

Do Votes Speak Louder than Motives? Moral Judgments and Tolerance in the 2016 Presidential Election

Sarah T. Huff^{†*} and Michael P. Hall[†]

University of Michigan

When judging a voter's decision, does that voter's reason for casting their vote influence moral and interpersonal judgments about them? In the context of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, past research suggests two competing predictions. First, people regularly account for an actor's intentions when forming judgments of the actor, indicating that judgments may vary according to a voter's motives. However, people are unlikely to see nuance among outgroups, especially amid divisive political partisanship, suggesting that judgments would ignore information about voters' motives. In Study 1, results supported the first prediction, showing that both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump supporters distinguished between different voting motives when making moral and interpersonal judgments of outgroup voters. In Studies 2 and 3, when some voters' motives became more extreme, Clinton and Trump supporters again distinguished between voting motives for outgroup and ingroup voters, respectively, albeit in a different pattern of results.

Imagine being a Hillary Clinton supporter in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, and you have two acquaintances who voted for Donald Trump. One

*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sarah T. Huff, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, 530 Church Street, 3225 EH, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 [e-mail: huffs@umich.edu].

[†]These authors contributed equally to this manuscript.

Acknowledgments: We thank the PR Lab at the University of Michigan, and particularly Dr. Phoebe Ellsworth, for their thorough feedback on study designs and drafts of this manuscript. This study was deemed exempt from oversight by the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board. Data collection and data analysis were performed by both M. P. Hall and S. T. Huff. Each author drafted different sections and provided critical revisions for one another. Both authors approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

supported Trump's positions and values; the second generally supports the Republican Party despite personally disagreeing with many of Trump's positions and values. Do their motives matter when judging each acquaintance on moral and interpersonal levels? Or is all that matters the fact that this person casts a vote for a candidate whom the observer finds objectionable, rendering that voter's motives irrelevant? Prior research suggests two potential answers to these questions.

Under one perspective, the vote itself might speak louder than the reasons behind it. In other words, if an act brings about a positive or negative outcome, the reasons for that act do not matter; instead, the act will be judged solely based on its outcome. When it comes to judging others' voting behavior, this *consequentialist perspective* suggests that judgments hinge solely upon whether the vote itself is seen as positive or negative by the judge. Returning to the previous example a Clinton supporter should object to a vote cast for Trump regardless of the reasons behind it, thereby evaluating the morality of two voters similarly, despite their differing motives. Evidence from psychological and political research supports that such consequentialist reasoning may occur in the context of American politics. American voters are increasingly defined by their political affiliations, and one's tribal affinity for one side of the partisan spectrum can be an important aspect of one's social identity (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Indeed, Americans who identify with a political party have become much more likely to view the opposing political party and its members negatively (Haidt & Hetherington, 2012; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012); and both Democrats and Republicans are increasingly likely to overestimate the degree of political polarization in the United States (Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2015).

In recent years, political party membership has become an increasingly salient defining attribute of ingroup membership. Indeed, party membership in the United States is as polarizing as race and decreasing numbers of Americans are willing to marry a member of the other political party (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Research on intergroup perceptions consistently finds that people perceive members of outgroups as possessing undesirable traits (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), tend to see them as all alike (i.e., more homogeneous than one's ingroup; Boldry, Gaertner, & Quinn, 2007; Linville & Jones, 1980), and express open dislike and hostility toward them (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Thus, this perspective suggests that simply voting for the opposing candidate would brand a person as unacceptable, with no consideration of his or her motives. One week after the election, this perspective appeared in a *Slate* article entitled, "There's No Such Thing as a Good Trump Voter," in which the author argued that Trump was such an abhorrent candidate that no votes in his favor could be justified, regardless of a voter's motivation (Bouie, 2016).

On the other hand, research from moral psychology suggests that, unlike the consequentialist perspective, a voter should be judged by her reasons for

casting a vote, and not the vote itself. Although we are not aware of research that has addressed the influence of voting motives on judgments of voters, several models of moral judgment contend that an actor's motivations are considered when making moral judgments of the actor and their act (Cushman, 2008; Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). Based on this theoretical background, the *motivational perspective* suggests that Americans may care about another's motives for voting when judging their behavior, even if that person voted for a candidate the judge finds objectionable. Indeed, research suggests that considerations of an actor's intentions are at the top of the hierarchy of inferences made when judging someone's actions, ahead of considerations about the actor's personality or desires (Malle & Holbrook, 2012).

In the realm of moral blame, negative outcomes that are produced by actors with different intentions may be judged differently. For instance, Alicke (1992) presented participants with a vignette about a driver (John) who hit another car at an intersection while driving over the speed limit, resulting in multiple injuries to the victim. However, John's motivation for speeding was manipulated between two conditions: John always wanted to get home quickly to hide something from his parents, but that item was either a vial of cocaine or an anniversary gift for his parents. Even though the same negative consequences occurred regardless of John's motivations (e.g., an injurious car accident), participants saw him as being more to blame for the accident when he was racing home to hide his cocaine (Alicke, 1992). Thus, participants judged an actor's behavior differently according to his motivations, even despite very negative consequences. Translating these conclusions to the example at the beginning of this article, the Clinton supporter might judge her two Trump-voting acquaintances differently depending on their motives for voting for Trump, despite the subjectively negative outcome in both cases. Although supporting Trump because he was the chosen Republican Party nominee might be tolerable, supporting Trump because of his (perceived) controversial positions and values might be a step too far. Consistent with this perspective, another postelection popular press article (entitled, "Sorry, Liberals. Bigotry Didn't Elect Donald Trump") urged liberals to consider the numerous motives for voting for Trump (Kuhn, 2016).

Because moral values and convictions are frequently interlaced with Americans' voting decisions (Westen, 2007), it is logical to study the perceived morality of voting decisions and motives. Indeed, Skitka and Bauman (2008) found that having stronger moral convictions about the 2004 major-party presidential candidates and the relevant issues at the time predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote. Moreover, having such moral convictions motivated political engagement in general for those across the political spectrum (Skitka & Morgan, 2014), and many Americans felt that their candidate preference was a reflection of their own moral values (Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Moreover, moral conviction about candidate preference has been linked to enthusiasm about one's

preferred candidate and hostility toward the nonpreferred candidate in the 2012 Presidential Election (Brandt, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2015), an association that was likely to occur again in 2016, given the high levels of negativity about the 2016 major-party candidates (Geiger, 2016).

Beyond moral judgments, what are the interpersonal and relational consequences of a voter's motives? Although political partisanship is among the most divisive categories in the United States (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), interpersonal judgments may depend on the perceived severity of the act. When judging a perceived immoral act, the judge's tolerance for the actor decreases with the emotional intensity of the judge's moral conviction (Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008); that is, as one's moral conviction about a subject increases, so should one's moral condemnation of someone who violates those moral principles. Therefore, if some motivations for voting for a presidential candidate are considered less moral than others, then the judge should exhibit lower tolerance of those voters and want to associate with them less (Ryan, 2016; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Wright et al., 2008). Thus, if the Clinton supporter from the beginning example judges one of the two Trump-supporting acquaintances to have less moral motives, then the Clinton supporter should tolerate that person less and seek distance (vs. closeness) from that person.

The present research addresses these questions across three studies conducted after the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. In Study 1, participants who self-identified as either Clinton or Trump supporters judged people who voted for the opposing candidate ("outgroup" voters). In Study 2, participants again judged outgroup voters, though third-party voters were included for judgment in comparison to some of the voter profiles from Study 1, with a focus on the voters most likely to elicit negative judgments from outgroup observers. Finally, Study 3 participants judged the same batch of voters from Study 2, but this time, they were people who voted for the participant's preferred candidate ("ingroup" voters).

