were made in the same connection, with the aim of popularizing the brand of Egyptian monasticism which Rufinus favored. Evagrius was not only a major ascetic writer and friend of
with Evagrius undoubtedly had a powerful influence not only on his translations of Evagrius but, as I will argue in this chapter, also on his translations of Origen.

As I will demonstrate, Rufinus’ translations of Origen were heavily influenced by his personal and professional relationship with Evagrius, the evidence of which can be seen by comparing the Rufinus’ translations of Origen with the texts of Evagrius.223 While there are only scant extant translations that Rufinus made of Evagrius’ works, the comparison of Evagrius’ Greek with Rufinus’ Latin translations of Origen will also prove to be a fruitful investigation.

Melania and Rufinus, but he was also a prominent member of the group of Origenist monks, only escaping persecution with them by his timely death in 399."

223 Both Toth (2009), and Guillaumont (1962) have also pointed out particular Evagrian influences in Rufinus' translations, specifically in the Historia Monachorum in Aegypto (HMA). Toth analyzes, in particular, the prevalence of the phrase *quae sunt scientiam* in Rufinus' Latin translation of the HMA, which is inconsistent with the Greek version of the text which has the simpler τῆς τῶν ἄλλῶν ἁπάντων γνώσεω. He traces Rufinus' translation back to Evagrius due to the prevalence of the phrase *quae sunt scientiam* when referring to things one can learn when getting to know God.
Evagrius’ Works

Central to this investigation will be the trilogy of *Praktikos*, *Gnostikos*, and *Kephalaia Gnostika*. These three present an overview of Evagrius’ thought. The *Praktikos* focuses on the practical stage of the ascetic struggle, the *Gnostikos* on the spiritual and contemplative part, and the *Kephalaia Gnostika* is a survey of Evagrius’ epistemology. Although the *Kephalaia Gnostika* only exists in its entirety in Syriac translation, there are also extant Greek excerpts, which will be utilized in this examination.

Further Evagrian texts which have been preserved in a Greek manuscript shall be studied, in particular those in which he discusses thoughts. These are the *To Eulogios*, *De octo spiritibus malitiae*, and the *Peri Logismou*. The *Eulogios* presents a case of how to judge thoughts, while the latter two texts are primarily about battling the temptation of thoughts, the *De octo spiritibus malitiae* being a more fundamental type of manual, and the *Peri Logismou* a more advanced manual for practitioners.

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226 Unfortunately, the entire work has only been preserved in Syriac, in two manuscripts, (S1) and (S2). There exist also some fragments in the original Greek, which will be referred to in due course. In his French translation, Guillaumont does deem the Syriac translation as faithful to the original. See Guillaumont, Les six Centuries des Kephalaï *Gnostika* d’Evagre le Pontique, PO 28.1, No. 134 (Paris, 1958). Given the nature of this dissertation and its ultimate aims, no assumptions will be made about the faithfulness of the Syriac translation, and the scarce Greek manuscripts will be points of reference whenever possible.
227 For a full chronology of Evagrius’ works, see Dysinger, *Psalmody and Prayer*, 22-30.
The Journey

Steps 1 and 2: The Descent of the Soul and Free Will

The descent of the intellect to soul and further into its embodied state is a central tenet of Evagrius’ thought. He mentions the fall in the Letter to Melania 26. He first explains the intellect falling to become a soul, then entering a body and finally in the end rising up to become an intellect again. While this letter is no longer extant in the original Greek, we see the concept of the descent of the intellect descending into embodiment and being called by different names at each stage of the descent both in the Letter to Melania 26 and the Kephalaia Gnostika 3.28. The emphasis on the intellect in its various stages only being named a body or named a soul, rather than becoming is also directly reflected in Rufinus’ translation of Origen, as we already saw in Chapter Two:

Origen, Peri Arkhōn, 2.8.230

“Just as the savior came to save what was lost, when he saved that which was lost, it was no longer lost. Thus, he came to save the soul, to save what was lost. And thus, the saved soul was no longer a soul… the intellect, when falling, became the soul and the soul, when formed again in virtues, will become the intellect again.”

It is possible that Rufinus had used the distinctly Evagrian method for describing the descent of the intellect into soul and body when he was translating Origen's strikingly similar (but by no means

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229 See also KG 3.28: A soul is an intellect that, in its carelessness, has fallen from Unity, and, due to its lack of vigilance, has descended to the order of praktike. Here Evagrius is also following Origen by using an etymology of the soul, psyche, deriving from the word psychsis, meaning to cool. Thus as the nous descends from the Good, it cools and becomes the soul.

230 frag 21, Koetschau, from Justinian Ep. ad Menam.
identical) passage. Where Origen speaks of actually becoming something different at each stage, both Evagrius (as evidenced by the *Letter to Melania* and *Kephalaia Gnostika*) and Rufinus’ translations of Origen emphasize that the different stages of descent are simply a matter of nomenclature.

Monica Tobon has suggested that, in fact, for Evagrius the intellect has not descended entirely, and this can explain the idea of simply being “called” something else, and not becoming something new in the process of descent: “The *nous* remains a *nous* even as it becomes (additionally) a soul and a body; that is, that a part of it remains undescended in the contemplative union with God that it hitherto enjoyed *in toto,*” (Tobon, “Raising Body and Soul”, 53).

