

Between dependence and deprivation: The interlocking nature of land alienation in Tanzania

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Abstract

Studies of accumulation by dispossession in the Global South tend to focus on individual sectors, for example, large-scale agriculture or nature conservation. Yet smallholder farmers and pastoralists are affected by multiple processes of land alienation. Drawing on the case of Tanzania, we illustrate the analytical purchase of a comprehensive examination of dynamics of land alienation across multiple sectors. To begin with, processes of land alienation through investments in agriculture, mining, conservation, and tourism dovetail with a growing social differentiation and class formation. These dynamics generate unequal patterns of land deprivation and accumulation that evolve in a context of continued land dependency for the vast majority of the rural population. Consequently, land alienation engenders responses by individuals and communities seeking to maintain control over their means of production. These responses include migration, land tenure formalization, and land transactions, that propagate across multiple localities and scales, interlocking with and further reinforcing the effects of land alienation. Various localized processes of primitive accumulation contribute to a scramble for land in the aggregate, providing justifications for policies that further drive land alienation.

KEYWORDS

accumulation by dispossession, agriculture, conservation, land grabbing, Tanzania

1 | INTRODUCTION

It appears that Tanzania is now facing a potential crisis of internal displacement in which people are shunted from place to place as valuable natural resources are appropriated from communities for conservation, commerce, and increasingly both together (Igoe & Croucher, 2007, p. 553).

There has been significant attention to the so-called African land rush (Hall, Scoones, & Tsikata, 2015; Scoones, Hall, Borras, White, & Wolford, 2013), that is, the surge of foreign agricultural investments in Africa that started in the early 2000s. Many see Tanzania as an ideal country for large-scale agricultural land investments due to its record of liberal economic reforms and high growth rates in the last two decades. Tanzania's government has actively embraced this international interest in its land through the introduction of investment-friendly policies and institutions. The Tanzania Investment Centre was created in 1997 to facilitate foreign (and domestic) investments in, among other things, land. Several attempts were undertaken at creating a land bank of demarcated, titled, and investment-ready tracts of land with agricultural potential. In 2009, the Government of Tanzania launched the "Kilimo Kwanza"—or "Agriculture First"—initiative aiming to modernize the agricultural sector through public and private investments. Shortly thereafter, Tanzania's president at the time—Jakaya Kikwete—launched the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) initiative at the 2010 World Economic Forum Africa summit. In the SAGCOT investment blueprint, Kikwete asserted the official and widely circulated government position that "Tanzania has immense opportunities for agricultural development. There are 44 million hectares of arable land, only 24 percent of which is being utilized. ... [T]he country's huge agricultural potential remains unutilized" (SAGCOT, 2011).

This classic narrative of "unused land" also circulates in other parts of the African continent and dovetails with a discourse of neoliberal economic development and growth through land tenure formalization, modernization and commercialization of agriculture, and animal husbandry (Geisler, 2012; Lunstrum, 2016; Nalepa, Short Gianotti, & Bauer, 2017). However, the narrative is at odds with continual reports of land conflicts across Tanzania. Drivers of such conflicts are many and include stalled or entirely failed land deals in large-scale agriculture, growth in human and livestock populations, patterns of displacement and migration, various conservation and tourism initiatives, infrastructure development, domestic land acquisition for speculation and cultivation, land tenure formalization and tree-planting initiatives, and mining. Indeed, against official narratives of "unused land," government authorities have threatened land owners of large estates with expropriation, accusing them of not properly "developing" the land, calling for their property to be given back to poor or landless farmers in light of widespread land conflicts across the country (DailyNews, 2013; Guardian, 2016b). The narrative of "unused land" is also questionable in light of growing concerns raised by Tanzania's environmental-conservation complex (see Brockington, 2006) over an allegedly growing number of incursions by pastoralists into national parks and game reserves (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2016; Shekighenda, 2016).

In this article,¹ we go beyond exclusive attention to the agriculturally driven African land rush. Instead, we create an overview of the totality of land alienation processes in Tanzania by focusing on investments in agriculture, mining, conservation, and tourism. Given their mutual reinforcement, these different processes should not be studied in isolation (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011; Hunsberger et al., 2017; Lunstrum, Bose, & Zalik, 2016). We show how land alienation processes take place in a context of continued land dependency by Tanzania's rural population and how these processes are reinforced by a growing social differentiation and class formation. We also show how rural people respond to land alienation and dispossession to maintain their means of production, such as through migration, land tenure formalization, and land transaction, and how these responses, in turn, further reinforce the effects of land alienation.

¹This article is based on an extensive reading and analysis of relevant literature, decades of cumulative research experience on land issues, and years of field presence in rural areas across several of Tanzania's regions, including Dodoma, Iringa, Manyara, Mbeya, Mtwara, Lindi, Kigoma, Arusha, and Ruvuma.

We provide important evidence to policy debates about land in Tanzania and elsewhere, thereby countering paradoxical claims over “unused” or “undeveloped” land amidst growing pressures on rural livelihoods by various drivers of land alienation.

2 | AGRARIAN CHANGE AND LAND ALIENATION

Our contribution speaks to debates on agrarian change (Bernstein, 1977; Li, 2014; Moyo, 2008) and primitive accumulation, what Marx famously coined a “historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production” and enabling the appropriation of this freed labour for capitalist production (Marx, 1976, p. 875). David Harvey and many scholars after him built on this historical and still ongoing process of land enclosures in demonstrating how capitalism continues expanding its reach, creating new markets and property regimes, and changing social relations in the process of accumulation by dispossession (Glassman, 2006; Hall, 2013; Harvey, 2003).

2.1 | Different forms of land alienation

Accumulation by rural dispossession takes many forms. It requires neither changes in formal property rights nor physical land grabbing by “extra-economic means” (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Hall, 2013). Rather, dispossession can be the result of more subtle processes of land *control* grabbing (Margulis, McKeon, & Borrás Jr., 2013; Peluso & Lund, 2011) whereby access to use land for certain purposes is restricted. Conservation interventions, commodification of seeds,² contract farming, juridical capture, land use planning and demarcation, and land transactions can all result in land control grabbing (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018; Stein & Cunningham, 2017; Borrás Jr. & Franco, 2012; Huggins, 2014; Oya, 2012; Prudham, 2007). Although none of these processes necessarily imply formal challenges to local land rights, they can have an effect similar to implying the loss of land altogether (Cáceres, 2015). Furthermore, accumulation by dispossession does not only involve the expropriation of land into *private* hands. It can also involve the transferral of customary or communal land ownership into the *public* domain (e.g., a national park), if third-party actors (such as conservation non-governmental organizations [NGOs] or tourism investors) can profit via this act of enclosure (Kelly, 2011).

