

Elite Framing and the Legitimacy of Global Governance

by

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For Sara.

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Abstract

Globalization has created opportunities and pressures that require cooperation beyond the nation-state. As a consequence, national governments worldwide are delegating governance tasks to international organizations. These organizations are now vital actors in efforts to address global challenges and overcome collective action problems, but public opposition has the power to severely curb their effectiveness. Yet to date, we know very little about public support for those global governance organizations that have not been heavily politicized in the public domain. This raises the important question of why some organizations involved in global governance become politicized and contested by the public, whereas others do not? And what shapes people's initial attitudes about such complex organizations?

This dissertation develops a broad theory for when global governance organizations become politicized and, in the process, perceived as illegitimate by the public. Across three substantive chapters, comprising six original experiments, I first examine support for global private governance in general, then in the context of environmental standard-setting, and finally I expand the scope to examine support for global governance more broadly. In contrast to explanations based on people's sincere preferences about what type of governance is legitimate, I argue that politicization is largely a function of elite messages that contain affective cues about an organization's legitimacy. I show that information about non-governmental governance that is beyond the control of democratic nation-states does not, by itself, depress support. Rather, it takes elite rhetoric affectively tagging these institutions as illegitimate to bring about this attitude change. Moreover, in seeking to elucidate these processes, I also develop a novel way of conceptualizing and measuring framing effects. Here, I examine how exposure to frames about organizations that people know very little about has the power to not only shape attitudes but change how people make sense of these organizations in the first place.

Chapter 1

Introduction

“We need to reflect on what we, as political scientists, know that could help actors in global society design and maintain institutions that would make possible the good life for our descendants”

— Robert Keohane, 2000 APSA Presidential Address

Robert Keohane’s 2000 American Political Science Association’s Presidential Address (Keohane 2001), from which the opening epigraph is drawn, introduced a governance dilemma: while globalization requires effective governance and global society benefits from the international proliferation of rules and cooperative institutions, endowing international bodies with more power also threatens liberty, thereby undermining these very institutions’ legitimacy. A similar argument was also made by Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004), who recast this dilemma as the ‘globalization paradox.’

Indeed, globalization has created opportunities and pressures that require cooperation beyond the nation-state. As a consequence, national governments across the globe are either explicitly or implicitly delegating myriad governance tasks to international organizations as a means to address a range of collective action problems. From efforts to mitigate the impacts of a changing climate to regulations that enable efficient international trade, authority is being ceded to organizations that are not the elected governments of nation-states. Recently, however, these normative endeavors have come into conflict with domestic politics. Not only does international commitment to global cooperation seem weaker than in the past (Haufler 2018), but political renationalization and a retreat from global cooperation are staples of European populist parties’ rhetoric (Zürn 2018). In the United States, the rhetoric of President Donald Trump has targeted a range of global organizations such as the United Nations (UN) as well as the notion

of global governance more broadly (cf. Posner 2017).

Despite these developments, global governance organizations are not equally politicized, which in this dissertation I understand as being contested in the public domain such that people believe an issue should be subject to public deliberation. The prime example of a shift from a depoliticized entity to a politicized entity can be found in the experience of the European Union (EU). Nearly fifty years ago, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) described public contestation vis-à-vis the EU as dormant, and described an era exhibiting a ‘permissive consensus’ in which elites were allowed to forge ahead with cooperation while the public played a passive role and its opinions had no impact on the workings and effectiveness of the organization. This period has famously come to an end, as most forcefully illustrated by the UK Brexit vote. It is now accepted that public opinion is consequential to the organization’s legitimation (see also Hobolt 2009; 2012).

What is interesting, however, is that the EU outperforms similar regional integration bodies, which are not politicized, on multiple indicators of democratic accountability and legitimacy (Duina and Lenz 2018). But prominent accounts seeking to explain politicization posit that this process occurs when people realize how much authority is yielded to un-elected organizations at the expense of national governments. This raises the important question of why some organizations involved in global governance have become politicized and, in turn, contested by the public whereas others have not? Moreover, are politicians who draw attention to and criticize the democratic deficit in these bodies tapping into a genuine concern on the part of the public? And how do people come to develop attitudes about such complex organizations in the first place?

This dissertation takes on these questions by concentrating on the power of framing. In contrast to explanations based on people’s sincere preferences about what type of governance is legitimate, I argue that politicization is a function of elite messages that contain affective cues suggesting whether or not an organization is legitimate. I show that information about governance that is beyond the control of democratic nation-states does not by itself depress support. Rather, it takes elite rhetoric affectively tagging these institutions as illegitimate to bring about this attitude change. Moreover, in seeking to elucidate these processes, I also develop a novel way of conceptualizing and measuring framing effects.

Here, I examine how exposure to frames about attitude objects that people know very little about has the power to not merely change attitudes, but to shape the way people understand these issues in the first place.

In developing these arguments, I depart from much of the extant scholarship that focuses on explaining the politicization of the EU and turn to examining organizations that have, to date, largely escaped the public discourse. I argue that focusing on the EU or other prominent bodies such as the UN or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is problematic because researchers are theorizing about — and subsequently empirically testing — the dynamics involved in how international organizations become politicized by studying institutions that cannot provide valid counterfactuals since these bodies have already been politicized. Therefore, I turn to lesser known organizations that have only recently been identified as powerful international actors in the international relations and international political economy literature (e.g., Bütthe and Mattli 2011) to examine the factors that shape public perceptions of these organizations.

Overall then, this dissertation develops a broad theory for when global governance organizations become politicized and, in the process, become perceived as illegitimate by large swathes of the population. Across three substantive chapters, comprising six original studies, I first examine support for global private governance in general, then in the context of environmental standard-setting, and finally I expand the scope to examine support for global governance more broadly by paying particular attention to variation in institutional design that can characterize a range of global governance organizations.

In the process, this dissertation provides the first comprehensive assessment of public opinion toward global private regulatory bodies — a class of organizations that includes diverse entities such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). These organizations are the focal institutions in their respective fields of regulation, meaning that they develop and monitor rules which countries and businesses adopt. These organizations, however, are private entities and thus their roles are not mandated by, or enshrined in international law, leading to their classification as non-state market-driven governance systems (Cashore 2002). While the precise institutional arrangements differ within this class of organizations, they generally develop rules by

involving multiple stakeholders from industry, academia, and sometimes citizen advocacy or pressure groups. Moreover, in cases such as the ISO, their membership includes representatives from national standard-setting organizations. These organizations clearly differ from many of the more well-known international bodies such as the EU or the UN because they lack the formal involvement of national governments. Importantly, therefore, I also extend my empirical analyses beyond this narrow form of global governance to global organizations more broadly. In particular, by also examining hypothetical institutions that are characterized by institutional arrangements that capture institutional configurations prevalent in a plethora of international organizations, I am able to generalize beyond private global governance. In sum, then, the dissertation provides a generalized framework for understanding when global governance organizations will face public opposition.

In Chapter Two, against the backdrop of recent critiques of the framing concept, I develop a novel way of conceptualizing framing effects that makes the concept more distinguishable from related media effects concepts and points to its unique added value. Substantively, in the broader context of the dissertation, I suggest that this framework lays the foundation for the analyses that follow by elucidating how people come to hold attitudes about global private standards organizations. My theoretical account substantiates how repeated exposure to frames can powerfully affect not just attitudes toward global private governance organizations, but also how people come to understand these and other complex political issues. I develop novel survey instrumentation to measure the degree to which frames become cognitively internalized and thus help people make sense of political issues. I implement these new measures in two original survey experiments and validate how cognitive internalization can be measured in a variety of ways. Using this technique, I show that frames need not always affect attitudes to be consequential but rather that the power in repeated framing lies in its ability to shape the way people understand complex political issues. This innovation helps substantiate cognitive internalization as a psychological mechanism underlying framing effects that is distinct from the framing-as-accessibility, framing-as-applicability or framing as belief change paradigms. Using this framing approach, the paper is thus able to substantiate how the information people receive about these organizations matters to how they understand these bodies, and in turn whether they perceive them as legitimate.

In Chapter Three, I take up the question of what drives support for global governance. In particular, I draw on diverse strands of political science literature, from the politicization of European integration to the concept of stealth democracy. Here, I argue that the commonly invoked authority transfer hypothesis, which suggests that the public will reject global governance organizations after learning about their often non-democratic, supranational character and the potential for distributive consequences is incorrect. Rather, I argue, the public only starts rejecting these organizations when elites frame them in ways that suggest they are undemocratic. Importantly, I posit that this is not solely a partisan dynamic whereby people take cues from in-party elites, but rather that this is a more general dynamic of responsiveness to national elites. To test my theoretical account, I again turn to private governance organizations. More specifically, I examine support for such organizations in the context of private environmental standard-setting. Drawing on evidence from two survey experiments, I show that public support for global private governance is surprisingly large, even when people learn about the decision-making structures. However, once national political elites ‘politicize’ these bodies, the public follows suit and rejects them as illegitimate.

In Chapter Four, I broaden my focus beyond global private governance to test competing theories of when the public will come to oppose global governance in more general terms. Here, I disaggregate global governance organizations to study how variations in specific institutional features affect support for organizations. I again contrast this with the role that elite rhetoric plays in driving public opposition. Specifically, I compare the relative impact of different institutional configurations and elite frames on levels support for hypothetical regulatory bodies operating at either the domestic or international level. Leveraging a conjoint experiment fielded on two samples, I show that while some information about institutional features can affect public support, there is no evidence that information about organizations’ increased authority or of decreasing control exercised by national governments affects support. In contrast, again, domestic elite rhetoric — sometimes even from out-partisans — powerfully decreases support.

In Chapter Five, I conclude the dissertation by summarizing its findings, contributions, and implications for scholarship across diverse political science literatures. Moreover, I discuss limitations

of the work and outline how future research can build on the foundation set out in this dissertation to further advance both our understanding of framing dynamics and public opinion toward global governance.

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Chapter 2

From a ‘Central Organizing Idea’ in a Frame to a ‘Central Organizing Idea’ in the Brain: The Psychology of Framing Effects Revisited

INTRODUCTION

Framing effects have become ubiquitous in political communication research. On the one hand, it has become abundantly clear that even subtle changes in the framing of information can lead to significant changes in political attitudes and evaluations. On the other hand, some scholars have recently questioned the usefulness of the framing concept (Scheufele and Iyengar 2012; Cacciatore et al. 2016; Leeper and Slothuus 2017). These critiques assert that ‘framing’ has become shorthand for a multitude of distinct media effects and that much of the extant literature adopting the framing framework fails to distinguish framing from related processes such as persuasion or priming. Indeed, while some recent research has begun to pay closer attention to the underlying mechanisms producing framing effects, a stark disconnect remains between the power ascribed to frames in their various conceptualizations and the understanding we have of how these frames structure people’s thinking.

This chapter sets out to redeem the framing concept by shifting the focus of inquiry from ‘attitudes’ to ‘understanding’. Inspired in part by the work of Berinsky and Kinder (2006), I examine whether exposure to frames affects the way in which people draw on information when thinking about the issue at hand. In line with early conceptualizations of issue frames as providing a ‘central organizing idea’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143), I outline whether this property of the frame in turn becomes a property in the brain that allows people to make sense of entire classes of attitude objects based on frames they were previously exposed to. That is, I develop a new measure capturing the extent to which people

use a frame in subsequent sense-making and then empirically test whether frames can become cognitively internalized. Substantively, I lay the foundation for the rest of the dissertation by leveraging this ‘cognitive internalization’ framework to explain how people come to hold attitudes towards the types of global governance organizations that are the subject of the remaining chapters.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide some background on the concept of framing, focusing primarily on how research has sought to conceptualize the mechanism leading to ‘framing effects’. Second, I introduce the idea of cognitive internalization, suggesting that exposure to frames might have a more structural effect on issue dimensions that respondents know little about, such that they provide respondents with information fostering a certain understanding of a new attitude object. Third, I briefly outline a general way to measure this concept of internalization that leverages an open-ended survey prompt. Fourth, I discuss how this approach can be adopted to study people’s opinions toward global private regulatory governance. Fifth, I conduct an initial single-shot experiment to validate different measures of internalization and show the usefulness of the concept. Sixth, I conduct a three-wave, repeated exposure experiment to more thoroughly test whether people internalize frames they are exposed to as well as whether such internalization is consequential. I conclude with a summary and implications for the broader literature on framing.

FRAMING EFFECTS AND MECHANISMS

In the political science literature, scholars usually refer to a framing effect as some difference in preferences, attitudes or evaluations that is the result of (oftentimes subtle) differences in the way an issue was presented to individuals. Such frames have been found to alter expressions of attitudes on issues as diverse as affirmative action, the Kosovo conflict, opposition to KKK rallies, and support for European integration (see e.g. Chong and Druckman 2007a; Berinsky and Kinder, 2006; Nelson et al. 1997).

While a litany of studies have thus demonstrated that framing matters, they often use vastly different conceptualizations and operationalizations of frames. Early work in psychology focused on equivalency frames in which equivalent information was presented in subtly different ways. Here, Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) work suggested a very clear mechanism leading to framing effects, rooted in prospect

theory. Frames, while equivalent in information, change whether people think about losses and gains which in turn alters their willingness to take risks (cf. Chong and Druckman 2007a). In contrast, much of the political science literature has adopted a conceptualization of so-called issue frames, where an issue is presented from two different angles, whereby the information itself is not logically equivalent. Here, I focus on the types of frames that are usually considered ‘issue frames’ or ‘emphasis frames’ and, in particular, on frames regarding attitude objects that people know little about. One of the most commonly cited definitions of such frames suggests that they provide “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143). It is worth noting that this emphasis leads to a conflation of frames and the content of messages (e.g., Leeper and Slothuus 2017; Scheufele and Iyengar 2012), but it is nonetheless evident that this conceptualization of frames reflects realistic messages as they exist in the actual information environment (cf. Vraga et al. 2010).

Now that I have introduced the types of frames I am interested in, the central question is how these frames impact attitudes. A meta-analysis in the communications literature found that a mere 11 percent of framing effect studies (study n=90) explicitly examined the underlying mechanism mediating any effect (Borah 2011: 255). Hence a vast majority of applied studies in political science and communication studies, while producing important research on the effects side, have not contributed to a deeper understanding of the framing mechanism. Comparatively few scholars have sought to unpack the black box of framing by trying to elucidate the psychological mechanisms producing these effects. Below I provide an overview of the work that has engaged this important question.

A first step for this literature was differentiating framing from priming. Indeed, some early studies in the literature highlighted accessibility as the key mechanism underlying framing effects (e.g. Kinder and Sanders 1996: 174). In this conception, framing effects are simply the product of priming whereby some considerations are made more accessible than others in a respondent’s memory. Thus, attitude expression following exposure to a frame is conceived through a memory-based information processing model such that respondents are drawing on the information that comes to mind at the time that they are asked to render a judgment (cf. Hastie and Park 1986). It should be noted that this mechanism is considered the

most automatic or subconscious of the potential mediation processes. Here, framing simply leads to shifting attitude expression because the frame makes certain considerations more readily accessible.

Other early studies acknowledged that, while frames could operate in the same way as primes, there probably was a different process taking place. Here, a second mechanism can be described as an applicability or ‘belief importance’ change effect. Here, frames produce connections between different considerations and thus make some aspects of the story more relevant than others (e.g. Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997ab; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Price and Tewksbury 1997; Price et al. 1997). This applicability paradigm permeates most of framing research and suggests that frames simply change the relevance that people assign to different considerations rather than changing their opinion in lasting ways. Nelson, Oxley and Clawson’s (1997b) study, for instance, tested both the aforementioned accessibility mechanism and the perceived importance mechanism. In their study, respondents read about a KKK rally framed either in terms of ‘free speech’ or in terms of ‘public order’. Following exposure to the frames, half of the respondents completed a word association task in which letter strings popped up on their screens and respondents had to indicate whether the words were true English words. If simple priming was at work, those exposed to frames should have been quicker to identify letter strings associated with the frame they were exposed to (because these concepts should be more accessible). They found no such effect. In contrast, the other half of respondents were asked to consciously rate values associated with free speech or public order in terms of their importance to the issue at hand. Here, respondents rated values associated with the frames they were exposed to as more important. Thus, the authors concluded that belief importance and not accessibility mediated the framing effect.

The third mechanism some have presumed to underlie framing effects focuses on persuasion or belief content change (Chong and Druckman 2007). This approach suggests that different ways of framing lead people to have different beliefs about the characteristics of the specific attitude object in question (see e.g. Slothuus 2008; Lecheler and de Vreese 2012). Here, framing simply affects attitudes through an information provision mechanism that can be conceptualized along the lines of Zaller’s (1992) receive-accept-sample framework. In recent work, Leeper and Slothuus (2017) seek to isolate the effect of information provision from the effect of emphasis framing. In particular, respondents were first

exposed to vignettes providing substantively different content (mimicking previous framing studies). But then they crossed this manipulation with a vignette that did not provide new information but rather just emphasized an aspect of the story they were previously exposed to. Thus, this second vignette asked respondents to consider the issue in terms of one specific dimension that was already previously introduced, thereby providing no new information. Across ten studies and 15 experiments they show that the information provision affected attitudes whereas the emphasis manipulation did not. This, they suggest, is evidence that most framing studies are simply the result of respondents being provided with novel information. In the case of the famous KKK rally example, this argument then contends that a frame emphasizing the rally's endangerment of public safety will change beliefs about the KKK in a more negative direction (as people had not considered that fact) and then support for the rally would decrease.

Relatedly, Slothuus (2008) proposes a dual-process model of framing. He argues frames may change either the importance placed on considerations and/or the content of these considerations. He argues that individual-level differences in political sophistication and values determine which process will be most effective. First, he finds limited or no effects of exposure to frames among the least aware or those who have strong pre-existing values on dimensions relevant to the attitude object (e.g., values about economic inequality when the issue under consideration is social welfare). He suggested that the least aware have insufficient numbers of considerations to affect and those with strong pre-existing beliefs are able to counter the information. In terms of mechanisms, he finds that importance change mediates the framing effect for highly aware respondents (as these respondents have crystalized beliefs but can shift in perceptions of importance) whereas both importance change and changes in considerations mediate the effect for the moderately aware and those with weak related values. Similarly, Baden and Lecheler (2012) argue that these mediators are complementary processes and that frames have to leave some trace in memory for there to be durable and persistent effects. This conception thus leaves out accessibility and subsequent investigation in this area has focused on changing belief importance and belief content. This has been assessed through mediation analyses that have shown that framing effects can be mediated by processes associated with both approaches (e.g. Lecheler and de Vreese 2012).

Berinsky and Kinder (2006) take a different approach to elucidating framing mechanisms by focusing

on how frames change the way that people understand a given issue (see also Jones and Song 2014). Thus, they explicitly examine the effects of frames on the structuring of information. In so doing, their focus is not primarily on attitudes as the dependent variable but rather on concepts measuring respondents' understanding of the issue. Specifically, they hypothesize that "first, successful frames should increase citizens' ability to remember facts pertinent to that frame. Second, frames should lead citizens to organize facts in their memory into clusters that follow the essential logic of the frame" (Berinsky and Kinder 2006: 646). These two concepts were measured with a free recall task and a categorization task. The first measure enables the examination of whether subjects remembered facts associated with the frame they were exposed to. In line with their predictions, they find that exposure to different frames led to different recall patterns. For the second measure, respondents were asked to group a number of terms related to the topic of the article into separate clusters. Here, respondents were provided with a number of terms (e.g., NATO, ethnic cleansing etc.) and asked to sort them into categories. Again, there were some important clustering differences between the two treatment groups such that they categorized different terms together. The evidence from these two tests provides initial empirical support for the conjecture that frames structure political understanding. It is important to note that this study did not manipulate the content of the texts but rather produced different emphases by re-arranging bits of texts to better fit a certain narrative structure (e.g., using different sentences as subheadings and placing arranging text either at the beginning or within the paragraph to manipulate emphasis).

While the preceding review of the literature reveals that some scholars are increasingly interested in understanding the mechanisms underlying framing effects, such explicit unpacking and testing of underlying mechanisms is still relatively rare given the size of the literature demonstrating framing effects. Moreover, these recent advances suggest that there probably is no one single mediation mechanism, but rather that these effects are the product of multiple processes. This paper sets out to add to this literature by attempting to measure one potential mechanism, namely the idea that people internalize the structure of frames they are exposed to and subsequently use these in their sense-making.

COGNITIVE INTERNALIZATION

The above discussion highlights some progress has been made toward a better understanding of framing mechanisms. That being said, several important issues remain unresolved.

First, while scholars often point toward two different conceptions of frames, namely frames in communication and frames in cognition, there has been little effort to more closely integrate these approaches. Most framing studies primarily deal with single-shot experiments in which the effect of a certain stimulus (the approximation of some frame) on attitudes is examined. However, the true power of a frame, I suggest, is based on the fact that it is perpetuated through ‘repeated exposure through multiple venues over long periods of time — a whole curriculum of exposure’ (Kinder 2007: 158). Rather than examining the direct effect of one way of framing an issue on subsequent expressions of attitudes, more attention should be devoted to understanding the power of systematically perpetuated frames. Gilliam and Iyengar (2000), for instance, argue that local news reports of crime follow a common script in which crime is portrayed as violent and the perpetrators are often portrayed using racial imagery. They show how exposure to this script changes peoples attitudes towards criminal justice processes and African Americans. Thus, rather than studying the one-off effects of a particular frame, more emphasis needs to be placed on the effects of continued exposure to certain ways of framing an argument.

Second, and relatedly, the aforementioned types of framing provide recurring narratives that have the potential to change the way people make sense of issues. Thus, rather than merely focusing on the effects of such frames on attitudes and evaluations, more research is required into how such frames shape people’s understanding of political issues. Taken together, these gaps in our knowledge call for a framework that allows us to examine how repeated exposure to ‘real’ frames affects how people make sense of the political world. The question then, simply put, is whether the ‘central organizing idea’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143) of the frame can become the ‘central organizing idea’ in the brain.