Besides the change of name in the process of descent, the *reason* for the descent as neglectfulness or idleness became a powerful tenet in later Christian thought. It was represented as one of the eight evil thoughts in Evagrius, as we shall see. Ilaria Ramelli notes that the neglectful nature231 that causes the fall of the intellect is also stressed in Origen, though the passages in question that stress this are Rufinus’ translations:

*In quo utique pro motibus suis unaquaque mens vel amplius vel parcius bonum neglegens in contrarium boni, quod sine dubio malum est, trahebatur.*

Rufinus, *De Principiis* 2.9.2

“Every intellectual being, neglecting the Good to a greater or lesser extent due to its own movements, was dragged to the opposite of the Good, that is, evil.”

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“Freedom of will either roused each one to progress by means of the imitation of God or dragged each one to deficiency due to neglectfulness.”

Thus, I would exercise caution when attributing the emphasis on neglect behind the fall of the soul to Origen without any evidence in the Greek text, especially given the potential infiltration of Evagrius’ thought in Rufinus’ Latin.

Examining Rufinus’ translation of Origen in isolation, as in Chapter Two, can illustrate the stylistic changes Rufinus made to the text but does not provide an explanation for why he made the alterations. Seen in the context of the Evagrian hierarchical system, however, the story of Rufinus’ translation has more clarity. Evagrius’ conception of the intellect being named for the different stages of its descent, rather than becoming something else as it descends, as we see in Origen, is reflected in Rufinus’ translations. It is also possible that the idea of neglectfulness, one of the eight evil thoughts in Evagrius’ work, has also infiltrated Origen through Rufinus’ translation process.

The following sections will delve deeper into an understanding of the Evagrian logismos, its connection with sin, and how Rufinus’ translations read thoughts in Origen through the lens of Evagrius.

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232 Texts and translations found in Ramelli (2013: 52). See also de princip. 1.4.1, 1.6.2, and PArch 2.8.3, all of which discuss the neglectfulness as a reason for the fall of the soul, and all of which exist only in Latin translation.
Steps 3 and 4: Emotion and Embodied Thoughts

Classification of Thoughts

Evagrius solidified in his work that there are three categories of thought: angelic, human, and demonic. After much spiritual exercise and gaining self-awareness, the monk could distinguish these three types of thoughts:

Τῶν ἀγγελικων λογισμῶν, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν ἐκ δαιμόνων ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς παρατηρήσεως ἐγνώκαμεν εἶναι.

*Peri Logismou* 8

"After lengthy observation, we have learned to recognize this difference between angelic and human thoughts, and those that come from the demons."

The angelic thoughts were a result of contemplation, focused on the realities of the natural world and their ultimate principles or *logoi*, as well as symbols in the spiritual realm. Thoughts that are implanted into the human soul by demons seem to be designed solely to invoke human emotion in the practical world. Human thoughts fall somewhere in between the angelic and divine, showing the intellect the forms of reality around it, without any emotion or deep contemplation.

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233 SC 438, 79.1209a.
235 See also: Τῷ δαιμονιώδει λογισμῷ τρεῖς ἀντίκεινται λογισμοί, τέμνοντες αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ διάνοιᾳ χρονίζοντα, ὃ τε ἀγγελικὸς, καὶ ὃ ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας προαιρέσεως ῥεπούσης ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ὃ ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀναδιδόμενος φύσεως, καθ’ ὅν κινούμενοι καὶ ἐθνικοὶ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ ἴδια τέκνα, καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν τιμῶσι γονεῖς. Τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ λογισμῷ δύο μόνον ἀντίκειναι λογισμοὶ, ὃ τε δαιμονιώδης, καὶ ὃ ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας προαιρέσεως ἀποκλινούσης ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον. Εκ δὲ τῆς φύσεως οὐδείς ἐξερεύνῃ λογισμὸς πονηρός. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπαρχής γεγόναμεν πονηροὶ

*Peri Logismou 31 (40.1240α) ΞΕ; SC, p.260)*

"Opposed to the demonic thought are three thoughts which cut it off when it lingers in the intellect: the angelic thought, that which proceeds from our free choice when it leans towards the better, and that which is furnished by human nature, according to which even pagans love their own children and honor their parents. Opposed to the good thought,
Note is often made of the fact that Origen likewise has distinguished three types of thoughts. The source for this assertion is Rufinus’ translation:

_Cogitationes quae de corde nostro procedunt, vel memoria quorumeumque gestorum, vel quarumlibet rerum causarumque contemplatio, invenimus quod aliquoties ex nobis ipsis procedant, aliquoties a contrariis virtutibus concitentur; interdum etiam a Deo, vel a sanctis angelis immittantur._

_Rufinus De Principiis 3.2.4_236

“We find that thoughts that proceed from our heart, whether they are a memory of deeds we have done or a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, sometimes proceed from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing powers, and occasionally also are implanted in us by God or by the holy angels.”

There is no explicit mention of the three types of thought in Origen’s Greek. However, we can find mention of demonic and angelic thoughts in Rufinus’ Latin translation of Origen. This lack of discussion of various types of thought in Origen’s extant Greek once again points to an Evagrian influence on the Latin translation.