In each study, we investigate whether people judge voters and their voting behavior solely by the content of their vote (the *consequentialist perspective*), or whether they account for a voter's motives when forming evaluations of them (the *motivational perspective*). If participants evaluate "believer" and "party loyalist" voters similarly on moral and interpersonal levels, this would confirm the consequentialist perspective and suggest that people disregard voters' reasons and motives for their voting decisions. However, if participants evaluate "believer" and "party loyalist" voters differently, this would confirm the motivational perspective, suggesting that voters' motives are considered in such evaluations.

Study 1: Judgments of Outgroup Voters and Their Motives

Study 1 investigates whether Clinton and Trump supporters differentiated between outgroup voters based on their reasons for voting (i.e., the motivational perspective), or whether they treated all voters equally regardless of reasons (i.e., the consequentialist perspective). Specifically, Study 1 measures whether moral evaluations and tolerance of these voters differed depending on one's reasons for voting.

Method

Participants

Four hundred one American adults were recruited through Mechanical Turk (MTurk) for compensation of \$1.00. Participants were excluded for failing an attention check ($n = 16$) or indicating that their data should not be used ($n = 0$), resulting in a final sample of 385 participants (54.5% male; 82.9% White/Caucasian; $M_{age} = 35.74$ years, $SD_{age} = 10.44$) comprising 245 Clinton supporters and 140 Trump supporters. This was sufficient to meet our goal to have at least 60 Trump supporters per cell, accounting for research showing that there are fewer conservative workers on MTurk than liberal workers (Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015). Self-identified political affiliation was as follows: 25.7% Republican or lean Republican, 18.2% Independent, 49.6% Democrat or lean Democrat, and the remaining 6.5% either had no preference, wrote in another option, or did not answer. To collect data quickly after the election's conclusion and to gather participants of ideological diversity, we used MTurk as the data collection source for all studies in the present research. Ideological differences obtained in MTurk samples have been shown to be similar to ideological differences in nationally representative panel studies (Clifford et al., 2015).

Design

In Study 1, all participants judged two voters who had *not* voted for the participant's preferred candidate (i.e., "outgroup" voters), but who varied in their motives: the "believer," or someone who voted for the opposing major-party candidate because they agreed with the candidate's positions and values; or the "party loyalist," someone who voted for the opposing major-party candidate because they primarily supported that candidate's political party affiliation. All participants evaluated both a "party loyalist" and "believer" voter (in random order), but there were two varieties of the "believer" that participants were randomly assigned to judge. These two "believers" were designed to reflect the diverse ways a voter could agree with a candidate's values: a "less extreme believer" who agrees with

a candidate's more conventional positions and values, or an "extreme believer" who is motivated by a candidate's most controversial or extreme characteristics (Full voter profiles are printed in the following section). Study 1 had a mixed 2 (candidate preference: Clinton or Trump) \times 2 (believer extremity: "less extreme believer" or "extreme believer") \times 2 (target voter type: believer or party loyalist) design, with candidate preference and believer extremity as between-subject factors, and voter type as a within-subject factor.

Procedure

The survey began with the question, "Regardless of whether or not you voted in the recent U.S. Presidential Election, which of the two major-party candidates did you prefer?" In response, participants could select either Clinton or Trump. Once a participant's preferred candidate had been determined, participants were presented with short vignettes about "outgroup" voters who supported the opposing major-party candidate (i.e., the participant's nonpreferred candidate). Participants read vignettes about two hypothetical voters ("believer" and "party loyalist") presented in a random order. The "believer" profile was also randomly assigned to be "less extreme" or "extreme."

All voter profiles began with "Imagine an individual who says they voted for [Donald Trump/Hillary Clinton] because . . ." The remainder of the voter profile was changed depending on candidate preference and condition. For example, a Trump-supporting participant reading about a Clinton "less extreme believer" voter read:

. . . they believed in her plans to improve conditions for the middle class by raising the minimum wage, preserving the Affordable Care Act (aka, Obamacare), and improving educational access.

Or a Clinton-supporting participant reading about a Trump "less extreme believer" voter read:

. . . they believed in his plans to improve conditions for the middle class by bringing back American manufacturing jobs, repealing the Affordable Care Act (aka, Obamacare), and improving the nation's infrastructure.

Or a Trump-supporting participant reading about a Clinton "extreme believer" voter read:

. . . they agree with her plans to disregard the Second Amendment, agree that half of Americans are "deplorables," and are proud of her endorsement by Cecile Richards, the president of Planned Parenthood.

Or a Clinton-supporting participant reading a Trump "extreme believer" voter read:

... they agree with his plans to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico, ban Muslim immigrants, and are proud of his endorsement by David Duke, former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan.

Or a Clinton-supporting participant reading about a Trump “party loyalist” voter would have read:

... they agree with Republican Party principles and he is the candidate their party chose, even though they personally disagree with his racist, sexist, misogynistic, and homophobic comments and actions.

Or a Trump-supporting participant reading about a Clinton “party loyalist” voter would have read:

... they agree with Democratic Party principles and she is the candidate their party chose, even though they personally disagree with her financial and political corruption.

After reading each vignette, participants reported their moral judgments of the voter’s behavior and character, and their interpersonal tolerance for the voter, including evaluations of the voter’s personality traits. Lastly, participants provided demographic information.

Measures

Moral evaluations. Participants first evaluated each of the voters on seven items measuring morality, character, and intentionality. The following four items were included to measure moral evaluations of the voter’s action as well as the participant’s feelings and trust for the voter:

Moral acceptability. “How morally acceptable is this person’s action?” (1 *not at all acceptable*–7 *completely acceptable*).

Moral character. “To what extent do you think this person possesses strong moral character?” (1 *not at all*–7 *very much*).

Trustworthiness. “To what extent is this person trustworthy?” (1 *not at all*–7 *very much*).

Feelings toward voter. “Overall, how would you rate your feelings about this person? (reverse-coded: 1 *very positive*–7 *very negative*).

Perceptions of agency. The following three items were inspired by research on mind perception and moral judgment (Gray et al., 2012) and were included to measure the participant’s perceptions of the voter’s causal connection to the consequences of the election (positive or negative). In particular, the following measures were included to detect whether certain voter types were seen as being more capable, intentional, and agentic compared to others:

Capability of recognizing right and wrong. “To what extent do you believe this person is capable of recognizing right versus wrong?” (1 *not at all capable*–7 *very capable*).

Agency. “How much thought does this person give to their behaviors before acting?” (1 *none at all*–7 *a lot*).

Responsibility for election’s outcome. “How responsible is this person for contributing to the outcome of the election?” (1 *not at all responsible*–7 *very responsible*).

Tolerance. Three separate measures of interpersonal tolerance were used.

Perceived traits. Participants rated the voters along 15 dimensions on a 5-point bipolar scale: accepting, inattentive, loyal, anxious, moral, unsupportive, selfish, careless, reliable, likable, unintelligent, positive, not loving, submissive, and professional.¹ After reverse-scoring negative traits, the ratings were averaged to form a single composite, where higher ratings indicated more positive trait inferences or higher levels of tolerance (Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{believer}} = .94$; Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{party loyalist}} = .93$).