Accumulation by dispossession can also involve the appropriation of labour of those who lose their land-based means of production. However, in the Global South and specifically in the Tanzanian context the appropriation of surplus labour through proletarianization—what could be called labour grabbing (Stein & Cunningham, 2017)—is limited to informal sectors where casual labour under highly exploitative arrangements is common (Mueller, 2011). Current patterns of land appropriation create only few formalized wage–labour opportunities (Meagher, 2016). Put differently, there may be no “proletarian future” for landless or land-deprived people in many parts across the Global South (Li, 2011, p. 296). Thus, many smallholders join the ranks of a growing landless labour reserve (in the Marxian sense), that is, they are rendered a surplus population without a prospect for employment (Ferguson, 2013; Li, 2010; Peters, 2013). Shivji (2009) conceptualizes this process of accumulation by dispossession in the Tanzanian context as a “disarticulated” accumulation, introduced through colonial or neoliberal regimes, and perpetuated by the state's disregard for the peasantry. Indeed, Marx's concept of primitive accumulation rests on the integration of the new labour force into circuits of capitalist production, which is a deeply transformative process (Glassman, 2006; Wood, 2002). In Tanzania, this process is ongoing and incomplete. Moreover, accumulation and dispossession are entangled with patterns of internal class formation, social differentiation, and social reproduction (Chung, 2017; Greco, 2015; Mueller, 2011). In the course of various processes of land (control) and labour grabbing, societies become stratified into (predominantly male) landlords and owners of large livestock herds who can extract rents and surplus labour, and land-deprived farmers (especially women) and impoverished pastoralists who must offer their labour, struggling

²“Tanzanian farmers are facing heavy prison sentences if they continue their traditional seed exchange”. Ebe Daems, 7 December 2016. (<http://www.mo.be/en/analysis/tanzanian-farmers-are-facing-heavy-prison-sentences-if-they-continue-their-traditional-seed>).

to survive. These agrarian transformations are not new to Tanzania (e.g., see Iliffe, 1979; Shao, 1986; von Freyhold, 1979) and continue even when recent foreign-led large-scale land deals stall or entirely fail to materialize (Hall, 2013; Oya, 2013).

In response to the growing land squeeze underpinned by different forms of land (control) or labour grabbing, rural people turn to migration, or occupation of land enclosed as protected area (Charney, 1997; Hall, 2013; Hall et al., 2011; Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Migration can create new forms of exclusion and increase land pressure elsewhere in the country where the arrival of migrants may contribute to land tenure formalization, as residents seek to protect their land against newcomers, whom they may be inclined to evict. Hall et al. (2011) refer to this interlocking nature of different processes of land alienation as primitive accumulation “from below.” Another response in the face of land alienation is livelihood diversification (Hodgson, 2001; Mueller, 2011). Socio-economic diversification can be underpinned by production declines in agriculture or livestock husbandry (McCabe, Leslie, & DeLuca, 2010; Ponte, 2001) and tends to increase social differentiation and to promote informal sectors of wage labour (Bryceson, 2002; Lyimo, 2014; Peters, 2004).

2.2 | Tanzania, a land-dependent nation

Agriculture in Tanzania can be broadly characterized by a stagnant agricultural labour productivity (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2015), and since the 1990s, a growing number of studies have reported a declining soil fertility (Baijukya, de Ridder, Masuki, & Giller, 2005; Kangalawe, Christiansson, & Östberg, 2008; Lindberg, 1996; Ponte, 2001; Snyder, 1996). This development was initiated by ill-conceived and coercive resettlement policies of the 1970s (villagization) that led to agricultural intensification (Kjekshus, 1977; Shao, 1986). It was then compounded by structural adjustment and liberalization policies of the 1980s and 1990s, which deprived a growing number of smallholders of agricultural inputs necessary to maintain or increase production (Bryceson, 2002). Lokina, Nerman, and Sandefur (2011) report that with the exception of rice, average yields of maize, sorghum, and beans—key food staples—declined in the 2000s, and total output could only be stabilized through agricultural area expansion. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) highlights that “with the exception of rice, the country has ... remained a net importer of food staples during the period 2007–2013.” FAO attests that Tanzania has “one of the lowest levels of productivity in sub-Saharan Africa” due to a lack of irrigation and improved seeds and fertilizers (FAO, 2014, p. 1). Coulson (2013) points out that the present growth in agricultural outputs (around 4% per year) exceeds population growth (around 3% per year), yet he is sceptical that this level of growth (which is largely based on agricultural area expansion) can be maintained in the future. The competition for farmland across many parts of Tanzania is therefore set to increase.

Despite ongoing processes of deagrarianization or depeasantization (Bryceson, 2002) that echo social differentiation and socio-economic diversification, we contend that Tanzania's growing peasantry remains highly dependent on land and environment. A majority of income for rural livelihoods across sub-Saharan Africa and specifically in Tanzania is sourced from agriculture, livestock, environmental resources (forest and non-forest), or casual labour on other people's farms. Land and environmental dependency cuts across wealth, gender, and education, although poorer, less-educated, and female-headed households tend to be more dependent (Angelsen et al., 2014; Lund & Treue, 2008). Tanzania's population is expected to reach 137 million in 2050, having already grown from 10 to 53 million people in 1960–2015 (Figure 1).³ Although Tanzania has seen substantial macroeconomic growth of late, the country remains a predominantly agriculture-based smallholder economy (Korotayev & Zinkina, 2015). Industrialization has been limited and uneven, and economic growth has not resulted in greatly expanded opportunities for formal employment (Gray, 2013; Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). Although rural–urban migration will continue to shift the Tanzanian demographic landscape in the coming decades, in absolute terms, more people will likely have to live off the land in the future. In the absence of mass industries that provide employment opportunities (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016), urbanization and deagrarianization will not change the fact that land and land-based resources will remain the

³World Bank Health Nutrition and Population Statistics, accessed April 27, 2017.




FIGURE 1 Population growth in Tanzania. Recorded until 2015, estimated beyond 2015

Source: World Bank Health, Nutrition and Population Statistics.

main means of (re)production for tens of millions of smallholders in the foreseeable future (see also Hall et al., 2011; Moyo & Yeros, 2005).

To further contextualize Tanzanian dynamics of agrarian change and land alienation, we present findings from two studies conducted across Tanzania by some of the authors of this article. The research project "Transformations in Poverty and Property Rights in Rural Tanzania"⁴ randomly sampled 1,600 households in 33 villages between 2010 and 2016, yielding average rates of landlessness (understood as owning 1 acre of land or less per household) from 9.4% to 22.2% across the regions Kigoma, Mbeya/Songwe, Manyara, and Dodoma. This range illustrates the geographically uneven effects of different drivers of land alienation as they intersect with population density and growth and local land markets. Another, larger dataset, collected under the auspices of a research project on rural livelihoods and conservation,⁵ illustrates that landlessness is also thoroughly gendered. On the basis of a sample of 945 female- and 1,924 male-headed households interviewed in 2014–2015 across the regions Arusha, Manyara, Ruvuma, and Lindi, female-headed households evince a fourfold prevalence in being landless (following the same definition as above). In the following sections, we illustrate how in the context of continued rural land dependency, and an uneven and gendered geography of landlessness, different drivers of land alienation interlock and jointly advance an ongoing and yet incomplete primitive accumulation.

3 | GOVERNANCE OF LAND IN TANZANIA

From colonial rule, Tanzania inherited a system of state-sanctioned land alienation through land laws (United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 1994). From a legal perspective, all land in Tanzania is public land, vested in the president as trustee for and on behalf of all Tanzanian citizens. Three overarching land categories are defined to govern land use and land control: *reserved land*, *village land*, and *general land*. General land includes urban areas and large-scale investments. It falls directly under the Commissioner for Lands and is defined in Land Act No. 4 as "all public land, which is not reserved land or village land, and includes *unoccupied* or *unused* village land" (URT, 1999, p. 10, our emphasis). General land is therefore an ambiguous residual land category for lands that either are not clearly categorized otherwise (Sundet, 2005) or can be claimed as "unused," "unoccupied," "undeveloped," and so forth. Such claims are enabled by the lack of a national cadastre and inaccurate and disputed records of village and reserved land boundaries, and they are generally underpinned by unequal power relations that render migrants, women, and pastoralists particularly vulnerable (Odgaard, 2002).