**Soul, Intellect, and Heart**

As noted in Chapter Two, Rufinus often seems to use soul and heart interchangeably in his Latin translations of Origen. While, as we saw, Origen does not interchange these two words in his Greek texts, and so the answer to why Rufinus has seen fit to do so lies in Evagrius’ work. Evagrius does, in fact, seem to use heart and soul interchangeably, and even sees the intellect as synonymous with the heart.237 We see in _Praktikos_ 47: Τὸν γὰρ νοῦν μόνος ἐπίσταται ὁ ποιήσας ἡμᾶς Θεός, καὶ οὐ δεῖται συμβόλων αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸ γινώσκειν τὰ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ κρυπτόμενα. “God there are only two thoughts, the demonic thought and that which proceeds from our free choice when it inclines towards the worse. No evil thought derives from our nature, for we were not created evil from the beginning …”

For more on the three types of thought in Evagrius, see Sinkewicz p. 138-9


_237 For more discussion of Evagrius’ view of the intellect as synonymous with the heart as the spiritual center of a human being, see Konstantinovsky (2009: p.88)
alone, who fashioned us, knows the intellect, and He has no need of signs to know that which is hidden in the heart.”

Ilaria Ramelli points to a passage of Origen in which he explains that what the Scriptures call “heart” is often meant to indicate our intellect, Rufinus’ Latin translation of Commentary on Romans Rufinus’ states that “usually the ‘heart' is called the rational faculty of the soul,” rationabilem animae virtum cor solere nominari (Commentary on Romans 2.7. 36-37). This evidence is only present in Rufinus' Latin translation. Given Rufinus' penchant for didactic interjections in his translations, as discussed in Chapter Two, it is difficult to say for certain that this was, in fact, Origen's original explanation.

There is, however, a parallel passage in Evagrius, which mimics much of Rufinus’ practice of using soul and heart interchangeably:

Δίκαξα τούς λογισμούς ἐν τῷ βήματι τῆς καρδίας, ἵνα τῶν ληστῶν ἀναρρουμένων, ὁ ἀρχιλῃστὴς φοβηθῇ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ὄν ἀκριβῆς τῶν λογισμῶν ἐξεταστής, ἐστι καὶ ἀληθὴς τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐραστής. Ἐπαν οὖν λογισμὸς ἐπιστῇ σου τῇ καρδίᾳ δυσεύρετος, τότε ἐπὶ πλεῖον συντόνους πόνους ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἐκπύρωσον· ἢ γάρ τὴν θέρμην ὡς ἐναντία οὐ φέρων ἀποδρᾷ, ἢ ταύτην ὑπομένει ως οἰκεῖον τῆς εὐθείας ὁδοῦ. Ἐστι δ’ ὅταν οἱ δαίμονες λογισμὸν δῆθεν καλὸν ὑποβάλλοντες τῇ καρδίᾳ, καὶ παρευθύνετε λόγοις ὑπομένεις τῇ καρδίᾳ,

238 For further examples: KG, VI.87; Praktikos 47.7; 50.9; epil. 6; Thoughts 6.29-32 (the intellect is identified with the heart of Matt. 6.21); 17.3ff. KG 6.52:

Many passions hide in our souls, those that, when they escape us, strong temptations reveal to us. Moreover, it is necessary that "with all solicitude, we keep our heart," lest, when the object of our passion presents itself, we immediately be drawn by demons and make any of those things that are odious to God.


239 (2011: 349). She goes on to state that “He, like some other Fathers, drawing inspiration from Gal 4:19, speaks of the formation and birth of Christ, as Logos and all virtues, in the heart of human beings (Commentary on Romans 7.5.41-51)"
καὶ παρευθὺ μεταμορφούμενοι ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῦτῳ προσποιοῦνται, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, νομίσῃς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις τῆς καρδίας σου εἰδέναι. To Eulogios, 13

"Judge the thoughts in the tribunal of your heart so that when thieves are done away with, the chief thief may take fright; for one who is a rigorous examiner of his thoughts will also be truly a lover of the commandments. Thus, whenever there arises in the heart a thought that is difficult to discern, then ignite all the more against it intense ascetic labors; for either it will depart, unable to bear the heat of its opposite, or else it will persevere because it belongs to the straight path. However, sometimes the demons suggest to the heart a thought that is apparently good and, immediately transforming themselves, they pretend to oppose it, so that from this opposition you may think that they know even the ideas of your heart."²⁴⁰

As in Rufinus' translation above, thoughts are “suggested to your heart.” They can also similarly arise there in the same place and be judged there. Evagrius makes much use of heart, soul, and intellect as interchangeable and interconnected terms which all refer to a human's spiritual capacity. As we have seen, Rufinus engages in the same practice in his translations of Origen.

**Evagrian Logismos**

Evagrius uses the term *logismos* principally for thoughts when he describes thoughts of any kind — evil or good, implanted or originating from within ourselves, assented to or not. Because this term is used both for thoughts that are implanted, those which come from us, as well as thoughts that have “lingered” too long and thus become a symptom of underlying sin, it aligns neither with the exacting Stoic distinction between *noēsis* and *logismos*, nor with Origen's own distinctions between those same terms, as seen in Chapter Two. Origen’s work reflects a distinction between a *noēsis* being something not up to us, and a *logismos* as something we have assented to, and thus are responsible for. The Evagrian process starts with an introduced *logismos* (whether introduced by good or evil forces or originating within the person herself). That the *logismos* arises

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is not necessarily a problem for Evagrius, as long as it is immediately dismissed. However, if we allow the *logismos* to linger, then it can become fixed in our mind and thus causes sin. Thus, the battle against the *logismos* becomes of extreme importance.

