BOOK REVIEWS

YOUNG WILLIAM JAMES THINKING

Paul J. Croce


There is always a reason to welcome a new book on William James. Following the literature, one gets the impression that James’s life and work are an inexhaustible source for new insights and reappraisals. Within this context, two central questions immediately arise for the reviewer of any new book on James: What is new, and to what extent does the book contribute to a better understanding of James’s life and work?

Paul Croce’s *Young William James Thinking* offers positive answers for both questions. Pursuing what he calls a “developmental biography,” Croce’s main goal is to “connect the young and mature James to show relations between the less refined expressions of early thought and his more famous theorizing” (p. 21). There is, however, another connection, no less important for an adequate apprehension of Croce’s goal, but which can be easily overlooked: the continuity between his previous book on James (Croce, 1995) and this new one. As the author sees it, “this is a companion to the earlier book” (p. 7), in the sense that the earlier book offers the context and general background for the specific episodes presented in the new one. It is not that it cannot be read independently, but rather that, read together with the previous book, it gives the reader new horizons of understanding.

The book is divided into four chapters, which reflect Croce’s methodological choices. Instead of following James’s early ideas in chronological sequence, he opts for a thematic focus “in the service of theoretical illumination” (p. 24). So, each chapter deals with one of these topics: scientific training, engagement with medicine, influence of ancient thought, and personal troubles.

Dealing with James’s first embrace of science in the early 1860s, the initial chapter describes his attitudes toward the American Civil War, the influence of his father’s beliefs about science and religion, as well as his response to positivism and scientific naturalism. Here we see James “moving among many sciences in search of a field for his own work” (p. 39). Also important at this point was James’s fascination with natural history, which took him to join the Swiss-American naturalist Louis Agassiz on his expedition to Brazil from March 1865 to January 1866. According to Croce, “he hoped to lay the groundwork for a career of teaching and research in the biological sciences” (p. 53). After returning from Brazil, he envisioned a program for a future science, which would include endorsement of naturalism without reduction to materialism.

Chapter 2 analyzes James’s double engagement with medicine. He both formally trained in scientific medicine at Harvard, and investigated alternative medical practices, such as hydrotherapy, while using them himself. For Croce, this ambivalence reflects James’s more general ambivalence between science and religion. This is further illustrated by James’s plans for studying physiology in Germany in 1867–1868, in which period his personal troubles interfered with his scientific goals. As a result, he failed to work with Helmholtz or Wundt, an episode that a historian of psychology has called “the Heidelberg fiasco” (Gundlach, 2018). According to Croce, “poor health and his own ambivalent lack of confidence kept him from their laboratories” (p. 96).

In the third chapter, Croce portrays James’s fascination with the ancient world, which helped him think about the relation between science and religion. As Croce sees it, “the ancients served James as models for comprehending nature as all that can be experienced, and for understanding how those spheres exist in relation, not even needing compromise once separate” (p. 134). Croce pays special attention to the role stoicism—particularly
Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations*—played in James’s early reflections and personal defense of free-will. According to Croce, “James even used Marcus’s approach to philosophy as a kind of inner citadel for personal striving” (p. 169).

In the last chapter, Croce examines James’s personal crises between 1869 and 1872, as well as his intellectual development toward his mature philosophy. Here we see how his philosophical outlook is intertwined with his existential and psychological problems in young adulthood, not least the choice of a career and the weakness of his will. As Croce puts it, “the formation of James’s own philosophy would begin with the choices he made throughout his youth” (p. 261).

As for Croce’s general goal, there is no doubt that it has been accomplished. Showing a thorough mastery of the relevant primary sources, Croce displays not merely the young William James thinking, but thinking in the direction of his mature positions. To my knowledge, it is the most comprehensive treatment of the young James’s theoretical views, with a penetrating account of his relation to stoicism. In addition, it clearly contributes to James scholarship by broadening our understanding of James’s philosophical development.

Like any methodological choice, however, a developmental biography has its own limits. Despite its adequacy to shed light on the formation of an author’s early commitments and the direction toward his later theories, it cannot offer a proper philosophical analysis. Readers of Croce’s book will find allusions to pragmatism, radical empiricism, and pluralism, but not a systematic treatment thereof, so that the theoretical connection between the young and the mature James is indicated in general contours about the young scientist’s commitments that would lead toward later theories.

None of this, however, diminishes neither the novelty of Croce’s analysis nor its contribution to a deeper understanding of James’s theoretical development.

**REFERENCES**


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**A HISTORY OF “RELEVANCE” IN PSYCHOLOGY**

**Wahbie Long**


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Wahbie Long is a psychologist with a social conscience and this forms the background to the book. As a newly-qualified clinical psychologist in South Africa, he began to have doubts about the social value of his profession. A 50-min session with a psychologist would typically cost $60 in a country where half of the population lives on less than $2 a day. Psychologists were overwhelmingly based in the major urban centers and very scarce elsewhere.
South Africa has 11 official languages and two of them, Zulu and Xhosa, account for 40% of the population. In spite of this, 80% of the psychologists in the country speak only English and/or Afrikaans, which are historically the languages of privilege. There was also the problem that psychology was usually taught using American textbooks that were of little relevance to the local situation. Considerations like these led to Long asking to be removed from the professional register of psychologists and he came close to leaving the profession. Fortunately for us, he had second thoughts and decided to examine the history of “relevance” in psychology in a Ph.D. thesis. This thesis was the basis of the book.