Reserved land is governed by various statutory bodies. Forest reserves are for example governed by the Tanzanian Forest Service in accordance with the Forest Act 2002. The vast majority of reserved land in Tanzania is

⁴<https://www.udsm.ac.tz/node/492>.

⁵<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/pima/>.

set aside for conservation and tourism purposes. Village land is governed by democratically elected village councils under the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999. The act formally recognizes customary land rights and has legal provisions to prevent discrimination against women and vulnerable groups. Smallholders are encouraged to further secure their land rights by obtaining certificates of customary rights of occupancy (CCROs), and male-headed households are encouraged to register land titles jointly with their wives (Odgaard, 2006), yet progress towards more equitable land registration is slow (Pedersen, 2015). For instance, only 3.4% and 5.8% of issued CCROs in Babati and Bariadi Districts were jointly received by a man and his wife (URT, 2010). Preliminary results from a 2014–2016 study show similar trends across the districts Chamwino, Kongwa, and Kasulu. On average, 11.4% of CCROs were held jointly by a man and a woman (Askew & Odgaard, in review). Through CCROs, rural people are expected to avoid land disputes, increase agricultural productivity, and become integrated in the formal banking sector, with the CCRO acting as collateral to receive a loan. CCROs are technically not to be issued before the village has obtained a certificate of village land from the Commissioner of Lands, which is conditioned upon the successful surveying and demarcating of village boundaries, an approved village land use plan and a village registry (Stein et al., 2016).⁶

Village land use planning (VLUP) has attained a prominent role in land tenure formalization policies that aim to identify “freely available” and “unoccupied” village land for large-scale agricultural investment or community-based conservation. VLUP exercises invite several actors to influence the process: They are sometimes facilitated by outsiders interested to acquire land, and they must be reviewed by district land and planning officers before approval by the National Land Use Planning Commission is sought (Walwa, 2017). Although ostensibly aimed at secure land rights and empowerment for village communities, VLUP processes have, in practice, resulted in physical or economic displacement and reinforced the very same farmer–herder conflicts that they proclaim to mitigate (Walwa, 2017). VLUP processes have been observed to enable a shift of authority into the hands of political-bureaucratic and economic elites and have furthered land alienation at the expense of both farmers and pastoralists in favour of investments in commercial agriculture, conservation, and tourism (Greco, 2016; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein & Cunningham, 2017). Farmers and pastoralists who are deemed migrants are particularly vulnerable to be rendered landless through VLUP exercises that do not recognize their residency in the village (Bluwstein, 2017; Walwa, 2017). Pastoralists with recognized claims are also vulnerable in land use planning exercises that fragment rangelands (Goldman & Riosmena, 2013) or result in limitations of livestock mobility to particular districts or villages (usually through branding of livestock) and/or forced sales of “excess cattle” (URT, 2013b, p. 193). The practice of land use planning therefore challenges provisions under the Land Acts that aim to protect people’s customary land rights by recognizing their claims to village land vis-à-vis external investors, even when smallholders do not have a title or other forms of registration. When village land is acquired by outsiders under a granted right of occupancy that is governed by statutory law, local people’s customary land rights and land claims can be overridden, because “unequal power relations lead to unequal recognition of customary and statutory law” (Locher, 2016, p. 393).

Given the evidence so far, it is therefore not surprising that the promises of land tenure formalization have been elusive, even in cases of counter-mapping of communal resources by local people (Hodgson & Schroeder, 2002; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein et al., 2016). Importantly, once land has been identified for commercial investment through village land use planning exercises, the land undergoes a legal shift out of *village land* status and village control to *general land* status and control by Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC). TIC secures a Certificate of Occupancy for the land and in turn subleases it to the investor for up to 99 years. Consequently, power over land control shifts from village to TIC (central government), regional authorities, and investors, and it remains in these hands even if the investment does not materialize. A draft of the 2016 National Land Policy proposes to limit leases to 33 years (URT, 2016a, p. 41) but suggests to allow investors to purchase “Unit Titles” in village lands that would further facilitate land alienation through highly capitalized investment (URT, 2016a, pp. 40–41). Therefore, we contend that

⁶According to a 2016 National Land Policy draft, out of roughly 12,500 villages (nobody really knows the exact number), 80% have their boundaries surveyed and 13.1% have a village land use plan (URT, 2016a).

dispossession by formalization continues to be inscribed in official land policies from the outset, rather than being an unintended outcome.

Having situated the dynamics of agrarian change in the contemporary context of land governance through land use planning and land formalization in Tanzania, we now present evidence of multiple drivers of land alienation, starting with investments in commercial agriculture, continuing with mining, and finishing with conservation.

4 | INVESTMENTS IN COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE

Table 1 provides a historical overview of land alienation through commercial agriculture and ranching. The data reflect a poor state of information, showing an inconsistent and at times conflicting picture (Sulle, 2015; URT, 1994). Official data from 2008 suggest that around 1.5% of Tanzania's terrestrial land is under commercial large-scale investments (>100 ha) and 6.6% under medium-scale farming (5–100 ha, see Table 1). Locher and Sulle (2014) estimated around 10,000 km² of new land deals above 200 ha by foreign investors⁷ for agricultural production⁸ at the height of the land rush by the end of 2012. Locher and Sulle emphasized that only 10 deals with a total area of 1,450 km² could be considered *concluded*. Focusing on agrofuel investments since 2003, Abdallah, Engström, Havnevik, and Salomonsson (2014) identified 32 mostly foreign investors that had *requested* 11,000 km² of land above 2,000 ha. Yet only nine investors *acquired* land, totalling 2,000 km². A majority have gone bankrupt or have shifted to food production and are still struggling to become operational.

The recently updated Land Matrix database covers recent deals (contract size) amounting to 2,725 km², considerably less than initially reported (Table 1). These deals spatially correlate with the SAGCOT designation (Figure 2). The SAGCOT initiative envisages the development of 350,000 ha of land into large-scale agriculture and 330,000 ha into outgrower schemes within the corridor (NewAlliance, 2014; SAGCOT, 2011). This would entail the recategorization of village into general land, which is a declared objective of the SAGCOT initiative. In a 2012 presentation aimed to advertise the SAGCOT initiative to potential investors, the Minister of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement indicated that around 9,000 km² of village land in the SAGCOT corridor had already been identified ("freed up") for potential investments on the basis of a review of village land use plans (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements [MLHS], 2012).

In addition to foreign-led investments, smaller land deals and leases by domestic investors for investments in agriculture or forestry are taking place in different parts of the country (Olwig, Noe, Kangalawe, & Luoga, 2015). In a commissioned study for the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement, the University of Dar es Salaam evaluated agricultural land holdings (>50 acres) in mainland Tanzania in 2013 (URT, 2013a). Out of a purposive sample of 691 farms covering 3,651 km² across Tanzania, ownership of 666 farms could be determined. Tanzanian individuals owned by far the most farms (455), followed by Tanzanian companies (72). However, given the differences in average farm area between domestic and foreign property owners, proportionately few foreign individuals and companies (45 out of 666) owned more than a quarter of all sampled land area (Table 2).

