ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: America’s Europe: Examining the Impact of American Involvement in European Integration

Sarah Fisher, Bachelor of Arts, International Studies, 2018

Thesis directed by: Dr. Anthony Marcum

The United States advocated a strong and cohesive pro-European-integration policy from 1945 through 1968. While there are many motivations behind this pro-integration policy, the overarching objective was to create an integrated Europe that was strong enough to be independent of American aid, yet not so powerful as to threaten American preeminence. I analyze how the United States influenced the early stages of Western European integration and how its policy sought to ensure that any outcome would be advantageous to the achievement of American policy objectives. In general, the United States leveraged its dominant position in the post-World War II world order to create an agent through which it could achieve its goals. I argue that, from a long-term and broad historical perspective, the United States succeeded in encouraging its European allies to create a union that fulfilled its objectives: a closer internal cooperation, physical and economic reconstruction, a greater Atlantic orientation, and a supportive partner. To arrive at this conclusion, I have evaluated two case studies; the implementation of the Marshall Plan and American support of the European Defense Community, using the principles of strategic interaction and process-tracing in the Principal-Agent Model framework.
America’s Europe:
Examining the Impact of American Involvement in European Integration

By:
Sarah Fisher

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Thesis Committee:
Dr. Anthony Marcum
Dr. Rob Franzese
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Acknowledgements

This project began while I was abroad in Aix-en-Provence, France, during the 2017 Winter semester. During my stay, France was preparing for a national election. There was a lot of discussion of a possible “Frexit” and of the sustainability of the European Union in the twenty-first century world. President Trump was inaugurated just days after I arrived in France, and every person I met had a lot to say about our new President and his views on Europe when they realized I was an American. This atmosphere got me thinking about the relationship between the US and the EU, the historical origins of this relationship, and how the European Union developed. Mix this context with my background as a student of economic and political development, and my interest in examining American involvement in European integration was born.

Writing this thesis has been an incredible personal growth experience, but has certainly brought along distinct and difficult challenges. I want to express my thanks to several people, without whom, these challenges would have been impossible to overcome. Firstly, thank you to my advisor, Dr. Anthony Marcum. You have helped guide me through every part of this journey: from brainstorming topics, to formulating a strong organization, to editing and re-editing all of my drafts. I could not have gotten to this point if not for your endless support. Your commitment to all of your students and our projects is impressive and rare. Every student who embarks on the thesis-writing journey should be so lucky as to have someone like you to guide them through the process.

As for all the students in 498/499, thank you for your dedication to my paper, as well as to your own research. Your projects often propelled me along when I felt like I wanted to give up. I appreciate the time you spent editing my (many) drafts more than you may know. You offered insight into my approach that I was too close to the project to be able to see for myself. A special thanks to Cheryl Gordon; I would not have survived this without your help and encouragement.

I also need to thank my roommates and friends. You put up with my stress and complaints, and pushed me to just keep going. You listened to me talk through my problems, even when you (and often I, too) had no idea what I was talking about. You were genuinely interested in what I was doing and supported me every step of the way. You suffered with me through late nights and long hours; thank you for making all of the time spent in the School of Social Work bearable. I cannot imagine completing this project without your encouragement: you guys were there to celebrate with me, help me de-stress, and constantly reminded me that I was capable of doing this. I wouldn’t have made it through this year (or college) without you.

Finally, thank you to my family. Liv, your love of writing and learning always inspire me. Thank you for making me laugh when I need it, and for your unwavering support. To my parents: you have spent my entire life pushing me to be my best, to achieve more, and to think differently. You have always led me to believe that anything I wanted to achieve is within my reach, and this project has been no exception. Dad, you helped inspire me to begin this process, and served as the best listener when I was overwhelmed. Mom, your constant support and encouragement has kept me going, even when I didn’t believe I could. Thank you for always letting me know how proud you are of me and for always being on my side. You guys are the world’s best role models, greatest inspirations, and strongest support system. Thank you for everything, a million times over.
### Key Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benelux</td>
<td>Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg (1944) Political-economic union of these three nations. Name refers to this general grouping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Committee of European Economic Cooperation (1947) Joint European conference in Paris to determine the aid priorities for European recovery after World War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration (1948) US government agency designed to administer the American aid dollars promised under the Marshall Plan to Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community (1951) Organization of six countries created to regulate industrial production under a centralized authority. It created a common market for coal and steel, neutralizing competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community (Never ratified, Treaty signed 1952) A proposed plan for a supranational European army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community (1957) Created a common market and a customs union between the founding 6 members. Established by the Treaty of Rome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPU</td>
<td>European Payments Union (1950) Established by the OEEC in order to ease international trade since all trade was based on US dollar reserves, which most European nations were lacking. The EPU lowered the opportunity cost of trading for its members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Program (1947) The official name of the Marshall Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union (1993) Political and economic union of 28 Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community (1957) Sought to create a specialized market for nuclear power in Europe, establishing a centralized body to develop and distribute nuclear energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany (1949) The West German state that was established when Great Britain, France, and the United States consolidated their occupied zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) The military alliance and collective defense system between several North American and European states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1960) Intergovernmental economic organization serving as a forum to discuss matters regarding the promotion of and cooperation for economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation (1948) Set up to supervise the European management of the Marshall Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (1951) Head of the Allied forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Six</td>
<td>Six original Member States of the European communities Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union (1954) Military alliance of Western European nations, set up to implement the Modified Brussels Treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Key Figures

### The United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Name</strong></th>
<th><strong>Title</strong></th>
<th><strong>Years</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harry S. Truman</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>(1945-1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>(1947-1949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsible for Marshall Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean Acheson</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>(1949-1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Lovett</td>
<td>Under Secretary of State</td>
<td>(1947-1949)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William L. Clayton</td>
<td>Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs</td>
<td>(1946-1947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Hoffman</td>
<td>ECA Administrator</td>
<td>(1948-1950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Kennan</td>
<td>US Ambassador to the Soviet Union</td>
<td>(1952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspired the Truman Doctrine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>(1951-1963); SACEUR (1951-1952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Foster Dulles</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>(1953-1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John F. Kennedy</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>(1961-1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>(1963-1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dean Rusk</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>(1961-1969)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Name</strong></th>
<th><strong>Title</strong></th>
<th><strong>Years</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean Monnet</td>
<td>President of ECSC</td>
<td>(1952-1955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developed the Monnet Plan, the “Father of Europe”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles de Gaulle</td>
<td>General (WWII), Future President and Prime Minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Though not politically active during the time period in question, his opinions were important to the French public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Schuman</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>(1947-1948); President of European Parliamentary Assembly (1958-1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developed the Schuman Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>René Pleven</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>(1950-1951, 1951-1952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduced the Pleven Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Laniel</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>(1953-1954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Mendès-France</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>(1954-1955)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

At the end of World War II, the United States occupied the dominant power position in the Western world. This hegemonic status endowed the US with the task of rebuilding the rest of the West. Through this project, Washington oversaw the reconstruction of the West and was able to shape it, such that the resulting design fulfilled America’s vision for the post-War world. In particular, the United States chose to use its leverage to encourage the political and economic integration of Western Europe. This choice drove America’s foreign policy in Western Europe throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, and was especially prominent until the Nixon Administration’s investiture in 1969. Although the phenomenon of European integration has received much attention in the literature, scholars often downplay America’s role in this process. Yet, as Berend notes, the United States was:

…the most powerful and influential among the initiators of the European Community institutions in the 1950s and 1960s and pushed the European Community enlargement as much as possible…it was the US government that virtually ‘dictated’ the Monnet-Schuman initiative that set the [integration] process in motion (Berend 2016, 2).

Given this substantial role, US involvement in the integration phenomenon demands analysis to understand both the process and the modern design of Europe. Therefore, I explore how the United States influenced Western European integration, such that any product would be conducive to the achievement of America’s domestic policy objectives.

Chapter 1 reviews the vast compilation of literature that has been amassed on European integration. Based largely on patterns found in the literature, I then justify the decision to limit the period of analysis to the years between 1945 and 1968. Finally, this chapter outlines a basic history of European integration. Chapter 2 explains the motivations behind the US decision to involve itself so heavily in European affairs for five successive presidential administrations. Chapter 3 will lay out a theoretical framework in which to consider the US-Western European relationship during this time period. This framework is then used in Chapter 4 to explore two
specific US policy programs, the Marshall Plan and American support of the European Defense Community. These case studies enable me to make claims about the influence of the United States on the integration process. Chapter 5 concludes this work, discussing the legacy of American involvement in European integration.

Literature Review

Many scholars have examined European integration and indeed, some attribute the phenomenon to the direct influence of the United States in European politics in the immediate post-War years. A strong base of scholars also claims that the United States sought to establish a specific construction of Europe: a confederation of states that would make a valuable trading partner, not reliant on American aid, but that would still be weak in the face of American political and economic dominance. The literature neglects, however, identifying any sort of model to examine the unique relationship between the United States and its reliant European allies in the post-World War II world. Additionally, past scholarship overlooks a study of the ways in which the US promoted this strong, yet subordinate, integrated Europe.

European origins of European integration

Western Europe was particularly troubled by its fall from world power after the Second World War and was eager to reaffirm its dominant position on the world stage. While the Europeans had many different motivations, most Western European governments came to the conclusion that the only way to ensure their return to power was through collaboration with one another. Many prominent European officials understood that even through integration, the damage to Western Europe was too great for independent reconstruction (Lundestad 2003, 23). Geir Lundestad (2003) demonstrates that the European states essentially invited the United States into their affairs to gain the necessary financial and military aid to rebuild. He argues that the United States did not force itself into the European integration process, but rather was asked to
play an active role. Lundestad highlights a variety of different reasons for this invitation including to serve as a mediator, guarantor, and military and financial lender in Europe (Lundestad 2003, 29). Although I do not dispute that the Europeans certainly needed the United States and often willingly included American officials in their regional affairs, I offer a different way to model this relationship, rather than proposing that the US was “invited”. This model will be further discussed in the coming sections.

While Lundestad (2003) offers a European account of integration focusing on the American role in the process, Andrew Moravcsik and Sebastian Rosato consider the theoretical motives in Europe for a transition from nationalism towards integration. Moravcsik (2013) takes the liberalist approach, claiming that economic interdependence was the driving force. He postulates that national governments foresaw economic advantages of integration, and thus went about trying to manipulate and design institutions to accrue such advantages (Moravcsik 2013, 18). Conversely, Rosato (2010) approaches the question of integration from the realist perspective, maintaining the balance of power explanation. He highlights the importance of the Cold War political environment under which integration began; Europe sought to balance the Soviets and the Americans in an effort to preserve European power and autonomy (Rosato 2010, 2). Yet, both Rosato (2010) and Moravcsik (2013) consider integration only from the European vantage, ignoring the United States’ motivations for American involvement in their analyses.

**The United States’ Role**

While much of the momentum for integration came from a European impetus, the American motivations and mechanisms for supporting integration are critical in shaping the form that integration took. Past works primarily focus on the following American motivations for encouraging European integration: preventing the spread of communism, containing Germany, creating a strong trading partner, promoting the American way of life abroad, limiting
dependence on American financial and military aid, easing the distribution of this aid, demonstrating American dominance, and promoting peace and maintaining security (Lundestad 1998, Ellwood 1992).

Lundestad (1998) neatly separates the American motives for integration into five succinct categories: spreading the American model; encouraging a more rational and efficient Europe; reducing the American burden; containing the Soviet Union; and containing Germany (Lundestad 1998, 13). David Ellwood (1992) considers the early years of integration, devoting most of his book to the first post-War decade. He argues primarily from an economic perspective, discussing how a desire for larger and more efficient markets strongly motivated integration (Ellwood 1992). In constructing their arguments based on historical events, these scholars offer expansive accounts of the particular circumstances and actions leading to integration milestones. These works, however, do not present any theoretical explanations or models for the American involvement that they detail.

The scholarship also highlights the mechanisms that the US employed to promote integration. Lundestad (1998, 2003) primarily emphasizes and analyzes the large and discernible American efforts such as the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). He demonstrates that the United States utilized these mechanisms to tacitly urge its dependent Western European allies towards integration and collaboration (Lundestad 1998). In his later work, Lundestad (2003) maintains that in both Western Europe’s implicit and overt requests for American assistance, Europe essentially handed the Americans the leadership role in governing its regional affairs. Rappaport (1981) emphasizes the role of the OEEC and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in furthering integration, making specific mention of the United States’ role in these institutions. Ellwood (1992) also analyzes prominent American programs, such as the Marshall
Plan, demonstrating how these efforts introduced the US into Europe’s affairs. The specific techniques that the US used to try to achieve European integration are important, but equally important are the reasons why American policymakers chose to employ these mechanisms as opposed to other ones. Analysis of this underlying question is largely absent in these scholars’ works.

Additionally, the scholarship ignores a crucial nuance in the American position: that “integration” in general would not have benefitted the United States. Only a construction that would ultimately create domestic dividends would be advantageous. Thus, Washington did not encourage integration in general, but rather a structure that would yield domestic benefits. Rappaport (1981) describes this particular brand of integration as “…a United Europe strong enough to defend itself yet not so strong as to threaten American economic or political hegemony” (Rappaport 1981, 121). Yet, these works, Rappaport’s (1981) included, ignore the connection between the motivations behind American support for European integration and those mechanisms utilized to realize this specific construction. Given this void in the scholarship, a comprehensive study of American influence on European integration must consider the basic motivations behind American support, as well as the mechanisms through which Washington encouraged an integration that would fulfill its objectives.

Van der Beugel (1966) begins to address this problem, offering an in-depth explanation of the United States’ involvement in the integration process while also highlighting America’s interest in a particular type of integration. His recount references memorandums, specific official and unofficial meetings, and acute details of contemporary events, providing greater insight into real policy considerations. This detailed background explicitly demonstrates the mechanisms that the United States employed to encourage integration. The work’s major drawback is that, being a
contemporary piece, it lacks the advantage of hindsight and ends its analysis prior to the end-date for this paper’s review.

_Theorizing the US-European Relationship_

Another drawback of past works is their lack of any comprehensive theoretical framework. Although the European-centric works often provide a framework to consider integration, these models fail to include the US in their formulation. In its work to rebuild Western Europe, the US chose to abandon the imperialistic and divide-and-conquer strategies of the past. Instead, officials favored promoting unity and supranationalism (Lundestad 2003, 37).

Given this marked break with historical strategy, the study on American involvement in European integration requires the development of a framework through which one can theorize about the new kind of relationship between the US and Western Europe. This thesis seeks to theoretically model this relationship using the Principal-Agent Model. Although political scientists have used this model in this past, their work has largely centered on domestic politics. In an overview of the model’s political science application, Miller (2005) offers a jumping-off point for considering assumptions and implications of the model in the political science sphere. For example, he highlights the model’s canonical assumptions in a political science context.

Additionally, the model has been used extensively to consider delegation to supranational associations or international organizations. In _Delegation and Agency in International Organizations_ (2006), the authors ask why states choose to confer a degree of sovereignty to other agents or organizations and to what extent and through what mechanisms are they able to control the organizations to which they delegate? They formulate a list of motivations as well as discuss strategies for controlling an agent, and consider under what circumstances these strategies might be successful (Hawkins et. al. 2006). This application is helpful in providing a conception of the model that can examine the reasons why and the methods by which the
European states chose to delegate some of their sovereignty to international organizations. Yet, the works using this application assume principals delegate based on their personal needs rather than due to external pressure (Hawkins et. al. 2006). In this case, this assumption would imply that the Europeans chose supranationalism out of their own desire rather than at America’s urging.