Long suggests that the issue of relevance has been a constant throughout psychology’s history. In the United States, for example, there was little demand for what William James famously called, “brass instrument” psychology and psychologists tried to demonstrate the relevance of their discipline in a variety of settings, including hospitals, schools, the courtroom, industry, and the military. There were also calls for a psychology that would address important social issues and the establishment of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) in 1936 was an expression of these concerns. Many people in the West will associate calls for social relevance with the questioning of political and disciplinary authority that was common in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A similar questioning occurred in non-Western countries around the same time but it was centered on intellectual imperialism and it has continued to the present day. Western psychology has often been seen as an alien import that reflects the culture in which it was produced and there have been calls for the “indigenization” of the field. This problem is compounded in developing countries whose social needs are often very different from those of the wealthier countries of the West. Both of these factors are present in South Africa and there is the added complication that 10% of the population is of European origin and they provide 75% of the psychologists. As Long points out, the issue here is not one of “race” but the ability to connect with the other 90% of the population in linguistic, geographical, and economic terms.

The main part of the book is an analysis of 45 presidential, keynote and opening addresses that were delivered at national psychology conferences in South Africa from 1950 to 2011. 1948 is an important year in the history of the country. It was in this year that the Afrikaner-dominated National Party came to power and began to implement the segregationist policies that were known throughout the world as “apartheid.” It was also coincidentally the year in which the South African Psychological Association (SAPA) was founded. The addresses reflect the differences that existed between Afrikaner nationalists and more liberal English-speakers. These came to a head over the issue of allowing a psychologist of Indian origin to become a member of SAPA and it led to a breakaway “whites-only” organization called the Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA) in 1962. The two organizations were reunited under the label, Psychological Association of South Africa (PASA) in 1982 but it was generally apolitical and emphasized the “neutrality” of science. Appalled by this lack of engagement, disaffected mental health professionals and students founded the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa (OASSSA) in 1983. The addresses chart the growing criticism of apartheid in the 1980s and its demise in the early 1990s, as well as the challenge of adapting to the new political order. Far from presenting this history in triumphalist terms, as other authors have done, Long suggests that the current situation is not as different from the apartheid era as many people suppose. It “remains trapped in a sea of poverty, inequality, unemployment, violence, and poor education” (p. 34). He is equally critical of attempts to “Africanize” psychology, arguing that these too are reminiscent of the discourse on “cultural difference” that was a feature of the apartheid era. Apartheid has cast a long shadow that the country is still struggling to overcome.

The theoretical orientation is “critical discourse analysis” and it is associated with psychologists like Michael Billig, Derek Edwards, Jonathan Potter, and Margaret Wetherell. The work of the linguist, Norman Fairclough has been particularly influential in the book. This approach has been more popular in the United Kingdom than elsewhere and it is presumably old colonial ties that have led to its influence in South Africa. One of its consequences is that Long does not argue for a more relevant psychology. His aim is to analyze the discourse surrounding the topic of relevance and he shows how it has been used by conservatives, liberals, and radicals alike.

In making this point, he distinguishes four different kinds of relevance:
One of Long’s arguments is that, although South African psychologists pay lip-service to the need for social relevance, they are usually more interested in market relevance and this situation has been exacerbated by the reorganization of the universities on business lines.

Long concludes that the concept of relevance is so malleable and it has been used in so many different ways that it has outlived its usefulness. It is an interesting journey that he has made from concerns about the relevance of psychology to arguing for the abandonment of the concept itself. It is far from clear that the concerns that led to the research have gone away, though he now prefers to express them in different terms. As Long is well aware, the topic of relevance is central to the relationship between psychology and society. Given that it has been a constant throughout psychology’s history, it is unlikely to disappear soon. Indeed, an article on the need for a more relevant psychology in South Africa appeared in the *Monitor on Psychology* as recently as November 2017 (Clay, 2017). This ironically makes the book all the more important. Its main achievement lies in showing us that the issues are much more complicated than they might at first appear.

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SUCCESS AND SUPPRESSION: ARABIC SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE RENAISSANCE