Table 2 may already reflect a growing urban class of Tanzanian elites who drive investments in medium-scale commercial agriculture, seeking to reinvest their wealth in land (Jayne et al., 2016). Official Tanzanian statistics indicate that 28% of urban residents are engaged in agricultural activities (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Jayne et al. (2016) report a rise in Tanzanian land ownership by urban households from 11.8% to 32.5% of national landholdings in only five years from 2005 to 2010. Within the same period, urban households increased their share of landholdings of 20 ha or above from 17.2% to 78.9% (Jayne et al., 2016). This development disproportionately affects rural women in negative ways (Knapman et al., 2017), may "exacerbate land scarcity in rural areas" (Jayne

⁷Or in collaboration between foreign and domestic investors.

⁸Including food, biofuels, timber plantations, and forestry carbon credits.

TABLE 1 Land under alienation through commercial agriculture in Tanzania

Period	Details	km ²	Share (%) ^a	Source
Colonial land alienation	German rule (1880s–1916)	5,261	0.6	URT (1994)
	British rule (1923–1961)	14,125	1.6	URT (1994)
Nationalization following Arusha Declaration 1967	NAFCO farms as of 1984 (34 farms)	700	0.1	Chachage and Mbunda (2009)
	Ex-NAFCO farms as of 2009 (29 farms)	595	0.1	Chachage and Mbunda (2009)
	NARCO ranches as of 2008 (13 ranches)	4,736	0.5	Chachage and Mbunda (2009)
Land under medium- and large-scale farming 1990s–2000s	Land under “large-scale” farming (1992, “under granted right of occupancy”)	3,247	0.4	URT (1997)
	Land under “large-scale” farming (1992, “under granted right of occupancy”)	10,927	1.2	URT (1994)
	Land under “large-scale” farming (2002/2003, including livestock ranching)	11,051	1.2	URT (2012)
	Land under “large-scale” farming (2007/2008, including livestock ranching)	11,131	1.3	URT (2012)
	Land under “large-scale” farming (>100 ha, 2008 Agriculture Sample Census)	12,940	1.5	Jayne et al. (2016)
	Land under “medium-scale” farming (5–100 ha, 2008 Agriculture Sample Census)	58,610	6.6	Jayne et al. (2016)
New large-scale land deals since 2000s	Land Matrix (>200 ha, since 2000s, “reliable,” April 2012)	20,000	2.3	Anseeuw et al. (2012)
	Land Matrix (>200 ha, since 2000s, “contract size,” July 2017)	2,725	0.3	landmatrix.org
	New land deals since 2000s (>200 ha, <i>announced, ongoing, or concluded</i> , data from end of 2012)	10,000	1.1	Locher and Sulle (2014)
	New land deals since 2000s (>200 ha, <i>concluded</i> , data from end of 2012)	1,450	0.2	Locher and Sulle (2014)
	New land deals since 2003 (>2,000 ha, <i>requested</i> , data from end of 2013)	11,000	1.2	Abdallah et al. (2014)
	New land deals since 2003 (>2,000 ha, <i>acquired</i> , data from end of 2013)	2,000	0.2	Abdallah et al. (2014)
SAGCOT plans	Village land with a land use plan within SAGCOT (391 villages as of 2012, out of planned 700)	62,000	7.0	MLHS (2012)
	Village land already identified for potential land investments within SAGCOT (as of 2012)	9,000	1.0	MLHS (2012)
	Planned large-scale agricultural production within SAGCOT by 2030	3,500	0.4	SAGCOT (2011)
	Planned outgrower schemes for agricultural production within SAGCOT	3,300	0.4	NewAlliance (2014)

Note. NAFCO = National Agriculture and Food Corporation; NARCO = National Ranching Company; SAGCOT = Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania.

^a100% = 885,800 km², Tanzania's terrestrial area excluding main water bodies, including islands Mafia, Pemba, and Zanzibar (source: World Bank 2016, Tanzania; accessed online at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/tanzania>).

et al., 2016, p. 197), and may also reconfigure social relations of property and labour. Land accumulation for production and speculation by urban elites is in some cases followed by the subsequent leasing of this land to the previous owners—often poor smallholders who cannot afford to cultivate their own land—who now find themselves as tenants working for the new landlords or co-owners. These gendered dynamics of class formation and labour grabbing tempted *The Economist* to blame the urban elites for “Africa's real land grab” (Economist, 2016).

To conclude, attempted, successful, and failed investments in large-scale land deals for agribusiness may all contribute to land alienation. Land tenure reconfigurations for medium-scale cultivation and speculation without any involvement of foreign investment constitute another important process of land alienation in Tanzania that is underpinned by and produces new dynamics of class formation and social differentiation. Importantly, agricultural investments—foreign or domestic—that do not materialize and might be excluded from official data and statistics,




FIGURE 2 SAGCOT (2011) and land deals for large-scale agriculture in Tanzania (Landmatrix, 2016)

TABLE 2 Farm ownership and size, compiled on the basis of URT (2013a)

Farm owner	Number of farms	Average farm size (ha)	% of total area
Tanzanian institution	63	829	16
Tanzanian company	72	1,203	27
Tanzanian individual	455	114	16
Tanzanian and foreign company (joint ownership)	31	1,251	12
Foreign company	31	2,550	24
Foreign individual	14	1,031	4

can have severe impacts on land access and control for both farmers and pastoralists. Overlapping claims to land and subsequent conflicts abound around investments that are initiated with little regard for local context, legal pluralism, and locally specific and gendered power relations around access to land. Because land must be acquired by the investor relatively early in the process, processes of resettlement, evictions, or fencing happen in advance of production. If the investment implementation is delayed or abandoned, land is alienated from smallholders even though nothing is being produced by the investor (Engström, 2013; Maganga et al., 2016; Stein & Cunningham, 2017).

5 | MINING

Mining has also increasingly affected land tenure in Tanzania in the past years. The government of Tanzania considers 90% of the country's terrestrial area (800,000 km²) as potentially having mining resources (URT, 2015). Recent estimates suggest that 680,000 people are engaged in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in Tanzania and another 15,000 in large-scale mining (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016; URT, 2015). Although artisanal mining is dominated by men, local economies built around mining also attract women (Bryceson & Geenen, 2016). In the wake of the 1998 Mining Act, which strongly promoted foreign direct investment, Tanzania has experienced a mining boom, and gold has become a major export commodity (Bryceson & Jønsson, 2010; Schroeder, 2012). International mining companies'




FIGURE 3 Different mining concessions in Tanzania, overlaid with an incomplete selection of protected areas. Screenshot from FlexiCadastre. Accessed January 10, 2017
 Note: ASM stands for Artisanal and Small-scale Mining.

large-scale investments and extraction methods are barely taxed by the Tanzanian state,⁹ generate little employment, have led to displacement of hundreds of thousands of artisanal miners, and have polluted the environments of farmers and pastoralists living close to mines (Emel, Huber, & Makene, 2011; Holterman, 2014; Kitula, 2006; Magai & Márquez-Velázquez, 2011; Schroeder, 2012). Tanzanian mining laws are ambiguous and vest much power in the Commissioner of Mining, whereas villagers have little say in mining concession allocations (Lange, 2008). Once minerals are discovered, mining laws take precedence over land laws, challenging existing customary land rights of rural people (Pedersen & Jacob, 2017). At times, mining investors work with outdated maps, sweeping aside claims to land ownership and control by small-scale miners, pastoralists, and farmers, and even entire villages (Kulindwa, Mashindano, Shechambo, & Sosovele, 2003; Lange, 2008). The Geological Survey of Tanzania¹⁰ maps 482 mines across the country, including 125 gold mines. According to the national mining cadastre, an estimated total area¹¹ of almost 140,000 km² (15% of Tanzania's terrestrial land area) is designated for prospect licenses for potential exploration (Figure 3).