In the context of the European-US relationship, however, the primary consideration is the United States’ decision to delegate authority over the integration process to the European states. In other words, this particular conception demands applying the model to interstate relations, a realm which the scholarship has largely ignored thus far. Anthony Marcum (2015) has done some work using the model, exploring why states choose to engage in military occupations and how they implement control and mechanisms for monitoring in occupied states (Marcum 2015). His work, however, offers a narrow conception of delegation in interstate relations. Since the United States chose not to directly occupy most of Western Europe, Marcum’s work does not offer a basis for theoretical analysis in this situation. Given the gap in the literature and building on Miller (2005) and Marcum’s (2015) setups, this project develops a framework for using the PA model in the context of interstate relations. Another hole to fill is the problem of multiple agents. The model’s prior political science applications have considered cases of multiple principals, but not multiple agents. The US-European relationship, however, features one principal but many agents.

A Basic History of Integration

Before offering an overview of the integration process from 1945 through 1968, it is necessary to clarify to what exactly “integration” will refer. In the context of this paper, integration references the process of moving towards a closer collaboration between European states, both politically and economically. This increased cooperation implies a greater degree of
regional consideration in the development of national programs, a dismantling of economic and political barriers, and an abdication of some amount of national sovereignty to international organizations.

In this work, I will not debate whether integration was achieved during this time period, since my interest is in the process itself, not a particular culmination. A basic timeline of key events in the general process is provided below in Table 1. The following section will detail the process towards integration, focusing on the specific events that are relevant to America’s role.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1947</td>
<td>Announcement of the Marshall Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1948</td>
<td>First Meeting of Hague Congress (Congress of Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1949</td>
<td>Creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1949</td>
<td>Creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1950</td>
<td>Announcement of the Schuman Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1951</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1952</td>
<td>European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty Signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1954</td>
<td>French fail to ratify EDC Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1954</td>
<td>Western European Union (WEU) established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1957</td>
<td>Treaty of Rome (EEC, EURATOM) signed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before the war even ended, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic believed that a closer collaboration between European states would be necessary to rebuild the region (Ellwood 1992, 11). But in the immediate aftermath of World War II, between 1945 and 1947, Europe was far too physically, politically, and economically devastated to begin any meaningful process of reconstruction, let alone integration. The gross food and raw material shortages and the great decrease, if not temporary paralysis, of both Europe’s industrial capacity and labor productivity meant that during these years, Europe simply tried to survive (Van der Beugel 1966, 37).
America doled out emergency aid to ensure Europe stayed afloat. After the particularly harsh winter of 1946-1947, US policymakers started to recognize that preventing total economic collapse would require longer-term and larger-scale aid (Van der Beugel 1966, 38).

In 1947, in the wake of imminent European disintegration, the United States announced the Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program (ERP). The Marshall Plan sought to rebuild Western Europe’s economy, with the goal of making it self-sufficient in four to five years. In addition to rebuilding the economy, the ERP spurred integration. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the operational arm of the Marshall Plan, furnished aid on the American assumption that the Europeans would work on a foundation of economic collaboration. The ECA further assumed that this economic collaboration would eventually evolve into some sort of institutionalized union of Western European states (Ellwood 1992, 83).

In 1948, the Europeans launched the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to manage the influx of American aid. The organization was designed as a check on the individual national authorities and provided a collaborative forum. Although the OEEC did not have much real power, it marked an important step in the integration process by promoting cooperation of European states (Ellwood 1992, 157).

In addition to greater intra-European cooperation, the first years after the War also saw more collaboration between the two sides of the Atlantic. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created. In terms of European integration and specifically America’s role in this integration, NATO served two purposes. First, membership demanded that the European states collaborate on matters of military security (Van der Beugel 1966, 252). This forced cooperation facilitated an alignment of Western European security policies. NATO’s second role was to enhance the European-American relationship by compelling North America and Western Europe to cooperate and collaborate on military issues. NATO both directly
included the United States in European security matters and enhanced the American leadership role. The European states were heavily relied upon the United States for the maintenance of their physical security. This dependence elevated the relative position of American superiority in the US-European relationship (Van der Beugel 1966, 253).

Shortly after the creation of NATO, in May of 1949, the United States, Great Britain, and France consolidated their occupied zones in Western Germany to establish the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). While this move may not seem like much in the scheme of European integration, it represents increased cooperation of the two strongest and most outspoken European governments. The United States had initially hoped that Britain would lead the integration push from within Europe. The French, and General de Gaulle in particular, staunchly opposed a British-led integration (Lundestad 1998, 62). The two European powers were constantly at odds with one another and so their cooperation in consolidating the occupied zones symbolized a significant step towards European unity. Furthermore, the French initially firmly resisted any plan to rebuild or integrate Germany and instead preferred a strategy of defeatism (Lundestad 1998, 24). Consolidating the West German zones represents a degree of French acquiescence to integrating and reviving West Germany.

In September of 1950, the OEEC created the European Payments Union (EPU) to ease the transfer of money in international trades. The United States was highly instrumental in the construction of the EPU. The idea was originally proposed by Americans and the US was the Union’s primary source of funds (Van der Beugel 1966, 203). The EPU represents another important move towards integration; it created a European currency area. In the context of the mass postwar dollar shortage, the multilateral system of currency transactions between the US and each individual European state was inefficient. The EPU rectified this problem, stressing the importance of currency balances between the US and the EPU members as a whole, rather than
bilateral currency balances between the US and individual European nations (Ellwood 1992, 160).

Despite the French animosity towards Germany, the French were determined to harness the economic potential of their neighbor. In May of 1950, French foreign minister Robert Schuman announced his plan to consolidate French and German steel and coal production under a single authority. The Plan proposed the creation of a single market and, by pooling French and German resources, provided the first step towards a federation of Europe. The Schuman Plan led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. As with the consolidation of the West German zones, this plan was a step towards linking Germany with the rest of Western Europe and a move away from France’s cynicism towards its neighbor. Although there was no official American involvement in the Schuman Plan negotiations, America’s strong endorsement, as well as the close personal relationships between American officials and the Plan’s architects, were significant in its development (Van der Beugel 1966, 244).

The years between the establishment of the ECSC and the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 represent a turning point both in US-European relations and in the American role in European integration. Between 1950 and 1954, US policy evolved from supporting European integration in general to supporting a supranational construction, specifically (Van der Beugel 1966, 249). Policy promoting the European Defense Community (EDC) characterizes this period. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 intensified the American sentiment that Europe needed to strengthen its own defense capabilities, including the rearmament of Germany. Both American and European officials, however, strongly believed that West German rearmament could not be safely achieved without integrating the reenergized state into the rest of Western Europe (Kunz 1953, 275). Additionally, at the time, the United States and Great Britain were the only states who could supply adequate conventional defense contributions to NATO (Van der
Beugel 1966, 274). US policymakers believed that some sort of European Army that pooled all European military resources would remedy these problems. This belief was embodied in the strong American support for the EDC, which became the cornerstone of America’s European policy (Van der Beugel 1966, 249). The realization of the EDC would have established a supranationally designed and European-led defense alliance.

Although the United States spent years vehemently backing the EDC and pushing for ratification of the treaty that was signed on May 27, 1952, in 1954, the French failed to ratify the EDC (Van der Beugel 1966, 298). While the US had often threatened an “agonizing reappraisal” of American policy if the Europeans did not ratify the treaty, this reassessment never happened. Shortly after the failure of the EDC, France proposed the Western European Union (WEU) to prevent any possibility of Great Britain and the United States rearming Germany without French involvement (Creswell 2002, 119). Although President Eisenhower did not look favorably upon this new solution, primarily due to its lack of supranationalism, the EDC’s defeat and the absence of alternative programs ultimately forced the President to support the WEU (Creswell 2002, 120). While the American administrations continued to strongly support integration until Nixon’s investiture, after the US lost the EDC battle, American support was less direct and overt than it had been in the past (Van der Beugel 1966, 301).

Their refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty was not the only obstacle to integration that the French posed. During his tenure, General de Gaulle repeatedly obstructed America’s attempts to achieve integration. The General wanted a form of integration that was led from within Europe, ideally by France. De Gaulle felt that the American plan put too strong an emphasis on the Atlantic framework. He favored a protectionist Europe, independent of the United States: a conception which stood at odds with American objectives (Lundestad 1998, 61).
The combination of the EDC failure, de Gaulle’s anti-American stance, the deterioration of the US balance of payments, and a growing trade deficit between the US and the EEC contributed to US policymakers’ decision to take a less direct role in European integration after 1954. This indirect role generally consisted of igniting the American diplomatic machinery: instead of American policy overtly supporting any particular program, US officials worked in the background to secure victories for American preferences (Van der Beugel 1966, 308).

Although the US no longer considered it prudent to publicly throw its opinions into the European arena, it still sought to support European-born efforts towards greater integration. In March of 1957, “the Six”; Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (Benelux), Italy, France, and West Germany, signed the Treaty of Rome, which formally established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The United States generally supported the treaty and the foundation of these two collaborative European communities (Van der Beugel 1966, 309). In terms of US involvement in EURATOM, American support was vital to its establishment. In November of 1958, at European urging, the United States committed financial assistance, technical know-how, and an allocation of U-235 to Europe’s nuclear program (Van der Beugel 1966, 322). Yet, concerning the EEC, American support was tempered compared to the past: the US began to acknowledge the potentially negative domestic consequences of an economically strong and united Western Europe. In 1962, the first real trade war between the EEC and the US unfolded. The US continued to support integration even through the trade war, but fear began to spread throughout the US: perhaps the EEC was not as Atlantic-oriented as policymakers had hoped (Lundestad 1998, 88).

In 1960, the OEEC was re-founded as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the US and Canada serving as full members (Ellwood 1992, 219). This transformation had many causes. The United States felt that the Europeans needed to be
responsible for a greater share of the world’s economic burden given their newfound economic strength and the faltering of the US economy (Lundestad 1998, 88). Additionally, the Euro-centric framework of the OEEC was no longer adequate in the contemporary period; now, the world needed a broader forum to discuss common economic problems. The OECD symbolized an intensification of Atlantic cooperation by putting US policy on a level playing field with its European allies (Van der Beugel 1966, 348).

The transformation of the OEEC to the OECD was representative of the time period. The conversation increasingly centered on the need to develop an Atlantic framework and partnership after the election of President Kennedy in 1960. The United States no longer had a complete monopoly over the Western power structure. Thus, the United States needed to actively encourage Europe to orient itself towards the Atlantic to ensure that the US would not be left out of, nor hurt by, Europe’s continuous growth (Van der Beugel 1966, 353). The US needed to ensure that the new Europe that it had helped to rebuild did not now turn against its savior. This necessity guided American policy through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, marking the concluding policy program for this particular study.

The First Phase of European Integration in America: 1945-1968

Capping the period of analysis between 1945 and 1968 aligns this work well with past scholarship. Klaus Larres (2009) maintains that there are two different stages of European integration from the American perspective. He claims that from the immediate conclusion of World War II in 1945 until the Nixon Administration took office in 1969, American enthusiasm for European integration was strong and pervasive. From Nixon’s investiture through the present-day conception of the European Union, as marked by the signing of Maastricht Treaty in 1992, he purports that American support for integration deteriorated (Larres 2009, 151).
As can be seen from the basic history of integration, the successive administrations from 1945 through 1968 operated under a generally cohesive policy concerning Western Europe. By and large, these administrations vehemently supported an integrated Europe, often citing the profound political benefits an integrated Europe would bring to the US as justification for subordinating America’s economic health to that of Europe. But when Nixon was sworn in, American policy towards Europe underwent a reorientation (Lundestad 1998, 100). The break with the past administrations can be boiled down to three basic causes.

Most prominently, America’s economic power weakened while Europe’s grew stronger. The US had succeeded in its goal to put Western Europe’s economy back on its feet. Unfortunately for the Americans, much of Europe’s economic strength came at the expense of US interests. For example, protective subsidies enabled EEC to keep its domestic agricultural prices low, which weakened European demand for American agricultural imports (Berend 2016, 98).

From the mid-1950s onward, America’s relative economic strength faltered. Between 1949 and 1960, the US experienced a nearly 15 percent decrease in its share of output among advanced-industrialized countries, a 10 percent decrease in its share of world exports, and saw a drastic decline of the dollar on foreign exchange markets (Berend 2016, 98). The United States’ balance of payments situation had been deteriorating since 1958 (Van der Beugel 1966, 306), becoming a serious threat to America’s economic health by 1965 (Berend 2016, 98). America’s reduced economic strength caused a shift in priorities: policy switched from emphasizing the achievement of political objectives to ensuring domestic economic health (Lundestad 1998, 97).

This policy reorientation weakened American support for integration for two reasons. First, taking lessons from American history, US policymakers believed that the secret to economic prosperity lay in a vast and unimpeded market. According to this logic, an integrated
European economy, unobstructed by cumbersome internal trade barriers, would necessarily produce a more prosperous Europe. In the face of waning American economic health, Washington viewed a more prosperous Europe as a greater threat and thus, American support for integration diminished (Lundestad 1998, 14). Second, the US could not be preoccupied with issues across the Atlantic when its own economy was in trouble.

The second cause for the policy change was the precarious status of the United States’ general hegemonic position. By the 1960s, Western Europe was strong enough that US-European relations came to be characterized by greater balance. No longer did the Pax Americana govern the international system. Instead, a growing interdependence developed between the two sides of the Atlantic (Berend 2016, 99). Similar to the changing nature of the economic relationship between the US and Western Europe, this greater degree of equality of power implied that the United States no longer needed to be so intricately involved in another region’s internal affairs. Instead, the US could turn inward and focus on the domestic problems boiling up at home.

Finally, the political environment was changing. Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, believed that the United States and Western Europe fundamentally diverged on some basic interests, particularly economic matters (Lundestad 1998, 102). In the past, US administrations had underscored the similarities in European and American interests, making a strong partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic appear so desirable. The idea that the US and Europe might not be so closely aligned on basic principles shook the bedrock of justification for European integration: if Europe and the US were at odds with one another, it was less logical to unquestioningly support a strong Europe. Additionally, the American-Soviet rivalry began to wane. As will be explored in the following chapter, the Cold War served as a strong initial source of American enthusiasm for European integration. The fervor for uniting and federalizing Europe abated in America as the Cold War became less menacing (Berend 2016, 95).
Given the reorientation of American policy away from all-out support of European integration that began under the Nixon Administration, it makes sense to end this study with Nixon’s inauguration/election. From the Truman through the Johnson Administrations, the United States operated under a coherent and cohesive policy towards Western Europe: encourage the region to integrate. The twenty-three years and five American administrations during which US policy was more or less consistent provide an ample time frame to consider how the United States influenced European integration. Additionally, this time period saw impressive movement towards European integration. One could argue that this initial phase was the most important in the integration phenomenon. It kick-started the entire process and saw sovereign states come together in ways that were contemporarily unimaginable, given the recent memory of war.

Conclusion

Between 1945 and 1968, the United States facilitated and encouraged a closer collaboration of Western European states. This particular period of integration is especially relevant because it saw great leaps towards European cooperation and also occurred under a cohesive American policy. While the literature discusses the phenomenon of European integration, it often downplays the American role in the process and fails to posit a theoretical manner by which to consider the American-European relationship. This work fills these gaps, beginning with considering why the US chose to pursue a policy of encouraging European integration for five successive administrations.
Chapter 2: Motivations for Integration

Many scholars remark that the United States’ decision to encourage unity rather than divisiveness in Western Europe is significant because it marks a distinct break from past tactics of dominance (Rappaport 1981, 121). Historically, great powers divided states to conquer and subordinate them. The United States, however, had no interest in directly controlling Western Europe. Instead, the US sought the region’s reconstruction and return to prosperity. An American impetus for European integration existed before World War II even ended, and was widespread throughout the US shortly after the War was over (Ellwood 1992, 22).