Willingness to interact. Participants were asked to indicate their willingness to interact with the voter in a variety of domains, including intermittent social relations, work or business relations, guest at one’s home, intimate friendship, letting children play together, and having the person as a next-door neighbor (rated on a scale from 1 *not at all willing*–5 *definitely willing*; Roccas & Amit, 2011). These items were combined to create a score of willingness to interact (Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{believer}} = .95$; Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{party loyalist}} = .94$).

Feelings of closeness. Participants were asked, “How close do you feel to this person?” and responded using a 7-point scale (1 *not at all close*–7 *very close*; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

Exposure to voter profiles. After each vignette, participants were asked three questions to measure their familiarity with the voter profiles included in the present research. First, participants were asked, “To what extent did you hear about voters who met this description in media coverage of the 2016 Presidential Election?” and responded using a 7-point scale (1 *not at all*–7 *very often*). Next, participants read, “To what extent do you think voters like this existed?” and responded using a 7-point scale (1 *definitely not*–7 *definitely yes*). Lastly,

¹ The dominant–submissive item was not included in the final scale because depending on the context, dominant and submissive could be seen as either positive or negative traits. Therefore, the final scale had 14 items.

participants were asked, “To what extent did you know people who fit this description?” and responded on a 7-point scale (1 *none at all*–7 *very many*).

Results

Data Analyses

For the following analyses, we conducted mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA) using two between-subject factors (candidate preference, belief extremity) and one within-subject factor (voter type). For specific values and effect sizes, please see the Supplemental Results.

Moral Evaluations

We were primarily interested in whether moral judgments differed depending on the voter’s motivations for voting, but also whether this difference was affected by belief extremity. Belief extremity influenced the directionality of the differences between believers and party loyalists. Between “party loyalists” and “extreme believers,” party loyalists were rated more favorably on measures of: moral acceptability, $F(1, 381) = 127.60, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.25$; moral character, $F(1, 381) = 110.09, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.22$; trustworthiness, $F(1, 381) = 97.75, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.20$; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, $F(1, 381) = 119.22, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.24$; thinking before acting, $F(1, 381) = 24.97, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.06$; personal feelings toward the voter, $F(1, 381) = 68.41, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.15$. Interestingly, the pattern of results is the opposite when judging “party loyalists” and “less extreme believers.” When compared to less extreme believers, party loyalists were rated less favorably on measures of: moral acceptability, $F(1, 381) = 26.65, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.07$; moral character, $F(1, 381) = 27.91, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.07$; trustworthiness, $F(1, 381) = 12.20, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.03$; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, $F(1, 381) = 4.72, p = .030, \eta_p^2 = 0.01$; and thinking before acting, $F(1, 381) = 27.67, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.07$. There were no significant differences in personal feelings toward the voter and beliefs about responsibility for the election’s outcome when comparing the party loyalist to either of the two types of believers. Thus, moral and character evaluations differed according to voters’ motivations, but the extremity of their motivations influenced the direction of subsequent evaluations: “Less extreme believers” were regarded most favorably, whereas “extreme believers” were evaluated most negatively.

Importantly, these simple effects were supported by a two-way interaction between target (believer vs. loyalists) and belief extremity (extreme vs. less extreme) on measures of: moral acceptability, $F(1, 381) = 135.05, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.26$; moral character, $F(1, 381) = 124.12, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.25$; trustworthiness, $F(1, 381) = 89.19, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.19$; capability of recognizing right versus




Fig. 1. Moral judgments of outgroup voters (Study 1). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

wrong, $F(1, 381) = 85.25, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.18$; thinking before acting, $F(1, 381) = 52.61, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.12$; and personal feelings toward the voter, $F(1, 381) = 46.02, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.11$. These two-way interactions supported the interpretation that party loyalists were judged more positively when compared to extreme believers, but less positively when compared to less extreme believers. There was not a significant two-way interaction for responsibility for the election's outcome. Means and 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 1.

Tolerance

We aimed to test whether ratings of interpersonal tolerance differed depending on a target's motivations behind his or her vote, and whether these differences were affected by belief extremity.

When compared to extreme believers, party loyalists were rated more favorably on measures of: positive trait inferences, $F(1, 381) = 162.79, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.30$; willingness to interact, $F(1, 381) = 185.64, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.33$; and feeling of closeness, $F(1, 381) = 86.61, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.19$. Interestingly, when compared to less extreme believers, party loyalists were rated significantly less favorably on measures of positive trait inferences, $F(1, 381) = 7.21, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = 0.02$; marginally significantly less favorably for feelings of closeness, $F(1, 381) = 2.89, p = .090, \eta_p^2 = 0.01$; but not on willingness to interact ($p > .250$). Central to our hypotheses, these main effects were supported by a significant two-way interaction between target (believer vs. loyalists) and belief extremity (extreme vs. less extreme) on measures of: positive trait inferences,




Fig. 2. Tolerance of outgroup voters (Study 1). Positive trait inferences and willingness to interact were measured using a scale of 1–5, whereas feelings of closeness were measured using a scale of 1–7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

$F(1, 381) = 118.67, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.24$; willingness to interact, $F(1, 381) = 107.65, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.22$; and feelings of closeness, $F(1, 381) = 65.57, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.14$. Means and 95% confidence intervals are depicted in Figure 2. Again, party loyalists were favored over extreme believers, but were evaluated less positively when compared to less extreme believers.

Exposure to Different Voter Profiles

In line with our hypotheses, we found evidence to suggest that people were familiar with voters who fit the profiles of both types of believer (extreme and less extreme) and the party loyalist. Agreement with each type of exposure was determined by combining people who gave a rating of greater than the scale midpoint of four (i.e., five, six, and seven). An overwhelming majority of participants agreed that they had heard about voters in the media who met all three descriptions (party loyalist: 75.5%; extreme believer: 67.4%; less extreme believer: 84.9%), thought these voters existed (party loyalist: 87%; extreme believer: 82.3%; less extreme believer: 89%), and, to a lesser extent, knew people who fit the description (party loyalist: 63.7%; extreme believer: 34.8%; less extreme believer: 70.8%).

Discussion

Study 1 yielded two main conclusions. First, Study 1 found support for the motivational perspective across measures of moral judgment and interpersonal tolerance. Participants did not simply regard all outgroup voters unfavorably for supporting the participant's nonpreferred candidate; instead, participants took

outgroup voters' motives for casting their votes into account when making moral and interpersonal evaluations of them. Specifically, "less extreme believers" were regarded more favorably than "party loyalists," whereas "extreme believers" were regarded less favorably than "party loyalists." In other words, participants most preferred "less extreme believers" who voted for a candidate out of agreement with that candidate's more conventional values and positions, but least preferred "extreme believers" who were motivated by a candidate's most controversial positions. This is consistent with other research showing that people are more likely to evaluate moderate groups more favorably than extreme groups (Hogg, 2007). In the current study, the "less extreme believers" are the more moderate of the two groups.

Second, Study 1 validated the use of the various "believer" and "party loyalist" voter profiles by showing that participants were aware that such voter types existed, and often knew similar voters themselves. Thus, although the "extreme believers" in particular were motivated by somewhat controversial motives, participants still felt that such voters existed in the 2016 Election.