Where mining interests collide with conservation and tourism interests, these geographic and economic intersections can lead to further expansion of conservation on village lands to compensate for mining activities in protected areas, as the example of Selous Game Reserve illustrates. Uranium mining in Selous was permitted on condition that the UNESCO World Heritage Site should not be reduced in size. Consequently, boundary changes to excise the mining area from the reserve have been proposed to include land outside the game reserve to compensate the losses

⁹But see Pedersen and Jacob (2017) for the most recent changes to Tanzania's mining legislation.

¹⁰<http://www.gmis-tanzania.com/>.

¹¹Own estimate, based on <http://portal.mem.go.tz/map/>.

to mining.¹² In return for potentially highly hazardous activities, the mining company is expected to support anti-poaching operations in and around the game reserve (Tairo, 2014). These novel intersections and alliances between conservation and mining interests can jointly challenge local land and resource control.

6 | CONSERVATION

Tanzania's colonial and post-colonial history is deeply intertwined with efforts to set aside land held in common for biodiversity conservation that would benefit tourism activities such as game viewing and hunting (Neumann, 1998). This fortress conservation approach (Brockington, 2002) was initiated in the end of the 19th century by the German colonial occupation, continued under the British rule and after independence, and was supplemented by community-based conservation initiatives since the 1990s in the course of neoliberalization of conservation (Igoe & Brockington, 2007). These two paradigmatic regimes of conservationist land control have produced an extensive network of protected areas (Figure 4). Since the late 1990s, conservation approaches in the Global South have morphed into what big international NGOs and their donors call landscape conservation,¹³ a claim to vast territories spanning different conservation interventions and protected area categories, ecosystems and habitats, people, villages, and communities (Bluwstein, forthcoming; Clay, 2016). In the following, we show how large parts of Tanzania's land are to different degrees taken out of local control and production through the advancement of different conservation regimes.

6.1 | Community-based forest management

The first community-based forest management (CBFM) schemes on village land were reserved in the 1990s, and since then, implementation has proceeded under donor financing (Lund et al., 2017). By 2012, 1,233 villages were involved in CBFM, and the area of village land under reservation was estimated at 23,667 km² (URT, 2012b).¹⁴ This estimate also includes CBFM areas in various planning stages (Lund et al., 2017). In reality, the area where CBFM has changed smallholder's access to land and land-based resources may thus be much smaller. Yet conservation "work in progress" may also imply "land alienation in progress."

Through CBFM, village councils are granted administrative powers to manage and benefit from forest reserves on village land, whereas the state can no longer exploit them and waives all royalties generated from them (Blomley & Iddi, 2009). However, with the reservation, village councils foreclose the possibility of changing land use away from it being a "forest." Farming and settlements are banned, as is livestock grazing in some areas. This change in property relations and land control implies that the forest bureaucracy gets a permanent say in determining the land use, whereas the village councils lose the right to independently change it (Sungusia & Lund, 2016). Yet, in terms of access to forest-based livelihoods, CBFM, in principle, enables villagers to exclude others, such as urban elites, from exploiting their forest areas. Villagers gain legal access to retain all benefits from the use of the forest under the constraint that it is managed in accordance with the Forest Act 2002. In practice, this access is curtailed by various other pieces of legislation and bureaucratic procedures (Sungusia & Lund, 2016). Thus, it took 20 years since the initiation of CBFM in Tanzania before the first larger volume of timber was harvested in a CBFM forest and substantial revenues started flowing (Khatun et al., 2015).

¹²Interview with Ministry official, November 2016. Relevant United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decisions and documents available at <http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/4814> and <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/199/documents/>.

¹³For example, African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), The Nature Conservancy, (TNC), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

¹⁴We do not mention Joint Forest Management here as it only applies to reserved forests under state authority (see Table 3).




FIGURE 4 Conservation territories in Tanzania. Geographic information system (GIS) shapefiles are sourced from the recent World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) dataset (see Table 3) and from several known protected areas that are missing in WDPA (seven game reserves, four wildlife management areas, and one forest reserve), provided by World Wildlife Fund. Community-based forest management is not mapped for lack of geodata

Formalization of villagers' rights to access forests, but also the responsibility to maintain them, has led to restrictions, increased enforcement, and policing of fellow villagers (Lund & Treue, 2008; Vyamana, 2009). This has constrained and criminalized the livelihoods of poor and forest-dependent smallholders while giving a small elite of village-level forest managers the possibility of benefiting from allowances and associated income opportunities (Green & Lund, 2015; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013).

6.2 | Wildlife management areas

Since the early 2000s, around 20 wildlife management areas (WMAs) have been established on around 30,000 km² of village land across Tanzania. This has happened under the auspices of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, supported by various international donors,¹⁵ and several international conservation NGOs, most prominently WWF, AWF, WCS, and FZS. A WMA consists of a contiguous village land area set aside by several neighbouring villages for wildlife conservation purposes. Often, WMAs are established in areas that are believed to serve connectivity or corridor functions for the movement of wildlife between core protected areas (Goldman, 2009). In WMAs, agriculture, settlements and, in some places, livestock grazing are banned or heavily restricted through village land use planning. Many other land-dependent activities, such as production of charcoal or the collection of firewood or construction materials, are also restricted or banned altogether. In return, villages are promised revenues from tourism investors who are invited to operate in WMAs under a contractual agreement with the community-based organization (CBO). A CBO manages the WMA jointly with a board of trustees¹⁶ on behalf of the

¹⁵For example, United States Agency for International Development, Danish International Development Agency (Danida), German Development Agency (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ) German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW) Agence Française de Développement, and Global Environmental Finance/United Nations Development Programme.

¹⁶That includes district government representatives.

member villages. The land administration powers bestowed on village councils by the Local Government Act of 1982 and reinforced with the 1999 Village Land Act No. 5 are thereby handed over to these newly established and weakly accountable institutions, resulting in often overly restrictive land use and management plans that foreclose alternative land use in WMA territories into the future (Bluwstein et al., 2016). CBOs are generally not willing to allow changes in WMA land use planning, and it is virtually impossible for dissenting communities or even entire villages to undo a WMA in practice, once it is established (Bluwstein et al., 2016; Bluwstein & Lund, 2018). WMAs thus, in many cases, erode the progressive features of land reforms inscribed in the Land Acts of 1999.

In many instances, the implementation of WMAs has spurred land and boundary conflicts, evictions, and displacement, despite the rhetoric of community-based participation and ownership. Restrictive WMA regimes tend to recentralize land and resource control, offering few employment opportunities in return (Benjaminsen et al., 2013; Green & Adams, 2014). Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable to WMA interventions, especially if they are poor (Homewood, Nielsen, & Keane, in review). Contrary to CBFM arrangements that allow village councils to protect village land against external interests and to keep revenues from resource use, in WMAs new actors—conservation NGOs, tourism investors, and local economic and political elites—are invited to control village lands in the name of community-based conservation. This undermines elected village councils and leads to the emergence of new forms of authority over land control, while promoting elite capture of WMA benefits (Bluwstein, 2017).

There are a few cases where local residents have chosen to create a WMA to protect their land rights against actual or perceived outsiders who may want to establish themselves in these villages (Bluwstein, forthcoming). Often the ones excluded are landless migrants searching for land, farmers in need to expand their activities but lacking inputs to intensify production, or urban or rural elites looking for capital investment opportunities. These cases of exclusion, too, tend to contribute to the growing land pressure across the country when communities or entire villages succeed in taking land out of production or investment.