Therefore, I am interested in the extent to which people adopt the structure of the frame they are exposed to when making their own deliberations on related issues. Here, my approach follows a logic similar to that of Berinsky and Kinder (2006), who importantly highlighted the need to look beyond attitude change and also consider the role of frames in structuring understanding. My work goes

even a step further by examining whether frames become cognitively internalized and act as ‘internal guidelines’ for the subsequent evaluation of attitude objects other than the one directly discussed. The idea here is that the framing of an issue is internalized in such a way that peoples’ thinking on the issue is subconsciously structured along the dimensions that are central to the frame. In contrast to Berinsky and Kinder (2006), however, I am not merely interested in whether frames affect recall and simple concept categorization, but whether people adopt the frame they have previously encountered when making sense of new information pertaining to an entire class of objects. I posit that one of the key mechanisms through which repeated frames affect attitudes and evaluations is by developing a ‘central organizing idea’ that people rely on when encountering new information such that they have established a new cognitive architecture that allows them to abstract away from the information provided in the frame to a host of related attitude objects. For instance, in the Gilliam and Iyengar case mentioned above, do people structure new information about a crime using the script provided in the media? Here, I use the term structure to denote something that has become internalized as opposed to merely having been made more accessible or applicable.

Importantly, I conceptualize the effect on ‘understanding’ as quite distinct from simple accessibility or applicability. Here understanding is seen as a process that is most pertinent when people encounter new attitude objects and thus frames will establish an initial belief structure and subsequently leave a trace in memory. Conceptually, cognitive internalization is related to the ideas of scripts, schemas, or thinking by analogy (e.g. Gick and Holyoak 1980; 1983; Kuklinski et al 1991; Abelson 1981). In a way it is a generalization of these various ideas for the domain of framing. For instance, it differs from ‘thinking by analogy’ because it has broader applicability beyond problem solving and does not require direct hints for the process to be set into motion. Cognitive internalization implies that elements of a frame are retained as cognitive structures thus encompassing the concepts of schemas or scripts. It is broader than a script as there are no constraints on the form that this internalization takes. It is conceivable that cognitive internalization leads to the development of a new schema, but in the current discussion I more broadly consider cognitive internalization to encompass any process through which elements of frames are integrated into memory.

In sum then, a key difference between my approach and accessibility and applicability effects is that those two processes, according to Nelson et al. (1997a), function by activating information that respondents' already had at their disposal. In these conceptualizations the scope of framing effects is somewhat narrow because the information provided in a frame has to make relevant considerations accessible or applicable which requires some prior linkage in a respondent's memory between the information in the frame and the target attitude object. In contrast, 'cognitive internalization' is a process that is most relevant for explaining responses on issues that respondents do not yet have information at their disposal. Here, I argue that exposure to frames helps build that initial understanding of a new attitude object which operates at a higher level of abstraction such that frame internalization guides understanding beyond the domain specific frame that people were originally exposed to. For instance, in contrast to Price et al. (1997), I am thus not interested in knowledge activation but in the process of developing new knowledge structures that can subsequently be activated.

Importantly, I further proffer that 'cognitive internalization' is also distinct from the 'belief content change' conception of framing. Framing in that conceptualization suggests that frames provide information that changes the content of people's beliefs about the specific issue at hand by "introduc[ing] new considerations about a subject" (Chong and Druckman 2007: 116). In contrast, frames in the 'cognitive internalization' framework do not merely alter considerations for the specific attitude object at hand but rather they provide respondents with a 'central organizing idea' for the class of related objects. Thus, the effect is much broader because it changes how people come to think about an entire class of objects rather than a specific issue, thereby creating a new cognitive structure that provides a narrative to understand novel information. This is not merely a semantic difference but it fundamentally changes the expectations about the scope of framing effects by highlighting how information contained in frames can foster attitude generalization (here again this dynamic distinguishes 'cognitive internalization' from accessibility which also posits very domain specific effects).

Taken together then, the central idea is that exposure to frames allows people to incorporate structural features of a frame, which then create initial belief structures that respondents subsequently use to make sense of new issues. This leads to a general basic hypothesis:

H1: People will internalize the central idea of a frame they are exposed to.

This hypothesis thus suggests that exposure to a frame leads to cognitive internalization, meaning that people will retain aspects of the ‘central organizing idea’ of the frame in their memory. Moreover, then, the degree to which people internalize a frame should mediate the relationship between the frame and subsequent attitudinal outcomes. A second hypothesis is thus:

H2: Cognitive internalization can mediate the effect of a frame on subsequent attitude expression.

Here it is important to clarify that I am not suggesting that this is the only mechanism through which framing works, rather I am proposing that this is one way of thinking about the process. Moreover, it is worth reiterating at this point that my argument differs from the accessibility (making certain information more available), the applicability paradigms (making a certain consideration seem more important/relevant), or the ‘belief content change’ paradigm (changing specific beliefs about the attitude object). The key distinction is that I am not interested in the effect of a frame on an attitude expression or evaluation but rather on subsequent sense making, which entails building a cognitive architecture that people can use to extrapolate beyond the information they were exposed to. Thus, I suggest that internalization can be causally prior to applicability or accessibility. Indeed, I think it would be consistent with both schools of thought because residues of the frame in memory could make aspects of the frame more applicable or more accessible. This conceptualization goes a step further though, by suggesting that frames may not simply affect the outcome but the way people come to think about the outcome. This requires new measurement techniques that will be introduced in the next section.

MEASURING COGNITIVE INTERNALIZATION

It is worth differentiating the general goal of measuring cognitive internalization from the empirical strategy used in this specific case. Here, I seek to provide an intuitive understanding of how internalization

can be measured in general terms, after which I will introduce the specific design used in the present empirical application at a later stage.

The general idea is to measure the extent to which people incorporate the narrative (or ‘central organizing idea’) of a frame when thinking about information on an issue related to that frame - even if that new information has no traces of the frame. For example, if people are constantly exposed to news reports claiming that violence is predominantly perpetuated by African Americans then they might, when asked to describe a violent incident for which they were provided with no information about race, nonetheless include race in their description of the event. That is, I am not simply saying that they might be more likely to tick a box on a survey indicating the perpetrator belonged to a certain racial group but they will, without being prompted, provide this information as part of their narrative of events. The value-added of the open-ended prompt vis-à-vis the closed-ended prompt is that the former measures understanding without providing any information that may prime associations (i.e. a question about the race of the perpetrator would provide an additional prime).

This is the dynamic that cognitive internalization seeks to uncover. The measurement device I am proposing can be implemented as part of any framing experiment. The key innovation in this design lies in the measurement instrument administered as part of the post-test survey after respondents have read a randomly assigned text framed in a certain way.¹ In addition to the standard post-test questions participants will also be directed to a vignette providing them with basic, bullet-point style information related to the issue in question. This vignette, in essence, provides participants with the basic facts surrounding an issue in the absence of any framing or narrative structure. Participants are then prompted to write about the issue in a paragraph.

The prompt for this question, which takes on the form of an open-ended text box, simply asks respondents to objectively describe the information presented in the bullet points in their own words. Note here that I seek to elicit objective descriptions rather than evaluations in order to minimize respondents seeking to rationalize their responses in line with any pre-existing attitudes. The responses to

¹It is assumed that this measurement strategy is administered within a standard survey instrument aimed at recording traditional variables associated with attitude change that are needed to construct the dependent variables for the substantive analysis.

these open-ended items can then be coded to establish whether people make use of the ‘central organizing idea’ that they were previously exposed to. In the racialized crime script example, this would look as follows: People are randomly exposed to stories about crime that either use the racialized crime frame or not. Then, later on in the survey they are exposed to bullet-pointed information about a different event that states that there was an armed robbery at a certain location, that no-one was harmed, and that the subject fled on foot. They are then asked to objectively describe this event in their own words. If they have internalized a frame suggesting that there is a racial dimension to violent crime then they will be more likely to make inferences about the race of the subjects in their descriptions.

This coding can be done manually or using automated approaches so as to tap into the central features of each frame. The coding scheme can concentrate on both the way the paragraph is structured and whether people make use of a certain narrative in their descriptions. If frames affect people because they take on their narrative structure when making sense of new information, then this structure should be visible in their write-ups of new information - even if that information was not itself presented in a way that adopted a certain frame. In this application I will discuss different ways that open-ended responses can be coded and validated, and introduce alternative measurement using closed-ended questions.

APPLICATION: ATTITUDES TOWARD GLOBAL PRIVATE GOVERNANCE

I test the idea of cognitive internalization in two experimental studies that are substantively concerned with citizens’ attitudes toward global private regulation. While previous work on supranational governance arrangements has primarily focused on bodies such as the European Union (EU) that have become politicized and are subject to public contestation (e.g. De Wilde and Zürn 2012), I explore attitudes towards new forms of global governance in a different context, namely the realm of global private regulators such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). As discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, these two international private-sector bodies are removed from traditional democratic control yet account for roughly 85 per cent of international product standards (Büthe and Mattli 2011: 5). While regulations and standards pertaining to the size of transport containers or the substances in paints might sound

trivial, these decisions have far-reaching consequences that can benefit some industries or countries at the expense of others. For example, if a new standard size for container ships is adopted and this new standard is the same as the existing one in a given country then businesses in that country would not incur adaptation costs whereas those in other countries would. These organizations produce this large body of standards through decision-making mechanisms that are quite distinct from the democratic, participatory structures that are common in democratic nation-states. Here, expertise and efficiency are often the focus of deliberation as opposed to input from public stakeholders (Benvenisti and Downs 2009).

Academic inquiry into such global private-sector regulation and standard setting is still in its infancy. That said, it has already been suggested that standard-setting is an ‘inherently political activity’ that has ‘considerable distributional implications’ (Büthe and Mattli 2011: 41; 220). While the substantive question of what drives support for these organizations is the focus of Chapter 3 of this dissertation, here I focus on the idea that framing has the potential to structure how people think about these organizations. Centrally, framing global standard-setting in terms of efficiency gains and the fact that their operations can help businesses reduce waste should lead respondents to internalize such a narrative centering on the role of these organizations in producing more efficient outcomes. In contrast, framing global standard-setting in terms of their governance arrangements (i.e. technocratic committees as opposed to elected governments) should lead respondents to internalize a narrative focusing on their independent nature and their detachment from national politics. Thus, I suggest that exposure to frames focusing on either ‘efficiency’ or ‘governance’ will lead people to internalize two different understandings of what these organizations are about. Importantly, I contend that ‘cognitive internalization’ can best be measured when respondents are exposed to a new attitude object, thereby allowing frames to create an initial belief structure about a class of attitude objects. Therefore, this substantive case provides a good domain for testing this process as respondents are not likely to already have formed opinions about these organizations. To reiterate, the argument here is not that simply that exposure to narratives employing an ‘efficiency’ or ‘governance’ frame in discussions of a specific organization will affect solely attitudes about that specific organization but rather that respondents will internalize these frames as cognitive structures

to make sense of new governance organizations they encounter.

In terms of attitudinal outcomes, I am interested in how these frames affect respondents' general favorability toward non-governmental international bodies setting global standards, as well as their perceptions of how legitimate and democratic these organizations are. While Chapter 3 provides both a theoretical framework and more comprehensive empirical analysis of these public opinion dynamics, here I focus on simplified conjectures, namely that exposure to efficiency frames will lead to more favorable attitudes toward these organizations, whereas exposure to governance frames should lead to less favorable attitudes as well as beliefs that these bodies are illegitimate and undemocratic. The conjecture that the governance frame should decrease support is based on the authority transfer literature and this question will be central in subsequent chapters.

It is worth highlighting that there are multiple reasons to study cognitive internalization in the context of global private regulatory governance. First, it is a real issue that can be covered in the news media. Second, it is an issue that can be framed in a variety of ways, by focusing either on the efficiency of such regulatory bodies or on the way in which its governance structures differ from traditional governments. Third, it is an issue that has not garnered much public attention to date and therefore people are unlikely to have deep pre-existing schemata to guide their thinking on the issue, thus limiting the role of frames to move opinion (cf. Goodwin et al. 2018).

STUDY I

This section introduces a first single-shot experiment in which I seek to validate my cognitive internalization measure. To test both whether a frame can become cognitively internalized and whether differences in framing can affect attitudes toward global regulatory governance, I conducted a survey experiment in March 2015. I recruited 375 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The sample was 52% female and 58% of respondents identified as Democrats, 27% as Republicans, and 14% as Independents. The mean age was 39 years and 60% of respondents had achieved at least a 2-year college degree. While this is clearly not a representative sample, previous research has shown the suitability of MTurk samples for political science experiments (e.g., Berinsky et al 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015).

Furthermore, it has been shown that experimental effects generalize from the original sample to MTurk samples (Coppock 2018). Thus, despite this study using a convenience sample, the expectation should be that similar effects would be uncovered when moving to a more representative sample.

The survey included a between-subjects experiment in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (the full texts for the conditions can be found in the appendix). The control condition consisted of a short text introducing the ISO, providing basic information about the organization, its scope, and activities. While some framing experiments use a control condition on an unrelated topic, the nature of the topic at hand requires that I generate a baseline for the attitudes I am interested in, and it would be difficult to ask people their opinions on bodies that they can be expected to know very little to nothing about.

The two competing frames I am interested in can be described as an ‘efficiency frame’ and a ‘governance frame’. These are frames that could feasibly be used to report on global regulatory bodies. Indeed, mentions of regulatory bodies in the media often include descriptions of governance structures (even the terms non-governmental and supranational convey such information) or their purported aims of increasing efficiency. They also mirror the types of frames commonly encountered in reporting on the EU. For both frames I use the same text as in the control condition but include an additional paragraph emphasizing the frame. The ‘efficiency frame’ condition highlights some of the benefits of global standardization by describing how international standards improve efficiency for businesses by reducing cost and minimizing errors and waste. Specifically, the baseline text about the ISO is augmented with the following text: *‘This standardization means that businesses are able to work more efficiently because working with standardized products and materials helps reduce costs. It does so by minimizing errors and waste, thus in turn increasing productivity.’*

In contrast, the ‘governance frame’ condition highlights how the governance arrangements rely on expert decision-making without interference from elected governments or pressure from public opinion. Specifically, the baseline text about the ISO is augmented with the following text: *‘The governance structure allows technical experts to develop standards without interference from elected governments or pressure from the public. The standards thus exclusively represent the needs of experts and industry and do*

*not take into account public opinion.*²

After reading the (randomly assigned) text all respondents were directed to the same task used to measure cognitive internalization.³ They were told about the fact that the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) existed and provided with the following bullet point information:

- International, non-governmental standards organization
- Founded in 1906 with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland
- Made up of national standards committees
- Develops standards for all electronic and electrical technologies
- Examples: sizes of batteries or dimensions of audio CDs

Respondents were told that they should read this information carefully as they would be asked about it later. On the subsequent screen they were then asked to respond to the following prompt in an open-ended text box: “Based on the bullet points on the previous page, please try and objectively describe the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in a few sentences.” Here it is worth taking a moment to reiterate how this measurement strategy differs from previous approaches that use ‘thought listing’ tasks (e.g., Price et al. 1997; Berinsky and Kinder 2006). The key difference is that those studies elicit thoughts regarding the frame that people were randomly exposed to whereas I, in contrast, have all respondents elicit thoughts to the same information. Thus, in my case the task is not with reference to the frame but with reference to new information and the expectation is that prior exposure to frames will affect peoples’ responses.⁴

²The notion of not taking into account public opinion might be considered a negative cue. This question is taken up more in subsequent chapters and it is worth noting that the vignettes in the second study are designed to overcome this limitation.

³There was no “back” button in the survey and thus respondents were not able to go back and read the vignette again

⁴It is worth emphasizing that the measurement in this study is not ideal as exposure to this task is directly preceded by exposure to a frame. My second study addresses this limitation.

Hand Coding

The first measurement of cognitive internalization relies on hand coding the open-ended responses. I treat each open ended response as a unit of analysis and code for two variables, namely presence of the ‘efficiency frame’ and presence of the ‘governance frame’. The hand-coding measure was only coded by the researcher and therefore the next two sections discuss alternative coding approaches used to validate this coding.

Following from the experimental manipulations described above, I conceptualize any response that explicitly describes the IEC with reference to its benefits for businesses and trade as well as discussions of how standards can lower production costs, increase productivity or lower waste as having internalized the ‘efficiency frame’. The coding scheme was holistic based on whether information in the responses integrated content about efficiency or governance. The texts did not have to use any specific key words but rather any response that included information about potential efficiency gains from standardization was coded as having internalized the ‘efficiency frame’ (coded one if it did and zero otherwise). For instance, if a respondent describes the IEC by stating that they set standards for batteries and that these standards help increase businesses’ productivity by cutting waste then I take this as evidence of internalization.

I conceptualize any response that includes discussion of how the IEC’s governance arrangements center around experts instead of elected governments as having internalized the ‘governance frame’. Specifically, this includes any response that explicitly discusses how standards are the product of decision-making that has no input from elected bodies and are not linked to public opinion or democratic pressure. Again, there are no necessary keywords that need to be present as long as there is explicit mention of no interference from democratically elected bodies or the public. Importantly, it does not matter if the respondent suggests whether this is a good or a bad thing in their mind, rather any mention is coded as having internalized the ‘governance frame’ (again coded one if mentioned and zero otherwise).

These two measures of internalization thus capture whether respondents’ descriptions of the IEC include aspects of the framed narrative they were exposed to in the text they read about the ISO. This mirrors the theoretical construct of internalization as it measures whether respondents, without any prompt to do so, incorporate central ideas from a frame in subsequent sense-making.

Automated Coding

To examine the reliability and reproducibility of the hand-coded measure, I complement the analyses by also measuring internalization using an automated coding technique. Here, I use a dictionary-based word count approach, which I implement using Lexicoder software (Daku, Soroka, and Young 2011). The basic idea here is to create a dictionary with two sets of terms, corresponding to the two frames. The program then counts how many words associated with each frame exist in each response and based on this count I code whether a response has internalized a frame or not.

I constructed the first dictionary based on a small number of terms that capture the essence of the two frames, respectively. On the one hand, words associated with the ‘efficiency frame’ include all variations of the word efficient, and words such as *productivity, waste, cut, cost*. On the other hand, words associated with the ‘governance frame’ include *governance, elected, public, opinion, democratic*. Based on the automated coding I then classify each response that includes at least one term associated with a frame as having internalized that frame. It would thus be theoretically possible that a respondent internalized both frames as these are measured separately (this also applies for the hand coded measure). Due to the fact that a response using one term is coded as internalization, it is important to develop parsimonious dictionaries that clearly map onto the theorized frame and do not include extraneous terms. The second dictionary is a simple extension that includes a few additional words. For instance, the efficiency words are augmented with terms related to business and simplicity and the governance words are augmented with words such as influence and control. The reason behind using two dictionaries is to be able to examine the tradeoffs involved in adding additional words to the dictionary.

Validation using a Structural Topic Model

The two above procedures enable me to generate variables for each respondent indicating whether or not they internalized the frame they were exposed to. However, the above measures invariably rely on researcher input as the researcher conducts the coding (or devises a coding scheme for others to use) and selects the words that are associated with each frame for the dictionary-based analyses. Therefore, as an additional validity check, I also conduct a test that does not suffer from this issue. Specifically, I fit a

Structural Topic Model (STM) (Roberts et al. 2014) to the open-ended responses and include a variable for treatment assignment (Efficiency frame versus Governance frame) as a predictor of topic prevalence. To minimize researcher degrees-of-freedom, I do not pre-determine the number of topics to be returned but rather allow an inbuilt algorithm to make this selection given the data. While this procedure does not produce an internalization measure for each individual respondent, I use it here merely to test whether the model uncovers statistically significant differences in topic prevalence based on the treatment. And, in so far as there are differences, I examine the words most exclusively associated with these topics as a validation exercise.

Attitudinal Outcome Variables

I examine the effect of the frames on four outcomes: (1) general favorability to non-governmental bodies setting international standards for products and services, (2) the perceived legitimacy of such bodies, (3) the perceived democratic nature of these bodies, and (4) an additive index of the three preceding variables ($\alpha = .75$). The original variables are measured on 5-point Likert scales running from zero (signifying strongly oppose/very illegitimate/very undemocratic) to one (signifying strongly favor/very legitimate/very democratic). Thus, higher values on each variable denote more positive responses.

Substantive Results

First, I will very briefly introduce the substantive results from the first experiment. I am interested in both differences between the efficiency and governance frames as well as differences between either of these frames and the control condition.

Table 2.1: Study 1 - Substantive Results

	Efficiency Frame Mean	Control Mean	Governance Frame Mean
Favorability	0.75 (.022)	0.75 (.021)	0.72 (.022)
Legitimacy	0.78 (.020)	0.77 (.021)	0.80 (.021)
Democracy	0.67 (.020)	0.66 (.023)	0.60 (.024)
Index	0.73 (.017)	0.73 (.019)	0.71 (.017)

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses

Examining Table 2.1, the first thing that becomes evident is that, across both the control condition and the two treatment conditions, attitudes towards global regulatory bodies are rather positive. On both the question of general favorability towards global regulatory bodies, their perceived legitimacy, as well as the index there are no statistically significant differences between the governance and the efficiency frame or between the control condition and either frame. On the first question the means hover around 0.75, substantively meaning that people are somewhat favorable towards these bodies. On the question of legitimacy, results are similar just above 0.75 meaning that, overall, respondents articulated that they perceived these bodies as somewhat legitimate.

The only significant experimental result is that compared to both respondents in the control condition or the efficiency condition, respondents exposed to the governance frame were slightly more likely to believe these bodies to be undemocratic. Specifically, the mean in the governance frame was 0.60, substantively close to “neither favor nor oppose” compared to 0.67 in the efficiency frame condition ($p < 0.05$) and 0.66 in the control condition ($p < 0.05$). Thus, reading about the ISO framed in a way to emphasize that the body is not responsive to democratically elected governments or public opinion resulted in a less favorable evaluation in terms of their democratic nature, albeit still a relatively positive or neutral one as opposed to an outright unfavorable evaluation.

It is worth taking a moment to discuss these results. Importantly, across the board there seems to be widespread approval for the concept of global non-governmental bodies setting standards, even if it is made clear that these standards are not subject to deliberation by elected governments or pressure from the public. Respondents did not think that this type of governance is illegitimate and even being exposed to information that clearly differentiates the governance mechanisms of these bodies from traditional representative governance mechanisms, respondents only perceive them as slightly less democratic (and it has no bearing on their evaluations of the bodies’ legitimacy or general approval). I focus on the substantive question of what drives support for these organizations in Chapter 3 of the dissertation.