Study 2: Outgroup and Third-Party Voters

Study 2 had two primary goals. First, we included judgments of third-party voters in addition to "believers" and "party loyalists" to measure how these nonmajor-party voters compared to those who voted for major-party candidates. Third-party voters sometimes have a notable effect on election results and coverage: Roughly 4% of the national popular vote in the 2016 Election went to third-party candidates (Quealy, 2016), and third-party voters are sometimes the subject of resentment from supporters of major-party candidates, particularly if third-party candidates are perceived to have reduced one of the major-party candidate's chances of electoral victory (e.g., Nguyen, 2016). In addition, Study 2 sought to replicate Study 1's findings in support of the motivational perspective, with a particular focus on how the "extreme believers" are judged in comparison to third-party voters, both of whom we expected to be rated less favorably. Because 2016 was an especially divisive election, we were interested in focusing specifically on voter profiles that would be regarded unfavorably by outgroup observers, a more rigorous test of the motivational perspective. Therefore, the "less extreme believer" profile from Study 1 was not used in Study 2.

Method

Participants

One hundred ninety-three American adults were recruited through Amazon MTurk for compensation of \$1.00. Study 2 is the combination of two separate

surveys conducted on MTurk, both of which began with the same candidate preference question as Study 1. Participants could select either Clinton or Trump as their preferred candidate, and were not told that this question was used as a screening measure for recruitment. Participants who selected the candidate who was the focus of that survey continued onto the next portion of the study, whereas those who selected the nonfocal candidate were sent to the end of the survey and compensated for their time. Study 2 used the same sample size determination as Study 1 (i.e., at least 60 Trump supporters per cell). Participants were excluded for failing the same attention ($n = 3$) and quality ($n = 3$) checks as Study 1, resulting in a final sample of 187 participants (68.4% male; 76.5% White/Caucasian; $M_{age} = 33.97$ years, $SD_{age} = 10.45$) that included 95 Clinton supporters and 92 Trump supporters. Self-identified political affiliation was as follows: 34.8% Republican or lean Republican, 20.3% Independent, 40.1% Democrat or lean Democrat, and the remaining 4.8% either had no preference, wrote in another option, or did not answer.

Design

All results for Study 2 are based on a combination of the two surveys used to recruit Clinton and Trump supporters separately, each following the same design and procedure. All participants judged three voters who had *not* voted for the participant's preferred candidate (i.e., "outgroup" voters) for differing reasons: "extreme believer" (same as Study 1); "party loyalist" (same as Study 1); and "third party," or someone who voted for a third-party candidate out of dissatisfaction with the two major-party candidates. Study 2 had a mixed 2 (candidate preference: Clinton or Trump) \times 3 (target voter type: believer, loyalist, or third party) design, with candidate preference as a between-subject factor and voter type as a within-subject factor.

Procedure

After indicating their preferred candidate (Clinton or Trump), participants read vignettes about three hypothetical voters ("extreme believer," "party loyalist," or "third party") in a random order. The "extreme believer" and "party loyalist" profiles were the same those used in Study 1, and the "third party" profile was the same for both Clinton and Trump supporters:

Imagine an individual who says they voted for a third party candidate because they strongly disliked both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton and felt that they should not only have to consider a major party candidate when both of those candidates were unsatisfactory.

After reading each vignette, participants reported their moral judgments of the voter's behavior and character and their tolerance for the voter, including

evaluations of the voter's personality traits. Lastly, participants provided demographic information.

Measures

All measures for Study 2 were the same as those from Study 1, with the exception that Study 2 excluded the exposure to different types of voter measures. As with Study 1, reliability was acceptable for both sets of tolerance measures (perceived traits: Cronbach's $\alpha_{\text{believer}} = .94$; Cronbach's $\alpha_{\text{party loyalist}} = .94$; Cronbach's $\alpha_{\text{third party}} = .95$; willingness to interact: Cronbach's $\alpha_{\text{believer}} = .96$; Cronbach's $\alpha_{\text{party loyalist}} = .96$; Cronbach's $\alpha_{\text{third party}} = .96$).

Results

Data Analyses

For all analyses, we conducted mixed ANOVAs using one between-subject factor (candidate preference) and one within-subject factors (voter type). For specific values and effect sizes, please see the Supplemental Results.

Moral Evaluations

We were primarily interested in whether judgments of the three different voter types differed on a within-subject basis, and there were significant evaluative differences between these voters in measures of moral acceptability, $F(2, 370) = 217.54, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.54$; moral character, $F(2, 370) = 232.24, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.56$; trustworthiness, $F(2, 370) = 172.72, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.48$; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, $F(2, 370) = 155.07, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.46$; perceiving the voter as thinking before acting, $F(2, 370) = 96.67, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.34$; and personal feelings toward the voter, $F(2, 370) = 108.83, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.37$. In each case, the patterns were similar: Compared to "party loyalists" and "third-party" voters, pairwise comparisons showed that "extreme believer" voters were viewed as less morally acceptable ($p_{\text{party}} < .001$; $p_{\text{third}} < .001$), of weaker moral character ($p_{\text{party}} < .001$; $p_{\text{third}} < .001$), less trustworthy ($p_{\text{party}} < .001$; $p_{\text{third}} < .001$), less capable of recognizing right versus wrong ($p_{\text{party}} < .001$; $p_{\text{third}} < .001$), thinking less before acting ($p_{\text{party}} < .001$; $p_{\text{third}} < .001$), and were regarded with more negative feelings ($p_{\text{party}} < .001$; $p_{\text{third}} < .001$). However, for the measure of perceived responsibility for the election's outcome, there were no significant within-subject effects, $F(2, 370) = 2.24, p = .108$. Figure 3 depicts the means and 95% confidence intervals for the evaluations of the three different voter types in Study 2 (see the Supplemental Results for additional details).




Fig. 3. Moral judgments of outgroup voters (Study 2). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

There were no between-subject differences as a function of the participant's preferred candidate in the election, except for measures of personal feelings toward the voters ($F(1, 185) = 4.52, p = .035, \eta_p^2 = 0.02$) and perceived responsibility for the election's outcome ($F(1, 185) = 28.28, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.13$); in these cases, Trump (vs. Clinton) supporters expressed more positive feelings toward the outgroup voters and judged the outgroup voters to be less responsible for the election's outcome. Lastly, there was a significant two-way interaction of preferred candidate and voter type on responsibility for the election's outcome that was not predicted: The interaction indicated that Clinton voters generally judged their outgroup voters as more responsible for the election's outcome than Trump voters did, $F(2, 370) = 3.64, p = .027, \eta_p^2 = 0.02$. More details on these between-subject main effects and interactions can be found in the Supplemental Results.

Tolerance

We were primarily interested in whether tolerance toward outgroup voters differed depending on the motives behind their vote. These data provide strong evidence that voting motives influenced all measures of tolerance, including positive trait inferences, $F(2, 370) = 156.29, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.46$; willingness to interact, $F(2, 370) = 203.89, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.52$; and feelings of closeness, $F(2, 370) = 190.74, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.51$. Patterns were consistent across all three measures, demonstrating the highest levels of tolerance toward "third-party" voters, intermediate tolerance toward "party loyalists," and strong intolerance toward "extreme believers." Means and 95% confidence intervals for these evaluations of tolerance are plotted in Figure 4.




Fig. 4. Tolerance of outgroup voters (Study 2). Positive trait inferences and willingness to interact were measured using a scale of 1–5, whereas feelings of closeness were measured using a scale of 1–7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Interestingly, Trump supporters were more tolerant of outgroup voters on all measures of tolerance, including positive trait inferences, $F(1, 185) = 6.28, p = .013, \eta_p^2 = 0.03$; willingness to interact, $F(1, 185) = 8.24, p = .005, \eta_p^2 = 0.04$; and feelings of closeness, $F(1, 185) = 6.09, p = .014, \eta_p^2 = 0.03$. Lastly, there was a two-way interaction between candidate preference and voter type for willingness to interact, $F(2, 370) = 10.11, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.05$ and feelings of closeness, $F(2, 370) = 3.29, p = .038, \eta_p^2 = 0.02$, but not for trait inferences. Clinton supporters were less willing to interact with and felt less close to the outgroup “extreme believer” voters than did Trump supporters. However, this between-subject difference did not emerge in judgments of the “party loyalist” or “third-party” voters (see Supplemental Results for additional details).