6.3 | National parks and game and forest reserves

Most of Tanzania's core protected areas (national parks and game and forest reserves) were initially declared many decades ago, often involving evictions (Brockington, Sachedina, & Scholfield, 2008; Sunseri, 2009). However, their protection status and territories have not remained stable, often leading to recurring incidences of physical and economic displacement (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). Displacement reconfigures the gendered intrahousehold dynamics in complex ways, in many instances creating new burdens for women, but to some extent also offering opportunities to renegotiate entrenched gender roles (Brockington, 2002). Many parks and reserves have consolidated or expanded their existing territories in the past decades, often animated by the landscape vision of conservation NGOs and their donors (Bluwstein, forthcoming). With the introduction of GPS technology in the 2000s, several national parks have resurveyed their boundaries, which led to new claims against adjacent villages (Boerstra, 2017; Sachedina, 2008). Calls to resettle rural people or to relocate entire villages in order to “resolve” protracted boundary conflicts with protected areas are common and continue until this day.¹⁷

Similarly, forest reserves in Tanzania have been gazetted, expanded, diminished, or entirely degazetted over the past century since the German colonial period (Hurst, 2004; Sunseri, 2009). Furthermore, changing regulations and waxing and waning patterns of enforcement have implied that the role of forest reserves in rural livelihoods has been in constant flux. The forest reserve estate has grown throughout the post-colonial period, especially in the 1980s and 1990s (Hurst, 2004). Today, according to different sources, Tanzania features around 450–700 forest reserves (see Table 3). Since the formation of the state agency Tanzania Forest Service in 2010, there has been an increased emphasis on revenue generation from forest reserves, which has led to more enforcement and evictions, as well as to

¹⁷For example, nine villages adjacent to Ruaha National Park are to be “removed completely.” IPP *Guardian*, June 15, 2017 (<http://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/act-environmental-degradation-samia-orders-dcs>).

TABLE 3 Territories under different forms of conservation in Tanzania

Conservation initiative	abbr.	Introduced since	Official government data ^a		WWF ^b		World database on Protected Areas ^c		Min range km ²	Max range	Min range Share (%)	Max range
			n	km ²	n	km ²	n	km ²				
Game reserves	GR ^{T, L}	1890s	28	117,755	21	111,246	+ 19	94,666	94,666	117,755	10.7	117,755
Forest reserves (excluding CBFM, including JFM)	FR ^T	1890s	455	142,500	523	88,389	+ 692	94,023	88,389	142,500	10.6	142,500
National parks	NP ^{T, L}	1940s	16	57,366	16	44,342	+ 16	48,681	44,342	57,366	5.5	57,366
Game controlled areas	GCA ^T	1940s	41	58,565			+ 19	71,369	58,565	71,369	8.1	71,369
Ngorongoro Conservation Area	NCA ^T	1959	1	8,292			+ 1	8,305	8,292	8,305	0.9	8,305
Nature reserves	NR ^{T, L}	1990s	12	3,097			+ 6	2,009	2,009	3,097	0.2	3,097
Marine parks/reserves	MP, MR ^T	1990s	4		4	932	+ 5	1,489	932	1,489	0.2	1,489
Community-based forest management (excluding JFM)	CBFM	1990s	1,233	23,667			+ na	na (use government data)	23,667	23,667		23,667
Wildlife management areas (operational)	WMA ^T	2000s	19	29,518	16	28,568	+ 13	29,353	28,568	29,518	3.3	29,518
Double counting (NPs, GRs, FRs, NCA, NRs, MPRs, GCAs, and WMAs), based on WDPA dataset							-	34,023			3.8	
Total area under protection (without OAs, with CBFM, without double counting)							=	339,539	315,407	421,043	35.6	47.5
Additional conservation designations, not included above												
Missing PAs ^e					12	22,414	+ 12	22,414	22,414	22,414	2.5	22,414
World heritage sites	WHS ^T	1979					4	69,773				
Ramsar sites, terrestrial and marine	Ramsar ^T	2000	4	48,684			4	52,511				
Net Ramsar and WHS terrestrial area outside of PAs (without double counting), based on WDPA dataset							+	9,930	9,930	9,930	1.1	9,930
Total area under protection (with missing PAs, with net WHS and Ramsar terrestrial areas, without double counting)							=	371,883	347,751	453,387	39.3	51.2

Note. JFM = Joint Forest Management; L = rural livelihoods fully prohibited; na = not available; OAs = open areas; PAs = protected areas; T = tourism allowed; WDPA = World Database on Protected Areas; WWF = World Wildlife Fund.
 Bold emphasis is to indicate total area.
^aURT (2012b), URT (2013c), URT (2013d), URT (2014), and Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (2017).
^bGIS shapefiles provided by WWF staff in 2014.
^cUnited Nations Environment Programme-World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 2017. GIS shapefiles and CSV dataset available at <https://www.protectedplanet.net/country/TZ>. Accessed January 17, 2017.
^d100% = 885,800 km², Tanzania's terrestrial area.
^ePAs missing in WDPA dataset: seven GRs (14,701 km²), four WMAs (8,025 km²), and one FR (1,448 km²). Based on WWF shapefiles.

renewed efforts to re-establish firm reserve boundaries. Thus, rural people who in the past benefited from access to poorly defined, demarcated, and enforced reserve boundaries now find themselves under increasing scrutiny and policing.

6.4 | Hunting concessions

There are around 140 hunting blocks in Tanzania. A hunting block is neither a protected area nor a land category, but a concession to hunt in a bounded area inside a core protected area (game reserve [GR]), a game controlled area (GCA), an open area (OA), or a wildlife management area (WMA). GCAs and OAs have overlapped with communal lands since their establishment during colonial rule. The Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism can allocate a hunting block within a GCA or an OA, thereby challenging game viewing tourism activities on village lands that may have been agreed on with the approval of village governments. The Wildlife Division favours professional hunting outfitters' interests against the interests of village governments because—unlike game viewing activities—hunting concessions directly fund the Ministry's coffers, and rents can be captured directly by Ministry officials (Benjaminsen et al., 2013). However, OAs are not codified as a land category in land or wildlife laws. Similarly, many GCAs *de jure* also ceased to exist as a land category after the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act declared that GCAs cannot overlap with village lands (URT, 2009, § 16(5)). Nonetheless, until this day, the liminal category of GCAs—more so than of OAs—is used to assign hunting blocks against the will of village councils (Gardner, 2016) or to impose restrictions on settlement and livestock keeping (URT, 2013b). GCAs and OAs continue to be invoked in official government and NGO reports and statistics (World Database on Protected Areas; URT, 2013c). If villages are opposing the often highly restrictive hunting operations on their lands (Wright, 2016), the Wildlife Division might impose a false choice on village governments to either accept a restrictive WMA scheme or to see their land being reassigned as exclusive hunting grounds under a GCA or a GR regime, as the long-standing and ongoing conflict in Loliondo demonstrates (Gardner, 2016).

Most hunting blocks are controlled by foreigners (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, 2006), and some are directly linked to ultra-rich U.S. or Arab oligarchs or Asian–Tanzanian nationals (Wright, 2016), whose wealth and exclusive access to government authorities can corrupt individuals at all levels of government down to elected village officials (Packer, 2015). The U.S.-based Friedkin Conservation Fund alone claims an area of 6.1 million acres (24,685 km²)—2.8% of Tanzania's terrestrial area—for conservation and tourism through exclusive hunting, game viewing, and lodging.¹⁸ Hunting concessions on village lands are often subleased to other hunting operators (Packer, 2015) or even to mining companies (Noe, 2013) without any say by the village governments, whose land is traded as a commodity between private investors for significant sums of money, with negligible compensation for the villages (Kisembo, 2012).