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Dag Nikolaus Hasse’s (2016) *Success and Suppression: Arabic Sciences and Philosophy in the Renaissance* is an engaging book that challenges readers to think differently about the Renaissance and the place of Arabic thought and traditions. According to Dag Hasse, the Renaissance was the critical period when the West began to disengage from its Arabic heritage such that subsequent generations in the West to this day may not be fully aware of some Arabic influences on Western culture. Hasse’s ambitious historical study uses a monumental range of sources to formulate an interpretation that goes beyond one-sided pronouncements by anti-Arabic humanists or by pro-Arabic defenders. Hasse builds his arguments by focusing on three prominent specializations in the Renaissance—materia medica, philosophy, and astrology—in which Arabic thought and traditions were well-known and contentious. He divides his 660-page book into two parts and an appendix.
Part 1 shows that Arabic traditions and authors had a prominent presence in the Renaissance. The centerpiece of this evidence is the extensive printing of Latin editions of Arabic works, most notably those of Averroes, Avicenna, Mesue, Rhazes, and 40 other Arabic authors who are less well known today. Arabic works inspired commentaries and debate, attracted philological attention, were regularly taught in universities, and guided professional practices in medicine and astrology. Moreover, biography collections and bibliographies written during the Renaissance included many Arabic philosophers and scientists although portrayals of them had errors. Hasse provides detailed evidence to suggest possible reasons for errors, including biographers' lack of access to sources, reliance on anecdote, a predilection for juicy stories, or adherence to ideology driven by religion or patriotism. Hasse gives a thorough analysis of a new wave of Arabic–Latin translations and of Hebrew–Latin translations of Arabic original works. He compares Renaissance Latin translations to ones from the Middle Ages, and to the Arabic or Hebrew source, as well as to the Greek source of Arabic commentaries. Discussion of translations is technical and meticulous and might be beyond the interests of general readers. Nevertheless, Hasse's lucid contextualization of the translations will appeal to a broader audience. Hasse pieces together a story about the translators, using their prefaces and other writings to capture what they said they did compare with their actual translations, which were often corrupt. He scours numerous sources to understand possible causes of errors, attributing them to evidence that translators did not consult originals, were not sufficiently competent in one of the languages involved, or introduced distortions that were consistent with ideology. Hasse extends his narrative to the social contexts in which translations were produced, including roles of academics, Jewish translators, wealthy patrons, humanist scholars, clerics, and world travelers. Collectively, the extensive and diverse evidence Hasse uses in Part 1 makes a compelling case for his argument that Arabic thought and traditions were an integral component of the Renaissance. Moreover, Hasse's thoroughness and ingenuity in selecting and synthesizing source material is impressive and might stimulate innovation in types of sources that could be useful for other projects.

Part 2 has separate chapters on materia medica, philosophy, and astrology that can be read collectively or singly. Each chapter illustrates Hasse's central argument that Renaissance reception to the vast presence of Arabic works was not monolithic. Arabic works and traditions were respected and embraced as well as rejected and suppressed. Reactions of humanists were not universally hostile to the Arabic. Humanists promoted, tested, and refined Arabic contributions, as well as discriminated against them in ways that harmed disciplines and professional practice. Moreover, Arabic sources continued to be influential long after the introduction of Greek alternatives. The chapter on materia medica highlights the plant Senna, which was a popular laxative known through Arabic traditions. When humanist reformers called for a return to Greek pharmacology and nomenclature, they dismissed Arabic authorities as untrustworthy barbarians and temporarily expunged Arabic authorities from medical curricula. Senna was problematic because it was not in Greek records. Reformers retained senna by wrongly categorizing it as different plants or by manipulating Greek texts to imply its presence. Debates about senna inspired improvements in research and eventually validated Arabic authorities, which universities reintroduced into curricula. The chapter on philosophy concentrates on debates about Averroes—the most prominent Arab author in the Renaissance—in regard to his alleged irreligious character, his philosophy (especially his unicity theory that humans shared a common intellect), and the quality of his commentaries on Aristotle. Partisans of Averroes were an identifiable movement (Averroista) and partook in bitter debates with adversaries. Adherents of Averroes's unicity theory were censored on religious grounds, but not suppressed by them. The unicity theory was eventually rejected on philosophical grounds and because of waning reliance on Averroes' commentaries as an authority on Aristotle. Hasse's chapter on astrology focuses on power struggles between the humanist advocates for Ptolemy's Greek system of astrology and practitioners who endorsed astrology practices with Arabic roots.

In his final chapter, Hasse summarizes the evidence for his compelling claim that Arabic philosophy and science were both successful and suppressed in the Renaissance. Hasse challenges contemporary claims that the Renaissance grew almost entirely from Greek logos and Christianity. He makes thought-provoking arguments about historical fairness and the layers of scientific and nonscientific motives that can affect the reception of ideas. These arguments offer insights that might transfer to other topics of historical study. Hasse's book includes
detailed technical analyses of material written in multiple languages and it has nearly 100 pages of scholarly notes, making it suitable for specialists in the field. But Hasse also weaves throughout his book an engaging narrative that makes the gist of his arguments accessible and interesting to a broader audience. Moreover, in the appendix, he compiles biographies of 44 influential Arabic authors and lists of their works. This is a valuable resource for specialists and for general readers looking to learn more about Arabic heritage.

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ON THE COUCH: A REPRESSED HISTORY OF THE ANALYTIC COUCH FROM PLATO TO FREUD

Kravis N.


Freud’s Couch: Repressed No More

The analytic couch. Like Freud, there is a love–hate relationship with this four-legged piece of furniture by both clients and analysts. Kravis opens with “most psychoanalysts today are ambivalent about the couch” (p. 1). But, as a patron of the psychoanalytic process and someone trained in the field, I was always struck by the amount of time and energy training analysts put into purchasing the perfect settee as they embarked on their careers. It needs to be comfortable; long enough for the tallest man but not so big that a small woman sinks into an abyss. Should I get leather so that the oil from hair can be wiped away? Do I get pillows? Should I go modern, antique, traditional, contemporary, or transitional? Is $6,000 too much to pay for a couch? Does anyone have any clients who refuse to use the couch? These were the questions discussed at our coffee breaks during our last year of training, and today the couch is still a discussion in psychoanalytic circles. For those interested in the history of psychoanalysis, Kravis has normalized the couch conversation; however, fixated discussions about this analytic armamentarium would still sound very pathological in lay circles. Nevertheless, this book is not only an excellent piece of contextual historiography but is also aesthetically stunning. The cover artwork entitled After the Ball was painted by Ramon Casas i Carbo in 1895, the same year Freud wrote Project for a Scientific Psychology. Carbo’s rich oil on canvas depicts an exhausted red-haired woman wearing a black ball gown, fallen back and sunken down into an emerald-green sofa with her arms splayed out like wings, a pose reminiscent of Charcot’s verklempt Augustine (Didi-Huberman, 2003, photo p. 143).