Understanding why policymakers in Washington advocated integration is vital to comprehending the shape united Europe eventually took: the US had a heavy, although sometimes inconspicuous, hand in the European integration process. Crucial to comprehending the American role is the recognition that the American approach was not altruistic. The US wanted, “to create a united Europe strong enough to defend itself yet no so strong as to threaten American economic or political hegemony” (Rappaport 1981, 121). The United States believed it could reap economic benefits and greater political clout from an integrated Europe. Consequently, the once-isolationist America now enthusiastically immersed itself into regional European politics.

In this chapter, I unravel the underlying American motivations that drove US policy to vehemently support integration in Europe. I first explore the contemporary environment to better understand the real circumstances that policymakers faced. I then break down domestic American ambitions into four different categories of general US policy objectives to serve as a loose guide for understanding why officials made certain complex policy prescriptions. These four categories are: economic reconstruction of Europe, military security, a supranational design
for the integrated continent, and an Atlantic partnership. Finally, I reconcile some internal inconsistencies in the American preference for European integration.

The Contemporary Climate

Of all the contemporary circumstances that influenced policymakers’ decisions to throw their full support behind European integration, the threat of the Cold War was the strongest catalyst (Berend 2016, 18). Fear of a potential World War III spread rapidly throughout Western Europe and the United States, particularly following the 1948 coup d’état in Prague (Ellwood 1992, 103). Europeans and Americans alike realized that the world would soon divide itself between the communists and the capitalists; where the dividing line would lie remained the only question. This uncertainty created great anxiety for the US—even America’s leading allies were not assuredly on its side. The French, for example, vengeful of their decline in power, threatened communist alliance if the US did not meet their demands for aid (Berend 2016, 44). The US needed to take swift and strong action to safeguard its interests abroad.

Taking lessons from Chamberlain’s failed appeasement policy in 1938, the United States recognized that it needed to take a firm resistance against the developing Soviet Bloc to stop the Red spread (Berend 2016, 21). In George Kenan’s “long telegram” to Secretary of State George Marshall in February of 1946, Kenan outlined the Soviet policies and his beliefs about the best course of American action. He noted that unlike Hitler’s Germany, the Soviet Union,

“is neither schematic nor adventuristic…It does not take unnecessary risks […] For this reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so” (Kennan 1946, 475).

This characterization demonstrates the motivation for establishing a Western bloc against which the Soviets would be unmatched, causing them to back down and thus avoiding a World War III.
Militarily, the communist hysteria erupting in the United States was a forceful stimulant for the US initiative (Berend 2016, 18).

The threat of World War III, however, did not come from the Soviet Union alone. In the immediate post-War years, the German question rang loudly. Geir Lundestad coined the term “double containment” to explain the use of integration to provide physical security in the face of the Cold War environment: an integrated Europe would contain both the spread of communism and simultaneously prevent Germany from again engaging in hostile and threatening activities (Lundestad 2003, 38). American policy changed in 1946 from advocating German industrial disarmament to prevent a violent resurgence, toward strengthening its industrial capacity. Given Germany’s strategically important position in the Cold War as a front between the East and the West, the United States was not prepared to lose German support. Consequently, US policymakers spearheaded this policy evolution for fear that continuing to dismantle the German economy would alienate the West German population and push them into the arms of the Soviet Union (Berend 2016, 12). Unity was an impediment to renewed violent and nationalistic tendencies; naturally linking Germany with the greater Western European community diminished the likelihood that it would attack the region again. Additionally, integration provided an alternative to the defeatism that the French sought to impose and solidified a cooperative relationship between the two historically antagonistic neighbors (Lundestad 1998, 24).

Although a push for integration already existed, American policymakers still worried that the peace that immediately prevailed after Hitler’s defeat was only transitory. Given the devastation that the Second World War brought to nearly all corners of the earth, officials on both sides of the ocean universally agreed upon the imperative of establishing new measures to
ensure a sustainable peace. From their view across the Atlantic, many in Washington believed that the Westphalian nation-state system upon which Europe was built was obsolete, and that a new organizational structure was necessary moving forward (Van der Beugel 1966, 393). American officials and many European statesmen alike used basic game theory to conclude that integration was the best way to combat a potential resurgence of violent conflict. By linking all of the economies and political systems in Western Europe, the losses one would incur from inciting violence greatly increased. The greater risk of loss diminished the likelihood of any state taking violent action against another to which it was so intricately linked (Lundestad 1998, 24).

Physical security was not the only concern in the postwar world. After the end of the War, it quickly became evident that Europe’s economy was more devastated than any estimates had predicted (Van der Beugel 1966, 38). Early on, the US government recognized that large-scale and long-term American aid would be required to rebuild the European continent. In addition to the obvious benefits that the world economy would accrue from a functioning European economy, an additional externality of an American-led economic reconstruction would be to limit the Soviet Union’s ability to encroach on the region (Berend 2016, 30). Taking lessons from America’s experience during the Great Depression and New Deal era, drafters of the Marshall Plan believed that integration was the best way to rebuild the European economy. American economic history demonstrated that the path to economic prosperity lie in a large economy regulated by the free market with central institutions and unimpeded by internal trade barriers (Ellwood 1992, 89).

The contemporary circumstances; the fear of another World War and the desperate need to revive the world economy, explain why American support for integration caught on so strongly and quickly. These circumstances alone, however, do not explain why the United States
promoted European integration so emphatically even after the threats of European economic collapse, German resurgence, and a Soviet offense dwindled. Deeper understanding of American motivations behind integration demand a knowledge of the post-War world that Washington envisioned, beginning with an understanding of the economic reconstruction objective.

**Economic Reconstruction**

After World War II, the United States committed billions of dollars in foreign aid to rebuild the struggling European states. The US needed Europe to become financially independent so as to relieve American taxpayers from the burden of these massive aid packages (Lundestad 1998, 18). US policymakers determined that integration offered the most promising solution to enable such an independence, based on logistical hurdles as well as future domestic economic objectives. The US expressed this sentiment early on, including their interest in European integration in the initial discussions of designing aid programs. A 1947 memorandum by George Kennan stated that, “the [recovery] program should be designed to encourage and contribute to some form of regional political association of western European states” (Kennan 1947, 134).

Two logistical problems made integration attractive. First of all, the European countries needed to win over Congress to secure financial assistance. In order to guarantee passage of the ERP, Congress needed evidence that the plan would work, and ideally, that it would be successful in under four years (Van der Beugel 1966, 166). Originally, the European countries drew up aid requests based on national needs, but the United States deemed this form of aid application unacceptable. Instead, the US demanded that the states cooperate to draft a comprehensive request, based on aggregate regional needs, rather than individual national
deficiencies (Ellwood 1992, 90). Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett defined this request more explicitly as;

“Concrete proposals for area-wide recovery of agriculture and basic industries…which are fundamental to a viable European economy. Proposals must correlate individual national programs and individual industry programs” (Lovett 1947, 229).

Again, taking lessons from America’s previous experiences, US officials believed that the ERP would be most successful if it were based on a collaborative effort among the European states.

The second logistical problem that integration remedied was the actual furnishing of aid. Through establishing multilateral economic institutions, integration could also provide a mechanism through which aid dollars could be effectively requested, funneled, and distributed. American officials agreed that institutionalized economic cooperation between the European states was required, and offered the only “politically feasible basis on which the United States could operate” (Ellwood 1992, 84). In the same memorandum where he described the collaborative effort for aid application, Lovett explained that the establishment of a European Customs Union, or another organization that would boost the multilateral nature of the European economy, was high on America’s list of priorities (Lovett 1947, 229).

In addition to the logistical demands, domestic American economic objectives made integration attractive. In general, these motivators were more future-oriented than the logistical imperatives that first demanded integration. It was this long-run perspective, however, that kept the American enthusiasm for integration alive well after Europe’s economy had bounced back.

First, the US wanted to create a strong trading partner through its reconstruction of the European economy. The United States explicitly stated this objective early on and the goal empowered a strong support for integration until the US balance of payments situation detrimentally deteriorated in the early 1970s (Lundestad 1998, 98). In a 1947 report to President
Truman, a council of economic advisers explained the domestic benefits of a strong Europe: “In the longer run, the economic restoration of Europe will benefit our economy by enabling us to obtain more goods by advantageous trade” (Nourse Report, cited in Van der Beugel 1966, 90). Proponents of integration could easily sell utilizing the new Europe to the advancement of the American economy to both Congress and the American public, helping integration support stay afloat for decades.

Additionally, the US wanted someone with whom it could share its mounting international burdens: forging development in the Third World, containing communism, and generally maintaining peace. Although the burden-sharing goal did not gain much momentum until after the European economy had been restored, it was a predominant objective under the Kennedy Administration (Van der Beugel 1966, 353). Overall, American policymakers strongly believed that these economic objectives could be fulfilled through European integration: economic integration would enlarge the European market, making it robust enough to take on some international responsibilities, serve as a beneficial trading partner, and become independent of American financial aid.

Military Security

The second American motivation that fueled its support for integration is military security. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought this imperative to the forefront, as fear of a Soviet military offensive heightened (Van der Beugel 1966, 250). Although within the realm of physical security the US was chiefly concerned with preventing communist aggression and ensuring that Germany remained a peaceful neighbor and ally, other military considerations also generated integration support.
In the immediate post-War years, Western Europe had a massive American military presence: American forces were the largest Western mobile force deployed on Europe’s lands, and in its waters and skies (Holborn 1953, 21). This substantial US military presence created an intense need, both politically and economically, to reduce the American military burden in Europe (Creswell 2002, 90). Consequently, the United States initially resisted any formal security obligation in Europe, and instead encouraged the Western European countries to build a European defense alliance, as the Brussels Pact suggested (Ellwood 1992, 123). The Republican Congress of the early 1950s was strongly pro-integrationist because it believed that a collaborative European military unit would be effective enough to enable a substantial reduction in US military expenditures (Lundestad 1998, 46). A greater European role in its own security, which would require some degree of European integration and collaboration, could enable a reduction in the US military commitment to Europe.

Nevertheless, as the Soviet threat deepened and the European pleas for American assistance grew louder, the United States acquiesced and eventually established NATO. Although NATO represented a greater security burden in the US, policymakers in Washington expected that the Europeans would meet the American commitment with strong contributions to their own defense, particularly in the form of increased conventional troops (Van der Beugel 1962, 260). President Truman voiced this hope in September of 1950 when he said, “our plans [for NATO] are based on the sincere expectation that our efforts will be met with similar action on [the Europeans’] part” (Truman 1950, 468). Through NATO, the US sought to reduce the number of American troops in Europe by providing the European nations with the assistance to augment their own conventional forces.
NATO also solidified America’s commitment to Europe. Immediately after the War, Western Europe almost entirely relied upon the United States for its physical security maintenance. In light of the Cold War climate, the European governments clung to an American military presence for protection; many countries even made explicit requests that the United States permanently commit itself to an Atlantic security alliance (Lundestad 2003, 48). Many Europeans were gravely concerned that the United States’ commitment to their security was not credible, and that it might back out on a moment’s notice. This worry was problematic for the US: it spawned the possibility that Western European states might turn to the Soviet Union for protection if they felt they could not count on the US. To assuage the Europeans’ fears, the United States conclusively proved that its pledge was durable by linking the two sides of the Atlantic through a binding security alliance (Van der Beugel 1966, 257). NATO simultaneously furthered the need for and the realization of European cooperation. The alliance demanded an integrated defense system, and so it forced European countries to “realize unified direction and effort” (Acheson 1950, 1). Moreover, the US offered military assistance to members of NATO, rather than to countries on a bilateral basis (Acheson 1950, 1). Consequently, the design of the alliance encouraged closer European cooperation.

As with economic integration, another underlying motive in the security realm was to link Germany with the rest of the region. Germany’s strategic position in the Cold War motivated the US to encourage West German rearmament (Van der Beugel 1966, 262). Given Germany’s violent history, this interest was met with a lot of contention, particularly from the French. Nevertheless, the United States often expressed that it believed integrating Germany politically, economically, and militarily into the rest of Europe would prevent a menacing resurgence of German nationalism.
Supranational Design

The third American motive was to encourage a supranational construction for the new Europe to combat the problem of international anarchy. By “supranational”, the US envisioned a union where the national governments delegated some power to another authority, made up of delegates from all member states. In other words, the US wanted the states of Europe to collaborate through international organizations that transcended the sovereignty of national governments (Mearsheimer 2003, 30). This objective differs from the economic reconstruction or military security imperatives. In the first two categories, American needs and policy objectives could be achieved through an integrated Europe in general. The push for a supranational design illustrates that the United States was not interested in promoting integration in general, but rather a certain type; specifically, one of a supranational design. Despite how important this distinct construction was to US goals, American policymakers never explicitly stated this objective to the Europeans (Van der Beugel 1966, 402). The lack of concrete American policy directing European governments towards this path makes the underlying motivations for encouraging a supranational design less clear than those in the economic or military realms.

There are a variety of reasons why the United States would have kept this objective more inconspicuous than some of its other goals. For starters, a supranational design would have weakened the sovereignty of the individual European countries, thus comparatively elevating the American position in the power scale that stretched across the Atlantic. This balance was favorable for the US, as the United States was interested in maintaining superiority over the European states. Understandably, however it might upset the Europeans and therefore the US may have chosen to keep it understated. Additionally, the US officially maintained that although
it was more than willing to aid in the establishment of an integrated Europe, the actual design and impetus had to come from within Europe. Partly as a result of its firm anti-imperial stance, America did not want to appear to be meddling too heavily in another region’s internal affairs (Van der Beugel 1966, 42). The US expressed this feeling from the onset of American aid in Europe. In a memorandum to Secretary of State Acheson discussing the long-term goal of European integration, the policy planning staff noted:

“It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for [the United States] to undertake to draw up unilaterally and to promulgate formally on its own initiative a program designed to place western Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The formal initiative must come from Europe; the program must be evolved in Europe; and the Europeans must bear the basic responsibility for it.” (Kennan 1947, 135).

Yet, through the Nixon Administration, the United States was adamant that European integration adopt a supranational form.

An underlying motive for the supranational design couples with the economic and military imperatives: the United States believed that a united Europe organized on a federal basis would be the easiest structure with which to cooperate (Lundestad 1998, 16). Instead of having to collaborate with multiple governments on European-US objectives, a supranational construction of Europe would make negotiations bilateral. Additionally, by virtue of America’s federalist history, the analogy between supranationalism and federalism struck a chord with many Americans. In this respect, the US supported supranationalism because this construction achieved another foreign policy goal: promoting the spread of American values throughout the world, including America’s federal version of democracy (Lundestad 1998, 14).

Furthermore, the US did not trust the European states’ ability to maintain the peace in their current construction. As previously mentioned, the United States believed that the Westphalian nation-state design of the past was insufficient to ensure peace in the twentieth
century (Van der Beugel 1966, 393). Secretary Dulles went so far as to say that “complete sovereignty for the many nations of Europe, […] is a luxury which European countries can no longer afford at US expense” (“Memorandum” 1957, 105). The United States concluded that a supranational construction of Europe would impede the likelihood of a resurgence of violence: increasing the risk associated with inciting violence by inextricably linking national economies would remedy the Europeans’ inability to maintain their own security.