In sum, foreign and domestic interests in tourism, wildlife and forest conservation constitute the major immediate driver of land tenure change and land alienation in Tanzania. By comparing the most authoritative yet incomplete and inaccurate sources, we conclude that around 42% of Tanzania's total terrestrial area is already enclosed for different forms of conservation (Table 3 and Figure 4).¹⁹ Taking into account the widespread boundary uncertainties, overlapping claims, and different data sources, we provide a range of 39.3–51.2%.

¹⁸<http://www.tgts.com/philanthropy/>.

¹⁹There is no single accurate dataset of protected areas in Tanzania, but different organizations keep their own records, which they sometimes share with each other. Because many protected areas are in the process of being upgraded or resurveyed, or their boundaries remain poorly known to conservation authorities, any available datasets can show only an outdated, incomplete, and inaccurate snapshot. To counter this, in Table 3, we provide a spatial range of the total amount of land that is likely claimed for conservation. Our estimate builds on the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA, accessed January 11, 2017) and improves it by avoiding double counting and by including a number of known protected areas that are missing in WDPA. WDPA shows an area of around 361,000 km² under different forms of protection, yet it includes double counting, its WMA coverage is incomplete, and CBFM areas are entirely excluded.

This estimate differs significantly from often-repeated official statistics about land distribution in Tanzania. A recent draft of the National Land Policy, for instance, gives the impression that there is plenty of village land and underplays the extent of conservation enclosures by stating that “village land is estimated to be 70 percent, general land 2 percent and reserved land which includes forest and wildlife sanctuaries is 28 percent” (URT, 2016a, p. 19). Such misleading statistics become even more problematic if we also consider the many more WMAs that are currently planned across Tanzania.²⁰ If realized, Tanzania could claim to protect 50% or more of its terrestrial area in the name of conservation and tourism.²¹ We do not think that all WMAs will be implemented as envisioned due to (a) local resistance (e.g., Loliondo and Simanjiro), (b) lack of investment interest (in most southern and western areas), or (c) too ambitious spatial planning (e.g., Lake Natron). However, the planning process in itself raises serious concerns over land alienation (Gardner, 2012). It is due to such contestations around planning and territorial claims in the name of conservation that we do not provide one fixed estimate for total land under conservation, but rather offer a corroborated estimate on the spatial extent of conservation *claims*. The widespread and vast boundary uncertainties, overlaps, and discrepancies among different data sources constitute a major driver of land conflicts, as rural communities have little say over the maps that prescribe whether people's actions and resident status are lawful or not (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018).

7 | THE INTERLOCKING NATURE OF MULTIPLE DRIVERS OF LAND ALIENATION

Many current land tenure conflicts are remnants of past processes of land alienation (Nelson, Sulle, & Lekaita, 2012; Sundet, 1997; URT, 1994). With the onset of colonial rule, agropastoral communities saw their territories diminished by land reservations and commercial agriculture, and were forced into less fertile territories with a lack of water resources for agricultural and livestock production (Hodgson, 2001; Neumann, 1998). Colonial land alienation gave way to policies of post-colonial villagization through resettlement and the nationalization of land through parastatals in the 1970s (Shivji, 1998; Sundet, 1997). Land alienation policies were again reconfigured during the transition from post-colonial socialism towards liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, when large swaths of communal lands were appropriated for agriculture, tourism, and mining (Igoe & Brockington, 1999; Richter, 1994; URT, 1994).

The history of dispossession is as complex as it is contested. For instance, large-scale agricultural investments through parastatals such as the National Food and Agricultural Corporation displaced many smallholders and pastoralists. Later, these people would be blamed for “invading” alienated lands (Chachage & Mbunda, 2009). After many parastatal companies had been dismantled and privatized by the late 1990s/2000s, the lands that remained without claimants were reappropriated by farmers or pastoralists. In some cases, people would advance their land claims in the form of customary rights of occupancy under adverse possession according to the Village Land Act 1999, having used abandoned land for more than 12 years. However, their claims and land rights have often not been recognized formally (Chachage & Mbunda, 2009), and years later, new investors would purchase the contested lands by paying the former—officially recognized—owners, and attempting to evict the farmers or pastoralists. Examples are a sugar plantation in Bagamoyo (Chung, 2017), a rice plantation in Kilombero (Maganga et al., 2016), and a tourism lodge and investment in Loliondo (Gardner, 2016).

The case of Kilombero is particularly insightful in illustrating how multiple and intersecting authoritative claims to land can converge into a powerful bulwark against the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. In 2006–2007, the government evicted thousands of pastoralists from the Usangu wetlands that were then incorporated into the Ruaha National Park. At least 15 villages had to be “moved” to make space for the park. According to Walsh (2012, p. 323), the expansion of the park was pushed by a small group of well-connected tourism investors that effectively lobbied

²⁰Different sources suggest 38 or 39 WMAs to be eventually established on 125,000–136,714 km² (Mayeta, 2016; Sosovele, 2015).

²¹An accurate estimate is impossible, because some WMAs would replace some of the existent GCAs.

the central government to evict pastoralists by “disseminating the degradation narratives and fuelling the environmental panic.” Many of the displaced people and their livestock ended up in the Kilombero valley. Kilombero had already been designated a GCA and a Ramsar site under the international Wetland Convention.²² Backed by the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act, which introduced stringent restrictions on human activities in Game Controlled Areas, the state-run research institute TAWIRI²³ concluded that cultivation and settlement—51.4% of land use in the Kilombero valley in 2009—were “incompatible” with the GCA designation (TAWIRI, 2011, cited in URT, 2013b). Within the scope of Ramsar, 29 villages in the Kilombero and Ulanga districts had to prepare restrictive village land use plans (Axberg et al., 2011; Greco, 2016) that in 2011–2012 culminated in evictions in line with the 2009 Wildlife Conservation Act (URT, 2013b). Soon thereafter, in 2013, the international consulting firm Environmental Resources Management (ERM) conducted environmental and social impact studies for SAGCOT in, among other places, the Kilombero valley (ERM, 2013; URT, 2013b). With reference to the earlier TAWIRI report, ERM highlighted how “the designation of the floodplain and surrounding areas as a Game Controlled Area, and also as a Ramsar Site, has seemingly had very little deterrent effect on encroachment” (URT, 2013b, p. 163). ERM staff also pointed out that efforts to evict pastoralists from Kilombero were not accompanied by a plan to identify an alternative location for the displaced (ERM, 2013). The most recent report on vulnerable groups and social impacts of SAGCOT—issued by the Prime Minister’s office in 2016—omitted any references to Usangu evictions as reasons for immigration into Kilombero, and it failed to include the recent evictions from Kilombero (URT, 2016b). The same year, repeated calls to protect the “national heritage” against “invaders” were issued by regional government authorities (Guardian, 2016a).

