

Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim-Majority Countries: Reconceptualization and Assessment

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To capture the common features of diverse fundamentalist movements, overcome etymological variability, and assess predictors, religious fundamentalism is conceptualized as a set of beliefs about and attitudes toward religion, expressed in a disciplinarian deity, literalism, exclusivity, and intolerance. Evidence from representative samples of over 23,000 adults in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey supports the conclusion that fundamentalism is stronger in countries where religious liberty is lower, religion less fractionalized, state structure less fragmented, regulation of religion greater, and the national context less globalized. Among individuals within countries, fundamentalism is linked to religiosity, confidence in religious institutions, belief in religious modernity, belief in conspiracies, xenophobia, fatalism, weaker liberal values, trust in family and friends, reliance on less diverse information sources, lower socioeconomic status, and membership in an ethnic majority or dominant religion/sect. We discuss implications of these findings for understanding fundamentalism and the need for further research.

Keywords: *fundamentalism, Islam, Christianity, Sunni, Shia, Muslim-majority countries.*

INTRODUCTION

The literature on religious fundamentalism has considerably expanded in recent decades. Yet, three major challenges continue to hamper establishing empirical generalization and theoretical abstraction concerning its predictors on the country and individual levels. First, the movements so characterized vary historically, cross-nationally, and across religions. Examples of such variability are numerous, particularly in contemporary Muslim-majority countries: the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Arab countries, *Jama'at Islami* in Pakistan, *Front Islamique du Salut* in Algeria, the *Taliban* in Afghanistan, the National Islamic Front in the Sudan, *Hamas* in the Gaza Strip, *al-Shabaab* in Somalia, and *Boko Haram* in Nigeria in Sunni Islam; the *Fedayeen-e Islam* and the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, the *Hezbollah* in Lebanon, and the *Houthis* in Yemen in Shia Islam. Also included are such myriad transnational terror groups as *al-Qaeda* and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Ahmad 1964; Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Kepel 1985; Mitchell 1993 [1969]; Roy 1994; Sivan 1985).

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Complicating the subject is the etymological variability and ambiguity of the term itself. While fundamentalism is traced to some Christian churches in 20th-century United States (Marsden 1980; Smith 1998; Wills 1990) and leads some to argue against its usage in Islam (Esposito 1992), others have argued that the construct is still preferable over the alternatives to identify similar types of movements in Judaism, Islam, and other religious traditions (Marty and Appleby 1991; Moaddel and Karabenick 2013). We propose a conceptualization and operational definition of fundamentalism that is multidimensional and thus goes beyond the existing approaches in Christianity (Altemeyer 2003; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004) and Islam (Moaddel and Karabenick 2008, 2013) and is generalizable to the Abrahamic faiths.

Finally, while scholars have moved beyond single cases to detect general “transnational, transcultural” patterns of religious fundamentalism (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Antoun 2008; Emerson and Hartman 2006:130; Lawrence 1989; Munson 1989; Riesebrodt 1993), their definitions vary widely and are sometimes constructed in terms that overlook its religious character; that is, fundamentalism is considered (a) a reaction to secularization (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Kaplan 1992), (b) “an orientation to the modern world” (Antoun 2008:2; Lawrence 1989), (c) “a style of political participation” (Lustick 1988:5), (d) “an urban movement directed primarily against the dissolution of personalistic, patriarchal notions of order” (Riesebrodt 1993:9), and (e) a “hierarchy, patriarchy, discipline, and seclusion” (Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai 2005:25). Aspects of these definitions are also often conflated with propositional statements concerning the causes of fundamentalism; for example, that fundamentalism is a reaction to modernization (Almond, Sivan, and Appleby 1995; Emerson and Hartman 2006:134), or an urban movement to protect a patriarchal order (Riesebrodt 1993).

Reconceptualizing Religious Fundamentalism

To overcome these limitations, we propose that fundamentalists, despite their diversity and often irreconcilable differences—such as those found between Christian and Muslim or Shia and Sunni variants—share core orientations toward their own and other’s religions (Altemeyer 2003; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008, 2013; Schwartz and Lindley 2005; Summers 2006). We conceptualize these core orientations as a distinctive set of beliefs and attitudes that rests on a disciplinarian conception of the deity, a literal reading of the scriptures, religious exclusivity, and intolerance. Focusing on the Abrahamic faiths, fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes are distinguishable from the basic tenets of these faiths that the adherents unquestionably accept. These tenets in (Shia and Sunni) Islam, for example, include the belief in the oneness of God, the Prophecy of Muhammad, the Quran as the word God, and the Resurrection and Day of Judgment. In Christianity, they are the belief in the trinitarian notion of God as Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, Jesus as the Son of God, and the Virgin Mary. Muslim or Christian fundamentalists certainly believe in the tenets of their own religion. But the belief that their religion is closer to God than other religions, that only Muslims or Christians will go to heaven, that God severely punishes people even though they have engaged in only a minor infraction of religious laws, or that the Quran or the Bible is literally true—all constitute fundamentalist beliefs because they display distinctive religious orientations rather than asserting specific tenets of either faith.

Fundamentalism also differs from religious conservatism (Belcher, Fandetti, and Cole 2004). For some, fundamentalism is a subset of conservatism, such as conservative Protestants (Woodberry and Smith 1998), and for others, it is similar to conservatism (Glass and Jacobs 2005; Glass and Nath 2006). However, a clearer conceptualization and more precise measurement of the term, which are necessary for a better understanding of the subject (Woodberry and Smith 1998), require considering fundamentalism and conservatism as distinct phenomena. The latter is primarily concerned with social issues and preserving the norms associated with the religious tradition such as those governing gender relations and communal practices (Davidman 1991;

Grasmick, Wilcox, and Bird 1990; Hawley 1994; Smith 1998), whereas fundamentalism is a distinctive orientation toward one's and others' religion such as adherence to literalism or the belief in the exclusivity or superiority of one's religious community.

Finally, our conceptualization is deemed preferable to the single-factor conceptions of fundamentalism, primarily those defined solely on text-based inerrancy or intratextuality (e.g., Williamson et al. 2010). The latter exclusively focuses on the scriptures, which is only one facet of religions. Rather, religions are multifaceted, consisting of beliefs in supernatural forces or entities that are codified in the scriptures, embodied in saints and religious leaders, grounded in organizations, objectified in symbols and sartorial regimes, supported by the communities of the faithful (e.g., the abode of Islam, Christendom), enacted in periodic rituals, and affirmed or referred to in daily conversations. A multidimensional conception of the term that considers these multiple aspects of religion is more stable across individuals and nations than fundamentalism as simply inerrancy. We thus suggest four interrelated components that together constitute fundamentalist orientations. These are beliefs in: (a) a *disciplinarian deity*—a God who rewards the faithful and punishes in Hell those who fail to follow His instructions;¹ (b) the *inerrancy* of the scriptures—the belief in the scriptures as a comprehensive system of universal truth and historical accuracy (e.g., the Chicago Statement of Biblical Inerrancy 1978) that is superior to science; (c) religious *exclusivity*—the belief that one's faith is decidedly superior to other faiths and that only the faithful members of one's religion “will enjoy religious rewards and compensators” (Sherkat 2014:24); and (d) religious *intolerance*²—that the faithful restrict interaction with the followers of other faiths, maintain religious boundaries to keep the faith pure, and limit the rights of other religions. Although the strength of these components may vary among individuals and groups, we propose that they are coterminous with one another and form a single fundamentalism construct.

These features were present in such historically specific forms of fundamentalism as the movements for the rehabilitation of Islam that followed the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1787) in Arabia and Shah Waliullah (1703–1762) in India. Firmly believing that impurity had crept into the faith, these movements advocated a return to the fundamentals of Islam practiced by the first generation of Muslims, revitalized the notion of the oneness of God to attack the prerogative of the ruling elite, and demanded the formation of an Islamic state in order to protect the purity of the Islamic community from the influence of other cultures, which for Shah Waliullahis meant the folkways and mores of the Hindus, and for the Wahhabis, the Ottomans and the Shia (Ahmad 1967; Hourani 1983; Malik 1980; Moaddel 2005).

These religious orientations were revived by Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, and Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979), the founder of *Jamaati Islami* in India and Pakistan. For Banna, “the provision of Islam and its teachings are all inclusive, encompassing the affairs of the people in this world and the hereafter . . . Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation . . . and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and

¹On the face of it, this component applies to only theistic (Abrahamic) religions. Nonetheless, given the fundamentalists' preoccupation with God's retributions—rewards and punishments—a parallel may be established between fundamentalisms in theistic and atheistic religions of the East, like Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism. The concept of karma used in varied ways in these religions also revolves on rewards and punishments. We thus propose that in the same way that fundamentalists in the Abrahamic faiths may be concerned over how their actions in this life would bring about God's retributions on judgment day, fundamentalists in Eastern religions may also worry about how their misdeeds in this life would result in misfortune in the next and how strict adherence to the teachings of their religions may alleviate such sufferings (BBC 2018; Bronkhorst 2011; Faure 2009; Paine 1997).