The *logismos* also has the curious feature of being relevant only for monks. Evagrius is careful to point out that ordinary people are confronted by physical objects meant to deceive them. Monks, who do not have the physical possessions of the average person, are attacked using *logismoi*:

"The demons war with seculars more through objects, but with monks, they do so especially through logismoi, for they are deprived of objects because of the solitude. Further, to the extent that it is easier to sin kata dianoian than in action, so is the warfare kata dianoian more difficult than that which is conducted through objects. For the nous is a thing easily set in motion and difficult to check in its tendency towards unlawful fantasies."  

Evagrius is careful to refer to thoughts in his treatises and not sin because Evagrius’ *logismoi* are not (at the outset) within our control. However, they can turn into sin if we entertain them too long or if they result in emotion.  

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241 SC 170  
243; See Harmless (2004: 322-23): “Note that Evagrius calls them ‘thoughts’ and not sins. Sin implies consent and responsibility, as Evagrius notes: ‘It is not in our power to determine whether we are disturbed by these thoughts, but it is up to us to decide if they are to linger within us or not and whether or not they are to stir up our passions.’ [Evagrius, Prak 6 SC 171:508; trans. Bamberger, CS 4:17]”
When discussing evil thoughts, Evagrius is also wont to replace *logismos* with synonyms that describe where he believes these thoughts originate: demons. So, often he uses expressions such as *daimones* when referring to thoughts originated by negative influences.\(^{244}\)

Evagrius’ conception of *logismoi*, how they fit into emotional states and in what regard and circumstance we are responsible for our thoughts is expanded in more detail below. Although Evagrius’ works are not structured in such a way as to give a systematic outline of the definition and behavior of *logismoi*, nevertheless I will endeavor to flesh out its structure by comparing examples from the texts mentioned above.

*To Eulogios*

A brief section in Evagrius’ work *To Eulogios* deals with *logismos*, encouraging us to judge thoughts in our heart so that only the good thoughts will persevere. In this way, his conception of dealing with thoughts mirrors the view of the Stoics in that a thought arises and we must then decide whether it should be accepted or rejected. However, the terminology for a thought that appears before it is judged is different in the Stoic framework (the representation is a *noēsis*), and even in Origen, a *logismos* is never described in the Greek text as a type of representation, but rather a reasoned thought.

\(^{244}\) See Harmless (2004: 323), in his discussion on vainglory: “Note how Evagrius shifts from the language of ‘thoughts’ to the language of ‘demons.’ If one surveys his works, one finds that he refers almost indifferently to the ‘thought of vainglory’ and the ‘demon of vainglory.’ the same flip-flopping between ‘thoughts’ and ‘demons’ appears when he speaks of the other vices.” It should be noted that these interchanging synonyms for thoughts should not be read as metaphor or exaggeration. Indeed, as we will see, Evagrius does believe that thoughts are often implanted in us by demons. See Harmless (2004: 327): “Evagrius, as we saw, speaks of ‘thoughts’ and ‘demons’ as though they were synonyms. That does not mean he thought of demons as merely metaphorical, as a symbol for psychological dynamics. He believed that there really were demons. ‘Thoughts were simply the most common mechanism by which desert solitaries encountered demons.’
In terms of the relationship between thoughts and emotions, Evagrius says the following:

πῇ μὲν οἱ λογισμοὶ ἐφέλκονται τὰ παθη, πῇ δὲ τὰ πάθη τοὺς λογισμοὺς. τὸ
tηνικαῦτα καὶ οἱ λογισμοὶ διὰ τοῦ πάθους, πολεμοῦσι τὴν ψυχήν.
To Eulogios, 1109Aff (PG 79)

“Sometimes the thoughts attract the emotions, and sometimes the emotions the 
thoughts, and then the thoughts through the emotions make war on the soul.”

To Eulogios, 1109Aff

This emphasizes the emotions as the primary source of discord in the soul. The thoughts do not
cause the war in the soul themselves; they must have emotions as their vehicle to be the agents of
sin. There is a vicious cycle, in that thoughts can produce emotions and vice versa.

Additionally, there is a connection made between thoughts and sense perception. Evagrius
warns:

ὁ ανήσυχος ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ὄψεις αἰσθήσεων τὴν ψυχήν πολεμεῖται, ὁ δὲ
φιλήσυχος, τὰς αἰσθήσεις φυλάσσων, τοὺς λογισμοὺς πολεμεῖ.
To Eulogios, 1109Bff

“He who does not preserve stillness brings warfare to his 
soul from the senses
associated with sight, but the person who loves stillness guards the senses and
makes war on thoughts.”

There is some parallel here with the Stoics and Origen, in that they too draw close
comparison between thoughts, the process of developing an emotion, and sense perception.
Similarly, Evagrius points out that ‘guarding the senses’ can save you from bringing any evil
thoughts internally to his soul. The Stoics, too, believed that you can accurately analyze your
sensory inputs, and choose only to pursue the truth.
Treatise on Thoughts

Evagrius’ *Peri Logismou* is meant as a sort of advanced manual on how to deal with thoughts, both judging and accepting the good ones, and fighting and expelling the bad ones.248

He first proceeds by laying out the different types of vices, which are organized into three main types of thoughts, from which all other evil thoughts arise. The three primary thoughts are gluttony, avarice, and vainglory.249 There are several points in Evagrius’ treatise on thoughts which are of particular interest to this study. First, in laying out the primary thoughts, Evagrius states:

Τῶν ἀντικειμένων δαιμόνων τῇ πρακτικῇ, πρῶτοι κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον συνίστανται οἱ τὰς τῆς γαστριμαργίας ὀρέξεις πεπιστευμέοι, καὶ οἱ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν ἡμῖν ύποβάλλοντες, καὶ οἱ πρὸς τὴν τὸν ἀνθρώπου δόξαν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαλούμενοι. Οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι πάντες κατόπιν τούτων βαδίζοντες, τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων πορείας, μὴ ὑπὸ τῆς γαστριμαργίας καταπεσόντα, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ταράξαι θυμὸν, μὴ ὑπὲρ βρωμάτων ή χρημάτων, ή δόξης άλογον ἐπιθυμιῶν, μαχόμενον καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὸν τῆς λύπης δαίμονα διαφυγεῖν, τούτων πάντων στερηθέντα, ἡ μὴ δυνηθέντα τυχεῖν ὡδὲ ἀποφεύξεται τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν τις, τὸ

248 See Sinkewicz (2000: 136-7) "Although this treatise examines the subject of ‘thoughts,’ it does so in a manner quite different from other Evagrian works such as Eulogios, Eight Thoughts, and Praktikos. These works address the concerns of the monk still very much engaged in the practical life, whereas the treatise On Thoughts offers a more advanced teaching to those who have crossed the threshold of impassibility and have begun to enjoy the fruits of the gnostic life. Thoughts offers no systematic or detailed treatment of each of the eight thoughts, such as can be found in other works, and when it does treat individual vices it takes up special cases or concerns that will be particularly relevant to the more advanced stages of spiritual development. The most substantial part of the treatise is devoted to an exploration of the typology or categorization of the thoughts as well as a detailed examination of their mechanisms and the tactics employed by the demons who inspire them."

249 This structural approach that posits these three as the fundamental vices from which all others arise persists in future Byzantine ascetic literature. See, for example, Maximus the Confessor, Centuries on Charity 3. 56, PG 90. 1033BC, ‘Self-love, as often has been said, is the cause of all the impassioned thoughts. From it are begotten the three main thoughts of concupiscence — gluttony, avarice, and vain glory. From gluttony is begotten the thought of fornication, from avarice greed, from vain glory pride. All the rest follow upon one or the other of these three — the thoughts of anger, sadness, resentment, acedia, envy, slander, and the rest. These passions then bind the mind to material objects and hold it down on earth, lying upon it like a massive stone, whereas by nature it is lighter and more agile than fire.
πρῶτον γέννημα τοῦ διαβόλου, μη τὴν τῶν κακῶν ῥίζαν ἐξορίσας φιλαργυρίαν, εἶπερ καὶ πενία ἄνδρα ταπεινοῖ, κατὰ τὸν σοφὸν Σολομῶντα· καὶ συλλήβδην ἔπειν, ὥς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος πενίας δαίμονι, μη πρῶτερον ύπ' ἐκείνων τῶν πρωτοστατῶν κατατρωθέντα…

*Peri Logismou*, 1ff

"Among the demons who set themselves in opposition to the practical life, those raged first in battle are the ones entrusted with the appetites of gluttony, those who make to us suggestions of avarice, and those who entice us to seek human esteem. All the other demons march along behind those and in their turn take up with the people wounded by these. For example, it is not possible to fall into the hands of the spirit of fornication, unless one has fallen under the influence of gluttony; nor is it possible to trouble the irascible part, unless one is fighting for food or wealth or esteem. Also, it is not possible to escape the demon of sadness, if one is deprived of all these things, or is unable to attain them. Nor will one escape pride, the first offspring of the devil, if one has not banished avarice, the root of all evils (1 Tim. 6: 10), since, according to the wise Solomon 'poverty makes a person humble' (Prov. 10:4). To put it briefly, no one can fall into a demon's power, unless he has first been wounded by those in the front line."

The passage is rife with imagery of warfare between the sage and evil thoughts. We see in the Stoics and Origen the metaphor of emotions as natural forces, such as storms or winds, or unruly animals.

In his treatise *Peri Logismou*, Evagrius states that *logismoi* are introduced to the soul by mental representations. In this way, his sense of a *logismos* is something like the Stoic notion of a representation, in that it is introduced from the outside and is something not up to us.

There is also a great deal of emphasis placed on the duration of a thought. Whether one dwells on a thought (without any action taken) is itself an indicator of the strength or purity of an individual. Thus, even if a thought arises from a demon, or from outside of us in some way, simply allowing it to linger is problematic. Evagrius also discusses the lingering of certain representations and compares this to the lingering of emotions:

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250 SC 438.
252 Cf. Reflections S2, ‘A demonic thought is a mental representation of a sensible object, which moves the irascible or the concupiscible part in a manner contrary to nature.’
Πάντες οἱ ἀκάθαρτοι λογισμοὶ διὰ τὰ πάθη χρονίζοντες ἐν ἡμῖν, κατάγουσι τὸν νοῦν εἰς ὀλέθρον, καὶ ἀπώλειαν: ὡσπερ γάρ τὸ νόημα τοῦ ἄρτου χρονίζει ἐν τῷ πείναι, καὶ τὸ νόημα τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν τῷ διψᾶντι, ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ νόημα τῶν κτήματος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων, χρονίζει διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, καὶ τῶν νοήματων βρωμάτων, καὶ τῶν τικτομένων αἰσθήματος 

*Peri Logismou*, 22

“*All the impure thoughts that linger within us on account of the passions bring the mind down to ruin and destruction (1 Tim. 6:9). For just as the mental representation of bread lingers with the hungry person on account of the hunger, and the mental representation of water in the thirsty person because of thirst, so too the mental representations of food and shameful thoughts begotten by food linger with us because of the passions.*”

On the one hand, the idea of representations lingering is not consistent with Origen, who does not mention any sort of representation lingering in someone’s mind to taunt her. The connection is made between the image of bread being perpetually in the mind of a hungry person and the persistence of an evil thought in a spiritually weak or impure person. Again, here the *logismos* is said to be a mental representation, but one for which we are responsible.