I highlight the cover because at first glance this gloriously illustrated book could be found in a Paris museum bookstore or on the coffee table of an art dealer. Kravis uses photographs of artwork (sculptures, drawings, mosaics, paintings, pottery) and funerary monuments, at times going back to the second century (BCE). He also makes use of advertisements and cartoons to present a pictorial history that situates Freud’s couch within “the social history of recumbent posture” (p. 8). Early on, Kravis points to the couch as the “fetishized,” “talismanic,” and “cultural” icon for the psychoanalytic profession, that ironically has never been historically or analytically explored by the field it epitomizes (p. 5).

Kravis begins with an exposition of the ancient practices of the Greek Symposium (upper-class men drinking wine and reading and discussing poetry/philosophy) and the Roman Convivium (a banquet with both men and women), where eating and drinking occurred in the recumbent position. According to Kravis, reclining to eat was a sign of “status and power” (p. 11). He notes, although most well-known Renaissance paintings of the “Last
Supper” depict Jesus and his disciples seated, earlier mosaics show them reclining to eat their meal. Before the 18th century, Kravis notes that beds and couches looked very similar, and it was not until the 18th century that French, German, and British furniture makers began adding arms and backs to couches, transforming them into "sofas." This change aligned with the more relaxed domestic social settings that emerged in the late 18th century, where social intimacy and comfort became a priority, as was depicted in the portraiture of this time. The creation of more comfortable furniture followed as homes became more comfortable (indoor heating and plumbing) and women's clothing became more accommodating to reclining postures (smaller bustles). Kravis suggests that this desire for intimacy played a role in the creation of the sofa, which in turn set the stage for the psychoanalytic couch to become an intimate prop in a unique social yet therapeutic setting.

In the first four chapters, Kravis establishes a clear history of the recumbent position, as demonstrated in religious, intimate, and social settings, but I would argue, Chapter 5, “The medicalization of comfort," and Chapter 6, "Psychiatry and therapeutics," provide a more direct link to the development of Freud's use of the couch, which is detailed in Chapter 7. Kravis cites 19th-century medical illnesses such as tuberculosis and increasing numbers of war casualties as social factors that prompted the need for "the production of portable and invalid furniture" for sanatoriums (p. 97). Moreover, hypnosis and the asylum-based treatments, such as electrotherapy, hydrotherapy, and the "rest cure," required the use of the supine position. Kravis explores these historical practices, Freud's time with Charcot and Freud's medical training imbued with recumbent-based treatments, and suggests that this made the recumbent position a natural one for Freud when he began using hypnosis. He continued to use this position when he used the pressure technique and when he switched to the free association method (pp. 127–128). Kravis's final chapter explores the contemporary analytic couch as a reflection of the analyst's use of self. Kravis argues that the aesthetic chosen provides patients with insights into the analysts' "moral interior," as he takes readers into the consulting rooms of prominent psychoanalysts.

Although Kravis explores Freud's use of the couch as being particularly influenced by the Nancy School, and its emphasis on the patient being encouraged to sleep in a quiet environment during hypnotic treatment, there is no mention of the connection between Freud's continued use of the recumbent position and his theories of sleep and dreams. As far back as the "Project" (1895), Freud theorized dreams were a form of free association. He stated, "in dreams the compulsion to associate prevails” (p. 337). For Freud, dreams emerged when the spine and body were in a relaxed state, in the supine position, and when exogenous stimuli had been minimized (eyes closed, lights out, quiet space): "in sleep the spinal tonus is in part relaxed; it is probable that the motor discharge is manifested in tonus..." (p. 337). Here Freud suggests that when the spine is relaxed unconscious processes are less likely to be converted into hysterical motor symptoms. Thus, lying down in a quiet consulting room, on a comfortable couch, out of the analyst's sight, prepared the spine (and body) to enter a state of relaxation similar to the one that prompted sleep and free-associative dreaming processes. Freud's free-associative technique could not be separated from his couch; he theorized that in creating a space for the ego to be quieted in sleep, as in the analytic setting, unconscious processes were more likely to break free into the client's associations.