Cognitive Internalization Results

Next, I turn to the main question of interest, namely whether people draw on the frame they were exposed to when reading about the ISO in their open-ended responses describing the IEC. It is worth reiterating here that respondents all read the same information about the IEC but that their objective descriptions might differ depending on which text about the ISO they were previously exposed to. The fact that these answers are in response to a prompt asking respondents to describe the organization as opposed to providing an opinion facilitates measurement of understanding. Thus, I suggest this is a very direct test of cognitive internalization because it measures whether people draw on previously received (and framed) information when thinking about related issues.

Table 2.2: Cognitive Internalization Results - Hand & Word Count Coding (Study 1)

	Efficiency Frame	Control	Governance Frame
Hand Coding			
Internalized Efficiency	0.13 (.03)	0.02 (.01)	0.01 (.01)
Internalized Governance	0	0.02 (.01)	0.09 (.03)
Dictionary Count ver. 1:			
Internalized Efficiency	0.10 (.03)	0.01 (.01)	0
Internalized Governance	0	0	0.05 (.02)
Dictionary Count ver. 2:			
Internalized Efficiency	0.16 (.03)	0.07 (.02)	0.02 (.01)
Internalized Governance	0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.01)	0.06 (.02)

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses

The ‘cognitive internalization’ results using both a hand-coding procedure and two dictionary-based word count procedures are presented in Table 2.2. I discuss these results in turn before examining the relationship between the hand-coded measure of internalization and the measure based on automated dictionary coding.

First, the top section of Table 2.2 shows the mean level of internalization based on hand coding of responses where a one in the coding scheme denoted that the frame was internalized. Thus, we can interpret these numbers as the percentage of respondents incorporating structure from the frame in their descriptions. It shows that 13 percent of respondents in the efficiency frame condition described the IEC

using language about efficiency or minimizing errors and waste compared to only 2 percent in the control condition ($p < 0.001$) and 1 percent in the governance frame condition ($p < 0.001$). An example of this kind of response included the following text: “They do this in order for businesses to be more efficient so they will reduce more waste.” Here the respondent thus provided information in their descriptions that draws on information they read about the ISO previously. In contrast, 9 percent of respondents in the governance frame mentioned lack of responsiveness to governments or the public compared to 0 percent in the efficiency frame condition ($p < 0.001$) and 2 percent in the control condition ($p < 0.05$). An example response internalizing the governance frame included the following: “it is non governmental and is made up of experts and thus has no public opinion pressure.”

Second, the bottom two sections of Table 2.2 replicate these results using the internalization measures derived from the two automated codings. The results look similar.⁵ For instance, we can see that 10 percent of respondents in the efficiency frame condition used words associated with the frame in their responses compared to one percent in the control group ($p < 0.01$) and zero percent in the governance frame condition ($p < 0.001$). Similarly, 5 percent of respondents in the governance frame condition used words associated with the frame compared to 1 percent in the other two conditions ($p < 0.01$).

There are a couple of ways to examine inter-coder reliability.⁶ First, it is worth noting that the percent agreement in classification between the hand coded variables and the automated variables is always above 90% (ranging from 94% to 98% agreement). Second, comparing the hand-coding to the first dictionary coding (using the more parsimonious dictionary) the Cohen’s Kappa statistic and the Krippendorff’s alpha coefficients are both .65 for the efficiency frame internalization measure and both are .62 for the governance frame internalization measure. For Cohen’s Kappa this counts as substantial agreement, although the Krippendorff alpha measure is on the lower end (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007).

It is worth noting that the two dictionaries I used for the present analysis were based on a small number of terms that I associate with the specific frames. Both dictionaries slightly increased the number of cases falling into the efficiency frame (compared to the hand-coding procedure) but they had fewer

⁵Here I only discuss the results from the more parsimonious dictionary but it is worth noting that all differences I discuss are also statistically significant at conventional levels using the augmented dictionary.

⁶Here I conceptualize the hand coded variable and the automated variables as different ‘coders’.


cases falling into the governance frame. We can see that increasing the number of words had a greater effect for the efficiency frame while not really increasing the number of cases falling into the governance frame. It is of course possible to develop more extensive dictionaries in the future but suffice it to say that even two small yet specialized dictionaries produce variables that look similar to the hand-coded variables and produce substantively similar results. Increasing the words included in the dictionaries increases the risk of misclassification.

In sum, these results suggest that a non-trivial number of respondents, when asked to objectively describe an organization based on a couple of bullet points, incorporated information into their descriptions that they had picked up from a frame they were previously exposed to. I believe this elucidates a potential mechanism underlying framing effects such that people start understanding information using a lens and this lens can be altered through framing.

The above results provide initial evidence that ‘cognitive internalization’ can be measured and that some people explicitly draw on frames they were exposed to when describing a novel organization. Next, I briefly examine the results from the STM procedure. The algorithm returned 33 topics, for which the prevalence of six topics differed significantly (at $p < 0.05$) between respondents in the *Efficiency* frame condition and respondents in the *Governance* frame condition. Figure 2.1 plots this difference in topic proportions for those topics alongside the ten words that represent each topic using simplified frequency-exclusivity (FREX) scoring, which provide relatively intuitive representations of what each topic is about.

The results in Figure 2.1 provide additional corroboration that respondents are internalizing the frame they are exposed to. Estimates on the left side of the dashed line denote topics that are more prevalent among respondents in the governance condition whereas estimates on the right hand side represent topics that are more common among respondents in the efficiency condition. At first glance, we can see that topics represented by words such as ‘government’, ‘independent’ or ‘interference’ are significantly more likely to be found among respondents in the governance frame, whereas topics with words such as ‘allow’, ‘uniform’ or ‘help’ are more likely among respondents in the efficiency frame. The intuitive governance-related topics nicely complement the above findings while the topics that are more prevalent

Figure 2.1: Study I - Difference in Topic Proportions



among respondents in the efficiency condition are not as clear cut.

STUDY 2

The results from Study I provide initial support for the idea that people may be internalizing ‘frames in communication’ such that they become ‘frames in thought’. However, I believe that internalization is a process that develops over time with cumulative exposure to the same frame. Thus, while finding some initial evidence in a single-shot experiment is encouraging, I am ultimately interested in the effects of repeated exposure. Moreover, the ideal experimental design would seek to manipulate the internalization mechanism to provide additional causal leverage. To address these shortfalls, I designed a second study. This study augments the first experiment in a number of ways. First, the study consists of a three-wave

panel design in which respondents are exposed to multiple treatment texts. Second, in the first two waves I also include experimental manipulations seeking to facilitate cognitive internalization to provide additional leverage on the mechanism. I describe the three waves in turn.

Wave 1: The first survey wave included attitudinal and demographic question batteries as well as random assignment to stimuli about the ISO. The frames employed in this wave were amended versions of those used in the first experiment (see Appendix for full stimuli). However, in addition to the three framing conditions (i.e., control condition, efficiency frame condition, and governance frame condition), there were two additional conditions. These two conditions included the same information as the efficiency frame and governance frame conditions, but then augmented these conditions by asking respondents to describe the organization in an open-ended text box. To be clear, this serves a different purpose than the open-ended text box that will be used in the third wave. Specifically, this text box task should facilitate internalization by increasing respondents' cognitive engagement with the text whereas the text box in the third wave (see below) will be used to assess internalization. These manipulations were thus developed following the implicit mediation analysis framework (Gerber and Green 2012: 333-336; see also Archaya et al. 2018), in which treatments are crafted such as to provide leverage on the causal mechanism. Here, the argument is that the task itself should facilitate internalization of the frame, and thus respondents in these conditions should be even more likely to internalize the frame compared to respondents in the basic framing conditions.

Wave 2: The procedure in the second wave mirrored that of the first. The key differences being the nature of the attitudinal questions asked and, importantly, the topic of the stimuli. The topic of the stimuli was the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This is an organization that can be categorized as belonging to the same class of organization as the ISO or the IEC even though it is concerned with a very different domain of regulation, namely international accounting standards. The idea behind this manipulation is thus to provide repeated exposure to the same frame respondents were previously exposed to, while varying the information in a way that showcases the same type of regulatory body operating in a very different domain. Respondents were assigned to the same five treatment conditions from the first wave and treatment assignment was carried over. This means respondents were

exposed to the same frame, and those respondents who were assigned to the initial writing task were again asked to describe the organization they had read about.

Wave 3: The procedure in the third wave differed slightly from the preceding waves. First, there was no writing task manipulation, meaning that there were only three framing conditions. The organization introduced in the stimuli was the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a private standard setting organization that develops standards for non-financial disclosure relating to sustainability, corruption, and human rights. Second, however, only half of the respondents were randomly assigned to read about this organization. This manipulation provides additional leverage for the question of whether ‘cognitive internalization’ is not simply the product of priming. Before respondents were exposed to a modified version of the IEC writing prompt used in Study 1, I included a distractor block consisting of comprehensive need for cognition and need to evaluate question batteries. Thus, unlike the first experiment, respondents did not complete this task directly after being exposed to the stimuli. It is worth reiterating three design features that seek to strengthen the internal validity of the IEC writing task. First, half of the respondents in the third wave were not exposed to a treatment text in this wave thus eliminating the possibility that any results among this subset were simply brought about by exposure to a stimulus immediately prior (i.e. respondents in this condition were last exposed to a frame in the second wave). Second, even for those respondents who were exposed to a stimulus in the third wave, there was a distractor block intended to minimize such spillover effects. Third, the stimuli in the third wave were about an organization that while considered a global private regulatory body, is active in a very different domain than the IEC.

Measures

As in the first study, I leverage multiple ways of measuring ‘cognitive internalization’. I again use text from open-ended responses following a prompt to objectively describe the IEC⁷ as the basis for the key internalization measures. First, I measure internalization using the same hand-coding procedure outlined

⁷The IEC task prompt was identical to the one used in the first study with the exception that the term ‘non-governmental’ was deleted from the bullet-point description.

previously. Second, I measure the concept using a similar dictionary-based word count procedure that included key terms associated with the respective frames.⁸

Third, in addition to measuring cognitive internalization using the open-ended task, I also subsequently asked respondents about the terms they associated with these types of organizations. Specifically, the question read: “[W]e are interested in what terms you associate with global standard-setting organizations. Please mark all words that you associate with these organizations.” Respondents were presented with a list of nine terms of which three were associated with the efficiency frame (namely efficiency, reduce costs, and productivity) and three were associated with the governance frame (namely independent, non-governmental, and experts). I analyze this data using (1) two variables measuring how many ‘Efficiency’ or ‘Governance’ words respondents selected, respectively (each ranging from zero to three words); and (2) a net measure for which I subtract the number of ‘Governance’ words from the number of ‘Efficiency’ words (this variable ranges from negative three to positive three). These measures thus provide a complement to the open-ended internalization measures.

Finally, attitudes toward global private regulatory governance in general was measured using the same three questions used in the first study, namely whether respondents favored or opposed such bodies, whether they perceived them as legitimate, and whether they perceived them as democratic. I also again combined these variables into an additive index ($\alpha = .74$).

Sample

I recruited 1000 US-based respondents through MTurk Prime to participate in the first wave of the study.⁹ These respondents were then re-contacted with invitations to participate in the second and third waves after 24 and 48 hours, respectively. Given the nature of the subject pool, I purposely kept the repeated exposure to a limited timeframe. This procedure yielded 776 respondents in wave 2 (78% re-contact rate) and 743 respondents in wave 3 (75% re-contact rate). These rates are comparable to those observed in

⁸The governance frame dictionary consisted of the terms govern*, independen*, expert*, stakeholder*, academ* and the efficiency frame dictionary consisted of the terms efficien*, cost*, trade, streamlin*, perform*, waste*, grow*, invest*, error, and productivity

⁹Studies fielded through MTurk Prime rely on the Amazon MTurk crowd-worker subject pool but the Prime platform provides additional features that make it more suitable for multi-wave studies (e.g., the ability to message workers with an invitation to the follow-up waves).

other panel studies using MTurk subject pools (see Stoycheff 2016; Hall et al. 2018). Importantly, rates of attrition did not vary by the experimental condition respondents were assigned to. That said, it is worth noting that more highly educated respondents and older respondents were slightly less likely to attrite.

The wave one sample was 43% female and 22% non-white. The mean age was 38 years and 53% of respondents had at least a college degree. In terms of party identification, 55% of respondents identified as Democrats, 30% as Republicans, and 14% as Independents. While it is again worth acknowledging the usual caveats of MTurk samples, it is also important to note that fielding such a three-wave panel study on a more representative sample was not possible given the cost associated with panel studies.

Substantive Results

Before examining the internalization results, I again briefly turn to the substantive results of the framing manipulation, which are presented in Table 2.3. These results largely mirror those of the first study such that attitudes toward global regulatory organizations are rather positive. Although we again see some variation based on the different dependent variables whereby the means are highest for the legitimacy variable and lowest for the democracy variable. Turning to the question of whether these frames had any effect on attitudes, it is first worth noting that there are no significant differences (at $p < 0.05$) between the control condition and either frame for any of the dependent variables. Indeed, even looking at differences between the two frames there is only one comparison that yields a statistically significant comparison at below the $p < 0.05$ level: namely on the general favorability question, with respondents in the efficiency frame condition being more favorably predisposed compared to respondents in the governance frame condition. I further examined if there were heterogeneous effects based on whether or not respondents were assigned to write about the stimuli they were exposed to in the prior waves but found none. Even though there is limited evidence for traditional *attitudinal* framing effects, I next turn to examining whether respondents cognitively internalized the frames they were exposed to.

Table 2.3: Study 2 - Substantive Results

	Efficiency Frame Mean	Control Mean	Governance Frame Mean
Favorability	0.83 (.013)	0.79 (.017)	0.79 (.012)
Legitimacy	0.84 (.013)	0.82 (.016)	0.81 (.014)
Democracy	0.67 (.014)	0.66 (.018)	0.65 (.013)
Index	0.78 (.011)	0.76 (.014)	0.75 (.011)

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses

Internalization Results

Table 2.4 displays the means of the two frame internalization measures by experimental condition. First, across both the hand-coded measure and the dictionary-based measure, only 2 percent of respondents in the efficiency frame condition show signs of having internalized language associated with the efficiency frame. Moreover, the level of efficiency frame internalization does not differ significantly between experimental conditions at conventional levels of significance. In contrast, internalization of the governance frame is somewhat stronger. Here, using both the hand coding and dictionary-based coding reveals that 8 per cent of respondents in the governance condition internalized this frame compared to only one percent in the efficiency frame condition ($p < 0.05$). The difference between the governance condition and the control condition is only significant when using the hand-coding measure, however. Overall, while these results do provide some evidence for frame internalization, it is important to note that the number of respondents classified as having internalized the frames is very low. Unfortunately, there is thus too little variation in these variables to feasibly estimate effects conditional on whether respondents were assigned to write about the organizations they were exposed to in the previous waves. That said, in a later section, I conduct such tests using the word association proxy measures.

As a validity check, I again fit a structural topic model to the open-ended descriptions to examine whether topic prevalence differed between those respondents assigned to the two substantive frames using the same procedure outlined in Study 1. This model generated 38 topics, the prevalence of seven of which differed significantly between respondents in the efficiency frame and governance frame conditions. These results are presented in Figure 2.2. Examining the words associated with these topics further substantiates the above findings. On the one hand, topics associated with words such as

Table 2.4: Cognitive Internalization Results - Hand & Word Count Coding (Study 2)


	Efficiency Frame	Control	Governance Frame
Hand Coding			
Internalized Efficiency	0.02 (.008)	0.01 (.007)	0.00 (.003)
Internalized Governance	0.01 (.006)	0.01 (.009)	0.08 (.016)
Dictionary Count			
Internalized Efficiency	0.02 (.008)	0.03 (.013)	0.01 (.007)
Internalized Governance	0.01 (.007)	0.05 (.019)	0.08 (.016)

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses

‘independent’ and ‘govern’ are more frequently found among respondents assigned to the governance frame thus providing further evidence that some respondents in the governance frame have internalized the frame’s central organizing idea. On the other hand, while there are topics that are more prevalent among respondents assigned to the efficiency frame, the words associated with these topics do not intuitively correspond to words that are central to the efficiency frame. While the terms do appear to focus more on the technical side of global private governance, this test does not provide any indication that the topics are related to the core tenets of the efficiency frame. Thus, the results from the topic models support the above findings that there is some evidence for internalization of the governance frame but not for the efficiency frame.

The low degree of internalization of the efficiency frame raises an interesting measurement question. While I have measured ‘cognitive internalization’ based on open-ended responses in which respondents were asked to objectively describe the IEC, I also subsequently asked them how they felt about the organization. Interestingly, using the same hand coding and dictionary count approaches as above shows that 14 per cent of respondents in the efficiency frame condition express opinions that draw on language from that frame compared to only 5-7 per cent of respondents in the control and governance frames. It is thus possible that the descriptive open-ended prompt lends itself more to measuring internalization of the governance frame as information about governance arrangements can be considered more pertinent to an effort to describe an organization compared to information about the likely benefits of the organizations. The former is inherently more descriptive whereas the latter is more evaluative. Future work should thus seek to refine how best to elicit respondents’ ‘frames in thought’ through open-ended questions.

Figure 2.2: Study 2 - Difference in Topic Proportions



Word Associations

The above results provide initial evidence for the idea that at least some respondents are internalizing the ‘central organizing idea’ of frames they are exposed to. That said, the open-ended measurement strategy produced very limited variation for the internalization concept, making it difficult to estimate how exposure to frames affects internalization. Therefore, I also rely on a closed-ended approach by leveraging the words people associated with these organizations. As previously noted, three terms were associated with the efficiency frame (namely efficiency, reduce costs, and productivity) and three were associated with the governance frame (namely independent, non-governmental, and experts).

Using this proxy measure, in Table 2.5 I examine how exposure to frames as well as the interaction between frame exposure and the writing manipulation aimed at facilitating internalization affect which

Table 2.5: Predicting Word Associations

	Efficiency Words	Efficiency Words	Governance Words	Governance Words	E-G Words	E-G Words
Control	-0.451*** (0.104)		0.011 (0.098)		-0.463*** (0.135)	
Governance	-0.416*** (0.085)	-0.248* (0.118)	0.522*** (0.080)	0.416*** (0.112)	-0.939*** (0.110)	-0.663*** (0.152)
Internalization Task		0.042 (0.122)		-0.124 (0.116)		0.166 (0.157)
Governance X Task		-0.348* (0.170)		0.222 (0.162)		-0.570** (0.220)
Constant	1.928*** (0.061)	1.908*** (0.084)	1.230*** (0.057)	1.289*** (0.080)	0.698*** (0.079)	0.618*** (0.108)
<i>N</i>	743	594	743	594	743	594

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

words respondents associate with global private governance organizations. The dependent variable in the first two columns is the number of ‘Efficiency’ words a respondent selected, in columns 3 and 4 it is the number of ‘Governance’ words selected, and in columns 5 and 6 it is the net measure (‘Efficiency’ words minus ‘Governance’ words). Here, the ‘Efficiency’ condition is the baseline condition because the main comparison is between that condition and the ‘Governance’ condition as it allows testing of whether these two frames lead to distinct associations.

The unconditional results show that exposure to a frame increases the number of words related to said frame that respondents associate with private global regulatory governance. For instance, respondents in the governance condition selected 0.42 fewer efficiency words and 0.52 more governance words compared to respondents in the efficiency condition. Additionally, in two of the three conditional analyses we see that this relationship is even stronger for those respondents who were assigned to the task aimed at facilitating internalization. This finding provides additional evidence in support of the cognitive internalization hypothesis given that this moderation model is suggestive of implicit mediation (i.e. the effect is stronger in the condition that was explicitly developed to facilitate internalization).

One concern with these results is that they may be driven by respondents who were exposed to a stimulus in the third wave and thus simple priming is leading to the result. However, in Appendix Table 2.6 I replicate these findings when restricting the sample to only those respondents who were not exposed

to a stimulus in the third wave. These results, for example, show that respondents in the governance condition selected 0.35 fewer efficiency words and 0.38 more governance words compared to respondents in the efficiency condition when the sample was restricted. This, I suggest, strengthens the case that frames have the ability to affect the structure of people's understanding, rather than simply operating through a priming dynamic. Indeed, the fact that these results replicate for the subset of respondents who were not exposed to a stimulus in the third wave indicates that these associations have at least to some extent become internalized.¹⁰

Cognitive Internalization as a Mediator

The above results, in combination with those from the first study, provide some support for my first hypothesis, namely that respondents internalize the frame they were exposed to. I now briefly turn to the second hypothesis which stated that cognitive internalization can mediate the effect of a frame on attitude change. In the current case we are thus interested in whether internalization mediates the statistically significant difference between the efficiency frame condition and the governance frame condition in support for global private governance. As noted above, the internalization measures based on the open-ended responses exhibit too little variation to reliably test this hypothesis. However, I nonetheless conduct a preliminary test using the word association measure described above as a proxy for internalization. In particular, I use the net measure in which the number of 'Governance' words a respondent selected is subtracted from the number of 'Efficiency' words they selected.


I can then examine whether this proxy measure mediates the difference in favorability. Here, I estimate an average causal mediation effect (ACME) using the causal mediation framework introduced by Imai and colleagues (Imai et al. 2010ab; 2011).¹¹ That is, I examine the expected difference in support for global standardization bodies when internalization (the mediator) takes on the value associated with the governance frame as opposed to the efficiency frame while holding frame exposure constant. In brief

¹⁰It is worth noting that one drawback of the 'word association task' as currently implemented is that the words included in the task were words found in the vignettes. To strengthen this design, future applications should rely on synonyms to lessen the possibility that respondents are merely remembering words rather than internalizing the frame.

¹¹It is worth noting that both the outcome model and the mediator model are linear which means that the results produced using this approach will produce equivalent results to mediation approaches using the product of coefficients method

I am thus examining the extent to which the effect of the treatment (exposure to a frame) is mediated through respondents' frame internalization (measured using the word association proxy).

Figure 2.3: Mediation Results



The results of this mediation analysis are presented in Figure 2.3. First, it is worth noting that there is an indirect effect of the word association internalization proxy ($ACME = -0.02$; $p < 0.01$) on favorability toward global private governance organization. The implication is that, to the extent that exposure to the governance frame as opposed to the efficiency frame made respondents less likely to associate these organizations with efficiency words (i.e. a higher internalization of the governance frame as opposed to the efficiency frame), this led to reduced support. Indeed, once the mediator is accounted for in the model, the treatment itself has no statistically significant direct effect on the outcome, which is denoted in the Figure by the insignificant average direct effect (ADE). Moreover, the specified mechanism accounts for

62 percent of the total effect.