There is, furthermore, an emphasis on the staying power of *logismoi*. Evagrius gives the example of intervening thoughts:

Τῶν λογισμῶν οἱ τέμνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τέμνονται· καὶ τέμνουσι μὲν οἱ πονηροὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, τέμνονται δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἱ πονηροὶ τὸ τοῖς Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον πρῶτοι, τεθέντι προσέχει λογισμῷ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον κρίνει ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀποδέχεται. Ὅ ὦ δὲ λέγω τοιοῦτον ἔστιν. Ἐξω τις φιλοξενίας λογισμὸν, καὶ τοῦτον ἔχω διὰ τὸν Κύριον, ἀλλὰ οὗτος ἐπελθόντος τοῦ πειράζοντος τέμνεται καὶ δόξης χάριν φιλοξενοῦν ὑποβάλλοντος. Πάλιν ἔχω φιλοξενίας λογισμὸν πρὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φανῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος ἐπελθόντος κρείττονος λογισμοῦ διατέμνεται, τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Κύριον μᾶλλον ἐν τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπευθύνοντος. *Peri Logismou*, 7

“*Among thoughts, some serve to cut off others, while some are themselves cut off: evil thoughts cut off good ones, and in turn, evil ones are cut off by good ones. The Holy Spirit, therefore, pays attention to the thought that was posited first and condemns and approves us with respect to it... If then we stay with the...*”

253 SC 438
255 SC 438.
former thoughts by our works even while tempted by the latter ones, we will receive the reward only of those thoughts posited first, because, being human and occupied in the fight with the demons, we do not have the strength always to hold onto the right thought intact, nor in turn are we able to keep the evil thought unchallenged, for we possess the seeds of virtue. However, if one of the thoughts that cuts off the others stays for awhile, it becomes established in the place of the one that is cut off, and then the individual will be moved to act according to that thought.”

The fact that priority goes to the thought that takes hold for the most prolonged period of time suggests that these logismoi are changeable and controllable. This is in sharp contrast to the logismoi of the Stoics or Origen, which are rational thoughts that have been assented to, for which you are responsible, and are nearly impossible to stop or change. Instead, the intervening thoughts in Evagrius seem to act more like propatheia, pre-emotions, which can be stopped as long as they have not gained too much momentum and you have not been lured into assenting to them.

Thoughts: Rufinus’ Alignment with Evagrius

Where we have seen Origen mention that noēseis can come from different sources, Evagrius systematically sets forth that there are three types of thoughts: angelic, human, and demonic. In a formulation similar to Origen’s own, Evagrius refers to the possibility that thoughts could be “suggested to the heart” by demons, by angels, or by divine powers:

"After lengthy observation, we have learned to recognize this difference between angelic and human thoughts, and those that come from demons. Firstly, angelic thoughts are those concerned with the investigation of the natures of things and search out their spiritual principles. For example, the reason why gold was made and why it is sand-like and scattered… The demonic thought neither knows nor understands these things, but without shame, it suggests only the acquisition of sensible gold and predicts the enjoyment and esteem that will come from this. The human thought neither seeks the acquisition of gold nor is concerned with investigating what gold symbolizes; rather, it merely introduces in the intellect the simple form of gold separate from any passion of greed."\textsuperscript{258}

In Chapter Two, we saw the same formulation in Rufinus’ translation of Origen:

\textit{Cogitationes quae de corde nostro procedunt, vel memoria quorumeumque gestorum, vel quarumlubere rum causarumque contemplatio, invenimus quod aliquoties ex nobis ipsis procedant, aliquoties a contrariis virtutibus concitentur; interdum etiam a Deo, vel a sanctis angelis immittantur.}

\textit{Rufinus, De Principiis 3.2.4}\textsuperscript{259}

"We find that the 'thoughts which proceed out of the heart (Matt. XV 18,19; Mark VII 21) whether they are a memory of deeds we have done or a contemplation of any things or causes whatsoever, sometimes proceed from ourselves, sometimes are aroused by the opposing powers, and occasionally also are implanted in us by God or by the holy angels."

Again, however, these suggested thoughts are \textit{logismoi}, which under Origen's framework are thoughts that have already been accepted, and thus it would be too late to decide upon them and cast them from our hearts. Here, Rufinus' translation renders the text in Latin in a way that aligns exactly with Evagrius' outline of the implantation of evil thoughts here in the \textit{To Eulogios}. As discussed in Chapter Two, Rufinus uses the Latin term \textit{cogitatio} to translate a variety of different

\textsuperscript{257} SC 438.
specific Greek terms. Unfortunately, since in this particular passage the Greek is not extant, we cannot see what Origen's original term in Greek would correspond to the Latin *cognitiones*. It should be noted that Origen does not use *logismos* to describe thoughts that have not been assented to, and thus many scholars have found that this translation of Rufinus presents at best confusion, and at worst, inconsistency in Origen's doctrine. While we cannot attempt to recreate the “original” text, we can potentially save Origen from inconsistency by tracing the story of his text's translation and shining light on Rufinus' agency as a translator.