Discussion

Like Study 1, Study 2 replicated findings supporting the motivational perspective, again finding that “extreme believers” were judged less favorably than “party loyalists.” In addition, “third-party” voters were regarded most favorably in both moral and interpersonal terms, suggesting that, when compared to true outgroup voters (i.e., those who voted for the participant’s nonpreferred major-party candidate), participants most favored voters who opted not to vote for either major-party candidate in the divisive 2016 election. This positive regard for third-party voters may not be particularly surprising, given that they abstained from voting for the

participant's nonpreferred major-party candidate who is usually considered to be the main rival in presidential contests. Study 3 examines whether these patterns replicate when judging ingroup voters, or those who voted for the participant's preferred major-party candidate.

Study 3: Judgments of Ingroup Voters and Their Motives

In Study 3, we examine whether the motivational perspective is supported when judging ingroup voters (i.e., voters who voted for one's preferred candidate). For example, do Clinton supporters differentiate between other Clinton supporters depending on their motivations for voting? Unlike judgments of outgroup voters, it is conceivable that one might applaud all ingroup voters—regardless of their motives—because they voted for one's preferred candidate, thus validating the consequentialist perspective and illustrating a reversal of the outgroup homogeneity bias. However, it is also possible that differentiation based on motives may be stronger when judging the ingroup because people tend to perceive more heterogeneity within the ingroup (Boldry et al., 2007; Linville & Jones, 1980). Study 3 investigates this question. We expect that “party loyalist” voters should again be evaluated more favorably than “extreme believers,” and also more favorably than “third-party” voters who abstained from voting with a participant's ingroup.

Method

Participants

One hundred ninety-eight American adults were recruited through MTurk for compensation of \$1.00. Using the same screening question as Studies 1–2 to determine a participant's preferred candidate, participants were presented with short vignettes about “ingroup” voters who supported the same candidate as they did. Participants were excluded for failing the same attention ($n = 11$) and quality ($n = 1$) restrictions used in Studies 1 and 2, resulting in a final sample of 186 participants (48.4% male; 81.7% White/Caucasian; $M_{age} = 33.98$ years, $SD_{age} = 10.73$) comprised of 119 Clinton supporters and 67 Trump supporters. This met our goal of at least 60 Trump supporters per cell. Self-identified political affiliation was as follows: 25.3% Republican or lean Republican; 16.1% Independent; 43.2% Democrat or lean Democrat; and, the remaining 5.4% either had no preference, wrote in another option, or did not answer.

Design and Procedure

The design was almost identical to Study 2, with one exception: Participants in Study 3 evaluated ingroup instead of outgroup voters. That is, using the same

vignettes as in Study 2, participants read about voters with whom they agreed (in the cases of the “extreme believer” and “party loyalist” voters) instead of voters who had voted against the participant’s preferred candidate. If participants initially said they supported Trump, they rated other Trump voters. If they supported Clinton, they rated other Clinton supporters. Study 3 had a mixed 2 (candidate preference: Clinton or Trump) \times 3 (target voter type: believer, loyalist, or third party) design, with candidate preference as a between-subject factor and voter type as a within-subject factor.

Measures

Nearly all measures were identical to those used in Study 2, with one added measure at the end of the study: After reading about and evaluating the three different types of voters, participants were asked to indicate to which of the three voter types they felt they were most similar. For answer options, participants could select one of the following three options: “The voter who primarily agreed with their preferred candidate’s positions and beliefs” (i.e., believer), “The voter who supported their preferred candidate mostly because of their political party membership” (i.e., party loyalist), or “The voter who supported a third-party candidate because they disliked both of the major-party candidates” (i.e., third party). When asked to indicate which of the three voter types they most identified with, participants who supported Clinton and Trump both displayed the same pattern. The largest group was identified as “believers” (52.9% of Clinton supporters, 46.3% of Trump supporters), whereas smaller groups were identified as “party loyalists” (22.7% of Clinton supporters, 22.4% of Trump supporters) or “third-party” voters (24.4% of Clinton supporters, 31.3% of Trump supporters). This pattern of identification did not differ significantly as a function of a participant’s candidate preference, $\chi^2(2, N = 186) = 1.16, p > .250$. As with Study 2, reliability was acceptable for both tolerance measures (perceived traits: Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{believer}} = .94$; Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{party loyalist}} = .91$; Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{third party}} = .94$; willingness to interact: Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{believer}} = .96$; Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{party loyalist}} = .95$; Cronbach’s $\alpha_{\text{third party}} = .96$).

Results

Data Analyses

For all analyses, we conducted mixed ANOVAs using one between-subject factor (candidate preference) and one within-subject factors (voter type). For specific values and effect sizes, please see the Supplemental Results.




Fig. 5. Moral judgments of ingroup voters (Study 3). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Moral Evaluations

We were primarily interested in whether judgments of the three different voter types differed on a within-subject basis, and as in Studies 1 and 2, there were significant evaluative differences among these voters in measures of moral acceptability, $F(2, 368) = 41.12, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.18$; moral character, $F(2, 368) = 28.82, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.14$; trustworthiness, $F(2, 368) = 19.99, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.10$; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, $F(2, 368) = 18.28, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.09$; and perceiving the voter as thinking before acting, $F(2, 368) = 10.37, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.05$. In each case, the patterns were similar: Compared to “party loyalists” and “third-party” voters, pairwise comparisons showed that “extreme believer” voters were viewed as less morally acceptable ($p_{\text{party}} < .001; p_{\text{third}} < .001$), of weaker moral character ($p_{\text{party}} < .001; p_{\text{third}} < .001$), less trustworthy ($p_{\text{party}} < .001; p_{\text{third}} < .001$), less capable of recognizing right versus wrong ($p_{\text{party}} < .001; p_{\text{third}} < .001$), and thinking less before acting ($p_{\text{party}} < .001; p_{\text{third}} < .001$). Figure 5 depicts the means and 95% confidence intervals for the evaluations of the three different voter types in Study 3 (see the Supplemental Results for additional details).

There were also significant within-subject differences in personal feelings toward the voter ($F(2, 368) = 9.72, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.05$), but with a slightly different pattern: In this case, participants reported significantly more positive feelings toward the “party loyalists” compared to the “extreme believers” ($p < .001$) or “third-party” voters ($p = .020$). Lastly, although there was not a significant omnibus within-subject result for responsibility for the election’s outcome ($F(2, 368) = 2.77, p = .064$), pairwise comparisons revealed a similar pattern to the

personal feelings measure: “Party loyalists” were seen as more responsible for the election’s outcome than “extreme believer” ($p = .005$) and “third-party” ($p = .058$) voters, suggesting that they had the greatest influence on the election’s outcome.

For all measures, there were no significant between-subject effects of the participant’s preferred candidate (all $ps > .250$). Lastly, there were significant two-way interactions between candidate preference and voter type for each of the moral and character judgment measures, about which we had no specific predictions; decompositions of these interactions are available in the Supplemental Results.