These results thus suggest that the word associations that I consider proxies for internalization mediate the relationship between being exposed to a frame and support for global private governance. While not a direct test of internalization, these results are consistent with the idea that frames can lead people to incorporate information into their own narratives and that these internalizations, in turn, can affect their attitudes.¹² Moreover, it is worth noting that I also ran the same mediation model with an interaction term for whether respondents were assigned to the writing conditions in the first two waves (i.e. the manipulation intended to facilitate internalization). However, there were no significant differences in the estimated ACMEs between these two types of respondents.

CONCLUSION

Against the backdrop of recent critiques of the ‘framing effects’ literature (e.g., Scheufele and Iyengar 2012; Cacciatore et al. 2016; Leeper and Slothuus 2017), this chapter set out to make the case for the usefulness of the framing concept. I suggested shifting the focus of inquiry from ‘attitudes’ to ‘understanding’ and to leverage the framing concept to test whether exposure to frames affects the way in which people make sense of the political world. In particular, drawing on early conceptualizations of frames as providing a ‘central organizing idea’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1987), I proffered that what distinguishes framing from related media effects concepts is the leverage it proves for studying how ‘frames in communication’ shape peoples’ ‘frames in thought’ in a structural manner that goes beyond simple accessibility, applicability, or ‘belief change’ effects.

I introduced the notion of ‘cognitive internalization’ as a way of conceptualizing and measuring when people draw on frames they were previously exposed to when encountering new information. Importantly, I suggested that this conceptualization goes beyond previous approaches based on the breadth of the effect. Here, I suggested that the internalization of frames enables people to abstract away

¹²It is worth noting that the results presented here can also be replicated with data from the first study. In that study I measured perceptions of what the focus of the text respondents read was using one question on how much it focused on efficiency and one question on how much it focused on governance arrangements. Combining this variable in a similar fashion to the word association variable shows that the statistically significant difference in attitudes about the democratic nature of these bodies in that study is similarly mediated by that internalization proxy.

from information they are exposed to larger classes of objects. Thus, the effect is not as narrow (and object specific) as previous frameworks suggests but rather exposure to frames can alter the considerations people bring to bear on issues that are more far-reaching than the actual domain of the frame they were exposed to. This concept can be measured through open-ended survey prompts that ask respondents to objectively describe information. Across two studies, I found initial evidence that some people internalize central ideas of frames and then use this information in subsequent sense-making. Moreover, I uncovered initial suggestive evidence that frame internalization can mediate the effect of frame exposure on attitudes.

While this chapter introduced ‘cognitive internalization’ and provided initial evidence for this dynamic, a lot more work is needed in this area. I agree with recent critiques of the framing effects literature that highlighted the lack of attention to the psychological mechanisms underlying framing effects. Not every media effect or attitude change brought about by provision of information should be classified as a framing effect. The framing concept is uniquely suited to the examination of how repeated exposure to frames in communication structurally affect peoples’ frames in thought as well as their attitudes. Here, future scholarship is needed to refine and test how cognitive internalization can be measured.

One fruitful avenue for future research would be to test alternative ways of measuring internalization — and in particular the breadth of abstraction — through more direct, closed-ended questions. For instance, after exposure to frames respondents could be presented with novel information on an issue for which the frame they have ‘cognitive internalized’ should be applicable. Here, respondents could be explicitly asked about how they conceptualize the issue (e.g., what they think the main conflict dimension is or what class of issue the text they read about is an example of). If respondents have internalized the frame then they should choose a framework consistent with the frame they were previously exposed to even if the topic is distinct. Relatedly, it would be good to examine scope conditions of such attitude generalization by testing how far-reaching these effects are. For instance, the text people respond to in the internalization task could be made increasingly abstract. In the current example this could entail moving from specific global governance organizations to regulatory agencies or bureaucracy more broadly such that people are asked to write about bureaucracy in the US and if they adopt the efficiency or governance

frame in their descriptions this would provide evidence of abstraction. Moreover, it has to be noted that all tests of 'cognitive internalization' thus far have relied on the same issue (global private governance) and two competing frames (efficiency vs governance). Future work is needed to expand this to other domains with more clearly established existing competing frames.

In sum, I posit that cognitive internalization provides a mechanism for understanding the structural component that underlies framing effects, thereby clearly elaborating framing beyond a simple accessibility, applicability or 'belief content change' effect. Specifically, exposure to frames may not simply have an immediate impact but rather will affect people's basic understanding of novel political issues. This provides us with a clearer picture of how consistently repeated frames can fundamentally affect how citizens come to understand political issues.

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APPENDIX

Stimulus Materials for Study 1

Control Condition

The International Organization for Standardization

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is a non-governmental organization whose membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 164 countries.

The organization's primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists of over 250 technical committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees consist of experts who negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted on by the ISO membership.

These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines so that a variety of materials, products or services are consistently of the same quality. Examples of ISO standards include standard dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.

Efficiency Condition

The International Organization for Standardization

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is a non-governmental organization whose membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 164 countries.

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These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines so that a variety of materials, products or services are consistently of the same quality. Examples of ISO standards include standard

dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.

This standardization means that businesses are able to work more efficiently because working with standardized products and materials helps reduce costs. It does so by minimizing errors and waste, thus in turn increasing productivity.

Governance Condition

The International Organization for Standardization

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is a non-governmental organization whose membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 164 countries.

The organization's primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists of over 250 technical committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees consist of experts who negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted on by the ISO membership.

These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines so that a variety of materials, products or services are consistently of the same quality. Examples of ISO standards include standard dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.

The governance structure allows technical experts to develop standards without interference from elected governments or pressure from the public. The standards thus exclusively represent the needs of experts and industry and do not take into account public opinion.

Stimulus Materials for Study 2

Wave 1: Control Condition

The International Organization for Standardization

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is an organization whose membership is

made up of the national standards bodies of 162 countries.

The organization's primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists of over 250 committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted on by the ISO membership.

These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines for a variety of materials, products or services. Examples of ISO standards include standard dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.

Wave 1: Efficiency Condition

The International Organization for Standardization

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is an organization whose membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 162 countries.

The organization's primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists of over 250 committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted on by the ISO membership.

These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines so that a variety of materials, products or services are consistently of the same quality. Examples of ISO standards include standard dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.

This standardization means that businesses are able to work more efficiently because working with standardized products and materials helps reduce costs. These efficiency gains are the result of minimizing errors and waste, thereby increasing productivity.

Wave 1: Governance Condition

The International Organization for Standardization

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947 with headquarters in Switzerland, is a major international standard-setting body. It is a non-governmental organization whose

membership is made up of the national standards bodies of 162 countries.

The organization's primary aim is to promote global proprietary standards. The organization consists of over 250 technical committees who are tasked with developing ISO standards. These committees consist of experts who negotiate draft standards, which are then commented on and subsequently voted on by the ISO membership.

These standards are documents providing specifications and guidelines for a variety of materials, products or services. Examples of ISO standards include standard dimensions for freight containers or screw threads.

The governance structure allows technical experts to develop standards without interference from elected national governments. The standards thus represent the needs of experts and industry and are not voted upon by national governments.

Wave 2: Control Condition

The International Accounting Standards Board

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which is based in London, is an international accounting standard-setting body. Since 2001, the organization is responsible for developing accounting standards called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

The board's primary mission is to develop a common financial language as well as approving new interpretations of standards. The standards provide a set of rules that accountants must follow for companies' bookkeeping and when creating financial statements.

These international standards are increasingly replacing previous national standards and are becoming the norm for how companies report their financial information across the world.

Wave 2: Efficiency Condition

The International Accounting Standards Board

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which is based in London, is an international accounting standard-setting body. Since 2001, the organization is responsible for developing accounting

standards called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

The board's primary mission is to develop a common financial language as well as approving new interpretations of standards. The standards provide a set of rules that accountants must follow for companies' bookkeeping and when creating financial statements.

These international standards are increasingly replacing previous national standards and are becoming the norm for how companies report their financial information across the world.

Such common accounting standards reduce costs for businesses and increase efficiency as companies operating in multiple countries can produce one set of financial reports rather than having to waste resources producing separate reports for each country. Common rules also help potential investors by increasing comparability of financial information.

Wave 2: Governance Condition

The International Accounting Standards Board

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which is based in London, is an international private non-governmental accounting standard-setting body. Since 2001, the organization is responsible for developing accounting standards called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

The board consists of an independent group of experts drawn from industry and academia. Its members have a range of experiences including setting standards as well as preparing, auditing and using financial reports. While countries can sign up to adopt these standards, national governments have no direct influence in the development of standards.

The board's primary mission is to develop a common financial language as well as approving new interpretations of standards. The standards provide a set of rules that accountants must follow for companies' bookkeeping and when creating financial statements.

These international standards are increasingly replacing previous national standards and are becoming the norm for how companies report their financial information across the world.

Wave 3: Control Condition

The Global Reporting Initiative

The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an international standards organization that was founded in 1997 and has its headquarters in Amsterdam.

The organization is responsible for the world's first and most widely adopted global sustainability standards, which provide companies across the globe with a common language for understanding and disclosing non-financial information.

In particular, this standards framework enables businesses and other organizations to understand as well as report the impacts their processes and procedures are having on issues such as human rights, corruption, and climate change.

Wave 3: Efficiency Condition

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In particular, this standards framework enables businesses and other organizations to understand as well as report the impacts their processes and procedures are having on issues such as human rights, corruption, and climate change.

Such non-financial reporting can increase companies' efficiency and reduce costs by streamlining decision-making processes, improving operational performance, reducing waste, and highlighting new growth and investment opportunities.

Wave 3: Governance Condition

The Global Reporting Initiative

The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an international, non-governmental standards organization

that was founded in 1997 and has its headquarters in Amsterdam.

The GRI is independent from national governments and its governance combines technical experts and diverse stakeholders from four main constituencies: civil society organizations, business, labor, and mediating institutions.

The organization is responsible for the world's first and most widely adopted global sustainability standards, which provide companies across the globe with a common language for understanding and disclosing non-financial information.

In particular, this standards framework enables businesses and other organizations to understand as well as report the impacts their processes and procedures are having on issues such as human rights, corruption, and climate change.

Additional Tables

Table 2.6: Internalization among Respondents who read no text in Wave 3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Efficiency	Efficiency	Governance	Governance	Eff-Gov	Eff-Gov
Control	-0.400** (0.1487)		-0.088 (0.1414)		-0.312 (0.1940)	
Governance	-0.345** (0.1230)	-0.118 (0.1638)	0.380** (0.1169)	0.216 (0.1572)	-0.725*** (0.1604)	-0.334 (0.2128)
Internalization Task		0.059 (0.1759)		-0.434* (0.1689)		0.493* (0.2285)
Governance X Task		-0.507* (0.2431)		0.352 (0.2334)		-0.860** (0.3158)
Constant	1.886*** (0.0891)	1.859*** (0.1196)	1.250*** (0.0847)	1.451*** (0.1148)	0.636*** (0.1163)	0.408** (0.1554)
<i>N</i>	352	278	352	278	352	278

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Chapter 3

Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of Global Private Environmental Governance

INTRODUCTION

The rise of private authority in global environmental governance has received considerable scholarly attention in political science and international relations (e.g. Cutler et al. 1999; Green 2014). Institutions such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) perform important tasks overcoming collective action problems but have also been shown to produce environmental regulations with apparent distributive consequences (Clapp 1998; Bütte and Mattli 2011). It has also been noted that these bodies' decision-making organs can easily be captured by industry interests and that the private good and the public good are not necessarily equivalent (Lipschutz and Vogel 2002; Taylor 2005). Hence, a central question in this line of research asks: how legitimate are the institutions involved in this new system of polycentric governance? This question has led scholars to scrutinize these new governance actors with regards to their design and performance on a number of dimensions, including their compatibility with the ideals of deliberative democracy and the openness of their participatory structures.

While this normative debate is undoubtedly of importance to scholars and practitioners alike, this paper seeks to expand the locus of inquiry by stressing the need to consider sociological legitimacy, that is whether the public perceive the organizations as legitimate. To date, we know little about the public as a legitimating audience and whether there is public support for bodies such as the ISO and the FSC. My research begins with a basic description of public attitudes toward global private environmental governance. More specifically, what are people's attitudes about organizations such as the ISO and

the FSC developing global environmental standards? Do they perceive these bodies as legitimate? As democratic? And furthermore, what factors shape public attitudes toward the ISO, the FSC, and polycentric environmental governance more broadly? To address these questions, I first draw on lessons from the trajectory of public opinion toward the European Union (EU). I contend that private actors now play a significant role in global environmental governance, yet the critiques about their legitimacy have by and large been confined to the academy. Thus, bodies such as the ISO and the FSC are not politically contested in the public domain. Consequently, we have not paid much attention to the public's attitudes toward these bodies and their implications for legitimation. But the example of the EU shows how public opinion can suddenly become crucial to the survival and effectiveness of actors involved in global governance once these bodies become politicized.

Acknowledging that public opinion matters invariably leads to the question of what might drive public opposition. I suggest that there are two conflicting hypotheses as to why these bodies become politicized. On the one hand, a popular theoretical framework implies that global non-governmental actors will become contested by the public when it recognizes how much authority these organizations wield despite not being beholden to traditional democratic control. On the other hand, I hypothesize that the public does not hold such sincere preferences and that public backlash occurs when national elites frame this same information by adding affective tags suggesting that these bodies are undemocratic and illegitimate. Importantly, departing from traditional partisan resistance (Zaller 1992) or motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2013) accounts, my argument contends that people will be receptive to these messages irrespective of the partisan identity of the elite. Adjudicating between these competing conjectures will help shed light on how public opinion might affect the legitimation of global private environmental governance. The purpose of the empirical analyses in this paper is thus threefold. First, I am interested in examining the extent to which people support bodies such as the ISO and the FSC and whether they perceive them as legitimate actors in global environmental governance. Second, I am interested in whether it is basic information about the bodies' governance arrangements or frames highlighting a potential democratic/legitimacy deficit that alter support and perceptions. Third, I seek to identify other correlates of this support.

The paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly introduce the literature on the legitimacy of global private environmental governance. Second, I outline the importance of studying public opinion vis-à-vis bodies such as the ISO and the FSC and discuss hypotheses for what drives support or opposition toward them. Third, I present experimental designs that aim to measure attitudes toward global private environmental governance whilst overcoming concerns about asking survey respondents questions on organizations they may have never heard of. Fourth, I examine public support for such organizations and leverage two survey experiments to test my core hypotheses. Fifth, I further unpack the demographic and socio-political correlates of said support. Sixth, in conclusion, I discuss the implications of the findings for the larger literature on legitimacy of global governance.

THE LEGITIMACY OF GLOBAL PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

The emergence of polycentric governance in global environmental regulation has led to the creation of a number of diverse private bodies that share an important characteristic: their roles are not prescribed or mandated by law (Black 2008). Nonetheless, they develop impactful rules and regulations through non-governmental channels that often lack traditional democratic public participatory structures (Davis 2012) leading them to sometimes be labelled as non-state market-driven governance systems (Cashore 2002). Organizations that can be categorized in this manner come in a variety of forms but generally they develop and implement standards and rules through the involvement of multiple stakeholders and often have a membership-based character such that they are composed of representatives from national standard-setting organizations. Importantly, the rules and standards that such bodies develop and implement can have significant distributive consequences (Clapp 1998; more generally see Bütte and Mattli 2011; Nölke and Perry 2007). Unsurprisingly, this has led to scholarly interest in the legitimacy of such forms of governance.

The scholarly debate on the legitimacy of such bodies can broadly be divided into two strands, one normative and one empirical or sociological in nature (cf. Schleifer 2015). Scholars in the normative tradition focus on delineating the characteristics that an organization ought to have in order to be considered legitimate (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Here, institutions are evaluated on whether they

adhere to some commonly embraced ideal, such as deliberative democracy (Steffek 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; Bäckstrand et al. 2010; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014). By contrast, sociological or empirical legitimacy is attained when an organization's audience believes it has the right to rule (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Of course, there are intersections between these two debates as well (see for instance Quack 2010). For example, some research has shown that transparency can increase perceptions of legitimacy if the underlying decision-making structures it shines light on approximate notions of deliberative democracy (De Fine Licht 2014). Thus, there is a belief embedded in conceptions of deliberative democracy, for instance, that sociological legitimacy can follow from normative legitimacy.

Some observers have claimed that global private environmental bodies do relatively better in terms of deliberative democracy than traditional global governance organizations. Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009: 733) for instance contend that:

“transnational rule-making organizations capitalize on the current legitimacy crisis of intergovernmental organizations. By putting a strong emphasis on values such as inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and deliberativeness, they portray themselves as approaching the normative ideal of global governance organizations more closely than actual intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.”

However, the central concern in this paper is not whether bodies such as the ISO or the FSC are legitimate in terms of achieving a normative ideal akin to deliberative democracy, but rather whether they are considered legitimate by the public. This stands in contrast to the extant empirical literature that has traditionally focused on whether organizations are considered legitimate by those most directly affected such as individual firms, entire industries or interest groups (cf. Bernstein 2011; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Cashore 2002; Schleifer and Bloomfield 2015; Falkner 2003).

The notion of the audience of global private environmental governance is crucial here. It makes a difference if one is focusing on whether actors are legitimate because states or other international organizations adopt their rules or whether firms do, for instance. Scholars have rightly pointed out that the legitimacy requirements will vary over time as audiences change (Bernstein 2011; Bernstein and

Cashore 2007). Indeed, the audiences in most of these cases are still emerging, and as audiences increase in variety and number, disagreement over legitimacy will inevitably grow (Bexell 2014; Quack 2010).

THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING PUBLIC OPINION

The preceding section ended by highlighting the role of ‘audience’ for legitimacy in the empirical or sociological sense. The lack of a global ‘public’ has always posed a problem for legitimacy in global governance and thus the audience for which legitimation is construed is usually not the general public but rather more proximate actors such as NGOs, firms or specific industries (cf. Bernstein 2011; Bernstein and Cashore 2007).

Against this backdrop, I posit that a comprehensive empirical assessment of sociological legitimacy needs to include consideration of both public support for the organizations or system in question and public perceptions of their legitimacy. Factoring in public opinion dynamics is best motivated by an examination of the trajectory of public support for the EU. Prior to the 1990s, public opinion toward the EU was characterized as dormant and inconsequential, mainly because the EU could, at this stage, be characterized as “structurally condemned to inspire apathy” (Menon 2008: 220). This was due to its focus on supranational regulation and low political contestation among mainstream national political elites, which facilitated a period of ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; see also Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009) when elites were able to advance European integration without paying much attention to the public and support was considered a fair-weather phenomenon (Hix 2008). Thus, public opinion was not consequential for elites’ assessments of the Union’s legitimacy.

Times have radically changed. Nowadays, the EU is in an era of ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2005) where elites cannot afford to ignore public opinion. Moreover, public opinion has become polarized and is central to debates regarding the Union’s legitimacy. Explanations for the rise of public opposition differ and often include economic considerations, identity-based explanations, or the types of institutional considerations that will be discussed below. But what does the rise in public contestation over the EU have to do with the legitimacy of global private environmental governance? Clearly, the ISO and the FSC are quite distinct in institutional design and scope from the EU. For example, they are not

formalized intergovernmental structures and their scope is a lot more specialized. More importantly, at this point, the ISO and FSC are still largely uncontested in the broader public domain.

However, the same argument about an absence of public contestation was made regarding the EU in the 1970s (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). In both cases, the public was not directly involved in the creation of these organizations and legitimacy was conferred either formally or informally through the consent of national governments. The early academic debate surrounding the EU's normative legitimacy was uncannily similar to the current discourse on the legitimacy of global private governance. For instance, there were extensive discussions regarding legitimation based on sound institutional features (i.e. input legitimacy) or assessments of organizational performance (i.e. output legitimacy) (Scharpf 1999). Thus, if private environmental governance organizations follow the same trajectory as the EU, they are likely to face more public opposition in the future. The question, then, is what happened in the EU case and what lessons can be learned from it for the present purpose? While a full discussion of the causes and consequences of declining public support for the EU is beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2005), two potentially competing arguments should be considered: the authority transfer hypothesis now prevalent in the 'EU politicization' literature (e.g., De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Statham and Trezn 2015) and the elite framing perspective (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009).

On the one hand, some scholars have recently sought to expand the study of public opinion dynamics vis-à-vis supranational or transnational organizations by shifting the focus from the *sui generis* experience of Euroscepticism to the more broadly applicable concept of 'politicization' (e.g., Zürn 2014). For the purposes of this dissertation, I conceptualize politicization to mean when an issue becomes contested in the public domain and people believe that it should be subject to public deliberation. The case of the EU illustrates such a shift when the public rejected the notion that the organization was solely a positive sum endeavor and thus sought public deliberation on the issue given the sense that the EU's actions produced winners and losers. The idea then is to examine how bodies involved in global governance become politically contested. A central hypothesis in this line of work posits that the public will seek public contestation over these bodies once it notices that substantial authority has been transferred from the nation-state to global organizations. Hence, the 'authority transfer hypothesis' insists that the public

has sincere preferences over the legitimate locus of political authority. The implication of this authority transfer hypothesis is that bodies such as the ISO and the FSC will inevitably become politicized, which in turn will raise new questions about their democratic and participatory credentials as well their legitimacy.

Thus, the authority transfer line of argument thus leads to the following conjecture:

H1: Information about supranational organizations' authority and decision-making structure will decrease support for these organizations and increase perceptions that they are illegitimate and undemocratic.

On the other hand, Hooghe and Marks' (2005; 2009) influential 'Postfunctionalist' theory of European integration posits that political entrepreneurs played a central role in mobilizing public tension toward the EU. Their argument implies that people may not have had strong opinions either way about European integration — as opposed to rejecting any supranational authority on sincere grounds — but that political elites stoked rising antipathy toward the Union for political gain.

On the other hand, evidence suggests citizens do not universally reject expert or industry-involved decision-making in favor of popular democratic arrangements (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's (2002) find, contrary to the popularized view of citizens as eager to be more involved in politics, Americans are quite content for non-democratic actors to be involved in policy-making and implementation. Citizens often yearn for more efficient policy-making, including business and expert involvement instead of the traditional partisan conflict they have become accustomed to at the national level (see also VanderMolen 2017). Subsequent research has also found some support for these Stealth Democracy attitudes in Europe (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Webb 2013; Coffé and Michels 2014).