**Atlantic Partnership**

Finally, America’s dream of a strong partnership, stretching across the Atlantic between the newly rebuilt Western Europe and the US motivated its pro-integration policy. Naturally, the United States wanted the Europe that it rebuilt to closely cooperate with and further American policy goals. Even in 1947, policymakers tried to design assistance programs so as to orient the aid-receiving nations towards greater cooperation with the US in the long-term (“Report” 1947, 132). Despite early intimations of an American desire for cooperation between the US and Western Europe, the Atlantic Partnership objective in its best-known form was not conceived until the Kennedy Administration. In 1962, Kennedy’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, summarized the objectives of the Administration’s Atlantic Partnership goal well in saying,

> “American interests in the present complex are essentially those that we have been pursuing over more than a decade: […] to ensure that a United Western Europe works with us ever more closely in the framework of an Atlantic alliance for ensuring our common security and a close partnership for carrying out our shared responsibilities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America” (“Scope Paper” 1962, 44).

As the security and economic imperatives of the US-European relationship began to dwindle, the effect that a United Europe would have on domestic conditions started to increase in importance (Van der Beugel 1966, 325). The United States needed to ensure that the integrated Europe that it
had worked so hard to see come to fruition would be one that was complementary to American policy objectives.

In addition to the general concept of a closer collaboration between the two sides of the Atlantic, the Kennedy Administration launched the idea of a partnership of two equals. The Administration contended that as long as Europe was divided into individual nations, it could never be as strong as the United States, thus limiting the potential for real partnership (Van der Beugel 1966, 373). Despite Kennedy’s consistent promotion of this argument, historical evidence challenges it. Van der Beugel points out that there is no historical example of a successful partnership between countries of equal size exists (Van der Beugel 1966, 398). Nevertheless, the Kennedy Administration ardently pushed for a more balanced relationship stretching across the Atlantic.

These four motivations of the pro-integration position outline the basic contemporary policy objectives of the United States for five successive presidential administrations. They offer a greater understanding of the American decision to break with history and push for unity rather than divisiveness. Moreover, these interests help to explain why European integration took the shape that it did. Nevertheless, these motives do not completely reveal the entire picture. There are some discordant facets of the American encouragement of integration that demand further analysis.

**Inconsistencies in the American Integrationist Drive**

As mentioned earlier, the United States did not support all structures of integration. The realization that the US did not see “integration” in itself as satisfactory is implicit in the understanding that the US pushed for integration based on domestic objectives. Although the United States wanted to enable a strong and prosperous Europe, the new construction could
threaten neither America’s vision for the post-War world, nor its dominant position in this self-envisioned landscape (Rappaport 1981, 121). Especially as domestic problems became more pressing, emphasis on an advantageous form of integration, rather than integration in general, gained momentum. A 1964 pamphlet voiced this concern as, “greater unity in Europe is desirable, insofar as it strengthens the Atlantic Community; developments in Europe that weaken Atlantic unity are undesirable” (“The Atlantic Alliance” 1964, 18). Yet, even in 1964, this sentiment was not widespread: the majority of Americans still supported integration, ignoring potential consequences for the US.

Despite the lack of resistance to integration, the United States would not have tolerated an integrated Europe that was not aligned with its post-War vision of the world. For example, de Gaulle’s protectionist, France-led Europe vision posed a real threat to American plans. Even if a “Gaullist Europe” was united, the United States would have opposed it (Van der Beugel 1966, 384). Yet, the US never explicitly explained that it was only after a certain kind of integration. Even though the US often intimated that the Europe it sought would be friendly and in close concert with the US, absent from any official statements was the notion that only some integrated structures, namely those designed to operate under US leadership, were acceptable. As will be explained, the US used its economic, military, and political strength to encourage this particular type of construction.

Another important discrepancy in US policy is the indirect exertion of American power in Western Europe rather than imposing direct imperialistic rule. This particular command structure significantly limited Washington’s ability to affect change in Europe and establish the kind of integration it wanted. Moreover, the United States insisted that the integration impetus come from within Europe, it could not be imposed by any external force (Van der Beugel 1966,
42). The Americans, therefore, faced an intractable coordination problem: they sought the establishment of a construction of Europe that they could not directly create. All of the American aid that went into Europe’s reconstruction made this problem a difficult pill for many policymakers to swallow. A memorandum by Secretary of State Dulles expresses this sentiment explicitly;

“Two world wars have cost us something and we are entitled to have some interest in the matter […] the US understands that dictation to European countries would be counter-productive but as members of the Western Community, we are entitled to some views” (“Memorandum” 1956, 172).

Although a push for American assistance within Europe existed (Lundestad 2003, 43), the US often struggled with its inability to directly affect change on the continent. The US faced many challenges to its power from within Europe. General de Gaulle’s staunch opposition to American dominance, for example, made achieving America’s policy objectives from an external position more difficult. The American decision to not impose imperial rule in Western Europe is too complex to fully examine here, but for moral and economic reasons, imperialistic control was out of the question (Lundestad 1998, 155). Consequently, the US had to overcome the coordination problem by simultaneously drawing the European states closer together and durably linking the United States and Western Europe through integration-seeking mechanisms, like NATO and the OECD.

Finally, one must question why the United States promoted a pro-integration policy when the resulting union could have hurt American interests. Strangely enough, the scholarship does not give this question much attention. Lundestad (1998) touches slightly on this issue, arguing that policymakers generally viewed the domestic economic consequences of European integration as subordinate to political objectives. The majority of contemporary American
policymakers agreed that the aggregate gains from integration to both the United States economy and its political clout would outweigh any negative effects. (Lundestad 1998, 83).

For example, the drive to create a strong trading partner through integration was based on the unfounded assumption that an economically prosperous Europe would inherently be advantageous to the United States. Even if American aid dollars facilitated the reconstruction of the European economy, there was nothing innate about a prosperous nor integrated Europe that would compel it to support US policy objectives. Nevertheless, the American public largely assumed that Europe would naturally be on America’s side (Lundestad 1998, 83). For the majority of the time period in question, 1945-1968, the US usually ignored potential negative side effects of European integration.

As the American economic situation began to deteriorate while the European economic situation improved, policymakers began questioning using political objectives as an excuse to prioritize Europe’s prosperity over America’s (Van der Beugel 1966, 325). Yet, it is still unusual that US policymakers would have consistently subordinated their domestic interests to the Europeans in the first place. Lundestad (1998) argues that the United States was not acting altruistically in supporting Europe’s growth over its own. Rather, the United States accepted short-term domestic losses to meet long-term domestic objectives. Even this argument, however, rests on the false notion that an integrated Europe would inherently align with American objectives. In retrospect, the United States could not incontrovertibly ensure that Europe would always side with American policy objectives.

Nevertheless, one can rationalize this dissonance with the understanding that at the time, the United States believed it could prevent any real threat of European opposition through leveraging its hegemonic power and dominant financial position (Lundestad 1998, 91). US
strength was impressive, particularly since the world was so otherwise void of Western power. This relative power made it unforeseeable that any European country, who was so contemporarily reliant on US aid, would seriously pose any threat to US objectives. Further, The US vowed to only commit itself to countries that would not use American aid to undermine its objectives (Kennan 1947, 134).

For argument’s sake, allow that the United States believed that it could ensure a Europe that would be complementary to its objectives. From this viewpoint then, the American decision to support a policy that created domestic losses is not irrational: subordinating domestic needs in the short-run would yield long-run payoffs. Still, as evidenced by the many challenges to American power in its attempts to encourage integration, it seems imprudent that the US believed that a united Europe would emerge that would incontrovertibly advance US objectives. Nevertheless, little evidence suggests that the United States recognized this uncertainty that undergirded its entire European foreign policy for the first post-War decades. Therefore, one can assume that the United States indeed believed its hegemonic position guaranteed that a united Europe would undoubtedly support American interests in the long-term.

Conclusion

Gaining a deeper understanding of the shape that European integration ultimately took requires a knowledge of why the United States pursued a pro-integration policy for the better part of the post-War years. The United States’ motivation can essentially be broken down into four separate categories of sub-objectives: economic reconstruction, physical security, supranational design, and an Atlantic partnership. Despite some paradoxical facets of American policy, these four motives explain why the US sought European integration in general, as well as help illuminate the rationale behind the specific type of integration it supported.
Chapter 3: The Principal-Agent Model and Strategic Choice

In order to understand the intricacies of the international system that the aims laid out in the previous chapter motivated, one must consider this international structure’s origins. This process demands a theoretical study of the relationships within the relevant international system. Put another way, understanding the shape of European integration and the American role in this process fundamentally requires an understanding of the relationship between the United States and its Western European allies.

In analyzing the phenomenon of European integration, scholars have tried to apply traditional international relations theories. The liberalist and realist camps, however, have limited their works to only considering integration from one side; generally, that of the Europeans. While these analyses of integration (Rosato 2010, Moravcsik 2005) reconcile the events within traditional international theory rather well, they leave out a crucial piece of the puzzle: the role of the United States. As the United States held the dominant position in the Western world’s power structure, American policymakers had a heavy hand in shaping the process of European integration. This influence was generally indirect, and often camouflaged under the guise of something other than America intervening directly in Western European politics. For example, US policymakers packaged integration as essential to the logistical distribution of ERP funds. This often-covert nature of American influence explains why many scholars have ignored or downplayed the American role in European integration when applying traditional theory to analyze the process. Yet, the intensity of American influence in Western Europe in the years after World War II implies that analyses of European integration must consider the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic to ensure full comprehension of the phenomenon.
Since the United States did not employ a traditional hegemonic strategy, such as imperialistic rule, non-traditional theories are required. The Principal-Agent (PA) Model offers a unique perspective of the US-Western Europe dynamic. The model presents a way to understand how the United States exerted its power over its Western European allies. The following chapter explores the Principal-Agent Model. It first outlines the relevant assumptions and the appropriate environmental setup for the context of analyzing international relations. I then explore the application of the model to the Western European-United States case.

**Principal-Agent Model: The Setup**

Economists originally developed the Principal-Agent Model to explain how one agent can leverage incentives to achieve a desirable outcome over which he has no direct control (Miller 2005, 204). To be a principal, the actor must be able to both grant and revoke authority (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 7). The principal has some goal that he cannot fulfill independently, but for which he specifically selects the agent to achieve. In other words, the principal is dependent on the agent. In this model, the principal is unable to contract with the agent in a conventional nature to secure its objectives. Instead, the principal offers the agent some sort of incentive scheme to encourage the agent to act in a manner that will further the principal’s goals.

In the context of international relations, this relationship implies a power disparity between the principal and the agent. For one reason or another, the principal objectively has a greater degree of power in the world system than does the agent. If we undertake the realist assumption that all nations are in competition with one another to accumulate greater national power (Mearsheimer 2003, 29), then this power imbalance between the principal and the agent naturally creates an incentive scheme. The principal can encourage the agent to act in a manner advantageous to its own goals by offering to confer a degree of authority to the agent, thus
boosting the agent’s position in the world power structure. Since greater power is always ideal under the realist school of thought, this is a powerful incentive (Mearsheimer 2003, 29). In essence, the incentive scheme developed in the PA model can be viewed as a form of delegation: the principal conditionally grants authority to the agent so as to empower the agent to act on its behalf (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 7).

Ultimately, since each actor is autonomous and the relationship between the principal and the agent is neither explicitly defined nor contractually binding, the agent can act in whatever manner it chooses. For the sake of simplicity, this aspect will be modeled as the agent choosing between one of two options: compliance or non-compliance. The principal’s lack of control over the agent’s actions demands that the principal create some set of monitoring institutions or mechanisms of control to ensure favorable actions on the agent’s part (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 8).

Past applications of the PA model in the political science and international relations realms have largely dealt with either domestic politics or delegation to international organizations; scant attention has been given to its interstate relations applications. This void creates some need to deviate from the theory’s traditional assumptions and claims. For example, in applications outside of the economics discipline, there typically can be more than one principal, but only one agent. In considering interstate relations with the presence of a hegemon, this set-up will be reversed, with one principal and multiple agents. Switching these roles means that this situation diverges from traditional applications’ findings and patterns regarding the choice to delegate, monitoring strategies, and how the principal influences the agent.

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1 A hegemon refers to a state with economic, military, and/or political preponderance in the world power system
Principal-Agent Model: Application

To delve into the application of the PA model to the post-World War II Transatlantic relationship, we must reconcile the features of this relationship with the model’s basic set-up. Adhering to conventional conceptions of the PA model, the US-Western Europe relationship features a power disparity between the principal and the agent: the United States was the only Western power not completely ravaged by World War II, and as such, it served as virtually the only source of credit to the majority of war-torn and insolvent Western Europe (Lundestad 2003, 46). The heavy European dependence on American aid gave the United States an important advantage over the European people. US policymakers tried to use this position to encourage the European states to act according to American goals (Van der Beugel 1966, 103). Thus, in this application, the United States acts as the principal while the Western European states function as agents.

There are six core assumptions of the Principal-Agent Model in its traditional form: (1) the principal’s payoff is dependent on the agent’s action; (2) the principal can only observe outcomes, but not the agents’ actions themselves; (3) the two sets of actors have fundamentally different preferences; (4) the principal initiates any action based on coherent preferences; (5) the principal can generally guess how the agent will respond to certain actions; and (6) the principal has ultimatum bargaining power over the agent (Miller 2005, 206). While these assumptions are based on an application in economics, they generally extend, with some variance, to the realms of political science and international relations.

The US-European situation meets all of these canonical assumptions. (1) The United States was dependent upon the Europeans to see the fruition of its goal: an integrated Europe. (2) Washington could observe the outcomes of European decisions, but for many events, the US was
barred from observing the decision-making process and therefore could not assuredly know the preferences of every European state. (3) Although many European states agreed with the objective of integration, ultimately, they wanted to retain their sovereignty and thus divergent preferences existed across the two sides of the Atlantic. (4) The United States generally initiated the action, calling for an integrated Europe and providing the funds to achieve it. (5) American policymakers could generally infer how the Europeans would react to any particular policy prescription or statement, and consequently tailored their actions to achieve certain results. Finally, (6) the United States had ultimatum bargaining power: it could have revoked all aid to the European governments had it felt that doing so was the best course of action.

In addition to these canonical assumptions, analysis of the transatlantic relationship in the post-War world relies on some other important assumptions. Chiefly, this particular application operates under the assumption of strategic choice. The strategic-choice approach generates a mechanism to analyze how actors go about making decisions. This approach assumes that all actors are rational and purposive, meaning that they respond to any given action based on a coherent set of preferences in order to meet defined goals. More specifically, a strategic interaction implies that, “each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how other actors behave, and therefore each actor must take the actions of others into account” (Lake & Powell 1999, 3).

Under the strategic-choice approach, there are four independent variables to consider: possible actions, available information, actors’ preferences, and their beliefs about the preferences of others (Lake & Powell 1999, 8). As a result of the multiple agent-set-up of the US-Western Europe relationship, there is another dimension of the strategic interaction variables. Although individual states have coherent preferences, one can assume some heterogeneity across
states. The presence of multiple agents implies that when developing their strategies, agents had to consider their own beliefs about the preferences of the principal, but also those beliefs of the other agents, and what strategies these beliefs would lead their peers to adopt. In this particular context, this implication means that other European states’ actions were of the utmost importance in an individual state’s decision-making process. By disaggregating all outcomes into these variables, one can draw robust conclusions about how outcomes came to be and thus formulate theories about how actors make complex decisions.