Tolerance

Our primary question was whether tolerance would differ as a function of motivations behind voting behavior for ingroup voters. As with Studies 1 and 2, these data provide strong evidence that motivations behind a vote influence tolerance toward ingroup voters on measures of: Positive trait inferences, $F(2, 368) = 17.49, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.09$; willingness to interact, $F(2, 368) = 32.67, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.15$; and feelings of closeness, $F(2, 368) = 17.78, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.09$. Interestingly, the pattern of results differ from those of outgroup voters in that people were generally most tolerant of ingroup “party loyalists.” Specifically, participants made more positive trait inferences about, were more willing to interact with, and reported feeling closer to “party loyalists” than “extreme believers” (trait: $p < .001$; interact: $p < .001$; closeness: $p < .001$). Additionally, participants made more positive trait inferences about and reported feeling closer to “party loyalists” than “third-party” voters (trait: $p = .003$; interact: $p = .190$; closeness: $p = .016$). Finally, participants were more tolerant of “third-party” voters than “extreme believers” on all three measures (trait: $p = .006$; interact: $p < .001$; closeness: $p = .002$). Means and 95% confidence intervals for these evaluations of tolerance are plotted in Figure 6.

Interestingly, Clinton supporters were more willing to interact with ingroup and third-party voters than were Trump supporters, $F(1, 184) = 3.95, p = .048, \eta_p^2 = 0.02$. Additionally, Clinton supporters made more positive trait inferences about ingroup voters than did Trump supporters, as evidenced by a marginally significant between-subject difference in positive trait inferences, $F(1, 184) = 2.77, p = .098, \eta_p^2 = 0.02$. Finally, there were significant two-way interactions between voter type and candidate preference for trait inferences, $F(2, 368) = 11.40, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.06$; willingness to interact, $F(2, 368) = 16.49, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.08$; and feelings of closeness, $F(2, 368) = 8.70, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.05$. Decompositions of these interactions and other statistics are available in Supplemental Results.




Fig. 6. Tolerance of ingroup voters (Study 3). Positive trait inferences and willingness to interact were measured using a scale of 1–5, whereas feelings of closeness were measured using a scale of 1–7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Discussion

Like Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 found support for the motivational perspective, but with ingroup voters as the subjects of evaluation. For both moral and interpersonal evaluations, “extreme believers” were regarded the least favorably, although the effects were of slightly smaller magnitude than Studies 1 and 2. These results are consistent with research showing that when judging others who are relevant to one’s social identity—in this case, identifying with a political party or a candidate—people will embrace likable ingroup members and distance themselves from unlikable ingroup members to preserve the strength of the social identity (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). As a result, “extreme believers,” despite their fervor and ingroup status, are less preferred than the more benign “party loyalists.”

As with Study 2, “party loyalist” and “third-party” voters were regarded more favorably. However, there were often no significant differences in evaluations between these two voter types, despite the fact that “third-party” voters, by definition, still voted against the participant’s preferred candidate.

Studies 2 and 3: Do Evaluations of Voters Differ Depending on Whether They Are Members of the Ingroup or Outgroup?

The data from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that evaluations of both outgroup and ingroup voters differ depending on those voters’ motives. Though the patterns of

results are similar across studies, one may wonder whether the effect of motives differs depending on group membership (i.e., whether target voters were members of a participant's ingroup or outgroup). To address this question, data from Studies 2 and 3 were combined. Next, we conducted a 2 (candidate preference: Trump, Clinton) \times 2 (group membership: ingroup, outgroup) \times 3 (voter type: extreme believer, party loyalist, third party) mixed ANOVA with candidate preference and group membership as between-subject effects and voter type as a within-subject effect.

Moral Evaluations

Group membership (i.e., ingroup vs. outgroup) influenced how people judged different types of voters, as evidenced by significant two-way interactions between group membership and voter type for moral acceptability, $F(2, 738) = 36.46$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.09$; moral character, $F(2, 738) = 42.20$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.10$; trustworthiness, $F(2, 738) = 36.83$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.09$; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, $F(2, 738) = 33.88$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.08$; perceiving the voter as thinking before acting, $F(2, 738) = 26.12$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.07$; personal feelings toward the voter, $F(2, 738) = 38.33$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.09$. Responsibility for the election's outcome did not significantly differ based on group membership. These patterns suggest that although people differentiated by motives when judging both ingroup and outgroup voters, the evaluative differences between voter types were larger when judging outgroup members. Additionally, across all target types, participants judged ingroup voters more favorably (see Figures 3–6).

Clinton and Trump supporters differed in their judgments of ingroup and outgroup voters, as evidenced by significant two-way interactions of candidate preference and group membership for moral acceptability, $F(1, 369) = 4.37$, $p = .037$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$; personal feelings toward the voter, $F(1, 369) = 3.86$, $p = .050$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$; responsibility for the election's outcome, $F(1, 369) = 9.67$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.03$; and marginally significant two-way interactions for moral character, $F(1, 369) = 3.48$, $p = .063$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$; and trustworthiness, $F(1, 369) = 2.49$, $p = .115$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$. When judging believers and party loyalists, Clinton supporters show stronger differentiation between ingroup and outgroup voters than do Trump supporters, with Clinton supporters showing greater favor toward ingroup voters.

Moreover, these two-way interactions were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between candidate preference, group membership, and voter type for moral acceptability, $F(2, 738) = 11.47$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.03$; moral character, $F(2, 738) = 12.68$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.03$; trustworthiness, $F(2, 738) = 6.91$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$; capability of recognizing right versus wrong, $F(2, 738) = 7.46$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$; perceiving the voter as thinking before acting, $F(2, 738) = 4.58$, $p = .011$, $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$; personal feelings toward the

voter, $F(2, 738) = 6.58, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.02$; and responsibility for the election's outcome, $F(2, 738) = 13.39, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.04$. Specifically, Clinton supporters were less likely than Trump supporters to significantly differentiate between ingroup voters according to their motives. See Figures 3–6 for an illustration of these effects and Table 1 for means and standard deviations.

Tolerance

Group membership influenced judgments of tolerance toward different types of voters, as evidenced by significant two-way interactions between target and group membership for trait judgments, $F(2, 738) = 48.04, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.12$; willingness to interact, $F(2, 738) = 54.13, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.13$; and feelings of closeness, $F(2, 738) = 54.42, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.13$. Consistent with the moral evaluations, differences between voter types were larger when judging outgroup (vs. ingroup) members. Additionally, across all target types, participants judged ingroup voters more favorably.

Additionally, Clinton and Trump supporters differed in their ratings of ingroup and outgroup members, as evidenced by significant two-way interactions between candidate preference and group membership for trait judgments, $F(1, 369) = 9.60, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = 0.03$; willingness to interact, $F(1, 369) = 11.69, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.03$; and a marginally significant two-way interaction for feelings of closeness, $F(1, 369) = 2.62, p = .107, \eta_p^2 = 0.01$. Trump (vs. Clinton) supporters were more tolerant toward outgroup voters, whereas Clinton (vs. Trump) supporters rated ingroup voters more favorable. Finally, there was a significant three-way interaction between candidate preference, group membership, and voter type for trait judgments, $F(2, 738) = 11.94, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.03$ willingness to interact, $F(2, 738) = 26.18, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.07$; and feelings of closeness, $F(2, 738) = 10.967, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.03$. See Figures 3–6 for an illustration of these effects and Table 2 for means and standard deviations.

Discussion

Analyses of Studies 2 and 3 together found that although participants across both studies differentiated between voters according to those voters' motives, Trump supporters were more likely to show significant evaluative differences when judging their ingroup voters; on the other hand, Clinton supporters were significantly less likely to differentiate among ingroup voters according to their motives. Thus, Trump supporters may have been more attuned to voters' motives regardless of in- or outgroup status, whereas Clinton supporters engaged in slightly more consequentialist reasoning when judging their ingroup voters.