Rufinus’ translation goes on in the same passage to display other striking similarities to Evagrius’ description of *logismoi*:

\[
\text{Nihil tamen alius putandum est accidere nobis ex ipsis quae cordi nostro suggeruntur bonis vel malis, nisi commotionem solam et incitamentum provocans, nos vel ad bona vel ad mala. Possibile autem nobis est cum maligna virtus coeperit ad malum incitare, abiicere a nobis pravus suggestiones, et resistere suasionibus pessimis, et nihil prorsus culpabiliter gerere.} \\
\text{Rufinus, De Principiis 3.2.4}^{260}
\]

> “Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that nothing else happens to us from these things [thoughts from 3.2.4 above] which are suggested to our heart, whether good or bad, except provoking a movement and inclination, whether it be towards good or evil. It is possible for us, however, when an evil power begins to incite us to evil, to cast away the bad suggestions from us, and to resist against the worst of persuasions, and ultimately to do nothing blameworthy.”

Here, thoughts are described as “suggested” to us and are meant to be “resisted”. If we presume these thoughts were originally *logismoi* in Origen's original Greek, then we encounter a problem. However, this formulation of thoughts which are suggested, as if some sort of test of our strength and clear-sightedness, and which must be resisted and not allowed to linger, aligns quite well with Evagrius and his emphasis on battling and resisting *logismoi*.

I have pointed out the clear similarities between Evagrius’ three sources for thoughts and the above passages of Origen (in translation). This is an instance for which it would be more

\[^{260}\text{Ibid.}\]
fruitful to compare Rufinus to Evagrius. Rufinus’ text has such a striking similarity to Evagrius that it points to Evagrius as an accessory text in the process of translating Origen to Latin.

Conclusions

Just as Guarino Guarini brought Homer to Latin through the lens of Vergil, likewise Rufinus has brought Origen to his Christian, Latin-speaking audience through the lens of Evagrius. In this chapter, I presented the influence of Evagrius’ work as an important piece of Rufinus’ translation practices with respect to the psychology of “sinful” thought. I first discussed instances in which Rufinus borrowed Evagrian conceptions throughout the first three steps of the soul’s journey. However, the primary focus of the chapter was on how Evagrius’ conception of logismos infiltrated Origen’s text through Rufinus’ translation. I illustrated that the distinction in Origen’s works between thoughts that are up to us and those which are not was confused and retroactively made to align with Evagrius’ description of logismoi in his works.
CONCLUSION

The process of translation is central to the field of Classics as well as Ancient Philosophy and Theology. In this dissertation, I have deconstructed the process of translation in these three related disciplines by incorporating relevant methodology from the field of Translation Studies. I have also endeavored to add new, relevant tools and considerations along the way. Viewing translation as a narrative process in which every element is crucial for understanding the overall picture gives us a way to study translation in antiquity more holistically.

I used the above translation methodology to unpack Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s psychology. I used an important early Christian narrative, Origen’s narrative of the descent of the soul into embodiment, as a case study in this endeavor. The narrative of the soul’s descent is a particularly useful one because so much of it is still extant in both Origen’s Greek and Rufinus’ Latin translation. This provides a rare opportunity to compare Rufinus’ translations with the original. The textual comparison and analysis of the influences acting on Rufinus in his own time revealed that Rufinus made a change in how thoughts are judged. Although Origen’s Greek reflects a type of thought for which we are not responsible unless we act upon them, Rufinus’ translations suggest that thoughts can be sinful even without action.

Although there is evidence in Rufinus’ translations that suggest Origen viewed thinking as a sinful activity, it is not supported by Origen’s extant Greek corpus. Furthermore, Rufinus himself admits to altering Origen’s texts in his prefaces. He is also invested in a project of standardizing a Latin library of Christian texts and is motivated to “save” Origen from the Origenist controversy. Finally, I have argued that the specific changes he makes to Origen’s thought formation have come
from the works of Evagrius, which Rufinus also translated. I uncovered Rufinus’ conflation of sinful actions and sinful thoughts and the interpolation of Evagrius’ texts in three chapters.

Chapter One focused on laying the methodological groundwork for investigating Rufinus’ process of translation. It began with a review of the importance of translation studies and how relevant theories of translation might be incorporated into the study of Rufinus and Origen. It then moved on to providing a concise and complete definition of translation. As stated by Roger Bell, a complete definition necessarily takes into account the process of translating, the product of the translation itself, and translation as the abstract concept that includes both the process and the outcome. More complex than simply converting words from one language to the next in a one-to-one correspondence, my definition of translation was inspired by Jacques Derrida, who stressed that the source text can only be converted successfully to another language by the strength of the translator’s ability to interpret and contextualize. I uncovered that translation should be seen as a form of rewriting, and that no text is free from the influence of its translator. Next, building on theories from Lawrence Venuti and Naomi Seidman, I outlined the first two influences acting on every translator: the audience of the target text and the contemporary historical and political environment. I introduced both the concept of foreignizing translation, staying as true to the source text as possible, but potentially alienating the target audience, and domesticizing translation, working to make the target text sound as natural as possible, to the possible detriment of the message of the source text. Several examples of domesticizing and foreignizing translations were employed to show how a translator’s audience can influence her, and it was noted that the current prevailing opinion on what makes a “faithful” or “accurate” translation is heavily influenced by the notion that a domesticizing translation is superior to a foreignizing one. I next introduce and build upon Lawrence Venuti’s concept of the accessory text. An accessory text is a third text used by the translator with the purpose of strengthening or supplementing the target language text, or simply as
an aid in the translation process. This can be as basic as a lexicon, or as complex as a text covering the same or a similar topic. Whatever the accessory text or texts that a translator uses in her work, she cannot prevent the outside text infiltrates the translation to a greater or lesser extent. The chapter concluded with a discussion of how the above translation theories can be applied to Rufinus’ translations of Origen. I remarked that in the study of Origen there is also remarkably little conversation about translation. However, the preservation of both the original Greek and the Latin translations of much of Origen’s First Principles and Commentary on the Gospels gives us a unique opportunity to study the journey of a philosophical idea as it goes through the process of translation. In some cases, we are left only with the Latin translation. In such instances, the establishment of crucial accessory texts, such as the writings of Evagrius, can provide valuable insights into potential alterations to the text and thereby present a clearer picture of the story of Rufinus’ translation.