Kravis also notes that analysts today are ambivalent about the couch and, while he suggests some reasons for this, I would add the evolution away from a one-person psychology to a two-person has played a significant role in the couch being used less often. In addition, the move toward time-limited psychodynamic modalities may have also put the couch back into storage. Finally, Kravis makes note of the couch as an erotic symbol, particularly in historical portraiture where women were often posed nude or partially clad in evocative positions, on settees. This point made me associate back to Davies and Frawley's (1994) work, "Treating the Adult Survivor of Childhood Sexual Abuse," where they state, adult survivors are “usually highly functional...appear always ready to flee the session at a moment's notice (and)...are terrified of the couch” (p. 49). Davis and Frawley's research, and my own anecdotal evidence, suggests that with more and more women with histories of abuse entering treatment, the couch may be used less often today, at least initially...
until a trusting therapeutic relationship is established. Moreover, depending on the context of the abuse history, the gender of the analyst may also impede the use of the couch by certain clients. However, these are only a few of the issues to consider in the co-constructed client-therapist relationship.

Overall, Kravis’s work is a unique and needed contribution to the history of psychoanalysis. I encourage those interested in entering the uncharted territory of Freud’s couch to give this book a read. But please, do pick up a hard copy of this illustrative history; an e-copy just might not do it the justice it deserves.

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REFERENCES


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DEFECTIVES IN THE LAND: DISABILITY AND IMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF EUGENICS

Douglas C. Baynton


Immigration, and who should and should not be allowed to cross American borders has once again been a heated topic of discussion in the United States. Often these discussions, as they always have, move to questions of race, nationality, class, and gender. Douglas Baynton, however, in his work Defectives in the Land, calls our attention to another variable that has been used to restrict immigration yet remains otherwise unacknowledged, even by historians: disability.

“Disability” Baynton states “matters everywhere in history” (p. 2). In his second monograph, Baynton’s goal is to show how US immigration used “disability” to restrict the entrance of individuals to America during the late 19th and early 20th century. Those assessed to be either psychologically or physically “defective” were turned back from the United States. They were presumed to be an inevitable burden to the state economically due to the assumption that they were unable to work and support themselves financially, have and look after healthy children, and otherwise contribute to the social and economic “progress” of America. Most interesting and unique about Baynton’s work is the ways in which he explores how ideas regarding disability were socially and culturally constructed at the height of the popularity of Eugenics within the United States. His work, therefore, makes two interventions into historical scholarship. He shows how the label “defective” was applied to people to exclude those deemed undesirable citizens in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He also explores and explains how the assumptions and understandings of what it was to be disabled at this time were historically created.

Baynton’s work is arranged into four chapters exploring the major assumptions regarding disabled people; that they were “defective,” “handicapped,” “dependent,” and “ugly.” The first chapter explores the process of “selection” of immigrants, and the ways in which immigration officials decided who and who was not “defective.” On arrival to the
United States, quick assessments were made by immigration officials as to the mental and physical fitness of the immigrants filing through Ellis Island. As Baynton points out, labels such as “poor physique” were never clearly defined, and as he explains: “Perhaps none was possible, for poor physique was never a medical diagnosis, but rather a nebulous description, promulgated largely by eugenicists, intended as an easily applied means of excluding degenerates” (p. 37).

In Chapter 2, “Handicapped,” Baynton examines how disabled immigrants were denied entry into the United States due to the common misconception that they could not be productive workers in a modern economy. Baynton looks at the relationship between industrial understandings of time and labor and the 19th-century development of ideas that disabled people were incapable of acceptable work standards for the modern era due to being “inefficient.” They would always fall behind in the “race of life” according to these presumptions. The cruel fallout from this assumption, which Baynton reveals, was never supported by evidence, as outlined in the third chapter “Dependent.” As those given the label of disability were presumed incapable of industrious work, they were also presumed to be forever dependent on others and thus a potential burden to the US state. Even in the face of overwhelming evidence that individuals with a disability were talented workers, the cultural assumptions of “disability” led to immigration officials being justified in their exclusion of people who did not fit with their limited notions of who an acceptable US citizen was.

Particular looks were important to immigration officials too and they also denied entry to those classed as “ugly.” Beauty was paramount for eugenicists, and ugliness to them was a sign of inner degeneracy. Baynton thus argues in this final chapter that “appearance can figure just as importantly as a function in the creation of disability, in some instances even more so” (p. 106). Baynton outlines the disgust expressed by immigration officials when they came across immigrants whose physical appearance was different from their own discriminatory and narrow-minded ideas of what a person should look like. Those deemed “ugly” were immediately labeled as “defective” and thus excluded from America too.

Baynton’s work is engaging and the material is shocking. Reading of individuals being separated from their families and returned to their homes in Europe because of unfair assumptions regarding their capacity to work as a disabled individual, even after securing work in the United States and arriving in America with a substantial amount of savings is heartbreakingly. Baynton’s work is strongest and most illuminating when looking at the application of ideas regarding disability through case studies of immigrants. This alongside his explanation of how these ideas were created gives the reader a sense of the lived experience of disabled immigrants when they had to engage with immigration officials and try to prove that they were not “defective” but rather capable individuals deserving of entry to the United States. Perhaps one criticism would be that case studies do not feature evenly in each of the chapters. In Chapter 2, especially, discussion of the case studies feels a little rushed.

Overall though Baynton’s work is groundbreaking in making historians aware of the lack of attention paid to disabled peoples throughout history and in historiography. Disability, as he points out, is a category that is historically constructed. It has also been ignored by historians for far too long, meaning that presumptions still feature heavily in the way we think about and understand those who are different. As he argues, “For a long time we never thought of disabled people, but they are everywhere, and our histories are defective without them” (p. 138). Through exploring the creation of categories of disability from 1890c to 1920c Baynton thus brings the reader face to face with the ways in which disability is understood and spoken of now, and that this minority group deserves far more attention than it has otherwise received in history and beyond.