Table 1. Studies 2 & 3: Moral Judgments for Ingroup and Outgroup Combined

Judgment	Preferred candidate	Target group	Extreme believer		Party loyalist		Third party	
			Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Moral acceptability	Clinton	Outgroup	2.17	1.66	3.78	1.95	5.42	1.74
		Ingroup	5.03	1.54	5.53	1.60	5.55	1.68
Moral character	Trump	Outgroup	2.67	1.74	3.72	1.90	5.84	1.33
		Ingroup	3.78	1.98	5.57	1.53	6.13	1.25
Trustworthiness	Clinton	Outgroup	1.93	1.54	3.46	1.75	5.09	1.61
		Ingroup	4.76	1.51	5.03	1.59	5.22	1.56
Capable of recognizing right vs. wrong	Trump	Outgroup	2.48	1.47	3.34	1.67	5.41	1.49
		Ingroup	3.64	1.82	5.31	1.37	5.58	1.55
Thinking before acting	Clinton	Outgroup	2.14	1.65	3.64	1.83	4.92	1.69
		Ingroup	4.70	1.45	5.13	1.51	5.03	1.52
Personal feelings toward voter	Trump	Outgroup	2.53	1.59	3.50	1.65	5.10	1.49
		Ingroup	3.81	1.75	5.10	1.56	5.30	1.54
Responsible for election's outcome	Clinton	Outgroup	2.59	1.89	4.19	2.00	5.44	1.64
		Ingroup	5.03	1.51	5.59	1.54	5.32	1.57
Thinking before acting	Trump	Outgroup	3.08	1.81	4.03	1.85	5.43	1.65
		Ingroup	4.31	1.86	5.34	1.54	5.76	1.30
Personal feelings toward voter	Clinton	Outgroup	3.00	1.75	3.79	1.74	5.09	1.74
		Ingroup	4.84	1.47	5.22	1.56	4.97	1.72
Responsible for election's outcome	Trump	Outgroup	3.41	1.60	3.72	1.75	5.32	1.48
		Ingroup	4.22	1.66	5.18	1.52	5.42	1.47
Thinking before acting	Clinton	Outgroup	1.84	1.48	3.13	1.59	4.51	1.79
		Ingroup	4.26	1.49	4.67	1.58	4.25	1.60
Personal feelings toward voter	Trump	Outgroup	2.57	1.64	3.36	1.48	4.49	1.54
		Ingroup	3.66	1.69	4.72	1.55	4.52	1.71
Responsible for election's outcome	Clinton	Outgroup	5.42	1.90	5.47	1.71	4.85	1.87
		Ingroup	4.33	1.82	4.55	1.85	4.90	1.79
Thinking before acting	Trump	Outgroup	4.21	1.88	4.05	1.81	4.20	1.76
		Ingroup	4.45	1.93	4.88	1.55	3.90	1.91

Table 2. Studies 2 and 3: Interpersonal Tolerance Judgments for Ingroup and Outgroup Combined

Judgment	Preferred candidate	Target group	Extreme believer		Party loyalist		Third party	
			Mean	<i>SD</i>	Mean	<i>SD</i>	Mean	<i>SD</i>
Positive trait inferences	Clinton	Outgroup	1.99	0.82	2.77	0.89	3.35	0.89
		Ingroup	3.37	0.79	3.65	0.65	3.25	0.79
	Trump	Outgroup	2.36	0.78	2.90	0.77	3.50	0.70
		Ingroup	2.82	0.84	3.56	0.69	3.50	0.76
Willingness to interact	Clinton	Outgroup	1.62	0.95	2.78	1.20	3.79	0.98
		Ingroup	3.62	1.14	3.94	0.95	3.69	1.05
	Trump	Outgroup	2.40	1.12	3.01	1.20	3.80	0.97
		Ingroup	2.81	1.19	3.83	1.02	3.87	1.02
Feelings of closeness	Clinton	Outgroup	1.47	1.14	2.38	1.35	4.07	1.70
		Ingroup	3.69	1.81	4.17	1.59	3.61	1.53
	Trump	Outgroup	2.10	1.38	2.92	1.61	4.13	1.59
		Ingroup	2.97	1.75	4.37	1.62	4.18	1.72

General Discussion

When judging voters and their voting decisions, people take into account their motives. In Study 1, neither Clinton nor Trump supporters treated outgroup voters as a monolithic group. Indeed, Study 1 found that participants differentiated their moral and interpersonal judgments of outgroup voters based on their reasons for their votes; participants consistently regarded “less extreme believers” more favorably than “party loyalist,” and “extreme believers” least favorably overall. In Study 2, judgments of outgroup voters were again influenced by motives: Moral and interpersonal judgments both disfavored the “extreme believer” voters, whereas “third-party” voters were judged most positively. Studies 1–3 revealed that the extremity of motives of “believers” mattered: “Less extreme believers” in Study 1 were judged most positively, whereas the “extreme believers” in Studies 1–3 were judged most negatively. Thus, participants not only distinguished among “believer” and “party loyalist” motives, but further examined the types of values that motivated “extreme” and “less extreme” believers. This pattern is consistent with research showing that people dislike extreme attitude-holders (Wright et al., 2008) and tend to view their own attitudes as less extreme (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). Lastly, Study 3 found that judgments of ingroup voters were similar to those of outgroup voters in Study 2—with “extreme believers” again regarded less favorably than “party loyalists” and “third-party” voters—indicating that even when judging ingroup voters, participants did not simply reward those who voted for their preferred candidate (as the consequentialist perspective would predict). Similar to outgroup judgments, participants disfavored ingroup voters who held extreme views and drifted from moderation (Hogg, 2007; Wright et al., 2008). Lastly, across Studies 2 and 3, we found that Trump supporters were

more likely than Clinton supporters to differentiate between ingroup voters in the same way they had for outgroup voters, specifically regarding their ingroup “extreme believers” more negatively than Clinton supporters viewed their “extreme believers.”

Although people are less likely to distinguish among outgroup members (e.g., Linville & Jones, 1980), our results are consistent with research indicating that people account for intentions and act severity when making moral and interpersonal judgments (Malle et al., 2014; Skitka et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2008). Moreover, these results occurred for both Clinton and Trump supporters, indicating that being on the winning or losing side of the election did not affect the tendency to evaluate voters based on their motives. However, we did find that Clinton supporters were less likely than Trump supporters to differentiate between voter types when judging ingroup voters, instead showing a fairly high degree of favor to all three voter profiles; perhaps Clinton supporters, in the wake of an electoral loss, felt more favor for anyone who supported their preferred candidate.

These results suggest several future directions. “Third-party” voters, who have received condemnation in past elections (e.g., the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election), typically fared well in our participants’ eyes. Perhaps they received leniency by not voting for participants’ nonpreferred candidate, or by remaining untainted by the historically unpopular candidates in general (Saad, 2016); future research can assess these possibilities. Interestingly, Trump supporters were generally less morally and interpersonally judgmental of outgroup voters. Indeed, an October 2016 Pew survey (i.e., prior to the election) found that whereas 40% of Trump supporters reported difficulty respecting Clinton supporters, 58% of Clinton supporters reported difficulty respecting Trump supporters (Gramlich, 2016). Because similar patterns emerged after the election in the present studies, this may be more than simply a reflection of the election result and merits future research.