Thus, drawing on the insights from Stealth Democracy and Hooghe and Marks' (2009) postfunctionalist theory leads me to posit a very different expectation about the trajectory of public support toward global private environmental governance. Here, the public might indeed be positively predisposed toward bodies such as the ISO or the FSC, yet such support could easily be undermined

if people are exposed to frames suggesting they are undemocratic or illegitimate. Thus, people, when exposed to the same information about institutional arrangements discussed above, will decrease support not based on this information but because of the affective tags provided by elites, which suggest that the organizations are undemocratic or illegitimate. Moreover, these cues can come from any domestic elite because the purported conflict is between the domestic and the supranational level rather than between partisan factions, which should reduce partisan motivated reasoning or partisan resistance. In sum, I thus hypothesize:

H2: Elite frames claiming the existence of a democratic or legitimacy deficit will decrease support for these organizations and increase perceptions that they are illegitimate and undemocratic.

Besides these expectations about how different information will affect attitudes, there are individual-level differences that should be associated with higher levels of support. Centrally, the Stealth Democracy rationale suggests:

H3: Respondents who support expert and industry involvement in decision-making will have more favorable attitudes toward these organizations and perceive them as more legitimate.

Before examining attitudes toward global private environmental governance an important question must be addressed: do people know enough about the institutions involved to have formed opinions? This raises the question of measuring non-attitudes: simply asking survey respondents their opinions of the ISO and the FSC could yield unstable or even invalid results given that these bodies do not enjoy widespread public recognition.

An illustration of this problem can be found in YouGov's 2012 Voice of the People survey in which respondents were asked whether they had a positive, negative, or neutral opinion of the ISO or whether they had never heard of the organization. Across all the countries in the study, 54% of respondents articulated that they did not hold an opinion regarding the ISO and of those who held opinions, 45% said

they were neutral, 47% were positive, and only 9% were negative. While this might imply the public is favorably disposed toward the ISO, a clear majority of respondents either have no opinion or are neutral. This is a situation in which political elites have tremendous potential to influence policy opinion on a large scale: they simply need to supply an affective cue and many citizens will pick it up.

This state of affairs must not deter us from studying these institutions because they do such important and consequential work, and precisely because political elites have the power to generate popular support or opposition. Still, we need to be careful in our measurement of attitudes about these organizations. The next section outlines an experimental survey design that seeks to overcome the problems involved in asking survey respondents about organizations they may not have heard of. The key here is to provide respondents with sufficient information about the organizations in a baseline condition and then to compare responses in that condition with responses to information that was explicitly developed to operationalize the competing hypotheses.

To test these hypotheses, I conducted two experiments embedded in original surveys, which I will discuss in turn in subsequent sections. Then I will turn to broader observational analyses examining the correlates of support for private environmental governance using data both from studies.

STUDY I

Sample

The first study was fielded in April, 2016 using respondents ($n=503$) recruited through the crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The survey was restricted to U.S.-based adults, yielding a convenience sample that was 43% female, 17% non-White, and 20% Republican (48% Independent and 32% Democrat). Previous research has validated MTurk as a subject pool that has a reasonable correspondence to the U.S. population and is more diverse than traditional samples of college students (Berinsky et al. 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015). Moreover, recent research shows that experimental effects across twelve studies generalized from the original sample to MTurk samples (Coppock 2018). Thus, despite this study's use of a convenience sample, the expectation should be that similar effects would be

uncovered when moving to a more representative sample.

Experimental Design

This section introduces the study's experimental design and procedure. First, all respondents answered a host of pre-test questions, including basic demographic information as well as a number of political variables, ranging from trust in government to attitudes about climate change. It is worth noting that there was a split-split sample manipulation such that half the respondents answered questions about 'Stealth Democracy' (see more information about this measure in the section on the correlates of support) in the pre-test and half the respondents answered those questions in the post-test.¹ Then, respondents were randomly assigned to read a short vignette about global private environmental governance. Finally, after exposure to the treatment, respondents answered a post-treatment question battery before being provided with debriefing screen and information about compensation.

The experimental component of the study seeks to reduce the problem of measuring non-attitudes by providing participants with varying amounts of information about the ISO and the FSC. The design thus leverages random assignment to assume that any differences in outcomes following exposure to the treatment can be attributed to the differences induced by the manipulation. The idea, then, is to isolate factors that correspond to the theoretical predictions outlined above.

For this purpose, the experiment consisted of four conditions, crafted by the researcher to isolate pieces of information that were theorized to affect dynamics of support. First, participants in the *No Information* control condition did not receive any information about the ISO 14001 environmental management standards or the FSC. These respondents were simply told that they would answer questions about global governance. This condition, then, enables the establishment of a neutral baseline to examine respondents' reactions in the absence of any information. It thus mirrors the situation most commonly encountered in survey research.

¹This manipulation was implemented to test for the possibility that asking questions about expert or business involvement might affect respondents' attitudes toward the ISO and FSC. However, the manipulation did not produce significant differences in response patterns for the Stealth Democracy items. That said, (1) the results can be replicated when the sample is restricted to only those respondents who answered those questions in the pre-test, (2) including a control variable for this design feature does not substantively change the results, and (3) there is no significant interaction between this manipulation and the substantive conditions

Second, participants assigned to the *Basic* condition read a brief text introducing two organizations involved in global non-governmental environmental standard-setting:

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems.

Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.

The main purpose of this condition was to provide participants with a simple introduction to the ISO and the FSC. While these bodies are undoubtedly much more complex than presented, the intention of the phrasing was to highlight the non-governmental nature of the bodies as well as a sense of the scope of their functions.

The authority transfer hypothesis predicts that citizens hold and utilize sincere preferences favoring domestic governments over unelected organizations such as the ISO and the FSC. Thus, the key question is whether mere awareness of the organizations' non-governmental, stakeholder-driven decision-making would be of consequence for public opinion. Thus, the *Governance* condition augments the basic condition by providing additional detail about the nature of these bodies. Specifically, it adds the following text operationalizing central aspects of the authority transfer hypothesis:

Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies who develop and monitor standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, decisions are largely made without formal government participation or interference.

This additional text reiterates that the ISO and the FSC are private bodies with decision-making structures that involve stakeholders such as industry groups and NGOs as opposed to decisions being

made by national governments. Of course, this is a very stylized and incomplete view of their decision-making structures, but it highlights a key dimension that, according to the authority transfer hypothesis, should depress popular support.

By contrast, the competing hypothesis states that information about governance arrangements, by itself, will not powerfully affect public support. Rather, elite affective cues about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these bodies will have a much more powerful effect. In this vein, the *Politicized Governance* condition augments the text by introducing a possible critique of private governance:

Some national politicians and activist groups have raised concerns about these organizations, suggesting that these private bodies are developing rules and regulations through non-governmental channels, thus raising serious questions about their democratic legitimacy.

This final manipulation was intended to add an element akin to a politicization cue, thereby providing participants with the heuristic that there are concerns about a democratic or legitimacy deficit. While the claim is not particularly substantive in nature, it establishes a connection between private rule making and potentially lacking legitimacy.

The aim of the experiment, then, is to ascertain whether exposure to any of these frames alters support for organizations that the public knows little about but which exert significant economic and political authority. Thus, while the information provided to respondents is invariably incomplete and stylized, the distinctions between the conditions are grounded in theoretical predictions. To reiterate, examining differences between the *Basic* condition and the *Governance* condition operationalizes *Hypothesis 1*, whereas the differences between the *Basic* condition and the *Politicized Governance* condition operationalizes *Hypothesis 2*.² It is worth noting here that the *No Information* condition is not used to assess the core hypotheses but rather it provides leverage on the non-attitudes question by enabling a comparison with respondents in the *Basic* information.

²While I argue that this is the core comparison for the second hypothesis, I also compare the *Governance* condition to the *Politicized Governance* condition for additional leverage on the question of just how powerful the elite frame is compared to information about governance arrangements.

Measures

The key dependent variables capturing attitudes toward global private environmental governance were measured with three questions. For the first variable, *Favorability*, respondents were asked: “How strongly do you favor or oppose global non-governmental bodies setting environmental standards?” Response options ranged from “strongly oppose” to “strongly favor” on a 5-point scale with a neutral midpoint. The second outcome, *Legitimacy*, was based on responses to the question “How legitimate do you think global non-governmental environmental standard-setting bodies are?”, again measured on a 5-point scale with response options ranging from “very illegitimate” to “very legitimate”. The variable *Democracy*, aimed at capturing perceptions of the democratic nature of such bodies, was measured by asking respondents “How democratic do you think global non-governmental environmental standard-setting bodies are?” Again, responses were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from “very undemocratic” to “very democratic”. It is worth noting here that there was no “don’t know” option for any of these questions.

These three variables are conceptualized as tapping into the broader concept of public support toward bodies such as the ISO or the FSC. Factor analysis revealed that the three variables load onto one common factor and combining them into a single, additive measure, the *Favorability Index*, produced a reliable scale (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .80$). While I suggest that this index provides a more general measure of support toward the private governance, I also present results for the individual items that make up the index and discuss heterogeneity in these results (all variables are recoded 0-1).

Results

Given the lack of prior research on the organizations studied here, before examining the experimental results, there are a couple of pertinent descriptive questions that merit discussion: does the public support bodies such as the ISO or the FSC setting environmental standards? Does it perceive them to be legitimate and democratic? The overarching takeaway is that public opinion appears to be quite positive. I first concentrate only on those respondents in the *No Information* condition. Here, 52% of respondents in this study have either a very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of global

non-governmental bodies setting environmental standards, compared to only 11% who have a negative opinion. Similarly, 63% of respondents perceive the organizations as legitimate, while only 15% find them illegitimate. The corresponding democratic assessments are somewhat less positive with only 40% of respondents indicating they find the bodies either very or somewhat democratic compared to 25% who find them undemocratic. It is important to note that MTurk samples are more liberal, younger, and more politically engaged than the general population and thus these point estimates should not be interpreted as population estimates. I discuss this limitation in the concluding section. Another visible pattern, displayed in Table 3.1 is a general decline in respondents opting for the neutral category when being provided with any type of information, compared to the condition that provided no information. This provides initial evidence that even basic information about global private environmental regulators can help form initial opinions (but note that the differences in two of the three variables using the full scale are not significant — see Figure 3.1 below).

Table 3.1: ‘Opinionation’ by Condition


	No Information			Basic Condition		
	Tot. Negative	Neutral	Tot. Positive	Tot. Negative	Neutral	Tot. Positive
Favor Bodies	11	37	52	12	28	61
Bodies Legitimate	15	22	63	12	17	72
Bodies Democratic	25	35	40	17	30	54

Cell entries are the percentage of respondents falling into the combined categories

Next, I turn to the experimental results. I first examine experimental effects vis-à-vis the *Basic* condition by regressing the dependent variables on an indicator for the experimental conditions where the excluded category is the *Basic* condition. These results are presented in Figure 3.1 (The figure is based on results presented in Table 3.3 in the Appendix). In the Appendix, I also include Figure 3.4 showing the means of these variables by experimental condition, which provides additional context about the overall positive nature of attitudes, mirroring the descriptive discussion above.

The hypothesis drawn from the authority transfer literature suggests that respondents in the *Governance* condition would be less supportive than respondents in the *Basic* condition. This conjecture captured the argument that individuals would reject global private governance simply as a result of learning about the governance structure (i.e. private bodies through stakeholder input making decisions

Figure 3.1: Experimental Results (Study 1)



Note: OLS regression coefficients; Baseline category: *Basic Condition*; Underlying Models can be found in Table 3.3 in the Appendix

as opposed to governments). If this were indeed the case one would expect to see a negative and significant coefficient for the *Governance* condition. However, this conjecture is not supported by the data as the difference between the *Governance* condition and the *Basic* condition is not statistically significant for any of the four dependent variables. Thus, individuals do not appear to reject bodies such as the ISO or the FSC simply on the grounds that they are non-governmental and market-driven.

The second hypothesis stated that cues about a democratic deficit would lead to lower levels of support. Here, I first compare the *Politicized Governance* condition to the *Basic* condition. For each of the *Index*, *Favorability*, and *Democracy* variables there is a clear statistically significant decline in positivity when comparing the *Politicized Governance* condition to the *Basic* condition (all at $p < 0.05$). The only exception is the *Legitimacy* dependent variable. While I argue that the central comparison here is between the *Basic* condition and the *Politicized Governance* condition, it is also instructive to

examine the difference between the *Governance* condition and the *Politicized Governance* condition to see whether these are actually significantly different from one another. The results, which are presented in Table 3.4 in the Appendix, show that the same basic pattern also holds when comparing the *Politicized Governance* condition to the *Governance* condition (*Index* and *Democracy* at $p < 0.01$ and *Favorability* at $p < 0.05$). Once again, however, the differences in *Legitimacy* do not reach traditional levels of statistical significance ($p = .08$).

Lastly, there was no explicit expectation about the difference between the *Basic* condition and the *No Information* condition. That said, however, the results are nonetheless of some interest. While the means in the *Basic* condition are higher across all four variables, only the difference in terms of democratic evaluation reaches statistical significance ($p < 0.05$). This result can be interpreted in at least two ways. On the one hand, it suggests that peoples' conceptions of the bodies in question are generally quite positive and thus they align very closely in the condition where people base their evaluation on no information and the condition where people receive basic information. On the other hand, this could also be construed as evidence that people do not have fully formed opinions and that the information provided in the basic condition does not really augment understanding. I return to this question in the Discussion section.

STUDY 2

The results from the first study provide initial evidence that information about organizations' governance structures does not diminish public support. Rather, elite rhetoric claiming that these organizations are illegitimate depresses support. While these results are informative, the first study has some limitations that I seek to address in a second study. First and foremost, it is unclear whether the findings from the first study are generalizable beyond the MTurk sample, which is a convenience sample that skews more liberal than the general population. Thus, as this paper is concerned with measuring public opinion toward these types of organizations, it is vital to be able to discuss the substantive level of approval these bodies enjoy based on a more representative sample. Second, there is a need to unpack whether it matters which domestic elites are politicizing private governance organizations. In addition, the second study seeks to heighten internal validity by reducing imbalances in vignette length and more precisely operationalizing

the core elements of the authority transfer hypothesis in the vignettes.

Sample

For the second study³ I contracted with Survey Sampling International (SSI) for a sample of US adults balanced by age, sex, ethnicity, and census region. The survey was fielded in February-March 2018 and yielded a sample of 1,012 respondents. The resulting sample was 51% female and 73% White. The median age was 42 years and 64% of respondents reported having at least some college education. Including leaners with partisans, the partisan make-up of the sample was 45% Democrat, 39% Republican, and 16% Independent. While this is typically less liberal than an MTurk sample, it is nonetheless not representative of the country at large, as respondents may be more highly educated and more politically engaged. Furthermore, partisans in this sample may not be representative of partisans in the general population since they may be more sophisticated and attentive than average. I further discuss these sample limitations and the implications for the results in the conclusion.

Experimental Design & Measures

The basic experimental set-up mirrors that of the first study. The *No Information* and *Basic* conditions are largely equivalent to the ones used in the first study (The full texts of the conditions can be found in the Appendix).⁴ The *Governance* condition was modified to more precisely operationalize core tenets of the authority transfer hypothesis by highlighting that “standards are largely negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments.” Here, the vignette thus more explicitly emphasizes loss of governmental authority in the domains of negotiation, ratification and implementation.

The most significant departure from the first study concerns the inclusion of a broader variety of conditions containing elite rhetoric providing affective cues about the organizations. Specifically, instead of the generic *Politicization* condition, here I operationalize this concept with three different conditions whereby the politicization cue is attributed to either journalists (*Politicized Media* condition), Democrat

³This study was pre-registered on aspredicted.com: <https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=d6jk76>

⁴The Basic condition was edited slightly for length.

politicians (*Politicized Democrats* condition), or Republican politicians (*Politicized Republicans* condition). Compared to the first study, the length of these conditions was significantly reduced (by more than half) and the cue explicitly stated that the cue-giver “condemn[ed] the organizations as undemocratic and illegitimate.” These politicization conditions enable testing of both whether any main effects differ depending on who is seeking to de-legitimize private governance organizations and whether reactions can be characterized as responsive to messages from any domestic elite or whether respondents are simply reacting in ways consistent with work on partisan identities and motivated reasoning.


The dependent variables are the same as in the first study. Once again, these variables load on a single factor and combining the *Favorability*, *Legitimacy*, and *Democracy* questions into an additive *Index* yields a reliable scale (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .78$). For analyses in which results are broken down by partisanship, leaners are included with partisans.

Results

First, in terms of descriptive results regarding the nature of support toward private organizations developing environmental standards, the results in this more representative sample largely confirm those of the MTurk sample. Restricting the sample to those in the *No Information* condition, we see that opinion is generally favorable with 45% of respondents having a very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion compared to 16% of respondents who hold an unfavorable view. Figure 3.2 displays the coefficients on the indicators for the experimental conditions compared to the *Basic* condition. An initial take-away is that favorability increases when respondents are provided with some information about the organizations, suggesting that people are generally positively predisposed toward such forms of non-governmental private governance.

Recall that *H1* suggested that support in the *Governance* condition would be lower than in the *Basic* condition. Replicating the results from the first study, I find no support for this conjecture. Across all four dependent variables, I find no evidence that providing respondents with information suggesting a lack of governmental control over negotiation, ratification, and implementation of environmental standards depresses support.

Figure 3.2: Experimental Results (Study 2)



Note: OLS regression coefficients; Baseline category: *Basic Condition*; Underlying Models can be found in Table 3.5 in the Appendix

By contrast, Figure 3.2 does provide support for H_2 and the conjecture that elite cues affect support for global private environmental governance. Specifically, respondents in the *Politicized Media* and *Politicized Democrats* conditions reported significantly lower favorability than respondents in the *Basic* condition. Interestingly, contrary to expectations, this result was not replicated for respondents in the *Politicized Republicans* condition. I discuss potential reasons for this finding below. Moreover, the *Politicized Media* and *Politicized Democrats* conditions also differ significantly from the *Governance* condition for two and three of the dependent variables, respectively (see Figure 3.5 and Table 3.6 in the Appendix).

Although my main conjecture was that the three politicization conditions should yield significant negative main effects,⁵ I also suggested that there may be heterogeneity in the effects by respondents'

⁵It is worth noting that when the three politicization conditions are pooled I also observe significant differences between

partisanship.⁶ Therefore, in Figure 3.3 I estimate the effects of the experimental treatments for Democrats and Republicans.

Figure 3.3: Experimental Results by Partisanship (Study 2)




Figure 3.3 illustrates that the effects uncovered above look very similar to the effects for Democrats. The figure shows that Democrat respondents exhibit decreased levels of support in both the *Politicized Media* and the *Politicized Democrats* conditions compared to the *Basic* condition. There is no effect of the *Politicized Republicans* condition for these respondents, suggesting that while partisans respond most strongly to partisan cues, there is no evidence of a backlash effect such that support increases in response to a de-legitimizing cue from the out-party. Turning next to Republican respondents, first it is noteworthy that providing *Basic* information actually increases support when compared to the *No Information* condition in which respondents are simply told that they will be answering questions about global governance. None of the other conditions affects support among Republican respondents and there is no evidence of any partisan dynamic in response to the politicization conditions. Indeed, Republicans are responding in a similar fashion to Democrats but the inflated standard errors prevent detection of significant effects. One reason for this may be the fact that the domain of regulation is the environment, which is a more liberal issue, thereby making a Republican cue less credible. Or it may be that the information conveyed by the affective cue is already ‘priced-in’ by Republican respondents this pooled condition and the *Basic* condition (with the exception of the *Legitimacy* dependent variable which yields a p-value of 0.092).

⁶It is worth noting that there also are no significant differences between the *Basic* condition and the *Politicized* conditions among Independents, but I caution against interpreting this result given the small sample size (n=161).

given their more negative baseline attitudes toward environmental regulation writ large. That said, it is important to note that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for Democrats are statistically distinguishable from the coefficients for Republicans.

In sum, the results of the second study complement those of the first. Across two samples and different operationalizations of both authority transfer and elite rhetoric, no evidence was uncovered to support the hypothesis that information about private environmental governance organizations' authority is sufficient to decrease public support. By contrast, the results highlight the power that domestic elite rhetoric plays in de-legitimizing private governance.

CORRELATES OF SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

The preceding analyses provide unique experimental evidence into the dynamics that affect support for global regulatory governance in the environmental domain. Thus far the results have indicated that survey respondents in the U.S., across two samples, are generally favorably predisposed toward global private environmental bodies and that affective cues about a democratic deficit as opposed to simple information about governance arrangements reduces support. This section aims to provide additional context to the core experimental results by more broadly examining the correlates of support for this emerging form of governance.

Given the lack of prior empirical work on support for bodies such as the ISO or the FSC, my core objective is to examine a relatively parsimonious model predicting favorability (measured here using the additive *Favor Bodies Index*) to provide a better understanding of the correlates of attitudes toward global private environmental governance. With this aim in mind, first, the models include basic demographic variables such as age (in years), dummy variables denoting non-White respondents and sex, and education level. Second, the models include political characteristics that should arguably affect support for private environmental regulatory bodies based on existing work on determinants of domestic institutional trust and global governance more broadly. These variables include party identification on a 7-point scale ranging from “Strong Republican” to “Strong Democrat”, support for limited government, and trust in government, as well as a variable measuring how concerned respondents are about climate change.

To ease interpretation in the regression models, all continuous variables (with the exception of age) are rescaled to run from zero to one.

Lastly, my theoretical account for why respondents might not inherently reject this form of governance was informed by the work on *Stealth Democracy* in the domestic U.S. context. Therefore, I include a variable tapping into this concept to test whether respondents with this set of attitudes are indeed more favorably predisposed toward bodies such as the ISO and the FSC. The variable, *Stealth Democracy*, is operationalized using the four-item agree-disagree battery originally developed by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002). The four items tap into a set of beliefs associated with the desire for efficient, non-involved government. The items are (1) “Elected Officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take action on important problems”, (2) “What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles”, (3) “Our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business people”, and (4) “Our government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected, independent experts rather than politicians or the people”. Unfortunately, although these items are generally positively correlated, the scale reliability coefficients for this index were quite low (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .42$ in study 1 and $\alpha = .56$ in study 2).⁷ This low reliability is consistent with work showing that people can selectively embrace Stealth Democracy traits and that support for the expert and business components of the scale do not necessarily go hand-in-hand (Fernández-Martínez and Fábregas 2018), which is why some work has sought to examine support for expert decision-making and business involvement independently (see e.g., Gangl 2007; Rapaeli 2016; Bertsou and Pastorella 2017). Therefore, any results stemming from the indices are also discussed in disaggregated form to facilitate clearer interpretation.