Another importance facet of the PA model is its dependence on asymmetries in information between the principal and the agent. In the context of international relations, “information” refers to preferences, defined as the ranking of various potential outcomes (Frieden 1999, 41). The strategic-choice approach assumes preferences are exogenous and constant throughout the duration of any particular round of strategic interaction (Frieden 1999, 46). Further, actors adopt strategies as paths to achieving their defined preferences. In this context, the preferences of the other relevant actors, those of each European state and the United States, in a particular strategic interaction are unobservable; each actor can only infer the aims of the other actors. This inference cannot be drawn directly from observed behaviors because doing so would ignore the strategic setting in which actors design their strategies. If one were to infer an actor’s preferences based only on the strategies it employed, it is likely that certain concessions, compromises, and strategic moves would be overlooked, thus leading to a false assumption of preferences (Frieden 1999, 48). This asymmetry of information regarding the other actors’ objectives creates the foundation of the contractual relationship in the PA model: The United States’ information disadvantage compels American policymakers to offer incentives
to the European countries in order to induce these agents to choose strategies that will produce America’s most preferred outcomes.

Additionally, since we are examining interstate relations, another assumption of this particular application will be of an international system of anarchy. Essentially, this means that the state is the most powerful sovereign entity and no effective organizing force with greater authority than national governments exists. This assumption implies that neither a hegemon nor an international organization has the power to authoritatively control another sovereign state (Mearsheimer 2003, 30). More specifically, the United States, nor any supranational organization, could compel the European states to act in a certain way. This construction explains actors’ decisions to contract with one another in a principal-agent relationship, as opposed to in a more direct or credible manner. Because all of the relevant actors are sovereign states, under a system of international anarchy, there is no way to credibly contract between actors since no greater power through which states can truly be held accountable exists. While international organizations have been developed to try and mitigate this coordination problem, ultimately, under anarchy, the dilemma persists. As such, states have to encourage one another to choose strategies that will lead to the fulfillment of their own preferences. In this application of the PA model, this encouragement takes the form of the United States offering incentives to the European countries, in order to induce them to take the specific actions that will lead to America’s most-preferred outcome.

There are two other questions at hand which must be addressed. Firstly, why states would concede to delegate some degree of their authority when realist theory claims that accumulating national power is the chief goal of sovereign nations. To answer this question completely, one must consider the alternatives to delegation: unilateralism or international cooperation (Hawkins
et. al. 2006, 11). Unilateralism was not a productive option for the US because it demands that the United States undertake the expensive task of imperialistic control so that it could force its policies upon the region. On the other hand, international cooperation relies on policy implementation through national laws or regulations, with no international third-party to serve as an enforcement force (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 11). Given the contemporary state of affairs in Europe when the US first undertook the task of encouraging integration, one characterized by distrust and physical and economic ruin, international cooperation was unviable.

Delegation, however, allows nations to reap benefits from basic economic theory: division of labor and gains from specialization (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 13). The theory essentially states that different nations have productivity advantages, and by specializing in the good that one nation is comparatively more efficient at producing, there are gains to be had from trade (Ricardo 1817). In the context of the US-European relationship, the European states had the comparative advantage in European policy. Given this comparative advantage, it would have been too costly and inefficient for the Americans to dictate policy or directly control the European states. By delegating the task of carrying out integration to the European countries rather than imposing it upon them, the United States operated according to basic economic theory.

On a similar note, states, like firms, only have finite resources. In order to function successfully, states must allocate these resources in the most efficient way to achieve their objectives. By encouraging the European nations to integrate themselves rather than undertaking the expensive and imperialistic task of forcing it upon the region, the United States used its resources most efficiently.
Secondly, the fundamental question of the PA model asks how the principal ensures that the agent acts advantageously on its behalf. To this end, the principal employs mechanisms of control designed to make the agents’ best interest and the principal’s preferences analogous. The specific mechanisms of control that the principal chooses to use are heavily situation-dependent. Broadly speaking, these instruments should (1) make it so that the agent wants to act in ways that the principal deems advantageous, and (2) enables the principal to monitor the agent’s actions such that the principal can punish the agent if he is shirking (Hawkins et. al. 2006, 24).

The principal selects a control strategy based on many different factors. First, the strategy must convince the agent that the principal’s threats and power are credible. Second, as will be further discussed, the principal and agent are not fully informed about each other’s intentions. The principal must seriously try to anticipate how the agent will react to its demands. Since objectives are not directly observable, the principal’s selection of a strategy is ultimately based on an uncertainty about how the agent will react; whether he will choose compliance or non-compliance. This uncertainty can take different forms. It could manifest as fear; that the agent ultimately wants the principal to fail, indeterminacy; that the agent will need significant reinforcement to act according to the principal’s objectives, or ignorance; that the agent does not know whether or how to comply with the principal’s demands (Marcum 2015, 89). Additionally, since asserting power is a costly business and states have limited resources, the cost of any given strategy must be taken under serious consideration.

As previously mentioned, the reversal of the typical political science set-up, featuring one agent and multiple principals, has some important implications. Most prominently, the mechanisms for monitoring and controlling the agents are different. The number of agents over which the United States had to exert control rendered direct strategies inefficient. Instead of just
having to observe the actions of one unitary actor, the US had to follow the actions of all of the Western European states involved. While it was too costly to employ direct strategies, it was also implausible to be too hands-off. Since the US was working with so many different, non-unitary agents, allowing a great degree of autonomy and authority heightened the risk of non-compliance by some if not all of the agents. Thus, the United States had to operate somewhere in the middle; dictating its goals to the agents and pushing for compliance through incentive schemes. To achieve this balance and induce compliance, the US employed three broad mechanisms of control: financial aid, military security, and leverage of its dominant political position. The following chapter elaborates on the application of these mechanisms.

Conclusion

Applying the PA model to the relationship between Western Europe and the United States in the decades immediately following World War II offers new insight into the degree of influence the United States possessed in European integration. The US used its position as a hegemon as leverage to induce the European states to integrate. Sometimes, the US succeeded in incentivizing Europe to do what it wanted, and other times it did not. Whether Washington was able to engender specific instances of integration is a result of how well American policymakers inferred the preferences and beliefs of the European states. The European governments made all decisions within the strategic environment and thus policymakers had many important variables to consider: personal preferences, the preferences of the other agents, their own as well as the other agents’ beliefs about what the United States preferred, the range of possible actions, and all the information that they had available. Examining integration in the context of the strategic environment with attention to the principal-agent nature of the US-European relationship presents a new perspective of why European integration.
Chapter 4: The United States, Western Europe, and Integration

Thus far, I have established the United States’ pro-integration motivations: those factors that catalyzed the American decision to encourage integration for five successive presidential administrations, from 1945 to 1968. I have also laid out a framework through which one can consider the US-Western European relationship during this period. Based on this groundwork, I can explore how, specifically, the United States went about encouraging integration. And particularly, how the US promoted a construction that would be domestically advantageous, while deterring the formation of any sort of integrated Europe that might be contrary to American domestic objectives.

The following chapter uses the Principal-Agent Model framework to examine two different American policy programs, the Marshall Plan and the European Defense Community. By applying the PA framework, it is possible to demonstrate how the United States employed mechanisms of control to encourage the European states to integrate as well as to fulfil America’s underlying motivations. I first outline the basic methodology for analyzing whether the US achieved its objectives. This chapter then diverges into the two different programs. In accordance with the PA model framework, I examine the most relevant strategic interaction variable for each of these programs to make claims about why the United States chose certain policy prescriptions and why the European states reacted as they did. I subsequently analyze the United States’ relative success or failure in each program at achieving each dimension of the integration objective. Finally, this chapter offers remarks on each program’s legacy.

Methodology

Process tracing is the act of disaggregating events into individual actions and tracing the link between potential causes and observed results to make causal inferences about the outcome
(Beach & Pedersen 2013, 2). Using this method to examine the American implementation of the Marshall Plan and the US support of the European Defense Community enables me to demonstrate how the United States influenced the European integration process. In order to use this method, I break down each program and consider specific instances of American influence and strategy. Analyzing both the Marshall Plan and American support of the EDC in the context of the strategic environments in which the programs were developed offers important insight into the shape that they took. As previously mentioned, the four variables of any strategic interaction are: the objective, the other actors’ beliefs about the principal’s preferences, the information available, and the range of possible actions (Lake & Powell 1999, 8). It is beyond the scope of this work to analyze each component of the strategic environment of these two programs. Instead, I examine just one variable in each program. Because every variable so intimately affects the others, this concession does not hinder my ability to demonstrate why the US advocated certain policy prescriptions and the implications of these choices.

I selected these two cases for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the promotion of both programs furthered US attempts to achieve all four underlying motivations. The Marshall Plan primarily focused on economic reconstruction, but it also linked the two sides of the Atlantic through logistic operational bodies like the OEEC, thereby advancing the transatlantic partnership motivation as well. As the EDC was a plan for a supranational European army, ratification would have furthered both the military security and supranational design goals. Moreover, the Marshall Plan and American support of the EDC represent the two most prominent American policy programs during the period in question.

Additionally, the two cases have important similarities. Notably, both programs feature the same actors and their roles in the PA model remain constant across the two programs: the
United States had the ability to leverage its political and economic dominance and served as the principal, while the weaker European states were the agents. Both programs also feature information asymmetries; primarily, each actor’s uncertainty about the preferences of its peers. These informational asymmetries prove fundamental to the decisions that actors made. Yet, despite these similarities, the Marshall Plan succeeded while the EDC Treaty was never fully ratified. Since the United States used different methods of control in each of the programs, strategy variation is the independent variable. In large part, examining the difference in control mechanisms explains the variation in outcomes.

As discussed in the first chapter, in the context of this work, integration is considered to be a process, rather than an end in itself. Therefore, to analyze whether these programs succeeded in furthering American objectives, the question is not if the agents were compliant, but rather how compliant were the agents? This question is highly qualitative and does not provide easily discernable or objective standards of success. As such, I will examine each policy program from a broad point of view, comparing the stated US objective to the overall results. The explicit American objective was: to promote and see the establishment of an integrated and cooperative Europe, strong enough to be independent of American aid and serve as a valuable domestic asset, but not so strong as to threaten American superiority (Rappaport 1981, 121). Since this goal is multi-faceted, it is useful to break the policy down into its four different dimensions: (1) closer cooperation among the Europeans, (2) transatlantic orientation, (3) European reconstruction, and (4) American preeminence. These four components speak to the type of integration that the US sought. By breaking the American objective down into these smaller goals, I can more easily assess the success or failure of the American programs.
The Marshall Plan

The Marshall Plan primarily sought to rebuild the Western European economies. Given the magnitude of the financial aid allocated and the need to ensure responsibility of its use, the US demanded the development of regional organizations dedicated to oversight and distribution. These logistic operational bodies encouraged closer cooperation among both the Western European recipients as well as between the recipients and patron, thereby working to strengthen the Atlantic partnership. The Plan additionally enabled the development of other crucial associations that propelled the integration process forward, such as the OEEC and the ECSC (Morella 2008, 6). The wide breadth of the Marshall Plan’s influence, as well as its role in intricately involving the United States in Western European affairs, makes analyzing this program necessary to understand the American role and the shape of European integration.

Strategy

The US made clear that it wanted an economic reconstruction of Western Europe, as well as a closer collaboration of European states, with the ultimate goal of an institutionalized integration (Ellwood 1992, 83). More specifically, the US sought the development of a multilateral clearing system, reduced trade barriers, and the eventual establishment of a customs union (Lovett 1947, 229). While the US made its objectives explicit, the European states’ preferences were more ambiguous. Western Europe knew it could not survive without American financial assistance (Lundestad 2003, 46). The Europeans understood that that some degree of compliance was necessary because the Marshall Plan required congressional approval before Europe would receive any aid money. The extent to which they needed to comply to receive aid, however, was unclear (Ellwood 1992, 89). The British frequently toed the line, pushing the United States to see how far they could go in refusing compliance before defiance became a real
threat to Anglo-American relations and to the offer of aid. They resisted American pressure to take the internal leadership role in the integration process and repeatedly fought other US attempts at achieving closer European economic and political collaboration (Dobson 1995, 96).

Since the European states resisted compliance whenever possible, a cloud of uncertainty surrounded how the agents would react to any given US directive (Van der Beugel 1966, 55). Thus, the strategic interaction variable of relevance in the implementation of the Marshall Plan is the American beliefs about the European states’ preferences and available actions. Given this informational dynamic, the United States implemented a unique strategy of control. It endowed its agents with some degree of authority with which to carry out US objectives, but limited their autonomy in doing so. In other words, the US gave its agents substantial latitude to make decisions that would affect the shape of integration, but the European states had little choice about whether or how to comply with the specific demands that the US set forth (Marcum 2015, 92). To achieve this particular type of control, the United States operated under a general theme of respect for its agents’ sovereignties, while still leveraging America’s economic and political superiority.

This governing ideology was not always clear-cut. US officials struggled with competing goals: to realize their objectives without impinging upon the European states’ authorities. Europe, and Great Britain in particular, was not accustomed having domestic policy dictated. As such, states were often reluctant to act according to US directives (Dobson 1995, 90). The Congressional debate on the ERP exemplifies this internal struggle; how to balance encouraging integration without offending Europe to the point of non-compliance. Led by Representative William Fulbright, a large congressional contingent ardently believed that the Europeans should only be eligible to receive American aid if they took observable steps toward integration (Van
ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman even suggested suspending Marshall aid to Great Britain if the British continued to refuse involvement in the integration process (Dobson 1995, 96).

Although the contingency arguments sparked debate, at Secretary of State Marshall’s urging, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ultimately concluded that making aid reliant upon discernible movement towards greater European cooperation was not likely to produce the desired results (Marshall 1947, 1213). In delegating authority to the European states, American policymakers believed that it was of the utmost importance to recognize and not offend European sovereignty. The US therefore tried to be sensitive to the fact that the Western European countries were highly developed, sovereign entities who would resent external interference in their internal affairs (Van der Beugel 1966, 113). This feeling manifested itself in the American effort to encourage the impetus for integration to be European-born and to avoid making imperial-like demands. The Truman Administration and its successors made it clear that the US was not in a position to demand specific actions from the Europeans (Marshall 1947, 1213).

In its efforts to respect European sovereignties, the US generally tried to be accommodating and otherwise non-combative. For example, despite the priority of the American objective to integrate Germany into the rest of Western Europe, the United States initially tried to remain rather soft-spoken about this goal. Policymakers made this effort to avoid antagonizing the French, whose support America desperately needed (Van der Beugel 1966, 74). Furthermore, the strong interest in British involvement motivated ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman to omit any mention of supranational institutions in his proposal of the EPU, given Britain’s staunch opposition to anything supranational (Eichengreen 2007, 80). In addition to trying to avoid policies that would be antagonistic, when it was necessary to make explicit demands, the US
tried not to appear too demanding. At an official meeting between the executive members of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and American officials, William Clayton laid out seven points that the US wished to see in the conference’s final report (Van der Beugel 1966, 80). Clayton framed these points as “friendly advice,” rather than demands. Framing the suggestions in this way emboldened the European states to make “a great effort […] to meet the United States point of view in spite of the great difficulties, raised by some of the participating nations” (Van der Beugel 1966, 81). Thus, the American strategy’s accommodating nature encouraged compliance.