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A. Javier Treviño’s book deals with the relationship between one of the US’s leading public intellectuals and the event that most shaped mid-20th-century geopolitics in the Americas: the Cuban Revolution. Whereas his earlier volume, *The Social Thought of C. Wright Mills* (2012), focuses on Mills’s ideas, this book uses those ideas. It focuses squarely on the production and impact of his polemical, epistolary book, *Listen, Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba* (1960). Although Cubanists will find the large portions of the text dedicated to transcriptions of Mills’s hitherto unpublished interviews of interest, Treviño does not make a big contribution to Cuban studies. The book is, instead, a Millsian sociology of Mills. Readers will be rewarded with an enriched appreciation for Mills—the intellectual, the scientist, and the valiant person, who, in his words, tried "to be objective" but not "detached."

Chapters 1 and 2 follow directly from Mills’s methodological playbook, emphasizing the importance of and relationship between biography and history. Focusing on Mills’s interest in Cuba, Treviño recounts, among other things, how the Fair Play for Cuba Committee convinced Mills to go to Cuba and organized his trip. Focusing on the moment in history, Treviño strikes a reasonable balance between concision and chapter-length comprehensiveness. Chapter 3 provides an overview of some of Mills’s key concerns: individuals, intellectuals, and interviewing.

Mills made one 16-day research trip to Cuba in August 1960. During that time, he worked long days touring the island and conducting interviews. Returning to the transcripts of Mills’s interviews, Treviño’s main concerns are concerned to determine whether Mills actually interviewed people "close to the events," and whether he accurately portrayed the views of "the Cuban revolutionary," as he claimed. This is immensely important because many have questioned the relationship between Mills’s views and the views of the composite Cuban revolutionary featured in *Listen*. In effect, Treviño asks and answers the question: Did Mills present his views or the views of Cuban revolutionaries? (The question could equally have been put the other way around: As a revolutionary, how accurately did Mills portray Cubans' views of the Revolution?) In other words, did Mills write mere propaganda? Treviño concludes that Mills did, indeed, speak with Cubans close to the events, and that he honestly portrayed their perspectives.

In Chapter 4, Treviño focuses on Mills’s interviews with Cuban government officials. He discusses and presents transcriptions of interviews with his interpreter (Juan Arcocha; Mills did not speak Spanish) and with Rebel Army officers (including Isabel Rielo and Dermidio Escalona). Chapter 5 covers three interviews Mills conducted with Cuban civilians: A clinical psychologist (Franz Stettmeier), a professor of domestic economy (Elvira Escobar), and a peasant (Elba Luisa Batista Benítez). At different points during several of these interviews, Mills presses questions about whether the guerrilla organization that made the Revolution—the July 26th Movement—was the equivalent of a political party, about the problem of personnel for the revolutionary state, and about the USSR-aligned Popular Socialist Party’s role in the government at present and in the future. In addition to answering these questions, his respondents impressed upon Mills the righteousness of their cause and the importance of Fidel Castro in the revolutionary process.

Chapter 6 covers Mills’s time with Fidel. Castro read Mills’s *The Power Elite* (1956) and discussed it with his comrades in November 1958, just before taking power. After traveling extensively with René Vallejo, Fidel’s aide-de-camp and doctor, Mills traveled for a short time with Castro. They spent 18 hr together conversing in a hotel room. Mills needed no convincing about the perils dangers of the US empire. Treviño makes a convincing case that Fidel and Mills struck up a friendship. He offers several points of comparison between the two men, discusses
Mills’s concern with the concentration of power into this charismatic leader’s hands, and suggests that Mills was transfixed by Cuba, in part because he longed to be a man of action.

Chapter 7 examines *Listen*’s publication history. The book sold about half a million copies in English—making it one of the best-selling books ever written by a sociologist—and was translated into six other languages despite its being addressed specifically to US readers. Chapter 8 discusses public and state reactions to the book, and implies that stresses stemming from liberals in and out of the John Kennedy administration and from the FBI may have exacerbated Mills’s worsening heart health, the cause of his death in March 1962 at the age of 45. Despite the attacks, Mills stood by his analysis and retained his beliefs. He even asked his students why they did not take to the Rocky Mountains with arms (see also *Listen*, p. 166)—offering to teach the students to use them—and mimic the Cuban Revolutionaries. Meanwhile, *Listen* had an abiding impact on the development of the New Left.

Treviño’s book deserves praise and recognition as a Millsian sociology of Mills. But it is not without its shortcomings. First, this book is fundamentally about a sociological master craftsperson successfully navigating the context of discovery, but it does not distill the outlines of a method or even a series of relevant insights. Treviño shows that Mills did sound research. (He opines that Mills introduced an angry tone into *Listen* not found in the interviews but that he may have encountered elsewhere, though it is not clear that the text actually has an angry tone, as opposed to a direct one. And he observes that Mills failed to include the voice of Cuban peasants and workers, though he does not claim to.) He concludes that Mills “depicts quite accurately the thoughts and actions of the Cuban Revolutionary” (p. 136). He also includes an appendix comparing quotations from Mills’s interviews to passages in *Listen*, further supporting this conclusion. Given that Mills did a good job, we could learn something from him about how to produce good sociopolitical research on topics about which we may have strong views.