²We realize that a multidimensional conception of fundamentalism that is too closely related to its historical context (i.e., too concrete and specific) and its components that vary independently of one another may be less stable than a single dimension, as shown in the debate over the church-sect typology (Johnson 1963). The multidimensional conception employed here is general and abstract, and its components significantly correlate with one another across the countries (see below).

sword” (Mitchell [1969]1993:232). His followers were mobilized to repel what they considered an assault on Islam by secular intellectuals and Christian missionaries (Banna 1978; Lia 1998). Likewise, Maududi’s fundamentalism opposed first the nationalist stand of Muslim theologians in India and later the Pakistan movement for independence, claiming that Muslims were not a national entity but a *jamaat* governed by the immutable and everlasting divine law. Advancing a literalist exegesis of the Quran, he argued that God was not only the creator, but also the only absolute ruler and legislator for human society (Ahmad 1967). Maududi “did not stand for the political freedom or self-determination of Muslims, but for the rule of Islam, for a purely Islamic, traditionalist-fundamentalist theocracy” (Ahmad 1967:224).

In Shia Islam, *Fedayeen-e Islam*, formed in Iran in 1944, was among the sect’s first expressions of contemporary fundamentalism. Warning that the society had strayed from the right path, they called for a strict application of the sharia: prohibitions of alcohol, tobacco, opium, films, gambling, and wearing of foreign clothing; enforcement of amputation of hands of thieves and the veiling of women; and eliminating non-Islamic subjects from school curricula. They also demanded restricting the activities of Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, and totally banning the Bahais (Abrahamian 1982; Kazemi 2012). Another manifestation of Shia fundamentalism was the *Hojjatieh* Society (formed in 1953) to combat the spread of the Bahai faith. Like fundamentalist Christians, it displayed a millenarianism penchant, and similar to the Muslim Brothers, it employed a modern organizational and sartorial style (Sadri [2004] 2012). After the Iranian Revolution, the fundamentalists were closely associated with the belief in clerical absolutism and Shia sectarianism. Finally, *Osulgarayan* (translated as Principalists) (Sanandaji 2009) became the nom de guerre of a group of fundamentalist parliamentarians who wanted to distinguish themselves from the reformists.

Despite their differences, these movements were similar in orientations—believing in a total submission to the sharia, Islam as a complete system of truth, and religious exclusivity and intolerance. We measure these orientations, examine the factors linked to cross-national and individual variation in fundamentalism, and discuss the implications of this study for a broader understanding of the subject.

Theoretical Development

Fundamentalism varies among individuals; some strongly believe in a disciplinarian deity, the inerrancy of the scripture, religious exclusivity, and superiority of their faith over other faiths. Others manifest these beliefs to a lesser extent, and some, such as atheists, not at all. Part of this variation may be due to factors operating at broader sociopolitical and cultural contexts that affect everyone, including globalization, state structures and policies, and the religious profile of the country; and another part related to variation in individual attributes and attitudes. We specify and assess these factors in order to uncover and explain the pattern of variation in religious fundamentalism not only among individuals but also cross-nationally.

Explaining Cross-National Variation in Fundamentalism

We draw on Moaddel’s (2005) episodic-discourse model to explain cross-national variation in religious fundamentalism. Moaddel contrasts modernism and fundamentalism as opposing orientations of Muslim intellectuals toward significant issues. Among these issues are the role of rational reasoning in Islam, secular government, the social status of women, and Western culture. Islamic modernists followed rational exegesis of the Quran, supported constitutional government, reinterpreted religious teachings on gender to favor women, and considered Western culture progressive. Islamic fundamentalists, by contrast, followed a literal reading of the Quran, supported the unity of religion and politics in an Islamic government, favored male supremacy and patriarchy, and considered the West as culturally decadent.

Moaddel (2005) contends that these diverse orientations were a function of variation in (a) cultural context from pluralistic to monolithic and (b) state intervention in culture from low to high. He then proposes that Muslim intellectual leaders developed modernist orientations in Egypt and India in the second half of the 19th century because they encountered a plurality of discourses advanced by followers of the Enlightenment, Westernizers and think-tanks connected to colonial administration, the missionaries, and the ulama—all competing for the intellectual control of the society, while state intervention in culture was limited. The rise of fundamentalism in 20th-century Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Syria, on the other hand, was a reaction to the monolithic secular discourse imposed from above by the authoritarian ideological state (Moaddel 2005).

Fundamentalism defined as disciplinarian deity, literalism, and religious exclusivity and intolerance reflects a distinctive religious orientation that is different from the definition of the term as orientations toward sociopolitical and cultural issues. The latter are indicators of the liberalism-conservatism continuum and considered as predictors of fundamentalism. However, some of the key elements of Moaddel's model are relevant for explaining cross-national variation of the phenomenon. First, we propose that *pluralistic* contexts, inclusive of both secular and religious options for seekers of spirituality, weaken fundamentalism because these contexts are likely to offer a richer menu of options to satisfy a wider range of spiritual needs (Montgomery 2003). As a result, fewer of these "spiritual shoppers" (Wuthnow 2005) would be willing to adopt fundamentalism. Furthermore, a pluralistic context exposes the public to a greater number of perspectives on life, security, and happiness, reinforcing views concerning the varied ways that metaphysical entities may be worshiped. People are thus less likely to follow a disciplinarian deity and a literal, exclusivist, and intolerant reading of religion (Berger and Luckman 1969). Religious monopolies, on the other hand, may contribute to religious fundamentalism through mobilizing resources, the sanctioning of religious behavior, punishing religious nonobservance, and exploiting sectarian rivalries (Blau, Land, and Redding 1992; Blau, Redding, and Land 1993; Breault 1989; Handy 1991; Ellison and Sherkat 1995).

The authoritarian secular state is another aspect of the social context that may shape fundamentalism. Two features of the state are relevant for understanding the relation of religious fundamentalism with regimes. One is the state's *regulation* of religion. Fundamentalism may arise as a reaction to such interventions. By launching cultural programs to promote secular institutions, such as fostering national identity as a substitute for religious identity, or instituting laws that run contrary to religious beliefs, a secular state may contribute to the perception among the faithful that their religion is under siege, core values offended, and religious freedom obstructed. This perception of besieged spirituality may activate religious awareness that prompts individuals to grow "hypersensitive even to the slightest hint of theological corruption within their own ranks" (Smith 1998:8), use religious categories to frame issues, and adopt alarmist attitudes and conspiratorial perspectives (Moaddel and Karabenick 2013). While different conceptions of God may coexist in a society (Froese and Bader 2010), the perceived urgency to rise in defense of "His dominion" and combat the all-powerful secular state may popularize among the public an authoritarian conception of a deity who handsomely rewards the faithful and severely punishes the unbelievers. As Almond, Appleby, and Sivan (2003:19–20) stated, fundamentalists "fashion their own programs and ideologies in an awkward mimesis of the [state]."

Fundamentalism may also be influenced by the *structure* of an authoritarian state. The premise that state structures shape religious outcomes has a long pedigree in the sociology of religion. For example, the success of Protestantism in 16th-century Europe is linked to variation in the structure of political sovereignty (Swanson 1967) or state autonomy (Wuthnow 1985). Here, we argue that consequential for the rise of fundamentalism is the extent to which the structure of power relation is unified or fragmented. An authoritarian state under a unified elite would be more effective in imposing a monolithic religion on the subject population, which would limit the available secular or alternative religious options for the seekers of spirituality. An authoritarian state that is controlled by a fragmented elite, on the other hand, tends to experience

interelite rivalries and acrimonious debates (Moaddel 2016). Such internal disputes would not only diminish the state's ability to impose religious uniformity on society, but also generate the social space that permits the growth of an alternative religious or secular movement (Wuthnow 1985).

In sum, an authoritarian state with a unified structure strengthens and a fragmented structure weakens fundamentalism. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provide contrasting examples. While both regimes are remarkably similar in religious sectarianism, repressiveness, and oil as their sources of revenue, the ruling elite is fragmented in Iran but unified in Saudi Arabia. The rise of liberalism and religious reformism in Iran (Kamrava 2008; Moaddel 2009; Rajaei 2007) and fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia (Champion 2003; Dekmejian 1994; Moaddel 2006; Okruhlik 2002) appears to correspond to the difference in the structure of power relation between the two regimes.

Finally, *globalization* may weaken fundamentalism by contributing to the diversification of culture. The development of digital communication technology and the means of mass transportation reduce the constraints of geography on social interactions (Waters 1995), intensifying "worldwide social relations" (Giddens 1990:64) and expanding intercontinental networks of economic, political, and cultural interdependence among nations (Frankel 2000; Keohane and Nye 2000; Sassen 2001). These developments globalize economic activities and enhance the diffusion of cultures and civilizational osmoses, facilitating access to diverse information sources, undermining religious monopolies, and thus weakening fundamentalism.

Alternatively, fundamentalism may even be an outcome of globalization by (a) intensifying the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996); (b) breaking down the protective shields of small communities as a result of the efforts to eliminate barriers to the world markets, employing similar organizational structures (Stohl 2005), and enforcing a homogeneous cultural pattern (Ritzer 1993), which triggers the feeling of alienation and insecurity (Giddens 1991; Kinnvall 2004); and (c) expanding inequality through the incorporation of the indigenous economies into the global hierarchy of asymmetrical exchange relations of the world capitalist system (Wallerstein 2000).

Individual Variation in Religious Fundamentalism

To explain cross-national variation in fundamentalism, we focus on religious freedom and fractionalization, state regulation of religion, fragmentation of state authoritarian structure, and globalization. On the individual level, we consider the potential influence of (a) religiosity, trust in religious institutions, and religious modernity; (b) liberal values; (c) hostility toward outsiders; (d) fatalism; (e) information sources; and (f) demographics.