The US faced the most trouble in securing its preferences in confrontations with the British. Britain was less interested in the integration project than its continental neighbors, instead prioritizing the Commonwealth and its “special relationship” with the United States (Lundestad 1998, 30). The face-offs with the British demonstrate another facet of the American strategy: although the US generally tried to remain respectful of European sovereignties, it did not hesitate to leverage its political and economic superiority when necessary.

A chief example of the Anglo-American cross-ocean tug of war can be found in the debate over British involvement in the EPU, a multilateral payments system among OEEC members designed to ease trade in the face of inconvertible currencies. The ECA proposed that drawing rights should be transferable among OEEC members and convertible into American dollars, to ease the burden on the American economy and the flow of European trade. In effect, the convertibility of drawing rights would enable European countries to continue to import American goods, essentially on credit, despite temporary balance of payments deficits with the US. The British government fiercely resisted joining the Union, primarily for concern about preserving the sterling area (Adams 2018). But, America’s position as the largest international
creditor gave the US some latitude to dictate policy when necessary. The United States funded the EPU with ERP funds (Ellwood 1992, 160). In doing so, Congress implied that those left out of the Union were also left out from aid allocations. Moreover, Congress stipulated that all of the money it provided for the purpose of promoting this multilateral trading and transferability system had to be used to this effect; any money not used for this purpose would be returned to the Treasury. Congress intended this provision to exert pressure on the UK to join the payments union (Board of Governors 1950, I4). Once it became clear that continuing to resist membership would be detrimental in terms of harming American good will, Britain capitulated (Eichengreen 2007, 80). After multiple rounds of negotiations, the US reconciled the British into the Union as a full member (Ellwood 1992, 160).

Moreover, the US used the necessity of congressional approval in allocating ERP funds to secure European compliance. The US often intimated that both Congress and the American taxpayers would be impressed by positive steps taken towards integration. In a 1949 speech, ECA director Paul Hoffman expressed the widespread American interest in integration, using American support as bait.

“The People and the Congress of the United States and, I am sure, a great majority of the people of Europe have instinctively felt that economic integration is essential if there is to be an end to Europe’s recurring economic crises. A European program to this end – one which should show real promise of taking this great forward step successfully – would, I strongly believe, give new impetus to the American support for carrying through into 1952 our joint effort toward lasting European recovery” (Hoffman 1949).

Framing the situation in this way still had the effect of encouraging the Europeans to act favorably, but it came off as less hostile than had the legislation explicitly required progress. Leveraging the incentive of financial aid became an important American technique. Indeed, this tactic pushed the French government to see the necessity of economic integration, as well as to
prepare itself to engage in negotiations to see its realization (Berend 2016, 48). Without French approval of and accession to the integration scheme, progress would have been unlikely.

**Objective #1: Closer Cooperation**

The Marshall Plan was instrumental in facilitating a closer cooperation among the European states. One primary tactic to elicit this closer collaboration was to use the logistical distribution challenges accompanying Europe’s financial reliance on America to promote closer collaboration. For example, the US mandated the creation of collaborative bodies of regional authority to oversee aid distribution. The US required that the OEEC be responsible for coordinating and integrating the national programs of its Member States. This mandate empowered the OEEC to both aggregate national programs as well as serve as a third-party cross-examiner to ensure productivity and effectiveness (Van der Beugel 1966, 147). Further, the ECA, the US agency in charge of the ERP, collaborated only with the OEEC, rather than with individual governments bilaterally (Van der Beugel 1966, 142). Additionally, although the Europeans originally submitted their aid requests based only on national considerations, the US demanded they instead compile a comprehensive list of needs for all of Western Europe (Lovett 1947, 229). This demand compelled national governments to consider one another’s needs and work together to present an inclusive proposal.

Moreover, the OEEC itself was a source of closer collaboration among the European states. The Organization was comprised of Member State delegates. By facilitating Europeans coming together to negotiate as a single unit with the United States concerning aid matters, the OEEC furthered collaboration (Van der Beugel 1966, 165). Additionally, since the Organization aggregated and cross-examined national programs, it meant that European national economic programs began to take the other states’ plans into greater consideration (Van der Beugel 1966,
Furthermore, the prior existence of the OEEC and EPU enabled the establishment of the ECSC, which created a single European market (Van der Beugel 1966, 233). Thus, by extension, the Marshall Plan also worked to empower future European cooperation.

**Objective #2: Transatlantic Orientation**

The most important motivation behind ensuring Western Europe’s transatlantic orientation was the American desire to secure an advantageous trading partner. The US allocated 350 million dollars-worth of Marshall Plan aid to capitalize the EPU and in doing so, Washington demanded the liberalization of intra-European trade and payments, effectively creating a customs union and paving the road towards a single market (Eichengreen 2007, 79). Simply put, the US sought to establish a large and unobstructed European market. The United States believed that access to this type of European market would facilitate greater trade across the two sides of the Atlantic; increasing the degree of interdependence and domestic benefits for the US.

The implementation of the Marshall Plan also inextricably linked the two sides of the Atlantic in the sense that it demanded that Europe make policy decisions with an eye on the US. Since aid allocations were at the will of congressional approval, Europe needed to be in Congress’ good graces. As such, officials closely considered how Washington might receive any changes in national policies (Van der Beugel 1966, 147). Furthermore, the US sought to establish a new economic structure in Europe that was reminiscent of the American economy (Ellwood 1992, 90). In pursuing this goal, policymakers necessarily advocated a Europe oriented towards the US.

Although the US only committed itself to supplying Europe with aid through the ERP for four years, in establishing the logistical bodies to distribute and monitor aid, the US effectively
tied itself to Europe for much longer. The OEEC, created by the Marshall Plan, evolved into what is today the OECD. As such, the Marshall Plan provided the foundation for lasting interdependence and collaboration between the European states and across the Atlantic.

**Objective #3: European Reconstruction**

The Marshall Plan’s primary purpose was to facilitate Western Europe’s economic reconstruction through the distribution of American assistance. In this respect, the Plan was wildly successful. By the time the program ended in 1952, the US had supplied over 100 billion 2008 USD to 16 European countries (Morella 2008, 5). This aid money saved Western Europe from starvation, jumpstarted industrial growth, and revitalized agricultural production (Bossuat 2008, 17). Western Europe’s post-World War II economic recovery far surpassed its previous degree of economic prosperity (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 28). While economic growth was rampant across the world during the post-War period, the countries that received ERP funds underwent productivity surges far greater than those states that did not (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 29). Further, even among all ERP recipients, those in which the US had the greatest influence experienced the fastest rate of reconstruction: the US had the most influence in Germany and the least in Britain; German economic recovery was the most successful whereas British was the least (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 54).

In addition to kick-starting economic reconstruction by providing emergency funds and restoring financial stability, the Marshall Plan also catalyzed long-term sustained and dynamic economic growth. ERP funds went towards furthering public and private investments, relaxing constraints on foreign exchanges, restoring the free market’s ability to regulate itself, and curbing inflationary tendencies (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991). While it is impossible to speculate the state of the Western European economies if not for the Marshall Plan, the relative
success of ERP recipients’ economies compared to other expanding economies, demonstrates the Plan’s importance.

Objective #4: American Preeminence

The question of how the implementation of the Marshall Plan inspired an integration that would generate domestic advantages for the United States remains. The wording of the Marshall Plan explicitly fostered domestic benefits. For example, Congress stipulated that recipients spend seventy percent of ERP aid on American-made goods. Further, Congress demanded that all governments receiving aid suppress communist movements within their countries, by removing any members of the Communist Party from governing coalitions (Hunt 2007, 167). Moreover, in enabling the birth of the EPU, the Marshall Plan also bolstered the American economy. The EPU enabled the European states to effectively purchase goods on credit. Since the European economies heavily depended on American goods, the EPU maintained and augmented the influx of American goods to the European market (Adams 2018).

In addition to creating domestic advantages, the Marshall Plan cemented the American leadership role in the transatlantic relationship. The need to remain in Washington’s good graces kept the Europeans compliant and acting in accordance with American preferences, as evidenced by Britain’s eventual concession to membership in the EPU (Eichengreen 2007, 80). The Marshall Plan went even further in securing American preeminence by enforcing the international dominance of the dollar. The EPU, capitalized by the Marshall Plan, set the European currencies based on the gold value of the dollar (Eichengreen 2007, 77). In doing so, national governments in Europe gave up their capacity to insulate their economies from America’s macroeconomic policies. For example, the US to controlled inflation policies in Europe (Adams 2018). As such, American policies heavily influenced the European economies.
Finally, the Marshall Plan facilitated American preeminence by elevating and spreading American culture in Western Europe. The United States sought to furnish the Europe that it helped to build with American values and culture (Lundestad 1998, 14). Through the Marshall Plan, Europeans came in closer contact with the US and American culture. A new kind of middle class, oriented towards the US, emerged (Bossuat 2008, 21). Europeans were exposed to and thus more interested in American politics and popular culture (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 9). European markets began trying to emulate those in America, particularly inspired by both American mass media and marketing techniques. The OEEC, created by the Marshall Plan, also worked to spread American production methods by sending Europeans to the US to learn from American productivity standards (Bossuat 2008, 21). The Marshall Plan, and the organizations it spawned, worked to secure US leadership in political, economic, and social realms.

**European Defense Community**

The Cold War climate and fear of another violent conflict on the European continent created a desire to develop a system of regional collective security. The first attempt at such a system was the establishment of NATO in 1949. While NATO is important to this work in that it solidified the American military commitment to Western Europe, the organization was not directly aimed at promoting greater European integration, and thus does not warrant extensive analysis here. Alternatively, the French devised the European Defense Community (EDC) as a defensive treaty to ensure regional security in response to American calls for West German rearmament (Kunz 1953, 275). Although Washington initially worried that the development of a European defense system might undermine the power of NATO, policymakers quickly assuaged this fear by insisting that the defense cooperation among the Six be fit within the wider NATO framework and respect the Atlantic partnership (Lundestad 1998, 78).
Realization of the EDC would have achieved the military security and supranational design objectives. Secretary of State Dulles worried that NATO was not supranational enough, so the EDC offered a welcome solution (Lundestad 1998, 48). Its promotion was the most poignant American attempt at achieving a supranational organization for integrated Europe (Van der Beugel 1966, 249). The preamble of the EDC Treaty states that the signatories decided to enter into the Treaty,

“Considering that as complete an integration as possible, compatible with military requirements, of the human and material elements gathered in their Defense Forces within a supranational European organization is the most appropriate means of reaching this goal with all the necessary rapidity and effectiveness; Certain that such integration will result in the most rational and economic utilization of the resources of their countries, as a result, particularly, of the establishment of a common budget and of common armament programs…” (Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community 1952).

In addition to this explicit enumeration of the proposed supranational nature of the Community in the treaty’s opening lines, the treaty goes on to eliminate all national armies. Instead, it proposes the Members work together to create a common, supranational European army (Kunz 1953, 277).

Despite strong US support, on August 30, 1954, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the treaty. The US spent roughly four years vehemently and overtly supporting the EDC. So, when the French failed to ratify, it tempered the United States’ position of power. Whether due to inadequate mechanisms of control or if the incentives for non-compliance were too strong, the principal was unable to secure the desired action from its agents.

**Strategy**

Uncertainty regarding how actors on both sides of the Atlantic would react to particular actions surrounded the implementation of the Marshall Plan. In the case of the EDC, the American objectives were not at all ambiguous; the US made it explicit that it wanted the
ratification of the EDC Treaty. Yet despite this overt iteration of US preferences, the European agents continuously refused and delayed ratification. The relevant strategic interaction variable in this scenario then, is the Europeans’, and the French more specifically, beliefs about the American objectives. In particular, how important was ratification of the EDC to the Americans, and if those in Western Europe chose non-compliance, how would the US react to such an upset? Given their eventual refusal to ratify, this question is of the greatest importance in examining the French case. The transparency of the American position regarding the EDC put the US in a position of weakness, particularly with the French who were aware that their participation in a system of regional collective security was strongly desired if not necessary. The French government knew it could leverage this position to gain important concessions from the Americans, but was unsure just how far it could push the US before Washington would make arrangements that excluded France entirely (Konde 2013, 28).

Early on in the EDC’s development, the US still held obvious power. At a North Atlantic Council Meeting in September of 1950, Secretary of State Acheson told the Europeans that if they wished to continue receiving American financial and military aid, they needed to create a European defense force that included West German units (Creswell 2002, 100). While France vetoed West German membership in NATO, the French responded to this American call for German rearmament with the Pleven Plan (Creswell 2002, 101). The Pleven Plan was designed to curb any potential negative consequences of a German revitalization: linking Germany to the rest of the continent through a supranational organization enabled economic and military rebirth while minimizing the likelihood of violent resurgence (Kunz 1953, 275). The Plan quickly passed the French National Assembly by a large majority, 343 to 225 votes (Creswell 2002,
By promoting a European army, France could please the United States while denying West Germany an independent military. The Pleven Plan eventually evolved into the EDC Treaty.

Yet the momentum behind the Plan died quickly and the Truman Administration encountered many delays in securing the establishment of the EDC. Although they approved the Pleven Plan by a wide margin, the French hoped to defer German rearmament until a later date. The National Assembly explicitly stated its strong opposition to the reconstitution of a German army or any immediate action to this end (Konde 2013, 27). The US faced other obstacles to securing a workable version of the Pleven Plan. A December 1950 poll showed that nearly 70 percent of West Germans opposed rearmament (Creswell 2002, 106). Further, the public announcement of the US decision to rearm Germany triggered protests in Moscow; the Soviets claimed the rearmament of West Germany violated the demilitarization clause of the Potsdam Agreement (Creswell 2002, 107).

Nevertheless, the Cold War provided the US with strong incentives to rearm West Germany. Although the US could have unilaterally done so despite French opposition, Washington valued a positive relationship with France. Between 1950 and 1952, the Truman Administration treaded lightly, trying not to anger French officials such that they might act counter to American interests (Creswell 2002, 105). The US was patient, but persistent. Finally, in May of 1952, the Truman Administration managed to secure the signature of the EDC Treaty. Yet, the two years that it took the US to win the signatures of the treaty paled in difficulty to achieving ratification. After the treaty was signed, it was another two years before the French government would even agree to submit the treaty to its National Assembly for consideration (Creswell 2002, 108).
While in the implementation of the Marshall Plan the United States emphasized respect but American superiority, American support of the EDC took a different route. Here, the indeterminacy of the European countries, and France in particular, in ratifying a treaty which they had already signed caused the United States to operate under the assumption that it needed to reinforce its position to its agents by offering encouragement (Marcum 2015, 90). Consequently, the United States sought to stress the importance it placed on the ratification of the EDC. These reinforcements took three different forms.

Firstly, the United States attempted a policy of intimidation. The US tried to make it clear that if the European agents did not act according to American preferences and ratify the treaty, there would be grave consequences. In a December 1953 speech to the North Atlantic Council, Secretary of State Dulles expressed the need for EDC ratification, and then proceeded to assert that; “if, however, the European Defence Community should not become effective [...] That would compel an agonising reappraisal of basic United States policy” (Dulles 1953, 238). In other words, failure to ratify would compel the United States to turn its back on its European allies. Congressional hearings concerning the passage of the 1954 appropriations bill for the Mutual Security Act echoed similar sentiments. Either the Europeans ratified the EDC, or the US would make alternate plans (Cong. Rec. 1954, 9181). Moreover, after it became clear that France was the holdout, the US concentrated its efforts on the other five members of the Community; the Benelux countries, Italy, and West Germany. If France refused to ratify, it would be disruptive to European politics and viewed as an embarrassing political blunder on the part of the French government (Van der Beugel 1966, 291). The US hoped that inspiring fear in its agents would catalyze favorable action.
Second, the US tried to make aid contingent upon ratification. The Richards Amendment to the Mutual Security Act stipulated that unless the EDC went into effect, 50 percent of aid would be cut off. The American desire to see the EDC come to fruition was so strong that the amendment even forbade supplying the full amount of aid to individual states that had ratified: it was all or nothing (Cong. Rec. 1954, 9193). Eventually, the US delivered aid to those states that had done their part in ratifying, seeking to incentivize the states straggling behind. Yet, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee still approved an amendment to the Mutual Security Act appropriations bill of 1954 denying US aid to those countries that failed to ratify the EDC, or an acceptable alternative, by December 31, 1954 (Van der Beugel 1966, 291).