Second, in several passages, Treviño employs psychological speculation to shore up political views inconsistent with his evidence. He recounts that Mills was drawn to and supported the Cuban Revolution largely out of visceral revulsion to the US political establishment (pp. 125–126) and insists that Mills was in no way a communist (pp. 173–174 et passim). He also downplays the facts that Mills continued to support the Cuban Revolution after Cuba aligned with the Soviet Bloc (p. 157), and that he acted on his long-standing desire to travel to the USSR after publishing *Listen* (p. 170). Mills’s interest in rigorous sociology and in pressing political problems evidently drove him towards an interest in Marxism and actually-existing socialism (p. 160). And it seems most plausible—given his ability to understand complex situations quickly and accurately and given his extensive theoretical knowledge of power, bureaucracy, and social change—that Mills understood what he was getting himself into (although the Cold War certainly made his positions tricky to maintain and to interpret). Thus, Treviño’s evidence suggests that Mills knew well what he was doing and did so anyways. But he endorses the view that, to the contrary, Mills suffered from cognitive dissonance (p. 158). These criticisms, however, should not dissuade readers from engaging with this important book.

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**REFERENCES**

HAPPIER: THE HISTORY OF A CULTURAL MOVEMENT THAT ASPIRED TO TRANSFORM AMERICA

Daniel Horowitz


In Happier, historian Daniel Horowitz charts the short history and long(er) past of positive psychology. In important respects, this movement began with Martin Seligman’s imperial presidency of the American Psychological Association in 1998. When Seligman announced a new force in psychology, one which rejected the medical model of mental illness in favor of examining personal strengths, character, and resilience; he largely denied precedents focused on mental health and human flourishing. Horowitz seeks to address this remarkable act of historical amnesia by situating positive psychology in terms of new techniques for measuring the effect, a burgeoning marketplace for pop psychology, and neoliberal policies that favor individualized achievement over collective social action.

Any history of positive psychology needs balances Seligman’s singular influence as the movement’s charismatic leader and the broader historical conditions allowing positive psychology to flourish in recent decades. Horowitz, who comes to positive psychology having written a series of books tracing the ambivalent reactions of American intellectuals to mass consumption, handles this challenge with aplomb. He demonstrates that Seligman’s genius resides in artful marketing, in securing money and eyeballs rather than developing any new approach to mental life. Chapter 1 opens with Seligman’s presidency and the launching of positive psychology as his personal brand, but Chapters 2 through 5 backtracks to the period from 1945 to 1998 and document various attempts to measure and increase happiness. Horowitz casts a wide net, seeing precursors in Norman Vincent Peale’s positive thinking, Victor Frankl’s logotherapy, Abraham Maslow’s humanistic psychology, Aaron Beck’s cognitive behavioral therapy, opinion polls measuring satisfaction, the neuroscience of the pleasure center, and most especially the behavioral turn in economics. Chapters 6 through 8 again focus on the particulars of Seligman’s project and its multiple markets among a new set of patrons, book publishers, and online viewers. Horowitz contends the various elements of what became positive psychology were available by 1984. Yet it took Seligman’s leadership to organize these heterogeneous fields into a coherent and marketable movement.

Happier is not the first book to look askance at our contemporary obsession with “well-being.” Critical psychologists and sociologists such as Barbara Held, John Cromby, William Davies, Jeffrey Yen, and Barbara Ehrenreich have given positive psychology considerable scrutiny. However, Horowitz makes a number of important contributions to this literature. First is his recognition of ways in which positive psychology and behavioral economics reinforced one another. He distinguishes between positive psychology focused on individual fulfillment and happiness studies dedicated to measuring positive effect at a societal level, but he recognizes that both of these “hedonistic psychologies” focus on the measurement, manipulation, and augmentation of (positive) effect. Next, Horowitz does an excellent job of documenting positive psychology’s cozy relationship with one particular patron, the John Templeton Foundation. Championed by psychologists for providing an alternative to government patronage in the form of NIH and the medical model, Horowitz shows positive psychology’s revival of character reflects the worldview of this neoconservative patron. Finally, as a historian of consumption, Horowitz details changes in the publishing marketplace since the 1970s. He argues for a realignment of the relationship among scientists, professionals, and journalists. He notes the emergence of a new genre of self-help, signal-boosted by the ubiquitous TED talk and its aesthetics of expertise. Where before journalists or clinicians authored self-books, now this has become the mandate of the academic scientist.
Unlike the more theoretical and sociological accounts mentioned above, Horowitz largely eschews polemic in favor of detailed description. However, his performed neutrality proves utterly devastating. Positive psychologists consistently ignore the line separating experimental design and consumer marketing as they eagerly rebrand a century of nostrums to populate their latest trite and streamable sermon. Horowitz acknowledges the controversies engendered by positive psychology such as the failed replications of some of its most cherished findings, the easy slippage between supposed basic science and shmaltzy self-help, and the controversy concerning Seligman’s collusion with the military when it came to psychological torture. Yet, he also documents the benefits he and his wife derived from such teachings.