First, it is evident that without religion, religious fundamentalism may not exist (Ammerman 1987; Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Kellstedt and Smidt 1991; Lapidus 1992; Lewis 1993; Peshkin 1988). Higher *religiosity* may thus be linked to stronger fundamentalism. Moreover, people with greater *confidence in religious institutions* are more likely to self-restrict to such institutions for information and guidance, develop a stronger monolithic view of religion, and are thus more strongly fundamentalist. Finally, individuals who believe that religious beliefs foster development—espousing *religious modernity*—may develop a stronger attitude against secular change, have a more holistic view of religion, and a stronger fundamentalist orientation. Second, fundamentalism is also linked to the conservative and patriarchal values as well as submission to religious rule (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Antoun 2008; Kaplan 1992; Lawrence 1989; Moaddel 2005; Riesebrodt 1993). As a corollary of this argument, we propose that individuals who support the *liberal values* of expressive individualism, gender equality, and secular politics are more likely to express doubt about the truth of religion and less likely to espouse fundamentalism.

Third, as shown by social science research, hostility toward outsiders, or *xenophobia*, and the belief in *conspiracies* are linked to right-wing solidarity and religious fundamentalism (Bermanis, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur 2010; Choueiri 2010; Euben 1999; Inglehart, Moaddel, and Tessler

2006; Koopmans 2014; Maehr and Karabenick 2005; Pipes 1996; Zeidan 2001). We further test these hypotheses by assessing their relationships with fundamentalism across the eight countries. Likewise, fourth, the belief in obedience to a disciplinarian God and the necessity of surrendering unconditionally to Him may also be stronger among *fatalistic* individuals, who consider their fate as firmly established and that there is little one can do to change it (Booth 1991; Brink and Mencher 2014; Cohen-Mor 2001; Ellerbe 1995; Ford 1962; Mercier 1995; Quinney 1964).

Fifth, individuals who rely more on family and friends (Ellison 1995; Sherkat 1995) as a source of information concerning religion are less likely to avail themselves of other and more diverse sources, and more likely to espouse stronger fundamentalism. On the other hand, those who rely on diverse sources of information are more likely to be exposed to a variety of perspectives on religion. As a result, they tend to develop a general awareness of the existence of a plurality of belief systems and alternative venues for spiritual satisfaction, and as a consequence, are less likely to espouse religious fundamentalism.

Finally, among demographics, social class, ethnic and religious identity, and urban-rural residence may all be linked to fundamentalism. We argue that higher education and income are likely to weaken fundamentalism; education is said to lower cognitive barriers to enlightenment. The educated are more skilled in analyzing issues, assessing alternative perspectives, and making sense of the world autonomously than those less educated (Krueger and Malečková 2003; Schussman and Soule 2005). They are thus less likely to espouse a literalist, exclusivist, and intolerant view of religion, compared to those with lower levels of education. Also, individuals with higher incomes are less likely to harbor fundamentalist beliefs given their greater access to more diverse cultural perspectives and networks. Lower-income individuals, on the other hand, are more likely to support fundamentalism (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Ayubi 1991; Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel 2013; Mehmet 1990). Experiencing a higher level of status insecurity (Caudill 1963; Coreno 2002; Shapiro 1978; Weber 1964; Weller 1965), they are more likely to support the communitarianism of religious fundamentalism (Davis and Robinson 2006).

Inequality in terms of ethnicity and religion or religious sect may also have ramifications for fundamentalism. Parallel to the view that relates prejudice by the members of the dominant ethnic group to their perception of threat from other groups (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Quillian 1995), we assess whether members of the dominant ethnic group are also more strongly fundamentalist than are ethnic minorities. Likewise, we expect fundamentalism to be higher among members of the dominant religion or religious sect because of their claimed ownership of religion and the perception that religious minorities have deviated from the true path and therefore pose a threat to their religion. Fundamentalism among religious minorities, on the other hand, should be weaker because taking a more moderate religious stand would be accommodating toward the dominant religion and thus reduce religious tensions.

People living in rural areas, with limited access to a more diversified religious environment, may display stronger fundamentalism than those in urban areas. Finally, to rule out the possibility of spurious functions of employment, age, gender, and marital status, we statistically control for these variables.

METHOD

Sample and Survey Procedure

Using a multistage probability sampling design, face-to-face interviews were conducted of a nationally representative sample of 3,143 adult (age 18+) Egyptians, 3,000 Iraqis, 3,008 Jordanians, 3,034 Lebanese, 3,523 Pakistanis, 1,635 Saudis, 3,070 Tunisians, and 3,019 Turkish in 2011–2016. They add up to over 23,000 completed interviews, representing 400 million or

Table 1: Data collection overview

	Sample Size	Survey Dates	Response Rate (%)	Data Collection Institution or Firm
Egypt	3,143	June–Aug 2011	93	ERTC, Cairo
Iraq	3,000	Jan–Feb 2011	88	IIACSS, Baghdad
Jordan	3,008	Apr–May 2016	80	U of Jordan, Amman
Lebanon	3,034	Mar–July 2011	61	ICOD & Am. U., Beirut
Pakistan	3,523	May–Sept 2011	83	U of Agriculture, Faisalabad
KSA	1,635	Jan–Feb 2011	73	PARK, Jeddah
Tunisia	3,070	Mar–May 2013	78	ELKA Consulting, Tunis
Turkey	3,019	Apr–June 2013	62	FREKANS, Istanbul

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Table 2: Respondents' demographic characteristics (%)

Sample Characteristics	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon	Tunisia	Turkey
Mean age	35	39	34	36	42	35	44	41
Male	51	48	50	53	50	59	45	44
University education	4	17	17	13	17	28	17	13
Married	76	71	64	70	74	50	63	69
Religion:								
Sunni	90.0	96	92	40	97	23	99	86
Shi'a	8.6	–	8	31		33	–	2
Allawi								4
Muslim (no sect specified)	8		–	29		3	–	7
Druze						6	–	–
Christian	1.4	4	–	<1	3	27	–	–

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

26 percent of the 1.6 billion world Muslim populations in 2010.³ Egypt and Lebanon have sizable Christian populations. A team of investigators developed the questionnaire in collaboration with researchers from the eight countries.⁴ To ensure consistency of meaning across the countries, the questionnaire was translated from English into Arabic, Kurdish, Pashto, Urdu, and Turkish, back translated into English by someone who had not seen the original version, and compared with the original English version. Table 1 shows the sample size, fieldwork date, response rate, and the organization that carried out the survey in each country, and Table 2 provides the respondents' demographics.

Measurement

Religious Fundamentalism

Adhering to the stipulation that a multidimensional conception of fundamentalism more effectively captures the diverse manner in which the subject may be manifested vis-à-vis sundry aspects of religion, we operationalized the four components in terms of a series of items that

³See <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2011/muslim-population-growth.aspx>.

⁴For a copy of the data and the questionnaire, see <https://mevs.org/data/survey-summary/1004>.

were intended to grasp the multiple meanings linked to each of the components: *deity*, *inerrancy*, *exclusivity*, and *intolerance*. Initially, our research team developed a total of 25 items with a Likert-scale response format (coded as “strongly agree” = 4, “agree” = 3, “disagree” = 2, and “strongly disagree” = 1). Muslim respondents were asked about the Quran, Islam, and Muslims, while Christian respondents about the Bible, Christianity, and Christians. Although we were not allowed to use some of the items in Egypt, no more than one of the excluded items in Egypt, identified with * below, was in the same component, with the remaining items deemed sufficient to provide stable estimates of each component.

Six items measured the beliefs and attitudes that are manifested by a disciplinarian deity. These revolve on God’s rewards in heaven, (fear of) punishment, and Satan’s scheme. Four items measuring inerrancy (or literalism) highlighted the belief in the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the religious truth and its superiority over man-made laws and science. There were also three reversal items that modified these claims. The measures of exclusivity included four items—stressing that only one’s faith is truthful and comprehensive, and only through which salvation is attainable—and one reversal. Finally, five items measured intolerance of other faiths and criticism of one’s religion and two reversals.

After incorporating input from researchers in five of the eight countries (where surveys first conducted in 2011), the 25 items were extensively pretested in these countries in 2010. We then conducted a series of exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor analyses of the items related to each of the four components to arrive at four sets of four items (a total of 16 items). We examined these sets to construct a single scale with the desired goal of creating a balanced contribution of the four components. EFAs determined that each set of four items combining the samples from all countries yielded a single factor for each component with eigenvalues > 1 (accounting for percent of the variance) as follows: Deity = 2.12 (53 percent), Inerrancy = 1.61 (40 percent), Exclusivity = 1.78 (45 percent), and Intolerance = 1.89 (47 percent). The four items in each component were then averaged to yield means across the entire sample: Deity = 3.39, Inerrancy = 3.41, Exclusivity = 3.35, Intolerance = 2.60. An EFA of the four component means yielded a single factor with eigenvalue > 1 (2.50) that explained 62.58 percent of the variance.

We also assessed whether the entire 16 items would provide a reliable scale. Internal consistency estimates (Cronbach’s α) across all countries combined including Egypt with all but the excluded items = .82, and using all items when excluding Egypt = .86. A further reliability check conducted at the item level for each country resulted in α levels that were also in the acceptable range: Tunisia = .88, Lebanon = .88, Iraq = .84, Turkey = .80, Saudi Arabia = .75, Jordan = .74, Pakistan = .72, and Egypt = .65. We then averaged the four components to create a single fundamentalism score with the intended balance of the four items for each component, which are as follows (the excluded items are reported in the footnotes):

*Deity*⁵

- Any infraction of religious instruction will bring about God’s severe punishment.
- Only the fear of God keeps people on the right path.*
- Satan is behind any attempt to undermine the belief in God.
- People stay on the right path only because they expect to be rewarded in heaven.