The results of two OLS regression models are presented in Table 3.2, with MTurk (Study 1) results presented in the first column and SSI (Study 2) results in the second column. The first set of coefficients simply reproduce the effects of the experimental conditions on the *Favor Bodies Index*, showing again that information operationalizing the authority transfer hypothesis does not reduce support whereas elite rhetoric providing affective cues does.

⁷It is worth noting that responses to these questions were measured on 4-point scales in Study 1 and 5-point scales in Study 2.

Table 3.2: Correlates of Favorability toward Global Private Environmental Governance

	MTurk Sample	SSI Sample
<i>Experimental Conditions</i>		
No information	-0.056* (0.0260)	-0.048* (0.0204)
Governance	-0.039 (0.0262)	-0.020 (0.0204)
Politicized Governance	-0.081** (0.0260)	
Politicized Media		-0.060** (0.0204)
Politicized Democrats		-0.056** (0.0204)
Politicized Republicans		-0.010 (0.0204)
Age	0.000 (0.0009)	-0.001*** (0.0004)
Female	0.017 (0.0192)	-0.013 (0.0122)
Non-White	-0.034 (0.0249)	-0.012 (0.0141)
Education	-0.002 (0.0330)	0.043* (0.0189)
Party Identification	0.116** (0.0361)	0.066*** (0.0182)
Limited Government	-0.001 (0.0412)	-0.005 (0.0172)
Trust in Government	0.132** (0.0428)	0.149*** (0.0225)
Stealth Democracy	0.183** (0.0599)	0.122*** (0.0326)
Concern about Climate Change	0.155*** (0.0358)	0.196*** (0.0207)
Constant	0.339*** (0.0664)	0.445*** (0.0362)
N	494	1003

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Turning first to the demographic factors, we see slight differences between the two models which may be attributable to having more leverage on these questions in the SSI study given its more diverse sample. While age, education, race, and sex do not appear to be correlated in the MTurk study, we do see that younger and more highly educated respondents have more favorable attitudes toward bodies such as the ISO and the FSC.

Partisanship, measured such that identifying as a “Strong Democrat” is coded at the top of the scale, is strongly positively associated with favorability, implying that Democrats, as opposed to Republicans, are more supportive of such bodies, *ceteris paribus*. Somewhat surprisingly, the *Limited Government* variable, which captures agreement with the belief that the government is taking on responsibilities that should be the purview of individuals and businesses, is not significantly correlated with the dependent variable. Moreover, *Trust in Government* is positively associated with support. This latter finding is of interest as it indicates that, contrary to some suggestions, there may not necessarily be a tension between accepting global non-governmental regulation and support for national governmental political institutions. This finding mirrors some work on support for the EU that shows that trust in domestic institutions is associated with support for supranational organizations (Rohrschneider 2002; Hobolt 2012). Unsurprisingly, concern about climate change is positively correlated with support for global private climate governance.

Notably, as conjectured in *Hypothesis 3*, there is a strong and statistically significant positive relationship between holding views that are indicative of stealth democracy and favorability toward bodies such as the ISO and the FSC setting environmental standards. Due to the low scale reliability statistic for the *Stealth Democracy Index*, this model was also run with the four distinct variables that make up the index. These disaggregated results reveal an interesting pattern: in both studies the results of the index are driven by the “take action” question and the “experts” question. Specifically, believing that elected officials “should stop talking and just take action on important issues” is associated with greater favorability, as is the desire to leave decisions up to independent experts. Conversely, there is no relationship between holding the belief that business people should be entrusted with decisions and favorability. I also tested the conjecture that the Stealth Democracy attitudes or their components interact

with the conditions, in particular when comparing the *No Information* condition to the *Basic* condition. However, contrary to these expectation, Stealth Democracy attitudes do not appear to be moderating the effect of the conditions.

DISCUSSION

What do these results imply? Primarily, the results seem to contradict the view that people will reject global bodies simply after learning about the non-governmental nature of their authority. Rather, it seems that attitudes turn more negative when people are exposed to frames providing affective cues suggesting that the bodies are not democratic or legitimate. More broadly, these findings suggest that awareness of organizations' increased authority is not a sufficient condition for declining public support. Indeed, while the transfer of authority may be an issue that can be made salient and consequential through elite frames, the results here suggest that declining support is not an automatic process that is purely driven by sincere preferences about what constitutes legitimate governance in the eyes of the public. This complicates the original authority transfer hypothesis by highlighting the role that political entrepreneurs can play in driving opinion dynamics about global governance organizations via quite simple affective framing (cf. Zürn 2018).

The experimental and observational results also provide some preliminary insight into the question of non-attitudes. In general, support for organizations was higher when respondents were provided with some basic information compared to when they were simply asked to render an opinion about the ISO and the FSC. This suggests that it is important to ensure that respondents have at least minimal information upon which to base their opinion and, in this case, illustrates that this kind of information is useful for respondents. Moreover, the observational results show that attitudes toward global private environmental organizations are related to other attitude constructs in meaningful ways, positing that attitudes toward these bodies are not simply random noise. In particular, the research suggests that there is value in applying the concept of stealth democracy to attitudes about global governance. Experts and businesses are integral parts of polycentric climate governance, and global private governance more generally, and thus attitudes toward these will help explain citizens' perceptions.

The partisan dynamics uncovered in this study raise some interesting questions for future research about the power of elite frames conditional on underlying partisan attitudes. Republicans have lower levels of support for global private governance than Democrats and we do not see any significant experimental results for this subset of respondents. One reason for this may be that for Republicans, who are already negatively predisposed toward these bodies, this negative information is already ‘priced-in’ and thus the frames providing affective cues are less likely to change their opinion (for a similar dynamic see e.g., Goodwin et al. 2018).

CONCLUSION

As private actors have become central players in global environmental governance, questions of legitimacy have been front and center in the debate. This paper suggested that both the normative and the empirical literatures on the legitimacy of global governance need to pay more attention to citizens’ attitudes toward a broader set of organizations. The trajectory of public contestation of the EU highlights that metrics of legitimation can easily change when bodies become politicized. More specifically, assessments of legitimacy that rely on an audience legitimation component have to take into account the fact that organizations’ audiences are not set in stone and can easily expand to include the general public.

Descriptively, results from two surveys suggested that the public is generally supportive of bodies such as the ISO and the FSC being involved in setting environmental standards. These findings are noteworthy because they provide initial evidence that, in the absence of politicization, there is no inherent opposition toward this form of governance. Moreover, results from two experiments suggest that, contrary to the expectations of the authority transfer hypothesis, providing people with information about organizations’ non-governmental, industry-involved decision-making structures does not reduce support. By contrast, the evidence presented here highlights the role that elites can play in de-legitimizing bodies such as the ISO and the FSC through narratives emphasizing that governance arrangements are undemocratic and illegitimate.

Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the studies used in this chapter. The samples used are not representative samples and while the SSI sample is a better match to the U.S.

population in terms of partisanship than the MTurk sample, both samples are likely to include people who are more politically engaged and aware than the general population. Moreover, it is possible that the partisan subgroups are not representative of those subgroups in the population. These limitations affect the generalizability of the findings beyond the current samples in two ways. First, the correlational analyses showed that partisanship and other socio-demographic are associated with support for global private governance and thus levels of support may differ in a more representative sample. Given that these samples arguably skew liberal and more educated the current point estimates may overstate support and potentially provide an upper bound for the level of support. Second, it is also important to acknowledge that the effect sizes may be smaller in more representative samples that include less engaged respondents. Future work with more representative samples is thus needed to make more precise and reliable inferences about the exact levels of support toward global private governance as well as corroborating that the experimental effects replicate in those samples.

What are the implications of these findings for the broader debate surrounding the legitimacy of global private environmental regulation? On the one hand, the results suggest that, at present, public opinion may provide a ‘permissive consensus’ to the actors involved in private environmental governance. Moreover, this support may not necessarily decline when people learn more about the organizations’ decision-making structures and authority. On the other hand, support could decline if national elites start to become involved and seek to increase contestation. Either way, empirical accounts of legitimacy should be cognizant of the role that the public could yet come to play in legitimating global private governance.

This paper set out to address the explicitly identified need for both more public opinion and interdisciplinary research on environmental governance (von Staden 2012; Cao et al. 2014; Vogel 2008), as well as more investigation of politicization of global governance organizations beyond the case of the EU (Zürn 2016). Furthermore, the paper contributes to an emerging literature seeking to understand public support for non-majoritarian and technocratic governance structures more generally (e.g., Bertson and Pastorella 2017) and extends the applicability of the Stealth Democracy framework to governance arrangements beyond the nation-state.

In conclusion, an increasingly interconnected world and global challenges require coordination

beyond nation-states, and the rise of private governance — whether in the environmental domain or more generally — is merely one facet of contemporary global governance. The myriad organizations involved in global governance, from the bodies discussed in this paper to more established international actors such as the EU, increasingly need to be viewed as legitimate by the public to remain effective in addressing complex global challenges (Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Tallberg and Zürn 2017). Advancing our understanding of when a host of different types of institutional arrangements will be supported and perceived as legitimate by the public as well as whether de-legitimizing elite rhetoric can be counteracted presents an important avenue for future research.

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APPENDIX

Stimulus Materials for Study 1

No Information Condition

Next we will ask you a couple of questions about global governance.

Basic Condition

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.

Governance Condition

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests. Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies who develop and monitor standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, decisions are largely made without formal government participation or interference.

Politicized Condition

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests. Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies who develop and monitor standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, decisions are largely made without formal government participation or interference. Some national politicians and activist groups have raised concerns about these organizations, suggesting that these private bodies are developing rules and regulations through non-governmental channels, thus raising serious questions about their democratic legitimacy.

Stimulus Materials for Study 2

No Information Condition

Next we will ask you a couple of questions about global governance.

Basic Condition

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests.

In sum, both the ISO and the FSC are bodies that develop and monitor environmental standards.

Governance Condition

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests. Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies that develop and monitor environmental standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, standards are largely negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments.

Politicized Republicans Condition

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests. Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies that develop and monitor environmental standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, standards are largely negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments. This has led Republican politicians to condemn the organizations as undemocratic and illegitimate.

Politicized Democrats Condition

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests. Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies that develop and monitor environmental standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, standards are largely negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments. This has led Democratic politicians to condemn the organizations as undemocratic and illegitimate.

Politicized Media Condition

The rise of global non-governmental environmental standard-setting

There has recently been a rise in non-governmental organizations setting standards in the area of environmental regulation. For instance, the International Standards Organization's (ISO) 14001 environmental management standards provide a framework for companies to develop and implement effective environmental management systems. Another organization, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 to provide a forest certification and labeling system. This non-governmental organization produces certification to show whether forest products come from well-managed forests. Both the ISO and the FSC are non-governmental private standard setting bodies that develop and monitor environmental standards based on industry and NGO input. Thus, standards are largely negotiated and implemented without formal participation or ratification by national governments. This has led journalists to condemn the organizations as undemocratic and illegitimate.

Additional Figures & Tables

Figure 3.4: The Effect of Information on Support and Perceptions of Legitimacy and Democracy of Global Private Environmental Government Institutions (Study 1)




Figure 3.5: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Governance Condition) (Study 2)




Table 3.3: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Basic Condition) (Study 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Favor Bodies Index	Favor Bodies	Bodies Legitimate	Bodies Democratic
No Information	-0.051 (0.0273)	-0.037 (0.0317)	-0.039 (0.0336)	-0.075* (0.0321)
Governance	-0.022 (0.0275)	0.000 (0.0319)	-0.036 (0.0338)	-0.029 (0.0323)
Politicized	-0.078** (0.0274)	-0.067* (0.0318)	-0.061 (0.0337)	-0.106** (0.0323)
Constant	0.659*** (0.0193)	0.667*** (0.0224)	0.691*** (0.0237)	0.618*** (0.0227)
N	503	503	503	503

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Table 3.4: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Governance Condition) (Study 1)

	(1) Favor Bodies Index	(2) Favor Bodies	(3) Bodies Legitimate	(4) Bodies Democratic
No Information	-0.029 (0.0275)	-0.037 (0.0319)	-0.004 (0.0338)	-0.045 (0.0323)
Basic	0.022 (0.0275)	-0.000 (0.0319)	0.036 (0.0338)	0.029 (0.0323)
Politicized	-0.056* (0.0276)	-0.067* (0.0320)	-0.025 (0.0339)	-0.077* (0.0325)
Constant	0.637*** (0.0195)	0.667*** (0.0227)	0.655*** (0.0240)	0.589*** (0.0230)
N	503	503	503	503

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Table 3.5: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Basic Condition) (Study 2)

	(1) Favor Bodies Index	(2) Favor Bodies	(3) Bodies Legitimate	(4) Bodies Democratic
No Information	-0.056* (0.0223)	-0.085** (0.0277)	-0.051 (0.0263)	-0.031 (0.0263)
Governance	-0.019 (0.0224)	-0.013 (0.0277)	-0.004 (0.0264)	-0.038 (0.0264)
Politicized Media	-0.063** (0.0224)	-0.059* (0.0278)	-0.062* (0.0265)	-0.068* (0.0265)
Politicized Dems	-0.070** (0.0223)	-0.088** (0.0277)	-0.066* (0.0263)	-0.058* (0.0263)
Politicized Reps	-0.014 (0.0224)	-0.027 (0.0277)	0.018 (0.0264)	-0.032 (0.0264)
Constant	0.661*** (0.0159)	0.673*** (0.0197)	0.663*** (0.0187)	0.648*** (0.0187)
N	1011	1011	1011	1011

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Table 3.6: Main Experimental Effects (Baseline = Governance Condition) (Study 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Favor Bodies Index	Favor Bodies	Bodies Legitimate	Bodies Democratic
No Information	-0.037 (0.0222)	-0.072** (0.0276)	-0.047 (0.0262)	0.007 (0.0262)
Basic	0.019 (0.0224)	0.013 (0.0277)	0.004 (0.0264)	0.038 (0.0264)
Politicized Media	-0.045* (0.0223)	-0.046 (0.0277)	-0.058* (0.0263)	-0.030 (0.0263)
Politicized Dems	-0.052* (0.0222)	-0.074** (0.0276)	-0.061* (0.0262)	-0.020 (0.0262)
Politicized Reps	0.005 (0.0223)	-0.013 (0.0276)	0.022 (0.0263)	0.006 (0.0263)
Constant	0.643*** (0.0157)	0.660*** (0.0195)	0.658*** (0.0186)	0.609*** (0.0186)
N	1011	1011	1011	1011

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Chapter 4

Do Elite Frames Trump Institutional Design? Unpacking the Dynamics of Support for Global Governance

INTRODUCTION

As the organizations involved in global governance have acquired more authority over time (see e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2015), some have increasingly come under political attack. From the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom to President Donald Trump's attacks on international institutions like the United Nations (UN), both political elites and the public seem increasingly hostile toward governance efforts beyond the nation-state. And while public opposition toward bodies such as the European Union (EU) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) is by no means a new phenomenon, it appears as though opposition is no longer confined to specific organizations, but rather extends to the system of global governance writ large. This has led some observers to frame this development as the 'populist backlash' against liberal internationalism and the global legal order (e.g., Posner 2017; Rodrik 2017).

Such backlash has consequences. Buchanan and Keohane's (2006: 407) seminal work on the legitimacy of global governance institutions proffers that "[d]etermining whether global governance institutions are legitimate — and whether they are widely perceived to be so — is an urgent matter" and that such "institutions will only thrive if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics." Expanding on this point, Tallberg and Zürn (2017) argue that, inter alia, organizations require legitimacy to remain focal institutions for global cooperation, to be able to propagate rules and regulations, and to ensure compliance with said rules and regulations. Thus, political backlash, politicization and the de-legitimization of global governance can undermine global governance efforts and impede

cross-national and supranational collaboration aimed at addressing some of the world's foremost coordination challenges (e.g., environmental or financial regulation).

But how and why does the public come to oppose the organizations involved in global governance in the first place? The majority of the evidence on this question comes from the literature on support for the EU, and while it was initially concerned with only that organization, more recent work has sought to derive generalizable hypotheses that can be applied to any organization involved in global governance. Research emanating from the study of the EU's politicization has proposed a central hypothesis suggesting that citizens have sincere preferences against delegating authority to supranational organizations. This work, coupled with normative studies of institutional legitimacy, has pointed to features and procedures that should enhance the legitimacy of global governance organizations, chiefly institutional rules that constrain these bodies and vest powers in democratic nation-states (in addition to more general ideals such as participation of civil society organizations and transparency). Recently, scholars of the EU have also started looking at the role that national elites (especially populist and far-right political entrepreneurs) play in driving opposition to global governance. That said, this approach suggests that elites are merely mobilizing attitudes that naturally develop as a response to authority being ceded from national governments.

This chapter sets out to test the key claims of the authority transfer literature. More importantly, however, I argue that the primacy of institutional factors as underpinning support for global governance is overstated. By contrast, I contend that elite rhetoric providing affective cues suggesting the organizations are illegitimate are key drivers of attitudes toward global governance. Importantly, I suggest that these cues will not merely resonate with co-partisans, but rather that these cues will affect opinion more broadly. While, I afford that these cues may be moderated by partisanship such that the effects are larger for cues from co-partisans, I also contend that out-party cues should also depress support. This expectation stands in contrast to work on partisan resistance or partisan motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber 2013; Zaller 1992) and is rooted in the belief that the dimension of conflict here is between existing domestic governing institutions and new institutions that may threaten national sovereignty. Thus, I argue, attitudes toward the myriad organizations involved in global governance are not driven by sincere preferences over their

institutional designs, but instead by domestic cues claiming that these institutions are legitimate or not. Hence, extending the work in the third chapter, I proffer and test the hypothesis that elite rhetoric providing affective cues can depress support, irrespective of the known facts about the organizations.

In addition, I investigate whether attitudes toward these organizations are truly a function of their global or international nature, or whether non-governmental domestic rule-making bodies would receive the same reactions. While implied in much of the existing literature, the impact of the international character of these organizations has not been tested empirically. Therefore, I test whether support for non-governmental regulatory bodies follows a similar trajectory when the organizations are described as operating at the domestic level.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I define the class of organizations that I seek to generalize to in this chapter. Second, I provide an overview of the literature on public support for global governance organizations. Third, I outline my theoretical approach and hypotheses. Fourth, I introduce the conjoint experimental design that I use to test my hypotheses and discuss results from a pre-test validating key conjoint attributes. Fifth, I discuss results from a conjoint experiment that was fielded on two samples. Finally, I conclude by drawing attention to the implications of the study for work on global governance and its politicization more broadly.

SCOPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Global governance encompasses myriad organizations from well-known regional integration bodies (e.g., the EU) to international organizations (e.g., the UN) to private regulatory bodies (e.g., the International Organization for Standardization [ISO]). It is thus important to set some scope conditions for the work in this paper. Tallberg and Zürn (2017: 5) discuss global governance as it pertains to international organizations, by which they mean “formal, multilateral, and bureaucratic arrangements established to further cooperation among states.” Yet they readily admit that their framework (which is an extension of the original authority transfer argument) can be extended to any other form of global governance including private or informal arrangements. Some recent work in this tradition (e.g., Anderson et al. 2017) thus conceptualizes global governance institutions more broadly to encompass bilateral, informal,

or private arrangements.

I define a global governance organization as any supranational or transnational non-governmental organization that exercises authority that was either formally or informally ceded from nation-states. This conceptualization explicitly covers a broad range of institutional configurations including the examples introduced above (see also Zürn 2018). However, rather than examining support for specific organizations, I examine support for characteristics that are widespread across a plethora of institutions. Therefore, this is not a study of the EU or any other specific body, but of the likely opinion dynamics surrounding a class of non-governmental organizations.

The drawbacks of focusing on generalizations, rather than specific examples such as the EU or the UN, are twofold. First, the results will not tell us exactly how much people support any organization in particular. Second, survey participants will be responding to hypothetical institutions with which they have no familiarity. However, this design choice also has considerable benefits. First, focusing on specific institutional arrangements rather than named organizations reduces concerns about measuring non-attitudes. Survey participants are not asked to indicate support for an organization they potentially know very little about, but rather are asked to respond to more easily relatable features of institutional design. Second, moving to the hypothetical domain allows for variation in the politicization of organizations and ensures that this dimension can be manipulated and randomly assigned by the researcher. This would not be possible if respondents were asked about organizations for which they have already formed an opinion based on their existing information environment. Third, the global governance landscape includes a host of organizations and institutional structures and thus focusing on the constituent parts potentially provides more leverage than focusing on a limited set of organizations that have received attention in the past but may not be representative of the population of global governance bodies.¹

Moreover, it is worth highlighting that I explicitly examine support for organizations or regulatory bodies. This stands in contrast to much of the nascent literature that is empirically examining support for international agreements (e.g., Freyburg et al. 2016; Bernauer et al. 2016; Bechtel et al. 2017) as opposed to

¹The extant literature has focused on a limited set of organizations (e.g., the UN or the EU) and research has followed politicization rather than preceded it, thus making it difficult to assess the trajectory that led to declining support.

the actors involved in global governance *per se*. I am thus interested in the legitimacy of the organizations and not the procedures that created the organizations. This is an important distinction because it allows me to adopt the broader conceptualization of global governance organizations outlined above. I can thus manipulate features of the organizations without reference to international agreements that created many (but not all) types of actors involved in global governance.

It is worth noting here that the decision to also examine how organizations' jurisdiction (i.e. domestic or international) affects support complicates what other types of features can realistically be manipulated because any feature must make sense for bodies at both the global and the domestic US level.² However, framing the choice tasks around 'regulatory bodies' alleviates some of these concerns. Regulation is central to most global governance efforts. Indeed, some early defenses of the EU against those who decried the organization's democratic deficit conceptualized the organization as a 'regulatory' actor (Majone 1994).

SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Scholarly work on the question of public support for global governance can be found in a few political science literatures. First, there is a relatively small body of literature focusing on individual-level factors associated with support for global organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations (UN). This work largely relies on large scale cross-national surveys such as the Eurobarometer, Afrobarometer, Asia Barometer, the World Values Survey (WVS), or the PEW global attitudes study to examine how individual-level factors ranging from demographics (Hessami 2011; Edwards 2009), social and political trust, perceived or experienced corruption (Torgler 2008; Breen and Gillanders 2015), or perceptions of state influence (Johnson 2011) affect support for these organizations.

The case of the UN provides a useful illustration of some of the trends surrounding support for global governance organizations. On the one hand, while work by Gravelle (2011) shows that global public

²While conjoint experiments technically allow some possible combinations of features to be excluded, I opt for a fully randomized design with no constraints on the relationships between different features under consideration.

opinion toward the UN was net positive across 117 countries, it also highlighted that most publics have limited knowledge about the organization upon which to base opinions. This research points to the potential malleability of attitudes toward even the most prominent of global governance organizations. On the other hand, Holyk's (2010:173-174) overview of Americans' attitudes toward the UN points toward a clear decline in support over time.

Somewhat in contrast to this nascent and still sparse literature on public support for a wide range of organizations involved in global governance, research on support for the EU is quite extensive. Early work on support for the EU — or more accurately opposition to it as captured through the concept of Euroscepticism — also focused on individual-level determinants ranging from economic considerations to national identity and trust in government (e.g., McLaren 2007; Gabel 1998). Two aspects of the EU literature are worth highlighting here. First, the literature acknowledges the role that elites played in mobilizing opposition toward the EU and shows that opinion toward the organization is susceptible to framing effects (e.g., Gabel and Scheve 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009; De Vries and Edwards 2009). Second, in search of more generalizable explanations, scholars have recently expanded the study of public opinion dynamics vis-à-vis the EU by invoking the more broadly applicable concept of *politicization*, which is centered around examining when organizations become publicly contested. The idea here is that citizens come to believe that a domain is not zero sum and that it thus requires public deliberation. The key hypothesis in this line of thinking is that citizens will seek public deliberation over organizations once they notice that substantial authority has been transferred from the nation-state to global organizations. Hence, this *authority transfer hypothesis* entails that the public has sincere preferences over the legitimate locus of political authority.

The EU, of course, is merely one example of a 'regional organization.' Indeed, one central benefit of the authority transfer hypothesis was its generalizability beyond the EU case and its call to study regional integration beyond the European case (e.g., Zürn 2014; 2016). That said, to date there is limited research on public support for regional integration outside of Europe. Some exceptions include Schlipphak's (2015) examination of UNASUR and the African Union, as well as work on NAFTA (Davis 1998; Wals et al. 2015) and the potential support for regional integration in South-East Asia (Jhee 2009;

Kwon 2010). These studies examined individual-level characteristics and did not look at elite rhetoric or variation in institutional design. This is potentially problematic as Duina and Lenz's (2018) analysis of regional organizations suggests that the EU boasts comparatively strong performance on a number of institutional indicators and thus should fare comparatively better in terms of legitimacy perceptions than other regional organizations.

Some research has sought to unpack the specific institutional features that help bestow public legitimacy upon organizations involved in global governance. This research encompasses both normative discussions of legitimating properties and empirical studies examining the relation between institutional features and support. The normative literature posits that organizations that have transparent avenues for civil society participation, that require ongoing consent from national governments, and whose decisions are made through democratic decision-making processes will be deemed more legitimate (see e.g., Stevenson and Dryzek 2014; Buchanan and Keohane 2006). While these arguments originated as normative ideals, some recent research has sought to empirically test these conjectures.

Bernauer and colleagues (2016), perform a series of experiments in the UK and Germany to examine how features associated with input (*or* procedure) and output (*or* performance) legitimacy affect support for national governments adopting a global environmental governance agreement. The output features they examine are (1) costs, operationalized as how much the agreement would cost an average household per month; (2) relative benefits, operationalized as whether health benefits in one's country would be larger or smaller than in other countries; and (3) problem-solving effectiveness, operationalized as the extent to which the agreement would reduce air pollution. As expected, the results show that higher costs decrease support, whereas higher benefits and higher effectiveness increase support.

More importantly for present purposes, they examine how procedural features — namely transparency, civil society participation, and approval from national legislatures — affect support. Transparency is operationalized as whether journalists have access to the negotiations or whether negotiations are confidential such that the public only learns of the results upon conclusion of the negotiations. Civil society participation is operationalized by what types of non-governmental organizations are involved in negotiations (e.g., environmental groups, scientists, business groups, or

none). Lastly, the agreement either needs to be approved by the national government or merely by a majority of negotiating countries. While there are some differences in the results between the UK and the German experiment, these procedural factors are less consequential for public support. Transparency and national parliamentary oversight over implementation of the agreement have small positive effects on support whereas the participation of non-governmental groups makes no real difference.

Similarly, a working paper by Freyburg and colleagues (2016) examines how procedural features affect support for international agreements on climate change, the refugee crisis, and the financial crisis in Switzerland, France, Germany and the UK. Specifically, they manipulate who negotiates the agreement on behalf of domestic countries (government representatives, members of parliament, experts, private businesses), whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in the negotiations, how the positions of the negotiating parties are determined (e.g., based on national interest, a search for an effective solution, etc.), whether the agreement requires consensus from all parties or merely a majority, and lastly who monitors the agreement (the national government, international organizations, or private businesses).

However, while their conjoint experiment includes these five features, the researchers are concerned primarily with three models of democracy: representative, deliberative, or private. The paper only discusses the results by aggregating individual institutional features to correspond to these models rather than examining the effect of the attributes individually. The results suggest that respondents do not differentiate between the representative and deliberative models but prefer both to the private model. But this analysis is limited in its generalizability because it constrains how certain features can covary. In the Appendix, the researchers provide the full disaggregated results showing that support increases when agreements are adopted by majority rule (as opposed to consensus), when NGOs can participate in the process, when monitoring is performed by the international organization or the government (as opposed to businesses), and when the agreement is negotiated by parliamentarians, experts or the government as opposed to the private sector. Another drawback is that the models are too stylized and lack ecological validity. For instance, in contrasting expert participation with business participation, this design ignores that many forms of global governance are distinguished precisely by the participation of both groups (see

e.g., the case of global regulatory bodies in Bütte and Mattli [2011]).

A more explicit test of authority transfer hypothesis in experimental work can be found in the work of Anderson and colleagues (2017).³ Using a survey experiment in the US and Germany, the authors examine how varying levels of authority affect perceived legitimacy of an international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Increased authority is conceptualized along two dimensions: the voting rule used in the negotiation of an international agreement and the whether the agreement is implemented automatically or requires national legislative approval. Interestingly, and running counter to core tenets of the authority transfer hypothesis, moving from consensus to majoritarian decision-making to produce international agreements as well as moving from ratification of these agreements by national governments to automatic implementation does not lead to significantly decreased legitimacy perceptions. Anderson et al (2017) thus produce some of the first concrete empirical evidence challenging the notion that information about increased authority will invariably depress support for global governance. In concluding they point toward the potential role of elite cues and the ability of elites to frame these shifts in ways that depress support. Here, they point to the work of Dellmuth and Tallberg (2016) as an initial foray into examining this question.

Dellmuth and Tallberg (2016) use a vignette experiment fielded in Germany, the US, and the UK to examine confidence in the EU, the IMF, NAFTA, the UN, and the WTO. The paper is relevant for the current investigation for a number of reasons. Notably, it is the first paper to experimentally test the effect of elite communication on support for a wide range of global governance organizations. The results show that elites' framing of international organizations' performance and procedure affect public perceptions of legitimacy. Specifically, positive messages claiming the organization is democratic (i.e. procedure) or doing a good job (i.e. performance) increase support whereas negative messages claiming the reverse decrease support vis-à-vis a control condition (but note that there is no difference between the procedure and performance messages).

³It is important to note that the papers by Anderson et al (2017) and Dellmuth and Tallberg (2016) are unpublished working papers written for inclusion in a special issue on international authority that also includes a paper (Tallberg and Zürn 2017) proffering a more nuanced authority transfer argument in which the role of elites is more explicit than in previous work. While the two papers are a leap forward in this literature and come closest to the inquiry of this chapter, I suggest that my examination can go beyond this work by explicitly addressing both arguments simultaneously as well as the interaction between these factors.

While this study makes an important contribution, there is room for improvement. First, messages about procedure and performance are operationalized rather simplistically such that the vignette just states whether the organization has been praised (criticized) for being ‘highly democratic’ (‘highly undemocratic’) in the procedure condition or whether it is doing a ‘very good job’ (‘very bad job’) in the performance condition. Second, the source of the elite cue is either the international organization itself, ‘civil society organizations’, or the respondent’s national government. While interesting, the results highlight that cues from the internal organization itself are not particularly persuasive whereas those from the national government are. I suggest that domestic political dynamics need to be taken more seriously here (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2015). Specifically, I contend that the conflict of interest is whether national domestic elites politicize the issue as opposed to international organizations. I posit that respondents are reacting based on affective cues from national elites. Third, by examining elite rhetoric on organizations that have already been politicized in the public domain, it is difficult to assess what impact elite cues can have when citizens have limited prior information about these organizations — it is possible that elite cues are already baked into support dynamics such that some partisans will automatically reject these organizations. One indirect illustration of what happens when elites politicize global governance organizations, for example, comes from a recent study by Johnson and Rickard (2017) who examine whether framing the 1992 sustainable development policy, Agenda 21, as a UN action changes public support. While they find no effect in the full sample (300 US-based MTurkers), they do find that the UN connotation led to decreased support among Republicans. Thus, simply associating a global governance initiative with the UN led to decreased support among a partisan group, presumably because they had been exposed to elite rhetoric in the past.

This chapter sets out to expand upon this nascent and rapidly developing literature in a number of ways. Most importantly, it does so, first, by integrating testing of the authority transfer argument as well as the elite affective cueing argument in the same empirical design, thereby enabling an examination of how these two theoretical approaches interact. Second, it explicitly tests whether it matters to whom authority is ceded, namely whether authority is delegated to organizations operating at the domestic or the global level.

ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES

The overarching argument I seek to advance in this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that the traditional authority transfer hypothesis does not accurately capture the dynamics of support for global governance. In particular, information about authority being ceded to the supranational level does not automatically lead to decreased public support for such bodies. Moreover, I predict that — in the absence of elite politicization — variation in institutional rules will have no (or limited) impact on support. Second, I argue that elite communication, which provides affective cues suggesting that these same institutional rules are illegitimate, is the key factor that sways opinions, rather than the information about the institutional rules *per se*. Here, I do not simply suggest that partisans will solely follow cues from co-partisans or engage in motivated reasoning (cf. Lodge and Taber 2013; Leeper and Slothuus 2014) but rather that any elite rhetoric can decrease support. The rationale behind this expectation is that the conflict dimension is between traditional governmental governance and new governance and thus respondents are opposed because the affective cue suggests that the new organization is illegitimate, thereby potentially undermining national sovereignty. It must be noted though that I do not examine what happens when the two parties are divided over an organization. In that scenario the expectation would align more with well established partisan cue-taking dynamics (e.g., Zaller 1992; Lodge and Taber 2013) as respondents are exposed to information from both parties thus changing the dimension of conflict from traditional governmental governance versus new governance to a simple partisan issue. That said, I do expect that these effects will be augmented when the partisanship of the cue-giver and the cue-taker aligns. Importantly, I argue that elite cues can depress support for a global governance organization even when that organization exhibits the types of institutional properties that the literature suggests will enhance perceived legitimacy and support and the organization is described as benefitting US citizens.

In this section, I thus first reiterate the authority transfer hypothesis and expectations derived from it. Second, I outline the elite cueing hypothesis. The conventional authority transfer hypothesis contends that citizens who notice that authority is delegated from their national government to supranational organizations will reject such governance efforts due to their sincere preferences prescribing a role for

national governmental control. Note that this hypothesis has two related components: organizations taking on authority and the government having no control over them. The basic hypothesis drawn from this literature thus suggests:

H1: Public support for regulatory bodies will decrease when authority is ceded to non-governmental bodies.

While the authority transfer hypothesis is chiefly concerned with the impact of institutional rules as they relate to increased authority, its empirical examination is also intertwined with the broader argument that institutional rules matter for support. Here, the normative literature on the legitimacy of global governance posits that organizations that are transparent, accountable, and that include avenues for civic participation are more legitimate (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014; Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Thus, I extend the argument to include the more general assertion that variation in institutional rules affects support along the lines suggested by the normative literature on the legitimacy of global governance.

H2: Public support for regulatory bodies will increase when institutional rules display properties commonly associated with transparency, participation, and democratic decision-making.

To date the authority transfer hypothesis has been conceptualized as an explanation for how supranational organizations (originally the EU) become politicized in the eyes of the public. Here, the theory, as commonly applied, concerns transfer of authority from sovereign nation-states to international bodies. However, the basic underlying premise of the hypothesis need not be a transfer of authority beyond the confines of the nation-state. Authority is similarly ceded to non-governmental organizations at the domestic level.

This chapter, therefore, seeks to establish whether any dynamic of support truly is a ‘global’ phenomenon such that institutional rules and — following my theoretical framework outlined below

— elite cues have a distinctive ‘international’ effect. Answering this question has the potential to greatly expand the applicability of the authority transfer hypothesis, and I contend that the alternative hypothesis — that there is nothing ‘global’ about perceptions of support — is plausible and merits investigation. Hence, if a key mechanism of opposition to global governance is indeed that authority is transferred from the domestic domain to the global domain then the following hypothesis should hold:

H3: Public support for regulatory bodies operating at the supranational level will be lower than for those operating at the domestic level.

The alternative hypothesis simply states that respondents do not distinguish between domestic or global authority transfer. Besides any main effect, I am also interested in whether any effect of institutional rules more broadly as well as elite cues are moderated by this distinction. That is, I investigate whether institutional features affect support differentially depending on whether the organization is described as having domestic or international jurisdiction.

The above hypotheses suggest that people have sincere preferences that guide their opinion vis-à-vis global governance organizations. As previously mentioned, however, Hooghe and Marks’ (2005; 2009) influential *postfunctionalist* theory of European integration posits that political entrepreneurs played a central role in mobilizing public tension toward the EU. Their argument implies that people may not have had strong opinions either way about European integration — as opposed to rejecting any supranational authority on sincere grounds — but that political elites stoked the rising antipathy toward the Union for national political gain. This rhetoric can take many forms, ranging from politicization through claims that the organization is illegitimate and undemocratic to claims that the organization is a corrupt endeavor seeking to undermine the concept of national sovereignty. The resulting hypothesis thus emphasizes the role elites can play in shaping attitudes toward global governance:

H4: Public support for regulatory bodies will primarily respond to elite rhetoric containing affective cues.

However, in contrast to Dellmuth and Tallberg's (2016) examination of elite communication, I suggest that — at least in the US case — the most potent distinction between cues will not be between cues from the international organization and the national government but will be cues rooted in domestic politics (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009; 2015). This follows from the work on political entrepreneurs politicizing global governance to amass domestic political support — oftentimes evidenced by fringe or populist politicians railing against established elites and the permissive consensus that enabled global governance to develop in the first place.

As I am disaggregating the elite cue to allow for variation in support at the domestic level (i.e. partisan polarization on the issue), I suggest that the power of elite cues will be moderated by a respondent's partisanship. Note for instance, Johnson and Rickard's (2017) study in which mention of the UN only led to decreased support for a global initiative among Republican respondents.

H5: Respondents will respond more strongly to elite cues when they share the same partisanship as the cue giver.

Up until now I have largely considered the authority transfer hypothesis as unrelated to the elite cueing hypothesis. Yet, while it is my reading that early articulations of the theory (e.g., Zürn 2014) conceptualized the process such that citizens would reject global organizations when they became aware that authority was ceded from the nation-state, more recent iterations of this theoretical framework acknowledge the importance of elite cues in mobilizing opposition (Tallberg and Zürn 2017; Zürn 2018). This acknowledgement, I argue, poses a fundamental question for the nature of the relationship between these two theoretical approaches.

Do citizens truly have sincere concerns about global governance such that they deem it illegitimate because authority has been ceded from their national government, but they require elites to make this connection obvious? The idea that people may not inherently disapprove of all forms of authority beyond the nation-state is compatible with research demonstrating that citizens do not universally reject non-traditional forms of governance (cf. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). This revised argument

suggests that increased authority is a necessary but not sufficient condition for declining support for global governance organizations. In this formulation, elite cues simply allow people to arrive at conclusions that reflect their underlying attitudes. By contrast, I suggest that elite cues work irrespective of the facts regarding the institutional arrangements. This is where the importance of the interaction between the ‘authority transfer’ argument and the elite cueing argument comes into play.

Lastly, I am interested in the role that citizens’ attitudes toward the domain of regulation and their perceived importance of regulation play in shaping support. In particular, I investigate whether the effect of institutional rules and elite cues are conditioned by individuals’ underlying preferences.

METHOD: CONJOINT EXPERIMENT

To test the above hypotheses, I leverage a conjoint experimental design embedded in two online surveys. Conjoint experiments have recently gained traction in political science as a means of examining treatment effects for more dimensions than are usually feasible using factorial or vignette designs (see e.g., Hainmueller et al. 2013). Indeed, some of the studies highlighted in the literature review rely on this design to test the effect of a multitude of procedural and performance factors on the perceived legitimacy of international agreements.

Importantly, the conjoint design enables me to not only examine how institutional features and elite cues affect support for global governance organizations while holding other factors constant, but it also provides for examinations of conditional effects. This allows for more nuanced testing of the effects of institutional design and expanded supranational authority. Specifically, I can examine whether variation in institutional design does indeed shape opinion in the absence of politicization and elite cues.

I use a paired conjoint design in which respondents are asked to evaluate pairs of organizations and to indicate which organization they support more as well as how legitimate they perceive each organization. The general paired design has been validated against a behavioral benchmark and found to perform better than single-profile designs (Hainmueller et al. 2015). Respondents sequentially evaluate five conjoint pairs where each pair features six attributes. Based on research by Bansak and colleagues (2017; 2018), the number of conjoint pairs and features should lead to no satisficing concerns.

Table 4.1: Overview of Conjoint Attributes & Attribute Levels

Attribute	Attribute Levels
What type of organization is it?	Domestic (US) International
How much authority does the organization have?	Limited authority to create new regulation Some authority to create new regulation Extensive authority to create new rules Fulfills role previously exercised by national governments
What is the likelihood that regulation will benefit US citizens?	High Modest Low
How transparent and open is decision-making?	Not transparent and no involvement of citizen groups, scientists or business groups Somewhat transparent and some involvement of citizen groups, scientists and business groups Very transparent and formal involvement of citizen groups, scientists and business groups
What role does the US government play?	Government has no formal role Government voted to establish body Government voted to establish body and monitors implementation of rules Government voted to establish body, monitors implementation of rules, and can veto any new regulation
Have any groups taken a position on this organization?	Organization is not politically contested Organization has bi-partisan support Democrats have raised concerns about legitimacy Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy Journalists have raised concerns about legitimacy

Respondents are introduced to the conjoint choice task through a vignette that provides some background on the task. Here, I randomly assign respondents to one of three conditions in which the task is either described without reference to a domain of regulation (control), described as regulation to “strengthen environmental protections” or described as regulation to “strengthen workplace protections”. This manipulation provides additional leverage to examine how preferences and issue priorities affect support.⁴

Preferences for the domain of regulation and perceived importance of such regulation are measured earlier in the survey. Support is measured with the question “How strongly do you favor or oppose regulation to strengthen [environmental/workplace] protections?” with response options ranging from “favor strongly” to “oppose strongly” on a five-point Likert scale. Importance is measured with the question “How important do you feel [environmental/workplace] regulations are?” with response options ranging from “not at all important” to “extremely important” on a five-point scale.

⁴This manipulation worked as intended although there were significant differences between the two samples. In the MTurk sample 85 percent of respondents in both the environmental protection and worker protection conditions reported that the task was focused on the issue area they were assigned to. However, this figure was somewhat lower in the SSI sample in which only 62 percent of respondents reported the condition correctly

Next, I introduce the individual attributes and explain how they operationalize the key concepts I am interested in. See Table 4.1 for an overview of all six attributes and all possible attribute levels. The attribute levels randomly vary both within and across the comparisons (see Figure 4.1 for an example of the choice task respondents are asked to evaluate).

Figure 4.1: Example of a Conjoint Task

Please carefully review the two organizations below and then please answer the question.

	Organization A	Organization B
What type of organization is it?	Domestic (US)	Domestic (US)
How much authority does the organization have?	Limited authority to create new regulation	Extensive authority to create new regulation
What is the likelihood that regulation will benefit US citizens?	Low	High
How transparent and open is decision-making?	Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups	Somewhat transparent and some input from citizen groups, scientists, and business groups
What role does the US government play?	Government voted to establish body	Government voted to establish body
Have any groups taken a position on this organization?	Republicans have raised concerns about legitimacy	Organization is not politically contested

Which organization do you prefer?

Organization A

Organization B

I include one output (or performance) dimension by providing information about the likelihood that the organization's regulations will benefit US citizens. Including information about the potential distributive consequences follows a similar logic to other conjoint experiments that are interested in examining how much varying the cost or benefit of a proposal changes support (e.g., Bernauer and Gampfer 2015). Here, it is interesting to examine the direct effects of distributive consequences, especially given the authority transfer hypothesis' claim that it is a combination of awareness of authority and distributive consequences that makes people reject global authority.

To operationalize whether an organization is politicized I include an attribute containing information about elite rhetoric. I allow the organization to either be de-politicized or vary which domestic actor provides an affective cue highlighting concerns about the legitimacy of the organization. This attribute is similar to one used in Bechtel and colleagues' (2017) conjoint experiment into support for international bailouts in which they include information about actors (such as the government, the opposition, the national central bank or international organizations) who endorse the bailout. This attribute enables testing of the elite cueing hypotheses as well as the conditional hypotheses.

For each pair of organizations respondents are asked which one of the two organizations they prefer. This forced-choice binary question gauges support and the introductory vignette explains that I am asking about which organization they support more. I then use the *cjoint* R-package (Strezhnev et al. 2015) to estimate Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) as described by Hainmueller and colleagues (2014). The resulting estimates can be interpreted as the expected change in the probability that an organization is preferred when the attribute level in question is compared to the baseline level for that attribute.