As a recent history, Horowitz confines his analysis largely to positive psychology’s public face. He lacks access to the archival evidence often used by historians of science to form the bedrock of their accounts such as grant applications, drafts of reports, and correspondence among collaborators, publishers, and agents. Instead, Horowitz adopts an informal ethnographic methodology to compensate, relating his personal experience of attending conferences, workshops, and lectures as well as interviews with key players. However, these materials serve more as background for his reading of published texts rather than forming the substance of his analysis. More disappointing is a lack of attention to testimony from the consumer’s positive psychology. What meaning do audiences ascribe to its nostrums? Are their readings faithful to the intentions of Seligman and his ilk or do they inscribe alternative interpretations? This neglect is somewhat understandable given the daunting task of parsing and interpreting the mass of online commentary of uncertain provenance.

Despite these methodological limitations, Happier contributes to a rethinking of how to periodize the history of psychology. The rise both cognitivism and neuroscience fail to capture the essence of this movement, one currently exercising tremendous cultural influence. Indeed, narrating the history of psychology in terms of trends with academic research is misleading in an era when clinical application dominates. Instead, Horowitz's analysis suggests psychology underwent an effective revolution around the turn of this century. A revolution informed by new neuroimaging techniques and digitized data collection, but also shaped the politics of the culture wars, 9/11, and the financial crisis. The history of this effective revolution remains unwritten, but Happier along with other recent titles is suggestive of its broad contours. As such, the book is essential reading for historians of psychology.

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ADOLPHE QUETELET, SOCIAL PHYSICS AND THE AVERAGE MEN OF SCIENCE, 1796-1874.

Kevin Donnelly


Biographies of scientists generally tend to focus on their discoveries, their contexts, and the trajectories that led to them. Although this book gives precious insights on the dimensions regarding Adolphe Quetelet’s contribution to a “science of man,” its core relies on another, often disregarded, dimension: practices, or more precisely, the time allocation of the scientist’s activities. This scrutiny on Quetelet’s timetable allows us to unveil that what is now remembered as his most important achievements (the application of the methods of natural science to social phenomena) was relatively secondary in his views compared with two main goals: making Belgium regain “its status among the great scientific nations of Europe” (p. 1) and promoting a scientific model grounded on “large-scale data collection and international collaboration” (p. 163).
Kevin Donnelly convincingly claims that Quetelet’s social physics can better be understood as correlates of this double quest. Building a large network of correspondents among scientists and administrators put him in an ideal position to gather data on social phenomena and apply his knowledge on probability and the methods of the natural science.

The book starts with a description of the intellectual context in which Quetelet, as a student in the early 19th century, had to choose between a career in literature or mathematics. Focusing on the close circle of his friends from Ghent, he shows that the “historically unprecedented discord between science and art” (p. 21) led to difficult situations for many who, contrary to Quetelet, chose the latter. Donnelly then turns to Quetelet’s contribution to the transformation of the Royal Academy of Belgium and to the creation of the Royal Observatory of Bruxelles. This latter project allowed him to engage and correspond with most of the main statisticians and astronomers of Europe, to learn about new methods but maybe more importantly, Donnelly argues, to create a bridge between scientists and administrators. This dimension is particularly salient in the case of the founding of a journal, "Correspondance mathématique et physique", that accumulated statistical accounts and other scientific notices from a wide variety of administrators and researchers (p. 16). Donnelly shows next that the move toward physique sociale that Quetelet made between 1827 and 1835 was at the crossroad of constraints and opportunities: his observatory’s project was delayed; he had access through the Correspondance to national data on birth, death, marriage, crime, height, and weight of European citizens. De facto, this focus on social data stopped as soon as the observatory was functional. Donnelly eventually describes the large amount of critique that was made to physique sociale through the 20th century, presenting this phenomenon as the conjunction of a misreading of Quetelet’s work as denying free will to individuals, and of the vagueness—and lack of interest—of its own defence (made worse by the wrong association, Donnelly argues, of his work with the one of Henry Thomas Buckle). Donnelly, relying on Quetelet’s friend and later prime minister Pierre de Decker, defends the idea that Quetelet’s Average man is best understood as a definition of the men making the observation rather than the individuals under observation (p. 155). In other words, physique sociale was conceived as a practical mean for the administration of people through scientific methodology rather than an epistemological claim.

This book is a remarkable demonstration of the benefits of “sticking to practices” to avoid a teleological history of science: if Quetelet inherited from Laplace and Condorcet, the analysis of the roots of his discoveries is highly improved by this precise account of his actual daily work. The influence of the increasing incompatibility between arts and science is also adequately depicted as an emerging and structuring phenomenon in the development of a new kind of science during the 19th century. This process is finely used to explain Quetelet’s own trajectory. But it could have also led, we may argue, to a more convincing argument regarding the critics that were addressed to physique sociale: although Quetelet’s personal trajectory and position gave him a large scientific credibility, his propositions were rejected by individuals (especially philosophers and administrators) for whom the application of a scientific method to social data was a threat to their own position and expertise. A more systematic comparison between the intellectual and institutional resources of the different actors involved in this controversy could have been of help to shed light on these power struggles over the definition of the legitimate ways to tackle moral issues. Putting these reservations aside, this book is a significant contribution to the history of social sciences and an example of the added value of the materialist history of scientific practices.

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