⁵The excluded items were: (1) “Allah requires his slaves to repent (tobbah)” and (2) “Allah is the source of everything good.”

Inerrancy⁶

- The Quran (Bible) is true from beginning to end.
- The Quran (Bible) has correctly predicted all the major events in human history.*
- In the presence of the Quran (Bible), there is no need for man-made laws.
- Whenever there is a conflict between religion and science, religion is always right.

Exclusivity⁷

- Only Islam (Christianity) provides comprehensive truth about God.
- Only Islam (Christianity) gives a complete and unfailing guide to human salvation.
- Only Muslims (Christians) are going to heaven.
- Islam (Christianity) is the only true religion.*

Intolerance⁸

- Our children should not be allowed to learn about other religions.
- The followers of other religions should not have the same rights as mine.
- Criticism of Islam (Christianity) should not be tolerated.
- Criticism of Muslim (Christian) religious leaders should not be tolerated.

Predictors of Fundamentalism: National Context***Religious Pluralism***

Two indicators measured this construct. (a) A religious-liberty index as an average of religious freedom (1 = high, 7 = low) and religious persecution (1 = low, 10 = high) provided by the Association for Religion Data Archives (ARDA).⁹ This average is recoded so that higher value indicates more religious liberty. And (b) a *religious-fractionalization index* constructed from the distribution of the sample data by religion/sect that is reported in Table 2, using this formula:

$$\text{Religious fractionalization index} = 1 - \sum p_i^2,$$

where p_i is the proportion of religion or sect i in the sample. Higher values indicate greater religious diversity.¹⁰

⁶The excluded items were three reversals: (1) the Quran's (Bible's [for Christian respondents]) description of past historical events is not always accurate; (2) the Quran (the Bible [for Christian respondents]) contains general facts, but some of its stories need to be interpreted; and (3) different interpretations of the Quran (the Bible [for Christian respondents]) are equally valid. The first two questions were disallowed in Egypt. In other countries, the first question was negatively linked to fundamentalism, but the other two proved to be conceptually vague.

⁷The excluded item was a reversal question: "All religions are equally acceptable to Allah."

⁸The excluded items were one direct measure—Non-Muslims (Non-Christians [for Christian respondents]) should be prohibited from practicing their religion in (Study Site Country)—and two reversal questions: (1) the followers of all religions should have equal rights to practice their religion in (Study Site Country) and (2) Non-Muslims (Non-Christians [for Christian respondents]) should be free to build their places of worship in (Study Site Country).

⁹Roger Finke, Christopher Bader, and Andrew Whitehead, www.thearda.com/internationalData/.

¹⁰Adopted from the Herfindahl ethnic concentration formula (cited in Posner 2004:849).

State Structure Fragmentation

We constructed a *fragmentation ratio* as the square root of a measure of fractionalized elite¹¹ divided by political and civil liberties index:¹²

$$\text{Fragmentation ratio} = \frac{\sqrt{\text{Fractionalized elite}}}{\text{Political rights \& civil liberties index}}.$$

State Intervention in Religion

A *government-regulation-of-religion index* (GRRI)¹³ was available for 2003–2008 (averaged) and ranges between 0 (no regulation) and 10 (high regulation).

Globalization

We used two measures of globalization. One is *economic globalization*¹⁴ as an average of standardized measures of *international trade*—the sum of import and export as percentage of GDP—and *foreign capital penetration* (FCP). FCP is measured as:

$$\text{FCP} = \frac{\text{Foreign direct investment}}{\sqrt{(\text{Domestic capital penetration} \times \text{labor})}}.$$

Internet Penetration

This was measured as the percentage of the population that had access to the Internet.

To make these measures more stable, the three-year average of the data on trade, foreign capital penetration, and Internet access were constructed where data were available for 2009–2011, 2010–2012, and 2012–2014, depending on whether the country survey was completed in 2011, 2013, or 2016, respectively.

Predictors of Fundamentalism: Individual-Level Variables

Religiosity Index

This index was constructed by averaging three variables: (a) frequency of prayer—ranging from (1) never, (2) once a year, (2) once or twice a month, (3) once or twice a week, (4) once a day, (5) two to four times a day to (6) five times daily; (b) self-described as religious—ranging from 1, not at all religious, to 10, very religious; and (c) the importance of God in life, ranging from none (1) to utmost important (10).¹⁵

¹¹<http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/>

¹²<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.vi6jtcvf9u1>

¹³See <http://www.thearda.com>.

¹⁴For GDP, see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ne.trd.gnfs.zs>; for different measure to construct FCIP, see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/bx.klt.dinv.wd.gd.zs>, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/bx.klt.dinv.cd.wd>, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sl.tlf.totl.in>, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ne.gdi.totl.cd>; and for the Internet, see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/it.net.user.p2>.

¹⁵Mosque attendance is excluded from this index because the measure carries gender bias; across these countries, women are often discouraged from attending mosques.

Confidence in Religious Institutions

This construct was measured by one survey question: "Please tell me whether you have (4) a great deal of confidence in religious institutions, (3) quite a lot of confidence, (2) not very much confidence, or (1) none at all?"

Religious Modernity Index

This index was constructed as the average of responses to three questions about the belief that religious beliefs foster development: "Would it make your country (1) a lot less developed, (2) less developed, (3) more developed, or (4) a lot more developed, if (a) faith in Allah increases, (b) the influence of religion on politics increases, and (c) the belief in the truth of the Quran [Bible (for Christians)] increases?"

Conspiracy

One question probed respondents about whether they "(4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree that there are conspiracies against Muslims (or Christians for Christian respondents)."

Xenophobia

This index was the average of responses to a series of questions on whether respondents would like to have as neighbors French, British, Americans, Iranians, Kuwaitis in Iraq survey/Indians in Pakistan/Iraqis in other countries, Turkish in Iraq and Saudi Arabia/Saudis in other countries, Jordanians in Iraq/Afghanis in Pakistan/Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia/Syrians in other countries. The responses were coded as 2 for those mentioning "would not like" and 1 for those mentioning "would like" to have them as neighbors.

Fatalism

Respondents were asked to choose a number between 1 and 10, where 1 = "people shape their fate themselves" and 10 "everything in life is determined by fate."

Liberalism

A liberalism index was created by averaging four components of the construct.

Expressive-individualism index was the average of three indicators: basis for marriage, a woman's right to dress as she wishes, and child qualities. Response to the basis for marriage was coded as 4 for love and 1 for parental approval. Woman's right to dress was coded as follows in response to the question: "Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree that it is up to a woman to dress as she wishes?" For child qualities, respondents were asked to select five from a list of 10 favorable qualities for children to have. Those who selected "independence" or "imagination" were coded as "1," and those who did *not* select "religious faith" or "obedience" were also coded as "1" (0 = otherwise). This average was adjusted to range between 1 and 4.

A *gender-equality index* was constructed by averaging responses to: "Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree" that: (a) "it is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife," (b) "a wife must always obey her husband," (c) "men make better political leaders," (d) "university education is more important for boys," and (e) "when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job." This index varies between 1 and 4.

Secular politicians measured the support for secular politicians in contrast to those who are religious. It averaged three indicators: “Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree that: (a) it would be better for your country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office and (b) religious leaders should not interfere in politics?” The answers to this question were recoded so that higher values indicated stronger agreement.

A *secular politics* index was constructed by averaging responses to three questions as follows. “Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree that your country would be a better place if religion and politics were separated.” “Would it be (1) very good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad, or (4) very bad for your country to have an Islamic government [Christian government for Christian respondents], where religious authorities have absolute power.” And “Is it (1) very important, (2) important, (3) somewhat important, (4) least important, or (5) not at all important for a good government to implement only the sharia (for Muslims) or the laws inspired only by Christian values (for Christians)?” Answers to this question were adjusted to range between 1 and 4. The average of the four components made a liberalism index, where higher values indicated stronger liberal orientations and weaker conservatism.

Sources of Information

Two indices assessed respondents’ sources of information. One was the extent to which the respondents *trusted family or friends* as sources of information about religion, consisting of the average of responses to two questions: “How much do you trust what (a) family members or (b) friends tell you about the role of religion in politics: (4) a great deal, (3) some, (2) not very much, or (1) none at all?” The second, a *plurality-of-information-sources index*, was based on averaging how much respondents rely on (a) the radio, (b) foreign (satellite) TV, (c) newspapers, (d) the Internet, and (e) mobile as a source of information, ranging from (1) not at all, (2) not very much, (3) some, to (4) a great deal.

Demographics

A socioeconomic-status index was created by averaging education coded in nine categories ranging from no formal education (1) to university degree (9), and household income coded as (1) for the lowest decile and (10) for the highest.¹⁶ *Employment, gender, marital status, and rural area* were included as dummy variables: employed (= 1, 0 = otherwise), male (= 1, 0 = female), and married (= 1, 0 = otherwise), and age as reported by respondents.

Coded as *rural* were those areas with populations of 10,000 or less (= 1) and 0 with more than 10,000. For Saudi Arabia, information was available only for the size of towns below 500,000 (coded as 1) and more than 500,000 (coded as 0). Other dummy variables were also created to specify *religious identity*: Christian, Druze, Shia, Muslims (sect unidentified), and others. Sunni was used as the reference category; and *ethnicity*: Arab (vs. non-Arab for Lebanon, vs. Kurd for Iraq, and vs. Berber for Tunisia); Jordanian (vs. Palestinian for Jordan); Turk (vs. Kurd for Turkey); and Punjabi (vs. Pathani, Sindhi, Kashmiri, and others for Pakistan) were used as the reference categories.