Chapter Two initiated the study of Rufinus’ translation process. Viewing the process of translation as a journey from one language to another, not unlike a physical journey from one country to another, it answered the question of what was present in Origen’s original Greek that may have been subject to “border control” measures in Rufinus’ translation process. It also illuminated the consequences that their absence had for the Latin text. The investigation was framed using Tejaswini Niranjana’s translation border zones. The chapter first engaged with Origen’s original Greek works by exploring his descriptions of the journey of the soul in its descent into embodiment and struggle with thought and emotion, and subsequently details how Origen borrowed and adapted from Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Stoic doctrines. The soul’s journey was divided into four steps: the fall of the intellect, the establishment of free will, the embodied battle with emotion, and finally the struggle with sinful thoughts. In each of the above steps, Origen appropriated Platonic images and Stoic terminology to complete his narrative of the soul’s journey,
but these philosophical markers were left behind in the process of translation. The result was a discontinuity in Rufinus’ Latin translation between the emphasis on the importance of free will and the weakened agency a person has over his thoughts. Rufinus’ translation choices ultimately limited the agency a person has over her thoughts and thereby downgrades her free will in the process. The chapter closed with an emphasis on the fact that the philosophical purging of the texts disrupts the delicate balance and artistry of Origen’s original Greek, thus conflating Origen’s own doctrine. I showed that Origen borrows Stoic terminology when discussing different types of thoughts: the *noēsis*, a type of thought for which we are not ourselves responsible, and *logismos*, a thought that we have accepted and must take responsibility for. In Latin, both of these terms are translated as *cogitatio*. This dramatically changes the meaning of the text. In conflating thoughts that are our responsibility and those that are not, Rufinus not only makes a big change in Origen’s doctrine on thought, but also weakens Origen’s emphasis on free will. Rufinus’ Latin allows for thoughts to be implanted into our head for which we must be responsible. However, this circumvents our free will to choose and decide which thoughts to accept.

After the first two chapters established the effect of Rufinus’ translation choices on Origen’s overall narrative of the soul’s descent, Chapter Three turned to the infiltration of accessory texts on Rufinus’ translations of Origen. I explored a model for some of these translation choices: Evagrius. As discussed in Chapter One, Marianne Pade argued that Guarino Guarini made Homer Roman through the use of an accessory text. He thus brought Homer into Latin through the lens of Vergil. In Chapter Three, I demonstrated that Rufinus likewise brought Origen into Latin through the lens of Evagrius. I presented the influence of Evagrius’ work as an important piece of Rufinus’ translation practices with respect to the psychology of “sinful” thought. Although I first presented instances in which Rufinus borrowed Evagrian conceptions throughout the first three steps of the soul’s journey, the primary focus of the chapter was on how Evagrius’ conception of


logismos infiltrated Origen’s text through Rufinus’ translation. I illustrated that the distinction in Origen’s works between thoughts that are up to us and those which are not was confused and retroactively made to align with Evagrius’ description of logismoi in his works.

Uncovering the complexity of the translation of Origen’s moral psychology helps us better to understand the overall story of Origenism. It is also a small but significant piece in the history of moral psychology. As I examined in the philosophies of the Stoics and Platonists in Chapter Two, there was a long intellectual history before Origen that directly equated thoughts with action. Without action, we were not culpable for our thoughts. When Richard Sorabji wrote that Origen’s shift to a discussion of sinful thoughts was a significant one, he was correct, although I have argued that this shift cannot convincingly be traced to Origen himself, but rather to Rufinus’ translation. The idea of sinful thoughts is prevalent in the works of Evagrius and indeed goes on to enjoy a long history after the time of Evagrius as well. In fact, the question of whether we are culpable for our thoughts is still relevant today as we still debate on the relative importance of intent, action, and consequence.

In sum, I have stressed the importance of viewing Rufinus as a very active and decidedly not invisible translator. This demonstrates that we not only must consider whether a translation is biased, has been altered, or otherwise does not conform to the spirit and doctrine of the original work, but it is also fruitful to uncover what type of contemporary influences might have been acting upon the translator when working on the text. The methods outlined in this dissertation helped investigate translation as a process and the translator as active agent. These methods can be applied to other works of translation in antiquity. Although they are especially suited and crucial when looking at Christian translations for the Western Empire (because of the particular power the translators had over their increasingly monolingual audiences), they are also relevant to the study of translations throughout antiquity. The translator should never be reduced to the status of a
conduit or an invisible hand.


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