PRE-TESTING THE AUTHORITY TRANSFER ATTRIBUTES

One concern with the conjoint design — both in general and more specifically in the context of a complex issue — is whether respondents actually notice and understand the different attribute levels. While it could be argued that any statistically significant effect in such an experiment is evidence that respondents were reactive to something, the inverse is not true if such a test yields no significant results. A non-result

could be caused either because the attributes really do not affect respondents or because respondents simply did not recognize or understand the attributes.

Hence, there is a need to validate the conjoint design to ensure that the attributes that are meant to operationalize the more complex authority transfer hypothesis, in particular, are really capturing what I intend them to capture. Thus, I need to assess whether respondents notice that certain attribute features imply that the national government has more or less control over the organizations' as well as showing that other features vary the amount of authority that the organizations have. These two factors are key to the authority transfer hypothesis and thus any design trying to counter this theory should be able to demonstrate that a null effect is not the result of a failed manipulation. Therefore, I conducted a pre-test on an MTurk sample (n=250) in which each respondent completed five conjoint tasks. This reduced (fully randomized) conjoint included three attributes drawn from the larger conjoint: the key attribute operationalizing organization authority (i.e. how much authority does the organization have), the key attribute operationalizing government control (i.e. what role does the US government play) as well as a filler attribute operationalizing how transparent the organization is.

For each conjoint pair, respondents were asked two binary choice questions: (1) over which organization do you think the US government has more control and (2) which organization do you think has more power? The expectation is that responses to the first question are primarily driven by the attribute operationalizing government control whereas the responses to the second question are primarily driven by the attribute operationalizing organization authority. The results are presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 in the Appendix. First, the three attributes of increasing levels of government control increase the likelihood that respondents deem the government to have control over the organization by roughly 20, 30, and 40 percentage points. By contrast, the remaining attributes exert no influence over perceptions that the government has control. Second, compared to the baseline (limited authority), respondents are 12 percentage points more likely to say an organization has power when the organization is described as having some authority and 33 percentage points more likely when it is described as having extensive authority. The level "fulfills role previously exercised by national governments" falls in between the former two by increasing the likelihood by 19 percentage points. Overall then, these results suggest that

the attributes operationalizing the authority transfer hypothesis work as intended.

SAMPLES


I fielded the conjoint experiment on two different samples. First, I fielded it in March 2018 using respondents ($n=1002$) recruited through the crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The survey was restricted to U.S.-based adults. Previous research has validated MTurk as a subject pool with reasonable correspondence to the U.S. population (Berinsky et al. 2012; Huff and Tingley 2015). As is the case for most MTurk samples, the sample was relative young (mean age of 39 years), more highly educated (53% with 4-year college degree or above), predominantly White (76% White), roughly balanced as to sex (46% female) and skewed liberal (51% Democrat when including leaners). That said, recent research shows that experimental effects across twelve studies generalized from the original sample to MTurk samples (Coppock 2018). Second, in April-May 2018 I contracted with Survey Sampling International (SSI) for a sample ($n=1000$) of US adults balanced by age, sex, ethnicity, and census region. The resulting sample was 52% female, 66% White and respondents' mean age was 42 years. The partisan breakdown was 45% Democrat, 16% Independent, and 39% Republican. It is important to note that this chapter, given the conjoint design, does not discuss point estimates but rather discusses experimental effects. Nonetheless, in the conclusion, I discuss the limitations of these samples as they pertain to the estimation of effect sizes. As I administered the same conjoint experiment in both samples, I pool the data. However, I also discuss how results differ between the two samples.

RESULTS

The main effects of the conjoint experiment are presented in Figure 4.2 where the point estimates are the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) and the lines are the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The estimates represent the expected change in the probability that an organization is preferred when the attribute level in question is compared to the respective baseline level.

First, I am interested in the authority transfer hypothesis which was operationalized through two

Figure 4.2: Main Effects in Conjoint Experiment (SSI and MTurk Samples Combined)



attributes measuring how much authority the organization has as well as how much control the US government has. The pre-test results indicated that respondents understood the consequences of these attributes. However, contrary to the expectations laid out in *H1* these two attributes have no discernible effects on the probability that an organization is preferred. Specifically, varying the amount of authority that organizations have (ranging from limited to extensive authority) as well as government control over these organizations (ranging from no formal control to control that includes veto power) does not affect respondents' probability of supporting an organization. Indeed, the only two attributes that are not statistically significant are the ones operationalizing the authority transfer hypothesis and it appears that respondents do not reject organizations because they acquire authority without governmental control.

Importantly, however, the fact that increased authority and a loss of governmental control do not

affect support does not mean that objective facts about the organizations do not matter. In fact, the two factors producing the largest shifts in support are (1) the expected benefit of the organization to US citizens, with higher likelihoods increasing the probability the organization will be preferred by 11 and 18 percentage points for the “modest” and “high” levels, respectively; and (2) in line with H_2 increased transparency and involvement of interest groups increases support. More specifically, when compared to procedures described as “not transparent”, procedures described as “somewhat transparent” or “very transparent” with input from interest groups increases support by 14 and 22 percentage points, respectively. Of course, while it has to be acknowledged that perceptions of transparency can themselves be affected by elite rhetoric, respondents seem to be extremely concerned with transparency. This finding highlights an important avenue for the legitimation of regulatory organizations and the framing of institutional arrangements.

Second, I am interested in evaluating whether support for organizations differs depending on the level of jurisdiction to establish whether the global nature of regulation really matters. This does seem to be the case: when an organization is described as “international” the probability that the organization will be preferred decreases by seven percentage points. While in line with H_3 , I suggest that the magnitude of this effect is substantively smaller than expected. Moreover, additional analyses suggest that the other attributes do not operate significantly different dependent on whether the organization is described as domestic or international.


Third, I turn to the effect of elite cues. In line with H_4 , we see that elite cues substantively affect support for all respondents. While these effects are potentially smaller in size than expected, the unconditional results suggest that this is not a simple partisan dynamic. Indeed, compared to the attribute level operationalizing no politicization (i.e. that the organization is not politically contested), cues by journalists, Democrats, and Republicans raising concerns about legitimacy all decrease support by a corresponding 6, 8, and 7 percentage points. Thus, as hypothesized, elite rhetoric can powerfully decrease support for both domestic and global regulatory bodies. Moreover, it is worth noting that stating that an organization has bi-partisan support increases support by 3 percentage points. While there was no clear hypothesis about this attribute level, it is interesting that cues are asymmetrical whereby respondents are

more affected by negative politicization cues than by positive cues.

In Figure 4.6 in the Appendix, I show these same results broken down independently for the MTurk and SSI samples. The patterns are identical across the two samples — in both samples there are no significant effects for either of the two attributes operationalizing the authority transfer hypotheses whereas there are significant effects for the elite cues. It is worth noting, however, that the magnitude of the effect sizes differ with effect sizes being larger for the MTurk sample. For instance, the effect for the journalist, Democrat, and Republican elite cues is 9, 13, and 8 percentage points in the MTurk samples whereas the corresponding numbers in the SSI sample are 4, 4, and 6 percentage points. Thus, while the interpretation of the conjoint results is the same across the samples, effects are generally stronger in the MTurk sample. Similarly, the effects for the remaining attributes (i.e., ‘transparency’, ‘benefits’, and ‘international’) all behave the same way in both samples with the only difference again being that the effect sizes are slightly larger in the MTurk sample. I attribute these differences to variation in respondent attentiveness. As mentioned previously, MTurk respondents were significantly more likely than SSI respondents to correctly recall the topic of regulation (which they were randomly assigned to). This is probably due to the fact that MTurk respondents are paying more attention due to the way MTurk compensation works.

Beyond these main effects of elite cues, to evaluate H_5 it is important to examine the role of cues conditional on respondents’ own partisan identification. Figure 4.3 breaks down the effects of attributes for Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. In line with expectations, cues from co-partisan elites have the greatest impact on support. For Democrat respondents, a Democrat cue calling into question the legitimacy of an organization decreases support by 11 percentage points while for Republican respondents an in-party cue decreases support by 8 percentage points. In line with my conjecture that this dynamic is not solely a partisan dynamic, affective cues from the outparty reduces support among Democrats by 6 percentage points and among Republicans by 5 percentage points. The cues from journalists reduces support by 8 percentage points among Democrats and by 4 percentage points among Republicans. For independents, all negative cues reduce the probability of preferring an organization by 7-9 percentage points. These results confirm H_5 as respondents respond more strongly to co-partisan cues, but it is also

Figure 4.3: Unpacking Response to Elite Cues by Respondent Party Affiliation (SSI and MTurk Samples Combined)



worth noting that the substantive size of these effects is smaller than the effects of the transparency and benefit attributes.

Lastly, Figure 4.7 in the Appendix breaks down the results based on the issue dimension manipulation that was included in the vignette introducing the conjoint experiment while Figures 4.8 and 4.9 break down the results by respondents' underlying issue preferences and issue importance for environmental and workplace regulation, respectively. There is no heterogeneity by issue dimension (recall that this was randomly assigned and that 85% of respondents in the Mturk sample and 62% in the SSI sample correctly recalled the condition they were assigned to). Moreover, while analyzing effects conditional on both respondent-level preferences for environmental protection/workplace protection as well as the importance of these types of regulations reveals slight differences in the observed magnitude of effects, the

key institutional features operationalizing the authority transfer hypothesis do not exhibit heterogeneity based on underlying beliefs.

In summary, the results from the conjoint experiment do not provide support for the authority transfer hypothesis as institutional features pertaining to the amount of authority that organizations have as well as the power that governments have over these organizations do not affect support. Furthermore, while elite cues do affect support as predicted, these effects are smaller than the role of transparency or information about the likely benefit of the regulatory body to US citizens.

CONCLUSION

This chapter set out to examine what factors shape public support for organizations involved in global governance. Specifically, I contrasted hypotheses drawn from the authority transfer hypothesis with hypotheses centering on the power of elite cues to shift opinion. The results from the conjoint experiment provided no support for direct operationalizations of the authority transfer hypothesis based on information about increased authority of organizations and decreased governmental control. However, this did not mean that institutional features were irrelevant as the largest effects were observed for information concerning the transparency of organizations. There was also strong evidence that output legitimacy matters as information about the likely benefit of regulation to citizens led to substantial increases in support.

The results also provided clear evidence that elite rhetoric matters. Elite cues painting organizations as illegitimate — especially from co-partisans — had the power to decrease respondents' support for governance organizations. Importantly, the story here is not simply one of motivated reasoning by partisans, but there is some evidence that cues from domestic elites can decrease support for non-governmental governance irrespective of the partisan affiliation of the cue-giver and the cue-taker. Moreover, the fact that respondents react strongly to information about the transparency of organizations has implications for the role of elite rhetoric. This dimension, arguably, is very amenable to elite manipulation and it is possible that elites can be successful at branding an organization as lacking transparency irrespective of the actual institutional mechanisms. Future research should unpack what

happens when elites seek to delegitimize organizations on the grounds of not being transparent and whether this strategy is effective irrespective of organizations' actual level of transparency.

Due to the nature of the conjoint experiment, this chapter was concerned with estimating effects rather than producing point estimates. That said, it is nonetheless important to note the limitations of the current samples as they pertain to effect sizes. Indeed, while the two samples produced converging results, I noted that there were important differences in the sizes of the effects. Some of these differences are attributable to differences in attention (as evidenced by the differential passage of the manipulation check) and it is conceivable that respondents in these convenience samples are more attentive to stimuli than respondents in a more representative sample. It is also possible that there are heterogeneous effects that would result in changes in effect size when moving to a more representative sample. For example, if the Republican respondents in the present samples are more highly educated and cosmopolitan than Republicans in the population and these factors affect the extent to which they respond to the cues, then a more representative sample may reveal a different pattern. In future work, I thus plan to extend this line of inquiry using more representative samples.

It is also worth highlighting that while the analyses in this paper were not explicitly concerned with the case of the EU, which has been the focus of previous politicization research, the findings are nonetheless relevant for that case. Indeed, the EU can be considered one potential combination of conjoint attributes (e.g., having authority previously held by nation-states or the role of national governments in monitoring regulation). Thus, the finding that these institutional features do not, in fact, affect support contributes to the literature on the EU's politicization and the authority transfer hypothesis which have posited that those features led to decreased public support. That said, it is important to acknowledge that the current results are based on US samples and thus respondents exist in a context in which they have no tangible experience with the EU. Future work should replicate this design on a European sample to examine whether the results hold in that context. More broadly, however, this chapter highlights the benefits of looking beyond the EU case to examine how institutional features affect public support for decision-making arrangements and features that are central to a plethora of global governance organizations.

These findings have important implications for the literature on the politicization of global governance and the potential legitimation of organizations involved in both domestic and international regulation. Importantly, contrary to the narrative in the extant literature, institutional features may not be the key factors affecting support — with the exception of perceptions regarding the transparency of organizations. Thus, legitimation strategies need not be as concerned with the intricacies of institutional design, but rather with the processes proving transparency and participation. However, the results also suggest that legitimation will be difficult in the face of domestic elite cues seeking to paint organizations as illegitimate. As the shift from “permissive consensus” to a “constraining dissensus” in the context of the EU foreshadowed, elite rhetoric has the power to delegitimize global governance. Future work should examine the conditions under which objective information can trump elite cues but initial findings from this study suggest that focusing on perceptions of transparency and output (i.e. potential benefits) provide potentially potent legitimation strategies in the face of elite politicization.

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APPENDIX

Additional Figures

Figure 4.4: Effects of Conjoint Attributes on Perception that the US government has control over the organization (Pre-Test)




Figure 4.5: Effects of Conjoint Attributes on Perception that the organization has authority (Pre-Test)




Figure 4.6: Main Effects in Conjoint Experiment broken down by Sample




Figure 4.7: Effects of Conjoint Attributes Conditional on Issue Manipulation




Figure 4.8: Effects of Conjoint Attributes Conditional on Issue Preference





Figure 4.9: Effects of Conjoint Attributes Conditional on Issue Importance



Chapter 5

Conclusion

This dissertation began with the premise that we face a worldwide governance dilemma, where, on the one hand, increased international cooperation is needed to efficiently manage a globalized economy and to address some of the world's most pressing coordination problems. While on the other hand, much of this coordination is orchestrated by a plethora of organizations that are not subject to control by the democratically-elected governments of nation-states and not necessarily responsive to democratic publics.

I started by suggesting that, at present, public opinion toward a host of international governance arrangements, including private regulatory bodies, can be described using Lindberg and Scheingold's (1970) moniker of a 'permissive consensus' in which the public plays a passive role and its opinions have no impact on the workings and effectiveness of bodies such as the ISO or the FSC. The idea of such a 'permissive consensus' originated nearly half a century ago to describe the lack of public contestation toward EU integration, when European elites were moving toward ever greater union whilst the European public was sidelined as a passive bystander. In Europe, this 'permissive consensus' has given way to a 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks 2009). European public opinion is now consequential for the future of the continent's cooperative endeavor as most recently and forcefully illustrated by the British public's vote to withdraw from the Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Using this trajectory as a point of departure, I contended that there are also cracks in the broader global 'permissive consensus' toward global governance writ large and the myriad organizations that have not yet become household names. One need look no further than the rhetoric of populist parties in Europe or even of President Trump to appreciate the fragility of the current 'permissive consensus' (e.g., Zürn 2018; Haufler 2018). Indeed, research has shown that the EU actually performs better on multiple indicators

of democratic accountability and legitimacy than other regional integration bodies that have not received the same sort of public contestation (Duina and Lenz 2018). Thus, politicization of the organizations discussed in this dissertation may be just one tweet away.

Importantly, I suggested that we have insufficient knowledge of how this politicization will occur and what will drive public dissatisfaction. I noted that important theories of how and why this type of politicization occurs simply cannot adequately be tested by looking at the EU case because we lack a valid counterfactual inasmuch as we cannot examine these dynamics absent of the politicization that already has taken place. So, what did we learn from shifting the focus to the increasingly important domain of global private governance as well as governance arrangements more broadly?

Taken together, the chapters in this dissertation brought new evidence to bear on the question of how global governance organizations become politicized and subsequently opposed by the public. In contrast to prominent approaches in the EU literature, across six studies I found little to no evidence that awareness of global governance organizations' institutional design depressed support. Rather, the results in Chapters Three and Four provided consistent evidence that elite frames — providing affective cues suggesting that these same institutional arrangements are illegitimate and undemocratic — drive opposition. Thus, the findings highlight that public opposition to global governance is primarily driven by how global organizations are described by elites rather than what their institutional arrangements are.

These findings have clear implications for the debate surrounding the legitimacy of not just global private regulation but global governance organizations more broadly. The research herein suggests that the public is potentially more accepting of governance arrangements centered around expert and industry involvement than one might assume given their unelected governance structure. Indeed, support for these types of organizations will not inevitably decline with increased awareness of their decision-making structures. However, my results also show that this support is very fragile and that elite rhetoric providing affective cues can easily depress support. Here, this dissertation thus also contributes to the growing literature on populism by shedding light on politicians' ability to politicize both governance bodies and specific decision-making structures. The dissertation delineated the fertile ground for rhetoric aimed at delegitimizing supranational organizations, which could easily be incorporated as part of a populist

agenda. The script writes itself. Populist politicians around the globe can rail against global organizations lacking national governmental control yet developing standards that may impact domestic firms and industries. A vast literature in political science has sought to assess how a similar politicization scenario unfolded — after the fact — in the case of the EU. Expanding the scope of inquiry to organizations that have to date not been politicized contributes a novel insight to that literature.

Beyond these substantive findings and implications, this dissertation also contributed to our understanding of framing effects. In Chapter Two I introduced a new conceptualization of ‘framing effects’, which argued that the exposure to frames can shape people’s initial belief structure of novel attitude objects. Thus, rather than simply shifting attitudes, the real power of repeated frames may be that it changes the way people make sense of new information in ways that allow them to abstract up from framed information they encounter to make sense of new information. Thus, framing effects in this conceptualization are broader than previous conceptualizations would suggest as they create new cognitive architectures that have the power to affect opinions on more abstract attitude objects. In the context of global private governance and international standard-setting, I showed how framing these organizations by emphasizing either ‘efficiency’ or ‘governance’ dimensions led some respondents to use this type of language when describing a new organization they were introduced to. Importantly, while I uncovered these effects there were no strong and consistent effects of the frames on attitudes about these organizations. Hence, I suggest that future work should pay more attention that framing can play in shaping understanding and not just attitudes.

This dissertation has sought to chart new ground by examining public opinion dynamics in a substantive area that has to date received limited attention. I suggest that the substantive results advance our understanding of the current state of public opinion vis-à-vis a class of global organizations that have been largely overlooked in public opinion scholarship. Besides laying this descriptive foundation, I also elucidated the factors that lead global governance organizations more broadly to become contested by the public. Moreover, I developed a novel approach for conceptualizing and measuring ‘framing effects’, which allowed me to demonstrate how exposure to frames shapes how people come to make sense of the political world. That said, this project, like any study, has limitations that need to be acknowledged.

First, examining public opinion toward organizations that have to date largely operated outside of general public awareness comes with a substantial drawback, namely the acute lack of existing survey data to work with. On the one hand, I have proffered that designing original surveys afforded me the possibility to design instrumentation that helped attenuate a potential non-attitudes problem by comparing responses in ‘no information’ conditions with responses in baseline conditions. On the other hand, this means that the six surveys in this dissertation were fielded on samples that cannot purport to be fully representative. Four of the six come from crowdsourced convenience samples (MTurk) that, while validated both as subject pools (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2012) and as means to test experimental effects that generalize to more representative populations (e.g., Coppock 2018), differ from national benchmarks in important ways such as partisanship. This prevents me from claiming that the observed levels of support correspond to the actual observed value of support in the US population. The two SSI samples, while somewhat more diverse do not constitute representative samples either. Thus these point estimates and effect sizes should also be interpreted cautiously as the general population may be less supportive of global governance than the current samples suggest and the effects may be smaller. Indeed, it is possible that the SSI sample, while including more Republican respondents, oversamples more highly educated Republicans that may not be representative of that group as a whole. Moreover, the SSI samples suffer from an additional drawback, namely respondents who are paying less close attention to the task at hand. In future work, I will thus seek to employ both more representative samples as well as maximizing respondent attention through survey instrumentation that heightens respondents’ engagement with the vignettes and survey tasks.

Furthermore, the studies in this dissertation examined US public opinion toward global governance. But the theoretical framework I put forward is a general one that calls out for cross-national testing. Indeed, examining these questions comparatively opens up a range of future research opportunities, including examination of the extent to which support for global private governance is related to support for other forms of global governance such as attitudes toward the EU.

Second, the experiments in this paper sought to maximize internal validity, sometimes at the expense of ecological and external validity. In particular, the experimental stimuli relied on stylized

representations of organizations and institutional arrangements that sought to carefully operationalize key hypotheses. Future work should thus expand on this research with more realistic stimuli that are presented to respondents in a manner that more convincingly mirrors their information environment. Relatedly, like many other studies on framing and information effects, this project suffers from reliance on experiments at the expense of broader ecological validity (cf. Kinder 2007). Although I sought to address one common pitfall through an experiment that included repeated exposure to stimuli, my experiments still only looked at the consumption and not the supply of rhetoric about global private governance. In particular, future work will need to examine both the frames that people are exposed to in the real world and how people receive those frames. In part, the substantive focus of this project made such a design infeasible precisely given the lack of politicization and public contestation of organizations like the ISO or the FSC. That said, there is potential for a study that monitors and tracks both media narratives about global governance and public opinion once these debates emerge in public discourse.

Fourth, in the second chapter I introduced novel instrumentation to measure cognitive internalization. While I found some evidence of internalization using the measures based on open-ended responses, it has to be acknowledged that the overall observed levels of internalization were quite low. The question, then, is whether this was due to the absence of a true effect or problems with measurement. Evidence from the word association questions might lead us to believe that it was the latter. Therefore, more work is needed to refine measurement using open-ended prompts or to devise alternative measurement strategies.

In closing, this dissertation leveraged the case of global private governance as a means to study the broader phenomenon of attitudes toward global governance in no small part because it enabled studying the dynamics of support in a context for which the counterfactual of ‘no politicization’ was valid. Only time will tell if and when these organizations become politically contested by the public. It has already been noted that “to the extent that private authority grows, questions of accountability will become increasingly important” (Green 2014: 178) and that “the debate on how to render global private governance more accountable and legitimate has only just begun” (Büthe and Mattli 2011: 225). It is my hope that the research in the preceding pages will contribute to this debate.

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