Hypotheses

Based on our analytical framework and these measures, we predicted that fundamentalism would be stronger in countries characterized by:

¹⁶For Jordan, both education and income had seven categories. In order to retain the maximum number of cases, one indicator was used as a measure of SES when the other was missing.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of fundamentalism in the eight countries

	Egypt	Pakistan	KSA	Iraq	Jordan	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon	Total
Mean	3.44 ^a	3.42 ^{ab}	3.39 ^b	3.27 ^c	3.26 ^c	3.18 ^d	2.97 ^e	2.80 ^f	3.21
SD	.33	.32	.41	.41	.34	.46	.55	.59	.49
N	3,142	3,523	1,506	2,991	3,008	3,065	2,994	3,024	23,253

Note: $F_{7,23245} = 793.00$, $p < .000001$. $\eta^2 = .19$, which is a large effect size = $> .14$ according to Cohen (1977). *Post hoc* Scheffé paired comparisons: means with different superscripts are significantly different at $p < .001$. KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

H1: Weaker religious liberty and diversity,

H2: Lower state structure's fragmentation ratio, and higher government regulation of religion, and

H3: Weaker economic or cultural globalization.

On the individual level, fundamentalism was predicted to be associated with:

H1: Higher religiosity, higher trust in religious institution, and stronger belief in religious modernity,

H2: Higher xenophobia, stronger belief in conspiracy, and higher fatalism,

H3: Weaker liberal outlooks (higher conservatism),

H4: Greater trust in family and friends as a source of information about the political role of religion, and lower reliance on diverse information sources, and

H5: Lower socioeconomic status, rural living, and membership in the dominant sect or ethnicity.

Analytic Approach¹⁷

ANOVA was used to assess the degree of intercountry variance in fundamentalism, and correlation coefficients to examine the associations between the country-level variables and the aggregated level of fundamentalism. Individual-level analyses were treated separately for each country, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to estimate the relationships between individual characteristics and fundamentalism. We employed hierarchical regression to provide additional information about the contribution of different sets of variables to fundamentalism. The absence of some of the variables in several countries precluded conducting a regression analysis using pooled data across all countries.

RESULTS

Between-Country Analysis

As shown in Table 3, the level of fundamentalism is high ($Mean = 3.21$ on a 1- to 4-pt. scale) summed across all countries. Results of a one-way ANOVA showed statistically significant variance ($F_{7,23245} = 793.00$, $p < .000001$) among the countries, which is not surprising because of the large sample size ($n > 23,000$) and thus the high power to detect small differences. Nevertheless, these differences can be considered substantial according to effect size estimates

¹⁷Employing hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) would have been ideal. This was not possible, however, due to the small number of countries (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

(Cohen 1977). Since effect sizes for η^2 greater than .14 are considered large, the value of $\eta^2 = .19$ in the present case provides justification that between-country variance in fundamentalism can be considered statistically relatively large over and above the statistical significance that is a function of the very high power. *Post hoc* Scheffé paired-comparison significance tests (at $p < .0001$) were conducted to determine which countries differed. These are indicated by means with different superscripts in Table 3. Accordingly, fundamentalism was highest in Egypt and Pakistan, followed by Saudi Arabia, then Iraq and Jordan, and successively lower, respectively, in Tunisia, Turkey, and finally lowest in Lebanon.

Table 4 presents the measures of the country-level constructs—religious pluralism, the state's structure and intervention, and globalization. The table also shows the correlations between these measures and the countries' mean level of fundamentalism.

Pluralistic Versus Monolithic Religious Context

The two variables measuring the extent to which the religious context is monolithic or pluralistic—religious-liberty index and religious-fractionalization index—are both negatively connected to fundamentalism ($r = -.62$ and $-.65$, respectively). These linkages thus support our interpretation that religious diversity and religious liberty provide favorable conditions for individuals to freely pursue their religious preferences and therefore weaken overall fundamentalism on the national level.

Fragmentation of State Structure and Regulation of Religion

Fragmentation ratio is also negatively linked to fundamentalism ($r = -.66$). It indicates elite rivalries, which tend to generate the space for the rise of discursive diversity within society and thus weaken fundamentalism. The government regulation of religion index, on the other hand, is positively linked to fundamentalism ($r = .81$), supporting our hypothesis that the more the government intervenes in religion, the higher the likelihood of the rise of religious fundamentalism.

Globalization

Both economic globalization and Internet penetration are negatively linked to fundamentalism ($r = -.55$, and $-.52$, respectively). These findings run contrary to the notion that globalization fosters fundamentalism. Globalization's effect on fundamentalism, however, appears to be weaker than that of religious diversity, state structure, or regulation of religion.

Individual-Level Analysis

Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for individual-level variables. Tables 6–10 provide results of hierarchical linear regression models (standardized regression estimates— β), which begin with a baseline of demographics (Model 1—Table 6), then successively the variance and increased variance accounted for by adding categories of variables designated as religious and ethnic identity (Model 2—Table 7), religion (Model 3—Table 8), perceptions and values (Model 4—Table 9), and sources of information (Model 5—Table 10). In view of the large number of variables, we tested the models for possible multicollinearity, which was found to be negligible. Most of the variables had variance inflation factors (VIF) less than 2.0 and none exceeding or even close to 5.0, above which there is reason for concern. Taking the models in turn, demographics alone accounted for between 2 percent (Iraq) and 10 percent (Turkey) of the variance (Model 1). Religious and ethnic minorities accounted for between .6 percent (Egypt) and 21 percent (KSA) additional variance, after controlling for demographics (Model 2), religion variables for another 4 percent (Jordan) and 26 percent (Lebanon) after controlling for demographics and religious/ethnic minorities (Model 3), and perception and values further add between 3 percent (Saudi Arabia) and 14 percent (Tunisia) to the variance (Model 4), and finally, sources of information add between

Table 4: National aggregate religious fundamentalism and measures of national context

Variables	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Iraq	Tunisia	Jordan	Turkey	Lebanon	r* with Fundamentalism
Fundamentalism	3.42	3.44	3.33	3.27	3.18	3.26	2.97	2.80	
1. Religious pluralism									
A. Religious liberty	3.5	3.5	4	1	5	6	5.5	6.5	-.62 ^b
B. Religious fractionalization	.18	.08	.15	.50	.02	.06	.21	.81	-.65 ^b
2. State structure & intervention									
A. Fragmentation ratio	.34	.26	.21	.28	.35	.23	.47	.37	-.66 ^b
B. Gov. regulation of relig. index	8.8	8.3	9.8	6	6.2	8.6	5.2	4.9	.81 ^c
3. Globalization									
A. Economic globalization**	-2.37	-1.56	1.22	-.76	.47	1.56	-1.23	2.67	-.55 ^a
a) International trade	32.67	49.67	84.67	73.67	102.67	118.00	54.33	97.00	
b) Foreign capital penetration	1.43	4.23	22.56	4.00	5.32	17.93	5.93	34.38	
B. Internet	8.17	22.40	42.17	2.87	39.10	46.67	42.67	41.93	-.52 ^a

Note: These are all considered large effect sizes according to Cohen (1977).

* Pearson correlation coefficients.

** Linear combination of standardized international trade and foreign capital penetration.

^a $p < .01$.

^b $p < .05$.

^c $p < .1$.

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Table 5: Aggregate individual variable descriptive statistics for each country: mean (*SD*)

Variable (Response Range)	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Jordan	Iraq	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon
Demographics								
Socioeconomic status	4.01	4.40	5.61	3.10	3.62	5.24	4.07	5.87
(1–10)	(1.58)	(1.96)	(1.63)	(.86)	(1.65)	(1.51)	(1.81)	(1.85)
Employed	.48	.44	.37	.29	.43	.38	.34	.61
(0–1)	(.50)	(.50)	(.48)	(.45)	(.49)	(.49)	(.48)	(.49)
Male	.51	.48	.50	.50	.53	.44	.44	.59
(0–1)	(.50)	(.50)	(.50)	(.50)	(.50)	(.50)	(.50)	(.49)
Not married	.21	.19	.32	.21	.24	.27	.21	.42
(0–1)	(.41)	(.39)	(.47)	(.41)	(.43)	(.45)	(.41)	(.49)
Age	35	39	34	42	36	44	41	35
(18–80)	(12.02)	(14.74)	(13.39)	(15.65)	(13.00)	(17.03)	(16.13)	(12.83)
Rural	.53	.20		.18	.52	.29	.82	.59
(0–1)	(.50)	(.40)		(.38)	(.50)	(.45)	(.39)	(.49)
Religion								
Religiosity index	7.13	7.55	7.34	7.66	7.48	7.02	7.03	6.40
(0–10)	(.95)	(.83)	(1.01)	(.96)	(.98)	(1.32)	(1.40)	(1.80)
Confidence in rel. inst.	2.97	3.63	3.32	3.75	3.08	3.57	2.77	2.45
(1–4)	(.81)	(.67)	(.78)	(.60)	(.78)	(.86)	(1.01)	(.90)
Religious modernity	3.74	3.39	3.21		3.17		2.78	2.65
(1–4)	(.37)	(.52)	(.56)		(.57)		(.65)	(.73)
Perception & values								
Conspiracy against Muslims	3.48	3.36	3.22	3.49	3.08	3.31	2.86	2.91
(1–4)	(.65)	(.89)	(.81)	(.74)	(1.00)	(.92)	(.79)	(.98)
Xenophobia	1.66	1.72		1.52	1.66	1.42	1.46	1.46
(1–2)	(.34)	(.30)		(.35)	(.31)	(.35)	(.45)	.37
Fatalism	6.29	7.41	5.25	7.31	6.10	7.65	5.14	5.77
(1–10)	(1.96)	(2.80)	(2.69)	(3.09)	(2.35)	(2.86)	(2.87)	(2.66)
Liberalism index	1.98	2.08	2.24	2.15	2.23	2.48	2.63	2.72
(1–4)	(.45)	(.42)	(.42)	(.40)	(.39)	(.53)	(.48)	(.49)
Sources of information								
Family/friends	3.12	3.21	3.24		3.30			2.99
(1–4)	(.50)	(.78)	(.70)		(.58)			(.68)
Plurality of info sources	2.51	1.58	2.50	1.87	1.87	1.94	1.63	2.23
(1–4)	(.53)	(.54)	(.69)	(.66)	(.64)	(.67)	(.62)	(.70)