While Congress looked more favorably upon making aid contingent in the case of EDC ratification than it had concerning the Marshall Plan, the strategy was still met with some resistance. Representative Fulton expressed this opposition as follows;

“We should say to these European countries, we want you to join in a collective defense security pact of some kind, and we will give you aid to help you, and ask that you adopt a feasible course which the President feels is satisfactory and will protect the aid the United States taxpayers give you. We should not insist rigidly on the EDC as the only course, or aid will be cut off. This is not fair nor is it realistic” (Cong. Rec. 1954, 9194).

Given this sentiment, the United States employed a final strategy to encourage the ratification of the treaty: offering important concessions to those nations who showed their support by ratifying. For example, passing the revision to the Richards Amendment, which allowed aid distribution to those countries who had ratified the treaty (Cong. Rec. 1954, 9193). Additionally, after the FRG approved the EDC on March 14, 1953, the United States showed its appreciation. Washington pledged substantial military aid to its German contingents as well as economic aid to Berlin. The US also offered its assistance to help resettle German refugees and even agreed to reconsider the status of German war criminals (Van der Beugel 1966, 290).
Eisenhower also tried concessions to appease French Prime Minister Laniel. Laniel told US officials that before he would submit the treaty to the legislature, Washington needed to make certain guarantees. He demanded a pledge of close ties between the EDC and the UK, an Anglo-American commitment to not withdraw their forces from NATO after its 20-year expiration date, a favorable settlement of the Saar dispute, and maintenance of French power in European affairs. Laniel intimated that without these assurances, the treaty would fail in the French National Assembly. Eisenhower dutifully provided the assurances that were within his control (Creswell 2002, 114).

Yet, the US had to draw the line somewhere. Mendès-France, the new French Prime Minister, arrived at the August 1954 Brussels Conference with a list of proposed changes to the EDC Treaty (Creswell 2002, 117). The US determined that in addition to the proposals themselves being unacceptable, these changes were so drastic that they would demand reconsideration of the treaty by national parliaments, causing an unacceptable delay in ratification. The US refused to support the French proposals (Dillon 1954, 562), and encouraged the other states to be uncompromising as well (Konde 2013, 28). The Conference denied Mendès-France’s proposals, but he submitted the treaty to the National Assembly without any amendments anyways, knowing well that the legislature was hostile to the treaty in its original form. The National Assembly struck down the treaty by 55 votes (Creswell 2002, 117). Despite its use of intimidation, applying contingency, and offering concessions, the United States tried without success to entice its agents in Europe to bring the EDC to fruition.

Objective #1: Closer Cooperation

After the French failed to ratify, US policy did not undergo an “agonizing reappraisal,” as Dulles had once suggested. The US and others in Europe still believed that West German
rearmament was absolutely essential. Eisenhower was ready to proceed without the French as early as September 3, just days after the EDC defeat. Rightfully worried that the rejection of the EDC would not stop the Americans and British from rearming the FRG, France proposed the Western European Union (WEU) (Creswell 2002, 119). In December of 1954, just months after rejecting the EDC, the French National Assembly ratified the Paris Accords, establishing the WEU and admitting the FRG into NATO.

In this sense, the failure of the EDC did not necessarily represent a defeat for the integration objective. The signing of the Paris Accords brought all allied forces in Europe under a central command, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR) (Van der Beugel 1966, 268). Yet, had the EDC been ratified, the supranational organization of the Community united by one European army would have marked a much greater step towards collaboration.

Objective #2: Transatlantic Orientation

Even initial discussions of a European defense system made clear that such a system would never be autonomous; all movement towards collective European defense was to occur within the institutional confines of NATO. The SACEUR, an American, would have all European military units at his disposal, and be in complete control of all European forces (Kunz 1953, 276). Furthermore, when the US proposed German inclusion into NATO in September of 1950, it also advocated increasing American assistance, thus cementing American military assistance in Europe (Fleischer 2015, 113).

The failure of the EDC did not lead to a weakening of transatlantic orientation in Europe. Instead, it reinforced the importance of NATO. Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty, which established the WEU, compels all signatories to the treaty and any institutional organs that they create to work in close cooperation with NATO. The provision goes on to underscore the
superiority of NATO, stating that the WEU “will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters” (Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration 1954, Art. IV). Only under NATO’s supervision were Germany and Italy able to rebuild their defense capabilities (Fleischer 2015, 2). Moreover, the reliance on NATO that prevailed after the EDC’s defeat demonstrates a pattern in the integration process that persists today: the EU institutions of today only deal with “low-level” issues, while transatlantic institutions, like NATO, attend to matters of “high-level” security (Fleischer 2015, 91). Thus, despite the failings of the EDC, transatlantic orientation prevailed.

**Objective #3: European Reconstruction**

Whereas the Marshall Plan facilitated economic reconstruction, support of the EDC was aimed at achieving security reconstruction. Put another way, the EDC was supposed to decrease Western Europe’s reliance on the United States for the maintenance of its physical security. To this effect, promotion of the EDC did not entirely fail. Despite the French refusal of the EDC, the subsequent signing of the Paris Accords rearmed West Germany and admitted it into NATO. The signatories of the WEU treaty agreed to mutual assistance in the event of an attack, thus strengthening the collective European defense system (Fleischer 2015, 134). While American officials always understood that the EDC would in effect be a part of NATO, the US hoped that in its realization, the European states would adopt a greater responsibility in their own military security. Particularly, the United States hoped to see a European defense system strong enough to deter Soviet aggression, such that the US could lessen its military commitment in Europe (Creswell 2002, 121). As the EDC was never realized and NATO, as well as the American military presence, took on increased importance, the US did not elicit success in its attempts to establish the restoration of self-maintained security in Europe.
Objective #4: American Preeminence

Throughout the ratification process, the US sought to use its political and economic power to elicit compliance. The US believed its relative dominance was so great that, when it came down to it, the European states would not dare oppose American policy. The US so vehemently supported the EDC because it believed the eventual realization would confer real benefits to the United States. Primarily, it would feature a supranational construction, an outspoken US policy goal, and lessen the American military burden in Europe by building up conventional European forces. For these reasons, the United States put the full force of its support behind the EDC, as opposed to behind the creation of a European defense force in general. The Eisenhower Administration relied on the perceived American prestige and refused to consider alternatives to the EDC (Creswell 2002, 115).

Some scholars have claimed that the overt American support for the Community partly perpetrated its detriment (Van der Beugel 1966, Klemm 2016). The rejection of the EDC represented a resurgence of French nationalism (Dillon 1954, 603), which can, at least in part, be attributed to France’s dislike for America’s interference in European affairs. France, and General de Gaulle in particular, favored a French-led, protectionist Europe. Greater certainty regarding the principal’s objectives increases the likelihood that agents will leverage this knowledge to secure more preferred outcomes: this was the downfall of the EDC. Those who resented American power had the opportunity to deny the principal its objective (Van der Beugel 1966, 300). The EDC failure substantially hurt American prestige. Although the US initially opposed the WEU for its lack supranationalism, the blow to American power and the lack of any other acceptable alternative offered the United States no choice but to go along with the French solution (Creswell 2002, 120).
Yet, while the US had certainly suffered a weakening of power, the collapse of the EDC did not entirely diminish American dominance. The strength of American pressure for a German solution provoked the reversal of French policy; from ardently opposing German rearmament and a European defense system, to proposing and ratifying the WEU (Creswell 2002, 91). Furthermore, the failure of the EDC demonstrates European dependence on the US. The Europeans desperately wanted to retain a strong American military presence in Europe. In failing to ratify the EDC Treaty, increase European conventional forces, or demonstrate military stability, Europe effectively proved that it needed the US to continue security assistance and sustain a military presence in Western Europe (Creswell 2002, 122).

**Changing times, strategies, and outcomes**

The reasons that the US was able to elicit compliance in the implementation of the Marshall Plan but failed so damagingly in the case of the EDC are complex. Three fundamental differences between these two policy programs led to America’s implementation of different strategies and primarily work to explain the drastic difference in results.

The first factor is the relative balance of power on the two sides of the Atlantic. In 1947, the US was the only reliable creditor available and the European economies desperately needed funds (Lundestad 2003, 46). As such, the Europeans relied heavily on the United States and therefore bent to American demands to gain access to US aid. In 1952, however, the financial situation had changed. The European economies were no longer on the brink of collapse (Bossuat 2008, 13), and thus no longer so dependent on the US. This change made compliance with American preferences less important and consequently less likely.

Secondly, the locus of control for the Marshall Plan was in the United States, while that of the European Defense Community was in Europe. The US Congress determined whether and
how much Marshall aid to extend, putting the European agents at the mercy of American policymakers. This setup put the command center in Washington and enabled the US to leverage its dominance to encourage Europe to act according to American policy preferences. Conversely, in the case of the EDC, the European agents held the center of control. Although the US made its preference for a supranational European defense force clear, the United States could not directly affect the realization of this objective. Instead, it had to motivate its agents to act accordingly.

Finally, the two programs advocated integration differently. On the one hand, the Marshall Plan encouraged integration more generally, using American aid as an incentive to achieve it. On the other hand, in their support of the EDC, the US supported a specific policy, offering no alternatives. With the Marshall Plan, the US was much more willing to let impetus arise within Europe and was more likely to concede specific provisions to further the integration goal in general. These drastically different strategies led to radically different outcomes.

The combination of changing power dynamics, different centers of command, and fundamentally different objectives led the United States to employ different strategies and different mechanisms of control in the two programs. In implementing the Marshall Plan, American policymakers were sensitive to the fragility of European sovereignty. They chose to offer friendly advice rather than make specific demands and stayed away from making aid explicitly contingent on integration progress. Yet, the US was still able to elicit progress towards integration by only authorizing aid distribution through collaborative organizations and generally leveraging America’s economic dominance. The United States used the promise of financial aid and its hegemonic position to elicit compliance. Conversely, in supporting the EDC, the United States opted for a more hostile strategy. The US tried to reinforce its agents towards compliance through making aid contingent on ratification, offering concessions, and using intimidation
tactics. In this scenario, the US used all three of the mechanisms of control at its disposal: financial aid, military security, and its hegemonic position, to encourage compliance.

Legacies

Ultimately, the Marshall Plan strategy won out while the aggressive efforts to promote the EDC fell short. In June of 1987, President Reagan made an address in which he discussed the impressive legacy of the Marshall Plan. He discussed how, through the Plan and under American direction, Europeans found common ground with one another, defeated protectionist and isolationist tendencies, and developed economic and political relationships that catalyzed future progress (Reagan 1987). The Marshall Plan was a cooperative and collaborative venture, fusing the two sides of the Atlantic in a partnership that still exists today. The ERP demanded that the European states cooperate with American interests and simultaneously ensured that US policymakers were in tune with local conditions in Europe. For example, ERP administrators were sensitive to European preferences to avoid creating an opening for communist support (Hunt 2007, 168).

Moreover, the Marshall Plan facilitated and demanded the creation of collaborative regional organizations like the OEEC, which established the foundation for what is today the OECD. Through the Marshall Plan, the Europeans were able to combat the problems of nationalism and work towards greater unity (Bossaut 2008, 23). The emphasis that the Marshall Plan put on harmonizing Western Europe as one, cohesive region, “…helped in turn lay the foundation for the integration of Western European economies and the creation of the institutions that would eventually become part of today’s European Union” (Morella 2008, 6).

While both sides of the Atlantic generally remember the Marshall Plan as a success, the European Defense Community does not hold such a positive legacy. The EDC’s failure marked a
defeat to the progress of integration and to the American prestige. When the US did not follow through with its threats to reevaluate policy after the EDC failed, America’s word lost some of its credibility. After the embarrassment of being unable to secure ratification through overt pressure, the US opted to try and influence European policymakers from the background. The United States henceforth transitioned from promoting American initiatives to simply supporting European efforts towards integration (Van der Beugel 1966, 301).

In part, external circumstances, such as the US’ deteriorating balance of payments, caused this changing nature of the American role in the integration process. While the American strategy evolution was not entirely a result of its failure to elicit the desired action from its European agents, the blow to American prestige was strong. In the case of the EDC, the French were able to actually dictate policy to the United States (Creswell 2002, 123). Displaying such strong support for the EDC revealed American vulnerabilities on which the French capitalized. This forever changed the balance of power relationship between the US and its agents, as the relationship transitioned from being characterized by American leadership to a rhetoric advocating interdependence and equality (Van der Beugel 1966, 384).
Chapter 5: Legacies of American Involvement in European Integration

Throughout the course of this thesis, I have established the profound impact that America’s pro-integration policy had on the European integration scheme between 1945 and 1968. During this time period, the five successive presidential administrations advocated a policy of leveraging the United States’ dominant position in the world power structure to promote a European integration that would be beneficial to American objectives. This policy had four underlying sub-motives: economic reconstruction, military security, supranational design, and an Atlantic partnership. Through policies aimed at achieving these motivations, the US sought to encourage its overarching aspiration of integration. In examining US policy and its effects on the integration progress, it is important to understand the contemporary Western European-US relationship. The Principal-Agent Model offers a nuanced view of this relationship, allowing us to consider how the United States attempted to achieve policy objectives over which it had no direct control. The actual mechanisms on which American policy relied can be easily analyzed through the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the strong American support of the European Defense Community. These two case studies enable me to contemplate how the United States pursued its preferences while at the whim of its European allies, and then consider which strategies yielded success. While it is useful to consider the achievement of American objectives in individual circumstances, it is also important to look at the success of American policy overall.

Consequently, this final chapter considers the lasting impact of America’s 1945-1968 European policy. This chapter presents an analysis of the success of this policy, by considering the extent to which the United States was able to elicit the achievement of its objectives. In other
words, how successful was the United States in encouraging the European states to implement an integration scheme that was domestically advantageous? Next, this chapter examines how the legacy of American involvement in the early stages of integration manifests itself in the present construction of Europe. Finally, I assess the transatlantic relationship of the twenty-first century, as it relates to America’s initial involvement in European integration.

The United States of Europe: by America, for America?

Between 1945 and 1968, officials in Washington supported a variety of different policies to encourage their allies in Europe to act according to American preferences. To make overarching and long-run judgements about American success, this section considers the integration process as a whole, rather than individual policies or programs, as prior chapters have done. The methodology, however, remains constant. I will break the US integration objective down into its four discernable components and compare the stated objective to the results. Through this type of analysis, I conclude that the United States elicited substantial success in its pursuit of a reconstructed, integrated, and Atlantic-oriented Europe. From a broad historical view, the Europe that emerged generally, if only weakly, meets all of the United States’ stated goals.