Another prominent case of the interlocking nature of land alienation centres around the plight of Barabaig pastoralists, whose homeland in Hanang District was appropriated by a Canadian–Tanzanian wheat investment scheme in the 1980s and 1990s (Lane, 1994). The Barabaig have, since then, struggled to find other lands for livestock grazing and watering. In response to land alienation, some Barabaig have settled in neighbouring Babati District close to Lake Manyara, where their resident status is currently challenged by a European ecotourism investor and a village government in the context of community-based conservation, known as Burunge Wildlife Management Area (Bluwstein, 2017). Other Barabaig migrated to Bagamoyo District, where a Swedish company was promised land for sugar cane production in 2006. Years before the official allocation of 20,000 ha to the company in 2013, this investment intensified conflicts among Barabaig pastoralists, other pastoral groups, and farmers present in the area. Eventually, the investment has stalled and failed to plant any sugar cane. In November 2016, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development revoked the investor’s title deed. This exemplifies that deals that do not materialize and fail to produce can also lead to land alienation (Chung, 2017). In another and similar case, both farmers and immigrant Sukuma pastoralists were dispossessed of land and water access due to a stalled biofuel–food investment project in Kigoma (Engström, 2013).

Yet another example illustrates the historical amnesia by conservationists who often perceive people living adjacent to protected areas as a threat, with little regard to histories of dispossession and land alienation that contribute to migration and to land conversion to agriculture. Markus Borner, the former director of Frankfurt Zoological Society, a prominent German conservation NGO, published an influential paper in 1985 suggesting that due to human activities such as agriculture taking place around Tarangire National Park in Northern Tanzania, Tarangire is becoming an “isolated ‘island’ park” for resident species only (Borner, 1985, p. 91). Some of the land conversion to agriculture was due to immigration of displaced farmers from the slopes of Mount Meru and Kilimanjaro to make space for European coffee plantations and national parks (Igoe, 2008). Regardless, Borner recommended to ban agriculture across 6,000 km² around the park and to destock the Maasai. Thus, previous dispossession and land alienation taking place

²²Ramsar sites are managed by the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Ramsar sites overlap with village lands, game controlled areas, game reserves and forest reserves, lakes, and marine parks, representing an additional layer of land and water protection against subsistence use (see Table 3 and Figure 4).

²³Tanzania’s Wildlife Research Institute.

hundreds of kilometres away (around Meru and Kilimanjaro) created, years later, new justifications for land control and alienation in a new area (around Tarangire).

We have not touched upon land alienation in the wake of the establishment of refugee camps. However, as recently as in 2000, Tanzania hosted the largest population of refugees on the African continent with over 680,000 people from Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda.²⁴ Refugee camps were established across Kigoma and Kagera regions on land that was in most cases acquired from villages and converted into general land. Camps operated by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) have all resulted in land loss to local communities and were not returned to the villagers even after most camps were eventually shut down (although recently some had to reopen due to the continuing conflict in Burundi). More research is needed to better determine the extent of land alienation in these cases.

In response to dispossession, many pastoralists and farmers diversify their income sources, continue migrating to other parts of the country, or turn to urban areas in search for wage labour (May & Ikayo, 2007; McCabe, Smith, Leslie, & Telligman, 2014; Nyenza, Nzunda, & Katani, 2013). However, the formal labour market in Tanzania absorbs only a fraction of those searching for work (Wuyts & Kilama, 2016). The growing tensions between farmers and pastoralists, pastoralists and conservationists, or farmers and conservationists are exemplifying this development. To what degree are human population growth and migration intertwined with processes of land alienation and associated land conflicts that we have illustrated so far? Given the population projections as previously discussed, most Tanzanians will continue to depend on land as their primary means of (re)production due to lack of alternatives, although making a living in rural areas is becoming increasingly difficult for many (Coulson, 2013; Patnaik & Moyo, 2011). Coulson (2013) suggests that two opposing processes take place in Tanzania in parallel (and may be spatially unevenly distributed) and will likely shape the future of Tanzania's peasantry: On one hand, agricultural innovation can to some degree counteract population growth and a decreasing land availability (see Boserup, 1965); on the other hand, deagrarianization (see Bryceson's work) is another response to decreasing land availability and reduced agricultural productivity. Although it is difficult to pass a definite judgement on which of the two processes currently prevails, rural-urban and rural-rural migration dynamics and widespread land conflicts suggest that, in a context of projected population growth and a jobless economic growth, an increasingly land-deprived peasantry will suffer growing hardship in the future.

8 | CONCLUSION

Contrary to claims of unused land, we assert that the overall land pressure in Tanzania has increased substantially over the past 1–2 decades. Reinforced by continual land dependency of the rural population, population growth, and increasing social differentiation, this development is a consequence of Tanzania's embracement of neoliberal policies to attract and enable foreign and domestic investment for conservation and tourism, mining, and agriculture. Historical and present data on land under conservation, medium- or large-scale agriculture, and mining are incomplete and to some extent ambiguous. Moreover, many land tenure reconfigurations that we describe cannot be simply conceptualized, measured, and counted as physical land grabs. Rather, the rush to land use planning and titling, and pastoral and labour migration patterns are indicators of often indirectly experienced effects of an ongoing and incomplete primitive accumulation. Accumulation by dispossession comes in many shapes ranging from the complete alienation of land, to restrictions on the uses of land as a means of production. The processes underlying land alienation are underpinned by uneven power relations that particularly affect poor and female-headed households pertaining to land access and resource control. The effects further extend into the patriarchal household, leading to a locally specific and *a priori* unpredictable renegotiation of gender roles and relations in the wake of commercial agriculture, mining, or conservation interventions (Brockington, 2002; Bryceson & Jønsson, 2010; Chung, 2017). Such

²⁴Tanzanian refugee numbers drops below 100,000: UN, "UNHCR/REFDAILY, November 29, 2009. Also, "Tanzania opens new camps for Burundian refugees to ease conditions in Nyarugusu Camp," UNHCR, October 7, 2015.

land tenure reconfigurations, of course, do not go unchallenged as demonstrated by some examples of failed investments in large-scale agriculture or stalled implementations of wildlife management areas or hunting concessions.

The localized effects of all these reconfigurations are geographically contingent, unevenly distributed, not always associated with foreign investment, and they contribute jointly to a growing land pressure in Tanzania. As shown in this article, exclusive attention to foreign investment or a particular sector (such as agriculture) would unnecessarily narrow the analysis. Instead, an aggregated view across sectors, actors, institutions, time, and scales is needed to appreciate the interlocking nature of different processes of land alienation. The ongoing scramble for land in Tanzania pushes land-dependent, yet land-deprived, people to respond in ways that may look like voluntary choices, but end up further undermining the conditions of land-based reproduction.²⁵ Local processes of land alienation mutually reinforce one another, amplifying land tenure reconfigurations that at an aggregate scale mean growing land pressure overall. With these various processes jointly contributing to a scramble for land, we can begin to see a “simple reproduction squeeze” (Bernstein, 1977), whereby the most vulnerable groups—rural poor, migrants, women, youth, pastoralists—find it increasingly difficult to maintain or increase their consumption and production. This may, in turn, lend support to claims that rural livelihoods are less productive than large-scale investments, thereby further entrenching the arguments for land tenure changes that adversely affect vulnerable smallholders, who become increasingly trapped between land dependence and land deprivation. Ultimately, official policy objectives of poverty alleviation and inclusive development through land use planning, land tenure formalization, agricultural commercialization, mineral extraction, and community-based conservation and tourism will fail, as long Tanzania’s political economy advances an uneven development through land alienation.

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²⁵In the Indonesian context, Li (2014) describes a similar apparently self-determined process of individualization of land rights and formalization of capitalist relations *from below*, where smallholders themselves are taking initiatives to improve their condition. To Li, the tragedy is that many do not become incorporated into commercial production but cannot go back to a “past condition” either, becoming a surplus population without land.

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