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Table 6: Hierarchical linear regression estimates (β) prediction of fundamentalism—Model 1

Variable	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Jordan	Iraq	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon
Demographics								
Socioeconomic status	-.170 ^d	-.182 ^d	-.023	-.202 ^d	-.117 ^d	-.220 ^d	-.281 ^d	-.149 ^d
Employed	.020	.018	-.057	.005	-.009	-.052 ^a	-.077 ^b	-.032
Male	-.002	-.002	-.076 ^a	-.004	.026	.017	.089 ^c	-.102 ^d
Not married	-.028	-.024	-.039	-.047	-.047	-.074 ^b	-.033	-.074 ^b
Age	.128 ^d	-.030	.042	-.059 ^b	.022	.018	-.066 ^b	.020
Rural (smaller town for KSA)	.088 ^c	.117 ^d	.248 ^d	-.023	-.085 ^c	.009	.099 ^c	.137 ^d
<i>F</i>	52.68 ^d	25.41 ^d	21.63 ^d	21.92 ^d	10.41 ^d	32.94 ^d	45.40 ^d	30.16 ^d
df regression/df residual	3,378/6	2,775/6	1,501/6	2,897/6	2,488/6	2,483/6	2,335/6	2,432/6
<i>R</i> ²	.086	.052	.080	.043	.024	.074	.104	.069

^a*p* < .05.^b*p* < .01.^c*p* < .001.^d*p* < .0001.

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

.1 percent (Tunisia) and 3 percent (Saudi Arabia), controlling for all other variable sets, all of which are statistically significant increases (Model 5). It should be noted, of course, that the increases depend on the order in which the variables are entered. All variables combined accounted for between 13 percent (Egypt) and 51 percent (Lebanon) of the total variance. Although regression estimates vary across models, a function of which variables are in the model, since most estimates are relatively stable and have similar levels of statistical significance, we focus on the final model (Model 5) to discuss the results.

Demographics

Most notably, fundamentalism is lower for those with higher socioeconomic status, which is consistent across the eight countries. The strength of this relationship, however, varies between countries, from the standardized regression magnitudes of $-.126$ in Tunisia to $-.035$ in Lebanon. The link between rural residence and fundamentalism is less consistent across the eight countries. People living in rural areas are significantly more fundamentalist than those in urban areas in Egypt, Turkey, and Lebanon ($\beta = .086, .049, \text{ and } .102$, respectively); but the opposite is the case in Pakistan and Iraq ($\beta = -.044 \text{ and } -.042$, respectively). There is no urban-rural difference in Tunisia or Jordan. Data for Saudi Arabia were available only for the size of towns between those below and over populations of 500,000. In this case, our analysis shows that people residing in areas with less than 500,000 were more strongly fundamentalist than those residing in areas with populations greater than 500,000 ($\beta = .310$). It should be noted that SES and residence results are independent effects since each controls for the other regression estimate and can be considered additive. In other words, especially high levels of fundamentalism were present for persons residing in rural areas who in addition have lower SES.

Religious and Ethnic Identity

As we hypothesized, members of religious minorities were consistently less fundamentalist than those in the majority. Minority Shia were less fundamentalist compared to Sunnis in Pakistan,

Table 7: Hierarchical linear regression estimates (β) prediction of fundamentalism—Model 2

Variable	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Jordan	Iraq	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon
Demographics								
Socioeconomic status	-.165 ^d	-.178 ^d	-.022	-.180 ^d	-.130 ^d	-.212 ^d	-.272 ^d	-.103 ^d
Employed	.036	.017	-.025	.010	-.002	-.051 ^a	-.065 ^b	-.018
Male	-.010	-.002	-.092 ^b	-.010	.021	.025	.082 ^d	-.083 ^d
Not married	-.041	-.022	-.053	-.027	-.055 ^a	-.070 ^b	-.032	-.028
Age	.126 ^d	-.028	.024	-.017	.018	.024	-.070 ^b	.038
Rural (smaller town for KSA)	.034	.117 ^d	.195 ^d	-.005	-.068 ^d	.012	.085 ^d	.159 ^d
Religious identity								
Shia vs. Sunni	-.102 ^d		-.637 ^d		-.050 ^a		-.130 ^d	-.133 ^d
Druze vs. Sunni								-.192 ^d
Muslim (sect unidentified) vs. Sunni	-.010				-.143 ^d		.065 ^c	-.032
Christian vs. Sunni	-.200 ^d	-.076 ^d		-.232 ^d				-.310 ^d
Other vs. Sunni	-.242						-.032	-.326 ^d
Ethnic identity								
Sindhi vs. Punjabi	-.097 ^d							
Pathan vs. Punjabi	.058 ^c							
Kashmiri vs. Punjabi	.130 ^d							
Other vs. Punjabi/Arab	-.034							-.054 ^b
Kurd/Berber vs. Arab/Kurd vs. Turk					-.001		-.007	
Palestinian vs. Jordanian				-.063 ^b				
<i>F</i>	74.24 ^d	24.30 ^d	87.54 ^d	39.32 ^d	10.87 ^d	30.21 ^d	33.94 ^d	55.92 ^d
df regression/df residual	3,370/14	2,774/7	1,500/7	2,895/8	2,484/10	2,481/8	2,331/10	2,426/12
<i>R</i> ²	.236	.058	.290	.097	.042	.089	.127	.201
ΔR^2	.150	.006 ^d	.210	.054	.017 ^d	.015	.023	.132

^a*p* < .05.

^b*p* < .01.

^c*p* < .001.

^d*p* < .0001.

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Table 8: Hierarchical linear regression estimates (β) prediction of fundamentalism—Model 3

Variable	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Jordan	Iraq	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon
Demographics								
Socioeconomic status	-.135 ^d	-.157 ^d	-.061 ^b	-.162 ^d	-.092 ^d	-.200 ^d	-.160 ^d	-.084 ^d
Employed	.018	.017	-.033	.007	-.003	-.031	-.052 ^b	-.016
Male	.033	-.003	-.031	.011	.034	.051 ^a	.064 ^b	-.016
Not married	-.028	-.018	-.031	-.022	-.010	-.052 ^a	.004	.024
Age	.053 ^b	-.027	.002	-.037	.009	-.009	-.056 ^b	.007
Rural (smaller town for KSA)	-.012	.087 ^d	.215 ^d	-.006	-.086 ^d	.024	.072 ^d	.124 ^d
Religious identity								
Shia vs. Sunni	-.074 ^d		-.540 ^d		-.101 ^d		-.058 ^c	-.165 ^d
Druze vs. Sunni								-.127 ^d
Muslim (sect unidentified) vs. Sunni	.005				-.200 ^d		.067 ^d	-.033 ^a
Christian vs. Sunni	-.145 ^d	-.071 ^d		-.222 ^d				-.203 ^d
Other vs. Sunni	-.167 ^d						-.010	-.152 ^d
Ethnic identity								
Sindhi vs. Punjabi	-.092 ^d							
Pathan vs. Punjabi	.008							
Kashmiri vs. Punjabi	.046 ^b							
Other vs. Punjabi/Arab	-.107 ^d					-.044 ^a		-.047 ^b
Kurd/Berber vs. Arab/Kurd vs. Turk					-.090 ^d	-.078 ^d	.00	
Palestinian vs. Jordanian				-.061 ^b				
Religion								
Religiosity	.165 ^d	.025	.179 ^d	.098 ^d	.146 ^d	.140 ^d	.135 ^d	.293 ^d
Trust in religious institutions	.115 ^d	.070 ^d	.126 ^d	.173 ^d	.153 ^d	.227 ^d	.167 ^d	.090 ^d
Religious modernity index	.189 ^d	.131 ^d	.181 ^d		.274 ^d		.293	.341 ^d
<i>F</i>	92.37 ^d	24.60 ^d	91.86 ^d	47.31 ^d	44.77 ^d	48.11 ^d	72.95 ^d	139.67 ^d
df regression/df residual	3,367/17	2,771/10	1,497/10	2,893/10	2,481/13	2,479/10	2,328/13	2,423/15
<i>R</i> ²	.318	.082	.380	.141	.190	.163	.289	.464
ΔR^2	.082 ^d	.024 ^d	.090 ^d	.043 ^d	.148 ^d	.074 ^d	.162 ^d	.263 ^d

^a*p* < .05.^b*p* < .01.^c*p* < .001.^d*p* < .0001.