Objective #1: Closer Cooperation

In terms of cooperation, the United States had high hopes. It sought a political union and a common market. Essentially, the US wanted to see a federalist Europe, modeled off of the United States. The Europe that emerged fell short of this hope (Lundestad 1989, 130). In general, the European states were disinclined to give up any sovereignty. In the European Union (EU) of today, this reluctance has meant sustained fragmentation of European policies: twenty-eight autonomous national governments need to coordinate to establish effective European policy.
Among other things, the EU lacks a harmonized fiscal policy or legal system (Berend 2016, 106). The absence of such coordination substantially hinders Europe’s ability to cooperate as an effective and cohesive unit. Nevertheless, the American push for integration led to the immense progress in cooperation that characterized the 1950s and 1960s (Berend 2016, 231). For example, American policy regarding Germany, based on the understanding that integration could limit future German aggression, was wholly important to the integration process. Thanks to this policy, West Germany was rearmed, the ECSC was established, and France and Germany reached reconciliatory status, allowing fear of resurgent violence to subside. Without these developments, Europe could not have achieved the degree of cooperation it possesses today.

In 1985, the Schengen Agreement was signed, eventually eliminating border controls among signatories. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty led to the establishment of the Eurozone: a common currency zone governed by a common central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), and a common monetary policy. Today, the EU has twenty-eight member countries, although in March 2017 the UK provided formal notification of its intended departure. The Member States collaborate on a variety of different policy issues, including a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The governing structure of the EU, while weakened by uncoordinated national policies, still represents a degree of cooperation that was unthinkable in 1945. The four European decision-making bodies; the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union, are highly collaborative and somewhat supranational. Furthermore, these institutions are representative governmental bodies. The European Council, Commission, and the Council of the European Union are all comprised of one representative from each Member State. The European Parliament is proportionally
representative, consisting of Member State representatives allocated by population (European Commission 2018).

Total political nor economic unity exists today. Yet despite the weaknesses of the European integration progress, the scheme has greatly advanced since the idea was initially proposed. Europeans engage in a substantially greater degree of regional consideration in the formulation of national policies today than in 1945. Moreover, the European institutions themselves, as well as the cooperation that they foster, are certainly indicative of positive steps towards the achievement of the US objective to elicit heightened European cooperation.

**Objective #2: Transatlantic Orientation**

As internal integration in Europe is far from perfect, so too is transatlantic integration. US pro-integration policy sought the birth of an advantageous trading partner. Despite this goal, American and Western European economic interests have often been at odds. The establishment of the EEC in 1957 unleashed long-suppressed American fears that the region’s harsh external trade barriers and preferential trade agreements would detrimentally exclude American goods from the European market (Alcaro et. al. 2016, 170). With mixed results, the US has repeatedly had to fight for increased access to the European market (Lundestad 1989, 114). Yet, today, the US and the EU have the world’s most integrated economic relationship, and US-EU trade is the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world (European Commission 2017). The great degree of interdependence of economies has also empowered the other side’s interests in becoming important players in domestic politics (Peterson & Steffenson 2009, 32).

For decades, administrations in the US and Europe have worked to institutionalize this partnership, but the system of international anarchy obstructs success on this front. Much like its European allies, the United States has been reluctant to give up sovereignty to supranational
institutions (Lundestad 1989, 150). Washington opposed any credible commitments that linked the two sides of the Atlantic if they diminished America’s sovereignty. The United States has tried repeatedly to augment formal links between the two sides of the Atlantic, but most attempts have been merely symbolic. Multiple proposals for an Atlantic Union were submitted to Congress in the 1950s (Lundestad 1989, 147), Kennedy urged an Atlantic Partnership (Van der Beugel 1966, 371), and the HW Bush administration proposed the Transatlantic Declaration (Lundestad 1989, 114), which was then rebranded as the New Transatlantic Agenda by the Clinton administration (Lundestad 1989, 124). Although all of these programs have been effectively weakened by nationalistic tendencies, neither side is willing to give up on the prospect for eventual institutionalization (Peterson & Steffenson 2009, 30). The US and the EU hold joint summits roughly annually, and meetings between officials from EU Member States and the US are held even more frequently. The two bodies are committed to common goals on a variety of issues, such as security (Peterson & Steffenson 2009, 33).

**Objective #3: European Reconstruction**

Arguably, the United States achieved the greatest success in its efforts to rebuild Western Europe to a state of prosperity. The Marshall Plan facilitated the reconstruction of the Western European economies and set them on track for sustained growth (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 4). By the program’s effective end in October of 1951, the national income per capita in Western Europe surpassed pre-war levels by more than ten percent (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 23). Post-World War II economic growth in Western Europe was far more than simply reconstruction; the region underwent a period of “supergrowth”, thanks in part to Marshall aid. Through restoring financial stability and free market forces, as well as through initiating a
sociocultural foundation upon which future growth was based, American policy played a crucial role in European economic recovery (DeLong & Eichengreen 1991, 43).

In addition to facilitating the economic reconstruction of Western Europe, the United States enabled Europe to prosper militarily, socially, and politically as well. Through preserving the European economies, the Marshall Plan enabled the restoration of political stability in Western Europe. Western Germany was rearmed through NATO supervision and with funds provided by the US, enabling Western Europe to regain a semblance of independent security. Moreover, by alleviating the sense of total destruction, the US enabled Europe’s cultural and social life to flourish once again.

Objective #4: Facilitating American Preeminence

The final dimension of US pro-integration policy was the desire to support a united Europe that would ultimately benefit American interests and respect American superiority. Despite the shortcomings in the other objective areas, it is in this final realm that the outcome diverged most significantly from US intentions. Largely beginning in the 1970s, the United States started to understand that Western Europe was not simply an ally, but also an increasingly menacing competitor: Europe’s economy really began to gain strength relative to the United States’ (Berend 2016, 123). Europe also posed a challenge to US interests outside of the economic sphere. For example, when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, Western Europe and the United States had opposing views concerning how to address the new German problem (Alcaro et. al. 2016, 177). More recently, Europe strongly opposed the US invasion of Iraq and frustrated the Obama Administration with its lackluster contributions to NATO (Alcaro 2016, 184-6). As such, the new construction of Europe is neither entirely complementary to American objectives,
nor wholly subordinate to American preeminence. Evidently, the US was unable to secure an incontrovertibly beneficial partner across the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, the EU and the US are each other’s most valuable allies (Peterson & Steffenson 2009). Historically, the two have backed each other up on economic, security, political, and social issues alike. Further, many scholars have claimed that the legacies of European dependence are still very much alive today; that there is no such thing as a Europe without America (Dumbrell 2002, Shapiro & Paradijs 2017). Even in the age of President Trump, when American involvement in Europe is rife with uncertainty, Europeans still look to the US for cues and support. Creating a partner who would unequivocally support American interests was unrealistic. Necessarily, Europe and the US are going to diverge on some issues. Yet, the US came remarkably close to its seemingly impossible goal. In fostering the new Europe, the US created a partner who is uncommonly supportive and often facilitates and supports the advancement of domestic gains.

Thus, a broad overview of the integration progress in Europe reveals that the United States achieved its objectives. The European Union enjoys a great degree of prosperity and is more internally collaborative today than was thought possible in 1945. Moreover, Western Europe is constantly and intensely engaged with the US on a multitude of issues, on which it generally supports domestic gains for the US.

America’s Role in Shaping the Europe of Today

It would be pure speculation to make claims about what Europe would look like today in the absence of US involvement in the immediate post-War decades, or to try and quantify the degree that this involvement has influenced the present-day construction of Europe. Nevertheless, the US was significantly and undeniably influential in the integration process.
Indeed, American proposals initiated the first pertinent step towards a new, integrated Europe (Schmitt 1962, 30). Although Europeans generally supported the integration objective early on, they faced too much devastation at the end of the War to take any actionable steps towards reconstruction or integration on their own; they needed the push as well as the aid from the US. Europe responded to US calls for integration and pursued policies that would satisfy American policymakers, so as to ensure continued flow of aid (Schmitt 1962, 30). The development of NATO further proves the reliance on US assistance for European survival (Schmitt 1962, 37). It would be easy to play this game all day: listing all the instances of US involvement without which, present-day Europe would be different. Instead, it is useful to consider how the history of the American leadership role in integration manifests itself today.

Today, the United States is still an important actor in furthering the integration scheme. The promotion of American thought patterns has forged greater cooperation across the Atlantic. For example, the US became intensely occupied with homeland security after 9/11. In the United States’ attempts to push Europe to achieve similar security standards, the US has actually fostered greater security policy coordination among EU Member-States (Peterson & Steffenson 2009, 33). Additionally, the US has encouraged the EU to think of itself as a cohesive political unit. Largely beginning during the Clinton Administration, US policy often treats the European Union as a single actor, rather than individual, sovereign countries. This treatment furthers the conception of the EU as a single identity in the minds of Europeans (Peterson & Pollack 2003, 5).

The current construction of Europe is largely a product of European efforts. For example, the Maastricht Treaty, which formally founded the EU, was a European program (Alcaro et. al. 2016, 176). Yet, the US pledged strong support for the further integration (Lundestad 1989,
After the treaty was signed, President HW Bush expressed America’s joy for the “historic steps toward economic and political union,” explaining that European unity is beneficial to Europe, the Atlantic partnership, and the entire world order (Bush 1991). He went on to take some of the credit in this milestone, stating;

America can take pride in its contributions to Europe’s success. The U.S. engagement on that continent has yielded many benefits for the Europeans and for us. […] We are intimately connected to what happens in Europe and beyond. Now, we are getting an even stronger European partner (Bush 1991).

While Bush’s comments may seem somewhat egotistical, he is not wrong. The US played an important role in the integration process, one that should not be carelessly overlooked in celebrating its successes. In 2000, Bill Clinton was awarded the Charlemagne Prize, an award for progressive work done in pursuit of European integration and unification (Peterson & Pollack 2003, 5). Although Clinton was the first American president to receive the honor, he was certainly not the first American president to be instrumental in the integration process.

**Twenty-First Century Transatlantic Relations**

Examining the modern conception of the transatlantic relationship reveals the lasting importance of America’s initial influence and objectives. The US continues to view European unity and further integration as something desirable, insofar as it would bring domestic advantages. A more united Europe, not bogged down by the coordination of twenty-eight different national governments, would be able to act more decisively and therefore be a more effective partner to the US in global affairs. Yet, unlike the nearly impenetrable support of the Truman through the Johnson Administrations, support is now tempered by concerns about the domestic downsides of European integration: what happens when Europe opposes American interests (Mix 2013, 23)?
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the European public feared that the American role in Europe would fall with it. Contrary to this prediction, the US has remained intimately involved in European affairs and essential to European security and prosperity (Lagadec 2012, 18). Given this lasting American impact, Europe was generally displeased with the election of George W. Bush, a president regarded as touting an “America First”, unilateralist approach to foreign policy (Dumbrell 2002, 279). Bush’s tendency towards unilateralism to solve international issues angered his European allies. In particular, his disregard for international protocols in his pursuit of Operation Iraqi Freedom caused a great rift across the Atlantic. Yet, supporters of the Bush Administration have argued that, while the Europeans are quick to condemn Bush as isolationist, Europe is overwhelmingly internally-oriented as well (Zakaria 2001). In this sense, legacies are left over from the immediate post-war period: “free-riding Europeans still look to the US for leadership and ultimate security, despite efforts at integrating their own defences” (Dumbrell 2002, 283).

Allies across the ocean welcomed President Obama’s investiture in 2009. Obama operated under the belief that Europe needed to be treated “not as a problem but as a partner” (Grevi 2016, 10). In other words, the Obama Administration felt that Europe had progressed to a point where it no longer required the US to facilitate its growth. Instead, the Administration hoped to rely on its long-time ally as a partner in shaping the new world order. While this policy could be seen as an empowering message for Europeans, Obama’s European policy was met with disappointment. It soon became clear that Obama was interested in diminishing US involvement in Europe because he wanted to pivot towards Asia instead (Grevi 2016, 2). Nevertheless, the US returned to Europe to protect its old friend, as successive crises threatened
to topple the continent. This refocusing confirmed a worry that many Americans have held for decades: Europe is unable to manage its own affairs without US support (Grevi 2016, 10).

Transatlantic relations did, however, see some positive progress during the Obama Administration. In 2013, the US and EU began negotiations on a bilateral free trade and investment agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TTIP sought to further liberalize both commercial and financial Atlantic trade, as well harmonize judicial and security policies. The goal was to eventually develop complete mobility of goods and capital across the two continents (Mot 2014, 127). The pursuit of this policy has an interesting familiarity. Today, the US no longer holds hegemonic status: other players on the world stage threaten its economic superiority. In the TTIP’s aspirations to combine the US and EU markets, the US would cement its dominant position in the world market: the agreement would completely reconfigure the world economic order, empowering the US to protect its geo-strategic position as a superpower (Mot 2014, 139). The TTIP negotiations were put on hold after President Trump was elected, but some US officials have indicated they are still interested in discussing the trade agreement (LaRocco 2017).

President Trump’s election in 2016 changed the foreign policy field. Europe was concerned with Trump’s unexpected win, based on his “Make America Great Again” platform, (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 2). In a December 2017 National Security Address, Trump took credit for the increase in European spending on NATO, stating it was “because [he] would not allow member states to be delinquent in the payment while we guarantee their safety and are willing to fight wars for them” (Trump, 2017). Indeed, throughout the first year of his presidency, Trump’s rhetoric has repeatedly suggested that he is not interested in maintaining the benevolent transatlantic relationship, nor continuing to defend our European allies. In his first NATO
meeting in Brussels in May 2017, Trump refused to reaffirm the mutual security pledge enshrined in Article 5 of the 1949 Treaty. In effect, this refusal signaled to European allies that the US would not assuredly provide its military forces in case of an attack on another NATO member (Pifer 2017). This fear is particularly potent because Trump’s campaign often insisted that the US would back out of Europe if the continent did not solve its many crises (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 10).

Just days after the NATO meeting, German Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed that it was time that “we Europeans must really take fate into our own hands” (Smale & Erlanger 2017). Trump’s first year in office has pivoted America’s transatlantic policy, rejecting the longstanding notion that American leadership is necessary for the maintenance of global stability (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 11). Trump’s focus on domestic concerns have proven American support in Europe unreliable and consequently, his presidency has fostered discussion of a “post-American Europe”. This debate hints that any such construction would rely on greater integration of and consensus among the European states (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 13). Interestingly enough, it seems that Trump’s attempts to secure American dominance by turning away from its European allies may actually have the effect of strengthening the EU, by forcing the Member States to engage in closer cooperation.

The European Foreign Relations Council notes that perhaps Trump’s “America First” rhetoric was so troubling to the Europeans because “the nations of Europe rely on America for its security and America does not rely on Europe” (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 2). This asymmetry in dependence has characterized transatlantic relations since the end of World War II. American influence is embedded in the fabric of European society. This importance is evidenced by the popularity of American television, the broad reach of American companies, the pervasive nature
of the English language, and the overwhelming knowledge of and attention to American politics and economics in Europe (Shapiro & Paradijs 2017, 9). No administration nor policy blunders can erase the history of dependence, friendship, and connectivity between the two continents.

Despite how the Europeans feel about current and future American policy or American presidents, they remain in a position of reliance: European dependence on the US renders the continent in a permanent relationship of dependency with the United States. Although the US ultimately failed in its objective to forge a united Europe who is incontrovertibly complementary to American interests and wholly supportive of US preeminence, Washington came close. For the past seventy years, since the end of World War II, the Europeans have relied on the US for their physical, economic, and psychological security. While this dependence does not always translate to complacency nor compliance, it is symbolic of the lasting impact of American involvement in Europe in the decades immediately following World War II.
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