To conclude, participants did not support the consequentialist perspective by universally condemning voters who favored their nonpreferred candidate. Instead, Clinton and Trump supporters alike demonstrated that they were attuned to voters’ motives for casting their votes, varying their moral and interpersonal evaluations of different voter types. Studies 2 and 3 were conducted within weeks of the election, when temperatures on both sides were still quite high; nonetheless, people routinely considered a voter’s motives when making moral and interpersonal judgments, even when disagreeing with that voter’s decision. And Study 1, conducted 9 months after the election, found a similar pattern of results, indicating that these evaluative patterns of different voter types were not temporary. By not universally condemning outgroup voters, participants in the present studies may have provided heartening results in a time of fierce national polarization.

References

- Alicke, M. D. (1992). Culpable causation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*, 368–378. <https://doi.org/10.1037/022-3514.63.3.368>
- Boldry, J. G., Gaertner, L., & Quinn, J. (2007). Measuring the measures: A meta-analytic investigation of the measures of outgroup homogeneity. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *10*, 157–178. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430207075153>
- Bouie, J. (2016). There's no such thing as a good Trump voter. *Slate*. Retrieved from http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/11/there_is_no_such_thing_as_a_good_trump_voter.html
- Brandt, M. J., Wisneski, D. C., & Skitka, L. J. (2015). Moralization and the 2012 U.S. presidential election campaign. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, *3*, 211–237. <https://doi.org/10.5964/jsp.v3i2.434>
- Clifford, S., Jewell, R. M., & Waggoner, P. D. (2015). Are samples drawn from Mechanical Turk valid for research on political ideology? *Research and Politics*, 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168015622072>
- Cushman, F. (2008). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. *Cognition*, *108*, 353–380. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006>
- Geiger, A. (2016). *For many voters, it's not which presidential candidate they're for but which they're against*. Retrieved from <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/02/for-many-voters-its-not-which-presidential-candidate-theyre-for-but-which-theyre-against/>
- Gramlich, J. (2016). *It's harder for Clinton supporters to respect Trump backers than vice versa*. Retrieved from <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/01/its-harder-for-clinton-supporters-to-respect-trump-backers-than-vice-versa/>
- Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012). Mind perception is the essence of morality. *Psychological Inquiry*, *23*, 101–124. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840x.2012.651387>
- Haidt, J., & Hetherington, M. J. (2012). Look how far we've come apart. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/look-how-far-weve-come-apart/?mcubz=0&r=0>
- Hogg, M. A. (2007). Uncertainty-identity theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 39, pp. 69–126). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2601\(06\)39002-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2601(06)39002-8)
- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *76*, 405–431. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038>
- Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, *59*, 690–707. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12152>
- Kuhn, D. P. (2016). Sorry, liberals. Bigotry didn't elect Donald Trump. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/opinion/sorry-liberals-bigotry-didnt-elect-donald-trump.html?mcubz=0>
- Linville, P. W., & Jones, E. E. (1980). Polarized appraisals of out-group members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*, 689–703. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.38.5.689>
- Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014). A theory of blame. *Psychological Inquiry*, *25*, 147–186. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2014.877340>
- Malle, B. F., & Holbrook, J. (2012). Is there a hierarchy of social inferences? The likelihood and speed of inferring intentionality, mind, and personality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *102*, 661–684. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026790>
- Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Leyens, J. P. (1988). The “black sheep effect”: Extremity of judgments toward ingroup members as a function of group identification. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*, 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180102>
- Nguyen, T. (2016). Gary Johnson and Jill Stein handed the presidency to Donald Trump. *Vanity Fair*. Retrieved from <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/11/gary-johnson-jill-stein-election-2016>

- Quealy, K. (2016). Election facts to keep handy for holiday discussions. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/23/upshot/election-facts-to-keep-handy-for-thanksgiving-dinner-discussion.html?mcubz=0>
- Robinson, R. J., Keltner, D., Ward, A., & Ross, L. (1995). Actual versus assumed differences in construal: "Naive realism" in intergroup perception and conflict. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *68*, 404–417. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.68.3.404>
- Roccas, S., & Amit, A. (2011). Group heterogeneity and tolerance: The moderating role of conservation values. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *47*, 898–907. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.03.011>
- Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *6*, 88–106. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0602_01
- Ryan, T. J. (2016). No compromise: Political consequences of moralized attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science*, *61*, 409–423. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12248>
- Saad, L. (2016). Trump leads Clinton in historically bad image ratings. *Gallup*. Retrieved from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/193376/trump-leads-clinton-historically-bad-image-ratings.aspx>
- Skitka, L. J., & Bauman, C. W. (2008). Moral conviction and political engagement. *Political Psychology*, *29*, 29–54. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00611.x>
- Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Sargis, E. G. (2005). Moral conviction: Another contributor to attitude strength or something more? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*, 895–917. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.895>
- Skitka, L. J., & Morgan, G. S. (2014). The social and political implications of moral conviction. *Political Psychology*, *35*(1), 94–110. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.6.895>
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), *Social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Westen, D. (2007). *The political brain*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Westfall, J., Van Boven, L., Chambers, J. R., & Judd, C. M. (2015). Perceiving political polarization in the United States: Party identity strength and attitude extremity exacerbate the perceived partisan divide. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *10*, 145–158. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691615569849>
- Wright, J. C., Cullum, J., & Schwab, N. (2008). The cognitive and affective dimensions of moral conviction: implications for attitudinal and behavioral measures of interpersonal tolerance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *34*, 1461–1476. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167208322557>

Appendix

Studies 1–3 Voter Profiles

Trump “extreme believer”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Donald Trump because they agree with his plans to build a wall between the United States and Mexico, ban Muslim immigrants, and are proud of his endorsement by David Duke, former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan.

Trump “less extreme believer”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Donald Trump because they believed in his plans to improve conditions for the middle class by bringing back American manufacturing jobs, repealing the Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare), and improving the nation’s infrastructure.

Trump “party loyalist”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Donald Trump because they agree with Republican Party principles and he is the candidate their party chose, even though they personally disagree with his racist, sexist, misogynistic, and homophobic comments and actions.

Clinton “extreme believer”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Hillary Clinton because they agree with her plans to disregard the Second Amendment, agree that half of Americans are “deplorables,” and are proud of her endorsement by Cecile Richards, the president of Planned Parenthood.

Clinton “less extreme believer”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Hillary Clinton because they believed in her plans to improve conditions for the middle class by raising the minimum wage, preserving the Affordable Care Act (aka, Obamacare), and improving educational access.

Clinton “party loyalist”: Imagine an individual who says they voted for Hillary Clinton because they agree with Democratic Party principles and she is the candidate their party chose, even though they personally disagree with her financial and political corruption.

Third party: Imagine an individual who says they voted for a third-party candidate because they strongly disliked both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton and felt that they should not only have to consider a major-party candidate when both of those candidates were unsatisfactory.

Supplementary Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s web-site:

Supplemental Results

SARAH T. HUFF is a doctoral candidate in psychology at the University of Michigan. She received her BA in psychology from Colorado College and her MA in psychology from Brandeis University. She conducts research on interpersonal and intergroup tolerance, how people manage their different selves, and cultural adaptation. She aims to improve interpersonal and intergroup relations through a deeper understanding of identity and culture.

MICHAEL P. HALL is a doctoral candidate in social psychology at the University of Michigan. He received his BS in psychology at Tufts University and his MS in social psychology from the University of Michigan. He conducts research on political attitudes and beliefs, political information processing, and moral judgments. His research broadly explores how political beliefs and moral values affect how people process external information relevant to those beliefs and values.