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Table 9: Hierarchical linear regression estimates (β) prediction of fundamentalism—Model 4

Variable	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Jordan	Iraq	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon
Demographics								
Socioeconomic status	-.058 ^c	-.134 ^d	-.077 ^b	-.135 ^d	-.064 ^d	-.142 ^d	-.104 ^d	-.048 ^b
Employed	.025	.021	-.028	.001	-.015	-.025	-.041 ^a	-.010
Male	-.012	-.001	-.043	-.014	.018	-.005	.021	-.034 ^b
Not married	.014	-.013	-.032	-.013	-.006	-.037	.002	.030
Age	-.026	-.020	-.019	-.033	.000	.001	-.033	-.017
Rural (smaller town for KSA)	-.036 ^a	.092 ^d	.276 ^d	-.010	-.049 ^b	.018	.051 ^b	.107 ^d
Religious identity								
Shia vs. Sunni	-.037 ^b		-.549 ^d		-.116 ^d		-.038 ^a	-.154 ^d
Druze vs. Sunni								-.111 ^d
Muslim (sect unidentified) vs. Sunni	.004				-.233 ^d		.051 ^b	-.028
Christian vs. Sunni	-.083 ^d	-.030		-.154 ^d				-.118 ^d
Other vs. Sunni	-.129 ^d						-.012	-.125 ^d
Ethnic identity								
Sindhi vs. Punjabi	-.077 ^d							
Pathan vs. Punjabi	-.045 ^b							
Kashmiri vs. Punjabi	.024							

(Continued)

Table 9 (Continued)

Variable	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Jordan	Iraq	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon
Other vs. Punjabi/Arab	-.094 ^a				.037	-.038 ^a	-.037 ^a	-.031 ^a
Kurd/Berber vs. Arab/Kurd vs. Turk				-.060 ^b		-.057 ^c		
Palestinian vs. Jordanian								
Religion								
Religiosity	.111 ^d	.009	.139 ^d	.052 ^b	.107 ^d	.080 ^d	.082 ^d	.243 ^d
Trust in religious institutions	.037 ^a	.062 ^a	.092 ^d	.123 ^d	.087 ^c	.135 ^d	.092 ^d	.052 ^b
Religious modernity index	.107 ^d	.084 ^d	.148 ^d		.228 ^d		.219	.285 ^d
Perception & values								
Conspiracies against Muslim	.092 ^d	.097 ^d	.098 ^d	.147 ^d	.283 ^d	.018	.053 ^b	.099 ^d
Xenophobia	.032 ^a	.040 ^a	.103 ^d	.083 ^d	-.015	.113 ^d	.006	.097 ^d
Fatalism	.081 ^d	.035	.064 ^c	.115 ^d	.175 ^d	.176 ^d	.050 ^b	.067 ^d
Liberalism	-.334 ^d	-.163 ^d	-.175 ^d	-.206 ^d	-.148 ^d	-.312 ^d	-.302 ^d	-.147 ^d
<i>F</i>	105.07 ^d	27.25 ^d	81.32 ^d	62.33 ^d	60.63 ^d	77.20 ^d	78.20 ^d	128.72 ^d
df regression/df residual	3,363/21	2,767/14	1,494/13	2,889/14	2,477/17	2,475/14	2,328/17	2,419/19
<i>R</i> ²	.396	.121	.415	.232	.294	.304	.364	.503
ΔR^2	.078 ^d	.040 ^d	.034 ^d	.091 ^d	.104 ^d	.141 ^d	.074 ^b	.039 ^d

^a*p* < .05.^b*p* < .01.^c*p* < .001.^d*p* < .0001.

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Table 10: Hierarchical linear regression estimates (β) prediction of fundamentalism—Model 5

Variable	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Jordan	Iraq	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon
Demographics								
Socioeconomic status	-.044 ^b	-.115 ^d	-.054 ^b	-.118 ^d	-.073 ^d	-.126 ^d	-.096 ^d	-.035 ^a
Employed	.027	.025	-.016	.004	-.018	-.023	-.041 ^a	.006
Male	-.006	-.001	-.017	-.010	.014	.002	.022	-.024
Not married	.016	-.009	-.036	-.010	-.007	-.027	.004	.036
Age	-.031	-.015	-.040	-.040	.004	-.013	-.037	-.025
Rural (smaller town for KSA)	-.044 ^b	.086 ^d	.310 ^d	-.011	-.042 ^a	.016	.049 ^b	.102 ^d
Religious identity								
Shia vs. Sunni	-.038 ^b		-.561 ^d		-.115 ^d		-.037 ^a	-.160 ^d
Druze vs. Sunni								-.108 ^d
Muslim (sect unidentified) vs. Sunni	-.003				-.226 ^d		.051 ^b	-.024
Christian vs. Sunni	-.084 ^d							-.111 ^d
Other vs. Sunni	-.133 ^d	-.033		-.154 ^d			-.011	-.119 ^d
Ethnic identity								
Sindhi vs. Punjabi	-.076 ^d							
Pathan vs. Punjabi	-.050 ^b							
Kashmiri vs. Punjabi	.021							
Other vs. Punjabi/Arab	-.100 ^d					-.039 ^a		-.032 ^a

(Continued)

Table 10 (Continued)

Variable	Pakistan	Egypt	KSA	Jordan	Iraq	Tunisia	Turkey	Lebanon
Kurd/Berber vs. Arab/Kurd vs. Turk				-.059 ^b	.029	-.054 ^c	-.036 ^a	
Palestinian vs. Jordanian								
Religion								
Religiosity	.108 ^d	.007	.132 ^d	.051 ^b	.113 ^d	.083 ^d	.181 ^d	.231 ^d
Trust in religious institutions	.032 ^a	.057 ^b	.097 ^d	.125 ^d	.086 ^b	.133 ^d	.094 ^d	.061 ^d
Religious modernity index	.104 ^d	.080 ^c	.141 ^d		.224 ^d		.218	.286 ^d
Perception & values								
Conspiracies against Muslim	.092 ^d	.100 ^d	.079 ^d	.152 ^d	.292 ^d	.016	.054 ^b	.090 ^d
Xenophobia	.033 ^a	.037 ^a		.082 ^d	-.013	.114 ^d	.006	.096 ^d
Fatalism	.078 ^d	.043 ^a	.073 ^d	.115 ^d	.179 ^d	.173 ^d	.049 ^a	.053 ^d
Liberalism	-.326 ^d	-.156 ^d	-.150 ^d	-.202 ^d	-.150 ^d	-.307 ^d	-.305 ^d	-.140 ^d
Sources of information								
Family/friends	.032 ^a	.070 ^d	.115 ^d		.012			.057 ^d
Plurality of info source	-.051 ^b	-.046 ^a	-.162 ^d	-.050 ^b	.056 ^b	-.066 ^c	-.035 ^a	-.098 ^d
<i>F</i>	96.96 ^d	25.24 ^d	80.79 ^d	58.79 ^d	54.90 ^d	73.12 ^d	74.18 ^d	121.54 ^d
df regression/df residual	3,361/23	2,765/16	1,492/15	2,888/15	2,475/19	2,474/15	2,323/18	2,417/21
<i>R</i> ²	.399	.127	.448	.234	.296	.307	.365	.513
ΔR^2	.003 ^c	.006 ^d	.034 ^d	.002 ^b	.003 ^b	.003 ^c	.001 ^a	.011 ^d

^a*p* < .05.^b*p* < .01.^c*p* < .001.^d*p* < .0001.

KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

especially in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey (mostly Alavi Shia), and Lebanon ($\beta = -.038, -.561, -.115, -.037,$ and $-.160,$ respectively), Druze and other religious minorities to Sunnis in Lebanon ($\beta = -.108$ and $-.119,$ respectively), and Christians compared to Sunnis in Pakistan, Jordan, and Lebanon ($\beta = -.084, -.154,$ and $-.111,$ respectively). There was no significant difference between Sunni Muslims and Christians in Egypt. When only demographics and religion variables (Tables 7 and 8) are controlled, Christians were less fundamentalist than Sunni Muslims in Egypt. Those who identified themselves as *only Muslim* were less fundamentalist in Iraq ($\beta = -.233$), although more so in Turkey ($\beta = .051$), but not significantly different from Sunnis in Pakistan and Lebanon. Those identified with much smaller groups or no religious identity were less fundamentalist in Pakistan and Lebanon ($\beta = -.133, -.109,$ respectively).

Fundamentalism is lower among members of ethnic minorities and than those in the majority, but about the same in only two cases. In Pakistan, fundamentalism is weaker among Sindhis, Pathans, and Others than Punjabis ($\beta = -.076, -.050,$ and $-.100,$ respectively), but not significantly different between Punjabis and Kashmiris. Less fundamentalist were also Berbers and Others in Tunisia and Others in Lebanon than Arabs ($\beta = -.054, -.039,$ and $-.032,$ respectively), Palestinians than Jordanians in Jordan ($\beta = -.059$), and Kurds than Turks in Turkey ($\beta = -.036$). But Iraqi Kurds were not significantly different from Iraqi Arabs. To explain the two exceptional cases, we postulate that where ethnic minorities are predominantly concentrated in a region of the country and enjoy substantial autonomy from the central government—like Iraqi Kurds or Pakistani Kashmiris—they exhibit no significant difference in fundamentalism from those in ethnic majority. On the other hand, ethnic minorities are less fundamentalist where they are relatively more dispersed among, and thus interact more often with, the ethnic majority (e.g., Berbers in Tunisia, Sindhis, Pathans, and Others in Pakistan, Others in Lebanon, Palestinians in Jordan, Kurds in Turkey). This area, however, requires further empirical research.

Religion

Except in Egypt where religiosity has no significant link to fundamentalism, all other religious-related variables are related to fundamentalism.¹⁸ Religiosity is positively linked to fundamentalism in the other seven countries (β s between .051 for Jordan and .231 for Lebanon), and to trust in religious institutions across all the countries (β s between .032 for Pakistan and .133 for Tunisia). These findings confirmed similar results from other contexts reported in the literature (e.g., Ammerman 1987; Blaydes and Linzer 2008; Kellstedt and Smidt 1991; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008, 2013; Peshkin 1988). Finally, the belief in religious modernity is significantly linked to fundamentalism across six countries where data on this construct were available (β s between .080 for Egypt and .286 for Lebanon), supporting the connection between the belief that religious beliefs foster development and fundamentalism. This finding suggests that, while fundamentalism may be a reaction to secular modernity (Antoun 2008; Lawrence 1989; Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Kaplan 1992; Riesebrodt 1993), it is not against development, reflecting adherence to religious modernity. As Iranian Muslim intellectual Ali Shariati (Shariati 1969:23; Hanson 1983) stated, “Europe abandoned religion and made progress, [while] we abandoned religion and went backward.” This linkage may also explain why fundamentalism in such contexts as Pakistan under General Zia al-Haq or Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Gumuscu and Sert 2009; Hussain 1999; Mohiuddin 2007; Talbot 1998) displayed strong support for economic development. Altogether, the robustness of these three predictors across the countries supports

¹⁸One reason for a lack of significant relationship between religiosity and fundamentalism among Egyptians is that these variables have low variability. The standard deviations for religiosity and fundamentalism were .83 and .33, respectively, both lowest across the eight countries, while the mean fundamentalism was highest and religiosity was the second highest among Egyptians (Tables 3 and 5).

the view that this multifactor measure of religion, as conceived here, is an important contributor to the study of religious fundamentalism.

Perceptions and Values

The perception that there are conspiracies against Muslims is positively linked to fundamentalism in every country except Tunisia (β s are between .054 in Turkey and .292 in Iraq). In Tunisia, the size of the correlation coefficient between the belief in conspiracy and fundamentalism is much smaller than the size of its coefficient with liberalism ($r = .082$ vs. $-.126$, respectively, both significant). In all other countries, by contrast, the size of the correlation coefficient between the belief in conspiracy and fundamentalism is either larger than the size of its coefficient with liberalism or close to it. As a result, the link between the belief in conspiracy and fundamentalism is insignificant when the liberalism index is in the regression equation but significant when it is removed from the equation. Xenophobia is positively linked to fundamentalism in five of the seven countries: Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Lebanon ($\beta = .033, .037, .082, .114,$ and $.096$, respectively). When religiosity, trust in religious institutions, and the liberalism index are removed, its link with fundamentalism is significant in Turkey. Among Iraqis, on the other hand, the question of xenophobia is a bit complicated. Because of intense interethnic and sectarian rivalries between Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis, attitudes toward neighboring countries vary considerably across these three groups (for example, Shia have stronger favorable attitudes toward Iran and Kuwait than either Kurds or Sunnis). Thus, the measure is not as stable as it is in other countries and may not be appropriate to use for Iraq. Questions related to xenophobia were not permitted in Saudi Arabia.

Suspicion of outsiders, as measured by the belief in conspiracies and xenophobia, when considered in conjunction with membership in the dominant religion indicates the significance of sectarian rivalries in shaping fundamentalism. This finding is not only consistent with the literature (Blau, Land, and Redding 1992; Blau, Redding, and Land 1993; Breault 1989; Handy 1991), but also points to a connection between religious fundamentalism and national chauvinism. Fatalism is consistently and positively linked to fundamentalism across all countries (β s are between .043 for Egypt and .173 in Tunisia). As expected, the liberalism index is markedly inversely linked to fundamentalism across all of the countries, from $-.150$ in KSA and Iraq to $-.326$ in Pakistan. Alternatively, conservatism is positively linked to fundamentalism.

Sources of Information

Regression estimates showed that fundamentalism is positively linked to trusting family and friends on what they tell respondents about the role of religion in politics among Pakistanis, Egyptians, Saudis, and Lebanese ($\beta = .032, .070, .115,$ and $.057$, respectively), but not significantly among Iraqis. This relationship is consistent with findings in the literature on the role of family in shaping people's religious preferences (Ellison 1995). This question was not included in the surveys in the other three countries. Reliance on the plurality of information sources, on the other hand, is consistently negatively linked to fundamentalism across all the countries (β s range between $-.162$ for Saudi Arabia and $-.035$ for Turkey), except among Iraqis, where this relationship is positive ($\beta = .057$). We postulate that the intensification of sectarian rivalries in Iraq might have contributed to the sectarianism of the media—where each group preferred to rely on their sectarian sources of information. As a result, reliance on these sources tended to reinforce, rather than weaken, fundamentalism.

In sum, our analysis at the individual level shows that a higher level of fundamentalism is linked to (a) religion in different ways—religiosity, confidence in religious institutions, and religious modernity; (b) stronger xenophobia and beliefs in conspiracy; (c) higher fatalism and weaker liberal outlooks; (d) a higher trust in family and friends as information sources about religion and less reliance on diverse sources of information; and (e) lower socioeconomic status and membership in an ethnic majority, or dominant religion or sect.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This study was designed to advance the social-scientific study of fundamentalism in several respects. First, to address the challenges to the study of the subject posed by (a) the diversity of fundamentalist movements, (b) the controversy over the concept in the Islamic context, and (c) the variability of its operational definitions in the literature, we conceptualized the term as a set of core beliefs about and attitudes toward religion that rests on a disciplinarian conception of the deity, literalism, religious exclusivity and intolerance. Our conceptualization thus captures the common features underpinning the diversity of fundamentalist movements in Christianity and Islam. Whether Shia, Sunni, or Christian fundamentalists, they are more likely to adhere to a disciplinarian deity, believe in the literal truth of the scriptures, espouse an exclusivist view of their religious community, and be intolerant of other religions than people who are not. Our analyses of the data from cross-nationally comparable representative samples of respondents in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey supported combining these components to form a single fundamentalism scale. A stable yardstick was thus created to compare fundamentalism across religions, religious sects, and nations.

Second, our analysis showed that aggregate fundamentalism was higher in countries where religious liberty or diversity was more restricted, state regulation of religion greater and authoritarian structure less fragmented, and the national context less globalized. Third, on the micro (individual) level, our analysis also indicated that fundamentalism was stronger among individuals who were of a lower socioeconomic status, members of the dominant religion/sect or ethnic majority, more religious, express greater confidence in religious institutions, stronger believers in religious modernity, less liberal (more conservative), stronger believers in conspiracy, more xenophobic, more fatalistic, more trusting of what family and friends tell them about the political role of religion, and rely less on diverse sources of information. The minor exceptions to this general pattern were noted, explained, and considered not a serious deviation from this general pattern.

These findings have ramifications for our understanding of fundamentalism on a higher level of empirical generalization and theoretical abstraction than in the existing literature. Given our cross-sectional data, it would be hard to assess the extent to which fundamentalism is a reaction to changes in each of the seven countries that would warrant causal conclusions, such as responses to changes in socioeconomic status or state intervention, for example. Its cross-national variation, however, provides suggestive consistent evidence. Generally, fundamentalism on the macro (country) level is higher where freedom to engage in religion is restricted by (a) state structure and policies, and (b) religious monopoly. It is weakened under the conditions of (a) religious liberty, and (b) cultural diversity provided by globalization. On this level, the key variables related to cross-national variation in aggregate fundamentalism revolve on religious unfreedom and monopoly. On the (micro) individual level, we showed that fundamentalism does not appear to be a reaction to modernity *per se*. In fact, it is strongly linked to a religious conception of modernity *qua* development, where religious belief is believed to foster development. However, although fundamentalism has multiple determinants, its strength relates to religion (religiosity, religious modernity, and trust in religious institutions), personal inefficacy (subjectively [fatalism] and objectively [lower socioeconomic status]), illiberal values, outgroup hostility (xenophobia, conspiracy, religious or ethnic domination), and monolithic information source.

As noted above, we fully recognize that while we have advanced possible explanations of the subject, our cross-sectional data preclude definitive causal claims, which would require collecting data at multiple points in time. Even though fundamentalism is treated statistically as a dependent variable, we do not rule out reciprocal causations or that the direction of causality could be just the opposite of what our model has specified. From our perspective, the specified factors are statistical predictors of fundamentalism and our model is one way of interpreting the pattern of relationship between the variables. Nonetheless, these societal conditions and personal characteristics that

are linked to the measure of the construct as orientations toward religion rather than religious beliefs themselves advance the social-scientific study of fundamentalism in an empirically more generalizable and theoretically more abstract manner.

With that foundation, we suggest that future research move in several directions. One is to apply the analytical framework employed here to study Jewish fundamentalism and examine whether the same or a similar set of variables predicts fundamentalist orientations among Jews, particularly in Israel. We also suggest applying our measurement of the construct to examine fundamentalism in such atheistic or nontheistic religions as Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Jainism. For sure, the disciplinarian conception of the deity, one of the components of fundamentalism, may not be directly applicable to Eastern religions. However, given that our indicators of this component revolve on the notion of reward and punishment from God, a similar set of measures may be formulated that focus on a retributive conception of karma that stresses on the severity of punishment in the next life from misdeeds in this life. Finally, another line of research is to go beyond religion and develop parallel measures that tap into fundamentalism in other belief systems, including secular fundamentalism such as the literalism, group-centrism, and intolerance displayed among the followers of different secular ideologies. This line of research may produce the necessary empirical evidence in order to construct a more general conception of fundamentalism that includes both religious and secular variants. We hope that the present research provided the foundation for a broader understanding of the concept and its assessment.

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